Tamazgha in France

Indigeneity and Citizenship in the diasporic Amazigh movement

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Thesis Summary

This thesis examines how the Amazigh diaspora, networked in France’s Amazigh cultural associations, village committees and political movements, constructs an imaginative geography of North Africa, which they call Tamazgha, and the implications this has for this emergent and diverse group. It sets out to theorise and understand the political geographies of this diasporic social movement in the contemporary moment. It does so by approaching the Amazigh diaspora as its primary object of research within a relational, multiscalar analysis of its geopolitics.

This thesis contributes to the subdiscipline of political geography as well as Amazigh studies. Drawing on ethnographic and documentary methods, including an experimental methodology for the digital sphere, it outlines the major themes of the diasporic Amazigh movement’s relationship to space and place; making the diaspora, articulating indigeneity, negotiating citizenship and accommodating nativism. It analyses facets of Amazigh diaspora politics at times as a nation, at others as a social movement, finding a productive interaction between these two concepts. It is both an imagined community of people who claim to share a common language and culture and a political movement entraining activists, members and political parties in the pursuit of political change. As an Indigenous people, it is both a transnational social movement calling on the states where they live to uphold the rights of their Amazigh populations, and also a nation with a flag, asserting its claim to sovereignty, however limited. The diaspora associations frame themselves as a social movement championing diverse citizenship and integration in French society, whilst homeland-oriented citizenship is mostly expressed in nationalistic terms. This thesis charts how the politics of this diasporic Amazigh movement contest and produce spatial imaginations in the contemporary context of Mediterranean integration, new nationalisms and populisms, and the fear of Islamist terrorism in French society.

With its focus on the political and imaginative geographies of the diasporic Amazigh movement, the thesis is organised topically, elaborating on different facets of political subjectivities in four substantive chapters that focus on the core themes of diaspora, indigeneity, citizenship and nativism. Chapter 2 provides an historical and sociological context for the study, and Chapter 3 details its methodology. Chapter 4 examines diaspora as a geopolitical concept, understood on the one hand as like a social movement and on the other as like a nation. It presents an understanding of diaspora ‘as process’ or ‘assemblage’
that constantly reworks the boundaries of nation, state, community and identity, within an imaginative geography of ‘home’. Chapter 5 picks up from here to focus on how indigeneity is articulated as a political positioning in the diasporic Amazigh movement. Drawing on Stuart Hall’s terminology to theorise the politics of indigeneity in relation to place, it outlines several Indigenous articulations made in the discourse and practices of the leaders and members of diasporic Amazigh associations. Chapter 6 focuses on the discourses and practices of citizenship, which in the diaspora intersect, overlap and produce transnational spaces. Drawing out an empirical distinction between ‘diaspora-oriented’ and ‘homeland-oriented’ citizenships, the chapter details how citizenship practices in relation to French state and society can be understood as ‘ordinary’ whilst those in relation to North African state(s) and society are characterised more as performative ‘Acts’. Finally, chapter 7 homes in on Amazigh politics in the current context of increasingly influential nativist-populism in France and across Europe.
Declaration

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration.

It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution.

It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the Faculty of Earth Sciences & Geography Degree Committee.
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Notes on the Text

Transcription and Terminology

Achieving clarity and simplicity in the transcription of Tamazight, Arabic and French names and places is a constant battle for scholars working in the region of North Africa and its diaspora. Here I have sought as much as possible to use spellings more easily comprehensible to an anglophone audience (e.g. Kabylia, not Kabylie; Amazigh (pl.) rather than Imazighen), whilst recognising that for many words the dominant francophone spelling is better for cross-referencing with other scholarly and popular literature (e.g. Chawi, not Shawi; Maghreb, not Maghrib). I have privileged the use of the ethnonym “Amazigh” over “Berber”, but the reader will see that there are times when it was appropriate to use one as opposed to the other. Where non-English words, association names and place-names are used they are in italics. When italicised, ‘Tamazgha’ refers to the eponymous Parisian association, and I hope that the English language accepts the addition of this Indigenous name for North Africa to its lexicon.

Interview Referencing

Throughout the thesis, interviews are referenced with a number which corresponds to the table given in Appendix 1. For example, (1) refers to Hakim Touati’s interview from the 15th of October 2015. Named interviewees gave permission for their names to be used. Where they wished to remain anonymous, pseudonyms have been used, indicated with single quotation marks.
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<th>Full Title</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACB</td>
<td>Association de Culture Berbère</td>
<td>Berber Culture Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFKIF</td>
<td>Association Franco-Kabyle d’Île-de-France</td>
<td>Franco-Kabyle Association of Île-de-France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJKF</td>
<td>Association des Jeunes Kabyles de France</td>
<td>Young Kabyles of France Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKRED</td>
<td>Association des Kabyles des deux Rives pour l’Entraide et le Développement</td>
<td>Association of Kabyles of on both sides [of the Mediterranean] for Aid and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANOM</td>
<td>Archive National d’Outre-Mer</td>
<td>(French) National Overseas Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRTV</td>
<td>Berbère Radio Télévision</td>
<td>Berber Radio Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CABIL</td>
<td>Coordination des Associations Berbères Laïques</td>
<td>Coordination of Secular Berber Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Caisse d’Allocations Familiales</td>
<td>Family Benefits Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBF</td>
<td>Coordination des Berbères de France</td>
<td>Coordination of the Berbers of France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERAK</td>
<td>Cercle d’étude et de réflexion sur l’autonomie de la Kabylie</td>
<td>Study and Reflection Circle on the Autonomy of Kabylia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFCM</td>
<td>Conseil français du culte musulman</td>
<td>French Council of the Muslim Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Congrès Mondial Amazigh</td>
<td>World Amazigh Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CME</td>
<td>Collectif Mozabite en Europe</td>
<td>Mozabite Collective in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNAF</td>
<td>Collectif Nationale des Amazighs de France</td>
<td>National Collective of the Amazigh of France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIF</td>
<td>Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France</td>
<td>Representative Council of Jewish Institutions of France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELCO</td>
<td>Enseignement des langues et cultures d’origine</td>
<td>Teaching of Languages and Cultures of Origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFS</td>
<td>Front des Forces Socialistes</td>
<td>(Algerian) Socialist Forces Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
<td>Translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIDEK</td>
<td>Fondation pour l’Investissement et le Développement de la Kabylie</td>
<td>Foundation for Investment and Development in Kabylia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLN</td>
<td>Front de Libération National</td>
<td>(Algerian) National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Front National</td>
<td>(French) National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPRA</td>
<td>Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne</td>
<td>Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPK</td>
<td>Gouvernement Provisoire Kabyle</td>
<td>Provisional Government of Kabylia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCA</td>
<td>Haut Conseil à l’Amazighité</td>
<td>(Algerian) High Council for Amazigh [Culture]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INALCO</td>
<td>Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales</td>
<td>(French) National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRCAM</td>
<td>Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe</td>
<td>(Moroccan) Royal Amazigh Culture Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWGIA</td>
<td>International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mouvement pour l’Autonomie Chawi</td>
<td>Movement for Chawi Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAK</td>
<td>Mouvement pour l’Autodétermination de la Kabylie</td>
<td>Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCB</td>
<td>Mouvement Culturel Berbère</td>
<td>(Algerian) Berber Cultural Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Mouvement Culturel Amazigh</td>
<td>(Moroccan) Amazigh Cultural Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLA</td>
<td>Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad</td>
<td>Azawad National Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Parti Socialiste</td>
<td>(French) Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie</td>
<td>(Algerian) Rally for Culture and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDRIP</td>
<td>United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary

Académie Berbère - An association of Amazigh intellectuals and activists based in Paris in the 1960s and 70s.

Autochtone - ‘Indigenous’ in French (see chapters 2 & 5)


Banlieue - French term referring to the near suburbs of large cities, often the sites of large social housing projects.

Groupe de Paris - A group of Amazigh intellectuals and activists who held a series of meetings focused on Kabyle autonomy around the turn of the millennium.

Hôtel de ville - ‘City Hall’ in French (see mairie below)

Loi du 1er Juillet 1901 relative au contrat d’association (Loi 1901) - The French law governing the creation and administration of civil society associations.

Indigène - a pejorative term used during France’s colonisation of North Africa and elsewhere, meaning ‘native’. Indigènes did not have equal legal status with French citizens.

Journal Officiel (des Associations) - The legal record of registered associations under the Loi du 1er Juillet 1901 relative au contrat d’association (see above) in France.

Laïcité - Roughly translates as ‘secularism’ in English but has a distinct legal and cultural meaning in the French context.


Mairie - The ‘town hall’ in French. Local politics in France is organised around the mairie. Paris and other cities’ primary mairie is housed in an ‘hôtel de ville’. In urban areas the municipal government is often referred to as the mairie or ville (see below).

Maison(s) des associations - A municipal building operated by the mairie which provides meeting spaces for civil society organisations.

MAK-Anavad - refers in this thesis to the Kabyle independence movement headed by Ferhat Mehenni.
Pied-Noir - ‘Black-foot’ in French, refers to the settler population of North Africa during the French colonial period.

Préfecture - Represents the national government at the local level in France, and administers the registration of associations, as well as work permits, identity cards, driving licenses etc.

Taddart - ‘Village’ in Kabyle.

Tafsut (Imaziɣen) // Berber Spring - the period of popular mobilisation in 1980 in Algeria which is commemorated annually in the Amazigh movement on the 20th of April.

Tafsut (Taberkant) // Black Spring - the period of violent unrest in Kabylia in 2001 where over one hundred young people were killed, which is commemorated in conjunction with the Berber Spring (see above).

Tajmaât - Kabyle name for the ‘village council’ and its ‘meeting place’.

Tamazight - The Amazigh language, or family of languages.

Tamurt - ‘Land’ or ‘Homeland’ in Kabyle.

Ville - ‘City’ or ‘Town’ in French. Used in urban areas to describe the municipality, synonymously with ‘mairie’ (see above).

Yennayer - Amazigh New Year, celebrated on the 12th of January according to the Gregorian calendar.
Introduction: Tamazgha in France

One quiet Saturday afternoon in July 2016, on the premises of Azul Espace Franco-Berbère Créteil, a long-standing cultural association in a concrete cité of the Parisian banlieue, a group of around fifty Amazigh (Berber) activists and association leaders came together to discuss federating their respective groups to create a new platform to challenge the French government to do more for the Amazigh of France. The resulting Collectif National des Amazighs de France (CNAF), at the time of writing, is yet to have successfully lobbied the French government, but organised a second meeting in Paris in 2017 aimed at highlighting the benefits Amazigh citizens bring to the Republic. The meeting had been called by activists from the Congrès Mondial Amazigh (CMA) around a month previously, in reaction to changes in language education policy affecting those of North African origin in France announced by French Education Minister Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, herself of Amazigh parentage. Arabic (along with other ‘languages of origin’) was no longer to be taught by foreign teachers employed by origin-states but by teachers employed by the French state, like any other foreign language. Seeing their chance to advance Amazigh interests in France, this diverse group of Amazigh activists and association leaders were calling for the incorporation of Amazigh languages into the portfolio of languages taught in French schools, as this, they argued, was their real ‘language of origin’.

The CMA’s Secretary General, Belkacem Lounes, opened the meeting by saying that those in attendance were ‘united by Tamazgha’. Tamazgha is at once a territorial referent used by Amazigh activists to describe North Africa, their homeland, and a symbol of Amazigh unity. It is an imaginative geography, whose geopolitics amongst the Amazigh in France are the subject of this thesis.

Representatives of some forty associations were in the room; some were women, but around four times as many were men. There were regionalists - those that would prioritise their Kabyle, Chawi, Mozabite, Riffian and Chleuh identities - and pan-Berberists - those that see themselves as being part of a single Amazigh nation. There were older and there were younger activists. There were representatives of associations from across Île-de-France but also from Marseille, Lyon, and Nantes. There were those with French citizenship and those without. There were those born in France and those born in North Africa. There were representatives of political groups, of cultural associations, and of
homeland village committees. In one corner of the room Mohand Kacioui, a journalist from the Berber TV group BRTV, was filming, presumably for a section of his current affairs show that would later be broadcast across the Amazigh world. There were some notable absences, however - nobody from the Kabyle/Algerian political parties often present in the Parisian Amazigh associations, and nobody from the CBF (*Coordination des Berbères de France*).

The crowded meeting took place in the association’s main meeting room. The walls were a colourful mural representing Amazigh scenes from across North Africa - a Tuareg tent pitched in the desert, distinctive *ghorfa*, *igherman* and *agadir* (fortified granaries of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco respectively), *axxam* (the Kabyle house) and prehistoric wall painting in the style of the *Tassili N’Aïjer*. Words in *Tifinagh*, the Amazigh script, named Berber heroes - ancient king Micipsa (ʼⵎⵉⵙⵉⵒⵙⴰ) and female colonial resistance leader Lalla Fadhma N’Soumer (ʼⵍⴰⵍⵍⴰⴼⴰⴹⵎⴰⵏʼⵙⵓⵎⵎⵔ). In the centre of the room, a u-shape of tables was set up, with the leaders that had called the meeting at its head. I found a space in the back corner of the room, amongst a stack of children’s toys, on the periphery looking in.

1.1 Tamazgha in France?

Who are the Amazigh, what are they doing in France, and what is their relationship with their homelands and with each other? How is it that this heterogenous group of individuals, living far from ‘home’ in the diaspora, can be ‘united by Tamazgha’? This thesis examines how the Amazigh diaspora, networked in France’s Amazigh cultural associations, village committees and political movements, constructs an imaginative geography of North Africa, which they call Tamazgha, and considers its implications for this emergent and diverse group. France is home to a large Amazigh diaspora; hundreds of associations and other organisations group together thousands of individuals who are united by a common interest in the preservation and promotion of *Amazighité*, that is, the quality of being Amazigh. Indigenous to North Africa and distinct from Arabic, Amazigh language (Tamazight) and culture are under threat in the eyes of the diaspora’s leaders, not only as the children of Amazigh migrants grow up as ‘French’, but as Amazigh across North Africa and the diaspora are being ‘arabised’. Arabisation, they argue, is the result of state policies
dating from the colonial period and accelerated in the post-colonial era\(^1\), which privilege(d) Arabic as the language of administration, education, literature and media as well as religion, and coded Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian and Libyan national identities as exclusively ‘Arabic’. As a result, the activities of the Amazigh diaspora associations are political in their motivation and content. Creating and maintaining transnational diasporic spaces between origin states and host state, the members of the diasporic Amazigh movement negotiate and contest their inclusion as citizens at multiple scales. As they do so, at a distance from their homelands, they reimagine and reterritorialise Amazighité, constructing an imaginative geography of ‘Tamazgha in France’, a spatial representation that “articulate[s] the desires, fantasies and fears of [its] authors and the grids of power between them” (Gregory, 2009:370).

This thesis sets out to theorise and understand the political geographies of this diasporic social movement in the contemporary moment. It does so by approaching the Amazigh diaspora as its primary object of research within a relational, multiscalar analysis of its geopolitics. One of the key demands of the diasporic Amazigh movement is for Amazigh people not to be amalgamated and subsumed within national or religious categories of identity which they see as secondary. Taking inspiration from Indigenous scholars whose research challenges the state’s categories of governance by aligning with Indigenous claims to self-determination (Tuhiwai Smith, 2004; Hunt, 2014; Simpson, 2014), this thesis has resisted the pull of methodological nationalism, which categorises the Amazigh diaspora according to their or their forebears’ sending-state in much of the existing literature (Silverstein, 2004a; Dumont, 2007; Lacroix, 2012; Aïtel, 2013; Collyer, 2013). It also resists the other categorisation through which the Amazigh diaspora are amalgamated in much of the literature that informs their governance: as Muslims (see

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\(^1\) The postcolonial context of the Francophone world is poorly understood and frequently misinterpreted in Anglophone scholarship (Houssay-Holzschuh and Milhaud, 2013). Though the experiences of the British and French empires bear comparison, there are a number of key differences, notably in the modalities of decolonisation and the politics of post-colonial immigration to the metropole. Proudly separate academic traditions unfortunately hinder effective exchange between Anglophone and Francophone scholarship (Fall and Rosière, 2008). This causes problems because without an understanding of the specificities of the Francophone context, postcolonial or decolonial political paradigms such as the global Indigenous movement are likely to be mistranslated. For example, as this thesis explains (chapter 6), autochtonie is no straightforward translation of ‘indigeneity’ (Geschiere, 2011). This thesis therefore draws on francophone as well as anglophone scholarship to articulate a nuanced account of the Amazigh postcolonial context.
Sajed, 2010; Bertossi, 2012a; Fredette, 2014; Beaman, 2017). Of course, these categories are not entirely absent from this thesis, yet my research suggests these categories are secondary to the self-ascribed identity claim of the members and leaders of the Amazigh diaspora. Relegating the categories of state governance to the background has allowed this thesis to examine the diasporic opportunities for the production of transnational space across borders that brings together all North Africa within a space of circulation and solidarity that operates within and beyond the state. It also allows for an approach to diaspora that is not reduced to the politics and governance of the home state (Gamlen, 2008; Ho, 2011; Mullings, 2012), but is formed and maintained through a political process (Barrineau, 2015; Christou and Mavroudi, 2015). Finally, by taking the Amazigh claim seriously, this thesis can start to analyse its positioning in relation to the secondary categories of nationality and religion, offering a critique of the existing work and policy that includes, but frequently does not name, the Amazigh.

This thesis contributes to the subdiscipline of political geography as well as Amazigh studies. Drawing on ethnographic and documentary methods, including an experimental methodology for the digital sphere, it outlines the major themes of the diasporic Amazigh movement’s relationship to space and place; making the diaspora, articulating indigeneity, negotiating citizenship and accommodating nativism. It analyses facets of Amazigh diaspora politics by conceptually approaching the diaspora at times as a nation, at others as a social movement, finding a productive interaction between these two concepts. The diasporic Amazigh movement is both an imagined community of people who claim to share a common language and culture and a political movement entraining activists, members and political parties in the pursuit of political change. It is both a transnational social movement calling on the states where they live to uphold the rights of their Amazigh populations as Indigenous people, and also a nation with a flag, asserting its claim to sovereignty, however limited. The diaspora’s associations frame themselves as a social movement championing diverse citizenship and integration in French society, whilst homeland-oriented citizenship is mostly expressed in nationalistic terms. This thesis charts how the politics of this diasporic Amazigh movement contest and produce spatial imaginations in the contemporary context of Mediterranean integration, new nationalisms and populisms, and the fear of Islamist terrorism in French society.
1.2 Political Geography with(out) the State

Through its research questions, this thesis identifies a series of theoretical and analytical problems in political geography, for which it offers some new perspectives and possible solutions. The sub-discipline, which is primarily concerned with the relationship between space and power, has historically focused on states and their control of and competition over territory (Painter, 2008). Questions of sovereignty, international relations and military strategy remain key areas of study in political geography, but over the past twenty years since the development of research in critical geopolitics this focus on states has been challenged (Mountz, 2013). The (partial) incorporation of ideas about scale and the body from feminist geography and elsewhere into the sub-discipline, as well as global socio-economic and technological changes have blurred the previously neat scalar categorisations of ‘local’, ‘national’ and ‘global’ structured around the idea of the state (Hyndman, 2004; Dittmer, 2015). Research in political geography has increasingly turned to focus on the everyday and the embodied, theorising relationships between space and power without and alongside the state (Staeheli et al., 2012). This thesis identifies and contributes to four overlapping currents of research examining the everyday in political geography; geopolitical performance, the geopolitics of diaspora, popular geopolitics, and citizenship studies.

Slow to draw on feminist theory when compared to other sub-fields in human geography (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007), political geography today contains a broad sweep of different uses of concepts related to ‘performance’ and ‘performativity’ (Butler, 1993, 1997). Some have used the concept of performance at the scale of individual bodies to analyse the differential spatial politics of gender and race (Sharp, 2011), often in relation to citizenship (Isin, 2012; Staeheli et al., 2012), and public space (Staeheli et al., 2009; Brickell, 2012), which are key themes in this study. Other scholarship is linked to such work but re-scaled to examine the state and state governance (Jeffrey, 2013; Postero, 2017; Loyola-Hernández, 2018). Somewhere between the two lies recent work by Fiona McConnell, who uses examples of unrecognised states, nations and governments to analyse the performativity of the state as a subject in international diplomacy (McConnell et al., 2011; Wilson and McConnell, 2014) and in its everyday governmentality (McConnell, 2009, 2016). A key focus of such research is the notion of political legitimacy and legitimising practices, which it exposes beyond and outside the supposed source of legitimacy in most political theory: the state (Caspersen, 2015; Jeffrey et al., 2015). This thesis contributes to
the geopolitical performance literature by suggesting that diasporic Amazigh engage in legitimising performances across a range of scales and contexts, taking as given that Amazigh identity is performative (Butler, 1997; Richardson, 2015) and embedded in wider fields of power. In doing so, it extends prior research on political legitimacy beyond the state through the case study of the MAK-Anavad. It also highlights diaspora as an ‘anomalous geopolitical space’ (Jeffrey et al., 2015) where state categories and other subjectivities of identity and language are performed apart-from-but-in-relation-to home states and societies.

Our first research question asks; through what kinds of performance do members of the diasporic Amazigh movement legitimise their political claims? Performances such as concerts, poetry readings, dances and plays are common in the Amazigh cultural associations of the diaspora, particularly around the festive periods such as Yennayer and Tafsut. These ritual performances and their role in sustaining Amazigh culture are well documented in the anthropological literature (Yacine, 1990; Goodman, 2005; Becker, 2006; Bensmaïa, 2006). However geopolitical performances of the kind outlined in the previous paragraph - from public demonstrations and marches to weekly language or cultural classes and from international meetings and conventions to radio shows and internet activism - remain under-studied and under-theorised. Amazigh political claims, to recognition as a distinct ethno-linguistic category, as Indigenous people, and to certain rights (human and Indigenous), to citizenship, and to territory, are legitimised through these performances. Diaspora, Amazighité, and indigeneity are understood to be performative categories in this thesis, that is as embodied and discursive subjectivities wherein meanings, identities, and political assemblages combine the ideal and the material.

The study of diaspora politics has largely left civil society groups like the Amazigh behind in recent years to focus on state diaspora outreach (Gamlen, 2008, 2014; Mullings, 2012; Collyer, 2013; Délanos and Gamlen, 2014). The development of increasingly sophisticated extraterritorial governance has focused political geographers on the way that states construct and govern their diasporas, rather than how diasporas are assembling themselves.

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2 This thesis consistently refers to the Kabyle independence movement headed by Ferhat Mehenni as the ‘MAK-Anavad’, one of the many monikers the group uses to describe itself. At times the thesis refers explicitly to the MAK or to the GPK, both of which are elements of the broader MAK-Anavad.
beyond and in parallel to state categories (Christou and Mavroudi, 2015). Not only does this mean that the empirical focus is frequently on sending-states’ active governance of diasporas (Cassarino, 2004; Faist, 2008; Kavada, 2014), but also that the conceptual understanding of what a diaspora is has become more bounded (Mavroudi, 2007). In contrast, the ‘geopolitics of diaspora’, as outlined in Carter’s widely-cited paper (2005), seeks to balance these bounded understandings of diaspora with earlier ‘diaspora discourse’, which emphasised their characteristics of radical hybridity and non-essentialism (Hall, 1990; Gilroy, 1993; Brah, 1996; Clifford, 1997). Using specific histories, maps and interventions to account for and explain the spatial politics of diaspora, work in this sub-field typically emphasises the scale of the body (Mavroudi, 2008a, 2008b) and the temporality of the everyday (Mercer and Page, 2010; Dickinson, 2017). Geopolitics of diaspora ask how it is that diasporas decentre state categories (Barrineau, 2015), and reconfigure territory through transnational practices (Carter, 2005; Ragazzi and Balalovska, 2011; Brand, 2014).

However, this approach to diaspora remains rare in political geography, where state-centred spatial categorisations remain the norm, and studies of diaspora have rarely gone beyond methodological nationalism (Agnew, 1994; Taylor, 1994; Glick Schiller, 2010; Glick Schiller and Faist, 2010) in their framing. By analytically separating diasporas from processes of territorial and geopolitical change, such studies occlude the possibilities for political, social and economic change that diasporas frequently see as their reason for existing (Safran, 1991; Sökefeld, 2006; McConnell, 2015). Methodological nationalism has meant that the Amazigh diaspora has mostly been studied and analysed as a minority within Moroccan, Algerian or other nation-state diasporas (Sayad, 1999, 2002, Silverstein, 2004a, 2005; Dumont, 2007), if not forgotten completely within them (Sajed, 2010; Mitchell, 2011; Stoler, 2011).

A key original finding of this thesis is that the ‘diasporic Amazigh movement’ does not constitute a single community bounded in space and time. Rather, it emerged as the object of this thesis throughout the fieldwork, as I pieced together mostly informal networks of associations and political activism. It is a complex and constantly changing entity, lacking any central guiding organisation or institution from which it can be defined, or any a clear geography of settlement. It englobes a radical plurality of regional languages and cultures from across North Africa, and cuts across age, class and gender, as demonstrated in the opening pages of this introduction. The diaspora’s cultural associations function as the
skeleton upon which the diaspora is constructed, their leaders as self-appointed political agents for the Amazigh of France and as key sites for the emergence of diasporic actors onto the public stage. No qualitative study could ever claim to quantify the diaspora, nor to produce a definitive account of it, but rather by studying the connections that Amazigh people have created and maintain between themselves in France, this thesis adds substance and texture to the speculative claims made by politicians, commentators and researchers, for lack of official data. It advances the ‘geopolitics of diaspora’ project by examining the role that geopolitical practices and discourses play in the assemblage of an Amazigh diaspora and the reconfiguration of its members’ territorialities.

The thesis’s second research question asks; How do Amazigh groups in France reassemble diaspora through Amazighité, and what effects (political, social and territorial) does this have? As observed in previous work on the Amazigh diaspora (Dirèche-Slimani, 1997; Silverstein, 2005), cultural difference is not only negotiated between the diaspora and the host society, but also with the hegemonic national identities of the diaspora’s ‘home’ states (Benrabah, 2013), and then again between the ethno-regional groups represented within the Amazigh movement itself (Hoffman and Miller, 2010). These varied registers of difference operate at different scales and are performed and enunciated according to the diverse conjunctures of the diaspora; being Berber in relation to French ‘host society’, Amazigh in relation to an ‘Arabic’ state of origin, or Mozabite in relation to other Amazigh, for example. The question of how Amazighité is constructed and contested as a unitary discourse within such a field of radical heterogeneity, away from ‘home’, leads to a consideration of how Amazigh groups evoke, perform, and mobilise cultural difference. Ontologically approaching diaspora as assemblage, this thesis argues that the transnational spaces in which the diaspora is continuously brought into existence are in turn transformed through differential/relational politics (Castree, 2004; Murphy, 2012). In short, diaspora territoriality constantly reshapes both diaspora and territory. This thesis is therefore subtly different in its focus to the related concept of ‘transpolitics’ described in Paul Silverstein’s work on the Algerian diaspora, where political activism and membership “occur within the larger space of transnational engagement that unites spatially non-contiguous polities and state structures” (2008:25). The Amazigh diaspora is a particularly good case study for detailing this, as it correlates to no single ‘sending state’ and as such the state is comparatively absent from shaping its territoriality.
The focus of this ‘geopolitics of diaspora’ on ordinary association members and their activities is complemented in this thesis by insights from the sub-field of popular geopolitics. Here, political geographers shift from the study of political elites to the imaginative geographies of popular culture, studying how magazines, books and film engage their audiences in geopolitics (Sharp, 2000; Dalby, 2008; Kirby, 2015; Grayson, 2017). However, in the past decade such work has been critiqued for its focus on “elite scriptings of the world” (Dittmer and Gray, 2010:1665) which prioritise the ways that popular media reinforce elite discourses and do not take the agency of audiences sufficiently into account, generating calls for “New methodologies of the everyday” (Dittmer and Gray, 2010), to focus on the seemingly ordinary intersections of geopolitics with everyday life (Dittmer and Dodds, 2008; Ingram, 2011; Gerlach, 2015; Grayson, 2017; Mostafanezhad, 2017). Theoretically, contributions from feminist geography (Hyndman, 2004, 2015; Brickell, 2012) and STS-inspired assemblage approaches (Anderson and McFarlane, 2011; Dittmer, 2014) have encouraged political geographers to consider the embodied, networked, and mobile subjects of popular geopolitics, beyond textual and media discourse. Furthermore, the conceptual distinction between ‘popular’, ‘formal’ and ‘practical’ geopolitics (Ó Tuathail, 1996) is becoming increasingly blurred (Pinkerton and Benwell, 2014), as new technologies and practices reconfigure the “different sites of production, distribution and consumption” of these components of “geopolitical culture” (Toal and Dalby, 1998:5). Publics can no longer be treated as only being easily-influenced audiences for geopolitical discourse, lacking their own agency, but must be understood as geopolitical actors themselves. Notably, the almost ubiquitous use of social media for geopolitical discourse by diasporic Amazigh activists is a key focus of the ethnography of this thesis, which highlights the agency of the popular online audience in producing and shaping Amazigh geopolitical culture.

Postcolonialism and indeed decoloniality have been marked features of popular geopolitics in recent years, evidenced in the discourses and spatial politics of #RhodesMustFall, Black Lives Matter, and the widening challenge of Indigenous movements globally. However, insights from postcolonialism have not been taken on board in much academic work on popular geopolitics (Woon, 2014). Despite writing that geopolitics is “a discourse and a practice engaging in the creation of geographical relationships and order so that global space becomes divided into simplistic categories such as good/evil, threatening/safe and civilised/barbaric” (Dittmer and Dodds, 2008:441), the leaders in the field have not made
connections to the binary categorisations inherent to colonial power (Said, 1978; Tuhiwai Smith, 2004; Mignolo, 2007, 2012). In this thesis, the ways in which colonial power relations continue to shape the Amazigh movement’s discourse and practices, particularly in relation to space, place and territory, are a key consideration. The diasporic Amazigh movement’s geopolitics is primarily popular, expressed through artwork, songs, poems, etc. on the platforms of associations and social media, and frequently contests “colonial domination and the legacies of colonialism” (Loomba, 2005:16) in North Africa. This thesis, or rather the people it speaks about, brings postcolonial ideas and critiques into conversation with popular geopolitics, further developing the field beyond the ‘elite scriptings of the world’ that it initially reacted against. At times this anti-elite reaction is shown to articulate with populist and nativist discourse in contemporary France.

Returning to popular geopolitics’ fundamental concern with imaginative geographies, itself inherited from postcolonial studies (Said, 1978), this thesis’s third research question asks: “What imaginative geographies are scripted by the members of the diasporic Amazigh movement, and what political work do they do?”. Imaginative geographies of ‘home’ and of ‘homeland’ are key elements of diaspora discourse, and in the diasporic Amazigh movement imaginative geographies - past, present and future - of ‘Tamazgha’, of colonisation, and of resistance are an important territorial referent for the Amazigh ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 2006). Mapping these imaginative geographies cartographically and through an analysis of Amazigh leaders’ discourse, this thesis explores the various spaces of belonging that overlap at different scales, often corresponding to different citizenships and subjectivities. By asking what political work these imaginative geographies do, this thesis seeks to analyse the ways that they are articulated (Hall, 1988), through the agency of Amazigh actors or otherwise, with other discourses and subjectivities such as nationalism and nativist-populism.

Indigenous peoples’ movements are similarly beyond and parallel to the state in many parts of the world, and are closely related to decolonial agendas. Research with Indigenous movements has to date broadly focused on their places and territories (or what is left of them) (Andolina et al., 2009; Erazo, 2013; Lucero, 2013; Simpson, 2014). Just as scholars criticise the biopolitics that enclose Indigenous people, often in small pockets of marginal land (Povinelli, 2002; Rifkin, 2009; Morgensen, 2011; Mountz, 2013), they just as frequently localise their studies to the spaces of these Indigenous territories and their relationships with the (settler-colonial) state and international institutions (Garoutte and
Snipp, 2013; Lawrence, 2013; Simpson, 2014; Grydehøj and Ou, 2017). ‘Differential geographies’ are pursued by many Indigenous groups, who make claim to exclusive rights to certain places and territories (Castree, 2004), focusing researchers’ attention there as well. The vast majority of Indigenous people today live in urban centres, often far from their historic territories (Clifford, 1997, 2001; Li, 2000; Gagné, 2016; Gagné and Trépied, 2016), and this ‘Indigenous diaspora’ has significant effects on the social reproduction of populations ‘at home’ (Brysk, 2000). As such, Clifford (2013) argues, ‘Indigenous diaspora’ is not a contradiction in terms but a political category that requires theorisation. The concept of Indigenous diaspora breaks with the reductive assumption that Indigenous attachments to place necessarily entail continuous residence, and rather points to the “complexly routed and rooted experiences” (2013:83) of both Indigenous and diasporic consciousness. However, little geographical research to date has been undertaken to understand indigeneity ‘at a distance’, and its spatial and political effects.

The Amazigh represent themselves as the Indigenous people of North Africa at various international institutions including the UN, EU and AU and associated organisations, mostly through the CMA, the convenors of the meeting described at the beginning of this introduction. However, the Amazigh and their diaspora are far from occupying an ‘Indigenous slot’, that is a simplified frame within a regime of representation (national or international) that prefigures the processes of dialogue and contestation through which they are identified (Li, 2000). Following the relational perspective outlined above, I argue that the Amazigh position themselves ambivalently in relation to the politics of indigeneity. The ways in which indigeneity is (or is not) articulated by the diasporic Amazigh movement offer insight into the relational politics of place that link territorial and identity claims transnationally.

Consequently, the fourth research question is; “In what ways and to what ends do expressions of indigeneity emerge in diasporic Amazigh discourses and practices?”. Examining how indigeneity is articulated in the Amazigh diaspora contributes to a more nuanced geographical approach to the concept of indigeneity. The counter-intuitive combination of ‘rooted’ indigeneity and ‘routed’ diaspora adopted in this thesis sheds light on the complex relationships to place and mobility in a postcolonial, globalised world. One such complex relationship is with nativism, which Amazigh discourse articulates with both Indigenous activism and French radical-Right ‘Republican values’ (see chapter 7). Again,
the framing of this research question allows for the consideration of identity construction alongside, and not merely within, the state.

1.3 Thesis Structure

With its focus on the political and imaginative geographies of the diasporic Amazigh movement, the thesis is organised topically, elaborating on different facets of political subjectivities in four substantive chapters that focus on the core themes of diaspora, indigeneity, citizenship and nativism. Chapter 2 provides an historical and sociological context for the study. It recognises that history is invested with political meaning, not least in the diasporic Amazigh movement. Drawing on secondary literature as well as oral histories collected during fieldwork, it presents the story of the Amazigh in North Africa, the migration of Amazigh populations to France during the twentieth century, and the development of the Amazigh movement on both sides of the Mediterranean. It details how Amazigh activists in the diaspora have challenged North African states, which since independence have marginalised the Amazigh dimension from the national narrative, in the process bringing together an emergent, politicized diaspora of people, organisations and institutions. Drawing lines of connection between the colonial past and postcolonial present, the chapter then outlines the dimensions of indigeneity and the Indigenous movement in the politics of the Amazigh diaspora. It argues that indigeneity is articulated with existing sets of discourses and political subjectivities as it is translated into the diasporic Amazigh movement’s politics of citizenship. The chapter then provides a set of typologies for understanding the different forms of citizenship that intersect within this diaspora process, and charts these in relation to the geography of the Amazigh diaspora.

Following the example of recent studies in cultural and political geography (Blunt, 2007; Dumont, 2007; Mavroudi, 2008a; Nagel and Staeheli, 2008; McConnell, 2016), the research on which this thesis is based addressed the above questions through a period of situated fieldwork and ethnographic methods. Chapter 3 details this methodology, considers the epistemological and ethical considerations of the fieldwork’s ethnographic, documentary and online methods, and describes the data analysis. The fieldwork took place over 2015-2016, when I became a member of some and participated in the activities of many Amazigh associations in the Paris region and nationally across France. To complement my fieldwork ‘on the ground’ I undertook a parallel ‘online ethnography’ and drew on secondary documentation from Paris’s libraries and archives.
Chapter 4 examines diaspora as a geopolitical concept, understood on the one hand as resembling a social movement and on the other as resembling a nation. Following Liz Mavroudi (2007), the chapter presents an understanding of diaspora as process, an assemblage that constantly reworks the boundaries of nation, state, community and identity, within an imaginative geography of home. It argues that the framing processes of this diaspora-movement and the territorialities of this diaspora-nation have evolved over time, as it has undergone different developmental phases and in response to political developments. The diaspora is shown to be a privileged space of Amazigh knowledge production and dissemination, which has shaped the politics of the Amazigh movement transnationally. The chapter argues that different discourses of nationalism are produced in the accounts of diaspora scholar-activists, most recently tending towards greater ethnolinguistic regionalism. It ends by suggesting that a similar approach, combining the geopolitics of diaspora with popular geopolitics, should be taken where other new nationalisms have gained strength, such as in Indigenous movements worldwide.

The thesis also includes two calendar snapshots. These shorter chapters provide a moment of ‘thick description’ to contextualise the chapters that they precede. Each focuses on a key moment in the calendar of the diasporic Amazigh movement and describes some of the practices and moments observed and described from fieldwork. The first one describes and contextualises Yennayer, the Berber New Year, as a key event in the annual calendar of the diasporic Amazigh movement. It describes Yennayer celebrations as key sites of articulation with indigeneity, events which are constructed as culturally authentic, secular and apolitical by their organisers, attracting the participation of greater numbers of diaspora Amazigh and local politicians.

Chapter 5 picks up from here to focus on how indigeneity is articulated as a political positioning in the diasporic Amazigh movement. Drawing on Stuart Hall’s terminology to theorise the politics of indigeneity in relation to place, and the language of performance to analyse its embodiment, this chapter outlines several Indigenousarticulations made in the discourse and practices of the leaders and members of diasporic Amazigh associations. Their preoccupation with the defence of the Tamazight language, threatened by the hegemony of Arabic, is linked to an historical narrative of prior occupation and of present-day Arabo-Islamic ‘colonisation’. This colonisation is found by diasporic Amazigh in the underdevelopment of their home regions, their resistance to violent state repression, and exile. Indigenous territoriality is practiced through village committees and the repatriation
of deceased members for burial. The chapter explores the embodiment of indigeneity, particularly by women’s bodies, through clothing and dance. It draws out the ways that Amazigh leaders position themselves within the global Indigenous movement. Finally, it also presents examples of how diasporic Amazigh leaders have rejected an Indigenous positioning. The chapter’s exploration of the politics of these diverse Indigenous articulations leads to the argument that indigeneity and diaspora are closely interconnected in their relationships to place.

The second calendar snapshot focuses on the annual commemoration of Tafsut, the ‘Berber Spring’. Unlike Yennayer, this is an explicitly political event, marked by public marches, demonstrations and political debates. Though commemorating the original Tafsut in Kabylia in 1980, the event has come to be commemorated by Amazigh activists across Tamazgha and the diaspora, where it provides space for rehearsing and altering narratives of Amazigh citizenship.

Chapter 6 focuses on the discourses and practices of citizenship, which in the diaspora intersect, overlap and produce transnational spaces. Drawing out an empirical distinction between ‘diaspora-oriented’ and ‘homeland-oriented’ citizenships, the chapter details how citizenship practices in relation to French state and society can be understood as ‘ordinary’ whilst those in relation to North African state(s) and society are characterised more as performative ‘Acts’. Drawing on Lynn Staeheli’s notion of ‘ordinary citizenship’, the chapter analyses the activities and partnerships through which Amazigh cultural associations promote and perform social integration in France, by means of community representation, civil society actions and foregrounding ‘Republican values’ of laïcité, democracy and gender equality. Then, drawing on Engin Isin’s concept of ‘Acts of citizenship’, it turns to describe and analyse the performative actions of Amazigh political movements in France in relation to their homelands, unpacking the politics of citizenship bound up with village committees, ethnolinguistic nationalism, and public demonstrations. The two facets are brought together towards the end of the chapter, which argues that the multiple negotiations of citizenship that are juxtaposed in the ‘transpolitics’ (Silverstein, 2004a) of the diasporic Amazigh movement provide space for one another transnationally, as the spaces created through the practices of ‘ordinary citizenship’ (e.g. the association meeting room, the municipal festival) become the theatre for ‘Acts of citizenship’ (e.g. flag raising).
Finally, chapter 7 homes in on Amazigh politics in the current context of increasingly influential nativist-populism in France and across Europe. It brings the politics of diaspora, indigeneity and nativism into conversation, arguing that they share some common traits, and discusses the Kabyle nationalists’ ambivalent positioning in relation to progressive and reactionary forms of nativism in their search for political allies. Social media is argued to offer a key political opportunity structure for the MAK-Anavad, but also to privilege a populist communication style. The chapter then outlines and explains the MAK-Anavad’s attraction for French nationalists, arguing that this is possible because of its diasporic situation, colonial history, and a common discourse of anti-Islamism.

Little anglophone scholarship has focused on the Amazigh of France, when compared with the numerous studies of Islam or ‘Maghrebin’ identity in France. It is over a decade since the last substantial ethnographic studies on the Amazigh movement in France, Paul Silverstein’s ‘Algeria in France’ (2004a) and Jane Goodman’s ‘Berber Culture on the World Stage’ (2005). With the notable exception of Michael Collyer’s work (2008, 2013), little has been done to continue to develop the political geographical study of the Amazigh movement. Literature on the Amazigh movement, in both French and English, has been focused on North Africa (Pouessel, 2011; Maddy-Weitzman, 2012), often on particular ethnographic pockets (Hoffman, 2002; Lacoste-Dujardin, 2006; Scheele, 2009; Claudot-Hawad, 2010; Cornwell and Atia, 2012; Oiry-Varacca, 2013; Silverstein, 2015). Geographers are in “a privileged position to study the global present, to trace the colonial roots and everyday enactments of contemporary struggle” (Silverstein, 2004a:16), and the diaspora geopolitics studied in this thesis are only a small part of larger struggles over the spatial modes of being in the modern world, coloured by various cosmopolitan and particularist visions. It is my hope that the diasporic Amazigh movement’s ambivalent relationship to place as detailed in this thesis will offer fresh insight for its activists as well as researchers and academics. Drawing out Indigenous articulations in the diaspora links them to transnational processes and spaces, to better equip the diasporic Amazigh movement to articulate and pursue its political goals. For scholars working in the field of political geography, this thesis offers a fresh engagement with the geopolitics of diaspora but also with other research into the ‘everyday’ in political geography.
Chapter 2: Approaching ‘Tamazgha in France’

Contextualisation is a key part of the production of geographical knowledge. Rather than understanding space as an empty Cartesian backdrop to social activities, numerous geographers have emphasised the contextual and relational nature of the productions of space and place (Massey, 1993; Thrift, 1996; Sparke, 2005). This thesis continuously connects theory and analysis with the context in which they emerge. Before going further, then, this chapter provides a general context of the historical and contemporary diasporic Amazigh movement. The first section provides an historical backdrop to the current issues and debates that are at stake within and around the diasporic Amazigh movement and which are the subject of the thesis. It is not intended to be a comprehensive history of the Amazigh movement, France and its (post)empire, or of North Africa - writing history is not the aim of this thesis. Nonetheless, some historiography is necessary to sketch out the background from which the diasporic Amazigh movement emerges, one often poorly understood in the anglophone academy (Willis, 2012), and to explain why it is this thesis’s object of study in political geography. The second section moves on to give a more detailed sociological contextualisation of the diasporic Amazigh movement’s sites of citizenship through a series of typologies that describe the key geographies and forms of organisation within it. Finally, this chapter contextualises the Amazigh diaspora’s articulations of indigeneity that form an interpretive thread throughout the thesis.

2.1 Historicising the Diasporic Amazigh Movement

The task of writing a history of the Amazigh is not without its challenges for three main reasons. Firstly, as widely is recognised across disciplines (Hobsbawm, 2000; Li, 2000; Graebner, 2007), history is highly politicised, often biased, and a powerful tool for making claims on the present. As chapters 4 and 5 detail, the history of the Amazigh is no exception, and the task of ‘correcting the history books’ takes up a large part of the Amazigh movement’s activity. Diaspora members interviewed during the fieldwork almost always spoke about history, whether ancient or recent, as a frame for answering questions about the present. This ‘memory work’ (Maddy-Weitzman, 2007) is key in negotiating the claims of the Amazigh movement within North Africa and globally (Crawford and Hoffman, 1999). Secondly much of this history relates to the colonial and postcolonial era, and historical accounts need to treat power relations with care - avoiding Eurocentric narratives for example - whilst exposing the violence of colonialism and its profound
effects and legacy in both North African and French societies (Stoler, 2011). Thirdly, perhaps as a corollary of the above challenges, both primary and secondary sources are often contradictory and/or unreliable, particularly for events within living memory. For these reasons, I have endeavoured to base the following on multiple sources and perspectives, including those of interviewees, who during fieldwork frequently took considerable time to rehearse historical narratives. Taking a cue from Audra Simpson (2014), who argues for a critical consideration of who benefits from writing about Indigenous politics, I will broadly privilege Amazigh points of view; firstly as it best introduces Amazigh activists’ own perceptions of this history, and secondly as it may redress some of the imbalances inherited from the colonial historiography of the Amazigh.

Ancient Roots to Modern Routes

Plenty of archaeological evidence suggests that Berber people were living in North Africa when the Sahara was still green, and that they had significant economic and political relationships with the ancient Egyptians (including an Amazigh pharaoh, Shoshenq I) and later Greeks, Carthaginians and Romans (Camps, 1980). The apogee of this civilisation is widely considered in the Amazigh movement to be the Numidian kingdom of Massinissa (ⵎⵙⵏⵙⵏ), the ‘great king’ whose help secured Rome’s victory over Carthage, and whose rule extended across modern Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Following this were a series of wars and struggles as much of this territory was incorporated into the Roman Empire. Latin culture flourished in the provinces of ‘Africa’ and ‘Mauretania’, and many early church leaders, emperors, and writers originated there (Merrills, 2004). Whilst the cities, ports and garrisons of the empire would have been Latinized, the surrounding rural populations remained Berber-speaking. At this time, alongside diverse polytheistic beliefs, Judaism and Christianity spread amongst many Berber tribes (Brett and Fentress, 1996). As the Roman Empire collapsed, North Africa was invaded by Vandals and Byzantines. This pre-Islamic history, mostly reliant on the texts of Greco-Roman historians like Sallust and on archaeological evidence, is key to Amazigh activists’ claim to indigeneity, and is a basis upon which the purely ‘Islamic and Arabic’ nature of North Africa’s postcolonial nation-states are challenged (Gellner and Micaud, 1973).

Unlike the fleeting influence of these prior invasions, the Arab conquests from the seventh century were to have a lasting impact on the linguistic landscape and socio-political structures of North Africa. Some argue that due to a common Semitic linguistic structure,
monotheistic religion, and tribal social structure, the two cultures were comparatively commensurable (Témiali, 2015), whilst others stress their differences, arguing that Islam and the Arabic language were forced upon the Indigenous population (Zirem, 2013). Berber resistance to the invading Arab armies is remembered and celebrated by Amazigh movement members in the figure of ‘La Kahina’ or ‘Dihya’ (ⴷⵉहⵢⴰ), the Judeo-Christian Warrior-Queen of the Aurès said to have magical powers (Hoffman and Miller, 2010). Following her defeat Islam was accepted relatively quickly, and Berber soldiers formed the greater part of the Islamic armies that conquered Spain. The subsequent history of wars and empires in North Africa is not one of ‘Berbers’ opposed to ‘Arabs’, but more one of religious wars between Muslims (McDougall, 2010). Arabic became (as Latin had been) the language of towns and cities, of the state, of religion and of literary culture, and Berber remained the oral language of the illiterate, rural majority which Ibn Khaldun called ‘Amazigh’ (Chaker, 1998a). In the eleventh century, however, Arabic Bedouin tribes called the ‘Banu Hilal’ invaded in far greater numbers than the previous conquerors. Advancing from East to West, these nomads sacked cities and destroyed irrigation systems, shaking up the political, cultural and socio-economic landscape of North Africa. From this point on, nomadism became a more extensive practice in the plains and valleys of the region, and the Berber tribes were joined in the countryside by Arab tribes (Témiali, 2015).

A third wave of Arabisation came as the Muslims of Andalusia fled Catholic Spain’s Reconquista in the fifteenth century, bringing with them new styles of music, architecture, and literature. By the time of the Ottoman regency and Moroccan empire of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Arabic had been the language of the state (makhzen) and religion (din) for a millennium, but the loose forms of control over territory exercised by the region’s sovereigns meant a great degree of political autonomy for rural societies and tribes, many of whom remained Berber-speaking (Roberts, 2014).

The French conquest from 1830 and subsequent colonisation of Algeria heralded a new era, marked by the violent integration of previously fragmented geographical spaces and the progressive unification of their diverse populations into a single ‘nation’ - the indigènes, the non-Europeans, the Muslims. Through forcible evictions and violent repression associated with conquest and later as retribution for the failed war of resistance in 1871, French military rule made room for colonial plantations whilst creating a pauperised Indigenous population that provided cheap labour. During the period of colonisation, military accounts, ethnographies and administrative notes attest to a
widespread French fascination with the Berbers. The Berberophone tribes closest to Algiers, who became known as ‘Kabyles’, were the primary focus of this fascination. The ‘Kabyle myth’ and wider ‘Berber myth’, the “conjunction of an ideological projection of nineteenth-century racial thought and colonial ethnographic misinterpretations” (Lorcin, 1999:xviii), broadly opposed Arabs and Berbers in North Africa, the former being ‘Oriental’ the latter ‘European’, and created many other binaries; religious/secular, despotic/democratic, lazy/hardworking, sly/honest and so on (Shatzmiller, 1983). Whether due to a fanciful attempt to assimilate the Berbers to the French nation (Lacoste-Dujardin, 2006), or rather due to the precolonial system of primary education in Kabylia (Temlali, 2015), many of the first North Africans educated in French schools were Kabyles (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011; Zirem, 2013). They were also the first North Africans to be recruited as labourers in metropolitan France, and emigrant Kabyles played an important role in the Algerian nationalist movement (Bouaziz, 2012). The ‘Kabyle Myth’ however led to a perception of ethnic difference being a tool of divide-and-rule for the French authorities, and so-called ‘Berberism’ was ruthlessly stamped out of the national liberation movement as a perceived threat to unity. Similarly, in Morocco, the attempt by the French authorities to ‘free’ the Berbers from Islamic law in the ‘Berber Dahir’ of 1930, although roundly rejected³, led to suspicion of any politicised Berber identity within the national liberation movement (Maddy-Weitzman, 2007). The ideology of pan-Arabism that had helped secure the withdrawal of the imperial powers from the Middle East had an inspirational influence on the North African independence movements. Consequently, independent Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria were declared ‘Arab, Islamic’ countries, despite the active participation of large numbers of Berbers in these anti-colonial struggles. Many ‘Berberist’ leaders were exiled or assassinated, and the use of the Berber language was actively suppressed (Willis, 2008). The tension between ‘Islamism’ and ‘Berberism’ as two

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³ The Dahir (Royal Edict) sparked religious resistance and solidarity between Muslims rather than ‘freeing’ Berbers from Islamic law, adding momentum to a nascent nationalist movement (Crawford and Silverstein, 2004).
counteracting popular political ideologies would reappear several times over the following decades.

The first large groups of Berbers from both Algeria and Morocco to arrive in France were recruited to work in industry in the decades before the First World War (Dirèche-Slimani, 1997; Bouyaakoubi, 2012b), around Marseille and Nantes to begin with and later in the mines of the North and East of the country. Large numbers of Berbers were among those recruited to fight for France in both World Wars, and the inter-war and post-war periods both saw large fluxes of immigration in response to the demand for labour associated with reconstruction. A disproportionately large number of migrants to France from North Africa at the time were from the Berber-speaking regions of the Souss and Kabylia, partly due to the recruiters’ preference for ‘hardworking Berbers’, partly because of existing patterns of labour migration, and partly due to the severe poverty of these regions (Lorcin, 1999; Agrou, 2012). These early migrants, particularly those from Kabylia, set up social structures that mirrored those found in their home villages in the diaspora, village committees that would assist new arrivals in finding work and accommodation, provide a social base, and operate a common fund that would act as insurance for members and allow the group to collectively send money to their village. Often based around a business such as a hotel, café or shop, these structures are still in place today, in various forms (Lacroix, 2012). These caisses du village (village funds) also became a key source of income for the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) during the war of independence (Bouaziz, 2012). Berber migrants, mostly young men, remained well integrated in the life of their villages, and would return often in a circular pattern of migration. After 1962 many settled in France, for fear of returning home after the war, and when in the 1970s French law severely restricted labour migration but allowed for family members to join those already in the country, many women and children joined their male relatives in the diaspora. However, in keeping with a policy that hoped to see immigrant workers and their families ‘return home’, the French state struck a series of bilateral deals with migrants’ ‘states of origin’ to allow those states to run a teaching programme in French schools to teach the ‘language of origin’ (ELCO). In the case of the Berbers, mostly of Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian nationality, this ‘language of origin’ was Arabic.

It was in the post-colonial moment that the Amazigh movement emerged and developed in the largely Kabyle diaspora in France. By “the late 1960s and early 1970s… a new generation of Berbers started to research and work on ‘Amazigh’ identity” (Aïtel, 2013).
It was not without its precedents - political figures from the Algerian independence movement, writers and artists like siblings Jean and Taos Amrouche or Mouloud Feraoun, academics like Mouloud Mammeri, or poets like Mohand u Yidir Aït Amrane, who in 1945 wrote the revolutionary song *Kker a mnis umaziɣ* ('Arise Son of Amazigh'). However it was the *Académie Berbère* in Paris, formed in 1967, that first articulated a sense of an Amazigh nation around a common language, culture and history within a territory that stretched from ‘Siwa in the East to the Canary Islands in the West’. The *Académie Berbère* formed around a group of academics, activists and artists that shared the aim of ‘promoting Berber culture, history and civilisation’, and came to lay many of the foundations for the transnational Amazigh movement. They invented a national flag, resurrected and standardised the Tifinagh alphabet, devised an Amazigh calendar, held concerts, and published a bilingual monthly bulletin (in French and Tamazight) with the help of the diaspora’s students and factory workers (Aïtel, 2013). These publications were passed around the diaspora and North Africa (despite government censorship), provoking discussion and debate, and had a great influence on the Amazigh youth of the time. Also in the 1970s at the *Université de Paris VIII - Vincennes*, an institution famous for its radical and experimental academic culture, a Berber study group formed with the involvement of Pierre Bourdieu, Ernest Gellner, Camille Lacoste-Dujardin and others (Silverstein, 2004a; Pouessel, 2011). Students from this group, many of whom were active members of the exiled *Front des Forces Socialistes* (FFS), would go on to be instrumental in structuring the *Mouvement Culturel Berbère* (MCB) in Algeria following the Berber Spring (Hirèche, 2010).

The Transnational Amazigh Movement takes Shape

Post-Independence state-building in North Africa was “characterised by strong centralised systems” (Willis, 2012:78) that suppressed political opposition. In the first years of independence, resistance to central government in Amazigh regions of Morocco, Algeria, Mali and Niger was violently repressed. The influence of pan-Arabism on independence leaders, which was unifying in the religiously diverse Mashreq but divisive in the linguistically diverse Maghreb, drove a policy of Arabisation which not only aimed to replace French with Arabic as the language of the state and of national culture, but to ‘Arabise’ their heterogenous populations. In 1980 an eruption of popular protest and civil disobedience, started following the Algerian government’s cancellation of a lecture on Berber poetry by Mouloud Mammeri at the University of Tizi-Ouzou, broke out in Kabylia.
The activists called it the ‘Berber Spring’ or ‘Tafsut Imaziɣen’ drawing a parallel with the famous Prague Spring of 1968, and heralded a renaissance of Amazigh cultural and political activity in Algeria largely organised around the MCB (Chaker, 1998a). In the kingdom of Morocco, the Amazigh Cultural Movement (MCA) took a little longer to emerge, but when it did it was organised among much the same lines as the Algerian MCB. Mostly formed of students and intellectuals, the Amazigh movement called for recognition of their language and culture within the plurality of their national societies (which comprised multiple Amazigh and Arabic dialects), and for the democratisation of the state. Berber political parties in Algeria such as the FFS and the Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD) took advantage of the multi-party opening in Algeria in 1989, only to be embroiled in the conflict of the decade that followed. Having emerged victorious at the ballot boxes, the Islamist Front Islamique du Salut was banned by the military, sparking an insurgency and civil war, during which the Amazigh political parties were played off against one another, sometimes siding with the government and at other times with the Islamists. During this period, the only key concession these parties were able to gain in terms of the Amazigh question was the creation of the Haut Commissariat à l’Amazighité (HCA) charged with promoting Tamazight following a year-long school boycott in Kabylia4. The 1990s also saw armed rebellions by Tuareg groups in Niger and Mali over access to land and natural resources and the environmental degradation linked to uranium extraction, which were eventually defeated by government forces with help from the French military (Benjaminsen, 2008).

Until 1981, the formal organisation of the Amazigh movement in the diaspora had been restricted by the legal requirement for registered association (loi 1901) leaders to be French citizens (Defrasne, 1995; Idaissa, 2012). When the newly elected socialist government of François Mitterrand extended the freedom of association to foreign nationals, the Amazigh diaspora experienced something of an ‘associative boom’ which mirrored political activism in North Africa. The new policy aimed to liberalise associative life, viewing associations less with suspicion and more as complementary to the state, civil society

4 This boycott was led by singer-turned-politician Ferhat Mehenni, who at the time was a part of the RCD, but from 2001 would lead the MAK. In 2010 the MAK created the Gouvernement Provisoire Kabyle (GPK) in the diaspora, with Mehenni as its president.
actors that would counter-act societal tendencies towards isolation, segregation and ghettoization (Defrasne, 2004). One of the first Amazigh associations to appear in this period was the Action de Culture Berbère (ACB) in Paris. Taking on the mantle of the more militant Académie Berbère, but oriented more to the needs of the Amazigh community locally, the ACB quickly became a hub for Amazigh culture, hosting language classes, poetry readings, concerts, conferences and publishing a monthly bulletin (Tiddukla) (Chaker, 1985). The success of the ACB is evident in the long list of associations that it has inspired, spawned or whose leaders it has trained over the following decades. Local cultural associations that animate activities like Tamazight language classes for the children of Amazigh immigrants, legal advice, educational support, and create a platform for artists, musicians and other cultural animators to perform have become a generalised phenomenon in France’s towns and cities - wherever there are a handful of Amazigh people willing to run them. The issue of racism linked to immigrant assimilation/integration became a hot topic in the 1980s, as the Front National (FN) won its first seats in the Assemblée Nationale and the Beur and SOS Racisme movements protested police brutality and institutional discrimination against ‘Arab’ and ‘Black’ people in France, and called for equal opportunities and citizenship (Gibb, 2008). A minority within a minority, the Amazigh positioned themselves ambivalently as sharing the core values of the Beur movement (particularly the right to cultural difference within the French Republic) whilst stressing their non-Arab ethnicity (Silverstein, 2007).

In 1999 Mohammed VI ascended to the Moroccan throne and in an immediate break with his father’s Amazigh policy began to valorise Morocco’s Amazigh component, creating an Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe (IRCAM) which was to advise on introducing Tamazight to the national curriculum (Crawford and Silverstein, 2004), and in 2011 Tamazight became an official language in the constitution (Darif, 2012), alongside Arabic. Concurrently in Algeria, the death in police custody of a young Kabyle (Massinissa

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5 The lower house of French parliament, where directly elected députés represent their constituencies.
6 ‘Beur’ is a French ‘verlan’ slang term derived from the word ‘arabe’ said backwards.
Guermah) at the time of *Tafsut* commemorations in 2001 sparked an extended period of unrest in which over 120 civilians were killed and many more injured, and the symbols of the state, particularly police stations, were attacked and destroyed by young Kabyles (Lacoste-Dujardin, 2001). Out of this ‘Black Spring’ came two political reverberations. One was the formation of a citizens’ movement based on the Indigenous village committee structures that was able to bring calm and negotiate the state’s recognition of Tamazight as a ‘national language’ before losing its momentum (Chabani, 2011). The other was the formation of a regionalist movement called the *Mouvement Pour l’Autonomie de la Kabylie* (MAK) which has since developed into a national independence movement, switching ‘*Autonomie*’ for ‘*Autodétermination*’ (self-determination) in its name in 2010. Out of this came two political reverberations. One was the formation of a citizens’ movement based on the Indigenous village committee structures that was able to bring calm and negotiate the state’s recognition of Tamazight as a ‘national language’ before losing its momentum (Chabani, 2011). The other was the formation of a regionalist movement called the *Mouvement Pour l’Autonomie de la Kabylie* (MAK) which has since developed into a national independence movement, switching ‘*Autonomie*’ for ‘*Autodétermination*’ (self-determination) in its name in 2010. Still within Algeria, the voice of Amazigh activism has in recent years spread beyond its Kabyle base to grow in the Saharan Mzab and in the Chawi East of the country. In recent years, the Arab Spring of 2011 that swept away Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi has triggered a revival of interest in *Amazighité* as well as political Islamism in both countries (Mansour, 2015), with the Amazigh region of Libya enjoying a precarious autonomy in the post-Gaddafi anarchy (Chaker and Ferkal, 2012). The wave of popular protest also set off a renewed effort to achieve Tuareg independence in the North of Mali, Azawad, but early success for the *Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad* (MNLA) was usurped by Islamist groups and defeated by a French-led international military intervention. The Amazigh question continues to represent a challenge to the states of North Africa (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011).

The conflict in Algeria, Mali and Niger throughout the 1990s combined with the attraction of studying in France kept a stream of Amazigh immigrants flowing into the diaspora’s associations. The Berber Studies group at Paris’s *Institut Nationale des Langues et Civilisations Orientales* (INALCO), the only higher education institution in the world to offer a full complement of Tamazight courses (Bouyaakoubi, 2012b), brought together students from across the berberophone regions, who in 1993 created the association 7 The *Mouvement Citoyen des Aarchs* was based on the Indigenous political structures of *Tajmaât* (village committee) and *Aarch* (confederation). As the state’s legitimacy was in crisis, this movement gained widespread support in Kabylia in 2001 by reviving traditional forms of democratic political organisation. Accounts differ as to why the movement fell apart having achieved very little: either its goals were too ambitious, its structure too horizontal, or it was skilfully played by the Algerian state.
Tamazgha. This radical association, which fundamentally rejects the sovereignty of North Africa’s states, became the hub around which the CMA formed in 1995. A federation of associations from across North Africa and the diaspora, registered as an association in Paris, the CMA seeks to represent the Amazigh cause transnationally, and to be a support network to the associations ‘on the ground’. During the 1990s, Moroccan Amazigh and Tuareg activists started to organise in the diaspora as part of the wider Amazigh movement, in conjunction with the CMA. Numerous radio stations and later online forums became important media for uniting a diaspora spread across the cities and towns of France and beyond (Idaissa, 2012). The years of pan-Amazigh cohesion were short-lived, however, and the CMA went through a series of internal divisions and leadership struggles. Ethno-regionalism following the example of the MAK after the ‘Black Spring’ of 2001 has accentuated the differences between Amazigh groups. Since 2010, the MAK and its Gouvernement Provisoire Kabyle (GPK) or ‘Anavad’ have been an increasingly important part of the landscape of the Amazigh diaspora.

Approaching the Amazigh Diaspora

The Amazigh diaspora today is fractured and amorphous, almost defined by disunity, difference and exceptions, but it nonetheless remains as a category of cultural, linguistic and ethnic affiliation outside the nation-state. In France, it is also over a century old, and many of those attending and animating Amazigh associations are second- or third-generation French citizens. Whilst the fragmented nature of the Amazigh diaspora is often highlighted as a reason for its failures to achieve political goals (Lacroix, 2009; Bengio and Maddy-Weitzman, 2013), its longevity, size and continued relevance could equally be highlighted as a success. As will be argued more fully in chapter 4, the diaspora does not merely exist as an automatic consequence of immigration, but is continually reproduced and constituted by the multiple structures, events and practices that articulate Amazigh identity. As such, the Amazigh diaspora cannot be conceptually dissociated from the Amazigh movement; by referring to it as ‘the diasporic Amazigh movement’, this thesis

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8 The complexity of different names and subdivisions of this Kabyle independence movement over time are frequently points of debate and confusion, for its members as well as others. This thesis refers simply to the MAK-Anavad to mean the Kabyle independence movement in the diaspora (regrouping the GPK, the MAK-France, the Rseau Anavad and their sympathisers) unless a more precise designation is required or the text is a quotation.
constantly positions the diaspora and Amazigh identity in ongoing processes of becoming, as well as making a distinction between the Amazigh movement ‘in Tamazgha’ and ‘in diaspora’.

A mirror and an amplifier for Amazigh activism, today conservative estimates put the number of Amazigh people living in France at over 1 million (Gordon et al., 2005), whilst most Amazigh association leaders estimate that number to be well over 2 million (Mehenni, 2004; Bouyaakoubi, 2012b). The official ‘blindness’ to markers of ethnic difference (such as race, language and religion) operated by both the French Republic and its former colonies in North Africa means that no census data exists that could give an official figure. However, my examination of the Journal Officiel des Associations, the legal record of registered associations, suggests that in the past twenty years more than 340 associations have been created in the Paris region alone (Île-de-France) concerned with the promotion of Amazigh culture, and this suggests a wider base of several thousands of members. Amazigh associations have become a staple of local associative life in many of the villes of Île-de-France, and yearly celebrations of Yennayer (Amazigh New Year) are increasingly hosted at mairies and municipal buildings across France (see Merabet 2016). Every year several thousand teenagers in France take the baccalauréat in Tamazight, even though no French school offers the course as part of its curriculum. Politically-engaged Amazigh performers such as Idir, Lounis Aït Menguellet, Mohamed Allaoua and before his death Lounes Matoub attract(ed) crowds of thousands to France’s biggest venues, such as Zenith or Olympia. Paris-based Berbère Radio Télévision (BRTV), started in 2000, broadcasts to all of North Africa, Europe, and Canada as well as online from its studios in Montreuil. In April 2016, in commemoration of the Berber Spring and Black Spring, a crowd of 10,000 gathered to march in Paris. Several other diverse public manifestations aimed at raising awareness of the Amazigh movement took place during the fieldwork year; the May Day march, gatherings to commemorate the victims of the Paris massacre of 17th October 1961, Kabyle Dress Day and Kabyle week to give a few examples. These different structures and events are elements of an emergent Amazigh diaspora - an

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9 On this date, peaceful pro-FLN demonstrators in Paris were attacked by the Parisian police, who shot at the crowd, and threw many of them into the Seine. As many as 200 were killed, but the incident was covered up and only acknowledged by the French government in 1998 (House and MacMaster, 2006).
assemblage of people, organisations and institutions that defines itself by its articulation of Amazighité in contrast to, above or alongside other markers of identity, be they religious (Muslim), national (Algerian/Moroccan/French), or political (Left/Right).

2.2 Sites of Citizenship

In analysing the political geographies of citizenship in the diasporic Amazigh movement, it is necessary to distinguish the different state and parastatal citizenships that operate through it, and the ways in which they are either reinforced or contested through spatial practices. Conceptually, citizenship is both a formal status and a substantive practice, encapsulated in Isin & Nyers’s definition: “an institution mediating rights between subjects of politics and the polity to which these subjects belong” (2014:1). An Amazigh individual might be a naturalised French national, and whilst retaining their Algerian passport for ease of travel might also hold a Kabyle Identity Card (CIK) distributed by the MAK-Anavad. They might vote in French elections but be heavily involved in civil society activity in their region of origin, spending hours engaging in cyber-activism raising awareness of the global public. They might speak French and Tamazight themselves but send their children to learn their ‘language of origin’ - Arabic - with the Moroccan ELCO teacher at school. These various citizenships overlap and jump scales from the local to the global, juxtaposed with one another and, as argued in chapter 6, making space for one another. Approaching the diasporic Amazigh movement as an object of study, I have developed a series of typologies that I use to describe the main tendencies, geographies, and forms of organisation that constitute the wider movement as a way of analysing its citizenship politics.

Firstly, the use of multiple ethnonyms within the Amazigh movement can be cause for confusion. These ethnonyms often seem to be used interchangeably; however, each one has its own specific usages relative to overlapping imagined communities and geographies. Firstly, ‘Berber’ and ‘Amazigh’ are broadly synonymous. The ethnonym ‘Berber’, the origin of which is disputed, has been applied to North Africa for thousands of years in both European and Middle Eastern languages. However its pejorative connotations (etymological links to ‘barbarian’ and ‘babbling’) and instrumentalisation under French colonial rule have led to the term being increasingly replaced by ‘Amazigh’, meaning ‘free man’ in Tamazight, and presented by its promoters as more authentic by virtue of its Indigenous quality (Bouyaakoubi, 2012a). The term ‘Amazigh’ also extends its application southward into the Sahara - the Tuareg are not necessarily Berber but they are certainly
Amazigh. As Chapter 4 will unpack, the diaspora in France uses a mix of the two, as *Berbère* remains more readily known and used in French society. The ethnonym’s associations with the colonial period, which make the term pejorative in North Africa, reflect the stereotypes of the ‘Berber Myth’ that persist in postcolonial French society (Geisser and Zemouri, 2007). It is in a sense a term that belongs to a time and place in the past, existing today in the form of a geographically indistinct cultural heritage, but a politically powerful imaginary. Amazigh cultural associations in France usually name themselves ‘Berber’, but organisations that operate internationally more often use the term ‘Amazigh’, as do official bodies in North Africa.

This Amazigh family can then be sub-divided into regionally discrete ethno-linguistic groups. One of these groups is simply called the ‘Amazigh’, and so to avoid confusion most writers on the subject specify ‘Middle Atlas Amazigh’. Other groups include Kabyles/Taqbaylit, Rifians/Tarift, Chleuhs/Tacelhit, Chawi/Tacawit, Mozabites/Tamzabt, Tuareg/Tamahq, and Libyan Nafusi, and there are many more smaller groups scattered across the oases, mountains and islands of North Africa in what could be called an Indigenous archipelago. By far the group most represented in the associations of the diaspora (if not necessarily the most numerous demographically in France) are the Kabyles, followed by Chleuhs and Rifians. Although united in name as Amazigh/Berber, often associations will only attract people of the same ethno-linguistic
community, and increasingly groups in the diaspora self-identify using these ethnonyms rather than the more general ‘Amazigh’ or ‘Berber’. This trend is linked to the appearance of autonomist groups, such as for Kabylia, Chawiland, the Rif, the Mzab, the Nafusa and Azawad (see Fig. 4, p86), but is much broader than these movements themselves. The recognition of differences as well as similarities between Amazigh groups in terms of language, culture, geography and history are part of the maturation of the Amazigh movement, and whilst the diaspora brings the whole ‘Amazigh family’ together in one place, it is also a theatre for the articulation of difference. The tension between the ideologies of ‘pan-Berberism’ and ethno-regionalism surfaces in different ways across the diasporic Amazigh movement, in association practices, language politics, and relationships with states of origin.

A second, triadic typology relates to the overlapping organisational structures that make up the diasporic Amazigh movement. These are; village committees, cultural associations, and political movements. Village committees are as old as the Amazigh diaspora, and are defined as the groups formed on the basis of a shared village or traditional socio-political unit of origin, whose activities are focused on that group and their unit of origin, and reconstitute the socio-political organisation of that unit of origin in the diaspora. They are most often informal, in that they are not registered within any state administration and rely on inter-personal relationships rather than legal contracts to regulate their activities. Many are now ‘modernising’ and registering as formal associations, in response to intergenerational social and economic changes, meaning that the old systems were no longer fit for purpose. Cultural associations, in contrast, are generally not attached to any specific village, or even to a specific ethno-national group, but are formed to promote Amazigh culture. These are registered associations under the loi 1901 and are legally obliged to operate in the way it prescribes. They should have statutes, members, elections, minuted committee meetings and so on, and many are organised enough to have made successful applications for state grants, employ staff, and use municipal buildings. As such, they are much more easily identifiable and accessible to a researcher than the village committees, and therefore figure much more prominently in my ethnography. Distinguishable from the cultural associations and village committees but closely linked to them are political movements. Sometimes structured in part as associations or attached to trade unions or universities but increasingly organised through online platforms such as Facebook groups, news sites and forums these movements range from small collectives
with specific short-term goals to large movements with broad aims. The use of online social media in particular has allowed small groups to broadcast to a wider, potentially global audience\textsuperscript{10}.

The third typology is that of geographical focus or orientation, and borrows heavily from previous theoretic approaches to diaspora geopolitics and transnationalism (Basch \textit{et al.}, 1993; Carter, 2005; Mavroudi, 2008a; Faist, 2010; Adamson, 2012). Institutions, associations and movements within the Amazigh diaspora and their actions can be \textit{diaspora-oriented} or \textit{homeland-oriented}. These non-exclusive categories are intended reflect the geographical tensions that animate Amazigh diasporic consciousness. I choose to speak of diaspora-oriented groups or activities to denote those that operate primarily in relation to the diaspora: located outside the country of origin but within the territory of France and held in tension between the two. Diaspora-oriented groups make an effort to break with the concerns of the North Africa, instead focusing on the development and wellbeing of the Amazigh diaspora and its place in French society. They might aim to collaborate with local authorities on delivering local services such as after-school clubs, language classes, and legal advice. Diaspora-oriented groups are more likely than average to self-identify as ‘Berber’, and take the form of cultural associations. A key example would be the \textit{Coordination des Berbères de France} (CBF), a nationwide federation of Berber cultural associations whose mantra ‘Berber culture, culture of France’ squarely frames its orientation. In contrast, homeland-oriented groups and actions focus on the place of origin in North Africa, be it village, region, or nation. They maintain links with communities ‘at home’, through long-distance nationalism (Anderson, 1992; Schiller and Fouron, 2001), development projects (Lacroix, 2009), return visits (Scheele, 2009) and transnational advocacy (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Homeland-oriented activities are much more likely to be undertaken by first-generation migrants, who are also more likely than average to identify by their ethno-linguistic group. Village committees are most likely to fall into this category, as are political movements such as the MAK-Anavad. These

\textsuperscript{10} In practice, though potentially global in reach, the social networks created by individuals online often reinforce the views and beliefs already held by those individuals, and so ‘activist’ discourse is increasingly broadcast to a self-selected, already convinced audience (Kavada, 2014).
orientations are not mutually exclusive, but as demonstrated in chapter 6 each can produce space for the articulation of the other.

Finally, a minority of internationally oriented groups and actions focus on the international community - the UN, EU, AU as well as international human rights organisations. The proximity of Brussels, Geneva and Strasbourg mean that it is often activists from France that travel to present various human rights cases to the UNHRC and EU commission on behalf of the Amazigh. The CMA or Tamazgha are key examples of organisations that frequently adopt this role. This international orientation means that the focus is on international institutions and the politics of the nation-states concerned rather than on local or even regional politics. It is here that indigeneity is consciously articulated by Amazigh activists to gain a platform on which to criticise state policies regarding the Amazigh and to highlight human rights cases.

The typologies and examples given above illustrate the ways in which a multi-scaled approach is needed for a political geography of the diasporic Amazigh movement, and will be developed in the substantive chapters. However, the emergence of the diasporic Amazigh movement cannot be dissociated from the structures and processes of colonialism that have marked its history, and which themselves are a key part of understanding current citizenship regimes although they are often made invisible by them. Indigeneity serves as a platform to claim rights, recognition and participation for those marginalised by colonial processes. By focusing on indigeneity alongside citizenship, this thesis draws lines of connection between a colonial past and a postcolonial present to better understand the political geography of this Indigenous diaspora.

2.3 Articulations of Indigeneity/Autochttonie

In seeking to analyse the spatial politics of the diasporic Amazigh movement “through the lens of indigeneity […] to identify and theorize the relational, historically- and geographically-contingent positionality of what is (known to be) ‘Indigenous’” (Radcliffe, 2015:5), my approach has required a critical reflexivity concerning the translation of this multi-faceted term across languages, cultures, and political traditions. Whilst officially ‘Indigenous’ is translated as ‘autochtone’ in French (Bellier, 2011), these terms are only equivalent some of the time, and in particular places. As one of the key research questions of this thesis is how expressions of indigeneity emerge in diasporic Amazigh discourses and practices, I needed to approach the term with an awareness of its context and varied
meanings when conducting my ethnography, as well as reading francophone academic work or political discourse. It also means that ‘expressions of indigeneity’ need to be understood beyond direct utterances and conscious articulations of an imagined monolithic conceptual framework. Chapter 5 will look at this subject in greater detail, but here I briefly tease out the modalities of this approach, first by contextualising the term ‘Indigenous’ within its history of use in international institutions and anglophone geography and anthropology, then by considering the French context and the word ‘autochtone’.

The term ‘Indigenous’ has enjoyed a growing usage in anglophone postcolonial studies and within international institutions over the past few decades, particularly following ILO convention 169 in 1989 (Castree, 2004), which defined Indigenous peoples as;

“tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations” (ILO, 1989).

However a clear geography, reflecting perhaps the regional focus of the International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) that was instrumental in shaping ILO 169, placed Indigenous peoples primarily within the settler states of the New World, where several divides could be identified between ‘First Nations’, ‘Aboriginals’, ‘Indians’ and the descendants of settler populations (Simpson, 2014; Radcliffe, 2015). In the New World, indigeneity as a political paradigm has been articulated with claims to territorial, economic, cultural and linguistic rights (Hale, 2005; Engle, 2010; Radcliffe, 2010; Postero, 2013; Li, 2014). The global tenor of ILO 169 was followed up by a series of international meetings, expert mechanisms and in 2007 a declaration on the rights of Indigenous peoples at the UN (UNDRIP). These have led to development of a global Indigenous movement, as minority groups in Africa and Asia, including the Amazigh, increasingly articulate demands for sovereignty, resources and rights as ‘Indigenous peoples’, taking advantage of the networks of solidarity, funding opportunities, and emergent legal framework this framing offered (Lucero, 2013). For the Amazigh movement, operating within the francophone sphere, this translated as a demand for droits autochtones.

The political theory that underpins the concept of ‘Indigenous rights’ in international law, that of overlapping sovereignties within states, has been unevenly applied across states and contested by them (Porter, 2002; Rifkin, 2009; Erazo, 2013). As unpacked more fully in
chapter 6, the ‘Jacobin’ tradition of protecting the universal sovereignty of the French state within an indivisible Republic has been a central theme in French politics since the revolution (Safran, 2003, 2015). However, in French North Africa colonised subjects were denied equal citizenship rights with settlers\(^\text{11}\), creating a group of second-class citizens called *indigènes*. Following independence, these *indigènes* theoretically became sovereign in their own territory\(^\text{12}\). The word *indigène* kept its pejorative meanings and associations with colonial injustice\(^\text{13}\), and so was deemed an inappropriate translation of ‘Indigenous’ by the UN and the IWGIA (Bellier, 2011; Bellier *et al.*, 2017); rather, the less politically divisive term *autochtone* has been used.

*Autochtone*, from the Greek *autókhthônos* meaning ‘(born) of the earth’, has a different etymology, history, and meaning to *Indigenous*, despite sharing many similarities. Little used outside of academic or specialist contexts, it broadly opposes those ‘from’ a given place with those from ‘elsewhere’, and forms part of a mythological legitimising discourse for democratic citizenship that traces back to ancient Athens (Detienne, 2003). *Autochtones* are therefore likely to be the dominant group in a given space rather than a dominated minority - *autochtone* denotes a kind of superiority in the Athenian tradition just as being *français de souche*\(^\text{14}\) does for French nativists today (see Chapter 7) (Detienne, 2003). Unlike with the term ‘Indigenous’, colonisation and colonialism needn’t be a part of the picture. A separation has occurred in francophone scholarship on the subject between those that write of *autochtone* as an analogue of indigeneity, and who mostly focus on the anglophone or hispanophone ‘settler colonies’ of the New World (Perrot and Potte-Bonneville, 2007; Gagné, 2009, 2016), and those that understand it as ‘being from a place’ in opposition to ‘being from elsewhere’ (Geschiere, 2011). *Autochtone* has even been quantified as a measurable ‘rate’ within a social science approach, based on the proportion

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\(^{11}\) In North Africa, these settlers became known as *pied-noirs*, meaning ‘black-feet’.

\(^{12}\) Several thousand *indigènes* who had fought in the French Army during the Algerian war of Independence were assimilated as French citizens and expatriated upon independence.

\(^{13}\) The term has been re-appropriated and used as a radical critique of racism in France by the *Indigènes de la République* political party since 2005. *Indigènes* was also the title of a 2006 French film about North African soldiers in the French Army in WWII (released as *Days of Glory* in English).

\(^{14}\) The term *français de souche* translates literally as French ‘of the stump’, meaning ‘pure’ or ‘true’ French as the stump is the part of the tree closest to the roots. It is a politically contested term that is divisive along racial lines, separating the (white) ‘true French’ from the (black) ‘French citizen on paper’ or ‘*français de papier*’. Whilst not being politically correct, the term is commonly heard in wider debates about immigration and citizenship.
of the population of a given region that was born there (Renahy, 2010). The privilege of an ‘objective’ *autochtonie* stands in stark contrast to the marginality of a ‘subjective’ indigeneity.

This ambivalence in scholarship is just as present in public discourse and wider understandings of the term in France. The use of the term is therefore quite restrained - rather than position oneself as *autochtone*, one would say ‘Basque’ or ‘Breton’ (Lagoueyte, 2015), or in our case, ‘Amazigh/Berber’. Beyond stating that the Amazigh are the *peuple autochtone* of North Africa, most diasporic Amazigh activists have little use for the term. It is instead a tool and platform for lobbying at international institutions via the UN’s Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Permanent Forum on the Rights of Indigenous People or the AU’s African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Si Belkacem, 2006; Maddy-Weitzman, 2011). Whilst *autochtonie* is certainly articulated in the context of international institutions, it is rarely directly evoked in the cultural associations and political movements of the diaspora. Furthermore, the lack of a large settler-colonial population in the image of North American or Australasian states makes the discourse of *autochtonie* unappealing for most Amazigh activists who, rather than conceiving of present colonialism as the project of an alien settler population, see it as an ideological struggle. Rather than being articulated directly then, I argue in chapter 5 that indigeneity is articulated through a set of identifiable discourses and practices that relate its constituent parts to one another.

To approach the question of indigeneity in the diasporic Amazigh movement, translation and interpretation is needed. As a concept, indigeneity does not translate very well as *autochtonie*, the former defined by a history of marginalisation and colonisation and the latter defined by a privileged claim to prior presence. The use of the term is therefore problematic outside of those intellectual and activist communities that are aware of the term’s definition and usage at international institutions. When I argue that indigeneity is articulated in the diasporic Amazigh movement, I do not then mean that it is imported as a

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15 North Africa’s ‘Arabs’ are almost all descendants of Berbers; the number of ethnic Arabs that invaded and settled the region is in the tens of thousands at most (Gellner and Micaud, 1973). Amazigh activists, except in rare cases, would not suggest that North Africa’s Arabs are from ‘elsewhere’, rather that they have been ‘arabised’.
coherent set of ideas, but rather that is has been “inflected and reworked as it has travelled” (Li, 2000:155). This inflected and reworked indigeneity joins a set of discourses, political subjectivities and histories that are specific to the diasporic Amazigh movement, and is referred to and articulated without necessarily being identified as such. The challenge in researching these articulations is one of translating across languages, cultures, and political traditions, aiming to reduce the frictions and misunderstandings inherent to the process.

2.4 Conclusion

The themes explored in this chapter, through its historical narrative and contemporary contextualisation of citizenship, indigeneity and diaspora geopolitics within the diasporic Amazigh movement, will be unpacked in more depth in the chapters that follow. It has introduced and explained some key typologies (cultural associations, village committees and political movements), historical phenomena (Berber Spring, waves of migration) and concepts (citizenship, indigeneity and autochtonie) that will serve as a reference during the following chapters. The themes covered in this contextual chapter are not comprehensive, but rather focus on the political geography of the diasporic Amazigh movement in a way that is unique to this study. The overarching theme of the thesis, that of ‘Tamazgha in France’ will lead us to consider how despite its diasporic dimension, or even because of it, the Amazigh movement both reimagines and contests the political geographies of North Africa.

The broad history of the Amazigh and of the Amazigh movement given here, drawing on secondary sources and interview data, remains the subject of controversy within the diasporic Amazigh movement today: Could any of North Africa’s medieval kingdoms have been Berber? Were Kabyles favoured by French colonial authorities, or were Kabyles their hardest resistors? What was the Amazigh-dominated diaspora’s role in North Africa’s independence struggles? Whilst these questions are not the subject of this thesis, during fieldwork they were constantly raised by research participants in response to my questions. The following chapter details the methodological approach and research methods used in this thesis, unpacking the main epistemological, ethical and practical considerations that guided the fieldwork and data analysis.
Chapter 3: Getting to know the Amazigh diaspora (Methodology)

The methodological aim of this thesis is to develop an ethnographic account of the political geographies of the diasporic Amazigh movement in France; an emergent socio-political entity articulating indigeneity and citizenship claims in a postcolonial context. New articulations of power and place are being explored in contemporary political geography, and this case study pulls together several of these key interests; popular geopolitics, geopolitical performance, Indigenous and diaspora politics, and citizenship. A case study approaches its research object holistically using mixed methods (Cresswell, 2003), insights from which can be used to inform, extend and critique existing understandings of political geography. Such an approach has the advantage of allowing relationships and processes to emerge during the study and permitting the development of explanatory theories grounded in empirical data (Eisenhardt, 1989; Iosfides, 2011) through this thesis, with the caveat that such empirical data will always be partial and shaped by subjectivities and choice of methods (Law, 2004).

Though significant Amazigh communities are to be found throughout France, Europe and North America, Paris is the central crossroads of the diasporic Amazigh movement and home to many of the largest, oldest and most influential Amazigh associations. It is Paris that Amazigh communities from across North Africa call home and Paris where the key cultural, political and academic institutions of the Amazigh movement are based. While there, I observed and participated in a wide variety of Amazigh associativ activities, and questioned association members. The research questions guiding the fieldwork were;

1. Through what kinds of performance do members of the diasporic Amazigh movement legitimise their political claims?
2. How do Amazigh groups in France reassemble diaspora through Amazighité, and what effects (political, social and territorial) does this have?
3. What imaginative geographies are scripted by the members of the diasporic Amazigh movement, and what political work do they do?
4. In what ways and to what ends do expressions of indigeneity emerge in diasporic Amazigh discourses and practices?

Answering the above questions required a methodological approach that attended to both textual or spoken discourse and to the embodied performances and structures of
organisation that produce and are produced by the diasporic Amazigh movement. These sources of data are relevant to addressing the research questions because they are qualitative, situated and relational. This chapter situates the methodological approach of this thesis within the field of political geography and in relation to previous studies in diaspora geopolitics, Indigenous movements and Amazigh studies. It then goes on to detail and evaluate the research methods used during the fieldwork, including a discussion of positionality and ethical considerations.

3.1 Methodological Approach

This research project follows the example of political geographers who have employed ethnographic methods to investigate qualitative questions about everyday geopolitics through performance (Jeffrey, 2013; McConnell, 2016; Loyola-Hernández, 2018), the popular (Dittmer and Dodds, 2008; Dittmer and Gray, 2010; Pinkerton and Benwell, 2014), diaspora (Carter, 2005; Mavroudi, 2007, 2008b; Finlay, 2015) and citizenship (Desforges Jones and Woods, 2005; Staeheli, 2011; Closs Stephens and Squire, 2012). Prior to the development of critical geopolitics in the 1990s by scholars such as Gearóid Ó Tuathail (1996; Toal and Dalby, 1998) and John Agnew (1994, 2002), the field was mostly concerned with explaining and theorising the political strategies of states against a static backdrop of objective geographical limitations and strengths. This materialist focus lent itself to the collection and analysis of quantitative data on population, economics, and the environment as theorists sought to explain international balances of power (Painter, 2008). ‘Critical geopolitics’ challenged this by questioning the objectivity of such geographies, arguing that geopolitical discourse could be critically analysed, and deconstructed through methods like discourse analysis to reveal the unstable foundations of geopolitical knowledge (Dittmer, 2015). Critical geopolitics has been widely taken up within the sub-discipline, but political geographers have been extending its critical approach beyond the purely textual (Dodds, 2005; Dittmer, 2015; Squire, 2017), using ethnography to engage with embodied, performed, and affective political geographies (Megoran, 2006). Whilst time-consuming, subjective and often limited in scale, this has the advantage of grounding geopolitical narratives in specific places and times, as well as better capturing often unwritten ‘popular geopolitics’ (Dittmer and Gray, 2010). As such, ethnographic research techniques such as interviewing, participant observation and participatory mapping amongst many others are increasingly common within political geography.
Such methods have a longer history within the broader discipline of human geography, and the engagement of numerous geographers (Pile, 1991; England, 1994; Mullings, 1999; Cresswell, 2003) with the epistemological questions raised by their use has informed my approach. For example, in choosing to conduct a qualitative study of the diasporic Amazigh movement largely based in Paris I opened up some avenues of enquiry and closed others, delimiting ‘the field’ in such a way as to include certain people and things and to exclude others (Katz, 1994). The spatial and temporal boundedness of this research project was influenced by several factors - time constraints, language proficiency, accessibility, security and finance - but was also borne out of an engagement with the study of diaspora, territoriality, indigeneity and citizenship in political geography. My reading of academic texts, themselves mediated by the suggestions of colleagues and the availability and searchability of particular journals and libraries, is itself a key part of my ‘method assemblage’ (Law, 2004), and informed the design, operation and framing of the research project. This framing is explored in the following three paragraphs.

I designed a mixed-method, qualitative, ethnographic methodology, framed to focus primarily on the scale of the Amazigh diaspora taking into account its urban and digital setting. Paul Silverstein’s Algeria in France (2004a) used a mixture of participant observation and interviews including life histories to investigate what he calls the ‘transpolitics’ of the Algerian diaspora. Silverstein’s work successfully grounded a compelling argument in empirical data collected from the field, and this thesis draws on its mixed-method case study methodology. However, its framing was national even though his fieldwork was carried out locally in the Parisian banlieue and the majority of his informants were Berbers rather than simply ‘Algerians’. Other qualitative studies on the diasporic Amazigh movement by non-Amazigh researchers have likewise used ethnographic methods (Lacoste-Dujardin, 2006; Collyer, 2008; Pouessel, 2010), some focusing specifically on diaspora associations (Dumont, 2007; Lacroix, 2009), whereas the majority of Amazigh scholars to have studied the diaspora have done so from fields such as (socio)linguistics (Chaker, 2009; Bouyaakoubi, 2012b; Touati, 2015), and sociology (Sayad, 1999), using more experimental quantitative and survey methods. Whilst some Amazigh anthropologists based in the diaspora use ethnographic methods when working on their ‘home’ societies (Yacine, 1990, 2010; Ait Ferroukh, 1999; Taieb, 2014), few have published qualitative studies on the diaspora of which they form a part. Current work in the field is therefore limited in its framing, focusing on the Amazigh movement as bounded
within the nation-state and reproducing the ‘territorial trap’ of methodological nationalism (Glick Schiller, 2010).

The assumption that the nation-state is the basic territorial unit within which social and political processes are contained (Taylor, 1994) remains commonplace in social science methodologies, despite the appeals of scholars advocating a ‘transnational’ approach (Faist, 2010; Glick Schiller and Faist, 2010). The problem with methodological nationalism is that it reifies the nation-state, its boundaries and its territory. However often "these national narratives bear little resemblance to the complex web of the contemporary transnational institutional structures within which social life and relations of power are actually produced" (Glick Schiller, 2010:121). This research project is framed around a relational understanding of diaspora, focusing on a “transnational institutional structure”, which holds in tension the local, lived realities of both ‘here’ and ‘there’ without always being mediated by nation-states. The diaspora is not conceptualized in this project as a segment of a population outside the nation-state (Safran, 1991), as if a diaspora is mysteriously created the moment a group of people cross a border (or a border crosses them), but rather as a contingent “product or outcome” (Adamson, 2008:2) of a political project in the making. It is in the associations that define themselves as Amazigh that the diaspora can be understood as an emergent network in a process of gathering, coherence and dispersion (Mavroudi, 2007; Anderson and McFarlane, 2011; Barrineau, 2015). Therefore, the locus of the fieldwork was the numerous associations across Paris and Île-de-France, initially those registered under the ‘Loi du 1er Juillet 1901 relative au contrat d’association’ and expanding into non-registered associations such as loosely structured ‘collectifs’, village committees and political groups. Ethnographic research methods are key for discovering and exploring the everyday discourses and activities that assemble, perform and maintain this diaspora of associations - and whilst these discourse and activities might involve the nation-state, they are not bound by them (Basch et al., 1993).

The second frame of the research project draws on postcolonial approaches (Hall, 1996; Sharp, 2009; Li, 2010; Radcliffe, 2015), to view Amazighité as a non-essential, Indigenous articulation of identity. The national and ethno-racial identities inherited from the French colonialism in North Africa were fashioned through epistemologically violent processes of subjectification (Spivak, 1987) that produced native peoples as governable Others (Lorcin, 1999). Amazigh diasporic experience is defined by heterogeneity and hybridity, and the cultural or religious boundary-maintenance often associated with diasporas.
(Brubaker, 2005) is diffuse and multi-faceted. Open-ended and relational, diaspora *Amazighité* encompasses wide diversity and contradictions, “infused with the rhetoric and sentiments of nationalism, indigenousness, human rights, resistance movements, subaltern and post-colonial studies, and other cultural self-determination movements” (Crawford and Hoffman, 1999:118). The methodological implications of this approach are that ethnographic methods such as interviews and participant observation must be used in order to understand *Amazighité* in context. In a conscious attempt to decolonize this methodology (Tuhiwai Smith, 2004) I left space for those participating in the ethnography to describe and articulate their own concepts of *Amazighité* and indigeneity, to counter deleterious effects on Indigenous sovereignty, autonomy, and voice that often come from research by “inquisitive and acquisitive strangers” (2004:3). This approach also aspired to be participatory in that it recognised the agency of interlocutors in shaping the research, through techniques such as open-ended semi-structured interviews and network sampling (Velez-Torres, 2013; Coombes et al., 2014; DeLyser and Sui, 2014).

### 3.2 The Field

All fieldwork takes place *somewhere*, and the landscape within which it is conducted cannot be treated as a mere backdrop or surface upon which social research happens - rather the fieldwork’s setting has important effects on the delimiting the field (Katz, 1994; Rose, 1997). Following multiple visits (weeks at a time) to Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from 2010-2015 and a pilot study conducted in Marseille in the summer of 2014, I conducted eleven months of fieldwork between September 2015 and August 2016. The majority of this work took place amongst the Amazigh associations in Paris and the wider region of Île-de-France. From July 2016, I spent a month close to Marseille. A further five of my interviews were conducted outside of Île-de-France with interviewees in Orleans, Le Mans, Lille, Grenoble and Freiburg.

My fieldwork took place in an urban and digital setting, and the resultant methodology reflected this fact. Firstly, using ethnographic methods in an urban setting poses several challenges. Urban ethnographers have long recognised that the imagined setting for most ethnography since Malinowski’s classic anthropological work has been the isolated rural village, where social relations are dense, spatially concentrated, and therefore most easily observed (Wacquant, 2008). In contrast with urban ethnographies that focus on specific neighbourhoods (Lemanski, 2006; Thieme, 2013), the vastness of a city like Paris and the
Figure 2: Map of Paris and the Petite Couronne showing locations of key Amazigh associations included in the fieldwork, with illustrations of Amazigh signs and symbols in the Parisian landscape. This map is the author's own work, derived from a base map by 'Metropolitan'; public domain licence.
spatial fragmentation of individual lives as people rarely live, work and socialise in the same place make ethnography in this urban setting necessarily multi-sited and mobile. Urban ethnographers are “always, everywhere, in “the field”” (Katz, 1994:72), but only ever perceive or experience a small part of what is going on. Life in the city is ‘translocal’, “situated within a network of spaces, places and scales” (Brickell and Datta, 2011:5), constantly mobile and connected to potentially distant places (Page, 2011). In contrast with the majority of urban ethnographic work in geography, my object of research was not the city itself (Derickson, 2015), but rather the geopolitics of a diaspora that assembled there.

I needed to spend time learning to see the Amazigh diaspora in the landscape. The premises of various associations were a starting point, but it took time to be invited into other spaces - cafés, homes, businesses - where the Amazigh diaspora gathered, where it constituted itself. Over time I learned to recognise the subtler expressions of Amazighité inscribed in the Parisian landscape; names, graffities, products, smells, accents… Several spaces were described or shown to me through images and media. I not only noted their locations but experienced the qualities of these spaces situated within the urban landscape, building up a contingent and subjective but situated picture of the Amazigh diaspora in Paris (figure 2).

Secondly, the methodology has included an engagement with the cultural geographies of digital technology and the online world. The digital setting plays an active role in shaping the outcomes of the research project as much as the urban setting, but its rapidly changing contours have left ethnographers struggling to develop coherent methodologies for engagement with it. Whilst geographers increasingly recognise the widespread presence of “digitally inflected spatial formations” (Kinsley, 2014:365), methods to study these formations have been contingent and provisional and as such there is no general method for online research (Parr, 2003; Madge, 2010). The political effects of social media, for example, are only beginning to be theorised and understood by political scientists, but as detailed in chapter 7 links have been made between online communication and populist rhetoric through discourse analysis (Krämer, 2017). The internet is a dynamic construct; content, profiles and access can change daily. Data is not only text but image, audio and video too. Websites in multiple languages and links to other websites can inflate the number of sources, and the anonymity of users can make linking back to 'offline' communities or social groups problematic (Kissau and Hunger, 2010), limiting the possibilities for triangulating data. Nonetheless, methods of ‘virtual ethnography’ (Hine,
2000) and ‘online ethnography’ (M. Lafkioui, 2013) have sought to codify ways of conducting ethnographic research online. Hine’s ‘virtual ethnography’ drew heavily on discourse analysis to focus on the way factual accounts are organised to establish authenticity in Internet chatroom interactions, which informed later ethnographic research into authenticity online (Evans, 2010). Lafkioui’s ‘online ethnography’ also used discourse analysis, but through case studies of particular websites drew links between language use and identity construction online. Her approach considered not only text but format, script, media and platform; this thesis extends this approach into the study of social media. An advantage of online research is the abundance of pre-existing information in textual form, which is often accessible without the need for lengthy immersion in a given group or building trust with an individual. However, like ‘traditional’ ethnography, active participation is still needed to corroborate and nuance this data, which in turn is triangulated with other data produced through the multi-method approach. As online and offline worlds interact and are not independent of one another, I used online ethnography only to triangulate my ‘real world’ participant observation and interviews. This was a key resource for mitigating the limitations of the urban environment on traditional ethnographic methods like participant observation.

3.3 Sampling

The locus of the research project was cultural and political associations, rather than focusing on individuals, groups or communities. As argued above, the Amazigh diaspora is an emergent entity, with no fixed membership and no census data, so the ‘population’ of the sample cannot be readily defined. The sample itself, obtained through ‘network’ (Lee, 2008) or ‘snowball’ (Noy, 2008) sampling, was hence a productive way to approach this ‘hidden population’, and generated an “emergent, political and interactional” type of knowledge (Noy, 2008:327). Whilst this means that the data collected can only objectively represent the sample itself, it has the advantage that the knowledge produced from interviews and other ethnographic encounters within the network is situated and pays attention to social dynamics. By following up connections and relationships from previous respondents, I built a qualitative data set that was representative within its own diaspora network in that particular moment. As such the sampling method was not an “instrumental means whose sole purpose [was] to enable access to knowledge” (Noy, 2008:332) but rather a way of producing knowledge in and of itself.
Obtaining an initial sampling frame through key informants was nonetheless required to get network sampling started. I approached well-known and established Amazigh associations for orientation prior to the fieldwork; the ACB, Tamazgha, and Taferka. Once in Paris, I began to gather further contacts - either I was introduced, given a name and a phone number, or linked via social media. However, once started my sample was not limited only to referents from respondents but took advantage of chance encounters in diaspora events as I sought out new informants. I found through my fieldwork that there were limited referrals between ethno-regional groups, so at times I had to reach out to potential respondents as I could not wait for others to make the introductions when I identified parts of the Amazigh diaspora that I was not covering, for example Tuareg associations. This did not mean that connections between these associations did not exist - just that the nature of these connections did not always lead to personal introductions with members or leaders. I also took care to include a representative gender balance in the sample, at times deliberately seeking out female respondents to counter the effects of my positionality as a man in a French and Amazigh cultural setting that tends to facilitate same-gender dialogue and sociability.

### 3.4 Positionality

Positionality has been a key consideration for geographers undertaking primary fieldwork following insights from feminist thinking about embodied power relations in the field (England, 1994; Rose, 1997; Mullings, 1999). Debates about how to minimise subjectivity have shifted to “thinking more about how to bring oneself into the research process through notions of reflexivity” (Cousin, 2010:10) in such a way as to produce context-sensitive, mobile and relational research. Positionality is a comparative latecomer to debates in political geography (Woon, 2013), but as more political geographers undertake primary ethnographic research (Megoran, 2006; McConnell, 2016; Mountz, 2018) the politics of positionality are being increasingly acknowledged. This acknowledgement has meant a critical evaluation of how dynamics of race, gender and class, for example, affect data collection and hence research outcomes, and the development of mitigation strategies to avoid reproducing these power dynamics.

My positionality as white, Cambridge-educated man of British nationality made me a relatively privileged researcher during the ethnographic fieldwork. The power relations and effects of my presence during the participant observation and particularly in interviews...
must be recognised and accounted for, but should not be seen as merely having a negative effect on the data’s objectivity (Cousin, 2010). Rather, the context-sensitive, interactionally determined data produced through such ethnographic methods are key sources for the formation of knowledge, no matter how partial (Law, 2004). When conducting an ethnography, the researcher constantly negotiates a position at once within and outside the group they study (Mullings, 1999), and a reflexive awareness of this positionality was vital for maintaining a critical perspective on the data as I co-produced, gathered and analysed it (Rose, 1997). I occupied a position of privilege in relation to many interlocutors, particularly in my ability to travel freely within Europe and further afield (Megoran, 2006), and the diverse privileges I have due to dominant class, gender and racial-ethnic relations. My fluency in French, and knowledge of certain key vocabulary in Tamazight and Arabic, facilitated conversations and interviews with research participants. Not being French was also significant, as interlocutors could dissociate me with France’s colonial history in North Africa. Despite my privileged position, I was frequently dependent on them for making contacts (Noy, 2008), understanding practices, and learning to communicate (Krzywoszynska, 2015). I began as a complete outsider to a movement that is mostly defined by identity, and this had the advantage (from my point of view) of making me something of a curiosity and allowing me to ask very simple questions, for example defining terms (Sidaway et al., 2004).

Throughout the fieldwork, I had to be aware of the ways in which I was ‘becoming political’ through participant observation. Interlocutors wanted to know - was I an activist? Could I help advance the causes of their movement in some way? Becoming political meant not only taking on the label of ‘militant’ which is current in the diasporic Amazigh movement and denotes an anti-establishment style of contestation, but also potentially taking sides in its internal conflicts. Influenced by postcolonial perspectives, I critically assessed and discussed with research participants the ways in which the research process was ‘good’ for the people and associations being researched (Simpson, 2014) during the entire research process, including writing. Whilst I was keen to “practice an ethics of reciprocity” (Taylor, 2014), in which I both worked to ‘give something back’ (Gupta and Kelly, 2014) and got to know the activist practices of the diasporic Amazigh movement ‘by doing’, this was neither participatory action research nor activist research (Wynne-Jones et al., 2015). I did align myself “with a group working for change and work[ed] with them to achieve it in a spirit of partnership and collaboration” (Kindon and Elwood,
2009:20) when, for example, I acted as translator and media officer for the Mozabite pressure group Izmulen. However, translating their communiqués and managing their website and Twitter account from January 2016 was not a systematic part of data gathering. Rather, I was careful to measure my approach to any given group within the diasporic Amazigh movement in such a way as not to alienate their competitors from the research project. This meant that I maintained that my role was primarily as a researcher and was careful when publicising my participation in certain groups. This was most difficult to achieve online; I chose to use my personal Facebook profile for my fieldwork, as I did not want to split myself between a ‘professional’ engagement with the Amazigh movement and a ‘personal’ profile. When I was given my Kabyle Identity Card (CIK) by the President of the GPK in June 2016, however, I agreed to have my photograph taken. Within hours this photograph had been shared over a hundred times and probably seen by thousands of people. I was ‘added’ as a ‘friend’ by around forty people I had never met. I was now recognised by MAK-Anavad supporters as the ‘English camarade’. Whilst this experience allowed me to better understand the processes, practices and symbols surrounding this concept of Kabyle citizenship, it also provoked polarised responses from interlocutors and certainly changed the way in which I was seen by many of them, as having taken sides in some way. Most were satisfied with my explanation that this was part of my research, but not all. As this occurred towards the end of the fieldwork, it is hard to say whether it would have closed down any avenues of research for this project.

The power relations of positionality extended to the fact that a significant number of Amazigh association leaders and activists in the diaspora are university-educated and many work as academics. On the one hand, this allowed us to speak directly about concepts and problematics using technical theoretical language, from habitus to structuration, and these interlocutors even gave advice on how I should be researching the thesis. As a doctoral student of a well-known and prestigious university, I was rarely refused an interview. However, this also affected the data I collected, particularly in ‘interviewing up’, where the interviewees’ awareness of the research process made them act and speak in certain ways (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). For example, when I asked a doctoral student in anthropology for an interview, he replied that he’d do it if I wanted, but said he would not be much use as we were ‘intellectual equals’, that he knew how to ‘play the game’. As such, I adapted my interview approach depending on the interviewee (Rice, 2010) as a mitigation strategy, and so I have paid careful attention during analysis and interpretation.
to the ways in which my positionality as a researcher might have affected the perceptions and actions of academic interviewees.

3.5 Ethics

Rendered déontologie in French, a consideration of ethics should go beyond duty and obligation to act in a certain way to a systematic deliberation of morality. The ‘moral turn’ in human geography (Smith, 1997; Proctor, 1998) has led geographers to critically evaluate the ethical issues that arise in much geographical work around distance/proximity, difference, and normativity. Beyond the duties obliged by the University and Department ethics committees, the fieldwork required careful consideration of “reflexivity, the production of knowledge and the power relations that are inherent in research processes in order to undertake ethical research” (Sultana, 2007:382). This meant thinking about ways in which the research project could cause harm to the group under study, or the environment (or anything else), and finding ways to reduce or remove those parts of the research before embarking on the fieldwork. Core ethical standards were then kept throughout the fieldwork, including respect for privacy and confidentiality, respect for free and informed consent, respect for vulnerable persons, maintenance of data protection, openness about purpose and respect for the environment. Three main ethical issues arose in relation to this research - interviews, online data and the postcolonial context.

Firstly, interviews and the data co-produced in them involved interactions with people, places and things. Prior free and informed consent was obtained in writing from all interviewees, with the option to maintain anonymity, and not to digitally record the interview if they wished. Very few asked to remain anonymous, as the majority of those interviewed were public figures who saw the interview as an opportunity to do what they are engaged to do - promote their association, alongside Amazigh language and culture. The uses for the interview data, the conditions under which they would be stored and the context within which they would be published, in this thesis, were explained to interviewees and their consent was sought. I always introduced myself as a researcher when visiting Amazigh associations, only took photographs or videos with permission, and have kept such data protected, to be destroyed when the research project is completed in accordance with UK data protection standards.

Secondly, the use of online ethnography as a method of data collection carried with it a challenge in ensuring respect for privacy and confidentiality. Because activist websites are
increasingly linked to social media, material such as text, images and video that one might suppose are private often become quite public. The publication of private information in this thesis or any other research output linked to this research project would contravene its ethics. Twitter places particular emphasis on making ‘tweets’ publicly available, and so using tweets in the ethnography posed no ethical dilemma. However, Facebook accounts are commonly linked to tweets or activist web pages and are indeed the tool of choice for many Amazigh activists for disseminating arguments, ideas and news. Petitions, surveys, and organisational ‘groups’ are based on the participation of individuals through their Facebook profile. Before starting the fieldwork, I committed to not gather any data from Facebook pages other than the public pages of associations in order to completely avoid collecting personal data without prior consent. Instead, I have built up a network of individuals and groups through interactions on Facebook that has been useful for discovering new contacts, groups and phenomena. Interactions with both the ‘online’ and ‘offline’ self of interlocutors (Hine, 2000) fed into one another, and so some interview transcripts involve discussions about posts or comments online. In practice, Facebook has become so ubiquitous, particularly in the world of the diasporic Amazigh movement, that it could not be compartmentalised as separate from the ‘real world’ part of the research.

The postcolonial context of the research project called for a consideration of the politics of knowledge production beyond the explicit institutional ethics formalities. Indigenous people have long been the subjects of anthropological studies that have reproduced colonial power relations by producing research about them but not with them, by them or for them (Mignolo, 2009; Coombes et al., 2014; Simpson, 2014). As a non-Amazigh non-Parisian researcher, I have made a commitment to reporting back (Tuhiwai Smith, 2004), and so I travelled to Paris to give a presentation on this thesis to my research participants and others on the 28th January 2018, giving them a chance to voice their opinions before final edits were made. Before leaving the field in July 2016, I also presented my early thoughts to the Berber Civilisation class at the ACB. This thesis will be made available to the diasporic Amazigh movement, and particularly that figure in it, so that the research contained in it can be accountable to them.

3.6 Research Methods

The research on which this thesis is based employs a number of qualitative methods, triangulated to produce a multidimensional representation of the diasporic Amazigh
movement’s discourses and practices, which Geertz called “thick description” (1973). The ambition of the research project to take the diaspora as the object of study meant that the ethnography needed to be multi-sited rather than focusing on a single site or association. By employing a qualitative, multi-method, multi-sited approach I was building on the research of human geographers who have argued that as all knowledge is partial and socially constructed (Rose, 1997; Law, 2004) and no single ‘truth’ is obtainable. As a result, many geographers advocate methodologies that aim to understand social phenomena from a variety of perspectives (Mullings, 1999; Whatmore, 2006; Kirsch, 2015; Krzywoszynska, 2015), using innovative techniques (Gallagher and Prior, 2014) to build up the most differentiated picture of reality possible. In political geography, textual media remains privileged, but diverse methods are being experimented with (Mountz, 2013, 2018). The specific methods used in this project include; Participant Observation, Online Ethnography, Interviews, Fieldnotes and Secondary Documentation.

a. Participant Observation

Participant observation forms a core part of all ethnography, representing an ‘umbrella method’ (Iosifides, 2011) that shapes the use of other methods and enriches the data produced by them. Ethnographic methods that are able to engage with forms of communication beyond language and text is the most effective way to research the cultural practices of a social group (Geertz, 1973; Bourdieu, 1977). This work of ‘interpretation’ requires some form of participant observation, where the researcher places themselves within the group to be studied, in order to share experiences, participate in practices, and understand by doing (Ingold, 2001). No research encounter can be purely observational or participatory; rather they sit on a spectrum between the two, participation complements observation and vice-versa. I started as an outsider to each association I worked with, and the more frequently I came to each one, the more participatory my participant observation became. A daily-updated field diary, composed of various data-media such as field-sketches, videos, recordings and photographs, was vital to building up a set of data that contributed to a ‘thick description’. However, using these methods in a digitally saturated urban context (Rose, 2016) posed several problems rarely encountered in political geography, where ethnography has mostly been used to research defined sites such as ‘the border’ (Megoran, 2006) or ‘the courtroom’ (Jeffrey and Jakala, 2014). The same social fragmentation and individualisation that occurs in wider urban society is present in the Amazigh movement too. Though a given association might have a core membership living
locally, it was not uncommon for members to travel long distances for meetings. For example, the members of Association Amazir d’Île de France lived across the region and would only assemble for irregular seminars or festivals for which they would hire a room in central Paris. This meant that I was not in constant or even daily contact with most interlocutors. Amazigh associations operated typically in the evenings and on weekends during leisure time, and those attending classes, meetings, or events often had to leave quickly at the end to get on with their other engagements. There is little spatial fixity to the diasporic Amazigh movement, which is mobile, its members constantly on the move. ‘Deep hanging out’, to borrow another of Geertz’s terms, was therefore possible only on rare and unpredictable occasions. I maintained more constant contact through the digital technologies and social networks that have become increasingly ubiquitous in the Amazigh diaspora, as much as elsewhere - namely Facebook and Twitter. However, the ways in which this digital reality intersects with actual observed phenomena is not always clear (Kinsley, 2014); the mediation of social phenomena through screens, texts, and networks producing what Rose calls ‘unstable cultural objects’ (2016) that are mutable, multimedia, and mass cultural. This thesis accounts only partially for these unstable social phenomena and their possible effects through online ethnography, detailed below.

In Paris, I became a member of five Amazigh associations and had varying levels and qualities of interactions with twenty-one others (see Appendix 3). Given the effects of the urban setting detailed above, I sought to engage with associations that had a functioning membership with semi-regular meetings and consistent attendance, so that I could build rapport and notice recurrent and performative discourses and practices. At the ACB, I volunteered with a weekly homework club, attended two weekly Tamazight classes, and took part in a weekly Berber Civilisation class. Though I became a member of the CBF, Timlilit and Tamazgha, I took part in no regular activity with these groups but rather attended events when they occurred and was kept informed by email. I also attended several meetings of the MAK-Anavad, obtaining Kabyle citizenship towards the end of my time in Paris. On several occasions I travelled to and from events, shared coffee and ate with Amazigh friends, which was an opportunity to engage in participant observation of the more mundane aspects of diaspora life. I attended many large events accompanied by Amazigh friends who would act as informants and interpreters both of language and of goings on. Just as often I arrived alone to observe rather than participate, before seeking any explanations from those present. This allowed me to notice phenomena that I might
miss if I was overly focused on the ‘main event’. The most regular opportunities for participant observation were in the classes at the ACB, where I was entirely integrated as a student. I was not the only non-Amazigh taking these classes, nor the only researcher, and I was able to gather valuable data pertaining to the pedagogical presentation of Amazigh culture and language to both those of Kabyle origin and to non-Amazigh.

Note-taking in the field was key to this participant observation, and the online ethnography discussed in the next section. In ethnographic research, the reflex of noting observations as or soon after social phenomena are occurring, whether in a paper notebook or increasingly in digital form (Gorman, 2017), provides more than a simple aide-memoire for the researcher. In the field, they help keep the researcher’s focus on their research (Herbert, 2000) and capture their observations, as well as advertising the role of the researcher to all potential participants (covert research is impossible whilst taking notes).

Detailed notes from the field formed a key data set for the analysis, which could be triangulated with online ethnography and interview data to contextualise events and comments. This included observations and impressions from the field to build up a picture of what was happening, when and where. For example, when attending an association meeting, I normally made some basic quantitative estimates such as the size of the gathering and its generational and gender balance, and some more qualitative ones, such as notes on mood and tone. Where appropriate I sketched, photographed or described the setting, noting symbols such as flags, dress or foods. I made notes of who was speaking and what they were speaking about, and later recalled the conversations I had had with those present. These I either recorded by hand in my diary and later entered into my digital copy of the field diary, or entered directly. This allowed me to include multimedia data, including videos, recordings and photos to supplement the written notes I took. Alongside such notes, I wrote my interpretations, thoughts and reactions to phenomena experienced in the field. This field diary has been a reference against which to check my later interpretations, a timeline on which to place significant events as the research fieldwork developed, and resource for developing codes for analysing interview and documentary data.

b. Online Ethnography

The thesis’s use of online ethnography as a research method built on existing scholarship on Amazigh activism, language and identity construction online. Numerous scholars have
pointed to this phenomenon to explain the transnational and scalar effects of the Amazigh movement (Pouessel, 2011; Silverstein, 2013; Maddy-Weitzman, 2015). However, only Mena Lafkioui has used online methods to explore them in more detail, investigating the “vital processes of identity construction (i.e. interactive semiotic processes) … trans-locally” on French-Amazigh websites (M. Lafkioui, 2013:140), through a discourse analysis of user and edited texts on a sample of websites. Whether this research was really ethnographical is unclear, as social media was not included in the sample, or images and videos, and the findings were not corroborated with evidence from other methods. By contrast, online ethnography as used in this thesis adapts the ethnographic method of participant observation to social media, analysing social interactions not only through texts but also images, videos and other aspects of the social media environment such as ‘likes’, ‘shares’ and ‘comments’.

For this study, using online ethnography represented a chance to test a little-used method within the field of political geography, and to extend the fieldwork into the digital sphere so as to engage with the everyday practices of the diasporic Amazigh movement. User texts, which included comments sections, open blogs, and public message boards, were subject to analysis in the same way as observed speech or text in the ‘non-digital’ world (Garcia et al., 2009). Different researchers have termed this ‘online’ or ‘virtual’ ethnography (Hine, 2000), and have used other internet-based methods such as network analysis (Moe, 2010; Dekker and Engbersen, 2013) to draw connections between online communities around a certain ideology or issue, for example by using the IssueCrawler tool (Kissau and Hunger, 2010). I triangulated the online social media (Facebook and Twitter) data with the data from ‘real world’ methods, continuing conversations with respondents, reading, sharing, ‘liking’ and commenting on blogs and articles posted by activists with whom I had had contact in the interviews and participant observation. I spent on average an hour each day catching up on the day’s news and debates from within my ever-expanding network of Amazigh contacts and websites, noting observations in my field diary (which was also digital). This activity altered my positionality in the field - what

16 [https://www.issuecrawler.net/](https://www.issuecrawler.net/) is an open-access tool for mapping networks of websites around a given ‘issue’ through tracing hyperlinks from a given sample. Although my use of IssueCrawler yielded negative results, the notion of an ‘issue network’ was a valuable concept that informed my approach on social media.
my profile displayed, who I was ‘friends’ with, and what content I shared and ‘liked’ would affect the way in which I was perceived by research participants online. My online research also served to provide numerous texts for analysis of militant discourse, and to inform me on wider developments and news from the Amazigh movement, just as reading the local newspaper has long served researchers in the field building up a contextual panorama. As such, I used a webpage clipping tool to save images of webpages that were pertinent to my research questions throughout the year, which were later coded and analysed in the same way as the interview data.

The clear advantage of using this method was that I could follow the issues and people important to the research as their activities and effects moved online, into the digital reality. Social media and online activism form a major arena of Amazigh diaspora political and social engagement, and researching it gave me access to a broad sample of texts that were highly relevant to answering research questions. I could do so regardless of where I was at the time, and whenever I had the time. However, the main limitation when using this method was the potential limitlessness of ‘the field’. Drawing the line between what to include and what to leave out was a constant challenge, and required care to ensure note-taking using ‘copy and paste’ did not create excessive amounts of unusable data. I did this by using provisional coding categories such as ‘diaspora associations’ and ‘diaspora events’, and prioritising their connection to the associations and movements already included in the research. A further limitation is that platforms like Facebook use algorithms to filter the content their users interact with based on several indicators of past user interaction, interest and popularity, meaning that the online world I was interacting with was being constantly mediated by these algorithms (Pariser, 2012; Amoore and Piotukh, 2015). This not only means that my experience of the Amazigh online world was partial, but that it was likely to become focused on similar kinds of posts and users by virtue of its algorithmic mediation (Rose, 2016). In short, my online ethnography did not avoid the ‘filter bubble’ effect, explored in more detail in chapter 7. Furthermore, as discussed above, the ethical implications of these methods are numerous, particularly concerning personal privacy. My policy was not to reproduce any text taken from a personal Facebook page in this thesis, but to use such data only to inform the fieldwork as it was taking place. Only information from public web pages, including user texts such as comments and articles, are included here.

c. Interviews

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Interviews were a key element in the research and writing of this thesis. A widely used method in social science research, interviews create a formal encounter between researcher and researched that allows for the in-depth verbal exploration of the key research questions (Rapley, 2001; Rubin and Rubin, 2012). Recorded by hand or digitally, they provide a body of discursive data which can be analysed and reproduced in the written thesis. Unlike secondary documentation, interviews are creative of new data through dialogue, give voice to interviewees who do not write and provide space for reflection with those that do. As the research object of the diasporic Amazigh movement is not an externally-defined entity but an assemblage approached in this study through network sampling, interviews were essential for creating a body of relevant data that was large enough for a representative analysis.

I employed semi-structured interviews in order to gain key information about processes, motivations, perceptions and histories that go beyond the data co-produced through participant observation. My standard approach was to participate in associations’ activities in some way before interviewing at least one leader, asking for some information on the history of the association, its wider activities over time, its aims and its projects. Digressions and tangents were welcome, allowing the interviewee to express themselves on matters that were important to them. In total, I conducted sixty semi-structured interviews lasting typically between one and two hours (see Appendix 1). Some were conducted with a group, but most were conducted individually. Almost all were in person, but two were conducted via Skype and one via email. One interviewee was interviewed four times as we always needed to cut our meetings short, but most interviews were not repeated.

I viewed the interview as both a social reality produced through the 'active interview' by the researcher and the interviewee and as a resource that drew on the interviewee’s experience outside the interview (Rapley, 2001), which helped answer the key aspects of my research questions around Amazigh discourse and practice in the diaspora. My awareness of the co-constitution of the interview’s 'reality' (Watson, 1996) helped me both during the interview process and in data analysis to account for the ways in which the interviewee’s responses and engagement may have been influenced by location, rapport, positionality, as well as the nature of the questions asked. This was particularly true in the ‘interview society’ (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995) of the Amazigh movement, where the interviewee’s experience and self-awareness as an interviewee directly affected how they
chose to present themselves and what they shared. Rather than a passive ‘vessel of answers’, therefore, I approached the interviewee as a partner in the research. The technique of ‘responsive interviewing’, where predetermined questions quickly give way to a more conversational style of response and enquiry is exemplary of this approach, wherein “an interview is part of a developing relationship in which issues of mutual interest are explored in depth” (Rubin and Rubin, 2012:128). This is closer to the French notion of entretien (as distinct from the Anglicism interview) which denotes a more relaxed but nonetheless formal exchange. To begin most interviews, I presented the interviewee with a basic map of North Africa (only coastlines and major rivers) and asked them to draw a map of Tamazgha, explaining it as they went. This small instance of participatory mapping highlighted the geographical nature of my project and framed the interview in such a way as to focus on the political geography of North Africa as well as the diaspora.

All interviews were conducted in French, a second language for me and for many interviewees. On the one hand, this meant a certain amount of misunderstanding, particularly in the earlier interviews. On the other hand, this misunderstanding was often productive, as the way in which my (at times badly worded) questions were interpreted allowed the interviewee to express themselves on subjects that I had not even thought to ask about. Equally, by asking for precision on certain points, I was able to have interviewees break complex concepts down in a way that they could be more simply understood and shed more light on the way they thought about the issues at hand.

d. Secondary Documentation

Throughout fieldwork, I collected documents from Amazigh associations as well as the webpage screengrabs from the online ethnography. These included administrative forms, educational literature, documents regarding proposed political structures, publicity material, press releases and newsletters, both in print and digital form. Materials from the weekly Tamazight language and Berber civilisation classes are a key part of this body of data. I kept a scrapbook of these documents, which served to contextualise other data sources and to provide a source for analysis of the material culture of documentation. As such, I do not approach these documents only as texts, but as cultural objects with embodied histories and mobilities. For example, a flyer describing Yennayer was handed to me by a leader of Timlilit association when I entered their Yennayer celebration. I recognised some of the text and artwork on the flyer from a flyer I had received from the
ACB a week previously, and was later able to ask questions in our interview about the ways that Timilit drew on associative networks. I annotated and commented upon these pieces of paper or digital files during my fieldwork, drawing observations and making sense of them, contextualising them. I frequently referred back to this compilation as part of my data analysis in order to contextualise events.

Secondly, I undertook a survey of the French government’s Journal Officiel des Associations, searching for data on Amazigh associations in the Île-de-France region going back to 1996 (the earliest date available in this archive). I searched for Amazigh associations by name, using a range of search terms to identify as many associations as possible that articulated Amazigh identity in some way, and used the data to create a database of Amazigh associations. These were then mapped using registered addresses, and their mission statements coded and analysed. Initially this survey provided a population from which a sample could be taken. However, because the Journal Officiel records announcements relating to the creation, modification, or dissolution of a given association at the préfecture rather than constantly updating a database of currently registered associations (like the UK Charity Commission database), it was not fit for this purpose. Nonetheless, the database was useful for giving an indication, however flawed, of the quantitative and spatial scale of the Amazigh movement in the Paris region, and giving an indication of broad changes over time in the way that these associations describe themselves through their mission statements and titles.

3.7 Procedures for Analysis

I translated my interviews from French to English as I transcribed them, leaving me with a fluent but at times approximate set of transcriptions. I chose to do this to save time, and also to use the translation process as a means of better understanding the data through interpretation (Geertz, 1973; Krzywoszynska, 2015). Doing this allowed me to rapidly gain an overall perspective on my interview data and to begin my analysis, keeping the interview recordings on hand in case more precision was needed. The qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti automatically linked my transcribed text to the audio recordings of the interviews, allowing me to check translations at any stage.

The data was analysed through ‘open coding’ (Crang, 1997) according to recurrent themes and phenomena from the analysed texts. For example, the code “Agency of History” signified someone’s referring to the agency of the past and could be split to denote where
this agency was positive or negative, and “Cultural not Political” was used where someone claimed that an activity or institution was apolitical by virtue of being only cultural. After one round of coding in this way produced well over one hundred separate codes, several similar individual codes with few applications were merged and organised into theory-based ‘families’ linked to the research questions such as ‘Practiced/Embodied’ and ‘Space/Land/Region’. This made it easier to look for patterns and associations in the coded material, such as causality, grounding and density. Triangulating data between the interviews, fieldnotes, secondary documentation and digital material required a means of transforming the data so that it could be compared on the same platform - something that Atlas.ti was very useful for. I coded multiple media (text, image, video) using the same platform and created links between sources that were useful for drawing connections and insights from the full range of the data. These connections and insights formed the basis for the substantive chapters that follow.

3.8 Evaluation and Conclusion

This chapter has detailed the methodology employed during the fieldwork and wider research process, situating it in relation to previous work in the fields of political geography and Amazigh studies. It has shown that taking a methodological approach to diaspora as an emergent, networked social and political institution necessitated the use of network sampling and qualitative ethnographic methods to build up a contextualised knowledge of the diasporic Amazigh movement. Similarly, its urban and digital setting required the innovative use of online methods as well as face-to-face participant observation. Because of this approach, the data co-produced with research participants is at once both uniquely relevant to the object of research, and inherently limited and subjective in its partiality. A more comprehensive study of the diasporic Amazigh movement could take in a greater range of field sites, going beyond France to Belgium, Canada and elsewhere. It could be carried out by a researcher fluent in Tamazight and Arabic as well as French. It could involve closer collaboration with Amazigh researchers. However, despite its limitations, the methodology outlined in this chapter has been sufficient to enable the investigation of the research questions through this thesis. Responding to calls in political geography for ‘new methodologies of the everyday’ (Dittmer and Gray, 2010), it has taken an ethnographic approach which has successfully produced a specific body of knowledge from which the research questions can be moved on. Innovating with the use of online ethnography to triangulate participant observation and interviews in the material world.
with participant observation and documentary analysis in the virtual, it allows for the tracing of socio-political phenomena, practices and discourses across digital and material realities (Kinsley, 2013, 2014; Rose, 2016).

As outlined in chapter 2, the Amazigh diaspora has long been a key site of academic research and knowledge production which has informed the development of the Amazigh movement transnationally. Academic research has a particular status in diaspora politics, which means that the research I have carried out and the knowledge contained in this thesis is not politically neutral. The politics of producing knowledge in and through diaspora will be unpacked in the next chapter, which deals with the effects of this knowledge in shaping spatial discourses and territorialities.
Chapter 4: The making of an Amazigh diaspora

Who, or what, makes a diaspora? How is it defined? Beyond representing a methodological problem for fieldwork, as discussed in the previous chapter, what are the politics of embodying, performing (Richardson, 2015) and claiming to constitute (Sheffer, 2006) a diaspora, and what effects do these politics have on rescaling identities (Charron and Diener, 2015) and territorialities (Carter, 2005)? This chapter draws on theoretical approaches from political geography and beyond to produce an account of the changing geopolitics of the Amazigh diaspora in the discourses and practices of its leaders and members. It unpacks their diaspora-scripted imaginative geographies and the work that they do, by approaching the Amazigh diaspora as both a social movement and a nation. As a social movement (Sökefeld, 2006; Collyer, 2008), its framing processes gradually redefine the understanding of the Amazigh diaspora among those that identify with it, whilst as a nation it is an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 2006), requiring constant maintenance and always in process, with a putative identity based on shared culture, language, religion, history, ethnicity and ‘homeland’. The articulations of nation, diaspora and social movement are encapsulated well by James Clifford:

“Nationalisms articulate their purportedly homogeneous times and spaces selectively, in relation to new transnational flows and cultural forms, both dominant and subaltern. The diasporic and hybrid identities produced by these movements […] stitch together languages, traditions, and places in coercive and creative ways, articulating embattled homelands, powers of memory, styles of transgression, in ambiguous relation to national and transnational structures” (1997:10).

This chapter examines the geopolitics of the Amazigh diaspora through this bifocal theoretical lens of nation/movement, detailing how the discourses and practices of association members frame the spaces of ‘Tamazgha’ at the same time as shaping the diaspora itself. It outlines how ideas of Amazigh nationhood have developed and continue to develop in the process of diaspora, rather than emerging in the berberophone regions of ‘Tamazgha’.

In its first section, the chapter outlines a theoretical approach to diaspora and nation as contingent and processual, reliant on the constant maintenance and framing of the Amazigh movement’s members. As Sean Carter has stressed, "given the increased capacity for diasporas to ‘act at a distance’ […] we need to reconsider the ways that we think about the
nation and its territorialities, as well as diaspora and its territorialities” (2005:61). Diaspora and nation, I argue, are inseparable, but not homologous. The chapter then describes the ways in which the Amazigh diaspora and national consciousness have developed in tandem historically through scholar-activism, and continue to be constituted today through an assemblage of people, organisations, ideologies and materials that frame and populate a shared sense of Amazighité. This diaspora-nation’s territorialities, and how they are changing, are examined in the third and fourth sections. Rather than view “territoriality as a form of behaviour that uses a bounded space, a territory, as the instrument for securing a particular outcome” (Taylor, 1994:151), this thesis follows Claude Raffestin in approaching territoriality as a “system of mediated relations that determine the field of social geography, that is relationships of exteriority and alterity” (1986:94)\(^\text{17}\). As such, territoriality is not “a particular behaviour or product of an effort to achieve something, but [rather] a set of relationships rooted in ties to the material environment and other people or groups” (Murphy, 2012:162), and is consequently closely linked to diasporas’ ‘imaginative geographies’. This chapter argues that, having developed and put into practice a unified pan-Amazigh imaginative geography of Tamazgha, the Amazigh diaspora’s territoriality is now parochialising as it matures and responds to geopolitical developments in North African states and globally. The movement’s parochial nationalisms not only challenge the existing state-territory configuration in North Africa, but also signal a changing sense of group identity for diaspora Amazigh.

Berber linguistics Professor Salem Chaker highlighted the ongoing political and academic processes that constituted the Amazigh movement twenty years ago; “To be Berber today - and to want to keep on being it - is necessarily an act which is radical, cultural, at times scientific, always political” (Chaker, 1998a:1)\(^\text{18}\). These words remain true today, although what it means ‘to be Berber’ in the diaspora has evolved, and is no longer accepted as a singular, knowable category for many of its members. For a growing number in the Amazigh diaspora, ‘to be Berber’ has become a secondary identity claim to more parochial ethno-linguistic nationalisms. The discussion of this changing geopolitics of diaspora leads

\(^\text{17}\) Author’s Translation

\(^\text{18}\) Author’s Translation
to some conclusions and suggestions for further research on diasporas in political geography towards the end of the chapter.

4.1 The geopolitics of Nationalism and Diaspora

What kind of diaspora is constituted by the Amazigh movement in France? Scholarly uses of the term ‘diaspora’ range widely, meaning several different things across and often within disciplines (Brubaker, 2005; Faist, 2010). The cultural studies approach that popularised the term in the humanities (Hall, 1990; Gilroy, 1993; Appadurai, 1996; Brah, 1996) evoked diaspora as a metaphor for cultural difference and hybridity that lies outside the dominant cultural narrative. Diaspora as a “theoretical concept” is distinguished in this approach from “the historical ‘experiences’ of diaspora” (Brah, 1996:179), rendering diasporic identity non-essentialist and hybrid, but also disconnected from place and materiality. Within such an approach space is “often evoked but rarely described as a material determinant of social action and imagination” (Sparke, 2005:57). Diaspora identities are rather understood through the heterogeneity of individuals’ “diaspora experience” (Hall, 1990). A second approach, taken by scholars interested in diaspora from a political science perspective, theorises it as the population of a given nation-state residing outside its borders. Mostly concerned with the politics of the state - its ‘diaspora outreach’ (Koinova, 2010; Collyer, 2013), the projection of power beyond borders (Gamlen, 2008; Collyer and King, 2015), the governance of expatriate citizens (Barrineau, 2015; Dickinson, 2017), and the harnessing of diaspora resources for homeland development (Glick Schiller and Faist, 2010; Mullings, 2012) - such work foregrounds states as the primary actors in defining and structuring diasporas. However, the Amazigh movement constitutes neither of these kinds of diaspora. It is not defined and structured by an Amazigh state, nor is it a non-essentialised narrative of individual identity, disconnected from place and materiality.

This leads us to a third type of approach to diaspora, as process, wherein the boundaries of nation, state, community and identity are (de)constructed (Mavroudi, 2007). When conceptualised in this way, the making of an Amazigh diaspora can be analysed as part of a wider geopolitical context constantly undergoing a process of assemblage (Dittmer, 2014; Barrineau, 2015; Dickinson, 2017). An emphasis on assemblage in political geography joins arguments originating in sociology and the study of social movements. Drawing on studies of Sikh, Kashmiri and Tamil diasporas, Sökefeld argues for a focus on
“the formation of diaspora [as] an issue of social mobilization [to counter] primordialist and essentializing approaches” (2006:268), citing Sidney Tarrow’s description of social movements’ activities beyond contentious politics; “they build organizations, elaborate ideologies, and socialize and mobilize constituencies, and their members engage in self-development and the construction of collective identities” (1998:3), partly through their ‘framing’. Movements actively frame their concerns in relation to their constantly changing contexts, and diasporas are similar in this respect. Brubaker argues that diaspora should be treated “as a category of practice, project, claim and stance, rather than as a bounded group. The ‘groupness’ of putative diasporas, like that of putative ‘nations’, is precisely what is at stake” (2005:13). Geographers have similarly highlighted the ambivalent, uncertain interpretations of national identity, particularly in diasporas (Dwyer, 1999; Mavroudi, 2007, 2008a), but this chapter will make use of Brubaker’s term, which emphasises the collectivity of identity formation that is key to senses of diaspora and nation. It will outline the key processes and practices that make the contemporary Amazigh diaspora and develop Amazigh ‘groupness’ and territoriality within the geopolitics of diaspora and nation.

Coupled, ‘hyphenated’ with the state (Sparke, 2005), the ‘nation’ is central to the ‘modern geopolitical imagination’ (Agnew, 2002). This view of the political world as a set of nations self-governing through state institutions within their discrete, bounded territories has faced numerous challenges in theory and in practice, particularly in the context of accelerated globalisation and transnational processes (Sparke, 2005). Nonetheless, nations and nationalism remain key concepts and objects of research in political geography (Koch and Paasi, 2016). The nation, idealised as a culturally homogenous political community occupying a contiguous territory (Gellner, 1983), but in practice a fractured and divided assemblage, remains central in hegemonic narratives and imaginations of political community (Ozkirimli, 2010; Harris, 2016). Benedict Anderson’s widely accepted argument that nations are ‘imagined communities’, first constituted through the social effects of mass media made possible in early modern Europe (2006), hinges on the unifying power of language (Anderson, 1990). Yves Lacoste describes the nation as “the fundamental geopolitical concept” (1997:38) in that it “refers itself fundamentally to language and territory” (p. 36). The defence and promotion of the Amazigh language(s) is indeed of central concern in the diasporic Amazigh movement. but is this sufficient for it
to be considered a nation? This begs more fundamental geopolitical questions; how does a nation become a nation, and how is that nation territorialised?

The early development of a national sentiment has been theorised extensively by Miroslav Hroch (1985, 2007), who foregrounds the role of intellectual work on the standardisation of minority languages and the development of literary culture in the making of nations. Basing his argument on the development of central European nationalist movements in the twentieth century, Hroch describes three ‘phases’: Phase A, where a small group of intellectuals devote themselves to scholarly enquiry into the language, history and ‘traditional’ culture and so on, of a non-dominant ethnic group; Phase B, where a new range of activists emerge, beginning to agitate for their compatriots to join them in forming a nation based on the scholarly enquiry of phase A; and phase C, where a majority of the population respond to the patriotic call and form a mass movement for national sovereignty. This teleological approach provides a framework within which the intellectual, socio-linguistic and socio-political development of Amazigh nationalism in its early stages, outside the state, can be analysed and understood (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012). It does not rely on a pre-conceived national essence or ethnie (Smith, 1986, 2010), or reduce nationalism to the politics of the state (Gellner, 1983), but rather allows the nation-forming projects of the Amazigh movement, in their early stages, to be understood as part of the diaspora process.

However, the ways in which nationalism itself changes territorialities, or develops in space itself, are not the focus of Hroch’s analysis. His historical examples are of linguistic minorities that were also regional minorities, and so his framework assumes that these processes of national development take place within a preconceived idea of contiguous national territory. However, this need not be the case, and in the case of the diasporic Amazigh movement I will argue that phases A and B are taking place in the diaspora.

To fill this gap in Hroch’s approach I draw on the writing of two geographers on the development of Irish nationalism around the turn of the twentieth century. First, Adrian Mulligan (2002) calls for greater academic attention to what he calls the ‘transnational roots of nationalism’:

“Although it is commonly assumed that national identity grows organically within the territory of the nation or state, I contend that it might also emerge from the margins - forged by diasporas through the articulation of difference” (2002:221).
This argument draws on Homi Bhabha’s view of the nation (1990) as developing within an ongoing process of negotiation and articulation, most visible on the margins, in the ‘interstitial spaces’ where the naturalness of the nation is called into question. Although the nationalist spatial narratives of Ireland downplay the role of the diaspora in its constitution, Mulligan demonstrates the diaspora’s key role in ideologically and materially constituting Irish nationalism in nineteenth century. Secondly, Gerry Kearns’s writing on the different ‘discourses of nationalism’ (2003) held by nationalist leaders on the eve of Irish independence highlighted the way that ideas of Irish nationhood mapped the nation differently; the historical nation was not the same as the religious nation, the political, or the linguistic nation. He demonstrates that each of these nationalisms in reality had parochial, at best regional dimensions, and were open to the charge of not capturing “the essence of the people of the territorial unit corresponding to the nation” (2003:219). The strength of the religious discourse of nationalism ended up determining, to a great extent, the territorial partition of the island of Ireland at the moment of Irish independence. These arguments are historical, drawing on archival data from diaries, journals and newspapers to “extend transnationalism back in time” (Mulligan, 2002:221) and describe the “rescaling of political identities” in the territorialisation of Irish nationalism (Kearns, 2003:219).

This thesis is instead based on the contemporary moment, drawing on multi-method ethnographic fieldwork to better situate and triangulate the geographical phenomenon of diaspora politics as they unfold. Rather than focusing on nationalism as a political ideology, I incorporate it as part of a conceptual toolkit for understanding the diaspora’s groupness. In so doing I wish to avoid the spatial boundedness and teleological determinism of Hroch’s schema whilst nonetheless accounting for the relative lack of engagement with social processes and practices in Mulligan’s and Kearns’s frameworks. In the study of the Amazigh movement, the diaspora is widely recognised as an important influence (Crawford and Hoffman, 1999; Aïtel, 2013; Bengio and Maddy-Weitzman, 2013; Silverstein, 2013), a space of comparative freedom for political action, and a source of moral, political and financial support. Some have directly studied the ways in which the Amazigh diaspora negotiate their place in France in relation to the identity politics of the Amazigh movement ‘back home’ (Dirèche-Slimani, 1997; Silverstein, 2007; Collyer, 2008), but none have specifically examined diaspora’s re-territorialisations of ‘home’, and their effects on the constitution of Amazigh national identities.
4.2 Assembling the Diaspora, Assembling the Nation

“The immigrant refuses to see the [world he has left] disappear, which he tends to idealise and which he tries, somehow, to reconstitute in the foreign land, as if he wanted to prolong an old [hi]story in a new place. If necessary, he reinvents this lost world in order to keep a remnant of it”19 (Sayad, 2002:9)

Diaspora-based scholar-activism has been at the forefront of the Amazigh movement from its beginnings in the late 1960s in the Académie Berbère. Credited with reviving and popularising Tifinagh (Chaker, 1985), the Académie also championed the use of the ethnonym ‘Amazigh’, established the Amazigh flag and ⵝ as identity symbols (Bessaoud, 2000), and published a journal that circulated amongst thousands of Amazigh in France before making its way to Algeria and Morocco (Aïtel, 2013), to a readership starved of material to read in their first language. For Amazigh activists and intellectuals engaging in academic and literary work on and in the Tamazight language, the diaspora in France comprised a privileged space of meeting, collaboration, and ‘memory work’ (Maddy-Weitzman, 2007), which, following Hroch, I describe as phase A nationalism. Instances of scholar-activism in the Amazigh diaspora have repeatedly preceded and shaped forms of wider activist mobilisation; for example, the tracts of the Académie were frequently the formative first inspiration for the diaspora leaders I interviewed who had grown up in North Africa during the 1970s. Though it was dissolved in 1978, the Académie set a precedent for later forms of scholar-activism led from the diaspora. Student members of the Groupe d’Études Berbères, including many linked to the exiled Algerian FFS, were later influential in leading the Berber Spring, and structuring the Algerian MCB that followed (Comité de défense des droits culturels en Algérie, 1980; Mouvement Culturel Berbère, 1989; Hirèche, 2010). In the early 1990s, a group of students from INALCO formed the association Tamazgha which in 1994 was pivotal to the organisation of the CMA (22), the first transnational Amazigh NGO to explicitly include delegate representatives from across North Africa’s Amazigh regions. In the late 1990s a group of Kabyle intellectuals, calling themselves the Groupe de Paris, met in a series of conferences where they debated and reasoned the basis for Kabyle autonomy that Ferhat Mehenni would act upon in 2001,

19 Author’s Translation
forming the MAK (56). Thus, these scholar-activist circles are not only influential within the transnational Amazigh movement, but play an active role in the assemblage of the Amazigh diaspora.

This active role includes the production and transmission of knowledge and cultural materials, the primary basis upon which the diaspora constitutes itself. Amazigh association members are producers and consumers of Amazigh history, sociology and linguistics alongside music, poetry, theatre and literature. A large proportion of academic work on Amazigh issues is carried out in French universities and in the country’s libraries and archives, which contain an unparalleled body of documents and sources gathered from across North Africa during France’s colonisation. Specialists in Amazighité, or *berbérisants* as they are known, engage in practices of knowledge production, curating, ordering and interpreting bodies of evidence and artefacts relating to Amazigh culture, language and history. In the Amazigh cultural associations, their work is interlinked with the cultural production of writers, singers, poets and artists to form the basis of a developing national culture. As INALCO and Aix-Marseille University Professor Salem Chaker put it, “from this point of view approaching the diaspora is complex. The academic world is at play too” (59). This is not to suggest that Amazighité is merely an invention of a clique of nostalgic North African intellectuals, but rather that the diaspora has been, and continues to be, a privileged space for its development and articulation. The very question of what it means ‘to be Berber’ is thrown up regularly in the diaspora context, where the answer is not self-evident, and diaspora scholar-activists have therefore developed and defined responses that have repercussions for the diaspora’s territoriality.

Despite a gradual opening in North Africa’s higher education institutions and the inauguration of Morocco’s IRCAM in recent years, the world centres for Amazigh studies remain INALCO, the University of Paris-VIII and Aix-Marseille University. Scholarly work from the diaspora has a great influence on the fields of Berber linguists, history, sociology and anthropology (Crawford and Hoffman, 1999; Pouessel, 2010; Touati, 2015), for a range of reasons besides the long-term repression of Amazigh studies in Algeria and Morocco. Firstly, the Archive National (situated beside University of Paris-VIII) and the Archive National d’Outre-Mer (ANOM, in Aix-en-Provence) hold documents and images transferred upon independence from the French colonial administrations of North Africa, as well as the writings of contemporary ethnologists who sought to systematically record the social, legal and religious systems of Indigenous societies (e.g. Hanoteau and
Letourneux, 1872; Masqueray, 1886), before they were transformed by their violent incorporation into the modern world (Bourdieu, 1979; Manzano, 2006). Such work aimed to inform France’s governance of the Indigenous population, to map territories to be colonised, through acquisition and expatriation of artefacts and knowledges. Since 1964, they have been the object of repeated requests from the Algerian authorities for repatriation (HuffPost Algérie, 2017). Such archives are not only larger than those held by the North African states for the colonial period, they are also more easily accessible for Amazigh researchers\textsuperscript{20}, both because of widespread digitization and lower levels of censorship. Secondly, academic institutions like INALCO had long established themselves as centres of learning for the languages and cultures of France’s empire, and following independence, berbérant scholars and experts largely left North Africa, where funding and political tolerance for Amazigh studies came to an end, to take up academic positions in France. Scholars who would later become significant figures in the fields of sociology (Ernest Gellner and Pierre Bourdieu\textsuperscript{21}), archaeology (Gabriel Camps) and anthropology (Camille Lacoste-Dujardin\textsuperscript{22}) added to the scholarly community committed to continuing research and study into the Amazigh language and culture, giving a further opening in Paris VIII after 1968.

As a result, students from across North Africa received their training in Amazigh studies exclusively in France in the formative post-independence years. Today an influential scholar in Amazigh studies, Professor Chaker was among the first to gain his doctorate in 1973:

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\item \textsuperscript{20} A broad overview of the archives available in France relating to colonial North Africa can be found on the ANOM website; \url{www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/anom/fr/PDFs/General/2012_ALGERIE.pdf}
\item \textsuperscript{21} “Bourdieu is not merely the intellectual progenitor to this cultural activism. He and his Kabyle students and colleagues have been implicated in the movement throughout its history, as supporters of the foundational 1967 Berber Academy for Cultural Exchange and Research (later Agraw Imazighen) and the 1972 Berber Study Group based in the University of Paris-Vincennes. Moreover, Bourdieu consistently used his academic position in the Collège de France to underwrite Berber intellectual efforts, providing the opportunity for the Kabyle writer/scholar Mouloud Mammeri to establish the Centre for Amazigh Study and Research and its journal \textit{Awal} in 1985” (Silverstein, 2004b:565).
\item \textsuperscript{22} Spouse of Yves Lacoste, professor of Geography at Paris VIII.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
“All the *berbérants*, whether Algerian or Moroccan, know each other in my generation. I studied in Paris or Aix with these people. […] Just at the beginning of the ‘70s I was quite alone, but from ‘75 there were more and more. I was on their [PhD] juries, because I was around ten years ahead. […] Fundamental questions for the future of the language were debated even at this time, about notation, standardisation.” (59)

Chaker now oversees work on the *Encyclopédie Berbère*, an interdisciplinary, transnational collaborative work supported by the University of Aix-Marseille and INALCO started in 1984 by Gabriel Camps, which aims “to gather, collate and catalogue knowledge on the Berber world that was previously dispersed and fragmented”23. In our interview, he explained that;

“It’s not an accident that [the *Encyclopédie Berbère*] is published in France, along with the *berbérant* journals. And *berbérants* are almost all Francophones. The documentary base is mostly to be found in Aix and in Paris, there are considerable archives and texts. But in France I have no problem collaborating with people in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco…” (59)

Lines of communication, ease of travel, finance for academic activity without censorship by the state, and the politically ‘neutral ground’ of a French university allows Chaker and his team to pull together and draw on the expertise of berbérants from across North Africa. Terming the work “a sort of recuperation of history” (59), Chaker is aware of the power that he and his colleagues have to establish an authoritative account of the Amazigh world. In Kearns’s terms, they are developing the basis for discourses of the *historical*, the *ethnic* and the *linguistic* Amazigh nation, spatialised accordingly. Through its cataloguing and categorisations of *Amazighité* and its territorialities, this scholarly work is part of assemblage of the Amazigh diaspora. For example, Chaker explained that although Islamic history was rarely included in the *Encyclopédie Berbère*, he would include an entry on *Rahmaniyyah*, one of the Muslim brotherhoods of pre-colonial North Africa, in the upcoming volume despite the encyclopaedia’s policy of disentangling (and omitting)

23 Author’s Translation https://encycopedieberbere.revues.org/?lang=en
Islamic ‘religion’ from Amazigh ‘culture’. The reason he gave was that the Rahmaniyyah was territorially concentrated on Kabylia, and so was intrinsically, primarily, Amazigh.

According to research interviews, Chaker and many other berbérisants (42, 48, 54) see their research as an integral part of their activism (as do many geographers - see Chesters, 2012; Gillan and Pickerill, 2012; Taylor, 2014). They frequently involve themselves in the life of cultural associations where they hold a privileged position as experts, and are able to disseminate their research to an audience beyond the academy. During fieldwork, for example, the association Tamaynut-France invited a group of historians and Islamic scholars to hold a debate about Islam and gender in Amazigh society on international women’s day, whilst AFB Pierrefitte invited a group of linguistics experts (including one who had produced a Tamazight dictionary) to mark International Mother Language Day (21st February). Pro-autonomy Kabyle university students found and reproduced colonial-era maps of North Africa from the Archive National to support the territorial claims of the MAK-Anavad and their case for self-determination (e.g. figure 3). Sisters Samia and Nadia Ammour recorded, collected and performed the Amazigh songs and poems of their grandmothers’ generation in associations and cafés in a group called Tiyri użar, “roots of peace” (54). Dr. Farida Aït Ferroukh, an anthropologist, gave weekly classes at the ACB on ‘Berber Civilisation’, aimed largely at the children of Amazigh immigrants who want to learn about their culture of origin: “These are people that have questions, often about their origins. There’s a need, and I respond to it” (42). She incorporated her own ethnographic and archival research into the course, which she had taught before at Paris VIII as a postgraduate module. For Dr. Aït Ferroukh, who defines herself as Kabyle, it was important to include all parts of “the Berber world” in the course, to show that as well as exhibiting similarities it “is varied and diversified […] It's a wealth. The Berber world is not only Kabyle.” (42)

As demonstrated in these examples, knowledge production and transmission forms part of the programme of many Amazigh associations in the diaspora, which serve as links into the wider diaspora. In researching, debating, and disseminating knowledge about the Amazigh world, they develop, define and map it, continuously assembling an imagined community and imaginative geography. This Amazigh world is political, economic, cultural and social but it is also environmental, spiritual, and material. Through the associations, diaspora scholar-activists are uniquely positioned to engage in “forging a
multitude of persons and groups into a self-conscious collective” (Levy, 2003:223) or emergent nation.

However, the question of scale divides the opinions of berbérisants in the diasporic Amazigh movement. For some, Tamazight was and is a single language, whose regional variations are of secondary importance. For others, these regional variations should be recognised as languages in their own rights. Debates over the language are very contentious in the diaspora associations - they often serve as a proxy for political debates about the diaspora’s relationship with North Africa, framing its homeland geopolitics through certain imaginative geographies.

Ramdane Touati, an activist and doctoral student at Aix-Marseille university, defended the idea of Tamazgha to me based on this single language;

“if you look at it culturally, then it’s true that Tamazgha exists. It's a shared language. Some argue that it's not one language, but many. This is false. It’s an ensemble of dialects, just like any language.” (37)

For berbérisants like Touati, the melting pot of the diaspora associations, which include speakers of Tamazight variants from across North Africa, represents an opportunity to develop a shared speech for all Tamazgha. Language has political effects (Anderson, 1990), and the work of defending, elaborating and standardising Tamazight has been a locus of activism in the Amazigh movement since its beginnings, taking place between the university and the associations (Basset, 1950; Bessaoud, 2000). However, multiple groups and individuals have, over time, produced multiple standardisations of Tamazight, which remain incomplete and contested. In the Tamazight classes I attended at the ACB, for example, the teacher, Belaïd Addi, was from Kabylia. He had been trained in the Algerian educational system, and developed, with others, his own teaching materials (24). The language he taught was the Kabyle regional variation, and but he often gave the class multiple local variations for certain words (e.g. ‘Sun’ = ‘Itij’ or ‘Tafukkt’). He couldn’t recommend a single authoritative dictionary, preferring to write his class materials himself. Although we called the language Tamazight, Addi never presented it as a standardized, single language spoken across North Africa. Rather than a single Tamazight emerging in the diaspora, regional variants seem to be coalescing: recalling the heyday of the CSPK in 2002, its founder Amokrane told me how its members “all shared our dialects from various regions [of Kabylia] and began to speak a homogenous Kabyle, naturally” (43a).
The following two sections of this chapter detail how these competing imaginative geographies of Tamazgha, associated with certain diaspora territorialities, are mobilized in the contemporary diasporic Amazigh movement. The phase A nationalism identified here in past and present scholar-activism, particularly focusing on language, is rescaled as it moves to phase B nationalism.

4.3 Tamazgha and pan-Amazighité

Imaginative geographies of Tamazgha framed many of the research encounters that are the basis of the thesis. I started interviews by asking each interviewee to draw a map of Tamazgha by hand, noting not only what they drew, but how they responded to the request and what they said as they did so. Some respondents refused to make a mark on the coastline-only sketch of North Africa I gave them, saying; “That’s it. That’s Tamazgha” (2). Others, for example activist Yacine Cheraiou, deferred to the cartographic expertise and authority of others found online: “you should have said, I could have brought a printout” (26). Most broadly sketched out the same outline - from Siwa in Egypt’s Western Desert, to the Niger south of the Sahara, to the Canary Islands. For almost all respondents, this was a historical territory, regrouping peoples with a common language and culture, who had begun to diverge from their common origins long ago, since the time of Massinissa (see Chapter 2). Today, according to most of my informants, Tamazgha no longer existed, or was fragmented and distant, an imagined space rather than a lived territory:

I asked Yazid [Ikdoumi] to draw a map of Tamazgha, which he did. He said that he was not sure if it had ever existed, that he does not have the dream of ‘La Grande Berbérie’. ‘We cannot redraw history or geography to suit our dreams’, he said. There is however a cultural and linguistic solidarity between Berbers, even in the diaspora. But it bothered him to draw a territorial map; ‘Tamazgha is an idea, not a territory’. (Fieldnotes, 3rd April 2015)

The power of this geographical idea within the diasporic Amazigh movement, and its transformation over time, was described in detail by other Amazigh leaders. Yella Houha, the founder of the MAC (Mouvement pour l’Autonomie Chawi), explained as he sketched his map that Tamazgha was a recent political concept, ideologically bound up with pan-Amazigh discourse, and developed in the diaspora: “before the 70s, ‘Amazigh’ and ‘Tamazgha’ didn’t make any sense […] All that was the work of the Académie Berbère.
Behind it all was a handful of Kabyles” (3). For Kabyles during and after the Algerian War, although an awareness of a wider Berber world did exist, ‘Berber’ meant themselves (Temlali, 2015). Defining themselves linguistically as non-Arabophones, this Berber-speaking community was regionally concentrated, sharing common speech, historical and social links (Amrouche, 2009). In the diaspora, the predominately Kabyle scholar-activists of the Académie Berbère, influenced by ideas of decolonisation current on the French intellectual Left, began to insist on the use of the ethnonym ‘Amazigh’, meaning ‘free man’, arguing that a break was needed from the ‘Berber’ label perceived as having been imposed and carrying pejorative associations (Bessaoud, 2000). Becoming ‘Amazigh’ was to be part of decolonising ideology, to paraphrase Sartre’s introduction to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth (1968), free from the legacy of French colonialism, but also the strong regional associations to Kabylia (Tilmatine, 2015). Accordingly, it changed its official name to Agraw Imaziɣen in 1969 (Silverstein, 2003b). The imaginative geography of Amazighité gave the impression of a far larger reach and group size than the Kabyle-dominated core. As a Chawi speaker, arriving in Paris in the 1970s, Houha was intrigued to hear that Tamazight, the language of the Berbers, was being taught at the University of Paris VIII. However, when he went to a class he realised that he understood little, and that the language was essentially Kabyle; “For me personally, the thing was that I was Chawi, but I hadn’t understood ‘Tamazight’, so they were trying to teach me another language to my own.” (3).

When, in 1980, the Tafsut Imaziɣen erupted in Kabylia, the social movement’s demands were inspired by the pan-Amazigh imaginative geography current in the diaspora; recognition of Tamazight as a language of the state, and Amazigh culture as culture of Algeria (Chaker, 2010; Hirèche, 2010). As greater numbers of Amazigh from across North Africa’s regions began to adhere to the Amazigh movement in the 1980s and 90s, consciously imitating the Kabyle-dominated movement (Silverstein, 2013), the Académie Berbère’s imaginative geography of Tamazgha, formed through its diasporic scholar-activism, was put into practice. Phase A intellectual nationalism was translated to phase B activism and popular mobilisation. Eventually, a group of Paris-based activists succeeded in gathering Amazigh association representatives from across Tamazgha into a transnational NGO, the Congrès Mondial Amazigh (CMA), in 1994.

Whereas prior Amazigh associations had been largely Berber in name and Kabyle in substance, the CMA consciously sought to be representative of the entire Amazigh world
- from Siwa to the Canary Islands. Operating transnationally but based in Paris, the CMA today remains the main advocate for Tamazgha in the Amazigh movement. Although its constituent members usually represent a specific region or people within the Amazigh whole, the CMA outwardly represents a single ‘Amazigh nation’, notably when it challenges the representatives of North African states in international fora. General Secretary Belkacem Lounes was clear in our interview: “for us it's simply that there is a territory called Tamazgha, a more or less shared language and history, and a common ideal of liberty” (27). Within the diaspora the CMA’s activists try to encourage cultural associations to cooperate on the basis of this shared Amazigh language. Invited to speak alongside Kabyle, Chawi and Mozabite nationalists at a Tafsut commemoration in 2016 organised by the Association Tudert de Pierrefitte, Belkacem argued for the linguistic unity of Tamazgha, saying that the difficulties of inter-comprehension between Tamazight-speakers of different regions were mostly differences in accent and vocabulary, not evidence of several distinct Amazigh languages. This distinction is key to maintaining the imaginative geography of Tamazgha as a homogenous territory. Only by focusing on what united rather than divided them, Lounes argued, could the Amazigh come together to constitute a force that could confront the power of the North African states. Another CMA activist elaborated on the role of the diaspora in performing this pan-Amazigh solidarity, as she took part with others in public demonstrating in Paris in support of the Tuareg independence movement in Azawad, as well as in support of the Mozabites in 2015. Charged with encouraging diaspora associations to join the CMA, she told me she argues that “Tamazgha is not just the regions, it’s all of North Africa. We need to learn to communicate” (29). Language and communication are evidently a central part of the CMA’s pan-Amazigh ideology, a category of practice, claim and stance that are linked to its vision of Tamazgha and the Amazigh diaspora. Lounes described, for example, how at its triannual congress meetings the CMA is multi-language, but delegates are encouraged to speak Tamazight, and Arabic is avoided (27). This discursive and practiced imaginative geography constructs Amazigh homogeneity against the Arabic ‘other’ represented by North African states.

The CMA is not alone in working to produce a sense of ‘groupness’ that englobes the Amazigh diaspora within singular national sentiment. It was first structured and organised by the association Tamazgha, which a group of students from INALCO had set up in Paris in 1993. The association withdrew from the CMA after a leadership struggle in 2002, and
today continues its pan-Amazigh agenda as a separate association, headed by one-time CMA secretary general Masin Ferkal. With clusters of members in Provence, Toulouse, Paris and Lille, Tamazgha seeks to be “a space of communication, debate and meeting between the different Amazigh elements” (Tamazgha, 2015a). It runs a website, which reports on the Amazigh movement across North Africa, and includes lengthy debate pieces from the group’s members, many of whom are journalists and academics. Like the CMA, Tamazgha submits alternative reports to the UN on the state of Amazigh rights in North Africa (e.g. Tamazgha, 2015b). In Paris, it currently holds meetings on an irregular basis, usually to debate an issue of current affairs concerning a different part of the Amazigh world. Such debates are deliberately pan-Amazigh, as invited participants over 2015-2016 included not only Kabyles but Mozabites, Chleuhs, and Tuaregs, who spoke in their mother-tongues partly as a means to learn Tamazight from one another through linguistic exchange. Examples from fieldwork include when the Mozabite leaders of Izmulen were invited to speak (Fieldnotes, 11th December 2015) and when we all recited a Kabyle song together at Yennayer (16th January 2016). Such activities reflect the roots of the association in INALCO, among berbérisans of multiple linguistic regions, and the expertise in Amazigh languages of many of its members. Other ideologically pan-Amazigh associations which adopt similar practices, and were included in the study, include Ameslay, Association Amazir d’Île-de-France and Taferka. Through such practices of inclusion of diverse Amazigh members, use of the language in its various forms, and discursive adhesion to the idea of Amazigh cultural unity, these associations individually contribute to the assemblage of a singular, Amazigh nation in the diaspora. This assemblage is intellectually driven, characterised by debates and scholarly presentations, and does not have a large popular base in the diasporic Amazigh movement.

Pan-Amazighité is practiced differently by other associations. Several, like the Association Franco-Berbère de Pierrefitte, are ‘Berber’ in name but in practice are “99% or 100% from Kabylia. We would have liked to have Moroccans or other Amazigh, but they join other associations, where they feel close” (19b). Such associations often network with other groups of different regional origins, most often in the realm of artistic performance, for example in inviting Tuareg bands or Chleuh dancers to perform in their regional styles at pan-Amazigh music festivals, such as BRTV’s annual Amazigh festival in Bois de Vincennes. In June 2016 I attended a day-long festival in Montreuil organised by three
different Amazigh associations. Acts included a Chawi-language performance of ‘Waiting for Godot’, a Tuareg blues band, a Kabyle women’s choir and even an Andalusian folk singer who claimed that her songs were inspired by her region’s Amazigh past. Tuareg activist and performer Amoumene Hiadara described such events as “important because they allow us all to share the problems we are facing [from across Tamazgha], and to fuse together more closely, to wield more force in our challenge to the states that oppress us” (51), exemplifying the political edge to this cultural activism. Such ‘fusing together’ in diasporic assemblage develops a singular sense of Amazigh groupness, territorially expressed in the imagination of Tamazgha, but reaches a wider audience, which recognises itself in the regional variations.

More long-term links are sought by Berber association networks like the CBF and the CABIL. The director of the ACB, the parent association of the CABIL, explained that, not wanting to close itself in, his association had called itself “Berber, but we are Kabyle and proud to be it! Tamazgha is Berber, and that’s what we are at heart” (5). When I asked for an example of how, in practice, the association remained open to the rest of the Berber world, he replied “there’s ACAL - a Moroccan association with which we work. We organise debates jointly with them. The public is completely mixed - man and woman, and region of origin” (5). The CBF, whose associations “work together to amplify the message of the Berbers of France, to be more efficient and powerful together by sharing resources” (28) according to its founder, was also initially dominated by Kabyles. However, the CBF’s leaders travelled to make presentations to a Tuareg diaspora meeting in Normandy and to a Chleuh association in Picardy in the spring of 2016, and later invited the Paris-based Tamaynut-France to partner with it in a series of initiatives such as their 2017/2967 Yennayer celebrations. At the CBF’s central association in Drancy, Amazigh artists and scholars of Moroccan and Tuareg origin were invited to animate cultural events throughout the year 2015-2016. So, rather than constituting pan-Amazigh associations themselves, the CBF, CABIL and other similar Kabyle-dominated Amazigh associations practice Tamazgha by seeking to network and collaborate with representatives of non-Kabyle Amazigh, whether associations, artists or scholars. They are part of the process of

24 Chawi d’ici et d’ailleurs, Berbères anti-fascistes and Association Imazighen

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assemblage that defines and shapes the Amazigh diaspora in relation to an imaginative
geography of a unified Tamazgha.

Such networking and collaboration takes work and time from association leaders and
members, as regional differences in language and relationships with the state, religion, or
politics mean that Amazigh associations mostly form around different regional groupings.
Emphasising pan-Amazigh commonality and putting it into practice is a political choice,
with consequences for the shape and scope of the nation imagined in diaspora. What, then,
is the purpose of making such a choice? Two reasons for this from the point of view of
Amazigh activists in the diaspora emerge from the ethnographic data. Firstly, for groups
like the CBF seeking to gain political influence in France or groups like the CMA seeking
to represent Amazigh interests to North African states, casting a wide net over the Amazigh
increases their assumed demographic size, strengthening the case for the direction of
resources to promoting and preserving Amazigh culture. Secondly, pan-Amazigh identity
claims do not challenge the existing order of territorial sovereignty in North Africa, and
are broadly tolerated by those states’ governments. The suspicion of irredentism that has
dogged assertions of Kabyle specificity since Algerian independence, for example, falls
far less on groups articulating a pan-Berber or Amazigh groupness (Tilmatine, 2015),
widening their appeal for those who wish to avoid the more radical elements of the
Amazigh movement. The same applies for Riffians’ relationships with other Moroccan
Amazigh. This is because the territoriality of this pan-Amazigh ideology is very flexible,
and as such Tamazgha remains a largely abstract territory or idea for many Amazigh
activists, malleable to the geopolitical imagination of existing nation-states (Cornwell and
Atia, 2012). For example Belaïd Addi, the Tamazight teacher at the ACB, was “sure
[Tamazgha] will always exist, because now the states recognise the language” (24).
Similarly, for the CBF’s Mustapha Saadi Tamazgha is “a historical, sociological, linguistic
reality” (28), but not a “political” one. For ‘Khadija’, “the question is not about whether to
cut up Algeria, but what's greater than it. Tamazgha is all [North Africa]” (29). Such
territorialities of the pan-Amazigh ideology do not challenge existing state paradigms in
North Africa, but rather have been adapted to them, geographically rendered at the scale
of the existing nation-states.

The imaginative geography of Tamazgha as a unified and homogenous linguistic and
cultural territory is performed in associative practices, discourses and structures which
shape the Amazigh diaspora-nation assemblage. It is the emergent historical product of
Kabyle-dominated diaspora scholar-activism which in its first decades emphasised pan-Amazigh unity as a counterweight to pan-Arabism, based on linguistic and cultural similarity. Today it finds expression in certain associations’ attempts to assemble Tamazgha in diaspora by grouping diverse individuals together, forming a common vernacular and pooling cultural knowledge in a single association or in association networks. This means Amazigh leaders can claim to represent a demographically large group within France and North Africa to state representatives, whether at the mairie or at international institutions. The territorialities associated with this imaginative geography are regional, and as such do not necessarily challenge the existing state territories of North Africa. However, as the next section argues, the idea of the pan-Amazigh nation in the diaspora has in the last two decades been challenged by new ethno-linguistic nationalisms in the Amazigh movement that re-imagine Tamazgha and parochialise narratives of diaspora-nation.

4.4 Parochialisation of the Amazigh Diaspora

“Yes, [the diaspora] is Kabylising. Since 2002, the Tafsut Taberkant, the Black Spring. Since the eruption of the political question of autonomy for Kabylia. We've gone from 'Berber/Amazigh cultural' associations to Franco-associations and now it's more and more Kabyle [...] Because there was an evolution in the discourse that has permeated the real.” (56)

An increasingly common mode of pan-Amazigh diaspora assemblage marks a shift in its imaginative geographies and territorialities, which will be unpacked in the final part of this chapter. Some interviewees called this shift ‘Kabylisation’, capturing both the particularity of Kabyle assertions of national identity and the segmentation of the Amazigh movement along ethno-linguistic lines (9, 42, 56)25. Kabylisation has seen Chawis, Chleuhs, Rifians, Mozabites and other Amazigh “composants” (literally: components) asserting their linguistic, cultural and social specificity within the wider Amazigh whole. It is a rescaling of groupness to more parochial spaces and regions, which Kearns argues are the territorialisations of different discourses of nationalism (2003), and so I term this

25 The word Kabyle comes from the Arabic Qaba'il, meaning ‘tribes’, and before the latter half of the twentieth century was not exclusively used to identify the berberophone population in North East Algeria, but was applied more widely across purportedly ‘tribal’ Amazigh groups.
‘parochialisation’. Parochialisation in the Amazigh diaspora hinges on changing discourses of nationalism, relative to language, history, religion and sociology amongst other things. Saïdi’s assessment in the quote above is corroborated in the data from the Journal Officiel, as new diaspora associations have been slightly more likely to use a parochial ethnonym rather than a pan-Amazigh moniker since 2001, openly appealing to a regionally-specific sense of groupness. Unlike the ‘balkanisation’ of the Yugoslavian diaspora in the USA observed by Carter (2005), where Serbian and Croatian diasporas split over the conflict at home, this parochialisation of diaspora territoriality has not arisen out of conflicts between Amazigh groups. Rather, as phase B Amazigh activism has put phase A nationalist frameworks developed by scholar-activists into practice, they have been rescaled and parochialised along lines of redefined ethno-linguistic homogeneity, both in the diaspora and North Africa. The ethnographic data shows that as well as a singular Amazigh diaspora, many activists now see themselves as part of diasporas based exclusively on their respective regions. This has implications for the territorialities of the Amazigh diaspora, which are being redrawn through an ethno-linguistic nationalist lens. This section will detail the ways in which this rescaling of identity is transforming the Amazigh diaspora’s territorialities and embodied practices.

During the 1990s, a new wave of Amazigh activists and intellectuals came to France from Algeria, many fleeing the climate of insecurity that gripped the country. Many were Kabyles who had been active members of the RCD or FFS, political parties with almost exclusive Kabyle support. One figure who became a prominent leader among them was Ferhat Mehenni, a Kabyle singer whose songs calling for human rights and democracy were among the first examples of ‘modern Kabyle song’ in the 1970s. As an RCD activist, he led a school boycott in Kabylia in 1995 which led to the government’s introduction of Tamazight teaching to the school curriculum and the institution of Algeria’s HCA. He left Algeria and the RCD soon after. However, when the Black Spring of 2001 entered Kabyle youths into another round of violent confrontation with the state Mehenni returned to politics,

“but uniquely for Kabylia, not for Algeria. We broke with the dogma of the single Amazigh nation, speaking the same language - it’s a lie to say this. Maybe at the time of Mouloud Mammeri and Mohand Araav Bessaoud we needed to stand together, but every time has its ideology that hides the truth. From 1926 the Kabyles
were only invested in Algeria, but [from 2001] many began to see that it was leading us nowhere, this pan-Berberism” (34).

On the 14th of June, 2001, Ferhat Mehenni announced the creation of the MAK, a political movement for Kabyle national independence, which is having profound effects on the wider diasporic Amazigh movement today.

Kabyle autonomy was being discussed by scholars and activists in the diaspora towards the end of the 1990s. The hope that a democratic transition could occur throughout Algeria that would allow Berberophones to assert their linguistic and cultural rights, which was strong at the end of the 1980s, was fading after years of civil violence (McDougall, 2017). Several attempts had been made by the Algerian state to accelerate Arabisation through laws passed in 1991, 1996 and 1998, and although Mehenni’s school boycott had won a concession from the state in the form of the HCA, its effects were largely confined to Kabylia. Following the assassination of celebrated singer Matoub Lounes in 1998, Salem Chaker wrote a column in *Le Monde* entitled “For the linguistic autonomy of Kabylia”, arguing that “The objective of the Berber movement can only be the recognition of the linguistic and cultural specificity of Kabylia, in the context of a large regional autonomy”26 (Chaker, 1998b:11). As well as coordinating the *Encyclopédie Berbère*, Chaker was one of a group of Kabyle intellectuals based in the diaspora who debated the case for Kabyle regional autonomy in the late 1990s and early 2000s, looking to forms of regional autonomy within Europe (e.g. in Switzerland, Belgium, the UK, Spain and Italy) for inspiration. In a series of meetings, this ‘Groupe de Paris’ and later the ‘Cercle d’étude et de réflexion sur l’autonomie de la Kabylie’ (CERAK) considered the political, economic, and social modalities of different forms of autonomy, and theorised the form that an eventual Kabyle autonomy could take. At a time when the diaspora’s associative activities were largely framed by its members as pan-Amazigh (Silverstein, 2004a; Pouessel, 2010), these scholar-activists elaborated an alternative framing with a different territoriality.

During the ‘Black Spring’, this alternative framing was a vector of mobilisation, as a new set of Kabyle associations and informal collectives were set up by diaspora activists to raise public awareness in France and internationally, to arrange material aid for protestors

26Author’s Translation
in Kabylia, and to assure their medical treatment in France. For Malika Baraka, a Kabyle doctor who had been politically active with the RCD in Algeria before fleeing the conflict in 1995, it was an opportunity to federate the isolated village committees into a diaspora group to fund aid and development projects;

“It was just after 2001. When [the Black Spring] happened, we really needed to help the Kabyles, especially the casualties. We, as doctors, made a medical association to help them. With the association of Kabyle taxi-drivers, we made a group to take them in, and personally I took care of the procuring medicines. It was quite complicated, but we managed. But we saw that we needed to be well organised because it wasn't as simple as we’d thought it would be. So, we tried to federate the villages, because each was in its own corner.”. (20)

The resulting Associations Kabyles des deux rives pour l’entraide et la développement (AKRED), which brought together a dozen village committees, was one of many Amazigh associations created in Île-de-France that year that were explicitly Kabyle in name. Baraka and a key collaborator Madjid Boumekla were both inspired by the autonomist ideas of Salem Chaker and the CERAK (20). Since 2002 they have continued in their efforts to federate the Kabyle village committees of the diaspora to serve Kabylia. In 2015 Boumekla held a conference in collaboration with BRTV, inviting village committee leaders to attend. Speaking to the attendance, and those watching on BRTV, Boumekla outlined the century-long history of the Kabyle village committees in France, highlighting their role in investment and development but also as relays of information from and to the outside world. Since coming together during the Black Spring, they “are moving from organising for a narrow, local impact to something with larger effects” (Boumekla, 2015:4). In contrast with the pan-Amazigh territoriality outlined in the previous section, these larger effects were on the scale of Kabylia, an assumed cultural, political and territorial entity that needed to “take its destiny into its own hands” (23) in the aftermath of the Black Spring. A ‘Kabyle’ diaspora was evoked and shaped through such meetings and cooperation, emerging from within the wider Amazigh diaspora assemblage.

At a follow-up meeting to Boumekla’s conference, to discuss the possibility of forming a new federation like AKRED, several committee leaders wanted to make one thing clear before continuing - was this initiative linked to the MAK-Anavad? It was not - in fact Boumekla and Baraka saw themselves and their group as representing a more moderate
autonomist alternative - but among the Kabyles of the Amazigh diaspora in 2015-16 the MAK-Anavad’s call for independence was sparking debate and controversy, as the ACB’s director told me;

“we have never debated independence as much as we do today, and it’s thanks to the upset caused by Ferhat Mehenni. It’s shaking people up. It makes people laugh, people fear, but it’s worth debating.” (5)

Regardless of the political affiliations of the activists and associations that contribute to it, the distinctly Kabyle diaspora assemblage has benefitted and been encouraged by the Kabyle nationalists. The organisers of the *Journée de la robe Kabyle* in May 2016 (see chapter 6) drew criticism from opponents of the MAK-Anavad, but one organiser was categorical in telling me that “The term 'Kabyle' is not in the pocket of the MAK. We don’t have a complex about it, we’re apolitical […] The MAK is not in the business of profiting from every event that says 'Kabyle'. They're probably just proud that it's happening” (35). Similarly, at a cross-association planning meeting for the *Semaine de la Kabylie* in 2016, a week-long series of public, open-air events partly receiving municipal funding, one organiser clearly signalled that the event could have no political angle; “No RCD, no FFS, and especially no MAK” (Fieldnotes, 18th May 2016). Another organiser later told me, “If [the MAK-Anavad] gain from [the *Semaine de la Kabylie*], good for them, but that’s not our intention […] Our event, in the end, is apolitical” (36). Of course, such claims to neutrality are in themselves political, but what is nonetheless significant is that the Kabyle framing, which twenty years ago, even in the diaspora, was seen as a radical political statement of opposition to the Algerian state (Dirèche-Slimani, 1997), has become acceptable to the point that such an event today could claim to be politically neutral. Associations like the Paris-based *Association des Jeunes Kabyles de France* (AJKF), with its website bylka.fr27, are explicit in regrouping Kabyles, and speaking and teaching Taqbaylit rather than Tamazight. Moving on from the phase A scholar-activism of the previous decades, their members articulate a common-sense understanding of Kabyle groupness in their everyday practices. This popular adoption of the Kabyle frame represents a rescaling of ‘homeland’ for many in the Amazigh diaspora, and a shift in its

27 Among the youth and second-generation in the diaspora, the name ‘Bylka’, used by popular rappers such as 113 or Sinik, is a reversal ‘Kabyle’ following the French slang tradition of verlan.
diasporic territoriality - both ‘up’ from the village and ‘down’ from Tamazgha. “We’re not interested in a single village, we’re interested in Kabylie”, the diaspora-based president of the Fondation pour l’Investissement et le Développement de la Kabylie (FIDEK) told me, “The ‘Berber’ notion is too large, FIDEK limits itself to the Kabyle nation” (15).

Some associations have been started by MAK-Anavad enthusiasts, such as AFK-Ivry, AFK-Champigny, and AFKIF. Samia Kachir, president of AFK-Champigny, told me that her aim was “to grow the Kabyle community here in France. We need to help each other, grow like a family, hand in hand. For example, the MAK - I’m not part of it, but if they hold a march or need help with anything I’m ready to help them” (47). AFKIF’s president, Cyprien Hamadouche, was open in his support for Kabyle independence, telling me that he and two other founding members of AFKIF

“were more or less pro-MAK, but the others were Kabyles who needed to be convinced. They wanted the association to be called ‘Berber’, but I did everything to make it Kabyle. It was a little later that we decided to invite Ferhat [Mehenni] several times” (45).

In the case of Hamadouche, the choice to call his association ‘Kabyle’ was part of a wider aim to broaden the appeal and acceptability of Kabyle nationalism in the diaspora. Similarly to Madjid Boumekla and Malika Baraka, he was trying to federate village committees in order to concretise a financial and political resource for the Kabyle community at home and in the diaspora.

Such assemblages of cultural associations, village committees and political movements within a Kabyle national framing mark a break with the prior territorialities of the Amazigh diaspora. This territorial frame is far more precise than that of Tamazgha - focusing on a single region, and in the case of the MAK-Anavad calling for national self-determination at this scale. In 2015-2016 the GPK was in the process of drawing up its case for a referendum on independence, which it took to the UN in September 2017. Part of this process, its leaders recognised, would require defining ‘Kabyla’ and ‘Kabyles’ as a nation. Research by pro-independence university students in France’s colonial archives produced cartographic evidence to support their historical claim that Kabyla was only annexed to Algeria by the French in 1857, being hitherto an independent territory and polity (figure 3). This map has since been shared several times online, by MAK-Anavad activists on social media and on its news site, Siwel (Yann, 2015). The clearly marked KABILIE
INDEPENDANANTE, words chanted by MAK-Anavad supporters at rallies and marches, cover the area of Grande Kabylie. For the MAK-Anavad this map is a piece of evidence that Kabylia was, for a time, territorially independent of Algeria, and could be again.

Maps are only part of the imaginative geography of Kabylia as a nation, of course. As Anderson puts it, “changing apprehensions of space” are the necessary ‘coordinate’ of “changing apprehensions of time” (Anderson, 2006:pxiv). Youcef Zirem’s *Histoire de Kabylie* (2013) is an example of the popular historiographical reorientation being worked on by diaspora activists, writing Kabylia into history and territorialising it in the process. In his book, episodes of state-building or rebellion centred on the region such as the ‘Kingdom of Koukou’, the rebellion of 1871, or the FLN’s Wilaya III during the Algerian war, are stitched together to as part of a Kabyle national narrative. Hugh Roberts’s recent book *Berber Government; The Kabyle Polity in pre-Colonial Algeria* (2014) does similar work. Following Anderson’s observations of South East Asian postcolonial nationalisms, I suggest that such historical mappings are “designed to demonstrate, in […] cartographic discourse, the antiquity of specific, tightly bounded territorial units” (Anderson, 2006:147). The antiquity and historical continuity of the Kabyle national territory is further documented online, through social media pages and groups based on Kabyles and Kabylia, such as ‘Kabyles de Paris’ or the ‘National Geographic Kabyle’. These are popular places for several thousands of members to share all kinds of digital media that play a role in
shaping and defining the contours of what Kabyle national identity is, and where its borders begin and end. Pictures of certain places, food items, rural scenes and festivals alongside songs and videos combine in these online forums to assemble a popular geopolitics of Kabylia, intermingled with diverse popular culture; “it’s all about the young Kabyles of France, the news, cool stuff, where to go out, parties, deals on the internet, videos from the week that are linked to our identity” (35). As discussed more fully in chapter 7, this online popular geopolitics is a key part of the MAK-Anavad’s appeal, communication strategy, and, they argue, a source of their legitimacy. This online activity is currently largely diasporic, as Ferhat Mehenni explained in our interview, because broadband connections are only recently becoming accessible to the mass market in Kabylia (34). Diaspora actors in this online mapping of Kabylia collectively and reflexively define a sense of groupness that reconfigures the territoriality of the Kabyle diaspora-nation and therefore the Amazigh diaspora-nation of which it forms a central part.

The growth of Kabyle national sentiment is not alone in the diasporic Amazigh movement; other regionalist and nationalist projects have sprung up alongside it. A clear example is that of the Paris-based MAC (Chawi), whose handful of activists have been companions of the MAK since 2001. The MAC’s founder, Yella Houha, claimed even to have come to an agreement with the MAK-Anavad’s leaders as to the frontier between each nation’s eventual sovereign territory (3). Similarly to the Kabyles, a set of websites and social media pages have been created over the past 10-15 years, dedicated to elaborating a Chawi national sense of groupness (e.g. inumiden.com, chawinet.org, ichawiyenautrement.fr). The MAC portrays the Chawi nation as needing to defend itself both from the grip of Algerian nationalism and the ‘Fus dug fusisme’ (which roughly translates as ‘hand in hand-ism’) of pan-Amazigh ideology (Fieldnotes, 14th June 2016). Such a stance echoes the discourse and practice of the MAK-Anavad’s Kabyle nationalists, suggesting that parochialisation is not exclusively Kabyle. When, in 2013, the Riffian independence movement 18 Septembre under Fikri El Azrak announced its creation in the Netherlands, MAK-Anavad and MAC leaders travelled to meet them, and publicised their support and “natural diplomatic ties” as fellow Amazigh (3). Then, in 2014, a group of Mozabite activists led by Dr. Kamaleddine Fekhar began to argue for greater autonomy for the Mzab, with the support of the MAK-Anavad and the MAC expressed in communiqués posted online. Following the arrest of the majority of this group, those that claimed asylum in France were taken in by MAC and MAK-Anavad activists, housed and given financial and
legal help, and supported in continuing their activism on behalf of Dr. Fekhar and the Mzab under the name Izmulen (4a, 50, 53). Drawing on the parochial national territorialities that are becoming increasingly widespread in the Kabyle-dominated Amazigh diaspora, these autonomist movements are symptomatic of a broad change in the organisation of the diasporic Amazigh movement, and its imaginative geographies of Tamazgha.

Even the CMA has had to adapt its organisational structure in recent years to fit this changing territorial frame. Until 2015 the CMA membership elected individuals to represent each nation-state in North Africa; “ten for Algeria, ten for Morocco, ten for the Diaspora… and five for the other countries” (27). At the CMA’s 2015 general assembly, held in Agadir, this changed. The abortive Azawad war of independence fought in Northern Mali from 2012 meant that the CMA’s Tuareg delegates came to the assembly arguing that for them “there is no longer Mali, there’s a state called Azawad, even if it’s contested” (27).

“And so, the Kabyles that were well represented at Agadir said; 'us too, us too!' . That’s how the Kabyles proposed and firmly defended the idea of not having Algerian delegates but delegates by territory of Algeria. Kabylia is not yet like Azawad, but under the circumstances it was difficult to refuse them, and the General Assembly accepted [their proposal]. So, now there is a Kabyle vice-president, and a Mzab vice-president. There’s only no Chawi vice-president because there was no Chawi representative.” (27)

This shift in the organisation of the diaspora and its associations is happening as ideas of nationhood translate from phase A intellectual work into phase B activism and agitation. As will be more fully unpacked in chapter 9, much of this nationalist activism is populist in that it opposes ‘the people’ to ‘corrupt elites’. The linguistic, cultural, historical and geographical differences between Amazigh peoples that are downplayed by pan-Amazigh ideologues and also the governments of North African states increasingly form the basis of an emergent set of national identities. The identification of these nations’ putative territories means redrawing the political map of North Africa (figure 4).

Whereas the pan-Amazigh vision of Tamazgha could be accommodated within the borders of the existing states of North Africa, the new nationalist claims of Amazigh independence movements directly challenge them. Safely at a distance from the states whose territories they contest, leaders in the diaspora such as Ferhat Mehenni, Yella Houha and Fikri El
Azrak elaborate arguments for national independence that appeal to parochial territories and populations, situations and politics. The diaspora territorialities they promote contest the governance of local and regional spaces and reframe practices of international relations, similarly to the “translocal assemblages of activism” of other transnational social movements (Davis, 2017). Regardless of whether any of these political movements succeed in gaining national independence, the shape and organisation of the diaspora assemblage has been altered by them. The imaginative geographies through which the diaspora understands its homeland(s), and the territorialities that are their consequents, shape the groupness of the diaspora, assembled through associations, networks and practices.

Figure 4: Map of North Africa showing territories claimed by Amazigh autonomist movements in 2016

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that ideas of Amazigh nationhood have developed and continue to develop in the process of diaspora, rather than emerging only in the berberophone regions of ‘Tamazgha’. Through knowledge production and cultural activism related to the Tamazight language and drawing on Amazigh cultural and political institutions, scholars and activists located in France developed an ideology of a single Amazigh nation, which in the 1970s, 80s and 90s framed the groupness of the diasporic Amazigh movement. This framing enlarged the Amazigh movement, strengthening the case for promoting and
preserving Amazigh culture in France and in North Africa. The sovereignty of North African states was left unchallenged, and Amazigh activists rather called for the state to recognise and safeguard their language and culture. However, in the last two decades this ideology has diversified along ethno-linguistic lines and the diaspora is undergoing a process of parochialisation. Amazigh groups seeking secession from the existing states of North Africa have reacted against pan-Amazighité. The ideal of creating a standardised, singular Tamazight shared by all of Tamazgha, as evidenced in interviews, and the dozens of inter-association meetings I attended during fieldwork, is now seen by many as an impossible dream. Diaspora associations and individuals are increasingly likely to identify as ‘Kabyle’, ‘Chawi’ etc., whilst ‘Amazigh’ remains an umbrella term. The territorialities of the Amazigh diaspora are changing as a consequence of this rescaling of groupness. As the following chapter examines in more detail, the diaspora relationship to place is far from de-territorialised, but for groups like the Amazigh is intimately territorialised through an Indigenous positioning.
Calendar Snapshot: Yennayer

“Yennayer is an Amazigh, Berber, Kabyle festival. When we celebrate it, it is our own. It means we have a history, an existence, practices. That's something concrete.

We explain these things as we celebrate” (56)

Yennayer, the Amazigh New Year, is celebrated across North Africa and the diaspora around the 12th-14th of January. Encompassing a diverse range of purportedly ancient agrarian traditions, the festival was re-popularised in the second half of the twentieth century by Amazigh associations inspired by the calendar rehabilitated by the Paris-based Académie Berbère in the 1960s. This calendar took as its starting-date the ascendance of the Berber leader Sheshonq to the throne of Egypt in 950BC, whilst sticking to the Roman-era Julian calendar which was still used in some Amazigh communities, hence its celebration almost two weeks into the Gregorian New Year. Whilst many of the North Africa’s agrarian traditions fell victim to the socio-economic upheavals of colonisation, independence, and post-independence state-building, Yennayer has survived, and today is celebrated across Amazigh and non-Amazigh communities, especially in Algeria where it was adopted as a national holiday in 2018, two years after fieldwork. In the diaspora, Yennayer is a time of year when Amazigh associations are particularly active, organising various parties, concerts, dinners and conferences. The Hôtel de Ville de Paris\(^\text{28}\) under socialist mayor Bertrand Delanoë began to host a Yennayer celebration in 2002\(^\text{29}\), and other city halls across France have since followed suit. As a non-Islamic cultural event for the North African community, Yennayer is presented by both Amazigh and French authorities as a secular festival that it is politically acceptable to celebrate within French state institutions. For the Amazigh associations, it is a chance to bring the community together and renew social ties, to rehearse and pass on cultural heritage, to take stock of the year just gone and the year to come, and to promote Berber culture to wider society. The pre-Islamic nature of this festival is a key part of its articulation as essentially Amazigh, and so its celebration is an opportunity for diaspora associations to represent themselves as

\(^{28}\) Paris City Hall, a large and impressive building in the centre of Paris containing numerous baroque reception rooms, as well as the seat of the municipal government.

\(^{29}\) This tradition has been continued in 2016 and 2017 by Delanoë’s successor, Anne Hidalgo. Delanoë also hosted annual Aid el-Fitr celebrations from 2001.
distinct from ‘Arab’ or ‘Muslim’ labels. Not only distinct, but also antecedent, Indigenous, and therefore legitimately existing within the cultural-political life of North Africa. Yennayer is also an inviting occasion for non-members of associations to attend, and for some in the Amazigh diaspora is the only time they will attend an association event. It is therefore a time at which Amazigh indigeneity is articulated and performed in the diaspora, that the diaspora becomes visible and tangible, and its politics are expressed.

Agrarian Tradition to Modern Festival

Said to link back to classical Mediterranean ritual practices to herald a prosperous and fertile year ahead (Servier, 1962), common Yennayer practices include gift-giving, a first haircut for boys, cleaning the home, and eating special foods, such as the imensi n Yennayer. Seven vegetables must be consumed in a couscous sauce full of dried beans and fruits that expand when cooked and soaked, symbolising fertility. At a time of the year where resources are scarce in agrarian villages, a feast is assembled as a portent of the desired plenty of the year to come. An animal, normally a chicken, is sacrificed and eaten along with the meal. In some regions, notably among the Beni Snous of Western Algeria, these rituals are accompanied by a carnival-like procession of masked villagers that personify various spirits (Virolle-Souibès, 2001). These practices are understood to have declined in the 20th century, struggling to find their place in the post-independence states of North Africa, whose cultural and economic policies blended Islamic traditions with socialist ideals of modernisation. Following the Amazigh Spring of 1980 in Kabylia, Yennayer became a symbol of contestation as a part of the Berber cultural movement’s challenge to these states’ vision of an Arabo-Islamic society. Formerly a family and local community occasion, Yennayer became a politicised phenomenon when Amazigh cultural-political meetings and marches were held, particularly in Kabylia. The following ‘snapshot’ is based on observations made from Paris during the Yennayer of 2966 (2016).

Preparations for Yennayer in the diaspora began several weeks in advance. My weekly Kabyle language and Berber Civilisation classes at the ACB were on the theme, educating us about the traditions and language around the event and building a sense of anticipation. I learned to say Aseggwas Ameggaz (Happy New Year) and was given the recipe for making the imensi n Yennayer. Posters advertising YENNAYER 2966 on various dates and in various quartiers and towns appeared in Amazigh association meetings, in maisons des associations, on social media, on Amazigh websites, and posted in some public places.
Notices appeared outside some Amazigh-owned restaurants advertising free couscous over the weekend. Trying to avoid clashes with other associations, and to ensure the availability of musicians and artists, smaller associations held their Yennayer party up to three weeks late, so the festivities were spread over an extended period of time. The evening of Yennayer itself is commonly spent as a family or with friends at an Amazigh restaurant, eating the Imensi n Yennayer. The association celebrations and concerts are separate, larger events that provide the Amazigh diaspora with an opportunity to manifest itself, and are frequently platforms for political discourse through speeches, songs and dance that affirm the Amazigh identity in the diaspora and in North Africa.

Yennayer in the diaspora, like many contemporary festivals, has an important online presence. Through social media, Amazigh people share images, videos, and texts related to Yennayer, including texts explaining Yennayer’s historical traditions, news stories about how and when it will be celebrated, and coverage of political and cultural events as they happen. For example, activist friends shared online coverage of the annual protest marches held in the cities of Kabylia and discussed the possibility of Yennayer becoming a national holiday in Algeria, whilst messages and posts wishing friends Aseggwas Ameggaz (in numerous different spellings, scripts and variations depending on the region) became ubiquitous. Yennayer parties themselves typically took place in multi-purpose public halls with a stage area at one end. Amazigh and sometimes Kabyle flags decorated the halls, and a space was dedicated to selling Amazigh literature and other wares such as jewellery, pottery, or dress. There was always space in front of the stage area for dancing. Several cameras were trained on the stage, including camera-phones in the hands of attendees, ready to relay performances to a wider audience via social media or the diaspora Amazigh television channel BRTV. Yennayer is a family event, often well-attended by women and children, outnumbering men. Typically, association parties started in the mid-afternoon and carried on into the late evening.

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30 For the MAK-Anavad, Yennayer is an opportunity to organise protest marches calling for Kabyle independence from Algeria, as Kabyles take the day off, and the day is symbolic for the Amazigh movement. Several thousand attend these marches each year, though they are much smaller than the marches of Tafsut in April.
Speeches

Every Yennayer event involved at least one speech by the association’s leader, and often visiting dignitaries. Speeches started in Tamazight - Azul Fellawen Azul Fellakunt (hello/welcome to all men and all women) - but continued in French, giving an account of the year gone by and hopes for the year to come. In 2016, the recent Daesh attacks in Paris dominated these speeches, and orators contrasted the threat of radical Islam with the secular, Republican values and successful integration of the Amazigh community in France. Houria Labou, president of an Amazigh association explained how “often we name our events depending on hot topics in the news, for example this year we called in ‘the Berber New Year of tolerance’ after the attacks in November” (39). These themes were particularly present at events attended by local French politicians, where the contribution of the Amazigh to French society was lauded. Mustapha Saadi, a prominent politician of Amazigh origin who grew up in Algeria, emphatically declared in his speech at the Centre Culturel Berbère; “The French republic is us. We shouldn’t have a complex about saying ‘I am French’” (Fieldnotes, 17th January 2016). Speeches equally turned towards North Africa, celebrating developments such as the constitutional officialisation of Tamazight in Algeria (to applause and ululation) but reminding listeners of the repression suffered by Amazigh people - for example the Mozabite prisoners or the Tuaregs in Mali living under occupation. This political performance was most evident at the Hôtel de Ville, where not only the Mayor of Paris but also representatives from the Moroccan, Algerian and Malian embassy were present on stage. Expressing resistance to this ‘appropriation’ by the state, Amazigh and Kabyle flags were on show in the crowd, and many Amazigh activists were critical of the inclusion of North African state representatives in the soirée, boycotting the event and starting a petition to the Mayor to have them uninvited. Although the ‘purely cultural’ credentials of the event were extolled to justify the presence of French state representatives, themselves under scrutiny to maintain laïcité, the traditional rites of Yennayer itself were barely discussed in any speeches, if discussed at all.

Poetry, Story-telling and Songs

It is through poetry, story-telling, and songs that Yennayer is more likely to be evoked. At one event, we sang a traditional Kabyle song altogether that would be sung by the women preparing the Yennayer feast in village societies. The song ran through the work to be done through the year - planting, building, pruning, harvesting, preserving and so on. By singing
through these future activities on the day of Yennayer, they symbolically protected them from failure. Though the song’s lyrics were no longer relevant to their everyday lives, the diaspora Amazigh could be transported in their imaginations (back) to their home village through the song, reconnecting the Yennayer festival with these homely spaces. At other celebrations, all-female choirs sang traditional songs such as this as a performance. These songs were sung in Tamazight, and were familiar to older audiences who had grown up in the relevant region. Similarly, some associations had a time of story-telling, in which some of the many myths and tales surrounding Yennayer were told to children present. These tales often featured Tamyart n Yennayer, the old woman of Yennayer, who cursed the winter and was frozen in the snow. In contrast with the songs, these stories were told in French. Most commonly one or several artists took to the stage to perform a range of both traditional and modern Amazigh songs, often including protest songs. The songs of Matoub Lounes and Idir, both iconic singers of the Amazigh movement in Algeria, were particularly popular to Kabyle audiences who often sang along. These songs were about struggle and the injustice of the state (e.g. Monsieur le President, Matoub Lounes), but were also melancholic odes to better times and idealised village life (e.g. Vava Inouva, Idir). In the Kabyle-dominated diaspora of Paris Yennayer was mostly celebrated in Kabyle style, but the music segment often included Moroccan or Tuareg bands and troupes, emphasising the pan-Amazigh nature of the festival. Songs were always sung in Tamazight. As at all Amazigh festivals, the audience participated through ululation, hand clapping, and dancing.

Dance

Women and children were particularly likely to dance, and dancing formed a part of the spectacle. Most women in attendance wore the traditional dress\(^3\) with a tasselled belt, and danced by vigorously shaking their hips, keeping their upper bodies quite still. Some took an Amazigh flag and wrapped it around their waist. Children were encouraged to dance by their families, often wearing their traditional dress too. One association had the children

\(^{3}\) Amazigh ‘traditional dress’ varies depending on the region, but for women involves a variation on the theme of bright colours and distinctive Amazigh geometric patterns, with a fabric belt around the waist. Amazigh women also often wear headscarves, but unlike the hijab these rarely cover the whole head. Male ‘traditional dress’ is the ‘burnous’, a full-length woolen or camel-hair cloak with a hood. The burnous is rarely seen in the Amazigh diaspora, whilst women’s dress is extremely common.
put on a mini-fashion show of the traditional dress they were wearing. Men, the majority of whom did not generally wear traditional dress, did dance together with women (generally the Arabic/Islamic custom is to dance separately) but were more likely to watch, be a part of the band or sound team, or wider organisation. All generations danced together. Wearing traditional dress embellished with Amazigh symbols such as the *Aza* (★★) or the
*Tizerzai*\(^{32}\) and dancing in an Amazigh style, these dancers embody the political discourse of Amazigh specificity distinct from a supposed Arabic/Islamic culture; “we celebrate *Yennayer* - you'll not see a veiled woman there […] Religion doesn't come in to make the law” (45). That this embodiment is gendered is not coincidental (Staeheli *et al.*, 2004); the role of Amazigh women in transmitting most aspects of culture and language through her bodily practices is admired, whilst a man’s ability to speak well in public is valued highly. *Yennayer* is, then, an agrarian festival, traditionally celebrated in the home with family, that has become a key event for the diasporic Amazigh movement. The practices of its celebration today are much more politically-focused than in the past, and have also been adapted to the diasporic, modern and urban context. Association members and leaders alike expressed a desire not to simply celebrate *Yennayer* in a ‘folkloric’ way, all dancing and singing with no substance. However, rather than coming from the agrarian practices of *Yennayer* they imagined or remembered being practiced in the village, this substance came from a political discourse in speeches, songs and dancing. However, part of its appeal is that it can be treated as a purely cultural, secular and apolitical event, which both allows local politicians to participate and attracts wider participation from the Amazigh population in France.

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\(^{32}\) An Amazigh brooch that fastens the dress at the shoulder. *Tizerzai* are very rarely used today, but retain a symbolic importance and are worn as pendants, earrings, or as print patterns.
Chapter 5: Articulations of Amazigh Indigeneity

If the Amazigh diaspora continually remakes its relationship to territory beyond and parallel to the state through a process of assemblage as argued in chapter 4, its postcolonial context must form a part of this assemblage. An examination of this context leads to the concept of indigeneity as a political positioning, performed by the diasporic Amazigh movement through the discourses and practices of its members. A range of academic (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011; Pouessel, 2011; Oiry-Varacca, 2013) and grey literature (Vinding and Mikkelsen, 2016; UN-DESA, 2017) to date identifies the Amazigh as the Indigenous people of North Africa, although this status so far has no legal meaning in its postcolonial states (e.g. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, 2014). Drawing on anthropological scholarship that has sought to theorise the politics of indigeneity in relation to place (Li, 2000, 2010, 2014, Clifford, 2001, 2013), this chapter draws on the terminology and approach of Stuart Hall’s ‘articulation theory’ (1988, 1990, 1996) to describe and theorise the diasporic Amazigh movement’s relational political geography. Breaking with the reductive assumption that Indigenous attachments to place must necessarily entail continuous residence, this chapter extends Clifford’s theorisation of ‘Indigenous diaspora’, which points to the “complexly routed and rooted experiences” (2013:83) of both Indigenous and diasporic consciousness where “diasporic displacements, memories, networks, and reidentifications are recognised as integral to tribal, aboriginal, native survival and dynamism” (2013:71). Clifford suggests that scholarship on Indigenous politics should engage with populations “on the edge” in the urban, international, diaspora environment - which this thesis is well placed to do. This chapter unpacks the ways in which Indigenous articulations are (re)produced in the Amazigh diaspora, demonstrating the range of answers to the question ‘are the Amazigh Indigenous?’, and that those answers are to be found in various contexts and forms. For the leaders of the Amazigh associations of the diaspora, indigeneity is not a given, but rather is articulated through a range of discourses and practices. By contextualising and theorising the work that these articulations do, this chapter aims to shed light on a set of complex relationships to place and mobility made possible in a postcolonial diaspora.

A politics of identification is tightly bound up in policy and scholarly responses to indigeneity (Forte, 2013). Definitions of indigeneity can be essentialist or anti-essentialist: they can either conceive of identity as a pre-existent reality marked out by continuity,
cultural survival and strong ethnic traits or as a continuous production which is never complete and always in process. In this chapter, and indeed in the wider thesis, this distinction between the reified difference of cultures and identities and the deconstruction of that difference is understood through Stuart Hall’s concept of articulation (1990). Hall proposed his neo-Gramscian approach as a way of understanding how seemingly disparate “ideological elements come, under certain conditions, to cohere together within a discourse” (1996:141). Articulation, itself a play on the word’s dual meaning (‘to speak’ and ‘to join’ as in an ‘articulated lorry’), refers to “the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time” (Hall, 1996:141). Articulation is achieved discursively and politically (and not necessarily consciously), with the consequence that a range of ‘different’ positions may be linked so that “people begin to recognise themselves in all of them” (Hall, 1988:61). Such a perspective offers a way of dealing with the tendency in approaches to indigeneity to either reify cultural difference and therefore seek to establish things like ‘authenticity’ (Garoutte and Snipp, 2013; Gagné, 2016) or to see it as purely ‘invented’ or ‘constructed’ and therefore meaningless or dangerous (Kuper, 2003; Amselle, 2011, 2012). It does so by both recognising the “capacity of new political discourses to articulate themselves on and through the fractured, necessarily contradictory structures or formed subjectivities” (Hall, 1988:48), in other words the ability of already-formed structures to be transformed and interlinked in dynamic new ways, within the limitations imposed by those structures. Tania Murray-Li used exactly this theoretical terminology to outline her view of indigeneity, writing that:

“a group's self-identification as tribal or indigenous is not natural or inevitable, but neither is it simply invented, adopted, or imposed. It is, rather, a positioning which draws upon historically sedimented practices, landscapes, and repertoires of meaning, and emerges through particular patterns of engagement and struggle. The conjunctures at which (some) people come to identify themselves as indigenous, […] are the contingent products of agency and the cultural and political work of articulation” (Li, 2000:151, emphasis in original).

This chapter provides a geography of this articulation in the relational positionings and embodiments of the diasporic Amazigh movement’s everyday geopolitics. One of the potential limitations of the articulation approach is that it can quickly become focused on discursive representations and not account for the practiced, situated and embodied ways
in which Indigenous subjectivity is produced (Radcliffe, 2017). To balance against this tendency, this chapter draws on the language of performance as modelled in recent ethnographic work in political geography (Jeffrey, 2013; McConnell, 2016), and specifically in relation to Indigenous peoples (Turnbull, 2004; Glowczewski and Henry, 2011; Oiry-Varacca, 2013; Loyola-Hernández, 2018). Performances are “explored as practices rather than expressions of essential identities” (Jeffrey, 2013:6) wherein subjectivities and relationships are repeatedly reworked through embodied and situated actions and processes. Indigeneity is performative and embedded in wider fields of power; as Hunt writes “Indigeneity is not just as idea. It is not just words on a screen, theorizations, discourse analysis or a series of case studies. Indigeneity is also lived, practiced and relational” (2014:29). As this chapter demonstrates, performing Indigeneity is an embodied legitimising practice in the Amazigh movement that gives Amazigh leaders a voice and a visibility related to a status and a quality as Indigenous, ‘culturally authentic’ and therefore within the bounds of acceptable difference in French society. However, taking Radcliffe’s assessment that “geography remains deeply complicit in producing essentializing and de-contextualized representations” in relation to Indigenous peoples seriously, this chapter seeks to consistently decentre “any straightforward category or containment of ‘Indigenous peoples’” and instead “theorize the relational, historically- and geographically-contingent positionality of what is (known to be) ‘Indigenous’” (2015:5).

The chapter is organised into four sections. Using Tuhiwai Smith’s twenty-five ‘Indigenous projects’ (2004) as a non-prescriptive starting point for organising the ethnographic data, this chapter identifies a series of positionings within the articulation of indigeneity in the diasporic Amazigh movement, grouped into four clusters. The first cluster focuses on how some Amazigh leaders position the movement within wider, global constellations of Indigenous peoples, drawing comparisons and similarities between their own situations and struggles and those of Australian Aborigines or American First Nations and European ethno-linguistic minorities. Following on from this are positionings of Amazigh culture and people as colonised by ‘Arabo-Islamism’, as diaspora members decry underdevelopment and episodes of violent repression in their home regions. They frame their own diaspora experience in terms of exile and alienation, a source of anxiety for diaspora members, whose ‘double consciousness’ and ‘double absence’ is linked to their lived experiences of colonialism. The third cluster examined in this chapter regroups positionings that rely on the definition of the Indigenous ‘self’ against the non-Indigenous
Amazigh difference is performed in the diaspora through public displays of ‘traditional’ costumes, which articulate with gendered subjectivities, and public utterances of Tamazight. Such performance is very selective - the strong value of integration in wider society widely held in the Amazigh diaspora means that ostentatious demonstrations of Amazighité only punctuate the diaspora’s everyday business of blending in at circumscribed times and places. Finally, the chapter examines village territoriality as an Indigenous positioning, expressed through the continued importance of village connections, forms of village sociability and politics, habitation, and a strong tradition of repatriating the deceased to be buried with their ancestors in their ‘home village’. This territoriality is practiced as much as it is discursive, not only in the repatriation of the dead, but in the organisation of village committees and their emotional and financial investment in the village environment.

The adoption of an Indigenous positioning is not a given, however. Some Amazigh association leaders indeed reject the label ‘autochtone’ outright, arguing that it is not appropriate for the Amazigh as it essentialises them, placing them in what some leaders have termed an ‘ethnic ghetto’. Others defend a sense of nomadism in relation to place as a hallmark of Amazigh identity, contrasting their idealised ability to travel and integrate seamlessly with the weakness, vulnerability and backwardness of those ‘autochtones’ that never leave the place where they were born. Rather than understanding them as anti-Indigenous discourses (Forte, 2013), I will seek to demonstrate that these exceptions are due to the essentialist connotations that ‘autochtonie’ has in the French language, and rather than running contrary to the Amazigh diaspora’s Indigenous discourses and practices, reinforce their anti-essentialism.

5.1 Enrolling the Amazigh in the Global Indigenous Movement

The most self-evident articulation of indigeneity to be found in the diasporic Amazigh movement is with what has been termed the Global Indigenous Movement (Morgan, 2007; Kemner, 2011). Belkacem Lounes, the CMA’s secretary general, told me that many of its activists had first met “under the guise of indigeneity at the UN” in the early 1990s when the issue of Indigenous rights was gaining momentum (Brysk, 2000);

Q. “Is that where the CMA began to take form?

A. Yes, exactly. These first Indigenous meetings, even though we all already had the idea of the Amazighité of North Africa […] But we didn't know how to reach
Amazigh delegates like French député\textsuperscript{33} Belkacem Lounes, human rights lawyer Hassan Id Balkassm or activist Kamira Naït Sid attend meetings such as the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (of which the current chair, Mariam Wallet Aboubakrine, is Tuareg), the UN Human Rights Council’s Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, or the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, where they network with and are exposed to the political arguments of Indigenous delegates from across the globe. They have been able to use these mechanisms, institutions and infrastructures as a platform for promoting the concerns of the Amazigh movement; attending meetings, representing the Amazigh at international fora, giving and receiving statements of solidarity with other Indigenous leaders and activists, and bringing human rights cases to the attention of relevant experts, thereby putting pressure on the states in question over their legal and diplomatic commitments regarding those rights. Histories of colonisation at the hands of state and corporate actors are told and compared within this transnational social field (Andolina \textit{et al.}, 2009).

These comparisons between the Amazigh struggle and that of Indigenous peoples globally are then repeated, articulated in the associations of the diasporic Amazigh movement which are the focus of this thesis\textsuperscript{34}. Each comparison serves a purpose in the discursive positioning of the Amazigh, as not all Indigenous peoples and geographies are equal (Coombes \textit{et al.}, 2012). For example, Chawi autonomist Yella Houha said; “the Chawis, if I can permit myself to make a comparison… we are the Indians of Algeria. We had an immense territory, but we now have nothing – no language, no recognition of our identity – we are the Apaches of Algeria” (3) whilst Ahmed Amrioui, president of the Kabyle diaspora foundation FIDEK, explained that “The Amazigh are the Aborigines of North Africa” (15). These comparisons serve to emphasise the dispossession and victimisation of the Amazigh as they focus on Indigenous peoples whose struggles with and near-

\textsuperscript{33} An elected member of France’s \textit{Assemblée Nationale}

\textsuperscript{34} This research project also articulated indigeneity with the Amazigh, of course. In one interview with Mozabite activist Mohammed Dabouz, I asked “Have you heard of UNDRIP”, to which he replied “No, but that could be useful” (4a)
extermination by European settlers are well-known and dramatic (Morgensen, 2011). On the other hand, Mohamed Bennana, a Moroccan Amazigh association leader who told me he had visited an Inuit reserve in Labrador, said he would “prefer to speak in terms of ‘First Nations’ … like the Inuit” (21). Bennana’s comparison served rather to assert the potential for more effective political recognition and autonomy through the discourse of Indigenous rights, as the Inuit have achieved to a comparatively high degree in Canada. Though he said he had no illusions as to the difficulties of life on an Inuit reserve, Mohammed also recognised the economic and political rights that Indigenous groups in Canada had vis-à-vis the state. Whatever their emphasis, these comparisons position the Amazigh within the constellation of Indigenous peoples worldwide (Silverstein, 2015). For Bennana, this positioning legitimises Amazigh claims to the rights associated with Indigenous peoples. He explained the articulation of indigeneity as part of a political evolution from a cultural, to a political/economic, to a regional/territorial struggle, where the Amazigh movement in North Africa has begun to position itself as Indigenous in order to claim territorial rights after decades of cultural and later political/economic activism (Oiry-Varacca, 2013). Similarly, Cyprien Hamadouche, a Kabyle association president and open supporter of the MAK-Anavad, argued that “[the issue of] independence goes past Algeria, to the UN and its statutes for Indigenous peoples” (45).

Rahma Houzig, president of Tamaynut-France, described how attending a meeting of the Femmes Autochtones d’Afrique held in her native Agadir in 1998 was a formative experience for her in terms of building links across Tamazgha; “I have friends in Libya and in Egypt, luckily. In 1998 we did an event in Agadir on ‘Les Femmes Autochtones’ that gathered women from across Tamazgha. It was a shared moment. We shared things like clothes, jewellery, songs” (25). This ‘shared moment’ of transnational networking is just one example of many instances where Amazigh leaders have been exposed to and participated in wider Indigenous networks and discourses, and for Houzig has prompted her to approach other cultural groups in her association’s locality with the aim of building intercultural cooperation and solidarity. In these instances, Amazigh leaders articulate indigeneity as if it were a fixed and knowable quality rather than viewing indigeneity as constantly being constantly (re-)made; they are Indigenous by association. Like the ‘reloaded boomerang’ of neoliberal Indigenous development policies in Latin America (Andolina et al., 2009), the global Indigenous discourse articulates with key parts of the
Amazigh movement’s agenda but does not fit with others, leading some to reject it as we will see later in the chapter.

A similar and parallel articulation is made through performances of inter-community solidarity with other ethnic minorities. In France, Amazigh association members draw lines of comparison with Breton, Occitan, Corsican, Basque, and Catalan groups, who they argue represent the victims of the same French ‘Jacobinism’ (see chapter 8) that has seen the enforcement of repressive language policies in its North African ex-colonies. Nationalist groups like the MAK-Anavad engage in a mimicry of state diplomacy, the “strategic adoption of metropolitan manners and practices” (McConnell et al., 2011:806) with representatives of these ethno-linguistic minorities, offering congratulations on successes, holding joint press-conferences, and organising actions together. A key locus for this activity is the European Free Alliance (EFA) at the EU, which represents a number of European ‘stateless nations’ and which has invited numerous ‘diplomatic delegations’ from the GPK, performing solidarity with the Kabyle nationalist cause through signed agreements and declarations (Alfonsi and Mehenni, 2016; Siwel, 2016b). Similarly, representatives of several ‘stateless nations’ such as Panjab attended the creation in Rotterdam in 2014 of the Riffian separatist ‘Mouvement 18 Septembre’ (40). Such performances of diplomacy also articulate the popular geopolitics of diaspora Amazigh nationalisms with the ‘formal’ and ‘practical’ geopolitics of international relations.

Though the discourse of such groups does not explicitly position them as Indigenous, their claims parallel those of the Indigenous movement focused around ILO convention 169; calls for self-determination, recognition and enabling of linguistic and cultural specificity, historical anteriority and a common ethnic identity. These points of similarity are touched upon within diaspora Amazigh associations through inter-community meetings and collaborative events which, though not exclusive to such groups, are often held with local Breton, Basque, or other French minorities. It is not a coincidence that several academic meetings on the subject of the Amazigh movement have been held in Barcelona (Roque, 2010), that in May 2016 the association Amazigh Breizh held a conference of Indigenous peoples, or that in June 2016 the Maison Amazighe de Saint-Denis collaborated with the Bretons de Saint-Denis to organise an open-air celebration of the two cultures. The networks of solidarity between minority cultural organisations in France and across Europe point to a politics of nativism - more fully explored in chapter 7 - which “assumes the existence of a plurality of irreducibly distinct and essentially different groups” and
“privilege[s] one or other notion of ‘identity’ against the rest” (De Genova, 2016:233). Again, this nativism is articulated as if it were a fixed and knowable quality through the Amazigh diaspora’s performances of solidarity with European ethno-linguistic minorities.

These links between the Global Indigenous Movement and Europe’s ethno-linguistic minorities are “not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time” (Hall, 1996:141). These elements are as different as they are similar. However, Amazigh diaspora members bring them together in a process of articulation that comes from their attempts to position themselves at a distance from their ‘homeland’ and in contrast with state narratives of political identity. As a consequence, the meanings and subjectivities of indigeneity and ‘nativeness’ are being worked out in the diaspora in relation to these other groups and structures. Such straightforward articulations of indigeneity are only a small part of the picture of the diasporic Amazigh movement, whose everyday practices and politics performed in associations are unpacked in the following sections.

**5.2 New Colonialism in the Post-Colonial State**

“You must understand; Arabism is a form of territorial and linguistic colonialism”

(14)

The experience of colonialism is defining of Indigenous subjectivities. Indigenous peoples “share experiences as peoples who have been subjected to the colonization of their lands and cultures, and the denial of their sovereignty, by a colonizing society that has come to dominate and determine the shape and quality of their lives” (Tuhiwai Smith, 2004). Suffering from colonisation is a key articulation of indigeneity that reappears often in diaspora Amazigh discourse. Emotional and affective language - of suffering, violence, trauma - used to describe the experience of colonialism frames it in a way that highlights its psychological and embodied nature and effects on the individual and the group. Diaspora leaders use this language to narrate a colonised subjectivity that does not point to specific instances of colonisation by the state, describing the “structure” rather than the “event” of colonisation (Wolfe, 1999). For example, some described epistemic violence as colonial: “We developed a pride in our Arabic, and a shame in our Amazigh. Arabic was the language of the state even where Amazigh was language of the people. It was like colonialism” (7a). In contrast, ethno-nationalist Amazigh leaders adopt a geopolitical discourse of territorial occupation, enrolling it in a wider narrative of national struggle. Several Kabyle diaspora leaders, when describing the end of the Algerian War in 1962,
described how in their opinion “we won nothing, because we swapped the colonial domination of France for Arabo-Islamic domination” (2), echoing the words of earlier Amazigh personalities Kateb Yacine and Lounes Matoub. For the members of Tamazgha, this geopolitical assessment has a geopolitical corollary; “The Amazigh are colonised by the states of North Africa, so a necessary part of [our project] is our non-recognition of North African states” (13). This discursive articulation of the Amazigh movement with anti-colonial struggle also affects diaspora members’ representation of their migrant subjectivity.

The regions of North Africa where Tamazight is still spoken are generally rural, mountainous and desert environments, for the most part geographically isolated from the mainly arabophone urban centres and agricultural plains. In their discourse, several diaspora association leaders refer to the poverty and underdevelopment of these Amazigh regions as a consequence of marginalisation and colonisation by the state. For Malik Houha, a Chawi autonomist, the Chawi region is “a poor region, the poorest in Algeria, particularly in the mountains. It's social poverty, total poverty” (33). The lack of economic development, infrastructure (except for resource extraction), and state institutions (except for gendarmeries) in these regions alongside accelerating environmental degradation is held up by Amazigh leaders as proof of ongoing colonialism in North Africa. The damaging effects of conflict and environmental degradation associated with uranium and oil extraction in the Sahara (Larsen and Mamosso, 2014), silver and timber in Morocco (Tamaynut-France and linked associations), and cement manufacture in the Aurès are argued to fall on the Amazigh populations whilst the profits are taken elsewhere (Aboubacrine, 2006). This underdevelopment is directly linked by Amazigh leaders to a form of disregard if not colonisation by the state; “the Algiers government is burning the forests, they’re cancelling development projects in the region, they’re filling the area with both terrorists and armed forces, securitising the area” (2). Several NGOs have been founded in the Amazigh diaspora over the past two decades with the stated aim of encouraging investment and development in these regions, achieving varying levels of popular support, success in securing public funding, and implementing development projects ‘at home’. Such organisations include Touiza Solidarité, IDMediterranée, AKRED and FIDEK. Alongside these organisations, village committees also represent important sources of investment for development in Amazigh regions (Mohan and Zack-Williams, 2002).
In diaspora activists’ narratives, this sense of instability and underdevelopment created by repressive colonialism over the long term is punctuated by episodes of inter-ethnic and state violence against Amazigh in North Africa. These are widely publicised and protested by diaspora Amazigh, through street demonstrations, press statements, social media, and reports to international institutions. Often these episodes are framed by diaspora Amazigh as ‘colonial’ using descriptive vocabulary such as ‘apartheid’, ‘genocide’, ‘racist’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’. In doing so, they evoke a civilizational dimension to these violent episodes, such that Amazigh culture itself is understood to be under attack or dominated in a colonial system, as well as highlighting colonialism’s racial-ethnic dimension (Quijano, 2007). For example, between 2013 and 2015 inter-community violence erupted several times in the Mzab, Algeria. Numerous instances of looting and murder against the Amazigh population were reported by Amazigh activists as having been carried out by local arabophone thugs with the help of the security services as part of a government-orchestrated program of extermination, whilst the mainstream Algerian press and the Algerian government continued to frame the violence as occurring between the two communities. Amazigh diaspora activism aimed at drawing international attention to the Mzab and securing the release of scores of Mozabites held under preventive detention continued into 2015-2016. The version of events as established in this activism unambiguously framed the Mzab as a theatre of violent colonisation, as ancestral lands (cemeteries and palm groves particularly) were being destroyed and appropriated by an invading, non-Amazigh people group (50). The historical autonomy of the Mzab, its pre-colonial political institutions, and cultural specificities were framed as being under threat;

“Mr. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon … we would like to draw your attention to the institutional violence … perpetrated against the At-Mzab (Indigenous Amazigh of the Mzab valley) … an ancient civilisation listed since 1982 as UNESCO world heritage. The At-Mzab are under attack by men of the “Chaamba” Arabic community with the known support of the Algerian police force.” (CMA Open Letter to Ban Ki-moon 3/03/2016)

“They [Chaamba] say ‘we are nomads, and for a long time we used this place as a base for our tents. We are the first’. The Mozabites say no, it was them. We have our walled towns, we structured the environment. That's a deep debate between the two communities. And of course, the Mozabites consider themselves to be Indigenous.” (49)
“This war unfolds through a policy of confining the Mozabites within a few isolated islands on their historic territory. The sedentarisation of nomads on the ancestral soil of the Mozabites in the 1970s was done in a chaotic and illegal manner, with the support and complicity of the government, which has never tolerated the existence of an Indigenous community that assumes and cultivates its individuality. The objective is clear: to flood these territories with exogenous populations in order to upset the urban organisation of the region and make the Mozabites a minority in their own territory.” (Izmulen pour les droits des At-Mzab, “The Algerian Government continues its war against the Mozabites” 23/12/2015)

The Mzab example may seem to be an extreme case, particularly when presented using the rhetoric of groups like Izmulen, but it is not alone in its representation as an instance of present colonialism. MAK-Anavad activists routinely refer to the Algerian state as the ‘colonial state’ in communiqués, on social media, and in public discourse, particularly in reference to the activities of the Algerian gendarmerie in Kabylia where they constitute a ‘force of occupation’. This discourse presumes a sovereignty that has been illegitimately usurped. Other Amazigh activists use the same vocabulary to describe the Moroccan state’s presence in the Rif and the recent French military interventions in the Tuareg regions of Mali and Niger, positioning them as illegal and illegitimate attacks on the sovereignty of local Amazigh groups. Through this discursive articulation of episodes of conflict in North Africa with colonialism, the Amazigh diaspora’s activists are positioning themselves as Indigenous.

The linkages between colonisation and emigration are well-documented and repeatedly referred to in Amazigh scholarship (Chaker, 1985; Dirèche-Slimani, 1997; Geisser and Zemouri, 2007; Agrou, 2012; Zirem, 2013). The sociologist of immigration Abdelmalek Sayad, who was Kabyle (and a student of Pierre Bourdieu’s), defined the diasporic condition as a ‘double absence’ wherein the emigrant feels viscerally detached from the place and people they have left but is equally unable to avoid exclusion in their new home (Sayad, 1999). The expression is reminiscent of the ‘double consciousness’ of W.E.B. du Bois, who as a free black man travelling in the nineteenth century wrote of the “sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others” (Gilroy, 1993:134) in relation to his racialised subjectivity, similarly to the way Fanon would later write of “being dissected under white eyes” (Fanon, 1970:82). The psychological and affective conditions of ‘double absence’ and ‘double consciousness’ demonstrate how social alienation is central to lived
experiences of both the diasporic and colonised condition. The two are bound together in the memory of exile, of land appropriation, and of the threat of violence, but even more fundamentally in their logics of assimilation that compel the racial or migrant ‘other’ to aspire to join the hegemonic social group. In the case of the Amazigh, this social alienation is produced in their exclusion from the national narratives of North African and European states; “whether the national narrative is one of common origins or of gathered populations, it cannot assimilate groups that maintain important allegiances and practical connections to a homeland or a dispersed community located elsewhere” (Clifford, 2001:250). Amazigh leaders in the diaspora often position themselves as exiles rather than emigrants, partly to distance themselves from connotations of class and race that are associated with the term *immigré* (Sajed, 2010) and partly to articulate a colonised subjectivity based on alienation from the homeland. Riffian activist Fikri El Azrak expressed his position in this way;

“I feel exiled, not emigrated. Even if I’m here, I’m in the Rif […] I feel that I’m far from my home. I want to be there, but the regime has chased me out. And other Riffians in the diaspora are the same […] In France or elsewhere, we feel far from our homes” (40).

Ahmed, another Amazigh association leader, intimated how his feeling of exile began even when he was still living in Algeria; “I felt like a foreigner in my own country; at school, on the TV, outside” (19a). For Malika, who was born and brought up in France, starting an Amazigh association was a way of working through a feeling of alienation;

“I have an awareness of what's at stake - the politics of it, Tamazgha, Berber... it’s affective and I need to transmit ... It's important for me but it's not easy, to manage this double culture. I don't belong totally to either. It's a sort of cobbling together of a third identity” (17).

If Amazigh diaspora discourse “articulates, or bends together, both roots and routes” (Clifford, 1997:251), then it does so in a way that highlights the colonial forces that have shaped and continue to shape those roots and routes. The diaspora’s members materially and metaphorically locate themselves between French and Arabic cultures and colonialities. ‘Third spaces’ of cultural hybridity (Bhabha, 1994) are far more complex in this inter-colonial schema, but Amazigh leaders tend to celebrate Franco-Amazigh hybridity over Arabo-Amazigh (1). Writer Kateb Yacine famously opposed the
Arabisation policy of the post-independent Algerian state, saying that “the deepest alienation for an Algerian is not to think that he is French but that he is Arab” (Aïtel, 2013:64). French-born Malik Houha explained his admiration for “the [French political] party ‘Indigènes de la République’” whose frames present injustices in French society as being a continuation of colonial power relations, but couldn’t agree with them as “they only talk about being Arabs, and the colonialism and imperialism they talk about is only Western. But my problem is the colonialism of Arabo-Islamism” (33).

Interviewees described the extension of these power relations into the diaspora in encounters with their state of origin. Rahma Houzig of Tamaynut-France told me about a protest led by her association in collaboration with other Moroccan Amazigh associations in France, following a Moroccan Embassy clerk’s refusal to process their applications because they were obviously Amazigh (25). Amazighité is embodied by many Amazigh diaspora members in wearing the Aza (تفاصيل) symbol on pendants and earrings, which is recognisable to other North Africans but unremarkable to wider French society. It represents the ‘standing man’ or ‘free man’ and evokes resistance to the power of the state in North Africa. Tamazgha member Mustafa described an experience at the Algerian consulate in Marseille, where he had gone to pick up his son’s passport; “this guy stopped speaking to me because he saw this sign... he saw me, he went ‘OH - that [تفاصيل] necklace’”. I said ‘that, what?’ He said ‘that thing, it’s not ok in here’” (57). Other similarly coded symbols that are worn decoratively include the Tizerzaï and the colours of the Amazigh flag - blue, green and yellow. Besides being worn on the body, these coded symbols are inscribed on the landscape in shop windows, taxi dashboards, and according to Lounes Le Kabyle, school exercise books; “Us young ones, we saw that although we didn't know each other before we did the same things, like tagging the Aza in our textbooks and in the toilets” (35). These coded symbols are only legible to a particular audience, within which they perform cultural difference. When this difference is performed, it is within a politics of indigeneity that articulates non-Western and non-Arabic being through an embodiment of common material culture and cultural heritage. Double absence/consciousness in this embodied politics articulates diaspora and Indigeneity in Amazigh “everyday practices of mobility and dwelling” (Clifford, 2013:70)

5.3 Performing the ‘authentic’ North African autochtone

Whilst other details may be negotiable, the main identity claim of the Amazigh movement
is to be at once North African and non-Arab. Preceding Arabic civilisation by over a thousand years, this is also a claim to cultural ‘authenticity’ that is performed and embodied as well as discursive. Unlike the politics of authenticity described in countries where specific Indigenous rights have entered into law (Gagné, 2016; Gagné and Trépid, 2016), Amazigh authenticity is a moral claim to not only precede Arabic but to be equal to it as a language and cultural heritage. Embodied difference is a key part of the symbolic competition behind this moral claim. For example, Amazigh costume in its diverse forms is worn by organisers and attendees of numerous Amazigh diaspora events, particularly at celebrations such as *Yennayer*. Several tailors in the Paris region specialise in Amazigh fashion, exhibiting at associations and galas (8). On the 8th of May 2016, on the ‘Esplanade of Human Rights’ beneath the Eiffel Tower and opposite France’s national Anthropology museum the *Musée de l’Homme*, around 2,000 people gathered for Paris’s first *Journée de la Robe Kabyle*. The event had first occurred in Algiers in 2015 to protest a schoolgirl being sent home for wearing the Kabyle dress, a clear symbol of *Amazighité*, to class. A year later, the day was marked in the diaspora, in Montreal and Marseille. The Paris event had been organised and advertised on social media rather than through an association. An inter-generational crowd gathered, and journalists and camera teams set themselves up to capture the day’s events. Around a third of the women present were wearing colourful Kabyle dresses, but only a handful of the men present were wearing a *burnous*, the male costume. Several women wore henna tattoos of the *Aza*, and others wore the symbol in jewellery form. Once a *bendir* music troupe had paraded through the crowd, other musical acts began to perform and continued through the afternoon, giving the event a festival atmosphere that was unmistakably North African, but embodied non-Arabic *Amazighité*.

The organisers emphasised the force for unity that the Kabyle dress represents;

“Everyone feels implicated by the Kabyle dress. I don't think a single Kabyle household in France is lacking one. Very few Kabyle women don't have one, and they're worn at weddings etc. [...] And we know that we barely ever go out wearing traditional dress, so here we said let's go, a good event for families, it was a dream (35).

Diaspora Amazigh wear these costumes as spectacular rather than functional garments - Tuareg men in music groups wear the attire of the desert including vast enveloping...
headscarves when performing and Kabyle women pull their dresses on over their ‘Western’
clothes when they arrive at the venue for a special event.

Whilst wearing Amazigh costume is a way of performing indigeneity in that it embodies
an aesthetic of alterity to both the ‘Western’ and the ‘Islamic’, it can however be silent,
 passive and gendered in a way that essentialises, disempowers and fixes it. As one Kabyle
journalist wrote of the Journée de la Robe Kabyle; “viewed as a whole the spectacle comes
apart. The black leather jackets and blue denim jeans mixed with a few shimmering dresses
gives more the impression of indigénat than authenticity” (Boukhelifa, 2016). The term
indigénat is pejorative, referring to the administrative regime applied to colonised people
following the 1881 code de l’indigénat. This critical comment puts its finger on the flipside

![Figure 6: Journée de la Robe Kabyle on the Esplanade of Human Rights, Paris, 8th May 2016
Reproduced with the permission of Redha Zouir](image)

of the political project of performing indigeneity, which its author evaluates in terms of its
perceived ‘authenticity’. There, opposite the Musée de l’Homme, this critic saw only the
“‘bon Barbare’, an ethnographic or museographic object [sic]” (Chaker, 1998a:27) of
Amazigh subjectivity, removed from its lived cultural environment and put on display. As
Sarah Hunt writes, "in order to be legible [to Western eyes], Indigenous geographic
knowledge must adhere to recognised forms of representation” (Hunt, 2014:29), and
Amazigh costume worn as an ‘authentic’ cultural object fixes this knowledge on the bodies
of the diaspora population. During the fieldwork, Amazigh diaspora members frequently expressed concern that their activities, or more commonly the activities of other competing Amazigh associations, were becoming ‘folkloric’. This meant “putting Amazigh culture in a box” (40), making it “folklore, museums and cultural activities” (59). Political activism was needed, Amazigh leaders often told me, to defend the “music, language, culture” that are so popular (33). However, such activism was not popular in itself; “There are associations […] where organising a political event is somehow dirty, it spoils the party” (26). Articulated in anthropological literature on indigeneity as the ‘trap of visibility’ (Stocker, 2013), or the ‘cunning of recognition’ (Povinelli, 2002), this means that being acknowledged as Indigenous through performing cultural ‘authenticity’ frequently entails behaving in ways that entrench the stereotypical expectations of wider society. This is because Indigenous peoples often have limited power to define what is ‘authentic’ vis-à-vis state hegemony. However, in France these moral claims can be articulated with other forms of diaspora activism in relation to home and host societies. Always ‘out of place’, at a distance to the imagined and essentialised Amazigh subject of rural North Africa, embodiments of Amazigh indigeneity can be made dynamic, political, and vocal through the activism of diaspora members. The subaltern speaks through the diaspora.

Amazigh people may speak Arabic and recognise its long history in North Africa, but ultimately view Arabic as a foreign language in comparison with Tamazight. According to its common narrative, the Amazigh movement began in reaction to the imposition of Arabic as language of the state and consequently of the media, education, and public life in North Africa (Pouessel, 2010; Maddy-Weitzman, 2012). The experiences of Tamazight-speakers confronted with Arabisation programs are often key to their sense of Amazighité and the beginnings of their activism. For example, Belkacem Lounes described how;

“[Living through the Algerian war] was eye-opening for me. I didn’t understand much as a child. The French soldiers left, and the Algerians arrived. There was a difference - the French soldiers tried to play with us, to learn our language by asking us questions in Kabyle. When the Algerian gendarmes arrived, they would kick us and insult us because they didn’t understand us” (27).

In Lounes’s story and those of most other diaspora members, the status of the Tamazight language is a key vector through which power operates, and the language has continued to have a central place within the Amazigh movement.
The work of the diasporic Amazigh movement on preserving and promoting Tamazight through literary production, media and academic work has been described in chapter 4. During the fieldwork, the vast majority of Amazigh cultural associations in the diaspora operated weekly language classes, many of which were financed by the ELCO, out of a desire to preserve and transmit Tamazight to the next generation, but also to exercise a freedom that was previously denied. Amazigh leaders often explained how they saw Arabisation as a form of ‘cultural denial’, ‘erasure’, or even ‘extermination’, referring to the language as the essential vehicle of Amazigh identity; “We tolerated French, but never Arabic. For us it was a way of resisting, against forgetting our memory, our identity” (39). In the case of the Tuareg, other dominant regional languages were the threat;

“once we are sedentarised we lose our cultural links. We lose our language. Tifinagh and the language. We’re speaking Hausa more and more in Niger. We’re powerless, witnessing the erasure of a whole civilisation” (51).

Such discourse echoes Skutnabb-Kangas & Dunbar’s assessment of disappearing Indigenous languages as ‘linguistic genocide’ (2010). This biopolitical discourse is echoed in the representation of the language issue by some Amazigh leaders. Writing online, Meryam Demnati condemned the ‘programmed linguicide’ contained in Morocco’s education policy (2011). In our interview, ‘Khadija’ explained how her association’s main activity was teaching Tamazight because “the language symbolises life” (29). Early in our Tamazight classes at the ACB we were taught a Kabyle proverb “Agdud mebla idles am wemdan mebla iles”, which translates as “a people without culture is as a being without a tongue”, our teacher explicitly linking a wider imperative of cultural survival to the project of education in the language. Here, Ruth Rubio-Marín’s distinction between "the expressive interest in a language as a marker of identity", and "instrumental interest in language as a means of communication" (2003:56) in the field of Indigenous language rights is helpful for understanding this politics as practiced in the diaspora. For example, the officialisation of Tamazight in Morocco and Algeria\(^{35}\) was met with widespread

\(^{35}\) Tamazight was made an official language through constitutional amendment in Morocco (2011) then Algeria (2016), but in both cases the policy implications of this symbolic move are awaiting the development of a legal framework by respective governments. Arabic remains the de facto language of the state in both cases.
approval in the Amazigh diaspora and calls for implementation, as their expressive interest meant that they saw Amazigh identity being affirmed (24), whilst instrumental interest in the language leads most diaspora Amazigh associations to try and create “a secure linguistic environment in [the] mother tongue” (Rubio-Marín, 2003:56).

Tamazight is given a place of privilege within association life - certain words and phrases must be used and understood, even if French is universally understood36. In the context of the association, members often converse freely in Tamazight, and their words are only occasionally translated for visiting non-Berberophones, including local state representatives. Conversation classes are zones of linguistic exclusivity where only Tamazight is spoken. Such classes are however more about identity formation and performance than everyday literacy (Rubio-Marín, 2003). This is evidenced in the way that the distinction of Tamazight from Arabic is a central concern of Tamazight teachers and scholars. Tamazight in its various forms includes loan-words from neighbouring languages, chief among them Arabic. The removal of Arabic loan-words and the consequent ‘correction’ of the language is disciplined by the members of Amazigh associations. One association member told me “I think it’s more of a correction than a purification. We’re all learners ourselves. Often, I correct myself and others” (19b). For example, one should say Azul and Tannemirt (‘Hello’ and ‘Thank you’), not the loan-words Sabah el Kheer and Sahtik37 despite their common use in berberophone North Africa. Diaspora associations ‘correct’ the Arabisation of Tamazight away from the hegemonic arabophone societies of North Africa, but in France doing the same for French loan words is more difficult. However, this is of less importance for diaspora Amazigh associations. This is because what is at stake is differentiation from the Arabic dialects of North Africa - darijas - and the discursive construction of Tamazight as a language in its own right. As a language and not a mere ‘dialect’, etymologically distinct from Arabic as a ‘parent language’, Tamazight is positioned as an Indigenous language that is on a par with Arabic. Creating secure linguistic environments through the associations performs its social

36 Diaspora association mission statements commonly include transmitting the language, despite a general lack of success in doing so; transmission rates of Tamazight remain considerably lower than Arabic in the diaspora (Chamou, 2012).
37 The re-introduction of these words to Kabyle Tamazight is widely attributed to Berber socio-linguist Mouloud Mammeri, who noted their use in other Amazigh regions in Morocco, Algeria and Libya.
sustainability, authenticity and stateliness: it rehearses the administrative, organisational and political uses of Tamazight to legitimise its continued existence, recognition and officialisation.

The utterance of Tamazight (in songs, in poems, in speech) is an embodiment of the language, qualitatively distinct from its textual form. The tones and cadences of the language are markers of alterity, which like the Amazigh costume are put on display at specific times and in circumscribed spaces in the diaspora. Sustained speech in public spaces (in street demonstrations, public functions such as Yennayer celebrations, concerts, or videos online) that exclusively uses Tamazight does political work. Its unintelligibility to the dominant language group throws into relief the power relations involved - in which normally the dominant language group does not have to learn the minority/Indigenous language but forces the minority/Indigenous group to use their language. However, "to speak a language is to take on a world, a culture" (Fanon, 1970:8), and by uttering words in this language Tamazight speakers are able to articulate the wider Indigenous ontology of the Amazigh language community. By viewing ontology as a way of ‘wording’, a tool which also shapes its object(s) of knowledge and to which language is central (Blaser, 2014), we can understand Tamazight as a vehicle of knowledge production specific to its speakers. Kabyle anthropologist and association leader Kamal Saïdi said “When I speak in Kabyle, speaking about nature for example, I articulate a way of thinking. I articulate something that belongs to my heritage” (56). For many interlocutors, speaking Tamazight had an affective quality that was less present in other languages; “When I speak in Kabyle, it's the heart that speaks. When I speak in French it's reason that speaks” (35). To return to Hunt’s formulation that the embodiment of indigeneity is “lived, practiced, and relational” (2014), speaking Tamazight achieves this embodiment because it necessitates utterance, hearing, understanding and dialogue with living subjects. In contrast with the silent, passive Amazigh costume, it is active and vocal. Diasporic Amazigh position themselves as Indigenous through the performative, oral use of Tamazight to communicate, enunciating words and phrases that are not abstracted from a living population of speakers, for example codified in dictionaries or legal documents.

Wearing Amazigh costume and using Tamazight are only two examples of how the Amazigh diaspora performs Indigenous authenticity and makes visible its difference. As with the ‘cunning of recognition’, the benefits of this visibility for preserving and promoting Amazighité exist in tension with the essentialisation of Amazigh culture that
comes with it. Aware of this, many diaspora association members prioritise the ongoing use of Tamazight as the vehicle for Amazigh thought and cultural expression, as opposed to a superficial ‘folklore’ which is adaptable but rootless. Due to their ability to create ‘secure linguistic environments’ away from arabophone North Africa, as well as their attraction for *berbérisants* (see chapter 4), diaspora associations remain keys sites for the ‘Indigenous project’ of language preservation and revitalisation, which articulates with a moral politics of authenticity based on prior occupation, the status of language and the knowledge associated with it.

5.4 Indigenous Territoriality at a Distance

“There’s a common foundation, the terroir, the earth, the territory of Massinissa, the Massyles that founded Numidia. It's the beginning.” (33)

Territoriality is also a key part of the Amazigh diaspora’s Indigenous positioning. This “set of relationships rooted in ties to the material environment and other people or groups” (Murphy, 2012:162) is focused on the central place of the village (Scheele, 2009) in diasporic Amazigh discourse and practice. Indigenous people have long been essentialised in scholarship, policy and popular culture as rural, village populations, and so the diaspora Amazigh village territoriality articulates with indigeneity. Just as nineteenth century nationalists in central Europe came to see the traditions and practices of the rural population (*volk*) as a ‘soul of the nation’ (Sennett, 2011), Amazigh in the diaspora reify the village as an essential space of North African culture. As Nassim Amrouche argues, if the Amazigh village is presented as “a timeless or eternal place, inscribed in a legendary continuity, the foundation of indigeneity, it also offers a solid anchoring in time and a historical conscience that is reintroduced in the political struggle” (2013:59). Rooting *Amazighité* in the material environment of the village in this way counters the cultural hegemony of urban, Arabic-speaking North Africa, performing cultural authenticity and by extension political legitimacy as an Indigenous diaspora.

As frequently observed during the fieldwork, Amazigh diaspora members trace their origins to a specific village and/or lineage, and encourage each other to recover knowledge of these origins if it has been ‘lost’. For example, the MAK-Anavad’s *Carte d’Identité Kabyle* (CIK) identifies the bearer’s village (*taddart*) and confederation (*aarch*) (see chapter 6), deliberately evoking pre-colonial political institutions (Roberts, 2014) and prompting applicants to research their personal family heritage. The enduring importance
of village connections articulates Amazigh identity with rurality and ‘traditional society’. The ACB’s Tamazight language classes, despite taking place in a classroom in urban Paris, constantly positioned the language within the imagined rural village setting. We learned vocabulary related to village life (“paths” rather than “roads”, “field” rather than “office”), studied dialogues set in village settings, and were constantly reminded of the rurality of the language in the French and Arabic loan-words used to describe urban phenomena and modern technology (e.g. Takarrosto = Car (fr. carrosse)). Associations frequently held and displayed village artefacts such as different clay jars or bridle, brought back by their members from their usually annual return trips. Village committees, which regroup, represent and govern the diaspora population of a given village, are both an important part of the organisational structure of the diaspora and a commonly evoked Indigenous political institution.

Amazigh village committees, particularly Kabyle ones, have operated in France for several decades (Lacroix, 2012; Boumekla, 2015), encouraging the maintenance of social and economic ties to a certain village: “This [formation of diaspora village committees] happens in all the villages. It’s a Kabyle practice, and it’s as old as the immigration itself” (19b). Similar institutions exist in most Amazigh groups, but it was the Kabyle Tajmaât that captured the imagination of the mostly French ethnographers, administrators and missionaries of the colonial period, many of whom contributed to the view that Kabyle society was organised as a group of ‘village republics’ (e.g. Hanoteau and Letourneux, 1872; Masqueray, 1886; Montagne, 1930). Its organisation and practice were supposed by many observers to be ‘unchanged’ and ‘ancient’, unique to the ‘secular’ Berber society as the role of religion in politics was purportedly absent. Though this assessment has been challenged and nuanced by some political historians (Roberts, 2014; Temlali, 2015), these received ideas remain strong in the Amazigh movement today. The organisational structure of Tajmaât is reflected in the diaspora’s village committees; “It's the village transplanted to France. We have a single money pot. That's what really helps Kabylia … that's what has allowed us to resist the external powers and kept us from disappearing like the Chawis” (46a).
In its essential and idealized form as explained by Kabyle leaders in the diaspora, the *Tajmaât* includes every man\(^\text{38}\) in the village, and takes place in a designated common space located in the centre of the village. Decisions are taken unanimously, and so lengthy debates are aimed at building compromise and convincing those in opposition to a given idea, rather than a ‘majority rules’ version of democracy. Every man’s opinion needs to be heard on a given issue and every man’s voice should have equal weight, and consequently a man’s ability to deliver good speeches, drawing on poetic forms and classical themes, is admired. These practices are extended into the operation of association meetings, sometimes consciously as an explicit principle and sometimes in a more coded way. The democratic ideal of consensus is often in tension with the imperatives of leadership in an association or movement, and association leaders and members would often complain about both ‘undemocratic’ behaviour and the constant debate and dialogue rarely leading to ‘concrete’ action. Debates were often hosted by Amazigh associations, and regardless of the meeting’s size everyone present had the right to speak. Men however speak more often and at more length than women, who are rarely accepted in diaspora village committees.

The *Tajmaât* stands as a reference to Amazigh political autonomy and democratic organisation. The common traits of these village- or encampment-scaled democratic political institutions across Tamazgha were highlighted in Dr. Aït Ferroukh’s Berber Civilisation classes at the ACB. Differences were explained by the passage of time since an imagined common past, prior to the arrival of Islam, to French colonisation, or post-colonial independence. In claiming the *Tajmaât* as an enduring pre-colonial political institution unique to the Amazigh, and by continuing to practice it in the diaspora, Amazigh diaspora members position themselves as Indigenous through by articulating cultural difference, anteriority, a rejection of state institutions and an insistence on the village as the basic unit of political organisation. The imaginative geography of Tamazgha and Amazigh gender politics intersect here: because *Tajmaât* is presented as the ‘authentic’ Amazigh political institution by virtue of its purported ancientness, and several non-Tuareg diaspora leaders deem the Tuareg to be more ‘authentically Amazigh’ than the ‘Berbers of

\[^{38}\text{Women are not widely admitted to *Tajmaât*, though some are changing as Kabyle women struggle for gender equality (Naït Sid, 2006)}\]
the north’ because of their comparative geographical isolation and particularly the late arrival of Islam in Tuareg society. Ahmed Haddag, the GPK’s Minister of Institutions, explained how:

“Before, women had the power over men! Look at the Tuaregs; the men are veiled, and the women are uncovered. Women had power over men in Berber culture, but with the arrival of Islam, it has been turned on its head” (2)

Dr. Ferroukh’s Berber Civilisation classes also highlighted the political voice of Tuareg women in comparison to men in their version of the Tajmaât. Such discourses of anteriority lend weight to Kabyle women’s struggle for gender equality in diaspora village committees (20), but also situate them on a sliding scale of indigeneity in relation to territory and history where the Tuareg are imagined to be more Indigenous by virtue of the supposed ancientness of their practices and their isolated environment.39

The quality of the village environment was a recurrent concern for diaspora associations during the fieldwork. Interviewees often spoke of encouraging environmentally-friendly development and preserving the village aesthetic at home, and association events were organised by several associations on these themes. As pollution and urbanisation threaten the self-sufficiency and societal cohesion of Amazigh society, they argued, something had to be done to preserve it. At a debate organised by Tamazgha in November 2015, a short film showing the extent of the litter problem in Kabylia provoked a common response from those present during the debate: if Kabylia’s village institutions were strong then the problem would have been dealt with. Where it exists, international cooperation between associations in the diaspora and in the village are often explicitly aimed at preservation; “There's an association in my village interested in preserving heritage and we may partner with them [as an association]” (17). The rehabilitation of particular sites within the village environment, notably the Tajmaât (meeting place) and the Tala (fountain), which are seen as central places of Amazigh sociability, is often funded by the diaspora population. ‘Khadija’, who is also a member of IDmediterranée, a France-based development

39 Tuareg association leader ‘Ag Aissa’ mirrored this comparison, telling me “The Berbers of the North… they’re more educated than us […] the Kabyles were at school before us - we don’t have intellectuals like them” (55)
organisation focused on Amazigh regions in North Africa, explained her part in the rehabilitation of the village Tala;

“I'm very attached to the fountain of my village. The fountain is a symbol. People did not use to have water in their homes, so the women went to get water from the fountain… the women meet there; boys try to chat them up there. For me this place is important even though we have piped water these days. I've worked so that these fountains might be rehabilitated, embellished, for the pleasure of the village” (29).

‘Khadija’s’ words encapsulate a recurring narrative of the diasporic Amazigh movement, of nostalgia for an Amazigh village society, whose social, political and economic institutions should be preserved in the face of transformative forces and processes. As Djerbian researcher Soufien put it:

“Djerba ten years ago is different to Djerba today. But the values remain the same. We see it in the architecture, the spaces, the social structures, family structures, texts. These bear witness to the way of life of the past” (48c).

Within the idealised village, Amazigh domestic space is repeatedly returned to by the diaspora as a theme of research and association debates. At the ACB, my class learned the words associated with it in our Tamazight language course and spent three weekly Berber civilisation classes studying it. The house or tent is mapped, reconstructed and actively restored by diasporic Amazigh, and its loss in the landscape bemoaned;

“my sisters were raised in a traditional house. And now my uncle has torn it down and put a garage over it. My sisters are really angry. They don’t have a clue about architecture and its value” (12)

“It's a concrete policy - of concreting over our villages, building them up but in a basic sense, not paying attention to architecture and overall village planning. There are architects now working on this because it's part of the landscape, our culture” (46a)

One of these architects is Amar Lounas, who gave a presentation to Association Idlès in June 2016 explaining how the form of the Kabyle house (Axxam) lent itself to sustainability through both its use of renewable materials and through its relational character - spatially arranged to accommodate the extended family and to provide graded spaces for interaction with the village community, notably through the lack of a ‘front door’. Diaspora Amazigh
seek to elaborate a uniquely Amazigh architectural tradition, a touchstone for a way of life and a cosmology that is distinct from both Western and Islamic worldviews. Famously the subject of one of Pierre Bourdieu’s earliest essays (Bourdieu, 1979), and the inspiration for his concept of ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1977), the Axxam exists as a powerful imaginary for the Kabyle diaspora, removed from ‘home’ and nostalgic for it (Silverstein, 2004b). Bourdieu’s essay was written following fieldwork carried out amongst displaced populations living in the French resettlement villages during the Algerian War (Goodman and Silverstein, 2009), and so the Axxam he describes, with all its complex symbolisms, dualisms, forms and structures, is an abstract ideal, remembered through the collective memory of an exiled group. Today, in the Amazigh diaspora in France, the Axxam remains a powerful identity symbol as well as a locus of territoriality. It is the setting for Amazigh theatre adaptions, the subject of poems and songs, and a prized possession. By enrolling the Axxam as an identity symbol, Amazigh in the diaspora articulate indigeneity by positioning themselves within a non-Western, non-Islamic cosmology expressed through the form of the house.

Finally, diaspora village committees practice village territoriality by repatriating the deceased for burial. With each repatriation currently costing upwards of €2,000, the collective insurance that the village committee represents is a strong draw for its members. Repatriation for burial is common to both Amazigh and non-Amazigh North African communities, but only Kabyle village committees normally organise in this way; elsewhere insurance is taken out individually or in the case of Morocco, provided by the state. Burial amongst ancestors in the home village forms part of a cosmology of presence of ancestors in the lives of their families, evidenced in ethnographic work in Amazigh villages (Scheele, 2009; Silverstein, 2015), but also in art and popular culture. For example, Mouloud Feraoun’s La Terre et le Sang (Land and Blood) (1953), a favourite novel often included in Amazigh diaspora book sales, includes several scenes in the village cemetery where the living characters go to be with the dead, play and socialise. More recently Nora Chaouche’s L’étrangère française (2011), exhibited at the ACB in November 2015 as part of their monthly literary event, includes the dead grandmother of a young Amazigh immigrant as one of the novel’s key characters. Regardless of the extent of popular belief in the

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40 http://www.marocainsdumonde.gov.ma/fr/social/rapatriement-des-dépouilles date accessed: 13/02/2018
continued presence of ancestors in the world of the living, repatriation for burial remains sufficiently important for village committees to raise significant funds to achieve it, and remains focused on the village cemetery. Even when Hocine Aït Ahmed, a high profile Amazigh leader and Algerian War hero died in Switzerland\footnote{Hocine Aït Ahmed was a hero of the Algerian War of Independence, who founded the opposition party \textit{Front des Forces Socialistes} (FFS) in 1963. Following a short guerrilla war in Kabylie, Ait Ahmed escaped to Switzerland, continuing to lead the banned FFS from the diaspora until its re-instatement in 1989.} in December 2016, his will was to be buried alongside his mother in the village of his birth, and not, as the state would have liked, in Algiers’s El Alia cemetery amongst Algeria’s top officials (Ryan, 2016).

The positionings outlined above, articulated together within the discourse and practice of the diasporic Amazigh movement, do political work that legitimises claims to the resources of the state, to sovereignty, and to acceptable difference. As Amrouche argues; “The (re)construction of language, tribe and village is in the image of the projected culture: an attempt to give form to an imagined past and community” (2013:61). This ‘attempt to give form’ could be understood as territoriality, which in the Amazigh diaspora determine relationships of exteriority and alterity in relation to an Indigenous subjectivity. The village, embodied difference in Amazigh costume and spoken Tamazight, discourses of colonisation and exile, as well as solidarities and articulations with the Global Indigenous Movement and European ethno-linguistic minorities all define the Amazigh as an Indigenous Diaspora.

5.5 Non-Indigenous Positioning

Despite the multiple Indigenous positionings outlines above, the diasporic Amazigh movement’s articulations of Indigenous discourse have not been wholesale and its political positionings do not always lend themselves to interpretation as Indigenous. Indeed, at times indigeneity is rejected, resisted, or altered as a label. I argue that these caveats and instances of rejection of Indigenous discourse are coherent within an understanding of indigeneity that in the francophone context is combined with ‘autochthony’ as a political subjectivity, as described in chapter 2.

Masin Ferkal, founding member of the CMA and president of \textit{Tamazgha}, is a key example of an Amazigh diaspora leader who firmly rejects the discourse of indigeneity on the basis
of its perceived racial essentialism. “The danger of this notion of *autochtonie*”, he told me, “is that we created an ethnic difference between people, when it doesn’t really exist” (22). He explained *Tamazgha*’s refusal to engage with the Indigenous fora of the UN and elsewhere, saying “We don’t subscribe to the ‘pure race’ ideology that goes with *autochtonie* discourse” (13). Ferkal’s concern is that a key implication of *autochtonie* is one of racial/ethnic homogeneity within a given group that is racially/ethnically different to another in a given territory. In the Amazigh case, such a discourse of *autochtonie* would suggest that the Arabs invaded *en masse* and are today the ethnic majority in North Africa. The discourse espoused by Ferkal and most other diaspora leaders on the contrary seeks to demonstrate that all North Africans are ethnically homogeneous, and rather that the so-called Arabs are actually Amazigh too. Genetic testing, drawing on studies such as Coudray et al. (2009), is presented by Amazigh activists as proof that this is the case, particularly in blogs and social media posts. According to Ferkal; “If we subscribe to the Indigenous peoples issue, we accept, we admit, that there are foreigners to North Africa who are implanted there, and that they represent the majority” (22). He is cynical about the motivations of Amazigh representatives in the global Indigenous movement; “I know the people that go there [to the meetings of Indigenous peoples at international institutions], and it’s for reasons of privilege, for money, for power. It keeps Indigenous peoples occupied and distracted, whilst they lose out at home” (13). Although Ferkal categorically rejects Indigenous identity, he does so on the basis of a perceived ethnic essentialism partly bound up in the term *autochtonie*. In Forte’s terminology (2013), Ferkal rejects ‘pro-Indigenous essentialism’, and rather adopts a stance of ‘pro-Indigenous anti-essentialism’ that perceives colonialism to be ideological domination, and identity to be a malleable construct; “*Amazighité* is clear, it doesn’t exclude anyone, and that is what we need. When we migrate, we accept to integrate in the culture where we end up. In America, they [people] colonised. In North Africa, Arabo-Islamism has colonised” (13). Ferkal here makes a distinction between settler colonialism as experienced in the Americas and Oceania through a biopolitics of racial difference, and the epistemological domination of a particular colonising ideology as experienced in North Africa. Other interlocutors took a similar position, such as Rachid Oufkir; “All North Africans are Berbers, but we have forced Arabism on ourselves. Just speaking a language doesn’t make you that nationality. Arabism is a form of territorial and linguistic colonialism” (14). By rejecting indigeneity because it engenders ethnic essentialism,
Amazigh leaders are able to articulate non-essentialist, pro-Indigenous positions through a nuanced account of the politics of colonialism.

Indigenous positionings in the diasporic Amazigh movement also clash with narratives of the Amazigh as nomadic, global citizens. In a French-language song, Amazigh singer Akli D. sings about a nomadic existence in Paris; “I’m an Amazigh, Amazigh means ‘Free Man’; I walk in the footsteps of the Free Men, just as the sun crosses borders”42, the implication being that travel and border-crossing are essentially Amazigh (Crawford and Hoffman, 1999). Several interviewees described difficulties they had had at international borders, and went on to express their opinion that such borders should be done away with or changed: “they’re suffocating us, they make our traditional culture and way of life really difficult” (10); “Borders help powers to control. I think we need to see borders abstractly. We need not try to dominate others. We should be brothers of other Earthlings, quite simply” (15). Diaspora scholar-activists and association leaders highlight the historical spread of the Amazigh diaspora across several countries as a marker of a Amazighité; from Chleuh acrobats in nineteenth century Europe (Agroure, 2012) to Mozabite traders across the Muslim world (Ghazal, 2014) and from Kabyle porters and migrant labourers in the French Empire (Dirèche-Slimani, 1997) to the Tuareg cross-Sahara caravans (55).

Indigeneity is articulated with a lack of mobility by some Amazigh, a sign of weakness and vulnerability. For example, in the oases of eastern Morocco the Haratin ex-slaves at the very bottom of the social hierarchy have long been “reviled for their lack of asl [freedom of movement]” (Silverstein, 2015:95), and in the Tuareg Sahara the mobility of the camp was historically a source of power over the sedentary populations of the oases (Claudot-Hawad, 2011). The desert nomad is a powerful iconic image, one that is associated with Berbers in the French popular imagination and is articulated by diaspora leaders from the sedentary Amazigh north as part of their ‘reaching back’ into the ‘authentic’ Amazigh past. Diaspora members viewing themselves in such terms often have difficulty positioning themselves as Indigenous at the same time, particularly using the French form autochtone: Upon hearing about my project Belkacem Louanes, who represents the Amazigh as an Indigenous people at the UN and the AU, exclaimed;

42 Akli D. 2011 « Thé à la menthe » Paris - Hollywood, Rue Bleue
“Indigeneity and Diaspora… I don’t fully understand - indigeneity isn’t in the diaspora!” (27).

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explored four key positionings in which disparate subjectivities are articulated with indigeneity in the discourse and practices of the diasporic Amazigh movement. Firstly, diaspora Amazigh articulate Amazighité and indigeneity through the Global Indigenous Movement. Secondly, they position themselves and their homeland populations as colonised people. Thirdly, they perform cultural authenticity within an ‘Indigenous project’ of cultural preservation and revitalisation. Lastly, diaspora Amazigh, particularly Kabyles, practice a village territoriality that articulates with indigeneity through the privileging of rurality and pre-colonial political institutions. The chapter has built on Clifford’s claim that ‘Indigenous diaspora’, far from being a contradiction in terms, can help explain the postcolonial politics of mobility, place and identity. Rather than remaining static, opposing categories, diaspora and Indigenous consciousness have been argued to be continually remade through new articulations. If “the varieties of Indigenous experience proliferate between the poles of autochthony (we are here and have been here forever) and diaspora (we yearn for a homeland)” (Clifford, 2013:76), then at different times and contexts diaspora Amazigh articulate different positions along that spectrum. Only where indigeneity is understood through an essentialist lens, made more likely by the French translation of autochtone, do diaspora Amazigh actively reject it as a label.

These Indigenous positionings are part of diaspora Amazigh attempts to negotiate their inclusion across various political scales and localities. As Tamarkin and Giraudo point out, “the politics of indigeneity is always also a politics of citizenship” (2014:545), because it serves as a platform to claim rights, recognition and participation. This chapter has argued that indigeneity is articulated in diaspora, and in relation to populations at home. The following chapters will unpack the diasporic Amazigh movement’s wider citizenship practices, making a qualitative distinction between diaspora- and homeland-oriented practices.
**Calendar Snapshot: Tafsut**

“We have strong moments - like *Tafsut Imaziyen*. People thought it was a festival [like Yennayer] again, but we explain that it's like the Prague Spring. It's political. It's a cultural marker of identity - like the Bastille day for the French. That's part of the French identity, and it’s the same for us. That's what we need to transmit, not to forget.” (56)

In the spring of 1980, the Amazigh issue broke out of the elite intellectual circuit and into the domain of popular political action, as groups of students and then thousands of Kabyles in Tizi-Ouzou and the surrounding area stood up to the Algerian police, demanding the right to use their language and calling for greater political freedom in the form of nationwide democracy. Drawing a connection with the Prague Spring and other popular movements of 1968, the events of spring 1980 in Algeria were dubbed the ‘Berber Spring’ or ‘*Tafsut Imaziyen*’. In the years since, around the date of the 20th of April, Amazigh communities in North Africa and the diaspora have commemorated and celebrated Tafsut, making it a key date in their calendar for popular action (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011). Annual *tawada* (marches) in Morocco are now held in solidarity with those held in Kabylia, pan-Amazigh meetings and demonstrations take place in the cities of the diaspora, and Amazigh social media is filled with images of Amazigh flags, political slogans, popular marches, and assertions of Amazigh identity (Crawford and Silverstein, 2004).

In contrast the *Yennayer* festivities, *Tafsut* events and commemorations in the diaspora are rarely sponsored by local French politicians or hosted by state institutions, but are more likely to take the form of public demonstrations and marches to put pressure on North African states and to show solidarity with the transnational Amazigh movement. Similarly to *Yennayer*, however, *Tafsut* is a chance for Amazigh associations to bring the community together, to rehearse and pass on the movement’s heritage, renew social ties, and promote Amazigh culture to wider society. The project of ‘raising awareness’ in wider French society is a central part of *Tafsut* demonstrations, which are heavily mediatised and ‘shared’ via social media. They also (re)produce a sense of militant *Amazighité* through symbols such as the Amazigh flag and costume, written banners and chanted slogans in both French and Tamazight, and performances of Amazigh protest songs. *Tafsut* is therefore a time at which questions of citizenship come to the fore, as the diaspora mobilizes and makes itself visible, bringing its political project into the public sphere and
enrolling its members in forms of political action that reconfigure their subjectivities vis-à-vis state and society in both France and North Africa.

Beginnings of a Popular Movement

Through the 1960s and 70s political opposition had been stifled in Algeria by the single-party rule of the FLN, which tolerated no resistance to its post-independence revolutionary national project (Willis, 2012). A cornerstone of this national project was the generalisation of the Arabic language, achieved through education but also through purging other languages (French, but also Tamazight) from the public sphere (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012). The chair in Berber at Algiers University was removed in 1962, but Mouloud Mammeri, a specialist in Berber poetry and literature, continued to teach Berber on a voluntary basis until this too was forbidden in 1973 (Chaker, 2010). In 1978 a new university in Tizi-Ouzou (Kabylia) opened, and the possibility of Berber studies continuing seemed promising. However, on his way from Algiers to Tizi-Ouzou to give a talk on Berber poetry in March 1980 Mouloud Mammeri was stopped at a police checkpoint and turned back, his conference banned by the local governor. In response, students and activists occupied the university, the hospital and several factories in Tizi-Ouzou, and on the 20th April 1980 hundreds were arrested in a dawn raid by security services (Hirèche, 2010). This crackdown was met almost immediately with a mass popular reaction across Kabylia and in other parts of Algeria, as well as in the diaspora, which eventually led to the Algerian state’s release and pardon of the activists in custody after weeks of strikes and civil disobedience. It also led to the popularisation and organisation of the MCB in Algeria. The Berber Spring became a totemic, watershed moment for the Amazigh movement across North Africa and the diaspora, as the state was forced to reverse some of its Arabisation policies through the organised, non-violent protest of ordinary people. Every year since, in Kabylia and elsewhere, Amazigh activists have used the symbolic date of the 20th of April to organise further popular demonstrations.

However, in Kabylia in 2001, Tafsut turned violent after a teenager, Massinissa Geurmah, died whilst in police custody, plunging the region into a period of unrest over several

43 Both Morocco and Algeria adopted Arabic as the sole official language in their constitutions, and imported thousands of teachers from the Middle East to teach the standardized version of Arabic to replace French. Tamazight newspapers and pamphlets were banned, and such literature was circulated discretely.
months as groups of Kabyle youths fought with the gendarmerie. Symbols of the state, notably police stations and mairies, came under attack, several hundred people were badly injured and over one hundred were killed (Lacoste-Dujardin, 2006; Bengio and Maddy-Weitzman, 2013). The episode was dubbed the ‘Black Spring’, and has since become enrolled in the narrative of Tafsut rehearsed by Amazigh and particularly Kabyle leaders in diaspora. The following ‘snapshot’ is based on observations made from Paris during the Tafsut of 2016.

Taking to the Streets, Taking to Cyberspace

The activists of the MAK-Anavad were keen to capitalise on the opportunity that Tafsut represented to mobilise large numbers in the Amazigh diaspora, and to build on the momentum generated since the previous year’s Tafsut, when in a largely successful operation they unveiled the new Kabyle flag across Kabylia and the diaspora. Planning began months in advance for a march from Place de la Bastille to Place de la République on Sunday April 17th, advertised as a ‘Double Commemoration of the Amazigh Spring of 1980 and the Black Spring of 2001’, but as the GPK’s Institutions Minister explained to me; “That’s just for the French administration, for the public. But when people arrive they’ll see […] it won’t be as advertised - no it’ll be banners calling for the independence of Kabylia!” (18). The irredentist and anti-Algerian stance of the demonstrators was exemplified at the beginning of the march, when a small group of counter-protestors bearing Algerian flags were ejected from the group. Several thousand marchers then processed down the 2km stretch of road sectioned off for the march, with volunteer activists of the MAK-Anavad keeping them well-disciplined in distinct blocks, to best create space for photographs and to extend the march for as long as possible. The GPK president, Ferhat Mehenni, was surrounded by his ministers, as well as representatives of Mozabite and Chawi autonomist movements. I recognised faces from several Amazigh associations, people whom I knew were sceptical of the MAK-Anavad but had come along in support for the wider movement and to see what was happening. As well as a march, the organisers planned to involve other Amazigh associations and performance artists in creating a festival-like event on Place de la République, with different craft products and books on display and sale, and a succession of singers performing in accordance with an ‘artist’s charter’ set by the GPK’s Kabyle Language and Culture minister, Sakina Aït Ahmed. The event had a definite Kabyle tenor to it, but Chawi and Mozabite representatives were invited to speak, slightly widening the scope of Amazigh
participation. These speakers’ interventions dovetailed with the nationalist rhetoric of the MAK-Anavad and stressed the commonality of their political struggle, but turned their geographical focus towards other regions, places, and situations.

The march was heralded by MAK-Anavad activists as a resounding success, reporting 10,000 people in attendance. Although this figure is probably an exaggeration (a GPK minister would later speak of 3-4,000), the march was nonetheless widely recognised by diaspora Amazigh activists and commentators as the most significant single gathering of the Amazigh diaspora in over a decade, with the usually sceptical association Tamazgha reporting on its website that the march had “given hope for a possible fresh start for the Kabyle and Amazigh struggle in France, a movement that has been floundering since 2002” (Tamazgha, 2016). In contrast with similar previous instances of diaspora mobilisation, the Tafsut march of 2016 in Paris was not in response to an urgent situation or crisis in the homeland. Rather, it was the product of a consistent and conscious effort on the part of MAK-Anavad activists to mobilise the diaspora community regardless of political developments across the Mediterranean, according to GPK sources (18, 38). This was largely through the articulation of a national discourse of Kabyle identity, within which the Tafsut falls as a kind of national day, compared in the quote at the head of this section to ‘Bastille Day’. It is significant, then, that the march went between Place de la Bastille and République, each square representing a symbolic value that the event’s organisers were keen to articulate with their protest. Tafsut is being used as a commemorative event for the nascent Kabyle nation, and adopting this national commemoration in the diaspora means working within French ideas of nation, and structures of governance. Every step of the demonstration had been worked out and agreed with the Parisian police, for whom this was not an exceptional event - street protests are an almost daily occurrence in the French capital. Taking to the street to demonstrate was repeatedly reified by the majority of Amazigh diaspora leaders as the cornerstone of any political action, and the freedom to do so in France was highlighted as one of the advantages of being there. As Riffian activist Fikri El Azrak put it; “the freedom to organise, to speak out, to do whatever, demonstrations… we can’t do that in the Rif. When I was in the Rif, we got out a Riffian flag in a protest and the police fell on us. Repression, arrests, all the time” (40). As a public space, the street is meant to be the most visible place in which to articulate political demands and discourses, and for the leaders of the Amazigh diaspora this visibility is highly desirable; “The street isn’t something you can hide” (29).
It is ironic therefore that the main failure of the march was, in the words of MAK-Anavad President Ferhat Mehenni, the ‘media blackout’ with which it was met. Despite the group’s numerous invitations to small and large media outlets to cover the event, only one outside of the world of Amazigh journalism did so. In his speech to the assembled crowd, he blamed this ‘media blackout’ on the French state, accusing it of ‘complicity’ in the repression of the Kabyles. Mehenni’s frustration at the lack of coverage demonstrates the importance of the media in relaying and amplifying the actions of this diaspora to audiences at home, and transmitting the event more widely even locally, in Paris. Much of the march itself was captured on cameras and smartphones, then shared and uploaded to social media sites by participants, as well as live streams being broadcast by the MAK-Anavad’s media team on their Facebook page. BRTV journalists interviewed key leaders for their evening news broadcast, which over the period of Tafsut was often focused on issues related to the ‘Amazigh question’. The social mediatisation of the protest event allowed for the participation in cyberspace of those interested ‘back home’ and around the world. When, three days later, large marches took place in Kabylia, these same live streams allowed the diaspora to participate in the same way; through ‘likes’ and ‘comments’ that turned into debates and structured an online community of Amazigh people and

Figure 7: 2016 Tafsut March at Place de la République. Source: Siwel.info

44 Bernard-Henri Levy’s website laregledujeu.org
sympathisers around the *Tafsut* marches. Throughout its rolling, international coverage of the *Tafsut* marches in Kabylia on the 20th of April, the MAK-Anavad’s news website *siwel.info* reported the arrests and releases of protestors, in an effort to protect activists and to hold the Algerian state accountable for the way in which they dealt with popular protest.

**Political debate and the ‘Amazigh Question’**

Off the street and within the Amazigh associations *Tafsut*, like *Yennayer*, is a key date in the Amazigh calendar. Unlike *Yennayer*, *Tafsut* is marked by gatherings and meetings that focus on political debate, as well as concerts focused on protest songs (often repeating the still-popular songs of Lounes Matoub). In 2016: the ACB held a debate about the recent officialisation of Tamazight in the Algerian constitution; a group of Amazigh journalists, political representatives and village association leaders met in a Kabyle restaurant in Montreuil for a ‘round table’ discussion on Kabyle autonomy; *Tamazgha* held a day-long event in focused on the political struggles of the Amazigh movement; and the *Association Tudert de Pierrefitte* along with the CMA held a panel-debate that brought together a series of Amazigh politicians based in the diaspora. In all these cases, the focus of the debates was the politics of North Africa, and rarely that of the diaspora or of France. High on the agenda was the rise of a nationalist question for the Kabyles but also for Mozabites, Riffians and even Chawis - were these nations? Even if they could achieve some form of independence, would that do them any good? For some, the question was more about ‘when’ than ‘if’ Amazigh nations would achieve independence. Chairing the debate in Pierrefitte, journalist Ahviv Mekdam declared that “Nothing can stop the wheel of history, and this wheel rolls in the direction of the emancipation of peoples”. Political debate took numerous forms at these events, though speakers were almost all men. The Montreuil meeting consciously took the form of a *Tajmaât*, giving every person an equal opportunity to speak, including the one woman present. Similar themes were returned to again and again: the shape and scope of the political community; the problem of ‘handing on the baton’ to a disinterested youth; how best to organise the diaspora and the Amazigh movement; the relationship between language and state; and the question of developing a form of Amazigh citizenship. Throughout, participants affirmed political debate itself as a facet of this Amazigh citizenship, from organising as a *Tajmaât* (see chapter 5) through to Masin Ferkal’s remarks during the *Tamazgha* event; “Debate is good. Debate is Kabyle”.

Of course, these diaspora activists all agreed, the freedom to publicly hold such debates is not curtailed in the diaspora in the same way as it is in North Africa.
Berber movement // Berber culture

*Tafsut* represents a time of heightened activity for the diaspora Amazigh movement, but in contrast with *Yennayer*, Amazigh politics of contestation are put in the spotlight, rather than cultural practices. These politics are overwhelmingly homeland-oriented, and so *Tafsut* is less of an event for diaspora-oriented associations and groups. It is rather a time when the political movements and associations of the diaspora spring into action; they organise street demonstrations aimed at making the Amazigh movement visible beyond North Africa and hold political debates that provide space for rehearsing and altering narratives of Amazigh citizenship and subjectivity in North Africa.
Chapter 6: The Ordinary and the Act in Diasporic Citizenship

Franco-Berbère? I consider myself a French citizen. We are all full citizens, we don’t need to call ourselves “Franco” for that. We have the same rights and responsibilities as the rest. (5)

The history of the Amazigh movement is one of unfolding ‘contentious politics’ (McAdam et al., 2011), which include and exceed the Indigenous articulations examined in the previous chapter. Amazigh activists position themselves as political actors in relation to policies and institutions that govern them, claiming the political subjectivity of ‘citizen’ (Collyer, 2013), shaped by but also constitutive of the institution of citizenship (Staeheli et al., 2012). This chapter seeks to develop scholarly understandings of the political geography of citizenship and the operation of power across transnational space (Ong, 1999; Collyer and King, 2015) through an analysis of the orientations of diaspora Amazigh citizenship practices. It broadens Silverstein’s concept of ‘transpolitics’, which describes how diaspora members “simultaneously identify with and participate in the public life of a number of distinct localities (of national, infranational and transnational dimensions)” (Silverstein, 2004a:33, also 2007, 2008). Reacting to processes of subjectification operating across multiple scales and societies, particularly those that (re)produce the postcolonial North African subject as Islamic and Arabic, the activists of the Amazigh movement defend a vision of citizenship that preserves and promotes their Indigenous identity (see chapter 6). In the diaspora, the meanings and practices of citizenship are, additionally, inflected with the French dynamics of social and political integration and its opposite, exclusion. The acquisition of formal citizenship in France, as well as questions around education, employment, political participation, ethnic discrimination and access to public space are all issues that concern Amazigh association leaders, many of whom have decided to explicitly break with the concerns of North Africa altogether in order to focus on making ‘Berber culture, culture of France’. On both cross-cutting fronts, Amazigh activism in France engages with citizenship as a practiced, negotiated and imagined institution that is central to their positioning as Indigenous North Africans in the diaspora. During the fieldwork, a qualitative distinction between the movement’s ‘diaspora-oriented’ and ‘homeland-oriented’ practices emerged. By teasing apart these qualitative distinctions and contrasting them in this chapter, I argue that the former are best understood as
‘ordinary’ everyday embodied practices and the latter more as dramatic Acts of Citizenship.

Within the discipline of geography and beyond, scholars working on political subjectivity and identity in the context of transnational migration and diaspora have repeatedly drawn on and contributed to the concept of citizenship (Benhabib, 2004; Kivisto and Faist, 2007; Staeheli and Nagel, 2008; Glick Schiller, 2009; Staeheli et al., 2009; Ho, 2011). Defined broadly as “an institution mediating rights between subjects of politics and the polity to which these subjects belong” (Isin and Nyers, 2014:1), citizenship brings the embodied practices of individuals and groups into focus alongside the policies and politics of states. Citizenship is understood in some scholarship as a formal status, of a passport-holding citizen of a certain nation-state for example (Torpey, 2000; Ragazzi and Balalovska, 2011; Yarwood, 2013), and a rich scholarship on this form of citizenship in political geography focuses on problems posed by the legal status of stateless people (Mavroudi, 2008a; McConnell, 2013; Bauder, 2014). However, this definition of citizenship quickly becomes overly reductive (Painter, 2007; Closs Stephens and Squire, 2012; Staeheli et al., 2012), and whilst the state is a powerful shaping force, alternative and marginal forms of citizenship do exist beyond it. Diaspora is an increasingly common example of this citizenship beyond the territorial bounds of the state, and a locus of debates relating to inclusion and exclusion in the host society (Staeheli and Nagel, 2008; Bertossi, 2012a). This chapter takes this broader perspective to analyse the political geography of citizenship in the Amazigh movement, where many activists are engaged in their words and practices in engendering explicit forms of Amazigh citizenship.

Rather than overlooking “the lived experiences of citizenship, the agency of individuals, and reify[ing] citizenship as a monolithic instrument of state power” (Ho, 2008:129), recent scholarship has highlighted the ways in which citizenship is something that is practiced and continually re-made. It is the everyday practices of individuals that make them citizens, and these practices are in many ways ordered and governed by the state / political authorities, a tension encapsulated in Lynn Staeheli’s notion of ‘ordinary’ citizenship (Staeheli et al., 2012). Though this frame is applicable to all citizenships, Staeheli uses it specifically to approach the lived experiences of international migrants, as it is here that the distinctions in legal texts delimiting who is a citizen and defining their rights break down and overlap, arguing that such an approach grounds the notion of ‘citizenship’ in the human subject, the ‘citizen’ (Staeheli, 2011). Staeheli argues that
migrants’ citizenship status is caught between the legal frameworks and everyday bonds of membership and belonging that *order* citizenship (Staeheli *et al.*, 2012).

Approaching the concept from a different angle, Isin and Nielsen (2008) emphasise the importance of ‘Acts of Citizenship’ to making citizenship what it is, shifting the focus from the human subject and the structures that make that subject onto the moments and ‘deeds’ that make them citizens through a ‘rupture with structure’. They argue that scholars need to pay more attention to “the actual moments that shift established practices, status and order”, where “institutionally accumulated processes” are challenged, remodelled, overturned and claimed (2008:10). Such ‘Acts’ are as much legal metaphors as theatrical ones, compared by Isin & Nielsen to ‘acts of parliament’, which are made outside of the law, in order to change it. Their, examples include ‘acts’ as major as tearing down the Berlin Wall and as subtle as the Turkish state promising to ‘become European’. This chapter uses both the ‘ordinary’ and the ‘Act’ as conceptual approaches to the ways in which citizenship is negotiated in the diasporic Amazigh movement, because in the diasporic context these two approaches complement one another in elucidating the cross-cutting and interacting citizenships produced by transnational migration and political activism.

Finally, all these embodied practices and ‘acts’ of citizenship take place somewhere, and are indeed constitutive of space (Massey, 1993), particularly public space (Staeheli *et al.*, 2009). Place matters in the constructions of citizenship, which themselves link to forms of territoriality (Bauder, 2014) through the localising of power relations between the individual subject or group of subjects and (usually) the state. Staeheli writes that “territorialized forms of citizenship are the most feasible way to regulate citizens for particular ends and to create institutional forms that citizens can access to make claims” (2012:637). The differentiated rights of individuals to access, appropriate, occupy, claim and use public space can be understood through the conceptual lens of citizenship, as can the production of space as accessible to a given ‘public’. Questions of inclusion/exclusion, integration and democratic participation are played out in public space, both metaphorical and physical. For the diasporic Amazigh movement, this means a variety of spaces ranging from the street and public squares to association buildings and concert halls to online fora and the media. The politics of the visibility and invisibility of the Amazigh in public spaces was a recurrent theme in the interview data of this study, linked to notions of integration, recognition, and representation. Similarly to Arab activists in the UK, for whom “notions
of belonging and social membership revolve around conflicting interpretations of [the] group’s physical presence in the public sphere” (Nagel and Staeheli, 2009), Amazigh activists at once produce and reproduce certain cultural differences and seek to undermine others, seeking visibility in some spaces and contexts, but not all. The varied geography of public space in Paris serves as the theatre for the embodied citizenship practices and ‘acts’ of citizenship of the diasporic Amazigh movement in this study.

6.1 An Act in the Ordinary

On the 2nd April 2016, several hundred people of all ages gathered in the Parisian banlieue of Épinay-sur-Seine for the opening of the Espace Franco-Berbère Idir, which the local authorities had repurposed and refurbished for use of the CBF-affiliated Association Franco-Berbère d’Épinay-sur-Seine. Outside the glass doors, etched with a portrait of Idir (Kabyle music’s most celebrated and well-known figure), members of the diasporic Amazigh movement from near and far pressed in for a closer look as Idir himself, as well as the mayor Hervé Chevreau, and CBF founder Mustapha Saadi cut a tricolore ribbon, breaking out into applause and ululations in the fine rain. After a moment, the guests were allowed to enter in small groups to wander through the reception rooms and classroom spaces, decorated with Kabyle artwork, to fill up the main hall, standing along the sides of the room once the seats were taken. Cameras from BRTV were trained on the stage at the far end, where a children’s choir stood poised to perform a medley of Idir’s most popular songs. First, though, the Marseillaise struck up and the attendees got to their feet. After the applause had finished, the choir launched into Ode to Joy, which, as the woman leading the choir explained, is the European anthem. Third, the choir sang Kker a mmis Umazigh. These songs framed the opening ceremony, performative of French, of European, and of Amazigh citizenship respectively.

As the choir gave way to speeches from the mayor and several CBF representatives, the discourse of diaspora-oriented active citizenship was unambiguously taken up. The leader of the Association Franco-Berbère d’Épinay-sur-Seine, a young woman, emphasised the contribution of her association to the neighbourhood over the past decade, and in the context of recent terror attacks perpetrated largely by European citizens of North African origin in Paris and Brussels, affirmed the solidarity of the Amazigh diaspora with their French compatriots and its everyday need to struggle against Islamic fundamentalism as a community. At this point, several people in the crowd began to look back at the far end of the hall, where an elderly man had fastened a MAK-Anavad flag to a long pole and hoisted
it up. This act caused a stir in the crowd. The organisers of the event were careful never to take a political stance on North African politics, preferring to present their associative activities as purely ‘cultural’, their politics upholding received ideals of French citizenship. The Kabyle flag, however, was hard to ignore. As Idir stood to give his speech, the crowd quietened down and leaned in to hear what he had to say. He started, as expected, by thanking various people and paying tribute to the hard work of those Amazigh activists who had made the *Espace Idir* a reality. “We’re building towards something”, he said, articulating the newly opened centre within the broader Amazigh movement’s achievements, “Like that flag over there, the flag of the MAK. You can’t impose it, but I’m for it. The mother of all struggles is the struggle for identity”. The attendance broke out into claps and ululations. From a privileged position, in the spotlight, Idir had articulated the everyday work of Amazigh associations and individuals towards integration as French citizens with homeland-oriented negotiations of citizenship of Indigenous Kabyles. The material, financial and ideological constitution of the new cultural centre depended on the diaspora-oriented ‘ordinary citizenship’ practices of the Amazigh movement, and within it a ceremony was organised to celebrate, affirm and perform that citizenship. But at the same time and in the same space, through the ‘Act of Citizenship’ of a solitary elderly Kabyle and Idir’s speech-act, the attendance was caught up in a moment of homeland-oriented geopolitics. The multiple citizendships that cut across the Amazigh movement here overlapped, interacted, and were producing transnational, hybrid space.

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The rest of the chapter is organised into three parts. The first two sections make a distinction between ‘diaspora-oriented’ and ‘homeland-oriented’ citizenship practices, teasing apart their respective manifestations in the Amazigh diaspora and contrasting them, arguing that the former are best understood as ‘ordinary’ everyday embodied practices and the latter more as dramatic Acts of Citizenship. A third section then returns to consider the ways in which these two citizenship orientations co-produce Amazigh citizenship in the diaspora, exploring their relationships in space, as in the above example. The ‘transpolitics’ of the diasporic Amazigh movement is used to inform scholarly debates about performance and the geopolitics of diaspora.
6.2 Diaspora-Oriented ‘Ordinary’ Citizenship

Diaspora Amazigh associations in France are registered with the local préfecture and governed by French law. As a result, to varying degrees, they are all involved in practices, actions, and networks that are oriented towards French state and society, and the Amazigh community within it. Some associations, particularly members of the Coordination des Berbères de France (CBF), are explicitly oriented in this way, focused on the project of making ‘Berber culture, culture of France’. This diaspora-orientation is well summed up in the words of the CBF’s president, Yazid Ikdoumi;

“Our political project consists of accepting our history, and saying we are French citizens, of Berber culture. We have a vocation to stay and live in France like classic citizens - 100% - whilst keeping our difference alive. Our political project is to fully sign up to French society, and to somehow break with the concerns of North Africa.” (23)

Associations such as those of the CBF, the ACB and its related network CABIL (Coordination des Associations Berbères pour l’Intégration et la Laïcité), Ameslay, Taferca or the AJKF aim to operate within the ‘ordinary’. Seeking to “break with the concerns of North Africa”, they distance themselves from the ‘transpolitics’ of other associations of the diaspora. They collaborate with local authorities on delivering local services such as after-school clubs, French classes and legal advice for immigrants of all provenances, and participate in running local public events alongside other associations such as fairs, markets and festivals. The only Amazigh associations to have succeeded in negotiating the provision of permanent premises by the local authorities fall within this group. A prized achievement in a city where competition for public funds is fierce, this is part of a larger commitment to working with local state institutions such as the mairie and the Caisse d’Allocations Familiales (CAF). In several mairies across France Yennayer has become an annual event through the efforts of diaspora-oriented associations who have established relationships with local politicians and functionaries, as discussed in Chapter 5. This diaspora-orientation, which is characterised by a focus on local concerns, active

45 The CAF is the wing of the French social security system concerned with the family; it offers child benefits, housing grants, disability benefits, and back to school funding as well as grants to local community organisations (CAF, 2013).
involvement of a broad and inclusive membership base, and regular activities, comes with a set of citizenship practices that are produced through the engagement of these associations with their neighbourhoods, the French state, and the wider diaspora. This part of the chapter considers the citizenship practices of these diaspora-oriented associations, contextualising them historically as emergent products of migrant integration into contemporary French state and society.

The Amazigh diaspora assemblage in France networks individuals with multiple political statuses relating to immigration, including undocumented migrants, legally resident foreign nationals, naturalised French citizens and French citizens by birth. The children of many thousands of Amazigh immigrants over the past century today see themselves and are seen by others as nothing other than ‘French’. However, the members of France’s Amazigh associations continue to ethnically distinguish themselves and be distinguished by others from wider French society by their ‘origins’ regardless of their formal citizenship status, for example in the job market or police profiling, despite the ‘colour-blind’ ambitions of the state regime of civic nationalism (Bertossi, 2012b). Diaspora Amazigh negotiate substantive citizenship as immigrants even if they hold French citizenship, although to a different extent and in different ways to those without it. As Sayad (1999, 2002) argued, immigration should be approached as a ‘total social fact’, understood beyond legalistic definitions, in the meanings that individuals give their experience (Saada, 2000). Diaspora-oriented Amazigh associations engage in attempts to secure rights for their members (Benhabib, 1999, 2004), with full substantive citizenship representing the ultimate but elusive goal. Doing so as Amazigh however means that some remnant of migrant identity, of belonging to elsewhere which lies at the root of ‘diaspora consciousness’ (Clifford, 1994, 1997), is always conserved. The question of Amazigh integration in France is therefore geopolitical (Nagel, 2002), as political actors within and without the diasporic Amazigh movement seek to make sense of their ‘place’ in a wider system of political, cultural and territorial entities. As immigrants, the Amazigh must negotiate their citizenship in relation to existing structures and institutions of citizenship in France, which themselves are the unfolding product of French political and social history.

The political upheavals of the 1789 French Revolution and the subsequent ‘long nineteenth century’ are key to understanding the legal and social development of the institution of citizenship in France and are worth outlining here. Broadly, in contrast with the formation
of many European nation-states where the nation as a political community emerged ahead of the state, such as in neighbouring Germany, in France the state preceded the nation (Hobsbawm, 2000). For Rogers Brubaker;

“Revolutionary and Republican definitions of nationhood and citizenship - unitarist, universalist and secular - reinforced what was already in the ancien régime an essentially political understanding of nationhood. Yet while French nationhood is constituted by political unity, it is centrally expressed in the striving for cultural unity. Political inclusion has entailed cultural assimilation, for regional cultural minorities and immigrants alike” (1992:1)

Cultural assimilation in the name of political unity is often termed ‘Jacobinism’, which Rosanvallon (2004) calls a “political culture of generality” (culture politique de la généralité) which radically asserts the equality of individual citizens. Appearing during the founding years of the French Revolution in Robespierre’s Club des Jacobins, this core element of French political culture has continued to manifest itself in state and society “as a social form (the celebration of the “great national ensemble”), as a political quality (faith in the virtues of direct representation), and as regulatory procedure (the cult of the law)” (Rosanvallon, 2004:13). In Jacobin ideology nothing should come between the individual citizen and the state; no intermediates, no special clubs, classes, castes, communities or other special markers of identity.

As a result of Jacobinism, the concept of multiculturalism as adopted in the USA, the UK and elsewhere as an attempt to accommodate cultural difference, has been strongly resisted in French legal and political discourse (Stolcke, 1995; Safran, 2003). It is within civil society that citizens, and from 1980, foreign nationals, are free to organise on the basis of culture or religion (Defrasne, 2004). However the French state remains suspicious of it (Defrasne, 1995), most recently seeking a means to influence and regulate Muslim organisations and mosques through the creation of the Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM) and stricter legal requirements to declare sources of funding (Leschi, 2016). Jacobinism’s assimilationist framing of citizenship (Nagel, 2002) has prevailed despite challenges from across the political spectrum (the Left arguing that immigrants’ children

46 Author’s Translation
should be able to ‘opt out’ of citizenship, the Right arguing that citizenship should be ‘earned’). However, Jacobinism remains a key element of public and political discourse around citizenship and immigration in France (Casanova, 2002; Silverstein, 2005).

In contrast with the assimilationist paradigm, which demands that outsiders conform to certain proscribed criteria in order to join a given group, integration is a negotiated process in which two or more groups come to find commonality through exchange and hybridity whilst recognising and accepting cultural differences (Nagel and Staeheli, 2008). Whereas the ideology of assimilation puts the onus on the migrant Other to adopt the culture of the ‘native’ majority, integration is a two-way street. Director of Tamazight ELCO at the Algerian Consulate Dr. Youssef Nacib described the distinction in this way:

“Assimilation is what the extreme Right [in France] wants […] Assimilation means taking off the old identity and putting on the new. It could even demand that you change your name, that you should forget your history, your name and take on a new one. Integration is something else. It’s the respect of the law, participation in the society.” (44)

Integration emerged as a key concern of Amazigh cultural association members and leaders in the qualitative data, part of a discourse that links to specific ‘ordinary’ practices. This may at first seem contradictory - following the assimilationist logic of the ‘political culture of generality’, an explicitly Amazigh cultural association divides Amazigh individuals from the rest of French society and prevents their assimilation and therefore their equal citizenship. But Amazigh leaders carefully avoid any hint that they are working towards dissociation from wider society to form a cultural, linguistic, or religious enclave. By carefully denoting this distinction, they work to avoid accusations of ‘communitarianism’, which are politically toxic in contemporary France.

This discourse leads to specific ‘ordinary’ citizenship practices. Association leaders argue that by making a space, both physically and metaphorically, for people of Amazigh origin to gather and engage in cultural activities, associations aid the integration of Amazigh people by providing an opportunity for otherwise marginalised individuals and families to create social connections and build support networks (Ragi, 1998). This discourse and activity is derived from that of prominent French politicians, who normalise and legitimize it. For example, speaking of the proposed Amazigh culture centre for the ville de Paris in 2017, Mayor Anne Hidalgo said; “I think that Berber culture – so generous, so open –
carries with it universal values, and so this space will be a space of sharing and social integration” (BRTV, 2017a). These Amazigh associations, their leaders maintain, are open to all irrespective of cultural origins, and engage in intercultural activities with other similar associations that group together people of other cultures - for example the Breton-Amazigh festival co-hosted by the *Maison Amazighe de Saint-Denis* (Fieldnotes, 5th June 2016) or *Tamaynut-France*’s Creole fashion show (25). A quarter of the associations surveyed for this thesis in 2016 were explicitly ‘*Franco-Berbère*’ in name, to emphasise the adherence of their members to wider French society, and indeed their role in that wider society. However, Amazigh activists argue, the Amazigh component of their identity needs to be recognised and understood in order for them to be integrated as effectively participating members of French society.

For many Amazigh diaspora leaders, such a recognition would ideally be achieved at the level of the state through some form of community representation. The president of the Amazigh diaspora’s largest and most visible lobby, the CBF, spoke of how “the Berbers of France are in the process of taking their place in society, even though it’s not yet clear what that will be […], it’s difficult as they fall under the ‘Arab’ umbrella.” (23). The French state has formalised a few institutions for the representation and consultation of religious minorities (Akan, 2009), particularly relevant examples being the CFCM, under whose ‘umbrella’ the mostly Muslim Amazigh fall, and the *Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France* (CRIF) (Amselle, 2014). These institutions are highly controversial in France, where religious organisations are subject to twice the governmental scrutiny47. Some policy commentators celebrate them as a way of better bringing (particularly Muslim) communities into structures of governance and reducing instances of civil unrest (Mitchell, 2011), whereas others see them as divisive and essentialising (Amselle, 2011). Diasporic Amazigh leaders frequently expressed their aspiration of constituting a united Amazigh lobby comparable to these groups but distinct from them. AFKIF leader Cyprien Hamadouche made a direct comparison, saying “Here in France, if the Kabyle diaspora finds consensus and comes together in our plurality […] we [could] do something like the CRIF.” (45). Scholar-Activist Dr. Kamel Säidi emphasised the “need to work at

47 Religious organisations in France legally must exist as both cultural *associations de loi 1901* and religious *associations de loi 1905*, observing a strict separation of funds and activities that are ‘religious’ and ‘cultural’.
community - because if it exists it does so because we construct it […] There are Kabyles in the diaspora. And there are attempts at constituting a lobby, a community.” (56).

For these leaders, the ‘place’ of the Amazigh in French society relies partially on their distinction from the ‘Arab’ segment of the population originating in North Africa, and partially on their ability to function as a united community, whether within an institutional structure or as a loose confederation, within French society. Gaining recognition and acting as a lobby relies on these associations’ practices of public engagement, education and networking which entail ‘ordinary’ citizenship, produced both by the structures and political possibilities of state and society and by the small, everyday actions of Amazigh individuals. Such practices of citizenship dovetail with the politics of seeking visibility in state, society and media, emphasising the shared values of Amazigh and French civilisation and highlighting Amazigh integration and societal contribution, whilst downplaying religious categories of difference.

The “Taking our Place” (Prenons place) initiative of the association Ameslay is a good example of the kinds of visibility sought in the diaspora-oriented practices of Amazigh associations, which are acceptable within France’s framework of ‘ordinary citizenship’. Beginning in 2012, this group of second- and third-generation Amazigh from a range of ethno-linguistic backgrounds set about applying to the local authorities of arrondissements across Paris to rename public buildings and spaces after different icons of the Amazigh diaspora. Speaking about this project, the association’s leader Zoubir Ghanem told me;

“Why [do this]? Because we’re French. In public spaces, we see ‘école’ this and ‘rue’ that, named after Franco-French figures. We’re second or third generation but don’t see ourselves represented […] so we proposed this project [and now] in the 20th [arrondissement] there’s a youth club called Taos Amrouche […] then there is Slimane Azem square in the 14th and the third will be the Kateb Yacine garden in the 13th. […] We’ve chosen those that have a link with France. That’s to be able to say to our young generation, ‘Yes, your name is Mouloud, Mohammed, whatever, but a name that constantly sends you back to your origins doesn’t stop you having your place in France. […] Taking place in the city sends a signal that France is multicultural” (36).

The figures chosen by Ameslay embody the qualities that Amazigh want to be known for in France. They are artist-intellectuals that practiced and interpreted Indigenous Amazigh
cultural production as well as writing in French and living in France for significant portions of their lives. Taos Amrouche was an Amazigh writer, singer and poet and one of the earliest North African women to publish a novel in French - *Jacinthe Noire* (1947). Slimane Azem was a Kabyle singer who was very popular in the diaspora through the 1950s, 60s and 70s. Kateb Yacine was an Amazigh playwright and novelist. He wrote in French, considering the language to be the ‘spoils of war’, before later directing plays in Algeria’s vernacular languages, including Tamazight.

Similar projects have been successfully undertaken by Amazigh associations in other parts of greater Paris. By inscribing Amazigh names into the city’s built environment these diaspora-oriented associations hope to further their integration into French state and society. The sites of *Prenons place* are scattered around Paris and its banlieue rather than being concentrated in one area, as Ameslay’s strategy has been to identify unnamed spaces and to suggest names to local authorities. Rather than creating a communitarian ghetto, these initiatives open up the Amazigh diaspora’s heritage as the shared heritage of France, literally ‘taking their place’ within its territory. Ameslay makes its petitions to local authorities as French citizens, residents of the given neighbourhood, but also as Amazigh - articulating their project within a politics of visibility and representation that is nonetheless subject to the institutions and procedures of the French state. *Prenons place* is well suited to the possibilities for action imposed by France’s ordinary citizenship, and where it has been successful, the suggested names have come to occupy and describe a space in the everyday.

Attempts to achieve greater integration through forms of community representation and recognition relate directly to Amazigh associations’ entry into French civil society and the consequent substantive citizenship of their members. The ability to attract public funds and resources such as association spaces is framed in public discourse and seen by Amazigh leaders as an indicator of successful integration as it allows the associations to enter mutually beneficial relationships with other French organisations. At the same time, French institutions of local government hold a discourse of *citoyenneté* that closely resembles the ‘active citizenship’ of several neoliberal government projects globally (Postero, 2007; Holston, 2008; Staeheli, 2011). According to this discourse, ‘active citizenship’ means citizens contributing voluntary effort to their local communities, effort from which they collectively benefit and towards which the state will divert funding rather than running services on behalf of local communities (Yarwood, 2013). Speaking to a
BRTV journalist at a *Yennayer* event she hosted in 2017 Valerie Pécresse, the president of the Regional Council of Île-de-France, framed the Amazigh as ‘active citizens’ in these terms; “Those of Berber origin have an economic and cultural dynamism […] they are a model of integration […] they are fully-fledged French citizens, who engage in society” (BRTV, 2017b). Such a discourse about the diaspora Amazigh legitimises their allocation of state resources. Yazid Ikdoumi linked the success of the CBF in attracting public funds to a successful politics of visibility;

“Here we’ve managed what we’ve managed by attaining public funds; without it [obtaining two Berber cultural centres] wouldn’t have been possible. You don’t just get public money for a song, you get it because you’re organised, councillors see that you exist, that you carry weight (23)”.  

ACB director Chérif Benbouriche indicated the kinds of partners with which his association worked, and the dynamics of such a relationship;

“They’re partners - like the *Département de Paris*, the *Conseil Régionale*, the CAF. We share points, put actions in place. They have a few rules - if we ask the CAF to give us money to take kids to the mosque, I hope they’d say no! But if we ask for help with the homework club, that’s a good thing, they’ll put in money.” (5)

The contours of the particular kind of ‘active citizenship’ on offer are discernible here. These diaspora-oriented Amazigh associations have attracted public money by offering valuable services such as education support to their local communities and building trust over the long term with councillors and functionaries. Not all associations are successful in attracting such funding and support however, which hints at a need for Amazigh associations to subscribe to a particular normative framework of civil society in order to access these resources. This is a form of ‘ordinary’ citizenship that is produced through the everyday practices of such associations (homework clubs, legal advice, cultural activities) and the ability of the state to regulate those practices through its funding policies. The existing institutions of citizenship are not challenged by these practices, which form part of a wider project of socio-economic integration.

Some other association leaders held the opinion that seeking state resources would mean sacrificing their independence and their ability to challenge the *status quo*, including the institution of citizenship. Leader of the radical association *Tamazgha*, Masin Ferkal, explained how;
“We think, sincerely, that in the Berber associations there is no real activism. There’s associative activity, that is adapted to the French system of funding, grants etc. And they adapt to the principles of the French state” (52).

Taking a similar line, Rahma Houzig of Tamaynut-France said;

“we have literally no funding from elsewhere [...] Clichy [the municipality] gives us the room, but otherwise we have no support. The telephone is us, the fees to bring artists, the books, it's all us. It's becoming a bit of an issue [...] But then do we want to get funding? We're totally free at the minute. We're free to criticise, and we do criticise the Moroccan state, for example” (25).

The structures that regulate citizenship practices in France, both financial and legal, create secondary effects, as association leaders and members react in different ways to the trade-offs between agency and subjectivity implicit to ‘ordinary’ citizenship. ‘Active citizenship’ attracts public money and political endorsement, but in the estimation of several interviewees restricts associations’ activism. A key way in which association practices are ordered spatially is in the day-to-day concerns of obtaining and maintained access to meeting spaces.

‘Ordinary’ citizenship, like all political relationships, is spatially mediated and produces space (Lefebvre, 1991). Most Parisian Amazigh associations meet at the municipal maison des associations or another publicly accessible space run by a private organisation. The majority of these spaces are multi-purpose rooms obtained on a temporary basis, with the corollary that most Amazigh associations do not have permanent premises, but periodically occupy certain spaces and often have to move. The territorialisation of these associations’ activities is limited, affecting their visibility to wider publics as well as the organisation of associational life. Associations find it easier to book weekly slots for regular activities such as language classes, or book dates far in advance for key dates in the Amazigh calendar such as Yennayer or Tafsut, giving a particular rhythm to the diasporic movement’s activities over the short term. For regular activities, medium-sized associations in competitive environments like Tamaynut-France and AFB de Pierrefitte needed to demonstrate to local authorities their ability to draw a sufficient number of people to their meetings in order to keep their slot (19, 25). Associations need to avoid potentially controversial artistic or political themes to gain the approval of those governing association spaces, and some interviewees reported such meetings being banned at the last minute (10,
14). These dynamics lead to a generalised trend of Amazigh associations organising popular, cultural activities over controversial, topical, political activities involving smaller numbers. This trend is a spatialized expression of ‘ordinary’ citizenship, as associative activities are circumscribed by the materiality of spaces available them, and subject to the everyday governance of those spaces. By occupying and utilising these spaces, they act as citizens, becoming enrolled in citizenship practices, integrated as a part of wider civil society.

Staeheli and Nagel point out that there is a “need to understand 'integration' not only as an objectively determinable process or end state, but also as a set of ideas about how certain groups are to be included in the public” (Staeheli and Nagel, 2008:85). This ‘set of ideas’ in the context of the Amazigh diaspora could be called ‘Republican values’, at times a euphemistic reference to French patriotism, at others evoking the universal values that are often perceived to be ‘under threat’ from France’s majority Muslim immigrant community (Geisser and Zemouri, 2007). These include the French motto of “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” but also more specifically socio-legal conventions such as: laïcité, which in theory entails the complete separation of religious and public affairs, historically conceived in relation to the (Catholic) church but more recently almost solely used to limit Islamic practices; democracy, the political philosophy that ‘the West’ has appropriated as its heritage and which until the Arab Spring was perceived by many as incompatible with Islam (Ghanem, 2011); and gender equality, which whilst not being fully achieved in French society remains a strong value within it, and is often held up as a failing of Islamic orthodoxy. The adhesion of Amazigh associations to ‘Republican values’ was repeatedly referenced by interviewees but also declared in speeches and in the official association mission statements filed at the préfecture. A representative example is that of the AJKF which according to its mission statement exists:

“To promote Kabyle and Amazigh (Berber) culture throughout France, and this in the aim of multicultural exchange and dialogue; to combat discrimination and promote the values of citizenship; to support the actions of Amazigh (Berber) associations in France in fraternity and solidarity, when those actions are deemed useful and legitimate; to promote human rights, in particular the rights of women;
to defend the values of democracy and laïcité; to urge young people to vote and to participate in political debate.}

These ‘values’ are then practiced and performed as activities of ordinary citizenship in different ways by associations, often in such a way as to emphasise the Amazigh members’ distance from the perceived ‘threat’ of orthodox Islam. During Ramadan, when restaurants served no food until sunset in the Muslim-dominated parts of Paris such as Ménilmontant and Belleville, where the ACB is located, neither the fast nor the religious festivities were allowed to have an impact on the association’s schedule. Rather, at a community event during the fast, food was provided at the association - not only food, but alcohol and pork sausages, the most potently divisive culinary elements possible. Central to French culinary culture but considered ritually unclean in Islam, their presence at an Amazigh association was far from innocent. It represented laïcité, performed it, demonstrated it, practiced it in a way that left no doubt as to the association’s rupture with Islamic practices. In a similar way, women are actively encouraged not to wear the veil at Amazigh associations as both a marker of laïcité and of gender equality. Inviting me to an event at AFKIF, Cyprien Hamadouche told me “you'll not see a veiled woman there. There's a good welcome, we're diversified. If you want you can drink wine and beer, eat pork, or eat Halal. Religion doesn't come in to make the law” (45). Beyond laïcité, other examples of performing ‘Republican values’ include displaying the French flag alongside Amazigh flags at association meetings, or the CBF singing the Marseillaise to begin meetings, of which Yazid Ikdoumi said;

“We’re singing it more and more often. Before, it was only occasional […] now there are people who are capable of saying ‘that’s the way it is: I get involved, I progress, I sign up to the frame of France’” (23).

The “frame of France” in this case orders the embodied subjectivities of CBF members as French citizens. In contrast, Amazigh associations’ focus on preserving and promoting Amazigh culture rarely extends to upholding Islamic traditions, which are almost always viewed pejoratively by Amazigh activists. Language and civilisation classes, as well as conferences given by visiting scholar-activists, focused rather on the non-Islamic (and

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therefore ‘laïc’) festivals, traditions and practices associated with Amazighité. Performative embodiments of ‘Republican values’ coupled with their discursive repetition engender a particular politics of inclusion and exclusion. Whilst universal values like laïcité or gender equality are in theory socio-legal tools for defending equal access to the public sphere (Staeheli et al., 2009), by performing these ‘ordinary’ citizenship practices in ways that explicitly target Islamic activities, many Amazigh associations operate a regime of exclusion towards practicing Muslims whilst seeking to include themselves more fully within ‘secular’ French society.

As well as seeking to ‘take their place’ within French state and society through encouraging certain kinds of ‘active citizenship’ on the part of their members and the performance of ‘Republican values’, Amazigh associations also make claims on the French state. The status of Tamazight in France has been a focus of Amazigh associations since a consultative committee on the application of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages recommended that Tamazight be included as a ‘non-territorial language of France’, along with some others including dialectal Arabic, due to its high prevalence in France and non-official status in its home territories (Cerquiglini, 1999). The report also cautiously estimated that up to 2 million people in France spoke some form of Tamazight (Mena Lafkioui, 2013). Amazigh leaders and scholars began to hope that Tamazight would attract state resources and be included in school curricula in areas with a significant Amazigh population (Chaker, 2004). At the same time, the Stasi report (2003) on laïcité49 recommended the teaching and promotion of Tamazight and Kurdish in French schools to partly replace Arabic classes, which were argued to often link to Islamic education. Salem Chaker argued that this

“reference to non-Arabic languages (and cultures) can only be explained by the conviction that these languages and cultures naturally counter, counterbalance the

49 The Stasi Report lead to the introduction of the French law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools, and is therefore widely credited with the ban on headscarves, amongst other religious symbols, in the French education system.
weight and influence of Arabo-Islamism and Islamism. Along with this goes the old idea largely transmitted by Berber activists, that these languages and cultures carry values convergent with those of the Republic: democracy, tolerance and *laïcité*50 (2004:29)

‘Republican values’ were articulated with *Amazighité*, positioning the Amazigh diaspora as ideal citizens within French society, in contrast with the threat posed by Arabo-Islamism. However these proposed reforms were never implemented, notwithstanding the CMA’s protest to the EU and UN (2005), and Tamazight education has stayed confined to a few universities, and associations that either self-fund or have a teacher supplied by the Algerian ELCO. The issue resurfaced during the fieldwork period, as it emerged that diaspora-oriented associations would not cooperate with the Algerian consulate on principle. Samia Ould Amara of the *Maison Amazighe de Saint-Denis* said they had to stop their language course when funding from the *mairie* was cut off, but explained that they refused to “work with the [Algerian] embassy [:] the children coming to the course are French, so logically it is up to France to foot the bill” (41a). When Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, the French Education Minister, announced major reform to the ELCO in early 2016, a broad coalition of Amazigh association leaders formed a lobby (CNAF) aimed once again at introducing Tamazight into French schools (see chapter 1). A discourse of citizenship is enrolled into the CNAF’s rationale for the introduction of Tamazight, as their letters to the Education Minister evoke EU and international law as well as issues of integration, equal treatment, ‘Republican values’ and *laïcité* whilst suggesting that the current system of Arabic teaching only encouraged students to turn against France - alluding to the multiple Islamist attacks the country had seen in the months prior (CNAF, 2016). The Amazigh made their claims to the French state on the strength of their contribution to society, positioning themselves as model citizens deserving of their state’s resources.

The diaspora-oriented negotiations of citizenship outlined in this section are both everyday, embodied, practiced, bottom-up and also structured, influenced by the French polity. The resultant, emergent citizen-diaspora-subject is the product of this ‘ordinary’ citizenship.

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This citizenship is negotiated primarily in terms of integration, with diaspora Amazigh taking on a migrant subjectivity. As such, these negotiations join with much wider processes of social change in France, of increasing multiculturalism and cultural diversity, of anxiety over international migration and specifically the perceived threat of political Islam to French state and society. The Amazigh associations engaged in this negotiation are not, however, attempting to rewrite the rules of citizenship in France but rather emphasise their ability to integrate into the existing citizenship regime. In contrast, their members are often far more revolutionary regarding their homelands, and their political subjectivities in relation to them.

6.3 Homeland-Oriented ‘Acts of Citizenship’

The relationship of a diaspora with its homeland can take many forms, from family ties to participation as voters in the origin-state. Many studies on the latter relationship in political geography have explored variants of what Benedict Anderson termed ‘long-distance nationalism’ (1992), the tendency in diaspora communities to engage in often contentious national politics in relation to their origin-states (Frykman, 2002; Mulligan, 2002; Carter, 2005; Toal and Dahlman, 2011). Political geographers have highlighted diasporic populations’ ‘pragmatic’ (Mavroudi, 2008a, 2008b) or ‘flexible’ (Ong, 1999; Ho, 2008) approaches to citizenship, highlighting their agency in redefining the kinds of citizenship they take part in, particularly in relation to their origin-state. In this case study, homeland-oriented groups include ethno-nationalist political movements such as the MAK-Anavad, MAC or Mouvement 18 Septembre, advocacy groups like the CMA, the Collectif des Mozabites en Europe (CME), Izmulen or Assemblée Mondial Amazigh-France (AMA-France), development organisations like IDMéditerranée or Télilt, and village committees, to give some examples. These groups collaborate transnationally with people, associations and governments across the Mediterranean, at times engaging in what Keck and Sikkink (1998) described as ‘boomerang activism’ to internationalise the political issues facing Amazigh populations in their origin-states, at others engaging in fundraising or advocacy on their behalf. These groups are frequently not registered as associations of the Loi 1901, existing informally or using other registered associations as hosts. Their official membership is often quite small in comparison to their wider following; attendees to events and concerts, and followers on social media. Their primary political orientation, which focuses on the local and national concerns of the homeland, activist participation, and irregular, reactive actions, comes with a different set of citizenship practices to those of the
diaspora-oriented associations described above. Aesthetic, dramatic, mediatised one-off actions are aimed at affecting processes of change in the homeland, but also engender changes to the kinds of citizenship embodied in the Amazigh diaspora. I argue that this citizenship is consciously claimed and brought into being through Acts of Citizenship; “acts when, regardless of status and substance, subjects constitute themselves as citizens” (Isin and Nielsen, 2008:2). Acts of Citizenship are “simultaneously political, ethical and aesthetic” (2008:4), moments when new paths and directions are staked out through the actions of those claiming their status as citizens.

Although diasporic populations often live beyond the borders of their origin-states, the governance of those states is not absent from their citizenship subjectivities and practices. Modes of ‘diaspora outreach’ imbricate origin-states in the negotiation of diasporic citizenship regardless of formal citizenship status. As many Amazigh leaders and activists in the diaspora are binational French citizens, or are either political refugees or self-designated exiles, any consideration of their homeland-oriented citizenship practices must account for ‘diaspora outreach’. Alan Gamlen’s concept of the ‘Emigration State’ describes the complex geopolitics by which several states with large emigrant populations influence the ties that diasporas have with their homelands “through mechanisms that protrude beyond their borders and operate on a transnational scale” (2008:842). Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia are all ‘Emigration States’ in that the governance of their significant emigrant populations does operate on a transnational scale, and is expanding (Collyer, 2013; Brand, 2014; Harris, 2014). As a result, the Amazigh diaspora’s political relationship with its homeland(s) is, partially, a political relationship with the citizenship of its origin-states. It can be understood through the concept of citizenship outlined at the start of this chapter, as “an institution mediating rights between subjects of politics and the polity to which these subjects belong” (Isin and Nyers, 2014:1). However, the kinds of citizenship produced in this context are qualitatively distinct from the citizenship practices discussed above. The following section focuses on the homeland-oriented politics of the Amazigh diaspora and argues that they are take form in dramatic ‘Acts of Citizenship’.

The very first homeland-oriented organisations to appear in the Amazigh diaspora were the village committees, which for the Kabyle part of the diaspora still represent a key socio-political institution (see chapter 6). This form of translocal solidarity (Page, 2011), expressed through financial contributions, development projects, political support, and bodily return, was proposed by interviewees as the potential basis of Amazigh citizenship.
As explained by CBF president Yazid Ikdoumi; “they’re turned towards the country of origin and their villages […] These are people who will probably end up returning to live in the village. It’s their primary objective anyway” (23). Cyprien Hamadouche explicitly designated the members of his village committee as “citizens of their village” (45). In the years of the Algerian War, respondents often mentioned, the village committees represented a key source of economic and political support for the FLN (Bouaziz, 2012). During the 2001 Black Spring crisis in Kabylia, village committees were much more effective than the cultural associations in mobilising the diaspora and its resources, to internationalise the issue through public protests, to pay for the treatment of the injured in French hospitals, and to help undocumented Kabyle immigrants to regularise their status. As demonstrated in chapter 4, attempts to encourage these village committees to work together in a single federated structure has been hard for activists like Malika Baraka and Madjid Boumekla to achieve, as every committee operates in independence from the other. This has not meant that the idea of basing a form of Kabyle citizenship on these committees has gone away. Several interviewees, particularly those advocating for the autonomy of Kabylia, evoked the *Tajmaât* (and the *Aarch*51) as the key institution of the Indigenous Kabyle polity: past, present and future (2, 10, 34, 43b, 46a). In December 2015, in advance of the MAK congress that would take place the following spring in Kabylia, the MAK-Anavad held a two-day pre-congress in Paris, inviting its activists and sympathisers from across France to come and contribute their ideas. One of the workshops, presided over by lawyer and Minister for the Kabyle Language Sakina Aït Ahmed, focused on the project of a Kabyle Parliament. Delegates agreed that such a parliament should be based on the *Aarchs*, with the *Tajmaât* as its basic political unit. Beyond representing a reference to the pre-colonial Kabyle polity (Roberts, 2014) and therefore lending weight to Kabylia’s right to self-determination as Indigenous people, these activists suggested this idea because they themselves were invested in their village committees and believed that they represented durable political institutions capable of governing Kabyle political life.

The proposed Kabyle Parliament joins a number of institutional projects currently being undertaken by the MAK-Anavad to various degrees of completion; an online national library, a ministry for the environment, a national identity card and a new national flag, to

51 *Tajmaât* refers to the village assembly, the *Aarch* to the wider inter-village political union
name a few examples. The most successful projects have been ones with high symbolic, performative value. The MAK-Anavad is engaged in what Fiona McConnell terms ‘rehearsing the state’ (2016), seeking legitimacy both internally through appeals to traditional or Indigenous forms of governance (Caspersen, 2015) and externally through mimicry of state diplomacy (McConnell et al., 2011; Jeffrey et al., 2015). It seeks to enrol Kabyles as citizens just as its provisional government performs the role of a state-like entity. However, so far it has had no role to play in the everyday governance of Kabyle life, either in Kabylia or in the diaspora. In seeking public support the MAK-Anavad is “not seeking to gain activists, but to win citizens for Kabylia”, explained GPK Institutions Minister Ahmed Haddag (2). In contrast with ‘ordinary’ citizenship, “winning citizens” is a singular, defined ‘Act’. As described by Nacer Hamadene, Secretary of the GPK’s official support association Reseau Anavad; “Kabyle citizenship, today, consists of acts, actions, demonstrations. That's Kabyle citizenship, it’s an identity card. It's the first act of citizenship” (16).

The Kabyle Identity Card (CIK) was launched in 2010 as one of the first projects of the GPK. According to the GPK’s president Ferhat Mehenni, “somewhere between thirty and fifty thousand” (34) have been issued in both Kabylia and the diaspora. To obtain a card during the fieldwork, an individual has to fill out a form (either online or in person) including biographical information (date and place of birth, full name52) as well as identifying their village and aarch. These details are then used to print a plastic card, which in 2015 cost the applicant €40. Although Mehenni stressed the mainly symbolic nature of the CIK, saying “nobody is obliged to have it or to show it […] we’re not at the stage of asking people to prove their allegiance with the card”, he nonetheless hinted at the potential for the data gathered from these cards to be integrated into a Kabyle citizens’ registry, to “create a database for the day that Kabylia gains its independence” (34). Obtaining a CIK

52 At the bottom of the card is a space marked ‘colonial civil status’, reserved for the family name officially registered with the Algerian civil administration. These names are frequently different from the Indigenous family names. For example, ‘Ferhat Mehenni’ is ‘Ferhat Aït Saed’, ‘Mehenni’ being his ‘colonial civil status’. During the French colonial period, civil administrators gave and invented family names which were entered into the civil registry and have remained in place in independent Algeria.
is an ‘Act of Citizenship’ in that it is a “symbolically and materially constitutive” deed (Isin and Nielsen, 2008:17) that engenders a new paradigm in which citizenship practices can develop. Once in the hands of the recipient, the CIK can be used in multiple ways; Mehenni described using it as an ID card for a stay in a hotel, whilst others brandish their cards as MAK-Anavad events, or post pictures with them on social media.

My own CIK (fig.8), which I obtained in June 2016, was conferred on me as a foreign national. A committee was to assess my application and check that I did not have a criminal record before I was accepted as a Kabyle citizen. The conferral of this Kabyle citizenship on the Kabyle National Day (14th June) - another institutional innovation of the GPK - was enrolled by the GPK’s ministers into their popular geopolitics; in Ahmed Haddag’s speech to the assembled crowd at Trocadero, my case was described as an example of “friendship between the Kabyle people and the English people”. The materiality of the card enhances its symbolic effect, with signatures and an official-looking flag-stamp evoking authority and legitimacy whilst the false magnetic strip points to a functionality the card is yet to have. Its size makes it easily portable, something that cardholders can keep on their person. However, the card cannot be dismissed as ‘fake’. It is part of an emergent assemblage of Kabyle citizenship within which it is legitimate, more so indeed than other forms of identification. In Kabylia and the diaspora obtaining a CIK represents an act of rebellion against the ‘false’ Algerian citizenship that many Kabyles sympathetic to the MAK-Anavad feel is imposed on them. It is an ‘Act of Citizenship’ that is performative in its ability to mimic a state-like institution and to internationalise the Kabyle independence movement’s agenda, but also creative in its founding of a new institution of citizenship outside the frame of the origin-state. The forms that this institution of citizenship will take are subject to further changes through new ‘Acts of Citizenship’, and in the absence of an administration of everyday life by the GPK it is not the ‘ordinary’ but rather the ‘Act’ that defines this homeland-oriented citizenship.

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53 This is according to the GPK’s Institutions Minister Ahmed Haddag (2), but how and if this was done is uncertain.
In 2015, a second major project of the MAK-Anavad was launched; the new Kabyle flag. Flags are among the quintessential symbols of the nation (Ozkirimli, 2010), and usually project something about that nation’s sense of self, hence their ability to embody as sense of everyday, ‘banal’ nationalism (Billig, 1995) but also their propensity to change during revolutionary moments (Hobsbawm, 2000). In the case of the Kabyle nationalist movement this ‘reinvention’ was to be organised by the MAK-Anavad, in contrast to the spontaneous, popular adoption of the Amazigh flag first put together by the Académie Berbère in Paris in 1967 (see Appendix 2). According to Ferhat Mehenni, the GPK chose to organise a vote on the new flag, putting out a call for propositions; “in the end we had 100 or so options, and we put it to a vote - in Kabylia, in France, on the internet, in America, Canada… and a flag emerged as the favourite” (23). 20,000 voted over a period of months, with the majority voting in person, in Kabylia, rather than online. When I asked why it was important to hold the vote, Mehenni replied; “It was for democracy, to give an example. People needed to move themselves to vote, to show their support for the movement, the
will to have their own flag. It was a patriotic act” (23). In holding this vote, the MAK-Anavad was signalling a future extension of this same citizenship practice - a democratic system of voting and popular participation - in the image of the French political system. However, this was a singular action. The flag would only be voted on once, definitively, and so the flag vote is best understood as an Act of Citizenship, one that disrupted established socio-political relations, rather than a citizenship practice. It was creative (White, 2008), and as such can be understood to be constitutive of a new form of Kabyle and therefore Amazigh citizenship in the diaspora. This new form of citizenship is performative of a state-like institution, of democratic politics. The flag itself, as a material outcome of the vote, is enrolled by Kabyle citizens as a symbol of national identity, a key ‘prop’ in further citizenship ‘Acts’.

Continuing their performance of Acts of Citizenship, the MAK-Anavad organised for the flag to be unveiled in a series of flag raising ceremonies in cities throughout the diaspora in 2015, with GPK Ministers travelling to officiate. As the Kabyle national anthem (written by Ferhat Mehenni) played, the new flag was unfurled publicly for the first time;

“The raising of the flag was better than anything we could have hoped for. We never imagined for a second that the first raising of the flag, the 18th April 2015 at Trocadero - we were doubly surprised - there were 2,000 people there! The square was completely packed! A sea of people. Maybe that's what lit the fuse, because two days later in Kabylie there was another sea of people in the street with Kabyle flags for the 20th of April. The MAK had never before succeeded in bringing so many to the streets.” (2)

The symbolism of the flag itself was joined in these moments to the aesthetic performance of the ‘Act’ (Isin and Nielsen, 2008:10), as thousands of Kabyles across the diaspora and in Kabylia itself participated in ceremonies inaugurating the new flag, demonstrating their identification with the nationalist movement and becoming extras in a piece of geopolitical theatre. The strategic coincidence of these events with commemorations of Tafsut rendered them doubly potent, and allowed MAK-Anavad activists to articulate their movement with the prior activism of the MCB, looking to the past as well as the future in an emergent narrative of national struggle (Brubaker, 2004). The Tafsut march of 2016 in Paris was described by the MAK-Anavad’s news outlet Siwel.info as a ‘powerful moment’, the signature of a ‘divorce’ between the Kabyle people and the Algerian state (Siwel, 2016a).
Several thousand Amazigh, predominantly Kabyles, marched between Bastille and République, voicing support for a Kabyle referendum on independence and doing so embodied as Kabyle citizens: women wearing the Kabyle dress; the new Kabyle flag emblazoned on t-shirts, hats, and waved in the air; banners in French and Kabyle and slogans such as ‘Ulac smah ulac’ (No forgiveness [for the crimes of the Algerian state]); and CIKs held high. Several groups carried banners declaring their support as citizens of their Tajmaât and of their Aarch, for example ‘We, citizens of the village Ait-Bouadda arch Ait-Ghobri are for the independence of Kabylia’ (fig. 9). There was nothing ‘ordinary’ about these manifestations of citizenship, nor did they change the formal citizenship of any participants. The ability of the Kabyle polity to regulate everyday life, to ascribe and uphold rights and responsibilities to its citizens, is far from a reality at present. These were symbolic moments, Acts of Citizenship that outwardly projected a rupture with Algerian citizenship, in which Kabyle citizenship briefly came into being, embodied and performed by the assemblage of people, nation, and provisional government.

Not all homeland-oriented Acts of Citizenship in the Amazigh movement seek rupture with the origin state and institute new ethno-nationalist forms of citizenship; indeed, many act as citizens of the origin-state in a ‘transpolitics’ of distant identification. For example, CME secretary Slimane Tounsi described how their decision to speak out against the established authorities in North Africa broke with earlier forms of Mozabite diaspora organisation, which had never confronted the Algerian state before. In the context of
periodic reports of increasingly violent attacks against Mozabites and their property by Arabic youths guarded by police officers relayed on social media in early 2014 - “we’re hyper-connected because we’re far from our country and so we follow the news closely” (49) - the CME formed as a group of concerned Mozabite individuals in agreement that they needed to do something to help their community at ‘home’. Tounsi related how they hesitated at first to criticise the Algerian state, but that “there was a point where we did attack the government, because we had to”, and that in the end “this is the role that we played, we did our best to hold to government responsible” (49). This was decision to act as citizens, as subjects of politics, in relation to the Algerian state. The group published communiqués in the Algerian press, and went to give interviews on radio and television platforms such as France 24, Radio France Maghreb and others calling for the state to uphold the rights of its citizens. Mozabite lawyer Salah Dabouz explained; “You have the right to be Mozabite. You have the right to make declarations against the government. You have the right to live in the Mzab. But [the government makes sure that] you can’t do all three at the same time” (4b), the implication being that those Mozabites in the Mzab that criticised the government were forced to flee or were arrested. Tounsi reported that he was then invited to the Algerian Embassy and asked, “as an Algerian […] not to throw oil on the fire” by an embassy official, but responded “You say that, but you, you represent the state […] the state has the power to stop this, so stop it!” (49). In this example, and others like it, activists in the Amazigh diaspora practice the citizenship of their origin-states, using international media platforms to call them to account. The rights of these citizens, codified in state and international legislation, are frequently referenced by these diaspora activists, who play a role of ‘boomerang activism’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), relaying information and speaking on behalf of groups in North Africa. Whilst in Staeheli’s terms their citizenship is no longer ‘ordered’ by that origin-state, they are able to engage in performative actions that call for reform and (re)produce their own status as citizens.

Homeland-oriented political actions regularly take place in the diasporic Amazigh movement in the form of public demonstrations; sit-ins, gatherings and marches at particular spots in Paris and other major French cities aimed at transmitting a message as publicly as possible. These spaces enhance the performative dimensions of these Acts. Diasporic Amazigh activists target multiple ‘publics’, where ‘a public’ is understood as “a socio-political collective that is constructed through dialogue and action and that engages strangers” (Staeheli et al., 2009:634) rather than being subsumed within a single
all-encompassing public. The MAK-Anavad’s flag-raising events were directed as much at emergent online publics as they were at local residents, national communities or the wider diaspora. The public demonstrations and gatherings of other homeland-oriented groups are similarly targeted, at slightly different publics. Using the now readily-available media tools of social media, events in Paris can be immediately shared through digital networks, and in many cases activists evaluate their actions based on the effects of demonstrating transnational solidarity. Tamazgha’s Masin Ferkal explained that;

“Even if we only have 20 people who turn up for a demonstration it's ok – we show that we’re helping out. They [Amazigh activists ‘on the ground’] are not isolated. The internet is really helpful for this.” (11)

This mediatisation accentuates the importance of aesthetics and international visibility in performances of Amazigh citizenship. Diaspora activists create a stage for themselves, not only in the public spaces of Paris, but on the online platforms of their own websites and social media sites like Facebook. Armed with the symbolic tool of the new flag, MAK-Anavad activists would march at every given opportunity - joining onto the tail of the Parisian May 1st Workers’ March organised by the major trade unions, for example, as it represented an opportunity to create further images of popular mobilisation that could be shared online. This online-mediated politics is unpacked more fully in the following chapter, which draws on recent scholarship in media and communications to suggest that the social media environment tends towards radical political discourse, which in the case of the MAK-Anavad articulates with French nativist-populism.

Meetings, demonstrations and marches in recognisable places like Bastille, République, and Trocadero amongst others articulate the actions of the Amazigh movement to the histories and universal values associated with those places. The public squares of Paris, many of which have been named to enshrine ‘Republican values’ and were built in many places as aesthetically imposing monuments in themselves, represent ideal stages for popular demonstrations. Following the Journée de la Robe Kabyle described in Chapter 6, one of the day’s principal organisers Lounes ‘le Kabyle’ explained its success as partly due to the symbolism of its location; “this event was in Paris on the Esplanade of Human Rights, in the capital of the world, in front of the beautiful Eiffel Tower, a good date, music... people decided to come” (35). The images - of traditionally dressed Kabyle women with the Eiffel Tower behind them, or of the new Kabyle flag flying from the July Column
of the Bastille - that were transmitted through social media and Amazigh websites to the public ‘at home’ and elsewhere articulated the Amazigh movement with the symbols of power and universal ideals represented in those monuments. Acts of Citizenship taking place on the Paris stage are dramatic and emotive. They link the diasporic Amazigh movement’s political claims to the symbols of power and prestige of the old colonial capital. Access to this ‘Paris stage’ is, however, regulated by the local authorities and the police. Much in the same way as Amazigh associations must apply to the maison des associations for the use of their rooms, proposed demonstrations must be approved by the préfecture. Marches requiring the closure or partial closure of roads involve coordination between march organisers and police to provide security and maintain discipline. Popular spots, like Trocadero, are frequently double-booked, obliging demonstrators to share the space. They are also disciplined by the French authorities to keep to time, as Ahmed Haddag told me; “We’re restricted by time here - it’s not like Kabylia where if we’re not finished at midnight we’ll go on until 3am! The [French] police will shut us down!” (18). So, although many of these protests and marches may be considered as ‘Acts of Citizenship’ in relation to the Amazigh participants’ homeland(s), they are territorialised within spaces that are structured and governed by the French state and institutions of ‘ordinary’ citizenship that govern the conduct of the demonstrators.

The homeland-oriented negotiations of citizenship outlined in this section are not everyday and embodied but rather take place in dramatic, aesthetic moments and deeds that challenge and creatively reform the regime of citizenship. Here, the emergent citizen-diaspora-subject is best understood as the product of ‘Acts of Citizenship’, which is an indication of the weakness of the homeland institutions of citizenship that they challenge and recreate. As a diaspora, which must constantly work to maintain its existence (Adamson, 2012), ‘Acts of Citizenship’ come to define the institution of citizenship in relation to the homeland, as neither formal citizenship nor regular citizenship practices are maintained.

6.4 Diasporic Citizenship in Transnational Space

Where does this discussion leave our understanding of the political geography of citizenship in diaspora? The operation of power across transnational space, explored elsewhere with a focus on the state (Collyer and King, 2015), has been examined here in terms of overlapping citizenships performed and spatialised at the scale of the diaspora.
This chapter has described some ways in which diasporic Amazigh maintain and are maintained within multiple citizenships in relation to established and emergent polities in North Africa, in France, and transnationally between them. In doing so it has broadened the concept of ‘transpolitics’ (Silverstein, 2004a) by theorising the qualitative differences in the Amazigh diaspora’s practices of identification with distinct localities. But the recognition of “multiple publics to which individuals might feel aligned, that operate within and across political boundaries, and that have different spatial extensibilities” (Staeheli et al., 2009:643), begs the question of how to these overlapping, simultaneously occurring citizenships interact, and what spaces they produce? This chapter has argued that both diaspora- and homeland-orientated citizenship are important in the (re)production of Amazighité, the former being best understood as ‘ordinary’ through the everyday embodied practices of attempted ‘integration’ and the latter more as dramatic Acts of Citizenship through aesthetic performances and actions. In this section we turn to nuance this account, considering the ways that these kinds of citizenship cross-over and interact, and to theorise why and how these political relationships are performed the way that they are in the diasporic context.

Why are Acts of Citizenship primarily homeland-oriented and ‘ordinary’ citizenship primarily diaspora-oriented? In the examples unpacked above, the territorial exteriority of the diaspora greatly reduces its origin-states’ ability to order citizenship, and individual citizens’ ability to perform their citizenship in everyday life. Instead, it is the socio-legal structures of France that most closely regulate their everyday activities. The radical ethno-nationalist Acts of Citizenship of the MAK-Anavad, for example, which rupture with the institution of Algerian citizenship, are nonetheless ordered by the French authorities. In relation to French state and society, the Amazigh diaspora primarily embodies notions of ‘active citizenship’ in its negotiation of the problems of integration posed by a migrant (but also Indigenous) positioning. Coming from a positioning as Indigenous elsewhere, as precarious outsiders, Amazigh diaspora leaders must seek to practice and demonstrate complete complementarity with French citizenship rather than to remake it through a ‘rupture with structure’ (Isin and Nielsen, 2008). This has meant seeking community representation, participating in civil society, and performing and embodying ‘Republican values’. State categories of citizenship are only decentred in that the diasporic Amazigh movement seeks recognition outside of the Arab and Islamic categories that they are frequently amalgamated with.
Of course, these diaspora and homeland citizenship orientations overlap and coexist, and discourses, ideologies and practices are brought across from one into another. As described above, the democratic ideals of French civil and political society have been adopted in the discourse of the MAK-Anavad, which decided on holding a ‘flag vote’ as a legitimising performance. A frequently stated objective of homeland-oriented Amazigh leaders and activists during the fieldwork was to bring ‘Republican values’ like laïcité and gender equality to North African political and social life, by supporting the development of civil society groups at ‘home’. The appropriation of these values and experiences of civil society in France have served to shape the new forms of homeland-oriented citizenship, which challenge the forms of citizenship, and even the sovereignty of, North African states. These challenges are not only influenced by French ideas about citizenship, but are made possible by the institution of ‘ordinary’ citizenship maintained between the French state and the Amazigh diaspora. The association spaces for meetings, funding, and authorisation for public demonstrations are all contingent on the ongoing citizenship practices of the diasporic Amazigh in relation to the French state. As members are subject to and claim multiple citizenships across transnational space, Acts of Citizenship are articulated with ‘ordinary’ citizenship. Rather than being contrasting frames, they are often complementary and involve at least some of the same people.

Homeland-oriented Acts of Citizenship in the Amazigh movement also enhance the possibilities of ‘ordinary’ citizenship in the diaspora. According to interviewees, nationalist discourse was instrumental in gathering undocumented Kabyle migrants in Paris into an effective lobby for regularisation in 2001-2010, when large numbers of Algerians were fleeing the country. The leaders of the Collectif des Sans-Papiers Kabyles (CSPK) explained that the “Kabyle specificity meant that […] we decided to group together as Kabyles” (43a) and claimed that over a decade the CSPK achieved eleven thousand regularisations, largely due to an appeal to a specific threat linked to the violent confrontations ongoing in Kabylia which allowed them to apply for ‘territorial asylum’54 (Mazzella, 2005). In a precursor to the CIK, members were issued with CSPK membership cards, which many reportedly used to avoid arrest by showing that they were regularising

54 This legal mechanism existed from 1998 to 2003 and allowed “victims of non-state persecution” in their home territories to apply for asylum in France. 75% of applicants during this time were Algerian nationals.
their citizenship status. Through an Act of Citizenship - gathering as Kabyles, rejecting Algerian citizenship, and taking on refugee status (McConnell, 2013) - the CSPK created a unique avenue by which its members could become ‘ordinary’ citizens in France, rather than being treated as illegal economic migrants. Another example is the way that Indigenous institutions such as the Tajmaât inform the structure and organisation of diaspora-oriented groups, though not always by providing a set template. The leaders of Maison Amazighe de Saint-Denis explained that they developed as an almost entirely female association because of the exclusion of women from the village committees;

“For these women, it was the time to say you know, you too can have an association [...] you too can be activists. [...] The oldest say, when they come to our meetings, they tell their husbands that they too have their meeting to go to. It has valorised them somehow” (41a, 41b)

In forming this association, these women are performing an Act of Citizenship in which they claim a status as citizens equal to men - but they do so within the legal structures and institutions governing French civil society, entering into a relationship of ‘ordinary’ citizenship as Amazigh women. These examples show how Acts of Citizenship relative to homeland political institutions engender or complement the institutions and practices of ‘ordinary’ citizenship relative to the French polity, rather than standing in contrast with them.

6.5 Conclusion

To return to the empirical example given at the start of this chapter, it is evident not only that multiple negotiations of citizenship are juxtaposed in the diasporic Amazigh movement, often within a single space, but also that they also provide space for one another, space in which ‘transpolitics’ may occur. Conceptually, this space is transnational space, as it territorialises transnational processes (Collyer and King, 2015). Both the ‘ordinary’ and the ‘Act’ are needed to account for the production of this transnational space, which is relational space joining ‘here’ and ‘there’ across national boundaries, kept open by the labour of Amazigh activists. This approach could shed light on the ways that various migrant populations in postcolonial contexts, not only Indigenous peoples, negotiate citizenship transnationally. Through a geopolitics of diaspora focused on the embodied and the everyday, this study offers a new approach to the operation of power within diasporic citizenship by combining two distinct concepts of citizenship.
In conclusion, Staeheli’s ‘ordinary’ citizenship and Isin & Nyer’s ‘Acts of Citizenship’ are not as disconnected as they first appear. When considered geographically, and specifically in the diasporic context, the distinction between the two is helpful for teasing apart the qualities of different kinds of citizenship that exist across transnational space. However, their spatial context also reveals the ways in which the two approaches to citizenship overlap and complement one another. This chapter has shown that the diaspora- and homeland-oriented citi\-zenships of the Amazigh movement encompass a wide spectrum of discursive and embodied practices that produce the transnational space in which the Amazigh movement operates through ‘transpolitics’. The following chapter focuses in on the ‘transpolitics’ of nativist-populism in the discourse of the diasporic MAK-Anavad, which articulates seemingly opposing political positionings, to further demonstrate how the geopolitics of diaspora operate through relational articulations.
Chapter 7: The Return of the Native?

Within the longer term political context of globalisation, neoliberalism and postcolonial social reconfigurations, contemporary France and Europe are experiencing a “populist moment” (Brubaker, 2017), a key feature of which has been a resurgence of nativism in political discourse. Popular concerns about the weakening power of the nation-state to control the economic and demographic effects of globalisation have led to a rise in nativist-populism in the form of political parties and ideologies that are broadly anti-immigration (Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005; Mudde, 2007; De Genova, 2016). Both populism and nativism are slippery terms, but are broadly defined here as ‘a stylistic repertoire that opposes the ‘people’ to the ‘corrupt elites’ that (mis)govern them’ (drawing on Mudde, 2007; Jansen, 2011; Brubaker, 2017), and “a preference for the ‘native’ exclusively on the grounds of ‘being native’” (De Genova, 2016:223), respectively. At the same time as this populist- and nativist- moment, large diasporic populations including the Amazigh are organising themselves through a range of immigrant, homeland, diaspora and translocal politics (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003) as described in the preceding chapters. Thirdly, Indigenous peoples have gained increasing recognition and rights in the international arena (Crawhall, 2011; Radcliffe, 2016), both reacting to and utilising processes of globalisation (Brysk, 2000; Engle, 2010), as discussed in chapter 5. Indigenous, diaspora and nativist discourses all maintain a socially-defined relationship to place, a conception of ‘homeland’ that is constructed through perceived shared cultural, linguistic and ethnic traits mapped onto a given territory. All have also been facilitated in recent years by digital technologies, including online social media (Stearmer, 2016), which has emerged as an important field of political activity (MacKinnon, 2012; Pariser, 2012; Engesser et al., 2017). Social commentators and theorists were enthusiastic about the democratising potential of the internet during the Arab Spring (Stepanova, 2011), but today the internet’s effects on democratic politics are being critically re-evaluated, with some arguing that social media favours populist modes of communication (Krämer, 2017) linked to resurgent nativism (Mudde, 2012).

These intersecting flows and phenomena come together in what Tania Murray Li calls the ‘global conjuncture of belonging’ (Li, 2000; Geschiere, 2009). The politics of diaspora, indigeneity and nativism share some common discursive traits, though their starting points are different, as are their political effects. For Clifford, nativism is “the xenophobic shadow
of indigeneity” (Clifford, 2001:483), threatening to erupt in forms of nationalist chauvinism. For Adam Kuper and others, the success of the Indigenous rights movement merely represents the ‘Return of the Native’ (2003), through the resurrection of obsolete anthropological notions of cultural essentialism, verging on racism (Béteille, 1998; Amselle, 2012). This slippage is more noticeable in the francophone world, as ‘Indigenous’ is rendered as ‘autochtone’ to avoid the strongly pejorative connotations of the word ‘indigène’, as discussed in chapter 5 (Bellier, 2011). Anyone is an autochtone in the place where they were born, but to suggest that someone is ‘Indigenous’ would be to in some way place them in the racialised, colonised ‘tribal slot’ (Li, 2000). Therefore, in the francophone postcolonial world, a political discourse of autochtonie could just as easily entail a ‘reactionary’ nativism as a ‘progressive’ indigenism. As argued by Betz, nativism has historically developed in political movements across the Left-Right spectrum, as has populism (2017). Although populism and nativism share no necessary ideological or structural link, they have often developed together due to their shared insistence on the homogeneity of ‘the people’ and ‘the nation’, particularly in Europe’s radical Right (Mudde, 2007, 2012). This ‘affinity’ (Betz, 2017) leads this chapter to consider them in parallel, examining the diasporic Amazigh movement’s positioning in relation to nativist-populism, hyphenating nativism and populism to make explicit their conceptual interconnectedness. Whilst one might expect diaspora politics to be anti-nativist, I will argue that some in the diasporic Amazigh movement in France articulate a positioning that comes to accommodate nativism. Within the context of the ‘parochialisation’ of the diasporic Amazigh movement argued in chapter 4, the MAK-Anavad is a key example of this kind of ambivalent articulation of nativism.

The chapter is organised as follows; first, the political opportunities made available to the diasporic Amazigh movement in the current socio-political context are explored. For the political entrepreneurs involved in assemblage of diaspora as described in chapter 4, allies are to be found across the political spectrum in marginal political spaces. The second section homes in on the digital sphere as an emerging political terrain that provides a ‘political opportunity structure’ for the MAK-Anavad but also shapes its activism and communication strategy, favouring a ‘populist style’ (Block and Negrine, 2017). The chapter then comes to describe and analyse the MAK-Anavad’s ambivalent relationship with the nativist-populist Right in France, arguing that in seeking allies for its nationalist movement largely defined by anti-‘Arabo-Islamism’, the MAK-Anavad broadly appeals
to French nativist-populist discourse. The chapter concludes by offering a multi-layered explanation for the MAK-Anavad’s ability to hold nativisms of the political ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ in tension, and considers the role of visibility in the MAK-Anavad’s media and diplomatic strategy.

7.1 Indigeneity at a Distance, among Nativists

The political science literature on nativism is mainly written from the point of view of established Western liberal democracies experiencing high levels of immigration (Nagel, 2002; Mudde, 2012; Betz, 2017). Cas Mudde defines nativism as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state” (2007:19). Frequently coupled with discourses of anti-immigration, xenophobia, racism, and right-wing populism, such nativism can be broadly described as a reactionary ‘weapon of the strong’ as it aims to protect the rights and privileges of the already hegemonic socio-economic group against their perceived erosion by ‘non-native’ minorities. In the field of anthropology, however, nativism can have quite a different meaning (De Genova, 2016), linked to the project of decolonisation. In this context, it refers to ideologies of self-determination and emancipation that assert the Indigenous population’s freedom from colonial (non-native) rule, and is rather a ‘weapon of the weak’ (Scott, 1985), of the subaltern and not the hegemonic group. The claims to territorial, social and economic rights of Indigenous minorities across the globe most often legally proceed from evidence of prior occupation (Engle, 2010; Povinelli, 2011) and ancestral links to place, and as such “a preference for the ‘native’” (De Genova, 2016:223). Nativism of both kinds is found in both the Global North and South (Geschiere, 2009), and the same basic argument that ‘local’ people should have a greater claim than others to the rights and resources afforded by the state runs through both. What differs is the way in which this claim is articulated to other discourses, governing structures, and formed subjectivities (see chapter 5) (Hall, 1979, 1988).

In France, the nativist-populist discourse of the Front National (FN) has, at various times since the 1980s, influenced the politics of mainstream parties (Amselle, 2011; Cole, 2017). Policies targeting immigration, immigrants and minorities have been introduced by Centre-right and Centre-left governments in recent years, from the Centre-right Union pour un
Mouvement Populaire’s ban of the veil in the name of laïcité to the restrictions on dual nationality under Hollande’s Centre-left Parti Socialiste (PS) (Robcis, 2017). Combining radical right-wing populism, anti-EU rhetoric and an anti-immigration stance, the FN benefits from and contributes to xenophobic and particularly Islamophobic attitudes in broader contemporary French state and society, particularly directed at France’s large Maghrebi postcolonial diaspora (Lacoste, 1997, 2010; Geisser and Zemouri, 2007; Amselle, 2012, 2014). Two novels made headlines in 2015, Michel Houellebecq’s Soumission and Boualem Sansal’s 2084, both set in dystopian futures where France becomes an Islamic state. In the former, France elects a Muslim Brotherhood President as part of a ‘Republican bloc’ to beat the FN. These provocative novels took to their extreme the polarised politics surrounding questions of citizenship, religion and race that in the imaginations of many homogenise France’s Muslim population into a political bloc, in opposition to the ‘native’ French population. Such polarisation was exacerbated in the context of repeated Islamist terror attacks throughout 2015 and 2016, which were framed as a ‘clash of civilisations’ (Huntington, 1996) by right-wing commentators, pitting the universal values of the enlightenment, which are coded as ‘autochthonous’ to ‘the people’ of France, against the universal values of Islam, which are coded as ‘Arab’, and foreign.

Such a polarised, essentialised account of the political landscape links populism and nativism together in the European context. Brubaker describes populism as a “two-dimensional vision of social space”, where “tight discursive interweaving of the vertical opposition to those on top and the horizontal opposition to outside groups and forces” (2017:363) ties together economic, ethno-demographic, cultural and crime/terrorism-focused insecurities in a resonant narrative. In other words, populist discourse in which ‘the people’ must guard its sovereignty from ‘corrupt elites’ intersects with nativist discourse in which ‘the people’ must guard its sovereignty from ‘outsiders’, within a broadly nationalist rhetoric. Betz notes a second shared trait, which is the tendency to nostalgically attempt to reconstruct an idealized past (2017:3) Therefore, whilst nativism and populism are distinct ideologies, they share a common stylistic repertoire that means

55 The UMP re-branded themselves as Les Républicains in 2015
56 Huntington and the clash of civilisations is cited and elaborated upon by contemporary French right-wing personalities, such as Eric Zemmour (2016a, 2016b)
that they often accompany one another, as in the case of contemporary France (Mudde, 2012).

French government initiatives to better accommodate Islam and promote moderate forms of Islam in France, for example nationally in the creation of the CFCM (see chapter 6) or locally in facilitating the construction of mosques, are seen by the nativist Right as evidence of the government’s fear or favouritism, and of the progress of Islam in being able to influence French politics. As argued in the previous chapter, the MAK-Anavad holds a similar point of view, rejecting the idea that they should be labelled as ‘Muslims’ by the French state and lamenting the existence of platforms for Islamic views to be expressed in the public sphere. Instead, they argue, the French state should stick to its principles on laïcité, and rather than reifying the Muslim identity of its Maghrebin population should support expressions of secular Indigenous cultural identity. The political landscape in which the MAK-Anavad seeks to position itself can be understood to comprise a series of overlapping dialectical tensions, between Left and Right, universal and particular, diasporic and Indigenous, state and civil society, which constantly interact and within which lie political opportunities (Sökefeld, 2006; Collyer, 2008).

These political opportunities require that the MAK-Anavad, and the Amazigh movement more widely, occupy an ambivalent positioning in relation to populist-nativist political and public discourse. In seeking the support, protection or resources of the French state at the local and national scale, its leaders highlight the Kabyle commitment to ‘Republican values’ such as laïcité, gender equality, and democracy. In doing so, they play on the ‘Kabyle myth’ colonial-era stereotypes that contrast Kabyles and Arabs (see chapter 2), and reconstruct a ‘clash of civilisations’ narrative where they are on the side of ‘enlightenment’. The MAK-Anavad has developed an Indigenous positioning opposed to ‘colonial Arabo-Islamism’ (see chapter 5), which broadly matches the anti-Muslim, anti-Arab stance taken up by the French right. As is unpacked through this chapter, by articulating with far-Right ideas, the MAK-Anavad has adopted a nativist populism of its own to project its claim to sovereignty in the name of the Kabyle nation. It actively disengages from formal state politics, encouraging its supporters to boycott elections in Algeria and preferring to stage popular protests such as marches and sit-ins (23, 38). Engaging in ‘long-distance nationalism’ (Anderson, 1992) and deploying a nativist-populist stylistic repertoire puts the MAK-Anavad in an ambiguous position, as they are
reliant on the porous borders and limited multicultural policies that French nativist-populists oppose.

On the other hand, the MAK-Anavad espouses a broadly progressive, decolonial agenda which seeks to obtain the self-determination of the Kabyle nation through non-violent popular mobilisation. The MAK-Anavad is represented under the umbrella of ‘Indigenous peoples’ by the CMA, has recently joined the Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organisation (UNPO), and maintains a friendly relationship with the European Free Alliance (EFA) (Alfonsi and Mehenni, 2016). The Algerian state, which since independence has pursued a policy of cultural Arabisation which MAK-Anavad activists place within an ideology of ‘Arabo-Islamism’, is cast as a colonising power in relation to the Indigenous Amazigh Kabyles (see Chapter 5) (Mehenni, 2004, 2010), who trace their history back to pre-Roman times. Seeking to avail themselves of the right to self-determination described in the UN charter and the UNDRIP, the MAK-Anavad’s leaders’ primary demand to the Algerian state and the international community is for a referendum on Kabyle independence to be held, in imitation of the Scottish, Catalan and Kurdish nationalist movements. The ‘will of the people’ to decide on the way they are governed is central to the MAK-Anavad’s discourse, which otherwise focuses on the emergence of a Kabyle national consciousness, symbolic politics and popular mobilisation. As a consequence of this nationalist, populist rhetorical style, the MAK-Anavad’s critics, beyond those that simply decry the threat it poses to the unity of the Algerian nation (Telesud, 2016), condemn what they see as anti-Arab racism, populist demagoguery, and nativism. For example, a representative of the Berbères Antifascistes association wondered what the “facho-raciste-populiste” MAK-Anavad was doing at the Paris May Day march (Fieldnotes, 01/05/2016), and Masin Ferkal suggested in an online interview with on-the-ground MAK leader Bouaziz Aït-Chebib that his movement was “unable to mobilise the Kabyle elite” (2016), and was rather mobilised against them.

Whether or not nativism is the ‘xenophobic shadow of indigeneity’, or integral to it, the MAK-Anavad articulates both in its diaspora politics. Both provide political opportunity structures that the MAK-Anavad’s enterprising diaspora leaders seek to exploit. The polarised political discourse of nativist-populism in contemporary France is reflected in the MAK-Anavad’s account of the geopolitical situation of the Kabyle nation, at home and in the diaspora. Perhaps surprisingly, this means that they have developed a positioning of ‘indigeneity at a distance’ that figures on the French nativist-populist Right have come to
see as compatible with their own political narrative. Before continuing to examine this phenomenon in more detail, the chapter will next consider the digital sphere as an emerging political terrain that provides a further political opportunity structure but also shapes the MAK-Anavad’s political activism and communication strategies towards a more populist style.

### 7.2 Facebook Geopolitics

Public and political discourse is increasingly mediated digitally. As digital devices increasingly penetrate everyday life, with 71% of Europeans estimated to use the internet daily in 2016 (Eurostat, 2016), scholars of social and political sciences, including geographers (Ash et al., 2016), have sought to develop new methodologies (Hine, 2000; Kissau and Hunger, 2010; Kinsley, 2013; Rose, 2016), theories (Scopsi, 2009; Hamnett, 2014; Hidalgo, 2016), and epistemologies (Leszczynski, 2014; Leszczynski and Elwood, 2015; Stearmer, 2016) that engage with this new digital reality. One body of literature seeks to understand the political effects of online media, particularly in the wake of the so-called ‘twitter revolutions’ of the Arab Spring (Stepanova, 2011; Elwood and Leszczynski, 2013; Kavada, 2014). In these contexts, the ‘democratic potential’ of the internet was widely understood to have made possible the broad opposition movements that toppled the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt (Filiu, 2011; Ghanem, 2011). More recently, following the Brexit and Trump votes in the UK and US, such triumphalism about the democratic potential of the internet has been tempered. Some critics claim these votes were negatively affected by polarising ‘filter bubbles’ (Pariser, 2012) and ‘echo chambers’ (Jamieson and Cappela, 2008) within which ‘fake news’ and particularly the views of the populist Right could flourish (Krämer, 2017). Such debates are not entirely new (Bimber, 1998), but are gaining urgency as the politics of the internet comes increasingly to matter (Kinsley, 2014) in the politics of nations (MacKinnon, 2012).

The internet is a key political opportunity structure for the contemporary Amazigh movement. It is therefore a ‘field of political action’, the dynamics of which have effects on the movement’s positioning within it. Introducing the concept of “online opportunity structures”, a group of media researchers have recently explored the ways in which

“populist communication logics and online opportunities go hand in hand, because the Internet is presumed to frequently cultivate homophily [through the phenomena of] the filter bubble which pre-selects consonant media content [and] the echo
The structure of these online political spaces, they argue, favours a populist style of simplification, emotionalization and negativity, which has a competitive advantage in attracting the attention of users in a content-saturated “digital media ecosystem” (Brubaker, 2017). Journalistic gatekeeping and social control can be avoided, and highly personalised communication focused on the person of the leader purportedly representing ‘the people’ can be achieved through social media accounts of websites “with messages that seem to come directly from the leaders themselves”, concealing the “paradox of the technically and organizationally mediated ‘unmediatedness.’” (Krämer, 2017:1298). In the Amazigh movement, this “online opportunity structure” has been taken advantage of above all by the ethno-nationalist MAK-Anavad, whose presence on the social media accounts of Amazigh leaders in the diaspora was very widespread throughout the online ethnography. Through online interactions, the MAK-Anavad’s discourses and practices are structured by both the online environment and other discourses and practices that share that platform. The increasing power of populist nativist discourse in France and beyond, partly attributed by scholars to the emergence of social media as a site for political discourse itself affects the conjuncture within which the MAK-Anavad and other sub-groups of the Amazigh movement negotiate their positioning. This is not to argue that populism is an inevitable political effect of the internet, nor that it is the only political game in town as far as the Amazigh movement or French politics is concerned. It is rather to suggest that the diaspora politics of the MAK-Anavad, which are heavily mediated through social and online media, articulate nativism, nationalism and indigeneity in a way that uses a populist stylistic repertoire. The following section considers this virtual political geography, and the place of diasporic Amazigh activism within it.

Firstly, and most importantly for Amazigh activists, the internet represents a space of freedom of speech, and global reach. Their states of origin have a poor record concerning press freedoms (Rapporteurs sans Frontières, 2017), and at various points publishing in Tamazight (Maddy-Weitzman, 2001), or reporting on Amazigh issues in a way deemed critical of the state (Silverstein, 2003b) have seen Amazigh activists arrested or forced to flee. One prominent recent example is of Algerian Mohamed Benchicou’s daily newspaper *Le Matin*. The Algerian authorities ordered its closure in 2006, and shortly after Benchicou went into exile in France, from which he has continued to edit *lematin.dz* online (10). From
the diaspora, first through radio and now through the internet, Amazigh activists broadcast information, songs and opinions that are censored in their states of origin (Idaissa, 2012; Aïtel, 2014). Even more than radio, the media platforms of the internet enable individuals and groups to cheaply and quickly communicate through visual, textual and audio to a potentially global audience, in an environment where censorship is difficult (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; MacKinnon, 2012; Michaelsen, 2016). For the lobbying action of the Collectif des Mozabites en Europe (CME), Facebook was

> “a powerful media weapon. [The Algerian state] underestimated the power of social media. It's simultaneous reporting, even the press can't do that. We film whilst the events are happening, and we can upload it to Facebook.” (49)

Information and communication on online platforms is understood by these Amazigh activists as being liberated from the control of elites, who can neither shut down the internet nor buy their Facebook pages. “We’re no longer in the 90s where news came from the exclusive domain of the state, which had a monopoly on information”, explained Siwel director Yasmina Oubouzar, “Today, with social networks and the internet, we have the possibility of getting these stories out” (12). The Algerian political and socio-economic elite, ‘le Pouvoir’, are painted by MAK-Anavad activists as the archetypal corrupt elite, adept at keeping power from ‘the people’, and the media under their control. This is where the MAK-Anavad’s use of its media outlet Siwel is of major importance - it focuses on social media compatibility, providing local interest news stories for a diasporic population as well as livestreaming events and ‘presidential’ addresses via Facebook, lending them an air of authenticity and objectivity through seemingly unmediated, direct communication (Krämer, 2017), that the censored print media has lost for many Algerians. These diaspora Amazigh activists’ use of online media forms a part of a populist communication logic, wherein the power of controlling elites is imagined to be undone by the uncensored and radically democratic spaces of online media (Block and Negrine, 2017).

Freedom of speech does not mean that all views on an issue are equally expressed, and often moderate voices are squeezed out by polarised, extreme voices (Krämer, 2017). The MAK-Anavad, which is seen as radical by most Kabyles, is frequently evoked in the comments sections of Amazigh news websites and Facebook pages, regardless of whether the original article or post mentioned them. It has become symbolic of, and articulated with, ideologies and subject positions that make its agenda relevant to almost anything
Kabyle (see chapter 4). To give an example from the more or less constant debate ongoing online, a lengthy commentary argument under a piece by Malika Baraka published on the widely-read, Lyon-based Kabyle.com featured several anonymous and pseudonymous debaters. They accused one another of taking extreme political positions, and increasingly wrote in capital letters as their debate became an argument over the course of six days. Those who wrote “Long Live Free Kabylia” or similar were quickly labelled as “MAKists” while those that expressed opposition to the MAK-Anavad were accused of being “false Kabyles”. In such comment sections, the MAK-Anavad’s simple opposition of ‘the people’ and the ‘Arabo-Islamic’ elite is readily available for diaspora Kabyles to use to frame their short commentaries. This gains the MAK-Anavad visibility; however, their own news site, Siwel, has no comments section. “We don’t have the time to police [comments], or the political desire to have them”, Oubouzar told me, “We have a clear line, that is legitimate, and we don’t want it turned over by the misconduct of the comments” (12). Instead, it encourages its readers to take their debates onto the social media platform of Facebook, where they can increase the visibility of the MAK-Anavad within their networks, without affecting its public image on its own website, as well as circumventing the block placed on their website by the Algerian government and opening up their content to Kabyles in Kabylia (At Vrahem, 2017). The populist style of simplification, emotionalization and negativity works well in this context. Rather than a level playing field for the exchange of information with global reach, social media platforms instead increasingly provide forums for individuals to express themselves to groups of like-minded people (Krämer, 2017). In such ‘filter bubbles’ or ‘echo chambers’, radical views become ordinary for their members, especially when mainstream media is deemed to be controlled by corrupt elites.

The MAC’s founder, Yella Houha (the Chawi “Jean-Marie Le Pen”, to quote his successor (33)), developed his Chawi nationalist discourse (see chapter 4) through online forums in the late 1990s and early 2000s - “everything started there […] we had a blog, a site […] it was there before social media”, as these were spaces that could be “Chawi… full stop” (3). Facebook has made such spaces far more easily accessible and widespread. As online Amazigh activism moves from forums onto Facebook, according to long-time diaspora

Amazigh activist Mohammed Bennana, “on Facebook, people get [increasingly] lost, closed in on their own networks, posting and preaching to the converted” (21). Facebook groups such as “Les Kabyles de Paris”, “Tous pour un État Kabyle”, or “L’Ambiance Kabyle”, for example, regroup several thousands of users who post content on Kabyle culture and identity several times a day. These groups, whose members are not necessarily pro-MAK-Anavad, nonetheless create spaces that are avowedly Kabyle, and where outgroups are excluded from the conversation. An idea of the Kabyle ‘people’ is fashioned by and through these groups, as distinct from the ‘Algerian’ or even the ‘Amazigh’, which the MAK-Anavad then seeks to represent. One is either ‘in’ or ‘out’, in an online “everyday plebiscite” (Renan, 1882) measured in ‘likes’ (Krämer, 2017). This online politics tends towards the radicalisation of political positions and rhetoric, and a more ‘authoritarian-populist’ politics (Hall, 1980) in the discourse and practices of the MAK-Anavad and its nationalist sister organisations within the Amazigh movement.

These online dynamics lead to an online ‘popular geopolitics’ (Dittmer and Dodds, 2008), which both shapes the worldviews of users and plays a role in developing new geographies and mappings of the world. Where Dittmer & Dodds’s article identified “tabloid geopolitics” as a key arena of popular geopolitics, upon which democratic societies hinge many of their decisions (2008), a decade later a new phenomenon has emerged, that one could term “Facebook geopolitics”. The line between writer and audience of geopolitical text has been blurred in the social media format, as individual users are invited to comment, like, share, and publish their own content, which is often geographical. Siwel headlines act as mini-manifestos when shared on social media, framing geopolitical discourse in black-and-white terms, for example “Kabylie has no choice but to become independent again”58, or “Laïcité: the historic stamp of Kabyle sovereignty”59. Images, videos and visual cues predominate in the digital format, so that maps, flags, and other identity markers that link the user to a given (politically defined) space are not only made available, but are encouraged. As Anderson has argued, the “map-as-logo” as “pure sign, no longer compass to the world” has been a “powerful emblem” in postcolonial nationalist spatial discourse

58www.siwel.info/La-Kabylie-n-a-d-autre-choix-que-de-redevenir-independante--par-Firmus-L_a9401.html (accessed 27/06/2016)
59www.siwel.info/Talak-Laicite-Un-sceau-historique-de-souverainete-kabyle_a9169.html (accessed 21/05/2016)
(2006:174), and the MAK-Anavad’s map-as-logo is no exception (fig.1). The ease of its reproduction in digital and online fora means that it appears across its platforms and the personal pages of many of its supporters and activists, nominally delimiting the MAK-Anavad’s national territory and therefore ‘the people’ from outsiders.

![Figure 1: MAK logo including map-as-logo of Kabylia filled with Kabyle flag. Source: https://www.makabylie.org/index.php/logos/#!gallery-16-49](image)

The performance of culture and identity is opened to diverse publics in this online setting, and lends itself to the development of nationalism through an ongoing socially-constructed narrative (Bhabha, 1990). Signals such as language use60 (M. Lafkioui, 2013) and usernames are part of this performance, but the Amazigh and more recently the Kabyle flags are key visual signals that thrive on the social media platform. The Kabyle flag, from its launch date, was made available in multiple digital forms for download and sharing (see [https://www.makabylie.org/index.php/le-drapeau-kabyle/#](https://www.makabylie.org/index.php/le-drapeau-kabyle/#)), and the MAK-Anavad has called on its supporters to deploy it, for example in a profile picture ‘frame’ Ulac Ivuṭ (no vote) at the time of Algeria’s elections in 2017 (Siwel, 2017). These ‘frames’ not only concisely transmitted a political message to individuals connected on social media to those that used them, they also nationalised the identity of their users as Kabyle, through the use of the flag to frame their profile picture - often a picture of that user’s face. When Islamist terrorist attacks took place in 2015-2016 - at the Bataclan, the church in Rouen, in Nice

60 Tamazight is becoming more and more usable online, partly thanks to volunteer Amazigh web developers, notably Muḥend Belqasem (Siwel, 2016d)
and elsewhere - MAK-Anavad delegations went to show the solidarity of the Kabyle nation by posing with their flag in these places. In news stories destined to be shared over social media, Siwel covered these actions drawing on the nativist-populist stylistic repertoire, for example equating ‘nation’ and ‘people’ and linking Islamism to Algeria;

“Kabylia stands with France and the French people […] Islamism is the natural ally of the military dictatorships that pollute the world […] France must take the hand offered by Kabylia [so that] she can show a good example to the other peoples of [North Africa]” (Siwel, 2016e).

Such actions amount to a populist communication logic (Engesser et al., 2017) that constructs a homogenous notion of ‘the people’ which does not recognise itself in the identity politics of elites and outsiders and so will refuse to vote. Because, as outlined in chapter 3, the ethics of online ethnography restrains the collection and presentation of qualitative data from Facebook itself, my discussion of this phenomenon cannot go further than to suggest that the MAK-Anavad’s Facebook geopolitics tend towards an increasingly populist style. Coupled with nationalist and nativist discourses, they articulate well with the political messages and styles of other nativist-populist voices in contemporary France.

Online opportunity structures both increasingly mediate Amazigh leaders’ politics, and structure them in ways that lend themselves to a populist communication logic. The technological determinism of filter bubbles and echo chambers coincides with the conscious political strategies of groups like the MAK-Anavad, who seek to use the online platforms to avoid censor and reach a geographically dispersed audience. In comments sections, groups and through visual cues such as flags, the nationalist project of the MAK-Anavad gains a measure of visibility and representativeness of ‘the people’. In an environment which privileges extreme, attention-grabbing voices, the MAK-Anavad’s radical call for Kabyle independence has come to articulate with a range of ideologies and subject positions and has been a recurrent matter for debate in the Amazigh movement in recent years. This articulation goes beyond online opportunity structures, of course. The connected increase in the power of populist political narratives in the French context also affects the MAK-Anavad’s positioning, as well as that of similar political groups within the Amazigh movement.
7.3 The Nativist-Populist Right and the MAK-Anavad

How, then, does the MAK-Anavad, an ethnonationalist diaspora organisation seeking to develop and advance the cause of Kabyle national independence, relate to nativist-populism in France? Many of the GPK ministers are ex-patriates without French citizenship, and some, including President Ferhat Mehenni, are political refugees. Their transnational political advocacy, which coordinates activists between France and Algeria but also elsewhere in Europe, Africa and North America, relies on porous borders in terms of the movement of people, information and capital (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The GPK governs no state, but can be considered as more of a government-in-waiting (Rangwala, 2014), ‘rehearsing the state’ (McConnell, 2016). As is the case with these analyses of other governments-in-waiting, the MAK-Anavad’s politics are mostly symbolic, and focused on identity, recognition and visibility. As described in chapter 6, to date its major projects have included putting in place a Kabyle Identity Card for which supporters can register, electing a new national flag, and most recently launching an international diplomatic corps. Apart from the GPK ministers, of which there are never more than around 10, the MAK-Anavad has put in place an organisational structure for its activists and supporters called the Reseau Anavad, which is registered as a civil society association under French law. Online, it runs a media outlet called Siwel (The Call), which is focused on Kabylia, its diaspora, and the activities of the MAK. For the past two years, the MAK-Anavad has held several public rallies in Paris, the largest of which attracted a maximum of 10,000 supporters (see chapter 6 and the Tafsut calendar snapshot).

The discourses and practices of the MAK-Anavad bear many of the hallmarks of nativism and populism. It is avowedly nationalist in its rehearsal of the state - developing a national anthem, flag, identity card, even a football team - and presenting a view of history that places the Kabyles (and the Berbers more broadly) as long-time resisters of colonial domination by foreign empires and armies, up until the annexation of Kabylia by France in 1857 (Zirem, 2013). Algeria, the MAK-Anavad’s leaders argue, is a colonial invention and not a nation in the sense of ‘ethnos’ (Mehenni, 2004, 2010), whose nation-building project in the post-independence period was fundamentally flawed in its insistence on Arabic and Islamic unity, imported from the pan-Arabist movement of the Middle East (see chapter 5). Opposition to continued linguistic Arabisation often elides with xenophobic discourse towards ethnic Arabs and Arabic speakers, who are frequently told to ‘go back to Arabia’ by Kabyle activists, only half-jokingly. The MAK-Anavad’s
discourse is populist in that its leaders frequently reify the ‘will of the people’, which they claim to understand and represent, in their argument for the democratic self-determination of Kabylia. It is nativist in that Arabisation and political Islam are seen as demographically linked to ‘outsiders’, for example Ahmed Haddag told me that “whenever a new residential block goes up in Kabylia, 70 or 80% of people are settled in from outside, non-Kabyles. It’s a kind of colonialism. We’re losing our Amazighité through Islamisation” (2). In response, the MAK-Anavad and its supporters argue that Kabyles need to regain their own national sovereignty, to counter the power of these outside influences.

Such a discourse is articulated differently depending on audience and political terrain. Lacking established political allies, the MAK-Anavad seeks to advance its project and form ties across the political spectrum. Perhaps surprisingly for this diaspora group, it is the nativist-populist Right which has been most responsive. The GPK Minister for Relations with French Institutions, Nafa Kirèche, who acted as a spokesperson and lobbyist to the media and the government, told me that “For the moment, [the] people in France who are interested in our cause are the Right-wing nationalists and the Zionists”. I asked him:

Q. Why, in your opinion, is it the Right-wing politicians that are more interested [in the Kabyle cause]?

A. Because, I think, they're nationalists. Furthermore, they've seen here that in comparison with the other Algerians, the Kabyles don't cause much of a problem. They're not religious, not in the fundamentalist sense. They think, I don't know if it’s true or not, it’s what they think, that the Kabyles can integrate themselves in Western society. They have a tolerant Islam. But the other arabophone Algerians, they're people that... that's what I think. [The politicians of the Right] have a certain sympathy for the Kabyles. For them, there's a positive image of the Kabyles here in France. Zidane... the Kabyles aren't fundamentalists, they're workers, they don't cause problems in terms of integration, even in inverted commas, a Kabyle can integrate themselves in French society.

Q. Do you think there's a grain of truth in that?

A. Yes, of course. The Kabyles, in my opinion, are less religious. There are many that aren't. For example, I am not Muslim at all - I was but I’m not anymore.
During the interview Kirèche also gave examples of positive exchanges with prominent figures in the FN and Les Républicains, as well as journalists for the Figaro, a right-wing newspaper, and Zionist members of the Jewish diaspora. Of particular note were Ivan Rioufol, who has prefaced one of Ferhat Mehenni’s books (Mehenni, 2013) and authored radical-Right and Islamophobic books such as L’Urgence d’être réactionnaire (2012) and La Guerre Civile qui vient (2016), and radical Zionist philosopher and journalist Bernard Henri-Levy.

Kirèche’s reasoning above responded to three central claims articulated in right-wing nativist discourse in France: firstly, that immigrants from the Maghreb and their descendants pose a ‘religious problem’ in the form of Islamic fundamentalism (Zemmour, 2016b); secondly, that they do not ‘integrate’ and so create a divided society (Finkielkraut, 2011; Soral, 2012); and thirdly, that they represent a burden on the economy (Front National, 2012; Le Pen, 2017). For Kirèche and the MAK-Anavad, the Kabyle citizen is not only the opposite but the solution to these problems associated with immigration by French nativist-populists. Resurrecting the colonial-era stereotypes of the ‘Kabyle myth’ (Lorcin, 1999), they position Kabyles as racially ‘Mediterranean’, hardworking and entrepreneurial in terms of the economy, and holding to secular political institutions though threatened by fundamentalist Islam (Dirèche-Slimani, 1997; Lacoste-Dujardin, 2006).

They are not alone in doing so, but are joined by right-wing politicians who praise the Kabyle diaspora’s exemplary ‘integration’ in a way that also responds to nativist fears. In the course of the 2012 Presidential elections Nicholas Sarkozy remarked on the Berbers’ “always being an example of integration in the French Republic” (Sarkozy, 2012). Ivan Rioufol expressed his support at a MAK-Anavad rally to celebrate the first raising of the newly elected national flag in 2015: addressing the crowd, he said, “In many ways you [Kabyles] are exemplary in your integration but also in your courageous resistance to the coming totalitarianism” (Ivan Rioufol ‘Lever du Drapeau Kabyle’, 2015), by which he meant radical Islam. Again, in 2017, Les Républicains Île-de-France Regional President Valérie Pécresse checked off the whole list; “Those of Berber origin have an economic and cultural dynamism […] they are a model of integration, […] fully-fledged French citizens who engage in society. [I wish to] pay tribute to a people that is vaccine against fundamentalism, against totalitarianism” (BRTV, 2017b).

The MAK-Anavad’s positioning forms a part of a political strategy to gain an increased profile, visibility and acceptability in the French public sphere. It is an articulation of
colonial-era tropes with present-day geopolitics that is made possible by the common link of postcolonial immigration. The MAK-Anavad tries to articulate this ‘Imperial Debris’ (Stoler, 2013), this residual past of colonial ideas, to its benefit. By using it to reify the difference between Arabs and Berbers which underpins its claim to national self-determination, they are also able to appeal to the modes and idioms through which the nativist-populist right, often nostalgic for France’s imperial past, understand the present geopolitical moment. Like the French nativists, they highlight their desire for sovereignty, which has been eroded by an incompetent centralised state apparatus, whose “economic sabotage […] has put Kabylia back more than 50 years in its general development” (Mehenni, 2017c). Secondly, they highlight their attachment to ‘traditional values’, the family, education and village society (MAK-Anavad, 2016a). Finally, they foreground liberty - of action, speech, and conscience if not of movement - whilst calling out the perceived abuses of that liberty taken by militant Islam, framed as a foreign intrusion on their Indigenous society (MAK-Anavad, 2016b). This articulation is not only discursive but is achieved through certain practices that are coded ‘nationalist’ - for example the public display and veneration for the flag, flag-raising in symbolic places, wearing national dress, engaging in diplomatic relations in the name of the nation, creating cartographic territorialisations of nation, and running a media outlet focused uniquely on that territory.

Because it stresses some of the same values and engages in some similar practices, the MAK-Anavad’s movement is legible to, and can be accommodated by, the nativist-populist discourse of the French right.

The same could not be said for the French Left. Whilst the French Right readily speaks in terms of ethnicity, often through the idiom of ‘culture’ (Stolcke, 1995), the Left cleaves to a different kind of nationalism; radical Jacobin social equality (see chapter 6). This ‘colour-blind’ policy of course does not mean that the PS is completely racially-neutral (Bertossi, 2012b), but rather, in the words of Nafa Kirèche;

“[they] don't want to distinguish between Arabs and Kabyles, for them it's racism. To affirm one's identity as Kabyle... I don't know why but the Left has a problem with that in general. [...] they think they're fighting racism, but in fact they end up fighting difference” (32).

MAK-Anavad ministers bemoan the lack of support they receive from almost all French politicians of Kabyle origin who, to preserve their political career in the PS, have distanced
themselves completely from any identity-based politics. As such, the Left has an aversion to policies that can be linked to racially or culturally specific groups, and so carefully avoids any suggestion that Islam, Muslims, or Arab minorities pose any particular problem for the French polity.

However, despite the resonance that the MAK-Anavad’s nativism seems to have with those on the nativist-populist Right in France, it does not exclusively court its support. It also seeks to create links of solidarity with other nativist groups that would see themselves as diametrically opposed to the FN, such as Breton, Corsican and Basque minority movements and others across Europe (Alfonsi and Mehenni, 2016). The Kabyles joined the UNPO in July 2017 (UNPO, 2017), and are represented at UN Indigenous forums via the World Amazigh Congress (CMA) (Belkacem, 2010). At present, Mehenni’s MAK-Anavad is pursuing a political strategy of alliance-building on a broad platform that is able to accommodate multiple and seemingly contradictory political stances. The common thread is nativist-populism, most clearly described in the ideal of self-determination through referenda on national sovereignty. For example, Mehenni’s MAK-Anavad was full of praise for the Brexit vote of 2016 (Mehenni, 2016), but also for the Scottish independence referendum two years before, and has already pledged to recognise the independence of Catalonia and Kurdistan following their controversial referenda (Atcheba, 2017). Through articulating its indigeneity at a distance, the MAK-Anavad is able to hold multiple expressions of nativist populism together in tension in its positioning and alliance-making from the diaspora.

### 7.4 Diaspora Nativism in the ‘Populist Moment’

The Kabyle diaspora-nation formation spearheaded by MAK-Anavad (see chapter 4) within the political opportunity structures of the ‘populist moment’, including those of digital and online communication, accommodates both Indigenous and nativist ideologies and groups. This is initially surprising, as diaspora politics are usually framed differently to nativist and Indigenous politics. So far in this chapter we have only descriptively explored the MAK-Anavad’s diaspora nativism and pointed to some provisional conclusions. For the remainder of this chapter, I will explore three possible ways of

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61 One example, offered by Nafa Kirèche, was Malek Boutih, the PS’s national secretary for social issues.
explaining the MAK-Anavad’s ability to hold opposing nativisms in tension: the diasporic context, the persistence of colonial categories in contemporary French society, and anti-Islamism. These axes of explanation have a clear geography, since they link particular contexts and produce space within which political relationships and subjectivities are constructed and negotiated.

Firstly, as discussed in previous chapters, the MAK-Anavad exists in diaspora, positioning itself and its supporters in France as Indigenous, yet at a distance, exemplifying the interlinkages of diasporic and Indigenous consciousness, which though seemingly contradictory can be held in dialectical tension (Clifford, 2013). The MAK-Anavad’s field of political action is transnational, but their primary focus is on Kabylia, not on France. They act like a bridge linking the Indigenous struggle for Kabylia with the politics of citizenship and migration in France. Here I draw on Maria Koinova’s discussions of ‘frame-bridging’ and ‘positionality’ in diaspora political discourse (2010, 2012), but take this line of thinking further, to consider the geographical effects of a diaspora positioning. That is, the meanings and effects of the MAK-Anavad’s discourse and practices on their positioning in relation to Algerian and French politics are not the same. To assert the right of Indigenous peoples (autochtones) to national sovereignty in order to protect their cultural specificity is to argue for the independence of Kabylia in Algeria, but in France is to support the anti-immigration, anti-EU discourse of the FN. To argue in favour of laïcité in Algeria is to resist the strong state and civil society institutions that impose the religious norms of the majority in the public and private sphere, but in France is rather to support the strong state and civil institutions that impose the secular-atheistic norms of the majority in the public and private sphere. The MAK-Anavad’s diasporic geography allows them to position themselves in this way, which has seemingly contradictory political effects on each side of the Mediterranean, because of what Edward Said termed ‘contrapuntal geographies’ (Said, 1993; Castree et al., 2006). This musical metaphor describes the interconnectedness of people and events in often distant places within a complex, dynamic and uneven relationship that maintains their specificity whilst also mediating their interactions: “various themes play off one another, with only a provisional privilege being given to any particular one; yet in the resulting polyphony there is concert and order” (Said, 1993:51). The constant tension in diaspora discourse between ‘here’ and ‘there’ allows the MAK-Anavad to flit between the two registers, positioning itself accordingly in each context.
However, there’s more than diaspora that bridges this gap - the colonial history of France and Algeria is writ large across these discussions of citizenship, race and belonging. Beyond the colonial stereotyping that causes some to compare Kabyles favourably with their Arab compatriots, the legacy of a particularly virulent war of independence continues to polarise political debate concerning France and Algeria (Stoler, 2013). Not only does the nostalgia of *pied-noirs* and their descendants contribute to anti-Arab xenophobia of the FN and others (Stora, 1999; Ruscio, 2015), but Algeria’s 1990s civil war triggered an ideological struggle in the diaspora, with Berberist and Islamist civil society groups “attempting to reposextise Algerians born and raised in France (or Franco-Algerians) into essentialised forms of Berber and Islamic identities. In the process, France and Algeria became once again united into a single, transnational political terrain” (Silverstein, 2004a:3). In this polarised political debate, Berberism came to stand for a secular, place-based ideal of citizenship largely based on the French model, whilst Islamism was articulated with the anticolonial struggle of the FLN, Arabism and a religious, universalist ideal. Today, in the French domestic politics of the era of the ‘war on terror’, Islamism is described by the ideologues of the Right as opposing French Republican ideals, but now the Berber associations, the MAK-Anavad among them, occupy the place of apologists of those ideals within the Maghrebin community in France. This is of course a gross simplification, but one which fits the discourse of the nativist-populism, and which the MAK-Anavad uses to frame its discourse and position itself.

Opposition to and fear of Islamism, a central thread that links the MAK-Anavad and the populist Right’s political projects in France, emerges out of this long and complex colonial history. Islamophobia equates Islam with its politicised extremes, and sees the entry of Islam into public life as a form of colonisation, the spread of which poses a threat to the democratic, liberal life of the nation, whether that nation is Kabylia or France (Lacoste, 1997). In this respect, for the nativist Right fearful of the Islamic Other, the MAK-Anavad and other Amazigh actors come to be seen as ‘good natives’ (Geisser and Zemouri, 2007). As with the colonial-era search for native allies in the ‘civilising mission’ (Lorcin, 1999; Silverstein, 2003b), the Amazigh are able to claim special knowledge of Islam, and offer

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62 Nativist tropes of ‘peaceful’ (Rioufol, 2015) or ‘demographic’ colonisation by immigrants (Schor, 1996) are elided with fears that Islam will one day dominate public life in France (Zemmour, 2016a, 2016b).
their identity project as a sort of remedy for the ills of Islamism. For example, one Amazigh association leader in the Val-de-Marne reported having been invited by the local préfecture to advise the police on counter-radicalisation efforts in the area. Another in Montreuil explained that their association worked with immigration services to provide language classes and to teach “Republican Berber values” in a neighbourhood where the social problems of “delinquency, drugs and theft [were leading to] the hijab and the mosque” (31). As Muslims themselves, the cultural-racist reasoning goes, the Kabyles are able to ‘bridge the gap’ between the ‘secular’ native French and the Maghrebin ‘Islamists’ (Geisser and Zemouri, 2007). Amazigh activists at the local level are able to leverage political endorsement by positioning themselves as working towards the deradicalization of young men and women of North African origin, arguing that if they really knew their ‘true’ identity, were taught their culture and language, they would be well ‘rooted’ and would not get involved in radical Islam (Silverstein, 2003a), hence Pécresse’s praise of the Berbers as “a vaccine against totalitarianism” (BRTV, 2017b). Similarly, at the international scale, the MAK-Anavad presents itself and its project of an independent Kabylia as a force for greater peace and security in the region, arguing that the young Maghrebi men and women that carry out attacks in Europe in the name of Islam are a product of the policy of Arabo-Islamism pursued by the region’s governments (Mehenni, 2015). For example, Siwel publicised communiques following the Bataclan attacks in November 2015 (Haddag, 2015) and the killing of a priest in Rouen by Islamic militants in August 2016 (Siwel, 2016e) which expressed shock but also presented support for an independent Kabyle state as a way for the French government to combat Islamic extremism (At Seyd, 2016).

Such positioning is revealing in terms of the politics of the MAK-Anavad, but it tells us little about its ability to communicate its agenda and to achieve visibility in the public sphere, beyond the ‘echo chambers’ of the Amazigh movement. Visibility within the public sphere has already been explored as a key theme of diaspora geopolitics in terms of online organisation (Kissau and Hunger, 2010; Nagel and Staeheli, 2010), as a form of capital (Heinich, 2012), and in terms of integration (Nagel and Staeheli, 2008; Staeheli et al., 2009). As discussed in chapter 6, for Nagel and Staeheli, integration is a “politics of visibility - and invisibility - in which notions of belonging and social membership revolve around conflicting interpretations of a group's physical presence in the public sphere” (2008:84). This politics of visibility “involves the hypervisibility of particular differences
but also the invisibility of those who are marked by those differences” and “tends to produce and reproduce differences at the same time that it seeks to undermine them” (Nagel and Staeheli, 2008:92). The MAK-Anavad’s positioning is imbued with such politics, and so it seeks certain kinds of visibility or publicity that integrate it and the Kabyle diaspora it claims to represent into the established networks and conventions of the French body politic.

In April 2016, when the MAK-Anavad organised its first large-scale Tafsut march in Paris, the event was relayed through Facebook accounts, social media and Amazigh websites to the rest of the Amazigh movement worldwide, which mostly heralded it as a great success, “giving hope for a possible fresh start for the Kabyle and Amazigh struggle in France” (Tamazgha, 2016). However, the MAK-Anavad’s ministers were incensed by what they termed a ‘media blackout’ - no French newspapers, and only one non-Amazigh website, Bernard-Henri Levy’s anti-establishment La Règle du Jeu, publicised the event (Kabyles : un peuple sans reconnaissance en Algérie, 2016). The MAK-Anavad’s hope to take advantage of the connections it had made in French media and politics to gain them recognition, visibility, and eventually support, was disappointed. The establishment was in collusion with the Algerian government, they concluded, in an effort to undermine and discredit the MAK-Anavad by completely ignoring their presence (Siwel, 2016c). ‘The people’ would not be so easily duped, they argued, resorting to the populist rationale reminiscent of France’s nativist Right. Through popular and social media on the uncensored worldwide web, the weight of public opinion would eventually turn in their favour.63

Not all kinds of visibility are desirable for the MAK-Anavad, however. Publicly expressing support for or solidarity with the FN, for example, would alienate moderate Kabyle supporters. Kirèche explained that he could never follow up FN contacts because “there are many Kabyles, ministers who are non-receptive, because they know they would be called racists” (32). Furthermore, an anti-EU, anti-immigration government in France would have the potential to undermine the MAK-Anavad’s precarious existence, by closing avenues of transnational mobility and forums of domestic and international

63 The following year Mehenni made a renewed appeal to the mainstream French media to report on the Tafsut march, but to no avail (Mehenni, 2017b).
advocacy on which they rely. Refugee status could be revoked. Access to local and regional funds for Berber cultural activities could be restricted. The platform for the defence of human rights and minority rights offered at the EU could be taken away or weakened. A ‘France first’ foreign policy could leave the Kabyle independence movement high and dry, at the mercy of the Algerian government. To be associated with the FN is far from being an objective of the MAK-Anavad. Rather, it seeks to articulate with parts of the nativist-populist right’s discourse, whilst taking care not to visibly support it.

7.5 Conclusion

Days before the 2017 French presidential elections, the MAK-Anavad held a second Tafsut march. This time, from an official-looking podium complete with a red carpet, Ferhat Mehenni told the crowd that the MAK-Anavad would instruct its supporters on how to vote in the second round, claiming that with “more than one million Kabyle voters in France”, they could “make a president” (Igoudjil, 2017). Days later, in an open letter published online, he publicly backed Emmanuel Macron against Marine Le Pen and called upon the Kabyles of France to do the same, asking Macron to follow through on his condemnation of colonialism, made in a speech in Algiers two months earlier (Dimitrova, 2017), and help to “reconfigure the chaotic post-colonisation world” (Mehenni, 2017a).

Not only was Macron’s approach to France’s postcolonial responsibilities attractive, but his pro-EU, open border stance reassured the MAK-Anavad’s leaders of their ability to circulate internationally. Furthermore, Mehenni could hope to benefit from the popular wave that carried Macron and his brand-new party into power. Of course, it is likely only a few thousand voters will have listened to Mehenni’s instructions, but such a performance is aimed at incrementally building support from unconvinced Kabyles as well as the French government, as well as gaining visibility for the Kabyle diaspora. Instead of the current amalgamation through which French (and Algerian) governments treat Kabyles as Arabs, Muslims or both, the MAK-Anavad’s ministers seek to reproduce their difference within an acceptable visibility. Although their positioning complements and responds to the discourse of the nativist populist Right in France, they seem to take every opportunity to obtain public visibility within the mainstream. With the surprise arrival of Emmanuel Macron’s En Marche, the mainstream shifted, and the MAK-Anavad shifted with it.

The emergent phenomena that is the Kabyle diaspora is constructed in part through the political entrepreneurship of the MAK-Anavad (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Adamson,
The MAK-Anavad, in its attempts to gain allies and maximise political opportunities through the articulation of a range of political discourses and the investment of online media, has somewhat surprisingly developed accommodations with nativist-populism in France. Rather than resist it, its activists have in some ways drawn on its communication style and discourse. Playing on the field of what I term ‘Facebook geopolitics’, it invests social media with nationalistic symbols, slogans and geographies that stand out in this content-saturated environment. It is articulate both progressive and reactionary nativisms because as a diasporic organisation, the MAK-Anavad adapts a political positioning between France and Algeria, in the process holding both ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary’ nativism in dialectical tension. In the postcolonial context, it is able to draw on positive colonial-era racial stereotypes that make it comparatively amenable to the xenophobia of the nativist populist Right in France. Finally, by taking up a position of anti-Islamism, its activists are able to present themselves as allies in the defence of French ‘Republican values’. This positioning is to help the Kabyle diaspora achieve greater integration within the French body politic through a politics of visibility that differentiates them from ‘Arabs’, ‘Muslims’ or ‘Algerians’.
Conclusion: For a New Political Geography of Diaspora

The landscapes of citizenship and territoriality are undergoing great change. New technologies and geographical mobilities are making space for new political articulations, which in turn are having transformative effects on understandings of nation, state, and sovereignty. Diaspora and Indigenous movements are key elements in this transformation. Political identities and loyalties are being rescaled, both ‘up’ and ‘down’, in the ongoing processes of globalisation which reshape the world’s economic, social and political environments. In the hyper-connected ‘information age’, the everyday life of diasporic groups is intertwined with home populations and territories more than ever before. This thesis has argued that the diasporic Amazigh movement decentres the state categories of belonging and subjectivity through which its members are governed, through reimagining Tamazgha in France. It does so through the relational analytical framework of positioning, which must be understood in context: the postcolonial, the diasporic, the Indigenous, the transnational or the local contexts of the diasporic Amazigh movement are a field of political action within which it positions itself through its discourses and practices (Sparke, 2005). This relational politics shows us something about the nature of political categories such as ‘Indigenous’, that are constituted through ongoing spatial processes of translation and articulation.

This thesis has drawn on a range of empirical data to unpack and analyse the intersecting political geographies of this diverse diasporic movement. In the first of four substantive chapters, Chapter 4 examined diaspora as a geopolitical concept, drawing on the past and present discourse of Amazigh leaders and their associations to develop a view of diaspora as process, an assemblage that reworks the boundaries of nation, state, community and identity, within an imaginative geography of home. It argued that the diaspora is a privileged space for Amazigh knowledge production and dissemination, where different discourses of nationalism are produced by diaspora scholar-activists, most recently tending towards greater ethnolinguistic regionalism. The diasporic Amazigh movement is a knowledge-rich environment, where ethnographic study could quickly identify members’ overlapping issues and concerns. Because it is not a single-issue movement, and rather a dynamic assemblage of collectives, associations, and online fora englobing wide diversity, its political positionings needed to be understood as relational and context-specific. Diaspora Amazigh activists have made multiple attempts to institute coalitions, federations
and networks in order to structure their movement and enable mass participation in specific actions such as popular protest, organising humanitarian or development assistance in Tamazgha, or forming a voting bloc. Whereas these have been largely unsuccessful, affective performances of ethnic and increasingly nationalist subjectivities have increasingly framed moments of mass participation. The theme of unity and diversity was a key debate during the fieldwork, as the diasporic Amazigh movement ‘parochialisces’, becoming more articulated along ethno-linguistic lines. This parochialisation is expressed in discourses of national identity and belonging that are increasingly territorially focused and defined.

Chapter 5 theoretically unpacked and empirically examined the articulation and performance of an Indigenous diaspora in the discourse and practices of the diasporic Amazigh movement. The chapter’s exploration of diverse Indigenous articulations led to the conclusion that, following Clifford (2013), indigeneity and diaspora are closely interconnected in their relationships to place. The Indigenous articulations position the Amazigh as participants in the Global Indigenous Movement, as colonised (and exiled) people, as non-Arabic autochtones, and as village citizens with precolonial political institutions and cosmologies.

These village citizens negotiate multiple citizenships that cut across the spaces that they live in and through. They are governed as immigrants, Muslims, and foreign nationals in France, and as emigrants, Arabs, and sources of investment by their origin-states. Chapter 6 juxtaposed diaspora- and homeland-oriented citizenship practices in the diasporic Amazigh movement; the former being understood as ‘ordinary’ (Staeheli et al., 2012) in relation to French state and society, and the latter being characterised more as performative ‘Acts’ (Isin and Nielsen, 2008) in relation to North African state(s) and society. It argued that within the diaspora context, through ‘transpolitics’, these different citizenships can overlap and create space for one another.

Finally, Chapter 7 brought the politics of diaspora, indigeneity and nativism into conversation, arguing that they share some common traits. Specifically, it discussed the Kabyle nationalists’ ambivalent positioning in relation to progressive and reactionary forms of nativism in their search for political allies. The diaspora’s transnational spaces and new social media are part of a political opportunity structure which the political entrepreneurs of the diasporic Amazigh movement use to gain positive visibility.
activism has a contrapuntal geography which facilitates the MAK-Anavad’s appeal to progressive and reactionary nativism in the ‘populist moment’. Rather than articulating a single position in these debates, because of their diaspora context the MAK-Anavad’s discourse can mean one thing in France and another in North Africa.

8.1 Key Findings and Developments

The thesis’s first research question asked; “Through what kinds of performance do members of the diasporic Amazigh movement legitimise their political claims?”. The language of performance presumes not only a single actor but many, interacting in the production of relational space. Performance and performativity in current political geography scholarship has been used to analyse citizenship, diplomacy, and the state. The geographies of power in which legitimacy is performed are highlighted in actors’ need for an audience. As Clifford writes, “it is difficult to know, sometimes even for participants, how much of the performance of [Indigenous] identity reflects deep belief, how much a tactical presentation of the self” (2013:16). This suggests that Amazighité, and the political claims associated with it, are always relational and context-specific. Although everyday performances of Amazighité in the diaspora are intermitted with everyday concerns of life in France, the associations create environments where, through language, sociability, dress and dance, Amazigh members perform their cultural identities. The findings of this thesis point to two kinds of performance through which the members of the diasporic Amazigh movement legitimise their political claims: first, through political positioning, for example Indigenous articulations; and second, through embodied and symbolic public displays like protests, cultural events and flag-raising.

Political positioning in the discourse and practice of members of the diasporic Amazigh movement articulates Amazighité with indigeneity (chapter 5) and ‘Republican Values’ (chapters 6 and 7). These positionings are not explicit strategies of the diasporic Amazigh movement, nor are they only the product of the agency of its members. They are constantly negotiated and reiterated, performed through the everyday politics of diaspora life. Diaspora members position themselves as Indigenous through their identification of North African states with ongoing colonialism, strong village links, and enrolling themselves in the Global Indigenous Movement. However, this thesis has found that the meanings associated with Indigeneity in the francophone context, where it is translated as autochtone, lead some leaders to reject the term on the basis of its perceived racial
essentialism and juxtaposition with nomadism. This example, amongst others, demonstrates that such political positionings are context-specific and subject to the multiple interacting articulations, structures and spaces. Its performance brings greater legitimacy to demands for greater rights, as codified in UNDRIP and ILO 169, as well as legitimising the Amazigh claim to cultural and linguistic difference. Another example of this performance-as-positioning is in the articulation of Amazighité with ‘Republican Values’ - broadly laïcité, democracy and gender equality - which is partly a product of colonial-era tropes resurfacing in the discourse and practices of both Amazigh and non-Amazigh leaders in France, and partly a product of the everyday practices of Amazigh association members. Such a positioning legitimises claims to local French state resources for associative activities, as in the case of the CBF’s Espace Idir or the ACB’s CAF funding for local community projects.

The second kind of performance is more clearly embodied. Gatherings of people, for occasions such as Yennayer or Tafsut, bring the diaspora into view and serve to legitimise claims to existence as a group within French society. Wearing traditional dress, audibly speaking or singing in Tamazight, and wearing coded symbols such as Aza or Tizerzaï in jewellery or clothing performs Indigeneity. Such performances, however, are frequently perceived by Amazigh diaspora members as ‘folklore’ - performing cultural ‘authenticity’ entails behaving in ways that entrench the stereotypical expectations of wider society. Again, the language of performance highlights the relational nature of Amazighité, which is an assemblage of discourses, practices and material objects drawn together through the agency of multiple actors, not only Amazigh diaspora members. Moreover, although these performances of cultural ‘authenticity’ do reinforce stereotypes, they also legitimise claims to indigeneity through an aesthetic of alterity to both the ‘Western’ and the ‘Islamic’. This ‘trap of visibility’ (Stolcke, 1995; Stocker, 2013) continually negotiates and reiterates power dynamics between the Amazigh and the hegemonic francophone and arabophone societies in which they live.

These findings allow us to conclude that performance approaches to the political geography of diaspora are useful for illuminating the relational power dynamics that operate in ‘everyday’ spaces and practices. They have extended the analysis of this thesis beyond the imaginative and discursive to the embodied and the material. This thesis has shown that the diasporic Amazigh movement constantly negotiates its positioning and its visibility in relation to its context. However, as chapters 6 and 7 particularly highlight, the
Amazigh diaspora context constantly overlaps geographies of France and Tamazgha through ‘transpolitics’ (Silverstein, 2004a). Performance and positioning in this transnational space is bifocal, and these two foci create spaces and opportunities for one another. For example, the ‘ordinary’ embodied citizenship of Amazigh diaspora members in France makes space for ‘Acts’ of citizenship in relation to states and hoped-for states in the homeland. Geopolitical performance is a key locus of this homeland-oriented citizenship, but must take place within the daily, mundane, ordinary citizenship of France. Such performances decentre state categories and legitimise Amazigh political claims to rights and recognition, to citizenship and territory.

This thesis has sought to consistently eschew methodological nationalism in its approach to the geopolitics of diaspora. It agreed that "diasporas are not neatly organised political units, united under a single cause but are replete with contradictory positionalities as individuals and groups articulate different ways of being, feeling and acting diasporic" (Christou and Mavroudi, 2015:2), and asked, “How do Amazigh groups in France reassemble diaspora through ‘Amazighité’, and what effects (political, social and territorial) does this have?” At the outset of the research project, working only from secondary data about the Amazigh diaspora, it was impossible to discern its extent or degree of institutional unity. Although numbers of Amazigh people in France can be crudely estimated using old census and immigration data, such estimates tell us nothing about how, why and even if those people constitute a group or movement. What the diaspora is cannot be dissociated from what the diaspora does. The ‘diasporic Amazigh movement’ emerged as the object of this thesis through the fieldwork, which pieced together a unique body of knowledge about the mostly informal networks of associations and political activism of Amazigh actors, mostly in the Paris area.

The methodological approach of this thesis has conceptualised the Amazigh diaspora as a political project in the making (Adamson, 2008), an emergent assemblage in a state of gathering, coherence and dispersion (Mavroudi, 2007; Barrineau, 2015). A different approach would not have been able to account for the Amazigh diaspora’s changing imaginative geographies and territorialities detailed in this thesis; a bounded approach to diaspora as the segment of a population outside national borders would not have interrogated its very boundedness, and neither would an opposite, un-bounded and anti-essentialist approach. The understanding of diaspora as process, as assemblage, has been key. Geopolitical practices and discourses play a role in the Amazigh diaspora’s
Assemblage and the reconfiguration of its members’ territorialities. As argued in chapter 4, scholar-activism focused on Amazigh language, history, and geography has produced imaginative geographies that shape the territorialities of the diasporic Amazigh movement. The geopolitical discourses of this scholarship have informed the activism of the diaspora associations, which in the past two decades have increasingly focused territorially on their specific regions of origin rather than the pan-Amazigh whole. The imaginative geography of Tamazgha as a unified cultural and linguistic space, and of the Amazigh as a single culturally and linguistically unified people, has increasingly given way to a new geopolitical discourse of ethno-nationalism, re-shaping the diaspora as well as changing the political landscape of North Africa’s regions.

The transnational spaces in which the diaspora is continuously brought into existence are in turn transformed through differential/relational politics. The politics of the MAK-Anavad in particular exemplify this change, through which the geopolitics of diaspora have moved from what Hroch (2007) would call ‘Phase A’ to ‘Phase B’ nationalism. Through nationalistic symbols such as flags, identity cards, and an anthem but above all through mapping of the Kabyle nation’s territory, the MAK-Anavad has sought to institute a new national territoriality amongst its members. Through staging marches, demonstrations and flag ceremonies in symbolic places in Paris and across France, they articulate the universal Enlightenment values honoured in those public squares with their emergent concept of Kabyle nationhood. In its diplomatic relationships with other ethno-nationalist groups, amongst the Amazigh (Chawi, Mozabite, Riffian) and beyond (Breton, Occitan, Catalan), the MAK-Anavad contributes to the creation and maintenance of relational spaces of recognition and performativity. It is ‘rehearsing the state’ in its contingent practices of state-like institutions, such as elections, citizenship and diplomacy. Concurrently, its anti-Islamic stance has led to political opportunities within the French political landscape amongst the nativist-populist Right.

In the contemporary global political climate, where moves for re-localised national sovereignty are being made in Europe (e.g. Catalan and Scottish independence referendums, Brexit) and elsewhere (Kurdistan, plurinationalism in Latin America (Postero, 2017)), the imaginative geographies and territorialities of these nations’ diasporas and their links to national revivals at home could be better understood by political geographers. If in these contexts the performativity of the state is somehow underlined by the attempts of stateless nations’ leaders to institute state-like diplomacies and citizenships,
can we better theorise the role of diasporas as performative? Can we ask how, why, and with what effects does the assemblage of a Kurdish diaspora, not Turkish or Iraqi or Iranian, materialise? Or how these assemblages form in the postcolonial context? The ways in which diaspora develops the meanings and spatialities of these identities, which this thesis has outlined for the Amazigh diaspora, need to be considered in these other instances, because, as argued in chapter 4, a diaspora’s framing of itself and of ‘home’ has political effects.

Insights from political geography have made such an approach possible. Geographers cannot leave scholarly engagement with diaspora politics to other disciplines, such as political sciences, international relations and migration studies, which have increasingly come to frame debates and set the agenda for diaspora research. A renewed geopolitics of diaspora is needed, one based on the critical analysis of boundary-making and territoriality, to shed light on the resurgent nationalisms of the contemporary world, and the practices through which they create and maintain relational spaces of recognition and performativity.

Throughout the thesis, I have considered the ways in which colonial power relations shape the Amazigh movement’s discourse and practices, particularly in relation to space, place and territory. The diasporic Amazigh movement’s popular geopolitics, expressed through artwork, songs, poems, etc. on the platforms of associations and social media, has been analysed in their (post)colonial context. This thesis has brought postcolonial ideas and critiques into conversation with popular geopolitics, asking: “What imaginative geographies are scripted by the members of the diasporic Amazigh movement, and what political work do they do?” In doing so, it has developed the sub-field beyond a focus on “elite scriptings of the world” (Dittmer and Gray, 2010:1665). In chapter 7, this anti-elitist reaction was shown to articulate with populist and nativist discourse in contemporary France.

Colonial power dynamics still shape the everyday practices of the diaspora Amazigh. In most associations, Franco-Amazigh hybridity is acceptable or even positive, but Arabo-Amazigh hybridity is resisted. This tendency links back to colonial-era tropes and everyday concerns with integration in France. Chapter 5 detailed how association members ‘correct’ themselves and others in their use of Tamazight to remove Arabic loan-words. Chapter 6 argued that the politics of integration within which many Amazigh associations reproduce ‘ordinary’ citizenship equally leads to a privileging of French over ‘Arabo-Islamic’
attitudes and practices. The performance of laïcité in many associations goes beyond neutrality towards Islamic practices to actively discouraging and challenging them, for example by serving pork and alcohol during the Ramadan fast and strongly condemning the practice of wearing the veil. The imaginative geographies that are scripted as a result of these colonial structures map Tamazgha as the ‘natural ally’ of the universal values, particularly associated with France, against the ‘threat’ of Islamic authoritarianism and fundamentalism. They create political opportunities amongst the nativist-populist Right in France and also among their more centrist counterparts.

The diasporic Amazigh movement is an assemblage of individuals within a group, continuously authored by members as much as ‘elites’. This thesis has identified social media, in particular Facebook, as a key arena in which this assemblage comes together. Here, the imaginative geographies of popular culture engage their audiences in geopolitics through what I term ‘Facebook geopolitics’. New technologies and practices have reconfigured the “different sites of production, distribution and consumption [of] geopolitical culture” (Toal and Dalby, 1998:5). Publics can no longer be treated as only being easily-influenced audiences for geopolitical discourse, lacking their own agency, but must be understood as geopolitical actors themselves. In creating and participating in groups and forums, ‘commenting’ or ‘liking’, or posting images, texts and videos identified as ‘Amazigh’ or ‘Kabyle’, individual users participate in the creation of new geographies and mappings of the world. The line between writer and audience of geopolitical text is blurred in the social media format, which lends itself to the development of authoritarian-populist political narratives. Simple, and therefore often un-nuanced, messages are most effective in this content-saturated environment, and so Facebook geopolitics tends towards the use of national symbols, the map-as-logo, and other visual cues.

A clear geography of scholarship on indigeneity places Indigenous peoples primarily within the settler states of the New World, where political, geographical, ethnic, social and legal differences between ‘original populations’ and the descendants of settler populations are readily identifiable. However, indigeneity as a political paradigm has been articulated with claims to territorial, economic, cultural and linguistic rights worldwide. Held in comparative perspective, its effects and vicissitudes in other parts of the world can help us to analyse indigeneity from a new standpoint (Canessa, 2018). For the Amazigh movement, a claim to be Indigenous must be substantiated in the face of non-recognition by North African states. Also, operating within the francophone sphere, where Indigenous
rights translate as *droits autochtones*, Amazigh activists continually confront ethnic, racial and nativist definitions of *Amazighité*. Consequently, this thesis has sought to answer the question; “*In what ways and to what ends do expressions of indigeneity emerge in diasporic Amazigh discourses and practices?*”. Firstly, it has underlined the relational constitution of indigeneity by analysing the range of ways in which indigeneity is articulated in the diasporic Amazigh movement, only one of which is simply the representation of the Amazigh as North Africa’s Indigenous people at international meetings hosted by the UN, EU or AU. The Amazigh are in no danger of disappearing as an ethnic but rather as a cultural and linguistic group. Language politics are central to the diaspora’s groupness, as associations represent ‘secure linguistic environments’ for the transmission and preservation of Tamazight. Whereas Indigenous struggles and the policies they engender in the New World often essentialise indigeneity as a primarily ethno-cultural category, in some cases even making it a measurable quantity (Forte, 2013), the Amazigh case demonstrates that indigeneity is relational and context-specific.

In this thesis, the concept of Indigenous diaspora has been demonstrated to be helpful for understanding the constitution of *Amazighité*. By holding in tension the territorial roots and transnational routes implicit in claims to indigeneity at a distance, we have been able to examine both the fundamental theoretical complementarity between the two and the specific geopolitics they produce. Nativism, which Amazigh discourse articulates with both Indigenous activism and French radical-right ‘Republican values’, was argued in chapter 7 to enable the MAK-Anavad’s geopolitics through a contrapuntal geography between Kabylia and France. In chapter 5, the diasporic Amazigh movement’s ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ were argued to highlight the colonial forces that have shaped and continue to shape them.

### 8.2 New Directions

The findings of this thesis should be situated within current scholarly debates in Amazigh studies, political geography, diaspora studies, and Indigenous studies, where they could constructively inform future work. This thesis has also raised questions that have been left unanswered, emergent areas for research that need to be addressed in future work.

The explicitly geographical approach of this thesis to the analysis of the Amazigh in France is its key contribution to the field of Amazigh studies. Its conceptual framework centred on the ‘diasporic Amazigh movement’ could inform future political and historical analyses
of the Amazigh diaspora, which has been shown to be a relationally constituted assemblage whose ‘groupness’ has developed alongside its imaginative geographies of Tamazgha. The thesis has argued that the geopolitics of the diaspora (territorialities, imaginative geographies) have geopolitical effects at home. However, it has been beyond the scope of this project to trace the transnational links and processes by which this happens. A multi-sited ethnography would be needed to trace links between diaspora and home communities such as development applications, return journeys, repatriations of the deceased, and flows of finance. Such a multi-sited ethnography on the scale of Tamazgha would require a team of researchers with the ability to work transnationally throughout this space, but this could be facilitated through the Amazigh diaspora itself, which, as argued above, includes many qualified and accomplished researchers. Another area for further research raised through this thesis is the role of village committees in assembling the diaspora through inter-organisational relationships. This thesis has focused on the geopolitics of registered cultural associations and political movements in Paris, but the nature and scale of village committees’ diaspora geopolitics would necessitate a second project. Finally, despite its explicit efforts to study the diasporic Amazigh movement without becoming Kabyle-focused, this research project and the location of fieldwork meant that it privileged Kabyle voices over, for example, Chleuh or Riffian ones. Future research could adapt the approach of this thesis to new field sites, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, where these non-Kabyle voices of the diasporic Amazigh movement are reportedly more active.

In the weeks leading to the submission of this thesis in spring 2018, news broke that the personal data of millions of Facebook users had been obtained without their permission and used to target audiences for political campaigns in the UK and USA. Much of the data harvesting had been initially carried out in the name of academic research. Public scrutiny of the practices and policies around the security of personal data on social media platforms has already led to Facebook and others updating their policies, and should cause scholars developing and using online methods such as those described in this thesis to re-assess their research ethics. The way that political discourse develops on such platforms is also likely to change. However, online methods should not be avoided because of the complexity of privacy and consent issues. The online ethnography that informed this thesis was an invaluable part of its methodology, and never involved the misuse of personal data. As political geographers seek to better understand the contemporary ‘everyday’ spatial politics of citizenship, political activism and debate, social media cannot be ignored. What
this thesis describes as ‘Facebook geopolitics’ could be developed, contrasted with other social media platforms or studied over the period of a national election. On the other hand, it is worth underlining that online ethnography was used in this thesis to triangulate with other ‘real world’ ethnographic methods such as participant observation and interviews. Without this triangulation the utility of such online research would have been greatly limited.

Diaspora research is often limited to populations from one host-state with one origin-state, and frames diaspora politics within the transnational space between them. By contrast, the focus of this thesis on a population linked to multiple origin-states has allowed for new questions to be raised about the constitution of this transnational space, and how imaginative geographies of the homeland inform the ‘groupness’ of diasporas as well as geopolitical change at home. Further research could incorporate views from the diasporic Amazigh movement outside of France to examine the politics of the constitution of transnational space between host-states. The diaspora geopolitics of other ethno-linguistic groups spread across the territories of multiple origin-states in the postcolonial context, such as Hausa or Fulani, could be researched using a similar approach of diaspora as process. Turning the focus back on the politics of the state but retaining this relational understanding of diaspora, future research on state diaspora outreach could examine how diaspora assemblages change, accommodate and react to the policies and initiatives of their origin-states.

Finally, this thesis has raised questions for Indigenous studies that is has only partially answered, about the translation of indigeneity as a concept into the francophone world and the theoretical implications of Indigenous diasporas. Firstly, the ways in which indigeneity is accommodated or resisted by dominant French understandings of state-society and state-individual relationships have only been briefly explored. Further research in this direction could inform not only francophone Indigenous studies, but also shed further light on the relational constitution of indigeneity as a political category in other parts of the world. Research looking in more detail at the ways that development policies associated with indigeneity and conventions such as UNDRIP and ILO 169 are translated into francophone contexts, or for that matter other word language contexts (Arabic, Russian, Chinese), would be valuable not only for those contexts, but for understanding the different ways in which local political concerns are articulated with this global movement. Secondly, the Indigenous diaspora has been explored in this thesis as a space of unity, a melting pot in
which actors from across Amazigh regions, societies and traditions make up the diaspora together through a contingent process of assemblage, but it also a space of differentiation, between Amazigh and Arab. How the Indigenous diaspora is differentiated, in the host society, from its ‘non-Indigenous other’, has only been partially explored here and merits more systematic research. Rather than only researching the relationships between Amazigh associations, for example, a future study might focus on the relationships of Amazigh and non-Amazigh associations and groups, including Arabic ones. Finally, the implications of this thesis’s argument that diasporas’ imaginative geographies reconfigure not only their own ‘groupness’ but have geopolitical effects within their home territories needs to be more fully unpacked in relation to the concept of Indigenous diasporas. If these diasporas occupy a privileged position in relation to populations at home, could their mappings, territorialities and reconfigurations of their imaginative geographies represent some form of reflexive colonialism? Such questions are beyond the scope of this thesis, but are nonetheless important ones to develop in our increasingly mobile world.

8.3 Epilogue / Futures

Geopolitical change is ongoing, and the effects the Amazigh identity movement is having in North Africa are often underestimated (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011). The part that the diaspora plays in this geopolitical change has been outlined in this thesis, but future developments will determine its ongoing role. When in 2011 Libya’s long-standing dictator Colonel Gaddafi was deposed by revolutionary militias, two geopolitical shifts occurred in the Amazigh world. One of the militias that deposed Gaddafi, opening a crucial second front in the Nafusa mountains south of Tripoli, was flying the Amazigh flag designed in Paris in 1967. Prior to 2011 even speaking Tamazight in public could be dangerous in Gaddafi’s Libya, but from 2011 this region has governed itself with near total autonomy; it communicates and educates using Tifinagh, pursues the official recognition for Tamazight in Libya’s new national constitution, and negotiates peace and conflict with other groups in Libya through a self-proclaimed ‘Supreme Amazigh Council’. Second, several thousand Touareg soldiers left Gaddafi’s defeated army and returned to the Sahara where, helped by their weaponry and training, they led the Azawad war of independence in 2012 as the MNLA.

These geopolitical shifts were the secondary effects of the collapse of the Libyan state as part of the broader ‘Arab Spring’. However, they were also inspired and made possible by
the scholar-activism, imaginative geographies, and homeland geopolitics of the diasporic Amazigh movement. Algeria and Morocco’s governments remained relatively stable during this period but remain autocratic states with large youthful populations desiring political change and democratisation (Lefèvre, 2016). Drastic political change in either country could be the opening diaspora organisations are waiting, ‘rehearsing’ for - but change at home will mean change in the diaspora.

Future change in the diasporic Amazigh movement will also be determined by its success in consolidating its political achievements and taking advantage of future opportunities. Though Paris remains a significant population centre for the diasporic Amazigh movement, transnational networks with other Amazigh diaspora populations in other countries in Europe and further afield may lead to more effective international lobbying (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). For example, in summer 2018 Kabylia will compete alongside several other unrepresented nations and peoples in a football world cup for non-FIFA affiliated countries in London, which will necessitate a greater mobilisation of the Kabyle diaspora in the United Kingdom than ever before. In France itself, the election of Macron and his En Marche! party has overturned the traditional political order, but the opportunities this offers the diasporic Amazigh movement remain unclear as Macron’s government has so far focused on economic rather than social reform. Though beaten at the ballot box in France, the increasingly powerful ‘new Right’ in Europe will continue to present both opportunities and obstacles for the diasporic Amazigh movement. Thanks to the addition of a geographical perspective to these issues taken in this thesis, these future developments can be understood within their spatial parameters and have been opened to further geographical study.
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### Appendices

**Appendix 1 - Table of interviews conducted during the fieldwork period September 2015 - July 2016**

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<td>49</td>
<td>Sliman Tounsi</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Co-founder / Spokesperson</td>
<td>Collectif des Mozabites en Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>El Hachmi Bahamida</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Co-founder</td>
<td>Izmulen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Amoumene Hiadara</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>Tin Hinan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Masin Ferkal</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Association Tamazgha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Mohamed Dabouz</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Izmulen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54a</td>
<td>Nadia Ammour, Samia Ammour</td>
<td>f, m</td>
<td>Singer</td>
<td>Tiyri Uzar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>‘Ag Aïssa’</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Co-founder</td>
<td>‘Association Touareg’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Kamel Saïdi</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Association Tikli, Berbère Mémoire, ACB de Villeparisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Mustafa Benelhadj</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Association Tamazgha-Provence</td>
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<tr>
<td>58a</td>
<td>Mustafa Benelhadj, Nacira Abrous</td>
<td>m, f</td>
<td>Leader / Academic</td>
<td>Association Tamazgha-Provence</td>
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<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Salem Chaker</td>
<td>m</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Encyclopédie Berbère</td>
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</table>
Appendix 2 - Amazigh Flags

Amazigh Flag c.1967 - Licence: Public Domain

Chawi Flag c.2001 - Licence: Public Domain

Kabyle Flag c.2015 - Licence: Public Domain

Riffian Flag c1921 - Licence: Public Domain
### Appendix 3 - Table of association interactions during Fieldwork

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>MEMBER?</th>
<th>LEVEL OF INTERACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Association Amazir d'Ile de France</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Single Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association Ameslay</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Two Meetings, Online Presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association Culturelle Amazighe Laïque</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Two Meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association de Culture Berbère</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Weekly Tamazight and Berber Civilisation Classes, Weekly volunteering with homework club, Monthly literary events, multiple other meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association des Jeunes Kabyles de France</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Two Meetings, One street demonstration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association des Kabyles d'Ile de France</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Single Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association Franco-Berbère de la Sarthe</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Single Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association Franco-Berbère de Pierrefitte</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Three Meetings, including one Tamazight Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association Franco-Berbère du Kremlin-Bicêtre</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Three Galas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association Franco-Kabyle de Champigny</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Two Meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association Idlès</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Two Meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association Tikli</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Single Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Culturel Berbère de Drancy</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Two Meetings, Online Presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectif des Amazighs en France</td>
<td>Political Movement</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Two street demonstrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectif des Mozabites en Europe</td>
<td>Political Movement</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congrès Mondial Amazigh</td>
<td>Political Association /</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Five</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International NGO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordination des Berbères de France</td>
<td>Associative Movement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Six</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ibadica</td>
<td>Research Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmulen</td>
<td>Political Movement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Translation of communiqués for over a year, website and twitter account management, several meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maison Amazighe de Saint-Denis</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reseau Anavad</td>
<td>Political Movement</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Several</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>five street demonstrations</td>
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<td>Taferka</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamaynut France</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>meetings, online presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamazgha</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Several</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>meetings, online presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timlilit</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tudert</td>
<td>Cultural Association</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Two</td>
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