


Linguistic and Phenomenological Theories of Verbal Cognition in Mīmāṃsā

A Study of the Arguments in Śālikanātha's
Vākyārthamātrkā-I and the Response in Sucarita's
Kāśikāṭikā



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This dissertation is submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Fitzwilliam College

July 2018

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Shishir Rajan Saxena

Mīmāṃsā thinkers propound an epistemology generally characterised as philosophical realism, and given their foundational resolve to disambiguate Vedic comprehension, a similar attitude is reflected in their speculations on the nature of language as well. Unlike some other schools of the Indian philosophical tradition, Mīmāṃsā philosophers admit the reality of words and word-meanings, which led them to formulate two theories whose aim is to explain comprehensively how the cognition of sentential meaning arises from uttered words. These two theories, *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhīdhāna*, are advocated by Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas respectively, and are considered as being the fundamental theories of sentential meaning that formed the basis for all classical Indian thinkers debating the nature of linguistic cognition.

The *Vākyārthamāṭṛkā-I* (VM-I) of Śālikanāthamiśra (9th cent. CE) is considered to be the *locus classicus* for the presentation of *anvitābhīdhāna*. Sucaritamiśra (10th cent. CE) was the first Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka to respond to Śālikanātha's criticisms, and he presents *abhihitānvaya* accordingly in his *Kāśikāṭīkā* on Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika Vākyādhikaraṇa*. Modern scholarship is scarce with regard to these two seminal texts, and I present a translation/paraphrase of the several levels of argumentation found in the VM-I. In contrast to the VM-I whose Sanskrit text is published, the *Kāśikāṭīkā* on the *Vākyādhikaraṇa* is yet unpublished and I present an annotated edition and translation of Sucarita's essay on vv.110cd-112ab, based on a study of two manuscripts. I endeavour in this thesis to present a philosophical, philological and historical study of these two works and thereby demonstrate the cogent linguistic and phenomenological arguments presented therein. I hope that this thesis may thus indicate some of the complexity and sophistication of the Indian philosophical debates on language, as well as aid in understanding the early history of the formulation of these influential doctrines.

शिवेन काशिकायां यो ऽनुभूतविपदुत्तरः ।
कृतिरियं तदूर्जेन पद्माक्षीवन्दनास्तु मे ॥

Declaration

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. This dissertation does not exceed 100,000 words exclusive of bibliography.

Shishir Rajan Saxena

5th July, 2018

Acknowledgements

I have had the immense privilege of being able to study Indian philosophy in Banaras and Cambridge, both cities of light and learning. The time I have spent here has shaped me in a myriad ways, and I have only the deepest gratitude for the experiences and opportunities that have come my way living in these two remarkable cities.

This thesis would not have been possible without the continued support of my supervisor Dr. Vincenzo Vergiani, from whom I have learnt the rigour and scrupulous attention to detail needed for the study of any Sanskrit text. Our regular reading sessions together and his distinguished academic guidance have contributed greatly in my studies. Many thanks to him also for his careful reading of the multiple drafts of this thesis, which I'm sure must have made for tedious reading at various times!

I am also very thankful to Dr. Elisa Freschi for the many hours that she has spent reading and discussing these texts with me during our weekly readings over Skype. I have benefited immensely from her patient explanations of many difficult concepts, and I am grateful to her for sharing her ideas so freely and for her warm encouragement.

My sincere gratitude also to Dr. Hugo David and Dr. Kei Kataoka, who very kindly shared the two manuscripts of the *Kāśikāṭīkā* and encouraged me to study these for this thesis. I have also had the good fortune of being able to study with both these renowned scholars at various times during the PhD, and have gained significantly from my discussions and readings with them.

During the course of the PhD, I have had the opportunity of interacting with several senior scholars and discussing my work with them, particularly at the workshops organized at the IKGA, Vienna in the summers of 2015-2017 and

December 2017, as well as at the colloquium in Cambridge in November 2016. I am grateful to all the participating scholars who helped me with many ideas and difficult passages, and were always forthcoming with their support. I am especially thankful to Dr. Eivind Kahrs at the department, for his kind and encouraging words during our various meetings.

I would also like to thank the Master and the Tutors at Fitzwilliam College for encouraging me in my studies and awarding me the Fitzwilliam PhD Studentship, which has enabled me to study at Cambridge. The amiable and scholarly culture at Fitzwilliam has been very inspiring, and has deeply enriched my stay and studies here. I am also grateful to the managers of the Cambridge Trust, the Nehru Trust and the Rapson Trust for supporting me with their scholarships through the PhD.

I'd like to take this opportunity to also thank my teachers at Banaras Hindu University, who introduced me to the fascinating world of Indian philosophy. I am especially thankful to the grand old man of Indian philosophy, Dr. A. K. Chatterjee, for the many evenings I have spent on his porch, delighting at the wit and wisdom of this nonagenarian!

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List of Abbreviations

Aṣṭ. Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*

BHU A. Sastri (1964) Edition of VM-I

C M. Sastri (1904) Edition of VM-I

CoD Connection of Denoted [Meanings] (*abhihitānvaya*)

DoC Denotation of Connected [Meanings] (*anvitābhidhāna*)

KT Sucaritamīśra's *Kāśīkāṭikā* on *Ślokavārttika Vākyādhikaraṇa* vv.110ab-112cd

MK Kevalānandasaraswatī (1952) Edition of VM-I

MNS Mahādeva Vedāntin's *Mīmāṃsānyāyasaṃgraha*

NBh Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya*

NR Pārthasārathimīśra's *Nyāyaratnākara*

PMS Jaimini's *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra*

PP Pūrvapakṣin

RVP Śālikanāthamīśra's *Ṛjuvimalāpañcikā*

ŚBh Śābarabhāṣya

SM Sentential Meaning

ŚV Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *Ślokavārttika*

ŚV Vāk. *Ślokavārttika Vākyādhikaraṇa*

TV Kumāriḷa Bhāṭṭa's *Tantravārttika*

UP Uttarapakṣin

VM-II Second Chapter (*pariccheda*) of Śālikanāthamiśra's *Vākyārthamātrkā*

VM-I First Chapter (*pariccheda*) of Śālikanāthamiśra's *Vākyārthamātrkā*

VP Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya*

WM Word-Meaning

Introduction

Two Directions of Inquiry within Mīmāṃsā

Mīmāṃsā is a term etymologically derived from the verbal base *man-* (to think, to examine) and can be considered as either a desiderative nominal formation (that is nonetheless devoid of desiderative meaning)¹ or as an intensive formation. The term hence comes to mean either ‘deep reflection, inquiry’² or ‘profound thought or consideration’³ – an apt characterization of the school (*darśana*) of Indian philosophy thus named.

The school of Mīmāṃsā, or more precisely Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, has as its central focus the meticulous hermeneutic examination of the Vedic corpus (specifically the Brāhmaṇas) so as to disambiguate the process of Vedic sacrifice. The pursuit of Mīmāṃsā is not to articulate the details of every Vedic sacrifice – this is the responsibility of other ritualistic traditions and works (such as the different *śrautasūtras*) – but rather to justify how exactly only a specific procedure, as already known through other means, is enjoined by the Vedic text.⁴ This then becomes, as McCrea (2008, p. 28) explains, the “real mission of Mīmāṃsā” with the result being that “Mīmāṃsā serves, in effect, as an epistemology of Vedic comprehension”.

This mission has led the various Mīmāṃsā philosophers, throughout the

¹Whitney (1896, p. 378). Also Tubb and Boose (2007, p. 43).

²Apte 1958.

³Monier-Williams 1872.

⁴For instance, the Mīmāṃsā philosophers occasionally justify certain interpretations of Vedic injunctions by referring to their *vivakṣā* (intention), all the while maintaining that the Vedas have no author (*apauruṣeyatā*). See Yoshimizu (2008) for a discussion. For more on the doctrine of *apauruṣeyatā*, see Clooney (1987).

school's over two thousand year history,⁵ to pay particular attention to the nature of language and meaning, leading to Mīmāṃsā being traditionally labelled as the science of sentences (*vākyaśāstra*). Historically then, there have been two directions of inquiry within the school: firstly, the development of an intricate hermeneutic framework for textual interpretation, and secondly, the justification of the ontological and epistemological tenets upon which such a framework would be situated.

The former has always been of paramount importance for the Mīmāṃsā philosophers, and the hermeneutic tools developed by them are often considered unparalleled in South Asian intellectual history.⁶ Consequently, it is often considered that the efforts towards the latter mode of philosophical inquiry and the conclusions thereof, “while certainly not unimportant, are little more than a necessary prolegomenon to the real business of Mīmāṃsā”.⁷

One of the primary reasons for thinking thus is the disproportion in the emphasis laid upon each direction of inquiry in the foundational text of the school itself – Jaimini's *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra* (PMS) comprises twelve chapters with each in turn being divided into several sections (*pāda*), yet most of the ontological and epistemological speculations of the Mīmāṃsā philosophers are based upon the first *pāda* (*Tarkapāda*) of the very first chapter and the *Śābarabhāṣya* (ŚBh) thereon.

Be that as it may, the scope of emphasis of the Mīmāṃsā philosophers was considerably expanded in the second half of the first millenia, a stage referred to as the “Golden Age of the Mīmāṃsā”⁸, when the two founders of the sub-schools of Mīmāṃsā – Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (600-650 CE)⁹ and Prabhākara Miśra (620-680

⁵The beginnings of Mīmāṃsā are shrouded in antiquity, making any precise estimate as to the school's origination nearly impossible. As Verpoorten (1987, p. 5) states, “It is extremely difficult to determine [Jaimini's] chronological position . . . we ought to conclude carefully that the *MS* might be of rather high antiquity: 450-400 B.C. (? the age of Pāṇini?), but the collection took its present form . . . in a later period. But when? . . . about 250 B.C. (?), or . . . between 200 and 300 A.D. (?).” See also Kataoka (2011, pp. 13-20) for a discussion on the history of Mīmāṃsā. Nevertheless, all dates mentioned here are tentative.

⁶These tools also found their way into other disciplines, especially law – see, for instance, Jha (1942, pp. 367-387) and Davis (2010, pp. 47-69), as well as the traditions of Sanskrit poetics and dramaturgy (*alaṅkāraśāstra* and *nāṭyaśāstra*) – see, for instance, McCrea (2008) and David (2016).

⁷McCrea 2000.

⁸Verpoorten 1987.

⁹See Kataoka (2011, p. 112). 600 CE according to Potter (2014, p. 183).

CE)¹⁰ – developed complex and sophisticated philosophical doctrines. Like the thinkers of the other traditional philosophical schools in India, these Mīmāṃsakas presented their doctrines merely as elaborations of the ideas found in the two foundational texts PMS and ŚBh,¹¹ while nevertheless introducing sweeping alterations. Moreover, their doctrines also represented trenchant criticisms of the philosophical tenets of other schools, such as those of the Buddhists (especially Dignāga),¹² the Grammarians and Advaita Vedānta.¹³

abhihitānvaya and anvitābhidhāna

A natural outcome then of the two directions of inquiry in Mīmāṃsā is that even among the many philosophical doctrines articulated by both Kumārila and Prabhākara, as well as the subsequent adherents of their respective sub-schools, the deliberations on the nature of language become especially important and contentious. There are several such topics of deliberation – especially on the nature of phonemes (*varṇa*), words (*pada*) and word meanings (*padārtha*),¹⁴ and the interplay between these three leading to one’s cognition of meaning. Nevertheless, the most critical among these are the theories on the nature of sentences (*vākya*) and sentential meanings (*vakyārtha*) – for, as Kumārila says while admitting that the knowledge gained from words may be classified as either inferential or linguistic,¹⁵

¹⁰See Kataoka (2011, p. 112). 700 CE according to Potter (2014, p. 295).

¹¹McCrea (2013) argues that Śābara himself had many rival interpreters of the PMS. Yet, once the ŚBh was admitted as foundational in the works of both Kumārila and Prabhākara, “the welter of competing works – both pre- and post-Śābara – quickly vanish(ed) . . .” Moreover, he argues that “it is a mistake to see the movement of Mīmāṃsā in this period as a bifurcation of a formerly unified field into two subschools. Rather, it represents a change from a situation in which . . . virtually every author in the field in effect constituted his own sub-school of Mīmāṃsā, to one in which there are two and only two such schools.”

¹²In fact, McCrea (ibid.) argues that one of the primary reasons for Mīmāṃsā’s transformation in the seventh and eighth centuries was the challenge posed by the radical epistemology of Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

¹³For instance, see Taber (2005, pp. 1-15) for a discussion on the many opponents in the chapter on the nature of perception (*pratyakṣapariccheda*) from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s *Ślokavārttika* (ŚV).

¹⁴See Chapter I for an explanation of my choice of translation.

¹⁵ŚV *Śabdapariccheda* v.108: *pramāṇam anumānam vā yady api syāt padān mitih; vakyārthasyāgamārthatvād doṣo nāgamavādinām*. Kumārila expends much effort in this chapter arguing that the knowledge gained from words cannot be classified as an inference (*anumāna*). Nevertheless, towards the end of the chapter, he is prepared to admit the contrary position as

the meaning of the Vedas (*āgamārtha*) is the meaning of its sentences, and it may thus be admissible for a Mīmāṃsaka to tolerate some ambiguity at the level of words and phonemes.

However, any doubt about the nature and arising of Sentential Meaning (SM) becomes impermissible, and such keen attention to this topic leads to the development of two competing doctrines in Mīmāṃsā: *abhihitānvayavāda* and *anvitābhīdhānavāda*. These doctrines aim to comprehensively explain how SM cognition arises from uttered words, and I will argue in this thesis that these doctrines are both linguistic and phenomenological in their explanations. Moreover, even though these two theories are attributed to Kumārila and Prabhākara respectively, it is the commentators of their respective works as well as later thinkers who systematize and develop them further.

Kumārila and Prabhākara present their doctrines in their respective commentaries on the PMS and ŚBh. Kumārila's magnum opus is the *Ślokavārttika* on the *Tarkapāda*, whereas Prabhākara's commentary is titled *Bṛhatī* (extant upto the second *pāda* of chapter VI). The Mīmāṃsā theory of sentence and SM is first presented in PMS 1.1.24-26 (*Vākyādhikaraṇa*) and the ŚBh thereon, and both Kumārila and Prabhākara present their respective doctrines while commenting upon this section.

The textual scope of this thesis

Among the Prābhākaras, the most important thinker is Śālikanāthamiśra (800-900 CE)¹⁶ who composed the commentary *R̥juvimalāpañcikā* on the *Bṛhatī* of Prabhākara. Another significant text attributed to him is the *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, which takes the form of fourteen essays (verses and commentary). Of these, the *Vākyārthamāṭṛkā* (comprising two chapters) presents the Prābhākara theory of sentence and sentential meaning. The First Chapter (*pariccheda*) of Śālikanāthamiśra's *Vākyārthamāṭṛkā* (VM-I) is considered to be the *locus clas-*

presented in the verse, demonstrating thereby his general doctrinal position of permitting some ambiguity with regard to certain concepts related to phonemes and words. Moreover, as I will also discuss subsequently in Chapter I, Kumārila exhibits such an attitude even in his explanation of how words denote word-meanings.

¹⁶Kataoka 2011, p. 112.

sicus for the presentation of the Prābhākara doctrine of *anvitābhīdhāna*, for this is where the main tenets of the doctrine are first set forth and contrasted with the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of *abhihitānvaya*. It is this work that I will focus upon in this thesis as representative of the Prābhākara viewpoint.

Furthermore, there are three commentators on Kumārila's ŚV – Umbeka (730-790 CE) (*Tātparyaṭīkā*), Sucaritaśra (930-980 CE) (*Kāśikāṭīkā*) and Pārthasārathīśra (1000-1050 CE)¹⁷ (*Nyāyaratnākara*).¹⁸ The only commentary published thus far on the *Ślokavārttika Vākyādhikaraṇa* (ŚV Vāk.) has been Pārthasārathīśra's *Nyāyaratnākara* (NR), which does not engage extensively with the Prābhākara doctrine. In this thesis, I present the annotated text and translation of Sucaritaśra's *Kāśikāṭīkā* on *Ślokavārttika Vākyādhikaraṇa* vv.110ab-112cd (KṬ)¹⁹, an essay in which Sucaritaśra considers in some detail the doctrine of *anvitābhīdhāna* and justifies instead the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of *abhihitānvaya*. Moreover, I will also attempt to demonstrate that the main interlocutor for Sucarita's arguments in this essay is Śālikanātha, and the arguments given in the KṬ are deeply intertwined with those of the VM-I, thereby rendering the study of the latter a prerequisite for understanding the former.

The present state of research

A mention is made of the doctrines of *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhīdhāna* in nearly all contemporary discussions on Indian philosophy of language, as they are considered to be the fundamental theories of the comprehension of SM which all subsequent thinkers (philosophers as well as *ālaṃkārikas*) engage with and develop while debating the nature of language.²⁰ However, despite the critical importance of the study of the VM-I for an understanding of even the basic ideas of *anvitābhīdhāna* and its diametrical contrast to *abhihitānvaya*, there are

¹⁷See Kataoka (ibid., p. 112) for their chronology.

¹⁸There is also a fourth commentary on the ŚV by Bhaṭṭaputra-Jayamiśra (950 CE) titled *Śarkarikā*. (Potter 2014, p. 325). This text is published in C. K. Raja (1946) and spans four chapters of the ŚV: *Ākṛtivāda*, *Aphavāda*, *Vanavāda* and *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*.

¹⁹Note that I use the abbreviation KṬ to refer only to this particular section of the *Kāśikāṭīkā* (i.e. on ŚV Vāk. vv.110cd-112ab), and not the *Kāśikāṭīkā* in its entirety.

²⁰See, for instance, K. Raja (1969, pp. 189-227).

disproportionately scant detailed studies of the tenets and arguments expounded by Śālikanātha.

Two translations of the *Vākyārthamāṭṛkā* (both *paricchedas*) have been published, one in Hindi (Avasthi 1978) and another in English (Sarma 1987).²¹ An important study is Pandurangi (2004), in which the author gives an overview of nearly all passages from the *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, including the *Vākyārthamāṭṛkā*. However, these works, perhaps due to their broad scope, are unable to demonstrate the cogency and clarity of the various arguments – linguistic and phenomenological – that Śālikanātha wields in the VM-I to present and defend the theory of *anvitābhīdhāna*. Moreover, as I hope to demonstrate in this thesis, the reasoning in the VM-I is quite intricate and complex, involving many layers of argumentation – which not only aids in the development of his sophisticated theory of *anvitābhīdhāna*, but also has a profound impact on the ideas of the subsequent Bhāṭṭa opponents. Finally, I should mention that in her PhD thesis (Wicher 1987), Irene Wicher presented an edition of the *Vākyārthamāṭṛkā* with a German translation. However, her thesis is available only in a library at the University of Vienna and I have been unable to refer to it for the purposes of this thesis. I hope to be able to do so in the next stage of my research career.

Regarding the *Kāśikāṭīkā*, the Sanskrit commentary has been published only up to the end of the section *sambandhākṣepa*²², however the remaining text is available in manuscripts.²³ An important characteristic of this commentary is that Sucarita often composes long essays on the initial few verses of the chapters of the ŚV²⁴ where he seems to delve into arguments which came to the fore after Kumāriḷa's composition of the ŚV. In this thesis, I provide an annotated edition of a section from the *Kāśikāṭīkā*, in particular the commentary on the opening two verses (vv.110cd-112ab) of the *siddhānta* from the ŚV Vāk.²⁵ A similar approach is adopted in Kataoka (2014), where Kataoka presents a critical edition

²¹There are three additional books by the same author dealing with the contents of the *Vākyārthamāṭṛkā* – Sarma (1988), Sarma (1990) and Sarma (2005).

²²V. A. R. Sastri 1943.

²³Shida 2013.

²⁴For instance, see his commentary on the initial two verses of the *Anumānapariccheda* (V. A. R. Sastri 1943, pp. 1-5) or that on the first verse of the *Abhāvapariccheda* (ibid., pp. 189-194).

²⁵The *pūrvapakṣa* in the ŚV Vāk. is presented in vv.1-110ab (corresponding to PMS 1.1.24). The *siddhānta* follows thereafter (corresponding to PMS 1.1.25-26).

of the *Kāśikāṭīkā* on the first verse of the chapter of *apoha* from the ŚV. Kataoka presents a critical edition having consulted four manuscripts – mine, however, is a more modest attempt on the basis of the study of two manuscripts. Digital photographs and scans of these two manuscripts were made available to me by Dr. Hugo David (EFEO, Pondicherry) and Dr. Kei Kataoka (Kyushu University of Fukuoka), and I am deeply grateful to them for their kindness and generosity in permitting me to study these for the purpose of this thesis.

Overview and aim of the thesis

The thesis has been divided into six chapters. In the first chapter, I introduce the two doctrines of *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhīdhāna* elaborating upon their fundamental tenets and ideas about the process of SM comprehension. In chapters two and three, I present a dialectical examination of the two doctrines in turn, on the basis of the criticisms put forth by the opposite camp as well as their refutation. Such doctrinal elaboration as well as its dialectical examination is an integral aspect of the discussions of both the VM-I and the KṬ, and I hope to present their arguments while remaining as close to the texts as possible.

My aim in the first three chapters is thus two-fold, being both philosophical and historical. Firstly, I attempt to delineate the various philosophical arguments in the two texts – situating an argument in its context and distinguishing it from others, identifying the various steps within each argument and following the course of its internal reasoning which leads to the author's conclusions. Secondly, I hope also to demonstrate that historically, the arguments of the VM-I and KṬ are part of the same philosophical conversation, and in considering them thus, it is imperative not only to link their discussions and thus see where the argument from one text ends and that of the other begins, but also to try and capture some sense of the impact the ideas of the VM-I had on those of the KṬ.

In the next part of the thesis, I present my study of the two texts VM-I and KṬ which underpin the discussions of the first three chapters. In chapter four, I translate/paraphrase the sections of the VM-I relevant to the discussions on *anvitābhīdhāna* and *abhihitānvaya*. In chapters five and six, I put forward the KṬ – chapter five contains the edited Sanskrit text, while chapter six presents an

annotated translation.

My attempt in this thesis is to provide a philosophically sound, historically accurate and philologically robust study of the two Mīmāṃsā doctrines of *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna*, as presented in the VM-I and the Kṛ. In doing so, I hope to indicate the complexity and sophistication of the debates on the nature of language as were prevalent in the Indian philosophical traditions towards the end of the first millenia, and thereby contribute in some modest measure to an understanding of an important time in Indian intellectual history.

Chapter I

An Introduction to the Theories of *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna*

I.1 What do the terms *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna* mean?

I.1.1 Distinguishing between *abhidhāna* and *anvaya*

The two doctrines of *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna* offer distinct linguistic and phenomenological descriptions to explain one's experience of the cognition of sentential meaning (SM). These two doctrines, attributed to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas respectively, attempt to account for not only the verbal, communicative process ubiquitous in ordinary life (comprising speakers and hearers) but especially the linguistic process that the Mīmāṃsakas claim is unique to the Vedas. The philosophical school of Mīmāṃsā has as its central concern the meticulous hermeneutic deciphering of the Vedic language, and in doing so, they assert also that the Vedas have no author (*apauruṣeya*). Thus, an explanation of the SM cognition arising from Vedic sentences must necessarily focus upon the hearer rather than the speaker and thereby account for both — the role of language as well as the listener's phenomenological experience. Both doctrines endeavour to explain precisely these, thereby admitting that these two aspects are sufficient to account for the linguistic, communicative process which

leads to one's experience of SM cognition.

Moreover, the two doctrines agree that the entire phenomenon of verbal cognition comprises two processes — denotation (*abhidhāna*) and connection (*anvaya*). Both these processes have a broad definition acceptable to the Bhāṭṭas as well as the Prābhākaras, yet each camp modifies and explains each process quite disparately.

1.1.2 Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara conceptions of denotation

Even though the doctrines of *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna* are attributed respectively to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara themselves, both initiators of their own respective sub-schools of Mīmāṃsā, nevertheless, it is the subsequent Mīmāṃsā philosophers who articulated the details of both doctrines. It is these later authors who designated these two doctrines with their respective titles of *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna*, and thereby sharply contrasted several fundamental concepts across the two sub-schools. As mentioned previously, in this thesis I will focus most closely upon the Prābhākara theory as is presented in the VM-I, and the Bhāṭṭa theory as is set forth in the KT.

The verbal base *abhidhā-* is used by both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras to refer to the process whereby speech-units *express* meaning. What this implies is that it is accepted that speech-units (verbal and nominal bases, suffixes, words, etc.) *directly* lead one to cognize certain meaning, and *abhidhā-* refers to that very contribution that speech-units themselves make in the process of verbal cognition. I hence translate *abhidhā-* as 'to denote', and will retain this translation throughout the thesis to refer to this specific process as accepted by the Mīmāṃsā philosophers.

There are, however, (at least) two possible explanations in Mīmāṃsā discussions of how such contribution is actually achieved by the speech-units. For instance, in the chapter *Sphoṭavāda* of the ŚV, two alternatives are put forward to explain how Word-Meaning (WM) arises from phonemes (*varṇa*). For Kumārila, the cognition of WM arises from the phonemes either with the aid of the mind, just as the cognition of fire (*vahnidhī*) arises from the perception of smoke, or naturally, with the phonemes being expressive of meaning like a lamp and its light (*dīpavat*).¹ However, Kumārila does not unequivocally decide in favour of either,

¹ŚV *Sphoṭavāda* vv.135: *varṇoṭthā vārthadhīr eṣā tajjñānānantarodbhavā, yedṛśī sā tadutthā*

or even some combination of these.

Even though the Bhāṭṭas as well as the Prābhākaras accept this broad definition of *abhidhā-* (i.e. as leading one to cognize the directly expressed meaning from the corresponding speech-unit), nevertheless they differ sharply in the details. The Bhāṭṭas accept the process of denotation (*abhidhāna*) as causing one to cognize **word-meaning from a word**² whereas the Prābhākaras accept it as leading one to cognize **sentential meaning from a word**.³

I.1.3 Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara conceptions of connection

Early in the history of Mīmāṃsā, a distinction in the nature of word-meanings and sentence-meanings was indicated — words refer to universals, whereas sentences refer to particulars.⁴ The Mīmāṃsakas thus use the term *anvaya* to refer to the mutual connection between the distinct WMs, which thereby marks the difference between the isolated WMs and the complex SM. The verbal base *anvi-* is employed by both Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas to indicate this process of connection between the WMs, and I translate this as ‘to connect’. Moreover, it is also accepted that only when this connection comes about that isolated, unconnected WMs are converted into the complex SM which forms the basis for all linguistic communication.

Nevertheless, the exact method of this connection is the central problem for both doctrines. For the Bhāṭṭas, WMs are denoted (*abhihita*) by words first as

hi dhūmāder iva vahnidhīḥ.

ŚV *Sphoṭavāda* vv.136ab-c: *dīpavad vā gākārādir gavādeḥ pratipādakaḥ, dhruvaṃ pratīyamānatvāt.*

²In Mīmāṃsā discussions on language, it is commonly accepted that even individual words such as *yajeta* can be divided into distinct speech-units (such as the verbal base, the suffix, etc.), each having its own respective meaning. Thus, it is more accurate to speak of speech-units and their meanings, rather than words and word-meanings. Nevertheless, I prefer retaining the terms word and word-meaning to enable simplicity of understanding and conciseness of expression — all the while bearing in mind their more precise understanding as ‘speech-unit’ and ‘the meaning of the speech-unit’ respectively.

³To be more precise, the Bhāṭṭas accept each word in a sentence as denoting (*abhidhā-*) its *unconnected* WM, whereas the Prābhākaras accept that each word denotes a *connected* (*anvita*) meaning. See I.1.3.

⁴For instance, see ŚBh to PMS 1.1.24: *sāmānye hi padaṃ pravartate, viśeṣe vākyaṃ. anyac ca sāmānyam, anyo viśeṣaḥ.* (Āpaṭe 1929, p. 93). See also McCrea (2000, pp. 430-432) for a discussion on this.

unconnected, and their connection (*anvaya*) comes about only subsequently. On the other hand, the Prābhākaras assert that in sentences, one is only aware of WMs as connected (*anvita*) and words denote (*abhidhāna*) them as such, with the cognitive processes of the listener aiding the denotation of this connected (sentential) meaning.

These opposing claims of the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas lead to their complex and sophisticated philosophical argumentation regarding the nature of linguistic communication. Moreover, the relative sequence of the two processes of denotation and connection as is admitted in both doctrines becomes the basis for their respective titles — the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of *abhihitānvaya*, and the Prābhākara doctrine of *anvitābhidhāna*.

I.2 Introducing the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of *abhihitānvaya*

I.2.1 An overview of the main tenets of the doctrine

Kumārila's most sustained discussions on the nature of SM cognition are found arguably in the ŚV Vāk., and these underpin the argumentation of all subsequent philosophers elaborating upon the doctrine of *abhihitānvaya*. At the very beginning of his exposition, Kumārila sets out the basic premise of his doctrine that SM cognition arises only when WMs are comprehended (*tadbhāvabhāva*) — thus one must admit **WMs** as the basis (*mūla*) of SM cognition.⁵

In his KT, Sucarita clarifies that it is the **words** themselves which are the basis (*mūla*) for the SM cognition through the intermediate step of them conveying the WMs (*padārthapratipādanadvāra*).⁶ Sucarita explains further that in accordance with PMS 1.1.25,⁷ the doctrine of *abhihitānvaya* admits that SM is caused (*nimitta*) by WMs alone, since WMs themselves lead one to SM cognition once their mutual connections are understood by virtue of their mutual expectation (*ākāṅkṣā*), compatibility (*yogyatā*) and proximity (*sannidhi*).⁸ Moreover, it is explained

⁵ŚV Vāk. v.111ab: *padārthānāṃ tu mūlatvaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tadbhāvabhāvataḥ*.

⁶See V.1: *padāny eva padārthapratipādanadvāreṇa vākārthapratipattau mūlam iti*.

⁷PMS 1.1.25: *tadbhūtānāṃ kriyārthena samāmnāyo 'rthasya tannimittatvāt*.

⁸See V.1: *na, arthasya tannimittatvāt padārthānāṃ evākāṅkṣāyogyatāsannidhibalapatilabdhetaretaravyatiṣaṅgānāṃ vākārthabuddhau nimittatvāt*.

that the cognition of these unconnected WMs is the outcome of the process of denotation of words, since words terminate their functioning (*avasita*) once they have given rise to their respective WMs.

Sucarita also points out that if the WMs are not cognized due to some mental impediment (*manoparodha*) when the sentence is uttered, then the SM is not comprehended despite the sentence being heard.⁹ Thus, he argues that one who comprehends the mutual connections between the WMs (*padārthavyatiṣaṃgavid*) understands the qualified sentential meaning as well — consequently, the SM is settled upon as arising when WMs come about. Sucarita thus remarks that it is this very relation between WMs and SM that leads to these being ascertained as cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇatā*).

Sucarita also explains PMS 1.1.25 as defining a sentence (including Vedic ones) as a joint mention (*samāmnāya*) or enunciation (*uccāraṇa*) of those words which refer to their fixed (*nitya*)¹⁰ WMs, alongside a speech-unit whose meaning is an action (*kriyā*). This latter speech-unit is the verbal suffix, and the action it expresses is explained by Sucarita as referring to the efficient force (*bhāvanā*), which when qualified by its various attributes¹¹, is the sentential meaning itself.¹²

Thus, in essence, this theory describes SM cognition as a connection (*anvaya*) of word-meanings, which are denoted (*abhihita*) by words.¹³ Consequently, one may resolve the Sanskrit compound *abhihitānvaya* as *abhihitasya [svārthasya] anvayaḥ* or *abhihitānām [svārthānām] anvayaḥ*, with the term *svārtha* referring to each word's unconnected, isolated WM. Thus, the compound *abhihitānvaya* can be translated as Connection of Denoted [Meanings] (*abhihitānvaya*) (CoD).¹⁴

⁹See V.3.8.3. This is similar to an argument presented in the ŚBh on PMS 1.1.25, where the phrase used is *mānasād apy āghātāt* (i.e. due to a mental injury).

¹⁰See Freschi (2017) for an explanation of why the term *nitya* should be translated as 'fixed' and not as 'eternal' in Mīmāṃsā contexts.

¹¹The three components of *bhāvanā*: goal (*sādhyā*), instrument (*sādhana*) and procedure (*itikar-tavyatā*). See Freschi (2012, pp. 19-43) for a discussion on the Mīmāṃsā theory of *bhāvanā*.

¹²See V.1: *kriyete ca bhāvanām brūmaḥ, saiva cānekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭā vākyārtha ity ucyate*.

¹³See footnote 2 for an explanation of the choice of the terms *word* and *word-meaning*, and not instead the more precise terms *speech-unit* and *the meaning of the speech-unit*.

¹⁴This translation as Connection of Denoted [Meanings] (CoD) is somewhat convoluted and also possibly misleading — yet I include this translation and its abbreviation here since the Sanskrit term is used often in the texts to refer to this process of verbal cognition, and an abbreviated English reference makes for an easy substitute for the Sanskrit term. Matilal and Sen (1988, p. 74) refer to this as the “designation before connection theory”.

I.2.2 The Bhāṭṭa conception of *lakṣaṇā* in the process of SM cognition

As has been pointed out already, the main contention of the theory of *abhihitānvaya* is that all words in a sentence denote their own unconnected WMs, with their connection (i.e. SM) coming about only thereafter. It is generally considered that according to Kumārila, words denote their WMs through their primary potency of *abhidhā*, whereas the SM is conveyed by a potency of words for secondary or indirect denotation, namely *lakṣaṇā*.¹⁵ However, as McCrea argues¹⁶, Kumārila appears atypically reticent in advancing this position and the *Vākyādhikaraṇa* section of his ŚV, where Kumārila elaborately discusses his theory of SM cognition, has no verse corroborating the inclusion of *lakṣaṇā* in his theory. Instead, Kumārila's acceptance of the role of *lakṣaṇā* is demonstrated by Śālikanātha (in the VM-I) and Vācaspati (in the *Tattvabindu*) by quoting a half-verse, presumably from his (lost) *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*: “It is our view that sentence meaning is, in every case, secondarily expressed.”¹⁷

Śālikanātha, while presenting the *anvitābhidhāna* theory in his VM-I, rejects Kumārila's idea of using *lakṣaṇā* to explain SM cognition. As I will present subsequently,¹⁸ his main argument is that in order for *lakṣaṇā* to come about, it should not be possible to connect (*sambandhānupapatti*) the WM expressed by a word within the complex SM.¹⁹ That is precisely the case in sentences such as *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* (the village on the Gaṅgā), where the WM ‘*gaṅgā*’ cannot enter into the SM, but instead it is the WM ‘*gaṅgākūla*’ (the bank of the Gaṅgā) which forms a part of the SM.²⁰ In contrast, this is not so in cases such as *gāṃ ānaya* (bring the cow), where the respective WMs are not unsuitable (*anvayāyogyatva*) for a connection.

¹⁵K. Raja 1969, pp. 210-211.

¹⁶McCrea Forthcoming, 2019.

¹⁷*vākyārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitiḥ* – translation: McCrea (ibid.).

¹⁸See IV.6.4.

¹⁹*vācyasyārthasya vākyārthe sambandhānupapattitaḥ; tatsambandhavaśaprāptasyānvayāl lakṣanocyate* (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 398-399). The phrase from the verse *vākyārthe sambandhānupapattitaḥ* is glossed in the commentary as *vākyārthe anvayāsambhavāt*.

²⁰This example of *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* is often cited in discussions on the nature of *lakṣaṇā*. Here, the primary meaning of the word *gaṅgāyāṃ* is ‘on the Gaṅgā’, and the village cannot be *on* the river but instead on its bank. See K. Raja (1969, pp. 232-233) for a discussion of this example.

This argument of the impossibility of connection (*anvayānupapatti*) is also given by the Prābhākara *pūrvapakṣin* in Sucarita's KT.²¹ Surprisingly however, Sucarita, when presenting the Bhāṭṭa *siddhānta*, does not attempt to refute this argument of the *pūrvapakṣin* — even though (as will be seen in subsequent chapters) he considers and refutes several other arguments from Śālikanātha's VM-I. Moreover, he does not even once present the theory of *lakṣaṇā* to explain SM cognition. On the contrary, Sucarita argues repeatedly that it is the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of WMs themselves that leads to the cognition of their mutual connection.²² He explains also that SM cognition is in fact self-evident (*svasaṃvedya*) in all circumstances by every individual who hears a sentence (and who cognizes also the meaning of each word).²³

Furthermore, Sucarita argues also for an equivalence between verbal cognition and perceptual cognition.²⁴ He explains that the means of knowledge such as perception and inference lead one to cognize substances, qualities and actions as unconnected from each other — however, such substances, qualities and actions have an intrinsic expectation (*svabhāvasāpekṣa*) for each other, and it is as a result of this that their mutual association (*saṃsarga*) becomes evident to the mind. Sucarita argues that such an association of the substances, qualities and actions known through perception and inference is exactly analogous to the mutual association of substances, qualities and actions as may be conveyed through language.

One may wonder then as to the real import of Sucarita's argumentation. Is this explanation by Sucarita bolstering the Bhāṭṭa argument of *lakṣaṇā*, with the distinction being only in the terminology used? Or is Sucarita distancing himself from the need to resort to *lakṣaṇā* to explain SM cognition, while nevertheless upholding the doctrine of *abhihitānvaya*? Perhaps a more extensive study of

²¹See V.2.3: *api cānvayānupapattau lakṣaṇā bhavati, yadā tv anvayapratītāv api na kiñcit kāraṇam astīty uktam tadā kasyānupapattiyā lakṣaṇāṃ vakṣyāmaḥ.*

²²See V.3.8.2: *vyutpattyanusāriṇī hi śabde śaktikalpanā tadvaśena ca saṃbandhisvabhāvārthābhīdhānavāreṇa śabdānāṃ svābhāvikaṃ prāmāṇyam upapāditam eva.* See footnote 78 for another example of Sucarita's argument about the nature of WMs to connect mutually.

²³See V.3.5: *bhavati tu sarvadeśakālanarāvasthāntareṣu vākyaśrāviṇāṃ viśiṣṭārthasaṃvid iti sarvaṃ svasaṃvedyam.* See VI.3.5 for a discussion on the translation of the term *svasaṃvedya* as self-evident.

²⁴See V.3.8.2: *pratyakṣānumānāvagatānāṃ hi dravyaguṇakarmanāṃ svabhāvasāpekṣāṇāṃ eva śabdapratipāditānāṃ iva saṃsargo bhāsate.* This argument is contextually discussed in III.3.3.2.

Sucarita's works will help us determine the answer with more certainty.

I.3 Introducing the Prābhākara doctrine of *anvitābhidhāna*

The VM-I is a presentation and defence of the Prābhākara doctrine of *anvitābhidhāna*, and it begins²⁵ by explaining that words alone cause the SM cognition and not instead the WMs in the manner claimed by the Bhāṭṭas. Śālikanātha maintains, like the Bhāṭṭas, that words comprising the sentence are indeed real (unlike the doctrine of the indivisible sentence attributed to Bhartr̥hari) and admits also that WMs are universal while the SM is a particular.

Nevertheless, where the Prābhākara doctrine sharply diverges from the Bhāṭṭa account is that here, it is argued that words need only their primary potency of *abhidhā* to lead to SM cognition. And the reason for this is that each word in a sentence denotes its own respective WM (*svārtha*) as connected (*anvīta*) to other WMs. Thus, the Prābhākaras reject the Bhāṭṭa idea that words in a sentence denote unconnected WMs — instead, words are always observed as being used in sentences to denote connected (*anvīta*), qualified meanings, and the Prābhākaras insist that this is accomplished by the single process of denotation initiated by the words which are heard by a listener.

Moreover, it is explained that once the words of the sentence convey such connected WMs, the SM is also cognized. This is because the SMs are the WMs themselves, such that these WMs have their mutual connection cognized in the form of a relation between a primary element and other secondary ones (*pradhānaguṇabhāva*).²⁶

Consequently, this theory describes SM cognition as arising from the words denoting (*abhidhāna*) connected meanings (*anvīta*) — or more precisely, from the denotation of a word's own (isolated) meaning (*svārtha*) as connected to other

²⁵VM-I v.2: *padair evānvītasvārthamātropakṣiṇāśaktibhiḥ; svārthās ced bodhitā buddho vākyaṛtho 'pi tathā sati*. Commentary on v.2: *yadi tu padāny evānvītān svārthān abhidadhatīti śakyate sādhayitum...* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 377) (See IV.1).

²⁶VM-I v.3: *pradhānaguṇabhāvena labdhānyonyasamanvayān; padārthān eva vākyaṛthān saṅgirante vipāścītaḥ* (ibid., p. 377).

WMs. Thus, the Sanskrit compound *anvitābhīdhāna* may be resolved as *anvitasya [svārthasya] abhīdhānam* or even *anvitānām [svārthānām] abhīdhānam*, and the term *anvitābhīdhāna* may be translated as Denotation of Connected [Meanings] (*anvitābhīdhāna*) (DoC).²⁷

I.4 Going further into the doctrine of DoC

I.4.1 The three steps of DoC

In verse 12 and the commentary thereon,²⁸ the VM-I explains the three steps involved in DoC. The verse is as follows:²⁹

The entire composite of words (*padajāta*) which has been heard (*śruta*) causes the memories of their unconnected [word-]meanings to arise (*smāritānanvitārthaka*);

The *vacanavyakti*³⁰ [of this composite of words then arises] as brought about by linguistic principles (*nyāyasampāditavyakti*), subsequent to which (*paścāt*) the words cause the SM cognition (*vākyārthabodhaka*).

Thus, Śālikanātha outlines three distinct steps in DoC. When the composite of words comprising the sentence are heard (*śruta*), they firstly lead to the memories of their unconnected WMs (step one). Thereafter, the *vacanavyakti* of these words is brought about according to linguistic principles (step two) and it is only subsequent to this (*paścāt*) that SM cognition comes about (step three).

²⁷Similar to the caveat about the translation of *abhihitānvaya* as CoD, this translation of *anvitābhīdhāna* as Denotation of Connected [Meanings] (DoC) also seems convoluted and somewhat misleading. Yet, I persist with such an abbreviated translation exactly for the reason as presented in footnote 14. Matilal and Sen (1988) and Chakrabarti (1989) refer to this theory as ‘connected designation’.

²⁸See IV.8 for a detailed presentation of the ideas discussed here.

²⁹VM-I v.12: *padajātaṃ śrutaṃ sarvaṃ smāritānanvitārthakam; nyāyasampāditavyakti paścād vākyārthabodhakam* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 401).

³⁰The term *vyakti* found in the verse is glossed in the commentary as *vacanavyakti*, see I.4.4 for a discussion. This term *vacanavyakti* has an important technical sense in Mīmāṃsā, as was first pointed out in McCrea (2000, p. 457). How this term is used in the VM-I is discussed in I.4.4. Moreover, given the term’s specialized meaning in DoC, I prefer to keep it untranslated. (For a detailed presentation of these ideas, see IV.8.8).

Moreover, Śālikanātha explains in the commentary to v.12 that in the first step, two memories arise³¹ for one hearing the words — the memory that each word is expressive (*vācaka*) of a connected SM, as well as the memory of each word’s unconnected, isolated WM (*svarūpa*).³² Thus, one will remember simultaneously this isolated form of the WM along with its invariable situation of always being part of a connection (*anvayabhāj*).

It may seem odd that Śālikanātha categorizes as a *memory* one’s awareness that a word used in a sentence is always expressive of a connected meaning, equivalent to a *memory* of a word’s unconnected WM. Our phenomenological experience of both may instead warrant some distinction — since the former is unlike a particular memory and appears more as a general linguistic awareness necessary for language use, something first acquired during the childhood process of language learning and re-activated each time one hears someone speak. Nevertheless, Śālikanātha’s main argument in the commentary is quite lucid — that one’s apprehension of the word’s unconnected WM is not devoid of its awareness as being connected, and both are *remembered* as they have their basis in past experience.

I.4.2 Complexity and chronological extension in DoC

There are two points about DoC which can be understood on the basis of the preceding discussion and which will underpin all subsequent arguments:

I.4.2.1 Complexity of denotation (*abhidhāna*)

As discussed in I.1.2, Prābhākaras admit that the activity of denotation links words directly to the connected sentential meaning. Verse 12 elaborates upon this process of denotation further and explains this to be a three-step process as described above, demonstrating thereby the *complexity* of the process of denotation as is conceived here in the VM-I.

³¹*sa padaṃ śrutvā nūnaṃ tāvad idaṃ smarati — idam asyākāṅkṣitasannihitayogyapratīyogyanvitasya vācakam iti. evaṅ ca smaratā smṛtam eva ananvitam api svarūpam anvayabhājām.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 402) (See IV.8.2).

³²The term *svarūpa* is repeatedly used in the VM-I to refer to the unconnected WM, and not to the phonic form of the word as is the definition of the term *svaṃ rūpaṃ* in Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (Aṣṭ.) 1.1.68. See Cardona (1988, p. 14) for a discussion of this rule in the Aṣṭ.

According to the verse, when the words are heard, there come about two intermediate steps (the memory of the unconnected WMs and the determination of the *vacanavyakti*) before the SM cognition comes about. One must then accept the conclusion that in this doctrine, the process of denotation (*abhidhāna*) includes within its own operation other cognitive processes of the listener — specifically memory (*smṛti*) (as in step one) as well as those cognitive processes required in the determination of the *vacanavyakti* (as in step two).³³

Such a description of denotation as being complex deviates quite markedly then from the Bhāṭṭa conception of *abhidhāna*, a non-complex function of words to denote directly and immediately their own (unconnected) WMs. Moreover, how exactly these cognitive processes (such as memory) assist the denotation of SM according to Śālikanātha, and the logical congruence of admitting thus, is discussed subsequently in I.4.3 and I.4.4.

I.4.2.2 Chronological extension of denotation (*abhidhāna*)

Moreover, these two aspects of the process of denotation for Śālikanātha — it being the activity of words to directly convey their meanings, as well as being complex (i.e. including within itself other cognitive processes) — may seem to be contradictory, at least in their temporal aspects. As mentioned previously, the Bhāṭṭa conception of denotation is not complex, linking as it does words and their immediately occurring WMs, and may thus be considered as being temporally *momentary*.³⁴

Yet, the dual aspects of *abhidhāna* admitted by Śālikanātha lead one to the conclusion that in his theory, the process of denotation must be accepted as being *chronologically extended* across multiple instants of time, even while continuing to link words and the connected SM each of them denotes. In other words, the Prābhākara process of denotation must be accepted as temporally continuing over at least the three instants corresponding to the three steps identified in v.12 – i.e. beginning once the words are heard and continuing over the next three instants until the SM is cognized.

³³See I.4.4 for a discussion of the concept of the *vacanavyakti*.

³⁴For the Bhāṭṭas, the subsequent transition from unconnected WMs to the connected SM is explained on the basis of *lakṣaṇā* and not *abhidhā* (see I.2.2).

It may be possible also to consider the order described in v.12 (as well as the term *paścāt*) in a less rigid sense, not of chronology but rather of logical determination. Nevertheless, in comparison to the Bhāṭṭa concept of denotation which links words and their immediately arising WMs, denotation according to Śālikanātha is more complex, as it includes two intermediate steps between the hearing of words and the arising of SM cognition. I would contend here that even if these steps be considered as simply the logical determinants of SM cognition, nevertheless their sequential occurrence presumes their temporal aspect — and in contrast to the immediacy of the Bhāṭṭa conception of denotation, Śālikanātha's conception must be accepted as certainly more chronologically extended.

One final point to be added here is that this conclusion of chronological extension is reinforced also by the Bhāṭṭa opponent's objection in the VM-I against the three-step process outlined in v.12 as well as the Prābhākara's consequent response.³⁵ The objection here is that if SM is not cognized by means of directly heard words, it cannot be cognized subsequently when the words have disappeared (*antarhita*). The Prābhākara however affirms³⁶ that SM is not denoted (*abhihita*) at first (*prāk*) when words are directly heard, but is denoted (*abhidhīyate*) only subsequently (*paścāt*).³⁷

I.4.3 An example to justify further the complexity and chronological extension of denotation

Śālikanātha also puts forward an example in the VM-I with twin purposes — firstly, to substantiate the role of memory in the complex process of denotation and thereby demonstrate that no logical incongruence arises from accepting it as such; and secondly, to distinguish such denotation of SM from other types of cognitions.

The example he puts forward is the following:³⁸ children are taught to mem-

³⁵*nanv anvitābhidhānavādinām katham vākyārthapatipattiḥ. śrūyamāṇena hi padena yo 'rtho nāvabodhitāḥ, sa katham antarhite tasminn avabhāseta* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 402) (See IV.8.4).

³⁶*śrūyamāṇena hi padena pratiyogisūpekṣatvād anvitābhidhānasya prāk sahakārivirahād artho nābhihitaḥ, paścād abhidhīyata iti kim anupapannam* (ibid., p. 402) (See IV.8.4).

³⁷A similar criticism is put forward by Sucarita, see footnote 54.

³⁸*bālyadaśādhītāt prāganavadhṛtārthād aṅgaparijñānasaṃskārāt paścāt smṛtād api vedād arthāvagamadarśanāt. tena smṛtyārūḍhasyāvagamakatvam adoṣaḥ* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 402) (See IV.8.4).

orize Vedic words and sentences without any understanding of their meanings. It is only subsequently in adult life, once the other auxiliary sciences of the Vedas have been studied adequately (*aṅgaparijñāna*), that one can recall Vedic words and sentences committed to memory previously and, upon adequate reflection, cognize their SM. Śālikanātha contends that this is a very mundane observation, and is accepted by all — including the *abhihitānvayavādin* opponent.³⁹

Thus, one must accept that meaning is regularly seen as comprehended from the Vedas, even though their words and sentences are entirely remembered (*smṛtād api vedāt*). It is reasonable also to admit that the mere hearing of words and sentences is not adequate to apprehend meaning, as has been demonstrated to be the case from the example of children hearing words without any comprehension of meaning. Śālikanātha hence concludes that there is no fault in accepting that **recollected entities (*smṛtyārūḍha*) can aid in the cognition (*avagamaka*) of something else.**⁴⁰

Following are some important points with regard to this example:⁴¹

1. **Substantiating the acceptance of memory within *anvitābhidhāna*:** According to the example, it is the Vedic words and sentences which are being recollected (*smṛtyārūḍha*), and these aid in the cognition (*avagamaka*) of another, namely the Vedic SM. Thus, one must admit that the phenomenological process of memory is *not entirely removed* from other cognitive processes. This then leads one to accept also that there is no logical incongruence in admitting that memory can play a role even *within* the complex three-step process of denotation, as is specifically required in step one (memories of unconnected WMs) of v.12.

³⁹This peculiar situation where one remembers words and sentences devoid of *any* meaning seems to have few parallels in the modern world. However, an analogous situation may be the prayers taught by families across the world to their children, which are sung in languages such as Sanskrit or Latin even though their meanings are not understood. For instance, it is common experience for anyone growing up in a Hindu household (even without any overt religious leanings) to have learnt (at least!) a few *mantras* while growing up – I, for example, cannot remember when I was first taught to sing the *Gāyatrī mantra*. Yet, it is only in the recent years when I have begun to study Sanskrit that the meanings of the words and phrases comprising the *mantra* have become clear to me, and these are in complete contrast to what I could have ever imagined before!

⁴⁰The term *smṛtyārūḍha* literally means ‘elevated [in the mind] due to their memories’. I am translating this as simply ‘recollected’.

⁴¹See IV.8.4 and IV.8.5 for a detailed discussion of the example as well as the points that follow.

2. **What is meant by the phrase *smṛtād api vedāt?***: When Śālikanātha says here that meaning is cognized from the remembered (*smṛta*) Vedas, he refers to the Vedic words and sentences which were memorized in childhood and are subsequently recollected in adult life, from which arises the comprehension of Vedic SM. Thus, a doubt may arise here: Should such comprehended SM from *remembered words* also be considered as denotation in the Prābhākara doctrine?

If this were to be so, then not only would WMs be recollected in DoC (as mentioned in v.12) but so also would be the case for *words*. This would, however, make the doctrine quite convoluted, as the doctrine would then have to assert that *words* which are heard give rise to the *memories of words*. Moreover, this would also violate the three-step process as outlined in v.12 since according to the verse, only WMs are caused to be recollected (*smārīta*) by the words which are themselves heard (*śruta*).

3. **Difference between SM cognition through *śruta* and *smṛta* words**: With regard to this doubt above, I would contend that such SM cognition as arising from remembered words *should not* be considered as denotation in Śālikanātha's doctrine. This is because, as noted above in v.12 of the VM-I (I.4.1), DoC *commences* with words which are directly heard (*śruta*) and not with remembered (*smṛta*) words. Moreover, Śālikanātha himself says after explaining the example that recollected entities (*smṛtyāruḍha*) are *avaḡamakas* (i.e. they lead to the cognition of another) — he does not instead label them as *abhidhāyakas* (i.e. they denote another). The case of comprehending Vedic SM through remembered words (as in the example) must hence be considered as a process of gaining knowledge from recollected entities, which is entirely distinct from the denotation of SM which occurs through directly heard words *only*.

However, the following question arises as a result: How would such SM cognition arising from remembered words be classified in terms of *pramāṇa* i.e. what type of veridical knowledge would this SM cognition be? It seems to me that it cannot be considered linguistic (*śābda*), since such a claim will be open to the same criticism that the Prābhākaras level against the Bhāṭṭas,

namely that the cause of such SM cognition is not the words but instead their memories.

Moreover, I would argue that such comprehended SM should be considered analogous to *any* understanding that arises upon careful reflection of known facts (say, remembering A and B and upon reflection, comprehending something new from these, say C). Memories, for Mīmāṃsā, are not considered veridical knowledge as they provide no new information.⁴² Thus memories of words or of facts A and B cannot be considered veridical knowledge — nevertheless, SM cognition arising from the remembered words as well as the apprehension of C from A and B is indeed new knowledge. Thus, I would contend that in terms of *pramāṇa*, such comprehension of Vedic SM from the *remembered* Vedic words and sentences is analogous *more* to any novel understanding arising from other recollected facts, and *lesser* to the SM which is denoted from words directly heard. Moreover, this will not lead to a difficulty for the Prābhākara, since he could claim that once these remembered sentences have been reflected upon and understood, once again when they will be heard (*śruta*), the same Vedic SM will arise thereby making the Vedic SM linguistic (*śabda*) according to his doctrine.

4. **Contrast with the Bhāṭṭa example:** It seems to me also that this example is exactly complementary to the example put forth by the Bhāṭṭas of “a white horse is running” (*śveto ’śvo dhāvati*).⁴³ In this Bhāṭṭa example, WMs (‘white’, ‘horse’ and ‘running’) are cognized without their corresponding words whereas in Śālikanātha’s example, words are cognized without their corresponding WMs.

The purpose of an example is to present a specific instance whose occurrence is acceptable to all, and yet use the instance to further one’s own theory by claiming that it alone can adequately explain the instance. Hence, both Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras admit to the specific instance of one’s perception of the WMs ‘white’, etc. which leads to the complex cognition “a white horse is running” — although they differ as to the mechanisms of how this

⁴²Kataoka 2003.

⁴³This Bhāṭṭa example is explained in IV.6.2.2 as well as in V.2.8.

comes about.⁴⁴ Similarly, both camps also admit that Vedic words present in memory can be devoid of meaning, but may disagree upon the conclusions that the other derives from this.

I.4.4 The second step: Determining the *vacanavyakti*

This now leads to the second step in the process of DoC, namely the determination of the *vacanavyakti*. Following are some key points regarding this concept.

I.4.4.1 Four characteristics of *vacanavyaktis*

On the basis of the discussions in the VM-I,⁴⁵ four characteristics can be attributed to the Prābhākara concept of the *vacanavyakti*. These are as follows.

An intermediate stage between signifier and signified

The three-steps of DoC described in v.12 refer to the second step as *nyāyasampāditavyakti*, which the commentary explains as referring to the *vacanavyakti*.⁴⁶ The verse states that SM cognition arises only subsequent to (*paścāt*) the *vacanavyakti* being effected, and the commentary explains that SM cognition cannot come about until the *vacanavyakti* has not been understood (*yāvat-tāvat*).

Consequently, the stage of the *vacanavyakti* refers to a step in the process of denotation where the words which were heard (step one) have disappeared, and the SM cognition has not yet arisen. Thus, it may be best to describe this as an intermediate, cognitive stage which arises chronologically between the utterance of the signifier and the cognition of the signified.⁴⁷

⁴⁴The Prābhākara refutation of the Bhāṭṭa explanation of the example is discussed in IV.6.2.2 and IV.6.2.3.

⁴⁵See IV.8.8.

⁴⁶*nyāyasampāditavyaktī kim idam, yāvan nyāyena vacanavyaktir na sampādyate, tāvat padajātaṃ vākyārthasyāvabodhakaṃ na bhavati. lokavyavahāravartibhir nyāyair yāvat idaṃ vidheyam, idam anuvādyam, idaṃ pradhānam, idaṃ guṇabhūtam, idaṃ vivakṣitam, idam avivakṣitam ityādi na sampradhāryate, tāvan na kvacid vedavākyaṛtho 'vabuddhyate* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 404).

⁴⁷This further endorses the previous discussion about the chronological extension and complexity of denotation according to DoC.

The outcome of the process of conjecture

Śālikanātha explains⁴⁸ that the *vacanavyakti* is that form of the sentence where all elements have been correctly assigned their categories of subject-predicate, primary-subordinate, intended-unintended, etc., and this is effected by means of linguistic principles (*nyāyasampādita*). Thus, this implies that the *vacanavyakti* refers to the final decision wherein one ascertains which meaning is intended, and which is not — it does not refer to the preceding stages of conjecture when one could postulate all possible meanings which may be intended, etc. Hence, the *vacanavyakti* refers to the outcome and not the intermediate steps of the process of *nyāyasampādana*, thereby becoming *nyāyasampādita*.

Required for all sentences

Moreover, in order to understand the *vacanavyakti*, it becomes imperative also to understand what Śālikanātha means by the term *nyāya* when he speaks of the *vacanavyakti* being brought about by *nyāyas* (*nyāyasampādityakti*).

Śālikanātha argues in the VM-I that one requires *nyāyas* (i.e. linguistic principles) in order to understand SM from all sentences — simple, factual sentences such as *ukhāyāṃ pacati* (“[he/she] cooks in a pan”), and even figurative (*lākṣaṇika*) or metaphorical (*gauṇī*) sentences. He presents these arguments in order to respond to the Bhāṭṭa opponent who argues that memory is subjective and cannot be relied upon to convey the WMs of only the words which have been heard (as is required in step two of the three-step process described in v.12 of the VM-I).⁴⁹ Nevertheless, after considering several arguments, Śālikanātha concludes by putting forward his solution which is the fundamentality of *ekavākyatā* (i.e. the principle of the unitary sentence).⁵⁰ He explains that this linguistic principle is

⁴⁸See footnote 46.

⁴⁹The multiple levels of argumentation in this Bhāṭṭa-Prābhākara debate in the VM-I on the reliability of memory are translated and presented in IV.11. This argumentation is also summarized in II.5.

⁵⁰VM-I, commentary to v.15: ... *tadartham evedam uktaṃ nyāyasampādityaktīti. ekavākyatvaṃ hi nyāyaḥ. tadanusāreṇa yo 'rthaḥ, so 'tra vākyasyāśrayaṇīyaḥ. vṛddhavyavahāravvyutpattiniyantritāyāṃ śabdārthāvagatau ye nyāyāḥ vṛddhavyavahāre vākyārthāvagatihetutayā viditāḥ, tān aparijahatā vākyārthā boddhavyā iti.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 409) See IV.11.3.3 for a translation and discussion.

essential to comprehend meaning from any sentence. Moreover, he concludes that only someone who does not forsake these linguistic principles will be able to comprehend SM.

Thus, for Śālikanātha, the *vacanavyakti* must be determined in all instances of verbal communication and not just for ambiguous Vedic sentences, as for instance, the customary Mīmāṃsā example of *somena yajeta* (one should sacrifice by means of *soma*).⁵¹

Related to signifier and signified

The *vacanavyakti* can thus be understood as closely related to the meaning signified by the sentence. However, its relation to the signifier is also perhaps stressed by Śālikanātha given its presentation in v.12. The term *nyāyasampāditavyakti* is an exocentric compound (*bahuvrīhi*) qualifying the term *padajātaṃ* i.e. the group of *words* comprising the sentence have their *vyakti* effected by linguistic principles (*nyāyasampādita*).

I.4.4.2 A hypothesis to understand the concept

The above four characteristics described may perhaps be sufficient for an understanding of this second step of DoC, but there may still be some ambiguity as to the exact import of the term *vacanavyakti*. Any description of this concept must be consistent with all these characteristics, and a final evaluation would require a more extended study of its treatment in Prābhākara literature. Nevertheless, given my understanding of the argument in the VM-I, I cautiously outline a possible interpretation of this concept.

I contend that just as a single uttered sentence can have distinct possible SMs, similarly it may be plausible to hypothesize an intermediate stage wherein each of these distinct possible SMs correspond to distinct *signifying forms* belonging nevertheless to the same sentence. For instance, in case of the Vedic example *somena yajeta* (see footnote 51), this single sentence would have two possible

⁵¹In this example, it is only after some consideration that one can decide whether *soma* indicates the *substance* of a sacrifice (the sacrifice itself having been previously established elsewhere), or a specific type of sacrifice which is *particularized* by the use of *soma* (i.e. *somavatā yāgena*). See Thibaut (1882, p. 6) for a discussion of this example.

SMs, and correspondingly two distinct signifying forms. The *vacanavyakti* here would refer to that SM which is selected, as well as its corresponding signifying form (thereby meeting the above mentioned attribute of being related to signifier *and* signified).

Similarly, in simple sentences such as *ukhāyāṃ pacati*, the *vacanavyakti* would refer to the signifying form *ukhāyāṃ pacati* only (without any additional word, say *kulāla*, introduced on the basis of memory), which corresponds to the meaning of this sentence in the given context (without any additional WM, say ‘*kulāla*’, introduced on the basis of memory).⁵² A similar explanation could be given for figurative as well as metaphorical sentences.

Thus, it seems that Śālikanātha introduces the concept of the *vacanavyakti* to account for the fact that the same string or complex of words (i.e. a sentence) can correspond to several meanings — and thus, for Śālikanātha, a sentence should be considered not as a single polysemous signifier, but as a (potentially infinite) set of homophonous signifiers, one for each SM. Thus, the second step of the process of DoC would be that in which the hearer assesses the various SM alternatives, with the *vacanavyakti* being the outcome of this conjectural process. Consequently, it would be this final step of the determination of the *signifying vacanavyakti* which would immediately precede the cognition of the *signified* SM.

This would also explain the label *vacanavyakti* itself, literally meaning ‘the specific (manifested) form (*vyakti*) [among the many possible] of the statement (*vacana*)’.

I.4.4.3 Possible distinction between Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara conceptions of *vacanavyakti*

As mentioned previously, McCrea (2000) first pointed out the importance of the concept of the *vacanavyakti* for the Mīmāṃsakas. While explaining this concept, McCrea states the following (p.449): “The job of the Mīmāṃsaka is, by a careful analysis of the functional connections between such a sentence and

⁵²This criticism that additionally recollected words or WMs may be introduced into the uttered sentence is the main Bhāṭṭa objection against the Prābhākara’s claim of the role of memory. The Prābhākara refutes by presenting his argument of the fundamentality of *ekavākyatā*, see footnote 49.

other surrounding ones, to settle upon one of these many possible meanings as contextually appropriate; . . . The specific meaning arrived at when all of these variables have been fixed for a particular sentence in a given context is called by the Mīmāṃsakas the “sentence-particular” (*vacana-vyakti*).”

McCrea also quotes from Kumārila Bhāṭṭa’s *Tantravārttika* (TV)⁵³ and explains that “. . . it is only by determining the *vacana-vyaktis* of the sentences that make up a Vedic text that one can ascertain definitely what is to be done and what is not to be done in performing the ritual enjoined by that text.”

As discussed in the previous subsections, for Śālikanātha, *vacanavyaktis* are determined by means of *nyāyas* in all types of sentences — ordinary, figurative, metaphorical sentences as well as Vedic ones. Moreover, as I have argued, the stage of ascertaining the *vacanavyakti* seems for Śālikanātha to be related to the signifier as well as the signified, and it refers to the stage just prior to the arising of SM cognition.

The Prābhākaras admit denotation as the function of words connecting them directly to the SM (as discussed in I.1.2) — whereas for the Bhāṭṭas, it connects words to their unconnected WMs. The Bhāṭṭas admit thereafter of *lakṣaṇā* (as discussed in I.2.2) to transition from unconnected WMs to the connected SM, and may hence admit the process of determining the *vacanavyakti* at this stage. However, the Prābhākaras admit only the single process of denotation which culminates in the SM cognition, and thus, the stage of determining the *vacanavyakti* should precede this final result.

Moreover, such a distinct Prābhākara definition of the *vacanavyakti* is also criticized by Sucarita in his KT.⁵⁴ Sucarita’s objection is that for the Prābhākara, the denotation of SM comes about subsequent (*paścāt*) to the *vacanavyakti* being determined when the uttered words have long disappeared (*cirātipanna*) — thus substantiating the understanding of the Prābhākara conception of the *vacanavyakti* presented thus far.

⁵³McCrea (2000, p. 457) (footnote 71): *vacanavyaktibhedena sarveṣāṃ eva darśanāt; vihito viniyuktaś ca kaḥ ko neti vicāryate* (TV, Vol. IV, p.74) Translation by McCrea (p.450): “. . . because all [of these meanings] are seen [in the sentence], it is only by the differentiation of *vacana-vyaktis* that it can be determined which is enjoined [*vihita*] or used [*viniyukta*], and which is not.”

⁵⁴V.3.10: *api ca yadi sarvair eva padair uccāritair ananvitārtheṣu smāriteṣu mīmāṃsāgatānekanyāyikalāpānusāreṇa vacobhaṅgiṣu vibhaktāsu paścād abhidhānam iṣyate tac cirātipanneṣu padeṣu kena sampādanīyam iti cintanīyam.*

This points then to a possible distinction in the concepts of *vacanavyaktis* for the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras. Perhaps a further study of their discussions dealing with this concept may help us understand and contrast their respective conceptions further.

I.4.5 Such causal apparatus is required in all linguistic communication

As mentioned above, Sucarita criticizes the Prābhākara conception of *vacanavyaktis* and argues that there is too great a chronological delay between the utterance of words and SM cognition according to DoC.⁵⁵ Moreover, Sucarita concludes that on the basis of such a definition of *vacanavyakti*, the uttered sentence will itself be reduced to a restatement (*anuvādaka*).⁵⁶

However, a similar argument had been put forth by a Bhāṭṭa opponent in the VM-I. The Bhāṭṭa opponent here puts forward the charge that so much causal apparatus (*sāmagrī*) (the three-step process, as in v.12 of the VM-I) is not experienced in ordinary linguistic communication as SM cognition arises quite swiftly (*drāk*).⁵⁷ Śālikanātha responds by explaining that such is the case only for sentences which have been encountered often (*atyantābhyasta*). On the contrary, this is not true for sentences of *smṛti* texts, whose meanings are unknown. Further, even in the case of ordinary linguistic communication, various types of disputes do arise.

Moreover, in another context,⁵⁸ Śālikanātha does admit in the VM-I that the sentence according to his doctrine is in fact a restatement (*anuvādaka*) — yet, he does not consider this as a fallacy in the doctrine as Sucarita claims.

I.4.6 How words cause memories and not denotations of their WMs

In order to further the argument that words lead to the memories of their unconnected, isolated WMs (*svarūpa*) and not instead to their denotations, Śālikanātha

⁵⁵See footnote 54.

⁵⁶His argument is presented in VI.3.10.

⁵⁷See IV.8.9.

⁵⁸See I.5.3.1.

explains in the VM-I that the SM is a complex whole (*bhāgaśālin*) within which the isolated forms of WMs can be analytically distinguished only a posteriori. Thus, according to him, such an unconnected form of the WM is ever present even within the connected meaning which is denoted by the word — and hence, one cannot refute the claim that words cause memories of their WMs while denoting the connected SM.⁵⁹

Śālikanātha argues that there is nothing logically incoherent (*anupapanna*) in claiming that words can lead to the memories of their unconnected WMs. This is because any cognition, whether veridical or not, can lead to the memory of another. The cause of memory is the former cognition of a mental contiguity (*pratyāsatti*)⁶⁰ between any two entities — which can subsequently lead to either one of the two to bring about the memory of the other, by causing the mnemonic traces (*saṃskāra*) with regard to the latter to arise. And according to Śālikanātha, such mental contiguity exists between a word and its unconnected meaning.

Śālikanātha also puts forth an example to validate his argument.⁶¹ He explains that this capacity of a word to remind one of its isolated WM is similar to that of objects (*artha*), which have the capacity to remind one of the words signifying them (*svapada*). An object is not a veridical cognition, nor does it denote its own word — yet, even an object devoid of conceptualisation (*nirvikalpa*) leads to the memory of the word it is signified by. Similarly, a word causes the memory of its own meaning (*artha*), even though the latter is not denoted by the word and the word is not a veridical cognition.

Perhaps by this example of the cognition in the *nirvikalpa* stage, the VM-I is referring to Bhartrhari's concept of *avikalpajñāna* and the related concept of

⁵⁹VM-I v.13: *anvitasyābhidhāne 'pi svarūpaṃ vidyate sadā; tena svarūpamātre 'pi śabda janayati smṛtim* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 405) (See IV.9).

⁶⁰The term *pratyāsatti* is repeatedly found in Śālikanātha's account of memory in the VM-I. Śālikanātha admits that the cognition of any entity (X) can give rise to a memory of another entity (Y), without needing any ontologically real connection between X and Y. This leads to memory being quite subjective in nature, and Śālikanātha says simply that memory is dependent upon *pratyāsatti* (*smaraṇasaya pratyāsattinibandhanatvāt*, A. Sastri (ibid., p. 406); *smāraṇatvaṃ nāma pratyāsattinibandhanam*, A. Sastri (ibid., p. 407)). I hence translate the term *pratyāsatti* as *mental contiguity* to capture the idea of a subjectively-established proximity between any two entities involved in memory. This translation also distinguishes the term *pratyāsatti* from another similar term *sannidhi*, which is translated as *proximity*.

⁶¹VM-I v.14: *yathārthenāpramāṇena svapadaṃ smāryate kvacit; padenāpy apramāṇena tathārthaḥ smārayisyate* (ibid., p. 405) (See IV.9).

upalipsā (the intention to perceive) as explained in the beginning of the *vṛtti* to *Vākyapadīya* 1.131 (see Vergiani (2017) for an explanation and translation). As Vergiani explains “Bhartṛhari appears to admit the existence of a cognitive state in which the mind records the sense data but does not process them into full-blown cognitions. However, he insists that even such an inchoate mental state of which the subject is barely aware is inherently infused with language, as is shown by the fact that, when triggered by the appropriate circumstances, it can be *recollected* (emphasis mine) – namely, it can become the object of a distinct conceptualisation and thereby verbalised.”

I.5 Contrasting the two doctrines: Some specific similarities and differences

I.5.1 The role of memory as common and yet unique

In the VM-I, Śālikanātha points out that memory plays a vital role in leading to the denotation of SM in both doctrines. The importance of memory in DoC has been highlighted briefly in the previous sections, and Śālikanātha asserts⁶² that even the Bhāṭṭas acknowledge a similarly indispensable role of memory.

Śālikanātha explains⁶³ that according to the Bhāṭṭas, a word denotes its own unconnected WM — and thus, this WM’s connection to another WM cannot be cognized until a second WM is not presented (*upasthāpay-*) to the listener’s mind by another word. Hence Śālikanātha argues that the Bhāṭṭa must admit to the following: Upon being denoted by their respective words, the unconnected WMs are subsequently recollected (*smṛtyārūḍha*), and it is out of these that the SM is cognized. Consequently, even though the two doctrines differ on the role of memory in the denotation of SM, both admit two aspects of SM cognition — the denotation by words as well as the aid of memory.

⁶²This argument is discussed in IV.8.3.

⁶³*abhihitānvayavādino 'pi yāvat padāntaram arthāntaram nopasthāpayati tāvad anvayāvagamo nāsti padārthasyānvayāvabodhinaḥ padārthāntarāpekṣatvāt pratiyogisāpekṣatvād anvayasya. atas tanmate 'pi sarvapadair ananvitasvārthā abhidhānīyāḥ. paścāt tebhyaḥ sarvebhyaḥ smṛtyārūḍhebhyo vākyārthapratipattir aṅgīkaraṇīyā* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 402).

In the VM-I, Śālikanātha quotes a verse from Kumāriḷa's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* endorsing this role of memory:⁶⁴

According to us, since even these [WMs] certainly do not lead one to cognize SM if [the WMs] are not recollected (*asmṛta*),
The nature of being a means of knowledge (*pramāṇatā*) is present in those very aggregated (*saṃhata*) memories of the [WMs] (*tatsmaraṇa*).

Śālikanātha presents two other half-verses from the ŚV, also corroborating Kumāriḷa's acceptance of the role of memory in his doctrine. The first is *Śabda-pariccheda* v.107ab:⁶⁵

A word cannot be distinguished from an entity which causes the recollection of another (*smāraḷa*) since it does not convey anything additional [to what has already been understood from other means of knowledge].

Śālikanātha also quotes ŚV Vāk. v.248ab, where Kumāriḷa states:⁶⁶

The speech-unit expressing the efficient force (*bhāvanā*) reminds one of that [efficient force], as in ordinary communication.

These verses quoted in the VM-I serve to demonstrate that even the Bhāṭṭas admit that memory plays a vital role in the denotation of SM.

1.5.2 The conditions of expectation, proximity and compatibility

Both doctrines, *anvitābhīdhāna* as well as *abhihitānvaya*, agree that the three conditions of expectation (*ākāṅkṣā*), proximity (*sannidhi*) and compatibility (*yogyatā*) play an important role in SM cognition. Yet, there are also some striking differences between their conceptions of the same. Some of the main ideas for both doctrines regarding these are discussed below.

⁶⁴*te 'pi naivāsmṛtā yasmād vākyārthaṃ gamayanti naḥ; tasmāt tatsmaraṇeṣv eva saṃhateṣu pramāṇatā* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 402).

⁶⁵*padam abhyadhikābhāvāt smārakān na viśiṣyate* (ibid., p. 401) (See IV.7.3).

⁶⁶*bhāvanāvācānaḥ tāvat tāṃ smārayati lokavat* (ibid., p. 401) (See IV.7.3).

I.5.2.1 The conditions as accepted in DoC

While discussing the nature of expectation, proximity and compatibility,⁶⁷ Śālikanātha argues⁶⁸ that WMs are always added into or removed from sentences while possessing a connection with other WMs, and hence, even under analysis, words are found to denote a connected meaning. Thus, Śālikanātha argues that a word expresses its own WM as connected only to expected, proximate and compatible meanings. Moreover, accepting this does not negate one's cognition of the relation between a word and its WM (*sambandhabodha*)⁶⁹ and Śālikanātha explains that this comes about quite easily (*saukarya*) even while admitting the three conditions (*upalakṣaṇa*) of expectation, proximity and compatibility.⁷⁰

Thereafter, Śālikanātha demonstrates how expectation leads one from the command (*kārya*) to the commanded person (*niyojya*) in case of a Vedic injunction.⁷¹ He argues that the statement of the command inevitably leads to an expectation of the commanded person, and this person will hence be compatible for a connection (*anvayayogya*) with the command.

Śālikanātha also explains subsequently that this results in expectation arising according to a certain sequence.⁷² He argues that expectation does not arise at once altogether for all correlates, but instead comes about with the gradual appearance of its causes (*kāraṇopanipātakrama*). As the command cannot be apprehended without the content of the command (*viṣaya*), first of all, the in-

⁶⁷See IV.5.

⁶⁸See IV.5.1.

⁶⁹The terms *anvaya* and *sambandha* are used very often in Mīmāṃsā discussions on language, and are repeatedly found in this thesis as well. Both these terms have a specific, technical sense: *anvaya* refers to the **connection between word-meanings**, whereas *sambandha* refers to the **connection between a word and its own meaning**. The term *sambandha* is however used in some places to refer to the mutual connection (*parasparasambandha*) between WMs as well, i.e. in the sense of *anvaya*. This is only occasionally done in contexts where the discussion is clearly about *anvaya*. See, for instance, footnote 19 where the term *sambandha* in the verse is glossed by *anvaya* in the commentary.

⁷⁰*upalakṣaṇāśrayaṇenāpi sambandhabodhasaukāryād* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 384). Elsewhere in the VM-I, Śālikanātha reiterates this view using the term *sukara*: *yady api sambandhagrahaṇam sukaram* (ibid., p. 411); *sambandhagrahaṇam sukaram iti* (ibid., p. 412). In his KT, Sucarita also mentions this argument while outlining the Prābhākara position and uses the same term *sukara* (*sukaram eva sambandhajñānam*) — a reference to Śālikanātha's own descriptions (see V.2.9).

⁷¹See IV.5.2.2.

⁷²See IV.5.2.5.

junction (*vidhi*) has an expectation for its content, as this is the adjunct of the command's cognition (*pratipattyanubandha*). Similarly, expectation then leads one to the commanded person (*niyojya*) and thereafter to the other auxiliaries of the injunction (*karaṇopakāra*).⁷³

Moreover, Śālikanātha explains⁷⁴ that expectation comes about for both cases — incomplete statements (such as *dvāram*, which is meant to denote “*dvāraṃ saṃvriyatām*” i.e. “close the door”), as well as multi-word, complete statements (such as *gām ānaya śuklām* i.e. bring the white cow). In a *saṅgrahaśloka* in the VM-I, he says:⁷⁵

In order to denote a connected meaning [of an incomplete statement, such as *dvāram*], or to bring about the [connected] meaning of [multiple words] uttered [such as *gām ānaya śuklām*],
The curiosity for correlates which comes about is known as expectation.

In the case of multi-word, complete statements (such as *gām ānaya śuklām*), he explains⁷⁶ that a sentence is not completed after the first two words *gām ānaya* only, since the third word *śuklām* has also been uttered (*uccarita*). Thus, this too comes to be proximate with the word *bring* (*ānayatisannidhāna*) and is considered as forming a unitary sentence with it (*ekavākyatvāvagama*). As a result, one understands the third word *śuklām* as denoting its own meaning as connected with the meaning ‘bring’ — and this cannot come about without expectation.

I.5.2.2 The conditions as accepted in CoD

Sucarita mentions the conditions of expectation, proximity and compatibility early in his KT while explaining the phrase from PMS 1.1.25 *arthasya tannimitatvāt*,

⁷³Freschi (2012, p. 71) explains that the auxiliary rites perform the function of assisting the main action, and are hence referred to as *upakāra*kas.

⁷⁴See IV.5.2.3.

⁷⁵*anvitasyaḥbhidhānārtham uktārthaghaṭanāya vā; pratiyogini jijñāsā yā sākāṅkṣeti gīyate* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 388).

⁷⁶*uccarite tu tasmin, tasyāpy ānayatisannidhānād ekavākyatvāvagamād ānayatanvitasvārthābhidhāyitvāt ākāṅkṣāṃ vinā ca tadasambhavāt ānayer ākāṅkṣā parikalpyate* (ibid., p. 387).

and he declares that the connection between the WMs (i.e. the SM) is comprehended on account of these three.⁷⁷

Furthermore, Sucarita explains⁷⁸ that WMs of action (*kriyā*), etc. have an innate (*svābhāvika*) relation with other compatible WMs. He explains that one experiences the relation between actions (*kriyā*) and factors of actions (*kāraṅka*) as well as the relation between qualities (*guṇa*) and substances (*guṇin*) through other means of knowledge such as perception, etc. i.e. through means of knowledge other than language. Consequently, the cognition of either one of the two in each of these two pairs is not devoid of the other, i.e. the cognition of an action/a quality is never devoid of the cognition of the factor of action/substance, and vice versa. As a result, the mutual relation between actions and factors of actions is brought about even by words in accordance with the true nature of things (*yathāvastusvabhāvam*).

Such a relation between the WMs first only surfaces (*pariplu-*) in the mind of the listener when the words are heard. The verb *pariplu-* is used by Sucarita in the specific sense of ‘coming to the surface’, and the verb itself means ‘to swim’ or ‘to float’. Thus, what the Bhāṭṭa is arguing here is that the relation between *kriyās* and *kāraṅkas* (i.e. unconnected WMs) is natural and in accordance with the true nature of things — yet only a general understanding of it first surfaces in the listener’s mind when the words are heard. It is only thereafter that the particular SM is determined on the basis of the proximity of the WMs.

Thus, Sucarita declares that once the mutual relation between the actions and factors of action as brought about by language has surfaced, the particular SM will be determined on the basis of proximity (*sannidhi*).⁷⁹

Sucarita also argues that two objects which do not have expectation for each other, although proximate, will not be connected. And thus in fact, there is no relation between words whose meanings do not have any mutual expectation

⁷⁷See V.1: *arthasya tannimittatvāt padārthānām evākāṅkṣāyogyatāsannidhibalapratilabdhetaretaravyatiṣaṅgānām vākyārthabuddhau nimittatvāt*.

⁷⁸See V.3.6: *svābhāvikī ca kriyādipadārthānām yogyapadārthāntarasamgatīḥ. pratyakṣādīnāpi hi pramāṇāntareṇa guṇaguṇinoḥ kriyākāraṅkayoś ca sambandho dṛśyate, na tv anyatarasūnyānyatarasamvid asti*. This is another instance of Sucarita’s insistence on the intrinsic nature of WMs to connect mutually (as diverging from the Bhāṭṭa claim of *lakṣaṇā*), similar to the other case as quoted in footnote 22.

⁷⁹*ataḥ śabdād api yathāvastusvabhāvam evāvasthitaḥ kriyākāraṅkayor anyatarasambandhaḥ pariplavate, tatra sannidher viśeṣo nirdhāryate*. (See V.3.6).

(*nirapekṣārtha*), as in the case of a random list of items such as cow, horse, man, elephant, etc.

According to Sucarita's account then, each word in a sentence first denotes its own meaning. Thereafter, the listener understands a general idea of their possible connection on the basis of one's worldly experience (in which qualities such as *blue* need to be connected to substances such as *cloth*, and so on). As a result, an entity (*vastu*) known from language intrinsically expects something else (*svabhāvasāpekṣa*), and hence becomes naturally connected to something expected and proximate. Thus, on the basis of proximity, one comprehends which WMs are actually available in the sentence (to fulfil the mutual expectations) and arrives at the specific SM. Finally, if the proximate elements have no mutual expectation, no SM is understood from them.

I.5.2.3 A brief comparison

Thus, for Sucarita, proximity plays a vital role — first bringing about the general idea of the possible connection between the WMs, and thereafter helping to determine which WMs are available to fulfil the mutual expectation. As explained above, this is because according to the *abhihitānvayavādin*, the connections between actions (*kriyā*) and factors of actions (*kāraka*) conveyed by words reflect the connections as are ontologically real.

In comparison, for Śālikanātha, it is expectation which plays the initializing role with proximity and compatibility playing a subordinate role. For the *anvitābhīdhānavādin*, WMs are always observed as connected in sentences — and it is perhaps thus that he insists that expectation leads to them being connected in the first place. Moreover, he states that WMs which do not have expectation for each other cannot be connected.

I.5.3 The process of language learning

Both doctrines also present their conceptions of how language is learnt (*vyutpatti*), to justify further their own descriptions of the process of SM cognition. Following are some salient points regarding this.

I.5.3.1 Language learning according to DoC

Even though DoC is based upon the argument that words in sentences denote a connected meaning, nevertheless Śālikanātha admits in the VM-I that during the time of language learning, children learn the potencies of each word (*vācakaśakti*) for their respective meanings by means of the process of co-absence and co-presence (*āvāpoddhāra*).⁸⁰ Yet, he explains that this is not contradictory to his position that the sentence denotes the connected meaning.

According to Śālikanātha,⁸¹ a child learns to speak by observing the behaviour of elders. One speaks a command (say, bring the cow) and the other performs the requisite activity upon hearing this command, whereas the child watches the verbal exchange between the two and also the latter elder's subsequent activity.

Śālikanātha explains that the child will understand that the SM cognition experienced by the *prompted* elder, upon listening to the *prompting* elder, is caused by language. This is because, firstly, the child will infer that the prompted elder has had such a cognition of the SM since he/she watches the elder's activity concerning a specific object (*viśiṣṭaceṣṭā*). Secondly, since this SM cognition arises immediately after the prompted elder has heard the words uttered by the prompting elder, the child ascertains its cause as being language.

Śālikanātha now explains⁸² that this child, having learnt the language (*vyutpanna*), may subsequently (*kadācit*) (presumably at a later age) reason that words must only denote connected meanings and *not unconnected* meanings. The process he outlines is as follows: this young adult may consider that the sentence for the prompted elder was an arrangement of words having unconnected WMs. However, he may wonder how such a sentence having unconnected WMs could

⁸⁰*yady api vṛddhavyavahārapūrvikaiva sarvā śabdavyutpattiḥ, vākyair eva ca vyavahārah tathāpi yatpadāvāpe yasyārthasyāvāpaḥ, yaduddhāre coddhārah, tasminn evārthe tasya padasya vācakaśaktir avasīyate.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 379) (See IV.3).

⁸¹*bālo hi vyutpadyamānaḥ prayojyavṛddhasya śabdaśravaṇasamanantarabhāvinīṃ viśiṣṭaceṣṭānumitām arthapratītiṃ śabdakāraṇikām avagacchati.* (ibid., p. 380).

⁸²*sa tathā vyutpannaḥ kadācit kasyacid ananvitārthapadaracanaṃ vākyaṃ upalabhate, tathopalabhamānasya caiva vimārśo jāyate — sambhāvyamānānanvitārthapadaracanaṃ idaṃ vākyaṃ katham prayojyavṛddhasya arthaniścayaṃ krtavat? vṛddhasyāpi puruṣāyatte vākye 'nanvitārthapadaracanaśaṅkā mameva sambhavaṭīti. tasyaivaṃ vicikitsodaye punar eṣa niścayo jāyate — nūnam anenāyaṃ prayoktetthamavadhārito yad anvitārthāny eva padāny ayaṃ prayuṅkteti* (ibid., p. 380) (See IV.3).

bring about the conviction about its meaning for the prompted elder — as the SM is a qualified, complex meaning whereas the individual WMs are universal and unconnected. This young adult (who seems well on his way to being a future *dārśanika!*) would thus think that even the prompted elder may have such a doubt as his, and this elder thus settles upon the prompting elder as being one who employs words whose WMs are surely connected.

Moreover, Śālikanātha accepts that, if it is admitted that the connection between the WMs exists prior to the utterance of the words, the sentence becomes a restatement (*anuvādaka*) of the SM. Being restatements, sentences are certainly expressive of SM, thus one must admit that words have the potency to denote the connected SM.

I.5.3.2 Language learning according to CoD

For the *abhihitānvayavādins* also, language learning is based upon a similar circumstance of a child observing before him one elder prompting another, and the latter undertaking the action. Sucarita explains that what the child first understands from this process is that the prompted elder comprehends a meaning enmeshed with (*saṃkīrṇa*) multiple qualities, universals, etc. from the words uttered by the prompting elder. It is thus that that the prompted elder takes action immediately subsequent to that for the sake of purposeful activity (*arthakriyā*) whose scope is a qualified object.

This leads the child to understand that the cause of his activity are the words uttered by the prompting elder. Thus, this child postulates a potency of the words to convey SM as being inherent in uttered words (*śabdasaṃavāyin*).

Sucarita argues⁸³ that what is realized by the child at this stage is an unclear (*saṃkīrṇa*) relation of conveyer and conveyed between the sentence and the SM, both of which comprise parts. This is because the child does not yet discern which part of the SM is denoted by which part of the sentence.

Consequently, by splitting the sentence through the addition and removal (*āvāpoddhārabheda*) of this or that word signifying action (*kriyāpada*) or a factor of action (*karaka*), what is discerned by the child is the following: “That WM

⁸³See V.3.3: *evaṃ ca sabhāgayor vākyavākyārthayoḥ saṃkīrṇā vācyavācakatā sidhyati, na tu vivicyate kiyatā vākyabhāgena kiyān artho 'bhidhīyata iti.*

X which is recurrently comprehended when the word X recurs in sentences and is excluded when the word X does not occur is the WM denoted by the word X". And thus, in this way, the child discerns the potency of word X to be expressive of meaning, limited to WM X alone. Consequently, Sucarita argues that the child learns words as being devoted to (*avalambin*) independent parts i.e. isolated WMs.

Sucarita further explains that the child may later reflect (*vicikitsamāna*) upon the process of SM cognition, wondering:⁸⁴ "When words are devoted to independent parts (i.e. isolated WMs) (*avalambin*), on what basis does the cognition of the singular, qualified sentential meaning arise?" The following options are thereby considered: Are words themselves expressive of the qualified sentential meaning, just as the words are expressive of the independent parts (i.e. the isolated WMs)? Or is it that the indivisible sentence is expressive of the qualified meaning? Or instead, are those very parts of meanings (i.e. the isolated WMs) the causes of the SM cognition?

Sucarita now briefly rejects the first two options and accepts the third. He argues that the indivisible sentence (second option) as the basis of the SM is impossible since this would dispel all other modes of the sentence wherein the sentence is considered divisible. The first option is also rejected since the words exhaust their function when they have expressed their WMs. Thus, Sucarita explains that upon deliberating as to the cause of SM cognition, the unconnected WMs will be settled upon as the only admissible alternative.

⁸⁴See V.3.3: *evaṃ ca bhāgāvalambīṣu padeṣu kuto viśiṣṭārthasampratyaya iti vicikitsamānasya nānāvikalpāḥ samudbhavanti.*

Chapter II

A Dialectical Investigation of *anvitābhīdhāna*: Key Objections and Refutations

II.1 Introduction

A characteristic feature of Indian philosophical works is their insistence on dialectical reasoning to establish the precedence of one doctrine over another. Authors typically elaborate in some detail upon the doctrinal positions of their opponents (*pūrvapakṣa*), and only subsequently establish their own favoured doctrine (*siddhānta*). This course of argumentation is underpinned by a two-pronged approach: firstly, the author demonstrates the logical coherence of several aspects of his own doctrine and, in doing so, refutes possible objections as may be posed by opponents, and secondly, the author sets forth several criticisms against the opposing doctrines.

In the previous chapter, the main tenets of both doctrines were set forth. In this chapter, I attempt to understand DoC (*anvitābhīdhāna*) further by considering some main objections put forth against it by the Bhāṭṭa opponents, as well as their refutation by the Prābhākara. In particular, I will present both in this chapter — the objections and refutations as outlined in the VM-I, as well as the subsequent

criticisms of these refutations as argued in the KT.¹

II.2 The problems of synonymy and syntactic split, and their resolution based on *tantra*

II.2.1 An objection and its refutation: Multiple WMs and the unitary SM

As discussed previously, according to DoC, words denote² a connected meaning — more precisely, words denote their own WM (*svārtha*) as *connected* to other WMs.³ Thus, Śālikanātha states in VM-I v.3 that the sentential meanings (SM) are the WMs themselves — such that these WMs have their mutual connection cognized in the form of a relation between a primary element and other secondary ones (*pradhānaguṇabhāva*).⁴

However, an objection is set forth against this claim by the Bhāṭṭa opponent.⁵ The opponent argues that if the Prābhākara maintains that the SMs are the WMs only, then since there are *numerous* WMs in a sentence, the Prābhākara must also admit that there will arise *numerous* SMs from a *unitary* sentence. Such numerous SMs will, in turn, lead one to postulate a *plurality* of sentences as well — and such a conclusion is quite absurd.

Such a deficiency in the theory is however denied by the Prābhākara. Early in the VM-I, this objection is presented and refuted:⁶

Even though words have numerous meanings when considered indi-

¹For each argument presented here, I also mention the corresponding section in Chapters IV-VI where the underlying Sanskrit text is closely discussed.

²As previously discussed, I translate the verbal base *abhidhā-* as ‘to denote’.

³See I.3.

⁴VM-I v.3: *pradhānaguṇabhāvena labdhānyonyasamanvayān; padārthān eva vākyārthān saṅgirante vipāścitaḥ* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 377).

⁵See IV.2.

⁶VM-I vv.4-5: *bhūyāṃso yady api svārthāḥ padānāṃ te pṛthak pṛthak; prayojanatayā tv ekavākyārthaṃ sampracakṣate; tatpratītyekakāryatvād vākyam apy ekam ucyate; pratipattir guṇānāṃ hi pradhānaikaprayojanā* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 378) (The point about the unitary *kārya* is the topic of discussion in the Second Chapter (*pariccheda*) of Śālikanāthamiśra’s *Vākyārthamātrkā* (VM-II). See Kataoka (Forthcoming, 2019) for a summary of the argument of the VM-II).

vidually,

They still express together (*sampracakṣ-*) a unitary SM due to their [unitary] purpose (*prayojana*). (v.4)

And since that [SM] cognition is a unitary command (*kārya*), the sentence is also declared to be unitary.

The reason [for the words having a unitary purpose (*ekaprayojanatva*)] is that the cognition of secondary entities has the primary element as its single purpose.

Moreover, the commentary argues that a primary element (in this case, the unitary *kārya*) is always admitted as being qualified by secondary entities — and this is the reason for the secondary elements (in this case, the words having numerous word-meanings⁷) being conveyed. These secondary entities are directed towards (*tātparya*) the primary element as it is the latter alone which is to be known (*prameya*). Moreover, language is admitted as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) only with regard to what it is directed towards. Consequently, the cognition of that primary element is not dependent upon one word but instead, the entire sentence becomes its means of knowledge.

II.2.2 The problem of synonymy and its subsequent refutation

However, this explanation by the Prābhākara opens itself to another charge: the problem of synonymy (*paryāyatā*).⁸ The Bhāṭṭa opponent in the VM-I claims that in the Prābhākara doctrine, all words will become synonyms in sentences such as *gām ānaya* (bring the cow). In this sentence, just as the word *cow* denotes its own WM as connected with ‘the action of bringing’, in the same manner the word *bring* also denotes its own WM as connected with the meaning ‘cow’.⁹ Thus, as Sucarita

⁷I prefer to use the terms ‘words’ and ‘word-meanings’ in this thesis, see Chapter I footnote 2 for an explanation.

⁸See VM-I (IV.8.6), and also Kṛ (V.3.9.3).

⁹In his Kṛ (V.3.9.3), Sucarita presents this objection with the example of *odanaṃ pacati* (i.e. [he/she] cooks rice). He argues that by means of the word *pacati*, ‘the action of cooking’ (*‘pāka’*) is denoted as connected to the WM ‘rice’ (*‘odana’*), this latter being remembered as being in association with the WM ‘*pāka*’. As a result, the word *rice* should not be uttered — since its meaning is already understood. And both words *odana* and *pacati* denote the relation between ‘the action of cooking’ and ‘rice’ (*odanapākasambandha*), thus there comes about the fault of synonymy.

points out in the KṬ (see footnote 9), both words denote the relation between the two WMs resulting in them becoming synonyms (*paryāyatā*).

Nevertheless, the Prābhākara in the VM-I responds by arguing instead that these are two distinct meanings — the meaning ‘cow’ as connected to ‘the action of bringing’, and ‘the action of bringing’ as connected to the meaning ‘cow’ respectively. Thus, he argues that such distinct denotation by each word inhibits the fault of synonymy.¹⁰

II.2.3 The problem of syntactic split, and a possible refutation

The VM-I ends the discussion at this stage, but the Bhāṭṭa in the KṬ continues this argumentation a step further. He refutes this above solution of considering the denotation of each word as a distinct meaning, since he argues that this will lead to the problem of syntactic split (*vākyabheda*). He states:¹¹

[In the example of *odanaṃ pacati*, the fault of syntactic split arises] because ‘rice as qualified by the action of cooking’ is distinct from ‘the action of cooking as qualified by rice’ — and [Jaimini] will explain the unity of the sentence as being due to the unity of meaning/purpose (*arthaikatva*), as in “[A group of words] serving a single meaning/purpose forms a sentence . . .”.¹² Consequently, the fault of the syntactic split comes about in all cases of difference of meaning (*artha*).

Thus, Sucarita claims that the Prābhākara opponent cannot have it both ways — either the meanings denoted by all words in a sentence are the same, thus forcing

¹⁰A similar argument is presented by the Prābhākara *pūrvapakṣin* in the KṬ V.3.9.3. He argues that synonymy can be avoided on the basis of the difference in the two words *odana* and *pacati* as qualifier and qualified (*viśeṣanaviśeṣyabheda*). He explains that for the word *odana*, its meaning (*artha*) is ‘rice as qualified by the action of cooking’. In this case, ‘the action of cooking’ is the qualifier, whereas ‘rice’ is that which is qualified. Vice versa is the case for the word *pacati*.

¹¹*anyo hy odanaviśiṣṭāt pākāt pākaviśiṣṭa odanaḥ, arthaikatvāc caikavākyatām vakṣyati — arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyam iti . ataḥ sarvatraivārthabhedād vākyabhedaḥ.* (See V.3.9.3.)

¹²PMS 2.1.46: *arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyam sākāṅkṣaṃ ced vibhāge syāt* (A group of words serving a single purpose (*arthaikatva*) forms a sentence, if on analysis the separate words are found to have mutual expectancy.) See Devasthali (1959, pp. 186-188) for an explanation of this *sūtra*.

one to admit the problem of synonymy, or the meanings denoted are distinct, leading one to the problem of syntactic split in accordance with PMS 2.1.46.

Even though there is no direct refutation to this point in the VM-I (due to its chronological priority), one may still imagine a possible argument on behalf of the Prābhākara in accordance with the doctrine presented thus far. I expect that the Prābhākara would continue to insist that the meanings denoted by the words are in fact *distinct*, and instead attempt to deny the putative resulting syntactic split. For instance, one may notice that the Bhāṭṭa's argument about syntactic split above rests on understanding the term *artha* in PMS 2.1.46 as meaning. However, Śabara himself glosses this term as *prayojana*, or purpose.¹³ And as discussed previously, this is exactly the term used by Śālikanātha in VM-I vv.4-5, when he explains that despite their own numerous WMs, words express a unitary SM due to their unitary purpose (*prayojana*).

II.2.4 Two further Bhāṭṭa objections: Taking issue with the primacy of *kārya* and the nature of expectation

As seen earlier (II.2.1), Śālikanātha maintains that words express a unitary SM due to their unitary purpose (*prayojana*). Moreover, he had explained that since this SM is a unitary command (*kārya*), the sentence is also declared to be unitary. Finally, he had asserted that the reason for words to have a unitary purpose (*ekaprayojanatva*) was that the cognition of secondary entities has the primary element as its single purpose (*pradhānaikaprayojana*).

It is perhaps in response to such a possible refutation that Sucarita presents his next two arguments — opposing this consideration of the command as primary (*pradhāna*),¹⁴ and questioning also the role of expectation in injunctive sentences according to the Prābhākara doctrine.

Firstly, he explains¹⁵ that the primacy of the command in the sentence cannot

¹³ŚBh on PMS 2.1.46: *ekaprayojanatvād upapannam . . .*

¹⁴See KṚ V.3.9.4. The argument in the KṚ begins with the Prābhākara opponent attempting to refute the necessary syntactic split alleged by the Bhāṭṭa (as demonstrated above in II.2.3) by presenting his theory of the singularity of the sentence resulting from the singularity of the command, which is the primary element in the sentence. This thus further substantiates the expected Prābhākara response postulated in II.2.3.

¹⁵KṚ, V.3.9.4: *pradhānakāryaikatvād ekavākyateti cet, tan na loke tadabhāvābhyupagamāt.*

be accepted, since one must admit to the absence of such command in ordinary, communicative sentences. In other words, one must assent to the fact of there being worldly sentences without the injunctive element, such as *odanaṃ pacati* ([he/she/it] cooks rice).

Secondly, he argues that even in injunctive sentences, the sequential arising of expectation (as has been explained by the Prābhākara)¹⁶ is also unable to invalidate the resulting syntactic split. Following is his argument:¹⁷ even in Vedic sentences, if there does come about DoC of two elements at a time, sequentially beginning with the command and the object (*viśaya*) of the command, and continuing thereafter — nevertheless, syntactic split will most definitely result. The reason for this is that a sentence would be entirely completed at each step. Thus, even for a single verbal suffix (*ākhyāta*), one will be forced to admit multiple denotations and consequent multiple potencies to do so — since the verbal suffix will denote first *yajeta*, then *yajeta svargakāmaḥ*, thereafter *yajeta svargakāmaḥ jyotiṣṭomena*, and so on, and each of these can be considered a distinct sentence.¹⁸ This, therefore, undermines the understanding of the sentence as a unitary complex with a connected SM.

II.2.5 The possible Prābhākara response: The revised definition of expectation

Once again, there is no direct refutation available of these two arguments presented above in the Kṛ, due (of course!) to the VM-I's chronological priority. Nevertheless, one may postulate a possible Prābhākara response given the presentation of their theory thus far.

With regard to the first objection, it must be admitted that the VM-I has as its scope injunctive sentences only, particularly those of the Vedas. As a result,

¹⁶The discussion about the sequential nature of expectation was presented earlier in I.5.2.1. See also IV.5.2.2, IV.5.2.3 and IV.5.2.5. A similar Prābhākara presentation of the sequential nature of expectation is also found in the Kṛ V.2.11.

¹⁷See Kṛ V.3.9.4: *vede 'pi ca viśayādikrameṇa dvayor dvayor anvitābhidhāne pratyekaṃ vākyaparisamāpter vākyabheda eva. ekasyaiva cākhyātasyanekābhidhānāsaktikalpanāprasaṅgaḥ sarvānvitapratīteś caivam anibandhanatvaṃ.*

¹⁸As mentioned in footnote 16, the Prābhākara had argued that expectation comes about only sequentially and there are different stages of connection with the verbal suffix. These are being explicitly depicted here by the Bhāṭṭa.

the VM-I does not discuss any non-injunctive sentences, and the VM-II is in fact devoted to demonstrating that the SM is the unitary command. In this respect then, one will have to admit of Sucarita's objection about non-injunctive sentences being ubiquitous in common communication and thereby admit a limitation in the Prābhākara discussion thus far. Yet, one should bear in mind that this objection demonstrates only the *limited scope* of the VM-I explanations, which focus on injunctive sentences alone. This objection does not however render the Prābhākara theory as intrinsically inadequate, and it may very well be possible to expand the scope of this theory while preserving and further strengthening its central tenets.¹⁹

With regard to the second objection, i.e. the sequential arising of expectation leads to a syntactic split — this is an objection considered in the VM-I, although not with regard to the particular example of the verbal suffix as presented in Sucarita's objection. Śālikanātha, while discussing the nature of expectation,²⁰ had considered a similar objection in the case of a sentence such as *gām ānaya śuklām* (bring the white cow). Here, the opponent had claimed that the sentence should be complete upon the utterance of the first two words *gām ānaya* (bring the cow), and there will be no further expectation of the third WM 'white'. As a result, there will not come about the denotation of a meaning connected to all three WMs.

Nevertheless, Śālikanātha had explained that a sentence is not completed after the first two words *gām ānaya* only, since the third word *śuklām* has also been uttered. Thus, this too becomes proximate with the verb *ānayati* (*ānayatisannidhāna*) and is understood to form a unitary sentence with it (*ekavākyatvāvagama*). Consequently, one understands that the third word *śuklām* denotes its own meaning as connected with the meaning 'bring' — and hence, it is postulated that the third WM 'white' has an expectation for the WM 'bring'.

This argument may also be coupled with Śālikanātha's explanation of how expectation (specifically in case of a verbal suffix) comes about with the gradual appearance of its causes²¹ — for instance, the command cannot be apprehended

¹⁹Perhaps further study of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā discussions may help to understand whether subsequent philosophers did attempt to expand the scope of this theory, and the possible paths they may have taken in doing so. See Freschi (Forthcoming, 2019) for a discussion.

²⁰This argument was discussed previously in I.5.2.1. See also IV.5.2.3.

²¹See footnote 16.

without the content of the command (*viṣaya*) as it has an expectation for its content, since the content is the adjunct of the command's cognition (*pratipattyanubandha*). Moreover, as had been seen earlier, Śālikanātha admits that expectation comes about for both cases — incomplete statements (such as *dvāram*), as well as multi-word, complete statements (such as *gām ānaya śuklām* i.e. bring the white cow).

Perhaps these arguments by Śālikanātha may comprise a suitable response to the second objection highlighted above by Sucarita of sequential expectation necessarily leading to a syntactic split.

II.2.6 A final Prābhākara refutation: The principle of *tantra*

In the KṚ, the Prābhākara opponent offers a final possible refutation to the above mentioned two objections of the Bhāṭṭa (II.2.4). He argues that a possible refutation of the second objection could be that the verbal suffix denotes its own meaning as connected to all other meaning-elements. He says:²²

The verbal suffix (*ākhyāta*) denotes its own meaning as even connected to all [other meaning-elements] — what if this is claimed?

This argument of the Prābhākara seems reminiscent of an argument from the VM-I (See IV.8.7). The discussion in the VM-I follows the Prābhākara refutation of the problem of synonymy (IV.8.6), and puts forward the possibility of syntactic splits in sentences, such as the customary Mīmāṃsā example of *aruṇayā piṅgākṣayaikahāyanyā somaṃ krīṇāti* (one purchases *soma* by means of a one-year old, tawny-eyed, red [calf]).²³ The Bhāṭṭa opponent in the VM-I argues here that syntactic split consists in repetition (*āvṛtti*) — and since, according to the Prābhākara, the verb in this example *krīṇāti* denotes its own meaning (the action of buying) as connected to multiple meanings 'red', etc., a syntactic split of this sentence will come about. This seems to be the Bhāṭṭa response against the Prābhākara's previous explanation of the gradual appearance of expectation, and the sequential DoC of the verbal suffix.

²²See KṚ V.3.9.4: *sarvānvito 'py ākhyātenaiva svārtho 'bhidhīyata iti cet.*

²³This example is found in the ŚBh on PMS 3.1.12.

However, the Prābhākara refutes this with the following brief response:²⁴

No, due to the utterance [of the verb] in accordance with the principle of *tantra* (i.e. since the utterance of the verb is centralized and applies to all others equally).²⁵ And if there is [truly] a difference [between two speech-units] (*vairūpya*), then since [the application of] the principle of *tantra* would not be justified, a syntactic split [between the two speech-units] would [correctly] come about.

The Prābhākara here in the VM-I does not elaborate upon this sudden introduction of the concept of *tantra* into this discussion, and immediately moves on to another topic thereafter. Nevertheless, this argument here of the verb as centralized and applying to all WMs equally (*tantra*) is exactly that which seems to have been depicted in the KṬ as well, and described in the form of the Prābhākara opponent's refutation as quoted above.²⁶

II.2.7 The final Bhāṭṭa response: Logical incongruence resulting from accepting this principle

Now, against the Prābhākara's argument that the verbal suffix is central to the utterance and is connected to the meanings of all other speech-units in the sentence, the Bhāṭṭa *siddhāntin* in the KṬ presents two arguments.

Firstly, he argues²⁷ that this would violate the Prābhākara's own explanation thus far. The admission of the sequential DoC with two elements at a time (due to

²⁴VM-I, commentary on v.12: *na, tanthroccāraṇāt. vairūpye ca tantratānupapatter vākyabhedaḥ syāt* (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 403-404).

²⁵See Freschi and Pontillo 2013, on the concept of *tantra* in Mīmāṃsā.

²⁶A point to note here is that even though Sucarita puts forth the same argument as Śālikanātha, he does so without explicitly mentioning the principle of *tantra*. Further studies of subsequent Mīmāṃsā discussions may help one understand this better, but one may speculate here as to a possible reason for this — perhaps the principle of *tantra* was too widely accepted within Mīmāṃsā circles, and Sucarita may have wanted to oppose Śālikanātha's argument without seeming too brusque. A reason for thinking thus is that, as I will demonstrate in the following section, Sucarita does oppose such an understanding of *tantra* in the process of verbal cognition and presents arguments against this. Perhaps he wanted to pose these arguments to the doctrine of the acceptance of *tantra* in verbal cognition, without opposing the principle of *tantra* in general.

²⁷V.3.9.4: *anarthakaṃ tarhi dvayor dvayor anvitābhidhānāśrayaṇam astu prathamam eva sarvānvitakāryābhidhānam.*

the sequential arising of expectation) will become purposeless (*anarthaka*) and the command will be denoted at the very beginning of the process as connected to all meaning-elements in the sentence. Thus, according to the Bhāṭṭa, a contradiction arises if the Prābhākara claims that the command connects sequentially to all other WMs in the sentence, and claims yet again that the command is central and applies equally to all WMs.

Secondly, the Bhāṭṭa argues that even if one were to accept that the command is connected to all other meaning-elements, one would be at a loss to explain how there would come about the relation between the WMs in the sentence independently of the verb – say, a substance and its quality. Here, Sucarita brings back the Mīmāṃsā example referred to also in the VM-I — One purchases *soma* by means of a one-year old, tawny-eyed, red [calf].²⁸ He thus poses the following question to his hypothetical Prābhākara opponent:²⁹

In the sentence about the purchase [of *soma*], how would there be the mutual relation between the [WM] substance (i.e. the tawny-eyed cow and the one-year old cow) and the [WM] quality (i.e. red)?

As mentioned previously, this refers to the example *aruṇayā piṅgākṣyaikahāyanyā somaṃ krīṇāti*, discussed in the ŚBh on PMS 3.1.12. The example and consequent discussion in the ŚBh concludes that the relation between the substance and quality comes about because of the verb – the verb (purchasing) is primary (*pradhāna*) and the two factors (substance and quality) are the accessories (*guṇa*). Moreover, the two factors (substance and quality) are enjoined (*upadiś-*) in reference to the primary element (i.e. the action of purchasing), and not vice versa.³⁰ Thus, by quoting this example, the Bhāṭṭa is pointing out that for the Prābhākara, the *kārya* is already connected to all meaning-elements and as a result, there can be no possibility of any further connection between the meaning-elements themselves.

²⁸The mention of this same example here once again reinforces the belief that the Prābhākara objection in the Kṛ is in fact a reference to Śālikanātha's discussion of *tantra* in IV.8.7, without Sucarita explicitly referring to *tantra*.

²⁹V.3.9.4: *api ca krayavākye kathaṃ dravyaguṇayoḥ parasparasambandhaḥ.*

³⁰ŚBh on on PMS 3.1.12: *krayasya hi dravyāruṇīmānāv upadiśyete, na krayas tayoh. na ca pradhānaṃ pratiguṇaṃ bhidyate, pratipradhānaṃ hi guṇo bhidyata iti* (Āpaṭe 1930, p. 397).

Nevertheless, the KṬ's hypothetical Prābhākara opponent presents two possible alternatives — which are subsequently rejected by the Bhāṭṭa. The first possibility³¹ is that the mutual relation between the other WMs (say, a substance and a quality) be **denoted** (*abhidhā-*) by both the words (i.e. say, one-year old [cow] and red). This is denied by the Bhāṭṭa on the grounds that there will then be multiple denotations — one of the verb as connected to all other meaning-elements, and another of the relation between the other WMs (say, substance and quality). Such multiple denotations will force one to admit that syntactic split will result.

The second possibility³² is that the mutual relation is **based on reality** (*ārtha*) since both (i.e. the substance and the quality) are appropriated into the single command, and it is not that their mutual relation only exists at the linguistic level (*ābhidhānika*). However, the Bhāṭṭa denies this as well, stating that this alternative in fact reinforces his own theory further. The reason for this is the following: If the second alternative is accepted, then one will be admitting that the mutual relation between the substances and qualities (as signified by language) is caused by the power of the meaning³³ of their words themselves (*arthasāmarthyakārīta*). This is exactly what the Bhāṭṭas want to demonstrate in their doctrine of CoD, and it thus leads to the rejection of DoC.³⁴

³¹V.3.9.4: *so 'pi tacchabdābhyām abhidhīyata iti cet, evam apy ākhyātena sarvakārakānvitābhidhānād aruṇādikārakapadais ca punaḥ parasparānvitābhidhānāt vākyabheda evārthabhedāt.*

³²V.3.9.4: *athaikakāryaparigṛhītayor ārthaḥ parasparasambandho nābhidhānika ity ucyate. yady evaṃ asti tarhy arthasāmarthyakārīto 'pi sambandha iti.*

³³This is another instance of the dual senses of the term *ārtha* – as meaning *and* object.

³⁴This is the end of this particular discussion as I see it in the VM-I and KṬ. However, this by no means implies that this argument has been settled in favour of one over the other. This final argument by the Bhāṭṭa in the KṬ, despite its ingenuity and cogency, may perhaps have been refuted in subsequent Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā discussions – only to be overturned by somebody else thereafter!

II.3 The problem of endless correlates, and the impact on *sambandha* as well as the potencies of words

Another objection raised against DoC is with regard to the possibility of having endless correlates (*pratiyogin*) for each word. The term *pratiyogin*, translated as correlate or counterpart, is repeatedly employed in discussions of DoC. As has been discussed previously, in this doctrine, a word denotes its own WM as connected to other WMs. These other WMs are referred to as *pratiyogins*.

II.3.1 Objection: Endless correlates lead to the *sambandha* not being comprehended

This is the first form of this objection and is set forth in both texts, VM-I³⁵ as well as the KT.³⁶

Following is the objection raised by the Bhāṭṭa opponent:³⁷ according to DoC, a word denotes its own WM as connected (*anvita*) to other WMs. However, one must admit that there are infinite possible correlates (*pratiyogin*) for any given WM. Due to this, there would be endless possible *connections* (*anvaya*) that a WM could have, and consequently, there would be infinite possible *connected* meanings (*anvita*) that a single word could denote. As a result, argues the Bhāṭṭa, grasping the relation³⁸ of a word and its meaning (i.e. the meaning it *denotes*) would be rendered impossible.

Moreover, if such a word – whose relation with its own meaning has not been grasped – is considered expressive of meaning by the *anvitābhidhānavādins*, then they will have to admit the absurd consequence of the cognition of all meanings resulting from a single word. Hence, the Bhāṭṭa concludes that one should admit

³⁵See IV.4.1.

³⁶See V.2.9.

³⁷VM-I, commentary to v.6: *pratiyoginām anantatayā anvayānām ānantyāt, tadānantye cānvitānām apy ānantyāt sambandhagrahaṇam duṣkaram. aḡḡhītasambandhasya ca vācakatve ekasmāc chabdāt sarvārthapratītiprasaṅgaḥ* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 381).

³⁸See Chapter I footnote 69 for an explanation of the distinction between *anvaya* and *sambandha*.

the relation between word and meaning in accordance with CoD, where each word denotes only its own, unconnected WM and not the connected SM.

A point to note here is that the underlying principle for this Bhāṭṭa argument is that one is able to learn the relation of a word to its own WM *because* this WM is exactly what the word denotes. In arguing thus, the Bhāṭṭa equates the two — a word’s own meaning (related to the word by means of the *sambandha*), and the meaning that the word denotes (related to the word by means of the process of denotation). It is this very equivalence that the Prābhākara does not admit, and he presents his refutation accordingly.

II.3.2 Refutation: The three conditions restricting correlates, and the ease of *sambandhabodha*

The Prābhākara refutes this allegation of the Bhāṭṭa by presenting the restriction laid down by the three conditions (*upalakṣaṇa*) of expectation, proximity and compatibility. The same refutation is presented in both texts, the VM-I and the KṬ.³⁹

Following is the reasoning of the Prābhākara: It is first claimed that WMs are always added into or removed from sentences while possessing a connection with other WMs, and it is hence that the capability of words to *denote* connected meanings is comprehended. Moreover, he argues that a word expresses its own WM as connected only to expected, proximate and compatible meanings — as a result of which a word cannot possibly denote endless connected meanings. In other words, the correlates of a word are always marked by specific conditions (*asādhāraṇopalakṣaṇa*) and one never experiences a word being used to denote its isolated WM.

Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter,⁴⁰ Śālikanātha admits that at the time of language learning (*vyutpatti*), children learn the relation of each word to its WM by co-absence and co-presence. This, he argues, is not contradictory to DoC, and it is this explanation that he recalls to respond to the Bhāṭṭa argument above. He

³⁹VM-I: See IV.5.1; KṬ: See V.2.9.

⁴⁰See I.5.3.1.

argues⁴¹ that the argument of the Bhāṭṭa opponent is logically incongruous since one can ascertain a word's relation to its own WM quite easily (*sambandhabodhasaukarya*) even by admitting the three conditions (*upalakṣaṇa*) of expectation, proximity and compatibility. And one thus admits a process of language learning wherein it is understood that a word expresses that same WM as connected to expected, proximate and compatible correlates. Thus, for Śālikanātha, language learning is not just the process of learning a specific WM for each word — rather, it is also a process of learning the manner in which words are employed i.e. that words are always used in sentences to denote connected meanings.⁴²

II.3.3 Objection: Endless correlates lead to endless potencies for a word

The Bhāṭṭa opponent now presents another argument with regard to the possibility of endless correlates. This argument of the Bhāṭṭa opponent is clearly presented in the VM-I, whereas the KT mentions it only in passing while briefly outlining the Prābhākara refutation to it.⁴³

The previous objection was that the endless correlates would lead to an impossibility of the grasping of the *sambandha* — now the Bhāṭṭa argues that even if the above refutation be admitted, the Prābhākara will nevertheless encounter a difficulty in his reasoning. The reason for this is as follows:⁴⁴ The Prābhākara must postulate a plurality of potencies (*śakti*) for every word (say, cow), with each potency being responsible for bringing about the cognition of the word's own meaning (say, WM 'cow') as connected to one possible correlate (say, the WM 'bring'). However, since there are endless possible correlates for each word, one will be forced to admit that each word is attributed with endless potencies. On the

⁴¹VM-I, commentary on vv.8-9ab: *tad anupapannam. upalakṣaṇāśrayaṇenāpi sambandhabodhasaukāryād ākāṅkṣitena yogyena sannihitena cānvitaṃ svārthaṃ padaṃ vaktūti vyutpattir āśrīyate.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 384) This is discussed in IV.5.1.

⁴²This definition of *vyutpatti* is captured in VM-I v.8ab-c: *ākāṅkṣāsannidhiprāptayogyārthāntarasāṅgatān; svārthān ahuḥ padānūti vyutpattis saṃśritā* (ibid., p. 384).

⁴³VM-I: See IV.6.3; KT: V.2.9.

⁴⁴*nanv anantapratīyogyānvitasvārthabodhanaviṣayā anantā eva śabdasya śaktayaḥ kalpayitavyāḥ syuḥ. abhihitānvayavāde tv ekasminn arthe ekasya śabdasyaikaiva śaktir iti* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 394).

contrary, the Bhāṭṭa opponent asserts that this is not the case in CoD, where each word has a *single* potency for denoting a *single* meaning.

II.3.4 Refutation: Only a single potency needed for words

The Prābhākara responds by stating that even in their doctrine, one need admit only a *singular* potency for the denotation of the word's own meaning (*svārtha*) as connected to expected, proximate and compatible counterparts. This will be adequate to justify the distinction in the effects produced by a word (namely, the cognitions of distinct connected meanings denoted by the same word) (*kāryabhedopapatti*) due to the distinction in correlates. Moreover, in the VM-I, Śālikanātha states that this is similar to the case of the sense of sight (*caḥṣus*). He says:⁴⁵

Just as sight brings about distinct cognitions due to the distinction in its accompanying correlates of pot, etc. on the basis of a single potency for vision — in the same way then must it be admitted that even language (i.e. a word) (*śabda*) [brings about distinct cognitions] due to the distinction in its correlates.

Thus, Śālikanātha is arguing here that words function in a way that is analogous to sight. In the case of sight, one has distinct cognitions due to its distinct correlates (pot, cloth, table, etc.) and the cause of all such different cognitions is the *singular* potency of vision. In the same way, words lead to distinct cognitions due to their distinct correlates (i.e. when a word's own meaning (say, 'cow') is connected to other, distinct meanings, such as 'bring', 'fetch', etc.), with all this resulting from the *single* potency of words to denote their own meanings as connected to expected, proximate and compatible correlates.

As a result, Śālikanātha agrees with his Bhāṭṭa opponent that words have a *single* potency — but for him, every word has the *same potency* which leads to a word conveying *distinct meanings* in distinct sentences. For the Bhāṭṭa opponent however, each word has a *distinct potency*, which leads to a word conveying the *same meaning* in every sentence.

⁴⁵*caḥṣur yathaivaikayā darśanaśaktyā ghaṭādipratiyogisahāyabhedāj jñānāni bhinnāni janayati, tathā śabdo 'pi pratiyogibhedād iti mantavyam* (ibid., p. 394).

The KṬ provides the example of pronouns to explain this same Prābhākara argument.⁴⁶

. . . This is because one postulates a single potency alone [for the word] to denote [its own WM] as connected [to another WM] which has met the three conditions (*upādhi*) [of expectation, compatibility and proximity], just as in the case of pronouns (*sarvanāmaśabda*). In fact, even though these [pronouns] denote endless entities (*bhāva*) by means of the single condition of proximity, they do not lead one to postulate endless potencies [for each distinct entity].

Pronouns such as I, you, etc. are employed regularly in ordinary communication, and one may argue that they have the *same potency* in each occurrence while yet leading to *distinct meanings* in distinct sentences. Similar then is the case for language in general (i.e. all words), and as the Prābhākaras claim, this substantiates the argument that words have a single potency, with every word having the *same potency* (i.e. to convey its own WM as connected to its correlates) leading to it conveying *distinct meanings* in distinct sentences.

II.4 The fault of mutual dependence, and its resolution by the integral role of memory

II.4.1 The fault of mutual dependence due to denotation

In the VM-I,⁴⁷ the Bhāṭṭa opponent argues that in order to accept a word as *denoting* a connected meaning (i.e. its own WM as connected to other WMs) in a sentence (say, bring the white cow), the Prābhākara must explain whether the word's own meaning (say, WM 'cow') is connected to other WMs (say, WM 'white' and WM 'bring') which are *also denoted or not*. In either case, a fault arises.

⁴⁶. . . *upādhitrāyopetānvitābhidhanaśakter ekasyāḥ kṛtatvāt sarvanāmaśabdānām iva. te hi sannidhānenaikenopādhinānanteṣv api bhāveṣu vartamānā nānantaśaktikalpanādoṣam āpādayanti* (see V.2.9 for details).

⁴⁷See IV.4.2.

If the Prābhākara were to consider the other WMs as *not being denoted*, then the use of the other words (in this case, word white and word bring) in the sentence would become futile since one word (here, word cow) would be rendered capable of conveying all connections between WMs. On the other hand, if other WMs are considered as *being denoted* – then since a word denotes a connected meaning, it would depend upon the other WMs *denoted* by the other words for its own *denotation*. Consequently, the fault of mutual dependence (*itaretarāśraya*) will result.

II.4.2 The refutation on the basis of memory

The commentary in VM-I, when introducing v.12 which presents the three steps of DoC,⁴⁸ states that the explanation of how words directly lead to the SM cognition according to DoC also constitutes a refutation of the objection of mutual dependence. Thereafter, vv.13-14 of the VM-I further develop the argument that words cause only the *memories* of their unconnected WMs and do not instead *denote* these.⁴⁹

Finally, in v.15, the VM-I explicitly refutes the fault of mutual dependence by arguing thus:⁵⁰

In this manner, each word expresses its own [unconnected] WM as connected to other meanings that are proximate through memory, therefore there is no [fault of] mutual dependence.

The Prābhākara insists that even a WM made proximate to another WM by means of memory will be considered correctly as being proximate. This thus leads to a rejection of the fault of *itaretarāśraya* which had been postulated by the opponent, since a word does not depend upon the denotation of other WMs for its own denotation, but rather needs the isolated WMs *reminded* by the other words.

This is a fundamental tenet for the Prābhākara, and there is much discussion in the VM-I in defending the role assigned to memory in the process of SM denotation.

⁴⁸See I.4.1.

⁴⁹This is discussed in I.4.6.

⁵⁰VM-I v.15: *smṛtisannihitair evam arthair anvitam ātmanaḥ; artham āha padaṃ sarvam iti nānyonyasaṃśrayaḥ* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 406).

The Bhāṭṭa process of denotation is quite specific, linking as it does each word to its respective WM. However, memory can be quite subjective, varying drastically across circumstances and individuals, and may thus be unable to account for the fixed framework of language which forms the basis of all linguistic communication. The Bhāṭṭa attacks this very subjective bias of memory whereas the Prābhākara develops his theory in order to pre-empt all such criticisms. The objections and refutations as present in the VM-I as well as the Kṛ are discussed in the following sections.

II.5 Memory as unreliable for conveying WM: Multiple objections and their refutations

There are many layers of argumentation with regard to the role allocated to memory in the process of DoC. These are presented sequentially in the various subsections that follow.

II.5.1 Memory as unreliable: Which WM is remembered from a word?

II.5.1.1 Objection: Inability to grasp a specific (*viśeṣa*) WM from a word leads to infinite connections

The Bhāṭṭa opponent argues firstly that memory will lead one to cognize various WMs from a single word, and one will hence be unable to grasp a specific WM from a word resulting in endless DoC.⁵¹

His argument is as follows:⁵² If it is admitted that words bring about the process of DoC by resorting to meanings which are proximate due to their memory, then a logical incongruence will come about. Memory is based on the mental contiguity

⁵¹VM-I: IV.11.2, Kṛ: V.3.9.1.

⁵²yadi smṛtisannihitam āśrityānvitābhidhānaṃ padaiḥ kriyate, tadā smaraṇasya pratyāsattinibandhanatvāt, anekeṣāñ cārthānāṃ pratyāsattisambhavāt, teṣu smṛtisannihiteṣv agṛhyamāṇaviśeṣatvāt, ukhāyāṃ pacatīti nokhā pacatyarthānvitaiva kevalābhidhīyeta. sā hi kulālāḍyanvitāpi pratipannaiveti, smaraṇāt tadanvitāpy ukhābhidhīyeta (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 406-407).

(*pratyāsatti*)⁵³ of one entity with another, and since the mental contiguity of several meanings comes about with any one meaning, a hearer will be unable to grasp a specific WM (*viśeṣa*)⁵⁴ from among these various recollected meanings.

For instance, a word (say, *ukhā*) may initially lead to the memory of its own WM ('*ukhā*' or 'pan'), but this WM will thereafter bring about memories of several other WMs due to their mental contiguity with it (say, '*kulāla*' or 'potter', etc.). Consequently, one would be unable to distinguish between these various WMs ('*ukhā*', '*kulāla*', etc.), all of which are recollected from a single uttered word (*ukhā*), and a specific WM will not be comprehended by the hearer.

Furthermore, the Bhāṭṭa argues that the following will result when a specific WM is not grasped: in a sentence such as *ukhāyāṃ pacati* ([he/she] cooks in a pan), the word *ukhā* will not *denote* the meaning '*ukhā*' as connected *only* to the meaning '*pacati*' (which has been uttered alongside it in the sentence). This is because that meaning '*ukhā*' has in fact been ascertained previously also as connected to other meanings such as '*kulāla*', etc. — thus, on the basis of memory, the word *ukhā* will denote the meaning '*ukhā*' as connected *also* to those other recollected meanings '*kulāla*', etc.

Thus, the Bhāṭṭa opponent argues that contrary to the Prābhākara claim, one cannot rely on *memory* to grasp WM from a word which may thereafter aid in the *denotation* by the word — since a word will also give rise to all those WMs which may be mentally contiguous with its own WM for any possible reason. Thus, similar to the case of the WM '*ukhā*' in the above example, even the WM '*pacati*' will have mental contiguity with its means, such as '*piṣṭaka*' (flour), etc. Thus, on the basis of such memory, the word *pacati* will not only denote its meaning '*pacati*' as connected to the meaning '*ukhā*' (which was uttered together with the word *pacati* in the sentence), but will instead denote its meaning '*pacati*' as connected *also* to the meanings '*piṣṭaka*', etc. (which will be recollected from the word *pacati* itself).

⁵³See Chapter I footnote 60 for an explanation of the term *pratyāsatti*.

⁵⁴The term *viśeṣa* here can be understood and translated in two ways: one, as the *difference* among the various WMs present in memory, and two, as a *specific WM* from among the various WMs present in memory. In the case of the Sanskrit sentence paraphrased here, both translations can be justified. However, I contend that it is the latter (specific WM) which is intended, since as will be seen subsequently in II.5.3.2 (see especially footnote 74), the term *viśeṣa* is used in the VM-I in a manner that renders unambiguous its sense as the latter.

On the contrary, the Bhāṭṭa opponent claims that such a situation is entirely avoided in CoD, since for the Bhāṭṭas, every single WM constituting the SM is denoted (*abhidheya*) by its respective word and not remembered.

II.5.1.2 Refutation: The same holds true even for the Bhāṭṭa theory

The Prābhākara in the VM-I begins his response by disputing this very distinction between denoted (*abhihita*) and remembered (*smṛta*) WMs. He argues that⁵⁵ the WM cognition arising from a word is phenomenologically exactly equivalent to a memory, and this, he points out, is accepted even by the Bhāṭṭa opponent.

By arguing thus, the Prābhākara refers to a half-verse from the *Śabda-pariccheda* of ŚV, where Kumārila states that a word cannot be distinguished from an entity which causes the recollection of another (*smāraka*) — since a word does not convey anything additional to what has already been understood from other means of knowledge.⁵⁶ Consequently, the Prābhākara argues that even for the Bhāṭṭas, it is only those WMs which are *recollected* (and not *denoted*) from words that lead one to cognize (*bodhaka*) the connection between the WMs (i.e. the SM).

Now, thus far, the Bhāṭṭa has maintained that the WMs which constitute the SM in CoD are cognized as being *denoted* (*abhihita*) by words, and not *recollected* (*smṛta*) from words. The basis for this Bhāṭṭa claim is that in some manner, the hearer experiences a denoted WM as being *phenomenologically distinct* from a recollected WM.⁵⁷ Moreover, this very distinction is the foundation for the Bhāṭṭa's objection against the Prābhākara about the hearer's inability to grasp the specific WM (*viśeṣa*) from among the many recollected WMs, as explained previously.

⁵⁵*padāt tāvat padārthapratītiḥ smaraṇād bhinnā vaditum na śakyate. tena smṛtānām evānvayabodhakatvam ityāśrayaṇīyam. tathā ca tulyo doṣaḥ.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 407) This refutation is presented only in the VM-I (see IV.11.2.2), and not in the KṚ.

⁵⁶ŚV *Śabdapāriccheda* v.107ab: *padam abhyadhikābhāvāt smārakān na viśiṣyate.* This verse is quoted in the VM-I (ibid., p. 401), and was discussed previously in I.5.1. See also IV.7.3.

⁵⁷It is such distinction in the hearer's experience that also leads the Bhāṭṭa to postulate a distinction in the *processes* leading to the cognition of the denoted WM (process of *abhidhāna*) and to the cognition of the remembered WM (process of *smṛti*). At this stage, the Prābhākara is only refuting the distinction between the end-results of these two processes, the *denoted* WM and the *recollected* WM. In II.5.2, the Prābhākara will dispute also the distinction in the two processes of the *denotation* of an unconnected WM and the *recollection* of an unconnected WM.

However, as seen, the Prābhākara begins his refutation by demonstrating here that even the Bhāṭṭas cannot deny that the cognitions of unconnected WMs as arising from words are in fact phenomenologically equivalent to memories for the hearer — a claim which thereby makes the objections against the role of memory applicable equally (*tulya*) even against the Bhāṭṭa doctrine.

In response to this, the Bhāṭṭa opponent reformulates his position by stating that⁵⁸ in CoD, it is the WMs which are *recollected* by means of their *words* that cause one to cognize the SM. However, the Prābhākara responds⁵⁹ that this is exactly the case even in DoC — since here too words are accepted as leading to the recollection of WMs, which in turn cause one to cognize the SM.

Moreover, the Prābhākara adds that WMs are not always recollected by means of words, as has been suggested by the Bhāṭṭa — since one commonly does experience sentences where certain WMs are supplied by the hearer by means of other non-linguistic triggers (as in the case when one hears the incomplete sentence *dvāram* (door), which means in fact “*close the door*”).

II.5.2 A modification of the objection: Between which *type* of WMs is there a connection?

II.5.2.1 A modified objection: Connection only between *denoted* WMs, not remembered WMs

The Bhāṭṭa opponent now modifies his position. He explains that even if the above point were accepted — that a WM cognition arising from a word is indeed phenomenologically equivalent to a WM memory — nevertheless the Prābhākara doctrine cannot be admitted.

His modified objection is as follows:⁶⁰ In DoC, various meanings will be recollected by means of each of the words which are uttered, but these various

⁵⁸*atha śabdaiḥ smāritānām anvayabodhakatvaṃ vṛddhavyavahāre tathādarśanād ity adoṣaḥ* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 407).

⁵⁹*matāntare 'pi tulyam etat. na cāyam ekāntaḥ, vṛddhavyavahāre 'dhyāhrtenāpy arthenānvitābhīdhānadarśanād ity uktam* (ibid., p. 407).

⁶⁰*atha śabdair bahavo 'rthāḥ smāryante, kintu teṣāṃ katamenānvayāvabodhakatvam iti na vidmaḥ. abhīhitānvayavāde tv abhīhitenaivānvayabodhakatvaṃ yuktam eveti* (ibid., p. 407) (See IV.11.3.1).

WMs will, in turn, lead one to cognize a connection between which specific WMs of the many (*katama*) WMs present in the mind? On the other hand, in CoD, such *recollected* WMs will lead one to cognize a connection between only those WMs which are *denoted*.

Thus, the Bhāṭṭa is now insisting on the difference between the two processes of recollection and denotation, and claiming that only those WMs which are brought to the hearer's mind by means of the latter cognitive process will participate in the connection. The point of the Bhāṭṭa here is that even though the recollected WM and the denoted WM may not be phenomenologically distinct, yet they are the results of two distinct processes and as such can be differentiated. Thus, according to CoD, in a sentence such as *ukhāyāṃ pacati*, the two WMs 'ukhā' and 'pacati' would be denoted, and the hearer would thus be able to connect these two. In contrast, the process admitted by DoC will lead to endless WMs being recollected by the hearer upon hearing the two words *ukhā* and *pacati*, and thus the hearer will be unable to decide upon which among these endless WMs are to be connected.

II.5.2.2 A fundamental refutation: There is no denotation of WM, only the recollection of the WM

Śālikanātha's response to this objection must now squarely focus upon these two processes being spoken of by the Bhāṭṭa opponent — denotation as well as recollection of the unconnected WM. In the VM-I,⁶¹ Śālikanātha **rejects the distinction between the two**, and hence asks the Bhāṭṭa opponent to clarify what this distinct ability of words to *denote* the unconnected WM (*abhidhāyakatā*) is, which the Bhāṭṭa distinguishes from the ability of any one entity (say, X) to *remind* one of another entity (say, Y) (*smāratva*). The defence of this distinction becomes crucial now, as it is this very distinction which forms the basis for the Bhāṭṭa opponent's decision to admit denotation as distinct from recollection.

The Bhāṭṭa opponent responds by stating the following:⁶²

That which is called the ability of one entity (X) to be reminis-

⁶¹*tad asat. smāratvātirekiṇī kānyābhidhāyakatā yā vyavasthānibandhanam* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 407) (See IV.11.3.2).

⁶²*smāratvaṃ nāma pratyāsattinibandhanam. tena tadatirekiṇy abhidheyābhidhāyakatā-lakṣaṇā pratyāsattir aṅgikaraṇīyeti* (ibid., p. 407).

cent of another (Y) (*smāraakatva*) is based upon the mental contiguity (*pratyāsatti*) [of X and Y]. Consequently, one should accept [a kind of] mental contiguity, characterized as the relation between signifier and signified (i.e. the word and its unconnected WM), which is distinct from that [mental contiguity on which *smāraakatva* is based].

Thus, the Bhāṭṭa argues that *abhidhāyakatā*, i.e. the ability of a word to denote its unconnected WM, is quite distinct from *smāraakatva*, i.e. the ability of any one entity to be reminiscent of another. The reason is that the former requires the *specific* type of mental contiguity which exists only between a word and its meaning, and is distinct from the *generic* mental contiguity as may be subjectively established between any two entities X and Y.

However, the Prābhākara responds by arguing the following:⁶³

This is not true, as it is logically justified to characterize [words] as reminding (*smāraakatvopapatti*) [the hearer of their unconnected WMs] since [words] are seen as only reminding [the hearer of their unconnected WMs] (*smāraaka*) during the linguistic usage of elders. Surely, the [specific] ability [of words and WMs] to be related as signifier and signified (*vācyavācakatā*) is exactly the same as the [generic] relation between conveyor and conveyed (*pratyāyapratyāyakatā*). And even though this [generic relation of conveyor and conveyed (*pratyāyapratyāyakatā*)] is generally experienced [in (say) the case of smoke which conveys fire] as preceded by another [ontological] relation (*sambandhāntara*) between smoke and fire, etc., nevertheless in the case of language, [this relation of conveyor and conveyed] is not so accepted [as being preceded by another ontological relation between word and WM]. Rather, the ability [of a word A] to express [a WM A] (*vācakatva*) arises from one's comprehension of [this word's] ability to express [the WM A]. This is exactly similar to the ability [of some

⁶³*naitad evam, smāraakatvenaiva vṛddhavyavahāre darśanāt smāraakatvopapatteḥ. pratyāyapratyāyakatā hi vācyavācakatā. sā ca yady apy agnidhūmādīnāṃ sambandhāntarapūrvikā dṛṣṭā, tathāpi śabde tathā nāśrīyate kintu vācakatvāvagamād eva vācakatvam. evaṃ smāraakatvāvagamād eva smāraakatvam iti, kiṃ pratyāsattiyantarāśrayaṇena* (ibid., p. 407).

entity X] to remind one [of another entity Y], which arises from one's comprehension of the ability [of X] to remind one [of Y] — thus, what is the need to accept an alternate definition of mental contiguity [as argued by the Bhāṭṭa opponent]?

Śālikanātha is arguing here that there is a *generic* relation of conveyor and conveyed (*pratyāyyapratyāyakatā*), and the Bhāṭṭa's claim of the *specific* relation of signifier and signified (i.e. word and WM) (*vācyavācakatā*) is in fact an instance of the former generic relation. Moreover, within the broad category of all which can be related as conveyor and conveyed, Śālikanātha explains that there are some which become so related only on the basis of some ontological relation between them, as in the case of smoke and fire. On the other hand, there are others which become related as conveyor and conveyed without any such ontological relation connecting them, as may be the case of any two subjectively-established entities involved in memory (say X and Y). The relation between word and word-meaning is exactly of this sort, which needs no basis in any further ontological relation. Rather, a word becomes expressive of its WM simply once its ability to convey its WM has been understood, as is exactly the case for any two entities X and Y involved in memory, where X reminds one of Y once its ability to remind one of Y has been understood.⁶⁴

Śālikanātha thus argues that there is no need for the Bhāṭṭa to admit of any alternate definition of mental contiguity to justify the process of denotation between a word and its unconnected WM. Rather, the status of the relation between a word and its unconnected WM must be admitted as those of any two entities involved in memory.

⁶⁴How does this argument of Śālikanātha then align with the Mīmāṃsā doctrine that the relation of words and their meanings is *nitya*? Śālikanātha stops here exactly at the point of stating anything about *how* the relation between words and WMs is first established – his argument is that once the relation has been established, an individual learning the language needs only to comprehend the ability of the word to convey its related WM, just as is the case for any two entities related in memory. Moreover, this seems to conform to our everyday experience that words are not related to WMs based on any ontological connection (i.e. there is no ontological connection between the word cow and the meaning/object 'cow', unlike the pair of smoke and fire) – nevertheless, the word adequately conveys its related meaning/object. Furthermore, given the distinction that Śālikanātha admits in the bases of the two relations word-WM and smoke-fire, it does not seem that he considers *nityatā* of words and WMs as an ontological relation similar to *kāryakāraṇatā* of smoke and fire.

II.5.2.3 The Prābhākara's solution: The fundamentality of the tenet of *ekavākyatā*

Śālikanātha now returns to the Bhāṭṭa opponent's modified objection as discussed earlier (II.5.2.1), and presents his proposed solution.⁶⁵

Śālikanātha has demonstrated above (in II.5.2.2) that WM cognitions are in fact WM memories — and this applies equally to WM memories arising directly from the uttered words (say, the meaning 'ukhā' arising from the word *ukhā*), as well as further WM memories arising from the already remembered WMs (say, the meaning 'kulāla' arising from the meaning 'ukhā').

He now proceeds to demonstrate how only a particular connection is denoted by the uttered words of the sentence (say, *ukhāyāṃ pacati*), in priority to other possible connections with WMs present in memory (say, between 'ukhā' and 'kulāla'). The former are prioritised over the latter not due to any distinction of the denotation of WMs by the uttered words in contrast to the WMs present in memory, but instead **due to the fundamentality of the principle of a unitary sentence (*ekavākyatā*)**.

The reasoning offered by Śālikanātha is as follows:⁶⁶ When a sentence such as *ukhāyāṃ pacati* is heard, there will not come about the further DoC of 'ukhā' and 'kulāla' (even though one remembers the WM 'kulāla' from the WM 'ukhā') since otherwise, there will be a syntactic split (*vākyabheda*) in the sentence which was heard. Moreover, this syntactic split will not be justified since it is possible to construe the utterance as a single sentence (*ekavākyatvasambhava*).

Furthermore, Śālikanātha argues that this is an argument that even the Bhāṭṭa opponent must accept, as the following has been laid down even by Kumāṛila.⁶⁷

On the other hand, if a single sentence is possible — then a syntactic split of the sentence is not admitted.

Śālikanātha explains this to be the applicable principle even in sentences where

⁶⁵See IV.11.3.3.

⁶⁶*api ca jñātaṃ tāvad etad yad anena padenāyam artho 'nvito vācya iti, tatra yady anyenāpy anvitābhīdhānaṃ syāt tadā vākyabheda bhavet. na cāsāv ekavākyatvasambhava nyāyāḥ* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 408).

⁶⁷ŚV *Pratyakṣapariccheda* v.9ab: *sambhavaty ekavākyatve vākyabhedas tu neṣyate* (ibid., p. 408).

there is figurative and metaphorical usage of language. He argues that⁶⁸ ordinarily, figurative (*lakṣaṇā*) and metaphorical usages (*gauṇī*) of words are admitted only due to one's desire to avoid the syntactic split of the sentence.

A figurative usage of language occurs in a sentence such as *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* (a village on the Gaṅgā), where the word *gaṅgā* means instead 'gaṅgātīra' i.e. 'the bank of the Gaṅgā', rather than the river Gaṅgā herself. On the other hand, a metaphorical usage of language occurs in sentences such as *siṃho devadattaḥ* (Devadatta is a lion), where the word *siṃha* (lion) indicates the qualities of fierceness, bravery, etc. associated with a lion.⁶⁹

Thus, Śālikanātha is arguing here that such figurative and metaphorical usages of words are admitted only due to one's desire to avoid syntactic split in these sentences — else, one could admit the words *gaṅgā* and *siṃha* in the above examples as continuing to express their primary meanings and not any figurative or metaphorical ones respectively by supplying compatible alternate meanings (e.g. "[a fish] in the Gaṅgā" or "the lion [runs]").

Moreover, he explains that it is on account of this principle of *ekavākyatā* only that Vedic sentences and their meanings are understood, and the VM-I quotes several such instances.

Finally, Śālikanātha links this conclusion of the fundamentality of this principle of *ekavākyatā* to the three steps of *anvitābhidhāna* as were presented in the previous chapter.⁷⁰ He explains⁷¹ that in all the cases of Vedic sentences as well as sentences having figurative and metaphorical uses of language, if one were to abandon the connected meaning expressed by the second word (say, *gaṅgā* or *siṃha*) which is being uttered alongside the first word (e.g. *ghoṣa* or *devadatta*) and a connection of the first word's isolated WM is ascertained with another WM altogether — then the principle of the unitary sentence (*ekavākyatā*) would be violated.

Śālikanātha now states that this is the very reason that it had been said that

⁶⁸*loke ca lakṣaṇā gauṇī ca vṛttir vākyabhedabhayād eva. anyathā vākyam bhītvā kimity adhyāhṛtya योग्यमर्थान्तराम् सार्वपादान्येवा मुख्यार्थानि नास्तिरियन्ते* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 408).

⁶⁹McCrea (See 2000, footnote 30 for an explanation of *guṇavṛtti* and *lakṣaṇā*, as well as the example of *siṃho devadattaḥ*.)

⁷⁰See I.4.1.

⁷¹*tatra yadi samabhivyāhriyamāṇasya padasyābhidheyam parityajya anyena sahānvayo lakṣyate, tadā tadekavākyatā hīyeta* A. Sastri (1964, p. 409).

“The *vacanavyakti* [of this composite of words then arises] as brought about by linguistic principles (*nyāyasampāditavyakti*) . . .” (VM-I, v.12c). This is because the principle of a unitary sentence is a fundamental principle (*nyāya*) required for verbal cognition. Thus, Śālikanātha asserts that whatever is the meaning in accordance with that principle, that alone should be admitted as the meaning of the sentence. Moreover, he explains that one learns several principles (*nyāya*) as being the causes of SM cognition from the linguistic usage of elders, and insists that only one who does not forsake these very principles will be able to comprehend SM.

II.5.3 A final modification of the objection: DoC as never-ending

II.5.3.1 The Bhāṭṭa opponent’s criticism: Why not continued DoC?

The Bhāṭṭa opponent in the VM-I now puts forth a final modification in the context of this objection about the inability to grasp the specific (*viśeṣa*) WM. The Bhāṭṭa argues that even if the above principle of *ekavākyatva* is accepted, nevertheless a further difficulty will result.

Following is his reasoning:⁷² When a sentence is uttered (say, *ukhāyām pacati*), at first, a word (say, *ukhā*) will denote its own meaning (‘*ukhā*’) as connected to the second word’s meaning (‘*pacati*’), on account of the principle of the unitary sentence (*ekavākyatva*). Subsequently however, another WM (say, ‘X’) may be reminded by that second WM (‘*pacati*’) (*tatsmārita*) as well as the initial WM (‘*ukhā*’) (*svayaṃsmārita*). This third WM (‘X’) may also be suitable (*anugūṇa*) to form a unitary sentence with the first word, and thus the Bhāṭṭa claims that there will be nothing to inhibit such continued DoC. Consequently, such DoC may continue indefinitely in a similar manner since endless *suitable* WMs may be remembered due to their mental contiguity to the initial two WMs.

In the VM-I, the Prābhākara responds that there will be no such continued DoC since expectation for further WMs in the connection is appeased, as DoC is accomplished by means of two words only. However, the opponent enquires

⁷²*bhavatu tarhi padārthāntareṇa tāvad anvitābhīdhānam ekavākyatvabalāt tatsmāritena, svayaṃsmāritena ca tadekavākyatvānugūṇenārthāntareṇāpi kim ity anvitābhīdhānaṃ na bhavati* (ibid., p. 409) (See IV.11.4.1).

subsequently that if such an expectation is not appeased, what could possibly inhibit further DoC?

This is because, as argued in the Bhāṭṭa's objection, DoC explained thus far is based upon the role of memory and the selection from among the several recollected WMs on the basis of the principle of *ekavākyatā*. The Bhāṭṭa has now argued that even though the first connection in DoC may thus take place only between the meanings of the words uttered, nevertheless other recollected WMs may also conform to the principle of *ekavākyatā* and accordingly, the Prābhākara's explanation thus far will require that the process of DoC continue indefinitely.

II.5.3.2 The Prābhākara's first response: DoC with specific WM only

Śālikanātha presents the following refutation to the above argument:⁷³ when one word is uttered (say, *ukhā*), various meanings (say '*kulāla*', etc.) come to be proximate (*sannihita*) to the word's own recollected meaning ('*ukhā*') due to their memories, as a consequence of their mental contiguity to each other. Nevertheless, whichever meaning's **specific instantiation** (*viśeṣa*)⁷⁴ is grasped by *whatever means*, there is DoC with that specific WM only. On the other hand, when the specific instantiation of a WM is not being grasped by a hearer, there will be absolutely no cognition of SM since this specific WM is not being ascertained.⁷⁵

Thus, Śālikanātha is arguing here that DoC will come about with only that meaning whose specific instantiation (*viśeṣa*) is comprehended (say, '*ukhā*') when a word (say, *ukhā*) is uttered. As a result of such comprehension, this specific meaning would be distinguished from all the other meanings that may possibly

⁷³*ata evaikapadoccāraṇe tadarthasambandhamukhena bahusv api smrtisannihiteṣu yasyārthasya kenacit prakāreṇa viśeṣo gṛhyate tenaivānvitābhidhānam, agrhyamāṇe tu viśeṣe 'nadyavasāyād apratītir eva* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 409) (See IV.11.4.2).

⁷⁴The Sanskrit sentence used here renders unambiguous the sense of the term *viśeṣa*. The text states: ... *yasyārthasya kenacit prakāreṇa viśeṣo gṛhyate* ... i.e. the *viśeṣa* is **of one of the meanings** (*artha*) from among all those present in the mind due to their memories. Furthermore, the text continues: ... *tenaivānvitābhidhānam* ... i.e. there is DoC with that *viśeṣa* only, thus once again reinforcing our understanding of the term *viśeṣa* as 'specific WM' and not 'the difference amongst the WMs present in memory' (this ambiguity was also discussed in footnote 54).

⁷⁵To further substantiate his argument, the Prābhākara also puts forward here the Mīmāṃsā argument about derived rituals (*vikṛti*). He explains that such derived rituals *remind* one of a novel (*apūrva*) Vedic command (*kārya*) related to a *specific* archetypal ritual, due to their similarity with such an archetypal ritual (see IV.11.4.2).

be recollected in the mind (*'kulāla'*, etc.) when the word is uttered. Moreover, Śālikanātha does not elaborate on how this process of comprehension will be precipitated — he simply says “by whatever means” (*kenacit prakāreṇa*).⁷⁶

II.5.3.3 The Prābhākara’s second response: Words *consistently* remind one of their own isolated meanings

Finally, Śālikanātha puts forward one additional argument as to why the words in the uttered sentence (say, *ukhāyāṃ pacati*) will not continue to remind one of other suitable meanings (*'kulāla'*, etc.) such that DoC may continue endlessly. He states⁷⁷ that in the process of linguistic communication, whatever WM (say, *'ukhā'*) is **consistently** (*niyamena*) reminded by a word (*ukhā*) to a person whose mnemonic trace (*saṃskāra*) arising from learning the relation (*sambandha*) between the word and its WM is unimpaired — it is with that WM only (*'ukhā'*) that one observes DoC of the second word (say, *pacati*), not with any other.

Śālikanātha explains that this is because all words consistently (*niyamena*) lead to the memory of their own WMs (*svārtha*) since the relation between the word and the WM has been grasped, and not to the memory of some other WM (say, *'kulāla'*, etc.). And hence, the second word in the sentence (say, *pacati*) conveys its own WM as connected with the first WM (*'ukhā'*) only and not with some other remembered WM. Thus, Śālikanātha concludes that there is no fault in relying on memory in DoC.

⁷⁶One reason for this ambiguous, generic formulation may be that it paves the way for the specific method (*prakāra*) suggested by the Prābhākara in his subsequent (second) response immediately below, where he argues that words *consistently* (*niyamena*) remind one of their own WMs only. Another possibility however may be that this response is distinct from the second response below, and subsequent Prābhākara philosophers may have thus elaborated upon this possibility. Further such study may help us understand this better.

⁷⁷*api ca yathāvṛddhavyavahārāvagamam vākyaṛthābodbodhaḥ. tatra yad eva padena anapabhraṣṭasambandhagrahaṇasaṃskārasya puruṣasya niyamena smāryate tenaivānvitābhidhānam padāntarasya dr̥śyate nānyena. sarvaṃ padaṃ svārthaṃ hi niyamena sambandhagrahaṇāt smārayati nārthāntaram. tataś ca tenaivānvitasvārthabodhakateti na kāścid doṣaḥ* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 409) (See IV.11.4.3).

II.6 An additional Bhāṭṭa criticism of remembered WMs in DoC

The KṬ provides an additional criticism of the role of *remembered* WMs in DoC, an argument not mentioned in the VM-I. Sucarita first draws out the implications of one aspect of DoC, whereby the remembered, isolated WMs – rather than the denoted meaning (*abhidheya*) – become the condition (*nimitta*) for the SM. This is discussed below in II.6.1. He thereafter goes on to articulate and refute four possibilities for substantiating this distinction between *nimitta* and *abhidheya* according to the Prābhākara doctrine (II.6.2 – II.6.5).

II.6.1 Bhāṭṭa postulations about the Prābhākara's acceptance of *abhidheya* and *nimitta*

In his explanation of the *pūrvapakṣa*,⁷⁸ Sucarita presents a Prābhākara argument not explicitly stated in the VM-I, even though it may be implied by the text. Śālikanātha, in his description of language learning (*vyutpatti*), does not explicitly set forth how a word's unconnected WM (connected to the word through the *sambandha*) is related to a connected, qualified meaning that the word denotes in any given sentence.

Instead, Sucarita fills in this argument and explains that according to the Prābhākara, co-presence and co-absence (*anvayavyatireka*) only lead to the extraction of the condition (*nimitta*) for the word's employment, and not instead to the extraction of the meaning denoted by the word (*abhidheya*). Thus, for a word (say, cow), its unconnected WM ('cow') is the condition for the employment of the word in any sentence (say, bring the cow), where the word denotes its own meaning as qualified by other WMs (i.e. WM 'cow' as qualified by WM 'bring'). Hence, the Bhāṭṭa postulates that according to the Prābhākara doctrine, the *nimitta* for the use of a word is its unconnected WM, whereas the word's *abhidheya* is the qualified meaning it denotes in a sentence.

Moreover, this terminology of *nimitta* and *abhidheya*, as well as their distinc-

⁷⁸See V.2.5.

tion, is first found in the ŚBh on PMS 6.1.1-2⁷⁹ and Sucarita uses this to further endorse his argument. Here, the ŚBh explains that the meaning ‘*daṇḍa*’ (‘staff’) is the condition (*nimitta*) for the use of the term *daṇḍin* (staff-bearer) in order for this term to denote (*abhidheya*) the meaning ‘*daṇḍin*’ (‘staff-bearer’).

Since the ŚBh admits these terms and their distinction, the KṚ too must abide by this argument. Hence, Sucarita also accepts this distinction in case of the term *daṇḍin* as is stated in the ŚBh, but he endeavours to distinguish this from the Prābhākara conception as is postulated above. His arguments in order to do so are presented as follows.

II.6.2 Argument 1: No distinction between *nimitta* and *abhidheya* of indivisible words in contrast to complex words

At the very outset, Sucarita distinguishes the Prābhākara explanation of *nimitta* and *abhidheya* from the one presented in the ŚBh. He explains that⁸⁰ the example from the ŚBh of the staff-bearer (*daṇḍin*) is correct since this word comprises parts (*sabhāga*), i.e. it is complex. This complex word *daṇḍin* brings about the cognition of an individual bearing a staff (*daṇḍavat*).⁸¹ However, in order for this word *daṇḍin* to effect such a cognition, the WM ‘staff’ (‘*daṇḍa*’) becomes the condition for the use of the word *daṇḍin*. Moreover, this WM ‘staff’ is denoted by the speech-unit *daṇḍa* which forms a part of the complex word *daṇḍin* — this is perfectly acceptable even for the Bhāṭṭas.

However, Sucarita argues that it is impossible to develop and defend such a three-tier structure for indivisible words such as cow. Here, the WM ‘cow’ will be the *nimitta* for the use of the word cow, but one will be unable to show an *abhidheya* here which is different from the *nimitta* itself.

⁷⁹See Chapter VI footnote 35 for a translation and explanation of the argument in the ŚBh.

⁸⁰V.3.7: *maivam, sabhāgo hi daṇḍīśabdaḥ. tasya daṇḍavati pratyayam ādhātuṃ daṇḍaśabdābhīhito daṇḍo nimittam iti yuktaṃ. nirbhāgavādīpadārthās tu kasya kutra vartituṃ nimittam iti vaktavyam.*

⁸¹See footnote 83.

II.6.3 Argument 2: The *abhidheya* of the word cow cannot be its own WM qualified by the meaning action

Furthermore, Sucarita argues that⁸² such a distinction between *nimitta* and *abhidheya* in DoC is incorrect since in a sentence such as *gām ānaya* (bring the cow), the word signifying the action (bring) is altogether distinct from the word cow.

Sucarita contrasts this with the case of the complex word *daṇḍin*, where the WM ‘staff’ (*‘daṇḍa’*) is delivered by the same word *daṇḍin* and is hence the condition of the complex word *daṇḍin*. This is because the complex word *daṇḍin* can itself be analyzed into its following constituents: the nominal base *daṇḍa* and the suffix *-in*.⁸³ This leads to the complex word *daṇḍin* denoting a complex meaning which is someone bearing a staff — this is acceptable even to the Bhāṭṭas.

However, the WMs ‘cow’, etc. are understood by means of words such as cow, etc. — and thus, Sucarita concludes that these WMs ‘cow’, etc. cannot be the condition with regard to the denotation of some meaning by the word cow which is connected with the meaning of altogether distinct words such as bring, etc.

II.6.4 Argument 3: The words denoting action and cow are not part of the same speech unit

Very briefly, Sucarita also rejects the possibility that the two words – bring and cow (in the sentence *gām ānaya*) – are part of a single speech-unit (*aikapadya*).⁸⁴ This is an approach that one could adopt in order to justify the unconnected WM ‘cow’ as being the condition for the word cow — in such a case, the word cow would denote its own WM ‘cow’ as qualified by the WM ‘bring’, since the word cow and the word bring would be part of the same speech-unit.

Sucarita rejects this option quite tersely, stating that one cannot deny the reality

⁸²V.3.7: *kriyāpadaviśiṣṭasvārthābhīdhāne nimittam iti cen. na tasya padāntaratvāt, samānapadopātto hi daṇḍo sapratyayasya tadvati vartituṃ nimittam iti yuktam, gavāḍipadārthās tu gām ityāḍipadāntaropāttāḥ katham ānayetyāḍipadāntarānvitābhīdhāne nimittam bhaviṣyanti.*

⁸³Aṣṭ. 5.2.115 *ata inīṭhanau* prescribes the suffix *in*, or *ṭhaN* (= *ika*) after a stem ending in short *a* in the sense of *tad asyāsty asmīn iti* (by *anuvṛtti* from 5.2.94). Thus, the meaning of a nominal base X + suffix *in* is ‘having X’.

⁸⁴V.3.7: *na caikapadyam eva padānām vākyabhāgānām anihnavāt.*

of the various parts of the sentence.

II.6.5 Argument 4: If a word intrinsically expresses connected meaning, then its correlate will be the *nimitta* instead

Finally, Sucarita also criticizes what could most likely be the Prābhākara defence. As seen thus far, the Prābhākara argues that words do not denote their unconnected (*ananvita*) meanings as claimed by the Bhāṭṭas, but rather are always found in sentences to be denoting their own meanings as connected to other meanings. Moreover, the Prābhākara also admits that the connection between the WMs exists prior to the words being uttered, with the sentence being a *restatement* (*anuvādaka*) of the SM.⁸⁵ Thus, one may expect a Prābhākara to criticise Sucarita's arguments thus far by stating that the unconnected WM 'cow' can be the condition for the word cow, etc. in its denotation of the connected, qualified meaning, since a word's own meaning is always connected in sentences.

However, the Bhāṭṭa's final argument refutes this possible claim as well, reasoning as follows:⁸⁶ if a word (say, cow) denotes a connected, qualified meaning (say, WM 'cow' qualified by the WM 'bring'), then the other correlate (*pratiyogin*) (here, 'bring') will instead become the condition (*nimitta*) for this qualified meaning being denoted by the word cow. This is because it is on account of that other correlate being the condition only that the word's denoted meaning (*abhidheya*) will have the nature of being a connected meaning, not only on account of the word's isolated meaning — for this is unconnected, as is accepted also by the Prābhākaras.⁸⁷

⁸⁵... *niścite cānvaye vākyam etad anuvādakabhūtam arthasyeti. evañ ced anuvādatayā tasyārthasya tad vākyam vācakam eveti* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 380) (see I.5.3.1).

⁸⁶V.3.7: *atha svārthasyaivānvitatvenābhidheye teṣāṃ nimittatā tad apy ayuktam. evaṃ hi tasmin pratiyogyantaraviśiṣṭe 'bhidhīyamāne pratiyogyantaram eva nimittam bhavet. tadvaśena hi tasyānvitarūpatvaṃ na svarūpata, ananvitasvarūpatvāt.*

⁸⁷I end the present discussion about the reliability of memory at this point here — once again, without any definitive decision about the superiority of one theory over the other. As mentioned earlier as well, Sucarita's refutations are by no means final despite their keen insight and acumen — further studies of subsequent Mīmāṃsaka philosophers may well provide further ammunition for both camps.

II.7 The charge of hermeneutic non-conformity of DoC, and its refutation

II.7.1 Objection: CoD has greater hermeneutic conformity with the ŚBh on PMS 1.1.25

A final argument against DoC is that CoD has comparatively greater hermeneutic conformity with the arguments of Jaimini and Śabara.⁸⁸ The Bhāṭṭa opponent quotes an oft-cited phrase from the ŚBh to PMS 1.1.25 to support this criticism:⁸⁹

This is because all words cease functioning (*nivṛttavyāpāra*) once they have denoted their own meaning. Now, it is only when the WMs have been comprehended that these cause one to cognize the SM.

The Bhāṭṭa opponent explains that this quote supports his doctrine of CoD instead of DoC, since according to the former, words simply denote the isolated forms of their own WMs (*svarūpamātra*), which are independent of the denotations of other words. These WMs in turn possess mutual expectation, compatibility and proximity and thereby lead one to cognize SM.

II.7.2 Refutation: The statement as a response to separately denoting the *connected* and the *connection*

The Prābhākara however rejects this objection,⁹⁰ and argues instead that this phrase from the ŚBh is an answer to the following doubt: “If words denote a *connected* meaning (*anvita*), then they do not denote the *connection* between the WMs (*anvaya*). And in order to accomplish that connection, another potency to denote the connection should be postulated for the words.”

However, the Prābhākara argues that there is no need for any further potency to denote the *connection* independently. He explains that a word which denotes a

⁸⁸See IV.4.3.

⁸⁹*padāni hi svaṃ svaṃ artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi. athedānīm avagatāḥ santa vākyārtham avagamantīti.* (Āpaṭe 1929, p. 96) This is quoted in the VM-I (A. Sastri 1964, p. 383) and Kṛ (V.1).

⁹⁰VM-I: IV.12.1, Kṛ: V.2.7.

connected meaning most certainly also denotes the connection between the WMs. If that were not the case, then the connected meaning denoted by the word would certainly not be denoted as connected.

The reason for this is as follows: a complex object (say, A) which comprises two connected entities (say, X and Y), has the form of being something connected only because it appropriates into itself the connection between its constituent entities X and Y. If this is not admitted, then the former can no longer be admitted as a connected entity. This is similar to the case of words denoting a connected (*anvita*) meaning, which includes within itself the connection (*anvaya*) between the unconnected WMs. Thus, the Prābhākara concludes that no further potency of words should be postulated with regard to that denotation of the connection.

Thus, the Prābhākara now concludes as to the true sense of Śabara's phrase on PMS 1.1.25. He states:⁹¹

Words denote their *connected* WMs and then cease functioning (*nivṛttavyāpāra*) i.e. they do not denote the *connection* between the WMs separately. Now it is only when the connected WMs have been ascertained that these bring about the connection also as being understood.

Moreover, the Prābhākara explains that since unconnected WMs are learnt at the moment of grasping the relation between a word and its WM and since a completely different connection between WMs is ascertained for every different sentence — thus the sentence is only meant for conveying that connection. Hence, he argues that by the word *vākyārtha* in the ŚBh, Śabara refers to the connection between the WMs.

II.7.3 The consequent Bhāṭṭa rejection of this refutation

Sucarita however rejects Śālikanātha's explanation by demonstrating that the overall argument in PMS 1.1.25 as well as the *bhāṣya* thereon endorses *abhihitānvaya* and not *anvitābhidhāna*.⁹²

⁹¹*padāny anvitam abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi nānvayaṃ pṛthag abhidadhati. athedānīm anvitāḥ pratipannā anvayaṃ api pratītaṃ sampādayantīti* (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 411-412) (see IV.12.3).

⁹²See V.3.1.

Firstly, he argues that Jaimini has himself demonstrated the WMs to be the cause of the SM cognition by saying ‘since [word]-meaning is the cause of that [SM]’.⁹³

Moreover, he argues that even Śabara, while explaining PMS 1.1.25, says that “a sentence is not generally acknowledged as having a meaning altogether different [from the individual word meanings] (*pārthagarthyā*) after it has entirely disregarded the WMs.”⁹⁴ Sucarita explains that this statement unambiguously refutes Śālikanātha’s claim of the sentence being the conveyor of the SM.

Further, Sucarita also argues that Śabara had anticipated the objection of the postulation of the capacity of the sentence as the conveyor of SM on the basis of *arthāpatti*. In fact, by saying “this is not so, since [word]-meaning is the cause of that [SM]”⁹⁵ — Śabara demonstrates this part of the *sūtra* as being meant for the refutation of the postulation of the capacity of the sentence to convey SM.

Thus, Sucarita argues that the word *nivṛttavyāpārāṇi* ([those words] whose activity has ceased) in the ŚBh demonstrates that the denotation of words terminates (*paryavasāna*) in the WMs only.

Finally, Sucarita also quotes the phrase from the ŚBh: “who will indeed postulate an unseen capacity of the aggregate of words?”⁹⁶ He explains that this is in fact an unequivocal objection to the capacity of the sentence to be the conveyor of SM.

⁹³PMS 1.1.25: . . . *arthasya tannimittatvāt*.

⁹⁴*nānapekṣya padārthān pārthagarthyena vākyam arthāntaraprasiddham* (Āpaṭe 1929, p. 95).

⁹⁵*tan na, arthasya tannimittatvāt* (ibid., p. 96).

⁹⁶*ko jātucid adṛṣṭāṃ padasamudāyasya śaktiṃ kalpayati* (ibid., p. 97).

Chapter III

A Dialectical Investigation of *abhihitānvaya*: Key Objections and Refutations

III.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, key Bhāṭṭa objections against the Prābhākara doctrine of DoC were considered — here, the focus shifts to criticisms put forth by the Prābhākaras against the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of CoD. As seen previously, the examination of an objection and its refutation may often span several levels of argumentation, thus frequently going back and forth between the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara viewpoints. Consequently, there are some key Prābhākara arguments against CoD which have already been presented, albeit beginning as a Bhāṭṭa objection.

For instance, while discussing the crucial role ascribed to memory in DoC, Śālikanātha argued that the Bhāṭṭas also must assent to such a role of memory in CoD.¹ Another significant criticism set out by Śālikanātha was the denial of a word's denotation of WM, a claim that contests the very cornerstone of CoD. Śālikanātha asserts that unconnected WMs are cognized on the basis of memory and not due to denotation, since there is no distinction between these two

¹See II.5.1.2.

processes.²

In this chapter, I consider key Prābhākara objections against CoD which have not been mentioned yet, as well as the corresponding Bhāṭṭa refutations. Once again, the Prābhākara criticisms presented here are as set forth in the VM-I, while the Bhāṭṭa refutations are based on the arguments from the KṬ.

III.2 The problem of postulating potencies of word meanings rather than words

III.2.1 Objection One: Potency of WMs due to *padasaṃsparśa*, resulting in an additional potency of words

As discussed in the previous chapters, the Bhāṭṭas define *denotation* as the ability of words to express word meanings, and must thereby explain how one arrives at SM from these unconnected WMs. The Bhāṭṭas insist that WMs are responsible for leading one to cognize SM, and discuss also the role of the three conditions of expectation, proximity and compatibility which the WMs inherently possess.³

The Prābhākara however disputes this claim, as he argues instead that words denote a connected (qualified) meaning. The Prābhākara argues that in order for the Bhāṭṭa to substantiate his claim that WMs lead to SM cognition, the Bhāṭṭa must firstly admit to WMs having a potency to do so. Moreover, such potency of WMs to cause SM cognition can be postulated by the Bhāṭṭa only on account of the conjunction of WMs with words (*padasaṃsparśa*). This argument is present in the VM-I⁴ as well as in the KṬ.⁵

The following is Śālikanātha's argument:⁶ He states that it must be admitted by the Bhāṭṭa that meanings⁷ lead one to comprehend their mutual connection

²See II.5.2.2.

³See I.5.2.2. See also I.2.2 for a discussion on the role of *lakṣaṇā* in SM cognition.

⁴See IV.6.2.1.

⁵See V.2.8.

⁶*padārthānām hi śabdād anyataḥ pramāṇāt pratīyamānānām anyonyānvayabodhakatvaṃ na pratītam iti, śabdābhidheyānām tadavagamaśaktiḥ kalpayitavyā. tasyāś cotpattau śabdasamsparsa eva hetur ityāśrayaṇīyam* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 392).

⁷This is another instance of the ambiguity of the term *artha*, which refers to meaning as well

only when they are cognized through the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) which is language (*śabda*). Thus, the Bhāṭṭa should postulate that only verbally denoted meanings have the potency to cause the comprehension of their mutual connection (i.e. the SM). And it should be admitted that such a potency is caused by the conjunction (*saṃsparśa*) between words and WMs.

Śālikanātha explains⁸ that the reason for this is that it is only words which are used in ordinary communication to convey qualified, sentential meanings (*viśiṣṭārtha*). Nevertheless, since the Bhāṭṭas admit that words are themselves not capable of directly conveying the SM, hence they must accept that the words cause WMs to become entities having the intermediate function (*avāntaravyāpāra*) of causing one to cognize their mutual connection.

Consequently, the potency of WMs arises only from their conjunction with words, which are in turn intended to bring about the comprehension of a qualified, sentential meaning. And thus, the Prābhākara concludes, an *additional* potency of words must be admitted by the Bhāṭṭa in order for words to confer to WMs their potency to lead to the SM cognition, further to the accepted potency of words to denote WM.

III.2.2 Objection Two: Preferable to accept words as having potency for DoC rather than unconnected WMs

In the VM-I, Śālikanātha presents an additional argument related to the one presented above. He had previously argued at length that unconnected WMs are not denoted by words but are instead only caused to be remembered.⁹ However, subsequently in the VM-I,¹⁰ Śālikanātha explains what would result according to DoC even if WMs are considered as being denoted and *not* remembered.

He explains that in a sentence such as *ukhāyāṃ pacati* ([he/she] cooks in a pan),

as object.

⁸*śabdo hi viśiṣṭārthapratipattiparatayā lokavyavahāreṣu prayujyamāno dṛṣṭaḥ. na cāsau sākṣād vākyārthapratipādane samartha iti, padārthān avāntaravyāpārikaroti. te ca yady anyonyānvayabodhane samarthāḥ syuḥ, tadā teṣāṃ avāntaravyāpāratā syān nānyatheti. viśiṣṭārthāvabodhaparāśabdasaṃsparśād eva teṣāṃ eṣā śaktir āvirbhavatīti, śabdasyāpi padārthagatānvayabodhakatvaśaktyādhānaśaktir āśrayaṇīyā* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 392).

⁹This was discussed in II.5. See also IV.11.2 – IV.11.4.

¹⁰See IV.11.5.

the second word *pacati* may be admitted as conveying its own WM as connected to the other WM ‘*ukhā*’ which is denoted and *not* remembered. This is *not* the philosophical position endorsed by the Prābhākaras, as they firmly admit that the unconnected WMs are only remembered during the process of SM denotation by the words. Nevertheless, Śālikanātha presents such a philosophical position (which seems a step closer to the Bhāṭṭa doctrine) in order to demonstrate that even here, a conclusion from his theory of DoC is corroborated – namely, that one needs to admit the potency of words for denoting the connected (sentential) meaning. Thus, he argues that¹¹ even if the above-mentioned thesis was admitted, nevertheless one would need to postulate a word’s potency for *denoting* the connected meaning in addition to its potency for *denoting* its own unconnected WM.

Firstly, Śālikanātha argues that even if this leads to dual denotations, there would still be no fault. Initially (*pūrvam*), a word will *denote* its isolated WM only. However, when it obtains assistance from other entities (i.e. WMs) which are denoted by other words, so that these other entities become the correlates (*pratiyogin*) of the first WM, the first word will *denote* its WM as connected to this or that correlate.

Moreover, Śālikanātha claims that even if one accepts two potencies for denotation, his doctrine will nevertheless need to postulate fewer potencies than the Bhāṭṭa’s and therefore will be conceptually more economical (*śaktikalpanālāghava*). This is because this modified Prābhākara doctrine relinquishes the additional potency of words to confer to WMs their potency to cause one to cognize their mutual connection, which Śālikanātha had argued previously (III.2.1) the Bhāṭṭa would need to postulate in CoD.

Finally, Śālikanātha argues¹² that even if the number of potency postulations is the same in both doctrines, nevertheless it is better to admit that words possess the potency to denote the connected meaning instead of attributing such potency to unconnected WMs. This is because words are comprehended before WMs,

¹¹*kiñ ca yady abhīhitenaivānvitasvārthabodhanābhyupagama eva pratiniyatānvayabodho ghaṭate nānyathā, tarhi kalpyatām padānām anvitābhidhānaśaktir api. dvir abhidhānam āpadyata iti ced āpadyatām, na kaścīd doṣaḥ. pūrvaṃ kevalaṃ padam ananvitaṃ svārtham abhidhatte, pratiyogipadāntarābhīhitavastvantarasahāyaprāptyā tu tattadanvitam artham āha iti na kaścīd doṣaḥ* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 410).

¹²*tulyāyām api śaktikalpanāyām, padānām evānvitabodhanaśaktir āśrayitum ucitā, na padārthānām, prathamāvagatatvāt, vākyaṛthe ca tātparyasyopagamād iti* (ibid., p. 401).

and also because words are known as being employed with the sole purpose of conveying the SM.

III.2.3 Refutation Two: Words cannot denote the connected meaning, since no recursive denotation by words

In the first objection presented above (III.2.1), Śālikanātha argued that the Bhāṭṭa must admit that WMs have the potency to lead one to cognize the SM due to their conjunction with words, and hence the Bhāṭṭa must admit an *additional (third) potency* in the process of CoD — that of words to confer to WMs their potency to cause one to cognize the SM (in addition to the (first) potency of words to denote WM as well as the (second) potency of WMs to cause one to cognize SM). In the second objection (III.2.2) however, Śālikanātha argued that it is preferable for the Bhāṭṭa to admit instead that words have a potency not only to (first) denote WM but also to (secondly) denote the connected (sentential) meaning (i.e. DoC), and thus there would be no need to postulate an additional third potency of words to confer to WMs their potency.¹³ The Bhāṭṭa response to this latter objection is presented below, and the former will be considered subsequently.

First of all, Sucarita argues¹⁴ that contrary to the second objection of III.2.2, it is actually *preferable to postulate the additional third potency of words* to confer to WMs their potency for SM rather than postulating the potency of words for DoC. Sucarita explains that the (first) potency of words to denote certain unconnected WMs is ascertained by means of co-absence and co-presence (which is acceptable even to the modified Prābhākara position of the VM-I). However, one cannot thereafter postulate (as Śālikanātha suggests) a (second) capacity of words to denote the connected meaning (i.e. SM) **recursively** (*parivṛtti*) — i.e. one cannot postulate a potency for words such that they *initially* denote WMs and then are *recursively uttered* (*uccāraṇa*) to denote SM.

To further substantiate his argument, Sucarita puts forward the example of *mantras*. He explains that for *mantras* which have already reached the stage of

¹³Both these objections are present also in the KṬ, see V.2.8 and V.3.8.

¹⁴V.3.8.1: *yady api tāvad anyatrānupalakṣitaivaṃvidhasvabhāvā eva padārthā bhaveyus tathāpi teṣv eva padair atīśayādhānakalpanopapattimatī.*

denoting their meaning, an additional *adr̥ṣṭa*¹⁵ cannot be postulated on the basis of their recursive utterance. Rather, the *adr̥ṣṭa* is related to meaning and arises when the *mantra* is uttered.¹⁶ Hence, Sucarita argues that it must be admitted that the words confer to the WMs a special capacity (*atiśaya*) such that the WMs in turn cause one to comprehend the SM, and this comes about due to the conjunction of WMs with words.

III.2.4 Refutation One: Potency of WMs to cause one to cognize SM is not only due to their conjunction with words

Furthermore, the Bhāṭṭa now turns to the first Prābhākara argument presented in III.2.1 that WMs can only cause one to cognize the SM due to their conjunction with words, and claims instead that this Prābhākara argument is untrue.

In order to refute the argument, the Bhāṭṭa quotes the example from ŚV Vāk., where Kumāṛila states:¹⁷

For one who sees a white, vague form and hears the sound of neighing,
As well as the sounds of hooves pounding [upon the ground] — the
cognition that “a white horse is running”,
Is seen, devoid of a sentence . . .

This is an oft-cited Bhāṭṭa example, and it becomes the focus of several Mīmāṃsā discussions on the nature of WMs (see III.3). The argument presented here is that unconnected WMs possess an intrinsic ability to lead one to comprehend their complex connected (sentential) meaning, and such ability comes

¹⁵The term *adr̥ṣṭa* (also referred to as *apūṛva*) is of much significance in Mīmāṃsā, but is understood in very different ways by the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsākas. For the Bhāṭṭas, the term refers to ‘an energy produced by a sacrifice and lasting from the time of the sacrifice until its result is accomplished’ whereas for the Prābhākaras, it refers to the ‘duty, “newly” known through a prescription’ (Freschi 2012, p.372). Since this is a common Mīmāṃsā term with a technical meaning, I prefer to keep it untranslated.

¹⁶This is a passing reference to the conclusion accepted in Mīmāṃsā that *mantras* effect their force only when their meaning is understood, and not simply by virtue of their utterance. This is presented in ŚBh on the PMS 1.2.31-53 (*Mantrādhikaraṇa*). A brief outline of the argument in the ŚBh is also put forth in Jha (1942, p.182f).

¹⁷ŚV Vāk. vv.358-359a: *paśyataḥ śvetam ārūpaṃ hreṣāsabdaṃ ca śṛṇvataḥ; khuranikṣepasabdaṃ ca śveto ’śvo dhāvātīti dhīḥ; dr̥ṣṭā vākyavinirmuktā . . .*

about irrespective of whether the WMs are conveyed by words (*padasamsparsā*) or not. Thus, the verse above cites an instance of one who cognizes only the quality ‘white’ (from seeing the vague, white form), the substance ‘horse’ (from hearing the sound of neighing) and the action of ‘running’ (from hearing the sounds of the hooves) — yet, this person will spontaneously cognize the complex (sentential) meaning “a white horse is running”.

Moreover, such a complex (sentential) meaning is cognized by him/her even though no sentence was uttered to convey the idea. Consequently, the Bhāṭṭas argue that unconnected WMs do not need conjunction with words in order to possess a potency to lead one to cognize their complex, connected meaning and hence refute the Prābhākara argument as presented in III.2.1. However, the VM-I criticizes the Bhāṭṭa arguments based on this example from the ŚV Vāk., whereas the KṬ presents arguments to counter these criticisms of the VM-I. These are now presented.

III.3 An analysis of the Bhāṭṭa example of “a white horse is running”

III.3.1 Objection One: Need for further means of knowledge for complex SM cognition

In the VM-I, this Bhāṭṭa example is analysed further. Śālikanātha explains¹⁸ that the person arriving at the complex (sentential) meaning “a white horse is running” cognizes ‘white’, ‘horse’ and ‘running’ in the following manner: The quality ‘white’ is **directly perceived** (*pratyakṣa*) and is such that its specific substratum (*anavadhāritāśrayaviśeṣa*) is not understood; the substance ‘horse’ is **inferred** (*anumita*) from the directly perceived sound of neighing even as no specific quality (*guṇaviśeṣa*) of the horse is cognized; while the action of ‘running’ is **inferred**

¹⁸yadi mānāntarāvaseyānāṃ padārthānāṃ anyonyānvayāvagame sāmāthyam na syāt. asti tu tat śvāityasyānavadhāritāśrayaviśeṣasya pratyakṣadr̥ṣṭasya, aśvasyāpratipannaguṇaviśeṣasya pratyakṣahreṣāśabdānumitasya padanikṣepaśabdānumitasya ajñātakarṭṛbhedasya dhāvanasya sveto śvo dhāvatīty anvayabodhakatvadarśanāt. (A. Sastri 1964, p. 392) (See IV.6.2.2) Taber (1989, p. 415) briefly summarizes this ‘penetrating discussion’ by Śālikanātha.

from the sounds of the feet pounding upon the ground even as its agent is unknown.

However, Śālikanātha argues that in this case, one can experience the complex SM “a white horse is running” only if one ascertains that all three (‘white’, ‘horse’, and ‘running’) have the same substratum (*samānāśraya*). He outlines the following intermediate steps by which one goes from cognizing the unconnected WMs to cognizing the complex SM cognition:

1. **Relating ‘horse’ and ‘running’:** When one has cognized ‘running’ (from the sound of hooves) and ‘horse’ (from the sound of neighing), then one first settles upon the clippety-clop (*ṭāṅkāra*) sounds of hooves as being related to the horse. Such a conclusion comes about only on account of the knowledge which one acquires through repeated, previous observation of such association (*abhyāsapāṭava*) (in this case, of the sounds of hooves and the presence of a horse). Only thereafter will one *infer* the rapid motion (*gati*) as residing in the horse. Thus, it is not the case that one first observes only the motion of something running and then comprehends its connection to a horse by means of the WMs alone.
2. **Relating ‘horse’ and ‘white’:** Thereafter, one decides that there can be nothing apart from a horse in that place. Consequently, since it is also ascertained that a horse is the source from which the sound of neighing arises, he ascertains the horse-universal (*aśvatva*) as also having the same substrate as the quality white. Thus, for him, *postulation* (*arthāpatti*) is the means of knowledge in his thinking that “that which is white must be this very horse” — similar to how one understands through postulation that Devadatta is outside the house when one notices that Devadatta is not in the house.
3. **Relating ‘horse’, ‘running’ and ‘white’:** Finally, one must ascertain the sounds of neighing and the pounding of hooves as having a common substrate with the quality white (*śvāityasamānāśraya*). Only subsequently does one infer the two unconnected WMs ‘horse’ and ‘running’ as related to *that which is white* — and not these two unconnected WMs as independent of each other.

Hence, Śālikanātha concludes¹⁹ that WMs may manifest as unrelated through other means of knowledge (e.g. direct perception, etc.) as has been shown by the Bhāṭṭa — however, their ability to cause one to comprehend their mutual connection will be cognized with the aid of additional means of knowledge such as inference and postulation. Thus, Śālikanātha argues, this disputes the Bhāṭṭa claim that unconnected WMs connect spontaneously — rather, their connection will come about only when the perceiving subject connects them.

III.3.2 Objection Two: What type of veridical knowledge is the complex cognition classified as?

A second objection is also put forward with regard to the Bhāṭṭa example of “a white horse is running”.²⁰ Śālikanātha now argues²¹ that if the Bhāṭṭa admits that the connection between the WMs is understood on the basis of the cognition of the unconnected WMs alone, then he must additionally explain what type of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) such a complex understanding (“a white horse is running”) would be classified as.

His objection is as follows:²² In accordance with CoD, such a complex cognition of the connected meaning (“a white horse is running”, in this case) cannot be classified as linguistic knowledge (*śābda*). This is because firstly, there is no use of language (*śabda*) in this instance of cognizing the three unconnected WMs ‘white’, ‘horse’ and ‘running’. Moreover, according to the Bhāṭṭa, only such knowledge of connected WMs can be considered linguistic as comes about on the basis of language (i.e. words), by means of the intermediate activity of the denotation of the WMs by the words.

Furthermore, Śālikanātha argues that it would be absurd for the Bhāṭṭa to classify such complex understanding as anything apart from linguistic knowledge.

¹⁹*ataḥ pramāṇāntareṇāsambaddhāvabhātānām padārthānām na kvacid anyonyasambandhabodhakatvam anumānārthāpattivyatirekeṇa praītam* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 393).

²⁰VM-I: IV.6.2.3, KṪ: V.2.8.

²¹*api ca yadi padārthāvagamātrād eva parasparānvayāvagamaḥ, tadā kasmin pramāṇe tasyāntarbhāva iti vācyam?* (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 393-394).

²²*na tāvac chābde śabdābhāvāt. padārthābhīdhānāvāntaravyāpāreṇa hi yac chabdād an-vayajñānam, tac chābdam ity eṣa vo rāddhāntaḥ. tasmān nāsya śābde 'ntarbhāvaḥ* (ibid., p. 394).

He explains²³ that if one admits another type of veridical knowledge (say, X), then the knowledge of the connected WMs would no longer be linguistic — in fact, the Bhāṭṭa would have to admit instead that in every case of unconnected WMs becoming connected, the final connected cognition is a variety of this (X) type of veridical knowledge only. This will lead to the absurd conclusion that even in the case of WMs learnt from words (i.e. language), the connected SM would be classified as veridical knowledge of the X type, instead of being considered linguistic.

Thus, Śālikanātha once again points to an error arising from the disassociation of the two processes — of words denoting unconnected WMs, and these unconnected WMs *thereafter* leading one to comprehend their mutual connected (sentential) meaning. The argument here is that the first process (words to WMs) may be considered linguistic — but if (as the example of “a white horse is running” shows) there can be instances of unconnected WMs spontaneously connecting without any role of words, then one would be at a loss to explain what type of veridical knowledge (*pramāṇa*) such complex (SM) cognition of the connected WMs is (as comes about due to the second process).

III.3.3 A combined refutation of the two Prābhākara objections

III.3.3.1 The concept of *pramāṇa*, and the Bhāṭṭa’s explanation of the intrinsic natures (*svabhāva*) of words and WMs

Even though Sucarita does not explicitly present the first objection as stated above (III.3.1), nevertheless the arguments presented by him can be considered as refuting both objections. This is because both these Prābhākara criticisms are in fact connected, as they focus on the *pramāṇa* needed to justify the complex SM cognition arising in the case of the Bhāṭṭa example of “a white horse is running”. The term *pramāṇa* is inherently ambiguous as it can refer *either* to the means of knowledge whereby a cognition is experienced (say, perception, inference, etc.) *or* to the resultant veridical cognition itself. As can be seen from the discussion above, the first objection (III.3.1) focuses its argument on the former sense

²³*pramāṇāntarābhyupagame tu śābdasyocchedaḥ śabdāvagatāpadārthaviṣaye ’pi tasyaiva prāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 394).

of *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) in the Bhāṭṭa example, whereas the second objection (III.3.2) focuses upon the latter sense of *pramāṇa* (veridical knowledge).

Sucarita presents a combined refutation of these two objections from the VM-I by elaborating upon the concept of the *pramāṇa* in this example. Firstly, with regard to *linguistically expressed* sentential meanings (i.e. complex SM arising from words), he states²⁴ that the Bhāṭṭa postulation of the potency of words to denote their unconnected WMs is in accordance with the process of language learning (*vyutpatti*). Moreover, it is due to such potency itself that words are admitted as naturally (*svābhāvika*) being means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) for the complex SM, on account of their denotation of the unconnected WMs — which in turn, have an intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) to become connected.²⁵

Thus, Sucarita insists that it is on account of their respective natures that *both* words and WMs play a role in SM denotation, in accordance with CoD. Consequently, in the case of SM cognition arising from words, the Bhāṭṭa would now be able to respond to the previously described Prābhākara criticism (III.3.2) by arguing that such SM cognition would in fact be considered linguistic (*śabda*) according to CoD. This is because such SM cognition would be triggered by language, and would be the result of both words and WMs acting in conformity with their respective intrinsic nature.

III.3.3.2 The distinction between *pramāṇa* and *phala*, and the equivalence with the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of perception

Moreover, with regard to the example of “a white horse is running” (i.e. for SM cognized through non-linguistic means), Sucarita admits²⁶ that the final complex SM cognition arises from a multitude of means of knowledge (*pramāṇasamāhāraja*). Furthermore, the Bhāṭṭa refers to this SM cognition itself as the result (*phala*) of these various means of knowledge, and it hence cannot be considered as a

²⁴V.3.8.2: *vyutpattyanusāriṇī hi śabde śaktikalpanā tadvaśena ca sambandhisvabhāvārthābhīdhānadvāreṇa śabdānāṃ svābhāvikaṃ prāmāṇyam upapādītam eva.*

²⁵The term used here is *sambandhisvabhāvārthābhīdhānadvāreṇa* i.e. on account of the denotation of their [unconnected] WMs, which have an intrinsic nature to become connected (*sambandhin*). I am hence considering the term *sambandhin* in this compound as equivalent to *sambandhayogya* and not *sambaddha*.

²⁶V.3.8.2: *yat tu śveto 'śvo dhāvatīti buddhau kiṃ pramāṇam iti naikaṃ kiñcit pramāṇam. pramāṇasamāhārajā tu viśiṣṭārthabuddhiḥ phalabhūtā na svayaṃ pramāṇam.*

pramāṇa (i.e. as a particular means of knowledge, or as a specific type of veridical knowledge).

Now, the reason for treating the final complex SM cognition as the *phala* is as follows:²⁷ Sucarita explains that perception and inference lead one to cognize substances, qualities and actions — as unconnected from each other. However, such substances, qualities and actions have an intrinsic expectation (*svabhāvasāpekṣa*) for each other — and it is as a result of this that their mutual association (*samsarga*) becomes evident to the mind. And such an association of the substances, qualities and actions known through *perception and inference* is **exactly analogous** to the mutual association of substances, qualities and actions as may be conveyed through *language*.

Thus, this explanation by Sucarita aligns closely with the discussion on the nature of perception as presented in the *ŚV Pratyakṣapariccheda*. A key problem addressed by Kumārila in this chapter is “how *pramāṇa* and *phala* are distinct, that is, how a cognition, which itself is a knowing of an object, can be construed as the means for the arising of *another* cognition that will be construed as the result” (Taber 2005, p.20). Kumārila explains that “a particular sense faculty will perceive only one particular sensible quality” (ibid.), and thus one of the explanations corroborating the distinction between the *pramāṇa* and the *phala* considers that “the *pramāṇa* could be a cognition of a qualifying feature of an object, such as the colour blue, and the *phala* an awareness of that same object as qualified by that feature, for example, ‘The pot is blue’.” (ibid.)

In this same way then, Sucarita argues here that no difference can be discerned between a quality (say, blue) which is directly perceived, or which may be linguistically expressed (i.e. denoted by words). **Just as one arrives at the complex (conceptualized) cognition of ‘this pot is blue’ by directly perceiving distinct non-conceptualized cognitions, similarly one can arrive at the complex SM cognition ‘this pot is blue’ by the words which denote distinct unconnected WMs.** Moreover, as argued previously, it is the intrinsic nature of words and WMs to lead to such SM denotation.

Thus, Sucarita explains that if one were to consider language, perception,

²⁷V.3.8.2: *pratyakṣānumānāvagatānām hi dravyaguṇakarmanām svabhāvasāpekṣānām eva śabdapratipāditānām iva samsargo bhāsate.*

inference, etc. as means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), then the complex SM cognition becomes their result (*phala*). Thus, in the example of “a white horse is running”, it is the final, complex SM cognition that would be considered as the *phala* if the various means of knowledge (perception, etc.) involved in cognizing ‘white’, ‘horse’ and ‘running’ are considered as the *pramāṇa*.

However, (as also argued in *Pratyakṣapariccheda* vv.70-73)²⁸ one may also classify this SM cognition in accordance with the three-fold classification of all cognitions as *hāna*, *upādāna* and *upekṣā* i.e. to be avoided, desirable or neither.²⁹ In such a three-fold classification then, the Bhāṭṭa explains that the SM will become the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), with one among these three cognitions (*hāna*, *upādāna* or *upekṣā*) becoming the result (*phala*).³⁰

III.4 The charge of hermeneutic non-conformity of CoD, and its refutation

III.4.1 Objection: DoC has greater hermeneutic conformity with the ŚBh on PMS 3.3.14

The ŚBh on PMS 3.3.14 puts forward a definition of a sentence, which subsequently forms the basis of hermeneutic dispute between the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras. PMS 3.3.14 sets out the six different hermeneutic means of knowledge for Mīmāṃsā with regard to applicatory injunctions (*vinīyogavidhi*): *śruti*, *liṅga*, *vākya*, *prakaraṇa*, *sthāna* and *samākhyā*.³¹ The ŚBh explains the use of each, and it is while discussing the nature of *vākya* (sentence) that Śabara states:³²

²⁸Taber 2005, pp.20, 76ff.

²⁹The term *hānādibuddhi* is used also in ŚV *Pratyakṣapariccheda* vv.73ab. Taber (ibid., pp. 93-94) translates this as ‘the cognition that the object is to be avoided’.

³⁰For the purpose of this thesis, I end the discussion at this point. However, as I have mentioned also in Chapter II, these arguments by the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara cannot be considered as final or as vindicating one theory in favour of the other, despite their cogency and acuity. Rather, Śālikanātha and Sucarita may be considered as articulating and setting forth in detail the foremost arguments and refutations in this debate — further study of subsequent Mīmāṃsā philosophical works may add even more to the richness and complexity of this debate.

³¹PMS 3.3.14: *śrutiliṅgavākyaṅ prakaraṇasthānasamākhyānāṃ samavāye pāradaurbalyam arthaviprakaṣāt*. See Edgerton (1929, pp. 64-110) for an explanation and discussion.

³²ŚBh on PMS 3.3.14: *atha kiṃ vākyaṃ nāma? samhatyārtham abhidadhati padāni vākyaṃ*.

Now, what is that which is called a sentence? Once they have been aggregated, the words denoting the meaning (*artha*) are the sentence.

III.4.1.1 The Prābhākara's focus in the KṬ on the term *artham*

In the KṬ, the Prābhākara *pūrvapakṣin* quotes this definition from the ŚBh in order to substantiate his argument of the hermeneutic conformity of DoC.³³ The focus here is the singular term *artham*, which is being denoted by the (plural) words.

The Prābhākara opponent thus argues that the term *artham* in this definition of the ŚBh refers to the singular *vākyārtha* (SM) rather than the manifold *padārthas* (WMs), and he thus understands the definition as:

Now, what is that which is called a sentence? Once they have been aggregated, the words denoting the [sentential] meaning (*artha*) are the sentence.

As a result, the Prābhākara in the KṬ argues that this definition of a sentence in the ŚBh endorses DoC (words denoting SM) and not CoD (words denoting WMs).

III.4.1.2 Śālikanātha's focus in the VM-I on the term *saṃhatya*

Śālikanātha also quotes the above-mentioned definition of the sentence from the ŚBh, but he does so in a different context. This definition is quoted when Śālikanātha argues that memory plays a key role in SM denotation not only in DoC but also in CoD.³⁴ He is keen to demonstrate here that the memories of unconnected WMs are integral to SM denotation even in the Bhāṭṭa doctrine, and thus presents a quote from Kumārila's *Bṛhātīkā* to substantiate his claim:³⁵

According to us, since even these [WMs] certainly do not lead one to cognize SM if [the WMs] are not recollected (*asmṛta*),
The nature of being a means of knowledge (*pramāṇatā*) is present in those very aggregated (*saṃhata*) memories of the [WMs] (*tatsmaraṇa*).

³³See V.2.1.

³⁴See IV.8.3.

³⁵*te 'pi naivāsmṛtā yasmād vākyārthaṃ gamayanti naḥ; tasmāt tatsmaraṇeṣv eva saṃhateṣu pramāṇatā* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 402)

Śālikanātha argues that Kumārila has stated this verse in order to further explain the definition of the sentence from the ŚBh, and he then immediately quotes the definition as presented above.³⁶ It thus seems quite likely that he considers Kumārila’s use of the term *saṃhata* in his verse from the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* as glossing the term *saṃhatya* as found in Śabara’s definition. Śālikanātha’s focus is thus on the term *saṃhatya*, and he understands Śabara’s definition as:

Now what is that which is called a sentence? Once [the **WM memories** have been] aggregated (*saṃhatya*), the words denoting meaning (*artha*) are the sentence.

Thus, Śālikanātha seems to present this definition by Śabara in support of the role of memory in the process of SM denotation in accordance with CoD, and thereby links this definition with Kumārila’s verse where the WM memories (*tatsmaraṇa*) are explicitly mentioned as aggregated (*saṃhata*).

III.4.1.3 The uncertainty of Śālikanātha regarding the term *artham*

Now, if this were admitted – that Śālikanātha focuses on the term *saṃhatya* in Śabara’s definition – then one is left with an uncertainty with regard to the term *artham*. Śālikanātha does not discuss this definition any further, and it is hence possible to construe his intention with regard to the term *artham* in two ways: one, similar to the Prābhākara *pūrvapakṣin* from the KṚ who seeks to establish *artham* in the definition as *vākyārtha* (SM); or two, let *artham* in the definition be understood as the manifold *padārthas* (WM).

Reading the VM-I makes both interpretations seem justifiable, and it is clear that there is no special emphasis here to construe the term *artham* as *vākyārtha* alone, unlike the case of the Prābhākara *pūrvapakṣin* in the KṚ. Thus, I contend that in the VM-I, one cannot unambiguously settle upon whether the term *artham* refers to SM or to WM, just as is the case for the ŚBh. Perhaps one could postulate that the reason for the KṚ’s attempt to construe *artham* as *vākyārtha* alone was that the KṚ was also considering Prābhākara objections from sources other than

³⁶*ata eva tatrabhavata ācāryasya vākyalakṣaṇam saṃhatyārtham abhidadhāti padāni vākyam iti* (ibid., p. 402).

the VM-I — however, this can remain nothing more than speculation and only further study of works from this period will help resolve this definitively.

III.4.2 Refutation: Two possible interpretations of *abhidadhāti*

Sucarita however disputes the Prābhākara *pūrvapakṣin*'s interpretation of construing the term *artham* in Śabara's definition as *vākyārtha*. He argues³⁷ that in the phrase *saṃhatyārtham abhidadhāti padāni vākyam*, Śabara is not demonstrating the assistance of multiple words in the sentence for the denotation of sentential meaning (*artha*).

Rather, one possible interpretation of this definition is that once aggregated, the words – which are denoting their own meanings (*artha*) – become the sentence. This aligns with CoD, whereby a sentence comprises words which complete their function by denoting their own WMs only. This explanation relies on construing the term *abhidadhāti* as a Present Active Participle.

A second possible interpretation, argues the Bhāṭṭa, is that the sense of the term *abhidadhāti* is that the words cause one to comprehend (*avagamay-*) the SM (*artha*). Once again, such a reformulation is in accordance with the Bhāṭṭa argument, as words cause one to comprehend SM by denoting their WMs in accordance with CoD.

³⁷V.3.1: *saṃhatyārtham abhidadhātī tu nārthābhīdhāyāṃ sāhityaṃ darśayituṃ kintv artham abhidadhāti padāni saṃhatya vākyam bhavantīti vyākhyeyam, abhidadhātīti vāvagamayantīti vyākhyeyam.*

Chapter IV

A Philological and Philosophical Study of Śālikanāthamiśra's Vākyārthamātrkā-I

IV.1 Defining *anvitābhidhāna* (vv.1-3)

Śālikanātha's VM-I¹ is an exposition and defence of the Prābhākara doctrine of *anvitābhidhāna* (DoC).² At the very outset of his work, Śālikanātha states that according to this doctrine, it is the words alone that cause the cognition of SM.³ In the course of the text, he considers and rejects seven other possibilities:⁴ the unitary indivisible sentence, the terminal phoneme of the sentence, the recollected (*smṛtistha*) group of words, the first word, only the word denoting action, the unconnected word meanings (WMs) and the cognition of the generic connection

¹There are three editions of the Sanskrit text: A. Sastri (1964) Edition of VM-I (BHU), M. Sastri (1904) Edition of VM-I (C) and Kevalānandasaraswatī (1952) Edition of VM-I (MK). I have generally adopted the text from the BHU edition, but there are instances of important variant readings being found in MK and C as well. In case of any significant divergence in readings, I have mentioned the same in the footnotes.

²See I.3 for an explanation of the abbreviation DoC.

³VM-I v.1: *padebhya eva vākyārthapratyayo jāyate yathā; tathā vyaṃ nibadhnīmaḥ prabhākaraḥ guror matam* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 377)

⁴*vākyam ekaṃ na nirbhāgaṃ vākyāntyo varṇa eva vā; padavṛndaṃ smṛtisthaṃ vā prathamam padam eva vā; ākhyātapadamātraṃ vā padārthā vāpy ananvitāḥ; sāmānyānvayabodhe vā hetur vākyārthabodhane; padāny eva samarthāni vākyārthasyāvabodhane; viśeṣānvayavādīni bhāgaśo bhāgaśālīnaḥ* (ibid., pp. 413-414)

between the WMs (*sāmānyānvayabodha*). He concludes that that it is only the words which are capable of leading to the cognition of the SM, with this SM itself comprising parts. Moreover, words express the specific connection (*viśeṣānvaya*) between the WMs in turn.

Śālikanātha explains⁵ that words in a sentence entirely exhaust (*upakṣiṇa*) their potencies to express meaning in their denotation of their own respective WMs as connected to the other WMs. Moreover, once such connected WMs are known by means of their words alone, the SM will also be cognized. Thus, it is immediately made clear by the author what is meant by referring to this theory as *anvitābhīdhāna*: here, words denote (*abhīdhā-*) their own respective meanings (*svārtha*) as connected to other WMs⁶ i.e. there is the denotation (*abhīdhāna*) of the word's own meaning as connected (*anvita*) to other WMs.

Furthermore, Śālikanātha clarifies that the SMs are the WMs themselves — such that these WMs have their mutual connection cognized in the form of a relation between a primary element and other secondary ones.⁷

IV.2 Multiple words have the same purpose (vv.4-5)

An objection is raised to this last point about the SM being the WMs themselves:⁸ the WMs in a sentence are numerous, and hence, there will arise numerous SMs from a unitary sentence. And such numerous SMs will, in turn, lead one to postulate a plurality of sentences as well. Such an objection is presented and refuted in vv.4-5:⁹

Even though these words' respective meanings are numerous when
considered individually,

⁵VM-I v.2: *padair evānvitasvārthamātropakṣiṇaśaktibhiḥ; svārthās ced bodhitā buddho** *vākyaṛtho 'pi tathā sati* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 377) (*MK & C: *buddhau*)

⁶*yadi tu padāny evānvitān svārthān abhidatātī śakyate sādhayitum...* (ibid., p. 377)

⁷VM-I v.3: *pradhānaguṇabhāvena labdhānyonyasamanvayān; padārthān eva vākyaṛthān saṅgirante vipāścitaḥ* (ibid., p. 377)

⁸*nanu teṣāṃ bhūyastvād bhūyāṃso vākyaṛthāḥ, vākyaṇi ca syur iti* (ibid., p. 378).

⁹VM-I vv.4-5: *bhūyāṃso yady api svārthāḥ padānāṃ te pṛthakpṛthak; prayojanatayā tv ekavākyaṛtham sampracakṣate; tatpratītyekakāryatvād vākyaṃ apy ekam ucyate; pratipattir guṇānāṃ hi pradhānaikaprayojanā.* (ibid., p. 378) (The nature of the unitary *kārya* is the topic of discussion in VM-II)

They still express together (*sampracakṣ-*) a unitary SM due to their [unitary] purpose (*prayojana*). (v.4)

And since that [SM] cognition is a unitary command (*kārya*), the sentence is also declared to be unitary.

The reason [for the words' unitary purpose (*ekaprayojanatva*)] is that the cognition of secondary entities has the primary element as its single purpose. (v.5)

The commentary here explains¹⁰ that a primary element (in this case, the unitary *kārya*) is always admitted as being qualified by secondary entities — and this is the reason for the secondary elements (in this case, the words having numerous WMs¹¹) being conveyed. As a result, these secondary entities are directed towards (*tātparyā*) the primary element as it is the latter alone which is to be known (*prameya*). Moreover, language is admitted as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) only with regard to what it is directed towards. Consequently, the cognition of that primary element is not dependent upon one word but instead, the entire sentence becomes its means of knowledge.

Furthermore, Śālikanātha even quotes from Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* on PMS 6.1.1 in support of his argument.¹² Śālikanātha explains that the sense of Kumārila's phrase is that an isolated word is not a means of knowledge, and the isolated WMs are not what are to be known. Moreover, Śālikanātha turns to this argument later as well in IV.7.3.

¹⁰*yad dhi pradhānabhūtaṃ, tad eva kathaṃ nāma viśiṣṭaṃ pratīyatām* ity evam arthaṃ guṇānāṃ pratipādanam, tena tatraiva tātparyam, tad eva prameyam, tātparyaviśaya eva śabdasya prāmāṇyābhyupagamāt, tasya tathābhūtasya pratipattir naikapadanibandhaneti, vākyam eva tatra pramāṇam* (ibid., p. 378) (*MK & C: *pratīyate*).

¹¹See Chapter I footnote 2 for an explanation of my choice of the terms 'words' and 'word-meanings'.

¹²*śaṣṭhādye na padaṃ nāma kiñcana vākye, na padārthā nāma kecana vākyārthe* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 378)

IV.3 How language learning takes place (v.6)

In v.6, Śālikanātha discusses how language learning (*vyutpatti*) comes about in accordance with DoC. He says here:¹³

When multiple activities are performed by elders subsequent to hearing different sentences,
One can determine the potency of words [in each sentence] by splitting [a sentence] through the addition or removal [of individual words].

Śālikanātha explains that¹⁴ even though all language learning is preceded by the linguistic usage of elders and such usage is always in the form of sentences, nevertheless one ascertains the potency of each word to signify that very meaning which recurs when the word recurs in a sentence, and which is excluded when the word is excluded. Furthermore, Śālikanātha argues that such an understanding does not lead to the cognition of the SM becoming unjustified, and this will be explained subsequently in accordance with DoC.

Śālikanātha also argues here that it is the words only which are expressive of sentential meaning, not the indivisible sentence or the sentence's terminal phoneme. After some discussion, Śālikanātha explains that sentential meaning is not *inferred* from the sentence, as SM is expressed by words only. However, while arguing thus, he begins his explanation about how language learning comes about.

Śālikanātha discusses the case of a child who sees before him two elders engaging in linguistic communication.¹⁵ The specific situation considered is when one elder is prompted by the other to perform a specific activity, and this entire process (from the command being uttered until the activity is completed) is observed by the child.¹⁶ Śālikanātha explains that a child who is learning language

¹³VM-I v.6: *vyavahāreṣu vṛddhānāṃ vākyaśravaṇabhāviṣu; āvāpoddhārabhedena padānāṃ śaktiniścayaḥ* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 378)

¹⁴*yady api vṛddhavyavahārapūrvikaiva sarvā śabdavyutpattiḥ, vākyair eva ca vyavahāraḥ tathāpi yatpadāvāpe yasyārthasyāvāpaḥ, yaduddhāre coddhāraḥ, tasminn evārthe tasya padasya vācakaśaktir avasīyate* (ibid., p. 379).

¹⁵The explanation of *vyutpatti* in Kṛṣṇa is quite similar. See V.2.4 and V.3.3.

¹⁶*bālo hi vyutpadyamānaḥ prayojyavṛddhasya śabdaśravaṇasamanantarabhāvinīṃ viśiṣṭaceṣṭānumitām arthapratītiṃ śabdakāraṇikām avagacchati. sa tathā vyutpannaḥ kadācit kasyacid ananvitārthapadaracanaṃ vākyam upalabhate, tathopalabhamānasya caiva vimārśo jāyate — sambhāvyamānānanvitārthapadaracanaṃ idaṃ vākyam katham prayojyavṛddhasya*

will understand the SM cognition experienced by the *prompted* elder upon hearing the command of the *prompting* elder as being caused by language. This is because firstly, the child will infer the prompted elder as experiencing such SM cognition on account of his observing the prompted elder’s activity concerning a qualified object (*viśiṣṭaceṣṭā*), and secondly, since this SM cognition will arise immediately after the prompted elder has heard the words uttered by the prompting elder.

Moreover, Śālikanātha explains that the child, having learnt the language (*vyutpanna*), may one day (*kadācit*) (presumably at a later age) consider such a sentence for some prompted elder as being an arrangement of words having *unconnected* word-meanings. And for this (young) adult who is considering thus, the following deliberation will come about: “This sentence is a composition of words with possibly unconnected word meanings — how did it bring about a conviction about its meaning for the prompted elder? In the case of sentences which depend upon people (*puruṣāyatta*), even the prompted elder will possibly have this doubt about them being an arrangement of words having *unconnected* meanings, just as such a doubt comes about for me.” Śālikanātha now argues that when such a doubt has arisen for this young adult (a future *dārśanika* perhaps!), once again the following decision is arrived at — “Most certainly, this speaker of the command is ascertained by the prompted elder as being one who employs words whose WMs are surely connected (*anvitārtha*).”

Moreover, Śālikanātha reasons that such a restriction (*niyama*), namely that all speakers use words with connected WMs only, would not be justified if the connection between WMs was not grasped by him (i.e. the prompted elder). Thus, the connection between WMs is settled upon as being such (i.e. as being made before the speaker utters the words) by the one (i.e. the future *dārśanika*!) who is inferring the prompted elder’s grasping of the connection.

Śālikanātha also explains that once the connection between the WMs is settled upon as existing prior to the words being uttered, the uttered sentence becomes a

arthaniścayaṃ kṛtavat? vṛddhasyāpi puruṣāyatte vākye ’navitārthapadaracanaśaṅkā mameva sambhavatīti. tasyaivaṃ vicikitsodaye punar eṣa niścayo jāyate — nūnam anenāyaṃ prayoktethamavadhārīto yad anvitārthāny eva padāny ayaṃ prayuṅkteti. tathāvidhapadaprayoganiyamāś cāsyānupalabdhe ’nvaye nopapadyate ity evam anvayopalambham anumimānenānvayo niścīyate. niścīte cānvaye vākyam etad anuvādakabhūtam arthasyeti. evañ ced anuvādatayā tasyārthasya tad vākyam vācakam** eteti pūrvavācakaśaktijñānaṃ nāyathārtham iti manyate ... A. Sastri (1964, p. 380) (*BHU: anuvādashūtam), (**MK & C: bādhakam).*

restatement (*anuvādaka*) of the SM. And since this is so, that uttered sentence is indeed expressive of that SM as a restatement.

IV.4 Some major objections to DoC (commentary to v.6)

IV.4.1 Endless correlates lead to a word's relation not being grasped

The Bhāṭṭa Pūrvapakṣin (PP) now argues¹⁷ that if one were to admit in accordance with DoC that a word denotes its own WM as connected to other WMs, nevertheless, one will also have to accept that there are infinite possible correlates (i.e. connected WMs) (*pratiyogin*) for any given WM. Due to this, there will be endless possible connections (*anvaya*) that a WM could have, and consequently, there will be infinite possible connected meanings (*anvita*) that a single word could denote. As a result, grasping the relation (*sambandha*) of a word and its meaning will be rendered impossible.

Moreover, the Bhāṭṭa PP argues that if the *anvitābhīdhānavādins* still admit that such a word – whose relation with its own WM has not been grasped – is expressive of meaning, then they will be faced with the consequence of the cognition of all meanings resulting from a single word.¹⁸

IV.4.2 The fault of mutual dependence

The Bhāṭṭa opponent also argues¹⁹ that in order to accept a word as *denoting* its own WM as connected to other WMs, the Prābhākara Siddhāntin must explain whether

¹⁷*pratiyoginām anantatayā anvayānām ānanyāt, tadānantye cānvitānām apy ānanyāt sambandhagrahaṇaṃ duṣkaram. agrhītasambandhasya ca padasya vācakatve ekasmāc chabdāt sarvārthapratītiprasaṅgaḥ.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 381)

¹⁸See II.3.

¹⁹*tathā padenānvitas svārtho 'bhīdhīyamānaḥ — kim abhihitena padārthāntareṇānvito 'bhīdhīyate uta anabhihiteneti vikalpanīyam. anabhihitena cet padāntaraprayogavaiyarthyam. ekasmāc ca sarvānvayapratītiprasaṅgaḥ. abhihitena cet tad api tarhi padam anvitābhīdhāyitayā padāntaropāttam artham abhīdhānāyāpekṣata iti, itaretarāśrayaḥ prāpnoti.* (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 381-383)

the word's own meaning is connected to other WMs which are also *denoted* or not. In either case, a fault arises. If the Siddhāntin were to consider the other WMs as not being denoted, then the use of the other words in the sentence would become futile since one word will be capable of conveying all connections between WMs.

On the other hand, if other WMs are denoted – then since a word denotes a connected meaning (*anvitābhidhāyin*), it will depend upon another WM ascertained through the other word for its own denotation. Consequently, the fault of mutual dependence will result.

IV.4.3 CoD has greater hermeneutic conformity

The Bhāṭṭa opponent also claims that CoD²⁰ has comparatively greater hermeneutic conformity with the arguments of Jaimini and Śābara. He explains²¹ that according to his doctrine, words simply denote the isolated forms of their own WMs (*svarūpamātra*), which are independent of the denotations of other words. These WMs in turn possess mutual expectation (*ākāṅkṣā*), capability (*yogyatā*) and proximity (*sannidhi*) and thereby lead to the cognition of SM.

And it is exactly this which is described in the ŚBh to PMS 1.1.25:²²

This is because all words cease functioning (*nivṛttavyāpāra*) once they have denoted their own respective meanings. Now, it is only when the WMs have been understood that these cause one to cognize the SM.

²⁰See I.2.1 for an explanation of the abbreviation CoD.

²¹*tasmāt padāntarābhidhānānapekṣasvarūpamātrābhidhānam evārthānāṃ padaiḥ kriyate. te ca tathābhūtāḥ padair abhihitāḥ padārthā ākāṅkṣāsannidhiyogyatāvanto vākyārtham avagamayanti.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 383)

²²*tad āha bhāṣyakāraḥ — padāni hi svaṃ svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāni. athedānāṃ avagatāḥ santa vākyārtham avagamayantīti.* (ibid., p. 383)

IV.5 The conditions of expectation, proximity and compatibility (vv.7-9ab)

IV.5.1 The response to ‘endless correlates’ (IV.4.1) begins

In v.7, the Siddhāntin explains²³ that WMs are always added into or removed from sentences while possessing a connection with other WMs — and it is hence that the capability of words to denote connected meanings is comprehended. In this verse, the Siddhāntin seems to refute a Bhāṭṭa opponent’s hypothetical claim that when analyzed, words in sentences are found to be denotative of isolated, unconnected WMs. Instead, the Siddhāntin is asserting here that even under analysis, words are always found to be denotative of a connected meaning.

This now allows the Siddhāntin to refute the objection in IV.4.1 that the word’s endless correlates lead to one to being unable to comprehend the word’s relation (*sambandha*) with its WM. Rather, the Siddhāntin explains that:²⁴

Words express their own meanings as connected to other [word] meanings which are expected, proximate and compatible — if one admits such language learning,
Then there can be no fault due to infinity [of correlates] and deviation [of word denotation]²⁵.

Thus, Śālikanātha refutes here the opponent’s objection of IV.4.1, since for him, a word expresses its own WM as connected only to expected, proximate and compatible meanings. This doctrine thereby prevents a word from possibly denoting infinite connected meanings, as had been objected by the opponent.²⁶

The Siddhāntin also explains²⁷ that the arguments of the Bhāṭṭa opponent are logically incongruous (*anupapanna*) as one can ascertain a word’s relation

²³VM-I v.7: *opyante coddhriyante ca svārthā anvayaśālinah; anviteṣv eva sāmartyam padānāṃ tena gamyate* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 383)

²⁴VM-I v.8-9ab: *ākāṅkṣāsannidhiprāptayogyārthāntarasaṅgatān; svārthān ahuḥ padānīti vyutpattis samśritā yadā; ānantyavyabhicārābhyāṃ tadā doṣo na kaścana* (ibid., p. 384)

²⁵‘Deviation’ (*vyabhicāra*) refers to the argument that a word whose relation with its own WM is not grasped may become expressive of meaning, as in IV.4.1.

²⁶This is only a partial discussion yet of the ‘endless correlates’ argument — a related argument regarding the potencies of words is presented by the Siddhāntin in IV.6.3.

²⁷*yat tāvad uktam: ānantyāc chabdaśaktyavadhāraṇānupapattiḥ, agrhītaśakteś ca vācakatve*

to its own WM quite easily (*sambandhabodhasaukarya*)²⁸ even by admitting the three conditions (*upalakṣaṇa*) of expectation, proximity and compatibility. And language learning (*vyutpatti*) is admitted as a word expressing (i.e. denoting) that same WM as connected to expected, proximate and compatible correlates. Thus, the Siddhāntin now enters into a detailed discussion on the nature of these three properties while also considering other possible objections.

IV.5.2 The nature of expectation

IV.5.2.1 Defining expectation

After refuting the Nyāya explanation of expectation, Śālikanātha puts forth his own definition of this as being *pratiyogijijñāsā* i.e. expectation is the curiosity for correlates. He argues²⁹ that there are two bases for such curiosity to arise — the non-completion (*aparyavasāna*) of the process of denotation (*abhidhāna*), as well as the non-completion of the meaning which is to be denoted (*abhidheya*).

Śālikanātha explains the former a bit further by citing the example of instances when only a single word is used. For instance, when a word such as *dvāram* (door) is used to mean “close the door”, even the process of denotation is not completed. The reason for this is that when the second word (say, close) is not uttered, this second word being such that it will bring about the proximity of the first WM’s (WM ‘door’) correlate (WM ‘close’), one cannot speak of there being the process of denotation of a connected meaning.

Furthermore, Śālikanātha explains that since it is ascertained that words are always intended to convey a connected meaning on account of the linguistic usage

*vyabhicāraprasaṅga iti, tad anupapannam. upalakṣaṇāśrayaṇenāpi sambandhabodhasaukāryād**. *ākāṅkṣitena योग्येन सन्निहितेन चान्विताम् स्वार्थाम् पदाम् वक्तुं व्युत्पत्तिर अश्रियते.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 384) (*BHU: *upalakṣaṇāśrayaṇenāpi sambandhabodhaḥ, saukāryād ākāṅkṣitena . . .*; C and MK have the same text, as accepted above. Unlike MK however, C does not have a sentence-break. MK and C have the same sense, yet I prefer the MK variant as the sentence-break makes the two aspects of the refutation, corresponding to the two aspects of the objection, more evident.)

²⁸See IV.3.

²⁹*atrocyate – abhidhānāparyavasānam abhidheyāparyavasānañ ca jijñāsodaye nibandhanam. ekapadaprayoge hi dvāram ityādāv abhidhānam eva na paryavasyati. na hy anuccarite pratiyogisannidhāpake pade 'nvitābhidhānam śakyate vaktum. vṛddhavyavahāravaśēnānvitārthapratipādanaparatā padānām avadhāriteti, tadartham yuktaiva pratiyogijijñāsā* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 386).

by elders, it is for this reason that it is correct to admit of there being *pratiyogijjñāsā* i.e. the curiosity for correlates.

IV.5.2.2 Getting from *kārya* to *niyojya*

Śālikanātha now explains the process of how expectation leads one from the command (*kārya*) to the commanded person (*niyojya*) in case of a Vedic injunction. According to Śālikanātha,³⁰ it is the command alone which is the SM, and is hence denoted. Nevertheless, one cannot account (*anupapatti*) for a command without its performance (*anuṣṭhāna*), which is in turn impossible without an agent (*kartr̥*). This agent cannot be possible without knowing his/her qualification (*adhikāra*) – and such qualification can never be ascertained without knowing who the command applies to (*niyojya*). Consequently, in order to account for the command (*kārya*), it is indeed appropriate that there come about a curiosity for determining the person that the command applies to, and this commanded person will hence be compatible for a connection with the command.

Śālikanātha further explains³¹ how this commanded person (*niyojya*) comes to be determined as *svargakāma* i.e. someone desiring heaven. He explains that once the above-mentioned curiosity for the commanded person comes about, since one will understand the command as being incomplete in itself, one would resort to supplying language (*adhyāhāra*) as is often the case in ordinary sentences (such as ‘door’, where one supplies the WM ‘close’ even though not uttered). Nevertheless, since the performance of such a Vedic command is not necessary (*āvaśyakatva*) or essential (*antaraṅgatva*) to life, its performance cannot be postulated by the agent. Instead, agents are established as being desirous of personal gains (*kāmya*), and heaven is the only attribute whose desire is common to all agents. Consequently, heaven is suitable as a qualification of the commanded person — and as a result, the commanded person is supplied as someone desiring heaven.

³⁰*abhihitasya kāryasyāpūrvātmano ’nuṣṭhānaṃ vinā kāryatvānupapatteḥ, kartr̥ ca vinā tadasambhavāt, adhikārād ṛte ca tadayogāt, niyojyam antareṇa ca tasyānavakalpanāt, tadupapattaye yuktaiva tadanvayayogyaniyojyajjñāsā.* (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 386-387)

³¹*tasyām satyām aparipūrṇatvāvagamāt, lokavad adhyāhāre kartavye saty api, jīvanasyāvaśyakatve ’ntaraṅgatve ca vidher anuṣṭhānākṣepo na kalpeteti, tatparityāgena kāmye niyojyaviśeṣaṇe sthite sarvakāmipurūṣavyāpīsvargasyaiva niyojyaviśeṣaṇatvayogyatvāt, svargakāmo niyojyo ’dhyāhriyate.* (ibid., p. 387)

IV.5.2.3 The sentence is not complete at each step: A revised definition of expectation

An objection is put forth here:³² When three words are used in ordinary sentences, such as *gām ānaya śuklām* (bring the white cow), the sentence should be complete (*paripūrṇa*) upon the utterance of the first two words *gām ānaya* (bring the cow). Hence there will be no further expectation for the third WM ‘white’, and there will not come about the denotation of a meaning connected to all three WMs.

However, Śālikanātha explains³³ that this would be true had the third word *śuklām* not been uttered (*anuccāraṇa*). However, since it has been uttered (*uc-carita*), that too comes to be proximate with the verb bring (*ānayatisannidhāna*) and is considered as forming a unitary sentence with it (*ekavākyatvāvagama*). On this basis, we come to understand the third word white as denoting its own meaning as connected with the meaning ‘bring’. As a result of this, and also because such a connected denotation of the word white cannot be possible without expectation — one postulates the expectation of the verb bring for the WM ‘white’.

Śālikanātha also refers³⁴ to the example discussed in the ŚBh to PMS 1.2.7. Here, Śābara concludes that in the three-word sentence *paṭo bhavati raktaḥ* (the cloth is red), there is indeed expectation for (*prati*) the WM ‘red’. Thus in such an example of *gām ānaya śuklām* as well, Śālikanātha says that there is expectation of the verb bring for the WM ‘white’ in order to establish DoC.

Finally, Śālikanātha states that³⁵ one may object that in the case of incomplete sentences such as *dvāram*, there is expectation for DoC of that very word, whereas in multi-word, complete sentences such as *gām ānaya śuklām*, there is expectation for the DoC of another word. To this, he says:³⁶

³²*nanv evaṃ tarhi yatra padatrayaṃ prayujyate gām ānaya śuklām iti loke tatra hi kārakadvayasyāsambhavān nākāṅkṣāstīti katham anvitābhidhānam gām ānayety etāvataiva paripūrṇatvād vākyasya.* (ibid., p. 387)

³³*satyam. padāntarānuccāraṇa evam, uccarite tu tasmīn, tasyāpy ānayatisannidhānād ekavākyatvāvagamād ānayatyānvitasvārthābhidhāyitvāt, ākāṅkṣām vinā ca tadasambhavāt, ānayater ākāṅkṣā parikalpyate.* (ibid., p. 387)

³⁴*tathā coktaṃ bhāṣyakāreṇa — bhavati ca raktaṃ praty ākāṅkṣeti. tenātrāpy anvitābhidhānasiddhyartham evākāṅkṣā.* (ibid., pp. 387-388)

³⁵*yadi param ayaṃ viśeṣaḥ, dvāram ityādau tasyaiva padasyānvitābhidhānāyākāṅkṣā, gām ānaya śuklām ityādau tu padāntarasyeti.* (ibid., p. 388)

³⁶*anvitasvārthābhidhānārtham uktārthaghaṭanāya vā; pratiyogini jijñāsā yā sākāṅkṣeti gīyate* (ibid., p. 388)

In order to denote a connected meaning [of an incomplete statement, such as *dvāram*], or to bring about the [connected] meaning of [multiple words] uttered [such as *gām ānaya śuklām*],
The curiosity for correlates which comes about, that is known as expectation.

IV.5.2.4 Expectation as the pre-eminent condition

Śālikanātha now adds another feature of the condition of expectation. He states³⁷ that only when such expectation for correlates exists that one can admit to a condition for language learning. He explains that one may wonder as to why a condition is not admitted when proximity and compatibility alone exist, without expectation. However, Śālikanātha argues that the reason for this is that WMs which do not have expectation for one another are never seen as denoting a connected meaning.

To illustrate his point, Śālikanātha presents the example of the sentence: *ayam eti putro rājñah puruṣo 'yam apanīyatām*. Now, the question here is whether the WM *rājñah* (of the king) is to be connected with *putra* (son) or *puruṣa* (man). The response given by the Siddhāntin is³⁸ that SM cognition arising from a sentence has an expectation for a method (*nyāyasāpekṣa*). Thus, *rājñah* is to be connected only with *son*, as this latter always has an expectation for another in order to answer the question ‘whose son?’. And *rājñah* is rendered without any expectation due to its connection with *son*, and it does not undergo any connection with *man*.

IV.5.2.5 The sequence of expectation

Furthermore, Śālikanātha explains that expectation does not arise at once altogether for all correlates, but instead comes about with the gradual appearance of its causes (*kāraṇopanipātakrameṇa*). He explains³⁹ that without the content of the command

³⁷*sā ceyamākāṅkṣā bhavanti vyutpattāv upalakṣaṇam āśrīyate. kimiti punas sannidhiyogyatva eva nāśrīyate, nirākāṅkṣāṅām anvitābhīdhānādarśanāt.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 388)

³⁸*ucyate — vākyāt vākyārthapratipatter nyāyasāpekṣatvāt, nityasāpekṣeṇa putreṇaiva rājā sambadhyate, tatsambandhanirākāṅkṣā ca na puruṣasambandham anubhavatīty ākāṅkṣāpi vyutpattyupalakṣaṇam āśrīyate.* (ibid., p. 388)

³⁹*tathā hi — viśayam antareṇāpūrvaṃ kāryaṃ pratyetur eva na śakyata iti, pratipattyanubandhabhūta viśayāpekṣā prathamam vidheḥ. atha pratipanne viśayasambandhini vidhyarthe niyojyam antareṇa tatsiddhyasambhavān niyojyākāṅkṣā. tathā viśayībhūte bhāvārthe karaṇe lab-*

(*viṣaya*), the command which is unknown through other means of knowledge (*apūrva*)⁴⁰ cannot be understood. Thus, first of all, the injunction (*vidhi*) has an expectation for its content, being as this is the adjunct of the command's cognition. Thereafter, once the meaning of the command (*vidhyartha*), which is connected to the command's content, has been ascertained – there is then the expectation for the commanded person (*niyojya*) since that command cannot be accomplished without a commanded person. In this manner, once the meaning of the verbal form (*bhāvārtha*), which is the content of the command, has been ascertained as a means to accomplishing the command, there comes about an expectation for the auxiliaries of the injunction (*karanopakāraka*).⁴¹

IV.5.3 The nature of proximity

To elucidate the nature and role of proximity in verbal cognition, Śālikanātha explains that there is a recurrence (*viparivṛtti*) of WMs in one's mind in accordance with the order of one's knowledge of their proximity.⁴²

Moreover, he explains⁴³ that proximity is a condition for language learning in accordance with DoC not just when proximity is dependent upon words (*śabdanibandhana*). The reason for this is that one commonly experiences in ordinary linguistic usage a word's denotation of a meaning connected to another meaning which is supplied (*adhyāhṛta*). He also maintains that proximity is of WMs and not of words⁴⁴ – and thus clarifies that it is WMs which are supplied, and not words. This he argues in some detail explaining how a contrary claim of the

dhe vaikṛtāpūrvāṇām karaṇopakārākāṅkṣā. labdhe ca tasmin tajjanakapadārthākāṅkṣeti. (ibid., p. 388)

⁴⁰See Kataoka (Forthcoming, 2019) for an explanation of *apūrva* as *mānāntarāvedya*, as presented in VM-II.

⁴¹See Freschi (2012, p. 71) for an explanation of the term *upakāraka*.

⁴²C & MK: *atha yathā sannidhikathanam tathā buddhau viparivṛtīḥ.* The BHU edition is quite different here: *atha sannidhiḥ kaḥ? yasyārthasya śravaṇānantaram ākāṅkṣāyogyatābhyām arthāntare buddhi viparivṛtīḥ.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 389) Even if one were to emend to *buddhi viparivṛtīḥ* to *buddhiviparivṛtīḥ* or *buddhau viparivṛtīḥ*, nevertheless the BHU reading seems somewhat problematic. It equates proximity with a meaning recurring in the mind, after one hears another WM. But proximity cannot be a meaning, and one cannot hear a WM.

⁴³*sā ca na śabdanibandhanaiva kevalam anvitābhīdhānavyutpattāv upalakṣaṇam adhyāhṛtenāpi loke anvitābhīdhānadarśanāt.* (ibid., p. 389)

⁴⁴*na ca vācyaṃ – śabda evādhyāhriyate, sa cārtham upasthāpayatī anupayogāt apramāṇakatvāc ca.* (ibid., p. 389)

supply of words is entirely redundant (*anupayoga*) while also having no means of knowledge (*apramāṇaka*).

Finally, he summarizes these points about the nature of proximity in three summarizing verses (*saṅgrahaśloka*):

Proximity as born out of words alone is not a condition for language learning,

Since one commonly experiences in ordinary linguistic usage a connection even with a supplied meaning.⁴⁵

Proximity does not come about for all correlates at once altogether, Rather, it adheres to the sequence of the causal apparatus (*sāmagrī*) which brings about the proximity [of the correlates].⁴⁶

Whatever be the order in which proximity arises for counterparts, In that very sequence alone is there the cognition of the connected [meaning] by means of the words.⁴⁷

IV.5.4 The nature of compatibility

Śālikanātha explains⁴⁸ that any WM which has the capability for connection (*sambandhārha*) to another WM is considered as having compatibility (*yogyatva*). This is determined on the basis of commonly experiencing this WM as connected to the other WM.

In response to this definition,⁴⁹ an objection is posed that in case of the Vedas, the denotation of a connected meaning will not be possible since the command expressed in the Vedas is unknown through any other means of knowledge (*apūrva*)

⁴⁵*sannidhiḥ śabdajanmaiva vyutpattau nopalakṣaṇam; adhyāhṛtenāpy arthena loke sambandhadarśanāt* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 390).

⁴⁶*sahasaiva na sarveṣāṃ sannidhiḥ pratiyoginām; sannidhāpakasāmagrīkrameṇa kramavān asau* (ibid., p. 390).

⁴⁷*yathā yathā sannidhānaṃ jāyate pratiyoginām; tathā tathā krameṇaiva śabdair anvitabodhanam* (ibid., p. 390).

⁴⁸*kiṃ punar idam yogyatvaṃ nāma? ucyate – yat sambandhārham. sambandhārham idam iti katham avagamyate? sambandhitvena dr̥ṣṭatvāt* (ibid., pp. 390-391).

⁴⁹*nanv evaṃ tarhi katham apūrve kārye 'nvitābhidhānaṃ vede, tena saha kasyacit sambandhasyādarśanāt. ucyate – sāmānyato yogyatāvadhāraṇaṃ viśeṣapratittāv upāya ity adoṣaḥ. yad apy apūrvam*, tad api kāryam eveti dr̥ṣṭacarakāryasambandham yat, tad yogyam ity avasīyate. (*Emended to yad api apūrvam from yad api tad apūrvam)* (ibid., p. 391).

– and thus, nothing could be commonly experienced as being connected to this command. However, Śālikanātha responds by explaining that the ascertainment of compatibility in general (*sāmānyataḥ*) is the means for the cognition of the particular sentential meaning. Moreover, he explains that since the Vedic command is indeed unknown through any other means of knowledge, something is ascertained as compatible so long as it has a relation to known duties (*dr̥ṣṭacarakārya*).

IV.6 Objections against CoD (vv.9cd-10)

In the following verse and half and the commentary thereon, Śālikanātha puts forth certain arguments against CoD.

IV.6.1 Conditions required even in CoD (v.9cd)

In v.9cd, Śālikanātha states:

Even in the case of [unconnected] WMs, this causal apparatus (*sāmagrī*) [is required] to bring about the cognition of their connection.⁵⁰

Thus, Śālikanātha argues⁵¹ that even in CoD where WMs cause one to cognize their mutual connection, one must accept that it is the WMs as endowed with expectation, proximity and compatibility alone which lead one to comprehend the SM and nothing else, so as to justify the comprehension of a restricted (i.e. not random) (*pratiniyata*) connection.⁵² Moreover, this claim cannot be refuted since even according to the *abhihitānvayavādin*, the linguistic usage of elders conforms to such usage of WMs. Thus, the fault of postulating the three conditions of expectation, proximity and compatibility is common to both doctrines.

⁵⁰VM-I v.9cd: *padārtheṣv api caivaiṣā sāmagry anvayabodhane* (ibid., p. 391)

⁵¹*yasyāpi mate padārthā evānyonyānvayam avagamayanti, tenāpi pratiniyatānvayabodhasiddhyartham idam āśrayaṇīyam eva — ākāṅkṣāsannidhiyogyatāvanta eva padārthā vākayārthaṃ bodhayanti nānya iti. etad eva katham iti paryanuyuktēna vṛddhavyavahāre tathādarśanād iti parihāro vācyah. tasmād ubhayapakṣasādhāraṇatvān nedaṃ dūṣaṇam* (ibid., p. 391).

⁵²See IV.13 for a discussion of the term *pratiniyata*.

IV.6.2 The problem of postulating potencies in WMs rather than words (v.10)

IV.6.2.1 The potency of WMs is due to conjunction with words (*padasaṃsparśa*), causing an additional potency of words

In v.10, Śālikanātha states:⁵³

However, such a potency of those [WMs] [to bring about the cognition of their connection (see v.9cd)] is not seen if [WMs] are comprehended from another means of knowledge,
Such [potency] should be postulated [consequently] as being brought about by their conjunction with words (*padasaṃsparśa*) which are intended for [the denotation of] a particular meaning.

Thus, Śālikanātha is arguing⁵⁴ that WMs are not known to lead one to understand their mutual connection when they are cognized from any other means of knowledge except language. Consequently, the potency to cause the comprehension of their mutual connection should be postulated of only WMs which are denoted by words. Moreover, in order to account for such potency, its cause should be admitted as being the conjunction of WMs with words (*śabdasaṃsparśa*).⁵⁵

This is because words are seen being used commonly across different instances of ordinary communication (*lokavyavahāra*) in a manner such that they are dedicated to conveying the cognitions of qualified (sentential) meanings (*viśiṣṭārtha*).

⁵³VM-I v.10: *kintu teṣāṃ adṛṣṭaiṣā śaktir mānāntarād gatau; kalpyā viśiṣṭārthaparapadasaṃsparśabhāvitā* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 391)

⁵⁴*padārthānāṃ hi śabdād anyataḥ pramāṇāt pratīyamānānāṃ anyonyānvayabodhakatvaṃ na pratītam iti, śabdābhidheyānāṃ tadavagamaśaktiḥ kalpayitavyā. tasyāś cotpat-tau śabdasaṃsparśa eva hetur ity āśrayaṇīyam. śabdo hi viśiṣṭārthapratipattiparatayā lokavyavahāreṣu prayujyamāno dṛṣṭaḥ. na cāsau sākṣād vākyaṛthapratipādane samartha iti, padārthān avāntaravyāpārīkaroti. te ca yady anyonyānvayabodhane samarthāḥ syuḥ, tadā teṣāṃ avāntaravyāpāratā syān nānyatheti. viśiṣṭārthāvabodhaparaśabdasaṃsparśād eva teṣāṃ eṣā śaktir āvirbhavati, śabdasyāpi padārthagatānvayabodhakatvaśaktyādhānaśaktir āśrayaṇīyā* (ibid., p. 392).

⁵⁵The term *padasaṃsparśa* is found only once in the VM-I, as used in v.10. However, the commentary on this verse uses instead the term *śabdasaṃsparśa* in two distinct sentences (in one place, the commentary glosses the compound used in the verse *viśiṣṭārthaparapadasaṃsparśabhāvitā* as *viśiṣṭārthāvabodhaparaśabdasaṃsparśād . . .*). Sucarita refers to this same argument and uses the term *śabdasaṃsparśa* (see V.2.8 and V.3.8.1).

And words are not capable of directly conveying the SM – hence they cause WMs to become entities having an intermediate function (*avāntaravyāpāra*) such that they may lead to the cognition of the SM instead. Moreover, if one were to consider these WMs as being capable of bringing about the cognition of their mutual connection, then one must admit that these WMs have an intermediate function only and nothing else.

Consequently, their potency manifests only from their conjunction with words which are intended to cause the comprehension of a particular meaning. And thus, one must admit even for words a potency to confer a further potency to WMs to cause the comprehension of their connection.

IV.6.2.2 First refutation of the Bhāṭṭa example of “a white horse is running”: Additional means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) needed

The Bhāṭṭa opponent now attempts to refute this argument of potencies being required in words to confer a further potency to the WMs by bringing forward Kumāriḷa’s example of “a white horse is running”⁵⁶. The opponent tries to argue that⁵⁷ such potency of words can only be postulated if WMs⁵⁸ ascertained (*avaseya*) from means of knowledge other than language are unable to lead one to cognize their connection. Yet, this is untrue as the WMs ‘white’, ‘horse’ and ‘running’ can cause one to understand their mutual connection in the form of “a white horse is running”, even when (as Kumāriḷa says in his verse) there is no sentence present (*vākyavinirmukta*).

In this example, the Bhāṭṭa argues that the quality ‘white’ is directly perceived (*pratyakṣadrṣṭa*) and is such that its specific substratum (*āśrayaviśeṣa*) is not determined; the substance ‘horse’ is inferred (*anumita*) from the directly perceived

⁵⁶ŚV Vāk. vv.358-359a: *paśyataḥ śvetam ārūpaṃ hreṣāsabdaṃ ca śṛṇvataḥ; khuraniḥṣepaśabdaṃ ca śveto ’śvo dhāvatīti dhīḥ; drṣṭā vākyavinirmuktā*

⁵⁷*syād evam — yadi mānāntarāvaseyānāṃ padārthānām anyonyānvayāvagame sāmartyaṃ na syāt. asti tu tat śvaityasyānavadhāritāśrayaviśeṣasya pratyakṣadrṣṭasya, āsvasyāpratipannaguṇaviśeṣasya pratyakṣahreṣāsabdānumitasya padanikṣepaśabdānumitasya ajñātakartṛbhedasya dhāvanasya śveto ’śvo dhāvatīty anvayabodhakatvadarśanāt. (A. Sastri 1964, p. 392)*

⁵⁸This is an instance demonstrating the ambiguity of the term *artha*, which can refer to meaning as well as object. As explained in previous chapters, I translate this as WM even while bearing in mind this dual sense of the term.

sounds of neighing even as no specific quality (*guṇaviśeṣa*) of the horse is cognized; while the action of ‘running’ is such that it is inferred (*anumita*) from the sounds of the feet pounding upon the ground even as its agent (*kartr*) is unknown.

Nevertheless, the Prābhākara Siddhāntin argues that in this example, one can experience the complex SM cognition “the white horse is running” only if one ascertains that the sounds of neighing (from which ‘horse’ is inferred) as well the sounds of the pounding hooves (from which ‘running’ is inferred) have the same substratum as the directly perceived ‘white’ (*śvāityasamānāśraya*).

He explains⁵⁹ that if the complex SM cognition “the white horse is running” arises for someone by whom the place (*apādāna*) from which the sounds of neighing and the movement of the feet arise is not correctly ascertained – then there arises a contradiction in cognition for him. This is because he has an understanding in the following way: “In this place, since there is neighing there should *certainly* be a horse, and since there are the sounds of hooves there should be something running”.

In this case, he first settles upon the clippety-clop (*taṅkāra*) sounds of hooves as being related to the horse on the basis of his expertise gained through repeated observation (*abhyāsapāṭava*), and thereafter, he *infers* the rapid motion (*gati*) as residing in the horse. However, it is not that he will first cognize only that motion of something running and will then comprehend its connection to that horse by means of the WMs.

Subsequently, one who determines that in that place, there can be nothing apart

⁵⁹yadi tāvad apratyākalitahreṣādhvanipadavihāranirghoṣāpādānasyety ucyate*, tadā pratītivirodhaḥ. sa hy evaṃ pratipadyate — bhavitavyam asmin deśe nūnam aśvena, bhavitavyaṅ ca kenacid dhāvateti. athāśvasaṃbandhinam eva khurapuṭaṭaṅkāraravam abhyāsapāṭavavaśād avaiti, tadāsāv aśvavartinīm eva vegavatīṅ gatim anuminoṭīti, na punaḥ kevalām evāvagamya tasyānvayaṃ padārthasāmarthyenāvabuddhyate. yo 'pi tasmin deśe nāsty anyo 'śvād iti niścīya pāriśeṣyād, apādānādhyavasāye 'pi hreṣādhvaneḥ śvāityasamānādhikaraṇam aśvatvam apy adhyavasyati, tasyāpi gṛhābhāve iva** bahirbhāvāvagatāv arthāpattiḥ yo 'yaṃ śvetaḥ, sa eṣo 'śvaḥ ity atra pramāṇam. yas tu śvāityasamānādhikaraṇau hreṣādhvanikhurapuṭaṭaṅkārav adhyavasyati, tasyāpy aśvatve vegavati ca gamane śvetavartiny evānumānam, na svatantrayoḥ. ataḥ pramāṇāntareṇāsambaddhāvabhātānāṃ padārthānāṃ na kvacid anyonyasambandhabodhakatvam anumānārthāpattivyatirekeṇa pratītam. (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 392-393) (*MK: apratyākalitahreṣādhvanipadavihāranirghoṣāḥ na syur ity ucyate; C: apratyākalitahreṣādhvanipadavihāranirghoṣāḥ pādā na syur ity ucyate) (**BHU: gṛhābhāvadarśanam iva; C: vighrahābhāva iva)

from a horse – as a consequence (*pāriśeṣyāt*),⁶⁰ since it is also ascertained that a horse is the place from which the sound of neighing arises, he ascertains the horse-universal (*aśvatva*) as also having the same substrate as the quality ‘white’. Thus, even for him, *postulation* (*arthāpatti*) is the means of knowledge in his thinking that “that which is white must be this very horse” — just as one postulates that Devadatta is outside the house when one notices that Devadatta is not in the house.

However, for one who ascertains the sounds of neighing and the pounding of hooves as having a common substrate with the quality ‘white’, he infers the the horse-universal and the rapid motion of running as related to that which is white — and not these two as independent of each other. Hence, Śālikanātha argues that the ability of WMs, which manifest as unrelated through other means of knowledge, to lead to the understanding of their mutual connection is sometimes not cognized as distinct from inference and postulation.

IV.6.2.3 A second refutation: What type of veridical knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the complex (SM) cognition classified as?

The Prābhākara Siddhāntin further objects that if it is argued that the connection between the WMs is understood on the basis of the cognition of the unconnected WMs alone, then one must additionally explain what type of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) such a complex understanding (“a white horse is running”) would be classified as.

He argues that⁶¹ that if the understanding of the mutual connection of the WMs arises from the mere cognition of the unconnected WMs alone – then one

⁶⁰Among the different classifications of inference (*anumāna*) in Nyāya, one is its three-fold classification into *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. The *śeṣavat* form of inference is also termed as *pariśeṣa*, see Vātsyāyana’s *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh) on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.5: *śeṣavan nāma pariśeṣaḥ* (Nyaya-Tarkatirtha 1936, p. 155). This is a form of inference whereby one infers the unperceived cause from a perceived effect (Chatterjee and Datta 1939, p. 218). Hence, by the term *pāriśeṣyāt*, Śālikanātha may also be referring here to this specific type of inference. However, I have considered above the general meaning of the term.

⁶¹*api ca yadi padārthāvagamitātrād eva parasparānvayāvagamaḥ, tadā kasmin pramāṇe tasyāntarbhāva iti vācyam? na tāvac chābde śabdābhāvāt. padārthābhidhānāvāntaravyāpāreṇa hi yac chabdād anvayajñānam, tac chābdam ity eṣa vo rāddhāntaḥ. tasmān nāsya śābde ’ntarbhāvaḥ. pramāṇāntarābhyupagame tu śābdasyocchedaḥ śabdāvagatapadārthaviṣaye ’pi tasyaiva prāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt. tasmāc chābdābhīhitānām padārthānām anyatrādṛṣṭam vākyaarthabodhanasāmarthyam kalpayitavyam. tadādhānaśaktiś ca śabdānām apīti.* (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 393-394)

must explain as to what type of veridical knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that understanding would be classified as.

First of all, it could not be classified as linguistic knowledge – since there is no language here (i.e. the WMs ‘white’, ‘horse’ and ‘running’ are perceived without the use of language). According to CoD, only that knowledge of a connection can be considered linguistic which comes about from language by means of the intermediate activity of the denotation of the WMs. Consequently, this cannot be classified as linguistic knowledge.

However, if one admits another type of veridical knowledge (say, ‘X’ in this case), then the knowledge of the connection of WMs will no longer be linguistic – since there will be the absurd conclusion that X will be the type of veridical knowledge even with regard to the WMs understood from language.

Thus, argues Śālikanātha, one must postulate a capability of WMs which are denoted by language for causing one to understand the SM, such that this capacity is not seen elsewhere. And one must postulate also the capacity of words for conferring that capability to WMs.

IV.6.3 The ‘endless correlates’ argument does not lead to infinite potencies for a word

The Bhāṭṭa opponent now once again reinvoles his criticism regarding the endless correlates that result for the Prābhākara Siddhāntin (see IV.4.1). He argues that⁶² the Siddhāntin must postulate endless potencies (*śakti*) for a word (say, cow), with each potency conveying the cognition of the word’s own meaning (say, WM ‘cow’) as connected with a possible correlate (say, the WMs ‘bring’, ‘fetch’, etc.) — and since there are endless possible correlates, there will be endless potencies for each word. On the contrary, in CoD, *each* word has a *single* potency for denoting a *single* meaning.

However, the Siddhāntin refutes this by arguing instead that:⁶³

⁶²*nanv anantapratīyogyanvitasvārthabodhanaviṣayā anantā eva śabdasya śaktayaḥ kalpayitavyāḥ syuḥ. abhihitānvayavāde tv ekasmīn arthe ekasya śabdasyaikaiva śaktir iti.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 394)

⁶³*tan na. ekayaivākāṅkṣitasannihītayogyārthānvitasvārthābhīdhānaśaktiā pratīyogibhedena kāryabhedopapattēś cakṣurādīnām iva. cakṣur yathaiivaikayā darśanaśaktiā*

This [argument of yours] is not true — since the distinction in the effects [produced by a word (namely, the cognitions of distinct connected meanings denoted by the same word)] is justified (*kāryabhedopapatti*) due to the distinction in correlates, on the basis of a *singular* potency for the denotation of the word's own meaning (*svārtha*) as connected to expected, proximate and compatible counterparts – as is the case for the sense of sight (*caṅsus*). Just as sight brings about distinct cognitions due to the distinction in its accompanying correlates of pot, etc. on the basis of a single potency for vision — in the same way then must it be admitted that even language (i.e. a word) (*śabda*) [brings about distinct cognitions] due to the distinction in its correlates.⁶⁴

IV.6.4 A criticism of the Bhāṭṭa conception of *lakṣaṇā*

IV.6.4.1 A presentation of the Bhāṭṭa doctrine

The VM-I also presents the Bhāṭṭa conception of the role of *lakṣaṇā* in SM denotation, and thereafter criticizes the same. Śālikanātha explains that⁶⁵ Kumārila admits of all SM as being indirectly denoted (*lākṣaṇika*), and thus refuses to postulate of WMs a potency to lead to the cognition of their connection. Such reasoning is based on the argument that a WM is denoted as being unconnected (*ananvitāvasthā*), and it indirectly denotes its condition of being connected (*anvitāvasthā*) as this condition is related to it (*svasambandhin*). Due to the relation between a condition (*avasthā*) and the entity possessing the condition (*avasthāvat*), when the latter is denoted, even the former is cognized. In all cases, it is admitted that when one related entity (*sambandhin*) is seen, a cognition of the other related

ghaṭādipratyogisahāyabhedāj jñānāni bhinnāni janayati, tathā śabdo 'pi pratiyogibhedād iti mantavyam. (ibid., p. 394)

⁶⁴See II.3.4.

⁶⁵*vārtikakāramiśrās tu lākṣaṇikān sarvavākyārthān icchantāḥ padārthānām anavayāvabodhaśaktikalpanāṃ nirākurvanti. ananvitāvastho hi padārtho 'bhihito 'nvitāvasthāṃ svasambandhinīm lakṣayati. avasthāvasthāvator hi sambandhāt, avasthāvaty abhihite, bhavaty evāvasthāpi buddhisthā. sarvatra ca sambandhini dṛṣṭe sambandhyantare buddhir bhavatīti kṛptam eva. tena nāsti padānām anvitabodhane śaktikalpaneti* (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 395-396) (see I.2.2).

entity comes about. Thus, one need not postulate of words their potency to convey the connected SM as in DoC.

Śālikanātha also quotes from Kumārila's (lost) *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* to corroborate his presentation of Kumārila's view:⁶⁶

According to us, the sentential meaning is indirectly denoted in every case.

Śālikanātha also explains that according to the Bhāṭṭas, the concept of indirect denotation (*lakṣaṇā*) does not mandate the abandonment of the word's own meaning (*svārthaparityāga*). Thus, it is not the case that indirect denotation comes about only in sentences such as *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* (a village on the Gaṅgā), where a word (here, *gaṅgā*) relinquishes its own meaning (here, the 'river Gaṅgā') and instead conveys another (here, '*gaṅgātīra*' – the 'bank of the Gaṅgā'). According to the Bhāṭṭas, there are instances of indirect denotation in sentences such as *paurṇamāsīm yajate*, where the word *paurṇamāsī* does not only express a particular sacrifice (*yāgavacana*) but in fact indirectly denotes an aggregate of sacrifices (*yāgasamudāyalakṣaṇārtha*). Thus, in such cases, the word does not abandon its own meaning, but nevertheless indirectly denotes a different meaning.

IV.6.4.2 A criticism of this Bhāṭṭa conception

However, Śālikanātha rejects this reliance on indirect denotation to explain SM cognition. He explains that⁶⁷ in sentences such as *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*, it is impossible to connect (*anvayāsambhava*) the WM '*gaṅgā*' within the SM. Thus, one abandons this WM '*gaṅgā*', and ascertains instead the WM '*kūla*' (bank of the river), etc. as being connected within the SM (*vākyārthānvayin*) since its mental proximity is grasped on account of its relation to the WM '*gaṅgā*'. Thus, Śālikanātha argues that indirect denotation comes about due to logical impossibility (*anupapatti*) as well as a relation (*sambandha*). In contrast, in sentences such

⁶⁶*vākyārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitiḥ* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 396)

⁶⁷*gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣa ityadiṣu śrautasya gaṅgāpadārthasya vākyārthe 'nvayāsambhavāt, taṃ parityajya tatsambandhāl labdhabuddhisannidheḥ kṛtādīyarthasya vākyārthānvayitādhyavasīyate. ata evāhuḥ — anupapattyā, sambandhena ca lakṣaṇā bhavatīti. iha ca gāmānāyetyādau na śrautasīyarthasyānvayāyogyatvaṃ* (ibid., p. 399).

as *gām ānaya* (bring the cow), it is not the case that the directly expressed WM is incompatible for being connected within the SM. Consequently, Śālikanātha asserts that the Bhāṭṭas are not justified in resorting to indirect denotation in order to explain SM cognition.

IV.7 Three reasons to accept words and not WMs as denoting SM (v.11)

Śālikanātha now presents three reasons to favour the choice of words as denotative of SM rather than WMs. In v.11, he states:⁶⁸

Since [words] are first [cognized] (*prāthamya*), since they are the agents of denotation, and since they are known as being intended for that [SM],

It is better to admit that potency [to bring about the cognition of SM (see v.9cd)] as belonging to words alone [and not to WMs].

IV.7.1 Words as first cognized

The Siddhāntin argues⁶⁹ that words occur first (*prathamabhāvin*) in contrast to WMs which occur only subsequent to them, and thus it is incorrect to overlook the words and admit instead the potency in WMs. Furthermore, it is indisputable (*nirvivāda*) that words are the agents of denotation. Thus, their capacity for denotation is fully agreed upon by all, and hence it is easy (*sukara*) to postulate them as extending up to the connection (i.e. SM) as well (*anvayaparyanta*).

On the other hand, the Siddhāntin argues that the capacity of WMs to cause the comprehension of SM can only be postulated. Hence, in accordance with the principle that ‘it is (conceptually) more economical to postulate a quality

⁶⁸VM-I v.11: *prāthamyād abhidhātṛtvāt tātparyāvagamād api; padānām eva sā śaktir varam abhyupagamyatām* (ibid., p. 400)

⁶⁹*prathamabhāvīni padāny atilaṅghya nārtheṣu vākyārthabodhanaśaktir āśrayituṃ yuktā. kiñ ca padāni tāvad abhidhāyakānīti nirvivādam. tena teṣām abhidhānaśaktiḥ sampratipannaiveti, tasyā evānvayaparyantatā kalpayituṃ sukarā. padārthānān tu bodhanaśaktir eva kalpyā. tena dharmikalpanāto varam dharmakalpanā laghīyasīty anvitābhidhānaśaktiḥ padānām eva kalpayitum ucitā* (ibid., p. 400).

rather than a substance possessing that quality', it is more suitable to postulate the capacity for the denotation of a connected meaning of words only.

IV.7.2 Words as agents of denotation

Words are admitted by both, the Prābhākara Siddhāntin as well as the Bhāṭṭa opponent, as denoting meaning – the only dispute being whether they denote SM or WM. In this regard, the Siddhāntin argues⁷⁰ that if it is accepted that words deliver (*ādhā-*) a cognition of the isolated WM only, then one will be forced to relinquish the ability of words to denote meaning. This is because a cognition of an isolated WM arises due to the awakening of its corresponding mnestic trace (*saṃskāronmeṣa*) – such a mnestic trace being brought into existence at the time when the relation between the word and its meaning is learnt, and hence by definition, this mnestic trace is a conveyor of its WM.

Moreover, one cannot argue that the *relation* between a word and its WM is remembered in a manner different from the WM's own memory – since most certainly, one must accept that in order to establish the memory of the relation, there will have to come about the awakening (*udbodha*) of the mnestic trace which causes the memory of the WM, one of the two related entities (*sambandhin*) partaking of this relation.

Thus, Śālikanātha argues, words can only be accepted as denoting any meaning, if it is accepted that they convey a connected SM which is not understood at the time the word's relation to its WM is learnt. And one who accepts such a status of words must also admit of words denoting a connected meaning.

⁷⁰*kiñ ca padāny abhidhāyakānīṣyante, tatra yadi svarūpamātraviṣayām eva padārthabuddhim ādadhyuḥ, tadāpy abhidhāyakatā hīyeta tasyā buddheḥ sambandhagrahaṇasamayajātāpadārthabodhakasaṃskāronmeṣaprabhavatvāt. avaśyaṃ hi sambandhasmarāṇasiddhyarthaṃ sambandhibhūtārthasmarāṇasasaṃskārodbodho 'ṅgīkaraṇīyaḥ. tasmāt sambandhagrahaṇasamayānadhigatānvitārthapratipādanābhyupagama eva śabdānām abhidhāyakateti, tām aṅgīkuruvatā padānām anvitābhidhāyakatāśrayaṇīyā. (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 400-401)*

IV.7.3 Words as being intent on conveying SM

Finally, the Siddhāntin also quotes from Kumāriḷa's own works in order to refute the Bhāṭṭa opponent's claim of words denoting WM and not reminding one of the WM.⁷¹

A word cannot be distinguished from an entity which causes the recollection of another (*smāraḷa*) since it does not convey anything additional [to what has already been understood from other means of knowledge].

The Siddhāntin also quotes from ŚV Vāk. v.248ab:⁷²

The speech-unit expressing the efficient force (*bhāvanā*) reminds one of that [efficient force], as in ordinary communication.

Yet, the Siddhāntin opposes such a view also where the ability of the words for denotation is reduced to their ability to merely cause a recollection. In opposition to such a view, he presents the third argument – namely that words are known as being intended for that SM. The Siddhāntin argues⁷³ that one who accepts words as simply reminding one of the WMs must certainly accept that words are only meant for the SM cognition — else, there will be the absurd conclusion of SM becoming non-linguistic (*aśābdatva*).

Moreover, he argues⁷⁴ that those who consider the ability of words to denote WMs as different from their ability to remind would actually be postulating three potencies. The first would be the words' potency to denote WM, another would be their potency to additionally confer to WMs the potency to lead to the understanding of their mutual connection, while the third would be the potency of WMs to cause

⁷¹ŚV Śabdapariḷcheda v.107ab: *padam abhyadhikābhāvāt smārakān na viśiṣyate*

⁷²*bhāvanāvācānāṣ tāvāt tāṃ smārayati lokavat*

⁷³*yenāpi vādinā padānāṃ smāratvatm eva padārtheṣv aṅgīkṛtam, so 'pi vākyāthapratipattiparatāṃ padānāṃ abhyupaity eva, anyathā vākyārthasyāśābdatvaprasaṅgaḷ.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 401)

⁷⁴*tena padārtheṣu padānāṃ smāratvatīriktaṃ ye 'bhidhāyatvatm āhuḷ, teṣāṃ śaktitrayakalpanā. ekā tāvat padānāṃ abhidhāyatvatvaśaktiḷ, aparā ca padārthagatānvayabodhanaśaktiyādhānaśaktiḷ, padārthānāṃ cānvayajñāpanaśaktir iti. smāratvatvādināṣ tv abhidhānaśaktiṃ hitvā śaktidvayakalpanālāghavāt, uktenaiva nyāyena padānāṃ eva śaktikalpanāyā ucitatvāt, anvītābhidhāyīni padānūti sthāpitam. (ibid., p. 401)*

the knowledge of their connection. On the other hand, one who accepts words as simply reminding one of their WMs, he would relinquish the potency of words to denote their WM (i.e. the first potency for the opponent) and would postulate only two potencies instead.

IV.8 How does DoC work? (v.12)

IV.8.1 The three-step process of SM denotation

In the next few verses and the commentary thereon (vv.12-17), Śālikanātha explains how the process of *anvitābhidhāna* comes about i.e. how exactly do words denote the connected meaning. In doing so, he endeavours to refute the fault of mutual dependence (*itaretarāśraya*) which had been presented by the Bhāṭṭa opponent in IV.4.2. First of all in v.12, the Siddhāntin lays down the multiple steps involved in the process of SM cognition according to DoC:⁷⁵

The entire composite of words (*padajāta*) which has been heard (*śruta*) causes the memories of their unconnected [word-]meanings to arise (*smāritānanvitārthaka*);

The *vacanavyakti*⁷⁶ [of this composite of words then arises] as brought about by linguistic principles (*nyāyasampāditavyakti*), subsequent to which (*paścāt*) the words cause the SM cognition (*vākyārthabodhaka*).

Hence, this verse outlines the three-step sequential process of SM denotation according to DoC. Once the words comprising the sentence are directly heard, they cause the distinct memories of their unconnected WMs to come about (step one); subsequent to which their *vacanavyakti* is brought about according to linguistic principles (step two) — and it is only then (*paścāt*) that SM cognition comes about (step three).⁷⁷

⁷⁵VM-I v.12: *padajātaṃ śrutaṃ sarvaṃ smāritānanvitārthakam; nyāyasampāditavyakti paścād vākyārthabodhakam* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 401)

⁷⁶See IV.8.8 for a reference to and discussion of the commentatorial gloss of *vyakti* as *vacanavyakti*. As will be shown subsequently, this term has a specialised meaning in DoC and I prefer to keep it untranslated.

⁷⁷The three-step process of SM denotation forms the basis of DoC. These steps, along with the

IV.8.2 Two types of memories in the first step

In the commentary to v.12, the Siddhāntin explains further the first step (the role of memory) of the three-step process described above. He explains that⁷⁸ one who has not comprehended the relation between a word and its meaning, and another for whom the mnestic traces (*saṃskāra*) arising after comprehending this relation between a word and its meaning has either not been produced or has perished — such persons will not be entitled (*adhikṛ-*) to SM cognition.

On the other hand, one whose mnestic trace arising from comprehending the relation between a word and its meaning is not unimpaired — such a person hears the composite of words and certainly recalls the following: ‘Each of these words is expressive (*vācaka*) of its isolated WM as connected (*anvita*) to a correlate (*pratiyogin*) which is expected, proximate and compatible.’ And in this way, for the one who is having such a recollection — he most certainly also recalls the unconnected WM (*ananvita*), which is the isolated form (*svarūpa*) of those WMs which are participating in the connection (*anvayabhāḥ*).

Thus, the Siddhāntin is arguing here that two types of memories arise when one hears the words of a sentence: the memory that each word denotes a *connected* SM, as well as the memory of each word’s *unconnected* WM. Hence, that which is the isolated form of the WM is always known as being part of a connection.

consequent discussion on the two types of memories involved (see IV.8.2), indicate three aspects of this process of SM denotation — (i) the complexity of the process of SM denotation (including as it does within itself other cognitive processes of the listener, including memory);

(ii) the consequent chronological extension of this process of SM denotation, since the process must be accepted as temporally continuing over at least the three instants corresponding to the three steps identified in v.12;

(iii) the unambiguous start and end points of the process, commencing as it does with words which are directly heard, and ceasing once the SM cognition arises subsequently (see I.4.2).

⁷⁸*yas tāvad agrhūtasambandhaḥ, yasya ca sambandhagrahaṇasaṃskāro notpannaḥ pradhvasto vā sa vākyārthapratipattau nādhikriyate. yas tv anapabhraṣṭasambandhagrahaṇasaṃskārah, sa padaṃ śrutvā nūnaṃ tāvad idaṃ smarati — idaṃ idaṃ* asyākāṅkṣitasannihitayogyapratiyogyanvitasya vācakam iti. evañ ca smarataḥ smṛtam eva ananvitam api svarūpam anvayabhāḥjām.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 402) (*BHU: *idam*, MK & C: *idam idam*)

IV.8.3 Role of distinct WM memories even in CoD

The Siddhāntin argues that the pivotal role of the distinct WM memories cannot be denied in the process of SM cognition, and this is true also in CoD. He explains⁷⁹ that even for the *abhihitānvayavādin*, there can be no cognition of the SM so long as the second word does not present (*upasthāpay-*) the second WM to the mind. This is because the unconnected WM, which for the Bhāṭṭa causes one to cognize the connection (i.e. SM), expects another WM, since a connection needs correlates. Thus, even for him, it should be admitted that all words denote their own unconnected WMs, and thereafter, SM cognition arises from all of these recollected (*smṛtyārūḍha*) WMs.

Moreover, the Siddhāntin also puts forward a quote from Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭikā* admitting to the important role of memory in the process of SM cognition. Kumārila says here:⁸⁰

According to us, since even these [WMs] certainly do not lead one to cognize SM if [the WMs] are not recollected (*asmṛta*),
The nature of being a means of knowledge (*pramāṇatā*) is present in those very aggregated (*saṃhata*) memories of the [WMs] (*tatsmaraṇa*).

The Siddhāntin points out that this verse is explanatory of Śabara's definition of the sentence as found in the ŚBh on PMS 3.3.14,⁸¹ and he quotes the definition here: "once they have been aggregated (*saṃhatya*), the words denoting the meaning (*artha*) are the sentence."⁸²

⁷⁹*na caikapadaśravaṇe vākyārthāvagatir iti kaścin manyate. abhihitānvayavādinō 'pi yāvat padāntaram arthāntaram nopasthāpayati tāvad anvayāvagamo nāsti, padārthasyānvayāvabodhinaḥ padārthāntarāpekṣatvāt, pratiyogisāpekṣatvād anvayasya. atas tanmate 'pi sarvapadair ananvitasvārthā abhidhānīyāḥ. paścāt tebhyaḥ sarvebhyaḥ smṛtyārūḍhebhyo vākyārthapratipattir aṅgīkaraṇīyā. (A. Sastri 1964, p. 402)*

⁸⁰*te 'pi naivāsmṛtā yasmād vākyārtham gamayanti naḥ; tasmāt tatsmaraṇeṣu eva saṃhateṣu pramāṇatā (ibid., p. 402)*

⁸¹*ata eva tatrābhavata ācāryasya vākyalakṣaṇam saṃhatyārtham abhidadhāti padāni vākyam iti. (ibid., p. 402)*

⁸²See III.4 for a discussion of the hermeneutic differences in the Kṛ and VM-I relating to this definition by Śabara.

IV.8.4 An example to substantiate the role of memory

Nevertheless, given this three-step process of v.12 (as in IV.8.1 and IV.8.2 above), an objection is now posed by the Bhāṭṭa opponent regarding the viability of the same. He asks⁸³ specifically about how SM cognition comes about according to DoC if there are intermediate steps required for SM cognition (as in v.12). The Bhāṭṭa explains the reason for his objection – when the SM is not understood by means of a word directly heard, it cannot manifest (*avabhāsa-*) once that word has disappeared (*antarhita*) i.e. *after* the next three steps of the process of v.12 have been completed.

As is indicated by v.12, the process of SM denotation presented by the Siddhāntin is complex (i.e. includes within itself other cognitive processes, including memory) and also chronologically extended in time.⁸⁴ Thus, the question by the opponent here is about the intermediate cognitive processes (especially of memory) of the listener which are required according to the three-steps and which thus separate (in time) the hearing of words from the arising of SM. In response then, the Prābhākara Siddhāntin argues that distinct memories (say, of unconnected WMs) can indeed aid in the cognition of something altogether disparate (i.e. SM), in accordance with v.12 above — and this too is something accepted even by the Bhāṭṭa.

In order to argue thus, the Siddhāntin presents⁸⁵ the example of the Vedic words learnt in childhood. He explains that the Vedas are learnt during childhood (*bālyadaśādhita*), but their meanings are not ascertained initially. Rather, once one has subsequently gained the thorough knowledge of the Vedic six auxiliary disciplines (*aṅgaparijñāna*), thereafter one commonly experiences cognizing meaning from the Vedas even though they are remembered (*smṛtād api vedāt*).

Thus in this process, which is commonly experienced by all – including the Bhāṭṭa, it is not the case that the terminal phonemes of the Vedic words directly

⁸³*nanv anvitābhīdhānavādināṃ katham vākyārthapatipattiḥ. śrūyamāṇena hi padena yo 'rtho nāvabodhitah, sa katham antarhite tasminn avabhāseta.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 402)

⁸⁴See I.4.2.

⁸⁵*abhihitānvayavādinō 'pi nāyaṃ niyamaḥ — śrūyamāṇa eva pūrvapūrvavarṇajanītasamśkārasahito 'ntyo varṇaḥ padārthapratipādaka iti, bālyadaśādhītāt prāganavadhṛtārthād aṅgaparijñānasamśkārat paścāt smṛtād api vedād arthāvagamadarśanāt. tena smṛtyārūdhasyāvagamakatvam adōṣaḥ.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 402)

heard (*śrū-*) convey the WM even in the first instance (say, during childhood), as assisted by the mnestic traces engendered by the preceding phonemes in the word. Consequently, Śālikanātha concludes, one must accept that there is no fault in admitting that recollected entities can aid in the cognition of something else (*avagamaka*). In other words, Śālikanātha demonstrates that it is not logically incongruous to accept that memories (for instance, of unconnected WMs as stated in step 2 of the process) can aid in the cognition of another (in this case, SM).

Moreover, the Siddhāntin concludes by returning to the opponent's objection. He now states that admitting the assistance of memory is not a fault for the following reason:⁸⁶

Surely, since the denotation [by a word] of a connected meaning (*anvitābhidhāna*) requires correlates (*pratiyogisāpekṣa*), the [connected] meaning is not denoted at first (*prāk*) by the heard (*śru-*) word since there are no counterparts available (*sahakāriviraha*).⁸⁷ Rather, [the connected meaning] is denoted (*abhidhīyate*) [by the word] only subsequently (*paścāt*) [once the counterparts become available] — what is logically incongruous here?

IV.8.5 Two points arising from this example

This example presented above raises some doubts whose resolution is crucial to the understanding of DoC. Moreover, the example also helps to elucidate some important aspects of the doctrine and thereby contrast them with the opposing Bhāṭṭa theory. Following are two key points:

IV.8.5.1 Distinguishing denotation of SM from the cognition of something based *entirely* on memory

The phrase used in the example is *smṛtād api vedāt* — so we must understand that in the context of the example, one remembers later in adult life Vedic words (*and sentences*) which were memorized during childhood and upon recalling them, one

⁸⁶*śrūyamāṇena hi padena pratiyogisāpekṣatvād anvitābhidhānasya prāk sahakārivirahād artho nābhīhītaḥ, paścād abhidhīyata iti kim anupapannam.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 402)

⁸⁷Counterparts (*sahakārin*) are the same as correlates (*pratiyogin*).

cognizes their meanings. This leads to the following question — is Śālikanātha thus claiming that *remembered words* can lead to SM cognition by means of the intermediate steps as in v.12 (i.e. through the memory of the unconnected WMs and the subsequent determination of their *vacanavyakti*)? What this question means in the context of the example is the following: In the case of the individual who memorized Vedic words and sentences as a child and who remembers these subsequently in adult life thereby comprehending SM — for such an individual, is the Siddhāntin asserting that his SM comprehension in adult life from these *remembered* Vedic words is also a case of denotation?

If so, then this leads one to the conclusion that in this doctrine, not only unconnected WMs but even *words* are recollected, which then denote SM. This makes DoC seem quite convoluted and tedious, not to mention that it also violates the three-steps of v.12 (according to which only WMs are remembered, *not words*) — and hence, it does not seem that this would be Śālikanātha’s proposal.

Consider also once again the Siddhāntin’s concluding statement, where he had said (as quoted in the previous section):⁸⁸

... the [connected] meaning is not denoted (*abhihita*) **at first** (*prāk*) by the heard (*śru-*) word since there are no counterparts available (*sahakāriviraha*). Rather, [the connected meaning] is denoted (*abhidhīyate*) [by the word] only **subsequently** (*paścāt*) [once the counterparts become available] — thus, what is logically incongruent in this argument?

What exactly does Śālikanātha mean here? Does he mean that in the subsequent moment (*paścāt*), words are resurrected through memory and it is then that they denote SM? Once again, this leads to the convoluted doctrine of having words as well as WMs being recollected and the SM being denoted *by* remembered words.

Rather, I would contend that such SM cognized from *remembered* words should not be considered as a case of denotation. The reason for this is that, as is declared in v.12 (see IV.8.1), words which are *heard* (*śru-*) commence the process of denotation with, as Śālikanātha states here, the SM finally being denoted (*abhidhīyate*) only

⁸⁸*śrūyamāṇena hi padena . . . prāk sahakārivirahād artho nābhihitaḥ, paścād abhidhīyata iti kim anupapannam.*

subsequently (*paścāt*) (i.e. when the three-step process is completed). Moreover, this maintains the contrast of having the SM being denoted (*abhihita*) at the very moment of hearing the words.⁸⁹

It thus seems to me that what Śālikanātha means by this general phrase *smṛtād api vedāt* is not contradictory with the process of SM denotation as outlined in v.12. In this example, Vedic words are indeed remembered — and thus, the process of cognizing SM from these cannot be classified as denotation, since the latter must necessarily commence with heard (*śruta*) words. Thus, the conclusion here is that the two instances of SM being cognized from words which are *heard* and those which are *remembered* are two separate cases of gaining knowledge.

IV.8.5.2 Contrast with the Bhāṭṭa example of “a white horse is running”

The example as presented here is of individuals who remember only *words* and not WMs, since only Vedic words and sentences are memorized during childhood without any reference to their meanings. This is a distinctive feature of Vedic learning and presents an interesting situation of an individual cognizing only words and sentences, without any WMs or SM – a situation which may perhaps have few parallels in the modern world.

Moreover, this example by Śālikanātha can perhaps be directly contrasted with Kumārila’s example of “the white horse is running”. This Bhāṭṭa example had been presented and refuted by the Siddhāntin earlier (IV.6.2.2 and IV.6.2.3). In their example, the Bhāṭṭas point out the case of someone who cognizes WMs without their words — the reality of such an instance is admitted by the Prābhākaras as well, and the Bhāṭṭas use such a case to corroborate their theory of CoD. However, the Prābhākara Siddhāntin had rejected the Bhāṭṭa argument on multiple grounds, and (perhaps almost as a response!) he offers an example of his own where *words* are cognized without WMs, an instance admitted also by the Bhāṭṭas which the Siddhāntin uses to corroborate DoC instead.

⁸⁹This sentence by the Siddhāntin also corroborates the other point about this process of denotation being chronologically extended in time (see I.4.2). As is mentioned here, the SM is not denoted (*abhihita*) at the moment of hearing the words, rather it is denoted (*abhidhīyate*) only subsequently.

IV.8.6 No fault of synonymy in DoC

The Siddhāntin now considers and refutes the accusation of synonymy resulting in DoC. The objection as put forth by the Bhāṭṭa opponent is as follows:⁹⁰ In DoC, there comes about the fault that in sentences such as *gam ānaya* (bring the cow), all words become synonyms (*paryāyatā*). This is because just as the word cow denotes its own WM as connected with ‘the action of bringing’, in the same manner will the word bring also denote its own WM as connected with the meaning ‘cow’.

However, the Siddhāntin responds by arguing⁹¹ that there are in fact two meanings – the meaning ‘cow’ (*gotva*) (which refers to the cow-universal) as connected to ‘the action of bringing’, and ‘the action of bringing’ as connected to the meaning ‘cow’. Thus, since each word denotes a distinct meaning, the fault of synonymy cannot come about.

IV.8.7 Principle of *tantra* prevents syntactic split in DoC

The Bhāṭṭa opponent now puts forth another objection, that of possible syntactic split (*vākyabheda*) in DoC. In doing so, he quotes the example from the ŚBh on the Aruṇādhikaraṇa PMS 3.1.12 *aruṇayā piṅgākṣayaikahāyanyā somaṃ krīṇāti* (One purchases *soma* by means of a one-year old, tawny-eyed, red [calf]).

In the ŚBh, this example is presented to explain that the relation between the substance and the quality in the sentence arises because of the verb. In the long discussion on this example, the ŚBh concludes⁹² by explaining that the verb (here, purchasing) is primary (*pradhāna*) whereas the substance and the quality in the sentence are accessories (*guṇa*). Consequently, it is the latter two which are enjoined (*upadiś-*) for the action of buying (the primary element) and not vice versa.

In the VM-I, the Bhāṭṭa objects that⁹³ in a sentence such as that in the ŚBh,

⁹⁰*nanv evaṃ gām ānayetyādau parasparaparyāyatā sarvaśabdānāṃ syāt. yathā gām ity anenānāyatyanvitābhīdhānam, tathānāyety anenāpi gavānvitābhīdhānam iti.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 403)

⁹¹*ucyate — dvāv etāv arthau, yad ānayanānvitam gotvam, gavānvitān cānayanam iti. tenaikaike-naikakasyārthasyābhīdhānāt kutaḥ paryāyatvaprasaṅgaḥ.* (ibid., p. 403)

⁹²ŚBh on on PMS 3.1.12: *krayasya hi dravyāruṇimānāv upadiśyete, na krayas tayoh. na ca pradhānaṃ pratiguṇaṃ bhidyate, pratipradhānaṃ hi guṇo bhidyata iti.* (Āpaṭe 1930, p. 397)

⁹³*nanu krīṇātyarthasyāruṇyādyanekārthānvitābhīdhānād āvṛtilakṣaṇo vākyabhedaḥ syāt.* (A.

a syntactic split consisting in repetition (*āvṛtti*) would come about according to DoC. This is because the verb denotes its own meaning (here, the action of buying) as connected to several other meanings (here, red, one-year old calf, etc.)

Thus, the Bhāṭṭa argues that syntactic split would result according to the Prābhākara theory since the meaning of the verb would be repeated multiple times to connect individually with the remaining WMs in the sentence. Perhaps the Bhāṭṭa is thus considering the sequential process of DoC that had been explained by the Prābhākara in IV.5.2.2 and IV.5.2.5, and is arguing that the repetition of the verb at each stage leads to the syntactic split of the sentence.⁹⁴

However, the Siddhāntin refutes this argument by stating:⁹⁵

No, due to the utterance [of the verb] in accordance with the principle of *tantra* (i.e. since the utterance of the verb is centralized and applies to all others equally).⁹⁶ And if there is [truly] a difference [between two speech-units] (*vairūpya*), then since [the application of] the principle of *tantra* would not be justified, a syntactic split [between the two speech-units] would [correctly] come about.

IV.8.8 The second step of determining the *vacanavyakti*

The Siddhāntin now explains the second step of the process of SM denotation, mentioned in v.12⁹⁷ as “the *vacanavyakti* [of this composite of words then arises] as brought about by linguistic principles (*nyāyasampāditavyakti*)”. Śālikanātha does not explicitly define what he means by *vacanavyakti*, but he discusses this in two places — in the verse itself (v.12), and in two sentences in the commentary.

Consider first the verse.⁹⁸ In the verse, the term *nyāyasampāditavyakti* is an exocentric compound (*bahuvrīhi*) qualifying the term *padajātaṃ* — i.e. the group of *words* comprising the sentence have their *vyakti* effected by linguistic

Sastri 1964, pp. 403-404)

⁹⁴The argumentation in the Kṛ follows a similar structure. See II.2 for a discussion.

⁹⁵*na, tantroccāraṇāt. vairūpye ca tantratānupapatter vākyabhedah syāt.* A. Sastri (1964, p. 404)

⁹⁶See Freschi and Pontillo (2013) on the concept of *tantra* and *āvṛtti* in Mīmāṃsā.

⁹⁷See IV.8.1.

⁹⁸VM-I v.12: *padajātaṃ śrutam sarvaṃ smāritānanvitārthakam; nyāyasampāditavyakti paścād vākyaṛthabodhakam*

principles (*nyāyasampādita*). Moreover, it is stated that SM arises *after* (*paścāt*) this *vyakti* has been determined. Thus, the conclusion from this seems to be that the *vacanavyakti* refers to a stage *prior* to the arising of the signified SM, while also being *subsequent* to the words which were uttered (and disappeared instantly) – hence, it may perhaps be best to consider this as an intermediate, cognitive stage, arising chronologically between the utterance of the signifier and cognition of the signified.⁹⁹ Moreover, given the Sanskrit presentation of this term – as a *bahuvrīhi* compound qualifying *padajātaṃ* – perhaps Śālikanātha is stressing its relation to the signifier rather than the signified.

Furthermore, consider the two sentences of the commentary.¹⁰⁰ A point to note here is the construction of these two sentences — these are almost parallels of each other and have the same structure. The first sentence has the structure *yāvat nyāyena . . . na sampādyate, tāvat vākyārthasyāvabodhakaṃ na bhavati*, whereas the structure of the second is *yāvat nyāyair . . . na sampradhāryate, tāvat vedavākyārtho na avabudhyate*. The similarity in these two sentences is evident.

In fact, it seems that this similarity is deliberately constructed — in order to expand upon the subject of the first sentence (i.e. the *vacanavyakti*) further in the second sentence. Following is a translation of these two sentences:

So long as the *vacanavyakti* is not effected by linguistic principles (*nyāya*), until then the composite of words is not expressive of SM. So long as the following is not determined by means of linguistic principles (*nyāya*) which are current in ordinary linguistic usage — “this is the predicate (*vidheya*) while this [other] is the subject (*anuvādyā*); this is primary (*pradhāna*) while this [other] is subordinate (*guṇa*); this [meaning] is intended (*vivakṣita*) while this [other] is not (*avivakṣita*), etc.” — until then, the Vedic SM is never ascertained.

There are two points to note here in the concept of the *vacanavyakti*. Firstly, only once the *vacanavyakti* is itself determined that the SM will subsequently arise

⁹⁹This further corroborates the previous discussion about the chronological extension and complexity of denotation according to DoC.

¹⁰⁰*yāvan nyāyena vacanavyaktir na sampādyate, tāvat padajātaṃ vākyārthasyāvabodhakaṃ na bhavati. lokavyavahāravartibhir nyāyair yāvat idaṃ vidheyam, idaṃ anuvādyam, idaṃ pradhānam, idaṃ guṇabhūtam, idaṃ vivakṣitam, idaṃ avivakṣitam ityādi na sampradhāryate, tāvan na kvacid vedavākyārtho ’vabudhyate.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 404)

(*yāvat–tāvat*) (as was also seen in v.12) — so, once again, it appears that the term *vacanavyakti* refers to the final stage just before the SM arises. This reinforces the understanding that the *vacanavyakti* is an intermediate stage, between signifier and signified.

Secondly, this implies that the *vacanavyakti* is the form of the sentence where all elements *have been correctly assigned* their categories of subject-predicate, primary-subordinate, intended and unintended, etc. In other words, Śālikanātha is not referring here to the state of conjecture, but to the *final decisive stage*. He states that the *vacanavyakti* is determined only when one finally ascertains that *this* meaning is intended (*idaṃ vivakṣitam*), *this* is not, etc. — Śālikanātha does not declare this to be the stage of conjecture where one determines all possible meanings which *could be* intended (*idaṃ vivakṣitaṃ bhavituṃ śakyaṃ, idam api*).

Now, it is only possible to arrive at a final decisive stage having gone through certain preceding stages of conjecture. Thus, Śālikanātha's idea here seems to be that once the words have given rise to the memory of their unconnected WMs (as in step one from v.12), there may be other cognitive processes involved in conjecturing and then finally arriving at the stage of the *vacanavyakti*.

For instance, consider a customary Mīmāṃsā Vedic example, such as *somena yajeta* (one should sacrifice by means of *soma*) — where *soma* can indicate either the substance of a sacrifice which is itself already established elsewhere, or a specific type of sacrifice which is particularized by the use of *soma* (i.e. *somavatā yāgena*).¹⁰¹ The idea here is that one can distinguish between different possible SMs for a single sentence. The *vacanavyakti* is the stage when one has decided which is the correct, applicable meaning in a given context from among the (here, two) possible, conjectured meanings.

Moreover, in order to understand the concept of the *vacanavyakti*, it is also imperative to understand what Śālikanātha means by the term *nyāya*. As is demonstrated later in the VM-I (see IV.11.3.3), this term refers to all linguistic rules needed for the comprehension of SM, such as the principle of *ekavākyatā*, etc. Moreover, Śālikanātha explains that *nyāyas* are needed for all sentences, not just Vedic ones. Thus, according to Śālikanātha, the *vacanavyakti* is determined on the basis of these rules in all instances of linguistic communication.

¹⁰¹See Thibaut (1882, p. 6) for a discussion on *somena yajeta*.

Thus, given these **four characteristics** of the *vacanavyakti* — the intermediate nature of this stage (between signifier and signified), its depiction as the outcome of the process of conjecture, its determination in every instance of linguistic communication (not just Vedic), and its description as related to the signifier as well as the signified — the term *vacanavyakti* seems to refer here to an analytical, cognitive stage experienced in all instances of linguistic communication and which straddles the sentence (signifier) and its SM (signified), immediately subsequent to which the SM arises.¹⁰²

IV.8.9 All linguistic communication requires causal apparatus

The Siddhāntin argues that such a three-step process (as has been described in the previous subsections) is necessary for all instances for verbal cognition, and it is hence that that Mīmāṃsā is referred to as the procedure (*itikartavyatā*) for cognizing the meaning of Vedic sentences. This is because its central mission is to provide hermeneutic rules for correctly understanding Vedic sentences.

However, the Bhāṭṭa opponent now puts forth the charge¹⁰³ that so much causal apparatus (*sāmagrī*) is not experienced in ordinary linguistic communication as SM cognition arises quite swiftly (*drāk*).

To this, the Siddhāntin responds by saying¹⁰⁴ that such is the case only for sentences which have been repeatedly encountered (*atyantābhyasta*). On the contrary, this is not true for sentences of *smṛti* texts, whose meanings are unknown.

Furthermore, even in the case of ordinary linguistic communication, various types of disputes do arise (*nānāvidhāvivādotthāna*) — and thus it is indeed untrue that SM is settled upon swiftly. The Siddhāntin also clarifies that common language users do not experience such discrimination of sentences and SMs into subject-predicate, primary and secondary meanings, etc. since they simply have no reason in order to do so (*kāraṇābhāva*). On the contrary, it is left to the theoreticians learned about sentences (such as Mīmāṃsakas) (*vākyajñā*) to conduct

¹⁰²See I.4.4.2 for an interpretation of the concept of *vacanavyakti* on the basis of these four characteristics.

¹⁰³*nanu loke drāg eva vākyārthāvagatir neyatīm sāmagrīm apekṣate.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 404)

¹⁰⁴*ucyate — atyantābhyasteṣu vākyeṣu syād evam, [na]* adṛṣṭārtheṣu smṛtyādivākyaṣu, loke 'pi nānāvidhāvivādotthānāt kuto drāg evārthaniścayaḥ.* (*Text emended to include *na*) (ibid., p. 404)

such investigations.

IV.8.10 DoC in case of figurative and metaphorical language use

The Siddhāntin also clarifies the process of DoC in figurative (*lākṣaṇika*) or metaphorical (*gauṇa*) uses of language, referring to this as the esoteric teaching of their doctrine (*darśanarahasya*). A figurative usage of language occurs in a sentence such as *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*, where the word *gaṅgā* means instead ‘*gaṅgātīra*’ i.e. the ‘bank of the Gaṅgā’ rather than the ‘river Gaṅgā’ herself. On the other hand, a metaphorical usage of language occurs in sentences such as *siṃho devadattaḥ*, where the word *siṃha* (lion) indicates the qualities of fierceness, bravery, etc. associated with a lion.¹⁰⁵

The Siddhāntin explains¹⁰⁶ that this aspect of all words denoting a connected meaning is applicable in the case of only those words whose meanings are primary (*śrautārtha*). On the other hand, when words are used in a sentence with figurative meanings (*lākṣaṇikārtha*) or metaphorical meanings (*gauṇārtha*), then only the word in these sentences having a primary meaning (e.g. *ghoṣa* or *devadatta* respectively from the examples mentioned above) would be denotative of a connected meaning. On the other hand, the other word (e.g. *gaṅgā* or *siṃha* respectively) will be intent upon delivering to the hearer’s mind (*sannidhāpana*) the correlate (i.e. ‘*gaṅgātīra*’ or the WMs ‘fierce’, ‘brave’, etc. respectively) for the first word.

The Siddhāntin also explains that word used with a figurative or metaphorical meaning (e.g. *gaṅgā* or *siṃha*) is not ascertained during language learning (*vyutpatti*) as having a potency to be expressive of that correlate (i.e. ‘*gaṅgātīra*’ or

¹⁰⁵See McCrea (2000, footnote 30) for an explanation of *guṇavṛtti* and *lakṣaṇā*, as well as the example of *siṃho devadattaḥ*.

¹⁰⁶*yac cedaṃ sarvapaḍānām anvītābhīdhāyitvam ucyate, tat sarveṣu śrautārtheṣu paḍeṣu. lākṣaṇikagaṇārthapadaḥprayoḃe tu yad eva tatra śrautārthaṃ paḍam tad evānvītābhīdhāyakam, itarat tu paḍam pratiyogisannidhāpanaparam eva. tatra vācakatvaśaktyanavadhāraṇāt svārthasyāpi tat tadānīm avācakam, anvayāyogyatvāt. kintu tadarthena smṛtena yat svasambandhi, svasadrśaṃ vā svayam anvayayogyam upasthāpyate, tenānvītaṃ śrautārtham eva paḍam svārtham abhīdhatta iti darśanarahasyam idam. na ca sarvapaḍāny eva lākṣaṇikāni, gaṇāni vā vākye sambhavantīti niravadyam. (A. Sastri 1964, p. 405)*

WMs ‘fierce’, ‘brave’, etc. respectively). Hence, that word becomes inexpressive of even its own WM at that time of the utterance of the sentence, since this WM (e.g. ‘gaṅgā’ or ‘siṃha’) is not fit for a connection with the other WM (‘ghoṣa’ or ‘devadatta’).

Rather, in the case of figurative usage, an additional WM (e.g. ‘gaṅgātīra’) is presented to the mind of the hearer which is itself related (*svasambandhin*) to the remembered meaning of the word (e.g. *gaṅgā*). Similarly, in case of metaphorical usage, the additional WM (e.g. ‘fierce’, ‘brave’, etc.) presented to the mind of the hearer closely resembles (*svasadṛśa*) the remembered WM (e.g. ‘siṃha’). This additional WM is fit for a connection with the other primary WM (e.g. ‘ghoṣa’ or ‘devadatta’ respectively), and the word having the primary WM denotes its own meaning as connected to this additional WM.

Finally, the Siddhāntin asserts that this above theory holds as it is not possible for every single word in a sentence to have a secondary or a metaphorical meaning.

IV.9 How words cause the memories and not the denotations of their unconnected WMs (vv.13-14)

Furthering the argument about the role of memory as presented in IV.8, the Siddhāntin now explains the reason for words being capable of leading to the memory of the isolated, unconnected form of their WM. He explains¹⁰⁷ that unconnected WMs are always present in the denotation of the connected meaning, thus implying that these forms can be distinguished a posteriori (as had been explained occurs in the process of language learning, see IV.3).

Furthermore, the Siddhāntin explains¹⁰⁸ that such a memory of the isolated form of the WM is part of the process of one grasping the relation between a word and its WM (*sambandhagrahaṇāntargata*). This is thus a throwback to the previous discussion about the two memories (see IV.8.2). As mentioned therein,

¹⁰⁷VM-I v.13: *anvitasyābhidhāne ’pi svarūpaṃ vidyate sadā; tena svarūpamātre ’pi śabdo janayati smṛtim* (ibid., p. 405)

¹⁰⁸*evaṃ tāvat sambandhagrahaṇāntargataṃ svarūpasmarāṇam uktam* (ibid., p. 405)

it is the process of grasping the relation between a word and its WM that leads to mnemonic traces being generated, and these very traces lead to the two memories. Here, the Siddhāntin seems to state the same point but it is inverted – that the memory is intrinsic to the process of grasping the relation.

He argues further that the arising of such a memory from the word is not logically incoherent, since:¹⁰⁹

Just as by means of [the perception of] an object (*artha*), its own word (*svapada*) is remembered in some cases — even though the object is not a means of knowledge (*apramāṇa*);
Similarly by means of [hearing] a word, its meaning/object (*artha*) will be recollected, even though a word is not a means of knowledge.

The Siddhāntin explains that¹¹⁰ the above must be accepted since it is not the case that only that which is a veridical cognition (*pramāṇa*) causes memory to arise — since even a cognition which is not veridical can give rise to memory. Rather, when a mental contiguity (*pratyāsatti*)¹¹¹ of any two entities (say, X and Y) is formerly cognized on certain occasions, then a cognition of any one (say, X) definitely has the ability to lead to the memory of the other (here, Y) — through the intermediate step of the arising of the mnemonic traces (*saṃskāra*) with regard to the remembered entity (Y). And this is exactly the situation of a word and its isolated WM — there is affinity between them, due to the latter being part of the connected meaning which is denoted by the word (*tadabhidheyāntargati*).

An example is presented here by the Siddhāntin,¹¹² and he compares this capacity of a word with that of an object (*artha*). He explains that just as an isolated object perceived in its non-conceptual stage (*nirvikalpadaśāpratīta*) can

¹⁰⁹VM-I v.14: *yathārthenāpramāṇena svapadam smāryate kvacit; padenāpy apramāṇena tathārthaḥ smārayiṣyate* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 405)

¹¹⁰*na hi yat pramāṇam, tad eva smaraṇakāraṇam, apramāṇam eva hi tat. yasya tu yena saha kadācit pratyāsattiḥ pratītapūrvā, sa* tatra saṃskārod bodhadvāreṇa śaknoty eva smṛtiṃ janayitum. asti ca svarūpasyāpi tadabhidheyāntargatyā śabdena pratyāsattir iti, śaknoti tatrāpi śabdaḥ smṛtiṃ janayitum, arthavat.* (ibid., p. 405) (*Emending to *sa* from *sā* mentioned in all three editions, although perhaps a more preferable emendation would be *tat*.)

¹¹¹See Chapter I footnote 60 for an explanation of the term *pratyāsatti*.

¹¹²*yathā nirvikalpakadaśāpratītam arthasvarūpamātram anabhidheyam api śabdam smārayati, tathā śabdo 'py artham iti.* (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 405-406)

cause a memory of its word, even though the word is not denoted by the object (*anabhidheya*) — in the same way then even the word can cause a memory of the object/meaning (*artha*), even though this latter is not denoted by the word.

Moreover, the Siddhāntin explains that¹¹³ even the Bhāṭṭa opponent cannot deny this, since even for him the cognition of the isolated WM is not veridical knowledge as one does not determine any additional meaning from it.¹¹⁴ This is due to their acceptance of the doctrine that a means of knowledge is one that conveys a meaning which is previously unknown.

IV.10 Refuting the fault of mutual dependence (v.15)

The Siddhāntin now considers the objection of mutual dependence (*itaretarāśraya*), put forth by the Bhāṭṭa opponent in IV.4.2. The fault pointed out by the opponent was that if according to DoC, a word denotes its own WM as connected to other denoted WMs, then the word becomes dependent upon the denotation of other words for that of its own.

In order to refute this, the Siddhāntin states in v.15:¹¹⁵

In this manner, each word expresses its own [unconnected] WM as connected to other meanings that are proximate through memory, therefore there is no [fault of] mutual dependence.

The Siddhāntin thus insists that even a WM made proximate to another WM *by means of memory* is considered correctly as being proximate. Consequently, this leads one to dismiss the fault of *itaretarāśraya* as had been postulated by the Bhāṭṭa, as a word does not depend upon the denotation of other words for that of its own, but rather requires the WMs *reminded* by the other words.

¹¹³*abhihitānvayavādino 'pi sā na pramāṇam abhyadhikāarthaparicchedābhāvāt. anadhi-gatārthagantṛ pramāṇam iti siddhāntābhyupagamāt.* (ibid., p. 406)

¹¹⁴See IV.7.3.

¹¹⁵VM-I v.15: *smṛtisannihitair evam arthair anvitam ātmanaḥ; artham āha padaṃ sarvaṃ iti nānyonyasaṃśrayaḥ*

IV.11 Memory as unreliable for conveying WM (Commentary to v.15)

The refutation of the previous objection relied on accepting the WM cognitions as memories. Consequently, this once again leads to a sustained discussion on the role of memory in the process of SM denotation, and further objections and refutations are now put forth in the commentary — all of which are cumulatively intended to refute the argument that memory is unreliable for grasping WM from a word.

This argument, as will be discussed subsequently, is based upon a Bhāṭṭa objection that each word will remind one of infinite meanings, and hence, one will be unable to grasp the specific (*viśeṣa*) WM of a word. This is the topic of discussion in IV.11.2 and IV.11.3. Moreover, IV.11.4 presents a modified objection — that such an ability of a word to cause the memories of infinite meanings will lead to continued DoC.¹¹⁶

IV.11.1 Language learning leads one to first infer a connected cognition, then an unconnected one

First of all, the Bhāṭṭa opponent raises an objection to the memory of the unconnected meanings, stating that this is not compatible with language learning (*vyutpatti*) outlined earlier by the Siddhāntin (see IV.3). The opponent argues that¹¹⁷ according to the Siddhāntin, a child learns language by means of observing the activity undertaken by elders on the basis of language. Moreover, such activity of a *prompted* elder is dependent upon his cognition of a *connected meaning* from

¹¹⁶This objection in IV.11 is quite distinct from the previously discussed argument about ‘endless correlates’ (as seen in IV.4.1, IV.5.1 and IV.6.3). In these latter three, the putative result was explained by the Bhāṭṭa opponent as being infinite possibilities of DoC, and in this objection too, a similar outcome is alleged (a word leads to the memory of infinite WMs, which results in endless DoC). However, one can distinguish between these two objections — the previous one focuses on the correlates of each word (*pratiyogin*) i.e. the possible WMs that a word’s own meaning can be connected to, whereas this objection explains how a reliance on memory will not allow one to grasp a specific meaning (*viśeṣa*) from a word.

¹¹⁷*nanu vṛddhavyavahāreṇa vyutpattiḥ, anvitārthapratipattinibandhanaś ca vyavahāraḥ. atas taddarśanāt anvitapratipattir evānumātuḥ śakyā, na tv ananvitapadārthamātrasmaraṇam* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 406).

the sentence uttered by the *prompting* elder. Consequently, since this activity of the prompted elder is observed by the child learning the language, it is possible for the child to infer the prompted elder as having a cognition of a connected meaning *only*, and not instead his recollection of the isolated form of the WM.

However, the Siddhāntin responds¹¹⁸ by arguing that the prompted elder's cognition of the connected meaning as inferred from his activity cannot be justified by means of any other explanation (*anyathānupapatti*) — and this is in fact the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) to justify that his recollection of the unconnected, isolated form of the WM does come about. This is because a cognition of something connected is not logically coherent without a cognition of its unconnected correlates.

IV.11.2 Memory as unreliable: Which WM is remembered from a word?

IV.11.2.1 The Bhāṭṭa opponent's criticism: Inability to grasp a specific (*viśeṣa*) WM from a word leads to infinite connections

The Bhāṭṭa opponent now presents an argument in order to refute the Prābhākara claim that one can rely upon memory for WMs to be *reminded* from the words, instead of having the WMs being *denoted* by words. The thrust of the the opponent here is to object to the Siddhāntin's explanation of DoC which relies upon WM proximity by means of recollection, as discussed in vv.12-15 and the commentary thereon.

The Bhāṭṭa opponent argues¹¹⁹ that if one were to admit that words bring about DoC by relying on meanings which are made proximate due to their memory,

¹¹⁸*ucyate* — *vyavahārānumitānvitapratipattanyathānupapattir evānanvitasvārthasmarāṇasambhave pramāṇam. darśitaṃ hy etat — nānanvitapratipattim antareṇānvitapratipattir upapadyata iti. (ibid., p. 406)*

¹¹⁹*yadi smṛtisannihitam āsṛityānvitābhīdhānaṃ padaiḥ* kriyate, tadā smaraṇasya pratyāsattinibandhanatvāt, anekeṣāṅ cārthānāṃ pratyāsattisambhavāt, teṣu smṛtisannihiteṣv agraḥyamaṇaviśeṣatvāt, ukhāyāṃ pacatīti nokhā pacatyarthānvitaiiva kevalābhīdhīyeta. sā hi kulālādyanvitāpi pratipannaiveti, smaraṇāt tadanvitāpy ukhābhīdhīyeta. tathā pacatyartho 'pi piṣṭakādīkaraṇako 'vagata iti tatsmaraṇān naudanānvita** evābhīdhīyeta. abhihitānvayavāde tu nāyaṃ doṣaḥ, ekaikasyārthasyābhīdheyatvād iti. (ibid., pp. 406-407) (*BHU: paraiḥ) (**This must be emended to *nokhānvita*, and I have translated accordingly.)*

then the following would result: since memory is based on the mental contiguity between any two entities (*pratyāsatti*) and also since the mental contiguity of various meanings comes about with any one meaning, consequently among these various meanings which are made proximate due to their memories, a specific WM (*viśeṣa*)¹²⁰ is not grasped by a hearer.

Since such a specific WM is not being grasped, in the phrase *ukhāyāṃ pacati* ([he/she] cooks in a pan) — the word *ukhā* (pan) will not denote the meaning ‘*ukhā*’ as connected only to the meaning ‘*pacati*’ ([he/she] cooks). This is because that meaning ‘*ukhā*’ has in fact been ascertained also as connected to other meanings such as ‘*kulāla*’ (‘potter’), etc. Thus, on the basis of memory, the meaning ‘*ukhā*’ will be denoted by the word *ukhā* as connected to those other meanings ‘*kulāla*’, etc. as well.

Similarly, argues the Bhāṭṭa, even the meaning ‘*pacati*’ is known as having ‘*piṣṭaka*’ (‘flour’), etc. as its means. Thus, on the basis of the memory of those other known means, the meaning ‘*pacati*’ will not be denoted as connected only to the meaning ‘*ukhā*’. The Bhāṭṭa explains that such a fault does not arise in CoD as every single meaning is something that is denoted (*abhidheya*) and not remembered.

IV.11.2.2 The refutation: This problem arises even in the Bhāṭṭa doctrine

The Siddhāntin responds¹²¹ by arguing that the WM cognition arising from a word cannot be said to be any different from a memory. Thus, he claims that it must be accepted even by the Bhāṭṭa opponent that only those WMs which are recollected lead one to cognize (*bodhaka*) the connection between the WMs (i.e. the SM). And thus, this fault of endless *remembered* WMs and not *denoted* WMs, leading to one’s inability to grasp the specific (*viśeṣa*) WM applies equally to both theories of DoC and CoD.

¹²⁰The term *viśeṣa* here can be interpreted and translated in two ways: one, as the *difference* among the various WMs present in memory, and two, as a *specific WM* from among the various WMs present in memory. In the present sentence, both translations can be justified. However, I contend that it is the latter (specific WM) which is intended, since as will be seen subsequently in IV.11.4.2 (see especially footnote 139), the term *viśeṣa* is used subsequently in a manner that renders unambiguous its sense as the latter.

¹²¹*atrocyate – padāt tāvat padārthapratītiḥ smaraṇād bhinnā vaditum na śakyate. tena smṛtānām evānvayabodhakatvam ityāśrayaṇīyam. tathā ca tulyo doṣaḥ.* A. Sastri (1964, p. 407)

Thus, the Siddhāntin is firstly pointing out that even the Bhāṭṭas admit that WMs can be equated with memories, with words simply being entities that cause their recollection (*smāraka*) (as shown by the verse from ŚV Śabdapariçcheda quoted in IV.7.3). Moreover, he argues that the opponent's doctrine of *abhihitānvaya* also must postulate WMs which are remembered in order to cognize the SM (as also discussed previously in IV.8.3). As a result, this formulation of the fault of not being able to grasp the specific WM (*viśeṣa*) from a word will apply equally also to the opponent's theory.

In response to this,¹²² the Bhāṭṭa opponent reformulates his position by stating that in CoD, it is the WMs which are *recollected* by means of their *words* that cause one to cognize the SM. However, the Siddhāntin responds that¹²³ this is exactly the case even in DoC. Moreover, the Siddhāntin argues that this is not the case as the Bhāṭṭa claims by reformulating his position for every instance of sentence and SM (*ekāntataḥ*) — for in the linguistic communication of elders, DoC is observed even with meanings which may be supplied (*adhyāhṛta*) by the hearer.

IV.11.3 A modification of the objection: Between which *type* of WMs is there a connection?

IV.11.3.1 The Bhāṭṭa's modification: Connection only between *denoted* WMs, not remembered WMs

The Bhāṭṭa opponent now argues¹²⁴ that even if the above point was admitted – that WM cognition arising from a word is equivalent to a WM memory – nevertheless, in the theory of DoC, various meanings are recollected by means of each word which is uttered. Consequently, DoC cannot explain how these various WMs lead one to cognize a connection between only certain *specific* WMs of the many WMs present in the mind (*katama*). On the other hand, according to CoD, it is perfectly in order that the WM cognitions, even though equivalent to WM memories, lead

¹²²*atha śabdaiḥ smāritānām anvayabodhakatvaṃ vṛddhavyavahāre tathā darśanād ity adoṣaḥ.* (ibid., p. 407)

¹²³*matāntare 'pi tulyam etat. na cāyam ekāntaḥ, vṛddhavyavahāre 'dhyāhṛtenāpy arthenānvitābhidhānadarśanād ity uktam.* (ibid., p. 407)

¹²⁴*atha śabdair bahavo 'rthāḥ smāryante, kintu teṣāṃ katamenānvayāvabodhakatvam iti na vidmaḥ. abhihitānvayavāde tv abhihitenaivānvayabodhakatvaṃ yuktam eveti.* (ibid., p. 407)

one to cognize a connection between only those specific WMs which are denoted (*abhihita*).

Thus, the Bhāṭṭa opponent is arguing that even if he was to accept that the WM cognitions arising from the uttered words are no different from WM memories (which can in turn thus lead to even further WM memories), nevertheless for him, there is a connection only between WMs which are *denoted* by words. On the other hand, the Siddhāntin would not be able to distinguish in his theory between the various WMs which are remembered — those which are remembered on account of the words uttered, and those which are remembered *thereafter* by being related to the meanings of the uttered words. As a result, the Siddhāntin will be unable to explain why the connection comes about only between *certain* remembered WMs. For instance (as seen earlier), in the case of the uttered sentence *ukhyāyāṃ pacati*, the two WMs ‘*ukhā*’ and ‘*pacati*’ would be remembered on account of their respective words. However, each of these WMs would then cause one to remember other further WMs (WMs ‘*kulāla*’, etc. and ‘*piṣṭaka*’, etc. respectively) (as discussed in IV.11.2.1). As a result, endless WMs would be remembered from both words according to DoC, as a result of which one will be unable to choose which WMs among these many have a connection between them.

IV.11.3.2 The first response: There is no denotation of WM, only its memory

A response to this objection must now focus upon these two cognitive processes being spoken of by the Bhāṭṭa opponent — the denotation of WM, and the recollection of WM. The Siddhāntin rejects the distinction between the two,¹²⁵ and asks the Bhāṭṭa to clarify what this distinct ability of words to denote WM is (*abhidhāyakatā*) which the Bhāṭṭa distinguishes from the ability of any one entity (say, X) to remind one of another entity (say, Y) (*smāraakatva*).

The following is the Bhāṭṭa opponent’s response:¹²⁶

That which is called the ability of one entity (X) to be reminiscent of another (Y) (*smāraakatva*) is based upon the mental contiguity

¹²⁵*tad asat. smāraakatvātirekiṇī kānyābhidhāyakatā yā vyavasthānibandhanam.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 407)

¹²⁶*athocyeta — smāraakatvaṃ nāma pratyāsattinibandhanam. tena tadatirekiṇy abhidheyābhidhāyakatālakṣaṇā pratyāsattir aṅgīkaraṇīyeti.* (ibid., p. 407)

(*pratyāsatti*) [of X and Y]. Consequently, one should accept [a kind of] mental contiguity, characterized as the relation between signifier and signified (i.e. the word and its unconnected WM), which is distinct from that [mental contiguity on which *smāraakatva* is based].

However, the Siddhāntin responds by arguing instead:¹²⁷

This is not true, as it is logically justified to characterize [words] as reminding (*smāraakatvopapatti*) [the hearer of their unconnected WMs] since [words] are commonly experienced as only reminding [the hearer of their unconnected WMs] (*smāraaka*) during the linguistic usage of elders. The reason for this is that the [specific] ability [of words and WMs] to be related as signifier and signified (*vācyavācakatā*) is exactly the same as the [generic] relation between conveyor and conveyed (*pratyāyyapratyāyakatā*). And even though this [generic relation of conveyor and conveyed (*pratyāyyapratyāyakatā*)] is generally experienced [in (say) the case of smoke which conveys fire] as preceded by another [ontological] relation (*sambandhāntara*) between smoke and fire, etc., nevertheless in the case of language, [this relation of conveyor and conveyed] is not so accepted [as being preceded by another ontological relation between word and WM]. Rather, the ability [of a word A] to express [a WM A] (*vācakatva*) arises from one's comprehension of [this word's] ability to express [the WM A]. This is exactly similar to the ability [of some entity X] to remind one [of another entity Y], which arises from one's comprehension of the ability [of X] to remind one [of Y] — thus, what is the need to accept an alternate definition of mental contiguity [as argued by the Bhāṭṭa opponent]?

Thus the Siddhāntin argues that the specific relation between the word and WM, as argued by the opponent, is nothing but an instance of a generic relation of

¹²⁷*naitad* *evam*, *smāraakatvenaiva* *vṛddhavyavahāre* *darśanāt* *smāraakatvopapatteḥ*. *pratyāyyapratyāyakatā* *hi* *vācyavācakatā*, *sā* *ca* *yady* *apy* *agnidhūmādīnāṃ* *sambandhāntarapūrvikā* *dr̥ṣṭā*, *tathāpi* *śabde* *tathā* *nāśr̥īyate* *kintu* *vācakatvāvagamād* *eva* *vācakatvam*. *evam* *smāraakatvāvagamād* *eva* *smāraakatvam* *iti*, *kiṃ* *pratyāsattiyantarāśrayaṇena*. (ibid., p. 407)

pratyāyapratyāyakatā. And he claims that this is something that even the Bhāṭṭa opponent cannot refute.

Moreover, the Siddhāntin now goes a step further and argues that given such a relation between a word and its WM, it is only for an upholder of DoC that the specific (i.e. non-random) (*pratiniyata*) connection between WMs can be justified¹²⁸ — in contrast to the Bhāṭṭa opponent whose theory can explain only upto the manifestation of the universal WMs.

IV.11.3.3 The Siddhāntin's solution: *ekavākyatā* as fundamental

As discussed in IV.11.3.1, the Bhāṭṭa opponent had put forth the objection of the hearer's inability to grasp a specific (*viśeṣa*) WM among the various meanings caused to be remembered from each word, leading to endless DoC. The Siddhāntin now returns to this and presents his proposed solution.

He explains that:¹²⁹

Moreover, first of all, it is known that what is expressed by a certain word [uttered in a sentence] is a particular connected meaning [as connected to other WMs, conveyed by the other words uttered in the sentence]. In that case, if there is DoC even with another [WM which is not conveyed by the uttered words of the sentence], then there would come about the syntactical split of the sentence (*vākyabheda*). And that [syntactical split] is not justified (*nyāyya*) since it is possible to construe [the utterance] as a single sentence (*ekavākyatvasambhava*).

Thus, what the Siddhāntin is arguing is that when a sentence such as *ukhāyāṃ pacati* is heard, there will not come about the further DoC with any other WM such as 'kulāla', 'piṣṭaka', etc. – even though one may have a further recollection of these – since otherwise, there would be a syntactical split in the sentence which was heard. Moreover, this syntactical split is not justified since it is possible to construe the utterance as a single sentence.

¹²⁸This discussion about there being a *pratiniyata* connection with a specific WM (*viśeṣa*) and not a generic WM (*sāmānya*) in DoC is the topic of discussion in IV.13.

¹²⁹*api ca jñātaṃ tāvad etad yad anena padenāyam artho 'nvito vācya iti, tatra yady anyenāpy anvitābhidhānaṃ syāt tadā vākyabhedo bhavet. na cāsāv ekavākyatvasambhava nyāyyaḥ.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 408)

Moreover, the Siddhāntin argues that such reasoning is not inadmissible for a Bhāṭṭa, as Kumābila has set forth a similar argument in the ŚV *Pratyakṣasūtra* v.9ab:¹³⁰

On the other hand, if a single sentence is possible — then a syntactical split of the sentence is not admitted.

The Siddhāntin now continues, and explains this to be the applicable principle even in cases of sentences where there is figurative and metaphorical usage of language. He states:¹³¹

And it is for this reason only that if a single sentence becomes possible in any way, then the syntactical split of the sentence becomes unjustified. And ordinarily, figurative (*lakṣaṇā*) and metaphorical usages (*gauṇī*) [of words] are accepted only due to the fear [and the consequent need to avoid] the syntactical split of the sentence. Otherwise, why is it that sentences are not split and after supplying (*adhyāhr̥-*) compatible alternate meanings [for each word], all words are admitted as having primary [and not secondary or metaphorical] meanings (*mukhyār̥tha*)?

Thus, the Siddhāntin is arguing that this principle is at work even in the case of SM cognition from figurative sentences (such as *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*) as well as metaphorical ones (such as *siṃho devadattaḥ*). As has been explained previously,¹³² in the figurative sentence *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*, the word *gaṅgā* means instead ‘*gaṅgātīra*’ i.e. the ‘bank of the Gaṅgā’ rather than the ‘river Gaṅgā’ herself. Similarly, in the metaphorical sentence *siṃho devadattaḥ*, the word *siṃha* (lion) indicates the qualities of fierceness, bravery, etc. associated with a lion. The Siddhāntin argues above that such figurative and metaphorical usages of words are admitted only due to one’s desire to avoid syntactical split in these sentences — else,

¹³⁰*sambhavaty ekavākyatve vākyabhedas tu neṣyate*

¹³¹*ata eva yathā kathaṅcid ekavākyatvopapattau vākyabhedasyānyāyyatvam. loke ca lakṣaṇā, gauṇī ca vṛttir vākyabhedabhayād eva. anyathā vākyam bhūtvā kim ity adhyāhr̥tya योग्यमर्थान्तराम् sarvapadāny eva mukhyār̥thāni nāśrīyante. (A. Sastri 1964, p. 408)*

¹³²See IV.8.10.

one could admit the words *gaṅgā* and *siṃha* in the above examples as continuing to express their primary meanings and not any figurative or metaphorical ones respectively by supplying compatible alternate meanings (e.g. “[a fish] in the Gaṅgā” or “the lion [runs]”).

Moreover, the Siddhāntin explains that it is on account of this principle of *ekavākyatā* only that Vedic sentences and their meanings are understood, and he proceeds to quote several such instances. Thereafter he explains:¹³³

In all these cases [of Vedic sentences as well as sentences having figurative and metaphorical uses of language], if one were to abandon the [connected] meaning expressed by the [second] word (say, *gaṅgā* or *siṃha*) which is being uttered alongside [the first word (e.g. *ghoṣa* or *devadatta*)] and a connection [of the first word’s isolated WM] is ascertained with another [WM altogether] — then the principle of the unitary sentence would be relinquished. It is for this very reason that it had been said that “The *vacanavyakti* [of this composite of words then arises] as brought about by linguistic principles . . .” (v.12c). This is because the principle of a unitary sentence is a fundamental principle [required for verbal cognition] (*nyāya*). Whatever is the meaning in accordance with that [principle], that should be admitted as [the meaning] of the sentence in these cases.

Thus the Siddhāntin concludes¹³⁴ by explaining that one’s comprehension of the meaning of language is governed by language learning (*vyutpatti*), which in turn depends upon one’s observation of the linguistic usage by elders. And this leads one to learn certain principles (*nyāya*) as being the causes for SM cognition in such linguistic usage by elders. The Siddhāntin thus insists that only one who does not forsake (*aparihā-*) these very principles will be able to comprehend SM.

¹³³*tatra yadi samabhivyāhriyamāṇasya padasyābhidheyam parityajya anyena sahānvayo lakṣyate, tadā tadekavākyatā hīyeta. tadartham evedam uktam nyāyasampāditavyaktīti. ekavākyatvam hi nyāyah. tadanusāreṇa yo ’rthah, so ’tra vākyasyāśrayaṇīyah.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 409)

¹³⁴*vṛddhavyavahāravutpattiniyantritāyām śabdārthāvagatau ye nyāyāḥ vṛddhavyavahāre vākyārthāvatihetutayā viditāḥ, tān aparijahatā vākyārthā boddhavyā iti.* (ibid., p. 409)

IV.11.4 A final modification of the objection: DoC as never-ending

IV.11.4.1 The Bhāṭṭa opponent's criticism: Why not continued DoC?

The Bhāṭṭa opponent now puts forth a final modification in the context of this objection about the inability to grasp the specific (*viśeṣa*) WM. He states:¹³⁵

If this is so, let it be the case that at first, [a word] (say *ukhā*) denotes [its own WM] as connected to another WM (say, '*pacati*') on account of the principle of the unitary sentence (as was argued previously in IV.11.3.3). [Thereafter], why should [the word] (*ukhā*) not denote [its meaning] as connected to even another meaning (say, '*kulāla*', etc.), which is reminded by that [second word *pacati*] (*tatsmārīta*) and by the word (*ukhā*) itself (*svayaṃsmārīta*) [and] which may be suitable (*anugūṇa*) for forming a unitary sentence with that [word *ukhā*]?

This objection is a modification of the previous ones seen in IV.11.2.1 and IV.11.3.1. The objection in IV.11.2.1 was that the *anvitābhīdhānavādin* cannot rely on memory to grasp the WM from a word, as endless WM memories arise — and thus, endless DoC would be possible. The objection in IV.11.3.1 was that if WM cognitions arising from a word are equivalent to WM memories even for an *abhihitānvayavādin*, nevertheless these WM cognitions arising from a word are *denoted* and hence can be differentiated from WM memories — whereas this is not the case for the *anvitābhīdhānavādin*. In this section however, the Bhāṭṭa argues that even if the *anvitābhīdhānavādin* resorts to the principle of the unitary sentence for establishing the first connection between the remembered WMs, nevertheless there will be other suitable (*anugūṇa*) WMs as well with which connections could be established subsequently.

The Siddhāntin responds¹³⁶ by saying that there is no such continued DoC since expectation for further WMs in the connection is appeased (*upaśānti*) as DoC is accomplished by means of two words only. However, the opponent objects

¹³⁵*bhavatu tarhi padārthāntareṇa tāvad anvitābhīdhānam ekavākyatvabalāt tatsmārītena, svayaṃsmārītena ca tadekavākyatvānugūṇenārthāntareṇāpi kim ity anvitābhīdhānaṃ na bhavati.*

¹³⁶*padadvayenaivānvitābhīdhānasiddher ākāṅkṣopasānteḥ.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 409)

to this and argues¹³⁷ that if such expectation is not appeased, what could possibly inhibit (*vāray-*) the DoC?

IV.11.4.2 The Siddhāntin's first response: DoC with specific WM only

The Siddhāntin responds as follows:¹³⁸

This is precisely the reason for the following: When one word is uttered (say *ukhā*), various [meanings (say '*kulāla*', etc.)] come to be proximate [to the first WM '*ukhā*'] due to their memories as a consequence of their connections with the first WM. Nevertheless, whichever meaning's **specific instantiation** (*viśeṣa*)¹³⁹ is grasped by whatever means, there is DoC with that [specific instantiation] only. On the other hand, when the specific instantiation [of a WM] is not being grasped, [the WM] is not ascertained and hence, there is absolutely no cognition [of SM].

Moreover, the Siddhāntin also brings in the example of the derived rituals (*vikṛti*) in order to demonstrate this further. He explains that¹⁴⁰ even derived rituals remind one of a particular novel (*apūrva*) Vedic command (*kārya*), due to their similarity with a particular archetypal ritual (*prakṛti*). This Vedic command, in turn, reminds one of its own auxiliary rites (*upakāraka*), and the derived rituals are completed by means of the assistance of the rites of that very command. Thus, the Siddhāntin argues that only in derived rituals where a certain type of similarity

¹³⁷*atha nopaśāntākāṅkṣā tarhi ko nāma tatrānvitābhidhānaṃ vārayet.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 409)

¹³⁸*ata evaikapadoccāraṇe tadarthasambandhamukhena bahusv api smṛtisannihiteṣu yasyārthasya kenacit prakāreṇa viśeṣo gṛhyate tenaivānvitābhidhānam, agrhyamāṇe tu viśeṣe 'nadhyavasāyād apratītir eva.* (ibid., p. 409)

¹³⁹The Sanskrit sentence used here renders unambiguous the sense of the term *viśeṣa*. The text states: ... *yasyārthasya kenacit prakāreṇa viśeṣo gṛhyate* ... i.e. the *viśeṣa* is **of one of the meanings** (*artha*) from among all those present in the mind due to their memories. Furthermore, the text continues: ... *tenaivānvitābhidhānam* ... i.e. there is DoC with that *viśeṣa* only, thus once again reinforcing our understanding of the term *viśeṣa* as 'specific WM' and not 'the difference amongst the WMs present in memory' (this ambiguity was also discussed in footnote 120).

¹⁴⁰*ata eva vikṛtiṣu tatsādṛśyena yad apūrvaṃ smaryamāṇaṃ svopakārakaṃ smārayati, tadīyenaivopakāreṇa paripūraṇam. ato yatra bahutaradharmasādhāraṇyanibandhanaṃ sādṛśyam atyantodbhaṭam*, tatraiva śīghraṃ smṛtyupapattes tadīyopakārapari-graha eva. darvihomeṣu tu sarvāpūrvāṇām aviśeṣād viśeṣo grahītum aśakya ity anadhyavasāya eva prakṛtasyopakārasyeti, tatraivopakārakalpanā.* (C & MK: *sādṛśyam anyasyodgatam*) (A. Sastri 1964, p. 409)

(with a specific archetypal ritual) becomes most elevated (*atyantodbhāṭa*), that is where memory becomes logically justified and one can thereby admit the assistance of the rites belonging to that archetypal ritual.

The Siddhāntin contrasts such a case with oblations performed with ladles (*darvihoma*). Since all oblations require ladles, there is no distinct novel Vedic command which is reminded simply by an oblation requiring a ladle. Thus, no specific (*viśeṣa*) auxiliary rites of any archetypal ritual will be grasped and one will instead have to postulate (*kalpanā*) their assistance, instead of deriving them by means of the tool of analogical extension (*atideśa*).¹⁴¹

IV.11.4.3 The Siddhāntin's second response: Words *consistently* remind one of their own isolated meanings

Furthermore, the Siddhāntin also puts forth an additional point as to why the words in the sentence (say, *ukhāyāṃ pacati*) will not remind one of other suitable meanings (say, 'kulāla', etc.). He explains:¹⁴²

Moreover, SM cognition comes about in accordance with how one understands the linguistic usage of elders. In that [process of linguistic usage], whatever [WM (say, 'ukhā')] is **consistently** (*niyamena*) reminded by a word [*ukhā*] to a person whose mnemonic trace arising from learning the relation [between the word *ukhā* and its WM] is unimpaired¹⁴³ — it is with that WM only that one observes DoC (*anvitābhidhāna*) of the second word (say, *pacati*). This is because all words **consistently** (*niyamena*) lead to the memory of their own WMs (*svārtha*) for those individuals who remember the relation [between the word and the WM], and not to the memory of some other WM

¹⁴¹See Freschi (2012, p. 373) for an explanation of the terms of analogical extension (*atideśa*), derived rituals (*vikṛti*) and archetype rituals (*prakṛti*).

¹⁴²*api ca yathāvṛddhavyavahārāvagamaṃ vākyārthābodbhāṭaḥ. tatra yad eva padena anapabhraṣṭasambandhagrahaṇasamskārasya puruṣasya niyamena smāryate, tenaivānvitābhidhānaṃ padāntarasya dṛśyate, nānyena. sarvaṃ padaṃ svārthaṃ hi niyamena sambandhagrahaṇāt smārayati, nārthāntaram. tataś ca tenaivānvitasvārthabodhakateti na kaścid doṣaḥ.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 409)

¹⁴³This is a reference to the two memories which arise when one hears a word, as discussed in IV.8.2.

(say, ‘*kulāla*’). And hence, the second word (say *pacati*) conveys its own WM as connected with that [first WM ‘*ukhā*’] only [and there is no further DoC with other remembered WM] – thus, there is no fault [of endless DoC, as suggested by the Bhāṭṭa opponent].

IV.11.5 The Siddhāntin’s final concession: If denotation of WMs is required, still DoC is preferable

Finally, the Siddhāntin argues what would be the case if it had to be admitted that the cognition of the restricted (*pratiniyata*) connection between WMs could not come about until the other WMs were denoted and *not* remembered (as argued above in IV.11.3.2). He explains:¹⁴⁴

Moreover, if one accepts only that when [the second word (say *pacati*)] conveys its own WM as connected to [the first WM (say ‘*ukhā*’)] which is *denoted* [and not remembered] that the cognition of a restricted (i.e. not random) (*pratiniyata*) connection can come about [between these two WMs], and not in any other way (i.e. if the first WM is remembered and not denoted), then even the word’s **potency for DoC** should be postulated [in addition to its **potency for denotation of its own WM**]. If one objects that there is the unfortunate result of twin denotations — then [we would reply] ‘let there be this unfortunate result, there is [still] no fault [in our doctrine]’. [The reason for this is that] initially, the word denotes its isolated WM only. However, when it obtains assistance from other entities (i.e. WMs) which are denoted by other words, these other entities now becoming the first WM’s correlates — thereafter [the first word] expresses (i.e. denotes) its WM as connected to this or that [correlate] — hence there

¹⁴⁴*kiñ ca yady abhīhitenainvānvasvārthabodhanābhyupagama eva pratiniyatānvayabodho ghaṭate, nānyathā, tarhi kalpyatām padānām anvītabhidhānaśaktir api. dvir abhidhānam āpadyata iti ced āpadyatām, na kaścid doṣaḥ. pūrvaṃ kevalaṃ padam ananvitaṃ svārtham abhidhatte, pratiyogipadāntarābhīhitavastvantarasahāyaprāptyā tu tattadanvitaṃ artham āha iti na kaścid doṣaḥ. ittham api cāsmanmate śaktikalpanālāghavam asti, padārthagatānvayabodhanaśaktiyādhānaśaktikalpanātyāgāt. tulyāyām api śaktikalpanāyām, padānām evānvitabodhanaśaktir āśrayitum ucitā, na padārthānām, prathamāvagatatvāt, vākyaṛthe ca tātparyasyopagamād iti. (A. Sastri 1964, p. 410)*

is no fault [in our doctrine]. Even in this manner [of accepting two potencies for denotations], there [still] remains in our doctrine the economy of potency postulation [vis-à-vis the Bhāṭṭa position]. This is because [our doctrine] abandons the postulation of the **[additional] potency [of words] to confer to WMs the potency to convey their connection**. And if [the number of] potency postulations are the same [in both our doctrines], then it is better to admit the potency of words for conveying the connected [meaning] and not of WMs — since [words] are primarily comprehended and since [words] are comprehended as being meant for that SM.

IV.12 Hermeneutic conformity of DoC (vv.16-17)

IV.12.1 The denotation of connected and connection, demonstrating conformity with ŚBh (v.16)

The Siddhāntin now considers the statement from the ŚBh on PMS 1.1.25: *padāni hi svaṃ svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi. athedānīm avagatāḥ santo vākyārtham avagamayanti*. The Bhāṭṭa argued in IV.4.3 that this is an endorsement of CoD, as according to this statement, each word denotes its own WM, and then ceases to function (*nivṛttavyāpāra*). Thereafter, these WMs, once they have been comprehended as such, cause one to cognize the SM.

However, the Siddhāntin explains this phrase as conforming to DoC in his next verse and the commentary that follows:¹⁴⁵

In this manner, once the *connected* [WMs] have been ascertained by means of the words on account of their capacities [to denote the connected meanings],

There is no expectation for a further potency [to ascertain the *connection* between WMs] since the connection is grasped on the basis of the [connected] meanings . . . (continues in v.17)

¹⁴⁵VM-I v.16: *anviteṣu padair evaṃ bodhyamāneṣu śaktibhiḥ; anvayārthagṛhātātvan nānyāṃ śaktim apekṣate*. (ibid., p. 410)

The Siddhāntin explains in the commentary¹⁴⁶ that this phrase from the Bhāṣya is an answer to the following doubt: “If words denote a *connected* meaning (*anvita*), then they do not denote the *connection* between the WMs (*anvaya*). And in order to accomplish that connection, another potency to denote the connection should be postulated for the words.”

However, he argues that there is no need for any further potency to denote the connection independently. He explains that¹⁴⁷ a word which denotes a connected meaning most certainly is also denotative of the connection between the WMs. If that were not the case, then the connected meaning denoted by the word would certainly not be denoted as connected. The reason for this is as follows: An object which has the form of being something connected appropriates within itself (*svīkṛ-*) the connection between the entities comprising it — since without that connection between the comprising entities, that connected object will not come about. Thus, the Siddhāntin concludes that no further potency of words should be postulated with regard to that denotation of the connection.

IV.12.2 Connection-connected similar to (and yet distinct from) individual-universal (v.17)

The Siddhāntin now explains how the connection is grasped on the basis of the connected meanings (as claimed in v.16), and thereby puts forth an example in v.17:¹⁴⁸

[The connection is grasped on the basis of the connected meanings (v.16)] . . . because a person who is cognizing a connection [between certain simple entities] should cognize the connected [complex object comprising these simple entities].

This is similar to the case of that [person] [who is cognizing] an

¹⁴⁶*āśaṅkitottaram idaṃ bhāṣyam. kim āśaṅkitam? yady anvitābhīdhāyīni padāni tarhi nānvayābhīdhāyīni. tatsiddhyarthaṃ padānāṃ śaktyantaram kalpyam iti* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 410).

¹⁴⁷*atredam uttaram. yat padam anvitābhīdhāyakam, tad anvayābhīdhāyakam eva. anyathānvita evāsau nābhīhitaḥ syād iti, anvitarūpeṇārthenānvayaḥ svīkṛtaḥ taṃ vinā tadasambhavād iti, nāparā tadviṣayā padānāṃ śaktiḥ kalpanīyā.* (ibid., p. 410)

¹⁴⁸VM-I v.17: *pratīyann anvayaṃ yasmāt pratīyād anvitaṃ pumān; vyaktiṃ jātim ivārthe 'sāv iti samparikīrtiyate*

individual [and who should cognize] the universal in an object
(*artha*) — this is well known.

The Siddhāntin further explains¹⁴⁹ that the reason for the connection being grasped on the basis of connected meanings is that a connected complex object always possesses a connection (*anvayavat*). If there is no cognition of the connection, then that connected complex object will not be cognized — rather the mere isolated forms of the simple entities comprising the complex object (*svarūpamātra*) will be cognized. And that isolated form is not said to be connected. Consequently, one who is perceiving a connection between simple entities will most certainly perceive also the connected complex object — just as one who is perceiving an individual will most certainly also perceive its universal.

Nevertheless, this example of the connection-connected with the individual-universal does not hold at all levels and there is an important distinction in these two sets. The Siddhāntin explains¹⁵⁰ that something which is connected is said to definitely possess a connection. Thus even the connection *enters into* the denotation of the connected (*abhidhānānupraviṣṭa*). On the other hand, the nature of the universal is not such that it always possesses a particular — rather, the universal is the shape (*ākāra*) of the individual and is thus distinct from it.

If that shape of the individual (*ākṛti*) is what is denoted by the word (say, cow), then the individual also *cannot enter into* the denotation of the form/shape by the word. Rather, the Siddhāntin explains that the universal which is the shape (*ākāra*), despite being distinct from the individual, cannot however be understood without one's cognition of the individual — in accordance with the true nature of objects (*vastusvabhāva*). And thus, the Siddhāntin asserts that the example of the individual-universal with the connection-connected holds true with this extent of similarity (*sāmya*), not with complete similarity.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹*anvayavān eva hy anvitaḥ. so 'nvayāpratītau na pratīta eva syāt, kintu svarūpamātram eva. na ca tad anvitam ucyate. tasmād anvayaṃ pratipadyamāna evānvitam pratipadyate. yathā vyaktiṃ pratipadyamāna eva jātim.*

¹⁵⁰*ayan tu viśeṣaḥ. anvayavān evānvita ucyata iti, anvayo 'py abhidhānānupraviṣṭaḥ. vyaktimattaiva jātisvarūpaṃ na bhavati, kintu vyakter ākārāntarabhūtā jātis tato bhinnā. sā ced ākṛtiḥ śabdābhidheyā, na vyaktir apy abhidhānānupraveśinī, kintv ākārabhūtā jātir vyakter vyatiriktāpi vastusvabhāvena vyaktim antareṇa na pratītim anubhavati, etāvata ca sāmyena dṛṣṭāntaḥ, na sarvātmanā. (A. Sastri 1964, p. 411)*

¹⁵¹Immediately subsequent to this argument, Śālikanātha embarks on a discussion about how a

IV.12.3 Conclusion about Śabara's sentence

Thus, the Siddhāntin now concludes as to the true sense of Śabara's phrase on PMS 1.1.25: *padāni hi svaṃ svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi. athedānīm avagatāḥ santo vākyārtham avagamayanti.* He explains this phrase as:¹⁵²

The following is the meaning of the words in the ŚBh: The words denote their *connected* [WMs] and then cease functioning (*nivṛttavyāpāra*) i.e. they do not denote the *connection* [between the WMs] separately. Now it is only when the connected [WMs] have been ascertained that these bring about connection as also being understood.

Moreover, the Siddhāntin explains¹⁵³ that since unconnected WMs are learnt at the very moment of grasping the relation between a word and its WM and since a completely different connection between WMs is ascertained for every different sentence — thus the sentence is only meant for conveying that connection. Hence, the Siddhāntin explains that by the word *vākyārtha* in the phrase above, Śabara refers to 'the connection [between the WMs]'.¹⁵²

IV.13 Connection with a specific and not a generic WM (vv.18-22)

In the final section, the Siddhāntin presents and refutes objections from other *anvitābhidhānavādins* — referring to them as *sāmānyānvitābhidhānavādins* (the-word leads to the cognition of a universal as well as an individual. He argues that such a dual content (*ubhayaviśaya*) of the cognition arising from a word can be justified on account of the word denoting the universal only. Moreover, he presents this as an important discussion describing this to be the quintessence of the Prābhākara doctrine: *śrūyatām avadhānena sarvasvaṃ prābhākarāṇām* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 411). However, since this discussion is not directly related to the main focus of this thesis, namely the debate between *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna*, I am not presenting this argument here.

¹⁵²*bhāṣyākṣarāṇām ayam arthaḥ — padāny anvitam abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi nānvayaṃ pṛthag abhidadhati. athedānīm anvitāḥ pratipannā anvayam api pratītam sampādayantīti.* (ibid., pp. 411-412)

¹⁵³*loke ca padārthānām sambandhagrahaṇasamaya eva viditavāt, vākyāntare cānvayāntarasyaiva pratipannatvāt, tatparataiva vākyasyeti. vākyārthasābdena bhāṣyakāro 'nvayam āha.* (ibid., p. 412)

orists who accept the denotation of a WM as connected to other *generic* WMs), in contrast to himself who he labels as a *viśeṣānvitābhīdhānavādin* (those who accept the denotation of a WM as connected to other *specific* WMs).

Following is the main argument that the former put forth:¹⁵⁴ A word, whose relation with its WM is known in accordance with the linguistic usage of elders, is expressive of its WM only, and one ascertains this relation of the word with its WM by means of co-presence and co-absence (*anvayavyatireka*). This occurs since co-presence and co-absence cannot come about in a manner such that their content is a WM having a connection with a specific other WM. This is because a word signifying action (say, *pacati*) (*kriyāpada*) experiences co-presence and co-absence with its meaning action (here, ‘cooking’) which itself never deviates from a generic factor of action (*kāraśāmānya*) — since this meaning action deviates from a specific factor of action (*kāraśa*) (e.g. ‘*odana*’) in another specific connection (i.e. when it connects to ‘*piṣṭaka*’). This is similarly applicable also to the word signifying the factor of action.

Hence, the argument of the *sāmānyānvitābhīdhānavādins* is that the analytical processes of co-presence and co-absence can only yield a word as related to its WM which is connected to generic other WMs, not specific WMs. However, the Siddhāntin states:¹⁵⁵

Those [theorists] who declare that what is expressed by the words is
[their WM] connected with generic [other meanings] (*sāmānya*),
For these [theorists], how would there come about the [WM’s] con-
nection with a restricted (*niyata*), specific [WM] (*viśeṣa*)?

The Siddhāntin refers back¹⁵⁶ to his argument in IV.5.1 where it had been explained that despite there being in DoC the connection of a WM with specific

¹⁵⁴ye ’nvitābhīdhānavādina evam āhuḥ — vṛddhavyavahāraprasiddhasambandhaḥ śabdo ’rthasya vācakaḥ, anvayavyatirekābhyañ ca sambandhāvadhāraṇam. na ca viśeṣānvayaviśayau tau sambhavataḥ. kriyāpadaḥ hi kāraśāmānyāvvyabhicāriṇyā kriyayā sahānvayavyatirekau bhajate viśeṣānvayāntaravyabhicārāt. evaḥ kāraśapade ’pi yoḥyam. (ibid., p. 412)

¹⁵⁵VM-I v.18: sāmānyānvitābhīdhānavādīnāḥ vācyaḥ padānāḥ ye pracakṣate; niyatena viśeṣeṇa teṣāḥ syād anvayaḥ katham (ibid., p. 412)

¹⁵⁶darśitam idaḥ — viśeṣānvaye ’py ākāṅkṣāsannidhiyogyatopādihivaśena sambandhagrahaṇaḥ sukaram iti, tadabhīdhāyakataiva yuktā padānāḥ. yadi cāsau neṣyate, tadā vākyārthapratipattir eva nopapadyate, viśeṣānvayarūpatvād vākyārthasya. (ibid., p. 412)

other WMs (and not other infinitely possible, generic WMs), the comprehension of the relation of a word with its WM (*sambandha*) can be done quite lucidly (*sukara*) on account of the conditions of expectation, proximity and compatibility. Thus, the Siddhāntin insists that it is correct (*yukta*) that words denote that connection of their WM with specific other WMs. This is because if one does not accept that, then SM cognition itself will not be justified (*upapad-*) — since SM has the form of a specific connection between multiple WMs.

The remaining four verses present modifications to the *sāmānyānvitābhidhānavādin* position, and subsequent refutations of these¹⁵⁷ — v.19 refutes the position that the generic connection may be denoted while the specific connection may be indirectly denoted (*ākṣip-*), while v.20 explains that there will be nothing to convey (*sambandhabodhakābhāva*) the specific connection in the case of the opponent's doctrine. In v.21, the Siddhāntin explains that in his doctrine of *viśeṣānvayavāda*, expectation, proximity and compatibility are considered as assisting the cognition of the SM (*sambandhabodha*), whereas in v.22, he argues that in the opponent's doctrine, words will be used in vain since they will only express the generic connection (*sāmānyasaṅgama*).

¹⁵⁷VM-I v.19: *yady apyākṣipyate nāma viśeṣo vyaktijātivat; nirdhāritaviśeṣas tu tadvad eva na gamyate;*

v.20: *yady apy ākāṅkṣito yogyo viśeṣaḥ sannidhau śrutaḥ; sambandhabodhakābhāve gṛhyate na tathāpy asau;*

v.21: *sambandhabodhe vyutpattāv upādhitve samaviśat; viśeṣānvayavāde tu yogyatvādy upakāraḥ;*

v.22: *kiñ ca vastubalenaiva siddhe sāmānyasaṅgame; tasya vācyatvam icchadbhir vṛthā śabdaḥ prayāsitaḥ* (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 412-414)

Chapter V

Annotated Text of Sucaritamísra's Kāśikāṭikā on Ślokavārttika Vākyādhikaraṇa vv.110cd-112ab

An Introductory Note

The *Kāśikāṭikā* on the ŚV has been published only upto the end of the section *sambandhākṣepa*¹ – yet, as Shida (2013, p. 1108) explains, the rest of the *Kāśikāṭikā* is entirely available in several manuscripts. This chapter presents the edited text of the *Kāśikāṭikā* on ŚV Vāk. vv.110cd-112ab (Kṭ²), the opening two verses of the *siddhānta*. A distinctive feature of the *Kāśikāṭikā* is that for several chapters of the ŚV, it enters into extended discussions on the initial verse(s)³ and presents arguments which had not been articulated when the ŚV was composed.

Manuscripts

The text presented here is based on the study of the following two manuscripts:

¹V. A. R. Sastri 1943.

²As mentioned previously, the abbreviation Kṭ is used to refer only to this particular section of the *Kāśikāṭikā* (i.e. on ŚV Vāk. vv.110cd-112ab), and not the *Kāśikāṭikā* in its entirety.

³See for instance Kataoka (2014), which is the critical edition of the *Kāśikāṭikā* on the first verse of the ŚV chapter of *apoha*.

A: A manuscript preserved in the Adyar Library, Chennai, TR 66-3. Paper. Devanāgarī. pp.1359-1400. (Kataoka (2014) refers to TR 66-5 and Shida (2013) refers to TR 66-7, both manuscripts from the same series.)

S: A manuscript preserved in the Sarasvatī Bhavan Library, Sampūrṇānanda Sanskrit University, Varanasi. No. 29032. Paper. Devanāgarī. ff.577r-585r. (Kataoka (2014) designates this as S₁, Shida (2013) designates this as S.)

Following is a brief description of these two manuscripts: **A** is a transcript recorded in a notebook. It reports several sentence-breaks and is divided into distinct paragraphs. It has multiple instances where some text is underlined and other text is inserted within parentheses immediately thereafter. This has been recorded accordingly, for instance *upakalpa(tpāda)ytum* (footnote 8). The underlined text seems to be the scribe's suggested deletion with the text in parentheses being the preferred reading instead. Further, there are also instances where words/phrases are inserted within parentheses without any prior text being underlined (for instance *iṣyate (eva)*, footnote 89), which once again indicates that the text in parentheses is the scribe's preferred reading. **S** however does not have any paragraph breaks, and only a few *daṇḍas* indicating sentence-breaks.

Shida (ibid.) discusses the different manuscripts of the Kāśikāṭīkā available for the *śabdānityatādhikaraṇa* and presents also a subjective analysis of the phylogeny of the manuscripts (ibid., p.1110, fig. 1), including the two considered here.

I am very grateful to Dr. Hugo David (EFEO, Pondicherry) and Dr. Kei Kataoka (Kyushu University of Fukuoka) for giving me access to the digital photos and scans of these two manuscripts, and also granting me permission to present a study of these as part of my thesis.

The Edition

In the following edition of the KṚ, the text of the two manuscripts has been emended, firstly, to ensure the uniformity of the *sandhi* and spelling practices (*daṃḍo* to *daṇḍo*, *upapatyāpi* to *upapattyāpi*, etc.) Moreover, I have added the sentential punctuation with the intention of aiding the reader to understand and

follow the manifold arguments in the text. In doing so, I have also considered the punctuation used in A as well as the (few) *daṇḍas* and marks (dots) used in S.

Sentences are grouped into paragraphs, which are further classified into sections and sub-sections. Paragraph breaks are mostly as according to A (there are none in S), but I explain in footnotes in case my understanding diverges significantly from A. However, my main concern has been to correctly categorise the text into sections and sub-sections, depending on the speaker (*pūrvapakṣin* or *siddhāntin*), the argument being presented and the different steps within the argument. An explanation for this can be found in the subsequent chapter where the text is translated, as well Chapters I-III where I discuss the two theories of *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna* on the basis of the arguments found in the KṚ as well as the VM-I.

The text often quotes phrases/sentences from the ŚBh, ŚV Vāk., etc. These have been identified in **bold** and their reference provided in the critical apparatus. Moreover, the two manuscripts do not contain the two verses of the ŚV Vāk. vv.110cd-112ab. I have however included the verses here for the convenience of the reader.

Finally, in case of any deviation between the readings of A and S, the reading has been chosen on the basis of the inner consistency of the argument as found in the text, as well as external parallels of the argument found in the VM-I and other related works. Moreover, whenever the text has been emended in any significant way from that found in A or S, the reason has been summarised in the apparatus.

Critical Apparatus

The first apparatus presents the variant readings from the two manuscripts A and S. Angle brackets < > have been included to indicate the lemma pertaining to the corresponding footnote. The apparatus presented is negative, and hence only the divergent reading is presented (i.e. when the text from A is presented in the apparatus, the reading from S has been selected, and vice versa). When both A and S are presented in the apparatus, the text has been emended and the reason for this is mentioned in parentheses.

The second apparatus (in Roman numbering) presents passages from other

texts, either quoted or referenced. Margin notes provide the corresponding page/folio references in the two manuscripts.

V.1 Hermeneutic conformity of *abhihitānvaya* (CoD) with the views of Jaimini and Śabara

evaṃ mūlābhāvena pūrvapakṣite siddhāntasūtram —

A: p.1359,

**tadbhūtānāṃ kriyārthena samāmnāyo 'rthasya tannimittatvād
itiⁱ**

S: f.577r

asyārthaḥ — padānāṃ tāvat <padārthair>¹ nitya eva sambandhaḥ **teṣv eva padārtheṣu bhūtānāṃ vartamānānāṃ kriyārthena samāmnāya uccāraṇam ity arthaḥ.**ⁱⁱ <kriyeti ca bhāvanāṃ>² brūmaḥ, saiva cānekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭā vākyaṛtha ity ucyate. ata etad uktaṃ bhavati — padāny eva padārthapratipādana-dvāreṇa vākyaṛthapratipattaḥ mūlam iti na nirmūlatā.

A: p.1360

na cānapekṣitapadārthāny eva padāni pṛthag eva padārthavad vākyaṛthaṃ pratipādayantīti yuktaṃ pramāṇābhāvāt. na hi naḥ <kiñcit>³ pramāṇam asti yenānapekṣitapadārtha eva vākyaṛthyavarnaḥ pūrvavarṇajanitasamskārasahito 'rthāntarabhūtam eva vākyaṛthaṃ <pratipādayatīty upagacchāmaḥ>⁴.ⁱⁱⁱ

<nanv arthāpattir>⁵ eva pramāṇam, vākyaṛthe 'pi hi kāryadarśanānusāreṇa padārtha iva varṇānāṃ śaktiṃ kalpayiṣyāmaḥ.

S: f.577v

na, **arthasya <tannimittatvāt** padārthānāṃ evākāṅkṣāyogyatāsannidhibalapatilabdhetaretaravyatiṣaṅgānāṃ vākyaṛthabuddhau>⁶ nimittatvāt. kṣiṇārthāpattir na varṇagāminīm <aparām>⁷

A: p.1361

¹S: padārtheṣu

²S: kriyeti bhāvanāṃ

³A: kañcit

⁴A: pratipādayatīty apy upagacchāmaḥ

⁵S: nanv anyathānupattir

⁶S: tannimittatvāt padānāṃ evārthasyākāṅkṣāyogyatāsannidhibalapatilabdhetaretaravyatiṣaṅgasya viśiṣṭāvākyaṛthabuddhau

⁷S: aparām api

ⁱPMS 1.1.25

ⁱⁱŚBh on PMS 1.1.25: *teṣv eva padārtheṣu bhūtānāṃ vartamānānāṃ padānāṃ kriyārthena samuccāraṇam.* (Āpaṭe 1929, p. 95)

ⁱⁱⁱŚBh on PMS 1.1.25: *nānapekṣya padārthān pāṛthagarthyena vākyaṃ arthāntaraprasiddham. kutaḥ. pramāṇābhāvāt. na kiñcana pramāṇam asti yena pramimīmahe. na hy anapekṣitapadārthasya vākyaṛthyavarnaṣya pūrvavarṇajanitasamskārasahitasya śaktir asti padārthebhyo 'rthāntare vartitum iti.* (ibid., pp. 95-96)

śaktim <upakalpayitum>⁸ alam iti yathoktaṃ bhāṣye **padāni hi svaṃ svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi. athedānīm padārthā avagatāḥ santo vākyārtham avagamayantī**^{iv} <tam imaṃ>⁹ sūtrabhāṣyakārābhīmatam siddhāntam <vārttikakāro darśayati>¹⁰ — **atrābhīdhīyata iti.**

atrābhīdhīyate yady apy asti mūlāntaram na naḥ,
padārthānām tu mūlatvam dṛṣṭam tadbhāvabhāvataḥ^v

A: p.1362 ayam arthaḥ — yady api na pratyekaṃ padāni <vākyārthadhiyo>¹¹ nimittam na tatsamudāyo na vākyāvayavī na tajjātir ādyaṃ vā padam antyaṃ vā vyatirikta <eva vā vākyasphoṭo bāhyānirbhāsā vā buddhir bāhyaśūnyaiva vā>^{12vi} tathāpi padārthānām eva viśiṣṭavākyārthabuddhau <tadbhāvabhāvitayā>¹³ mūlatvam avagamyate. anavagatapadārtho hi saty api <vākyāśravaṇe na vākyārtham budhyate>¹⁴ budhyate cāsaty api <vākye padārthavyatiṣaṅgavit viśiṣṭam artham iti>¹⁵ <padārthabhāvabhāvī vākyārthapratyayo>¹⁶ niścīyate, tadbhāvabhāvaś ca <kāryakāraṇatāvagame>¹⁷ nimittam iti padārthamūlako vākyārtho na mūlābhāvād

⁸A: upakalpa(tpāda)yitum

⁹A: tad idaṃ

¹⁰S: vārttikakāro 'vatārayati

¹¹S: vākyadhiyo

¹²S: eva vā sphoṭaḥ vākyānirbhāso buddhir vārthaśūnyaiva

¹³A: tadbhāvabhāvitayā

¹⁴S: vākyāśravaṇe vākyam na budhyate

¹⁵S: vākye padārthavyatiṣaṅgaviśiṣṭam artham iti

¹⁶A: padārthatadbhāvabhāvī vākyārtho

¹⁷A: kāryakāraṇabhāve

^{iv}ŚBh on PMS 1.1.25: *nanv arthāpattir asti, yat padārthavyatiriktam artham avagacchāmaḥ. na ca śaktim antareṇa tad avakalpyata iti. tan na. arthasya tannimittatvāt. bhaved arthāpattiḥ, yady asatyām api śaktau nānyan nimittam avakalpyeta. avagamyate tu nimittam. kim? padārthāḥ. padāni hi svaṃ svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi. athedānīm padārthā avagatāḥ santo vākyārtham gamayanti.* (Āpaṭe 1929, p. 96)

^vŚV Vāk. vv.110cd-111ab.

^{vi}A similar enumeration is already found in the Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (VP) II vv.1-2: *ākhyātaṃ śabdasaṅghāto jātiḥ saṅghātavartinī, eko 'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ kramo buddhyanusamḥrtiḥ. padam ādyaṃ pṛthak sarvaṃ padaṃ sāpekṣam ity api, vākyam prati matir bhinnā bahudhā nyāyadarśinām.* This verse is also quoted in the NR on ŚV Vāk. v.49ab. Kumārila refutes each of these in ŚV Vāk. vv.49cd-57ab.

anyathā bhavitum arhati, yathā ca padārthānām tanmūlatvaṃ <tanmūlatve 'pi ca nāśābdatvaṃ>¹⁸ tathopariṣṭād <vakṣyata iti>.¹⁹

yat tāvan na vākyaṃ vākyaṛthasya vācakam ity uktam tad anumanyāmahā evety āha — **satyam iti**.

satyaṃ na vācakaṃ vākyaṃ vākyaṛthasyopapadyate^{vii}

V.2 The arguments of the Prābhākara Pūrvaṅgī in favour of *anvitābhidhāna* (DoC)

V.2.1 The sentence is indeed expressive of SM in Mīmāṃsā

kiṃ punar idaṃ mīmāṃsātantraviparītam iva siddhāntāvasare varṇyate, **saṃhatyārtham abhidadhati padāny eva vākyaṃ** <iti mīmāṃsakāḥ>²⁰.^{viii} <ato yady api na pratyekaṃ padāni viśiṣṭārthasya vācakāni>²¹ tathāpi vṛddhavyavahāravyutpattyanusāreṇa saṃhatāny eva viśiṣṭam artham abhidadhatīti yuktam āśrayitum. tathābhūteṣv <eva ca vākyaśabdaḥ>²² prasiddha <iti kathaṃ na>²³ vākyaṃ vākyaṛthasya vācakam ity ucyate. A: p.1363 S: f.578r

na ca nirbhāgavākyaḥprāyeneḍam ucyate tasyopariṣṭān nirākariṣyamāṇatvāt. sabhāgaṃ ca vākyaṃ vācakam anicchatāṃ vākyaṛthabuddhir <akāraṇikā>²⁴ syāt, <kriyākāraguṇaguṇipadāni hi svam>²⁵ svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi kuto <'rthasiddhir>²⁶ iti vaktavyam.

¹⁸S: tanmūlatve ca śābdatvaṃ

¹⁹S: vakṣyati

²⁰S: iti hi mīmāṃsakāḥ

²¹S: ato yady api pratyekaṃ padāni viśiṣṭasyārthasya na vācakāni

²²A: eva vākyaśabdaḥ

²³S: iti na kathaṃ

²⁴S: akāraṇā

²⁵S: kriyākāraguṇaguṇipadāni svam

²⁶A: 'nvayasiddhir

^{vii}ŚV Vāk. v.111cd.

^{viii}ŚBh on PMS 3.3.14: *atha kiṃ vākyaṃ nāma? saṃhatyārtham abhidadhati padāni vākyaṃ.* (Āpaṭe 1930, p. 824) This phrase from the ŚBh is also quoted in the VM-I (A. Sastri 1964, p.402).

V.2.2 No possible cause that can bring about a connection between unconnected WMs

A: p.1364 <padārthā anvayaṃ gamayantīti cet ko hetur. anyathānupapattiḥ>.²⁷ kriyāpadārtho hi <kārapadārtho vānyatarānvayam>²⁸ antareṇa nopapadyata iti taṃ <gamayatīti cet>²⁹ kā punar asyānupapattiḥ, na hi pratītenāvaśyam anvitenā bhavitavyam iti kaścīn <niyamahetur>³⁰ asti, ananvitārthapadaracanāyā api dr̥ṣṭatvād gaur aśvaḥ puruṣo hastīti. ata eva sannidhir apy akāraṇam anvaye anaikāntikatvāt, <sam̐nihitayor apy aṅgulyor>³¹ asambandhadarśanāt. <ata eva yogyatāmātram api na kāraṇam tayor eva vyabhicāradarśanāt, yogye hi sambandhum aṅgulyau kadācit sambandhadarśanāt>.³²

na cākāṅkṣayā sambandhaḥ. <ākāṅkṣati>³³ hi kṣudhito 'nnapānasambandham,
A: p.1365 na cāsau tasya bhavatīti <na kañcit padārthānāṃ parasparānvaye hetum>³⁴ upal-
abhāmahe.

V.2.3 Only words can denote a connected meaning, indirect denotation is not possible

ataḥ padāny evākāṅkṣitayogyasannihitārthāntarānvitasvārthābhidhānasvabhā-
vānīty āstheyam,^{ix} <na ca viśiṣṭārthapratītv>³⁵ upāyāntaraṃ paśyāmaḥ.

²⁷A: Om. padārthā . . . anyathānupapattiḥ

²⁸S: kārapadārtho anyatarānvayam

²⁹A: gamayatīti

³⁰A: niyamo hetur

³¹A: sannihitayor aṅgulyor

³²S: Om. ata . . . sambandhadarśanāt

³³S: kāṅkṣati

³⁴A: na kiñcit padārthānāṃ parasparānvaye hetum; S: na kañcit padānāṃ parasparānvayahetum
(Reasons for emendation: *kañcit* qualifies *hetu* (m); *anvaya* between WMs, not words)

³⁵S: na tu viśiṣṭapratītv

^{ix}This description of DoC is based on VM-I. A similar description is also found in the Śālikanāthamiśra's *Ṛjuvimalāpañcikā* (RVP) on PMS 1.1.25: *na ca sambandhagrahaṇāśaktiḥ, upādhiviśeṣāśrayaṇena sukaratvāt, ākāṅkṣāsannidhānopasthāpitānvayayogyārthāntarānvitasvārthābhidhāyini padānīti vyutpattiparigrahe na kiñcid anupapannam* (S. K. R. Sastri 1934, p. 384)

evaṃ cāvyavadhānaiva śabdaiḥ pratyāyyamāno vākyārthaḥ <śabdo>³⁶ bhaved, <itarathā hi niṣpramāṇiko bhavet>³⁷ lākṣaṇiko vā. tatra <sarvalākṣaṇikatve>³⁸ mukhyalākṣaṇikavivekānupapattiḥ.

api cānvayānupapattau lakṣaṇā <bhavati, yadā tv anvayapratītāv api na kiñcit kāraṇam astīty uktam tadā kasyānupapattyā lakṣaṇāṃ vakṣyāmaḥ>³⁹, na ca <svarūpeṇaiva padārthā nopapadyanta ity uktam>⁴⁰.^x

S: f.578v

A: p.1366

V.2.4 Language learning leads one to infer the potency of words to denote connected meanings

<syād etat — anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ kriyākāraḥkādipadānāṃ niṣkr̥ṣṭaikaikārthābhīdhānaśaktir avadhāriteti>⁴¹ nānvitam yāvad <abhidhānam>⁴² gacchatīti.

tan na, anvitābhīdhāna eva vyutpatteḥ. bālo hi gām ānayeti śabdaśravaṇasamanantarabhāvinīm prayojyavṛddhasya viśiṣṭārthaviśayāṃ ceṣṭām upalabhyākalayati <nūnam>⁴³ itaḥ sakāśād <asya viśiṣṭārthaviśayā saṃvid upajāteti>⁴⁴ evaṃ ca tadgocarām eva <śabdasyābhīdhānaśaktim unnayati>⁴⁵ an-

³⁶A: śabdo

³⁷ S: itarathā niṣpramāṇaka eva bhavet

³⁸S: lākṣaṇikatve

³⁹S: bhavati. yad vākyārthapratītāv eva na kiñcit kāraṇam astīty uktam tadā kasyānupapattau lakṣaṇāṃ vakṣyāmaḥ

⁴⁰A: svarūpeṇaiva padārtho nopapadyata ity uktam

⁴¹S: syād etad anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ eva kriyākāraḥkādipadānāṃ niṣkr̥ṣṭaikaikārthābhīdhāne śaktir evāvdhāriteti

⁴²S: abhidhā

⁴³A: ā(nū)nam

⁴⁴S: asya viśiṣṭārthasaṃvij jāteti

⁴⁵S: śabdasyābhīdhāśaktim arthayati

^xVM-I: *atrocyate. katham punar iyaṃ lakṣaṇā?*

vācyasyārthasya vākyārthe sambandhānupapattitāḥ; tatsambandhavaśaprāptasyānvayāl lakṣaṇocyate iti saṅgrahaślokaḥ.

gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ ityādiṣu śrautasya gaṅgāpadārthasya vākyārthe 'nvayāsambhavāt, taṃ parityajya tatsambandhāl labdhābuddhisannidheḥ kṛdādyarthasya vākyārthānvayitādhyavasāyate. ata evāhuḥ — anupapattyā, sambandhena ca lakṣaṇā bhavātīti. iha ca gāmānāyetyādauna śrautasārthasyānvayāyogyatvaṃ, nāpy anvitāvastasyānāyanasambandhārthāt anvitārthasyānvayāntarāsambhavāt. (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 398-399)

vayavyatirekābhyām.^{xi}

V.2.5 Difference between *nimitta* and *abhidheya*

A: p.1367
api cātra nimittaniṣkarṣamātram eva kriyate nābhidheyaniṣkarṣaḥ, gām ānaya
gām dogdhi gām abhyājety <evamādiṣu hi vākyeṣu>⁴⁶ gopadānvaye tat-
tatkriyāpadavyatireke <ca gor anvayād>⁴⁷ etāvad avagamyate yathā <gaur>⁴⁸ an-
vitābhidhāne gopadasya nimittam iti.

na ca nimittam evābhidheyam, <na hi daṇḍipadasya daṇḍinam abhidhātum
daṇḍo nimittam ity abhidheyo bhavati. ato nimittam abhidheye padārthaḥ
nābhidheyāḥ>⁴⁹^{xii} anvitasyaiva vyutpattibalēnābhidheyatvāt.

⁴⁶S: evamādiṣu vākyeṣu

⁴⁷S: ca anvayād

⁴⁸A: gor

⁴⁹A: na hi daṇḍipadasya daṇḍinam abhidhātum daṇḍo nimittam ity abhidheyo bhavati. ato
nimittam abhidhāna(dheye) padārthaḥ nābhidheyāḥ; S: na hi daṇḍipadasya daṇḍinam abhidhātum
daṇḍo nimittam iti daṇḍipadenābhidhīyata iti nimittam abhidheye na padārthā abhidheyāḥ
(A possible emendation could be [*anvitā*]bhidhāne (in order to explain the variant in A), to make
the construction of this sentence (i.e. the general argument) similar to the end of the previous
sentence (i.e. a particular example), which was *yathā gaur anvitābhidhāne gopadasya nimittam
iti*.)

^{xi}VM-I: *parihṛtaṃ hi tatredam – bālo hi vyutpadyamānaḥ prayojyavṛddhasya
śabdaśravaṇasamanantarabhāvinīṃ viśiṣṭaceṣṭānumitām arthapratītiṃ śabdakāraṇikām avagac-
chati. sa tathā vyutpannaḥ kadācit kasyacid ananvitārthapadaracanaṃ vākyam upalabhate,
tathopalabhamānasya caiṣa vimārśo jāyate – sambhāvyaṃ nānanvitārthapadaracanaṃ idaṃ
vākyam katham prayojyavṛddhasya arthaniścayaṃ kṛtavat? vṛddhasyāpi puruṣāyatte vākye 'nan-
vitārthapadaracanaśaṅkā mameva sambhavaṭīti. tasyaivaṃ vicikitsodaye punar eṣa niścayo jāyate
– nūnam anenāyaṃ prayoktetthamavadhārīto yad anvitārthāny eva padāny ayaṃ prayukta iti.
tathāvidhapadaprayoganiyamaś cāsyānupalabdhe 'nvaye nopapadyate ity evam anvayopalamb-
ham anumimānenānvayo niścīyate. (A. Sastri 1964, p. 380) See IV.3.*

^{xii}ŚBh on PMS 6.1.1: *naitad asti, prīter abhidhāyakaḥ svargaśabda iti. kutaḥ? viśeṣaṇatvāt.
yad viśeṣaṇam, na tac chabdenocyate. tad yathā, daṇḍīti daṇḍanimittaḥ puruṣavacanaḥ, daṇḍo
'sya nimittam, nābhidheyāḥ. evam eṣa na prītivacanaḥ prītisādhanavacanas tv eṣa svargaśabda
iti. (Āpaṭe 1932, p. 1347)*

ŚBh on PMS 6.1.2: *yat tūktam daṇḍīśabdavad iti, so 'pi pratīte śabdād daṇḍe daṇḍini pratyayam
ādadhātī. antargatas tatra daṇḍaśabdaḥ, sa daṇḍasya vācakaḥ. iha punaḥ svargaśabda eva prīter
abhidhātā. (ibid., pp. 1350-1351)*

V.2.6 Connection between WMs is ascertained, as cognition of connected WMs is incomplete without it

nanv anvitapratipattāv anvayo viśeṣaṇam, na cāgrhītaviśeṣaṇā viśeṣye <buddhir iti>⁵⁰ so 'py <abhidhātavya evāpatati>⁵¹. bādham. yady evaṃ <tadviśayāpi>⁵² śabdānām aparā śaktiḥ kalpanīyā. <maivam, ekayaiva śaktyobhayasiddheḥ. nānantarbhāvyānvayam anvitaḥ pratyetuṃ śakyata ity>⁵³ A: p.1368 <anvitapratītyaparyavasānalabhya evānvayo na pṛthag abhidhānaśaktim apekṣate, ekasamvitsamvedyatvād anvitānvayayoḥ.^{xiii}

V.2.7 Agreement of DoC with ŚBh on PMS 1.1.25

<niṣkr̥ṣṭaś ca yo>⁵⁴ na śabdenābhidhīyate>⁵⁵ anenaiivābhiprāyeṇa S: f.579r
bhāṣyakāreṇoktam — **padāni hi svam svam artham abhidhāya
nivr̥ttavyāpārāni athedānīm padārthā avagatāḥ santo vākyaartham
<avagamayantīti>**^{56xiv} <anvitā arthā avagatāḥ>⁵⁷ santo vākyaartham an-

⁵⁰S: buddhir bhavatīti

⁵¹S: abhidhātavya āpatati

⁵²S: tadviśayā

⁵³A: maivam, eta(ka)yaiva śaktyobhayasiddheḥ nānantarbhāvyānvayam anvayaṃ pratyetuṃ śakyata ity; S: śaktiḥ parikalpanīyā evam ekayaiva śaktyobhayasiddhir nānantarbhāvyānvayam anvitaḥ pratyetuṃ śakyata iti

(Reason for emendation: (i) Choosing *śaktyobhayasiddheḥ* (A) instead of *śaktyobhayasiddhir* (S) since this is the response of the Prābhākara to the Bhāṭṭa objection; (ii) Choosing *anvitaḥ* from S in place of *anvayaṃ* of A since this alone makes sense and also aligns with the present argument about *anvaya* and *anvita*.)

⁵⁴A: niṣkr̥ṣṭaṃ ca yo; S: see footnote 55

⁵⁵S: Om. anvitapratītyaparyavasānalabhya . . . śabdenābhidhīyate

⁵⁶A: gamayantīti

⁵⁷S: anvitā avagatāḥ

^{xiii}VM-I:

pratīyann anvayaṃ yasmāt pratīyād anvitaṃ pumān; vyaktiṃ jātīm ivārthe 'sāv iti samparikīrtyate. (v.17)

anvayavān eva hy anvitaḥ. so 'nvayāpratītau na pratīta eva syāt, kintu svarūpamātram eva. na ca tad anvitaṃ ucyate. tasmād anvayaṃ pratipadyamāna evānvitaṃ pratipadyate. yathā vyaktiṃ pratipadyamāna eva jātīm. (A. Sastri 1964, p. 410)

^{xiv}See footnote i.

vayam <anvitapratītyaparyavasānāt>⁵⁸ gamayantīty arthaḥ, **svam svam artham** <ity anvitābhiprāyeṇoktam>⁵⁹.^{xv}

ata eva āhuḥ — vyatiṣaktābhīdhānaṃ padaṃ **na vyatiṣaṅgābhīdhānaṃ** vyatiṣaktato 'vagater vyatiṣaṅgasyeti'.^{xvi}

V.2.8 Bhāṭṭa must accept potencies in WMs, additional to those of words

A: p.1369 avāśyaṃ ca padārthasāmarthyaprabhāvitam <api vākyārtham anvayam abhidadhānair>⁶⁰ abhyupagantavyaḥ ko 'pi padair āhitaḥ padārtheṣu mahimā yena te vākyārtham <gamayantīty>⁶¹ āśrayaṇīyam <pramāṇāntarāvagatebhyaḥ padārthebhyo viśiṣṭārthabuddhyadarśanāt>⁶².^{xvii}

⁵⁸S: anvitapratītyaparyavasāyaṃ

⁵⁹S: ity apy anvitārthābhiprāyeṇoktam

⁶⁰S: api vākyārthapratyayam abhidadhānair

⁶¹A: avana(ga)mayantīty

⁶²A: pramāṇāntarāvagatebhyo viśiṣṭārthabuddhyadarśanāt

^{xv}VM-I: *bhāṣyākṣarānām ayam arthaḥ — padāny anvitam abhidhāya nivr̥tavypārāṇi nānvayam pṛthag abhidadhāti. athedānīm anvitāḥ pratipannā anvayam api pratītaṃ sampādayantīti. loke ca padārthānām sambandhagrahaṇasamaya eva viditatvāt, vākyāntare cānvayāntarasyaiva pratipannatvāt, tatparataiva vākyasyeti. vākyārthasābdena bhāṣyakāro 'nvayam āha.* (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 411-412)

^{xvi}*Br̥hati* on PMS 1.1.25: *vyavahāre ca yathāvyatiṣaṅgam evāvāpoddhārau. tasmān na vyatiṣaṅgābhīdhānam, vyatiṣaktato 'vagater vyatiṣaṅgasya.* (S. K. R. Sastri 1934, pp. 384,386)
See also RVP: *nanv evaṃ vyatiṣaṅgam api kimiti nābhīdhatte tatrāha — na vyatiṣaṅgābhīdhānam, vyatiṣaktato 'vagater vyatiṣaṅgasya. vyatiṣakto hi vyatiṣaṅgam apratipadyamānena na śakya te pratipattum yathā vyaktim ākṛtir iti vyatiṣaktato vyatiṣaṅgāvagater na vyatiṣaṅgābhīdhānaṃ padaṃ.* (ibid., pp. 385-386)

This is also quoted in the VM-I: *ato 'nvitābhīdhānāyānvayasyārthagrahītāt vād asāv anvayo nābhīdhīyate. tena vyatiṣaktābhīdhānavan na vyatiṣaṅgābhīdhānaṃ, niṣkṛṣṭābhīdhānan tu na bhavati. vyatiṣaktato 'vagater vyatiṣaṅgasya, vyatiṣaktasya vyatiṣaṅgaṃ vinābhīdhānānupapatteḥ.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 411)

^{xvii}VM-I: *kintu teṣām adṛṣṭaiśā śaktir mānāntarād gatau; kalpyā viśiṣṭārthaparapadasaṃsparśabhāvitā* (v.10)

padārthānām hi śabdād anyataḥ pramāṇāt pratīyamānānām anyonyānvayabodhakatvaṃ na pratītam iti, śabdābhīdheyānām tadavagamaśaktiḥ kalpayitavyā. tasyāś cotpattau śabdasaṃsparśa eva hetur ityāśrayaṇīyam. śabdo hi viśiṣṭārthapratipattiparatayā

yad apy <ucyate – bhavati hi kadācit>⁶³ pramāṇāntarāvagatebhyaḥ padārthebhyo viśiṣṭārthāvagatiḥ. <yathā dūrāc chvetimārūpaṃ>⁶⁴ paśyataḥ śrṅvataś ca <heṣāśabdaṃ>⁶⁵ <khuranikṣepaśabdaṃ>⁶⁶ ca bhavati viśiṣṭārthāvagatiḥ śveto 'śvo dhāvatīti^{xviii} tad apy ayuktam.

kiṃ hi tatra pramāṇam iti cintanīyam, ekaikaṃ hi pramāṇam ekaikatra <paryavasitam iti na>⁶⁷ kiñcid viśiṣṭārthāvagatau pramāṇaṃ paśyāmaḥ. tatra A: p.1370 vā pramāṇāntaropagame <śabde 'pi>⁶⁸ tad eva viśiṣṭārthabuddhau pramāṇam iti śabdo na pramāṇaṃ bhavet.

ato 'vaśyaṃ <śabdābhīdhānāhitātīśayaśālinām>⁶⁹ eva padārthānām vākyārthabuddhau nimittatvam iti vaktavyam, evaṃ ca varam mukhyatayā śabdānām <evānvitābhīdhānaśaktir>⁷⁰ āśritā evaṃ hi sādhu <śabdānām prāmāṇyam upapāditam>⁷¹ bhavati.^{xix}

⁶³S: ucyate kadācit

⁶⁴S: yathā dūrāt śvetimarūpaṃ

⁶⁵S: heṣāśabdaṃ

⁶⁶A: khura(pada)nikṣepaśabdaṃ; S: padanikṣepaśabdaṃ

(Reason for emendation: All editions of the ŚV Vāk. presently available have *khura* and not *pada*. The VM-I also when discussing this example from the ŚV Vāk. uses *khura* and not *pada*.)

⁶⁷S: paryavasitam na

⁶⁸A: śabde 'pi

⁶⁹S: śabdābhīdhānāhitaviśeṣāśālinām

⁷⁰A: evābhīdhānaśaktir

⁷¹S: śabdānām eva prāmāṇyam abhyupagataṃ

lokavyavahāreṣu prayujyamāno dṛṣṭaḥ. na cāsau sāksād vākyārthapratipādanā samartha iti, padārthān avāntaravyāpārīkaroti. te ca yady anyonyānvayabodhane samarthāḥ syuḥ, tadā teṣāṃ avāntaravyāpārātā syān nānyatheti. viśiṣṭārthāvabodhaparaśabdasaṃsparśād eva teṣāṃ eṣā śaktir āvirbhavatīti, śabdasyāpi padārthagatānvayabodhakatvaśaktiśādhānaśaktir āśrayānīyā. (ibid., pp. 391-392)

^{xviii}ŚV Vāk. vv.358-359a: *paśyataḥ śvetam ārūpaṃ hreṣāśabdaṃ ca śrṅvataḥ; khuranikṣepaśabdaṃ ca śveto 'śvo dhāvatīti dhīḥ; dṛṣṭā vākyavinirmuktā.*

This example is also discussed in VM-I: *syād evam — yadi mānāntarāvaseyānām padārthānām anyonyānvayāvagame sāmartyaṃ na syāt. asti tu tat śvāityasyānavadhāritāśrayaviśeṣasya pratyakṣadrṣṭasya, aśvāsyāpratipannaguṇaviśeṣasya pratyakṣahreṣāśabdānumitasya padanikṣepaśabdānumitasya ajñātakartṛbhedasya dhāvanasya śveto 'śvo dhāvatīty anvayabodhakatvadarśanāt.* (ibid., p. 392)

^{xix}VM-I: *api ca yadi padārthāvagatimātrād eva parasparānvayāvagamaḥ, tadā kasmin pramāṇe tasyāntarbhāva iti vācyam? na tāvac chābde śabdābhāvāt. padārthābhīdhānāvāntaravyāpāreṇa*

V.2.9 WM's correlates are known through specific conditions

S: f.579v <yad api vadanti — ekaikaśyena>⁷² kriyāpadasya kārakapadasya vā pratiyoginām anantatayā sambandho duṣpratipādaḥ. <na cāgr̥hītasambandhaḥ śabdo 'rthaṃ gamayaṭīti>⁷³ <ananvitaikaikārthagocaraiva padānām>⁷⁴ abhidhānaśaktir iti^{xx} tad apy ayuktam.

A: p.1371 ānantye 'pi hi pratiyoginām <asādhāraṇopalakṣaṇopalakṣitānām>⁷⁵ sukaram eva sambandhajñānam. uktaṃ hi — <ākāṅkṣāsannidhiyogyatāḥ>⁷⁶ kāraṇam anvitābhidhānasyeti <tadupalakṣaṇam>⁷⁷ eva sambandhajñānam. <yad eva hi>⁷⁸ yasyākāṅkṣitaṃ yogaṃ <sannihitaṃ ca bhavati>⁷⁹ tenaiva <tad>⁸⁰ anvitaṃ svārtham abhidhatte.^{xxi}

⁷²S: yad api ca vadanti ekaikasyaiva

⁷³A: na cāgr̥hītas sambandhaś śabdo 'rthaṃ pratipādayatīty

⁷⁴S: ananvitaikaikārthagocaraiḥ padārthānām

⁷⁵S: asādhāraṇopalakṣitānām

⁷⁶S: ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsamnidhayaḥ

⁷⁷S: tadupalakṣaṇam

⁷⁸A: yad eva

⁷⁹S: sannihitaṃ bhavati

⁸⁰A and S: tad

(A possible emendation can be from *tad* to *tam*, for the following reasons: (i) *yad* and *yasya* have their counterparts in *tena* and *tam* respectively, with each of these correlative pronouns referring to WMs only (and not words). This is because only WMs are expected, compatible and proximate, and a WM alone can be connected (*anvita*) to another WM whereas words denote (*abhidhā-*) meanings; (ii) *svārtha* is a masculine noun, and when in accusative, its pronoun would be *tam* and not *tat*; (iii) Emending *tad anvitaṃ* to *tam anvitaṃ* may not be a very significant emendation of the script (*da* to *ma*).

hi yac chabdād anvayajñānam, tac chābdam ity eṣa vo rāddhāntaḥ. tasmān nāsyā śābde 'ntarbhāvaḥ. pramāṇāntarābhyupagame tu śābdasyocchedaḥ śabdāvagatapadārthaviṣaye 'pi tasyaiva prāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt. tasmāc chabdābhicitānām padārthānām anyatrādṛṣṭaṃ vākyaṛthabodhanasāmarthyam kalpayitavyam. tadādhānaśaktiś ca śabdānām apīti. (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 393-394)

^{xx}VM-I: *atra kecid ācakṣate — bhavatu padānām padārtheṣu śaktijñānam, tathāpy anvitābhidhānam na sidhyatīti. tathāhi — pratiyoginām anantatayā anvayānām ānantyāt, tadānantye cānvitānām apy ānantyāt sambandhagrahaṇam duṣkaram. agr̥hītasambandhasya ca vācakatve ekasmāc chabdāt sarvārthapratītiprasaṅgaḥ.* (ibid., p. 381)

^{xxi}VM-I: *ākāṅkṣāsannidhiprāptayogyārthāntarasaṅgatān; svārthān ahuḥ padānūti vyutpattis saṃśritā yadā; ānantyavyabhicārābhyām tadā doṣo na kaścana* (vv.8-9ab).

ata evānantye 'pi <pratiyoginām nānantaśaktikalpanāpatati>^{81xxii},
<upādhitrayopetānvitābhidhanaśakter ekasyāḥ>⁸² kṛptatvāt^{xxiii} sar-
vanāmaśabdānām iva. <te hi sannidhānenaikenopādhinānanteṣv api bhāveṣu
vartamānā nānantaśaktikalpanādoṣam āpādayanti>.⁸³

V.2.10 DoC in case of a single word

kim idānīm ekasmāt kriyākārapadād asati pratiyogyantare 'pratītir anvitapratītir
vā. nāpratītiḥ. anvitapratītis tu kenānvitapratītiḥ. na hy atra <pratiyogyantaram A: p.1372
śrūyata ity uktaṃ. satyaṃ>⁸⁴ <na śrūyate. na tu śrutenavānvitābhidhānaṃ san-

⁸¹S: pratiyoginām ānantaśaktikalpanā nāpatati

⁸²A: upādhitrayopetānvitābhidhanaśakter etasyāḥ; S: upādhitrayope[—]tānvita
evābhidhanaśakter ekasyāḥ

(Reason for emendation: *ekasyāḥ* is more relevant in this argument than *etasyāḥ*.)

⁸³A: te hi sannidhānenaikenopādhinānanteṣv api bhāveṣu vartamānānantaśaktikalpanādoṣam
upāpādayati(tpādayanti); S: te hi saṃnidhānenaikenopādhinā nanteṣv api bhāveṣu vartamānā na
śaktikalpanādoṣam āpādayanti

(Reason for emendations: *āpādayanti*, and not *āpāpādayanti*. Also, emending A's *var-
tamānānantaśaktikalpanādoṣam* to *vartamānā nānantaśaktikalpanādoṣam* for two reasons: (i)
The emended text alone makes sense in context of the argument being discussed, and (ii) there is
a possibility of an error in A whereby a second *nā* (immediately after *vartamānā*) was overlooked
and hence deleted.)

⁸⁴A: pratiyogyantaram śrūyate (ity uktaṃ satyaṃ); S: pratiyogyantaram śrūyata ity uktaṃ

(Reason for emendation: Suggested reading in A.)

*yat tāvad uktam: ānantyāc chabdaśaktyavadhāraṇānupapattiḥ, agrhītaśakteś ca vācakatve vyab-
hicāraprasaṅga iti, tad anupapannam. upalakṣaṇāśrayaṇenāpi sambandhabodhasaukāryād.
ākāṅkṣitena योग्येना सन्निहितेना चान्विताम स्वार्थाम् पदाम् वक्तुं व्युत्पत्तिरश्रियते. (ibid.,
p. 384)*

^{xxii}VM-I: *nanv anantapratiyogyānsvārthabodhanaviṣayā anantā eva śabdasya śaktayaḥ
kalpayitavyāḥ syuḥ. abhihitānvayavāde tv ekasminn arthe ekasya śabdasyaikaiva śaktir iti. (ibid.,
p. 394)*

^{xxiii}VM-I: *tan na. ekayaivākāṅkṣitasannihitayogyārthānsvārthābhidhānaśaktyā pratiyo-
gibhedena kāryabhedopapatteś cakṣurādīnām iva. cakṣur yathavaikayā darśanaśaktyā
ghaṭādipratiyogisahāyabhedāj jñānāni bhinnāni janayati, tathā śabdo 'pi pratiyogibhedād iti man-
tavyam. (ibid., p. 394)*

See also RVP to PMS 1.1.25: *na ca sambandhagrahaṇāśaktiḥ, upādhiviseṣāśrayaṇena
sukaratvāt, ākāṅkṣāsannidhānopasthāpitānvayayogyārthāntarānsvārthābhidhāyini padānīni
vyyutpattiparigrahe na kiñcid anupapannam. (S. K. R. Sastri 1934, p. 384)*

nihitamātreṇa tadāśrayaṇāt>.⁸⁵ sannidhir iti ca buddhau viparivṛttir ākhyāyate. tad <yad api>⁸⁶ na <śabdenopanītaṃ>⁸⁷ <kutaścin nimittāntarād>⁸⁸ api buddhāv ārūḍhaṃ tenāpy anvitābhīdhānam <iṣyata eva>⁸⁹. ata eva dvāraṃ dvāraṃ ityādiṣu <pramaṇāntaropasthāpitenāpi saṃvaraṇādinānvitābhīdhānasiddhiḥ>⁹⁰ <viśvajīdādu ca kāryāvinābhāvaparyupasthāpitena svargakāmādinīyojyena vikṛtiṣu cāśrutavidhyantāsu niyogasāmarthyopasthāpitayai va prākṛtetikartavyatayā>.^{91xxiv}

A: p.1373 <yady>⁹² ekapadaprayoge 'py anvitābhīdhānam eva⁹³ kathaṃ tarhi pacatīty ukte karmaviśeṣākāṅkṣā kriyāpadenaiva viśiṣṭānvayasya pratipāditatvāt.

S: f.580r nanv ata <evānvitābhīdhānaṃ>⁹⁴. yadi hi śabdo 'nviṭaṃ abhidadyād evam ekatra sambandhiny avagata sambandhyantare bhavaty ākāṅkṣā <kimanvito>⁹⁵ 'nenārtho 'bhīdhātavya iti. <tad yad eva hi>⁹⁶ śabdāt pramaṇāntarād vā buddhau bhaviṣyati tenaivānviṭaṃ svārtham <uccaritaṃ>⁹⁷ padam <abhidhāsyati. ā

⁸⁵A: na śrūyate. na (tu) śrutenāivānvitābhīdhānaṃ sannihitamātreṇa tadāśrayaṇāt; S: na śrūyate nanv aśrutenāivānvitābhīdhānaṃ saṃnidhānaṃ sannidhimātreṇa tadāśrayaṇāt

(Reason for emendation: Suggested reading in A.)

⁸⁶A and S: yady api

(Reason for emendation: *yad* required for *tena*)

⁸⁷A: śabdeno(nānu)panītaṃ

⁸⁸S: kutaścit tu nimittāntarād

⁸⁹A: iṣyate (eva)

⁹⁰A: pramaṇāntaropasthāpitena saṃvaraṇādinānvidhābhīdhānasiddhiḥ

⁹¹S: viśvajīdādu ca kāryāvinābhāvaparyupasthītena svargakāmādinā niyojyena vikṛtiṣu cāśrutavidhyantasū viniyogasāmānyopasthītayaiva prākṛtetikartavyatayā

⁹²S: saty

⁹³A and S construe *yady* / *saty* ekapadaprayoge. . . eva as part of the previous sentence. A changes paragraph after *eva* while S has a *daṇḍa*. However, emending this to consider this phrase with the following sentence, since *yadi*. . . *kathaṃ tarhi* is a common construction and fits the argument here.

⁹⁴S: evānvitābhīdhānāt

⁹⁵A: (kim)anvito

⁹⁶S: tadvad eveha

⁹⁷S: ucitaṃ

^{xxiv}VM-I: *atha sannidhiḥ kaḥ? yasyārthasya śravaṇānantaram ākāṅkṣāyogyatābhyām arthāntare buddhiviparivṛttiḥ. sā ca na śabdanibandhanaiva kevalam anvitābhīdhānavyutpattāv upalakṣaṇam adhyāhrtenāpi loka anvitābhīdhānadarśanāt.* (A. Sastri 1964, p. 389) The example of *dvāraṃ* is also found in the ŚBh on PMS 4.3.11.

pratiyogisannidhes tūdāsta eva śabdo na tv abhidhatte>.^{98xxv}

V.2.11 No fault of mutual dependence, due to sequential DoC

<nanv evaṃ prathamapadenārthe 'nabhihite dvitīyapadam al-
abdhākāñkṣitasamnihitayogyapratīyogīti kenānvitam artham abhidadhyāt>.⁹⁹ A: p.1374
<evaṃ ca prathamasyāpy avācakatve dvitīyapadasannidhir na kiñcid up-
akuryāt>.¹⁰⁰ tatretaretarāśrayaṃ bhavet, prathamapadābhīdhānāpekṣaṃ
<dvitīyasyābhīdhānaṃ>¹⁰¹ tadapekṣaṃ ca prathamasyeti.^{xxvi}

satyaṃ <yady abhidhānanibandhanasannidhir āśrīyeta>¹⁰² sarvāṇi tu
padāny <uccarītāni>¹⁰³ santi vyutpattikālāvagatam ātmīyaṃ <pravṛttinimittam
smārayanti>¹⁰⁴, tato 'nanvitasmr̥tenaiva tena tenārthena viśiṣṭaḥ sarvair eva
svārtho 'bhīdhīyata <iti netaretarāśrayaṃ bhavet>¹⁰⁵.^{xxvii}

⁹⁸S: abhidhāsyati pratiyogisamvidhes tūpātta eva śabdo 'bhīdhāsyā na tv abhidhatte

⁹⁹A: nanv evaṃ prathamapadenārthe na vihite dvitīyam api padam alab-
dhvākāñkṣitasannihitayogyapratīyogīti kenānvitam abhidadhyāt

¹⁰⁰A: evaṃ cāprathamasyāpy avācakatve dvitīyapadasannidhir na kiñcida(du)pakuryāt; S: evaṃ
prathamapadasyāpy avācakadvitīyapadasamnidhir na kiñcid upakuryāt

(Reason for emendation: *prathamasya* from S accepted, rest as according to A.)

¹⁰¹S: dvitīyapadasyābhīdhānaṃ

¹⁰²S: yady abhidhānanibandhanaḥ sambandha āśrīyate

¹⁰³S: uccarītāni

¹⁰⁴S: pravṛttinimittam arthaṃ smārayanti

¹⁰⁵S: iti netaretarāśrayatā

^{xxv}VM-I: *atrocyate – abhidhānāparyavasānam abhidheyāparyavasānañ ca jijñāsodaye niban-
dhanam. ekapadaprayoge hi dvāram ityādāv abhidhānam eva na paryavasyati. na hy anuccarite
pratiyogisannidhāpake pade 'nvitābhīdhānaṃ śakyate vaktum.* (ibid., p. 386)

^{xxvi}VM-I: *kim abhihitena padārthāntareṇānvito 'bhīdhīyate uta anabhihiteneti vikalpanīyam.
anabhihitena cet padāntaraprayogavaiyartham. ekasmāc ca sarvānvayapratītiprasaṅgaḥ. abhi-
hitena cet tad api tarhi padam anvitābhīdhāyitayā padāntaropāttam artham abhidhānāyāpekṣata
iti, itaretarāśrayaḥ prāpnoti.* (ibid., pp. 381-383)

See also RVP to Bṛhati on PMS 1.1.25: *kiñ ca kim abhihitena viśeṣeṇa tadvyatiṣaktam
abhidhīyate, anabhihitena vā? abhihitapakṣe itaretarāśrayam, dvitīyam api padam abhi-
hitārthāntaravyatiṣaktābhīdhāyakatayā itarapadābhīdhānam āśrayatīti prasaktam duruttaram
itaretarāśrayam. anabhihitapakṣe padāntaraprayogavaiyartham.* (S. K. R. Sastri 1934, p. 384)

^{xxvii}VM-I: *itaretarāśrayam idānīm pariharati:*

*smṛtisannihitair evam arthair anvitam ātmanaḥ; artham āha padaṃ sarvam iti nānyonyasamśrayaḥ
(v.15).*

ākāṅkṣākrameṇa cānvitābhīdhānakramaḥ. prathamam <hy ākhyātena>¹⁰⁶
 <kāryātmany>¹⁰⁷ abhidhīyamāne nirviṣayatadavagamāsambhavāt sva-
 A: p.1375 padopāttaprakṛtyupanītabhāvārthaviṣayānviṭaḥ kāryātmābhīdhīyate taṃ
 <vinā>¹⁰⁸ tatpratītyanupapatteḥ, pratītyanubandho <hi sa niyogasyeti>¹⁰⁹.
 pratyāsattiviśeṣāt sa eva prathamam apekṣitaḥ sannihitaś ceti tenaiṣa <prathamam
 anvitābhīdhānam>¹¹⁰. <tataḥ svargakāmādinīyojyānubandhena>¹¹¹ tadan-
 taram apekṣaṇāt, tato viṣayībhūtabhāvārthakaraṇāpekṣayetīkartavyatānvaya itī
 <krameṇa dvayor dvayor anvitābhīdhānam>¹¹² darśayitavyam. yadanviṭam ca
 S: f.580v <itī sarveṣāṃ anvitābhīdhāne siddhiḥ>¹¹³.^{xxviii}
 prādhānyāc ca kāryasya tātparyād <itareṣāṃ vākyārthaikatvaṃ>¹¹⁴ tadekatvāc
 A: p.1376 ca nānārthānviṭānekārthabodhe 'py ekavākyatvaṃ.^{xxix} ataḥ padasaṅghātātmakam
 vākyam eva vākyārthasya vācakam ity ayukto vākyasyāvācakatvābhyupagamaḥ.

¹⁰⁶A: vyā(hyā)khyātena

¹⁰⁷S: karmakāryyātmany

¹⁰⁸A: vināpi

¹⁰⁹S: hi sanniyogasyeti

¹¹⁰A: prathamānvitābhīdhānam

¹¹¹S: tataḥ svargakāmādinā niyojyēnānubandhena

¹¹²A: krameṇa dvayo(r dvayo)r anvitābhīdhānam; S: krameṇa dvayor anvitābhīdhānam

(Reason for emendation: Suggested reading in A.)

¹¹³A: itī sa teṣāṃ anvitābhīdhānasiddhiḥ

¹¹⁴S: itareṣāṃ ca vākyārthatvaṃ

svārthasvarūpamātrasmaraṇe hi na padaṃ padāntaram apekṣate. smṛtisannihitam apīdam bhavaty eva sannihitam. nāsti tenetaretarāśrayatvam. (A. Sastri 1964, p. 406)

^{xxviii}VM-I: *abhihitasya kāryasyāpūrvātmano 'nuṣṭhānam vinā kāryatvānupapatteḥ, kartrā ca vinā tadasambhavāt, adhikārād ṛte ca tadayogāt, niyojyam antareṇa ca tasyānavakalpanāt, tadupapattaye yuktaiva tadanvayayogyaniyojyājijñāsā. tasyāṃ satyāṃ aparipūrṇatvāvagamāt, lokavad adhyāhāre kartavye saty api, jīvanasyāvaśyakatve 'ntaraṅgatve ca vidher anuṣṭhānākṣepo na kalpeteti, tatparityāgena kāmye niyojyaviśeṣaṇe sthite sarvakāmīpuruṣavyāpīsvargasyaiva niyojyaviśeṣaṇatvayogyatvāt, svargakāmo niyojyo 'dhyāhriyate. (ibid., pp. 386-387)*

See also: *sā ceyam ākāṅkṣā pratiyogiṣu sarveṣu na sahasaivopajāyate, kintu kāraṇopanipātakrameṇa. tathā hi — viṣayam antareṇāpūrvaṃ kāryam pratyetum eva na śakyata itī, pratipattyanubandhabhūtaṣayāpekṣā prathamam vidheḥ. atha pratipanne viṣayasambandhini vidhyarthe niyojyam antareṇa tatsiddhyasambhavān niyojyākāṅkṣā. tathā viṣayībhūte bhāvārthe karaṇe labdhe vaikṛtāpūrvāṇāṃ karaṇopakārākāṅkṣā. labdhe ca tasmin tajjanakapadārthākāṅkṣeti. (ibid., p. 388)*

^{xxix}VM-I vv.4-5: *bhūyāṃso yady api svārthāḥ padānāṃ te pṛthakpṛthak; prayojanatayā tv*

V.3 The arguments of the Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin in favour of CoD

ata āha: **anyathāpīti**.

anyathāpy upapannatvāc chaktis tatrāpramāṇikā^{xxx}

V.3.1 Hermeneutic inconsistency in the Prābhākara's argument

ayam abhiprāyaḥ:

na tāvad ayaṃ siddhāntaḥ sūtrabhāṣyānugato dṛśyate. sūtrakāro hy **arthasya tannimittatvād** iti padārthānām eva vākyārthabuddhau nimittatvaṃ darśayati, bhāṣyakāro 'pi tadvyācakṣāṇo **nānapekṣya padārthān <pārthagarthyaena>**¹¹⁵ **vākyam arthāntare prasiddham** iti vadan vispaṣṭam eva vākyasya vākyārthe vācakatāṃ nirasyati.^{xxx}

arthāpattyā ca vākyasya vācakaśaktikalpanām āśaṅkya **tan na arthasya tannimittatvād** iti śaktikalpanānirākaraṇaparayatā sūtraikadeśaṃ darśayati.^{xxxii} **nivr̥ttavyāpārāṇīti** ca padārtheṣv <evābhīdhānaparyavasānaṃ>¹¹⁶. **ko jātucid adṛṣṭāṃ <padasamudāyasya śaktim kalpayatīti>**¹¹⁷ ca vyakta <eva vākyasya vācakaśaktipratikṣepaḥ>¹¹⁸.^{xxxiii} sarvaṃ cedam <kathañcit kāśaṃ kuśaṃ vā

A: p.1377

¹¹⁵A: vārthagatyena

¹¹⁶S: evābhīdhāvyāpārāparyavasānaṃ

¹¹⁷S: padasamudāyāśaktim upakalpayatīti

¹¹⁸S: eva vācakaśaktipratikṣedhaḥ

ekavākyārthaṃ sampracakṣate; tatpratītyekakāryatvād vākyam apy ekam ucyate; pratipattir guṇānām hi pradhānaikaprayojanā. (ibid., p. 378)

The argument of the unitary *kārya* being the sentential meaning is the topic of the VM-II.

^{xxx}ŚV Vāk. v.112ab

^{xxx}i See Footnote iii.

^{xxx}ii See Footnote iv.

^{xxx}iii ŚBh on PMS 1.1.25: *yatra hi śukla iti vā kṛṣṇa iti vā guṇaḥ pratīte bhavati. bhavati khalv asāv alaṃ guṇavati pratyayam ādhātum. tena guṇavati pratyayam icchantaḥ kevalaṃ guṇavacanam uccārayanti. sampatsyata eṣāṃ yathāśaṅkalpito 'bhiprāyaḥ. bhaviṣyati viśiṣṭārthasampratyayaḥ. viśiṣṭārthasampratyayaś ca vākyārthaḥ. evaṃ ced avagamyate 'nyata eva vākyārthaḥ ko jātucid adṛṣṭā padasamudāyasya śaktir arthād avagamyata iti vadiṣyati.* (Āpaṭe 1929, pp. 96-97)

'valambyānyathānīyetāpi>¹¹⁹ yady upapattir api <sādhīyasī dṛśyeta, na tu sāpi sādhiyasī dṛśyata ity>¹²⁰ abhidhāsyata eva.

saṃhatyārtham <**abhidadhatī**^{xxxiv} tu nārthābhidhāyām>¹²¹ sāhityaṃ darśayitum kintv artham abhidadhāti <padāni saṃhatya vākyaṃ bhavāntī vyākhyeyam>¹²², <abhidadhatī vāvagamayantī>¹²³ vyākhyeyam. tad iha **anyathāpy upapannatvāc chaktir apramāṇiketi** vadatā vārttikakāreṇa A: p.1378 vācakaśaktinirākaraṇaparatayā bhāṣyavirodho 'bhīhita itī <anusandhātavyaṃ>¹²⁴.

V.3.2 Incongruence in the Prābhākara's doctrine, since WMs can lead to SM cognition

<tad evaṃ>¹²⁵ tāvat granthato 'nupapattir uktā, upapattyāpi nāyaṃ siddhāntaḥ saṅgacchate. <yad dhi kutaścid anyasmāl labhyate na tatra vācakaśaktikalpanātmānaṃ labhate>¹²⁶. <śaknuvanti ca padapratipāditāḥ padārthā ākāṅkṣitasannihitayogyārthāntaralābhe>¹²⁷ vākyaṃ gamayitum itī <na tadviṣayāpi śabdaśaktikalpanā>¹²⁸ bhavitum arhati. tad idam uktaṃ śaktis tasyāpramāṇiketi.

<nanv anyathāpy upapattir>¹²⁹ eva nāsti sarvaprakāraṃ padārthānāṃ vākyaṃ pratītvā animittatvasyoktatvāt. maivam, <nimittāprakārasya>¹³⁰ vākyaṃ pratītvāt. vākṣyati hi **śabdapramāṇanirṇītyā** ity^{xxxv} atra padārthānāṃ A: p.1379

¹¹⁹S: kathañcit kāśakuśam ālambyānyathānīyetāpi

¹²⁰A: sādhiyasī dṛśyata (sāpi na dṛśyata) ity

¹²¹S: abhidadhatī nārthābhidhāyām

¹²²A: padāni saṃhṛtya vākyaṃ bhavāntī

¹²³S: abhidadhatī avagamayantī

¹²⁴A: anusandhātavyaḥ(vyam)

¹²⁵S: evaṃ

¹²⁶S: yad dhi na kutaścid anyato labhyate tatra śabdavācakaśaktikalpanā nātmānaṃ labhate

¹²⁷S: śaknuvanti ca padapratibodhitāḥ padārthā evākāṅkṣitayogyasannihitārthāntaralābhe

¹²⁸S: na tadviṣayeyam śabdasya śaktikalpanā

¹²⁹S: na hy anyathānupapattir

¹³⁰S: nimittaprakārasya

^{xxxiv}See Footnote viii.

^{xxxv}ŚV Vāk. v.247: śabdapramāṇanirṇītyai padārthebhyo yatheṣyate; atyantādṛṣṭavākyaṃ pratipattis tathocyate.

<vākyārthapratītinimittatāprakāram>¹³¹. <anāgatāvekṣaṇena cehāpi kiñcid>¹³²
asmābhir <ucyate.

V.3.3 The Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin's explanation of language learning

etāvad dhi>¹³³ bālena vṛddhayor vyavaharamāṇayoḥ prathamam avagatam —
<anekaguṇajātyādisaṅkīrṇo 'rtho>¹³⁴ anena prayojyavṛddhenātaḥ śabdād <av-
agato>¹³⁵ yad ayam etadanantaram viśiṣṭārthaviśayārthakriyārthaṃ ghaṭata
iti. tato <'vagataśabdakāraṇabhāvo>¹³⁶ 'vyāpriyamāṇasya <tadanupapatteḥ>¹³⁷
śabdāsamavāyinaṃ vyāpāram <upakalpayati>¹³⁸. evaṃ ca <sabhāgayor
vākyavākyārthayoḥ saṅkīrṇā>¹³⁹ vācyavācakatā sidhyati, na tu vivicyate kiyatā
vākyabhāgena <kiyān artho 'bhidhīyata>¹⁴⁰ iti. tatas tasya tasya kriyāpadasya A: p.1380
kārapadasya <vāvāpoddhārabhedena>¹⁴¹ yadanugame <yasyānugamo yadvy-
atireke ca vyatirekaḥ sa tenābhidhīyata>¹⁴² iti tadviśayām eva vācakaśaktim viv-
inakti.

evaṃ ca bhāgāvalambīṣu <padeṣu>¹⁴³ kuto viśiṣṭārthasampratyaya iti vi-
cikitsamānasya <nānāvikalpāḥ samudbhavanti>¹⁴⁴, kiṃ <khalv evaṃ tāny
eva padāni viśiṣṭārthasya>¹⁴⁵ bhāgānām iva vācakāni <āhosvit>¹⁴⁶ nirbhāgam S: f.581v

¹³¹S: vākyārthapratītinimittatāprakāram

¹³²A: anāgatopekṣaṇena cehāpi kiñcid; S: anāgatāvekṣaṇena kiñcid

(Reason for emendation: To clearly refer to the subsequent discussion.)

¹³³S: ucyate evaṃ hi

¹³⁴A: anekaguṇajātyādisaṅkīrṇā arthā

¹³⁵A: avagatāḥ

¹³⁶S: 'vagatakāraṇabhāvo

¹³⁷S: tadanupapattiḥ

¹³⁸S: unnayati

¹³⁹S: sabhāgayor vākyārthayoḥ saṅkīrṇaiva

¹⁴⁰S: kiyān samanvitabhāgo 'bhihita

¹⁴¹S: vā tatkriyākārapadodvāpāvāpabhedena

¹⁴²S: yasyānugamo vyatireke ca vyatirekas tenābhidhīyata

¹⁴³S: Om. padeṣu

¹⁴⁴A: nānāvikalpāḥ(tarkāḥ) samudbhavanti; S: nānāvikalpāḥ samupārohanti

(Reason for emendation: Accepting *nānāvikalpāḥ*, found in both A and S.)

¹⁴⁵S: khalv etāny eva padāny asya viśiṣṭasyāpi

¹⁴⁶S: āho

eva vākyam ta eva <vārthabhāgā viśiṣṭārthadhiyo>¹⁴⁷ nimittam iti. tatra nirbhāgavākyāsambhavāt <sakaletaravākyaparakārasamutsāraṇāt>¹⁴⁸ padānām cārthabhāgāvasitavyāpāratvād arthabhāgā eva viśiṣṭadhiyo nimittam iti niścinoti.

V.3.4 Cause of SM cognition remains linguistic

A: p.1381 <nanv evam śabdakāraṇatvāc chabdakāraṇatvānumānaṃ bādhyeta>¹⁴⁹. na, tasyaiva padārthadvāreṇa nirvahaṇāt. <anvayavyatirekaviviktaśaktīni padāni saṃhatya>¹⁵⁰ vākyārthe sannipatitum utsahanta iti padārthadvārakas teṣāṃ nimittabhāvo niścīyate. na cāvāntaravyāpāravavyavahir akāraṇatām āpādayati sarvatraprasaṅgāt. <tathā vividhā>¹⁵¹ hi padair arthāḥ pratipādītā yat te svayam eva viśiṣṭam vākyārtham <gamayantīti>¹⁵².

V.3.5 SM cognition is self-evident and not inferential

nanv ekaikapadārthaparyavasiteṣu padeṣu na parasparasambandhe padārthānām pramāṇam asti sannidhyādīnām vyabhicārād ity uktam. nānumāniko vākyārthapratyayo 'smābhir iṣyate yad <vyabhicāradarśanenopālabhyemahi>¹⁵³.
A: p.1382 <bhavati tu sarvadeśakālanarāvasthāntareṣu vākyāsrāviṇām>¹⁵⁴ viśiṣṭārthasaṃvid <iti sarvaṃ svasaṃvedyam>¹⁵⁵.

<na cānāmbanā ātmāmbanā vā saṃvid iti vijñānavāde bhaṇitam>¹⁵⁶. na

¹⁴⁷S: vā bhāgā viśiṣṭadhiyo

¹⁴⁸A: sakaletaravākyasamutsāraṇāt

¹⁴⁹S: nanv evaṃ śabdakāraṇābhīdhānaṃ bādhyeta

¹⁵⁰A: anvayavyatirekaviviktaśaktīni padāni sahatya; S: anvayavyatirekaviviktaśaktīni hi padāni nādr̥tya

(Reason for emendation: *saṃhatya* is the term from ŚBh and best fits the argument. Also, possible error in A where *anusvāra* in *sahatya* was overlooked.)

¹⁵¹S: tathāvidhā

¹⁵²A: gamayanti

¹⁵³S: vyabhicāradarśanonopalabhyemahi

¹⁵⁴A: bhavati hi sarvadeśakālanarā(vasthā)ntareṣu vākyāsrāviṇām

¹⁵⁵A: iti sarva(ṃ) svasaṃvedyam; S: iti svayaṃ vedyaṃ

(Reason for emendation: Suggested reading in A.)

¹⁵⁶A: na cāmbanā ātmāmbane veti vijñānapā(vā)de varṇi(bhaṇi)tam; S: na cānāmbanā vā saṃvid iti vijñānavāde bhaṇitam

(Reason for emendation: Including both *anāmbanā* and *ātmāmbanā* since even S has *vā*, even

cāsyā <bādhako>¹⁵⁷ ḍṛśyate śabdavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgāt. kvacit bādhas tu sarvapramāṇābhāseṣv aviśiṣṭa iti nānenāpi vākyārtho 'palapitum śakyate. ato asmād eva viśiṣṭārthabuddher ḍṛḍhimno <'sti viśiṣṭo 'rtha iti samarthyate>¹⁵⁸.

V.3.6 The initializing role of proximity and the accompanying role of expectation

svābhāvīkī ca kriyādipadārthānām yogyapadārthāntarasāṅgatiḥ. <pratyakṣādināpi hi>¹⁵⁹ pramāṇāntareṇa guṇaguṇinoḥ kriyākārayoś ca sambandho ḍṛśyate, na tv S: f.582r
<anyataraśūnyānyatarasamvid>¹⁶⁰ asti. ataḥ śabdād <api yathāvastusvabhāvam evāvasthitaḥ>¹⁶¹ kriyākārayor anyatarasambandhaḥ pariḥlavate, tatra sannidher A: p.1383
viśeṣo <nirdhāryate>¹⁶².

yat tu durbalaḥ sannidhir iti satyaṃ. na tu durbalam apy anuḡaṇaṃ bādhyate, <na ceḥa śrutivirodha iti vakṣyate>¹⁶³.^{xxxvi}

yat punaḥ sannihitayor apy aṅguloḥ sambandha iti tad astu nirapekṣatvāt tayoh. ata eva <nirapekṣārthānām>¹⁶⁴ śabdānām sambandho <gaur aśvaḥ puruṣo hastīty evamādīnām>¹⁶⁵. ataḥ svabhāvasāpekṣaṃ vastu śabdād <avagataṃ

though it has no second option. Moreover, this emended sentence is quite similar to Sucarita's comment in the Kāśikā to the Autpattikasūtra section on v.15: *na ceyam anālambanā, na ca svāmśālambaneti vijñānavāde varṇitam*. A similar comment is also found in the beginning of the Kāśikā on the Ābhāvapariccheda: *na ca buddher anālambanatvaṃ svāmśālambanatvaṃ veti vijñānavāde varṇitam eva.*)

¹⁵⁷S: bādho

¹⁵⁸S: 'sti viśiṣṭārtha iti sambadhyate

¹⁵⁹A: pratyakṣādinā (pi hi); S: pratyakṣādināpi

(Reason for emendation: Suggested reading in A.)

¹⁶⁰S: anyaśūnyānyatarasamvid

¹⁶¹A: api yathāvastusvabhāvam evāvasthitayoḥ; S: api yathāvarṇasvabhāvam evāvasthitaḥ

(Reasons for emendation: *yathāvastusvabhāvam* (from A) alone fits the argument here; Accepting *avasthitaḥ* (from S) and not *avasthitayoḥ* (from A) since the relation between *kriyās* and *kārayoḥ* cannot be *yathāvastusvabhāvam*, it depends upon the *vivakṣā* of the speaker.)

¹⁶²A: nirdhāryate

¹⁶³S: na ceḥa śrutya virodha iti vakṣyati

¹⁶⁴A: nirapekṣānām

¹⁶⁵S: gaur aśva ityādīnām

^{xxxvi}PMS 3.3.14: *śrutiliṅgavākyaprakaraṇasthānasamākhyanām samavāye pāradaurbalyam arthaviprakaṣāt*

svabhāvād evāpekṣitenaiva sannihitena sambadhyate¹⁶⁶. so 'yaṃ kra-
masahāyāl <liṅgāt kriyādīpadārthānām parasparasambandhaḥ>¹⁶⁷ <sruvasyeva
dravadravyādāne barhimantrasyeva lavane.

na cāyaṃ viśeṣānvayo 'numānam iti parastād vakṣyate,^{xxxvii} ataḥ śaknuvanty
arthā avagatā vākyārtham avagamayitum¹⁶⁸ iti <na padānām anvitagocarā śaktir
upakalpyate>¹⁶⁹, <anyathāpy anvitapratīter upapatteḥ>¹⁷⁰ ata evoktam **anyathāpy
upapannatvād** iti.

V.3.7 Condition of indivisible words is not distinct from what they denote

A: p.1384 nanūktam anvitārthaviśayatvād <eva>¹⁷¹ vyutpattes tadgocaraiva
śabdānām <abhidhānaśaktir>¹⁷² upakalpyate, anvayavyatirekayos <tu
nimittaniṣkarṣamātravyāpāro na tv abhidheyaniṣkarṣa iti>¹⁷³ na kevala-
padārthābhīdhānam iti.

maivam, sabhāgo hi daṇḍīśabdah. tasya daṇḍavati pratyayam ādhātuṃ
daṇḍaśabdābhīhito daṇḍo nimittam iti yuktam. < <nirbhāgagavādīpadārthās>¹⁷⁴
tu kasya kutra vartitum nimittam iti vaktavyam.

<kriyāpadaviśiṣṭasvārthābhīdhāne>¹⁷⁵ nimittam iti cen na tasya padāntaratvāt,

¹⁶⁶A: avagataṃ svabhāvāpekṣitena sannihitena parasparaṃ sambadhyate

¹⁶⁷A: liṅgāt kriyādīpadārthānām sambandha; S: liṅgāt kriyādīpadānām parasparasambandhaḥ

(Reason for emendation: *parasparasambandha* is between WMs, not words.)

¹⁶⁸A: Om. sruvasyeva . . . avagamayitum

¹⁶⁹S: nānvitagocarā padānām śaktir upakalpyate

¹⁷⁰S: anyathāpy anvitapratīpatter upapannatvād

¹⁷¹A: Om. eva

¹⁷²S: abhidhāśaktir

¹⁷³A: tu nimittaniṣkarṣe(rṣamātre) nābhidheyaniṣkarṣa iti

¹⁷⁴A: nirbhāgā gavādīpadārthās; S: See footnote 177.

(Reason for emendation: It is the words (such as cow) which are *nirbhāga*, not the WMs. Further-
more, the term *nirbhāgaśabda* is used subsequently in this section.)

¹⁷⁵A: kriyāpadasya viśiṣṭasvārthābhīdhāne; S: See footnote 177.

(Reason for emendation: A WM (say, 'cow') will be the *nimitta* of the word cow only –
not of a *kriyāpada* (say, bring). Hence, emending to include *kriyāpada* within the com-
pound *kriyāpadaviśiṣṭasvārthābhīdhāne*, similar to the compound in the following sentence

^{xxxvii}ŚV Vāk. vv.231-246.

samānapadopāto <hi daṇḍo sapratyayasya>¹⁷⁶ tadvati vartituṃ nimittam itī yuktam>,¹⁷⁷ gavāḍipadārthās tu gām <ityāḍipadāntaropāttāḥ>¹⁷⁸ katham <ānāyetyāḍipadāntarānvitābhīdhāne>¹⁷⁹ nimittam bhaviṣyanti.

A: p.1385

<na caikapadyam>¹⁸⁰ eva padānām vākyabhāgānām <anihnavāt>¹⁸¹.

atha <svārthasyaivānvitatvenābhīdheye>¹⁸² teṣām nimittatā tad <apy>¹⁸³ ayuktam. evaṃ hi tasmin pratiyogyantaraviśiṣṭe 'bhīdhīyamāne pratiyogyantaram eva nimittam bhavet. <tadvaśena hi tasyānvitārūpatvaṃ na svarūpataḥ, anānvitasvarūpatvāt>¹⁸⁴.

S: f.582v

<ato 'narthikā>¹⁸⁵ nimittamātram padārtha itī vāco yuktiḥ. <yathā tu vāyam^{xxxviii} tathā>¹⁸⁶ nimittam evābhīdheyam. yad eva hi <nirbhāgaśabdānām>¹⁸⁷ pravṛttau nimittam tad evābhīdheyam itī siddhāntaḥ. ato niṣkrṣṭapadārthamātrābhīdhāna <evānvayavyatirekābhyām śaktiniṣkarṣaḥ. ato nānvitārthagocarā>¹⁸⁸ padānām śaktiḥ siddhyati <anyata eva>¹⁸⁹ padārthebhyas tatpratyayopapatteḥ.

A: p.1386

ānāyetyāḍipadāntarānvitābhīdhāne.)

¹⁷⁶A: hi daṇḍasya pratyayasya; S: See footnote 177

(Reason for emendation: Argument becomes inexplicable if A is retained.)

¹⁷⁷S: Om. nirbhāgā . . . yuktam

¹⁷⁸S: ityāḍipadārthāntaropāttāḥ

¹⁷⁹A: ānāyetyāḍipadāntarā(nvitā)bhīdhāne; S: ānāyetyāḍipadāntarānvitābhīdhāne 'pi

(Reason for emendation: Reading in A and S.)

¹⁸⁰S: nanv aikapadyam

¹⁸¹S: anapahnuvate

¹⁸²A: svārthātmany evānvitatvenābhīdheye; S: svārthasyevānvitatvenābhīdheye

(Reason for emendation: S reading accepted, with slight correction of *sandhi* – from *svārthasyeva* to *svārthasyaiva*.)

¹⁸³A: Om. apy

¹⁸⁴S: tadvaśena na hi tasyānvitānvarūpānānvitasvarūpatvād

¹⁸⁵S: ato 'rthikā

¹⁸⁶S: yathā tavāyam tathāpi

¹⁸⁷S: śabdānām

¹⁸⁸S: evānvayavyatirekābhyām śaktiniṣkarṣān nānvitārthagocarā

¹⁸⁹S: anyatra ca

^{xxxviii}A similar phrase is found in ŚBh 6.5.39: *yathā tu vāyam brūmaḥ, tathā śrutiḥ kāraṇam*.

V.3.8 How WMs lead one to cognize SM according to CoD

yat punar uktam anyatraivaṃvidhaḥ svabhāvo na padārthānām avagato yad viśiṣṭaṃ pratipādayantīti padair evāyam atīśayaḥ padārtheṣv <ādihātavyaḥ>¹⁹⁰, evaṃ ca varam <padānām>¹⁹¹ evānvitābhīdhānaśaktir upakalpiteti tad ayuktam.^{xxxix}

V.3.8.1 Argument 1: No need to admit words as having potency for denoting a connected meaning, since no recursive (*parivṛtti*) denotation by words

A: p.1387 yady api tāvad anyatrānupalakṣitaivaṃvidhasvabhāvā eva padārthā bhavyus tathāpi teṣv eva padair <atīśayādihānakalpanopapattimatī>¹⁹². <na tv>¹⁹³ <anvayavyatirekāvdhṛtanīṣṛṣṭapadārthamātrābhīdhānaśaktīnām>¹⁹⁴ padānām <parivṛtīyānvitārthaviśayaśaktikalpanā>¹⁹⁵. <yathā hy arthābhīdhānaṃ>¹⁹⁶ yāvad gatānām mantrānām na <parivṛtīyoccāraṇād>¹⁹⁷ evādrṣṭaṃ <kalpyate>¹⁹⁸, arthagatam eva tu <mantrapratyāyanajanitam adrṣṭam adrṣṭakalpanāviśeṣe>¹⁹⁹ 'pi sthāsyati, mantrair eva smārīto <'rtho>²⁰⁰ 'bhyudayāya ghaṭata

¹⁹⁰S: abhīdhātavyaḥ

¹⁹¹S: padārthānām

¹⁹²A: atīśayādihānakalpanopapattimatī; S: atīśayādihānaśaktikalpanopapattimatī

(Reason for emendation: Accepting A, and removing the abstract suffix (as in S).)

¹⁹³A: (na tv); S: yad

(Reason for emendation: Suggested reading in A.)

¹⁹⁴A: anvayavyatirekāvdadhate(vadhṛta)niṣṛṣṭapadārthamātrābhīdhānānām(naśaktīnām)

¹⁹⁵A: viparivṛtīyānvitārthaviśayaśaktikalpanā (See also footnote 197.)

¹⁹⁶A: yathā (hy a)arthābhīdhānaṃ; S: yathārthābhīdhānaṃ

(Reason for emendation: Suggested reading in A.)

¹⁹⁷A: parāvṛtīyoccāraṇād; S: parivṛtīyoccāraṇam

(Reason for emendation: S repeats the term *parivṛtti*, whereas A uses *viparivṛtti* and *parāvṛtti* respectively. Hence emended in accordance with S, since there is no deviation in meaning.)

¹⁹⁸S: parikalpyate

¹⁹⁹A: mantrapratyāyanajanita(m a)drṣṭam adrṣṭakalpanāviśeṣe; S: tu mantrapratyayena janitam adrṣṭakalpanāviśeṣe

(Reason for emendation: Suggested reading in A.)

²⁰⁰S: mantrārtho

^{xxxix}See V.2.8.

iti evam ihāpi padārtheṣv eva <samāhitaḥ>²⁰¹ ko 'pi padair atīśayo
<yenānyatrāgamitai vaṃvidhasvabhāvā api padārthāḥ śabdasaṃsparśād>²⁰²
eva viśiṣṭam arthaṃ pratyāyayanūti <pramāṇavatī śaktikalpanā>²⁰³.

S: f.583r

V.3.8.2 Argument 2: Potency of WMs to lead one to cognize SM is not only due to their conjunction with words (*śabdasaṃsparśa*)

api ca pramāṇāntarāvagatānām api viśiṣṭārthabuddhau hetubhāvo dṛṣṭa eva, yathā
vakṣyati — <paśyataḥ śvetimārūpaṃ ityādi>²⁰⁴.^{x1} yat tūktaṃ <śabde>²⁰⁵ 'pi
tadvad eva <viśiṣṭāvagater>²⁰⁶ upapattau śabdo na pramāṇam iti tad ayuktam. A: p.1388
<vyutpattyanusāriṇī>²⁰⁷ hi śabde śaktikalpanā tadvaśena <ca>²⁰⁸ sambandhisv-
abhāvārthābhidhānadvāreṇa śabdānām svābhāvikaṃ prāmāṇyam upapāditam eva.
na tat kenāpi śakyate pratikṣeptum.

yat tu śveto 'śvo dhāvatīti <buddhau>²⁰⁹ kiṃ pramāṇam iti naikaṃ
kiñcit <pramāṇam. pramāṇasamāhārajā tu viśiṣṭārthabuddhiḥ pha-
labhūtā na svayaṃ pramāṇam>²¹⁰, pratyakṣānumānāvagatānām hi
<dravyaguṇakarmanām>²¹¹ svabhāvasāpekṣānām eva śabdapratipāditānām

²⁰¹S: sa nāmāhitaḥ

²⁰²A: yenānyatraivaṃgamita(vaṃvidha)svabhāvā api padārthāḥ śabdasaṃsparśād; S:
yenānyathāgamitai vaṃvidhasvabhāvā api śabdasaṃsparśād
(Reasons for emendation: *anyatra* (from A) and not *anyathā* (from S) due to its use earlier in
this paragraph as well; *agamita* (from S) and not *evamgamitalevaṃvidha* (from A) best fits the
argument.)

²⁰³S: pramāṇavatī kalpanā

²⁰⁴A: paśyatar śvotamārūpaṃ hreṣāśabdaṃ ca śṛṇvataḥ ityādi

²⁰⁵S: śabde

²⁰⁶S: viśiṣṭārthāvagater

²⁰⁷S: vyutpattyanusāriṇo

²⁰⁸A: Om. ca

²⁰⁹A: buddheḥ

²¹⁰A: pramāṇam samāhārajāti viśiṣṭārthabuddhiḥ phalabhūtā na svayaṃ pramāṇam; S: pramāṇam
pramāṇasamāhārajā tu viśiṣṭārthabuddhiḥ phalabhūtā na pramāṇam

(Reason for emendation: Eclectic text (from both S and A) to best describe the argument.)

²¹¹S: guṇadravyakarmanām

^{x1}ŚV Vāk. vv.358-359a: *paśyataḥ śvetam ārūpaṃ hreṣāśabdaṃ ca śṛṇvataḥ;*
khuranikṣepaśabdaṃ ca śveto 'śvo dhāvatīti dhīḥ; dṛṣṭāvākyavinirmuktā (See also footnote xviii)

iva saṃsargo bhāsate. <vākyārthajñānam api phalam>²¹² eva śabdādipramāṇatve <hānādibuddhyapekṣayā tu>²¹³ pramāṇam ity <abhyupadiśyate>²¹⁴.

V.3.8.3 Argument 3: SM is not comprehended if WMs are not cognized

A: p.1389 api ca <vākyoccāraṇe>²¹⁵ yadā padārthā <nāvadhāryante>²¹⁶ kutaścīn <mana uparodhāt>²¹⁷ na tadā vākyārtho 'vagamyate saty api vākye.^{xli} ataḥ padārthā eva vākyārthabuddhau <nimittam iti yuktam>²¹⁸.

na cedam padārthānām vākyārthabuddhau nimittatvam vyākhyākauśalamātreṇāsmābhir ucyate <kintu>²¹⁹ pratītisiddham eva. yathā <viṣphāritākṣasyāloke>²²⁰ na rūpajñānam vilambate, <evam padārthasaṅgativido 'pi śrutavākyasya vākyārthajñānam>²²¹ iti padārthānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyivākyārthajñānam <tatkāraṇam>²²² iti niścīyate. ata evoktam <tadbhāvabhāvata iti>.²²³

S: f.583v tad idam **anyathāpy upapannatvād ity** anenoktam padapratipāditebhyaḥ padārthebhya evoktena <prakāreṇa viśiṣṭārthabuddher upapannatvād>²²⁴ vākyasya

A: p.1390 śaktir apramāṇiketi.

²¹²S: vākyārthajñānam api hi phalam

²¹³A: hānādibuddhivivakṣayām tu(ādhyapekṣayā tu)

²¹⁴A: apadiśyate

²¹⁵S: vākyoccāraṇe 'pi

²¹⁶S: na smaryante

²¹⁷S: manoparādhān

²¹⁸A: nimiti yuktam

²¹⁹A: Om. kintu

²²⁰A: viṣphāritākṣasyāloke

²²¹A: evam padārthasaṅgativido 'pi(vi)śrutavākyasya vākyārthajñānam; S: evam hi padārthasaṅgatividaḥ śrutavākyasya na vākyārthajñānam

(Reason for emendation: Suggested reading in A.)

²²²S: tatkāraṇakam

²²³S: tadbhāvabhāva iti

²²⁴S: prakāreṇopapannatvād

^{xli}ŚBh on PMS 1.1.25: *api cānvayavyatirekābhyām etad avagamyate, bhavati hi kadācid iyam avasthā mānasād apy āghātāt. yad uccaritebhyaḥ padebhyo na padārthā avadhāryante. tadānīm niyogato vākyārtham nāvagaccheyur yady asya apārthagartham abhaviṣyat. niyogatas tu nāvagacchanti.* (Āpaṭe 1929, pp. 97-98)

<śabdāhitātīśayaśālinām>²²⁵ vākyaṛthe <nimittatvam ity atrāpy>²²⁶ <etad evottaram **anyathāpy upapannatvād iti**. upapannā khalu>²²⁷ padārthānām <eva>²²⁸ svābhāvīkī viśiṣṭārthaśaktir uktena prakāreṇeti na vākyaśyāsau padārtheṣv ādhātavyatayā <pramāṇavatī>²²⁹.

<tadaivaṃ tāvad>²³⁰ <anyathāpy upapattis>²³¹ tredhā vivṛttā.

V.3.9 Words cannot denote SM in accordance with DoC

V.3.9.1 Argument 1: In DoC, a *specific* WM (*viśeṣa*) cannot be cognized due to the role of memory

anvitābhīdhāna eva tv anupapattiḥ. tathā hi — <sannihite-naivānvitābhīdhānam>²³² iṣyate. <tad yadi kriyākārapadasmāritaiḥ smṛtisthair evānvitābhīdhānam iṣyate>²³³ <tadaikam>²³⁴ eva pacatīti A: p.1391
 kriyāpadaṃ <samuccaritaṃ>²³⁵ nānākarmakam eva pākaṃ smārayati. yathā hi paceḥ pākena sambandho drṣṭa <iti tatsmaraṇam>²³⁶, <evaṃ>²³⁷ nānākarmopahitenaiva <pākena>²³⁸ sambandhadarśanāt <tadvad eva>²³⁹ karmāntarāṇy api smṛtāv ārūḍhānīti <naudanenaiva>²⁴⁰ samabhivyāhṛtena <pacatīty asyānvitābhīdhānam>²⁴¹ siddhyati.^{xlii}

²²⁵A: śabdābhīhitātīśayaśālinām

²²⁶S: nimittatvam iti. atrāpy

²²⁷S: etad evottaraṃ anyathāpy upapannā khalv api

²²⁸S: Om. eva

²²⁹A: pratīyate(māṇavatī)

²³⁰A: tad eva(n tāvad)m

²³¹S: anyathānupapattis

²³²A: sannihitenānvitābhīdhānam

²³³A: tad yadi . . . iṣyate is repeated

²³⁴A: tad ekam

²³⁵S: uccaritaṃ

²³⁶S: iti tatas tatsmaraṇam

²³⁷S: eva

²³⁸S: tena

²³⁹S: tadaiva

²⁴⁰S: nodanenaiva

²⁴¹A: pacatīty aṃśasyānvitābhīdhānam

^{xlii}See also VM-I: *atra kaścid āha — yadi smṛtisannihitam āsṛityānvitābhīdhānam padaiḥ kriyate, tadā smaraṇasya pratyāsattinibandhanatvāt, anekeṣāñ cārthānām pratyāsattisambhavāt,*

na ca <śrutisannihitenāivānvitābhīdhānam>²⁴² iti niyamaḥ sannihitamātraparigrahāt. ata eva lokavedayor dvāraṃ dvāram ityādau viśvajidādiṣu <cāśrutenāivānvitābhīdhānasiddhiḥ>²⁴³.

A: p.1392 na <cāvāpoddhāranirdhāritaṃ>²⁴⁴ svārtham eva padāni smārayantīti yuktam sambandhamātranibandhanatvāt smaraṇasya.

<api ca svārthasyā pratiyogisannidher>²⁴⁵ anābhīdhānān <nābhīdhānasadasabhāvākṛto>²⁴⁶ viśeṣa upapadyate. ata odanaṃ pacatīty ukte kalāyādyanvitaḥ pāko <'vagamyeta>²⁴⁷.

S: f.584r yadi tv ekenānvitābhīdhāne śrutena tāvad bhavatīty ucyate, viśeṣahetur <vācyaḥ>²⁴⁸. na hi śrutaṃ śrutatvenānvitābhīdhāne <hetuḥ api tarhi>²⁴⁹ sannidhānena. tac ca <śrutāśrutayor>²⁵⁰ aviśiṣṭam ity uktam.

V.3.9.2 Argument 2: The fear of syntactical split (*vākyabheda*) cannot lead one to favour the *śruta* WM over the other remembered WMs

A: p.1393 <vākyabhedabhayād>²⁵¹ anyataraparigrahe kena viśeṣeṇa śrutenaivānvitābhīdhānam iti vaktavyam. api cāgrhyamāṇe viśeṣe 'gatyā <vākyabhedo 'py āpadyamānaḥ>²⁵² kena parāṇudyate, <nāśadoṣaparihāreṣv iva>²⁵³ haviṣām

²⁴²S: śrutisahitenāivānvitābhīdhānam

²⁴³S: cāśrutenāpy anvitābhīdhānasiddhiḥ

²⁴⁴S: cāvāpodvāpanirdhāritaṃ

²⁴⁵A: api ca svārthasyā pratiyogisannihite(dhe)r; S: svārthasyāpi pratiyogisannidher

(Reason for emendation: Suggested reading in A.)

²⁴⁶S: nābhīdhānasadasabhāvākṛto

²⁴⁷A and S: 'vagamyeta

(Reason for emendation: Argument needs a sense of potentiality.)

²⁴⁸S: vācya

²⁴⁹S: hetur api tu tarhi

²⁵⁰S: śrutayor apy

²⁵¹S: vākyabhedabhayād apy

²⁵²A: vākyabhedo vyāpadyamānaḥ

²⁵³S: nāśadoṣāpahāreṣv iva

teṣu smṛtisannihiteṣv agrhyamāṇaviśeṣatvāt, ukhāyāṃ pacatīti nokhā pacatyarthānāvitaiva kevalābhīdhīyeta. sā hi kulālādyanvitāpi pratipannaiveti, smaraṇāt tadanvitāpy ukhābhīdhīyeta. tathā pacatyartho 'pi piṣṭakādikaraṇako 'vagata iti tatsmaraṇān naudanānvita evābhīdhīyeta. abhīhitānvayavāde tu nāyaṃ doṣaḥ, ekaikasyārthasyābhīdheyatvād iti. (A. Sastri 1964, pp. 406-407)

<ājyasaṅkalpaḥ>²⁵⁴.^{xliii}

<yadi caitaddoṣabhayād ādyaṃ padam>²⁵⁵ ananvitam eva svārtham abhidhatte ity āsrīyate tatas tadvad eva padāntarāṇy apy <ananvitārthāni>²⁵⁶ bhaveyuḥ. bhavati <cātra>²⁵⁷ vimatipadāni <padāny>²⁵⁸ ananvitābhidhāyīni padatvād ādyapadavad iti.

V.3.9.3 Argument 3: The problem of synonymy (*partyāyatā*) in DoC (*anvitābhidhāna*)

api ca smṛtisannihitenānvitābhidhāne pacatīty <anena>²⁵⁹ sāhacaryasmṛtaudanānviṭaḥ pāko 'bhihita ity odanam <iti na vaktavyam>²⁶⁰, gatārthatvāt. ubhābhyāṃ <caudanapacatiśabdābhyāṃ odanapākasambandho 'bhihita iti>²⁶¹ paryāyatāprasaṅgaḥ.^{xliv}

<viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhedād>²⁶² aprasaṅga iti cet, na vākyabhedāpatteḥ. tatra itat <syāt, odanam ity odanapadasya>²⁶³ pākaviśiṣṭa odano 'rthaḥ. tatra pāko viśeṣaṇam odano viśeṣyaḥ, pacatīti viparīto viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva iti na paryāyatāprasaṅga iti. tac ca naivam vākyabhedāpatteḥ, anyo hy odanaviśiṣṭat pākāt pākaviśiṣṭa odanaḥ, arthaikatvāc caikavākyatāṃ vakṣyati — **arthaikatvād ekam vākyam iti**^{xlv}. <ataḥ sarvatraivārthabhedād vākyabhedāḥ>²⁶⁴.^{xlvi}

A: p.1394

²⁵⁴S: ājyakalpane

²⁵⁵S: yadi tv etaddoṣabhayād ājyapadam

²⁵⁶S: ananvitavacanāni

²⁵⁷S: ca

²⁵⁸S: Om. padāny

²⁵⁹S: anenaiva

²⁶⁰S: ity apy avaktavyam

²⁶¹S: caudanapacatiśabdābhyāṃ pākaudanāsambandho 'bhidhīyata iti

²⁶²A: viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhedād

²⁶³S: syāt odanapadasya

²⁶⁴A: atas sarvatraivārthavākyabhedād vākyabhedāpattiḥ

^{xliii}See PMS 6.4.1-2 and the ŚBh thereon for a similar example. Also Mahādeva Vedāntin's *Mīmāṃsānyāyasaṃgraha* (MNS) 6.4.1.

^{xliv}VM-I: *nanv evaṃ gām ānayetādau parasparaparyāyatā sarvaśabdānāṃ syāt. yathā gāmity anenānayatyanvitābhidhānam, tathānayetā anenāpi gavānvitābhidhānam iti.* (ibid., p. 403)

^{xlv}PMS 2.1.46: *arthaikatvād ekam vākyam sākāṅkṣam ced vibhāge syāt*

^{xlvi}VM-I: *ucyate — dvāv etāv arthau, yad ānayanānviṭaṃ gotvam, gavānviṭaṃ cānayanam iti. tenaikaikenaikaikasyārthasyābhidhānāt kutaḥ paryāyatvaprasaṅgaḥ. padārtheṣv api cai-*

V.3.9.4 Argument 4: DoC cannot be established by considering the obligation (*kārya*) as central

pradhānakāryaikatvād ekavākyateti cet, <tan>²⁶⁵ na loke tad-abhāvābhyupagamāt. vede 'pi ca viṣayādikrameṇa dvayor dvayor <anvitābhidhāne pratyekaṃ vākyaparisamāpter vākyabheda eva>²⁶⁶. ekasyaiva A: p.1395, cākhyātasyānekābhidhānaśaktikalpanāprasangaḥ sarvānvitapratīteś caivam S: f.584v anibandhanatvaṃ.

<sarvānvito 'py ākhyātenaiva>²⁶⁷ svārtho 'bhidhīyata iti cet, anarthakaṃ <tarhi dvayor dvayor anvitābhidhānāśrayaṇam>²⁶⁸ astu <prathamam>²⁶⁹ eva sarvānvitakāryābhidhānam.

api ca krayavākye kathaṃ dravyaguṇayoḥ parasparasambandhaḥ.^{xlvii} <so 'pi tacchabdābhyām abhidhīyata iti>²⁷⁰ cet, evam apy ākhyātena <sarvakārakānvitābhidhānād>²⁷¹ <aruṇādikārapadaiś>²⁷² ca <punaḥ parasparānvitābhidhānāt>²⁷³ vākyabheda evārthabhedāt. anyo hi sarvaviśiṣṭāt krayāt parasparaṃ dravyaguṇayor anvayaḥ. ato yathā <grahaṃ saṃmārṣṭīti>^{xlviii} atra grahasaṃmārjanasambandhe punaś ca grahaikatvasambandhe vākyabhedo varṇita>²⁷⁴ evam ihāpi bhavet. A: p.1396

²⁶⁵S: Om. tan

²⁶⁶A: anvitābhidhāne pratyekavākyaparisamāpte vākyabheda eva; S: anvitābhidhāne pratyekaṃ parisamāptir vākyabheda

(Reason for emendation: Eclectic text (from both S and A) to best describe the argument.)

²⁶⁷A: sarvānvito hy ākhyātena

²⁶⁸S: tarhi dvayor anvitābhidhānāśrayaṇam

²⁶⁹A: prathamam

²⁷⁰A: sāpi tacchabdābhyām abhidhīyata iti S: so 'pi tachabdārtho na vidhīyata iti

(Reason for emendation: Eclectic text (from S and A) to best describe the argument.)

²⁷¹S: sarvakārakānvitārthābhidhānāt

²⁷²S: aruṇādipadaiś

²⁷³A: punaḥ punaḥ parasparānvitābhidhānād

²⁷⁴A: grahaṃ saṃmārṣṭīti (atra) grahasaṃmārjanasambandhe punaś ca grahaikatvaṃ sambandhe vākyabhedo varṇitaḥ; S: grahaṃ saṃmārṣṭīty atra grahasaṃmārjīsambandhe vākyabhedo varṇita

tatsamānam. (A. Sastri 1964, p. 403)

^{xlvii}This refers to the example *aruṇayā piṅgākṣyaikahāyanyā somaṃ krīṇāti*, discussed in the ŚBh on PMS 3.1.12 (*aruṇādihikaraṇa*). This example is also discussed in the VM-I (ibid., pp. 403-404).

^{xlviii}This refers to the example *grahaṃ saṃmārṣṭī*, discussed in the ŚBh on PMS 3.1.13-15 (*grahaikatvādihikaraṇa*).

athaikakāryaparigrhīṭayor <ārthaḥ>²⁷⁵ parasparasambandho nābhidhānika ity ucyate. yady evaṃ asti tarhy arthasāmarthyakārīto 'pi sambandha <iti sarva-traivānanvitā eva padārthā abhihitāḥ svabhāvād eva sambhatsyante>²⁷⁶, kim anvitābhidhānavyasanena. <dravyaguṇayor api>²⁷⁷ parasparasambandhaḥ śāstrārtha eva²⁷⁸ na cābhidhīyate evam.

anabhidhīyamānā api sarvavākyārthās tatparatvāc chabdasya śābdā bhaviṣyanti. vakṣyati ca **pāke jvāleva kāṣṭhānām padārthapratipādanam** iti.^{xlix} <tad idam uktam>²⁷⁹ **anyathāpy upapannatvād** iti dravyaguṇayoḥ svābhāvīkasyāpi sambandhasyopapannatvāt sarvatraiva A: p.1397 vākyasyānvitābhidhānaśaktir apramāṇīkety uktam <bhavatīti>²⁸⁰.

V.3.10 Chronological delay between utterance of words and SM cognition in DoC

api ca yadi sarvair eva <padair uccāritair ananvitārtheṣu smāriteṣu>²⁸¹ mīmāṃsāgatānekanyāyakaḥpānūsāreṇa <vacobhaṅgiṣu vibhaktāsu>²⁸² paścād abhidhānam iṣyate¹ tac <cirātipanneṣu>²⁸³ padeṣu kena sampādanīyam iti cin-tanīyam. S: f.585r

(Reason for emendation: Suggested reading in A.)

²⁷⁵A and S: arthaḥ

(Reason for emendation: To bring about logical consistency with overall argument)

²⁷⁶A: iti sarvatrānvitābhīhitāḥ padārthāḥ svabhāvād eva sambadhantām

²⁷⁷S: dravyaguṇayor eva hi

²⁷⁸The phrase 'na cābhidhīyate evam' has been considered in A as the beginning of a new sentence and a new paragraph. This is modified here and this phrase is considered as part of the previous sentence, with a new paragraph beginning after this phrase.

²⁷⁹S: tad ayuktam

²⁸⁰S: bhavati

²⁸¹A: padair anviteṣv eva padārtheṣu smāriteṣu

²⁸²S: vācobhaṅgiṣv avibhaktāsu

²⁸³A: cirāniṣpanneṣu

^{xlix}ŚV Vāk. vv. 342-343: *sākṣād yady api kurvanti padārthapratipādanam; varṇās tathāpi naitasmin paryavasyanti niṣphale; vākyārthamitaye teṣāṃ pravṛttau nāntarīyakam; pāke jvāleva kāṣṭhānām padārthapratipādanam.*

¹VM-I v.12: *padajātaṃ śrutam sarvaṃ smāritānanvitārthakam; nyāyasampādītavyakti paścād vākyārthabodhakam*

na hi tadānīm <antyo 'pi>²⁸⁴ varṇo buddhau viparivartate prāg
 eva <sarvapaḍāni>²⁸⁵. evaṃ ca pūrvapūrvavarṇajanitasamskārasahito
 A: p.1398 'ntyo varṇaḥ <pratipāḍaka>²⁸⁶ iti siddhānta upekṣito bhavet. na
 ca mahāvākyeṣūttarakālaṃ <sakalavarṇapaḍānusmaraṇam>²⁸⁷ api sambhavati
 vijātīyapaḍārthādismaraṇavicchedāt.

api ca yadi prāg <evānvitābhidhānād>²⁸⁸ vidh-
 yanuvāḍoddeṣyopāḍeyaguṇapradhānādirūpeṇa vacanavyaktayaḥ sampāditāḥ
 kṛtam abhidhānena smṛtisthānām eva paḍārthānām <parasparānvayasiddheḥ>²⁸⁹.
 ata <eva cābhidhānanirapekṣo 'pi>²⁹⁰ paḍārthānām asti <parasparānvaya>²⁹¹ iti
 <pratijānīmahe>²⁹². <tasminn eva>²⁹³ paḍārthasāmarthyasamudbhave 'nvaye
 <pravartamānaṃ>²⁹⁴ vākyam anuvāḍakaṃ bhavet.

<atrāpy>²⁹⁵ <anyathāpy upapannatvād>²⁹⁶ ity etad eva
 vyākhyeyaṃ prāg <evābhidhānād>²⁹⁷ <vidhyanuvāḍādirūpeṇa>²⁹⁸
 A: p.1399 paḍārthasaktyaivānvayasyopapannatvād vākyasya tadabhidhānaśaktir
 apramāṇiketi.

<pañcadhānyathāpy upapannatvād>²⁹⁹ ity asyārtho 'nusandhātavyaḥ.

²⁸⁴A: antyāpi

²⁸⁵A: sarvapaḍāni(nām)

²⁸⁶S: pratyāyaka

²⁸⁷S: sakalavarṇapaḍārthasmaraṇam

²⁸⁸A: evābhidhānād

²⁸⁹S: paramparayārthasiddhiḥ

²⁹⁰A: evābhidhānanirapekṣāṇām api (kṣo 'pi)

²⁹¹S: paramparānvaya

²⁹²S: jānīmahe

²⁹³S: tasminn eva ca

²⁹⁴S: vartamānaṃ

²⁹⁵A: tatrāpy

²⁹⁶S: anyathānupapannatvād

²⁹⁷S: eva cābhidhānād

²⁹⁸S: vidhyanuvāḍarūpeṇa

²⁹⁹S: pañcadhānyathānupapannatvād

V.4 Conclusion

ataḥ siddham ekaikapadārthāvasiteṣv eva padeṣv
<ākāṅkṣāsannidhiogyatānibandhanaḥ>³⁰⁰ parasparānvaya <iti. bhāvanāyā
hy ākhyātopāttāyā ākāṅkṣitayogyasannihitaiḥ sādhyādibhir aṃśaiḥ sambandho,
'rthāt>³⁰¹ teṣāṃ apy anyonyasambandham <āpādayatīti>³⁰².

<na caivaṃ vākyabhedo bhavati, na hy arthād arthasahasram āpadyamānaṃ
vākyabhedam āpādayati>³⁰³. yathāha — **arthād anekam apy arthaṃ
vidhāpayati <bhāvaneti>**³⁰⁴.ⁱⁱ <ataḥ sūktaṃ **satyaṃ na vācakaṃ vākyam**>³⁰⁵
iti. <tad evaṃ tāvat prathamam eva padānām ananvitaviṣayam abhidhānam iti A: p.1400
uktaṃ>³⁰⁶.

³⁰⁰S: ākāṅkṣānibandhanaḥ

³⁰¹S: iti bhāvanākyātopāttākāṅkṣitayogyasannihitaiḥ sādhyāditribhir aṃśaiḥ sambaddhārthāt

³⁰²S: āpādayati

³⁰³S: Om. na caivaṃ . . . āpādayati

³⁰⁴A: bhāvanā iti

³⁰⁵S: sūktaṃ na vācakaṃ vākyam

³⁰⁶S: tad evaṃ na tāvat prathamam eva padārthānām anvitaviṣayam abhidhānam iti uktaṃ

ⁱⁱTV 1.4.2 (Āpaṭe 1929, p.399): *arthād anekam apy arthaṃ vidhāpayati bhāvanā;*
viśeṣaṇavidhis tv anyan na grhṇāti viśeṣaṇam

Chapter VI

Annotated Translation of Sucaritamísra's Kāśikāṭikā on Ślokovārttika Vākyādhikaraṇa vv.110cd-112ab

VI.1 Hermeneutic conformity of *abhihitānvaya* (CoD) with the views of Jaimini and Śabara

Thus, with regard to the argumentation of the PP [as put forth in ŚV Vāk. vv.1-110ab], which is based on the absence of an adequate basis [to account for the arising of SM cognition],¹ the *sūtra* [1.1.25] presenting the accepted view [is stated]:

[A (Vedic) injunction/sentence is] a joint mention (*samāmnāya*) of [words] that have [already] occurred with regard to their [word meanings (WMs)] (i.e. are known in relation to their respective WMs) (*tadbhūta*) along with [a word] whose meaning is an action (*kriyārtha*),

¹The Vākyādhikaraṇa of PMS comprises 1.1.24-26. Of these, the 1.1.24 is the *pūrvapakṣa*, and ŚV comments upon this is vv.1-110ab. The main argument of the PP here is that there is no adequate basis to account for SM cognition. The *sūtras* 1.1.25-26 present the accepted view (*siddhānta*).

since the [sentential] meaning (SM) (*artha*)² is caused by these [WMs] (*tannimitta*).³

The following is the meaning of this [*sūtra*]: To begin with, the relation of words with WMs is fixed (*nitya*).⁴ “[A (Vedic) injunction/sentence] is a joint mention, i.e. enunciation (*uccāraṇa*), of those [words] which have [already] occurred [with regard to], i.e. which refer to those very WMs, along with [a word] whose meaning is an action”⁵ — this [sentence in the ŚBh] is the meaning [of the *sūtra*]. And we say that [what one calls] “action” is the efficient force (*bhāvanā*). And this very [efficient force] qualified by its multiple attributes [which are its three components] is the SM⁶ – this is stated [as our (i.e. the Bhāṭṭa) explanation]. Hence, the following has been said — it is the words themselves which are the basis for the SM cognition through [the intermediate step of] them conveying the WMs. Thus, [the arising of SM cognition] is not without a basis.

²The term *artha* is often ambiguous and can refer to meaning or object. This present discussion focusses on the doctrines of *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna*, hence I prefer to translate the term as *meaning* throughout, while nevertheless bearing in mind its dual senses. I will also point out specific instances where an understanding of the term as object may be quite significant (for instance, see footnote 34).

³PMS 1.1.25: *tadbhūtānām kriyārthena samāmnāyo ’rthasya tannimittatvāt*.

Jha (1933, p.44) translates the *sūtra* as: “[In the sentence] there is only a predication (or mention) of words with definite denotations along with a word denoting an action, as the meaning (of the sentence) is based upon that (i.e. the meanings of the words).”

Clooney (1990, p.90) translates the *sūtra* as: “There is a handing down together (*samāmnāya*) of (words) already formed (prior to use) for the sake of action. This (handing down together) is the means (to the knowledge) of that purpose (*dharma*).”

Moreover, Clooney states: “*tadbhūtānām*: ‘already existent at the utpatti (=tad)’. The meaning of individual words is not dependent on the ritual. We already know what “rice”, “fire”, “heaven”, etc. mean, before we are told that the oblation of rice on the fire will lead us to heaven. It is the *samāmnāya*, the handing down of these words ordered in a particular fashion that tells us something new”.

Clooney (ibid., p.90) admits that in his translation he is “adopting the *anvitābhidhāna* theory of language enunciated later by Prabhākara”. I have translated the verse in accordance with how the ŚBh as well as the Kṛ seem to consider it, which seems similar to the translation given by Jha (1933).

⁴See Freschi (2017) for an explanation of why the term *nitya* should be translated as fixed and not as eternal in Mīmāṃsā contexts.

⁵ŚBh on PMS 1.1.25: *teṣv eva padārtheṣu bhūtānām vartamānānām padānām kriyārthena samuccāraṇam*

⁶The three components (*aṃśa*) of the efficient force (*bhāvanā*): goal (*sādhyā*), instrument (*sādhana*) and procedure (*itikartavyatā*). See Freschi (2012, pp. 19-43) for a discussion on the Mīmāṃsā theory of *bhāvanā*.

And it is also fallacious [to state] that the words convey an entirely distinct SM after having disregarded the WMs, in a manner similar to how they convey WMs, because there is no means of knowledge. Surely, we do not have any means of knowledge on the basis of which we could accept that the terminal phoneme of the sentence, having entirely disregarded the WMs [but] accompanied by the mnemonic traces (*saṃskāra*) produced by the previous phonemes,⁷ conveys the SM which is a meaning entirely distinct [from the WMs].⁸

[Uttarapakṣin (UP):]⁹ Well, the means of knowledge is most certainly Postulation (*arthāpatti*). This is because we will postulate a potency (*śakti*) of phonemes to [convey] the SM as well, in accordance with our experience of the effect [which is the arising of SM cognition] — just as is the case with WMs.¹⁰

[Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin:] No, “since the [sentential] meaning (SM) (*artha*) is caused by these [WMs]” (PMS 1.1.25) i.e. since the WMs themselves, whose mutual connections are understood by virtue of [their mutual] expectation, compatibility and proximity, cause the SM cognition. Postulation, which has [already] been exhausted (*kṣīṇa*) [to account for WMs arising from phonemes], is not be

⁷The term *varṇa* may also be translated (more accurately) as *speech-sound*. This is because the term *phoneme* has a specific meaning in Western Linguistics. Aklujkar (1970, pp. 9-14) translates *varṇa* as phoneme despite noticing some key differences between Western Linguistics and Pāṇinian Vyākaraṇa. For instance, the three variants of (say) *u* — short, long and prolated — would be treated as distinct phonemes by the former (since they would lead to a change in meaning in some minimal pairs, such as *pura* (city) and *pūra* (flood)) whereas the latter would consider these as “two different realizations of one *varṇa*” (Ibid., p. 10), attributing the difference to the temporal duration of each. Similarly, other scholars such as Kataoka (1999) and Freschi (2012) also translate the term as *phoneme*.

⁸Sucarita is here glossing the following sentence from ŚBh on PMS 1.1.25: *nānapekṣya padārthān pārthagarthayena vākyam arthāntaraprasiddham. kutaḥ. pramāṇābhāvāt. na kiñcana pramāṇam asti yena pramimūmahe. na hy anapekṣitapadārthasya vākyāntyavarṇasya pūrvavarṇajanitasamskārasahitasya śaktir asti padārthebhyo 'rthāntare varṭitum iti.*

⁹The terms *uttarapakṣa*, *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta* are common dialectical markers within Indian philosophical discussions. The Pūrvapakṣin (PP) presents and upholds the *prima facie* view (i.e. the opposing viewpoint) (*pūrvapakṣa*), whereas the Siddhāntin advances arguments to refute the PP and thereby establish the *final accepted doctrine* (*siddhānta*). In this section of the Kāśikā (on ŚV Vāk. 110cd-112ab), the PP is the Prābhākara upholding the doctrine of the DoC, whereas the Siddhāntin is the Bhāṭṭa upholding the doctrine of the CoD.

An *uttarapakṣa* is an initial argument, which will subsequently be disproved. An Uttarapakṣin (UP), who develops and upholds an *uttarapakṣa*, may be found as situated within the Pūrvapakṣa as well as the Siddhānta.

¹⁰For the Mīmāṃsakas, the arising of WM from a word is due to the potency of the phonemes comprising the words, and such a potency is known through Postulation (*arthāpatti*).

able to cause one to postulate an altogether distinct potency in the phonemes [to additionally account for SM as well] . Thus, as is stated in the Bhāṣya [on PMS 1.1.25], “this is because all words cease functioning (*nivṛttavyāpāra*) once they have denoted (*abhidhā-*) their own respective meanings. Now, it is only when the WMs have been understood that they cause one to cognize the SM”. Thus, Kumāriḷa demonstrates here that doctrine (*siddhānta*) which is in conformity with the views of Jaimini and Śābara:¹¹

“To this [PP argument presented in ŚV Vāk. vv.1-110ab], it is said:
Even though there is a different basis [of SM cognition according to others] (*mūlāntara*), that is not so for us.¹²

Rather, [we accept that] word-meanings (WMs) are seen as being its basis, since that [SM cognition] arises when they (i.e. WMs) arise (*tadbhāvabhāva*).” (ŚV Vāk. 110cd-111ab)

The following is the meaning [of the verse]:¹³ Even though individually words are not the cause of the SM cognition, nor is their aggregate, nor the whole primary (*avayavin*) sentence¹⁴, nor the universal [inhering in the aggregate of words] (*tajjāti*)¹⁵, nor the first or the last words, nor the *vākyasphoṭa* which is entirely additional [since it is an intermediate entity between the sentence and SM], nor a mental event (*buddhi*) appearing as if it were something external (*bāhyanirbhāsa*) nor even [a mental event] devoid of anything external (*bāhyaśūnya*) — nevertheless the WMs themselves are understood as the basis for the cognition of the qualified SM¹⁶, since [the SM cognition] arises when they arise (*tadbhāvabhāvitā*). The

¹¹ŚV Vāk. vv.110cd-111ab: *atrābhidhīyate yady apy asti mūlāntaram na naḥ; padārthānām tu mūlatvaṃ dṛṣṭam tadbhāvabhāvataḥ*

¹²One may also consider the terms *na* and *asti* together in v.110cd, thereby translating as ‘Even though there is no (*nāsti*) alternate basis [for SM cognition] for us . . .’. There is no significant deviation in the two interpretations – hence the above is preferred simply due to its uncommon formulation.

¹³A similar enumeration is already found in VP II vv.1-2: *ākhyātaṃ śabdasaṅghāto jātiḥ saṅghātavartinī, eko ’navayavaḥ śabdaḥ kramo buddhyanusaṃhṛtiḥ. padam ādyaṃ pṛthak sarvaṃ padaṃ sāpekṣam ity api, vākyam prati matir bhinnā bahudhā nyāyadarśinām*. This verse is also quoted in NR on ŚV Vāk. v.49ab. Kumāriḷa argues against each of these in ŚV Vāk. vv.49cd-57ab.

¹⁴The term *vākyāvayavin* implies that the sentence is the primary entity (*avayavin*), vis-à-vis words and phonemes which are secondary (*avayava*).

¹⁵The term *tajjāti* corresponds to the alternative *jātiḥ saṅghātavartinī* in VP II v.1-2. This is explained subsequently in VP II vv.20-21.

¹⁶The Mīmāṃsakas accept that SM is a qualified/particularized meaning, whereas WM is a

aggregated, the words themselves – which are denoting ²¹ the [sentential] meaning – are the sentence”.²² Thus, even though individually, words are not expressive of the qualified [sentential] meaning, nevertheless it is reasonable to admit that aggregated [words] (*saṃhata*)²³ most certainly denote²⁴ the qualified [sentential] meaning in accordance with the process of language learning (*vyutpatti*), which is based on the linguistic usage of elders (*vṛddhavyavahāra*). And the term ‘sentence’ is known to apply to those very [words] which have this quality (*tathābhūta*) – hence, why is it said [by Kumārila in v.111cd] that the sentence is not expressive of the SM?

Further, this [statement in v.111cd] has not been put forward with the intention of [refuting the Grammarians’ thesis of] the indivisible sentence (*nirbhāgavākya*), since that will be refuted subsequently. And for those [theoreticians, such as the Grammarians] who do not admit that the divisible (*sabhāga*) sentence is expressive [of the SM], [the conclusion that will follow is that] the SM cognition would have no cause, since the words signifying²⁵ actions (*kriyā*), factors of action (*kāraka*),

²¹See I.1 for a discussion on the distinct conception of denotation (*abhidhā-*) in Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. In summary, for the Bhāṭṭas, *abhidhā-* links **words and word-meanings**, whereas for the Prābhākaras, *abhidhā-* links **words and sentential meaning**.

Note also that the term *abhidadhati* here is being translated as a Present Active Participle and not a Present Indicative Verb (see VI.3.1).

²²ŚBh on PMS 3.3.14: *atha kiṃ vākyaṃ nāma? saṃhatyārtham abhidadhati padāni vākyaṃ*. See also III.4 for a discussion on how this definition of the sentence from the ŚBh is presented in the VM-I, and a comparison of the VM-I’s view with the PP discussions here.

²³The definition of the sentence from the ŚBh on PMS 3.3.14 uses the term *saṃhatya*. The Prābhākara PP here renders unambiguous that for him, it is the *words (padāni)* which are being aggregated (*saṃhatāni*). It is important to note that such aggregation is not in the mind of the hearer through the *memories of the words*, as that would contradict the process of DoC as outlined in the VM-I where only *memories of WMs* are included (see I.3 and I.4 for a discussion on the doctrine of DoC). Thus, we must accept that the Prābhākara PP here is considering the words as aggregated within the hearer’s mind **as they are heard** (*śruta*) (which is the first step in the process of DoC) – see I.4.1 for details).

In contrast, a possible interpretation of this definition of the sentence from the ŚBh as quoted in the VM-I is that the *word-meaning memories* are being aggregated (*saṃhatya*) — as this is something that the VM-I attempts to demonstrate is common to both doctrines of DoC as well as CoD. This is discussed in III.4.

²⁴The term *abhidadhati* here is being translated as a Present Indicative Verb and not as a Present Active Participle (see footnote 21).

²⁵I am using the term *signifying* as referring to the generic process of linking words to their word-meanings, in order to include all possible types of linkages between words and WMs as may be acceptable for the Prābhākara PP. As discussed in the VM-I, words *remind* one of their WMs and do not instead *denote* (*abhidhā-*) them (see I.4.1). Nevertheless, another possible modified

qualities (*guṇa*) and [substances] possessing qualities (*guṇin*) denote their own respective word-meanings [only] and thereafter cease to function. [Thus], one would have to address [the problem of] how the [sentential] meaning is established.

VI.2.2 No possible cause that can bring about a connection between unconnected WMs

[Prābhākara PP:] If one was to claim that WMs cause one to cognize their [mutual] connection (*anvaya*)²⁶, then [we would ask] what would be the basis [of this claim]?

[Bhāṭṭa UP:] The fact that any other explanation [of SM] is not justified (*anyathānupapatti*).

[Prābhākara PP:] If [the Bhāṭṭa UP] were to claim that the reason for this is that a WM action (*kriyā*) or a WM factor of action (*kāraṇa*) is not justified without its connection to the other, [and] hence [each WM] leads one to cognize that [connection to the other WM] — then [we would ask] why is this [unconnected WM] unjustified? Surely, there is no basis for the restriction (*niyamahetu*) that ‘something cognized should necessarily be connected’, as one does also observe compositions of words having unconnected meanings – for instance, ‘cow, horse, man, elephant’. Consequently, even proximity (*sannidhi*) [of the WMs] is not a cause for their connection, since it is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) as no connection is seen between two proximate fingers, etc. As a result, even compatibility (*yogyatā*) [of WMs] alone is not the cause [for the connection between the WMs], since both [these factors – proximity and compatibility] are in fact seen to have exceptions as one does see [only] sometimes a connection between two fingers which are able to connect.

Nor is there a connection [between the WMs] (*sambandha*) due to their [mutual]

position in the VM-I is that words *denote* WMs and then subsequently also *denote* SM (see III.2.2).

²⁶The terms *anvaya* and *sambandha* are used very often in Mīmāṃsā discussions on language, and are repeatedly found in this essay as well. Both these terms have a specific, technical sense: *anvaya* refers to the **connection between word-meanings**, whereas *sambandha* refers to the **connection between a word and its own meaning**. (Note that the term *sambandha* is used in some places to refer to the mutual connection (*parasparasambandha*) between WMs as well, i.e. in the sense of *anvaya*. However, this is only occasionally done in contexts where the discussion is clearly about *anvaya*. Such instances are indicated in this essay.)

expectation (*ākāṅkṣā*) [for each other]. The reason for this is that one who is hungry [certainly] hopes (*ākāṅkṣ-*) to procure food and drink – yet, this does not come about for him [simply on the basis of his hope]. Hence, we do not see any basis for the mutual connection between the WMs.

VI.2.3 Only words can denote a connected meaning, indirect denotation is not possible

[Prābhākara PP:] As a result, it must be admitted that it is the words themselves which have an innate nature (*svabhāva*) to denote (*abhidhāna*) their own [unconnected] meanings (*svārtha*) as connected (*anvita*) to other [word] meanings which are expected, compatible and proximate.²⁷ And we cannot see any other means for the cognition of the qualified [sentential] meaning.

And in this manner (i.e. when words *denote* the SM itself), the SM would be linguistic (*śabda*) as it is conveyed by words (*śabda*)²⁸ without any intervention whatsoever. This is because [if the SM was to come about] in any other manner, [then the SM] would either have no means of knowledge [to grasp it] (*niṣpramāṇika*) or would be indirectly denoted (*lakṣaṇika*). In that case [of the second alternative] (*tatra*),²⁹ it is impossible to discern the primary (i.e. denoted) (*mukhya*) [SM] from the indirectly denoted (*lakṣaṇika*) [SM], since all [SMs] would be indirectly denoted.

Moreover, indirect denotation (*lakṣaṇā*) takes place [only] when the connection [between the WMs] is not justified (*anvayānupapatti*).³⁰ However, once [we] have stated [as above in VI.2.2] that there is no cause for even the cognition of the connection [between the WMs] – then, due to what being unjustified will we speak of indirect denotation? As it has been stated [by us in VI.2.2], it is not the case

²⁷This is a succinct description of the concept of denotation according to DoC (*anvitābhidhāna*) as presented in the VM-I (see Chapter IV).

²⁸The term *śabda* can be more accurately understood as speech-unit. This is because even individual words (such as *yajeta*) can be further divided into distinct speech-units (such as the verbal base, suffix, etc.), each signifying their own meanings (*artha*). Nevertheless, since the present discussion focusses on the doctrines of *anvitābhidhāna* and *abhihitānvaya*, I prefer to translate the term *śabda* (and also *pada*) as word, and its *artha* as word-meaning (WM).

²⁹i.e. Since the first alternative is inadmissible.

³⁰This argument of *anvayānupapatti* is found in the VM-I as well. See IV.6.4.

that WMs are unjustified in their own isolated forms (*svarūpa*).

VI.2.4 Language learning leads one to infer the potency of words to denote connected meanings

[**Bhāṭṭa UP:**] That may be so.³¹ On the basis of co-presence and co-absence (*anvayavyatireka*), it is ascertained that words signifying actions, factors of action, etc. have the potency for denoting [only] their respective WMs, as may be extracted (*niṣkṛṣ-*) [out of the complex SM]. Thus, the denotation [of words] does not extend as far as the connected [SM] [as the Prābhākara PP has claimed in the VI.2.3].

[**Prābhākara PP**] This is not so, since language learning (*vyutpatti*) occurs only in accordance with the process of DoC. Certainly, by observing the activity related to a qualified (i.e. sentential) meaning that is undertaken by an elder who is prompted [to act] by [the words] “bring the cow” immediately after he hears [those] words, a child conjectures thus: “Surely, an understanding concerning a qualified meaning has arisen for him (i.e. the prompted elder) from those [words ‘bring the cow’]”. And in this manner, [the child] deduces the potency of words to denote that [qualified meaning] by means of co-presence and co-absence (*anvayavyatireka*).³²

VI.2.5 Difference between *nimitta* and *abhidheya*

[**Prābhākara PP**] And in this [process of language learning], there is the bare extraction (*niṣkarṣamātra*) of the condition (*nimitta*) [for the employment of the word], and not the extraction of the meaning denoted by the word (*abhidheya*). Certainly, in various sentences such as “bring the cow”, “he milks the cow”,³³ “fetch the cow”, etc. – whenever there is the presence of the word cow and the absence of one word or another signifying an action, then this much is understood

³¹By the phrase *syād etat*, the Bhāṭṭa UP seems to be admitting the Prābhākara PP’s argument of *anvayānupatti* about *lakṣaṇā*. This phrase is not used elsewhere in Kṛ, and may be of particular importance when considering Sucarita’s views on the role of *lakṣaṇā* in SM cognition as attributed to Kumāri (see I.2.2).

³²A similar discussion is found in the VM-I. This is discussed in IV.3.

³³The other two illustrative sentences have imperative verbal forms, and a similar imperative verbal form is expected here. Yet, both manuscripts have *dogdhi* and not *dugdhi*, the former being the third person, singular present indicative form and the latter being the second person, singular imperative form of the verbal base *duh-* (to milk).

from the presence of the [word] cow that the [unconnected WM (*artha*)] ‘cow’ is the condition [for the employment] of the word cow in the process of DoC.³⁴

And the [connected] meaning which is denoted by the word (*abhidheya*) is not [the same as] the condition (*nimitta*) [for its employment]. Surely, it is not the case that the [WM ‘staff’ (*daṇḍa*)] is the meaning] which is denoted by the word *daṇḍin* (staff-bearer) (*daṇḍipada*), [simply] because the [WM] ‘*daṇḍa*’ is the condition (*nimitta*) for the word *daṇḍin* to denote a ‘staff-bearer’. Thus, the WM [‘staff’] is the condition with regard to the [word *daṇḍin*’s] denoted meaning

³⁴In other words, the unconnected WM ‘cow’ is the *condition* (*nimitta*) for the employment of the word cow which *denotes* (*abhidhāna*) its own meaning as connected (*anvita*) to other WMs. Thus, the *nimitta* for a word’s denotation is the unconnected WM, whereas the word’s *abhidheya* is the connected meaning.

Now, the condition (*nimitta*) for the use of a word is its *artha*. This is an instance where the ambiguity of the sense of the term *artha* becomes quite important — it can either be understood (and hence translated) as meaning or object. Nevertheless (as also mentioned previously in footnote 2), I retain the translation of the term *artha* as meaning, all the while bearing in mind the dual possible senses of this term.

[which is ‘staff-bearer’]³⁵, [WMs] are not what are denoted since the connected [meaning] alone is denoted by the words on account of language learning.³⁶

³⁵This example of *daṇḍin* is set forth in the ŚBh on PMS 6.1.1-2, where the terminology as well as the distinction between *abhidheya* and *nimitta* are presented and admitted by Śabara. Following is a brief outline and translation of the discussion in the ŚBh:

In ŚBh to PMS 6.1.1 and 6.1.2, one of the questions raised is that in Vedic injunctions such as *darśapūrṇamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajeta* or *jyotiṣomena svargakāmo yajeta*, does the word *svarga* (heaven) denote happiness (*prīti*) or a substance (*dravya*) which brings happiness (*prītimat*)? (ŚBh to PMS 6.1.1: *kiṃ prītiḥ svargaḥ, uta dravyam iti.*)

In the ŚBh to PMS 6.1.1, the Pūrvapakṣin argues:

“It is not the case that the word heaven denotes (*abhidhāyaka*) happiness.”

“How so?”

“Since it is a qualifying factor (*viśeṣaṇa*). Whatever is a qualifying factor, that is not expressed by the word. For instance, the word staff-bearer (*daṇḍin*) is expressive of a person [bearing the staff], [whereas] the ‘staff’ (*daṇḍa*) is the condition [for such expression] (*nimitta*). [Here], the ‘staff’ is the condition (*nimitta*) [for the use] of this [expression i.e. staff-bearer] [and] not its denoted meaning (*abhidheya*). In this same way, this [word heaven] is not expressive of happiness, rather this word heaven is expressive of the means to happiness.”

(ŚBh to PMS 6.1.1: *naitad asti, prīter abhidhāyakaḥ svargaśabda iti. kutaḥ? viśeṣaṇatvāt. yad viśeṣaṇam, na tac chabdenocyate. tad yathā, daṇḍīti daṇḍanimittatḥ puruṣavacanaḥ, daṇḍo 'sya nimittam, nābhidheyaḥ. evam eṣa na prītivacanaḥ prītisādhanavacanas tv eṣa svargaśabda iti.*) (Āpaṭe 1932, p. 1347)

However, in the ŚBh to PMS 6.1.2, the Siddhāntin opposes the Pūrvapakṣa argument (as above) while admitting this example. He states:

“And in case of that which had been said earlier, that [the word heaven expressing a substance bringing happiness] is similar to the word staff-bearer — [well,] that [word staff-bearer] effects the cognition of the [WM] ‘staff-bearer’ when the [WM] ‘staff’ is cognized from the speech-unit [staff]. In this case, the speech-unit staff forms a part of that [word staff-bearer], it is that [speech-unit staff] which is expressive of the [WM] ‘staff’.

However, in this case [of the Vedic injunction], the word heaven is itself denotative of happiness.”

(ŚBh to PMS 6.1.2: *yat tūktam daṇḍīśabdavad iti, so 'pi pratīte śabdād daṇḍe daṇḍini pratyayam ādadhāti. antargatas tatra daṇḍaśabdaḥ, sa daṇḍasya vācakaḥ. iha punaḥ svargaśabda eva prīter abhidhātā.*) (ibid., pp. 1350-51)

³⁶This argument is discussed further in II.6.1.

VI.2.6 Connection between WMs is ascertained, as cognition of connected WMs is incomplete without it

[**Bhāṭṭa UP:**] Well [for you], the connection [between WMs] is an attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the cognition of the connected [meaning], as there cannot arise an understanding of something possessing an attribute (*viśeṣya*) such that the attribute [itself] is not grasped. Thus, even that [connection] comes to be something which must certainly be *denoted* [by the word] [alongside the *denotation* of the connected meaning].

[**Prābhākara PP**] Certainly!

[**Bhāṭṭa UP**] [However,] if this is so, a distinct potency of the words should be [additionally] postulated which is concerned even with [the *denotation* of] that [connection].

[**Prābhākara PP**] No, it shouldn't – because both these (i.e. the connected meaning as well as the connection between the WMs) can be established by means of a single potency alone. A connected [meaning] cannot be understood when it has not caused the connection to become intrinsic (*anantarbhū-*) [to itself] — thus, the connection [between the WMs] is indeed capable of being grasped on the grounds that the cognition of the connected [WM] is not completed (*aparyavasāna*)³⁷ without it [and] does not require any distinct potency of denotation – as the connected [meaning] as well as the connection [between the WMs] are capable of being [jointly] cognized by means of a single cognition.³⁸

VI.2.7 Agreement of DoC with ŚBh on PMS 1.1.25

[And as argued previously in VI.2.5 and VI.2.6], [that] which is extracted [through co-presence and co-absence i.e. the condition (*nimitta*) for the employment of a word] is not denoted by a word. It is with this very intention that it is said in the ŚBh [to PMS 1.1.25]: “This is because all words cease functioning once they have denoted their own respective meanings. Now, it is only when the WMs have been comprehended that these cause one to cognize the SM.” The sense [of this sentence] here is that connected (*anvita*) meanings are comprehended first,

³⁷See McCrea (2000, p. 450) for an explanation of the term *paryavasāna* in Mīmāṃsā.

³⁸The VM-I also puts forth a similar argument. See IV.12.

which thereby cause one to cognize the SM i.e. the connection [between the WMs] (*anvaya*), on the grounds that the cognition of the connected [WMs] is incomplete (*aparyavasāna*) [without the cognition of the connection]. And by the phrase “their own meaning” – this has been said [by Śabara] with the intention of [depicting their meaning as] connected.³⁹ Thus it has been said [in Prabhākara’s *Bṛhatī* on PMS 1.1.25]: A word denotes the connected [meaning] (*vyatiṣakta*), “it does not denote the connection [between the WMs] (*vyatiṣaṅga*) – since an understanding of the connection [between the WMs] arises on the basis of the connected [WM].”⁴⁰

VI.2.8 Bhāṭṭa must accept potencies in WMs, additional to those of words

[Prabhākara PP:] And certainly, those who say that the SM is a connection [between the WMs] which is even generated (*prabhāvita*) by the capability of the WMs – even they must admit that there is some power (*mahiman*) conferred (*āhita*) by words to WMs due to which those [unconnected WMs] lead one to cognize the SM. This must be admitted, since WMs apprehended through other means of knowledge (perception, etc.) do not lead to a cognition of a qualified [sentential] meaning.⁴¹

This [argument] has also been stated [by the Bhāṭṭa]: For sometimes, one does understand a qualified [sentential] meaning on the basis of WMs comprehended through other means of knowledge (perception, etc.). For instance, one who sees from a distance a white (*śvetiman*), indistinct form (*ārūpa*) and who hears neighing (*heṣā*) as well as the sound of hooves (*khura*) pounding [upon the ground], for him/her arises an understanding of the qualified [sentential] meaning: “a white horse is running”.⁴² [However], even this [argument of the Bhāṭṭa] is fallacious.

This is because one should reflect upon the question: Which is the means of

³⁹This argument is also found in the VM-I. See IV.12.

⁴⁰This is a quote from the *Bṛhatī* on PMS 1.1.25: *vyavahāre ca yathāvyatiṣaṅgam evāvāpoddhārau. tasmān na vyatiṣaṅgābhidhānam, vyatiṣaktato ’vagater vyatiṣaṅgasya.* This phrase is also quoted in the VM-I.

⁴¹This Prabhākara objection is found in the VM-I, see IV.6.2.1.

⁴²This is an example from the ŚV Vāk. vv.358-359a: *paśyataḥ śvetam ārūpaṃ hreṣāsabdaṃ ca śṛṇvataḥ; khuranikṣepasabdaṃ ca śveto ’śvo dhāvātīti dhīḥ; dṛṣṭā vākyavinirmuktā.*

knowledge (*pramāṇa*) [which accounts] for that [cognition of the qualified meaning “a white horse is running”]?⁴³ Surely, each means of knowledge (perception, inference, etc.) completes [its functioning] (*paryavasita*) with respect to its own [object]. Consequently, we do not see any means of knowledge [which is able to account] for the cognition of the qualified meaning. Or rather, if another means of knowledge (say, X) is admitted in that case [for the cognition of the qualified meaning “a white horse is running”], then that [X] alone is the means of knowledge [accounting] for the cognition of the qualified [sentential] meaning [arising] even in case of language (i.e. even if a verbal expression is used). And as a result, language would cease to be the means of knowledge [for the cognition of qualified meaning arising from the use of language].

Hence, [the Bhāṭṭa UP] must say that the denotation by words confers (*ādhā-*) a certain capacity (*atiśaya*) to WMs, and these WMs, as endowed with this capacity, cause the SM cognition. And in this way, it is preferable to admit that the potency of words themselves to denote a connected [meaning] is primary, because in this way it has been correctly shown that words are a means of knowledge.

VI.2.9 WM’s correlates are known through specific conditions

[Prābhākara PP:] Even those [Bhāṭṭa opponents] who state the following — [In the Prābhākara theory of DoC], every word signifying action (*kriyāpada*) or factor of action (*kāraṅkaṇḍa*) considered individually has endless correlates (*pratiyogin*), due to which the relation [of the word to its meaning] (*sambandha*) is difficult to comprehend [since each word would *denote* endless connected meanings].⁴⁴ And a word, whose connection [to its own meaning] has not been grasped [previously], cannot [ever] convey meaning. Thus, the potency of words for denotation is concerned only with the individual isolated [word] meanings⁴⁵ — even this [argument

⁴³This Prābhākara objection is also discussed in the VM-I, see IV.6.2.3.

⁴⁴Like *sambandha* (see footnote 26), the term *pratiyogin* also has a technical sense in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā discussions on language. The term *pratiyogin* refers to any WM which is connected to any one given WM — and for the Prābhākara, the word *denotes* its own WM as connected to other WMs i.e. to *pratiyogins*.

⁴⁵The argument here is the following: The Prābhākaras as well as the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas accept the *sambandha* (i.e. the relation of a word to its own WM). The Bhāṭṭas argue that one learns this *sambandha* in the process of language learning (*vyutpatti*), as each word denotes its own unconnected WM during linguistic usage. The Bhāṭṭas thus assert that since the Prābhākaras

of the Bhāṭṭa opponent] is incorrect.

Surely, despite the correlates being endless, one becomes aware easily (*sukara*)⁴⁶ of the relation [of a word to its own meaning], since [the correlates] are marked (*upalakṣita*) by specific conditions (*asādhāraṇopalakṣaṇa*). For it has been said that expectation, proximity and compatibility cause DoC. Thus, one's knowledge of the relation [between a word and its meaning] has those [three factors] as its conditions (*tadupalakṣaṇa*). This is because some [word X] denotes its own WM ['X'] as connected to that [correlate WM 'Y'] alone which is expected, compatible and proximate.⁴⁷

It is for this very reason that despite the [word's] correlates being endless, [the fault of] the postulation of endless potencies [to denote endless connected meanings] does not befall [the word].⁴⁸ This is because one postulates a single potency alone [for the word] to denote [its own WM] as connected [to another WM] which has met (*upeta*) the three conditions (*upādhi*) [of expectation, compatibility and proximity],⁴⁹ just as in the case of pronouns (*sarvanāmasabda*). In fact, even though these [pronouns] denote endless entities (*bhāva*) by means of the single condition of proximity, they do not lead one to postulate endless potencies [for each distinct entity].

VI.2.10 DoC in case of a single word

[Bhāṭṭa UP:] Now [in the Prābhākara PP's theory of DoC], when no other correlate (*pratiyogyantara*) is present, does no cognition [arise] from a single word signifying action or factor of action? Or does a cognition of a connected [meaning arise]?

[Prābhākara PP:] It is not the case that there is no cognition.

[Bhāṭṭa UP:] In that case, the connected cognition [arising from the single word] is a cognition connected to what [correlate]? Surely, no other correlate is heard

consider each word as denoting a connected meaning instead, there would be endless denotations for each word and one would thus be unable to learn the *sambandha* for any word. This Bhāṭṭa objection is present in the VM-I, see IV.4.1.

⁴⁶Śālikanātha presents the same argument, and uses the term *saukarya*. See footnote 47.

⁴⁷This Prābhākara argument is also found in the VM-I, see IV.5.1.

⁴⁸This is a brief reference to the Bhāṭṭa objection in VM-I, see IV.6.3.

⁴⁹This Prābhākara argument is also set forth in the VM-I, see IV.6.3.

here – this has been declared.

[Prābhākara PP:] This is true, no [other correlate] is heard. However, it is not that there is DoC with only something which is heard⁵⁰ since we accept [DoC with] merely that which is proximate. And ‘proximity’ is said to be the occurrence (*viparivṛtti*) in the mind. Thus, we do admit of DoC even with that [WM] which is not delivered (*upanīta*) by a word [and] has appeared (*ārūḍha*) in the mind due to some other reason. Thus, in the case of [sentences such as] *dvāraṃ, dvāram*, DoC is established with [the WM] ‘the action of closing’, and other [such actions] even though they are presented to the mind (*upasthāpita*) through a distinct means of knowledge. And in the case of the *viśvajit* [sacrifice], etc., [DoC of the Vedic injunction *yajeta* (one should sacrifice) is established] with the one who is commanded to perform the injunction (*niyojya*), namely one who is desirous of heaven, etc. as [such a commanded person] is presented to the mind due to its invariable association (*avinābhāva*) to the [Vedic] obligation (*kārya*). And in the case of the modified sacrifices (*vikṛti*) where the minor aspects (e.g. *prayāja*) (*vidhyanta*) are not directly expressed, [DoC is established] with the procedure (*itikartavyatā*) of the archetype sacrifices (*prākṛta*), since [such procedure] is presented to the mind by the capability of the injunction (*niyoga*).⁵¹

[Bhāṭṭa UP:] If it is the case that despite the use of a single word [as in the example of *dvāram*], DoC still comes about – then, in a word like *pacati* ([he/she] cooks), how can there be an expectation for a specific grammatical object (*karma*), since this word signifying the action [of cooking] (*kriyāpada*) [already] conveys a qualified connection?

[Prābhākara PP:] Rather, this is exactly why DoC comes about. Surely, if a word denotes [its own WM, say ‘X’] as connected [to another WM, say ‘Y’], then in this manner when one connected entity [X] is known, there arises an expectation for the other related entity [Y] [in the form of] “As connected to what [WM ‘Y’] should this [word] denote [its own] meaning [‘X’]?” Thus, the uttered word will

⁵⁰More precisely, the translation would be: “However, it is not that there is denotation [by a word] of a [meaning which is] connected (*anvitābhidhāna*) only to something which is heard.” However, in order to be concise, I translate as: “. . . DoC with something which is heard.” The following discussion has many similar constructions (*anvitābhidhāna* + instrumental noun), and I translate throughout in this concise manner.

⁵¹Such an explanation of *sannidhi* is also found in the VM-I, see IV.5.3.

denote its own meaning as connected precisely to that very [WM] that arises in the mind on account of language or any another means of knowledge. However, until a correlate is proximate [i.e. present in the mind], the word is inert (*udās-*) and does not denote [any connected meaning] (i.e. it is unable to perform its denotative function).⁵²

VI.2.11 No fault of mutual dependence, due to sequential DoC

[**Bhāṭṭa UP:**] An objection here is that when a meaning is not denoted by the first word X, the second word Y would be such that its expected, proximate and compatible correlate (i.e. WM ‘X’) [which is connected to its own WM ‘Y’] is not comprehended. Thus, as connected to what [correlate] would the WM [‘Y’] [of the second word] be denoted? And in this way, when even the first [word] is not expressive, its proximity to the second word would not assist in any way. In that case, the fault of mutual dependence (*itaretarāśraya*) would come about, for the denotation of the second [word] is dependent upon the denotation of the first word, and [the denotation] of the first [word] is dependent on that [of the second word].⁵³

[**Prābhākara PP:**] This [would be] true, if proximity is accepted as having [the process of] denotation for its basis. However, [we consider *memory* to be the basis instead as] all words on being uttered cause the memory of the condition of their employment (*pravṛttinimitta*) which had been apprehended at the time of language learning.⁵⁴ Therefore, all [words] denote their own [isolated] meaning as qualified by various other meanings, all of which are in fact remembered as unconnected – consequently, there is no fault of mutual dependence.

And the sequence of DoC [proceeds] according to the sequence of expectation. At first, when the injunctive verbal suffix (*ākhyāta*) denotes its nature of an obligation (*kāryātman*), the obligation is denoted as connected to its content (*viśaya*), namely the meaning of the verbal form (*bhāvārtha*), which is delivered by the verbal base used (*upātta*) within the same word (*svapada*), since the

⁵²A similar argument on the nature of *ākāṅkṣā* is also found in the VM-I, see IV.5.2.

⁵³This Bhāṭṭa objection is also found in the VM-I, see IV.4.2.

⁵⁴See VI.2.5 for a discussion by the Prābhākara PP on how a word’s condition (*nimitta*) is different from what the word denotes (*abhidheya*).

cognition of that [obligation] is impossible without a content. This is because without the [content], one cannot account for the cognition of that [obligation] since that [content] is an adjunct to the cognition (*pratīyanubandha*) of the injunction. [And] due to this special mental contiguity [between the obligation and its content] (*pratyāsattiviśeṣa*)⁵⁵, that [content] itself is expected and proximate in the first step. Thus, at first, there is the DoC with that [content]. **Thereafter**, [there is DoC] with the [next] adjunct i.e. the person commanded by the obligation, namely someone who desires heaven, etc. since there comes about the expectation [for this] immediately after. **Subsequently**, there is a connection to the procedure (*itikartavyatā*), since there is an expectation of the means for [realizing the action that is] the meaning of the verbal form, which has become the content [of the obligation]. Consequently, according to this sequence, the DoC can be demonstrated of two elements at a time. As the obligation is denoted by the main word (i.e. the injunctive suffix) (*pradhānapada*) as connected to X (i.e. a specific action, *niyojya* and procedure), even that X is denoted by the same word as connected to the obligation – hence DoC is established for all [words in the sentence].⁵⁶

And due to the primacy of the obligation, since all other [meaning elements] are meant for it, the SM is unitary. And since the SM is unitary, [even] the sentence is unitary despite the comprehension of many [word] meanings as connected to various other meanings.⁵⁷

[Prābhākara PP concludes] Thus, the sentence alone, which has the nature of being an aggregation of words, is the signifier of the SM. Consequently, maintaining that the sentence does not signify [the SM] is incorrect.

VI.3 The arguments of the Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin in favour of CoD

And so, [to this entire Prābhākara PP] he (i.e. Kumārila) says:

⁵⁵The term *pratyāsatti* is an important one for Śālikanātha, and according to him, this forms the basis of all memory (*smaraṇasya pratyāsattinibandhanatvāt*). I translate the term as mental contiguity (see IV.11.3.2).

⁵⁶These arguments are also presented in the VM-I, see IV.5.2.2 and IV.5.2.5.

⁵⁷This Prābhākara argument is also found in the VM-I, see IV.2.

Since [the arising of SM] can be justified even by a different explanation, in this argument [of the Prābhākara PP], the potency [of the sentence to denote the SM (as in ŚV Vāk. v.111cd)] is not based on any means of knowledge (*apramāṇika*). (ŚV Vāk. v.112ab)

VI.3.1 Hermeneutic inconsistency in the Prābhākara's argument

[**Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin:**] This is the intention [with which v.112ab has been stated]:

To begin with, this doctrine [of the Prābhākara PP] is not seen to conform to the *sūtras* and the *bhāṣya*. This is because Jaimini demonstrates WMs to be the cause of the cognition of SM by saying “since [word]-meaning is the cause of that [SM]” [in PMS 1.1.25]. Even Śabara, while explaining that [*sūtra*], says that “a sentence is not generally considered to have a meaning that is different from the [individual] word meanings, disregarding [these entirely]” – and saying this, he unambiguously refutes the claim that the sentence is the signifier of the SM.⁵⁸

And [Śabara], anticipating (*āsaṅk-*) that one may hypothesize a potency of the sentence to convey [the SM] on the basis of postulation (*arthāpatti*) [as the means of knowledge], shows that this part of the *sūtra* is meant to refute the hypothesis of a potency [of the sentence to convey SM] by saying [in the *bhāṣya*] “this is not so, since [word]-meaning is the cause of that [SM]”. And [the expression] *nivṛttavyāpārāṇi* ([those words] whose activity has ceased) [in the ŚBh demonstrates] that the denotation [of words] is completed with [the expression of] WMs only. And by the phrase [in the ŚBh] “who at all will postulate an unseen capacity of the aggregate of words?”⁵⁹ – an objection to the capacity of the sentence to be the signifier [of SM] is unequivocally made. And all this [argumentation in the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya*] may somehow even be understood (*ānī-*) in an altogether different manner by resorting to trivialities (*kāśaṃ kuśaṃ vā*) if a more

⁵⁸See footnote 8.

⁵⁹ŚBh on PMS 1.1.25: *yatra hi śukla iti vā kṛṣṇa iti vā guṇaḥ pratīte bhavati. bhavati khalv asāv alaṃ guṇavati pratīyayam ādhātum. tena guṇavati pratīyayam icchantāḥ kevalaṃ guṇavacanam uccārayanti. sampatsyata eṣāṃ yathāsaṅkalpito 'bhiprāyaḥ. bhaviṣyati viśiṣṭārthasampratīyayaḥ. viśiṣṭārthasampratīyayaś ca vākyaṛthaḥ. evaṃ ced avagamyate 'nyata eva vākyaṛthaḥ ko jātucid adṛṣṭā padasamudāyasya śaktir arthād avagamyata iti vadiṣyati. (Āpaṭe 1929, pp. 96-97)*

compelling justification is observed [in the alternate argument] – however, such a comparatively more compelling [justification] is also not seen as will indeed be stated.

On the other hand, the phrase *saṃhatyārtham abhidadhāti* [in the ŚBh on PMS 3.3.14] is not for demonstrating the assistance [of multiple words in the sentence] for the denotation of [sentential] meaning [as the Prābhākara PP argues].⁶⁰ Rather, [the phrase] should be glossed (*vyākhyeya*) as: “Once aggregated, the words which are denoting their [own] meanings become the sentence.” Or else, the term *abhidadhāti* should be glossed as “the [words] cause one to comprehend [SM]” (*avagamay-*). So here, one should conclude that by stating [v.112ab] “Since [the arising of SM] can be justified even by a different explanation, the potency [of the sentence to denote the SM] is not based on any means of knowledge”, Kumārila has stated a contradiction [of the Prābhākara PP’s argument] with the *bhāṣya* which is intended to refute the potency [of the sentence] to be a signifier [of SM].

VI.3.2 Incongruence in the Prābhākara’s doctrine, since WMs can lead to SM cognition

Thus, to begin with, in this way the lack of any justification on the basis of the [arguments of the] treatises (i.e. the *sūtra* and *bhāṣya*) was stated. [Moreover,] this thesis [of the Prābhākara PP] is not in accordance with [the requirements of] logical congruity (*upapatti*) as well. The postulation of the potency [of the sentence] to denote does not come into being with regard to something [namely the SM] that is obtained from something altogether different. And the WMs, which are conveyed by the words, are capable of causing one to cognize the SM when one grasps the other meanings which are expected, proximate and compatible. Thus, a postulation of the potency of the words (i.e. the sentence in the Prābhākara sense) whose scope is that [SM] as well is not possible. Hence, it is said [in v.112ab] that the potency of that [sentence] is not be based on any means of knowledge.

[Prābhākara UP:] But [it may be objected that] one cannot account [for the arising of SM] in any other way [contrary to that explained by us], because it has

⁶⁰See VI.2.1 for the Prābhākara PP’s argumentation. See also footnotes 21 and 22 for explanations of this phrase from the ŚBh.

[already] been explained [in ŚV Vāk. vv.1-110ab] that the WMs cannot be the cause for the SM cognition in any possible way.

[Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin:] This is not true, since the manner in which they cause [the SM] will be explained [subsequently]. This is because [Kumārila] will subsequently explain the manner in which WMs are the cause of the SM cognition by stating “In order to settle upon language as an means of knowledge . . .” (ŚV Vāk. v.247a).⁶¹ And bearing in mind that [argument] which has yet to be reached (*anāgatāvekṣaṇa*), we state something here as well.

VI.3.3 The Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin’s explanation of language learning

This much alone is understood at first by a child when two elders are linguistically communicating (*vyavaharamāṇa*) [with each other]: A meaning as enmeshed (*saṅkīrṇa*) with multiple qualities, universals, etc. is comprehended by the *prompted* elder (*prayojyavṛddha*) from this [specific use of] language (say, from a sentence such as “bring the cow”), such that this [prompted elder] takes action immediately subsequent to [hearing the sentence] for the sake of purposeful activity (*arthakriyā*) regarding a qualified object (i.e. the real cow). Thus, [the child] understands the cause [of the *prompted* elder’s activity] to be the sentence [of the *prompting* elder]. Since [the causality of speech] cannot be justified for [an elder who] does not act, [this child] postulates (*upakalpay-*) the functioning [of the potency of the sentence to convey SM] as inherent in language (*śabdasaṁavāyin*). And in this manner, [for the child, at this stage] a unclear (*saṅkīrṇa*) relation of conveyor and conveyed (*vāvyavācakatā*) is established of the sentence and the SM, both of which comprise parts. However, what is not discerned is which meaning is denoted by which part of the sentence. Consequently, by means of the splitting [of the sentence] by the addition and removal (*āvāpoddhārabheda*) of this or that word signifying action or signifying a factor of action, [the following is discerned]: that [WM] ‘X’ which is recurrently comprehended when there is the recurrence of [word] X and [that WM ‘X’ which is] excluded when there is the exclusion of

⁶¹ŚV Vāk. v.247 commences the discussion on how language must be admitted as a distinct means of knowledge.

[word] X, that [WM 'X'] is denoted by that [word X]. And thus, one discerns the potency of [word X] to be a conveyor such that the scope [of its potency] is that [WM 'X'] alone.

And in this manner, since words are devoted to [denoting] the parts [of the SM, i.e. individual WMs], on what basis does the cognition of the qualified [sentential] meaning arise? For someone reflecting on this, various alternatives arise. Is it that those words themselves are expressive of the qualified [sentential] meaning, just as they are expressive of the parts (i.e. the unconnected WMs)? Or is it the indivisible sentence which is the cause of the cognition of the qualified [sentential] meaning? Or are those very parts of meanings (i.e. the unconnected WMs) [the cause of the cognition of the qualified sentential meaning]? Among those [options], the indivisible sentence is impossible since this will dispel all other modes of the sentence wherein [the sentence is considered] divisible (*sakala*). Furthermore, since the words complete their function [by denoting] their parts of meanings (i.e. the unconnected WMs) – one concludes that it is these parts of meanings (i.e. WMs) alone which are the cause of the cognition of the qualified [sentential meaning].

VI.3.4 Cause of SM cognition remains linguistic

[Prābhākara UP:] But [one may object that], since in this way the cause [of the SM cognition] is not language, one's inference that language is the cause [of the SM cognition] would be blocked.

[Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin:] No, since that [linguistic nature of the cause of SM cognition] can certainly be justified on account of the WMs. Once words, whose potency is discerned by means of co-absence and co-presence, are aggregated together, they are capable of cooperating (*sannipat-*) to [convey] the SM. Thus these [words] are settled upon as the cause, by means of the WMs. And it is not the case that the intervention (*vyavadhi*) of the intermediate activity [of WMs] leads to [words] no longer being the cause [of the SM cognition], since this unwanted consequence would occur in all cases [of cause and effect].⁶² In this manner,

⁶²In other words, no cause-effect relation would ever be justified since there is always intermediate activity between any two entities classified as cause and effect.

words convey a variety of meanings such that these [WMs] themselves lead one to cognize the qualified SM.

VI.3.5 SM cognition is self-evident and not inferential

[Prābhākara UP:] However, [one may object that] if words complete [their activity] in [denoting] this or that WM, there is no means of knowledge with regard to the mutual relation of their WMs, since there are exceptions in the case of proximity, etc. – as was stated [earlier in VI.2.2].

[Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin:] We do not admit that the SM cognition is inferential such that we may be censured due to the observation of such exceptions [since only in the process of inference is the presence of exceptions an impediment]. Rather, the cognition of a qualified meaning (i.e. the SM cognition) comes about for [all] those who hear the sentence – in all places and times, for all individuals and in any circumstance. Hence all [sentences] are self-evident (*svasaṃvedya*).⁶³

And it is not that this [SM] cognition is without a basis (*anālambana*) or has itself as a basis (*ātmālambana*)⁶⁴ – as is stated in the *Vijñānavāda*.⁶⁵ And [another cognition which] overrides (*bādhaka*) this [SM cognition] is not observed, since this will lead to the undesired consequence of eradicating all linguistic

⁶³By this description as *svasaṃvedya*, the Bhāṭṭa intends to demonstrate that one needs no conscious effort to cognize meaning from sentences. Once the conditions have been fulfilled (hearing the words correctly, having the knowledge of WMs, etc.), the SM arises on its own for the listener — and it is hence that I translate the term as *self-evident*.

A similar term *svasaṃvitti* is found thrice in vv.79-80 of the ŚV *Pratyakṣapariccheda*. Taber (2005, pp. 78-83) groups vv.74-83 into a section, and explains that this section is a refutation of the Buddhist doctrine of the identification of the *pramāṇa* and the *phala* in perception. Taber translates the term *svasaṃvitti* as self-consciousness (ibid., pp. 81-82) or self-reflexive awareness (ibid., p. 21), referring to the Buddhist idea of a cognition's self-awareness, which is refuted by Kumārila (who admits a distinction between *pramāṇa* and *phala* in perception). Thus, the Bhāṭṭa's description of sentences as *svasaṃvedya* cannot mean such self-consciousness/self-reflexive awareness. On the contrary, it refers to their being cognized without any effort of the listener, i.e. they are self-evident.

⁶⁴These two descriptions of *anālambanā* and *ātmālambanā* correspond to two Buddhist theories of error (*khyāti*), first labelled by Maṇḍana Miśra in his *Vibhramaviveka* (v.1ab) as *asatkhyāti* and *ātmakhyāti*. This is also discussed in Kataoka (2018).

These two theories are mentioned similarly in another part of the *Kāśikāṭīkā* on the *Autpatikasūtra* section on v.15: *na ceyam anālambanā, na ca svāṃśālambaneti vijñānavāde varṇitam*. Another comment is also found in the beginning of the commentary on the *Ābhāvapariccheda*: *na ca buddher anālambanatvaṃ svāṃśālambanatvaṃ veti vijñānavāde varṇitam eva*.

⁶⁵This is a reference to the the chapter titled *Nirālambanavāda* in the ŚV.

communication. Rather, at times a contrary [cognition] (*bādha*) is common in the case of all cognitions which appear as valid – thus even by this [form of contradiction], one cannot deny [the reality of] SM. Thus, due to this very firmness (*dṛḍhiman*) of the cognition of the qualified [sentential] meaning, there exists a qualified meaning – this is justified.

VI.3.6 The initializing role of proximity and the accompanying role of expectation

And the WMs such as action, etc. have an natural (*svābhāvika*) relation with other compatible WMs. Indeed, the relation between actions and factors of actions as well as the relation between qualities and [substances] possessing qualities is seen by means of other means of knowledge such as perception, etc. as well (i.e. through means of knowledge distinct from language). Yet, the cognition of either one of the two [in each of the two pairs mentioned] (*anyatarasaṃvid*) is not devoid of the other (*anyataraśūnya*).⁶⁶ Thus, on the basis of [the use] of language (i.e. words), the mutual relation between actions and factors of actions as exists (*avasthita*) in accordance with the true nature of things (*yathāvastusvabhāva*), [first] surfaces [in the hearer’s mind] (*pariplu-*)⁶⁷ [and] the particular [SM] is determined on the basis of the proximity [of WMs] in this context.

And that which had been stated earlier [by the Prābhākara PP] that proximity is weak (*durbala*), this is true. Yet, an element which is conducive (*anugūṇa*) [to the SM cognition], although weak, is not invalidated. And in this case, there is no contradiction with the direct mention (*śruti*) – as will be explained later.⁶⁸

⁶⁶In other words, the cognition of an action/a quality is never devoid of the cognition of the factor of action/substance, and vice versa.

⁶⁷The verb *pariplavate* has been used here in a specific sense of ‘coming to the surface’. The verbal base *pariplu-* literally means ‘to swim’ or ‘to float’. Thus, what the Bhāṭṭa is arguing here is that the relation between *kriyās* and *kāraṅkas* (i.e. unconnected WMs) is natural (*svābhāvika*) and in accordance with the true nature of things (*yathāvastusvabhāva*) — yet only a general understanding of it first surfaces in the hearer’s mind when the words are uttered. It is only thereafter that the particular SM is determined on the basis of proximity of the WMs.

⁶⁸PMS 3.3.14 mentions the list of six criteria of interpretation (*pramāṇa*) for determining correctly what is related to an applicatory injunction (*vinīyogavidhi*). These are: *śruti*, *liṅga*, *vākya*, *prakaraṇa*, *sthāna* and *samākhyā*. These are listed in their order of dominance, with *śruti* being the most powerful and *samākhyā* being the weakest. See Edgerton (1929, 64ff) for a discussion on these.

And again, that [which was the Prābhākara’s argument in VI.2.2] that there is no relation between two fingers [of two different hands] even though they are proximate, that [argument] is true since the two [fingers] do not have any expectation for each other. This is precisely why there is no relation between words whose meanings do not have any mutual expectation, as in the case of ‘cow, horse, man, elephant’, etc. Consequently, an entity (*vastu*) which naturally expects something else (*svabhāvasāpekṣa*) [and] is known from language is naturally related with something which is expected [and] proximate. So here, there comes about the mutual relation between the WMs ‘action’ (*kriyā*) etc. on the basis of the power of words (*liṅga*)⁶⁹ with the assistance of sequence (*krama*)⁷⁰ – just as [there is the mutual relation] of the wooden ladle (*sruva*) with the action of taking a liquid and of the [recitation of the] *barhirmantra* with the act of cutting [the *barhis* grass].⁷¹

And this particular connection [between WMs] is not an inference – as will be explained later.⁷² Therefore, the [unconnected word] meanings, which are comprehended [from the words], are capable of leading one to cognize the SM. Consequently, a potency of words concerned with [the denotation of] the connected [meaning] is not postulated [as in the Prābhākara PP’s doctrine], since the cognition of the connected [meaning] is justified even by another explanation. Hence, it has been said: “Since [the arising of SM] can be justified even by a different explanation . . .” [in ŚV Vāk. v.112ab].

Thus, the Bhāṭṭa is arguing here that proximity (*sannidhi*) would be invalidated only if there was a contradiction (*virodha*) with a stronger means of knowledge, namely *śruti*. However, there is no such contradiction.

⁶⁹Edgerton (ibid., p. 74) translates *liṅga* as word-meaning, whereas Thibaut (1882, pp. 8,12) translates it as ‘power residing in words (i.e. the power words possess to denote or point out something)’.

⁷⁰The two means of knowledge *liṅga* and *krama* are part of the list of PMS 3.3.14. See footnote 68.

⁷¹These are both examples of making connections related to the applicatory injunction (*viniyogavidhi*) on the basis of the means of knowledge known as *liṅga* and *krama*. In both these cases, there is no direct mention (*śruti*) of using the ladle for the liquid or of reciting the *barhirmantra* while cutting the grass. Nevertheless, on the basis of *liṅga*, the Mīmāṃsakas argue that the actions of taking the liquid (*dravadravayādāna*) and of cutting (*lavana*) the grass should be connected to the ladle and the *barhirmantra* respectively.

⁷²This is a reference to ŚV Vāk. vv.231-246, where it is argued that SM cognition cannot be classified as an inference.

VI.3.7 Condition of indivisible words is not distinct from what they denote

[Prābhākara UP:] However, [one could object that] it has been stated that,⁷³ since language learning (*vyutpatti*) is concerned with a connected meaning, the potency of words for denotation is postulated as having that [connected meaning] alone as its scope [and not the unconnected WMs]. Rather, one uses co-presence and co-absence merely to extract the condition (*nimitta*) [of the use of the word], not to extract the meaning which is denoted [by the word] (*abhidheya*). Consequently, there is no denotation of the isolated WM (*kevalapadārtha*).

[Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin:] This is not so. Surely, the word *daṇḍin* (staff-bearer) comprises parts (*sabhāga*) (i.e. it is a complex formation). The WM ‘staff’,⁷⁴ denoted by the speech-unit *daṇḍa* (staff) [within the complex word *daṇḍin*], is the condition of the use of that [word *daṇḍin*] in order to bring about the cognition of one bearing a staff (*daṇḍavat*) — this is correct [as has been stated previously by the Prābhākara PP].⁷⁵ However, the WMs of indivisible words such as cow, etc. (*nirbhāgavādīpadārtha*) are the condition [for the use] of what [word X]? [And] what does this [word X] denote? This [objection] should be addressed [by the Prābhākara opponent].

If [one were to argue that for indivisible words such as cow, the WM ‘cow’] is the condition of the [word cow] when [it is used in the sense] of denoting its own meaning [‘cow’] as qualified by [the meaning of] the word signifying action (say, bring), [then we would say] no, this cannot be since that [word signifying action (say, bring)] is an altogether distinct word. Surely [in the case of the complex word *daṇḍin*,] the [WM] ‘staff’ (*daṇḍa*) which is expressed in the same word (*samānapadopāṭṭa*) [*daṇḍin*] is the condition [for the use] of [the word *daṇḍa*] with the suffix [-in] [i.e. *daṇḍin*] to denote ‘someone having that’ [i.e. a staff-

⁷³See VI.2.5 for the Prābhākara PP’s argument.

⁷⁴See footnote 34 for a translation of *artha* here as meaning, while retaining in mind the term’s dual senses of object as well as meaning.

⁷⁵As discussed in footnote 35, this example of the word *daṇḍin* is presented in the ŚBh on PMS 6.1.1-2, and the distinction in this case of the word’s *nimitta* and *abhidheya* is accepted by Śabara. Thus, this too is admitted by Sucarita — yet he seeks now to distinguish the Prābhākara explanation from the one presented in the ŚBh.

bearer]⁷⁶ — this is correct. However, how can the WMs ‘cow’, etc., which are expressed by means of words such as cow, etc., be the condition [for the use of words such as cow, etc.] in the denotation of [some meaning] which is connected with [the meaning of] other words such as bring, etc.?

And [various] words do not constitute a single speech unit (*aikapadya*), since one cannot deny that they are the parts of the sentence.

If [the Prābhākara opponent were to argue that] those [WMs ‘cow’, etc.] are the condition [for the use of the words cow, etc.] with regard to their denoted meaning, only insofar as their own meaning is connected [to other WMs] — that too is incorrect. Surely in this case, the meaning being denoted [by a word] (*abhidhīyamāna*) will be [that word’s unconnected meaning (say, WM ‘cow’) as] qualified by its correlate (say, WM ‘bring’). With regard to such denoted meaning, the correlate (i.e. WM ‘bring’) would itself become the condition. This is because it is on account of that [correlate being the condition] alone that that [denoted meaning] has the nature of being connected – not on account of [the word’s] isolated meaning (*svarūpa*), since its isolated meaning is unconnected.

Thus, this line of reasoning (*yukti*) of the claim that the WM is merely a condition is meaningless. Rather, that which is denoted [by a word] is itself the condition [for the use of the word] in accordance with (*yathā*) what we [state].⁷⁷ This is because whatever is the condition for the use of indivisible words [such as cow, unlike complex words such as *daṇḍin*], that alone is denoted [by the word] – this is our doctrine. Consequently, one extracts the potency [of words] to denote the mere word meaning extracted [from the SM] by means of co-absence and co-presence. As a result, the potency of the words is not established as being concerned with a connected meaning, since the cognition of that [connected SM] is justified even by an altogether different explanation i.e. on the basis of the [unconnected] WMs.

⁷⁶Aṣṭ. 5.2.115 *ata inīṭhanau* prescribes the suffix *in*, or *ṭhaN* (= *ika*) after a stem ending in short *a* in the sense of *tad asyāsty asmīn iti* (by *anuvṛtti* from 5.2.94). Thus, the meaning of a nominal base X + suffix *in* is ‘having X’.

⁷⁷I am construing the phrase *yathā tu vayam* in a manner similar to the phrase found in the ŚBh 6.5.39 *yathā tu vayaṃ brūmaḥ*.

VI.3.8 How WMs lead one to cognize SM according to CoD

And once again, that [argument] which had been stated previously [by the Prābhākara opponent]: Elsewhere (i.e. outside the scope of language) (*anyatra*), such a nature of WMs is not comprehended, namely that they lead one to understand the qualified [SM]. Thus, the words themselves should confer this capacity to the WMs. And in this way, it is better to postulate the potency of the words themselves to denote a connected [meaning] (*anvitābhidhānaśakti*)⁷⁸ – this [argument] is incorrect.

VI.3.8.1 Argument 1: No potency for DoC since no recursive denotation by words

First of all, even if WMs were such that this nature of theirs (i.e. to lead one to understand the qualified SM) is not observed elsewhere (*anyatrānupalakṣita*) (i.e. outside the scope of language), nevertheless we [Bhāṭṭas] postulate that words confer to these very [WMs] a capacity [to lead one to cognize the SM], and [this postulation of ours] is justified. Rather, words have the potency to denote only the WMs extracted [from the SM], ascertained by means of co-absence and co-presence. And one cannot postulate of such words [denoting unconnected WMs] a potency concerning the [denotation of the] connected meaning (i.e. SM) recursively (*parivṛtti*).⁷⁹ [To explain:] for *mantras* which have reached upto [the stage] of the denotation of their meaning, one cannot postulate an *adrṣṭa*⁸⁰ due to their recursive utterance. Rather, the *adrṣṭa* will be established as certainly related to meaning [and] as arising when it is conveyed by the *mantra*, even though there is a difference in [our] postulations of the *adrṣṭa* (*adrṣṭakalpanāviśeṣa*).⁸¹ The

⁷⁸This Prābhākara argument was discussed in VI.2.8.

⁷⁹In other words, one cannot assume that words have the potency to denote WMs and then are *recalled* to denote the SM.

⁸⁰The term *adrṣṭa* (also referred to as *apūrva*) is an important term in Mīmāṃsā, but is understood in quite different ways by the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsākas respectively. For the Bhāṭṭas, the term refers to ‘an energy produced by a sacrifice and lasting from the time of the sacrifice until its result is accomplished’ whereas for the Prābhākaras, it refers to the ‘duty, “newly” known through a prescription’. (See Freschi 2012, p.372) Since this is a common term with a technical meaning, I prefer to keep it untranslated.

⁸¹I am unsure of the sense of the phrase *adrṣṭakalpanāviśeṣe* ‘*pi*. Perhaps this means that the Bhāṭṭa admits that their definition of the *adrṣṭa* is distinct from the Prābhākaras’, but nevertheless

meaning [of the *mantra*] which is caused to be remembered by the *mantras* leads to prosperity (*abhyudaya*). Similarly (*evam*) here too (i.e. in ordinary sentences) a special capacity is conferred (*samāhita*) into the WMs themselves by the words so that even though this nature of WMs is such that it is not known elsewhere (*anyatrāgamita*), they lead one to cognize the qualified [sentential] meaning due to their conjunction with words (*śabdasaṃsparśa*), thus the postulation of such potency is justified.

VI.3.8.2 Argument 2: Potency of WMs to lead one to cognize SM is not only due to their conjunction with words

Moreover, it is in fact seen that even those [WMs] known by different means of knowledge (i.e. through means of knowledge other than language) cause the cognition of the qualified meaning. As [Kumārila] will say [in ŚV Vāk. vv.358-359a]: “For one who sees a white, vague form . . .”.⁸² However, the [argument of the Prābhākara opponent] that had been [previously] stated⁸³ — [namely] that even in the case of something known linguistically (*śabda*), language is not a means of knowledge, since the cognition of the qualified [meaning] can be justified in an exactly similar manner [by this new means of knowledge, as in the example of the cognition of “a white horse is running”] — is not correct. This is because the postulation of the potency of the words [to denote WMs] is in accordance with language learning. And it is on account of that [potency] that words are established as intrinsically (*svābhāvika*) being the means of knowledge [for SM] through the denotation of the [word] meanings which are innately capable of being connected (*sambandhin*).⁸⁴ That cannot be refuted by anyone.

they agree on the *adr̥ṣṭa* being *mantrapratyāyanajanita* and *arthagata*.

⁸²ŚV Vāk. vv.358-359a:

For one who sees a white, vague form and hears the sound of neighing,
As well as the sounds of hooves pounding [upon the ground] — the cognition that “a white horse is running”,

Is seen, devoid of a sentence . . .

(*paśyataḥ śvetam ārūpaṃ hreṣāśabdaṃ ca śṛṇvataḥ; khuranikṣepaśabdaṃ ca śveto 'śvo dhāvātīti dhīḥ; dṛṣṭāvākyaavinirmuktā . . .*)

⁸³See VI.2.8.

⁸⁴The term used here by Sucarita is *sambandhisvabhāvārthābhīdhānavāreṇa* i.e. ‘on account of the denotation of their [unconnected] WMs, which have an intrinsic nature to become connected (*sambandhin*)’. I am hence considered the term *sambandhin* in this compound as *sambandhayogyā*

But [if one asks:] “What is the means of knowledge for the cognition ‘a white horse is running’?” — [well, in this example here] there is no one means of knowledge. On the contrary, the cognition of the qualified [sentential] meaning arises from a multitude of means of knowledge (*pramāṇasamāhāraja*) [such as perception, inference, etc.]. [Consequently], being the result [of these means of knowledge] (*phalabhūta*), [this cognition of the qualified SM] is not itself the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*)⁸⁵ because [as in this example of “a white horse is running”], [unconnected] substances, qualities and actions are comprehended by means of perception and inference and they have an intrinsic expectation [for each other] (*svabhāvasāpekṣa*), [and] it is due to such intrinsic expectation that their association becomes evident to the mind. [And such an association of substances, qualities and actions known through perception and inference, arising due to their mutual expectation for each other] is exactly analogous [to the mutual association] of those [unconnected substances, qualities and actions] conveyed through language (*śabdapratipādita*) [which would also have an intrinsic expectation for each other].⁸⁶ The cognition of the SM too is just the result (*phala*), when language [alongside perception, inference,] etc. are the means of knowledge, but it is [itself] the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) with regard to the cognition that the object is to be avoided, etc.⁸⁷ – this has been taught.

VI.3.8.3 Argument 3: SM is not comprehended if WMs are not cognized

Moreover, when the sentence is uttered, if the WMs are not cognized due to some blocking of the mind (*mana uparodha*), then the SM is not comprehended despite

and not *sambaddha*.

⁸⁵An important problem as discussed in the ŚV *Pratyakṣapariccheda* is the distinction between *pramāṇa* and *phala*. The problem is “how *pramāṇa* and *phala* are distinct, that is, how a cognition, which itself is a knowing of an object, can be construed as the means for the arising of *another* cognition that will be construed as the result” (Taber 2005, p.20). This is discussed further in III.3.3.2.

⁸⁶This equivalence of the process of SM cognition with the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of perception is discussed further in III.3.3.2.

⁸⁷This refers to the three-fold classification of cognitions of all objects as *hāna*, *upādāna* and *upekṣā* i.e. to be avoided, desirable or neither. The term *hānādibuddhi* is used also in ŚV *Pratyakṣapariccheda* vv.73ab. Taber (2005, pp. 93-94) translates this as ‘the cognition that the object is to be avoided’.

the sentence being [heard].⁸⁸ Consequently, it is correct to state that the WMs themselves cause the cognition of the SM.

And we do not state that the WMs are the cause of the SM cognition simply on the basis of a clever explanation (*vyākhyākauśalamātra*). Rather, [their being the cause of SM cognition] is established on the basis of [the characteristics] of the cognition [itself]. Just as there is no delay in knowing the form [of an object] (*rūpajñāna*) for one who is looking [at the object] with wide-open eyes, similarly [there is no delay] in knowing the SM even for one who has heard the sentence [and] knows how to connect the WMs.⁸⁹ Thus, it is determined that the knowledge of SM which conforms to the co-presence and co-absence of WMs has those [WMs] as its cause. Thus in fact it was said [in ŚV Vāk. v.111b]: “Since [the SM] arises when those [WMs] arise” (*tadbhāvabhāva*).

Thus, by means of the following statement [in ŚV Vāk. v.112ab] “Since [the arising of SM] can be justified even by a different explanation”, it is declared [that] the cognition of the qualified [sentential] meaning which [arises] from the WMs themselves, which are conveyed by words, is justified in the manner as has been explained [by us, the Bhāṭṭas]. Therefore, [the Prābhākara’s postulation of] the potency of the sentence [to denote SM] is not based on any means of knowledge.

[And] with regard to the [Prābhākara objection that]⁹⁰ [the WMs which are] endowed with the capacity [to lead one to cognize SM], this capacity being conferred by words, are the cause of SM — here too this is certainly the answer: “Since [the arising of SM] can be justified even by a different explanation” (ŚV Vāk. v.112ab). Indeed, the innate (*svābhāvika*) potency of WMs [to lead] to the qualified [sentential] meaning has been accounted for in the manner presented [above]. Thus, there is no means of knowledge [to justify] that [capacity] as belonging to the sentence, insofar as it must be conferred to the WMs.

⁸⁸This is similar to an argument presented in the ŚBh on PMS 1.1.25, where the phrase used is *mānasād apy āghātāt* (i.e. due to a mental injury).

⁸⁹The term *rūpa* can also be considered as colour. Yet, I prefer to consider it as meaning the outward form of an object since this aligns better with the earlier explanation of the equivalence of perception and SM cognition (See VI.3.8.2). The perception of the colour of an object (i.e. perception of a quality devoid of its substance) would thus be equivalent to the cognition of an unconnected WM, whereas the perception of the outward form of the object (i.e. perception of the qualified substance) would be equivalent to the qualified SM cognition. Moreover, this also endorses the earlier claim of SM being self-evident (*svasaṃvedya*) (see VI.3.5).

⁹⁰See VI.2.8.

Thus, in this way, first of all, the justification [of the arising of SM] with even another explanation has been described in three ways [as in the VI.3.1, VI.3.6 and VI.3.8].

VI.3.9 Words cannot denote SM in accordance with DoC

VI.3.9.1 Argument 1: In DoC, the *specific instantiation* of a WM (*viśeṣa*) cannot be cognized

However, there is incongruence in DoC itself. To explain, what is admitted is the DoC with [some WM] which is proximate.⁹¹ Thus, if it is admitted [by the Prābhākaras] that there is DoC with [meanings] present in one's memory which have been recollected by their [respective] words which signify actions or factors of action — then [what follows is that] a single verbal form *pacati* ([he/she/it] cooks) uttered causes the recollection of the action of cooking (*pāka*) having many grammatical objects [like rice, wheat, soup, etc.] (*nānākarmaka*). Surely, one sees the relation⁹² of the verbal base *pac* with [the action of] cooking (*pāka*) — hence, [according to the Prābhākaras] there is the recollection of that [action of cooking from the verbal base *pac*].⁹³ In this same way (i.e. according to this same Prābhākara reasoning), one sees [also] the relation [of the verbal base *pac*] with the action of cooking which is in fact connected to several [grammatical] objects and therefore, similarly [to the case of *pac* and *pāka*], [these various] other [grammatical] objects are recollected.⁹⁴ Consequently, the DoC of this [word] *pacati* only with [the WM] 'rice' ('*odana*'), [whose word rice] had been uttered alongside [the word *pacati*], is not established.⁹⁵

And there is no restriction (*niyama*) [put forth by the Prābhākara opponent]

⁹¹In order to keep the translation concise, I am here translating the phrase '*anvitābhidhāna* + instrumental noun X' as 'DoC with X', all the while bearing in mind that the complete sense of this pithy expression is 'the denotation [by a word] [of its WM] as connected to [WM] X'. This was also done previously, see footnote 50.

⁹²As discussed previously in Chapter I, the term *sambandha* refers to the relation of a word to its (unconnected) meaning.

⁹³See VM-I v.12 for an explanation of how each word reminds the hearer of its unconnected WM according to DoC.

⁹⁴The phrase *smṛtāv ārūḍhāni* literally means 'elevated in memory', and I thus translate it as 'recollected'.

⁹⁵This Bhāṭṭa objection is also presented in the VM-I, see IV.11.2.1.

that there is DoC only with [a WM] proximate through direct expression (*śruti*) [such as the WM ‘rice’ in the sentence *odanaṃ pacati*] – since any [WM] which is proximate is accepted. This is precisely the reason that in ordinary as well as Vedic [language] such as ‘door, door’, etc. and in the *viśvajit* [sacrifice], etc. that it is established that there is DoC connected with [a WM] not directly expressed.

And [hence], it is not correct that words cause the recollection of their own [unconnected] meanings only as ascertained during through adding and removing [words into/from sentences], since recollection has as its basis all kinds of relations.

Moreover, since the [word’s] own meaning is not denoted until there is proximity of its correlates,⁹⁶ the specific instantiation (*viśeṣa*) [of the word’s meaning] is not justified as being brought about by the presence or absence of denotation.⁹⁷ Consequently, in the utterance ‘[he/she] cooks rice’, one could comprehend instead the action of cooking as connected to peas, etc. (*kālāyādyanvita*).

However, [the Prābhākara opponent] may argue that when there is DoC with only one [correlate], firstly with that [WM] which is directly expressed. [Now, in order to defend such a position], [the Prābhākara opponent] must state the cause of [determining] the specific instantiation [of a WM] (*viśeṣa*) [from among the endless possible meanings that a single word may recall]. This is because that [WM] which has been directly expressed (say, ‘*odana*’) cannot be the cause for DoC on the basis of it being directly expressed. Rather, [a WM would be a cause for DoC only] due to proximity [according to the Prābhākara doctrine]. And this [proximity] is common (*aviśiṣṭa*) to both, [a WM] directly expressed (say, ‘*odana*’) as well as another which is not (say, ‘*kalāya*’ which is remembered) — this has been stated.

⁹⁶As until then, the unconnected WM is only *recollected* according to DoC.

⁹⁷The term *viśeṣa* used here was introduced in the VM-I, and I understand it here in the same context as that in the VM-I (see IV.11). As explained in footnotes 120 and 139 in Chapter IV, the term *viśeṣa* may be understood alternately as the *difference* among the various WMs present in memory, which are being recollected from a single word (for example, the difference in the WMs ‘*kalāya*’, ‘*pāka*’, etc. being recollected from the single word *pacati*). However, the discussions in the VM-I demonstrate that the term *viśeṣa* means **the specific instantiation of one meaning from among all the meanings recollected in the mind from a single word** (for example, to refer to the specific WM *pāka* from among all the different meanings being recollected due to the word *pacati*). I thus retain the translation of the term *viśeṣa* from that in the VM-I, and translate this here simply as the ‘specific instantiation’ of the word’s meaning.

VI.3.9.2 Argument 2: The fear of *vākyabheda* cannot lead one to favour the *śruta* WM

If one accepts either one of the two (*anyataraparigraha*) (i.e. the *śruta* WM or the *aśruta* WM) due to the fear of syntactic split (*vākyabheda*), then one should explain what the difference is [between a WM that is directly expressed and one that is only remembered] because of which there is DoC only with the directly expressed [WM]. Moreover, when the specific instantiation of a WM [from a word] is not grasped, what forestalls even the syntactic split which follows as a consequence, as there is no other alternative (*agati*)? This is unlike the formal decision (*sankalpa*) [to use] butter in the case of avoiding the flaws [ensuing] from the destruction (*nāśadośa*) of the oblations [one had initially prepared].⁹⁸

And due to the fear of this fault [of *vākyabheda*], if one resorts to the position that the first word [in the sentence] denotes its own meaning which is in fact unconnected, then, similarly even the other words would have their [own] meanings as unconnected. And in this case words, which are [actually] words under dispute (*vimatipada*), become expressive of an unconnected [meaning] on the basis of being words, just as is the case for the first word.

VI.3.9.3 Argument 3: The problem of synonymy in DoC

Moreover, if there is DoC with [a WM] proximate in memory, then the action of cooking is denoted by the word *pacati* ([he/she] cooks) as connected to [the WM] ‘*odana*’ (‘rice’) which is remembered as being in association (*sāhacaryasmṛta*) [with the WM *pacati*]. Consequently, [we would object that] the word *odana* should not be uttered, since its meaning is already understood. And both words *odana* and *pacati* denote the relation between the ‘action of cooking’ and ‘rice’ –

⁹⁸In other words, in case of the ruined offering, one is in doubt: Should one complete the sacrifice by taking a second slice of the cake which is partly ruined or by taking a slice of a new cake? Accordingly, one could complete the sacrificial prescription in two ways and this could lead to *vākyabheda*. Similarly, in the case of *śruta* and *aśruta* (i.e. remembered) WMs, one could have *vākyabheda*. In the case of the former problem about the cake, the hierarchy of *pramāṇas* leads one to the correct decision, but in case of the latter, since the Prābhākara accepts only *sannidhi* and cannot differentiate between the *śruta* and *aśruta* WMs, the fault of *vākyabheda* will remain unresolved. See PMS 6.4.1-2 and ŚBh thereon for a similar discussion. See also Benson (2010, p. 171).

thus there is the undesirable consequence of synonymy.⁹⁹

If one argued that this consequence [of synonymy] is avoided on the basis of the difference [in the two WMs ‘*odana*’ and ‘*pacati*’] as qualifier and qualified (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabheda*), then [we would say] no, due to the fault of syntactic split (*vākyabheda*).

[Prābhākara UP:] Well, the following would come about in this case: For the word *odana* [in the sentence *odanaṃ pacati*], the meaning (*artha*) of the word *odana* is ‘rice as qualified by the action of cooking (*pāka*)’. In this case, the ‘action of cooking’ is the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), whereas ‘rice’ is that which is qualified (*viśeṣya*). In case of the word *pacati*, the condition of the qualifier and the qualified is the opposite – hence, there is no unwanted consequence of synonymy.¹⁰⁰

[Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin:] But it cannot be thus, due to the fault of syntactic split. This is because ‘rice as qualified by the action of cooking’ is distinct from ‘the action of cooking as qualified by rice’ – and [Jaimini] will explain [subsequently] the unity of the sentence as being due to the unity of meaning/purpose (*arthaikatva*), as in ‘[A group of words] serving a single meaning/purpose forms a sentence . . .’ (PMS 2.1.46). Consequently, the fault of the syntactic split comes about in all cases of difference of meaning/purpose (*artha*).¹⁰¹

VI.3.9.4 Argument 4: DoC cannot be established by considering the obligation (*kārya*) as central

If one claimed that the sentence is unitary since the obligation, which is the primary element, is unitary, then [we would reply] that is not so, since one must admit to the absence of that [obligation] in ordinary [sentences].¹⁰² And even in Vedic [sentences], if there is DoC of two elements at a time, sequentially beginning with [the obligation and] the content of the command, and continuing thereafter¹⁰³ – [the fault of] syntactic split most definitely arises, since a sentence would be entirely

⁹⁹This argument is also found in the VM-I, see IV.8.6.

¹⁰⁰This argument is also present in the VM-I, see IV.8.6.

¹⁰¹This is discussed further in II.2.3.

¹⁰²In other words, there are worldly sentences without the injunctive element, such as *odanaṃ pacati* ([he/she] cooks rice).

¹⁰³See VI.2.10 for this Prābhākara argument.

completed at each step. And so, even for a single verbal suffix (*ākhyāta*) alone, there comes about the undesirable consequence of postulating multiple potencies of denotation.¹⁰⁴ And in this way, the cognition of a [(sentential) meaning] connected to all [meaning-elements in the sentence] would be without any basis.

If it is claimed that the verbal suffix denotes its own meaning as even connected to all [other meaning-elements] – then [we reply that] in that case, one’s resorting to DoC with two elements at a time becomes purposeless and the denotation of the obligation as connected to all [meaning-elements in the sentence] will be the first to come about.

Moreover [if the obligation denotes its meaning as connected to all other meaning-elements], in the sentence about the purchase [of the *soma*], how would there be the mutual relation between the [WMs] substance (i.e. the tawny-eyed [cow], the one-year old [cow]) and the [WM] quality (i.e. red)?¹⁰⁵ If one claims that even that [mutual relation] is denoted by both the words [*ekahāyana* and *aruṇa*], then [we would reply that] even in this way, since the verbal suffix denotes a [meaning] connected to all the factors of action, and also, since the words signifying the factors of actions such as *aruṇa*, etc. again denote a mutually connected [meaning] – there certainly comes about [the fault of] syntactic split due to the difference in meaning. This is because the mutual connection of the substance and quality (*ekahāyana* and *aruṇa*) is entirely distinct from the action of purchasing as qualified by all. Consequently, just as the [fault of] syntactic split is described in [the example of] *grahaṃ saṃmārṣṭi* (one wipes the cups) when there

¹⁰⁴In other words, the injunctive verbal suffix (*liṅ*) would first denote itself as connected to the verbal base (*yaj-*) in order to denote *yajeta*. Thereafter, the suffix would denote itself as connected not only to the verbal base but also to the agent of the action in order to denote (say) *yajeta svargakāmaḥ*. This process would similarly continue indefinitely.

¹⁰⁵This refers to the example *aruṇayā piṅgākṣyaikahāyanyā somaṃ krīṇāti*, discussed in the ŚBh on PMS 3.1.12 (*aruṇādhikaraṇa*). The ŚBh concludes that the relation between the substance and quality comes about because of the verb – the verb (purchasing) is primary (*pradhāna*) and the two factors (substance and quality) are the accessories (*guṇa*). Moreover, the two factors (substance and quality) are enjoined (*upadiś-*) in reference to the primary element (i.e. the action of purchasing), and not vice versa. (ŚBh: *krayasya hi dravyāruṇimānāv upadiśyete, na krayas tayoh. na ca pradhānaṃ pratiguṇaṃ bhidyate, pratipradhānaṃ hi guṇo bhidyata iti.*) Thus, by quoting this example, the Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin here is pointing out that for the Prābhākara, the *kārya* is already connected to all meaning-elements and there can be no possibility of any further connection between the meaning-elements themselves.

This example is also discussed in the VM-I, see IV.8.7.

is the relation between the action of wiping and cup, and again when there is the relation between singularity and cup,¹⁰⁶ similarly, [there would be syntactic split] in this case [of the example of the sentence about the purchase of the soma] as well.

[Prābhākara UP:] It is said that the mutual relation is based on reality (*ārtha*) since both (i.e. the substance and the quality) are included (*parigrhīta*) into a single obligation, and it is not that their [mutual relation] only exists at the linguistic level (*ābhidhānika*)?

[Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin:] If this is so, then the relation [between substances and qualities] is caused by the power of the meaning¹⁰⁷ [of the words themselves] (*arthasāmarthyakārīta*). Thus, WMs, which are denoted only as unconnected in every circumstance, will be connected [between themselves] due to their own nature (*svabhāva*) alone. And so, what is the need for this calamity (*vyasana*) which is the [theory of] DoC? [Moreover,] the very purpose of the discipline [of Mīmāṃsā] (*śāstrārtha*) is [to demonstrate] the mutual relation of the substance and the quality [as in the discussions in the ŚBh on PMS 3.1.12 (*aruṇādhikaraṇa*)], and [such relation] is not denoted in this way [as proposed by the Prābhākara opponent].

All SMs, even though they are not denoted [by words], will become linguistic in nature since the words are meant for that [SM]. As [Kumārila] will explain later “the expression of WMs [by phonemes] is like the burning of the wood in the action of cooking”.¹⁰⁸ Hence it is said: “Since [the arising of SM] can be justified

¹⁰⁶This refers to the example of *grahaṃ saṃmārṣṭi* discussed in the ŚBh on PMS 3.1.13-15 (*grahaikatvādhikaraṇa*). The ŚBh concludes that the connection of the action of wiping (*saṃmārjana*) and singularity (*ekatva*) can only be established through the means of knowledge which is sentence (*vākya*), whereas the connection of the cup (*graha*) and the singularity (*ekatva*) is established through the means of knowledge of direct mention (*śruti*). Thus, the two connections cannot be considered the same. (ŚBh on PMS 3.3.14: *prātipadikāarthagataṃ hi vibhaktiḥ svam arthaṃ śrutyai va vadati. athaivaṃ sati kim na saṃmārgeṇa sambhantsyata iti. tena hi sambadhyamānaṃ vākyena sambadhyeta, na ca śrutyā, anyena sambadhyamānaṃ vākyenācchidyānyena sambandham arhati.*) This example of *grahaṃ saṃmārṣṭi* is also discussed in Yoshimizu (2006).

The Bhāṭṭa Siddhāntin’s argument here is that if the Prābhākara accepts the two relations (relation between the different meaning-elements as well as the relation between the verbal suffix and its factors of action) as being denoted, then this distinction between the two types of connections as explained in the ŚBh would be violated.

¹⁰⁷This is another instance of the dual senses of the term *ārtha* – meaning and object.

¹⁰⁸ŚV Vāk. vv.342-343.

even by a different explanation” [in ŚV Vāk. v.112ab] – i.e. since the relation between the [WMs] substance and the quality, which is also intrinsic (*svābhāvika*), is justified, [then] in every circumstance, the potency of the sentence for DoC is not known through any means of knowledge – hence there is the statement [of ŚV Vāk. v.112ab].

VI.3.10 Chronological delay between utterance of words and SM cognition in DoC

Moreover, if the denotation [of the connected meaning according to the Prābhākaras] is accepted only after every single uttered word reminds one of its unconnected WMs, [and] once the [*vacanavyaktis*¹⁰⁹, which are actually] divisions of the utterance (*vacobhaṅga*) have been analyzed (*vibhakta*) according to the groups of various linguistic principles related to Mīmāṃsā – then one would wonder how this could take place since the words have long since disappeared (*cirātipanna*)?

This is because at that time [of DoC], even the terminal phoneme is not present in the mind – [this being true] even more so (*prāñc*) of words. And in this way the established view [of Mīmāṃsā] – according to which the terminal phoneme, as assisted by the mnestic traces produced by all previous phonemes, is the entity which conveys [the SM] – would be overlooked. And in the case of *mahāvākyas*,¹¹⁰ it is not possible that one remembers at a later time all phonemes and words, since their memory would be interrupted by that of different word-meanings, etc.

Moreover, if even prior to DoC, individual *vacanavyaktis* are brought about as *vidhi*, *anuvāda*, *uddeśya*, *upādeya*, *guṇa*, *pradhānā*, etc. – no need for the denotation of the meanings that are in fact present in memory since their mutual connection would [already] be established. This is precisely why we admit that there is mutual association of WMs even independent of denotation [of SM]. The

¹⁰⁹The *vacanavyaktis* are considered as the subject in this phrase for multiple reasons: (i) A little further, the Kṛ explicitly discusses *vacanavyaktis* in the same context, (ii) This sentence is a description of the three steps of DoC, as outlined in v.12 of the VM-I, and one expects a mention of *vacanavyaktis* here, and (iii) the qualifiers *vacobhaṅga* and *vibhakta* are both presented in the feminine.

¹¹⁰A *mahāvākya* is a collection of sentences which form a functionally unified text, see McCrea (2000, p.437).

sentence, occurring to denote that very connection [between the WMs] which arises on the basis of the capability of the WMs [as present in memory already], would [simply] be a restatement (*anuvādaka*).

Even in this case, [Kumarila's phrase] "Since [the arising of SM] can be justified even by a different explanation" should be glossed as follows: Since the connection [between the different WMs] in the form of *vidhi*, *anuvāda*, etc. is justified on the basis of the potencies of WMs alone [in accordance with the doctrine of CoD], even before the denotation – hence, the potency of the sentence [as claimed by the Prābhākara opponent] to denote that [connected meaning] is not known through any means of knowledge.

Thus, one may interpret the meaning of this phrase "Since [the arising of SM] can be justified even by a different explanation" (ŚV Vāk. v.112ab) in five ways [as shown in VI.3.1, VI.3.6, VI.3.8, VI.3.9 and VI.3.10].

VI.4 Conclusion

Thus, it has been established that once the words complete their function by [denoting] their respective WMs only, the mutual connection [of these WMs] comes about on the basis of expectation, proximity and compatibility. Certainly there is a relation between the efficient force (*bhāvanā*), conveyed by the verbal suffix, and the [three] components – its goal, etc. (i.e. instrument (*sādhana*) and procedure (*itikartavyatā*)) – which are expected, proximate and compatible. And on the basis of reality (*arthāt*), even their mutual connection is effected.

And in this way, there is no syntactic split, since a thousand meanings coming about on the basis of reality cannot bring about syntactic split. Just as it is said [in TV 1.4.2] – "The efficient force can cause even multiple meanings to be enjoined on the basis of reality". Thus, it is correctly said [in ŚV Vāk. v.111cd] that "Truly, it is not [justified] that the sentence is expressive [of the SM]." Thus in this way, at the beginning [of the presentation of the Bhāṭṭa *siddhānta* in the ŚV Vāk.], it has been stated that the denotation of words, which is concerned with the unconnected [WMs], is indeed first to come about.

Conclusion

The two doctrines of *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna* occupy a position of prominence in discussions on the nature of the cognition of SM, in traditional Indian philosophical debates as well as in contemporary accounts of these debates. Alongside the Grammarian doctrine of *sphoṭa* and the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha*, these two Mīmāṃsā theories have formed the basis for all classical Indian philosophers debating the nature of language and linguistic cognition. Moreover, among these four doctrines, these two alone admit the reality of words and word-meanings, and have thereby lent themselves to speculations and modifications from all quarters of the Sanskrit literati, including philosophers belonging to different Brahmanical schools (Nyāya, Advaita Vedānta, etc.) as well as several *ālaṃkārikas* (such as Māhima Bhaṭṭa, Ānandavardhana, etc.).

The aim of this thesis has been to present these two doctrines in light of their key tenets and supporting arguments, as demonstrated in the two important Mīmāṃsā works – the VM-I and KṬ. Śālikanātha was the first Prābhākara thinker to systematise DoC and present it philosophically, whereas Sucarita was the first Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka to respond to Śālikanātha's criticisms and modify CoD accordingly.¹¹¹ Nevertheless, despite the evident significance and influence of these two texts, there is little modern scholarship engaging substantially with their ideas.

I have attempted in this thesis to reconstruct the arguments from the VM-I and KṬ while bearing in mind the philosophical, philological and historical requirements from any such endeavour. I am thus hopeful that this work may aid somewhat in not only indicating the intricacy, sophistication and complexity of the two doctrines but also in demonstrating the impact of the Prābhākara ideas in the VM-I on the Bhāṭṭa ideas in the KṬ, thereby navigating through an important bend

¹¹¹See Kataoka (2011, p. 112) for the chronology of Mīmāṃsā authors.

in the history of Indian speculations on language. Given the far-reaching impact of the ideas presented in these texts as well as the nascent nature of this study, my explanations and conclusions here should be considered only provisional, subject to modification on the basis of further scholarship and inquiry. Nevertheless, the following are some of the key conclusions arrived at in the preceding chapters.

Linguistic and phenomenological accounts in the two doctrines

For the Mīmāṃsakas, the central instance of linguistic communication which must be explained is that of the Vedic injunctive sentences, which are admitted by them as having the unique characteristic of being devoid of any author (*apauruṣeya*). Consequently, they abstain almost entirely from discussing the role of the speaker in composing the sentence,¹¹² and focus their explanations entirely on the ability of language to denote meaning as well as the cognitive processes of the listener required to comprehend it. The Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas thus consider the two processes of denotation (*abhidhāna*) and connection (*anvaya*) as being sufficient to explain the cognition of SM, and the VM-I and the Kṛ are replete with cogent arguments on the cognitive differences between recollection and denotation, the process of comprehension of the *vacanavyakti* and the requisite mental application of linguistic principles (*nyāya*), the innate nature of the cognitions of unconnected word-meanings and the process by which they lead one to cognize a qualified (sentential) meaning, the equivalence of linguistic cognitions with perceptual cognitions, etc. These arguments are both linguistic and phenomenological, and these doctrines are thus accordingly classified.

The role of *lakṣaṇā* in Sucarita's account of CoD

According to classical authors such as Śālikanātha and Vācaspati, Kumārila attributes the cognition of SM to the potency of words for indirect denotation (*lakṣaṇā*), in contrast to a word's potency to (directly) denote (*abhidhā*) its WM. As seen previously, Śālikanātha disputes this and contends instead that *lakṣaṇā*

¹¹²An exception to this is the explanation of language learning (*vyutpatti*) according to Śālikanātha in the VM-I where, as discussed previously, a key role is attributed to the fact that the speaker is known to be using words with connected meanings.

can only be admitted when the connection between WMs is not justified (*sambandhānupapatti*).

This argument of the VM-I is known to Sucarita and he refers to it in his presentation of the Prābhākara *pūrvapakṣa* in the KT. Nevertheless, he chooses not to defend the doctrine of *lakṣaṇā* from these criticisms, and instead bases his explanation of CoD on the innate nature (*svabhāva*) of words and their (unconnected) WMs to lead to the cognition of SM. The following question thus emerges: is Sucarita rejecting the role of *lakṣaṇā* in SM cognition, as attributed to Kumāriḷa? Or is he in fact bolstering the idea but using instead an altogether different terminology?

The complexity and chronological extension of the Prābhākara conception of denotation

According to DoC, each word in a sentence denotes its own WM as connected to other meanings. Śālikanātha describes this process of denotation as involving three steps beginning once the uttered words are heard by the listener — the memory of the unconnected WMs, the ascertainment of the *vacanavyakti* in accordance with linguistic principles and the subsequent arising of SM cognition.

Such a description of denotation thus includes within its own operation the role of multiple cognitive processes of the listener, such as memory as well as the others required for determining the *vacanavyakti* (which will include an awareness and application of the *nyāyas*). Consequently, this Prābhākara conception of denotation can be considered as being *complex*, in contrast to the Bhāṭṭa conception of denotation which may be regarded as being *simple*, as according to the latter, words denote their WMs only.

Furthermore, the Prābhākara conception of denotation must also be admitted as being chronologically extended, as it will span the three instants corresponding to the three steps of the process. Once again, this can be contrasted with the Bhāṭṭa concept of denotation, which would be momentary as it is a function linking words and their immediately occurring WMs.

Distinction in the Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa conceptions of *vacanavyakti*

For Śālikanātha, the *vacanavyakti* is an intermediate cognitive stage arising between the utterance of the signifier and the cognition of the signified, but which is nevertheless related to both the signifier and the signified. It is the form of the sentence wherein all elements have been correctly assigned their categories of subject-predicate, primary-subordinate, intended-unintended, etc. Moreover, *vacanavyaktis* are brought about for all sentences i.e. not just for Vedic but also for the simple, figurative and metaphorical sentences experienced frequently in ordinary linguistic communication. Hence, the conception of the *vacanavyakti* as per Śālikanātha seems to differ markedly from that of the Bhāṭṭas, where it is considered to be the specific, contextually appropriate meaning of a sentence from among its many possible meanings.

The role of *tantra* in DoC

For the Prābhākaras, words in sentences denote a connected meaning – and the Bhāṭṭas object that this leads to synonymy (*paryāyatā*) (if all words in a sentence denote the same connected meaning) or syntactic split (*vākyabheda*) (if words denote distinct connected meanings). Śālikanātha argues that words denote distinct qualified meanings, thereby eschewing the difficulty of syntactic split on the grounds that the words in a sentence have a unitary purpose (*prayojana*), which is to denote the SM. Moreover, he explains that syntactic split is also denied since the verb is uttered in accordance with the principle of *tantra* (*tanroccāraṇa*) i.e. the verb is centralized and applies to all other elements in the sentence equally.

No phenomenological distinction between a recollected WM and a denoted WM

Śālikanātha criticises the cornerstone of the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of CoD, namely that words denote their WMs only. He argues that there is no phenomenological distinction between a recollected WM and a denoted WM, and attempts to invalidate any attempt to distinguish between the processes of denotation and recollection of WMs. He reasons instead that the specific relation of words and WMs (*vācyavācakatā*) is an instance of the generic relation of conveyor and conveyed

(*pratyāyyapratyāyakatā*). Within this latter broad category, there are some pairs such as smoke and fire which are ontologically related, but there are also others which need no such basis (say, two entities related in memory). According to Śālikanātha, the relation between a word and its meaning is of the latter sort, and is without any ontological basis. Instead, just as an entity becomes reminiscent of another once its ability to be reminiscent (*smāraakatva*) has been comprehended, similarly a word becomes expressive of its WM once one has learnt of its ability to signify its WM (*vācakatva*).

The Prābhākara's reliance on *ekavākyatā* and consistent recollection

For the Bhāṭṭas, a pivotal objection against the role of memory in SM cognition is that it is impossible to grasp a specific (*viśeṣa*) WM from among the many WMs that may be associated in memory to a single word. However, Śālikanātha responds that a connection of only certain WMs is cognized when a sentence is heard. He argues that this arises not due to any distinction between the denoted and the recollected WMs, but due to the fundamental principle of the unitary sentence (*ekavākyatā*). Śālikanātha argues that it is a commonly accepted linguistic principle that if it is possible to comprehend a string of words as a unitary sentence, then it is not admissible to split it. He asserts that it is this very principle that leads one to consider only the WMs of the words uttered and not any others that may be further recollected on the basis of these, and Śālikanātha explains this to be the case for simple, figurative, metaphorical and even Vedic sentences.

The Bhāṭṭa contends also that another problem can arise, namely that of endless denotation. This is because memory may continue to supply WMs which are suitable for connection in accordance with the principle of *ekavākyatā*. Nevertheless, Śālikanātha explains that there is DoC only with that meaning (from among the many possible recollected WMs) whose specific instantiation (*viśeṣa*) is comprehended. Furthermore, he argues that words consistently (*niyamena*) remind one of their own WMs, and there is DoC only with these meanings.

The equivalence of the Bhāṭṭa doctrines of perception and language

Sucarita rejects Śālikanātha's arguments in his Kṛ and explains instead that words are admitted as naturally (*svābhāvika*) being the means of knowledge for the SM on account of their denotation of unconnected WMs – which, in turn, have an innate nature (*svabhāva*) to become connected. The SM cognition thus arising from words would be considered linguistic, since it would be triggered by language and would be the result of both words and WMs acting in conformity with their respective innate nature. Moreover, Sucarita argues that sentences (and their meanings) are self-evident (*svasaṃvedya*).

Furthermore, he makes a distinction between the *phala* (i.e. the result of the means of knowledge, which here is the SM cognition) and the *pramāṇa* (i.e. the particular means of knowledge, or the specific type of veridical knowledge), a differentiation mirroring that as is found in the ŚV *Pratyakṣapariccheda*. Consequently, Sucarita endeavours to establish an equivalence between the Bhāṭṭa accounts of perception and language, arguing that the association of substances, qualities and actions known through perception and inference is exactly analogous to their association as conveyed through language.

These are some of the key conclusions arising from the study of the VM-I and the Kṛ, and they, in turn, give rise to three topics of inquiry. Firstly, there arise several doctrinal questions, such as: the discussions of the VM-I are restricted to injunctive sentences, how did subsequent Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas understand and widen its scope? Would it be correct to argue that Sucarita eschews a reliance on the doctrine of *lakṣaṇā* and presents an alternative instead? How are the pivotal concepts of *tantra*, *vacanavyakti*, *viśeṣa*, *svasaṃvedya*, etc. understood and interpreted by subsequent Mīmāṃsakas, both Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa? How do these ideas in the VM-I and Kṛ relate to other Mīmāṃsā tenets?

Additionally, there can be historical concerns, for instance: how were the arguments of these two seminal texts received within the various quarters of Indian philosophy and how were they interpreted? How was this received by other philosophers, within the Bhāṭṭa camp as well as those external to it?

Finally, there are also textual matters, such as the need for critical editions based on several manuscripts, leading in turn to additional questions: are there any substantial differences in the two texts as recorded in other available manuscripts? Could these lead to a divergent understanding?

Answers to these questions shall certainly further a finer and more comprehensive understanding of this important strand of Indian intellectual history, and I do hope that I may be able to contribute to this endeavour in some modest measure.

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