Reading as rewriting: Miguel de Unamuno, Jorge Luis Borges and the Quijote

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Abstract
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The relationship between Miguel de Unamuno and Jorge Luis Borges remains understudied. In this thesis I compare both authors according to their shared interest in reading and rewriting Miguel de Cervantes’s Don Quijote de la Mancha. Across their vast respective bibliographies on Cervantes, from Vida de don Quijote y Sancho and ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’, both examine the canonical Spanish work from anachronistic perspectives, and re-author it according to personal circumstances and points of view.

I interrogate a series of works that both authors produce on Cervantes’s masterpiece, and outline the comparable yet contrasting aesthetic approaches that underlie their arguments. From this I show that the aesthetic models of reading that they produce are strongly derived from aspects of the Quijote, a novel whose narrative complexities compel the reader into a more active, critical role in interpreting the work.

Beyond demonstrating the Cervantine echoes in their works, I argue that the non-intentionalist approach that Unamuno and Borges take when reading texts including and especially the Quijote fits comfortably within the realm of literary theories that were formalised much later on. In particular I focus on the reader-response theories of thinkers such as Hans Robert Jauß and Wolfgang Iser, as well as Stanley Fish’s affective stylistics. I adopt key critical terms from the works of these theorists in order to critique the way Unamuno and Borges interpret the Quijote across their careers.

Chief among my concerns is how the reader’s cultural and historical circumstances produce unique meanings in the text that the author cannot prohibit. I also explore the question common to these theorists as to the principle by which an interpretation of a work can be considered acceptable or unacceptable. By tracing the commonalities and contrasts between Unamuno’s and Borge’s readings and rewritings of the Quijote I show how their works respectively further such theoretical discussions.
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I. Introduction

There are few narratives that have been revisited and reworked quite as much as Miguel de Cervantes’s *Don Quijote de la Mancha*. Few stories have been the subject of such a rich history of readings and revisions as Cervantes’s masterpiece; from the author-centric Golden Age view of the text as a comedic aping of the chivalric form, to the 19th Century Romantic view of don Quijote as a kind of hapless tragic hero.

The present study is dedicated to investigating how two avid readers of Cervantes in the 20th Century: Miguel de Unamuno and Jorge Luis Borges, revisit and appropriate the *Quijote* in the service of their overarching approaches to reading as a practice. I also show how these two approaches to the *Quijote* can communicate with each other: Unamuno’s view of *quijotismo* as a cultural and philosophical export plays into the same suspicion of the authority of authorship as explored most prominently in ‘Pierre Menard, autor del *Quijote*’.

Common to their extensive bibliographies on Cervantes’s work, which I will explore throughout this thesis, is a method of reading that questions authorial intention as a source of literary meaning. In my research I position both authors in relation to each other, as well as to modern theories of intentionalism and reader-response which bring the theoretical implications of their works into sharper focus.

In doing so, I achieve two key aims, which will constitute the chief contribution of my work: to shed light on how their complementary yet contrasting views on reading can help produce new meanings in the 17th Century Spanish classic, and to explore what these new meanings might say about the process of reading in and of itself.

I.1 Unamuno and Borges: readers on the margin

Any serious analysis of the relevance of Cervantes’s *Quijote* to Unamuno and Borges must not ignore the cultural circumstances in which they read the Golden Age masterpiece. Those cultural circumstances are particularly of interest in a study that emphasises the possibility of reading the *Quijote* from a unique point of view. As such I will show that their emphasis on the reader’s role in creating meaning in the work is equivalent to their emphasis on the validity of reading canonical literature from marginal perspectives. Here I will set out some of the relevant context in which they read the *Quijote*, in order to explain why both authors are at pains to reclaim the *Quijote* and read it
afresh from a new perspective. This will also help to explain my choice of reader-response theory as a tool for the comparison.

Unamuno’s revisitation of the *Quijote* cannot be extricated from his interest in national regeneration. Unamuno’s career began just as Spain’s colonisation of the Americas was giving its swan song. In this context he produced his first major engagement with the *Quijote* in the essays that in 1895 would come to be known as *En torno al casticismo*. Unamuno, one arm of the Generación del ’98, begins to re-read and reengage with the Spanish national text at a point when much of the intellectual discussion in Spain was centred around the lack of an overarching literary and philosophical tradition. Ganivet’s 1889 *España filosófica contemporánea* lamented the dearth of intellectual spirit in Spain in light of philosophical models abroad. Much of the work of the Generation was marked by a spoken need to emulate European intellectual trends. Unamuno’s membership of a cosmopolitan generation of writers who often looked abroad for philosophical inspiration underlies much of his work on the *Quijote*. For as I will show, his insistence on reading the novel as a crystallisation of literary influences is one of the bases on which Unamuno disavows Cervantes’s authority to determine the whole of the meaning of the novel.

His work on the *Quijote* must also be contextualised in his disagreement with Ganivet’s insistence on a Volksgeist as a source of national ideals, as well as the latter’s promotion of a small patriotic elite that would ‘españolizar nuestra obra’ (Shaw 1975: 27-28). In this sense, Unamuno’s nuanced approach to casticismo — where what is universal is also what is specific — presents a countercurrent to some of the ideas of his generation. Through *En torno al casticismo*, which explores many of the pitfalls of dogmatic regionalism, and even in light of what might be considered a turn against Europeanisation in some of his later works, Unamuno never strays far from the discourse of transnational ideological exchange. For bare casticismo, an over-insistence on national exceptionalism, is intellectually stifling. Though most of my argument will focus on the literary-theoretical implications of Unamuno’s and Borges’s interpretations of the *Quijote*, it is also important to note that their promotion of the reader in the interpretive act is commensurate with their promotion of cosmopolitan literary approaches.

Their perspective on the *Quijote* is also a marginal one. For, inasmuch as Unamuno was a major

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1 As Donald Shaw shows in his brilliant *The Generation of 1898 in Spain*, the philosophical ideals of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were formative to many of the works of ’98 thinkers such as Baroja, Azorín and Maeztu (Shaw 1975: 13). Azorín’s novel, *La voluntad*, for example, is clearly lifted from the pages of Schopenhauer.
figure in Spanish intellectual life, he was often at pains to stress his identity as a Basque national through many of his literary works. One of his most significant chapters on the Quijote, as I shall discuss in the fourth chapter, is overwritten in Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho with a eulogy to his corner of northern Spain. When he writes Cómo se hace una novela in exile in Hendaye in 1927, the tantalising presence just over the border is not Spain itself, but his native País Vasco. I will show that his particular brand of Spanishness, where the regional, national and international are not mutually exclusive, is a driving force behind his readings of the Quijote, permitting him to set out an aesthetics of reading that ignores authorial intention per se. In other words, his empowerment of the reader in the interpretive act is always in line with the empowerment of readers external to the communities in which canonical works of literature are written. Reader-centrism in Unamuno and Borges, as I will demonstrate, always drives at opening the borders of literary discourse and inviting perspectives on literary works from the margins. Margins that both of these authors occupy.

I must credit Jon Juaristi’s brilliant recent biography of Unamuno with this connection to Borges:

Lo que va del silencio a la bulla o de la intrahistoria a la historia se desvanece con la muerte y no hay otra forma de revivirlo que el arte y en eso, Borges y Unamuno estaban a la par; tan lejos uno de la Argentina de las patriadas como el otro de la Vasconia de los banderizos, objetos fantasmales de un deseo irremediablemente destinado a la melancolía o a la escritura.
(Juaristi 2015: 42)

Unamuno and Borges are both writers whose specific contexts always stood in some marginal relationship to Castilla. Borges too writes from the perspective of a cosmopolitan reader born in a country much newer to the world than the one that had created it. His national literary culture is younger too. The gauchesque genre specific to the Southern Cone was a 19th Century invention, and was Shumway points out, was often used to represent populist political movements:

Populist gauchesque literature sought to affirm a place in the country’s guiding fictions for the common folk, the rural poor, the mixed-bloods, the non-elite. In this endeavour, [Bartolomé] Hidalgo identifies the gaucho not only as one more kind of Argentine but also as the authentic Argentine, the true symbol of an emerging nation. (Shumway 1991: 68)

Gauchesque literature hones in on the lives of the bárbaros who exist outside of civilisation, outside of culture, but who are represented lyrically within it. Borges’s complex relationship to the genre goes some way to explaining his interest in taking on the Quijote. Some of his most important fictions derive in form and content from El Gaucho Martín Fierro in particular, including ‘El Sur’ and ‘El
Fin’. Also his ‘Biografía de Tadeo Isidoro Cruz’ represents an interest in rewriting as well as in the national literature, given that it focalises the narrative of Martin Fierro through the gaucho’s companion. But his interest in what is particular to Argentina, including what might be termed the Argentine Quijote in Hernández’s 1872 epic poem coexists with a love of international literature. While there is no denying Borges’s early insistence on the creation of a national culture — his Fervor de Buenos Aires and El idioma de los argentinos both state Argentina’s contribution to world literature — his vision for Argentine culture takes him very close to Unamuno’s rejection of casticismo in 1895. In their view, a national literature is the product of international exchange.

In this sense, Borges is an inheritor of Domingo F. Sarmiento, who made the term ‘gaucho’, ‘synonymous with country-dwelling nomads whom he viewed as natural supporters of caudillismo and thereby an obstacle to progress’ (Shumway 1991: 70). Shumway argues that the raison d’être of gauchesque poetry was to bring the gaucho into the cultural mainstream, to civilise them by representing them in culture (73). The pre-existing models which provided for this were, of course, European. And European literary ideals were placed next to civilisation itself: the liberal opposition to Perón used the Europeanising Sarmiento as a symbol of modern civilisation (Balderston 1993: 95). Sarmiento, like Bartolomé Mitre and Nicolás Avellaneda, was interested in cultural and economic exchanges with Europe. As Williamson also shows, the point in Sarmiento’s biography of Facundo Quiroga, the caudillo whom Juan Manuel Rosas had murdered in 1835 was to promote the European Enlightenment as a source of political ideals for the modern Argentina (Williamson 2005: 6-7). Beatriz Sarlo’s Una modernidad periférica expresses the complexities of Borges’s view of Argentina’s place in the world of literature:

En el juicio de Borges sobre Sarmiento, la argentinidad ha encontrado su fórmula: la ausencia de límites frente a la cultura occidental y a sus traducciones de oriente. Sin embargo, aun esta ausencia de límites, plantea problemas de legitimación: ¿a quiénes les está permitido elegir de todas partes? Podría decirse, sin exagerar, que en los años veinte y treinta los escritores argentinos eligen de todas partes, traducen y el que no puede traducir lee traducciones, las difunde, publica o propagandiza. (Sarlo 1988: 43)

The Europeanising Sarmiento provides a model of Argentine identity for Borges, where national literature can be extracted and displaced from all corners of the world. Moreover, Borges’s membership of groups such as that of Sur further emphasises his desire to bring Argentina into a global cultural mainstream. The journal was produced, as John King notes, at a time of similar cultural crisis to the one in which Facundo was written, when ‘Federalist dictator Juan Manuel Rosas was attempting to organise the country under his exclusive rule and shut it off from outside
influences’ (King 1986: 7). Ultimately, Borges produces literature at a point when Europeanisation is a very current political theme. That is reflected in his engagement with European literature, particularly the Quijote. It is little surprise that someone like Borges would emphasise the closeness of his own national culture to Europe. His grandmother Fanny Haslam had introduced him to the literature of Kipling, Dumas and the Brothers Grimm, to name just a few. His experiences of Europe, from a stint in Geneva during the First World War, his introduction to ultraismo in Mallorca in 1919, and his publication of an ultraist manifesto in Nosotros in December 1921, further emphasise Borges’s position as a writer between multiple national poles.

Edwin Williamson even argues that Borges considered Buenos Aires, after his return from Europe, to be ‘a philistine place, where, as he put it to Sureda, there reigned a “disheartening incomprehension of and indifference to anything connected with art”’ (Williamson 2005: 94). The disaffection he felt on his return to Argentina might account for his exploration of the Quijote’s status as a national text. The provocative statement that a modern Frenchman’s version of the canonical text is superior to Cervantes’s must be rooted to a large extent in Borges’s personal closeness to European literature. That does not mean that Argentina escaped his interest: his project from the mid 1920s was to use ultraist techniques to produce a work that could project the criollist soul of his native country (Williamson 2005: 135). So his engagement with European literature is often reflective of his own country’s status as an off-cut of a European power, one still finding its place within world culture. What I term Borges’s non-intentionalist method of reading the Quijote promotes the reader in the interpretive process. He offers readers across all national cultures the same validity in interpreting the work. As such, his reader-centric approach to the Spanish canon, which reaches its apex in his 1939 ‘Pierre Menard’, also serves to open the discussion of the Quijote to national cultures including his own.

My argument will not strictly emphasise the specific aspects of Spanish and Argentine culture that produce specific readings of the Quijote. Nor will I analyse in detail the possible postcolonial interpretations of their various readings of the novel, though this is an aspect I will touch upon in order to signpost the possibility of further research. Simply, I will show that their arguments on how the Quijote can be read are always commensurate with the marginal position in which they read it. I will link this to ideas of reader-response theory, from the way in which historical circumstances promote and permit certain readings, to the interpretive role of the reader’s horizon of expectations (a term I will define in the following chapter), as well as the ways in which acceptable strategies for interpreting a work are in a state of constant updating. In doing so, I will be able to demonstrate that Unamuno and Borges read the Quijote, the most canonical work in the Spanish language, according a radical, non-intentionalist method in a way appropriate to their cultural circumstances.
1.2 Roadmap of the thesis

A thesis comparing Unamuno and Borges as readers of the *Quijote* will be complex in method and draw on a wide range of material. As such I will separate my study into five key, discrete chapters. I will start in the second chapter by exploring the various theories I will be drawing on when I arrive at my comparison between Unamuno’s and Borges’s methods of reading the *Quijote*. My use of terms such as ‘reader-centric’ and ‘non-intentionalist’ must be justified in line with extant literary theory. Much literary theory produced since the beginning of the 20th Century has called into doubt the role of the author in the creation of a text’s meaning. I will start with some of the works of Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault, which re-think the importance of the author at the moment of reception. This will also take me through a discussion of intentionalism and non-intentionalism in literature, starting with a discussion of Wimsatt and Beardsley’s essay on intentionalism in the 1940s. The key literary theorists I will be drawing on to support my argument are reader-response theorists Hans-Robert Jauß, Wolfgang Iser and to a smaller extent Stanley Fish. I will also be drawing on the works of modern thinkers such as Paisley Livingston and Sherri Irvin who have dealt specifically with intentionalism as an interpretive practice. From this I will extrapolate the key theoretical ideas that will form the basis of my arguments in later chapters.

I will dedicate the third chapter to the changing reception of Cervantes’s work over time and across different national spaces. For it is important not to take Unamuno’s and Borges’s readings in a vacuum, but to show an understanding of how the two authors contribute to the history of ideas on Cervantes’s work. I will lead a discussion of the amply-studied individual connections that both authors share with Cervantes, starting with Unamuno’s vast oeuvre on the work in Chapter IV and and moving onto Borges’s in Chapter V.

In my specific chapters on Unamuno and Borges I will position my argument in terms of the literature that has sought the traces of Cervantes in their works. Though the relevance of theories of reader-response to individual authors such as Unamuno and Borges has been mentioned before, no detailed analysis of that relationship has yet been produced. Most of the work on Unamuno and Borges as readers of the *Quijote* has sought the specific Cervantine influence on their work, and I will engage with much of it later in the study. My aim is not to render such scholarship obsolete, rather to expand upon it and broaden it in scope. For it is amply demonstrated that Unamuno and Borges inherit techniques and approaches from the works of Cervantes. It has yet to be demonstrated, however, that their inheritance of Cervantine ideas positions them comfortably in the 20th Century development of non-intentionalist literary theories, which recommend reading without emphasising the author’s
ostensible intent. I will therefore extrapolate an aesthetics of reading from both of their works that can shed light on their vast œuvres in the most general sense, œuvres which often emphasise the reader’s creative role in the act of reading. I will go a step further and hold their shared aesthetics of reading up to the light of modern reader-centric literary theories.

In this sense I do not close any doors in the discussion of Unamuno and Borges, and my work does not represent a paradigm shift to the extent of dismantling or invalidating previous scholarship. This thesis will broaden the discussion on both authors. Positioning them in a literary-theoretical trend that can be traced back at least to Cervantes, and which strongly anticipates many contemporary critical methods, does not overwrite any major approach to either author. Rather it will add weight to the vast possibilities of reading their works. For both authors enjoy reading works such as the *Quijote* through interpretive frameworks unavailable to the author. Their respective aesthetics of reading therefore promote a freedom of scholarship on their œuvre.

This will allow me to compare the ways in which Unamuno and Borges revisit and reclaim the *Quijote* according to individual circumstances in the sixth chapter. In this sense my approach will be a trans-national one, taking into account the role of their respective national and historical contexts in their reading. I will demonstrate how their contexts produce readings of the *Quijote* that Cervantes could never have accounted for. Their personalised, often adventurous and controversial readings of the *Quijote* can therefore be explored in terms of reader-response theory, which broadly emphasises the role of the individual reader in creating a unique meaning that an author cannot specifically intend. Their Cervantine works adopt and recommend such methods. As a result, they discover in Cervantes’s novel a wealth of meanings that would be prohibited by intentionalist interpretations.

In the conclusion I will mention just some of the ways my research could be furthered by taking into account reader-response ideas that are beyond the scope of my thesis. As such, this thesis will open doors rather than closing them. It will demonstrate the possibility and importance of revisiting Unamuno and Borges with modern literary theory in mind. It will also, I hope, provide for an exchange of new ideas on both authors, both together and separately, by reading them according to new interpretive trends.

**1.3 Approaches to Unamuno and Borges**

There is a small yet significant number of studies which have traced the relationship between the works of Unamuno and Borges. The first major investigation into this relationship was written by Anthony Kerrigan in 1972. His article ‘Borges/Unamuno’ takes broad strokes in pointing to a series
of shared literary interests between them. Most interestingly, Kerrigan shows that both Unamuno and Borges exist on the periphery of Spanish letters; Unamuno as a Basque writer and Borges as an Argentinian one. Neither author is strictly Castilian, rather they had Castilian Spanish thrust upon them, feeling conquered in linguistic, cultural and geographic terms (Kerrigan 1972: 296). I am particularly indebted to Kerrigan’s study in this sense. For I will show that both take a cosmopolitan approach to the novel appropriate to their peripheral perspectives on the Spanish canon. These peripheral perspectives are the ideal platform from which to launch non-intentionalist investigations of the work.

Kerrigan is also one of a small number of critics who have paid attention to the presence of dreams as metaphors in their work: ‘Unamuno, and then Borges, both wonder (Unamuno, desperately; Borges, deviously) whether we have anything whatsoever to do with molding and imagining life — either in terms of dreams or dreamers or (and herein is the essential and annihilative doubt) as dreamed’ (Kerrigan 1972: 302). Many of the works Unamuno and Borges produced on the Quijote have taken the dream as a guiding metaphor. The current trend among critics who have undertaken comparisons of their works is to treat dreams as an exploration of the insecurity of the self in the face of existential doubt.2 Dolores Koch’s 1984 ‘Borges y Unamuno: Convergencias y divergencias’ compares ‘Las ruinas circulares’: a narrative in which the protagonist is horrified to find that he has no objective reality outside of the mind of another, to Unamuno’s Niebla: a novel (or nivola) where the author and his character are seen to exist on the same plane (Koch 1984: 114). She adds that their oneiric narratives are often based in a shared existential doubt: ‘el hombre de ayer muere en el de hoy, y el de hoy en el de mañana; y como a Heráclito “que no bajarás dos veces al mismo río”. No sólo el río es otro, puntualiza Borges, él también es otro’ (118). So far, scholarship has highlighted the way in which Borges and Unamuno question the objectivity of the world around them, whether we are not simply the fiction of another, whether our perception of external reality corresponds to the world as it is.

My contribution to the work of scholars like Kerrigan and Koch will be to show that the motif of dreams in Unamuno and Borges has an additional function. I will demonstrate how the dream serves

2 Borges’s works on dreams have also, I would add, attracted psychoanalytic readings. Catalina Bronstein’s 2002 ‘Borges, Immortality and the Circular Ruins’ analyses ‘Las ruinas circulares’ and ‘El inmortal’ as indications of a human desire for immortality; Thomas Ogden’s 2003 ‘On not being able to dream’ reads ‘Funes el memorioso’ as a literary representation of a human condition in which subjects are psychologically incapable of dreaming, and of forming psychic distinctions between the states of sleeping, dreaming and perceiving.
both authors well as a metaphor for the relationship between author and reader. Both present authorship as an act of dreaming, a kind of passive event in the mind, so as to limit the author’s scope to provide an objective meaning in the text. This helps to explain the choice of the Quijote as a bridge between these two authors. Its narrative devices, including Cervantes’s claim to be the stepfather of the novel, its feigned historicity which only serves to reinforce its sense of fictionality, and the protagonist’s constant poeticisation of the prosaic worlds he lives in, make the text a useful tool to two writers who agree that the act of reading cannot produce anything other than a subjective version of the text.

I am also by no means the first to note the comparison between Unamuno and Borges as readers of the Quijote. This comparison is most often made between Unamuno as a rewriter of the Quijote in 1905 and Pierre Menard as a literal rewriter of the novel in 1939. Roberto Yahni (1992) and Fernando Iwasaki Cauti (2005) have both opened the discussion of how Unamuno’s approach to the Quijote communicates with that of the apocryphal Borgesian author. Yahni in fact points to Unamuno’s non-intentionalist method of reading Cervantes as a point of crossover with Pierre Menard:

   En el citado ensayo [‘Sobre la lectura e interpretación del Quijote’], Unamuno, de forma más clara y tajante que en su Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho, expone su voluntad de desentenderse de lo que quisiera o no quisiera decir Cervantes, autor que, incapaz de entender a Don Quijote y menos a Sancho, es inferior a su obra. (Yahni 1992: 1009)

Where Unamuno calls Cervantes a malicious historian whose total oeuvre was frankly second-rate, Yahni sees a point of contact with the later Menard, whose impossible enterprise of rewriting the Quijote verbatim without plagiarism produces a work not only superior to Cervantes’s, but the rest of Menard’s oeuvre (1013). I will nuance this understanding of their relationship by pointing to shared affinities between Unamuno, Pierre Menard, Pierre Menard’s contemporary in the narrator, as well as Borges himself. No single figure comfortably embodies any of the others; all add their voice to a discourse on the Quijote that serves to explore some of the narrative experiments undertaken by the novel over four centuries ago.

There is also a trend among commentators of positing Unamuno as a causal precursor to Menard: ‘Unamuno resultó ser por segunda vez el motivador de otra de las ficciones borgianas, sin duda una de las más originales. ¿No es esto lo que Pierre Menard deseaba? Poder atribuir a Unamuno un relato de El Aleph, “no puebla de aventura los libros más calmosos?”’ (Yahni 1992: 1014). Causality is always difficult to prove. While it is clear that Borges had read Unamuno’s Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho before he published his own ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’, it seems to do an injustice to
the intellectual and literary richness of the novella to reduce its meaning to a simple homage to Unamuno. By giving authorial credit to an invented Arabic historian, the Quijote lends itself well enough to an investigation into the role of attribution in literary reception on its own. The main literary influence on ‘Pierre Menard’, in my view, is the Quijote itself. I therefore find the conclusion that Borges arrived at ‘Pierre Menard’ strictly through his reading of Unamuno to be much too hasty.

This does not, however, devalue my examination of the myriad affinities between Unamuno’s provocative reading of the novel, and Pierre Menard’s act of modernising the novel by reproducing it from a contemporary, international frame of reference. For Pierre Menard’s task, of finding new content in the same form, communicates with Unamuno’s task of overwriting the narrative with a series of political, religious and cultural observations. It also, however, communicates with Cervantes’s stated task of editing a translation of an historically dubious document. Borges’s act of attributing the Quijote to Menard is commensurate with Cervantes’s act of attributing it to Benengeli. Both claim that a fictional character of their own invention penned the fictional text. As such, the relationship between Pierre Menard and Unamuno is complicated by the lurking ever-presence of the original author, Cervantes. I will contribute to the discussion of Menard’s affinities to Unamuno by studying them from a literary-theoretical point of view, to discover what both authors can tell the reader about the Quijote, and by extension, the act of reading itself. This will nuance the relationship between Unamuno and Menard, placing them into a discourse rather than positing one as the necessary predecessor to the other.

Fernando Iwasaki Cauti’s study, ‘Borges, Unamuno y el Quijote’ (2005) also makes the claim that Pierre Menard is an avatar of Miguel de Unamuno. Cauti goes so far as to suggest that Borges effectively ‘pilfered’ (‘birló’) his idea for ‘Pierre Menard’ from Unamuno’s numerous vituperations against Cervantes. He even argues that Borges’s spoken distaste for Unamuno’s ‘incontinencias patéticas’ towards the hidalgo (‘Presencia de Unamuno’, 1937) is disingenuous in light of Borges’s similarly charitable reworkings of Martín Fierro. ‘Si reescribir el Quijote fue fruto de la patética incontinencia,’ asks Cauti, ‘¿no tendría «Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote», algún tic o agónico ramalazo unamuniano?’ (Cauti 2005). I do not consider all rewriting of the Quijote to be analogous. Unamuno’s uncontrolled pathos towards a protagonist whose historian maliciously invites the reader to delight in his mishaps, motivates him to rework the novel by interspersing its narrative episodes with personal commentary. In Borges’s view, such an approach to the Quijote teaches us little about the text. It would be so much more interesting to reconstruct the circumstances in which the Basque could arrive at a reading of the text empathetic to the protagonist, and antipathetic to the author. In Borges’s text, that is the value of Menard’s rewriting: it demonstrates the extreme subjectivity of each reading as conditioned by historical and cultural circumstances, thereby negating the notion of an
objective, ‘correct’ reading of a text. Unamuno’s brief is different. It is to produce a text that is different in form and content in order to demonstrate the inadequacy of the author as an omniscient source of meaning. In that sense, I believe that Borges’s and Unamuno’s rewritings are not equal, as Cauti argues, but mirror images of each other. Pierre Menard empowers the reader in spite of the author. Unamuno, meanwhile, disempowers the author in favour of the reader. Any comparison between Unamuno’s version and Menard’s must take their differing points of departure into account.

Cauti does note some positive associations between Unamuno and Menard. Menard’s ‘obra visible’ is, he argues, strongly reminiscent of the work of Unamuno, who also wrote various works on reforming language and orthography, to name just one example. There are further resonances. Both have a connection to the Basque Country, albeit on different sides of the Pyrenees. Menard, who hails from Nîmes, seems to write his version in Bayonne, a mere hundred miles from Unamuno’s native Bilbao. They also come to the *Quijote* from a peripheral perspective. At a time when the Spanish national culture is rethought as a set of disparate regional mores revolving around the central nucleus of Castilla, Unamuno’s perspective on the Spanish canon is seen to come, to some extent, from the fringes. Menard is a Frenchman whose expertise in Spanish letters is born of personal interest and not a national connection. Both, as I will show, extricate the *Quijote* and its readings from Spain, and open the doors to cross-border communication and interpretations of the great work.

Their modi operandi are not fully divorced from each other either: both repudiate a majority reading, and from their respective peripheries, identify a broader intellectual and philosophical significance in the *Quijote* that goes far beyond the satirical interpretation common to cervantistas and intentionalist readers in general. Both do so in the exercise of different techniques. That distinction is the reason that I cannot agree with Cauti that ‘Pierre Menard es un trasunto de Miguel de Unamuno’. Moreover, my inquiry into the relevance of Unamuno’s and Borges’s works to modern reception theory will be consistent with the theory itself. It is of much greater interest to see how their texts communicate independently, rather than trying to grasp some slippery causality between the two authors. So, while Cauti’s section ‘Unamuno, autor de Borges’ is titled appropriately for a study on Menard’s affinities to Unamuno, the statement that Unamuno authored Borges is less meaningful, in my view, than to treat both as authors of comparable yet contrasting versions of the *Quijote*. The way the texts interact, comment upon and shed light on each other is much more informative from the perspective of a literary-theoretical analysis.

Two relatively recent studies have examined in minute detail the intellectual and literary interchanges between Unamuno and Borges: J. Óscar Carrascosa-Tinoco’s 2006 book, *La utopía de la eternidad en Miguel de Unamuno y Jorge Luis Borges*; and Miguel Gorka Bilbao Terreros’s 2009 PhD thesis,
Divergencias y convergencias en la literatura transnacional de principios del siglo XX: El caso de Jorge Luis Borges y Miguel de Unamuno. Their approaches to the comparison are quite contrasting: Tinoco situates their relationship within the history of Spanish letters, whereas Terreros situates the two authors in a pan-European, philosophical framework. Tinoco’s analysis relies on a construction of the cultural milieu in which their respective works communicate:

Hemos de definir [la Modernidad] en relación a unos rasgos diferenciadores: confianza ilimitada en la razón, conciencia histórica, utopía del progreso, principio de inmanencia, reivindicación de la libertad y ateísmo. Sobre estas bases, ambos autores construirán un edificio ideológico en el que las voces históricas y las poéticas se confundirán de igual manera que en la lectura cervantina, lo que nos brindará la posibilidad de asistir al paso del yo lector al yo creador. (Carrascosa-Tinoco 2006: 13-14)

I will add to the discussion on the Cervantine influence on Unamuno and Borges, which Tinoco has inaugurated, by showing how the development of reader-centric literary theory provides a useful intersection between them, and situates them in a theoretical discourse that can be traced back at least to Miguel de Cervantes.

I am also indebted to Terreros’s thesis, which refocused the discussion from Unamuno’s influences on Borges, to a search for the affinities and literary commonalities between the two. Terreros’s method —which I intend to emulate— is to consider how the works of Unamuno and Borges elucidate each other, rather than reducing their relationship to a straight line between a predecessor and a successor.

Terreros pays little attention to their shared interest in Cervantes, and instead draws on Kierkegaardian concepts such as the maieutic ideal that an individual must search for their own version of truth, as well as Schopenhauer’s philosophy of deterministic causation, as the basis of his comparison. So, although the content of our studies various greatly, Terreros’s emphasis on the transnational status of both writers will form a significant basis of my analysis. Both take avid interest in literary works and ideas well outside of their own regional and national borders. They both write from a certain geographical periphery, from the Basque Country to Buenos Aires, from Fuerteventura to Mallorca, from Hendaye to Geneva. Their periphery is intellectual as much as it is geographic. Their attributions of the text to imagined authors, and their appropriation of the novel’s form and content in order to reinforce particular viewpoints on the relationship between author, reader and text, present a countercurrent to majority readings. Those include the satirical response that Unamuno
admonished in *Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho*, and the tendency among Spaniards to see the *Quijote* as a compendium of national clichés, which Borges criticises through Pierre Menard.

Tinoco also notes that Cervantes’s works are one of the myriad links between Unamuno and Borges. In his view, the motif of dreaming in their works makes a cervantine comparison all the more valid, for Augusto Pérez’s existential dilemma in *Niebla* is strongly echoed in Borges’s ‘Las ruinas circulares’ (Tinoco 2006: 54). And given that *Niebla* itself carries a series of resonances from Cervantes, including the mention of the *Quijote* in the prologue, to Orfeo’s epilogue, Tinoco sees Unamuno and Borges as inheritors of Cervantes. And what unites them is the repeated use of dreaming as a metaphor in their works; Unamuno is the dreamer of Augusto, and in ‘Las ruinas circulares’, the narrator’s project is to ‘soñar un hombre […] soñarlo con integridad minuciosa e imponerlo a la realidad.’ Tinoco’s discussion implies a productive element of dreaming. Unamuno dreams Augusto Pérez into being through an act of literary creation. The narrator of ‘Las ruinas circulares’ fears that he is the dream of another, and quite rightly, as he is a fiction of Borges’s design. I will build on Tinoco’s insights into dreams in Unamuno and Borges in order to bring my theoretical approach to their works into sharper focus. I will argue that dreams not only serve to explore metaphysical questions on the objective nature of existence, but that the use of dreams as a metaphor for writing literature is interesting to reader-response theorists, for dreaming implies an act of creation not wholly in control of the author. This, as I will show, helps to state the case that the author has only a limited influence in the production of meaning in their works.

**II. Theories of rewriting**

In order to ground my discussion properly in modern literary theory, and to show how the development of reader-oriented thinking can contribute to our understanding of Unamuno’s and Borges’s response to the *Quijote*, I must explore that development. I will start by outlining the potential of Cervantes’s works to provide theoretical models for later readers. In the subsections that follow I will outline many of the 20th and 21st Century approaches to problematising authorship, from the work of Barthes and Foucault, to modern reader-response theorists, to contemporary critics who have explored the merits and pitfalls of anti-intentionalist readings. A study of those theoretical trends will provide me with the key intellectual tools to explore the reader-centric approaches that Unamuno and Borges take to Cervantes’s *Quijote*.
II.1 Cervantes as a reader-centric author

When Cervantes addressed his reader in 1605 as the desocupado lector, he anticipated a trend of 20th Century theoretical approaches to reading — a tradition in which Unamuno and Borges are firmly embedded. In fact, Cervantes’s masterpiece opens with an ironic admission of authorial inadequacy, a failure of the historian to convey everything he has wished to: ‘Desocupado lector: sin juramento me podrás creer que quisiera que este libro, como hijo del entendimiento, fuera el más hermoso, el más gallardo y más discreto que pudiera imaginarse’ (Cervantes 2010: 13).

Here is an instruction to reassess one’s relationship to the text, from an idle recipient to active participant. It deliberately draws attention to the artificiality of the work, departing markedly from the Spanish works of chivalry that Cervantes so famously parodies. Rather than attempt to persuade a reader of the historical veracity of the account, the same way for example that the prologue to the 1508 version of Amadís de Gaula, a favourite of our hidalgo, promises its reader that the narrative is constructed on a foundation of historical truth, here the reader is allowed to labour under no such misconception. The Quijote is the fictional product of an inadequate mind:

Y así, ¿qué podrá engendrar el estéril y mal cultivado ingenio mío sino la historia de un hijo seco, avellanado, antojadizo y lleno de pensamientos varios y nunca imaginados de otro alguno, bien como quien se engendró en una cárcel, donde toda incomodidad tiene su asiento y donde todo triste ruido hace su habitación? (13)

In pointing to the fictionality of the text, the authorial-narratorial voice redefines narrative in relation to those chivalric fictions which had fraudulently pretended that their stories were true histories rather than invented fictions (Puig 2009: xiii). Narrative, rather than being secondary to the event, is constitutive of it. In other words, chivalric authors would write in post-hoc style, as if their narratives were informative of some objective event that took place in the past. Yet in reality, fictional narration always precedes the story; it is the condition by which the events it describes can be said to have taken place.

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3 As Puig puts it: ‘The Spanish libros de caballerías were works that repeatedly drew the reader’s attention to the conditions of their own existence, but they did so in a fraudulent and defensive manner because their authors were reluctant to admit that they were actually writing fiction, and so they resorted to a number of stock devices to pretend that their narratives were true histories’ (Puig 2009: xiii).
Under these circumstances, a reader can free themselves from their idle role. The notion of ‘story as history’ appeals to the inscrutable knowledge of those who were there. Textual exegesis can scarcely take place if it is assumed that the text reflects events in the world unseen by the reader. It can, however, when a text admits to its being a fabrication. A reader is now encouraged to criticise the product of the estéril y mal cultivado ingenio of Cervantes, and to find within it whatever they wish. In sum, Cervantes’s admission of the fictionality of his text places the reader in the active position of a critic.4

Moreover, presenting authorship as a sort of parenthood, Cervantes implies that the author is ill-qualified to understand the merits of the text: ‘Acontece tener un padre un hijo feo y sin gracia alguna, y el amor que le tiene le pone una venda en los ojos para que no vea sus faltas, antes las juzga por discciones y lindezas y las cuenta a sus amigos por agudezas y donaires’ (13).

The author’s emotional connection to his text might blind him to its inadequacies, which might be more easily caught by a vigilant reader who has not suffered the process of writing. As such, the text can only be interpreted in an objective sense from the perspective of a third party.

Cervantes famously complicates this notion of authorship as parenthood by claiming: ‘Pero yo, aunque parezco padre, soy padrastro de don Quijote, no quiero irme con la corriente del uso, ni suplicarte casi con las lágrimas en los ojos, como otros hacen, lector carísimo, que perdones o disimules las faltas que en este mi hijo vieres’ (14). Cervantes subverts the author’s position as sole progenitor of the text, to such an extent that parenthood is not an adequate metaphor for writing. In doing so, Cervantes abjures his claim to being what Barthes would much later call the ‘author-God’. The text is not a result of a single point of origin, and it does not spring up in a vacuum free of external literary and cultural influences. In that case, how can the author be the sole source of meaning in a text? A text can be situated within a preceding literary tradition, for example. A work which relies so heavily on a pre-existing literary model, in this case tales of chivalry, cannot lay claim to the sort of originality which would justify reading it from an author-centric perspective. As I will show later, Unamuno’s claim that the eponymous hidalgo is extracted from the intra-historic Spanish spirit is just

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4 Robert Bayliss persuasively argues that the various discursive models in the Quijote, from the ever-presence of the chivalric literary form, to Renaissance humanism, forbid the text any straightforward reading: ‘The upshot of this discursive hybridity is that the Quixote subverts authorial claims to guide interpretation along predetermined ideological lines; Cervantes refuses to explicitly prescribe how his work is to be read’ (Bayliss 2007: 388).
as narratologically interesting: his existence within a Spanish culture shared by more than just Cervantes gives all of those who continue to live within it an equal share in determining the narrative’s meaning.

The prologue shows a profound awareness of that narrative difficulty, and in fact avoids instructing the reader on how to approach the text to come: ‘puedes decir de la historia todo aquello que te pareciere, sin temor que te calunien por el mal ni te premien por el bien que dijeres della’ (14). The reader is offered a radical freedom by this literary stepfather to read as they see fit, for any reading is as good as any other. Because the text, for all of its subversion of literary norms, still relies on those norms in order to be meaningful, it is impossible for this author to define what the text can or cannot be taken to mean. In that sense, the conditions by which one reading can be considered superior to another remain unclear. This idea, as I will argue later on, is close to Borges, whose meta-rewriting of the Quijote shows how each act of reading is an inevitable consequence of each reader’s precise circumstances.

This is also a text written in an ostensibly collaborative way. Cervantes’s interlocutor comes to his aid during a period of writer’s block, and issues an instruction that is of particular interest:

Lo primero en que reparáis de los sonetos, epigramas o elogios que os faltan para el principio, y que sean de personajes graves y de título, se puede remediar en que vos mismo toméis algún trabajo en hacerlos, y después los podéis bautizar y poner el nombre que quisiéredes, ahijándolos al Preste Juan de las Indias o al Emperador de Trapisonda, de quien yo sé que hay noticia que fueron famosos poetas […] ya que os averigüen la mentira, no os han de cortar la mano con que lo escribistes. (17)

The prologue therefore practises a sort of false attribution that is famously explored in Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’. Cervantes lets his reader in on the literary ruse of attributing the paratextual elements of the work to other, ostensibly real authors, as great texts must naturally follow the strictures of being prologued by known figures. The reader is originally invited to interpret the paratextual elements (Juan Gallo de Andrada’s Tasa, for example) as had they been written by someone other than Cervantes, so as to offer the text the appropriate amount of prestige. The attribution of the sonnets, epigrams and elegies at the beginning to other poets is designed to program the reader to interpret the text as if it had been written by a well-connected and prestigious literary figure. It is through this lens that a reader might expect to view the Quijote, before the ruse is revealed in the prologue, after which the text must be re-read with a different emphasis. In other words, a reader will inevitably alter their view of a text, even if subtly, depending on the attribution of aspects
of it to another author. This phenomenon is particularly relevant to Pierre Menard, whose verbatim rewriting relies on a reader effectively attributing to him the authorship of the *Quijote*.

There is also evidence that Cervantes’s introduction aligns itself with what would later be termed ‘non-intentionalist’ or reader-centric approaches to writing. What Cervantes ought to create, says his friend, is a text that is malleable to the demands of each reader:

Procurad también que, leyendo vuestra historia, el melancólico se nueva a risa, el risueño la acreciente, el simple no se enfade, el discreto se admire de la invención, el grave no la desprecie, ni el prudente deje de alabarla. En efecto, llevad la mira puesta a derribar la máquina mal fundada destos caballerescos libros, aborrecidos de tantos y alabados de muchos más; que si esto alcanzásedes, no habríades alcanzado poco. (22)

In other words, the text ought to conform to the tastes of each reader. If Cervantes can dismantle the machinery of chivalric literature, and disavow fiction’s claim to historical truth, then he can allow a reader to take from literature not what they ought to read, but precisely what they wish to. This approach strongly aligns Cervantes with the late 20th Century development of reader-response theory, a movement in which Unamuno and Borges would have felt quite comfortable.5

In 1614 Cervantes becomes a reader of his own prologue to *Don Quijote de la Mancha* when he also prologues his *Novelas ejemplares*. Beginning also with an admission of his failure to repeat previous successes, marked by a kind of tragicomic self-effacement, he laments that he was unable to find a prologuist to extol his virtues. Yet he admits that such an introduction would have been dishonest:

Y cuando a la deste amigo, de quien me quejo, no ocurrieran otras cosas de las dichas que decir de mí, yo me levantara a mí mismo dos docenas de testimonios y se los dijera en secreto, con que extendiera mi nombre y acreditara mi ingenio. Porque pensar que dicen puntualmente

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5 It also, as Parr notes, distances Cervantes from the textual practices of his time: ‘The subverting of *auctoritas* in *Don Quixote* transcends Cervantes’s masterpiece, for it has implications for the appreciation of all writing, implicitly advocating as it does a skeptical posture with regard not only to fiction, whether in the original or in translation, but also to history and even the Bible. For Cervantes’s time, still basking in the afterglow of the Council of Trent, with the Counter Reformation proceeding apace, it is a revolutionary and therefore a hazardous position to advance, once calling for both ingenuity and courage. At the same time, it is one of the qualities of this protean text that helps bring it alive for the sophisticated, skeptical reader of today.’ (Parr 1988: 39)
la verdad los tales elogios es disparate, por no tener punto preciso ni determinado las alabanzas ni los vituperios. (Cervantes 2005: 134)

Here Cervantes highlights a few narrative issues. Is writing about another person not contaminated with the voice of that person? How can textual tributes to Cervantes’s greatness be trusted when these might be nothing but a device of his own invention? On a broader level, the prologue warns us against the extraction of truth from text. Praise or vituperation might be born of biases, interpersonal loyalties, or even third-party interference. In an even broader sense, Cervantes problematises narration. A narrative voice may be contaminated by voices of others; authors might be nothing but mere padrastros of the narrative. When the voice of the author-narrator is difficult to distinguish from interfering voices, it is difficult to see that voice as the source of the text’s meaning.

The meaningfulness of these texts lies in their exemplarity: ‘no hay ninguna [novela] de quien no se pueda sacar algún ejemplo provechoso’ (134-135). In other words, the text is not meaningful in as far as the author has intended it to say anything specific: rather it is meaningful in possibly infinite ways, according to each specific reader for as long as those readers find some personal relevance in it. Though paradoxically, Cervantes ties the notion of reader-centric interpretations of his text to his intentions as an author: ‘Mi intento ha sido poner en la plaza de nuestra república una mesa de trucos, donde cada uno pueda llegar a entretenerte, sin daño de barras; digo sin daño del alma ni del cuerpo, porque los ejercicios honestos y agradables antes aprovechan que dañan’ (135). Cervantes seems to suggest that there are some texts whose meaning is fixed by the author. This, though, is a text specifically designed to open itself to an endless string of equally valid interpretations, where each one of us can entertain ourselves without impinging on the enjoyment of others. By this argument, meaning in this text exists only to the extent that it is enjoyed as an aesthetic event.

Those who see true exemplarity in a fictional work, run the risk of misappropriating it, expecting it to do more than it is capable of. Cervantes hence concludes with this warning:

Una cosa me atreveré a decirte: que, si por algún modo alcanzara que la lección destas novelas pudiera inducir a quien las leyera o a algún mal deseo o pensamiento, antes me cortara la mano con que las escribí, que sacarlas en público. Mi edad no está ya para burlarse con la otra vida, que al cincuenta y cinco de los años gano por nueve más y por la mano. (135)

Cervantes here argues that a text can be misread to the extent that it can incite a reader to ill action. The validity of a text’s interpretation can thus be measured by the moral goodness of the reader’s response. For allowing each reader the space to determine the meaning of the work complicates the
discussion as to what constitutes an acceptable reading of it. A reading is unacceptable not in terms of its relationship to the text, but to the real world in which the text is read. The reader’s ethical responsibility to eschew interpretations that can lead them to ill deeds is, as I will show, scarcely interrogated in Unamuno’s work on Cervantes, whereas in Borges’s it is ever-present, even if obliquely.

II.2 Reception theory

Much modern criticism has since caught up with Cervantes’s narrative games. As Eagleton points out, the overwhelming trends towards reading can be broadly split into the author-centric Romantic tradition, the text-centric practices of the New Critics, and now in the modern day to a more reader-centric method (Eagleton 1996: 66). I think Borges’s and Unamuno’s mutual interest in Cervantes can be explored in terms of a reader-centric model.

Reader-centrism was the subject of much writing in the latter half of the 20th Century. Most notably Hans-Robert Jauß was at the forefront of the movement that would later come to be known as reception theory. His 1982 Toward an aesthetic of reception distanced the act of reading away from a formalist approach of close reading, and argued instead that reading is a process that is inalienable from the historical moment in which it takes place. In other words, Jauß argues that the aesthetic value of the work is determined in an historical chain of readings, in which the significance of the work changes commensurately and consecutively with cultural progress:

A literary work is not an object that stands by itself and offers the same view to each reader in each period. It is not a monument that monologically reveals its timeless essence. It is much more like an orchestration that strikes ever new resonances among its readers and that frees the text from the material of the words and brings it to a contemporary existence. (Jauss 1982: 21)

The notion that a text does not contain a monolithic, unchanging set of meanings is central to both Borges and Unamuno, whose interest in the Quijote extends to how it ought to be read in their particular circumstances, both geographic and temporal. To Jauß, the circumstances in which a text is read are absolutely formative to the meaning that a reader discovers in it. In his words, each reader receives a text according to an individual horizon of expectations (Erwartungshorizont), which will inevitably produce a unique reading in each case (23-24). Given that those horizons of expectations are historically-bound, the meaning of a text is subject to constant development, where previous readings are overwritten by new ones. We will see later how the different horizons of expectations
of a 19th and 20th Century Spaniard and of a 20th Century Argentine respectively serve to revive the text: the former in terms of resurrecting the hero and his quest, the latter in terms of allowing the 17th Century text to comment on the 20th Century status quo.

In Jauß’s view, a text has an infinite potential to produce meaning in as far as it is received as part of a sort of dialogue with the reader:

Only as the horizon changes and expands with each subsequent historical materialisation, do responses to the work legitimise particular possibilities of understanding, imitation, transformation, and continuation — in short, structures of exemplary character that condition the process of the formation of literary tradition. (64)

Readers and texts stand in a dialectical relationship. A reader approaches the text with a horizon of expectations, which is subtly altered by the text. A text is both subjected to and formative of a reader’s horizon of expectations. As such, to read one text will impact on how we read another. This is precisely how the historical meaning of a text in Jauß is subject to constant change: new texts add themselves to a reader’s frame of reference, and inevitably impact on the ways in which older texts are received. So: for as long as time passes, and new readers come to revisit old texts, the potential of the work to produce meaning might be endless. This is an idea that Borges apparently arrives at in his essay ‘Kafka y sus precursors’, but I will demonstrate later on how this constant updating of reader’s expectations is the basis on which Pierre Menard’s version of the Quijote can be said to be different to that of Cervantes.

The fact that a reader’s horizon of expectations is inevitably altered by each act of reading suggests that no two readings of the same work are every fully alike. A text can never be brought back to mean exactly what it meant on a previous reading, as cultural frames of reference are constantly updated. So says Jauß:

Every reader is familiar with the experience that the significance of a poem often discloses itself only on rereading, after returning from the end to the beginning. Here the experience of the first reading becomes the horizon of the second one: what the reader received in the progressive horizon of aesthetic perception can be articulated as a theme in the retrospective horizon of interpretation. (143)

Jauß argues that a re-reading, can never fully extricate itself from the previous reading, even if they do not quite arrive at the same meaning in a text. The first reading will always provide the conceptual
framework by which the second reading is carried out, the second reading will provide the next framework, and so on. This is the limitation of reader-centrism. Under Jauß, it does not allow for a fully anarchistic style of reading in which every reading is as valid as any other. Rather, Jauß’s aesthetic of reception describes the process by which readers’ expectations of texts, and the possible meanings they might find there, are in constant historical flux. It does not preclude the possibility of an unacceptable reading of a text, as Stanley Fish later discusses. Instead, ‘literary hermeneutics poses the hypothesis that the concretisation of the meaning of literary works progresses historically and follows a certain ‘logic’ that precipitates in the formation and transformation of the aesthetic canon’ (147). In other words, the range of acceptable readings of a text is given by the way in which the aesthetic canon interacts with the progress of historical change. As I will demonstrate in the third chapter, Unamuno’s reading of the Quijote in light of the ostensible intra-historic Spanish spirit, which moves across historical generations, is in this sense a means by which to return the text to an original or ‘source’ meaning. By contrast, Borges presents a possibly unacceptable reading of the Quijote that defies the development of historical events, or that ought not to have been produced according to the horizon of expectations of a wartime European intellectual.

Wolfgang Iser’s *The Act of Reading* placed him at the forefront of a movement of reader-based aesthetics. Broadly, Iser’s work defines aesthetic responses as a ‘dialectic relationship between text, reader, and their interaction’ (Iser 1987: Preface, x). A text is therefore best understood in terms of an ‘effect theory’ (*Wirkungstheorie*), an investigation into its effect on the reader. Iser does not feel that the meaning of a text can be prescribed by the circumstances in which it is read: ‘It would not be unfair to say that, at least since the advent of “modern art,” the referential reduction of fictional texts to a single ‘hidden’ meaning represents a phase of interpretation that belongs to the past’ (10). So, to read as if to discover meaning rather than to produce it, is outdated. A text can convey new and original meanings should a reader approach it with that possibility in mind. It simply sets out the rules of the game of interpretation, and a reader is allowed to process the text according to their own desires (108). As such, ‘The reader’s enjoyment begins when he himself becomes productive, i.e., when the text allows him to bring his own faculties into play’ (108). Simply, in Iser’s view, a text is meaningful only when a reader takes pleasure in exercising his creative faculties.

To Iser, the reader’s horizon of expectations is in constant flux, not just before and after the reading is completed, but during the process itself. The reader synthesises their expectation of the text with the words on the page (112). In fact, it is not only the case that our expectations of the text to follow will delineate how we will read it, but also that how we have read the text that will cause us to reassess our expectations. In this way, ‘reading does not merely flow forward, but […] recalled segments also have a retroactive effect, with the present transforming the past’ (115). To re-read, by
extension, is to read a transformed version of the text given a new set of expectations. Thus, re-reading is a transformational act very much akin to the act of re-writing: in both cases a text is overwritten with an updated version. Reading cannot in that sense be easily distinguished from authorship. If such a distinction does exist, it is based on the fact that authorship establishes certain rules of the game that reading can play along to as it sees fit. As Iser puts it, ‘Reading is an activity that is guided by the text; this must be processed by the reader, who is then, in turn, affected by what he has processed’ (163). As such, a phenomenology of reading is in no way mutually exclusive with the author’s capacity to delineate possible meanings in the text.

Stanley Fish in his 1970 essay ‘Meaning as Event’ explored the relevance of the author’s intended meaning to interpretation. He highlights cases ‘where the work includes a statement of intention, […] which because it establishes an expectation on the part of a reader becomes a part of his experience’ (Fish 1970: 147). So in his view, when the author’s intention is stated, it becomes a relevant factor in how a text ought to be interpreted, or more precisely, it inevitably factors into the reader’s experience of the text. In that sense, Cervantes’s prologue to the Quijote is paradoxical for its insistence that the reader ought to read without concern for what the author had in mind! Any reader-centric analysis of the Quijote will always be in line with the stated authorial intention in the prologue to the first volume of that work. This, as I will demonstrate shortly, complicates the discussion as to how far Unamuno and Borges present acceptable readings of Cervantes’s novel.

In 1980 Fish specifically explored the question as to what constitutes an acceptable reading of a text. There he cited the example of Raine’s and Hirsch’s respective readings of Blake’s ‘The Tyger’, in which the same verses are held up as evidence for two competing interpretations. As Fish states:

> Clearly they cannot both be right, but just as clearly there is no basis for deciding between them. One cannot appeal to the text, because the text has become an extension of the universe that divides them; and in fact, the text as it is variously characterised is a consequence of the interpretation for which it is supposedly evidence. (Fish 1980: 340)

As I will outline in the specific chapter on Borges and Pierre Menard, this is precisely the intellectual quandary at the heart of that famous tale on rewriting. When the same text can beget such incompatible readings, how can one arbitrate between these poles? The answer cannot lie in the text itself, given that reading is generally a process marked by confirmation bias. In other words, the text is often used in order to align with the attitudes present in the reader before the act of reading began. Or as Fish explains, ‘in the light of an already assumed interpretation, the word [‘forests’, in this case] will be seen to obviously have one meaning or another’ (340). Reading in Fish’s view is a process of
conforming a text to pre-existing assumptions. The reader requires of the text that it align with their expectations, and uses it as a post-hoc justification of their original standpoint.

Fish argues with success that a text lends itself to a vast multitude of acceptable readings, though I do not agree with him that an infinite set of possible readings is impossible:

while ‘The Tyger’ is obviously open to more than one interpretation, it is not open to an infinite number of interpretations. There may be disagreements as to whether the tiger is good or evil, or whether the speaker is Blake or a persona, and so on, but no one is suggesting that the poem is an allegory of the digestive processes or that it predicts the Second World War, and its limited plurality is simply a testimony to the capacity of a great work of art to generate multiple readings. (341-342)

I believe that the strictures of genre and form do not exclude an infinity of valid readings. A reading might need to meet certain criteria in order to be considered acceptable, but those criteria do not preclude an infinity of possible readings. The infinite set of multiples of three by definition excludes the numbers two and four. Genre and form can rule out certain readings while still permitting an infinite number of others. What differentiates one of these acceptable readings from an unacceptable one cannot be found within the text itself, according to Fish: ‘if, as I have argued, the text is always a function of interpretation, then the text cannot be the location of the core of agreement by means of which we reject interpretations’ (342).

There must, however, be something present in the text that excludes certain readings. The various approaches to the Quijote, from the comedic to the romantic, are only as adventurous as that text will allow. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to uphold the masterpiece as a work of science fiction. Even Unamuno and Borges, at their most daring, still read the Quijote in keeping with the rules of Cervantes’s game, as I shall demonstrate later in this thesis. There also must be some core agreement on how the text should be approached in order for discourse to be possible. A text determines its own method of reading. But that method might leave room for infinite recreations of the text. In other words, a text provides the strictures by which a possibly infinite set of acceptable readings might take place.

However, it is hard to specifically place those strictures in the text itself. Fish argues that an acceptable reading is in and of itself a canonical idea, and that as the literary canon continues to update itself, so does the total number of readings that have become acceptable:
the canons of acceptability can change. Moreover, that change is not random but orderly and, to some extent, predictable. A new interpretive strategy always makes its way in some relationship of opposition to the old, which has often marked out a negative space (of things that aren't done) from which it can emerge into respectability. (349)

According to Fish, reading is considered acceptable in as far as it is the product of a defined and accepted practice of reading. This implies that the acceptability of a reading does not rest on universally identifiable aspects within the text, but a performative routine that intellectual consensus considers permissible. I argue in the final chapter that Unamuno and Borges attempt to update the interpretive routines by which the Quijote can or ought to be read. Unamuno’s Vida de don Quijote y Sancho appears to aim at dismantling interpretive routines per se, in order to inaugurate a sort of textual idealism where the validity of an interpretation is a matter of human will. That, paradoxically, is an interpretive routine like any other. I also argue that Unamuno’s anarchistic reading of the Quijote might be considered ethically unacceptable. In Borges’s case, interpretation must take into account the historical moment both at the moment of writing and the moment of reception. I will also put forth in the final chapter that the narrator’s reading of Pierre Menard’s Quijote, taking into account its 1939 publication is just as, if not even more ethically unacceptable.

II.3 The author as reader

The death of the author was finally announced in 1967. Barthes’s famous essay was daring for its disregard for the author at the moment of reception, as ‘writing is the destruction of every voice, every point of origin. Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing’ (Barthes 1987: 142). Significantly, the author is by nature absent at the moment of reading, to such an extent that the act of reading cannot be a dialogical process, but a personal one, where meaning is projected onto the text by the reader, and not discovered in tandem with the author:

Mallarmé was doubtless the first to see and to foresee in its full extent the necessity to substitute language itself for the person who until then had been supposed to be its owner. For him, for us too, it is language which speaks, not the author; to write is, through a prerequisite impersonality […] to reach that point where only language acts, ‘performs’, and not ‘me’. (143)

The author is a mere occupant of a temporal moment at which writing takes place. This is neither here nor there as far as reading is concerned. The language of narrative is detached from a speaking
subject, unlike in spoken or essayistic discourse. This presents the reader with an effectively anarchistic power to read the text ad libitum. That is in direct violation of the rights of what he terms the Author-God:

We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture. (146)

In other words, a text is not just the product of an author, but a synthesis of given forms, norms and genres that exist independently of that author. In that sense ‘His [the author’s] only power is to mix writings, to counter the ones with the others, in such a way as to never rest on any one of them’ (146). The argument that the author mediates existing culture is crucial to Unamuno’s non-intentionalist reading of the Quijote. In fact, Unamuno’s invective against Cervantes relegates him from the author to what Barthes calls the scriptor:

Succeeding the Author, the scriptor no longer bears within him passions, humours, feelings, impressions, but rather this immense dictionary from which he draws a writing that can know no halt: life never does more than imitate the book, and the book itself is only a tissue of signs, an imitation that is lost, infinitely deferred. (147)

Unamuno’s take on Cervantes is the very image of the Barthesian scriptor. There can be no Quijote without the pre-existing tradition of chivalric literature; no Cervantes without Ariosto, no Ariosto without the Arthurian legend, and so backwards. Each new text is the product of a relationship to an earlier text: hence the authorial moment is deferred retrospectively through the history of literary production. The Quijote is authored by the major literary works that preceded it, and in Unamuno’s view, by the intra-historic Spanish spirit, just as much as by Cervantes himself.

Barthes’s idea of reception is the logical extreme of reader-centrism:

The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its destination. Yet this destination cannot any longer be personal: the reader is without history, biography, psychology; he is simply that someone who holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written text is constituted. (148)
Unamuno and Borges align to different extents with the statement that ‘the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.’ The reader in Unamuno’s *Quijote* is the only relevant factor in what a text says. And the success of each reading relies on the force of human will with which it is defended in public discourse. In Borges’s, the original author is not to be disregarded. While reading is the process by which the meaning of a text reaches its completion, this relies on a synthesis between what the author and reader are mutually capable of conceiving of in their given places and times. And the intervening period between the moment of writing and moment of reading can produce a new reading superior to that of the original author.

Two years after Barthes killed the author, Foucault took it upon himself to identify the body. His 1969 ‘Qu’est-ce q’un auteur?’ aimed to more fully explore the disappearance or death of the author as Barthes had proclaimed it. According to Foucault, the disappearance of the author may not leave a simple hermeneutic void. The author must be replaced by some other guiding principle. This was problematic for Foucault to the extent that he considered an anti-authorial reading just as theological as an authorial one; the author’s authority had merely been transferred to the reader.

To disregard the author as a relevant factor in interpretation is to reduce a work to the level of a text, to relegate it back from an *oeuvre* to mere *écriture*. How can one read a work as a mere piece of writing without referring back to the conditions under which the text was written, and therefore, reinstating the author? Foucault asks: ‘In granting a primordial status to writing, do we not, in effect, simply reinscribe in transcendental terms the theological affirmation of its sacred origin or a critical belief in its creative nature?’ (120). There is no possible reading of a literary work that can wholly disregard the fact that it has been *authored*. This is particularly germane to Borges, as I will show in the fourth chapter. One of many relevant factors in how the narrator of ‘Pierre Menard, autor del *Quijote*’ interprets his contemporary’s verbatim copy of the original is the identity of the authors of the two versions: sufficient to bifurcate the same text into two different works.

The author can be, for example, one of the key links between distinct literary works, and unite them into a broader corpus. In that sense, the author’s name stands as a metonym for their body of work. If it turned out, for example, that Shakespeare had had many of his major works ghostwritten, the force of his name would change, along with many of the literary relationships that readers have discovered bearing his name (122). Moreover, the author’s name is a method by which readers distinguish texts from works:

the name of an author is a variable that accompanies only certain texts to the exclusion of others: a private letter may have a signatory, but it does not have an author; a contract can
have an underwriter, but not an author; and similarly, an anonymous poster attached to a wall may have a writer, but he cannot be an author. In this sense the function of an author is to characterise the existence, circulation, and operation of certain discourses within a society. (124)

Borges and Unamuno view the cult of the author’s personality very differently. Borges’s attribution of certain texts to apocryphal authors (a favourite pastime of the residents of Tlön) is in keeping with this idea of Foucault’s: the function of Pierre Menard as the ostensible author of a new Quijote is to update the discourses in which the Quijote can be seen to operate. Unamuno also clearly recognises that the author’s name generally characterises the discourse around the text. For that reason he takes against Cervantes, the malicious historian whose masterpiece was a fluke. His reader-centric, idealistic interpretation of the Quijote makes the text the function by which the author is judged, and not vice versa. The right of the author to characterise the operation of certain discourses within a society is one he would rather attribute to the reader.

Foucault cites Freud, Marx and Aristotle as three authors whose body of work has opened up entirely new methods of discourse. Literary authors, as receivers of old methods of discourse, are also capable of producing new ones: ‘one could say that Ann Radcliffe did not simply write The Mysteries of Udolpho and a few other novels, but also made possible the appearance of Gothic Romances at the beginning of the nineteenth century. To this extent, her function as an author exceeds the limit of her work’ (131). Cervantes is also one such author. The stepfather of don Quijote has created a self-defeating discursive method of reading. The apparent intervention of a third party during the writing of the novel to overcome a case of writer’s block, the author-narrator’s own refusal to acknowledge himself as the sole creator of the narrative, the constant deferral of authorship from an unreliable narrator, to a morisco translator, to a dishonest Arabic author: all of this allows Cervantes to create a text in such a way as to deny that he created it at all. As such his approach is both discursive and literary. Cervantes created a text which enables, and actively encourages, a reader-centric approach to texts. Literature and discourse in that case cannot be easily extricated. In that sense, Cervantes is an author who updates discursive norms. For without Cervantes’s narrative experiments which diminish the author’s role in the reader’s interpretation of the work, there might never have been a Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho, or a ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’.

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6 As Anthony Close notes: ‘Authors of medieval prose romances, and their Spanish successors, wanted to invest fiction with something like the solemn authority of reliably attested history; Cervantes’s invention of Benengeli aims largely to expose and debunk that ambiguous and (for the vulgar) misleading impression’ (Close 1990: 15-16).
Foucault, much like Jauß, argues that the new methods that great authors can produce can help shed further light on their works on a second reading: ‘a reexamination of the books of Freud or Marx can transform our understanding of psychoanalysis or Marxism’ (136). New discourses allow new readers to return to old texts and discover something unprecedented within them. For all of Borges’s and Unamuno’s posturing against the authority of Cervantes over his own text, they remain firmly within the discursive field that he inaugurated. At most, both present new readers with updated methods for reading Cervantes’s original. Those methods, however, are provided specifically by the aspects of the Quijote they tally with.

II.4 The role of intention in literary meaning

In the time since Unamuno and Borges produced their non-intentionalist readings of the Quijote, the relevance of the author’s intention in interpretation has been the subject of much critical theory. An exhaustive chronicle of those texts is far beyond the scope of this thesis. I will however comment on the development of theory related to intentionalism, including the work two contemporary theorists who have furthered our understanding of the reader-centric method.

Intentionalism entered the theoretical lexicon when Wimsatt and Beardsley published their article ‘The Intentional Fallacy’ in 1946. This was the first major discussion of intentionalist approaches to reading in contemporary theory, and it held as its main thesis that ‘the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art’ (Wimsatt & Beardsley 1946: 468). Simply, the premise of ‘intention’, ‘corresponds to what he [the author] intended in a formula which more or less explicitly has had wide acceptance […] Intention is design or plan in the author’s mind. Intention has obvious affinities for the author’s attitude toward his work, the way he felt, what made him write’ (469 - emphasis in original). This is the definition of intention that I intend to work with throughout this thesis: a design or plan with which the author specifically planned to produce a text. They attempted to replace this popular approach to literature with a more reader-centric method, arguing that ‘The poem belongs to the public. It is embodied in language, the peculiar possession of the public, and it is about the human being, an object of public knowledge’ (470).

Unamuno’s readings treat the literary work as an aesthetic object onto which he can project a kind of literary idealism. Criticism fails, in Unamuno, when it becomes a case study in what an author had desired when writing. Similarly, Wimsatt and Beardsley argue that criticism ought not to work as a sort of ‘author psychology’ (477). It must not conflate itself with a narrative of the author’s life, or
an investigation into the author’s mental state. As they put it, ‘There is a difference between internal and external evidence for the meaning of the poem’ (477). Paradoxically, the internal meaning of the text is publicly available to a reader in the way that the external meaning is not. External meaning ‘is private or idiosyncratic; not a part of the work as a linguistic fact: it consists of revelations […] about how or why the poet wrote the poem’ (477-478). As such the literary work is not a trove of authorial intentions. Intentions are effectively a biographical detail. As we will see later, biography, while external to the text, is for Borges one of the most relevant factors in interpretation.

‘The Intentional Fallacy’ proposes that the author’s horizon of expectations, as Jauß later put it, is not informative to reading. What an author had read, what literary circles they participated in, are extratextual information that must be excluded from the reader’s response. They take for example Coleridge’s ‘Kubla Khan’, noting that Bartram’s Travels contains much of the vocabulary that can help a reader to make sense of Coleridge’s poetry:

But it would seem to pertain little to the poem to know that Coleridge had read Bartram. There is a gross body of life, of sensory and mental experience, which lies behind and in some sense causes every poem, but can never be and need not be known in the verbal and hence intellectual composition which is the poem. For all the objects of our manifold experience, especially for the intellectual objects, for every unity, there is an action of the mind which cuts off roots, melts away context — or indeed we should never have objects or ideas or anything to talk about. (480)

The narrator of ‘Pierre Menard’ strongly disagrees with this position. The author’s possible knowledge before and at the moment of writing is wholly pertinent. In fact what the author hopes for — to write the Quijote — is taken into account by the narrator. More relevant still is the cultural knowledge available to Pierre Menard given the extant linguistic codes in his time and place, and the enormous contrast between the nature of his work at that of his literary contemporaries. In my specific chapter on ‘Pierre Menard’ I will show how Wimsatt and Beardsley’s essay can help to critique that narrator’s reading of Menard’s version of the Quijote, given that this narrator exists contemporaneously with Menard, at a point in which his friend’s intentions, knowledge and experiences are all available to him.

That said, the notion that relationships between authors cannot inform texts ought to be held up to scrutiny. Wimsatt and Beardsley argue that when a reader identifies similarities between two authors’ works, it is not useful to inquire as to whether the allusion is deliberate. ‘Our point is that such an answer to such an inquiry would have nothing to do with the poem […] it would not be a critical
inquiry. Critical inquiries, unlike bets, are not settled in this way. Critical inquiries are not settled by consulting the oracle’ (487). Whether an author deliberately alluded to the work of another may or may not be informative to the reader. It is however a mistake to think that critical inquiry ought to be settled at all. Placing texts next to each other to explore their comparisons and contrasts is one way to initiate and not close a critical inquiry. When Cervantes’s version of the Quijote is placed alongside Menard’s, the French author’s act of allusion yields a potentially never-ending inquiry into how or if one ought to read original meaning into a repeated text.

‘The Intentional Fallacy’ has given rise to more pages of theory than there is space to discuss here. I will now examine two recent investigations into intentionality in art, beginning with Paisley Livingston’s 2005 Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study, which provides a comprehensive philosophical overview of the relevance of intention in reading. It helps to answer the question as to how far the author’s intention can inform our view of literature. As Livingston shows, intention is an imprecise philosophical category. It is therefore difficult to discuss its relevance to hermeneutics. Though there are useful possible answers to that quandary: ‘As a meaningful attitude, an intention represents some targeted situation or state of affairs as well as some means to that end. The content of an intention is schematic, requiring specification and adjustment at the time of action’ (8).

To put that differently, intention is an end to which the author must have the means. It does not have to be a specific plan, but a broad sense of some telos achievable by the author. In the fifth chapter I will show in more detail how Pierre Menard’s impossible rewriting of the Quijote violates this understanding of intention. Menard intends the impossible. How, then, can his stated intention to produce a verbatim duplicate of that text be read from the perspective of intentionalism? Perhaps Borges explores a model of intention that does not correspond to applicable literary models that currently exist.

Though perhaps an author’s intention extends to what readings they may be able to anticipate:

One objection to the view that intentional action entails intending is based on unintended side-effects. For example, in writing a poem, it probably was not Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s intention to exacerbate Karl-Philip Moritz’s powerful feelings of artistic inferiority, but it may be thought that as he in fact anticipated such an outcome. (13-14)

Remember that there is a stated intention in the introduction to the Quijote that the text should be read according to the interests of individual readers. Unamuno and Borges both read according to
those interests. Perhaps the *Quijote* is a text with the peculiar feature of only ever being read according to the author's intention, even when those readings purport to be anti-intentionalist.

Livingston is largely defensive of the intentionalist method. He argues that intentionalism has not satisfactorily been replaced by a superior method, and therefore that intentions still have some explanatory value (30). He even argues that intentionalism is not hampered by the unavailability of the author’s thoughts:

Intentionalist enquiry need not rest upon the dogmatic acceptance of an a priori proof; nor must we assume that everything about our behaviour can be explained along intentionalist lines; even less does it imply that we must know for sure what went on in Samuel Taylor Coleridge's mind as he wrote ‘Kubla Khan’. (30)

I do not agree that intentionalist enquiry avoids that difficulty. If intention is informative, then not knowing what Coleridge had in mind at the point of writing ‘Kubla Khan’ renders certain readings unavailable to the reader. Intentionalism imposes a finite number of permissible readings, many of which we cannot access without knowledge of the state of mind of authors of years long past. This, though, does not per se justify non-intentionalism as a valid method. The disappearance of previously available readings does not automatically validate any new reading constructed to fill that gap. Unamuno provides a useful insight into why non-intentionalism might be a valid method in light of the unavailability of the author’s thoughts. As both author and critic of his own works, many of those on the *Quijote*, he shows both that literature is a matter of public property, and that the author is not a deity, but a human being whose ideas, interests and intentions transform over the course of time. As such, those provide an unsatisfactory framework for the reader to interpret the literary work.

A further problem for intentionalism is that an artist’s stated intention might not represent what they really intended: ‘As anti-intentionalists helpfully remind us, artists' reports on their intentions and actions are not always sincere, and when they are, still may not be true’ (32). Can it be, then, that Cervantes’s intention to provide each reader with a story that would satisfy their individual tastes was not really his intention at all? What frameworks exist outside of the text to allow that discussion to take place? Pierre Menard’s claim that he intends to write an original duplicate of the *Quijote* as opposed to simply creating a collage of excerpts from Cervantes’s version requires a leap of faith from the reader. Later I will discuss how Menard’s non-intentionalist reading of the *Quijote* relies paradoxically on an intentionalist reader in order to be meaningful.
Livingston also finds Foucault’s idea of the author function highly problematic. He believes that the author cannot be relegated to a projection of the reader:

Ascertaining facts about actual, empirical authorship need not, then, be part of an operation designed to support individualist myths; it can, on the contrary, lead to a better understanding of the complex social network within which an author has been active, and thereby contribute to the debunking of mystifications surrounding the relevant ‘author-function’ (69).

This idea is posited in Borges’s great thought experiment, ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’. The relevant factor that makes Menard’s version superior to that of Cervantes is not something that exists within the text, but the contexts in which the works were produced. Later I will explain in more detail how the literary work is always effectively rewritten, as the circumstances in which it is written synthesise with those in which it is read.

Helpfully, Livingston tackles Pierre Menard in a chapter specifically dedicated to ‘The Intentions of Monsieur Pierre Menard’. He agrees with the Borgesian distinction between a text and a work. The texts, he explains are ‘type-identical’ whereas the works ‘have divergent artistic or aesthetic properties’ (114). In a mirror-image of Borges’s argument, Livingston adds that two texts can be the same work even if not type-identical: ‘Editors frequently correct misspellings when establishing texts, and it is common to assume that textual equivalence is maintained in spite of various sorts of syntactical variations’ (115).

On that basis, he speculates on some of the possible variations of the symbolist poem mentioned towards the start of Menard’s bibliography. First, he suggests that the original contained typographical errors, thereby justifying the term variações as the narrator refers to them. This would, unlike Menard’s rewriting of the Quijote, present us with a single work written in two typographically different texts (128). I find this argument problematic for the reason that the narrator refers to these variations as individual obras. That is recognised by Livingston, who offers the following alternative view:

Another option for our imaginative theoretical explication of the Menard story is to set aside the possibility that Menard's sonnet owed its two-part appearance to the sorts of epistemic conditions which keep the critical-editorial industries up and running. Menard, we would then surmise, provided La Conque's editor with a definitive authorial manuscript that was then reliably set in type and printed. Menard in turn carefully read and corrected proofs, the result being that on both occasions what was printed in the literary periodical corresponded
character-by-character, point-by-point, to the author's settled choices. The variations, then, have nothing to do with some effort to replicate the linguistic features of a lost primary token. (128)

That is, Menard may have submitted two verbally identical texts whose conditions of creation were distinct enough to provide two distinct works. Should a reader of La Conque note two versions with striking similarities but some significant distinctions,

a reader quickly reasons from the artistic differences between the poems to their strict non-identity. On the basis of the observed similarities and common authorial affiliation, such a reader might conclude that the second sonnet is a version of the first, a closely related yet distinct literary work, in which case there are two texts and two works. (129)

One might wonder in such a case how two works produced by two typographically different texts constitute variations of each other, unless each work is not simply a variation on every other. That is, what categories do readers choose to identify two texts with each other, while considering them unrelated to others. A reader might choose the author as a convenient model by which a text is considered a version of another one: typographically similar texts with a common authorial affiliation, as Livingston puts it, can be considered versions of each other. Borges, as I will show in the fifth chapter, deconstructs this approach. Menard’s and Cervantes’s versions of the Quijote are typographically equal but intellectually unique; they exist as versions of each other without having an author in common.

Livingston also offers interesting qualifications on Borges’s approach to tradition as he discusses most famously in ‘Kafka y sus precursors’, in which each text is simply a reiteration and small distortion of some previous one:

The Borgesian emphasis on the idea that the object of interpretation is not just a work, but relations between works and groups of works, could seem to have some rather disastrous consequences if taken to the extreme. If every work can only be a version of some anterior work, then how did literary creation ever get started? (133)

This reading of Borges is too linear. There might be other, more appropriate ways to describe the notion of tradition in Borges, perhaps as fragments of all possible works as in the Library of Babel, or as Ilan Stavans recently put it, as part of a Universal Mind (Stavans 2015: 105). One might even think of literary tradition as a garden of forking paths, one in which different literary traditions constantly diverge and converge over time. Such a model does not rely on a single point of origin.
As such the question as to how literary creation ever got started relies on a false dichotomy. As we’ve seen, Cervantes could never have written the Quijote as we know it without Ariosto. But that is also true of the Chanson de Roland and La vida de Lazarillo de Tormes. The fallacy lies in assuming that a text is only a version of one previous text. This is something that Borges never claimed, not even in ‘Kafka y sus precursores’ where the works of Kafka are the product of various traditions. Borges claims to be able to ‘reconocer su voz, o sus hábitos, en textos de diversas literaturas y de diversas épocas’ (Borges 1974: 279). Those include the writings of Zeno, Browning and Kierkegaard. In that sense these various strands of literary and intellectual thought have distilled into the writing of Kafka. Borges’s approach to literary tradition is a complex interaction of diverse strands that distil into different texts throughout time.

It’s also important to note, as Livingston does, that this model need not discard the author from consideration. Tradition is authored: it does not author. While tradition has a formative relationship to texts, the author is the active conduit of that tradition. As Livingston puts it, ‘Menard, like other writers, wrote works and fragments of literature, not just texts in an endless hypertext, and we can take them as objects of appreciation by attempting to reconstruct the projects and contexts in which these writings were situated’ (134). As such we cannot consider literary creation as an act of platonic discovery of some form outside human experience. There is a creative talent at work in the author, to whom literary tradition makes itself available without becoming the driving force in the act of creation. Borges makes this explicit in ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’, as Menard and Cervantes are two nodes in a complex system of diverging and converging literary paths. An author is both a passive recipient of an enormous number of literary ideas, as well as the active innovator of new ones. In that sense, the author’s context within the historic moment can inform our reading of the text, because it can demonstrate what new understandings an author has contributed to literary thought. This is the purpose of Borges’s thought experiment in ‘Pierre Menard’: to uncover what new ideas might be contributed by an author who reiterates the product of a previous literary tradition.

Livingston also contributes significantly to our understanding of intentionalist and non-intentionalist readings, and separates these respectively into various taxonomies. This will be of great interest later on as I discuss what sort of non-intentionalist readers Unamuno and Borges are, and whether they can be described as non-intentionalist authors at all. The most obvious sort of intentionalism is termed absolute intentionalism: the belief that the author’s intention and the meaning of the literary work are synonymous (139). There are, however, more nuanced instances of intentionalism. Fictionalist intentionalism is practised by a reader who accepts that a text is written through a series of decisions, though who paradoxically does not consider it to have been written by a real, historical author (140). By contrast, textualist intentionalism holds that a text is always the product of an historical author.
whose precise intentions are always present and therefore discoverable in the text. Most interestingly is the case of conditionalist intentionalism: ‘A conditionalist intentionalism recommends conjectures as to meanings the author “could have intended”, where the possibilia in question are appealing ones in worlds close to the actual artist’s’ (140-141). I will argue in the fifth chapter that this is the theory of reading practised by the narrator of ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’. That narrator’s reading relies on a leap of faith that Menard’s Quijote is not a mere plagiarism, and his preference for the later version is based on the assumption that Cervantes could not have intended the same meanings that Menard ostensibly has.

By contrast, what Livingston refers to as absolute anti-intentionalism is quite close to what Unamuno practises: ‘absolute anti-intentionalism holds that authorial intentions are never decisive or determinant with regard to a work's meanings, and that the former are in some sense irrelevant to the interpreter's tasks’ (141). Livingston considers a drawback of that anti-intentionalist approach to be the fact that intentions obviously have a role to play in the creation of a text (142). When Unamuno argues throughout his literary career that whatever an author may have meant is irrelevant to him as a reader, he practises absolute anti-intentionalism. This relies fundamentally on presenting the author as a mere conduit of a given narrative, precisely as he does in Vida de don Quijote y Sancho. Unamuno is therefore not ignorant of the drawbacks of his own method, and as I will show, his invectives against Cervantes serve only as a defence of his own absolute anti-intentionalist readings. This is by no means an exhaustive list of the different shades of intentionalism and anti-intentionalism. Rather I aim to broadly position Borges and Unamuno within the wider discussion on such readings. Livingston in fact argues that anti-intentionalism, which I believe broadly characterises Unamuno’s approach to reading, has complicated discourse on reading:

The anti-intentionalist's best argument takes the form of a dilemma: either the artist's intentions are successfully realized in the text or structure produced by the artist, in which case the interpreter need not refer to them; or the artist's intentions are not successfully realized in the artefact or performance (taken in conjunction with other, non-intentional features of the context), in which case reference to them is insufficient to justify a related claim about the work's meanings. As far as I can see, absolute intentionalisists lack a convincing response to this argument. (146-147)

I believe that Unamuno more closely follows the latter line of argument: that the author’s intention is an irrelevant factor in reading, because the text might imperfectly represent what the author wished to achieve. Moreover, when Unamuno claims to have discovered the author’s implicit intention, he often uses his disagreement with these intentions as his interpretive crutch. So even the argument
that Unamuno comfortably fits into the category of absolute anti-intentionalism must be qualified, as not only does he express the fact that he takes no interest in an author’s intention when he reads, but his posturing against what a malicious author such as Cervantes might have been attempting provides much of the weight behind his interpretation of the *Quijote*.

Livingston appears also to suggest that the rhetorical question at the end of ‘Pierre Menard’ as to how the *Imitatio Christi* might be read differently if it were attributed to James Joyce, is an example of fictionalist intentionalism in which a real text is attributed to some projection of an author figure: ‘In spite of the recommendations made by the narrator at the end of Borges’s “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote”, we do not construct an authorial persona responsible for both Winter Light and some lurid Hollywood production’ (168). Borges does not construct such a persona. Rather, he is interested in how a text might be different if it were attributed to others, as to in how far the identity of the author might be a relevant factor in reading. One way of course to test this theory is to in fact read the *Imitatio Christi* as if Joyce had written it. That would not constitute the construction of an author, but of a corpus of work whose common thread was the historical author.

Finally, Livingston identifies a possible reason for which anti-intentionalist readings can be so seductive:

> How can we ever know for sure what happened in the complex process whereby a text is created? Lacking such knowledge, we may be loath to take the risk of making assertions about the actual author's thoughts. Instead, we choose to project that form of authorship that best suits the text at hand and whatever evidence we happen to have regarding its context of creation. (168)

The unavailability of the author’s thoughts at the moment of creation might persuade a reader to adopt an anti-intentionalist view. As Unamuno’s volte-face from *cervantismo* to *quijotismo* also shows, authors’ intentions change over time. How can a reader rely on those intentions when they might no longer be shared by the author? Livingston’s best solution to the problem is that good reading might somehow re-constitute the circumstances of authorship. This leaves room though for an objection: how can we therefore identify a good reading when those circumstances are unavailable to the reader? This question will help to scrutinise the claim that Menard’s version is superior to Cervantes’s because of the differences in those authors’ circumstances.

Sherri Irvin’s 2006 article, ‘Authors, Intentions, and Literary Meaning’ responds to Livingston’s sympathetic view towards aspects of intentionalism. It is unequivocal in its position that the author
has only a limited influence over the meaning of the text. As Irvin argues, the meaning of a text is to a large extent fixed by the words on the page, whose definitions cannot be decided by the author but are mutually agreed on by a linguistic community. So, ‘Word meanings are constrained by linguistic conventions, and idiosyncratic intentions can’t simply make the word “broccoli” mean “cauliflower”’ (Irvin 2006: 114).

In Irvin’s view, an author is bound by constantly updating linguistic conventions. Texts do not have a monolithic meaning impervious to the change of linguistic meaning in any given community: ‘even the same string of words in English may have a different meaning depending on the era in which it was generated, since conventions related to word meaning shift over time’ (144). That argument will of course be acutely familiar to anyone who has read ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’. As language changes, the words on the page have the potential to change meaning altogether. This process cannot be stemmed by an author.

Irvin also proposes a number of varieties of intentionalism. It is not the purpose of the thesis to discuss all of these, but to hone in on some relevant examples. The most obvious is strict anti-intentionalism, or ‘conventionalism’ as Irvin terms it. This holds that in order to understand a work, we need only consider it in light of the relevant linguistic conventions at the moment of writing. When an idea in a work is ambiguous, a reader might consider it a simple condition of the text, or simply appeal to a reading that would provide the text with the greatest aesthetic value (121). This aligns quite closely with Unamuno’s quasi-idealist readings of the Quijote. Unamuno programs himself to read the text from the most charitble, romantic point of view. Perhaps we can consider Unamuno that kind of conventionalist reader.

Irvin also helps nuance Menard’s placement in his linguistic community:

Another possibility would be to say that the relevant conventions are determined by the author’s own linguistic community. But an author may belong to more than one linguistic community; and, in any case, this proposal reintroduces an appeal to the author that conventionalism, especially in its more extreme versions, is designed to eschew. (121)

‘Pierre Menard’ explores the role of competing linguistic conventions in reading. Menard belongs to more than one linguistic and cultural community. Under whose linguistic jurisdiction is the appropriate reading of the text set — that of 17th Century Spain, or 20th Century France? Linguistic convention in that circumstance cannot be the guiding principle by which reading is validated. I do not, however, believe that ‘Pierre Menard’ appeals to the author in a way conventionalism aims to
reject. The author in that story is taken into account only in so far as to determine what the author’s horizon of expectations might permit him or her to conceive. In that sense, conventionalism does not mutually cancel with an appeal to the author, provided that we appeal to the circumstances external to the author above the thoughts internal to him or her.

The model of reading which Irvin identifies and which most closely resembles that practised by the narrator of ‘Pierre Menard’, is what she terms ‘hypothetical intentionalism’. Her description of this method could easily have been written in reference to the Borges story:

To understand a work appropriately, perhaps we must see it as the product of an author: a particular human being in a certain socio-historical context, who writes with a certain style, tends to use words in certain ways, brings certain background knowledge and experiences to bear, and has written a body of works which may inform one another. (122)

The argument in ‘Pierre Menard’ is based on the existence of an author whose socio-historical context creates a horizon of expectations in the reader. Irvin considers this to be a kind of ‘sophisticated conventionalism’ (125) where publicly accessible information about the author’s life is informative to what the text might have meant. The narrator of ‘Pierre Menard’ is a sophisticated conventionalist in that sense. Menard’s perceived incompetence in the linguistic and cultural mores of 17th Century Spain heightens his contemporary’s appreciation of the rewritten Quijote, given that it was penned by an author with a horizon of expectations which ought to have prohibited his writing a work so formally similar to a work of 17th Century Spanish parody.

II.5 Texts and Palimpsests

Gérard Genette’s 1982 ‘Palimpsests: Literature in the second degree’ investigates the relationship between texts and their rewritings, or as he terms it, hypotexts and their hypertexts. Genette subscribes to a view that all literature is a hypertext of some previous hypotext: ‘there is no literary work that does not evoke (to some extent and according to how it is read) some other literary work, and in that sense all works are hypertextual. But like George Orwell’s “equals,” some works are more so than others’ (Genette 1997: 9). Genette views literature as a series of ever diverging and reconverging paths, as Borges may have. In fact, much of Genette’s early discussion turns directly to Borges’s investigations into the relationship between transformations and imitations of texts, and sides with the argument expounded in ‘Pierre Menard’ that excising a text from its original context and repositioning it in another prevents accusations of plagiarism:
The most elegant parody, since it is the most economical, is then merely a quote deflected from its meaning or simply from its context, or demoted from its serious status [...] Jorge Luis Borges succeeded in demonstrating with the imaginary example of Pierre Menard that the mere displacement of context turns even the most literal rewriting into a creation. (16-17)

Borges demonstrates this in Pierre Menard, according to Genette, because the comparison between two typographically equal texts that cannot be held as the same work renders the hypertext original by way of its relation to the hypotext. Citing Chapelain décoiffé, a conscious parody of Le Cid, Genette argues that ‘One could, of course, read Chapelain décoiffé without knowing Le Cid; but one cannot perceive and appreciate the function of the one without having the other work in mind or hand’ (18-19). This is the case of Menard’s rewriting of the Quijote. One cannot fully appreciate the richness of Menard’s words without some reference to the comparative poverty of Cervantes’s. Yet this argument can and must be extended to Cervantes’s work: it cannot exist, and cannot fully be understood, without some knowledge of the chivalric novels which the work so joyfully lampoons. So we cannot understand a text without reference to some previous hypertext, which itself is always a hypertext of another previous hypertext. There must exist some meaning in the text that precedes both the author and the reader. Moreover, searching for such a meaning is futile. From the fact that a hypertext is also always a hypertext we can extrapolate that the desire to understand an item of literature requires understanding all of literature and the relations between that unimaginable number of literary works.

Genette argues that Menard’s Quijote is a transformation of Cervantes’s, and not a mere imitation of it. What separates the two categories is the degree of artistic endeavour required to recreate a given original. To recreate a Velázquez painting indistinguishable from the original would be a staggering artistic achievement. A simple copying of the Quijote word for word is not. The validity of Menard’s version relies heavily on its having been the product of serious intellectual effort. Though, Menard’s Quijote does not in fact correspond to any of the categories of transformation or imitation that Genette proposes. A parody is a playful transformation, a travesty is a satirical transformation, a transposition (say, updating a piece of literature to suit a modern audience) a serious transformation. A pastiche is a playful imitation, a caricature a satirical imitation, and a forgery is a serious imitation (28). None of these adequately describe Menard’s Quijote. It is, we’re asked to believe, not a forgery. It cannot parody nor travesty the work without altering it textually. To some extent it could be considered a transposition, given that its attribution to a modern author modernises its meaning, though Menard has done nothing to actually aid the comprehension of a contemporary reader. Menard expressly imitates the style of Cervantes’s work, yet he creates a serious and thought-provoking work of literature, so we must rule out pastiche and caricature. And given that he is able to put his name to a work he has arrived at through honest means, it cannot be a forgery either. So Menard’s version
exists somewhere between the transformational and imitative poles of Genette’s system. It can safely be referred to as a rewriting, but the nature of its rewriting appears to escape real categorisation.

Unamuno’s *Vida de don Quijote y Sancho* can be categorised much more easily: ‘Between the satirical and serious divisions, I see the polemical; that is the spirit in which Miguel de Unamuno transposes *Don Quixote’* (29). Unamuno’s rewritings of Cervantes generally lie between a satirical and serious transposition: he updates the form of the text, using contemporary Spanish and introducing an essayistic thread, as well as the meaning, in line with the more romantic approach to the work which I will discuss in the following chapter. I would add that *Vida* also bears strong undercurrents of forgery. Unamuno deliberately takes credit for, or at least tries to outdo the work of the original author. His point of departure is the premise that he might be able to tell the story of the life of Quijote and Sancho as it ought to have been told. So, while we might disagree, as I do, that the relationship between imitation and transformation is clear cut (30), Genette is correct not to exclude the possibility of ‘mixed practices’ (30). Borges and Menard absolutely mix practices of rewriting. Borges, though, does so in a way that defies straightforward definitions.

The Rimbaud affair is the mirror-image of Menard’s situation. *La chasse spirituelle* was published posthumously in 1949, and attributed to the French author. Its poor quality relative to Rimbaud’s wider oeuvre fed the narrative, still widely accepted, that it was written by apocryphal authors, because ‘what they wrote was absolutely unworthy of Rimbaud’ (160). The similarity between this apocryphal version and Menard’s rewriting is striking:

their pastiche was at first presented as an authentic text; that was enough to alter its readers’ expectations and to subvert the criteria for its appreciation. With the possible exception of a mimetic genius […] the reader’s expectations for a successful pastiche are a far cry from those brought to the reading of an authentic text, or a text presented as such: i.e., an apocryphal one. (160)

The reader’s expectations of the text are informed by the name of the author. A reader might anticipate a great work of French literature if they believe in good faith that it was penned by Rimbaud. Borges’s title, ‘Pierre Menard, autor del *Quijote’* functions similarly. It alerts the reader to expect a different version of the *Quijote*, a more authentic one. Menard has to be considered an author for a comparison to take place that does not hold that his *Quijote* is some cheap imitation of Cervantes’s. This might also explain why Borges invents a fictional author instead of attributing the text to an existing one. It allows the reader to consider Menard’s version without any expectations that would be given by a body of pre-existing literature.
Menard as an invented, apocryphal author, is able to explore the relationship between authorship and reception:

In writing a rigorously literal *Don Quixote* from his own inspiration, Menard allegorizes the act of reading considered as, or disguised into, an act of writing. Conversely, when Borges attributes to others the invention of his tales, he presents his writing as reading. Needless to say, these two approaches are complementary; they mesh into a unifying metaphor of the complex and ambiguous relationships between writing and reading: relationships […] that are quite evidently the very soul of hypertextual activity. (252-253)

In other words, Menard’s reading of it is productive of a new *Quijote*. When Borges says that others are responsible for his own stories, he presents himself as a reader of that which he himself has written. Here, the reader approaches the text with so few expectations of Menard’s work, that the paltry evidence pertaining to his time, place and cultural milieu and a brief overview of his publications are the only intellectual crutches the implicit reader has to interpret the text. The narrator-as-reader settles on an interpretation which relies on those specific factors. The external reader is hence invited to consider the factors they take into account when interpreting a text, including to what extent an author might be relevant. If we discover that the author’s time and place limit the possible meanings we allow his text to convey, then we must also accept that this is a mere projection of the reader. Appealing to the author as a guiding principle in interpretation therefore strengthens the case for the creative role of reading.

Helpfully, Genette collates Menard’s and Unamuno’s rewritings of the *Quijote*:

Contrary to Pierre Menard, who was reproducing *Don Quixote* from within, as it were, and who could thus naively and even unconsciously repeat it word for word, Unamuno was rewriting his *Don Quixote* while constantly eyeing Cervantes’ text, which could but stifle his own narrative impulse. In fact, Unamuno could only *remind* his readers, in one way or another, of what they all knew had happened to Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. The rest, his chief contribution even in quantitative terms, can be said to fall under the heading of *commentary*. (318)

This comparison conveys some key assumptions worth unpicking. First, the notion that Unamuno’s narrative impulse has been totally stifled is not wholly fair. As Unamuno explains in *Cómo se hace una novela*, the best way to write a novel is to write about how a novel is written. It is possible for a
text to exist between the two poles of narrative and commentary. Narrative can also play an interpretive role. The various essayistic diversions of Vida serve a narrative purpose: they reframe the story, producing a narrative of a selfless knight of faith in whose example one should strive to live. In fact the narrative also changes from a novelistic mode to a moralising, often evangelical one.

In fairness, Genette recognises that Vida develops a ‘problematic relationship […] between a conditioned narrative and a free commentary’ (318). However, ‘the very possibility of that dissociation points to an essential aspect of the work, which is that the transformational intent has been brought to bear not on the events but on their significance’ (318-319). I see a false dichotomy here. The significance of the events is a factor their narration. The way an event is narrated in fact must always assume the significance of the event. There is no telling a story without some framing principle that conveys the perceived wider sense of the events. Unamuno’s search for an original significance in the narrated events cannot be straightforwardly excised from narration. Is the Quijote the story of a madman who could not distinguish fact from fantasy, or that of a romantic hero who obeys a moral standard far higher than anyone around him?

Narrative must always have the significance of the event as a guiding principle. No example in Vida conveys this point more clearly than that of the lion in 2, XVII. While Cervantes’s version is that the lion was uninterested in Quijote’s presence, Unamuno’s is that the lion was humbled before the courage of the brave knight, and he presents this view as if it were what actually happened. Whether the lion lay down out of apathy or fear is a matter of narrative and not commentary. The events and their significance run so closely together in Unamuno’s Vida that unpicking them seems almost impossible.

In Vida, Unamuno proposes that authors do not always create, but often act as mere conduits of narratives that exist somewhere in space, as if they were a painter transposing a landscape onto canvas. As such, the text creates the author in that it promotes the scribe to a privileged status in the cultural consciousness. Genette scrutinises this in Unamuno, asking: ‘ Might we read this as an invitation to apply Unamuno’s hypothesis to himself and see him — shades of the Borgesian vertigo — as a Quixotic invention?’ (322). Yes, we might. Unamuno as the author of this rewriting is subject to precisely the same logic. He happily pens a text which he admits contains characters not of his own invention. The implication that a text can impose itself on the author takes Unamuno strikingly close to considering literary works as fragments of one great universal library.

Genette reads into Unamu’s Vida a number of significances from symbolic to evangelical. The molinos represent the evils of the industrial age; Dulcinea the endless pursuit of glory; the generic
shift from chivalric to pastoral indicates a Spanish people, now without an empire, who must turn to agriculture; and Quijote’s renunciation of knight-errantry is an inter-textual reference to Calderón’s Segismundo. On the evangelical side, the *mozas del partido* reflect the redemption of Mary Magdalene (322-323). In order to read those sorts of spiritual meanings into the work, Unamuno treats the text as if it were a Gospel, conveyed poorly by a human who has had the work dictated to them. Unamuno accuses Cervantes of missing the significance of a story given him by an inscrutable higher force. Unamuno’s reading of the *Quijote* as an apocryphal Gospel helps a reader to discover more symbolic meaning in a text that could not possibly have been written by Cervantes. This, in fact, ties Unamuno’s rewriting quite closely to Menard’s. Unamuno practises what Menard’s narrator preaches: he attributes the true authorship of the text to someone else, and explores the possible readings that this could permit.

Genette also notes that the generic constraints of the original *Quijote* also constrain Unamuno’s reevaluation of the text:

Primary revaluation, the revaluation of the hero and his deeds, which we have abundantly observed in Unamuno, cannot of course consist in investing that hero with a prominence that is his already in the hypotext. It consists, much rather, in heightening his merit or his symbolic value. Unamuno’s Don Quixote does nothing more and nothing else than Cervantes’, but what he does ceases to be — or to be described as — the ridiculous behaviour of a dotty hidalgo and becomes the emblematic saga of a hero of Spain and Christendom. (350)

As such, when Unamuno invests the hidalgo with the significance of a Spanish saint, he can only do so because the eponym was imbued with no such significance in the original work. In that sense, even when Unamuno transforms don Quijote from an armour-wearing fantasist into the emblematic practitioner of idealism and altruism, his authorial hands are tied. To meaningfully read new significance into the original work, he could not simply produce another story about a knight-errant. The generic shift from comedic novel to exemplary Gospel takes place because a somewhat rewritten comedy might add little novelty to the work. Unamuno, like all rewriters, is in that sense positioned beneath the author of his hypotext in an authorial hierarchy. This, despite all of his posturing against Cervantes’s ability as a writer and his claim to having produced the original narrative at all.

Genette is aware of the complexity involved in categorising Menard’s *Quijote* in his own system. ‘Pierre Menard’s *Don Quixote* is not a copy of Cervantes,’ he explains, ‘as we know, but rather a minimal transformation, or a maximal imitation, produced by the canonical means of pastiche: the acquiring of a perfect competence through absolute identification (to be Miguel de Cervantes)’ (393).
Menard’s version is a minimal transformation to the fullest extent: no textual replacements are made, rather, the most major change to Cervantes’s original is the omission of the vast majority of the source material. In that sense one can justify calling Menard’s *Quijote* a transformation of Cervantes’s. Paradoxically it can equally be referred to as an imitation in that it deliberately apes the style and content of Cervantes’s *Quijote*. It is simultaneously a transformation and an imitation, and ultimately neither.

Genette permits himself a daring final thought on Menard. Where the narrator muses that attributing texts such as the *Imitatio Christi* to Joyce might have a renovating effect on the text, Genette wonders what might happen were we to collate two texts that have no relation to each other. Why not, for example, consider Ulysses a copy of the Imitation of Christ? ‘Such a relation might well be as relevant as the more accepted one […] between *Ulysses* and the *Odyssey*’ (393). I am not persuaded that this is very different to the point Borges raises. An author is a metonym for a body of work. To attribute a text to another author is to consider it in light of another series of different literary works. So in both cases a text is displaced from a given context and replaced into another literary context. Re-contextualising a text in that sense will always provide a new reader with fresh insights into its meaning.
III. Approaches to Cervantes

It is important not simply to situate Unamuno and Borges in a context of literary theory on reading, but also within the wealth of criticism that has been produced regarding the Quijote ever since its publication. In this chapter I will situate Unamuno and Borges within a broader historiography of Cervantes reception across Europe and Latin America. Showing that Unamuno and Borges are products of their cultural and historical circumstances will help to clarify what these two authors have to offer the trans-national discussion on Cervantes’s magnum opus.

III.1 Don Quijote as a work of comedic fiction

Canavaggio’s 2006 ‘Don Quijote: Del libro al mito’ chronicles much of the response to the Quijote in the years following its publication, and provides insights into how changing conceptual frameworks have changed the meaning that readers have found within it. The most prevalent response of a 17th Century reader to Cervantes’s text is laughter in the face of an obviously burlesque fiction. Many of the century’s major reworkings of the Quijote cast the eponymous hero in a grotesque light. A version of Calderón’s Los disparates de Don Quijote de la Mancha presented Quijote as a womaniser trying to woo a transvestite, and this version took hold significantly in France where Pichou and de Bouscal transposed the work to the stage (Canavaggio 2006: 75-76). In Canavaggio’s words: ‘Sea en España, en Inglaterra o en Francia, Don Quijote fue percibido en el siglo XVII como un personaje cómico: en los juicios sobre él; en las representaciones que se dieron, coreográficas o plásticas; en las aventuras, en fin, de los que en él se inspiran’ (88). We will see shortly how later intellectual currents convert don Quijote from a hapless figure of ridicule into an admirable hero, readying the ground for Unamuno’s evangelical co-opting of the hidalgo into his pseudo-biblical narrative.

The sense that the Quijote is a work of comedy has survived into the modern era. Anthony Close argued in 1978 that for all of the nationalist or romantic representations of the novel, it is fundamentally a burlesque fiction. Close put forth that the Romantic approach, which I will discuss later, was characterised by a belief that don Quijote is in fact a hero, that his status as such is granted by modern sensibilities, and that the novel is a symbol of Spain’s history and the nature of the human spirit (Close 1978: 1). Close distrusts that approach, which underlies the whole of Unamuno’s Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho. Lofty readings of the Quijote are seductive because, as Close puts it, ‘Comic fiction, such as the picaresque novel and Don Quixote, had to contend with the prejudice that it was frivolous, or still worse, dangerous to morals […] So Don Quixote was neglected in intellectually weighty speculation about literature’ (9).
Close is one of a number of contemporary critics who deny that the Quijote has an inherent meaning beyond comedy:

A work is burlesque if, in order to ridicule another literary work or genre or style, it uses some ludicrous combination of baseness and nobility — by employing a grand style for an incongruous subject […] or by attributing base language or sentiments to supposedly noble characters […] or by adopting an aggressively banal style for a grand subject […] Don Quixote is burlesque for all these reasons together. (19)

Close even argues that digressions on Cide Hamete Benengeli and the ‘sacredness of historical truth’ are part of the burlesque in that they make a mockery of the ‘pseudo-historicity of chivalric romances’ (22).

Intentionalist critics implicitly position themselves against the work that Unamuno and Borges carry out in relation to the Quijote. They would accuse both authors of requiring that the Quijote do more than it is capable of. Similarly, Peter Russell’s 1969 ‘Don Quixote as a Funny Book’ argues that the text ought to be read as Cervantes outlines in his prologue. He disagrees with the tendency to see in the text a synthesis of national mores: ‘that, of course, makes it rather difficult to entertain the possibility that Cervantes simply wanted to give his readers something to laugh at’ (313). Russell fails to adequately explain why this implicit intention is the sole guiding principle for reading the Quijote. What is to stop readers from seeing in the title character aspects of themselves or their own cultures, as Unamuno so vocally does? There is surely more at play than the ridiculous tale of a man who believes his world to be that of chivalric knights. The narrative conceit has implications that cannot be relegated to a cheap burlesque device: the protagonist’s inability to distinguish between reality and fiction is reflected in a novel whose position between those two poles is constantly in flux.

Critics like Russell put forth that the meaning of the Quijote was fixed when Cervantes set out to write a comedy:

for some two centuries after 1605, Don Quixote seemed to its readers to be a funny book […] But what of Cervantes? Did his contemporaries all fail to get his point, or was his intention what they took it to be? There is certainly no evidence in those chapters in Part II where the success of Part I is discussed to suggest that Cervantes thought his readers had misunderstood him. (319)
Russell conflates understanding an author with understanding a text, arguing that the only permissible response to the novel is laughter. Unamuno agrees that Cervantes’s intention is to make its reader laugh, though this is precisely the motivation for his accusing Cervantes of being a malicious historian; to mock an idealist who aims only to improve the world for those around him is ethically unacceptable. Hence one of the weaknesses of intentionalism: it assumes that understanding is equal to agreement. Unamuno is aware that there are sections in the work he is supposed to laugh at. But laughter might blind a reader to the text’s deeper philosophical implications.

It is plausible for burlesque and satire to be the vehicle of bigger ideals. For example, when a reader takes a sympathetic view of Quijote’s mishaps:

That kind of sympathy […] also stems from attitudes developed by European romanticism. People in earlier ages judged men rather by the results of their actions than by the respectability of their intentions, and even if we leave aside the crucial question of Don Quijote’s madness, they can hardly have shared the romantics’ sympathy with the knight simply because he wanted to put the world to rights, though he made such a hash of it. (324)

The tragicomic freeing of and beating by the galeotes doesn’t escape moralistic readings, as Unamuno shows in Vida. I therefore find the claim that Cervantes intended the work to be solely a work of humour to be irrelevant when comedic moments within the text lend themselves to explorations of ethical questions. Unamuno, incidentally, does not judge don Quijote by the results of his actions — given that he broadly speaking exacerbates situations he wishes to resolve — but by the intentions. The paradox that Unamuno is a non-intentionalist reader yet remains an intentionalist ethicist will be explored in the following chapter. One reason that Unamuno’s and Borges’s readings of the Quijote are so daring is that they depart radically from this kind of understanding of the work:

A careful scrutiny of the text of both parts of Don Quixote seems to me to provide, then, no grounds for suggesting that Cervantes himself thought of his book — except, of course, for those sections in which the knight and his squire are temporarily put on one side — as anything other than a funny book. (324)

A joke is not funny because the teller believes it to be, but because it conforms to the listener’s sense of humour. A reader who scarcely raises a smile cannot be required to refer to the Quijote as a funny book in order to be credited with having understood it. Russell falls into this either way in claiming that ‘one can only make critical sense of the whole book, from whatever critical angle one chooses to
approach it, by going back to Cervantes’ declared intentions and to the assumptions of his age which went with them’ (325).

Intentionalist critics who see a purely burlesque work in the Quijote presume that their interpretation aligns wholly with Cervantes’s intention regarding the work, as well as the way 17th Century Spaniards as one homogenous intellectual mass might have treated the text. They prohibit readers like Borges and Unamuno from deriving more than just humour from it. Russell even makes the dubious claim that: ‘It cannot be claimed that Cervantes […] contributes anything original to the general history of ideas’ (Russell 1985, 105). Yet Unamuno sees in the text a national philosophy, the zenith of the intra-historic Spanish spirit. Pierre Menard’s rewriting acknowledges the unseriousness of some of don Quijote’s philosophical digressions as they might have been received in 17th Century Spain. But a reader in Menard’s day must not ignore the relationship of those digressions to the development of the history of ideas since 1615. Ultimately, Unamuno and Borges forbid the text a purely humorous reading. In it they identify a tabula rasa, or as Bell-Villada puts it, a ‘‘Rorschach blot’’ of art criticism, a work in which readers see what they want to see or what history conditions them to see’ (Bell-Villada 1999: 134).

III.2 The Romantic Approach to Don Quijote

The 17th and 20th Century trend to view the Quijote as a comedy has been interspersed by a number of radical rethinnings of the work. In particular the German Romantics, who ‘tended to disregard the comic aspects of Cervantes’ prose in favour of a more philosophical-symbolic interpretation,’ (Martín 2002: 162) initiated don Quijote’s transformation from ill-fated knight to a figure of virtue. German translations of the work in 1682 and 1734 proposed that Quijote may well have taken leave of his senses, but that this could convey important moral lessons (Canavaggio 2006: 140). Swiss essayist Johann Bodmer wrote in 1741 that the contradictions in Quijote’s character embodied the chivalric spirit as well as his well-read perspicacity. Wilhelm Schlegel, the first German Romantic, was the recipient of these ideas in the late 18th Century. For Schlegel, the novel’s plot revolves around the conflict between the real world and the ideal world; between poetry (embodied by the caballero) and prose (embodied by Sancho) (Canavaggio 2006: 143). He was among the first to argue that the Quijote had taken on a universal validity, which Unamuno channels when he puts forth in 1905 that don Quijote’s universality lies in his Spanishness.

Schelling argued in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Art that Quijote is simultaneously ridiculous and admirable. The conflict between these two poles has elevated him to a universal, mythological status (143). Contemporary Ludwig Tieck believed that Quijote is mad not because he wishes to
live in the world of chivalric knights, but because his methods for applying the lessons of his reading in the real world are so absurd. So, a reader ought to follow Quixotic ideals if not practices (145-146). This will sound familiar to readers of Unamuno. The notion that don Quijote is the embodiment of a Spanish philosophy of idealism can at least be traced back to the work of Romantics like Tieck. In fact, don Quijote’s ostensible universality is surely in the background of Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’, which implies that a Frenchman’s version of a Spanish masterpiece can be superior to a Spaniard’s. Many of the key tenets of Unamuno’s and Borges’s versions of the Quijote at least are reflected in the work of the earlier German Romantics.

I am indebted to Close’s masterful work on the Romantics. To them, the work embodied the conflict between the prosaic elements of the world and romantic representations of them. As Close puts it, ‘The consecration of Cervantes’s novel as a Romantic work came with Schelling’s interpretation of it, according to which Cervantes is a philosopher-poet treating through the symbolism of the hero’s adventures the universal struggle of the Ideal and the Real’ (Close 1978: 35). Schelling’s statement that ‘Das Thema [des Don Quichotte] im Ganzen ist das Reale im Kampf mit dem Idealen’ (‘The major theme is the conflict between the real and the ideal) is the point of departure for the Romantic approach to Don Quijote (35). That could not more perfectly express the conflicts at the heart of Unamuno’s and Borges’s readings of don Quijote. Unamuno’s texts on the Quijote cite the protagonist’s idealistic worldview; his rejection of prosaic reality in favour of an ideal he can impose on the world. Nowhere does Unamuno express this more vocally than his invective against the neologism bacielymo in Vida 1: XLV. ‘Pierre Menard’ shows that the text is not a thing-in-itself, rather an experience whose significance can only be determined by the perspective of each viewer. The prosaic reality of the words on the page therefore exists in a conflict with the poetic reality of how they are read. It is also probably no coincidence in this respect that Borges chose a Frenchman: ‘After 1836, the Romantic view is firmly established in France, and becomes a commonplace of encyclopaedias and most literary histories’ (46). Menard’s rewritten Quijote is different to Cervantes’s if the reader subscribes to a romantic view of the conflict between prosaic and poetic realities; an idea prevalent in his native France one hundred years before he writes. A more comprehensive view of how Unamuno and Borges relate to the Romantic movement would be the subject of further scholarship. For now, suffice it to demonstrate that Unamuno and Borges, in their rewritings of the Quijote, do not depart drastically from key tenets of a literary movement that predated them by at least a century.

It is ironic that the Romantic view of don Quijote took hold least readily in Spain (Close 1978: 48). Close offers possible explanations for the delayed onset of Romanticism in Spain:
Was it because of the existence in Spain, if one may quote an Unamunesque concept against Unamuno, of a popular ‘inrahistoric’ conception of Quixote and Sancho as figures of fun? […] Whatever the reason or combination of them, no significant piece of Romantic criticism of Don Quixote was published there, to my knowledge, before 1856. Then Fernando de Castro brought out his abridged El Quijote para todos (Madrid, 1856), with a prologue which incorporated a number of ideas of Romantic derivation mixed with some traditional opinions. The first substantial Romantic interpretation is Díaz de Benjumea’s series of articles in La América, which appeared from 8 August to 24 December 1859. (48)

Unamuno’s view of the Quijote, for all of its insistence on the text’s Spanishness, might fit quite comfortably into a more trans-national approach to the work that took hold in the 18th and 19th Centuries. Taking the Quijote as a symbol of Spanish decline as Unamuno does in his late 19th Century commentaries on the Quijote, is nothing new. It was the subject of a 1782 article in the de Morvilliers’s Encyclopédie méthodique that Spain’s national decline (notably, before the loss of any of Spain’s Latin American colonies) was symbolised in the novel. William Temple’s 1690 Miscellanea even argued that Cervantes was responsible for such a decline, as the Quijote had caused Spain to become ashamed of its honour, precipitating the fall of the Habsburgs (Canavaggio 2006: 108). Unamuno’s early writings on Cervantes, before a major shift between cervantismo and quijotismo in the early 20th Century, do not so much blame Cervantes for Spain’s decline, but Spanish readers for seeing a moral exemplum in a madman, ahead of the practical Alonso Quijano.

Nor is it a novelty, as Unamuno begins to in 1902, to see Quijote’s madness as a form of wisdom unavailable to a reader obsessed with reason. José Cadalso’s 1789 Cartas marruecas made precisely that point: ‘lo que se lee es una serie de extravagancias de un loco […] pero lo que hay debajo de esta apariencia es, en mi concepto, un conjunto de materias profundas e importantes’ (Cadalso 1966: 131). It is not my intention to show that Unamuno definitively read or directly communicates with authors such as Cadalso, or even Tieck and Schlegel who uphold don Quijote as some kind of moral bastion, rather to demonstrate that Unamuno, part of a generation who could not read the novel ‘in abstraction from “the problem of Spain”’ (Close 1978: 140) weaves a variety of strands into his writing on don Quijote: from German and French Romanticism to a national and trans-national discussion on Spanish national decline that had been ongoing since at least the late 17th Century.

III.3 The Quijote in Spain and Argentina
Close dedicates much attention to Unamuno’s bibliography on the Quijote. He correctly identifies a volte-face in Unamuno’s reading, from taking Alonso Quijano’s renunciation of knight-errantry on his deathbed as a model in En torno al casticismo in 1895, to his exultation of don Quijote most completely expressed ten years later in Vida de don Quijote y Sancho (Close 1978: 143-144). In Close’s words, ‘Spain’s destiny will be to bring materialistic modern Europe to its religious senses, preaching “la filosofía de Dulcinea, la de no morir, la de creer, la de crear la verdad”’ (144). Though, in calling quijotismo ‘Todo un método, toda una epistemología, toda una estética, toda una lógica, toda una ética, toda una religión, toda una esperanza en lo absurdo racional’ (Unamuno 1980: 325) in the epilogue to Del sentimiento trágico de la vida, Close accuses Unamuno of misreading. He argues that the invention of Cide Hamete Benengeli bears no philosophical relevance, and that Unamuno has simply missed the irony (146). As I will argue in the next chapter, the ‘found-manuscript’ device allows Unamuno to make two key arguments: One, that the text ought to be read as a gospel, with all the associated moralistic implications; two, that such a reading requires a non-intentionalist approach. When Unamuno reads the Quijote as a tract on Spanish philosophy, he reads into the text. Appreciating the narrator’s humorous deferrals of his authority does not mutually exclude with Unamuno’s wish to see more in the Quijote than Cervantes originally put there. Thus, one could (anachronistically) call Unamuno’s approach quasi-Borgesian. As well as attributing the text to Benengeli ahead of Cervantes (as Borges attributes it to Menard), Unamuno attributes it a new intellectual framework that had not been formalised when Cervantes penned the Quijote. Close, in fact, identifies that framework:

He [Unamuno] believes that there is a higher epistemological principle than common-sense — that of the creative will which needs the existence of this or that object of belief because its very life depends on it. By reference to that principle, he assigns Don Quixote and St Ignatius to the same plane of timeless, live substantive reality. That is, the intra-historic Spanish spirit. (146)

Criticisms that readers such as Borges and Unamuno have misunderstood don Quijote by seeing more than a box of narrative tricks seem unfounded. Perhaps both writers recognised those tricks at first reading, but returned to the novel to test its capacity to demonstrate new concepts. Common to both is an aesthetics of reading in which the individual is the creative influence. Unamuno generally takes advantage of that creative freedom to further arguments he puts forth in En torno al casticismo related to the intra-historic Spanish spirit, and Spain’s crisis and rebirth. Borges, also calling Cervantes’s bluff on the existence of Benengeli, profits from this device in his later works on the Quijote, which present more of a philosophy of existence than an aesthetics of reading. Thus, a key difference
between intentionalist and non-intentionalist readers of the * Quijote*. Intentionalist readings tend to encase the * Quijote* within the frameworks of narrative gimmicks and self-effacing jokes. Non-intentionalist readings often open up the text to philosophical investigation, and to borrow Russell’s term, examine what the text can offer to the general history of ideas.

While much has been written on the relationship of European intellectuals to the major trends of thinking on the Spanish national text, Borges reads from a more peripheral perspective. Certainly, Unamuno exists in a literary and historic circumstance in which the * Quijote* becomes the target of much nationalistic attention. Borges’s constant return to the * Quijote* is not surprising in an Argentine avant-garde writer often considered to be * europeizante*. Sarmiento’s * Facundo*, a text Borges was intimately familiar with, was written in the culturally and politically isolated Argentina of Rosas (King 1986: 7). Sarmiento, of course, viewed the Rosas government as the logical end untamed gauchesque barbarism. His presidency fomented the kind of isolationist nationalism that caused * europeizantes* to be condemned as anti-Argentine well into the 20th Century. The paper * La Nación* was known to condemn the import of literary trends from abroad. It’s against this backdrop that the Florida group founded * Prisma* — a magazine with an ultraist manifesto, aping ongoing European literary fashions — in which Borges first published in 1925 (King 1986: 22-24). Victoria Ocampo’s obsession with all things European was fundamental in the foundation of the magazine * Sur*, which attempted to use literary models to defend Argentine liberalism during The Infamous Decade, and

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7 Resina is also wary of their approach: ‘Scholars like P.E. Russell, Anthony Close, and their followers, have claimed exclusive interpretive legitimacy for a hypothetical authorial intention projected from these critics’ analysis of Cervantes’s works in terms of Renaissance and post-Renaissance works on poetics, references to literary works from the same period, and the reception of the * Quixote* as reconstructed from seventeenth-and-eighteenth-century sources’ (Resina 1996: 219).

8 The novel is also, as Bayliss demonstrates, a more convenient metonym for Spanish national for the 19th group: ‘In the aftermath of the so-called Crisis of 1898 recognized that its colonial wealth, power, and glory had waned and receded into history; it found clear parallels with Don Quixote, himself an older member of a waning social institution bent on reviving a lost Golden Age’ (Bayliss 2007: 385).

9 For this reason Borges looked to Sarmiento as a modernising influence on Argentine identity: ‘En el juicio de Borges sobre Sarmiento, la argentinidad ha encontrado su fórmula: la ausencia de límites frente a la cultura occidental y a sus traducciones de oriente’ (Sarlo 1988: 43).

10 Carlos Ibargüen condemned Argentine liberals for betraying their country to European capitalism in the 1930s, for example. That anti-European rhetoric coincided in Argentine nationalists with a love for strong, * criollo* leaders that was once expressed by Martín Fierro himself (Shumway 1991: 294).
which was on the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War (32). Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard’ was written in the context of his literary generation’s burgeoning interest in European literature, as well as an explicit concern with the rise of fascism in Europe when ‘Pierre Menard’ is published in Sur in May 1939. In the final chapter I will detail how this political and literary context conveys itself through the narrative voice of that story.

Before Borges arrives at the Quijote in the 1920s, there are very few major Latin American commentaries on which to draw. Unlike in Unamuno’s case, Borges does not participate in an ongoing discourse of reclaiming the Quijote out of political, cultural or philosophical concerns. Ruben Dario’s Letanias de Nuestro Señor Don Quijote of 1905 exalts a ‘rey de los hidalgos’ who ‘nadie ha podido vencer todavía’, thus fitting very comfortably into the Romantic trend outlined above. It might have fed into some of Borges’s later writing on the Quijote, which shift their focus from the relationship between Cervantes and the reader, to the relationship between Cervantes and his protagonist. Challenges to Cervantes’s authority were already part of the Latin American bibliography before Borges created Pierre Menard. Ecuadorian Juan Montalvo’s 1895 Capítulos que se le olvidaron a Cervantes interspares new chapters, omitted by Cervantes, at some indeterminate point during Quijote’s third sally. The title suggests that Cervantes is far from the perfect author — an idea that Borges takes further when denying that Cervantes is the author at all11. It is unclear whether Dario and Montalvo directly influenced Borges’s Cervantine texts, even if they do bear traces of his two Latin American literary predecessors.

Literary discourse on the Quijote is much more sparse in Borges’s milieu than in Unamuno’s. Perhaps this is why he spent so much of his early career justifying the presence of Peninsular writers on Argentine bookshelves. Quevedo, Góngora and Manrique are each the subject of essays in Borges’s 1928 El idioma de los argentinos. ‘Pierre Menard’ could be read as a means to introduce the Quijote into Argentine literary debates. Meanwhile, Unamuno’s obsession with the novel situates him comfortably within the literary and political debates of his time. Joaquín Costa’s Estudios jurídicos y políticos began this trend in 1883, presenting the protagonist as an archetypal Spaniard in whose

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11 In fact, the introduction to a 2004 edition of Capítulos is at pains to distance Menard’s work from Montalvo’s: ‘Capítulos que se le olvidaron a Cervantes. Se adelantó a Pierre Menard, y no escribió el Quijote sin copiarlo, sino que sustituyó a Cervantes y redactó lo que le faltaba a su magna obra. Para ello, siguió los mismos métodos que el personaje de Borges: conocer bien el español, asimilar la fe católica, tener un buen acopio de materiales caballerescos y tradicionales hispánicas […] Y lo más importante: seguir siendo Juan Montalvo (como sugirió Pierre Menard, alternativa mucho más estimulante y difícil que ser Cervantes) y llegar al Quijote’ (Montalvo 2004: 15).
example lay the foundations of the regeneration of civil society. Ganivet’s 1896 *Idearium español* promoted a eugenist message where Spain, in its enviable commitment to Christian justice, was duty-bound to ‘dominate’ and ‘educate’ the primitive nations of the world (Ganivet 1915: 26). The archetype of that Christian justice, where no man should bear witness against another if the punishment does not fit the crime, is embodied in Cervantes’s *libro inmortal* which separated ‘la justicia española de la justicia vulgar de los Códigos y Tribunales: la primera la encarnó en Don Quijote y la segunda en Sancho Panza’ (68). Ganivet presents Quijote as the moral rectitude that has been forgotten by the contemporary legal system bound by ‘códigos y tribunales sanchopancescos’ (38). Incidentally, the *Quijote* chapter that Ganivet cites — 1: XXII, where don Quijote frees the *galeotes* on the premise that no man should be another’s executioner — is of major interest to Unamuno and Borges. Unamuno disagrees with Ganivet in *Vida* that don Quijote’s words do not embody any significant philosophical ideal (Unamuno 2005: 252). Borges’s 1946 ‘Nuestro pobre individualismo’ feels that the chapter symbolises an affinity — intellectual, cultural, and literary — between the Argentine and the Spaniard (Borges 2013: 194).

When Ganivet calls Cervantes ‘el más grande de todos los conquistadores’ (Ganivet 1915: 79) it becomes obvious that Unamuno’s later distaste for *cervantismo* does not correspond to his cultural milieu. Though the early Unamuno — the anti-Europeanising *cervantista* — would have found much to praise in Ganivet’s upholding of Sancho Panza as a symbol of the pragmatism necessary to a successful nation, one which does not stretch itself beyond its capabilities (Ganivet 1915: 172). In fact, Ganivet believes that national regeneration lies in the abandonment of colonialism and the exportation of the best of Spanish culture to the rest of the world.12 Spain’s new place in the world will be won in letters, and not arms. Quijote’s postprandial speech underlies much of the 98 Generation’s rhetoric on Spain’s post-colonial future, as Cascardi explains: ‘part of what Don Quijote offers is a response to the eclipse of heroic values by revitalising a form of rhetoric that makes the case for the value of heroic action (*armas*) over an approach to the world that would rely on books (*letras*)’ (Cascardi 2012: 79). Ganivet’s racially-problematic proposals on exporting Spanish culture to civilise the cultural savages of Africa (an idea expressed both in his *Idearium español* and reiterated in correspondence with Unamuno published in *El porvenir de España*) could be read as a re-appropriation, or rethinking of the binary between arms and letters as don Quijote proposes it.

Azorín’s *La ruta de don Quijote*, a re-narration of the novel from a first-person perspective, was also published on the tercentenary of Don Quijote’s publication. Many of its key ideas will be familiar to

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12 ‘Si España quiere recuperar su puesto, ha de esforzarse para restablecer su propio prestigio intelectual, y luego para llevarlo a América e implantarlo sin aspiraciones utilitarias’ (122).
readers of Unamuno: a return to the Siglo de Oro in order to revive a Spain whose fortunes cultural and political were beginning to dwindle. The narrative ‘yo’ (always under examination in Unamuno’s literature) has in Azorín’s work a cultural implication. As Minardi points out:

Ese yo, unido a las constantes preguntas retóricas que desafían al lector, marca la búsqueda de identidad en el trayecto. De esta manera, la primera pregunta retórica que se formula está ligada a la reflexión acerca de la rutina de la ciudad en oposición a la libertad de acción en los pueblos ‘La vida, ¿es una repetición monótona, inexorable, de las mismas cosas con distintas apariencias? Yo estoy en mi cuarto; el cuarto es diminuto; tiene tres o cuatro pasos en cuadro; hay en él una mesa pequeña, un lavabo, una cómoda, una cama...’ (Minardi 2010)

Spain must discover itself as much as Quijote does, and find within itself the traditional, provincial values of a pueblo. Unamuno and Azorín thus take a similar approach in searching for the eternal tradition that underpins the work. In longing for a return to a pastoral society, Azorín closely aligns himself with Unamuno’s statement in 1898 that Spain ought to ‘morir como nación y vivir como pueblo’ (Unamuno 1967: 1195).

José Ortega y Gasset’s Meditaciones del Quijote of 1914 also appropriate the novel in order to propose a model for the modernisation of Spain.\(^{13}\) Praising the hidalgo for his ability to view the world through a series of abstract frameworks,\(^{14}\) Ortega identifies don Quijote as an intellectual example to follow; someone able to respond spontaneously to the world free of preconceptions. Quijote’s Weltanschauung teaches its reader to identify more in the text than just the character. Reading beyond the character into the world Cervantes creates can give us ‘una noción más amplia y clara del estilo cervantino, de quien es el hidalgo manchego sólo una condensación particular’ (45). As such, Ortega y Gasset complicates the binary of cervantismo and quijotismo that Unamuno has been working in since 1905. Ortega responds that perhaps the greatness of one does not exclude the

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\(^{13}\) According to Close, it ‘was motivated by the tacit urge to salvage from the seemingly hidebound culture of Counter-Reformation Spain an outlook and set of values prophetic of a new Spain destined to emancipate itself from the traditions of the old’ (Close 1990: 2).

\(^{14}\) ‘En comparación con lo inmediato, con nuestra vida espontánea, todo lo que hemos aprendido parece abstracto, genérico, esquemático. No sólo lo parece: lo es. El martillo es la abstracción de cada uno de sus martillazos’ (Ortega y Gasset 1921: 33).
greatness of the other, and to look beyond Quijote for one moment reveals a particular Spanish style that was most perfectly put to paper by Cervantes.\footnote{15 ‘En Cervantes esta potencia de visualidad es literalmente incomparable: llega a tal punto que no necesita proponerse la descripción de una cosa para que entre los giros de la narración se deslicen sus propios puros colores, su sonido, su íntegra corporeidad. Con razón exclamaba Flaubert aludiendo al “Quijote”: Comme on voit ces routes d’Espagne qui ne sont nulle part décrites!’ (89-90).}

The Quijote to Ortega stands alone among a Spanish literary tradition that ought to be abandoned:

No, no podemos seguir la tradición; todo lo contrario: tenemos que ir contra la tradición, más allá de la tradición […] En un grande, doloroso incendio habríamos de quemar la inerte apariencia tradicional, la España que ha sido, y luego, entre las cenizas bien cribadas, hallaremos como una gema iridiscente la España que pudo ser. (120)

In this aspect, Ortega distances himself from Unamuno. Both before and after 1914, Unamuno called for his reader not to discover an authorial style in the Quijote, but a philosophical exemplum, to return to the text and find exactly that eternal tradition whose existence he proposed in En torno al casticismo, and whose discovery was hindered by the deficiencies of Cervantes’s prose. Though Unamuno and Ortega share a suspicion of bourgeois materialism (Close 1978: 181), as well as a belief that the Quijote expresses something meaningful about Spanish culture, it is hard not to see the former as an anomaly in the contemporary discourse of his cultural milieu for his intense vituperations against Cervantes and denial of the literary value of his great novel.
IV. Unamuno, reader of Cervantes

In this chapter I will examine Unamuno’s writings dealing specifically with Cervantes’s *Quijote*. I will extrapolate some key aesthetic principles on reading to later show how these communicate with Borges’s approaches to the *Quijote*, and to position both in a wider tradition of theoretical approaches to reading that goes back at least to Cervantes.

Authoritative chronologies of all of Unamuno’s works on Cervantes have already been produced: Jesús Maestro’s 1990 ‘Miguel de Cervantes, Miguel de Unamuno: el *Quijote* desde la experiencia de la estética de la recepción de 1898’ examines the circumstances which led Unamuno to write more than thirty works specifically on the *Quijote*. I am indebted to his chronology, and his reading of Unamuno’s texts through Hans-Robert Jauß’s reception theory. I will engage with Maestro’s theoretical approach at various points throughout this chapter. Luis Andrés Marcos’s 2005 ‘El lector unamuniano como clave filosófico’ also examines the Cervantine echoes in Unamuno’s *Vida de don Quijote y Sancho* from the perspective of Wolfgang Iser’s reader-centric literary theory. This chapter’s chief contribution will be to condense some of these literary theories in order to identify an overarching approach to reading in Unamuno.

I am not the first to attempt this: Charles Alex Longhurst argued in ‘La Tradición Hermenéutica En La Narrativa Unamuniana’ that many of Unamuno’s narratives are interpretations of pre-existing works, and therefore are a kind of hermeneutics in practice (Longhurst 2009: 349). Longhurst situates Unamuno in a hermeneutic tradition, arguing that Unamuno’s involvement of his reader:

> es la base de todas las teorías que desarrollan a lo largo de la segunda mitad del siglo XX críticos tan conocidos como Wolfgang Iser, Hans Robert Jauß, Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Umberto Eco, Stanley Fish, Jonathan Culler y varios otros que, ya sea bajo la etiqueta de teoría de la recepción o bajo alguna otra de posterior invento, colocan al lector en el centro mismo del proceso de significación. (350)

Where Longhurst traces a relationship between Unamuno and Gadamer’s hermeneutic principles, my analysis will limit itself to reception theorists including Iser, Jauß and Fish. Longhurst recently pointed to the viability and need for a study relating Unamuno to reader-response theory (Longhurst 2014: 88). I agree with him that ‘Unamuno se empapó de una tradición de pensamiento hermenéutico

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16 ‘Unamuno, then following the German hermeneutic tradition, associates literary texts with interpretation, and interpretation with an active, participatory reading. Interpretation is synonymous with creation, it is a creative act requiring an effort of the imagination’ (Longhurst 2014: 83).
que resulta ser la misma que ha llegado hasta nuestros días en la obra de los teóricos de las ciencias humanas’ (2009: 350-351), and in this chapter I will show how Unamuno’s views anticipate much of the modern approaches now known as reception theory, in order to open that new pathway into studying Unamuno’s texts.

I will limit my discussion to a series of major Unamuno works with a spoken engagement with Cervantes, including En torno al casticismo, Vida de don Quijote y Sancho and Del sentimiento trágico de la vida. This is not to ignore that other scholars have identified Cervantine traces in many of Unamuno’s significant fictions, particularly Niebla. Carlos Blanco Aguinaga argued in 1964 that the confrontation between Pérez and Unamuno is obviously derived from the Quijote (Aguinaga 1964: 205). Since then, critics such as Willard King (1967),17 James Gunn (1980), Bénédicte Vauthier (1999), Thomas Franz (2007) and J.A.G. Ardila (2010) have explored the similarities between Unamuno’s major fictions and Cervantes’s. Paul Olson’s study of the chiastic mode of Unamuno’s major fictions even turns its attention to the influence of Cervantes, noting that ‘Unamuno’s ultimate model for a work [Niebla] in which the narrative is mediated by a series of authors, editors and translators enclosed within another, was the Quixote’ (Olson 1984: 161). Ardila encapsulated this trend in 2010 with his statement that ‘Los más de los recursos narratológicos de los que Unamuno se sirve proceden del Quijote’ (Ardila 2010: 366). Ardila and Biggane’s recent work, ‘Quixotic Unamuno: Cervantes in Unamuno’s thought and Fiction’ also notes significant traces of Cervantes in Unamuno’s fictions, how Unamuno’s Quijote began as a symbol of the problems of Spanish history, and ended in Del sentimiento trágico de la vida as the embodiment of the conflict between reason and faith in Spanish cultural life. Diego Catalán’s ‘Tres Unamunos ante un capítulo del Quijote’ separates Unamuno’s interpretation into three broad chronological periods: an early interest in don Quijote’s relevance to material issues in Spanish society; a post-1897 interest in Alonso Quijano as a symbol of national regeneration, and his post-1902 championing of don Quijote’s Herostratism. I am aware of Unamuno’s changing approach to the Quijote across his career. I will not dedicate myself to an investigation of that development, but rather I will derive some ideas central to Unamuno’s aesthetics of reading from texts spanning all of those major stages.

17 King for example argues that Augusto Pérez in Niebla is a spiritual and literary twin: ‘es un joven sin norte; las acciones previas a su aparición en la novela parecen carecer de interés; pero, como a Don Quijote, se le despierta el angustioso sentido de la existencia solo después de tropezar por casualidad con Eugenia Domingo del Arco, de la que se enamora inmediata y desesperadamente. Como Don Quijote, se forja una imagen ideal de Eugenia […] que llena de tal modo su mente, que cuando se cruza con ella en carne y hueso por la calle ni siquiera la reconoce’ (King 1967: 227).
I am also aware of criticism that situates the vitalist, voluntarist statements in *Vida de don Quijote y Sancho* in philosophical models. Sinclair’s 2001 ‘Uncovering the Mind’ provides a comprehensive commentary on Unamuno’s relationship to Nietzschean voluntarism, and Teobaldo Noriega (2005) investigates the role of Rivadeneira’s *Vida del bienaventurado Padre Ignacio de Loyola* (1583), and also collates the triumph of quixotic will with Nietzsche. Sánchez-Barbudo (1950) argued that Unamuno’s Quijote is akin to Kierkegaard’s Abrahamic knight of faith, and more recently Jan Evans (2006, 2013) has submitted *Vida* to Kierkegaardian readings. Roberts (1966) also makes note of Kierkegaard’s relevance to Unamuno’s *Quijote*, and even Terreros’s 2009 PhD thesis considers the philosophies of Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer one of the key unifying factors between Unamuno and Borges. My aim is not to situate Unamuno’s vitalist, voluntarist statements in the works of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer or Kierkegaard, but to assess them from the perspective of some of the modern reader-response theorists.

In my analysis of *Vida de don Quijote y Sancho*, I will focus primarily on those chapters which lend themselves to a comparison with Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard, autor del *Quijote*’. I will highlight his rewritings of Menard’s chapters: IX, XXII and XXXVIII for the purposes of a later comparison. Other chapters, such as XLV in which the term *baciyelmo* is introduced, have been chosen specifically for their ability to communicate with the Borgesian idea that meaning is determined by the reader. I could also not avoid mentioning Unamuno’s version of Chapter 2, II, which is also at the heart of Borges’s *Magias parciales del Quijote*, nor Unamuno’s traditionalist interpretation of the adventure at Montesinos which contrasts against Borges’s view of literary tradition as expressed in ‘Kafka y sus precursores’. I will also examine the final chapter of *Vida de don Quijote y Sancho* to bring that contrast into even sharper relief.

**IV.1 The early Unamuno**

Unamuno’s first major engagement with the *Quijote* comes in a series of five essays which would come to be known as *En torno al casticismo*. Despite a radical shift in his approach to the Spanish work from around 1902, from *cervantismo* to *quijotismo*, some of the key ideas expressed in these essays are still present in his writings on the *Quijote* until the mid-1930s. Inasmuch as Unamuno continually amends his reading, he still constantly holds to some fundamental notions, including the hidalgo’s status as the epitome of an eternal Spanish tradition.
When Unamuno proposes his concept of intrahistoria18 in ‘La tradición eterna’, he adopts a Spencerian view that history is not the product of great men, but instead that great men are the product of history. This notion is one that Unamuno never abandons in relation to don Quijote as a protagonist. I will explore how this theory is interesting from a narratological point of view, in that it shares interpretive authority over the text across the community in which it is written and read.

Unamuno’s reading of the Quijote can also never be excised from his interest in (and later distaste for) Europeanisation. As Rabaté recently argued,

For Unamuno […] the country must open itself more to ‘crossbreeding’ with European ideas, cultures and practices in order to make progress; those casticistas who had historically attempted to seal off Spain from foreign currents such as the Reformation, or who promoted a chauvinistic account of Spanish intellectual and cultural achievements were, in effect, producing a pernicious inbreeding, leading to the decline of the country. (Rabaté 2016: 11)

Moreover, Unamuno in his 1906 ‘Sobre la europeización’ proposes that the future of Spain lies in a reciprocal relationship of cultural importing and exporting with the rest of Europe. Spain must be willing to consider itself simultaneously Spanish and European, in order to Europeanise the country and ‘hispanicise’ the continent:

la verdadera y honda europeización de España, es decir, nuestra digestión de aquella parte de espíritu europeo que pueda hacerse espíritu nuestro, no empezará hasta que no tratemos de imponernos en el orden espiritual a Europa, de hacerles tragar lo nuestro, lo genuinamente nuestro, a cambio de lo suyo, hasta que no tratemos de españolizar a Europa. (OC VII: 187)

Don Quijote bridges the gap between Unamuno’s political and cultural beliefs and his phenomenology of reading.19 To wit, he argues that Europe and Spain carry their own antheses within

18 The object of which is ‘the anonymous people of the countryside, the lives of millions of ordinary people living silent, obscure lives’ (Rabaté 2016: 16).
19 I am not the first to note this. Stephen Roberts’s ‘Unamuno’s Opposition to Primo de Rivera and his Sense of Mission (1923-24)’ showed that ‘All of his [Unamuno’s] works can be seen as part of an attempt to express what it means to be Spanish, beyond the false definition of the traditionalists. La vida de Don Quijote y Sancho (1905) and Del sentimiento trágico de la vida (1912) represent approximations to the reality of the ‘Spanish soul’ as Unamuno intuited the deeply religious and spiritual nature of the Spanish character’ (Roberts 1989: 85).
them in *En torno al casticismo*:20

Desde hace algún tiempo se ha precipitado la europeización de España […] Y hasta Menéndez y Pelayo, ‘español incorregible que nunca ha acertado a pensar más que en castellano’ (así lo cree, por lo menos, cuando lo dice), que a los veintiún años, ‘sin conocer del mundo y de los hombres más que lo que dicen los libros’ […] dedica lo mejor de su *Historia de las ideas estéticas en España*, su parte más sentida, a presentarnos la cultura europea contemporánea, sazonándola con una exposición aperitiva. (Unamuno 2014: 130-131)

Pointing to a Spanish intellectual whose interest in national politics led him to a study of contemporary Europe, Unamuno shows that the two are mutually reconcilable: ‘Tenemos tan deformado el cerebro, que no concebimos más que ser o amo o esclavo, o vencedor o vencido, empeñándonos en creer que la emancipación de éste es la ruina de aquél’ (134). This section of ‘La tradición eterna’ helps to explain Unamuno’s claim in *Vida* that don Quijote is the archetypal Spaniard and a universal hero. His Spanishness does not cancel with his universality; Spain’s greatest philosophical export is a style of idealism honed on the fields of la Mancha and ready to be tested against the best philosophy that exists outside of Spain.21

Unamuno’s reading is daring commensurately with the radicalness of the statements he makes on regeneration. He considers the *Quijote* to be an example of classic literature that eschews geographical and temporal colour, an artistic tradition that extrapolates general principles from individual circumstances:

20 Mermall’s explanation of the dialectic approach of *En torno al casticismo* is useful here: ‘By confronting similar structures from different spheres, dialectic initiates the tension and interpenetration of contrary notions, so that each concept turns into its own inherent opposite’ (Mermall 1993: 285).

21 Close made this point better than I: ‘it [the *Quijote*] is the perfect self-expression of a race — the Castilian — which in its art and culture tended to display narrowly exclusive habits of mind (either abstractly intellectual or sensuous but never both). Here, the Castilian caste manifested itself in a form which transcended its limitations in a universal synthesis, at once eternally Spanish and universally human. The novel incarnates the pure spring of eternal human realities which constitute the intrahistoric source of Spain’s successive castes and the substance enduring beneath historical change’ (Close 1972: 27). Quijote’s Spanish intra-historicity allows him to tap the most profound potential of his humanity. Similarly, the novel has become a kind of universal text, which forms much of Borges’s later analysis.
A ese arte eterno pertenece nuestro Cervantes, que en el sublime final de su Don Quijote señala a nuestra España, a la de hoy, el camino de su regeneración en Alonso Quijano el Bueno; a ése pertenece, porque de puro español llegó a una como renuncia de su españolismo, llegó al espíritu universal, al hombre que duerme dentro de todos nosotros. (142)

Unamuno reads into a 17th Century Golden Age text a moral for 19th and 20th Century Spanish politics, proposing a coded message on the future of Spain: that it must follow the example of Quijano, stop overreaching its own capabilities, and adopt a practical politics. Rabaté also notes the curative power of Don Quijote in Spanish political life, arguing that Quijote in Unamuno is ‘inscribed within the broader discursive framework of psychoanalysis […] When Don Quixote died, his madness died with him, and the healthy strengths of Alonso Quijano el Bueno are a model for Spain’s regeneration’ (Rabaté 2016: 15). Quijano is an ideal Spaniard whose renunciation of the ways of knight-errantry offers a universal moral on political pragmatism. At this stage, Unamuno’s lionising of Quijano is paired with a deep admiration for Cervantes. Unamuno sides with the authorial-narratorial voice that ends the second volume of the Quijote, and its statement after Quijano’s death on the text’s purpose:

pues no ha sido otro mi deseo que poner en aborrecimiento de los hombres las fingidas y disparatadas historias de los libros de caballerías, que por las de mi verdadero don Quijote van ya tropezando, y han de caer del todo, sin duda alguna. Vale. (Cervantes 2010: 1332)

Though Unamuno reads according to a new historical perspective, he does not stray far from the author-narrator’s stated intention. Unamuno’s later homages to Quijote ahead of Quijano require a more radical, anti-authorial stance.22 It is testament to the power of the author that a text set on the plains of La Mancha could have universal significance. The novel’s passage from Spanish national text to a universal work is symbolic of Spain’s hopeful passage from a nación to a pueblo, as Unamuno expresses in ‘¡Muera Don Quijote!’ in 1898:

España, la caballeresca España histórica, tiene como Don Quijote que renacer en el eterno hidalgo Alonso el Bueno, en el pueblo español, que vive bajo la historia, ignorándola en su mayor parte por su fortuna. La nación española —la nación, no el pueblo—, molida y

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22 Willard King showed in 1967 that Unamuno’s early essays interpret the story as a hero’s return to sanity, paying Cervantes due respect for a story well told. King points to a contradiction between Unamuno’s later tributes to the figure of Quijote and his new-found disdain for Cervantes (King 1967: 219).
quebrantada, ha de curar, sí cura, como curó su héroe, para morir. Sí, para morir como nación y vivir como pueblo. (OC VII: 1195)

That is a political and aesthetic argument. Spain must dismantle the machinery of nationhood and embrace the curative power of its own pueblo. It must look for its Spanish essence, and universalise it. If what is Spanish is also universal, then we must accept the validity of cross-border ideas on aspects of Spanish culture. It therefore divests Spain of its claim to sole interpretive authority over the Quijote. I will show later that an interest in supra-national interpretations of national texts also underlies Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’.

The connection between historical progress and literary tradition is strengthened in ‘La casta histórica Castilla’. The eternal Spanish tradition expresses itself in history and culture as an ever-changing yet never-changing spirit that moves inexorably throughout time. Don Quijote is one iteration of that tradition, a recipient of what has gone before and an antecedent to what will come next. In that sense, Spanish history and culture are in constant flux: ‘Nos queda por buscar algo del espíritu histórico castellano revelado sobre todo en nuestra lengua y en nuestra literatura clásica castiza, buscar qué es lo que tiene de eterno y qué de transitorio y qué debe quedar de él’ (163). Aguinaga notes that paradox in El Unamuno contemplativo:

La definición de tradición, en su primera parte, no podía ser más dinámica: es lo que está siempre en proceso de hacerse; en su segunda parte, sin embargo, cuando Unamuno indica que bajo lo que pasa hay algo que siempre queda, es ya un concepto estático, esencialista. (Aguinaga 1975: 66)

Don Quijote is an example of that transitory and eternal culture. The idealism he practises in Vida de don Quijote y Sancho is an eternally valid philosophy which adapts itself to cultural and political circumstances. Spain’s international politics should be marked by a flux of cosmopolitanism and regionalism: ‘Conviene mostrar que el regionalismo y el cosmopolitismo son dos aspectos de una misma idea y los sostenes del verdadero patriotismo, que todo cuerpo se sostiene del juego de la presión externa con la tensión externa’ (163).

The idea that each concept contains its own antithesis is explored further in 1905’s Vida. The internal contradictions of the intra-historic system, in which history has both ever-lasting and always-changing features, and in which Spain should take an increased interest in the culture within and
without its own borders\textsuperscript{23}, are exemplified in the clash of prosaic and poetic worlds in don Quijote’s philosophy.

Unamuno rejects all notions that the \textit{Quijote} was written in a vacuum, and that instead it is causally related to literary antecedents and successors. For example, Calderón’s protagonists, like Segismundo, live fully in the spirit of Alonso Quijano:

\begin{quote}
en aquel relato eterno, en que, despojado del héroe, muere Alonso Quijano el \textit{Bueno} en el esplendor inmortal de su bondad. Este Alonso Quijano, que por sus virtudes y a pesar de sus locuras mereció el dictado de el \textit{Bueno}, es el fondo eterno y permanente de los héroes de Calderón, que son los que mejor revelan la manifestación \textit{histórica}, la meramente histórica de aquel pueblo. (170)
\end{quote}

Texts condense preceding literary tradition; Calderón’s \textit{La vida es sueño} explores metaphysical questions proposed by the narrative tricks of \textit{Don Quijote de la Mancha}. When the works of Calderón and Cervantes are collated, the variables and the constants of the intra-historic spirit which has begotten them might be better understood. Placing the \textit{Quijote} in an endlessly proliferating culture implies that a work cannot be attributed to a single figure, but to a whole community. As such, the intra-historic idea that culture is the product of a community spirit has much in common with the anti-intentionalist approach to reading, in which the author can never explain the total meaning of a work, but in which an ever-changing community of readers across time will constantly discover new meanings within it. For this reason, Marcos (2005: 95) argues that we must not ignore Unamuno’s statement towards the end that ‘El lector sensato pondrá el método que falta y llenará los huecos’ (269). \textit{En torno al casticismo} invites its reader to oust the author, as Unamuno takes to extremes in \textit{Vida}. Moreover, Jaub’s position that a text is not a monument but an orchestration of constantly-updated readings seems to reflect Unamuno’s intra-historic view of literary culture. I contend that Unamuno builds his later discussion of don Quijote on the intra-historic system proposed in \textit{En torno al casticismo}.

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\textsuperscript{23} John Butt notes that Unamuno’s romanticised version of the \textit{pueblo}, the basis of the idea of intrahistoria, is heavily derived from the extant German concept of the Volksgeist/Volksgeschichte.

and is therefore a Europeanising model derived from wider European thought (Butt 1972: 14). Pedro Ribas also situates Unamuno’s \textit{intrahistoria} within Hegel’s \textit{Völkerpsychologie} for the same reason (Ribas 2002: 127).
‘El espíritu castellano’ highlights why critics like Basdekis argue that Unamuno, for all of his later invectives against the author, always lionised Cervantes (Basdekis 1969: 180). Cervantes is emblematic of the new Spain, one that lives within and outside of its borders. Calderón, he argues, ‘es a quien «leemos con más fatiga» los españoles de hoy, mientras Cervantes vive eterna vida dentro y fuera de su pueblo’ (186 - emphasis in original). The text is set across Spain but has found a readership around the world. The Spanishness and universality of the text is symbolised, Unamuno suggests, in the relationship between Quijote and Sancho: ‘Don Quijote y Sancho caminan juntos, se ayudan, riñen, se quieren, pero no se funden. Los extremos se tocan sin confundirse’ (187). The two clash yet beneficially co-exist. Moreover, Quijote’s idealism is the philosophy Spain ought to adopt and bring to the outside world, just as ‘La sistematización del honor, la caballería, es, como tantas sistematizaciones y pulimentos, de origen francés’ (209). Spanish culture is an amalgam of internal and external influences. When those influences condense into new cultural phenomena, they must exert an external influence on foreign culture. As Unamuno stresses, ‘Los franceses nos dieron Rolando, como nosotros a ellos Gil Blas’ (210). In Vida, quijotismo becomes both a Spanish philosophy and a universal method for living, as well as the means by which Spain can participate in supra-national culture, bringing quixotic idealism into communication with European, pragmatic sanchopancismo. These approaches are not foes. As Vicén argues, ‘El ‘pueblo’, lo perpetuamente ignorado bajo el brillo de los ‘hechos históricos’, ha de ser el plasma germinativo que fecundado por corrientes europeas, dará vida a una nueva España’ (Vicén 1943: 222).

Unamuno takes the Quijote as a political fable, with Segismundo’s statement that renown is key to eternal life at its heart. ‘Tras esto eterno se fue el vuelo del alma castellana’ (218), argues Unamuno in ‘De mística y humanismo’, here taking Quijote’s unerring faith in his moral rectitude as an illustration of how the Castilian spirit is given to seeking fame. Don Quijote’s ethics forego a materialist view, instead holding to a moral principle where the individual must suffer physical pain in the face of injustice:

 Cuando del buen Sancho perdonaba cuantos agravios le habían hecho y hubieran de hacer, Don Quijote, molido por los yangüeses, habría querido poder hablar un poco descansado y dar a entender a Panza el error en que estaba, adoctrinándole en cómo el que gobierna ha de tener ‘valor para ofender y defenderse en cualquier acontecimiento’, doctrina caballerescas, levantadora de imperios, y «lo que ha levantado y levanta estos imperios de tierra es lo bestial que hay en los hombres.» (238-239)

Sancho is too fearful of physical pain to battle the muleteers. Unamuno laments this mistake, agreeing with don Quijote in violation of the satirical reading, that the courage to defend oneself is the greatest
moral standard. Unamuno does not just rebuke Sancho, but also those readers who see in the Quijote a satire for obeying a cowardly rationale, an ethically-unsound obsession with material consequences rather than spiritual ideals.

Unamuno’s early writing on the Quijote is ambivalent in its preference for either Quijote or Quijano, both becoming the moral exemplum of many of the arguments in En torno al casticismo. Unamuno jarringly shifts from a pro-Quijote view to a pro-Quijano one within the same text:

Hay que matar a Don Quijote para que resucite Alonso Quijano el Bueno, el discreto, el que hablaba a los cabreros del siglo de la paz [...] «¡Verdaderamente se muere y verdaderamente está cuerdo Alonso Quijano el Bueno!». El bachiller Sansón Carrasco, la razón raciocinante apoyada en el sentido histórico, creerá incorregible a Don Quijote y siempre para su solaz la graciosa locura de éste. Así ha sido hasta hoy así tiene que seguir siendo, hoy como ayer y mañana como hoy. (244-245)

Quijote is the ultimate pragmatist in the abandonment of an ideal he could no longer support in light of the irrefutable evidence of his defeat to a disguised Sansón Carrasco. Paradoxically, that confirms Quijote’s worldview: he has become enlightened because he had the courage to impose his ideals onto his environment.

A Sancho-like inability to impose an ideal onto the world, Unamuno explains, is one of the reasons for what ‘el marasmo actual de España’. Sanchopancismo holds in a Spain stuck in the mire of common sense without a moral telos:

¡Qué rozagante vive el sancho-pancismo anti-especulativo y anti-utopista! ¡Qué estragos hace el sentido común, lo más anti-filosófico y anti-ideal que existe! El sentido común declara loco en una sociedad en que sólo se emplea la simple vista, la vista común, a quien mira con microscopio o telescopio; el sentido común emplea argumentum ad risum para hacer ver la incongruencia de una opinión con nuestros hábitos mentales. (251)

Unamuno denies the reading that the Quijote is simply the comic tale of a madman. To consider don Quijote mad is philosophically illiterate and morally pusillanimous. It requires conforming events to a pre-conceived view, rather than updating one’s view in light of events. What Unamuno dislikes in Sancho, he comes to later exult in Quijote; his quest to make the world conform to his expectations. For now, the sanchopancista habit of rejecting the incongruence between his mind and the world is illustrative of the economic decline of Spain:
Vivimos en un país pobre, y donde no hay harina todo es mohina. La pobreza económica explica nuestra anemia mental; las fuerzas más frescas y juveniles se agotan en establecerse, en la lucha por el destino. Pocas verdades más hondas que la de que en la jerarquía de los fenómenos sociales los económicos son los primeros principios, los elementos. (255)

Spain’s poverty and lack of national philosophical discourse are products of each other.24 Unamuno declares the Spanish crisis to be primarily an intellectual one, brought about by a ‘desquite del viejo espíritu histórico nacional que reacciona contra la europeización’ (262). Spain reaffirms its own intellectual frameworks by rejecting unfamiliar notions which exist outside, just as Sancho reaffirms his by rejecting Quijote’s chivalric worldview. Spain’s future lies in an opening of its own intellectual borders, capturing the spirit without the practices of its colonial past: ‘Fue grande el alma castellana cuando se abrió a los cuatro vientos y se derramó por el mundo; luego cerró sus valvas y aún no hemos despertado’ (263). Quijote always symbolises the necessary search for a national ideal. In a comment that he nuances in his 1906 ‘Sobre la europeización’, he argues that, ‘sólo abriendo las ventanas a vientos europeos, empapándonos en el ambiente continental, teniendo fe en que no perderemos nuestra personalidad al hacerlo, europeizándonos para hacer España y chapuzándonos en pueblo, regeneraremos esta estepa moral’ (268). The regeneration of Spanish moral, intellectual and political life relies on replacing Sancho-esque self-preservation with quixotic cosmopolitanism. The Quijote could never have been written without the influence of literature in France and Italy, for example. The greatness of Spanish letters is provided by its position in a tapestry of literary exchange. Unamuno closes ‘El marasmo actual de España’, the final instalment of En torno al casticismo, stating that the intra-historic Spanish spirit awaits a saviour who can reawaken that golden-age cosmopolitanism. It took less than ten years for Don Quijote himself to be anointed that saviour.

IV.2 The turn of the century

Between 1895 and 1905, Unamuno published multiple times on the Quijote, including an 1896 essay ‘El caballero de la triste figura’. This essay proposes that don Quijote was a real historical figure in order to justify the argument that the fame of Quijote’s deeds granted him eternal life, pre-empting many of the assertions Unamuno makes in Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho. It argues that Cide Hamete Benengeli is an imperfect biographer who ‘no caló’ (OC I: 911) details of the hidalgo’s life.

24 As Stephen Roberts argues: ‘Unamuno understood that the absence of debate has a deadening effect upon the minds of a nation, and he also saw that Primo’s coup had had the aim and effect of removing criticism and conflict from public life’ (Roberts 1989: 83).
Unamuno plays at taking literally the literary devices of the *Quijote*: the invention of Cide Hamete Benengeli as an historian whose version Cervantes edits. He works entirely within what Iser denotes ‘the rules of the game’ when reading, abiding by many of the features of the text despite the tendency to read Benengeli’s role satirically. Moreover, to argue that Benengeli has missed aspects of the *Quijote* suggests that the reader’s understanding of the text can outstrip the author’s, and that our experience of *Don Quijote* can tell us more about the hidalgo than the historian might have known. Paradoxically, the reader is permitted to conclude from the text, which cannot and does not say everything, everything that it cannot and does not say! The *Quijote* presents itself as a biography, but provides little historiography, ascribing to conjecture the name of our hidalgo. It lacks credibility as the narrative voice is shared. As such, Unamuno’s non-intentionalist reading of the *Quijote*, which disregards any attempt at satire, still plays by Iser’s rules of the game. Hence, I cannot agree with critics like Close, who argue that Unamuno misses the irony. That irony is present in Unamuno’s apparently ingenuous reading of Benengeli as an historical man, in a reductio ad absurdum which reinstates only that message that the reader might naturally have taken from the *Quijote*: that the stated intention of the author is not equal to the true meaning of the text.

When Unamuno claims that different cultures produce particular readings of the *Quijote*:

> Hay un tipo diverso de Don Quijote para los diversos pueblos que más o menos le han comprendido. Hay el francés, apuesto, de retorcidas y tiesas guías de bigote, no caído éste, sin mucho asomo de tristeza, más parecido al aragonés de Avellaneda que al castellano de Cervantes; hay el inglés, que se acerca mucho más al español, y al verdadero, por tanto […] si le cojieran [sic] todos ellos y se fundiesen en uno, como se hace con las fotografías compuestas, de manera tal que los ragos [sic] comunes se reforzaran dejando en penumbra a los diferenciales, neutralizados unos con otros, obtendríase un arquetipo empírico, como tal nebuloso y gráficamente abstracto, de donde poder sacar el pintor la verdadera figura de Don Quijote. (923)

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25 The attribution of the novel to a fictional author is a Cervantine technique common to Unamuno and Borges. One could well argue that Cide Hamete Benengeli is Unamuno’s Pierre Menard.

26 I align more with Rachel Schmidt, who recently argued that ‘To assert Cide’s historicity, as well as that of Don Quixote, is a flagrant violation of all the narrative frames within which Cervantes has placed this fictional manuscript. Such a violation is typical of Unamuno’s literary thought and creation, for from this transgression of boundaries he seeks to problematise authorship and readership as well as the status of fiction’ (Schmidt 2011: 171).
Such a claim would have been interesting to Jauß, who argues that ‘meaning only becomes progressively visible and definable in the subsequent changes of aesthetic experience, and dialogically so in the interaction between the literary work and the literary public’ (Jauß 1982: 64). That might provide the link between Unamuno’s desire for Spain to participate in a European political framework, and his aesthetics of reading. Unamuno rejects the assumption that the text can be understood in an absolute sense from a Spanish perspective. No reader can conceive of the absolute meaning of a work, as they are bound by, in Jauß’s term, their horizon of expectations. I disagree with Ribas that the dialectical process of reading can create a utopian view of a text: ‘En la dialéctica autor-lector que establece la teoría de la recepción cabe perfectamente la perspectiva utópica y crítica, si bien ésta no se basará ya sólo en la intención del autor, que el lector leería sin más, sino en que éste interviene activamente junto con el autor’ (Ribas 2002: 78). Reception theory forbids a utopian, ideal version of the text. Don Quijote is not just a series of words put to paper, but a synthesis of all of the possible interpretations of those words. No mind can have an absolute overview of all possible interpretations. Borges demonstrates that impossibility in ‘El Aleph’, where the narrator’s capacity to make rational abstractions is dissolved when he conceives of the absolute. Were it possible to collate all of the possible readings of Don Quijote into a single explanatory text, then the reader would have reached the ‘true’ interpretation of it. But such a text would be simultaneously impossible and useless. For as long as there is a reader, there is an interpretation, and to catalogue all interpretations would be akin to constructing the Library of Babel. Unamuno leads the reader to a conclusion they might have drawn from reading the Quijote: that there is no empirical principle by which to read. He fills that gap with faith: ‘Hay que pintarlo con la fe que crea lo que no vemos, creyendo firmemente

27 I am not the first to notice this association. Maestro identifies Unamuno as a precursor to Jauß: ‘Sin saberlo, Unamuno se convierte así en un precursor de la Rezeptionsästhetik o estética de la recepción alemana, que no se manifestará con toda su plenitud y notoriedad hasta 1967’ (Maestro 1990: 243).

28 Maestro also discusses Unamuno’s reading of the Quijote in terms of Jauß’s theory on the Erwartungshorizont: ‘En el caso del Quijote, su horizonte de expectativas está constituido por la suma de comportamientos, conocimientos e ideas estéticas preconcebidas que el texto cervantino encuentra en el momento de su aparición, durante los años 1605 y 1615, y merced a los cuales será valorado entre sus contemporáneos’ (Maestro 1990: 245).

29 I agree with La Rubia Prado on this point: ‘La apertura de la textualidad a la interpretación también significa un rechazo de Dios en el sentido teológico tradicional: no se nos puede imponer un significado verticalmente porque Unamuno descarta la posibilidad de que la escritura mecanicista/ovipara, en la que el poeta escribe con preconocimiento (con plan) como el Dios mismo monoteísta tradicional creó el universo, sea siquiera poesía’ (Prado 1999: 142).
que Don Quijote existe y vive y obra, como creían en la vida de los santos y ángeles que pintaban aquellos maravillosos *primitivos* (924 - emphasis in original). As *Vida* later shows, don Quijote’s readings assume that there is no objective truth outside of his own mind. In that sense, quixotic idealism is the epitome of Unamuno’s aesthetics.

**IV.3 Unamuno after 1902**

Months before *Vida de don Quijote y Sancho* was published, Unamuno ‘Sobre la lectura e interpretación del *Quijote*’ which anticipated his great rewriting of Cervantes’s work. Notable is his turn from extolling the Spanish national spirit to bemoaning its decline:

En pocas cosas se muestra más de relieve que en lo que con el *Quijote* ocurre en España la tristísima decadencia en nuestro espíritu nacional. Se ha podido decir, con toda justicia, que no es España la nación en que más se conoce el *Quijote*, y puede añadirse que no es aquella en que mejor se le conoce […] Puede asegurarse que España es una de las naciones en que menos se lee el *Quijote*, y desde luego as aquella en que peor se lee. (OC I: 1227)

Unamuno’s concern with a national spirit in decline never extricates itself from a concern with reading. Unamuno defines a poor reader as one who searches for meaning rather creating it. *Cervantistas* who have robbed the text of its possible meanings: ‘los críticos y comentadores que como nube de langostas han caído sobre nuestro desgraciado libro, dispuestos a tronchar y estropear las espigas y a no dejar más que la paja’ (1227-1228). Unamuno’s task in rewriting the *Quijote* is to restore an intellectual curiosity to Spanish readers of the *Quijote*, one that has taken hold already in European literary traditions.

Unamuno takes aim at intentionalist readers for their assumption that they know the author had in mind, and that this assumption forms a critical method:

Y de cuando en cuando nos sale algún santón de la crítica sesuda y de cortos vuelos, diciéndonos que Cervantes ni quiso ni pudo querer decir lo que tal o cual simbolista le atribuye, sino que su propósito fué tan sólo el de desterrar la lectura de los libros de caballerías.

Convenido que así fuese; pero ¿qué tiene que ver lo que Cervantes quisiera decir en su *Quijote*, si es que quiso decir algo, con lo que a los demás se nos ocurra ver en él? ¿De cuándo acá es el autor de un libro el que ha de entenderlo mejor? (1230)
The interpretive authority over the Quijote is shared among those who share in the spirit from which Quijote was extracted:

Desde que el Quijote apareció impreso y a la disposición de quien lo tomara en mano y lo leyese, el Quijote no es de Cervantes, sino de todos los que lo lean y lo sientan. Cervantes sacó a Don Quijote del alma de su pueblo y del alma de la humanidad toda, y en su inmortal libro se lo devolvió a su pueblo y a toda la humanidad. (1230)

When Cervantes derived don Quijote from the spirit of his pueblo, he found in the hidalgo the epitome of the Spanish cultural and political mindset on the lowest level. Basdekis explains the link between the author and tradition as follows:

Cervantes, through his immortal work, returns to his ‘pueblo’ and all of humanity what he found there. It is in this sense that he is an ‘instrument’ of his ‘pueblo,’ a product of his tradition and culture who has synthesised that tradition and culture in a great work of art. Cervantes has created for all readers an open dialogue wherein the reader as co-author sees himself and his ‘intra-history’ spread across a platform which is in turn a ‘possibility’ for all future generations of men. (Basdekis 1969: 185)

Cervantes provides his pueblo with a work of art with which they can communicate. It is the intra-historic Spanish spirit distilled into literature. And as long as Spanish readers are recipients of their own eternal tradition, which is itself a synthesis of internal and external cultural influences, the interpretive authority of the Quijote is shared equally among them. Unamuno expresses that in a highly poetic section:

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30 Vicén considers this a point of admiration for the author: ‘Cervantes fué un genio, pero lo fué en un sentido concreto y determinado; no porque acertara a crear una figura imperecedera, sino porque supo encarnar en un momento preciso todo la esencia ideal de su pueblo’ (Vicén 1947: 198).

31 Longhurst raises a similar point: ‘If this is so, an author is not only expressing an own outlook and disposition but also those of the community within which that sense of identity was developed. If our self-identity is as dependent on the external world of others as Unamuno makes out, it follows that Don Quixote or any other hero will embody much of that external prompting. Don Quixote is the real representative, whereas the author is a mere instrument’ (Longhurst 2014: 37). In other words, the author is a conduit of external cultural phenomena.
Cervantes puso a Don Quijote en el mundo, y luego el mismo Don Quijote se ha cargado de vivir en él; y aunque el bueno de don Miguel creyó matarle y enterrarle e hizo levantar testimonio notarial de su muerte para que nadie ose resucitarlo y hacerle hacer nueva salida, el mismo Don Quijote se ha resucitado a sí mismo, por sí y ante sí, y anda por el mundo haciendo de las suyas […] Cervantes escribió su libro en la España de principios del siglo XVII y para la España de principios del siglo XVII, pero Don Quijote ha viajado por todos los pueblos de la tierra y durante los tres siglos que desde entonces van trascurridos. Y como Don Quijote no podía ser en la Inglaterra del siglo XIX, pongo por caso, lo mismo que en la España del siglo XVII, se ha modificado y trasformado en ella, probando así su poderosa vitalidad y lo realísimo de su realidad ideal. (1231)

Cervantes is the scription of that which the horizon of expectations of a 17th Century Spaniard allowed him to conceive. There is an authoring responsibility outside of the author, which places interpretive freedom in the reader.32 Don Quijote is the point of departure for various possible readings of him, all of which are enabled and legitimised by the changing historical circumstances in which the text is received. This aligns Unamuno with Jauß’s later argument that each successive historic generation enables new understandings as horizons of expectations are updated. It also bridges the gap with Borges’s argument in ‘Pierre Menard’ that Menard’s version is superior as it is more difficult for someone of his particular historical circumstances to have conceived of the novel.

Unamuno and Borges share a universalising view of the novel. While Unamuno argues that the Quijote condenses all of the historical and literary influences in early 17th Century Spain, he is keen to see its interpretation become a matter of international discourse:

Nunca he podido pasar con eso de que el Quijote sea intraductible; y aún hay más: y es que llego a creer que hasta gana traduciéndolo, y que si ha sido mejor sentido fuera de España que en ella misma, se debe en buena parte a que no ha podido empañar su belleza la preocupación del lenguaje. (1233)

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32 Ribas describes that freedom as such: ‘Don Quijote es personaje creado por Cervantes, pero una vez que éste lo entregó a los lectores, Don Quijote tiene ‘realidad’ independiente de quien lo creó’ (Ribas 2002: 95).
Borges famously read the *Quijote* for the first time in English, before reading a Spanish version that he considered a poor translation of an English original. As such both subscribe to a reader-centric, cosmopolitan approach to reception for its potential to imbue texts with new possible meanings that could not have existed in the geographical-historical circumstances in which Cervantes published his work. Hence a text’s possible meaning is far greater than the meaning that an author can devise. As Unamuno puts it:

> Y no me cabe duda de que Cervantes es un caso típico de un escritor enormemente inferior a su obra, a su *Quijote* [...] Llego a sospechar que Cervantes se murió sin haber calado todo el alcance de su *Quijote*, y acaso sin haberlo entendido a derechas. Me parece que si Cervantes resucitara y leyese de nuevo su *Quijote*, lo entendería tan mal como lo entienden los masoretas cervantistas y se pondría del lado de éstos. (1233)

When reading is free of a unifying principle other than the view of the reader, it is difficult to argue for the existence of misreadings. Though to Unamuno, the only unacceptable reading of a text is an author-centric one. The battle between *quijotismo* and *cervantismo* in Unamuno’s writing can generally be described as a battle between the opposing methods of reader-centrism and intentionalism. I agree with Basdeikis’s distinction between *quijotismo* as an emphasis on the literary content and *cervantismo* as an emphasis on the authorial meaning. As he argues:

> ‘Cervantismo’ [...] means the myopic focusing on the battle of Lepanto, on a possible illicit episode, on financial irregularities, on life in a seventeenth-century jail, etc [...] It is an exercise in paleontology performed to the detriment of reader, literary work and even to the detriment of the author. (Basdeikis 1969: 183)

Calling *cervantismo* a sort of paleontology recalls the contention of the non-intentionalists that an author’s meaning cannot reliably be reconstructed. *Quijotismo* avoids this difficulty: ‘And ‘quijotismo’ means that the author politely steps aside and allows future generations of critics,

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33 Fernando Iwasaki Cauti has also noted this affinity: ‘No me propongo negar que la primera lectura borgeana del Quijote fuera en inglés, pero el primero que aseguró que el Quijote mejoraría con una buena traducción fue Unamuno’ (Cauti 2005).

34 Though Gemma Roberts argues persuasively that *quijotismo* stands for a philosophy of idealism: ‘El quijotismo permite imperar sobre el mundo objetivo, permite adaptarlo y crearlo de acuerdo con nuestro ideal, de acuerdo con nuestros deseos más íntimos y anhelos más profundos’ (Roberts 1966: 22).
readers, authors to search in his pages for the looking glass which will reveal them to themselves, which will put relief in their “tradición eterna”’ (Basdekis 1969:182). Self-identification with the text is a possible meaning that an author cannot intend. It is the task of the quijotistas to identify such meanings. Closing this essay, Unamuno asks: “¿Lucirán en España mejores días para Don Quijote y Sancho? ¿Serán mejor comprendidos? Es de esperarlo, sobre todo si los quijotistas nos proponemos quijotescamente derrotar a los cervantistas’ (1237). Vida de don Quijote y Sancho presents Unamuno’s final assault on the intentionalism of the cervantistas.

IV.4 Vida de don Quijote y Sancho

Contemporary editions of Vida de don Quijote y Sancho exemplify Unamuno’s dual status as reader and author. The 1905 edition passed without authorial note, until a prologue was added to a second edition published in Salamanca in 1913. An addendum to the prologue was provided in 1928, with a notional third section released in 1930 to assure the reader that the author had nothing more to add. Post-1913 editions of Vida feature arguably the most significant authorial comment in Unamuno’s writings on the Quijote. Unamuno opted to publish Vida after his essay ‘Sobre la lectura e interpretación del Quijote’ as the former is simply an explanation of the system set out in the latter:

Lo que se reduce a asentar que dejando a eruditos, críticos e historiadores la meritoria y utilísima tarea de investigar lo que el Quijote pudo significar en su tiempo y en el ámbito en que se produjo y lo que Cervantes quiso en él expresar y expresó, debe quedarnos a otros libre el tomar su obra inmortal como algo eterno, fuera de época y aun de país, y exponer lo que su lectura nos sugiere. (Unamuno 2011:133)

Ironically referring to the task of critics to reconstruct the intentions of Cervantes as utilísima, he proposes a new approach: one which sees meaning as determined by the circumstances of reading. We are free to examine how meaning has changed by the force of historical progress far outside of the spatio-temporal coordinates of a 17th Century Spanish reader. Unamuno condenses various theories that would be expressed later in the 20th Century, including Iser’s statement that reading texts as if they held meaning only as intended by the author is outdated, and Jauß’s contention that the ever-changing historical moment provides new horizons of expectations that validate readings departing from those that would have been accepted at the moment of writing. Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard’ also examines how the Quijote might be read from a modern, international perspective, though it allows for communication between the author’s horizon of expectations and the reader’s.
The quality of Menard’s rewriting is relative to the poverty of Cervantes’s, whereas Unamuno sees little interpretive use for Cervantes’s version.\textsuperscript{35}

Unamuno takes a radical stance against the author that would be permitted by Iser’s and Jauß’s later theoretical work. The clash between \textit{cervantismo} and \textit{quijotismo} is an early expression of the conflict between what we would later call intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, as Unamuno seems to express here:

\begin{quote}
No creo deber repetir que me siento más quijotista que cervantista y que pretendo libertar al \textit{Quijote} del mismo Cervantes, permitiéndome alguna vez hasta discrepar de la manera como Cervantes entendió y trató a sus dos héroes, sobre todo a Sancho. Sancho se le imponía a Cervantes, a pesar suyo. (134)
\end{quote}

Reception theory permits us to dispute the meaningfulness of an author’s stated intention. \textit{Vida} achieves this. The statement that Sancho imposed himself on his creator is evidence of Unamuno’s reader-centrism.\textsuperscript{36} The novel’s authorship must be credited to a broader, international literary tradition. Literature is one of the many ways in which the intra-historic spirit expresses itself. Recipients of that spirit have an interpretive authority equal to the author. Hence Sancho imposed himself on the author; Cervantes could not have authored his story were it not for the chivalric form that enabled him. To Unamuno, the text appears to the author as a landscape might appear to a painter. So his railing against Cervantes is an extreme vocalisation of an aesthetics of readership. New horizons of expectations can provide a meaning in the work distinct from that which the author intended. Historical circumstances outside the text provide a reading that bears few traces of the satirical, burlesque interpretation that would have been most accepted in 17th Century Spain.

\textsuperscript{35} For that reason, Gemma Roberts argues that: ‘No intenta Unamuno realizar en su \textit{Vida de don Quijote y Sancho} labor de erudición cervantina y mucho menos de crítica literaria […] Es decir, su propósito es extraer la verdadera filosofía del Quijote contraponiéndola a las usuales interpretaciones profesorales. Trata, precisamente, de sacar a don Quijote de la cátedra literaria para introducirlo de lleno en la vida. Ciertamente, la filosofía que él deriva de la figura el héroe cervantino es, en parte, el producto de su propia interpretación de la vida del propio carácter de su pensamiento, que pudiéramos definir, con sus mismas palabras como un ‘quijotismo filosófico’ (Roberts 1966: 17).

\textsuperscript{36} It is, I must add, reminiscent of the clash between Unamuno and Augusto in \textit{Niebla}, as Ardila and Biggane recently pointed out (Ardila & Biggane 2016: 200).
In a second prologue in 1928, Unamuno apologises for typographical errors in previous editions caused by ‘precipitaciones de improvisador’ (135). Calling himself an improviser instead of an author could hardly express Unamuno’s suspicion of authorial authority more clearly. This prologue also shows Unamuno taking Cervantes literally in a reductio ad absurdum of intentionalism:

En el prólogo del Quijote —que, como casi todos los prólogos (incluso éste) no son apenas sino mera literatura—, Cervantes nos revela que encontró el relato de la hazañosa vida del Caballero de la Triste Figura en unos papeles arábigos de un Cide Hamete Benengeli, profunda revelación con la que el bueno [...] Cervantes nos revela lo que podríamos llamar la objetividad, la existencia [...] de Don Quijote y Sancho y su coro entero fuera de la ficción del novelista y sobre ella. Por mi parte, creo que el tal Cide Hamete Benengeli no era árabe, sino judío y judío marroquí, y que tampoco fingió la historia. (136)

Unamuno probably did not see Benengeli as anything other than a literary trick. Rather, in taking Cervantes literally, he guides his reader in the pitfalls of reading naively, and explores the rich meaning that an anti-intentionalist reading can create.37

Modern editions of Vida also feature the essay ‘El sepulcro de Don Quijote’ published in La España Moderna in 1906. It defines don Quijote’s agonismo as an idealist worldview that accepts that ‘El verdadero porvenir es hoy. ¿Qué será de nosotros mañana? ¡No hay mañana! ¿Qué es de nosotros hoy, ahora? Esta es la única cuestión’ (141). Historical advancement must be made by agonistas like don Quijote who wish to make a material impact here and now. That ideological movement has don Quijote as its figurehead: ‘Creo que se puede intentar la santa cruzada de ir a rescatar el sepulcro del Caballero de la Locura del poder de los hidalgos de la Razón’ (142). Don Quijote teaches the value of existing over simply being, of seeing the world in an irrational way so as to change it according to the will.

Quijotismo’s greatest moral teaching is stoicism towards ridicule. Ridicule is the weapon of erudite bachilleres who guard the sepulchre of a ‘Caballero que hizo reír a todo el mundo, pero que nunca soltó un chiste. Tenía el alma demasiado grande para parir chistes’ (143). Fear of ridicule stifles intellectual progress. If we abandon that fear as Quijote did, we will promote a reader-centric discourse of free ideological exchange. Ridicule is a circular argument born of common sense in

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37 As Molinero argues, ‘Unamuno ha tenido que pasar por la ocurrencia cervantina del autor fingido; esto es, ha tenido que enmascararse literariamente de cervantista para posicionarse poéticamente como quijotista’ (Molinero 1999: 111).
order to justify the application of common sense. The satirical reading of *don Quijote* is based on a positivist logic which is affirmed cyclically. The romantic approach, by its nature irrational, empowers the reader to trust their own interpretation and to bring it into public discourse. So, says Unamuno,

*Sigue a la estrella. Y haz como el Caballero: endereza el entuerto que se te ponga delante. Ahora lo de ahora y aquí lo de aquí. ¡Poneos en marcha! […] ¡Luchar! ¡Luchar!, y ¿cómo? ¿Cómo? Tropezáis con uno que miente?, gritarle a la cara: ¡mentira!, y ¡adelante! ¿Tropezáis con uno que roba? gritarle: ¡ladrón!, y ¡adelante!…* (146-147)

The reader’s own mind is the source of categorial imperatives. This is the stuff of modernising political discourse:

*Mira, amigo, si quieres cumplir tu misión y servir a tu patria, es preciso que te hagas odioso a los muchachos sensibles que no ven el universo sino a través de los ojos de su novia. O algo peor aún. Que tus palabras sean estridentes y agrias a sus oídos […] Echa del escuadrón a todos los danzantes de la jeringa […] Son a la vez estetas y perezistas y lopecistas o rodriguezistas.* (148)

Unamuno’s political, cultural and aesthetic views share a methodology. An interpretive approach described by reception theorists bridges the gap between those disciplines. Serving one’s nation entails a scepticism of given literary interpretations and political ideologies: ‘Si quieres, mi buen amigo, llenar tu vocación debidamente, desconfía del arte, desconfía de la ciencia, por lo menos de eso que llaman arte y ciencia y no son sino mezquinos remedos del arte y de la ciencia verdaderos. Que te baste tu fe. Tu fe será tu arte, tu fe será tu ciencia’ (150). Art, science, politics: all must be viewed exclusively through the eyes of the individual, and each view must be defended with unerring faith.

The irony of Unamuno’s treatment of *don Quijote* as an historical figure is evident from the first chapter. In an aping of Cervantes’s pseudo-admission as to the unreliability of the record on Alonso Quijano, Unamuno offers a similar admission, with an unlikely solution: ‘Nada abemos [sic] del nacimiento de Don Quijote, nada de su infancia y juventud, ni de cómo se fraguara el ánimo del Caballero de la Fe’ (157). He calls Cervantes’s bluff on the historicity of the account to illustrate the success of the narrative conceit: forewarning against reading objectivity into a text. He takes the feigned historical record to its logical extreme, ostensibly criticising those who see *don Quijote* as a mere fiction. How could anyone ascribe *Quijote*’s existence to Cervantes when ‘tan esparcida cuanto
nefanda creencia de que Don Quijote no es sino ente ficticio y fantástico, como si fuera hacedero a humana fantasía el parir tan estupenda figura”? (158). From there, he makes the dubious claim that Quijote ‘era de los linajes que son y no fueron. Su linaje empieza en él’ (158). Here I believe that Unamuno argues an extreme case in order to state its opposite. A lacuna in the historical record does not imply that don Quijote is free of all lineage. Rather that lacuna is a condition of his literary heritage: it is a travesty of the pseudo-historical nature of the chivalric novels that Cervantes so lampoons. The Quijote is the meeting point of various cultural and historical trends that are not the work of one author. It must be read as a fiction which does not prescribe its own meaning. Unamuno demonstrates the extent to which a reader must engage scepticism when reading by playing the extreme form of an unsceptical reader.

This seems to be at work when Unamuno embarks on a pseudo-biblical reading of the novel. For what hermeneutic principle exists for a reader to separate the truth of the Gospel from the truth of the novel? Unamuno’s messianic statements on don Quijote highlight the ingenuousness that readers of any work must abandon: ‘Por nuestro bien lo perdió [el juicio]; para dejarnos eterno ejemplo de generosidad espiritual. Con juicio, ¿hubiera sido tan heroico? Hizo en aras de su pueblo el más grande sacrificio: el de su juicio’ (163). This claim is an imbroglio of competing readings. Unamuno’s feigned naivety reduces to the absurd the kind of reader the Quijote seems to take aim at. But Quijote’s reading of chivalric novels as if they were historical record is the basis of his heroism. His heroic madness is a product of the necessary scepticism of given modes of reading. The inherent contradictoriness of the argument is a condition for its success: the only valid interpretation is arrived at sceptically.

Radical scepticism towards given models of thinking promotes the reader to a quixotic agonista. Quijote's abandonment of reason is an act of self-sacrifice that a reader must emulate. When we no longer fear ridicule, but work to realise our worldview, then we might leave a lasting impact on the world that will grant us metaphysical longevity. This is precisely what Quijote achieved:

Y su honra ¿qué era? ¿Qué era eso de la honra de que andaba entonces tan llena nuestra España? ¿Qué sino un ensancharse en espacio y prolongarse en tiempo la personalidad? ¿Qué es sino darnos a la tradición para vivir en ella y así no morir del todo? (164, emphasis in original)

To live without making some impact on the world is to practically not exist. To be a quixotic agonista bridges the gap between estar and existir, and brings into being the best of all possible worlds.
Unamuno demonstrates the potential to extrapolate political, cultural and philosophical morals from fictional works when the majority reading is abandoned.

Chapters VIII and IX of the first volume of the *Quijote*, where the narrative device of Cide Hamete Benengeli is introduced, finds its narrative entirely overwritten by a reader whose horizon of expectations renders it completely foreign. The comedic narrative of the eighth chapter, in which don Quijote tilts at windmills under the illusion that they are giants, is practically omitted: ‘Y Don Quijote los tomó [los molinos] por desaforados gigantes, y sin hacer caso de Sancho encomendóse de todo corazón a su señora Dulcinea y arremetió a ellos, dando otra vez con su cuerpo en la tierra’ (199). Reducing the narrative to a framework strips it of its comic impact, and tells it from an apparently impartial perspective before interpreting it as a symbolic parable on industrialization.38 This is the technique by which Unamuno excises the text from the horizon of expectations of a Golden Age reader and reinserts it into that of a reader in early 20th Century Spain. Critic María Ochoa Penrozh in fact labels the work a kind of *novela-ensayo*, a kind of textual *bacielymo* (Ochoa Penroz 1997: 65). This can be observed here:

Tenía razón el Caballero: el miedo y sólo el miedo le hacía a Sancho y nos hace a los demás simples mortales ver molinos de viento en los desaforados gigantes que siembran mal por la tierra […] Hoy no se nos aparecen ya como molinos, sino como locomotoras, dinamos, turbinas, buques de vapor, automóviles, telégrafos con hilos o sino ellos, ametralladoras y herramientas e ovariotomía, pero conspiran al mismo daño. (199)

The anachronistic references to post Industrial Revolution phenomena directly reflect the extent to which readers’ horizons of expectations have changed since the publication of the *Quijote*. Unamuno sees in the symbols of modern industrialisation exactly the same giants that appeared to Quijote in what is now a primitive technology.39 Hence a caveat: there remains a shared possible reading across

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38 Ardila & Biggane see a historiographical significance here: ‘The legacy of 1898, and the rise of other nations’ imperial and economic might haunts the pages of the Vida, and the text is, in part, a defiant nationalist credo in the wake of defeat, pitting will, faith and spiritual superiority against technological and military might. It also contains bitter criticism of Spain’s civic and political life: the Restoration monarchical regime, for Unamuno a regime with little credibility, is compared with maese Pedro’s puppet show, and a Don Quixote was needed to destroy it’ (Ardila & Biggane 2016: 202).

39 Prado argues that *Vida* is a manifesto on the role of poetry in human lives. He suggests that Unamuno prefers the poetic view of don Quijote to the material view of Sancho: ‘‘aunque en primera
various horizons of expectations. This is the eternal tradition of En torno al casticismo set to narrative commentary. Unamuno identifies the fleeting phenomena in the material world, as well as the spiritual reality they convey. No matter whether windmills are replaced with automobiles or telegraph poles, we must never be afraid to see in them what we wish to see.

Sancho is an intentionalist reader of the world. He declares that the giants are in fact windmills by showing how a windmill works: ‘—Mire vuestra merced — respondió Sancho — que aquellos que allí se parecen no son gigantes, sino molinos de viento, y lo que en ellos parecen brazos son las aspas, que, volteadas del viento, hacen andar la piedra del molino’ (Cervantes 2010: 100). For don Quijote, the intended function of an object has no role in determining its essence: ‘—Bien parece — respondió don Quijote — que no estás cursado en esto de las aventuras: ellos son gigantes; y si tienes miedo, quitate de ahí, y ponte en oración en el espacio que yo voy a entrar con ellos en fier y desigual batalla’ (100). Fear is the sanchopanzine hermeneutic principle. It delineates things in the world according to a prescribed purpose. That principle blinds its adherents to the potential meanings in the world: ‘El miedo y sólo el miedo sanchopancesco nos inspira el culto y veneración al vapor y a la electricidad; el miedo y sólo el miedo sanchopancesco nos hace caer de hinojos ante los desaforados gigantes de la mecánica y la química implorando de ellos misericordia’ (Unamuno 2011: 200).

Fear prevents Sancho from exercising his imaginative faculties to the extent that don Quijote does so. Sancho sees windmills because they have been built to fulfil that purpose. This is irrelevant to don Quijote, to whom the intended purpose of things does not define them. Similarly, the intended purpose of a text is not the meaning of a text. Unamuno advanced this argument explicitly in a 1917 essay, ‘La traza cervantesca’, stating that:

por mi parte me metí a comentar el Quijote […] no pretendí desentrañar lo que Cervantes quiso decir en él, cosa que me tiene sin cuidado, sino lo que yo en él veo y no lo que me sugiere. No me interesa lo que los autores quieren decir, sino lo que dicen o mejor lo que me

instance Don Quijote, un mito genuinamente español — y, por ello, diría Unamuno genuinamente universal — se presente como modelo a seguir frente a una crisis española, en realidad su alcance ético es mucho mayor: Don Quijote y el quijotismo son una alternativa de vida frente a los nada poéticos valores, imperativos y corolarios de la modernidad’ (Prado 1999: 120-121).

40 Antonio Muñoz Molina drew a succinct connection between Quijote’s interpretation of texts and his approach to the world: ‘Mistaking a novel for a book of History is no less of a catastrophe than mistaking windmills for giants, or peasant women for princesses’ (Muñoz Molina 2010: 24).
Unamuno cares not what the author meant, but what the author allows him to think. This nuances our understanding of Unamuno’s non-intentionalism. An author is not irrelevant. It is that an author communicates certain things to each reader dialogically. Iser’s apparently ambivalent view of the author — relevant in one sense, irrelevant in another — is upheld by Iser’s *The Act of Reading*, and its contention that an author sets out the rules of the interpretive game: ‘Reading is an activity that is guided by the text: this must be processed by the reader, who is then, in turn, affected by what he has processed’ (Iser 1987: 163). A text sets out rules by which it ought to be interpreted, though this does not forbid infinite possible readings that still play by those rules. Authored texts and manufactured objects promote certain ‘readings’. Some aspect of the windmills allows don Quijote to see them as giants: their height, the reach of their arms, and so on. Unamuno’s Quijote therefore practises a version of anti-intentionalist readings of the word and the world. He does not violate the rules of the game when he sees windmills as giants. Nor, as we will see shortly, when he sees a legendary helmet in a barber’s basin.

Unamuno’s awareness that he plays by Cervantes’ rules is evident in the ninth chapter, one which Pierre Menard later rewrites. As Quijote and the Biscayan charge at each other, he interjects, aware that his version of the story is subsidiary to Cervantes’: ‘¡Oh espectáculo de largos en largos siglos sólo visto, el de la lucha de dos Quijotes: el manchego y el vizcaino, el del páramo y el de las verdes

41 As Ribas puts it, ‘La novela, como ejemplo supremo de la creación literaria, se analiza hoy como interacción o dialéctica entre autor y lector. Desde esta perspectiva, no hay una interpretación, sino varias, ya que distintos lectores pueden leer contenidos distintos o al menos relativamente distintos’ (Ribas 2002: 77).

42 Though in an essay on the interaction between text and reader in Spanish literature, Iser denies that reading is a dialogic process, given that a dialogue and a reading are governed by different internal laws thanks to the absence of the author at the moment of reception (Iser 1982: 227). This aligns Iser with the New Critics’ insistence that there is only text, and serves to critique Unamuno’s dialogical model of reading. The fact that the reader cannot enquire as to the author’s meaning, according to Iser, prohibits reading from functioning as dialogue.

43 In fact, Gemma Roberts argues that ‘no podemos aquí identificar este fenómeno con el idealismo, porque esos gigantes no son el producto de la conciencia sino de la voluntad’ (Roberts 1966: 22). I would argue that Quijote’s philosophy has a complex relationship to idealism. It accepts the objective nature of the world, but sees no meaning in the world other than that willed by his mind.
montañas! [Hay que releerlo como nos lo relata Cervantes’ (206). He cannot provide a definitive version, but an individual interpretation. This might explain the fragmentary nature of the rewriting, which omits key narrative details. The dubious justifications for the narrative lacunas might persuade a reader to return to the original and determine their relevance for themselves.44 Unamuno requires his reader to question the validity of every narrative voice, including his own.

His narrative voice makes the kind of brindis patriótico that Pierre Menard appears to disapprove of. Unamuno feels an individual connection to the vizcaínno in the tale, and intersperses the narrative with the statement that the Basques have no historical antecedent: ‘¡Pues nosotros los vascos no datamos! Y no, no datamos los vascos. Los vascos sabemos quiénes somos y quiénes queremos ser. Ya ves, Don Quijote, que es un vasco el que ha ido a buscarte a tu Mancha y te arremete porque le regateaste lo de ser caballero’ (207). Unamuno relegates the narrative beneath a commentary on the Basque Country’s role in Spanish culture. It proves Borges’s later point that the Quijote has become an opportunity for patriotic self-congratulations. It also connects to theories of reader-response. Unamuno reads according to the Jaußian model, where a text is ‘an orchestration that strikes ever new resonances among its readers and that frees the text from the material of the words and brings it to a contemporary existence’ (Jauß 1982: 21). Unamuno’s regionally-aware reading of the Quijote states the case for that model where personal resonances are valid interpretations.

Chapter XXII, famous for the meeting with Ginés de Pasamonte, is an important point of comparison with Borges considering its place in Menard’s version. Unamuno eschews a narratological investigation of that famous conversation with Ginés, and rather focuses on Quijote’s freeing of the galley slaves. He criticises his contemporary Ganivet for his symbolic reading of don Quijote in Idearium español (152). Unamuno does not look at don Quijote from a legalistic perspective like Ganivet, who sees don Quijote as the embodiment of moral rectitude underlying judiciary decision-making. He does not read Quijote’s character as if he had an essential, symbolic purpose. He cares only for the subjective meaning he can find in the character, just as Quijote projects a vision of giants onto some distant windmills:

44 Ochoa Penroz also considers this an important aspect of Unamuno’s Vida: ‘Muy importante en Vida es la omnipresencia y relieve del lector implícito. Unamuno apela constantemente a él. Don Miguel no es un autor que se esconda tras la máscara de un supuesto narrador ficticio, ni que cumpla la función de un mero copista. Su papel nos recuerda más bien al Unamuno autor de Niebla, que dialoga con Augusto Pérez, su personaje’ (Ochoa Penroz 1997: 70). The human aspect of Unamuno’s narrative voice empowers the implicit reader to challenge Unamuno in the same way that Augusto Pérez does so.
No es que Cervantes quisiera encarnar en Don Quijote la justicia española, sino que lo encontró así en la vida del Caballero y no tuvo otro remedio sino narrarnoslo tal y como sucedió, aun sin alcanzársele todo su alcance. Ni aun siquiera el íntimo contraste que surge del hecho de que fuese Don Quijote el castigador de los mercaderes toledanos, del vizcaíno y de tantos otros más, el mismo que negaba a otros derecho a castigar. (252)

Cervantes is not the source of meaning, rather he narrates the symbolic meaning he found in the character. This was a task beyond Cervantes, an author Unamuno continues to label a *malicioso historiador*. Unamuno accuses Cervantes of identifying symbolism in his literary creation but failing to notice the inconsistency in his own record. Unamuno attempts to redefine Quijote’s sense of justice given Cervantes’s failure to persuade his reader of it fully:

_niego que los libertara movido en realidad, y allá en sus adentros, por semejante consideración. Y si así fuera, ¿con qué razón y derecho castigaba él, Don Quijote, como castigaba, sabiendo que escaparían los más del rigor de su brazo? ¿Por qué castigaba Don Quijote, si no hay castigo humano que sea absolutamente justo? (253 - emphasis in original)_

Unamuno’s answer is to present Quijote’s justice as inscrutable: ‘Mi fe en Don Quijote me enseña que tal fue su íntimo sentimiento, y si no nos lo revela Cervantes es porque no estaba capacitado para penetrar en él’ (256). Unamuno’s reading of the *Quijote* is itself quixotic. Don Quijote assimilates contradictory outlooks to his own, assuming that others have failed to understand a phenomenon beyond their reason. We see a non-intentionalist note in a chapter that thematises the limitations of authors in Ginés de Pasamonte’s inability to write a complete account of his own life. Unamuno’s comment on Cervantes’s incapacity to convey Quijote’s true guiding principles reflects Pasamonte’s inevitable failure to write an authoritative life story. Moreover, his defence of quixotic justice is justified according to a quixotic logic. Hence his essayistic diversions on the *Quijote* still abide by the governing rules of the text.

The thirty-eighth chapter, where don Quijote delivers his postprandial speech on arms and letters, is also key to the comparison between Borges’s and Unamuno’s rewritings. It is fundamental to the narrator’s analysis of Menard’s version, yet in Unamuno’s rewriting it is wholly ignored: ‘Con el buen suceso de los encuentros de la venta aumentaron los burladores de Don Quijote, a los que enderezó éste su discurso de las letras y las armas. Y como no lo dirijó [sic] a cabreros, lo pasaremos por alto’ (294). One of the most significant aspects of ‘Pierre Menard’ is one of the least significant of *Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho*. A single sentence seems inadequate reason to omit the narrative.
Perhaps Unamuno recuses his authority the same way that the author of ‘Pierre Menard’ does. A reader may return to Cervantes’s Quijote and read the speech for themselves. So Unamuno’s rewriting is not an over-writing: we are led to re-read a text and question its relevance. This is not the first chapter Unamuno overlooks: Chapter VI is omitted on the basis of the distinction between books and life. Throughout the rest of the text his quixotic philosophy relies on a radical self-sufficiency. A reader must decide whether aspects of the original narrative truly are unworthy of their attention, lest they fall into the trap of sanchopanzine ingenuousness. Prado explains this particular omission as follows:

Para él sólo es arte lo que es vital, lo que engendra vida — que para él es la definición misma de la poesía y de la verdad — lo que trata de recrear la totalidad ética que la modernidad destruye. De ahí que el escrutinio de la librería de Don Quijote por parte del cura y el barbero, Unamuno lo pase sin otro comentario en su Vida más que la advertencia de que el capítulo ‘trata de libros y no de vida. Pasémoslo por alto’; esto es: el capítulo en sí mismo es representativo de la suerte de libro que no genera vida porque consiste, precisamente, en la quema — en nombre de la razón y el sentido común mecánicos — de los libros que han dado vida a Don Quijote en nombre de la razón mecánica. (Prado 1999: 123)

True art is life-giving, and calls its reader into action. Unamuno’s omissions fulfil that aim. A narrative where books are ironically burned in the name of reason becomes a narrative which awakens the reader into a productive role. His omissions are consistent with his wish to awaken the reader from an interpretive stupor as expressed in ‘Mi religión’, and recall Cervantes’s provocative address to his idle reader. Iser’s ‘La Interacción Texto-Autor’ argues that narrative omissions are:

lo que estimula al lector a suplir los blancos con sus propias proyecciones. El lector resulta atrapado hacia los acontecimientos haciéndolo proveer lo que se quiere decir a partir de lo que

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45 As Longhurst puts it, ‘A text has to become in some sense a cognitive activity, both for authors and for readers. Just as writing was for Unamuno a kind of reading, so for Unamuno’s readers reading is a kind of writing. By becoming his readers they are discovering themselves in the same way that they discover themselves via others’ (Longhurst 2014: 104).

46 Ochoa Penroz also argues that they strip the narrative back to a case-study of the character: ‘También elude el capítulo del cautivo, y en general, todos los que no tienen relación directa con el quehacer de don Quijote como figura mesiánica. Unamuno no piensa que estas novelas intercaladas son tan ajenas a la historia central, como la del ‘Curioso impertinente’, que le resulta francamente insoportable’ (Ochoa-Penroz 1997: 79).
no se dice. Lo dicho sólo parece adquirir significación en tanto refiere a las omisiones; es por medio de implicaciones y no a través de afirmaciones que se da forma y peso al significado. (Iser 1982: 228-229)

This fittingly describes the lacunas that Unamuno inserts into the Quijote. When Unamuno excises chapters which deal with art and not life, or where a famous speech is unworthy of our attention as it was not delivered to a group of cabreros, the reader must assess those choices. The lacunas in Vida are produced in such a way that they require the reader to fill them in the way Iser identifies. So just as the Quijote does not prescribe its own reading, neither does Unamuno’s Vida prescribe a reading either of the original or of the copy. The technique of omission forbids the reader the idle role that Cervantes so vocally deplored.

Iser describes what form that active role must take:

Si el blanco es en gran medida responsable por las actividades descritas, entonces participación significa que el lector no está simplemente llamado a internalizar las posiciones dadas en el texto, sino que él es inducido a hacerlas actuar una sobre otra, haciéndolas transformarse mutuamente como resultado de lo cual el objeto estético comienza a emerger. (236-237)

An absence in a text — say, for example, an absence of any commentary on Quijote’s chapter on arms and letters — allows the reader to re-position what is said in the text according to the way they interpret the absence. If for example one reads Unamuno’s Cervantine omissions as a reinstatement of Cervantes’s authority, or a deconstruction of his own, one is sure to read the rest of Unamuno’s work through that lens, to emphasise given aspects over others, to arrive at an overall interpretation of the work as guided by their interpretation of what is missing. From a reader-response point of view, the aspects of the quixotic narrative which Unamuno ignores become one of the most significant aspects of the text’s interpretation.

Unamuno’s argument that we must read with no other guiding principle than our own viewpoint is explored in his rewritten versions of chapters XLIV and XLV, when the barber finds Quijote and Sancho in an inn and demands the return of his basin. A comparison between Cervantes’s and Unamuno’s versions helps here:

‘en aquel mismo punto entró en la venta el barbero a quien don Quijote quitó el yelmo de Mambrino’ (Cervantes 2010: 572)
‘A poco de esto entró en la venta el barbero del yelmo de Mambrino y la tramó con Sancho’
(Unamuno 2011: 300)

Unamuno’s version makes more explicit the narrator’s position that the object is indeed a helmet, as Cervantes’s version is focalised purely through Quijote’s perspective. Unamuno never scrutinises the claim that it is a helmet and not a basin because Quijote’s faith is enough to render his view acceptable: ‘Mentó el barbero la bacia y entonces se interpuso Don Quijote y mandó traerla y juró que era el yelmo y lo puso a la consideración de los allí presentes. ¡Sublime fe que afirmó en voz alta, bacia en la mano, y a la vista de todos, que era yelmo!’ (301). Quijote projects a purpose onto an object with such force that Unamuno is in no place to contradict him. This is the model of Unamuno’s preferred kind of open public discourse, where the best possible world will arise if we defend our worldview to the full extent of our faith in it.47 Quijote’s perception of the object makes it so, in an act of Schopenhauerian will. Though, as Gemma Roberts points out, this is not a denial of objectivity in and of itself:

El quijotismo de Unamuno no da lugar en ningún momento a un perspectivismo subjetivo según el cual cada uno ve las cosas de acuerdo con su posición o punto de vista. Al hablar de la fe en Unamuno, insistimos, no se trata de renunciar la objetividad, sino de vencerla. Se trata precisamente de fundamentar un nuevo objetivismo basado en la voluntad, aunque el objeto así obtenido sólo tenga sentido dentro de la subjetividad. La estructura esencial de nuestra existencia hace que nos remitamos siempre a otra cosa, al exterior, pero el poder de nuestra voluntad puede realmente crear ese mundo objetivo sobre el cual nos transcendemos haciéndolo concordar con nuestro más preciado ideal. (Roberts 1966: 21)

For the same reason, Unamuno later argues that reason has to be the weapon of choice for a regenerated Spain. Unamuno does not deny objectivity. Rather he wishes to supersede it with a new form of reason derived from the will of the individual. Though the will can only project a meaning

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47 As Prado argues, ‘En Unamuno el universo como totalidad de lo que existe es una lucha de fuerzas enfrentadas creativa y generosamente. Cuando una fuerza se afirma e impone sobre otras, la primera está afirmando en Unamuno lo mejor de sí misma que comparte con las fuerzas derrotadas de las que absorbe sus propiedades también. Toda batalla lo es en Unamuno de renovación y es intrínsecamente orgánica porque conduce a la unidad, cualquiera que sea el resultado’ (Prado 1999: 152-153). This is a perfect summary of Unamuno’s meliorism: a clash of viewpoints will inevitably synthesise the best of both into a new and better one.
onto an object that is permitted by objective features in that object. The form of the ‘basin’ allows Quijote to see it as a legendary helmet. So, the objective features of objects and texts paradoxically allow for subjective views of them. The windmills and the basin encapsulate the difficulty in Unamuno’s assault on objectivity. Quijote overwrites the view of the world which categorises things according to functions. However, the objective features of those things rule what kind of subjective views are possible. In other words, aspects of texts or objects that we agree on are the source of disagreement about what a text means or what an object is. Sancho and Quijote both see long protrusions from the top of enormous structures in the distance. But where Sancho sees the blades of a windmill, Quijote sees the arms of a giant. This recalls Fish’s discussion of Raine’s and Hirsch’s interpretation of a Blake poem, which take the same words as evidence for two incompatible viewpoints. Note how Fish could just as easily be referring to Quijote and Sancho:

Clearly they cannot both be right, but just as clearly there is no basis for deciding between them. One cannot appeal to the text, because the text has become an extension of the universe that divides them; and in fact, the text as it is variously characterised is a consequence of the interpretation for which it is supposedly evidence. (Fish 1980: 340)

Sancho and Quijote conform objects in the world to a subjective viewpoint. And just as the text cannot be the source of disagreement between two interpretations, features of the object that Sancho sees as a basin cannot be used to deny don Quijote’s view that it is in fact a helmet. This anticipates Borges. In ‘Pierre Menard’, the fact that two versions of a text are objectively identical is itself the source of subjective disagreement on the text’s meaning.

In Cervantes’s version, Sancho provides a compromise, referring to it as a baciylemo. Unamuno considers this compromise impermissible. The nature of truth, he explains in chapter XLV, is relative. Truth only exists when there is unwavering human belief in it: ‘es el valor descarado de afirmar en voz alta y a la vista de todos y de defender con la propia vida la afirmación, lo que crea las verdades todas. Las cosas son tanto más verdaderas cuanto más creídas, y no es la inteligencia, sino la voluntad, la que las impone’ (302). One might call Unamuno a true Tlönian, one who believes in a world where truth only exists as a production of the human mind. Unamuno renounces Sancho’s neologism, baciylemo:

¿Baciylemo? ¿Baciylemo, Sancho? ¡No hemos de ofenderte que esto de llamarle baciylemo fue una de tus socarronerías, no!; es la marcha de tu fe. No podías pasar de lo que tus ojos te enseñaban, mostrándote como bacia la prenda de la disputa, a lo que la fe en tu amo te enseñaba, mostrándotela como yelmo, sin agarrarte a eso del biciylemo [sic]. En esto sois
muchos los Sanchos, y habéis inventado lo de que en el medio está la virtud. No, amigo Sancho, no; no hay baciyelmo que valga. Es yelmo o es bacia, según quien de él se sirva, o mejor dicho, es bacia y es yelmo a la vez porque hace a los dos trances. Sin quitarle ni añadirle nada puede y debe ser yelmo y bacia, todo él yelmo y toda ella bacia; pero lo que no puede ni debe ser, por mucho que se le quite o se le añada, es baciyelmo. (303)

Unamuno claims that the object is a basin and a helmet, yet contests the use of the word baciyelmo to describe it. The term baciyelmo captures the polysemy of the object, its multiple meanings according to different contexts and points of view. The contradiction in the term also captures that contradiction in Unamuno’s view of it, that it cannot be either the helmet or the basin, but that it must simultaneously be both.

The neologism also suggests, by bringing together two contradictory statements, that the number of identities the object can sustain is greater than two. It could be an infinite number between two poles. I contend that reading, as the reader-response theorists would have theorised it, can be exemplified in the Unamunian baciyelmo (a term he rejects, but one that still serves him well). Reading wills into existence a meaning, and projects it onto an object. Quijote and the barber project purposes onto the object to bring it into their own horizon of expectations. They produce different interpretations of the object that are still permitted by its form, just as readings must be in keeping with the form of the text. Quijote sees giants in windmills and a helmet in a basin because the form of those objects makes his reading of those acceptable. Quijote’s idealism explores reader-centrist interpretations through a narrative medium. To Unamuno, the only method by which to arbitrate between these different interpretations — and to answer Stanley Fish’s question as to what constitutes acceptable reading — relies on the will with which each interpretation is defended.

Fish shows that we cannot decide what constitutes an acceptable reading of the text by referring to the text itself, and Unamuno’s hermeneutic principle for making such a decision relies on a threat of force that makes his reader-centrist model ethically dubious. When a brawl erupts over the purpose of the object, the might of Quijote’s arm is an intellectual arbiter: ‘En pocas aventuras se nos aparece Don Quijote más grande que en ésta en que impone su fe a los que se burlan de ella y los lleva a defenderla a puñetazos y a coces y a sufrir por ella’ (304). The commonsensical view is of a basin. This cannot be undone by reason, so it must be defeated by violence. Hence the most ethically unacceptable comment in Unamuno’s rewriting of the Quijote. His view that a violence is the best arbiter between ideas reaches an apex with infelicitous resonances:

Sí, es lo que necesitamos: una guerra civil. Es menester afirmar que deben ser y son yelmos.
It is unclear whether Unamuno means a civil war in the material sense.\textsuperscript{48} Though such resonances are now unavoidable given the breakout of the Civil War thirty-one years after Unamuno published his work. Perhaps the weapons Unamuno refers to are intellectual ones. But what if a reader were to disregard the question as to Unamuno’s intended meaning? That is Unamuno’s preferred reader, as he makes explicit comments on his preference for non-intentionalist readings in \textit{Del sentimiento trágico de la vida} (1912) and ‘La traza cervantesca’ (1917). He runs the risk of persuading the reader of the necessity of a civil war in the literal sense, which would abide by the rules of his work given that Unamuno does not forbid that interpretation.\textsuperscript{49} Unamuno violates the cervantine principle put forth in the prologue to the 1614 \textit{Novelas ejemplares}: ‘Una cosa me atreveré a decirte: que, si por algún modo alcanzara que la lección destas novelas pudiera inducir a quien las leyera o a algún mal deseo o pensamiento, antes me cortara la mano con que las escribí, que sacarlas en público’ (Cervantes 2005: 135). Cervantes would sooner cut off his hand than incite his reader to ill; Unamuno

\textsuperscript{48} Jon Juaristi does not think so, arguing that ‘Para Unamuno, la guerra civil significa al menos dos cosas: es una guerra entre civiles (es decir, sin militares) y la irrupción de los intrahistóricos en la historia para rectificar o culminar revoluciones que los políticos ponen en marcha y no aciertan a concluir’ (Juaristi 2015: 285).

\textsuperscript{49} For this very reason, Clintoc has, perhaps unkindly, referred to Unamuno’s reading of the \textit{Quijote} as ‘proto-fascist’, arguing that: ‘Unamuno’s identifying stance in respect to Cervantes’s \textit{Don Quijote} hence acquires its ideological lopsidedness since he sees in Don Quixote not only a symbol of ‘castiza’ Spanish philosophy (as \textit{Weltanschauung}) but also a symbol of national regeneration. He will, therefore, contribute, even if in the absence of his actual awareness, to the crystallization of a ‘proto-Fascist’ Spanish ideology, an imaginative-representational catalyst for the future success of Franco’s totalitarian regime’ (Clintoc 2005: 20), adding that to Unamuno ‘anything is justifiable in the name of a lofty ideal, thus preparing the Spanish collective unconscious for the advent of fascism, which, as Unamuno remarked of Don Quixote, is entitled to be beyond laws’ (22). I will comment on the danger of legitimising totalitarianism in the sixth chapter.
meanwhile is all too happy to do so.\textsuperscript{50} This will form my criticism of Unamuno’s method of reading Cervantes later on, and part of my proposal that an unacceptable reading is not text-oriented but world-oriented. In other words, acceptable readings are decided ethically. A comparison with Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard, autor del \textit{Quijote}’ will assist us in that aim.

The early chapters of the second volume of Unamuno’s rewriting justify my connection between quixotic idealism and anti-intentionalist, reader-centric interpretations. In Chapter II, Unamuno explores the relationship between don Quijote and Sancho, who ‘se sonsacaban y distraían y se llevaban mutuamente por los andurriales del mundo’ (329). This relationship is a form of idealism where both are created by the other:

Lo más grande y más consolador de la vida que en común hicieron es el no poderse concebir al uno sin el otro, y que muy lejos de ser dos cabos opuestos, como hay quien mal supone, fueron y son, no ya las dos mitades de una naranja, sino un mismo ser visto por dos lados. Sancho mantenía vivo el sanchopancismo de Don Quijote y éste quijotizaba a Sancho, sacándole a flor de alma su entraña quijotesca. (330)

Their self projections synthesise with their counterpart’s image of them, such that they become a version of themselves pertaining only to the other. That recalls Unamuno’s claim in the prologue to the \textit{Tres novelas ejemplares} that there are in any given discussion three individuals: the true self, the self’s self, and the other’s self; as well as the narrator’s insistence that he wishes only to tell the story of his Don Sandalio in the eponymous, epistolary novel. Unamuno reads Quijote’s statement that ‘juntos salimos, juntos fuimos y juntos peregrinamos’ (330) through that lens. Just as the reader and author create each other in \textit{Cómo se hace una novela}, Quijote and Sancho create each other in \textit{Vida de don Quijote y Sancho}. That is the link between don Quijote’s idealism and Unamuno’s method of reading. Both synthesise the meaning that we project onto a person, text or thing with the meaning that they themselves project. Hence don Quijote’s philosophy is a kind of reader-response theory applied to a diegetic world.

\textsuperscript{50} He also proposes an intentionalist ethics contrasted against intentionalist readings. Addressing Quijote, he says: ‘Dijiste bien; tenías bríos para dar tú solo cuatrocientos palos a cuatrocientos cuadrilleros que se te pusieran delante, o por lo menos para intentarlo, que en intento está el valor’ (310). The text is read according to a consequentialist method; actions are read according to intentionalist ethics. This ambivalence in Unamuno’s reading is difficult to reconcile.
When Unamuno turns his attentions to the adventure at Montesinos, he reads through the lens of literary tradition that arose after the novel was published, practising the later method that Borges set out in his ‘Kafka y sus precursores’. He presents the cave as an example of the eternal Spanish tradition that he outlined in En torno al casticismo. The cave — a permanent fixture on the Spanish landscape — symbolises to Unamuno an ever-present, inherent aspect of Spanish nature that is also surrounded by fleeting Spanish culture. Culture becomes the ephemeral expression of an historical constant. Quijote’s descent into and return from the Cave of Montesinos symbolises that constant:

Si te empeñas en empozarte y hundirte en la sima de la tradición de tu pueblo para escudriñarla y desentrañar sus entrañas, escarbándola y zahondándola hasta dar con su hondón, se te echarán al rostro los grandísimos cuervos y grajos que anidan en su boca y buscan entre las breñas de ella abrigo [...] Y antes de hundirse y empozarse uno en esa sima de las verdaderas creencias y tradiciones del pueblo [...] tiene que derribar y cortar las malezas que cubren su entrada. Cuando lo hagáis os dirán que queréis cegar la cueva y taparla a los moradores de ella; os llamarán malos hijos y descastados y cuanto se les ocurra. Haced oídos sordos a graznidos tales. (372-373)

Quijote’s companions can only doubt his account a priori. This ironically empowers his account. The unreliable narrator’s saving grace is that he recounts an experience which others cannot have shared. We must adopt that quixotic philosophy: trust in the meaning that our minds find in the world around us wholeheartedly, and disregard those who have sought no meaning in it.

Unamuno instructs the reader to re-read the original Quijote through an original lens. This is an idea common to both Borges and Unamuno: that the deliberate adoption of a horizon of expectations can find a kind a permissible meaning in the text, whether it be an attribution of the same text to a different author, or a shift of the mode of reading from the satirical to the spiritual:

Invito al lector a que relea, en el capítulo XXIII de la segunda parte, el relato de las asombrosas visiones de Don Quijote, y juzgando, como debe juzgarse, por el contenido y deleite que de su lectura reciba, me diga luego si no son más fidedignas que otras no menos asombrosas con que dicen que Dios regaló a siervos suyos, soñadores en la profunda cueva encantada del éxtasis, Y [sic] no sirve sino creer a Don Quijote, que siendo hombre incapaz de mentir, afirmó que lo por él contado lo vio por sus propios ojos y lo tocó con sus mismas manos, y esto baste y aun sobre. (374)
The reader is instructed to re-read the Quijote according to a different horizon of expectations, to entertain the thought that the novel might instead be a Gospel. How could a reader believe unquestioningly the veracity of visions that appeared to characters in the Bible, but a priori refute that of Quijote’s visions in the novel? If we read the fiction from the same Christian perspective we might be committed to crediting Quijote’s visions. Does that not require that we see Don Quijote as exactly the kind of person whose reports deserve to be taken as gospel? If not, then we must revise the horizon of expectations by which we read. When Unamuno tells his reader to revisit the novel according to a religious instead of a narrative framework, we realise that the hermeneutic approach to a text is formative of its meaning. The doubtfulness of Quijote’s accounts, the credulity of his reading, his inability to separate fantasy from reality, all implicitly warn against reading without scepticism. The Quijote portrays such readings as intellectually dubious. Vida portrays them as the only acceptable model of reading.

The final chapter of Vida exemplifies ‘Pierre Menard’s’ argument that the same text read in different era will engender different meanings. When Quijote renounces the ways of knight-errantry and dubs himself Alonso Quijano, Unamuno does not take this as a defeat for chivalric novels, as the narrator of Cervantes’s version puts it, but argues that Quijote has arrived at the same conclusion as his literary heir, Segismundo: ‘A lindero de morir, y a luz de la muerte, confiesa y declara que no fue su vida sino sueño de locura. ¡La vida es sueño! Tal es, en resolución última, la verdad a que con su muerte llega Don Quijote, y en ella se encuentra con su hermano Segismundo’ (507). Unamuno reads according to a much broader horizon of expectations than Cervantes. The Quijote has become more meaningful in the years since the author wrote the text. Twenty years after Cervantes died, Calderón’s La vida es sueño added itself to global literary tradition. Unamuno traces affinities backwards from Calderón’s work to Cervantes’s, following the method that Borges would set out in his 1951 ‘Kafka y sus precursores’. We can read resonances from modern authors into earlier ones without anachronism invalidating our interpretation. Precisely because Cervantes and Calderón exist within Unamuno’s cultural field, Unamuno can read Cervantes through a Calderonian lens. Such a lens grants the text a philosophical clout:

Tu muerte fue aún más heroica que tu vida, porque al llegar a ella cumpliste la más grande renuncia, la renuncia de tu gloria, la renuncia de tu obra. Fue tu muerte encumbrado sacrificio. En la cumbre de tu pasión, cargado de burlas, renuncias, no a ti mismo, sino a algo más grande que tú: a tu obra. Y la gloria te acoje [sic] para siempre. (510)

Quijote admits that his life has been a Calderonian dream, yet still acts according to a lofty ethical principle. Unamuno makes this point through Calderón:
Don Quijote trusts in some material reality behind what might be a series of illusory images: ‘Don Quijote perdió su fe y murióse; tú la cobraste y vivases; era preciso que él muriera en desengaño para que en engaño vivificante vivas tú’ (513). Life might be a dream; but we must act as if it were not. Quijote showed us what it is to lose faith in the reality of his world view so that we must never repeat that sacred mistake. Dreams, incidentally, are a key aspect in Unamuno’s and Borges’s texts on the Quijote. Both take advantage of the metaphysical layering implied by the presence of the first volume in the second. Borges extrapolates that such a moment fictionalises the audience. This concern appears to underly Unamuno’s use of the term sueño when rewriting the final chapter of the Quijote. It seems appropriate that Unamuno would question reality through a text that comedically proposes such a quandary:

¡Oh Dios mío! Tú, que diste vida y espíritu a Don Quijote en la vida y en el espíritu de su pueblo; Tú, que inspirastes a Cervantes esa epopeya profundamente cristiana; Tú, Dios de mi sueño, ¿dónde acojes [sic] los espíritus de los que atravesamos este sueño de la vida tocados de la locura de vivir por los siglos venideros? (521)

Cervantes’s Quijote opens those questions to Unamuno. He cannot verify experiences in his mind by way of some principle outside of that mind. So the only reassurance comes in the faith that the world is meaningful. There is no human principle that can prove the validity of a reading of a text or a view of the world. We need quixotic faith that our reading of the world accords with the world as it is: ‘¡La vida es sueño! ¿Será acaso también sueño, Dios mío, este tu Universo de que eres la Conciencia eterna e infinita?, ¿será un sueño tuyo?, ¿será que nos estás soñando?’ (521).

Borges’s discussions of the Quijote often compare textual production to dreaming. That nuance of the term ‘dreaming’ exists in Unamuno. Dreams are passive: they exist within the mind of the dreamer, but are not actively authored by them. Cervantes can be said to have ‘dreamt’ the Quijote far from having authored it, because the text is more than the result of an individual person’s thought. Hence the statement, rejected by critics such as Close, that Cide Hamete Benengeli is no mere literary device:
No cabe duda sino que en El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha que compuso Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra se mostró éste muy por encima de lo que podríamos esperar de él juzgándole por sus otras obras; se sobrepuso con mucho a sí mismo. Por lo cual es de creer que el historiador árábigo Cide Hamete Benengeli no es puro recurso literario, sino que encubre una profunda verdad, cual es la de que esa historia se la dictó a Cervantes otro que llevaba dentro de sí, y al que ni antes ni después de haberla escrito, trató una vez más: un espíritu que en las profundidades de su alma habitaba. (524 - emphasis in original)

Dreams exemplify authorship as Unamuno knows it. No author has sole responsibility for their work, as a work is produced within a literary tradition. Cide Hamete Benengeli could never have existed without the faux-historicity of chivalric texts such as Amadís de Gaula which promise a report of events witnessed first-hand. The unreliable pre-narrator allows the novel to play many of the narrative tricks which have been convenient to Unamuno’s analysis, including the deferrals of authority from Cervantes which Unamuno co-opts in order to justify a non-intentionalist reading. So it is unwise to read the claim literally.\(^{51}\) Benengeli’s presence in the work is crucial to its success, and to demonstrating how Cervantes’s relationship with his literary milieu prevents an author-centric reading. The author simply internalises the works in his cultural framework, carries them dentro de sí, reforms them into a broad horizon of expectations from which they passively produce literature. The horizon of expectations is formative to the text as it is authored and the text as it is read. Just like Benengeli is the kernel of a literary work that appears to Cervantes in his readings of chivalric literature, Sancho and Quijote now appear to Unamuno, he develops a profound understanding of the characters in his reading of the novel, and they become part of the framework according to which Unamuno receives literature: ‘Y aun llego a sospechar que mientras he estado explicando y comentando esta vida, me han visitado secretamente Don Quijote y Sancho, y aun yo sin saberlo, me han desplegado y descubierto las entrelazas de sus corazones’ (524-525 - emphasis in original). Unamuno warns us against taking an author to be a persona real y verdadera while taking their works to be the stuff of pure fantasy, arguing instead for the converse (525). Texts influence reading far

\(^{51}\) Though as Ugarte shows, doing so produces an interesting textual effect: ‘¿Podrá algún día la investigación literaria descubrir, Dios sabe en qué rincón de los archivos de la Mancha, la existencia física de los heroes cervantinos? ¿O acaso demostrar documentalmente que Cide Hamete Benenjeli [sic] fué un historiador arábigo de carne y hueso y no un recurso literario que utilizó Cervantes?’ (Ugarte 1951: 18). Does entertaining the thought that Benengeli truly existed not transform the aesthetic experience of reading the text?
more than authors can.\textsuperscript{52} That view requires an undying faith in the power of the individual mind to discover objective meaning in a world that might be nothing other than a fiction. That faith is embodied in Don Quijote:

No puede contar tu vida, ni puede explicarla ni comentarla, señor mío Don Quijote, sino quién esté tocado de tu misma locura de no morir. Intercede, pues, en favor mío, ¡oh mi señor y patrón!, para que tu Dulcinea del Toboso, ya desencantada merced a los azotes de tu Sancho, me lleve de la mano a la inmortalidad del nombre y de la fama. Y si es la vida sueño, ¡déjame soñarla inacabablemente! (527)

The desire to live on is the aesthetic principle that validates a reading. It relies on a faith that the world exists, and that the individual mind is capable of discovering truth in it. If we believe in our view of the world, then we can impose an ideal onto it, and live on in some material sense after our physical bodies expire. Or as Unamuno puts it in \textit{Del sentimiento trágico de la vida}, we can supersede ‘lo que el mundo es’ with ‘lo que queremos que sea’.\textsuperscript{53} If we believe in our view of the text and are inspired to act upon those views, then we take part in a literary tradition in which our names will live on as a link in a great causal chain of authorship and reception. Unamuno collapses the boundary between word and world, between text and deed. Quixotic faith is the ultimate aesthetic and metaphysical principle, which assures us of life-giving eternal renown. That faith relies on approaching the world and the text with the same faith in the meanings our minds find there.

\textbf{IV.5 The tragic sense of life}

By his 1912 ‘Don Quijote en la tragicomedia europea contemporánea’, the concluding instalment of

\textsuperscript{52} This echoes Ribas’s point that Unamuno makes an anti-Platonic statement which reverses the normal rules of cause and effect: ‘Hay más gente que conoce a Don Quijote que a Cervantes. Don Quijote es algo así como un símbolo universal, que ha tenido repercusiones en la literatura, en la pintura, en la música, etc. Es decir, ha tenido efectos, ha operado. Desde la perspectiva de la efectividad histórica, de los efectos a que ha dado lugar, Don Quijote está por encima de Cervantes.’ (Ribas 2002: 77)

\textsuperscript{53} Vicén has also drawn this comparison between \textit{Vida de don Quijote y Sancho} and \textit{Del sentimiento trágico de la vida}: ‘Sus aventuras y hazañas son símbolo del afán del hombre por vencer su destino más inexorable, impulso apasionado contra la certeza que nos habla del fin nuestro y del fin de todo robándonos así la fe en el sentido del mundo y de la vida. La ‘locura’ es para Don Quijote la revelación del problema fundamental de la existencia humana’ (Vicén 1947: 204).
Unamuno has taken to referring to the hidalgo as ‘Nuestro Señor Don Quijote’. The essay contains a series of comments on reading, authorship and anticipates Borges’s later ‘Kafka y sus precursores’ by proposing that contemporary literature can be the lens through which to view preceding literary works. He applies this internationalist, anachronistic approach to the Quijote:

Muy pocos años después de haber andado Nuestro Señor Don Quijote por España, decíamos Jacobo Boehme, (Aurora, cap. XI, §75), que no escribía una historia que le hubiesen contado otros, sino que tenía que estar él mismo en la batalla, y en ella en gran pelea, donde a menudo tenía que ser vencido como todos los hombres, y más adelante (§83) añade que aunque tenga que hacerse espectáculo del mundo y del demonio, le queda la esperanza en Dios sobre la vida futura, en quien quiere arriesgarla y no resistir al Espíritu. Amén. Y tampoco yo, como este Quijote del pensamiento alemán, quiero resistir al Espíritu. (2007: 303)

The possessive ‘Nuestro’ functions similarly to the repeated ‘mi’ in Don Sandalio; the narrator is interested only in telling the story of ‘mi Don Sandalio’, and admonishes the reader that if they want the story of the Don Sandalio then they must write it themselves. ‘Nuestro Don Quijote’ is our version of him. A Spanish reader cannot claim to have an authoritative view of the character, because their interpretation is determined by cultural and historical circumstances. Aurora, which was published in incomplete form in 1612, arose after the first volume of the Quijote, and becomes a rewrite of the Quijote from a German linguistic and cultural perspective. It therefore adds itself to a possibly infinite number of Quijotes and can retrospectively alter our interpretation of that text. Equally, Goethe’s Faust can retrospectively ‘discover’ Marlowe. Marlowe’s 1604 Doctor Faustus ‘es ya el mismo que volverá a descubrir Goethe, aunque en ciertos respectos más espontáneo y más fresco’ (305). Unamuno talks of literature in similar terms to Borges, who believes in renovating a text by attributing it to an author in another time and place. The copy is superior to the original much as Menard’s Quijote is superior to Cervantes’s.

Unamuno’s descriptions of literary and scientific progress make me suspicious of the claim by critics such as Otero (1967: 173) that Unamuno has turned wholly against Europeanisation at this stage. Del

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54 The collection channels many of the same philosophical discussions as Vida. ‘El hambre de inmortalidad’ seeks a response to his inevitable mortality; ‘La disolución racional’ argues that scepticism is the natural by-product of rational investigations; ‘El problema práctico’ argues for a moral system where one ego exerts itself over another, in an attempt to make itself irreplaceable, insustituible.
sentimiento trágico de la vida nuances without negating Unamuno’s earlier comments on Spain’s relationship to Europe. Europeanisation brought with it the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Inquisition which took ridicule as its weapon. It seems to me that Unamuno still values open cultural borders provided that Spain imposes itself onto the rest of the world as vice versa: ‘Los progresos suelen venir del bárbaro’ (Unamuno 2007: 307) is hardly a statement of cultural isolationism. The use of Italian, German and French sources to support arguments in this chapter would also torpedo any argument of anti-European intellectual seclusion. As such Quijote remains a symbol of cultural and intellectual openness, the kind of cosmopolitanism he mentioned in En torno al casticismo: ‘Y es aquí donde tengo que acogerme a mi señor Don Quijote para aprender a afrontar el ridículo y vencerlo, y un ridículo que acaso —¿quién sabe?— él no conoció’ (307).

Unamuno instructs his reader to embrace the limitations of their horizon of expectations. The Spanish, he argues, do not have a scientific spirit, but in fact obey an intellectual principle shared by no others (310). But Spanish intellectual culture must open itself to alternative methods of thinking, and must aggressively export itself:

La razón ha de ser nuestra arma. Lo es hasta del loco. Nuestro loco sublime, nuestro modelo, Don Quijote, después que destrozó de dos cuchilladas aquella a modo de media celada que encajó con el morrón, ‘la tornó a hacer de nuevo, poniéndole unas barras de hierro por dentro, de tal manera que él quedó satisfecho de su fortaleza, y sin querer hacer nueva experiencia della la diputó y tuvo por celada finísima de encaje’. Y con ella la cabeza se inmortalizó. Es decir, se puso en ridículo. Pues fue poniéndose en ridículo como alcanzó su inmortalidad Don Quijote. (310)

Quijote resists intellectual hegemony. The ridicule of others blinded them to the moral goodness in his deeds. Ridicule is faced only by those who present a countercurrent to accepted models of thinking. So Spain must produce culture in spite of all intellectual superciliousness from outside. For this is how the Quijote came into being: ‘Carducci […] dejó escrito (en Mosche cochiere) que ‘hasta España, que jamás tuvo hegemonía de pensamiento, tuvo su Cervantes.’ ¿Pero es que Cervantes se dio aquí solo, aislado, sin raíces, sin tronco, sin apoyo?’ (310). Spanish literature hit its zenith due to the creative minds of non-Spanish writers. In fact, Spanish and non-Spanish readings of the work are just as valid as each other, for a text is simply a sum of all of its possible acceptable readings. It is the impossible, never-ending task of human minds to catalogue all of those possible readings: ‘El fin del hombre es hacer ciencia, catalogar el Universo para devolviérselo a Dios en orden, como escribí hace unos años, en mi novela Amor y pedagogía’ (312). Humanity can tend only to the end of intellectual history when engaged in a cosmopolitan cultural exchange.
Having confessed to an apostasy in writing ‘¡Muera Don Quijote!’ in 1898, Unamuno explains his motivations for writing Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho seven years on:

Escribí aquel libro para repensar el Quijote contra cervantistas y eruditos, para hacer obra de vida de lo que era y sigue siendo para los más letra muerta. ¿Qué me importa lo que Cervantes quiso no quiso poner allí y lo que realmente puso? Lo vivo es lo que yo allí descubro, pusiéralo o no Cervantes, lo que yo allí pongo y sobre pongo y sotopongo, yo lo que ponemos allí todos. Quise allí rastrear nuestra filosofía. (312 - my emphasis)

When a reader accepts the role of literary agonista, they enliven the text, and realise meanings within it. Also, while it is possible to take the text as if it were a mere aesthetic event — as Cervantes wished — Unamuno asks his reader to interpret Spanish literary texts on the assumption that they contain a set of philosophical meanings, not deliberately woven into narrative by an author, but which are nonetheless present because an author situated in an eternal philosophical and literary tradition will inevitably produce literature bearing traces of that tradition:

Pues abrigo cada vez más la convicción de que nuestra filosofía, la filosofía española, está líquida y difusa en nuestra literatura, en nuestra vida, en nuestra acción, en nuestra mística, sobre todo, y no en sistemas filosóficos. Es concreta. ¿Y es que acaso no hay en Goethe, verbigracia, tanta o más filosofía que en Hegel? Las coplas de Jorge Manrique, el Romancero, el Quijote, La vida es sueño, la Subida al Monte Carmelo, implican una intuición del mundo y un concepto de la vida Weltanschauung und Labensansicht [sic]. Filosofía esta nuestra que era difícil de formularse en esa segunda mitad del siglo XIX, época afilosófica, positivista, tecnificista, de pura historia y de ciencias naturales, época en el fondo materialista y pesimista. (313)

Unamuno responds to the implicit complaint that Spain has not produced philosophy as much of continental Europe has. The best philosophy, says Unamuno, is produced passively, automatically, non-intentionally. The reader’s task is to look for the meaning that is produced without the author willing it into the text. So the reader is not just asked, as Iser argued, to fill the lacunas in the text according to their creative faculties, but to fill lacunas in an entire literary tradition. Given a lack of philosophical production since the mid 19th Century, a Spanish reader is required to read

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55 Just one example of the regenerationist literature that Unamuno believes caused, and was not caused by, the loss of the last of the Spanish colonies.
philosophical implications into the Spanish literary canon. The reader’s role is to discover the possible philosophical discourses at the time of authoring. That search for the Spanish philosophy in Spanish literature is exemplified in ‘Pierre Menard’s’ comparison between two versions of the same section of the Quijote, where the philosophical implication of the text is given by the extant ideological frameworks at the moment of writing. It also recalls Jauß’s idea that a text is ‘an orchestration that strikes ever new resonances among its readers and that frees the text from the material of the words and brings it to a contemporary existence’ (Jauß 1982: 21). If a reader can discover the differing philosophical resonances at the moment of writing and compare them to those at the moment of reading — exactly as the narrator of ‘Pierre Menard’ does — then they will naturally discover the intra-historic Spanish philosophical discourse hidden beneath the surface of Spanish literature.

Unamuno’s reading of the Quijote is not constitutive of a whole philosophy, but opens the doors to philosophical discourse through literature. Quijotismo — reading without allowing ourselves to be constrained by literary expectations of others — is the method for discovering philosophy.

Unamuno’s description of Quijote’s world-oriented idealism (or ‘espiritualismo’, as he terms it) could equally be applied to the conflict between prosaic and poetic readings of the text:

Aparéceseme la filosofía en el alma de mi pueblo como la expresión de una tragedia íntima análoga a la tragedia del alma de Don Quijote, como la expresión de una lucha entre lo que el mundo es, según la razón de la ciencia nos lo muestra, y lo que queremos que sea, según la fe de nuestra religión nos lo dice. (322)

A philosophy of imposing an ideal onto the world as it ought to be must include reader-centric interpretations of texts. There is little distinction between the world and ideas, just as Quijote could not distinguish between them: ‘sé que todo el que pelea por un ideal cualquiera, aunque parezca del pasado, empuja el mundo al porvenir’ (323). So that kind of interpretive anarchism aims to be a motor of history. Though the author does not argue for a distinct political position, but a method for bringing about the best possible world. It is the role of all of us to convert our spiritual ideology into material effects. As such, Unamuno’s readings of the Quijote have become politically ambivalent, and as I will argue in the final chapter, dangerously so. For don Quijote ‘se ha dejado a sí mismo, y que un hombre, un hombre vivo y eterno, vale por todas las teorías y por todas las filosofías’ (324).

Quijotismo is the practice of justifying our worldview despite the ridicule of others. It does not fall along ideological lines, but represents something more abstract: ‘¡el quijotismo, y no es poco! Todo
un método, toda una epistemología, toda una estética, toda una lógica, toda una ética, toda una religión sobre todo, es decir, toda una economía a lo eterno y lo divino, toda una esperanza en lo absurdo racional’ (325). Quixotic faith in one’s own perspective represents the salvation of the individual, and the society those individuals inhabit. Don Quijote is reduced to an archetype by which to live. There are other versions of him, some preceding him, including Savonarola, ‘Quijote italiano de fines del siglo XV’ who battles against the tenets of modernity inaugurated by Machiavelli. All of these Quijotes are united by a common human thread, a shared philosophy, despite their cultural and temporal distance. ‘Don Quijote’ no longer refers to a literary character but a spiritual idealism which unites the greatest thinkers in human history, from Jesus Christ, to Galileo, to Santa Teresa:

¿Cuál es, pues, la nueva misión de Don Quijote hoy en este mundo? Clamar, clamar en el desierto. Pero el desierto oye, aunque no oigan los hombres, y un día se convertirá en selva sonora, y esa voz solitaria que va posando en el desierto como semilla, dará un cedro gigantesco que con sus cien mil lenguas cantará un hosanna eterno al Señor de la vida y de la muerte. (329)

The reader must become the quixotic and Christ-like voice calling in the desert. Stephen Roberts argues that all of Del sentimiento trágico de la vida’s commentaries on human life are viewed through a quixotic lens:

Y esta identificación entre Unamuno y Don Quijote sirve también para confirmar retrospectivamente que todos los aspectos de la vida humana que han sido analizados en esta obra —desde el modo de conocer el mundo hasta la moral de la imposición y dominación mutuas—son aspectos también de la vida y del quehacer del intelectual quijotesco unamuniano. (Roberts 2013: 122)

That is, quijotismo is the method by which the philosophical investigations of Del sentimiento trágico can be put into practice. When, for example, Unamuno argues in ‘La disolución racional’ that materialism ‘no quiere decir para nosotros otra cosa que la doctrina que niega la inmortalidad del alma individual, la persistencia de la conciencia personal después de la muerte’ (Unamuno 2007: 120), he recommends a philosophy combining trends from idealism and voluntarism that are exemplified in don Quijote’s romantic worldview. The human consciousness persists only when it has made itself irreplaceable, or insustituible as he says in ‘El problema práctico’ (276). In my view, the kernel of quijotismo common to all of these statements is, when applied to the world, what we might call idealism; when applied to a text, what we might call non-intentionalism. Non-
intentionalism is the recommended reading method for the Unamunian *quijotista* who wishes to become an irreplaceable part of the world they inhabit.

Few of us can ever become a Quijote and dream the dream of life in eternal renown. But for our own sake, and that of others, we must become the idealist reader, and convert ideas into action, for ideas themselves are not redemptive:

> Y vosotros, ahora, bachilleres Carrascos⁵⁶ del regeneracionismo europeizante […] haced riqueza, haced patria, haced arte, haced ciencia, haced ética, haced o más bien traducid sobre todo Kultura, que así mataréis a la vida y a la muerte. ¡Para lo que ha de durarnos todos! (329)

Ideology turned action is the only defence against the tragic sense of life, against the finitude of our physical bodies. That relies on a divine faith in the rectitude of our own thoughts, and a willingness to declare them in the face of dissent. In this chapter I have shown that non-intentionalist readings strongly underly what Unamuno terms *quijotismo*. What literary theorists would later refer to as reader-response is a cornerstone of the spiritualist, idealist and voluntarist philosophy of personal salvation and historical progress that he expounds in some of his most significant essays. In my final chapter, where I will compare Unamuno’s *quijotismo* with Borges’s attribution of the *Quijote* to an invented author, I will argue that the political ambivalence of Unamuno’s *quijotismo* violates the Cervantine principle that a reader must not be moved to ill deeds, and that the ethical permutations of a reading can determine its acceptability or unacceptability.

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⁵⁶ Stephen Roberts considers this a swipe at Ortega y Gasset, who had turned against Unamuno’s metaphysical enquiries and begun to mischaracterise him as anti-European (Roberts 2013: 122).
V. Borges, reader of Cervantes

Si las páginas de este libro consienten algún verso feliz, perdóneme el lector la descortesía de haberlo usurpado yo, previamente. Nuestras nadas poco difieren; es trivial y fortuita la circunstancia de que seas tú el lector de estos ejercicios, y yo su redactor.

—Borges, Fervor de Buenos Aires

Borges’s affinity to the Quijote is extremely well documented. The anecdote of having read the novel in English first, and then finding the Spanish original to be a poor translation unfaithful to it is a perfect emblem of his career-long treatment of Cervantes’s masterpiece. The Quijote, a text that gleefully subverts the author’s monolithic status, and which does not prescribe a straightforward interpretation, is a convenient text to a writer for whom the nature of authorship was a source of curiosity. The text becomes a canvas onto which he paints many of his inquiries into the possibility of literary originality, and the author’s and reader’s ability to determine the meaning of the literary work. These are ideas common to most of his major works on the Quijote, and which would be of clear interest to theorists from Barthes to Jauß, Fish and Iser.

It is beyond my scope to engage with every single major work Borges produced on Cervantes. Teodosio Fernández has successfully provided an overview of all of Borges’s works on the novel, of which I will contend with a small number. His 2006 “‘El Quijote” en Hispanoamérica’, to which I am indebted, provides a thorough overview of Borges’s explicit dealings with Cervantes. Importantly, he demonstrates that Borges’s interest in the Quijote is not purely theoretical. Borges’s earlier work concerned itself with the novel’s style, and argued in his 1928 ‘La conducta novelistica de Cervantes’ that its greatest success was the characterisation of its protagonist. His 1933 ‘Una sentencia del Quijote’ sees in Quijote’s liberation of the galley slaves a cultural affinity between Argentina and Spain: ‘Siempre he sabido que esas tan decentes palabras eran un secreto que los hombres de nuestra América sólo podemos compartir con los hombres de España’ (Borges 2001: 65).

It would be simplistic to argue that Borges sees in it only an aesthetics of readership. I am therefore careful not to make sweeping generalisations about Borges’s view of the work. My discussion will limit itself to a selection of works that lend themselves to a reader-response analysis, in order to show that some of Borges’s works on the Quijote demonstrate an aesthetics of reading that positions him within more contemporary theoretical trends.

Taking the major works I have identified in a chronology, I will demonstrate the variety of ways in which the Quijote aided Borges’s investigations into the role of the reader in the discovery of
meaning. The critic Sergio Missana argued in his ‘Borges, lector del Quijote’ that Borges’s readings of the novel lend themselves to that kind of theorisation. He argued that ‘Pierre Menard’: ‘desborda el tema del Quijote, lo toma como punto de partido para elaborar una teoría general de la lectura y de la escritura’ (Missana 1998: 61). He also highlighted the viability of a future study on the relationship between Menard’s rewriting and the literary theories of Jauß and Iser (66). This thesis will fill that lacuna by using the theories of Jauß and Iser, as well as Fish and Barthes, to identify a general theory of writing and reception across many of Borges’s works on the Quijote.

I will begin with a brief comment on some of Borges’s earlier essays on reading and authorship, including ‘Kafka y sus precursores’ which credits wider literary tradition with the creation of some of the meaning of a text, and ‘La fruición literaria’ which explores the relevance of attribution to Borges’s aesthetics of reading. I will also make note of some of Borges’s commentaries on Unamuno’s cervantine works, which speak to a shared method for reading the Quijote which brings them to strongly contrasting interpretations of it. Contextualising Borges’s works on the Quijote within his wider aesthetics will allow for a clearer focus on the complexities of ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’ where the textual meaning is produced when author’s horizon of expectations meets the reader’s.

Later texts have been specifically chosen both to allow for a comparison with Unamuno, and for their relevance to the literary theories that I have broadly termed reader-centrism. His works in El hacedor show how both reading and authorship are a passive process guided on an unconscious level by the individual’s system of cultural references. In the fourth major section of this chapter, I will discuss the ways in which Borges collapses the metaphysical boundaries between reader, author and text in works such as ‘Magias parciales del Quijote’ and ‘Sueña Alonso Quijano’. I will demonstrate that the metaphysical game that Borges plays in those works aligns with an aesthetics of reading that broadly aligns with branches of reader-centrism, including Iser’s ‘effect theory’ which posits that a text’s meaning is determined by the effect that it exerts on the reader, as well as Jauß’s view that interpretation is restricted by the reader’s historical circumstances and cultural knowledge. I will argue that the image of the dream in Borges’s work — which is also fundamental to Unamuno’s work on the Quijote — communicates profitably with many contemporary theories on reader-response. This will allow for a comparison between the complex systems of reading and authorship that Unamuno and Borges set out in their works on a novel which itself complicates those two poles.

Though Borges dedicated significantly less page space to the Quijote across his career than Unamuno did, we must still be selective. I have chosen a set of texts that deal with specifically the authorship
and re-authorship of the *Quijote*, as well as his famous essay ‘Magias parciales del *Quijote*’ which helps to explain the aesthetic nuances of some of Borges’s work on the novel. Pierre Menard carries out a rewriting in the most literal sense, reproducing the same text from a different historical perspective. In *El hacedor*, Borges explores the role of literary tradition in the creation and reception of the work. He also posits a previously undiscovered chapter of the *Quijote*, thematically discordant with the rest of the novel, in an exploration of the specific process of reading, where the reader assimilates each moment in the text, forming the horizon of expectations by which every subsequent moment in the text is interpreted. In his later work on the *Quijote*, Borges poeticises the novel. In those rewritings he proposes that the relationship between author and text is the same as that between the dreamer and the dream: the text is created in a passive sense by the individual mind. The dreamer cannot dream, and the author cannot author, what their circumstances do not allow them to. I will not focus on the act of transferring the novel into a poetic mode per se, but investigate how these specific works theorise a complex relationship between author, reader, and text, where none has ultimate authority to determine meaning.

**V.1 The early Borges**

By the publication of Borges’s first book, *Fervor de Buenos Aires* in 1923, the Cervantine influence on him is obvious. A 24-year-old Borges’s first major contribution to the world of letters prefaced itself in the Cervantine style with a direct address to its reader, apologising in advance should the text prescribe a reading unintended by the author. Like Cervantes in the prologue to his *Quijote*, Borges refuses to prescribe any interpretation to his reader. For the role of the author and the role of the reader cannot be simply extricated from each other; it is mere circumstance that places them on either side of an arbitrary divide. Neither the reader or author may prescribe the meaning of a work; they can only view it from their particular horizon of expectations and read into the text a personal meaning. The introduction to *Fervor de Buenos Aires* is a microcosm of the relevance of modern reception theory when interrogating Borges’s reading of the literary work he returns to most across

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57 For this reason, his ‘Análisis del último capítulo del *Quijote*’ will not form a major part of my analysis, despite his admission that he was inspired to take on that analysis by Unamuno’s *Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho*. I am not interested in Borges’s analysis of the novel per se, rather in how the novel provides him with a useful model by which to construct a complicated aesthetics of authorship and reading.

58 In fact, in *Las versiones homéricas* he admits that the famous opening line to the *Quijote* might have meant little to Cervantes. ‘Yo, en cambio, no podré sino repudiar cualquier divergencia. El Quijote, debido a mi ejercicio congénito del español, es un monumento uniforme’ (OC I: 240).
the course of his literary career. The reader is intellectually alone, and cannot rely on a declared intention from the author to guide their interpretation. The author in Borges has, as throughout most of Unamuno’s fictions, no authority to declare the sum of meanings in their work.

It is interesting and presumably not incidental that Borges makes this point by borrowing the self-effacing technique of Cervantes’s prologues. The non-intentionalist method recommended by Borges as early as 1923 reaches its apex in his 1939 ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’, the most perfect expression of a model which conflates the act of writing with that of reading. It is the logical extreme of many of the ideas expounded in some of Borges’s literary investigations. Some of these investigations not only justify reading Borges from the perspective of reader-based reception theory, but also demonstrate a strong affinity to Unamuno. One example is ‘La flor de Coleridge’, published as part of Otras inquisiciones in 1952, which posits that literature is perpetuated throughout time by an endless human spirit. The sense that literature begets literature in an endless chain of reception and repetition, relegates authors to a footnote in the history of letters:

La historia de la literatura no debería ser la historia de los autores y de los accidentes de su carrera de sus obras sino la Historia del Espíritu como productor o consumidor de literatura. Esa historia podría llevarse a término sin mencionar un solo escritor. (OC I: 161).

The unimportance of great authors in the history of literature has an obvious relevance to Unamuno’s system of intrahistoria, which presents great men as the consequence of history, rather than vice versa. Authors are as incidental to Borges as history’s great men are to Unamuno. And great authors are simply a product of the literary tastes of their readership: ‘Detrás de la invención de Coleridge está la general y antigua invención de las generaciones de amantes que pidieron como prenda una flor’ (162). Paradoxically, reading is the mother of literary invention. Generations of readers beget new generations of readers, which provides new, valid readings.

‘La fruición literaria’, published in El idioma de los argentinos in 1928 provides a useful framework for reading ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’. It distinguishes between plagiarism and invention, a distinction that the narrator of ‘Pierre Menard’ is at pains to make (Borges 2008: 93). It also denies the possibility of a total understanding of any given work: ‘Tus libros preferidos, lector, son como borradores de ese libro sin lectura final’ (94). This implies that there exist possibly infinite valid readings which are decided purely by the circumstance in which the text is read. But there also

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59 Borges makes this point by citing a 1938 work by Paul Valéry. It does not seem incidental that works on Valéry appear in Menard’s bibliography published in 1939.
follows a comment that requires us to qualify Borges’s non-intentionalist method. Where Unamuno was an extreme non-intentionalist, seeing little interpretive use for the author at the moment of reception, Borges proposes that the identity of the author has a hermeneutic relevance. As he puts it, ‘¿Cómo admirar los sonetos de Juan Boscán, si no sabemos que fueron los primeros de que adoleció nuestro idioma?’ (94). The historical circumstance at the moment of writing, experienced by the author, is informative to reading. And the interaction between the moment of reading and the moment of reception is the process by which meaning is produced in the text, as the narrator implies in ‘Pierre Menard’. This distances Borges’s view of literature somewhat from Unamuno’s; the latter proposes that meaning can only be produced when the author does not concern us, whereas the former argues that meaning is produced by a synthesis of the author’s circumstances with the reader’s expectations.

A fundamental argument of ‘Pierre Menard’ is that attributing the same text to different authors necessarily alters the meaning of the words on the page. As Borges explains in ‘La fruición literaria’, the sentence, ‘El incendio, con feroces mandíbulas, devora el campo’ (94 - emphasis in original) must be read differently according to the source: ‘Esta locución ¿es condenable o es licita? Yo afirmo que eso depende solamente de quien la forjó, y no es paradoja’ (94). ‘Pierre Menard’ ascribes some textual meaning to the author’s identity. It also explores the ways the meaning of the text can change according to the source. Should we ascribe the above quote to one of Borges’s contemporaries in Buenos Aires, ‘Ahora es vulgarísima tarea la de hacer metáforas’ (95) whereas, were this a verse of Oriental poetry, ‘Yo pensare: Todo se les vuelve dragón a los chinos y me representará un incendio claro como una fiesta y serpeando, y me gustará […] Ese concepto de un fuego con mandíbulas es realmente de pesadilla, de horror y añade malignidad humana a un hecho inconsciente’ (95). Borges takes the author’s presumed horizon of expectations into account.60 The difficulty of such a method is that his view of what constitutes the horizon of expectations of another can only be given to him through his own61. As such this attribution of the text to various different authors can still be said to

60 Missana notes that confluence between Borges and Cervantes: ‘Si al menos en teoría la tesis de Borges debería funcionar en dos sentidos, el proceso se intensifica por la naturaleza misma del texto cervantino, su inasibilidad, su ironia, de modo que ocurre también al revés: la lectura del Quijote modifica la obra de Borges’ (Missana 1998: 76). In other words, Borges’s daring rewritings of the Quijote are only as daring as the original text has allowed him to be. His narrative experiments are commensurate with the ludic narrative mode of the Quijote, which denies its own authorship.

61 Edward Lane, one of the translators of The 1001 Nights, exemplifies this difficulty. Despite living five years in Cairo, no amount of exposure to Egyptian culture or literary discourse could bring him to forget his British propensity towards modesty when translating (OC I: 398-399). He could not
be a form of non-intentionalism where only the reader can form the meaning of the work. As in ‘Pierre Menard’, reading for Borges is a synthesis of what the author could have conceived of in their time and place, together with the literary expectations of the reader.

Here he also highlights how the temporal distancing between writing and reception form interpretation. In a move familiar to readers of ‘Pierre Menard’, he cites the opening verse of Cervantes’s *Al túmulo del Rey Felipe II en Sevilla*: ‘¡Vive Dios, que me espanta esta grandeza!’ (96). This kind of locution was generally accepted, says Borges, in Cervantes’s time, but ‘Nosotros lo vemos firme y garifo. El tiempo — amigo de Cervantes — ha sabido corregirle las pruebas’ (97). The force of time has imbued new meaning into Cervantes’s work. Jauß theorised precisely this idea in 1982:

A literary work is not an object that stands by itself and offers the same view to each reader in each period. It is not a monument that monologically reveals its timeless essence. It is much more like an orchestration that strikes ever new resonances among its readers and that frees the text from the material of the words and brings it to a contemporary existence. (Jauß 1982: 21)

The meaning internal to the text is formed to a large extent by historical events external to it. This is the central argument of ‘Pierre Menard, autor del *Quijote*’: the attribution of the same text to authors in different historical circumstances produces meaning in the work. To the same extent, reading old works in new historical circumstances will cause the work to strike ever new resonances among its readers.

‘Kafka y sus precursores’, also published within *Otras inquisiciones*, represents an affinity between Borges’s literary essays and much of later reception theory. Borges argues that reading anachronistically is intellectually valid. For after having read some of the works of Kafka, ‘creí reconocer su voz, o sus hábitos, en textos de diversas literaturas y de diversas épocas’ (279). One Kafkaesque resonance can be found in Antiquity, as Zeno’s Paradox has the form of Kafka’s novel *Das Schloss*. Kafka has not just added something modern to ancient thought. It is also the case that Kafka’s works have integrated themselves into Borges’s cultural framework, or to use the Jaußian term, his horizon of expectations. Borges cannot but read the works of Zeno from a Kafkaesque perspective. This appears to violate the most natural method: reading Kafka as a recipient of Zeno.

truly escape the influence of his original cultural circumstances, through which all of his cultural experiences are filtered.
However, reader-response theory provides for a reading of this kind. Fish’s ‘Is there a text in this class?’ argues that valid models of reading, or ‘interpretive strategies’ are subject to constant invention: ‘A new interpretive strategy always makes its way in some relationship of opposition to the old, which has often marked out a negative space (of things that aren't done) from which it can emerge into respectability’ (Fish 1980: 349). When Kafka produces literature, he provides his reader with new interpretive strategies by placing himself in a relationship with and opposition to pre-existing works of literature. The argument is also in keeping with Jauß’s idea on the way in which horizons of expectations are updated throughout history:

Only as the horizon changes and expands with each subsequent historical materialisation, do responses to the work legitimise particular possibilities of understanding, imitation, transformation, and continuation — in short, structures of exemplary character that condition the process of the formation of literary tradition. (Jauß 1982: 64)

As time advances, new texts enter into the horizon of expectations of readers. Jauß’s theoretical approach therefore provides a basis for the anachronism of Borges’s statement on Kafka, and his reading of Cervantes through an invented author in his 1939 ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’. Here I am in fact borrowing that method, and reading ‘Pierre Menard’ through the lens of later works, including ‘Kafka y sus precursores’, as well as later literary theory. ‘Pierre Menard’ itself practises that method, re-reading the Quijote from a new historical lens, reducing to glib aphorism many of the hidalgo’s grander pronouncements in Cervantes’s version, as the progress of history has invested them with greater meaning and more serious resonances. Moreover, in a comparative thesis such as this I cannot avoid reading Unamuno to some extent through a Borgesian lens. Unamuno is part of Borges’s horizon of expectations when revisiting the Quijote. The obvious affinities between Unamuno’s and Borges’s works on the Quijote might be an inevitable consequence of Borges’s having read the works of his literary forebear, and need not be read as a deliberate homage to or commentary on Unamuno.

The year after Unamuno’s death, Borges published a tribute to his counterpart in Sur. ‘Inmortalidad de Unamuno’ credits Unamuno with having updated the framework of literary discourse:

Este [Unamuno] fue, ante todo, un inventor de espléndidas discusiones. Discutió el yo, la inmortalidad, el idioma, el culto de Cervantes, la fe, la regeneración del vocabulario y de la sintaxis, la sobra de individualidad y falta de personalidad de los españoles, el humorismo, el malhumorismo, la ética […] El primer escritor de nuestro idioma acaba de morir; no sé de un
homenaje mejor que proseguir las ricas discusiones iniciadas por él y que desentrañar las secretas leyes de su alma. (Borges 1999: 144)

It is not clear that all of Borges’s writings on Cervantes deliberately communicate with those of Unamuno. It is however interesting to note that Borges admires Unamuno, among other reasons, for disputing the tendency among readers to venerate Cervantes. Unamuno may have informed Borges’s non-intentionalist approach to Cervantes’s text. That comes to light in three further essays, ‘Conducta novelística de Cervantes’ (1928), ‘Presencia de Unamuno’ (1937) and ‘Nota sobre el Quijote’ (1947). The first demonstrates certain affinities with Unamuno’s reading. Borges calls it an antigua equivocación to see in the Quijote a mere aping of the chivalric form. It therefore departs from the intentionalist reading of the Quijote, which would credit Cide Hamete Benengeli’s claim at the end of the second volume that the text’s function is to bring to an end the chivalric novels he so dislikes. He reads into it a moral significance, arguing for the sanctity of Alonso Quijano and against the false dichotomy between quixotic generosity and Quijano’s pragmatic practicality (Borges 2008: 122). These terms are of course familiar to Unamuno’s evangelical reading. Borges even sympathises with the hidalgo to a similar extent as Unamuno does, extolling the carácter honestísimo of don Quijote, who has become a ‘semidiós en nuestra conciencia’ (124). Though, as ‘Presencia de Unamuno’ makes clear, these shared conclusions can be arrived at without altering the form or content of the text. In that work, he criticises Unamuno for his interference into the Cervantine narrative, denigrating the quality of Unamuno’s most significant work on the Quijote:

Otros consideran que la obra máxima es su Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho. Decididamente no puedo compartir ese parecido. Prefiero la ironía, las reservas y la uniformidad de Cervantes a las incontinencias patéticas de Unamuno. Nada gana el Quijote con lo que refieran de nuevo, en estilo efusivo; nada gana el Quijote, y algo pierde, con esas azarosas exornaciones tan comparables, en su tipo sentimental, a las que suministra Gustavo Doré. Las obras y la pasión de Unamuno no pueden no atraerme, pero su intromisión en el Quijote me parece un error, un anacronismo. (Borges 1986: 79)

The Quijote has gained nothing from the retrospective re-workings of its form and content, as the meanings Unamuno identified in that text were already present in the original. Nor, as he explains in his 1947 ‘Nota sobre el Quijote’, from the invective against the author that characterises Vida de don Quijote y Sancho:

Del culto de la letra se ha pasado al culto del espíritu; del culto de Miguel de Cervantes al de Alonso Quijano. Este ha sido exaltado a semidiós; su inventor - el hombre que escribió: “Para
Borges criticises Unamuno’s reduction of Cervantes to a deficient historian, given that Cervantes was presumably well aware of many of the traits that Unamuno found in the character. An investigation into the reader’s place in the production of meaning in the text need not rely on a diatribe against the author. It suffices, as I will show, to simply attribute the text to someone else. Nor is it necessary to change the form of the text in order to discover meaning in it; Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard’ shows how much the text can gain from changing only its para-textual information, attributing the same form and content to an alternative source. It can be read to some extent as a critique of Unamuno’s practice of finding new meaning in the Quijote by denigrating the author, and by rewriting his text in the most literal sense.

V.2 Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote

The various ways in which Borges’s 1939 ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’ problematises the relationship between author and reader are of interest from a reader-response point of view, as well as for a comparison with Unamuno. It is a tale of the role of attribution in interpreting a text, where reading and authoring are beholden to the individual’s horizon of expectations. However, the deliberate attribution of one text to a different author is complicated by the fact that the reader can only construct the author’s horizon of expectations by way of their own. As such the act of interpreting by combining the reader’s viewpoint with the author’s historical circumstances — the key point of comparison between Menard’s and Cervantes’s versions — remains a non-intentionalist method. For there is no appeal to what the author wanted to say, but what the author could possibly have said.\(^{62}\) In this sense I take ‘Pierre Menard’ not only as the story of an impossible rewriting by an apocryphal author, but a kind of literary thought experiment, which can be read through theories related to the reader’s horizon of expectations and the way in which historical circumstances create and permit new readings.

\(^{62}\) Though reading this way has been categorised under intentionalism. This reflects what Paisley Livingston calls ‘conditionalist intentionalism’, which ‘recommends conjectures as to meanings the author “could have intended”, where the possibilia in question are appealing ones in worlds close to the actual artist’s’ (Livingston 2005: 140-141).
In ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’, the reader is placed in the critical position of determining meaning. The name of the author is a useful interpretive tool for the reader. This is in keeping with Iser’s view that:

author and reader are to share the game of the imagination, and, indeed, the game will not work if the text sets out to be anything more than a set of governing rules. The reader’s enjoyment begins when he himself becomes productive, i.e., when the text allows him to bring his own faculties into play. (Iser 1987: 108)

The narrator’s enjoyment of Menard’s work, which is ‘más sutil que el de Cervantes’ (Borges 2015: 49) is due to its taking Cervantes’s Quijote as a set of governing rules by which he could play an extremely daring literary game. The narrator’s method of reading Menard’s work posits that in any moment of reading the author’s and reader’s respective horizons of expectations clash and synthesise into a unique meaning. This divests Cervantes of authority; he is the point of origin that has destroyed itself in the Barthesian style, allowing himself to be usurped by a contemporary reader outside of his immediate cultural vicinity. Moreover, what Cervantes specifically may have intended by the Quijote is relegated behind a reader’s perspective on what Cervantes might have been able to produce in his context of 17th Century Spain.

In ‘Pierre Menard’, texts are rewritten as soon as they are read. A text is a canvas onto which the reader paints their own expectations, departing from the original meaning of the author, intended or otherwise. This is by its nature an anachronistic approach to the literary work. It is therefore relevant to Jauß’s later theory on historical materialisations of new readings (Jauß 1982: 64). This is

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63 ‘Menard’s project undermines the idea that a text communicates a message from what Barthes called “The Author-God” (Williamson 2013: 211).

64 This point is made in Alazraki’s investigation into Borges’s metaphysics: “Paul [sic] Menard, autor del Quijote” es la expresión literaria de ese pensamiento de Borges según el cual “una literatura difiere de otra, ulterior o anterior, menos por el texto que por la manera de ser leída” (Alazraki: 1968: 35). Though more precisely, ‘Pierre Menard’ shows how each literary work can differ to itself according to the way it is read.

65 As Iser suggests, ‘Apprehension of a literary work comes about through the interaction between the reader’s presence in the text and his habitual experiences, which are now a past orientation. As such it is not a passive process of acceptance, but a productive response’ (Iser 1987: 133). That is, the reader responds actively to a text in a way that determines an individual meaning for the work.
also a point of comparison with Unamuno, who was guilty of writing the kind of parasitic text that inspired Menard’s enterprise to compose *the Quijote*, the kind that places Jesus Christ on a Marseille avenue or don Quijote on a Parisian boulevard. A key dividing factor between Borges’s rewriting and Unamuno’s is that in the former’s case, the anachronism is only in the act of reading. The fact that Unamuno rewrites the Quijote in an authorial sense makes his version intellectually uninteresting. The deliberate modernisation of the text will *obviously* entail a modernised reading. Much more interesting is how a classic text can yield a contemporary interpretation. This is a key dividing factor between Borges’s and Unamuno’s approach to the *Quijote*. In Borges’s view, Unamuno seems not to have realised that a daring reading of a work’s contents does not require a chapter-by-chapter rewriting of the novel’s form.

Menard’s bibliography betrays an interest in non-intentionalist methods. On his friend’s passing, the narrator takes it upon himself to catalogue the visible works that Menard left behind, arriving finally at a correction to Madame Bachelier’s incomplete version published in a journal of Calvinist leanings. Among the visible works are a symbolist sonnet published twice in the same journal, a monograph on Leibniz’s *Characterista universalis* and various translations of works by authors from López de Segura to Quevedo. Item *p* particularly captures our interest. It is a diatribe against Paul Valéry, ‘el reverso exacto de su verdadera opinión sobre Valéry. Éste así lo entendió y la amistad antigua de los dos no corrió peligro’ (44). The text is an imperfect representation of the view of the author — something that Paul Valéry understood, but other readers of his *obra visible* may not. This raises a key question: how is the meaning of that text determined? Is the narrator’s reading of that text superior to others’ because he has a personal knowledge of the author’s real point of view? Would it be a misreading of Pierre Menard’s work to be persuaded of Valéry’s literary shortcomings? A non-intentionalist reader might argue that not only does a reader without knowledge of Menard’s intention have an equal say in uncovering meaning in the text, but that their reading might in fact be superior to that of those readers who interpret the text according to features not present within it. It plays by the rules of the textual game to read a diatribe against Valéry into a work by an author whose distaste for the French poet was expressed only ironically.

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66 For that reason, Borges’s claim that Unamuno’s interference with the *Quijote* is an anachronistic mistake is not contradictory with his interest in reading the text from an anachronistic perspective. In fact, perhaps Borges was inspired to write ‘Pierre Menard’ by reading Unamuno’s *Vida de don Quijote y Sancho*, in exactly the same way Pierre Menard was inspired to write his *Quijote* by reading a series of texts which mirror Unamuno’s technique.
Menard authors texts in such a way as to render his method of authorship an irrelevant factor to the reader. Item e is another example. Menard proposes a modification to the rules of chess, initially arguing for and eventually against the position he advances. The reader, in the act of interpretation, is intellectually isolated as Menard’s essay, much like the Quijote he rewrites, does not prescribe an interpretation. Meaning in that text is produced only in as far as the reader declares their position in the discussion that Menard initiates. Item p only provides one view — that Valéry’s writing was substandard. Similarly, that text’s meaning extends to how a reader engages their critical faculties and positions themselves in the discussion around the quality of Valéry’s works. As such, the paleontological investigation into the real attitude of the author offers little to the reader’s interpretation.

When the narrator introduces the impossible conceit of the story — that Menard’s intention was to arrive at a version of the Quijote through an act of enormous authorial endeavour — it hints at the limitations of non-intentionalist methods. For a work of literature needs to be considered an artistic achievement, created intentionally, in order for it to have any interpretable value. To copy a Velázquez masterpiece in such a way as to make it indistinguishable from the original would entail an outstanding artistic accomplishment (Genette 1997: 385-386). To copy Cervantes’s Quijote directly from the page entails no such achievement. For this reason, Menard needs his reader to believe that his Quijote is the product of independent thinking. Literature must be produced by the mind and not by an act of mechanical reproduction; there is no difference between each printed copy of Cervantes’s version whereas Menard’s apocryphal version is formally equal but intellectually different. In other words, it is the same text, but a different work.

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67 A term Demetrios Basdekis uses to describe the method of cervantist intentionalism Unamuno so disliked, but which would also comfortably describe the act of searching for the author’s intention as a means to construct an interpretation.

68 The fact that it can be interpreted differently to Cervantes’ version rescues Menard from the criticism that he was a mere charlatan, and a plagiarist, much like the one made by Saer (Saer 1998: 36) as well as that of Villada: “‘Pierre Menard’ is a richly textured argument in defense of an author who writes another man’s work verbatim, indeed, claiming with ironclad logic that Menard’s effort is commendable precisely because he wrote someone else’s writing’ (Bell-Villada 1999: 37). Delia Ungureanu’s recent study, ‘Pierre Menard, the Sur-realist’ also argues that ‘Creative plagiarism is precisely the theme of Borges’ short story’ (Ungureanu 2016: 115). Ungureanu’s argument rests on the fact that, while Borges was publishing ‘Pierre Menard’ in La Nación in 1939, a real author by the name of Pierre Menard published a defence of Lautréamont’s plagiarisms in a surrealist magazine, La Minotaure. In her view this strongly suggests that ‘Pierre Menard’ is a defence of the practice of
This raises the question as to whether the act of attributing a text to an author can be included in a non-intentionalist method of reading. Iser argues in *The Act of Reading* that a text is a ‘structured prefigurement’ that has to be received in order to have meaning, and the reception of the text relies on the reader. That ‘prefigurement’ provides governing rules for interpretation (Iser 1987: 107-108). Iser’s theory, which highlights the interaction between text and reader as the guiding principle for interpretation, does not ignore the author. The author is a surrogate for the orchestrating guidelines that permit and exclude certain interpretations. This does not have to extend to an effect intended by the author. It suffices to know that an author intended to create a literary work. The specific intentions within that literary work can be put aside.

Menard’s text is not just a valid piece of literature, worthy of interpretation in its own right. In fact, says the narrator, it’s actually better than Cervantes’s version: ‘el fragmentario *Quijote* de Menard es más sutil que el de Cervantes’ (49). The narrator explains that Menard’s version is superior to Cervantes’s for the fact that writing the *Quijote* from Menard’s horizon of expectations is a greater artistic endeavor. For that reason it is so much less interesting (not to say impossible) for Menard to write the *Quijote* by becoming Cervantes. The availability of cultural references and historical events to Cervantes makes the novel, in the narrator’s view, a crude juxtaposition of the provincial reality of his country. Cervantes was a man of letters and action, losing the use of his arm at Lepanto before becoming a key figure in his country’s cultural life:

plagiarism. I cannot agree with any of the critics I mention here, however. Menard would only have been plagiarising had he copied the *Quijote* directly from the page. We know that he did not. I believe that ‘Pierre Menard’ can be read as an experiment in attribution, based on the question as to how we might interpret the *Quijote* differently, not when Menard takes credit for it, but when we give that credit to him nonetheless.

69 This was recently highlighted by Michael Wood: ‘[He] is not a native speaker of Spanish, and he lives in the wrong country and the wrong century’ (Wood 2013: 37).

70 As Kristal points out, Menard also rejects Novalis’s notion that in order to understand an author, a reader must be able to fully identify with him. ‘Once he rejects the idea of becoming spiritually one with Cervantes, Menard decides to continue with his project of producing a work that would be identical to pages found in *Don Quixote* but to continue as himself, not as Cervantes’ (Kristal 2002: 31). He does not attempt to understand the work by identifying the author. He understands the work by reading it from a modern perspective.
The challenge to Menard’s vision of Spain is to avoid the local colour, the exoticisation of the Spanish landscape that Larre
ta, who is mentioned by the narrator, was guilty of in his La gloria de don Ramiro. The literature produced between Cer
vantes’s time and his own, including Mérimée’s Carmen (a text with which it seems fair to assume that Menard was famili
ar) might have romanticised and distorted the Spanish landscape in his mind. Cervantes writes according to a local perspec
tive, spatially and temporally; Menard writes according to a perspective wholly removed from his time and place. 71 Menard has defied his horizon of expectations, conceiving of a vision of Spain that ought to have been unavailable to him. This is one of the reasons that false attribution enriches the text. The reader’s relationship to the text changes fundamentally according to the identity of the author. Given that a text needs to be authored in order to have an interpretive value, the narrator of ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’ implies that the greater the authorial endeavour, the worthier of interpretation the literary work becomes. The interpretive richness of Menard’s version is directly proportional to the effort needed to produce a copy of the Quijote from his particular cultural circumstances.

The act of attribution in ‘Pierre Menard’ has a nuanced relationship to later non-intentionalist theories, including Jauß’s reception theory and Iser’s effect theory, in that it traces interpretation as a tripartite relationship between reader, author and text, as opposed to an interaction solely between text and reader. The reader is the most intellectually active and decisive aspect of this relationship. Attributing aspects of the Quijote to Menard that he in fact never attempted gives them the same interpretive value as those Menard did attempt. Attributing the work of one author to another is a way of considering them in the context of and in comparison with other works of literature, to investigate how they communicate. 72 Texts are not meaningful in a vacuum. Their meaningfulness

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71 As Boldy argues, ‘Our understanding of older texts is inevitably done through the lens of intervening literature. Thus, Cervantes contrasts chivalresque romances with the poor provincial reality of his time, while for Menard, this reality has become something altogether more literary and exotic, out of Bizet and Mérimée’ (Boldy 2009: 72).

72 That technique in fact is Cervantine; the attribution of the Quijote to Menard is equivalent to Cervantes’s attribution of the same text to Benengeli. For that reason Guillermo Corona argues that
is determined by the historical and cultural circumstances in which they are produced. Reading the same text as if it had been authored by another plays by the text’s orchestrating rules, as the text remains unmodified. It traces comparisons between texts, and not between authors, in order to enliven meaning within them. There is therefore an interpretive use in the author’s identity, though not his intention. It is effectively a method for comparing different works across cultural and temporal divides. The author’s name is a metonym for a body of literature which arbitrarily includes some works but excludes others. Perhaps this is the narrator’s motivation for issuing a corrective to Mme. Bachelier, scolding her for misrepresenting Menard’s easily enumerated bibliography. It is a debate about the framework in which the text should be read. Mme. Bachelier’s readers might read Pierre Menard’s Quijote differently in light of a different interpretive framework. The author has some interpretive value in as far as his name stands for a group of texts that a reader must relate to each other. When the narrator attributes the Quijote to Menard, he does so in the context of the extended bibliography of visible works that Menard has brought to public attention. The way the reader will interpret his Quijote cannot extricate itself from that body of work, whose meaning will guide interpretation. To wit, Menard is a meta-textual author. Many of his texts are about texts themselves: they include translations, transpositions and literary experiments. Would that not cause his reader — in this case the narrator — to receive Menard’s Quijote in a similar way?

‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’ can itself be seen as a rewriting of the novel: Borges’s story and Cervantes’s are narrated by a reader of the work of another (Corona 2008: 424).

And, as Beatriz Sarlo argued, in which they are read: ‘In fact Borges is using the paradox of Menard to assert that all texts are the rewriting of other texts (in an endless interplay of textuality and meaning) — but that at the same time, all texts are read against a cultural background which forms the fleeting course of meaning into a historical pattern’ (Sarlo 2006: 32). There might be a fixed number of possible texts — even the Library of Babel is mathematically finite albeit functionally infinite — but the number of possible readings is not bound in the same way. New readings are permitted by ever-changing circumstances.

In this sense Borges practises what Sherri Irvin calls ‘hypothetical intentionalism’, which holds that ‘To understand a work appropriately, perhaps we must see it as the product of an author: a particular human being in a certain socio-historical context, who writes with a certain style, tends to use words in certain ways, brings certain background knowledge and experiences to bear, and has written a body of works which may inform one another’ (Irvin 2006: 122). Though this is an even more hypothetical form, which treats the author as a shifting category, an imagined context in which texts can be read and inform each other.
When our narrator collates the same excerpt from Cervantes’s and Menard’s version, not only does he find in Menard’s version a more pragmatic series of philosophical statements, but also a superior written style. He argues that: ‘También es vivido el contraste de los estilos. El estilo arcaizante de Menard — extranjero al fin — adolece de alguna afectación. No así el del precursor, que maneja con desenfado el español corriente de su época’ (Borges 2015: 51). But the satirical reading of the Quijote is enabled by the fact that the language of the novel is already outdated by the time Cervantes puts pen to paper. While Menard’s writing is even more anachronistic than Cervantes’s, the latter can hardly be seen to write according to contemporary cultural norms.\(^75\) For this reason, the wary reader of ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’ will be suspicious of the motivations of the narrator. He is, of course, a reader of Pierre Menard’s oeuvre, an oeuvre entirely unavailable to us. His reading is not without motivation or biases. For as Stanley Fish argued, reading is generally an act of conforming a text to a preconceived notion of it, of confirming an a priori interpretation (Fish 1980: 340).

Problematically, the narrator’s preference for Menard’s version is based on his failure to reconstruct the horizon of expectations relevant to Cervantes. The narrator’s method of reading — where the reader’s horizon of expectations interacts with what he assumes the author’s horizon of expectations must be — is subjective. The narrator attempts to reconstruct Menard’s and Cervantes’s expectations, in order to compare them, but can only do so through his own.\(^76\) When the narrator upholds as philosophically profound the quote in Chapter IX that history is the mother of truth, he does so in light of the textual experiments that Menard has already carried out. Menard’s literary experiments are the context in which Cervantes’s statements are given philosophical profundity. When Cervantes wrote the phrase la verdad, cuya madre es la historia, he was putting to paper an item of rhetoric common to his historical situation, ‘un elogio retórico de la historia’ (50). When Menard writes, he does so from the perspective of an early 20th Century French author, one acquainted with William James and Bertrand Russell. That is sufficient, says the narrator, to change the meaning of the phrase. Only when the text is produced by Menard, a 20th Century French intellectual, does the phrase possibly signify that there is no objective hermeneutic principle for establishing truth. But a reader might be critical of the narrator’s view that Cervantes could not have conceived of the idea with any

\(^75\) ‘[Cervantes] himself used a language that had already been out of usage and was thus archaic with respect to his usage of Spanish, that is to say, of Medieval Spanish’ (Grandis 1988: 21).

\(^76\) This is also problematic for the various narrative theories I have drawn on. The discussion of horizons of expectations has its limitations in that it can reduce to sweeping statements the possible meaning of text in its time and place. We may be able to justify the idea that texts mean different things across history, that canons of acceptability change with historical circumstances, but it remains difficult to demonstrate what readings were permitted at any one historical time.
philosophical depth. In fact, could a reader not simply read a discussion of the nature of truth into Cervantes’s version? For how can the narrator of ‘Pierre Menard’ know that his contemporary has actually put forward a different viewpoint to the one imputed to Cervantes? Their respective horizons of expectations might differ, but there must be some intellectual common ground between Menard and Cervantes in order for one to read the work of the other. The fact that the narrator happens to be a contemporary of Pierre Menard does not particularly credit him, as he is still guilty of the paleontological argument that he can reconstruct the author’s possible intellectual state through objective investigation. An author might betray their declared intention, as two of Menard’s works in fact do. It also seems uncertain that Cervantes’s status as a 17th Century author would prevent him from arriving at the philosophical idea that truth is what each of us judges it to be. That is especially the case in a text whose protagonist puts that philosophical standpoint into practice.77

It is not merely attribution that alters textual meaning. Fragmentation has an equal role to play in the interpretation of the work. Both Menard’s and Unamuno’s versions are fragmentations of the original work78 which exercise the creative faculties of the reader, and compel them to create the thematic link between the disconnected chapters independently. Iser’s argument on the function of narrative omissions can be applied equally to Borges as to Unamuno:

Si el blanco es en gran medida responsable por las actividades descritas, entonces participación significa que el lector no está simplemente llamado a internalizar las posiciones dadas en el texto, sino que él es inducido a hacerlas actuar una sobre otra, haciéndolas transformarse mutuamente como resultado de lo cual el objeto estético comienza a emerger. (Iser 1982: 236-237)

Iser argues that the act of reading relies on what Husserl calls ‘protensions’. That is, the structure of the text provides us with certain expectations of what is to follow that inevitably colour our view of the text later on: ‘The semantic pointers of individual sentences always imply an expectation of some kind’ (Iser 1987: 111). As such, the reader, faced with a text consisting of Chapters IX and XXXVIII,

77 This is why Unamuno’s intrahistoria is narratologically compelling. In his search for an eternal Spanish philosophy, he shows that horizons of expectations are constantly changing ad infinitum, but there will always remain intellectual commonalities throughout human culture which allow for exchange of ideas across time.

78 Though it must be pointed out that Menard’s fragmentary version is presented as superior, while Unamuno’s version is presented in ‘Presencia de Unamuno’ as inferior to Cervantes’s.
as well as a fragment of Chapter XXII, will trace a thematic continuity between the chapters based on the initial stages of their reading, which will continually form their interpretation.

Chapter IX concludes the battle between don Quijote and the Biscayan, but not before a discussion of the relationship between author and reader that seems to inform Menard’s approach. In this chapter, Cervantes relegates himself to the level of just another reader, introducing the conceit of Cide Hamete Benengeli, an apocryphal author to whom he attributes his own text.\textsuperscript{79} The narrator describes the reader’s frustration at the moment when the narrative is interrupted.\textsuperscript{80} The narrator’s apology follows the account of how Cervantes came by the story. It is, he says, a translation of a found Arabic manuscript by a morisco, tasked with conveying the records into Spanish ‘sin quitarles ni añadirles nada’ (Cervantes 2010: 117). The narrator is an editor of a text provided him by a translator transposing a work that is not itself the ‘original’, as its narrative conveys hearsay of ostensibly real-life people, including Dulcinea del Toboso. Menard’s work is a fragmentation of a work that claims to be a fragmentation. His method of attribution is opposite and equivalent to Cervantes’s. Cervantes attributes the text to multiple other sources. Menard reverses this, attributing the text back to himself. For this reason the relationship between the Cervantine narrator and the reader mirrors that of the reader to the Borgesian narrator. In both cases an unavailable text is described to us by a third-party reader. Menard’s practice of false attribution, and the way our narrator reads Menard’s version, are derived from the specific aspects of the Quijote that Menard rewrites. Menard’s rewriting is therefore a copy in terms of form: the specific words on the page, and the content: the problematic status of the author as a reader in the text. With Chapter IX reflecting the limited authority of an author in the face of preceding tradition, Chapter XXXVIII reflective of the status of intellectual thought in a world ruled by material action, and a fragment of Chapter XXII reflecting the inability of human beings to adequately reflect reality through narrative, Menard’s Quijote is thematically consistent.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{79} Mario Fernández argues that this choice is far from incidental, as it represents the ‘Primer punto cervantino desde donde se inicia la construcción de la paradoja, de la parodia borgeana: el punto en que un autor deviene lector’ (Fernández, M. 2005: 104).

\textsuperscript{80} ‘Causóme esto mucha pesadumbre, porque el gusto de haber leído tan poco se volvía en disgusto, de pensar el mal camino que se ofrecía para hallar lo mucho que, a mi parecer, faltaba de tan sabroso cuento’ (Cervantes 2010: 113).

\textsuperscript{81} My reading is simply an exercise of my horizon of expectations. My aim as expressed in the introduction was to deliberately seek the resonances in Borges’s works on the Quijote which would be relevant to certain literary theories. My interpretation cannot be anything other than a projection of that intention.
Textual experimentation is, however, not the only thematically continuous idea present in Menard’s version. While we might read into his Quijote a philosophical document, the immediate shift between Chapters IX and XXXVIII reveals a more sinister, political meaning. The discussion on the meaning of the phrase, ‘la verdad, cuya madre es la historia’, that gives our narrator such pause in Chapter IX, is placed at a remove from Cervantes’s self-ironic discussion of the unreliability of Arabic-speaking narrators given that this no longer strikes the same cultural resonance among a modern readership. What might read as a self-ironic statement on an unreliable narration in Cervantes’s version takes on startling resonances in Menard’s:

> Si a ésta [historia] se le puede poner alguna objeción cerca de su verdad, no podrá ser otra sino haber sido su autor arábigo, siendo muy propio de los de aquella nación ser mentirosos; aunque, por ser tan nuestros enemigos, antes se puede entender haber quedado faltó en ella que demasiado. (Cervantes 2010: 118)

As I highlighted in the second chapter, it is worth asking under which jurisdiction the phrase ‘nuestros enemigos’ falls under. That question, as Irvin shows, reintroduces an appeal to the author in reading

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82 I confess that Chapter XXII only bears a tenuous relation to the other two if read from a political viewpoint. This is made all the more difficult given that it is never specified which particular fragment of the text Menard writes, which could be one of a practically infinite number. One could for example read into don Quijote’s freeing of the galeotes a tract on imposing justice through physical force. Balderston suggests that the fragment can only be the meeting between don Quijote and Ginés de Pasamonte (Balderston 1993: 22). Though which fragment we impute to Menard depends entirely on the way we interpret the purpose of the other two chapters in the work. If they are taken as an investigation into the limitations of the author, then it is natural to assume that Menard chose the meeting with Ginés as his fragment.

83 Even beyond any ethical interest in the work, Corona argues that reading the original chapter should be cause for suspicion on the part of the reader: ‘we discover that, just before the passage quoted in the “Pierre Menard”, there is that other one in which Cervantes calls Hamete a liar. Is Borges calling himself a liar? Should we, therefore, question Borges’ reliability in the “Menard” too? Let us bear in mind that Borges, commenting Menard’s Quixote, says that the truth “no es lo que sucedió; es lo que juzgamos que sucedió” (Ficciones, p. 53). Is Borges telling us the truth about Menard or simply what he reckons to be true?” (Corona 2009: 428). I do not conflate Borges with the narrator to the same extent, but I agree that the narrative voice should be taken as unreliable. My aim is to show a logical extreme of that narrator’s unreliability.
(Irvin 2006: 121). The statement is given in Spanish by a French author in the late 1930s. Is the first-person plural inclusive of Spain, or exclusive to France? Let's consider both possibilities. When Cervantes’s Quijote referred to the mendacious Arabs of a hostile nation, he will have been writing as a war-weary veteran of the Battle of Lepanto against the Ottoman Empire, a power which enveloped much of the North African territory from which Cide Hamete Benengeli hailed. This would explain both the original statement of enmity towards Arabs, as well as the reference to the Arabic-speaking world as a single nation. The declaration that Arabs are prone to dishonesty undercuts itself humorously in a narrative where truth is a shifting category.

Assuming that when Menard writes ‘nuestros enemigos’ it is focalised only through a French perspective, the intervening historical changes between Cervantes’s moment of writing and Menard’s produce a wholly different reading. Cide Hamete Benengeli is a Moor, broadly speaking a resident of the Maghreb region which encompasses Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. At Menard’s time of writing, France has become a major colonial power in precisely this part of the world. After a series of military engagements in the region, France had effectively colonised all three nations: Algeria in 1834, Tunisia in 1881 and Morocco in 1912. French involvement in the Levant was almost at an end, with Lebanon and Syria declaring independence in 1943 and 1946 respectively. All of those nations remained under French hegemony when Menard condemned Arabs as a national enemy. His invention of a deceitful historian in Cide Hamete Benengeli singles out the Arab as a morally-debased ‘other’. It suggests that French colonial interests across North Africa and the Levant are the natural consequence of his country’s antagonism towards those regions. Colonialism as enmity speaks the language of fascism. The purpose of colonialism is not based on the manifest destiny of North American political doctrine, nor is it based on the great civilising myth. It is simply based on an ostensible duty to conquer a belligerent. And to that point, Menard betrays a level of cultural ignorance in referring to the Arab world as ‘aquella nación’. This was a description with some validity, perhaps, in Cervantes’s time and place, but which is now long since defunct.84

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84 Pierre Menard, whatever his intention, adds his voice to the racial and cultural suprematism behind French expansionism into North Africa and the Middle East. That legitimises the kind of postcolonial reading of Menard’s work that Fiddian (2017) recently alluded to. There is a trend of reading Borges from the perspective of postcolonial studies. Julia Kushigian (1991) explores Borges's exotisising view of the Orient in her chapter 'The Orient of Borges.' Edna Aizenberg (1992) interrogates Borges’s essays on tradition as an exploration of linguistic nativism in the formation of literary culture. Ian Almond (2004) criticises Borges’s works on Islamic themes for their reliance on well-worn Occidental clichés of the East. No study I can identify has thoroughly explored the colonialist,
Though writing in Spanish from a French historical perspective makes the statement all the more questionable. Is Menard writing from a pan-European perspective? What unifying factors are there between the national context of his writing and the linguistic codes in which his work is read? The work does not seem to be meant for a French-speaking audience. The French colonial resonances are difficult to ignore. But the text is aimed at a well-read, Spanish-speaking readership. Perhaps it is a statement of cultural proximity to Spain with an antagonism towards Arabs at its heart. Perhaps Menard appropriates aspects of a text written little over a century after the reconquest of Spain, by an author present at a battle against the Ottoman Empire, in order to cast a racial other as an eternal enemy to European countries like Spain and France. That would be all the more difficult to ignore if it were clear that Menard did indeed write after the onset of the Spanish Civil War.

The statement is also very proper of the kind of anti-Semitic, xenophobic rhetoric at the heart of a regime that rose to power in 1933, a year before Pierre Menard set out on his Quijote.\(^{85}\) Both the narrator and Pierre Menard mix in intellectual circles characterised by intellectual snobbery and latent xenophobia. The narrator makes a series of thinly-veiled comments which betray anti-Semitic attitudes. There is a nod to the Jewish readership, the circuncisos who subscribe to Mme. Bachelier’s journal, and a swipe at the presumably Jewish American magnate Simon Kautzsch and the many victims of his ‘disinterested manoeuvres’, a comment reflecting a stereotypical contemporary caricature of Jewish people. The narrator scarcely mentions the racial aspect of Menard’s work. He is too concerned with how the meaning of the statement ‘la verdad, cuya madre es la historia’ has changed over time to turn his attention to the immediately preceding statement on the enmity between Europeans and Arabs. Menard produced that statement independently, in a contemporary setting where such rhetoric would soon have such disastrous consequences for so many. He and his contemporary see in the Quijote a racially supremacist ideology relevant to their modern setting. This is one of the dangers of a method where the reader is king. As Stanley Fish said, all readers interpret the text in such a way as to confirm their pre-conceptions of it (Fish 1980: 340). As we cannot appeal to the text to reject an interpretation, our rejection of his interpretation must be world-oriented, and not text-oriented. It is ethical, and not aesthetic.

\(^{85}\) As Balderston also notes, the narrator is ‘antisemita, antiprotestante, [y] un esnob empedernido’ (Balderston 2010: 82).
The xenophobic proclamations of the ninth chapter are followed immediately by a discussion on the relevance of arms in intellectual society. The narrator acts on the premise that don Quijote is a mouthpiece of Cervantes, and wonders only at the fact that Menard, an intellectual, could ever suggest that the sword is mightier than the pen: ‘Cervantes era un viejo militar: su fallo se explica. ¡Pero que el Don Quijote de Pierre Menard — hombre contemporáneo de *La trahison de clercs* y de Bertrand Russell — reincida en esas nebulosas sofisterias!’ (49-50). The narrator enjoys Menard’s work to the extent that he represents a countercurrent to the intellectual trends of his time. Even so, he does not take into account how historical events can legitimise and delegitimise particular understandings (Jauß 1982: 64). The speech on arms and letters is filled with references contemporary to Cervantes. The presence of those references in a modern version suggests, perhaps, a romanticisation of war given its appropriation of Golden Age imagery:

dicen las letras que sin ellas no se podrán sustentar las armas, porque la guerra también tiene sus leyes y está sujeta a ellas, y que las leyes caen debajo de lo que son letras y letrasados. A esto responden las armas que las leyes no se podrían sustentar sin ellas, porque con las armas se defienden las repúblicas, se conservan los reinos, se guardan las ciudades, se aseguran los caminos, se despejan los mares de cosarios, y, finalmente, si por ellas no fuese, las repúblicas, los reinos, las monarquías, las ciudades, los caminos de mar y tierra estarían sujetos al rigor y a la confusión que trae consigo la guerra el tiempo que dura y tiene licencia de usar de sus privilegios y de sus fuerzas. (Cervantes 2010: 495)

Had Menard written the whole of the *Quijote* from scratch then the discussion on arms and letters might not resonate quite so strongly with the xenophobic statements made in the previous chapter. But placing these chapters side by side, which is jarring from a narrative point of view, causes them to be read in light of each other. This imputes to the text a rhetoric that would be immediately familiar to a European reader in 1934. Menard deliberately chooses the language of racial suprematism and war propaganda at a time when this had become the intellectual norm in a country bordering his own. Attributing the text to a major figure in that country’s intellectual life would make these resonances difficult to ignore. For now, they remain strongly suspicious. We know that Menard had a habit of saying the opposite of what he thought. This makes the question as to whether Menard truly believed in the supremacy of arms over letters, or the racial supremacy of the Europeans over the Arabs, as irrelevant to the interpretation as the question as to whether Unamuno truly longed for a civil war. The correct interpretation is not a reconstruction of Menard’s viewpoint, but an ethically sound reading as permitted by historical circumstances.
When the author’s intention cannot arbitrate between meanings, and the text cannot be the source of disagreement on the meaning of the text itself, as Fish argued, then reader-centric models can provide readers with an anarchistic power to determine meaning. For textual meaning under reader-response theory is entirely appropriable according to the expectations of individual readers. This is one aspect of ‘Pierre Menard’ that literary criticism has only touched on. Fish shows that readings are validated when the canons of acceptability change; Jauß shows that texts are events that continue to strike ever new resonances with readers. The horizon of expectations includes cultural and historical circumstances outside of the text, which produce new canons of acceptability within the text. It is worthwhile examining the horizon of expectations in which Menard writes, and showing how the canons of acceptability might have changed by the time his contemporary reads the work.

There is an intervening period of five years between Menard’s original plan and the narrator’s reception of the text. Menard writes to his friend from Bayonne in 1934 to outline his plan to produce the Quijote. The narrator publishes his reading of Menard’s Quijote in May 1939. Between those years, one could argue that the canons of acceptability for reading may have changed. That is, how the text ought to have been read in September 1934 is different to how the text ought to have been read in 1939. It is amply recognised that the story posits the reader as a kind of author, that the act of reading is a way of creating the text anew. But little scrutiny has been paid to the narrator’s interpretation, to what particular type of text the author creates in his reading. A wary reader might discover a version of the Quijote that places the narrator’s view of the text alongside Unamuno’s. Unamuno’s anarchistic reading of the Quijote directly permits him to tell his reader that Spain ought to go to war with itself without his reader pointing to the text in contradiction of his idea. Unamuno wrote 31 years before the onset of the Civil War, and his pain of seeing himself defeated by his own argument is historically well-documented. That might provide him with some sympathy from the

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86 This is also how Jaime Alazraki conceptualises meaning in ‘Pierre Menard’: ‘El tiempo, al modificar el contexto de una obra, modifica también su sentido, sus valores, sus alcances; así, con el girar del tiempo, una obra puede alcanzar una estatura imprevisible o insospechada en el original’ (Alazraki 1968: 35). Fundamentally, the passage of time produces readings that the author cannot possibly have conceived of. This makes a purely intentionalist reading of the text inappropriate.

87 The exact moment at which Menard writes is not certain, but Daniel Balderston has pointed out that the reference to Novalis’s ‘Pflichtenlehre des Lesers’ as an inspiration for Pierre Menard’s enterprise, and the letter dated September 30th, 1934, strongly suggest that he wrote his Quijote during the mid-1930s (Balderston 1993: 21-22).

88 The point that intellectual rhetoric can be appropriated and used to justify the use of force is made by Jon Juaristi in his recent biography of Unamuno. Unamuno, having seen how his rhetoric had
reader. Perhaps he could not have foreseen the future political situation and how it unfolded. But Menard’s narrator’s reading is ethically dubious given the European political situation at the precise moment of reading.

Critics such as Fernando Iwasaki Cauti have expressed the view that Pierre Menard is an avatar of Unamuno in Borges’s work (Cauti 2005). There are certainly affinities. They have some connection to the Basque Country. Both write politically outrageous statements that would later be damned by history. Assuming that Menard began writing before 1936, neither he nor Unamuno could have foreseen the fall of the Basque country to the political ideology that their writing would permit. Though unlike Unamuno, Menard does not bring his work to public attention. It became a matter of public discourse through a contemporary in May 1939. Perhaps Menard was cautious of violating the Cervantine principle, set out in the prologue to the Novelas ejemplares, that no reader ought to be brought to an ill thought or deed by reading. Was Menard wary of adding fillip to burgeoning European militarism and racial extremism at his moment of writing? His version of the Quijote seems like another draft that would have been destined for the bonfire but for his untimely death and the intervention of his contemporary. Perhaps the full implications of the statements he makes in his text were not clear to him until he finished authoring the text, and started reading it.

The narrator’s historical circumstances ought to forbid his reading of Menard’s Quijote. In the intervening period between Menard’s writing and the narrator’s reading, Spain has fallen to fascism. The Spanish Civil War will be a familiar and timely reference for Menard and the narrator. He is also an intellectual with a command of the Spanish language and literature, an awareness of German and Greek philosophy and expertise in the French poetic tradition. Yet a fascist regime set up in a country he knows intimately well does not prevent him from taking pleasure in Menard’s statements on the superiority of arms over letters, or the racially motivated statements that readily recall Shakespearean quotes on malignant Turks. Would any reader on the Republican side of the Spanish Civil War possibly produce such a reading? Would the horizons of expectations of a left-wing intellectual not prevent such a reading from being produced?

found its way into Primo de Rivera’s fascist manifesto, ‘se percató con horror —y no sería la última vez— de que los odiosos militares se habían apropiado fácilmente de sus ideas para justificar un golpe de Estado, y, por tanto, se creyó urgido a marcar distancias entre lo que él había sostenido y lo que el manifiesto proclamaba’ (Juaristi 2015: 353).

89 Unlike him I think there are key differences. Unamuno’s rewriting changes form and content; Menard’s changes neither. Menard’s narrator is the one who reads into the Quijote a militaristic fable for contemporary times, much like Unamuno does in 1905.
The narrator’s reading defies the intellectual trends of his time and place. But where the narrator sees this as a mark of the quality of Menard’s work, the reader ought to see this as a mark of the deficiency of the narrator’s reading. The narrator reads the original Quijote in a highly dubious way. When Menard writes on the relationship between arms and letters, he presumably does not remove don Quijote’s admission that the superiority of the former over the latter has yet to be demonstrated: ‘volvamos a la preeminencia de las armas contra las letras, materia que hasta ahora está por averiguar’ (Cervantes 2010: 495). The narrator therefore reads into Menard’s Quijote a significance that the text as it is written might not allow for. He imputes to don Quijote a statement that he did not explicitly make. The narrator’s appropriation of Menard’s text may in that sense rely on a reading of the Quijote that ignores the text’s role in defining meaning.

For the narrator, the question as to whether Menard truly places arms above letters is in no way interesting to his interpretation. His interest extends to the fact that Menard ignites that discussion in his contemporary situation, and a reader is free to project their own viewpoints onto the text without seeing their interpretation negated by the discovery of what the author really wanted to say. Herein lies one of the difficulties of reader-centric methods. It allows readers to co-opt texts for various purposes with no mind for the author’s wishes, and without the text itself being able to disprove their reading (Fish 1980: 342). Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’ professes both a reader-centric method, and explores its limitations and liability to appropriation. Is it not adequate grounds to reject the narrator’s interpretation, in May 1939, that Europe is heading inexorably towards war; that three of France’s immediate neighbours have fallen to fascist dictatorships? I would add that Borges’s explicit rejection of totalitarianism throughout his career separates him from the narrator

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90 Zur Linde in ‘Deutsches Requiem’ is guilty of appropriating Schopenhauerian determinism in order to exonerate himself from his active role in the Holocaust. Boldy also notes his quixotic conversion of reading into action: ‘He is a Germanic Don Quijote who has gone mad by reading too much Spengler, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, or by reading it too naively and literally’ (Boldy 2009: 169). Echevarría reads zur Linde as an emblem of the intellectual baselessness of fascism, who has arrived at his doctrine by misreading philosophical texts (Echevarría 2013: 131). Though zur Linde has similarities to Borges — he is of similar familial and intellectual extraction — he like the narrator of ‘Pierre Menard’ shares a method of reading with Borges which serves wholly incompatible viewpoints.

91 It took many forms, from the subtle to the explicit. In a 1946 speech he argued that, ‘Las dictaduras fomentan la opresión, las dictaduras fomentan el servilismo, las dictaduras fomentan la crueldad; más abominable es el hecho de que fomenten la idiotez […] Combatir estas tristes monotonías es uno de
to a large extent. Borges shares a methodology of reading with his narrator. But the conclusions they draw will differ wildly. The narrator is about to feel the full force of his own argument when the Nazis invade France twelve months from the publication of his review of Menard’s work.92

Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard’ is prescient in that sense. As Jauß shows, the force of historical progress provides new aesthetic frameworks by which to interpret and critique texts. History allows us to criticise the narrator’s glorification of arms and his disregard for racial suprematism all the more acutely than would have been possible in 1939. The modern reader benefits from the knowledge of the subsequent World War, Holocaust and collapse of European fascism as interpretive tools for determining the acceptability of the narrator’s reading. The narrator goes some way to helping us answer the question Fish asked in 1980 as to what constitutes an acceptable reading of the text. It is a world-oriented interpretation, one in keeping with the Cervantine principle, that no reader must be moved to ill thought or deed by the text. For the author cannot intend for their text not to be appropriated for ill purposes. Cervantes recognised his own inability to prevent this. The appropriation of texts for ill ends is what constitutes an unacceptable reading, even if it is in keeping with the rules of the textual game. Proper reading is historically and ethically motivated; it obviates the totalitarianism that Borges stood against; the kind that Unamuno, it has been argued, helped to precipitate. Cervantes’s principle that: ‘si por algún modo alcanzara que la lección destas novelas pudiera inducir a quien las leyera o a algún mal deseo o pensamiento, antes me cortara la mano con que las escribí, que sacarlas en público’ (Cervantes 2005: 135) is an important check on the reader-centric method which leads Unamuno, and the narrator of Pierre Menard, to ethically dubious interpretations. Any ill desire or thought produced by the text must be considered an unacceptable reading, and as such discarded.

92 In another twist, it was published originally in La Nación in Argentina, a country whose sympathy towards Nazism was the target of Borges’s 1940 ‘Definición del germanófilo’: ‘He tenido el candor de conversar con muchos germanófilos argentinos; he intentado hablar de Alemania y de lo indestructible alemán; he mencionado a Hölderlin, a Lutero, a Schopenhauer o a Leibnitz; he comprobado que el interlocutor “germanófilo” apenas identificaba esos nombres’ (Borges 1986: 335). A text stating the specious case for arms over letters by way of a literary reading will have found a welcoming readership in Buenos Aires.

los muchos deberes del escritor. ¿Habré de recordar a los lectores del Martin Fierro y de Don Segundo Sombra que el individualismo es una vieja virtud argentina?’ (Dèle, Dèle, August 1946). Interesting is his position that, for all his fascination with arms and letters, or civilisation and barbarism, militaristic totalitarianism is anathema to intellectual liberalism.
V.3 El hacedor

Borges’s later writings on the *Quijote* are interesting from a more purely aesthetic point of view than from an ethical one. Where Borges pays much attention in the first half of the 20th Century to readers of the *Quijote*, including Unamuno and Pierre Menard, in the latter half he takes the *Quijote* as a symbol of the possibilities and limitations of reading. In ‘Un problema’, an essay published in his 1960 *El hacedor*, he posits the objective reality of Cide Hamete Benengeli in order to set out interpretive possibilities for the work. This, as I will show, aligns him somewhat with Unamuno despite the latter’s anachronistic and emotional interference with the work. For both profit from the paradoxically non-intentionalist method of taking the author in the most literal sense of his words. Though for Borges, Benengeli is made all the more relevant to the interpretation when taking one more imaginative step: that of attributing a missing chapter to the whole body of the work. Here Borges does not quite state a case for non-intentionalist methods, but rather explores how the reader’s interpretation is an act of assimilating new information in real time, of how each moment in the text has an interpretive impact on all following moments.

He opens asking the reader to imagine that Cervantes had indeed stumbled upon the Arabic manuscript written by someone who had left the signature Hamete Benengeli, and had translated it personally. The original manuscript is unfaithful to the copy in the novel that we know today:

> En el texto leemos que el héroe (que, como es fama, recorría los caminos de España, armado de espada y de lanza, y desafiaba por cualquier motivo a cualquiera) descubre, al cabo de uno de sus muchos combates, que ha dado muerte a un hombre. En este punto cesa el fragmento: el problema es adivinar, o conjeturar, cómo reacciona Don Quijote. (OC I: 794)

This would represent an obvious breach of the canonical text. The humorous, satirical reading to some extent relies on the fact that don Quijote is relatively harmless, that the worst of his sins is to inconvenience those around him, without ever bringing them to harm. He is a figure of ridicule for his inability to impose his will through physical force. Should the reader find that Quijote is in fact competent with arms, this would represent a total reinvention of the character. They are invited to conjecture their own version of what happens next, to impute a psychological state to the hidalgo having found that he had been capable of killing. From here a reader will create their own version of the character, one who acted according to their particular expectations of him. As such, ‘Un problema’ represents another thought experiment that sets out how a reader invents a new version of the text at the point of reading. Interestingly, Borges does so in full respect of many of the novel’s original devices, including the claim that the novel is a translation of an extant historical work, and
the exclusion of episodes which the narrator claims have been lost to history. Should we imagine a chapter as described here, and intersperse it into the original novel, this would surely alter our interpretation of what followed. In this way ‘Un problema’ demonstrates that a literary work is a complex organism of interacting cells, where the interpretation of one aspect relies on the interpretation of all preceding aspects.

Borges offers three possible readings of the theoretical event, all with a unique interpretive value for the rest of the work:

La primera es de índole negativa; nada especial ocurre, porque en el mundo alucinatorio de Don Quijote la muerte no es menos común que la magia y haber matado a un hombre no tiene por qué perturbar a quien se bate, o cree batirse, con endriagos y encantadores. La segunda es patética. Don Quijote no logró jamás olvidar que era una proyección de Alonso Quijano, lector de historias fabulosas; ver la muerte, comprender que un sueño lo ha llevado a la culpa de Caim, lo despierta de su consentida locura acaso para siempre. La tercera es quizá más verosímil. Muerto aquel hombre, Don Quijote no puede admitir que el acto tremendo es obra de un delirio; la realidad del efecto le hace presuponer una pareja realidad de la causa y Don Quijote no saldrá de su locura. (OC I: 794)

Borges does not comment on how these conjectures might be formative to the reading. But in the first instance, it is suggested that the reader might think little of it. For if an accidental killing is an occupational hazard of knight-errantry, events such as this are simply to be expected. By contrast the reader might respond with pathos, feeling sympathy for a protagonist who had been bedevilled by books of chivalry, only to have the illusion broken when faced with the real consequences of his actions. Or, the reader might assume that Quijote will continue unperturbed, unable to assimilate the accepted rules of cause and effect into his worldview.

Each reader will have interpreted the Quijote according to a unique horizon of expectations. That includes the particular approach adopted before the moment of writing: say, the satirical approach or the romantic one. That approach will inevitably form which of the explanations the reader chooses. That explanation will then propagate throughout the rest of the interpretation. Let us assume for example that the reader places this apocryphal chapter early on in the novel. This would surely impact on the way in which the reader experienced the rest of the text. Would a reader not approach each new Quijote adventure with fear, then relief, at the outcome of each new episode of Quijote’s adventures? Borges’s attribution of an apocryphal chapter to the Quijote is here not so much an exploration of what the reader can deliberately bring to a text, of the meaning that they can actively
produce, but of how the reader’s interpretation is a self-propagating model, where each new aspect is
interpreted in the light of all previous aspects. This aligns neatly with Iser’s argument that textual
meaning is given by the effect that each text has on a given reader. The impact of the apocryphal
chapter is a literary thought experiment whose results Iser puts to theory: ‘The reader’s position in
the text is at the point of intersection between retention and protension. Each individual sentence
correlate prefigures a particular horizon, but this is immediately transformed into the background for
the next correlate and must therefore be necessarily modified’ (Iser 1987: 111). Interpretation is a
complex process. It involves a reader constantly updating their expectations of the text in the face of
new information; however, that new information is always interpreted in line with the reader’s
expectations.

Borges again makes note of how different horizons of expectations produce entirely different
interpretations. There is a final conjecture that bears almost no relation to Cervantes’s text as we
know it:

Queda otra conjetura [...] Don Quijote — que ya no es Don Quijote sino un rey de los ciclos
del Indostán— intuye ante el cadáver del enemigo que que matar y engendrar son actos
divinos o mágicos que notoriamente transcien dan la condición humana. Sabe que el muerto
es ilusorio como lo son la espada sangrienta que le pesa en la mano y él mismo y toda su vida
pretér ita y los vastos dioses y el universo. (794)

What if the Quijote is a distant product of literature in a totally different time and place? How would
that guide the reader’s interpretation of the text? In Unamuno’s case, where the Quijote is a product
of an intra-historic spirit, the authoring and therefore interpretive authority over the work is shared
across temporal generations and communities. Borges’s suggestion that the Quijote might be one of
endless distortions of given narratives from other cultural and historical frameworks makes a similar
but slightly different argument. The interpretive authority over the novel is not shared across a
community, but does not exist at all. It cannot lie with the author, who merely distorted given forms
and archetypes he could not fully conceive of. For the same reason it cannot lie with the reader either:
the text is produced in its own historical circumstances, and read in a different set of historical
circumstances. Neither reader nor author can fully conceive of the sheer number of cultural
influences which have impacted on the way the text is authored, and the way it is read. A reader’s
horizon of expectations is formed by all of the texts that they have read, all of which have distilled
given tradition in ways accessible to the author. This reflects Iser’s idea on protensions on a grand
scale. Not only is the act of reading a process of updating one’s expectations in the face of new
information, and interpreting new information in line with those expectations. The act of writing
literature is similarly a process of updating works of literature in light of new ideas, and interpreting new ideas in light of given works. This is how the horizon of expectations of an author and a reader is formed. Ultimately, reading on the most microscopic level is reflective of authorship on the most macroscopic.

It also connects strongly to Borges’s views on tradition, that there is a set of human myths common to all world literatures that are simply regurgitated over time.\(^{93}\) Tradition has a limiting effect on the authorial authority over the work. The writer cannot produce an original work of literature, one that does not crystallise the literary influences that have gone before. Tracing Cervantes’s literary influences all the way backwards throughout cultural history would be an impossible endeavor.\(^{94}\) But those influences make themselves felt at the moment of writing, even if the author does not fully understand how. Perhaps if it were possible to trace the Quijote back to literary archetypes in different times and places, it would provide the reader with enough contextual information to form a new canon of acceptability through which to read the work, and therefore arrive at a new interpretation entirely removed from any major trend of thinking on the novel.

The deconstruction of Cervantes’s authority continues in ‘Parábola de Cervantes y de Quijote’. This short poetic essay proposes that the Quijote is the product of a cosmopolitan author, distilling both Spanish and Italian cultural influences into a single text. Borges paints Cervantes as a former military man looking for solace in literature, and finding it in an Italian Renaissance tradition: ‘Un viejo soldado del rey buscó solaz en las vastas geografías de Ariosto, en aquel valle de la luna donde está el tiempo que malgastan los sueños y en el idolo de oro de Mahoma que robó Montalbán’ (OC I: 799). The act of cultural borrowing from Ariosto negates any possibility of referring to the novel as a specifically Spanish work. The Quijote has a meaning that pre-dates Cervantes. It cannot be considered a satire without the existence of previous texts for the novel to lampoon. The hapless knight-errant cannot have come to life without the adventures of Amadis, Roland or his avatar in Orlando. So Cervantes’s right to determine the meaning in the text is deconstructed commensurately

\(^{93}\) ‘El encuentro’ makes that point by showing how outlaw Juan Almada’s tribal rivalry against Juan Almanza repeats itself in the battle between Uriarte and Duncan that Borges remembers from his childhood.

\(^{94}\) Though it must be said that the limitation of this model is that it implies no beginning to human culture. If each work is just a repetition of a previous one, this must entail an infinite set of texts going ever backwards.
with the Spanish nation’s claim to have a sole interpretive authority over the work.\textsuperscript{95} The author’s writing is as beholden to a set of international influences as the reader’s interpretation is.

The mention of Ariosto is interesting for our purposes. Ariosto’s \textit{Orlando Furioso} is a continuation of Boiardo’s \textit{Orlando Innamorato}, which itself is heavily influenced by the French \textit{Chanson de Roland}. All will have been heavily influenced by the British Arthurian legend. So the \textit{Quijote} is not to be interpreted as a simple homage to Ariosto, but a trove of an unimaginable number of cultural strands which have been woven into the novel that we know today.\textsuperscript{96} The presence of these cultural strands within the work forbid an intentionalist reading. For the \textit{Quijote} has a meaning that can be explored when collated with the works of Boiardo, Montalvo or Ariosto, from whom Cervantes inherits the literary form he satirises. Cervantes has no way to intend the whole meaning of a text that is meaningful in comparison to the works of others.\textsuperscript{97}

There also appears a comment that allows for a comparison with Unamuno. Borges mythologises literature, reducing it to a series of set-pieces that are repeated throughout time in different ways and from different perspectives\textsuperscript{98}. Within that statement is an interesting reference to Cervantes and don Quijote as the dreamer and the dreamed:

\textsuperscript{95} As Ilan Stavans recently suggested, even the aesthetic investigations into the \textit{Quijote} are not easily divorced from an interest in national issues: ‘By using Menard as an endorser of derivative art as authentic, Borges therefore announces that the former colonies known today as the Spanish-speaking Americas, while arriving late to the banquet of Western civilisation, are as original in their derivative culture as Europe is’ (Stavans 2015: 88). Fiddian’s recent chapter on ‘Pierre Menard’ also considers the work to be important from a cross-cultural point of view, demonstrating the tendency of European intellectual circles to appropriate great works for entirely self-serving purposes (Fiddian 2017: 55-77).

\textsuperscript{96} Borges tended to see national literature as the product of international borrowing. In ‘El escritor argentino y la tradición’, he wrote of Güiraldes’s \textit{Don Segundo Sombra} that ‘para que nosotros tuviéramos ese libro fue necesario que Güiraldes recordara la técnica poética de los cenáculos franceses de su tiempo, y la obra de Kipling que había leído hacia muchos años; es decir, Kipling, y Mark Twain, y las metáforas de los poetas franceses fueron necesarios para este libro argentino’ (OC I: 271).

\textsuperscript{97} As Livingston argues: ‘As a meaningful attitude, an intention represents some targeted situation or state of affairs as well as some means to that end. The content of an intention is schematic, requiring specification and adjustment at the time of action’ (Livingston 2005: 8).

\textsuperscript{98} Borges expressed similar in conversation with Willis Barnstone: ‘I think in the case of an author the best thing is to be part of tradition, to be a part of a language, since the language goes on and the
Vencido por la realidad, por España, Don Quijote murió en su aldea natal hacia 1614. Poco tiempo lo sobrevivió Miguel de Cervantes.

Para los dos, para el soñador y el soñado, toda esa trama fue la oposición de dos mundos: el mundo irreal de los libros de caballerías, el mundo cotidiano y común del siglo XVII.

No sospecharon que los años acabarían por limar la discordia, no sospecharon que la Mancha y Montiel y la magra figura del caballero serían para el porvenir, no menos poéticas que las etapas de Simbad o que las vastas geografías de Ariosto. Porque en el principio de la literatura está el mito, y asimismo en el fin. (OC I: 799)

Cervantes could not have conceived of the way his novel would be read in the future, because different historical circumstances will continue to find new relevance in old works, as Borges shows us in his ‘Pierre Menard’. The canons of acceptability change in ways that the author cannot dictate. More interesting here might be the reference to Cervantes and Quijote as the dreamer and the dreamed, which speaks the language of Unamuno’s Vida de don Quijote y Sancho. This will be useful for the comparison between Unamuno’s and Borges’s readings of the Quijote in the next chapter. Here the dream is the dream of literature, and not life. The act of writing literature is akin to dreaming, as I will argue in the next section. In Unamuno’s work, the world and the dream exist on the same plane; in Borges’s, the world and the dream are extricable from each other. For literature is a series of myths which are transmitted across history. The plot is a simple clash between the unreal world of chivalric novels and the real world of readers. Don Quijote’s madness is based on an inability to separate these two worlds; a separation that Unamuno hotly denies.

V.4 Magias parciales y crónicas de sueños

books may be forgotten, or perhaps every age rewrites the same books over and over again, changing or adding a few circumstances. Perhaps the eternal books are all the same books. We are always rewriting what the ancients wrote, and that should prove sufficient’ (Barnstone 1982: 9).

99 Rodríguez-Luis argues similarly: ‘las circunstancias que afectaron la recepción del Quijote hicieron que éste terminase atrayendo interpretaciones de tipo romántico, el equivalente moderno de la idealización característica de aquellas novelas que Cervantes atacó parodiándolas’ (Rodríguez-Luis 1988: 488).
Borges’s later works on the *Quijote* do not explore a reader-centric model of interpretation in explicit terms, but do so by exploring the novel through a more metaphysical lens. This shift from focusing on the novel’s readers to focusing on its metaphysical play reaches its completion when Borges pens his 1952 ‘Magias parciales del *Quijote*’. It does not seem coincidental that the *Quijote* serves as a useful tool by which Borges can explore many of the key notions behind some of his earlier fictions: ‘Las ruinas circulares’ expresses an irrevocable concern that the self might, humiliatingly, be the dream of another, who might be the dream of another, ad infinitum. That particular interest does not abandon Borges in his later career. At this point the *Quijote* bears the weight of Borges’s metaphysical investigations. Those metaphysical investigations, however, are still interesting to reader-response theory.

In ‘Magias parciales’, Borges recognises the *Quijote* as a work which opposes two different worlds: the prosaic world of Cervantes and the poetic world of don Quijote (Borges 2013: 207). Don Quijote’s inability to separate the poetic world from the prosaic one becomes a useful intellectual support for Borges’s discussion of that separation. In fact, Borges argues that the creation of realist literature in the Cervantine mode is an act of fictionalising or poeticising the prosaic reality of the reader:

_Cervantes ha creado para nosotros la poesía de España del siglo XVII, pero ni aquel siglo ni aquella España eran poéticas para él; hombres como Unamuno o Azorín o Antonio Machado, enternecidos ante la evocación de la Mancha, le hubieran sido incomprensibles. El plan de su obra le vedaba lo maravilloso._ (208)

This is simultaneously a comment on the opposition between a poetic reality and a prosaic one — the world of Quijote versus the world of Cervantes, for instance — and on the author’s ability to establish canons of acceptable readings of their work. For Cervantes’s plan might have been to create a work whose narrative depended on the reader’s ability to understand, as Quijote could not, that the world of fiction and the world of reality were separate. But that authorial assumption cannot forbid modern readers, including Unamuno, from reading a poetic significance into the work, or from projecting an idealised, poetic vision onto the prosaic world. In other words, Borges highlights that Cervantes’s intention to write a satire on one man’s inaptitude to separate chivalric fiction from objective fact is no hindrance to the Romantic approach, which extols Quijote’s ability to see in the world what he wished to find there, and which was significantly expanded upon later by intellectuals such as

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100 By metaphysical, I mean here the difficulty of separating fictional reality from material reality. This is also explored through the motif of the dream as an act of literary production.
Unamuno. In fact, his intention to produce a work with a particular meaning obstructed him from seeing the full wealth of meanings that his work could contain.\textsuperscript{101} As I will maintain throughout this final section, the meeting of two different metaphysical planes in Borges’s work — whether it be prose versus poetry, dreams versus wakefulness — is highly symbolic of the reader’s freedom to produce meaning, and the author’s inability to dictate the limits of the meaning of their work.\textsuperscript{102}

The metaphysical ambiguity of the Quijote, where the fictional character can judge the work of the real author, and the real author claims to be the editor of a work written and translated by two other fictional characters, meets its apex in Volume 2, Chapter 2: ‘Ese juego de extrañas ambigüedades culmina en la segunda parte; los protagonistas han leído la primera, los protagonistas del Quijote son, asimismo, lectores del Quijote’ (209). The obvious jarring effect that this will exert on a reader, used to the feigned historicity of chivalric novels, is highlighted by Sancho, who informs don Quijote that their exploits have been put to print by a certain Cide Hamete Berenjena:

anoche llegó el hijo de Bartolomé Carrasco, que viene de estudiar en Salamanca, hecho bachiller, y yéndole yo a dar la bienvenida, me dijo que andaba ya en libros la historia de vuestra merced, con nombre de El Ingenioso Hidalgo don Quijote de la Mancha; y dice que me mientan a mí en ella con mi mismo nombre de Sancho Panza, y a la señora Dulcinea del Toboso, con otras cosas que pasamos nosotros a solas, que me hice cruces de espantado cómo las pudo saber el historiador que las escribió. (Cervantes 2010: 704)

This leads Borges to a discussion of the motif of literature containing itself, taking the 1001 Nights and Royce’s The World and the Individual as examples, which he concludes not by separating the world of the reader from the world of Quijote, but by uniting them:

\textsuperscript{101} This is a point of agreement with Unamuno, who explicitly argued in his 1906 ‘Sobre la lectura e interpretación del Quijote’ that an author cannot explain the full meaning of a work: ‘¿qué tiene que ver lo que Cervantes quisiera decir en su Quijote, si es que quiso decir algo, con lo que a los demás se nos ocurra ver en él? ¿De cuándo acá es el autor de un libro el que ha de entenderlo mejor?’ (OC I: 1230).

\textsuperscript{102} The mention of the basin as an explicit discussion of the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity is indicative of this (208). The implicit question behind this section of the Quijote is whether the identity of the object is given objectively, or whether it depends on the subjectivity of each individual viewer. This can be extrapolated to include readings. Is there an objective meaning to a text — which would logically have to be given by an author — or can the reader read subjectively, producing a helmet from the basin that is the text?
Don Quijote is the embodiment of the need to make a distinction between the poetic world and prosaic one. The fact that his poetic vision does not compute with the world he lives in is the basis of the satiric, humorous reading of the novel. Borges eschews such a reading, opting instead to unite the reader with Quijote on the same plane of existence. For perhaps the reader is, like Quijote, a mere fiction, or the dream of another. The combination of the novel’s realism — Quijote and Sancho travel across a realistically-portrayed Spanish landscape — and its meeting of fictional and non-fictional spaces provides in that sense for a non-intentionalist reading, in as far as it is assumed that Cervantes’s intention extended as far as a simple satire. Don Quijote’s mad quest through a fictional reality that contains itself does not permit the reader to assume — as the satirical reading would — that the reality they inhabit has an objective nature. In this context it seems far from incidental that Unamuno is mentioned among the readers who Borges believes identified in the Quijote ideas unavailable to Cervantes at the moment of writing. The idea that the metafictional devices of the Quijote fictionalise the reader is removed from Unamuno’s insistence that Quijote and Sancho were the creators of Cervantes only in terms of emphasis. Their obfuscations of fact and fiction, of dream and wakefulness, prosaic reality with poetic imagination; all are the products of arguments in favour of a reading of the original text that Cervantes may never have identified.103

Dreams are an important motif in Borges’s works.104 The narrator of Las ruinas circulares tells of his humiliation at realising that he is the dream of another. In the prologue to El informe de Brodie, he refers to literature itself as a dream directed by the dreamer: ‘la literatura no es otra cosa que un sueño dirigido,’ he explains (OC I: 1022). This is emblematic of the role of intention in Borges’s reading. As in Unamuno’s Vida, to consider literature a type of dream is to remove some creative

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103 For that reason I do not agree with Julio Rodríguez-Luis, who argued that the objective of Magias parciales is simply to deny reality (Rodríguez-Luis 1988: 486).

104 In fact, Rodriguez-Luis argues that the understanding of literature as an oneiric projection is a cornerstone of Borges’s aesthetics (Rodríguez-Luis 2010: 230).
authority from the writer. It posits that literature is not the deliberate product of a mind, but something that imposes itself, something that arrives into the mind of the author in a somewhat complete form. Also, nothing can be dreamt without the framework for imagining it having existed before the dream takes place. To apply that to literature, everything that is written must be written according to literary and cultural models that pre-exist the author. The author is the figure who directs the influences external to him and produces a literary work. The dream motif — which is, not to forget, a part of the philosophical games that Borges plays in some of his fictions — is therefore also relevant to the divide between intentionalist and non-intentionalist readings. For how can the author’s intention provide the whole meaning of the work when the cultural frameworks that the author profited from are what enabled the work to be written at all?

In a 1964 work appropriately entitled ‘Lectores’, Borges makes a claim totally contrary to the understanding of the Quijote that all readers presumably share. Don Quijote did not in fact become a knight-errant wandering across La Mancha in search of adventure. Rather, Alonso Quijano dreamt up Don Quijote safely within the confines of his library:

De aquel hidalgo de cetrina y seca  
Tez y de heroico afán se conjetura  
Que, en vispera perpetua de aventura,  
No salió nunca de su biblioteca.  
La crónica puntual que sus empeños  
Narrar y sus tragicómicos desplantes  
Fue soñada por él, no por Cervantes. (OC I: 892)

The attribution of the creative influence over the work to a character within that work expands on the assumptions behind ‘Pierre Menard’. The author is never wholly responsible for the act of writing. On the most basic level this eschews the cult of personality often attributed to authors. It also empowers the text ahead of the author. The claim that Quijote was a creation of Quijano and not Cervantes ought not to be read literally. In my view, it implies that the text is the guiding principle for literary interpretation, and that texts are produced according to literary rules and norms that the author cannot himself dictate. Moreover, it implies that literary practices are a kind of platonic form, not created by the author but only able to be discovered by him. The text, to use Iser’s words, is itself a set of governing rules for its own interpretation. The claim that Quijano created Quijote is symbolic.

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105 As Piglia notes, ‘Hay una relación entre la lectura y lo real, pero también hay una relación entre la lectura y los sueños’ (Piglia 2005: 23).
of the text’s position in a reader-based aesthetics. The text, and not the author, is the sole guiding principle which permits and discards certain readings.

For the reader this is equally empowering. The very fact of reading the novels of chivalry is enough to transport the reader, Quijano, across the whole of the Peninsula, tilting at windmills and freeing galley slaves from their bounds. Simply by reading, Quijano has authored his own story, focalised entirely through his unique experience. The creative literary act is reading, not writing. The text is brought to life, and meaning is created within it, purely at the moment of reading. The apparently absurd claim that Quijano authored Quijote is a metaphor for the relationship between the text and the reader. The text sets out the rules which govern the aesthetic experience possible to the reader; the reader’s unique aesthetic experience of the text awakens a meaning in it that is unique to the individual. What I mean by ‘meaning’ here, is not strictly an intellectual interpretation or analysis. ‘Lectores’ shows that the aesthetic experience of reading is a unique interaction between text and reader. ‘Meaning’ here is best understood as the effect of the text on the reader. That unique interaction is the basis for intellectual interpretations. In other words, when a reader experiences a text in a way no other reader does, then their active interpretation of the text will be equally unique.

The poem makes a more explicit combination between reading and dreaming that will inform the rest of this section:

Tal es también mi suerte. Sé que hay algo
Inmortal y esencial que he sepultado
En esa biblioteca del pasado
En que leí la historia del hidalgo.
Las lentas hojas vuelve un niño y grave
Sueña con vagas cosas que no sabe. (892)

Dreaming is used here as a synonym for reading. For reading is a process of the imagination just as dreaming is. This problematises the position of the reader. Dreams take place within the individual mind, yet are something that happens to the dreamer, they impose themselves on the mind and are processed by the unconscious imagination. Texts impose themselves also on the mind of the reader, providing them with a set of orchestrating rules, including characters, places and events, which are processed automatically by the reader’s unconscious imagination. The reader’s role in the text is vital for the production of meaning, because the text needs to be experienced aesthetically in order for interpretation to be possible. But the potential of the reader to play an active part in the production
of meaning in the text is entirely limited by their imagination, or their horizon of expectations. This characterises the metaphor of dreaming as reading in all of Borges’s later works on the *Quijote*.

It also does not seem incidental that a major work of *El oro de los tigres* in ‘Sueña Alonso Quijano’ specifically explores the relationship between author and text through the dream motif.\(^\text{106}\) The ekphrastic poem shows Quijano’s renunciation of Quijote’s chivalric ambitions as the act of waking from a dream. Here, the dream referred to is the fantasy that Quijote could reinstate the age of chivalry in his contemporary setting. But the poem concludes by providing a more significant resonance to the term:

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\begin{align*}
\text{El hidalgo fue un sueño de Cervantes} \\
\text{Y don Quijote un sueño del hidalgo} \\
\text{El doble sueño los confunde y algo} \\
\text{Está pasando que pasó muchos años antes.}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{Quijano duerme y sueña. Una batalla:} \\
\text{Los mares de Lepanto y la metralla. (OC I: 1096)}
\]

The poem is striking for its confusion of existential levels. The hidalgo was a dream of Cervantes’s, but don Quijote was a dream of Quijano! Cervantes is not responsible for authoring Quijote; Quijano is. That is simultaneously empowering and disempowering to the author. Cervantes passively produces the tale of Alonso Quijano, a tale that has an agency unto itself. Quijano’s transformation into don Quijote is a condition of the work as it appears to Cervantes, as, to borrow Unamuno’s term, it imposes itself on the writer. The literary work develops in a way that the author cannot fully intend or plan for. Its subversion of the chivalric form relies upon the existence of that form, and as such is guided by external forces that the author cannot control. The notion that literature is a dream directed by the author is part of Borges’s method for reading the *Quijote*. He holds Cervantes as a dreamer, whose authority over the way the work is written is far from absolute.\(^\text{107}\) When the author has only a limited role in the creation of literature, they cannot be held as the source of truth in any individual work.

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\(^{106}\) He also does this in his 1975 poem ‘Quince monedas’, where he takes Cervantes as a mouthpiece, reminiscing on the starry night ‘En que soñé el Quijote’ (OC II: 91).

\(^{107}\) For this reason Unamuno’s view that the *Quijote* is authored by an eternal Spanish cultural spirit is relevant to Borges’s readings also. Both subvert the author’s authority by proposing that a work is never written free of external cultural influences.
The poem’s conclusion problematises this discussion. Quijano does not just dream himself as don Quijote, but also dreams of the very real historical events that Cervantes witnessed first-hand. In that sense Cervantes and his reality become the creation of Quijano. Cervantes is secondary to the Quijote because he is identified as a metonym for the work. That is, he is known simply as the author of a work, whereas don Quijote is known for his adventures, including tilting at windmills and freeing the galley-slaves. Quijano exists in a reality that is constantly reinstated whenever a reader receives the work. Cervantes’s reality is fleeting by comparison. The claim that Quijano can dream of the reality of Cervantes is a playful, self-ironic symbol of the primacy of the work over the author, developed by the New Critics and which culminated in various types of theories which explore the text in its relationship to the reader. To consider the work superior to the author is to permit the reader to interpret the work without considering the author’s specific intended plan.

Moreover, the idea that producing literature is akin to dreaming unites reading and writing in an important sense. The author is always beholden to the horizon of expectations through which they write. Cervantes’s will have included the works of Montalvo, Ariosto and Boiardo. He could not have written the Quijote free of their influence. The reader’s horizon of expectations functions similarly. As Borges shows in ‘Kafka y sus precursores’, when a new work becomes part of our cultural knowledge, it inevitably changes how we read others, even anachronistically. For works influence each other not according to the order in which they are written, but in which they are read. Both reading and authorship also entail a limited amount of deliberate action. A reader can deliberately receive the work, attribute it to other authors, contextualise it within other times and places, and collate it next to other works so as to show how they enlighten each other. An author must deliberately decide to write a work through their own endeavour. Yet in both cases the horizon of expectations is decisive. What a reader can deliberately find in the work is limited by their conceptual framework, their time and place, their cultural points of reference. What an author can deliberately create is limited in precisely the same way. As such Paisley Livingston’s notion of a conditional intentionalism — which takes into account what the author would have been able to

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108 The narratological interest in the claim that Cervantes is less real, or similarly fictional, to his characters was explored by Unamuno in one of his early essays, ‘El caballero de la triste figura’: ‘Cuando volvamos a la tierra de que salimos, ¿quedará de nosotros mucho más que de Don Quijote queda? ¿Qué queda de Cide Hamete, su biógrafo? El mundo pasajero y contingente va produciendo el permanente y necesario de nuestro espíritu, es su mayor realidad ésta: la historia toda es la idealización de lo real por la realización del ideal. ¿Hizo Homero a Aquiles, o éste a aquél?’ (OC VII: 917-918).
intend at the moment of writing — is a useful reflection of Borges’s arguments on reading and authorship. Interpretation is ultimately a matter of what the reader is historically and culturally capable of perceiving in the work, and what the author is historically and culturally capable of putting there. Reading and authorship are equal in that they both entail a deliberate action under the constraints of a mind conditioned by external circumstances. Borges’s reflection that literature is a directed dream applies to reading just as much as it does to authorship.

Borges’s final major work on the Quijote, ‘Ni siquiera soy polvo’ published in Historia de la noche, places Alonso Quijano and Miguel de Cervantes in a similar relationship to that shared by Augusto Pérez and Miguel de Unamuno. Quijano recognises, unlike in the Quijote, that he is the dream of another:

Ni siquiera soy polvo. Soy un sueño
Que entreteje en el sueño y la vigilia
Mi hermano y padre, el capitán Cervantes,
Que militó en los mares de Lepanto
Y supo unos latines y algo de árabe…
Para que yo pueda soñar al otro
Cuya verde memoria será parte
De los días del hombre, te suplico:
Mi Dios, mi soñador, sigue soñándome.’ (OC II: 177-178)

This will aid my comparison in the next chapter between Borges’s and Unamuno’s respective conceptualisation of dreams in the following chapter. A few key features of this sonnet stand out to the reader. Quijano narrates it from a first-person perspective. He explains that, in his desire to reinstate the age of chivalry, he will deliberately dream himself into Quijote:

Quiera Dios que un enviado restituya
a nuestro tiempo ese ejercicio noble.
Mis sueños lo divisan. Lo he sentido
a veces en mi triste carne célibe.
No sé aún su nombre. Yo, Quijano,
seré ese paladín. Seré mi sueño. (177)

This connotation of dreaming is present also in the poem ‘Lectores’. The whole adventure was nothing other than an act of reading, of giving life to the text at the moment of reception. In both of
these cases, the conflict between Quijano’s dream and Cervantes’s is reflective of the relationship between the author and text. When an author writes, at what point does the text have a life of its own? To what extent is the text dependent on the meaning of the author? The paradoxical use of dreams here highlights these questions without offering a straightforward answer to them. Quijano has agency over his decision to become Quijote. It is his choice. Yet this agency does not seem to mutually cancel with the fact that his existence depends entirely on Cervantes.\(^\text{109}\) In fact, Quijano is brought into being through the kind of waking dream that Borges uses as a model for literature. He is a product of the author’s horizon of expectations — Quijano could never have existed were it not for his author’s participation at the Battle of Lepanto, or his command of Latin and Arabic. This posits an extremely difficult relationship between author and text, and one that is heavily reflected in the work of Unamuno.\(^\text{110}\) It posits, paradoxically, that a text cannot exist without an author, yet the text has an autonomy free of that author’s deliberate influence. Such an idea clearly recalls Barthes:

> We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings,

\(^\text{109}\) A striking resemblance to Unamuno’s *Niebla* appears here. The dialogue between Pérez and Unamuno treats dreams in much the same way. The author and text are interdependent yet autonomous. The representation of literature as a dream complicates the relationship between author and text:

> Cuando un hombre dormido e inerte en la cama sueña algo, ¿qué es lo que más existe: él como conciencia que sueña, o su sueño?
> —¿Y si sueña que existe él mismo, el soñador?— le repliqué a mi vez.
> —En ese caso, amigo don Miguel, le pregunto yo a mi vez: ¿de qué manera existe él, como soñador que se sueña, o como soñado por sí mismo? Y fíjese, además, en que al admitir esta discusión conmigo me reconoce ya existencia independiente de sí.
> —¡No, eso no! ¡Eso no! —le dije vivamente—. Yo necesito discutir, sin discusión no vivo y sin contradicción, y cuando no hay fuera de mi quien me discuta y contradiga, invento dentro de mí quien lo haga. Mis monólogos son diálogos. (Unamuno 2014: 256)

\(^\text{110}\) Unamuno uses dreams to convey a more serious metaphysical doubt. At the end of his *Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho* he makes an invocation very similar to the conclusion of ‘Ni siquiera soy polvo’: ‘Intercede, pues, en favor mío, ¡oh mi señor y patrón! […] Y si es la vida sueño, ¡déjame soñarla inacabable!’ (Unamuno 2011: 527). Though Augusto’s relationship to Unamuno in *Niebla* is also indicative of the conflict between an author-God and his creation.
none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture. (Barthes 1987: 146)

The author writes a text from their horizon of expectations, which contains a series of influences drawn from various centres of culture. A text is not imbued with a single theological meaning, but is the canvas onto which the reader can project their own interpretation. The author in that sense becomes a kind of Abrahamic Author-God, one responsible for creating the fiction, but one who must give his creations autonomy. For the author need not be the one who understands the work best, and the author can also be a critic of their own work. And as Jauß and Fish argue, the acceptable readings of the text change across time, according to new historical moments and updated canons of reading.

In this sense, dreams become the ideal expression of the difficult relationship between authors, texts and readers in the work of Borges and Unamuno. Authorship is akin to a waking dream in that it deliberately shapes a set of unconscious external influences into a coherent unit that we call the text. Those unconscious influences — or the horizon of expectations as I have referred to it — prohibit the author from dictating the total meaning of the work. Reading is akin to a waking dream in the same sense. External influences — historical events and other texts — impact unavoidably on the reading moment. Reading and authorship are both the active projection of an unconscious horizon of expectations, much akin to a waking dream. This will be one of the key points of comparison between Unamuno and Borges in the chapter to come. The dream is an image common to their theories of reading, neither of which allow for a straightforward distinction between authorship and reception.
VI. Comparing Unamuno and Borges

Unamuno and Borges constantly efface the ultimate authority of the author. Unamuno’s great essay on literary production, Cómo se hace una novela establishes a parity between the reader and author that echoes in much of Borges’s work. A novel is written, says Unamuno, so that both reader and author can enter into a life-giving, existentially-affirming discourse, so that both can be saved from their ‘soledad radical’. In the reading act, which in Unamuno’s view is the interaction between the mind of the reader and the mind of the author, there is little to separate the two poles of reading and writing. For the author, too, is a reader: ‘Porque el que lee una novela puede vivirla, revivirla — y quien dice una novela dice una historia —, y el que lee un poema, una criatura — poema es criatura y poesía creación — puede recrearlo. Entre ellos el autor mismo’ (Unamuno 2009: 108). In the same text, Unamuno sets out a norm of reading in which the guiding principle behind reading is that the reader must be brought into intellectual action. This norm is mutually exclusive with a reliance on the author’s intended meaning as a hermeneutic crutch: ‘¿Qué me importa que no leas, lector, lo que yo quise poner en ella [mi obra], si es que lees lo que te enciende en vida? Me parece necio que un autor se distraiga en explicar lo que quiso decir, pues lo que nos importa no es lo que quiso decir, sino lo que dijo, o mejor lo que oímos’ (121). The reading act is the authoring act; what the author said is equal to what the reader heard. There is no more radical non-intentionalist position than that.

Borges shares this interest with Unamuno. He too argues that reading is the communication between the opposing voices of the author and the reader. ‘A quien leyere’ is an apology to the reader for possibly usurping their creative role in the interpretation of the text solely by having been the one to put pen to paper. The young Borges saw little distinction between the two roles: ‘Nuestras nadas poco difieren’ (OC I: 15 - emphasis in original), which yielded later in his career to a more explicit favouring of the reader over the author. His 1935 Historia universal de la infamia is prefaced with a discussion of the superiority of the reader over the author: ‘A veces creo que los buenos lectores son cínicos aun más tenebrosos y singulares que los buenos autores […] Leer, por lo pronto, es una actividad posterior a la de escribir: más resignada, más civil, más intelectual’ (OC I: 289). In 1939 even the great Golden Age author Miguel de Cervantes finds himself despoiled of his own work by a reader well outside of his own time and place, and by 1952’s publication of Otras inquisiciones he has all but promoted reading to the status of the sole creative act in literature: ‘Una literatura difiere de otra, ulterior o anterior, menos por el texto que por la manera de ser leída: si me fuera otorgado leer cualquier página actual — ésta, por ejemplo — como la leerán el año 2000, yo sabría cómo será la literatura del año 2000’ (‘Nota sobre (hacia) Bernard Shaw’, Otras inquisiciones, Borges 2013: 342). Literature is not a set of words printed on paper during any given time period, but the set of possible interpretations permitted at any given historical moment. What an author can say, or what
a reader might hear, as Unamuno put it in *Cómo se hace una novela*, is conditioned by circumstances outside of the text, and as such, is different at any given moment in human history.

This gives rise to both comparisons and contrasts between their respective methods of reading. Unamuno and Borges very clearly share a non-intentionalist approach to reading, one that favours the reader’s perspective above any formalist or intentionalist interpretation. However, Borges qualifies Unamuno’s view on reading. It is true, in Borges’s view, to argue that a text is defined by what a reader finds in the text. Though both differ on the weight they give to the author in the reading act. Borges de-emphasises the author’s role, reducing it to an accident of history that has no meaningful relationship to the content of the work. Unamuno claims in *Cómo se hace una novela* that all acts of writing are autobiographical: ‘Sí, toda novela, toda obra de ficción, todo poema, cuando es vivo, es autobiográfico. Todo ser de ficción, todo personaje poético que crea un autor hace parte del autor mismo’ (Unamuno 2009: 136) and that the reader as such invokes the author at the point of reception. For Unamuno’s wish was to ‘hacer una novela en la que quería poner la más íntima experiencia de mi destierro, crearme, eternizarme, bajo los rasgos de desterrado y de proscrito’ (140). Unamuno in that sense theorises reading as a process of personal communication. The author is not an irrelevance, but as he explains in *Cómo se hace una novela*, the author’s intention does not dictate the reader’s response. Every reading is a unique discourse between the reader and the author, one whose meaning is determined by what the reader hears, ‘lo que oímos’. In Borges’s view, the author is not present or invoked at the moment of reading, and therefore has no such redemptive power for the person who only by accident of fate is writing and not reading. After all, Pierre Menard’s reading, which is filtered through cultural and historical circumstances unavailable to Cervantes, are sufficient to create a new text altogether. Though in Menard’s case, there is still an interpretive use for Menard’s version, if only to show that each act of reading differs from every other.

Herein lie the comparisons and the contrasts between Unamuno’s and Borges’s views on reading. The author’s position in a tripartite process between author, reader and text is affirmed much more strongly in Unamuno’s case. To have written, and to be read, grants the author a metaphysical immunity from physical death. The author’s role in Borges’s method of reading is twofold. First, it acts as a metonym for literary corpora, real or imagined, among which the reader can trace comparisons that inform readings of various texts. Two, it illustrates his argument that interpretations are in constant renewal by constructing the author’s possible horizon of expectations, and using it as a comparative tool between preceding and contemporary interpretations. For, as he proposes in ‘Nota sobre (hacia) Bernard Shaw’, ‘La literatura no es agotable, por la suficiente y simple razón de que un solo libro no lo es’ (342). This is where Unamuno’s theory of reading re-converges with Borges’s. For the latter does not theorise reading as a communicative relationship between reader and
He does, however, provide the grounds on which such a communication could be said to take place. Because in Unamuno’s model, a text’s meaning is determined by what the author says to a given reader, or at least, what a given reader hears in the text. Borges provides grounds for taking that proposition seriously: a given reader obeys a unique horizon of expectations, different from that of each other reader as well as the author, which causes a single text to be infinitely polyseme according to the individual perspective. Changing historical circumstances might cause readers to hear certain resonances in the text and be deaf to others, to identify and value in the text concepts that others, the author included, may not have identified. Borges expresses this idea, appropriately, through a reading of the Quijote in ‘Las versiones homéricas’:

Ya no sé si el informe: En un lugar de la Mancha, de cuyo nombre no quiero acordarme no ha mucho tiempo que vivía un hidalgo de los de lanza en astillero, adarga antigua, rocín flaco y galgo corredor, es bueno para una divinidad, impoluto; sé únicamente que toda modificación es sacrílega y que no puedo concebir otra iniciación del Quijote. Cervantes, creo, prescindió de esa leve superstición, y tal vez no hubiera identificado ese párrafo. Yo, en cambio, no podré sino repudiar cualquier divergencia. El Quijote, debido a mi ejercicio congénito del español, es un monumento uniforme, sin otras variaciones que las deparadas por el editor, el encuadernador y el cajista. (‘Las versiones homéricas’, OC I: 239-240)

As a Spanish-speaking man of letters, he is an inheritor—even if a distant and peripheral one—of a national literature which has left an indelible mark on the way he reads. The opening line, ‘En un lugar de la Mancha, de cuyo nombre no quiero acordarme’ is arguably the most canonical phrase in all of Hispanic literature. His linguistic and cultural closeness to Spain has transformed into a monolith a phrase that Cervantes may never have considered in depth. Moreover, this phrase becomes a protension by which the rest of the text is interpreted: it becomes the narrative experiment of a provably unreliable narrator, of an author who understands the limits of his position. In other contexts it might cause a reader to see this as the work of a malicious historian, who scornfully mocks the misfortunes of a selfless national hero. Both of these are interpretations that can present themselves to specific readers, whether the author intended this or not. And what an author can say to specific readers is determined by the reader’s own historical and cultural circumstances.

VI.1 The relevance of literary tradition to reader-response theory

111 This, as Iser points out, does not adequately describe the true relationship between author and reader, given the author’s physical absence at the moment of reading. Unlike in a verbal discussion, there is no means outside of the text to interrogate or challenge the author (Iser 1982: 227).
What allows us to compare Unamuno’s work on the Quijote to that of Borges is a shared interest in reader-based responses to texts. Their reader-based responses are, in both cases, embedded in cosmopolitan literary and intellectual contexts that wrest some interpretive authority from the author. Their effacements of the hegemony of the writer over the reader show an acute awareness of their own finitude in an infinite chain of human cultural progress. It is worth exploring the cultural backdrop that allows them to promote the reader as the creative influence in the text. For both Unamuno and Borges see literature as a condition of human nature, which filters itself through individuals in their time and place. A collective human consciousness produces and reproduces ideas ad infinitum AND crystallises into literary works thanks to individuals who exist within it.

Unamuno thinks of Spanish culture, from Menéndez y Pelayo to Cervantes, as firmly embedded in a much broader European context (Unamuno 2014: 130-131). For no culture, and no phenomena within that culture, are free of the influence of external factors. For that reason Cervantes, as aware of his place in an infinite string of human cultural output as Unamuno is, provides universal moral tales for all of humanity by embodying the full spirit of his pueblo into the protagonist of his masterpiece. Spanishness is not mutually exclusive with universality. Equally, Spanish texts cannot be extricated from the universal human cultural condition, or the arte eterno, which gave rise to them. As such, the text is not only in some sense authored and propagated by a latent human spirit, reducing the role of author to a scribe of literary commonplaces as they present themselves in his time and place. It is also an aesthetic event unique to each reader across all moments and spaces. The text has a universal significance that offers a personal validity to readers who are separated by cultural boundaries, but united by their human condition. That is how, in En torno al casticismo, Quijano becomes the universal man. He symbolises at once the Golden Age interest in chivalric norms, as well as a common human thread. Unamuno’s reader-centric approach, explored through the Quijote, is built therefore on a basis of shared interpretive authority, not just in the reader, but across all readers, no matter the temporal or cultural circumstances. The very notion that the protagonist of what many consider to be the Spanish national text can embody a universal human spirit relies on a non-intentionalistic method of reading, for it must open the text to interpretations from readers well outside of Cervantes’s time and place.

In En torno al casticismo, Unamuno also appropriates the Quijote to propose that literature is a series of texts which contain other texts, suggesting for example that Alonso Quijano is at the heart of Segismundo’s existential woes, ‘es el fondo eterno y permanente de los héroes de Calderón, que son los que mejor revelan la manifestación histórica, la meramente histórica de aquel pueblo’ (Unamuno 2014: 170). Calderón is a successor to Cervantes, who is a successor to Ariosto, and so on. Calderón
has a similar function in Unamuno’s work to Coleridge in Borges’s: ‘Detrás de la invención de Coleridge está la general y antigua invención de las generaciones de amantes que pidieron como prenda una flor’ (Borges 2013: 162). The credit for the authorship of each literary work must be shared between all of the authors who have participated in the intrahistoric causal chain which has produced each individual literary phenomenon. For the same reason, interpretive power over a work is shared across all readers across all cultural spaces, as no nation’s culture can be removed from a system of total human thought.

What if, for example, the Quijote is derived from a national literary culture that prima facie bears little relation to the Spanish literary culture in which it’s written, as Borges asks in ‘Un problema’? Does that not validate different interpretations of the Quijote according to the norms of international cultures? Unamuno argued for that position in 1896, stating in ‘El caballero de la triste figura’ that ‘Hay un tipo diverso de Don Quijote para los diversos pueblos que más o menos le han comprendido’ (Unamuno 1966: 923). And in fact, he puts forth in his 1905 ‘Sobre la lectura e interpretación del Quijote’ that the cosmopolitan nature of the work invalidates any insistence on Spanish hegemony on interpreting it: ‘Puede asegurarse que España es una de las naciones en que menos se lee el Quijote, y desde luego es aquella en que peor se lee’ (Unamuno 1966: 1227). Menard’s project is, on one level, to demonstrate how reading the text from one national perspective impoverishes its meaning. So their non-intentionalist method of reading the Quijote is paired at all times with an insistence on reading it from marginal and international perspectives. They both practice a sort of conditional intentionalism, where what the author might have conceived it set in opposition to the meaning that a reader could find in the work, in order to legitimise marginal voices on texts that are firmly entrenched in a national canon. Their readings also deliberately represent countercurrents to the majority interpretation of the work. Ultimately, when no reader or author can dictate the total meaning of a work, the interpretation of the work is opened across all national borders. How apt that two writers on the margins of Hispanic literary culture should argue for a reader-centric system of reading based on shared humanity rather than exclusive cultural specificity.

112 In this sense I am indebted to Anthony Kerrigan’s argument in ‘Borges/Unamuno’ (1972) that a comparison between the authors must not ignore their position as marginal figures in the field of Castilian letters. It is beyond my scope to identify how specific marginal produce specific types of responses to canonical literature. I do, however, propose that their peripheral relationship to the Spanish literary canon is at the heart of their responses to the most famous item within that canon. Empowering the reader to produce meaning in a canonical work also empowers the communities in which reading takes place. Both open up the Quijote to cosmopolitan and transnational discourse by interpreting it according to reader-centric methods.
That is at the heart of Unamuno’s declaring the hidalgo ‘Nuestro Señor Don Quijote’ in *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida*. There is no absolute version of the protagonist, no total understanding of him or his adventures, but simply individual perspectives filtered through finite frameworks. Jacob Boehme’s *Aurora* is what Unamuno holds to be the *Quijote* born of the German philosophical tradition. And tellingly, he proposes that cultural advancements are made when national phenomena are viewed from foreign perspectives, in the same way that German culture has assimilated the *Quijote* and reproduced it from a different horizon of expectations: ‘Los progresos suelen venir del bárbaro, y nada más estancado que la filosofía de los filósofos y la teología de los teólogos’ (Unamuno 2007: 307-308). The peripheral perspective has an inherent value. Those who do not meet a narrow description of a Castilian reader can vivify the study of the national text.

Barbarians, who in the purely etymological sense are those who do not speak the majority language, are the ones who promote intellectually novel approaches to given forms. Borges shows his reader precisely what such progress would look like. ‘Kafka y sus precursores’ puts forth that a 20th German-speaking Czech author has recast the discussion of various works of literature from well outside of his time and place, including those of Zeno and Browning. Kafka is the barbarian who has advanced the literary discourse of the British, Danish and Greek traditions. Pierre Menard is a French intellectual who, it is not unreasonable to think, has a command of Spanish only as a second language. His reading of the *Quijote* from an admittedly controversial modern perspective, and his application of some of that novel’s techniques to his contemporary setting, imbue the text with a series of significances it could never have conveyed when it was first published. Pierre Menard is the embodiment of Unamuno’s views on cultural progress, and how the specific circumstances of the individual are simply the expression of cultural and intellectual commonalities between all human beings. For, just as Unamuno says that one can discover the eternal, cosmopolitan Spanish tradition through a close reading of texts, ‘Pierre Menard’ provides a sense of the development of that tradition, of the development of human thought and history by comparing a modern reading with a previous reading. In the intervening period of time between Cervantes’s *Quijote* and Menard’s arose a philosophical discourse that gave additional profundity to the notion that history is the mother of truth. The history of European colonialism has reduced comments from the dishonesty of the Arabic nation, from a self-ironic joke on the novel’s unreliable narration, to a racially problematic and

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113 That Borges essay is autological, that is, it exemplifies its own argument by building very heavily on T.S Eliot’s own work. ‘ Tradition and the Individual Talent’ is felt everywhere in that essay. But were Borges’s reader to revisit Eliot, then they would still read the latter through the lens of the former.
culturally ignorant slur. To compare the two versions is to understand how the progress of human history has made itself known in specific national boundaries.

This gives rise, however, to an important distinction. For as much as Borges legitimises much of Unamuno’s ‘intra-historic’ reading of the Quijote, it is worth bearing in mind his view that the text has gained nothing from Unamuno’s effusive and anachronistic interference (Borges 1986: 79). Borges in fact criticises Unamuno in 1947 for a reductive reading of the work:

Del culto de la letra se ha pasado al culto del espíritu; del culto de Miguel de Cervantes al de Alonso Quijano. Este ha sido exaltado a semidios; su inventor —el hombre que escribió: «Para mí solo nació don Quijote, y yo para él; él supo obrar, y yo escribir»— ha sido rebajado por Unamuno a irreverente historiador o a evangelista incomprensivo y erróneo. (‘Nota sobre el Quijote’, in Textos recobrados 1931-1955, Emecé, Barcelona, 2001, p. 251)

In Borges’s view, Unamuno’s reading of the work is no less reductive than that of a reader who worships at the altar of Cervantes. The text in Borges’s view cannot be reduced to a single guiding principle. Given that Borges also viewed literary tradition in spiritual terms, this is a subtle distinction. Borges highlights that positioning texts in a tradition of reception and passing on can reveal the infinite polysemy of the words on the page. The very words ‘la verdad, cuya madre es la historia’ is itself a statement that can convey multiple meanings depending on the context in which it is read. But in Unamuno’s view, positioning texts in a tradition of reception and passing on does not just allow for the words on the page to be read polysemantically. It also allows readers to trace the constants of an eternal human tradition. If there is a way to distinguish Unamuno’s view of literature in tradition from Borges’s, perhaps we can express it as follows. Unamuno favours the discovery of a shared meaning across all works of literature. Borges favours the discovery of a unique meaning in just some works of literature. In that sense, both are non-intentionalist authors, but the way they frame their positions is different. Unamuno takes against the author in promotion of the reader; Borges promotes the reader in spite of the author.

The latter approach is, in my view, more informative from a reader-response point of view. For the different ways in which they frame an essentially shared understanding of the power of the reader to create meaning in the work accounts for the different ways in which they rewrote the Quijote. For both Unamuno and Pierre Menard fragment Cervantes’s work. But Unamuno replaces narrative moments in the text with his own commentary, he changes the form of the work in and of itself. While Menard’s rewriting constitutes a transformation of Cervantes’s work, given that he both writes it from an anatopic and anachronistic perspective, and his text is of course a fragmentation, he does
not alter any of the content per se. Borges’s thought experiment on how the meaning of the Quijote would change when read from an external perspective is a more successful defence of non-intentionalist readings, for it demonstrates the thematic richness of a text in a process of constant historical updating. Unamuno’s method for defending his spiritualist and voluntarist interpretation of the Quijote relies on a formal transformation of the given text. While Unamuno’s rewritten version represents, to a large degree, the Quijote’s ability to mean all things to all readers, he ultimately asks his reader to arrive at a new reading of the original Quijote through a text that has little in common with the original. Borges does not need to rely on an act of vandalism on the original text to profess an argument, common to Unamuno, that the text can convey a set of meanings that no author can ever account for.

VI.2 Miguel de Unamuno, author of Pierre Menard?

In their major re-writings of the Quijote in Vida and ‘Pierre Menard’, both Unamuno and Borges explore the various interpretive strategies that can provide interpretations of the Quijote that go well beyond intentionalist, satirical ones. The attribution of the text to an apocryphal author is a technique within the Quijote that requires exegesis on the part of the reader. It is an interpretive strategy entirely in keeping with Cervantes’s literary games to attribute the text to a fictional author. It is a way of exercising the reader’s horizon of expectations to produce a meaning in the text they may never have considered. This is common to Unamuno, who, even at his most daring and provocative, both implicitly and explicitly invites his reader to re-read the original Quijote according to a new framework. His rewriting is also based on the attribution of the text to a fictive author in Benengeli. At times, Benengeli is treated as a kind of evangelist whose work has been maliciously vandalised by an inadequate historian in Cervantes. At one point, Unamuno even instructs the reader to re-read the adventure at Montesinos as if it were an evangelical text. In both cases, the Quijote becomes a canvas onto which Unamuno and Borges ask the reader to actively project a new set of expectations in order to to produce a new set of interpretations.

It is worth looking closely at the specific chapters rewritten by both Menard and Unamuno for the purposes of a comparison between the two respective theories of reader-centrism that we have identified. Often the most striking aspects of Menard’s version are absent in Unamuno’s, and vice versa. That is the case in their versions of Chapter IX. Cide Hamete Benengeli, who is the subject

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114 ‘A new interpretive strategy always makes its way in some relationship of opposition to the old, which has often marked out a negative space (of things that aren't done) from which it can emerge into respectability’ (Fish 1980: 349).
of a self-ironic joke on unreliable narration in Cervantes’s version, and who is invented as a racial caricature of a colonised other in Menard’s version, is absent in Unamuno’s chapter. Benengeli is instead taken for granted as the real author whose work Cervantes has simply distorted. And the thrust of Unamuno’s work is to make the Quijote the subject of the patriotic self-congratulations that Menard is critical of. The fact that the Quijote features a Basque antagonist is a source of personal involvement in the novel from Unamuno’s perspective: ‘¡Oh, tierra de mi cuna, de mis padres, de mis abuelos y trasabuelos todos, tierra de mi infancia y de mis mocedades, tierra en que tomé a la compañera de mi vida, tierra de mis amores, tú eres el corazón de mi alma!’ (206). It represents a quite odd, meandering rewriting of one of the finest chapters of the original. Unamuno subverts the literary expectations of the reader in an equal and opposite way to Cervantes. A reader of chivalric novels such as Amadís de Gaula would be told in the prologue to expect a narrative build on a foundation of real history experienced and documented by real people. On reading the Quijote, such a reader would find those expectations frustrated. When a contemporary reader who has also read the Quijote goes on to read Unamuno’s version of this chapter, they will be disappointed to find no such narrative games, but a simple tract on the timelessness of the Basques. In other words, the reader’s expectation, that their expectations will be subverted, is itself subverted!

This is not so far removed from Menard’s use of Chapter IX. As I discussed in the previous chapter, Menard’s version of Chapter IX does not remove the comments on the unreliability of a narrative written by a Moor, but they are decontextualised from the introductory chapter which problematises the search for truth in an obvious fiction. The humour of the ninth chapter goes somewhat missing in Menard’s version. Chapter IX of the Quijote serves two equal yet opposite nationalistic interests in the respective rewritings. In Unamuno’s case, it is appropriated in order to legitimise the presence of Basque culture in the Spanish literary canon. In Menard’s, it is appropriated in order to legitimise the political hegemony of his native France over the Maghreb to which Cide Hamete Benengeli is a native. What unites both approaches, beyond a personal, nationalistic interest is the Jaußian idea that history allows texts to legitimately strike new interpretive resonances between readers.

In the intervening period between the publication of the Quijote, and the start of Unamuno’s and Borges’s respective literary careers, the face of world history has changed enough to legitimise different perspectives on the work. The 1812 Constitution of Cádiz rejected Basque self-determination. The Basque fueros were ultimately abolished late in the 19th Century, homogenising

115 I refer here to some of the features of the first chapter, from the narrator’s unwillingness or inability to recall where the action is set, the various conjectures around the very name of the protagonist, and the obviously ironic comment that the history will not stray an inch from the truth.
political rule over the Spanish regions. Antonio Rivera (2005: 155) shows how Unamuno, an unavering fuerista, was so deeply affected by the ensuing political crisis in his native Basque Country. It is hard to avoid reading that sort of significance into his work on the Quijote. The presence of a Biscayan in the narrative becomes an opportunity for Unamuno to defend the exceptionalism of a political and cultural region which has been subsumed into a homogenous Spanish nation. It is an attempt both to legitimise his regional culture under a Spanish banner by pointing to the Basque involvement in the Spanish literary canon, as well as to re-marginalise that culture, to return it to some extent to the fringes by differentiating the Basques from the Castilians. The inherent paradox of such an approach is in keeping with the dualistic relationship between Spanish and European cultures in Unamuno’s writing as expressed in En torno al casticismo: ‘sólo abriendo las ventanas a vientos europeos, empapándonos en el ambiente continente, teniendo fe en que no perderemos nuestra personalidad al hacerlo, europeizándonos para hacer España y chapuzándonos en pueblo, regeneraremos esta estepa moral’ (Unamuno 2014: 268). Unamuno’s cosmopolitan views on culture and politics, which on the microscopic level go hand in hand with an appeal to the reader’s personal interpretation, are present at and supported by this instance of the text. What to Menard might have seemed little more than a patriotic toast (and in a Cervantine twist we may wish to imagine that the fictional Menard has read the work of the real Unamuno) might in fact hide a more nuanced take on the relationship between Basque culture and Spanish culture, between Spanish culture and European culture. To understand a Basque perspective on the work is to understand the Basque position in the broader national and supra-national cultural frameworks in which it participates.

I have already discussed at length the culturally problematic side of version Menard’s Chapter IX, which legitimises the subjugation of Arabic-speaking nations by his native France. It must not be forgotten, however, that Menard’s rewriting is the product of Borges’s own writing on the Quijote. There are important commonalities in fact between Unamuno, Borges and Pierre Menard. All of them take on the most famous text in the Spanish literary canon from a perspective that is never wholly Castilian. Unamuno’s sense of Basque exceptionalism couples with Menard’s justification of French colonial hegemony, as well as what might be seen as Borges’s attempt to legitimise his own position as a commentator on a canonical Spanish work. For the claim that Menard’s version can be superior to the original ultimately promotes cross-border discussions of the work. If a French version can be better than a Spanish one, then so too can an Argentine version. A unifying factor between Vida and ‘Pierre Menard’ is a shared desire between Unamuno and Borges to promote the particular perspectives from which they read the Quijote.
The ninth chapter also supports the shared method by which the two read the novel. While only ‘Pierre Menard’ draws the reader’s attention to the philosophical profundity of the idea that history is the mother of truth, the narrator’s exposition of that idea serves both authors well: ‘Menard, contemporáneo de William James, no define la historia como una indagación de la realidad sino como su origen. La verdad histórica, para él, no es lo que sucedió; es lo que juzgamos que sucedió’ (Borges 2015: 51). In Unamuno’s view, such a judgement has to be defended forcefully, with full faith in its veracity. Don Quijote turns an object without inherent meaning into a legendary helmet through his willingness to take up arms to defend that perspective. In Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard’, by contrast, don Quijote is an emblem of the automatic validity of each individual perspective. Menard’s approach to the text is equal to Quijote’s approach to objects mentioned within that text: don Quijote projects the horizon of expectations of a reader of chivalric literature onto objects in his environment in the same way that Menard projects the horizon of expectations of a racially-supremacist, intellectually self-superior French author onto the Quijote itself. This is not as creative a process in Borges’s writing as it is in Unamuno’s; rather it represents an automatic function of the mind which has been contaminated by a specific set of influences in a specific time and place. Borges’s work on a text which forbids author-centric interpretations does not come with an explicit instruction to defend the interpretation the reader must then arrive at. The reader’s mind participates only passively in the interpretation. Borges’s reader does not so much produce and defend an interpretation as much as the interpretation is an effect exerted on a reader who exists within specific cultural coordinates.  

A specific comparison between their version of Chapter XXII is made all the more difficult by the fact that the reader can only make educated guesses as to which fragment Menard rewrote. Various moments in the chapter may have caught his attention. It might have been don Quijote’s decision to override the rule of law by obeying an ostensibly higher principle of human justice. Equally it could have been the famous conversation with Ginés de Pasamonte, whose life story is richer than that of Lazarillo de Tormes. Ginés would be a useful feature of a rewriting by Pierre Menard in light of his propensity towards textual experimentation. It might have been useful to Unamuno for precisely the same reason, but Ginés is mentioned only obliquely in favour of a discussion of quixotic justice. Unamuno reads into the episode a lesson on higher principles of human morality and justice than can

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116 This is one of various reasons that I cannot agree with critics such as Yahni (1992) and Cauti (2005) that Unamuno is the chief motivator of Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’, or that Menard is a simple copy of Unamuno. The perspectives from which, and the techniques according to which they rewrite the Quijote are enough to separate them and to allow for contrasts to be made. To argue that Pierre Menard is another Miguel de Unamuno is to ignore the myriad distinctions between them that can enlighten their versions of the Quijote when they are examined in parallel.
be set out legislatively. There is therefore an ethical significance in Unamuno’s reading. And whatever the fragment that Menard took on, there is a clear ethical implication in his reading of the other two chapters in his own version.

For the reader must question both Unamuno’s and Menard’s treatment of Chapter XXXVIII. The inclusion of this chapter in Menard’s rewriting of the Quijote can be seen to problematise Vida’s insistence on the individual’s faith in their particular worldview. For, although Unamuno effectively ignores the postprandial speech on arms and letters, the chapter retains a relevance to a comparison between the two rewritings. For Unamuno’s disregard for the speech is embedded in the context of his claim, in a rewritten XLV, that national progress relies on a civil war. Menard announces the discussion to his reader by making it a major feature of a much-shortened version of the original text, a discussion in which the narrator delights. A comparison between both approaches highlights the risks inherent to a reader-centric model. For it is perfectly possible that Unamuno did not intend to refer to a Civil War in the most literal sense. It is also possible that Menard was defending a position that was contrary to his true view, as he did in his diatribe against Valéry’s works. Appealing to the author’s true intention in neither case invalidates the literal interpretation of the words on the page: that Spanish regeneration relies on a Civil War in the most material sense, and that weapons are a valid legislative tool in a European context heading inexorably to war. For the text itself permits both interpretations. Intentional or otherwise, and we can only suspect either way, Unamuno and Menard have added intellectual fillip to causes which led to the onset and consolidation of fascist rule in their own cultural contexts. This problematises the voluntarist statements Unamuno makes in Vida. The imposition of the individual will onto the world is not arbitrated simply by an intellectual process of thought. It must be regulated by an overarching concern for the ethical impact of intellectual thought on the world around us. For as don Quijote himself said, arms are the tools by which laws, which are the product of the intellect, are imposed. This brings the reader back to the Cervantine principle

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117 For this reason my analysis does not overwrite that of Terreros, who examines the role of the mind in eternalising the self in the works of Unamuno and Borges. Both subscribe to idea that total knowledge is impossible (Terreros 2009: 204). For this reason, Unamuno recommends that his reader adopt a boundless faith in their specific worldview. By the same token, Borges seems to argue for a kind of stoic pessimism, an acceptance of one’s fleeting place in a chain of infinite human discourse. Pierre Menard rewrites a text starring a protagonist with the most extreme faith in his own worldview, in a way similar yet distinct from Unamuno, an author who proposed that quixotic faith has a practical use. In doing so, he helps to show that such undying faith in one’s worldview can have ethically unacceptable consequences, and that the eternalising oneself by making a material impact on the world in line with one’s faith is not an end in itself.
as set out in the Novelas ejemplares. That Cervantes would sooner cut off his hand than incite his reader to ill thought or action goes well beyond a self-ironic joke about his obvious inability to perform such a deed; it becomes a relevant statement to reader-response theory. The reader’s power to determine meaning in their interaction with the text must be regulated by a concern for the way their projections onto the text might materially impact on the world. This goes some way to answering Stanley Fish’s query on acceptable readings. Ethical interests must become a key motivation by which interpretations are accepted or rejected.

For both Unamuno’s and Menard’s rewritings of the Quijote credit Fish’s argument that the text cannot be the source of core agreement or disagreement on what constitutes an acceptable reading versus an unacceptable one. Such a statement is appropriately Cervantine. Sancho’s neologism, bacivelmo, whose purpose is to legislate for the differing interpretations of the object according to individual viewers, is a perfect metaphor for the way in which the text is read in ‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’. The objective features of the object — the fact that it is made of metal, its round shape, its size relative to the human head — simultaneously support the view that it is a basin and that it is a helmet. In precisely the same way, Borges demonstrates that a finite number of words support infinitely polysemic interpretations. The objective features of the text — the comment on Arab dishonesty, the speech on arms and letters, the discussion of history’s role in determining truth — simultaneously support satirical readings, as well as philosophically profound and politically controversial ones. No interpretation violates what Wolfgang Iser calls the rules of the game. What promotes such different interpretations is the historical process by which canons of acceptability change. The author, and it is by no means a contradiction to refer to an author when discussing reader-response theory, is the embodiment of the way in which canons of acceptability have transformed. To Menard, the Quijote is the bacivelmo that Sancho proposes within the very text. Unamuno, despite his rejection of the neologism, projects meaning onto the text according to the same quixotic principle.

The major difference between Borges’s and Unamuno’s discussions of the Quijote is that in Borges’s case, the novel’s interpretive polysemy is interesting more strictly from an aesthetic point of view; in Unamuno’s, that interpretive polysemy requires the reader to defend their view vehemently, even to the point of civil war. Unamuno appropriates the Quijote to recommend a philosophical and political system based on the idealist, not to say Tlönian, practice of seeing in the world that which we wish to see. The fact that canons of acceptability change over time problematises Unamuno’s and Menard’s project. In the intervening period between 1934, when Menard declares his intention to write the Quijote, and the publication of his work in 1939, his racial and militaristic comments will appear just as infelicitous as the promotion of civil war in Unamuno’s 1905 work. The context of
writing and that of reading interact. Unamuno wrote Vida thirty-one years before the onset of a Civil War that he would live to see, at least in part. The modern reader would surely not be ignorant of the outcome of that event, nor the murderous regime that ensued. What, after 1898 might have been intended as a desperate cry for a redefinition of Spanishness has, due to the historical events since the text’s publication, been redefined as a profession of the necessity of a war that cost so many so much.

One might wonder if Menard, by contrast, kept his writing secret once he realised the way in which history would condemn the statements made in his rewritten Quijote. Even if Borges did not have Unamuno in mind when writing ‘Pierre Menard’, that text can still be read as a commentary on Unamuno’s world-oriented reading of a text. For imposing one’s ideals onto the world, a practice that Unamuno recommends so violently, is not universally valid. His melioristic insistence on it is naive in the extreme. For very real totalitarian regimes have imposed ideals common to Otto Dietrich zur Linde and Pierre Menard in very real ways. If only Unamuno would have sooner cut off his hand than incited his reader to ill thought or action.

VI.3 The author as dreamer

The final major principle that underlies their respective works on the Quijote is the idea of dreaming as an act of literary creation. Unamuno’s Vida closes with an anachronistic quote from Calderón’s La vida es sueño: ‘¿La vida es sueño! ¿Será acaso también sueño, Dios mío, este tu Universo de que eres la Conciencia eterna e infinita?, ¿será un sueño tuyo?, ¿será que nos estás soñando?...’ (Unamuno 2011: 521). The use of dreams in the work of both Unamuno and Borges is extremely multifaceted. On the most basic level, it is a metaphysical query common to both writers. The Calderonian quote could equally be the internal monologue of the protagonist of Borges’s ‘Las ruinas circulares’. Dreams are a common motif to Unamuno’s and Borges’s work on Cervantes. While it prima facie appears to question the very nature of existence, it has an important literary function. 118

118 This is where I differ somewhat to critics such as Dolores Koch, whose 1984 ‘Borges y Unamuno: Convergencias y divergencias’ compared Niebla to ‘Las ruinas circulares’. I agree with Koch that their oneiric narratives open themselves up to questions on the nature of existence and the divide between reality and the imagination. I have identified an additional function: the denial of an objective meaning in the text that promotes the reader into an intellectually active engagement with the text in order to project meaning onto it. This places my analysis more closely alongside that of J. Óscar Carrascosa-Tinoco, who notes that in Niebla and ‘Las ruinas circulares’, dreaming is akin to production. This, he argues places them in a literary tradition that goes back all the way to Cervantes. However, our analysis must not end at how Unamuno and Borges inherit ideas from Cervantes, but how they build upon them. There are indeed Cervantine echoes in works such as Niebla and ‘Las
For across all of the texts they produce on *Quijote*, the life-as-dream idea promotes interpretations of texts that would be of interest to reader-response theory. For the introduction of Calderón’s work into Cervantes’s as an anachronistic commentary supports the argument that new literary canons have permitted new readings. The fact that the *Quijote* permits metaphysical enquiries aligns the two authors neatly with the argument made by Jauss that new historical materialisations provide the horizons of expectations which permit new interpretations.\(^{119}\) For those metaphysical enquiries were not fully and explicitly developed until Calderón penned his *La vida es sueño*. Calderón can be seen to inaugurate a philosophical method of reading Cervantes, one that allows Unamuno and Borges to theorise reading in and of itself.

Borges’s ‘*Magias parciales del Quijote*’, might be interpreted a Calderonian reading of that novel’s technique of mise-en-abyme, one that speaks to the possible fictionality of the reader beyond the possible reality of the characters depicted. That technique is also shared by Unamuno’s *Cómo se hace una novela*: he, like Quijote and Sancho, reads his own story within the same text that the reader holds. Unamuno and Borges paint such metaphysical doubts onto a text entirely deserving of it: the presence of the first volume of the *Quijote* in the second gives way to genuine doubt on the sureness of the individual existence. For that reason Unamuno’s conclusion to *Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho* is equivalent to the conclusion of Borges’s ‘*Ni siquiera soy polvo*’. Unamuno finishes with a declaration of existential anguish that would be explored in the fullest sense in *Del sentimiento trágico*: ‘*Y si es la vida sueño, ¡déjame soñarla inacabablemente!*’ (Unamuno 2007: 527). Borges ends similarly, imploring an unknown deity to continue to dream his existence: ‘*Mi Dios, mi soñador, sigue soñándose*’ (‘*Ni siquiera soy polvo*’, OC II: 178). The philosophical richness of such commentaries is undeniable. However, the realisation of the fictional character and the fictionalisation of the real reader; the reduction of the life of the individual to a dream contained in an endless number of other dreams: these are techniques of interest from a literary-theoretical point of view.

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ruinas circulares’, but their specific works on the *Quijote* use the motif of dreams in order to discuss the nature of the text and its relationship to the author. Positing the text as a dream and an author as a dreamer arrests interpretive authority from the author in a way reminiscent of the confused question of authorship in the *Quijote* that culminates in Quijote and Sancho reading their own story. It also supports my argument that Unamuno and Borges, as inheritors of Cervantes, also anticipate the literary-theoretical movement that would later be termed reader-response theory.

\(^{119}\) It also clearly reminiscent of the argument in Borges’s ‘*Kafka y sus precursores*’ that each new work of literature retrospectively alters the reading of every other. Unamuno's anachronistic introduction of Calderón into Cervantes prospectively credits Borges’s argument.
In ‘Parábola de Cervantes y de Quijote’, Borges posits the author and protagonist as a dreamer and the dreamed. The aesthetic quality of the dream is also present in Unamuno: his friend don Hilario, an avid, quixotic reader whose story is narrated in his essay ‘Sueño’, turns to his dreams as a source of literary analogy after he has exhausted all of the texts he could hope to read (OC I: 781-783). The connotation of a dream as an act of literary production is common to both. And that connotation is particularly relevant to reader-response theory as it negates the possibility of appealing to the author in the reading act. For, if literature is a dream, it cannot be the wholly active process of a creative mind. Rather, it posits that the act of authorship is a somewhat passive activity that interweaves various strands, from previous literary movements to historical and linguistic circumstances, and produces a text almost inevitably.

This mirrors Borges’s claim, as I discussed in the last chapter, that literature is nothing other than a directed dream. The author has a limited agency of their own text, simply becoming the time and space when previous historical and cultural moments combine. Paradoxically, however, this does not remove the author as a consideration. Unamuno theorises reading as a tripartite relationship, where the author and reader communicate through the text. Borges theorises reading as an act of attributing text to people within certain moments of cultural and historical progress. Both reinstate the author to some extent. Unamuno’s claim that the text is autobiographical, speaks the same language as Borges’s game of attribution. For the life of the author is a moment in history and culture, which provides the horizon of expectations in which a text can be read. Menard’s rewritten Quijote is autobiographical in the same sense: he produces a hypertext identical in form to the hypotext, but the meaning of the text changes according to the moment of writing. That is not an appeal to the author’s intention per se, but an appeal to the circumstances and context of writing. And just as all texts are autobiographical, readings are also. The way a reader interprets the text is as directed by historical and cultural circumstances as the way we write.

Such a theory could find an original meaning in Unamuno’s claim that Cervantes simply extracted don Quijote from the spirit of his pueblo and returned him to that pueblo fully formed. Similarly the notion that Quijano dreams himself into Quijote without the interference of Cervantes, as made in ‘Lectores’, and that Cervantes is himself a dream of his fiction, as made in ‘Sueña Alonso Quijano’. The artist is created by the work, and not vice versa. I do not wish to deny that such statements deny the objectivity of the world of the reader. I do, however, wish to add that these various statements can also be read from a reader-response point of view. For when the author cannot take sole responsibility for the work, then the whole meaning of the work cannot lie in the author’s mind alone. This supports the reader-response argument that literature is an interactive event that takes place.
between the reader and the author. For when a text is produced by an unimaginable number of factors external to it, then no reader can hope to extrapolate the text’s whole meaning, which must to some extent be given by its interaction with other texts in the canon in which they are written. The meaning of the text is limited in that sense to what the reader can find in it, as no objective principle exists by which to unite all of the possible meanings of a text within one interpretation. Unamuno therefore does not pay much attention to what Cervantes may or may not have intended in his Quijote (Unamuno 2007: 312). And for Pierre Menard, history is not what happened, but what we judge to have happened. In literary terms, a text is not what is said, but what the reader hears.

This brings my argument back to where it began. Implicit in the argument that Sancho and Quijote imposed themselves on Cervantes, and that Quijano dreamed Cervantes rather than vice versa, is an acknowledgement of the fact that the literary work is created at least in part through factors external to and predating the author. It therefore suggests, in my view, an acknowledgement of the role of literary tradition in the act of writing. Unamuno and Borges are of course quick to point out the international influences and relevance of the work. The Quijote itself was penned in a pan-European literary context. As such, the empowerment of the reader cannot be extricated from a cosmopolitan interest in the work. There is no single interpretive authority over the work. And whatever meaning the work can provide, it cannot remain within one set of national borders. Their metaphysical and oneiric interpretations of aspects of the Quijote contain the more subtle function of inviting cross-border perspectives on the novel. So when they wrest interpretive control from the author, they also remove it from the specific time and place that Cervantes occupied, providing for valid readings of the text within a universal human context. As Unamuno said, the emblem of Spanish culture is given universality through his Spanishness. It is now the privilege of the reader to interpret the text from their individual perspectives, opening it to a possibly infinite set of meanings.
VII. Conclusion

The chief contribution of my thesis has been to further outline the importance of comparing the two authors. I have built on the work of critics such as J. Óscar Carrascosa-Tinoco and Miguel Gorka Bilbao-Terreros who have sought a communicative relationship between Miguel de Unamuno and Jorge Luis Borges, by reading their works through the lens of non-intentionalist theories of literature such as reader-response. This has opened a new door into establishing the commonalities and contrasts in their works on an individual and collective level.

To a much smaller extent, I have been able to show that the works of Cervantes may also be read from such a theoretical point of view. The various meanings that Unamuno and Borges find in the Quijote can only have been arrived at through a non-intentionalist method of reading. My study of their works on the novel has therefore contributed to the study of it, by showing that interpretations in line with reader-response theory can enrich the text, and find more than just a satirical imitation of chivalric narratives in it. Cervantes’s works are interesting and challenging to reader-response theorists. They could provide modern thinkers with useful theoretical tools. From the prologues which ironise the conventional relationship between a reader and an author, to a protagonist who defines the world by what he sees in it, Cervantes’s works provide ideal material for reader-response theory. Perhaps Cervantes scholars might be interested in reading and re-reading his works according to such theories. This might advance discourse on the novel way beyond the arguments of critics like Close and Russell, who read it exclusively as a satire.

More fundamentally, one of the great pitfalls of the kind of theory I have used is its insistence on the freedom of reading according to personal circumstances. Such a theory cannot adequately define the conventions according to which reading takes place, because there are no objective markers in the text by which to reject interpretations, as Stanley Fish explains. Don Quijote’s propensity to see the fantastical in the mundane, say a legendary helmet in a metal basin, is a kind of idealism that underlies Unamuno’s reading of the text. What the text says to him and him alone is the deciding factor as to its meaning. It is also reflected in Borges’s approach to it, where the same words produced according to different perspectives inevitably produce different meanings. All three are articulations of the same pitfall in reader-response theory. By what convention can we disprove Quijote’s view of the object? Or Unamuno’s and Borges’s readings of the text?

Perhaps no such convention exists. But a possible answer as to one way to reject interpretations of the text is in accordance with personal ethics. Such a convention would itself not be textual. Rather it would be world-oriented. Could we reject interpretations of texts when the text is appropriated to
particular ends that have real and infelicitous consequences in the world. That might keep an important check on readers such as Miguel de Unamuno and Pierre Menard. For, within the communities in which they read and wrote, they gave vocal support to radical political trends that would have dire consequences for so many. That would imbue the statement in the prologue to Cervantes’s _Novelas ejemplares_ with a theoretical significance: ‘Una cosa me atreveré a decirte: que, si por algún modo alcanzara que la lección destas novelas pudiera inducir a quien las leyera o a algún mal deseo o pensamiento, antes me cortara la mano con que las escribí, que sacarlas en público’ (Cervantes 2005: 135). Future literary theorists might wish to look more closely at Cervantes’s works as part of a discussion on reading conventions.\(^{120}\)

Beyond that, I have also shown that much of the blending of existential levels in the fictions of Unamuno and Borges can be read as statements of reader-response aesthetics. I have only dealt with a small number, and in most cases I have engaged with some of the authors’ more ‘minor’ texts. A sustained engagement with _Niebla_ or ‘Las ruinas circulares’ for instance might bring my conclusions into sharper focus. For in my dealings with texts such as ‘Magias parciales del _Quijote_’, ‘Sueña Alonso Quijano’, as well as _Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho_, I have invited the reader to revisit them as if they were manifestoes for non-intentionalist methods of reading. I have done so by arguing that the inherent passivity of the dream —a key metaphor for literary creation across both authors’ oeuvres—is more than just a sign of existential doubt. It entails the view that an author is never fully in control of the various strands that weave together into the literary work. It therefore proposes that the author is an imperfect convention by which to interpret. This is not to overwrite the metaphysical aspects of texts such as _Vida_ and ‘Magias parciales’. Questions on the nature of the world, time and existence are ever-present in those and many other works by both authors. I have simply enriched the discussion and shown that their various fictions are capacious enough to posit various theoretical and philosophical quandaries at once. They are rich in possible meanings, only some of which have been fully explored thus far.

Another contribution has been to expand the discussion of literature according to aspects of reader-response theory. I have added weight in particular to Hans-Robert Jauß’s argument that successive moments in history change the horizon of expectations by which readers interpret, and into which they assimilate new literary works. This process, as Jauß argues, provides for ever new interpretations of texts across time and space. The various works that Unamuno and Borges produce on the _Quijote_ strongly defend such a notion. Unamuno finds in the _Quijote_ a manifesto of modern political and

\(^{120}\) Including ethics in any method of reading entails its own problems. According to which ethical principle ought we to read? For obvious reasons such a question is beyond my scope.
philosophical thinking, as well as a method of reading that trusts interpretive validity to his mind alone. Borges’s greatest work on the *Quijote* shows specifically how anatopic and anachronistic readings can invigorate a text and produce a meaning in it that could never have been predicted by the author.

In neither Unamuno’s nor Borges’s case do their readings disobey what Wolfgang Iser has referred to as the rules of the game of interpretation. For Iser, the text itself is the convention by which reading is produced. Literary theory has, as yet, not been able to demonstrate that this limits the number of possible interpretations permitted by a work. Unamuno and Borges enjoy the interpretive freedom that the *Quijote* permits them. Even their most controversial responses to the work result from aspects of it that are objectively there. The presence of the first Volume inside the second provides theoretical material to Borges, allowing him to argue that the self might be the fiction of another in the same way Quijote and Sancho are. This provides for some of his later readings, which posit that Cervantes is the creation of Quijano, and not vice versa. Unamuno’s statement that his contemporary Spain would benefit from a civil war is based on don Quijote’s inability to use reason in order to establish that the item he has despoiled from a wandering barber is a legendary helmet. Unamuno extrapolates from this moment in the *Quijote* that violence is an intellectual arbiter. His evangelical reading of the novel is hardly prohibited either. Through a different interpretive strategy, one that does not assume from the outset that the work is a simple comedy, Unamuno sees enough Christ-like resonances in the protagonist to extrapolate a code of ethics woven into the fabric of the intra-historic Spanish culture. Ultimately, Unamuno and Borges demonstrate that taking the text as a restrictive convention on reading does not preclude all manner of readings. Since competing and incompatible interpretations are permitted by the same text, as most deftly argued in ‘Pierre Menard’. The text cannot, as Stanley Fish argued, be the source of core agreement on what makes a reading permissible or not.

Even under the restrictive conventions of form and content, there might remain infinite possibilities of reading inasmuch as there may be infinite possible readers. That problematises the notion of understanding. Borges as the narrator of ‘El Aleph’ loses his ability to make conceptual abstractions after seeing the absolute. Equally ‘La biblioteca de Babel’ shows that ordering all of the possible meaningful statements in human language would remain chaotic, impenetrable and ultimately useless. Countless perspectives and interpretations can be defended according to the conventions of the same text or object. The conventions themselves are the source of core disagreement on what constitutes an acceptable reading of a work. As I have argued, readers should reject interpretations that abide by the rules of the text when such interpretations violate the Cervantine principle that the author should sooner not write at all than risk inciting the reader to ill thought or action. Given that authors cannot account for the total possible meanings of their works, including those which compete
or mutually exclude with other readings, the responsibility to read well lies with the reader alone. Readers therefore have a freedom to read according to their personal horizon of expectations, which is formed by the sum of their historical and cultural experiences at the moment of reading. But they have a responsibility to ensure that their reading stays within ethical boundaries.

I am aware that my research has taken place within certain limitations. A significant limitation has been a theoretical one. Up until now there had been no sustained reader-response investigation into either Unamuno or Borges. The need for such a study of Unamuno’s works was identified by Charles Alex Longhurst in 2014, and I hope to have done justice to that wish. This work, however, is inaugural. It is an introduction into rather than an overview of the potential value of reader-response theory to Unamuno and Borges. The most appropriate way to engage with such a theory was to investigate some of its most central arguments. That included looking at some of its earliest and foremost practitioners, including and especially Jauß and Iser. It also involved dealing with some of its most fundamental terms, from the horizon of expectations, to the acceptability of readings, and so forth, and stretching those terms to their limits in order to provide a basis for a reader-response interpretation of their works. What I have not and could not have done was to take on every single theorist who might reasonably be brought under a reader-response framework.

As such, the possibility of further study into the value of different reader-centric theories of interpretation in Unamuno and Borges criticism is very much open. David Bleich’s subjective reader-response theory is more radical than many of the theories I have dealt with. The fundamental argument of his 1978 *Subjective criticism* is that the text is defined purely as the experience of the reader, thereby rejecting the idea that the text sets out conventions of reading. He sets out a method of understanding texts by chronicling the specific personal experience of reading. This would offer an interesting counterpoint to my conclusion that Borges and Unamuno rely on the text as a convention by which to read personal significance into the work. My discussion of how acceptable their readings of the *Quijote* are has veered towards the ethical, but this could be furthered by taking into account Jonathan Culler’s definition of literary competence, where valid interpretations are produced by readers with ‘an implicit understanding of the operations of literary discourse which tells one what to look for’ (Culler 2002: 132). Investigating how competently readers like Unamuno and Pierre Menard read the *Quijote* would help to broaden the discussion on acceptable readings beyond the ethical concern I have identified.

That could also be bolstered by looking into Peter Rabinowitz’s 1987 work ‘Before Reading’, which analyses the impact of the reader’s knowledge of narrative conventions on their interpretation. This would sharpen the discussion of Jauß’s concept of the horizon of expectations, which informs and is
informed by every act of reading. Also, Peter Bürger’s 1984 work on fragmentation would be of specific use to Unamuno and Borges, who both fragment the Quijote in their rewritings. Bürger distances collage, the technique that Menard and Unamuno take when rewriting the novel, from literary creation. Those rewritings can critique and be critiqued by Bürger’s theory of fragmentation.

Future studies must take into account that reader-response theory has in fact been engaged with and critiqued. Steven Mailloux’s system of ‘rhetorical hermeneutics’ is essentially a theory of interpretation and misinterpretation, aimed at establishing a system for dividing acceptable and unacceptable readings of literature. He is himself not a reader-response theorist. He argues that in reader-response theory, the correct interpretation is that which is produced by the ideal reader. While I disagree that reader-response theory generally posits such an ideal reader, his work takes an overview of hermeneutic theory that could provide the basis for a later critique of my own work. Mailloux suggests that reader-response theory is a kind of hermeneutic idealism (Mailloux 1985: 622). That description fits very neatly with the way don Quijote approaches the world, and the quixotic approach to the text that Unamuno and Borges take. Mailloux contrasts this against ‘textual realism’ — the idea that the text can set out its own conventions (623). Mailloux points to a weakness in one of the key arguments of reader-response theory, in that it shows how reading conventions are constantly changing and providing for new interpretations, but does not adequately explain what those conventions look like in any given time or place: ‘But such a claim only leads to a more difficult question for the idealist: What constrains the use of interpretive conventions in a specific context?’ (625). In other words, literary idealism can be vague, and it might be impossible to construct each reader’s conceptual framework. As such, Mailloux argues that the tenets of reader-response theory are ‘not formalizable’ into a coherent system (626).

Rhetorical hermeneutics is what Mailloux calls an ‘anti-Theory theory’ (629). Its key argument is that texts become meaningful through an exchange of various hermeneutic approaches. It posits that all theoretical models can shed light on works and communicate with interpretations produced in accordance with other theories (629-630). It could become a useful model by which to further critique the works of Unamuno and Borges, either together or separately. Particularly in Borges’s works, there is no system that can explain all of the meaning in the text, or in the world. Meaning is a mere projection of the content of the human mind, a production of the frameworks that we create so as to bring the world around us into a coherent order. Moreover, it might provide a useful comment on the specific ways in which they read the Quijote. For Unamuno explicitly negates any interpretive value

\[121\] A complicating factor is that a text can set out its own conventions yet still allow for a reader to interpret it in any number of ways.
in Cervantes’s version, with his most explicit non-intentionalist comment coming in the concluding essay of *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida*. A theory that allows for intentionalism and non-intentionalism to communicate, without one negating the other, could provide a more nuanced way of reading the *Quijote* than would otherwise be possible. Can a reader-centric argument not unite with an author-centric one? Could one not revisit a text having interpreted it according to a reader-centric method, then compare it to a reading produced by an intentionalist one?

That question must be left for further study. But answering it would help to further comment on the comparison that I have made. Because in Unamuno and Borges I have found two differences of what might be broadly referred to as reader-centrism. Unamuno’s reading veers closer to what has been referred to as strict anti-intentionalism or ‘conventionalism’ (Irvin 2006: 120-121). Borges’s reading, in particular through ‘Pierre Menard’ is evidence of some interest in the author at the moment of writing. The quality of Menard’s version is only relative to Cervantes’s. Producing a work like the *Quijote* from the conceptual framework of a 20th Century French intellectual is much more impressive than doing so from Cervantes’s conceptual framework. Borges in that sense practises a sort of ‘conditional intentionalism’ (Livingston 2005: 140-141) where what the author could have conceived is relevant to the reader’s interpretation. In that sense, Borges’s reading might bridge the gap between intentionalism and non-intentionalism. His interpretation might sit more comfortably in the realm of rhetorical hermeneutics than in reader-response theory. This presents an obvious next step for investigations into Borges as a reader of fiction.

Other possible research might wish to look at Unamuno and Borges as readers of the *Quijote* within their specific contexts. My approach has been transnational. This works in service of my point that reader-centric contributions to the literary canon empower readers on the periphery. But it may be possible to bring that argument into sharper focus by focusing more specifically on their respective peripheries. Borges is by no means the first Latin American author to reclaim the *Quijote* from a transatlantic point of view. Ecuadorian Juan Montalvo anticipated Borges by writing about the chapters that Cervantes had forgotten in *Capítulos que se le olvidaron a Cervantes*. My research could bolster further studies on Latin American approaches to the *Quijote*. Equally, Unamuno’s reworkings of the novel could be more strongly positioned in the discourse of the 98 Generation as a result of my work. Montserrat Herrero (1998) showed that Unamuno, Azorín and Maetzu took the *Quijote* as a symbol of particular politics, and conducted a discussion on national regeneration by way of the novel. Pedro Pascual (1999) also shows that the Generation have a shared interest in the *Quijote*, and Rachel Schmidt (2011) showed that the trend of the ’98 group was to think of don Quijote as an emblem of the failure of Spanish culture (166). Future work could explain what these thinkers
contributed to the understanding of the novel as a work of literature, to unpick the theoretical
approaches at play when prominent thinkers at the turn of the 20th Century turn their attentions to it.
My work has emphasised the possibility and importance of reading the Cervantine works of Unamuno
and Borges in connection with modern, reader-oriented literary theories. Yet in what represents a
first step into opening this discussion, I leave my study with contemporary theoretical approaches to
Unamuno and Borges as readers of the *Quijote* still in their infancy.

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