

Individual Giving: Theoretical Discussions and the Evidence from Serbia and Canada

Ethical Issues, Contextual and Individual Factors of Giving Time and Money to
Organisations and People

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February 2018

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Bojana Radovanović

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on individual giving, defined as voluntarily dedicating one's non-material and/or material resources for the benefit of others or the common good. My research seeks to examine whether we are morally obliged to give, and it also strives to explain the factors that influence individuals to give. In searching for answers to the first question, I have discussed normative theories in ethics. All analysed normative theories maintain that we are morally obliged to help others, but they differ in respect to who these "others" are and for what reasons we should help. My research furthermore investigates contextual and individual factors that shape giving. Whether and how one engages in giving depends on her awareness of the need for help, then on her motivation as well as the personal and social resources she has a command of, as well as on an institutional environment, in terms of welfare systems, governmental support to the non-profit sector and the characteristics of the non-profit sector. Finally, my research provides evidence on volunteering for organisations, participating in the activities of informal groups, helping people directly and donating money to organisations and individuals in Serbia and Canada. This is the first such type of encompassing research on individual giving conducted in Serbia. Placed in a comparative perspective, it provides valuable insights. The rates of all types of individual giving that are analysed in both countries are higher in Canada than in Serbia, while differences in giving to organisations are particularly prominent. Most volunteers and donors in both countries give their time and money to similar causes, related to health, social services, education, religion and recreation. Both in Serbia and in Canada, most volunteers reported making contributions to the community as the reason they dedicate their time, while, reportedly, most donors give because they feel compassion towards people in need. In general, respondents who have a command over greater levels of personal resources are more likely to give both time and money than those with lower levels. However, not all resources are predictors of all forms of giving in each country. My research confirms that in order to gain an encompassing picture of individual giving in a country, as well as meaningful international comparisons, country-specific forms of giving must be considered.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1. The Concept of Individual Giving

All over the world, many people give money and other material resources and dedicate their time, emotions and energy to both people they know personally and those they do not (Butcher and Einolf 2017, Ilchman et al 1998, Jung et al 2016, Moody and Breeze 2016, Smith et al. 2016, Wiepking and Handy 2015).

Ann donates money to charitable organisations fighting extreme poverty in Africa. Omar pays for a language school his nephew attends. Steve gives money to a homeless person on the street. Mina babysits her friend's children. Jovana contributes to the medical treatment of a sick child she has heard about in the media. David volunteers his time at a local church. Dunja joins a group of fellow students who are cleaning a local river bank. These and other, similar gestures, which I refer to as *individual giving*, are the focus of my PhD thesis. I define individual giving as the following:

Individual giving is voluntarily dedicating one's non-material and/or material resources for the benefit of others or the common good.¹

This definition implies that giving is *behaviour*. Having an intention, but not acting upon it is not sufficient to be defined as "giving". It is behaviour designed to *benefit* the other or the common good, where *benefit* means 1) relieving the suffering or (2) improving the quality of life (Payton and Moody 2008). Whether it be providing emotional support to a friend, preparing meals in a shelter for the homeless, cleaning a local river bank or donating money to someone begging in the street, giving is always about *doing*.

While when giving to *others* a donor is excluded from the benefit created by her act, dedicating one's resources for a *common good* does not exclude one who gives from the usage of it. Thus, the common good is what is beneficial, in terms of relieving the suffering and improving the quality of life, for the group the actor belongs to, it is a shared or collective goal. For example,

¹ Payton and Moody (2008) use the term "public good" to refer to benefit of others and the common good. I prefer to avoid using this term in my thesis, since the term "public good" has different meaning across disciplines (for example, in economics, public goods are defined by their two characteristics: non-rivalry and non-excludability in consumption).

when Ann donates money to charitable organisations fighting extreme poverty in Africa, she does not benefit from this donation.² However, when Dunja joins a group of fellow students who are cleaning a local river bank, she is doing something that benefits herself as well. She can also enjoy walking along the clean river bank.

Although the *goal* of individual giving is to benefit others or for the common good, this may be the final goal or only an instrument whereby to reach some benefit for oneself. Thus, giving is not necessarily done from altruistic motivations. For example, one may volunteer because she truly cares about the needs of the recipients, while someone else volunteers to increase the employment prospects.

Giving involves two active parties: the subject *who gives* - a *giver*, a *donor* and the subject *who receives* - a *receiver*, a *recipient*. The relationship between a donor and a recipient can be fluid. One can be a donor one moment, and a receiver the next, from the same or another person. The two can, at the same time, be both givers and receivers, when they are coordinating their actions to bring about an outcome that is mutually valued and beneficial for both.

A donor and a recipient can be a person or an organisation. My research focuses on the *person* as donor, and thus I call this practice *individual giving*. It should be stressed that it is often only through collective action that the benefit of others and/or the common good can be reached, such as through the formal and informal organisation of people.

This thesis focuses on individual giving to *organisations* (formal and informal) and to *individuals* (unknown and known to the donor). In this research, *formal organisations* include charitable (philanthropic) organisations, but also any other organisation to which an individual may voluntarily dedicate her non-material and/or material resources, including places of worship, schools, sports clubs, etc. Usually, formal organisations are *intermediary* (e.g. when one donates to poverty relief programmes through a charitable organisation). Alternatively, organisations can be the final recipients (e.g. donation to a church for its reconstruction). *Informal organisations* or *groups* include any ad hoc gatherings organised to address specific

² This means that Ann is not a direct beneficiary of the organisation she donates to. However, Ann may still reap certain benefits as a result of her giving to this charitable organisation, for example, she can feel the joy of giving (Andreoni 1990, Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). This may be the ultimate goal of her action, but it could also be only the side-effect of giving (Batson 2011). Motives for giving are discussed in the Chapter 4.

needs within a local community. For example, when a group of students gathers to clean a local river bank.

Within the context of this research, recipients are also *individuals*, both those who are *personally known to the donor* (excluding household members), and those who *are unknown to the donor*. We are part of a chain of giving and receiving with our friends, extended family members, colleagues, neighbours and all those with whom we have close relationships (Moody 2008). Many people also engage in giving to complete strangers, for example to homeless person on the street.

Individual giving is a *voluntary* activity, which means that it is uncoerced. It is not required by law (as is the case with the payment of taxes) or something that we do in response to threats, blackmail or other forms of coercion. Also, it is not a professional obligation. If we fail to dedicate our material and non-material resources for the benefit of each other, we generally do not suffer sanctions in terms of material fines or incarceration. However, we often feel *obligated* to do something for the benefit of others. We may consider it our (moral) *duty* to help those in need, when we are committed to remove the suffering (Sen 1977). Also, we may so strongly *feel* for the troubles of another that this compels us to provide aid, when we act from sympathy (*ibid.*). This is experienced as a form of internal pressure. Thus, sanctions are internal, in the form of guilt or remorse (Bowles and Gintis 2011, Richerson and Boyd 2005). In addition, we often believe that we are expected to do good deeds, we feel *social or peer pressure* to aid others, and when we fail to provide support, we feel ashamed and our *reputation* often depends on whether we are helpful (*ibid.*)

Being a voluntary action also implies that giving is not financially remunerated. A donor gives without expecting anything in return, at least not immediately, as is the case with market exchange. Although the type of giving which occurs between individuals who personally know each other usually means that they are intertwined in a web of giving and receiving, they are not materially compensated for the very act of giving, even though there are expectations that the favour will be reciprocated should a need arise (Komter 2005). When someone dedicates her material and non-material resources to organisations or unknown individuals, then she does not usually expect compensation. However, organisations are known to provide material incentives for giving, such as, for example, an invitation to a special event for donors (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011a). This is rather an expression of gratitude than a form of compensation.

Although organisations sometimes cover certain volunteering-related costs, for example, transportation costs, or providing certain material pay-back in the form of stipends, these are usually much lower than the market value of the service provided by the volunteer (Smith and Van Puyvelde 2016).

Finally, the outlined definition indicates that the *object* that could be dedicated for the benefit of others and the common good are *non-material* or *material resources*. Someone can give her non-material resources, in other words her *time*. When we talk about dedicating our time to others, what we mean is this: providing support, assistance and labour, sharing our emotions and strengths, applying our skills for the benefit of other individuals or for a common cause. This type of support can be provided through formal organisations and informal groups, but it can also be given directly. In the literature, volunteering is defined as an activity when time, labour and expertise are given freely to benefit another person, group or cause (Hustinx, Cnaan and Handy 2010). However, under the term volunteering, scholars usually count formal and public activities which benefit strangers (Hustinx, Cnaan and Handy 2010, Musick and Wilson 2008, Wilson 2012). Volunteering as defined is distinguished from providing direct help to people or addressing problems in an ad hoc and informal way (Musick and Wilson 2008).

While formal, institutionalised volunteering is more common in the developed world, informal, direct help is universal (Butcher and Einolf 2017). Thus, the perspective of volunteering as public and formal that benefit strangers is rather narrow and holds a “Northern bias” (ibid: V). Such a view leads to the inaccurate conclusion that there is very little volunteering taking place in many countries, particularly those which are developing and formerly socialist. In order to overcome this bias, certain definitions include helping people directly and addressing communal problems in informal groups, as well as supporting the organisations of which the volunteer is a member, such as those definitions developed by the United Nations Volunteers in the *Expert working group meeting on volunteering and social development* (1999) and the International Labour Organisation in the *Manual on the Measurements of Volunteer Work* (2011).

Authors who count giving time directly to people as volunteering, usually distinguish between formal and informal volunteering, where formal volunteering is managed and coordinated through formal organisations (association, non-profit organisation, etc.) and informal is carried

out through loosely organised groups, often spontaneously gathered to address certain problem, or through initiatives of individuals (Leigh et al. 2011).

To avoid these terminological ambiguities, I have developed the concept of individual giving of time. I will use the term *formal volunteering* and *volunteering* to refer to people giving their time to formal organisations, while the terms *helping (people directly)*, *providing assistance* and *taking care* will be reserved to define the giving of one's time to individuals in need. The action of giving one's time to assist an informal group, will be referred to as *participating in an informal group* in the remainder of this research.³

Apart from giving time, we also donate *material resources*, such as money, possessions, even our blood and organs. In this research, among different forms of material giving, I will focus on giving *money* to organisations and directly to individuals in need. For example, to contribute to the medical treatment of sick children, one can donate to a charity that provides them with financial support. One could also donate for the medical treatment of a particular child by directly paying into the mother's bank account. Finally, one could financially support the medical treatment of a friend's own child. All these activities include giving money away.

In the literature, charitable or philanthropic giving and donating are the terms that are most often used to refer to giving money to organisations (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, Wiepking and Handy 2015). Some authors under the term philanthropic giving include giving money to beggars in Mexico (Layton and Mossel 2015) and sharing goods with neighbours (Mottiar and Ngcoya 2016).

In this thesis, the practice of giving money to organisations and to unknown individuals shall be referred to as *donating*. The terms: *giving money* and *providing financial support* will be used to define monetary contributions made to those individuals one knows personally. The activities that I refer to as individual giving and that will be in the focus of this thesis are summarised in Table 1.

³ Although these terms do not necessarily imply helping, I have chosen them to refer to the activities undertaken in an informal group. Most often an informal group gathers to address a problem in a community thereby benefiting all group members.

Table 1. Individual Giving

Who gives?	What is given?	Who receives?		What do we call it?
Person	Material (money and goods)	Organisation	Formal	Donating
		Person	Known	Giving Money, Providing financial support
			Unknown	Donating
	Non-material (time)	Organisation	Formal	(Formal) Volunteering
			Informal	Participating in informal groups
		Person	Known	Providing assistance, Taking care, Helping
			Unknown	Providing assistance, Taking care, Helping
				Providing assistance, Taking care, Helping

1.2. Aims of the Research and Research Questions

The *aim* of this research is twofold. My research seeks to examine whether we are morally obliged to dedicate our non-material and material resources for the benefit of others and/or the common good. It also strives to explain the factors that influence on individuals to give, exploring similarities and differences between countries with different institutional backgrounds.

Research Question 1: *Are we morally obliged to give our material and non-material resources for the benefit of others?*

In that context, my research seeks to address the questions:

- *Are we morally obliged to give?*
- *Whom we owe our support?*
- *Are the motives for which one gives ethically relevant?*
- *How to choose between the incompatible requests for help?*

Although many moral philosophers have been interested in the outlined questions since ancient times, it is only recently that “a new field of inquiry”, namely “the ethics of philanthropy” (Illingworth, Pogge, Wenar 2011), or “the ethics of giving” (Paul Woodruff 2018) has emerged. My thesis endeavours to contribute to contemporary debates on the issues drawing on a range of theories in normative ethics.

Research Question 2: *Why do we give our material and non-material resources for the benefit of others and the common good?*

Many people give their time and money to benefit others (Butcher and Einolf 2017, Ilchman et al 1998, Jung et al 2016, Moody and Breeze 2016, Wiepking and Handy 2015). Some will go so far as to place their own life in harm's way to save the life of a stranger, which is perhaps best illustrated by the rescuing of Jews during WWII (Monroe 1996, Oliner and Oliner 1988). The questions that arise:

- How have we evolved to be capable of altruistic acts?
- Do we maximise our utility function even when we dedicate our material and non-material resources for the benefit of others?
- Which factors induce individuals to give?
- What are the contextual factors that shape giving in a country?

These questions have been addressed by scholars from different disciplines, from evolutionary biology, social psychology, sociology, to economics and political science. Each of them brings their own theoretical and empirical insights that can explain certain aspects of individual giving. To get an encompassing picture of individual giving, I will take into the consideration findings of various disciplines and approaches.

Research Question 3: *What are similarities and differences in giving practices in countries with different institutional backgrounds?*

Although many people have dedicated their material and non-material resources for the benefit of others and the common good throughout recorded history and in different cultures (Gouldner, 1960, Komter, 2005, Ilchman et al. 1998, Moody and Breeze 2016), the way giving is channelled is not uniform. In some countries, majority of people give to organisations, while in others the rates of giving to organisations are relatively small (Butcher and Einolf 2017, Wiepking and Handy 2015). However, it is plausible to conclude that in those countries where formal giving is lacking, informal acts of giving are present (Butcher and Einolf 2017). Notwithstanding, volunteering and donating money to organisations tend to predominate in the research on giving (Musick and Wilson 2008, Wiepking and Handy 2015). When these informal practices are not included in the analyses, what we are left with is a distorted picture on the rates of giving in a country where such practices may predominate. Moreover, our knowledge on the individual and contextual factors that promote giving mostly comes from countries where practices of giving to organisations are well developed, particularly from

Anglo-Saxon and Western and Northern European countries. (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, Musick and Wilson 2008, Wilson 2012).

Research on giving in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe is particularly scarce. For example, in *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Philanthropy* (eds. Wiepking and Handy 2015), the seminal collection of essays on philanthropy around the world, only Bulgaria and Russia are included among all the former socialist countries. In the collection of essays titled *Perspectives on Volunteering Voices from the South* (eds. Butcher and Einolf 2017) which focuses on giving time in developing and transitional countries, none of the Eastern European countries are present.

A couple of studies which included volunteering and donating money have been conducted in Serbia. In 2017, Pew Research Center (PRC) published a report on *Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe*, covering donating to organisations and volunteering. Serbia has also been a part of global surveys that provide comparative statistics on volunteering and donating such as Gallup World Poll (GWP) and the World Values Survey (WVS). Catalyst, a local non-profit organisation, collects data on philanthropy by monitoring the electronic, printed and on-line media on the local, regional and national levels in the Western Balkans. It produces annual reports on philanthropy across the region, providing valuable insights into giving money for the benefit of other and the common good.

However, each of these researches has its limitations. International surveys focus on giving of time and money to organisations, while it is questionable whether media reports, used by Catalyst, provide comprehensive and credible data. Most importantly, none of these research studies provides insights into the characteristics of donors, their motives and resources. Thus, our understanding of individual giving in Serbia is rather limited.

My thesis seeks to address these gaps in the literature by providing a comprehensive picture of individual giving in Serbia, including both giving to organisations and giving to people directly, and placing it within the comparative perspective of giving in Canada. These two countries are chosen to illustrate giving practices within different institutional settings.

My research addresses the following questions:

- What are the contexts within which individuals make their choices regarding giving time and money for the benefit of others and the common good in Serbia and Canada?
- What are the rates of different types of individual giving in two countries?
- Who gives, what and why in each country?
- What are the similarities and differences in giving practices and the characteristics of those who give between the countries?

In order to address these questions, I perform analyses of the data on individual giving collected through surveys. While for Canada secondary data from the *General Social Survey – Giving, Volunteering and Participating* (GSS: GVP) are used, primary data are collected in Serbia within my fieldwork. The survey conducted in Serbia, which is first comprehensive survey on individual giving in this country, is modelled on the Canadian GSS:GVP.

1.3. Individual Giving and Related Concepts

Individual giving is often connected with the concept of *helping*, *prosocial behaviour*, *altruism*, *gift giving*, *reciprocity* and *solidarity*, and it is also closely related to *charity* and *philanthropy*. In this section, I will discuss the similarities and differences between individual giving and related concepts.

Helping, Prosocial Behaviour and Altruism

The terms helping, prosocial behaviour, and altruism are often used interchangeably, but they have slightly different meanings (Bierhoff 2002). *Helping* is the broadest concept and it includes all forms of interpersonal support (ibid.). Individual giving by its nature is helping. However, this research, under the term individual giving, encompasses a much narrower range of activities than the term helping entails.

Prosocial behaviour “occurs when one acts in a manner that benefits another person or group of people” (Snyder and Dwyer 2013: 467). This action is intended to improve the situation of the person that receives help and is not done out of professional obligation (Bierhoff 2002). Prosocial behaviour covers a range of activities that are intended to benefit others such as comforting, sharing and cooperation (Batson and Powell 2003). Generally, there are three types of prosocial behaviour: *interpersonal* (one-to-one helping), such as spontaneously assisting a stranger in an emergency; then *collective* which includes larger groups and more deliberate

planning and coordination, for example volunteering and donating blood; finally, *cooperation* within and between groups, which is behaviour “in the service of a shared and collective goal and to promote collective wellbeing” (ibid.: 478) such as, for example, when tenants’ assemblies gather to decide how to spend their budgets, where all members are willing to forge a consensus. Individual giving is a form of prosocial behaviour. Since the range of activities that are in the focus of this research is narrower than those included in the concept of prosocial behaviour, I prefer to use the term individual giving when referring to the practices analysed here.

The word *altruism* comes from the Latin and it means “for the other”. This term was introduced by Auguste Comte to refer to an individual fully devoted to others (Kolm 2006). There are three different usages of the term in the literature of today: behavioural, motivational and evolutionary. In a *behavioural sense* altruism is an *act* that benefits other persons from which there is no expectation of reward (Music and Wilson 2008). Thus, altruism in a behavioural sense is the same as prosocial behaviour. In the *motivational sense*, altruism is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare (Batson 2011, Elster 2006). It is opposite to egoism, which is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing one’s own welfare. An act beneficial to others can be performed because one truly cares about the wellbeing of the other, but it can also be undertaken with the final aim of increasing one’s own wellbeing. Thus, altruistic behaviour is not necessarily based upon altruistic motivation. In an *evolutionary sense*, altruism means the sacrifice of fitness (reproductive success) for the benefit of other organisms (Bowles and Gintis 2011, Simon 1983, Sober and Wilson 1998). An act can be altruistic in a motivational sense, but not in terms of evolution and vice versa (Sober and Wilson 1998). For example, being solely motivated by his own safety, an individual wants to make a fort (ibid.). However, the fort provides everyone in the group with defence against predators. This individual is not altruistically motivated, but his action is altruistic from the evolutionary perspective. Individual giving is altruistic behaviour, not necessarily motivated by altruistic concerns, nor is it necessarily altruistic in an evolutionary sense.

Gift, Reciprocity and Solidarity

Gift giving is most often associated with concrete and material objects that people, those in certain types of relationships, exchange between each other on certain occasions (Komter 2005). However, a gift can also be non-material, such as providing help and emotional support

(ibid.). *Solidarity* is usually defined as a feeling of togetherness and acting as a consequence of that (ibid.). Gifts such as, for example, donating money to or volunteering for a charity or helping elderly neighbours are expressions of solidarity (ibid.). Giving can have different meanings and serve various purposes. Most gifts are based on the *principle of reciprocity*, which consists of gift, gratitude and counter-gift (ibid.). Such giving is meant to be equal.

Reciprocity may come in many forms (Moody 2008, Putnam 2000). The most common form is direct reciprocity, when two individuals exchange material or non-material gifts (ibid.). Indirect or generalised reciprocity occurs when one gives to the other but receives back from a third party (ibid.). A special form of generalised reciprocity is serial reciprocity, when one gives to a third party for what has been received, but the initial benefactor does not necessarily receive back (Moody 2008).

Individual giving as defined in this thesis can be seen as gift giving. It is an expression of solidarity and it can take the form of either type of reciprocity.

Philanthropy and Charity

The words that are brought to mind when talking about giving are *philanthropy* and *charity*. Most often today, the two terms are interchangeably used. However, the meanings of these terms, as well as the practices they refer to have changed throughout history. In addition, in the contemporary usage of the terms, one is preferred to the other in one place and vice versa in another. For example, in the United States philanthropy is more readily used than charity, while charity is the term preferred in the United Kingdom (Wright 2002), both referring to the same objects or practices.

The term philanthropy, as well as the practice it refers to, is older than charity. It derives from the Greek word *philanthrôpia*, which means “the love of mankind”. The meanings assigned to the word *philanthropy* have undergone significant changes throughout history. This term was in use in ancient times, then forgotten through the medieval period and reborn in the 16th century (Sulek 2010, Sulek 2010a). In the meantime, the term charity emerged.

The term *philanthrôpia* was used for the first time in the mid-5th century BC to describe loving actions performed by the gods to help the advancement of humanity (ibid.). Two aspects should be noted in this definition. Firstly, there is the *behavioural aspect* – acting in a way that is

beneficial to humans. Secondly, there is the *motivational aspect* – acting from the love of mankind. The usage of the term changed to encompass relations between people signifying an innate sense of friendship that, as members of the same species, people naturally feel toward one and other (ibid.). This terminology was also used to describe financial generosity (ibid.). Those capable of advancing human civilisation were divinities in the beginning, and the role of these benevolent divinities was assumed by benevolent rulers, and subsequently by the wealthy individuals.

During late antiquity in Antient Greece and the Roman Empire (approximately during the period 100 – 400 AD) persons in need could find assistance through one of three sources: patronage, philanthropy and family (Beer 2015). The extended family was most important source of aid, but family could not always be relied upon. For many people, particularly for those who were truly poor, the sick, the widowed, and the orphaned, these sources of help were often inaccessible (ibid.). This is because Roman patrons engaged in the patronage system with those who were able to give something in return, such as votes, money, or prestige, while the practice of philanthropy by the wealthy was not reliable nor regular. The intent of wealthy donors was not to relieve the sufferings of the needy, but to gain a reputation for piety (ibid.). However, in their failure to make a greater effort to help the destitute and the sick, the ancient Greeks and Romans were not acting impiously, since no ancient divinity required that action of this kind (ibid.). Thus, the giving of the rich did not serve a religious function among the Greeks and the Romans.

In contrast, the Jews and Christians of the time were dedicated to serving the needy, since this idea was central to the biblical theology of both of these religious traditions of the ancient world. For them, helping the sick, the poor, the deprived meant saving their own soul, i.e. earning merit with God. A new word that refers to the practice of helping the needy was introduced – *charity*. The term *charity*, translated from the Latin *caritas*, means mercy, compassion, alms. It requires loving others in their needs (Schervish 1998). However, the acts of charity were not primarily seen as a means towards eradicating poverty and misery, but they rather were tools for the salvation of those who perform charitable deeds (Beer 2015). A great network of charitable institutions emerged from the fourth century until the Reformation in the early sixteenth century thanks to the centrality of charity within Christianity (ibid.). Charity underwent certain changes with the Reformation. It did not have salvific merit in Reformist theology. A person engaged in charitable giving could no longer earn merit with God. Also, a

greater focus on the efficacy of charity was put. However, charity was still seen through theological lenses and it was still preached as a Christian duty (Beer 2015).

At approximately the same time of the Reformation, the term philanthropy was reintroduced by Sir Francis Bacon (Sulek 2010a). He considered philanthropy to be synonymous with goodness and the habit of doing good (ibid.). In the seventeenth century, philanthropy meant possessing a benevolent disposition, while in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries philanthropy became associated with active participation in reforms to improve the treatment of prisoners, abolish slavery, and obtain rights for women and workers (Bremner 1996). Thus, philanthropy has been viewed as a tool for improving society (Beer 2015).

Charity has lost its purely religious connotation. Today it means giving money and food, providing help for the poor, sick, destitute, etc.. The term also denotes an organisation which can have different social aims outside the sphere of immediate family and friends.

The term philanthropy in its contemporary usage has several meanings. Sulek synthesises seven frameworks for understanding the modern usage of this term (Sulek 2010a). Philanthropy refers to: 1) the love of mankind; 2) god's love of humankind, 3) meeting needs or advancing human wellbeing; 4) a certain aspect of human nature that compels people to want to help others; 5) one's readiness to voluntarily help others, 6) a relationship, movement, organisation, or other such social entity that seeks to meet a certain charitable or public cause; 7) an act, such as the giving of money or time to a charitable cause or public purpose (ibid.).

There has been a growing scholarly interest in research in philanthropy since the 1980s, that a separate field of *philanthropic studies* has emerged (Bekkers 2014). Philanthropy is defined within the philanthropy studies as a *voluntary action for the public good* (Payton and Moody 2008). It is also defined as the *use of private resources for public purposes* (Phillips and Jung 2016). Thus, philanthropy as defined includes voluntary giving of time, talents and treasure, and voluntary association with others.

Though philanthropic and charitable actions can take on many forms, from gestures of courtesy such as holding the door open for someone, to heroic acts such as pulling out a stranger from a burning building, donating money to charitable (philanthropic) organisations is the most often analysed when discussing philanthropy and charitable giving (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a, Wiepking and Handy 2015). While some authors include some country-specific types of

monetary contributions such as for example giving money to beggars in Mexico (Layton and Mossel 2015) or for instance women buying vegetables and sharing it with her neighbours in South Africa (Mottiar and Ngcoya 2016), activities that are more organised and formalised are usually analysed within the concept of philanthropy.

When talking about giving to organisations, there is a need for clarification of the terms charitable, philanthropic, non-profit, non-governmental and civil society organisation. Terms *civil society organisation (CSO)*, *non-profit organisation (non-profits)*, and *non-governmental organisation (NGO)* are cross-nationally used in a rather inconsistent and confusing way (Edwards 2011, Edwards 2014). Sometimes, they are used interchangeably (Brelaz and Alves 2009).

Non-profit organisations (non-profits) is a preferred term in the United States, while internationally, *non-governmental organisation* is preferred (Payton and Moody 2008). The term *non-governmental organisation*, which originated in the League of Nations in the 1920s and came to prominence in the United Nations (UN) system, is most often used to refer to (non-profit and nongovernmental) organisations working in the fields of international relations, environment, human rights, humanitarian assistance and development co-operation (Anheir and List 2005).

Non-profit organisations are: i) organised, that is institutionalised to some extent, ii) private, meaning they are separate from government, iii) non-profit-distributing, they do not return profits to their owners, iv) self-governing, they control their own activities, v) voluntary, meaning they have uncoercive membership and participation (Salamon and Anheier 1996). Thus, non-profits are defined not only by their non-profit-distributional nature, but also as entities separate from government. However, in some countries, there are organisations that are non-profit-distributing but established and financed by the government, such as schools, universities, social protection institutions, hospitals.⁴ These should be treated as non-profits and perhaps called governmental (public) non-profit organisations (Paunovic 2011) to be distinguished from non-governmental non-profits. However, following the literature, under the term non-profit organisations, I will assume that these are organisations which are both non-profit distributing and separate from government.

⁴ This is the case in many post-communist countries.

Non-profits can be categorised in various ways. There is a distinction between *charitable/philanthropic* organisations (charities) and *mutual benefit* organisations (Steinberg and Powell 2006). *Charitable organisations* in the common usage of this term are organisations concerned with helping those in need (providing food, shelter, and other necessities). Different legal systems define charitable organisations (or rather charitable purposes) differently. *Mutual benefit organisations*, such as labour unions, trade associations, and social clubs, benefit a specific class of members. Thus, charitable (philanthropic) organisations are a type of non-profit organisation, but not all non-profit organisations are charitable ones.

The activities of non-profit organisations could also be divided into *expressive fields* and *service-oriented fields* (Anheier 2005). Service-oriented organisations provide welfare services such as education, social and health-related services. Expressive fields are culture and recreation, business and professional, civic advocacy and environmental protection.

Non-profit organisations compose the *non-profit sector*, which is often called *the third*, or *the civil* sector, and differentiated from the state (public sector, government sector) and the market (for-profit sector). However, the boundaries between the sectors are often blurred (Payton and Moody 2008).

To conclude, similarity between charity and philanthropy, on the one hand, and the concept of individual giving, on the other, is that they all are voluntary actions that are beneficial for individuals other than the donor, though the donor is not necessarily excluded from enjoying the benefits of her act. While the concept of individual giving encompasses giving to individuals a donor personally knows, such as his friends and extended family members, these gestures are not encompassed by the concepts of philanthropy and charity. In the literature, dedicating one's material and non-material resources to those known to the donor are classified as mutual aid (Payton and Moody 2008). Individual giving is a broader concept than philanthropy and charity, it includes both mutual aid and philanthropy (charity) as defined.

1.4. Why There is a Need for Individual Giving?

In line with Payton and Moody, I argue that there is a need for individual giving because: “things often go wrong, and things could always be better” (Payton and Moody 2008: 63). This is what they call the *human condition*. According to Payton and Moody, there are four types of responses in these situations: *self-help*, *mutual aid*, *philanthropy* and *government* (ibid.). In

other words, when things go wrong, but also to improve the quality of life, we rely on our own resources, then on all those with whom we are in reciprocal relations, on philanthropic organisations and the state (ibid.).

As a society, we should decide to what extent to rely on each of these forms of support. What is in the sphere of personal responsibility and the support of loved ones? What rights should be guaranteed to all? Do we want to live in a country where the ill have full health care, students do not pay for their education, and the unemployed are financially supported and where this should be the responsibility of everyone? How much should we rely on the generosity of strangers? In practice, the way in which such questions are answered depends on the historical, ideological and cultural settings and power relations in a society (Esping-Andersen 1990, Salamon and Anheier 1998).

It is not the focus of my thesis to analyse the advantages and disadvantages of these four responses to the human condition, but it is important to stress that the way a society answers them creates a *context* which shapes the way individuals dedicate their material and non-material resources for the benefit of others, as will be elaborated in more detail in Chapter 4.

As individuals, we face decisions on how to split our material and non-material resources for our own endeavours and for all those who need our help. We are aware that there are many calls for help. To whom do we owe our support? Do we have moral obligations towards strangers? What drives us to give? Since the focus of my thesis is on the individuals and their decisions to engage in giving, these questions will be addressed in the chapters that follow.

1.5. When Doing Good Is Not Beneficial

Although we often praise those who provide support and help and criticise those who deny assistance (Bowles and Gintis 2011, Green 2013, Richerson and Boyd 2005), giving can have a dark side too, both in terms of the relationship between direct participants and in terms of the common good (Butcher and Smith 2015, Callahan 2017, Eikenberry and Mirabella 2017, Komter 2005, Martin 1994, Moody 2011, Powell and Steinberg 2006, Reich 2016, Salamon 1987). There are some risks inherent to the very relationship of giving and receiving, but some are more specific to the specific types of individual giving. Although my PhD research is not about the effectiveness of giving, it is necessary to shed some light on the negative aspects of

individual giving and become aware of the dangers that it can bring. The list of potential dangers offered here is certainly not an exhaustive one.

As has been outlined, each act of giving has two ends. On one side is the person that gives and the other person (or a group) that receives the material good, service, or some other form of support. This is often an asymmetrical relationship, which can result in a feeling of superiority on the donor side, and a sense of frustration and inferiority on the recipient side (Komter 2005). This is the result of the failure to respect persons and their exceptional individuality (Martin 1994). The one who gives is often more focused on her own vision of the benefit being provided for the recipient, than on what the receiver really needs. Since we often deceive ourselves in terms of our own needs, it is hardly likely that we can know what others need (Ignatieff 1984).

Being familiar with someone's circumstances, caring deeply for another and wishing to provide help and support are necessary preconditions to ensure that one in need receives adequate support. Solidarity and reciprocity are important ingredients in relationships among those who are near and dear to each other (Komter 2005). However, giving even within these relationships does not always stem from care or equality. In fact, it may be used as a justification for a donor to interfere in the recipient's life even when not asked, or to promote his own vision of the welfare of the recipient, not paying attention to what they really need and want. Even more, giving may be a way to exercise power and reinforce dependency (ibid.). Authority, power and dependency are very common aspects of relationships (ibid.). Giving can even be inspired by hostility, hate or contempt (ibid.)

Misunderstanding the needs and circumstances of receivers is potentially greatest in international volunteering. The so-called "volunteer tourism" or "voluntourism" is a contemporary practice that has grown rapidly in the past two decades (Butcher and Smith 2015, Vradi 2013). Taking a gap year between high school and university to live in a developing country under a volunteer programme has been a common practice among young people from middle classes. It is estimated that there were 1.6 million volunteer tourists in 2008 year (Butcher and Smith 2015). Not only is the question of whether the money invested in transportation costs, insurance and support for volunteers could be better used in local communities, but there is also the question of whether these programmes bring benefit and whether they may even be potentially harmful. A cultural insensitivity (Moody 2011), seen in the lack of understanding local customs, and a fundamental misunderstanding of the needs of

disadvantaged individuals and communities can hardly result in the kind of help and support these people may require.

There are also certain risks and dangers inherent in philanthropy as a response to the human condition. Not just charity fraud and scams, but also other, subtler, misuses of these organisations are not rare. Misappropriation of money or its inadequate spending is the most common abuse. Often, these are visible and targeted by the media. Therefore, in many countries where the philanthropic sector is well developed there is a body that regulates the operations of these organisations. Much greater risks are related to “voluntary failure” which lies in philanthropic insufficiency, amateurism, particularism and paternalism (Salamon 1987).

Possibly the biggest issue with philanthropy as an answer to human suffering lies in its *insufficiency*. Being voluntary means that giving for the benefit of others is not guaranteed. It depends not only on the will of individuals, where the “free ride problem” can arise, but also on the fact that individuals willing to help may not be capable of making donations, particularly in times of economic challenge (ibid.). As a result, help may be denied to many.

Moreover, philanthropy may act *amateurishly*, when it approaches social problems with a lack of professionalism or through small-scale operations (Leete 2006). Many philanthropic organisations must rely on staff and volunteers without professional training which are not capable of dealing adequately with societal problems (Smith and Grønbjerg 2006).

Also, philanthropic organisations focus on *particular* populations, ethnic, religious, geographic, or ideologic groups, not necessarily those in greatest need. This leads to duplication in some cases and gaps in coverage in others (Steinberg 2006). Donors decide who “deserves” help and support. In the past, the central premise of philanthropy was that the poor are responsible for their destitution and that they need moral and religious uplift first (Salamon 1987). What makes someone deserving and undeserving of support might often depend on an opinion that may be subject to manipulation.

In addition, an important problem of philanthropy lies in *paternalism*, when those who control philanthropic organisations define and treat societal problems as they perceive them rather than as they are seen and experienced by the beneficiaries (ibid.). This leads to the support of services favoured by the wealthy, such as high culture for example, while those services needed by the poor, housing for example, are neglected (Smith and Grønbjerg 2006).

Finally, under the banner of promoting the common good, philanthropic organisations often promote the interests of certain groups or individuals that might even be harmful to the broader community. Philanthropic organisations have long been criticised for their undemocratic influence on social and public policies and for exacerbating the very social and economic inequalities they strive to remedy (Reich 2016, Eikenberry and Mirabella 2017). It is argued that in the era of neoliberalism, social problems are increasingly treated as philanthropic opportunities rather than political questions, where instead of elected officials, billionaires decide who receives social welfare (Callahan 2017, Reich 2016).

1.6. Thesis Outline

The second chapter of my thesis deals with the research question of whether we are morally obliged to help others, addressing it from the perspective of normative ethics. I discuss and critically examine main normative ethical theories. Then, I apply normative concepts to an example, aiming to show how different normative theories can guide us in resolving “real life” moral dilemma regarding individual giving. Finally, I summarise fruitful insights from different theories aiming at sketching an ethics of giving.

The third chapter of the thesis focuses on the origins of altruistic behaviour and explanations of such behaviour. Firstly, the evolutionary explanation of the origins of behaviour that is beneficial for the receiver in terms of reproductive success, while costly for the actor are presented. Then, rational choice theory and its potential for explaining individual giving is examined.

In the fourth chapter, I analyse individual and contextual factors that influence individuals to engage in different forms of giving. Dedicating one’s material and non-material resources for the benefit of others and the common good is to a great extent influenced by subjective dispositions, personal resources and social resources. However, individual factors only partly explain behaviour. A decision as to whether and how one gives her material and non-material resources is shaped by institutional settings.

In the fifth chapter of this thesis, I analyse individual giving in Canada and Serbia. Firstly, I outline factors that make a context for individuals’ dedication of material and non-material resources for the benefit of others or the common good. Then, I perform analyses of the data on individual giving collected through surveys.

In the concluding chapter, the main findings of this thesis are summarised, and in the final Chapter 7, policy recommendations, limitations of the study and the streams of future research are outlined.

Chapter 2 The Ethics of Giving

No fundamental moral principle should be seen as directly solving all moral problems (especially controversial ones). Its task is rather to provide a correct framework within which problems can be raised and discussed. (Wood 1999:155)

But I remained sure that a moral theory which was not fruitful, which cannot guide action, was pointless. (O'Neill 2013: 39)

2.1. Introduction

Going back to the examples from the Introduction, the following scenarios are possible: Omar wonders if he is depriving his own children by financing his nephew's language course. Mina ponders that, instead of babysitting her friend's children, she could practice maths and get a better mark on the exam. Not only would a better mark on the exam increase the chances of success in getting a job, but it would also please her family. Ann speculates whether donating money to an aid agency for poverty relief in a faraway country is at all helpful to the poor. Steve considers whether it is his responsibility to help a homeless person he meets on the street.

These and similar dilemmas lead to questions:

- Are we *must/should/ought to help a person in need?*⁵
- To *whom* do we owe our support? Should we be *impartial* when deciding how to split our resources for the benefit of others or should greater stress be placed on those near and dear to us?
- Are *motives* for giving ethically relevant?
- How to choose between the incompatible requests for help?

My thesis endeavours to discuss how varying normative ethical theories understand the issue of giving. Normative ethical theories provide behavioural guidance and criteria by which to

⁵In this section I will use ought to, should and must interchangeably, though some writers have made distinctions between these three verbs (Hursthouse 1999).

evaluate our actions. In other words, they tell us how we *ought to act* and what *reasons* are relevant for judging an action as right or wrong (Driver 2007).

In the first section, I will outline the main tenets of ethical theories, including deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics, classical sentimentalism, ethics of care, Nussbaum's account on emotions and the capability approach. Then in the second section, I will apply normative concepts to an example, aiming to show how different normative theories can guide us in resolving "real life" moral dilemmas regarding individual giving. As the quotes from the beginning of this chapter indicate, I am hoping to find fruitful insights in the analysed theories, the ways in which they may guide our actions in relation to giving our material and non-material resources for the benefit of others, while remaining aware of the fact that no fundamental moral principle can resolve all moral problems.

2.2. Normative Ethical Theories

2.2.1. Kant's Ethics

I will provide a summary of Kant's moral philosophy based on his two works *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788). Most interpreters of Kant consider these two works as essential for his moral philosophy.⁶

Immanuel Kant is a central figure in *deontological theory*. The word deontology comes from Greek *deon* (meaning duty) and *logos* (meaning science or study). According to deontological ethics, what makes an action right is its conformity to a moral norm, independent of the *good* the action produces.⁷ All moral agents are obliged to obey moral norms. In Kant's theory, the action is morally right if it is done out of respect for the moral law. To understand what the moral law requires, the main tenets of Kant's theory firstly need to be outlined.

Morality and Freedom

⁶ In recent years, some scholars have become dissatisfied with this standard approach to Kant's views and have turned their attention to the later works: *The Metaphysics of Morals*, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* and *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (Johnson 2014).

⁷ Some other theories (for example utilitarianism which will be analysed in the next section) are *theological*, meaning that they define *right* by reference to the *good* that the action produces. What is considered to be *good* differs between the theories.

Probably the most frequently quoted sentence from Kant's work is:

“Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within.” (Kant 2004: 75)

The “starry heavens” is a metaphor for the *sensible world* where everything is *determined* by the laws of nature. The moral law is related to the *intelligible (rational) world* where the possibility of *freedom* lies. According to Kant, physics is the science of the *laws of nature*, while ethics is a science of the *laws of freedom*. Kant argues that we, humans, are part of both worlds – sensible and intelligible. As members of both worlds, our behaviour is determined by the laws of nature, but it can also be based on free will. In other words, our behaviour is influenced, and often determined, by our desires, passions and inclinations. However, our *reason* is capable of controlling natural impulses. Even more so, our behaviour can be motivated by reason itself. In order to understand Kant's concepts of morality and freedom, let us examine the following example.

Marta is walking along, listening to her iPod. All of a sudden something hits her. She turns around realising that it was an apple that fell from the tree under which she was passing. Although she felt annoyed, she obviously was not angry with the tree, since it was not the tree's fault for hurting her. Gravity had caused the apple to fall.

Let us now examine a slightly different scenario. When Marta turned around, she saw that a man had thrown the apple at her. In her surprise, Marta asked the man: “Why did you do that?” Marta expects the man to explain his actions. Her attitude towards the man's behaviour depends on his *motive for action*.

While in nature everything is determined by natural laws, humans have *will*. Humans act for reasons. Apple trees do not. Kant defines *will* as *practical reason*, which means reason applied to govern our actions. Willing to do something is not merely wishing to do it or thinking about doing it. It means having a reason for doing it and setting oneself to do it. Human action is determined by certain *subjective principles* Kant calls *maxims*. Within Kant's framework, only when an agent has a maxim can we talk about his *motive* for action (Herman 1993). The maxim one acts upon can be based on one's desires or interest, but also on the moral law.

In our second example, Marta wants to know the maxim behind the man's behaviour in order to judge it. The man may have simply felt the urge to strike her with the apple in his hand. He may have been moved by a (very strange) desire. In this case, according to Kant, the man was just a puppet of his desires, not the author of his actions. He was just as the apple tree. Kant argues that when we let our desires, passions and inclinations guide us our will is *heteronomous* and then we do not act freely.

Let us now presume that the man threw the apple at Marta to warn her of approaching danger. She was too far away to run to and warn. He yelled, but she could not hear him and as he had no other option, he threw the apple. Thus, the man did not want to hurt her. Instead, he intended to attract her attention to help her. Was he acting *autonomously* in this case? In order to answer this question, we shall look at Kant's concept of autonomous will.

According to Kant, the will of a *moral agent* is *autonomous*. Will is autonomous in two ways. On the one hand, the will gives itself *moral law* (it is *self-legislating*). On the other, it can motivate itself to follow a law which is often against desires, inclinations, passions or self-interest. In other words, our will is autonomous when it *respects* the *moral law* which it *prescribes* itself. Moral law has the causal power of natural law – it determines will as natural law determines the physical world. The difference is that moral law resides in our reason and we act *in representation of the law*. This means that we think of ourselves as following the law, while objects in the physical world are necessarily determined by the law. What is moral law?

Hypothetical and Categorical Imperative

According to Kant, morality is about: "What *ought* I to do?". Something ought to be done either because it is *good as a means* of achieving a certain end, or because it is *good in itself*. Thus, there are two possible answers to this question. One is of the following form: "If I will A I ought to do B." In order to achieve a certain end, I ought to use a certain means. This is what Kant calls a *hypothetical imperative*. It is an imperative because it commands, and it is hypothetical because it commands conditionally, it depends on whether I *will* a certain end. For example, if I *will* to win a marathon, I ought to exercise every day. It is an imperative because it commands me to exercise, but it commands me conditionally. I ought to exercise under the condition that I *will* to win a marathon. Kant argues that one who wills the end she also wills the means towards that end. If one wills the end, then it is *irrational* for her not to will the

means for reaching this end. Thus, it would be irrational for me to will to win a marathon and not to will to exercise. I may *wish to* skip my exercises on a particular day, e.g. when weather is bad. However, if I am sincerely committed to winning a marathon, then I should be able to overcome the desire to skip exercising on a rainy day. Being conditional on our end, hypothetical imperative is not a form of the moral law.

The second answer to the question: “What *ought* I to do?” takes the form of the *categorical imperative*. The categorical imperative is *a form of moral law*. The moral law requires the following:

“I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.” (G4:02).

This formulation of the Categorical Imperative is known as the *Formula of Universal Law*. Moral law, as defined by Kant, does not have any content in the sense that it requires us to follow certain ends or to produce certain effects. Moral law commands *unconditionally*, meaning that there are no exceptions to its commands. Then, it commands *universally*, which means that every human being is required to abide by it.⁸ Finally, it commands *impartially* - regardless of any end the actor may have and regardless of her inclinations, desires, passions, etc. Kant argues that all normal adults can understand moral law. Moral law is derived from the *common use of our practical reason*, as Kant puts it. This means that in our ordinary thinking, we approve of an action when we can will that everyone behaves according to the same principle (maxim) under the same circumstances.

Apart from the Formula of Universal Law, there are two additional formulas of the categorical imperative known as the *Humanity Formula* and the *Autonomy Formula*. The categorical imperative in the Humanity Formula requires the following:

⁸It should be stressed that different societies have different social norms, abiding to which may be felt as universally required. The question is whether it is at all possible to go beyond one's own cultural settings and whether the universalisation of any norm or principle is possible. Main normative theories in ethics maintain that universalisation is possible, though some are more (Aristotelian virtue ethics) some less (Kant's ethics, utilitarianism) sensitive to concrete circumstances of history and culture. Moreover, some theories completely reject universal principles (ethics of care).

“So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (G4:429).

In this formula Kant defines the end we ought to pursue. We ought never to use other people – more precisely the *rational nature* or *humanity* in other people – as a means only to our ends, but we ought at the same time to use them as the ends in themselves. For example, we use a shopkeeper as a means of getting necessary groceries. However, we should treat him with respect and not merely as a means of getting what we need. Moreover, we should treat humanity in our own person with respect. Thus, Kant puts humanity in one’s person (the rational nature) at the centre of moral philosophy. Humanity is an end that already exists. It is worthy independently of any desire we may have. It has *dignity*, which is the value that cannot be compared or exchanged. In short, only humanity is an end in itself and has absolute worth (Wood 1999).

The categorical imperative in the Autonomy Formula requires the following:

“All maxims that proceed from our own making of law ought to harmonise with a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature” (G4:436).

Thus, our own maxims need to come into harmony with the maxims of all others, creating a union of rational beings through common laws. Kant claims that the three formulas of moral law are equivalent, but here is a disagreement among contemporary interpreters on Kant regarding the status of each formula (O’Neill 2013, Wood 1999, Herman 1993).

Duty

An act that comes from the respect of moral law Kant calls a *duty*. In Kant’s words, “duty is necessity of an action from respect of law” (G4:400). Since we, humans, belong to the sensible world, and thus we are influenced and often governed by emotions, inclination, whims, etc., a moral law is often felt as a constraint. At the same time, this constraint allows us to be free from the dictates of our impulsive nature or the authority of others. Moral agents are legislators of moral law and subject to it. In this way, morality and freedom are bound together. Going back to our example, a man acted autonomously if his action was derived from his respect for moral law.

When we act in respect of moral law, our will is a *good will*. Kant argues that the only thing that is *good without limitation* is will under moral law. Other good and desirable things such as *talents of mind* (wit, good judgement), *qualities of temperament* (courage, calmness) and *gifts of fortune* (wealth, power) are good only when they are accompanied by good will. Only good will has an intrinsic value; it is good in itself. The question that arises is: How do we reach good will? How do we know what our duties are? In other words: How do we know what we morally ought to do in any particular situation?

When we consider whether an act that we want to undertake is morally right or wrong, we should test our principle of action, our maxim, against the categorical imperative. This requires that we should try to imagine a world in which our maxim is universal law and seek out any contradictions that may arise. If a maxim passes the categorical imperative test (if we can universalise our maxim without contradictions) the action is permissible, if it fails the action is forbidden, and in this case, an opposite action (or omission) is required. For example, I may be in urgent need of money and am thinking of asking my colleague to lend me some. However, I know that I cannot repay him, but I am also aware that my colleague will not lend me any unless I promise to pay him back. I think about whether I should promise to pay him the money back knowing that I will be unable to keep my promise. The maxim here would be: “Whenever I need money, I should make false promises in order to get it.” Then, I should test this maxim against the categorical imperative. The universalised maxim in this case would be: “Whenever someone desperately needs money, she should make false promises in order to get it.” Now, I should see whether any contradictions arise when I try to universalise my maxim. The practice of promise-making requires trust that the promise will be kept. However, if promises are never kept – if everyone makes false promises then such trust is lacking, and the practice of promise making is not possible. In other words, I *cannot imagine* a world in which everyone makes false promises. Thus, *contradiction in conception* arises and my maxim does not pass the categorical imperative test (O’Neill, 2013). Therefore, the opposite action of not making false promises is required. Whenever the maxim cannot be universalised, whenever this kind of contradiction arises, we are facing a *perfect (strict) duty*. My perfect duty in this case is not to make false promises. This is an example of a *perfect duty towards others*.

The same example could be tested against the humanity formula of the categorical imperative. Lying or making a false promise is in violation of the autonomy of the other person. When I falsely promise a colleague that I will repay him, it is his understanding that he is lending me the

money and he agrees to this, while he is actually giving me the money. Thus, he is not the author of his actions. I am using his rational nature, the humanity in his person, merely as a means.

Besides perfect duty towards others, there are also *perfect duties towards oneself*. According to Kant a perfect duty towards ourselves is to refrain from committing suicide no matter how horrible our life may be.⁹

Kant argues that we are always able to and required to do what our perfect duty requires us to do. No matter how desperately I needed money, I ought not to make promises I cannot keep. Thus, under all circumstances one is morally obliged to adhere to perfect duty. Even if giving a false promise would save someone's life, within the framework of Kant's ethics, it still would be wrong to do it. Regardless of any consequences, one has to do what moral law requires. However, it could be argued that the consequences of our actions do matter in deciding what is right and wrong. This will be elaborated on in more detail in the following section.

Apart from perfect duties, there are also *imperfect duties*. The examples of imperfect duties, according to Kant, are the duty to help others and the duty to develop our talents. When we think about whether we should help someone in need, then we again should go through the thought experiment of testing the maxim against the categorical imperative. Although we can universalise our maxim of not helping anyone - we can imagine a world in which no one helps anyone, we cannot *rationally will* such a world. In this case, a *contradiction in will* arises (O'Neill, 2013). Kant argues that, in order to achieve our valuable ends, we necessarily need the help of others and that their help is the means towards our ends. We cannot rationally will the end without willing the means towards that end, which has already been pointed out in relation to the hypothetical imperative. Whenever we can imagine a world in which our maxim can be a universal law, but when we cannot rationally will such a world, it is the case of *imperfect duties*. Thus, helping the others, or beneficence, is an *imperfect duty towards others*. Based on the same logics, Kant argues that we have an *imperfect duty towards ourselves* to develop our talents. Imperfect duties require us to pursue a certain end, such as the benefit of others and development of our potentials.

⁹ Refraining from suicide is in line with Christian tradition. In other cultures, this may not be as important, the proof of which may be "seppuku" ritual suicide in the Japanese tradition.

Table 2. Duty

	Perfect	Imperfect
Towards others	Refraining from making a false promise	Helping others
Towards ourselves	Refraining from suicide	Developing one's talents

Although we are always able to perform what our perfect duty requires us to do, we might not be able to fulfil our imperfect duty under all circumstances. In other words, we are always able to refrain from making false promises, while there might be some situations under which we cannot help a person in need. Kant argues that: “To be beneficent *where one can* is one’s duty;” (G4:398, emphases added).

However, imperfect duty should not be interpreted as less of a duty than perfect duty. It is our duty to help people in need “where we can” and it is our duty to develop our talents. Kant does not say that we are morally required to develop all the gifts we have or to help every single person in need. Thus, within Kant’s framework, we are not morally required to actively seek out opportunities to help. We should never act contrary to duty, but the function of the motive of duty is not to press constantly for more dutiful actions (Herman 1993). Searching for situations where we make more and more promises and refraining from false promises does not make our will extremely good. There are no such calculations and quantifications in Kant’s ethics. By analogy, seeking out more and more situations where we can help someone in need and thus helping more people in need is not required within Kant’s framework. However, in any particular situation we should act as required by duty.

Imperfect Duty of Helping

What does imperfect duty to help require? How can we interpret Kant’s words that it is one’s duty to be beneficent *where one can*? There are different interpretations of the imperfect duty within Kant’s framework. Here I will outline O’Neill’s, Schneewind’s and Herman’s interpretations.

According to Herman, we are morally required to “adopt a general maxim expressing a willingness (a commitment) to help others *sometimes*” (Herman 1993: 34, emphases added). O’Neill argues that we are morally required to adopt the principle of beneficence, but “it is not possible to lay down in advance which other should be helped in which ways, to what extent,

or at what cost” (O’Neill 2013:19). The happiness of others should be our end, but the choice of occasions and ways of pursuing that end stays open. Finally, Schneewind argues that we ought to help people in need, but it is up to us to decide “*how, when and how much* to help others” (Schneewind 1992: 324, emphases added).

These interpreters of Kant, in elaborating duty to help others, leave much discretion to the actor. In deciding “how, when and how much to help others”, or when being “willing to help others sometimes”, one may as well leave duty to help others unfulfilled. Let us examine the following example. Mark is committed to helping anyone, with the exception of drug addicts. Thus, Mark is willing to help others sometimes, whenever the person in need is not a drug addict. He sees that someone is drowning but knowing that the person is a drug addict Mark decides not to jump into the swimming pool and save him. Although he is behaving in accordance with his maxim of helping others sometimes, because he is acting with discrimination and not taking into account the humanity of others, he is not performing his duty.

As I interpret the imperfect duty to help others, the agent ought to help anyone who is in need whenever the following four conditions are simultaneously satisfied:

- 1) the agent is aware of the need,
- 2) the agent is capable or in a position to help,
- 3) the act of helping is morally permissible, and
- 4) no other duty conflicts with the duty to help in the particular situation.

Let us now examine the above outline conditions in more detail. An agent becomes aware when she sees or hears that someone is in need. For example, she sees that someone is drowning, and thus in need for rescuing. If there is someone else who also sees the drowning person and who sets himself to rescue the victim, then there is no need for our help anymore. However, in cases when there are many potential helpers, there is always the possibility that everyone thinks that someone else will help, which is known as the bystander effect (Dovidio and Penner 2001, Manning, Levin and Collins 2007, Staub 2003).¹⁰ Also, our awareness of the needs of others is

¹⁰ The bystander effect will be elaborated on in more detail in Chapter 4.

influenced by our experience and attention. Our understanding of the world is moored in our experiences (Sen 2010), meaning that we may be unable to perceive that someone requires our help if their situation is unfamiliar to us.

An agent is capable of helping when she possesses the necessary capabilities and resources. For example, if he is able to swim and therefore capable of saving a drowning person. If she cannot swim, she can ask someone else to save the drowning person. Our interpretation of whether we are capable or in a position to help may also be distorted. Although someone might be relatively well-off, she may feel financially insecure, and thus lacking resources to give money to someone she perceives as in need for financial help.

The helping act is permissible when it passes the categorical imperative test. For example, Sara is a bank clerk and her friend desperately needs money. Sara does not have any money to give him herself, but she is in a position to take money from the bank by committing fraud. Such an act would help her friend, but is not permissible, thus she ought not to perform it.

Finally, when there is a conflict of duties, what one is morally required to do is inconclusive. For example, John's friend may ask him to spend the evening with her because she is feeling down and needs someone to talk to and provide support. Presumably, the very next day John has an important test and it is necessary for him to spend the evening practicing maths in order to get a good mark on the test, which, in turn, would increase his chances of enrolling in a post graduate programme at a good university. Here he faces the conflict of duties to help the friend and to develop his talents. There is no possible resolution of this conflict within Kant's framework. Whatever he chooses to do, one duty will remain unfulfilled.

Let us examine another example to more clearly clarify the above-outlined conditions. Lucy is doing research on charitable giving for which she often visits the webpages of charitable organisations. Thus, she necessarily becomes aware of various requests for help. Is she morally obliged to react to each and every request for help she sees posted on these web sites? Today's information technology makes this situation even more complex. Advertisements for charitable organisations will appear more often on Lucy's Facebook account than on someone else's who does not visit as many charity web sites as she does. Is she morally obliged to react to each of the advertisements that appears on her Facebook newsfeed and provide help too? If the only condition of the duty to help others were to be aware of the need, this would lead to the

conclusion that the more someone is prone to giving (or perhaps only interested in the phenomenon of giving) the more she is morally obliged to help. This does not seem plausible. Other conditions in this example cannot be satisfied. She will certainly be unable to donate to each organisation she encounters.

In short, all the above four conditions should be satisfied simultaneously. If one does not help others it may be that she lacks the necessary resources or opportunities to help, or that helping conflicts with a perfect duty. However, if someone never acts to help anyone, it may be that she is not sincerely committed to beneficence, and thus she is not fulfilling her duty.

Moral Worth of Helping

At the end of this outline on Kant's ethics I will examine the *moral status* of a beneficent act. It is important to notice that, within Kant's framework, helping others has *moral worth* only if it is done *out of duty*. Someone may feel compassion when confronted with a beggar in the streets, and this may prompt him to give money to the beggar. Kant argues that though *praise worthy*, such act lacks moral worth and does not deserve *esteem* because it is undertaken from an inclination. Such act is *in conformity with moral law*, but it is not undertaken *in respect of moral law*. Someone else may be experiencing deep sorrow and, preoccupied with his own unfortunate situation, he is unable to feel compassion for others. Passing a beggar in the streets, he no longer feels compassion. However, he finds the strength to help the person in need because moral law requires him to do so. Such an act, since it is done *out of duty* and not just in conformity with duty, deserves moral worth. In short, within the framework of Kant's ethics, duty is the only moral motive, while motives such sympathy and compassion are non-moral motives.

For many, Kant's theory seems cold and unemotional and it has been widely criticised for that.¹¹ However, Kant did not eliminate emotions from theory. Instead, he gave them a subordinate position in relation to reason, and there are many arguments in favour of this approach. To begin with, we cannot feel compassion for every needy person we encounter. Thus, helping another out of compassion makes the act itself unstable and dependent on

¹¹ For example, Michael Stocker argues that this leads to the strange conclusion that a person who visits her friend in the hospital out of a sense of duty deserves moral esteem rather than a person who visit her friend because the friend is someone whom she loves and cares for (Stocker 1976).

inclination of each person.¹² Most often, our emotions prompt us to favour our group's members.¹³ Moreover, some people are by their very nature more compassionate than others. Their motivation is the product of a "fortunate temperament". When we act from a moral motive, out of duty, we are acting as any actor is required to do when he can help a person in need regardless of his emotional capacities. Thus, unlike compassionate action, dutiful action may be commanded.

When we have both moral and non-moral motives to perform an action such action is called *overdetermined action*. Interpreters of Kant have different opinions on the moral status of an overdetermined action. While some authors argue that only action which is performed out of duty in the presence of an opposing inclination deserves moral worth, others argue that an action can have moral worth when it is performed out of duty no matter whether and what kind of non-moral motives are present as well (see Herman 1981, Herman 1993, Henson 1979, Stocker 1976, Woolf 1982).

2.2.2. Consequentialism

Ethical theories which hold that whether an action is right or wrong depends on the consequences it produces belong to *consequentialism*. In this section, I will focus on classical utilitarianism, then on a contemporary theory of Peter Singer and on the concept of effective altruism.

Utilitarianism

According to *utilitarianism* an action is morally right when it promotes the *overall good* (Driver 2007, Harisson 2003, Ryan 1987). The overall good is calculated as the sum of benefits minus the sum of harms of all those affected by the act. In the calculation of overall good the benefit or harm of any individual counts the same, implying that everyone is equally important. Approaches within utilitarianism differ in the conception of what counts as a benefit and harm for individuals, what the good is. According to *classical utilitarianism* of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, what counts as good is *utility* in terms of *subjective wellbeing*.

¹² Though there are scholars that question whether compassionate behavior is unstable (Blum 1980).

¹³ This is potentially due to evolutionary forces, which will be explained in more detail in Chapter 3.

“The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong in proportion as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.” (Mill 1987: 278).

In Bentham’s words:

“By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered...” (Bentham 1987: 66).

Happiness has an *intrinsic value* and it is equated with *pleasure*. Bentham, the founder of this theory, argues that: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.” (Bentham 1987: 65). This is Bentham’s view on human psychology, on “what is the case”. These “two masters” not only determine how people behave, but are also a *normative framework*, they point out “what should be the case”. In other words, the states of affairs should be judged based on how much pleasure (or reduction of pain) they produce for all those involved. The ultimate standard is “general happiness” where everyone’s happiness equally counts (Ryan 1987: 25).¹⁴

Bentham’s main preoccupation was on proposing a system of law and government which would promote overall utility, taken that people are led by self-interest in terms of gaining pleasure and avoiding pain (Harrison 2003). He was not concerned with private ethics, but rather with political reform. Although Mill belonged to the same political and reformist movement as Bentham, his focus was not on policy only, but he was also interested in private ethics (ibid.). Mill’s aim was to “defend utilitarianism as a guide to practice in all walks of life” (Ryan 1987: 15)

¹⁴ This component of utilitarianism which “restricts the judgements of states of affairs to the utilities in the respective states” is referred to as “welfarism” (Sen 1999: 59).

Mill holds that the greatest happiness principle is the foundation of morals. Although Mill also conceives happiness in terms of pleasure, he argues that there are lower and higher pleasures, therefore, there are qualitative differences between different types of pleasure, where pleasure from intellectual pursuit is a better kind of pleasure in comparison to those derived from the sensual (Mill 1987). According to Mill, higher pleasures are superior to lower because people who have experienced both prefer higher to lower.

In line with Bentham, he maintains that what matters is not only the happiness of the agent, but the happiness of all those influenced by the action, where everyone's pleasure is equally important. In other words, it would be wrong to prefer one's own wellbeing or the wellbeing of those near and dear to us over the happiness of strangers. Mill further argues that the "nobility of character is to be prized, and the man whose happiness lies in the pursuit of an ideal character is to be commended" (Ryan 1987: 45). However, the value of the noble character is rather instrumental, since it is an important means for reaching overall happiness. For the philosophers in the tradition of classical utilitarianism, motives are not intrinsically bad or good. The only thing that counts in moral judgement of an action are its consequences.

Stressing the relevance of consequences of an action when judging whether it is right or wrong, arguing that morality is about increasing happiness and that numbers do matter, are all valuable features of utilitarianism. However, this theory also has many issues. I will briefly outline some of the problems of this theory, relevant for my research.

Let us first consider the following example: Mila is a psychiatrist and she volunteers for a charity providing counselling services for rape victims. She has just completed the last counselling session scheduled for the day and she is looking forward resting after a busy day. She gets a phone call from a friend who wants to meet immediately. The friend has broken up with her boyfriend and sounds very distressed. Then, the charity coordinator asks if Mila could take another client. A woman who has been refusing to talk to a psychiatrist for a long time now asks to see her. What should Mila do?

In deciding what the right moral action in this situation is, according to classical utilitarianism, Mila needs to assess the *consequences* of each course of action (resting, meeting the friend and counselling the victim) in terms of the *utility* - pleasure and pain it will produce for all concerned. If she decides to go home and rest, which she needs, then both her friend and the

rape victim will remain in distress. Mila thinks she should help. However, due to weariness, she thinks she is not capable of supporting both of them and she needs to decide with whom to meet. Thus, Mila needs to assess the pain and pleasure each would gain from Mila's counselling. Then the utilities each gain should be *summed together* in order to obtain the level of overall utility each course of action produces. Since the utilitarian goal is to maximise the overall utility regardless of its distribution, it ignores inequalities in the distribution of happiness, thus raising the issue of justice (Sen 1999).

Moreover, happiness felt by other people is not easily inaccessible, if at all. How could Mila possibly *know* the intensity of pains and pleasures felt by two women? Having been in this relationship for a long time, Mila is aware that her friend is a very sensitive person who deeply feels everything that happens to her. However, the other woman is totally unknown to her. Presumably, due to her extremely difficult life, the woman is used to deprivation and even physical pain. Thus, the distress she feels might even be less intense than that of Mila's friend. This is another problem with classical utilitarianism – “our desires and pleasure-taking abilities adjust to circumstances” (Sen 1999: 62). Due to these *adaptive preferences* (Comim 2008), the pleasure and pain one feels is not always a reliable source of information about their wellbeing.

In addition, utilitarianism insists that the happiness of each person counts equally, while there are grounds for arguing that certain people, by the very fact that they are in a close relationship with us (our family and friends for example)¹⁵, are entitled to different treatment and that we have *special obligations* towards them (Diane 2014). If Mila decides to meet her friend regardless of any calculations of pleasure and pain, simply because it is her friend who needs help, it does not seem as though she is doing something wrong.

Finally, on utilitarian grounds, one can argue that Mila should meet both women that evening, since the good that would come from these acts would presumably trump the pain of Mila's tiredness. However, such requests fail to take into consideration her own goals and projects (Smart and Williams 1998).

To sum up, according to utilitarianism, when judging whether an action is morally right or wrong, an agent must take into consideration the consequences of the act in terms of the

¹⁵ This will be analysed in more detail in the section on the ethics of care.

pleasures and pains it produces, not only for oneself but for all those concerned. One ought to be *impartial* when calculating the pleasure and pain an act produces, meaning that each person's experiences and feelings count the same.

*Peter Singer's Utilitarian Theory and Effective Altruism*¹⁶

Singer argues that people from affluent societies are morally obliged to donate to charities that provide aid to people living in extreme poverty in developing countries (Singer 1972, 2009, 2015). Singer reported that there are 1.4 billion people around the world living in extreme poverty, lacking appropriate shelter, clean water, medical care and that 18 million people die annually from poverty (Singer 2009). At the same time, people in affluent societies buy things they never use, spend money on expensive clothes, buy bottled water when tap water is perfectly fine and go out for fine dining.

However, why should people, living in affluent societies, give to relieve poverty in faraway countries? How much do they ought to give? The argument Singer offers is as follows:

“First premise: Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care is bad.

Second premise: If it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong not to do so.

Third premise: By donating to aid agencies, you can prevent suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care, without sacrificing anything nearly as important.

Conclusion: Therefore, if you do not donate to aid agencies, you are doing something wrong.” (Singer 2009: 15)

In supporting his argument, Singer gives an example. A person comes across a toddler who falls into a pond and is likely to drown. There is no one else around. By going into the pond

¹⁶ The contemporary utilitarian theory of Peter Singer will be presented based on his paper “Famine, Affluence and Morality” (1972), further elaborated in his book “The Life You Can Save: How to Play Your Part in Ending World Poverty” (2009) and “The Most Good You Can Do” (2015).

and saving the child the person would ruin her shoes, get wet clothes and be late for work. What should she do? Singer argues that the person is morally obliged to enter the pond and save the toddler. This appeals to our intuition. Singer further elaborates that not wading into the pond to pull out the child would be wrong because getting wet and being late for work are small sacrifices in comparison to saving a life. By analogy, one ought to donate to aid agencies when by doing so we can prevent death and suffering without sacrificing anything nearly as important (ibid.).

Singer stresses that not only are we morally obliged to give what we can sometimes, but we ought to give to the extent until we have reduced ourselves to the point where if we were to give any more, we would sacrifice something nearly as important as a life (ibid.). Singer furthermore argues that when we spend money on concerts or fashionable shoes, we are doing something wrong since that money could be effectively used by aid agencies in saving the lives of children dying from curable diseases. Thus, we are morally obliged to choose actions that provide the most good in the world as a whole. What motivates giving is unimportant within the framework of Singer's theory. The only thing that matters is the amount of good the action produces. In fact, those who give in order to receive praise and who make their donations known are in fact doing the right thing, because people tend to emulate their peers and knowing that others give is an incentive for them to donate (ibid.).

Singer argues that by applying evidence and reasoning out, one can organise his whole life, from career choices to everyday activities, around the idea of doing the most good in the world, which is known as *effective altruism* (Singer 2015). It entails living modestly and donating large amounts of one's income to the most effective charities, doing research on which charities are most effective, choosing a career in which one can earn the most and then giving substantial portions of one's income, advocating for effective altruism, working out which causes, interventions and policies do the most to make the world a better place (ibid.). MacAskill, the co-founder of the effective altruism movement, argues that people living in affluent societies are comparatively so rich that the amount by which they can benefit others is much greater than the amount by which they can benefit themselves (MacAskill 2015). Thus, by donating to the most effective aid agencies affluent agents can produce an immense amount of good. While Singer emphasis that it would be wrong not to donate to aid agencies when by doing so one can prevent death and suffering without sacrificing anything nearly as important (Singer 2009),

MacAskill's argument for donating to agencies lies in the fact that this may result in a great amount of overall good, much greater than if one spends on herself (MacAskill 2015).

There are many challenges to Singer's theory, and effective altruism in general. To begin with, if one donates to save the lives of children dying from malaria, should she also donate for those dying from measles? Effective altruism advocates argue that our decisions should be based on the most good they produce, where more lives saved is better than less lives saved (Singer 2015, MacAskill 2015). Presumably, one can save the lives of three children from measles with the same amount of money needed to save one life from malaria.¹⁷ To produce the most good, she sends the money to the charity that provides medical assistance to prevent measles. The mere fact that the medical treatment of one disease costs more than the treatment of another leads to the conclusion that one's life is less valuable than the life of another. This is deeply at odds with our intuition.

Within the framework of Singer's theory, dining out, buying a new pair of shoes, going to a concert, paying tuition fees at prestigious universities, and in fact anything one does have repercussions on the whole world. He argues that it would be wrong not to spend money on all these instead of donating to aid agencies. Is it morally wrong to pay the tuition fees for one's children? In itself, this does not seem wrong.

Singer is aware that the principle of giving until one sacrifices something nearly as important as saving a life can be seen as too demanding and thus discouraging (Singer 2009). Taking this into account, Singer advocates for the public principle that would raise the largest possible total and thus would have the best outcomes. Namely, he proposes a target of "5% of the annual income for those who are financially comfortable, and rather more for the very rich" (ibid: 152). He suggests a progressive scale of giving, like a tax scale, where the amount one gives increases as income increases. Thus, average income earners who give 5% of their annual income are fulfilling their obligations, argues Singer (ibid.). He further stresses that there is a difference between what an individual ought to do and what set of principles one should advocate for and seek out as acceptable to the majority of society (ibid.). This is because advocating for the more demanding rule will do little good since no one would follow it. In

¹⁷ In fact, Singer provides figures on how much it costs to save a life from different diseases (Singer 2009).

short, the appropriate public standard must be relative to what we can “reasonably expect most people to do” (Singer 2009: 154).

What is particularly bothersome in Singer’s theory is the analogy between the drowning child example and the postulate on the obligation to give to aid agencies fighting extreme poverty in faraway countries. If one chooses not to enter the pond and pull out the drowning child who is dying before their eyes when no one else is around, she said person should, to some extent, be held responsible for the child’s death, although certainly not to the same extent as the parents or caregivers who left the child unattended.¹⁸ However, when the same person, who for example lives in Serbia, refrains from donating to a charity that provides medicines for sick children in say Ghana, her responsibility for the death of a child there is questionable. There is far greater certainty that the act of entering the pond would save the life of the toddler than that the donation to an aid agency would save the life of a child in Ghana. Also, while the person who comes across the drowning child is the only one in a position to save the child, there are many, in fact hundreds of millions, including many Ghanaians, who are in a position to donate to aid agencies. Finally, she could ponder that developing countries’ governments are responsible for the poverty.

However, it is a complex question of what one’s responsibility is in relation to poverty relief in other countries, which can be only briefly touched upon here. When discussing compassion, Nussbaum (2013) argues that we do not feel compassion for people in need when we think that people are to be blamed for their own misfortunes. Then we believe that they should be held responsible and should take care of themselves. However, we can be deeply mistaken when judging other people’s circumstances and such perception may be the result of social norms and predominant views in a society (Nussbaum 2013).

As Ashford stresses (2018), rich countries became affluent by taking the natural and social resources of countries now suffering severe poverty. Moreover, due to superior bargaining

¹⁸ This is recognised in legislation. For example, the *Obligations Act* of the Republic of Serbia requires the provision of necessary assistance: “*Whoever, without endangering himself, denies aid to a person whose life or health is clearly endangered, is liable for the damage resulting therefrom, if he had to foresee that damage according to the circumstances of the case*”. Moreover, according to the *Criminal Code* of the Republic of Serbia: “*One who does not aid a person who is in immediate danger for life, although he could have done it without risk to himself or another, shall be punished by a fine or by imprisonment of up to two years.*”

power in international relations, rich countries have pressed for rules concerning trade, intellectual property rights, debt, etc., which further widens the gap between developed and developing countries (Ashford 2018). Such structural arrangements violate the negative duty not to deprive people of the means of subsistence, which is “a philosophically straightforward and uncontentious account of the negative duty correlative to the right to subsistence, nonfulfillment of which constitutes a human rights violation” (ibid: Kindle Locations 1790-1793). Ashford further argues that “the persistence of severe poverty should be seen as a structural human rights violation and that responsibility for this violation is not plausibly confined to right-holders’ own governments but is shared by the international community” (ibid: 1794-1795).

Individuals living in affluent societies enjoy the benefits of an unjust world order and it is their duty to change it (ibid.). Ashford argues that the duty to end structural harms is a *shared duty of justice*, meaning that “it is held by individual agents, but each agent has only partial responsibility for its fulfilment” (ibid: 2021). The responsibility of an individual agent is to reform or create new institutions. However, only through the sustained commitment of many agents can a shift in social norms be made that would underpin structural reform (ibid.).

Therefore, the most questionable part of Singer’s postulate is that one ought to donate to aid agencies in order to make the world a better place. Charities work within the current world order and cannot enter into the spheres of systemic change (Krik 2012). Changing the structural settings could be a much more effective way of helping poor people in developing countries than donating money within the given structure. Thus, even on utilitarian grounds, one can argue that, people living in affluent societies should promote structural reforms that would lead toward the eradication of extreme poverty, rather than donate to charities operating within the current world order.

Despite numerous objections to Singer’s theory and effective altruism, the fact that there are hundreds of millions human beings dying from curable diseases is important and relevant in our decisions.

2.2.3. Virtue Ethics

The origins of *virtue ethics* date back to the works of Plato and Aristotle. Throughout the nineteenth century virtue ethics was neglected, then reappeared in the mid-twentieth century.

Over the past thirty years numerous modern approaches in virtue ethics have emerged. Although the approaches within virtue ethics, both ancient and modern, differ in certain aspects, they all share three main concepts: 1) *arête*, translated as excellence or virtue, 2) *phronesis*, the Greek word for practical wisdom and 3) *eudaimonia*, translated as happiness (Russel 2013). In this section, both Aristotle's and the neo-Aristotelian approaches will be outlined.

Aristotle's Ethics

The central question in Aristotle's ethics is: *How should I live?* There are differences in opinion about what is the best way to live. Most of us would argue that it is important to be healthy. Some would say that it is crucial to have friends and supportive relations. Someone else would argue that it is very important to possess wealth. All those are *good* or *desirable* things, things that we are seeking for.¹⁹ However, most things and activities are sought for because they are useful for something else, not because of themselves. For example, health is desirable because it keeps us free from pain and gives us the opportunity to enjoy different activities, while wealth is desirable because it gives us a comfortable life. Aristotle is searching for the *chief good*, something that is good in itself. Such good is not sought for the sake of something else. In fact, all other goods are desirable for the sake of the chief good. Since health and wealth are good for something else, they cannot be the chief good.

Happiness, Virtue and Practical Wisdom

According to Aristotle, all things are sought for because they promote *happiness*. Thus, happiness is the chief good. The Greek word *eudaimonia* is usually translated as happiness. However, *eudaimonia* is not (only) a sensation, an emotional state or state of mind, which the English word happiness implies. There are two perspectives on happiness in contemporary literature: the hedonic and eudemonic (Ryan and Deci 2001). In hedonic conception happiness is seen in terms of pleasure attainment and pain avoidance. Eudemonic happiness is "something like flourishing human living, a kind of living that is active, inclusive of all that has intrinsic value, and complete, meaning lacking in nothing that would make it richer or better"

¹⁹ Aristotle defines good as "that which all things seek". It is an end.

(Nussbaum 2012: 342). Therefore, some interpreters of Aristotle argue that more precise terms for eudemonia would be flourishing, or fulfilment, or a good human life (Brown 2009).

Aristotle believes that in answering the question on what happiness is, we should look at what makes us, *humans*, different from other species. He argues that the capacity for practical thinking, which requires setting ends and defining means for reaching them, in his words the “activity of soul which follows or implies reason” (Aristotle 2009: 11), is what makes humans different from other species. Therefore, only a life led by thinking counts as truly human life, and only such life can lead to happiness.

Within the framework of Aristotle’s theory, external goods, which are matters of good fortune, such as wealth and good health for example, are necessary factors for happiness. However, they are not the determining factors. In order to live a fulfilled life, one needs to develop *virtues*, such as courage, good temper, generosity, honour or intellectual accomplishment. Aristotle defines happiness as activity in accordance with virtue.

In its essence, a virtue is a steady, reliable and intelligent disposition, a character trait, which involve emotional reactions, attitudes, desires and values (Russel 2013). According to Aristotle, virtue is a condition that is intermediate, or *the mean*, between two extremes - the excess and deficiency. This is known as a doctrine of the mean (Curzer 2012). The mean between the two extremes should not be thought of as an arithmetic mean that is always the same. Rather, in every situation we should determine an appropriate behaviour which requires knowing all relevant circumstances. Aristotle argues that virtues are interwoven with practical wisdom. While virtues set the right sorts of ends, it is by practical reasoning that we find the ways that fulfil these ends. Thus, the mean itself is determined by practical wisdom. In Aristotle’s words:

“Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by reason, and by that reason by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.” (Aristotle 2009: 31)

Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtues: 1) intellectual excellences (such as intellectual accomplishment, good sense, wisdom); and 2) excellences of character or moral virtues (such as generosity, moderation, courage). However, possessing excellences is not enough, one needs to use them to live a fulfilled life.

While intellectual excellences develop as a result of teaching, the excellences of character and moral virtues result from habituation and practice. Aristotle argues that the capacity for the development of virtue is innate. In our childhood we are placed in numerous situations that require appropriate actions and/or emotions. Then, in deciding what an appropriate action and emotion is, we rely on others, particularly our parents and teachers, and we also follow habits. Thus, Aristotle stresses the importance of *moral education*. As we grow up, and as we repeat actions and corrections, we develop a skill of *practical wisdom*. Practical wisdom involves having an insight into what is good for human flourishing and an understanding of what is required in any situation in relation to it. The virtuous person not only does the right thing, but she does it in the right way, with the right sorts of emotions. For example, a generous person gives money to someone who is in need, and he does it gladly, without regrets.

Thus, for virtue, and consequently happiness, certain experience and maturity is necessary. To be counted as a virtue, it needs to be the result of rational deliberation and conscious choice. Once a person develops practical wisdom, once she is capable of figuring out what she ought to do in any situation, then she has moral virtue. Thus, possessing practical wisdom is both necessary and sufficient for being virtuous. This leads to the conclusion that if one person through practical reasoning chooses well on certain occasion; if she possesses, for example, good temper, then the practical wisdom would lead her to reach all other virtues too. This means that as a result of possessing a practical wisdom, if someone has a good temper, she is at the same time courageous, truthful, just, generous, etc., which is known as unity of virtues (Driver 2007). However, this is at odds with our experience. There are courageous liars and angry fighters for justice. Perhaps, they are not fully virtuous. Otherwise, the unity of virtues poses a flaw in Aristotle's theory.

Aristotle further argues that the life of those who live in accordance with excellences is a *pleasant life*. Something is pleasant in relation to what a person likes to do, or in Aristotle's words what he is a lover of. For example, if someone loves to play sports, he finds pleasure in exercising and competing. Actions in accordance with virtue are pleasant to the people and pleasant in themselves, and therefore the life of a virtuous person is full and blessed and it has no need for additional pleasure.

Inner Harmony

A virtuous person does not have to suppress internal pressures to act non-virtuously, since a virtuous person does not long for something she would think of as shameful, as opposite to virtuous. Only virtuous people can have *inner harmony* (Pangle 2003). A virtuous person is undivided, she desires the same things with her entire soul. Thus, inner harmony is one of the greatest rewards of a virtuous life.

However, most of us have experienced such an internal battle between what we think we should do as virtuous people and what our desires are urging us to do. According to Aristotle this is an internal disorder which can take different forms. Some people may deduce what a virtuous thing to do is at any moment in time but may experience pressure to satisfy a certain desire or appetite. Some may manage to suppress this pressure and do what a virtuous person does in such a situation. Although they do what virtuous people do, such people are not virtuous themselves. Some people are not able to resist this contra influence and they do the opposite of the virtuous activity. This is known as the weakness of will, which prevents them from carrying out actions that they reasoned as virtuous. Finally, some people do not even try to do what a virtuous person does. According to Aristotle, they are evil.

It seems hard, if at all possible, to achieve this inner harmony for such complex beings as we are. There are always many things worth pursuing in our lives and feeling torn between them seems unavoidable.

Grounding Experience and Virtue

So far, we have analysed the main tenets of Aristotle’s ethical theory. At this point, specific virtues will be presented. Aristotle goes into detail in articulating virtues. His strategy is firstly to outline a sphere of experience, sphere of actions and feelings, that every human being is involved in and in which everyone needs to make choices, which Nussbaum calls *grounding experience* (Nussbaum 1993). Then, he specifies what acting well is, choosing the condition intermediate in each sphere. Such choice is a *virtue*. The list of grounding experiences together with related virtues as defined by Aristotle is provided in the table below.

Table 3. List of Virtues

Sphere of Experience	Virtue
Fear of danger	Courage
Pleasure (bodily)	Temperance (Moderation)
Distribution of limited resources	Justice

Small giving	Liberality (Open-handedness, Generosity)
Great giving	Magnificence (Munificence)
Attitudes and actions with respect to one's own worth	Greatness of soul
Attitude to slights and damages	Good temper
Management of personal property, where hospitality is concerned	Expansive hospitality
Association and living together	Truthfulness, Friendliness, Kindness
Attitude to the good and ill fortune of others	Proper judgement (contrasted with enviousness, spitefulness, etc.)
Intellectual life	The various intellectual virtues, such as perceptiveness, knowledge, etc
The planning of one's life and conduct	Practical wisdom

Source: Adapted from Nussbaum's paper "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach" (Nussbaum 1993)

Aristotle seeks to discover experiences that are shared by different groups at different times. Thus, he believes in the universality of virtues throughout time and space. It could also be argued that virtues are culture-specific, that different groups value different things. Our feelings and beliefs about what right and what wrong is are to a great extent a result of cultural learning. Individuals are profoundly affected by prevailing moral norms and values in the group to which they relate (Hodgson 2013). However, individuals are not passive receivers of culturally specific norms and values, but through conflicting habits, feelings, and judgments they develop their own distinctive moral personalities capable of judging whether what is considered as a virtue in one's own culture leads to individual and human flourishing. Moreover, despite differences, certain values, such as for example truth telling and being generous and cooperative, are shared between different cultural groups and through history.²⁰

At the end, it should be stressed that what Aristotle provides is not a descriptive list, but one to evaluate culture-specific values against. He argues that his account of virtues is only an outline, "for we must presumably first sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details" (Aristotle 2009: 12). Thus, the list is not an exhaustive one. It is rather a guiding tool for everyone's pursuit in developing their own virtues, and a benchmark for the critical evaluation of what society considers to be a virtue.

Generosity and Magnificence

²⁰This is perhaps due to the mechanism of cultural group selection, which will be elaborated in the following chapter.

Among many excellences of character, these two are of particular interest for the purposes of this research: *liberality* (generosity, open-handedness) and *magnificence* (munificence) both are related to money, the sphere of spending.

Generosity is the mean between wastefulness and stinginess, both of which are excesses, thus vices. Generous people are those who give freely and, Aristotle argues, among the virtuous people those who are generous are praised the most because “they are useful” (Aristotle 2009: 61). The essence of generosity is not in the quantity that is given, but in the disposition of a giver. Thus, it is perfectly possible for the person who gives less to be more generous.

A generous person is one who gives “for the sake of what is noble”, which means having primary regard for one’s virtue. If he gives from some other motive, then he is not generous. For example, if he asks for something in return or if he gives to those who flatter him or provide some other kind of pleasure, such person is self-indulgent and cannot be considered generous.

He gives to “the right people, the right amounts, and at the right time, with all the other qualifications that accompany right giving; and that too with pleasure or without pain” (Aristotle 2009: 61). This means that if one gives with regrets and pain, he is not virtuous. Moreover, an open-handed person will not give randomly, but only to people of decent character. Aristotle argues that people should not be called generous if they “make rich those who should be poor” (Aristotle 2009: 63). Thus, it seems that there are certain people to whom nothing should be given, for example, if the person who receives is not virtuous himself. In addition, a virtuous person does not neglect his possessions, no matter how much he wants to use them to assist people. Thus, if one gives to the point that he becomes poor, thus neglecting his own possessions, he is not considered as virtuous.

Magnificence is another virtue related to money and it is related to the giving of greater amounts. Magnificence consists in expenditure that is suitable in scale, where the scale is relative to the person concerned. The effect of the expenditure that the munificent person is undertaking should be worthy of its expense. Moreover, a munificent person spends for the benefit of the public. As with any other virtue, a munificent person will incur such expenditure for the sake of the noble. Aristotle argues that since poor people do not have resources to spend large amounts in suitable ways, they cannot be munificent. He further argues that they are those

who attempt to go beyond what the circumstances require. Munificence is suitable for those who have resources which they either earned or inherited.

Friendship

In his search for the answer to the question on how one should live, Aristotle thus gives an essential role to friendship, arguing that “without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods” (Aristotle 2009: 143).

The term “friendship” is used as a translation of the Greek word “*philia*”, which refers to “all bonds of affection, from the closest erotic and familial ties to political loyalties, humanitarian sympathies, business partnerships, and even love for inanimate things” (Pangle 2003: 2). Aristotle is discussing a wider range of phenomena than the English word “friendship” would imply. However, the richest and fullest human love, according to Aristotle, can be found in friendships between mature and virtuous individuals.

There are three types of friendships, according to Aristotle: 1) friendships based on utility, 2) friendships based on pleasure and 3) friendships based on virtue. In the first type of friendships, we do not have an interest in a friend for its own sake, but rather for the sake of his usefulness for us. We do not love the other person at all, but our own good. Thus, if we had direct access to the goods we seek in this kind of friendships, such friendships would cease to exist. Such relationships are found in business, for example. Friendships based on utility are the furthest from perfect friendships. The second type of friendships are much closer to the best form of friendship. We seek such friendships for their own sake. Even when a friend’s good is not actively pursued as an end in itself, the presence of the friend is cherished as an end in itself. The reason for friendship is that it is pleasurable. Once it no longer brings pleasure to the parties, it ceases to exist. The perfect friendships are friendships based on virtue, where partners are virtuous and equal individuals, worthy of each other’s trust and support. Virtuous people are whole in themselves, and only people with an inner harmony can be the best kind of friends. Such friends seek the good of loved ones as an end in itself. This kind of friendship is perfect because partners love one another for their own sake, while in the friendships of utility and pleasure people love one another primarily because of what they seek for themselves (ibid).

The best friendship is among equals, when there is no dependence on one another. The relationship between the parent and a child is an unequal one. A good parent not only gives

birth to a child, but also provides an adequate upbringing, preparing a child for a virtuous life. Although a child cannot repay the parent, if a parent receives respect and devotion from the child, the relationship (“friendship”) will last and will in a sense be equitable.

What is good about friendship and what is its place in a life well lived? The intrinsic goodness about friendships Aristotle finds in our natural sociability. What distinguishes us from other species is speech and a life led by reason. Only through living and sharing with loved ones can we develop virtues (while we are young and in need of moral guidance) and augment pleasure. However, it is not only living together as such that is in the core of a life lived well, but rather in choosing the most appropriate partners in one’s life for the most important activities, which are activities in accordance with virtue. Thus, Aristotle brings together moral virtue and friendship in a fulfilled life (ibid).²¹

Giving such a prominent role to friendship in a life lived well, Aristotle is necessarily in favour of *partiality*. In fact, he stresses that it is “nobler to do well by friends than by strangers” (Aristotle 2009: 176). Although a virtuous person feels and behaves kindly toward all other human beings, a genuine friendship is only possible with a few. Could the requirements of friendship conflict with the requirements of virtue? Virtuous friends would never require vicious actions from one another. However, there are circumstances under which conflict does not seem easily reconcilable. For example, Ben’s son is very ill. If he does not undergo an expensive surgical procedure urgently, he will not survive. Tom, Ben’s best friend, has a very rich and old uncle, who is already in his 90s. When the uncle passes away, Tom will be the only heir to his fortune. Wishing to help his friend’s son, Tom asks his uncle to give him the money for Ben’s son’s surgery, which he refuses. The only way Tom can get the money is to steal money from his uncle, to whose bank account he has access, which is something that Ben does not ask of him, but which Tom sees as the only way of helping the friend, since Ben does not have any other source of income to rely on. The uncle’s fortune is so vast that he would not even notice the missing funds. Deceiving his uncle and stealing from him are certainly not activities that Tom as a virtuous person would engage in, but he nevertheless feels obliged to help Ben in this situation and does not see any other possibilities. How should he act?

Right Action

²¹ It should be stressed that, for Aristotle, the most fulfilling life is a philosophical one.

It is often considered that virtue ethics deals with questions of what kind of person one should be, rather than how one should act. Thus, it is considered that this approach does not provide the principles of morally right action. However, Hursthouse argues that virtue ethics can provide action guidance (Hursthouse 1999, Hursthouse 1996). According to this author, virtue ethics' account of the right action is as follows:

“P1: An action is right if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do under certain circumstances.

P1a: A virtuous agent is one who has, and exercises, certain character traits, namely, virtues.

P2: A virtue is a character trait that . . .” (Hursthouse 1999: 79).

The first premise introduces the concept of the virtuous agent as a measure of goodness.²² The second premise, in the Aristotelian tradition, could be completed with the statement that a virtue is a character trait that a human being needs to possess and exercise in order to live well (ibid). Thus, a virtuous agent is one who is generous, honest, friendly, who has a good temper and moderate appetites, etc.. Above all, he is one who judges circumstances fairly and whose behaviour and emotions are appropriate to those circumstances.

Hursthouse further argues that if an individual is not herself a virtuous person, when decided whether an action is morally right, she could ask for advice from someone who is virtuous. Moreover, we all have a fairly good idea of what acting honestly, justly, with good temper, etc. means, even when our own actions are far from virtuous.

There are situations in which the requirements of different virtues could point us in conflicting directions. For example, we may believe that being kind to a person requires occasionally hiding unpleasant truths. Telling lies is a vice, thus not in accordance with the virtue of truthfulness. Hursthouse points out that this is only an *apparent dilemma*, since it is questionable whether it is really kind to hide an unpleasant, even devastating truth.

²² Virtue ethics is thus called an agent-centred approach, in contrast to utilitarianism which is consequence-centred and deontology which is a rule-centred approach. Hursthouse's theory belongs to the qualified-agent accounts in virtue ethics (Zyl 2013)

She further points out that there are *irresolvable dilemmas* when two virtuous agents act differently under the same circumstances, which then implies that there can be more than one right action under certain circumstances. However, in any occasion it is questionable as to whether this is an irresolvable dilemma, or we are not comprehending well the circumstances. A specific case of irresolvable dilemmas are *tragic dilemmas*, from which it is impossible to “emerge with clean hands”. Whatever one does it does not seem right, it leaves regret.

The above outlined example may be a case of a tragic dilemma. Presumably, Tom decides to take the money from his uncle to save his best friend’s son. Is he acting wrongly? The way he acts, his motives, his feelings and attitudes, are all intertwined with his action and are key in determining whether his action is morally wrong (Hursthouse 1999). Tom is very sad to steal from his uncle, and this act causes his immense regret and pain. Because he is not indifferent or glad, Tom’s action is not wrong in this situation. Perhaps, it is more precisely to say that, under the circumstances, his action is less of a wrong than the alternative would be.

2.2.4. Emotions and Caring

Classical Sentimentalism

Classical sentimentalism dates back to 17th and 18th century Britain and relates mainly to the works of Earl of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, Hume and Smith (Driver 2013, Gill 2006, Frazer 2010, Kauppinen 2016, Roberts 1973). According to this theory, morality is based on the sentiment of sympathy (Driver 2013). Without the sentiment that gives rise to approval or disapproval an actor could not make moral judgements (ibid.).

Classical sentimentalism appeared as an opposition to Hobbesian egoism, which holds that human beings are solely or largely motivated by self-interest, and to moral rationalism, which holds that morality is based on reason alone (Driver 2013, Gill 2006). According to philosophers in the sentimentalist tradition, human beings are not solely motivated by self-interest, and reason alone is not enough to motivate our (moral) actions (Driver 2013). In other words, while reason can instruct us about the means for a certain end, it cannot motivate us to seek that end. Morality originates not in reason alone, but at least partly in emotions (Roberts 1973).

Some philosophers in moral sentimentalist tradition, such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Butler, hold that human beings have a distinctive moral sense that allow us to perceive moral properties through an “inner eye” (Driver 2013). Moral sense theorists hold that people have a capacity to detect moral distinctions directly, rather than inferring it from basic premises. It should be stressed that moral sense itself involves reflection on one's emotional reactions in determining whether one's reactions are appropriate (ibid.). Others, such as Hume and Smith, reject that we have a moral sense. Thus, sentimentalism and moral sense theory should not be equated.

It is also important to stress that moral sentimentalists do not hold that we should completely follow our emotional reactions without reflection. In other words, they do not reject the role of reason (Driver 2013). Emotional reactions are refined by reason and corrected with additional information (ibid.). An agent reflects on and assesses her mental states before approving it (Sen 2010). Even a moral sense involves reflection (Driver 2013). In other words, to use Nussbaum's formulation, “emotions involve cognitive appraisals” (Nussbaum 2013: 10). Thus, classical sentimentalists, and particularly Hume and Smith, maintain that reasoning and feeling are deeply interrelated.

The significance of moral sentimentalism lies in the fact that it stresses the role of emotions in moral judgements and motivation for moral action.²³ In this section, the main tenets of classical sentimentalism will be presented briefly, particularly through the works of Hume and Smith.

Hume

According to Hume, moral evaluations of a person's character traits or their actions arise from *moral sentiments*, which are feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by a disinterested spectator (Cohon 2010). When contemplation of a character trait produces approval in the spectator, looking from the common (general) perspective, then the trait is a virtue, while if it produces disapproval then it is a vice.²⁴ It is important to note here that the approval of the spectator must be produced when looking from the general point of view. Our

²³ Findings in moral psychology support the view that moral judgements engage emotions (Greene et al. 2001 quoted in Driver 2013). Moreover, the importance of the emotions of sympathy and love for the sound functioning of a society is recognised in contemporary political philosophy. As Nussbaum (2013) argues, political principles “need emotional support to ensure their stability” and sentiments of sympathy and love need to be cultivated as a “guard against division and hierarchy in society” (Nussbaum 2013: 3).

²⁴ Some modern virtue ethicists take Hume's ideas about virtue in developing their account of virtue ethics. (For example, Christine Swanton (2013) in her book “The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche”).

emotional reactions may be distorted by bias, prejudices or the lack of relevant information (Driver 2013). Thus, there is a need for correction, a need to view the situation from a general perspective.

Sentiments of moral approval and disapproval are caused by *sympathy* (Cohon 2010, Gill 2006, Kauppinen 2016, Roberts 1973). There are two ways in which Hume considers sympathy (Driver 2013). Firstly, as a kind of contagion, when the emotions of one person are communicated via sympathy to another (Driver 2013). Although one does not see the cause of fear, she feels afraid as a response to noticing another person's fear. Secondly, sympathy is similar to benevolence (ibid.). Not only is it a psychological mechanism through which one person receives the sentiments of the other, but it also explains why people care for the emotions of others (ibid.). These two characteristics of sympathy are intimately connected and when "sympathy is properly functioning in the human agent, there will be benevolent tendencies" (Driver 2013: 367).

Sympathy is the basis of moral conduct and it is a fact of human nature. If we lacked sympathy, we would not be able to make moral evaluations. It is important to stress that, when we make moral evaluations of people and their actions, what we take into consideration the most are their *motives*, that is internal states of the agent. According to Hume, human beings can be motivated by both self-interest and benevolence for others. When an act is motivated by benevolence, we approve of it.

Smith

Like Hume, Smith also holds that sympathy is the basis for morality (Driver 2013, Frazer 2010). For Smith, sympathy does not arise from the view of the emotion of the other, but from the perception of the situation which excites it (Frazer 2010). Sympathy in Smith's account involves placing oneself in the other person's situation and working out how it would feel to be in such a situation, thus, including a cognitive or imaginative effort (ibid.). It is possible to feel in accordance with the situation, for example, to feel afraid when faced with danger, even when the person with whom one sympathises, does not feel anything. Also, even when someone is aware of the feelings of the other person, she may not sympathise with those feelings if she thinks they are inappropriate under the circumstances.

When sympathetically considering another person's situation, a spectator judges whether the actor's reactions, including emotions, attitudes, actions, are appropriate for the situation (Frazer 2010). Deriving at this judgement requires the completion of a process in several stages (ibid.). Firstly, a spectator imagines what it would be like to be the actor in that situation. Imagination gives rise to certain emotional reactions, which may or may not resemble the feelings experienced by the actor. Then the spectator compares her reaction to the reaction of the actor. Finally, the spectator evaluates the actor's reaction, where she approves of the actor's reaction if it resembles her own and disapproves if it does not.

Since we tend to sympathise with those who are near and dear to us, Smith argues that there is a need for us to correct our judgements through the eye of an imagined impartial spectator and to consider how such a spectator would react in such a situation. Only the reactions of the impartial spectator set the standard for moral judgement (Driver 2013).

Impartial spectator is an ideal observer who is not prone to mistakes (ibid.). Smith insists that we must consider our sentiments from the point of view of an impartial spectator in order to inspect the influence of vested interests and impacts of custom and social norms (Sen 2010). How to attain the point of view of an impartial spectator is an important issue I will address in the section on the capability approach when discussing Sen's notion of "resend scrutiny" (Sen 2010, Sen 2017).

Ethics of Care

The ethics of care belongs to the "alternative" theories within normative ethics (Chappell 2013). Ethics of care follows the sentimentalist tradition of moral theory, stressing the importance of caring motivation, which is found in emotion and reasoning from particulars (Noddings 2013). In this view, there is moral significance in relationships between individuals. In fact, rather than individuals existing in isolation, *relation* is ontologically basic, meaning that the basic fact of human existence is in human encounters and affective responses (ibid.). A *caring relation* is ethically basic. Cultivating relationships and promoting the wellbeing of both givers and receives of care in the web of social relations is in the heart of ethics of care.

Noddings points out that there is a *natural sympathy* that human beings feel for each other. In addition, we are "longing to maintain, recapture, or enhance our most caring and tender moments" (Noddings 2013: 104). These feelings, attitudes and memories of caring-for and

being cared-for are *universal*. People *naturally care* for one another, which is motivated by *feelings* of love and inclination. However, when we do not feel this inclination towards the particular other that leads us to natural caring, or when we face difficult situations, we call upon our memories of caring and being cared for. Thus, through the process of reflection we decide what to do or how to respond to be one who cares for another. This is *ethical caring*. Natural caring is the motivating force behind ethical caring.

Caring Relation, One-Caring and Cared-for

A caring relation is a “set of ordered pairs generated by some rule that describes the affect – or subjective experience – of the members” (Noddings 2013: 4). The two parties in the relation are the “one-caring” and the “cared-for” (ibid.). Caring for implies apprehending another’s reality, understanding his nature, way of living, needs and desires. When the one-caring sees the other’s reality, she feels that she must act to meet the need of the cared-for, reduce his pain, or help him achieve his goal. She feels impelled to act on behalf of the cared-for and makes a commitment to act on his behalf. When she is in this sort of relationship with another, then she *cares* (Noddings 2013).

In order to act as one-caring we need to take into consideration the desires and the needs of the cared-for and the requirements of the concrete situation. It entails both knowing someone well and understanding the circumstances. However, there can arise a conflict between what the cared-for requires and what the one who cares thinks is best for him (ibid.). One-caring should consider the other’s point of view and his expectations, but also his objective needs. Thus, the dialogue and mutual understanding should be nurtured to maintain a caring relation.

Also, conflict may appear when we feel engrossment for several individuals at the same time and when they require incompatible things (ibid.). Then, we need to look into the place of the person in our circle of care. However, it may happen that two dear friends require incompatible things when taking their needs and desires into account, and the whole context should be taken into consideration in an open discussion.

Finally, there can arise conflict between what one needs and what the cared-for requires (ibid.). In natural caring one’s own needs can be, and often are, overridden because of the needs of the cared-for. The one-caring needs to care for herself as well. Caring for one’s own needs and desires, meeting oneself as one-caring, enlarges one’s capacity to care for others.

Caring begins with the engrossment and acting on the part of the one-caring, it needs to be *recognised* and *accepted* by the cared-for (ibid.). Without this kind of recognition, there is no completion of the caring, thus there cannot be the caring relation.

Caring as Action Guidance

Ethical behaviour within the framework of ethics of care requires feeling, thinking, and behaving as one-caring (Noddings 2013) Meeting the other as one-caring, maintaining and enhancing caring relations, is the *obligation* of a moral agent within ethics of care. The question that arises is which other we should meet as one-caring. According to Noddings, we are obliged to care for the *proximate other*, where proximity is determined by the possibility of acceptance. If caring cannot be completed in the other, then there cannot be a caring relation, and consequently no obligation to care for.

Each of us is in the centre of *circles of caring* (ibid.). In the inner circle we care because we love those near and dear to us, such as our family members and our close friends. Love can make a mother wake up several times throughout the night to soothe her child. Whenever she hears the baby cry, she feels an internal “I must”. She is impelled to do something, in fact she would do anything, to relieve the pain of the child. Although we naturally care for people in our intimate circle, sometimes we are tired, or the demands are overwhelming, and then we rely on ethical caring (ibid.). We remind our self that this screaming child is mine, or that that demanding person is my father, and provide them with what they need. Thus, even with our nearest and dearest, we sometimes move from natural to ethical caring.

In the outer circles are those people for whom we have personal regard (ibid.). How we feel about them, what they expect from us, and what the situational factors of our encounters are, all determine relations and obligations that arise. Our emotive inclination leads towards natural caring for them, though often we rely on ethical caring in meeting our obligations towards people in our outer circles. Finally, there are others that are linked to those in our personal circles, but whom we have not met (yet). Recognising these links, we become prepared to care for the individuals in them.

All those people, from our nearest and dearest, such as our family members, through those for whom we have personal regard, such as our friends and colleagues, to those whom we have never met, but who are linked to people we love or have regard for, are in our *web of caring*

(ibid.). They are the *proximate others*. The proximate other is also someone in the physical proximity of the agent. In the words of Noddings, the proximate other is the “one who addresses me, under whose gaze I fall my student, my neighbour, my stranger at the door selling his religion” (Noddings 2013:113).

According to Noddings’ ethics of care, when someone calls out for help, those in proximity are morally obliged to respond (ibid.). Those in the inner circles must respond first. If they cannot find resources to respond adequately, they must address the next circle.

There are many beyond the reach of caring. We are not obliged to act as one caring if there is no possibility of completion in the other, even though we may *care about* them. Here Noddings (2013) makes a distinction between caring for, which is part of the caring relation, and caring about, which does not require a relation. While we care *for* the wellbeing of our friends, we care *about* the wellbeing of unknown individuals in faraway countries.

Nussbaum on Emotions and Caring

Nussbaum argues that our “emotions are eudaimonistic, meaning that they appraise the world from the person’s own viewpoint” (Nussbaum 2013: 11). People who induce our deepest emotions are those to whom we are connected through “imagining of a valuable life” (ibid.). Those people are in our *circle of concern* (ibid.). While for Noddings’ ethics of care this is both the fact of life and a normative request, meaning that not only do we care for those near and dear to our hearts, but also that we are morally obliged to care for them the most, Nussbaum argues that such emotions divide people into “us” and “them”, on those who are and those who are not in the circle of concern. We are also “prone to ugly practices involving the projection of disgust properties onto subordinate groups” (Nussbaum 2013: 314). In other words, our emotions are tribalistic, causing us to favour those in the circle and disfavour those on the outside.²⁵

However, we can have deep emotions for distant people. As Nussbaum argues, this can happen only when these emotions “somehow position them within our circle of concern” (Nussbaum 2013: 11). In order to make people care for those outside the circle, we need to see them as “ours” (ibid.). Rituals, symbols poetry, narratives may create meaning in our lives in which

²⁵ Reasons why they are tribalistic will be elaborated in the Chapter 3 when discussing the evolution of altruism in humans.

“outsiders” and events matter and are part of “us”, i.e. regarded as part of our own flourishing (ibid.).

Compassion and Empathy

Nussbaum defines compassion as “a painful emotion directed at the serious suffering of another creature or creatures” (2013: 142). A spectator, person who feels compassion for another, needs to have four thoughts as conditions for compassion (ibid.). First, the thought of *seriousness*, meaning that the spectator thinks that someone else is suffering “in some way that is important and nontrivial” (ibid.:142). Second, the thought of *nonfault*, meaning that the spectator thinks that the suffering is not chosen or self-inflicted. Third, there is the thought of *similar possibilities*, when the spectator thinks that the person who suffers is similar in some way to herself. Finally, there is the *eudaimonistic* thought, meaning that the suffering person must be included in the important parts of the life of the spectator. Thus, when we think that suffering is not serious, that the person who suffers is exaggerating, also when we believe that the person is to be blamed for the suffering, then when we see the other as distant and remote whose vulnerabilities are completely unlike ours, or when we do not consider the suffering person within our circle of concern, being aware of the suffering may not induce compassion.

We can be mistaken in each of these judgements, which may then prevent us from feeling compassion for the plight of others. Those thoughts are to a great extent influenced by the social norms and circumstances in a society (ibid.). Particularly problematic is the thought of non-fault. When we blame other people for their misfortunes, this often prevents us from feeling compassion. For example, many Americans think that poor people are poor because they are lazy and do not put in effort (Clark 1997 quoted in Nussbaum 2013). Moreover, having a thought of similar possibilities is hard in societies divided by class, race, gender, and other identities (ibid.). In such societies distancing between divided groups happens and disgust and stigma toward subordinated groups are often present. A lack of thought of similar possibilities “often leads to a failure in the eudaimonistic thought: the other is expelled from the circle of concern by the thought of unlikeness” (ibid.: 262). One must be aware of these and similar judgements and to scrutinise them carefully. Helpful in undoing these segmentations is emphasis on common human vulnerabilities through tragic spectatorship, which make it possible to extend concern for others (ibid.).

Vivid imagining of the plight of others often elicits compassion (ibid.). Nussbaum defines empathy as “the ability to imagine the situation of the other, taking the other’s perspective” (ibid.: 145). Thus, empathy is not only understanding the other person’s mental states. It is not emotional contagion. It is also not thinking how one would feel if in the same situation. Empathy is imagining what the particular person feels and experiences in a particular situation. Although empathy is not always sufficient for compassion, often compassion grows out of empathy. Nussbaum further points out that by recognising the other as the centre of experience, empathy “involves something morally valuable” (ibid. 2013: 146).

2.2.5. Helping through Happiness and Capabilities’ Enhancement

We have seen that all analysed normative theories hold that we are morally obliged to help others. The question that arises is: *in what terms to appraise suffering and the quality of life which we are obliged to relieve and improve?*

In line with Comim (2008a, 2008b), I argue that we should follow *information pluralism* in order to produce a reliable assessment. In other words, when evaluating different courses of actions aiming at relieving the suffering or improving the life quality of the other, we should consider “real freedoms” those actions would bring about.

Whether her behaviour would increase the subjective wellbeing (hedonic happiness) of the recipient, is certainly important information a donor needs to have when deciding what to do. For example, when Omar decides to pay a language school for his nephew, he is basing this decision on an estimation of what would make his nephew happy. However, as it has been pointed out in the section on utilitarianism, hedonic happiness is not always a reliable expression of one’s wellbeing. That is why we should also look at the real freedoms our actions would bring about, talking of which brings us to the Capability Approach, which originated in the works of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.

Under *substantive freedoms* Sen means the *capabilities* “to choose a life one has reason to value” (Sen 1999: 74). A person may value a number of different *doings* and *beings* which Sen calls *functionings*. For example, one person may value to be adequately nourished, while self-realisation is a valuable functioning for someone else. However, an individual is not always *capable* of enjoying the functionings she has reason to value, and then she faces *unfreedom*. For example, a housewife overloaded with the house chores and taking care of the children,

may lack the opportunities to undertake what she aspires to do. There is a need for *conversion factors* to translate a doing/being into the *capability* to enjoy it (ibid.). *Capability* therefore “refers to the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible for her to achieve” (ibid: 75). Moreover, in reaching substantive freedom, a person must be an *agent* of her own life – has to have an “ability to pursue and realize goals she values and has reason to value” (Alkire and Deneulin 2009: 22). The amount or the extent of each functioning that an individual enjoys can be represented by a real number and then a person’s actual achievement is represented by a functioning vector. The alternative functioning vectors that one can choose from make a capability set. Thus, a functioning vector is what an individual actually achieves, “the capability set represents the *freedom* to achieve” (Sen 1999: 75).

Capability Approach is an evaluative framework for assessing alternative options, whether they be government policies or individuals’ decisions (Alkire 2008). It allows a comparative assessment of different courses of action by comparing benefits and disbenefits (in terms of capabilities) as they appear to different people and people in different situations (ibid.). Unlike with subjective wellbeing in terms of hedonic happiness, interpersonal comparison of capabilities is possible (Sen 1999).

Sen stresses that not just any doings and beings enhance the real freedoms, but only those we have “reason to value”. This implies that “we need to scrutinize our motivations for valuing specific lifestyles, and not simply value a certain life without reflecting upon it” (Robeyns 2003: 63). Only an *impartial spectator* could objectively judge what one has reason to value (Sen 2010). An impartial spectator is “a device of critical scrutiny and public discussion” (Sen 2010: 135). In other words, only through *reasoned scrutiny* a course of action that promotes real freedoms can be chosen (Sen 2010, Sen 2017). Reasoned scrutiny requires us to subject our actions, objectives, values and priorities to critical examination based on close reflection and dialogue with others and acquiring additional information when relevant and accessible (Sen 2010). Thus, it entails critical examination and reflective evaluation of different sets of doings and beings from the viewpoints of both donors and recipients alike.

Let us consider the following example. A father lives with his daughter in a patriarchal society, where women are denied employment and expect to take care of the house and children. Being a well-educated man, he wants his daughter to have more opportunities in life. However, the daughter is in love, and she seeks her father’s permission to marry. Presumably, she cannot get

married without her father's permission. Having in mind that she is a bright young person and an excellent student, her father thinks that enrolling her in a university abroad would be the best option for his daughter. He reckons that pursuing a further education and living in a different society offering more equal opportunities would broaden his daughter's horizons and open her up to a world of different possibilities in life. However, he is aware that not giving her permission to get married would certainly sadden her. Also, he wants his daughter to be the agent of her life and making this choice for her would deny her autonomy. Such considerations on the part of the father are in line with the Capability Approach. He is thinking about her wellbeing in terms of the real freedoms she could attain through education, but also in terms of the agency she exercises. In order to make the right decision, together they enter into a reasoned scrutiny of different courses of action. Critical examination and close reflection may reveal that the daughter was not aware of the possibilities to continue her studies abroad, perhaps she was not aware of the financial circumstances. In light of this new information, she may be willing to postpone the marriage and pursue further education.

This example shows the process of improving one's real freedoms. If father decided based on what would make his daughter happy in terms of instant subjective wellbeing, such decision would not be in line with capabilities' improvement, since it would possible deprive her of future choices which would have opened to her, had she completed the university. Also, if he decided to deny her marriage and make her go to the university abroad without reasoning with her, he would deprive his daughter of the agency over her life choices. Thus, again, acting contrary from what would bring about enhancement of the daughter's real freedoms.

In short, benefiting others requires providing them with what they need to flourish as humans and as unique individuals under concrete circumstances. It requires comparing benefits and disbenefits in terms of capabilities evaluating them through reasoned scrutiny.

2.3. Applying Normative Concepts

In this section I will analyse how normative ethics could guide our choices so that we behave in accordance with the requirements of morality. I will apply the outlined normative concepts to resolve the following moral problem:

John is a twenty-two-year old violinist. Searching Facebook, he comes across a request for help. A girl is suffering from a rare illness, treatment for which is very

expensive. If the girl does not have surgery soon, it is highly likely that she will not live to her 11th birthday. Her desperate mother is begging for financial help, providing an account where money can be paid into. The girl has the same sickness that took the life of John's father ten years earlier. The memories of the struggle that his family went through are still vivid and he sympathises deeply with the desperate family and the poor girl.

John has some money at his disposal. He has been saving for several years to buy a violin. He promised his deceased father that he would develop his talent for music. He is aware that he is obliged to keep this promise made to the father. At this stage he needs a new instrument to continue playing. John very much enjoys playing the violin and his dream is to become a concertmaster.

At the same time, his brother Nick has asked him for financial help. Nick had a fight with a classmate and he broke his friend's expensive, professional camera. The boy is threatening to report him to the school master if the camera is not replaced. As a troublesome teenager, John's brother has been reprimanded several times. He will probably be expelled from school if the school master learns of this incident. John despises his brother's behaviour. However, he knows that their mother would be desperate if Nick were to be expelled. John feels sorry for her after everything that their family has gone through.

What is John morally obliged to do in this situation? Should John give the girl money for treatment? Should he replace the camera? Should he buy a violin? Should he do anything else?

2.3.1. A Kantian Answer

If John turns to Kant's ethics for an answer, he realises that it is his imperfect duty to help a person in need. Both the sick girl and his brother need financial assistance. Impartiality requires him to neglect the fact that one of the needy individuals is an unknown girl, while the other is his brother. However, as a talented violinist, John also has the imperfect duty to develop his talent. He needs a new instrument in order to develop his talent further. Thus, his duty to help the other and his duty to develop his talents are in conflict. Kant does not provide guidance in the case of the conflict of duties. Whatever John chooses to do, one duty will not be fulfilled.

John has to act in respect of moral law. If he gives money for the girl's treatment because he deeply sympathises with her situation, as we have seen he does, and not because it is his duty to help a person in need, John's action will lack moral worth. Moreover, if he decides to give money to his brother because he favours his family over the unknown girl, his act also lacks moral esteem. Finally, his act again would lack moral worth if he buys a new instrument because of the joy he experiences in playing and not because he wills to develop his talent. Thus, it is not only relevant what choice he makes, but the principle on which he bases his decision.

However, John promised his deceased father that he would excel in playing the violin. If he gives the money to the girl for treatment or if he buys the camera for his brother's classmate instead of buying an instrument, he will break his promise. We have seen that keeping a promise is a perfect duty. Thus, the perfect duty to keep his promise and the imperfect duty to help the sick girl and his brother are in conflict. This might be the case when John cannot do what his imperfect duty requires him to do. Thus, as Kantian, John chooses to buy a violin in order to keep the promise made to his father.

2.3.2. A Utilitarian Answer

A utilitarian would choose an action that produces the greatest good. John's pleasure in playing the violin, as well as the satisfaction he gains from keeping the promise, should be taken into consideration, together with the consequences of saving the life of the girl and preventing Nick from being expelled from school. By saving the life of the girl the overall good would be the greatest. Thus, John should donate his money to the girl's surgery. He may have made these calculations, but he may as well donate out of compassion for the sufferings of the girl and her family. As it has been elaborated on in the section on utilitarianism, the only thing that counts in this normative theory is the overall good, regardless of the motive which induces action.

Peter Singer would argue that those who are affected by John's decision are not only John himself, his brother, their mother, the sick girl and her family, but that John's decision can have much wider repercussions. From the perspective of Singer's theory, John also has to take into account all the lives he could have saved by donating to aid agencies. Since the girl needs an expensive medical procedure, his donation could more effectively be used if sent to a charity

which provides nets to protect families from malaria in African countries. By doing this, John could save more lives.

2.3.3. Answer from the Perspective of (Neo)-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

When thinking about the moral dilemma from the perspective of virtue ethics, John asks himself what a virtuous agent would do in this situation. A virtuous person would certainly remain true to his word, i.e. keeping the promise made to his father. Also, he would develop his intellectual excellences by mastering the violin. However, being a person of practical wisdom and comprehending all the circumstances, the virtuous agent concludes that buying a violin is not the only way he can remain truthful to his father and master his excellences in playing the instrument. He may borrow a violin from a friend, use one from the conservatorium or buy a second-hand violin in good shape, which would be much less expensive, and some money would be left to contribute to the sick girl's medical procedure or to replace the broken camera.

When thinking about whether to donate money to the unknown girl or to buy the camera for his brother, saving him from being expelled from school, John is exercising his generosity towards the stranger in need as well as his bonds of affection towards his brother and his mother. His respect and devotion towards his mother, and her concern for the troublesome brother, may lead him to decide to buy the camera.

However, thinking of his brother's character, John, as a virtuous agent, is discouraged from giving to him, believing that he does not deserve it. However, he is at pains since he thinks that due to his respect for his mother and her feelings, he should help his brother, despite what he thinks of him. As a generous person he is also considering donating to the sick girl. Virtue ethics does not point towards one answer and neither action would be wrong under the circumstances. He finally decides to donate to the medical treatment of the sick girl, though not without regret and pain because he might be hurting his mother's feelings.

2.3.4. An Answer from the Perspective of Ethics of Care and Sentimentalism

Turning to ethics of care for an answer, John is obliged to meet the other as one-caring. He promised his father. The father is deceased and thus any act out of care for his father that John could do cannot be completed in his father. Since there cannot be completion, there is no

relation nor obligation. In fact, by keeping this promise, he may not be able to fulfil his obligation towards those with whom John is in caring relations.

His mother and brother are in his inner circle. Although he despises his brother's behaviour, he cares for him, as well as for their mother. He feels engrossment with the situation of both, considering how one who cares would act under such circumstances. Maybe he should buy the camera and save Nick from being expelled from school. However, thinking thoroughly about Nick's recent behaviour, talking with their mother about him, John concludes that acting as one-caring, in fact, would mean not buying the camera and letting Nick face the consequences of his behaviour. Knowing that there always will be someone to look after him, Nick may never become a responsible adult. Thus, meeting his brother as one-caring means preventing Nick from getting into greater trouble in the future. The caring relation requires John to discuss all the alternatives with both their mother and Nick. Even if Nick is angry with his brother's decision, if not at the moment, then in the future he will realise that this was the decision made by someone who truly cares for him. Also, he cares for his own needs and desires. Becoming a concertmaster would be a dream come true for him. However, taking the whole context into consideration, John may decide to go for the second-hand violin that is still in good shape. He feels strong sympathy for the sick girl. The thought of her and the suffering of her family makes him naturally caring for the girl. Although he does not know her, nor her family, he cares about them, and wishes to establish the caring relation. Knowing that his obligation towards his brother and their mother, those in John's inner circle, is already met, John decides to answer the girls' mother's call for help, and his urge to do something for the girl, thus he donates towards her surgery.

2.4. Summary of the Main Ethical Theories

All analysed normative theories maintain that we are morally obliged to help others. However, they provide different justifications and they also differ to which others we owe our help. The main arguments of normative theories in relation to helping others are summarised in Table 4.

Table 4. Normative Ethical Theories and Helping

	Am I morally obliged to help others?	Why am I morally obliged to help others?	Whom do I owe help?	Are motives relevant?	How to choose between the incompatible requests for help?

Kant's ethics	Yes	Because it is my imperfect duty	Impartial, anyone in need	Yes, motive of duty	No resolution in case of conflict of duties
Classical utilitarianism	Yes	Because I am obliged to increase the overall happiness	Impartial, anyone in need	No	Choose the action where the benefits in terms of pleasure are higher than the costs in terms of pain
Peter Singer's consequentialism	Yes	Because I am obliged to prevent something bad from happening	Impartial, anyone in need	No	Choose the action by which the most good can be done (the most lives can be saved) over a span of one's life
Aristotle's and Neo-Aristotelian ethics	Yes	Because it is what virtuous person does	Partial, Friends (loved ones) first	Yes, acting from virtue	More than one right course of action
Classical sentimentalist (Hume and Smith)	Yes	Because it is what sentiments of moral approval require	Impartial	Yes, sympathy	Come to the resolution through the reasoned scrutiny
Ethics of care	Yes	Because I am obliged to maintain caring relations	Partial, Proximate others	Yes, acting from natural and ethical caring.	Through an open dialogue and mutual understanding between the one-caring and the cared-for.

Applying normative theories in deciding what one should morally do in relation to dedicating one's material and non-material resources for the benefit of others reveals several important issues. Different theories lead John to choose different options. If he follows Kant, he would buy a violin to keep the promise made to his father. Classical utilitarianism requests from him to donate money to the girl's treatment, while still Singer's theory leads him to consider an option he did not even think as relevant.

Moreover, even when the application of the two theories leads to the same act, the justifications of the act are not the same. While as virtuous agent John refuses to buy the camera for his brother because Nick does not deserve it, as one-caring, he refuses to save his brother from being expelled from school because he cares for him and their mother, and under the circumstances it is the best way to help the brother.

In short, while they all maintain that we are morally obliged to help others, normative theories point in divergent directions and provide different justifications. This has an important implication for the practice of giving. As long as one helps the other, regardless of whether the recipient is a stranger or a dear person, she is acting as a moral agent ought to act.

2.5. Conclusion

At the end, I will integrate fruitful insights from different normative theories in an attempt to sketch an ethics of giving and provide answers to the questions outlined in the introduction of this chapter.

We are social beings, related to and dependent upon each other, which makes each of us morally obliged to help. It is our duty to remove suffering of others (or improve the quality of their lives), when possible.

Seeing someone's hardships often produces feelings of compassion and empathy. Moreover, we naturally care for those who are near and dear to us and feel that we must do something to promote their goals or remove their suffering. Those sentiments, which some people experience with a greater intensity than others do, motivate us to give our resources for their benefits.

However, these feelings do not always 'work'. We can be so deeply immersed in our own worries, or in our own endeavours, that we do not feel anything for others. Often, we have strong feelings for those whom we love, while our sympathy with the distant other is less intense. Sometimes we do not even recognise the plight of other, believing that what one feels as suffering is an exaggeration. On some occasions we think that suffering person is to be blamed for her misfortunes.

One must be aware of these and similar, often mistaken, judgements and to scrutinise them carefully, opening eyes and ears for the situations of others and their perspectives. We should always be reminded of the caring memories and our relations with others, as well as our duty to help those in need no matter whether they are near and dear to us, or complete strangers. Whether we act from the sentiment or a reason, from sympathy or duty, is unimportant, as long as the purpose of action is the benefit of the other, rather than own advantage. Helping other only to reap the benefits is using the person only as a means and neglecting her humanity.

When deciding on how to split our material and non-material resources, we should think thoroughly about the decision-making problem we face, scrutinising the available options and reasons for each choice. Sometimes we face the dilemma of whether to actualise our own dreams or to help others reach their goals, or we face incompatible requests for help. The whole context and all circumstances should be taken into consideration. The perspective one gains over an entire lifetime should be taken into account, rather than looking into each decision as isolated from all other aspects of one's life.

In some situations, we ought to put our own project first, sometimes the needs and desires of those near and dear to us, while on other occasions we should help complete strangers, even if it means going against our own benefit or that of the people we love and care for the most. However, if one never acts for the benefit of others, regardless of one's needs and desires, then one most certainly is not acting as a moral agent ought to act.

We should be reminded that some problems and dilemmas may be rethought, and alternatives could be found so that the needs and desires of the agent and of others are made compatible. There can be more than one right course of action in some cases, while others are of a kind that whatever one chooses, she would regret it later.

In choosing how to help others, rather than focusing on our own vision of what is good for the others, we should understand that what the concrete other in the concrete situation truly needs. We should also consider the conceivable consequences of different courses of action, when it is possible discuss them with the recipient and choose the act that is most, under the circumstances. Sometimes it means bringing about what makes the recipient happy, while at other times it requires going beyond subjective happiness and increasing the real freedoms of the recipient.

Chapter 3 Explaining Individual Giving

3.1. Introduction

Altruistic behaviour – actions that are beneficial to others while at the same time being costly for the actor, has puzzled evolutionary biologists and many social scientists, particularly the mainstream economists (Bowles and Gintis 2011, Hodgson 2013, Richerson and Boyd 2005). Such behaviour is puzzling because of the expectation that people are selfish, that they would rather have a free ride than dedicate their resources for the common good and that they would rather defeat than benefit others.

Nevertheless, many people give their time and money to philanthropic organisations and directly to those in need to relieve their suffering (Butcher and Einolf 2017, Ilchman et al 1998, Jung et al 2016, Moody and Breeze 2016, Wiepking and Handy 2015). Some people are even willing to place themselves in harm's way to save the life of a stranger, which is perhaps best illustrated by the rescuing of Jews during WWII (Monroe 1996, Oliner and Oliner 1988).

The questions that emerge in the context of my dissertation are: How can we explain the existence of altruistic behaviour? How can we explain individual giving? To address these questions, I will firstly discuss the findings of evolutionary biology. Then, I will turn to rational choice theory, which is applied to explain human behaviour in the Neoclassical school of economics. Since it is applied to explain a wide range of behaviours, not necessarily related to economic activities, I will outline this theory and its application to individual giving.

3.2. Evolution of Altruism

According to Darwin's *theory of natural selection*, living beings produce more offspring than the limited resources can support and therefore there is a *struggle for existence*. Individuals in a population have different genes, traits and behaviours (*variants*). Variants which are best *adapted* to their *environment* (conditions of life) are more likely to survive and reproduce, which is known as the *survival of the fittest*. Variation is *heritable*, and the offspring of survivors resemble their parents. Thus, variations of individuals who are more likely to survive and reproduce spread through a process of natural selection. In short, the inherent dynamic forces of nature allow only the fittest, the most adaptable, to survive and prosper.

Altruism in evolutionary terms means the sacrifice of fitness for the benefit of other organisms (Bowles and Gintis 2011, Simon 1983). The acts of those who benefit others at a cost to themselves, do not seem to be in line with the theory of natural selection. Here, *cost* is defined as the degree to which behaviour reduces the reproduction of the genes of the individual performing the altruistic act (“the altruist”) and *benefit* is the degree to which the behaviour increases the rate of reproduction of the genes of the recipient (ibid.). Nevertheless, organisms do sacrifice their fitness for the benefit of others.

Kin altruism and *reciprocal altruism* can be explained by the theory of natural selection (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, Dawkins 2006, Richerson and Boyd 2005, Trivers 1971). Altruistic behaviour towards those with whom we share genes is called kin altruism. The kinship theory takes a “gene's-eye view of natural selection” (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981: 1390). Altruism toward kin can be favoured by selection because of the genetical similarity between kin. Making a sacrifice for a child favours the survival and reproduction of one’s genes. Thus, an altruistic act towards one’s kin, despite the cost borne by the altruist, benefits the reproduction of his gene set. However, for selection to favour kin altruism, benefits should be higher than costs.²⁶ Apart from humans, kin altruism is common among many other organisms, an example of which is a suicidal barbed sting of the honeybee worker. However, unlike other species, humans often behave altruistically towards non-relatives.

Altruistic behaviour that can be expected to be *reciprocated* also fits well the theory of natural selection. In small groups, when the chances for interactions between the same pairs of individuals are high, natural selection can favour altruistic behaviour (Trivers 1971). However, certain conditions should be met. First, the cost of an altruistic act is lower than its benefit. Then, the chances that the two individuals will interact in the future are high and the altruist expects that the receiver will reciprocate. If a receiver does not reciprocate an altruist responds to this by denying him all altruistic acts in future. Thus, free riding has negative effects on a free rider’s life and when the benefits of lost altruistic acts are higher than the costs of reciprocating, then selection favours altruists to free-riders. In other words, under certain

²⁶ Evolutionary biologist Hamilton made a calculus of the cost-benefit ratio necessary for the kin selection to work (known as *Hamilton’s rule*). Siblings share half of their genes and one can help the other sibling as long as the benefits are twice the costs, while more-distant relatives require a higher benefit-cost ratio.

conditions, natural selection favours reciprocal altruistic behaviour because in the long run it benefits the organism performing the act (ibid.).

I argued that altruistic behaviour towards one's kin and towards people from whom one may expect a reciprocal activity is consistent with the theory of natural selection. However, people help complete strangers, and they also practice activities for the benefit of others when it is not likely that their behaviour will be reciprocated. In such cases, if the individual were to refrain from helping others his fitness or other payoffs would be higher. The explanation of how we evolved to become a species whose members help one another lies in the *gene-culture coevolution* and *cultural group selection* (Bowles and Gintis 2011, Green 2013, Hodgson 2013, Richerson and Boyd 2005).

In order to regulate altruistic and cheating tendencies in individuals, a complex psychological system has evolved (Bowles and Gintis 2011, Green 2013, Trivers 1971, Richerson and Boyd 2005). These psychological mechanisms are often called *social instincts* (Richerson and Boyd 2005). Strong positive and negative emotions regulate our interactions with others. We care about our fellow human beings and sympathise with their misfortunes. When we provide help to those in need, we often feel satisfaction and other *positive emotions*. *Shame* and *guilt* are emotions experienced when we have failed to provide support for those in need or when we take a free ride. We recognise other individuals and remember how we have treated and been treated by them, feeling *gratitude* to those who have helped us and *anger* towards those who have exploited us. Our negative reactive emotions such as anger motivate us to *punish* uncooperative individuals. We are willing to reward those who cooperate and punish people who do not. We do this even when we do not gain anything from this and even when the costs are higher than the benefits.²⁷ Our *self-esteem* and our *reputation* depend on what others think of us, where altruistic behaviour is praised and cheating despised. Finally, we perceive the social world as divided into competitive groups and we have predispositions to learn and internalise norms of the group we belong to. These “social instincts” allow the individual to

²⁷*Altruistic (moralistic) rewarding* – a predisposition to reward others for cooperation and *altruistic (moralistic punishment)* – a propensity to impose sanctions on those who violate norms and omit to reciprocate are well documented in many experiments (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).

reap the psychological benefits of an altruistic exchange and it also protects him from free-riders.²⁸

Our psychological capacities and dispositions are the products of a *gene-culture coevolution*. A coevolution of genes and culture is dynamic whereby genes affect cultural evolution and culture affects genetic evolution (Richerson and Boyd 2005).²⁹ Here *culture* is defined as *information* (any kind of conscious or unconscious mental state) that affects individuals' *behaviour*, which is acquired through *social learning* (ibid.). Words like *idea*, *knowledge*, *belief*, *value*, *skill*, and *attitude* are usually used to describe this information. Culture is acquired, stored and transmitted by a population (group) of individuals. As with other species, humans acquire knowledge through genetic transmission and individual learning, but unlike other animals, humans also learn from one another, which is known as the process of *social learning* or *cultural transmission* (Hodgson 2012, Richerson and Boyd 2005).³⁰ People in culturally distinct groups behave differently, mostly because they have acquired different skills, beliefs, and values. These differences persist because people learn from their parents, other adults and their peers.

The concept of gene-culture coevolution implies that a culture is a part of the environment where genes are selected, while genetic bases influence the cultural evolution. Although it is intuitively conceivable that the way we think and behave is shaped by our biology, that is our genes, it is less easy to imagine that our culture influences our genes. An example of gene-culture coevolution is the evolution of adult lactose digestion (Richerson and Boyd 2005). Milk has always been food for mammal babies. Since lactose only occurred in mother's milk, adult mammals had no need for the enzyme necessary to digest lactose. The majority of people can digest milk as infants but not as adults. However, some human adults can digest lactose. This is because they possess a certain gene that controls adult lactose digestion. This gene evolved as a result of an adaptation to the habit of milk consumption. People have kept cows and consumed fresh milk in some parts of the world (e.g. northwest Europe) for a long time.

²⁸ It should be noted that these psychological benefits are not the reasons of an altruistic act. They are rather its by-products.

²⁹In biology, the term *coevolution* refers to "systems in which two species are important parts of each other's environments so that evolutionary changes in one species induce evolutionary modifications in the other" (Richerson and Boyd 2005: 192).

³⁰ Some form of culture is also detected in nonhuman primates (McGrew 1998).

Calculations indicate that there has been plenty of time for this gene to evolve since the origin of dairying (ibid.). Once it is spread it encouraged even more milk consumption.

As with the culture of milk consumption and lactose digestion, a gene-culture coevolution explains the origins of altruistic behaviour found among humans. As it has already been pointed out, humans, like other organisms, behave altruistically towards their kin and in small groups when the reciprocation of the altruistic act is expected, but unlike other organisms, people often act altruistically towards complete strangers. In order to understand the process by which natural selection favours altruistic behaviour among unrelated humans, we need to introduce the concepts of *multilevel selection* and *group selection*. We can think about natural selection occurring at a series of levels: among genes within an individual, among individuals within a group, and among groups (Richerson and Boyd 2005). This process was introduced by biologist Price, who described the process of multilevel selection through a mathematical formalism called the *Price covariance equation*. Using Price's method, kin selection is conceptualised as occurring at two levels: selection *within* family groups favours free-riders, because defectors always do better than other individuals within their own group, but selection *among* family groups favours groups with more helpers, because each helper increases the average fitness of the group (ibid.).

Group selection is a mechanism of evolution when natural selection acts at the group level. In this concept, groups are adaptive and those, which better adapt to their environment reproduce and prosper, while those that do not adapt disappear.³¹ Group selection favours traits that maximise the relative fitness of groups, rather than that of individuals (Sober and Wilson 1998). For group selection to work, there is a need for a *conflict* and a *heritable variation* between groups with the corresponding *variation in fitness* (Richerson and Boyd 2005, Sober and Wilson 1998). There are two concepts of group selection: *genetic group selection* and *cultural group selection*. Although the group is the object of selection in both concepts, they differ because they focus on separate levels and mechanisms of inheritance (Hodgson 2013). In the genetic group, genes are causes of variation, while cultural and informational mechanisms (such as individual habits and social customs) are the sources of variation in cultural group selection (ibid.). In order for the genetic group selection to work, there is a need for the

³¹ It should be noted that a disappearance of a group does not necessarily mean that all its members are killed. They are rather assimilated, absorbed by the other, more successful group.

restriction of intergroup migration and the limitation of genetic mixing. When variation between groups is based on genetic material, then even very small amounts of migration are sufficient to reduce the variation. Although evidence on the intergroup migration among early humans is lacking, based on the evidence among primates, we can conclude that migration between groups occurred (ibid.). This makes genetic group selection an unimportant force in evolution (Richerson and Boyd 2005). However, migration between culturally different groups does not result in a decrease in between-group variation. This is due to the *conformist bias* – a propensity to do what the majority does and *altruistic (moralistic) punishment* – inclination of group members to punish individuals who violate group norms (ibid.). These two mechanisms, which evolved to assure group cohesion, induce migrants to adhere to the rules of behaviour (norms) in the group they migrated to.

Our Pleistocene ancestors lived in communities where different groups competed for material sources. Groups whose members were predisposed to cooperate and uphold the norms of sharing and caring for each other tended to survive and expand relative to other groups (Bowles and Gintis 2011, Hodgson 2013, Green 2013). An environment of between-group conflict favoured the evolution of the *social instincts* to assure within-group cooperation (Richerson and Boyd 2005). Group selection favoured the evolution of social instincts, which bring a competitive advantage to groups, such as fairness and sympathy. Individuals who did not possess these social instincts were denied the goods of the group and mating partners.

It should be noted that human genetic features have changed very little in thousands of years, while culture evolves at a much faster pace (Hodgson 2013). Our innate social psychology is probably the same as that of people in Pleistocene (2,588,000 to 11,700 years ago). Evolution in our culture, of the way we think and behave, happens at much faster paced than the evolution in our genes. This is exactly why, according to the evolutionary biologists, culture emerged in the first place. Culture arose because it can evolve adaptations to a changing environment that could not be done by genes alone.

The same psychological traits and social norms that have made us predisposed to favour group benefits over our own interests, often prompt us to favour our group members' or our group's interests over the benefits of the members of other groups. This is why we are often *parochially altruistic* or *tribalistic* (Green 2013). However, we do benefit individuals outside of our social groups, although perhaps not to the same extent as we favour our own group members. This is

possible because our behaviour is led by both emotions and reasoning (Green 2013). On the one hand, we have emotions. They are automatic processes that, based on the lessons of past experience, exert pressure on behaviour. This experience comes in three different forms. First, our emotions are shaped by our genes, then by cultural learning, and finally by personal experience. On the other, we are capable of reasoning. Reasoning involves the conscious application of decision rules. When we behave based on reasoning, we know what we are doing and why. We have conscious access to the rules on which we base our decisions. Although our emotions usually prompt us to favour our group members, regardless of whether the group is perceived in terms of ethnic origin or social status, since we are capable of reasoning and imagining we can go beyond the limits of one's group and engage in activities which benefit complete strangers (ibid.).

The subject of my PhD has allowed me, albeit only briefly, to touch on some possible explanations of the evolution of altruism among humans. According to the evolutionary theories of altruism, behaviour which promotes the reproductive success of the receiver at the cost of the altruist is favoured by natural selection, because it is either beneficial for the altruist in the long run, or for his genes, or for the group he belongs to. Thus, in line with Trivers, it can be argued that “models that attempt to explain altruistic behaviour in terms of natural selection are models designed to take the altruism out of altruism” (Trivers 1971: 35). However, altruism among people emerges as a distinctly human combination of innate and learned behaviours. Not only do we benefit the members of our own group, but we are capable of transcending our tribalistic instincts and benefit strangers at our own personal expense.

3.3. Rational Choice Theory

As defined by rational choice theory, a *rational individual* is a person able to precisely define the *problem*, set a clear *goal* and establish a set of *alternatives* (options) to achieve the goal. Through an unbiased collection and interpretation of information, the individual determines the characteristics of the alternatives on which he assesses their attractiveness and makes a decision. When choosing an alternative, a rational individual is guided by the principle of *maximising personal utility*. However, the term maximisation of personal utility does not assume that individuals are motivated solely by pecuniary rewards or other selfish gains. Behaviour is driven by many other motives, but rational choice theory assumes that no matter whether they are “selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic, individuals maximise

welfare as they conceive it” (Becker 1993: 386). However, reinterpreting all motives as some form of self-seeking, we lose sight of the complexity of human motivations.

Experimental evidence has shown that people often do not choose options that maximise their material payoffs.³² Experimental evidence in economics comes from, among others, public good, ultimatum and dictator games (Bowles and Gintis 2011, Hodgson 2013, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, Fray 1997). *Public goods games* are played by a group of individuals (for example 10) where each individual is given an endowment (e.g. 10 euro). Individuals can keep the endowments or invest them for the public good. All the money invested is multiplied (e.g. by two) and distributed equally among all the members of the group, regardless of whether they have made a contribution. If everyone contributes the endowment, everyone gets 20 euros, but if only one member invests in the public good, he, as all the others, receives 2 euros. An individual motivated by pecuniary rewards would keep the endowment for himself because of the risk that he would receive a smaller amount if other did not contribute. However, the empirical evidence suggests that players often invest in public goods. (Hodgson 2013). In *ultimatum games*, played by two players, one divides an amount of money between himself and the other player. If the second player accepts the division, then each receives their allocated amounts. If the second player rejects it, then both players get nothing. A payoff maximiser would prefer even the lowest possible allocation since it is better to get something than nothing. However, many players have rejected divisions. Instead of payoff maximisation, players’ behaviour is influenced by honour, custom, and fairness, even when they cannot bargain with one another and the game is not repeated (Hodgson 2013, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). In *dictator games* one player is asked to allocate a part of an assigned endowment to a passive recipient. A payoff maximiser would keep all the endowment for himself. However, typically more than 60% of subjects allocate some money to the recipient, which on average is about a fifth of the endowment (Bowles and Gintis 2011, Fray 1997). Many economists have now abandoned payoff rationality and replaced it with a broader concept of rationality defined as *consistency of behaviour* (Hodgson 2013). However, rationality as defined in this way is still consistent with utility maximisation.

³² A *payoff* is a reward in a game (usually a monetary reward) that is known to all players. A *payoff maximisation* is maximisation of those rewards by players, given the information available to them and their assumption that other players are also payoff maximisers (Hodgson 2013).

A rational individual estimates the benefits of the alternatives based on his desires, aspirations, beliefs, tastes, commitments, internalised norms, psychological propensities, affective relationships with others (Bowles and Gintis 2011). As a product of the influence of these factors he forms his *preferences*. When he estimates two alternatives, one may consider them to be equally good, and is then *indifferent* in the choice between them, or he can think that one is superior to the other, when he *prefers* one to the other.

Preferences are stable and unchanged from the time of the decision (moment when an individual makes his choice of alternative) to the moment of its realisation (outcome of the chosen alternative). Moreover, preferences are conceptualised as individual characteristics and independent of social context. Economists take preferences as given, without analysing their formation (Halfpenny 1999).

In order to create rational choices, preferences must satisfy *logical properties*: completeness, asymmetry, and transitivity. The *completeness* condition implies that the individual is able to compare any two alternatives (x and y) and determine his attitude towards them. Meaning, he either prefers x to y, or he prefers y to x or he is indifferent between the two. A rational individual always knows what he wants. The *asymmetry* condition excludes the possibility that, when comparing two alternatives x and y, a decision maker considers x better than y, and at the same time y better than x, or one alternative is preferred to another and at the same time both considered as equally good. Also, if two alternatives are considered equally good, he cannot simultaneously prefer one over the other. The *transitivity* condition requires that when comparing three options x, y and z: a) if a person considers x to be better than y and y better than z, then he also must consider x as better than z; b) if a person prefers x to y, and is indifferent between y and z, then he prefers x to z; c) if a person is indifferent between x and y and prefers y to z, then he prefers x to z; d) if a person is indifferent between x and y, and is indifferent between y and z, then he is indifferent between x and z. When these three logical properties are satisfied, then it is the case of *strong ordering* (Sen 2017). Many examples have been offered to show that transitivity property does not hold in general, particularly when comparing a series of objects that are so arranged that we cannot distinguish between two adjacent members of the series, whereas we can distinguish between members at greater distance (Feldman and Serrano 2005). The requirement of transitivity is weakened for *quasi-transitivity* (if a person considers x to be better than y and y better than z, then he also must consider x as better than z) and *acyclicity* (for any list of alternatives x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n if a person

prefers x_1 to x_2 , and x_2 to x_3 , ..., and x_{n-1} to x_n , then he cannot consider x_n better than x_1), without dramatic change in rational choice (Sen 2017).

A rational individual knows all possible events that may occur and influence the outcome of his alternatives. Also, he is capable of calculating the probabilities of their occurrence. When all these requirements are met, the decision maker is capable of comparing alternatives in pairs and forming a ranking list of alternatives. This ranking is called the *preference function*. He can join a real number to each alternative that reflects its *relative importance* - the *utility* that the alternative gives him, creating a *utility function*.

Regardless of their complexity, a rational individual is still able to identify the dominant alternative (one that is in all relevant characteristics at least equivalent to the other options and at least has one feature better than the others). Neither the manner of presentation of alternatives, nor the order in which he observes them affect his choice. If a dominant alternative does not exist, then he is capable of choosing the optimal one based on relevant characteristics and relative importance attributed to them; the one that maximises his utility.

Since individuals make decisions in conditions of *limited resources*, maximisation is always done with certain *restrictions*. This is known as the *budget constraint*. One may want to buy an unlimited number of different products, but the amount of money that someone has at his disposal forces him to come up with a specific combination of goods and services to obtain maximal possible utility for a given budget. Not only in economic decision-making, the principle of budget constraint and making trade-offs is applied to any other decision.

In short, mainstream economists describe motivation through utility function, which is a mathematical expression of what people care about. Any decision that is in accordance with the personal preferences of the decision-maker and which, under the circumstances, maximises his utility is considered rational.

3.3.1. Rational Choice of Giving

We have seen that the rational choice theory postulates that someone is driven by the maximisation of her utility function, regardless whether she is engaged within the sphere of business, family life or individual giving. The latter two do not seem to be the subject matter of economics. Nevertheless, economists analyse them by applying the so-called *economic*

approach.³³ Economists try to understand and explain the world by assuming that individuals make their decisions based on a calculation of how limited resources, such as time, money and energy can be best used to reach their goals. In other words, they maximise their utility – “welfare as they conceive it” (Becker 1993: 386). Once the scientific field of economics was defined by its method rather than its subject matter, economics became a study of “everything” (Chang 2014).³⁴ Thus, economics “colonises” other social sciences by extending its methods to explain phenomena that have been outside its scope (Fine 1999). This is known by its critics as “economics imperialism” (Chang 2014, Fine and Milonakis 2009, Mäki 2008).³⁵

When deciding whether to dedicate their material and non-material resources for the benefit of others, rational individuals *weight the costs and benefits* of such activity. They apply the principle of maximal utility when deciding to give. In the literature on economics of prosocial behaviour there are three motives that drive giving: 1) *self-interest* and *enlightened self-interest*; 2) *pro-social preferences*; 3) *reciprocity*; (Meier 2006). Although mainstream economists allow for different motives, they are all expressed in terms of utility gained by the decision maker, as it will be briefly outlined.

Self-interest, Enlightened Self-interest

According to the theories of giving based on *self-interest*, people dedicate their time and money for the benefit of others or the common good to receive some material or non-material *benefits* for themselves. For example, donors to opera houses may gain access to special events or gala dinners (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011c).

³³ The term was coined by Gary Becker in his book *Economic Approach to Human Behaviour* published in 1976.

³⁴ The Neoclassical school uses a (a variation of) definition of economics given by Lionel Robbins in his book *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science* published in 1932, which defines economics as “the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (Chang 2014).

³⁵ It should be noted that there is a distinction between ‘economics imperialism’ and ‘economic imperialism’. While the former means academic tendency of economics toward explanatory expansion beyond the boundaries of its subject matter, the later means the economy-driven imperialism in international relations and the global economy (Mäki 2008).

Also, people give because they are motivated by an *enlightened self-interest* (Collard 1978), or *self-interest rightly understood* (Tocqueville 1840 in Moody and Breeze ed. 2016). This happens when one realises that what is in the public interest is eventually in the interest of the individual. For example, a person donates blood because he thinks that he or a member of his family may need a blood transfusion and therefore expects that there will be someone to donate for him. Titmuss' famous analysis of motives for blood donation confirms that most blood donors are motivated to donate blood believing that someone will donate for them or their children if needed (Titmuss 1970). Individuals who are driven solely by self-interest would certainly free ride when it comes to blood donation, since it is more rational to reap the benefits of the public good without paying the costs of it. This leads to the conclusion that individuals are not solely motivated by self-interest in the narrow sense.

Economic models of human behaviour assume that behaviour depends on relative costs (Meier 2006). The more expensive it is to give the less likely it is that one gives. It is assumed that people have *extrinsic motivation* and that their behaviour can be induced by external intervention, such as *monetary incentive* (Frey 1997). That monetary incentives may induce monetary contributions to charitable organisations is shown in the studies on tax deductibility for charitable contributions (Meier 2006). However, people are often *intrinsically motivated*. Material incentives may encourage self-interested individuals to give, but inhibit those with intrinsic motivation, which is known as the *motivational crowding-out effect* (Frey 1997). That monetary incentives discourage those intrinsically motivated is shown in the example of paying for blood donations (Titmuss 1970). Thus, the application of rewards for undertaking an activity such as giving may have negative consequences.

Pro-social Preferences

To account for intrinsic motivations, economists have developed a concept of *prosocial preferences*, when an actor's utility depends directly on the utility of other people. In other words, utility function of the donor and recipient are *interrelated* (Schwartz 1970). The utility of others can 1) fully influence donor's utility (*pure altruism*), or 2) partly influence donor's utility (*impure altruism*), or 3) have an effect on one's utility that depends on the difference between one's own and another's well-being (*inequality aversion - fairness*) (Meier 2006). Prosocial preferences imply that people care about the wellbeing of others and that they are not

motivated solely by self-interest. However, they still choose alternatives that maximise their own utility.

Pure Altruism

Altruism is the preference for the good of the other and acting in favour of this good (Kolm 2006). In models of *pure altruism*, a donor derives utility from seeing that someone else's satisfaction or welfare (utility) is increased (Andreoni 1990, Arrow 1972, Becker 1976). Pure altruists enjoy seeing that other's utility is increased regardless of the source of that improvement (Meier 2006).

Contributions of a pure altruist are inversely related to the contributions of others to the same cause. If other people or the state contributes, a pure altruist will reduce her contribution by the same extent. In other words, purely altruistic motivation would lead individuals who know about an increase in contribution by others for example in 1 euro, to reduce their own contribution by 1 euro. This is known as *crowding out effect*. Empirical evidence shows that, though crowding out may exist, it is less than perfect (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). It is also complicated by the fact that when there are many donors it is difficult for any of them to assess the impact on the recipient's utility of their own contribution (Andreoni 2006). In addition, when people see that others make contributions to certain charities this may be a signal that they have confidence in this organisation, and that their contribution will make a difference, prompting them to give to those organisations. This is known in psychology as *efficacy* and it is seen as an important factor in deciding to give one's resources for the benefit of others (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a).

Impure Altruism

Because pure altruism theories do not make empirically accurate predictions with respect to crowding-out effects, Andreoni (1990) extends the altruism model with a *psychological benefit* that one obtains from the act of giving, creating the concept of *impure altruism*. An impure altruist derives satisfaction from giving, which is known as the *warm-glow effect* (Andreoni 1990). A donor derives utility not only from an increase in a recipient's utility but from the fact that he himself has contributed to this increase. According to Andreoni, impure altruism is the best explanation of human behaviour related to charitable giving, and the model built on this presumption leads to more accurate predictions (ibid.). The question that arises is whether such

motivation can be still titled as altruistic, since the donor is motivated by the psychological benefit from the act of giving.

Inequality Aversion – “Fairness”

A sense of fairness affects human behaviour (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). To account for this, economists model fairness as “self-centred inequity aversion” (ibid: 819). Inequity aversion means that people are willing to give up certain material payoff in order to reach more equitable outcomes. When people do not care about inequity per se but are only interested in the fairness of their own material payoff relative to the payoff of others, the concern for inequality is “self-centred”. In deciding whether to contribute his resources for the benefit of others, one’s relative standing in the income distribution is important (Meier 2006). Some empirical evidence shows that inequality aversion has significant effects on charitable contributions (Derin-Güre and Uler 2010).

Norm of Reciprocity

Reciprocity in economic models means that people behave with friendliness as a response to the friendly behaviour of others and they behave in a hostile manner in response to unfriendly behaviour (Meier 2006). Reciprocity is an important factor in explaining prosocial behaviour, as experimental studies show. When individuals are given an option to reciprocally punish free-riders in public good games they are ready to undertake costly punishment, and this leads to high rates of contributions to the public good (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). Moreover, it is shown that intentions are crucial for reciprocity. When a low offer is generated by a random mechanism, players in ultimatum games accept lower amounts than when it is chosen by the other player (Meier 2006). In addition, reciprocity models imply that people react and adjust their behaviour to the behaviour of others. If a member of a group who play public good game estimates that others will contribute, she will also contribute. This makes individuals *conditional co-operators* (Bowles and Gintis 2011, Meier 2006).

Field experiments of monetary donations to charitable organisations when a gift is included in the solicitation letter are inconclusive. It is expected that when one gets something and then he is asked to donate money the gift would induce him to reciprocate. There is some evidence showing that the likelihood of donations is higher among those receiving a gift (Meier 2006), while some studies show no effect (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). However, a gift may be

perceived as a *material incentive* rather than initiation of a reciprocal relationship, which may crowd out intrinsic motivation, as it has already been pointed out.

Reciprocity as defined in economic models and tested in games and experiments is rather a narrow concept. In “real life”, it entails establishing relations between people or groups, when each act is a part of a chain of actions and where donors and recipients constantly change side through a substantive period of time. Reciprocity as seen in anthropological and sociological studies will be elaborated on in Chapter 4.

3.2.2. Can Rational Choice Theory Explain Giving?

There are numerous objections to the main postulates of the rational choice theory and at least six critics of rationality conventionally defined have been awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics (Hodgson 2013). Generally, we can group objections to rational choice theory in two: 1) human incapability of satisfying conditions of rationality; 2) poor explanatory power of the theory.

Bounded Rationality

Due to the limits in our computational abilities, we are not capable of obtaining and analysing all the information necessary for ranking the alternatives and choosing the one that maximises our utility. Since our rationality is *bounded*, instead of maximising we are *satisficing*, meaning that we choose the option that is good enough (Simon 1955).

Not only does actual behaviour depart from the behaviour as depicted by rational choice theory, but it departs in a rather systematic way (Kahneman 2011). Instead of careful collection and analysis of the information, we use *heuristics* – mental shortcuts, intuitive judgements. Although they are often good enough without being too demanding on the brain's resources, heuristics can lead to systematic deviation to behaviour from the “rational” as expected by rational choice theory.

Our choices are affected by the way a problem is presented, which is known as *framing effects* (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). We tend to avoid risk when the problem is presented in a “positive frame” (for example, in terms of lives saved), while when the same problem is presented in a “negative frame” (lives lost) we seek risk. In other words, in essentially the same

decision-making problem, we choose different alternatives depending on the way options are presented (Plous 1993).

Moreover, we often act on a whim, without giving careful thought to define our goals. Instead of carefully calculating the probability of the occurrence of future events and how they influence the outcomes of our alternatives, we base our decisions expecting that the future will resemble the past or we follow the crowd (Keynes 2008 [1936]).

In short, people do not possess the intellectual capacities necessary for the fulfilment of the requirements of rational choice, as defined by the rational choice theory. We are simply not capable of maximising utility. However, economists have found a way around this. Rather than “real” utility maximisers, individuals are seen *as if* they maximise their utility functions. This comes from Friedman’s famous essay on “The Methodology of Positive Economics”, where he argues that a correct prediction can be made on the presumptions that do not fit well in the “real world” (Freidman 1953).

Self-interest and Everything Else

Even when we are aware of our best interests, we sometimes chose options which are not in line with what we perceive as beneficial. We often act upon our short-term desires that sometimes conflict with our long-term goals. Thus, though we may know what we should do rationally, we often fail to act in this way. In such situations, we are facing a *weakness of will* (Aristotle 2009).

Furthermore, we often have conflicting preferences. We behave differently when taking on different roles. For example, when doing business, an individual will advance his own purposes, without any regard for the other individual’s purposes, which is known as *non-tuism* (Wicksteed 1957), while on other occasions, for example, with friends and family, the same individual will behave in a tender and caring fashion.

Our motivation is much more complex than the rational choice theory presumes (Batson 2011). We have sense of fairness, we follow the norm of reciprocity, we care about our fellow human beings, we derive satisfaction from helping others, we are moved by patriotism, friendship, love, etc. When all the complex motives that move individuals are “translated” into utilities much of the motivational complexity is lost. Such approach Sen calls *definitional egoism*,

where an individual seeks to maximise his utility function no matter whether he is “a single-minded egoist or a raving altruist or a class-conscious militant” (Sen 1977: 323).

Some individuals are motivated by the welfare of others more often than others. Where do such preferences come from? Economists take preferences as given, without reference to how they are created. Our activities are socially embedded (Halfpenny 1999). We interpret the world we live in and these socially constructed meanings are critical to understanding our activity. Our preferences are influenced by our social environment, our family, friends, neighbours, and all the groups we belong to and identify with. Although we have some choice over who we are and what we want, we are much less “free” than it is postulated by mainstream economics.³⁶

Moreover, we belong to and identify with more than one social group, with people of the same religion, same language group, same race, same gender, same political beliefs, or same profession. Thus, we have *multiple identities* (Sen 2010), which impel us to do things that we feel we really “must” do. However, rational choice theory interprets any kind of behaviour and each choice *as if* it maximises personal utility, where utility can be encompassed. Thus, while appearing to explain “everything”, this theory does not really *explain* much.

3.3. Conclusion

In this chapter, a theoretical discussion of the origins of altruistic behaviour has been presented. An evolutionary explanation of the origins of behaviour in terms of reproductive success which is beneficial for the receiver while costly for the actor, lies in kin and reciprocal altruism for altruistic acts that benefit family members and those with whom the interaction is likely to

³⁶ It should be noted that there are economists in the mainstream tradition who take into account “the social”, such as George Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton (2010). In their book titled “Identity Economics”, they argue that people divide themselves and others into social categories (such as “the women”, “the thirteen-olds”, “the Manchester United supporters”) and they derive their identity (who they are) from those categories. Each category has its norms and ideals that influence behaviour. Although much of the time social categories define us, people often have some choice over who they are. In the framework of those authors, individuals’ decisions are driven by their preferences and social categories. Some choose actions which maximise their utility, given their identity, social categories and related norms. Although the authors take into consideration social categories, norms and identities, they are all only elements in a utility function.

happen again. Altruistic behaviour towards strangers can be explained with gene-culture coevolution and group selection.

It has been shown that rational choice theory, which originated in Neoclassical economics and has been applied to explain various phenomena, cannot explain individual giving. Utility maximisation, the central tenet of the rational choice theory, in fact has broadened the concept of selfishness so much so that it includes even actions that are costly for the actor while the receiver is the only beneficiary, without reference to the complexity of people's motivation and the social and institutional factors that shape our choices.

Chapter 4 Towards an Interdisciplinary Explanation of Individual Giving

4.1. Introduction

People have dedicated their material and non-material resources for the benefit of others and the common good throughout recorded history and in different cultures (Gouldner 1960, Komter 2005, Mauss 2011, Ilchman et al. 1998, Moody and Breeze 2016). However, not all people give, and some give more or more often than others. These differences could perhaps be attributed to the differences in personal characteristics, which need to be examined in order to elucidate giving.

Moreover, the way giving is channelled is not uniform. In some countries, there are high rates of giving to charitable organisations, while in others such practices are missing, but people give to each other directly (Butcher and Einolf 2017, Wiepking and Handy 2015). Thus, country-level differences and factors that create them need to be taken into consideration to understand individual giving. The questions raised in this chapter:

- Which factors induce individuals to dedicate their material and non-material resources for the benefit of others and the common good?
- What are the contextual factors that promote different forms of giving?

These questions have been addressed by scholars from different disciplines, starting with evolutionary biology, to social psychology, sociology, economics and political science. Each of them brings their own theoretical and empirical insights that can explain certain aspects of individual giving. To gain a profound understanding of this phenomenon, it is necessary to take into consideration findings of various disciplines and approaches, which will be the focus of this chapter.

I propose that individual giving, as a particular form of behaviour, is the result of a *deliberative process*, dependent on situational and personal factors. This process is not always a conscious reflection. People who performed heroic acts in emergency situations usually report that they did not think but helped spontaneously. However, in line with Sober and Wilson, I argue that any purposeful action, is a result of thinking, which can “occur in a flash, but it is thinking nonetheless” (Sober and Wilson 1998: 211). In other words, there is a decision-making process

that a person goes through before giving time and money to organisations and other individuals. The steps that one goes through when providing help are:

- a) Noticing the need for help;
- b) Deciding whether to provide help;
- c) Deciding what kind of help to provide; and
- d) Implementing the chosen course of action.³⁷

Each of these steps in the decision-making process is shaped by *individual* and *contextual* factors which influence whether one will dedicate her material and/or non-material resources for the benefit of others or the common good and in what ways.

4.2. Individual Factors

Dedicating one's material and non-material resources for the benefit of others and for the common good is to the greatest extent influenced by *subjective dispositions* and *personal resources*. Whether one gives her time and money depends on her awareness of the need for help, her motivation to give and internalised social norms.³⁸ One may be willing to give, but due to the lack of personal resources she may be impeded to do so. Thus, in order to give, one also has to have a command of personal resources in terms of income, education, time and health.

4.2.1. Subjective Dispositions

In explaining behaviour, psychologists look at *situational factors* and *subjective dispositions* (Staub 2003). Characteristics of the situation - including the identity of the recipient - the

³⁷ This decision-making process of helping is derived from the bystander intervention decision model of Latané and Darley (see Dovidio and Penner 2001).

³⁸ Apart from the outlined subjective dispositions, the influence of personality traits and values on giving has also been studied. For example, it was found that religious, political and prosocial values influence donating to organisations (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011(c)). Also, it was found that conscientiousness and neuroticism are inversely related to donating time and money, while openness to experience is positively related (Brown and Taylor 2015). However, the scope of my PhD allows me to focus only on perceptions, motives and norms.

anonymity of the helper, and the number and identity of observers, are also important factors in deciding to give (Staub 2003). For example, if we believe that a person is in need because of his own misguided actions, we may believe that he does not deserve our attention and help. We may think that a homeless person we have encountered has lost their home due to an imprudent lifestyle.³⁹

Moreover, the presence of other people influences the way we see our role in providing help. When there are many people around a person in need, then responsibility is diffused, and each person feels less responsible for the misfortunate (Staub 2003). In a series of experiments, Latane and Darley explored the influence of the presence of other bystanders on the likelihood that people will take action in emergencies and found that with an increase in the number of bystanders, there was a decrease in the subject's tendency to take an action, which became known as the bystander effect (ibid.).

The research on providing or refraining from providing help to someone in dire need emerged within psychology after the famous case of Kitty Genovese in the mid-1960s (Staub 2003). According to social psychology textbooks, Kitty Genovese was knifed to death outside her apartment in Queens, while 38 witnesses watched from their windows for the duration of the attack without intervening (Manning, Levin and Collins 2007). The "38 witnesses parable" results in the inference that "crowds, and groups more generally, could be dangerous because they promote inactivity" (ibid: 560). However, "the three key features of the Kitty Genovese story that appear in social psychology textbooks (stating there were 38 witnesses, that the witnesses watched from their windows for the duration of the attack, and that the witnesses did not intervene) are not supported by the available evidence" (ibid: 559). By challenging the story of 38 witnesses, Manning, Levin and Collins (2007) elucidate on the potential of the group to promote helping behaviour. For example, the possibility of communication among bystanders protected against the bystander effect (Darly et al. 1973 quoted in Manning, Levin and Collins 2007). Also, if a group is more cohesive before an emergency, this prevents the inactivity of the group in terms of providing help (Rutkowski et al 1983 quoted in Manning, Levin and Collins 2007).

³⁹ This of course may be the result of rationalisation, or publicly created opinion.

In short, while the characteristics of the situation influences one's decision to provide help, not everyone behaves in the same way under the same circumstances. Our behaviour is also dependent on *subjective dispositions*, such as *perception*, and the *motives* and the *norms* we internalise.⁴⁰

Perceiving the Need for Help

In order to give, donors first must become aware of the need for support (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). *Perceiving* a need involves noticing a negative discrepancy between another's current state and what is desirable for the other on one or more dimensions of wellbeing (Batson 2011). Elements of wellbeing that are considered desirable are the absence of physical pain, anxiety, stress, danger, and disease, but also the presence of physical pleasure, positive affect, satisfaction, and security (ibid).

For example, one may see a homeless person on the street on a rainy day begging for money and clothes, perceiving that this person is feeling cold and concluding that there is need for action to be taken to remove his current undesirable state. A need may exist in a very specific group, which can be a very small subsection of the population (Mohan and Breeze 2015). For example, there are charities in the UK dedicated to helping vegetarians (ibid.) Donations to such charities can be led by the perception that there is a person in hardship and distress because of the diet change. Thus, a need can be rather broadly defined.

Awareness of needs is usually the result of the activities of those who seek help or organise on behalf of others (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). For example, someone may learn that his colleague's child needs expensive medical treatment, or hear on television about the Syrian refugee crisis, or receive a letter requesting donations from an animal welfare charity learning that polar bears are under threat of extinction, etc. Awareness of needs is facilitated by the

⁴⁰ Here I classify norms under personal dispositions, following Musick and Wilson (2008). It should be stressed that norms are rules of (appropriate) behaviour in groups. Thus, norms 'exist' out of individuals. Nevertheless, in order to influence behaviour, norms need to be internalised – accepted by the actor. Through social learning, from our parents and peers, we learn these rules. Although most of the time we are not even aware of the social rules we are following, we are still often capable of become aware of them and even going against the rules of our group. Norms will be elaborated on in more detail in the next section.

media. Natural disasters covered by mass media usually provoke quick actions by individuals willing to help those who suffer (ibid.).

What is particularly important for the perception of needs and the resulting action of giving is the *solicitation* of giving. In most cases, contributions follow solicitations. Solicitation increases both the likelihood of giving time (Putnam 2000) and the number of hours volunteered (Sokolowski 1996). The study of the probabilities that people volunteer time or donate money or property given they are solicited conducted on the 1994 Independent Sector Survey of Giving and Volunteering in the USA shows that 80% of those solicited for volunteering did volunteer and 85% of solicited for donation donated some money or property (Bryant et. al. 2003). Furthermore, experimental studies show that actively asking for contributions rather than presenting the opportunity to give increases the likelihood that people will donate (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). In other words, most often, people give because they are asked to.

Although we are surrounded by information regarding the suffering of others and appeals to help those in need, we do not always take notice of these appeals, nor do we pay much attention to them. Subjective perceptions of need are crucial. We will always be driven to give to causes that are close to our hearts or have touched us personally. For example, people who have relatives suffering from a specific illness are more likely to give to charities fighting those diseases (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a, Walter et al 2015).

Sometimes people actively seek to give, analysing different causes and organisations that will receive their donation, thinking about how much to give and what method to use in order to make a gift (Mohan and Breeze 2016). However, there is evidence that many donors do not really pay close attention to the causes to which they donate (Breeze 2010). There is much ambivalence regarding what they support and why, even with the most committed donors (ibid.). This opens the possibility that what a charity does and who it helps matters less to donors than other factors, such as, for example, the sense of satisfaction or wellbeing that a person derives from giving (ibid.). It may be that people decide to give on a whim, or that they value giving itself rather than the cause to which they give.

There is “an element of self”, to use Sen’s words (Sen 1977), in everything we do. Thus, what we notice as a need, and who we see as needy, certainly depends on our experience, goals, the values and the norms that we adhere to.

Motives

Once we have noticed that there is a need for help, we then decide whether or not to provide it. In deciding whether to provide help to someone in need *motives* are crucial. To be motivated to do something requires that we have a *desire* to achieve a certain state and a *belief* about how to achieve that state (Sober and Wilson 1998). *Motives* are goal-directed psychological forces in a given situation (Batson et al. 2002, Batson 2011).

Motives are *goal-directed*, which means that they urge us to achieve a *desirable change in the experienced world* (ibid.). This change might be tiny, such as having a sandwich (when feeling hungry), but it can also be of a greater magnitude, such as improving the living conditions of refugees. A goal may be, and most often is, consciously set. For example, Pitter’s goal is to enjoy classical music and therefore he goes to a piano concert. However, we may act without really being aware of the goal we want to attain. Thus, the goal may be unconsciously set. For example, we internalise norms of appropriate behaviour in our society and behave in accordance with them, without really being aware of the goals of such behaviour.

Motives are *psychological forces*, meaning that they are *desires* that push us to attain the goal. To have a desire means wanting to have something or wishing for something to happen. The concept of desire does not necessarily include feelings and sensations, but they are sometimes accompanied by feelings. Mary may *feel* pity for a homeless person, and this feeling may induce a desire to help him. Alternatively, she might not feel empathy for his suffering, but she may *think* that it is her duty to help the needy, which then triggers a desire to help the beggar and give him some money.⁴¹

Finally, motives are not unidimensional, in a sense that whatever one does cannot be reduced to one motive. They are often different in different *situations*. Although Pit is motivated by his own welfare when negotiating a business contract, when he takes care of his sister’s children while she is on a mindfulness course, his sister’s wellbeing is his goal. Moreover, the same

⁴¹ This example is adapted from Sen (1977).

person, in relatively similar situations, may be moved by different motives. On one occasion Pit is motivated by his sister's wellbeing, on another he may be willing to take care of her children out of the pleasure he gets playing with them.

Goals can be *instrumental* or *ultimate*. While an *instrumental goal* is a means towards something else, an *ultimate goal* is an end in itself. For example, Susan's ultimate goal may be to gain a reputation for being a generous person and therefore, she donates to an organisation supporting the poor. Thus, the wellbeing of the poor is an instrumental goal, while gaining a good reputation is an ultimate goal here. In any given situation, we can have *different goals*, and thus various motives, which can *complement or conflict* with each other. Mina, for example, has conflicting motives. She wants to buy a new toy for her child, but at the same time, she wants to buy a toy for a child in an orphanage. Supposedly, she can only afford to buy one toy. Although she is aware that a child living in an orphanage would be better off with a new toy than her own child who already has a lot of things to play with, her motherly feelings prompt her to favour her own child. As another example, Jan participates in an activity of an informal group because he is concerned about the welfare of the group that he belongs to and at the same time, his own welfare. Thus, his motives are complementary.

Apart from goals, each action may also have *unintended consequences*. For example, Oliver's goal may be to increase the wellbeing of the homeless and because of that he volunteers with a shelter for the homeless. However, volunteering also produces a feeling of joy and satisfaction. These sentiments are unintended consequences of the act of volunteering and not the ultimate goal in this case. However, on some other occasion, Oliver's goal may be to experience this feeling of satisfaction, and he volunteers purely for the pleasure this induces.

Before we analyse the (possible) motives behind individual giving, let us examine two questions: Can we act without being motivated? Can our behaviour, at least sometimes, run contrary to our motivation? I suggest that there are motives behind any *purposeful action*, though we might not be aware of them. Whenever we want to make a change in the world we experience – whenever we have a goal (consciously or unconsciously set) – we are motivated to act. However, not all actions are purposeful. When Mark's lower leg suddenly jerks when he hits his knee, this is not a purposeful action. In this case, he did not set a goal to move his lower leg before the kick occurred. However, it is quite different when he kicks his lower leg to hit a ball when playing football. Or, when he immediately donates to flood victims, after

seeing a request for donations on television. Although he is reacting instantly after seeing the misfortune of the victims, there are still a goal behind his action.

Also, we cannot act *contrary to our motives*, but we can act contrary to our own wellbeing (benefit, utility, self-interest). Lucy may want to avoid inviting her cousins to her wedding reception, but nevertheless, she sends them an invitation. Though she does not like the idea of seeing her cousins on her wedding day, she wants to satisfy her mother's wishes. Thus, Lucy has two conflicting motives. On the one hand, not inviting the cousins would increase her own wellbeing. On the other, inviting the cousins would increase her mother's wellbeing. She cares for her mother and decides to fulfil her wishes. In other words, we can act with a goal of enhancing another's wellbeing, even when this comes into conflict with our own benefit.

What motivates individuals to give time and money to other people and organisations? Batson et al. distinguish four motives of helpful actions: *egoism*, *altruism*, *collectivism* and *principlism* (Batson et al. 2002). The differences in these four motives are based on the differences in ultimate goals. While the ultimate goal of *egoism* is the increase of one's own wellbeing, the ultimate goal of *altruism*⁴² is an increase in the wellbeing of another person or the welfare of a group to which one does not belong. In the case of *collectivism*, the ultimate goal is the welfare of one's own group.⁴³ When one's goal is adherence to a certain principle, regardless of the consequences to herself, the group she belongs to or others, then her motivation is called *principlism*. Each type of giving can be motivated by any of these motives.

⁴² It should be noted that the term *altruism* is used in a motivational sense here. To stress once more, an act of helping, such as giving one's money and time for the benefit of others, is a form of *altruistic behaviour*. Such behaviour may, or may not necessarily be motivated by a concern for another's wellbeing – *altruistic motivation*. Also, altruistic behaviour and altruistic motivation, should be distinguished from altruism in evolutionary terms, which is sacrifice of fitness for the benefit of other organisms.

⁴³ Although I use the classification of motives as outlined by Batson et al., there is a difference between altruism and collectivism as I define them here and those defined by Batson et al. The ultimate goal of collectivism as defined by Batson et al. can be the welfare of a group whose member is the one who gives and also the group to which one does not belong. I would argue that there is an essential difference between having as an ultimate goal the welfare of one's own group and the groups of others. While one can enjoy the benefits of the increased welfare of one's own group, that is not the case when her goal is the welfare of the group she does not belong to. When one's ultimate goal is the welfare of a group she does not belong to, her motivation is altruistic.

Egoism

Sometimes, we give to gain *psychological, social and material benefits* for ourselves (Kolm 2006). There is plenty of evidence that helping others produces positive psychological consequences (rewards) which are called *empathic joy* (Andreoni 1990). Moreover, neuropsychological studies suggest that donations to charity “elicit neural activity in areas linked to reward processing” (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011: 939). There are studies that show the correlation between personal well-being and volunteering (Bruni 2006). Of course, they cannot tell whether happy people tend to volunteer more, or whether volunteering increases happiness. Then, it is also pointed out that, volunteering increases a sense of belonging to the community, which is an important component of life satisfaction (Ibid). Psychologists further argue that giving may be explained as a means to increase *self-esteem*. A survey study in the United Kingdom found that individuals who report a stronger sense of accomplishment are more likely to donate (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011). Once again, it is difficult to say whether they give in order to increase their self-esteem or that those who have already reached a high level of self-esteem donate more often. Moreover, helping others may be an effective way of repairing one’s self-image when one has done something he regrets (ibid). In other words, the *guilt* may induce giving. One study tested the guilt hypothesis by comparing donations among people entering a church during confession hours and people leaving church after confession, when their guilt had been reduced (Ibid). Consistent with the guilt hypothesis, the former group donated more often than the latter.

However, these psychological benefits may just be *unintended consequences* of giving and not the main motivational factor. When someone jumps into a lake to save a drowning child, he is probably not thinking of rewarding feelings he might experience once the act of rescuing has been successfully performed. Even when such psychological benefits are foreseen, an actor can still be motivated by the wellbeing of the person in need. The fact that a psychological benefit can be foreseen does not mean that achieving it was the goal of the action (Marsh 2016).

Another egoistic reason for giving may be obtaining *social benefits* (Kolm 2006). For example, Linda helps a colleague in order to increase his *positive opinion* and build a *good reputation* about her rather than because she truly cares for the colleague’s wellbeing. Some studies find that people who are asked to give by a relative or a friend donate a larger percentage of their

income (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011c).⁴⁴ Numerous studies show that a good reputation or a positive opinion is a very important factor that induces giving. For example, people generally prefer their donations to be known about by others (ibid.). Moreover, people give to gain *rewards* and avoid *punishment*. As it has already been pointed out in the section on the evolution of altruism, we have a predisposition to reward others for cooperation and a propensity to impose sanctions on those who violate norms and omit to reciprocate. We often verbally and nonverbally praise a good deed such as giving. When people are given the option of donating money in an envelope rather than handing over the money, this reduces donations (ibid). Also, we withhold aid to those who are known as noncooperators.

Finally, giving may also be induced by *material benefits*. For example, one may volunteer in order to increase the chances of getting a job or for the attainment of greater success in an existing job. Empirical evidence across the globe shows that many undergraduate students volunteer to improve their employment prospects (Handy et al. 2010, Wuthnow 1991). A study conducted in the USA finds that volunteering is associated with 27% higher odds of employment (Spera et al. 2013). Giving then takes on the form of exchange induced by consumption motives.

In short, giving is egoistically motivated when the ultimate goal of dedicating one's material and non-material resources for the benefit of others or the common good is in fact to increase one's own wellbeing (psychological, social or material).

Collectivism

Ultimate goal of giving may be the increase in *the welfare of the group to which one belongs*. One can perform acts for the benefit of one's neighbourhood, colleagues, basketball club, nation, etc. In fact, the most important and numerous volunteers are association volunteers – those who give their time to an association defined as a “non-profit group who regularly provides services that help meet the operative goals of that group” (Smith and Stebbins 2016: 5). Although, as a member of the group, one enjoys the benefit of her act, it would be in her

⁴⁴ One explanation for this might also be that we place greater trust in our relatives and friends than in unknown solicitors, which makes us more willing to support the cause.

narrow self-interest to free-ride, thus collectivism is different from egoism. It is also different from altruism since the actor cannot be excluded from the benefits of her act.

Altruism

One can dedicate her material and non-material resources for the benefit of others because she *really cares for them*, sometimes even at the risk of significant harm to her own wellbeing. When the ultimate goal of our behaviour is the *wellbeing of the other* (individuals or group), then our motivation is *altruistic*. The welfare of others becomes goal that leads our action when we have affections towards someone (usually those dear to us), or when we feel sorry for the distress of the other, or when we perceive ourselves strongly linked to others through a shared humanity.

When we feel strongly about someone, when we love a person, we want what is best for her, and we set her welfare as a goal that leads our actions. Affection towards family members, friends and colleagues may influence us to help them, to give our support in various ways (Kolm 2006). In the same way that we react to people we know we can also have emotions towards unknown individuals. These emotions urge us to act and we give him money. In this situation, altruism is induced by *empathy* for the suffering of another. Batson defines *empathy* as the “other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need” (Batson 2011: 11). According to Batson, empathy involves feelings towards another such as “feeling sympathy for, compassion for, sorry for, distress for, concerned for, and so on” (ibid).⁴⁵ These feelings may prompt us to act in order to help a person who we perceive is in need.

Thus, improving the wellbeing of distressed and vulnerable individuals is often prompted by empathic concern (Batson 2011, Kolm 2006, Marsh 2016, Oliner and Oliner 1988, Schokkaert 2006, Sen 1977, Smith 2009). This is shown in experiments (Batson 2011), but also in natural settings (Oliner and Oliner 1988). In their analysis of motivation for rescuing Jews during the Second World War, Oliner and Oliner (1988) found that “an empathic reaction aroused more than a third (37%) of rescuers to their first helping act” (ibid: 189).⁴⁶ A direct encounter with a

⁴⁵ The term *empathy* has various definitions even within psychology (See Batson 2011). Here I will use Batson’s definition.

⁴⁶ The rest were the obligation to a social referent group (52%) and adherence to a moral principle (11%), which

Jewish person in distress was sometimes enough to provoke helping in the observer. As well as through a direct encounter, empathic feelings can be aroused through indirect contact, such as when we see on television the sufferings of those injured during an earthquake, or hear stories depicting the misfortunes of others.

Apart from empathic concern, one can set the welfare of others as the ultimate goal out of a particular world view, the so-called *altruistic perspective* - perception of oneself as strongly linked to others through a shared humanity (Monroe 1996). Such a perspective maintains that “each individual is linked to all others and to a world in which all living beings are entitled to certain humane treatment merely by virtue of being alive” (ibid: 206). When one has this way of seeing the world, setting the welfare of others as an ultimate goal results from the recognition that on the one hand the actor is human and therefore required to act in a certain way, and on the other that a person in need is human and therefore entitled to certain treatment. It is interesting to consider how some people came to have such a perspective, while others do not. It might be innate, but more plausible is that it is gained through socialisation and learning from their parents and peers.

Another study on heroic acts of rescuing Jews during WWII has shown that all rescuers who participated in the study had an altruistic perspective (ibid.). When facing the person in need, rescuers had a feeling that they had no choice concerning whether to help, even if it meant risking their lives for strangers. Many reported that they did not even think, but reflexively helped. Such feelings and reactions were firmly entrenched in their perspective on themselves in relation to others which gives rise to an instinctive response that guides their actions in saving others and makes even life and death decisions nonconscious (ibid.). It is interesting that those who endangered their own life and the lives of family members to help a stranger believed that they were acting normally, that there was nothing extraordinary about their behaviour. Having such expectations about what constitutes as normal behaviour together may explain why rescuers so often have a feeling that their behaviour is reflexive, not the result of a conscious process. Not only in such extraordinary situations, but also in everyday life those who have an altruistic perspective set goals to increase the welfare of others, known and unknown, and dedicate their resources to reach such goals.

is in the focus of the following section.

Principlism

When the ultimate goal of an action is adherence to a certain principle or a norm, then such motivation is called *principlism*. One can give her material or non-material resources for the benefit of others because it is the *right course of action*.

Caring about another is often the right thing to do, so how can we then distinguish between altruism and principlism? This distinction is based on Durkheim's differentiation of people who are "good" and those who are "responsible" (Staub 2003). While the former is concerned with others' welfare and doing good for others, the latter are concerned with the maintenance of rules and adherence to them. Thus, one can be indifferent about the other and her welfare, but the very fact that a person is in need and that helping the needy is the right course of action can induce his giving.

Principles may be moral and social. Moral norms address relations between people, they regulate social life and in a broader sense of the term, they are *social*. However, there is a difference between the two. While *social norms* may differ between societies, *moral norms* claim to be universal. In addition, the two may be in conflict in a certain society. Therefore, *moral norms* cannot be reduced to *social norms* in the narrow sense of the term *social*.

To understand better the distinction between the two norms, we can look at the example of the rescuing of Jews by fellow citizens in Poland during WWII. In pre-Second World War Poland, there was animosity towards the Jews, and the predominant *social norm* would not induce giving to Jews. However, the request for universality of *moral norms* and treatment of all people as equals may, even in such societies, induce helping people from deprived groups, which is noticed in the case of the Poles who rescued Jews during the War (Oliner and Oliner 1988). The above-mentioned empirical study of Oliner and Oliner shows that most rescuers (52 %) performed their first act of helping because they felt an obligation to a *social referent group* (*social norm*), while 11% of rescuers were inspired to action by moral principles (*moral norm*).

That obligation towards one's referent group is more strongly felt than duty to adhere to a moral norm does not come as a surprise, given the tribalistic nature of our social instincts, which prompt us to favour our group members, regardless of whether the group is perceived through

ethnic origin or social status, as it has been outlined in the section on the evolution of altruism. More on social norms and their influence on giving is elaborated in the next section.

Norms

Norms are rules about how to behave. Social norms, which are in the focus of this section, are rules of social groups.⁴⁷ What makes a rule a norm of a group is that it is accepted by the members of that group (Brennan et al. 2013). As well as at the level of the whole society (e.g. a country), social norms are created in smaller groups - *referent groups*, such as family and friends (ibid.). Though some rules are accepted through the conscious process of deliberation, norms are most often unplanned, unexpected results of individuals' interactions, which regulate relations between people and social life in general (Brennan et al. 2013, Hodgson 2013). Norms tell us what is appropriate and expected to be done in certain situations.

Our behaviour is to a great extent governed by social norms, which we internalise and feel in the form of inner pressure (Bowles and Gintis 2011). It is found that a donor's charitable contributions are affected by the level of contributions that are made by other members of the referent group (Andreoni and Scholz 1990 cited in Sokolowski 1996).

The Norm of Reciprocity

Although norms are rules that regulate the behaviour of particular groups, thus norms differ in different societies, certain norms are universal. One such norm is a *norm of reciprocity* (Gouldner 1960, Hodgson 2013). A norm of reciprocity "in its universal form, makes two interrelated, minimal demands: (1) people should help those who have helped them, and (2) people should not injure those who have helped them" (Gouldner 1960: 171). Norm of reciprocity imposes obligations in response to the benefits received by others and such obligations of repayment depend on the value of the benefit received (ibid.). The value of the benefit depends on the intensity of the recipient's need, a donor's resources and motives, and the constraints a donor faces (ibid.). The obligations imposed by the norm of reciprocity may

⁴⁷ Thus, it would be also appropriate to place this sub-section within the section entitled "Social Context". How we behave, and think, is shaped by those around us. As I previously elaborated, I choose to place it within subjective dispositions.

vary within a society. Also, this norm functions differently to some degree in different cultures (ibid.).

All contemporary accounts on reciprocity refer to the great work of French anthropologist Marcel Mauss. In his famous book “The Gift”, Mauss synthesises the ethnological research of his time, pointing out that giving, accepting and reciprocating underline all human social life in archaic and premodern societies (Mauss 2011). Gifts circulate between groups, rather than between individuals in these societies. These prestations and counter-prestations, as Mauss calls gifts, seem to be voluntary activities, but they are in fact strictly obligatory. Neither partner can refuse a gift, or to repay it, or to supply an inadequate amount in return. The return gift is always bigger than the initial, containing a form of interest with time lag between the two gifts. Reciprocity is underpinned by the belief that if a good or service is not repaid certain penalties, such as loss of dignity or even war, would be imposed. In the long run, the exchange balance benefits both sides. Giving, as explained by Mauss, entails freedom and obligation, generosity and self-interest.

Mauss further stresses that social phenomena in premodern societies are *total phenomena*, meaning they are *at the same time* legal, moral, economic, religious, etc. In other words, a gift is at the same time “property and a possession, a pledge and a loan, an object sold and an object bought, a deposit, a mandate, a trust; for it is given on condition that it will be used on behalf of, or transmitted to, a third person, the remote partner” (Mauss 2011: 22). The moral purpose of gift exchange is to create a *friendly feeling*, while the religious or mythical aspects are seen in the *spirit* the gift contains and which seeks to be returned to the initial giver, creating obligation for giving and repaying.

Mauss also talks about the origins of giving to the poor – *alms* or *charity*. He argues that alms are “the result on the one hand of a moral idea about gifts and wealth and on the other of an idea about sacrifice” (Ibid: 15). Within archaic societies, the rich had to be generous towards the poor, the spirits of the dead and the gods, otherwise the spirits of the dead or the gods would punish them. In other words, wealth requires sacrifice.

In his Algerian studies, Bourdieu also talks about the practice of gift giving. He discovered a sense of honour in gift giving (Bourdieu 1979). According to him, “a gift is a challenge which honours the person to whom it is addressed, at the same time putting his honour to the test”

(ibid: 106). One who makes an excessive gift, thus ruling out the possibility of a return gift, dishonours himself. The recipient of the gift is “caught in the toils of exchange” (ibid.), and he can choose to prolong the exchange or to break it. If he chooses to “play the game”, he is “obedient to the point of honour” (ibid.), and he makes a return gift. Failing to provide a counter-gift dishonours the recipient. However, the recipient can choose to refuse the exchange, indicating it by rejecting the gift or providing an identical gift immediately or subsequently.

Giving, as Bourdieu points out, can appear to the observer as an obligatory act in a continuous series of gifts and counter-gifts, but, due to the time-lag between a gift and a counter gift, it is expressed as a free act. In other words, since the return gift is provided with a time lag and it is different to the initial gift, “each act of giving can be grasped as an absolute beginning and not as the forced continuation of an exchange already begun” (ibid: 106). Gift-giving is an exchange, whose exact nature agents strive to conceal, i.e. the calculation which guarantees the equity of the exchange. Generous exchange sometimes tends towards an assault by generosity and since it engages a sense of honour, gift exchange always has a latent conflict. The calculation in gift exchange is, however, the calculation of equity, which should not be confused with economic calculation in its narrow sense, and the latent conflict present in gift exchange is the conflict of honour.

As it has already been pointed out, social phenomena are total phenomena in premodern societies, meaning they are at the same time legal, moral, economic and religious. Thus, there has not been anything strange in gift-giving being at the same time obligatory and voluntary, entailing self-interest and the interests of others, creating a friendly feeling and a latent conflict. In modern societies, there are discrete subsystems of politics, economics, religion, law, etc., a clear distinction between public and private, and an appropriate behaviour in each subsystem (Adloff and Mau 2006). Thus, what has previously been fused together in gift now seems to exist in differentiated spheres. On the one hand, there is an economic exchange and contract, believed to be based on rational calculations of self-interested parties. On the other, there is private giving, based on a friendly feeling, altruism, morality. However, this distinction is based on a “conceptual division in social science between morality and interest, elements that on a practical level of action do not perhaps diverge as much as has been suggested” (ibid: 94). In other words, reciprocity entails establishing *relations* between people or groups, when each act is simply part of a chain of actions.

Not only in archaic societies, but also in modern ones, the *principle of reciprocity*, which constitutes of the gist, gratitude and a counter-gift, is “the underlying rule of gift giving” (Komter 2005: 41). Modern accounts on reciprocity emerged within social exchange theory, which applies concepts from microeconomics and psychology to social interaction, thus assuming that actors enter social exchange in order to gain something in return (Moody 2008). However, reciprocity is often “hard to distinguish from altruism and difficult to cast as self-interest” (Putnam 2000: 143). It promotes solidarity and trust in society (Komter 2005).

Three distinct types of reciprocity can be found: direct, indirect or generalised and reciprocity within collectively (Moody 2008). *Direct reciprocity* occurs when A gives to B and receives back directly from B (Moody 2008, Putnam 2000). For example, Tara gives money to cover a debt for her friend today, knowing that the friend will support her in the future when Tara needs it. Or, Jana receives help with housework from a neighbour, feeling gratitude and an obligation to return the favour. A Dutch study provides empirical support for direct reciprocity as one of the mechanisms behind gifts and favours (Komter 2005).⁴⁸

Indirect or generalised reciprocity occurs when A gives to B but receives back from a third actor, C (Moody 2008, Putnam 2000). For example, John helps someone, without expecting anything in return and perhaps without even knowing the person, confident that someone else will return the favour. As previously cited, blood donors are most often motivated to donate because they expect that there will be someone to give blood for them or their children if in need (Ttimuss 1970). In most of the literature, such behaviour is labelled reciprocity only “if there *is* that eventual return from someone to the original giver” (Moody 2008: 133).

Finally, *reciprocity within collectivity* occurs when the actors of reciprocal exchanges, which could both be direct and indirect, are groups (ibid.). Mauss’s work cited provides examples for reciprocity between groups (Mauss 1990).

Social exchange theory focuses on the structure of the exchange rather than on the meaning for the actors and it highlights the importance of a return to the initial giver (Moody 2008). However, in some cases, people describe their acts of giving as reciprocity even when there is

⁴⁸ Apart from reciprocity, the author finds that giving is inspired by positive feelings towards others; then the reduction of the insecurity about the status of the relationship; also, by a need for power and prestige and considerations related to reputation and fame; then by personal benefit; finally, even hostility, hate and contempt inspire giving (Komter 2005).

no eventual return to the original giver. To account for such cases, as a special subtype of generalised reciprocity, Moody (2008) distinguishes *serial reciprocity* which occurs “when people reciprocate for what they have received -for example, from a parent, a friend, a mentor, a stranger, a previous generation - by providing something to a third party, regardless of whether a return is also given to, or makes its way back to, the original giver” (Moody 2008: 130). The structure of such exchange cannot reveal reciprocity since it looks like people are engaged in one-way transfers. Thus, only by looking “at the meaning of those “gifts” as returns for the one before would we recognise this structure as something intended to be reciprocal” (Moody: 135). This can be explained by considering recipients as *culturally socialised* to feel the obligation to reciprocate even when there is no external sanction or reward for such behaviour (ibid.).

Some acts of philanthropy can be seen as serial reciprocity, such as for example, the case of Andrew Carnegie who used the Colonel James Anderson Library as a teenager, and this was partial motivation for him to establish free libraries around the USA (Moody 2004). Volunteers, “recognising they had already gotten something”, often describe their volunteering as “a way of paying their debts” (Wuthnow 1991: 55).

In short, the feeling of obligation to give back can arise from the belief that one has received a great deal from society or certain groups and individuals (Ilana Silber 1998). Thus, serial reciprocity, as well as direct and indirect, can be a part of the explanation not only for individual giving of time and money to people with whom one has an established relationship, but also for giving to unknown individuals and organisations.

4.2.2. Social Resources

What I refer to as social resources here, following Musick and Wilsom (2008), some scholars call *social capital* (Lin 2004, Coleman 1988, Putnam 2000). While scholars agree on a “genotype” definition of social capital, as “certain aspects of social structure that enable social

action”, there is no consensus over “phenotype” definition, in fact, there is a plethora of definitions of social capital (Adam and Rončević 2003: 160).⁴⁹

In general, there are two perspectives on social capital depending on the level at which benefits are achieved: 1) individual and 2) collective (Lin 2004). The main premise behind the first perspective is that an investment in social relationships increases the likelihood of success in individual’s purposive actions (ibid.). Lin defines social capital as “capital captured through social relations” (ibid:19). He makes a distinction between personal and social resources. Personal resources are possessed by an individual and they consist of ownership of material and symbolic goods, while *social resources* are accessed through the individual’s social connections (ibid.). Thus, embedded in the relations we have with others are factors that enable us to reach our goals (Musick and Wilson 2008). Social resources are enabling factors because they facilitate the flow of information within a group; they influence group members’ decisions; in addition, they are certifications of members’ social credentials, also they reinforce identity and the recognition of someone as an individual and a member of a group (Lin 2004).

Social capital is seen as a collective asset within the second perspective (ibid.) Though it is acknowledged that individuals’ interactions are central to collective payoffs and that social capital benefits individuals as well, the focus is on examining “the elements and processes in the production and maintenance of the collective asset” (ibid: 22). There are three schools of thought within this perspective: Bourdieu’s, Coleman’s and Putnam’s (Adam and Rončević 2003, Lin 2004, Field 2003). While for Bourdieu social capital is a process through which a dominant class reinforces a privileged position, for Coleman and Putnam social capital is a public good (Lin 2004).

⁴⁹ According to some scholars, the idea of interaction in voluntary associations as a basis of social capital and effective democracy may relate to the works of Tocqueville, J. S. Mill, Toennies, Weber and Simmel (Adam and Rončević 2003). However, the concept of social capital was introduced in the sociological research by Bourdieu, Coleman and Lin in 1980s (Lin 2004). Since the 1990s, and particularly after the publication of Putnam’s book *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, there has been wide “acceptance, study and application” of this concept (Adam and Rončević 2003: 156).

Bourdieu sees social capital as “aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu 1986: 21). Individuals have different volumes of social capital, depending on the size of the network of connections they can effectively mobilise and on the volume of capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) that each person they are connected with possesses (ibid.). Through repeated exchanges mutual recognition of the members the group’s boundaries are reinforced (ibid.).

According to Coleman, social capital “exists in relations among persons” (Coleman 1988: 100). Coleman defines social capital by its function, as varieties of different entities with two characteristics: 1) they are certain aspects of social structure and 2) they facilitate certain actions (ibid.). Social capital makes possible achievement of certain ends which would not otherwise be possible (ibid.).

Putnam defines social capital as social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them (Putnam 2000). Social networks involve mutual obligation and foster norms of reciprocity, which can facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit (ibid.). Social networks facilitate gossip and other ways of forming a reputation, which is important for establishing trust among group members (ibid.). Since social networks involve the mutual obligations of their members, they create chains of direct reciprocity. Also, frequent interaction among diverse groups of people produces a norm of generalised reciprocity. Trust that there will be someone to rely on when needed is crucial for generalised reciprocity. The term social (interpersonal, generalised) trust is used to address the trust between people in a society (ibid.). According to Putnam, social networks and norms of trust and reciprocity, namely social capital, facilitate collective action, influence economic performance and democracy (ibid.).

Social capital, according to Putnam, can have different forms: extended family members, Sunday school class, regulars who play poker, college roommates, civic organisations to which one belongs, Internet chat group, network of professional acquaintances, volunteer ambulance squad (ibid.). It can be bridging or inclusive, for example, civil rights movements, youth service groups, and bonding or exclusive, such as ethnic fraternal organisations or church-based reading groups (ibid.).

Putnam stresses that the best way to know the likelihood of giving time, money and blood or even of doing a minor favour is to know how strong one's ties to family, friends and neighbours are and how active she is in their lives (ibid.). People who are active in formal organisations (such as, for example, professional associations, churches, etc.) or informal groups (neighbourhoods, groups of friends) are more likely to be asked to give (ibid.). They learn about opportunities to give that they might not be familiar if they did not belong to a group.

It could be argued that people dedicate their material and non-material resources for the benefit of others and the common good because their friends, relatives, colleagues induced them to give, or because they are recruited through the organisations they are affiliated with (Sokolowski 1996). In addition, those who have extended social networks are more likely to receive help from others and those who have received help are more likely to feel obliged to reciprocate (Komter 2005, Moody 2008, Putnam 2000). Thus, individual giving often comes from social ties (Sokolowski 1996).

4.2.3. Personal Resources

Resources are material or non-material goods that can be used in social actions (Musick and Wilson 2008). *Personal resources* are characteristics of individuals that can be measured objectively, such as education, income, health and time (ibid.). In order to give, one must have resources at her disposal. A person may be willing to help, but due to the lack of resources she might not be capable of providing help. For example, a woman with full time employment who takes care of children and a home, has little time at her disposal for providing help to others outside of her household. A person with health issues may have a lot of free time, but he may be lacking the physical ability that might be necessary to volunteer with an organisation. A person without an income, though willing to give money to the needy, does not have material resources.

Not all resources are equally important for each type of giving. For example, while having a compassionate soul may be enough for listening to and providing advice to a distressed friend and it may not depend on the level of education, offering free counselling service through a charitable organisation for war victims is not possible without a university degree in psychology. Also, lacking free time may be a greater impediment to volunteering than donating money. The main point of this section is that any form of individual giving requires certain

resources and an explanation of individual factors of giving must take into consideration the various resources that individuals have at their disposal.

Education

Through education people gain the skills and competences necessary to perform different voluntary activities in organisations (Musick and Wilson 2008). Also, through education people become capable of critical examination of societal problems and finding possible ways of addressing them (ibid.). Moreover, educated people have more expansive social networks and thus they are more likely to hear about available opportunities to give (ibid.). They are also more likely to have higher trust in other people and they tend to join more social organizations (Huang et al. 2009). Education is “strong and robust correlate of individual social capital” (ibid:460).

There is plenty of empirical evidence that education is one of the most powerful predictors of virtually all forms of altruistic behaviour (Putnam 2000). Bekkers and Wiepping (2011a), stress that a positive relationship between giving money to organisations and level of education are found in most empirical studies that have included education as a variable. Studies from different countries show that volunteers are more educated than non-volunteers and that education is the most consistent predictor of volunteering (Musick and Wilson 2008).

Income

Having more financial resources at one’s disposal make one more capable of donating to people and organisations. There is an omnipresent positive relationship between income and amounts donated (Bekkers and Wiepping 2011b). However, there are mixed results for the relationship between income and the chances of making donations. Some studies find a positive relationship between income and giving money to organisations, while others find that people with more financial resources are not more likely to give than others (ibid).

When thinking about volunteering as an unpaid labourer, we can argue that the more one earns the less likely is he is to volunteer since it is more rational for him to spend his time working for a wage than to provide labour for free (Musick and Wilson 2008). Thus, income and volunteering should be negatively related. However, we can think of volunteering as an activity that requires material resources. The costs of volunteering are not only in the form of time, but

there are also related material costs. For example, transportation costs for a volunteer. Moreover, people with a higher income tend to belong to a greater number of associations and thus are more likely to be asked to volunteer. Thus, the alternative hypothesis is that the more one earns, the more likely she is to volunteer. Empirical data shows that income and disposition to volunteering are positively related (ibid).

Health

Without good health many activities could not be performed. A person with poor health must expend much more energy in order to help than a person in good health, if it is at all possible for her to provide help to others. People with health problems, due to often expensive medical treatment, have fewer financial resources at their disposal to give to organisations and people in need. However, people who have suffered certain illnesses can put themselves in the position of others with the same problems more easily and thus should be more likely to give to them. For example, in 2009 in the USA, donations from patients made up approximately 20% of all philanthropic contributions to health care centres (Walter et al 2015).

Self-rated health and volunteering are positively related in many studies (Musick and Wilson 2008). Some of the health effects on volunteering are mediated by other factors such as social class and social integration (ibid). Healthier people tend to have higher incomes and levels of education which are positively related to giving, and they also tend to socialise more and thus are more likely to be asked to volunteer or give money (ibid.).

Time

Lack of time is an important impediment for volunteering, helping others and participating in informal groups. The time squeeze theory (Musick and Wilson 2008) predicts that people are more likely to give their time to others when they have free time available. The most commonly reported reason for not volunteering is the lack of time. For example, over half (58%) of the respondents in a United Kingdom survey who were not volunteering said they did not have the time (Smith 1998), while three-quarters of Canadians surveyed gave lack of time as the main reason for not volunteering more (Hall et al. 2006). Although these are subjective assessments of the time available, it is plausible to suppose time spent in paid work and in housework and caregiving to a family member influences time spent providing help for others and volunteering with organisations.

Studies that look at the relationship between housework and volunteering focus on hours spent on housework/care-giving to a family member and hours spent volunteering. The more hours one spends on housework and/or caregiving the less she/he has at their disposal for volunteering. Some research findings from Australia and Netherlands confirm that the more time people spend doing housework, the less time they spend doing volunteer work, but one study from the United States indicate that time spent on housework had a positive effect on volunteer hours (Musick and Wilson 2008). This could explain why those who are committed to the welfare of their household and family members generalised this commitment to include concern for the welfare of others (ibid.).

When it comes to the relationship between providing care for a sick family member and volunteering, one theory is that the more time someone spends on caregiving the less time she has for volunteering, while a competing theory is that caring persons are both more likely to volunteer and to spend time providing care for their family members, thus the two are not mutually exclusive. Empirical evidence shows that care-giving time does not stand in the way of volunteer time (ibid.)

4.2.4. Other Demographic Characteristics

Disposition to engage in giving varies with other demographic characteristics of individuals, such as gender, age, marital and employment statuses.

Gender

Gender differences in individual giving can be ascribed to differences in psychology and moral thinking, social norms and both personal and social resources. An orientation toward relationships and interdependence has been associated with the psychology of women (Gilligan 1993). Women's moral judgments are tied to feelings of empathy and compassion (ibid). They often define and judge themselves in their capacity to care for others (Gilligan 1993, Noddings 2013). The explanation for this might lie in normative conceptions of what gender roles should consist of and the cultural and social values attributed to women's main domain of activity (Komter 2005). Social norms encourage women to take on helping roles within families, and to care for the personal and emotional needs of others (Wilson and Musick 1997). Finally, women are more socially integrated and with extended social networks (Einolf 2010), and integration into social networks increases the likelihood that someone would engage in giving.

However, giving time and money requires command over resources, both material and non-material. Men are advantaged with respect to levels of resources such as income and education (Wit and Bekkers 2015). Moreover, due to their commitments with household chores and care for children, women have less free time at their disposal.

Data from the research performed in the USA and Germany indicate that women are more likely to provide direct help to individuals than are men (Wilson and Musick 1997, Helms and McKenzie 2013). Women also do more housework, childcare and care of kin than men (Kahn, McGill, Bianchi 2011). Not only is there the direct effect of gender on informal helping, but women are more likely to attach greater value to helping others, which encourages helpful behaviour in general (Wilson and Musick 1997).

Empirical studies on gender differences in volunteering nowadays are inconclusive. Gender differences in volunteering vary from country to country. For example, in the United States (Wilson and Musick 1997, Musick and Wilson 2008), Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan (Musick and Wilson 2008), the Netherlands and Italy (Dekker and van den Broek 1998), women are more likely to volunteer than men, but in Canada there are no gender differences, while men are more likely to volunteer in Sweden (Musick and Wilson 2008) and Germany (Helms and McKenzie 2013). Thus, gender differences in overall volunteering seem to be small. When it comes to informal volunteering, studies have found that women are in the centre of support networks and that they are more likely to provide care and in general do more informal helping (Gundelach, Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010, Hank and Stuck 2008)

When it comes to monetary contributions to organisations, the relationship between gender and giving is not clear (Wiepking and Bekkers 2012). According to some research there is no gender gap in donating to organisations (Bekkers 2007, Bolton and Katok 1995). Other studies point out that men are more likely to donate (Bekkers 2010). However, there are many recent studies from the United States and the United Kingdom showing that women are more likely to donate money than men (Piper and Schnepf 2008). A study conducted in the Netherlands shows that females are more likely to give, which can be attributed to their higher prosocial values of empathic concern and the principle of care, while Dutch males donate higher amounts than Dutch females (Wit and Bekkers 2015).

Age

Age is an indicator of the stage of life a person has reached. The life cycle consists of three major stages: an early stage devoted to socialisation and formal education, a middle stage devoted to setting up a home, forming a family, and working to support it; and in a third phase two major events are children leaving home and retirement (Musick and Wilson 2008). The stage of the life cycle influences the amount of resources we have at our disposal, the way we are integrated in society, and our priorities and interests. Young and elderly people are more likely to have more free time than those in the middle stage (ibid.). However, young and middle-aged people are more likely to be integrated into social networks through school, university and work (ibid.). Disposable income increases with age. Finally, elderly people can shift from taking care of their children to providing benefits to others (ibid.).

Musick and Wilson (2008) explain the relationship between volunteering and life cycle, drawing conclusions from the empirical data from the United States. The rate of volunteering is higher in adolescence than it is in early adulthood (ibid.). This is probably because schools, churches, and other youth-oriented institutions encourage or, in some cases, require community service of their young people. Also, young adults are pressured with commitments. Middle-aged people are the most likely to volunteer, probably because they begin to settle down with established careers, greater integration in the community, and children in local schools. Once children leave school, there is a decline in parent volunteering. However, volunteering does not seriously fall off until people reach old age, when shortage of money, lack of transportation, decline in health and social isolation combine to make it more difficult to volunteer. The same pattern is found for informal volunteering, which increases with age and then declines late in life (Gundelach, Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010).

Bekkers and Wiepping (2011b) point out that the typical finding on the relationship between age and donating to organisations in the literature is that it is positive, but some studies find that the giving decreases as age increases.

Marital Status

Getting married is one of the major events that alter our resources in fundamental ways, priorities and social networks (Musick and Wilson 2008). They influence how we choose to spend our financial resources and free time.

Married people have larger social networks and thus may be more often asked to give. The data on partner status and volunteering are inconclusive. Married individuals are more likely to volunteer (Wilson 2000). Married people also provide more direct help than people who are single (Gundelach, Frietag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010). Marriage is mostly found to be positively related to giving money to organisations (Bekekrs and Wiepking 2011d).

Employment Status

People who are employed have less free time at their disposal than the unemployed, retirees and students. Succeeding in one's career necessitates hard work and long hours which conflicts with volunteering (Wuthnow 1991). Thus, being employed may be an impediment to volunteering. However, although having a job leaves less free time, it also helps us enhance social networks and increases our chances of learning about volunteering opportunities or being asked to volunteer. Being employed means greater social integration, which in turn may lead to volunteering. If the time squeeze theory holds, we can expect that the retired and unemployed are more likely to volunteer than the employed. While, if the theory of social integration holds, then the employed and students would be more likely to give their time. Empirical data from the USA show that people with jobs are more likely to volunteer (Musick and Wilson 2008). When it comes to informal volunteering, hours spent in paid employment are found to be negatively correlated with informal volunteering (Gundelach, Frietag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010).

Employment yields income. Thus, the employed should be more willing to give money than students, the unemployed and retired who do not have as much money at their disposal. In studies lacking an income variable, the effects of employment on giving may in fact reflect the effects of income. For example, a study in Australia found that the employed were more likely to donate (Lyons and Passey 2005).

4.3. Contextual Factors

Individual factors only partly explain behaviour. A decision as to whether and how one gives her material and non-material resources is highly influenced by *contextual factors* (Wiepking and Handy 2015).

The way we dedicate our material and non-material resources for the benefit of others is structured by *institutional environment*. Institutions are “settled habits of thought” (Hodgson 1988: 7), a “habitual method of responding to the stimuli” (Veblen 1994: 117). They are “systematic patterns of shared expectations, taken-for-granted assumptions, accepted norms and routines, of interaction” (Chang and Evans 2005: 101). There are three categories of institutions: formal or written rules; informal habits, social norms or conventions; and, finally, more or less formal organisations of people (Dutt 2011).

The influence of norms, particularly the norm of reciprocity, has already been outlined. The influence of formal rules and organisations is of particular importance when it comes to giving. Institutional framework includes the *type of welfare system* and the extent of the social security guaranteed by the state, then the *government policy in the non-profit sector*, and the *size and characteristics of the non-profit sector*.

Volunteering and donating to organisations cannot flourish in countries where the non-profit sector is underdeveloped, where the legislation related to giving time and money to non-profits is lacking. If the state takes full responsibility for the provision of social welfare, there might not be the need for non-profit organisations, operating in the field of social welfare, and the role of the family and those near and dear in the provision of support might be diminished. However, while the state could protect the welfare rights of its citizens, providing them with welfare services, it is questionable as to whether state officials are well-equipped to address all the needs of recipients, for example the need of respect and consideration (Ignatieff 1984). Certain needs cannot be translated into rights, such as the need for love, fraternity, respect, etc. and thus cannot be requested nor guaranteed (ibid.). Nevertheless, they are necessary for human flourishing (ibid.). Therefore, it could be argued that even when the state provides welfare services, there is still a place for the benevolence of strangers, either through organisations or directly.

In countries where government policy is favourable for the non-profit sector and where it is perceived as an important factor in the provision of public goods, it is plausible to expect that individuals are more likely to dedicate their time and money to organisations. However, if both the state and the non-profits do not provide adequate welfare, people might turn to more traditional ways of mutual support. Options that are available for societies and individuals are to a great extent shaped by the *history of welfare provision* and the *culture*. Finally, the

existence of *emergencies* in the form of natural or man-made disasters are specific conditions which may induce many to offer spontaneous assistance to victims.

4.3.1. Institutional Environment

Creating the framework within which giving can be exercised, *formal rules* and *organisations* shape individual giving. The institutional framework includes: the *type of welfare system*, *government policy in the non-profit sector* and the *size, type and characteristics of the non-profit sector*.⁵⁰

Welfare System

Individual giving in any country cannot be understood without a reference to the kind of welfare system that creates the context for the expression of individuals' solidarity and care for others. Every welfare system is based on a value system that determines who gets and what kind of support and under what conditions (Dixon and Kim 2016). The central issue in any welfare system is the choice about whether and to what extent to rely on the market, non-profit sector and state for the provision of the assistance and services to the public.

The *welfare system* is related to *social security (social protection)*, defined as the protection that a society provides to individuals and households to ensure access to health care and to guarantee income security, particularly in cases of old age, unemployment, sickness, invalidity, work injury, maternity or loss of a breadwinner and other social services, such as free education and housing subsidies.

In the context of the capitalist democracies of the 20th/21st centuries, the government is concerned with "the production and distribution of social wellbeing" through *welfare state* (Esping-Andersen 1990: 1). The welfare state that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s has mitigated the consequences of self-regulating markets in at least three directions: it guarantees individuals and families a minimum income irrespective of the market value of their work or their property, then it reduces insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain

⁵⁰ As it has been defined in the Introduction of this thesis that the term non-profit organisation refers to organisations that are both non-governmental and non-profit distributing, while excluding governmental (public) non-profits. The non-profit sector comprises of such organisations.

social contingencies such as sickness, old age and unemployment, and it provides certain sets of social services agreed upon by society (Briggs 1961).

Advanced capitalist countries differ significantly in the priorities they place on competing goals such as welfare, law and order and the promotion of business and trade (Esping-Andersen 1990). These differences are the result of historical factors and struggles between different classes. Based on the kind of provided welfare, Esping-Andersen divides advanced capitalist countries into three ideal-types: liberal, corporatist and socio-democratic (ibid.). Esping-Andersen measures them in terms of degree of “decommodification”.⁵¹

There is a limited provision of state welfare in *liberal states*, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia (ibid.). Social policies have been influenced by the liberal, work ethic norms which encourage work instead of welfare. In the heart of economic liberalism is the belief that the market rewards those who work hardest, bringing the greatest amount of personal freedom and prosperity to a society. In these countries, governments apply means-tested assistance⁵², modest universal transfers, or modest social-insurance. Benefits, which are usually modest, are given to low-income individuals usually from the working-classes, who may suffer from social stigma on the grounds that they are labelled as “state dependents” (ibid.). Liberal states want to incentivise workers to work more and to gain higher income, making them as dependent as possible on the labour market. The state encourages the market, either by guaranteeing only minimum benefits or by subsidising private welfare schemes.

In *corporatist* states such as Austria, France and Germany, the welfare state developed under the control of non-democratic governments, which became democratic later (ibid.). State actors allied with wealthy elites to create a welfare system that provided services to the poor and working classes and securing the preservation of status differentials. These countries were not preoccupied with market efficacy hence, private insurance and occupational fringe benefits

⁵¹ The term ‘decommodification’ comes from the noun ‘commodity’. When workers are commodified, they must sell their labour-power on the market to survive. Thus, they become a commodity. Decommodification implies that they do not have to sell their labour to survive. The level of decommodification refers to the level of dependency on the market.

⁵²Means tested benefits are payments to those individuals or families whose income is below a certain level.

play a minor role. The corporatist regimes are also typically shaped by the Church and strongly committed to the preservation of traditional family. The welfare system provides a relatively high level of support, but this is not universalist – different groups receive different levels of support. For example, social insurance typically excludes non-working wives, while family benefits encourage motherhood, married couples are entitled to more money than couples who are living together or divorced, etc.

Finally, in the *social democratic* states, such as Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, welfare provision is universal (ibid.). In the social democratic regimes, workers gained enough power to successfully push for a welfare system that covers all citizens. In contrast to liberal models, social rights are guaranteed based on citizenship rather than performance. In contrast to the corporatist model, the principle is not to wait until the family's capacity to aid is exhausted. Here the welfare state provides equality of the highest standards, everyone incorporated under one universal insurance system. Thus, everyone benefits and presumably feels obliged to pay. There is a combination of welfare and work. On the one hand, the right to work has equal status to the right of income protection. On the other, the high cost of maintaining a universalistic welfare system means that it must minimise social problems and maximise revenue income, which is best done with most people working, and the fewest possible living off of social transfers.

As it has been pointed out, the concept of the welfare state is inextricably linked to advanced, capitalist democracies. Since Serbia is in a focus of this thesis, a country that used to have a socialist regime and which passed through the process of transition towards democracy and a market economy, I will briefly outline the main tenets of the socialist welfare system.

The welfare system in *socialist regimes* is based on the concept of need, which becomes a central criterion for the allocation of resources (Dixon and Kim 2015). The guiding principle of social security under socialism, stresses that it should provide assistance in case of accidents, old age, illness or the death of the breadwinner, as well as maternity and birth benefits (ibid.) It also meant to cover all the wage earners and their families, while the costs were covered by the employers and the, and its administration was under the full management of insured workers (ibid.). The basis of a socialist welfare system is the premise that it is in the best interest of society to alleviate poverty and to assist those unable to care for themselves, by increasing

production rather than through income redistribution, while those most in need are guaranteed assistance (ibid.).

Welfare System History

Historical factors play an important role in creating the range of available options for any welfare system. It has been argued that the central issue in any welfare system is the choice about whether and to what extent to rely on the market, non-profit sector and the state for the provision of services to the public. The weight attached to each of these models has varied throughout history (Edwards 2014). Mutual aid has been essential for survival in the preindustrial period (Butcher and Einolf 2017, Einolf et al 2016). With industrialization and urbanization in the 19th century in Western Europe and North America, the traditional networks of mutual support broke down being (partially) replaced by formal voluntary associations (ibid.). These formal networks did not meet the needs and welfare states started developing in the beginning of the 20th century (Einolf et al 2016). The state-based solutions were prominent in the period between 1945 and mid-1970. This was the time of the welfare state, backed up by a big increase in taxation in developed countries (the global North), while the non-profit sector lived on with the welfare state, identifying gaps in service and new needs (ibid.). Centralised planning in developing countries (the global South), when the government controlled much of the economy (Edwards 2014). It was succeeded by market-based solutions between the late 1970s and 1990s, which was known as the era of Reaganomics in the North, structural adjustment in the South, and central-planning in the socialist/communist countries of the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe (ibid.). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, state retrenchment and privatisation became more widespread throughout the world. This over-reliance on the market increased the vulnerability and insecurity of the majority of the world's population (ibid.). As a result, *a third way* for achieving social progress during the 1990s and 2000s emerged. The third way has been described as upholding a number of social democracy's core values including social justice, equality and individual freedom, combined with free market capitalism and individual responsibilities for the consequences of lifestyle habits (Giddens 1998). The central tenet of this new way is that all three sectors need to work together, also an important role in the provision of the social welfare has been given to non-profit organisations (Edwards 2014).

The practice of giving to voluntary (philanthropic, charitable) organisations is linked to recent history, going back to the mid-1800s. It can be expected that donating money and volunteering to organisations are dominant forms of altruistic behaviour in more developed societies, with active non-profit sectors (Butcher and Einolf 2017). Also, it can be expected that direct help is a dominant form of giving in less developed countries (ibid.). Finally, direct help is expected to be replaced by formal institutions, either through state welfare support or the non-profit sector, in developed societies (ibid.).

Global surveys such as the Gallup World Poll (GWP) and the World Values Survey (WVS) confirm that rates of giving of time and money to organisations are higher in developed countries than those in development or former socialist countries (World Giving Index 2015).

Cross-national studies in direct help is limited (Butcher and Einolf 2017, Bennett and Einolf 2017). The Gallup World Poll includes the question of helping a stranger.⁵³ Looking from a regional perspective at the Gallup World Poll data on helping strangers, it is notable that the differences in involvement between and to some extent within regions are much smaller compared to formal volunteering (Gavelin and Svedberg 2011). The data on helping strangers shows that those living in Anglo-Saxon countries are most likely to engage in giving, as well as people from certain African, Middle Eastern, Latin American and Caribbean countries along with Western Europe (ibid.).

Questions about informal help are included in the European Social Survey, which frames informal help as “providing help for other people” excluding activities directed at family or colleagues, capturing informal support provided to neighbours, friends and strangers. There is a variation in informal volunteering among European nations, where countries in central Western Europe (Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany) tend to be highest in informal volunteering among the nations studied, while nations in Southern and Eastern Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Poland, the Czech Republic) tend to rank lowest on average (Smith et al. 2016). Thus, direct help has not disappeared, nor diminished in developed countries (Einolf et al 2016, Salamon et al 2017).

⁵³ It should be stressed that helping a stranger is an unusual type of informal volunteering, substantially different from actions of mutual help and support within networks of family and neighbours which is the majority of informal volunteering (Butcher and Einolf 2017). However, since definitions of informal volunteering vary across societies, it is difficult to design a comprehensive and cross-nationally comparable survey measure of informal volunteering (Bennett and Einolf 2017).

Culture and the Welfare System

Culture defined as “the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying assumptions prevalent among people in a society” (Huntington 2001: xv) is an important contextual factor for giving. Culture, in this subjective sense, affects the extent people are willing to dedicate their material and non-material resources for the benefit of others and the common good, and also the ways people channel giving.

It is plausible to expect that people are more inclined to dedicate their material and non-material resources to non-profit organisations in countries where the non-profit sector is perceived as an important provider of social welfare and where people have a sense of personal responsibility to act in the interest of social welfare. Individuals’ attitudes about personal responsibility and readiness to act in the interest of the social and ecological well-being of society are found to be related to charitable giving (Schuyt et al. 2010).

However, if the non-profit sector is seen only as supplemental to the state provision of public goods, people might not be willing to give to sectors that are considered to be the core of the welfare state, such as healthcare and education, while being willing to donate in the expressive areas, such as recreation and culture (Wiepking and Handy 2015). For example, charitable giving in Sweden has historically been structured toward causes not considered to be the responsibility of the public sector (Vamstad and Essen 2012). Needs seen as social rights expected to be guaranteed by the state are not supported through individuals’ initiatives even when those needs have not actually been met by the state (ibid.).

In countries with socialist backgrounds, where there has been a discontinuation in the development of the non-profit sector, it might happen that people still expect the state to take responsibility for social welfare despite the fact that it has already been several decades since the political and economic transitions took place and many non-profits have emerged. If people believe that it is the government’s responsibility to help those in need, then they might not be willing to give, even when universal coverage is absent.

Government Policy in the Non-Profit Sector

Closely related to a country’s welfare system is the *government policy regarding the non-profit sector*, which includes a legal framework for the establishment and operation of non-profits,

government support in terms of funding, as well as fiscal incentives for the operation of non-profits and monetary donations for charitable purposes.

Legal Framework

A legal framework is necessary for the establishment and operation of non-profits. It can encourage the non-profit sector or be an impediment for its growth. Government regulation sets the requirements for their establishment and defines their legal forms, for example, whether a legal entity is called a non-profit organisation or a charitable organisation, or whether they are established in the form of associations, foundations, endowments or some other form. The legal framework further defines whether there is special treatment of organisations that have charitable purposes and what the fiscal and regulatory status are of each of them.

There can also be legislation regarding the operation of non-profits, such as their standards for integrity and control mechanisms. When the non-profit sector is well monitored and regulated, donors can trust it more and there is less concern about charity scams or fraud.

Government Funding

When the revenue of the non-profit sector is at least partly derived from the public sector in the form of grants, subsidies and payments for services rendered, then we are talking about government funding (Nguyen 2015).

The non-profit sector can play a supplementary role to the government, when government support comes in the form of contracts whereby non-profits deliver specific services to society, such as education and health care. This is the case in many developed countries. For example, in Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, Norway and Switzerland, Canada, the non-profit sector plays a complementary role to government in providing key public goods (ibid.). Also, most non-profits in the United States highly depend on the government for their revenues rather than depending mostly on private charity and volunteers (Lipski and Smith 1990). Thus, the relationship between the sectors (public and the non-profit) becomes blurred.

Government support in terms of funding of non-profits has a direct and indirect impact on individual giving. An indirect impact comes through an enlarged non-profit sector. The bigger the sector, the greater the need for additional funding through individual giving, also the greater

the need for volunteering to support the activities of non-profit organisations. On the other hand, government funding can have a direct effect on monetary contributions by individuals. Economic theory would predict that government provision of public goods crowds-out private contributions (Andreoni 1988). When governments provide public goods, the need for individual monetary donations is expected to be lower. However, empirical studies have rarely provided support for such a crowding-out effect, in fact there is proof of the crowding-in effect. When the government funds certain non-profits it can also be a signal that these organisations are trustworthy. In the analyses of the correlation between government funding and individual giving of money to non-profits in 20 countries around the world, Nguyen finds a positive, nonlinear relationship, but the relationship between the two sectors comes in different shapes in different countries (Nguyen 2015).

Another paper that examines the effects of aggregate government payments to non-profit organisations on aggregate private philanthropy in 40 countries finds that government payments to non-profit organisations have a positive effect on aggregate philanthropic donations to non-profits, thus supporting crowding-in (Sokolowski 2012). However, a field level analysis has shown that government support of service-oriented non-profit organisations results in a shift in private donations from service to expressive activities (ibid.).

Fiscal Incentives

Finally, government policy in the non-profit sector regards the fiscal treatment of non-profits revenue and individual donations. The fiscal system often has a central role in fostering or impeding the expansion of the non-profit sector. In many countries, charitable organisations and their donors are eligible for fiscal benefits. The charities are exempt from revenue tax, while individuals gain tax deductions or tax credits for their donations. Through such policies government encourages the development of the non-profit sector and incentivises people to donate to organisations. It has been documented in the literature that fiscal incentives have positive impact on development of non-profit sector. Countries that have more favourable tax treatment to the non-profit sectors tend to have larger sectors (Layton 2015). Moreover, Bekkers and Wiepking (2011a) identify lowering the costs of donations, through providing tax benefits for donors, as one of the eight mechanisms that drives individual donations to charities.

The Non-profit Sector

Size and Type

The *size* of the non-profit sector, in terms of the number of organisations per capita, creates a context for giving. When a country's non-profit sector is larger there is likely to be a greater demand for voluntary contributions of time and money from individuals, than if it were small. However, not only does the size of the sector matter, but more importantly, its *type*.

Based on the level of government social welfare spending and the size of the non-profit sector, Salamon and Anheier (1998) outline four types of non-profit sector: liberal, social democratic, corporatist and statist. These categories are derived from Esping-Andersen's welfare state regimes. Salamon and Anheier have provided the most influential theory, titled *social origins theory*, of how historical events explain differences in the non-profit sector across countries (Einolf 2015).

The *statist* countries, an example of which is Japan, have a small non-profit sector and low government social welfare spending (Salamon and Anheier 1998).⁵⁴ *Liberal* states, such as the USA, the UK, Australia and Canada, have a large non-profit sector and low government social welfare spending (ibid.). In these countries, the state provides fewer services and the provision of public goods is perceived as a role of the non-profit sector. In *corporatist countries*, such as France, Germany and Austria, there is both a large non-profit sector and high government social welfare spending and they work together in the provision of public goods and services (ibid.). In these countries, the government takes a larger role in social welfare provision, and it also supports certain non-profits. *Social-democratic* countries, such as Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, have a small non-profit sector and high government social welfare spending (ibid.). Social welfare, particularly health care, education and social benefits are within the realm of government, while the non-profit sector works in the expressive areas, such as arts, culture, recreation, the environment and advocacy.

In his analyses of the non-profit sector in Europe, Archambault (2009) adds the categories of *emerging* and *post-communist* countries. In the *emerging countries* of Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal and Greece), the non-profit sector has emerged only recently due to the dictatorships of the 20th century. Social protection in these countries is rising since their entry into the

⁵⁴Since this category is not well defined and since it is not relevant for my research that focuses on Serbia and Canada, I will exclude it from the further discussion.

European Union, while the non-profit sector operates in social services and education in these countries. Private donors are the main source of funding for these purposes, while governments contribute little to the sector. In the *post-communist countries* of Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia)⁵⁵ non-profit organisations are shaped by their recent historical background. Before the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, there was no freedom of association and the existing ones were mainly in the field of culture, sports, and recreation. From 1989 onward, the non-profit sector has grown steadily under the influence of international support. The question towards which of the non-profit sector types (liberal, social-democratic or corporatist) these countries will develop in the future stays open.

The social origins theory predicts that the type of the non-profit sector influences on giving (in particular, monetary contributions) to the non-profit organisations as following: i) The rates of donations are highest in liberal democracies, followed by corporatist democracies and then social-democratic countries; ii) Liberal countries have the highest level of donation to services (health, education, poor relief and housing), followed by corporatist, then by social-democratic countries; iii) Social-democratic countries have the highest donations to expressive, advocacy and international causes, followed by liberal and then by corporatist countries; iv) Liberal countries have the largest non-profit sector, in terms of number of organisations per capita, followed by social-democratic countries and then corporatist countries (Einolf 2015).

Analyses of the data from 14 countries show a partial support for the predictions of social origins theory (ibid.). Although they donated larger amounts, people living in liberal democracies are not more likely to donate money than people in social-democratic or corporatist countries (ibid.). People from social-democratic countries are more likely to donate to expressive causes, while people in liberal democracies do not donate more to social welfare causes (ibid.). Corporatist countries have more non-profit organisations per capita than liberal or social-democratic countries (ibid.). In order to understand present day differences in giving and their relation to the characteristics of the non-profit sectors across countries, there is a need for greater understanding of the historical origins and roles of the non-profit sectors (ibid.).

⁵⁵ Archambault points out that the countries of the former Yugoslavia would be in this category, but since he uses data on the countries that have been included in the second phase of the *Johns Hopkins Non-profit Sector* these countries are excluded from his analysis (Archambault 2009).

Level of Professionalisation

The level of *professionalisation* of a non-profit sector is another important contextual factor for individual giving. Professionalisation is reflected in strategic planning, greater efficacy and effectiveness in creating and implementing programmes and using funds. Also, professionalised organisations are more bureaucratic with formal procedures, full time management and paid employees who are pursuing full-time careers in the non-profit sector.

Moreover, professionalism in fund-raising is an important factor for the level of individual giving of time and money. As it has been outlined in the section on the awareness of the need for help, people donate money and volunteer time when asked to do so, rather than actively searching for opportunities to give. Indicators of the level of fund-raising professionalism in a country is the presence of a formal body representing and regulating fund-raisers and the presence of financial advisory professionals who support potential donors with their giving strategies (Breeze and Scaife 2015).

Another characteristic of the professionalisation of a non-profit sector is the presence of representative organisations, which can organise training programmes for non-profit staff and also help in establishing relationships with the media. In addition, there is a voluntary regulatory system of non-profit organisations in many countries. In a self-regulatory system, non-profit organisations create sectoral organisations that establish a code of conduct with which all member organisations voluntarily comply.

4.3.2. Existence of Emergencies

Natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, fire, etc. as well as man-made emergencies, for example terrorist attacks, civil wars, etc. mobilise people to offer their time and money to victims. Natural disasters across the globe have sparked high levels of spontaneous assistance, both from neighbouring countries and local residents and international volunteers and donors. For example, in Switzerland, 130 million Swiss francs were collected within a few days for those who suffered in the tsunami catastrophe in 2004 (Meier 2006). Also, the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 significantly increased the number of volunteers. The upsurge in volunteerism was recorded by an organisation called Volunteermatch, which uses the Internet to link organisations in need of volunteers to people looking for volunteer opportunities. In the week following the attack, 13,227 people contacted

Volunteermatch, compared to 3,802 in the corresponding week in 2000 (Musick and Wilson 2008). Informational technology and media coverage are important factors in mobilising individuals to dedicate their time and money for emergency relief programmes. When a country is hit by a natural disaster, it creates a specific context which urges people to help victims directly, through formal organisations or informal groups.

4.4. Conclusion

To understand the complex phenomenon of individual giving I have applied an interdisciplinary approach. Whether one will give depends, in the first instance, on her awareness of the need for help. Once the need for help is recognised, or the cause worth supporting detected, one must be motivated to do something about it. Various motives prompt one to give. People give out of both egoistic and altruistic motives, also to adhere to moral principles, or to reach collective aims. Moreover, the norm of reciprocity, which has been found all over the world, impels us to give and makes it so that we are part of a chain of giving and receiving. Not only our subjective dispositions in terms of perception, motivation and internalised norms, but our decision to give is also influenced by the personal and social resources we have at our command. Being educated, having free time, being healthy and having disposable income make us more capable of giving away our money and time. Also, having a greater network of friends, colleagues and acquaintances, which is both our source of information and which reinforces norms of reciprocity, makes us more likely to get engaged in giving. This may differ throughout the life cycle and depend on marital and employment status. The way people give is not the same everywhere. Differences are attributed to institutional environments in terms of welfare systems, governmental support to the non-profit sector and the characteristics of the non-profit sector. The list of contextual and individual factors which influence on individuals to dedicate their time and money for the benefit of others or the common good is provided in the Table 5.

Table 5. Contextual and Individual Factors of Giving

<p>Contextual factors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Existence of emergencies• Institutional environment:<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Welfare system

- welfare system history and culture
- Government policy in the non-profit sector:
 - legal framework for establishment and operation of non-profits,
 - government support
 - funding
 - fiscal incentives
- Characteristics of the non-profit sector
 - size and type of the non-profit sector:
 - level of professionalization

Individual factors:

- Social resources
- Demographic characteristics:
 - gender
 - age
 - marital
 - employment status
- Personal resources:
 - education
 - income
 - time
 - health
- Personal dispositions:
 - norms:
 - norm of reciprocity
 - motives:
 - egoism
 - altruism
 - collectivism
 - principlism
 - perception

5. Individual Giving in Serbia and Canada

5.1. Introduction

Volunteering time and donating money to organisations tend to prevail in the research on individual giving (Butcher and Einolf 2017, Musick and Wilson 2008, Wiepking and Handy 2015). Moreover, our knowledge on the individual and contextual factors that promote giving comes mostly from Anglo-Saxon and Western and Northern European countries (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, Musick and Wilson 2008, Wilson 2012).

Comprehensive research on giving in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe is particularly scarce. A couple of studies which included volunteering and donating money have been conducted in Serbia. In 2017, the Pew Research Center (PRC) published a report on *Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe*, which covered donating to organisations and volunteering. Serbia has also participated in global surveys that provide comparative statistics on volunteering and donating such as the Gallup World Poll (GWP) and the World Values Survey (WVS). Catalyst, a local non-profit organisation, collects data on philanthropy by monitoring electronic, printed and on-line media at local, regional and national levels in the Western Balkans.

However, mentioned research has its limitations. International surveys focus on the giving of time and money to organisations, while it is questionable as to whether the media reports, used by Catalyst, provide comprehensive and credible data. None of these research studies provide insight into donor characteristics, their motives and resources. Thus, our understanding of individual giving in Serbia is rather limited.

The aim of my study is to fill this gap by providing an encompassing picture of individual giving in Serbia through a comparative perspective of giving in Canada. These two countries have been selected to illustrate giving practices within different institutional settings.⁵⁶ Canada is a country on the top of the global lists in terms of rates of giving and has therefore been chosen as a reference point for comparison.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Arguably, Canada is not the only case study that could serve as the benchmark for Serbia. There are other countries, the USA, the UK, Australia, etc. that fit the requirement of having different historical, cultural and institutional backgrounds than that of Serbia. The availability of data on giving to organisations and individuals in Canada at the time when the fieldwork for Serbia was planned, played a role in country selection.

⁵⁷ For example, based on GWP, 67% of Canadians donated money, 44% volunteered their time and 69% helped a

This chapter addresses the following questions:

- What are the contexts within which individuals make their choices regarding giving time and money for the benefit of others and the common good in Serbia and Canada?
- What are the rates of different types of individual giving in two countries?
- Who gives, what and why in each country?
- What are the similarities and differences in giving practices and the characteristics of those who give between the countries?

To address the above outlined questions, I firstly examined contextual differences between the countries and then I analysed giving practices in two countries based on the data from national surveys.

5.2. Contexts for Individual Giving

To understand factors that influence the ways individuals give their time and money for the benefit of others and the common good, it is necessary to bear in mind the contexts within which giving takes place. As it has been argued in the Chapter 4, the welfare system, as well as its historical and cultural underpinnings, government policy regarding the non-profit sector and characteristics of the sector are the factors that influence individuals' expression of solidarity and care for each other.

5.2.1. Serbia

Institutional environment

Social Welfare History

The first Serbian state was created in the 8th and it evolved into a Grand Principality by the 11th century, taking and losing independence from the Byzantium (ibid.). An important factor in the creation of Serbian national identity was the Serbian Orthodox Church.⁵⁸ Serbian state and the church considered themselves as heirs of Byzantine culture, modelling the state structure, the church-law and the state-church relations based on the Byzantine type (Ruzica

stranger in 2014, while in Serbia these rates were 38% for donating, 6% for volunteering and 24% for helping a stranger (CAP 2015).

⁵⁸Although the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople (Istanbul) is the head, the Orthodox Churches are independent, ethnic churches.

1998). When it comes to philanthropy, Byzantine culture and the Orthodox Church required concern not only for those near and dear, but toward any person. Church law obliged bishops to undertake charitable deeds, such as helping and protecting those in need (ibid.).

The central form of philanthropy in Serbia through the Middle Ages were *endowments* – churches and monasteries built by the rulers, nobility and clergy (Sofronijevic 1995). They donated large estates for the maintenance of the endowments, the foundations of hospitals and shelters within them, and the transcription of manuscripts. The social welfare was provided through the monasteries and churches in the Middle Ages in Serbia.

The Ottoman Empire annexed Serbia in 1459 (Corovic 2001). Under almost 450 years of Ottoman rule, small, isolated villages with an extended family became the basic social unit of Serbian society. Rural cooperatives that emerged through this period developed and preserved the sense of solidarity (ibid.). These traditional types of solidarity have been related to mutual help of village community members (Pavlovic 2007).

After gaining independence in 1878, Serbia undertook a political, cultural and economic transformation, which resulted in the social and economic development of society. First private endowments and foundations appeared in the mid-nineteenth century. They flourished through the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. The *Law on Endowments* was adopted in 1896 (Sofronijevic 1995). The founders and donors of foundations and endowments, which were particularly numerous in relation to cultural associations, educational and scientific institutions, were individuals from all social classes.⁵⁹ Moreover, humanitarian organisations also appeared in this period.⁶⁰

After the First World War, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians was established, which changed its name into Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. There was no national economic and social policy, while the country supported economic liberalism, giving concessions in all main industries to foreigners (Ruzica 2016).

After the Second World War, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was created, nationalizing the means of production, distribution, and exchange, and setting up a central

⁵⁹ For example, on the list of donors to the Belgrade University until the 1939 there were 76 persons and groups ranging from the king's family to ordinary citizens (ibid.).

⁶⁰ For example, the Red Cross of Serbia was founded in 1876. In this period the role of the church decreased as the country was on its way towards modernisation.

planning system. *Social security* became an important objective of socialist Yugoslavia. All employed were covered by a uniform social security for retirement, disability, health insurance and childcare (Ruzica 2016).

Private funds, foundations and endowments ceased to exist in the period from 1945 to the end of the 1980s. However, this does not mean that organisations driven by charitable and voluntary work did not exist in this period. One can go so far as to claim that the country was reconstructed and built on voluntary work. The organised voluntary work of the *youth labour actions* was very popular after the Second World War. In the period between 1946 and 1952 as many as 1,020,300 young people participated in youth labour actions on over 70 major projects (Vežzagic 2013).⁶¹

Through the 1950s and 1960s there was economic growth and prosperity in the country. Industrialisation and urbanization created a society that was different from the peasant economy of the pre-war period. New *social security programmes* were introduced, and family and employment legislation adopted. The first and most important social service institution – the Centre for Social Work was founded in 1956, which offered service to old people, invalids, children and families (ibid.).

With the adoption of the Constitution from 1974, the social welfare system was decentralised (ibid.). Every municipality was responsible for its own social programmes, while for underdeveloped municipalities special funds were created. Social security measures included insurances for retirement, disability, unemployment and health. The social security system was predominantly financed by personal social security contributions towards pensions and healthcare, and partly consisted of non-contributory cash benefits (ibid.). Health care and education were universal. They were free of charge regardless of social security contributions. The workers' rights were strong. Workers had many in-kind benefits such as subsidized housing, subsidized utilities, holidays and transport. Yugoslavia created an inclusive welfare system which guaranteed to all its citizens a basic living – every family with an income below the poverty line received monetary support (Stambolieva 2011).

In the period of socialist Yugoslavia, the non-profit sector was limited, comprising mainly of humanitarian organisations and self-organised groups such as the association for the blind, the

⁶¹ To mention just the biggest, they built 11 railways, 6 roads, 14 industrial objects and 5 hydropower-plants.

association for the retired, etc. (Ruzica 2016). Some of them have long traditions and constituted an integral part of the socio-political establishment (such as the Red Cross), but majority of them had a marginal role, with small membership and lack of resources. Their role in providing social services was negligible. The private welfare sector did not exist at all and the role of the religious organisations was marginal.

In the beginning of the 1980s an economic crisis started, together with the changes internationally - the collapse of the Soviet Union and move towards neoliberal economic policies across the world, led towards the introduction of the new reforms at the end of 1989, which included the introduction of market economy and private ownership (Ruzica 2016). In this period the environment for the establishment of the non-profit organisations was created (Kolin 2009).

The political crisis in the country resulted in war and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Through the 1990s Serbia experienced war, sanctions, NATO's bombing which resulted in a drop in the GDP, unprecedented inflation, a rise of unemployment and poverty, and an overall economic collapse (Vukovic and Perisic 2011). Although during the 1990s Serbia was lacking a favourable legal framework, a great number of non-profit organisations emerged, with the support of international donors (Kolin 2005). The majority of them were part of the political opposition, anti-war groups, peace organisations and human rights NGOs (ibid.). In addition, non-profit organisations providing social welfare emerged through the 1990s. A main task of these organisations was the redistribution of the humanitarian aid provided by international donors.

Welfare system

After the political changes of the 2000s, when a new democratic government was established, a wave of reforms was introduced with a goal to create a market economy, together with the social policy which would support those facing difficulties caused by the economic changes (Vukovic and Perisic 2011). The socialist welfare system has moved toward widening the responsibilities of individuals and their families, privatization and a plurality of service providers (Vukovic and Perisic 2011, Zarkovic et al. 2017). Social and economic reforms created possibilities for the development of the third sector (Kolm 2009). The international community played an important role in building a mixed welfare system, where the social

welfare is provided not only by the state, but also through the private and the non-profit sector (Vukovic and Perisic 2011).

An extensive use of the market has been introduced in pension, health and education services, while non-governmental organisations, mostly internationally funded, have been active in providing social services (Zarkovic et al. 2017). Although expenditure on social protection in Serbia amounts to almost 24% of GDP - the highest share of the GDP among the ex-socialist countries - one cannot conclude that there is a high level of social welfare in the country (ibid.). Firstly, because of the low GDP. Secondly, the high level of social spending is mainly due to the high cost of the pension system which is among the highest in Europe (ibid.).

Social protection services provide support and assistance to the needy individuals and families in order to improve or maintain quality life, remove or mitigate the risk of adverse life circumstances, creating opportunities to live independently in society (ibid.). The network of social services' organisations still consists of Centres for Social Work, which originated from the period of socialist Yugoslavia, and different organisations such as shelters, day care centres for children and youth with developmental disabilities, the elderly, drop-in centres for street children, etc.. The basic social assistance program consists of material support for poor families, child allowance and a supplement for the provision of care and help at home (mostly for the elderly). When it comes to the two major non-contributory benefits – monetary social assistance for poor families and child allowance, changes were introduced in order to reduce both the number of beneficiaries and the level of benefits (ibid.). Increasing the financial incentives to take up paid work, the reforms promoted labour market activation of the beneficiaries. This has been accompanied by a greater use of selective and means tested measures. Public spending on these two benefits has been reduced and as a percent of GDP it is below the average level of spending in the EU (ibid.).

In addition, private, both profit and non-profit, organisations have been incorporated into the provision of social services. The results of the introduction of various providers of the social services are ambivalent (Vukovic 2010). The social protection system is characterized by a relatively small amount of material giving paralleled with rigorous checks and low thresholds and modest network of local social welfare services (ibid.).

Greater flexibility in the *labour market* has been introduced together with active labour market policies. The main active labour market measure has been the promotion of self-employment through grants. Also, subsidies have been introduced for employers to create jobs, while for the employment of vulnerable groups, such as the long-term unemployed, persons with disabilities, Roma and refugees, a programme of social security contribution subsidies and wage tax relief for employers have been applied. The main passive labour market measure – unemployment benefit - has also been changed to introduce new obligations for the unemployed (Vukovic 2010). The unemployed have to actively seek a job, and must not refuse any offer of employment, etc. Also, private employment agencies have been introduced, thus there is a partial privatisation of the sector. However, all these reforms have not brought desired results. In fact, there has been a very high unemployment rate and a high informal economy through the period since 2000 (Zarkovic et al. 2017).

When it comes to the *education system* in Serbia, primary education is compulsory and free of charge, secondary education and (for certain number of students) universities are also free of charge at state schools and faculties. However, the number of university students that can be funded from the state budget is limited. Those who enrol and are not funded from the budget, pay very high tuition fees (between 1000 and 5000 euro per year of the undergraduate studies⁶²). Even those students whose tuition fees are covered by the budget, pay numerous administrative fees, teaching expenses, books, manuals, etc.. Because of this, studying at the state universities in fact is costly and thus it is not available to everyone. Private educational institutions have opened since the 1990s, while after the political changes in 2000s their number, particularly at the tertiary level (universities), has risen sharply. Third sector organisations have been operating in social science research and policy, as well as provision of (non-formal) education.

As an inheritance of the socialist past, there are employment-based rights on *health care*, where also all the family members of the employed are covered by her health insurance (Zarkovic et al. 2017). A system of support for the unemployed also includes health insurance. Thus, health care is, at least theoretically, universally provided by the state. However, health services are of low quality, and there are also long waiting lists to get a service, additional payments and widespread corruption. All of these make it hard for the poor and other vulnerable groups to

⁶²As a comparison, an average monthly salary in 2014 was approximately 370 euros.

get access to health care. Since the 1990s, there have been an increase in the number of private providers of health services. That health care is not free of charge shows household budgets survey where spending on health services of households amounts to 5% of GDP (ibid.).

Expenditure on *pensions* in Serbia is the fourth highest in Europe (ibid.). Pension system is the largest programme of government expenditures in Serbia (ibid). This is probably due to two factors. Firstly, unfavourable demographics makes the average age of citizens of Serbia (43 years in 2014) among the oldest in Europe (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia). Secondly, and probably more importantly, comprising one fifth of the total population, pensioners are an important political force. Not only do they have a political party (the Party of United Pensioners of Serbia), which has been in a ruling coalition during the last three governments, also they are a significant part of the electorate which make any radical reforms hard to introduce. Nevertheless, voluntary private pensions funds have been established from the 2000s.

Both liberal and corporatist welfare concepts can be detected in the Serbian welfare system (Vukovic 2010). Similarity with the corporatist welfare systems can be seen in the fact that state support depends on status in the labour market. Access to public health services is primarily related to work activity, although the system of support for the unemployed also includes health insurance. However, the liberal elements predominate. The influence of liberal models is seen in the low level of social assistance and modest social spending. In addition, the system of support in the case of unemployment is limited. Public services are going towards a generally available low-quality service, while higher quality services are provided only for those who can afford them, which is especially true for health services. Introduction of the private sector in health and education, as well as the introduction of voluntary pension funds, pushes citizens of Serbia towards the market as a place to get services of a satisfactory quality. However, such services are not affordable for many.

Attitudes towards social welfare responsibilities

While there is poor state provision of the social protection for its citizens, Serbians believe that the state should take the main responsibility for the provision of the social welfare.

In the field work that I conducted for the purposes of this research, methodology of which will be elaborated in the next section, survey participants were asked to rank from 1 to 6 (where 1

is “the least” and 6 is “the most”) who should help the poor, the sick, those affected by a natural disaster, the old and the talented students. The options were: their family, relatives and friends, the state, charities, rich individuals, all citizens and companies. The options that are ranked with 6 are summarised in the table below.

Table 6. Attitudes about Helping in Serbia

	Their family, relatives, friends	State	Charities	Rich individuals	All citizens	Companies
The poor	14.7%	60.0%	7.7%	6.1%	7.0%	4.8%
The sick	34.2%	48.8%	5.1%	4.2%	4.9%	3.6%
The victims of natural disasters	8.6%	68.2%	8.4%	2.6%	8.6%	4.3%
The elderly	52.7%	32.0%	3.5%	3.1%	4.9%	4.6%
Talented students	15.7%	67.5%	3.2%	2.5%	5.4%	5.9%

A high proportion of people in Serbia believe that the state should take responsibility for the social welfare. Except for the old, the majority think that the state should be engaged the most in providing help and support for those affected by natural disaster (68.2%), talented students (67.5%), the poor (60.0%) and the sick (48.8%). The support of the family is perceived as the most important for the elderly (52.7%). The role of the charities is perceived as far less important than the role of the state or the family members, friends and relatives of the needy and, except for the poor and the sick, even less important than the role of all citizens.

When it comes to the public perception of the role and significance of the non-profit sector, it is rather negative (TASCO 2016). Only 58% of Serbians know what a non-profit organisation is, while more than a half of them believe that non-profits cannot help them in dealing with their and their families’ problems (ibid.). Moreover, only 12% of Serbians believe that the non-profit organisations work in the public interest (ibid.).

Government policy regarding the non-profit sector

Legal framework for the establishment and operation of the non-profits

Non-profit organisations⁶³ in Serbia operate in the form of associations, endowments and foundations and their establishment and the operation are regulated by the *Law on Associations*

⁶³To stress once more, these are both non-profit and non-governmental to be distinguish from governmental (public) non-profit organisations are part of the public sector. Schools, universities and hospitals are part of public

from 2009 and the *Law of Endowments and Foundations* from 2010. An *association* is a “voluntary, non-governmental, and not-for-profit organisation composed of natural and/or legal persons, established to pursue mutual or public benefit goals, which are not prohibited by the Constitution and law” (Law on Associations Article 2). A *foundation* is a “not-for-profit, non-membership, and non-governmental legal entity pursuing public interest objectives”, while an *endowment* is a “not-for-profit, non-membership, and non-governmental legal entity whose founder designated specific property to support its public or private interest objectives” (Law on Foundations Article 2). The registration process is voluntary, accompanied by a clear, simple and decentralized procedure, done within a few days and via the Internet, while the organisations have the freedom to regulate their internal issues through the Statute (Velat et al. 2014).

The law does not recognise a *charity* as a distinct legal form. What is colloquially known as a charitable or humanitarian organisation can take any of the above outlined forms of non-profit organisations (association, endowment, foundation). The term charitable and humanitarian organisation is well known to the public, which is probably due to the presence of the Red Cross through the socialist past, and also due to the number of organisations allocating humanitarian aid during the 1990s.

Government support

The Office for Cooperation with Civil Society of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, established in 2011, is an institutional mechanism for the support and development of dialogue between governmental institutions and civil society organisations. It creates standards and procedures for involving civil society organisations at all levels of the decision-making process, providing support to government institutions in understanding and recognizing the role of civil society organisations in creation of the national policies and strategies. Although the interaction between the government and civil society organisations has improved, these relationships still exist only in fragments and do not exist in a structured way (Velat et al. 2014).

Governmental funding of the non-profits is available at all three levels: central, provincial and local. Governmental funding is provided for projects or programmes carried out by the non-

sector in Serbia. Thus, they are excluded from the non-profit (third) sector. However, I will analyse giving to these types of organisations, which will be elaborated in the section on the field research.

profit organisations, but not for the institutional development of the organisations. Government support to civil society organisations is regulated by the *Law on Associations* and the *Law of Endowments and Foundations*. These laws define *activities for public benefit* for which an association is eligible to apply for state, provincial and local governmental support. These activities include: social security, care for disabled war veterans, care for persons with disabilities, child care, care for internally displaced persons, promotion of the birth rate, assistance to senior citizens, health care, the protection and promotion of human and minority rights, education, science, culture, information dissemination, environmental protection, sustainable development, animal protection, consumer protection, fighting corruption, humanitarian aid programs and other programs whereby the association pursues public benefit purposes directly and exclusively. The definition of the public benefit is rather illustrative. Thus, it is entirely within the discretion of the local civil administrators to accept or not the claim that the project or program is of public benefit.

Fiscal incentives

The *Legal Entity Income Tax Law* exempts non-profit organisations from tax on grants, donations, membership dues, and non-economic sources of income, as long as they pursue activities of public benefit. The definition of the public benefit is not harmonized between the *Law on Associations* and the *Law on Foundations and Endowments* and the relevant tax laws. Deductions are provided only for donations that advance medical, educational, scientific, humanitarian, religious, environmental, and sport purposes, as well as for investments in culture and donations given to the institutions providing social services.

Tax legislation in Serbia does not exempt non-profits from paying property taxes on real estate. Traditional churches and registered religious communities are exempted from paying income and property taxes.

When it comes to donations to non-profits by individuals, the *Personal Income Tax Law* does not provide any tax exemptions or credits for donors. Thus, individuals are not incentivised to donate for the public benefit.

Characteristics of the non-profit sector

The non-profit sector in Serbia is relatively young, with a noticeable trend of growth, especially in the last few years (Velat 2015). There were 26,042 civil society organisations in 2014, which is one organisation for every 276 inhabitants. More than half of the non-profit organisations (52%) were established in 2010 and later, around one quarter (26%) between 2001 and 2009 and about 13% by 1989. The smallest number of associations, only 9%, was established between 1990 and 2000. The total income of the non-profit sector as a share of GDP is only 0.75%, while the sector employs 0.63% of all employed in 2014 (ibid).⁶⁴

Many organisations founded before the 1990s are self-help organisations for persons with disabilities, which are organized within nationwide units and they have branch offices in almost every town and municipality, while at the central level many of them are united under an organisation (TASCO 2016). Organisations formed before 1990 also encompass a variety of international and national organisations including the Red Cross, UNICEF, voluntary fire-brigades, auto-moto clubs, professional associations, pensioners' associations, cultural and sports clubs and hobby groups. They usually have a strong membership base and a capacity to organize activities in the community and respond to local needs.

During the 1990s a number of organisations dealing with human rights, disbursing humanitarian aid, promoting peace and reconciliation, fighting poverty, and promoting democratic values emerged, and they are still active (ibid.). Many of them with international support have developed into professionalised organisations that are engaged in advocacy and capacity-building in social policy, good governance, human rights and economic development. These organisations rely mostly on international support and have a weaker constituency base and relations with citizens. Most of these organisations are situated in Belgrade. After political and social changes in 2000, a wave of smaller, community-based initiatives and organisations that focus on social, environmental, economic, and other issues in the community emerged (ibid.). They usually engage in smaller-scale projects, mobilizing local resources.

⁶⁴As a comparison with the neighbouring countries, total income of the non-profit sector as a share of GDP was in Macedonia 0.96% and in Montenegro 0.58% (Velat 2015). Thus, in the Balkan countries total income of the non-profit sector as a share of GDP is below 1%. However, in the USA it is 5.3% (US *Bureau of Economic Analysis*), while in Canada 8.1% (Imagine Canada). When it comes to employment, 0.38% of all employed in Macedonia and 0.37% in Montenegro is employed in the non-profit Sector. Approximately 10.3% of the private sector workforce in the USA was employed in the non-profit sector in 2014 (US Bureau of Labour Statistics) while 11.1% of the economically active population in Canada (Imagine Canada).

When it comes to the level of professionalisation, it is low within Serbian non-profit sector. Strategical planning is rarely practiced, monitoring and evaluation are also weak (ibid). The practice of creating networks of civil society organisations is not very common, while partnerships particularly with local self-governments and public institutions are growing since this is usually a prerequisite for the EU-funded projects (ibid). There is a certain number of organisations which are positioned for dealing with specific issues and they have rather well-developed capacities for advocacy and policy dialogue, while most of the non-profits still have low advocacy and policy capacities (ibid).

When we look at the structure of the non-profit sector organisations' budgets, the largest share comes from financing based on projects (28%) and membership fees (24%), then from voluntary work (14%), self-financing (13%), institutional support (12%), while the smallest shares come from voluntary contributions (8%) and gifts (2%) (Velat 2011). Most organisations face financial instability due to difficulties to raise funds (TASCO 2016). This is partly because of the unstable funding provided by donors, partly because they are lacking strategic planning and more professional fundraising. The most prominent fundraisers have been public figures - artists and sportiest. However, fundraising professionalism is not very high. There is no formal body representing and regulating members working as fundraisers, nor are there financial advisory professionals who support potential donors with giving strategies which are according to Weipkeng and Handy two indicators of the level of fundraising professionalism (Weipkeng and Handy 2015).

Emergency Situations – Floods

In mid-May 2014, Serbia was hit by an extensive flooding. On 15th of May 2014 the Government declared a state of emergency for its entire territory. According to the *Report on the Floods in Serbia 2014*, approximately 32,000 people were evacuated from their homes. The surveying for this research has just started when the floods occurred. It is plausible to conclude that rates of giving at the time of this natural disaster were higher than they would have been if the floods had not happened.

5.2.2. Canada

Institutional environment

History of the social welfare provision

Social welfare in Canada has been rooted in the complex relationships between governments, churches and charitable organisations, where the long traditions of solidarity and mutual aid also had an important role. The history of individual giving can be traced back to the practices of the indigenous people who had inhabited North America for thousands of years before Europeans came (Lasby and Barr 2015).

With the arrival of European settlers in the late 15th century, governance structures, as well as social services, started to emerge (Elson 2007). During the pre-Confederation period in Canada, there were three regions: Atlantic Canada, Upper Canada, and Lower Canada and each of them had its own welfare regime (ibid). In *Atlantic Canada*, the English Poor Law was the basis for the social welfare system, which called for government to provide for the maintenance of the destitute (ibid.). However, government support was provided only in extraordinary emergencies and private charities were created in this period to relieve the distress of the poor. By the mid-19th century, charitable organisations mushroomed, providing aid to those in need. In 1608, a French colony called *New France* was founded in what would become *Lower Canada* in 1791 (Elson 2007). The ruler of the French Colony was King Louis XIV and the Catholic Church was the main institution for the provision of support for those in need (ibid.). Support for those in need in *Upper Canada* was provided through different institutions – municipalities, private philanthropy, the family (ibid.). Charities played a dominant role in the provision of health, education, and social services (ibid.).

The Confederation was confirmed in 1867, when these three regions united. The period between the late 1800s and early 1900s has been seen as the “golden age” of philanthropy, when charities were proliferating (ibid.). Citizens’ and religious organisations were the primary drivers of the third sector activities in this period. During the 19th century and early 20th century, churches were at the centre of community life (Lasby and Barr 2015). With each wave of immigration through the 19th century, newcomers founded their own churches and associations related to them, their main role being to give support and provide social services to their parishioners. Two events occurred in this period with repercussions today - the *Pemsel case* of 1891 and the *War Charities Act* of 1917 (Elson 2007).

The 1891 *Pemsel case* is the leading legal judgement on “charitable purposes” in the context of income tax legislation (ibid.). The Pemsel Case defines the four pillars of charitable activity: poverty relief, religion, education, and community benefit. To this day, courts and

administrators turn to the Pemsel Decision to assist them in determining acceptable charitable categories. The second major event was the introduction of the 1917 *War Charities Act* and *Income War Tax Act*. The *Income War Tax Act* provided unlimited income tax deductions for donations to designated war charities. It was the first time that income tax deductions for donations were introduced in Canada, while the first time that tax deductions were introduced for any charitable donation in Canada was in the 1930s.

After the Second World War, Canada experienced dramatic economic growth and massive immigration, when universal income and social welfare programmes were launched (Elson 2007). Unemployment assistance was introduced in 1940, family allowances in 1944, old age pensions in 1952 and a publicly funded health care system in 1966 (Lasby and Barr 2015). In the period between the 1960s and the 1980s, governmental spending on health, education and social services grew rapidly. At the same time, the voluntary sector was thriving as well.

From the 1960s, all charities are required to register with Revenue Canada. With the governmental funds, the *Coalition of National Voluntary Organizations* (NVO) was established in 1974 and the *Center for Philanthropy* in 1981, with broad purpose of the support to the charitable organisations (Elson 2007). In 2003, the two organisations merged creating *Imagine Canada*, which is an organisation at the national level that serves the interests of non-profit organisations and charities.

During the 1990s, the retrenchment of the welfare state took place in Canada, which resulted in funding cuts to third-sector organisations, while demands for services in the community increased (ibid.). In response to these changes, many non-profit organisations increased their efforts to raise money from individuals and corporations (Lasby and Barr 2015). There have also been changes in the federal tax policy with the aim of encouraging charitable donations (ibid.).

Welfare system

Canadian spending on public social expenditures is lower than the OECD average and in 2015 it amounted to 17.2% of the GDP (OECD website). While it is lower than most western and northern European countries, it is still higher than in the USA and Australia (ibid.). Based on Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare state regimes, Canada, along with the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, has been classified as a *liberal state*, in which governments

apply means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social-insurance (Salamon and Anheier 1998). However, in the word of Esping-Andersen, these are only ideal types, where each country has its own specificity. Since Government plays a large role in funding and supporting some sectors it is difficult to classify Canada in any of the four types and Lasby and Barr (2015) argue that the core non-profit sector should be classified as belonging to the liberal grouping, while organizations that are more closely linked to government, such as like hospitals, universities and colleges, should be seen as part of the social-democratic grouping. Their argument is that while government is responsible for the delivery of many social goods and services, it choses non-profit organizations as instruments for service delivery (ibid.).

The Canadian social programmes reflect the countries decentralised, federal system of government, two official languages and a long tradition of a free market economy mitigated by limited government intervention (Battle and Torjman 2001). Although Canada's network of social programmes grew both in content and in cost in the period between the Second World War and the late 1970s, Canada never achieved a comprehensive set of social and employment programmes that would protect citizens against various risks and provide a decent minimal income (ibid). Moreover, with the introduction of the neo-liberal reforms in the 1980s, the federal government introduced a range of measures aiming to reduce expenditure on social programmes.

The *healthcare system* is universal (or near-universal) and it is delivered at the provincial level and jointly funded by the federal and the provincial governments (Baker and Auckland 2013). However, Canada's health care does not cover a wide range of preventive and community-based services (Battle and Torjman 2001). Moreover, there has been the neo-liberal restructuring of the system in recent years, which resulted in increased user fees for health services (Baker and Auckland 2013).

Canada has a mixture of public and private *pension systems*. Approximately half of Canadians rely exclusively on the public pension system. The other half is covered by private pension schemes. The public pension system is made up of two components: a flat-rate pension from the Old Age Security Programme and an earnings-related pension from the mandatory Canada Pension Plan.

Labour market regulation has changed in a way that guarantees workers fewer statutory rights and union protection and encourage more part-time and temporary work (Baker and Auckland 2013). When it comes to unemployment programmes, the federal government introduced a new ideology to underpin unemployment insurance in 1995, when a shift from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ labour market policies and programmes took place (Battle and Torjman 2001).

Social assistance provides financial aid to individuals and families whose resources are inadequate to meet their needs (Battle and Torjman 2001). It is delivered by provincial governments. It is mostly directed toward persons who are unemployed, but it also can assist working households whose needs exceed their resources. Each province sets its own rules that govern eligibility and level of assistance. The social assistance recipients generally are seen as the ‘undeserving poor’, who have some personal weakness as which prevents them from finding or keeping a job and therefore (ibid).

Attitudes towards social welfare responsibilities

Canadians believe that the role of the charities in the social welfare provision is very important. The Muttart Foundation has commissioned surveys on Canadians’ opinions and attitudes towards charities since 2000, titled *Talking About Charities: Canadians’ Opinions on Charities and Issues Affecting Charities* (Lasby and Barr 2013). The results of the 2013 survey indicate that Canadians’ opinions and attitudes towards charities are positive. A significant majority of Canadians believe that charities are important and trustworthy (ibid). As many as 79% of Canadians trust charities, 93% of the population considers them to be important and 88% believe charities generally improve the quality of life (ibid). Moreover, approximately two-thirds of Canadians believe that charities understand their needs better than governments do, and that they are better at meeting those needs. However, Canadians give charities low ratings for the degree to which they report on how donations are used, the impact of programmes and fundraising costs (ibid).

Government policy in the non-profit sector

Legal framework for the establishment and operation of non-profits

There are two main types of organisations in Canada’s non-profit sector: *registered charities* and *non-profit organisations* (Blatchford and Hildebrand 2014). Both types of organisations

are defined by the *Income Tax Act* (ITA). Although many organisations in the non-for-profit sector describe themselves as both a non-profit and a charity, under the ITA these two categories are mutually exclusive.

The legal structure which is the most often used to create an organisation in the non-for-profit sector is a *society* or a *not-for-profit corporation*, as more recent legislation such as *Canada Not-for-Profit Corporations Act* from 2011, call them (ibid). This is a corporation without share capital, created for charitable or other non-profit purposes. These societies are free to do almost anything except generate and distribute wealth to their owners and members. Each of Canada's provinces and territories has its own legislation that regulates its own version of this type of society. Also, federal legislation can be used to create a society anywhere in Canada. Societies registered as charities and societies which qualify as non-profit organisations are exempt from income tax.

Canada Revenue Agency, based on the ITA, defines a *non-profit organisation* as a club, society, or association that's organised and operated solely for: social welfare, civic improvement, pleasure or recreation any other purpose except profit (ibid). To be qualified to register as a *charity*, an organisation must have a purpose that is exclusively charitable, and it must perform charitable activities that support those purposes. The term "charitable purpose" is not defined in the ITA (ibid). The common law of charity is the source of law which determines whether a charity has exclusively charitable purposes. The common law of charitable purposes derives from the *Charitable Uses Act* and the Pemsel case from 1891 which defines four pillars of charitable purposes: relief of poverty, advancement of education, advancement of religion and certain other purposes that benefit the community in a way that the law regards as charitable (ibid).

Government support

In the period 2000-2005, a close relationship had been established between the non-profit sector and the federal government, when the *Voluntary Sector Initiative* (VSI) was in operation (Johnston 2013). This was the most comprehensive attempt to strengthen the relationship between Canada's third sector and the federal government. This resulted in a series of regulatory reforms for registered charities, then in a *Canada Volunteerism Initiative* to

encourage volunteering, as well as in the support for research on the topics of volunteering and donating (Elson 2007).

After the initiative was closed, the third sector influence at the federal level has diminished (Lasby and Barr 2015). However, many provincial governments have begun to recognise the importance of the non-profit sector and thus have made moves to strengthen their relationship with it.

Almost a half of Canadian non-profit sector revenue comes from government funding, approximately 90% of which comes from provincial governments (Lasby and Barr 2015). Government funding is particularly important for hospitals, it accounts for 80% of their total revenue. For social services, government funding accounts for two thirds of their revenue, A bit over half of revenues for universities and colleges come from the government (Hall et al. 2005). Provincial government revenues dominate because health, education and many social services are areas of provincial responsibility (Lasby and Barr 2015).

Fiscal incentives

Although both registered charities and non-profit organisations are tax-exempt, registered charities have additional tax benefits and greater obligations (Blatchford and Hildebrand 2014). Registered charities can issue charitable donation receipts for gifts of property from individual and corporate donors. Only gifts of property are eligible for donation receipts, while donations of services are not ‘gifts’ according to common law. The donor can use a charitable donation receipt to enjoy a tax credit that will offset a portion of Canadian income tax that would otherwise be payable. Generally, individuals are entitled to a tax credit for charitable gifts of up to 75% of their taxable income in a given tax year, and excess credits can be carried over to future years, while for gifts of certified cultural property or ecologically sensitive land, they may be able to claim up to 100% of their net income.

Characteristics of the non-profit sector

Size and type of non-profit sector

The non-for-profit sector in Canada is comprised of organisations that provide a wide variety of services and support, from health care and education, through arts, recreation and religion.

It is difficult to define the precise boundaries between the non-profit sector and the government sector. The government plays a large role in funding and regulating hospitals, many residential care facilities, institutions of higher education and a number of social services organisations. The Canadian System of National Accounts classifies hospitals, universities and colleges as part of the government sector, while many researchers consider these organisations as a part of the non-profit sector (Lasby and Barr 2015). Therefore, the non-profit sector is divided into two groups: (1) hospitals, universities, and colleges and (2) all other organisations (ibid). In this research, the sector as a whole is analysed, thus including both groups of organisations.

There are approximately 170,000 non-profits and charities in Canada, one for each on every 210 citizens. Half of these organisations are run entirely by volunteers, 2 million people are employed by these organisations representing 11.1% of the economically active population and the sector represents CAN\$106 bn or 8.1% of the GDP (Imagine Canada, website). The majority of organisations belong to the core non-profit sector, which accounts for about a third of sector GDP. Hospitals, universities and colleges make up just 1% of sector organisations, but they account for large proportions of total non-profit sector GDP - hospitals for 45% and universities and colleges for 22% (Lasby and Barr 2015).

Due to such differences in the two subsystems within the sector, it is difficult to classify the non-profit sector in line with Salamon and Anheier's classification system, which, as was elaborated on in the previous chapter, differentiates four categories of sectors: liberal, social democratic, corporatist and statist. Lasby and Barr (2015) suggest that in Canada the core non-profit sector should be classified as liberal, while organisations such as hospitals, universities and colleges that are more closely aligned with government should be viewed as part of the social-democratic grouping.

The Canadian non-profit sector has a high level of professionalisation. The sector is well integrated and organised. In addition to *Imagine Canada*, the organisation at the national level that represents the interests of the sector, there are also numerous provincial and local organisations that serve the interests of non-profit and charitable organisations. In addition, subsectors have their own networks and umbrella organisations (Lasby and Barr 2015).

There are also several accreditation programmes for charities and non-profits in Canada. The accreditation programmes require that organisations comply with standards in different areas,

such as governance, financial accountability, fund-raising, staff and volunteer management. Although those programmes are not mandatory, many donors prefer to give to accredited charities (ibid).

Fund-raising is rather well developed and organised. There are more than a hundred organisations that raise and manage funds from various sources and distribute them to qualified registered charities (ibid). Moreover, there is also an organisation (CanadaHelp.org) that facilitates online donations for all registered charities. Several national and international associations of fund-raising professionals also operate in Canada.

5.2.3. Two Contexts for Giving

It has been shown that institutional environments within which Serbians and Canadians make their choices regarding whether and how to dedicate their time and money for the benefit of others and the common good are quite different. Differences in four contextual factors particularly stand out: a) history of social welfare provision, b) public perception of the third sector, c) the characteristics of the non-profit sector, and d) incentives for giving.

In both countries, the importance of different actors in welfare provision, such as the family, the non-profit sector and the state, has varied throughout history. However, the relative importance of the state and the third sector has not been the same in the two countries. There is a long tradition of reliance on the third sector in Canada. Throughout Canada's welfare state period (1950s - 1990s), third sector organisations were well integrated into the welfare system, when registered charities served as intermediaries between government and those in need. In contrast, the state was in charge of social welfare in Serbia and the role of the third sector was negligible during the socialist period spanning in the second half of the 20th century. Although the welfare system in Serbia has moved from a socialist to a more liberal model since the beginning of the 21st century, expanding the responsibilities of individuals and their families, Serbians still see the role of the state as most important in welfare provision. Expectations that the state should support those in need may discourage Serbians from giving to both individuals and organisations.

Moreover, public perception of the third sector is quite different in the two countries. Serbians perceive the third sector to be a far less important player in the provision of social welfare than

the state, and they also have little trust in non-profits. Quite the opposite is the case in Canada. Canadians perceive charities as important and capable of understanding and meeting their needs. This may encourage Canadians to give to charities, while the negative perceptions held by Serbians may be an impediment for giving to organisations.

Because of their different historical paths and varying governments' policies regarding the non-profit sector, the infrastructure for giving varies between the two countries. The non-profit sector in Canada is well developed and it plays a supplementary role to the government, while it is relatively young and small in Serbia, with only fragmented relationships with the state. Fundraising activities and solicitations for volunteering are much more professionally handled in Canada than in Serbia. Due to this fact, Serbians and Canadians are exposed to different levels of requests for giving. Being asked to give is an important predictor to giving, as elaborated on in Chapter 4. This is another reason why we can expect Serbians to be less likely than Canadians to give to organisations.

Finally, there are fewer incentives for giving money and time in Serbia than in Canada. Fiscal incentives for individual monetary contributions in terms of tax credit are present in Canada, while there are no such incentives in Serbia, which also may discourage Serbians from donating.

Due to the outlined factors, it could be expected that relatively more Canadians than Serbians give to organisations.⁶⁵ It might be expected that Serbians turn towards informal practices of mutual support in order to compensate for the lack of social welfare provision from the state and the lack of support from the third sector. The question is whether the strong third sector in Canada crowds out the necessity for mutual support of individuals in this country.

5.3. Methodology

I have performed analyses of the data on individual giving collected through surveys. While for Canada, secondary data from the *General Social Survey – Giving, Volunteering and Participating* (GSS:GVP) have been used, the primary data were collected in Serbia within my PhD research project. The field research in Serbia was designed for the purposes of my PhD

⁶⁵ That greater shares of the Canadian population volunteer time and donate money than is the case in the Serbian population is shown by the GWP (CAF 2015).

study, with the funds secured for these purposes. Please see the structure of the fieldwork budget as well as the sources of funding in the Appendix 2.

I obtained the dataset from the Canadian *General Social Survey – Giving, Volunteering and Participating* (GSS:GVP) 2013, together with the guidelines for the public use of the microdata file, from Statistics Canada on 24 November 2015. The dataset was in “stata” statistical software. For my analyses, I use “spss” statistical software. After converting the dataset into the “spss”, I conducted data analyses applying weighting factors for all person-level estimates, as instructed in the guidelines.⁶⁶ Although I performed all data analyses presented in this thesis, I indicated the source for said data published by Statistics Canada before submitting this thesis.

The field research in Serbia was designed with two aims. The main goal was to collect data in order to create an encompassing picture of individual giving in Serbia. The secondary goal was to collect data comparable with those in Canada, so that a comparison between the countries would be possible. For this reason, I used an adjusted questionnaire from the Canadian *General Social Survey – Giving, Volunteering and Participating* (GVP). The questionnaire used for data collection in Serbia is provided in Appendix 1.

I translated and adjusted the questionnaire used in the GSS:GVP. Bearing in mind that the work of non-profit organisations is rather unknown to the public, I wanted to see whether people in Serbia give to any type of formal organisations. Also, I wanted to account for any informal gatherings of groups to address common problems and the level of participation in them. Thus, instead of asking whether respondents took part in unpaid activities on behalf of a group or an organisation, as it is the case in the questionnaire used in Canadian research, the respondents in Serbia were offered a list of 12 organisations and asked whether they had volunteered their time to any of them in the past year. These organisations included: charitable organisations, other non-governmental organisations, churches and religious communities⁶⁷, schools, governmental institutions for social services (such as shelters for the homeless, day care centres for the elderly, orphanages, shelters for migrants, etc.), tenants’ assemblies, cultural and arts organisations, sport clubs, political parties, hobby organisations, businesses, and trade unions. Then, in the next set of questions, they were asked about their level of participation in informal

⁶⁶ The details of the GSS:GVP methodology are available on Statistics Canada’s website.

⁶⁷ In the text, I will use the term “a place of worship” referring to churches and religious organisations.

groups. When it comes to giving money to organisations, Canadians were asked whether they donate to non-profits and charities, while in Serbia the respondents were offered a list of the above-mentioned 12 types of organisations.

Moreover, unlike the Canadian questionnaire, the one used in the Serbian research included questions on giving money to unknown and known individuals. There is the widespread practice of parents, who have sick children (whose medical treatment is too expensive and cannot be undertaken in Serbia), to seek financial support from the general public. They set up a bank account and ask for donations to be made to the account, or a telephone number is provided, where donations can be made via text messaging. Also, there is a considerable number of beggars in the urban areas of Serbia. Given this fact, I have included a question on giving to unknown individuals. I have also analysed giving money to known individuals in order to account for mutual aid between friends and relatives. Finally, since it was not in the focus of this research, the questionnaire omitted a set of questions on civic engagement, which is present in the *General Social Survey – Giving, Volunteering and Participating (GVP)*.

The targeted population were inhabitants of Serbia, 15 years of age and older, excluding institutionalised persons. This was chosen as the target population in the Serbian research in order to match the Canadian. The sample was made for the purposes of this research by the sampling department of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. The sample is a national representative probability sample. The sample was selected to provide statistically reliable estimates both at the national and the level of geographical areas (statistical regions): 1) Vojvodina, 2) Belgrade, 3) Sumadija and Western Serbia, 4) South and Eastern Serbia. Mechanisms that were used to produce a random sample of individuals in Serbia were a combination of two sampling techniques: stratification and multi-stage sampling.

Population data for Serbia (from the 2011 Census) were used to make the initial strata. Two variables were used to make the strata: region (four statistical regions) and type of settlement (settlements were divided into urban and other settlements). The main strata in the sample were four statistical regions and then by the further division of four strata into the urban and the other settlements, a total number of eight strata were defined.

Multi-staged sampling was applied. The units of the first stage are the census circles selected on the basis of probability proportional to their size (Probability Proportional Sampling). The

second stage units were households. Households were selected using a Simple Random Sample Without Replacement technique. The units of the third stage were individuals. In each household one individual, 15 years of age or older, was interviewed. The selection of individuals in the households was random (the one whose birthday was coming the first was chosen for interviewing). In cases where the person was not home after three attempts to reach her/him, or refused to participate, a replacement was chosen based on the pre-established replacement procedure. The replacement was from the same street/same building as the original household.⁶⁸

The pilot research (total of 10 persons were interviewed) was conducted in Belgrade and in two villages (Dudovica and Vrba) in Central Serbia in the period 1 April – 15 April 2014, while the surveying was carried out in the period 12 May - 30 August 2014. Data were collected through the face-to-face interviews were conducted. Surveying was carried out with the support of the Institute for Sociology, University of Belgrade.

The total number of individuals envisaged for interviewing was 1,600. A total of 1,528 individuals (95.5%) were interviewed, among which 763 (49.94%) were from the original sample, while the nonresponding unit were replaced (50.06%). Approximately 20% of the interviewed individuals were randomly selected and contacted in order to make sure that interviews had taken place. The respondents were asked several questions from the questionnaire. This confirmed that the data collection process was performed well.

5.3.1. Methodological Challenges

Giving time and money is usually measured through population surveys on relatively small samples, covering a long reference period, usually one year. This leads to a number of challenges in measuring giving, among which most important are: 1) *ambiguity regarding what activities are captured by a survey* due to different interpretations of terms; 2) *nonresponse bias* - those who refuse to take part in surveys are probably those who do not give, which may lead to exaggeration in the rate of giving; 3) *recall bias* - since giving is done sporadically it is difficult to be recalled, this is particularly the case with giving to organisations; 4) *social desirability bias* - since helping others is a socially desirable behaviour, survey respondents

⁶⁸ The characteristics of the sample from Canadian research are provided in Appendix 3, and characteristics of the sample from Serbian research in Appendix 4.

often exaggerate in reporting such behaviour (Salamon, Haddock and Sokolowski 2017). Consequently, different surveys performed in the same country often yield different estimates (Salamon, Haddock and Sokolowski 2017).

An example of how framing questions differently when asking about volunteering yields different estimates of the share of population which volunteers is given by Rochester and colleagues (2010): “If a survey asks something along the lines of ‘do you volunteer’, in the United Kingdom, very broadly speaking, we tend to find that approximately 20 per cent of the population will say ‘yes’ However, if we ask about participation in a range of organisations, and then about helping those organisations through a range of activities, which we have defined as volunteering but which respondents might not themselves recognise as such, then we find approximately 40 per cent of people volunteer.” (Rochester et al. 2010: 39).

Organising and implementing a national poll is a huge task with numerous practical issues. Practical issues from designing the research and getting funds to cover fieldwork expenses to the implementation of the chosen research design, may pose numerous challenges. My work experience prior to the doctoral studies, as a junior researcher engaged at the Institute of Economic Sciences, Belgrade, as well as the local coordinator for Serbia of the *Regional Research Promotion Programme in the Western Balkans* (RRPP), funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and coordinated by the Institute of Economic Sciences, Belgrade, equipped me with both the understanding of the social science research sector in Serbia, and experience of participation in research projects in this country. This was particularly valuable in designing, organising and implementing my PhD fieldwork. Serbian as my native language was also a great asset. Although my PhD project was the first big research project that I was in charge of, my previous experience and knowledge of the local conditions, were helpful for my fieldwork in several regards.

Understanding the social science research sector in Serbia, I knew that the Institute for Sociological Research would be the most appropriate research organisation for data collection. This is because of the great experience in social research and particularly conduction of national surveys. This institute has a network of experienced interviewers from all over the country. I also knew that the most reliable sample is made by the sampling unit of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. In order to secure a cooperation with the two institutions in the implementation of my research project, I had several meetings with the representatives of

the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia and the Institute for Sociological Research in November 2013. The approval of the fieldwork funds allowed me to implement the field research in Serbia.

Moreover, I personally knew senior researchers working in Serbia who had great experience in conducting national polls, which made it easy for me to contact them and secure their support in designing and implementing my field research. They were willing to advise me on all the matters in relation to my fieldwork. Their support was particularly helpful in choosing the data collection method. In order to follow the methodology used in the GSS: GVP, I had planned to collect data through telephone interviews. However, in the consultation with the senior researchers from the Institute of Economic Sciences and the Institute for Sociological Research, who informed me that telephone interviews were unreliable in Serbia because they overrepresent certain sectors of population (elderly population) and underestimate other sectors (younger population), I decided to collect data through face-to-face interviews, which my supervisor approved of. Having secured the fieldwork funds, I was able to implement the chosen, more expensive data collection method.

In addition, support of the senior researchers was valuable in translating and making adjustments to the questionnaire. Differences in the conceptualisation of giving, as well as differences in the meanings of these practices for different individuals is a great challenge. To account for this problem, the questions were framed avoiding ambiguous terms, as discussed in the previous section. The senior researchers advised me on how to frame certain questions to obtain reliable answers.

In the period March – September 2014, I was situated in Belgrade. I completed the translation and adjustments of the questionnaire, had meetings with the colleagues from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, the Institute for Sociological Research and the Institute for Economic Sciences and made all the preparations for the fieldwork. I conducted a pilot research myself, after which, I have revised and made minor adjustments to the questionnaire. I also organised printing, photocopy and binding of the questionnaires in this period.

I performed the instructions for interviewers, which included familiarising them with the aims of the research and the ethical standards of the University of Cambridge in conducting research and explaining each question in the questionnaire. A total of 54 interviewers participated in

data collection. The interviewers were experienced in face-to-face interviewing, and they also knew the local terrain. They were remunerated in accordance to the market value of their services in Serbia at the time.

The data collection was carried out in the period 12 May – 30 August 2014. Through the process of data collection, my role was to coordinate the interviewers, being in everyday contact with them and resolving practical issues that occurred. Two main problems occurred. First, the surveying had just started when the floods occurred. This directly influenced data collection since a small city whose inhabitants were envisaged for interviewing was evacuated. In order to account for this problem, the statisticians made the changes in the sample. Second, the interviewers faced refusals from the individuals envisaged for participation in the survey. Envisaging this problem, the statisticians prepared the replacement procedure in advance. These two challenges slightly slowed down the whole process, but they did not jeopardise the representativeness of the sample.

At the end of the data collection process, I performed a control, contacting the interviewees. After the data collection and control were completed, the entry of the data into the “spss” data basis was performed by the three research assistants. Once data entry was done, experts from the Sampling Department of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia assigned a weight to each survey respondent. The timeline of the fieldwork activities is provided in the Appendix 3.

5.4. Individual Giving in Serbia and Canada

5.4.1. Giving Time

Volunteering

Approximately a quarter of the inhabitants of Serbia (27.7%)⁶⁹ volunteered their time to a formal organisation within a period of one year. My research finds a higher rate of volunteering than was found in the previous studies. According to Gallup World Poll, 6% of Serbians volunteered in one month in 2014 (CAP 2015), while the rates of volunteering according to the


⁶⁹ Survey weights, which were provided by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia and Statistics Canada, are applied when calculating the rates.

World Value Survey wave 1999-2004 was 10% (WVS website) and Pew Research Centre found a rate of 11% of volunteers in 2015/16 (PRC 2017).

There are several likely explanations for this difference in the rates of volunteering. It could be due to the different reference periods. The reference period in the GWP is a month, while it is a year in my research, as it is in the WVS and PRC studies. It might also be that due to the floods, greater number of Serbians volunteered in 2014 than in 2015/16, as natural disasters prompt giving behaviour (Musick and Wilson 2008). Finally, it could be that framing the questions as giving time to a list of organisations rather than as “volunteering to organisations” helped respondents recall activities which are considered as volunteering, but which respondents do not recognise as such (Rochester et al. 2010). Perhaps, the joint influence of these factors created differences in the rates of volunteering between the studies.

As expected, relatively more Canadians than Serbians dedicated their time to formal organisations. The rate of volunteering was 43.6% in Canada.⁷⁰ Not only relatively more Canadians than Serbians dedicated their time to organisations, but they also undertook unpaid activities more often. While 62.7% of Canadian volunteers dedicated their time at least once a month or more often, only 37.9% of Serbian volunteered as often.

Figure 1. Frequency of Volunteering




Source: Sinha, M. 2015, Spotlight on Canadians - Results from the General Social Survey: Volunteering in Canada, 2004 to 2013, Statistics Canada

⁷⁰ I performed the calculations and analyses of all the data from the Canadian survey presented here. I will provide source for the data published until the submission of this thesis.

When Serbian volunteers were asked about the organisation to which they volunteered the most hours, 18.9% reported that it was a charitable organisation. A school was the organisation to which 10.7% of Serbians volunteered the most, followed by a place of worship (11.4%), social services institution (10.2%) and a sport club (8.9%). Approximately one fifth (20.3%) of the volunteers did not know (or declined to answer) the type of the organisation to which they had volunteered.


When more than a fifth of the volunteers interviewed do not know the type of organisation to which they give their time, it might be that Serbian volunteers do not pay much attention to the type of organisation to which they volunteer. It is shown in the literature that donors often fail to pay attention to the cause to which they donate (Breeze 2010). It could also be the case with volunteers. However, it might as well mean that these are not volunteers at all. This could be a case of social desirability bias when survey respondents exaggerate in reporting socially approved behaviour (Salamon et. al. 2017).

Figure 2. Organisations to Which Serbians Volunteered the Most



The greatest number of Canadians volunteered with cultural or recreational organisations (22.7%), followed by educational and research organisations (17.4%), then social services (16.4%), religious organisations (14.7%) and in connection with health-related issues (10.6%).

Figure 3. Organisations to Which Canadians Volunteered the Most



When asked about the hours spent volunteering during the year, as many as half of the volunteers in Serbia did not know (or declined) to answer this question, while more than a quarter (27%) volunteered twenty or less than twenty hours a year. It might be that due to recall bias so many Serbian volunteers did not specify the number of hours spent volunteering, but it may also indicate that the volunteer rates are overestimated (Salamon et. al. 2017).

As in Serbia, the greatest number of Canadian volunteers (36.1%) volunteered twenty or less hours a year. However, in comparison to only 5.7% of Serbian volunteers who reported volunteering for over a hundred hours, Canadians are much more dedicated to volunteering - as many as 29% volunteered as much. Thus, Canadian volunteers are much more dedicated to volunteering.


Table 7. Hours Spent Volunteering

Hours spent volunteering	Serbia	Canada
1-20	27%	36.1%
21-40	7.5%	14.9%
41-60	5.5%	9.7%
61-80	1.8%	4.4%
81-100	3.2%	5.9%
100 +	5.7%	29%
DN/RF	49.3%	/

Source: Sinha, M. 2015, Spotlight on Canadians - Results from the General Social Survey: Volunteering in Canada, 2004 to 2013, Statistics Canada

More than half of the volunteers in Serbia have been engaged with the organisation to which they volunteered the most hours for less than three years in total. In contrast, in Canada, more than half of volunteers have been volunteering for the same organisation for three years or more, and as many as a fifth of the volunteers have been dedicating their time to the same organisation for over ten years. Again, many Serbian volunteers did not know or refused to answer to the question regarding their engagement with the organisation, which could be another sign of the inability to recall a practice that is sporadically undertaken (Salamon et. al. 2017).


Figure 4. Engagement with the Organisation



The next set of questions dealt with the ways in which volunteers became aware of the need for help or the causes they thought worthy of supporting. The majority of Serbian volunteers reported that they approached the organisation themselves (61.6%), while the vast majority of Canadian volunteers were asked to volunteer (89.4%).


Among those who reported that they were asked to volunteer, approximately half of Serbian and two thirds of Canadian volunteers said that someone from the organisation asked them to volunteer. Having in mind that the non-profit sector is professional, and the fund-raising activities well developed in Canada, unlike Serbia, this result does not come as a surprise. People are, in general, are more likely to give their time when asked to do so, rather than being inclined to actively seek out an opportunity to give (Musick and Wilson 2008, Putnam 200, Sokolowski 1996). Thus, to some extent, the fact that there are relatively more volunteers in Canada than in Serbia might be attributed to this contextual factor of the different characteristics of the non-profit sectors.

Figure 5. Who Asked You to Volunteer?



Approximately two thirds of Serbian and more than two thirds of Canadian volunteers who approached the organisation themselves heard about the opportunity to volunteer either through word of mouth or by attending a meeting or some other activity. Many fewer volunteers responded to an advertisement or found out through the internet. This may indicate the importance of social networks, both formal and informal, in terms of finding opportunities to volunteer which is well documented in the literature on social capital (Lin 2004, Coleman 1988, Putnam 2000).

Figure 6. How Did You Find Out About This?



When it comes to payments and benefits from volunteering, relatively more Canadians than Serbians reported receiving payment, benefits and skills from volunteering. It is particularly notable that many more Canadian volunteers than Serbian reported volunteering increases their employment opportunities both for getting a job or starting a business (28.2% in comparison to 12.1%) and succeeding in their current jobs (45.3% in comparison to 12.8%). This could indicate that volunteering is more relevant to the job market in Canada than is the case in Serbia, where perhaps some people volunteer to improve their employment prospects. It is shown in the literature that many young people volunteer to “build” their CV (Handy et al. 2010). Perceiving that one benefits from volunteering is not the same as being motivated to acquire skills and opportunities through volunteering. Nevertheless, since volunteering is a way of gaining valuable skills and enhancing the chances of success in the workplace by more Canadian than Serbian volunteers, it indicates that Canadians have more incentives to volunteer. Thus, the Canadian context is much more favourable in attracting people who seek to benefit from volunteering than is the Serbian.

Table 8. Benefiting from Volunteering

Payments and benefits from volunteering	Serbia	Canada
payment to cover out-of-pocket expenses	3.2%	10.8%
monetary compensation for any of your volunteer time	3.1%	3.7%
benefits	15.7%	16.4%
formal recognition from the organisation	12.1%	37.2%
Skills gained from volunteering		
interpersonal skills	45.5%	63.0%
communication skills	27.7%	40.0%
organisational or managerial skills	24.6%	31.4%
fundraising skills	24.2%	43.2%
technical or office skills	12.1%	32.7%
Employment opportunities through volunteering		
Getting a job or starting a business	12.1%	28.2%
Success in a paid job or business	12.8%	45.3%

Source: Sinha, M. 2015, Spotlight on Canadians - Results from the General Social Survey: Volunteering in Canada, 2004 to 2013, Statistics Canada

Volunteers were given a list of reasons and asked to assess which of those on the list were important in making a decision to volunteer. Whether stated reasons correspond with the “real” reasons that motivated individuals to volunteer cannot be assessed through surveying. It could be expected that to some extent respondents were biased towards socially desirable answers, such as, for example, making a contribution to the community (Salamon et. al. 2017). Thus, these results should be taken with caution.

The stated reasons for volunteering listed in the questionnaire could be grouped into four-type motives, following Batson et al (2002). However, since we cannot know for certain how the respondents interpret any of the given reasons, any grouping of the reasons is likely to be arbitrary. It is particularly difficult to assign a goal for the statement “You or someone you know has been personally affected by the cause supported by this group or organisation.” It might be interpreted as one’s motive to help others, as knowing how it feels to be affected by the cause the organisation supports gives one the ability to empathise with those who have had similar experiences. This may be the case, for example, when someone who has beaten cancer, or whose family member suffered from this disease, volunteers for cancer research. This may be interpreted as altruism. Similarly, it may be interpreted as a way to benefit oneself, thus as egoism. For example, one could volunteer with a sport club that she plays basketball in.

Moreover, the fact that a friend or a family member decides to volunteer can be interpreted as principlism in a way that a respondent is following a social norm created in a group of friends or family. This too may be altruism. She may want to make her friend or a family member happy by helping the cause the friend is supporting. The goal may as well be to increase the welfare of the group a respondent and her friend or a family member belong to or supports.

Finally, making contribution to the community is most likely related to collectivism, when one gives to the groups one belongs to. However, one may contribute to the community as a way of giving back for what has been received, which makes serial reciprocity as another possible meaning behind this stated reason.

In short, both taking the stated reasons as motives for volunteering and grouping them should be done with caution. Nevertheless, stated reasons could be used as an approximation of the motives for volunteering.

Table 9. Stated Reasons for Volunteering

Reasons	Serbia	Canada	Type of motive
To make a contribution to the community.	73.1%	92.8%	Collectivism/ Serial reciprocity
Because your friends volunteer.	57.9%	77.1%	Principlism/ Altruism/ Collectivism
To improve your sense of wellbeing or health.	39.5%	60.3%	Egoism
To use your skills and experiences.	35.5%	51.7%	Egoism
To network with or meet people.	32.1%	48.8%	Egoism
To fulfil religious obligations or other believes.	30.7%	47.4%	Principlism

Because a family member volunteers.	30.6%	38.9%	Principlism/ Altruism/ Collectivism
You or someone you know has been personally affected by the cause supported by this group or organisation.	28.0%	35.1%	Altruism/Egoism
To support a political, environmental or social cause.	26.9%	25.2%	Principlism
To explore your own strengths.	22.2%	22.9%	Egoism
To improve your job opportunities.	10.3%	18.3%	Egoism

Source: Sinha, M. 2015, Spotlight on Canadians - Results from the General Social Survey: Volunteering in Canada, 2004 to 2013, Statistics Canada

According to the stated reasons, majority of volunteers in both countries are moved by the same motives. Both Serbian and Canadian volunteers reported the following five reasons as the most important in the same order: making a contribution to the community, the fact that their friends volunteered, then, improving their sense of wellbeing, implementing their skills and experiences and networking.

Although volunteering is perceived by many volunteers as valuable for job success in Canada, only 18.3% reported that the reason for volunteering was to improve job opportunities. It may thus be that improving job success is only a side effect of volunteering and not the main reason for volunteering, but it may also be that it is not socially desirable to volunteer from the egoistic motive of attaining professional success and that this is an understated motive.

Respondents were also asked whether any of the listed statements was a reason for why they did not volunteer at all or volunteered more in the past 12 months. A lack of time was reported as an impediment for the greatest number of respondents in both countries. The second rated among the stated reasons for not volunteering in Serbia was that respondents were not asked to volunteer, while this was the fifth rated reason for Canadians. This further supports the hypothesis that the inhabitants of Serbia are less exposed to solicitation than are Canadians, and that the differences in the rates of volunteers to some extent might be attributed to the different institutional settings in the two countries.

Table 10. Barriers to Volunteering

Reasons	Serbia	Canada
You did not have the time.	49.4%	68.9%
Because no one asked you.	32.2%	41.0%
You were unable to make a long-term commitment.	32.1%	57.6%
You had health problems, or you were physically unable.	25.1%	21.7%
The financial cost of volunteering.	21.0%	15.7%

You did not know how to get [more] involved.	15.9%	20.3%
You had no interest.	15.9%	25.5%
You gave enough time already.	14.5%	47.5%
You preferred to give money instead of time.	11.8%	43.1%
You were dissatisfied with a previous volunteering experience.	9.3%	8.4%

Source: Sinha, M. 2015, Spotlight on Canadians - Results from the General Social Survey: Volunteering in Canada, 2004 to 2013, Statistics Canada

Participating in an informal group

While Canadian respondents were asked about doing unpaid work on behalf of any organisation or a group, I have made a distinction between giving time to formal and informal organisations in Serbia.

When it comes to participating in informal groups in Serbia, 22.8% were engaged in activities for the benefit of the community on a more informal bases, with their friends, colleagues, neighbours, etc., which is a slightly smaller number than that of Serbians who reported volunteering to formal organisations. However, since many respondents who reported that they volunteered for formal organisations did not report the causes supported, it might be that some of them participated with informal groups.

About a quarter of informal volunteers participated in the activities of informal groups once a month or more often, which is a greater share than that among formal volunteers who volunteer as often. However, most of informal volunteers (46.9%) participated only once or twice a year.

Most of the participants (62.5%) were engaged in the cleaning and maintenance of communal areas, followed by those who provided help to a vulnerable family and participated in flood relief activities. Thus, the majority of activities of informal groups are undertaken for the benefit of the community to which one belongs, which may imply that the motive behind them is collectivism.

Figure 7. Frequency of Participating





Figure 8. Activities



When these informal practices are added, the differences in giving time to organisations are much smaller between the countries. 40.5% of Serbians dedicated their time to organisations (both formal and informal) in comparison to 43.6% of Canadians. This indicates that cross-country comparisons may lead towards biased conclusions in terms of the differences in volunteering rates, based on how volunteering is conceptualised, as already stressed in the literature (Butcher and Einolf 2017, Rochester et al. 2010).

Helping individuals


The respondents were asked about helping people on their own, including friends, neighbours, and relatives and excluding help given to household members. In regard to giving time to individuals, 71.2% of Serbians and 80.1% of Canadians provided direct help to someone in need. Although relatively more Canadians than Serbians help people directly, the difference in the rates of helping is much smaller than the difference in the rate of volunteering.

Five types of help were analysed. In both countries the greatest number of respondents provided help with work at home such as: cooking, cleaning, gardening, maintenance, painting, shovelling snow, or car repairs, followed by health-related or personal care such as emotional support, counselling, providing advice, visiting the elderly, unpaid babysitting, then shopping or driving someone to the store or to an appointment. These three types of help were practiced by relatively more Canadians than Serbians.

Help with paperwork such as writing letters, doing taxes, filling out forms, banking, paying bills or finding information and unpaid teaching, coaching, tutoring, or assisting with reading

were practiced by relatively more Serbians than Canadians, but in both countries, these were the two types of help provided by the minority of respondents.


Figure 9. Helping Individuals



Source: Sinha, M. 2015, *Spotlight on Canadians - Results from the General Social Survey: Volunteering in Canada, 2004 to 2013*, Statistics Canada

In general, Serbians and Canadians help individuals directly more often than they volunteer. The differences in frequencies of helping between the countries are smaller than the frequencies of formal volunteering.

Figure 10. Frequencies of Helping Individuals



Due to the unfavourable contextual factors for formal volunteering in Serbia, it does not come as a surprise that many more Serbians help others directly than they volunteer time to formal organisations. It is interesting that strong third sector in Canada does not crowd out the necessity for mutual support of individuals in this country. The finding that so many Canadians provide direct help is in line with the findings that direct help has not diminished with the high rates of volunteering to organisations that occur in developed countries, in particular, Anglo-Saxon countries (Einolf et al 2016, Gavelin and Svedberg 2011, Salamon et al 2017). Perhaps there is something more to human relations which cannot be replaced by formal organisations, no matter how efficient they may be in meeting the needs.

It is likely that that, if not all, then majority of activities of direct help that are analysed here are undertaken between people who know each other. Based on the literature review from Chapter 4, one can only guess that reciprocity, particularly direct, plays a role in these activities. Whether it is a case and to what extent reciprocity could explain direct help in Serbia and Canada should be in focus of future research.

Who gives time?

The propensity to give time is not equal across the population of Serbia and Canada. Certain socio-demographic groups of people are more likely to give their time than others. In this section, I examine how the rates of giving time vary according to gender, age, marital status, employment status, formal education, personal income and self-reported health condition, and whether there are statistically significant relationships between giving time and demographic characteristics and personal resources of the respondents. These factors are analysed independently, and the associations between them are tested using chi square test and point biserial correlation, where appropriate.

Gender

The rates of giving time are higher among men than women in Serbia. The rate of volunteering is higher among women and the rate of providing direct help to individuals is higher among men in Canada. The relationship between gender and giving time is statistically significant in case of participating in informal groups in Serbia and volunteering in Canada.

Differences in giving time between the sexes are usually attributed to the different roles women and men have, where women are expected to be caring and compassionate (Gilligan 1993, Komter 2005, Noddings 2013, Wilson and Musick 1997). They are also attributed to different resources men and women have a command of, where men are found to be more resourceful than women (Wit and Bekkers 2015). There is a possibility that lack of resources is a greater impediment for women in Serbia, an economically less developed country, than in Canada. However, since the activities of informal groups are mostly related to maintenance of communal areas, it could also be that men engage more than women due to the predominant type of activities of informal groups.

Table 11. Giving Time by Gender

	Serbia			Canada	
	Organisation (all types)	Informal Groups	Individuals (all types of help)	Organisation (all types)	Individuals (all types of help)
Male	29.0%	26.4%	73.4%	42.4%	82.0%
Female	26.6%	19.6%	71.6%	44.7%	81.4%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(1) = 2.593$, p = 0.107	$\chi^2(1) = 10.080$, p = 0.001	$\chi^2(1) = 0.658$, p = 0.417	$\chi^2(1) = 20.730$, p < 0.001	$\chi^2(1) = 0.009$, p = 0.925
N	1528	1507	1528	14714	14287

Age

Young people are more likely to give time than their older fellow citizens in both countries. While 41.8% of young Serbians (15 to 24-year olds) volunteer for organisations, 29.4% participate in informal groups and 82.6% provide direct help to individuals, only 16.2% of seniors (65 years and older) volunteer, 14.1% are engaged with an informal group and 52.5% help individuals directly. In Canada, 53.2% of young people volunteer and 89.9% provide help to individuals in comparison to 33.6% and 67.0% Canadians 65 years and older.

Younger and elderly are expected to have more free time (Musick and Wilson 2008, Gundelach, Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010), while young and middle-aged people are more likely to be integrated into social networks through school, university and work (Musick and Wilson 2008). Although it is plausible to expect that older people have more free time, it may be that they are lacking the personal and social resources necessary to engage in giving activities.

It is interesting that considerably more Canadians than Serbians at the age 65 and above volunteer (33.6% to 16.2%), while the differences in providing direct help are smaller (67.0% to 52.5%). This might be attributed to the fact that volunteering, in its present form, is relatively new to Serbians, while it has been practiced in Canada for much longer. It may also be that elderly people in Serbia are more excluded from the community than their Canadian peers, or that they are less resourceful. Elderly in Serbia are likely to be socially isolated (Stojilković and Dinić 2012).

Table 12. Giving Time by Age

Age	Serbia			Canada	
	Organisation (all types)	Informal Groups	Individuals (all types of help)	Organisation (all types)	Individuals (all types of help)
15-24	41.8%	29.4%	82.6%	53.2%	89.9%
25-34	36.7%	24.0%	84.5%	42.2%	89.3%
35-44	27.9%	26.2%	80.3%	47.7%	84.2%
45-54	27.3%	27.3%	75.6%	45.3%	82.3%
55-64	22.7%	19.8%	67.8%	40.6%	79.1%
65+	16.2%	14.1%	52.5%	33.6%	67.0%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(5) = 48.016,$ $p < 0.001$	$\chi^2(5) = 102.238,$ $p < 0.001$	$\chi^2(5) = 102.238,$ $p < 0.001$	$\chi^2(5) = 198.540,$ $p < 0.001$	$\chi^2(5) = 385.034,$ $p < 0.001$
N	1,522	1,501	1,522	14,714	14,287

Marital status

Based on their marital status, respondents are divided into four categories: single (never married), divorced, widowed and married (including cohabitating). In both countries, the rates of giving time are the lowest among the widowed. Since the widowed are most likely to be found among the elderly (74% of the widowed in Serbia and 81.1% in Canada are 65 +), who are least likely to volunteer and singles tend to be in the age group that volunteer the most (15-24), this difference may, to some extent, be related to the age of the respondents. The rates of giving are the highest among the single in both countries, except in the case of those participating in informal groups in Serbia, where divorcees are slightly more likely to get involved than those who are single (25.5% to 24.9%).

It is expected that married people are more socially integrated and that they are more likely to give their time (Gundelach, Frietag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010, Musick and Wilson 2008). This is confirmed in the Canadian case where after single people, those who are married are

most likely to volunteer and help others. In Serbia, the percentage of divorcees who volunteer is higher than the percentage of married respondents, which is an unexpected finding. However, the association is not statistically significant in case of Serbia.

Table 13. Giving Time by Marital Status

Serbia			Canada		
Marital status	Organisation (all types)	Informal Groups	Individuals (all types of help)	Organisation (all types)	Individuals (all types of help)
Single	35.6%	24.9%	76.9%	46.6%	86.4%
Divorced	33.1%	25.5%	74.8%	37.2%	78.4%
Widowed	15.8%	14.4%	51.9%	27.4%	62.6%
Married	26.0%	23.1%	74.4%	44.2%	81.5%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(3) = 3.146,$ p = 0.076	$\chi^2(3) = 1.717,$ p = 0.190	$\chi^2(3) = 3.483,$ p = 0.062	$\chi^2(3) = 126.269,$ p < 0.001	$\chi^2(3) = 144.631,$ p < 0.001
N	1,489	1,469	1,489	14,707	14,281

Employment status

Based on their employment status, respondents in Serbia are divided into four categories: students, employed, unemployed and retired, while respondents in Canada are sorted into three categories: employed, unemployed and not in the labour force. Thus, both students and retirees are in the category “not in the labour force” according to the Canadian survey.

In Serbia, the rates of all forms of giving time are the highest among students, followed by the employed, while those retired are the least likely to give their time. Greater social integration and related social resources might be the explanation why students and the employed are most likely to dedicate their time for the benefit of others and the common good (Musick and Wilson 2008).

Table 14. Giving Time by Employment Status in Serbia

Employment status	Organisation (all types)	Informal Groups	Individuals (all types of help)
Student	40.1%	34.1%	81.7%
Employed	33.7%	32.8%	81.7%

Unemployed	25.5%	18.4%	71.2%
Retired	17.6%	17.1%	59.1%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(3) = 38.702,$ p < 0.001	$\chi^2(3) = 34.291,$ p < 0.001	$\chi^2(3) = 62.210,$ p < 0.001
N	1,384	1,366	1,384

In Canada, the share of the employed who volunteer is higher than the share of unemployed volunteers, while the rate of those who provide direct help to individuals is highest among the unemployed. However, the differences in relative numbers between the employed and unemployed who give their time are small.

Table 15. Giving Time by Employment Status in Canada

	Organisation (all types)	Individuals (all types of help)
Employed	46.2%	86.3%
Unemployed	45.4%	87.2%
Not in the labour force	38.1%	73.7%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(2) = 142.566, p < 0.001$	$\chi^2(2) = 351.460, p < 0.001$
N	13,885	13,875

That relatively more unemployed Canadians give their time than Serbians can possibly indicate that the lack of material and social resources faced by the unemployed more greatly impedes giving time in Serbia than it does in Canada.

Education

The level of education is an important personal resource that enables volunteering. More educated people are more likely to have greater social networks, as well as valuable skills, and thus are more likely to be asked to give their time. It is argued that people with a higher level of education are more likely to dedicate their time for the benefit of others than those with lower levels of education (Musack and Wilson 2008, Putnam 2000).

Data from Serbia and Canada confirm this. The rates of giving time are the smallest among respondents with less than a high-school diploma in both countries. University graduates are most likely to volunteer and provide direct help in both countries and the respondents with

post-secondary diplomas are most likely to participate in informal groups in Serbia. However, the relationship is not statistically significant in case of volunteering and participating in Serbia.

Table 16. Giving Time by Level of Education

Education	Serbia			Canada	
	Organisation (all types)	Informal Groups	Individuals (all types of help)	Organisation (all types)	Individuals (all types of help)
Less than high school	20.4%	17.4%	58.0%	39.4%	71.4%
High school	25.9%	23.2%	74.1%	36.8%	80.9%
Post-secondary diploma	37.8%	29.9%	74.4%	42.5%	84.5%
University	40.1%	24.9%	85.1%	54.7%	85.8%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(3) = 0.521$, p = 0.914	$\chi^2(3) = 0.553$, p = 0.907	$\chi^2(3) = 8.258$, p = 0.041	$\chi^2(3) = 581.617$, p < 0.001	$\chi^2(3) = 366.229$, p < 0.001
N	1,514	1,493	1,514	13,814	13,803

*Income*⁷¹

Having in mind that there are usually associated financial costs of volunteering, income could be a factor that enables giving time. However, when thinking about volunteering as an unpaid labourer, we can argue that the more one earns the less likely is he is to volunteer since it is more rational for him to spend his time working for a wage than to provide labour for free (Musick and Wilson 2008). Thus, the relationship between income and volunteering is not a straightforward one.

In Serbia, there is no correlation between logarithm transformation of respondent's average, monthly income and volunteering, while there is a positive relationship between income and participating in informal groups and providing direct help, but the effect size is small.⁷²

⁷¹ It should be noted that income in Serbian research is after taxes and contributions, while in Canadian research income is before taxes.

⁷² I have performed the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test of normality and Levene's test of homogeneity of variance. Since a continuous variable (income) is not normally distributed for each category of a dichotomous variable (donating to organisation, donating to unknown individuals, giving to known individuals), nor does it have equal variances, the logarithm transformation is performed as suggested by Field (2013).

Table 17. Giving Time and Personal Income, Serbia

Correlation between log transformation of income and giving time to:	Point-biserial correlation coefficient (r_{pb})	Sig. (2 tailed)
Organizations (all types)	0.049	$p = 0.107$
Informal groups	0.128	$p < 0.001$
Individuals (all types of help)	0.109	$p < 0.001$

There is a statistically significant relationship between respondent's annual income and giving time in Canada. In general, respondents with higher income are more likely to give their time than those with lower income. The rates of giving time are the smallest among respondents with less than \$ 20,000, indicating that a low income is an impediment of giving time. It is interesting that while the rate of volunteering is the highest among respondents with income of \$120,000 and above, the rates of helping are higher among respondents in all income groups between \$40,000 and \$119,000, than among respondents who earn \$120,000 and above. This could be due to differences in volunteering and helping activities. Majority of volunteers engage in expressive fields of culture and recreation. These leisure activities are costly and possibly status symbols, while there might be a trade of between providing direct help, in forms analysed here, and working more to earn higher income, or relaxing in leisure activities.

Table 18. Giving Time and Personal Income, Canada

	Organisation (all types)	Individuals (all types of help)
Less than \$20,000	49.3%	79.3%
\$20,000-\$39,999	48.0%	79.7%
\$40,000-\$59,999	52.8%	84.9%
\$60,000-\$79,999	57.7%	87.0%
\$80,000-\$99,999\$	62.9%	88.4%
\$100,000-\$119,999	61.3%	88.7%
\$120,000+	63.5%	84.8%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(6) = 153.678, p < 0.001$	$\chi^2(6) = 117.309, p < 0.001$
N	14,714	14,287

Health

Health is another personal resource that enables giving time (Musick and Wilson 2008). A quarter of Serbians and a fifth of Canadians reported health problems as a reason why they do not volunteer.

Respondents whose self-reported health condition is poor are the least likely to give their time in both countries. Serbians and Canadians who give their time are more likely to be found among respondents with excellent and good health. Except in case of participating in informal groups, respondents' self-reported health and giving time are statistically significantly associated.

Table 19. Giving Time by Self-reported Health

Health	Serbia			Canada	
	Organisation (all types)	Informal Groups	Individuals (all types of help)	Organisation (all types)	Individuals (all types of help)
Excellent	35.0%	23.9%	74.6%	49.9%	84.4%
Very good	34.6%	27.0%	78.8%	47.1%	85.9%
Good	26.1%	24.3%	76.2%	38.0%	80.3%
Fair	23.6%	19.1%	71.7%	32.9%	73.1%
Poor	14.5%	16.2%	49.7%	21.8%	61.6%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(4) = 33.086,$ $p < 0.001$	$\chi^2(4) = 5.346,$ $p = 0.254$	$\chi^2(4) = 38.684,$ $p < 0.001$	$\chi^2(4) = 390.007,$ $p < 0.001$	$\chi^2(4) = 245.902,$ $p < 0.001$
N	1514	1493	1514	13847	13837

Predictors of giving time

Next to be analysed are the predictors of each form of giving time. I am interested in whether and which demographic characteristics and personal resources, are important in predicting different forms of giving time. I am also interested in whether personal resources explain giving time better than demographic characteristics. Based on the literature review elaborated in Chapter 4, my hypotheses are:

H1: Models with personal resources and demographic characteristics of respondents explain greater variance in giving time than models with demographic characteristics.

H2: Respondents who have more of a command over personal resources, those with higher levels of formal education, higher incomes, and better self-reported health, are more likely to give their time than respondents with fewer resources, having controlled for other factors.

Dependant variables in the models are dichotomous (whether a respondent gives time (volunteers; participates in informal groups; helps individuals), while independent variables are continuous and dichotomous (gender, age, employment status, marital status, formal education, personal income and subjective health condition). This makes binary logistic regression the most appropriate technique for analysing the data (Field 2013). I applied two

models for each dependent variable. In model 1, variables which represent the main demographic characteristics (gender, age, employment status, marital status) are included in the analyses. In model 2 variables of personal resources (formal education, personal income and subjective health condition) are added to the analyses.

Before applying the models, I checked whether the following assumptions for logistic regression have been met:

1. linearity – it is assumed that there is a linear relationship between any continuous predictors and the logit of the outcome variables (Field 2013);
2. multicollinearity – occurs when two or more explanatory variables are very strongly correlated (usually above 0.80; with tolerance values greater than 0.1 and VIF greater than 10) (Field 2013);
3. outliers - among continuous variables, outliers are cases with very large standardised scores, z scores, that are disconnected from the other z scores. Cases with standardised scores in excess of 3.29 are potential outliers (Tabachnick and Fidell 2013);
4. incomplete information from predictors – occurs when data are not collected from all combinations of variables. Checked through crosstabulation, expected frequencies of each cell in the table should be greater than 1 and no more than 20% are less than 5 (Field 2013);
5. complete separation – occurs when the outcome variable can be perfectly predicted by one or a combination of independent variables (Field 2013). If this the case, the model should not be able to converge.

Serbia

There are three dependant variables in the models, which are dichotomous - measuring whether or not the respondent volunteered time to organisations, participated in informal groups, or provided help to individuals directly. There are two types of independent variables: 1) demographic characteristics: gender (categorical, 2 categories: male and female), age (scale, years), employment status (categorical, 4 categories: student, employed, unemployed, retired), marital status (categorical, 4 categories: single (never married), married, divorced, widowed); 2) personal resources: formal education (scale, years), average monthly personal income (scale,

thousands of Serbian dinars)⁷³ and subjective health condition (categorical: poor, not bad, good, very good, excellent).

There is no multicollinearity between the independent variables. Outliers for education (10 cases) are excluded from the analyses. There is no issue with incomplete information, nor complete separation. In case of volunteering, the linearity of logit for the variables age and education is met, while for the variable income is not and this variable is left out from the analyses. The linearity of logit for the variables age, education and income have been met both for participating in informal groups and helping individuals. All models are efficient, based on the -2LL which decreases with the introduction of independent variables in all models, and based on the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test, which is not significant in neither of the models (except for model 2 in case of participating in informal groups, but, since -2LL decreases, I will analyse this model too).

There has been an increase in Cox & Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R Square in model 2 for each dependent variable (volunteering, participating, helping), indicating that, as expected, greater variance is explained by the models which include both demographic characteristics and personal resources, then by models with only demographic characteristics as independent variables.

Controlling for other variables in the model, age and formal education are predictors of volunteering in Serbia. When the age of the respondent increases by a year the likelihood of volunteering decreases by a factor of 0.98. As time spent in formal education increases by one year, the likelihood of volunteering increases by a factor of 1.1.

Volunteers are thus found among younger and more educated people in Serbia, which is in line with what has been found in other countries and elaborated on in Chapter 4. The question that arises is this: why are only two variables significantly related to volunteering? This might be due to the great variation in the types of organisations which have all merged into the category “formal organisation”. Perhaps different demographic categories of respondents, as well as

⁷³ There are 29.1% missing cases for variable income. Since it cannot be expected that these data are missing at random, because the question of personal income is a sensitive one, and having in mind that imputation methods in case when data are not missing at random, can provide biased estimates, as elaborated by Lodder (2014), I have decided to proceed with the analyses without imputing the missing data.

those with different resources, volunteer with different types of organisations, which is something that requires further examination in future research.

Table 20. Volunteering in Serbia, Logistic Regression

	Model 1				Model 2			
	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Gender								
Male	/							
Female	-.131	.127	.305	.878	-.121	.130	.353	.886
Age	-.023	.006	.000	.977	-.020	.006	.002	.981
Marital status			.191				.123	
Married	/				/			
Single	.248	.183	.174	1.281	.241	.186	.194	1.273
Divorced	.325	.262	.216	1.383	.419	.268	.118	1.521
Widowed	-.319	.270	.237	.727	-.354	.282	.210	.702
Employment status			.098				.625	
Employed	/				/			
Retired	-.202	.225	.370	.817	-.011	.235	.963	.989
Unemployed	-.377	.159	.017	.686	-.198	.166	.231	.820
Student	-.322	.258	.211	.724	-.220	.265	.407	.803
Formal education					.103	.024	.000	1.108
Self-reported health							.682	
Poor					/			
Not bad					.295	.282	.296	1.343
Good					.306	.280	.274	1.359
Very good					.451	.301	.133	1.571
Excellent					.351	.311	.259	1.421
Cox & Snell R Square	4.7%				7.9%			
Nagelkerke R Square	6.9%				11.8%			
N	1,332				1,318			

Controlling for other factors, gender, age, marital and employment status appear to be important factors in predicting participation in informal groups. Women are 32.9% less likely to participate in informal groups. With an increase in age by one year there is a decrease in the likelihood of participating in informal groups by a factor of 0.98. The unemployed are 49.2 % less likely to participate in informal groups than the employed, while single respondents are 48.2% less likely to be active in informal groups than those who are married.

The activities of informal groups are mostly related to the maintenance of communal areas, many to cleaning and repairing local parks, cemeteries, etc., and thus it comes as no surprise

that men are more likely to participate in these activities than women. Although they are expected to have more free time, the unemployed lack social resources which might explain why they are more likely to participate in informal groups than those employed. Married people, and particularly those with children, are expected to have different interests than those who are single, which perhaps explains why singles are less likely to participate in the activities of informal groups than married.

Table 21. Participating in Informal Groups in Serbia, Logistic Regression

	Model 1				Model 2			
	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Gender								
Male	/				/			
Female	-.446	.140	.001	.640	-.398	.167	.017	.671
Age	-.019	.007	.008	.981	-.020	.009	.028	.980
Marital status			.017				.059	
Married	/				/			
Single	.834	.335	.003	.531	-.659	.252	.009	.518
Divorced	.831	.338	.471	1.223	.201	.352	.568	1.223
Widowed	.633	.213	.439	1.219	.106	.285	.710	1.112
Employment status							.068	
Employed	/		.000		/			
Retired	-.374	.240	.119	.688	-.330	.293	.259	.719
Unemployed	-.759	.179	.000	.468	-.688	.269	.010	.502
Student	-.152	.304	.618	.859	-.044	.427	.919	.957
Formal education					.013	.030	.669	1.013
Monthly income					.007	.006	.221	1.007
Self-reported health							.918	
Poor					/			
Not bad					-.161	.293	.581	.851
Good					-.047	.297	.873	.954
Very good					-.238	.336	.478	.788
Excellent					-.163	.359	.649	.849
Cox & Snell R Square	3.9%				4.8%			
Nagelkerke R Square	5.9%				7.2%			
N	1,308				933			

Predictors of direct help are age, marital status, education and self-reported health. With an increase in age by one year there is a decrease in the likelihood of helping by a factor of 0.95. Single people are 57.4% less likely to provide direct help than those who are married. More

educated respondents are more likely to help, as years spent in formal education increase by one, the likelihood of helping increases by a factor of 1.1. Respondents with moderately good health are 1.7 times more likely to help than those with poor health.

Command over resources in terms of higher levels of formal education and good health enables helping individuals, which is in line with what has been found in the literature and elaborated in Chapter 4. Married people have larger social networks and thus may be more often asked to give, and they are found to be more likely provide direct help than people who are single (Gundelach, Frietag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010). As with other forms of giving time, getting older seems to be an impediment to helping, which might be attributed to the fact that the elderly in Serbia are likely to be socially isolated (Stojilković and Dinić 2012).

Table 22. Helping Individuals in Serbia, Logistic Regression

	Model 1				Model 2			
	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Gender								
Male								
Female	-.095	.134	.480	.909	-.019	.165	.908	.981
Age	-.049	.007	.000	.952	-.054	.009	.000	.948
Marital status			.002				.010	
Married	/				/			
Single	-.761	.206	.000	.467	-.854	.264	.001	.426
Divorced	-.047	.271	.861	.954	-.312	.337	.355	.732
Widowed	-.188	.206	.362	.829	-.193	.237	.415	.824
Employment status			.021				.760	
Employed								
Retired	.045	.219	.837	1.046	.096	.281	.733	1.101
Unemployed	-.447	.174	.010	.639	-.178	.267	.506	.837
Student	-.601	.323	.063	.548	-.317	.451	.481	.728
Formal education					.068	.028	.017	1.071
Monthly income					.012	.006	.052	1.013
Self-reported health							.034	
Poor								
Not bad					.504	.249	.043	1.655
Good					.149	.260	.566	1.161
Very good					-.255	.307	.406	.775
Excellent					-.239	.332	.471	.787
Cox & Snell R Square	8.4%				12.3%			

Nagelkerke R Square	12.1%	17.6%
N	1,325	938

Canada

There are two dependant variables in the models, which are dichotomous - measuring whether or not the respondent volunteered time to organisations or provided help to individuals directly. There are two types of independent variables: 1) demographic characteristics: gender (categorical, 2 categories: male and female), age (categorical, 6 categories: 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+), employment status (categorical, 3 categories: employed, unemployed, not in the labour force), marital status (categorical, 4 categories: single (never married), married, divorced, widowed); 2) personal resources: formal education (categorical, 4 categories: less than high school, high school, post-secondary diploma, university), annual personal income (categorical, 6 categories: less than \$20,000, \$20,000-\$39,999, \$40,000-\$59,999, \$60,000-\$79,999, \$80,000-\$119,999, 120,000+) and subjective health condition (categorical, 5 categories: poor, not bad, good, very good, excellent).

All models are efficient, based on the -2LL which decreases with the introduction of independent variables in all models. Although Hosmer and Lemeshow Test is significant for model 2 of both dependent variables since -2LL decreases, I will analyse these models too.

There has been an increase in Cox & Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R Square in model 2 for each dependent variable (volunteering and helping), indicating that, as expected, greater variance is explained by the models which include both demographic characteristics and personal resources, then by models with only demographic characteristics as independent variables.

Controlling for other variables in the model 2, gender, age, marital status, level of education, income and self-reported health are significant factors in predicting volunteering. Women are more likely to volunteer than men, younger respondents than older, married than single, divorced and widowed, as well as those with higher levels of educated than those with less than high school, those with better self-reported health than those with poor health, and Canadians who earn higher incomes (particularly those in income groups \$80,000-\$99,999\$ and above \$120,000) than those with income of less than \$20,000.

Command over higher levels of all analysed personal resources appear to be important in predicting volunteering in Canada, which is in line with what has been found in the literature. Moreover, Canadian case shows that women are more likely to give time to organisations, which could potentially be explained by their greater empathic concerns, as well as social norms which encourage women to help others, but which needs further analyses. Command over greater social resources might explain why married people are more likely to volunteer.

Table 23. Volunteering in Canada, Logistic Regression

	Model 1				Model 2			
	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Gender								
Male								
Female	.239	.036	.000	1.271	.237	.038	.000	1.267
Age			.000				.000	
15-24								
25-34	-.660	.088	.000	.517	-1.072	.095	.000	.342
35-44	-.390	.087	.000	.677	-.772	.095	.000	.462
45-54	-.607	.086	.000	.545	-.862	.093	.000	.422
55-64	-.669	.085	.000	.512	-.884	.092	.000	.413
65+	-.654	.089	.000	.520	-.864	.097	.000	.422
Marital status			.000				.000	
Married								
Widowed	-.259	.049	.000	.772	-.181	.051	.000	.834
Divorced	-.310	.056	.000	.734	-.233	.058	.000	.792
Single	-.440	.066	.000	.644	-.276	.070	.000	.759
Employment status			.000			.423		
Employed								
Unemployed	-.196	.095	.040	.822	-.041	.099	.679	.960
Not in the labour force	-.334	.045	.000	.716	-.065	.050	.195	.937
Education							.000	
Less than High School								
High School					.280	.061	.000	1.324
Post-secondary Diploma					.622	.063	.000	1.863
University					1.096	.067	.000	2.993
Annual income							.001	
Less than \$20,000								
\$20,000-\$39,999					-.004	.051	.943	.996
\$40,000-\$59,999					.049	.057	.389	1.051
\$60,000-\$79,999					.105	.069	.127	1.111
\$80,000-\$99,999\$.325	.086	.000	1.384
\$100,000-\$119,999					.209	.112	.062	1.232
\$120,000+					.279	.098	.005	1.322
Self-reported health							.000	
Poor								

Fair					.613	.124	.000	1.845
Good					.736	.119	.000	2.088
Very good					.565	.118	.000	1.760
Excellent					.355	.127	.005	1.426
Cox & Snell R Square	2.5%				7.3%			
Nagelkerke R Square	3.3%				9.7%			
N	13,880				13,712			

In providing direct help to individuals women are more likely to get engaged than men, younger respondents than older, married than single and widowed, employed than those who are not in the labour force, Canadians with higher levels of education than those with less than high school and those with better self-reported health than those with poor health. When it comes to personal income, Canadians who earn between \$40,000 and \$80,000 are more likely to provide direct help than those who earn less than \$20,000. However, respondents with income higher than \$80,000 are not statistically significantly more likely to help than those with low income. As it has been already pointed out, there could be a trade of between providing direct help, in forms analysed here, and working more to earn higher income, or relaxing in leisure activities.

Table 24. Helping Individuals in Canada, Logistic Regression

	Model 1				Model 2			
	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Gender								
Male								
Female	.134	.047	.005	1.143	.114	.050	.024	1.121
Age			.000				.000	
15-24								
25-34	-.396	.136	.004	.673	-.729	.143	.000	.483
35-44	-.623	.132	.000	.536	-.933	.139	.000	.393
45-54	-.726	.130	.000	.484	-.920	.137	.000	.398
55-64	-.726	.126	.000	.484	-.912	.134	.000	.402
65+	-1.059	.128	.000	.347	-1.247	.136	.000	.288
Marital status							.002	
Married			.000					
Widowed	-.284	.065	.000	.753	-.214	.068	.002	.807
Divorced	-.043	.074	.560	.958	.033	.077	.667	1.034
Single	-.291	.076	.000	.747	-.162	.079	.041	.850
Employment status			.000				.000	
Employed								
Unemployed	-.083	.140	.555	.921	.059	.143	.682	1.060
Not in the labour force	-.584	.060	.000	.557	-.332	.065	.000	.718
Education							.000	
Less than High School								

High School					.401	.069	.000	1.493
Post-secondary Diploma					.707	.073	.000	2.028
University					.882	.082	.000	2.417
Annual income							.071	
Less than \$20,000								
\$20,000-\$39,999					.011	.064	.859	1.011
\$40,000-\$59,999					.168	.076	.027	1.183
\$60,000-\$79,999					.191	.096	.046	1.211
\$80,000-\$99,999\$.231	.123	.061	1.260
\$100,000-\$119,999					.215	.166	.193	1.240
\$120,000+					-.018	.131	.891	.982
Self-reported health								
Poor							.000	
Fair					.587	.114	.000	1.799
Good					.763	.109	.000	2.146
Very good					.592	.108	.000	1.807
Excellent					.398	.116	.001	1.489
Cox & Snell R Square	3.4%				5.1%			
Nagelkerke R Square	5.6%				8.5%			
N	13,870				13,703			

In both countries, younger people are more likely to give time than older. Also, in line with what is found in other studies, being married and employed increases the likelihood of giving time to organisations and individuals in Canada, and of participating in informal groups in Serbia. While women are more likely to give time in Canada, there are no significant differences in propensity to give among sexes in Serbia.

This research has confirmed that personal resources, in terms of income, level of education and health, are predictors of giving time. However, not all resources are predictors of all types of giving and in both countries. While among personal resources only education appears as important in explaining volunteering and helping individuals in Serbia, all three analysed resources are predictors of giving time in Canada. There is a need for further research in order to understand better why such differences appear.

5.4.2. Giving Money

Giving money to organisations

The rate of donors to organisations was 49.3% in Serbia. According to the Gallup World Poll, 38% of Serbians donated in one month in 2014 (CAP 2015), while the Pow Research Centre

found a rate of 31% of donors in 2015/16 (PRC 2017). The difference in donor rates could be due to the different reference periods, in the case of the GWP, while floods might explain the difference in the case of the PRC research. Also, framing the questions as giving money to a list of organisations rather than donating to organisations may have helped respondents recall activities better.


Another valuable research on philanthropy in Serbia is provided by the local non-profit organisation, Catalyst. Since the data come from media reports, it provides evidence on (reported) philanthropic instances, but not on the rates of donors. There were 4,488 various philanthropic instances of the collection of cash and/or goods recorded in Serbia in 2014, where 58.8% of them were related to flood relief. (Vesić Antić 2016). The most active donors in 2014, as a percentage of recorded instances, were mass individual donors (46.0%), followed by individuals (18.8%) and the corporate sector (18.0%) (ibid.). Thus, more than four fifths of all (reported) donations in Serbia come from individuals. In most cases, recipients were individuals or families (49.3%), followed by institutions (27.9%), non-profit organisations (15.4%) and local/national governments (2.5%) (ibid.). Thus, according to this study, half of the direct recipients of philanthropic donations in Serbia were individuals, which confirms that these practices should not be omitted when analysing individual giving in Serbia.

As expected, substantially more Canadians donate to organisations than Serbians. The rate of donors was 82.4% in Canada.

In both countries, donating is rather a reactive activity than one that is well planned. However, Canadians are more prone to familiarising themselves with an organisation before donating than are Serbians. Only 10% of Serbian donors and 14.3% of Canadian decided in advance on the total amount of money they intended to donate in one year. When considering whether or not to donate to an organisation they had not donated to in the past, approximately one third (31.5%) of Serbian donors, and a half (52.6%) of Canadian donors, research the organisation beforehand. This may indicate a lack of interest in what organisations do among greater portions of Serbians than Canadians. However, it also might be that a greater number of Serbian donors do not think that there is reliable information available on charitable organisations. Low levels of trust in charitable organisations and lack of regulatory agencies in Serbia might be causes for this.


Five types of organisations to which a greatest number of Serbians donated were charities (28.2%), places of worship (21.5%), social services institution (10.0%), schools (7.9%) and sport clubs (5.4%).

Figure 11. Percentages of Donors to Organisations in Serbia



The greatest number of Canadians (66.7%) donated to health-related causes, followed by social services (49.5%), religion (38.0%), education and research (20.9%) and culture and recreation (19.6%). Thus, most donors in both countries donate to similar causes, related to health, social services, education, religion and recreation. Though health-related causes are not explicitly stated, most charitable organisations to which Serbian donors donate operate in the health-related field, which is explain below.

Figure 12. Percentages of Donors to Organisations in Canada



Serbian donors are often unaware of the type of organisation to which they donate. When asked about the name of the organisation to which they donated the most, only half of donors (49.1%) reported a name of a charitable organisation. Others named flood relief programmes, churches,

Government sectors, schools, etc. This makes it plausible to conclude that only those respondents who were able to provide a name of the charitable organisations had actually donated to charities, which is 9.3% of the total sample (not 28.2%, as reported). Among those respondents who said that they donated for a flood relief programme, the great majority recalled a telephone number to which they sent a text message. This telephone number was launched by the Government as a means of collecting donations for flood relief. Thus, 20.8% of those who reported that they donated to a charity actually gave to the Government for a flood relief programme and 10.7% of said donors gave to the church. It seems that donors are more aware of the cause they are giving to, than of the type of organisation. If they perceive the cause as charitable or humanitarian, then they report giving to charitable organisations. Therefore, the rates of giving to different types of organisations should be taken with caution.

Donors who were able to name the charity, named seventeen different organisations. The greatest number of donors to charities (64.8%) reported that they gave to the Red Cross (the biggest Red Cross programme at the time was related to flood relief, other programmes were related to healthcare and poverty relief), 12.7% to the Blic Foundation (provides aid to sick and impoverished children, provides financial support to children's hospitals), 5.6% to the B92 Fund (provides financial support to maternity hospitals, supports victims of violence), 4.2% to the Ana & Vlade Divac Foundation (provides financial support to schools, builds homes for refugees and displaced persons), 2.8% to UNICEF (social inclusion of children, children's health) and 9.9% named other organisations. Having in mind that the Red Cross has a long history in Serbia and continuity throughout the socialist period, it does not come as a surprise that almost two thirds of charity donors give to this organisation. Other named organisations (except for UNICEF) were founded after 2000.

When asked about the activities of the organisation to which they gave the most, approximately a quarter of donors did not know or declined to answer this question, while approximately half reported that the organisation provided humanitarian aid and social services. As already pointed out, donors are often unaware of the causes they give to (Breeze 2010). However, it is also possible that due to the desirability bias respondents exaggerate or falsely report donating.

Figure 13. Charitable organisations





Figure 14. Activities



When asked about the reasons for giving money, the three highest rated reasons in both countries are the same. Most donors in both countries give because they feel compassion towards people in need. The second rated reason for giving in Serbia was to contribute to the community, which was rated third in Canada. Helping a cause a donor personally believes in was the second rated reason in Canada and third in Serbia.

Table 25. Stated Reasons for Donating

Reasons	Serbia	Canada	Motive
You felt compassion towards people in need.	89.7%	91.5%	Altruism
You wanted to make a contribution to the community.	78.0%	81.8%	Collectivism / Serial reciprocity
To help a cause in which you personally believe in.	45.8%	87.8%	Principlism
To fulfil religious obligations or other beliefs.	27.1%	29.3%	Principlism
You or someone you know has been personally affected by the cause the organisation supports.	26.1%	67.2%	Egoism/Altruism
A family member, friend, neighbour or colleague requested that you make a donation.	15.1%	44.9%	Principlism/Altruism/Collectivism
Tax credit	/	28.2%	Egoism

Source: Turcotte, M. 2015, Spotlight on Canadians - Results from the General Social Survey: Charitable Giving by Individuals, Statistics Canada.

As it has been pointed out, there are no tax breaks for donors in Serbia, while Canadians can claim tax credits. Almost half of the donors reported claiming tax credits (46.3%), though only 28.2% of them reported this as an important reason for giving. It may be that Canadians perceive tax credits only as a side effect of giving, not the ultimate goal. It could also be that reporting tax credits as an important reason is underestimated, since this answer is not socially

desirable. Lowering the costs of donations, by providing tax benefits for donors, is one of the mechanisms that drives individual donations to charities (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). A lack of fiscal incentives in Serbia certainly discourages certain groups of individuals, perhaps those egoistically motivated, to donate and it might, to some extent, be accounted for the differences in giving between the countries.

Serbians and Canadians face different barriers to donating. When asked about the reasons why they did not give at all or did not give larger amounts, reason important for relatively the greatest number of Serbians was inability to make (larger) donations, while the majority of Canadians were happy with what they gave.

Table 26. Barriers to Donating

Reasons for not giving (at all or larger amounts)	Serbia	Canada
You could not afford to give (a larger) donation.	72.1%	69.3%
You did not think the money would be used efficiently or effectively.	27.3%	29.1%
Because no one asked you.	26.9%	27.6%
You did not like the way in which requests were made for donations.	19.9%	28.6%
You were happy with what you already gave.	19.0%	72.9%
It was hard to find a cause worth supporting.	15.4%	11.7%
You felt that you have already given enough money directly to people on your own, instead of through an organisation.	15.1%	38.9%
You gave time instead of money.	14.9%	32.3%
You did not know where to make a contribution.	14.0%	12.7%

Source: Turcotte, M. 2015, Spotlight on Canadians - Results from the General Social Survey: Charitable Giving by Individuals, Statistics Canada.

As many as 65.3% of Serbians and even relatively more Canadians (71.5%) are concerned about fraud or scams in charities. This does not come as a surprise for Serbia, since half of Serbians believe that non-profit organisations do not work in the public interest (TASCO 2016). Having in mind that Canadians perceive charities as important and trustworthy, as the Muttra Foundation’s research titled *Talking About Charities: Canadians’ Opinions on Charities and Issues Affecting Charities* shows, this result may strike as surprising one. However, the same research points out that Canadians give charities low ratings for the degree to which they report on how donations are used, the impact of programmes and fundraising costs. Also, being concerned about charity fraud and scams leads many to research information on charities, as was pointed out, about a half of Canadians search for information on a charity they have not donated to in the past. While potential donors in Canada could find information about charity transparency and accountability through numerous “charity watchdogs”, there

are no such organisations in Serbia. Also, unlike in Serbia, there are several accreditation programmes for charities and non-profits in Canada, which require that organisations comply with standards in different areas (Lasby and Barr 2015). Thus, while concerned Canadians may be informed on how trustworthy charities are, such information is not available in Serbia. This might explain why, despite the high rates of concerned Canadians, there are also high rates of donors in Canada.

Giving money to individuals

The questionnaire used in the fieldwork in Serbia included questions on giving to known and unknown individuals. As many as 79.8% of Serbians donated to an individual, 67.0% to unknown and 55.2% to people they know personally.

Both in giving money directly to strangers and donating to organisations the recipients are unknown to donors. Thus, giving to strangers is similar to giving to organisations in this respect. Therefore, it can be said that the rate of donors to unknown recipients was 78.3% in Serbia.

The Canadian GSS:GVP did not include giving money to individuals directly. However, there is a research available which has included these practices as well. Namely, the country report *Giving Canada*, provided by the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) in 2017. According to this report, 26% of adult Canadians (18+) gave money directly to people/families in need within a period of 12 months.

The rate of giving to individuals in Canada is considerably lower than in Serbia. However, one has to be careful with the data from this research, since it might underestimate giving in Canada. This research found that 64% of Canadians donated money over a 12-month period, which is smaller than was found in the Statistic's Canada survey (82.4%). Differences in the rates of giving to organisations between the two Canadian surveys could perhaps be attributed to different research methodologies. Firstly, the target population of the Statistics Canada's research was 15+, while the CAF research focused on adults 18+. Then, Statistics Canada used a much larger sample than the CAF research (14,714 in comparison to 1,001). Finally, Statistics Canada used telephone interviews while on-line interviews were used in the CAF research.

Giving money to unknown individuals in Serbia

The main purpose of monetary contributions to unknown individuals in Serbia was medical treatment, followed by everyday needs and flood relief. This is in line with what was found by Catalyst, where the main reasons for donations were: flood relief, healthcare, support to marginalised groups, poverty reduction and education (Vesić Antić 2016).

The low quality of universal healthcare and expensive services in the private sector makes healthcare inaccessible for many. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that medical treatment is the main purpose of donations to unknown individuals. Throughout the media, there are numerous requests for support for medical treatment, usually for children and young people. They provide a bank account to which donations can be made, or a mobile phone number for donations via text messaging. Also, there is a considerable number of the pedlars on the streets.

Almost a half of the donors discovered that the person needed help from an unknown person that they met on the street, at the market, etc., a quarter found out from family members, friends, relatives or colleagues and 22.5% reported that they found out through the media.

Figure 15. Purpose of Donation





Figure 16. How Did you Find Out About this Person?



Giving money to known individuals in Serbia

In most cases, the purpose of giving to people a donor personally knew was for everyday needs, followed by medical treatment. A half of donors gave to a friend and more than a quarter to a relative. Bearing in mind the high unemployment rate (18.9%), and the great number of people

who are living just above the poverty line (25.4%), it does not come as a surprise that many need support for everyday necessities which can be obtained from mutual aid provided by friends and relatives. Also, as education, especially higher education, becomes unaffordable for many, support from relatives and friends gains in importance. This can be seen from the presented results – education is among the three main purposes of direct contributions.

Figure 17. Purpose of Contribution





Figure 18. Relation with the Person



Who gives money?

In this section, I examine how the rates of giving money vary according to gender, age, marital status, employment status, formal education, personal income and self-reported health condition and whether there is a statistically significant relationship between giving money and these variables. These factors are discussed independently. I apply the Chi Square Test and point-biserial correlation to check for association.

Gender

The rates of donors to organisations are slightly higher among men than among women in Serbia, while the rates of donors to unknown individuals are higher among women than men. In Canada, donors to organisations are more likely to be found among women. The association between gender and giving money is not statistically significant in Serbia, while it is significant in Canada. It has been argued that women are likely to have empathic orientation towards others and social norms encourage women to provide care (Gilligan 1993, Komter 2005, Wit and Bekkers 2015).

Table 27. Giving Money by Gender

			Serbia	Canada
	Organisations (all types)	Unknown individuals	Known individuals	Organisation (all types)
Male	51.8%	46.8%	55.3%	80.4%
Female	49.6%	53.2%	55.2%	84.4%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(1) = 0.019,$ p = 0.889	$\chi^2(1) = 2.438,$ p = 0.118	$\chi^2(1) = 0.064,$ p = 0.800	$\chi^2(1) = 45.596,$ p < 0.001
N	1,528	1,528	1,492	14,714

Age

When it comes to the relationship between age and giving money, the rates of donors are the highest among middle aged individuals in both countries. Middle-aged people are likely to be employed and integrated into social networks through work, and thus more likely to be asked to donate and to have resources for donating. According to the Chi Square Test, the relationship between giving money and age is not statistically significant in Serbia, yet the opposite is true for Canada.

Table 28. Giving Money by Age

			Serbia	Canada
	Organisations (all types)	Unknown individuals	Known individuals	Organisation (all types)
15-24	53.6%	66.1%	48.6%	66.7%
25-34	54.7%	64.7%	55.6%	81.3%
35-44	55.3%	69.8%	61.4%	85.5%
45-54	55.4%	65.4%	53.6%	86.7%
55-64	48.0%	68.7%	55.6%	87.0%
65+	41.0%	67.5%	55.3%	86.0%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(5) = 5.218,$ p = 0.390	$\chi^2(5) = 1.940,$ p = 0.857	$\chi^2(5) = 6.634,$ p = 0.249	$\chi^2(5) = 367.872,$ p < 0.001
N	1,522	1,522	1,487	14,714

Marital status

The rates of donors to organisations are the highest among married both in Serbia and in Canada, but the relationship is not statistically significant in case of Serbia. The rate of donors

to unknown individuals is the highest among single, which could be related to their age, since younger Serbians are more likely to give to the unknown individuals. The rate of donors to known individuals is the highest among the divorced, which is an unexpected result.

Table 29. Giving Money by Marital Status

	Serbia			Canada
	Organisations (all types)	Unknown individuals	Known individuals	Organisation (all types)
Single	51.7%	75.7%	56.1%	70.1%
Divorced	52.4%	66.4%	63.8%	80.5%
Widowed	38.7%	53.1%	13.1%	84.3%
Married	52.9%	65.7%	53.2%	87.9%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(3) = 6.928,$ $p = 0.074$	$\chi^2(3) = 25.633,$ $p < 0.001$	$\chi^2(3) = 15.837,$ $p = 0.001$	$\chi^2(3) = 508.969,$ $p < 0.001$
N	1,489	1,489	1,455	14,707

Employment status

The association between giving money and one's employment status is statistically significant in both countries and the employed are more likely to give money than respondents in other categories.

Table 30. Giving Money by Employment Status in Serbia

	Organisations (all types)	Unknown individuals	Known individuals
Student	58.7%	81.5%	59.1%
Employed	58.5%	68.9%	68.0%
Unemployed	39.8%	65.0%	48.9%
Retired	45.2%	56.4%	48.9%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(3) = 30.946,$ $p < 0.001$	$\chi^2(3) = 20.976,$ $p < 0.001$	$\chi^2(3) = 35.213,$ $p < 0.001$
N	1,384	1,384	1,353

Employment yields income and also through work, people are more likely to have extended social networks which could explain why respondents in this category are more likely to give than those in others.

Table 31. Giving Money by Employment Status in Canada

	Organisations (all types)
Employed	85.9%
Unemployed	74.4%

Not part of the labour force	77.6%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(2) = 134.292, p < 0.001$
N	14,714

Education

In both countries, university graduates are most likely to donate to organisations, while there is no significant relationship between respondent's level of education and propensity to give money to individuals in Serbia.

Table 32. Giving Money by Level of Education

	Serbia			Canada
	Organisations (all types)	Unknown individuals	Known individuals	Organisation (all types)
Less than high school	37.6%	70.5%	58.6%	66.8%
High school	51.5%	67.4%	53.4%	79.4%
Post-secondary diploma	59.4%	59.6%	56.0%	87.5%
University	62.5%	63.2%	56.4%	88.1%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(3) = 9.409, p = 0.024$	$\chi^2(3) = 4.381, p = 0.223$	$\chi^2(3) = 1.945, p = 0.584$	$\chi^2(3) = 405.521, p < 0.001$
N	1,514	1,514	1,478	13,814

Income

In both countries, income is found to be an important personal resource which enables giving, which is in line with the literature (Bekkers and Wiepping 2011b). There is a positive relationship between logarithm transformation of respondent's average, monthly income and giving money in Serbia, but the effect size is small.⁷⁴

Table 33. Giving Money and Income, Serbia

Correlation between log transformation of income and donating money to:	Point-biserial correlation coefficient (r_{pb})	Sig. (2 tailed)
Organisations	.162	$p < 0.001$
Unknown individuals	.088	$p = 0.004$
Known individuals	.184	$p < 0.001$

⁷⁴ Since income is not normally distributed for each category of a dichotomous variable (donating to organisation, donating to unknown individuals, giving to known individuals), nor does it have equal variances, the logarithm transformation is performed as suggested by Field (2013).

The rate of donors is the highest among Canadians who earn \$120,000. As income increases, the likelihood of donating in Canada increases too.

Table 34. Giving Money and Income, Canada

	Organisation (all types)
Less than \$20,000	76.8%
\$20,000-\$39,999	85.1%
\$40,000-\$59,999	90.0%
\$60,000-\$79,999	91.9%
\$80,000-\$99,999\$	92.0%
\$100,000-\$119,999	94.2%
\$120,000+	94.5%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(6) = 455.920, p < 0.001$
N	14,714

Health

There is a statistically significant relationship between respondents' self-reported health and propensity to give money. In both countries, donors are significantly less likely to be found among respondents with poor self-reported health. The rates of donors are smaller among those with excellent health than among those who reported having very good or good health. Perhaps, respondents with some health issues have a better understanding of the need for support or they sympathise more with people in need more than respondents with no health issues.

Table 35. Giving Money by Self-reported Health

	Serbia			Canada
	Organisations (all types)	Unknown individuals	Known individuals	Organisation (all types)
Excellent	50.8%	76.8%	59.3%	82.9%
Very good	56.1%	70.6%	58.8%	84.7%
Good	58.1%	70.5%	56.4%	82.1%
Fair	45.7%	61.0%	53.9%	78.9%
Poor	30.8%	47.3%	40.3%	71.9%
Chi Square Test	$\chi^2(4) = 25.067, p < 0.001$	$\chi^2(4) = 25.263, p < 0.001$	$\chi^2(4) = 19.576, p = 0.001$	$\chi^2(4) = 152.540, p < 0.001$
N	1,514	1,514	1,479	13,847

Predictors of Giving Money

At the end, I will analyse the predictors of each form of giving money. My hypotheses are:

H1: Models with personal resources and demographic characteristics of respondents explain greater variance in giving money than models with demographic characteristics.

H2: Respondents who have more of a command over personal resources, those with higher levels of formal education, higher incomes, and better self-reported health, are more likely to give money than respondents with fewer resources, having controlled for other factors.

Serbia

There are three dependant variables in the models, which are dichotomous - measuring whether or not the respondent reported donating money to organisations, unknown individuals or known individuals. There are two types of independent variables: 1) demographic characteristics: gender (categorical, 2 categories: male and female), age (scale, years), employment status (categorical, 4 categories: student, employed, unemployed, retired), marital status (categorical, 4 categories: single (never married), married, divorced, widowed); 2) personal resources: formal education (scale, years), average monthly personal income (scale, thousands of Serbian dinars) and subjective health condition (categorical: poor, not bad, good, very good, excellent).

There is no multicollinearity between the independent variables. Outliers for education (10 cases) are excluded from the analyses. There is no issue with incomplete information, nor complete separation. In case of donating to organisations, the linearity of logit for the variables age and education is met, while for the variable income is not and this variable is left out from the analyses. The linearity of logit for the variables age, education and income have been met both for giving directly to unknown and known individuals. All models are efficient, based on the -2LL which decreases with the introduction of independent variables in all models, and based on the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test, which is not significant in neither of the models.

There has been an increase in Cox & Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R Square in model 2 for each dependent variable (donating to organisations, unknown individuals, known individuals), indicating that, as expected, greater variance in giving money is explained by the models which

include both demographic characteristics and personal resources, then by models with only demographic characteristics as independent variables.

When it comes to the predictors of donating to organisations, three variables appear as significant: employment status, level of education and self-reported health. The unemployed are 44.1% less likely to donate than the employed. This could be attributed to the lack of income. More educated respondents are more likely to donate, as years spent in formal education increase by one, the likelihood of donating increases by 1.1. Respondents with good health are 1.7 times more likely to donate than those with poor health. Thus, personal resources in terms of formal education and self-rated health are factors found to predict giving money to organisations in Serbia, which is in line with what has been found in the literature.

Table 36. Donating to Organisations, Logistic Regression, Serbia

	Model 1				Model 2			
	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Gender								
Male								
Female	.097	.117	.406	1.102	.120	.119	.313	1.128
Age	-.013	.006	.022	.987	-.010	.006	.120	.990
Marital status			.425				.577	
Married								
Single	-.233	.171	.174	.792	-.223	.174	.200	.800
Divorced	-.084	.242	.728	.920	-.035	.248	.887	.965
Widowed	-.189	.200	.344	.828	-.115	.207	.577	.891
Employment status			.000				.001	
Employed								
Retired	-.131	.197	.504	.877	.004	.205	.985	1.004
Unemployed	-.704	.145	.000	.494	-.581	.151	.000	.559
Student	-.354	.258	.170	.702	-.230	.265	.385	.794
Formal education					.084	.020	.000	1.087
Self-reported health							.168	
Poor								
Fair					.390	.214	.068	1.477
Good					.543	.215	.012	1.721
Very good					.417	.242	.085	1.517
Excellent					.476	.255	.061	1.610
Cox & Snell R Square	2.7%				4.9%			
Nagelkerke R Square	3.5%				6.5%			
N	1,325				1,311			

Three variables are found to be predictors of giving to strangers: gender, education and health. Women are 1.3 times more likely to donate to unknown individuals than men. Having in mind that in most cases donations to strangers are for medical treatment, most often children, empathic orientation, which is found to be more pronounced among women, might be a reason why women are more likely to give for these purposes.

It is shown once more that education and health are resources that enable giving. Better educated respondents are more likely to give money to unknown individuals, as years spent in formal education increase by one, the likelihood of donating increases by 1.1. Respondents with good health are 1.8 times more likely to donate than those with poor health.

Table 37. Donating to Unknown Individuals, Logistic Regression, Serbia

	Model 1				Model 2			
	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Gender								
Male								
Female	.252	.122	.039	1.286	.297	.149	.047	1.345
Age	-.015	.006	.013	.985	-.002	.008	.802	.998
Marital status			.348				.482	
Married								
Single	.069	.181	.704	1.071	.095	.224	.673	1.099
Divorced	.277	.258	.284	1.319	.201	.325	.537	1.222
Widowed	-.262	.201	.192	.770	-.300	.228	.190	.741
Employment status			.638				.450	
Employed								
Retired	-.001	.203	.995	.999	-.075	.256	.770	.928
Unemployed	-.165	.152	.278	.848	-.324	.233	.164	.724
Student	.077	.295	.794	1.080	.071	.409	.862	1.074
Formal education					.076	.026	.004	1.078
Monthly income					.004	.006	.499	1.004
Self-reported health							.144	
Poor								
Fair					.303	.234	.196	1.353
Good					.572	.245	.020	1.772
Very good					.286	.281	.308	1.332
Excellent					.579	.305	.058	1.785
Cox & Snell R Square	2.7%				4.8%			
Nagelkerke R Square	3.7%				6.6%			
N	1,325				938			

Predictors of giving to known individuals are age, employment status, education and income. When the age of the respondent increases by one year, the likelihood of donating decreases by a factor of 0.98. Students are 2.5 times more likely to give to known individuals than those employed. More educated respondents are more likely to give money to known individuals, as years spent in formal education increase by one, the likelihood of giving money to individuals increases by 1.1. Respondents with higher incomes are more likely to give to individuals, as incomes increase by 1,000 the likelihood of giving money increases by a factor of 1.02.

Table 38. Giving Money to Known Individuals, Logistic Regression, Serbia

	Model 1				Model 2			
	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Gender								
Male								
Female	.041	.120	.731	1.042	.101	.148	.496	1.106
Age	-.022	.006	.000	.978	-.017	.008	.029	.983
Marital status			.123				.530	
Married								
Single	-.196	.177	.268	.822	-.224	.222	.313	.799
Divorced	.451	.253	.075	1.569	.245	.319	.443	1.278
Widowed	-.139	.202	.494	.871	-.118	.232	.611	.889
Employment status			.001				.098	
Employed								
Retired	-.130	.201	.517	.878	.028	.255	.912	1.029
Unemployed	-.606	.148	.000	.546	-.051	.231	.825	.950
Student	-.403	.270	.135	.668	.901	.410	.028	2.463
Formal education					.085	.026	.001	1.089
Monthly income					.022	.006	.000	1.022
Self-reported health							.827	
Poor								
Fair					.238	.239	.321	1.268
Good					.060	.249	.809	1.062
Very good					.051	.287	.859	1.052
Excellent					.012	.306	.968	1.012
Cox & Snell R Square	4.0%				9.6%			
Nagelkerke R Square	5.3%				12.9%			
N	1,226				922			

Canada

There is one dependant variable in the models, which is dichotomous - measuring whether or not the respondent donated money to organisations. There are two types of independent variables: 1) demographic characteristics: gender (categorical, 2 categories: male and female), age (categorical, 6 categories: 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+), employment status (categorical, 3 categories: employed, unemployed, not in the labour force), marital status (categorical, 4 categories: single (never married), married, divorced, widowed); 2) personal resources: formal education (categorical, 4 categories: less than high school, high school, post-secondary diploma, university), annual personal income (categorical, 6 categories: less than \$20,000, \$20,000-\$39,999, \$40,000-\$59,999, \$60,000-\$79,999, \$80,000-\$119,999, 120,000+) and subjective health condition (categorical, 5 categories: poor, not bad, good, very good, excellent).

All models are efficient, based on the -2LL which decreases with the introduction of independent variables in all models and Hosmer and Lemeshow Test which is not significant for both dependent variables.

All analysed factors are predictors of donating in Canada. Women are more likely to donate than men, while elderly Canadians are more likely to give than the young. Married respondents are more likely to donate than those who are widowed, divorced and single, and employed than the unemployed and those who are not part of the labour force. Finally, respondents with higher levels of education, higher incomes and better health are more likely to donate than those with less than a high school education, incomes less than \$20,000 and poor self-reported health, respectively.

Table 39. Donating to Organisations, Logistic Regression, Canada

	Model 1				Model 2			
	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Gender								
Male								
Female	.388	.052	.000	1.474	.474	.055	.000	1.607
Age			.000				.000	
15-24								
25-34	.282	.103	.006	1.325	-.260	.112	.021	.771
35-44	.444	.105	.000	1.559	-.120	.115	.293	.887
45-54	.609	.105	.000	1.839	.172	.114	.131	1.188
55-64	.824	.102	.000	2.279	.427	.112	.000	1.532
65+	1.237	.110	.000	3.444	.849	.121	.000	2.338

Marital status			.000				.000	
Married								
Widowed	-.436	.101	.000	.646	-.368	.105	.000	.692
Divorced	-.774	.078	.000	.461	-.721	.082	.000	.486
Single	-.830	.066	.000	.436	-.714	.069	.000	.490
Employment status			.000				.000	
Employed								
Unemployed	-.769	.116	.000	.464	-.466	.120	.000	.628
Not in the labour force	-.871	.064	.000	.419	-.405	.070	.000	.667
Education							.000	
Less than High School								
High School					.446	.074	.000	1.563
Post-secondary Diploma					.813	.082	.000	2.255
University					.931	.091	.000	2.538
Annual income								.000
Less than \$20,000								
\$20,000-\$39,999					.292	.068	.000	1.339
\$40,000-\$59,999					.637	.085	.000	1.891
\$60,000-\$79,999					.840	.113	.000	2.316
\$80,000-\$99,999\$.970	.149	.000	2.637
\$100,000-\$119,999					1.224	.226	.000	3.402
\$120,000+					1.121	.188	.000	3.067
Self-reported health							.000	
Poor								
Fair					.613	.124	.000	1.845
Good					.736	.119	.000	2.088
Very good					.565	.118	.000	1.760
Excellent					.355	.127	.005	1.426
Cox & Snell R Square	5.2%				8.0%			
Nagelkerke R Square	9.4%				14.5%			
N	13,880				13,712			

This research has confirmed that personal resources, in terms of income, level of education and health, are predictors of giving money. In general, individuals with higher levels of personal resources are more likely to give, than those with low levels of the analysed resources. However, not all resources are predictors of all types of giving and in both countries, which needs to be further examined in the future research.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter has focused on individual giving in Serbia and Canada. Data analysed in this research come from the *General Social Survey on Giving, Volunteering and Participating* (GSS:GVP) for Canada, while for Serbia, primary data collection, modelled on the GSS:GVP, has been conducted within my fieldwork. To account for the country's specific types of giving, donating money to individuals directly is included in the questionnaire used in Serbia. Also, I have made a distinction between giving to formal and informal organisations in Serbia, while in Canada the respondents were asked about doing unpaid work on behalf of any organisation or group.

The rates of all types of individual giving that are analysed in both countries are higher in Canada than in Serbia. The exception is giving money to individuals. However, this data for Canada come from different research, and is therefore likely to underestimate giving to individuals. Since Serbia was hit by extensive flooding at the time the survey was conducted, it is plausible to conclude that the rates of giving in Serbia are inflated, to some extent. Thus, differences in the rates would most probably be even higher if the natural disaster and data collection did not coincide.

Table 40. Rates of Individual Giving in Serbia and Canada

		Canada	Serbia
Time	Organisations (formal and informal)	43.6%	40.5%
	Formal	/	27.7%
	Informal	/	22.8%
	Individuals	80.1%	71.2%
Money	Organisations	82.4%	49.3%
	Individuals	26%*	79.8%
	Unknown	/	67.0%
	Known	/	55.2%
	Organisations and Unknown individuals	/	78.3%

* this data come from *Giving Canada* (CAF 2017)

This chapter has shown that the institutional environments within which Serbians and Canadians make their choices regarding whether and how to dedicate their time and money for the benefit of others and the common good are quite different. Differences in four contextual factors particularly stand out: a) unlike in Serbia, a third sector has historically played an

important role in social welfare provision in Canada; b) Serbians believe that the role of the state is the most important in welfare provision, and they also have little trust in non-profits, while Canadians see charities as important and capable of understanding and meeting their needs; c) the non-profit sector in Canada is well developed and plays a supplementary role to the government, while it is relatively young and small in Serbia, with only fragmented relationships with the state; d) there are more incentives for giving, in terms of tax credits and gaining skills that are valuable within the labour market, in Canada than is the case in Serbia.

Based on the literature review elaborated in Chapter 4 and some empirical findings of my study, it could be inferred that these factors are likely to be part of the explanation of why the rates of giving, particularly to organisations, are higher in Canada than in Serbia. It has been argued that in order to understand present day differences in giving and their relation to the characteristics of the non-profit sectors across countries, it is necessary to understand the historical origins and roles of the non-profit sectors (Archambault 2009, Einolf 2015, Salamon and Anheier 1998).

It has also been pointed out that culture, in the subjective sense, defined as “the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying assumptions prevalent among people in a society” (Huntington 2001: xv), affects the extent to which people are willing to dedicate their material and non-material resources for the benefit of others and the common good, and also the ways people channel giving (Schuyt et al. 2010, Vamstad and Essen 2012).

Moreover, the relationship between government policy regarding the non-profit sector, in terms of funding, and giving to non-profits is found to be positive (Nguyen 2015, Sokolowski 2012). In addition, being asked to give increases the likelihood of giving (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a, Putnam 2000, Sokolowski 1996). Thus, in countries where people are more often solicited to give it is more likely that they will give.

Finally, tax benefits for donors are found to be one of the eight mechanisms that drives individual donations to charities (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). Also, empirical evidence across the globe shows that many people, particularly the young, volunteer to improve their employment prospects (Handy et al. 2010, Wuthnow 1991). Thus, gaining valuable skills and being able to claim tax credits are important incentives for giving.

In short, Canada has a more favourable institutional background than Serbia, which might be a reason why the rates of giving, particularly to organisations, are higher in this country. However, my empirical study cannot unequivocally claim that these are determinants of giving in the two countries.

The difference in the rate of giving is especially evident in the case of monetary contributions to organisations, where the rate of donors is 82.4% in Canada, in comparison to 49.3% in Serbia. In terms of giving time to organisations, not only do a greater portion of Canadians volunteer, but they also volunteer more often and for longer hours, and they have been engaged in organisations for longer periods.

Though relatively more Canadians than Serbians provide direct help to people, the difference in the rates is considerably lower than in the case of giving to organisations. Also, the frequencies of helping are fairly similar between the countries. The finding which shows that so many Canadians provide direct help is in line with findings that direct help has not diminished with the high rates of volunteering to organisations in developed countries, and particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries (Einolf et al 2016, Gavelin and Svedberg 2011, Salamon et al 2017).

When it comes to giving money to individuals, a great majority of Serbians (79.8%) practice these activities, among which 67.0% give to strangers and 55.2% to individuals they know personally. Providing financial support to individuals is the most common form of giving in Serbia. State provision of social welfare is quite lacking, particularly related to healthcare, also, the third sector has not taken a significant role in social welfare provision, which could be a reason why mutual aid between those who are near and dear to each other and solidarity among strangers are important sources of social welfare in Serbia. The Canadian GSS:GVP does not collect data on this form of giving. Data available from other sources indicate that the rate of giving to people in need is 26.0%, which is considerably lower than in Serbia. However, this rate is likely to be underestimated.

Both in giving money directly to strangers and donating to organisations the recipients are unknown to donors. Thus, giving to strangers is similar to giving to organisations in this respect. Therefore, it can be said that the rate of donors to unknown recipients was 78.3% in Serbia. If we focused on giving to organisations only, what we would have would be a distorted

picture of individual giving in Serbia. Thus, any encompassing research on individual giving in a country must consider country-specific types of giving, which in case of Serbia are monetary contributions to unknown individuals.

Most volunteers and donors in both countries give their time and money to similar causes, related to health, social services, education, religion and recreation. Both in Serbia and in Canada, most volunteers reported making contributions to the community as the reason they dedicate their time, while most donors give money because they feel compassion towards people in need. A lack of time is the most commonly stated barrier to volunteering in both countries. Not being able to give at all or to give more is the most commonly reported barrier to giving money to organisations in Serbia, while most Canadians reported as a reason for not donating more the fact that they are already happy with what they have given. This does not come as a surprise having in mind the high portion of donors among the population of Canada.

The propensity to engage in different forms of giving varies according to gender, age, marital status, employment status, level of education, personal income and self-reported health in both countries. Logistic regression models which include variables of personal resources, in terms of formal education, personal income and self-reported health, explain more of a variance in giving than models that exclude these variables, indicating that personal resources are important in predicting giving. In general, respondents who have a command over greater levels of personal resources are more likely to give both time and money than those with lower levels. However, not all resources are equally important for different forms of giving in each country. It is argued that education is found in a majority of empirical studies to be an important factor in predicting different forms of pro-social behaviour. This research finds that level of formal education appears to be a significant factor in predicting all forms of giving (except in participating in informal groups in Serbia). Health is a predictor of all forms of giving in Canada and of donating money to organisations and unknown individuals in Serbia. Personal income is important in predicting all forms of giving in Canada and in predicting the giving of money directly to known individuals in Serbia. However, having a relatively higher income does not necessarily mean a greater propensity to give, which is shown in the case of providing direct help in Canada. Further research should indicate why differences in some predictors of giving between the countries appear.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

This thesis focuses on individual giving, defined as voluntarily dedicating one's material and non-material resources for the benefit of others or the common good. The activities analysed under the term individual giving encompass giving of time and money to formal and informal organisations and directly to people, both those who the donor knows personally as well as complete strangers. In the literature, such activities are known as philanthropy and mutual aid. The term philanthropy is defined differently by different people. Some authors use the term to refer to donating money to organisations only, others include giving to people directly, still others include the volunteering of one's time to organisations as well, while in its broadest sense philanthropy means any gesture of good will, from holding the door for someone to saving the life of a drowning person. Mutual aid refers to help between those who know each other and those who are in a chain of giving and receiving of support from each other. To avoid ambiguities, I have chosen to use the term individual giving, while for each type of giving analysed within this research, separate terms are used: volunteering to formal organisations, participating in informal groups, helping individuals directly, donating money to organisations and individuals.

All these activities are well known to us, no matter where we come from. Many people help each other all over the world, voluntarily dedicating their material and non-material resources for the benefit of others or the common good. Some even endanger their own lives to save the lives of complete strangers. The questions that arise are: *are we morally obliged to help others?* and *how can the origin and existence of such behaviour be explained?* This study sets out to explore these questions.

In searching for answers to the first question, I have discussed and critically examined a range of normative ethical theories. All analysed normative theories maintain that we are morally obliged to help others, while at the same time, being obliged to care for ourselves, develop our own talents and intellectual excellence. Theories differ in respect to which 'others' and from what reasons we should help. This has an important implication for the practice of giving. As long as one helps the other, regardless of whether the recipient is a stranger or a dear person, she is acting as a moral agent ought to act.

It should be stressed that normative ethical theories give us a framework for thinking, rather than a simple formula to be followed. When deciding on how to split our material and non-

material resources, we should think thoroughly about the decision-making problem we face, scrutinising the reasons for each choice. In choosing how to help others, rather than focusing on our own vision of what is good for the others, we should understand that what the concrete other in the concrete situation truly needs. Thus, we must consider the conceivable consequences of different courses of action, when it is possible to discuss them with the recipient and choose the act that is most beneficial for the other, under the circumstances. Sometimes it means bringing about what makes the recipient happy, while sometimes it requires going beyond subjective happiness and increasing the real freedoms of the recipient.

We are social beings, related to and dependent upon each other. We have feelings of sympathy towards our fellow human beings. Those sentiments, which some people experience with a greater intensity than others do, motivate us to give our resources for their benefits. However, these sentiments do not always 'work'. Then, we should be reminded of the caring memories and our relations with others and of our duty to help those in need.

Sometimes we face the dilemma of whether to actualise our own dreams or to help others reach their goals, or we face incompatible requests for help. The whole context and all circumstances should be taken into consideration. The perspective one gains over an entire lifetime should be taken into account, rather than looking into each decision as isolated from all other aspects of one's life. We should be reminded that some problems and dilemmas may be rethought, and alternatives could be found so that the needs and desires of the agent and of others are made compatible. There can be more than one right course of action in some cases, while others are of a kind that whatever one chooses, she would regret it later. In some situations, we ought to put our own project first, sometimes the needs and desires of those near and dear to us, while on other occasions we should help complete strangers, even if it means going against our own benefit or that of the people we love and care for the most.

It has been shown that we are morally obliged to perform acts beneficial for others, at our own expense. The next issues that arise are: *what are the origins of such behaviour? and, how can we explain it?*

Altruistic behaviour, such as giving, does not fit in well with the perception of human beings as utterly selfish individuals, particularly prevalent in evolutionary biology and mainstream economics. It has been elaborated in this thesis that the evolution of the behaviour which is

costly for the actor and beneficial for others lies in three mechanisms: kin altruism, reciprocal altruism and cultural groups selection. Thus, altruism is favoured by natural selection because it is either beneficial for the one who performs such an act, albeit only in the long run, or because it ensures the survival of his genes, or because it enhances the survival of the group he belongs to. However, not only do we benefit the members of our own group, but we often undertake actions which are beneficial for strangers at our own personal expense.

In search of an explanation of individual giving, I have firstly analysed the rational choice theory, which originated in Neoclassical economics and has been widely applied. In the rational choice theory, any kind of behaviour is interpreted as if it maximises personal utility, where the utility can encompass anything – from caring for another to selfish considerations. However, real world behaviour cannot be explained without reference to the complexity of people's motivation and the social and institutional factors that shape our choices, all of which rational choice theory reduces to personal utility. This theory, while appearing to explain 'everything', does not really explain much.

Applying an interdisciplinary approach to individual giving, I have argued that the dedication of one's material or non-material resources for the benefit of others is a result of a deliberative process. Whether one will give depends, in the first instance, on her awareness of the need for help. Once the need for help is recognised, or the cause worth supporting detected, one has to be motivated to do something about it. Various motives prompt one to give. People give out of both egoistic and altruistic motives, also to adhere to moral principles, or to reach collective aims. Moreover, the norm of reciprocity, which has been found all over the world, impels us to give and makes it so that we are part of a chain of giving and receiving. Not only our subjective dispositions in terms of perception, motivation and internalised norms, but our decision to give is also influenced by the personal and social resources we have at our command. Being educated, having free time, being healthy and having disposable income make us more capable of giving away our money and time. Also, having a greater network of friends, colleagues and acquaintances, which is both our source of information and which reinforces norms of reciprocity, makes us more likely to get engaged in giving. This may differ throughout the life cycle and depend on marital and employment status. The way people give is not the same everywhere. Differences are attributed to institutional frameworks in terms of welfare systems, governmental support to the non-profit sector and the characteristics of the non-profit sector.

In order to show similarities and differences in individual giving in countries with different institutional backgrounds, this thesis has provided evidence from Canada and Serbia. Data analysed in this research come from the *General Social Survey on Giving, Volunteering and Participating* conducted by Statistics Canada, while for Serbia, the primary data collection, modelled on the Canadian survey, was conducted within my fieldwork. This is the first encompassing research on individual giving in Serbia. Put in the comparative perspective, it provides both valuable insight into giving in the former socialist countries, the research of which is scarce, and the profound understanding of the phenomenon of giving.

My research shows that the rates of individual giving depends highly on the conceptualisation of this phenomenon. For example, while the rate of donors to organisations was 49.3%, the rate of donors to unknown recipients (including giving directly and through intermediary organisations) was 78.3% in Serbia. This indicates that rates of giving may differ based on how giving is defined and what is being measured. Cross-country comparisons could lead towards biased conclusions regarding differences in the rates of giving, if country-specific types of giving are excluded from the analyses.

The rates of all types of individual giving that are analysed in both countries are higher in Canada than in Serbia, while differences in giving to organisations are particularly prominent. My research has shown that the institutional environments within which Serbians and Canadians make their choices regarding whether and how to dedicate their time and money for the benefit of others and the common good are quite different. Differences in four contextual factors particularly stand out: a) history of social welfare provision, b) public perception of the third sector, c) the characteristics of the non-profit sector, and d) incentives for giving. My empirical research cannot confirm that these four contextual factors determine differences in the rates of giving between the countries. However, it is possible that Canada's more favourable institutional background is a reason why the rates of giving, particularly to organisations, are higher in this country.

Most volunteers and donors in both countries give their time and money to similar causes, related to health, social services, education, religion and recreation. Both in Serbia and in Canada, most volunteers reported making contributions to the community as the reason they dedicate their time, while most donors give because they feel compassion towards people in need. The propensity to engage in different forms of giving varies according to gender, age,

marital status, employment status, level of education, personal income and self-reported health in both countries. In general, respondents who have command over greater levels of personal resources are more likely to give both time and money than those with lower levels. However, not all resources are predictors of all forms of giving in each country.

This thesis has shown that as long as we help others and undertake actions for the common good, we are behaving as moral agents ought to do. The way we give is not only shaped by who we are as individuals, with our distinct perspectives, motives and resources, but it is also moulded by where we come from as social beings in whom are embedded the historical, cultural and political contexts.

This study has several limitations. First, in its attempt to be encompassing, i.e. to include ethical aspects of individual giving, different theoretical explanations of this phenomenon and empirical evidence from two countries, this study inevitably leaves out of the analyses many aspects of these three perspectives of individual giving. Second, surveying as a method of data collection has its limitations. It cannot provide a profound understanding of the characteristics of those who give. Third, aiming to provide data comparable with Canada, this study is also limited by the range of questions included in the Canadian survey. Although, in accounting for country-specific practices, the Serbian survey includes additional questions, being limited by its length, it lacks questions on reasons for informal giving and barriers to these forms of giving.

Future research on individual giving should shed more light on why there are differences in demographic characteristics and personal resources that predict various types of giving between the two countries, as well as to show which contextual factors are predictors of giving. In addition, further research, particularly in Serbia, should focus on other possible explanators of giving, such as social capital, for example. Also, there is a need to implement other methods in the research of giving in Serbia, such as in-depth interviews, which would shed more light on motives and values, and other characteristics of those who give, as well as the barriers they face. Finally, it would be particularly interesting to see how attitudes on moral obligations in regard to giving are related to normative theories in ethics, as well as to examine whether altruism is more behavioural or motivational-laden, and whether these vary in different contexts.

My policy recommendation for Serbia is to begin conducting national surveys on individual giving on a regular basis. This would provide valuable data on the phenomenon and would allow for a better understanding of its developments over time. In order to gain an encompassing picture of giving in Canada, I propose that the GSS:GVP include questions on giving money directly to people. Finally, in order to account for the informal practices of giving and thus provide more accurate international comparisons, global surveys should include giving to people directly.

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Appendix 1 Questionnaire: Field Work in Serbia (in Serbian and in English)

Davanja pojedinaca u Srbiji

ID. Redni broj ispitanika (ne upisuju anketari!!!)

/_____/

Dobar dan. Moje ime je Angažovali su me Univerzitet u Kembridžu i Institut za sociološka istraživanja iz Beograda koji sprovode naučno istraživanje o načinima na koje ljudi u Srbiji pomažu jedni drugima i učestvuju u lokalnim zajednicama. Postavio/la bih Vam nekoliko pitanja o davanju novca u dobrotvorne svrhe i pomaganju organizacijama i ljudima. Vi ste izabrani postupkom slučajnog izbora i zbog valjanosti podataka za celu Srbiju bitno je da baš Vi prihvatite učešće u ovoj anketi. Svi podaci koje budete izneli biće poverljivi i biće korišćeni isključivo u naučne svrhe. Vaše ime, adresa i drugi lični podaci neće nigde biti prikazani.

Formalno volontiranje (FV)

Želeo/la bih da Vam postavim nekoliko pitanja o **NEPLAĆENIM** poslovima koje ste obavljali u **IME GRUPE ILI ORGANIZACIJE** tokom proteklih 12 meseci.

	Da li ste tokom proteklih 12 meseci pružili pomoć ili uradili nešto <u>bez materijalne nadoknade</u> za neku od sledećih organizacija:	Da	Ne	Ne zna/Odbija da odgovori
FV_Q01_01	Škola	1	2	3
FV_Q01_02	Crkva (verska organizacija)	1	2	3
FV_Q01_03	Sportska i rekreativna organizacija/klub	1	2	3
FV_Q01_04	Dobrotvorna/humanitarna organizacija (npr. Crveni krst, Blic Fondacija, Fondacija Ana i Vlade Divac, Fond B92 i sl.)	1	2	3
FV_Q01_05	Organizacija kulture i umetnosti (kulturno-umetnička društva)	1	2	3
FV_Q01_06	Politička partija	1	2	3
FV_Q01_07	Hobistička organizacija (npr. filatelija, numizmatika, bridž klub i sl.)	1	2	3
FV_Q01_08	Sindikalne organizacije i profesionalna udruženja	1	2	3
FV_Q01_09	Državna institucija ili Institucija lokalne samouprave (npr. Prihvatilišta za decu bez roditeljskog staranja, Dom za stara lica, Prihvatilište za azilante, Opština, Mesna zajednica, i sl.)	1	2	3
FV_Q01_10	Skupština stanara	1	2	3
FV_Q01_11	Preduzeće (izuzeti rad u sopstvenoj firmi)	1	2	3
FV_Q01_12	Nevladina organizacija	1	2	3
FV_Q01_13	Neka druga organizacija Koja? _____	1	2	3

Ukoliko DA na jedno ili više pitanja, idi na FV_Q01, ukoliko NE na sva pitanja idi na NV_Q020 (str. 4)

FV_Q01 Tokom proteklih 12 meseci, za navedenu/e organizaciju/e, da li ste učinili neku od sledećih aktivnosti BEZ MATERIJALNE NADOKNADE.

	Da li ste:	Da	Ne	Ne zna/Odbija da odgovori
FV_Q02	pokušavali da pridobijete nove članove?	1	2	3
FV_Q03	prikupljali novac?	1	2	3
FV_Q04	bili član komisije, saveta, odbora i sl.?	1	2	3
FV_Q05	podučavali, davali časove?	1	2	3
FV_Q06	organizovali, nadgledali ili koordinirali aktivnosti ili događaje?	1	2	3
FV_Q07	pružali pomoć u vidu kancelarijskih, knjigovodstvenih, administrativnih ili bibliotekarskih poslova?	1	2	3
FV_Q08	bili trener, sudija ili zapisničar na sportskom događaju?	1	2	3
FV_Q09	davali stručne preporuke ili savete?	1	2	3
FV_Q10	pružali zdravstvenu negu ili moralnu podršku obolelima?	1	2	3
FV_Q11	prikupljali, služili ili raznosili hranu ili druga dobra?	1	2	3
FV_Q12	pružali pomoć u održavanju, popravci ili izgradnji objekata ili terena?	1	2	3
FV_Q13	pružali usluge vožnje?	1	2	3
FV_Q14	pružali prvu pomoć, pomoć u gašenju požara, pomoć u potrazi i spasavanju?	1	2	3
FV_Q15	bili uključeni u aktivnosti koje su imale za cilj očuvanje i zaštitu prirodnog okruženja i divljih životinja?	1	2	3
FV_Q16	nešto drugo što nije navedeno? Šta?	1	2	3

VS_Q01 Tokom proteklih 12 meseci, za koliko grupa ili organizacija ste bez materijalne nadoknade uradili neku od navedenih aktivnosti?

1. _____ 2. Ne zna/Odbija da odgovori

VS_Q02 Tokom proteklih 12 meseci, koliko često ste uradili neku od neplaćenih aktivnosti? (Dozvoljen jedan odgovor)

1. svakog ili skoro svakog dana
2. najmanje jednom nedeljno
3. najmanje jednom mesečno
4. najmanje tri - četiri puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)
5. jednom ili dva puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)
6. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

Detalji o volontiranju (VD)

VD_Q01 Kako se zove organizacija za koju ste obavljali neplaćene poslove najčešće?

1. _____ 2. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

VD_Q02 Šta ova organizacija radi?

1. _____ 2. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

VD_Q040 Tokom proteklih 12 meseci, koliko sati ste radili za ovu organizaciju bez materijalne nadoknade?

1. _____

2. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

Glavne volonterske aktivnosti (MV)

Sada bih Vam postavio/la nekoliko pitanja o tome kako ste započeli saradnju sa ovom organizacijom.

MV_Q06 Da li ste se ovoj organizaciji obratili sami?

1. Da (*Idi na MV_Q07*)
2. Ne (*idi na MV_Q08*)
3. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori (*idi na MV_Q08*)

MV_Q07 Kako ste saznali za ovu priliku da pomognete? (Dozvoljen jedan odgovor)

1. Čuli ste na sastanku ili nekoj aktivnosti (npr., u lokalnoj zajednici, na poslu, u školi, u crkvi, itd.)
2. Saznali ste putem interneta
3. Saznali ste kroz uput neke organizacije
4. Putem oglašavanja (npr. poster, novine, TV ili radio)
5. Neko Vam je rekao
6. Drugo – precizirajte

7. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

MV_Q08 Da li Vas je neko pitao/zamolio da pomognete ovoj organizaciji?

1. Da (*Idi na MV_Q09*)
2. Ne (*Idi na MV_Q100*)
3. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

MV_Q09 Ko Vas je pitao/zamolio? (Dozvoljen jedan odgovor)

1. Prijatelj/rođak izvan organizacije
2. Vaš šef ili poslodavac
3. Neko iz te organizacije kojoj ste pomagali
4. Drugo, Navesti

5. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

MV_Q120 Koliko dugo ste aktivni u ovoj organizaciji? (Dozvoljen jedan odgovor)

- | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Manje od jedne godine | 2. 1 do 3 godine |
| 3. 3 do 5 godina | 4. 5 do 10 godina |
| 5. 10 i više godina | 6. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori |

	Tokom proteklih 12 meseci, pružajući pomoć u okviru ove organizacije, da li ste:	Da	Ne	Ne zna/Odbija da odgovori
MV_Q130	dobili naknadu za troškove nastale u vezi sa Vašim aktivnostima?	1	2	3
MV_Q140	dobili novčanu nadoknadu, honorar, džeparac?	1	2	3
MV_Q150	ostvarili druge materijalne koristi (npr. besplatno članstvo, hranu, besplatno učešće u nekom događaju i sl.)?	1	2	3

MV_Q160	dobili formalnu potvrdu od ove organizacije, kao što su diploma, sertifikat, preporuka, zahvalnica, značka, medalja i sl.?	1	2	3
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Razlozi volontiranja (RV)

RV_Q020 Sada bih Vam postavio/la nekoliko pitanja u vezi sa razlozima koji su Vas naveli da se uključite u aktivnosti ove organizacije tokom proteklih 12 meseci.

	Molim Vas recite mi da li su sledeći razlozi uticali na Vašu odluku:	Da	Ne	Ne zna/Odbija da odgovori
RV_Q020	Vi ili neko koga poznajete je lično pogođen uzrokom koji ove grupe ili organizacije podržavaju/pomažu.	1	2	3
RV_Q025	Član Vaše porodice već pomaže ovoj organizaciji.	1	2	3
RV_Q030	Vaši prijatelji već pomažu ovoj organizaciji.	1	2	3
RV_Q040	Da biste se povezali sa ljudima ili upoznali nove ljude.	1	2	3
RV_Q050	Da biste se lakše zaposlili.	1	2	3
RV_Q060	Da biste ispunili religijske ili moralne dužnosti.	1	2	3
RV_Q070	Da biste ispitili sopstvene sposobnosti.	1	2	3
RV_Q080	Da biste dali doprinos zajednici.	1	2	3
RV_Q090	Da biste primenili svoja znanja i veštine.	1	2	3
RV_Q100	Da biste podržali određeni politički, ekološki ili društveni cilj.	1	2	3
RV_Q110	Da biste se zdravstveno i emotivno bolje osećali.	1	2	3

Veštine stečene volontiranjem (SK)

	Tokom proteklih 12 meseci, pomažući ovoj organizaciji, da li ste stekli neku od navedenih veština:	Da	Ne	Ne zna/Odbija da odgovori
SK_Q010	veštine prikupljanja dobrotvornih priloga/sponzorstava/novca?	1	2	3
SK_Q020	tehničke ili administrativne veštine kao što su prva pomoć, podučavanje, rad na računaru ili knjigovodstvo?	1	2	3
SK_Q030	organizacione ili veštine upravljanja kao što su organizovanje ljudi ili novca, vođenje, planiranje ili upravljanje organizacijom/događajima?	1	2	3
SK_Q040	unapredili znanje o zdravlju, ženskim ili političkim pitanjima, krivičnom pravu ili prirodnoj okolini?	1	2	3
SK_Q050	veštine komunikacije kao što su javni nastup, pisanje, odnosi sa javnošću ili vođenje sastanaka?	1	2	3
SK_Q060	veštine u međuljudskim odnosima, kao što su razumevanje ljudi, motivisanje ljudi, ili snalaženje u teškim situacijama sa samouverenošću, saosećanjem ili strpljenjem?	1	2	3
SK_Q070	neke druge veštine ili znanja?	1	2	3

Koje_____			
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SK_Q080 Da li smatrate da će Vam ove neplaćene aktivnosti pomoći da pronadete posao ili da započnete svoj posao?

1. Da
2. Ne
3. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

SK_Q090 Da li smatrate da će Vam ove neplaćene aktivnosti pomoći da ostvarite veći uspeh u Vašem plaćenom poslu?

1. Da
2. Ne
3. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

Razlozi zbog kojih ne volontirate (više) (NV)

Da li usled nekih od navedenih razloga niste češće vršili neplaćene aktivnosti za neku organizaciju tokom proteklih 12 meseci / niste uopšte vršili neplaćene aktivnosti za neku organizaciju tokom proteklih 12 meseci	Da	Ne	Ne zna/Odbija da odgovori
NV_Q020 Već ste proveli dovoljno vremena vršeći neplaćene aktivnosti (pre više od 12 meseci).	1	2	3
NV_Q030 Zato što niste bili zadovoljni prethodnim iskustvom.	1	2	3
NV_Q040 Zato što to od Vas niko nije tražio.	1	2	3
NV_Q050 Niste znali kako da ste uključite (više) u aktivnosti organizacija.	1	2	3
NV_Q060 Imali ste problema sa zdravljem ili niste bili u fizičkoj mogućnosti.	1	2	3
NV_Q070 Niste imali vremena.	1	2	3
NV_Q080 Zbog finansijskih troškova takvih aktivnosti.	1	2	3
NV_Q090 Niste bili u mogućnosti da se obavežete na duži period.	1	2	3
NV_Q100 Više volite da date novac nego vreme.	1	2	3
NV_Q110 Niste bili zainteresovani.	1	2	3

Neformalno Volontiranje Grupa (IV)

NVG_01 Da li ste tokom proteklih 12 meseci sa komšijama, prijateljima, kolegama, ljudima sličnih interesovanja, itd, pokrenuli neku akciju za dobrobit zajednice (na primer čišćenja reke, uredjenje parka, pomoć ugroženoj porodici i sl.)?

1. Da (*Idi na NVG_02*)
2. Ne (*Idi na IV_R020*)
3. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

NVG_02 Koliko često ste to radili tokom proteklih 12 meseci? (Dozvoljen jedan odgovor)

1. Najmanje jednom nedeljno
2. Najmanje jednom mesečno
3. Najmanje 3-4 puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)
4. Jednom ili dva puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)
5. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

NVG_03 U kojim akcijama za dobrobit zajednice ste najčešće učestvovali (na primer čišćenja reke, uredjenje parka, pomoć ugroženoj porodici i sl.)?

1. _____
2. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

Neformalno Volontiranje Individualno(IV)

Sada bih Vam postavio/la nekoliko pitanja koja se tiču pomaganja ljudima samostalno, a ne preko organizacije. Ovde možete uključiti pomaganje prijateljima, komšijama, rođacima, ali ne i pomoć nekome ko živi u Vašem domaćinstvu.

IV_Q020 Tokom proteklih 12 meseci da li ste bez materijalne nadoknade pomogli nekome oko kućnih poslova kao što su kuvanje, čišćenje, sređivanje dvorišta, popravke u kući, krećenje, čišćenje snega, ili popravka kola?

1. Da (*Idi na IV_Q030*)
2. Ne (*Idi na IV_Q040*)
3. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

IV_Q040 Tokom proteklih 12 meseci, da li ste pomogli nekome tako što ste išli u kupovinu za nju/njega, ili tako što ste tu osobu negde odvezli?

1. Da (*Idi na IV_Q050*)
2. Ne (*Idi na IV_Q060*)
3. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

IV_Q060 (Tokom proteklih 12 meseci,) da li ste pomogli nekome oko poslova kao što su pisanje pisama, pravna pomoć, popunjavanje formulara/obrazaca, odlazak u banku, plaćanje računa ili pronalaženje informacija?

1. Da (*Idi na IV_Q070*)
2. Ne (*Idi na IV_Q080*)
3. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

IV_Q080 (Tokom proteklih 12 meseci,) da li ste nekome pružili zdravstvenu ili ličnu negu, kao što je emotivna/moralna podrška, savetovanje, davanje preporuka, posećivanje starijih osoba, čuvanje dece?

IV_Q030 Koliko često ste to radili? (Dozvoljen jedan odgovor)

1. Svakog dana ili skoro svakog dana.
2. Najmanje jednom nedeljno
3. Najmanje jednom mesečno
4. Najmanje 3-4 puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)
5. Jednom ili dva puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)

IV_Q050 Koliko često ste to radili? (Dozvoljen jedan odgovor)

1. Svakog dana ili skoro svakog dana.
2. Najmanje jednom nedeljno
3. Najmanje jednom mesečno
4. Najmanje 3-4 puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)
5. Jednom ili dva puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)

IV_Q070 Koliko često ste to radili? (Dozvoljen jedan odgovor)

1. Svakog dana ili skoro svakog dana.
2. Najmanje jednom nedeljno
3. Najmanje jednom mesečno
4. Najmanje 3-4 puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)
5. Jednom ili dva puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)

IV_Q090 Koliko često ste to radili? (Dozvoljen jedan odgovor)

1. Da (*Idi na IV_Q090*)
2. Ne (*Idi na IV_Q100*)
3. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

1. Svakog dana ili skoro svakog dana.
2. Najmanje jednom nedeljno
3. Najmanje jednom mesečno
4. Najmanje 3-4 puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)
5. Jednom ili dva puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)

IV_Q100 (Tokom proteklih 12 meseci,) da li ste pomogli nekome tako što ste mu pružili neplaćenu nastavu, podučavanje, treniranje?

1. Da (*Idi na IV_Q110*)
2. Ne (*Idi na IV_Q120*)
3. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

IV_Q110 Koliko često ste to radili? (*Dozvoljen jedan odgovor*)

1. Svakog dana ili skoro svakog dana.
2. Najmanje jednom nedeljno
3. Najmanje jednom mesečno
4. Najmanje 3-4 puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)
5. Jednom ili dva puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)

IV_Q120 (Tokom proteklih 12 meseci,) da li ste pomogli nekoj osobi na bilo koji drugi način koji nije naveden?

1. Da, Navesti šta _____
2. Ne (*Idi na FG_R010*)
3. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

IV_Q130 Koliko često ste to radili? (*Dozvoljen jedan odgovor*)

1. Svakog dana ili skoro svakog dana.
2. Najmanje jednom nedeljno
3. Najmanje jednom mesečno
4. Najmanje 3-4 puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)
5. Jednom ili dva puta (tokom proteklih 12 meseci)

Finansijska davanja organizacijama (FG)

FG_R010 Pitanja koja ću Vam sada postaviti tiču se davanja NOVCA organizacijama. Izostavite nenovčana davanja hrane, odeće, pokušva i sl.

	Da li ste tokom proteklih 12 meseci dali novac nekoj od navedenih organizacija (kako biste pomogli njen rad, podržali neku akciju, ili pomogli da reši neki problem i sl.):	Da	Ne	Ne zna/Odbija da odgovori
FG_1.1.	Škola	1	2	3
FG_1.2.	Crkva (verska organizacija)	1	2	3
FG_1.3.	Sportska i rekreativna organizacija/klub	1	2	3
FG_1.4.	Dobrotvorna/humanitarna organizacija (npr. Crveni krst, Blic Fondacija, Fondacija Ana i Vlade Divac, Fond B92 i sl.)	1	2	3
FG_1.5.	Organizacija kulture i umetnosti (kulturno umetnička društva)	1	2	3
FG_1.6.	Politička partija	1	2	3
FG_1.7.	Hobistička organizacija (npr. filatelija, numizmatika, bridž klub i sl.)	1	2	3

	Da li ste tokom proteklih 12 meseci dali novac nekoj od navedenih organizacija (kako biste pomogli njen rad, podržali neku akciju, ili pomogli da reši neki problem i sl.):	Da	Ne	Ne zna/Odbija da odgovori
FG_1.8.	Sindikalne organizacije i profesionalna udruženja	1	2	3
FG_1.9.	Nevladina/Neprofitna organizacija	1	2	3
FG_1.10.	Državna institucija ili Institucija lokalne samouprave (npr. Prihvatilišta za decu bez roditeljskog staranja, Dom za stara lica, Prihvatilište za azilante, Opština, Mesna zajednica, i sl.)	1	2	3
FG_1.11.	Skupština stanara	1	2	3
FG_1.12.	Neka druga organizacija. Koja?	1	2	3

	Da li ste tokom proteklih 12 meseci dali novac dobrotvornoj i/ili neprofitnoj organizaciji:	Da	Ne	Ne zna/Odbija da odgovori
FG_Q030	Tako što ste se odazvali na poziv koji ste dobili putem pošte?	1	2	3
FG_Q040	Tako što ste se odazvali na poziv koji ste dobili putem telefona?	1	2	3
FG_Q050	Tako što ste se odazvali na poziv koji ste čuli na televiziji ili radiju.	1	2	3
FG_Q060	Putem interneta.	1	2	3
FG_Q070	Tako što ste sami pronašli organizaciju.	1	2	3
FG_Q080	Tako što ste platili da biste uzeli učešće u događaju koji je bio organizovan u dobrotvorne svrhe (npr. koncert, sportski događaj)	1	2	3
FG_Q100	Kada Vas je neko na poslu zamolio da to učinite.	1	2	3
FG_Q110	Kada Vas je neko ko prikuplja novac od vrata do vrata zamolio da to učinite.	1	2	3
FG_Q120	Kada Vas je neko ko prikuplja novcu tržnom centru ili na ulici zamolio da to učinite.	1	2	3
FG_Q130	Putem priloga u crkvi, sinagogi, džamiji ili drugoj verskoj/religijskoj organizaciji.	1	2	3
FG_Q170	Nešto drugo, šta	1	2	3

Davanja Dobrotvornim Organizacijama Određenje(GS)

GS_Q010 Kako se zove organizacija kojoj ste dali najveću sumu novca?

1. _____

2. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

GS_Q020 Šta ova organizacija radi?

1. _____

2. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

GS_Q030 Orijentaciono, koja je suma novca (iskazano u dinarima) koju ste dali u dobrotvorne svrhe (donirali) ovoj organizaciji tokom proteklih 12 meseci?

1. _____

2. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

GS_Q040 Da li ste ovu donaciju učinili lično ili zajedno sa suprugom/partnerom?

1. Lično
2. Zajedno
3. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

Odluke o davanju (DG)

DG_Q030 Da li ste unapred odlučili o sumi novca koju ćete dati dobrotvornoj organizaciji u toku godine?

1. Da
2. Ne
3. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

DG_Q040 Za veće iznose novca koji dajete u dobrotvorne svrhe, da li odlučujete unapred kojoj organizaciji ćete ih dati ili ovakve odluke donositi kao odgovor na neki od poziva za davanje koje Vam neko uputi? (Dozvoljen jedan odgovor)

1. Odlučujem unapred
2. Reagujem na poziv
3. I jedno i drugo
4. Ne može se primeniti
5. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

DG_Q050 Koja od sledećih tvrdnji najbolje opisuje Vaše davanje dobrotvornim ili neprofitnim organizacijama? (Dozvoljen jedan odgovor)

1. Uvek dajem istoj organizaciji
2. Dajem različitim organizacijama
3. I jedno i drugo
4. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

DG_Q060 Kada razmišljate da li ćete dati novac dobrotvornoj organizaciji kojoj niste donirali u prošlosti, da li tražite informacije o toj organizaciji pre nego što date novac?

1. Da (*Idi na DG_Q070*)
2. Ne
3. Ne može se primeniti
4. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

DG_Q070 Kako tražite ove informacije? (Dozvoljen jedan odgovor)

1. Čitate štampani material organizacije (npr. a brošure, godišnji izveštaj ili finansijske informacije)(11)
2. Kontaktirate dobrotvornu organizaciju (npr., telefonom, lično) ili pristupite njenom sajtu. (12)
3. Raspitate se kod nekoga (npr. porodica, prijatelji, kolege) (14)
4. Drugo – navesti šta _____ (15)
5. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

Razlozi davanja novca dobrotvornim organizacijama (RG)

Ljudi daju novac dobrotvornim i neprofitnim organizacijama iz više razloga.

	Tokom proteklih 12 meseci, molim Vas recite mi da li su sledeći razlozi uticali na Vašu odluku da date novac:	Da	Ne	Ne zna/Odbija da odgovori
RG_Q010	Vi ili neko koga poznajete je lično pogođen uzrokom koji organizacija podržava.	1	2	3
RG_Q030	Da biste ispunili verske (religijske) dužnosti ili druga verovanja.	1	2	3
RG_Q040	Da biste pomogli ostvarenje cilja u koji lično verujete.	1	2	3
RG_Q050	Bilo Vam je žao ljudi koji ma je potreba pomoć.	1	2	3
RG_Q060	Želeli ste da date doprinos zajednici.	1	2	3
RG_Q070	Član porodice, prijatelj, komšija ili kolega Vas je zamolio da date novac.	1	2	3

Razlozi zbog kojih ispitanik ne donira novac (NG)

NG_R020 Postoje takođe mnogi razlozi koji mogu ograničiti iznos novca koji možete ili želite da date dobrotvornoj organizaciji.

	Razmišljajući o proteklih 12 meseci, molim Vas recite mi da li je neka od sledećih tvrdnji razlog zbog kog niste donirali više/uopšte:	Da	Ne	Ne zna/Odbija da odgovori
NG_Q020	Bili ste zadovoljni onim što ste već dali.	1	2	3
NG_Q030	Niste mogli da priuštite da date novac/ više novca.	1	2	3
NG_Q040	Zbog toga što to niko od Vas nije tražio.	1	2	3
NG_Q050	Niste znali gde ili kome da date novac.	1	2	3
NG_Q060	Zbog toga što je teško je pronaći cilj ili uzrok koji vredi podržati.	1	2	3
NG_Q070	Dali ste vreme umesto novca.	1	2	3
NG_Q080	Mislite da ste već dovoljno novca dali direktno ljudima, umesto putem organizacije.	1	2	3
NG_Q110	Niste mislili da će se novac iskoristiti na najbolji način.	1	2	3
NG_Q130	Nije Vam se sviđao način na koji su prikupljali dobrotvorne priloge.	1	2	3

	Recite mi molim Vas da li se slažete ili ne slažete sa sledećom tvrdnjom.	Slažem se	Ne slažem se	Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori
NG_Q160	Brinu me pronevere ili prevare dobrotvornih organizacija	1	2	3

Dobrotvorna Davanja Ljudima

DDLJ_01 Ljudi često daju novac ugroženima direktno. Da li ste tokom proteklih 12 meseci, BEZ POSREDSTVA ORGANIZACIJE, dali novac nekome kome je bila potrebna finansijska pomoć, a da tu osobu NE POZNAJETE?

1. Da (*Idi na DDLJ_02*)

2. Ne (*Idi na DDLJ_09*)
3. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

DDLJ_02 **Koliko osoba ste na ovaj način pomogli?**

1. _____
2. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

Sada ću Vam postaviti nekoliko pitanja koja se tiču osobe kojoj ste dali najveću sumu novca tokom proteklih 12 meseci, a **da tu osobu niste poznavali.**

DDLJ_03 **Koju sumu novca ste dali ovoj osobi?**

1. _____
2. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

DDLJ_04 **Za koju svrhu joj je pomoć bila potrebna?** (*Dozvoljen jedan odgovor*)

1. Lečenje
2. Studiranje
3. Drugo, navesti _____
4. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

DDLJ_05 **Koliko je po Vašoj proceni ova osoba imala godina?**

1. _____
2. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

DDLJ_06 **Ko je tražio finansijsku pomoć za ovu osobu?** (*Dozvoljen jedan odgovor*)

1. Ugrožena osoba/osoba kojoj je pomoć bila potrebna
2. Roditelji ove osobe
3. Prijatelji ove osobe
4. Neko drugi, navesti _____
5. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

DDLJ_07 **Kako ste saznali da je ovoj osobi potrebna pomoć?** (*Dozvoljen jedan odgovor*)

1. Čuli ste na radiju
2. Videli ste na televiziji
3. Pročitali ste u novinama
4. Videli ste na društvenoj mreži
5. Saznali ste putem interneta (izuzeti društvene mreže)
6. Obavestio Vas je član Vaše porodice
7. Saznali ste od prijatelja/kolege/rođaka
8. Na drugi način, navesti _____
9. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

DDLJ_10 **Da li ste tokom proteklih 12 meseci dali novac nekome koga **POZNAJETE** a kome je bila je bila potrebna finansijska pomoć?**

1. Da (*Idi na DDLJ_11*)
2. Ne (*Idi na PI_01*)
3. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

DDLJ_11 **Koliko osoba koje poznajete ste na ovaj način pomogli?**

1. _____
2. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

Sada ću Vam postaviti nekoliko pitanja koja se tiču osobe kojoj ste dali najveću sumu novca tokom proteklih 12 meseci.

DDLJ_13 Koju sumu novca ste dali ovoj osobi?

1. _____
2. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

DDLJ_14 Za koju svrhu je toj osobi pomoć bila potrebna? (*Dozvoljen jedan odgovor*)

1. Lečenje
2. Studiranje
3. Svakodnevn, egzistencijalni problemi
4. Drugo, navesti _____

DDLJ_15 Šta Vam je ta osoba? (*Dozvoljen jedan odgovor*)

1. Prijatelj
2. Rođak
3. Komšija
4. Kolega sa posla
5. Drugo, navesti _____
6. Ne zna, Odbija da odgovori

Podrška koju ispitanik dobija (PI)

Sada bih Vam postavio/la par pitanja o podršci i pomoći koju dobijate od drugih.

PI_01 Kada je Vama potrebna pomoć na koga možete da se oslonite? (*Dozvoljen jedan odgovor*)

	U sledećim slučajevima:	Samo na sebe	Članove porodice	Prijatelje	Rođake	Komšije	Kolege
PI_02	Kućni poslovi, odlazak u nabavku, plaćanje računa, čuvanje dece i sl.	1	2	3	4	5	6
PI_03	Negovanje bolesnog člana porodice.	1	2	3	4	5	6
PI_04	Emotivna i moralna podrška, dobijanje saveta.	1	2	3	4	5	6
PI_05	Materijalna i novčana pomoć.	1	2	3	4	5	6
PI_06	Pomoć i podrška na poslu / radnom mestu.	1	2	3	4	5	6

Stavovi ispitanika

SI_01 Molim Vas **RANGIRAJTE OD 1 DO 6** (gde je 1 najmanje a 6 najviše) ko bi po Vašem mišljenju trebalo da brine o članovima našeg društva kojima je pomoć/podrška potrebna?

	Ko bi trebalo da pruži pomoć/podršku:	Njihova porodica, rođaci, prijatelji	Država	Humanitarne/dobrotvorne organizacije	Bogati pojedinci	Svi građani	Uspješna preduzeća/kompanije
SI_02	Siromašnima						
SI_03	Obolelima						
SI_04	Onima koji su pogođeni prirodnim nepogodama						
SI_05	Starima						
SI_06	Talentovanim đacima/studentima						

Blagostanje (WB)

Sada bih Vam postavio/la nekoliko pitanja o Vašem osećaju blagostanja i sreće.

WB1 Uopšteno uzevši, da li biste rekli da je Vaše zdravlje...?

1. Odlično
2. Veoma dobro
3. Dobro
4. Nije loše
5. Loše
6. Ne zna/odbija da odgovori

WB 2 Na skali od 0 do 10 gde je 0 veoma nezadovoljan, 10 veoma zadovoljan, koliko ste zadovoljni svojim životom, kada se sve uzme u obzir?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11. Ne zna/odbija da odgovori

WB 3 Na skali od 0 do 10 gde je 0 veoma nesrećan, 10 veoma srećan, koliko ste srećni, kada se sve uzme u obzir?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11. Ne zna/odbija da odgovori

Demografski podaci (DP)1.

a) Pol	b) Godina rođenja	c) Završena škola (lista A)	d) Broj godina formalnog obrazovanja
1. M 2. Ž			

2. Kakav je Vaš bračni status?

1. neoženjen/neudata
2. razveden/a
3. udovac/udovica
4. živi u vanbračnoj zajednici
5. oženjen/udata

3. Kolika su Vaša lična prosečna mesečna primanja u proteklih 12 meseci (uključiti sva primanja – plata, socijalna pomoć, rente, doznake, prodaja poljoprivrednih proizvoda i sl.)

4. Kolika su prosečna mesečna primanja Vašeg domaćinstva u proteklih 12 meseci (uključiti sva primanja – plata, socijalna pomoć, rente, doznake, prodaja poljoprivrednih proizvoda i sl.)?

Hvala na saradnji!!

Anketari treba da popune po završetku razgovora sa ispitanikom:

Ime	i	prezime	ispitanika:

Adresa:	_____		
Kontakt	telefon:		

Datum	anketiranja:		

Trajanje	anketiranja:		

Ime	anketara:		

Type of Cost	Type of units	Rate in £	No. of units	Total in £
Data sampling and weighting	Data basis of individuals	850.00	1	850
Printing, photocopy, binding	Questionnaire	0.15	1,600	240
Data collection	Interviewers remuneration per filled questionnaire	3	1,528	4,584
Data collection	Travel costs of interviewers			540
Data entry	Researchers assistants' remuneration per entered questionnaire	0.5	1,528	764
Travel costs from Cambridge to Belgrade and back	Airplane and bus fares			350
Total cost of field research implementation				7,328

Appendix 2 Fieldwork Budget

The Board of Graduate Studies, University of Cambridge approved fieldwork funds in the amount of £3643.20, while the Queens College Cambridge approved a travel grant in the amount £350. The Cambridge Overseas Trust, which awarded me the International Students Scholarship for my PhD studies, approved the maintenance in the amount of £2,937. I also had personal savings in the amount of £500. While I was on my fieldwork, I stayed with my family in Belgrade, which covered all other expenses.

Appendix 3 Fieldwork Activities Timeline

Activity	Time
Designing the field research	September 2013 – December 2013
Consultations with senior researchers from the Institute of Economic Sciences and the Institute for Sociological Research regarding the research design	November 2013
Meetings with the representatives of the Institute for Sociological Research and the Statistical Office of the Republic of the Republic of Serbia regarding the fieldwork implementation	November 2013
Applications for fieldwork funds	November 2013 – January 2014
Fieldwork funds approved	February 2014
Questionnaire translation and adjustment	January 2014 – March 2014
Consultations with senior researchers from the Institute of Economic Sciences and the Institute for Sociological Research regarding the questionnaire translation and adjustment	March 2014
Meetings with the representatives of the Institute for Sociological Research regarding the organisation of the data collection	March 2014
Meetings with the statisticians from the Sampling Department of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia regarding sampling	March 2014
Sampling	April 2014
Pilot research	April 2014
Adjustment of the questionnaire	April 2014
Printing, photocopy, binding the questionnaires	April 2014
Instructions for interviewers	April 2014
Data collection	May – August 2014
Data control	August – September 2014
Data entry	September 2014
Data weighting	September 2014

Appendix 4 Characteristics of the Sample: Canada

	Share of sample	N
Gender		14,714
Male	49.7%	
Female	50.3%	
Age		14,714
15-24	15.6%	
25-34	16.8%	
35-44	16.0%	
45-54	18.1%	
55-64	15.8%	
65+	17.8%	
Marital Status		14,707
Single	27.1%	
Divorced	6.6%	
Widowed	4.6%	
Married	61.7%	
Employment Status		13,885
Employed	61.9%	
Unemployed	4.0%	
Not in a labour force	34.1%	
Education		13,814
Less than high school	12.7%	
High school	30.3%	
Post-secondary diploma	31.5%	
University	25.5%	
Income		14,714
Less than \$40000	62.6%	
\$ 40000 – \$ 79999	25.8%	
\$ 80000 - \$ 19999	7.4%	
120000 +	4.2%	
Health		13,847
Excellent	26.2%	
Very good	35.4%	
Good	26.4%	
Fair	8.8%	
Poor	3.1%	

Appendix 5 Characteristics of the Sample: Serbia

	Share of sample	N
Gender		1,528
Male	48.2%	
Female	51.8%	
Age		1,522
15-24	12.8%	
25-34	17.0%	
35-44	13.6%	
45-54	18.3%	
55-64	16.9%	
65+	21.5%	
Marital Status		1,489
Single	27.6%	
Divorced	6.0%	
Widowed	13.1%	
Married	53.3%	
Employment Status		1,461
Student	9.9%	
Employed	35.2%	
Unemployed	25.1%	
Retired	29.9%	
Education		1,514
Less than high school	22.1%	
High school	54.0%	
Post-secondary diploma	8.2%	
University	15.7%	
Health		1,514
Excellent	19.1%	
Very good	19.8%	
Good	28.1%	
Fair	22.6%	
Poor	10.5%	