

THE LANGUAGE OF COLLAPSING POWER

**A Cognitive-Linguistic Critical Discourse Analysis
of the Arab Spring Speeches of Mubarak**

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This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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April 2019

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee.

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MOHYI EL DEEN MAZIAD

ABSTRACT

This thesis problematizes how power was represented, marked, negotiated, then stripped down, in the speeches delivered by the ousted Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, during the Arab Spring Revolution in Egypt.

Seven linguistic, paralinguistic, cognitive-linguistic, argumentative, and multimodal features have been investigated and triangulated systematically as markers of power: deixis, presupposition, frames, hidden dialogicality, logical fallacies, stumbles, and backdrops.

The thesis is organized into seven chapters, in addition to an introduction and a conclusion. The first chapter lays necessary theoretical foundations and proceduralizes core methodological operationalisations; the second, third, and fourth chapters investigate the first, second, and third speeches of Mubarak, respectively. Within that context, Chapter Two introduces the new cognitive-pragmatic concept of *Classifying WE*, which accounts for the ‘problematic’ behaviour of the ‘political’ pronoun *WE* pragmatically, by not considering it a random, contradictory, flat, circular construct, as the ‘Wandering WE’ (Petersoo 2007) does, but as a strategic, systematic, complex, hierarchical structure that encodes sets of multiple referents and social actors, ranked at varying levels of power or submission and inclusion or exclusion. Similarly, Chapter Five introduces the new cognitive-pragmatic notion of *Nested Presuppositions (NestPs)*, and develops a relevance-theoretic model that explains its manipulative information structures and processing dynamics. Chapter Six compares the three speeches intertextually, on the afore-mentioned five levels, and contrasts Mubarak’s language of power, i.e. his pre-Arab Spring discourse, with his language of collapsing power, i.e. his Arab Spring speeches. Chapter Seven problematizes power as control and traces the mechanisms of text, context, and mind control exercised by Mubarak, in an attempt to develop a typology of his *language of collapsing power*.

This thesis has attempted to add three theoretical and methodological contributions to knowledge: it has established a transdisciplinary, harmonious, and fruitful dialogue among disciplines that have long been considered discordant, i.e. Cognitive Linguistics, Critical Discourse Analysis, and Argumentation (Heart 2011: 174; Nunez-Perucha 2011: 97-100), and has introduced the two new cognitive-pragmatic notions of *Classifying WE* and *Nested Presuppositions*, which have so far been applied successfully to two other corpora of presidential speeches, proving that both concepts can be nominated as global analytical tools in Cognitive Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am forever deeply indebted to seven eminent doctors and professors, for the academic advice and feedback they offered me. Arranged chronologically in the order of their appearance in the turbulent journey of my PhD, these are: Professor Yasir Suleiman, Doctor Glen Rangwala, Professor T. M., Professor Edward Roger Owen, Professor G. E., Professor E. A., and Professor Enam El Wer (I am referring to three Professors with their initials because they are Egyptians and mentioning their names might cause them serious troubles by the current Egyptian regime). I cannot express how thankful and grateful I am to these decent and honourable scholars, particularly Professor Enam El Wer, whose comments and corrections improved the quality of this thesis.

Having paid tribute to my dear doctors and professors, I would like to give myself a pat on the shoulder; I believe I deserve one, because the troubles I have been through as a result of conducting this PhD research are indescribable: I am no longer allowed to return to my beloved country Egypt, and hence cannot see my bed-ridden mother one last time; I have lost a PhD fellowship because the topic I wanted to investigate, i.e. this one, is politically sensitive; I have been deprived of sleeping more than two consecutive hours over the last four years, many times much less than two hours a day; I have been threatened indirectly that ‘investigating a moving target could hurt you’ and directly that ‘submitting this PhD could put your life at risk’; I have been isolated systematically and harassed and persecuted brutally; my food was drugged twice; and I had to write up and edit this thesis wearing a handmade aluminium foil cap and sitting behind my big fridge or stretching in my bath tub, in an attempt to protect myself from the very painful electro-magnetic waves that have been targeting me.

Those obstacles, which have backfired and made me all the more determined to complete this thesis, demonstrate that dictators, as well as those backing them, who export themselves to the world as invincible heroes, are in reality no more than cowards, scared of a written word. On the other extreme, the fact that I have managed to complete this thesis in such unbelievably adverse conditions proves that human will is unconquerable and that man can achieve whatever he aims at, if he believes in himself and in the value of what he is doing, regardless of the seriousness of the obstacles or the power and richness of the opponents. Speaking of richness, it might be worth pointing out here that the money that has been spent on setting me and this thesis up for failure could have educated a whole village in Africa. But, no money, even if it were the blackest money of all the oil in the whole world, can block the sun of democracy or set the pointers of history backwards. Because of these reasons as well as a few others, I am so glad that I have completed this thesis; I am very ready for whatever will come next.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis first to the soul of my father, Muhammad Hasan Saleh Saleh Maziad, who taught me how to accept the Other, by accepting my views, in spite of the ‘headache’ and troubles they caused him; second, to the Arab Spring, second-wave revolutionaries of Algeria and Sudan, who, although have been trapped, are certainly capable of seizing the opportunity to define their future; and last, but far from least, to the souls of the Egyptian heroes who have sacrificed their lives in Tahrir Square and in every other square in Egypt, since the 25 January 2011 Revolution, whose bodies might have fallen, but whose souls are standing erect, watching and guarding the unstoppable Egyptian march towards democracy and liberation.

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0. Exordium

This thesis investigates ‘strategic language’, i.e. texts and utterances whose ‘systems and structures’ vary as a function of the power of the speaker or writer as well as of the socio-political contexts within which such a language is embedded (van Dijk 2007: 5-6). More specifically, this is a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of the corpus of the speeches delivered by the ousted Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak during the Arab Spring revolution in Egypt.

The dimensions of power to be analysed are those closely related to language use and its pragmatic functions, particularly ‘those properties of discourse that are most typically associated with the expression, confirmation, reproduction or challenge of the social power of the speaker(s) or writer(s) as members of dominant groups’ (ibid). Those dimensions are to be problematized at the micro-, meso, and macro-levels, starting from the premise that the three mechanisms of the discursive reproduction of ‘power abuse’, i.e. context control, discourse control, and mind control, are interconnected, which methodologically implies that ‘social analysis is related to discourse analysis’ so closely that ‘such a relationship also requires cognitive analysis’ (ibid: 12).

Cognitive-linguistics is, therefore, to play a central role in this thesis: it is going to establish the missing link among the three mechanisms of the discursive reproduction of power abuse, by mapping the macro-level, socio-political analysis of context control onto its corresponding micro-level analyses of linguistic text control, cognitive mind control, and multi-modal, para-linguistic context control, i.e. Cognitive Linguistics is intended to relate power abuse to discourse abuse.

Cognitive mind control is to be partly investigated through Argumentation, i.e. ‘the linguistic and cognitive action pattern’ that ‘has the pragmatic purpose of persuasion’ (Reisigl 2014: 72-3): it is the abstract, cognitive-linguistic, problem-solving pattern, that consists of complex networks of statements and(or) utterances, realized by sequences of thematically, formally, and(or) functionally interrelated speech acts, whose function is to, non-violently and methodically, refute or corroborate validity claims, in order to ultimately achieve persuasion or manipulation (Kopperschmidt 2000: 59-94). The evaluative analysis of argumentation can be functional (Toulmin 1969), formal structural (Kienpointner 1992), and(or) propositional (Wengeler 1997, 2003; Rubinelli 2009).

Content-related analysis is the approach to be adopted in this thesis; it is particularly convenient for CDA, on more than one ground: First, propositional analysis aims at distinguishing between sound and fallacious argumentation through the investigation of 'ideology, subject positions, contested claims and justification strategies' (Reisigl 2014: 92). Moreover, content-related or 'material' topoi, i.e. 'recurring content-related conclusion rules that are typical for specific fields of social action, disciplines, theories, etc.' (ibid: 77), are more informative than formal topoi, because of their capability to reveal the 'character of discourse' (ibid).

Each of the speeches of Mubarak is, therefore, to be investigated linguistically, cognitive-linguistically, argumentatively, and multi-modally: person deixis, presupposition, frames, and hidden dialogicality are to be problematized as markers of text control; logical fallacies are to be identified and analysed as markers of mind control; and backdrops, performance, and stumbles are to be decoded and triangulated, as markers of context control.

The thesis is organized into seven chapters, in addition to an introduction and a conclusion. The first chapter lays necessary theoretical and methodological foundations: it defines CDA and the role played by power in it, formulates the research question, specifies the primary source materials, and proceduralizes the methodology to be followed.

The second chapter analyses the first speech of Mubarak: it begins by reviewing previous literature on Mubarak's language of power, as investigated by Dunne (2003). The chapter then critiques the only study of the deictic system of Mubarak, i.e. (Maalej 2013), and draws the conclusion that there were gaps in the theoretical framework and methodological tool employed by Maalej, particularly the concept of 'wandering we' (Petersoo 2007). I then introduce the new pragmatic concept of *Classifying WE* and explicate how it fills the specific research gaps I identified in Maalej (2013), as well as the generic gaps identified by Levinson (1983; 2003) and Wilson (1990) in the canonical pragmatic analysis of deixis. The chapter then explores the socio-political structures of power, as manifested in the political system in Egypt, and chronicles the most salient events that affected the balance of power before the delivery of the first speech of Mubarak. The chapter then investigates the deictic system Mubarak employed, the logical fallacies he committed, the multi-modal visual prompts he used, the most salient frames he operated, and the paralinguistic way he performed his first speech. Chapters three and four follow the same pattern in analysing the second and third speeches of Mubarak, respectively.

Chapter Five problematizes the most salient information structure employed by Mubarak, by introducing the new cognitive-pragmatic notion of *Nested Presuppositions*. The chapter begins

by defining pragmatic presupposition and identifying research gaps in its relevant literature. I then introduce the notion of *NestPs*, define it, develop a relevance-theoretic model that explains its manipulative information structures and cognitive mechanisms, and demonstrate how Mubarak complicated that already sophisticated type of presupposition by emotionalizing it.

Chapter Six compares the results of the analyses of the three speeches, on the intertextual level. Chapter Seven capitalizes on the previous six chapters, interweaves them, and develops a typology of Mubarak's *language of collapsing power*, by problematizing power as control and examining the layers and sub-layers of linguistic, cognitive-linguistic, paralinguistic, argumentative, and multimodal control exercised by Mubarak in his speeches. The thesis ends with a conclusion that summarizes its findings and suggests further research.

1. Literature Review and Methodology

1.1. Theoretical Framework

1.1.1. Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is the trans-disciplinary, problem-oriented, and socially situated approach of Discourse Analysis (DA) that critically investigates how hegemonic ideologies, identities, and (social, economic, political, ... etc.) inequalities are expressed, muffled, justified, reproduced, and (or) (de)legitimized through language; CDA has an emancipatory agenda, i.e. empowering the public by raising their critical awareness of the ideological operations of language (Kress 1990; van Dijk 1993b, 2001a; Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Wodak 2001a; Blommaert 2005; Reisigl & Wodak 2009; Hart & Cap 2014).

CDA differs from DA in five main respects: CDA investigates 'macro-' or 'meso-topics' that side with the 'socially discriminated groups'; CDA exposes hidden power relations critically and recommends 'practical' solutions, when possible; CDA pays particular attention to context; CDA maintains that the relation between language and social structures is 'mediated' not 'deterministic' (Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 271-80); and CDA is 'discourse analysis with an attitude' (van Dijk 2001a: 96) or 'agenda' (Wodak & Meyer 2009), i.e. taking the side of those suffering injustice against the power elites that enforce, support, justify, or maintain that injustice (van Dijk 1993b: 252). Critical Discourse analysts, therefore, adopt strong stances on injustice, and play an intellectually active role in society (Slembrouck 2001: 37; Billig 2003: 38; Blommaert 2005: 6).

1.1.2. Power in CDA: the language of power and the power of language

The concept of 'power' is a defining characteristic of CDA, the latter being 'specifically interested in theory formation and critical analysis of the discursive reproduction of power abuse and social inequality' (Van Dijk 2008c: 1). Power is, however, not an easy concept to investigate, because it is 'mostly invisible' (Wodak et al. 2009: 10) and 'is as complex as it is fuzzy' (Van Dijk 2008c: 1).

This thesis problematizes and defines power in terms of 'control', i.e. 'control of one group over other groups and their members' (ibid: 9). Such an approach is based on three main

premises: (1) 'language indexes and expresses power, and is involved when there is contention over and challenge to power', as it 'provides a finely articulated vehicle for differences in power in hierarchical social structures'; (2) texts are considered as (a) 'sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance', (b) 'manifestations of social action [...] determined by social structure', and (c) 'the result of collusion' among different powers; (3) Language is considered as a correlate indicator of power (Wodak et al. 2009: 10-17).

Three main mechanisms will, therefore, be identified as the constituents of 'the fundamental process of the reproduction of power through discourse' (Van Dijk 2008c: 9): context control, discourse/text control, and mind control (ibid: 9-12).

Context control is the first mechanism in the process of control: Contexts control discourses, discourses control minds, and minds control actions; it is therefore in the best interest of those in power to control contexts, in the first place, as a means of ultimately controlling the wishes, moods, minds, and hence actions of the people. Context control typically starts from controlling access to mass media and monopolizing the (re)creation, (re)production, and (re)circulation of hegemonic narratives, i.e. deciding who produces news, whose actions are to be considered 'the news', who organizes press conferences, who to invite, whom to interview, which public mood to engineer at particular which time, and whose socio-political definitions and evaluations to be adopted as 'the common sense' (ibid: 10).

The second mechanism is discourse/text control, i.e. controlling the topics that can or should be talked about and the form they can or should be presented in (ibid: 10-11). The third mechanism is 'mind control', which is the most complex, indirect, and effective form of control: it results from discourse control and can result in action control. Mind control does not only involve how texts or utterances are understood, but also how the complex, cognitive representations and processes involved in the 'personal and social knowledge, previous experiences, personal opinions and social attitudes, ideologies and norms or values' of the public can be exploited in order to influence them and change their minds and attitudes (ibid: 09-10).

These three mechanisms can be exercised for 'neutral and positive ends', such as parenting, education, medical treatment, and protection by the police and good governance (ibid: 17). CDA is, however, particularly interested in the critical analysis of 'power abuse' or 'domination', i.e. 'the various kinds of *communicative power abuse* [...] such as manipulation, indoctrination, or disinformation' which violate the fundamental social and

civil rights of the people ‘in the interest of those in power, and against the interest of others’ (ibid: 18-19).

1.2. Methodology and Literature Review

1.2.1. Research Question

This thesis attempts to answer the following research question: What are the characteristic features of the Arab Spring speeches of Mubarak, on the linguistic, cognitive-linguistic, argumentative, multimodal, and paralinguistic levels?

1.2.2. Primary Source Materials

The primary source materials to be investigated in this thesis are the three speeches delivered by Mubarak during the Egyptian Arab Spring Revolution, i.e. since the beginning of the protests on 25 January 2011 and up till his ouster on 11 February 2011. The three speeches are available on YouTube: the first can be accessed at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NbIBXNKMUhs>; the second at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4Ty6UuuUL4>; and the third at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_06qCKV3bE. The three speeches have been transcribed, Appendices 1-3, and translated, Appendices 4-6.

1.2.3. Tokens, numbering, translation, and transliteration

Tokens are cited in two ways in this thesis: short tokens, consisting of a few words, are cited within the relevant paragraph, with their transcribed Arabic in italics, followed by my English translation between parentheses, e.g. الإخوة المواطنون *al-`ixwah al-muwāṭiṇūn* (Brother citizens). Longer tokens, involving excerpts of phrases, sentences, or whole utterances, are numbered separately, with the transcribed Arabic first, followed below by my English translation, for example:

إِنَّ شِبَابَ مِصْرَ، هُوَ أَغْلَى مَا لَدَيْهَا
'inna šabāba miṣr huwa `aglā mā ladayhā
The youth of Egypt are indeed its dearest wealth

The numbering system I am following consists of three components: First, there will be an upper-case letter followed by a number indicating the number of the appendix in which the cited token may be found. Second, there will be a second numeral, separated from the first by a full stop, indicating the paragraph number, of that appendix, which contains the token. Third, there will be a third numeral, separated from the second by a colon, indicating the

number of that token within the series of tokens cited in the chapter so far. Thus, a token numbered (M1.5:20) means that the token may be found in the fifth paragraph of Appendix M1, and that it is the twentieth token in the chapter.

All transcription in the thesis follows the romanization scheme adopted by *Encyclopaedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics* (EALL) (Versteegh, Eid, Elgibali, Woidich, Zaborski 2006: 515-520), whose symbols are summarized in Table (1.1) below. All excerpts are transcribed as they are pronounced in the speeches. Mubarak made many grammatical errors and mistakes in the case and mode endings of many words, e.g. قبل أن تتحول هذه *qabla 'an tataḥwal hāḍihi t-tazāhurāt li-'a 'māli šaḡabin tuhaddida n-nizāma l-'ām (before these demonstrations turned into acts of riot, threatening public order); I have made no attempt to correct such mistakes, preferring to document and transcribe them as they were uttered.

Arabic	EALL	Arabic	EALL
ء - ا	'	ط	ṭ
ى , ا	ā		
ب	b	ظ	ẓ
ت	t	ع	'
ث	ṭ	غ	ġ
ج	j, ġ	ف	f
ح	ḥ	ق	q
خ	x	ك	K
د	d	ل	l
ذ	ḏ	م	m
ر	r	ن	n
ز	z	ه	h
س	s	و	w ū aw

ش	š	ي	y ī ay
ص	ṣ		
ض	ḍ		

Table (1.1): EALL Romanization Scheme adopted in the thesis

Finally, all translations are my own: I have tried my best to translate into idiomatic English, but have also been equally keen on reflecting the Arabic linguistic and rhetorical structures and features as authentically as possible in my English translation.

1.2.4. Procedural Operationalization

1.2.4.1. Levels of Critique

Critique in this thesis proceeds systematically at three levels: from a micro-level analysis of a specific linguistic feature in a speech, e.g. deictic expressions in the first speech; to a mini-level, text-internal analysis of more than one feature within the same speech, e.g. deixis, frames, internal polemic, and fallacies in the first speech; to a meso-level, intertextual, discourse-internal analysis that compares the three speeches, in an attempt to reach a generalization at the level of discourse. All analyses, at the three levels, are conducted against the backdrop of the macro socio-political relations of power held at the time of delivering every speech.

1.2.4.2. Methodological Triangulation

Research in this thesis is embedded within (cognitive) pragmatics, which has been defined as ‘simply [...] the analysis of meaning which is beyond what has been said, and it is accepted that locating each meaning may involve more than one procedural method of analysis’ (Wilson 1990: 7), because ‘[M]eaning is a particularly slippery term [...] and the construction of meaning within contexts, or specifically political contexts, involves more, of course, than a purely linguistic dimension (ibid: 179).

This thesis is, therefore, methodologically triangulatory: Each speech is to be investigated by at least four methods of analysis: linguistic, cognitive-linguistic, argumentative, and multimodal. I have devised this particular synergy in order to respond to the most frequently

repeated criticism of CDA, i.e. its failure to establish a link between the ways people talk and the ways they think:

CDA aims to be a theory of the relation between cognition and the textual representations of reality [...] I am not convinced that CDA provides testable claims about such relations [...] If language and thought are to be related, then one needs data and theory pertinent to both (Stubbs 1997: 1, 5, 6).

I think the methodology synthesized in this thesis has established that missing link: Cognitive-linguistic analysis will examine the linguistic representations of the cognition of Mubarak, i.e. how his language, intentionally and unintentionally, revealed his ideologies and beliefs. The argumentative analysis will identify the fallacies he committed while trying to substantiate his arguments. The para-linguistic and multi-modal analyses are predicated on the fact that all the speeches at issue are modally hybrid, i.e. cast in more than one semiotic modality: spoken, performed, and viewed; hence, these two levels of analysis will investigate the utterances over which Mubarak stumbled and the backdrops against which he chose to deliver their speeches, in order to explicate their significance. Following is a brief review of these four components.

1.2.4.2.1. Cognitive Linguistic analysis

The importance of cognitive-linguistic analysis is established by the relationship between language and ideology: the former being defined as the vehicle and the material representation of the latter (Fairclough 1995: 73) and the latter as a system of beliefs that has to be investigated socio-cognitively through the former (van Dijk 1998: 126). Such a dialectic relationship acquires particular significance in the language of politics, which is ‘eminently ideological’ and ultimately geared towards the legitimization of power (abuse), by manufacturing consent and (or) suppressing dissent on a given worldview (van Dijk 2003: 208). Hence, the language of politics ‘can only be adequately described and explained when we spell out the socio-cognitive interface that relates it to the socially shared political representations that control political actions, processes, and systems’ (van Dijk 2002: 234).

Four cognitive-linguistic phenomena are to be investigated in this thesis: Deixis, Pragmatic Presupposition, Frames, and Hidden Dialogicality. They have been selected because of their particular significance: *deixis* is '[T]he single most obvious way in which the relationship between language and context is reflected in the structures of language themselves' (Levinson 1983: 54). Presupposition aims at establishing a common ground between the speaker and the

hearer, by passing the assumptions of the former as premises agreed-upon by the latter, and hence is an important detector of ideology and underlying relations of power (Yule 1996: 29). Frames have occupied a central position in fields as diverse as linguistics, anthropology, cognitive psychology, and artificial intelligence, because of their ability elucidate many fuzzy areas of linguistics, particularly discourse analysis (Tannen 1979: 137-9, 141; Dunne 2003: 21, 37). *Hidden dialogicality* plays an important role in the processes of producing and consuming (political) discourse, by explicating and identifying the unheard voices of the hidden dialogical partners whom 'the producers of the utterances expect, fear, hope, or wish [...] to be there' (Scollon 1999: 9–10), and by pulling 'back the curtain that hides the wizard behind it who is ventriloquating what appears to be the main discourse' (ibid: 9). Following are brief accounts of those four components.

1.2.4.2.1.1. Reference, indexicality, deixis, and anaphora

Deixis is an important linguistic phenomenon in the study of political discourse (Van Dijk, 1995; Fairclough, 2001), because it is the 'single most obvious way in which the relationship between language and context is reflected in the structures of language themselves' (Levinson, 1983: 54). It proves descriptively essential to start with positioning *deixis* within its broader and narrower contexts of *reference*, *indexicality*, and *anaphora*.

Reference studies how linguistic forms are used to designate entities in the world (Matthews, 1997: 312); it has been closely associated with *indexicality* and *deixis*: philosophers, e.g. Peirce (1955), argue that the former represents the route into *reference*, and linguists, e.g. Bühler (1934), contend that the latter is the source of *reference*.

Indexicality refers to the 'broader phenomena of contextual dependency' (Levinson, 2003: 2) and can be defined in terms of four main characteristics: existential relationship between the indexical sign and its object of reference, semantic deficiency, attentionality, and intentionality. In other words, although the indexical sign is in a relationship of 'dynamical coexistence' with its referent, the descriptive content of the former is insufficient to identify the latter without resorting to contextual support, i.e. 'funneling' the attention of the addressee to spatio-temporal contextual clues that enable the addressee to reconstruct the referential intentions of the speaker (ibid: 08-13).

Deixis denotes the 'narrower linguistically-relevant aspects of indexicality' (ibid: 2): it 'encodes' extra-linguistic aspects of the context, whose analysis is required for the proper understanding and interpretation of the utterance (Levinson 1983: 54, 62, 68; Mühlhäusler &

Harré 1990: 9-10). Deictic expressions, also known as *deictics*, are thus ‘ready-made’ indexical expressions that have ‘a contextual variable built into their semantic conditions’, hence they necessarily invoke features tied directly to the context of utterance (Levinson, 2003: 14, 21). Deictics exhibit a gradient of contextual dependency, ranging from *pure* or *dedicated deictics*, i.e. exclusively deictic expressions that have no anaphoric use, to *weak deictics*, i.e. deictic expressions that can be used demonstratively for emphasis (ibid).

Deictics are classified into the five categories of person, place, time, discourse, and social *deixis*: *Person deixis* encodes the roles of participants in the speech event; *place* or *space deixis* encodes spatial locations relative to those of the participants in the speech event; *time deixis* encodes the temporal points and spans anchored to the time at which an utterance was spoken; *discourse* or *text deixis* encodes references to prior segments in the unfolding discourse within which the utterance occurs; and *social deixis* encodes aspects of the social identities, status, and rank of participants (Levinson, 1983: 62-90). This paper focuses on *person deixis*, because it is implicitly or explicitly present in every utterance (ibid: 62; Lyons, 1977: 638).

The last referentially related concept is *anaphora*, which signifies a relationship of co-referentiality, i.e. picking out the same referent, between two elements in the discourse: an anaphor and an antecedent, where the former is unified with the latter and depends on it for the determination of its semantic value (Levinson, 1983: 67).

In spite of these definitions and distinctions, *deixis* is still considered one of the most puzzling and understudied core areas of linguistics: it has no adequate metalinguistic apparatus, no coherent cross-linguistic typology of most of the types of its expressions, no clearly defining boundaries, and no consensus on whether the whole topic belongs to semantics or pragmatics (Levinson, 1983: 61, 68, 92; 2003: 1, 5). Following are some of the most problematic issues relevant to the topic of this paper.

First, the broader class of indexical expressions is itself not very clearly demarcated: on the one hand, some of the inherently deictic expressions ‘can be used non-deictically, e.g. anaphorically [...] or non-anaphorically’ (Levinson, 2003: 30-31); on the other, some deictic terms can be interpreted as both deictic and anaphoric at the same time, in the same sentence (Lyons, 1977: 676; Levinson, 1983: 67).

Second, although *anaphora* is prototypically categorized as non-deictic (Levinson, 1983; Diessel, 1999), anaphoric expressions ‘with their directional specification from the current point in the text, make clear the underlyingly deictic nature of anaphora’ (Levinson, 2003: 49),

that ‘clear conventional deictic component’ renders *anaphors* so closely related to *deictics* that it is not always possible to distinguish them (ibid). Furthermore, many of the standard anaphoric expressions ‘like third person pronouns in English, are general purpose referring expressions – there is nothing intrinsically anaphoric about them, and they can be used deictically [...] or non-deictically but exophorically’ (ibid: 49). Finally, and most importantly, ‘the property of indexicality is not exhausted by the study of inherently indexical expressions [i.e. *deictics*]. For just about any referring expression can be used deictically’ (Levinson, 2003: 8).

1.2.4.2.1.2. Frames

Frames, also known as scripts or schemata, are ‘structures of expectations’ that are based on past knowledge and experience of the world and evoked by a speaker, for themselves and for other participants in discourse, in order to organize their world knowledge in a manner that enables them to exchange the signals necessary for determining the level of abstraction at which a message is intended, and to predict relationships and interpretations regarding new events, experiences, and information. Frames can be thought of as the past operating ‘as an organized mass rather than as a group of elements each of which retains its specific character’ (Bartlett 1932: 197); they are ‘actively doing something all the time; [...] carried along with us, complete, though developing [...] from moment to moment’ (ibid: 201). The concept of frame is originally a psychological one, but ‘the physical analogy of the picture frame’ has been used to characterize it (Bateson 1972: 186).

Linguistically speaking, a frame is ‘a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation’ (Minsky 1975: 212). In other words, it is ‘any system of linguistic choices [...] that can get associated with prototypical instances of scenes’, the latter being ‘any kind of coherent segment of human beliefs, actions, experiences or imaginings’ (Fillmore 1975: 124). Frames can be identified through frame indicators, i.e. the linguistic devices indicating the operations of frames in discourse. These include omissions, additions, repetitions, negatives, contrastive connectives, conditionals, qualifiers, presuppositions, backtracks, hedges and hedge-like words or phrases, modals, inexact statements, generalizations, approximations, inferences, evaluative language, interpretations, moral judgements, incorrect statements, voice, markers of discomfort, and false starts (Dunne 2003: 37-39, 99; Tannen 1979: 166-177).

1.2.4.2.1.3. Interdiscursivity: hidden polemic, hidden dialogicality, and overt dialogicality

Given that language is both constituted by and constitutive of social interactions, and that discourse is an ‘inherently’ and ‘entirely’ social phenomenon that ‘lives, as it were, beyond itself’ (Bakhtin 1981: 291), texts can be considered as artifacts of discursive events and residues of social interaction (Scollon 1998: 4). No text is therefore completely original, and no writer or speaker disturbs ‘the eternal silence of the universe’; rather, instances of discourse are implicitly or explicitly connected to each other; every new instance represents a link in the complex chain of texts, builds on it, polemicizes with it, or presupposes it (Bakhtin 1986: 69); and every new instance brings with it the conventionalizations of its own social practice that had been established and developed over its previous history (Scollon 1998: 15). This process through which producers of texts ‘appropriate’ instances of previous discourses, produced by themselves or by others, has been termed interdiscursivity, polyvocality, intertextuality, and (or) appropriation (Dunne 2003: 36).

Moreover, languages are ‘directly intentional’ and ‘clear’ for their speakers, but ‘for those not participating in the given purview, these languages may be treated as objects, as typifications, as local color’ (Bakhtin 1981: 289). The reason why languages, including political discourse, may sound opaque to non-participant outsiders can be attributed to a form of interdiscursivity called *hidden polemic*, through which internally polemical discourses respond indirectly to an implicit discourse while seeming to be directly addressing another explicit one: they are ‘directed toward an ordinary referential object, naming it, portraying, expressing, and only indirectly striking a blow at the other’s discourse, clashing with it, as it were, within the object itself. As a result, the other person’s discourse begins to influence authorial discourse from within. For this reason, hidden polemical discourse is double-voiced, although the interrelationship of the two voices here is a special one’ (Bakhtin 1984: 196). Internally polemical discourses are not restricted to ‘hostile’ discourses that have ‘a sideward glance at someone else’s hostile word’ only; they can include apprehensive discourses that unfold cautiously in fear of a hostile response, i.e. discourses that ‘literally cringe in the presence or the anticipation of someone else’s word, reply, [or] objection’ by having ‘a thousand reservations, concessions, loopholes and the like’ (ibid). When the implicit discourse is not hostile, the interdiscursive process is called *hidden dialogicality* (ibid: 197). The hidden voice of the implicit speaker, in both *hidden polemic* and *hidden dialogicality*, manifests itself, in one form or another, in the tone, structure, and (or) meaning of the new instance of discourse: ‘each present, uttered word responds and reacts with its every fiber to the invisible speaker, points to

something outside itself, beyond its own limits, to the unspoken words of another speaker' (ibid). *Hidden polemic* and *hidden dialogicality* are the opposites of *overt polemic* which refers directly to an explicit discourse and refutes it (ibid).

1.2.4.2.2. Argumentative analysis: Fallacies

There has been no systematic treatment of fallacies, neither in traditional nor modern logic (Tindale 2007: xiv); their Standard Treatment exemplified in normative modern logic suffers from serious theoretical and practical shortcomings (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1995: 130).

The first list of fallacies was compiled by Aristotle; he listed thirteen types of fallacies, called them 'sophisms' and(or) 'elenches', and classified them into *in dictione*, i.e. fallacies dependent on language, and *extra dictionem*, i.e. fallacies independent of language. The *in dictione* fallacies are Equivocation, Amphiboly, Composition, Division, Accent, and Figure of Speech; the *extra dictionem* fallacies are Accident, *Secundum Quid*, *Ignoratio Elenchi*, *Petitio Principii*, *Affirming the Consequent*, *Post Hoc*, *Ergo Propier Hoc*, and *Plurium Interrogationum*.

Fallacies have been defined in various ways: 'flaws in the rational properties' of a persuasive message (Gronbeck, McKerrow, Ehninger & Monroe 1990: 414), arguments that seem valid but are not valid (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1995: 130), a 'faux pas of communication' (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1995: 130), 'argumentative moves that seem good when they are not' (Jacobs 2000: 273), 'arguments that contain common or seductive errors in reasoning' (Woods et al. 2004: 328), 'deficient move in an argumentative discourse or text' (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 158), 'weak inferences, or even deceptive argumentation tactics used to unfairly get the best of a speech partner' (Walton 2007: 21), and a speech act that infringes any of the rules of Critical Discussion and hence impedes the rational resolution of a difference of opinion (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2015: 168-9).

In terms of classification, fallacies have been divided into various types: fallacies dependent on language and fallacies independent of language; fallacies in evidence, in reasoning, and in the language of the persuasive message (Gronbeck et al. 1990: 414-417; Berko et al. 1989: 470-479); fallacies of relevance and fallacies of ambiguity (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 159); fallacies of ambiguity, presumption, and irrelevance (Woods et al. 2004: 330); and correlational and causal fallacies versus fallacies of structure (Tindale 2007: 41-173).

The methodological operationalization of fallacies adopted in this thesis starts from the Aristotelian list and adds to it the subsequent types suggested by modern logicians; more

specifically, Warnick (2000), van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, 2004), Tindale (2007), Van Eemeren, Garssen, and Meuffels (2009), van Eemeren (2015), and Walton (2014, 2016).

Fallacies will be problematized semantically, syntactically, and rhetorically, by investigating three main indicators: the lexical keywords the three presidents used to label different actors and their actions, the most salient syntactic structures they constructed in order to carry fallacious propositional content, and the tropes they employed to reach implicit fallacious conclusions.

Given that ‘[D]iscourse analysis that claims to be critical is well advised to rely on a normative model when doing argumentation analysis’ (Reisigl 2014: 79), this thesis will take as its normative model the Pragma-Dialectic theory of Argumentation (PDA) as developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987, 1992, 1995, 2004), van Eemeren, Garssen, and Meuffels (2009), and van Eemeren (2015).

PDA considers the study of argumentation a special branch of pragmatics that methodically integrates the descriptive and normative perspectives of argumentation by formulating ten rules for the resolution of differences of opinion, as summarized in the table below. Only observing all the rules constitutes a sufficient condition for resolving a difference of opinion; any violation of any of the rules obstructs the resolution process and is hence considered a fallacy (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1995: 130-131; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015: 166-168).

Rule (1)	Parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from casting doubt on standpoints.
Rule (2)	A party that advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked by the other party to do so.
Rule (3)	A party’s attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed been advanced by the other party.
Rule (4)	A party may defend a standpoint only by advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint.
Rule (5)	A party may not disown a premise that has been left implicit by that party or falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party.
Rule (6)	A party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point nor deny a premise representing an accepted starting point.

Rule (7)	A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defence does not take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly applied.
Rule (8)	A party may only use arguments in its argumentation that are logically valid or capable of being validated by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises.
Rule (9)	A failed defence of a standpoint must result in the party that put forward the standpoint retracting it and a conclusive defence of the standpoint must result in the other party retracting its doubt about the standpoint.
Rule (10)	A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous and a party must interpret the other party's formulations as carefully and accurately as possible.

Table (1.2): The Ten Commandments of Critical Discussion
(van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2015: 166-168)

1.2.4.2.3. Multimodal, paralinguistic analyses

Linguistic analysis alone is insufficient, as it 'represents only one level of analysis' of the complex 'political enterprise' (Wilson 1990: 180): 'what is traditionally understood by language is but one manifestation of it' (Blommaert 2005: 3). Other nonlinguistic, contextual aspects of communication, e.g. nonverbal 'semiotic devices', do have a communicative potential that contributes significantly to the process of meaning-making, because 'discourses are often multimodally realized, not only through text and talk, but also through other modes of communication such as images' (van Leeuwen 2006: 292).

This thesis considers all semiotic modalities as forms of social practice, dialectically inseparable from the socio-linguistic structures within which they are produced and consumed. The analytical approach adopted by this research is, therefore, a transmodal semiotic one: speeches will be analysed as combinations of written linguistic signs, spoken performances, and visual media prompts. Multi-modal contexts and backdrops will be identified, analysed, and related to the implicit, as well as explicit, value system of the speaker and his audience.

2. The first speech of Mubarak

2.1. Previous Literature

2.1.1. Dunne (2003)

Dunne (2003) investigated Mubarak's pre-Arab Spring discourse of power, and drew the conclusion that his discourse replicated his practice: he employed linguistic hedges as well as other devices in order to construct a nuanced identity that projected him as both democratic and 'firmly in control', and replicated the existing 'top-down power balance between the government and civil society' (ibid: 127). That public discourse of the powerful Mubarak portrayed a 'political field on which the only valid players are the state, institutions licensed and regulated by the state, and the individual, isolated citizen'; it reflected a 'top-down, centrally controlled power structure' that foregrounded the inability of citizens to 'change their government via a democratic process' (ibid: 130). Such relations of power were replicated and maintained by discursively isolating the citizen; demonizing, cutting down to size, and linking to undesirable phenomena any political parties, non-governmental institutions, or anyone who would criticise Mubarak and (or) pose a potential challenge to his democratic record or 'state supremacy'; and pledging heavily to hold fair elections and increase the share of opposition seats in parliament, in a hedging manner that gave the impression that he had made promises and at the same time had not. In short, the discourse of the powerful Mubarak replicated 'the strong president-weak political opposition dynamic' (ibid: 125).

2.1.2. Maalej (2013)

The only study that investigated the person deixis of Mubarak is Maalej (2013). It considered Mubarak the deictic center and concluded that he manipulated pronouns in order to misrepresent the revolution as 'demonstrations', not 'peaceful protests' (ibid: 633). This is a pioneering study conducted by an eminent professor who has enriched the library of modern Arabic discourse analysis with many important publications. Nevertheless, five main comments need to be pointed out about this important study.

First, the study was not very accurate in its calculation of the exact numbers of occurrences of all the pronouns it investigated. The study claims that there is only one occurrence of the second-person plural pronoun *YOU* in the antepenultimate speech (ibid: 634), where in reality there are two; that the penultimate speech counts thirty-one occurrences of *I* versus nine of *WE* (ibid: 646), where in reality these are thirty-seven versus eleven; that the last speech included sixty-one instances of *I* compared to twenty-eight of *WE* (ibid: 655), where in reality these are seventy-seven and forty-two; and that the three speeches included one-hundred and twenty-one instances of *I* against sixty-five of *WE* and fifteen of *YOU* (ibid), whereas in reality these are one-hundred and forty-seven against ninety and twenty respectively. Finally, it might be relevant to point out that Mubarak delivered his second speech, on the first of February, 2011, not the second as Maalej states (ibid: 645).

Second, the study assigned references to some pronouns in a manner that may not be very convincing. For example, Maalej argues that the deictic pronoun in *kamā 'annanī rajulun min rijāli quwātina l-musallaḥa* (Also, I am indeed a man of the sons of our armed forces), in the penultimate speech is ambiguous and could be a 'royal-WE' that refers to Mubarak to the exclusion of the people (2013: 648). This interpretation might have been plausible if the relations of power were in favour of Mubarak at the time of delivering the second speech. I think this instance is one of the *Third Class WE* in which Mubarak attempted to legitimize himself by associating himself with the armed forces 'which many Egyptians respect highly' (El Manawy 2012: 155).

Moreover, Maalej argues that the '*WE*' in *wa sayḥkumu t-tārīxu 'alayya wa 'alā ḡayrī bi-mā lanā aw 'alaynā* (and history will judge me as well as others for our merits and demerits) is an 'inclusive of the leadership, i.e. the DPE [Mubarak], his government, and the ruling party' (ibid). I would like, first, to cite the complete utterance from its beginning, then suggest what could be a more accurate translation of it:

(M2.22:1)

إنَّ حسني مبارك الذي يتحدثُ إليكم اليوم، يعتزُّ بما قضاؤه من سنينٍ طويلة، في خدمة مصرٍ وشعبها، إنَّ هذا الوطن، العزيز، هو وطني، مثلما هو وطن كل مصريٍّ ومصرية، فيه عِشت، وحاربتُ من أجله، ودافعتُ عن أرضه، وسيادته، ومصالحه، وعلى أرضه أموت، وسيحكم التاريخُ على وعلى غيري، بما لنا أو علينا.

'inna Husni Mubārak alladi yataḥadaṭu 'ilaykum al-yawm ya 'tazu bi-mā qaḍāhu min sinīna ṭawīlah fī xidmati miṣra wa ša 'bihā. 'inna hāda l-waṭan al-'azīz hwa waṭani, miṭlamā hwa waṭanu kulli miṣriyyin wa miṣriyyah, fthi 'išt, wa ḥārabtu min 'ajlih, wa dāfa 'tu 'an 'arḍihi wa siyādatihi, wa maṣālihih wa 'alā 'arḍihi 'amūt, wa sayḥkumu t-tārīxu 'alayya wa 'alā ḡayrī bi-mā lanā aw 'alaynā.

Hosni Mubarak who is speaking to you today is indeed proud of the long years he has spent at the service of Egypt and its people. This dear homeland is indeed my homeland, as it is the homeland of every Egyptian man and woman. In it, I have lived; I have fought for its sake; I have defended its land, sovereignty, and interests; and on its soil I die, and history will judge me as well as others for our merits and demerits.

Contra to the argument made by Maalej (2013), the possessive pronoun 'our' in the above-quoted utterance can be argued to be an instance of the *Third Class WE*, through which Mubarak attempted to relinquish power strategically and assimilate himself into the people by equating himself not only to ordinary Egyptian men and women, but also to his political opponents, a pronominal decision that signifies the steep change in the relations of power at the time of delivering the second speech.

Furthermore, Maalej argues that the last *WE* in the penultimate speech is 'ambiguous between two readings: A royal-*WE* and an inclusive “*WE*” (ibid) and concludes that it 'cannot be inclusive of the Egyptians or the people because the DPE [Mubarak] was talking about a peaceful transfer of power in the hands of the sons of the people' (ibid). I think this sentence is self-contradictory and the *WE* at issue is an instance of the inclusive *Third Class WE* through which Mubarak assimilated himself into the people in order to hold them co-responsible for finding an 'honourable' solution to the problem of transferring power, as I will explain in detail later.

In addition, Maalej argues that, in the ultimate speech, the filling of the two *OURs* in *fī iqtisādina wa sum‘atinā d-dawliyyah* 'our economy and our international self-image' is ambiguous and 'seem to be cynical and outrageous, and do not include the Egyptians' (ibid: 652). These two occurrences of *OUR* can be argued to be derivative instances of the bonding *Third Class WE* which Mubarak employed in an attempt to establish a bond with the people on the grounds of common losses and suffering, as I will explain in detail later. Similarly, I believe that all the occurrences of *WE* and *OUR* in that utterance are instances of the inclusive *Third Class WE*, not the exclusive *WE* as Maalej (ibid: 653) argues.

Third, the study interpreted the functions of some deictic pronouns in a non-holistic manner. For example, Maalej considers the utterance in which Mubarak said to the people *‘innī lā ‘atahadatu ‘ilay-kum al-yawm ka-ra‘isin li-l-jumhūriyyati faḥasb, wa innammā ka-miṣriyyin* (I am not addressing you today as the President of the republic only, but indeed as an Egyptian

man) as a 'gesture to seek closeness to and communality with them' (2013: 644). I think the second part of that utterance is too significant to be overlooked, because Mubarak says in it:

(MI.21:2)

إني لا أتحدثُ اليكُم اليوم، كرئيس للجمهورية فحسب وإنما كمصري، شاءتِ الأقدارُ أن يتحملَ مسئوليةَ هذا الوطن، وأمضى حياته من أجله، حرباً وسلاماً.

'innī lā 'ataḥadaṭu 'ilay-kum al-yawm ka-ra'īsīn li-l-jumhūriyyati faḥasb, wa innammā ka-miṣriyyīn šā'ati l-aqdāru an yataḥamala mas'ūliyata hāḍa l-waṭan wa 'amḍā ḥayātahu min ajlihi ḥarban wa salāman.

I am indeed not addressing you today as a President of the republic only, but indeed as an Egyptian man whom fate has decided to assign the responsibility of this homeland and who exhausted his life for its sake, in war and peace.

It might be more plausible to argue that Mubarak was attempting to establish as many layers of authority and power as possible in this utterance: he started by foregrounding his legal power, as the President of the Republic, in the first part of the utterance, then doubled that authority, against which the people were revolting, by adding a second, higher-level layer of spiritual authority that people cannot easily revolt against, as it appeals to their religious and cultural subconscious. The implied argument in that utterance can be explicated as follows: God/Fate has selected Mubarak to shoulder the responsibility of the homeland as the President. If God does not consider Mubarak fit for the job, He would have never selected him. Therefore, if the people were questioning the fitness of Mubarak for presidency, they would be questioning the judgment of their God.

Moreover, Maalej argues that the 'imbalance between "I" and "WE"' in the penultimate speech 'suggests a clear persistence on the part of the DPE [Mubarak] to stick to individualism, egocentrism, and self-centeredness [...] All the "I" instances were "presidential-I"' (2013: 646 & 647). Maalej also draws the same conclusion after analysing the ultimate speech, contending that Mubarak was 'a self-centred, individualistic, and egocentric old man. He did not feel the need to make communality with the rest of Egyptians' (ibid: 655). These two conclusions might have been plausible if the relations of power were in favour of Mubarak at the times of the delivering the second and third speeches, which was not at all the case. Mubarak, the experienced politician, was seeing his power collapsing and taken from him by the very youth he had ignored. It is, thus, unlikely that he would employ *I* to express his

individualism and presidential ego-centrism and detach himself from the people at that particularly critical time, as Maalej argues. Mubarak did exactly what any veteran politician would do in such a situation, i.e. employing *I* manipulatively to represent himself modestly and positively and stir the feelings of pity and sympathy of the people, as will be explained in detail later.

Furthermore, Maalej concludes that 'when it comes to political responsibilities, achievements and commitments, the DPE [Mubarak] used "I"' (2013: 648). This might not be a very precise conclusion: Mubarak evaded responsibilities and commitments by first using the *Second Class WE* which blamed responsibility on the cabinet, then the *Third Class WE* to hold the people co-responsible with him for finding a solution, as will be explicated later in the analysis. Finally, Maalej argues that the function of framing Egypt as the mother, Egyptians as the sons and Mubarak as the father is to create 'an emotive blend between Egypt and President [...] which establishes a close link between the DPE [Mubarak] and Egypt' (ibid: 650). The strategic function of that Conceptual Metaphor can be argued to go beyond that interpretation to impose some sort of religious parental authority which obliges the children, i.e. the revolutionary youth, to obey their metaphorical father, i.e. Mubarak, otherwise they would be disobeying the teachings of religion by committing the second gravely sin after disbelief in God, i.e. ingratitude to parents.

Fourth, Maalej (2013) did not only reduce the most 'complex' and 'problematic' pronoun, i.e. *WE*, to a simple, binary pronoun of an 'inclusive *WE*' versus an 'exclusive *WE*', but also was not very consistent in the references he assigned to each *WE* of them. For example, Maalej argues in some instances that the referents of the 'inclusive *WE*' are the President, his government, and ruling party (ibid: 644, 648), then in other instances, the President, his government, his ruling party, and the people (ibid: 645). Moreover, Maalej (2013) left the references of many occurrences of *WE* unresolved, considering them merely 'ambiguous' (ibid: 648, 652).

Finally, the study concentrated mainly on the two pronouns *I* and *WE*, to the exclusion of other important and revealing pronouns, e.g. *HE*, when used by Mubarak to encode himself; *THEY* when used by Mubarak to first encode the protesters, then all the Egyptians; and *hā'u l-ġaibah* هاء الغيبة, which can be argued to correspond to the English *ITS*, when used by

Mubarak to encode *Miṣra wa ša 'bahā* (Egypt and its people) and detach them from the speaker.

2.1.3. Wandering WE

The origins of the 'wandering we' go back to the observation made by Riggins (1997: 8) that the deictic pronoun WE can be used in a 'contradictory' manner within the same text, an observation upon which Petersoo elaborated and based his introduction of the concept of 'wandering we' which describes the 'contradictory use of the deictic expression "we"' (2007: 429). Maalej (2012) borrows this concept, maintaining that it explains the 'contradictory' uses ben Ali and Mubarak made of *WE* in their Arab Spring speeches.

Considering the broad grounds of pragmatics, semantics, and genre, I believe that the 'wandering we' is not the most appropriate concept to use for explaining the deictic decisions made by ben Ali, for more than one reason. First, and most importantly, the uses ben Ali made of *WE* are systematic, tactical, non-contradictory, and hence cannot be described as 'wandering' (Maziad, forthcoming). Moreover, a careful examination of the manner in which the 'wandering we' operates can demonstrate the inherent deficiency of the concept itself; the 'wandering we'

wanders between various forms of inclusiveness — from an exclusive newspaper "we" to an inclusive Scottish "we" and/or to an all-inclusive British "we" — or, indeed, vice versa. Sometimes the "we" wanders spatially — at one moment, the "we" becomes "them", or "they" become "us" (Petersoo 2007: 429)

The 'wandering we' thus can be argued to be a pragmatically vacuous and semantically ill-defined concept that needs further qualification, in terms of its reference, scope, and function. Finally, Petersoo (2007) introduced the 'wandering we' in an attempt to describe, not explain, the rhetoric of 'banal nationalism' in Scottish and British newspapers, i.e. he was drawing upon a discourse type whose genre, conventions, topics, socio-political contexts, and goals are all so disparate from those of the Arab Spring political speeches, under investigation, which were delivered at an erupting revolutionary moment, with the sole aim of tactically manipulating the addressees, in order to stop the revolutions and maintain power (abuse).

2.2. *Classifying WE*

Maalej (2012, 2013) base his depiction of person deixis, as a circular structure where the president stands at the centre, on the definition of the 'deictic field' suggested by Hanks (2005) and on the description provided by Levinson (1983). Hanks defines the deictic field as 'a special kind of threshold in the fine structure of communicative practice, a threshold at once individual and social, cognitive and embodied, emergent and durable, language and nonlanguage' (2005: 201 in Maalej 2012). Levinson describes the deictic center as an 'egocentric' construct, out of which 'concentric circles' 'radiate', distinguishing different zones of spatial proximity (1983: 63-4). I argue that this circular construct does not fit the strictly hierarchical structure of the socio-political system in the Arab world, nor the pivotal role played by the relations of power within that system.

I am thus introducing the new concept of *Classifying WE* which attempts to fill in the gaps identified by Levinson, i.e. deixis is an important yet underexplored phenomenon which 'surprisingly' lacks 'adequate theories and frameworks of analysis' (1983: 61). More specifically, the *Classifying WE* capitalizes on the recommendation, made by Levinson, that in order to 'capture the social aspects of deixis, we would need to add at least one further dimension, say of relative rank, in which the speaker is socially higher, lower or equal to the addressee and other persons that might be referred to' (ibid: 64). The new concept of '*Classifying WE*' provides this missing dimension of relative rank, by encoding the hierarchical positions and relations of power holding between speaker(s) and addressee(s) in a hierarchical structure that specifies their relative ranks and anchors them to the socio-political coordinates of the context of the utterance.

Instead of using the 'wandering we', which has proved unsuccessful in accounting for the pronominal decisions made by ben Ali and Mubarak, in terms of the six aspects of contextualization, structure, function, scope, power relations, and underlying ideologies, which will be explicated later, I intend to apply instead the new concept of *Classifying WE* to investigate the pronominal system employed by Mubarak.

The *Classifying WE*, as illustrated in Figure (2.2) below, consists of four classes: the grand *First Class WE*, which encodes the Speaker (S) (i.e. the ousted Presidents) to the exclusion of everyone else; the *Second Class WE*, which encodes the Speaker (S) and their Cronies (C), and combines them in the same deictic field as one entity, to the exclusion of everyone else (i.e. the ousted Presidents and their cabinets); the *Third Class WE*, which assimilates the

Speaker (S) into the Addressee (A), and excludes the Other (O) (i.e. combining the Presidents and the non-protesting people, to the exclusion of the protesters); and the *Fourth Class WE*, which although it semantically assimilates the Speaker (i.e. the Presidents) into the Addressee (i.e. the people), it pragmatically encodes the Addressee and the Other only (i.e. the non-protesting people and the protesters), to the exclusion of the Speaker (i.e. the Presidents). The *Fourth Class WE* is the most manipulative class of the *Classifying WE*, as it allows the speaker to not only tactically remove the differences and iron out the problems between himself and the addressee(s), but also to claim for himself the status of an ordinary member of the addressee(s), make implicit authority claims to speak for them, and hence obscure the tactical position, political interests, and precepts of the speaker and transpose them as those of the addressee(s). Following are examples of the four classes of *Classifying WE*:

- First Class WE
(M2.21:3)

ستخرج مصرَ (من الظ) من الظروفِ الراهنة، أقوى مما كانت عليه قبلاً، أكثرَ ثقةً وتماسكاً واستقراراً، سيخرجُ منها شعبنا، وهو أكثرُ وعياً بما يحقُّ مصالحه، وأكثرُ حرصاً على عدم التفریط في مصيره ومستقبله.

sa-taxruju mişra mina z-zurūfi r-rāhinah 'aqwā mimmā kānt 'alayhi qablahā, 'aktara tiqatan wa tamāsukan, wa stiqrāran, sa-yaxruju minhā ša 'buna wa hwa 'aktaru wa 'yan bi-mā yuḥaqqiqu maşāliḥahu wa 'aktaru ḥiršan 'alā 'adami t-tafrīti fi maşīrihi wa mustaqbalih.

Egypt will survive these current circumstances stronger than it was before, and more confident, unified, and stable. Our people will become more aware of what realizes their interests and more eager not to waive their destiny and future.

- Second Class WE
(M1.23:4)

إنَّ طريقَ الإصلاحِ الذي اخترناه، لا رجوعَ عنه، أو ارتدادٍ إلى الوراءِ، سنمضي عليه بخطواتٍ جديدةً، تؤكدُ احترامنا لاستقلالِ القضاءِ وأحكامه، خطواتٍ جديدةً، نحوَ المزيدِ من الديمقراطيةِ، والمزيدِ من الحريةِ للمواطنينِ، خطواتٍ جديدةً لمحاصرةِ البطالةِ، ورفعِ مستوى المعيشةِ، وتطويرِ الخدماتِ، وخطواتٍ جديدةً للوقوفِ إلى جانبِ الفقراءِ، ومحدودي الدخلِ.

'inna ṭarīqa l-işlāḥi llaḍi xtarnāh, lā rujū'a 'anhu 'aw irtidādin illa l-warā'. sa-namḍi 'alihi bi-xuṭūwātin jadīdah tu 'akidu iḥtrāmana l-istiqlāli l-qaḍā' wa 'aḥkāmih

The way of reform we have chosen is indeed neither reversible nor does it have a U-turn. We will go through it with new steps that confirm our respect for the independence of the judiciary and its verdicts

- Third Class WE
(M1.22:5)

لقد اجتزنا معاً من قبل، أوقاتاً صعبةً، تغلبنا عليها، عندما واجهناها كأمةٍ واحدةٍ وشعبٍ واحدٍ، وعندما عرفنا طريقنا، ووجهتنا، وحددنا ما نسعى إليه، من أهدافٍ.

la-qad ijtaznā ma'an min qabl 'awqātan ša'bah, tağalabnā 'alaihā 'indamā wājahnāhā ka-'ummatin wāḥidah wa ša'bin wāḥid, wa 'indamā 'arifnā tarīqanā wa wijhatanā wa ḥaddadnā mā nas'ā 'ilayhi min 'ahdāf.

We have indeed survived hard times together; we have surmounted them when we faced them as one nation and one people, and when we knew our way and our destination and specified our targets.

- *Fourth Class WE*
(M1.6:6)

لقد التزمتُ الحكومةُ بتنفيذِ هذهِ التعليماتِ، وكانَ ذلكَ واضحاً، في تعاملِ قواتِ الشرطةِ مع شبابِنَا، فقد بادرتِ إلى حمايتهم، في بداياتها، احتراماً لحقهم في التظاهر السلمي

la-qad iltazamat 'alḥukūmah bi-tanfīdi ḥādīhi t-ta'līmāt wa kāna dālīka wādīhan fī ta'āmuli quwāti š-šurṭah ma'a šabābinā faqad bādarat ilā ḥemāyatihim fī bidāyātihā iḥtirāman li-ḥāqihim fī t-taẓāhuri s-silmī

The government has indeed committed itself to implementing these directives, as evidenced in the way the police dealt with our youth and rushed to protect them, at the beginning, in respect of their right to protest peacefully

Semantically speaking, the four classes of the *Classifying WE* can be captured by the following semantic features: *First Class WE* (+S, -C, -A, -O), *Second Class WE* (+S, +C, -A, -O), *Third Class WE* (+S, +A, -C, -O), and *Fourth Class WE* (-S, -C, +A, +O).

Pragmatically speaking, these four classes of *WE* correspond to four levels of power and social statuses: The *First Class WE* encodes the highest level, i.e. the absolutely powerful Speaker mounting the top of the socio-political hierarchy; the *Fourth Class* encodes the lowest level, i.e. the socio-politically down-trodden and powerless Addressee(s) at the bottom of the hierarchy.

The four classes of *the Classifying WE* also perform the two main tactical functions of inclusion and (or) exclusion, in addition to other secondary functions, e.g. (un)marking the power, authority, and(or) superiority of the Speaker, threatening the Addressee directly and(or) indirectly, stirring the emotions of the Addressee, praising and(or) criticizing the Addressee ... etc. The relationship between power and inclusion is an inverse one: The most powerful class, i.e. the *First Class WE* which encodes the President in his absolute powers, is the most exclusive class, as it excludes everyone else, even his own cronies. The further the *Classifying WE* goes down the pyramid of power, i.e. away from the President, the less powerful and the more inclusive it becomes, until it reaches the bottom of the socio-political hierarchy of power, where the powerless people are encoded, manipulated, and criticised by the *Fourth Class WE*.

The *Fourth Class WE*, which encodes the people, to the exclusion of the President and his cabinet, is the most manipulative class of the *Classifying WE*: it simultaneously performs the multiple functions of encoding a *YOU*, covering the binary *YOU-versus-I* detachment implied in *YOU*, and replacing it with a pseudo-inclusive fake bonding that facilitates the passing of any message without suspecting its unilateral accusatory content.

This can be explained simplistically in terms of the *WE* used by doctors to ask about the medical conditions of their patients, e.g. 'How are *WE* feeling today?' Although that medical *WE* assimilates the speaker (i.e. doctors) to the addressee (i.e. patients), it encodes the latter only. The *Fourth Class WE* is similar to that communicative medical *WE* in terms of reference only, but differs significantly in its strategically manipulative functions: it creates a fake deictic field that gives the appearance of assimilating the speaker to the addressee, establishing an affective and empathetic bonding between them, in a manner that softens the sharpness of the content of the communicated message and diverts the attention of the addressee away from the ulterior motives of the speaker by presenting the latter as a member of the former. The *Fourth Class WE*, therefore, can be argued to be a manifestation of a higher level of power, i.e. soft power, which abandons direct threatening in favour of a softer, subtler, more mitigated, and consequently more effective power: 'Threats and personal attacks are often more effective if they are made in veiled terms or indirectly. Sometimes they are so indirect that there is even an explicit denial that the intention is to put pressure on the other party or to attack him personally (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 180-1).

This new concept of *Classifying WE* addresses the shortcomings of the 'wandering we' in terms of the six aspects of contextualization, structure, function, scope, power relations, and underlying ideologies, which are all not accounted for properly by the 'wandering we'. The *Classifying WE* depicts person deixis not as random, contradictory, flat, circular constructs, as the 'wandering we' does, but as tactical, systematic, complex, hierarchical structures that encode sets of referents, where the powerful speaker presides over the top, and all the other less powerful social actors lie beneath him at varying levels of power or submission and inclusion or exclusion.

The *Classifying WE* can therefore enrich the study and analysis of person deixis by positioning the pragmatic behaviour of *WE* along the indices of the wider socio-political contexts within which the deictic expression is produced; by detecting and explicating the relations of power holding between the speaker and the addressee(s) as expressed, suppressed, and negotiated by person deixis; by problematizing the tactical functions of inclusion and exclusion performed

by this highly political pronoun; and by uncovering the hidden ideologies that trigger certain tactical uses of the deictic expression.




Figure (2.1) Structure, Referents, and Features of the *Classifying WE*

2.3. Structure of society: Dialectic socio-political relations of power

2.3.1. Political system and structures of power in Egypt

The political system in Egypt under Mubarak was ‘monarcho-republican’, i.e. a quasi-monarchical political structure, engineered by Arab republican-presidents-for-life who governed almost like kings, creating dynasties for themselves, passing on power to one of their family members, and exercising highly monarchical practices, e.g. adopting a luxurious royal life-style and surrounding themselves by large entourages (Owen 2012: ix-xi, 26).

The constituent structures of power in monarchical republics and the roles played by them can be summarized in the concept of ‘security state’, i.e. a state rigidly arranged in a hierarchical order of power and importance: At the top, preside the president, his nuclear family, the presidency, and a narrow circle of elite advisers who are carefully selected from the military, the security services, and the business sector. Second in order of power come the senior commanders of the military, the intelligence agencies, the police, and a small circle of crony capitalists who fund the regime in exchange for political influence and a share in the state lucrative deals and contracts. Third in order are the different organs of the civilian administrative system: ministers, provincial governors, and the single-party of the state, followed by the state arms of ideological legitimation and control as represented in the apparatuses of education, official media, tame judiciary, and the equally tame religious establishment (Owen 2012: 9, 37-9).




Figure (2.2) Hierarchical structure of Power in monarchical republics

2.3.2. Chronicle of the Egyptian Revolution before the first speech

Mubarak delivered this speech in the evening of January 28, 2011, i.e. three days after the beginning of the revolution. Up until the afternoon of the day of delivering this speech, Mubarak and his senior ministers were confident of their full control over the situation (El Manawy 2012: 63, 75, 77, 86, 87, 106, 134), believing that the Egyptian people are 'a dead body' that would never revolt (ibid: 17, 68, 74) and if they dare to do so, security forces are too strong to allow their protests to 'move a single one hair in the body of the regime' (ibid: 77). Hence, the Minister of Interior Habeeb el Adli announced in public newspapers on January 23 that 'everything is under control' (ibid: 64), then repeated on January 25 that 'the security apparatus is capable of deterring any protests' because 'Egypt is not Tunisia' (ibid: 75, 88), and confirmed in the morning of the day of delivering this speech that he was controlling the streets of Egypt 'as if he were playing a video game' (ibid: 138-9).

Contra to these official expectations, around 20.000 Egyptians protested on the Police Day, i.e. January 25, calling it 'The Day of Anger' (BBC News 2011, January 26). The number of protesters in Tahrir Square only was estimated by tens of thousands; they started repeating the slogan 'depart', for the first time, on the second day of the protests (Ghonim 2012a: 284,

287-8). A few hours before Mubarak delivered this speech, the headquarters of the ruling NDP party in Cairo and some other cities were set on fire (Ghonim 2012a: 328; Al Jazeera 2011, January 28).

Mubarak and his regime responded to the protests from the perspective of power: imposing a media blackout on the protests (Ghonim 2012a: 293, 299; El Manawy 2012: 79); blocking Twitter, Facebook, and many other online news websites; cutting off all communication services, including landline calls, cell phone calls, text messaging, and Internet services across the country (Reuters 2012, January 24; Ghonim 2012a: 287, 299, 301, 325; El-Amrani 2011, January 28; Finley 2011, January 28; El Manawy 2012: 78); detaining and kidnapping prominent activists and protesters (AFP 2011, January 27); firing tear gas bombs and rubber bullets intensively to disperse a sit-in, of ten thousand protesters, as estimated by the government, in Tahrir Square after the mid-night of the 25th (Ghonim 2012a: 287-8); clashing violently with hundreds of thousands of peaceful protesters in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and other cities, on the 'Friday of Anger' (Reuters 2012, January 24; Fahim & El-Naggar 2011, January 25; The Daily News Egypt 2011, January 28); ordering snipers to shoot protesters dead, tanks to run over some protesters in central Cairo and security forces to bombard protesters with Molotov bombs (Ghonim 2012a: 327-8, 334); withdrawing police forces suddenly and completely from the streets and police stations in order to create a state of chaos and security disarray (ibid); opening many prisons and facilitating the escape of thousands of prisoners who committed acts of looting, robbery, arson, and sabotage (Reuters 2012, January 24; Steinworth & Windfuhr 2011, January 30); sending generic text messages to all cell phone numbers, asking the people to evacuate the streets immediately and return to their houses to safe-guard them against thugs (The Daily News Egypt 2011, January 28); and finally, a few hours before delivering this speech, ordering the deployment of the army and imposing a curfew from 06pm till 07am (Reuters 2012, January 24; CBS News 2011, January 28; Ghonim 2012a: 329).

2.4. Structure of the first speech of Mubarak

The first speech is divided structurally into three sections, each starting with the vocative *al-'ixwah al-muwāṭinūn* (Brother citizens). Thematically, every section is divided into three sub-sections: an introduction that marks one or more of the powers of Mubarak; a conclusion that frightens and(or) threatens the opponents of Mubarak; and a body that represented Mubarak positively and his opponents negatively, in the first section; presented implicit compromise and positive-other representation, in the second section; and

motivated the people by using abstract, vague language, in the third. Mubarak, therefore, embedded all the bodies of the three sections between appeals to fear and threats; he sandwiched the most important piece of information in the speech, i.e. his sacking of the government, between five appeals to fear and threats, two before and three after.

The whole speech is bracketed with two appeals to the religious sense of the people, by starting with the opening verse associated with reciting the Holy Qur'ān, i.e. *bi-smi llāhi r-rahmāni r-rāhīm* (In the name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful) and concluding with the Islamic greeting of departure *as-salāmu 'alaikum wa raḥmatu llāhi wa barakātuh* (peace, mercy, and blessings of Allah be upon you).

After setting the tone of the speech as formal and serious, through the Islamic starter, Mubarak marked his legal power by using the vocative *'al-'ixwah al-muwāṭinūn* (Brother citizens), which connotes a legal hierarchy at the top of which Mubarak resides, as the president of all citizens. That new vocative represented a clear shift from the formulaic *'al-'ixwah wa l-'xawāt* (Brothers and sisters) which Mubarak had been using repeatedly in his speeches over the past thirty years.

Mubarak then appealed to the fears of the people by describing the situation as 'delicate' and by implicating that the people were neither serious, honest, well-intentioned, nor patriotic. He then dedicated four paragraphs to represent himself and his government positively: he was the democratic president who had allowed the protests to take place and the protesters to express their opinions; he had been following the protests closely and listening to the demands of the protesters; he had 'granted wide spaces of freedoms to the people'; and he felt 'all the sorrow' for the victims who died from the protesters and the police. His government and police abided by his instructions and protected the protesters, although the latter turned to 'rioting', 'threatening public order,' and 'obstructing daily life'.

Mubarak concluded the first section with two indirect threats mixed with fear. He started the first with a premise stating the obvious fact that he was the president of the republic, reinforced it by emphasizing that he was authorized by the constitution to be the arbitrator among authorities, then mitigated the sharpness of that compound threat by jumping, within the same utterance, to the disconnected and incoherent conclusion that 'sovereignty'

will always be to the people, and that he would always stick to their right to express their opinions. The second threat was in the form of an admonition that ‘a fine line separates between freedom and chaos’ and that Mubarak would not allow Egypt to be over-swept to ‘dangerous slippery slopes’ that no one knows their repercussions on the present and future of Egypt. He concluded this section with a warning that Egyptians should be cautious, so as not to repeat the many examples of surrounding countries that were overswept to chaos, without preserving their stability, nor achieving any democracy.

Mubarak started section two with the same appeal to his legal power, as represented in the same legal vocative *’al-’ixwah al-muwāṭinūn* (Brother citizens), preceded this time by the particle *’ayuha* (O). He then repeated two sequences of a partial positive-other representation, followed by a proper positive-self representation juxtaposed with a strong negative-other representation, and ended the section with three consecutive appeals to fear.

The first positive-other representation took the form of a hedged praise of the protests as expressing ‘legitimate aspirations’ towards ‘more’ democracy and ‘more acceleration’ of the efforts Mubarak had already made ‘to besiege unemployment, improve living standards, fight poverty, and confront corruption decisively.’ He followed that partial positive-other representation with a highly qualified positive-self representation, juxtaposed with a negative-other representation, by arguing that he was very aware of the aspirations, pain, suffering, and problems of the people; that he had been working hard on solving them on a daily basis; and that those aspirations and problems would not be achieved or solved through violence or chaos.

Mubarak then praised the non-protesting youth as the most valuable asset Egypt had; juxtaposed that conditional positive-other representation with a demonization of the protesting youth as anarchists, looters, saboteurs, and arson attackers; and followed both accounts with a positive-self representation that depicted himself as the reformist president who was committed to ‘continuing’ the political, economic, and social reform he had initiated, and who had always ‘sided with the poor’, combatted unemployment, and provided more education, health, and housing services to the youth. Mubarak then threatened indirectly that the continuation of those services was contingent upon maintaining the safety and stability of Egypt. He followed that indirect threat with two negative-other representations, one explicit and the other implicit, and mixed both with

fear, by describing the protesters as plotters 'shaking stability and preying on legitimacy', and by calling upon every Egyptian man and woman to prioritize the interests of their homeland and defend their 'gains', because arson attacks and sabotage would not achieve their aspirations.

Mubarak started section three with the same appeal to his legal power, by using the same vocative *'ayuha l-ixwah al-muwāṭinūn* (O brother citizens), then accumulated three other levels of power, by appealing to his executive, moral, and professional powers, arguing that he was not addressing the people as the president of the republic only, but also as the man selected by Fate to shoulder the responsibility of the country, and as the man who had exhausted his life defending this homeland, in war and peace.

Mubarak then mitigated those four appeals to power by assimilating himself motivationally into the people, on the grounds that they had survived hard times together, and by metaphorically confirming that the 'road to reform' he and the people had chosen did not have a U-turn, and that they would continue it with 'new steps' that 'confirm' 'our' respect for the independence of the law and its verdicts, that allow 'more' democracy and 'more' freedoms to the people, and that combat unemployment, improve living standards, develop services, and support the poor. He concluded with a didactic confirmation that 'our' future would be determined only by 'our' aims and goals and that the only way to achieve that was 'awareness, work, and struggle', keeping in 'our' 'minds and consciences' the good of the homeland.

Mubarak followed those three motivational sub-sections with a justificatory appeal to fear followed by an appeal to power: he started with the emphatic statement that the protests had cast fear and apprehension in the hearts of the majority of Egyptians and made them afraid of being over-swept to more violence, chaos, destruction, and sabotage; then, he used that statement as a justificatory premise to introduce his power as the solution to that situation: being the first man responsible for safeguarding the security of Egypt and Egyptians, he would not allow that fear to 'obsess our citizens'. Mubarak followed those two frightening and threatening appeals with his announcement of the most important piece of information in the speech, i.e. his sacking of the government and his intention to form a new one, on the following day, with 'clear and precise instructions'. He followed that important concession with two other threatening and frightening appeals, stating that he

would not hesitate to take whatever decisions it would take to safeguard the safety, security, and stability of ‘Egypt and its people, and praying to Allah to protect ‘Egypt and its people’. He concluded the speech with the Islamic greeting of departure *as-salāmu ‘alaikum wa rahmatu llāhi wa barakātuh* (Peace, mercy, and blessings of Allah be upon you).

2.5. Structures of power:

2.5.1. Linguistic manifestations of power: Deictic and anaphoric analysis of the first speech of Mubarak

2.5.1.1. First-person singular pronoun ‘I’

Deictically speaking, Mubarak employed the first-person singular pronoun 'I', in its subjective, objective, and possessive forms, thirty-one times in his first speech, to perform three main functions: representing himself positively, establishing his authority and marking his power, and issuing threats.

First, Mubarak employed the deictic pronoun ‘I’ to represent himself positively, in twenty instances, as the well-informed president who has been closely following the protesters, their demands (M1.4:7), and those who traded on the protests (M1.5:9), the democratic presidents who has instructed the government to allow the protesters to express their opinions and demands (M1.4:8), the sympathetic presidents who is sorry for the innocent victims who died (M1.5:10), the democratic president who has underscored the sovereignty of the people and their right to express their opinions (M1.8:11), the president of the people (M1.9:12) who knows their pain and suffering and who has been working incessantly on alleviating them (M1.13:13), the president who has established political, economic, and social reform (M1.15:14), the president of the poor (M1. 16:15), the president who has regulated economic reform in order to minimize the suffering of the poor (M1.16.16), the president selected by fate to shoulder the responsibility of Egypt (M1.21:17), the responsive president who has met the demands of the protesters by sacking his government (M1.27:18), and the defending president who has been safeguarding Egypt, its people, and their security (M1.27:19).

(M1.4:7)

لقد تابعتُ أولاً بأول التظاهرات، وما ناديتُ بهِ ودعتُ إليه.
la-qad tāb ‘tu ‘awalan bi-’awal at-tzāhurāt wa-mā nādat bi-hi wa-da ‘at ilayh.
 I have indeed closely followed up the protests and what they advocated and called for

(MI.5:9)

ثم تابعتُ محاولات البعض، لاعتلاء موجة هذه التظاهرات، والمتاجرة بشعاراتها
tumma tāba 'tu muḥāwalāt al-ba'ḍ li-'tilā'i mawjati hādīhi t-tazāhurāt wa-l-
mutājarah bi šī 'ārātihā

Then, I followed up the attempts of some people to take a free ride of the wave of these protests and to trade on their slogans

(MI.4:8)

كانت تعليماتي للحكومة، تُشدّد على إتاحة الفرصة أمامها، للتعبير عن آراء المواطنين ومطالبهم
kānat ta 'līmātī li-lḥukumah tušadidu 'alā itāḥati l-forṣah amāmāha li-l-ta 'bīr 'an
'ārā 'i l-mwāṭinīn wa-maṭālibihim

my instructions to the government emphasized giving them the opportunity to express the opinions and demands of the people.

(MI.5:10)

وأسفّت كلّ الأسف، لما أسفرت عنه من ضحايا أبرياء
wa 'siftu kulla l-'saf lima 'sfarat 'anhu min ḍaḥāya 'briyyā'

and I was sorry all the sorrieness for the innocent victims who died as a result.

(MI.8:11)

أكدتُ مراراً وسوف أظل، أن السيادة للشعب، وسوف أتمسك دائماً، بحقه في ممارسة حرية الرأي والتعبير
'akadtu mirāran wa sawfa 'aḥal anna s-siyādata li-l-ša'b wa sawfa 'atamasaku
dā'iman bi-ḥaqīhi fi mumārasat ḥuriyyati r-ra'ī wa t-ta 'bīr

I have indeed reiterated, and will continue to do so, that sovereignty is to the people, and I will always adhere to their right to exercise the freedoms of opinion and expression

(MI.9:12)

وإنني، إذ انحازتُ كلّ الانحياز، لحرية المواطنين في إبداء آرائهم
wa innanī 'iz anḥāzu kulla l-inḥiyaz li-ḥurriyyati l-muwāṭinīna fi ibdā 'i 'arā 'ihim,
While I side completely with the freedom of citizens to express their opinions

(MI.13:13)

إنني، أعي هذه التطلعات المشروعة للشعب، وأعلم جيداً، قدر همومه ومعاناته. لم أنفصل عنها يوماً، وأعمل من أجلها كلّ يوم
'innanī 'a 'ī hādīhi t-tatalu 'āti l-mašrū'ah li-l-ša'b wa 'a 'lamu jayyidan qadra
humūmihi wa mu 'ānātih. lam 'anfaṣil 'anhā yawman wa a 'malu min ajlihā kulla
yawm

I am indeed aware of these legitimate aspirations of the people; I know well the amount of their pain and suffering. I have never been detached from them for a single day, and I work on solving them every day.

(MI.15:14)

إنّ اقتناعي ثابتٌ لا يتزعزع، بمواصلة الإصلاح السياسي، والاقتصادي، والاجتماعي

'inna iqtinā ī tābitun la yataza 'za 'bi-muwāsalati l-iṣlāḥi s-siyyāsī wa l-iqtiṣādī wa l-ijtimā'

My conviction is indeed unshakably firm in continuing the political, economic, and social reform

(MI.16:15)

لقد (إنح) إنحزتُ وسوف أظلُّ، للفقراء من أبناء الشعب على الدوام، مقتنعاً، بأنَّ الاقتصادَ أكبرُ وأخطرُ من أن يُترك للاقتصاديين وحدهم
la-qad inḥaztu wa sawfa aẓal li-l-fuqarā'ī min 'abnā'ī š-ša' b 'alā d-dawām, muqtani 'an bi-'anna l-iqtiṣād a 'kbaru wa 'axtaru min an yutraka li-l-iqtiṣādiyyīna waḥdahum

I have indeed taken the side of the poor people, all the time, and I will continue to do so, because I am convinced that economy is too big and dangerous to be left to economists alone.

(MI.16:16)

وحَرِصْتُ على ضبط سياسات الحكومة، للإصلاح الاقتصادي، كي لا تمضي بأسرع مما يحتملُ أبناء الشعب، أو بما يزيد من معاناتهم
wa ḥarištu 'alā ḍabṭi siyāsāti l-ḥukumah li-l-iṣlāḥi l-iqtiṣādī kay la tamā'ī bi-asra 'a mimmā yaḥtamiluhu 'abnā' a š-ša' b aw bimā yuzidu min mu 'anātihm

And I have been keen on regulating the economic reform policies of the government, so as not to let them proceed at a pace faster than that which the sons of the people can endure or that which might increase their suffering.

(MI.21:17)

إني لا أتحدثُ اليكُم اليوم، كرئيس للجمهورية فحسب وإنما كمصري، شاءت الأقدارُ أن يتحملَ مسؤوليةَ هذا الوطن، وأمضى حياته من أجله، حرباً وسلاماً.
'innī lā 'ataḥadaṭu 'ilay-kum al-yawm ka-ra'ṭsin li-l-jumhūriyyati faḥasb, wa innammā ka-miṣriyyin šā'ati l-aqdāru an yataḥamala mas'ūliyata ḥāḍa l-waṭan wa 'amḍā ḥayātahu min ajlihi ḥarban wa salāman

I am not addressing you today as the President of the republic only, but indeed as an Egyptian man whom fate has decided to assign the responsibility of this homeland and who has exhausted his life for its sake, in war and peace.

(MI.27:18)

لقد طلبتُ من الحكومة، التقدم باستقالتهَا اليوم، وسوف أكلفُ الحكومة الجديدة، اعتباراً من الغد، بتكليفاتٍ واضحةٍ ومحددة، للتعاملِ الحاسمِ مع أولويات، المرحلةِ الراهنة
la-qad ṭalabtu mina l-ḥukūmah at-taqadumi b-istiḳālatiha al-yawm, wa sawfa 'ukalifu l-ḥukumata l-jadīdah, i'tibāran mina l-ḡad bi-taklīfātīn wāḍiḥatin wa muḥadadah li-l-ta'āmuli l-ḥāsimi ma 'a awlawiyāt al-marḥalati r-rāhina

I have indeed requested the government to submit its resignation today and will charge the new government effective tomorrow with clear and precise instructions for dealing decisively with the priorities of the current stage.

(M1.27:19)

وسوف أدافع عن أمن مصر واستقرارها، وأمان شعبيها، فتلك هي المسئولية والأمانة، التي أقسمت
يميناً، أمام الله والوطن، بالمحافظة عليها
*sawfa 'udāfi 'u 'an 'amni miṣra wa stiqrāriha wa 'amāni ša'biha, fatilka hiya l-
mas 'ūliyatu w-l-'amānah allati 'aqsamtu yamīnan 'amāma llāhi wa l-waṭan bi-l-
muḥāfazati 'alaihā*

I will defend the security and stability of Egypt and the safety of its people. That is the responsibility and the trust I have taken the oath in front of Allah and the homeland to safeguard.

The second function Mubarak employed the first-person singular pronoun 'I' to perform was establishing and anchoring his authority and marking his power, in five instances: legally, spiritually, professionally, and morally. Legally, he is the President of the Republic who has the constitutional powers to arbitrate among authorities (M1.8:20); spiritually, he is the man selected by fate to be the President of the republic (M1.21:21); professionally, he is the fighter who has exhausted his life defending Egypt and its people in war and peace (M1.21:21); and morally, he is the person sworn by Allah and the homeland to safeguard Egypt and its people (M1.27:22).

(M1.8:20)

إنني كرئيس للجمهورية، ومقتضى الصلاحيات التي خولها لي الدستور
*'innanī kara 'īsin li-l-jumhūriyah wa muqtaḍā as-salāḥiyat allati xwalaha lī ad-dustur,
kaḥakamin bayna s-suluḥāt*

I, in my capacity as the president of the republic, and by virtue of the powers conferred upon me by the constitution as the arbitrator among authorities

(M1.21:21)

إنني لا أتحدث اليك اليوم، كرئيس للجمهورية فحسب وإنما كمصري، شاءت الأقدار أن يتحمل مسئولية
هذا الوطن، وأمضى حياته من أجله، حرباً وسلاماً.
*'innī lā 'ataḥadaṭu 'ilay-kum al-yawm ka-ra 'īsin li-l-jumhūriyyati faḥasb, wa innammā
ka-miṣriyyin šā'ati l-aqdāru an yataḥamala mas 'ūliyata hāḍa l-waṭan wa 'amḍā
ḥayātahu min ajlihi ḥarban wa salāman*

I am not addressing you today as the President of the republic only, but indeed as an Egyptian man whom fate has decided to assign the responsibility of this homeland and who has exhausted his life for its sake, in war and peace.

(M1.27:22)

فتلك هي المسئولية والأمانة، التي أقسمت يميناً، أمام الله والوطن، بالمحافظة عليها.

fa-tilka hiya l-mas'ūliyatu w-l-'amānah allati 'aqsamtu yamīnan 'amāma llāhi wa l-waṭan bi-l-muḥāfazati 'alaihā

That is the responsibility and the trust I have taken the oath in front of Allah and the homeland to safeguard.

Third, Mubarak employed the deictic pronoun *I* to issue indirect threats and warnings in six instances. He called upon the people indirectly to be honest and sincere and to prioritize the interests of the homeland (M1.3:23); he warned that he would not allow Egypt and its people to be over-swept to dangerous slippery slopes (M1.9:24); he requested the people to protect their homeland and earnings from the protesters (M1.19:25); he threatened indirectly that he would not allow the protesters to frighten the people (M1.26:26), and he warned that he would take any decision necessary to safeguard the security and stability of Egypt and its people (M1.27:27).

(M1.3:23)

أتحدثُ اليكم في ظرفٍ دقيقٍ، يفرضُ علينا جميعاً، وقفةً جادةً وصادقةً مع النفس، تتوخى سلامةً القصد،
وصالحَ الوطن.

atahadaṭu ilaykum fī ṣarfīn daqīq yafridu 'alainā jamī'an waqfatan jādatan wa-ṣādiqatan ma'a n-naḥs tatawaxā salāmata l-qaṣd wa ṣāliḥa l-waṭan.

I am addressing you in a delicate situation, that forces upon us all a serious and honest stance with the self, that seeks good intent and the interests of the homeland.

(M1.9:24)

أتمسكُ بذاتِ القدرِ، بالحفاظِ على أمنِ مصرَ واستقرارها، وبعدم الانجرافِ بها وبشعبها، لمنزلقاتٍ
خطيرةً

'atamasaku biḥāṭi l-qadr bi-l-ḥifāzi 'alā 'amni miṣra wa stiqrāriha wa bi-'adami l-injirāfi bi-ha wa bi-ša'bihā li-munzalaqātin xaṭīrah

I adhere, as strongly, to safeguarding the security and stability of Egypt and not allowing it and its people to be over-swept to dangerous slippery slopes

(M1.19:25)

إنني أهيبُ بشبابنا، وبكلِّ مصريٍّ ومصريةٍ، مراعاةً صالحَ الوطنِ، وأن يتصدوا لحمايةِ وطنهم،
ومكتسباتهم

'innanī 'ahību bi-ṣabābina wa bi-kulli miṣriyyin wa miṣriyyah, murā'ata ṣāliḥi l-waṭan, wa 'an yataṣadaw li-ḥimāyati waṭanihim wa muktasabātihim

I am indeed calling upon our youth and upon every Egyptian man and woman to consider the interest of the homeland and to stand up for protecting their homeland and their earnings.

(MI.26:26)

وإنني (محتماً) مُتحملاً مسؤوليتي الأولى، في الحفاظ على أمن الوطن والمواطنين، لن أسمح بذلك أبداً، لن أسمح لهذا الخوف أن يستحوذ على مواطنينا، ولهذا التحسب، أن يلقي بظلاله على مصيرنا، ومستقبلنا.

wa 'innanī mutaḥamilan mas 'ūliyatī al-'ulā fi l-ḥifāzi 'alā 'amni l-waṭan wa l-muwāṭinīn, lan asmaḥa bi-dālika 'abadan. lan asmaḥa lihāda l-xawf an yastahwiḍa 'alā muwāṭinīnā, wa lihāda t-taḥasub an yulqiya bi-zilālihi 'alā maṣīrina wa mustaqbalina

Shouldering my first responsibility of safeguarding the security of the homeland and citizens, I will indeed never allow that. I will never allow this fear to obsess our citizens nor that apprehension to cast its shadows on our fate and future.

(MI.27:27)

لقد طلبتُ من الحكومة، التقدم باستقالتها اليوم، وسوف أكلفُ الحكومة الجديدة، اعتباراً من الغد، بتكليفات واضحة ومحددة، للتعامل الحاسم مع أولويات، المرحلة الراهنة، وأقول من جديد، أنني لن أتهاون في اتخاذ أية قرارات، تحفظ لكل مصريٍّ ومصريَّة، أمنهم، وأمانهم، وسوف أدافع عن أمن مصر واستقرارها، وأمان شعبها

la-qad ṭalabtu mina l-ḥukūmah at-taqadumi bi-stiqālatihā l-yawm, wa sawfa 'ukallifu l-ḥukūmata l-jadīdah, i'tibāran mina l-ḡad bi-taklīfātīn wāḍiḥatin wa muḥaddadah li-l-ta'āmuli l-ḥāsimi ma'a awlawiyāt al-marḥalati r-rāhinah. Wa 'aqūlu min jadīd, 'annanī lan 'ataḥāwan fī itixādi 'ayati qārātin taḥfaẓu likuli miṣriyyin wa miṣriyyah 'amnahum wa 'amānahum, wa sawfa 'udāfi'u 'an 'amni miṣra wa stiqrāriha wa 'amāni ṣa'biha,

I have indeed requested the government to submit its resignation today and will charge the new government effective tomorrow with clear and precise instructions for dealing decisively with the priorities of the current stage. I am saying it again: I will not indeed hesitate to take any decisions that save the security and safety of every Egyptian man and woman and I will defend the security and stability of Egypt and the safety of its people.

2.5.1.2. Third-person singular pronoun 'HE'

A deictically related pronoun to the first-person singular pronoun *I* is the third-person singular pronoun *HE* of which Mubarak made an original usage by employing it twice to assign himself the spiritual and professional roles of the man selected by Fate to shoulder the responsibility of Egypt and of the warrior who had exhausted his life defending Egypt in war and peace, respectively.

(MI.21:28)

إنني لا أتحدثُ اليكُم اليوم، كرئيسٍ للجمهورية فحسب وإنما كمصريٍّ، شاءتِ الأقدارُ أن يتحملَ مسئوليةَ هذا الوطن، وأمضى حياته من أجله، حرباً وسلاماً.

'innī lā 'ataḥadaṭu 'ilay-kum al-yawm ka-ra'īsin li-l-jumhūrīyyati faḥasb, wa innammā ka-miṣriyyin ṣā'ati l-aqdāru an yataḥamala mas 'ūliyata ḥāda l-waṭan wa 'amḍā ḥayātahu min ajlihi ḥarban wa salāman

I am not addressing you today as the President of the republic only, but indeed as an Egyptian man whom fate has decided to assign the responsibility of this homeland and who has exhausted his life for its sake, in war and peace.

This can be considered as a revealing pronominal decision, because even when Mubarak was describing himself as an Egyptian man and a defender of Egypt, he deictically selected the role of the President, not that of the Egyptian man or the defender, to be his *origo* and his principal role and point of reference. He did so by using the anaphoric third-person singular pronoun *HE* to refer to himself as an Egyptian man, and the uniting deictic first-person singular pronoun *I* to encode himself as the president. These pronominal decisions resulted in foregrounding the President, backgrounding the Egyptian man selected by Fate, identifying Mubarak with the former, and detaching him from the latter.

2.5.1.3. First-person plural pronoun ‘WE’: *Classifying WE*

2.5.1.3.1. *First Class WE*

Mubarak employed the *First Class WE*, which encodes himself to the exclusion of everyone else, only once in the whole speech, in order to attribute the Egyptian people to himself, calling them *muwāṭinīnā* (our citizens):

(MI.25-26:29)

إنَّ أحداثَ اليومِ، والأيامَ القليلةُ الماضية، أَلْقَتْ في قلوبِ الأغلبيةِ الكاسحةِ من أبناءِ الشعبِ، الخوفَ على مصرَ، ومستقبلِها، والتحسبَ من الانجرافِ إلى المزيدِ من العنفِ، والفوضى، والتدميرِ، والتخريبِ. وإِنِّي (مُحتملاً) مُتحملاً مسؤوليتي الأولى، في الحفاظِ على أمنِ الوطنِ والمواطنينِ، لن أَسْمَحَ بذلكَ أبداً، لِنَ أَسْمَحَ لهذا الخوفِ أن يستحوذَ على مواطنينا، ولهذا التحسبِ، أن يَلْقَى بظلالِهِ على مصيرنا، ومستقبلنا.

’inna ’ahdāta l-yawm wa l-’ayāmu l-qalīlatu l-māḍiyah ’alqat fī qulūbi l-’aḡlabiyati l-kāsiḥa min abnā’i š-ša’b al-xawfa ’alā miṣr wa mustaqbalihā, wa t-taḥasuba mina l-injirāfi ila l-mazādi mina l-’unf wa l-fawḍā wa t-tadmīri wa t-taxrīb. wa ’innani mutaḥamīlan mas’ūliyatī al-’ūlā fī l-ḥifāzi ’alā ’amni l-waṭan wa l-muwāṭinīn, lan asmaḥa bi-ḍālika ’abadan. lan asmaḥa lihāḍa l-xawf an yastahwiḍa ’alā muwāṭinīnā, wa lihāḍa t-taḥasub an yulqīya bi-ḡilālihi ’alā maṣīrina wa mustaqbalina

The incidents of today and the past few days have indeed cast within the hearts of the overwhelming majority of the sons of the people fear for Egypt and its future and apprehension about being over-swept towards more violence, chaos, destruction, and sabotage. Shouldering my first responsibility of safeguarding the security of the homeland and citizens, I will never ever allow that. I will never allow this fear to obsess our citizens nor that apprehension to cast its shadows on our fate and future.

It is only after he had prepared the people mentally for this grandly authoritative *First Class WE* that Mubarak employed it: He embedded it between two appeals to fear and

authority, first creating fear in the minds of the people, by triggering the image of a violent, chaotic, destroyed, and sabotaged Egypt, then introducing his authority as the deterrent of falling into such a frightening scenario. The initial arousal of nationalistic and personal fears, therefore, justified the subsequent authority claim made by Mubarak, and legitimized his attribution of the people to himself, and his speaking and acting on their behalf, under the pretext that he was trying to save them an imminent national catastrophe. The sharpness of that hierarchical *First Class WE* was immediately mitigated by following it, within the same sentence, with two bonding *Third Class WEs* that assimilated Mubarak into the people again (M1.26:29).

2.5.1.3.2. *Second Class WE*

Mubarak employed the *Second Class WE*, which encodes himself and his government and combines them in the same deictic field, four times, to perform the two functions of representing himself and his government positively and evading full responsibility for the economic and political problems in Egypt. First, Mubarak used the *Second Class WE* to reverse all the criticisms levelled at him and his consecutive governments and present them as achievements, by depicting himself and his government as the fighters of unemployment; the providers of education, health, and housing services (M1.17:30); the democratic and economic reformists; the guardians of liberties and freedoms; the defenders of the independence of the judiciary; and the saviours of the poor and those on low income (M1.23:31). Second, and more importantly, since Mubarak, his government, and the people all knew that the 'achievements' Mubarak was listing were in reality the serious problems that triggered the revolution, after he and his consecutive governments failed to find solutions for them over his thirty-year rule, he employed the *Second Class WE* in order to evade full responsibility for those chronic failures, by inserting his government with him in the same deictic field, implicating that he was not acting alone and that others should also shoulder their share of responsibility.

(M1.17:30)

إِنَّ بَرْنَامِجَنَا لِمَحَاصِرَةِ الْبِطَالَةِ، وَإِتَاحَةِ الْمَزِيدِ، مِنْ خَدَمَاتِ التَّعْلِيمِ، وَالصِّحَّةِ، وَالْإِسْكَانِ، وَغَيْرِهَا لِلشَّبَابِ
وَالْمُؤَاطِنِينَ
'inna birnāmijanā li-muḥāṣarati l-bitālah wa 'itāḥati l-maziyydi min xadamāti t-ta'īm
wa ṣ-ṣiḥḥah wa l-'iskān wa ġairihā li-l-ṣabāb wa l-muwaṭīnīn

Our program to besiege unemployment and provide more services of education, health, housing, ... etc. to the youth and citizens

(M1.22:31)

إنَّ طريقَ الإصلاح الذي اخترناه، لا رجوعَ عنه، أو ارتدادٍ إلى الوراء، سَنَمضي عليه بخطواتٍ جديدةً، نؤكدُ احترامنا لاستقلال القضاء وأحكامه، خطواتٍ جديدةً، نحو المزيد من الديمقراطية، والمزيد من الحرية للمواطنين، خطواتٍ جديدةً لمحاصرة البطالة، ورفع مستوى المعيشة، وتطوير الخدمات، وخطواتٍ جديدةً للوقوف إلى جانب الفقراء، ومحدودي الدخل.

'inna tarīqa l-`iṣlāhi llaḍi xtarnāh, lā rujū`a `anhu `aw irtidādin illa l-warā`. sanamḍi `alihi bi-xuṭūwāṭin jadīdah tu`akidu ihtrāmana l-istiqlāli l-qadā` wa `ahkāmih xuṭūwāṭin jadīdah naḥwa l-mazīdi mina d-dīmuqrāṭiyah wa l-mazīdi mina l-ḥurriyyah li-l-mūwāṭinīn, xuṭūwāṭin jadīdah li-muḥāṣarati l-biṭālah wa raf`i mustawā l-ma`īshah wa taṭwīri l-xadamāt, wa xuṭūwāṭin jadīdah li-l-wqūfi ilā jānibi l-fuqarā` wa maḥdūdi d-daxl.

The way of reform we have chosen is indeed neither reversible nor does it have a U-turn. We will go through it with new steps that confirm our respect for the independence of the judiciary and its verdicts; new steps towards more democracy and more freedom to the citizens; new steps to besiege unemployment, raise living standards, and improve services; and new steps towards standing beside the poor and those on low income.

2.5.1.3.3. *Third Class WE*

Mubarak employed the *Third Class WE*, which assimilates himself into the people, in twenty-six instances in his first speech, in order to perform the two main functions of polarizing the people and establishing solidarity with the 'good' pole of them.

Although the *Third Class WE* is the most bonding and inclusive class of the *Classifying WE*, as it assimilates the President at the top of the pyramid of power into the people at the bottom, Mubarak employed it manipulatively in order to first polarize the people into good-us and bad-protesters, then to assimilate himself into the good-us. He first represented himself as the democratic, reformist president who had allowed the 'wide spaces of freedoms of expression and press and other liberties' which he and the good people were witnessing (M1.7:32). Then, he juxtaposed these positive attributes of himself and the good people with a demonization of the protesters as violent anarchists, saboteurs, and arson attackers (M1.13:33), whose goal is to spread anarchy, plunder public and private properties, and knock down what Mubarak and the good people had built (M1.14:34).

(M1.7:32)

إن هذه التظاهرات، وما شهدناه قبلها من وقفات احتجاجية، خلال الأعوام القليلة الماضية، ما كان لها أن تتم، لولا المساحات العريضة، لحرية الرأي، والتعبير، والصحافة، وغيرها من الحريات، التي أتاحتها خطوات الإصلاح لأبناء الشعب، ولولا ما تشهده مصر من تفاعل غير مسبوق، لقوى المجتمع.

'inna hādīhi t-tazāhurāt wa mā šahidnāhu qablahā min waqafātīn ihtijājiyah xilāla l-'a'wāmi l-qalīlati l-māḍiyah mā kāna lahā an tatim lawlā l-misāhātī l-'arīḍah li-ḥurriyyat ar-r'āi wa t-ta'bir wa s-saḥāfah wa ġairihā mina l-ḥurriyyāt allati atāhat'hā xuṭūwātī l-'islāḥ li'abnā'i š-ša'b wa lawlā mā tašhadhu misr min tafā'ulin ġayra masbūqin li-quwā l-mujtama'

Indeed, these demonstrations as well as the protesting stands we witnessed over the past few years would have never happened without the wide spaces of freedom of expression, opinion, and press, and the other freedoms that have been made available to the people by the steps of reform, and by the unprecedented interaction among the forces of society that Egypt is witnessing now.

(M1.13:33)

لكن ما نواجهه من مشكلات، وما نسعى إليه من اهداف، لن يحققه اللجوء الى العنف، ولن تصنعه
الفضى
lakinna ma nuwājihuhu min muškilāt wa mā nas'ā ilayhi min ahdāf lan yuḥaqqquhu l-lugū'a ila l-'unf wa lan tašna'ahu l-fawḍā

But, the problems we are facing and the goals we are aspiring to achieve will not be attained by resorting to violence, nor will they be accomplished by chaos

(M1.14:34)

وتربأ بهم، أن يندس بينهم من يسعى لنشر الفوضى، ونهب الممتلكات العامة والخاصة، وإشعال الحرائق،
وهدم ما بنيناه.
wa tarba'u bi-him an yandassa bayna-hum man yas'ā li-našri l-fawḍā wa nahbi l-mumtalakāti l-'āmmati wa-l-xāṣah wa 'iš'āli l-ḥarā'iq wa hadmi mā banaynāh.

and it is distancing them from allowing to sneak among them those who seek to spread anarchy, plunder public and private properties, set arson attacks, and knock down what we have built.

The solidarity Mubarak attempted to establish with the 'good' pole by employing the *Third Class WE* was based on four grounds: suffering the same current problems together (M1.13:35); surviving hard times together (M1.22:36); having the same choices, destiny,

goals, and future (M1.26:38); and sharing the responsibility for achieving those goals (M1.24:37; M1.28:39).

(M1.13:35)

ما نواجهه من مشكلات، وما نسعى اليه من اهداف
ma nuwājihuhu min muškilāt wa mā nas 'ā ilayhi min ahdāf
the problems we are facing and the goals we are aspiring to achieve

(M1.22:36)

لقد اجتزنا معاً من قبل، أوقاتاً صعبة، تغلبنا عليها، عندما واجهناها كأمة واحدة وشعب واحد، وعندما عرفنا طريقنا، ووجهتنا، وحددنا ما نسعى إليه، من أهداف
la-qad ijtaznā ma'an min qabl 'awqātan ša'bah, taḡalabnā 'alaihā 'indamā wājahnāhā ka-'ummatin wāḥidah wa ša'bin wāḥid, wa 'indamā 'arifnā ṭarīqanā wa wijhatanā wa ḥaddadnā mā nas 'ā 'ilayhi min 'ahdāf.

We have indeed survived hard times together; we have surmounted them when we faced them as one nation and one people, and when we knew our way and our destination and specified our targets.

(M1.24:37)

إن خيارنا وأهدافنا، هي التي ستحدد مصائرنا ومستقبلنا، وليس أمامنا من سبيل لتحقيقها، سوى بالوعي، والعمل (الكف) الكفاح، نحافظ على ما حققناه، ونبني عليه، ونرعى في عقولنا وضمائرنا مستقبل الوطن.
'inna xiyārātā wa ahdāfanā hiya llatī sa-tuḥaddidu mašā'iranā wa mustaqbalanā, wa laysa 'amāmanā min sabīlin li-taḥqīqihā siwā bi-l-wa'yī wa l-'amali wa l-kifāḥ, nuḥāfiẓu 'alā mā ḥaqqaqnāh, wa nabnī 'alaih wa nar'ā fī 'uqūlinā wa ḍamā'irinā mustaqbala l-waṭn.

Our choices and goals are indeed what will determine our fates and future; we have no way to achieve them other than awareness, work, and struggle, saving what we have achieved, building on it, and keeping in our minds and consciences the future of the homeland.

(M1.26:38)

لن أسمح بذلك أبداً، لن أسمح لهذا الخوف أن يستحوذ على مواطنينا، ولهذا التحسب، أن يلقي بظلاله على مصيرنا، ومستقبلنا.

Wa 'innanī mutaḥamilan mas'ūliyatī al-'ulā fī l-ḥifāẓi 'alā 'amni l-waṭan wa l-muwāṭinīn, lan asmaḥa bi-dālika 'abadan. lan asmaḥa li-hāḍa l-xawf an yastahwiḍa 'alā muwāṭinīnā, wa li-hāḍa t-taḥasub an yulqīya bi-zilālihi 'alā mašīrina wa mustaqbalinā.

Shouldering my first responsibility of safeguarding the security of the homeland and citizens, I will never ever allow that. I will never allow this fear to obsess our citizens nor this apprehension to cast its shadows on our destiny and future.

(M1.28:39)

سدّد على الطريق خطانا
saddada 'alā ṭ-ṭarīqi xuṭānā
guide our steps towards the right path

The above-mentioned four grounds were not balanced, numerically and temporally: Mubarak employed the *Third Class WE* only once to talk about the current problems he and the Egyptians were facing (M1.13: 33), and twice to describe the achievements he and the Egyptian people had made together, using the two generic and abrupt phrases *mā banaynāh* (what we have built) (M1.14: 34) and *mā ḥaqqaqnāh* (what we have achieved) (M1.24: 37). On the other hand, he employed the *Third Class WE* eight times to talk about the hard times he and the Egyptians had survived together in the past (M1.22:36; M1.24:37), and fourteen times to talk about sharing the same future goals and the responsibility for achieving them (M1.13:35; M1.24:37; M1.26:38; M1.28:39). The solidarity Mubarak attempted to establish with the people was therefore mainly based on future goals and aspirations, not on current affairs or specific past achievements.

2.5.1.3.4. *Fourth Class WE*

Mubarak employed the *Fourth Class WE* six times, in order to indirectly accuse the protesters, as well as whoever did not support him, of being ill-intentioned and disregardful of the interests of the homeland. The *Fourth Class WE* enabled Mubarak to swiftly pass his serious accusations, which sometimes amounted to disloyalty, without having to worry about their sharp implications, as it covered him deictically with a collective façade of bonding with the people, and represented him as if he were speaking about himself and the people together, while in reality he was distancing himself and implicating that the protesters were ill-intentioned, unpatriotic (M1.3:40), disloyal (M1.19:43) rioters (M1.6:41) and anarchists (M1.10:42).

(M1.3:40)

أتحدّثُ اليكم في ظرفٍ دقيق، يفرضُ علينا جميعاً، وقفَةً جادَةً وصادقَةً مع النفس، تتوخى سلامة القصد،
وصالح الوطن .
ataḥadaṭu ilaykum fī ṣarfin daqīq yafridu 'alaina jamī'an waqfatan jādatan wa-ṣādiqatan
ma 'a n-naḥs tatawaxā salāmata l-qaṣd wa ṣāliḥa l-waṭan.

I am addressing you in a delicate situation, that forces upon us all a serious and honest stance with the self, that seeks good intent and the interests of the homeland.

(M1.6:41)

وكانَ ذلكَ واضحاً، في تعاملِ قواتِ الشرطةِ معِ شبابنا، فقد بادرت الى حمايتهم، في بداياتها، احتراماً لحقهم في التظاهر السلمي، طالما، تم في إطار القانون، وقبل أن تتحول هذه التظاهرات، لأعمالٍ شغبٍ تهدد النظام العام، وتُعيقُ الحياةَ اليوميةَ للمواطنين.

kāna dālīka wāḍiḥan fi ta‘āmuli quwāti š-šurṭah ma‘a šabābinā faqad bādarat ilā ḥemāyatihim fi bidāyātihā iḥtirāman li-ḥaqihim fi t-tazāhuri s-silmī ṭalamā tamma fi ‘iṭāri l-qānūn wa qabla ‘an tataḥwal hādīhi t-tazāhurāt li-‘a‘māli šaḡabin tuhaddida n-niḏāma l-‘ām wa tu‘īqu l-ḥayāta l-yawmiyyah li-l-muwāṭinīn.

That was evidenced in the way the police dealt with our youth and rushed to protect them, at the beginning, in respect of their right to protest peacefully within the framework of law, before these demonstrations turned into acts of riot, threatening public order and obstructing the daily life of citizens.

(M1.10:42)

وعلينا أن نحاذرُ مما يحيطُ بنا من أمثلةٍ عديدةٍ، انزلتُ بالشعوبِ الى الفوضى والانتكاس، فلا ديمقراطيةً حققتُ، ولا استقراراً حَقَطْتُ.

wa ‘alainā an nuḥādir mim mā yuḥītu binā min ‘amtilatin ‘adīdah inzalaqat bi-š-š‘ūbi ilā l-fawḍā wa l-‘intikās, fa-lā dimuqrātiyatan ḥaqqaqat wa lā stiqrāran ḥafaḏat.

We have to be cautious of the many examples, around us, which slid the people towards chaos and setback, without achieving democracy or maintaining stability.

(M1.19:43)

إنني أهيّبُ بشبابنا، وبكلِّ مصريٍّ ومصريةٍ، مراعاةً صالحِ الوطنِ
‘innanī ‘ahību bi-šabābinā wa bi-kulli miṣriyyin wa miṣriyyah, murā‘āta šāliḥi l-waṭan
I am indeed calling upon our youth and upon every Egyptian man and woman to consider the interest of the homeland

2.5.1.4. Second-person plural pronoun ‘YOU’

Relevant to the *Fourth Class WE*, which can be considered as a manipulative, indirect *YOU*, is the second-person pronoun *YOU* which Mubarak employed only twice in the first speech, in order to establish his power and anchor his authority on more than one level. In the first instance, he used the second-person pronoun *YOU* to warn the people that he was addressing them at critical times that necessitate seriousness, honesty, well intentions, and patriotism; he did so after establishing the relationship between himself and the people as one between the President and his citizens, by addressing them as *al-‘ixwah al-muwāṭinūn*, (brother citizens) (M1.3:44).

In the second instance, he also used this deictic pronoun after addressing the people as *‘ayuha l-‘ixwah al-muwāṭinūn* (O Brother citizens), in order to assume two other levels of

authority, in addition to his legal one as the President of the republic, i.e. the spiritual authority of the man selected by Fates to be the President and the professional authority of the fighter who had exhausted his life defending Egypt and its people (M1.21:45). Mubarak did not employ the *Fourth Class WE* in either of these two instances and opted for the ordinary, open, non-problematic second-person pronoun *YOU* because he wanted to establish his authority and specify his relation with the people in a manner as clear as possible and because the message he was sending was not accusatory, hence he did not need the manipulative subtlety embedded in the *Fourth Class WE*.

(M1.3:44)

الإخوة المواطنين، أتحدث اليكم في ظرفٍ دقيق، يفرض علينا جميعاً، وقفه جادةً وصادقةً مع النفس،
تتوخى سلامة القصد، وصالح الوطن .
al-'ixwah al-muwāṭinūn, ataḥadaṭu ilaykum fī ẓarfīn daqīq yafrīdu 'alaina jamī'an waqfatan jādatan wa-ṣādiqatan ma'a n-naḥs tatawaxā salāmata l-qaṣd wa ṣāliḥa l-waṭan.

I am addressing you in a delicate situation, that forces upon us all a serious and honest stance with the self, that seeks good intent and the interests of the homeland.

(M1.21:45)

أبها الإخوة المواطنين، إنني لا أتحدث اليكم اليوم، كرئيس للجمهورية فحسب وإنما كمصري، شاعت
الأقدار أن يتحمل مسؤولية هذا الوطن، وأمضى حياته من أجله، حرباً وسلاماً.
'ayuha l-'ixwah al-muwāṭinūn, 'inni lā 'ataḥadaṭu 'ilay-kum al-yawm ka-ra'īsīn li-l-jumhūriyyati faḥasb, wa innammā ka-miṣriyyin ṣā'ati l-aqdāru an yataḥamala mas'ūliyata hāda l-waṭan wa 'amḍā ḥayātahu min ajlihi ḥarban wa salāman.

O brother citizens, I am not addressing you today as the President of the republic only, but indeed as an Egyptian man whom fate has decided to assign the responsibility of this homeland and who has exhausted his life for its sake, in war and peace.

2.5.1.5. *hā'u l-ḡaibah*

Mubarak employed *hā'u l-ḡaibah* هاء الغيبة (*the H of the Absent*), which corresponds to the English *ITS* and(or) *THEIR*, in eleven instances in the first speech. Given that *hā'u l-ḡaibah* distances the noun it is suffixed to and absents it from the deictic center of the speaker, it resulted in detaching Mubarak from Egypt, its stability, and its people (M1.9:46); from Egypt and its region (M1.10:47); from Egypt, its youth, and its future (M1.14:48); from Egypt and its sons (M1.19:49); from Egypt and its future (M1.25:50);

from Egypt, its stability, and the security of its people (M1.27:51); and from Egypt and its people (M1.28:52).

(M1.9:46)

أَتَمَسِكُ بِذَاتِ الْقَدْرِ، بِالْحِفَافِ عَلَى أَمْنِ مِصْرَ وَاسْتِقْرَارِهَا، وَبِعَدَمِ الْإِنْجِرَافِ بِهَا وَبِشَعْبِهَا، لِمَنْزَلَاتٍ
خَطِيرَةٍ
'atamasaku bi-zāti l-qadr bi-l-ḥifāzi 'alā 'amni miṣra wa stiqrāriha wa bi-'adami l-
injrāfi bi-hā wa bi-ša 'bihā li-munzalaqātin xaṭīrah

I adhere, as strongly, to safeguarding the security and stability of Egypt and not allowing it and its people to be over-swept to dangerous slippery slopes

(M1.10:47)

إِنَّ مِصْرَ هِيَ أَكْبَرُ دَوْلَةٍ فِي مَنْطِقَتِهَا، سَكَانًا، وَدَوْرًا، وَثِقْلًا، وَتَأْتِيرًا
'inna miṣra hiya 'akbaru dawlatin fī minṭaqatihā, sukkānnan wa dawran wa ṭiqalan
wa ta'ṭīran

Egypt is indeed the biggest country in its region, in terms of population, role, weight, and influence

(M1.14:48)

إِنَّ شِبَابَ مِصْرَ، هُوَ أَعْلَى مَا لَدَيْهَا، وَهِيَ تَنْتَطِعُ إِلَيْهِمْ (كُن) كِي يَصْنَعُوا مُسْتَقْبَلَهَا،
'inna šabāba miṣr huwa 'aḡlā mā ladayhā, wa hiya tataṭalla 'u ilay-him kay yaṣna 'ū
mustaqbalahās

The youth of Egypt are indeed the dearest it has and it is looking up at them to make its future

(M1.19:49)

فَلَيْسَ بِإِشْعَالِ الْحَرَائِقِ، وَالْإِعْتِدَاءِ عَلَى الْمَمْتَلَكَاتِ الْعَامَةِ وَالْخَاصَّةِ، تَتَحَقَّقُ تَطْلُعَاتُ مِصْرَ وَأَبْنَائِهَا
'fa-laysa bi-iš'al al-ḥarā'iq wa l-'i'tidā'i 'alā l-mumtalakāti l-'āmmati wa l-xāṣah,
tataḥaqaqu taṭalu 'ātu miṣra wa 'abnā'iha,

It is not by setting fires and vandalizing public and private properties that the aspirations of Egypt and its sons can be achieved

(M1.25:50)

إِنَّ أَحْدَاثَ الْيَوْمِ، وَالْأَيَّامَ الْقَلِيلَةَ الْمَاضِيَةَ، أَلْقَتْ فِي قُلُوبِ الْأَعْلِيَّةِ الْكَاسِحَةَ مِنْ أَبْنَاءِ الشَّعْبِ، الْخَوْفَ
عَلَى مِصْرَ، وَمُسْتَقْبَلِهَا
'inna 'ahdāta l-yawm wa *l-'ayāmu l-qalīlatu l-māḍiyah 'alqat fī qulūbi l-'aḡlabiyati
l-kāsiha min abnā'i š-ša'b al-xawfa 'alā miṣr wa mustaqbalihā

The incidents of today and the past few days have indeed cast within the hearts of the overwhelming majority of the sons of the people fear for Egypt and its future

(M1.27:51)

وسوف أدافع عن أمن مصر واستقرارها، وأمان شعبها

wa sawfa 'udāfi 'u 'an 'amni mişra wa stiqrārihā wa 'amāni ša 'bihā

I will defend the security and stability of Egypt and the safety of its people

(M1.28:52)

حفظ الله مصر، وشعبها

ḥafīza Allāhu Mişra wa ša 'bahā

May Allah safeguard Egypt and its people and guide our steps towards the right path

2.5.2. Argumentative manifestations of power: Logical analysis of the fallacies in the first speech of Mubarak

Mubarak committed thirteen fallacies in his first speech: *petitio principii* (the fallacy of begging the question), *argumentum ad metum* (appeal to fear), *slippery slope argumentum ad consequentiam* (argument from consequences), *argumentum ad baculum* (appeal to force/threats), *argumentum ad fidem* (appeal to religion), *bifurcation fallacy* (black and white fallacy), *argumentum ad misericordiam* (appeal to emotions), *argumentum ad superbiam* (appeal to pride), *straw man fallacy*, *red herring fallacy*, *ignoratio elenchi* (irrelevant conclusion), *argumentum ad hominem* (personal attack), and *argumentum ad populum* (appeal to popular favour).

The fallacy most frequently committed in this speech is *petitio principii* (the fallacy of begging the question), i.e. presupposing a conclusion, that is not likely to be known or admitted by the addressee, and 'smuggling' it into the wording of premises (Tindale 2007: 72-77); this fallacy is 'essentially fallacious' because it is a presumptive argument from authority (Whately 1848: 513). Mubarak committed this fallacy in fifty-seven instances in order to presuppose controversial propositional content, that represented himself positively and his opponents negatively, and to pass that content as agreed upon premises whose truth value is taken for granted: Mubarak had instructed the government to give the protesters the opportunity to express their opinions (M1.4:53); the protests were hijacked and their slogans were traded on

(M1.5:54); the police were protecting the protester, but the latter turned violent and chaotic and threatened public order (M1.6:56); The protests took place because of the democracy, liberties, and freedoms of expression, opinion, and press that Mubarak had nurtured (M1.7:58); Mubarak had always stressed that sovereignty is to the people and had always safeguarded their right to exercise the freedoms of opinion and expression (M1.8:59); Mubarak had always sided with the right of the citizens to express their opinions (M1.9:61); Egypt was a state of law run by the constitution (M1.10:62); Mubarak had combatted unemployment, improved living standards, and fought poverty and corruption before the protests (M1.12:63); Mubarak was well aware of the aspirations, suffering, and pain of the people and had been working on alleviating them on a daily basis (M1.13:64); the protesters were violent anarchists (M1.13:64); Mubarak considered the Egyptian youth the most valuable asset in Egypt, but they allowed anarchists, plunderers, saboteurs, and arson attackers to sneak among them (M1.14:66); Mubarak had started political, economic, and social reform and was keen on continuing it in order to establish a free, democratic, open society (M1.15:67); Mubarak had always sided with the poor and regulated economic reform policies, so as not to affect them adversely (M1.16:68); and Mubarak was adamant to continue the social, economic, and political reform he had started; to confirm his respect for the judiciary and its independence; to establish more democracy, freedoms, and employment; to improve living standards and services; and to increase support for the poor and those on low income (M1.23:69). In addition to their being instances of the presumptive *petitio principii* (*fallacy of begging the question*), all these instances violate the Pragma-Dialectic Rules 6, 7, and 8 of Critical Discussion.

(M1.4:53)

كانت تعليماتي للحكومة، تُشدّد على اتاحة الفرصة أمامها، للتعبير عن آراء المواطنين ومطالبهم.
kānat ta'limātī li-l-ḥukumah tušadidu 'alā itāḥati l-forṣah amāmaha li-l-ta'bīr 'an 'ārā'i l-mwāṭinīn wa-maṭālibihim

my instructions to the government emphasized giving them the opportunity to express the opinions and demands of the people.

(M1.5:54)

ثم تابعتُ محاولات البعض، لاعتلاء موجة هذه التظاهرات، والمتاجرة بشعاراتها
tumma tāba'tu muḥāwalāt al-ba'ḍ li-'itālā'i mawjati hāḍihi t-taẓāhurāt wa-l-mutājarati bi-šī'ārātihā

Then, I followed up the attempts of some people to take a free ride of the wave of those protests and to trade on their slogans

(M1.5:55)

وأسِفْتُ كلَّ الأسف، لما أسفرتُ عنهُ من ضحايا ابرياء، من المتظاهرين وقوات الشرطة.

wa 'asiftu kulla l-'asaf li-ma 'asfarat 'an-hu min ḍahāyā 'abriyyā' mina l-mutaẓāhirīn wa quwāti š-šurṭah

and I was sorry all the sorriness for the innocent victims, from the protesters and the police, who died as a result.

(M1.6:56)

لقد التزمتُ الحكومةُ بتنفيذِ هذه التعليمات، وكانَ ذلكَ واضحاً، في تعاملِ قواتِ الشرطةِ معِ شباننا، فقد بادرت الى حمايتهم، في بداياتها، احتراماً لحقهم في التظاهر السلمي

la-qad iltazamat 'alḥukūmah bi-tanfīdi ḥāḍihi t-ta'limāt wa kāna ḥāḍa wāḍiḥan fī ta'āmuli quwāti š-šurṭah ma'a šabābinā faqad bādarat ilā ḥemāyatihim fī bidāyātihā iḥtirāman li-ḥāqihim fī t-taẓāhuri s-silmī

The government has indeed committed itself to implementing these directives, as evidenced in the way the police dealt with our youth and rushed to protect them, at the beginning, in respect of their right to protest peacefully

(M1.6:57)

قبل أن تتحولَ هذه التظاهرات، لأعمالِ شغبٍ تهددُ النظامَ العام، وتُعيقُ الحياةَ اليوميةَ للمواطنين.

qabla 'an tataḥwal ḥāḍihi t-taẓāhurāt li-'a'māli šaḡabin tuḥaddida n-niẓāma l-'ām wa tu'īqu l-ḥayāta l-yawmiyyah li-l-muwāḥiḍīn

before these demonstrations turned into acts of riot, threatening public order and obstructing the daily life of citizens.

(M1.7:58)

إنَّ هذه التظاهرات، وما شهدناه قبلها من وقفاتٍ احتجاجية، خلالَ الأعوامِ القليلةِ الماضية، ما كان لها أن تتم، لولا المساحاتِ العريضة، لحرية الرأي، والتعبير، والصحافة، وغيرها من الحريات، التي أتاحتها خطوات الإصلاح لأبناء الشعب، ولولا ما تشهده مصرٌ من تفاعلٍ غيرِ مسبوقٍ، لقوى المجتمع.

'inna ḥāḍihi t-taẓāhurāt wa mā šhhidnāhu qablahā min waqafātīn 'iḥtijājiyah xilāla l-'a'wami l-qalīlati l-māḍiyah mā kāna lahā an tatīm lawlā l-misāḥāti l-'arīḍah li-ḥurriyyat ar-r'aī wa t-ta'bīr wa s-saḥāfah wa ḡairihā mina l-ḥurriyyāt allati atāḥat'hā xuṭūwāti l-'islāḥ li-'abnā'i š-ša'b wa lawlā mā tašhadhu misr min tafā'ulin ḡayra masbūqin li-quwā l-mujtama'.

Indeed, these demonstrations as well as the protesting stands we witnessed over the past few years would have never happened without the wide spaces of freedom of expression, opinion, and press, and the other freedoms that have been made available to the people by the steps of

reform, and by the unprecedented interaction among the forces of society that Egypt is witnessing now.

(M1.8:59)

إنني كرئيس للجمهورية، ومقتضى الصلاحيات التي خولها لي الدستور، كحكيم بين السلطات، أكدت مراراً وسوف أظل، أن
السيادة للشعب
'innanī kara 'īsin li-l-jumhuriyah wa muqtaḍā as-salāḥiyat allati xwalahā lī ad-dustūr,
kaḥakamin bayna s-suluḥāt, 'akadtu mirāran wa sawfa 'azal anna s-siyādata li-l-ša 'b

I, in my capacity as the president of the republic, and by virtue of the powers conferred upon me by the constitution as the arbitrator among authorities, have indeed reiterated, and will continue to do so, that sovereignty is to the people

(M1.8:60)

وسوف أتمسك دائماً، بحقه في ممارسة حرية الرأي والتعبير، طالما تم ذلك في إطار الشرعية، واحترام القانون.
wa sawfa 'atamasaku dā 'īman bi-ḥaqīhi fi mumārasat ḥuriyyati r-ra 'ī wa t-ta 'bīr and I will
always adhere to their right to exercise the freedoms of opinion and expression

(M1.9:61)

أنحازُ كل الانحياز، لحرية المواطنين في إبداء آرائهم
anḥāzu kulla l-inḥiyāz li-ḥurriyyati l-muwātinīna fi ibdā 'i 'arā 'ihim
I side completely with the freedom of citizens to express their opinions

(M1.10:62)

إن مصرَ هي أكبر دولة في منطقتها، سكاناً، ودوراً، وثقلاً، وتأثيراً، وهي دولة مؤسسات يحكمها الدستور والقانون
'inna miṣra [...] dawlatu mu 'asasātin yaḥkumuhā d-dustūru wa l-qānūn
Egypt is indeed the biggest country in its region, in terms of population, role, weight, and influence, a country of institutions, governed by the constitution and the rule of law.

(M1.12:63)

لقد جاءت هذه التظاهرات، لتعبّر عن تطلعات مشروعة لمزيد من الديمقراطية، والمزيد من الإسراع في جهود محاصرة
البطالة، وتحسين مستوى المعيشة، ومكافحة الفقر، والتصدي بكل حسم للفساد.
la-qad jā 'at hāḍihi t-tazāhurāt li-tu 'abira 'an taṭalu 'ātin maṣrū 'ah li-mazādin mina d-
dīmuqrātiyah wa l-mazādi mina l-isrā 'i fi juhūdi muḥāṣarati l-biṭālah wa taḥsīni mustawā l-
ma 'īshah wa mukāfaḥati l-faqr wa t-taṣadī bi-kulli hasmin li-l-fasād.

These demonstrations have indeed aimed at expressing legitimate aspirations towards more democracy and more acceleration of the efforts of besieging unemployment, improving living standards, and fighting poverty and confronting corruption decisively.

(M1.13:64)

إنني أعي هذه التطلعات المشروعة للشعب، وأعلم جيداً، قدر همومهم ومعاناتهم. لم أنفصل عنها يوماً، وأعمل من أجلها كل يوم
'innanī 'a 'ī hādīhi t-tatalu 'āti l-mašrū 'ah li-l-ša 'b wa 'a 'lamu jayyidan qadra humūmihi wa mu 'anātih. lam 'anfašil 'anhā yawman wa a 'malu min ajlihā kulla yawm

I am indeed aware of these legitimate aspirations of the people; I know well the amount of their pain and suffering. I have never been detached from them for a single day, and I work on solving them every day.

(M1.13:65)

وما نسعى إليه من أهداف، لن يحققه اللجوء إلى العنف
mā nas 'ā ilay-hi min ahdāf lan yuḥaqqiquhu l-lugū 'u ilā l- 'unf wa lan tašna 'ahu l-fawḏā
the problems we are facing and the goals we are aspiring to achieve will not be attained by resorting to violence, nor will they be accomplished by chaos

(M1.14:66)

إنَّ شباب مصر، هو أعلى ما لديها، وهي تتطلع إليهم (كن) كي يصنعوا مستقبلها، وتربأ بهم، أن يندس بينهم من يسعى لنشر الفوضى، ونهب الممتلكات العامة والخاصة، وإشعال الحرائق، وهدم ما بنينا.
'inna šabāba mišr huwa 'aḡlā mā ladayhā, wa hiya tataṭalla 'u ilay-him [XXX] kay yašna 'ū mustaqbalahā wa tarba 'u bi-him an yandassa bayna-hum man yas 'ā li-našri l-fawḏā wa nahbi l-mumtalakāti l- 'āmmati wa-l-xāšah wa 'iš 'āli l-ḥarā 'iq wa hadmi mā banaynāh.

The youth of Egypt are indeed the dearest it has and it is looking up at them to make its future and it is distancing them from allowing to sneak among them those who seek to spread anarchy, plunder public and private properties, set arson attacks, and knock down what we have built.

(M1.15:67)

إنَّ اقتناعي ثابتٌ لا يتزعزع، بمواصلة الإصلاح السياسي، والاقتصادي، والاجتماعي، من أجل مجتمع مصري، حرٍّ وديمقراطي، يحتضن قيم العصر، ويفتح على العالم
'inna iqtinā 'ī tābitun la yataza 'za ' bi-muwāsalati l-išlāḥi s-siyyāsī wa l-iqtisādī wa l-ijtimā 'ī min ajli mujtama 'in mišriyyin ḥurrun wa dīmuqrāṭi yaḥtaḏinu qiyama l- 'ašr wa yanfatihu 'alā l- 'ālam.

My conviction is indeed unshakably firm in continuing the political, economic, and social reform, for the sake of a free, democratic Egyptian society that embraces modern values and opens up to the world.

(M1.16:68)

لقد (إنح) [XXX] إنحزت وسوف أظل، للفقراء من أبناء الشعب على الدوام، مقتنعاً، بأن الاقتصاد أكبر وأخطر من أن يُترك للاقتصاديين وحدهم، وحرصت على ضبط سياسات الحكومة، للإصلاح الاقتصادي، كي لا تمضي بأسرع مما يحتملُه أبناء الشعب، أو بما يُزيد من معاناتهم.

la-qad [XXX] inḥaztu wa sawfa aẓal li-l-fuqarā'i min 'abnā'i š-ša'b 'alā d-dawām, muqtani'an bi-'anna l-iqtisād 'akbaru wa 'axtaru min an yutraka li-l-iqtisādiyyīna wahdahum, wa ḥarištu 'alā ḍabṭi siyāsati l-ḥukūmah li-l-islāhi l-iqtisādyī kay la tamāṭi bi-asra'a mimmā yaḥtamiluhu 'abnā'a š-ša'b aw bimā yuzidu min mu'ānātihim

I have indeed [XXX] taken the side of the poor people, all the time, and I will continue to do so, because I am convinced that economy is too big and dangerous to be left to economists alone. And I have always been keen on regulating the economic reform policies of the government, so as not to let them proceed at a pace faster than that which the sons of the people can endure or that which might increase their suffering.

(M1.23:69)

إنّ طريق الإصلاح الذي اخترناه، لا رجوع عنه، أو ارتداد إلى الوراء، ستمضي عليه بخطوات جديدة، تؤكد احترامنا لاستقلال القضاء وأحكامه، خطوات جديدة، نحو المزيد من الديمقراطية، والمزيد من الحرية للمواطنين، خطوات جديدة لمحاصرة البطالة، ورفع مستوى المعيشة، وتطوير الخدمات، وخطوات جديدة للوقوف إلى جانب الفقراء، ومحدودي الدخل.

'inna ṭarīqa l-'islāhi llaḍi ixtarnāh, lā rujū'a 'anhu 'aw irtidādin illa l-warā'. sa-namāṭi 'alihi bi-xuṭūwātin jadīdah tu'akidu iḥtrāmana l-istiqlāli l-qaḍā' wa 'aḥkāmih, xuṭūwātin jadīdah naḥwa l-mazīdi mina d-dīmuqrāṭiyah wa l-mazīdi mina l-ḥurriyyah li-l-mūwāṭinīn, xuṭūwātin jadīdah li-muḥāṣarati l-biṭālah wa raf'i mustawā l-ma'īshah wa taṭwīri l-xadamāt, wa xuṭūwātin jadīdah li-l-wqūfi ilā jānibi l-fuqarā' wa maḥdūdi d-daxl.

The way of reform we have chosen is indeed neither reversible nor does it have a U-turn. We will go through it with new steps that confirm our respect for the independence of the judiciary and its verdicts; new steps towards more democracy and more freedom to the citizens; new steps to besiege unemployment, raise living standards, and improve services; and new steps towards standing beside the poor and those on low income.

The second most frequently committed fallacies were *argumentum ad metum* (*appeal to fear*) and *slippery slope argumentum ad consequentiam* (*argument from consequences*), which both appeal to the fears of the audience by foreseeably citing the allegedly unfavourable consequences of an action as a premise, in order to conclude that the action should not be taken, because it is the first step in a sequence of events that will lead to a horrible outcome (Tindale, 2007: 183-189; Fearnside & Holther, 1959: 94). Mubarak committed these fallacies in twenty-seven instances in order to frighten the people of the protests and the protesters, arguing that they had caused Egypt and Egyptians to go through critical times (M1.3:70);

protests and protesters were spreading anarchy, jeopardizing the security and stability of Egypt, over-sweeping it to dangerous slippery slopes, and threatening public order and social peace with unknown present and future repercussions (M1.9:71; M1.17:73); protests and protesters had dragged other countries to chaos, deprived them of their stability, and did not lead them to any democracy (M1.10:72); protests and protesters did not only allow criminals to spread chaos, plunder public and private properties, set arson attacks, and sabotage what Egyptians had built (M1.14:74; M1.19:77), but also involved plotting against Egyptian stability and legitimacy (M1.18:76); protests and protesters hindered the program Mubarak had initiated for fighting unemployment and providing more education, health, and housing services (M1.17:73); protests and protesters were threatening not only Egypt, but also the earnings of Egyptians (M1.19:77); and protests and protesters allowed fear and apprehension to obsess the overwhelming majority of Egyptians and threatened their safety and security as well as those of Egypt (M1.26:79; M1.27:80).

(M1.3:70)

أتحدث اليكم في ظرفٍ دقيق، يفرضُ علينا جميعاً، وقفهً جادةً وصادقةً مع النفس، تتوخى سلامةً القصد، وصالحَ الوطن.

ataḥadaṭu ilaykum fī ḡarfin daqīq yafridu ‘ala-ina jamī’an waqfatan jādatan wa-ṣādiqatan ma‘a n-nafs tatawaxā salāmata l-qaṣd wa ṣāliḥa l-waṭan

I am addressing you in a delicate situation, that forces upon us all a serious and honest stance with the self, that seeks good intent and the interests of the homeland.

(M1.9:71)

إنَّ خيطاً رفيعاً يفصلُ بينَ الحريةِ والفضى، وإنني، إذ أنحازُ كلَّ الانحيازِ، لحريةِ المواطنينِ في إبداءِ آرائهم، اتمسكُ بذاتِ القدرِ، بالحفاظِ على أمنِ مصرَ واستقرارها، وبعدمِ الانجرافِ بها وبشعبها، لمنزلقاتٍ خطيرة، تُهددُ النظامَ العام، والسلامَ الاجتماعي، ولا يُعلمُ أحدٌ مداها، وتداعياتها، على حاضرِ الوطنِ ومستقبله.

‘inna xaiṭan raḡī’an yaḡṣilu bayna l-ḡurriyyah wa-l-fawḡā. wa innani ‘iḡ anḡāzu kulla l-inḡiyāz li-ḡurriyyati l-muwāṭinīna fī ibdā’i ‘arā’ihim, ‘atamasaku bi-ḡāti l-qadr bi-l-ḡifāzi ‘alā ‘amni miṣra wa stiḡrāriha wa bi-‘adami l-inḡirāfi bi-hā wa bi-ṣa’bihā li-munzalaḡāṭin xaḡīrah, tuḡadidu n-niḡāma l-‘ām wa s-salāma l-ijtimā’ī wa la ya‘lamu ‘aḡadun madāhā wa tadā’iyātihā ‘alā ḡādiri l-waṭan wa mustaqbalih.

A fine line is indeed separating between freedom and anarchy. While I side completely with the freedom of citizens to express their opinions, I adhere, as strongly, to safeguarding the security and stability of Egypt and not allowing it and its people to be over-swept to dangerous slippery slopes that threaten public order and social peace, and have unknown scope and repercussions on the present and future of the homeland.

(M1.10:72)

وعلينا أن نحاذر مما يحيط بنا من أمثلة عديدة، انزلت بالشعوب إلى الفوضى والانتكاس، فلا ديمقراطية حققت، ولا استقراراً حُفَّتْ.

wa 'alainā an nuḥādir mim mā yuḥītu binā min 'amtīlatin 'adīdah inzalaqat bi-š-š'ūbi ilā l-fawḍā wa l-'intikās, fa-lā dimuqrātiyatan ḥaqqaqat wa lā stiqrāran ḥafaḏat.

We have to be cautious of the many examples, around us, which slid the people towards chaos and setback, without achieving democracy or maintaining stability.

(M1.17:73)

إن برنامجنا لمحاصرة البطالة، وإتاحة المزيد، من خدمات التعليم، والصحة، والإسكان، وغيرها للشباب والمواطنين، تظل رهناً بالحفاظ على مصر، مستقرة وأمنة،

'inna birnāmijanā li-muḥāsarati l-bitālah wa 'itāḥati l-maziyyi min xadamāti t-ta'īm wa ṣ-ṣiḥḥah wa l-'iskān wa ġairihā li-l-šabāb wa l-muwāṭinīn tazalu rahnan bi-l-ḥifāzi 'alā miṣr mustaqiratan wa 'āminatan

Our program to besiege unemployment and provide more services of education, health, housing, ... etc. to the youth and citizens does remain contingent upon keeping Egypt stable and secure,

(M1.14:74)

إن شباب مصر، هو أعلى ما لديها، وهي تتطلع إليهم (كن) كي يصنعوا مستقبلها، وتربأ بهم، أن يندس بينهم من يسعى لنشر الفوضى، ونهب الممتلكات العامة والخاصة، وإشعال الحرائق، وهدم ما بنيناه.

'inna šabāba miṣr huwa 'aġlā mā ladayhā, wa hiya tataṭalla'u ilay-him kay yaṣna'u mustaqbalhā wa tarba'u bi-him an yandassa bayna-hum man yas'ā li-našri l-fawḍā wa nahbi l-mumtalakāti l-'āmmati wa-l-xāṣah wa 'iṣ'āli l-ḥarā'iq wa hadmi mā banaynāh.

The youth of Egypt are indeed its dearest wealth and it is looking up at them to make its future and it is distancing them from allowing to sneak among them those who seek to spread anarchy, plunder public and private properties, set arson attacks, and knock down what we have built.

(M1.17:75)

إن برنامجنا لمحاصرة البطالة، وإتاحة المزيد، من خدمات التعليم، والصحة، والإسكان، وغيرها للشباب والمواطنين، تظل رهناً بالحفاظ على مصر، مستقرة وأمنة، وطناً لشعب متحضر وعريق، لا يضع مكتسباته وأماله للمستقبل، في مهب الرياح.

'inna birnāmijanā li-muḥāsarati l-bitālah wa 'itāḥati l-maziyyi min xadamāti t-ta'īm wa ṣ-ṣiḥḥah wa l-'iskān wa ġairihā li-l-šabāb wa l-muwāṭinīn tazalu rahnan bi-l-ḥifāzi 'alā miṣr

mustaqiratan wa 'āminatan, waṭanan li-ša'bin mutaḥāḍirin wa 'arīq la yaḍa'u muktasabātuḥu wa 'āmāluḥu li-l-mustaqbal fī mahabi r-rīḥ.

Our program to besiege unemployment and provide more services of education, health, housing, ... etc. to the youth and citizens does remain contingent upon keeping Egypt stable and secure, a homeland of modern, civilized people who do not let their earnings and future aspirations twist in the wind.

(M1.18:76)

إِنَّ مَا حَدَثَ، خِلَالَ هَذِهِ التَّظَاهِرَاتِ، يَتَجَاوَزُ مَا حَدَثَ مِنْ نَهَبٍ وَفُوضَى وَحِرَائِقٍ، لِمَخْطِطٍ أَبْعَدَ مِنْ ذَلِكَ، لَزَعْرَعَةِ
الاستقرار، والانتقاض على الشرعية.
'inna ma ḥadaṭa xilāla hāḍihi t-tazāhurāt yatajāwazu ma ḥadaṭa min nahbin wa fawḍā wa ḥarā'iq, li-muxaṭaṭin ab'ada min zālik, li-za'ati l-istiqrār wa l-inqīdādi 'alā š-šar'iyah.

What has happened during those demonstrations goes indeed beyond the looting, chaos, and arsons that took place to represent a plot aiming at shaking stability and preying on legitimacy.

(M1.19:77)

إِنِّي أَهْبِبُ بِشِبَابِنَا، وَبِكُلِّ مِصْرِيٍّ وَمِصْرِيَّةٍ، مِرَاعَاةً صَالِحَ الْوَطَنِ، وَأَنْ يَتَصَدُّوا لِحِمَايَةِ وَطَنِهِمْ، وَمَكْتَسِبَاتِهِمْ، فَلَيْسَ
بِإِشْعَالِ الْحِرَائِقِ، وَالْإِعْتِدَاءِ عَلَى الْمَمْتَلَكَاتِ الْعَامَّةِ وَالْخَاصَّةِ، تَتَحَقَّقُ تَطْلُعَاتُ مِصْرَ وَأَبْنَائِهَا
'innanī 'ahību bi-šabābinā wa bi-kulli miṣriyyin wa miṣriyyah, murā'āta šāliḥi l-waṭan, wa 'an yataṣadaw li-ḥimāyati waṭanihim wa muktasabātihim fa-laysa bi-iš'ālī l-ḥarā'iq wa l-'i'tidā'i 'alā l-mumtalakāti l-'āmmati wa l-xāṣah, tataḥaqqaqu taṭalu'ātu miṣra wa 'abnā'ihā

I am indeed calling upon our youth and upon every Egyptian man and woman to consider the interest of the homeland and to stand up for protecting their homeland and their earnings. It is not by setting fires and vandalizing public and private properties that the aspirations of Egypt and its sons can be achieved

(M1.25:78)

إِنَّ أَحْدَاثَ الْيَوْمِ، وَالْأَيَّامِ الْقَلِيلَةَ الْمَاضِيَةَ، أَلْقَتْ فِي قُلُوبِ الْأَغْلِيَّةِ الْكَاسِحَةِ مِنْ أَبْنَاءِ الشَّعْبِ، الْخَوْفَ عَلَى مِصْرٍ،
وَمُسْتَقْبَلِهَا، وَالتَّحَسُّبَ مِنَ الْإِنْجِرَافِ إِلَى الْمَزِيدِ مِنَ الْعَنْفِ، وَالْفُوضَى، وَالتَّدْمِيرِ، وَالتَّخْرِيْبِ.
*'inna 'ahḍāṭa l-yawm wa l-'ayāmu l-qalīlatu l-māḍiyah 'alqat fī qulūbi l-'aḡlabiyati l-kāsiḥa min abnā'i š-ša'b al-xawfa 'alā miṣr wa mustaqbalihā 'inna 'ahḍāṭa l-yawm wa *l-'ayāmu l-qalīlatu l-māḍiyah 'alqat fī qulūbi l-'aḡlabiyati l-kāsiḥa min abnā'i š-ša'b al-xawfa 'alā miṣr wa mustaqbalihā, wa t-taḥasuba mina l-injirāfi ila l-mazīdi mina l-'unf wa l-fawḍā wa t-tadmīri wa t-taxrīb.*

The incidents of today and the past few days have indeed cast within the hearts of the overwhelming majority of the sons of the people fear for Egypt and its future and apprehension about being over-swept towards more violence, chaos, destruction, and sabotage.

(M1.26:79)

وإنني (محت) مُتَحَمِّلاً مسؤوليتي الأولى، في الحفاظ على أمن الوطن والمواطنين، لن أسمح بذلك أبداً، لن أسمح لهذا الخوف أن يستحوذ على مواطنينا، ولهذا التحسب، أن يلقي بظلاله على مصيرنا، ومستقبلنا.
Wa 'innani [XXX] mutaḥamīlan mas'ūliyatī al-'ūlā fī l-ḥifāzī 'alā 'amni l-waṭan wa l-muwāṭinīn, lan asmaḥa bi-dālika 'abadan. lan asmaḥa li-hāda l-xawf an yastahwiḍa 'alā muwāṭinīnā, wa li-hāda t-taḥasub an yulqiya bi-ḥilālihi 'alā maṣīrina wa mustaqbalina.

Shouldering my first responsibility of safeguarding the security of the homeland and citizens, I will never ever allow that. I will never allow this fear to obsess our citizens nor that apprehension to cast its shadows on our fate and future.

(M1.27:80)

لن أتهاون في اتخاذ أية قرارات، تحفظ لكل مصري ومصريّة، أمنهم، وأمانهم، وسوف أدافع عن أمن مصر واستقرارها، وأمان شعبها، فتلك هي المسؤولية والأمانة، التي أقسمت يميناً، أمام الله والوطن، بالمحافظة عليها.
lan 'atahāwan fī itixāḍi 'ayyati qarārātin taḥfazū li-kulli miṣriyyin wa miṣriyyah 'amnahum wa 'amānahum, wa sawfa 'udāfi 'u 'an 'amni miṣra wa stiqrārihā wa 'amāni ṣa'bihā, fatilka hiya l-mas'ūliyatū w-l-'amānah allati 'aqsamtu yamīnan 'amāma llāhi wa l-waṭan bi-l-muḥāfazati 'alaihā

I will not indeed hesitate to take any decisions that save the security and safety of every Egyptian man and woman and I will defend the security and stability of Egypt and the safety of its people.

The third most frequently committed fallacy was *argumentum ad misericordiam* (*appeal to emotions*), *i.e.* engaging the emotions of pity and mercy of the hearer and drawing upon them in a compelling manner that distracts their attention and unjustifiably interferes with their judgement and rational reasoning (Tindale 2007: 113-117). Mubarak committed this fallacy in order to stir the emotions of the people in fifteen instances, twelve on nationalistic grounds and three on personal ones. Nationalistically, he mitigated the sharpness and formal connotations of the legal vocative *al-muwāṭinūn* (citizens) by preceding it with the emotional kinship title *al-'ixwah* (brothers) thrice, called upon the people to prioritize the national interests of their homeland (M1.3:81), praised the youth of Egypt as its dearest asset and

advised them to work hard to protect their own earnings and their country which needed them badly (M1.14:84; M1.19:85), and assimilated himself into the people by arguing that as he and them had survived hard times together, when they united and shared the same way, goals, and destination (M1.22:87), it is their responsibility to safeguard their country, build it, and keep its future in their minds and consciences (M1.24:88). Personally, he expressed his sorriiness for the killed protesters and policemen (M1.5:82), confirmed that he had been living the pains and suffering of the people and working on alleviating them day by day (M1.13:83), and reminded the people that he had exhausted his life defending Egypt and its people in war and peace (M1.21:86).

(M1.3:81)

أتحدثُ اليكم في ظرفٍ دقيق، يفرضُ علينا جميعاً، وقفَةً جادَةً وصادقةً مع النفس، تتوخى سلامةً القصد،
وصالحَ الوطن.

*atahadatu ilaykum fi zarfin daqiq yafridu 'ala-ina jamī'an waqfatan jādatan wa-
ṣādiqatan ma'a n-nafs tatawaxā salāmata l-qaṣd wa ṣāliḥa l-waṭan.*

I am addressing you in a delicate situation, that forces upon us all a serious and honest stance with the self, that seeks good intent and the interests of the homeland.

(M1.5:82)

وأسفْتُ كلَّ الأسف، لما أسفرتُ عنه من ضحايا ابرياءٍ
wa 'asiftu kulla l-'asaf li-ma 'asfarat 'an-hu min ḍahāyā 'abriyyā'
and I was sorry all the sorriiness for the innocent victims, from the protesters and the police, who died as a result.

(M1.13:83)

إنني، أعي هذه التطلعاتِ المشروعة للشعب، وأعلمُ جيداً، قدرَ همومه ومعاناته. لم أنفصلَ عنها يوماً، وأعملُ
من أجلها كلَّ يوم، لكنَّ ما نواجهه من مشكلات، وما نسعى اليه من اهداف، لن يحققه اللجوءُ الى العنف،
ولن تصنعه الفوضى، وإنما يحققه، ويصنعه، الحوارُ الوطني، والعمل، المخلصُ الجاد.

*'innanī 'a ī hāḍihi t-tatalu 'āti l-mašrū'ah li-l-ša'b wa 'a 'lamu jayyidan qadra humūmihi
wa mu 'ānātih. lam 'anfaṣil 'anhā yawman wa a 'malu min ajlihā kulla yawm, lakinna ma
nuwājihu min muškilāt wa mā nas 'ā ilay-hi min ahdāf lan yuḥāqiquhu l-lugū'u ilā l-
'unf wa lan taṣna 'ahu l-fawḍā, wa innama yuḥāqiquhu wa yaṣna 'uhu l-ḥiwāru l-waṭanī
wa l-'amal al-muxliṣ al-jād.*

I am indeed aware of these legitimate aspirations of the people; I know well the amount of their pain and suffering. I have never been detached from them for a single day, and I work on solving them every day. But, the problems we are facing and the goals we are aspiring to will not be achieved by resorting to violence, nor will they be accomplished by chaos, but will be achieved and established by national dialogue and sincere, hard work.

(M1.14:84)

إِنَّ شَبَابَ مِصْرَ، هُوَ أَعْلَى مَا لَدِيهَا، وَهِيَ تَتَطَلَّعُ إِلَيْهِمْ (كُن) كَيْ يَصْنَعُوا مُسْتَقْبَلَهَا، وَتَرْتَبُّ بِهِمْ، أَنْ يَنْدَسَ بَيْنَهُمْ
من يسعى لنشر الفوضى، ونهب الممتلكات العامة والخاصة، وإشعال الحرائق، وهدم ما بيننا.
'inna šabāba miṣr huwa 'aglā mā ladayhā, wa hiya tataṭalla'u ilay-him kay yašna 'u
mustaqbalahā wa tarba 'u bi-him an yandassa bayna-hum man yas 'ā li-našri l-fawḍā wa
nahbi l-mumtalakāti l- 'āmmati wa-l-xāṣah wa 'iš 'āli l-ḥarā'iq wa hadmi mā banaynāh.

The youth of Egypt are indeed its dearest wealth and it is looking up at them to make its future and it is distancing them from allowing to sneak among them those who seek to spread anarchy, plunder public and private properties, set arson attacks, and knock down what we have built.

(M1.19:85)

إِنِّي أَهْيَبُ بِشَبَابِنَا، وَبِكُلِّ مِصْرِيٍّ وَمِصْرِيَّةٍ، مِرَاعَاةَ صَالِحِ الْوَطَنِ، وَأَنْ يَتَصَدَّقُوا حِمَايَةَ وَطَنِهِمْ، وَمَكْتَسِبَاتِهِمْ،
فليس بإشعال الحرائق، والاعتداء على الممتلكات العامة والخاصة، تتحقق تطلعات مصر وأبنائها، وإنما،
تتحقق هذه التطلعات، للمستقبل الأفضل، بالوعي، والحوار، والاجتهاد، من أجل الوطن.

'innanī 'ahību bi-šabābinā wa bi-kulli miṣriyyin wa miṣriyyah, murā'āta ṣālihi l-waṭan,
wa 'an yataṣadaw li-ḥimāyati waṭanihim wa muktasabātihim, fa-laysa bi-iš 'āli l-ḥarā'iq
wa l-'i'tidā' i 'alā l-mumtalakāti l- 'āmmati wa l-xāṣah, tataḥaqqaqu taṭalu 'ātu miṣra wa
'abnā'ihā, wa 'innamma tataḥaqqaqu hādīhi t-taṭalu 'āt li-l-mustaqbali l-afḍal, bi-l-wa 'yi
wa l-ḥiwār wa-l-ijtihād min ajli l-waṭan.

I am indeed calling upon our youth and upon every Egyptian man and woman to consider the interest of the homeland and to stand up for protecting their homeland and their earnings. It is not by setting fires and vandalizing public and private properties that the aspirations of Egypt and its sons can be achieved, but those aspirations towards a better future can be achieved by awareness, dialogue, and hard work for the sake of the homeland.

(MI.21:86)

إني لا أتحدث اليك اليوم، كرئيس للجمهورية فحسب وإنما كمصري، شاءت الأقدار أن يتحمل مسئولية هذا الوطن، وأمضى حياته من أجله، حرباً وسلاماً.

'innī lā 'ataḥadaṭu 'ilay-kum al-yawm ka-ra 'īsin li-l-jumhūriyyati faḥasb, wa innammā ka-miṣriyyin šā'ati l-aqdāru an yataḥamala mas'ūliyata hāḍa l-waṭan wa 'amdā ḥayātahu min ajlihi ḥarban wa salāman

I am indeed not addressing you today as a President of the republic only, but indeed as an Egyptian man whom fate has decided to assign the responsibility of this homeland and who exhausted his life for its sake, in war and peace.

(MI.22:87)

لقد اجتزنا معاً من قبل، أوقاتاً صعبة، تغلبنا عليها، عندما واجهناها كأمة واحدة وشعب واحد، وعندما عرفنا طريقنا، ووجهتنا، وحددنا ما نسعى إليه، من أهداف.

la-qad ijtaznā ma'an min qabl 'awqātan ṣa'bah, taḡalabnā 'alaihā 'indamā wājahnāhā ka-'ummatin wāḥidah wa ṣa'bin wāḥid, wa 'indamā 'arifnā ṭarīqanā wa wijhatanā wa ḥaddadnā mā nas'ā 'ilayhi min 'ahdāf.

We have indeed survived hard times together; we have surmounted them when we faced them as one nation and one people, and when we knew our way and our destination and specified our targets.

(MI.24:88)

إنّ خيارنا وأهدافنا، هي التي ستحدد مصائرنا ومستقبلنا، وليس أماننا من سبيل لتحقيقها، سوى بالوعي، والعمل (والكف) الكفاح، نحافظ على ما حققناه، ونبني عليه، ونرعى في عقولنا وضمائرنا مستقبل الوطن.

'inna xiyrātanā wa 'ahdāfanā hiya llatī sa-tuḥadidu maṣā'iranā wa mustaqbalanā, wa laysa 'amāmanā min sabīlin li-taḥqīqihā siwā bi-l-wa'yī wa l-'amali wa l-kifāḥ, nuḥāfiẓu 'alā mā ḥaqaqnāh, wa nabnī 'alāih wa nar'ā fī 'uqūlinā wa ḍamā'irinā mustaqbala l-waṭn

Our choices and goals are indeed what will determine our fates and future; we have no way to achieve them other than awareness, work, and struggle, saving what we have achieved, building on it, and keeping in our minds and consciences the future of the homeland.

The fourth most frequently committed fallacy is *argumentum ad baculum* (appeal to force/threats), i.e. drawing a conclusion on the basis of an appeal to force or threats that is irrelevant to determining the truth or falsity of the argument at issue (Tindale 2007: 108-113). Mubarak committed this fallacy, in twelve instances, in order to anchor his power, establish his authority, and threaten the people indirectly and directly: he called them *al-muwāṭinūn*

(citizens) thrice, a vocative that invokes as its legal counterpart, at the other end of the communication continuum, the title of President; he flagged up his position twice by mentioning that he is the President of the republic (M.8:89; M1.21:90); he highlighted his constitutional powers as the arbitrator among the authorities (M1.8:91) and the guardian of the security, stability, and safety of Egypt and its people, who will not hesitate to take any decisions to safeguard and protect them (M1.26:92; M1.27:93); and he added a divine level of authority by arguing that he was assigned the responsibility of Egypt by Fates (M1.21:94).
(M1.8:89)

إنني كرئيس للجمهورية
'innanī ka-ra 'īsin li-l-jumhūriyyah
I, in my capacity as the president of the republic

(M1.21:90)

إني لا أتحدث اليكم اليوم، كرئيس للجمهورية فحسب
'innī lā 'ataḥadaṭu 'ilay-kum al-yawm ka-ra 'īsin li-l-jumhūriyyati faḥasb
I am not addressing you today as the President of the republic only

(M1.8:91)

ومقتضى الصلاحيات التي حولها لي الدستور، كحكم بين السلطات
muqtaḍā as-salāḥiyat allati xwalahā lī ad-dustūr, kaḥakamin bayna s-suluṭāt,
by virtue of the powers conferred upon me by the constitution as the arbitrator among
authorities

(M1.26:92)

وإنني (محتملاً) مُتحملاً مسؤوليتي الأولى، في الحفاظ على أمن الوطن والمواطنين، لن أسمح بذلك أبداً، لن أسمح لهذا
الخوف أن يستحوذ على مواطنينا، ولهذا التحسب، أن يلقي بظلاله على مصيرنا، ومستقبلنا.
wa 'innanī mutahaḥamilan mas 'ūliyatī al-'ulā fī l-ḥifāzi 'alā 'amni l-waṭan wa l-muwāṭiṭīn,
lan asmaḥa bi-dālika 'abadan. lan asmaḥa li-hāda l-xawf an yastahwiḍa 'alā muwāṭiṭīnā,
wa li-hāda t-taḥasub an yulqiya bi-zilālihi 'alā maṣīrina wa mustaqbalina.

shouldering my first responsibility of safeguarding the security of the homeland and citizens, I will indeed never ever allow that. I will never allow this fear to obsess our citizens nor that apprehension to cast its shadows on our fate and future.

(M1.27:93)

وأقول من جديد، أنني لن أتهاون في اتخاذ أية قرارات، تحفظ لكل مصري ومصريّة، أمنهم، وأمانهم، وسوف أدافع عن
أمن مصر واستقرارها، وأمان شعبيها، فتلك هي المسؤولية والأمانة، التي أقسمت يميناً، أمام الله والوطن، بالمحافظة
عليها.

wa 'aqūlu min jadīd, 'annanī lan 'atahāwan fī itixādi 'ayyati qarārātin tahfāzu li-kulli miṣriyyin wa miṣriyyah 'amnahum wa 'amānahum, wa sawfa 'udāfi 'u 'an 'amni miṣra wa stiqrārihā wa 'amāni ša 'bihā, fa-tilka hiya l-mas'ūliyatu w-l-'amānah allati 'aqsamtu yamīnan 'amāma llāhi wa l-waṭan bi-l-muḥāfazati 'alaihā.

I am saying it again: I will not indeed hesitate to take any decisions that save the security and safety of every Egyptian man and woman and I will defend the security and stability of Egypt and the safety of its people. That is the responsibility and the trust I have taken the oath in front of Allah and the homeland to safeguard.

(M1.21:94)

كمصري، شاءت الأقدارُ أن يتحملَ مسئوليةَ هذا الوطن، وأمضى حياته من أجله، حرباً وسلاماً.
ka-miṣriyyin ša 'ati l-aqdāru an yataḥamala mas'ūliyata hāḍa l-waṭan wa 'amdā ḥayātahu min ajlihi ḥarban wa salāman.

as an Egyptian man whom fate has decided to assign the responsibility of this homeland and who has exhausted his life for its sake, in war and peace.

The fifth most frequently committed fallacy is *argumentum ad hominem* (*personal attack*), i.e. analysing or arguing a case not on its merits, but by emotively attacking the personality, motives, or background of its proponent (Tindale 2007: 81-97). Mubarak committed this fallacy in six instances by attacking the behaviour, motives, and background of the protesters instead of refuting their arguments and demands: he described them as free riders who exploited the protests and traded on their slogans (M1.5:95) and violent anarchists, plunderers, saboteurs, rioters, arson attackers, and fear mongers who aimed at destabilizing the country and preying on legitimacy (M1.14:96; M1.18:97; M1.25:98; M1.6:99; M1.26:100).

(M1.5:95)

ثم تابعتُ محاولات البعض، لاعتلاء موجة هذه التظاهرات، والمتاجرة بشعاراتها
tumma tāba 'tu muḥāwalāt al-ba 'd li- 'tilā 'i mawjati hāḍihi t-tazāhurāt wa-l-mutājarati bi-šī 'ārātihā

Then, I followed up the attempts of some people to take a free ride of the wave of these protests and to trade on their slogans

(M1.14:96)

من يسعى لنشر الفوضى، ونهب الممتلكات العامة والخاصة، وإشعال الحرائق، وهدم ما بنيناه.
man yas 'ā li-našri l-fawḍā wa nahbi l-mumtalakāti l-'āmmati wa-l-xāṣah wa 'iṣ 'āli l-ḥarā 'iq wa hadmi mā banaynāh.

those who seek to spread anarchy, plunder public and private properties, set arson attacks, and knock down what we have built.

(MI.18:97)

إنَّ ما حدث، خلال هذه التظاهرات، يتجاوز ما حدث من نهبٍ وفوضىٍ وحرائقٍ، لمخططٍ أبعدَ من ذلك،
لزعزعة الاستقرار، والانقضاض على الشرعية.
'inna mā ḥadaṭa xilāla hāḍihi t-tazāhurāt yatajāwazu ma ḥadaṭa min nahbin wa fawḍā wa
ḥarā`iq, li-muxaṭaṭin ab`ada min zālik, li-za`a`ati l-istiqrār wa l-inqīḍādi `alā š-šar`iyah.

What has happened during those demonstrations goes indeed beyond the looting, chaos, and arsons that took place to represent a plot aiming at shaking stability and preying on legitimacy.

(MI.25:98)

من الانجرافِ الى المزيد من العنف، والفوضى، والتدمير، والتخريب.
al-injirāfi ila l-mazīdi mina l-`unf wa l-fawḍā wa t-tadmīri wa t-taxrīb.
over-sweeping towards more violence, chaos, destruction, and sabotage.

(MI.6:99)

أعمالٍ شغبٍ تهدد النظام العام، وتُعيق الحياة اليومية للمواطنين.
'a`māli šaḡabin *tuhaddida n-niḡāma l-`ām wa tu`īqu l-ḥayāta l-yawmiyyah li-l-
muwāṭinīn.
acts of riot, threatening public order and obstructing the daily life of citizens.

(MI.26:100)

لهذا الخوفُ أن يستحوذَ على مواطنينا
hāḍa l-xawf an yastahwiḍa `alā muwāṭinīnā
this fear to obsess our citizens

The sixth most frequently committed fallacy was *argumentum ad fidem* (appeal to religion), which Mubarak committed in five instances by opening the speech with the Islamic starter *bi-smi llāhi r-rahmāni r-rāhīm* (In the name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful) and concluding it with the Islamic greeting of departure *as-salāmu `alaikum wa raḥmatu llāhi wa barakātuh* (peace, mercy, and blessings of Allah be upon you); by arguing that he was selected by Fates to shoulder the responsibility of Egypt and Egyptians (MI.21:101); by contending that the only reason why he was staying in power was to honour the oath he had taken before Allah and the homeland to protect Egypt (MI.27:102); and by

supplicating to Allah to protect Egypt and its people and to guide them to the right path (MI.28:103).

(MI.21:101)

إنني لا أتحدثُ اليكُم اليوم، كرئيسٍ للجمهوريةِ فحسبٍ وإنما كمصريٍّ، شاءتِ الأقدارُ أن يتحملَ مسئوليةَ هذا الوطن، وأمضى حياته من أجله، حرباً وسلاماً.
'innī lā 'ataḥadaṭu 'ilay-kum al-yawm ka-ra'īsin li-l-jumhūriyyati faḥasb, wa innammā ka-miṣriyyin šā'ati l-aqdāru an yataḥamala mas'ūliyata hāḍa l-waṭan wa 'amḍā ḥayātahu min ajlihi ḥarban wa salāman.

I am not addressing you today as the President of the republic only, but indeed as an Egyptian man whom fate has decided to assign the responsibility of this homeland and who has exhausted his life for its sake, in war and peace.

(MI.27:102)

وسوفَ أدافعُ عن أمنِ مصرٍ واستقرارِها، وأمانِ شعبِها، فتلكَ هي المسئوليةُ والأمانةُ، التي أقسمتُ يميناً، أمامَ الله والوطن، بالمحافظةِ عليها.
wa sawfa 'udāfi 'u 'an 'amni miṣra wa stiqrārihā wa 'amāni ša'bihā, fatilka hiya l-mas'ūliyatu w-l-'amānah allati 'aqsamtu yamīnan 'amāma llāhi wa l-waṭan bi-l-muḥāfazati 'alaihā.

I will defend the security and stability of Egypt and the safety of its people. That is the responsibility and the trust I have taken the oath in front of Allah and the homeland to safeguard.

(MI.28:103)

حَفِظَ اللهُ مِصرَ، وشعبَها، وسدَدَ على الطريقِ خطانا
ḥafīza Allāhu Miṣra wa ša'bahā wa saddada 'alā ṭ-ṭarīqi xuṭānā,

May Allah safeguard Egypt and its people and *guide our steps* towards the right path

The seventh most frequently committed fallacies are *bifurcation (black and white fallacy)*, *argumentum ad superbiam (appeal to pride)*, and *straw man*, which Mubarak committed twice, each. The *bifurcation fallacy*, i.e. inappropriately assuming the existence of only two contradictory alternatives, was committed by Mubarak in two instances when he argued that a fine line separates between freedom and anarchy (MI.9:104) and that the freedom of the people to express their opinions and maintaining the security and stability of Egypt are mutually exclusive (MI.9:105).

(MI.9:104)

إنَّ خِيطاً رَفِيعاً يَفْصِلُ بَيْنَ الحُرِّيَّةِ والفوضى
'inna xaiṭan raḥīfā bayna l-ḥurriyyah wa-l-fawḍā.

A fine line is indeed separating between freedom and anarchy

(MI.9:105)

وإنني، إذ أنحازُ كلَّ الانحيازِ، لحريةِ المواطنينِ في إبداءِ آرائهم، اتمسكُ بذاتِ القدرِ، بالحفاظِ على أمنِ مصرَ واستقرارها

wa innani 'iz anḥāzu kulla l-inḥiyāz li-ḥurriyyati l-muwātinīna fī ibdā'i 'arā'ihim, 'atamasaku bi-ḡāti l-qadr bi-l-ḥifāzi 'alā 'amni miṣra wa stiqrāriha

While I side completely with the freedom of citizens to express their opinions, I adhere, as strongly, to safeguarding the security and stability of Egypt

Mubarak committed *argumentum ad superbiam fallacy* (appeal to pride), i.e. appealing to the personal and (or) nationalistic pride of the hearer, in two instances, when he praised Egyptians as being deeply rooted in civilization (MI.10:106) and Egypt as the most important and influential country in its region (MI.17:107). Finally, Mubarak committed the *straw man fallacy*, i.e. misrepresenting the position of the opponent by refuting a proposition that varies significantly from that advanced by them (Tindale 2007: 19-28), in two instances, when he neglected all the demands of the protesters and argued that they wanted to solve the problems of Egypt through violence, chaos, arson attacks, and sabotage (MI.13:108; MI.19:109).

(MI.10:106)

إن مصرَ هي أكبرُ دولةٍ في منطقتها، سكاناً، ودوراً، وثقلاً، وتأثيراً
'inna miṣra hiya 'akbaru dawlatin fī minṭaqatihā, sukkānnan wa dawran wa ṭiqalan wa ta'īran

Egypt is indeed the biggest country in its region, in terms of population, role, weight, and influence,

(MI.17:107)

وطناً لشعبٍ متحضرٍ وعريقٍ
waṭanan li-ša 'bin mutaḥādirin wa 'arīq
a homeland of modern, civilized people

(MI.13:108)

لكنَّ ما نواجههُ من مشكلاتٍ، وما نسعى اليه من أهدافٍ، لن يحقُّهُ اللجوءُ إلى العنفِ، ولن تصنعهُ الفوضى
lakinna ma nuwājihuhu min muškilāt wa mā nas 'ā ilayhi min ahdāf lan yuḥaqqiquhu l-lugū 'u ilā l-'unf wa lan taṣna 'ahu l-fawḍā

But, the problems we are facing and the goals we are aspiring to achieve will not be attained by resorting to violence, nor will they be accomplished by chaos

(MI.19:109)

فليس بإشعال الحرائق، والاعتداء على الممتلكات العامة والخاصة، تتحقق تطلعات مصر وأبنائها
fa-laysa bi-iš'āli l-ḥarā'iq wa l-'i'tidā'i 'alā l-mumtalakāti l-āmmati wa l-xāṣah,
tataḥaqaqu taṭalu 'ātu miṣra wa 'abnā'iha

It is not by setting fires and vandalizing public and private properties that the aspirations of Egypt and its sons can be achieved

Finally, the least frequently committed fallacies were *ignoratio elenchi* (fallacy of irrelevant conclusion) and *argumentum ad populum* (appeal to popular favour). Mubarak committed *ignoratio elenchi*, i.e. drawing a conclusion that is irrelevant to the premises or refuting premises that are different from those advanced by the opponent (Tindale 2007: 34-36), in one instance, when he started with two premises from the threatening *argumentum ad baculum* that marked his power, then drew an irrelevant conclusion from *argumentum ad populum* (MI.8:110). He also committed the *argumentum ad populum* fallacy (appeal to popular favour), i.e. emotively tailoring the premises of an argument in a manner that appeals specifically to the popular favour, beliefs, sentiments, prejudices, and common knowledge of the audience (Tindale, 2007: 105-108), in one instance, when he stated that he had instructed the government to submit its resignation in response to the demands of the protesters.

(MI.8:110)

إنني كرئيس للجمهورية، ومقتضى الصلاحيات التي خولها لي الدستور، كحكيم بين السلطات، أكدت مراراً وسوف أظل، أن السيادة للشعب، وسوف أتمسك دائماً، بحقه في ممارسة حرية الرأي والتعبير، طالما تم ذلك في إطار الشرعية، واحترام القانون.
'innanī ka-ra'īsin li-l-jumhūriyyah wa muqtaḍā as-salāḥiyat allati xwalahā lī ad-dustūr,
kaḥakamin bayna s-suluṭāt, 'akadtu mirāran wa sawfa 'aḥal anna s-siyādata li-l-ša'b wa sawfa 'atamasaku dā'iman bi-ḥaqīhi fi mumārasat ḥuriyyati r-ra'ī wa t-ta'bīr, ṭālama tamma ḍālika fī iṭāri š-šar'iyyah wa 'iḥtirami l-qānūn.

I, in my capacity as the president of the republic, and by virtue of the powers conferred upon me by the constitution as the arbitrator among authorities, have indeed reiterated, and will continue to do so, that sovereignty is to the people, and I will always adhere to their right to exercise the freedoms of opinion and expression, as long as it is practiced within the framework of legitimacy and respect of the law.

(MI.27:111)

لقد طلبت من الحكومة، التقدم باستقالتيها اليوم، وسوف أكلف الحكومة الجديدة، اعتباراً من الغد، بتكليفات واضحة ومحددة، للتعامل الحاسم مع أولويات، المرحلة الراهنة

la-qad ʔalabtu mina l-ḥukūmah at-taqadumi bi-stiqālatihā l-yawm, wa sawfa ʔukallifu l-ḥukūmata l-jadīdah, i ʔtibāran mina l-ḡad bi-taklīfātin wāḡiḡatin wa muḡaddadah li-l-ta ʔāmulī l-ḡāsīmī ma ʔa awlawiyāt al-marḡalati r-rāḡinah.

I have indeed requested the government to submit its resignation today and will charge the new government effective tomorrow with clear and precise instructions for dealing decisively with the priorities of the current stage.

2.5.3. Multi-modal markers of power in the first speech of Mubarak: Backdrop and Stumbling

Mubarak delivered this speech from his presidential palace, standing, and wearing a grey suit; his carefully combed and youthfully dyed hair sharply belied the deep wrinkles on his face, the difficulty with which he was trying to open his eyes, and his tired, hoarse, and sometimes rattling voice. He stumbled at four instances in this speech, the propositional content of which can be proven unsubstantiated.

He first stumbled over the two words *kay yaṣna ʔū* (to make)), when he was saying that Egyptian youth were the dearest wealth Egypt had and that it was looking forward to them to make its future (M1.14:112):

(M1.14:112)

إِنَّ شِبَابَ مِصْرَ، هُوَ أَعْلَى مَا لَدَيْهَا، وَهِيَ تَنْتَظِعُ إِلَيْهِمْ (كُن) كِي يَصْنَعُوا مُسْتَقْبَلَهَا
*ʔinna šabāba miṣr huwa ʔaḡlā mā ladayhā, wa hiya tataḡalla ʔu ilay-him kay yaṣna ʔū (XXX)
mustaqbalahā*

The youth of Egypt are indeed its dearest wealth and it is looking up at them to make its future

Gelvin argues that Egyptian youth resorted to the virtual cyberspace of the internet in order to create an alternative community of protest, after they were not allowed any space in the real 'grim political sphere' they were living in (2015: 55); they were politically alienated, not only in Egypt, but in the whole Arab world which was 'a veritable kingdom of the old', with its most influential six presidents over sixty, by 31 December 2010 (Owen 2012: 172).

Second, Mubarak stumbled over the word *inḡaztu* (I have sided) when he was saying that he had always sided with the poor (M1.16:113):

(M1.16:113)

لقد (إنح) إنحزْتُ وسوف أظلُّ، للفقراءِ من أبناءِ الشعبِ على الدوامِ، مقتنعاً، بأنَّ الاقتصادَ أكبرُ وأخطرُ من أن يُتركَ
للاقتصاديينَ وحْدَهُمْ
la-qad inḥaztu (XXX) wa sawfa aẓal li-l-fuqarā'i min 'abnā'i š-ša'b 'alā d-dawām,
muqtani'an bi-'anna l-iqtisād a'kbaru wa 'axtaru min an yutraka li-l-iqtisādiyyīna
waḥdahum

I have indeed taken the side of the poor people, all the time, and I will continue to do so, because I am convinced that economy is too big and dangerous to be left to economists alone

International reports confirm that the gap between the rich and the poor became the widest and deepest during the rule of Mubarak (Owen 2012: 67-8); that Mubarak's family, associates, and cronies were the main source of corruption in the country; and that one of the striking examples in which Mubarak acted against the national economic interest of Egypt and the Egyptians was when he sold Egyptian natural gas to Israel at lower than the world market price, in a secretive deal brokered by his close friend Raafat Salem and executed by an offshore company owned by his son Gamal (Owen 2012: 181).

Third, Mubarak stumbled over the word *wa-l-kifāh* (and struggle) when he was saying that the only way to achieve 'our goals' was hard work and struggle (M1.24:114):

(M1.24:114)

إنَّ خيارَنا وأهدافَنا، هي التي ستحدُّ مصائرنا ومستقبلنا، وليسَ أماننا من سبيلٍ لتحقيقها، سوى بالوعي، والعملِ
و(الكف) الكفاحِ
'inna xiyārānā wa 'ahdāfanā hiya llatī sa-tuḥadidu maṣā'iranā wa mustaqbalanā, wa
laysa 'amāmanā min sabīlin li-taḥqīqihā siwā bi-l-wa'yī wa-l-'amali wa-l-kifāh [XXX]

Our choices and goals are indeed what will determine our fates and future; we have no way to achieve them other than awareness, work, and struggle

Gelvin contends that although forty-four percent of Egyptians worked more than one job, they counted as poor or extremely poor, with '2.6 million people so destitute that their entire income cannot cover their basic food needs' (2015: 39-40); on the other extreme, the ruling NDP party of Mubarak was an exclusive 'club whose board divided political and economic spoils among themselves' (Owen 2012: 53).

Fourth, Mubarak stumbled over the two words *wa'innanī mutaḥamilan* (shouldering my), when he was saying that he was going to shoulder his 'first responsibility' for safeguarding the security of Egypt and Egyptians (M1.26:115):

(M1.26:115)

وإنني (محت) مُتَحَمِّلاً مسؤوليتي الأولى، في الحفاظ على أمن الوطن والمواطنين، لن أسمح بذلك أبداً، لن أسمح لهذا الخوف أن يستحوذ على مواطنينا، ولهذا التحسب، أن يلقي بظلاله على مصيرنا، ومستقبلنا.
wa'innanī mutaḥamilan (XXX) mas'ūliyatī al-'ulā fi l-ḥifāzī 'alā 'amni l-waṭan wa l-muwāṭinīn, lan asmaḥa bi-dālika 'abadan. lan asmaḥa lihāda l-xawf an yastahwida 'alā muwāṭinīnā, wa lihāda t-taḥasub an yulqiya bi-ḥilālihi 'alā maṣīrina wa mustaqbalina
 shouldering my first responsibility of safeguarding the security of the homeland and citizens, I will indeed never allow that. I will never allow this fear to obsess our citizens nor that apprehension to cast its shadows on our fate and future.

International correspondents stated that it was Mubarak and his regime who adopted the 'burnt land' policy, during the Egyptian Revolution, by cutting communication, withdrawing the police from the streets and police stations, opening prisons, and employing hired muscle to attack the protesters and civilian people (Reuters 2012, January 24; Steinvorth & Windfuhr 2011, January 30; CNN 2011, February 2; El-Amrani 2011, January 28; Finley 2011, January 28; AP 2011, February 2; Ackerman 2011, February 2; RT 2011, February 2; Ghonim 2012a: 287, 299, 301, 325, 356-7 & 359; Owen 2012: 188; Gelvin 2015: 44 & 53).

Mubarak thus stumbled in his first speech when he was expressing unsubstantiated propositional content. This conclusion can also be related to the fact that he avoided looking straight at the camera, or the eye of his imagined interlocutors, most of the time, while delivering this speech: he kept looking instead to the right, left, and upwards excessively, although he had no audience around him to look at, as he was delivering the speech from the studio attached to his presidential palace (El Manawy 2012:178).

2.5.4. Frame analysis of the first speech of Mubarak

Mubarak activated thirteen frames in his first speech: seven to stir the fears of the people and at the same time demonize the protesters (M1.3:23; M1.14:66; M1.19:85; M1.24:37; M1.25:78; M1.26:79; M1.27:27) and six to represent himself positively (M1.12:63; M1.13:83; M1.15:67; M1.16:68; M1.21:86; M1.23:31). This section analyses those frames, in terms of the pragmatic functions they were assigned, the linguistic devices Mubarak employed within them, and whether those devices succeeded or failed to perform their intended functions.

First, the pragmatic function of the Slippery-Slope frame (M1.3:23), through which Mubarak attempted to stir the fears of the people by arguing that they were in *zarfīn daqīq* (delicate situation), was weakened by the implicature generated by his call upon all the people, not only the protesters, to have *waqfatan jādatan wa-ṣādiqatan ma ‘a n-naḥs tatawaxā salāmata l-qāṣd wa ṣāliḥa l-waṭan* (a serious and honest stance with the self that seeks good intent and the interests of the homeland). That call generated the three deniable implicatures that Egyptians were neither serious nor honest with themselves, that they were ill-intentioned, and that they were not seeking the interests of Egypt, otherwise the call Mubarak made upon them would be irrelevant.

Second, the pragmatic function of the More-Democracy frame (M1.12:63), through which Mubarak attempted to establish a bond with the protesters by arguing that their protests were expressing legitimate aspirations, was weakened by three linguistic features: qualifiers, implicative relations, and weak verbs. In terms of qualifiers, the indefinite qualifier *مزيد* *mazīdīn* (more), in the phrase *mazīdīn minā d-dīmuqrāṭīyah* (more democracy), generated the two implicatures that Mubarak had already established democracy before the protests, and that the protesters were asking for more of that existing democracy. Similarly, the definite qualifier *المزيد* *al-mazīdī* (more), in the phrase *al-mazīdī minā l-isrā‘i fī juḥūdi muḥāṣarati l-biṭālah* (more acceleration of the efforts of besieging unemployment), generated three implicatures: (1) Mubarak had already started ‘besieging’ unemployment, (2) he had done so in an accelerated manner, and (3) the protesters were not content with the pace of that accelerated besieging and were demanding ‘more’ of that acceleration. The third linguistic device that weakened the pragmatic function intended by this frame was the weak noun *محاصرة* *muḥāṣarati* (besieging), which demonstrated that the ultimate goal of Mubarak was besieging unemployment, not eliminating, or at least reducing, it, a goal that was neither revolutionary, nor even strong, enough to appease the protesters. These three linguistic devices sent the messages that Mubarak was not only misrepresenting the political situation in Egypt prior to the revolution, but also the demands of the protesters, and hence cast doubts on his sincerity and weakened the bonding function he intended by this frame.

Third, the pragmatic function of the President-of-the-People frame (M1.13:83), through which Mubarak attempted to empathize with the people by repeating twice that he knew well their legitimate aspirations, pain, and suffering; that he had never been detached from those pains and suffering; and that he had been working on solving them on a daily basis, was weakened

by three linguistic devices: contrastive connectives, negatives, and abstract language. First, the contrastive connective لَكِنَّ *lakinna* (but), which denies not only its preceding clause, but also its ‘entire preceding set of statements’ (Tannen 1979:170), cancelled the above-mentioned six repeated propositions and hence undermined Mubarak’s attempt to elongate their retention in the minds of the people. Second, given that a negative is generally used only when its affirmative would otherwise be expected (Tannen 1979: 170) and that it ‘indicates that an expected action failed to take place’ (ibid:161), the three negatives لَمْ أَنْفَصِلْ عَنْهَا يَوْمًا *lam ’anfaṣil ’anhā yawman* (I have never been detached from them for a single day), اللُّجُوءُ إِلَى الْعَنْفِ *lan yuḥaqqiquhu l-lugū’u ilā l-’unf* (will not be achieved by resorting to violence), and لَنْ تَصْنَعُهُ *lan taṣna’ahu l-fawḍā* (nor will they be accomplished by chaos) suggested that Mubarak was expecting the corresponding affirmatives of those negatives. Furthermore, the three negatives were then cancelled by their succeeding emphatic contrastive connective وَإِنَّمَا *wa ’innama* (but) which further confirmed their corresponding affirmatives, instead of negating them. Third, the two solutions suggested by Mubarak were phrased as two generic, abstract noun phrases, i.e. الْحَوَارِ الْوَطْنِي *al-ḥiwāru l-waṭanī* (national dialogue) and الْعَمَلُ الْمَخْلَصُ الْجَادُّ *al-’amal al-muxliṣ al-jād* (sincere, hard work), the former was a cliché repeated too frequently that it lost its meaning (Owen 2012: 173- 6), and the second was too vague to suggest any concrete meaning, let alone a specific action plan at that time of national crisis.

Fourth, the pragmatic function of the Valuable-Youth frame (M1.14:66), through which Mubarak attempted to establish a bond with the protesting youth, by describing them as the most valuable thing Egypt has, was weakened by two paralinguistic and linguistic features: stumbling and implicative evaluative language. First, given, that stumbles are a scientifically and criminologically proven indicator of deception (Gamson, Gottesman, Milan, Weerasuriya 2012: 3), Mubarak’s stumble while praising the youth, as indicated by the triple X within the extract, suggested that he was not telling the truth. Second, the evaluative cluster of the six negative verbal and nominal phrases, i.e. تَرَبَّأُ بِهِمْ *tarba’u bi-him* (it distances them from), يَنْدَسُ *yandassa baynahum* (sneak among them), نَشْرُ الْفَوْضَى *našri l-fawḍā* (spreading anarchy), نَهَبِ الْمَمْتَلَكَاتِ الْعَامَّةِ وَالْخَاصَّةِ *nahb l-mumtalakāti l-’āmmati wa-l-xāṣah* (plundering public and private properties), إِشْعَالِ الْحَرَائِقِ *iš’āli l-ḥarā’iq* (setting arson attacks), and هَدْمِ مَا بَنَيْنَاهُ *hadm mā banaynāh* (knocking down what we have built), did not only create and reinforce an air of pejorative connotations, but also generated the deniable, accusatory implicatures that the protesters were anarchists, looters, saboteurs, and arson attackers; otherwise, it would be irrelevant for Mubarak to admonish the protesters not to be so. Mubarak, therefore, praised

the protesting youth, in this frame, once, while stumbling, and accused them implicitly of committing six criminal activities.

Fifth, the Continuous-Reform frame (M1.15:67), in which Mubarak pledged to ‘continue’ his political, economic, and social reform, is remarkable, in terms of its implicative relations: It is one of two instances, in the whole speech, in which Mubarak admitted implicitly that there was room for improvement in the fields of liberties, democracy, and openness to the outer world, and hence implicating that Egypt under his rule was not free, democratic, modern, or open to the world. Mubarak further weakened that already implicit pledge by employing the noun *muwāsalat* (continuing), which generated the implicature that he had already started political, economic, and social reform, and that all he was pledging to do was continuing that reform.

Sixth, the pragmatic function of the President-of-the-Poor frame (M1.16:68), through which Mubarak attempted to represent himself positively, as the president of the poor, who had always sided with them, and regulated the economic reform policies of the government so as not to increase their suffering, was weakened by four paralinguistic and linguistic features: stumbling, over-qualification, negatives, and weak verbs and adverbs. First, Mubarak stumbled, over the second word of the frame, as indicated by the triple X in the excerpt (M1.16:68), i.e. while uttering the principal verb of the frame *inḥaztu* (I sided with). Such a paralinguistic feature, which is considered a typical indicator of deception (Gamson, Gottesman, Milan, Weerasuriya 2012: 3), aborted his positive-self representation attempt, from the beginning of the frame. Second, Mubarak employed five qualifiers within this short frame: he started it with the emphatic particle *لقد la-qad* (indeed) to confirm his siding with the poor, reinforced it with the qualifying parenthetical phrase *وسوف أظلّ wa sawfa azal* (and will continue to do so) in order to extend the past tense of the verb to the present and future tenses, and emphasized both qualifiers with the temporal adverb *على الدوام ‘alā d-dawām* (all the time); he then employed the two consecutive comparatives *أكبر وأخطر ‘akbaru wa ‘axtaru* (too big and too dangerous) to describe his conception of the impact of the economic reform policies on the poor. That five-layer over-qualification diverted the attention of the people from the propositional content of the frame, directed it towards the qualifiers themselves, and triggered questions about the reasons why Mubarak was employing five emphatic qualifiers and repeating them. Third, Mubarak employed three negatives: two implied in the two comparatives *‘akbaru wa ‘axtaru min an yutraka* (too big and too dangerous to be left) and

one in *kay la tamḏī* (so as not to proceed); such negatives indicated that their ‘affirmative was expected’ (Tannen 1979:148), and suggested that Mubarak did not expect the people to believe his statements about his siding with the poor and hence negated their affirmative expectations and over-emphasized them.

The last unsuccessful linguistic device Mubarak employed in this frame was six weak and passive verbs and adverbs: (1) the weak, past-tense, generic verb *إنحزتُ inḥaztu* (sided with) did not specify any presidential measures or aspects of his claimed siding with the poor; (2) that verb of siding was further weakened by its succeeding mental, non-performative, weak adverb *مقتنعاً muqtanī’an* (convinced), which qualified the already weak verb of siding by denoting a state of mind that is not necessarily associated with an action or action plan; (3) the weak, past-tense verb *حَرَصْتُ ḥariṣtu* (I was keen) sounded passive, timid, and incommensurate with the presidential and constitutional powers that Mubarak was marking in the previous frames; (4) the passive-voice verb *يُترك yutraka* (to be left) cancelled the previous attempts Mubarak made to attribute the agency of regulating economic reform policies to himself, and rendered the process of regulation agentless; (5) the negated weak verb *يَحْتَمِلُهُ yaḥtamiluhu* (endure) generated the two implicatures that (a) Mubarak did not mind the suffering of the people as long as they could endure it, and that (b) he regulated economic reform policies not because he wanted to eliminate or reduce that suffering, but because he did not want it to proceed at a level faster than that they could endure; and (6) the verb *يُزِيدُ yuzidu* (increase) corroborated the negative implicatures triggered by the previous verb *yaḥtamiluhu*, by suggesting that Mubarak regulated economic reform policies, not because he wanted to eliminate or stop the suffering of the people, but because he did not want that suffering to increase. Those five qualifiers, one stumble, three negatives, and six weak verbs and adverbs weakened the pragmatic function of representing Mubarak positively, as the President of the poor.

Seventh, the pragmatic function intended by the Slippery-Slope-II frame (M1.19:85) was weakened by five linguistic devices: deniable implicatures, negatives, contrastive connectives, indefinite nouns, and weak language. First, the call Mubarak made upon the protesters and all Egyptians to consider the interests of Egypt and to defend it, and not to set arson attacks or to vandalize public and private properties generated the four deniable implicatures that both the protesters and all the Egyptian people were not considering the

interests of Egypt, that they were not protecting it, and that they were arson attackers and vandalizers; otherwise, it would be irrelevant for Mubarak to address them with such a call.

Moreover, the negative statement *laysa bi-iṣ'āli l-ḥarā'iq wa l-'i'tidā'i 'alā l-mumtalakāti l-'āmmati wa l-xāṣah, tataḥaqqaqu taṭalu 'ātu miṣra wa 'abnā'ihā* (It is not by setting fires and vandalizing public and private properties that the aspirations of Egypt and its sons can be achieved) indicated that its 'affirmative was expected' (Tannen 1979:148) and hence cast doubts on the judgement of not only the protesters, but also all Egyptians. That negative effect was reinforced by the use of the indefinite noun *taṭalu 'ātu* (aspirations), which generalized, mystified, and hence devalued the aspirations of the Egyptian people. Both the negative statement and the weak indefinite description were then cancelled by the contrastive connective *'innamma* (but), which denied its preceding clause (Tannen 1979: 170) and hence confirmed its corresponding affirmative.

Mubarak concluded this frame with suggesting an alternative solution to protesting, which he phrased in the form of a clutch of three consecutive nouns: الوعي *al-wa'yi* (awareness), الحوار *ḥiwār* (dialogue), and الاجتهاد *al-ijtihād* (endeavour), which all were too abstract and weak to meet the demands of the protesters: the first noun indicated a mental state, not an action; the second is a cliché that had lost its meaning in the Arab world (Owen 2012: 173-176); and the third originated in religion and refers to a jurisprudential act whose doer is rewarded even if they make a mistake, as long as they are well-intentioned.

Eighth, the pragmatic function of the President-by-Divine-Decree frame (M1.21:86), through which Mubarak attempted to triple his power by listing his presidential, divine, and professional authorities, was weakened by five linguistic devices he employed: negatives, qualifiers, contrastive connectives, indefinite descriptive forms, and self-reference.

Mubarak started the frame with the emphasized negative *إني لا أتحدثُ اليكُم اليوم كرئيسٍ للجمهورية* *'innī lā 'ataḥadaṭu 'ilay-kum al-yawm ka-ra'isin li-l-jumhūriyyati faḥasb* (I am indeed not addressing you today as a president of the republic only). Given that a negative statement is used only when 'its affirmative would otherwise be expected' (Tannen 1979: 170), the above-mentioned negative confirmed its corresponding affirmative which Mubarak was trying to negate, i.e. he was addressing the people in his capacity as a president. The weakening effect of that negative was reinforced by the qualifier *فحسب* *faḥasb* (only), which

underplays its preceding statement and marks the ‘expectation that MORE was expected’ (ibid: 153); that qualifier created the impression that Mubarak expected the people to think that he had not fulfilled his role as a president, hence he accumulated divine and professional authorities in the rest of the utterance, in an attempt to anchor and buttress his insufficient presidential authority. Both the negative and the qualification were then cancelled by the contrastive connective *وإنما* *wa innammā* (but) which does not only deny its preceding clause, but its entire preceding set of statements (ibid: 170).

The pragmatic function of empowering himself with multiple layers of power, which Mubarak intended by this frame, was particularly undermined by his employment of the two indefinite nouns *رئيسٍ* *ra'īsīn* (a president) and *مصريٍ* *miṣriyyīn* (an Egyptian man) to describe himself: both indefinite descriptive forms had the accumulative effect of discursively weakening his claimed presidential and divine authorities and making them sound less specific, less emphatic, less forceful, and hence less powerful. The first indefinite noun represented him not as THE only one current President of Egypt, but as an unmarked president, who was not different from any other former or future president; the second indefinite noun represented him as an ordinary Egyptian man, not as THE only one Egyptian man singled out by Fate to be THE President, as he was trying to argue.

Ninth, the Road-to-Reform frame (M1.23:31), through which Mubarak attempted to establish a bond with the protesters, by arguing that he had already started the reform process they were calling for, and by admitting indirectly that more could be done in the fields of democracy, freedoms, unemployment, living standards, services, and poverty, was undermined by three linguistic devices he employed: negatives, repetitions, and weak language.

Mubarak started this frame with two emphatic negatives that repeated his denial of any potential *رجوع* *rujū'a* (retrogradation) or *ارتدادٍ* *irtidādin* (retrogression) on the ‘road to reform’. Given that a negative ‘expresses the defeat of an expectation that something would happen’ (Labov 1972: 380-381) and that a repetition represents ‘a departure from straight narrative syntax’ (Tannen 1979: 167), those two negatives and the repetition of two semantically related nouns combined to direct the attention of the people towards thinking about the expectation that was defeated and the reason behind such a syntactic deviation, and hence emphasized their corresponding affirmatives and suggested paradoxically that Mubarak had expected the people to believe that there were going to be retrogradation or retrogression.

Moreover, the rhetorical effect Mubarak intended by starting the frame with the emphatic particle *إنَّ* 'inna and by repeating the two nouns *rujū'a* and *irtidādin* was weakened, first, by the indefiniteness of those two nouns, which made them sound less emphatic and less forceful, and, second, by the negative, regressive meanings of those two nouns, which conflicted with the positive and progressive image Mubarak was trying to depict through the road to reform metaphor.

Furthermore, the pledges of reform which Mubarak made were undermined by the qualifier and the six weak verbs and nouns he employed: The central noun phrase upon which he built the whole frame, i.e. طريق الإصلاح *ṭarīqa l- 'iṣlāḥi* (road to reform) is an abstract, metaphorical road that cannot be specifically defined or practically measured; his intended action plan for reform was based on the weak verbal phrase سنمضي عليه *sa-namḍī 'alihi* (we will go down it), qualified by the indefinite, slow-paced unit of movement خطوات *xuṭūwāṭin* (steps), which showed neither the direction nor the distance of the intended movement; his targeted goals were (1) performing the weak verb تؤكد *tu'akidu* (confirm) on the abstract, non-specific noun احترامنا *iḥtrāmana* (our respect); (2) performing the two weak acts of محاصرة البطالة *muḥāṣarati l-biṭālah* (besieging unemployment) and الوقوف إلى جانب الفقراء *al-wqūfi ilā jānibi l-fuqarā'* (standing beside the poor); and (3) taking new indefinite, non-specific steps خطوات جديدة (new steps) نحو المزيد من الديمقراطية، والمزيد من الحرية للمواطنين *naḥwa l-mazīdi mina d-dīmuqrāṭiyah wa l-mazīdi mina l-ḥurriyyah li-l-mūwāṭinīn* (towards more democracy and more freedom to the citizens). The qualifier المزيد *al-mazīdi* (more) generated the implicature that Mubarak had already established democracy and freedoms, and that all he was pledging to do was new steps towards more of those already existing democracy and freedoms. In a similar vein, the verbal phrase تؤكد احترامنا لاستقلال القضاء *tu'akidu iḥtrāmana l-istiqlāli l-qaḍā'* (confirm our respect for the independence of the judiciary) generated the implicature that Mubarak had already respected the judiciary and was pledging to take new steps towards confirming that respect.

Finally, Mubarak assigned agency, in this important frame, either metaphorically or elusively: The subject who is supposed to perform the acts of respecting the independence of the judiciary and its verdicts, establishing more democracy and liberties, raising living standards, improving services, and standing beside the poor is the indefinite, non-specific, metaphorical noun 'steps', not Mubarak or his government. Similarly, the subject who chose the road to reform that was supposed to lead to and implement the above-listed goals is the most politically problematic pronoun *WE*, whose referent cannot be anchored decisively. Such

weak and metaphorical verbs and nouns were neither clear nor commensurate with the revolutionary momentum, expectations, and demands of the people at the time of the revolution; hence, they weakened the pragmatic function intended by the frame.

Tenth, the Hard-Work frame (M1.24:37), through which Mubarak called upon the protesters to stop their protests and join his national dialogue, was weakened by seven linguistic devices he employed: indefinite, vague descriptive forms; abstract nouns; weak verbs; repetitions; negatives; stumbles; and deniable implicature.

Mubarak started the frame with four indefinite, vague nouns, arguing that *خياراً* *xiyārātānā* (our choices) and *أهدافنا* *'ahdāfanā* (our goals) are what is going to determine *مصائرنا* *maṣā'iranā* (our fates) and *مستقبلنا* *mustaqbalanā* (our future). The indefiniteness and vagueness of those four nuclear nouns mystified them more and made them sound non-specific, non-concrete, and non-practical. Mubarak followed those nouns with the negative *ليس* *laysa* *'amāmanā min sabīlin li-tahqīqihā siwā* (we have no way to achieve them other than) in order to introduce his suggested tripartite solution of *الوعي والعمل والكفاح* *al-wa'yī wa l-'amali wa l-kifāḥ* (awareness, work, and struggle). Given that a negative statement is used when a corresponding affirmative has been mentioned, when the content of such a corresponding affirmative is considered likely, or when the speaker holds the affirmative to be true (Givon 1979 as cited in Wilson 1990), that negative suggested that there are ways to achieve the goals of the people other than the abstract solution of awareness, work, and struggle which Mubarak suggested.

The initial vagueness of the frame was further reinforced by the two weak and passive verbs that Mubarak employed as part of his suggested solution, i.e. *نُحافظُ على ما حققناه* *nuḥāfizu 'alā mā ḥaqqanāh* (maintain what we have achieved) and *ونرعى في عقولنا وضمائرنا مستقبل الوطن* *nar'ā fī 'uqūlinā wa ḍamā'irinā mustaqbala l-waṭn* (keep in our minds and consciences the future of the homeland). The first verb is a non-progressive one concerned with making sure that what has been achieved does not decrease, without necessarily trying to add to or to improve upon it; the second is a non-performative, abstract verb whose domains are the minds and consciences of the people. Finally, the stumble Mubarak made while pronouncing the word *الكفاح* 'struggle' weakened the pragmatic force of the frame and made Mubarak sound hesitant and unsure about what he was saying.

Furthermore, the fact that Mubarak was admonishing the people to adopt awareness, work, and struggle; to safeguard what they had already achieved and to build upon it; and to consider the future of Egypt in their minds and hearts triggered deniable implicatures that cast doubts on their ethics and patriotism; otherwise, Mubarak's call would be irrelevant.

Eleventh, the Slippery-Slope-III frame (M1.25:78), through which Mubarak attempted to infuse fear within the people, was undermined by six linguistic devices: indefinite nouns, inferences, over-qualification, repetition, negatively evaluative language, and performance.

Mubarak started this frame with the emphatic particle *إنَّ* 'inna (indeed), followed by the indefinite noun *أحداث* 'ahdāta (incidents), which he employed as the subject of the frame, in order to argue that those incidents had cast fear and apprehension in the hearts of the overwhelming majority of Egyptians; however, the indefiniteness of this subject weakened its agency and made it sound less specific and less threatening.

Moreover, the over-qualification of the frame, as represented in the emphatic particle *إنَّ* 'inna (indeed), the adjective *الكاسحة* *al-kāsiha* (overwhelming), the qualifier *المزيد* *al-mazīd* (more), the repetition of the negatively evaluative and semantically related nouns of *الخوف* *al-xawf* (fear) and *التحسب* *at-tahasub* (apprehension), and *العنف* *al-'unf* (violence), *الفوضى* *al-fawḍā* (chaos), *التدمير* *at-tadmīr* (destruction), and *التخريب* *at-taxrīb* (sabotage), which all belong to the semantic domains of fear and catastrophe, delineated a frightening picture of a catastrophic situation in which the protesters were committing criminal acts, terrorizing the people, and destroying the country. However, the exaggerated tone of that argument was foregrounded by the fact that Mubarak based his argument, and the whole frame, on *inferences*, i.e. 'statements which could not be known from observation [...] for example when subjects report characters' thoughts, feelings, and motivations' (Tannen 1979: 173).

Finally, Mubarak employed his voice in a performative manner in this frame, making it the most vocally vibrant one in the speech: he paused before and after every word, and elongated and pronounced every evaluative word slowly and emphatically, which gave those words extra weight and significance, and made them sound more frightening. That careful theatrical performance contrasted with his previous stumbles, suggested that he was not spontaneous, cast doubts on his sincerity, and weakened the pragmatic function intended by the frame.

Twelfth, the pragmatic function of the Slippery-Slope-IV frame (M1.26:79), through which Mubarak threatened that he was not going to allow fear to obsess the ‘citizens’, was undermined by five linguistic devices he employed: negatives, repetition, anaphoric *hāda*, evaluative language, and stumbles.

Mubarak started with two consecutive negatives: the qualified negative *لن أسمح بذلك أبداً lan asmaḥa bi-dālika ‘abadan* (I will never ever allow that), followed by the more elaborative one *لن أسمح لهذا الخوف أن يستحوذ على مواطنينا lan asmaḥa li-hāda l-xawfan yastahwiḍa ‘alā muwātinīnā* (I will never allow this fear to obsess our citizens), which instead of confirming the first, reinforced the impression that Mubarak expected the people to think that he was going to allow the negated scenario to happen, because a negative is used when a corresponding affirmative has been mentioned, when the content of such a corresponding affirmative is considered likely, or when the speaker holds the affirmative to be true (Givon 1979 as cited in Wilson 1990). Moreover, Mubarak’s employment of the anaphoric *هذا hāda* (this), which indicates ‘that this “frame” has been in the speaker’s mind even though [s]he has not mentioned it overtly’ (Tannen 1979: 148), suggested that the fear and apprehension, argued by Mubarak to be in the hearts of the people, were in reality in his own mind.

Furthermore, the negatively evaluative language Mubarak employed in this frame, i.e. the nouns *الخوف al-xawf* (fear) and *التحسب at-tahasub* (apprehension) and the verbs *يستحوذ yastahwiḍa* (obsess) and *يلقى بظلاله yulqiya bi-ẓilālihi* (cast its shadows) delineated a frightening image of fear as a gigantic ghost that was about to haunt the people and cover them with its shadows; an image that exaggerated the feelings of fear which Mubarak was trying to stir in the people and justified his interference with whatever measures it might take, in order to free Egypt and ‘the citizens’ from that fear.

Finally, voice played an important role in weakening this frame and undermining its pragmatic function, in two different ways. First, Mubarak stumbled, at the beginning of the frame, while uttering the central word *مُتَحَمِّلاً mutaḥamilan* (shouldering), which resulted in weakening the force of the threat he was supposed to be performing by that utterance, and in presenting Mubarak in a non-threatening, and even laughable, position. Second, Mubarak stressed the two words *أسمح asmaḥa* (allow) and *الخوف al-xawf* (fear) emphatically, by elongating them and pronouncing them slowly and carefully, in order to emphasize his authority, in the former, and exaggerate the intensity of fear, in the latter. However, the fact that Mubarak stumbled a

few seconds earlier, at the beginning of the frame, detracted from the emphasis he laid on those two words and weakened the pragmatic functions they were supposed to perform.

Thirteenth, the Slippery-Slope-V frame (M1.27:27) is the most important one in the speech; it contained the decision of sacking the government, which was one of the demands of the protesters. However, the reconciliatory function intended by this frame was undermined by four linguistic devices: repetitions, over-qualifications, negatives, and deniable implicatures.

Mubarak made six repetitions in this short, final frame: he repeated twice that he was going to defend the security and stability of Egypt and Egyptians, repeated the noun أمن *'amn* (security) twice and its derivative أمان *'amān* (safety) twice, and used the two closely related words المسؤولية *al-mas'ūliyatu* (responsibility) and الأمانة *al-'amānah* (trust). Although repetition elongates the repeated message in the memory and hence is a useful strategy for reinforcing the communicated message, over-repetition 'not only fails to further improve memory, but actually reverses and eliminates the benefits that brief periods of repetition impart on long-term semantic memory' (Kuhl & Anderson 2011: 964); it diverts the attention of the receiver from the repeated content of the message and directs it to the function intended by the repetition (ibid: 970, 971).

Moreover, the emphatic negative أنني لن أتهاون في اتخاذ أية قراراتٍ *'annanī lan 'atahāwan fī itixāḍi 'ayyati qarārātin* (I will not indeed hesitate to take any decisions) suggested its corresponding affirmative, i.e. Mubarak expected the people to think that he would hesitate to take such decisions. That corresponding affirmative was also reinforced by the heavy qualification Mubarak employed in the frame: he started it with the emphatic particle لقد *la-qad* (indeed) to confirm that he had sacked the government, employed the emphatic particle أنني to emphasize the negative, used the qualifier أية *'ayyati* (any) to confirm unreservedly that all decisions were on the table, and employed the qualifier كل *kulli* (every) to extend the coverage of security to all Egyptian men and women. Finally, Mubarak's repetition of his intention to defend the security, stability, and safety of Egypt and Egyptians generated the deniable implicature that the protesters were representing a threat to Egypt and Egyptians and justified his threats not to allow that to happen.

3. The Second speech of Mubarak

3.1. Structures of society: Dialectic Socio-Political Relations of Power

Although the second speech was delivered three days only after the first, those three days were very eventful that they tipped the balance of power drastically in favour of the protesters.

The first speech of Mubarak disappointed the protesters, as it did not only disregard their demands for dissolving the parliament, sacking the cabinet, and amending the constitution, but also demonstrated that 'Mubarak was too stubborn and disrespectful of the people to understand the seriousness of the situation' (El Manawy 2012: 177, 183, 204, 244, 255). Thousands of people responded, to the speech, by taking to the streets in solidarity with the protesters. Protests on the day of delivering this speech, i.e. February 1, were massive: AP described them as the largest and most organized since the beginning of the revolution; Reuters estimated the number of protesters in Tahrir Square only by more than 200.000; the BBC reported the number to be between 100.000 and 250.000; and Al Jazeera reported that the number of the protesters in Tahrir Square and central Cairo was over one million. Similar massive protests took place in Alexandria, Suez, and other governorates all over the country (Reuters 2012, January 24; Al Jazeera 2011, February 2).

Authorities responded to the spread of the protests by extending the curfew twice: imposing it from 04:00 pm till 07:00 am first, then from 03:00 pm till 08:00 am. Nevertheless, tens of thousands of protesters defied the curfew, took over the streets (Reuters 2012, January 24), and started an open sit-in in Tahrir Square (Ghonim 2012a: 343). Opposition forces called for a country-wide public strike on Monday and a million-man-march to the presidential palace, the Parliament, and the TV headquarters on Tuesday (Ghonim 2012a: 345; Associated Press 2011, January 31; Al Jazeera Live Blog 2011, January 30). By the time Mubarak delivered this speech, the death toll among the protesters was at least 100 (Reuters 2011, January 29).

Mubarak was not losing power and control over the street only, but also on other very critical fronts. The police apparatus collapsed by the evening of January 28 (Gelvin 2015: 53; El Manawy 2012: 8, 151-3). Head of the News Sector in the State TV, Abdul Lateef El

Manawy, reports that Mubarak suspected a military coup was underway, and privately blamed the Minister of Defence, Field Marshal Tantawy, for not deploying the army forces in a timely manner and for not taking decisive measures to stop the protests on the first two days of the revolution. Mubarak thus ordered State Security to tap the phones of all the members of the Military Council and asked his close ally and Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Sami Annan, to truncate his visit to Washington D.C. and return to Cairo immediately (Bumiller 2011, January 28; El Manawy 2012: 223).

In an attempt to peacefully withdraw the powers of his Minister of Defence, Mubarak offered Tantawy to be his Vice-President, then, Prime Minister, on 29 January 2011, but Tantawy declined both offers. Mubarak became furious and asked Tantawy to leave the Presidential Palace immediately, head for his house, and wait there, which technically meant sacking him and putting him under house arrest. Tantawy, however, defied the orders of Mubarak and left the Presidential Palace to the Center of the Command of the Armed Forces (CCAF) and stayed there. El Manawy argues that Mubarak realized at that point that he could not sack Tantawy; he visited CCAF in the morning of the following day, in an attempt to resolve or at least contain the conflict with him. After Mubarak left CCAF, Tantawy visited the TV building, shook hands with the protesters and the people in Tahrir Square, and ordered the video tape of that visit to be broadcast on state TV, in defiance of Mubarak (El Manawy 2012: 221-224).

Those unfavourable developments forced Mubarak to adopt a carrot-and-stick approach: He sacked his Prime Minister; ordered a cabinet reshuffle; appointed a Vice-President, for the first time in his thirty-year rule (Reuters 2012, January 24); deployed more military forces in Cairo and helicopters and fighters over Tahrir Square (ibid); allowed the continuation of the escape of thousands of prisoners to terrorize civilians and spread chaos (Ghonim 2012a: 342); stopped the broadcast of Al Jazeera Channel in Egypt; closed all the roads leading to the capital Cairo; and shut down railroads all over the country (Ghonim 2012a: 345). Those measures proved unsuccessful, as millions of protesters kept demonstrating in Cairo and other cities demanding the departure of Mubarak.

3.2. Structure of the second speech

The second speech is divided structurally into three sections, each beginning with the vocative *al-`ixwah al-muwāṭinūn* (Brother citizens). Thematically, the speech can be thought of as consisting of three layers, corresponding to its three sections: the first stirs the fears of the

people; the second represents Mubarak positively, and deprives him of his powers and accedes to the demands of the protesters, in a hedged manner; and the third stirs the personal and nationalistic emotions of the people. Mubarak therefore sandwiched the compromises he made to the protesters between intense fear and emotions. The speech is bracketed with two appeals to the religious sense of the people, i.e. the opening Qur'ānic starter *bi-smi llāhi r-rahmāni r-rāhīm* (In the name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful) and the concluding Islamic greeting of departure *as-salāmu 'alaikum wa rahmatu llāhi wa barakātuh* (peace and blessings of Allah be upon you).

Mubarak followed the opening Islamic starter, which set the tone of the speech as one of formality and seriousness, and represented him as a pious man seeking the blessing of God, with a marking of his legal power, by addressing the people with the legal vocative *al-'ixwah al-muwāṭinūn* (Brother Citizens), which set the relationship between him and the people as one between the President and his citizens.

Mubarak then started an extended appeal to fear, consisting of five consecutive appeals, the first and last of which aimed solely at stirring the fears of the people, whereas the three appeals in the middle mixed fear with positive-other representation followed by negative-other representation: the protests were 'testing Egypt and its people' and were about to over-sweep both of them to the 'unknown'; the protests were started by 'honourable youth and citizens', but were soon 'exploited' by violent, confrontational anarchists; the protests were turned from 'an elegant and civilized manifestation of practicing the freedoms of opinion and expression', to 'unfortunate confrontations' steered and controlled by inciters, looters, arson attackers, saboteurs, road blockers, and vandalizers; Mubarak and the people were living 'painful days', obsessed with concern, anxiety, and premonition of what 'the future hides' for them, their families, and their country; because of all those fears, both the people and the armed forces had to deal with the situation wisely and patriotically. That complex appeal to fear performed four functions: evoking and intensifying fear in the minds of the people, dividing their front into good and bad protesters, demonizing the bad protesters, and implicitly representing the armed forces and the people negatively.

The second section contained the most important proposition in the speech, i.e. Mubarak's decision not to step down immediately and to stay in power till the end of his presidential term. He embedded that critical statement, which was against the demands of the protesters, between

four preparatory preceding paragraphs, and five emphatic succeeding ones. Two of the four preceding utterances divided the people by praising the protesters and mildly criticizing ‘some political forces’ whom Mubarak did not identify; the other two represented Mubarak positively as a patriotic, reformist, responsible, and trust-worthy president, who was not aspiring to power. Mubarak then expressed that important statement in a challenging style, and followed it with five paragraphs that marked his power, but in a hedging manner that made such a marking look like a response to the demands of the protesters. He concluded the section with a soft relinquishing of his power, mixed with a religious appeal.

Mubarak started the second section with the same appeal to his legal power, by addressing the people with the vocative *’ayuha l-’ixwah al-muwāṭinūn* (O Brother citizens), followed it with a juxtaposition of a positive-self representation with a negative-other representation, by depicting himself as the responsive President who formed a new government in response to the demands of 'our youth', and instructed the Vice-President to hold a national dialogue with all political forces, but ‘some political forces’ were unpatriotic, prioritized their own agendas, and refused his invitation, leaving him no option other than resorting to the people and addressing them directly through this speech.

Mubarak reinforced his previous positive image with two other positive-self representations. The first listed five premises in order to draw the conclusion that he should stay in power: he had never been a 'seeker of power or authority', he had offered Egypt a lot in war and peace, he was a son of the armed forces, he had never betrayed trust nor abandoned responsibility or duty; therefore, it was his prime responsibility to stay in power, in order to protect Egypt and Egyptians, restore the security and stability of the country, and ensure a peaceful transition of power to whom the people would choose in the coming presidential elections. The second positive-self representation was mixed with an emotional appeal that depicted Mubarak as an honest man who was not intending to nominate himself for the new presidential elections, because he had spent enough of his life serving Egypt and ‘its people’, 'but' now he wanted to conclude his service to the country in a way that would ensure the delivery of ‘the banner’ and ‘the trust’ in a constitutional and legitimate manner that would guarantee the ‘dignity’, ‘stability’ and ‘security’ of the homeland.

Abruptly, the speech took a completely different turn when Mubarak switched from that soft emotional tone he had been adopting to a defiant, threatening one, by using the challenging

clause *'aqulu bi- 'ibārātin wāḍiḥa* (I am saying in unequivocal sentences) to start the utterance that expressed his decision to stay in power till the end of his presidential term, and by concluding the same utterance with the power-marking prepositional phrase *bi-mujabi mā yuxawiluhu liya ad-dustūr min ṣalāḥiyāt* (according to the powers conferred upon me by the Constitution).

Mubarak escalated that power-marking tone in the following five sub-sections, by issuing directives to the different bodies of the state: 'inviting' the parliament to 'discuss' amending the constitution; 'demanding' the parliament to 'abide by the verdicts of the judiciary'; promising to 'follow up on' the new performance of the new government, so as to ensure that it would express 'the people and their aspirations'; 'instructing' the police apparatus to 'serve' and 'protect' the citizens 'with complete respect for their rights, freedoms, and dignity'; and 'demanding' the supervisory and judiciary authorities to 'continue' pursuing the corrupt and investigating those who caused the security disarray.

He concluded this section on a soft tone that mixed an emotional appeal with a religious one, by describing his directives as a pledge to the people, and praying to Allah to help him fulfil that pledge, so as to conclude his offering to 'Egypt and its people' in a manner that would satisfy Allah, the homeland, and 'its sons'.

The third and last section consists of three intense emotional appeals, two nationalistic and one personal, followed by two short appeals to fear and religion. Mubarak started the section with the same marking of his legal power, by addressing the people with the vocative *'ayuha l- 'ixwatu l-muwāṭṭinūn* (O Brother citizens), following it with a nationalistic, optimistic, emotional appeal in which he confirmed that Egypt would survive those circumstances stronger, more confident, more unified, and more stable and that its people would be 'more aware of what would realize their interests' and 'keener on not waiving their future and destiny'.

Mubarak followed that short, nationalistic, emotional appeal with a longer, subtler, personal, emotional one, in which he distanced himself from Hosni Mubarak the President and spoke as Hosni Mubarak the old man, who was proud of the long years he had spent serving 'Egypt and its people', fighting for its sake, and defending its land, sovereignty, and interests, and who was not requesting more than being allowed to die and be buried in his homeland, like any other 'Egyptian man or woman.' He followed that personal emotional appeal with another

nationalistic emotional one, in which he praised Egypt as an eternal, noble homeland, whose banner had been passed among the hands of its generations, and hence it was the responsibility of this generation to guarantee the continuation of that tradition, with pride, honour, and dignity.

He concluded this section and the speech with two appeals to religion, through which he prayed to Allah to protect 'this homeland and its people' and greeted the people with the Islamic greeting of departure.

To sum up, the first section of the speech acted as an introduction that raised the fears of the people and intensified them, in order to prepare for introducing the power of Mubarak, in the second section, as the solution to that fear, by representing him as the strong, defiant president who was staying in office till the end of his term and who was not only in control of all the bodies of the state, but also was issuing instructions to them. The third section mitigated that power and covered the flaws implied in the hedges Mubarak made, by heightening the personal, nationalistic, and religious emotions of the people.

3.3. Structures of power

3.3.1. Linguistic manifestations of power: Deictic and anaphoric analysis of the second speech of Mubarak

3.3.1.1. First-person singular pronoun 'I'

Mubarak used the first-person singular pronoun 'I' thirty-nine times in his second speech in order to perform three functions: anchoring and marking his power, representing himself positively and his opponents negatively, and stirring the feelings of pity in the people.

The first function Mubarak employed the first-person singular pronoun *I* to perform was establishing his authority, at the beginning of the speech, by setting the relation between himself and the people as one between the President and his citizens (M2.3:1). He then used *I* to mark his power by issuing direct executive orders to the parliament, the government, the police apparatus, and the supervisory and judiciary authorities (M2.14:2; M2.15:3; M2.16:4; M2.17:5; M2.18:6) and by indirectly flagging up his constitutional powers against whoever would oppose his stay in office (M2.13:7).

(M2.3:1)

أتحدثُ إليكم، في أوقاتٍ صعبةٍ، تمتحنُ مصرَ وشعبَها، وتكادُ أن تتجرفَ بها وبهم، إلى المجهول.
'ataḥadaṭu ilai-kum fī awqātin ṣa'bah tamtaḥīnu miṣra wa ṣa'baha wa takādu 'an tanjarifa bihā wa bihim ilā l-majhūl.

I am addressing you at critical times that are testing Egypt and its people and are about to over-sweep both of them into the unknown.

(M2.14:2)

إنني أدعو البرلمانَ بمجلسَيْه، إلى مناقشةِ تعديلِ المادتين "76" و"77" من الدستور، بما يعدلُ شروطَ الترشيحِ لرئاسةِ الجمهورية، ويعتمدُ فتراتٍ محددةً للرئاسة.

'innanī 'ad'ū l-barlamāna bi-majlisayhi ilā munāqašati ta'dīli l-mādatayin 76 wa 77 mina d-dustūr, bimā yu'addilu šurūṭa t-tarašūhi li-ri'āsati l-jumhūriyya, wa ya'tamidu fatarātin muḥddadatin li-r-ri'āsah.

I do call upon the parliament in both its chambers to discuss amending articles 76 and 77 of the Constitution, in order to amend the conditions of nomination for presidential elections and set specific term limits.

(M2.15:3)

ولكي يتمكنَ البرلمانُ الحاليُّ بمجلسَيْه، من مناقشةِ هذه التعديلاتِ الدستورية، وما يرتبطُ بها من تعديلاتٍ تشريعيةٍ، للقوانينِ الكاملةِ للدستور، وضماناً لمشاركةٍ كافةِ القوي السياسية، في هذه المناقشاتِ فإنني أطلبُ البرلمانَ، بالالتزامِ بكلمةِ القضاءِ وأحكامه، في الطعونِ على الانتخاباتِ التشريعيةِ الأخيرة، دونَ إبطاء.

wa li-kay yatamakana l-barlamānu l-ḥāliu bi-majlisayhi min munāqašati ḥāzihi t-ta'dīlāti d-dustūriyyah, wa ma yartabiṭu bihā min ta'dīlātīn tašrī'iyah li-l-qawānīni l-mukammillati li-d-dustūr, wa ḍamānan li-mušarakati kāfati l-quwā s-siyāsiyah, fī ḥāḍihi l-munāqašāt, fa'innanī 'uṭālibu l-barlamān bi-l-iltizāmi bi-kalimati l-qadā'i wa 'aḥkāmih fi ṭ-ṭu'ūni 'alā l-intixābāti t-tašrī'iyati l-'axīrah, dūna ibṭā'

In order for the current parliament, in both its chambers, to be able to discuss these constitutional amendments as well as the related legislative amendments of the laws that complement the Constitution, and in order to ensure the participation of all political forces in these discussions, I do demand the parliament to abide by the word and verdicts of the judiciary, on the legal contestations made against the latest legislative elections, without delay.

(M2.16:4)

سوف أوالي متابعة تنفيذِ الحكومةِ الجديدةِ لتكليفاتها، على نحوٍ يحققُ المطالبَ المشروعةً للشعب، وأن يأتي أداؤها، معبراً عن الشعب، وتطلعهِ للإصلاحِ السياسي، والاقتصادي، والاجتماعي، ولإتاحة فرص العمل، ومكافحة الفقر، وتحقيق العدالة الاجتماعية.

sawfa 'uwālī mutāba'ata taṅfīdi l-ḥukūmati l-jadīdati li-taklīfātihā, 'alā nahwin yuḥāqiqu l-maṭāliba l-mašrū'ata li-l-ša'b, wa 'an y'atī 'adā'uhā mu'abiran 'ani š-ša'b, wa taṭlu 'ihi li-l-iṣlāhi s-siyāsī wa l-iqtisādī wa l-ijtimā'i, wa li-itāḥat furaṣi l-'amal wa mukāfaḥati l-faqr wa taḥqīqi l-'adālati l-ijtimā'iyah.

I will continue following up on the new government's execution of its assigned duties, in a manner that realizes the legitimate demands of the people, and ensures that its performance expresses the people and their aspirations to establishing political, economic, and social reform; securing job opportunities; fighting poverty; and realizing social justice.

(M2.17:5)

وفي ذاتِ السياق، إنني أكلفُ جهازَ الشرطة، بالاضطلاعِ بدوره في خدمةِ الشعب، وحمايةِ المواطنين، بنزاهةٍ وشرفٍ وأمانةٍ، وبالاحترامِ الكامل، لحقوقهم، وحرّياتهم، وكرامتهم.

wa fī dāti s-siyāq, 'innani 'ukalifu jihāza š-šurtah bi-l-iḍṭilā 'i bi-dawrihi fī xidmati š-ša 'b, wa ḥimāyati l-muwāṭinīn, bi-nazāhatin wa šaraḥīn wa 'amānah wa bi-l-iḥtirāmi l-kāmili li-ḥuqūqihim wa ḥurriyyatihim wa karāmatihim.

Within the same context, I do charge the police apparatus with carrying out its duty in serving the people and protecting the citizens with integrity, honor, and faithfulness and with the complete respect for their rights, freedoms, and dignity.

(M2.18:6)

كما إنني أطالب السلطات الرقابية والقضائية، بأن تتخذَ على الفور، ما يلزمُ من إجراءاتٍ لمواصلة ملاحقة الفاسدين، والتحقيق مع المتسببين، فيما شهدته مصرُ من انفلاتٍ أمني، (وم) ومن قاموا بأعمالِ السلبِ والنهبِ، واشعالِ النيرانِ، وترويعِ الأمنين.

ka-ma 'innani 'uṭālibu l-suluṭāt ar-riqābiyyati wa l-qaḍā'iyah bi'an tataxiḍa 'ala l-fawr mā yalzamu min 'ijrā'ātīn li-muwāṣalati mulāḥaqati l-fāsīdīn wa t-taḥqīqi ma'a l-mutasabibīn fī-mā šahīdat'hu mišru min infilātīn 'amniyin wa man qāmū bi-'a'māli l-salbi wa l-nahb wa iṣ'āli n-nīrān wa tarwī' al'āminīn.

I also do demand the judicial and supervisory authorities to immediately take necessary measures to continue pursuing the corrupt and to investigate who caused what Egypt witnessed of security disarray and who perpetrated acts of robbery, looting, arsons, and terrorization of the peaceful people.

(M2.13:7)

أقولُ بعباراتٍ واضحة، أنني سأعملُ خلالَ الأشهرِ المتبقية، من ولايتي الحالية، كي يتمَّ اتخاذُ التدابيرِ والإجراءاتِ، المحققةً للانتقالِ السلمي للسلطة، بموجبِ ما يخوله لي الدستور، من صلاحيات.

*'aqulu bi-'ibārātīn wāḍiḥa, 'annani sa-'a'malu xilāla l-'ašhuri l-mutabaqiyati min wilāyati l-ḥāliyya, kay ya-timma t-ixāḍu t-tadābīri wa l-ijrā'āt al-muḥaqiqati li-l-intiqāli s-silmi li-l-sulṭah, *bi-mujabi mā yuxawiluhu liya d-dustūr min šalāḥiyāt*

I am saying in unequivocal sentences that I will work in the remaining months of my current term on taking the precautions and measures necessary for the peaceful transition of power, according to the powers conferred on me by the Constitution.

Second, Mubarak employed *I* to represent himself positively and his opponents negatively: He is the responsive, democratic, and reformist president who invited the opposition to dialogue, but because they are unpatriotic exploiters, they refused his invitation and abandoned him in order to achieve their own private agendas (M2.9:8; M2.10:9; M2.11:10; M2.11:11). He is the responsible, God-fearing son of the armed forces who neither betrays nor abandons responsibility, who has exhausted his life serving Egypt and its people in war and peace, whose main responsibility is to restore stability and security and protect the people, who has not intended to nominate himself for a sixth term in presidency, and who wants to stay in power only to ensure the safe transition of power to whom the people would choose (M2.12:12; M2.13:13; M2.22:14). Protesters, on the other hand, are violent, confrontational, and unpatriotic anarchists, inciters,

thieves, looters, arson attackers, road blockers, vandalizers, and exploiters, preying on the constitution that Mubarak is safeguarding (M2.10:15; M2.18:6; M2.4:16; M2.10:17).

(M2.9:8)

لقد بادرتُ لتشكيلِ حكومةٍ جديدةٍ، بأولوياتٍ وتكليفاتٍ جديدةٍ، تتجاوبُ مع مطالبِ شبابنا ورسالتهم، وكلفتُ نائبَ رئيسِ الجمهورية، بالحوارِ مع كافةِ القوي السياسية
la-qad bādartu li-taškīli ḥukūmatin jadīdah, bi-`awlawiyātin jadīdah, tatajāwabu ma`a maṭālībi šabābina wa risālatihim, wa kallaftu nā`iba ra`īsi l-jumhūrīyah bi-l-ḥiwār ma`a kāfati l-quwā as-siyāsīyah

I have indeed taken the initiative of forming a new government, with new priorities and instructions, that respond to the demands of our youth and their message, and I charged the vice-president with holding dialogue with all the political forces

(M2.10:9)

وبالنظرِ لهذا الرفضِ، لدعوتي للحوارِ، وهي دعوةٌ لاتزالُ قائمةً، فإنني أتوجهُ بحديثي اليومِ، مباشرةً لأبناءِ الشعبِ
wa bi-l-naẓari li-hāza r-rafd, li-da`wati li-l-ḥiwār, wa hiya da`watun lā tazālu qā`imah, fa-`innani `atawajahu bi-ḥadīṭi l-yawm mubāṣaratan li-`abnā`i š-ša`b

In response to that rejection, of my invitation to dialogue, which is still extended, I am indeed addressing my speech today directly to the sons of the people

(M2.11:10)

إنني لم أكن يوماً طالبَ سلطةٍ أو جاهٍ، ويعلمُ الشعبُ الظروفَ العصيبةَ، التي تحملتُ فيها المسؤوليةَ، وما قدمتهُ للوطنِ، حرباً وسلاماً. كما أنني رجلٌ من أبناءِ قواتنا المسلحة، وليسَ من طبعي، خيانةُ الأمانة، أو التخلي عن الواجبِ والمسئولية
`innani lam `akun yawman ṭālība sulṭatin aw jāh, wa ya`lamu š-ša`bu ẓ-ẓurūfa l-`aṣībah allati taḥamaltu fīha l-mas`ūliyah, wa ma qadamtuḥu li-l-waṭani ḥarban wa salāman, kama `annani rajulun min rijāli quwātina l-musallaha, wa laysa min ṭab`ī xiyānatu l-`amānah, aw at-taxalli `ani l-wāgibi wa l-mas`ūliyah.

I have indeed never ever been a seeker of authority or power, and the people know the critical circumstances at which I shouldered responsibility, and what I have offered the homeland in war and peace. Also, I am indeed a man of the sons of our armed forces; it is not in my nature to betray trust or abandon duty and responsibility.

(M2.11:11)

إنَّ مسئوليتي الأولى الآن، هي استعادةُ أمنِ واستقرارِ الوطنِ، لتحقيقِ الانتقالِ السلمي للسلطة، في أجواءٍ تحمي مصرَ والمصريين، وتتيحُ تسلمَ المسؤولية لمن يختاره الشعبُ في الانتخاباتِ الرئاسيةِ المقبلة.
`inna mas`ūliyyati al-`ulā al-`ān hiya isti`ādatu `amni wa stiqrāri l-waṭan, li-taḥqīqi l-intiqāli s-silmyī li-l-sulṭah, fi `ajwā`in taḥmī miṣra wa l-miṣriyyīn, wa tuṭīḥu tasalumi l-mas`ūliyyah li-man yaxtāruḥu š-ša`b fi l-intixābāti r-ri`āsiyati l-muqbilah.

My primary responsibility now is indeed restoring the security and stability of the homeland, in order to ensure a peaceful transition of power, in circumstances that protect Egypt and Egyptians and allow receiving the responsibility to whoever the people would choose in the coming presidential elections.

(M2.12:12)

وأقول بكل الصدق، وبصرف النظر عن الظروف الراهنة، أني لم أكن أنتوي الترشح لفترة رئاسية جديدة، فقد قضيتُ ما يكفي من العمر، في خدمة مصر وشعبها، لكنني الآن، حريصٌ كل الحرص على أن أختتم عملي من أجل الوطن، بما يضمن تسليم أمانته ورايته، ومصرٌ عزيزةٌ أمنةٌ مستقرة، وبما يحفظ الشرعية ويحترم الدستور.

wa 'aqulu bi-kulli š-šidq, wa bi-šarfi n-naẓar 'ani z-zarfi r-rāhin, 'anni lam 'akun 'antawi t-tarašuḥa li-fatratin ri 'āsiyatin jadīdah, fa-qd qaḍaytu ma yakfī mina l-'umr, fī xidmati mišra wa-ša'bihā, lakinna-ni l'ana, ḥarīṣun kulla l-ḥirš 'alā 'an 'axtatima 'amali min 'ajli l-waṭan, bi-ma yaḍmanu taslīma 'amānatahu wa rāyatahu, wa mišru 'azīzatan 'āminatan mustaqirah, wa bi-ma yaḥfazū š-šar'iyah wa ya-ḥtarimu d-dustūr.

I am saying with all frankness, and regardless of the current circumstance, that I was not intending to nominate myself for a new presidential term, as I have indeed spent enough of my life at the service of Egypt and its people. But now I am indeed absolutely determined (emotional tone) to conclude my work for the homeland in a way that ensures handing over its trust and banner, while Egypt is honoured, secure, and stable, and in a manner that safeguards legitimacy and respects the constitution.

(M2.13:13)

أقول بعبارات واضحة، أنني سأعملُ خلال الأشهر المتبقية، من ولايتي الحالية، كي يتم اتخاذ التدابير والإجراءات المحققة للانتقال السلمي للسلطة، بموجب ما يخوله لي الدستور، من صلاحيات.

*'aqulu bi-'ibārātin wāḍiḥa, 'annani sa-'a'malu xilāla l-'ašhuri l-mutabaqiyati min wilāyati l-ḥālīyya, kay ya-timma t-ixāḍu t-tadābīri wa l-ijrā'āt al-muḥaqīqati li-l-intiqāli s-silmi li-l-sulṭah, *bi-mujabi mā yuxawiluhu liya d-dustūr min ṣalāḥiyāt.*

I am saying in unequivocal sentences that I will work in the remaining months of my current term on taking the precautions and measures necessary for the peaceful transition of power, according to the powers conferred on me by the Constitution.

(M2.22:14)

إنّ حسني مبارك الذي يتحدث إليكم اليوم، يعتزُّ بما قضاؤه من سنين طويلة، في خدمة مصر وشعبها، إنّ هذا الوطن، العزيز، هو وطني، مثلما هو وطن كل مصري ومصرية، فيه عشت، وحاربتُ من أجله، ودافعتُ عن أرضه، وسيادته، ومصالحه، وعلى أرضه أموت، وسيحكُم التاريخُ على وعلى غيري، بما لنا أو علينا.

'inna Husni Mubārak alladī yataḥadatu 'ilaykum al-yawm ya 'tazu bi-mā qaḍāhu min sinīna ṭawīlah fī xidmati mišra wa ša'bihā. 'inna hāḍa l-waṭan al-'azīz hwa waṭani, miṭlama hwa waṭanu kulli mišriyyin wa mišriyyah, fīhi 'išt, wa ḥārabtu min 'ajlih, wa dāfa'tu 'an 'arḍihi wa siyādatihi, wa maṣāliḥih wa 'alā 'arḍihi 'amūt, wa sayḥkumu t-tārīxu 'alayya wa 'alā ḡayrī bi-mā lanā aw 'alaynā.

Hosni Mubarak who is speaking to you today is indeed proud of the long years he has spent at the service of Egypt and its people. This dear homeland is indeed my homeland, as it is the homeland of every Egyptian man and woman. In it, I have lived; I have fought for its sake; I have defended its land, sovereignty, and interests; and on its soil I die, and history will judge me as well as others for our merits and demerits.

(M2.10:15)

وبالنظر لهذا الرفض، لدعوتي للحوار، وهي دعوة لاتزال قائمة، فإنني أتوجهُ بحديثي اليوم، مباشرةً لأبناء الشعب

wa bi-l-naẓari li-hāza r-rafd, li-da'wati li-l-ḥiwār, wa hiya da'watun lā tazālu qā'imah, fa-'innani 'atawajahu bi-ḥadīṭi l-yawm mubāšaratan li-'abnā' i š-ša'b

In response to that rejection, of my invitation to dialogue, which is still extended, I am indeed addressing my speech today directly to the sons of the people

(M2.4:16)

يتعرضُ الوطنُ لأحداثٍ عصبيةً، واختباراتٍ قاسيةً، بدأتْ بشبابٍ ومواطنينَ شرفاءَ، مارسوا حقهم في التظاهر السلمي، تعبيراً عن همومهم، وتطلعاتهم، سرعان ما استغلهم، من سعي لإشاعة الفوضى، واللجوء إلى العنف والمواجهة، وللقفز على الشرعية الدستورية، والانقضاض عليها.

yata 'araḍu l-waṭanu li'ahdātin 'asībah wa xtibārātīn qāsiyah bada'at bi-šabābin wa muwaṭīnīna šurafā', mārasū ḥaqahum fī t-tazāhuri s-selmi, ta' bīran 'an humūmihim wa taṭalu 'ātīhim, sur 'āna mā staḡallahum man sa 'ā li-išā 'ati l-fawḍā wa l-lujū 'i ilā l-'unfi wa l-muwājaha wa li-l-qafzi 'alā š-šar 'iyati d-dustūriyah wa l-inqīḍādi 'alaihā.

The homeland is experiencing grave events and tough tests, started by honourable youth and citizens who exercised their right to protest peacefully and express their concerns and aspirations, but they were soon exploited by those who sought to spread chaos and resort to violence and confrontation, in order to jump over constitutional legitimacy and pounce upon it.

(M2.10:17)

لكنّ هناك من القوي السياسية، من رفضَ هذه الدعوة للحوار، تمسكاً بأجنداتهم الخاصة، ودون مراعاة للظرف الدقيق الراهن، لمصر وشعبها

lakinna hunāka mina l-quwā s-siyāsiyah, man rafaḍa ḥādīhi d-da 'watu li-l-ḥiwār, tamaskan bi-'aḡindātihim al-xāṣah wa dūna murā 'ātin li-z-ẓarfī d-daqīqi r-rāhin li-miṣra wa ša 'bihā

But, there are some of the political forces who have declined this invitation to dialogue, sticking to their private agendas, with no consideration of the current delicate circumstance of Egypt and its people

The last function Mubarak performed by 'I' was stirring the emotions of pity in the people by strategically relinquishing all his powers, at the end of the speech, and representing himself as an old ordinary Egyptian man who had exhausted his life serving Egypt and its people, fighting for their interests and defending their sovereignty and land, and who was requesting no more than being allowed to die and be buried on the soil of his beloved country (M2.22:14).

To sum up, the principal pragmatic function Mubarak performed by employing the first-person singular pronoun *I* was self-legitimization: he did so by representing himself positively, in nineteen instances; appealing to his constitutional powers, in ten instances; and softening and mitigating the previous two functions by appealing to the emotions of the people, in six instances. He therefore manipulated this 'innocent pronoun' in order to exercise a subtle form of soft power, that started with a positive-self representation in order to legitimize himself, followed by an appeal to his powers in order to threaten the people indirectly, and concluded with an appeal to the pity and fear of the people in order

to mitigate the previous threat, intensify their fear and emotions, and hence justify his power and present himself and his power as the solution that can dispel the fear of the people and prevent the potential chaos.

3.3.1.2. Third-person singular pronoun ‘HE’

Mubarak employed the anaphoric third-person singular pronoun *HE* in a manner that made it referentially and pragmatically synonymous with the deictic first-person singular pronoun *I*, when he used it thrice to encode himself in the penultimate emotional appeal, he made at the end of the speech (M2.22:14). By referring to himself with *HE* instead of *I*, Mubarak detached the man from the president in himself, and hence performed more than one strategic function.

First, such a deictic detachment could be considered as a tactic within the wider strategy of relinquishing power, which Mubarak adopted in this speech, in order to represent himself positively as a non-seeker of power. This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that in the sentence that followed that appeal Mubarak made his most intense emotional appeal in the speech, in which he requested to be treated like an ordinary Egyptian man and be allowed to die and be buried on the soil of Egypt.

Second, the anaphoric *HE* which Mubarak employed instead of the deictic *I* could be considered as an attempt to distance the speaker from the spoken message, and hence add a tone of factual objectivity to the highly personal and subjective content of the message. Finally, given the sensitivity and emotional intensity of the appeal within which this anaphoric-turned-deictic pronoun is employed, on the one hand, and the complexity of the relations of power, on the other, this deictic detachment could be considered as a face-saving tactic that enabled Mubarak the President to speak on the tongue of Mubarak the ordinary Egyptian man, in order to stir the pity of the people with the latter without hurting the presidential pride and ego of the former.

3.3.1.3. First-person plural pronoun ‘WE’: *Classifying WE*

3.3.1.3.1. *First Class WE*

Mubarak employed the *First Class WE*, which encoded himself to the exclusion of everyone else, thrice in the second speech, in order to exercise the moral authority of the godfather or spiritual leader who, in the first instance, had the power to admonish the people and the army that they had to choose between chaos and stability and to act wisely

(M2.7:18) and, in the second instance, who could transcend the turbulent present of the country to foretell a prosperous future in which the people will be more aware of what realizes their own interests and more keen on defending their future (M2.21:19).

(M2.7:18)

إن أحداث الأيام القليلة الماضية، تفرض علينا جميعاً، شعباً وقيادة، الاختيار ما بين الفوضى والاستقرار، وتطرح أمامنا ظروفاً جديدة، وواقعاً مصرياً مغايراً، (يع) يتعين أن يتعامل معه شعبنا، وقواتنا المسلحة، بأقصى قدر من الحكمة، والحرص على مصالح مصر، وأبنائها.

'inna 'ahdāṭi l-'ayāmi l-qalīlati l-māḍiyah tafriḍu 'alainā jamī'an, ša'ban wa qiyādah, al-ixtiyāra mā bayna l-fawḍā wa l-istiqrār, wa taṭraḥu 'amāmanā zurūfan jadīdah, wa wāqi'an mišriyyan muḡāyiran [XXX] yata'aiyanu 'an ya-ta'āmala ma'ahu ša'bunā wa quwātunā l-musallahah bi-aqṣā qadrin mina l-ḥikmah wa l-ḥirši 'alā mašālihi mišra wa 'abnā'ihā.

The events of the last few days do impose upon us all, people and leadership, choosing between chaos or stability, and set in front of us new circumstances and a different Egyptian reality, with which our people and armed forces have to deal, at the highest level of wisdom and keenness on the interests of Egypt and its sons.

(M2.21:19)

ستخرج مصر من الطرف من الظروف الراهنة، أقوى مما كانت عليه قبلها، أكثر ثقة وتماسكاً واستقراراً، سيخرج منها شعبنا، وهو أكثر وعياً بما يحقق مصالحه، وأكثر حرصاً على عدم التقريط في مصيره ومستقبله *sa-taxruju mišra mina z-zurūfi r-rāhinah 'aqwā mi-mmā kānt 'alayhi qablahā, 'aktara tiqatan wa tamāsukan, wa stiqrāran, sayaxruju min-hā ša'buna wa hwa 'aktaru wa 'yan bi-mā yuḥaḡiqu mašāliḡahu wa 'aktaru ḥiršan 'alā 'adami t-tafriṭi fī mašīrihi wa mustaqbalih.*

Egypt will survive these current circumstances stronger than it was before, and more confident, unified, and stable. Our people will become more aware of what realizes their interests and more eager not to waive their destiny and future.

It is worth pointing out that Al Jazeera Channel broadcasted this second speech on a split screen, with Mubarak delivering the speech on the left half of the screen and the protesters in Tahrir Square on the right one. A multi-modal examination of that video, which can be accessed on YouTube, shows that immediately after Mubarak uttered the second instance of this *First Class WE*, the protesters in Tahrir Square became outraged and started waving their flags, and some their shoes, shouting 'depart'. Such an immediate, spontaneous, and adamant rejection demonstrates that the protesters neither believed nor accepted that Mubarak could assume such a kind of spiritual authority.

3.3.1.3.2. *Second Class WE*

Mubarak abandoned the *Second Class WE*, which combined himself and his cabinet in the same deictic field, completely in this speech, in what seems to be an attempt to detach

himself from his own cabinet and to wash his hands of the responsibility for any economic, social, or political problems.

3.3.1.3.3. *Third Class WE*

Mubarak employed the *Third Class WE*, which assimilated himself into the people, in eight instances in his second speech, in order to perform five strategic functions. First, he attempted to infuse fear among the people, from within them, i.e. he first presupposed the existence of a state of common fear, concern, anxiety, and premonitions, then established a bond with the people based on their common suffering of that presupposed state (M2.6:20). After establishing that bond, Mubarak used the *Third Class WE* to legitimize himself and justify his stay in power, by underscoring that he was an officer of 'our' armed forces, and as an officer in duty he could not abandon responsibility or leave power in such circumstances (M2.11:21). Third, Mubarak employed the *Third Class WE* to perform the new function of relinquishing his power voluntarily and equating himself to ordinary Egyptians, even those who opposed him (M2.22:23). Fourth, Mubarak used the *Third Class WE* as a face-saving device, in order to avoid looking like a defeated president who acceded to the demands of the protesters, by sacking his cabinet and appointing a Vice-President (M2.9:22). Finally, Mubarak used the *Third Class WE* in order to indirectly hold the people co-responsible for securing an 'honourable' transition of power (M2.23:24).

(M2.6:20)

نعيشُ معاً أياماً مؤلمةً، وأكثرَ ما يوجعُ قلوبنا، هو الخوفُ الذي انتابَ الأغلبيةَ الكاسحةَ من المصريين، وما ساورهم من انزعاجٍ وقلقٍ وهاجسٍ، حولَ ما سيأتي به الغدُ، لهم، ولذويهم، وعائلاتهم، ومستقبلٍ ومصيرٍ بلدهم.
na tīshu ma 'an 'ayāman mu 'alimah, wa 'aktara ma yuji 'u qulūbanā hwa l-xawfu alladi intāba l'glabiyata l-kāsihata min l-miṣriyyīn, wa mā sawarahum min inzi 'ājīn wa qalaqīn wa hawājis, ḥwla mā say 'atī bi-hi l-ḡadu la-hum wa li-dawīhim wa 'ā 'ilātihim wa mustaqbali wa maṣīri baladīhim

We are living together painful days: what aches our hearts most is the fear that has possessed the over-sweeping majority of Egyptians; the concern, anxiety, and premonitions that have preoccupied them of what might befall them, their families, and relatives the following day; and the future and destiny of their country.

(M2.11:21)

كما أنني رجلٌ من أبناءِ قواتنا المسلحة، وليسَ من طبعي، خيانةُ الأمانة، أو التخلي عن الواجبِ والمسئولية
kama 'annani rajulun min rijāli quwātina l-musallaha, wa laysa min ṭab 'ī xiyānatu l-'amānah, aw at-taxalli 'ani l-wāḡibi wa l-mas 'ūliyyah

Also, I am indeed a man of the sons of our armed forces; it is not in my nature to betray trust or abandon duty and responsibility.

(M2.22:22)

وسيحكم التاريخُ علىّ وعلى غيري، بما لنا أو علينا.
sayḥkumu t-tārīxu ‘alayya wa ‘alā ḡayrī bi-mā lanā aw mā ‘alaynā.
history will judge me as well as others for our merits and demerits.

(M2.9:23)

لقد بادرتُ لتشكيلِ حكومةٍ جديدةٍ، بأولوياتٍ وتكليفاتٍ جديدةٍ، تتجاوبُ مع مطالبِ شبابنا ورسالتهم
la-qad bādartu li-taškīli ḥukūmatin jadīdah, bi-‘awlawayātīn jadīdah, tatajāwabu ma ‘a maṭālibi šabābina wa risālatihim

I have indeed taken the initiative of forming a new government, with new priorities and instructions, that respond to the demands of our youth and their message

(M2.23:24)

وعليّنا، أن نضمنَ تحقيقَ ذلكِ بعزّةٍ ورفعةٍ وكرامه، جيلاً، بعدَ جيلٍ.
wa ‘alainā an naḍmana taḥqīqa dālīka bi-‘izatin wa rif‘atin wa karāmah jīlan ba ‘da jīl.

and we are responsible for ensuring that this is taking place with pride, honour, and dignity, one generation after another.

3.3.1.3.4. *Fourth Class WE*

Mubarak did not at all use the *Fourth Class WE*, which issues indirect accusations, in this speech, because the relations of power were clearly in favour of the protesters, and hence he was not in a position to accuse them even indirectly.

3.3.1.4. *Third-person plural pronoun THEY*

Mubarak unintentionally rendered his bonding *Third Class WE* ineffective by his excessive use of the detaching obviative *THEY* which he employed twenty-six times to reference not only the protesters and his political opponents who ‘exploited’ them, but also all the Egyptian people (M2.21:32; M2.17:31; M2.16:30; M2.10:29; M2.9:28; M2.6:27; M2.4:26; M2.3:25)

(M2.3:25)

أوقاتٍ صعبةٍ، تمتحنُ مصرَ وشعبها، وتكادُ أن تنجرفَ بها وبهم، إلى المجهولِ
awqātīn ṣa‘bah tamtaḥīnu miṣra wa ṣa‘baha wa takādu ‘an tanjarīfa bihā wa bihim ilā l-majhūl.

critical times that are testing Egypt and its people and are about to over-sweep both of them into the unknown.

(M2.4:26)

بشبابٍ ومواطنينَ شرفاءَ، مارسوا حقهم في التظاهر السلمي، تعبيراً عن همومهم، وتطلعاتهم، سرعان ما استغلهم، من سعي لإشاعة الفوضى، واللجوء إلى العنف والمواجهة، وللقفز على الشرعية الدستورية، والانقضاض عليها.
šabābīn wa muwaṭīnīna šurafā’, mārasū ḥaqḥum fī t-taḏāhūrī s-selmi, ta ‘bīran ‘an ḥumūmihim wa taṭalu ‘ātihim, sur ‘āna mā staḡallahum man sa ‘ā li-iṣā ‘ati l-fawḏā wa l-lujū ‘i ilā l-‘unfi wa l-muwājaha wa li-l-qafzi ‘alā š-šar ‘iyati d-dustūriyah wa l-inqīḏā ‘alaihā.

honorable youth and citizens who exercised their right to protest peacefully and express their concerns and aspirations, but they were soon exploited by those who sought to spread chaos and resort to violence and confrontation, in order to jump over constitutional legitimacy and pounce upon it.

(M2.6:27)

هو الخوف الذي انتاب الأغلبية الكاسحة من المصريين، وما ساورهم من انزعاج وقلق وهو اجسُن، حول ما سيأتي به الغد، لهم، ولذويهم، وعائلاتهم، ومستقبل ومصير بلدهم.

l-xawfu alladi ntāba l' aḡlabiyata l-kāsiḡhata min l-miṡriyyīn, wa mā sawarahum min inzi 'ājīn wa qalaqīn wa hawājīs, ḡwla mā say'atī bi-hi l-ḡadu la-hum wa li-dawīhim wa 'ā'ilatihim wa mustaqbali wa maṡiri baladīhim.

The fear that has possessed the over-sweeping majority of Egyptians and what preoccupied them of concern, anxiety, and premonition of what might befall them, their families, and relatives the following day; and of the future and destiny of their country.

(M2.9:28)

لقد بادرتُ لتشكيل حكومةٍ جديدةٍ، بأولوياتٍ وتكليفاتٍ جديدةٍ، تتجاوبُ مع مطالبِ شبابنا ورسالتهم، وكلفتُ نائبَ رئيسِ الجمهورية، بالحوارِ مع كافةِ القوي السياسية، حولِ كافةِ القضايا المثارة، للإصلاحِ السياسي والديمقراطي، وما يتطلّبهُ من تعديلاتٍ دستوريةٍ وتشريعيةٍ، من أجلِ تحقيقِ هذهِ المطالبِ المشروعة، واستعادةِ الهدوءِ، والأمنِ، والاستقرارِ.

la-qad bādartu li-taškīli ḡukūmatin jadīdah, bi-'awlawiyātīn wa taklīfātīn jadīdah, tatajāwabu ma'a maṡālibi ṡabābinā wa risālatihim wa kallaftu nā'iba ra'īsī l-jumhūrīyyah bi-l-ḡiwār ma'a kāfati l-quwā as-siyāsīyah, ḡawla kāfati l-qaḡāya l-muṡārah li-l-islāḡi s-siyāsī wa d-dīmuqrātī, wa mā yataṡalabuhu min ta'dīlātīn dustūrīyah wa taṡrī'iyah, min aḡli taḡqīqi ḡādīhi l-maṡālibi l-maṡrū'ah, wa sti'ādati l-hudū'a wa l-'amn wa l-istiqrār.

I have indeed taken the initiative of forming a new government, with new priorities and instructions, that respond to the demands of our youth and their message, and I instructed the vice-president to hold dialogue with all the political forces, about all the raised issues of political and democratic reform, and what it requires of constitutional and legislative amendments in order to realize those legitimate demands and restore peace, security, and stability.

(M2.10:29)

لكنّ هناك من القوي السياسية، من رفضَ هذهِ الدعوةَ للحوارِ، تمسكاً بأجنداتهم الخاصة، ودونِ مراعاةٍ للظرفِ الدقيقِ الراهنِ، لمصرَ وشعبها، وبالنظرِ لهذاِ الرفضِ، لدعوتي للحوارِ، وهي دعوةٌ لاتزال قائمةً، فإنني أتوجهُ بحديثي اليوم، مباشرةً لأبناءِ الشعبِ، وبفلاحيه، وعماليه، مسلميه، وأقباطه، وشيوخه، وشبابه، ولكل مصريٍّ ومصرية، في ريفِ الوطنِ ومدنه، على اتساعِ أرضه ومحافظةه.

lakinna hunāka mina l-quwā s-siyāsīyah, man raḡaḡa ḡādīhi d-da'watu li-l-ḡiwār, tamasukan bi-'aḡīndātīhim al-xāṡah wa dūna murā'ātīn li-z-zarfi d-daḡīqi r-rāḡin li-miṡra wa ṡa'bihā, wa bi-n-naẓari li-ḡāza r-raḡḡ, li-da'wati li-l-ḡiwār, wa ḡiya da'watun lā tazālu qā'imah, fa-'innani 'atawajahu bi-ḡadīṡī l-yawm mubāṡaratan li-'abnā'i ṡ-ṡa'b, bi-fallāḡihī, wa 'ummāliḡ, muslimīhi wa 'aqbātīh, ṡūḡihī wa ṡabābih, wa li-kulli miṡriyyīn wa miṡriyyah, fī rīfi l-waṡān wa mudunihī, 'alā itisā'i 'arḡihī wa muḡāfazātīh.

But, there are some of the political forces who have declined this invitation to dialogue, sticking to their private agendas, with no consideration of the current delicate circumstance of Egypt and its people. In response to that declination, of my invitation to dialogue, an invitation that is still extended, I am indeed addressing my speech today directly to the sons of the people, their farmers and workers, their Muslims and Christians, their elderly people and youth, and to every Egyptian man and woman in the countryside, cities, and governorates all over the country.

(M2.16:30)

سوف أوالي متابعة تنفيذ الحكومة الجديدة لتكليفاتها، على نحو يحقق المطالبَ المشروعة للشعب، وأن يأتي أداؤها، معبراً عن الشعب، وتطلعاً للإصلاح السياسي، والاقتصادي، والاجتماعي، ولإتاحة فرص العمل، ومكافحة الفقر، وتحقيق العدالة الاجتماعية.

sawfa 'uwālī mutāba'ata tanfīdi l-ḥukūmati l-jadīdati li-taklīfātihā, 'alā naḥwin yuḥāqiqu l-maṭālība l-mašrū'ata li-š-ša'b, wa 'an y'atī 'adā'uhā mu'abiran 'ani š-ša'b, wa taṭṭu 'ihi li-l-iṣlāhi s-siyāsī wa l-iqtisādī wa l-ijtimā'i, wa li-itāḥat furāṣi l-'amal wa mukāfahati l-faqr wa taḥqīqi l-'adālati l-ijtimā'iyah.

I will continue following up on the new government's execution of its assigned duties, in a manner that realizes the legitimate demands of the people, and ensures that its performance expresses the people and their aspirations to establishing political, economic, and social reform; securing job opportunities; fighting poverty; and realizing social justice.

(M2.17:31)

إنني أكلّف جهازَ الشرطة، بالاضطلاع بدوره في خدمة الشعب، وحماية المواطنين، بنزاهةٍ وشرفٍ وأمانة، وبالاحترام الكامل، لحقوقهم، وحرّياتهم، وكرامتهم .

'innani 'ukalifu jihāza š-šurtah bi-l-iḍṭilā'i bi-dawrihi fi xidmati š-ša'b, wa ḥimāyati l-muwāṭinīn, bi-nazāhatin wa šaraḥīn wa 'amānah wa bi-l-iḥtirāmi l-kāmili li-ḥuqūqihim wa ḥurriyyatihim wa karāmatihim.

I do instruct the police apparatus with carrying out its duty in serving the people and protecting the citizens with integrity, honor, and faithfulness and with the complete respect for their rights, freedoms, and dignity.

(M2.21:32)

ستخرجُ مصرَ من الظرف من الظروفِ الراهنة، أقوى مما كانت عليه قبلاً، أكثرَ ثقةً وتماسكاً واستقراراً، سيخرجُ منها شعبنا، وهو أكثرُ وعياً بما يحققُ مصالحه، وأكثرُ حرصاً على عدمِ التفريطِ في مصيره ومستقبله

sa-taxruju mišra mina z-zurūfi r-rāhinah 'aqwā mi-mmā kānt 'alayhi qablahā, 'aktara ṭiqatan wa tamāsukan, wa stiqrāran, sayaxruju minhā ša'buna wa hwa 'aktaru wa 'yan bi-mā yuḥāqiqu mašāliḥahu wa 'aktaru ḥiršan 'alā 'adami t-tafrīṭi fī mašīrihi wa mustaqbalih.

Egypt will survive these current circumstances stronger than it was before: more confident, cohesive, and stable. Our people will survive it more aware of what realizes their interests and keener on not waiving their destiny and future.

3.3.1.5. Second-person plural pronoun 'YOU'

Finally, Mubarak employed the deictic pronoun *YOU* two times only in the second speech, bracketing it at the beginning and the end. He first employed *YOU* at the beginning of an appeal to fear in order to specify his addressees, evoke their fear of the 'unknown' slippery slope to which the protesters were over-sweeping the country, and reinforce the President-Citizens relationship which he had established in the appeal to authority immediately preceding that appeal to fear (M2.3:33). Mubarak employed *YOU* again, at the end of the speech, within his most powerful and emotionally loaded appeal, in which he requested the people indirectly to allow him to die on the soil of Egypt (M2.22:34). Mubarak, therefore, acknowledged the temporal and spatial presence of the people by addressing them directly

with the deictic pronoun YOU, only when he was appealing to their fears or stirring their emotions.

(M2.3:33)

أتحدث إليكم، في أوقاتٍ صعبةٍ، تمنحُ مصرَ وشعبها، وتكادُ أن تتجرفَ بها وبهم، إلى المجهول.
'ataḥadaṭu ilai-kum fī awqātin ṣa'bah tamtaḥīnu miṣra wa ṣa'baha wa takādu 'an tanjarifa bihā wa bihim ilā l-majhūl.

I am addressing you at critical times that are testing Egypt and its people and are about to over-sweep both of them into the unknown.

(M2.22:34)

إنَّ حسني مبارك الذي يتحدثُ إليكم اليوم، يعتزُّ بما قضاؤه من سنينٍ طويلة، في خدمة مصرَ وشعبها، إنَّ هذا الوطنُ، العزيزُ، هو وطني، مثلما هو وطنُ كلِّ مصريٍّ ومصريةٍ، فيه عشتُ، وحاربتُ من أجله، ودافعتُ عن أرضه، وسيادته، ومصالحه، وعلى أرضه أموتُ، وسيحكمُ التاريخُ عليَّ وعلى غيري، بما لنا أو علينا.
'inna Husni Mubārak alladī yataḥadaṭu 'ilaykum al-yawm ya 'tazu bi-mā qaḍāhu min sinīna ṭawīlah fī xidmati miṣra wa ṣa'bihā. 'inna hāḍa l-waṭan al-'azīz hwa waṭani, miṭlama hwa waṭanu kulli miṣriyyin wa miṣriyyah, fthi 'išt, wa ḥārabtu min 'ajlih, wa dāfa 'tu 'an 'arḍihi wa siyādatihi, wa maṣālihih wa 'alā 'arḍihi 'amūt, wa sayḥkumu t-tārīxu 'alayya wa 'alā ḡayrī bi-mā lanā aw mā 'alaynā.

Hosni Mubarak who is speaking to you today is indeed proud of the long years he has spent at the service of Egypt and its people. This dear homeland is indeed my homeland, as it is the homeland of every Egyptian man and woman. In it, I have lived; I have fought for its sake; I have defended its land, sovereignty, and interests; and on its soil I die, and history will judge me as well as others for our merits and demerits.

3.3.2. Multi-modal markers of power in the second speech of Mubarak: Backdrop and Stumbling

Mubarak delivered this speech on 1 February 2011, from his presidential palace, as indicated by the logo of the Presidency of the Republic on the podium in front of him and the curtains behind him. He is delivering the speech standing, and is wearing the same grey suit and tie he was wearing while delivering the first speech.

The first and most striking multi-modal observation in the speech is the way in which Mubarak performed the first 'Brother Citizens' vocative in the speech. Although the steepness of the President-Citizens relations of power implicated in and evoked by that vocative was intended to be mitigated by foregrounding the friendly term of address 'Brother' in order to mitigate the sharp legal connotations implied in the nucleus 'citizens', the harsh rising intonation in which Mubarak pronounced this vocative and the fixated, threatening gaze he made to the people while pronouncing it, suggested that Mubarak did not only mean to render the qualifier

'Brother' semantically vacuous, but also to reverse its pragmatic function to be one of indirect intimidation and threatening.

In terms of delivery, Mubarak stumbled, as represented by the triple (XXX) sign in the utterances below, at seven instances in this speech: when he was talking about (1) the 'new circumstances and the different Egyptian reality [...] imposed' by the revolution (M2.7:35), (2) the rejection of his initiative by the opposition forces (M2.10:36), (3) the instructions he gave to the supervisory and judiciary authorities to pursue the corrupt and those who caused the 'security disarray' (M2.18:38), (4) his certainty that Egypt would survive its 'current circumstances' stronger and more united than before (M2.21:39), (5) his commitment to secure a smooth transition of power to the new generations (M2.23:40; M2.23:41), and (6) his statement 'with all the frankness' that he did not intend to nominate himself for a sixth term in presidency (M2.12:37).

(M2.7:35)

إن أحداث الأيام القليلة الماضية، تفرض علينا جميعاً، شعباً وقيادة، الاختيار ما بين الفوضى والاستقرار، وتطرح أمامنا ظروفاً جديدة، وواقعاً مصرياً مغايراً، يتعين أن يتعامل معه شعبنا، وقواتنا المسلحة، بأقصى قدر من الحكمة، والحرص على مصالح مصر، وأبنائها.

'inna 'ahdāti l-'ayāmi l-qalīlati l-māḍiyah tafriḍu 'alainā jamī'an, ša'ban wa qiyādah, al-ixtiyāra mā bayna l-fawḍā wa l-istiqrār, wa taṭraḥu 'amāmanā zurūfan jadīdah, wa wāqi'an miṣriyyan muḡāyiran, (XXX) yata'aiyanu 'an ya-ta'āmala ma'ahu ša'bunā wa quwātuna l-musallahah bi-aqṣā qadrin mina l-ḥikmah wa l-ḥirṣi 'alā maṣāliḥi miṣra wa 'abnā'ihā.

The events of the last few days do impose upon us all, people and leadership, choosing between chaos or stability, and set in front of us new circumstances and a different Egyptian reality, (XXX) with which our people and armed forces have to deal, at the highest level of wisdom and keenness on the interests of Egypt and its sons.

(M2.10:36)

لكنّ هناك من القوي السياسية، من رفض هذه الدعوة للحوار، تمسكاً بأجنداتهم الخاصة، ودون مراعاة للظرف الدقيق الراهن، لمصر وشعبها

lakinna hunāka mina l-quwā s-siyāsiyah, man rafaḍa ḥāḍihi d-da'watu li-l-ḥiwār, tamasukan bi-'aḡindātihim al-xāṣah wa dūna murā'ātin li-l-ẓarfi (XXX) d-daḡiqi r-rāhin l-miṣra wa ša'bihā

But, there are political forces that have declined this invitation to dialogue, sticking to their private agendas, with no consideration of the current (XXX) delicate circumstance of Egypt and its people

(M2.12:37)

وأقول بكل الصدق، وبصرف النظر عن الظرف الراهن، (أنن) أنى لم أكن أنتوي الترشح لفترة رئاسية جديدة

wa 'aqulu bi-kulli ṣ-ṣidq, wa bi-ṣarfi n-naẓar 'ani z-zarfi r-rāhin, 'anni (XXX) lam 'akun 'antawi t-taraṣuḥa li-fatratin ri 'āsiyatīn jadīdah

I am saying with all frankness, and regardless of the current circumstance, that I was (XXX) not intending to nominate myself for a new presidential term

(M2.18:38)

كما إنني أطالبُ السلطاتَ الرقابيةَ والقضائيةَ، بأن تتخذَ على الفور، ما يلزمُ من إجراءاتٍ لمواصلةِ ملاحقةِ الفاسدين، والتحقيقِ مع المتسببين، فيما شهدتهُ مصرُ من انقلاباتٍ أمني، (ومِم) ومن قاموا بأعمالِ السلبِ والنهبِ، وأشعالِ النيرانِ، وترويعِ الأمنين.

ka-mā 'innani 'uṭālibu l-suluṭāt ar-riqābiyyati wa l-qaḍā 'iyyah bi 'an tataxiḍa 'ala l-fawr mā yalzamu min 'ijrā 'ātin li-muwāṣalati mulāḥaqati l-fāsīdīn wa t-taḥqīqi ma 'a l-mutasabībīn fī-mā šahīdat 'hu miṣru min infīlātīn 'amniyin wa man (XXX) qāmū bi-'a 'māli l-salbi wa l-nahb wa iṣ 'āli n-nīrān wa tarwī 'al 'āminīn

I also do demand the judicial and supervisory authorities to immediately take necessary measures to continue pursuing the corrupt and to investigate who caused what Egypt witnessed of security disarray and who (XXX) perpetrated acts of robbery, looting, arsons, and terrorization of the peaceful people

(M2.21:39)

ستخرجُ مصرُ من الظرفِ من الظروفِ الراهنة، أقوى مما كانت عليه قبليها، أكثرُ ثقةً وتماسكاً واستقراراً، سيخرجُ منها شعباً، وهو أكثرُ وعياً بما يحققُ مصالحه، وأكثرُ حرصاً على عدمِ التفريطِ في مصيره ومستقبله

sa-taxruju miṣra mina z-zurūfi (XXX) r-rāhinah 'aqwā mi-mmā kānt 'alayhi qablahā, 'aktara ṭiqatan wa tamāsukan, wa stiqrāran, sayaxruju minhā ša 'buna wa hwa 'aktaru wa 'yan bi-mā yuḥaḥqu maṣāliḥahu wa 'aktaru ḥirṣan 'alā 'adami t-tafrīṭi fī maṣīrihi wa mustaqbalih

Egypt will survive these current (XXX) circumstances stronger than it was before, and more confident, unified, and stable. Our people will become more aware of what realizes their interests and more eager not to waive their destiny and future

(M2.23:40)

إن الوطنَ باقٍ، والأشخاصَ زائلون، ومصرُ العريقةُ هي الخالدةُ أبداً، تنتقلُ رايئها وأمانتها بين سواعدِ أبنائها

'inna l-waṭana bāqīn wa l-'aṣḫāṣa zā 'ilūn, wa miṣru l-'arīqatu hiya l-xālidatu (XXX) 'abadan, tantaqilu rāyatuhā wa 'amānatuhā bayna sawā 'idi 'abnā 'ihā

The homeland is indeed everlasting, but persons are ephemeral, and noble Egypt is forever (XXX) eternal; its banner and trust passing among the arms of its sons

(M2.23:41)

وعلينا، أن نضمنَ تحقيقَ ذلكِ بعزّةٍ ورفعةٍ وكرامه، جيلاً، بعد جيل.

wa 'alainā an naḍmana taḥqīqa ḍālika (XXX) bi-'izatin wa rif'atin wa karāmah jīlan ba 'da jīl.

and we are responsible for ensuring that this is taking place (XXX) with pride, honor, and dignity, one generation after another

Plethora of factual incidents, analyses, and viewpoints prove false the propositional content of six of these seven utterances at which Mubarak stumbled. First, in terms of the claim

Mubarak made, and stumbled at, that his invitation to national dialogue was rejected by the opposition forces, Ghonim (2012: 63, 70) confirms that there was no real opposition in Egypt under Mubarak and attributes that mainly to the fact that the organizational body responsible for approving the establishment of new political parties was headed by the Secretary General of the ruling NDP, Safawat el-Shareef, who 'politically assassinated' any viable alternative to Mubarak. Similarly, El Manawy argues that 'state leadership fought a battle against civilian opposition parties, besieging them economically and restricting their political action, which resulted in creating a state of chronic emaciation in all opposition parties (2012: 23). Finally, the representatives of the protesters confirmed that the national dialogue announced by Mubarak was merely a 'media show' that tricked them into two unannounced, yet video-taped, appearances with the Minister of Interior and the Prime Minister (Ghonim, 2012a: 417-27).

In a similar vein, the claim Mubarak made, and stumbled at, that he had instructed the judiciary and supervisory authorities to pursue the corrupt and those who caused the security disarray can be easily proven unsubstantiated by Owen (2012: 69) and Kienle (1998: 219-35) who maintain that corruption in Egypt was mainly a corruption of the elite, i.e. the close associates of the Mubarak family who had a huge stake in the continuation of his regime and to whom the state assets were sold at less than their value. As regards those who caused the security disarray, Steinvorth and Windfuhr (2011, January 30) maintain that there were 'orders from the very top to free known felons from the prisons, to arm them, and let them mingle with protesters.' This view is shared by many independent sources who confirm that it was the Egyptian government that employed 'hired muscle' to attack the protesters and cause the security disarray (CNN, 2011, February 2; Ackerman, 2011, February 2; AP, 2011, February 2; RT, 2011, February 2; Owen, 2012: 188; Ghonim, 2012a: 356-7).

Moreover, the claim Mubarak made, and stumbled at, that he was certain that Egypt would survive its 'current circumstances' stronger, more coherent, and more stable than it was before, can be refuted by the argument made by Steinvorth and Windfuhr (2011, January 30) who confirmed that Mubarak adopted a 'burnt land' policy when he dealt with the protests. Finally, the claim Mubarak made, and stumbled at, that he would secure a smooth transition of power, contradicts with the analytical observation made by Owen (2012: 70, 72, 144-6. 153) that Mubarak demonstrated 'unmistakable signs' that he was not only intending to stay in office for life but also to arrange for his son Gamal to succeed him in power.

The seventh utterance at which Mubarak stumbled was when he talked about the 'new Egyptian reality' imposed by the protests. It can be concluded that Mubarak stumbled in the second speech either when he was not telling the truth or when he was talking about his loss of power.

3.3.3. Argumentative manifestations of power: Logical analysis of the fallacies in the second speech of Mubarak

Mubarak committed twelve fallacies in his second speech: *argumentum ad misericordiam* (appeal to emotions), *argumentum ad populum* (appeal to popular favour), *argumentum ad hominem* (personal attack), *argumentum ad baculum* (appeal to force/threats), *petitio principii* (the fallacy of begging the question/presupposition), *argumentum ad metum* (appeal to fear), *slippery slope argumentum ad consequentiam* (argument from consequences), *argumentum ad fidem* (appeal to religion), *gambler's fallacy*, *bifurcation fallacy*, *ignoratio elenchi* (irrelevant conclusion), and *argumentum ad superbiam* (appeal to pride).

The most predominant fallacy in this speech is *argumentum ad populum* (appeal to popular favour), which Mubarak committed in thirty-four instances, in order to endear himself to the protesters, by nominating them positively as 'honourable youth' (M2.4:26); by calling their protests an 'elegant and sophisticated way of expressing their opinions' and their demands 'legitimate' (M2.5:42); and by listing the decisions he had taken to accede to their demands: He had formed a new government and instructed the vice-president to hold national dialogue with all political powers, and had invited all political forces to join it, but the opposition rejected that dialogue and prioritized their partisan interests (M2.9:28; M2.10:29); he had 'invited' the parliament to 'discuss' the suggested constitutional amendments and 'requested' it to dismiss its members who were illegally elected (M2.14:2; M2.15:3); he had 'assigned' the police to serve the people and protect their rights, freedoms, and dignity (M2.17:31); he had 'called upon' the judiciary to continue targeting the corrupt and to identify those responsible for the security disarray (M2.18:6); he promised to supervise the performance of the new cabinet, so as to ensure that it was meeting the demands of the protesters (M2.16:30); he confirmed that the only reasons he was staying in power were to protect Egypt and the Egyptians, to restore the security and stability of the homeland, and to hand power to whoever the people would choose in free and fair elections (M2.11:11; M2.12:12; M2.13:13); and he

invoked Allah to help him perform his duties in a manner that would satisfy the people (M2.19:43).

(M2.5:42)

مظهرٍ راقٍ ومتحضرٍ لممارسة حرية الرأي والتعبير
mazharin rāqin wa mutahaḍirin, li-mumārasati ḥurriyyati r-r'ayi wa t-ta'bīr,
an elegant and civilized manifestation of practicing freedoms of opinion and expression

(M2.19:43)

ذلك هو عهدي للشعب، خلال الأشهر المتبقية من ولايتي الحالية، أدعو الله، أن يوفّقني في الوفاء به، كي أختتم عطائي لمصرَ وشعبها، بما يرضي الله والوطن، وأبناءه.

ḍālīka hwa 'ahdī li-š-ša'b xilāla l'ašhuri l-mutabaqiyati min wilāyati l-ḥāliyya, 'ad'ū llaha 'an yuwaḥiqani fī l-wafā'i bihi kay a'xtatima 'aṭā'ī li-miṣra wa ša'bihā bi-mā yurḍī llaha wa l-waṭan wa 'abnā'ah.

This is my pledge to the people during the remaining months of my current term. I pray to Allah to help me honor it, so as to conclude my offering to Egypt and its people in a way that satisfies Allah, the homeland, and its sons.

The second most frequently committed fallacies were *argumentum ad metum* (appeal to fear) and *slippery slope argumentum ad consequentiam* (argument from consequences) which Mubarak committed, in thirty-one instances, in order to heighten the fears of the people, by listing the economic, social, personal, and nationalistic 'catastrophic consequences' of the protests (M2.3:33; M2.4:26; M2.5:44; M2.6:20; M2.7:18; M2.10:29; M2.11:10; M2.24:45).

(M2.5:44)

تحولت تلك التظاهرات، من مظهرٍ راقٍ ومتحضرٍ، لممارسة حرية الرأي والتعبير، إلى مواجهات مؤسفة، تُحرّكها وتهيمن عليها قوى سياسية، سعت إلى التصعيد وصب الزيت على النار، واستهدفت أمن الوطن واستقراره، بأعمال اثاره وتحرير، وسلب ونهب، واشعال للحرائق، وقطع للطرق، واعتداء على مرافق الدولة، والممتلكات العامة والخاصة، واقتحام لبعض البعثات الدبلوماسية، على أرض مصر.

taḥwalat tilka t-taẓāhurāt min maẓharin rāqin wa mutahaḍirin, li-mumārasati ḥurriyyati r-r'ayi wa t-ta'bīr, ilā muwājahātīn mu'asīfah, tuḥarrīkuhā wa tuḥaimīnu 'alaihā quwan siyāsīyah sa'at ilā t-taṣ'īd wa ṣabi z-zaytī 'ala n-nār, wa stahdafat 'amna l-waṭan wa stiqrārah, bi-'a'mālī 'iṭārātīn wa taḥrīḍ wa salbin wa nahb wa iṣ'ālīn li-l-ḥarā'iq wa qaṭ'in li-l-ṭuruqāt wa 'i'tidā'in 'alā marāfiqī d-dawlah wa l-mumtalakātī l-'āmmatī wa l-xāṣah wa iqtihāmīn li-ba'ḍi l-ba'aṭātī d-diplumāsīyah 'alā 'arḍi miṣr.

Those protests were turned from an elegant and civilized manifestation of practicing freedoms of opinion and expression to unfortunate confrontations, steered and controlled by political forces that sought escalation, poured oil on fire, and targeted the security and stability of the homeland, through acts of provocation, incitement, robbery, looting, arsons, road-blocking, vandalization of state utilities and public and private properties, and storming some diplomatic missions in Egypt.

(M2.24:45)

حفظ الله هذا الوطن، وشعبه
ḥafīḍa llāhu ḥāḍa l-waṭan wa ša'bah
May Allah safeguard this homeland and its people!

The third most frequently committed fallacy was *petitio principii* (the fallacy of begging the question/presupposition), which Mubarak committed in thirty instances in order to presuppose

the following unsubstantiated, controversial arguments that represented himself positively and his opponents negatively, and pass them as agreed-upon, factual premises whose truth values were taken for granted: the Egyptian people knew that Mubarak had never sought power or authority; Mubarak had shouldered the responsibility of Egypt at hard times; Mubarak had offered Egypt a lot in war and peace; Mubarak was not intending to nominate himself for another presidential term; Mubarak had spent sufficient time of his life serving Egypt and its people; the only reason Mubarak was staying in power was his keenness on handing over power in a constitutional and legitimate manner, through fair and free elections; and the protesters were violent anarchists, instigators, looters, arson attackers, and vandalizers destabilizing the country and targeting constitutional legitimacy (M2.4:26; M2.5:44; M2.6:20; M2.7:35; M2.11:11; M2.12:37; M2.13:13; M2.16:30; M2.21:39).

The fourth predominant fallacy was *argumentum ad misericordiam* (*appeal to emotions*), which Mubarak committed in twenty-nine instances, in order to stir and heighten the personal and nationalistic emotions of the people in a compelling manner that would distract their attention and spin their rational reasoning. He clustered his emotional appeals in three main networks: the Egypt network, the Egyptians network, and the Mubarak network.

The Egypt emotional network embedded nine nationalistic emotional appeals, arguing that Egypt was eternal, whereas individuals were inevitably dying; the banner of the civilized, immortal Egypt had been rotating among the arms of its sons for ages, and this generation should continue doing so with pride, honor, and dignity; and Allah will protect Egypt and its people from all dangers, evils, and plots (M2.21:19; M2.23:40; M2.23:41; M2.24:45). The Egyptians emotional network consisted of six appeals: the Egyptians were living ‘painful days’, their hearts were aching, and they were obsessed with over-sweeping fear and suspicions, hence they should act wisely and prioritize the interests of Egypt and its sons (M2.2:46; M2.6:20; M2.7:35; M2.8:47).

(M2.2:46)

الإخوة المواطنين
al-'ixwah al-muwāṭinūn
 Brother Citizens

(M2.8:47)

أيها الإخوة المواطنين
'ayuha al-'ixwah al-muwāṭinūn
 O brother citizens

The Mubarak complex of emotional appeals was the longest, most intense, and hence most effective; it embedded fourteen personal and nationalistic emotional appeals: Mubarak presented himself not as the president, but as an ordinary old Egyptian man who had never sought power or authority; he had offered Egypt many sacrifices, in war and peace; he was so proud of the long years he had spent serving Egypt and its people; he was one of the ‘sons of our armed forces’, hence treason or evasion of responsibility were not his manners; he loved Egypt as much as any other Egyptian did; he had spent his life on its soil, fighting for its sake, land, sovereignty, and interests, and was going to die on that very soil, not in any other place; he was so keen on concluding his service to Egypt in a manner that would guarantee its pride, security, and stability; and he was going to leave it to history to judge what he had done (M2.11:10; M2.11:11; M2.12:12; M2.19:43; M2.22:14).

The fifth most frequent fallacy was *argumentum ad hominem (personal attack)* which Mubarak committed, in eleven instances, in order to divide the protesters into ‘honourable youth and citizens’, on the one hand, and violent anarchists, saboteurs, and inciters, targeting the security and stability of Egypt and taking a free-ride of the protests of the good citizens, on the other (M2.4:26; M2.5:44; M2.10:36).

The sixth most frequent fallacy was *argumentum ad baculum (appeal to force/threats)* which Mubarak committed in seven instances, by addressing the people with the vocative ‘Brother citizens’ thrice, by appealing to his constitutional and presidential powers twice, and by stating ‘in unequivocal terms’ that he was staying in power till the end of his presidential term (M2.2:46; M2.8:47; M2.13:13; M2.20:47). One important non-verbal aspect of the *argumentum ad baculum* fallacy in this speech is the threatening fixated gaze which Mubarak made to the people while uttering the first ‘Brother citizens’, which can be considered as a multi-modal, non-verbal manifestation of the *argumentum ad baculum*.

The seventh most frequent fallacy was *argumentum ad fidem (appeal to religion)*, which Mubarak committed in five instances by opening the speech with the Islamic starter and concluding it with the Islamic greeting of departure, by invoking Allah to help him fulfil the promise he had made to the Egyptian people, by stating that he wanted to conclude his presidency in a manner that would satisfy Allah, and by invoking Allah to protect Egypt and its people (M2.1:48; M2.19:43; M2.24:45; M2.25:49).

(M2.1:48)

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
bi-smi llāhi r-rahmāni r-rāhīm
In the name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

(M2.25:49)

وَالسَّلَامُ عَلَيْكُمْ وَرَحْمَةُ اللَّهِ وَبَرَكَاتُهُ
wa s-salāmu 'alaikum wa rahmatu llāhi wa barakātuh
Peace and blessing of Allah be upon you

The eighth most frequent fallacy was the *gambler's fallacy* which Mubarak committed in two instances, by confirming that Egypt was going to survive its crisis stronger, more coherent, and more stable than it was before, and that the Egyptian people were going to emerge from that 'crisis' more aware of their interests and more adamant to control their future (M2.21:19).

The least frequently committed fallacies were the *bifurcation fallacy*, *ignoratio elenchi* (*irrelevant conclusion*), and *argumentum ad superbiam* (*appeal to pride*). Mubarak committed the *bifurcation fallacy* in one instance, when he stated that the Egyptian people had to choose between 'chaos or stability' (M2.7:35). He committed the *ignoratio elenchi* fallacy, in one instance, when he drew a conclusion from irrelevant premises (M2.15:50). Finally, Mubarak committed the *argumentum ad superbiam* in one instance, when he praised the Egyptian people as carriers of the banner of the eternal, civilized Egypt (M2.23:40; M2.23:41).

(M2.15:50)

ولكي يتمكن البرلمان الحالي بمجلسيه، من مناقشة هذه التعديلات الدستورية، وما يرتبط بها من تعديلات تشريعية، للقوانين المكملة للدستور، وضمناً لمشاركة كافة القوى السياسية، في هذه المناقشات فإنني أطلب البرلمان، بالالتزام بكلمة القضاء وأحكامه، في الطعون على الانتخابات التشريعية الأخيرة، دون إبطاء.
wa li-kay yatamakana l-barlamānu l-hāliu bi-majlisayhi min munāqašati hāzihi t-ta'dilāti d-dustūriyyah, wa ma yartabiṭu bihā min ta'dilātin tašrī'iyah li-l-qawānīni l-mukammillati li-d-dustūr, wa ḍamānan li-mušāarakati kāfati l-quwā s-siyāsiyah, fi hāḍihi l-munāqašāt, fa'innani 'uṭālibu l-barlamān bi-l-iltizāmi bi-kalimati l-qaḍā'i wa 'ahkāmīhi fi ṭ-ṭu'ūni 'alā l-intixābāti t-tašrī'iyati l-'axīrah, dūna ibṭā'.

In order for the current parliament, in both its chambers, to be able to discuss these constitutional amendments as well as the related legislative amendments of the laws that complement the Constitution, and in order to ensure the participation of all political forces in these discussions, I do demand the parliament to abide by the word and verdicts of the judiciary, on the legal contestations made against the latest legislative elections, without delay.

3.3.4. Frame analysis in the second speech of Mubarak

Mubarak activated ten frames in this speech; they can be classified in terms of their pragmatic functions and linguistic features as internally polemical frames that aimed at negotiating the relations of power between Mubarak and his opponents (M2.4:16; M2.5:44; M2.7:18; M2.10:29); weak and vague language frames that aimed at relinquishing the powers of Mubarak (M2.9:28; M2.11:10; M2.11:11; M2.12:12; M2.14:2; M2.15:3; M2.18:6); and emotive frames that aimed at stirring the emotions of the people (M2.6:20; M2.22:14).

3.3.4.1. Internally polemical Frames

As explained in Chapter One, internally polemical frames are those that operate at two levels of communication, in order to respond indirectly to an implicit discourse while seeming to be directly addressing another explicit one (Bakhtin 1984: 196). The Exploited-Honorable-Youth frame (M2.4:16) is the first internally polemical frame in the second speech: it operates at two levels and sends three simultaneous messages.

The first two messages were direct and addressed to the Egyptian people and the protesters, in order to stir the nationalistic fears of the former, by arguing that Egypt was experiencing *أحداثٍ عصبيةٍ واختباراتٍ قاسيةٍ* *’ahdātin ‘aṣībah wa xtibārātin qāsiyah* (grave events and tough tests), and to appease the latter by praising them as *شبابٍ ومواطنينٍ شرفاءٍ مارسوا حقهم في التظاهر* *’aṣābā wa muwaṭṭinīna šurafā’ mārasū ḥaqahum fī t-taẓāhuri s-selmi, ta’bīran ‘an humūmihim wa taṭalu’ātihim* (honourable youth and citizens who exercised their right to protest peacefully and express their concerns and aspirations).

Given that indefinite descriptive forms minimize the size of the described noun and make it sound less emphatic and less concrete (Dunne 2003: 39-40), the pragmatic functions of those two direct messages were weakened by the indefiniteness of the six nouns Mubarak employed in them: the gravity and fear intended by the two nouns *أحداثٍ* and *اختباراتٍ* were minimized by their indefiniteness; the praise intended by describing the protesters as *شرفاءٍ* was weakened by their indefinite description as just *شبابٍ* and *مواطنينٍ*; and the acknowledgement and appreciation of *همومهم* and *تطلعاتهم* were mitigated and devalued by their indefiniteness.

The third message was indirect and operated on two levels, surface and deep. On the surface level, Mubarak was praising the protesters and the people as honorable but exploited, without

specifying who exploited them *سرعان ما استغلهم من سعي لإشاعة الفوضى* *sur'āna mā stağallahum man sa'ā li-našri l-fawḍā* (they were soon exploited by those who sought to spread chaos). Given that 'the core aim of pragmatics is to account for what Lycan (1986) has called "implicative relations". These include what Lycan calls "secondary meanings" or "invited inferences"; meanings which are not strictly part of a sentence's logical form (semantic meaning)' (Wilson 1990: 20), the inference invited by this vague frame is that Mubarak was referring to the Muslim Brotherhood group, since it was the group specified and named by the first statement of the Ministry of Interior, on 25 January 2011, as the mobilizer of 10.000 protesters who were throwing stones at the police and vandalizing public utilities (El Manawy 2012: 94). Mubarak was, therefore, on the surface level of this frame, criticizing the Muslim Brotherhood indirectly and accusing them of 'exploiting' the 'honorable' protesters.

On the deep level, Mubarak employed three linguistic devices to send the Muslim Brotherhood the indirect, discreet message that he was willing to negotiate with them; those linguistic devices are indefinite relative pronouns, syntactic backgrounding, and weak verbs.

Pronominally speaking, Mubarak neither named nor specified the Muslim Brotherhood as the force responsible for exploiting the protesters or committing the crimes he listed; he referenced them with the most vague, indefinite, and generic relative pronoun in Arabic, i.e. *من* *man* (those/who/whom), which can be used to reference singular, dual, plural, masculine, feminine, subject, and (or) object referents (Al-Hammadi, Al-Menshawy, Atta 1994: 17). Syntactically, Mubarak delayed the mention of that already weak and non-specific subject till the second half of the utterance, a syntactic backgrounding that resulted in further weakening its agency.

Semantically, Mubarak employed a series of five consecutive weak verbs and nouns to describe the acts of that unspecified subject who 'exploited' the protesters: (1) the principal verb he used, i.e. *سعي* *sa'ā* (sought), was weak, indecisive, and non-incriminatory, as it did not accuse the Muslim Brotherhood of committing those crimes, but of only seeking or attempting to commit them; (2) the weak, abstract noun *إشاعة* *išā'at* (spreading), which is mostly associated in Arabic with 'spreading news', is used to describe spreading *al-fawḍā* (chaos), an act that is collocationally described by the stronger verb *إحداث* *iḥdāt* (executing/implementing); (3) the weak noun *اللجوء* *al-lujū'* (resorting to), which primarily means 'seeking refuge in' or 'being forced to do something', was used to describe committing

violent acts, an activity that is collocationally described by the stronger and incriminatory verbal phrase ارتكاب أعمال عنف *irtikāb a'māl 'unf* (committing acts of violence); (4) the verb قفز على *qafza 'alā* (jumped over) is used to metaphorically describe violating constitutional legitimacy, an act that is collocationally described by the stronger and incriminatory verb انتهك *intahaka* (violated); and (5) the strongest and most aggressive verb employed by Mubarak in this frame was a metaphorical one, i.e. انقض على *inqdda 'alā* (pounce upon) whose source domain is the animal kingdom, where stronger predatory animals pounce upon their weaker preys (Mu'jam Lisān Al-'arab; Al-Mu'jam Al-ġanni; Al-Qāmūs Al-Muḥīt, as cited in Al Maany Online Arabic Dictionary).

The weakness, imprecision, and hence evasiveness of those verbs and nouns made the acts they described too vague to be punishable by law. Mubarak could have easily employed the most lexically relevant verbs and nouns that habitually collocate with the acts he was describing, but he opted for using those less related, less accessible, and hence more cognitively taxing verbs in order to operate this frame at a deep level and send a message to the Muslim Brotherhood that he was not yet considering them criminals, that he was not intending to indict them for the acts he claimed they had committed, and that he was willing to negotiate with them.

The hidden polemic of this double-voiced frame, therefore, sent two simultaneous yet contrastive messages: a surface-level message that criticized the Muslim Brotherhood indirectly and blamed them for the criminal acts that accompanied the protests, and a deep-level message that assured the Muslim Brotherhood that Mubarak was still willing to negotiate with them. Since implications are defeasible inferences, i.e. not statements of facts that can be denied without contradiction (Wilson 1990: 20-1, 24), Mubarak cannot be held responsible for this interpretation and can very easily deny it.

The second internally polemical frame in this speech was the Hijacked-Elegant-Civilized-Protests frame (M2.5:44), which operated at two levels, sent three messages, and performed two pragmatic functions.

At the surface level, this frame sent two direct messages: the first praised the protesters by describing their protests as مظهِرٍ راقٍ و متحضّرٍ لممارسة حريّة الرأى والتعبير *mazharin rāqin wa mutahāḍirin li-mumārasati ḥurriyyati r-r'ayi wa t-ta'bīr* (an elegant and civilized

manifestation of practicing freedoms of opinion and expression); the second stirred the personal and nationalistic fears of the people by arguing that their elegant and civilized protests were turned into criminal acts: أعمالٍ اِثْرَةٍ *'a māli 'iṭāratin* (acts of provocation), تحريضُ *tahrīd* (incitement), سَلْبٍ *salbin* (looting), نهبٍ *nahb* (robbery), اشعالٍ للحرائِقِ *iṣ'ālin li-l-ḥarā'iq* (arsons), قطعٍ للطرقَاتِ *qaṭ'in li-l-ṭuruqāt* (road-blocking), اعتداءٍ على مرافق الدولة والممتلكاتِ *alā marāfiqi d-dawlah wa l-mumtalakāti l-āmmati wa l-xāṣah* (vandalization of state utilities and public and private properties), and اقتحامٍ لبعضِ البعثاتِ *iqtiḥāmin li-ba'di l-ba'aṭāti d-diplumāsīyah* (storming some diplomatic missions).

The third message was indirect and operated at two levels: on the surface level, it accused قُوِيّ سياسيّةً 'political forces' of steering and controlling the protests and targeting the security and stability of Egypt. Although Mubarak did not specify who those 'political forces' were, his vague statement invited the inference that he was talking about the Muslim brotherhood, for the reasons explained earlier. On the deep level, the frame sent an indirect message to the Muslim Brotherhood that Mubarak was willing to acknowledge them as a legal political force and to negotiate with them. Such a message was sent through six linguistic devices: nomination strategies; passive voice; syntactic backgrounding; weak, vague, indefinite verbs and nouns; and qualifiers.

First, Mubarak named the perpetrator who committed the above-mentioned acts of provocation, incitement, looting, robbery, arsons, road-blocking, and vandalism قُوِيّ سياسيّةً *quwan siyyāsiyah* (political forces), a name that does not reflect the criminal nature of those acts. As explained in the previous frame, the culprit accused, by the Ministry of Interior, of committing those acts was the Muslim Brotherhood, which was at the time of delivering this speech a 'banned, illegal group' (El Manawy 2012: 19-20). By calling the Muslim Brotherhood a 'political force', Mubarak was sending them the indirect messages that he was no longer considering them a banned, illegal, terrorist group, as he used to call them, and that he was willing to acknowledge them as a legal, political force, in spite of the list of crimes he had accused them of.

Moreover, Mubarak employed the passive voice in تحولت تلك التظاهراتُ، من مظهرٍ راقٍ ومتحضرٍ، إلى مواجهاةٍ مؤسفةٍ *taḥawalat tilka t-taẓāhurāt min maẓharin rāqin wa mutaḥādirin, li-mumārasati ḥurriyyati r-r'ayi wa t-ta'būr, ilā muwājahātin mu'asifah* (Those protests were turned from an elegant and civilized manifestation of practicing freedoms of

opinion and expression to unfortunate confrontations), in order to avoid naming or specifying the subject who turned the civilized protests into confrontations, and to depict the process as agentless. Moreover, when he mentioned those non-specific ‘political forces’ who were steering and controlling the protests, he backgrounded them to the object position.

Furthermore, Mubarak employed thirteen weak verbs and nouns to describe the criminal acts he accused the Muslim Brotherhood of committing: (1) the vague and non-incriminatory verb سَعَتْ *sa‘at* (sought) portrayed the Muslim Brotherhood as only seeking or attempting to commit those acts, without confirming whether they had committed them or not; (2) Mubarak used the two vague, metaphorical nouns التصعيد *at-taṣ‘īd* (escalation) and صب الزيت على النار *ṣabi z-zayti ‘ala n-nār* (pouring oil on fire), which do not constitute specific crimes punishable by law, to describe the acts he accused the Muslim Brotherhood of committing; (3) the least metaphorical and most specific verb he employed, i.e. استهدفت *istahdafat* (targeted), was weakened by the indefiniteness of the nine consecutive nouns that followed it and represented the crimes of the Muslim Brotherhood: أعمال *a‘māli* (acts), إثارة *iṭāratin* (provocation), تحريض *tahrīd* (incitement), سلب *salbin* (looting), نهب *nahb* (robbery), إشعال للحرائق *iṣ‘ālīn li-l-ḥarā‘iq* (arsons), قطع للطرق *qaṭ‘in li-l-ṭuruqāt* (road-blocking), اعتداء *i‘tidā‘in* (vandalization), and اقتحام *iqtiḥāmin* (storming). The indefiniteness of those nine nouns belittled the crimes they described; minimized their size, gravity, and danger; and hence weakened their intended frightening effect. Finally, the qualifying determiner بعض *ba‘di* (some) limited the scope of the act of storming and mitigated its intended threatening effect.

The third internally polemical frame in this speech was the Chaos-OR-Stability frame (M2.7:18) whose hidden dialogicality operated at two levels and sent two messages. At the surface level, Mubarak was addressing the people and advising them to choose between chaos or stability, and to join hands with the Military, in order to wisely and patriotically face the new circumstances and reality imposed by the protests.

At the deep level, Mubarak was sending an indirect message to his Minister of Defence and commanders of the Military, as suggested by the implicative, deep-level relations in the following two utterances

(1)

إن أحداث الأيام القليلة الماضية، تفرض علينا جميعاً، شعباً وقيادة، الاختيار ما بين الفوضى والاستقرار

'inna 'ahdāṭi l-'ayāmi l-qalīlati l-māḍiyah tafriḍu 'alainā jamā'an, ša'ban wa qiyādah, al-ixtiyāra mā bayna l-fawḍā wa l-istiqrār

The events of the last few days do impose upon us all, people and leadership, choosing between chaos or stability

(2)

يتعين أن يتعامل معه شعبنا، وقواتنا المسلحة، بأقصى قدر من الحكمة، والحرص على مصالح مصر، وأبنائها.
yata'aiyanu 'an ya-ta'āmala ma'ahu ša'bunā wa quwātunā l-musallahah bi-aqṣā qadrin mina l-ḥikmah wa l-ḥirši 'alā maṣāliḥi mišra wa 'abnā'ihā

With which our people and armed forces have to deal, at the highest level of wisdom and keenness on the interests of Egypt and its sons

Both (1) and (2) invite the inference that Mubarak suspected that his Minister of Defense and commanders of the army were plotting against him; that might be the reason why he decided to send them an indirect message through this frame. In (1), by conjoining the two nouns *شعباً وقيادة* *ša'ban wa qiyādah* (people and leadership), Mubarak was warning the commanders of the army that they themselves, not only the people, were going to suffer from the chaos that would ensue from the way the army was handling the protests. Moreover, the admonition he made to the people and the armed forces in (2), through the strong modal *يتعين* *yata'aiyanu* (have to), that they had to exercise the highest possible levels of wisdom and patriotism, generated the two deniable implicatures that both the armed forces and the people were acting unwisely and that they were not keen on the interests of Egypt and Egyptians; otherwise, Mubarak's call upon them to do so would be pragmatically irrelevant.

This interpretation is corroborated by the narrative of Abdul Lateef El Manawy, Head of the News Sector in Mubarak's state TV, who reported that Mubarak was not happy with the performance of the army and that he criticized, in his inner private circles, his Minister of Defense, Field Marshal Tantawy, for not deploying the army in a timely manner and for not taking decisive measures to stop the protests on their first two days. Mubarak, therefore, asked his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Sami Annan, to truncate his visit to the States and to return immediately to Egypt; ordered State Security to tap the phones of all the members of the Military Council (El Manawy 2012: 223); and ordered the Minister of Defense, while meeting with him on 29 January 2011, to leave the presidential palace immediately, head for his home, and wait there for further instructions, which technically

meant that Mubarak was sacking his Minister of Defense. Field Marshal Tantawy did not go home, and headed instead for the Ministry of Defense, in defiance of the orders of Mubarak (ibid: 221-222), and a few days later issued Communique Four, in which he told the Egyptian people that ‘your Armed Forces realize the legitimacy of your demands and confirm that peaceful freedom of expression is guaranteed to all, that the Armed Forces are deployed in the streets to protect you and safeguard your security [...] and that we did not and will not resort to the use of force against this great people’ (El Manawy 2012: 260). These important developments, which took place shortly before the delivery of this speech, corroborate the inference that Mubarak was sending an indirect message to his Minister of Defense and commanders of the army through the hidden polemic of this frame.

The last internally polemical frame in this speech was the They-Prioritized-Their-Agendas frame (M2.10:29), whose hidden polemic operated at two levels and performed four pragmatic functions. At the surface level, Mubarak was addressing the Egyptian people directly, after the declination of his national dialogue invitation, by some political forces who prioritized their own agendas over the national interests of Egypt. At the deep level, Mubarak employed six linguistic devices, i.e. nomination, definiteness, minimization, implied and explicit negation, repetition, and implicature to perform four pragmatic functions.

First, by using the definite noun phrase القوي السياسية *al-quwā as-siyyāsiyah* (the political forces) to refer to the Muslim Brotherhood, Mubarak added weight and importance to them, acknowledged them, and sent them the indirect message that he was willing to consider them as a legitimate political force, not as an illegal, banned group, as they were officially classified. Moreover, by preceding that positive nomination with *min at-tab‘īd*, in هناك من *hunāka mina l-quwā s-siyāsiyah, man rafaḍa hāḍihi d-da‘watu* (there are some of the political forces who have declined this invitation), Mubarak was putting pressure on them, by reminding them that they were only one of many other political forces, and that he could resort to those other forces if the Muslim Brotherhood continued to decline his invitation.

Furthermore, Mubarak employed three consecutive negatives to reproach the Muslim Brotherhood mildly: The negation implied in the verb رفض *rafaḍa* (declined); the explicit negation in *dūna murā‘ātin li-z-zarfī d-daḡīqi r-rāhin li-* دون مراعاة اللزف الدقيق الراهن لمصر

mišra (with no consideration of the current delicate circumstance of Egypt); and the negative implied in the noun الرفض *ar-rafḍ* (declination). The first negative evoked the impression that Mubarak expected the Muslim Brotherhood to accept his invitation, because ‘a negative generally is used only when its affirmative would otherwise be expected’ (Tannen 1979: 170); the second negative suggested that Mubarak expected the Muslim Brotherhood to consider the delicate circumstances of Egypt and its people, because a ‘statement of what it was not is evidence of an expectation that it should have been’ (ibid: 165); and the third negative confirmed and repeated for the third time that Mubarak was expecting the Muslim Brotherhood to accept his invitation to dialogue. Mubarak then inserted the fourth negative in the parenthetical phrase وهي دعوة لاتزال قائمةً *wa hiya da‘watuṅ lā tazālu qā‘imah* (an invitation that is still extended), in order to implicitly invite the Muslim Brotherhood to dialogue through the deniable implicature triggered by the parenthetical clause.

Although Mubarak intended this frame to perform the surface-level functions of representing himself positively and the Muslim Brotherhood negatively, and the deep functions of appeasing the Muslim Brotherhood by implicitly acknowledging them as a political force, of putting pressure on them and reproaching them for declining his invitation, and of re-inviting them to join his dialogue, the four negatives he employed weakened both the surface-level and deep level pragmatic functions. On the surface level, the four negatives triggered questions about the reasons why Mubarak had officially classified the Muslim Brotherhood as an illegal and banned group if he was calling them a political force and expecting them to accept his invitation to dialogue and to prioritize national interests. On the deep level, the three repetitions Mubarak made of the declination of his invitation represented him as a weak president, who was desperate to hold talks with the Muslim Brotherhood, and who turned to the people only after he was abandoned by a group he was banning and considering illegal.

Finally, Mubarak employed eight qualifications in this frame: he used the emphatic particle إنني *innanī* (indeed) to confirm that he was addressing his speech to Egyptians, the qualifying determiner كل *kulli* (every) to include all Egyptians in that address, and the adverb مباشرةً *mubāšaratan* (directly) to underscore that there were no intermediaries between him and the people. Moreover, he qualified Egyptians according to five criteria: professionally as مسلميه، وأقباطه *fallāḥihi wa ‘ummālih* (farmers and workers), religiously as

muslimīhi wa 'aqbātih (Muslims and Christians), regionally على اتساع ومدنه، في ريف الوطن ومدينه، *ft rīfi l-waṭan wa mudunihi, 'alā itisā'i 'arḍihi wa muḥāfazātih* (in the countryside, cities, and governorates all over the country), in terms of age groups شيوخه *siūxihi wa šabābih* (elderly people and youth), and in terms of gender مصري ومصرية *miṣriyyin wa miṣriyyah* (Egyptian man and woman). Those eight qualifications suggested that the utterances of Mubarak were losing their perlocutionary force, hence he had to repeatedly qualify what he was saying, in order to compensate for that loss of perlocutionary force.

3.3.4.2. Weak, vague language frames

The first frame Mubarak activated in order to relinquish his power was the I-Have-Initiated-and-Instructed frame (M2.9:28), through which he attempted to appease the protesters by arguing that he had acceded to their demands, by forming a new government and starting a national dialogue. That frame was, however, weakened by six linguistic devices: qualification, repetition, indefinite nouns, weak language, unsubstantiated content, and syntactic structures.

In terms of qualification, Mubarak started the frame with the emphatic particle لقد *la-qad* (verily/indeed) to emphasize that he had taken initiative and formed a new government; he repeated the pre-determiner كافة *kāfati* (all) twice to underscore that his national dialogue included all political forces and discussed all political and democratic reform issues; and he repeated the qualifying adjective جديدة *jadīdah* (new) twice, to confirm that his government was a new one and his instructions to it were new.

Although those five qualifiers aimed at emphasizing the compliance of Mubarak with the demands of the protesters, they created a sense of unreal exaggeration, which clashed with unspecificity and vagueness created by the indefiniteness of the most important six nouns in the frame, i.e. حكومة *ḥukūmatin* (new government), أولويات *'awlawayātīn* (priorities), تكليفات *taklīfātīn* (instructions), مطالب *maṭālibi* (demands), رسالتهم *risālatihim* (message), and تعديلات *ta'dīlātīn* (amendments). That indefiniteness undervalued the new government, deconcretized its instructions and priorities and made them sound unspecific, belittled and mitigated the demands and message of the youth, minimized the constitutional and legislative amendments, and hence weakened the significance and functions intended by those important words.

Although Mubarak was more specific in this speech than he was in the previous one, in terms of acknowledging and mentioning the specific demands of the protesters, he was not as specific in the verbs he employed to describe his response to those demands. He employed three problematic verbs to describe the important actions he argued he had taken, in response to the demands of the people: He first used the verb *بادرتُ* *bādartu* (I have taken the initiative) which was not substantiated by the world knowledge of the people, who knew that when Mubarak sacked his government and formed a new one, he was not taking initiative, but was forced to do so by the country-wide protests against him.

He followed that unsubstantiated verb immediately with the prepositional phrase *لتشكيل حكومة جديدة* *li-taškīli hukūmatin jadīdah* (of forming a new government) which is both vague and unsubstantiated: first, it did not specify whether he had formed that new government or not yet; second, it described the new government as new, in spite of the fact that it consisted of fourteen new ministers and sixteen old ones from the previous government (El Manawy 2012: 250). Moreover, Mubarak employed the relatively weak verb *تجاوبُ* *tatajāwabu* (respond to) to describe the approach of the new government to the demands of the protesters, such a verb was not up to the revolutionary expectations of the protesters who were expecting stronger and more performative verbs like *تنفذ* *tunafidū* (implement) or *تحقق* *tuhaqiqū* (accomplish). Similarly, the condescending and detaching verb *كلفْتُ* *kallaftu* (instructed) which Mubarak employed to argue that he had instructed his Vice President to hold national dialogue was not the most pragmatically appropriate one to use: it marked the power of Mubarak, against which the people were revolting, and connoted that he was washing his hands of any responsibility for the success or failure of that dialogue and blaming any potential problems on his Vice President.

Those weak and vague verbs, which allowed Mubarak to, first, hedge around the measures he argued he had taken in response to the demands of the protesters, and, second, to exonerate himself from any specific responsibility or commitment, weakened the appeasing pragmatic function he intended by this frame.

The second power relinquishing frame Mubarak activated in this speech was the I-have-Never-Sought-Authority frame (M2.11:10; M2.11:11), through which he aimed at representing himself positively, as the president who had offered Egypt many sacrifices in war and peace, and who was willing to hand over power. Those two pragmatic functions were,

however, weakened by five linguistic devices he used: negatives, vague and abstract language, qualification, repetition, and implicative relations.

Mubarak employed four negatives in this frame, two explicit and two implicit. He started the frame with the negative لم أكن يوماً طالباً سلطةٍ أو جاهٍ *lam 'akun yawman ṭāliba sulṭatin aw jāh* (I have indeed never been a seeker of authority or power, for one day), which he emphasized twice by the two qualifiers إني *innanī* (I indeed) and يوماً *yawman* (for one day/never). He then used the second explicit negative ليس من طبعي *laysa min ṭabī* (it is not in my nature), followed by the two negatives implied in the nouns الأمانةُ خيانةُ *xiyānatu l-'amānah* (betrayal of trust), and التخلي عن الواجب *at-taxallī 'ani l-wājibi* (abandonment of duty). Given that 'a negative generally is used only when its affirmative would otherwise be expected' (Tannen 1979: 170), those four negatives combined to create the impression that Mubarak expected the people to think that he had been seeking authority and power and that it was in his nature to betray trust and abandon responsibility.

The linguistic device that weakened the pragmatic functions intended by this frame most was the vague language Mubarak employed in three instances: First, he used the two non-specific nouns أمن *amni* (security) and استقرار *istiqrār* (stability) to describe his primary responsibility at that time, without specifying what those security and stability involved, nor how he was planning to restore them. Second, he used the two vague clichés الانتقال السلمي للسلطة *al-intiqālī s-silmyī li-l-sulṭah* (the peaceful transition of power) and في أجواءٍ تحمي مصرَ والمصريين *fi 'ajwā' in taḥmī miṣra wa l-miṣriyyīn* (in circumstances that protect Egypt and Egyptians), without specifying what that transfer meant, nor how it was going to be procedurally implemented. Third, Mubarak avoided using the precise and relevant term الرئاسة (presidency) which belongs to the political domain of power transfer he was talking about, and used instead the abstract, vague, and under-specified word *al-mas'ūliyyah* (the responsibility) which belongs to a completely different domain. That vagueness can be interpreted as an attempt on the part of Mubarak to evade his responsibility for triggering and implementing the specific constitutional measures and procedures associated with the precise political terms he avoided.

Furthermore, the weakening effect created by that strategic vagueness was reinforced by two linguistic devices Mubarak employed. First, he used the wrong form of the noun to talk about handing over presidency, i.e. he used the noun تسلم *tasallumi* (receiving) in تسلم المسؤولية لمن يختاره الشعب *tasallumi l-mas'ūliyyah li-man yaxtāruhu š-ša'b* (receiving the responsibility to

whoever the people would choose), instead of using the right form which is تسليم *taslīm* (handing over), because Mubarak was the agent who was going to do the act of تسليم to the prospective president, who was going to receive it and perform the act of تَسَلَّمَ. Second, instead of referring to the prospective president with his title, i.e. the ‘prospective president’, the ‘new president’, or any other honorific that suits a president, Mubarak referenced the prospective president with the most vague pronoun in Arabic, i.e. *man* (who/whom/whose), which can be used to reference singular, dual, plural, masculine, feminine, subject, and (or) object referents (Al-Hammadi, Al-Menshaw, Atta 1994: 17); he even relegated that pronoun to the object position, in order to further devalue that prospective president and detract his agency.

The third power relinquishing frame in this speech was the I-was-Not-Intending-to-Run-for-a-New-Term frame (M2.12:12), through which Mubarak attempted to convince the people that he was not intending to run for a sixth presidential term. That pragmatic function was weakened by five linguistic devices he employed: negatives, qualifiers, voice, contrastive connectives, and vague abstract language.

Mubarak employed the negative to prepare for and express the most important piece of information in this frame. He first used the negative implied in the parenthetical phrase بصرف النظر عن الظرف الراهن *bi-ṣarfi n-naẓar ‘ani ḡ-ẓarfi r-rāhin* (regardless of the current circumstance) in order to deny that his following statement was a result of the pressure put on him by the protests. He followed that implied negative immediately with the emphatic, explicit one لم أكن أنتوي الترشح لفترة رئاسية جديدة *annī lam ‘akun ‘antawī t-taraṣuḡa li-fatratin ri’āsiyatīn jadīdah* (I was not intending to run for a new presidential term) in order to confirm that he was not intending to run for another presidential term. That important negative was emphasized by twelve qualifiers: the adverbial, prepositional phrase بكل الصدق *bi-kulli ṣ-ṣidq* (with all the truthfulness), which contained three qualifiers: (1) the emphatic particle كل *kulli* (all), which is called in Arabic rhetoric *kullu l-kamāliyyah* كَلُّ الكَمَالِيَّة (the ‘all’ of perfection), as it marks the completion and perfection of the noun it is added to (Al-Mu‘jam Al-ḡanni; Al-Mu‘jam Al-Wasīt as cited in Al-Maany online Arabic Encyclopedia); *kulli* qualified the noun *aṣ-ṣidq* (truthfulness) and marked its perfection and completion; (2) the adverb *bi-ṣ-ṣidq* (with truthfulness) which qualified the act of saying in أقول *‘aqulu*, and (3) the definite article *al-* in *الصدق* *aṣ-ṣidq* which qualified the noun *صدق* *ṣidq*; (4) the conjoined parenthetical prepositional phrase وبصرف النظر عن الظرف الراهن *wa bi-ṣarfi n-naẓar ‘ani ḡ-ẓarfi r-rāhin* (and regardless of the current circumstance), which further qualified the act of saying in *‘aqulu*;

(5) the past emphatic particle *أكن* 'akun, which qualified and emphasized the verb *أنتوي* 'antawī; (6) the intensifier *تأ'و l-im'ān* which Mubarak inserted into the triliteral verb *نوى* *nawā* (intend) to intensify its pragmatic force, making it *إنتوي* *intawā*; (7) the emphatic particle *قد* *qad* (indeed) (8) the emphatic letter *نūnu t-tawkīd* in *لكني* *lakinnanī* (I indeed am); (9) the emphatic cognate accusative *حريص كل الحرص* *harīṣun kulla l-ḥirṣ* (keen, all the keenness); (10) *kullu l-kamāliyyah* in the previous cognate accusative, which completed and perfected Mubarak's keenness; and (11) the definite article *ال* *al-* in *الحرص* *l-ḥirṣ*; and (12) the intensifier *تأ'و l-im'ān* which Mubarak inserted again into the triliteral verb *أختم* *xatama* (conclude) making it *أختتم* 'axtatima.

Given that a negative statement is used when a corresponding affirmative has been mentioned, when the content of such a corresponding affirmative is considered likely, or when the speaker holds the affirmative to be true (Givon 1979 as cited in Wilson 1990), the above mentioned two negatives, together with their twelve qualifications, triggered a rhetorical effect opposite to that intended by Mubarak and emphasized their corresponding affirmatives, in an equally highly qualified manner, i.e. they suggested that Mubarak was not speaking truthfully at all; that his statement was a direct result of the protests; and that he was indeed intending to run for a sixth presidential term.

That reversed rhetorical effect was reinforced by Mubarak's use of the wrong connective, i.e. the contrastive connective in *لكني* *lakinnanī* (but I indeed am), which he employed to connect two similar sets of statements. Given that the four statements that preceded this contrastive connective were (1) Mubarak was speaking with all truthfulness, (2) Mubarak was speaking regardless of the protests, (3) Mubarak was not intending to run for a new presidential term, and (4) Mubarak had spent enough of his life serving Egypt and its people, and given that the two statements that followed that contrastive connective were (1) Mubarak was so keen on concluding his work for Egypt in a manner that would guarantee its stability, safety, and pride and (2) Mubarak was keen on safeguarding legitimacy and respecting the constitution, the connective most appropriate for connecting those two similar sets of statements is the conjunctive *و* *wa* (and), not the contrastive *لكني* which Mubarak employed. Given that 'but' marks 'the denial of an expectation not only of the preceding clause (Lakoff 1971) but of an entire preceding set of statements' (Tannen 1979:170) and that it 'often introduces a negative statement' that 'marks the contrast with the expectation established by the preceding

statement' (ibid: 151), لكنني which Mubarak employed, negated its preceding over-qualified negatives and turned them into highly qualified affirmatives.

Moreover, the weakening effect created by the afore-mentioned negatives, over-qualification, and wrong connective was reinforced by the vocal performance of Mubarak: he uttered the pronoun أنى 'annī (I) in a very quick and hesitant manner that he was about to stumble over it, which cast doubts upon the sincerity of that important statement.

Furthermore, Mubarak continued to adopt strategic vagueness when he expressed important propositional content, i.e. he opted for the less familiar verbal forms, employed metaphorical language, and avoided specific, precise, relevant vocabulary. For example, when he expressed the most important two pieces of information in the frame and the whole speech, i.e. his intention not to run for a new presidential term and to conclude his political work, Mubarak avoided using the familiar and more accessible trilateral forms of the verbs أنوي 'anwī (I intend) and أختتم 'axtima (I conclude) and opted, instead, for the less familiar and hence more cognitively taxing quadrilateral forms, i.e. أنتوي 'antawī and أختتم 'axtatima.

Moreover, Mubarak avoided using the exact, specific verbs and nouns that belong to the political domain of power transfer and handing over presidency, and used instead metaphorical, non-specific words that belong to other domains, e.g. تسليم أمانته ورايته *taslīma 'amānatahu wa rāyatahu* (handing over its trust and banner), in what can be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to avoid precision and hence responsibility triggering and implementing the relevant constitutional steps and measures associated with the specific terms he avoided using.

Finally, Mubarak expressed his two conditions for leaving power in vague, non-specific terms, i.e. بما يضمن تسليم أمانته ورايته، ومصرٌ عزيزةٌ آمنةٌ مستقرة *bi-mā yaḍmanu taslīma 'amānatahu wa rāyatahu, wa miṣru 'azīzatan 'āminatan mustaqirah* (in a manner that ensures handing over its trust and banner, while Egypt is honoured, secure, and stable), and وبما يحفظ الشرعية ويحترم *wa bi-mā yahfaẓu š-šar'iyah wa ya-ḥtarimu d-dustūr* (in a manner that safeguards legitimacy and respects the constitution). Such a vague language mystified strategically the meaning of 'trust' and 'banner'; the mechanisms intended for handing them over; and the measures and guarantors of achieving security, stability, and honour, and of safeguarding legitimacy and respecting the constitution. Such a strategic vagueness cast doubts on the

sincerity of Mubarak, as well as his seriousness about implementing the promises he was making.

The fourth frame that relinquished the power of Mubarak in this speech was the extended Parliament-Police-Judiciary frame (M2.14:2, M2.15:3, M2.18:6), through which he attempted to represent himself positively as the responsive president who was ordering the various bodies of the state to implement the demands of the protesters. The most outstanding feature of that frame is its weak, vague language.

Mubarak addressed the Parliament employing the weak, non-binding verb *'ad'ū* (I invite) in *إنني أدعو البرلمانَ بمجلسيهِ 'innanī 'ad'ū l-barlamāna* (I do invite the parliament), and followed it with the weak noun *مناقشة munāqashat* (discussing), at a time when the protesters were expecting stronger and more performative verbs and nouns, e.g. *أطالب* 'I demand', or *أكلف* 'I instruct' the parliament *بتعديل* 'to amend' the constitution. Similarly, the three pre-conditions which Mubarak set for the Parliament to meet before 'discussing' the constitutional amendments were too vague and broad: identifying the relevant legislative amendments that complement the intended constitutional amendments at issue, including all political forces in the intended parliamentary discussions, and abiding by the verdicts given by the judiciary on the contestations over the results of the last legislative elections. The last pre-condition was particularly revealing, as it meant terminating the membership of the illegally elected members of Parliament, then holding new parliamentary elections, and after that 'discussing' the suggested constitutional amendments. This interpretation was reinforced by the negative *دونَ إبطاء dūna ibṭā'* (without delay) which Mubarak employed at the end of the last pre-condition; that negative contrasted with the excessive delay implied by the previous three pre-conditions and acted paradoxically to emphasize the impression that Mubarak was not serious about amending the constitution and that he was just playing for time.

Moreover, Mubarak employed two minimizing structures and two weak nouns when he addressed the judiciary: the structure of *mā at-tab'īd* in *ما يلزمُ من إجراءاتِ mā yalzamu min 'ijrā'ātin* (necessary measures), which combined with the indefiniteness of *'ijrā'ātin* to unspecify and minimize the force of those intended measures. Also, when he talked about corruption, Mubarak used the weak noun *ملاحقة mulāḥaqati* (pursuing), which was not up to the high expectations of the protesters who were demanding revolutionary trials, or at least more decisive actions for punishing the corrupt. Similarly, Mubarak employed the weak noun

التحقيق *at-taḥqīqi* (investigating) in انفلتت أمنياً *at-taḥqīqi ma 'a l-mutasabibīn* which, together with the minimizing structure ما شهدته مصرُ من انفلتت *mā šahidat 'hu mišru min infilātin 'amniyyin* (literally: what Egypt witnessed of security disarray), and the indefiniteness of the noun انفلتت created the impression that Mubarak was belittling that security disarray, and was not intending to punish the perpetrators who caused it severely.

Finally, the pledge Mubarak made at the end of this frame was weakened by two linguistic devices: demonstratives and implicatures. First, Mubarak referred to his pledge by the distancing demonstrative ذلك *dālika*, not the proximal هذا *hāda* which indicates that its referent 'has been in the speaker's mind' (Tannen 1979:152) and hence would be the most grammatically effective demonstrative in that context. Moreover, Mubarak supplicated Allah to help him fulfil his pledge, an act that generated two deniable implicatures: Mubarak might not be able to fulfil 'that' pledge; if that happens, it would mean that Allah did not help him, and hence there must be an unknown divine wisdom in not fulfilling that pledge.

The weakness, vagueness, and unspecificity which Mubarak adopted strategically and systematically when he talked about his plans to respond to the demands of the protesters were replaced by strong, precise, and performative language when the actions he was talking about were going to mark his power or add to it. For example, when he talked about his prospective supervisory plans over the new government, he employed the precise nouns تنفيذ *tanfīdi* (execution) and تكليفات *taklīfāt* (assigned duties) (M2.16:4). Such a contrast cast doubts on the sincerity of the claims Mubarak was making about his intention to hand over power.

Similarly, when Mubarak informed the people that he was staying in office till the end of his term (M2.13:13), he started the frame with the clause أقولُ بعباراتٍ واضحةٍ *'aqulu bi- 'ibārātīn wāḍiḥa* (I am saying in unequivocal sentences), which included two qualifiers: the adverbial prepositional phrase *bi- 'ibārātīn wāḍiḥa* which qualified his act of saying, and portrayed him as a powerful man who was in a position to explicitly emphasize what he was saying and to warn the people against misunderstanding him. The second qualifier was the present continuous tense in which Mubarak expressed his verb *'aqulu*, a tense that elongated the act of saying and hence emphasized and intensified the power, challenge, and warning implied in it. Second, the prepositional phrase ما يخولهُ لي الدستور من صلاحيات *bi-mujabi mā yuxawiluhu liya ad-dustūr min ṣalāḥiyāt* (according to the powers conferred on me by the

Constitution) marked his presidential authority and generated the implicature that he was threatening to use his powers if any attempt was made to remove him.

On the other hand, that ‘unequivocal’, authoritative, emphatic language which Mubarak employed to mark his power was contrasted by the vague language he used, within the same frame, to talk about his plans of handing over power. First, he employed the passive construct *كَي يَتَمَّ اتَّخَذَ التَّدَابِيرَ وَالْإِجْرَاءَاتُ، الْمُحَقَّقَةَ لِلانْتِقَالِ السَّلْمِيِّ لِلسَّلْطَةِ kay ya-timma itixādu t-tadābīri wa l-ijrā’āt al-muḥaqiqati li-l-intiqāli s-silmi li-l-sulṭah* (in order for the precautions and measures necessary for the peaceful transition of power to be taken) in order to present the process of power transfer as an agentless one, and hence evade taking responsibility for it. Moreover, the two nouns *at-tadābīri* and *l-ijrā’āt* were too vague.

3.3.4.3. Emotive frames

The first emotive frame Mubarak activated in this speech was the Slippery-Slope frame (M2.6:20), through which he attempted to stir the personal and nationalistic fears of the people. That pragmatic function was however weakened by five linguistic devices: qualification, indefinite nouns, syntactic structures, repetition, and inference.

In terms of qualifiers, Mubarak employed the adverb *مَعاً ma’an* (together) to qualify the verb *نَعِيشُ na tīšu* (we are living) and hence assimilate himself into the people by emphasizing that he was living those painful days together with them. However, that air of bonding was soon denied by the following qualifier and referencing forms he employed: the strong, definite adjective *الكاسحة al-kāsiḥata* (the over-sweeping) suggested that the fear Mubarak was talking about was obsessing the over-sweeping majority of Egyptians, but not Mubarak himself; a suggestion that was reinforced by the third-person references Mubarak used after that adjective, i.e. *ساورهم sawarahum* (preoccupied them), *لهم la-hum* (for them), *لذويهم li-dawīhim* (for their relatives), *عائلاتهم ā’ilātihim* (their families), and *بلداهم baladihim* (their country). Those five third-person references detached and distanced the people from the deictic field of Mubarak and hence cancelled the bonding he created by the first qualifier.

Moreover, Mubarak employed four indefinite nouns to describe the *أياماً ayāman* (days), *انزعاج inzi’ājin* (concern), *قلق qalaqin* (anxiety), and *هواجس hawājis* (premonitions) experienced by the over-sweeping majority of Egyptians. The indefiniteness of those nouns minimized, unspecified, and mitigated the feeling of fear intended by them. That weakening

effect was reinforced by the syntactic structure of *mā at-tab'īd* من انزعاجهم ما ساورهم *mā sawarahum min inzi 'ājin wa qalaqin wa hawājis* (what preoccupied them of concern, anxiety, and premonition) which belittled those concern, anxiety, and premonition and weakened their intended pragmatic force.

Furthermore, Mubarak repeated many related lexical items in this frame: the adjective مؤلمة *mu'alimah* (painful) and the verb يوجع *yuji'u* (aching), the two verbs انتاب *intāba* (obsessed) and ساورهم *sawarahum* (preoccupied), and the three nouns انزعاج *inzi 'ājin* (concern), قلق *qalaqin* (anxiety), and هواجس *hawājis* (premonition). Such a repetition, which was supposed to reinforce the intended meaning, was weakened by the indefiniteness of the repeated nouns, the inconsistency between the bonding and detaching effects created within the same frame, and the fact that Mubarak based the whole frame on his own inferences, i.e. 'statements which could not be known simply from observation [...] as for example when subjects report characters' thoughts, feelings, and motivations' (Tannen 1979: 173). Finally, given that inferences reveal more about the expectations of the speaker than about those of other characters (ibid), this frame, which Mubarak intended to underscore the fear of the people, suggested that Mubarak was the one who was 'preoccupied' with fear.

Second, the Old-Man-Speaking-to-You-Today frame (M2.22:14) succeeded to perform its assigned pragmatic function, of stirring the sympathy of the people with the old-man Mubarak, because of seven linguistic devices: evaluative language, reference, strong verbs and nouns, juxtaposition, grammatical tense, qualification, and voice.

The most salient feature of this frame is its evaluative language, whose emotional tone Mubarak initiated by starting the frame with referring to himself, emphatically, in the third-person as *إنَّ حسني مبارك الذي يتحدث إليكم اليوم* 'inna Husni Mubārak alladī yataḥadaṭu 'ilaykum al-yawm (Hosni Mubarak who is speaking to you today is indeed). Such a preference of this less familiar referring form to the simple first-person pronominal(s) can be interpreted as an indicator of *role identification*, i.e. 'speakers who have a variety of roles [...] wish to specify a particular role relevant to the unfolding discourse' (Wilson 1990:78).

Moreover, that evaluative language was also reflected in the emotional vocabulary of the frame, which Mubarak regimented in five juxtapositional pairs: Mubarak's pride and his service of the people; the old Mubarak today and the young Mubarak long years ago; Egypt

of Mubarak and Egypt of Egyptians; the homeland of life, fighting, and defending and the homeland of death; and the merits and demerits of Mubarak versus the merits and demerits of others.

Those juxtapositional pairs performed strategic rhetorical functions: the first juxtaposition reconciled Mubarak with the people, by lowering and harnessing the highest thing he had, i.e. his pride, to the lowest thing they had, i.e. their service; the second juxtaposition bridged the present and past of Mubarak and summoned the latter up by reminding the people that the old man who was standing in front of them was once a strong, young fighter and that he had exhausted his strength and youth in defending them; the third juxtaposition, which was emphasized four times by the emphatic particle *إنَّ* *'inna*, the pronoun *هو* *hwa* twice, and the determiner *كل* *kulli*, equated Mubarak the president to ordinary Egyptian men and women and ironed out any superiority or conflict of interests among them; the fourth juxtaposition established a logical relation that justified the indirect plea Mubarak made to the people to allow him to die on the soil of Egypt, by arguing that he had spent his life in Egypt, fought for its sake, defended its land, sovereignty, and interests, and hence he was entitled to die on its soil; and the fifth juxtapositions compared Mubarak historically to other political leaders and presented him as confident of his achievements.

The emotional tone of this frame was also intensified by the six strong nouns and verbs Mubarak employed. He started with the positively connotative verb *يعتزُّ* *ya 'tazu* (prides himself) to describe his feelings when serving the people; he employed the strong, positive, yet modest noun *خدمة* *xidmati* (service) to describe his political career; he used the strong verbs *حاربتُ* *hārabtu* (I fought) and *دافعتُ* *dāfa'tu* (defended) to further describe his service for Egypt and its people; he employed the strong and highly emotional verb *أموتُ* *'amūt* (I die) to describe the last stage of his service, and expressed it in the present tense, instead of the future, in order to connote that he was dying soon, and hence stir stronger and deeper emotions and sympathy; and he used the strong, performative, and grand verb *سيحكمُ التاريخُ على* *sayḥkumu t-tārīxu* (history will judge) to describe how his legacy will be evaluated by history.

Finally, the vocal performance of Mubarak played an important role in the success of this frame, which was the most vocally vibrant in the speech: Mubarak started the frame by uttering his name in a deep, soft, and low intonation that made him sound modest and self-denying; he elongated the adjective *طويلة* *ṭawīlah* (long) and paused after it, in a manner that

emphasized the length of the years he had spent serving Egypt; he pronounced the three words *مصرَ في خدمة مصرَ* *fi xidmati miṣra* (at the service of Egypt) slowly and emphatically to connote devotion and commitment; and he uttered the clause *إنَّ هذا الوطنَ، العزيزُ هو وطني* *'inna hāda l-waṭan al-'azīz hwa waṭani* (This dear homeland is indeed my homeland) in a performatively slow and emphatic manner, adding particular weight and significance to the adjective *العزيز* by pausing before and after it.

Mubarak also modulated his voice theatrically in this frame: he uttered the verb *عِشْتُ* *'išt* (I lived) softly and deeply, in a low intonation that suggested modesty and self-denial, then juxtaposed it by following it immediately with raising his voice loudly while pronouncing the two verbs *حَارَبْتُ* *ḥārabtu* (I fought) and *دَافَعْتُ* *dāfa'tu* (I defended) in a forceful, emphatic intonation that was reinforced by an accompanying sharp and assertive hand movement. That strong performance was then juxtaposed with the deep, emotional intonation with which he uttered the verb *أَمُوتُ* *'amūt* (I die) in low, soft, and almost crying voice. Mubarak concluded this performance with pronouncing the last clause slowly and emphatically, adding a tone of soberness, gravity, and wisdom commensurate with the grandness implied in the judgement of history.

4. The third speech of Mubarak

4.1. Structures of society: Dialectic socio-political relations of power

This speech was broadcast on February 10, 2011, i.e. nine days after the emotional second speech in which Mubarak stirred the sympathy of the people deeply, by assuming the role of the old father and family man, not the president. That 'cleverly crafted' and 'ugly divisive' speech did not only touch 'a lot of hearts' by its 'emotional tone' (Ghonim 2012a: 392), but also caused a 'clear rift' in the front of the protesters in Tahrir Square, convincing some of them to leave the square and call for giving the 'old man' one last chance (ibid: 292, 392, 354).

Mubarak can be argued to have survived the attempts of his ouster by that emotional speech, which won the sympathy of 'millions of Egyptians' in a manner that surprised even some of the power centres inside the regime itself (El Manawy 2012: 286). Shortly after the second speech, thousands of pro-Mubarak protesters demonstrated in Mostafa Mahmoud Square in Cairo, in front of the TV Building, and in other places (Ghonim 2012a: 355; El Manawy 2012: 382). Although some online activists, international correspondents, and senior officials in the regime reported that those pro-Mubarak protesters were a mixture of policemen, government workers, and 'hired muscle' (CNN 2011, February 2), who were paid 400 Egyptian pounds each (Ghonim 2012a: 356-7) and 'assigned' to gather and demonstrate in 'pre-arranged and coordinated protests organized by the Presidency, the ruling NDP party, and some of its affiliated businessmen' (El Manawy 2012: 282-4, 301), it cannot be denied that some of those protesters were sincere supporters of Mubarak, moved by his emotional second speech.

The positive effect of the second speech did not last long: government forces, supported by thugs, started attacking the protesters and shooting live ammunition at them in Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, and other governorates. The most significant incident, which was later called the Camel Battle, took place in Cairo on 2 February 2011, when the unarmed sit-ins in Tahrir Square were attacked by more than five hundred thugs riding camels and horses and armed with knives, swords, and Molotov cocktails at around three o'clock in the afternoon. At eight thirty in the evening, Head of the State TV News Sector, Abdul Lateef

El Manawy, was 'ordered' to switch off the live broadcast cameras in Tahrir Square 'because the picture is going to be ugly' (El Manawy 2012: 308); after mid-night, 'snipers, stationed on the bridge, started targeting the protesters and firing live ammunition at them' (Ghonim 2012a: 359). The clashes continued until the morning of the following day, without interference from the police or the army forces which were surrounding the Square (CNN, 2011, February 2; AP 2011, February 2; Ackerman 2011, February 2; RT 2011, February 2; Owen 2012: 188; Gelvin 2015: 53; Ghonim 2012a: 356-7).

On the following day, the protesters in Tahrir Square displayed ID cards, of police officers and NDP members, which they found on the attackers they had captured overnight; the protesters accused the police and ruling NDP party of organizing the Camel Battle by clothing police officers in plain clothes, backing them with thugs and admitting them into the Square to attack the protesters (CNN 2011, February 2; Ghonim 2012a: 356). The death toll among the protesters rose to more than three-hundred (Human Rights Watch 2011; Williams 2011; South African Press Association 2011).

The Camel Battle signalled the end of the Mubarak regime, in spite of the fact that the official announcement of that end came nine days later (El Manawy 2012: 9). More than a million protesters responded to the Camel Battle by joining the sit-ins in Tahrir Square, in a million-man-march, on 4 February, which they called the 'Friday of Departure', demanding Mubarak to step down immediately (Press TV 2011, February 2; Bodenner 2011, February 4).

The numbers of protesters in Tahrir Square kept increasing; the areas they were sitting in kept expanding to include the TV building, Abdeen presidential palace, the streets surrounding the two chambers of parliament, and the Cabinet; and their demands rose to the immediate dissolution of the cabinet and the two chambers of parliament, on the top of the immediate departure of Mubarak. Labour unions staged general strikes, involving more than 20.000 workers, across the country (Muir 2011, February 8; AFP 2011, February 9; VOA News 2011, February 9; Al Jazeera English 2011, February 10). Calls were also made for a million-man-march on Friday, February 11, to march to the presidential palace and force Mubarak out of power (Ghonim 2012a: 433).

On the other end of the continuum of power, Mubarak continued to lose power and control not only over the street, but also over his own very close men. El Manawy reports that many

people and officials were wondering about the role of the armed forces which announced, from the beginning of the protests, that they were protecting the protesters, but adopted a 'too lenient' stance that did not take decisive or firm measures to stop the clashes between the protesters and the police. El Manawy then concludes that after the convention of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) without its Supreme Commander, i.e. Mubarak, on February 09; the announcement of Communiqué Number 1 on February 10; and the many video-taped visits of the Minister of Defence Field Marshal Tantawy to the protesters in Tahrir Square, and his friendly talks and hand-shaking with them, it became clear to all political forces that the 'contradiction' in the behaviour of the armed forces and the intelligence was due to the fact that 'their real aim was not to protect the protesters as much as to intensify the pressure on Mubarak, in order to force him to resign, and consequently abort his project of bequeathing presidency to his son Gamal (El Manawy 2012: 337, 338-9, 389, 398, 399-400).

Mubarak was thus forced to sacrifice more senior top officials and higher heads in the regime, in order to save his own head: He forced his son Gamal to resign from his two top positions in the ruling NDP party as Assistant Secretary General and Secretary of the Policy Committee; sacked the steel magnate Ahmed Ezz, who had been the principal financier of the party and the closest associate of Gamal Mubarak, from his top position in NDP (Owen 2012: 72); removed his loyal ex-Minister of Media Safwat el-Sherif from his position as the head of the Second Chamber of Parliament, the Shura Council, and also from his top positions in the ruling NDP (Ahram Online 2011, February 5); dismissed his Minister of State for Legal Affairs, Mufeed Shehab, who was publicly known as the 'private legal tailor' of Mubarak; and sacked his Presidential Chief-of-Staff, Zakaria Azmy, who was publicly known as the Crocodile, from the party (El-Hennawy 2011, February 5). Mubarak also ordered the arrest of some less influential ministers, banned others from travel, and froze their bank accounts (Ahram Online 2011, February 5; El-Hennawy 2011, February 5).

In an attempt to further appease the protesters, Mubarak did not only sack the backbone of his regime, i.e. the Minister of Interior, Habeeb el-Adli, and put him under house arrest (Egypt Independent 2011, February 3), he also charged him before the military Supreme State Security Court with causing breakdown in public order, ordering live fire on protesters, releasing prisoners from jails (Hammond 2011, February 7), and masterminding the bombing of the Two Saints Church in Alexandria, on the New Year's Eve, which killed 24

Egyptian Copts and injured 90 others (Copts United 2011; Ismail 2011, February 7). El-Adli had blamed that bombing on the Palestinian Army of Islam, in the speech he delivered in his last celebration of the Police Day, on January 23, 2011, i.e. two days before the revolution (ibid; El Manawy 2012: 61). Finally, Mubarak was also forced to release activist Wael Ghonim, the anonymous admin of the famous page 'We are all Khalid Saeed', who was kidnapped by state security on January 27 (Google 2011, February 7).

4.2. Structure of the third speech

This speech is divided into three sections: the first is addressed to both the protesters and the non-protesting people, using the two vocatives *al-'ixwah al-muwātinūn* (Brother citizens) and *al-'abnā'u šabāba mišra wa šābātiha* (The sons, male and female youth of Egypt); the second is also addressed to the protesters and the non-protesting people, using the two vocatives *al-'abnā'u šabāba mišr* (The sons, youth of Egypt) and *al-'ixwah al-muwātinūn* (Brother citizens); and the third is addressed to the non-protesting people only, starting with the vocative *al-'ixwah al-muwātinūn* (Brother citizens). The speech is bracketed with two appeals to religion, i.e. the opening Islamic starter *bi-smi llāhi r-rahmāni r-rāhīm* (In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate) and the concluding Islamic greeting of departure *as-salāmu 'alaikum wa raḥmatu llāhi wa barakātuh* (Peace and blessing of Allah be upon you).

The first section consists of three main thematic components: power relinquishment by Mubarak, mixed with excessive praise of the protesters, and embedded between four emotional appeals. Mubarak started his first emotional appeal with the new vocative *al-'abnā'u šabāba mišra wa šābātiha* (The sons, male and female youth of Egypt), which he used for the first time in this speech; he then further specified those youth as 'the youth of Egypt in Tahrir Square and all over the country', considered them 'as' his 'sons and daughters', and praised them as a 'symbol of a new Egyptian generation, that calls for change to the better and adheres to it, and dreams of the future and makes it.'

Mubarak reinforced that fatherly appeal with an emotionally stronger one, in which he confirmed to the protesters that the 'bloods' of 'their' martyrs and injured ones would not go in vain, and that he was going to punish the perpetrators with all 'fierceness, decisiveness, and utmost deterrent penalties'. He then addressed his third emotional appeal to the families

of the killed protesters, telling them that he was ‘pained all the pain for them, as you were pained’ and that his heart was ‘ached by what happened to them, as your hearts were ached.’

Mubarak followed those three emotional appeals with an excessive praise of the protesters, and a seeming surrender to their demands coupled with a relinquishment of his power: he confirmed to them that his response to their 'voice' and 'demands' was irrevocable; that he was ‘determined, all the determination’ and ‘keen, all the keenness’ on fulfilling his promises to them, ‘with no return or retreat’, because of his 'firm conviction' of the 'sincerity and purity' of their intentions and the 'legitimacy and fairness' of their demands, and because ‘mistakes’ are likely to happen in any country. He concluded the first section with a nationalistic emotional appeal, in which he argued that although he was the president of the republic, he was not ashamed of ‘listening to the youth of his country and responding to them’; but, he would never listen to ‘foreign dictations’.

Mubarak then started the second section, in which he alternated among relinquishing his power, acceding to the demands of the protesters, and appealing to their emotions, in a manner similar to what he did in the first speech. He, however, decreased the number and intensity of his emotional appeals, and increased those of relinquishing his power and representing himself positively. He started the section with addressing it to the protesters and the non-protesting people, using the two vocatives *al-ʿabnāʿu šabāba miṣr* (the sons, youth of Egypt) and *al-ixwah al-muwātinūn* (Brother citizens). Then, he listed the measures he had taken in response to the demands of the protesters, embedding them between an initial religious appeal and a concluding emotional one: he was not running for a sixth presidential term; he was staying in power only to ensure a safe transition of power in the coming presidential elections; he had laid down a vision that would respond to the demands of the protesters and transfer power in a constitutional manner; he had done so out of his sense of responsibility and had been working on it and following it ‘hour by hour’; he started a national dialogue with ‘the youth who called for change’ and agreed with them on forming two constitutional and follow-up committees; he instructed the rapid completion of investigating the 'sad tragic events' which resulted in the death of the 'martyrs of Egypt'; and he 'requested' amending the six constitutional articles that facilitate nomination for presidency, set a fixed number of presidential terms, facilitate judiciary supervision on elections, ‘confirm the exclusive jurisdiction of the judiciary’ to rule on the legitimacy of

the membership of parliament, and review the measures required for amending the constitution.

Mubarak then started the third section which contained the most important piece of information in the speech, i.e. his decision to delegate his presidential powers to his vice-president. He embedded that important proposition between nine appeals to fear and pity, three preparatory appeals to fear and a fourth to pity preceding the announcement, and five reinforcing appeals to emotions succeeding it.

Mubarak started this section with addressing it to *al-'ixwah al-muwātinūn* (Brother citizens) only, to the exclusion of the protesters. He followed that vocative with a complex of three emotional appeals that raised the social, economic, and political fears of the people, personally and nationalistically: he stated that the priority was to restore confidence among the Egyptian people, confidence in 'our' economy, and confidence in 'our' international reputation, so as not to increase 'our' losses; he repeated twice that the situation had nothing to do with himself, but was all about the present and future of 'Egypt and its sons'; and he concluded with a war metaphor through which he warned that all Egyptians were in the same 'ditch', and had to participate in the national dialogue in the spirit of 'a team, not that of enemies', in order to restore confidence in 'our economy', bring assurance and security to 'our' citizens, and return natural life to the Egyptian street.

Mubarak followed those three fear appeals with a long emotional one, consisting of thirteen short, sharp sentences that appealed to the personal and nationalistic emotions of the people, by listing the sacrifices he had offered Egypt and Egyptians: he exhausted his life in the military, defending the land and sovereignty of Egypt; he fought its wars and witnessed its defeats and victories; he raised the Egyptian flag over Sinai; he 'faced death' several times; he resisted foreign dictations, safeguarded peace, and worked on the revival of 'Egypt and its sons'; and he never sought authority or fake popularity. He concluded that emotional appeal with a very touching and emotionally loaded complaint about the way he was mistreated by some of the sons of his homeland, and how that hurt him deeply; he followed that highly emotional appeal with his announcement of the most important piece of information in the speech, i.e. his delegation of his presidential powers to the vice-president.

Mubarak then triggered a complex of five emotional appeals, four nationalistic, praising the strength, will, civilization, independence, zeal, pride, dignity, spirit, cohesion, and identity of the Egyptian people, and a fifth mixing personal and nationalistic emotions, depicting Mubarak and Egypt as an inseparable union, and highlighting the image of the president who had exhausted his life defending a homeland, that he had never parted with, and would never do so until he was buried in its soil. He intensified the implied pragmatic function performed by that appeal, i.e. his indirect request to the protesters to allow him to stay and die in Egypt, by another emotional appeal that put pressure on them by praising them as hospitable, proud, honourable, and dignified people. Mubarak concluded that section and the speech with two appeals to fear and religion: the first prayed to Allah to save Egypt a safe country and guide its people, and the second greeted the people with the Islamic greeting of departure.

4.3. Structures of power

4.3.1. Linguistic manifestations of power: Deictic and anaphoric analysis of the third speech

4.3.1.1. First-person singular pronoun 'I'

Mubarak employed the first-person singular pronoun I seventy-seven times in his third speech, in order to perform six main functions: representing himself positively, in forty-four occurrences; gearing his powers to accede to the demands of the protesters, in sixteen instances; flattering the protesters and adulating them, in seven occurrences; imploring the people indirectly and stirring their feelings of pity, in six instances; assuming a moral and religious parental role over the protesters, in five instances; and denying his political and executive powers and distancing himself from the political conflict over power.

The most predominant function Mubarak performed through the first-person singular pronoun I was positive-self representation. He portrayed himself as the old fighter who had been ill-treated by his countrymen after he had exhausted his life defending them and their country (M3.22:1); the responsible president whose stay in power was only to honour his oath to Allah and his respect of the constitution and the people (M3.10:2); the proactive president who worked hard to suggest a constitutional solution to the crisis and formed two committees to achieve that (M3.11:3; M3.12:4; M3.14:5); the modest president who was not too arrogant to listen to the demands of the protesters, but who was also so strong that he did not succumb to foreign dictations (M3.7:6); the patriotic president who prioritized the interests of the country and delegated his powers to the Vice-President (M3.23:7); and the fair, decisive president who was keen on punishing the perpetrators who committed

crimes against the protesters (M3.4:8). An important marker of Mubarak's loss of power, in this speech, is his refrain from juxtaposing his positive-self representation with any negative-other representation of the protesters, as he kept doing in the previous two speeches.

(M3.22:1)

لقد كنتُ شاباً مثلَ شبابِ مصرَ الآنَ، عندما تعلمتُ شرفَ العسكريةِ المصريةِ، والولاءَ للوطنِ، والتضحيةَ من أجله، أفتيتُ عمراً، دفاعاً عن أرضهِ وسيادتهِ، شهدتُ حروبهُ، بهزائمها، وانتصاراتها، عشتُ أيامَ الانكسارِ والاحتلالِ، وأيامَ العبورِ، والنصرِ والتحريرِ، أسعدُ أيامَ حياتي، يومَ رفعتُ علمَ مصرَ فوقَ سيناء، واجهتُ الموتَ مراتٍ عديدة، طياراً، وفي أديس أبابا، وغير ذلك كثير، لم أخضع يوماً لضغوطٍ أجنبيةٍ أو إملاءاتٍ، حافظتُ على السلام، عملتُ من أجل أمنِ مصرَ واستقرارها، اجتهدتُ من أجل نهضتها، ومن أجل ابنائها، لم أَسع يوماً لسلطةٍ أو شعبيةٍ زائفة، أثقُ، أن الأغلبيةَ الكاسحةَ من أبناء الشعب، يعرفون من هو حسني مبارك، ويُجزئ في نفسي، ما لأقبيه اليوم، من بعض، بني وطني.

la-qad kuntu šāban miṭla šabābi miṣra l'ān 'indamā ta'llamtu šarafa l-'askariyati l-miṣriyyah, wa l-walā'a li-l-waṭan, wa t-taḍḥiyati min 'ajlih. 'afnaytu 'umran difā'an 'an 'arḍihī wa siyādatih, šahidtu ḥurūbahū bi-hazā'imihā wa ntisārātihā, 'istu 'ayyama l-inkisāri wa l-iḥtilāl, wa 'ayāma l-'ubūri wa n-naṣri wa t-tahrīr. 'as'adu 'ayyama ḥayāti yawma rafa 'tu 'alama miṣra fawqa sainā', wājahtu l-mawta marrātin 'adīdah, ṭayyāran wa fī adis abābā, wa ḡayri ḍālika kaṭīr. lam axḍa 'yawman li-ḍuḡūṭin ajnabiyatin aw imlā'āt. ḥāfaẓtu 'alā s-salām. 'amiltu min ajli 'amni miṣra wa stiqrārihā. 'ijtahdту min 'ajli nahḍatihā wa min ajli 'abnā'ihā. lam 'as'ā yawman li-sulṭatin aw ša'biyatin zā'ifah. 'aṭīqu fī anna l-'aḡlabiyata l-kāsiḥah min 'abnā'i š-ša'b ya 'rifūna man hwa ḥusnī mubārak, wa ya ḥizzu fī nafsī mā 'ulāqihī l-yawma min ba'ḍi banī waṭani

I was indeed a youth like the current youth of Egypt, when I learnt the honour of the Egyptian military, allegiance to the homeland, and sacrifice for its sake; I have annihilated a life defending its land and sovereignty; I have witnessed its wars, in their defeats and victories; I have lived the days of defeat and occupation and the days of crossing, victory, and liberation; the happiest day of my life was when I raised the flag of Egypt over Sinai; I have faced death several times: as a pilot, in Addis Ababa, and in many other situations; I have never succumbed to foreign pressures or dictations; I have safeguarded peace; I have worked for the security and stability of Egypt; I have tried my best for the sake of its renaissance and for the sake of its sons; I have never sought power or fake popularity; I trust that the over-sweeping majority of the sons of the people know who Hosni Mubarak is, but it hurts me to see how some of the sons of my homeland are treating me today.

(M3.10:2)

لقد أعلنتُ بعباراتٍ لا تحتملُ الجدلَ أو التأويلَ، عدمَ ترشيحي للانتخاباتِ الرئاسيةِ المقبلة، مكتفياً، بما قدمتهُ من عطاءٍ للوطنِ، لأكثرَ من 60 عاماً، في سنواتِ الحربِ والسلامِ، أعلنتُ تمسكي بذلك، وأعلنتُ تمسكاً مماثلاً، وبذاتِ القدرِ، بالمضي في النهوضِ بمسؤوليتي، في حمايةِ الدستورِ، ومصالحِ الشعبِ، حتى يتمَ تسليمُ السلطةِ والمسؤوليةِ، لمن يختارُهُ الناخبونَ، شهرَ مستقبلِ سبتمبرِ المقبلِ، في انتخاباتِ حرةٍ ونزيهةٍ، توفرُ لها الضماناتُ الحرةِ والنزاهةُ، ذلك هو القسمُ الذي أقسمتهُ أمامَ الله والوطنِ وسوفَ أحافظُ عليه، حتى نبليغَ بمصرَ وشعبها، برَ الأمانِ.

la-qad 'a lantu bi-'ibārātin lā taḥtamli l-jadala 'awi t-t'awīl, 'adama taraṣuḥī li-l-intixābāti r-ri'āsiyati l-muqbilah, muktafiyan bimā qadamtuḥu min 'atā'in li-l-waṭan, li-'akṭara min 60 'aman, fī sanawāti l-ḥarbi wa s-salām. 'a lantu tamasukī bi-ḍālik,

wa 'a'lantu tamasukan mumātilan, wa biḍāti l-qadr bi-lmuḍiyi fi n-nuhūḍi bi-mas'ūliyyatī, fi ḥimāyati d-dustūr wa maṣālihi š-ša 'b, ḥattā yatimma taslīmu s-sulṭata wa l-mas'ūliyyah li-man yaxtāruhu n-nāxibūn šahra (XXX stumble) sibtimbir al-muqbil, fi intixābātin ḥurratin wa nazīhah, tuwaffaru lahā aḍ-ḍamānātu l-ḥurriyyah wa n-nazāhah (XXX stumble). ḍālika huwa l-qasam allāḍi 'aqsamtuḥu 'amāma llahi wa l-waṭan wa sawfa 'uḥāfizu 'alayh, ḥatta nabluga bi-miṣra wa ša 'bihā barra l-'amān.

I have indeed stated in sentences that do not allow misinterpretation or argumentation that I am not nominating myself for the coming presidential elections, content with what I have offered the homeland over more than 60 years, in war and peace. I have announced my commitment to that, and announced similar commitment, that is equally emphatic, to continue shouldering my responsibility of safeguarding the Constitution and the interests of the people, until power and responsibility are handed over to whom electors will choose in the coming September, in fair and free elections, for which guarantees of freedom and fairness will be secured. That is the oath I have taken before Allah and the homeland and I will honour it until we take Egypt and its people to a safe harbour.

(M3.11:3)

لقد طرحتُ رؤيةً محددةً للخروج من الأزمة الراهنة، ولتحقيق ما دعا إليه الشباب والمواطنون، بما يحترمُ الشرعية الدستورية، ولا يقوضُها، وعلى نحو يحقق استقرارَ مجتمعنا، ومطالبَ أبنائه

la-qad ṭaraḥtu ru'ayatan muḥaddadatan li-lxuruji mina l-'azmati r-rāhinah wa li-taḥqīqi mā da'ā 'ilayhi š-šabābu wa l-muwāṭinūn, bi-mā yaḥtarimu š-šar'iyata d-dustūriyya, wa lā yuqwiḍuhā, wa 'alā naḥwin yuḥaqiq istiqrāra mujtama'inā, wa maṭāliba 'abnā'ih

I have indeed laid down a specific vision for exiting the current crisis, and for realizing what the youth and citizens have asked for, in a manner that respects constitutional legitimacy, not undermines it, and in a way that accomplishes the stability of our society and the demands of its sons

(M3.12:4)

طرحتُ هذه الرؤية، ملتزماً بمسؤوليتي في الخروج بالوطن من هذه الأوقات العصيبة. وأتابع المضي في تحقيقها أولاً بأول، بل ساعةً بساعةً متطلعاً لدعم ومساندة كل حريص على مصر وشعبها، كي ننجح في تحويلها، لواقع ملموس، وفق توافقٍ وطنيٍ عريض، وامتساع القاعدة، تسهراً على ضمان تنفيذها، قوائماً المسلحةً بالأسلحة.

ṭaraḥtu ḥāḍihi r-ru'yah, multaziman bi-mas'ūliyyatī fi l-xurūj bi-l-waṭan min ḥāḍihi l-'wqāti l-'aṣībah wa utābi'u l-muḍiyya quḍuman fī taḥqīqihā 'awalan bi-'awal, bal sā'atan bi-sā'ah, mutaṭali'an li-da'mi wa musānadati kulla ḥarīšin 'alā miṣra wa ša 'bihā, kay nanjaḥa fī taḥwīlihā li-wāqi'in malmūs, wifqa tawāfuqin waṭaniyyin 'arīḍ, wa mutasi'i l-qā'idah, tasharu 'alā ḍamāni tanfīḍihī quwātuna l-musallaḥatu l-bāsilah

I have laid down this vision out of my commitment to my responsibility for leading the homeland out of these critical times, and I have been closely following up on its implementation, hour by hour, looking forward to the support and assistance of everyone who is keen on Egypt and its people, in order to succeed in transforming it

into a concrete reality, according to a broad national consensus, that has a wide base, and whose implementation is to be guaranteed by our intrepid armed forces.

(M3.14:5)

لجنة للمتابعة، تتولى متابعة التنفيذ الأمين، لما تعهدتُ به أمام الشعب، ولقد حرصتُ، على أن يأتي تشكيل كلتا اللجنتين، من الشخصيات المصرية، المشهود لها بالاستقلال والتجرد

lajnatin li-l-mutāba‘ah, tatawallā mutāba‘ata t-tanfīdi l-‘amīn limā ta‘ahadtu bihi ‘amāma š-ša‘b, wa la-qad ḥarišt ‘alā ‘an ya‘tiya taškīlu kiltā al-lajnatayin, mina š-šxšiyāti l-miṣriyyah, al-mašhūdi lahā bi-l-istiqlāl wa t-tajarud

a follow-up committee that undertakes the follow-up of the honest implementation of what I have promised the people. I was keen that the formation of both committees comes from Egyptian dignitaries, well-known for their independence and impartiality

(M3.7:6)

وأقول لكم، إنني كرئيس للجمهورية، لا أجدُ حرجاً أو غصاضةً أبدأ، في الاستماع لشباب بلادي، والتجاوب معه، لكن الحرجُ كلُّ الحرجِ، والعيبُ كلُّ العيبِ، وما لم ولن أقبَلُه أبدأ، أن أستمعَ لإملاءاتٍ أجنبيةٍ تأتي من الخارج، أياً كانت مصدرها، وأياً كانت ذرائعها، أو مبرراتها.

*wa ‘aqulu lakum, ‘innani ka-ra‘āsin li-l-jumhūriyya, lā ‘ajidu ḥarajan ‘aw ḡaḡāḡatan abadan fī l-istimā‘i li-šabābi bilādi wa t-tajāwubi ma‘ahum, lakinna l-ḥaraja kulla l-ḥaraj, wa l-‘ayba kulla l-‘ayb, wa mā lam wa lan *‘aqbaluhu [‘aqbalahu] ‘abadan, ‘an ‘astami‘a li-implā‘ātīn ‘ajnabiyah t‘atī mina l-xārij ‘ayyan *kānat [kana] maṣḡaruhā, wa ‘ayyan kānat ḡarā‘i ‘uhā ‘aw mubbarirātuhā.*

I am indeed saying to you, in my capacity as a president of the republic that I do not find any embarrassment or shame at all in listening to the youth of my country and responding to them, but the embarrassment, all the embarrassment, and the shame, all the shame, and what I did not and will not ever accept is to listen to foreign dictations that are coming from abroad, regardless of their source, and regardless of their pretexts or justifications.

(M3.23:7)

وعلى أية حال، فإنني إذ أعي تماماً خطورة المقترح الصعب الحالي، واقتناعاً من جانبي بأن مصرَ تجتازُ لحظةً، فارقةً في تاريخها، تفرضُ علينا جميعاً، تغليبَ المصلحة العليا للوطن، وأن نضعَ مصرَ أولاً، فوقَ أي اعتبارٍ، وكلَّ اعتبارٍ آخر، فقد رأيتُ تفويضَ نائبِ رئيسِ الجمهورية، في اختصاصاتِ رئيسِ الجمهورية، على النحو الذي، يحدده الدستور.

wa ‘alā ‘ayati ḡāl, fa-‘innanī ‘id ‘a tī tamāman xuṡūrata l-muṡtaraqi š-ša‘bi l-ḡālī, wa iqtinā ‘an min jānibī bi-‘anna miṡra tajtāzu lahḡatan fāriḡatan fī tāriḡihā, tafriḡu ‘alainā jamī‘an, taḡlība l-maṡlahati ‘uliyā li-l-waṡan, wa ‘an naḡa‘a miṡra ‘awalan, faḡqa ‘ayyi tībār wa kulla i tībārīn ‘āxar, fa-qd ra‘aytu tafwīḡa nā‘ibi ra‘īsi l-jumhūriyyah fī ixtiṡāsātī ra‘ayīsi l-jumhūriyyah, ‘alā n-naḡwi l-laḡi yuḡaddiduhu d-dustūr.

Anyway, while I am indeed completely aware of the gravity of the current critical conjuncture, and based on my conviction that Egypt is passing a defining moment, in its history, that imposes upon us all the prioritization of the higher interest of the homeland and to put Egypt first, above any consideration and every other

consideration, I have decided to delegate the powers of the President of the republic to the Vice-President as per the constitution.

(M3.4:8)

أقول (لكم) لكم قبل كل شيء، أن دماء شهدائكم وجرحاكم لن تضيع هدرا، وأؤكد، أنني لن أتهاون، في معاقبة المتسببين عنها، بكل الشدة والحسم، وسأحاسب الذين أجرموا في حق شبابنا، بأقصى ما تقرره أحكام القانون، من عقوبات رادعة. وأقول، لعائلات هؤلاء الضحايا الأبرياء، أنني تألمت كل الألم، من أجلهم، مثلما تألمتم، وأوجع قلبي ما حدث لهم، كما أوجع قلوبكم

'aqulu lakum qabla kulli šay', 'anna *damā'a [dimā'a] šuhadā'ikum wa jarḥākum lan taḍī'a hadara. wa 'u'akid 'annanī lan 'atahāwan fi mu'āqabati l-mutasabibīna 'anhā bi-kulli l-šiddati wa l-ḥasm, wa sa-'uhāsibu alladīna ajramū fi ḥaqqi šabābina bi-'aqṣā ma tuqariruhu 'aḥkāmū l-qānūn min 'uqūbātīn rādī'ah. wa 'aqūl li-'ā'ilātī hā'ulā 'i ḍ-ḍaḥāyā al-'abriyā', 'annanī ta'alamtu kulla l-'alam min 'ajlihīm, miṭlamā ta'allamtum, wa 'awja'a qalbī mā ḥadaṭa lahum, kamā 'awja'a qulūbakum.

I am saying to you before everything that the bloods of your martyrs and injured ones will indeed not go down the drain; I confirm that I will not be lenient in punishing its perpetrators with all fierceness and decisiveness; and I will punish those who committed crimes against our youth with the most deterrent sentences stipulated by the law. I am saying to the families of those innocent victims that I was indeed pained all the pain for them, as you were pained, and my heart was ached by what happened to them, as your hearts were ached.

The second function Mubarak performed through the first-person singular pronoun *I* was gearing his powers to implement the demands of the protesters, by confirming that his promise to punish their attackers was 'irrevocable' (M3.5:9; M3.4:10; M3.15:11), and by asserting that he had acceded to their demands and 'requested' the amendment of the constitution (M3.16:12).

(M3.5:9)

أقول لكم، أن استجابتي لصوتكم ورسالتكم ومطالبكم، هو التزام لا رجعة فيه، وإنني، عازم كل العزم، على الوفاء بما تعهدت به، بكل الجدية، والصدق، وحريص كل الحرص، على تنفيذه، دون ارتداد، أو عودة الي الوراء

'aqulu lakum 'anna istijābati li-ṣawtikum wa risālatikum wa maṭālibukum, hwa iltizāmūn la raj'ata fih, wa innanī 'āzimūn kulla l-'azm 'alā l-wafā'i bi-mā ta'ahadtu bihi, bikulli l-jiddiyah wa ṣ-ṣidq, wa ḥarīṣūn kulla l-ḥiṣ 'alā tanfīḍihi dūna irtidādīn 'aw 'awdatīn ilā l-warā'

I am saying to you that my response to your voice, message, and demands is an irrevocable commitment, and I am indeed determined, all the determination, to fulfil what I promised, with all seriousness and sincerity, and I am keen, all the keenness, on implementing it with no return or retreat.

(M3.4:10)

أقولُ (لكك) لكم قبل كل شيء، أن دماء شهدائكم وجرحاكم لن تضيع هدراً، وأؤكد، أنني لن أتهاون، في معاقبة المتسببين عنها، بكل الشدة والحسم، وسأحاسب الذين أجزموا في حق شبابنا، بأقصى ما تقررهُ أحكامُ القانون، من عقوبات رادعة. وأقولُ، لعائلات هؤلاء الضحايا الأبرياء، أنني تألمتُ كل الألم، من أجلهم، مثلما تألمتم، وأوجع قلبي ما حدث لهم، كما أوجع قلوبكم

'aqulu (XXX stumble) lakum qabla kulli šay', 'anna damā'a (XXX stumble) šuhadā'ikum wa jarhākum lan taḍī'a hadara. wa 'u'akid 'annani lan 'atahāwan fi mu'āqabati l-mutasabibīna 'anhā bikulli l-šiddati wa l-ḥasm, wa sa'uḥāsibu allaḍīna ajramū fi ḥaqqi šabābina bi-'aqṣā ma tuqariruhu 'ahkāmu l-qānūn min 'uqūbātīn rādi'ah.

I am saying to you before everything that the bloods of your martyrs and injured ones will indeed not go down the drain; I confirm that I will not be lenient in punishing its perpetrators with all fierceness and decisiveness; and I will punish those who committed crimes against our youth with the most deterrent sentences stipulated by the law.

(M3.15:11)

وفضلاً عن ذلك، فإنني إزاء ما فقدناه من شهداء من أبناء مصر، في أحداثٍ مأساويةٍ حزينة، أوجعت قلوبنا، وهزت ضميرَ الوطن، أصدرتُ تعليماتي بسرعة الانتهاء من التحقيقات، حول أحداثِ الأسبوع الماضي، وإحالة نتائجها على الفور، إلى النائب العام، ليتخذ بشأنها ما يلزم، من إجراءات، قانونية، رادعة.

wa faḍlan 'an ḍālika, fa-'innani 'izā' mā faqdnāhu min šuhadā' min 'abnā'i miṣr, fi 'ahdātīn m'asāwiyatin ḥazīnah 'awja 'at qulūbanā, wa hazzat ḍamīra l-waṭan, 'aṣḍartu ta'limātī bi-sur'ati l-intihā'i minā t-taḥqīqāt, ḥawla 'ahdāṭī l-'usbū'i l-māḍī wa 'ihālatu natā'ijihā (XXX stumble) 'ala l-fawr 'ilā n-nā'ibi l-'am, li-yataxiḍa bi-š'anihā ma yalzam, min 'igrā'ātīn qānūniyatīn rādi'ah.

In addition to that, and in response to the martyr sons of Egypt whom we lost in tragic, sad events that ached our hearts and shook the conscience of the homeland, I have indeed instructed the speedy completion of investigating the events of last week and the immediate referral of their results to the Chief Prosecutor, in order to take the necessary deterrent, legal measures.

(M3.16:12)

ولقد تلقيتُ بالأمس التقرير الأول، بالتعديلات الدستورية ذات الأولوية، المقترحة من اللجنة التي شكلتها، من رجال القضاء وفقهاء القانون، لدراسة التعديلات الدستورية، والتشريعية المطلوبة، وإنني، تجاوباً مع ما تضمنه تقرير اللجنة من مقترحات، ومقتضى الصلاحيات المخولة، لرئيس الجمهورية، وفقاً للمادة 189 من الدستور، فقد تقدمت اليوم، بطلب تعديل ست موادٍ دستورية، هي المواد 76 و77 و88 و93 و189. فضلاً عن إلغاء المادة 179 من الدستور

wa la-qad tallaqqaytu bi-l-'ams at-taqrīra l-'awal, bi-t-ta'dilāti d-dustūriyah ḍātī l-'awlawiyyah, al-muqtarahah minā l-lajnah allati šakaltuhā min rijāli l-qaḍā' ai wa xubarā'i l-qānūn, li-dirāsati t-ta'dilāti d-dustūriyyati wa t-tašrī'iyyati l-maṭlūbah, wa 'innani tajāwbān ma'a mā taḍamanahu taqrīru l-lajnah min muqtarahāt, wa muqtaḍā aṣ-ṣalāhiyāti l-muxawalah li-ra'isi l-jumhūriyyah, wiḥḍan li-lmādah 189 minā d-dustūr, fa-qd taqdamtu l-yawm bi-ṭalabi ta'dilī sitti mawādin dustūriyah, hiya l-mawād 76, 77, 88, 93, 189, faḍlan 'an 'ilgā'i l-mādah 179 minā d-dustūr

I did receive yesterday the first report on the top-priority constitutional amendments, suggested by the committee I have formed, from legal experts and the judiciary, to study the required constitutional and legislative amendments. In response to the suggestions included in the report of the committee, and by virtue of the powers vested in the President of the republic, as per article 189 of the constitution, I have indeed submitted a request today for amending six constitutional articles: these are articles 76, 77, 88, 93 and 189, and the annulment of article 179 of the constitution

Mubarak also employed *I* to flatter the protesters and adulate them: by telling them that he was proud of them and that he was addressing them from his heart (M3.3:13); by praising their intentions as sincere, their demands as fair and legitimate, and their will as unbreakable (M3.6:14); and by empathizing not only with them, but also with their families and loved ones (M3.4:15). Mubarak also employed *I* to assume the moral and religious roles of the father and godfather of the protesters (M3.3:13; M3.10:2) and to implore the people indirectly by stirring their feelings of pity with the old father and fighter who was being ill-treated by his ungrateful sons whom he had exhausted his life defending (M3.22:1). Finally, Mubarak used *I* to relinquish his power, by eliminating himself from the equilibrium of power and denying to have any role in the whole struggle over power (M3.21:16).

(M3.3:13)

أتوجهُ بحديثي اليوم، لشباب مصر، بميدان التحرير، وعلى اتساع أرضها، أتوجهُ إليكم جميعاً بحديثٍ من القلب، حديثُ الأب لأبنائه وبناته، أقولُ لكم، إنني أعتزُّ بكم، رمزاً لجيلٍ مصريٍّ جديد، يدعو إلى التغييرِ إلى الأفضل، ويتمسكُ به، ويحلمُ بالمستقبل، ويصنعه.

'atawajahu bi-ḥadīṭi l-yawm li-ṣabābi miṣr, bi-maidāni t-tahrīr, wa 'alā itsā'i 'arḍihā, 'atawajahu 'ilai-kum jamī'an bi-ḥadīṭin mina l-qalb, ḥadīṭu l-'abi li-'abnā'ihī wa banātih. 'aqulu lakum, 'innani 'a'tazu bikum ramzan li-jīlin miṣriyyin jadīd, yad'ū ila t-taḡyīri 'ila l-'afḍal wa yatamasaku bih, wa yaḥlumū bi-l-mustaqbal wa yaṣna'uh.

The sons, male and female youth of Egypt: I am addressing my speech today to the youth of Egypt, in Tahrir Square, and all over the country. I am addressing you all with a speech from the heart, a speech of the father to his sons and daughters. I am saying to you that I am indeed proud of you as a symbol of a new Egyptian generation, that calls for change to the better, adheres to it, and dreams of the future and makes it.

(M3.6:14)

إن هذا الالتزام، ينطلق من اقتناعٍ أكيد، بصدق ونقاء نواياكم، وتحرككم، وبأن مطالبكم، هي مطالبٌ عادلةٌ ومشروعةٌ

'inna hāḍa l-iltizām, yanṭaliqu min iqtinā'in 'akīd, bi-ṣidqi wa naqā'i nawāyākum wa taḥarukikum, wa bi-'anna maṭālibakum hiyya maṭālibu 'ādilatun wa maṣrū'ah

This commitment does stem from a firm conviction of the sincerity and purity of your intentions and movement and that your demands are indeed fair and legitimate demands

(M3.4:15)

وأقول، لعائلات هؤلاء الضحايا الأبرياء، أنني تألمت كل الألم، من أجليهم، مثلما تألمتم، وأوجع قلبي ما حدث لهم،
كما أوجع قلوبكم

*wa 'aqūl li-'ā'ilāti hā'ulā'i ḍ-ḍahāyā al-'abriyā', 'annanī ta'alamtu kulla l-'alam min
'ajlihim (XXX stumbling) miṭlamā ta'allamtum, wa 'awja'a qalbī mā ḥadaṭa lahum,
kamā 'awja'a qulūbakum*

I am saying to the families of those innocent victims that I was indeed pained all the pain for them, as you were pained, and my heart was ached by what happened to them, as your hearts were ached.

(M3.21:16)

إنَّ اللحظةَ الراهنة، ليست متعلقةً بشخصي، ليست متعلقةً بحسني مبارك، وإنما بات الأمر متعلقاً بمصر، في
حاضرِها، ومستقبلِ أبنائها

*'inna l-laḥẓata r-rāhinah layst muta'aliqatan bi-husnī mubārak, wa 'inna-mmā bāta l-
'amru muta'aliqan bi-miṣr, fī ḥāḍirihā wa mustaqbali 'abnā'ihā.*

The current moment has indeed nothing to do with my person, it has nothing to do with Hosni Mubarak, but it is all about Egypt, in its present, and the future of its sons.

4.3.1.2. Third-person possessive pronoun *HIS*

A deictically relevant pronoun to *I* is the third-person singular possessive pronoun *HIS*, which Mubarak used, once, to describe his speech to the protesters as one 'of a father to *HIS* sons and daughter' (M3.3:17). Mubarak aimed at establishing a parental bonding with the protesters by calling them 'sons and daughters'; however, instead of calling them his own sons and daughters, by using the first-person possessive pronoun *MY*, he inadvertently employed the third-person possessive pronoun *HIS*, which resulted in detaching him from the protesters. Moreover, Mubarak detached himself from himself by referring to himself as 'Hosni Mubarak' twice: in an attempt to deny his role in the struggle over power, in the first instance (M3.21:16), and to complain about his maltreatment at his old age, and hence stir the pity of the people, in the second (M3.22:18).

(M3.3:17)

أتوجهُ إليكم جميعاً بحديثٍ من القلب، حديثُ الأبِ لأبنائه وبناته
'atawajahu 'ilai-kum jamī'an bi-ḥadīṭin mina l-qalb, ḥadīṭu l-'abi li-'abnā'ihī wa
banātih.

I am addressing you all with a speech from the heart, a speech of the father to his sons and daughters

(M3.22:18)

أتوقُّ أنَّ الأغلبيةَ الكاسحةَ من أبناءِ الشعب، يعرفونَ من هو حسني مبارك
'aṭīqu anna l-'aḡlabiyata l-kāsiḥah min 'abnā'ī š-ša'b ya'rifūna man hwa ḥusnī
mubārak

I trust that the over-sweeping majority of the sons of the people know who Hosni Mubarak is

4.3.1.3. First-person plural pronoun ‘WE’: *Classifying WE*

4.3.1.3.1. *First Class WE*

Mubarak employed the *First Class WE*, which encodes himself to the exclusion of everyone else, only once in his third speech, in order to represent himself positively as the responsible patriotic president whose only one reason for staying in power was to honour his oath, to Allah and the homeland, and to safeguard the country and the people (M3.10:2).

4.3.1.3.2. *Second Class WE*

Mubarak did not use the *Second Class WE*, which encodes himself and his cabinet together and combines them in the same deictic field, at all in this speech, in an attempt to detach himself from his own cabinet and blame the responsibility for the economic, political, and social problems on them.

4.3.1.3.3. *Third Class WE*

The *Third Class WE* is the most predominant class of *WE* in this speech; Mubarak employed it in forty-one instances in order to perform two main functions simultaneously: establishing a bond with the protesters, their families, and the people, while representing himself positively. For example, when he bonded with the protesters, he did so from the perspective of the fair, strong president who was determined to restore their rights and punish the perpetrators who killed their fellows (M3.4:10); when he empathized with the families of the protesters, he exported himself as the decisive president who had ordered the speedy completion of investigations and the immediate referral of their results to the Chief Prosecutor to take necessary measures (M3.15:11); when he assimilated himself into the people as members of the same society, he did so within the vision of the national dialogue he had called for (M3.11:3; M3.13:19); when he bonded with the armed forces, he did so within his suggestion that they supervise the implementation of his vision (M3.12:4); when he bonded with the people on the grounds of their common economic losses, he suggested avoiding that by continuing his national dialogue plan (M3.19:20); and when he flattered the people and appealed to their emotions of national zeal and pride, he did so as the guardian of the country who had exhausted his life defending it and its values (M3.25:21; M3.26:22; M3.27:23).

(M3.13:19)

لقد بدأنا بالفعل، حواراً وطنياً بناءً، يضمُّ شبابَ مصرَ الذين قادوا الدعوةَ إلى التغيير، وكافة القوى السياسية، ولقد أسفرَ هذا الحوار، عن توافقٍ مبدئي، في الآراء والمواقف، يضعُ أقدامنا على بدايةِ الطريقِ الصحيح، للخروج من الأزمة، ويتعيَّن مواصلةُ الانتقالِ به من الخطوط العريضة، لما تم الاتفاقُ عليه، إلى خريطةٍ طريقٍ واضحة، وجدولٍ زمنيٍّ محدد، تمضي يوماً بعد يوم، على طريقِ الانتقالِ السلمي للسلطة، من الآن، وحتى سبتمبر المقبل.

la-qad bad`nā bi-l-fi`l ḥiwāran waṭaniyyan bannā`an, yaḍumu šabāba mišra allaḍīna qādu d-da`wata `ilā t-taḡyīr, wa kāfat al-quwā as-siyāsīyah, wa la-qad `asfara hāda l-ḥiwār, `an tawāfuqin mabda`iyin, fī l-`ārā`i wa l-mawāqif, yaḍa`u `aqdāmana `alā bidāyati t-tarīqi š-šaḥīḥ li-l-xurūji mina l`azmah. wa ya-ta`ayanu muwāšalatuhu li-l-`intiḡālī bihi mina l-xuṭūṭi l-`arīḍah li-mā tamma l-itifāqu `alaih, ilā xārīṭati tarīqin wāḍiḥah, wa bi-jadwalin zamaniyyin muḥaddad, tamḡī yawman ba`da yawm, `alā tarīqi l-intiḡālī s-silmī li-l-sulṭah, mina l`ān, wa ḥatta sibtimbir al-muḡbil.

Indeed, we have already started a constructive national dialogue that encompass the youth of Egypt who led the call for change, as well as all political forces. This dialogue has indeed yielded in a preliminary agreement, in views and stances, that lays our feet on the beginning of the right track, that leads out of this crisis. It has to be continued in order to transform it from the broad lines that have been agreed upon to a clear road map, with a specific timetable that proceeds on a daily basis, down the road of the peaceful transition of power, from now until next September.

(M3.19:20)

إنَّ الأولويةَ الآن، هي استعادةُ الثقةِ بينَ المصريينَ بعضهم البعض، والثقةِ في اقتصادنا وسمعتنا الدولية، والثقةِ في أن التغييرَ والتحولَ الذي بدأناه، لا ارتدادَ عنه، أو رجعةَ فيه.

`inna l`awlawiyata l-`ān, hiya isti`ādatu t-tiḡatu bayna l-miṣriyyina ba`ḍuhumu l-ba`d, wa t-tiḡati fī iqtisādina wa sum`atinā d-dawliyyah, wa t-tiḡati fī `anna t-taḡyyira wa t-taḥwul allaḍi bad`anāhu, la irtidāda `anhu, aw raj`ata fīh.

The priority now is indeed to restore confidence among Egyptians themselves, confidence in our economy and our international reputation, and confidence that the change and transformation we have started have no reverse or return.

(M3.25:21)

سنثبتُ نحنُ المصريينَ، قدرتناَ على تحقيقِ مطالبِ الشعبِ، بالحوارِ المتحضرِ والواعي، سنثبتُ أننا لسنا أتباعاً لأحد، ولا نأخذُ تعليماتٍ من أحد، وأنَّ أحداً لا يصنعُ لنا قراراتنا، سوى نبضِ الشارع، ومطالبِ أبناءِ الوطن.

sa-nuṭbitu naḥnu l-miṣriyyīn, qudratanā `alā taḥqīqi maṭālibi š-ša`b bi-l-ḥiwāri l-mutaḥaḍiri wa l-wā`i, sa-nuṭbitu annanā lasnā `atbā`an li-`aḥad, wa lā n`axuḍu ta`līmātin min `aḥad, wa `anna `aḥdan lā yašna`u lanā q-rārātunā, siwā nabḍu š-šāri`, wa maṭālibu `abnā`i l-waṭan.

We, Egyptians, will demonstrate our ability to realize the demands of the people, through civilized, rational dialogue; we will prove that we are not followers of anyone, that we do not take orders from anyone, and that no one can make our

decisions for us, other than the pulse of the street and the demands of the sons of the homeland.

(M3.26:22)

سنثبت ذلك، بروح وعزم المصريين، وبوحدة وتماسك هذا الشعب، وبتمسكنا بعزة مصر، وكرامتها، وهويتها الفريدة والخالدة، فهي أساس وجودنا وجوهرة، لأكثر من سبعة آلاف عام.

sanuṭbitu dālīka, birūḥi wa 'azmi l-miṣriyyīn, wa bi-wiḥdati wa tamāsuki hāda š-ša'b, wa bi-tamasukinā bi-'izzati miṣr, wa karāmatihā, wa huwiyatihā l-farīdatu wa l-xālidah, fa-hiya 'asāsu wjūdīnā wa jawharuh li-akṭari min sab'ati 'ālāf 'ām.

We will prove that, with the spirit and resolve of Egyptians, with the unity and solidarity of these people, and with our adherence to the dignity of Egypt, its honor, and its unique, eternal identity, which is the foundation and essence of our existence for more than seven thousand years.

(M3.27:23)

سنعيش هذه الروح فينا ما دامت مصر وشعبها، سنعيش هذه الروح فينا ما دامت مصر ودائم شعبها، سنعيش في كل واحد من فلاحينا وعمالنا، ومتقينا، سنبقى في قلوب شيوخنا، وشبابنا وأطفالنا، مسلميهم وأقباطهم، وفي عقول وضمائر من لم يولد بعد، من أبنائنا.

sa-ta 'ī šu hāḍihi r-ruḥu fīnā mā dāmat miṣru wa ša'buhā, sa-ta 'ī šu hāḍihi r-ruḥu fīnā mā dāmat miṣru wa dāma ša'buhā, sa-ta 'ī šu fī kulli wāḥidīn min fallāḥīnā wa 'ummālīnā, wa muṭaqqafīnā, sa-tabqā fī qulūbi šūḫīnā, wa šabābīnā, wa 'aṭfālīnā, muslimīhim wa 'aqbātīhim, wa fī 'uqūli wa ḍamā'iri man lam yuḥad ba'du min 'abnā'inā.

This spirit will live within us as long as Egypt and its people continue to exist. This spirit will live within us as long as Egypt continues to exist and as long as its people continue to exist. It will live within each one of our farmers, workers, and intellectuals. It will remain in the hearts of our elderly, youth, children, Muslims, and Christians and in the minds and consciences of our sons who have not been born yet.

4.3.1.3.4. *Fourth Class WE*

Because the relations of power were not in favour of Mubarak at the time of delivering this last speech, he did not employ the *Fourth Class WE* at all, because he was in no position to accuse the people or the protesters of anything, even indirectly.

4.3.1.4. *hā'u l-ḡaibah*

Mubarak employed *hā'u l-ḡaibah*, which corresponds to the English pronouns *ITS* and *THEIR*, in seventeen instances, none of which was successful, as they all resulted in detaching Mubarak from 'Egypt' (twice), 'the Egyptians' (twice), 'Egypt and its people' (six times), the 'current crisis' of Egypt (two times), 'its identity', 'its history', 'its honour', 'its present', 'its sons', their demands, and their future (four times) (M3.10:24; M3.11:25; M3.12:26; M3.21:27; M3.23:28 ;

M3.24:29; M3.26:30; M3.27:31; M3.29:32). Those seventeen instances suggested that Mubarak was not only detached from the protesters, but also from Egypt and 'its people'.

(M3.10:24)

حتى نبلغ بمصرَ وشعبها، برَ الأمان
ḥatta nabluga bi-miṣra wa ša 'bihā barra l-'amān
until we take Egypt and its people to a safe harbour)

(M3.11:25)

وعلى نحوٍ يحقق استقرارَ مجتمعنا، ومطالبَ أبنائه
'alā naḥwin yuḥaqiq istiqrāra mujtama 'inā, wa maṭāliba 'abnā 'ih,
in a way that accomplishes the stability of our society and the demands of its sons

(M3.12:26)

متطلعاً لدعم ومساندة كل حريص على مصرَ وشعبها
mutaṭali 'an li-da 'mi wa musānadati kulla ḥariṣin 'alā miṣra wa ša 'bihā
looking forward to the support and assistance of everyone who is keen on Egypt and its people

(M3.21:27)

إنَّ اللحظةَ الراهنة، ليست متعلقةً بشخصي، ليست متعلقةً بحسني مبارك، وإنما بات الأمرُ متعلقاً بمصرَ، في حاضرِها، ومستقبلِ أبنائها. إنَّ المصريين جميعاً في خندقٍ واحدٍ الآن، وعلينا، أن نواصلَ الحوارَ الوطني الذي بدأناه، بروح الفريق وليسَ الفرقاء، وبعيداً، عن الخلاف، والتناحر، كي تتجاوزَ مصرَ أزمتهَا الراهنة، ولنعيدَ لاقتصادنا الثقةَ فيه، ولمواطنينا الاطمئنانَ والأمان، وللشارع المصري، حياته اليومية الطبيعية.

inna l-laḥẓata r-rāhinah layst muta'aliqatan bi- ḥusnī mubārak, wa 'inna-mmā bāta l-'amru muta'aliqan bi-miṣr, fi ḥādirihā wa mustaqbali 'abnā 'ihā. 'inna l-miṣriyyina jamī'an fī xandaqin wāḥidin al'ān. Wa 'alaynā 'an nwāšila l-ḥiwara l-waṭaniyi alladī bad'anāh bi-rūhi l-fariq wa laysa l-furaqā', wa ba 'īdan 'ani l-xilāfi wa t-tanāhur, kay tatajāwaza miṣr 'azmatahā ar-rāhinah (XXX stumble), wa linu 'īda li-qtiṣādīnā aṭ-ṭiqata fīh, wa li-muwāṭinīnā l-iṭmi'nāna wa-l-'amān, wa li-l-šāri'i l-miṣriyyi, ḥayātah al-yawmiyyatu ṭ-ṭabī'iyyah

The current moment has indeed nothing to do with my person, it has nothing to do with Hosni Mubarak, but it is all about Egypt, in its present, and the future of its sons. All Egyptians are indeed in one ditch now, and we have to continue the national dialogue that we have started in the spirit of a team, not enemies, and away from disagreement and battling, in order for Egypt to survive its current crisis (XXX stumble) and in order to restore confidence in our economy, assurance and security to our citizens, and natural daily life to our streets.

(M3.23:28)

مصرَ تتجاوزُ لحظةً، فارقةً في تاريخها
miṣra tajtāzu laḥẓatan fāriqatan fī tāriḫihā
Egypt is passing a defining moment, in its history)

(M3.24:29)

إنني أعلمُ علمَ اليقين، أنَّ مصرَ سوفَ تتجاوزُ أزمتهَا. لن تنكسرَ إرادةُ شعبها، ستقفُ على أقدامها من جديدٍ، بصدق وإخلاص أبنائها، كلُّ أبنائها، وستردُّ كيدَ الكائدين، وشماتةَ الشامتين.

'innanī a 'lamu 'ilma l-yaqīn 'anna miṣra sawfa (XXX stumble) tatajawazu 'azmatahā. lan tankasira irādatu ša 'bīhā. sa-taqifu 'alā 'aqdāmihā min jadīd, bi-ṣidqin wa 'ixlāsi 'abnā 'ihā, kullu 'abnā 'ihā, wa satarudu kaida l-kā 'idīn wa šamātata š-šāmitīn.

I do know for certain that Egypt is going to (XXX stumble) survive its crisis; the will of its people will not be broken; it will stand to its feet again, by the faithfulness and sincerity of its sons, all its sons, and it will defeat the machination of those machinating against it and the plotting of those plotting against it.

(M3.26:30)

بتمسكنا بعزة مصر، وكرامتها، وهويتها الفريدة والخالدة
bi-tamasukinā bi-'izzati miṣr, wa karāmatihā, wa huwiyatihā l-farīdatu wa l-xālidah
our adherence to the dignity of Egypt, its honor, and its unique, eternal identity

(M3.27:31)

ستعيش هذه الروح فينا ما دامت مصر وشعبها، ستعيش هذه الروح فينا ما دامت مصر ودائم شعبها
sa-ta ṭ šu hādīhi r-ruḥu fīnā mā dāmat miṣru wa ša 'buhā, sa-ta ṭ šu hādīhi r-ruḥu fīnā mā dāmat miṣru wa dāma ša 'buhā

This spirit will live within us as long as Egypt and its people continue to exist. This spirit will live within us as long as Egypt continues to exist and as long as its people continue to exist.

(M3.29:32)

حفظ الله مصر، بلداً آمناً، ورعى شعبه، وسدد على الطريق خطاه
ḥafīza llāhu miṣr, baladan 'āminan, wa r'ā ša 'bahu, wa saddada 'alā ṭ-ṭarīqi xuṭāh.
May Allah save Egypt, a safe country, and may He safeguard its people and direct their steps to the right path

4.3.1.5. Second-person plural pronoun 'YOU'

Mubarak employed the second-person plural pronoun *YOU* in sixteen instances in this speech: fourteen to address the protesters themselves and two times to address the families of the killed protesters. Mubarak coupled every instance of *YOU* with excessive flattery of the protesters: he called them the symbol of a new generation who dreams of change for the better and makes it (M3.3:13); he considered their injured and dead fellows 'innocent victims' (M3.4:15); and he described their intentions as 'pure' and 'sincere' and their demands as 'fair' and 'legitimate' (M3.6:14). He also qualified his pain by repeating twice that he was pained 'all the pain' by the death of their 'innocent victims' (M3.4:15) and by repeating thrice that he would penalize the perpetrators with the most deterrent sentences (M3.4:10).

4.3.2. Multi-modal markers of power in the third speech of Mubarak: Backdrop and stumbling

Multi-modally speaking, Mubarak can be seen and heard trying to muffle a deep sigh, immediately before starting the speech. He is delivering the speech from the same presidential

palace, and is wearing the same dark grey suit and tie he was wearing in the first and second speeches. He looked very exhausted, compared to the previous two speeches. Anger, disaffection, and disappointment are clear on his facial expressions; his sharp, intimidating look at the camera while uttering the initial vocative *al-'abnā'u šabāba miṣra wa šābātiha* (The sons, male and female youth of Egypt), as demonstrated in Caption (4.1), reversed the pragmatic function of that supposedly endearing vocative to a threatening one. Similarly, when he addressed the youth with the supposedly endearing vocative 'the sons, youth of Egypt', he frowned, avoided looking at the camera, and uttered the vocative in a manner that showed clear disaffection, as shown in caption (4.2) below.



Caption (4.1)



Caption (4.2)

The speech is montaged, there is a clear cut in the video after two minutes and six seconds from the beginning of the speech, as indicated by the post-cut increased distance between Mubarak and the camera, brighter colours of the picture, higher angle of shooting the video, faster speed of delivery, less angry and more theatrical performance and tone, and the papers that were put in front of Mubarak to read from, instead of the autocue he was reading from, at the beginning of the speech.

In terms of delivery, Mubarak stumbled at eight instances in this speech: (1) immediately before uttering the sentence in which he confirmed to the protesters that the 'bloods' of their 'martyrs and injured ones' would not go down the drain and that he would punish the perpetrators with the most decisive and fierce sentences (M3.4:10), (2) while uttering the word 'bloods' in the phrase 'the bloods of your martyrs and injured ones' (M3.4:10), (3) when he told the families of the killed protesters that he was 'pained all the pain' by their losses (M3.4:15), (4) when he stated that he would hand over power to whomever the people would choose in the elections to be held in the coming September (M3.10:2), (5) when he confirmed that guarantees of fairness and freedom would be secured for those elections (M3.10:2), (6) when he said that he had instructed the rapid investigation of the incidents of killing the protesters and the immediate referral of the results to the Chief Prosecutor to take the necessary 'deterrent measures' (M3.15:11), (7) when he said that all Egyptians should continue the national dialogue he had

initiated in good faith (M3.21:27), and (8) when he said that he was 'very certain' that Egypt would brave through its crisis (M3.24:29). Plethora of facts, incidents, and analytical observations can prove false the propositional content of those eight utterances at which Mubarak stumbled.

First, as regards the 'perpetrators' who killed the protesters in the Camel Battle and whom Mubarak promised to bring to justice and punish severely, international journalists, correspondents, and news agencies confirmed that violence against the protesters in Tahrir Square was orchestrated by the Egyptian authorities; that those who attacked the protesters were a mixture of 'hired muscle', government workers, and policemen in plain clothes; and that the counter-protests were organized by the presidency, the ruling NDP, and their affiliated businessmen. A journalist reported to the CNN that she eye-witnessed police officers in uniform entering hotels on the way to Tahrir Square, coming out wearing civilian clothes, then mingling with the pro-Mubarak protesters. Analysts concluded that the Camel Battle must have been planned by security agencies, corroborating their argument by the observation that neither the police nor the army forces intervened to stop the Battle, in spite of the fact that they were surrounding the square (CNN 2011, February 2; Ackerman 2011, February 2; AP 2011, February 2; RT 2011, February 2; Owen 2012: 188; Ghonim 2012a: 356-7).

The specific details of the Camel Battle can be reverse-engineered from the account chronicled by the spokesperson of Mubarak regime, i.e. El Manawy, who reports that the Camel Battle took place after the pro-Mubarak protests gained momentum in Cairo and their organizers in the Presidency, the ruling NDP party, and State Police decided to use them to 'sweep' the revolutionaries off Tahrir Square and 'clean' it (2012: 282-4, 293, 301-2).

Hence, on 2 February 2011, at around 03:00pm, the army units protecting and surrounding the TV Building allowed the pro-Mubarak protesters to cross their lines, riding camels and horses and heading towards Tahrir Square. At around 06:00pm, new groups of 'assigned' attackers and 'hired' thugs arrived to the Square and kept attacking the protesters 'relentlessly', 'as if they were executing an order to evacuate the square at any cost and no matter what' (ibid). At around 07:30pm, the Armed Forces announced repeatedly on TV that the protesters had to evacuate Tahrir Square immediately, because there were 'provocative elements heading towards the Square, carrying balls of fire to throw at the protesters in the Square' (ibid: 296, 305, 307). At around 08:30pm, the presidency, the army, and the intelligence ordered El Manawy unanimously to stop the live broadcast of the state TV from Tahrir Square and to switch off all

the cameras they have there, because 'the picture will be ugly soon' – although the order was issued in Arabic, the word 'ugly' was said in English (ibid: 308).

It was widely believed that Mubarak, his son Gamal, or their supporters were responsible for the Camel Battle, until the March 2018 presidential elections campaign, when Mubarak's Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Sami Anan was detained on 23 January after expressing his intention to run against the incumbent Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in the presidential elections. Anan's Counsellor, Judge Hisham Genena, a former lawyer, police officer, prosecutor, and head of the Central Auditing Organization, said that he feared for Anan's life and threatened that if Anan was subjected to bad treatment or torture, he would release 'dangerous top secret' files, kept outside the country, that would 'implicate' 'government leaders' (The Telegraph 2018, February 13) and "'many people" in the deadly events that have unfolded in Egypt since 2011' (Middle East Eye 2018, February 13). After making that statement to HuffPost Arabic, Genena survived an 'assassination attempt' with serious injuries on 27 January, then was detained on 13 February 2018 (ibid).

Mubarak might therefore have stumbled in instances (1), (2), and (3) because he felt guilty for the killing of those protesters by his regime, because he felt that things got out of his control and that other powers inside his regime were plotting against him and implicating him, or because he did not know who killed the protesters and hence did not know how he could call the killers to account.

In a similar vein, the repeated statements Mubarak had made in his previous presidential speeches that he was staying in office 'till the last breath' he had (Qandil 2008: 63) and the 'many unmistakable signs' he demonstrated of his determination to not only be re-elected as president in the 2011 elections, but also to stay in office for life, and to 'vigorously prepare' and 'groom' his son Gamal for succeeding him in power (Owen 2012: 70, 72, 144-6), prove false the propositional content of stumble (4).

Moreover, the analytical observations that 'ballot stuffing' was so familiar in Egyptian elections under Mubarak that it undermined the efficacy of elections as a legitimating device (Owen 2012: 72) and that the Egyptian presidential elections were considered as a 'farce' because they were so rigged by the police in so many different ways (Ghonim 2012: 61-3 & 195; Gelvin 2015: 65), that they had 'set new standards for repression and fraud' (Brownlee, Masoud, Reynolds 2015: 2) indicate that Mubarak was not telling the truth when he said that 'guarantees of freedom and fairness would be secured' for the coming presidential elections (5).

Furthermore, the confirmation made by the representatives of the revolutionaries that the national dialogue announced by Mubarak was merely a 'media show' that aimed at tricking them into two unannounced, yet video-recorded, appearances with the Minister of Interior and the Prime Minister (ibid: 417-27), proves false the assertion Mubarak made, and stumbled at, that Egyptians should continue the national dialogue he had started in good faith (7). Similarly, the fact that Mubarak adopted the 'burnt land' strategy as a response to the protests (Steinvorth & Windfuhr 2011, January 30) proves false the assertion he made, and stumbled at, that he was certain that Egypt would brave through 'its crisis' (8).

Finally, Mubarak might have stumbled when he called upon the Egyptian people to act in the spirit of the team, because he was repeatedly accused of dividing Egyptians and creating a 'sectarian congestion' between Muslims and Christians in the interest of the survival of his regime (Qandil 2008: 6). Such accusations were corroborated when Mubarak charged the backbone of his regime, i.e. the Minister of Interior, Habib el-Adli, with causing security disarray, ordering live fire on the protesters, withdrawing security forces from the streets, releasing prisoners from jails (Reuters 2011, February 7), and masterminding the bombing of the Two Saints Church in 2011 (Ismail 2011, February 7; Copts United 2011). Many Egyptians considered those accusations an indictment of Mubarak, himself, and his regime, arguing that el-Adli would have never committed such crimes, without the permission of Mubarak, who scapegoated him in order to save his own head.

The specifics of the charge of bombing the Two Saints Church were particularly shocking: Interrogations referred to leaked reports, based on UK intelligence services, that el-Adli had built up 'a special security system that was managed by 22 officers and that employed a number of former radical Islamists, drug dealers and some security firms to carry out acts of sabotage around the country in case the regime was under threat to collapse', in order to 'gain increased western support for the regime' (Ismail 2011, February 7). Similarly, the Coptic Church Attorney, Joseph Malak, accused el-Adli of criminal responsibility and collusion on more than one ground: the security forces guarding the church were withdrawn nearly one hour before the blast; the Prosecutor General froze investigations into the case and imposed a media blackout on it; no one was formally charged in that case; and although all the arrested 20 Muslim suspects were exonerated by the Prosecution, they were not released and had been held as 'political detainees' (Copts United, 2011).

Mubarak, therefore, stumbled in his third speech when he was either feeling guilty or when he was not telling the truth.

4.3.3. **Argumentative manifestations of power: Logical analysis of the fallacies in the third speech**

Mubarak committed seven fallacies in this speech: *argumentum ad populum* (appeal to popular favour), *argumentum ad misericordiam* (appeal to emotions), *argumentum ad metum* (appeal to fear), *slippery slope argumentum ad consequentiam* (argument from consequences), *argumentum ad fidem* (appeal to religion), *argumentum ad baculum* (appeal to force/threats), and *petitio principii* (the fallacy of begging the question/presupposition).

The most predominant fallacy was *argumentum ad misericordiam*, which Mubarak committed, in eighty instances. The novel and most salient characteristic of this fallacy in this speech is that Mubarak clustered its tokens in five thematically connected networks, and positioned them strategically at the end of the speech, i.e. the Egypt network of fallacies, the Egyptian people network of fallacies, and the Mubarak network of fallacies. The five networks aimed at performing the generic function of heightening the emotions of the people in a manner that aimed at distracting their attention and interfering with their rational reasoning; the more specific functions differed according to the theme of each network.

The Egypt and the Egyptians networks of fallacies performed three pragmatic functions: presupposing negative, unsubstantiated premises about the theme of the network, i.e. Egypt and the Egyptian people; taking the truth value of those presuppositions for granted; indirectly criticising the people for the presupposed premises; and packaging the presuppositions and the criticisms in the wording of seemingly positive and encouraging propositions whose aim appeared to be enthusing optimism. For example, the first Egypt network of fallacies which Mubarak committed towards the end of the speech carried five presuppositions: Egypt was a woman in crisis; the will of the Egyptian people was about to be broken or was already broken; Egypt collapsed or at least was no longer standing to her feet; at least, some of the Egyptian people were not sincere or honest; and there were people plotting against Egypt and rejoicing at her misfortune (M3.24:29). Similarly, the following Egyptians network of fallacies which looked like an encouraging utterance, implicated eight emotionally loaded nationalistic presuppositions: Egyptians were not acting in a civilized manner, Egyptians became followers to others, Egyptians were taking orders from others, Egypt-related decisions were made for the Egyptians abroad,

Egyptians were not assimilating the Egyptian spirit, Egyptians lacked unity and coherence, and Egyptians were not assimilating the unique and eternal pride, honour, dignity, and identity of Egypt, which had characterized it for thousands of years (M3.25:21; M3.26:22; M3.27:23). The whole utterance would be irrelevant if those implicatures were not triggered.

The Mubarak network of fallacies was the most complex and most strategic, in terms of its propositional content, number of constituent fallacies, timing, and function. It consisted of three sub-networks: Mubarak-the-fighter sub-network, Mubarak-the-president sub-network, and Mubarak-the-old-man sub-network.

Mubarak the fighter joined the military and learnt the honour of loyalty to Egypt when he was at the age of the protesters; he exhausted his life defending Egyptian land and sovereignty; he witnessed Egypt's wars, defeats, and victories; he lived its days of shame, occupation, crossing, victory, and liberation; and he raised the liberation flag over Sinai, marking the happiest day of his life. Mubarak, the president, maintained peace, safeguarded the security and stability of Egypt, attempted to revive it, worked in the best interest of its people, and had never succumbed to foreign pressures or dictations. Mubarak the old man faced death several times for the sake of Egypt, was well known by the majority of the people, had never sought power or authority, and was hurt by the ingratitude he was met with, at this old age, by some of his countrymen (M3.10:2; M3.22:1). Mubarak the president was completely aware of the gravity of the historical moment Egypt was passing, prioritized the interests of Egypt over his own interests as well as any other interests, and relinquished all his powers to his vice-president (M3.23:7). Those two sub-networks performed the pragmatic function of legitimizing Mubarak militarily and politically.

The third Mubarak sub-network of fallacies performed the two pragmatic functions of intertwining Mubarak and Egypt as two inseparable constituents of one entity, and stirring the sympathy of the people with Mubarak the old man who was asking for no more than being allowed to die and be buried on the soil of his beloved country. Mubarak had lived for the sake of Egypt; Mubarak had safeguarded the responsibility and trust of Egypt; Egypt would remain above individuals and above every one until Mubarak delivers its banner and trust; Egypt had been the aim, the goal, the responsibility, and the mission of

Mubarak; Egypt had been the beginning, the journey, and the destination of the life of Mubarak; Egypt was the land of the birth of Mubarak and would be that of his death; Egypt had been the dear homeland that had never parted with Mubarak and with which he would never part until it covers him with its soil; and Egypt would remain a generous, honourable, proud, and dignified people (M3.28:33).

(M3.28:33)

أقول من جديد، أنني عشتُ من أجل هذا الوطن، حافظاً لمسؤوليته وأمانته، وستظل مصر، هي الباقية، فوق الأشخاص وفوق الجميع، ستبقى حتى اسلم أمانتها ورايتها، هي الهدف والغاية، والمسئولية والواجب، بداية العمر، ومشواره، ومنتهاه، وارض المحيا والممات، ستظل بلداً عزيزاً، لا يفارقني أو أفارقه، حتى يواريني ترابه وثرابه، وستظل شعباً كريماً يبقى ابد الدهر، مرفوع الرأس، والراية، موفور العزة والكرامة.

'aqūlu min jadīd, 'annanī 'istu min ajli hāda l-waṭan, ḥāfiẓan li-mas'ūliyatihī wa 'amānatahu. wa sa-taẓlu miṣr hiya l-bāqiyah, fawqa l-aṣḫāṣ, wa fawqa l-jamī'. sa-tabqā ḥatta 'usallim 'amānatahā wa rāyatahā, hiya l-hadafu wa l-ḡāyah, wa l-mas'ūliyatū wa l-wājib. bidāyatū l-'umr, wa miṣwāruhu wa muntahāh, wa 'arḍu l-mahyā wa l-mamāt. sataẓalu baladan 'azīzan la yufāriqunī wa lā 'ufāriquh, ḥatta yuwārīnī turābahu wa ṭarāh, wa sataḍlu ṣa'ban karīman yabqā 'abada d-dahri marfū'a r-r'as wa r-rāyah, mawfūra l-'izzati wa l-karāmah.

I am saying again, that I have indeed lived for this homeland, shouldering its responsibility and trust, and Egypt will remain eternal above persons and above all. It will remain, until I deliver its responsibility and its banner, the aim and the target; the responsibility and the duty; the beginning of lifetime, its journey, and its destination; and the land of living and death. It will remain a dear homeland that will never part with me, nor will I part with it, until its soil and dust bury me; it will remain hospitable people whose heads and banners will forever be high, in abundant dignity and honour.

In terms of timing, the Mubarak networks sandwiched the most important proposition in the speech, i.e. the delegation of the presidential powers of Mubarak to his vice-president. Moreover, by concluding the speech with the highly emotional Mubarak-the-old-man network of fallacies, Mubarak had strategically positioned it in the cognitive Focus of Attention of the people, i.e. the position of the most recently processed and hence most active proposition in the mind of the people, and ensured that he was leaving them emotionally heightened and sympathetic with him. Finally, in terms of the number of constituent fallacies, the Mubarak networks were the longest and most complicated of all the other networks; consisting of twenty-five fallacies.

The second most predominant fallacy was *argumentum ad populum*, which Mubarak committed in fifty instances in order to establish a bond with the protesters, by tailoring his premises in a fashion that appealed specifically to their beliefs, sentiments, prejudices, and demands: He started the speech by specifying his addressee as the protesters in Tahrir

Square, addressed them with the new endearing vocative ‘the sons and youths of Egypt’, told them that he was proud of them (M3.3:13), described their demands as fair and legitimate (M3.6:14), consoled the families of the killed protesters and promised them to severely punish those who killed their sons (M3.4:15), confirmed that his promises to them were irrevocable (M3.5:9), admitted that ‘mistakes had been made’ (M3.6:14), confirmed that he was not nominating himself for a new presidential term and repeated that he was staying in power only to respect the constitution, safeguard the interests of the people, hold free and fair elections, and lead Egypt and its people to safety (M3.10:2), and listed the actions he had taken to meet the demands of the protesters (M3.11:3; M3.12:4; M3.13:19; M3.14:34; M3.15:11; M3.16:12; M3.17:35; M3.19:20), including the delegation of his presidential powers to the vice-president (M3.23:7).

(M3.14:34)

إنّ هذا الحوار الوطني، قد تلاقى حول تشكيل لجنة دستورية، تتولى دراسة التعديلات المطلوبة في الدستور، وما تقتضيه من تعديلات تشريعية، كما تلاقى حول تشكيل لجنة للمتابعة، تتولى متابعة التنفيذ الأمين، لما تعهدت به أمام الشعب، ولقد حرصت، على أن يأتي تشكيل كلتا اللجنتين، من الشخصيات المصرية، المشهود لها بالاستقلال والتجرد، ومن فقهاء القانون الدستوري، ورجال القضاء.

'inna hāda l-ḥiwāra l-waṭānī, qad talāqā ḥawla taškīli lajnatīn dustūriyah, tatawallā dirāsata t-ta'dīlāti l-maṭlūbah fī d-dustūr, wa mā taqtaḍih min ta'dīlātīn tašrī'iyah, kamā talāqā ḥawla taškīli lajnatīn li-l-mutāba'ah, tatawallā mutāba'ata t-tanfīḍi l-'amīn limā ta'ahadtu bihi 'amāma š-ša'b, wa la-qad ḥarišt 'alā 'an ya'tiya taškīlu kiltā al-lajnatayīn, mīna š-šxšiyāti l-miṣriyyah, al-mašhūdi lahā bi-l-istiqlāl wa t-tajarud, wa min fuqahā 'i l-qānūni d-dustūrī, wa rijālī l-qadā'.

his national dialogue has indeed agreed on the formation of a constitutional committee that undertakes the study of the required constitutional amendments and the legislative amendments they require. It has also agreed on forming a follow-up committee that undertakes the follow-up of the honest implementation of what I have promised the people. I was keen that the formation of both committees comes from Egyptian dignitaries, well-known for their independence and impartiality, and from constitutional law jurists and the judiciary.

(M3.17:35)

تستهدف هذه التعديلات ذات الأولوية، تيسير شروط الترشيح لرئاسة الجمهورية، واعتماد عدد محدد لمدد الرئاسة، تحقيقاً لتداول السلطة، وتعزيز ضوابط الإشراف على الانتخابات، ضماناً لحريتها ونزاهتها، كما تؤكد اختصاص القضاء وحده، بالفصل في صحة وعضوية أعضاء البرلمان، وتعدل شروط وإجراءات طلب تعديل الدستور. أما الاقتراح، بإلغاء المادة 179 من الدستور، فإنه يستهدف تحقيق التوازن المطلوب، بين حماية الوطن، من مخاطر الإرهاب، وضمان احترام الحقوق والحريات، المدنية للمواطنين، بما يفتح الباب، أمام إيقاف العمل بقانون الطوارئ، فور استعادة الهدوء والاستقرار، وتوافر الظروف المواتية، لرفع حالة الطوارئ.

tastahdifu hādihī t-ta'dīlāt dāti l-'awlāwiyah taysīra šurūṭi t-tarašūḥi li-ri'āsati l-jumhūriyya wa i'timādi 'adadīn muḥaddadīn li-muddadi r-ri'āsah, taḥqīqan li-

tadawli s-sulṭah, wa ta 'zīzi dawābiṭi l-iṣrāfi 'alā l-intixābāt, ḍamānan li-ḥurriyyatihā wa nazāhatihā, kamā tu 'akidu ixtiṣāsa l-qaḍā'i waḥdahu bi-l-faṣli fī ṣiḥati wa 'uḍwiyyati 'a 'dā'i l-barlamān, wa tu 'adilu ṣurūṭa wa ijrā'āti ṭalabi ta 'dīli d-dustūr. 'amma l-iqtirāḥ bi-ilgā'i l-mādah 179 mina d-dustūr, fa- 'innahu yastahdifu taḥqīqa t-tawāzuni l-maṭlūb, bayna ḥimāyati l-waṭan, min maxāṭiri l-irhāb, wa ḍamāni iḥtirāmi l-ḥuqūq wa-l-ḥurriyyāt al-madaniyah li-l-muwāṭinīn, bi-mā yaftahu l-bāb 'amāma 'iqāfi l- 'amal bi-qānūni ṭ-ṭawāri', fawra sti 'ādati l-hudū'i wa l-istiqrār, wa tawāfuri z-zurūfi l-mwāṭiyah li-raf' ḥālat aṭ-ṭawāri'.

These top-priority amendments aim at facilitating the conditions of nomination for presidency; approving a fixed number of terms in presidency, in order to ensure rotation of power; reinforcing the checks of judiciary supervision over elections, in order to guarantee their freedom and fairness; confirming the exclusive jurisdiction of the judiciary to rule upon the legitimacy and validity of parliamentary membership; and amending the conditions and measures of requesting constitutional amendments. As for the proposal to scrap article 179 of the constitution, it aims at achieving the required balance between protecting the homeland from the perils of terrorism and ensuring the respect of the civil rights and liberties of the citizens, in a manner that opens the door for stopping the Emergency Law once calmness and stability are restored and the suitable circumstances are met for lifting the state of emergency.

The third most frequent fallacies were *argumentum ad metum* and *slippery slope argumentum ad consequentiam*, which Mubarak committed in thirteen instances in order to frighten the people of the personal, social, and financial consequences of the protests (M3.19:20; M3.20:36; M3.21:16).

(M3.20:36)

إِنَّ مِصْرَ تَجْتَازُ أَوْقَاتاً صَعِبَةً، لَا يَصِحُّ أَنْ نَسْمَحَ بِاسْتِمْرَارِهَا، فَيَزِدَادُ مَا أَلْحَقْتُهُ بِنَا وَبِاِقْتِصَادِنَا، مِنْ أَضْرَارٍ وَخَسَائِرٍ، يَوْمًا بَعْدَ يَوْمٍ، وَيَنْتَهِي بِمِصْرِ الْأَمْرِ، لِأَوْضَاعٍ، يُصِحُّ مَعَهَا الشَّبَابُ الَّذِينَ دَعَوْا إِلَى التَّغْيِيرِ وَالْإِصْلَاحِ، أَوْلَ الْمُتَضَرَّرِينَ مِنْهَا.

'inna miṣr tajtāzu 'awqātan ṣa 'bah, lā yaṣiḥu 'an nasmaḥa bi-stimrārihā, fa-yazdādu ma 'alḥaqat 'hu bi-nā wa bi-qṭiṣādīnā min 'aḍrārīn wa xasā'ir, yawman ba 'da yawm, wa yantahī bi-miṣra l- 'amr, li- 'awḍā'in yuṣbiḥu ma 'ahā aṣabābu l-aḍīna da 'aw ilā t-tagyīri wa l-iṣlāḥ 'awala l-mutaḍarirīna minhā.

Egypt is indeed braving through hard times, which we should not allow to continue, so as not to increase the damages and losses they have inflicted upon us and upon our economy day after day, and so as not to end up with Egypt in conditions that would make the youth who called for change and reform the first to suffer.

The fourth most frequent fallacy was *argumentum ad fidem*, which Mubarak committed in six instances in order to establish a bond with the protesters on religious grounds, by

opening the speech with the Islamic starter and concluding it with the Islamic greeting of departure (M3.1; M3.30), by stating that he had taken an oath to Allah to safeguard Egypt (M3.10:2), and by invoking Allah thrice to protect Egypt and its people and to guide them to the right path (M3.29).

The fifth most predominant fallacy was *argumentum ad baculum*, which Mubarak committed in five instances, not to threaten the protesters, as he did in the previous two speeches, but to mark his power in a manner that would endear him to them, by telling them, in two instances, that although he was the president, he was not embarrassed to listen to them or to meet their demands (M3.7:6), and that he had already requested the amendment of the constitution, in response to their demands (M3.16:12). In the other three instances Mubarak marked his power over his own supporters, not over the protesters by addressing them with the legally hierarchical vocative *al-'ixwah al-muwātinūn*.

The least frequent fallacy was *petitio principii*, which Mubarak committed, in three instances, not to pass his unsubstantiated propositions as facts, as he did in the previous two speeches, but to presuppose that he had already responded to the demands of the protesters, in an attempt to appease them (M3.13:19; M3.21:16)

4.3.4. Frame analysis of the third speech of Mubarak

Mubarak activated seventeen frames in this speech: they can be categorized in terms of their pragmatic functions and linguistic features into seven evasive frames that employed weak and vague language in order to relinquish the powers of Mubarak, seven emotive frames that attempted to stir the emotions of the people, and three internally polemical frames that attempted to negotiate the new relations of power.

4.3.4.1. Power-relinquishing, weak, vague language frames

First, Mubarak activated the I-will-Honour-My-Promises frame (M3.5:9), at the beginning of the speech, in order to confirm to the protesters that he was determined to fulfil his promises to them, a pragmatic function that was weakened by three linguistic devices he employed: over-qualification, repetition, and negatives.

Mubarak employed nineteen qualifiers in this frame, making over-qualification its most salient linguistic feature: He emphatically qualified his own act of saying by opening the frame with the assertive verb أقولُ 'aqulu (I am saying); he qualified his implied

addressee by explicating لكم *lakum* (to you); and he qualified the demands of the protesters by referring to them with the three consecutive nouns صوتكم *ṣawtikum* (your voice), رسالتكم *risālatikum* (your message), and مطالبكم *maṭālibukum* (your demands) which glorified the protesters and their demands and represented Mubarak as keen on responding to everything related to them.

The most qualified point in the frame is Mubarak's commitment to fulfil his promises to the protesters, which he emphasized with fourteen qualifiers: The explication of the implicated pronoun هو *hwa* (is) which referenced and emphasized his commitment; the negative لا رجعة فيه *la raj'ata fih* (irrevocable) which further qualified that commitment by denying and blocking any possible retreat; the emphatic letter *nūn at-tawkīd* in أنني *inmanī* (I am indeed) which asserted its subsequent cognate accusative; the cognate accusative عازم كل العزم *āzimun kulla l-'azm* (determined, all the determination), which qualified his determination to fulfil his promises; the emphatic *kullu l-kamaliyyah* which Mubarak inserted in the middle of the previous cognate accusative in order to complete and perfect it; the definite article ال *al-* which Mubarak attached to the noun of the cognate accusative, *al-'azm*, in order to emphasize it; the adverbial prepositional phrase بكل الجدية والصدق *bi-kulli l-jiddiyah wa ṣ-ṣidq* which included three qualifiers: the emphatic *kullu l-kamaliyyah* which completed and perfected its two subsequent nouns *aj-jiddiyah* (seriousness) and *aṣ-ṣidq* (sincerity) and the two definite nouns which qualified the manner of his fulfilment of his promise; the second cognate accusative حرص كل الحرص *ḥarīṣun kulla l-ḥirṣ* (keen, all the keenness) which emphasized his keenness on fulfilling his commitment; the emphatic *kullu l-kamaliyyah* in the middle of the cognate accusative; the definite article *al-* which Mubarak attached to the noun of the cognate accusative, *al-ḥirṣ*; and the two final negatives دون ارتداد *dūna irtidādin* (with no return) and أو عودة الي الوراء *'aw 'awdatin ilā l-warā'* (or retreat) which bracketed the frame by repeating its opening negative.

However, those nineteen qualifiers, six repetitions, and three negatives, which were supposed to reinforce the appeasing function of the frame by confirming that Mubarak was resolved to respond to the demands of the protesters, created instead an air of unreal exaggeration, cast doubts on the sincerity of Mubarak, and directed the attention of the people towards the reasons behind such heavy qualification, redundant repetition, and defensive negation.

Second, the second power relinquishing frame, i.e. Mistakes-Happen (M3.6:14), is a significant one because of its implicative relations: it contained an implicit acknowledgement of Mubarak that his regime had made mistakes. He prepared for that indirect admission by starting the frame with an excessive praise of the intentions, actions, and demands of the protesters, a new strategy completely different from his previous one of embedding his responses to the demands of the protesters within threats; this new laudatory tactic can be considered as another marker of his loss of power, at the time of delivering this speech.

Mubarak emphasized his introductory praise with seven qualifiers: the emphatic particle *إن* 'inna (indeed), which introduced the frame and emphasized Mubarak's commitment; the demonstrative *هذا* *hāda* (this), which specified Mubarak's commitment and made it present in the minds of the hearers; the adjective *أكيد* 'akīd (firm), which qualified and reinforced his conviction; the noun *نقاء* *naqā'i* (purity), which combined with its preceding noun *صدق* *sidqi* (sincerity) to reinforce the praise of the intentions and movement of the protesters; the second emphatic particle *بأن* *bi-'anna* (indeed), which qualified the demands of the protesters; the explication of the emphatic pronoun *هي* *hiyya*, which referred to its preceding noun *مطالبكم* *maṭālibakum* (your demands) and further qualified it; the repetition of the noun *مطالب* *maṭālibu* (demands), which added more weight and significance to the demands of the protesters; and the adjective *مشروعة* *mašrū'ah* (legitimate), which combined with its preceding adjective *عادلة* 'ādilatun (fair) to further qualify the demands of the protesters.

Mubarak followed that laudatory introduction with an implicit admission that his regime had made mistakes, by arguing that mistakes are likely to happen in any political system and in any country, but the important thing is to admit and correct them as soon as possible, and hold those who committed them to account. He achieved and maintained that implicitness through two linguistic devices: indefiniteness and nominalization. He used the two indefinite nouns *نظام* *nizāmin* (system) and *دولة* *dawlah* (country) in order to unspecify the political system and the country he was talking about, i.e. Egypt; he also intensified their indefiniteness by preceding each noun of them by the generalizing determiner *أي* 'ayyi (any), which unspecifies the noun following it (Lisān Al-'arab as cited in Al-Maany online encyclopaedia). Moreover, Mubarak employed the three nominal forms *الاعتراف* *al-i'tirāfu* (admitting), *تصحيح* *tashḥīh* (correcting), and *محاسبة*

muḥāsabati (holding to account), instead of their corresponding verbal ones, in order to present the three processes as agentless, and hence avoid specifying or mentioning the agents who are responsible for performing those acts of admission, correction, and holding to account.

Third, the pragmatic function of the This-is-My-Last-Term-in-Office frame (*M3.10:2*), through which Mubarak attempted to appease the protesters by confirming that he was not intending to run for the coming presidential elections, was weakened by three linguistic devices: over-qualification, passivization, and stumbles.

Mubarak employed eleven qualifiers in this frame: the emphatic particle لقد *la-qad* (indeed), which contained two qualifiers: *lām at-tawkīd* and *qad*, which both qualified the assertive verb أُعلنتُ *'a'lantu* (I have stated); the adverbial prepositional phrase لا تحتملُ الجدلَ أو التأويلَ *bi-'ibārātin lā taḥtamīlu l-jadala 'awi t-t'awīl* (in sentences that do not allow misinterpretation or argumentation), which contained two qualifiers: the negative *lā taḥtamīlu l-jadala*, and the definite noun *at-t'awīl*, which both qualified their preceding noun *'ibārātin*; the repetitive verbal phrase أُعلنتُ تمسكي بذلك *'a'lantu tamasukī bi-dālik* (I have announced my commitment to that), which qualified its preceding utterance by repeating its assertive verb *'a'lantu* and introducing the commissive noun *tamasukī* (my commitment); the parallel, conjoined phrase *wa 'a'lantu tamasukan mumāṭilan* وأُعلنتُ تمسكاً مماثلاً (and announced a similar commitment), which repeated the assertive verb *'a'lantu* for the third time and the commissive noun *tamasukan* for the second time; the adverbial prepositional phrase بذاتِ القدرِ *bi-dāti l-qadr* (that is equally emphatic), which qualified its preceding qualifying phrase; the definite noun المسؤولية *al-mas'ūliyyah* (the responsibility) which was following the noun السلطة *as-sulṭata* (the power) in order to emphasize it; the adjective نزيهة *nazīhah* (fair) which followed the adjective حرة *ḥurratin* (free) in order to reinforce it; and the repetition of the previous two adjectives in their nominal forms, i.e. الحرية *al-ḥurriyyah* (the freedom) and النزاهة *an-nazāhah* (the fairness).

Furthermore, Mubarak employed two passive structures to describe his plan of transferring power. The first passive, i.e. حتى يتم تسليمُ السلطة والمسؤولية لمن يختارُهُ الناخبون *ḥattā yatimma taslīmu s-sulṭata wa l-mas'ūliyyah li-man yaxtāruhu n-nāxibūn* (until power and responsibility are handed over to whomever electors will choose), enabled

him to depict the process of power transfer as an agentless one, and hence exonerated him from his constitutional responsibility for initiating, conducting, supervising, and handing over power to his successor. Moreover, Mubarak further mystified that process of power transfer by referencing the prospective president with the most vague, indefinite, and generic relative pronoun in Arabic, i.e. *man* (those/who/whom), which can be used to reference singular, dual, plural, masculine, feminine, subject, and (or) object referents (Al-Hammadi, Al-Menshawy, Atta 1994: 17). The second passive, which Mubarak used to talk about the guarantees of freedom and fairness that were to be secured for the coming presidential elections *الحرية والنزاهة تُوفّر لها الضمانات tuwaffaru lahā aḍ-ḍamānātu l-ḥurriyyah wa n-nazāhah* (for which guarantees of freedom and fairness will be secured), enabled him to avoid specifying the subject who was to be held responsible for securing those guarantees.

The suspicions raised by the *strategic vagueness* of those two passives were corroborated by the stumble, the mispronunciation, and the grammatical mistakes Mubarak made in this frame. He stumbled when he talked about the date of the new presidential elections

حتى يتم تسليم السلطة والمسؤولية، لمن يختارُه الناخبون، شهر [stumble مستقبل] سبتمبر المقبل
ḥattā yatimma taslīmu s-sulṭata wa l-mas'ūliyyah li-man yaxtāruhu n-nāxibūn šahra
[mustaqila - stumbling] sibtimbir al-muqbil (until power and responsibility are handed over to whom electors will choose in the coming September). He also mispronounced the whole phrase *انتخاباتٍ حرةٍ ونزيهة تُوفّر لها الضمانات الحرية والنزاهة fi intixābātin ḥurratin wa nazīhah, tuwaffaru lahā aḍ-ḍamānātu l-ḥurriyyati wa n-nazāhah* (in fair and free elections, for which guarantees of freedom and fairness will be secured). Finally, he made the grammatical mistake of adding the definite article *al-* to the definite noun *ḍamānātu* which is already defined by addition. Those stumble and mispronunciation suggested that something was not right with Mubarak and hence undermined his credibility.

Fourth, the pragmatic function of the National-Dialogue frame (M3.13:19), through which Mubarak attempted to appease the protesters by confirming that he had started a national dialogue in preparation for transferring power, was weakened by the vague language he employed.

He started the frame with the weak verb بدأنا *bad'nā* (we've started), which suggested that what had been done was just a beginning and that a lot of 'dialoguing' was still to be done. The weakness of that verb was foregrounded, paradoxically, by the three-layer emphasis Mubarak put on it: the two emphatic particles *lām at-tawkīd* and *qad* لقد *la-qad* (indeed), which preceded the verb, and the qualifying prepositional adverbial phrase بالفعل *bi-l-fi'l* (already) which followed it. Mubarak then expressed the supposedly important object of that verb in the indefinite form حواراً *hiwāran* (a dialogue), which made it sound less specific, less concrete, and less significant.

Furthermore, Mubarak used the indefinite, weak noun توافق *tawāfuqin* to refer to the result of his dialogue, a selectional choice that was problematic on more than one ground: the semantic domain of this noun is personal relations, where it principally means 'harmony' or 'accord' (Almaany online Encyclopaedia); however, Mubarak employed it in the political domain to mean agreement on political opinions, and avoided the more relevant, accurate, precise, and hence cognitively accessible noun اتفاق *itifāqin* (agreement), in order to avoid precision and hence responsibility, and continue the strategic vagueness he had been adopting systematically. That imprecise noun allowed him a manoeuvring space to reply, if asked about the agreement he claimed he had reached, that it was a personal *tawāfuqin*, not a formal *itifāqin*.

Moreover, Mubarak further mitigated that indefinite, vague noun, i.e. *tawāfuqin*, by following it with the weak qualifying adjective مبدئي *mabda'iyin* (preliminary), which further weakened its already weak pragmatic force and connoted that the *tawāfuq* 'agreement' was neither binding nor well-developed. The indefiniteness, weakness, and imprecision of that important noun and the mitigation caused by its qualifying adjective were contrasted with the two-layer emphasis created by *lām at-tawkīd* and *qad* in the second لقد *la-qad* (indeed/verily) which preceded them.

Furthermore, the increasingly weak pragmatic force of the frame was significantly undermined by the verbal clause in which Mubarak said that the goal behind both his dialogue and its ensuing *tawāfuq* was to يضع أقدامنا على بداية الطريق الصحيح *yada'u 'aqdāmana 'alā bidāyati ṭ-ṭarīqi ṣ-ṣahīh* (lay our feet on the beginning of the right track), which suggested that the dialogue Mubarak was talking about was still standing at the beginning of a metaphorical road that has not been even started. Finally, the last

sentence of the frame cancelled the viability of those already weak dialogue and its *tawāfuq*, by stating that they were not feasible in their current form, that they were just broadlines, and that they had to be translated to a roadmap

يتعين مواصلة الانتقال به من الخطوط العريضة، لما تم الاتفاق عليه، إلى خريطة طريق واضحة

ya-ta'ayanu muwāṣalatuhu li-l-'intiḳāli bihi mina l-xuṭūṭi l-'arīḍah li-mā tamma l-itifāqu 'alaih, ilā xārīṭati ṭarīḳin wāḍiḥah (It has to be to continued in order to transform it from the broad lines that have been agreed upon to a clear road map.

Fifth, Mubarak activated the I-have-Formed-a-Committee frame (M3.14:34) in order to appease the protesters by confirming to them that he had already started the process of amending the constitution; however, that pragmatic function was weakened by the vague language he employed.

The main verb Mubarak used in this frame was the Form Five verb *تلاقى talāqā* which has ten meanings in Arabic: to assemble, band together, collect, come together, congregate, gather, get together, join, meet, and rally (Al-Mu'jam Al-Wasīt, Al-Mu'jam Al-ġanni, Al-Mu'jam Ar-rā'id, Mu'jam Al-Luġah Al-'arabiyyah Al-Mu'āṣirah, Lisān Al-'arab, and Al-Qāmūs Al-Muḥīt, as cited in Almaany online Arabic Encyclopaedia). The meaning of 'to agree on' which Mubarak employed this verb to denote, twice in this frame, is not one of the established meanings of this verb. Mubarak, therefore, avoided using any of the verbs that mean 'to agree' and opted instead for employing a non-related verb and twisting its meaning, in order to avoid precision and hence evade responsibility and accountability for what he was saying.

In a similar vein, Mubarak used a grammatically and syntactically vague structure to describe the process of forming the two committees he was talking about

ولقد حرصتُ، على أن يأتي تشكيل كلتا اللجنتين، من الشخصيات المصرية

wa la-qad ḥarišt 'alā 'an ya'tiya taškīlu kiltā al-lajnatayin, mina š-šxṣiyāti l-miṣriyyah

I have indeed been keen that the formation of both committees comes from Egyptian dignitaries

He used the past tense to describe his keenness on forming the two committees, then switched to the present tense to refer to the process of forming the two committees. Such a combination made it difficult to determine whether the two committees had already been formed or whether they were still in the process of formation. Moreover, Mubarak

inserted the unnecessary verb *يأتي*, used it as an auxiliary verb, and conjugated it to agree with the following noun *taškīlu* (formation), in a manner that depicted the formation process as an automatic one, and obscured his role and cancelled his agency in selecting the members of both committees. Such a linguistic tactic saved Mubarak any criticism that he might have formed the two committees from his supporters. Finally, the weak noun *dirāsata* in *دراسة التعديلات المطلوبة في الدستور*, which Mubarak used to describe the task he assigned to the new constitutional committee, connoted that he was not serious about amending the constitution and that the committees he claimed he had formed aimed at wasting time.

Sixth, Mubarak activated the I-have-Requested-the-Amendment-of-the-Constitution frame (M3.16:12) in order to appease the protesters by arguing that he had responded to their demands and requested the amendment of the constitution; however, that pragmatic function was weakened by the language he employed.

He used the weak verbal phrase *تقدمتُ بطلبٍ taqdamtu bi-ṭalabi* (I submitted a request) to describe his response to the recommendations of the constitutional committee: such a phrase has negative connotations of slow bureaucracy and red tape, and hence was not up to the expectations of the protesters, who anticipated a strong, performative, and commissive language. Moreover, the weakness of that verb was foregrounded by and contrasted with the three qualifiers that Mubarak employed before it, in order to mark his power: the emphatic particle *إنني innanī* (I indeed am), the first parenthetical phrase *والمقتضى الصلاحيات المخولة، لرئيس الجمهورية wa muqtaḍā aṣ-ṣalāḥiyāti l-muxawalah li-ra' īsi l-jumhūriyyah* (by virtue of the powers vested in the President of the republic), and the second parenthetical phrase *ووفقاً للمادة 189 من الدستور wiḥqan li-lmāddah 189 mina d-dustūr* (as per article 189 of the constitution). Those three strong and power-marking qualifiers contrasted with the verbal phrase *taqdamtu bi-ṭalabi* and intensified its weakness.

Moreover, when Mubarak expressed his willingness to amend more constitutional articles, he did so by employing three linguistic tools that maintained his strategic vagueness: nominalization, semantic ambiguity, and indefiniteness. He used the three nominal forms *تأكيد t'akīdi* (confirmation), *الاستعداد al-'isti'dād* (the readiness), and *للتقدم li-t-taqdum* (the submission), instead of their corresponding verbal ones, in order to

avoid having to specify the subject of those verbs, and hence absolved himself of the responsibility for implementing such amendments. Also, when he talked about the time of amending those further constitutional articles, he used the indefinite, vague prepositional phrase وقتٍ لاحقٍ *fī waqtin lāḥiq* (at a later time) which did not commit him to any specific time.

In a similar vein, when Mubarak talked about the demand of scraping article 179, which allows him to impose Emergency Law, he did not only use the weak, non-binding noun الاقتراح *al-iqtirāḥ* (the suggestion) which demoted the demand to just a suggestion, but also qualified, or rather mitigated, that noun with the vague, non-conclusive, conditional phrase

بما يفتحُ الباب، أمام إيقافِ العملِ بقانونِ الطوارئ، فورَ استعادةِ الهدوءِ والاستقرارِ، وتوافرِ الظروفِ المواتيةِ، لرفعِ حالةِ الطوارئ.

bi-mā yaftaḥu l-bāb 'amāma 'īqāfi l-'amal bi-qānūni ṭ-ṭawāri', fawra sti'ādati l-hudū'i wa l-istiqrār, wa tawāfuri z-zurūfi l-mwātiyah li-raf' ḥālat aṭ-ṭawāri'

in a manner that opens the door for stopping the Emergency Law once calmness and stability are restored and the suitable circumstances are met for lifting the state of emergency (M3.17:35).

Finally, Mubarak's use of the adjective الأول *al-'awal* (the first) to qualify the report he had received from the constitutional committee invited the inference that there were going to be other reports before the constitution could be amended, and hence implicated that he was playing for time.

Seventh, the last power-relinquishing frame activated by Mubarak in this speech is the Anyway frame (M3.23:7), which contained the most important information in the speech, i.e. Mubarak's delegation of his powers to his vice-president. The frame consists of a long conditional whose conditional phrase is separated from its complement, or *jawāb aš-šarṭ*, by six qualifying phrases that kept repetitively paraphrasing the conditional phrase in an attempt to justify the complement.

Mubarak started the frame and the conditional with a conditional phrase that contained six qualifiers إذ أعني خطورة المفترق الصعب الحالي *fa-'innanā 'id 'a ṭ tamāman xuṭūrata l-muftaraqi ṣ-ṣa'bi l-ḥālī* (while I am indeed completely aware of the gravity of the

current critical conjuncture): the emphatic particle *فإنني* *fa-`innanī*, which consisted of three emphatic particles: *al-fā`*, the emphatic particle *inna*, and the emphatic letter *nūn at-tawkīd*; the adverb *تماماً* *tamāman* (completely), which qualified and intensified the awareness of Mubarak; the noun *خطورة* *xuṭūrata* (gravity) which, although its meaning is implied in the noun it qualifies, i.e. *المفترق* *al-muftaraq* ‘the conjuncture’, its explication further qualified it; the definite adjective *الصعب* *aṣ-ṣa`bi* (the critical) which also qualified *al-muftaraq*; the conjoined adverbial phrase *بأن مصرَ تجتازُ لحظةً، فارقةً في* *wa iqtinā`an min jānibī bi-`anna miṣra tajtāzu laḥẓatan fāriqatan fī tāriḫihā* (and based on my conviction that Egypt is passing a defining moment, in its history), which is a paraphrased repetition of the conditional phrase preceding it; the verbal phrase *تفرضُ علينا جميعاً، تغليبَ المصلحةِ العليا للوطن* *tafriḍu `alainā jamī`an, taḡlība l-maṣlahati `uliyā li-l-waṭan* (that imposes upon us all the prioritization of the higher interest of the homeland), which qualified the historical moment highlighted in the preceding phrase, and was qualified by and repeated in its subsequent three phrases *أن* *an naḍa`a miṣra `awala* (to put Egypt first), *فوقَ أي اعتبارٍ* *fawqa `ayyi `tibār* (above any consideration), and *وكلَ اعتبارٍ آخر* *wa kulla i`tibārin `āxar* (and every other consideration).

After regimenting those eleven qualifiers, Mubarak concluded the conditional by mentioning its complement, which contained his delegation of his powers to the vice-president. He used the less authoritative verb *رأيتُ* *ra`aytu* (literally I have seen or considered appropriate, to mean I have decided), and further restricted the complement and the declaration by the adverbial prepositional phrase *على النحو الذي، يحدده الدستور* *alā n-naḥwi l-laḍi yuḥaddiduhu d-dustūr* (as per the constitution).

Although Mubarak backgrounded that important announcement by relegating it to the end of the frame, and qualified it with eleven qualifying phrases, in order to justify it and hence save the face of the president, the first three words in the frame, i.e. *وعلى أيةِ حال* *wa `alā `ayati ḥāl* (anyway), announced indirectly that Mubarak had already lost his power, because ‘anyway’ ‘is a common type of evidence that an expectation is violated [...] it functions as an admission of defeat’ (Tannen 1979: 150).

4.3.4.2. Emotive frames

First, the first emotive frame employed by Mubarak in this speech was the opening Father-and-HIS-Sons frame (M3.3:13): he started it with the new fatherly vocative *al-'abnā'u šabāba Mišra wa šabātiha* (the sons, male and female youth of Egypt), which he employed for the first time to address the protesters, and establish close, warm, and emotional father-sons relations with them, instead of the legally hierarchical relations triggered by the vocative *al-'ixwah al-muwāṭinūn* (Brother citizens), which he used systematically in the previous two speeches.

Mubarak also employed new nomination strategies, in this frame, that reflected the steep changes in the relations of power between himself and the protesters: He did not call them free riders, traders, rioters, violent anarchists, looters, saboteurs, or arson attackers aiming at shaking stability and preying upon legitimacy, as he did in the first speech; nor did he describe them as exploited honourable youth and citizens, who were waiving their destiny and future, and unaware of what realizes their interests, as he did in the second speech; but he glorified them as

رمزاً لجيلٍ مصريٍ جديد، يدعو إلى التغيير إلى الأفضل، ويتمسكُ به، ويحلُمُ بالمستقبل، ويصنَعُه
ramzan li-jīlin mišriyyin jadīd yad'ū ila t-taḡyīri 'ila l-'afḍal wa
yatamasaku bih, wa yaḥlumu bi-l-mustaqbal wa yašna'uh
a symbol of a new Egyptian generation that calls for change to the better
adheres to it, and dreams of the future and makes it.

The appeasing function intended by this frame was, however, weakened by three linguistic devices Mubarak employed: over-qualification, indefiniteness, and anaphoric reference.

Over-qualification is the most salient feature of this frame: Mubarak employed seven qualifiers to emphasize everything he was saying: He qualified his speech thrice, by emphasizing its time *اليوم al-yawm* (today), its source *من القلب mina l-qalb* (from the heart), and its target *لشباب مصر li-šabābi mišr*). He also qualified the protesters four times: by specifying those in Tahrir Square once *بميدان التحرير bi-maidāni t-tahrīr* (in Tahrir Square), those all over Egypt once *على اتساع أرضها 'alā itsā'i 'arḍihā* (all over the country), and both of them twice *إليكم جميعاً 'ilai-kum jamā'an* (to all of you). Only one of those seven qualifiers added new information to the propositional content of the frame; the other six were redundant, detracted from the intended emphatic force of the frame, represented the speech

acts of Mubarak as lacking their due presidential perlocutionary force, and hence marked his loss of power.

Moreover, the laudatory pragmatic function which Mubarak intended to perform by describing the protesters with the two consecutive indefinite nouns *ramzan* (a symbol) and *jīlin* (a generation) was weakened by the indefiniteness of the two nouns, which made them sound less emphatic, less specific, and less concrete. Furthermore, the third-person pronouns which Mubarak used in the parenthetical phrase حديثُ الأبِ لأبنائه وبناته *ḥadītu l-`abi li-`abnā`ihi wa banātih* (a speech of the father to his sons and daughters), in order to claim the role of the father of the protesters, resulted in detaching and distancing him from the protesters, and highlighted paradoxically that he was addressing them, not as their father, but in a manner similar to that in which a father addresses his sons and daughters; the former implicature could have been triggered by the use of the first-person pronouns, i.e. حديثي لأبنائي وبناتي *ḥadīti li-`abnā`ī wa banātī* (my speech to my sons and daughters).

Second, Mubarak activated the emotive Blood-of-the-Martyr frame (M3.4:8) in order to console the protesters; however, that pragmatic function was weakened by four linguistic devices: over-qualification, repetition, negatives, and stumbles.

Mubarak employed eighteen qualifiers in this frame: he qualified his own act of saying thrice, by using the assertive verb أقولُ *aqulu* (I am saying) to say that he was saying, by explicating the implied, yet obvious, pronoun of the addressee لكم *lakum* (to you), and by the adverbial phrase قبل كل شيء *qabla kulli šay`* (before everything). Mubarak also qualified his pain over the death and injury of the protesters with eight qualifiers: the second present continuous assertive verb أقولُ *aqūl* (I am saying), which qualified his very act of saying; the emphatic particle *nūn at-tawkīd* في أنني *annanī* (I indeed), which confirmed his agency; the emphatic cognate accusative تألمتُ كل الألم *ta`alamtu kulla l-`alam* (I was pained all the pain), which qualified, intensified, and emphasized his pain; *kullu l-kamaliyyah* which Mubarak inserted in the middle of the previous cognate accusative in order to complete and perfect it; the prepositional phrase من أجلهم *min `ajlihīm* (for them), which explicating the implied, yet obvious, cause of his pain; the phrase مثلما تألمتم *miṭlamā ta`allamtum* (as you were pained), which further qualified his pain and related it to that of the families of the killed and injured protesters; the conjoined synonymous verbal phrase وأوجع قلبي ما حدث وأوجع قلبي ما حدث *awja`a qalbī mā ḥadaṭa lahum* (my heart was ached by what happened to them), which

paraphrased and repeated its preceding phrase in order to intensify his pain; and the phrase كما أوجع قلوبكم *kamā 'awja 'a qulūbakum* (as your hearts were ached), which further qualified his pain and attempted to establish a bond between his aching heart and those of the families of the protesters. However, the stumble Mubarak made while saying *min 'ajlihīm* (for them), weakened the accumulative emphatic bonding he had been building.

Mubarak also qualified his determination to punish the perpetrators who killed and injured the protesters with seven qualifiers: the strong assertive verb أؤكد *'u 'akid* (I confirm); the emphatic particle أنني *nūn at-tawkīd* in *annanī* (I indeed); the emphatic particle *kullu l-kamāliyyah* بكل الشدة والحسم, which completed and perfected his intended decisiveness and firmness; the conjunction of the definite noun الحسم *al-ḥasm* (decisiveness) with its semantically related definite noun الشدة *aš-šiddati* (fierceness), in order to reinforce their connotations of strength and power; the combination of the negative clause لن أتهاون، في *lan 'atahāwan fī mu 'āqabati l-mutasabibīna 'anhā* (I will not be lenient in punishing its perpetrators) and its synonymous affirmative paraphrase أجرموا في حق شبابنا *lan 'atahāwan fī mu 'āqabati l-mutasabibīna 'anhā* (I will not be lenient in punishing its perpetrators) and its synonymous affirmative paraphrase *ajramū fī ḥaqqi šabābina* (I will punish those who committed those crimes against our youth); and further qualifying the affirmative clause with the prepositional phrase بأقصى ما تقرره أحكام القانون، من عقوبات رادعة *bi-'aqṣā ma tuqariruhu 'aḥkāmu l-qānūn min 'uqūbātīn rādī'ah* (with the most deterrent sentences stipulated by the law), which is itself internally qualified by the strong superlative *'aqṣā* and the adjective *rādī'ah*). However, Mubarak stumbled while uttering the second word of the frame, i.e. *'aqulu lakum* (I am saying to you) and mispronounced the three words دماء *dimā'a* (bloods), شهدائكم *šuhadā'ikum* (your martyrs), and جرحاكم *jarḥākum* (injured ones), which weakened the emphatic tone he attempted to build up by the eighteen qualifiers.

Although Mubarak intended those qualifiers, repetitions, and negatives to emphasize the consoling function of the frame, the three linguistic devices combined to weaken that intended function: the over-qualification and repetition created an air of exaggeration, diverted the attention of the hearers away from the repeated and qualified messages, and directed it towards the rhetorical aims behind such heavy repetition and qualification. Such an air was reinforced, first, by the negatives which suggested that Mubarak was expecting the people to think that he was going to cover up those crimes and let them go unpunished, and, second, by the stumbles Mubarak made while uttering significant words in the frame.

Third, Mubarak activated the Old-Father-Ingrate-Children frame (M3.22:1) in order to appeal to the pity of the people, on personal and nationalistic grounds.

Personally, Mubarak started the frame with the assertive, past-tense verb *كنتُ kuntu* (I was), emphasizing it twice by *lam at-tawkīd* and the emphatic particle *qad* لقد (indeed), and following it with the noun *شاباً šāban* (a youth), in order to stir the pity of the people with the old man they were looking at, and remind them that he was once a young man like the youth who were protesting against him. Mubarak then employed the emotive, assertive, strong verb *أفنيْتُ 'afnaytu* (I have annihilated) to connote that he had no life left, and to emphasize that his life since he was young had been exhausted completely in defending the land and sovereignty of the people who were protesting against him. He then raised the level of his sacrifices and heightened its accompanying emotional tone by using the assertive, performative, strong verb *واجهتُ wājahtu* (I have faced) and intensified its force, and hence his heroism, by following it with the abstract noun *الموتِ al-mawta* (death) and by qualifying the whole verbal phrase with the intensifying four adverbial clauses *مراتٍ عديدةٍ marrātin 'adīdah* (several times), *طياراً tayyāran* (as a pilot), *وفي أديس أبابا ft adis abābā* (in Addis Ababa), and *وغير ذلك كثيرٍ gayri dālīka kaṭīr* (in many other situations).

Professionally, Mubarak employed the positive verb *تعلمتُ ta'llamtu* (I learnt) to say that he had learnt the honour of the Egyptian military when he was at the age of the protesters, and emphasized the constructive connotations of that verb by qualifying it with three conjoined noun phrases loaded with nationalistic emotions: *شرفَ العسكرية المصرية šarafa l-'askariyati l-miṣriyyah* (the honour of the Egyptian military), *الولاءَ للوطنِ al-walā'a li-l-waṭan* (allegiance to the homeland), and *التضحية من أجله at-taḍḥiyati min 'ajlih* (sacrifice for its sake). The inferences invited by this triple qualification is that while the protesters were using the strength of their youthfulness to destroy the country and allow foreign dictations, Mubarak was using his strength to build and defend Egypt, when he was their age.

Mubarak then narrowed down his so far abstract argument, by listing specific instances of the sacrifices he had offered 'Egypt and its people': he used the assertive verb *شهِدتُ šahidtu* (I have witnessed) to denote that he was very close to the wars, defeats, and victories of Egypt; he followed that verb with the more involving, assertive verb *عشتُ 'ištu* (I have lived) to depict himself as one of the people who had actually lived the days of crossing, victory, and liberation; and he employed the assertive verb *رفعتُ rafa'tu* (I have raised) to remind

the people specifically that he was the president who raised the Egyptian flag over Sinai, declaring the liberation of the last occupied part of Egypt. He qualified that verb by preceding it with the fronted predicate *أسعدُ أيامَ حياتي* 'as 'adu 'ayyama hayāti (the happiest day of my life), in order to attract the attention of the people and establish a connection between his personal happiness and their national dignity.

Mubarak's successful employment of strong language stopped at that point; he then used a series of four weak verbs, starting with the assertive verb *أخضعُ* axḍa' (I succumbed), which he negated then emphasized that negation twice by the time adverbial *يوماً* yawman (one day) and the noun *إملاءاتُ* imlā'āt; he then used the static verb *حافظتُ* ḥāfaẓtu (safeguarded) which although it argued that he had safeguarded peace, it connoted that he did not dynamically promote it; he also employed the weak verb *عملتُ* 'amiltu (I have worked for) which sounded too generic; and he concluded with the verb *اجتهدتُ* 'ijtahdtu (I have tried my best) which originated in jurisprudence, and according to which if someone in charge 'tries his best concerning a certain case until he reaches what he thinks is the right decision [...] he will have a double reward if his ruling is sound and correct [...]: One reward is for his effort and keenness and the other for reaching the right decision. However, if he makes his best effort and does not reach a correct ruling, he will have a single reward for his diligence' (Hadeethenc.com). Mubarak was therefore implying that even if he had made mistakes, he should be given credit for trying his best, based on the religious ruling of 'al-ijtihād.

Mubarak concluded both the personal and professional scenarios of the frame with a highly emotional sentence: In its first part, he confirmed his confidence that the over-sweeping majority of Egyptians knew the sacrifices he had made; in the second, he employed a highly emotional phrase that is widely used in colloquial Egyptian Arabic to express love-based disappointment, pain, and sadness *يا حيزو في نفسي* ya ḥizzu fī nafṣī (it hurts me). That highly emotive sentence represented Mubarak as a reproaching old father who was ailed by the ingratitude of his sons whom he had been defending all his life; that implicated reproach was reinforced by Mubarak's emotional delivery of this sentence, which made it effective.

Fourth, Mubarak followed the previous frame with four other frames: the We-will-Never-be-Broken frame (M3.24:29), the We-are-Free frame (M3.25:21), the Egyptian-Identity frame (M3.26:22), and the Egyptian-Spirit frame (M3.27:31). The most outstanding

characteristic of those four frames was their highly emotional and metaphorical language, which personalized Egypt as a human being who, although in crisis, was able to survive, stand to her feet again, and defeat her enemies. Mubarak also prescribed that the exit of the crisis was through روح وعزم المصريين *rūḥi wa 'azmi l-miṣriyyīn* (the spirit and resolve of Egyptians), وتمسكنا بعزة مصر، وكرامتها، وهويتها الفريدة والخالدة *tamasukinā bi-'izzati miṣr, wa karāmatihā, wa huwiyatihā l-farīdatu wa l-xālidah* (our adherence to the dignity of Egypt, its honour, and its unique, eternal identity) (M3.26:22). Finally, Mubarak continued to avoid using precise political terms to describe the process of power transfer and employed instead non-political, vague, and abstract nouns that have moral and religious connotations, e.g. الأمانة *'al-'amānah* (the trust) and الراية *ar-rāyah* (the banner) (M3.28:33).

4.3.4.3. Internally polemical frames

The first internally polemical frame in this speech was the No-to-Foreign-Dictations frame (M3.7:6) which Mubarak activated to perform two pragmatic functions: repeating his readiness to respond to the demands of the protesters, and denying his acceptance of foreign dictations. However, the two functions were weakened by four linguistic devices he used: over-qualification, indefiniteness, contrastive connectives, and hidden dialogicality.

In terms of qualification, Mubarak used fifteen qualifiers in this short frame: six to emphasize the first function and nine to reinforce the second. On the one hand, he emphasized his readiness to respond to the protesters by using the assertive verb أقول *'aqulu* (I am saying), whose continuous tense marked its duration and confirmed the act of saying; the explication of the implied addressee pronoun لكم *lakum* (to you), which involved the protesters and made them present in the picture; the emphatic particle إنني *'innanī* (I indeed), which emphasized the agency of Mubarak; the addition of the negative noun غداضة *gādāḍatan* (shame) after the equally negative one حرجاً *ḥarajan* (embarrassment) to further qualify it; the negative emphatic time adverb أبداً *abadan* (at all) which qualified its preceding negative; and the addition of the positive, definite noun التجاوب *at-tajāwubi* (responding) after the equally positive, definite one الاستماع *al-istimā'i* (listening to).

However, the emphatic tone intended by those six qualifiers was weakened by three linguistic devices: indefiniteness, contrastive connectives, and negatives. Mubarak used the indefinite form to mark his power by saying إنني كرئيس للجمهورية *'innanī ka-ra'aīsin li-l-jumhūriyya* (in my capacity as a president of the republic), instead of the definite and hence

more emphatic structure *الجمهورية إنني كرئيس innanī ka-ra 'aīsi l-jumhūriyya* (in my capacity as the president of the republic). The indefiniteness of the structure he employed mitigated the very power he intended to mark. Moreover, the contrastive connective *lakinna* (but) cancelled the above-mentioned six qualifiers, because it denies its 'entire preceding set of statements' (Tannen 1979:170). Furthermore, given that a negative statement is used when a corresponding affirmative has been mentioned, when the content of such a corresponding affirmative is considered likely, or when the speaker holds the affirmative to be true (Givon 1979 as cited in Wilson 1990), the negative *لا أجدُ حرجاً lā 'ajidu ḥarajan* (I do not find any embarrassment), which Mubarak emphasized with six qualifiers, three before and three after, reinforced its corresponding affirmative, in an equally emphatic manner, and suggested that Mubarak, as a president of the republic, finds its embarrassing and shameful to listen and respond to the youth of Egypt.

On the other hand, Mubarak employed nine qualifiers to emphasize his rejection of foreign dictations: the two consecutive *kullu l-kamāliyyah كُئِلُّ الكَمَالِيَّةُ* (the 'all' of perfection), which marks the completion and perfection of the noun it is added to (Al-Mu'jam Al-ḡanni; Al-Mu'jam Al-Wasīt as cited in Al-Maany online Arabic Encyclopedia), in *الـحرجُ كلُّ الحرجِ al-ḥaraja kulla l-ḥaraj* (the embarrassment, all the embarrassment) and *العيبُ كلُّ العيبِ al-'ayba kulla l-'ayb* (the shame, all the shame), completed and perfected the embarrassment and shame Mubarak was talking about; the relative phrase *ما لم ولن أقبَلُهُ أبداً mā lam wa lan 'aqbaluhu 'abadan* which contained three qualifiers: the past-tense negative *lam 'aqbaluhu* (what I did not accept), the future negative *lan 'aqbaluhu* (what I will not accept), and the emphatic negative time adverb *'abadan* (never); the verbal phrase *تأتي من الخارج t'atī mina l-xārij* (coming from abroad) which immediately followed the adjectival phrase *إملاءاتٍ أجنبية imlā'ātīn 'ajnabiyah* (foreign dictations) and qualified its source; and the three consecutive negative repetitions *أياً كانت مصدرها 'ayyan kānat maṣdaruhā* (regardless of their source), *أياً كانت ذرائعها 'ayyan kānat zarā'i'uhā* (regardless of their pretexts), and *مبرراتها أو 'aw mubbarirātuhā* (or justifications).

Finally, the second part of this frame is internally polemical, and can be best understood in terms of the socio-political contexts of the speech; more specifically, the calls that had been made, before the speech, upon Mubarak to step down: The American president had stated that 'the transfer of power in Egypt should start now' because 'change is inevitable' and 'the current situation cannot continue' (EL Manawy 2012: 286-287); the French President

had renewed his wish to see ‘a specific and quick transfer of power in Egypt, with no delay’; and the Turkish president had ‘urged Mubarak to start a power transfer sooner not later’ (ibid: 287). Such adverse relations of power manifested themselves in the indefinite noun إملاءات *imlā’ātin* (dictations) which enabled Mubarak to remind the people that there were international pressures on him, without having to specify the content of those ‘dictations’, nor those who were dictating them.

The second internally polemical frame in this speech was the Our-Intrepid-Armed-Forces frame (M3.12:4), which operated at two levels and sent more than one message: On the surface level, Mubarak was informing the people that he had laid down a vision for exiting the crisis and was calling for their help, in order to turn it into a reality. On the deep level, the last phrase of the frame, i.e. وفق توافقٍ وطنيٍّ عريضٍ، ومتسعٍ القاعدة، تسهر على ضمان تنفيذه، قوائنا *wifqa tawāfuqin waṭaniyyin ‘arīd, wa mutasi ‘i l-qā ‘idah, tasharu ‘alā ḍamāni tanfīdihī quwātuna l-musallahātu l-bāsilah* (according to a broad national consensus, that has a wide base, and whose implementation is to be guaranteed by our intrepid armed forces), suggested that Mubarak was sending his Minister of Defense and commanders of the military, who were getting out of his control, the indirect messages that he had an important role for them to play in his new initiative, and that he would not take critical decisions without their agreement.

Moreover, this frame was also significant in terms of its weak language: Mubarak opened it with the weak verb طرحت *ṭaraḥtu* (I have laid down), and followed it with the noun الرؤية *ar-ru’yah* (the vision) which connoted that his plan to exit the crisis was no more than an imaginary, futuristic, mental image that was not necessarily concrete nor well developed. He then reinforced the abstractness of that vision and his inability to implement it, when he called upon the people to assist him in order to ننجح في تحويلها لواقع ملموس *nanjaḥa fī taḥwīlihā li-wāqi ‘in malmūs* (succeed in transforming it into a concrete reality).

Third, the last internally polemical frame in this speech was the I-have-Lived-for-this-Homeland frame (M3.28:33), with which Mubarak concluded the speech on a highly emotional tone. In terms of emotional language, Mubarak concluded the frame with two parallel sentences: the first was that Egypt ستنزلُ بلداً عزيزاً لا يفارقني أو أفارقه حتى يواريني وثرابه *sataḥalu baladan ‘azīzan la yufāriqunī wa lā ‘ufāriqih, ḥatta yuwārīnī turābahu wa tarāh* (It will remain a dear homeland that will never part with me, nor will I part with it,

until its soil and dust bury me), which triggered the implication that Mubarak had decided not to leave Egypt, as ben Ali did in Tunisia, and that he was determined to stay there until he dies and is buried in its land. The second sentence was conjoined with the first, repeated its main verb, and stated that Egypt *الرأس، والراية، موفورَ ستظلُّ شعباً كريماً يبقى ابداً الدهر مرفوع العزة والكرامة* *sataḍlu ša 'ban karīman yabqā 'abada d-dahri marfū 'a r-r'as wa r-rāyah, mawfūra l-'izzati wa l-karāmah* (and it will remain hospitable people whose heads and banners will forever be high, in abundant dignity and honour). This second sentence was internally polemical, with a hidden dialogicality that operated at two levels.

At the surface level, Mubarak was praising the Egyptian people as hospitable, honourable, and dignified. On the deep level, he was indirectly appealing to their hospitality, sense of honour, and dignity, in order to forgive the old man in him, not necessarily the president, and to allow him to die and be buried in Egypt. The adjective *كريماً karīman* (hospitable) resonated with the traditional culture and religious heritage of the people, reminding them that as hospitable people, they should never refuse the request of an old man to be buried in his land, even if he were their enemy, let alone the man who had defended them and their country; it also harped on the Prophetic Saying 'He does not belong to us who does not show mercy to our young and honour our old' (Hadeethenc.com).

In a similar vein, the two nouns *العزة al-'izzati* (dignity) and *الكرامة al-karāmah* (honour) resonated with the famous Arabic saying *ارحموا عزيز قوم ذل irḥamū 'azīza qawmin ḍall* (have mercy on an honourable man who has lost his power) and stirred the pity of the people with the old man who was once the most powerful man in the country. Those emotionally, culturally, and religiously resonant words, therefore, sent indirect messages that evoked and activated the deeply-rooted cultural and religious images, memories, and emotions of the people, and prepared for his indirect request to be allowed to stay and die in Egypt.

5. *Nested Presuppositions (NestPs)*

The most salient syntactic structure employed by Mubarak in his three speeches is a new, complex type of presupposition that has not been described in the books of pragmatics.

That structure was first used by the ousted Tunisian president ben Ali who employed it extensively in his first two speeches, using a non-emotive language. Mubarak adopted the same complex structures of ben Ali, but loaded them with emotional propositional content that performs more indirect, sophisticated pragmatic functions.

This chapter introduces this new pragmatic concept which I termed *Nested Presuppositions (NestPs)*, traces its origins, and develops a relevance-theoretic account that explains its cognitive dynamics and manipulative mechanisms.

5.1. Pragmatic presupposition

Although the literature on presupposition almost exceeds that written on any other topic in Pragmatics, a great deal of it is 'obsolete and sterile' (Levinson 1983: 167), and has failed to reach a consensus on even a definition or a set of defining properties (Peccei 1999: 19). Aspects of disagreement include whether presupposition is a relation between sentences, statements or speakers and assumptions (Frege 1892; Strawson 1950; 1952); whether the locus of presupposition is speakers, sentences or both (Keenan 1971; Brown & Yule 1983; Levinson 1983; Yule 1996; Simons 2003; Richardson 2007; Stalnaker 2011); and whether presupposition refers to a specific homogenous phenomenon or a range of heterogeneous phenomena (Levinson 1983; Green 1989; Huang 2007). These competing views have yielded many conflicting definitions of presupposition, each tackling it from a different perspective.

One of the most comprehensive definitions of presupposition is that proposed by Stalnaker (1972: 387-8) in which he argues that to 'presuppose a proposition in the pragmatic sense is to take its truth for granted, and to presume that others involved in the context do the same.' He recast this definition, two years later, in the following Grice-like formula:

A proposition P is a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in a given context just in case the speaker assumes or believes that P, assumes or believes that his addressee assumes or believes that P, and assumes or believes that his addressee recognizes that he is making these assumptions, or has these beliefs (1974: 473).

The importance of the conditions of sincerity and cooperation, which Stalnaker foregrounded in the second definition, are also underscored by Verschueren (1999) who confirms that for an utterance to be meaningful and successful, its presupposed propositions must be shared as common knowledge by both the speaker and the hearer.

5.1.1. Types of presupposition

In spite of their disagreement on a definition of presupposition, researchers have agreed on identifying some prototypical examples that represent the different types of presupposition and their presuppositional triggers, the latter being the linguistic ‘inducers’ or ‘clues’ used to communicate the meaning implied in a presupposition.

Out of the thirty-one types of presuppositional triggers ‘isolated’ by Karttunen (1973; 1974), Levinson selected only thirteen and considered them ‘the core of the phenomena that are generally considered presuppositional’: definite descriptions, factive verbs, implicative verbs, change of state verbs, iterative verbs, verbs of judging, temporal clauses, cleft sentences, implicit clefts with stressed constituents, comparisons and contrasts, non-restrictive relative clauses, counterfactual conditionals, and questions (1983: 184).

There are less comprehensive classifications of presuppositional triggers: Short (1989) classified them into existential, linguistic and pragmatic; Yule (1996) categorized them into existential, factive, lexical, structural, non-factive and counter-factual and Maingueneau (1996) reduced them to two broad categories of presuppositions triggered by linguistic structures and presuppositions triggered by the relation between utterance and context.

5.2. *Nested Presuppositions*

5.2.1. Theoretical framework: Relevance Theory

Relevance Theory (RT) is a cognitive, psychological, inferential theory of communication that aims at interpreting utterances, as well as any other ‘ostensive stimulus’, in terms of cognitive processes (Wilson 1998; Sperber & Wilson 1985, 1995, 2002; Wilson & Sperber 2004). RT is constructed upon three key concepts: The Cognitive Principle of Relevance (CGPR), the Communicative Principle of Relevance (CMPR) and the presumption of Optimal Relevance (OR).

CGPR states that human cognition is ‘geared to the maximisation of relevance’ (Wilson & Sperber 2004: 249), and CMPR assumes that every ‘ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance’ (ibid: 254). CMPR is thus based on the CGPR and the Gricean concept of Inferential Communication (IC) which considers communication ‘a process of inferential intention attribution’ (ibid: 254). Wilson and Sperber added an extra layer of intention to IC and called it Ostensive Inferential Communication (OIC), contending that it involves ‘a. The informative intention: The intention to inform an audience of something, [and] b. The communicative intention: The intention to inform the audience of one’s informative intention’ (ibid: 255). While the fulfilment of the communicative intention is a prerequisite for understanding, the fulfilment of the informative intention depends on whether the audience trusts the communicator or not, a condition not necessary for mere recognition. Every act of OIC is based on the use of an Ostensive Stimulus (OS): a stimulus intentionally designed to attract the attention of the audience and focus it on the meaning intended by the communicator; consequently, it is more capable than any other stimulus of generating ‘precise and predictable’ anticipations of relevance (ibid: 255).

The third key concept in RT is the presumption of Optimal Relevance (OR) which regulates the effort-effect balance:

- [1] An ostensive stimulus is optimally relevant to an audience *iff*:
- a. It is relevant enough to be worth the audience’s processing effort;
 - b. It is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s abilities and preferences (ibid: 256).

Finally, RT suggests a comprehension procedure for testing and constructing hypotheses about the meaning intended by the speaker, based on CGPR and OR. The inferential comprehension procedure, which applies at both the explicit and implicit levels, i.e. for the identification of explicated content and explicatures, and the recovery of implicatures, directs the hearer to:

- [2] a. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.
- b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (ibid: 259).

5.2.2. Definition of *NestPs*

NestPs are cognitively taxing information structures which nest several layers of participant-new-information contents (NI) that are ideological, unshared by the hearer and not satisfied by the objective context; take their truth value for granted; build upon them and package them in linguistic structures that are typically associated with participant-old information (OI), in order to deliberately manipulate the hearer.

In other words, *NestPs* are difficult-to-process information structures that are strategically devised to carry, flash then hide several propositions that are neither substantiated nor shared by the hearer. Nevertheless, the speaker presents those NI contents as true, OI common knowledge and tactically casts them in linguistic structures associated with shared OI, in order to implicitly sell them to the hearer in a manipulative linguistic transaction. Moreover, *NestPs* are manipulative not only because they disguise NI in the form of OI by carrying the former in structures typically associated with the latter, but also because *NestPs* attack the cognitive system of the hearer with multiple such structures at the same time, which results in cramming the short-term and working memories of the hearers, dissipating their processing capacities and preventing them from evaluating the presupposed propositions properly, as will be explained in detail in the following section.

5.2.3. Information structures (IS) & packaging in *NestPs*

The structuring of information in *NestPs* can be best illustrated through an authentic example. Following is an extract from the first speech delivered by the ousted President of Tunisia Zine El Abidine ben Ali, on 27th December 2010, in response to the Arab Spring Jasmine Revolt in Tunisia:

Ex. (1):

وإذ حققنا نتائج مرموقة في مجال التعليم كمياً ونوعياً هي محل تقدير وتثمين من قبل الهيئات الدولية والأممية المختصة فإن ذلك يجسم خياراً جوهرياً ثابتاً في سياستنا من أجل بناء شعبٍ مثقف.

wa'it haqqaqnā natā'ija marmūqatan fī majāli t-ta'lim kammiyyan wa naw'iyyan hiyya maḥalu taqdīrin wa taṭmīn min qibal al-hai'āt ad-duwaliyyah wa l-'umamiyyah al-muxtaṣah, fa-'inna dālika yuḡassimu xiyāran ḡawhariyyan tābitan fī siyyasatinā min aḡli binā'i ša'bin mutaqqaf

While we have achieved outstanding results in the field of education, qualitatively and quantitatively, which received appreciation and recognition from specialized international and UN-affiliated bodies, this indeed signifies a constant, fundamental choice in our policy of building an educated nation.

In terms of message segmentation, the nuclear constituent of *NestPs* is the Core (C), which corresponds in Example (1) to the proposition ‘we have achieved outstanding results’. The Core is the most dubious and problematic proposition in *NestPs*, because it does not have a truth value, nor does it constitute a common ground. That is the reason why the speaker buries the Core as deeply as they can at the bottom of *NestPs*, as visually illustrated in Figures (5.1) and (5.2) below. All the following propositions, in *NestPs*, can be thought of as Layers (L#) accumulated to cover the dubious Core, by pushing it as far as possible from the active processing of the Focus of Attention (FOA). Layers also act as post-modifiers that take the truth value of the Core for granted and build upon it. In Example (1), those are L1, L2, L3, L4 and L5. The highest layer of *NestPs* is called the Top Surface Layer (TSL). Since it is the last proposition the hearer receives and consequently the most active one in the FOA, TSL needs to have unproblematic content. In Example (1), TSL corresponds to ‘building an educated nation’.




Figure (5.1): Message segmentation in *NestPs*

In terms of packaging, the two main strategies of *NestPs* for assigning degrees of prominence and (or) subordination to constituent presuppositions is foregrounding and (or) backgrounding, respectively. The core, being the most dubious proposition, is assigned the least possible degree of prominence by being buried inside multiple embedded presuppositions and consequently backgrounded and relegated to the back of attention and processing. On the other hand, the TSL which constitutes an unproblematic part of the common knowledge of the speaker and the hearer is foregrounded and fronted to attention, processing, and evaluation. As Figure (5.2) below illustrates, gradation in colour and font refers to the different Layers of presuppositions nested deliberately to background the Core and foreground the TSL.




Figure (5.2): Example of the information structures of NestPs

5.2.4. Illustrative example of *NestPs*

Following is a longer and more illustrative example of *NestPs*, extracted from the same speech of ousted President ben Ali:

Example (2):

ولئن كان منطلق هذه الأحداث حالة اجتماعية نتفهم ظروفها وعواملها النفسية كما نأسف لما خلفته تلك الأحداث من أضرار وأن ما اتخذته من أبعاد مبالغ فيها بسبب الاستغلال السياسي لبعض الأطراف الذين لا يريدون الخير لبلادهم ويلجؤون الى بعض التلفرات الأجنبية التي تبث الأكاذيب والمغالطات دون تحر بل باعتماد التهويل والتحريض والتجني الإعلامي العدائي لتونس يدعونا الى توضيح بعض المسائل وتأكيد حقائق لا ينبغي التغافل عنها.

wa la'in kāna muntalaqu hādīhi l-'hdāt hālatan 'ijtimā'iyah na-tafahamu zurūfahā wa 'awāmilahā an-nafsiyyah, ka-mā n'safu li-mā xallafathu tilka l-'ahdātu min 'adrārin wa 'anna mā itaxadathu min 'ab'ādin mubālagin fihā bi-sababi l-istiḡlālī l-siyyāsī li-ba'di l-'atrāfi laḏīna lā yurīdūna l-xaira li-bilādihim wa yalja'ūna ilā ba'di l-talfazāt al-ajnabiyyah allatī tabūtu l-'akāzīb wa l-muxalaṭāt dūna taḥarin bal b-i'timādī l-tahwīl wa t-tahrīḏ wa t-tajannī al-i'lāmī l-'adā'ī li-tunus yad'unā ilā tawḏīhi ba'di l-masā'il wa t'kīdī ḥaqā'iqā lā yanbaḡi t-tagāfulā 'anhā

While the trigger of these events was one social case, whose circumstances and psychological factors we understand, we feel sorry for the damages that resulted from those events and took exaggerated dimensions, due to the political exploitation of some parties who do not want the good for their homeland, and resort to some foreign television channels that are hostile to Tunisia and broadcast lies and fallacies without scrutiny, adopting exaggeration, incitation and media defamation, all these call upon us to clarify some issues and confirm some facts that should not be overlooked.

	Utterance	Presuppositional trigger	Presupposition	Type of presupposition
1	• هذه الأحداث <i>hādīhi l-'hdāt</i> These events	• Definite NP (Demonstrative + N)	>> There exist events;	• Specific Existential
2	• ولئن كان منطلق <i>wa la'in kāna muntalaqu</i> While the trigger	• Conditional Clause	>> There exists a trigger of these events;	• Specific Existential
3	• نتفهم ظروفها وعواملها النفسية <i>na-tafahamu zurūfahā wa 'awāmilahā an-nafsiyyah</i>	• Factive epistemic verb • <i>hā'u l-gaibah</i>	>> That trigger has circumstances and psychological factors; >> We understand the afore-mentioned circumstances and factors;	• Specific Existential • Factive Epistemic

	whose circumstances and psychological factors we understand			
4	<p>• نأسف لما خلفته تلك الأحداث من أضرار <i>n'safu li-mā xallaḥathu tilka l-'aḥdātu min 'aḍrārīn</i></p> <p>we feel sorry about the damages that resulted</p>	• Factive emotive verb	>> The above-mentioned events resulted in damages >> We feel sorry for those damages	• Factive emotive
5	<p>• ما اتخذته من أبعاد مبالغ فيها <i>mā itaxaḍathu min 'ab 'ādin mubālaḡin fihā</i></p> <p>The exaggerated dimensions it took</p>	• Change-of-state verb	>> those damages were exaggerated	• Other
6	<p>• بسبب الاستغلال السياسي <i>bi-sababi l-istiḡlālī l-siyyāsī</i></p> <p>due to the political exploitation</p>	• Definite NP (definite article + NP)	>> There exists a political exploitation which caused the aforementioned exaggeration	• Specific Existential
7	<p>• لبعض الأطراف <i>li-ba 'aḍī l-'aṭrāfi</i></p> <p>by some parties</p>	• Prep + Determiner + NP	>> There exist some parties who exploited that situation politically	• Non-Specific Existential
8	<p>• الذين لا يريدون الخير لبلادهم</p>	• Relative clause	>> Those parties do not want the public good of their country	• Other

	<p><i>laḍīna lā yurīdūna l-xaira li-bilādihim</i></p> <p>who do not want the good for their homeland</p>			
9	<p>بعض التلفزيونات الأجنبية <i>ba 'ḍi l-talfazāt al-ajnabiyya</i></p> <p>some foreign television channels</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Determiner + NP 	>> There exist foreign TV channels to which the above-mentioned parties resort	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-Specific Existential
10	<p>التي تبث الأكاذيب والمغالطات <i>allatī tabuṭu l-'akāzīb wa l-muxalaṭāt</i></p> <p>which broadcast lies and fallacies</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relative clause 	>> There are lies and fallacies broadcast by those channels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Other
11	<p>يدعونا الى توضيح بعض المسائل وتأكيد حقائق لا ينبغي التغافل عنها <i>yad 'unā ilā tawḍīhi ba 'ḍi l-masā'il wa t'kīdi ḥaqā'iqā lā yanbaḡi t-tagāfula 'anhā</i></p> <p>Call upon us to clarify some issues and confirm some facts that should not be overlooked</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Factive Epistemic verbs • Definite NPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> >> There exist issues >> There exist facts >> Some of those issues and facts are neither clear not confirmed >> Those issues and facts are overlooked 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific Existential

Table (5.1): Detailed analysis of the constituent presuppositions of *NestPs* in Example (2)

The Core of this twelve-Layer *NestPs* is the Specific Existential presupposition triggered by the definite NP (Demonstrative + N) which assumes that '>> there exist events'. Here, the ousted President of Tunisia is employing presupposition ideologically and manipulatively, not only to present his view as a taken-for-granted common ground, but also to build upon it: He is reducing the Revolution of the Tunisian people to mere 'events', attributing those 'events' to a single 'one social case' which he considered unworthy of explication, and employing the thickest type of implicature, i.e. Particularized Implicature, to implicate that it is 'one social case' and gloss over it in a vague manner.

That 'one social case' which ben Ali implicated was the 26-year-old Tunisian man Tarek al-Tayeb Muhammad Bouazizi, who was supporting his family by selling fruit and vegetables, until a policewoman confiscated his cart, slapped him, and beat him up when he objected. Bouazizi went to the police station and the municipal council to file complaints against the policewoman, but no official agreed to meet with him; he doused himself in paint thinner and set himself on fire in front of the local municipal council of his town, Sidi Bouzeid (Rifai 2011; de Rosa 2011; al-Karama Forum 2011). His death triggered the Tunisian revolution which ousted ben Ali twenty-eight days later and started the domino effect of the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Algeria, and Sudan.

In the following Layer of *NestPs*, ben Ali uses the conditional Clause (While + NP) to trigger the specific existential presupposition '>> There exist a trigger of those events', in order to perform the pragmatic function of mitigation. He then uses *hā'u l-ġaibah* in order to trigger the Specific Existential presupposition '>> There exist circumstances and psychological factors that lead to that' and follows it with a Factive Epistemic verb to trigger the presupposition that '>> We understand those factors'. He also uses the Factive Emotive verb 'feel sorry' to trigger the presupposition that '>> The events resulted in damages'. The last three presuppositions acted as an indirect acknowledgement of the problem and performed the reconciliatory function of sending a message to the revolutionaries that ben Ali was following the situation closely, and that he was sad for what was going on. He then employs the Change-of-State verb 'were exaggerated' to trigger the presupposition that '>> Those damages are exaggerated', and the Definite NP (Definite Article + NP) to trigger the Specific Existential presupposition that '>> There exists a political exploitation which caused that exaggeration'.

Ben Ali, then, identifies the exploiters who committed the act of exaggeration through the prepositional phrase (Prep + Determiner + NP) structure which triggered the Non-Specific Existential presupposition that '>> There exist some parties who exploited the situation politically' and the non-restrictive Relative Clause structure which triggered the presupposition that '>> Those parties do not want the public good of their country'. Ben Ali, then, uses a (Determiner + NP) structure to trigger the Non-Specific Existential presupposition that '>> There exist foreign TV channels' to which the aforementioned exploiting parties resort. He describes what those channels broadcast by using a non-restrictive Relative Clause structure to trigger the presupposition that '>> there exist lies and fallacies broadcast by those channels'. All the previous seven presuppositions perform the functions of attacking, defaming, and demonizing the protesters.

Finally, in the TSL, ben Ali employs Definite NP, Relative Clause and Factive Epistemic verb structures to trigger the Specific Existential presuppositions that '>> There exist issues and facts that are overlooked, not confirmed, and not clarified'.

NestPs were, therefore, employed ideologically and strategically to disguise unsubstantiated, unshared propositions and present them as true, common-ground, presupposed facts: *NestPs* mitigated the political situation in Tunisia, by reducing the revolution to mere 'events', triggered by a single 'one social case'; *NestPs* covered the highly sensitive and mobilizing story of the self-immolation of Bouazizi, by dehumanizing him, reducing him to a 'case', and undermining his credibility by depicting him as a mentally ill man; and *NestPs* considered all the protesters as traitors conspiring with foreign media against their own country, and legitimized the interference of ben Ali as the source of clarification.

Ben Ali smuggled all the above-mentioned presupposed propositions as taken-for-granted premises and built upon them to legitimize himself and the measures he had taken. *NestPs*, in this short utterance, have therefore performed the multiple manipulative functions of mitigation, Other-dehumanisation, Other-demonization, and Self-legitimation.

5.3. *NESTPS* as a manipulative form of informative presupposition

Based on the premise that the presuppositions assuming specific propositions which implicitly transmit value-judgemental conceptions about how the world is and how it should be are to be considered ideological (Sbisà 1999: 492), *NestPs* are ideological. The fact that not all

ideological propositions are manipulative leaves *NestPs* at the crossroads of two potential paths: being classified as informative or as manipulative. This fundamental issue can be settled in light of the pragmatic definitions of informative presupposition, the Gricean Maxims and Conditions of Quantity, Quality, Manner and Sincerity, and the principles of Relevance Theory.

5.3.1. Pragmatic definitions of informative presupposition

Pragmatically speaking, Brown and Yule (1983) stipulate that presuppositions can communicate new unshared information if that information is neither 'controversial' nor 'asserted'. In a similar vein, Stalnaker states that the definition of presupposition, in terms of common-ground, is valid in 'normal, straightforward serious conversational contexts where the overriding purpose of the conversation is to exchange information' (1974: 474). None of these three conditions is satisfied in *NestPs*: which communicate highly controversial information, in contexts that are far from being straightforward, for purposes that have nothing to do with exchanging information.

NestPs also violate two important conditions specified by Stalnaker as defining characteristics of informative presupposition: the speaker should not 'have any particular mental attitude towards the proposition' nor should they 'assume anything about the mental attitudes of others in the context' (1972: 387). The fact that the speaker employs *NestPs* in order to manipulate the cognitive processing system of the hearer entails necessarily that the speaker does have not only a mental attitude towards his presupposed propositions, but also a deliberate intent to manipulate the mental attitudes of the hearer.

5.3.2. Gricean maxims

In terms of Gricean pragmatics, *NestPs* violate more than one maxim at the same time. They first violate the Gricean Maxim of Quantity, by nesting many layers of presuppositions and consequently providing more information than required. *NestPs* also violate the Maxim of Quality, by presupposing unsubstantiated propositions and taking their truth for granted. Moreover, *NestPs* violate the Maxim of Manner, by being neither clear, nor brief, nor orderly. Finally, *NestPs* violate the Sincerity Condition, as the speaker knows that the content of the propositions he is assuming is unsubstantiated and unshared by the hearer; nevertheless, the former strategically presupposes the propositions, as true and shared common knowledge, in order to manipulate the latter.

The fact that *NestPs* violate the pragmatic definitions of informativeness and the Gricean maxims of communication eliminates the possibility of their being informative and renders them manipulative. The sense of manipulation meant here is that defined by Rigotti as:

A message is manipulative if it twists the vision of the world (physical as well as social - or human - actual as well as virtual) in the mind of the addressee, so that he/she is prevented from a healthy attitude towards decision (i.e., an attitude responding to his/her very interest), and pursues the manipulator's goal in the illusion of pursuing her/his own goal (2005: 68).

This definition is in line with the argument advanced by van Dijk that the discourse employed to reproduce power, exercised discursively in the interest of the powerful and against that of the powerless, is an ideological and manipulative discourse (2006: 360).

In *NestPs*, the speaker commits the hearers to his views, provides them with unsubstantiated information with which they are unlikely to agree in normal circumstances and manipulates their cognitive systems in order to achieve the strategic goal of maintaining unequal relations of power. *NestPs* are thus inherently ideological and manipulative.

5.4. Manipulative information structures and cognitive mechanisms of *NestPs*

Manipulation in *NestPs* can be problematized and accounted for relevance-theoretically in terms of information structures and cognitive mechanisms.

5.4.1. Information structures

5.4.1.1. Ostensive Stimulus (OS)

An OS 'conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance', i.e. it is engineered to behave as the strongest stimulus most capable of attracting the attention of a targeted audience and focusing it on the specific meaning intended by the speaker (Wilson & Sperber 2004: 254). In *NestPs*, the TSL functions as the OS which the speaker baits in order to trigger anticipations of optimal relevance in the cognitive systems of his audience, enticing them to assume that the TSL is the strongest and most relevant stimulus, and consequently the most rewarding one to process.

The first manipulative aspect of *NestPs* thus lies in the fact that their TSL does not qualify for the position it occupies as the OS worthy of foregrounding and processing. This is

because the TSL is not optimally relevant: it is not the most relevant stimulus 'compatible with communicator's abilities and preferences' (ibid: 256) and it is not the stimulus most capable of generating 'precise and predictable' anticipations of relevance; consequently, it is not the strongest stimulus most worthy of processing. TSL is in fact a weak stimulus whose positive cognitive effects do not compensate for the effort required for processing it; thus, it should not have been foregrounded in the position it occupies.

5.4.1.2. Cognitive Principle of Relevance (CGPR)

NestPs are also manipulative because they exploit the universal tendency towards the maximisation of relevance, as informed by the CGPR, i.e. the human tendency to select the most optimally relevant stimulus in the environment and process it (ibid: 249). This manipulative exploitation is also performed by designing the TSL to act as the salient OS, and foregrounding it in the way that most attracts the attention of the targeted audience and best prompts the retrieval of specific contextual assumptions that warrant yielding the exact conclusion intended by the speaker. *NestPs* thus do not only anticipate the cognitive behaviour of the targeted audience, but also frame, channel and direct it strategically in order to achieve specific manipulative goals.

5.4.1.3. Optimal Relevance (OR)

NestPs are also manipulative because they violate the concept of OR, not only by their TSL, as explained above, but also by their other sub-structures. According to OR, it is in the best interest of the speaker, if they would like to communicate successfully with an audience, to formulate their message in the easiest and most cognitively accessible, economic and consequently rewarding manner to that audience. The speaker is also obliged to substantiate any claims they make with the evidence necessary to achieve the intended cognitive effects in the audience.

NestPs do not fulfil any of these conditions. The producer of *NestPs* tactically segments, arranges, and packages the message in a convoluted and hard-to-process manner that backgrounds and buries the strongest proposition most worthy of processing, i.e. the Core, and foregrounds and assigns the highest degree of prominence to the weakest and least relevant stimulus, i.e. the TSL. This manipulative ordering enables the producer of *NestPs* to create a groundless, deceptive air of agreement with their audience, by hiding the most controversial proposition, flashing the shared one, and embedding, nesting, and disguising

multiple, unsubstantiated presuppositions in between, without establishing the truth values of any of them.

5.4.2. Cognitive (Mis)Behaviour of *NestPs*

5.4.2.1. *Structure-content cognitive conflict (SCCC)*

Since pragmatic presuppositions are participant-old information shared by the interlocutors, they behave cognitively as backgrounded information that is not currently under active processing and do not go through the filters of relevance or the checks of further discussion (Simons 2004; von Stechow 2008; de Saussure 2012).

NestPs, on the other hand, consist mainly of participant-new active information (NI) that is twisted to act as presuppositions by being carried in structures associated with old-information (OI). This forced imposition of NI content in OI structures is likely to cause logical and cognitive conflict in the minds of the hearers. This conflict, which can be termed *Structure-Content Cognitive Conflict (SCCC)*, results from the situation when the old-information structures of *NestPs* are readily classified as relevant and prepared to be admitted into the long-term memory, while their new-information contents are still being processed, i.e. classified as new, disambiguated, explicated, inferentially resolved, checked for reconciliation against their old-information structures, etc., and ultimately classified as irrelevant. Figure (5.3) below attempts to depict this *SCCC* visually.

Resolving this *SCCC* is cognitively taxing, in terms of the processing efforts it consumes at the expense of the overall processing capacity. *SCCC* thus causes a deficiency in the cognitive processing capacity of the hearer, which in turn incapacitates their cognitive checks, filters and controls allowing the unsubstantiated propositions and implausible arguments carried by *NestPs* to bypass those checks and filters and be admitted into the long-term memory.




Figure (5.3): *Structure-Content Cognitive Conflict in NestPs*

5.4.2.2. Minimum effort path (MEP)

According to clause (b) of the definition of OR in [1], the speaker is expected to formulate their message in the easiest way their audience can understand. On the other end of the OIC situation, the hearer is entitled to follow a path of minimum effort and to stop processing upon reaching the first plausible interpretation that satisfies their expectations of relevance, as suggested by clauses (a) and (b) of the comprehension procedure in [2] (Wilson & Sperber 2004: 256-259). Moreover, given the inverse relationship between relevance and effort in RT, the first and most easily constructed interpretation is most likely to enjoy the status of optimal relevance, because the speaker is expected to have cooperated and formulated his utterance in such an easy way that the first interpretation to strike the cognitive effort-effect balance, in the hearer, is to be deemed the one intended by the supposedly cooperative speaker.

In violation of clause (b) of the definition of OR in [1], the producer of *NestPs* tactically formulates their message in a complex and difficult-to-process manner: embedding many presuppositions in a large, deep nest; disguising and wrapping NI in the structures of OI; reversing the order of accessibility by backgrounding the strong stimulus, foregrounding the weak ones, and forcing the latter to function as an OS; and taking the truth value of many unsubstantiated propositions for granted and building upon them. On the other hand, the hearer of *NestPs* innocently follows the *minimum effort path* (MEP), by testing interpretive hypotheses in their order of accessibility and stopping when his expectations of relevance are satisfied, driven by good faith in the expectation that the speaker had observed clause (b) of OR and formulated his message in the easiest and most accessible way.

As a result of these cooperatively and sincerely incompatible approaches adopted by the producer and the consumer of *NestPs*, the comprehension procedure in *NestPs* does not proceed as smoothly as informed and anticipated by RT. MEP fails to lead the hearer to construct relevant, anticipatory interpretive hypotheses that satisfy the expectations of relevance raised by the utterance itself, which imposes an extra processing load on the already strained cognitive processing system, that has been making hard attempts to solve the *SCCC*, and consequently dissipating more processing efforts and resources of the overall processing capacity of the hearer. This MEP failure, exacerbated by the waste of processing capacity caused by the *SCCC*, renders the cognitive system of the hearer vulnerable to what I call the process of *Cognitive Underpassing*.

5.4.2.3. *Cognitive Underpassing (CU)*

Cognitive Underpassing (CU) can be thought of as the total sum result of many factors that have joined forces to hamper the proper cognitive processing of the hearer: foregrounding the weak and non-optimally relevant TSL and backgrounding the strong and optimally relevant C; creating a cognitive conflict by casting NI propositional content in OI structures; harnessing many layers of finer nested presuppositions the testing and construction of whose interpretative hypotheses require complex, cognitively taxing processing; taking the truth value of those nested presuppositions for granted and building upon them without substantiation; attacking the cognitive system of the hearer with a large number of those presuppositions; manipulating the OR effort-effect formula by reversing the order of accessibility to the nested propositions; failing to establish relevance through the MEP; and

wasting many processing efforts in resolving the *SCCC*. All these factors combined together can result in a processing overload which strains the cognitive processing capacity of the hearer, renders it incapable of performing any further proper processing, and allows unsubstantiated claims and propositions to bypass Relevance Checking Controls and filters and to be accepted as relevant.

In other words, this *Cognitive Underpassing* process takes place when the processing capacity of the hearer fails to handle the cognitive processing load caused by (1) the information structures, (2) the fallacious contents, and (3) the cognitive behaviour of *NestPs*, as visually illustrated in Figure (5.4) below. As a result, the Short-Term Memory and the Working Memory get gradually crammed and overstrained, until no processing capacity is left to check or verify incoming presuppositions. It is at that point that the Layers of *NestPs* take advantage of their structure, as already-relevant, low-cost, effect-producing, old-information, in order to bypass the truth/falsity and relevance-checking controls of the hearer and get admitted into their Long-Term Memory, as presupposed, checked, relevant propositions, with substantiated truth value.




Figure 5.4: Cognitive Underpassing in *NestPs*

5.5. Emotive *NestPs* of Mubarak

Mubarak complicated the *NestPs* of ben Ali by emotionalizing them and assigning them extra indirect functions, in addition to the original ones assigned to them by ben Ali, i.e. passing unsubstantiated propositional content as agreed upon facts. Mubarak thus sophisticated the cognitive processing of *NestPs* and increased their manipulative potential.

For example, the following emotive *NestPs* performed three pragmatic functions: it presupposed negative, unsubstantiated premises and took their truth value for granted; it indirectly criticised the people for the presupposed premises; and it packaged the presupposition and the criticism in the wording of encouraging propositions whose aim seemed to be enthusing optimism and motivating the people.

(M3.24)

إنني أعلم علم اليقين، أن مصرَ سوفَ تتجاوزُ أزمَمَها. لن تنكسرَ إرادةُ شعبِها، ستقفُ على أقدامِها من جديدٍ، بصدقٍ وإخلاصٍ
أبنائها، كلُّ أبنائها، وستردُّ كيدَ الكائدين، وشماتةَ الشامتين.

*'innanī a lamu 'ilma l-yaqīn 'anna mişra sawfa tatajawazu 'azmatahā. lan tankasira irādatu
ş'a bīhā. sa-taqifu 'alā 'aqdāmihā min jadīd, bi-şidqin wa 'ixlāsi 'abnā 'ihā, kullu 'abnā 'ihā,
wa satarudu kaida l-kā 'idīn wa şamātata ş-şāmītīn.*

I do know for certain that Egypt is going to survive its crisis; the will of its people will not be broken; it will stand to its feet again, by the faithfulness and sincerity of its sons, all its sons, and it will defeat the machination of those machinating against it and the plotting of those plotting against it.

This *NestPs* thus carried five presuppositions: Egypt was in a crisis; the will of the Egyptian people was already broken or was about to be broken; Egypt was no longer standing to its feet; at least, some of the Egyptian people were not sincere or honest; and there were people plotting against Egypt and rejoicing at its misfortune.

In a similar vein, the following *NestPs* which looks like an encouraging utterance, carried eight emotionally loaded nationalistic presuppositions: Egyptians were not acting in a civilized manner; Egyptians became followers to other countries; Egyptians were taking orders from other countries; Egypt-related decisions were made for the Egyptians abroad; Egyptians were not assimilating the Egyptian spirit; Egyptians lacked unity and coherence; and Egyptians were not assimilating the unique and eternal pride, honour, dignity, and identity of Egypt which had characterized it for thousands of years.

(M3.25; 26)

سنثبتُ نحنُ المصريين، قدرتنا على تحقيق مطالب الشعب، بالحوار المتحضر والواعي، سنثبتُ أننا لسنا أتباعاً لأحد، ولا
نأخذُ تعليماتٍ من أحد، وأن أحداً لا يصنع لنا قراراتنا، سوى نبض الشارع، ومطالب أبناء الوطن. سنثبتُ ذلك، بروح
وعزم المصريين، وبوحدة وتماسك هذا الشعب، وبتمسكنا بعزة مصر، وكرامتها، وهويتها الفريدة والخالدة، فهي أساس
وجودنا وجوهرة، لأكثر من سبعة آلاف عام.

*sa-nuṭbitu naḥnu l-miṣriyyīn, qudratanā 'alā taḥqīqi maṭālibi ş-şā'b bi-l-ḥiwāri l-
mutaḥaḍiri wa l-wā'ī, sa-nuṭbitu annanā lasnā 'atbā'an li-'aḥad, wa lā n'axuḍu ta'līmātīn
min 'aḥad, wa 'anna 'aḥdan lā yaşna'u lanā qrārātunā, siwā nabḍu ş-şā'ri', wa maṭālibu
'abnā'i l-waṭan. sanuṭbitu ḍālika, birūḥi wa 'azmi l-miṣriyyīn, wa bi-wiḥdati wa tamāsuki
hāḍa ş-şā'b, wa bi-tamasukinā bi-'izzati mişr, wa karāmatihā, wa huwiyatihā l-farīdatu wa
l-xālidah, fa-hiya 'asāsu wjūdīnā wa jawharuh li-aktari min sab'ati 'ālāf 'ām.*

We, Egyptians, will demonstrate our ability to realize the demands of the people, through civilized, rational dialogue; we will prove that we are not followers of anyone, that we do not take orders from anyone, and that no one can make our decisions for us, other than the pulse of the street and the demands of the sons of the homeland. We will prove that, with the spirit and resolve of Egyptians, with the unity and solidarity of these people, and with our adherence to the dignity of Egypt, its honor, and its unique, eternal identity, which is the foundation and essence of our existence for more than seven thousand years.

6. Intertextual Analysis of the speeches of Mubarak

6.1. Linguistic Intertextuality

6.1.1. Deixis:

Mubarak responded to the rising power of the protesters, as chronicled in the previous chapters, by relinquishing his own power strategically; such a response was reflected in the deictic and anaphoric pronouns he employed, the pragmatic functions he assigned them, and the number of times he repeated them.

First, when Mubarak was still powerful, i.e. in his first speech, he employed the first-person singular pronoun *I*, in thirty-one instances, to perform three functions: representing himself positively, marking his power, and issuing indirect threats. When he became less powerful, i.e. by the time he delivered the second speech, Mubarak dropped the threatening function completely, decreased the number of the instances that marked his power, assigned *I* the two new functions of stirring the pity of the people and instructing his cabinet to serve the protesters, and retained the function of representing himself positively.

In the third speech, Mubarak was forced by the looming success of the revolution to almost double the frequency of *I* from thirty-nine in the second speech to seventy-seven in the third, to retain the function of positive-self representation and abandon all the other functions he had assigned the pronoun in the previous two speeches, and to assign the pronoun five new functions that contradicted its previous ones: gearing his executive powers to accede to the demands of the protesters, in sixteen instances; flattering the protesters, in seven instances; entreating the people indirectly, in six instances; assuming the emotionally, morally, and religiously loaded role of the old father of the protesters, in five instances; and relinquishing his power by excluding himself altogether from the struggle over power and denying to have any role to play in it, in one instance.

Mubarak therefore manipulated the frequency of the deictic pronoun *I* and the functions he assigned it according to the level of power he had at the time of delivering each speech: He used the pronoun to mark his power and threaten the people when he was powerful, then twisted, reversed, and dropped those functions when he lost power. The only one function Mubarak allowed *I* to retain throughout the three speeches was positive-self representation, a deictic tactic upon which he drew heavily in order to legitimize himself.

Second, Mubarak made the anaphoric third-person singular pronoun *HE* referentially synonymous with the deictic first-person singular pronoun *I* by employing the former to refer to himself twice in the first speech, thrice in the second, and thrice in the third. In the first speech, Mubarak referred to himself in the third-person in order to claim the moral authority of the leader chosen by Fate to rule Egypt and the Egyptians. In the second speech, he reversed that function by assigning *HE* the three new functions of relinquishing his power, assuming the role of the civil servant, and saving the face of Mubarak-the-President when Mubarak-the-man appealed to the pity of the people and requested to be treated like any ordinary Egyptian man who wanted no more than being allowed to die on the soil of his country. In the third speech, Mubarak employed *HE* to assume the role of the old father who was pained by the ill-treatment of his ingrate sons and daughters, a role that is not only emotionally loaded, but also religiously charged, as it dictates the immediate obedience (surrender) of the sons and daughters (protesters).

Mubarak thus manipulated the semantic content, anaphoric reference, and pragmatic functions of the third-person singular pronoun *HE* in order to assume moral authority, relinquish it, then appeal to the pity and religion of the people, according to the level of power he had at the time of delivering each speech.

Third, Mubarak employed the ‘most problematic pronoun’, i.e. *WE*, in a revealing manner. In terms of the grand *First Class WE*, which encoded him exclusively, Mubarak employed it in the first speech to mark his executive and legal powers as the President. In the second speech, he mitigated that powerful function to be anchoring his moral and spiritual authorities. In the third speech, he further softened its function to be representing himself as the old father whose only one reason for staying in power was to protect his family (country). Mubarak, therefore, manipulated the grand *First Class WE* to suit the persona he was impersonating: the powerful President, the spiritual leader, then the protective, old, dying father.

The *Second Class WE*, which encoded Mubarak and his cabinet and combined them in the same deictic field, to the exclusion of the people, was employed in four instances in the first speech, in order to establish a bond among Mubarak, his government, and his police apparatus and represent them as a harmonious body that had been working hard in the best interest of the people. Mubarak was then forced by the continuous collapse of his power, at the time of delivering the second and third speeches, to abandon the *Second Class WE* completely, in both

speeches, in an attempt to not only sever any relation that might connect him with his cabinet and police, but also to accuse them of killing the protesters and causing the security disarray.

The *Third Class WE*, which is supposed to be the most bonding class of *WE*, as it assimilates the speaker into the addressee, was employed by Mubarak in the first speech to perform the two principal functions of polarizing the people into good-us and bad-them and assimilating Mubarak into the good-us pole. With the rise of the power of the protesters and the failure of the first speech to divide them, Mubarak assigned the *Third Class WE* four new functions in the second speech: endearing himself to the protesters, relinquishing his presidential power, saving his presidential face, and holding the people co-responsible for exiting the crisis. In the third speech, Mubarak increased the frequency of the *Third Class WE* to forty-one instances, compared to eight in the second speech, in an attempt to establish a bond with the increasingly powerful protesters and people.

Mubarak thus manipulated the *Third Class WE* according to the level of power he had: he employed it to polarize the people, then decreased the frequency of its polarizing instances; used it to establish a bond with the people, by increasing the frequency of its bonding instances, then assigned it completely new functions and widened the scope of its semantic content to include not only the people but also his political opponents.

Mubarak employed the *Fourth Class WE*, which semantically assimilates the speaker into the addressee and pragmatically encodes the latter only, in six instances in his first speech, in order to accuse the protesters and all the Egyptian people indirectly. In the second and third speeches, Mubarak was forced by the changing relations of power to abandon the *Fourth Class WE* completely, because he was in no position to accuse the people or the protesters, even indirectly.

Finally, the second-person singular pronoun *YOU* was used by Mubarak only twice in his first speech, in order to mark his legal power. In the second speech, he assigned the pronoun the third function of infusing fear in the people, in order to justify the two other functions of marking his legal and spiritual powers. In the third speech, the success of the revolution forced Mubarak to not only increase the frequency of *YOU* to sixteen instances, compared to two in the first and second speeches, but also to change both the referent and function of the pronoun. All the sixteen instances of *YOU*, in the third speech, encoded the protesters, not the supporters

of Mubarak as was the case in the previous two speeches. *YOU* was also assigned, in the third speech, the brand new single function of flattering the protesters excessively, with no marking of any sort of power. That diametric reversal in the reference, frequency, and function of *YOU* reflected a parallel diametric reversal in the relations of power: Mubarak was forced in this speech to acknowledge the spatial-temporal existence of the protesters as an important player worthy of acknowledgement, repeated direct address, and excessive praise. The following Table (6.1) summarizes and compares the occurrences of these pronouns

In terms of the systems of address Mubarak employed, he addressed the people with a vocative that appealed to his legal power, anchored his authority, and established his superiority, i.e. 'Brother citizens', in the first speech. He then mitigated the sharpness of that appeal by preceding it with the particle 'O' which denotes personal closeness in Arabic. In the third speech, the looming success of the revolution forced Mubarak to not only single the protesters out for the endearing vocative 'the sons, male and female youths of Egypt', but also to call them the 'symbol' and the 'pride' of Egypt, not the traitors they were in the first two speeches.

Speech		1 st Speech	2 nd Speech	3 rd Speech	Total/pronoun
Pronoun					
I		31	39	77	147
He = I		2	3	3	8
YOU		2	2	16	20
WE	1 st Class	1	3	1	5
	2 nd Class	4	0	0	4
	3 rd Class	26	8	41	75
	4 th Class	6	0	0	6
Total		37	11	42	90
<i>hā`u l-gaibah</i>		12	11	17	39
THEY		25	26	8	59

Table (6.1): Frequency of the deictic and anaphoric pronouns in the three speeches of Mubarak

6.1.2. Frames

Frame analysis demonstrated that the frames Mubarak activated in his speeches and the micro linguistic selectional choices he made within them replicated, and thereby reinforced, the macro socio-political relations of power held at the time of delivering each speech: The first speech reflected a top-down power structure similar to that characteristic of Mubarak's discourse of power; the internal polemic and strategic vagueness of the second and third speeches depicted the new Arab Spring relations of power. Following is a summary of the most salient characteristics of the frames of each discourse.

6.1.2.1. Pre-Arab Spring, top-down discourse

Mubarak's discourse of power, i.e. before the Arab Spring revolutions, reflected the existing 'top-down power balance' (Dunne 2003: 127): it employed linguistic hedges that projected Mubarak as both democratic and 'firmly in control' (ibid); it confined political activity to the state and its institutions only; it reflected a 'top-down, centrally controlled power structure' that discursively isolated the citizens and emphasized their inability to 'change their government via a democratic process' (ibid: 130); it demonized, minimized, and linked to undesirable phenomena any political parties, non-governmental institutions, or anyone who would criticise Mubarak and (or) pose a potential challenge to his democratic record or 'state supremacy'; and it pledged heavily to hold fair elections and increase the share of opposition seats in parliament, in a hedging manner that gave the impression that Mubarak had made promises and at the same time had not (ibid).

A very similar top-down structure of power was depicted in the first speech of Mubarak: he activated seven frames to demonise the protesters and whoever opposed him, and six frames to represent himself and his government positively; he employed deniable implicatures to indirectly accuse the protesters and the people of committing criminal and unpatriotic acts, and to implicitly admit that there was room for improvement in the fields of democracy, freedoms, liberties, unemployment, corruption, poverty, and openness to the world; he indirectly acknowledged the aspirations and demands of the protesters, but mystified, deconcretized, minimized, and mitigated them, by expressing them in indefinite and (or) abstract descriptive forms; and he pledged to 'continue' reform, but exonerated himself and his government from any responsibility or commitment to do so, by expressing his reform plans in generic, abstract, vague language that is hard to define or measure, by making the implementation of his reform goals contingent upon non-specific conditions, by using weak

verbs that do not commit him to real acts of reform, and by assigning the agency of the acts of reform to either metaphorical or deictically elusive agents. Finally, Mubarak used qualifiers to confirm that he had already established reform and to misrepresent the demands of the protesters as being for more of the freedoms and liberties he had already allowed.

The frames Mubarak activated in his first speech, and the micro linguistic and paralinguistic selectional choices he made within them, therefore, reflected the pre-revolution macro socio-political relations of power, i.e. a 'top-down, centrally controlled power structure' (Dunne 2003: 130) where Mubarak was in control.

6.1.2.2. New Arab Spring Frames

By the times of delivering the second and third speeches, the relations of power, between Mubarak and the people, on the one hand, and Mubarak and the armed forces, on the other, had changed radically. Those changes were reflected, quantitatively and qualitatively, in the frames he activated and the linguistic selectional choices he made within them.

Quantitatively, the more Mubarak lost power, the more he suppressed the frames that marked his power and activated those that relinquished it and empowered the protesters. On the one hand, he decreased the number of the frames that represented himself and his government positively from six in the first speech to zero in the second and zero in the third; he decreased the number of the frames that demonized the protesters from seven in the first speech to two in the second and zero in the third; and he decreased the number of the frames that threatened the protesters from two in the first speech to zero in the second and zero in the third. On the other hand, Mubarak increased the number of the frames that relinquished his power and acceded to the demands of the protesters from one in the first speech, to four in the second, to seven in the third; and he increased the number of the internally polemical frames that operated at two levels of communication and sent indirect messages from zero in the first speech to four in the second and three in the third.

Qualitatively, the most salient linguistic characteristics of the frames of collapsing power were their hidden dialogicality and strategic vagueness.

6.1.2.2.1. Hidden dialogicality

When Mubarak started to lose power, he employed double-voiced, internally polemical frames, i.e. frames whose 'hidden dialogicality' operates at two levels, 'reacts with its every fiber to the invisible speaker, points to something outside itself, beyond its own limits, to the unspoken words of another speaker' and responds implicitly to it, while

seeming to be directly addressing another explicit one (Bakhtin 1984: 196). Mubarak employed seven such frames, in order to negotiate the new relations of power, and send indirect, discreet messages that he was no longer able to send openly.

In his second speech, he sent three internally polemical messages to the increasingly powerful Muslim Brotherhood group, and one to the commanders of the Military, while seeming to be addressing the ordinary Egyptian people and criticizing the Muslim Brotherhood. The messages he sent to the Muslim Brotherhood were to inform them that he was not considering them criminals and that he was willing to condone their violent acts, to negotiate with them, and to acknowledge them as a legal political force. He performed that function by naming the Muslim Brotherhood positively; by using the passive voice to depict as agentless the crimes he accused them of committing; by referencing them with syntactically backgrounded, vague, indefinite, and generic relative subject pronouns, that weakened their agency for those crimes; and by avoiding the use of the precise verbs and nouns that habitually collocate with the crimes he was describing, and regimenting instead a series of weak, metaphorical verbs and nouns that mitigated those crimes and made them too vague to be punishable by law. The last internally polemical message Mubarak sent was to the commanders of the army, through deniable implicatures, in order to indirectly criticize the way they were handling the protesters.

In the third speech, Mubarak used internally polemical frames to send three indirect, discreet messages: two to the Egyptian people and one to the commanders of the military. He reminded the people of the international pressures put on him to step down, without overtly naming or criticising the more powerful presidents who put those pressures on him; he performed that function linguistically through indefinite nouns and adjectives. The second internally polemical message appealed to the emotions of the people and harped on their cultural and religious repertoire, in order to subtly request them to allow Mubarak to stay, die, and be buried in Egypt; he achieved that function linguistically by using emotive culturally and religiously resonant nouns and adjectives. The third internally polemical message was sent to the commanders of the military in order to assure them that Mubarak had a supervisory role for them to play in his new plan; he achieved that linguistically through positive nomination strategies and definiteness.

6.1.2.2.2. Strategic vagueness

The second most salient linguistic feature of the frames Mubarak activated when he lost power is what I termed earlier *strategic vagueness*, i.e. his employment of deliberately weak, vague, metaphorical, abstract, irrelevant, evaluative, implicative, and hence evasive language to express important propositional content that relates to his responsibilities, promises, plans to transfer power, and responses to the demands of the protesters; the more he lost power, the more strategically vague he became. Following is a summary of the four principal features of that vagueness.

The first feature of Mubarak's strategic vagueness is its semantically and syntactically weak language. Semantically, Mubarak employed weak, ambiguous, non-performative, and non-commisive verbs that enabled him to make generic promises and hedge on implementing them, without committing him to any specific action; he avoided using relevant verbs that belong to the political domain and used instead unrelated, imprecise verbs that are principally associated with other domains; and he further hedged on those already irrelevant, underspecified verbs by assigning them new meanings, not established as their original ones, in order to avoid precision, confuse the hearers, and evade responsibility. In a similar vein, Mubarak employed indefinite, unspecific, weak, and non-binding nouns that connoted abstract, futuristic concepts and aspirations, rather than concrete actions and measures.

Syntactically, Mubarak achieved his strategic vagueness through one or more of the following syntactic structures and devices: he mixed more than one grammatical tense, within the same sentence, in a manner that made it difficult to determine whether the actions he was describing had been completed or not yet; he avoided using the familiar and more accessible trilateral verbal forms, and opted instead for the less familiar and hence more cognitively taxing quadrilateral forms, in order to confuse the hearers, avoid precision, and evade responsibility; he inserted redundant verbs and (or) nouns in order to cram his sentences, hide the subjects of the processes he was talking about, and hence conceal their agency; he used nominal forms instead of their corresponding verbal ones, in order to avoid having to specify the subjects of those verbs and hence absolve himself of any commitment to implement them; he employed the passive structure to depict some highly important processes, e.g. power transfer, as automatic and agentless, and hence exonerated himself from his legal and constitutional responsibilities for conducting such critical processes; he referenced his potential opponents with the most vague, indefinite, and generic relative pronouns in Arabic, in order to devalue them; he employed distancing demonstratives in order to distance himself

subtly from the promises he had made; he employed minimizing particles, in order to belittle the problems he was trying to evade responsibility for; he employed indefinite nominal forms to condense, unspecify, and devalue important processes, and further intensified the indefiniteness of those important nouns by preceding them with generalizing, unspecifying determiners; he over-qualified his verbs, nouns, and structures through repetition, paraphrase, and (or) qualifiers that ranged between one emphatic letter and eleven qualifying phrases, within the same utterance; and he generated implicative relations in order to trigger deniable implicatures that no one can hold him responsible for.

The second feature of the strategic vagueness of Mubarak is its evaluative language, which aimed at stirring and heightening the personal and nationalistic emotions of the people, in an overwhelming manner that would spin their rational reasoning, and suspend their critical judgement. Mubarak achieved such effects through four linguistic devices: replacing the legal, dry vocative system he had been using with an emotional, fatherly one; activating highly effective emotional frames, e.g. the old-dying-father-ingrate-children personal frame and the slippery-slope nationalistic frame; manipulating grammatical tenses in order to appeal emotionally to the people, e.g. talking about his life in the past tense and his death in the present, in order to connote that his days were numbered and that he was dying soon; and regimenting emotionally, culturally, and religiously resonant lexical items that evoke deeply-rooted images and memories, in order to steer the behaviour of the people subconsciously.

The third feature of the strategic vagueness of Mubarak is its metaphorical language, which he employed to perform seven functions: praising the protesters grandly and excessively; stirring the personal and nationalistic emotions of the people subconsciously and overwhelmingly; promising the protesters evasively; expressing his vision of how to exit the crisis vaguely; evading responsibility for implementing the important promises he had made by assigning it to metaphorical agents; mitigating the crimes committed by parties stronger than him; and avoiding the use of precise political terms and expressions, and employing instead metaphorical ones that have spiritual, moral, cultural, and religious connotations, in order to mystify, abstract, and underspecify the political processes he was describing, and hence evade his legal and constitutional responsibilities that are associated with the precise terms he avoided.

Fourth, the last linguistic device through which Mubarak achieved his strategic vagueness was implicative relations, which he employed to trigger deniable implicatures that no one can hold him responsible for, e.g. his implicit acknowledgement that his regime had made

mistakes. The most implicative linguistic devices Mubarak employed were negatives and contrastive connectives: the former implicated that their corresponding affirmatives were expected and hence reinforced them paradoxically, and the latter denied their preceding sets of statements and undermined most of the premises upon which Mubarak established his arguments.

Although such weak, vague, abstract, non-performative, metaphorical, imprecise, implicative, emotive, and avasive verbs, nouns, and structures allowed Mubarak to manoeuvre and hedge around the measures he had taken and the promises he had made, and exonerated him from any specific responsibility or commitment, they depicted him as lacking credibility, seriousness, and willingness to deliver those promises, and hence undermined his credibility and depicted him as playing for time. They also represented him as detached and unable to understand the protesters who were expecting strong, performative, revolutionary language that keeps pace with the momentum of their revolution. The results of his speeches were therefore not surprising: they were ‘very catastrophic’; instead of appeasing the people, they ‘backfired and inflamed the streets with angry, disappointed protesters’ (El Manawy 2012: 413).

6.2. Argumentative intertextuality

The relations of power held between Mubarak and the protesters, during the Egyptian revolution, can be deduced logically from the types of fallacies he committed in his three speeches, their frequency, and the pragmatic functions they performed.

First, holistically speaking, the more Mubarak lost power, the more he committed fallacies: one-hundred and thirty-one fallacies in the first speech, one-hundred and fifty-two in the second, and one-hundred and fifty-nine in the third.

Second, the most significant logical marker of the loss of the power of Mubarak was the *argumentum ad populum* fallacy: when he was powerful, i.e. in his first speech, he committed this fallacy only once; when his power was shaken, i.e. in the second speech, he increased its occurrences to thirty-four; and when he lost power, i.e. in the third speech, he further increased them to fifty, in an attempt to establish a bond with the protesters by appealing specifically to their favour, beliefs, sentiments, and demands.

On the other hand, the most significant logical indicator of the power of Mubarak was the *petitio principii* fallacy: when he was powerful, he committed it in fifty-seven instances; when his power was shaken, he cut that number to almost its half, i.e. thirty instances; and when he lost power, he further reduced it to only three. Furthermore, those last three presuppositions were significantly revealing in terms of content and function: The only propositional content Mubarak could presuppose, at that time of no-power, was that he had already met the demands of the protesters; therefore, he did not only commit the authoritative *petitio principii* to cede his power, but also reversed its direction in order to hand over the authority implied in it to the protesters.

Fourth, the *argumentum ad misericordiam* fallacy is another logical indicator of the loss of the power of Mubarak: he committed it in fourteen instances in the first speech, increased its instances to twenty-nine in the second, and did not only increase them to eighty in the third speech, but also clustered large numbers of the tokens of this fallacy in thematically coherent networks that performed multiple, complex, and subtle functions: mongering fear indirectly, criticizing the people indirectly while pretending to encourage them, endearing Mubarak to the protesters, legitimizing Mubarak on more than one plane, and stirring and heightening the sympathy of the people with him as an old man, in an overwhelming manner that distracted their attention and spinned their rational reasoning. In a similar vein, the *argumentum ad baculum* fallacy is another logical marker of the loss of the power of Mubarak: when he was powerful, he committed it in twelve instances, in order to mark his power and threaten the protesters; when his power was shaken, he reduced those instances to seven; and when he lost power, he further decreased them to five, addressed three of them to his own supporters, and reversed the pragmatic function of the other two in order to be endearing himself to the protesters, instead of threatening them, in a clear sign of the drastic change in the relations of power.

Finally, *argumentum ad metum* and *slippery slope argumentum ad consequentiam* are two other indicators of the change in the relations of power. In the first speech, Mubarak committed *argumentum ad metum* in thirteen instances in order to frighten the people; in the second speech, when he realized that they had breached the barrier of fear, he decreased the number to six; and in the third speech, he further decreased it to five. The following Table (6.2) summarizes and compares the occurrences of the fallacies Mubarak committed in his three speeches

	Mubarak Fallacy	First speech	Second speech	Third speech	Total/fallacy
1	<i>petitio principii (the fallacy of begging the question/ presupposition)</i>	57	30	3	90
2	<i>argumentum ad metum (appeal to fear)</i>	27	31	13	71
3	<i>argumentum ad misericordiam (appeal to emotions)</i>	14	29	80	123
4	<i>argumentum ad baculum (appeal to force/threats)</i>	12	7	5	24
5	<i>argumentum ad hominem (personal attack)</i>	6	11	0	17
6	<i>argumentum ad fidem (appeal to religion)</i>	5	5	6	16
7	<i>Bifurcation fallacy (black or white fallacy)</i>	2	1	0	3
8	<i>Argumentum ad superbiam (appeal to pride)</i>	2	1	1	4
9	<i>Straw man</i>	2	0	0	2
10	<i>red herring</i>	2	0	0	2
11	<i>ignoratio elenchi (irrelevant conclusion)</i>	1	1	0	2
12	<i>argumentum ad populum (appeal to popular favour)</i>	1	34	50	85
13	<i>gambler's fallacy</i>	0	2	1	3
	<i>Total number of fallacies/speech</i>	131	152	159	442

Table (6.2) comparison of the fallacies committed by Mubarak

6.3. Multi-modal intertextuality

Mubarak stumbled in twenty instances in his three speeches: nineteen of which were when he was not telling the truth and one when he was talking about his loss of power. The fact that the frequency of his stumbles kept increasing from five in the first speech to seven in the second to eight in the third suggests that his stumbling can be interpreted as another marker of his loss of power. Moreover, stumbles have been proven scientifically and criminologically as a typical indicator of deception (Gamson, Gottesman, Milan, Weerasuriya 2012: 3): When liars tell lies, they have to cover those lies inwardly, by suppressing the truth and concealing their nervousness, and outwardly, by self-consciously monitoring and controlling their movements, in order to appear normal and honest. Such forced adaptations consume an extensive amount of cognitive resources and create a cognitive burden that strains the mental capacities of the liars and increases their vulnerability to stumbling (Gamson et al. 2012: 3-5; Meek, Phillips, Boswell, Vendemia 2013: 81-87).

7. Typology of Mubarak's *Language of Collapsing Power*

Analysis of the corpus of the speeches under investigation demonstrated the existence of what can be termed Mubarak's *language of collapsing power*, whose characteristics contradicted those of his discourse of power. This chapter defines that *language of collapsing power*, in terms of the dynamics of control it exercised through the three mechanisms of the 'fundamental process of the reproduction of power through discourse', i.e. 'text control', 'context control', and 'mind control' (Van Dijk 2007: 8-10).

Each of the following sections starts with identifying the markers of text, context, and mind control, on the linguistic, cognitive-linguistic, paralinguistic, logical, and multimodal levels, as manifested in the selectional choices Mubarak made, then evaluates whether those selectional choices managed to perform the pragmatic functions assigned to them.

7.1. Text Control: Linguistic markers of Mubarak's *language of collapsing power*

Mubarak's *language of collapsing power* exercised text control through three cognitively taxing linguistic devices: deixis, Frames, and *NestPs*. Following is an evaluation of how each of those devices operated.

7.1.1. Cognitively taxing linguistic structures

7.1.1.1. Deixis

7.1.1.1.1. Inconsistent deixis

The most salient characteristic of the speaker-oriented deictic system of Mubarak is its inconsistency; the more he lost power, the more pronominally inconsistent he became. In the first speech, he assimilated himself into the people in thirty-two instances, but did not maintain that bonding throughout the speech and distanced himself from all the Egyptian people, in thirteen instances; from the protesters, in seven; and from Egypt, 'its people', and 'their' sons in sixteen instances. All in all, he established a bond with the Egyptian people in thirty-two instances and detached himself from them in thirty-six.

In the second speech, the deictic inconsistencies of Mubarak became clearer, at the levels of the utterance and the sentence. Not only did he start an utterance with a bonding *Third Class WE*, in the first sentence, then switched to the absenting *THEY* or the detaching *hā'u l-ġaibah* in the second, but also he switched among the three pronouns within the same sentence, while indexing the same referent. For example, he assimilated himself into the protesters, by using the *Third Class WE*; distanced himself from their 'message', by using the obviative

THEY; polarized them into well-intentioned protesters and traitors, by using *THEY* again; then detached himself from both poles, by using *hā' u l-ġaibah*, all within the same sentence.

Mubarak was inconsistent not only in his switching among different pronouns to encode the same referent, but also in his employment of the same pronoun to encode different referents. For example, he first employed the obviative *THEY*, which is called in Arabic the Pronoun of the Absent, to refer to his 'unpatriotic' political opponents who 'exploited' the protesters, in two instances; to refer to the protesters themselves, in five instances; and to refer to all the Egyptian people, in nineteen instances. Given that 'deictic expressions generally are used to express physical proximity, but also can be used (deliberately or not) to express emotional proximity to an event or set of circumstances' (Levinson 1983: 81), the selectional choices Mubarak made invited the inference that he was holding his political opponents, the protesters, and all the Egyptian people at the same distance. That detachment was further reinforced by the possessive pronoun *hā' u l-ġaibah*, which he employed in eleven instances to refer to 'Egypt and its people' and 'Egypt and its sons', denoting that those Egyptian people and their sons were detached from him.

In a similar vein, Mubarak assimilated himself into the protesters in one instance, detached himself from them in five, bonded with the Egyptian people in seven instances, and detached himself from them in forty, inviting the inference that the disconnect between him and the Egyptian people was wider than that between him and the protesters. Given that deictic expressions offer us 'a pronominal window into the thinking and attitude of politicians towards particular political topics and political personalities' (Wilson 1990: 59), 'reveal ideological bias [...] and [...] present specific idiosyncratic aspects of the individual politician's own personality' (ibid: 76), the pronominal inconsistencies of Mubarak reflected the following conceptual consistencies: Mubarak distanced himself from the Egyptian people when he talked about the dangerous consequences of the protests, implicating that he was immune to those consequences; he separated himself from the people when he talked about 'their' fear of the future, inviting the inference that he was not afraid; and he detached himself from the people when he talked about 'their rights', 'their freedoms', 'their dignity', 'their interests', 'their demands', 'their aspirations', and 'their future', generating the implicatures that he had rights, freedoms, dignity, interests, demands, aspirations, and future different from those of the people.

In the third speech, Mubarak was more deictically and anaphorically inconsistent. Although he employed the *Third Class WE*, in forty-one instances, to assimilate himself into the people, he detached himself from them in eleven instances, within the same sentences and phrases. He assimilated himself into the people when he talked about ‘our economy’ (thrice), ‘our armed forces’, ‘our international reputation’, ‘our society’, ‘our citizens’, and ‘our existence’; he detached himself from them when he talked about ‘their youth’ (thrice), ‘their killed and injured protesters’, ‘their demands’, and the Egyptian street.

Moreover, Mubarak employed the distancing *THEY* to refer to the perpetrators who killed the protesters, in three instances; the killed protesters, in four instances; and the Egyptian people, in one instance. Given that pronouns ‘serve as an indirect index of the general “deictic” placement of referents in each author’s world-view’ (Connor-Linton 1988:109), Mubarak’s employment of the same absencing and detaching pronoun to reference the victim, the perpetrator, and all the Egyptian people resulted in a deictic inconsistency that cast doubts on the sincerity of his utterances.

Finally, Mubarak employed *hā’u l-ġaibah* in sixteen instances, which resulted in further detaching him from ‘the people of Egypt’ (in six instances); from the ‘sons of Egypt’, their demands, and future (in four instances); from ‘Egypt’ (twice); from ‘the Egyptians’ (twice); from the ‘current crisis’ of Egypt (twice); from the ‘identity’ of Egypt; from the ‘history’ of Egypt; from the ‘honour’ of Egypt; and from the ‘present’ of Egypt. Such a distribution invited the inference that Mubarak was not detached from the protesters only, but also from Egypt and the Egyptians, an argument corroborated by the incident reported by El Manawy that Mubarak and his regime were living in a world so different from that of the Egyptian people (2012: 47, 273, 387-8) that his son Gamal hired two famous American and British companies, specializing in public relations and media, in order to advise him on how to deal with the protests in Egypt (ibid: 142-3).

7.1.1.1.2. Deictic cognitive load

The heavy dependence of Mubarak on deixis and his manipulation of its content are predicated on the cognitively taxing nature of that highly political linguistic phenomenon. First, the relation between the sense and the thought of deictic expressions is neither direct nor transparent: Neither the verbal expression nor the written wording of deictics represents ‘the complete expression of the thought; the knowledge of certain accompanying conditions of utterance, which are used as means of expressing the thought, are needed for its correct

apprehension, these include indexing as well as facial and gestural expressions (Frege 1952: 24 as cited in Levinson 2003: 5-6). The establishment of that difference between what deictics mean, on the one hand, and what the speaker means by using them, on the other, i.e. the semantic vs. pragmatic values of deictics, and the complementation of the missing part of the thought underlying the deictics, add extra layers of mandatory cognitive processing, without which the deictically anchored expressions cannot be resolved.

Second, that ‘semantic deficiency’ of deictics, i.e. the fact that ‘their descriptive content does not suffice to identify a referent’ (Levinson 2003: 10) results in their having ‘variable characters’, i.e. ‘constant meanings’ but systematically ‘varying referents’ (ibid: 14, 15). The process of identifying those different characters and resolving their various referents is taxing in terms of the cognitive processing efforts it consumes: The addressee is bound to fail in their attempt to identify the referent of a deictic expression after examining the semantic conditions imposed by it; they will be forced to seek a pragmatic resolution, first in the discourse, and failing that in the spatio-temporal circumstances of the context of the speech event. Such a semantic deficiency combined with the variable characters of deictics render them heavily dependent on pragmatic resolution, and consequently more taxing in terms of the cognitive processing efforts they consume (ibid).

Finally, deictic expressions involve the embedding of existential, subjective, context-dependent deictic systems in symbolic, objective, context-independent descriptive systems, a process which results in a hybrid system that cannot be reduced to either. The decoding and interpretation of that mediated and complex emergent system are costly in cognitive terms: the deictic meaning of the utterance has to be translated into deicticless absolute space/time coordinates, by first mapping contexts into the proposition, then casting the contextualized proposition in a non-indexical *lingua mentalis* that expresses the full propositional content of the utterance and makes sense of it. Given that deictics have attentional, intentional, and subjective features that resist any cashing out of their content in objective descriptions, the developed metalanguage is bound to fail in depicting the deictic content of the original deictic expression, in spite of the high cognitive price invested in generating it (ibid: 4-5, 19).

7.1.1.2. Nested *Presuppositions* (*NestPs*)

The most salient syntactic marker of Mubarak’s *language of collapsing power* is its *NestPs*, which are linguistically, pragmatically, and cognitively misbehaved utterances, deliberately

engineered to manipulate the cognitive processing systems of the hearers, by tactically segmenting, arranging, and packaging unsubstantiated propositional content in hard-to-process structures, that background the strongest propositions, most worthy of processing, and assign the highest degree of prominence to the weakest and least relevant stimulus. Mubarak complicated the *NestPs* of ben Ali by emotionalizing their non-emotive language and hence made them more manipulative.

The presumptive control Mubarak exercised through *NestPs* was a strong one: it enabled him to not only bypass his unsubstantiated, controversial propositional content as agreed upon factual premises that can be built upon, but also to create a cognitive processing load that dissipated the cognitive processing efforts of the people and hampered their processing capacity, by casting NI propositional content in structures typically associated with OI; by further arranging those structures in a complex, hard-to-process order that foregrounded the weak, non-optimally relevant propositions, backgrounded the strong, optimally relevant ones, manipulated the OR effort-effect formula, reversed the order of accessibility to those nested propositions, and hence caused the MEP to fail in leading the hearer to construct relevant, anticipatory interpretive hypotheses that satisfy the expectations of relevance raised by those utterances; by harnessing those structures in larger and deeper nested presuppositions that require complex, cognitively taxing processing for testing and constructing their interpretive hypotheses; and by attacking the cognitive system of the hearer with large numbers of such nested presuppositions, in a manner that tactically impeded their proper cognitive processing.

Mubarak therefore exercised presumptive control on the information structures in which he cast the propositional content of his message and on the cognitive behaviour or the processing of those structures, but not on the propositional content carried by those structures. That two-level structural, cognitive control consumed a substantial amount of the processing capacity of the hearers and created a cognitive load that strained and hampered their processing capacity, but did not convince the people with the unsubstantiated content.

7.1.1.3. Internally polemical and strategically vague language

The frames Mubarak employed in his *language of collapsing power* are primarily characterized by their internal polemic and strategic vagueness. However, those internally polemical and strategically vague frames did not operate pragmatically in the exact manner he intended.

Although his strategic vagueness allowed him to hedge around the measures he had taken and the promises he had made, and exonerated him from any specific responsibility or commitment, it belittled, undervalued, mitigated, and hence weakened the pragmatic force of the actions he claimed he had taken or promised to take; represented them as insignificant; and represented Mubarak as not serious or unwilling to deliver his promises, and hence undermined his credibility. Moreover, although the passive, nominalization, minimization, distancing, and backgrounding structures enabled Mubarak to minimize the problems and crimes at issue and to hide their causers and perpetrators, they also represented him as keen on not identifying or punishing those causers and perpetrators, and hence aroused suspicions about his potential involvement in those problems and crimes.

In a similar vein, the over-qualification connoted that Mubarak did not have much substantial content to say or to offer the protesters, and suggested that he was reasserting what he had already said in order to compensate for his utterances' loss of their due presidential perlocutionary force, which in turn resulted from, and marked, his own loss of power. Furthermore, the negatives Mubarak used implicated that their corresponding affirmatives were expected and hence reinforced those affirmatives paradoxically. Also, the contrastive connectives cancelled their preceding sets of statements, and hence undermined most of the premises Mubarak built his arguments upon. Finally, the vagueness of the language Mubarak employed when he talked about his responsibilities and promises was starkly contrasted with and foregrounded by the clarity, specificity, precision, strength, and performativeness of the language he used when he represented himself positively or marked his power. Such a contradiction cast doubts on his sincerity and suggested that his vagueness and internal polemic were deliberately manipulative.

7.2. Mind Control: Logical markers of the *language of collapsing power*

7.2.1. Hard then Soft fallacies

The mind control of Mubarak's *language of collapsing power* was fallacious; however, the fallacies he committed most prevalently to exercise such control differed according to the level of power he had.

When he was powerful, i.e. at the time of delivering his first speech, Mubarak attempted to control the minds of the people by predominantly committing the presumptive *petitio principii*

(*the fallacy of begging the question/presupposition*), which is considered ‘essentially fallacious’ because it is a sub-category of the *arguments from authority*, which in turn allow the speaker to presuppose an unsubstantiated conclusion and pass it as an agreed upon premise (Whately 1848: 513; Tindale 2007: 72-77). Exercising that specific type of authoritative, presumptive mind control emphasized the main trigger of the revolution, i.e. the authority of Mubarak, and hence backfired and contributed to the failure of the logical mind control he was trying to exercise in his first speech.

Following the change in the relations of power, i.e. at the times of delivering the second and third speeches, Mubarak abandoned *petitio principii* (*the fallacy of begging the question/presupposition*) and committed, instead, the emotive fallacy *argumentum ad misericordiam* (*appeal to emotions*) more predominantly. Hence, his most successful speech was the second; it ‘won the sympathy of millions of Egyptians’ and ‘touched a lot of hearts’ (Ghonim 2012: 392).

Nevertheless, although Mubarak kept increasing his appeal to the emotions of pity and fear of the people, which are well known to have a ‘tremendous impact’ on mass audience (Johnson 2000: 269), as they overwhelm their critical judgement and indirectly suggest that they follow their impulses, instead of weighing all the evidence in the case (Walton 2007: 145), his logical mind control failed because of five main reasons. First, the extreme logical switch Mubarak made when he lost power - by abandoning the hard fallacies of power, i.e. the authoritative, presumptive fallacy *petitio principii* (*the fallacy of begging the question/presupposition*), the threatening fallacy *argumentum ad baculum* (*appeal to force/threats*), the attacking fallacy *argumentum ad hominem* (*personal attack*), and the frightening fallacy *argumentum ad metum* (*appeal to fear*), and by committing instead the soft fallacies of emotions, i.e. the bonding fallacy *argumentum ad populum* (*appeal to popular favour*) and the emotive fallacy *argumentum ad misericordiam* (*appeal to emotions*) - represented him as logically contradictory and unconvincing, and suggested that his attempt to establish a logical bond with the people was not because he had genuine reasons to do so, but because he was forced to do so by his loss of power; hence, his argumentative decisions made him sound like a ‘defeated man’ (Ghonim 2012: 213-4). Second, he appealed to the emotions of the people by using the wrong linguistic vehicle, i.e. Modern Standard Arabic which is the medium most inappropriate for expressing emotions, as it is distancing, depersonalizing, detaching, and loaded with connotations of formality and authoritative superior-inferior relationships (Shouby 1951: 286). Third, the emotiveness of his language was self-centred, not people-

oriented, and hence did not resonate with the people. Fourth, his emotional appeals were long and exaggerated, and hence violated the brevity condition necessary for successful *pathos*, i.e. being brief, because ‘nothing dries more quickly than a tear’ (anon, as cited in Caplan 1954). Fifth, Mubarak failed to establish his credibility or ‘good *ethos*’, and hence lacked another prerequisite for successful *pathos* (Lee 1939: 66-8).

In terms of patterning, Mubarak concentrated, buried, and foregrounded his fallacies in layers of *Nested Presuppositions*, emotionalized their contents, and hence made them highly manipulative.

7.2.2. Strategic manoeuvring

Pragma-dialectically, when an arguer meets their ‘dialectical obligations’ and, at the same time, achieves their ‘rhetorical effectiveness’, they are argued to have achieved *strategic manoeuvring*; if such a balance between dialectical and rhetorical objectives is not maintained, ‘inconsistencies’, i.e. fallacies, arise and *strategic manoeuvring* gets ‘derailed’ (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2015: 173-5).

Mubarak employed a self-centred, inconsistent deixis of power; created sophisticated syntactic structures that anchored his power by imposing his claims as undisputed facts, i.e. *NestPs*; cast those structures and deictic contents in the code of power, i.e. MSA; delivered his speeches against a backdrop that symbolized the negative semiotic field of his power, i.e. his presidential palace; and committed authoritative, presumptive fallacies that marked his power, i.e. *petitio principii*. Such linguistic, cognitive, argumentative, and multi-modal selectional choices resulted in sacrificing his ‘dialectical reasonableness’ for the sake of achieving his ‘rhetorical effectiveness’. The *strategic manoeuvring* of Mubarak, therefore, got derailed.

7.3. Context Control: Multi-modal markers of Mubarak’s *language of collapsing power*

Mubarak failed to exercise a proper context control over the time, place, medium, or modality of his speeches. Temporally, he delivered three speeches, totalling thirty-nine minutes and thirteen seconds, over the eighteen-day timespan of the Egyptian revolution; within the same timespan, Qaddafi, for example, delivered five speeches, totalling four hours, twenty-four minutes and fifty seconds.

In terms of place, Mubarak delivered his speeches against the backdrop of his presidential palace. Although he intended that seemingly powerful symbol of his legal, executive, and constitutional power to export his control and legitimacy, it undermined both of them, and functioned as a negative multimodal contextual frame, conceptual cue, and emotional prompt that channelled the minds of the people, at a subliminal level, in a direction opposite to that intended by Mubarak, by anchoring the speeches to contexts associated with the power abuse and state-sponsored corruption against which the people were revolting (El Manawy 2012: 35, 36), and hence delegitimizing him.

In terms of delivery, the most salient two multimodal observations were the discrepancy between some of Mubarak's linguistic messages and his paralinguistic performance of them, as well as his increasing stumbles. First, the discrepancy between some of the linguistic signs Mubarak was sending and his para-linguistic performance of them cast doubts on his sincerity, and undermined his credibility and *ethos*. Moreover, given that stumbling has been established as a significant scientific and criminological detector of manipulation and a typical indicator of deception (Gamson, Gottesman, Milan & Weerasuriya 2012: 3), Mubarak's increasing stumbles suggested that he was not telling the truth.

Finally, the more Mubarak lost power, the more he had his speeches shot, directed, and montaged unprofessionally, and the more he failed to control his linguistic and paralinguistic delivery of them, by performing them poorly, and stumbling increasingly.

7.4. Involvement vs. detachment

Audience involvement is established through some or all of the following 'discourse organizing strategies': controlling the communication channel paralinguistically; providing specific details that enhance concreteness and imageability; personalizing the discourse; prioritizing people and relationships; emphasizing agency, i.e. actions and agents rather than states and objects; citing direct quotations, dialogues, conversations, and reported speeches; expressing the state of the mind of the speaker; being fuzzy; using emphatic particles; employing the traditional devices of rhetorical ornamentation; identifying with the audience emotionally; and requiring the audience to participate in the sense-making process (Havelock 1963; Tannen 1982, 1988; Beeston 1983; Mazraani 1997). Mubarak employed only two of those twelve strategies, i.e. being fuzzy and using emphatic particles.

On the other communicative extreme, ‘audience detachment’ results from employing some or all of the following strategies: abstractness, combining many ideas and thoughts at once, emphasizing states and objects, rather than actions and agents, impersonality, and compactness (Chafe 1983: 1099). Mubarak did not only employ all those five strategies, i.e. delivering short speeches, predominantly characterised by cognitively taxing *NestPs* which nested large numbers of ideas and propositions in single utterances, but also used self-oriented deictic system that elevated him up the social and linguistic ladders and relegated the people to the bottom; committed self-centred, authoritative, presumptive fallacies that marked his power; and delivered his speeches from his presidential palace, which symbolized the negative triggers of the revolution, particularly power abuse and corruption. The *language of collapsing power* is therefore interpersonally more detaching than involving.

7.5. Communicative competence

By employing a complex, inconsistent deictic system, cognitively taxing *NestPs*; an incompatible, detaching code; strategically vague and internally polemical frames; authoritative and emotive fallacies whose strategic manoeuvring got derailed; and semiotically negative and delegitimizing backdrops, Mubarak violated the three conditions of Communicative Competence: grammatical skills, i.e. knowledge of the formal and consciously learnt rules that govern the formation of the words and sentences of the language; sociocultural skills, i.e. pragmatic knowledge of the most appropriate place, time, and context to use each level of the language; and communication skills, i.e. the good judgement as to when to best use the first skills according to the dictations of the second, in order to achieve the intended goals (Hymes 1971: 7; Widdowson 1979: 90; Chen & Starosta 1996: 356). Mubarak’s *language of collapsing power* was, therefore, communicatively incompetent.

7.6. Construction of Public Identity

De Fina contends that a ‘speaker’s identity emerges through consistent use of certain pronouns with a stable referent and through the oppositions and connections established in the text between these referents and the referents of other pronominal and non-pronominal forms’ (1995: 379).

Although Mubarak regimented all his deictic system to construct, reinforce, and change his public identities, the pronoun most indicative of that process is the anaphoric third-person

singular pronoun *HE*, which Mubarak twisted to function as a deictic first-person singular pronoun *I*, in each of his three speeches. Given that the employment of third-person self-reference can be thought of as ‘an indicator of *role identification*’, i.e. ‘speakers who have a variety of roles [...] wish to specify a particular role relevant to the unfolding discourse’ (Wilson 1990:78), Mubarak’s employment of this less common type of self-reference, and his avoidance of the simple, and hence more cognitively accessible pronominal *I*, can, therefore, be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to refer to himself not as an individual person, but as a holder of a ‘conceptual role’ (ibid), and hence to construct a specific public identity for himself.

Mubarak used this third-person self-reference to construct various identities that differed according to the relations of power held between him and the people at the time of delivering every speech.

In the first speech, Mubarak referenced himself with the third-person singular pronoun *HE* in order to construct for himself the two power anchoring identities of the Egyptian man selected by Fate to rule Egypt and who had exhausted his life defending the country in war and peace; he preceded those two anaphorically marked, moral and professional, identities with a deictically marked presidential one (M1.21:28). The medium of constructing those three identities is revealing, because even when Mubarak was foregrounding his moral and professional identities and backgrounding his presidential one, he deictically selected his presidential identity to be his *origo* (deictic center) and hence his principal role and main point of reference. He did so by referencing his moral and professional identities with the anaphorically detaching and distancing third-person singular pronoun *HE*, and by encoding his presidential identity with the deictically uniting and proximal first-person singular pronoun *I*.

The two new identities performed more than one strategic function: The moral identity directed the attention of the hearers away from Mubarak the president, who might have failed in undertaking the responsibilities of his job, and focussed it on Mubarak the divine, who was selected and supported by God to be the president, and hence whose challenge would be a challenge of the judgement and will of God; the professional identity exported the image of Mubarak the protector, who had exhausted his life defending the country. The new anaphoric identities, therefore, manipulated the identification of the people, by rerouting their direct attention away from the problematic presidential identity of Mubarak, and focussing it on the more ambiguous, abstract, divine, and hence less accountable identity of the president selected by God. The new identity, therefore, helped Mubarak deflect responsibility, by inviting the

inference that whatever he had done should not be associated with him as an individual person or as a president, but with his identity as the man selected to rule by God.

In the second speech, following the drastic changes in the relations of power, Mubarak reversed the power marking presidential, moral, and professional identities he had constructed in the first speech, and replaced them with the new power relinquishing identity of the civil servant who was proud of the long years he had spent serving 'Egypt and its people,' and who was claiming no more than his right to stay and die in his country, like any other Egyptian man (M2.22:14). He did so by referencing himself with the anaphoric third-person singular pronoun *HE*, within an emotional appeal.

That anaphorically constructed new identity performed more than one function. First, it identified and distinguished between two Mubaraks: Mubarak the president and Mubarak the man. Second, it stripped the former of his presidential power, after it became a threat to him, and represented the latter as a modest, self-denying man. Third, by relinquishing the power of Mubarak the president and backgrounding him, the new identity suppressed any accusations that could be levelled at him, exonerated Mubarak the man from any official responsibilities associated with the dismantled personality, and foregrounded the rights of respect, sympathy, and gratitude entitled to Mubarak the old man. Finally, the new identity saved the presidential face of Mubarak the president by enabling him to speak on the tongue of Mubarak the ordinary Egyptian man, and to stir the pity of the people with him without hurting the presidential pride and ego of Mubarak the president.

In the third speech, Mubarak employed the third-person singular pronoun *HE* to construct for himself the identity of the old father who was addressing his sons and daughters (M3.3:17), and who was pained by their ill-treatment (M3.22:18). Such an identity performed two strategic functions: First, it stirred the people's emotions of pity and sympathy in an overwhelming manner that spinned their rational thinking, by activating a famous frame that is resonant culturally and emotionally. Also, Mubarak's assumption of the identity of the father legitimized him conceptually and religiously, and dictated the immediate obedience (i.e. surrender) of his sons and daughters (i.e. the protesters) to his parental authority, otherwise they would be committing the second gravely sin after disbelief in Allah, i.e. ingratitude to parents.

Deictically, Mubarak reinforced his anaphorically constructed identities through the deictic selectional choices he made: He employed the first-person singular pronoun *I* in the first speech to issue indirect threats, legitimize his power, and hence reinforce his powerful presidential

identity. In the second speech, he decreased the number of this pronoun's power-marking instances, dropped its threatening function completely, and replaced it with the two new functions of stirring the pity of the people and instructing the cabinet to serve the protesters. In the third speech, Mubarak reversed the functions he had previously assigned to the first-person singular pronoun *I* and assigned it the new five functions that suited his new identity: gearing his executive powers to meet the demands of the protesters, flattering them, entreating the people indirectly and emotionally, and relinquishing his power by excluding himself altogether from the struggle over power.

Similarly, Mubarak employed the 'highly political' first-person plural pronoun *WE* to reinforce the identities he was constructing: The grand *First Class WE* marked the executive and legal powers of his presidential identity, in the first speech; it then anchored the moral and spiritual authorities of his new identities, in the second; and it polished his third identity of the old, protective father, in the third. The *Second Class WE* reinforced the presidential power of Mubarak, in the first speech, and represented him, his government, and his police apparatus as a harmonious body. In the second and third speeches, the *Second Class WE* disappeared completely, in order to suppress the power of the previously constructed presidential identity and sever any relation that might remind the people of his connection with his revolted against cabinet and police. The *Third Class WE* enabled the powerful Mubarak, in the first speech, to polarize the people, and hence mark his power implicitly. In the second speech, it endeared the new spiritual Mubarak to the protesters and relinquished the presidential powers of his previous identity. In the third speech, the *Third Class WE* established an emotional bond between the new identity of the old father and his ingrate sons. The *Fourth Class WE*, enabled the powerful president to accuse the protesters and all the Egyptian people safely in the first speech, but disappeared in the second and third speeches, because the identities assumed in them were in no position to accuse the people or the protesters, even indirectly.

Finally, the addressee pronoun *YOU*, which acknowledges the spatio-temporal existence of the protesters and the people, appeared only twice in the first speech, in order to reinforce the powerful identity of the president by marking it legally. However, the new power-relinquishing identities constructed in the second and third speeches forced Mubarak to change both the referent and function of *YOU*, by addressing it to the protesters, not to his supporters as he did in the first speech, and by assigning it the new single function of flattering the protesters excessively, with no marking of any sort of power. That diametric reversal in the reference,

frequency, and function of *YOU* reflected a parallel diametric reversal in the identity Mubarak was assuming.

Given that the most important fact about pragmatics is that 'it draws our attention to the role of sequencing in the construction of pragmatic meaning; the fact that meaning may be constructed, reformulated and changed across turns' (Wilson 1990: 6), it can be concluded that Mubarak regimented and manipulated his deictic and anaphoric pronominal systems in order to construct, reinforce, then change the persona he was impersonating at the time of delivering every speech, i.e. the powerful president, the spiritual leader, then the old, dying father, in order to negotiate the new relations of power by relinquishing some of his power, legitimizing himself, and hence maintaining his real power.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has investigated the corpus of the speeches delivered by the ousted Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak during the Arab Spring revolution in Egypt, in an attempt to identify the characteristics of the language he used, at that particularly significant socio-political moment in history.

Theoretical and methodological analyses triangulated seven features systematically: deixis, presupposition, frames, hidden dialogicality, logical fallacies, stumbles, and backdrops, and led to the conclusion that the Arab Spring discourse of Mubarak, henceforth referred to as his *language of collapsing power*, was manipulative, on the linguistic, cognitive-linguistic, paralinguistic, argumentative, and multimodal levels.

First, linguistically, Mubarak employed a manipulative deictic system, and reinforced, twisted, dropped, and (or) reversed the semantic contents, pragmatic functions, and frequencies of its pronouns according to the level of power he had at the time of delivering every speech. The more he lost power, the more he abandoned the pronouns that marked his legal, presidential, constitutional, and executive powers; the more he adopted the pronouns that foregrounded his human, moral, and spiritual personae; the more he decreased the frequency of the pronouns that threatened and (or) criticised the people; and the more he increased the frequency of the pronouns that flattered them and addressed them endearingly. The system aimed at performing four principal strategic functions: dividing the people into good people and bad protesters; further dividing the protesters into well-intentioned protesters and anarchists; delegitimizing whoever opposes Mubarak, even if they were not protesters; and legitimizing him legally, constitutionally, professionally, spiritually, and morally. However, the increasing inconsistency of that system cast doubts on the truth value and sincerity of the speech acts of Mubarak, resulted in the failure of the pronominal system to perform the strategic functions assigned to it persuasively, and led to the failure of the speeches.

Moreover, Mubarak was forced by the adverse change in the relations of power to employ double-voiced, internally polemical language, whose hidden dialogicality operated at more than one level of communication, in order to negotiate the new relations of power and send indirect, subtle messages to more powerful addressees, whom he was no longer able to address openly. Mubarak also employed strategically vague language, i.e. deliberately weak, metaphorical, abstract, irrelevant, evaluative, implicative, and hence evasive lexico-semantic items and syntactic structures, to express important propositional content that related to his

responsibilities, promises, plans to transfer power, and responses to the demands of the protesters. Although that strategic vagueness enabled him to hedge on his promises and to minimize the crimes and problems he wanted to evade responsibility for, it represented him as unwilling to identify and punish the perpetrators who committed and caused those crimes and problems, and hence aroused suspicions about his potential involvement in those crimes and problems. Moreover, that strategic vagueness contrasted with the strength, specificity, and performativeness of the language Mubarak used when he represented himself positively or when he marked his powers, and suggested that Mubarak's vagueness was deliberate, tactical, and manipulative. Similarly, the pragmatic functions Mubarak tried to perform through his language were weakened by four main linguistic devices: negatives, contrastive connectives, over-qualification, and stumbles. The negatives combined with over-qualification to trigger a rhetorical effect opposite to that intended by Mubarak, and emphasized in an equally qualified manner their corresponding affirmatives; the contrastive connectives denied their preceding sets of statements, and hence undermined the premises upon which Mubarak built his conclusions; the over-qualification suggested that Mubarak had lost power, and that his repetitions aimed at compensating for his utterances' loss of their perlocutionary force; and his stumbles suggested that he was not telling the truth, that he had lost power, or that he was afraid.

Cognitively, the most salient cognitive-linguistic structure in Mubarak's *language of collapsing power* is his *Nested Presuppositions (NestPs)*, whose sophisticated information structures, condensed fallacious contents, and manipulative cognitive behaviour cause a cognitive processing load that hampers proper cognitive processing: *NestPs* foreground the weak, non-optimally relevant TSL and background the strong, optimally relevant C; create a cognitive conflict by casting NI propositional content in OI structures; accumulate many layers of finer nested presuppositions the testing and construction of whose interpretative hypotheses require complex, cognitively taxing processing; take the truth value of those nested presuppositions for granted and build upon them without substantiation; attack the cognitive system of the hearer with a large number of those presuppositions; manipulate the OR effort-effect formula by reversing the order of accessibility to the nested propositions; fail to establish relevance through the MEP; and waste many processing efforts in resolving the *SCCC*. The combination of these factors results in a processing overload that strains the cognitive processing capacity of the hearer, renders it incapable of performing further proper processing, and hence allows unsubstantiated claims and propositions to bypass Relevance Checking Controls and filters and be accepted as relevant.

Mubarak's *language of collapsing power* is, therefore, characterised by its heavy use of contextually dependent, semantically vacuous, and cognitively taxing linguistic devices: First, his deictic system employed non-unique referring expressions that had ambiguous, variable, and sometimes contradictory references that did not designate fixed entities, and the value of whose under-specified content needed to be instantiated by reference to non-linguistic information in the situation of utterance. Second, *Nested Presuppositions* are a sophisticated type of informative presupposition that depends for the resolution of their ambiguity on the mutual Old Information knowledge of the speaker and the addressee. Third, the frames Mubarak employed were internally polemical and strategically vague; hence, they responded indirectly to an implicit discourse, while seeming to be directly addressing another explicit one; they were addressed to 'invisible', external addressees, different from the ostensible, announced ones; and they depended for the deciphering of their hidden dialogicality on the extra-textual, socio-political knowledge of the world. Given that such semantic vacuity and cognitive sophistication were tactical, i.e. they aimed at deliberately manipulating the cognitive processing system of the addressees, Mubarak's *language of collapsing power* is semantically, cognitively, and pragmatically manipulative.

Second, argumentatively, Mubarak's *language of collapsing power* is fallacious: When he was powerful, he appealed most to his authority and power and least to the people, by committing the hard fallacies of power, i.e. the authoritative, presumptive *petitio principii* (*the fallacy of begging the question/presupposition*), the frightening *argumentum ad metum* (*appeal to fear*), and the threatening *argumentum ad baculum* (*appeal to threats*), in order to presuppose unsubstantiated propositional content, pass it as factual, and stir the fears of the people. When he lost power, Mubarak abandoned those hard fallacies and committed the soft fallacies that appealed to the popular favour, emotions, national pride, culture, religion, beliefs, favour, sentiments, prejudices, and common knowledge of the people, i.e. the bonding *argumentum ad populum* and the emotive *argumentum ad misericordiam* fallacies. Mubarak's language of collapsing power is, therefore, fallaciously emotive, presumptive, appealing to the people in a non-identifying manner, and hence is manipulative. Third, multimodally and paralinguistically, Mubarak's *language of collapsing power* is poorly performed, unprofessionally montaged, linguistically-paralinguistically contradictory, and delivered against semiotically negative and delegitimizing backdrops.

Mubarak regimented those linguistic, cognitive-linguistic, argumentative, and multi-modal devices in order to legitimize himself, by constructing various public identities that changed

according to the level of power he had at the time of delivering every speech: when he was powerful, he constructed for himself the two power anchoring identities of the Egyptian man selected by Fate to rule Egypt and the defender who had exhausted his life defending the country in war and peace. When his power was seismically shaken, i.e. by the time of delivering the second speech, Mubarak reversed the power marking moral and professional identities he had constructed in the first speech, and replaced them with the new power relinquishing identity of the civil servant, who was proud of the long years he had spent serving ‘Egypt and its people’ and who was claiming no more than his right to stay and die in his country, like any other Egyptian man. When Mubarak lost power, i.e. by the time of delivering the third speech, he denied any involvement in the struggle over power, and replaced the identity of the civil servant with that of the old father who was addressing his sons and daughters and who was pained by their ill-treatment and ingratitude.

It can, therefore, be concluded that while the discourse of the powerful Mubarak replicated ‘the strong president-weak political opposition dynamic’ (Dunne 2003: 125), his *language of collapsing power* reflected the new weak-president, strong-protesters reality; while his discourse of power constructed a nuanced identity that projected him as both democratic and ‘firmly in control’ (ibid: 127), his *language of collapsing power* denied his powers, kept constructing and changing his identities until it depicted him as a powerless old man whose only one aspiration was to be allowed to die and be buried in his country; while his discourse of power portrayed a ‘political field on which the only valid players are the state, institutions licensed and regulated by the state, and the individual, isolated citizen’ (ibid), his *language of collapsing power* depicted a new bottom-up, people-oriented power structure that anchored the supremacy of the protesters and the people, and represented the president as a powerless civil servant to them; and while his discourse of power replicated the existing ‘top-down, centrally controlled power structure’ that foregrounded the ‘inability’ of the people to ‘change their government via a democratic process’ (ibid: 130), his *language of collapsing power* underscored the ability of the youth to change not only the present, but also the future.

In short, Mubarak’s Arab-Spring language was an ‘apprehensive language’, i.e. language that unfolds cautiously in fear of a hostile response, that ‘literally cringe[s] in the presence or the anticipation of someone else’s word, reply, [or] objection’, and that has ‘a thousand reservations, concessions, loopholes and the like’ (Bakhtin 1984:196). The apprehension of his language manifested itself on its three levels of control: The text control attempted by Mubarak’s *language of collapsing power* was weakened by its self-centered, inconsistent,

contradictory, cognitively taxing, and manipulative deictic system; by its presumptively authoritative, propositionally unsubstantiated, structurally and behaviourally complex, and cognitively non-rewarding *Nested Presuppositions*; and by its internally polemical, strategically weak, vague, abstract, metaphorical, evaluative, implicative, and hence evasive frames. The mind control attempted by Mubarak's language was weakened by its logically fallacious, functionally contradictory, pragma-dialectically derailed, structurally sophisticated, and hence unconvincing arguments, which were cast in the wrong linguistic vehicle and based on unestablished ethos or pathos. The context control attempted by that language was undermined by the short duration of the speeches, the delegitimizing backdrop against which they were delivered, the increasing stumbles Mubarak made, the discrepancy between the linguistic content of some of his messages and his paralinguistic performance of them, and the poor direction and montage of the speeches. Finally, the overall pragmatic function performed by the speeches was weakened by their interpersonal detachment and communicative incompetence. Mubarak's *language of collapsing power* was, therefore, an apprehensive, weak, collapsing language.

Within this context of analysing Mubarak's *language of collapsing power*, this thesis has added three theoretical and methodological contributions to knowledge: it has established a triangulatory, interdisciplinary dialogue among otherwise competing and almost non-conversing disciplines, i.e. Cognitive Linguistics, Critical Discourse Analysis, Argumentation, and multi-modal semiotics, and has introduced the new pragmatic notion of *Classifying WE* and the new cognitive-pragmatic concept of *Nested Presuppositions (NestPs)*. Following is a summary of these contributions.

First, the theoretical and methodological triangulation established in this thesis has proven highly successful: the results of the linguistic and cognitive-linguistic analyses have corroborated and dove-tailed with their argumentative, multi-modal, and para-linguistic counterparts: The cognitive-linguistic finding that the most salient structure employed by Mubarak, when he had power, was *Nested Presuppositions* has been confirmed by the argumentative finding that the fallacy most predominantly committed by him, at that stage, was the presumptive, authoritative *petitio principii* (the fallacy of begging the question); those two results have been further corroborated by the deictic finding that the pronoun most frequently used by him was the authoritative, ego-centric first-person singular pronoun *I*. Finally, by analysing the speeches as combinations of written linguistic signs, spoken performances, and visual backdrop prompts, and by relating those semiotic modalities to the value systems of

Mubarak and the people, this thesis has attempted to widen the scope of the ‘language’ of the ‘political enterprise’ to include transmodal, nonverbal semiotic devices that have a communicative potential, and to consider them as dialectically inseparable from the socio-politico-cognitive-linguistic structures within which they were produced and consumed. This thesis has, therefore, moved beyond verbal ‘language’, in an attempt to draw a holistic portrait of the politics of sign in the *language of collapsing power*.

Second, the thesis has filled in the ‘relative rank’ gap identified by Levinson (1983, 2003), the ‘social impoverishment’ gap identified by Harre (1988), and the ‘social relations’ gap identified by Wilson (1990), by introducing the new pragmatic concept of *Classifying WE*, which encodes the relations of power holding between speaker(s) and addressee(s) in a hierarchical structure, that specifies their ranks and anchors them to the contextual socio-political coordinates of the utterance at issue. The *Classifying WE* also addresses the shortcomings of the ‘wandering we’ (Petersoo 2007), in terms of the six aspects of contextualization, structure, function, scope, power relations, and underlying ideologies, by depicting person deixis not as random, contradictory, flat, circular constructs, but as strategic, systematic, complex, hierarchical structures that encode multiple sets of referents, classified according to their varying levels of power or submission and inclusion or exclusion. The *Classifying WE*, therefore, enriches the study and analysis of person deixis, by positioning the pragmatic behaviour of *WE* along the indices of its wider socio-political contexts of production and consumption; by detecting and explaining the relations of power holding between the speaker and the addressee(s) as expressed, suppressed, and negotiated by that ‘problematic’ deictic expression; by problematizing the strategic functions of inclusion and exclusion performed by this ‘highly political’ pronoun; and by uncovering the hidden ideologies that trigger the strategic uses of this deictic pronoun.

Third, the thesis has introduced the new cognitive-pragmatic concept of *Nested Presuppositions* (*NestPs*), which are linguistically, pragmatically, and cognitively misbehaved utterances, tactically engineered to manipulate the cognitive processing systems of the hearer, through their unsubstantiated propositional content, sophisticated information structures, strenuous cognitive behaviour, and manipulative pragmatic functions. The thesis has also developed a relevance-theoretic cognitive model that accounts for their manipulative dynamics.

Given that Cognitive Linguistics has been rapidly taking enormous strides as a major field of Linguistics and Cognitive Science, whereas CDA has been lagging behind (Hart & Cap 2014: 2-15), this thesis can be argued to represent a step in the right direction: both the *Classifying*

WE and *NestPs* have been tested and applied successfully to more than one corpus of speeches, and hence can be nominated as global analytical tools in Cognitive Linguistics, Pragmatics, and CDA.

In conclusion, this thesis has shed some light on the structures of power and dynamics of control exercised by the presidential discourse of a contemporary revolution that has re-shaped not only the present and future of the Middle East, but also the international geo-political map. That strategic language has been problematized not only as autonomous ‘verbal’ objects, but also as situated and interactive social, linguistic, cognitive, logical, and semiotic practices, by mapping the structures of society onto those of language, cognition, argumentation, semiosis, and power. It is a first step towards developing the new theoretical approach of Politico-Linguistics Discourse Analysis, which aims at unitarily demystifying power abuse, by exposing its corresponding patterns of language abuse, and hence enabling the people to recognize the linguistic and multi-modal shackles that have been cuffing their minds, as a first step towards breaking them.

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Appendices
Appendix One
M1
First Speech of Mubarak

1. بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
2. الإخوة المواطنين
3. أتحدثُ اليكم في ظرفٍ دقيق، يفرضُ علينا جميعاً، وقفَةً جادَةً وصادقَةً مع النفس، تتوخى سلامة القصد، وصالحَ الوطن .
4. لقد تابعتُ أولاً بأول التظاهرات، وما ناديتُ به ودعتُ إليه. كانت تعليماتي للحكومة، تُشدُّ على اتاحةِ الفرصةِ أمامها، للتعبير عن آراء المواطنين ومطالبهم.
5. ثم تابعتُ محاولات البعض، لاعتلاء موجةِ هذه التظاهرات، والمتاجرة بشعاراتها، وأسفّت كل الأسف، لما أسفرتُ عنه من ضحايا ابرياء، من المتظاهرين وقوات الشرطة.
6. لقد التزمتُ الحكومة بتنفيذِ هذه التعليمات، وكانَ ذلك واضحاً، في تعاملِ قواتِ الشرطة مع شبابنا، فقد بادرت الى حمايتهم، في بداياتها، احتراماً لحقهم في التظاهر السلمي، طالما، تم في إطار القانون، وقبل أن تتحولَ هذه التظاهرات، لأعمالٍ شغبٍ تهددَ النظامَ العام، وتُعيقُ الحياةَ اليومية للمواطنين.
7. إنَ هذه التظاهرات، وما شهدناه قبلها من وقفاتٍ احتجاجية، خلال الأعوام القليلة الماضية، ما كان لها أن تتم، لولا المساحات العريضة، لحرية الرأي، والتعبير، والصحافة، وغيرها من الحريات،

التي أتاحتها خطوات الإصلاح لأبناء الشعب، ولولا ما تشهده مصر من تفاعلٍ غير مسبوقٍ، لقوى المجتمع.

8. إنني كرئيسٍ للجمهورية، ومقتضى الصلاحيات التي خولها لي الدستور، كحكم بين السلطات، أكدت مراراً وسوف أظل، أن السيادة للشعب، وسوف أتمسك دائماً، بحقه في ممارسة حرية الرأي والتعبير، طالما تم ذلك في إطار الشرعية، واحترام القانون.

9. إن خيطاً رفيعاً يفصل بين الحرية والفوضى، وإنني، إذ أنحاز كل الانحياز، لحرية المواطنين في إبداء آرائهم، أتمسك بذات القدر، بالحفاظ على أمن مصر واستقرارها، وبدعم الانجراف بها وبشعبها، لمنزقات خطيرة، تُهدد النظام العام، والسلام الاجتماعي، ولا يعلم أحد مداها، وتداعياتها، على حاضر الوطن ومستقبله .

10. إن مصر هي أكبر دولة في منطقتها، سكاناً، ودوراً، وثقلاً، وتأثيراً، وهي دولة مؤسسات يحكمها الدستور والقانون، وعلينا أن نحاذر مما يحيط بنا من أمثلة عديدة، انزلت بالشعوب إلى الفوضى والانتكاس، فلا ديمقراطية حققت، ولا استقراراً حَفِظَتْ.

11. أيها الإخوة المواطنين

12. لقد جاءت هذه التظاهرات، لتعبرَ عن تطلعاتٍ مشروعةٍ لمزيدٍ من الديمقراطية، والمزيد من

الاسراع في جهودِ محاصرةِ البطالة، وتحسينِ مستوى المعيشة، ومكافحةِ الفقر، والتصدي بكلِ

حسمٍ للفساد.

13. إنني، أعي هذه التطلعاتِ المشروعةِ للشعب، وأعلمُ جيداً، قدرَ همومهِ ومعاناته. لم أنفصلَ عنها

يوماً، وأعملُ من أجلها كلَّ يومٍ، لكنَّ ما نواجهه من مشكلاتٍ، وما نسعى إليه من اهدافٍ، لن يحقُّقه

اللجوءُ الى العنف، ولن تصنعهُ الفوضى، وإنما يحقُّقه، ويصنعهُ، الحوارُ الوطني، والعملُ، المخلصُ

الجاد.

14. إنَّ شبابَ مصر، هو أعلى ما لديها، وهي تتطلعُ إليهم (كنن) كي يصنعوا مُستقبلها، وتربياً بهم، أن

يندسَ بينهم من يسعى لنشرِ الفوضى، ونهبِ الممتلكاتِ العامةِ والخاصة، وإشعالِ الحرائق، وهدمِ

ما بنيناه.

15. إنَّ اقتناعي ثابتٌ لا يتزعزعُ، بمواصلةِ الاصلاحِ السياسي، والاقتصادي، والاجتماعي، من اجلِ

مجتمعٍ مصري، حرٍّ وديمقراطي، يحتضنُ قيمَ العصر، وينفتحُ على العالم.

16. لقد (إنحز) إنحزتُ وسوف أظل، للفقراءِ من ابناءِ الشعبِ على الدوام، مقتنعاً، بأنَّ الاقتصادَ أكبرُ

وأخطرُ من أن يُتركَ للاقتصاديينَ وحدهم، وحرصتُ على ضبطِ سياساتِ الحكومة، للإصلاحِ

الاقتصادي ، كي لا تمضي بأسرعٍ مما يحتملُهُ ابناءُ الشعب، أو بما يزيدُ من معاناتهم .

17. إنَّ برنامِجنا لمحاصرة البطالة، وإتاحة المزيد، من خَدَماتِ التعلِيم، والصحة، والإسكان، وغيرها

للشبابِ والمواطنين، تظلُّ رهناً بالحفاظِ على مِصر، مستقرةً وأمنة، وطناً لشعبٍ متحضّرٍ وعريقٍ،

لا يضعُ مكتسباته وأماله للمستقبل، في مهبِّ الريح.

18. إنَّ ما حدث، خلالَ هذه التظاهرات، يتجاوزُ ما حدثَ من نهبٍ وفوضى وحرائق، لمخططٍ أبعدَ من

ذلك، لزراعةِ الاستقرار، والانقضاءِ على الشرعية.

19. إنني أهيبُ بشبابنا، وبكلِّ مصريٍّ ومصرية، مراعاةَ صالحِ الوطن، وأن يتصدُّوا لحمايةِ وطنهم،

ومكتسباتهم، فليس بإشعالِ الحرائق، والاعتداءِ على الممتلكاتِ العامةِ والخاصة، تتحقَّق تطلعاتُ

مِصرَ وأبنائها، وإنما، تتحقَّق هذه التطلعات، للمستقبلِ الأفضل، بالوعي، والحوار، والاجتهاد، من

أجلِ الوطن.

20. أيها الإخوه المواطنون

21. إنني لا أتحدثُ اليكم اليوم، كرئيسٍ للجمهوريةِ فحسب وإنما كمصريٍّ، شاءتِ الأقدارُ أن يتحملَ

مسئوليةَ هذا الوطن، وأمضى حياته من أجله، حرباً وسلاماً.

22. لقد اجتزنا معاً من قبل، أوقاتاً صعبةً، تغلبنا عليها، عندما واجهناها كأمةٍ واحدةٍ وشعبٍ واحدٍ،

وعندما عرفنا طريقنا، ووجهتنا، وحددنا ما نسعى إليه، من أهدافٍ.

23. إنَّ طريقَ الإصلاحِ الذي اخترناه، لا رجوعَ عنه، أو ارتدادٍ الى الوراءِ، سنمضي عليه بخطواتٍ

جديدةً، تؤكِّدُ احترامنا لاستقلالِ القضاءِ وأحكامِهِ، خطواتٍ جديدةً، نحوَ المزيدِ من الديمقراطيةِ،

والمزيدِ من الحريةِ للمواطنينِ، خطواتٍ جديدةً لمحاصرةِ البطالةِ، ورفعِ مستوى المعيشةِ، وتطويرِ

الخدماتِ، وخطواتٍ جديدةً للوقوفِ إلى جانبِ الفقراءِ، ومحدودي الدخلِ.

24. إنَّ خيارَاتنا وأهدافنا، هي التي ستحدُّ مصائرنا ومستقبلنا، وليسَ أمامنا من سبيلٍ لتحقيقها، سوى

بالوعي، والعملِ و(الكف) الكفاحِ، نُحافظُ على ما حققناه، ونبني عليه، ونرعى في عقولنا وضمائرنا

مستقبلَ الوطنِ.

25. إنَّ أحداثَ اليومِ، والأيامِ القليلةِ الماضيةِ، ألقتْ في قلوبِ الأغلبيةِ الكاسحةِ من أبناءِ الشعبِ، الخوفَ

على مصرِ، ومستقبلِها، والتحسبَ من الانجرافِ الى المزيدِ من العنفِ، والفوضى، والتدميرِ،

والتخريبِ.

26. وإنَّني (محملاً) مُحملاً مسؤوليتي الأولى، في الحفاظِ على أمنِ الوطنِ والمواطنينِ، لن أسمحَ

بذلكَ أبداً، لن أسمحَ لهذا الخوفِ أن يستحوذَ على مواطنينا، ولهذا التحسبِ، أن يلقيَ بظلاله على

مصيرنا، ومستقبلنا.

27. لقد طلبتُ من الحكومةِ، التقدمَ باستقالتيها اليومِ، وسوفَ أكلفُ الحكومةَ الجديدةَ، اعتباراً من الغدِ،

بتكليفاتٍ واضحةٍ ومحددةٍ، للتعاملِ الحاسمِ مع أولوياتِ، المرحلةِ الراهنةِ، وأقولُ من جديدٍ، أنني لنُ

أتْهَونُ في اتْخاِذِ أَيْةِ قَراراتِ، تحْفِظُ لِكُلِّ مِصرِيٍّ ومِصرِيَّةً، أَمَنَهُمُ، وأَمانَهُمُ، وسوْفَ أَدافِعُ عَن أَمَنِ
مِصرَ واستَقْرارِها، وأَمانِ شَعْبِها، فَتَلِكُ هِيَ المَسْئولِيَةُ والأَمانَةُ، الَّتِي أَقسَمْتُ يَمِيناً، أَمامَ اللّهِ والوَطَنِ،
بِالمَحافِظَةِ عَلَيا.

28. حَفِظَ اللّهُ مِصرَ، وشَعْبَها، وسَدَدَ عَلى الطَّرِيقِ خَطاناً، والسَّلَامُ عَلَياكمُ ورَحْمَةُ اللّهِ وبِركاتُهُ .

Appendix Two
M2
Second Speech of Mubarak

1. بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
2. الإخوة المواطنين
3. أتحدثُ إليكم، في أوقاتٍ صعبة، تمتحنُ مصرَ وشعبَها، وتكادُ أن تنجرفَ بها وبهم، إلى المجهول.
4. يتعرضُ الوطنُ لأحداثٍ عصبية، واختباراتٍ قاسية، بدأتُ بشبابٍ ومواطنينَ شرفاء، مارسوا حقهم في التظاهرِ السلمي، تعبيراً عن همومهم، وتطلعاتهم، سرعان ما استغلهم، من سعي لإشاعةِ الفوضى، واللجوءِ إلى العنفِ والمواجهة، وللقفزِ على الشرعيةِ الدستورية، والانقضاضِ عليها.
5. تحولت تلك التظاهرات، من مظهرٍ راقٍ ومتحضرٍ، لممارسةِ حريةِ الرأي والتعبيرِ، إلى مواجهاتٍ مؤسفة، تُحرِّكها وتهمينُ عليها قويٌّ سياسية، سعتُ إلي التصعيدِ وصبِ الزيتِ على النار، واستهدفتُ أمنَ الوطنِ واستقراره، بأعمالِ اثاره وتحريض، وسلبٍ ونهب، واشعالٍ للحرائق، وقطعٍ للطرق، واعتداءً على مرافقِ الدولة، والممتلكاتِ العامةِ والخاصة، واقتحامٍ لبعضِ البعثاتِ الدبلوماسية، على أرضِ مصر.

6. نعيشُ معاً أياماً مؤلمةً، وأكثرَ ما يوجعُ قلوبنا، هو الخوفُ الذي انتابَ الأغلبيةَ الكاسحةَ من المصريين، وما ساورهم من انزعاجٍ وقلقٍ وهواجسٍ، حولَ ما سيأتي بهِ الغدُ، لهم، ولذويهم، وعائلاتهم، ومستقبلِ ومصيرِ بلدهم.
7. إن أحداثِ الأيامِ القليلةِ الماضيةِ، تفرضُ علينا جميعاً، شعباً وقيادةً، الاختيارَ ما بينَ الفوضى والاستقرارِ، وتطرُحُ أمامنا ظروفاً جديدةً، وواقعاً مصرياً مغايراً، يتعينُ أن يتعاملَ معه شعبنا، وقواتنا المسلحة، بأقصى قدرٍ من الحكمةِ، والحرصِ على مصالحِ مصرِ، وأبنائها.
8. ايها الإخوة المواطنون
9. لقد بادرتُ لتشكيلِ حكومةٍ جديدةٍ، بأولوياتٍ وتكليفاتٍ جديدةٍ، تتجاوبُ مع مطالبِ شبابنا ورسالتهم، وكلفتُ نائبَ رئيسِ الجمهورية، بالحوارِ مع كافةِ القوي السياسية، حولَ كافةِ القضايا المثارة، للإصلاحِ السياسيِّ والديمقراطيِّ، وما يتطلُّبه من تعديلاتٍ دستوريةٍ وتشريعيةٍ، من أجلِ تحقيقِ هذه المطالبِ المشروعة، واستعادةِ الهدوءِ، والأمنِ، والاستقرارِ.
10. لكنَّ هناكَ من القوي السياسية، من رفضَ هذه الدعوةَ للحوارِ، تمسكاً بأجنداتهم الخاصة، ودونَ مراعاةٍ للظرفِ الدقيقِ الراهنِ، لمصرَ وشعبها، وبالنظرِ لهذا الرفضِ، لدعوتي للحوارِ، وهي دعوةٌ لاتزالُ قائمةً، فإنني أتوجهُ بحديثي اليومِ، مباشرةً لأبناءِ الشعبِ، بفلاحيه، وعماله، مسلميه،

وأقباطه، شيوخه، وشبابه، ولكل مصري ومصرية، في ريف الوطن ومدنه، على اتساع أرضه
ومحافظاته .

11. إنني لم أكن يوماً طالب سلطة أو جاه، ويعلم الشعب الظروف العصبية، التي تحملت فيها المسؤولية،
وما قدمته للوطن، حرباً وسلاماً. كما أنني رجلٌ من أبناء قواتنا المسلحة، وليس من طبعي، خيانة
الأمانة، أو التخلي عن الواجب والمسئولية. إنَّ مسئوليتي الأولى الآن، هي استعادة أمن واستقرار
الوطن، لتحقيق الانتقال السلمي للسلطة، في أجواء تحمي مصرَ والمصريين، وتتيح تسلم المسؤولية
لمن يختاره الشعب في الانتخابات الرئاسية المقبلة.

12. وأقول بكل الصدق، وبصرف النظر عن الظرف الراهن، أني لم أكن أنتوي الترشح لفترة رئاسية
جديدة، فقد قضيتُ ما يكفي من العمر، في خدمة مصرَ وشعبها، لكنني الآن، حريصٌ كل الحرص
على أن أختتم عملي من أجل الوطن، بما يضمن تسليم أمانته ورايته، ومصرَ عزيزةً آمنةً مستقرة،
وبما يحفظُ الشرعية ويحترم الدستور.

13. أقولُ بعبارات واضحة، أنني سأعملُ خلال الأشهر المتبقية، من ولايتي الحالية، كي يتم اتخاذ التدابير
والإجراءات، المحققة للانتقال السلمي للسلطة، بموجب ما يخوله لي الدستور، من صلاحيات.

14. إنني أدعو البرلمان بمجلسيه، إلي مناقشة تعديل المادتين "76" و"77" من الدستور، بما يعدلُ

شروط الترشح لرئاسة الجمهورية، ويعتمد فترات محددة للرئاسة.

15. ولكي يتمكن البرلمان الحالي بمجلسيه، من مناقشة هذه التعديلات الدستورية، وما يرتبط بها من

تعديلات تشريعية، للقوانين المكملة للدستور، وضماناً لمشاركة كافة القوى السياسية، في هذه

المناقشات فإنني أطلبُ البرلمان، بالالتزام بكلمة القضاء وأحكامه، في الطعون على الانتخابات

التشريعية الأخيرة، دون إبطاء.

16. سوف أوالي متابعة تنفيذ الحكومة الجديدة لتكليفاتها، على نحو يحقق المطالب المشروعة للشعب،

وأن يأتي أداؤها، معبراً عن الشعب، وتطلعاً للإصلاح السياسي، والاقتصادي، والاجتماعي،

ولإتاحة فرص العمل، ومكافحة الفقر، وتحقيق العدالة الاجتماعية.

17. وفي ذات السياق، إنني أكلفُ جهازَ الشرطة، بالاضطلاع بدوره في خدمة الشعب، وحماية

المواطنين، بنزاهةٍ وشرفٍ وأمانة، وبالاحترام الكامل، لحقوقهم، وحياتهم، وكرامتهم .

18. كما إنني أطلبُ السلطات الرقابية والقضائية، بأن تتخذَ على الفور، ما يلزم من إجراءات لمواصلة

ملاحقة الفاسدين، والتحقيق مع المتسببين، فيما شهدته مصرُ من انفلاتٍ أمني، (ومن) ومن قاموا

بأعمال السلب والنهب، واشعال النيران، وترويع الأمنين.

19. ذلك هو عهدي للشعب، خلال الأشهر المتبقية من ولايتي الحالية، أدعو الله، أن يوفقني في الوفاء

به، كي أختتم عطائي لمصرَ وشعبها، بما يرضي الله والوطن، وأبناءه .

20. ايها الإخوة المواطنين

21. ستخرج مصر من الظرف من الظروف الراهنة، أقوى مما كانت عليه قبلها، أكثر ثقة وتماسكاً

واستقراراً، سيخرج منها شعباً، وهو أكثر وعياً بما يحقق مصالحه، وأكثر حرصاً على عدم

التفريط في مصيره ومستقبله.

22. إنَّ حسني مبارك الذي يتحدث إليكم اليوم، يعتز بما قضاؤه من سنين طويلة، في خدمة مصر وشعبها،

إنَّ هذا الوطن، العزيز، هو وطني، مثلما هو وطن كل مصري ومصرية، فيه عشت، وحاربت من

أجله، ودافعت عن أرضه، وسيادته، ومصالحه، وعلى أرضه أموت، وسيحكم التاريخ على وعلى

غيري، بما لنا أو علينا.

23. إنَّ الوطن باقٍ، والأشخاص زائلون، ومصر العريقة هي الخالدة أبداً، تنتقل رايثها وأمانتها بين

سواعد أبنائها، وعلينا، أن نضمن تحقيق ذلك بعزة ورفعة وكرامه، جيلاً، بعد جيل. حفظ الله هذا

الوطن، وشعبه

24. والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

Appendix Three
M3
Third Speech of Mubarak

1. بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم.
2. الإخوة المواطنين،
3. الأبناء شباب مصر وشاباتها، أتوجه بحديثي اليوم، لشباب مصر، بميدان التحرير، وعلى اتساع أرضها، أتوجه إليكم جميعاً بحديث من القلب، حديث الأب لأبنائه وبناته، أقول لكم، إنني أعتز بكم، رمزاً لجيل مصري جديد، يدعو إلى التغيير إلى الأفضل، ويتمسك به، ويحلم بالمستقبل، ويصنعه.
4. أقول (لك) لكم قبل كل شيء، أن دمء شهدائكم وجرحاكم لن تضيع هدرا، وأؤكد، أنني لن أتهاون، في معاقبة المتسببين عنها، بكل الشدة والحسم، وسأحاسب الذين أجرموا في حق شبابنا، بأقصى ما تقرره أحكام القانون، من عقوبات رادعة. وأقول، لعائلات هؤلاء الضحايا الأبرياء، أنني تألمت كل الألم، من أجلهم، مثلما تألمتم، وأوجع قلبي ما حدث لهم، كما أوجع قلوبكم
5. أقول لكم، أن استجابتي لصوتكم ورسالتكم ومطالبكم، هو التزام لا رجعة فيه، وإنني، عازم كل العزم، على الوفاء بما تعهدتُ به، بكل الجدية، والصدق، وحريص كل الحرص، على تنفيذه، دون ارتداد، أو عودة الي الوراء.

6. إن هذا الالتزام، ينطلق من اقتناع أكيد، بصدق ونقاء نواياكم، وتحرككم، وبأن مطالبكم، هي مطالب عادلة ومشروعة. فالأخطاء واردة في أي نظام سياسي، وفي أي دولة، لكن المهم هو الاعتراف بها، وتصحيحها في أسرع وقت، ومحاسبة مرتكبيها.
7. وأقول لكم، إنني كرئيس للجمهورية، لا أجد حرجاً أو غصاصة أبداً، في الاستماع لشباب بلادي، والتجاوب معه، لكن الحرج كل الحرج، والعيب كل العيب، وما لم ولن أقبله أبداً، أن أستمع لإملاءات أجنبية تأتي من الخارج، أيًا كانت مصدرها، وأيًا كانت ذرائعها، أو مبرراتها.
8. الأبناء شباب مصر،
9. الإخوة المواطنون
10. لقد أعلنتُ عباراتٍ لا تحتلُّ الجدلَ أو التأويلَ، عدم ترشيحي للانتخابات الرئاسية المقبلة، مكتفياً، بما قدمته من عطاءٍ للوطن، لأكثر من 60 عاماً، في سنوات الحرب والسلام، أعلنتُ تمسكي بذلك، وأعلنتُ تمسكاً مماثلاً، وبذاتِ القدر، بالمضي في النهوضِ بمسؤوليتي، في حماية الدستور، ومصالح الشعب، حتى يتم تسليم السلطة والمسؤولية، لمن يختاره الناخبون، شهر مستقبل سبتمبر المقبل، في انتخابات حرة ونزيهة، توفر لها الضمانات الحرة والنزاهة، ذلك هو القسم الذي أقسمته أمام الله والوطن وسوف أحافظ عليه، حتى نبليغ بمصر وشعبها، بر الأمان.

11. لقد طرحت رؤيةً محددةً للخروج من الأزمة الراهنة، ولتحقيق ما دعا إليه الشباب والمواطنون،

بما يحترم الشرعية الدستورية، ولا يقوضها، وعلى نحو يحقق استقرار مجتمعا، ومطالب أبنائه،

ويطرح في ذات الوقت، إطاراً متفقاً عليه، للانتقال السلمي، للسلطة، من خلال حوارٍ مسؤول، بين

كافة قوى المجتمع، وبأقصى قدرٍ من الصدق، والشفافية .

12. طرحت هذه الرؤية، ملتزماً بمسؤوليتي في الخروج بالوطن من هذه الأوقات العصيبة. وأتابع

المضي في تحقيقها أولاً بأول، بل ساعةً بساعة، متطلعاً لدعم ومساندة كل حريصٍ على مصر

وشعبها، كي ننجح في تحويلها، لواقعٍ ملموس، وفق توافقٍ وطنيٍ عريض، وامتسح القاعدة، تسهراً

على ضمان تنفيذها، قوائماً المسلحةً بالباسلة .

13. لقد بدأنا بالفعل، حواراً وطنياً بناءً، يضم شباب مصر الذين قادوا الدعوة إلى التغيير، وكافة القوى

السياسية، ولقد أسفر هذا الحوار، عن توافقٍ مبدئي، في الآراء والمواقف، يضع أقدامنا على بداية

الطريق الصحيح، للخروج من الأزمة، ويتعين مواصلة الانتقال به من الخطوط العريضة، لما تم

الاتفاق عليه، إلى خريطة طريق واضحة، وبجدول زمني محدد، تمضي يوماً بعد يوم، على طريق

الانتقال السلمي للسلطة، من الآن، وحتى سبتمبر المقبل.

14. إن هذا الحوار الوطني، قد تلاقى حول تشكيل لجنة دستورية، تتولى دراسة التعديلات المطلوبة في

الدستور، وما تفضيه من تعديلات تشريعية، كما تلاقى حول تشكيل لجنة للمتابعة، تتولى متابعة

التفويض الأمين، لما تعهدتُ به أمام الشعب، ولقد حرصتُ، على أن يأتي تشكيلُ كلتا اللجنتين، من الشخصياتِ المصريةِ، المشهودِ لها بالاستقلالِ والتجرد، ومن فقهاءِ القانونِ الدستوري، ورجالِ القضاءِ.

15. وفضلاً عن ذلك، فإنني إزاء ما فقدناه من شهداءٍ من أبناءِ مصر، في أحداثِ مأساويةٍ حزينة، أوجعت قلوبنا، وهزت ضميرَ الوطن، أصدرتُ تعليماتي بسرعةٍ الانتهاءِ من التحقيقات، حول أحداثِ الأسبوعِ الماضي، وإحالة نتائجها على الفور، إلى النائبِ العام، ليتخذَ بشأنها ما يلزم، من إجراءاتٍ قانونيةٍ، رادعةٍ.

16. ولقد تلقيتُ بالأمس التقريرَ الأول، بالتعديلاتِ الدستوريةِ ذاتِ الأولوية، المقترحةً من اللجنة التي شكلتها، من رجالِ القضاءِ وفقهاءِ القانون، لدراسةِ التعديلاتِ الدستوريةِ، والتشريعيةِ المطلوبة. وإنني، تجاوباً مع ما تضمنه تقريرُ اللجنة من مقترحات، ومقتضى الصلاحياتِ المخولة، لرئيسِ الجمهورية، وفقاً للمادة 189 من الدستور، فقد تقدمتُ اليوم، بطلبِ تعديلِ ستِ موادٍ دستورية، هي المواد 76 و 77 و 88 و 93 و 189. فضلاً عن إلغاءِ المادة 179 من الدستور، مع تأكيدِ الاستعداد، للتقدمِ في وقتٍ لاحق، بطلبِ تعديلِ المواد التي تنتهي إليها هذه اللجنة الدستورية، وفق ما تراه، من الدواعي، والمبررات.

17. تستهدف هذه التعديلات ذات الأولوية، تيسير شروط الترشيح لرئاسة الجمهورية، واعتماد عددٍ محددٍ لمدد الرئاسة، تحقيقاً لتداول السلطة، وتعزيز ضوابط الإشراف على الانتخابات، ضماناً لحريتها ونزاهتها، كما تؤكد اختصاص القضاء وحده، بالفصل في صحة وعضوية أعضاء البرلمان، وتعدل شروط وإجراءات طلب تعديل الدستور. أما الاقتراح، بإلغاء المادة 179 من الدستور، فإنه يستهدف تحقيق التوازن المطلوب، بين حماية الوطن، من مخاطر الإرهاب، وضمان احترام الحقوق والحريات، المدنية للمواطنين، بما يفتح الباب، أمام إيقاف العمل بقانون الطوارئ، فور استعادة الهدوء والاستقرار، وتوافر الظروف المواتية، لرفع حالة الطوارئ.

18. الإخوة المواطنين

19. إن الأولوية الآن، هي استعادة الثقة بين المصريين بعضهم البعض، والثقة في اقتصادنا وسمعتنا الدولية، والثقة في أن التغيير والتحول الذي بدأناه، لا ارتداد عنه، أو رجعة فيه.

20. إن مصر تجتاز أوقاتاً صعبة، لا يصح أن نسمح باستمرارها، فيزداد ما ألحقته بنا وباقتصادنا، من أضرارٍ وخسائر، يوماً بعد يوم، وينتهي بمصر الأمر، لأوضاعٍ، يُصبح معها الشباب الذين دعوا إلى التغيير والإصلاح، أول المتضررين منها.

21. إن اللحظة الراهنة، ليست متعلقةً بشخصي، ليست متعلقةً بحسني مبارك، وإنما بات الأمر متعلقاً بمصر، في حاضرها، ومستقبل أبنائها. إن المصريين جميعاً في خندقٍ واحدٍ الآن، وعلينا، أن

نواصل الحوارَ الوطني الذي بدأناه، بروح الفريق وليسَ الفرقاء، وبعيداً، عن الخلافِ، والتناحر،
كي تتجاوزَ مصرَ أزمتهَا الراهنة، ولنعيدَ لاقتصادنا الثقةَ فيه، ولمواطنينا الاطمئنانَ والأمانَ،
وللشارعِ المصري، حياته اليومية الطبيعية.

22. لقد كنتُ شاباً مثلَ شبابِ مصرَ الآن، عندما تعلمتُ شرفَ العسكريةِ المصرية، والولاءَ للوطنِ،
والتضحيةِ من أجله، أفنيتُ عمراً، دفاعاً عن أرضهِ وسيادته، شهدتُ حروبهُ، بهزائمها،
وانتصاراتها، عشتُ أيامَ الانكسارِ والاحتلال، وأيامَ العبورِ، والنصرِ والتحرير، أسعدُ أيامَ حياتي،
يومَ رفعتُ علمَ مصرَ فوقَ سيناء، واجهتُ الموتَ مراتٍ عديدة، طياراً، وفي أديس أبابا، وغير ذلكَ
كثير، لم أخضع يوماً لضغوطٍ أجنبيةٍ أو إماءاتٍ، حافظتُ على السلام، عملتُ من أجلِ أمنِ مصرَ
واستقرارها، اجتهدتُ من أجلِ نهضتها، ومن أجلِ ابنائها، لم أسع يوماً لسلطةٍ أو شعبيةٍ زائفة،
أثقُ، أنَّ الأغلبيةَ الكاسحةَ من أبناءِ الشعب، يعرفونَ من هو حسني مبارك، ويُجزُّ في نفسي، ما
الأقايه اليوم، من بعض، بني وطني.

23. وعلى أية حال، فإنني إذ أعني تماماً خطورةَ المفترقِ الصعبِ الحالي، واقتناعاً من جانبي بأنَ مصرَ
تجتازُ لحظةً، فارقةً في تاريخها، تفرضُ علينا جميعاً، تغليبَ المصلحةِ العليا للوطن، وأن نضعَ
مصرَ أولاً، فوقَ أي اعتبارٍ، وكل اعتبارٍ آخر، فقد رأيتُ تفويضَ نائبِ رئيسِ الجمهورية، في
اختصاصاتِ رئيسِ الجمهورية، على النحو الذي، يحدده الدستور.

24. إنني أعلم علم اليقين، أن مصرَ سوف تتجاوزُ أزمَتَها. لن تنكسرَ إرادةُ شعبِها، ستقفُ على أقدامِها

من جديدٍ، بصدقٍ وإخلاصٍ أبنائها، كلُّ أبنائها، وستردُّ كيدَ الكائدين، وشماتةَ الشامتين.

25. سنثبتُ نحنُ المصريين، قدرتناً على تحقيقِ مطالبِ الشعب، بالحوارِ المتحضرِ والواعي، سنثبتُ

أننا لسنا أتباعاً لأحد، ولا نأخذُ تعليماتٍ من أحد، وأن أحداً لا يصنعُ لنا قراراتنا، سوى نبضِ الشارع،

ومطالبُ أبناءِ الوطن.

26. سنثبتُ ذلك، بروحٍ وعزمِ المصريين، وبوحدةٍ وتماسكٍ هذا الشعب، وبتمسكنا بعزةِ مصر،

وكرامتها، وهويتها الفريدةُ والخالدة، فهي أساسُ وجودنا وجوهْرُه، لأكثرِ من سبعةِ آلافِ عام.

27. ستعيشُ هذه الروحُ فينا ما دامت مصرُ وشعبُها، ستعيشُ هذه الروحُ فينا ما دامت مصرُ ودامَ شعبُها،

ستعيشُ في كلِّ واحدٍ من فلاحينا وعمالنا، ومتقينا، ستبقى في قلوبِ شيوخنا، وشبابنا وأطفالنا،

مسلميهِم وأقباطيهِم، وفي عقولِ وضمائرِ من لم يولد بعد، من أبنائنا.

28. أقولُ من جديد، أنني عشتُ من أجلِ هذا الوطن، حافظاً لمسؤوليتهِ وأمانتهِ، وستظلُّ مصر، هي

الباقية، فوقَ الأشخاصِ وفوقَ الجميع، ستبقى حتى اسلمَ امانتها ورايتها، هي الهدفُ والغاية،

والمسؤوليةُ والواجب، بدايةُ العمر، ومشواره، ومنتهاه، وارضُ المحيا والممات، ستظلُّ بلداً عزيزاً،

لا يفارقني أو أفارقه، حتى يواريني ترابه وثراره، وستظلُّ شعباً كريماً يبقى ابدَ الدهر، مرفوع

الرأس، والراية، موفورَ العزةِ والكرامة.

29. حَفِظَ اللهُ مِصرَ، بِلِدًا اَمْنًا، وَرَعَى شَعْبَهُ، وَسَدَدَ عَلَيِ الطَّرِيقِ خِطَاهُ.

30. وَالسَّلَامُ عَلَيكُمْ وَرَحْمَةُ اللهِ وَبَرَكَاتُهُ.

Appendix Four
M4
Translation of the First Speech

- 1- In the name of Allah, the Most Compassionate the Most Merciful
- 2- Brother citizens
- 3- I am addressing you in a delicate situation, that forces upon us all a serious and honest stance with the self, that seeks good intent and the interests of the homeland.
- 4- I have indeed closely followed up the protests and what they advocated and called for; my instructions to the government emphasized giving them the opportunity to express the opinions and demands of the people.
- 5- Then, I followed up the attempts of some people to take a free ride of the wave of those protests and to trade on their slogans, and I was sorry all the sorrow for the innocent victims, from the protesters and the police, who died as a result.
- 6- The government has indeed committed itself to implementing these directives, as evidenced in the way the police dealt with our youth and rushed to protect them, at the beginning, in respect of their right to protest peacefully within the framework of law, before these demonstrations turned into acts of riot, threatening public order and obstructing the daily life of citizens.
- 7- Indeed, these demonstrations as well as the protesting stands we witnessed over the past few years would have never happened, had it not been for the wide spaces of freedom of expression, opinion, and press, and the other freedoms that have been made available to the people by the steps of reform, and by the unprecedented interaction among the forces of society that Egypt is witnessing now.
- 8- I, in my capacity as the president of the republic, and by virtue of the powers conferred upon me by the constitution as the arbitrator among authorities, have indeed reiterated frequently, and will continue to do so, that sovereignty is to the people, and I will always adhere to their right to exercise the freedoms of opinion and expression, as long as it is practiced within the framework of legitimacy and respect of the law.
- 9- A fine line is indeed separating between freedom and anarchy. While I side completely with the freedom of citizens to express their opinions, I adhere, as strongly, to safeguarding the security and stability of Egypt and not allowing it and its people to be over-swept to dangerous slippery slopes that threaten public order and social peace, and have unknown scope and repercussions on the present and future of the homeland.
- 10- Egypt is indeed the biggest country in its region, in terms of population, role, weight, and influence, a country of institutions, governed by the constitution and the rule of law. We have to be cautious of the many examples, around us, which slid the people towards chaos and setback, without achieving democracy or maintaining stability.
- 11- O brother citizens,

- 12- These demonstrations have indeed aimed at expressing legitimate aspirations towards more democracy and more acceleration of the efforts of besieging unemployment, improving living standards, fighting poverty, and confronting corruption decisively.
- 13- I am indeed aware of these legitimate aspirations of the people; I know well the amount of their pain and suffering. I have never been detached from them for a single day, and I work on solving them every day. But, the problems we are facing and the goals we are aspiring to will not be achieved by resorting to violence, nor will they be accomplished by chaos, but will be achieved and established by national dialogue and sincere, hard work.
- 14- The youth of Egypt are indeed the dearest it has and it is looking up at them to make its future and it is distancing them from allowing to sneak among them those who seek to spread anarchy, plunder public and private properties, set arson attacks, and knock down what we have built.
- 15- My conviction is indeed unshakably firm in continuing the political, economic, and social reform, for the sake of a free, democratic Egyptian society that embraces modern values and opens up to the world.
- 16- I have indeed taken the side of the poor people, all the time, and I will continue to do so, because I am convinced that economy is too big and dangerous to be left to economists alone. And I have been keen on regulating the economic reform policies of the government, so as not to let them proceed at a pace faster than what the sons of the people can endure or at one that might increase their suffering.
- 17- Our program to besiege unemployment and provide more services of education, health, housing, ... etc. to the youth and citizens does remain contingent upon keeping Egypt stable and secure, a homeland of modern, civilized people who do not let their earnings and future aspirations twist in the wind.
- 18- What has happened during those demonstrations goes indeed beyond the looting, chaos, and arsons that took place to represent a plot aiming at shaking stability and preying on legitimacy.
- 19- I am indeed calling upon our youth and upon every Egyptian man and woman to consider the interest of the homeland and to stand up for protecting their homeland and their earnings. It is not by setting fires and vandalizing public and private properties that the aspirations of Egypt and its sons can be achieved, but those aspirations towards a better future can be achieved by awareness, dialogue, and endeavour for the sake of the homeland.
- 20- O brother citizens,
- 21- I am indeed not addressing you today as a President of the republic only, but indeed as an Egyptian man whom fate has decided to assign the responsibility of this homeland and who exhausted his life for its sake, in war and peace.
- 22- We have indeed survived hard times together; we have surmounted them when we faced them as one nation and one people, and when we knew our way and our destination and specified our targets.

- 23- The road to reform we have chosen knows no retrogradation nor retrogression. We will go down it with new steps that confirm our respect for the independence of the judiciary and its verdicts; new steps towards more democracy and more freedom to the citizens; new steps to besiege unemployment, raise living standards, and improve services; and new steps towards standing beside the poor and those on low income.
- 24- Our choices and goals are indeed what will determine our fates and future; we have no way to achieve them other than awareness, work, and struggle, maintaining what we have achieved, building on it, and keeping in our minds and consciences the future of the homeland.
- 25- The incidents of today and the past few days have indeed cast within the hearts of the overwhelming majority of the sons of the people fear for Egypt and its future and apprehension about being over-swept towards more violence, chaos, destruction, and sabotage.
- 26- Shouldering my first responsibility of safeguarding the security of the homeland and citizens, I will never ever allow that. I will never allow this fear to obsess our citizens nor this apprehension to cast its shadows on our destiny and future.
- 27- I have indeed requested the government to submit its resignation today and will charge the new government effective tomorrow with clear and precise instructions for dealing decisively with the priorities of the current stage. I am saying it again: I will not indeed hesitate to take any decisions that safeguard the security and safety of every Egyptian man and woman and I will defend the security and stability of Egypt and the safety of its people. That is the responsibility and the trust I have taken the oath in front of Allah and the homeland to safeguard.
- 28- May Allah safeguard Egypt and its people and guide our steps towards the right path
- 29- and peace, mercy, and blessings of Allah be upon you.

Appendix Five
M5
Translation of the Second Speech

- 1- In the name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful
- 2- Brother Citizens,
- 3- I am addressing you at critical times that are testing Egypt and its people and are about to over-sweep both of them into the unknown.
- 4- The homeland is experiencing grave events and tough tests, started by honorable youth and citizens who exercised their right to protest peacefully and express their concerns and aspirations, but they were soon exploited by those who sought to spread chaos and resort to violence and confrontation, in order to jump over constitutional legitimacy and pounce upon it.
- 5- Those protests were turned from an elegant and civilized manifestation of practicing freedoms of opinion and expression to unfortunate confrontations, steered and controlled by political forces that sought escalation, poured oil on fire, and targeted the security and stability of the homeland, through acts of provocation, incitement, robbery, looting, arsons, road-blocking, vandalization of state utilities and public and private properties, and storming some diplomatic missions in Egypt.
- 6- We are living together painful days. What aches our hearts most is the fear that has possessed the over-sweeping majority of Egyptians and what preoccupied them of concern, anxiety, and premonition of what might befall them, their families, and relatives the following day; and of the future and destiny of their country.
- 7- The events of the last few days do impose upon us all, people and leadership, choosing between chaos or stability, and set in front of us new circumstances and a different Egyptian reality, with which our people and armed forces have to deal with the utmost possible levels of wisdom and keenness on the interests of Egypt and its sons.
- 8- O brother citizens
- 9- I have indeed taken the initiative of forming a new government, with new priorities and instructions, that respond to the demands of our youth and their message, and I instructed the vice-president to hold dialogue with all the political forces, about all the raised issues of political and democratic reform, and what it requires of constitutional and legislative amendments in order to realize those legitimate demands and restore peace, security, and stability.
- 10- But, there are some of the political forces who have declined this invitation to dialogue, sticking to their private agendas, with no consideration of the current delicate circumstance of Egypt and its people. In response to that declination, of my invitation to dialogue, an invitation that is still extended, I am indeed addressing my speech today directly to the sons of the people, their farmers and workers, their Muslims and Christians, their elderly people and youth, and to every Egyptian man and woman in the countryside, cities, and governorates all over the country.

- 11- I have indeed never been a seeker of authority or power, for one day, and the people know the critical circumstances at which I shouldered responsibility, and what I have offered the homeland in war and peace. Also, I am indeed a man of the sons of our armed forces; it is not in my nature to betray trust or abandon duty and responsibility. My primary responsibility now is indeed restoring the security and stability of the homeland, in order to ensure the peaceful transition of power, in circumstances that protect Egypt and Egyptians and allow receiving the responsibility to whoever the people would choose in the coming presidential elections.
- 12- I am saying with all the truthfulness, and regardless of the current circumstance, that I was not intending to run for a new presidential term, as I have indeed spent enough of my life at the service of Egypt and its people. But now I am indeed keen, all the keenness, (emotional tone) to conclude my work for the homeland in a manner that ensures handing over its trust and banner, while Egypt is honoured, secure, and stable, and in a manner that safeguards legitimacy and respects the constitution.
- 13- I am saying in unequivocal sentences that I will work in the remaining months of my current term in order for the precautions and measures necessary for the peaceful transition of power to be taken, according to the powers conferred on me by the Constitution.
- 14- I do invite the parliament in both its chambers to discuss amending articles 76 and 77 of the Constitution, in order to amend the conditions of nomination for presidential elections and set specific term limits.
- 15- In order for the current parliament, in both its chambers, to be able to discuss these constitutional amendments as well as the related legislative amendments of the laws that complement the Constitution, and in order to ensure the participation of all political forces in these discussions, I do demand the parliament to abide by the word and verdicts of the judiciary, on the legal contestations made against the latest legislative elections, without delay.
- 16- I will continue following up on the new government's execution of its assigned duties, in a manner that realizes the legitimate demands of the people, and ensures that its performance expresses the people and their aspirations to establishing political, economic, and social reform; securing job opportunities; fighting poverty; and realizing social justice.
- 17- Within the same context, I do instruct the police apparatus with carrying out its duty in serving the people and protecting the citizens with integrity, honor, and faithfulness and with the complete respect for their rights, freedoms, and dignity.
- 18- I also do demand the judicial and supervisory authorities to immediately take what is necessary of measures to continue pursuing the corrupt and investigating the causers of what Egypt witnessed of security disarray and the perpetrators of the acts of robbery, looting, arsons, and terrorization of the peaceful people.
- 19- That is my pledge to the people during the remaining months of my current term. I pray to Allah to help me fulfil it, so as to conclude my offering to Egypt and its people in a way that satisfies Allah, the homeland, and its sons.

- 20- O brother citizens
- 21- Egypt will survive these current circumstances stronger than it was before: more confident, cohesive, and stable. Our people will survive it more aware of what realizes their interests and keener on not waiving their destiny and future.
- 22- Hosni Mubarak who is speaking to you today is indeed proud of the long years he has spent at the service of Egypt and its people. This dear homeland is indeed my homeland, as it is the homeland of every Egyptian man and woman. In it, I have lived; I have fought for its sake; I have defended its land, sovereignty, and interests; and on its soil I die, and history will judge me as well as others by our merits and demerits.
- 23- The homeland is indeed everlasting, but persons are ephemeral, and noble Egypt is forever eternal; its banner and trust passing among the arms of its sons, and we are responsible for ensuring that this is taking place with pride, honor, and dignity, one generation after another.
- 24- May Allah safeguard this homeland and its people!
- 25- Peace and blessing of Allah be upon you

Appendix Six
M6
Translation of the Third Speech

- 1- In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate
- 2- Brother citizens
- 3- The sons, male and female youth of Egypt: I am addressing my speech today to the youth of Egypt, in Tahrir Square, and all over the country. I am addressing you all with a speech from the heart, a speech of the father to his sons and daughters. I am saying to you that I am indeed proud of you as a symbol of a new Egyptian generation, that calls for change to the better and adheres to it, and dreams of the future and makes it.
- 4- I am saying to you before everything that the bloods of your martyrs and injured ones will indeed not go down the drain; I confirm that I will not be lenient in punishing its perpetrators with all fierceness and decisiveness; and I will punish those who committed crimes against our youth with the most deterrent sentences stipulated by the law. I am saying to the families of those innocent victims that I was indeed pained all the pain for them, as you were pained, and my heart was ached by what happened to them, as your hearts were ached.
- 5- I am saying to you that my response to your voice, message, and demands is an irrevocable commitment, and I am indeed determined, all the determination, to fulfil what I promised, with all seriousness and sincerity, and I am keen, all the keenness, on implementing it with no return or retreat.
- 6- This commitment does stem from a firm conviction of the sincerity and purity of your intentions and movement and that your demands are indeed fair and legitimate demands. Mistakes are likely to happen in any political system and in any country, but the important thing is admitting them, correcting them as soon as possible, and holding those who made them to account.
- 7- I am indeed saying to you, in my capacity as a president of the republic that I do not find any embarrassment or shame at all in listening to the youth of my country and responding to them, but the embarrassment, all the embarrassment, and the shame, all the shame, and what I did not and will not ever accept is to listen to foreign dictations that are coming from abroad, regardless of their source, and regardless of their pretexts or justifications.
- 8- The sons, youth of Egypt,
- 9- Brother citizens,
- 10- I have indeed stated in sentences that do not allow misinterpretation or argumentation that I am not nominating myself for the coming presidential elections, content with what I have offered the homeland over more than 60 years, in war and peace. I have announced my commitment to that, and announced similar commitment, that is equally emphatic, to continue shouldering my responsibility of safeguarding the Constitution and the interests of the people, until power and responsibility are handed over to whom electors will choose

in the coming September, in fair and free elections, for which guarantees of freedom and fairness will be secured. That is the oath I have taken before Allah and the homeland and I will honour it until we take Egypt and its people to a safe harbour.

- 11- I have indeed laid down a specific vision for exiting the current crisis, and for realizing what the youth and citizens have asked for, in a manner that respects constitutional legitimacy, not undermines it, and in a way that accomplishes the stability of our society and the demands of its sons, and at the same time offers an agreed-upon framework for the peaceful transition of power, through a responsible dialogue among all the forces of society, with utmost veracity and transparency.
- 12- I have laid down this vision out of my commitment to my responsibility for leading the homeland out of these critical times, and I have been closely following up on its implementation, hour by hour, looking forward to the support and assistance of everyone who is keen on Egypt and its people, in order to succeed in transforming it into a concrete reality, according to a broad national consensus, that has a wide base, and whose implementation is to be guaranteed by our intrepid armed forces.
- 13- Indeed, we have already started a constructive national dialogue that encompass the youth of Egypt who led the call for change, as well as all political forces. This dialogue has indeed yielded in a preliminary agreement, in views and stances, that lays our feet on the beginning of the right track, that leads out of this crisis. It has to be continued in order to transform it from the broad lines that have been agreed upon to a clear road map, with a specific timetable that proceeds on a daily basis, down the road of the peaceful transition of power, from now until next September.
- 14- This national dialogue has indeed agreed on the formation of a constitutional committee that undertakes the study of the required constitutional amendments and the legislative amendments they require. It has also agreed on forming a follow-up committee that undertakes the follow-up of the honest implementation of what I have promised the people. I was keen that the formation of both committees comes from Egyptian dignitaries, well-known for their independence and impartiality, and from constitutional law jurists and the judiciary.
- 15- In addition to that, and in response to the martyr sons of Egypt whom we lost in tragic, sad events that ached our hearts and shook the conscience of the homeland, I have indeed instructed the speedy completion of investigating the events of last week and the immediate referral of their results to the Chief Prosecutor, in order to take the necessary deterrent, legal measures.
- 16- I did receive yesterday the first report on the top-priority constitutional amendments, suggested by the committee I have formed, from legal experts and the judiciary, to study the required constitutional and legislative amendments. In response to the suggestions included in the report of the committee, and by virtue of the powers vested in the President of the republic, as per article 189 of the constitution, I have indeed submitted a request today for amending six constitutional articles: these are articles 76, 77, 88, 93 and 189, and the annulment of article 179 of the constitution, with a confirmation of the readiness to submit, at a later time, a request for amending the articles suggested by this constitutional committee, according to the reasons and justifications it sees.

- 17- These top-priority amendments aim at facilitating the conditions of nomination for presidency; approving a fixed number of terms in presidency, in order to ensure rotation of power; reinforcing the checks of judiciary supervision over elections, in order to guarantee their freedom and fairness; confirming the exclusive jurisdiction of the judiciary to rule upon the legitimacy and validity of parliamentary membership; and amending the conditions and measures of requesting constitutional amendments. As for the proposal to scrap article 179 of the constitution, it aims at achieving the required balance between protecting the homeland from the perils of terrorism and ensuring the respect of the civil rights and liberties of the citizens, in a manner that opens the door for stopping the Emergency Law once calmness and stability are restored and the suitable circumstances are met for lifting the state of emergency.
- 18- Brother citizens,
- 19- The priority now is indeed to restore confidence among Egyptians themselves, confidence in our economy and our international reputation, and confidence that the change and transformation we have started have no reverse or return.
- 20- Egypt is indeed braving through hard times, which we should not allow to continue, so as not to increase the damages and losses they have inflicted upon us and upon our economy day after day, and so as not to end up with Egypt in conditions that would make the youth who called for change and reform the first to suffer.
- 21- The current moment has indeed nothing to do with my person, it has nothing to do with Hosni Mubarak, but it is all about Egypt, in its present, and the future of its sons. All Egyptians are indeed in one ditch now, and we have to continue the national dialogue that we have started in the spirit of a team, not enemies, and away from disagreement and battling, in order for Egypt to survive its current crisis and in order to restore confidence in our economy, assurance and security to our citizens, and natural daily life to our streets.
- 22- I was indeed a youth like the current youth of Egypt, when I learnt the honour of the Egyptian military, allegiance to the homeland, and sacrifice for its sake; I have annihilated a life defending its land and sovereignty; I have witnessed its wars, in their defeats and victories; I have lived the days of defeat and occupation and the days of crossing, victory, and liberation; the happiest day of my life was when I raised the flag of Egypt over Sinai; I have faced death several times: as a pilot, in Addis Ababa, and in many other situations; I have never succumbed to foreign pressures or dictations; I have safeguarded peace; I have worked for the security and stability of Egypt; I have tried my best for the sake of its renaissance and for the sake of its sons; I have never sought power or fake popularity; I trust that the over-sweeping majority of the sons of the people know who Hosni Mubarak is, but it hurts me to see how some of the sons of my homeland are treating me today.
- 23- Anyway, while I am indeed completely aware of the gravity of the current critical conjuncture, and based on my conviction that Egypt is passing a defining moment, in its history, that imposes upon us all the prioritization of the higher interest of the homeland and to put Egypt first, above any consideration and every other consideration, I have decided to delegate the powers of the President of the republic to the Vice-President as per the constitution.

- 24- I do know for certain that Egypt is going to survive its crisis; the will of its people will not be broken; it will stand to its feet again, by the faithfulness and sincerity of its sons, all its sons, and it will defeat the machination of those machinating against it and the plotting of those plotting against it.
- 25- We, Egyptians, will demonstrate our ability to realize the demands of the people, through civilized, rational dialogue; we will prove that we are not followers of anyone, that we do not take orders from anyone, and that no one can make our decisions for us, other than the pulse of the street and the demands of the sons of the homeland.
- 26- We will prove that, with the spirit and resolve of Egyptians, with the unity and solidarity of these people, and with our adherence to the dignity of Egypt, its honor, and its unique, eternal identity, which is the foundation and essence of our existence for more than seven thousand years.
- 27- This spirit will live within us as long as Egypt and its people continue to exist. This spirit will live within us as long as Egypt continues to exist and as long as its people continue to exist. It will live within each one of our farmers, workers, and intellectuals. It will remain in the hearts of our elderly, youth, children, Muslims, and Christians and in the minds and consciences of our sons who have not been born yet.
- 28- I am saying again, that I have indeed lived for this homeland, shouldering its responsibility and trust, and Egypt will remain eternal above persons and above all. It will remain, until I deliver its responsibility and its banner, the aim and the target; the responsibility and the duty; the beginning of lifetime, its journey, and its destination; and the land of living and death. It will remain a dear homeland that will never part with me, nor will I part with it, until its soil and dust bury me; it will remain hospitable people whose heads and banners will forever be high, in abundant dignity and honour.
- 29- May Allah save Egypt, a safe country, and may He safeguard its people and direct their steps to the right path
- 30- And peace of Allah and His mercy and blessings be upon you.