B I L D U N G :

The Relation between the Self and Culture

in Schiller, Hegel, and Nietzsche

Michael Amos
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge

Dissertation Submitted for the Degree of Ph. D.
I begin this thesis by introducing some of the key words which are relevant to the development of the concept of Bildung, or self-cultivation, in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Germany. In the second chapter Schiller is grouped with his contemporaries - Humboldt, Herder, and Goethe - as a 'Weimar Humanist'. I attempt to show how the 'Weimar Humanists' developed a contradictory but definite intellectual concept of self-cultivation, which sought to forge some relation between the moral and the aesthetic in the development of the individual. I proceed, in the third chapter, to examine Friedrich Schlegel's radical or romantic conception of self-cultivation: what I typify as the extension of one of the tendencies inherent in, but eventually antagonistic to Schiller's aesthetic education. In the same chapter I introduce the terms which are essential to understanding Hegel's approach to self-cultivation, and account for their relevance to both his historical dialectics and his exposition of the development of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology. The fourth chapter focusses upon an exposition of self-development in the Phenomenology itself, and attempts to characterise Hegel's mature theory of the relation between the self and culture in the context of his earlier theory of self-cultivation. This leads to a conclusion which sets the stage for
Nietzsche's response to the right-Hegelian theorists of culture, which I concentrate upon in an analysis of the *Untimely Meditations* in the first section of the fifth chapter. I then examine the three books in which Nietzsche both developed a picture of the "free spirit" and the "paths" along which he saw the free spirit coming: *Human, All Too Human*, *Daybreak*, and *Gay Science*. In the final sections I examine each of these books in turn and how they portray Nietzsche's systematic rejection of many of the concepts which are essential to the theories of self-cultivation which I have previously examined, but how, at the same time, they set out his own theory of the relation between the aesthetic and the moral in his own very particular concept of self-cultivation.
I am indebted to my supervisor, Dr. M. K. Tanner, for his imaginative and unstinting advice during both the course of my research and the composition of this dissertation. I would like to thank Nick Walker for some especially helpful discussions about Hegel and Bildung during the course of my work, and Lynn Morgan. I should take this opportunity to acknowledge the Deutsche Akademische Austausch Dienst, who awarded me a scholarship for study in Germany during the summer of 1988.

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration. No part of this dissertation has been submitted for any other degree.

Michael Amos
Cambridge: February, 1991
# CONTENTS

## CHAPTER ONE: A Few Difficult words

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The Self</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Aesthetic</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Moral</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Culture</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. <em>Bildung</em></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER TWO: Weimar Humanism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Herder</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Humboldt: A world within</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Schiller: <em>Aesthetic Education</em> and the Sublime</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Goethe: <em>Handwerk als Berufung</em></td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER THREE: Ideals of Self-Cultivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Schlegel and Radical Self-Cultivation</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Classicism and Romanticism: historical self-consciousness</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hegel: <em>Romanticism</em> and <em>Bildungsgeschichte</em></td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER FOUR: Phenomenology as *Bildung*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The <em>Antigone</em>: the beginning of wisdom</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <em>Le Neveu de Rameau</em>: Bildung through Wit</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Creon and the <em>Philosophe</em>: the other half</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) The Bourgeois</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Civil Society</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Parting of the Ways: Thomas Mann's <em>Buddenbrooks</em></td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER FIVE: *Bildung* in Early Nietzsche

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Of First and Last Things</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Man in Society</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Man Alone</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Out of the Souls of Artists and Writers</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: A Few Difficult words
1. The Self 2
2. The Aesthetic 4
3. The Moral 9
4. Culture 10
5. Bildung 20

CHAPTER TWO: Weimar Humanism
1. Herder 36
2. Humboldt: A world within 45
3. Schiller: Aesthetic Education and the Sublime 53
4. Goethe: Handwerk als Berufung 82

CHAPTER THREE: Ideals of Self-Cultivation
1. Schlegel and Radical Self-Cultivation 106
2. Classicism and Romanticism: historical self-consciousness 124
3. Hegel: Romanticism and Bildungsgeschichte 142

CHAPTER FOUR: Phenomenology as Bildung
1. The Antigone: the beginning of wisdom 173
2. Le Neveu de Rameau: Bildung through Wit 193
3. Creon and the Philosophe: the other half 208
   a) The Bourgeois 221
   b) Civil Society 230
5. The Parting of the Ways: Thomas Mann's Buddenbrooks 236

CHAPTER FIVE: Bildung in Early Nietzsche
1. Of First and Last Things 253
2. Man in Society 273
3. Man Alone 295
4. Out of the Souls of Artists and Writers 315
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

HEGEL

Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art A
Phenomenology of Spirit P
Philosophy of History PH
Philosophy of Right PR

KANT

The Critique of Judgement CJ
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime O

NIETZSCHE

Daybreak D
The Gay Science GS
Human, All Too Human H
Volume One H, I
Volume Two H, II
Notebooks:
The Philosopher tP
Philosophy in Hard Times PHT
The Philosopher as Cultural Physician PCP
Untimely Meditations UM
1. David Strauss, the confessor and the writer UM, I
2. On the uses and disadvantages of history for life UM, II
3. Schopenhauer as Educator UM, III

SCHILLER

On the Aesthetic Education of Mankind AE
On Naive and Sentimental Poetry N&S
On the Sublime S
CHAPTER ONE: A FEW DIFFICULT WORDS

The relation between the self and culture is central to any philosophy which attempts to deal with the relation between the aesthetic and the moral. While either of the concepts of self or culture would not necessarily be involved in the philosophical examination of the moral alone, or the aesthetic alone, as soon as an attempt is made to show how the moral and the aesthetic could be related to each other, it seems that the relation between the self and culture must be examined. If the philosophical examination of morality deals, essentially, with the concepts which pertain to individuals and their conduct insofar as it affects other individuals, then it is not too taxing to see how this could be related to the philosophical examination of how individual tastes in aesthetic matters interact with each other in a culture. It is, then, no accident that the philosophers whom I will be looking at in my examination of the relation between the self and culture either presuppose, attempt to establish, strive to defend, or criticize the relationship between the aesthetic and the moral.

Of course, like the aesthetic and the moral, the self and culture have their own meanings outside of their relationship to each other. The definition of the self is dependent upon what a particular philosopher is most concerned with: philosophy of
mind, epistemology, religion, law, phenomenology, psychology, as well as the aesthetic and the moral. So that in characterising what a particular philosopher calls the self, and showing how this is related to what he calls culture, one finds that there are many elastic but tough little strands which connect it to the main body of his system or thought.

The Self

In Kant, for example, the self might be defined by his critical epistemology – the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception which one finds in his first Critique; or it might be more concerned with what in his second Critique is called Persönlichkeit, a self which is subject to the laws of practical reason. In his third Critique, the book to which I will refer most often, it is difficult to know which concept of the self is most obviously entailed by his argument: when he is discussing the Geschmacksurteil or judgment of taste, it seems fairly obvious that the "transcendental synthetic unity of apperception" is most prominently required, especially when he discusses what he calls the four moments of the judgment; and yet when he discusses the sublime in the same book, it seems as if he must be more concerned with what is entailed by Persönlichkeit. This interpretative problem in Kant's third Critique is even more prevalent in the philosophical works of his wayward disciple, Friedrich Schiller. Whatever difficulties are encountered in Kant on this score are exacerbated by Schiller's tendency to be
now strictly Kantian, and now quite unphilosophical altogether; so that in some paragraphs it seems that what he means by the self is determined in a very narrow sense, while at any moment, even in the same paragraph, he might slip out of that mode and say something which either confounds or contradicts that sense.

Hegel attempts to subsume many other philosophical definitions of the self into his concept which, out of his attempt at embracing the whole of the history of philosophy, emerges as something like the person who reflects philosophically - what Hegel refers to in his Phenomenology as "the universal self" (P, Preface: On Scientific Thinking', §30; 1977, 18). It is impossible to characterize Hegel's concept of the self without going into what is involved for him in the concept of self-consciousness. Although Hegel also writes of the particular, historical self, it is the historically self-conscious, universal self which remains his primary concern. The latter is antipathetic, in almost every way, to Nietzsche's conception of the self. The most striking differences between Hegel and Nietzsche can be seen in their portrayal of the relationship between the self and language. In section 508 of his Phenomenology, Hegel writes that language "contains it [the self] in its purity, it alone expresses the 'I'" (P, §508. 1977, 308); whereas, for Nietzsche, language actually hinders one from either understanding or realizing one's self, and is seen as the agent through which society moulds the self into what Nietzsche thinks of as a "pseudo self" which,
in Daybreak, he calls "a bloodless abstraction..., a fiction" (D, 105; 1982, 106).

From this thumbnail sketch of what the self can and cannot imply for the philosophers with whom I shall be dealing, it should be obvious that no one definition could hold true for all. However, what I am concerned with, and what I will endeavour to keep in sight through these various philosophical systems and non-systems (there are two opposing pairs here: Kant and Hegel both endeavour to produce systems whereas Schiller would never have been so ambitious as to attempt to do so and Nietzsche was altogether opposed to it), is what can be imagined as involved in the process of Bildung, or self-cultivation. Like Hegel’s concept of self-consciousness, which arises out of the unfolding of the Phenomenology, I can only offer a promissory note for what is involved in the concept of Bildung at this point. Before I pay-up, to carry on in the metaphor, I believe that it is necessary to have sorted out what is involved in the other terms which are relevant: the aesthetic, the moral, and what the self will be seen sometimes in distinction from, and sometimes as an extension of - culture.

The Aesthetic

The aesthetic must be defined in a narrow and a broad sense in order to encompass both what Kant and Schiller mean by it. Firstly, when Kant writes of the aesthetic in his critical works,
it can have either of two meanings: it is either what is involved in sensation generally, as in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' of his first Critique, or what is involved in aesthetic judgment, entailing nature and works of art, their appreciation and, in the case of works of art (but rarely in Kant), their production. The former sense can - although it does intrude at some points in Kant's analysis of the four moments of the judgment of taste in his 3rd Critique - for our purposes be ignored, and by the aesthetic the latter will always be intended. If one accepts, what Paul Crowther calls the "fundamental strategy" in Kant's 3rd Critique, "to show how the structure of the phenomenal world can be in harmony with morality" (Crowther, 1989; 92), then there must be a connection between Kant's concern with the agreement between subjective pleasure in the beautiful and its imputed grounding in an object, and the possible agreement between inclination towards an action and the moral concept of a good action. Of course, it takes Kant much close argumentation in order to establish such a connection - and it is open to question whether, in truth, he did. Kant attempted to encapsulate this connection in saying that "beauty is the symbol of the morally good". Unless this relationship dissolves into incomprehensible hopefulness, it must be analysed very carefully. In Schiller, however, this relationship is not analysed at all, and thus Kant's "necessity in the beautiful" and "inclination towards the good" - if it is possible to define Schiller's terms at all succinctly - slip in and out of the same paragraph with no apparent tension between them. This can be seen in letter 23 of
his Aesthetic Education, where he writes that man "must learn to
desire more nobly, so that he may not need to will sublimely"
(AE, 23; 1967, 169), and goes on to write that it would be
through "aesthetic education" that this could be brought about.
Thus, in Schiller, the aesthetic is often, as J.A. Bernstein has
defined it in his Shaftesbury, Rousseau, and Kant, "used very
broadly... to suggest the entire sphere of happiness possessing
or involving a contemplative element..." (Bernstein, 1980; 9);
but the term also, as R. D. Miller has pointed out, refers often
"to [moral] freedom rather than beauty" (Miller, 1970; 81). The
broadness of the definition of the aesthetic in Schiller allows
him to write of aesthetic education as effecting the kind of
freedom which Kant connected with autonomy. This culminates, for
Schiller, in the aesthetic being "an actual union and interchange
between matter and form, passivity and activity..., the infinite
being realized in the finite...", and the assertion that in
"beauty alone do we enjoy [something] at once as individual and
genus, i.e., as representatives of the human genus" (AE, 25-27;
1967, 189-217).

The aesthetic in Hegel's system, occupies a position which is,
mostly, equatable with art - and as such plays only a limited
part within that system - but is also the ongoing concern with
what works of art mean. If the formal definition of aesthetic
judgment in Kant is not necessarily dependent upon the existence
of art, but merely upon a perception of beauty which can be
occasioned by either art or nature, then the aesthetic in Hegel
must be seen as necessarily dependent upon the existence of art and, furthermore, upon its human significance. Because art, for Hegel, is a form of expression which must have a subject-matter, the aesthetic is a kind of hermeneutics, the purpose of which is to read out of a work of art that human significance which is its subject matter. Without devoting more space here than is suitable to a mere sketch of what the aesthetic means in Hegel it is easiest to grasp it in this final distinction from Kant. Roughly speaking, where Kant would remain on the surface of the work of art, taking a subjective aesthetic enjoyment - if it meets certain rigorous prerequisites - which is indistinguishable from that which is occasioned by a beautiful form in nature, Hegel would assert that it is what the work of art means - as opposed to natural beauty which cannot mean anything in Hegel's sense - which is brought to one's attention. This devolves upon Hegel's definition of beauty, which is the agreement of content and form. It was in this sense that Hegel considered Schiller as having anticipated his definition of beauty, for Hegel saw this as the reconciliation of just those elements which Kant would have objected to Schiller's having so blithely thrown together. "It is Schiller who must be given great credit for breaking through the Kantian subjectivity and abstraction of thinking and for venturing on an attempt to get beyond this by intellectually grasping the unity and reconciliation as the truth and by actualizing them in artistic production" (A, 7, ii; 1979, 61).
Thus far the aesthetic is equated with (1) a subjective state which is somehow equatable with the moral in Kant, and as such is concerned with (2) freedom in Schiller’s "aesthetic education"; while for Hegel it is, essentially, concerned with (3) a meaning which must be read out out the work of art. In Human, All-Too Human, Daybreak and Gay Science, there are many sections which undercut and condemn the above mentioned definitions of the aesthetic. In Changed Taste (GS, §39; 1974, 106) Nietzsche, in his reductive mode, undercuts both (1) and (2) by describing both aesthetic and moral judgment as the "subtlest nuances of the physis": the operation of physical forces in what Kant wanted to establish as more or less autonomous mental processes renders Kant’s project in the 3rd Critique meaningless, because pleasure in the beautiful and inclination in the moral would always be reducible to non-intellectual stimuli. The identification of the beautiful and the good (1) is condemned further – or forfeited – in The realm of beauty is bigger (D, §468; 1982, 194-195), where Nietzsche points out that as "surely as the wicked enjoy a hundred kinds of happiness of which the virtuous have no inkling, so too they possess a hundred kinds of beauty: and many of them have not yet been discovered". It is difficult to imagine how Schiller’s "aesthetic education" could progress towards the moral if beauty was extended to cover that which, according to both him and Kant, is morally reprehensible. Finally, Hegel’s definition (3) of the aesthetic is undercut in The Beyond in art (H, I, §220; 1986, 102) where Nietzsche writes that the significance which most great works of art embody in their form is false:
"that in their highest flights the artists of all ages have raised to heavenly transfiguration precisely those conceptions which we now recognize as false". And although this leads Nietzsche to write of something like the death of art in a manner reminiscent of Hegel, the emphasis is topsy-turvy because there is at the same time a rejection of just that kind of all-embracing vision which is essential to Hegel's philosophy. However negative this may make Nietzsche seem towards the aesthetic, he does hold a very exalted opinion of where it fits into both culture generally and our everyday lives. It is "an enhanced aesthetic sensibility" (H, I, §23; 1988, 24) - which is, interestingly, something like the broad sense of the aesthetic which is necessary in Schiller - which Nietzsche sees as performing the individual's essential task in our modern age, of choosing among the different "philosophies of life, customs, cultures" (Ibid), and what must be defined next, moralities.

The Moral

The moral, like the aesthetic, must be both specifically and broadly defined in order to cover what it can mean in all of the philosophers with whom we are concerned. All of these come together in the writings of Nietzsche for whom the moral can be: morality as in (1) the narrow sense of ethical philosophy, as in (2) custom, or as in (3) the broad sense connected with "what is to become of man?" - what he calls mankind's "ecumenical goals"(H, I, §25; 1986, 25). The narrow sense (1) of ethical
philosophy is the almost predominant realm of the Kantian ethic; when the thinkers with whom we are concerned deal with morality in this sense it can be taken for granted that they are concerned either with Kant's ethical system or something very closely related to it. The second sense is close to what Kant typified as "fantastic virtue" whereby everything is considered moral, and includes the whole gamut of prescriptions which are involved in what is best thought of as a pre-rational system, what Schiller considered the Notstand which man obeys out of habit; Nietzsche employs morality repeatedly in this sense, in his works before Zarathustra, in order to undermine the distinction between senses 1 and 2. It is in the third, what might be considered despairingly, broad sense which makes it possible for Nietzsche to write: "All our experiences are moral experiences, even in the realm of sense perceptions" (GS, §114; 1974, 174), because he wants to argue that our habits of perception form our customs. Without anticipating too much of what I shall be discussing in chapter five, given the latter sense it is possible to see that Nietzsche's conception of taste - which dictates, according to him, much that Kant would consider moral - could play a role similar to that which it played in Kant and Schiller, where it is an integral part of culture.

Culture

Culture - like many other words which are used to describe areas within which a whole range of activities, dispositions, goals,
traditions, concepts, etc., and the products of such activities, as well as the objects (of whatever ontological status) which might be pertinent to them - is, like society or politics, what Raymond Williams has called a "difficult word" (Williams, 1983; 14). By which Williams meant that in order to define it you cannot simply use a dictionary - even a very extensive one compiled on historical principles like the O.E.D. - most obviously, because it is so limiting to remain within the framework of one language alone. The difficulty involved can be seen in defining politics - a word which will crop up many times in the examination of the self and culture - to take another word from among this group before tackling culture itself.

Taken as a plural noun politics could be just what one finds in the Shorter Oxford: "the science and art of government". But the examination of what is involved in "the science and art of government" is daunting enough without taking on the second sense: "political affairs or life", or the third sense: "political principles". Extending one's examination to the other forms such as the adjective "political", one would soon find that the full range of things which the word describes, has moved beyond what can be included within the bounds of a dictionary - it encompasses much that is traditionally, conceptually, and artifactually intractable. For example, if one takes republicanism as one of many systems of government and considers one particular instance of it, and in this way chances upon the Florentine Republic of 1498 to 1512, then one finds that there is
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much more involved in the political than one might originally have thought. There is that which directly pertains to the art of government: the Grand Council itself, which was set up after the expulsion of the Medicis and which accounted for around one-fourth of the adult male population, the various offices and responsibilities which constituted its domain of influence, and of course the laws which outlined the exercise of its powers over the remaining population of the city; then there remain the conceptual manifestations of such a regime, which includes numerous pamphlets and decrees, and the writings of such people as Machiavelli; and finally there also remains, thankfully, some of the artifacts which are relevant to the political in this case, such as the Palazzo della Signoria's Great Council Hall, and Michelangelo's David which, as Josef Chytry has pointed out, "was commissioned for the very entrance of the res publica" (Chytry, 1989; liii). In this way according to Chytry, the "forceful gaze [of the] "great head of Michelangelo's Adamic tyrannicide... remained political in reflecting the keen courage of a revitalized civic humanism" (Ibid, liii-liv).

In looking at what is involved in any of these difficult words one finds oneself crossing boundaries which are usually imposed upon academic discourse. It is possible that one might begin in something like the realm of politics, and end up in what one might want to call the realm of aesthetics, or vice-versa. It is confusing to say that the gaze of Michelangelo's sculpture is political in nature, but one can see how such an assertion is
rendered somewhat meaningful by the sketching out of the background of republican Florence of the time of its production, and of the story of how the sculpture fits in. I have mentioned in passing what is perhaps a not widely accepted or recognized quality which is attributable to what is perhaps the most famous of all sculptures because it points towards the interrelation of forces which exists within the concept of culture.

The definition of culture needs to be broad enough so as to encompass what are the most important forces - as well as their interaction - which operate within a culture, and yet not be reducible to merely one of them; otherwise, for our purposes, the term is useless. Adapting Raymond Williams (Williams, 1983; 90) I will use culture in three senses: (1) the works and practices of intellectual activity; (2) a way of life conceived of as either (2a) particular to a people or a group, or (2b) general to a period or stage within what is called 'universal history' or humanity's development; or (3) a process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development - what might be closer to a vulgarisation of something, rather ethnocentrically, called 'civilization' as in, for example, the celebrated work of Kenneth Clark. In this way, one says that Michelangelo's *David* is a cultural product not specifically because of its political content, but (1) because it is the product of an activity which is intellectual in nature, or (2) because it is, most importantly, the product or expression of a way of life, or (3) because it is a part of the general process of intellectual,
spiritual, or aesthetic development. It might be that because one tends to think of famous works of art as not specific to a culture in sense (2), as ways of life, that it comes as a shock when one is reminded that only a certain set of contingencies lead to the production of a particular work and that it might, therefore, have particular meanings which are relevant to a particular way of life. It doesn't occur to most people that Michelangelo's *David* is the product of a short lived culture of republican civic humanism - for fairly obvious reasons: because it is so famous, one becomes acquainted with it long before one might finally read, or be told, that it was sculpted in Florence by Michelangelo between 1501 and 1504. Yet at the same time, it is perhaps equally surprising to some people that African tribal masks are exhibited in museums of art, emphasizing that they could been seen as cultural in senses 1 or 3.

Although in these two cases it is helpful to distinguish between these senses of culture, it is often difficult, and sometimes even impossible, to point out precisely which sense is dominant in a given usage. It could also be the case that there is, often, no one dominant sense, and that they are all engaged at the same time. In the second sense of culture, for example, I have subdivided Williams' way of life - as either (a) particular to a people or group, or (b) a period within universal history, or a stage in humanity's development - because in the philosophers with whom we are concerned there is a tendency to be unquestioningly ethnocentric and to write of culture as a
particular way of life, imposing the concept of universal civilization upon a history and world which is innocent of that concept. I have also attempted to imply a progression in these three senses from what could be considered essentially individual culture through the culture of a group - whether conceived of (a) more or less isolated from, or as (b) a part of, a larger grouping - to the culture of a whole - whether conceived of as a society, or as what is implied in "Western culture". But, of course, the senses of the word almost always drift, exhibiting what T.S. Eliot, in his essay "Can 'Education' be Defined?", has called the "wobbliness of words". For the sake of clarity I have attempted to pin down culture as best I can, and I recognize that there are many superficial as well as more profound problems in doing so. I would also like to stress that I agree with Eliot who wrote that it should not be considered deplorable that words like culture, politics, or education are wobbly because "if they did not change, it would mean... that we were living exactly the same life as our ancestors" (Eliot, 1939; 65). Of course if, pace Plato, the ideal culture, politics, and education evolved, then perhaps I'd change my mind, but I doubt it.

There is a considerable degree of deviation among the philosophers with whom we are concerned as to the sense of culture which is implied in their writings. In the pre-Critical Kant of the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, for example, there is an emphasis upon what he calls the "mental characters of peoples" (0, §4; 1959, 99), which dictates
what mixture of the two "finer feelings" - the feeling of the beautiful and the sublime - is operative in their national cultures (2a). In his 3rd Critique Kant mentions - as an anecdote in support of his point that "without the development of moral ideas, that which, thanks to preparatory culture, we call sublime merely strikes the untutored man as terrifying" (CJ, 829 'General Remark'; 1986, 115-116) - the story recounted by a European traveller of a Savoyard peasant calling all lovers of snow-covered mountains fools. Here, Kant is simultaneously using all three of the senses which I have listed, with the third sense predominating over the other two: the Savoyard, a member of a culture in sense 2a, could be educated through the process of "preparatory culture", as in sense 3, to the point where he, too, could understand the European's practice of travelling vast distances merely to admire the very mountains which he considers horrible - a paradigmatic example, then, of culture in the first sense. And it is this view of culture which is, largely, shared by Schiller in his Aesthetic Education, where he insists that it is by "means of aesthetic culture... [that] the freedom to be what [a man] ought to be is completely restored" (AE, 24; 1967, 147). But even in Schiller there are many small shifts of emphasis: "aesthetic culture" must be taken to be culture in the first sense, and yet he takes it, later as in Kant's sense (3) in Letter 26, where he writes that in "whatever individual or whole people we find this honest and autonomous kind of [aesthetic culture], we may assume both understanding and taste, and every kindred excellence" (AE, 26; 1987, 199). Schiller's emphasis
upon the development towards a culture shared by individuals within a "whole people" - something which Schiller believes is ethico-political in nature - must be distinguished from Kant's less explicit ideas in this regard. Nevertheless, there is an obvious trend towards the conflation of the aesthetic and the moral in this conception of culture, which will be examined in chapter two; something which pushes taste forward as the most important of what might be called cultural forces.

The concern which Kant and Schiller share with a culture which is conceived of as a process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development is one which tends to denigrate the accomplishments of other cultures. Given the predominance of the sense in which culture is conceived of as a 'universal' process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development, it is difficult to see how the neutrality necessary for the sense in which culture is particular to a people or group (2a) could be adopted: the emphasis upon 'universality' which paradoxically leads to a kind of history which places other cultures, and characterizes them in terms of a single concept of development and of fully developed culture. The dominance of this concept of culture is evident in Hegel, who wrote "Europe is, as such, the end of world history, Asia the beginning" [Europa ist schlechthin das Ende der Weltgeschichte, Asien der Anfang]. For Hegel the history of mankind's development goes well beyond what could be said to be involved in that concept of culture, and effects the classification of culture itself as merely a stage along the way
towards the fulfilment of man's - or Spirit's - ideals in philosophy itself. Nietzsche viewed this approach to both culture and history with consistent and profound contempt.

And yet great caution must be exercised in this respect, for it is too easy to identify Nietzsche's criticism of the Hegelian Spirit with the reflection of something like that of a modern consciousness upon what can seem, by comparison, an outmoded philosophy. Hegel's attempt, however, to see what were previously considered as separate constituents of culture - morality, art, politics, philosophy - as interdependent should not be underestimated or cheapened. It was his essential insight to see the above - and especially art and morality - as inherently involved in a particular way of life. And in this regard, I believe that Hegel's contribution to an understanding of how these different forces interact in a culture is indispensable to an understanding that cannot be prised out of Nietzsche's philosophy alone. Nevertheless, it is his ultimate emphasis upon what might be called the immanent forces of the rational spirit working towards its own goal which subsumes that insight, and brackets him in a peculiar manner. It is the tension between seeing ways of life as separate possible structures of belief as in 2a and the predominant view, what might be called the phenomenologist's view, of their individual limitations in regard of the whole culture as in sense 3, which makes Hegel's *Phenomenology* such a fascinating book to read; and yet, at the same time, the individual analysis is, ultimately
weakened by its dependence upon what has been called, rather unhelpfully, romanticism. The position from which Hegel places other cultures is, I will argue, tied to the culture of romanticism itself, and in order to understand his phenomenologist's point of view one must, as David Hume wrote, "enter into [some] of the opinions which then prevailed". When one considers Nietzsche's criticisms of the Hegelian system and romanticism in general, there is a need to characterise that culture out of which his philosophy arose.

In Nietzsche's *Daybreak* one reads often of "many higher cultures" (as in Mexico and Peru), which for us represents the adoption of 2a for the first time among the three writers with whom we are concerned. This move towards what might seem like a more liberal concept of culture - something which might surprise those who think of Nietzsche as somehow responsible for the Nazi concept of culture - might be seen as the reentry of the sense in which Herder used the term in the mid 1770s. This usage of culture allowed for the acceptance of a pluralism which is quite opposed to the ethnocentric, or universalizing, tendencies of Kant, Schiller, and Hegel. For Herder the use of language, for example, though it showed that a people had arrived at a certain form of consciousness, also allowed them to express their own particular essence. In this way there are some similarities, as regards language itself, between Herder and Hegel which would exclude Nietzsche; but the tendency of the position is best put forward by Charles Taylor: "Herder and the expressivist
anthropology developed from him which added the epoch-making demand that my realization of the human essence be my own, ...launched the idea that each individual (and in Herder's application, each people) has its own way of being human, which it cannot exchange with that of any other except at the cost of distortion and self-mutilation" (Taylor, 1975; 15). What is involved in what might be called the death of the universal goal of culture for Nietzsche, could be seen as the return to a concept of culture which was mooted just over a hundred years before. Nietzsche called this ethnocentric conception of culture, a process of 'universal history', a "monotheism" which he viewed as "the greatest danger that has yet confronted humanity" (GS, §143; 1974, 192). And although Nietzsche may seem, at times, to write of Europe in a spirit similar to that of Hegel's cultural hegemony, for example in Human All-Too Human, where "'modern' and 'European' are almost equivalent" (H, II, §215; 1966, 364), as well as stressing at other times the ultimate universal in humanity as a "species", he always stresses the importance of what might be called the culture of individuality. This turn, in Nietzsche, towards a polytheism of individual cultures could be seen as the completion of a hundred year cycle of thought.

Bildung

In devoting more time to the elucidation of an at best very sketchy definition of culture, I hope that it has become evident
that the keyword in the relation between self and culture is, inevitably, the latter. However, insofar as the conception of culture seems to culminate, for our purposes, in the Nietzschean concept of individuality, it is difficult to claim a predominance of one over the other. It is this balance between the two members of the relationship which, in the philosophers with which we are concerned, is expressed in the concept of Bildung or self-cultivation. In the concept of self-cultivation the complex of interrelations between the aesthetic and the moral, self and culture is focussed upon what comes to be the most essential question of philosophy: what it means, or should mean to be human.

The answer to this question was, for Kant, quite straightforward: to be morally good. This, however, involved Kant in a complex and unconvincing set of propositions - involving man's innate sociability, the three postulates of the 2nd Critique and specifically the teleology implied in the summum bonum of the latter - in order to show that the world achieved its purpose in the moral consciousness or Persönlichkeit. I think that Kant's reasoning in this respect is to assert that the development of the self is, at the same time, the most unselfish of concerns. This is accomplished, for Kant, through the elaboration of the moral law and its predominance over self-love in the fully developed individual. Kant's conception of Persönlichkeit is, then, essentially a matter of self-overcoming, and of what he always seems to have regarded as the imposing of self-conscious
rationality upon the natural self of one's inclinations. Self-cultivation is necessary, according to Kant, for it is one's duty to realize in oneself the moral law, and because of what he considered the intransigence of the natural self, this cannot be accomplished without going through such a process.

As we have seen, Kant believes that the aesthetic can give one hope that it is possible to achieve the goal of moral development because it is inherently involved with a pleasure which is somehow universal. What excites Kant about the aesthetic is that, in this way, it presents a way in which the natural self can be seen as not entirely antipathetic to the demands of rationality: in enjoying beauty one is both a sensuous individual and a rational member of a community - the ideal towards which self-cultivation, as a process, is directed. His conception of both Persönlichkeit and the aesthetic are perfect examples of what is involved in what I have characterised in the third definition of culture as a process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development. It is no surprise, then, to find that when Kant discusses the sublime, he should emphasize the interpenetration of Persönlichkeit and the aesthetic - or taste - in a subsequent concept of culture in the 3rd Critique.

This [human nature], now, is the foundation of the necessity of that agreement between other men's judgments upon the sublime and our own, which we make our own imply. For just as we taunt a man who is quite inappreciative when forming an estimate of an object of nature in which we see beauty, with a want of taste, so we say of a man who remains unaffected in the presence of what we consider sublime, that he has no feeling. But we demand both taste and
feeling of every man, and, granted some degree of culture, we give him credit for both.

(CJ, §29; 1986, 116)

This is evident in his ever logico-lawful use of "demand", that one expects or demands that other human beings share in one's feeling for the sublime follows from the conception of culture as being general to all individuals by virtue of their having either taste or feeling, something which is to be commended where it is found because, for Kant, it implies a degree of self-cultivation, or what he calls "moral feeling". It is in this way that Kant feels that he is justified, as we have seen, in placing the Savoyard who does not share the capacity to feel the sublime with the European traveller at a lower level of culture (2b). And it is precisely this conviction that leads Kant to be equally convinced that self-cultivation must at the same time be a part of the process of universal culture. In the 'Appendix' to the "Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgement" Kant sets out what he thinks to be involved in such a self-cultivation, in what he calls a "sound preparatory education".

The propaedeutic to all fine art, so far as the highest degree of its perfection is what is in view, appears to lie, not in precepts, but in the culture of the mental powers produced by a sound preparatory education in what are called the humanoria so called, presumably, because humanity signifies, on the one hand, the universal Feeling of sympathy, and, on the other, the faculty of being able to communicate universally one's inmost self - properties constituting in conjunction the befitting social spirit of mankind, in contradistinction to the narrow life of the lower animals. (CJ, §60; 1986, 228)

Thus works of art are inherently involved in the culture of
humanity, the development of that which makes human beings different from animals, because they promote the "social spirit", the relation of the self through culture to other selves.

This concept of self-development is dependent upon a theory of common sense which is extremely troublesome. What is involved in the proof that there is an innate taste and feeling in human nature, is troublesome because it depends upon the assertion that there just happen to be certain works of art which are favoured time and again, and that because this is so they must have some particular quality which appeals to a sense which is common to many different ages and peoples. It is the former assertion which Mary Mothersill has called one of the facts of the aesthetic, and has claimed "has a privileged, pre-theoretical status and stands as a conviction against which theory must be tested" (Mothersill, 1984; 208). That Kant upholds this view is evident from both sections 32 and 60 of the 3rd Critique where he is concerned, respectively, with the "examples of what has in the course of culture maintained itself longest in esteem" (CJ, §32; 1986, 139), and what he calls "models" in the fine arts which claim universal approval. Good enough, but Kant goes on to assert, in section 60 when he deals with "sound preparatory culture", that in these models there is to be supposed some particular, though subjective, quality which accounts for their universal appeal; this quality is, Kant concludes, what he calls a "mean". This "mean" is exhibited in "the art of reciprocal communication" which can turn a collection of individuals into a
community, and which devolves upon that rational sociability which Kant believed innate to human nature:

such must have been the age, and such the nation, that first discovered the art of reciprocal communication of ideas between the more cultured and ruder sections of the community, and how to bridge the difference between the amplitude and refinement of the former and the natural simplicity and originality of the latter - in this way hitting upon that mean between higher culture and the modest worth of nature, that forms for taste also, as a sense common to all mankind, that true standard which no universal rules can supply.  (CJ, §60; 1986, 227)

The "art of reciprocal communication" seems to imply that Kant means by the fine arts something like the communicative arts, or what Chytry has called "the persuasive arts", so that art is seen as involved in the practices of politics. Although Kant's definition of what it is that continues to act upon men in these models seems to favour what might be called the arts of persuasive communication, it is possible to extend it further than merely poetry, drama, rhetoric etc., and include in this light Michelangelo's David which could be reintroduced as just the kind of classic model which Kant has in mind, because it mirrors a community which had hit upon this mean - especially when one considers Kant's worship of republicanism. Such models will never be dispensed with because they represent "the happy union, in one and the same people, of the law-directed constraint belonging to the highest culture, with the force and constraint of a free nature sensible of its proper worth" (Ibid). Kant combined a whole complex of interrelations in this small appendix. Although Kant admits that no universal rule can be
supplied, he has certainly gone further than the mere "fact" that some works survive the five hundred year labour of the file.

It is only a small jump to see how these models are suited to the kind of dualistic theory of the self which Kant put forward in his critical works. The self is a microcosm of the community, consisting of both sensuous nature and mental faculties, and what holds true for the "mean" of the community in this regard is also true of the individual. This is a consequence of Kant's having asserted in the previous section of the 3rd Critique, that the beautiful is a symbol of morality. Reaffirming what Paul Crowther has called the "fundamental strategy" of the 3rd Critique, the concept of self-cultivation which Kant sketches out, albeit very cursorily, involves an optimism about both human nature and the nature of works of art. This is what I would like to refer to as an aesthetic optimism in both the broad and the narrow sense of aesthetic. And although in the critical Kant, there are certain tensions which prevent him from taking this aesthetic optimism very far, it is obvious in what direction its tendency lies. This is evident in the concluding sentence to the previous section. "Taste makes, as it were, the transition from the charm of sense to habitual moral interest possible without too violent a leap..." (CJ, §59; 1986, 225). This aspect of the critical Kant can be seen as an inheritance from his earlier, precritical writings, in particular The Observations of the Beautiful and the Sublime, which we will encounter in the next chapter. In the context of the Observations, this aspect is both
When Schiller first read Kant's 3rd Critique, as Dieter Henrich has pointed out, he marked it almost exclusively wherever it was concerned with what could be interpreted as the relation between the aesthetic and the moral. This is obviously what led Schiller to define beauty as in some way the freedom to realize moral ideals. It is interesting to note how closely he seems to have read just those sections which conclude part one of the 3rd Critique, for his conception of self-cultivation fastens upon the closing sentence of the penultimate section of the first part and rather wilfully develops it: "it is only out of the aesthetic, not out of the physical, state that the moral can develop" (AE, 23; 1967, 165). It is upon this that Schiller founds his concept of aesthetic education, taking as its foundation the aesthetic optimism which is introduced so cautiously in Kant. For Schiller, art opens up the possibility of a moral state, the ideal of a society in which all conform to the law willingly. The development of a taste for that mean which was expressed in the appendix of Kant's 3rd Critique, which is the goal of aesthetic education, is to enable the realization of that "happy union".

Though it may be his needs which drive man into society, and reason which implants within him the principles of social behaviour, beauty alone can confer upon him a social character. Taste alone brings harmony into society, because it fosters
harmony in the individual. All other forms of perception divide man, because they are founded exclusively either upon the sensuous part or upon the spiritual part of his being; only the aesthetic mode of perception makes of him a whole, because both his natures must be in harmony if he is to achieve it. All other forms of communication divide society, because they relate exclusively either to the private receptivity or to the private proficiency of its individual members, hence to that which divides man from man; only the aesthetic mode of communication unites society, because it relates to that which is common to all. (AE, 27; 1967, 215)

This is Schiller in full flight as what Erich Heller has called "the Kantian poet"; but the tendency of the poetry, the product of an extreme aesthetic optimism, is quite true to one aspect, at least, of its Kantian sources. Aesthetic education entails the relation between the self and culture which is presupposed in Kant. Schiller goes well beyond the spirit of the critical Kant in many passages of the Aesthetic Education, and most obviously when he asserts that beauty is "at once a state of our being and an activity we perform" (AE, 25; 1967, 187). Where Schiller emphasizes the realization of beauty in action, he parts company with the critical Kant who, for various reasons which I hope to make clear in the following chapter, could not move beyond the contemplative model of the aesthetic despite whatever tendencies are exhibited in the closing sections of the first part of the 3rd Critique. It is in this latter respect that Schiller is sometimes referred to as a "left Kantian" and as having anticipated Hegel.
What was characterisable, but on the periphery of Kant's main concerns in the 3rd Critique, and central to Schiller's Aesthetic Education, was quite well established in German thought as a tradition by the time that Hegel began his philosophical career. The concept of self-cultivation, I submit, was uppermost in the development of Hegel's system. This cannot be dealt with in the manner which is necessary here - and will be the subject of the fourth chapter - but must be seen as building upon Schiller's tendency to consider self-cultivation as reaching its fulfilment in a social activity. This expanded self-cultivation is involved in the development of self-consciousness. The role which the aesthetic plays within this development is similar to Schiller's - and, as we have seen, to a degree Kant's - conception of the aesthetic as a social activity, because it is one of the ways in which the Ideal is expressed. An exposition of what is involved in Hegel's Ideal would require more time than it is appropriate to devote here, but could be formulated as what Dieter Henrich has called it in his essay 'Beauty and Freedom': "the objectification of the self in beauty" (Cohen & Guyer ed.; 1962, 252). Sophocles' Antigone, for example, is taken by Hegel to have a primarily moral content which he elaborates into the expression of that culture's stage in the general moral and intellectual development of self-consciousness. The process of self-cultivation is encompassed by the universal tendency which we have already noted, so that the self which is expressed - through the medium of language - is that of a whole culture.
This universalizing tendency of self-cultivation was, as we have seen, condemned by Nietzsche who presented a somewhat less rational theory of tragedy in *Birth of Tragedy* - a work which will be only very cursorily dealt with. In the works with which we are concerned - *The Untimely Meditations*, *Human, All-Too Human*, *Daybreak*, and *Gay Science* - Nietzsche has dropped the aesthetic metaphysics of this early book, and has adopted what I hope to show is the point of view of radical self-cultivation. In these works Nietzsche emphasizes the importance of the development of a self which is not subsumed in one or other self-consuming ideal of culture. This is conceived of as a scientific approach to culture, one which enables an individual to adopt a culture, in the sense of (2a) a way of life, which will be best suited to his individual *physis*. As opposed to Hegel's examination of the history of western civilization as the development of a single universal self, which culminates in the fully self-conscious individual, Nietzsche considers the past as a repository of many different ways of life from which, almost as a cultural super-market, an individual can choose what is best suited to his *physis*. This amounts to a historical philosophy of the self which is completely antithetical to Hegel's. Our modern age is, what Nietzsche called it in *Human, All-Too Human*, an "Age of comparison" in which many cultures - art-forms, moralities, and customs - coexist with one another. With characteristic abandon, Nietzsche describes the task or *Aufgabe* which such an age imposes upon the individual - what might be called the travail of freedom.
Such an age acquires its significance through the fact that in it the various different philosophies of life, customs, culture, can be compared and experienced side by side; which in earlier ages, when, just as all artistic genres were attached to particular place and time, so every culture still enjoyed only a localized domination, was not possible. Now an enhanced aesthetic sensibility will come to a definitive decision between all these forms offering themselves for comparison: most of them—namely all those rejected by this sensibility—it will allow to die out. There is likewise now taking place a selecting out among the forms and customs of higher morality whose objective can only be the elimination of the lower moralities. This is the age of comparison! It is the source of its pride—but, as is only reasonable, also of its suffering. Let us not be afraid of suffering! Let us rather confront the task which our age sets us as boldly as we can: and then posterity will bless us for it—a posterity that will know itself to be as much beyond the self-enclosed original national cultures as it is beyond the culture of comparison, but will look back upon both species of culture as upon venerable antiquities. 

As I have pointed out already, this "enhanced aesthetic sensibility" which Nietzsche considers essential to modern culture, uses something like the expanded sense of the aesthetic which is necessary in Schiller, but is also a reintroduction of the concept of taste—so important in Nietzsche’s philosophy—which Hegel had dropped from aesthetic discourse because he thought of it as "directed only to the external surface on which feelings play and where one-sided principles may pass as valid" (A, 6, ii; 1979, 34). This concern with what characterizes modern culture is something which harks back to Schiller who criticized the limitations of modern alienated consciousness. Nietzsche, for the first time, makes a close examination of national culture, the criticism of which in the first of the
Untimely Meditations, forms the basis of his mature thinking on culture tout court. There remains the concept of development which must be considered the ultimate universal in Nietzsche: that of the human species. But the concept of the development of the human species is, in the books which I look at most closely, used as an indeterminate principle of criticism, one which never quite reaches the sanctified level of Hegel's Absolute Geist. One must be very careful in ascribing anything close to a belief in progress to Nietzsche. He was quite willing to poke fun at the profundity which is bestowed on the concept of development with a humour inspired by Darwinian evolution, as is evident in his Circular orbit of humanity:

Perhaps the whole of humanity is no more than a stage in the evolution of a certain species of animal of limited duration: so that man has emerged from the ape and will return to the ape, while there will be no one present to take any sort of interest in this strange comic conclusion. (H, I, §247; 1986, 117)

Where Hegel would lead the self to some sort of Millennium in which it self-consciously contemplates the path that it has taken to its attainment of itself, Nietzsche is quite contented to have all of creation come full circle, in a sense, and miss out contemplation altogether. But this is Nietzsche the iconoclast, the worst enemy of any academic exercise. In the works which we will be examining, Nietzsche stays within the confines of the humanistic philosophy which, in his later capacity as thorough iconoclast, he ultimately rejected.
When, in the late 1870's, Nietzsche looked back over "German culture as it used to be", the culture of under a hundred years earlier which was shared by Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Schiller, Friedrich Schlegel, Goethe and Hegel, he asked himself: "what is it in them that seems to us, as we are today, now so insupportable, now so pitiable and moving?" The answer to which, according to Nietzsche, is their "soft, good-natured, silver-glistening idealism which wants above all to affect noble gestures and a noble voice, a thing as presumptuous as it is harmless, infused with a heartfelt repugnance for 'cold' or 'dry' reality, for the anatomy, for wholehearted passion, for every kind of philosophic temperance and scepticism, but especially for natural science except when it is amenable to being employed as religious symbolism" (D, §190; 1982, 111). This attitude was shared by such diverse cultural commentators as Bruno Snell and Lukács, for whom the "silver glistening idealism" of what I will characterise as Weimar Humanism was found to be lacking some essential degree of engagement with political or ideological exigencies. This culture was rejected by the Germany of the middle nineteenth century which, Nietzsche says, gradually became more preoccupied with "political and nationalist lunacy"
The culture of which Nietzsche is writing in *Daybreak* is very much a predecessor culture, one which was close to his own culture but which he interpreted as having failed and been superseded by what he regarded as a pseudo-culture. Thus, despite the weaknesses of the culture of which Weimar Humanism is the essence, it was considered by Nietzsche to have attained the status of being a genuine culture as opposed to the victorious post Franco-Prussian War Germany of the 1870's. The history of the relationship between the self and culture which is embodied in the concept of *Bildung* will take us, over the course of roughly one hundred years, from the predecessor culture which Nietzsche was very much preoccupied with examining in his writings before *Zarathustra*, to the German culture which he came to hold in the greatest contempt.

In this chapter we will be examining the theories of *Bildung* espoused by the writers who are primarily connected with the term 'Weimar Humanism': Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Schiller and Goethe. In these four very different writers there is a wide variety of views as to what constitutes self-cultivation. Herder, perhaps the most difficult to characterise, was concerned with an incredible range of factors which can be seen as active in both the self and culture. While Humboldt, on the other hand, believed that self-cultivation was concerned very specifically with the inner self, as opposed to that which lies beyond it. These two writers present us, essentially, with an initial
opposition between two divergent conceptions of self-cultivation, the former perhaps more concerned with culture, and the latter more concerned with the self. Schiller’s “aesthetic education”, the theory of self-cultivation which is central to an understanding of Bildung, is engaged with a large number of complex, and ultimately problematic, philosophical concepts which, given their essentially Kantian background, will require much closer, and more thorough, examination. It is possible to gather these writers under ‘Weimar Humanism’ because of their relationship to Goethe who, according to Nietzsche, “observed these goings-on in his own way: standing aside, gently remonstrating, keeping silent, ever more determined to follow his own, better path” (Ibid). For this reason I have left Goethe, the figure who binds all the others, until the end of the chapter. Goethe, who is responsible for producing the novel which gives Bildung its most famous and widely known expression, Wilhelm Meister, is entirely innocent of any theoretical dependence and remains, as Nietzsche portrayed him, very much his own man. These various attitudes towards, and definitions of self-cultivation are the expression of a period and its attempt to describe an ideal. Therefore, before advancing a definition of self-cultivation it is important to develop an understanding of the culture out of which it arose and of which it seems, at the same time, to have been the essence.
Herder

Herder's thought moves both towards a large number of all-encompassing concepts and at the same time concentrates on particularities, a characteristic which makes him very difficult to examine with any degree of consistency or economy. If one looks, for example, at his definition of Bildung as "reaching up to humanity", one is compelled, in order to understand that definition, to establish what he meant by 'humanity'. But before one can understand what he meant by 'humanity' one finds that he has also attempted to define the salient characteristics of man himself in contradistinction to animals. And once this inquiry has been exhausted, it then becomes evident that Herder was not content to leave things at such a level of generality and that he has devoted whole chapters of his many works to the forces which lead to the greater particularisation of individual peoples: languages, governments, climates and ways of life. It is all too easy to see in what way Nietzsche was justified in characterising him as "a restless guest" at the table of ideas, "tasting in advance every spiritual dish the Germans raked together over a half-century from all the realms of space and time" (H, II, §118; 1886, 338).

Perhaps the best starting point in a brief account of Herder's theory of self-cultivation is his definition of culture. Of the three senses of culture which were introduced in the first
chapter, we found that Herder was primarily concerned with sense (2a), a way of life particular to a people or a group. This could be contrasted to the sense in which I have used the word in saying that 'Weimar Humanism' is the essence of the culture of which Nietzsche was writing in *Daybreak*. The latter usage is biased towards the sense in which culture is (3) a process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development. Herder's conception of culture takes in a much wider number of influences than the basic trio mentioned above. In an early work, *Auch einer Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit*, Herder asserted that every culture is unique and responds to a diverse number of stimuli not the least of which is its physical environment. This was developed further in his later work, *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, where he asserted that there are as many different cultures as there are ways of living, and environments.

It is customary to divide the nations of the world into hunters, fishermen, shepherds and farmers, not only to determine accordingly their level of cultural development, but also to suggest that culture as such is a necessary corollary of a given occupation or mode of life. This would be most admirable, provided the diverse modes of life were defined in the first place. Since these, however, vary with almost every region and for the most part overlap, it is exceedingly difficult to apply such a classification with accuracy. The Greenlander who harpoons the whale, hunts the reindeer and kills the seal, is engaged in both hunting and fishing, yet in quite a different manner from that of the Negro fisher or the Arancoan hunter. The Bedoin and Mongol, the Lapp and the Peruvian are shepherds; but how greatly do they differ from each other, with one pasturing camels, and the other horses, the third reindeer, and the last alpacas and llamas. The farmers of Whidoh are as unlike those of Japan as the merchants of England are to those of China. (Barnard, 1969; 302)
This approach to culture is, although not denied by most of the writers with whom we will subsequently be concerned - aside, perhaps, from Nietzsche - quite irrelevant. The differences between cultures for them, are not so significant as their similarities, and insofar as culture is subsumed under the concept of "civilisation", the primary trio serves the purpose of defining particular cultures because of the presumed interrelation between them. Whereas for Herder, as F.M. Barnard has pointed out, because he introduces so many salient factors, and distinguishes their various effects in cultural terms, "it would be more accurate to speak of specific cultures (in the plural) rather than of culture in general" (Ibid).

But, despite the relativism of his definition of cultures, it was in this later book where a general pattern was laid down for the development of culture tout court, that he formulated the concept of Humanität, that human essence which is "not ready made, yet is potentially realizable" (Ibid; 266) in every man. He defines this essence as "the thirst for truth, freedom and happiness... the most powerful strivings for self-determination" (Ibid; 267). The realization of Humanität is not conceived of by Herder as a linear progression towards its completion in the culture of Europe; nor does the education of man towards a full realization of Humanität have to follow a certain fixed pattern as in Vico's institutional approach which imposes the same pattern upon each
society that it would examine. For Herder, Bildung is introduced into the discussion of culture as the transmission of something inherently particular to a group of people but, at the same time, disseminated generally in each individual culture's realization of Humanität.

Education, which performs the function of transmitting social traditions, can be said to be genetic, by virtue of the manner in which the transmission takes place, and organic, by virtue of the manner in which that which is being transmitted is assimilated and applied. We may term this second genesis, which permeates man's whole life, enlightenment, by the light it affords to his understanding, or culture, in so far as it is comparable to the cultivation of the soil. But whichever term we prefer, its connotation is the same in two important respects: it is continuous and it is world-wide. The difference between the so-called enlightened and unenlightened, or between the cultured and uncultured peoples, is not one of kind but merely of degree. The picture of nations has infinite shades, changing with place and time. But as in all pictures, everything depends on the point of view or perspective from which we examine it. If we take the idea of European culture for our standard, we shall, indeed, only find it applicable to Europe. If, however, we establish arbitrary distinctions between cultures and modes of enlightenment, we are liable to lose ourselves in cloud cuckoo-land.... (Ibid; 313-314)

Bildung is, according to Herder, innately involved both with what distinguishes man from animals, because this very striving to the ideal of Humanität is the fulfilment of man's capacity to be self-determined, to create for himself the conditions of its happiness, and also involved in what makes one group of men distinguishable from another. It is in this way that Herder's statement that "what is divine in our species is therefore Bildung zur Humanität (the capacity to train ourselves to
'Humanität')" (from Bruford, 1962; 233-234) could, despite what Nietzsche called its "boneless generality", be regarded by Charles Taylor as "epoch-making", because it is a definition of self and culture which placed an emphasis upon particularity. "It was Herder and the expressivist anthropology developed from him which added the epoch-making demand that my realization of the human essence be my own, and hence launched the idea that each individual (and in Herder's application, each people) has its own way of being human, which it cannot exchange with that of any other except at the cost of distortion and self-mutilation" (Taylor, 1975; 15).

Taylor's interest in Herder's "expressivist anthropology" is related to what he sees as its difference from the Aristotelian tradition in which the self and its life is the "fulfilment of an idea or a plan which is fixed independently of the subject which realizes it" (Ibid). This emphasis upon the "self-unfolding subject" is not borne out by Herder's texts to the degree that Taylor gives it prominence in the first chapter of his Hegel. Herder is mostly concerned after all with culture at the level of a people [Volk], and his theories of language and 'reflection' [Besonnenheit], the way in which man reflects upon his experience and gives it shape in language, remain tied to larger groups than can be related, as closely as Taylor insists, to the subject. Nevertheless, it is fair enough to emphasize, as Taylor does, Herder's insistence upon the particular embodiment of these
general capacities. "If man is a being who is to be understood under the category of expression, if what is characteristic of him is a certain form of consciousness, Besonnenheit, and if this is only realized in speech, then thought, reflection, the distinctively human activity is not something which can be carried on in a disembodied element" (Ibid, 19-20). Herder's interest in language is indicative of his essential concern with larger groups, groups which are capable of being characterised as "cultures". What T.J. Reed has called "Herder's revolutionizing feeling for particularities" (Pasley, 1982; 509), only goes so far in its tendency to insist upon the particular embodiment of general concepts. Herder speaks of the education of mankind as necessarily involving the education of individuals, but his concept of Bildung remains a general concept nevertheless, one which is involved in the transmission of traditions. "For no one of us became man by himself alone. The whole structure of man's humanity is connected by a spiritual genesis - education - with his parents, teachers and friends, with all the circumstances of his life, and hence with his countrymen and forefathers" (Barnard, 1968; 312).

Through the introduction of traditions into the concept of Bildung, Herder's emphasis upon the larger group becomes manifest. The traditions which are the source of an individual's language and way of life are transmitted through his upbringing and interaction with his fellow countrymen. Herder writes of
these factors as if they are organic forces which operate within man, as opposed to the external forces of climate and soil. The essence of a people is something which Herder identifies as the complex of beliefs and practices which is passed down from generation to generation, paradigmatically in folktales and myths which incorporate a particular history and a particular language in the active and assimilative practice of recitation and composition. In his Correspondence on Ossian, Herder wrote of the ability which poetry has of expressing a way of life, "the objects, actions, events... a living world" (Simpson, 1988; 75), in a way which is consonant with his theory of reflection and its immediate relation to language (the unity of language and thought). Art, at least in its more primitive forms, is involved in the process by which an individual "reaches up to humanity", in that it both transmits and assimilates traditions. As Barnard has pointed out, "his main purpose is to identify socio-cultural traits which could form the basis for the existence and continuity of a distinct community" (Barnard, 1969; 32). There is no hint of art's being involved in the self-expression of the individual as such. But in that art is both assimilative and transformative it is, according to Herder, an example of the organic forces (Kräfte) which, through their self-generating and participative activity, maintain a culture. It is surprising, given that the most ineliminable factor in Herder's anthropology is the concept of a people [Volk], that modern writers identify him, along with Humboldt, as being responsible for the kind of
"self-unfolding subject" which one encounters in Taylor's Hegel. Habermas, for example, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, brackets Herder and Humboldt together in having laid the foundations of a self-formative process which was later developed by the Romantics and Hegel. "Herder and Humboldt had sketched out the ideal of the all-round self-realizing individual; Schiller and the Romantics, Schelling and Hegel had then grounded this expressivist idea of self-formation in an aesthetics of production" (Habermas, 1987; 64). Although it is right to point towards Herder's emphasis upon the importance of the aesthetic - in that it is involved in the transmission and expression of a people's essential character or humanity - it is another thing entirely to ascribe to him the ideal of the "self-realizing individual".

Insofar as Herder’s concept of Bildung is essentially involved in the process of the communication of a unique way of life which distinguishes one Volk from another, his concept of self-cultivation is biased towards those practices which comprise a particular way of life. This is perhaps best exhibited by Herder's analysis of the political problem posed by the French Revolution. Like Schiller, Herder thought that the Revolution was bound to fail because of a lack of supporting Bildung. But Bildung meant quite different things for the two writers. Herder's emphasis upon the transformative and assimilative activities which are essential to culture cannot be easily balanced against
such abrupt changes as are implied in a revolution. As Barnard writes:

[the] interactive and reciprocal building up of new societal and political goals within a socio-cultural continuum represents for Herder the true purpose of human association, the creative, continuous development of man. Bildung, thus understood, provides the alternative to abrupt socio-cultural discontinuities attending the replacement of traditions and values through their prior destruction rather than their transformation. (Barnard, 1969; 12)

Whereas Schiller, as we shall see, did not have difficulty in accepting the radical break with tradition which the Revolution implied, but thought that the Terror resulted from a lack of individual culture. From this it should be evident that the self which is emphasized by modern writers when they write of Herder's "expressivist anthropology", is not given any particularly radical significance by Herder. The self in Herder could be said to be similar to Hegel's concept of the self - if one extrapolates from Herder's concepts of culture, thought and language - which is expressed in language; but that self is nowhere near as particularised as the "self-unfolding subject" which is envisaged by Taylor. In being bracketed with Humboldt, however, it becomes understandable how this could be supported. It is important, in this regard, to establish the differences between their theories of self-cultivation before going on to examine the development of later and, it is claimed, intimately related concepts of Bildung.
Humboldt: A world within

Humboldt was not a part of the Weimar circle in that he never, unlike the others, took up residence in Weimar itself; but he was a powerful presence through his friendship with both Goethe and Schiller and the subsequent exchange of letters which continued until the time of Goethe's death in 1832, as well as his contributions to the Weimar literary journals: the Propyläen and Die Horen. It is the letters between Schiller and Humboldt which are, following W.H. Bruford, most illuminating as to Humboldt's views on culture and self-cultivation. In a letter of 1796 written to Schiller from Berlin, he presented a program for self-cultivation, and the choosing of a way of life.

If we imagine a man whose sole aim in life is to cultivate himself, his intellectual activity must finally be concentrated on discovering (a) a priori, the ideal of humanity, and (b) a posteriori, a clear picture of mankind in reality. When both are as precise and complete as possible in his mind, he should, by comparing them, derive from them rules and maxims for action. (Bruford, 1975; 15)

This seems, on first reading, quite similar to Herder in that it requires a general concept which is at the same time elaborated with regard to particulars. But Humboldt's tendency to present self-cultivation as something which is more of an ideal than something accomplished reveals what is his most distinct difference from Herder. Despite Herder's rather broad assertions concerning Humanität, culture is always considered a realised, or
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potentially realised way of life, an expression of an essence which must be embodied in, at least, a language or art.

This difference is further exhibited in their divergent ideas concerning the relation between the self and culture. Herder in his *Ideen* had asserted that however much philosophers liked to imagine the individual as forming himself according to ideals supplied by the "isolated faculty of reason" (and this is more of an arrow directed at Kant's ideal of autonomy), when they return "from the world of fantasy to the world of empirical reality" they "cannot but recognize that the whole chain of human development is characterized by man's dependence on his fellows" (Barnard, 1969: 311). In Kantian terms, Herder's theory of self-cultivation is an essentially heteronomous process, one in which the sovereignty of the individual's reason is surrendered partly, and that is all that is necessary for Kant, to tradition. Humboldt, on the other hand, put forward a theory of self-cultivation that sought to develop the independence of the self, its autonomy and self-subsistence. The uncritical development of a way of life in an individual, though far from the ideal of Herder's concept of culture, is considered by Humboldt to be the opposite of the true process of *Bildung*.

Everyone must seek out his own individuality and purify it, ridding it of the fortuitous features. It will still be individuality, for a portion of the fortuitous is inseparable from the make-up of every individual, and cannot and should not be removed. It is only in that way that character is possible, and through character greatness. (Bruford, 1975: 13-14)
This critical attitude towards "fortuitous" aspects is not within the scope of Herder's concept of culture, in that a Volk is not able to make such radical decisions, unless one accepts revolution as a viable expression of people's common nature, which Herder does not. But as is evident from this letter to Schiller (1796), Humboldt didn't accept the Kantian primacy of the autonomous Persönlichkeit either - even though he had studied at Frankfurt an der Oder when Kant was teaching there - because he believed in the essential individuality of the self and its personality.

There are two distinctions which must made at this point. On the one hand, the distinction between Herder's and Humboldt's conception of Bildung; and on the other hand the distinction between the Kantian conception of Persönlichkeit and Humboldt's belief in the essential importance of an individual's personality. Bildung, as Harvey Goldman has written,

also takes as its "highest good" the "unfolding of the personality," but personality in a sense different from Kant's. For Humboldt the self must follow an "inward" pattern, and it must flourish and unfold, unbound by abstract reason to overcome the world of nature and the flesh. The inner pattern or form determines the personality and allows the self to develop and harmonize all its faculties, making it a whole but not a servant of the higher laws of practical reason and morality. This process encourages natural development rather than demanding the imposition of moral or religious imperatives that hold the self to a higher standard than it could provide from within. Thus the metaphor in Humboldt is organic rather than elevating and taming. (Goldman, 1988; 126-127)
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(Goldman, 1988; 126-127)
Where Herder’s concept of Bildung concentrates upon the transmission and development of beliefs and practices which constitute a particular way of life, the paradigmatic example of which is art, Humboldt concentrates upon the harmony of the "inner depths of the soul", the paradigmatic example of which is "the development of moral strength" (Bruford, 1975; 18). But as opposed to the Kantian definition of the moral, Humboldt uses "moral" in quite a broad sense which implies an attitude of inner poise which is irrelevant in Kant. Something which compounds the difficulty involved in keeping these quite simple distinctions clear is that all three writers want to claim some kind of freedom. For Herder, as we have seen, the desire for freedom is part of "reaching up to humanity", but it is difficult to elaborate this sense of freedom in isolation from the self-determination of a Volk. Kant is specifically concerned with the autonomy of reason which must, as we will see in the next section, be free from the particular inclinations of the self in order to be fully realised. By way of contrast, Humboldt’s freedom is also that of the philosophic spirit, but he had the classical ideal of stoicism in mind when he wrote of the detachment which the self should inhabit. "One must have a world of one’s own within, over which the waves of life roll on, while it quietly grows within" (Bruford, 1975; 23).
History, to adapt Erich Heller, "seems to be fond, sometimes, of rather obvious theatrical effects" (Heller, 1986; 125): after the defeat by Napoleon of the Prussians, Humboldt was asked to restructure Prussia’s education system. So that one of the most idealistic conceptions of Bildung was transformed into the education system responsible for the development of what Nietzsche called the "culture philistine", the citizen of the Germany which defeated France in 1870. There is a high degree of irony, given Nietzsche’s criticism of the product of Humboldt’s reforms, that Humboldt stressed the division between merely practical education [Fachausbildung] and Bildung, "the attitude of mind which, from the knowledge and the feeling of the total intellectual and moral endeavour, flows harmoniously into sensibility and character" (Gadamer, 1975; 11): a division between the education of the outer and the inner man. Nietzsche’s main source of criticism was this division between inner and outer which he saw as responsible for the culture philistine’s lack of culture. Although Humboldt’s division between outer and inner education can be criticised, it counterbalances the charge that his concept of self-cultivation is suitable only for the leisured class. It was the purpose of Humboldt’s theory of Gymnasialbildung to make available the classical texts which inspired the kind of separation or dehors in which he believed character can develop. Humboldt, like Hegel, believed that the bourgeois must develop within himself the "inner depth" which was considered the prerogative of the
nobility alone. This division between inner and outer, character and talent, bourgeois and nobleman, the antithesis of the humanistic ideal of 'Weimar Humanism', is bitterly expressed by Wilhelm in book five of *Wilhelm Meister*:

I know not how it is in foreign countries; but in Germany, a universal, and if I may say so, personal cultivation is beyond the reach of any one except a nobleman. A burgher may acquire merit; by excessive efforts he may even educate his mind; but his personal qualities are lost, or worse than lost, let him struggle as he will... The burgher may not ask himself: 'What art thou?' He can only ask: 'What hast thou? What discernment, knowledge, talent, wealth?' If the nobleman, merely by his personal carriage, offers all that can be asked of him, the burgher by his personal carriage offers nothing, and can offer nothing. The former has a right to *seem*; the latter is compelled to *be*, and what he aims at seeming becomes ludicrous and tasteless. The former does and makes; the latter but effects and procures; he must cultivate some single gifts in order to be useful, and it is beforehand settled, that in his manner of existence there is no harmony, and can be none, since he is bound to make himself of use in one department, and so has to relinquish all the others.

(*Wilhelm Meister* tr. Carlyle, Vol. 1; 1944, 250-251)

So that behind the non-political exterior of Humboldt's theory of Bildung there exists an essentially political objective: the democratisation of character. But this political objective is only made explicit in Schiller's revolutionary theory of "aesthetic education". Humboldt's conception of Gymnasalbildung is very similar to Kant's conservative theory which we found in section 60 of the 3rd *Critique*. This very elementary conception of education forms the background against which later theories of Bildung are elaborated. It is a theory which supports the central line of argument for the third sense of culture as
"civilization". And as such it opposes the relativistic tendencies of Herder's thought.

If we look at Bruno Snell's *The Discovery of the Mind*, a later product of this line of theorising in German thought concerning antiquity, it is possible to extend the argument which is only sketched by Kant and Humboldt. The essentially important concept is that of *paidea*. As Bruford has written, "'Bildung' meant for [Humboldt] the weeding of his mental and emotional garden, the Ciceronean 'cultura animi' in its original sense, that of the Greek 'paidea' as it was understood in the Hellenistic age" (Bruford, 1975; 14). Snell emphasizes the importance of the Ciceronean relationship between speech and humanity - what distinguishes man from the animals. This aspect of Cicero's conception, however, is traced by Snell back to Isocrates, who believed that "wherein man differs from the animals depends in the main upon the power of speech and persuasion", and who, in this way "admonished the Athenians to acquire eloquence through education (*paidea*), for you excel all others in that which man excels the beasts, and the Greeks excel the barbarians: you are better educated (*pepaideusthai*) toward thinking and speaking" (Snell, 1953; 247).

The tradition out of which *paidea* arises is one which emphasizes the "persuasive arts" which we have already encountered in section 60 of Kant's *3rd Critique*. The essentially rhetorical
nature of this tradition has been diverted from any overtly political connections in Humboldt. But it is interesting to note that many of the concepts which reappear in what could be called the aesthetic discourse of individuality are founded upon a tradition which is oriented towards public persuasion. This is particularly evident when one looks into the concept of the sublime - what was originally an adjective used to describe rhetorical excellence - which, although it doesn't play a role in Humboldt's theorizing about Bildung, does play a role in Kant as well as Schiller. Some of the terms which are used to describe aspects of inner development and experience are imported from the realm of public discourse. This movement from rhetoric to an inner world of self-development mirrors, as Peter Kivy has written, "a growing appeal" in eighteenth century aesthetics generally "to subjective rather than objective criteria in aesthetic judgment" (Kivy, 1973; 10). The Ciceronean tradition in which Humboldt writes has imparted something which is yet another version of that quality which is so pervasive in Kant's description of aesthetic experience, a form of "disinterestedness".

It is this aspect of Humboldt's theory of Bildung which it is possible to bracket with Herder's as having laid the foundations of an "all-round self-realizing individual" which was developed by later writers who "grounded this expressivist idea of self-formation in an aesthetics of production" (supra). Like the
Kantian theory of the subjective appreciation of works of art, this theory of Bildung separates the self from all external forces and posits its development as the expression of its freedom. But this extremely ideal conception which, I submit, takes a high degree of "disinterestedness" from the aesthetic discourse of individuality, was found by Schiller to be too remote from the political; and it is out of a desire to revolutionize the self that he took up the problem of self-development.

Schiller: Aesthetic Education and the Sublime

It was as a professor of history in Jena - he assumed the post in 1789 - that Schiller, taking what was to be a long break from his artistic career, was to devote himself to the philosophical studies with which we are concerned. In the next section I will deal with the relationship between Schiller and Goethe, and contrast their conflicting views and contributions to what has been called 'Weimar Humanism'. In this section I will interpret the philosophical works which are immediately relevant to the examination of the relation between self and culture within the scope of Bildung. This section will also, because of Schiller's grounding in the Kantian critical philosophy, examine aspects of Kant's moral and aesthetic philosophy.
Schiller, as we will see, attempted to graft on to the 'disinterestedness' of the Kantian aesthetic something of the original political importance of paidea, so that his aesthetic education differs quite significantly from Humboldt’s Bildung. The strict division which Humboldt imposed between vocation (Berufung) and Bildung is weakened in Schiller’s philosophical writings by the adoption of a Kantian conception of man’s proper vocation as rational autonomy - what is involved in Persönlichkeit. In this manner, although Schiller reintroduces the centrality of the aesthetic into his conception of paidea, he introduces an element of Kantian reserve towards inclination at the same time. Self-consciousness is introduced into the very realm that is supposed, in Humboldt’s conception of Bildung, to be an inner garden of cultivated human nature. In his philosophical writings Schiller takes up contradictory elements and attempts to build out of them a systematic theory of self-cultivation. This self-cultivation is subsumed, however, under the attempt to combine the aesthetic with the demands of the moral. This latter project and its inevitable failure, I will argue, to defuse the antagonism between the beautiful and the sublime, makes Schiller central to any discussion of the relationship between the aesthetic and the moral. It is crucially important to consider this line of argument closely because Schiller attempts to elucidate the relation between the self and culture by means of that project.
The primary attitude towards the inclinations of human nature in Kant is one of reservation. The only way out of heteronomy is to question both the provenance of an inclination and the action towards which it may incline one. Some part of the self must be withheld from the direct influence of what may be called the impulses or drives inherent in human nature. It is this, the central concern of the Kantian ethic, which Schiller both accepted as the essence of man's sublimity, and characterised as the illness of modern consciousness. Schiller accepted that it was, if anything, the vocation of man to perfect his natural self to the point that it would freely adopt any maxim which reason imposed upon his sensual being, but was profoundly disturbed by the division which such a vocation imposed. There is, in Schiller's mature philosophical works, a conflict between the demands of Kantian rationality and a more graceful, undifferentiated, harmony; what could be characterized as a conflict between the sublime and the beautiful. It is difficult to see how such a conflict could ever be resolved in favour of beauty once it is set up on the grounds of Kantian reserve. Although it might be possible to admire the beauty of art there can never be a complete relaxation of the rational demands which morality imposes. Behind the work of art, then, there would always stand the spectre of the moral, commenting upon both the form and the content. In the Kantian sense of the word, one's respect would always be withheld, the placet following not immediately from the sensual id cuius ipsa apprehensio. Respect
can only be bestowed upon that which we find to be morally worthy. And with the admission of the "Kantian reserve" must be admitted "all of the seven deadly sins of modern consciousness" (to quote Erich Heller on Schiller's follower in this respect, Hegel) - self-division, diremption from nature, alienation from the classical past, etc. - which Schiller diagnosed, for the first time in the context of the Kantian critical philosophy, as Zwiespältigkeit or division.

In an essay entitled 'On the Necessary Limits in the Use of Beautiful Forms', Schiller put forward a stark contrast between the aesthetically beautiful and the morally sublime: which he writes of as embodied in the man who possesses taste and the man who attempts to realize the moral law.

So dangerous may it prove for morality of character, if a too intimate communion reigns between the sensuous and moral impulses, which can be completely united in the ideal, but never in reality... The uninterruptedly prosperous man never... sees duty face to face, since his lawful and well-regulated inclinations will always anticipate the injunctions of reason, and no temptation to an infraction of law brings the law to his remembrance. Only governed by the sense of Beauty, the viceregent of reason in the world of sense, he will descend into his grave without perceiving the dignity of his destiny. The unfortunate man, on the contrary, if he is at the same time a virtuous man, enjoys the [sublime] privilege of communing directly with the divine majesty of law, and while yet a man, of evincing the freedom of a spirit, as his own virtue is dependent upon no inclination. (Weiss, 1845; 197)

In this passage, almost the whole of Schiller's philosophy can be seen in its contradictions, confusions and conflations, as well
as its fascinating tendency to still hit on something which must be admitted as at least important. Schiller proceeds by dividing the psyche into radically opposing forces which he portrays as possible ways of life—what could be called an anthropomorphic dialectic. Having polarized the beautiful and the sublime, the aesthetic and the moral, he imagines them as embodied in two men: one who is happy, and one who is unhappy. These two Lebensformen are present throughout Schiller's philosophical writings. What he attempted to accomplish was a resolution to their imagined conflict. In the fourth of his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Mankind where this conflict has spawned a culture which can be characterized as the battlefield of these Lebensformen (renamed as Nature and Reason), Schiller attempts to look beyond this tendency.

It is true that from a one-sided moral point of view this difference disappears. For Reason is satisfied as long as her law obtains unconditionally. But in the complete anthropological view, where content counts no less than form, and living feeling too has a voice, the difference becomes all the more relevant. Reason does indeed demand unity; but Nature demands multiplicity; and both these kinds of law make their own claim upon man. The law of Reason is imprinted upon him by an incorruptible consciousness; the law of Nature by an ineradicable feeling. Hence it will always argue a still defective education if the moral character is to assert itself only by suppressing variety. The State should not only respect the objective and generic character in its individual subjects; it should also honour their subjective and specific character, and in extending the invisible realm of morals take care not to depopulate the sensible realm of appearance.

(AE, 4; 1967, 19)

Schiller attempts to establish the mediation of this opposition
by a third character which can allow an individual to develop to
the full extent of his capacities, as well as the founding of
both a culture and a State on their reconciliation.

What Schiller saw as the inescapable division of modern
consciousness, that between Reason (or the rational) and Nature
(or the sensual), was characterised by him in a way that mirrored
the Kantian faculties: as the antagonism between the sense drive
and the form drive. The definition of 'drives', the concept of
which was probably adopted from Fichte, and the distinctions to
be made between their roles in the human psyche seems for
Schiller to have been the most essential job of the philosopher.
The one thing that was needful, accordingly, was a drive which
could mediate between the two opposing drives, the essential
third power of the aesthetic which Schiller called the "play
drive". In their most essential forms, the "sense-drive" and the
"form-drive" can be seen as the Kantian imagination and
understanding, between which the mediating "play-drive" acts like
the Kantian harmony of the faculties. "Drives", for Schiller,
are the essential urges within man, and account for the totality
of the psyche. Using the Kantian division of "field",
"territory" and "realm", each drive has a particular "field" of
influence, within which it is possible for us to have knowledge
of a certain "territory" of psychological forces and, finally, a
"realm" within which it has its potential fulfilment in some form
of gratification. The "form drive" and the "sense drive", in
by a third character which can allow an individual to develop to the full extent of his capacities, as well as the founding of both a culture and a State on their reconciliation.

What Schiller saw as the inescapable division of modern consciousness, that between Reason (or the rational) and Nature (or the sensual), was characterised by him in a way that mirrored the Kantian faculties: as the antagonism between the sense drive and the form drive. The definition of 'drives', the concept of which was probably adopted from Fichte, and the distinctions to be made between their roles in the human psyche seems for Schiller to have been the most essential job of the philosopher. The one thing that was needful, accordingly, was a drive which could mediate between the two opposing drives, the essential third power of the aesthetic which Schiller called the "play drive". In their most essential forms, the "sense-drive" and the "form-drive" can be seen as the Kantian imagination and understanding, between which the mediating "play-drive" acts like the Kantian harmony of the faculties. "Drives", for Schiller, are the essential urges within man, and account for the totality of the psyche. Using the Kantian division of "field", "territory" and "realm", each drive has a particular "field" of influence, within which it is possible for us to have knowledge of a certain "territory" of psychological forces and, finally, a "realm" within which it has its potential fulfilment in some form of gratification. The "form drive" and the "sense drive", in
their opposition to one another for their gratification at the other's expense, express themselves to the individual, according to Schiller, as obsessional forms of life. Since the drives account for the totality of the psyche, the predominance of one over the other would, by definition, result in an incomplete way of life. And this is not a mere rhetorical device, slap-dash psychology, or philosophy of mind-cum-ontology for Schiller, he believed that modern man did not combine in his way of life the totality of the psyche.

With us [moderns]... the image of the human species is projected in magnified form into separate individuals - but as fragments, not in different combinations, with the result that one has to go the rounds from one individual to another in order to be able to piece together a complete image of the species. With us, one might almost be tempted to assert, the various faculties appear as separate in practice as they are distinguished by the psychologist in theory, and we see not merely individuals, but whole classes of men, developing but one part of their potentials, while of the rest, as in stunted growths, only vestigial traces remain.

(Æ, 6; 1967, 33)

Thus Schiller takes the "form drive" as the urge to think, to live intellectually and without reference to feeling as far as possible, and the "sense-drive" as the urge to feel, to live sensuously and without reference to thought as far as possible. The man who is exclusively formed by such a way of life is deficient because of the tyrannizing of the one drive over the other, a onesidedness which earns the sensuous man and the spiritual man the name of savage and barbarian respectively.

What betrays Schiller's philosophical naivety most obviously is
the manner in which this contradiction is resolved. The tyrannical aspect of the two drives is counteracted by the Lebensform of the "play-drive", the urge to combine both of the other urges, to live so as to fulfil both of them as far as that is possible. He has, in setting up the argument in this way, already placed art in the mediating position between two opposing tendencies: the "play-drive" is satisfied by the production and appreciation of works of art.

The satisfaction of the "play-drive" is at the same time the realization of a freedom within man from the dominance of either of the other two drives. This concept of freedom is very difficult to define. We have already encountered two different definitions of freedom in Herder and Humboldt, where it stands, roughly, for self-determination in the former, and the classical stoic concept of the philosophic disposition in the latter. The Kantian concept of freedom is a combination of these two, essentially, and requires that one abstract from one's inclinations in order to be able to determine for oneself what action is rationally, and therefore morally right. It is essential for Kant that the accomplishment of that action is not as important as the ability, firstly, to determine what is right. Morality is dependent in Kant upon the power to fight against one's inclinations, to determine what is right against the desires of human nature. As J.A. Bernstein has written:

For Kant, morality as power in relation to and against inclination even took on an aesthetic
dimension as the *sublime*. The very awesome force of nature affects us chiefly through its suggestion of a force within ourselves which gives us courage to be able to measure ourselves against the seeming omnipotence of nature. (Bernstein, 1980; 130)

To be conditioned by the "play-drive" towards the production or appreciation of a work of art, curiously, becomes the expression of an unconditioned state, of freedom. In this way Schiller is able to draw a close analogy between the aesthetic and the moral:

> Aesthetic man often needs no more than the challenge of a sublime situation [*die Aufforderung einer erhabenen Situation*] (which acts most directly upon our will-power) to make of him a hero or a sage. (AE, 23; 1967, 164-165)

The man who is sensitive to beauty is capable of moral action, which Schiller immediately characterizes as sublime. However, what is "moral" in the *Aesthetic Education* is hardly ever what is, in the most important sense, considered "moral" in Kant's ethical philosophy. Though, in places, he uses the Kantian concept of freedom - "as a necessary presupposition of reason in a being who believes himself to be conscious of a will" (*Groundwork*, 120), and the formulation of man gaining his freedom through his conformity to law, he writes in his twenty-third letter of the law not of practical reason, but of harmony.

> Through the aesthetic modulation of the psyche, then, the autonomy of reason is already opened up within the domain of sense itself, the domain of sensation already broken within its own frontiers, and physical man refined to the point where spiritual man only needs to start developing out of the physical according to the laws of freedom. (AE, 23; 1967, 163)
It is only by first attaining to the aesthetic "state", the state in which he can potentially create or appreciate works of art, that man can have the freedom to become what he ought, establishing a culture of wholeness and a State which "not only respect[s] the objective and generic character in its individual subjects", but also "honour[s] their subjective and specific character" which in "extending the invisible realm of morals take[s] care not [to] depopulate the sensible realm of appearance."

Schiller moves at a breathless speed, in order to arrive at the essentially political importance of the aesthetic. At the political level, however, the architecture of Schiller's argument is altered. The state which is constructed out of needs and desires of the unself-conscious barbarian is called the state of Nature or Notstand; the opposing concept of the state, that which Schiller thinks has been attempted in modern times, caters to a mistaken concept of self-consciously rational "spiritual" men. However, not the aesthetic state but a "moral State" is presented as the ideal which is to be brought about by the cooperation of man's "play drive". What Schiller has in mind is essentially that in order to move from the Kantian ideal of autonomy to some kind of realization in the world of a morally desirable political system - what Bernard Yack has called "the actualization of man's autonomy in the interaction of individuals"(Yack, 1986; 152) - it is necessary, firstly, for man to learn how to appreciate things
merely as appearances - i.e. "disinterestedly". Schiller makes an unusual distinction between the craftsman's or the artist's attitude towards his material - one essentially of violence - and the politician's attitude towards people who must be treated as ends in themselves. This gives a slant to the Platonic image of the craftsman as possessing a techné which, as opposed to the poet, enables him to "produce the principle in virtue of which he offers what he does" (Gorgias, 485a): the principle involved in such a practice is different from that in the politician's art.

The statesman-artist must approach his material with a quite different kind of respect from that which the maker of Beauty feigns towards his. The consideration he must accord to its uniqueness and individuality is not merely subjective, and aimed at creating an illusion for the senses, but objective and directed to its innermost being.

\[\text{(AE, 4; 1967, 21)}\]

It is in this manner that Schiller takes the aesthetic and not the practice of artists to be a stepping stone towards the creation of such a morally desirable political system: the aesthetic is a way of gaining access to the innermost being of the citizen.

Even though Schiller had no particularly attachment to the French Revolution, the disappointment of the 'Terror' appears to have inspired him to write the Aesthetic Education. In his analysis, the savagery of the "Terror" was let loose because although legislators had a definite and commendable idea of the political state, the citoyens had not firstly been aesthetically educated:
the harmony of the aesthetic state had not prepared the way for
the legislated freedoms of the moral State. And although
Schiller doesn't fill this out, I think that what he must have
had in mind was that without a certain degree of sensitivity on
the side of the citoyens, the rhetoric - as in the "flattery" of
the Gorgias - of leaders like Robespierre, and not the true
spirit of the ideals of the Revolution, would win their support.
The excellences of the pepaideusthai are required in each
citizen, and therefore some form of paidea or aesthetic education
must precede the granting of such political freedoms. Later, we
will find that Hegel takes an entirely different view of the
'Terror', one which attempts to exhibit the danger of the
atomistic conception of the political individual. It is
interesting to note that where Hegel's interpretation moves
towards the distinctly political Schiller's moves in the same
direction but firstly interposes the aesthetic. Once again, I
think it is clear that Schiller must have had in mind something
like the arts of persuasive communication as his paradigm. It is
as a result of this that taste, or wholeness of character (he
considered them indistinguishable), was considered by Schiller so
necessary to the realization of political ideals. This aspect of
Schiller's theory has lead Bernard Yack to classify him as a left
Kantian. Expanding upon Schiller's statement concerning the moral
state, Yack writes:

True political freedom is a work of art, something
that we must construct in the external world. But
unlike all other works of art, the form and material
of true political freedom are drawn from our
humanity, our moral freedom. Since it represents the realization of what is highest in human beings, it is "the most perfect" of human artifacts. (Yack, 1986; 151)

The harmony which the aesthetic state brings about in individuals allows the construction of a truly public work of art; therefore beauty, and the experience of the beautiful takes a central position in the establishment of the ideal polis.

This is clearly where Schiller turned to Kant's third Critique with the expectations of a radical legislator looking for his key to all sensibilities. As Dieter Henrich has pointed out, in the edition of the work which Schiller first read, the marginalia show clearly that he "found only those remarks noteworthy which seemed to him to contain or to make possible a connection between aesthetics and ethics" (Cohen & Guyer, 1982; 244). Although it is quite obvious, on reading Schiller's Aesthetic Education, that his use of Kant's philosophy is very loose at best, I think that it is important to do justice to Schiller and to look closely at how he takes up that philosophy and to what purpose he uses it. It is important to emphasize, firstly, that Schiller is concerned with a Zustand or "state" whereas Kant is concerned with a judgment in his Geschmacksurteil or judgment of taste. What in Kant's 3rd Critique is a pleasure which we must reflect upon before being able to make, with epistemological certainty, what is called an "aesthetic judgment" (ie. that we know that the pleasure is attributable to the harmony of imagination and
understanding), is in Schiller a "state" which, although borrowing the same epistemological grounds, is essentially the fulfilment of an urge.

Our psyche passes... from sensation to thought via a middle disposition in which sense and reason are both active at the same time... This middle disposition, in which the psyche is subject neither to physical nor to moral constraint, and yet is active in both these ways, pre-eminently deserves to be called a free disposition; and if we are to call the condition of sensuous determination the physical, and the condition of rational determination the logical or moral, then we must call this condition of real and active determinability the aesthetic.

(AE, 20; 1967, 141)

Schiller's reformulation of Kant's position threatens to go beyond the point where one can follow him systematically. In the Kantian aesthetic the conflation of the moral and the aesthetic is an extremely volatile interpretative question. The universality of the aesthetic judgment which is at the base of the 3rd Critique is essential to not only its a priori status, but to the possibility of the claims that an aesthetic judgment can make on individuals and society. Without the claim of universality, the whole Kantian aesthetic would be rendered futile. The grounding of this claim on the "disinterestedness" of the judgment is central not only to the judgment but to the adoption of aesthetics into the wider field of both the critical philosophy as a whole (including of course the ethics within that system) and a society which is ruled according to rational principles. It is in this context that Schiller seems to have taken up the Kantian concept of "disinterestedness".
That Schiller should attempt to graft on to disinterestedness the moral importance of taste, as the ground of the possibility of not only morality, but the very development of man towards a higher realization of himself - as in the third sense of 'the moral' which I defined in Chapter One - as well as the left Kantian realization of an ethical State, is his most significant move. Schiller takes from Kant the position which is outlined in section 9 of the 3rd Critique, in the "Analytic of the Beautiful":

Now a representation by which an object is given that is to become a cognition in general requires imagination for the gathering together of the manifold of intuition, and understanding for the unity of the concept uniting the representations. This state of free play of the cognitive faculties in a representation by which an object is given must be universally communicable, because cognition, as the determination of the object with which given representations (in whatever subject) are to agree, is the only kind of representation which is valid for everyone.

(CJ, §9; 1986, 58)

The tendency, in the interpretation of this aspect of the Kantian aesthetic, is either to move towards the moral, or something akin to it such as the legal (as regards rights in the broadest sense), or to move decisively away from any such conflation into the field where art is considered as entirely separate from the immediate concerns of man's relation with other men, or his conception of himself. However, the words which Kant uses here - Anspruch, zumuten, ansinnen - all, as Paul Guyer has pointed out, "suggest the imposition of some sort of demand or request on another person, an imposition which would ordinarily require some
legal or moral basis" (Guyer, 1979; 141). The belief in the "disinterestedness" of one's response to a beautiful object, in the Kantian aesthetic, does lead one to impute the judgment to other people, and this imputation is of no little import, it carries with it something related to the full weight of logical necessity - and therefore qualifies as a possible moral significance for other rational beings. That Schiller should lean so heavily upon the communicative ability of art and works of art in conveying something - be it a pleasure alone, or an emotion, or even a disposition - is not entirely antagonistic to the most sober of Kantian interpretations. It is more a question of what else he grafts upon this, what he claims is the potential influence of that which art can convey through its intersubjective validity.

In the aesthetic state, then, man is Nought, if we are thinking of any particular result other than the totality of his powers, and considering the absence in him of any particular determination. Hence we must allow that those people are entirely right who declare beauty, and the mood it induces in us, to be completely indifferent and unfruitful as regards either knowledge or character... By means of aesthetic culture, therefore, the personal worth of a man, or his dignity, inasmuch as this can depend solely upon himself, remains completely indeterminate; and nothing more is achieved by it than that he is henceforth allowed to make of himself what he will - that the freedom to be what he ought to be is completely restored to him.

(AE, 21; 1967, 145-146)

"Disinterestedness" forms not only the base of Schiller's claims for the communicability of the particular aesthetic State, through the harmony of the faculties to which one attributes the
pleasure caused by the beautiful object, but is also the unconditioned state in which any moral determination is possible. At this point, however, it is impossible to follow Schiller consistently because the condition of the Spieltrieb cannot, even though Schiller seems to expect it, be equated with Kant's harmony of the faculties because the "play-drive" retains the general definition of being the unconscious fulfilment of an objective - probably the inheritance of the Fichtean Trieb which, Copleston writes, "aims... at being causality, at effecting something outside of itself" (Copleston, 1965: Vol. 7; I, 76). The Kantian harmony of the faculties must be seen as something less straightforward.

Despite this essential problem, or thanks to this rather slanted interpretation of Kant's 3rd Critique, it would seem that the beautiful, because of its harmonious effect, must be placed above the sublime in the overall structure of Schiller's Aesthetic Education. As Jürgen Habermas has pointed out in his Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,

For Schiller an aestheticisation of the lifeworld is legitimate only in the sense that art operates as a catalyst, as a form of communication, as a medium within which separated moments are rejoined into an uncoerced totality. (Habermas, 1987; 50)

This position, it can be seen, is dependent upon the role which art plays within the polis, and has lead interpreters of Schiller to attribute to him the concept of the Kunstreligion, a tradition
which was introduced to the Germany of the 1750s by Winckelmann and which culminated in Nietzsche’s — and many others’ — conception of Richard Wagner’s music-dramas. As we have found in section 80 of Kant’s 3rd Critique and Humboldt, there is a tradition of seeing the aesthetic discourse of individuality as inherently connected with what can be called the arts of persuasive communication. So that in Schiller’s concept of aesthetic education, the reintroduction of the public-oriented aspect of art into the realm of subjective aesthetic judgment should not be so surprising, it is the return of the original tendency of paideia. Schiller, the master of a rhetoric which can win one over to the least understandable of positions in the Aesthetic Education, portrays all the excellences of the pepaideusthai, in something which amounts at the same time to a dance of poetic philosophizing which, if nothing else, is an instantiation of the very Spieltrieb that he would establish through argument alone. The superiority of beauty over the sublime then, is guaranteed, by its essential importance to the polis.

Once, however, Schiller ceases to be such a good left Kantian, and begins to emphasize the individualistic tendencies of his Weimar friend Humboldt, or die menschliche Berufung (without subsuming that under Gemeinschaft), the guarantor in the relationship ceases to exert its influence and the sublime threatens, once again, to get the upper hand. This is what
occurs in Schiller's *On the Sublime*, where the opposition between
the beautiful and the sublime is dealt with most concentratedly. In setting up his argument he resorts to the same kind of
dialectical anthropomorphism which we found in his earlier essay.
He portrays his thought as embodied in opposing individuals or
types of humanity, with opposing *Lebensformen* which can be
examined for their various merits.

In the beautiful, reason and sensuousness are in
unison, and only for the sake of this harmony does it
possess any charm for us. Through beauty alone, then, we should never discover that we are destined
and able to manifest ourselves as pure intelligences. But in the sublime, however, reason and sensuousness
do *not* accord, and precisely in this contradiction
between the two lies the magic with which it captures
our minds. The physical and the moral individual are
here most sharply differentiated from one another; for it is precisely in the presence of his limitations
that the latter is aware of his *power* and is
infinitely exalted by the very same object that
 crushes the physical man to the ground.

(S, 1966; 199-200)

Although Schiller conflates the beautiful character with the
physical man, the drift of his thought is quite clear in this
essay: the harmony of the beautiful doesn't afford a view of the
sublimity inherent in man's vocation, which is "to manifest
ourselves as pure intelligences." Further on in the essay, he
claims that in the harmony possessed by the beautiful character
it is impossible to discern where inclination has ceased and duty
to the moral law of rationality has begun. It would seem that
the latter somewhat limits the likelihood of Yack's
characterization of what would form a "real" society in
Schiller's left Kantian vein: "the form of interaction that allows freedom of individuals to become manifest to each other in the phenomenal world" (Yack, 1986; 167). As opposed to the broad usage of 'the moral' in the *Aesthetic Education* (1795), in *On the Sublime* (1801) he seems to have returned to the familiar Kantian concern with autonomy. This becomes obvious if we juxtapose two quotations, the first from *Aesthetic Education*, and the second from *On the Sublime*.

He must learn to desire more nobly, so that he may not need to will sublimely. This is brought about by means of aesthetic education, which subjects to laws of beauty all those spheres of human behaviour in which neither natural laws, nor yet rational laws, are binding upon human caprice, and which, in the form it gives to outer life, already opens up the inner.

(A.E., 23; 1967, 169)

Thus the sublime affords us an egress from the sensible world in which the beautiful would gladly hold us forever captive... if in the seductive guise of the spiritually beautiful it [the beautiful] has succeeded in penetrating the innermost seat of moral legislation, there to poison the holiness of its maxims at their source, often a single sublime emotion suffices to rip this web of deceit asunder, to restore in an instant all of the vivacity of the bound spirit, to accord it a revelation of its true vocation [my emphasis], and, for the moment at least, to impose upon it a sense of its dignity.

(S, 1986; 201-202)

The opposition between the beautiful and the sublime has become that of *aesthetische Erziehung* and *Berufung*, aesthetic education and vocation. The dance of the playing powers of imagination and reason which is so intoxicating in the *Aesthetic Education* is broken in this later book. This was dealt with by Schiller in his *Naive and Sentimental Poetry* where - as Francis Sparshott has
imaginatively interpreted him (allowing us to carry on in the metaphor) - he distinguished "between dance that is simply danced and dance that is danced self-consciously under the idea of dancing" (Sparshott, 1988; 275). The beautiful, in the Aesthetic Education, which accomplishes the reunification of the parts of the psyche into a joyous totality is not self-conscious in the way that is implied in Naive and Sentimental Poetry. Once the jump is made into appearance, the freedom which results regains a spontaneity which is otherwise impossible given the necessary reserve towards sensual gratification which the Kantian Berufung imposes. The truly aesthetically educated man [gebildeter Mann] is not content with mere appreciation of the appearance, he must express this overabundance in a living form which celebrates, in ever surpassing inutility, the freedom of his individuality. Without this radical transformation of the passive observer who enjoys the subjective universality of the beautiful into a participant in a community of play, Schiller's rhetoric would be merely a self-conscious dance to no music, for it must be accompanied by the harmony of the "uncoerced totality". In letter twenty-seven Schiller writes:

And as form gradually comes upon him from without in his dwelling, his household goods, and his apparel - so finally it begins to take possession of him himself, transforming at first only the outer, but ultimately the inner, man too. Uncoordinated leaps of joy turn into dance, the unformed movements of the body into the graceful and harmonious language of gesture; the confused and indistinct cries of feeling become articulate, begin to obey the laws of rhythm, and to take on the contours of song.

(AE, 27; 1967, 213)
The sublime, however, is conceived of by Schiller, as by Burke and Kant, as an abrupt cessation of any such unself-conscious joy; for it is in being made aware of the dissonance between the sensuous and man's vocation in which the sublime consists. The former was conceived, as we have seen, as something which prepares the individual for his membership in an ideal polis, or spielende Gemeinschaft, even in this latter passage where the emphasis is clearly upon the arts of persuasive communication; while the latter shares more of the traditional Kantian concern with the autonomy necessary for self-conscious rational morality: it is in this self-conscious possession of something "absolutely great", as we shall see, that the sublime consists.

It would seem, then, that in On the Sublime, Schiller has abandoned the Humboldt-like attempt to encompass both inclination and the rational in a harmonious totality in favour of the Kantian concept of Persönlichkeit. It is, according to Kant, man's vocation to become a "person" who is subject to his own laws of practical reason. And it is just such a character, like the "starry heavens above" in his 2nd Critique, which fills Kant with wonder and convinces him that he is "einer Intelligenz, unendlich, durch [seiner] Persönlichkeit", an infinite intelligence through his personality. In the face of such a profound vocation, it is not surprising that aesthetic education seems to shrink into the mere cultivatedness of a "refined
sensuousness" [bloß eine kultivierte Sensualität]. Yet Schiller, who never ceases to attempt the giddy if incomprehensible heights of idealism, asserts that the "sublime must complement the beautiful in order to make aesthetic education into a complete whole and to enlarge the perceptive capacity of the human heart to the full extent of our vocation; beyond the world of sense in any case" (1966, 210). It seems as if the dance of the uncoerced totality must be interrupted by the self-conscious moment of the sublime, for the sublime wins from Schiller the higher ranking, as it appears to have done in every aesthetic theory since Addison's 'On the Pleasures of the Imagination' (which was translated into German in 1745).

It is important to emphasize that although Schiller has placed the sublime above the beautiful, and has characterised the two in quite different ways, he still attempts to conceive of them as combined within the compass of art, which allows him to represent man's vocation as an extension of aesthetic education, which becomes in this formulation a "propylaeum" - the word which Goethe will use - towards the realization of the moral. Much as I admire Dieter Henrich's essay "Beauty and Freedom: Schiller's Struggle with Kant's Aesthetics" I have to disagree with him where, after an excellent discussion of the Kantian errors and restrictions within Schiller's philosophical works he writes:

Until this point, we have been discussing beauty and the work of art as if it were self-evident that the latter is merely a particular form of beauty. But for a long time we have felt a linguistic discrepancy
in the concept of the "beautiful arts". We demand that a work of art do more than simply actualize beauty... the concept of art, to which, in distinct separation from that of nature, the theory of aesthetic enjoyment is henceforth directed, is now conceived as the unity of beauty and sublimity. The distinction between these two loses its fundamental importance for aesthetics, thereby drama becomes the paradigm of beauty. (Cohen & Guyer, 1982; 255-256)

Firstly, it is not, as I have attempted to show, true to say that Schiller, or most of his Weimar friends, was concerned with the "beautiful arts". Secondly, this seems to ignore Schiller's dramatic theory where, in a way that contains both much which is perhaps already familiar in 18th century theorizing about tragedy and much that is peculiar to him alone, Schiller presents a theory which points towards something of a union which Henrich sees as lying completely beyond the dichotomous pleasures of the beautiful and the sublime. Of course it then remains to be seen whether Schiller really did accomplish such a union.

In order to see how it could be possible, within the scope of Schiller's philosophical writings, for this degree of freedom to be exhibited in a work of art, we need to turn to his two essays of 1791 and 1792 on tragedy. The way in which tragedy achieves the moral height of the sublime is twofold: through what Schiller calls the freedom of its pleasure and the sublimity of what it depicts. In his description of the latter a familiar Kantian phrase is used: "moral independence of natural laws in a condition of emotional stress" - which reads into tragedy, almost verbatim, a definition of the Kantian dynamically sublime. In
appreciating tragedy, according to Schiller, one learns to consider a type of object which "constitutes a threat to our existence only in so far as we choose to consider it as such." For, as he points out, "when we find ourselves really in danger ... it is all over with our aesthetic judgment. This danger must be in our imagination rather than actual, in order that a feeling may arise which is not identical with fear, but which is analogous to it" [as quoted in (Miller, 1970; 22-35)]. The characters of tragedy must, like Medea who, despite her "badness" in one sense, resolves to kill her children against her inclination, convince us of their reasons for performing their actions, so that the tragedy is very much the artform for the pepaideusthai. It is important that the drama fulfils both the function of preparing its audience for an encounter with misfortune, as well as educating its ability to judge, according to Schiller, the characters through their expression (1845, 298).

Returning, then, to On the Sublime, it is possible to see what he might have meant by "the artificial misfortune" of the pathetic:

The pathetic is an artificial misfortune, and like real misfortune it sets us in direct concourse with the spiritual law that rules within our breast. But true misfortune does not always choose its man nor its time well; it frequently surprises us unarmed. The artificial misfortune of the pathetic on the other hand finds us fully armed and, since it is only imagined, the autonomous principle in our minds gains space in which to assert its absolute independence. The more frequently the mind repeats this act of independence the more skilled it becomes, the greater the advance won over the sensuous impulse, so that finally, should an imaginary and artificial misfortune turn into a real one, the mind is able to treat it as an artificial one, and - most exalted
inspiration of human nature! - to transform actual suffering into sublime emotion. (S, 1968; 209)

It is by experiencing what Schiller calls the pathetic in tragic art that one could be prepared to face the real threats of life with the disinterestedness necessary to achieve what for both Kant and Schiller is the "absolutely great", the moral law. Although Schiller makes a strong distinction in his later work between the beautiful and the sublime, in his theory of tragedy there is a necessary coincidence of the two within the work of art.

It is all too clear that this broadly defined sense of the aesthetic can only encompass the self-consciousness of moral autonomy within an artform which, according to Schiller's theory, imposes such stringent rules upon both artist and audience, that Hegel is right in saying that what is implied in such a theory is "that art does not carry its vocation, end, and aim in itself but its essence lies in something else to which it serves as a means" (A, 6, iii; 1979, 51) - Schiller admits that arts "which affect the passions, such as tragedy... are not entirely free arts" in Letter twenty-five of his Aesthetic Education. Schiller could only afford the aesthetic the Kantian respect which can only be bestowed on the "absolutely great", as Miller has pointed out, on the basis that the 'aesthetic' refer "to freedom rather than beauty" (Miller, 1970; 58). So that in incorporating the sublime into the purview of the aesthetic, Schiller had to leave the
harmonious ideals which are so predominant in his descriptions of beauty in the Aesthetic Education. In order to achieve his principal goal of asserting that the aesthetic can lead to the moral, Schiller had to abandon beauty itself. This, however, renders most of his Aesthetic Education incomprehensible. Paul Crowther, whose The Kantian Sublime attempts to explore in Kant what I have attempted to follow in Schiller, has written:

Kant's real point [in his 3rd Critique] is that what makes the sublime absolutely great is the fact that it pertains to our supersensible being (i.e. that which is beyond all questions of phenomenal magnitude)... on the basis of Kant's critical ethics Kant has good reason to reserve the term "sublime" for our moral being alone, in so far as it is ontologically, axiologically, and cosmologically superior to any item or sets of items in the phenomenal world. (Crowther, 1989; 31)

The importance of the Kantian "respect" which cannot, like the scholastic placet be accorded to whatever the very apprehension of which pleases, is given its due weight in Schiller by virtue of his ultimate rejection of beauty in favour of the human vocation of autonomy.

Although what Schiller attempted to accomplish in his Aesthetic Education through a confusion of Kantian faculties, Fichtean drives, and general inconsistency of reasoning, extends far beyond the limitations which autonomy imposes, it was inspired by Kant's philosophical goal in the 3rd Critique: to show that there is a relation between taste and morality. Schiller's aesthetic education - although it must be seen as either falling short of
the sublime or beauty - is, through the concept of vocation which he added on almost as the further education of the self, the imaginary gratification of what Kant was only able, as Crowther concludes, to "broach... in the most circumspect way".

This is because, as he explains them, judgements of taste are sufficiently accounted for in terms of the harmony of imagination and understanding. To introduce an additional moral element too soon and too explicitly might be seen as casting doubt on the credibility of his main explanation. (Ibid, 134)

Although Crowther attempts to show how it might be possible to make room for the forging of links between taste and morality in judgments of sublimity, he still finds it difficult to admit that they, too, are disinterested enough to qualify as similar to judgements of taste. So that like Schiller, Crowther has to move beyond the strictly Kantian - in terms of actually quoting Kant as supporting the view - in order to show that the sublime is, like the beautiful, a disinterested judgment. It is at precisely the point where Schiller would forge this link that it is impossible to consistently follow him through his arguments.

This inconsistency in Schiller is inevitable because of the constraints which the Kantian philosophy imposes once it has been adopted as a starting point. As Henrich has pointed out, Schiller never considered himself talented enough as a philosopher to carry out what his beliefs imposed upon him as his task; to search out some unity between taste and morality, the beautiful and the sublime. It was left to Hegel, accordingly, to
get to work where the spectre of reserve always interposed itself between Schiller’s conception of inclination and the Kantian conception of the rational which rendered his task unachievable. As Henrich writes:

it is anything but an accident that Hegel designates the essence of the work of art, the unity of opposition and reconciliation, of beauty and sublimity, with a term belonging to Schiller’s basic vocabulary, and that in this term he explicitly appropriates the whole fullness of meaning which Schiller had given it unaware and only indistinctly. The work of art is the "Ideal".

(Cohen & Guyer, 1982; 256)

Henrich is unquestionably right in attributing the beginnings of this last great metaphysical aesthetic concept to Schiller; but, perhaps less unquestionably right in his assertion that Schiller remained, essentially, within the old philosophy of art which looked towards a harmony with nature. I agree instead with Adorno who, in his Aesthetic Theory, cited Schiller’s philosophy as entailing "an element of destruction in relation to nature" (Adorno, 1984; 92). In answering the question "why was natural beauty dropped from the agenda of aesthetics?", Adorno says that the "reason is not that it was sublated in a higher realm, as Hegel would have us believe... the concept of natural beauty was simply repressed."

The price that aesthetics had to pay for repressing the theme of natural beauty was the shift in the nineteenth century towards an ideological "religion of art" [Kunstreligion], a term coined by Hegel, denoting the satisfaction of having achieved symbolic reconciliation in works of art. Natural beauty vanished from aesthetics thanks to the expanding supremacy of the concept of human freedom and dignity.
inaugurated by Kant, but fully realized in Schiller and Hegel, who transplanted these ethical concepts into aesthetics, with the result that in art, like everywhere else, nothing deserved respect unless it owed its existence to the autonomous subject. (Ibid)

In Schiller, the importance of beauty is dwarfed by the "absolute greatness" or sublimity of the moral law. The concept of human nature which allows for an agreement between sensuous enjoyment and rational ideals is put under a pressure which it cannot withhold. The aesthetic education which Schiller puts forward is a vain attempt to incorporate beauty, in terms of harmony, into the project of the cultivation of the rational ideals of humanity. This leads, as we shall see later, to the downfall of the conservative conception of self-cultivation and its replacement in the aesthetic discourse of individuality by what will be characterized as romantic self-cultivation: a conception of self-cultivation which accepts the unattainability of an agreement between the sensuous and the rational.

Goethe: *Handwerk als Berufung*

It is appropriate that the subject of one of the first conversations between Goethe and Schiller should have been the *Ur-pflanze*. Goethe, through his irascible anti-philosophical bent, seems to have attempted to stem Schiller's abandoning of nature. At Jena, where the conversation is reported to have taken place on Schiller's doorstep, Schiller was studying Kant,
and Goethe, who had by now begun his *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, was living in the grounds of the botanical gardens. Years after Schiller had died, Goethe said to Eckermann:

> Schiller was like all men who proceed too much from the idea. Then he was never in repose, and could never have done; as you may see see from his letters about my *Wilhelm Meister* which he would have now this way, and now that way. I had enough to do to stand my ground, and keep his works and mine free from such influence. (Monday, March 23, 1829; 1970, 303)

But if in Schiller’s philosophical writings the emphasis upon the importance of the Kantian concept of rational autonomy obscures what he attempted to accomplish in the *Aesthetic Education* through aesthetic education, then in Goethe’s *Wilhelm Meister* the inability to complete that education obscures the process of *Bildung*. Human nature, which is to be prepared through aesthetic education for its participation in a moral state is, in Schiller’s writing, ultimately canalized in just the way that he hoped to avoid, so that nature itself recedes from the purview of the aesthetic and the autonomous subject is brought forward as the true content of a work of art. Whereas in Goethe’s *Wilhelm Meister*, chance and contingency play so ubiquitous a role that the Kantian concept of autonomy simply couldn’t enter into the game; Goethe seems to have maintained Herder’s essential point that it is impossible for the individual to develop without the influence of either his environment or society and, most emphatically, without an art or nature so that the “absolutely great”, although it may be present, remains at best *primus inter
pares. Something like this seems to be the point of Goethe's saying, at the end of the conversation above reported by Eckermann:

Had I not some solid foundation in the plastic arts and natural science, I should scarce have kept myself up in that evil time and its daily influences; but this was my protection, and enabled me to aid Schiller also. (Ibid, 304)

Much can, and has been made out of the contrast between Goethe and Schiller at this stage of their careers. For our purposes it is important merely to note that at this point in the development of the set of aesthetic and moral terms which play a role in the concept of self-cultivation, that the Dioscouri represent two opposed camps. Goethe upholds a view of self-cultivation which is something like what I have termed conservative self-cultivation, while Schiller's theories contain the seeds which will develop into what will be explored in the next chapter: "romantic self-cultivation".

Without committing myself to a study of Goethe's views of nature, culture, the individual, society, and subsequently the classic and the romantic, I would like to give a brief account of what role self-cultivation plays in his "Introduction" to the Propyläen and an even briefer, and therefore highly selective account of self-cultivation in Wilhelm Meister. Goethe's views on self-cultivation are chiefly represented in the novel, the first part of which dates from the period of his friendship with
Schiller, and the second part of which from the time following Schiller's death in Weimar in 1805. It is interesting to note in the context of Schiller's writings on tragedy that the first version of *Wilhelm Meister* was to focus upon "the ambitious dream of reforming German theatre and making it a means of educating the public through art" (Bruford, 1975; 30). This *theatralische Sendung* stands as a reminder of the kind of idealism which was so readily engaged in regard to art by the members of the Weimar group.

Goethe's views on the education of the public through art, however, are most classically expressed in the introduction to the short-lived *Propyläen*. In this periodical, Goethe hoped to disseminate the culture of the Greeks, especially as it was available in the plastic arts, to a younger public which he thereby hoped, would be spared from wandering "those circuitous paths in which he himself had wandered" (Gage, 1980; 5). In his prospectus of 1798 Goethe set forward much that should already be familiar from my outline of Kant's position in section 60 of the 3rd *Critique*. Goethe emphasises the importance of a society with "the common interest in advancing [its] culture" and, with a salesman's turn of phrase, writes that though conversation is essential to such a process "and although we do not lose any of the results of mutual cultivation, the recollection of the means by which it was arrived at vanishes".

The stages of such a common progress are better preserved by correspondence: each moment of growth is
thus fixed, and while our achievement gives us a feeling of satisfaction, a retrospective look at the progress of growth is instructive, and gives us reason to hope for ceaseless development in the future.  

(Ibid, 4)

Goethe asserts that it is important for an individual to be not only a member of a group which shares the "common aim of ... artistic and scientific development", but that it is also necessary that he have "contact with the wider public". As in Kant's short outline of aesthetic education, Goethe's introduction to the Propyläen puts forward a semi-anthropological view of how human nature contains an essential element of sociability, so that it is as natural for an individual to want to communicate his aesthetic feelings as it is for an artist to search for applause. This is something like the pre-critical [circa 1770] Kant's theory that, as Guyer has pointed out, "our disposition [Gemüt] is communicable, and sympathetic, so that man as gladly communicates as he allows himself to be communicated [to]" (Guyer, 1979; 25). It is a common belief, then, that an individual's desire to communicate aesthetic feelings is a part of human nature which, so the general theory runs, promotes both his individual, as well as society's, development. Goethe writes:

This is what has given rise to our title [Die Propyläen]; the step, the door, the entrance, the antechamber, the space between the inner and the outer, the sacred and the profane, this is the place we choose as the meeting-ground for exchanges with our friends.  

(Gage, 1980; 3)
It is only a small step from this position to Goethe's assertion that the artist's activity consists in the bestowing of significance upon the forms of nature, and that in this activity lies the value of art. The education of taste is conceived of as the education of the instinctual response towards the perception of artistic truth, the agreement between inner and outer. Goethe does not put forward any particular judgment in support of this claim because, as he stresses so often, it "is really only possible to speak usefully of works of art in their presence" (Ibid, 13). This position is similar to that which Arnold Isenberg put forward in "Critical Communication": "that the critic's meaning is 'filled in', 'rounded out', or 'completed' by the act of perception, which is performed not to judge the truth of his description but, in a certain sense, to understand it..., [that] it is a function of criticism to bring about communication at the level of the senses that is to induce a sameness of vision, of experienced content" (Isenberg, 1973; 163). In a similar spirit Goethe writes:

Everything depends on direct apprehension, for this is what determines whether the word by which we hope to elucidate the work produces a clear impression or none at all. Hence it so often happens that the writer on art deals only in generalities, which certainly awaken the mind and the imagination; but only those readers who examine the work itself with book in hand will be really satisfied. (Gage, 1980; 13)

Goethe, however close he comes to holding the position that "unverbalized apperceptive reactions are engrained in the content
and structure of the perceptual field" (Isenberg, 1973; 187), does after all show that he is preeminently a man of his time when he asserts that, contra-Isenberg, the truth of a work always consists in the right application of a set of words which, though empty until 'filled in' by observation, serve an echt normative function: "feeling for nature", "knowledge, regularity, strength and seriousness", and "perfect". Given the assurance that a work of art contains a "feeling for nature", Goethe certainly would have said "If it is true, I shall like it so much the better". It is important, nevertheless, to emphasize that Goethe does show himself to be aware of certain problematic aspects of critical procedure. Something similar to Isenberg's critical "communion" is established in both observation and agreement between individuals, and is "to be tested by artists" (Gage, 1980; 11). It is the participation in a group which shares this kind of aim which forms the beginnings of Goethe's aesthetic education.

To turn to Wilhelm Meister, it is not surprising to find that Goethe stresses the importance of communities in the Bildung of its hero. This Bildungsroman takes as a fundamental structural element the forming and reforming of groups which share practical aesthetic goals as in the production of plays, groups which share the common goal of mutual improvement as in the Turmgesellschaft, and groups whose goal is the improvement of mankind as in the Weltbund. There is a stress, through this element of the plot, laid on the essential sociability of man, on the importance of
society for individual development. This concept of self-cultivation is, like Kant's, ultimately conservative because sociability tends to emphasize a conception of the self as dependent (in a manner that Kant would have objected to in the realm of morality) upon an existent (or nascent) culture - as in both a particular way of life (2), and works and practices (1). The only way in which the individual can progress along the path of general development - sense (3) - is through such participation. This is reflected, in Wilhelm Meister, in the doctrine of the *Turmgesellschaft*. Bruford writes:

The leading idea of the theorists of the Tower is the inability of the individual to live happily for himself alone. The division of labour on which middle-class society is founded is therefore reaffirmed... It is mankind that is infinite in faculty, not the individual, and a man's first aim should be to discover his true vocation.

(Bruford, 1975; 55)

This aspect of Goethe's writing has been emphasized by Thomas Mann as well, who asserted that Goethe's views are essentially bourgeois. It is interesting to note that there are two attitudes towards self-cultivation which can be seen as pivoting upon the Kantian philosophy. The conception, which we find in Goethe, of a conservative self-development which is dependent upon "models" and a conception of man's natural sociability - what could be called the weak Kantian position (although I do not mean by this that Goethe was in any way indebted to, or in favour of, Kant's philosophy); and the strong Kantian conception of development as entailing the ultimate rejection of any models,
which considers dependence upon either them or a particular society as akin to heteronomy. However, it is just as easy to see that the conservative element of Goethe's conception of self-cultivation shares something of the Greek emphasis upon technē, which we have already noted in Herder's conception of art generally: the learning of particular skills. As concerns the latter, Josef Chytry writes:

Whatever the choice of option, basic to all these communal formations is the specialization in a craft related, however remotely, to the hand (Handwerk). For all levels of talent this principle offers integrity, purpose, and utility on behalf of the social body... Accordingly, Wilhelm's journeymanship is capped by his commitment to become a surgeon, not a profession exalted in the period.

(Chytry, 1989; 63-64)

Vocation in Wilhelm Meister is opposed to the Kantian sense of man's vocation [die menschliche Berufung], it is the bourgeois ideal of a particular role within a given culture. This bourgeois ideal emphasizes, as Bruford has written, that education proceeds mostly "by disciplined work" the aim of which is to increase "a man's usefulness to society, and [that] this, not Romantic self-expression, is the proper creation" (Bruford, 1975; 96-99). There is a strong similarity between the assertion that an individual must take up a particular vocation in a society before his Bildung can be completed, and the assertion that it is only in the presence of a particular work of art that it makes sense to talk of qualities: that an examination of the particular determination of a term is the only way to fill out
its meaning. As Alasdair MacIntyre has pointed out, when "man is thought of as an individual prior to and apart from all roles that 'man' ceases to be a functional concept" (MacIntyre, 1985; 59). There is a strong opposition between a concept of Bildung which requires both a tradition of "models" and a particular function within a particular society in order to be filled out, and a concept which depends upon neither but, instead, some universal conception of die menschliche Berufung. The former is typified by its dependence upon particular models, types, or what MacIntyre has called "characters" for its elaboration, while the latter is dependent upon a universal ideal. 'Weimar Humanism' can be seen as breaking into two distinct definitions of self-cultivation: Schiller's strong Kantian vocation of striving towards autonomy, with its stressing of tragedy as its expressive artform - which has to be seen, simultaneously, as the failure of the project of his Aesthetic Education - and Goethe's definition of self-cultivation as dependent upon a particular culture for its content, which is expressed in his Bildungsroman.

Self-cultivation, clearly, means many things to the Weimar humanists. But essentially, the opposition of the "heavenly twins" captures the two most important tendencies in its definition. The dialogue between these two conceptions of self-cultivation is as interminable as it is complex, because both can invoke justifications from different definitions of either self, morality, art, or culture. For example, Schiller or
someone who holds the view that self-cultivation must proceed from a concept of what man's universal vocation is - which could, after all, be either philosophically or religiously determined - presumes, firstly, that he has access to a valid definition of the self from which he can generalize about the nature of what it is to be a man as such without having to subsume that under, let's say, being a Canadian and a lumberjack. This universal definition gives him a viewpoint from which he can conceive of any man as able to cultivate himself: it presumes both a common starting and finishing point. Insofar as this definition of the self is universally valid, the individual should be able to overcome whatever particular obstacles lie in the way of developing himself towards the goal. But if the starting and finishing point are common to all men, the course itself varies from culture to culture, as in sense 2: the way of life which a particular group imposes. Just as, in the Kantian ethic the heteronomy of being influenced by inclination has to be overcome so, too, does the invidious influence of an incompatible culture.

Take as an example Thomas Mann's early masterpiece Buddenbrooks, in which Mann depicts the rise and fall of a merchant family. As Mann has presented it in the novel, it might be nearly impossible to be both a cultivated man - in the sense of Schiller's gebildeter Mann, someone who has developed the totality of his psyche - and a good Buddenbrook. The Buddenbrooks' way of life, which is entirely devoted to the amassing of capital, is
fundamentally hostile to such a goal. If tragedy is averted in Tony Buddenbrook’s life by the irony of Mann’s treatment and the essential lightness of her character, it is fully realized in Thomas Buddenbrook’s brief moment of self-consciousness before his death.

Was not every human being a mistake and a blunder? Was he not in painful arrest from the hour of his birth? Prison, prison, bonds and limitations everywhere! The human being stares hopelessly through the barred window of his personality at the high walls of outward circumstances, till Death comes and calls him home to freedom!

Individuality? - All, all that one is, can, and has, seems poor, grey, inadequate, wearisome; what one is not, can not, has not, that is what one looks at with a longing desire that becomes love because it fears to become hate.

I bear in myself the seed, the tendency, the possibility of all capacity and all achievement. Where should I be were I not here? Who, what, how could I be, if I were not I....

(In Thomas’s discovery of Schopenhauer, Mann has portrayed the painful coming to awareness of an individual who has devoted his life to keeping up the dehors, the dignity or separateness which befits the economic superiority of a good Buddenbrook. Thomas has never, until this moment, been confronted by his personality (in Humboldt’s sense of personality), so that his "inner self" is conscious of its "personality", at this singular moment of self-consciousness, as a "prison". *Buddenbrooks* is a cruelly inverted *Bildungsroman*, which portrays the the inner self’s inability to develop within a certain culture.)
There is, in the Schillerian scheme of things, an optimism which shies away from admitting that the course of self-cultivation may lead through a culture which is insurmountable. The vision which Thomas Buddenbrook has of the self as a prison which prevents him from realizing his potentialities is one which is not directly answered by Kant, or Schiller. After introducing the importance of semblance in his Aesthetic Education, Schiller comes close to dealing with such an objection:

It (aesthetic semblance) will not become universal as long as man is still uncultivated enough [so lang der Mensch ungebildet genug ist] to be in a position to misuse it; and should it become universal, this could only be brought about by the kind of culture which would automatically make any misuse of it impossible. (AE, 27; 1967, 205)

But despite this reservation, Schiller conceives of a total revolution in man's whole way of feeling [einer totalen Revolution in seiner ganzen Empfindungsweise] which singles him out as both radical and optimistic. Hegel recognised that there was a serious weakness in this argument and, as we will see in chapter four, developed a different form of radical transformation which emphasises reason and its necessary elaboration in both individual and the state. Schiller, however, remains dependent upon the aesthetic and its ability to prepare the individual man for moral determination. He believes that not only is a total revolution possible within the individual but that, given the truth of the Kantian critical philosophy, it
could be "imputed" to contribute to the transformation of general culture.

In a letter to Goethe of the 28th of October, 1794, Schiller wrote that Kant's philosophy expressed a truth which would, if his works were lost by some twist of fate, be silently acknowledged by reason (Briefwechsel; 1960, 30). Goethe, despite the occasional good word towards Kant, never seems to have learned what it was that was to be silently acknowledged. In a letter to Schiller of the 18th of February, 1795, Goethe said that he admired the early, pre-critical, Kant's Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime in which he saw the foundations of Kant's mature philosophy - something which belies his ignorance of the latter. Schiller rightly dismissed the early book as "merely anthropological", giving no final ground of beauty, and conceded that it was interesting as a natural history. This shows, in clear contrast, the difference between Goethe and Schiller. Schiller's acceptance of the superiority of the sublime over the beautiful stems directly from his acceptance, I have attempted to show, of the Kantian concept of Persönlichkeit. Whereas Goethe never seems to accept the necessity of going beyond inclination in a way which is entailed by the later Kantian ethic - references to which are very hard to find in Goethe's correspondence and conversations. Goethe's response to Kant's early book can be accounted for, perhaps, by its presentation of the beautiful and the sublime as "finer feelings"
which act upon man with a directness which self-conscious reason, in the later critical scheme, cannot. Goethe is satisfied by the characterization of the "finer feelings" as the essential forces within both individual and national characters because this account preserves the fundamental objectivity of experience: although the "finer feelings" are internal, they account for qualities which can be found everywhere in the world of nature and men. The outer world is taken as directly related to the inner in a way which doesn't entertain any of the problematic relationships which characterize the later Kantian reserve. This can be seen in one of the "beloved remarks" [allerliebste Bemerkungen] (Briefwechsel, 50) which Goethe could have had in mind, and which Schiller probably found too "flowery" [blumenreich]:

Temperaments that possess a feeling for the sublime are drawn gradually, by the quiet stillness of a summer evening as the shimmering light of the stars breaks through the brown shadows of night and the lonely moon rises into view, into high feeling; of friendship, of disdain for the world, of eternity. The shining day stimulates busy fervour and a feeling of gaiety. The sublime moves, the beautiful charms. The mien of a man who is undergoing the full feeling of the sublime is earnest, sometimes rigid and astonished. On the other hand the lively sensation of the beautiful proclaims itself through shining features, and often through audible mirth.

(0, 1960; 47)

This quaint work of Kant's is, very much in the tradition of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, concerned with the relation between the "finer feelings" and the outer world because it is this connection between nature and the individual upon which the
summum bonum is founded. In Hutcheson, for example, one finds the belief expressed that,

He [the Author of Nature] has given us strong affections to be the spring of each virtuous action, and made virtue a lovely form that we might easily distinguish it from its contrary, and be made happy through the pursuit of it. (An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design: Kivy, 1973; 25)

Kant's early work presents what he attempted, unsuccessfully, to incorporate into his later work where the reserve which is entailed towards the inclinations tout court rules it out: the connection between the aesthetic and the moral. It is interesting to note that in this early work a theory of tragedy is presented which, despite its similarity to Schiller's later theory, accounts for its sublimity as an experience, as a feeling aroused in its audience, which shifts the argument away from the necessarily conscious reflection upon the precise moral nature of what is presented. Thus Goethe's admiration for Kant's Observations can be seen as an example of his favouring the experiential over the theoretical and, conversely, Schiller's rejection of it as an example of his having adopted the later Kantian philosophy which entailed a grounding of that experience in both a theory of mind and epistemology which ruled out any such direct relationship between the aesthetic and the moral.

To return to Wilhelm Meister, the difference between Schiller and Goethe is well documented in the correspondence to which Goethe referred Eckermann in the passage from the Conversations which I
quoted earlier. Goethe, who sends Schiller instalments of the novel as they are prepared for printing, is exposed to some fascinating attempts by Schiller to characterize the novel in terms taken from both the Kantian ethic and aesthetic. In a letter of Schiller's to Goethe of the 8th of July, 1796, for example, one finds Schiller accounting for the relation between Wilhelm and the Turmgesellschaft in a way which encompasses both the third moment of Kant's account of aesthetic judgment in the 3rd Critique, and the necessity of Wilhelm's character developing according to rational principles. The fellowship of the Tower must guide Wilhelm through his experiences without his knowing, so that a rational idea forms his character while, at the same time, allowing it to merely respond to experience in a manner which is free.

Auf dieser Art erhält das Ganze ein schöne Zweckmäßigheit, ohne daß der Held einen Zweck hätte, der Verstand findet also ein Geschäft ausgeführt, indes die Einbildungskraft vollig ihre Freiheit behauptet. [In this way the whole preserves a beautiful purposiveness without the hero's having had a purpose; understanding finds, therefore, a duty carried out in which imagination has fully maintained its freedom.] (Briefwechsel; 1960, 172)

Schiller, in this clever but essentially desperate attempt to impose on Goethe's haphazard presentation of Wilhelm's education some kind of Kantian autonomy, shows how profoundly Kantian he is; something to which Goethe, in his reply, does not refer - after all, he probably did not know what Schiller was going on about. Goethe's persistence, despite Schiller's attempts to
impose a rational structure on the novel, in regarding Wilhelm's development as, essentially, the product of so many experiences and not rational principles completes, quite vividly, a picture of their differences concerning self-cultivation.

The ultimate adoption of a Handwerk or craft in Wilhelm Meister, as I have already pointed out, can be seen as the rejection of the Kantian 'human vocation'. And this is symptomatic of the different theories which the two hold concerning Bildung. This presents us with not only a different conception of the self and its relation to society, but with the even more essential difference of perception. Returning to the famous conversation in Jena, it is interesting to note Goethe's reply to Schiller's assertion that the Ur-pflanze is not an experience, as Goethe explained it, but an idea: "How nice to learn that I have ideas without knowing it! And actually see them with my own eyes too". Goethe's conception of beauty is, like his conception of the Ur-pflanze, an experience which doesn't require Kant's subjective account, in just the same way that Wilhelm's apprenticeship is a process of self-cultivation which doesn't require Schiller's rationalization. As opposed to Schiller's looking for the sublimity of things in their expressing a rational autonomy, Goethe is quite contented, as Karl Heinz Bohrer has written, to look for "the dignity of things... in the very moment, in the very place which he finds them. The decisive factor for him is thus not the 'Transcendental Argument' of the subjectivity of the
percipient; but the objectivity of things in their local and temporal habitation" (Wilkinson, 1984; 106).

"The objectivity of things" could be taken as the key to an understanding of Goethe's approach to art, life, and experience. And although this approach has a freshness about it when it is compared with the over-intellectualised interpretations which Schiller put forward concerning *Wilhelm Meister*, it has also lead many writers to accuse him of being too conservative. For Goethe's character and his own development are of central importance to later writers. It was Schiller's questionable idealisation of Goethe's character and outlook in both his early letters to Goethe and *On Naive and Sentimental Poetry* that formed the seed of this accusation. Goethe is, according to Schiller, 'naive' in the way in which the Greek was 'naive':

[in] his love for the object he seems to make no difference between what exists through itself and what exists through art and the human will. Nature seems more to interest his understanding and his desire for knowledge than his moral sense; he does not cling with inwardness, with emotion, with sweet sorrow to her as we moderns do. (N&S, 1981; 33)

Leaving the classical/modern distinction to be dealt with in the next chapter, it is important to point out that Schiller's assertion of a harmony between the inner and the outer is something which will stick to Goethe and the interpretation of his character. Nietzsche, for example, will praise him for his 'pagan' unity of being (GS §304); which manifested itself in his
lack of moral guilt for his "happiness of the truth of the five senses" [aus der Wahrheit der fünf Sinne] (Goethe in a letter to Lavater quoted by T.J. Reed in Wilkinson, 1984; 114). If the chief characteristic of culture for Schiller is "striving for unity", then although Goethe is a paradigm for the ideal of culture, as an accomplished unity between inner and outer, he cannot be taken as a paradigm for those who must be active in the pursuit of that goal.

In this sense Goethe is taken to represent, either through his actions or his demeanour, an affirmation of existence which is perceived to be either sui generis or downright suspect. Even Schiller, through his adoption of the Kantian 'human vocation', was unable to accept Goethe's 'naivety' unreservedly. He seems to have opted for the consciousness which strives for harmony over the consciousness which exemplifies it: "only a dominating drive for harmony is able and is allowed to produce that deep sense of moral contradictions" (N&S, 1981; 44). In the next chapter we will find that this is taken up by Friedrich Schlegel in his conception of radical or romantic self-cultivation. The foundations of the latter theory are evident in Schiller, who wrote:

the goal for which man strives through culture is immeasurably preferable to that which he reaches through nature. One, therefore, has his value because of his absolute attainment of a finite greatness, the other because of his approximation to an infinite one. (Ibid, 40)
Not only does this support Adorno’s claim that there is a shift away from nature to the autonomous subject in Schiller, but it also introduces the concept of infinity which is so important for radical or romantic self-cultivation. Insofar as the concept of infinity is involved with the sublimity of what is “absolutely great”, it attracts Schiller’s esteem in a way that mere beauty, as achieved harmony, cannot. In staunch opposition to such a conception of self-cultivation, and the value which it places upon the sublimely unattained, Goethe wrote:

Man is born to a limited condition; he is able to understand simple, accessible, definite goals, and he accustoms himself to employing the means that happen to lie close at hand; but as soon as he oversteps his limits he knows neither what he wants nor what he ought to do, and it is all one whether his head is turned by their loftiness and dignity. It is always a misfortune when he is induced to strive after something which he cannot proceed towards through a practical activity.

(Wilhelm Meister’s Lehrjahre, Book 4)

Despite the characters of sentimental longing for harmony and insatiable desire for experience - Werther and Faust - which he created, Goethe comes to be seen as relatively complacent once this system of values is brought into operation.

As we have seen, Goethe, in his prospectus for the Propyläen, can be seen as putting forward a theory which is similar to the conservative concept of self-cultivation which I introduced through section 60 of Kant’s 3rd Critique, and found to be present in Humboldt’s theory of Gymnasialbildung. Although there
are many differences between Kant, Humboldt and Goethe, the primary aspect which unites them is their mutual belief in the nourishment which the self takes from the continuity which is to be perceived and assimilated in, to use Nietzsche's phrase, "everything great and memorable that has ever existed or still exists" (UM, III: 4; 1983, 152). But Nietzsche expands this to assert that this is indicative of a type of man: "Goethean man is a preservative and conciliatory power" (UM, III: 4; 1983, 152). In short, this type of man who is developed after the Goethean mould is conservative because he would conserve the achieved orders of culture in his own character. This belief in the power and the importance of the achieved harmony of culture is rejected by both Schlegel and Nietzsche. Furthermore, Nietzsche asserts that the very happiness of Goethe is a danger for the advancement of culture itself. In 'Schopenhauer as Educator' Nietzsche writes: it is "Goethe whom our cultural philistines point to as the happiest of Germans, so as to demonstrate that it must therefore be possible to be happy among them - with the implication that anyone who feels unhappy and solitary among them has only himself to blame" (UM, III: 3; 1983, 138). The unity of being which Goethe exemplifies is, then, ultimately a cultural force for complacency in its misuse by the pseudo-culture of the Germany of the 1870s.
This chapter examines Friedrich Schlegel's 'radical self-cultivation', classicism and historical self-consciousness, and romanticism and the principles which are fundamental to Hegel's theory of Bildung. The aim of these three sections is to represent three different ideals of self-cultivation. In the first section I will finally make good the promissory note which I delivered in the first chapter, and define Bildung. The second section examines the first of two essentially important cultural concepts which, despite their ostensibly extra-subjective subject-matter are intimately connected with the elaboration of the development of historical self-consciousness, a concept which is of fundamental importance for both the general framework within which Hegel's philosophy developed and the specific background to his concept of self-consciousness. I can imagine no more well-mined area than the one in which these three sections attempt to burrow. But aside from invoking Aristotle's statement that it will be adequate if the following sections have as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, I would like to address the general problem which this subject-matter poses.

The subject-matter of this chapter is as amorphous as it is significant, in fact its significance might very well lie in the
fact that it is amorphous. These ideals of self-cultivation are at the opposite end of the spectrum from Kant's ideal conception of 'man's vocation' to be a moral agent, although the latter is incorporated into Schlegel's 'radical self-cultivation'. They are involved not only with literature and philosophy, or the history of literature and philosophy, but also with the attempts which have been made by writers and philosophers to establish the very function of literature and philosophy. To move from the Kantian language of the description of maxims to the language in which these ideals are explicable is "to move to a language of 'thick description', in the sense of this term that Clifford Geertz has made famous, a language which is a lot richer and more culturally bound, because it articulates the significance and point" (Taylor, 1989; 80) that literature or philosophy had within a certain culture. In order to describe these ideals it is necessary to retrieve some aspects of the culture in which they were developed. A degree of cultural history is thus required before these ideals can be examined. Against this admittedly confused background it will be possible not only to better understand Hegel's theory of self-cultivation which (to adapt Nietzsche), like a bell, was founded in this "casing of coarser, commoner stuff" (H, I; 8245), but also to be able better to sound its note.
Schlegel and Radical Self-Cultivation

How disappointed the reader of [Wilhelm Meister] might be by the end, for nothing comes of these educational arrangements but an unassuming charm; and, behind all those amazing chance occurrences, prophetic hints and mysterious appearances, there is nothing but the most lucid poetry; the final threads of the entire action are guided merely by the whim of a mind cultivated to perfection. (Friedrich Schlegel, "On Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister": Wheeler, 1984; 72)

Friedrich Schlegel’s criticism of Goethe’s Bildungsroman operates on two fronts. Firstly, in asserting that nothing comes of Goethe’s "educational arrangements but an unassuming charm"; and secondly, that the action of the novel is guided merely by whim. Schlegel objects to the way in which the novel pretends to portray an education of the kind that is implied by Bildung, while actually offering something closer to a process of "finishing". He also objects that because events in the novel are only chance occurrences without a unifying principle, the novel is merely poetry. This latter point is extremely important for Schlegel who believed that a novel "becomes a work through the bond of ideas, through a spiritual central point" ('Letter about the Novel': Wheeler, 1984; 78). In his analysis, however, Schlegel makes it clear that by going beneath the surface of the novel, the true structure becomes apparent. In another passage he writes: "The whole man who feels and thinks in universal terms is interested not only in the brilliant outward covering, the bright garment of this beautiful earth; he also likes to investigate the layering and the composition of the strata far
within; he would wish to delve deeper and deeper, even to the very centre, if possible, and would want to know the construction of the whole" (Wheeler, 1984; 83). It is presumed that beneath the surface of the novel a power is at work which is not mere chance and which is attributable to the genius of the artist. The critic's task is to uncover that genius. Schlegel's criticism of the novel is one which naturally extends to the mind which creates the surface. Schlegel allays the objection that the events of the novel are not directed towards any particular meaning by asserting that "Chance itself is here a cultivated man". Schlegel is fascinated by how the structural intricacy of the novel removes goal directed activity from immediate view, so that Wilhelm appears to develop without a goal and yet at the same time raises "himself out of that baseness which originally adheres even to the noblest natures or accidentally forms their environment" (Wheeler, 1984; 88). Schlegel presents an interpretation of the novel which comes very close to Schiller's assertion that "the whole preserves a beautiful purposiveness" which fully maintains the imagination's freedom through Goethe's having shifted the responsibilities of Wilhelm's education off his own shoulders and onto the characters who emerge at the end of the novel: the Abbé and Lothario - those "architectonic natures" who "encompass, bear and support the whole" (Wheeler, 1984; 73). Behind these "architectonic natures", of course, lies the cultivated mind of Goethe. The structure of the novel is presented by Schlegel in the following way: the events which form the plot of the novel consist of (1) Wilhelm's "infinite impulse
towards cultivation" which propels him through those events and which is controlled by (2) the Abbé, Lothario and (3) chance itself, which is to say (4) Goethe. The whole point of Schlegel's exercise is to show how Goethe is present merely as a mind "cultivated to perfection" which appears to operate, and this is important, by whim and not by principle. The critic is forced to go looking for the structure, to go beneath the surface and uncover the genius beneath the strata of appearances.

The subterranean and organic nature of this interpretation is indicative of what M.H. Abrams has called "the heterocosmic model" of art which was put forward, during the eighteenth century in Germany, by writers such as Karl Philipp Moritz. This approach to the work of art considers a particular work as "a self-governing [einemächtig], self-sufficient whole", in which the "active power" of the artist

creates [schafft] its own world, in which nothing isolated any longer has a place, but everything is, in its own way, a self-sufficient whole [ein für sich bestehendes Ganze].

(Cohen, 1985; 26)

This is certainly a good description of Schlegel's procedure in the essay on Wilhelm Meister where one reads that "the larger and smaller masses reveal the innate impulse of this work, so organized and organizing down to its finest detail to form a whole" (Wheeler, 1984; 63). The autonomy of the work of art is seen as sharing something of the autonomy of the artist's imagination. This approach to the work of art, combined with the
Kantian terminology which we found in Schiller — Kant's *Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck* from the 3rd "moment" of the judgment of taste in Kant's 3rd *Critique* — leads to a very peculiar form of criticism, one which, ultimately, divides off the imagination of the artist from the constriction of any particular culture as in (2) a way of life. The genius of the artist is seen to consist in a unique and autonomous imagination.

The approach which Schlegel takes in his essay on *Wilhelm Meister* is one which is very much in the tradition of Schiller's aesthetic theorizing. The work of art is symbolic of the autonomy of the artist's imagination. The self-sufficient whole of the work of art is taken to be the expression of the artist's cultivation. It is Goethe's cultivation, more than Wilhelm's process of self-cultivation, which is at the centre of the novel. Without the concept of cultivation Schlegel's essay would be incomprehensible. This is exemplary of the degree to which the concept dominated German intellectual life during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. If Schlegel could write in 1798 that the "French Revolution, Fichte's philosophy, and Goethe's *Wilhelm* are the greatest tendencies of the age" (*Athenäum Fragmente*, 8220: Wheeler, 1984; 48), then it is certainly fair to say that *Bildung* is one of the most important concepts of that age.

'Weimar Humanism' divides, as we have seen, into two separate concepts of self-cultivation, which stem from two distinct
concepts of the self. Schiller’s concept of the self, one which is ultimately independent insofar as it is based upon Kant’s autonomous rational individual, is oriented towards its fulfilment in moral determination. While Goethe’s concept of the self is ultimately dependent upon a particular culture for its definition, is oriented towards a particular role within a society, and takes its ideal from the Handwerker or craftsman. Schlegel’s concept of self-cultivation, as I have already pointed out, is much like Schiller’s. It is fascinating that the very influence which Goethe confessed to Eckermann as having fought against so diligently should come to be expressed in the interpretation of Wilhelm Meister by its greatest critic; in the very work which instantiates Goethe's ideal of self-cultivation, Schlegel uncovers an autonomous imagination which is "cultivated to perfection". This clearly signals a move towards a glorification of the artist as the ideal of autonomous individuality; which is expressed by Schlegel with characteristic bravado.

Even in their outward behaviour, the lives of artists should differ completely from the lives of other men. They are Brahmins, a higher caste: ennobled not by birth, but by free self consecration.

(Ideen, §146: Wheeler, 1984; 59)

The artist is considered a free individual because of his ability to create, to be self-determined. This picks up on an aspect of Schiller's theorizing which is most prominent in his essay Über Anmut und Würde (1793) where he distinguished between 'beings which are merely organic [and which] are worthy of respect as
creatures" and man "who is the originator of his own condition."

It is not for him, as it is for other natural creatures, to reflect the rays of some other rational being, not even those of the divine being himself; but it is for him to shine, like some heavenly body, by his own light. (Miller, 1970; 31)

If it is the vocation of man to be an autonomous being, then the artist is the most autonomous by virtue of the freedom of his imagination. Works of art are symbolic of the autonomy to which the artist has attained - an aspect of interpretation which we will see carried over into Hegel's theory of art when he distinguishes the beauty of art from the beauty of nature. In this regard the artist is the model which all men should follow in their own self-development. If in Kant the power of reason is given the highest place in the development of the individual, then the sublimely willing individual is supplanted in Schlegel's writing by the artist. This move was prefigured in an early letter to Goethe, where Schiller wrote that "der Dichter ist der einzige wahre Mensch, und der beste Philosoph ist nur ein Karikatur gegen ihn" - the poet is the only true man, and the best philosopher is only a caricature compared to him (Briefwechsel, January 7; 1795: 1960, 47).

In the aphorism "Every uncultivated person is a caricature of himself" (Athenäum Fragmente, §63: Wheeler, 1984; 45), Schlegel puts forward almost the whole of his 'theory' of self-cultivation. But the use of the adjective, here, is impossible to establish without placing it within the range of
meanings which it can have. Essentially, "cultivated" operates in the critical vocabulary of the time in much the same way that "wit" operates in eighteenth century English. William Empson, in *The Structure of Complex Words*, distinguishes between three kinds of wit. "A wit, then, or man who displays wit may be a

1. bright social talker  
2. critic of the arts or of society  
3. poet or artist,

and in each class he may be divided into similar heads:

a. mocking,  
b. acting as judge,  
c. giving aesthetic pleasure or expressing new truths.

These divisions are perhaps only a matter of how he is applying his wit, and in all of them there is a doubt about what qualities of mind are so called" (Empson, 1951; 86). Similarly, when many of the writers with whom we are concerned use the adjectives *gebildet* or *kultiviert*, it is not always clear in what sense they are being employed. When a man is called *ein gebildeter Mann*, he could be: (1) a man of refined manners [*wohl maniert*], (2) a man respected for his education [*gelehrt*], or (3) a well-rounded or cultivated man [*kultivert*]; and, just as in Empson's characterization of "wit", each class may be divided into the same three subdivisions. So that if one were to expound Schlegel's use of cultivated in the passage which I quoted above, it would follow that he accuses Goethe of presenting Wilhelm's becoming 3 in the process and himself as being 3c, while actually
Wilhelm becomes merely 1 and Goethe is merely 1a. Of course, Schlegel really does believe that Wilhelm has become 3 and that Goethe is 3c. The importance of noting these possibilities of word-play, or what Eliot called "the wobbliness of words", lies in the fact that it is not easy to characterize, in any given text, exactly how the adjective gebildet is being used. So that in an examination of Bildung, one must exercise a degree of sensitivity to the way in which the word is being used. It is significant to note that wit was given much critical attention in early nineteenth century German criticism - in Solger's Erwin (1816), and in Jean-Paul Richter’s Vorlesungen über Aesthetik (1804-1825), for example; and Hegel, we will see, stressed the importance of wit [Geistreichleih] to an understanding of the predicament of consciousness under the prevailing rule of culture in the section "Self-alienated Spirit, Culture and its Realm" in the Phenomenology. In the confrontation between the Lui and the Moi in Diderot's Neveu, Hegel finds a similar movement to that which we have observed in Schlegel’s comment on Wilhelm. The noble philosophe or Moi perceives Rameau’s Nephew, the Lui, as being a rather contemptible, or in Hegel’s words lowly, bright social talker who is mocking (1a). But what “prevails”, according to Hegel,

in it [the disrupted consciousness of the Nephew] is the Notion, which brings together in a unity the thoughts which, in the honest individual, lie far apart, and its language is therefore clever and witty.  

(F, §521; 1977, 317)

As Hegel interprets Diderot’s Neveu, Lui is representative of the
Notion - is, most importantly, a progressive character viewed from the perspective of a universal cultural development (culture, sense 3) - and is therefore a wit as in 2c: a critic of society expressing new truths.

To be cultivated or to be involved in the process of cultivation is a tentacular concept. One source of complexity is the extremely wide range of meanings which the word encompasses. In English, the verb "to cultivate" is immediately related - as I have already pointed out - to the noun 'culture', as they stem from two related Latin words: *cultivare* (to till), and *cultura* (tillage). Taken as a cluster of related words - cultivate, culture, cultivated, cultured, cultivation, cultural, etc. - we are confronted with a curious mixture of natural and human significations having, on the one hand, to do with the development of something within nature (bacteria, crops, pearls); or, on the other hand, having to do with the development of something distinctly human (customs, civilizations, arts). Though we will be restricted to the development of the latter, one cannot ignore the basic sense of the Latin verb, a plough being forced through the soil. Inherent in the concept of cultivation is the breaking up of the original nature of the thing, the altering of what would otherwise, naturally, occur. The shift away from nature involved in the process of cultivation is emphasized in the German adjective *gebildet*, and in the noun *Bildung*, which both share the verb *bilden* (to form, or fashion). The German language makes a not entirely strict, but discernible,
distinction between the natural significations of kultivieren and "mixed" significations in such related words as kultiviert, Kultivierung, Kultur, kulturell, etc., by the use of equivalent words using the root bilden. In this manner it is possible to signify a specifically human "cultivation", the process of Bildung (education; formation; shaping). To be ungebildet necessarily implies that one is not fully formed. I will, however, not follow this division and will use cultivation because the words spread into each other from writer to writer.

But what is fully formed humanity, and how would one know when it had been achieved? Humboldt believed that each of us has within us something like our own "lights" which we should follow; presumably once followed, the process would have made us the person that we always, potentially, were. And this is not to be confused with the mere development of talents, as it might be easy to think. Following from Humboldt's conception of Bildung it is evident that what is to be developed has more to do with the inner person, something which we would think more of as involved in personality than in outer accomplishments, though of course personality as well is a relatively external concept when measured against the German concept of inwardness. Gadamer has made this distinction rather cleverly in his Truth and Method.

Like nature, Bildung has no goals outside itself. (The word Bildungsziel - the goals of cultivation - is to be regarded with the suspicion appropriate to such a secondary kind of Bildung. Bildung as such cannot be a goal, it cannot as such be sought, except in the reflective thematic of the educator.) In this the concept of Bildung transcends that of the mere
cultivation of talents, from which concept it is derived. The cultivation of a talent is the development of something that is given, so that the practice and cultivation of it is a mere means to an end. Thus the educational content of a grammar-book is simply a means and not itself an end. In Bildung, contrariwise, that by which and through which one is formed becomes completely one's own. To some extent everything that is received is absorbed, but in Bildung what is absorbed is not like a means that has lost its function. (Gadamer, 1975; 12)

In Goethe's Wilhelm Meister this is reflected, though not entirely verified, by the strange events of chapter 9 in Book Seven, and the next chapters in the subsequent book where Wilhelm receives his indenture from the Turmgesellschaft. Once his apprenticeship is considered at an end, he finds that a roll has been kept on which is recorded his process of cultivation, or Bildungsgeschichte. He is then exposed to what he calls, in Carlyle's translation, "wise saws" which read like a source book on Bildung and told that he is henceforth "free".

For Schlegel, despite the concept's indeterminacy, the process is essential to being altogether human. In an aphorism from his Ideen he writes:

> Only by being cultivated does a human being, who is wholly that, become altogether human and permeated by humanity. (Ideen, §65: Wheeler, 1984; 58)

To be involved in the process of goal directed formation, while not necessarily knowing what that goal is, or how one would know that one had attained it, is to be altogether human. To be gebildet, to be involved in the process of Bildung, is the
defining characteristic of being altogether human; while to be ungebildet is to be merely human. The sense, which is always closer in the English, of having to alter original nature in order to "cultivate" is clear here - one has to try to become more than merely human in order to be altogether human. Returning to Schlegel's assertion that "every uncultivated person is a caricature of himself", one could conclude that to be a caricature of oneself is to be something less than altogether human. The original practice of a caricaturist was to portray his subject in such a way as to resemble an animal; and to be so portrayed would be to appear less than altogether human. When one looks at the Physiognomic Studies of Charles LeBrun, which the young Goethe was given by his painting master for copying, one sees various human characteristics portrayed through the exaggeration or diminution of certain features of the face so that it resembles an animal which is exemplary of that characteristic in nature. A pugilist is made to look like a bull, the eighteenth-century equivalent of the lager-lout - a boor - is drawn so as to resemble a pig. The animal kingdom supplies many examples which can be employed for various portrayals, as LeBrun has shown so vividly. To portray a man in caricatura then, could be defined: to make outwardly visible, by similarity with an animal, the essential characteristic of the subject's personality - or, at least, that for which he is most notorious. To be portrayed as a bull would be to appear as less than human and at the same time more exaggeratedly oneself - if one were pugilistic. Without delving any deeper into the
relationship between the characteristic portrayed and the animal chosen to represent that characteristic, it is essential to emphasize the reductive nature of the comparison. Even if the caricature does not portray a similarity between the subject and an animal, the exaggeration of certain features alone reduces the subject to fewer intelligible characteristics than he, in actuality, possesses, and endows certain recognizable features with a significance which they otherwise do not have. There is, inherent in the caricature, the art of reduction. The caricaturist reduces a more or less complex human individual to a mere animal, to a few exaggerated physical features, or passions, alone.

Schlegel, when he says that the uncultivated man is a caricature of himself, could be saying that the man who does not attempt to be altogether human (as in 3 above) by committing himself to Bildung is merely human – merely a congeries of physical and emotional characteristics. The goal of Bildung, according to Schlegel, is to rise above merely physical being, above the original nature which humanity shares with animals, and to become, in a sense, incorporeal.

Every good human being is always progressively becoming God. To become God, to be human, to cultivate oneself are all expressions of the same thing.

(Athenäum Fragmente, §262: Wheeler, 1984; 50-51)

If we take "God" as equivalent to "the infinite", then it could be said that the cultivated man is constantly striving to
distance himself, as far as it is possible for him to do so, from his finite nature. *Bildung* seems to be a process of self-transcendence, or *imitatio Dei*. The latter has been pointed out by Gadamer.

The rise of the word *Bildung* calls ... on the ancient mystical tradition, according to which man carries in his soul the image of God after whom he is fashioned and must cultivate it in himself. (Gadamer, 1975;12)

In order for man to be "fully formed" he must transcend the merely physical form to which nature would confine him - the awkwardness of which portrays the inadequacy of the Latin *formatio*. The way in which this can be seen as employing the Kantian concept of rational man's attempt to overcome inclination in order to be autonomous should be quite clear. Because man cannot be a purely rational being, according to Kant, he requires the postulate of immortality in order for autonomy to appear as a possibility. What follows is that only the man dedicated to the infinite task of *Bildung* is worthy of respect in the Kantian sense.

It is difficult to ignore the influence of Goethe's *Faust* - what Schlegel, following once again in Schiller's footsteps, considered "a philosophical tragedy" - upon Schlegel's definition of cultivation. In *Faust*, there is a conflict between striving and enjoyment. As opposed to the ideal of achieved culture which Goethe himself represented, Faust, like the Schlegelian cultivated man, is never fulfilled by "the happines of the truth
of the five senses".

Oh how I feel this truth, that for mankind
No boon is perfect. To such happiness,
Which brings me ever nearer to the gods,
You added a companion, who already
Isindispensable to me, although
With one cold mocking breath he can degrade me
In my own eyes, and turn your gifts to nothing.
He stirs my heart into a burning fire
Of passion for that lovely woman's image.
Thus from my lust I stumble to fulfilment,
And in fulfilment for more lust I languish.

(Faust, Part One; 1987, 103)

In David Luke's translation, Mephistopheles enters at this point and asks Faust "have you not tired of this life-style?" An interestingly sarcastic way of putting the question in modern language, suggesting exactly what, I believe, Schlegel is concerned with in his many writings on cultivation. The opposition which he constantly tries to pin down is that between - what we have observed already in his essay on Wilhelm Meister - fashion, modishness, or manners (as in 1 above), and its transcendence through the use of irony, by undercutting any apparent characterization of one's fulfilled desires. This is developed by Schlegel into his definition of romantic poetry.

Romantic poetry is in the arts what wit is in philosophy, and what society and sociability, friendship and love are in life. The romantic kind of poetry is still in the state of becoming; that, in fact, is its real essence: that it should forever be becoming and never be perfected. It can be exhausted by no theory and only a divinatory criticism would dare try to characterize its ideal. It alone is infinite, just as it alone is free; and it recognizes as its first commandment that the will of the poet can tolerate no law above itself.

(Athenäum Fragmente, §116: Wheeler, 1984; 47)
The individual who has a "life-style" could be said to be a caricature of himself in the sense that his potentially infinitely striving humanity is reduced to the fulfilment of a finite number of characteristics. This is the way in which Schlegel attempts to distance himself from a concern with taste, which is noticeably - and understandably - absent in his writings. It is interesting to note that, faced by a similar problem, Søren Kierkegaard opted for the quotidian instead, so that the 'Knight of Faith' has a house in the suburbs, a solid marriage, a steady job - his definite and unchanging 'life-style' is itself a rejection of all limitation, an expression of freedom which could never be distinguished from its opposite. The moral epithet which Schlegel attaches to the eternally striving man - "Every good human being is always progressively becoming God" - makes it clear that he believes that the bad human being, the merely human being, the caricature of himself, is a man with a characteristic life-style.

The imperative to strive towards the infinite seems to dictate that the cultivated man destroy that which is not itself striving and which is arrested at the finite. Man's prime faculty is his ability to conceive of ever new ideals; Bildung is therefore more concerned with the development of man's reason than with his development as a physical being. Artists, who are for Schlegel at the spearhead of humanity's development towards the infinite, must destroy while at the same time creating ever-new styles, fashions, modes and art forms, in order to assert their freedom.
In this manner, Schlegel continues:

All artists are Decians, and to become an artist means nothing but consecrating oneself to the gods of the underworld. In the enthusiasm of annihilation, the meaning of the divine creation is revealed for the first time. Only in the midst of death does the lightning bolt of eternal life explode. *(Ideen, §131: Wheeler, 1984; 58)*

This is Schlegel's 'romantic cultivation', the ideal of self-sufficiency, that a man — for which one reads the artist — is independent of nature, a particular style of life, society, or any kind of received form. Following his basic principle of self-formation, the cultivated man must, like the artist, create — *schafft* as in Moritz's "active power" of the artist who creates the "self-governing whole" — his own character as an expression of his own idea of what he should be, and not be formed by the norms of his society or the necessities of the physical. Beauty of form, in this sense, is equivalent to originality, to the discernibility of immanent reason.

All self-sufficiency is radical, is original, and all originality is moral, is originality of the whole man. Without originality, there is no energy of reason and no beauty of expression. *(Ideen, §153: Wheeler, 1984; 59)*

Beauty cannot be employed as the sole defining characteristic of the aesthetic in Schlegel, a way in which he anticipates Hegel for whom there is a necessary connection between ideal beauty and the art of the past, the art which can fulfil certain purposes. What is essential is Schlegel's stressing of the the recognition of autonomy in artistic production, so that the arts are still
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very much arts of persuasive communication; art both conveys an artist's autonomy and compels others to reexamine their life-styles in the light of a romantic aesthetic - Schiller's total revolution of the psyche is maintained as the purpose of art, along with the tendency which we found in his philosophical writings to move away from nature towards the autonomous individual.

It is dangerous to follow Schlegel too far down the Bildungsweg of romantic self-cultivation, though it is quite interesting. In such formulations as the one above there is an evident desire for intellectual fireworks, or what Hegel has called a greed "for novelty in the search for the distinctive and extraordinary". Although Schlegel writes in such a way that he would have us believe that he is 2b, a critic of the arts or society acting as a judge while at the same time giving aesthetic pleasure or expressing new truths (2c), it is all too easy to think of him as merely la [bloß ein wohl manierter Mann], a bright social talker who is merely mocking. What is significant in Schlegel is his ability to both anticipate future, more consistent thinkers, and to express the tendencies of the definition of culture which we will be following. The connection between the moral, the aesthetic, and the process of self-cultivation or Bildung, which centres upon originality and reason - or what Hegel calls the "philosophical idea".
What was perhaps Schlegel's most interesting anticipation of later writers was his stressing of historical self-knowledge, which introduces into the examination of self and culture two important but troublesome concepts: classicism and romanticism. "There is no self-knowledge except historical self-knowledge. No one knows what he is if he doesn't know what his contemporaries are, particularly the greatest contemporary of the brotherhood, the master of masters, the genius of the age" (Ideen, §139; Wheeler, 1984: 58). The master of masters in Schlegel's age was, it can be argued, what was to a large degree his concept of romanticism. This concept of romanticism was used by Schlegel as a term which could differentiate one 'age' from another. The concept of an 'age' comes to be used interchangeably with culture which, in Herder at least, was not as ethnocentrically conceived as an 'age' which is predominantly used as if it were culture in sense 3, a general process of intellectual, spiritual or aesthetic development. The relationship between self and culture, I will argue, becomes a matter of historical self-consciousness. The process of self-cultivation comes to incorporate historical self-consciousness.

Romanticism served much the same purpose in Schlegel's age as modernity, or post-modernity, does in ours: a term which is used to distinguish between what is conceptually engaged with the
Classicism and Romanticism: historical self-consciousness

What was perhaps Schlegel's most interesting anticipation of later writers was his stressing of historical self-knowledge, which introduces into the examination of self and culture two important but troublesome concepts: classicism and romanticism. "There is no self-knowledge except historical self-knowledge. No one knows what he is if he doesn't know what his contemporaries are, particularly the greatest contemporary of the brotherhood, the master of masters, the genius of the age" (Ideen, §139: Wheeler, 1984; 58). The master of masters in Schlegel's age was, it can be argued, what was to a large degree his concept of romanticism. This concept of romanticism was used by Schlegel as a term which could differentiate one 'age' from another. The concept of an 'age' comes to be used interchangeably with culture which, in Herder at least, was not as ethnocentrically conceived as an 'age' which is predominantly used as if it were culture in sense 3, a general process of intellectual, spiritual or aesthetic development. The relationship between self and culture, I will argue, becomes a matter of historical self-consciousness. The process of self-cultivation comes to incorporate historical self-consciousness.

Romanticism served much the same purpose in Schlegel's age as modernity, or post-modernity, does in ours: a term which is used to distinguish between what is conceptually engaged with the
future and what is merely a part of what Habermas has called "the inert continuum of history". Though it is difficult to try to draw this comparison too precisely, the relationship which I think most essential here is that between whatever the thinkers which have been characterised as romantic saw in the past - say the Enlightenment - as responsible for certain present state of affairs - e.g. Zwiespältigkeit - which they either hoped to change or remedy by some means - e.g. through aesthetic education - and the future in which this state of affairs will have been overcome. In this way both romanticism and post-modernity, and to a degree classicism, are reflexive terms. Their reflexiveness consists in seeing some aspect of the past as related to one's own culture while at the same time related to the future in a way that cannot be encompassed by an understanding of the continuum of tradition alone: the subject's understanding of the past affects himself in such a way that it transforms both his present and his future.

Much has been written recently about modernity and postmodernity, and I find it difficult to ignore those concepts, out of scepticism as to the impetus of their proliferation, while at the same time availing myself of the literature which they have produced. I am principally interested in Jürgen Habermas's The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. In introducing the cultural concept of romanticism, a concept which is essential to an understanding of both Hegel's and Nietzsche's theories and views of the self and culture, I will borrow much from Habermas,
as well as some of the writers whom I have already quoted, in particular Charles Taylor. What Taylor has called, in *Sources of the Self*, a "watershed" seems to have occurred around the time of the Enlightenment and the subsequent period of romanticism, even though it is hard to characterise what either, but most particularly the latter, might have been or meant for its age.

Perhaps we are now going over another such watershed, though I have my doubts. But even if this is what is occurring, we are still too much involved in it to see it clearly. We still instinctively reach for the old vocabularies, the ones we owe to Enlightenment and Romanticism. (Taylor, 1989; 393)

Although there are many similarities between how romanticism and post-modernism operate in what has come to be called a "critical discourse" I would claim that post-modernism is specifically connected with an attempt - albeit an unconcerted one, but this, too, is true of romanticism also - to distinguish our culture from that of what some thinkers would like to delegate to the role of being merely our predecessor culture. The difficulty being that it is very difficult to prove that a watershed has been crossed. It is easier to accept that classicism might characterise the culture, for example, of Augustan England which certainly is foreign to us, but more difficult to make the same claim concerning romanticism, and all the more difficult when one is out to prove that modernism is also behind us.

The most essential element, the starting point, is the perception of a cultural difference. The problem is that these terms are
often radically oriented in that no neutral observation point is even alluded to, the point of the exercise being, mostly, to create a cultural difference. In this manner, it is not so important that the culture be considered a past culture. The same process could be at work in an attempt to characterise one national culture from another, especially if the writers concerned are hoping to bring about development of a new national culture. One begins with a difference or attempts to help bring one about. Nietzsche, we will see, was particularly critical of what he saw as an attempt by some intellectuals in the newly emergent national culture of Germany to prove itself as different from and, after 1870, victorious over French culture.

In order to understand what follows we need to establish some sense of what romanticism could mean, even if it is the roughest of definitions. Romanticism, however, can perhaps only be understood in contradistinction to the concept of classicism. This, I believe, is the only reasonable way to distinguish concepts of this kind. Of course an infinite regress presents itself here. One can only understand romanticism from the perspective of classicism, classicism from the perspective of the Baroque, etc. I believe, however, that classicism is sufficiently distant from our perspective that it supplies a better starting point. I have not devoted any time to a definition of the latter, and I am reticent about doing so because of the subsequent questions which immediately present themselves vis-a-vis Goethe and Schiller. Although classicism
does play a role in the development of certain key concepts with which we are concerned - in the concept of the aesthetic state in particular, and the subsequent concepts of art and culture - I think that it is best to deal with each of these concepts as they arise and not as involved in yet another tentacular concept. In introducing Hegel's approach to both historical consciousness and aesthetics it is impossible to put aside the question of the relation between the concepts of the classical and the romantic; Hegel was influenced very strongly by the philosophico-literary critical issue of both how one characterizes the difference between the two and why why such a difference is important.

The classicism of the Germans is, as opposed to the classicism of either seventeenth century France or eighteenth-century England not a concept which denotes an entire culture. T.J. Reed has pointed out that both these other classicisms "spring from the advantages of the age - its social stability, its accepted religious and philosophical beliefs, its agreement about the forms and purposes of literature" (Pasley, 1982; 516); conditions which certainly do not describe the Germany of either Goethe or Schiller. What principally distinguished German classicism from the classicisms of other national cultures, was its being principally both a tool for philosophical criticism and - what is its artistic correlative - for the imaginative fulfilment of certain ideals. Schiller supplies us with a characteristic example of the former when, in his Naive and Sentimental Poetry, he describes the feeling we - moderns, or the Germans of his
The feeling of which we are speaking here is, therefore, not that which the ancients had; it is rather one with that which we have for the ancients. They felt in a natural way, we feel the Natural. It was with without doubt a quite different feeling which filled Homer's soul when he had his swineherd play host to Ulysses, from that which moved the soul of the young Werther when he read those verses after an irritating social gathering. Our feeling for nature is like that of the feeling of the sick man for health. (N&S, 1981; 34)

This distinction between sickness and health was made famous by Goethe in one of his conversations with Eckermann, which portrays him in his characteristic mode of dismissing the intricacies of the critical fashions of his time. "Most modern productions are romantic - not because they are new but because they are weak, morbid, and sickly. And the antique is classic - not because it is old; but because it it is strong, fresh, joyous, and healthy" (Eckermann, 1970; 305). The contrast between the two was first introduced in Schiller's equally famous letter to Goethe which began their correspondence in 1794. Schiller called Goethe both a Greek and a southerner by temperament, someone who was able to take nature as a whole at once into his vision. Extending from the Winkelmannian noble simplicity and tranquil grandeur [Edle Einfalt und Stille Größe] to its apotheosis in Hegel's aesthetic, classicism is one of the most influential concepts of Goethe's time. The distinction between the northern and the southern was, if the distinction between the classical and the romantic was a little stale for him, endlessly productive for Nietzsche who, in The Greeks as interpreters, held a view of classicism which
captures the sense in which it can be used in critical discourse.

When we speak of the Greeks we involuntarily speak of today and yesterday: their familiar history is a polished mirror that always radiates something that is not in the mirror itself. We employ our freedom to speak of them so as to be allowed to remain silent about others - so that the latter may now say something into the thoughtful reader's ear. Thus the Greeks make it easier for modern man to communicate much that is delicate and hard to communicate.

(H, 'Assorted Opinions and Maxims', §218; 1986, 264)

The difference between "today and yesterday" was inherent in the appreciation of classical works of art. How this distinction was employed depended upon what it was that was thought should be changed in the present. The attention which was brought to bear upon the aesthetic qualities of classical art was burdened with moral, cultural, ideological and metaphysical significance.

The qualities which Greek art was seen to possess, "the noble simplicity and tranquil grandeur", were evidence of a certain state of being. The importance which is placed upon the validity of those qualities, the validity of the perception of them, becomes not so much a matter of aesthetic contemplation as the perception of so many instantiations of another way of life. This moves well beyond the contemplative model which dominated the aesthetic of Kant's 3rd Critique. The necessity of interpretation, from the point of view of this classically minded present, stemmed from the fact that the qualities which classical works of art possessed were believed to be inimitable. Why this was the case, it was believed, could only be arrived at through
an account of those qualities which related to the state of affairs in the culture which produced them, the way of life which - following Herder - they express.

When Goethe edited a book in honour of Winckelmann, in which he included his own essay on Winckelmann, he entitled it "Winckelmann and his Century", indicating the degree to which he considered his age as in the thrall of a certain view, an outlook extending beyond the mere appreciation, in a disinterested way, of the qualities which classical works of art possessed. The importance of Winckelmann to Goethe, and his age, is brought out by Schlegel:

The systematic Winckelmann who read all the ancients as if they were a single author, who saw everything as a whole and concentrated all his powers on the Greeks, provided the first basis for a material knowledge of the ancients through his perception of the absolute difference between ancient and modern. Only when the perspective and the conditions of the absolute identity of ancient and modern in the past, present, and future have been discovered will one be able to say that at least the contours of classical study have been laid bare and one can now proceed to methodical investigation.

(Athenäum Fragmente §149; Wheeler, 1984; 47)

That the Greeks had achieved a sensual harmony which it was impossible for the moral agents of modern times to attain to and instantiate in both their lives and works of art, became an obsession which was characteristic of those who had accepted Winckelmann’s view of the Greeks, the motivation for as much poetry as philosophy. The terrible aspect of the beauty of Greek art was that it possessed just those qualities which they thought
inimitable. To refer to the beauty of the Greeks was at the same time - and the purists like Hegel didn’t make the exceptions which Schiller made when he called Goethe 'naive' - to illuminate an emptiness at the centre of modern art.

Classicism, in the German sense of the word, becomes synonymous with a yearning which is defined by a love for, and knowledge of the unattainability of the qualities which they found in Greek art. The relationship between the conceptions they had of form, "spiritual culture" and task or function - what Nietzsche was later to call "die Harmonie von Gestalt, Geist und Aufgabe" (D, §60) - is the defining characteristic of that classicism. "Spiritual culture", as in Schiller and Hegel’s appropriation of it into his concept, was understood to refer to the complex of relationships which existed between the consciousness of a people and its material world, what can be loosely described as that people’s relationship to nature. Nature in Schiller, for example, encompasses both the material world and the relationship between consciousness and action, in such a way that the creation of works of art was an action which represented a certain moral - defined in the broad sense - state of mind, i.e. a certain relationship between impulse and thought, which can no longer be recaptured except, of course, if one is Goethe. The sentimental poet, the modern poet,

is constantly dealing with two opposing concepts and emotions, with reality as a boundary and with his idea as the infinite, and the mixed feeling which he excites will always bear witness to this double source. (N&S, 1981; 42)
The art of a people is necessarily related to its "spiritual culture"; and any use of art-forms from another culture will, according to this line of thought, necessarily make apparent the differences between it and the one into which it is imported. The age of reflection, in which these Germans saw themselves as living, could not use the same artforms as those of the Greeks without the expression’s turning, of its own accord, towards the difference between the two – which took, most often, the form of yearning, or, as in Heine, the form of irony (cf. "The Gods of Greece", or "The Gods in Exile"). In the same way, when Hegel looked at ancient works of art, he asserted that there was a difference between the way that they were appreciated in antiquity and the way in which they are appreciated in his own age.

What is now aroused in us by works of art is not just immediate enjoyment but our judgement also, since we subject to our intellectual consideration (i) the content of art, and (ii) the work of art’s means of presentation, and the appropriateness or inappropriateness of both to one another.


In appreciating the art of the Greeks, Hegel found himself reflecting on the “content” of that art, and while he dwelt upon the way in which he thought their form ‘ideally’ suited, he found himself dwelling upon the difference between his own ‘spiritual culture’ and the Greeks’. He appreciated most what he felt his own culture lacked. In this way, the appreciation of classical art encompassed an account of the difference between modern and
ancient. Hegel believed that criticism's primary task was to illuminate the deeper reasons for this difference and to supply some sense of how content is related to form.

The beautiful days of Greek art... are gone... our whole spiritual culture is of such a kind that he [the artist] himself stands within the world of reflection and its relations, and could not by any act of will and decision abstract from it; nor could he by any special education or removal from the relations of life contrive and organize a special solitude to replace what he has lost.


The feeling which accompanies the admiration of Greek art takes on the content of a metaphysics which attempts to explain that sense of distance by reference to the development - not of art and our conception of it alone - of a certain condition within modern consciousness and culture. Hegel's aesthetic, then, is concerned with the central unifying principle of a culture. This theory of the relation between spiritual culture [Geist], form [Gestalt] and task [Aufgabe] is principally the product of classicism and, for our purposes relates Schlegel's approach to Hegel's.

It is only a small step for Schlegel and his contemporaries to move towards an account of how the classical is to be distinguished from the romantic in such a way that a new relationship between the past and what Habermas has called "an authentic present" (Habermas, 1987; 11) is established. Habermas's "authentic present" is a present which is conceptually related to both a past and an idea of future progress, a "horizon
of expectation". A kind of cultural history is developed from this which is oriented to the future in such a way that the "authentic present is preserved as the locus of continuing traditions and of innovation" (Ibid). It is in this manner that history enters the purview of the concept of self-development. An examination of the past is undertaken in order to establish both what enabled the production of a beauty, or harmony of character in the Schillerian sense, which is interpreted as the expression of a particular culture (conceived of as in sense or 2), and what could enable future cultural (as in sense 3) progress: what Habermas calls "effective history" (Habermas, 1987; 13).

The difference between classicism and romanticism does not lie in the fact that romanticism is more involved in an effort to distinguish a genuine innovative present from what is conceived of as the "inert continuum of history". As I have pointed out, classicism in Germany was not, as in Augustan England, a period which can be characterized as shared or participated in by a whole culture. It might be more appropriate to rename 'Weimar Humanism' as 'Weimar Classicism' because it is in Weimar, according to some critics, that the concept was realized as it was nowhere else in Germany. As T.J. Reed has written, "Weimar classicism reverses this model (of classicism entailing a stable national culture)... Goethe found... no mature society, not even a unified nation, no national culture or literary tradition to ease his apprenticeship, no public of taste. He had to work to
create these things, after first developing alone" (Pasley, 1982; 516). Although this perhaps overstates the case in favour of Goethe creating classicism ex nihilo, it is an important aspect of the kind of classicism from which romanticism was to be distinguished. It was very much part of the myth of Weimar that Goethe had created a cultural movement by firstly developing himself. This is consonant with what Goethe seems to have discovered on his journey in Italy, which he completed before he began his friendship with Schiller. "He now grasped the essential principles of natural growth and great art. They were the same: a force forming from within, an irresistible law. 'Was nicht eine wahre innere Existenz hat, hat kein Leben und kann nicht lebendig gemacht werden und nicht groß sein und nicht groß werden'" (Ibid, 516). It is only by the force of a real existence, a real power of character, that something can become great. This is close to what Humboldt stressed in his concept of inner development, and very much in the spirit of Schlegel's critical approach to Wilhelm Meister: the classical is something which one develops within oneself in contradistinction to the outside world.

As opposed to the conservative self-cultivation which we found expressed in Kant and Humboldt, however, this form of development is directed towards a horizon: the realization of ideals which relate to a reformation of culture as a whole. This is certainly the spirit in which Schiller wrote his Aesthetic Education. The optimism which is involved in this concept of a self-cultivation
which leads to a total revolution of culture as a whole, is essential. However, as in Schiller, the attempt to ground that optimism in some rational goal with an equally rational theory of the self and culture must be seen as having failed.

When Schiller, in the passage quoted above from *Naive and Sentimental Poetry*, cites the passage in *Werther* where, "after an irritating social gathering", Werther reads the account in Homer of the swineherd entertaining the returning Odysseus, there is no sense of revolutionary zeal. At this point in Goethe's novel Werther has been told that he was unwelcome at a social gathering which was too high for a mere bourgeois; so that his reading of the swineherd's entertaining the returning king is specifically appropriate. The feeling which might have filled Homer's soul — as Schiller points out — when he recited or wrote this part of the story was probably different from Werther's, but more significantly one wonders what Goethe meant by the juxtaposition. There is an obvious sense in which this is a criticism of German *Kleinstaaterei*, but it is by no means clear that this should be taken as the chief point. Without going into the question of how one is to interpret this with anything near a degree of depth, it would seem that it emphasises both Werther's isolation and his imaginative participation in another way of life. It is as a depiction of the self in isolation from society reading the classics, that it is a paradigm encounter. Hegel thought Werther a "thoroughly morbid character" who was interesting only because of "his close relationship to nature along with the development
and tenderness of his heart" (A, III; 1975, 241). It was with the revolutionary program of Schiller's aesthetic education that this merely introspective form of classicism achieved its ideological validity. However, given that this program failed to ground itself in the Kantian system, it is not surprising to find it turning to a foundation in historical consciousness. The way in which the present can be revolutionised is through a closer relationship with, and a better understanding of, the past.

The are many influences which are active here. Essentially, however, we have touched upon the most important: Herder's expressive anthropology, Humboldt's paidea, Schiller's aesthetic education, Goethe's particular concept of Bildung - a continuation of the conservative self-cultivation which I introduced in Kant - and finally Schlegel's romantic self-cultivation. In Schlegel's assertion that "there is no self-knowledge except historical self-knowledge" there is an expansion of the limits of the self which were, for example, much more narrowly drawn by Humboldt. How is it, one might ask, that history can be essential to self-knowledge or consciousness? We are principally concerned with artists at this point. The self-knowledge of the artist is taken to be the paradigm case of the individual consciousness's attempt to come to some understanding of its relationship with both the past as well a future in which is to be realized in the improvement of either the individual alone or the "lifeworld". The artist's conception of his function is to be of the utmost importance to the
development of culture as a whole. A function of art which we have already encountered in Herder's examination of culture, was fastened upon shortly by Schlegel as the "centre of poetry". With the characteristic ingredients of his 'romantic self-cultivation', Schlegel asserted that myth was both the key to the past and the essence of art.

The kernel, the centre of poetry, is to be found in mythology and the mysteries of antiquity. Satiate the feeling of life with the idea of infinity, and you will understand both the ancients and poetry.

(Ideen, §85: Wheeler, 1984; 57)

The fruit of historical self-consciousness was, according to Schlegel, that as a creator of myth, the artist could supply a culture with a unifying principle.

This is close to what was at the heart of the early Hegel's passion for myth which he shared with both Hölderlin and Schelling. "From his earliest years", writes Harris, "[Hegel] was impressed by the role of the poet as teacher in Greek society, and by the achievement of Shakespeare in making the history of England a living heritage for his fellow countrymen" (Harris, 1972; 254). Myth was to be the unifying principle between the isolated self, which is depicted in Goethe's Werther, and society as a whole. This myth was to replace the divisions which were imposed upon the self by the rationalistic philosophy of Kant, those very tensions which Schiller attempted to reconcile in the aesthetic state but which could not, as I have shown, overcome the Kantian reserve towards inclination. It is
in this way that the aesthetic is so central to Hegel's early philosophy, which relates it to the development of self-consciousness. Hegel wrote in 1797:

I am now convinced that the highest act of Vernunft... is an aesthetic act, and that truth and goodness only become sisters in beauty - the philosopher must have as much aesthetic power as the poet. The men without aesthetic sense are our Buchstaben-philosophers. (Harris, 1972; 253)

These strong words show Hegel to be a passionate disciple of Schiller (Hegel read the Aesthetic Education as it was published in Die Horen, and reread the whole series of letters in the summer of 1796). But Hegel takes Schiller's "aesthetic education" to an even higher level of aesthetic optimism: the function of the artist is to fashion a myth which can unify a culture. From this viewpoint art such as Goethe's Werther must have seemed quite inadequate, offering as it does merely a dispiriting commentary upon the isolation of the individual in an alien and unconducive culture. This is even more evident in Hölderlin's Hyperion (1797) where he equates Germany with the banqueting suitors, picking up on the Odyssey just a little later than where we left it in Werther.

It is heart-rending, too, to see your poets, your artists, all those who still honour the Genius, who love and cultivate Beauty. The poor good creatures live in the world like strangers in their own house, they are exactly like long-suffering Ulysses when he sat at his door disguised as a beggar while the shameless suitors rioted in the hall and asked, "Who sent us this vagabond?" (Hölderlin, 1965; 165-166)

Hegel, although he wanted to combine the powers of poetry and
philosophy into a new religion which would make use of myth in order to disseminate freedom to all men, retreated from the early belief that this could be accomplished through art. This estranged relationship between the self and its culture is carried by the later Hegel to the extremes of a self-estrangement which cannot be healed any form of "aesthetic education". As Habermas writes:

Hegel begins to doubt the aesthetic utopia almost immediately. In the Differenzschrift of 1801 he no longer gives it any chance whatsoever, because in the formation of the self-estranged spirit, "the deeper, serious reference of living art" could no longer get consideration. In Jena the poetry of early Romanticism was springing up right before Hegel's eyes, as it were. He recognized immediately that romantic art was congenial to the spirit of the age - in its subjectivism, the spirit of modernity was expressed. But as a poetry of diremption it was hardly called to be the "schoolmistress of mankind"; it did not lead to the sort of religion of art by which Hegel, together with Hölderlin and Schelling, had sworn in Frankfurt. Philosophy could not subordinate itself to it. Rather, philosophy had to understand itself as the place where reason, as the absolute power of unification, entered upon the scene. (Habermas, 1987; 32)

The artists, far from supplying some kind of unifying principle, merely expressed the situation in which Hegel believed that consciousness had found itself to be entrapped in what he characterized as 'the romantic age'. In Hegel's later philosophy, in particular the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) he looked to history itself, and the unifying principle of philosophy, as the way of turning this - to use Schiller's terminology - state of necessity [Notstaat] of romanticism into a moral state [Moralstaat]. Hegel was to produce a philosophy in
which history would be revealed to be a general self-development, or *Bildungsgeschichte*. It was this *Bildungsgeschichte* which was to take the place of myth in the radical transformation of both the self and culture.

**Hegel and Romanticism: *Bildungsgeschichte***

Although Hegel was mostly opposed to romanticism, he was preeminentely a writer of and for the age of the romantic. Much work has been done in characterizing the world-picture out of which Hegel wrote, and which influenced him at many crucial points in his philosophy. The first chapter of Charles Taylor’s *Hegel* focusses upon the expressive background of his philosophy; and in a less famous but equally valuable chapter, Edward Craig, in *The Mind of God and the Works of Man*, has presented the romantic *Weltbild* and argued that it is essential to an understanding of Hegel’s system. As the former is taken up into the concept of *Bildung* itself, I will concentrate on Craig’s “The Metaphysic of the Romantic Era”. Craig asserts that the “underlying metaphysical convictions of the romantic period can in fact best, or at the lowest estimate perfectly well, be studied in works nearly all of which belong fairly and squarely to literature” (Craig, 1987; 132). In this way Craig proceeds to give an account of some of those underlying convictions by analysing Schiller’s “*Die Götter Griechenlands*”, Goethe’s “*Der
Fischer", and Kleist’s "Über das Marionettentheater". In these works - as well as Schiller’s Aesthetic Education, Goethe’s "Die Natur" and Hölderlin’s Hyperion - Craig believes that one finds the majority of the metaphysical presuppositions, or "feelings", which Hegel shared with his audience and which, therefore, he should be understood as having built into his system without a very rigorous examination of either their providence or validity.

Hegel... had a ready-made metaphysical framework and an audience with a ready-made enthusiasm for it. He still undertook, it is true, the a priori proof and the empirical confirmation of this metaphysic; but one cannot without naivety expect that his efforts would have been so strenuous as those of a writer who felt himself to be in a climate basically hostile to his conception of reality, and so was driven to anticipate, so far as he was able, every likely objection and to secure himself against attack from every likely quarter. All writers, no doubt, are to some extent drawn on by their hoped-for conclusions, prone to jump gaps when the jump leads in a favoured direction; and Hegel was exposed to a powerful additional temptation, the temptation to tell his audience (including himself) what it wanted to hear. (Craig, 1987; 184)

This amounts to what he calls "the one great metaphysical theme" of the romantic era: "unity, its loss and its recovery." These romantics "saw a picture of the universe as riven by strife, all its principles at odds with each other, fractured in every direction. And that this was the ultimate truth of things they could not or would not accept" (Ibid, 138). The main thrust of the "one great metaphysical theme" is towards a unity which can truly be called a culture, a unified way of life, free from the contradictions and subsequent anxieties of the modern world which Schiller, as we have seen, described in his Aesthetic Education.
Despite the more desperate tone of Hölderlin’s writing, in his *Hyperion* one finds a similar relation between nature, the past of antiquity, and modern self-divided consciousness which one finds in Schiller. But if Schiller’s contribution was his setting of the fragmentation (*Zwiespältigkeit*) of modern consciousness in the context of the Kantian philosophy, Hölderlin’s contribution was to place this within the context of the division between classicism and romanticism.

Ah! had I never been to your schools! The knowledge which I pursued down its tunnels and galleries, from which, in my youthful folly, I expected the confirmation of all my pure joy - that knowledge has corrupted everything for me.

Among you I became so truly reasonable, learned so thoroughly to distinguish myself from what surrounds me, that now I am solitary in the beautiful world, an outcast from the garden of Nature, in which I grew and flowered, drying up under the noonday sun.

(Hölderlin, 1965; 23)

From the point of view of the distinction between classical and romantic "spiritual culture", it is fascinating how in *Hyperion* a modern consciousness is placed in the conquered landscape of Greek culture, the locus of the ideals which the Winckelmannian’s saw as eternally instantiated in the torsos of antiquity. As Craig points out, the "curse of which Hölderlin writes is not so much that of the Ottoman empire as the loss of the right relationship with the rest of reality" (Craig, 1987; 185). In the preface - which is not translated in the English edition to which I have referred - Hölderlin writes that "the resolution of dissonances in a certain character is neither for mere reflection
nor empty pleasure", and goes on to write that the elegiac character of Hyperion was hostil\y judged by his public. Which shows that it is very difficult to know what the relationship was which existed between the romantic writer and audience.

What was shared by most of these writers was a predominantly Protestant upbringing which culminated in theological training. What Craig has elaborated in its philosophical context - although he is more concerned with the epistemic significance of the mind of God model which was derived from Christianity as such - M.H. Abrams has elaborated from a literary-critical viewpoint in his Natural Supernaturalism. The romantic theme is very much the product of the Christian world-view where man lives in a fallen world and looks forward to a time when the world will be renewed after the second-coming. The Millennium is a long way off, however, which leads to the second characteristic of the theme, the importance of the image or concept of infinity. The culture which we seek to establish in both ourselves and in our "lifeworld" is infinitely beyond us, but is, at the same time something towards which we must strive in order to be good men, or - in the strictly Lutheran teaching - in order to let it show forth that we are not condemned to a fate worse than that of a fallen world. This is a perfectly valid description of the goal of 'romantic self-cultivation' which I outlined in Schlegel, the goal which every civilized man pursues in the process of Bildung, for it is that very striving which constitutes his being civilized. Abrams characterizes this attitude towards both the
world and the infinite as romantic:

a hopeless nostalgia for a lost condition to which civilized man can never return, and ought not to return if he could; for what makes him civilized, and a man, is his aspiration toward a harmony and integrity which is much higher than the unity he has lost. And it is higher, these thinkers point out, not only because it preserves diversification and individuality, but also because, instead of being a condition merely given to man, it is a condition which he must earn by incessant striving along an inclined circuitous path. The typical Romantic ideal, far from being a mode of cultural primitivism, is an ideal of strenuous effort along the hard road of culture and civilization. (Abrams, 1971; 185)

In opposition to classicism, romanticism looks back at the classical world as an ideal but also forwards, from the perspective of a present fallen world, to a horizon of expectation. Where there is a degree of optimism, usually aesthetic in nature, the present is "empowered" - to use Habermas' terminology once again; but where a reconciliation is infinitely beyond the individual, there is a concomitant degree of pessimism.

To adapt Richard Rorty, there is a very easily collectable - but not so easily definable - set of words which would constitute Hegel's, and many of his contemporary's, "final vocabulary", without which his philosophy could become, at certain crucial points, incomprehensible. A list of which would have to include: spiritual culture (as in sense 3), expression, division (or diremption), recognition, transcendence, development, and resolution or reconciliation. Some of these terms have been
introduced and some will be explained in what follows. Hegel's examination of the "hard road of culture" turns into the Bildungsgeschichte of an individual consciousness in its attempt to both understand the path that history has taken and to comprehend the goal which lies ahead of him.

It is necessary at this point to assert that the distinction between classic and romantic ceases to be of any significance. Hegel, when he began to move away from his companions in Jena, was not becoming merely anti-romantic, although that is one interpretation and certainly one which is largely ignored by Craig, he was rejecting any view of the individual which was independent of society as a whole. The reconciliation essential for the romantics which Craig describes as partaking of "the one great metaphysical theme" is just as important as, if not less than, the classical ideal of the polis. And this is more than the kind of story which is found at the end of Kleist's Marionettentheater which is spurred by the grace of the Spinnario. Although Hegel believed that it was only by the action of self-consciousness that any kind of reconciliation could be gained, he did not envisage any glorification of the individual. In the works which Craig quotes from, primary emphasis is placed upon the individual and his relation to nature, a view which is perhaps justified if one sticks to the Weltbild as primarily romantic. But this is a curiously, and conspicuously, depoliticized view of what kind of tradition Hegel could have been writing out of - and this is the correct way to
view it: Hegel was writing and thinking his way out of such a Weltbild. The "classical" influence of nostalgia for the polis, which is at the heart of Schiller’s Aesthetic Education, is equally important, and cannot be entirely subsumed under the individual which he thought made that political structure possible and its supposed relation to nature.

It is the failure to achieve any kind of unified vision or program on the part of the writers and thinkers which could be called romantic that Hegel found least conducive to any improvement of the "lifeworld". Schiller’s attempt to do so, as we have seen, was an epochal event for Hegel; and his contemporaries’ failure to continue in Schiller’s footsteps was perhaps equally epochal. Lukács, in The Young Hegel, attempts to distinguish Hegel from Goethe and Schiller, who he sees as sharing the "humanistic illusions" inherent in the project of resolving a belief in the fully developed individual with the fragmentation of modern society, at the same time developing a picture of Hegel as having an affinity with the German classics and not with the romantics. As opposed to Goethe’s Turmgesellschaft, or Schiller’s "few chosen circles, where conduct is governed, not by some soulless imitation of the manners and morals of others, but by the aesthetic nature we have made our own" (AE, Letter 27; 1967, 219) with which the Aesthetic Education concludes, Lukács asserts:

Hegel is never content with the idea of a small group as the repository of humanistic ideals; he always strives for a moral code, for a theory of human
conduct which could be capable of penetrating the whole of society... Hegel's greatness as a thinker can be seen in the way in which he resolutely faces up to the contradictions that meet him in his search for the ideal, the way he articulates them and strives constantly to discover their nature, their tendency and their underlying laws.

(Lukács, 1975; 204)

When one considers the romantic individual as depicted by Craig this is even more appropriate a criticism. The failed revolutionary of Hölderlin's *Hyperion* is an exaggerated form of what Hegel reacted against. In portraying Hegel as sharing the *Weltbild* of the romantic individual’s relation to nature, Craig has fallen into the trap in which, according to Lukács, "Hegel's bourgeois commentators" are to be found. The essence of the trap is to fail to sufficiently grasp the significance of Hegel's socio-political analysis. But this is essential to an understanding of Hegel's view of the relationship between the self and culture. The culture which Hegel ultimately attempts to come to an understanding of is that of modern bourgeois capitalism, and the self which he attempts both to understand and revolutionize is the bourgeois individual. As Lukács rightly puts it:

> When Hegel... treats individual morality as a moment in the totality and subordinates it to ethical life as a whole, the intention is to express the entire volatile tension between the universal and the particular.

(Lukács, 1975; 205)

The importance of ethical life as a whole never ceases to be of essential importance to Hegel's project of reconciliation. An
elaboration of that project must be incorporated into an understanding of Hegel's view of the self and culture.

As I pointed out in Chapter One, however, Hegel conceives of the individual self as no longer this particular man; the individual is conceived of by Hegel as traversing the path of history, as a general process. Insofar as the individual self is immersed in the *Bildungsgeschichte* of the hard road of culture, he has ceased to be the representative of culture in the second sense and has become the representative of culture in the third sense; what he must experience, however, is how each particular stage of culture, as in the second sense, has been negated, transcended, and carried up into his own culture. This new, distinctly Hegelian conception of the self as the reflective individual, is Hegel's answer to the Schillerian problem of how to bring about a common sense. The course of Hegel's resolution of the left Kantian problem of how to engage the individual psyche in harmonious political structure lies through his hopes for the development in each individual of an understanding of the route which consciousness has taken through history itself. Instead of art performing the function of preparing the individual for Kantian moral determination as in Schiller, it is itself subsumed into a system of expression, division, and reconciliation. Although art is involved in this new *Bildungsgeschichte* it cannot carry man ahead to the final stages, as Hegel realized through his disappointment with the art of his romantic contemporaries. Aesthetic education forms merely a propylaeum to the development
of reason itself, which must produce out of its own resources the very wholeness which the aesthetic in Schiller was supposed to bring about in the individual psyche. But this is where it is appropriate to appreciate how the mythical system of "the one great metaphysical theme" of the romantics reasserts itself in an unexpected and cunning manner. "In art in general", as Habermas writes, using a terminology which must be introduced before it is defined, "the spirit is said to catch sight of itself as the simultaneous occurrence of self-externalization and return to itself."

Art therefore discovers an inner limit in the sensible character of its medium and finally points beyond the boundaries of its mode of presentation to the absolute... In this manner, the aesthetic conflict between the ancients and the moderns finds an elegant resolution: Romanticism is the "completion" [Vollendung] of art into reflection and in the sense of a reflective penetration of a form of presentation of the absolute still tied down to the symbolic. (Habermas, 1987; 35)

Art supplies the individual who is immersed in Bildungsgeschichte with a symbolic representation of the very process which must be realised in his own development towards the millennium itself, the complete and harmonious unity of reason, the ultimate resolution of what Hegel calls Absolute Knowledge.

It is best, for our purposes, to look closely at how it is that Hegel interprets particular works of art as involved in this Bildungsgeschichte. In order to understand Hegel's system as a whole it would be necessary to devote much time to what is,
ultimately related but of secondary importance to what it is that I wish to mark off as specifically relevant to his conception of the relationship between the self and culture. It will, I hope, become evident that Hegel takes up much of what we have previously examined under the auspices of self-cultivation. The relationship between the self and culture is relevant to Hegel's interpretation of two works of art in the Phenomenology in such a way that they are considered in light of a general cultural history or Bildungsgeschichte: Sophocles's Antigone and Diderot's Le Neveu de Rameau. This Bildungsgeschichte is accomplished through the effect upon the modern self of what Hegel insists is a consciousness or understanding of how the general process which produced the modern self progressed through its various stages. Modern consciousness, however, is revolutionized by its achievement of this understanding in such a way that it becomes more than merely the product of that process. The modern self is related to the past but is at the same time already, through that understanding, related to the future. In participating in this process, according to Hegel, the individual self is no longer merely this particular individual but becomes a universal self through the operation of reason. Culture, in this way, is inevitably— and preeminently— a general process of reason's development, or what Hegel called Spirit. Bildungsgeschichte is that of the development of Spirit towards its goal. "The goal is Spirit's insight into what knowing is" (P, 'Preface on Scientific Cognition', §29; 1977, 17). When one looks to the German text (Ullstein: Frankfurt, 1970), one see this reflected in Hegel's
choice of adjectives in the immediately preceding sentence:

Die Wissenschaft stellt diese bildende Bewegung sowohl in ihrer Ausführlichkeit und Notwendigkeit, als das, was schon zum Momente und Eigentum des Geistes herabgesunken ist, in seiner Gestaltung dar. (Ullstein: Frankfurt, 1970; 27)

Science sets forth this formative process in all its detail and necessity, exposing the mature configuration of everything which has already been reduced to a moment and property of Spirit. (P, 'Preface', §29; 1977, 17)

The use of bildende is entirely consistent with the language which is used throughout the "Preface" where in the fourth paragraph Hegel claims that this development which is presented, must be susceptible to the language of everyday life:

Dieser Anfang der Bildung wird aber zunächst dem Ernst des erfüllten Lebens Platz machen, der in die Erfahrung der Sache selbst hineinfurt, und wenn auch dies noch hinzukommt, daß der Ernst des Begriffs in ihre Tiefe steigt, so wird eine solche Kenntnis und Beurteilung in der Konversation ihre schickliche Stelle behalten. (Ullstein: Frankfurt, 1970; 19)

From its very beginning, culture must leave room for the earnestness of life in its concrete richness; this leads the way to an experience of the real issue. And even when the real issue has been penetrated to its depths by serious speculative effort this kind of knowing and judging will still retain its appropriate place in ordinary conversation. (P, 'Preface', §29; 1977, 3)

The works of art which are to be understood as "moments" of Spirit's development, must be presented in such a way that they relate to the real issue, which is the relationship between the ordinary self and its culture in both the present immediate sense - Habermas's "life-world", culture as in (2a) "a way of life" -
and in the sense (3) of an overall development. If they are to be related to self-development, that is to say, they must have some content which contributes towards this process of coming to know what the truth is about the self and in this way becoming the self. Which is what Hegel puts forward in a characteristically granitic - to ordinary conversation - pair of sentences. "The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development [Entwicklung]" (F, 'Preface', §20; 1977, 11).

One requires concrete examples in order to see what it is that could be entailed by this line of philosophising. This is where the two works of art to which I have referred are so helpful. The relationship between morality and art which is so essential to the line of argument which was adopted by Schiller is reintroduced by Hegel in such a way that, as I mentioned in chapter one, is so common to the writers with whom we are concerned. It may be quite impossible to follow Schiller when he asserts that it is out of the aesthetic that the moral develops; but it may be possible to consider works of art as "expressions" of particular cultures, and to find some discernible correlations between those works of art and the moral states which characterizes those particular cultures. Schiller, himself, in the Sixth Letter of the Aesthetic Education, shows the tendencies of this kind of philosophy of culture where he follows the development - or deterioration - of what he calls "the concrete life of the individual" (AE, Letter 6; 1987, 31).
The concern with "the concrete richness of life" which is so essential in the 'Preface' to the Phenomenology is anticipated by Schiller's approach in the Aesthetic Education in a way that shows both how good a reader of Schiller Hegel must have been and how pervasive are the set of concerns which are involved in self-cultivation. To ignore the political elements which help to constitute that "concrete life" would amount to a simplification of the forces which are operative in both the self and culture. It was of essential significance for Hegel that cultural systems brought certain particular configurations of the self into being, and that they in turn affected those systems themselves. This made it possible for him to portray a development which engages with the self and culture on almost every front but it also enabled him to make some of his most dubious assertions. What proves to be the binding thread between Hegel's individual "moments" in the development of self-consciousness is, ultimately, the Logic. Although an examination of the necessity which underpins the spiritual development would require a close study of the later work, it is not the necessity of Hegel's development which is important here.

What rises above the "manure of contradictions" however much it may seem like a will-o' the-wisp is perhaps one of the profoundest theories of art's vocation: to reconcile the opposites which are presented as unreconcileable in Kant, and which Kant could not overcome, despite his motions towards such a reconciliation in the 3rd Critique. The presentation of man in
his sublimity in tragedy, which formed the superiority of the sublime over the beautiful in Schiller, is paradigmatic of the failure to resolve the contradictions between reason and sense. This stems from the tendency to characterize the sublime as that which commands our respect absolutely; not surprisingly this is reserved for "our moral being alone, in so far as it is ontologically, axiologically, and cosmologically superior to any item or set of items in the phenomenal world" (Crowther, 1989; 91). As we have seen, in his adoption of the Kantian moral philosophy, Schiller follows this tendency; and it is fulfilled in Schlegel's 'romantic self-cultivation', which takes its starting point from the infinite, the utterly higher than the present which is expressed in the 'human vocation', or what Fichte, in his *Vocation of the Scholar*, called the ultimate goal.

To subjugate [unterwerfen] all non-rational nature to himself, to rule over it [es zu beherrschen] freely and according to his own law, is the ultimate goal of man - an ultimate goal which is utterly unattainable... His way to it must be endless..., and therefore his true vocation as man, that is as a rational but finite and as a sensuous but free being, is to approximate this goal unto infinity.

(Abrams, 1971; 358-9)

Hegel negates this vocation or dedication to the infinite by defining man as "a *thinking* consciousness, i.e. that man draws out of himself and puts *before himself* what he is and whatever else is" (A, 'Introduction'; 1975, 31). In this simple definition there is at work a complex metaphysic which has assigned to man the vocation of bringing to consciousness all that is. The supreme move of Hegel's philosophy is to locate the
"absolutely great" not in an infinite task which cannot be adequately expressed, but in the resolution of those differences which render the task unattainable, in Reason or Spirit. The sublime, as a category suffers from this in a way that might at first escape notice. Incommensurability, which has its source in the infinity inherent in the 'human vocation' [menschliche Berufung], is the concomitant of the division within man of reason and sense and the Kantian impossibility of their resolution. It is this incommensurability which Hegel sees Schiller, in his Aesthetic Education, as having overcome.

It is Schiller who must be given great credit for breaking through the Kantian subjectivity and abstraction of thinking and for venturing on an attempt to get beyond this by intellectually grasping the unity and reconciliation as the truth and by actualizing them in artistic production.

(A, 'Introduction'; 1975, 81)

Hegel interprets Schiller as having escaped, momentarily, from the domination of Kantian respect in his Aesthetic Education, in order to gain an ally in his 'Introduction'. The most comprehensive truth, for Hegel, is that reason and sense are ultimately reconciled by the ability to think in terms of what he calls the Concept or Idea.

For the Concept is the universal which maintains itself in its particularizations, overreaches itself and its opposite, and so it is also the power and activity of cancelling again the estrangement in which it gets involved. Thus the work of art too, in which thought expresses itself, belongs to the sphere of conceptual thinking, and the spirit, by subjecting it to philosophic treatment, is thereby merely satisfying the need of the spirit's inmost nature. For since thinking is the essence and Concept of spirit, the spirit in the last resort is only
satisfied when it has permeated all products of its activity with thought too and so only then has made them genuinely its own. (A, 'Introduction'; 1975, 13)

Art is given the same task as that of religion and philosophy, which is to help man realize his task, that of bringing to consciousness all that is. While that task, in the end, leaves art behind, it also ends the operations of the sublime from gaining the upper hand over beauty. Respect, which in the Kantian philosophy is reserved for that alone which is "absolutely great", the autonomous individual, is in Hegel's philosophy accorded only to that which has gained expression or has been realized. Incommensurateness, or the sublime, in this "critical discourse" of Hegel's is no longer accorded respect. Beauty is placed firmly above the sublime. That is to say that a definite and achievable goal is held out for the self. In so far as the self can cultivate reason, and bring itself around to the Concept or the Idea, it can achieve a reconciliation. Works of art are understood once one understands the way in which they contribute to the task of reconciliation, which is to say, once one has understood the individual reconciliation which they actualize. This relationship is important to understand in Hegel's terms, because art's end cannot lie outside itself.

Against this we must maintain that art's vocation is to unveil the truth in the form of sensuous artistic configuration, to set forth the reconciled opposition
just mentioned, and so to have its end and aim in itself, in this very setting forth and unveiling.

(A, "Introduction"; 1975, 55)

Beauty must be understood as an accomplishment of man's goal, not an attempt. The harmony between form, 'spiritual culture', and task is to be removed from having anything to do with the sublime. But this harmony, consistent with Hegel's classicism, was found to be wanting in the art and life of modern man. This was the difference, as we have seen, which was made manifest to the Germans who read Winckelmann during the late eighteenth century. And here it is Hegel's promise of reason which makes it possible to look back at Greek art with yearning, and with a sense of the tragedy of having moved beyond the ideas which empowered it and which could be so completely realized, but at the same time without the pessimism or fanaticism which Hegel thought characterized romanticism.

In Hegel's seeing beyond Kant, with whatever degree of logical clarity he may have attained, he was able to offer a consolation to the isolated self - as depicted by Goethe in Werther - which, despite its almost Baroque and wayward logic, had one great advantage: that it held out the possibility of a revolutionized "lifeworld". The demise of the sublime demands of the Kantian 'human vocation' [menschliche Berufung] was to make possible the attainment of a realized harmony. The thaumaturgic powers of the artist, as well as art, was to be lost in this move of Hegel's. The creation or attainment of an individual harmony was deemed
impossible (cf. A, 'Introduction'; 1975, 11), except by the power of reason itself. In this manner Hegel's philosophy both maintains the absolute significance of art while at the same time asserting that it can no longer fulfil the most absolutely essential need of the modern self. Hegel's classicism and romanticism come together at this point in that he both emphasises the absolute achievement and beauty of classical art while accepting that the "hard road of culture" takes the self beyond the harmony which it so manifestly objectified for him. William Desmond emphasises this contradictory aspect of Hegel's thought.

Hegel's aesthetics, like the general thrust of his entire teachings, has a clear Janus-like character: it swings on a hinge between the old and the new. He looks to the history of the west and its metaphysical tradition, intending to gather from that tradition its abiding contribution to the human spirit, not only in aesthetics, but also in religion, in science, in politics and law, in philosophy. At the same time he is firmly placed within the modern consciousness and its contemporary problematic. Tradition and modernity are not finally to be viewed as unmediated opposites. To the contrary, Hegel seeks to uncover the historical genesis of modern self-consciousness within the progressive dialectical unfolding of human possibilities implicit within attitudes older than modernity. (Desmond, 1986; 126)

Art is both elevated and surpassed, just as the classical is given enormous significance while at the same time subsumed under the "one great metaphysical theme" of the romantic. This is the central characteristic of Hegel's Bildungsgeschichte. In elevating art to the role of bringing to consciousness the absolute, Hegel was able to both assert the active significance
of classical art and hold out to the modern self a similar harmony which it could attain in its own lifeworld. This was possible through the exercise of reason which could both confirm the "perfection" of the harmony between the content and the form of classical art and offer to modern self-consciousness the promise of actively recapturing that perfect harmony at a higher level.

A certain level of general culture (sense 3) must be achieved before the self can realize its ultimate goal, and this is where Hegel's political tendencies come into play. When he writes of the necessity of the development of the individual to the point where he can understand that "the goal is Spirit's insight into what knowing is", he does not sidestep the issue of action. This is where the beauty of classical art is so important to the self involved in the process of raising itself to that level because it supplies an insight into its goal [Bildungsziel]. That, for Hegel, is the coincidence of the universal and the particular. Because he believed that the real self which is realized through such a self-development, the thinking self, is at the same time a universal self (cf. P, 'Preface', §30; 1977, 18), the account which he gives of the beauty of Greek art is particularly suitable as a symbol of the goal of self-development:

in classical art the particularity of the content consists in its being itself the concrete Idea, and as such the concretely spiritual, for it is the spiritual alone which is the truly inner [self].

(A, 'Introduction'; 1975, 78)
But this can only be achieved once the self has risen to the state of science which for Hegel amounts to thinking through the speculative terms laid down in the *Logic*. The character of the artist has been replaced by that of the speculative thinker or scientist because it is to become one with knowledge which is essential, for the individual self to become the universal self.

This move transforms "the one great metaphysical theme" into an objective history, while still maintaining its structural framework. General culture must undergo a series of transformations before the "truly inner self", the thinking self, can externalize itself in coming to an understanding of how it came to be, then, and only then, it has achieved its goal. Abrams has accounted for this move in Hegel's philosophy.

Hegel described the subject of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as "the becoming of knowledge," or "the detailed history of the education [Bildung] of consciousness to the level of science." In this philosophical context the Christian history of the creation, fall, and redemption was translated to the realm of human consciousness as stages, or "moments", in its evolving knowledge ... redemption, even after it has been translocated to history and translated into self-education of the general mind of mankind, continues to be represented in the central Christian trope of life as a pilgrimage and quest: the *Bildungsgeschichte* of the Romantic philosophy of consciousness tends to be imagined in the story form of a *Bildungsreise* whose end is its own beginning.

(Abrams, 1971; 188-191)

The most essential aspect of this concept of *Bildung* is the way in which it transforms history into a personal narrative. The natural and most notorious conclusion, if one is willing to
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The most essential aspect of this concept of Bildung is the way in which it transforms history into a personal narrative. The natural and most notorious conclusion, if one is willing to
arrive at it with Hegel, is that subject is the same as object or, more germanely - but equally problematically - that the self is, at the end of its Bildungsreise, the same as the culture in which it finds itself. This harmony between self and culture is not, however, immediately achieved. The journey of development, like the quest of medieval legend, requires almost heroic efforts of cultural and self development. But what is to be overcome is not necessarily, if one assumes to a large extent - as Hegel seems to have done - that the cultural institutions which have developed are part of the goal itself, that to which one finds oneself opposed but that very opposition itself. In a comment on romantic fiction, which is in essence a commentary upon both Werther and Wilhelm Meister, Hegel shows his hand.

The contingency of external existence has been transformed into a firm and secure order of civil society and the state, so that police, law-courts, the army, [and] political government replace chimerical ends which the knights errant set before themselves. As individuals with their subjective ends of love, honour, and ambition, or with their ideals of world-reform, they stand opposed to this substantial order and the process of actuality which puts difficulties in their way on all sides. Therefore, in this opposition, subjective wishes and demands are screwed up to immeasurable heights; for each man finds himself before an enchanted and quite alien world which he must fight because it obstructs him and in its inflexible firmness does not give way to his passions but interposes as a hindrance the will of a father or an aunt and civil relationships, etc. Young people especially are these modern knights who must force their way through the course of the world which realizes itself instead of their ideals, and they regard it as a misfortune that there is any family, civil society, state, laws, professional business, etc., because these substantive relations of life with their barriers cruelly oppose the ideals and the infinite rights of the heart. Now the thing is to breach this order of things, to change the world, to improve it, or at
least in spite of it to carve out of it a heaven upon earth: to seek for the ideal girl, find her, win her away from her wicked relations or other discordant ties, and carry her off in defiance. But in the modern world these fights are nothing more than 'apprenticeship', the education of the individual into the realities of the present, and thereby they acquire their true significance. For the end of such apprenticeship consists in this, that the subject sows his wild oats, builds himself with his wishes and opinions into harmony with subsisting relationships and their rationality, enters into the concatenation of the world, and acquires for himself an appropriate relationship to it.

(A, III: 2(c); 1975, 592-593)

What Hegel attempts to accomplish in his philosophy, and perhaps most evidently in his Philosophy of Right, is just the kind of reconciliation which is rather ironically portrayed in this passage from the Aesthetics where the ideal girl who was an angel becomes just like any other and the hero gets mired in the banalities of civil society. In the following chapter we will find this principle expressed, not ironically but perhaps tragically, in his theory of Bildung: the process by which the individual forces his way out of particularity into universality, a passage which is simultaneously outwards into the real world of "subsisting relationships" and inwards into the "truly inner self". The profound movement of Hegel's philosophy is embodied in the attempt to make this reconciliation the expression of the self's freedom through reason. Once again, but from an entirely different perspective from that expressed in Kierkegaard's 'knight of faith', the suburban becomes, potentially, the most profound expression of the spiritual: the bringing of the knight-errant and heaven down to earth with a crash. Thus, the
Bildungsreise of the self in its development from mere individuality to the real universality which is, according to Hegel, its goal, is from the modern world which Schiller described as self-divided because of the existence of institutions which demand such a specialization of man's character to a similar world which is, however, transformed by the development of the self. Hegel’s optimism centres upon the conviction that a sufficient degree of rational order has been established by the interaction between the self and culture over the course of history that once the individual becomes completely immersed in that history or Bildungsgeschichte he will be able to recognize both that degree of rationality which the relationships of civil society have attained and, at the same time, transform himself into a true self which is able to engage with the institutions of its society and improve them even further until the completely rational state is realized.
In his valedictory address to the Stuttgart Gymnasium (1788) the eighteen year old Hegel compared the culture of the Germans and the Turks. It is interesting that he should have chosen to ascribe the Turks' barbarity to their lack of Bildung (cf. Avineri, 1972; 1). Though Hegel's reference to Bildung is, as Shlomo Avineri has pointed out, more an "indication of the intellectual climate nurtured by a culture" (Ibid) than a reflection of his nascent concerns as a mature philosopher, it was an abiding concern of Hegel's philosophy, which is not surprising, given the importance which he gives to the education of consciousness. Self-development or Bildung is one of the most necessary words in Hegel's philosophy. Which is not to say that its structural importance is always recognized by commentators. Taken as a starting point, it was the impulse for Hegel's earliest works. "Disunity is the source of the need for philosophy and as the culture [Bildung] of the age it is its unfree, predetermined aspect. In culture manifestations of the absolute have become isolated from the absolute and have become fixed as autonomous things" (Erste Druckschriften, from Lukács, 1975; 263). The elements of the metaphysical outlook which characterize the romantic Weltbild are well displayed in this piece from Hegel's Jena period. It is the 'positivity' of
culture and its institutions which must be overcome. The dissonances in the character of modern culture must be resolved in a higher culture.

What was also a part of Hegel's point of departure was the concept of estrangement [Entfremdung], another word which is ineliminable in the exposition of his philosophy of self and culture. Hegel begins with an account of the estrangement of the self from the institutions of its culture - profession, legal-economic structures, and the state itself - and moves towards a reconciliation [Versöhnung] between the self and those institutions through a self-development which can only be effected by philosophy. The philosophical education of the self, however, involves more than the analysis of the estranged culture which the self inhabits. The self must come to a philosophical understanding of how those institutions developed. But more than this is required. Through this process of self-development, the self must come to see itself from the outside, must be able to perceive itself in its cultural context. This process of self-development involves a self-estrangement. Hegel believed that this self-estrangement was necessary because it was only after having seen itself as the product of external forces which it itself has produced that the self is able to perceive the interdependence of those cultural institutions and the individual self. Near the end of the Phenomenology, Hegel wrote:

The cultivated [gebildete] self-consciousness which has traversed the world of self-alienated Spirit has through its self-alienation, produced the Thing as
its own self; therefore, it still retains its own self and it knows that the Thing lacks self-subsistence, that it is essentially only a being-for-another; or, to give complete expression to the relationship, i.e., to what alone constitutes the nature of the object here, the Thing counts for it as something that exists on its own account; ... but this being-for-self is itself declared to be a moment that merely vanishes and passes over into its opposite, into a being that is at the disposal of another. (P, §791; 1977, 481)

The way in which original nature must be altered in order to develop the self, which we found to be an essential element of self-cultivation, reappears in Hegel at a much higher level of abstraction. The philosophical education of the individual can only be completed through the estrangement of the self. Because this process must be realized by the self, it is necessarily a self-estrangement.

When one puts all four words together - aufheben, Bildung, Entfremdung, Versöhnung - one arrives at a characteristically Hegelian form of utterance. The original self must become self-estranged [sich-entfremdet], must be negated [aufgehoben] through that self-estrangement but also carried up [aufgehoben] to a higher level from which it is possible to see the institutions of its culture as being-for-another, dependent upon subjects like itself for their existence, and at the same time preserved [aufgehoben] in that it may now be completely self-conscious, which is to say more completely itself. Having completed this process of self-development, the self will have overcome the 'positivity' which confronted it before it began its process of
Bildung. "The objective element into which it puts itself forth, when it acts, is nothing other than the Self's pure knowledge of itself" (P, §792; 1977, 481-482). The ultimate goal of Hegel's philosophy, the end of his conception of Bildung, is for the self to be completely at home in, or reconciled [versöhnt] to its world.

The process of Hegel's Bildung is that of a journey which consciousness must undergo [Bildungsreise] in order to traverse the history of both the development of the cultural institutions which have shaped it and the philosophical understanding which has been attained by reflecting upon those developments. The very act of thinking about the earlier 'moments' of history, the earlier shapes of culture, will bring about [Wirkungsgeschichte] both the self-estrangement and the understanding of how its culture's institutions developed which are necessary before the self can be completely at home, in-and-for-itself, in its culture. There is one essential requirement, however, which Hegel's philosophy itself attempts to fulfil, that of thinking in the right way. Which for Hegel amounted to thinking in terms of the words which have been introduced above, in the way which is set down in the Logic.

In the following sections we will examine Hegel's analysis of two of the predecessor cultures which must be properly understood before the self can be said to have become cultivated: the Greek polis, and the culture of the ancien régime. It is necessary
firstly to come to an understanding of the position that these two moments or Bildungsformen occupy in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, the book which he thought the ladder with which the common man could climb up to the level of scientific thought, and which Jean Hyppolite has called "the itinerary of the soul which rises to spirit through the intermediary of consciousness" (Hyppolite, 1974; 11).

The "primary idea" of the *Phenomenology* is that of a *Bildungsroman*, according to Hyppolite, somewhat loosely comparable to Rousseau's *Emile*.

The "primary idea" of Rousseau's book has been described as "rigorously scientific; if the individual's development summarily repeats the evolution of the species then the child's education must largely reproduce the general movement of humanity." (Ibid, 39)

Hyppolite goes on to say that the *Phenomenology* is "on the one hand, the passage of empirical consciousness to science, and on the other, the elevation of the specific individual to the consciousness of the spirit of his time, to the consciousness of humanity within himself" (Ibid, 43). Throughout the book Hegel constantly shifts his emphasis from the particular demands of logical development which he sees as embodied in a certain way of seeing things and of experiencing them, to the historical exposition of what he sees as their embodiment in ways of life.
The two ways of life, or forms of culture, which we will be examining are themselves embodied for Hegel in two works, Sophocles's *Antigone* and Diderot's *Le Neveu de Rameau*. The places that they occupy in the structure of the *Phenomenology* are equivalent. Both are fastened upon by Hegel as the expression of cultures at the moment of their imminent collapse under the pressure of inherent contradictions in their way of seeing things. The structure of the *Phenomenology*, loosely following Lukács, can be divided into a "threefold repetition of the course of history": (ch.I-IV) "configurations of consciousness," which starts with the ordinary consciousness of the individual and ends with his gradually coming "to perceive that the real character of society and history is something created by men together" (*Ibid*, 470-471); (ch.VI) "forms of the world", the section which Hegel called "Spirit", the cycle during the course of which the individual "recognizes history as real, society and its development ceases to be a lifeless thing or uncanny destiny", in which "the entire course of history from its beginnings" is run in "its concrete social totality" (*Ibid*, 471); and (ch.VII-VIII) "the great epic of world history", the cycle in which consciousness "looks back over the panorama of history" but not, this time, specifically surveying the particular social aspects of each moment and instead summarizing "mankind's attempt to comprehend reality" through art, religion, and finally philosophy which culminates in Absolute Knowledge (*Ibid*). If this division is accepted then Hegel's interpretation of the *Antigone* falls into place
just at the moment when, as Lukács put it, the individual acquires knowledge of the real character of society, at the beginning of 'Spirit'; and his interpretation of Le Neveu de Rameau falls roughly in the middle of 'Spirit', which immediately precedes his treatment of the Enlightenment.

In the examination of Hegel's analysis of these predecessor cultures I will concentrate upon the elements which are relevant to the self and culture. In the Antigone it will be found that the virtue of nobility is the chief mechanism through which the self is related to the culture of the polis, and which can also be seen as the keystone of Hegel's interpretation of the work itself. If this is accepted, then the concept of the noble forms a bridge between the Antigone and Le Neveu de Rameau where Hegel's develops his famous exposition of the dialectical relationship between noble and base consciousness. It is important to place these two conceptions of the self and culture, and their concomitant conceptions of the noble, side by side. In this way I hope to foreground an aspect of the Phenomenology which might otherwise appear, given the dialectical complexity of Hegel's arguments, blurred. Accordingly, a section devoted to a summary of the concatenating figures and arguments will follow the examination of Le Neveu de Rameau. Instead of concluding with the third cycle, I will look at Hegel's mature philosophy of the modern state in which can be found the most thorough expression of his views of the relationship between the self and culture. In the
Philosophy of Right it is possible to see the particular consequences of what is laid down in an entirely abstract way in the final cycle of the Phenomenology. In order to illustrate Hegel's mature philosophy of the relationship between the self and culture I will briefly turn to Thomas Mann's Buddenbrooks and examine the predicament of Thomas Buddenbrook.

The Antigone: the beginning of wisdom

Wonders are many, and none more wonderful than man; the power that crosses the white sea, driven by the stormy south-wind, making a path under the surges that threaten to engulf him; and Earth, the eldest of the gods, the immortal, the unwearied, doth he wear, turning the soil with the offspring of horses, as the ploughs go to and fro from year to year.

(Antigone, tr. Jebb; 1900, 69-70)

Hegel's examination of Greek tragedy is central to many of his arguments in the Phenomenology. The particularly cultural or aesthetic aspects are, in his examination of the tragedy, tied up with the explication of political, moral, or ontological, arguments. In this section of the Phenomenology he is concerned with the development of an ethical argument which is, in turn, considered as part of the greater development, that of Spirit, or consciousness's coming to understand both itself and the world which it has created. Spirit [Geist], however, may be seen as relating directly to his analysis of the Antigone. Given the definition of man as a being who must place before
himself what he is and whatever else is, the conflation of all of these aspects of culture in the interpretation of a work of art may not seem so remarkable, and its relation to Spirit - the ultimate fulfilment of man's vocation - accordingly, understandable. The relation between these elements in his interpretation of the Antigone gives his philosophy of culture the form of being based upon the criticism of a work of art, so that, in a sense, when one evaluates that philosophy one is also evaluating the cogency and accuracy of his interpretation. Curiously, however, because it is the latter which compels one to believe Hegel it is, as Charles Taylor has pointed out, to take Hegel on the strength of his "hermeneutical dialectics" instead of the "strict logical dialectics" by which he so obviously hoped that his philosophy would command assent. "It would seem that while Hegel has some candidates for the first category - most notably the Logic - his historical dialectics fall in the second category. They do not convince by strict argument, but by the plausibility of their interpretation" (Taylor, 1979; 64). Goethe, after all, admired Hegel as a critic but found that he could neither understand nor admire his speculative dialectical method. It is in this capacity that the plausibility of Hegel's interpretation of the Antigone commands assent - one might not otherwise be wholly convinced.

When one considers the culture which is expressed in the Antigone, Hegel asserts that one must consider the laws of ethical action as given and not created by man, as "the
unwritten and infallible law of the gods”.

They are. If I enquire after their origin and confine them to the point whence they arose, then I have transcended them; for now it is I who am the universal, and they are the conditioned and limited. If they are supposed to be validated by my insight, then I have already denied their unshakeable, intrinsic being, and regard them as something which, for me, is perhaps true, but also is perhaps not true. (P, §437; 1977, 261)

It is just this attitude which is expressed in the chorus’s popular moral concept of “the law of the land”. The second chorus in the Antigone presents us with a picture of man “excellent in wit” who has tamed animals, bent nature to his will, taught himself “speech, and wind-swift thought, and also all the moods that mould a state.” But these accomplishments are dependent upon his honouring “the laws of the land”; only when he upholds “that justice which he hath sworn to the gods” does the work of his cunning stand fast. There is a universal order which man’s imposed order cannot contradict, by which, when in agreement, he prospers. The man who in “his rashness, dwells in sin”, will soon come to misery; while the happy man lives in harmony with the “laws of the land”. Justice is ostensibly a harmony between man and the order of the universe, and wisdom consists in the ability to live in accordance with that order. “Wisdom is the supreme part of happiness; and reverence towards the gods must be inviolate.”

It is not easily established that the morality of the play would necessarily be a morality which its audience would
condone, but it is safe to assume that there are certain limits of credibility which the play's morality could not have exceeded. However, the popular morality of the Athenians is expressed in the chorus, there are no other sources than just such documents from which we could construct any picture at all of that popular morality; aside from forensic oratory (Dover, 1974; 6). The choruses from Greek tragedy are popular morality; the laws of the land which they impose on the protagonists - what might be called the laws of limit, which, if they exceed them, they have isolated themselves as a criminal might have been isolated from an assembly in forensic oratory - are the laws of the land. It is from such sources, not from the classical philosophical definition of terms, that we can get some idea of the popular beliefs of the Greeks. For example, Aristotle uses eudaimonia in such a way as to define happiness as a disposition of the mind. The man who, through "the active exercise of his soul's faculty in conformity with the excellence or virtue" (Nicomachean Ethics tr. Rackham; 1926, 33), will achieve eudaimonia. However, in the choruses of Greek tragedy we do not find eudaimonia used to express a state of mind, it is used to express the pleasures which accompany material wealth and well-being. K.J. Dover has written that eudaimonia would have to be translated, in the usage of the chorus, as "the condition which indicates the good will of a supernatural being, occasionally [requiring] translation as 'happiness', but ... far more often applied to material wealth, sometimes to high standing and honour, and
rarely to a state of mind" (Ibid, 174). Despite Hegel's essentially Aristotelian outlook, he was right to have referred to the chorus of the Antigone and not to Greek philosophy in his analysis of their culture.

It is the substantial nature, in keeping with the popular conception of eudaimonia, of Greek culture that impressed Hegel most. The way in which the public sphere seemed to take pride of place, quite naturally, over the individual - what we characterized earlier as its uncoerced totality. But according to Hegel, the happiness of the Greeks was accounted for by the restricted nature of their wisdom, the degree to which their ethical terms were accepted as substantial and inviolable. The term which Hegel uses, Sittlichkeit, does not describe the restricted wisdom which it embodies but refers instead to the public nature of their ethical system. However, in that the word has its origins in Sitten or customs, it is somewhat close to the second definition of the moral in Chapter One, with its tendency to be thought of as pre-rational. The latter, however, is an anomaly in Hegel's system because Sittlichkeit will be repeatedly used by him to denote a public system of morals which, for example, in the Philosophy of Right will be the fully rational product of self-consciousness. In the case of the Bildungsform of the polis, the connection with pre-rationality is not entirely inappropriate because it is considered by Hegel to be close to Schiller's conception of Notstaat. Taylor has asserted that in Hegel's doctrine of
Sittlichkeit, "morality can only receive a concrete content in politics, in the design of the society we have to further and sustain" (Taylor, 1975; 376). In this regard, according to Taylor, the "full realization of freedom"

requires a society for the Aristotelian reason that a society is the minimum self-sufficient human reality. In putting Sittlichkeit at the apex, Hegel is - consciously - following Aristotle. For the last time that the world saw an effortless and undivided Sittlichkeit was among the Greeks. Hegel's notion of Sittlichkeit is in part a rendering of that expressive unity which his whole generation saw in the Greek polis, where - it was believed - men had seen the collective life of their city as the essence and meaning of their own lives, had sought their glory in its public life, their rewards in power and reputation within it, and immortality in its memory. It was his expression for that vertu which Montesquieu had seen as the mainspring of republics. (Ibid, 378)

The perfection of the polis depended, notoriously, upon much that is in itself morally reprehensible when judged by what must be recognized as a higher standard. But it was the strength of Athenian culture - to use a Nietzschean-sounding phrase - between the Peloponnesian wars, however, which represented a vertu which Hegel thought deserved to be preserved and recreated [aufgehen] at a higher level. This, to echo Jean Hyppolite, is the goal [Bildungsziel] of both the greater and the lesser - if the two can be discussed separately - self-developments of Hegel's system: the self who reflects upon history and the culture which rises out of the continuum of history itself.
Hegel's exposition is much more complex than can be explained through such an explanation. Deepening, as it does, the account which he gave of subjective consciousness's development in the previous chapters of the Phenomenology, much more must be elaborated. In the first section of 'Spirit', the Antigone is used to portray one of the most important moments in consciousness's development. He begins this section with what in his philosophy of history he calls a "political work of art", the Greek city-state, and ends with a critique of the Kantian moral philosophy. There is, then, a development from the simplicity of ethical unity in the polis, through the 'diremption' - of the individual and the ethos of the state - in tragedy, the divisions of the Christian conscience - which will be examined in the following chapter on Nietzsche - which culminates in an interpretation of the Kantian moral philosophy, and which concludes with a reinstatement of harmony within self-consciousness - the equivalent in the Phenomenology of the Sittlichkeits which we will find that Hegel attempted to establish in his theory of the modern state in the Philosophy of Right. At the beginning of this development, the individual is torn away from the Sittlichkeits of the polis, but at the end Hegel asserts that there is another unity which will be attained in 'Absolute Knowledge'. In this manner, Hyppolite writes in his Genesis and Structure:

The beautiful ethical life, the ancient city, with which Hegel begins ['Spirit'] because it is for him the first genuine form of a harmonious organization of the human city, is also the goal that history pursues. But in order to become what it already is
in-itself, spirit must renounce immediateness; it must regain itself and deepen itself as the subject of history. The phenomenology of spirit proper develops this transition from immediate spirit to subjective spirit. (Hyppolite, 1974; 330-331)

History, or 'Spirit', becomes the inexorable path of consciousness from the polis to 'Absolute Knowledge'. The separation of the individual from the ethical unity of the polis, of Antigone from the ethos of Thebes, is necessary and unavoidable. As we will find, it is this - what Hegel calls - estrangement from unity, this 'diremption', which is expressed in the Antigone which must be transcended in order for consciousness to develop towards its goal. It is essential, then, that he portray this division between the individual and the given order in tragedy, and thus the development of consciousness as implicit in the Bildungsform which expresses the transition point of consciousness.

There is a contrast in the Antigone, as interpreted by Hegel, between the chorus and the protagonists. The chorus, as we have seen, expresses the belief of popular morality in a "law of the land" which is not created by man, and it is just this non-problematic relation with ethical law which Hegel wishes to show that consciousness must transcend. The opposition between Antigone and Creon is the expression of what could be called the progressive element in the play, that which makes apparent - or 'actual' - the development of consciousness. The contrast is that between the chorus which expresses consciousness
arrested at a lower stage, and the protagonists who express the state of consciousness in its development. The chorus represents consciousness that does not question its relationship to the ethical system of the city-state; it is the unreflective consciousness of the citizen who is not an atomistic individual but a member of a unified whole or "uncoerced totality". In the Aesthetics, Hegel remarked that, in contrast to the characters on the stage, the chorus is the "soil out of which they grow ... the existent character of which they are conditioned."

Consequently the chorus is essentially appropriate in an age where moral complications cannot yet be met by specific valid and just laws and firm religious dogmas, but where the ethical order appears only in its direct and living actuality and remains only the equilibrium of a stable life secure against the fearful collisions to which the energies of individuals in their opposing actions must lead.

[\[A, III, iii (c) (aa); 1975, 1209\]

The protagonists, on the other hand, represent the contradiction between the laws of the family and the recognized laws of the community. They are the ploughshares, to reintroduce the original image of cultivation, which must break up the unreflective soil out of which they grew. "Ethical substance", as he calls it, is embodied in the state, and the attitude of the chorus; but consciousness must come to recognize the internal opposition between the individual and the community of which it thinks itself an inalienable member. The contrast which is dramatized, according to Hegel, is that between the community's ethical law and the individual
consciousness which cannot be subsumed under it. Antigone is the "actuality" of that stage of consciousness, the thought of consciousness "giving itself expression".

Hegel has gone beyond mere "hermeneutical dialectics" in his interpretation of the Antigone, and brought into play the strict dialectics which he used in the preceding chapters which were concerned with the development of the subject. It is the dialectics of subjectivity which unbalance the whole structure of the polis according to Hegel. At this level, Hegel portrays the two characters as the dialectical opposites which must be resolved by the negation, the dissolution of the ethical order out of which they grew.

The victory of one power and its character, and the defeat of the other, would thus be only the part and the incomplete work which irresistibly advances to the equilibrium of the two. Only in the downfall of both sides alike is absolute right accomplished, and the ethical substance as the negative power which engulfs both sides, that is, omnipotent and righteous Destiny, steps on the scene. (P, §472; 1977, 285)

It is the movement towards the realization of the tragic conflict between the individual and the destiny which appears to overwhelm it which Hegel fastens upon as the expression of Spirit in its self-development. The eventual goal of that development is the understanding of destiny as a rational history, the downfall of incomplete realizations of rationality such as the citizen of the polis and the corresponding development of an individual who becomes self-conscious.
The use which Hegel makes of the Antigone can be contrasted with Schiller in this regard. Unlike Schiller, Hegel does not define the aesthetic as that out of which the moral develops, but uses works of art to interpret the moral state of a society. The historicity which his philosophy of self and culture is concerned to develop does not focus upon the static elements in the works but upon the progressive. As opposed to his Aesthetics, where he is primarily interested in Homeric Epic on the one hand, and on the other with Greek statuary, his exposition concentrates, particularly in his examination of Greek statuary, upon the ideal beauty which is attained through the conception of the gods in their human shape. Hegel is at pains there to distinguish between the human shape as "immediate, i.e. corporeal shape", and "humanity pure and simple [in our conception of it as that] which is its inner world of subjective consciousness" [A, II, ii (a); 1975, 504]. Hegel asserts in the Phenomenology that the point at which consciousness becomes aware of its inner world, becomes subjective consciousness, it becomes wholly incapable of, if not hostile to, the repose in an ideal corporeal shape which he thought the source of the beauty of Greek statuary.

The awe which the character of Antigone fills Hegel with is ultimately, her degree of certainty as to her duty regardless of the ontological innocence of her moral consciousness. Hegel's respect seems to have been won not by the grandeur of Antigone's moral stature as a subjective individual, for if
that was the case then he would be coming close to the view which we found Schiller expounding in his *On the Sublime* where it is the sublimity of the individual's autonomy which was foregrounded in tragedy, but as a representative of a *Sittlichkeit*. As Judith Shklar has pointed out:

[that] is far superior to the modern (Kantian) morality which is merely a matter of abstract knowledge. She may have been less self-aware, but she completely lived her morality; she did not have to think. (Shklar in Pelczynski, 1971: 87)

The necessity which Hegel conceived of as unimpeachable—having, after all, the power and inevitability of destiny—does not give him cause for celebration in its having destroyed the Greek polis. The difference between modern consciousness and that of the polis's is encapsulated in the *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie* by Hegel's referring to the latter as an artwork, as opposed to the infinite personality of the former: "*Individualität als Kunstwerk (nicht diese unendliche Persönlichkeit)*" (quoted in Chytry, 1989; note 49, 191). The necessity is one of conceptual articulation, which Hegel thinks inalienably allied to a specific way of looking at things; hence the structure of the *Phenomenology* entails the first cycle's occurring where it does. In the *Aesthetics*, where Hegel's structure is a little less convoluted and the treatment of tragedy is spread throughout, Hegel developed the latter point more thoroughly. It is here that the concern with language, which is introduced in the *Phenomenology* where he wrote that language "contains [the self] in its purity" (P,
§508; 1977, 308) is elaborated with regard to the characters of Greek, especially Sophoclean, tragedy:

What drives them to act is precisely an ethically justified 'pathos' which they assert against one another with the eloquence of their 'pathos' not in sentimental and personal rhetoric or in the sophistries of passion, but in solid and cultivated language... They do not want to arouse sympathy or pity, for what arouses pity is not anything substantive, but subjective grief, the subjective depth of the personality. But their firm and strong depth of character is one with its essential 'pathos', and not the pity and emotion that Euripides alone has slipped into expressing.

[A, III, iii (c)(aa); 1975, 1215]

Hegel, then, has fastened upon the Antigone as the expression of a culture, as in sense (2a) - a way of life particular to a group or people -, which possessed a Sittlichkeit of a certain kind which also developed a corresponding self. Because the language of Antigone is the equivalent of Greek statuary, sculpted as it is before the development of "subjective depth", it cannot be accused of expressing the inevitable downfall of that culture. The radical element of the work is suppressed and can only be perceived by virtue of the strict dialectics which Hegel imposes upon his interpretation. It is the recognition, on the part of the phenomenological onlooker who observes this Bildungsform, of the division of the concepts of justice into two aspects, which alone, in the end, constitutes the progressive element expressed in the tragedy. This element, as Hegel points out, is not yet apparent to the audience or the chorus with which it identifies itself.
At the level of this spectator-consciousness [the Chorus], the indifferent ground on which the performance takes place, Spirit does not appear in its scattered multiplicity, but in the simple diremption of the Notion. Its Substance, therefore, shows itself torn asunder merely into its two extreme powers. These elementary universal beings are at the same time self-conscious individualities — heroes, who place their consciousness into one of these powers, find in it determinateness of character and constitute the effective activity and actuality of these powers. This universal individuation descends again, as will be remembered, to the immediate reality of existence and presents itself to a crowd of spectators who have in the Chorus their counterpart, or rather, their own thought expressing itself. (P, 8735; 1977, 445)

The wisdom which is the beginning of 'Spirit', the dialectical force which compels self-consciousness further along the calvary of its Bildungsreise, is that which informs the melancholy of Hegel's language when he described "a world in which the self has become real", but which is, at the same time "a world in which the self is always external to itself" (Hyppolite, 1974; 374).

What remains perhaps the most important aspect of this 'moment' or Bildungsform is the nature of the self in its relation to the virtue of nobility. This aspect of morality predominates in Hegel's discussion of the later 'moment' which he finds expressed in the Le Neveu de Rameau. Morality, in this sense, comes close to what I have outlined briefly in Chapter One: the third sense where it encompasses the way in which, as Nietzsche asserted, perceptions can be accounted for as moral experiences. The way in which 'nobility' can be used to
describe both moral and aesthetic characteristics, illustrates the broadness inherent in this sense. John Casey has attempted to account for the spread which is involved here.

Nobility is something that can be presented directly to the eye. It can appear (to use Hegelian language) ‘in concrete form’. The seated statues of Lorenzo and Giuliano de Medici in the tomb of San Lorenzo visually express two aspects of the noble. One is the noble as active; the other is the noble as contemplative. In neither case do we infer a quality of mind or character from outward signs. The statues do not symbolize nobility, or make us think of nobility. It would be truer to say that the nobility of the two figures is something that we can actually see, and not something we infer, any more than we infer the expressive qualities - say, of a piece of music... The sculpture is not a mere step in a process of inference, but a concrete embodiment of ideas; and our perception of the sculpture cannot be described without some reference to these ideas.

(Casey, 1990; 74-75)

This mode of perception is in keeping with the Hegelian concept of the work of art as an accomplishment of unity between content and form. And it is in just this way, as we have seen above, that the immediacy of ethical content is to be accounted for in tragedy, according to Hegel: the tragedy is an instantiation of the complex of ethical concepts which characterizes Greek culture, an understanding of the play cannot be achieved without reference to those concepts - although the particularly strict dialectical and progressive content does need to be elaborated. It is only a small step to the position that the virtues through which the self orients itself in such a culture must operate in precisely the same way. This, after all, must be what Hegel had in mind when he
distinguished between Antigone's 'pathos' and modern subjectivity: in a rather vulgar sense, the former is worn on the cuff and the latter must be prised out into the open with categorical imperatives. As we found in Chapter Three, the unity of the former falls under the principle of beauty, while the latter tends towards the sublime.

The degree to which the ethical pervades all modes of perception in a culture, is a reflection of what Hegel expressed in *Sittlichkeit*. The essential principle of *Sittlichkeit* is, as we have seen, that of an "expressive unity" between the self and its culture. This aspect of *Sittlichkeit* is extended by Taylor to encompass the unity of the private and the public.

The happiest, unalienated life for man, which the Greeks enjoyed, is where the norms and ends expressed in the public life of a society are the most important ones by which its members define their identity as human beings. (Taylor, 1975; 383)

The ultimate honour is to die for one's country. It is this heroism of self-sacrifice demanded by war which is the source of the concept of nobility in Greek culture, because it is at the same time its self-fulfilment. In keeping with the popular conception of *eudaimonia* which characterizes happiness through material wealth and high standing as opposed to a mental state, the noble is an epithet used to describe the coincidence of the private and the public: ultimately it can imply the combination of both in death.
Hegel’s dialectic treatment of the relation between public and private in the polis is perhaps the most complex argument in his examination of Greek culture. This relation is characterized, in the *Phenomenology*, as that between the shadow of the human law of the city— which ultimately demands death—and the light of the divine law of the family—the Penates. This is the closing characterization of Creon and Antigone in the *Phenomenology*.

Human law in its universal existence is the community, in its activity in general is the manhood of the community, in its real and effective activity is the government. It *is*, *moves*, and *maintains* itself by consuming and absorbing into itself the separatism of the Penates, or the separation into independent families presided over by womankind, and by keeping them dissolved in the fluid continuity of its own nature. But the family is, at the same time, in general its element, the individual consciousness the basis of its general activity. Since the community only gets an existence through its interference with the happiness of the Family, and by dissolving [individual] self-consciousness into the universal, it creates for itself in what it suppresses and what is at the same time essential to it an internal enemy—womankind in general. Womankind—the everlasting irony [in the life] of the community—changes by intrigue the universal end of government into a private end, transforms its universal activity into a work of some particular individual, and perverts the universal property of the state into a possession and ornament for the Family. (P, §475; 1977, 287–288)

The ultimate conflict with which Hegel deals, the *sacrifice* of the private to the public, is expressed in the death of the individual for the polis. There is, however, a dialectical fault in this relation which is exposed in the *Antigone*. The death which is demanded of the individual by the polis, which
forms the ultimate basis for its system of values, depends upon the reinstatement of individuality after death. Unless the individual is gathered back into the womb of particularity after his service to the polis, his service would be rendered an utter negation, according to Hegel. It is difficult to describe Hegel's position without descending into his dialectical language, but it is an essentially simple point. The family must take back the individual's service as a source of pride before the nobility of that service can be fully realized. Without that resolution, according to Hegel, the death of the individual would appear as a contingency, devoid of spiritual significance: "the preeminent function of the family is to restore to death its true meaning, to remove it from nature and to make of it a spiritual action" (Hyppolite, 1974; 343).

It is through the mechanism of the dialectical relation between family and polis, according to Hegel, that virtue is embodied in Greek culture. It is at this most abstract and difficult level of dialectical thought that the harmony of the public and the private is accounted for. The concept of the self is intimately connected with that of the polis: because the self's attributes are objectified its virtues are correspondingly substantial. The noble is concerned with certain activities on behalf of the polis, and its qualities are reflected back upon the individual through the medium of the family. This conception of the virtues is the most obvious difference
between Greek or pagan and modern culture. Casey points towards this in elaborating the notorious connection between nobility and citizenship.

The problem arises where certain morally good qualities - for instance, the Good Will - pass over into something else. The noble does not coincide with the Kantian picture of the man of Good Will. It does not place all its weight upon intentions, since it also takes into account success in acting upon the world. It assumes that certain admirable personal qualities may depend for their realization upon contingencies - particular gifts, or particular worldly circumstances. Aristotle seems to think a slave is by nature incapable of the cardinal virtues. It would presumably follow that he who pursues noble ends cannot be a slave... So a central problem about the idea of the noble, if it is to be understood in anything like its traditional form, is that it seems to be both an ethical quality, to involve dispositions that every human being necessarily has a reason for cultivating, and at the same time to characterize superior people, what we might call those who are favoured with exceptional qualities and advantages. To be like these people cannot be an obligation for everyone. (Casey, 1990; 72-73)

The ultimate form of nobility, in self-sacrifice for the polis, can only be achieved by those who, firstly, are citizens who, secondly, have the money to equip themselves with the necessary armour and who, thirdly, are able to acquit themselves honourably on the battlefield. A less dramatic version would be the citizen who is both gifted with the qualities which command respect among his equals - who has been looked upon benignly by the gods, as in the sense of eudaimonia (supra) - and also has the rhetorical skills which enable him to acquit himself well in assembly. There is an enormous difference between this and the Kantian conception of virtue.
Principally, the definition of the self plays the most essential role. Once the self is isolated, is removed from the substantial world of the polis as it must be, according to Hegel, because of the dialectical fault which it contains, and moves towards Kantian Persönlichkeit, the corresponding virtues become unattainable: the nobility of Greek culture is lost once and for all. The self, however, needs a goal [Bildungsziel] towards which it can develop. In the following section which deals with Le Neveu de Rameau, we will find what happened, according to Hegel, when a distinctly different and higher form of culture, with a distinctly different self - the self which has fully developed its subjectivity - attempted to recapture nobility in the "heroism of service".

Hegel, however, looked forward to a reconciliation of the beautiful harmony of the polis and the eventual dissolution of the divisions inherent in the sublimity of Persönlichkeit. As the reader progresses through 'Spirit', the second major section of the Phenomenology, he follows Hegel on the path which he believed was there for all, once equipped with the ability to think dialectically, in the progress of history itself.

The main drama of history is ... opened by the breakdown of the perfect unity of Sittlichkeit in the Greek world, the birth of the individual with [actual] universal consciousness. It then follows the slow development through the succeeding centuries both of the individual (his Bildung) and of the institutions embodying Sittlichkeit, so that the two can eventually rendez-vous in the rational state.

(Taylor, 1975; 393)
The opposition between Creon and Antigone which is enacted before the reader of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, the breaking down of the mechanism through which the essential virtue of nobility operates in the polis, is the necessary first stage in the development of the self and culture towards their mutual goal.

**Le Neveu de Rameau: Bildung through Wit**

I am jester to Bertin and a host of others - to you, perhaps at this moment - or possibly you are mine. A really sensible person wouldn't have a jester. So anyone who has a jester is not sensible, and if he is not sensible he must be a jester and perhaps, if he is a king, his jester's jester.

*(Rameau's Nephew* tr. Tancock, 1966; 83)*

*Bildung*, or culture, occupies a chapter in the *Phenomenology*: 'Self-Alienated Spirit. Culture and its Realm' [*Der sich entfremdete Geist, die Bildung und ihr Reich*]. This is the most crucial chapter of the *Phenomenology*, as it is in this 'moment' that consciousness encounters its greatest estrangement [*Entfremdung*] before it begins the final cycle which culminates in the reconciliation [*Versöhnung*] of 'Absolute Knowledge' and, in the *Philosophy of Right*, the rational state. It is curious, first of all, to find that culture is here connected with estrangement, where it has previously been connected with development or cultivation and so eventual - though not necessarily explicit - fulfilment. This is characteristic of the *Phenomenology* where human
consciousness's *Bildung* is understood as, essentially, the painful process of having to eschew its static and possibly happy 'moments' for the purpose of transcending itself and progressing towards its goal. Each particular stage in that development is discovered, inexorably, by human consciousness to contain some fault that is more injurious to it than whatever fulfilling state of affairs might be found to predominate. In characteristically dramatic religious imagery, Hegel compares these stages or 'moments' to the Stations of the Cross. This development can be seen as a journey of self-discovery in which once each stage is found to incorporate an untruth it must be abandoned, for it is no longer sufficient as an object for consciousness. The unhappiness of estrangement which consciousness experiences in the stage of its self-development which Hegel calls *die Bildung* is, then, not unusual. Moreover because *die Bildung* plays such an important role in that development, estrangement attains through it the zenith of its influence over consciousness, impelling it to both radically reinterpret and reconstruct its world and way of life.

*Die Bildung* could best be described as the world which human consciousness builds for itself, but in which it finds itself estranged, and so self-estranged. Culture is a distinctly human world which consciousness finds as foreign to itself as, at an earlier stage of its development, it found nature. This explains the profound unhappiness which consciousness
experiences. Historically, this is the world of the ancien régime and the complex of relations between the individual and the state. It is these relations, and the definition of the two constituents upon which Hegel's argument focusses. The work of art which he fastens upon as expressive of this Bildungsform is Diderot's Le Neveu de Rameau [Rameau's Nephew].

The key word in this chapter of the Phenomenology is 'estrangement'. The necessity of estrangement in the development of consciousness has already been encountered in Hegel's examination of the Antigone. Although it is seen by some commentators to be necessary to distinguish between estrangement and alienation in describing this essential force at work in consciousness's self-development, I will use the former more neutral - given the spread of the latter in our modern usage which confounds any precise meaning - word. Estrangement, then, is the process by which consciousness separates itself from that in which it can no longer believe, and thus enables it to advance towards ultimate freedom or reconciliation with its world, in 'Absolute Knowledge' and the rational state. There is a sense, then, in which man must cultivate himself, must develop himself into the kind of being which is able to attain 'Absolute Knowledge'. This self-development involves the estrangement of both that within and without which would hinder that development. Both man himself and his world must be changed in order for him to develop. As in the original Latin verb cultivare, once again, original
nature must be altered before man can develop towards his Bildungsziel:

"culture" and "alienation" are akin in meaning: the determinate individual cultivates himself, and forms himself to essentiality, through the alienation of his natural being. (Hyppolite, 1974; 384)

Here, however, it is a topsy-turvy situation in that what nature is supplanted by is even more alien or, in Hegel’s terms, ‘positive’ than the original nature which it replaced. Hyppolite emphasizes, in his commentary, that Hegel’s conception of cultivation is, at this point in the Phenomenology, far from the harmonious development which his contemporaries would have expected. "To cultivate oneself is not to develop harmoniously, as in organic growth, but to oppose oneself and rediscover oneself through a rending and a separation" (Ibid, 385). There is much in this which is reminiscent of Schlegel’s emphasis upon cultivation as self-destruction – "all artists are Decians" (supra) – in the interests of self-transcendence. Humboldt’s sense of Bildung as the cultivation of an inner garden for the self is inappropriate here because of the degree of antagonism between the self and that which is imposed upon it in die Bildung – Humboldt’s reposeful and essentially Stoical image of development seems to be quite out of place.

In the world of Le Neveu de Rameau, Hegel asserts that individual consciousness has reached the highest degree of
estrangement that it is possible to attain. This can be very simply accounted for: the Bildungsform of the self with which Hegel is concerned in this section of 'Spirit', is an "absolutely discrete unit", and yet the world in which it finds itself demands that it form itself into something universal. This is best understood from the viewpoint of Roman Law, in which the individual is a legal person - and so "absolutely discrete" - and yet at the same time that personhood is only identified, for the purposes of law, through its property. Hence the very thing to which its personhood is related is the opposite of itself. The principle that Trimalchio expresses in Petronius's Satyricon is particularly apt: "Take my word for it: if you have a penny, that is what you are worth; by what a man hath he shall be reckoned" \[Credite mihi: assem habeas, assem valeas; habes, habeberis\] (tr. Rouse, 1961; 154).

But the Spirit whose self is an absolutely discrete unit has its content confronting it as an equally hard unyielding reality, and here the world has the character of being something external, the negative of self-consciousness. This world is, however, a spiritual entity, it is in itself the interfusion of being and individuality; this its existence is the work of self-consciousness, but it is also an alien reality already present and given, a reality which has a being of its own and in which it does not recognize itself. This real world is the external essence and free content of legal right.

\(P, \text{§}484; 1977, 294\)

The paradoxical situation is that consciousness, in creating this world against nature, has created a world which it finds is essentially against itself. Far from having created a 'second nature' - a purer more perfected world in which it
recognizes itself and can more easily develop towards 'Absolute Knowledge' - it has created a world which it finds even more intransigent and rebarbative to its self-development. But this world is the product of its development. This unhappy state is necessary in order that consciousness move on to a higher 'moment', which historically corresponds to the Enlightenment, and which, in turn, leads consciousness on to another, even higher, 'moment'.

This revolution gives birth to absolute freedom, and with this freedom the previously alienated Spirit has completely returned into itself, has abandoned this region of culture and passes on to another region, the region of the moral consciousness.

(P, §486; 1977,296)

This emphasis upon "freedom" is somewhat reminiscent of Schiller's Aesthetic Education; but here it is not merely aesthetic culture with which Hegel is concerned, and "absolute freedom" is achieved through the actions of individual consciousness not by its creating works of art or appreciating semblance. However, it is very similar to Schiller in the sense that consciousness learns, during the course of die Bildung, to live entirely by semblance, for nothing, morally, is what it seems, but must be recognized as if it were actual. Once this way of life has been thoroughly lived-out, in a sense, consciousness is ready to engage in the radical attempt to grasp the world through the combination of rational reflection and practical manipulation. The resolution of this dialectical movement from semblance to practical manipulation
will be the moral consciousness which attempts "a complete transformation of [its] sensuous being in order to make it conform to pure moral will" (Hyppolite, 1974; 478).

The society of pre-Revolutionary France is, according to Hegel, a society in which the values which its consciousness considers 'noble' or 'good' are completely undermined. In Hegel's analysis this stems from the fact that the individual has surrendered his 'natural self', has alienated his individual nature, in return for wealth. As the culmination of the development of the 'legal person' [rechtliche Persönlichkeit] which arose during the Roman Empire - the person who has certain rights which revolve around his possessions - the world of pre-Revolutionary France entails something specifically superadded to this Roman legacy: the estrangement of personality itself. The property and possessions of the individual, his wealth, is the individual; this individual may be recognized by all as this particular conglomeration of possessions and is, in Hegel's words, the "actual self". This "actual self" is however, completely alien to the individual consciousness it represents.

Such, then, is the constitution of that aspect in which self-consciousness, qua absolute Being, is actual. But the consciousness that is driven back into itself from this actuality ponders this its inessential nature. (P, §483; 1977, 293)

The underlying essence of this conglomeration of possessions is rendered "inessential"; that to which the legal person refers
is no longer a personality. The virtue of the 'actual' person in this society is equatable only with his wealth, the degree to which he can direct his will to the acquisition and maintenance of possessions.

In this world, Hegel asserts, 'state power' is merely the whim of an absolute monarch, 'the good' merely that which is in accordance with his will. And since all wealth is given by the absolute monarch as a favour to the "actual person", the virtue of the "inessential" personality consists in its "self-estrangement", in its will to be only that which is recognised and rewarded. It is here that Hegel reintroduces the concept of the noble into our analysis, and its opposite, the base. If one goes along with Lionel Trilling who, in Sincerity and Authenticity, emphasized the way in which the set of values which are expressed in the concepts of the noble and the base are closer to a sense of style, then it would be possible to say that they involved more of an aesthetic than a moral idea of conduct.

The words [noble and base] were applied, rather, to the ideal of personal existence of a ruling class at a certain time - its ethos, in that sense of the word which conveys the idea not of abstractly right conduct but of a characteristic manner or style of approved conduct. What is in accord with its ethos is noble; that falls short of it or derogates from it is base.

(Trilling, 1972; 37)

Conformity becomes the key factor: the individual must create himself, must form himself into a person who gratifies the
monarch's whims rather than expresses his own essential character. And in this regard it is insignificant whether the noble and the base are moral or aesthetic in nature. The contradictions between purported value and moral content from the point of view of the phenomenologist, Hegel's reader, stem from the specifically moral concepts of human conduct; but from the point of view of the Bildungsform the aesthetic does seem to predominate with mere overtones of moral propriety. In either case, the public realm is not perceived as the creation of the individual's action, as it was in the polis. The externalization of the self through the mechanism of style, is more of an estrangement than the sacrifice of the self on behalf of the polis. Where, as we have seen, there was in the polis the saving although contradictory power of the family to restore to the citizen, at the end of his service to the state, a life as an individual, in die Bildung all individuality is surrendered and, according to Hegel, there seems to be no corresponding institution which is empowered to reintegrate the externalized self with the individual.

If, therefore, individuality is erroneously supposed to be rooted in the particularity of nature and character, then in the actual world there are no individualities and no characters, but everyone is like everyone else: but this presumed individuality really only exists in someone's mind, an imaginary existence which has no abiding place in this world, where only what externalizes itself and, therefore, only the universal, obtains an actual existence.

(P, 8489; 1977, 298)

The noble individual is he who is able to appear in just that
form which pleases the absolute monarch, who is able to cultivate himself in accordance with that "universal" form which is imposed on him. The base individual is he who is unable, or unwilling, to do so, and therefore displeases the absolute monarch - an ungebildeter man. Where in Schlegel we found that the uncultivated man was a caricature of himself, was merely human and so partook of the animal or finite instead of the godly or 'infinite', we now find that the uncultivated man is labelled an espèce, a kind of human being, and does not fulfil the "universal" ideal of the absolute monarch's form of cultivation. In this usage of Bildung there is something of the old concept of Bild which one keeps in mind during the process of self-cultivation, but now the image - not of God but the honnête homme - is everything, the material of which it is made counts for nothing. For this Hegel quotes Diderot when he defines espèce as "the most horrid of all nicknames; for it denotes mediocrity and expresses the highest degree of contempt" (ibid). As Hyppolite has pointed out in his commentary, "using Goethe's translation of Le Neveu de Rameau, Hegel emphasized the disdain that people in such a world have for what preserved in itself the specificity of a nature and what has not cultivated itself" (Hyppolite, 1974; 387).

Cultivation in this Bildungsform is similar to that which we encountered in Schlegel's characterization of Wilhelm Meister as the product merely of a mind cultivated to perfection. In that criticism, it might be remembered, there was an active
form which pleases the absolute monarch, who is able to
cultivate himself in accordance with that "universal" form
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encountered in Schlegel's characterization of Wilhelm Meister
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that criticism, it might be remembered, there was an active
distinction between many different meanings of cultivation which were compared to the different senses of wit. The sense in which Schlegel was using cultivated was similar to Empson's definition (1a) of wit: that in Wilhelm Meister Goethe was merely a bright social talker who was mocking. It is this sense of wit [Geistreichelei] and cultivation [Bildung] which is predominant in die Bildung. The language of die Bildung, that of the court, emphasizes, as does the fashion of the nobility, the taste of the king and not the individual. The noble consciousness has no particular life-style whereas the espèce, the base consciousness, is the man with a particular life-style. This extended operative influence of the aesthetic which Trilling characterised in his concept of the noble ethos is significant insofar as it represents the rather unusual reintroduction of what Kant has called "fantastic virtue" (supra), which characterizes the lower forms of morality embodied in custom. Hegel is convinced that the Bildungsziel of Geist is to transcend mere custom [Sitten], and bring about a Sittlichkeit which is wholly rational and which is also self-consciously so, in that it is the expression of the individual consciousness at the same time. The predominance of style over morality which die Bildung imposes upon the individual is as far removed from such a concept of Sittlichkeit as is, perhaps, possible. The significance of this in regard to the language which characterises die Bildung, is that its wit, as we will see is both (1a) and (2c): mere cultivatedness as well as a criticism of society itself. It is important to highlight this
nexus of concepts in Hegel's analysis of courtly culture because it is so startlingly different from Nietzsche's. For the former, die Bildung represents an ethos, in Trilling's sense, which must be transcended by a higher Sittlichkeit, whereas for the latter, the ethos or style of courtly culture represents an aspect of culture which deserves to be preserved, just as Hegel thought the Sittlichkeit of the polis deserved to be recreated at a higher level of man's self-development.

The culture for which Hegel takes Le Neveu de Rameau to be representative has turned the word Bildung into something which stands opposed to the "essential personality" of an individual consciousness. The individual expressivity of personality is completely denied in return for the wealth which attends upon the "universality" of the "actual person", the gebildeter man. What stands opposed to the "cultivated" or "actual" self is the "pure" or "expressive" individual. The situation in which consciousness finds itself, according to Hegel, is that to be honest one must express one's essential estrangement from any "actual" realization of the individual self - the only "expression" possible is the "negation" of the "actual self". Lui says to the more upright Moi of Diderot's novel:

Devil take me if I really know what I am. As a rule my mind is as a sphere and my character as honest as the day; never false if I have the slightest interest in being true, never true if I have the slightest interest in being false. (Tancock, 1966; 79)

It is in this way that the man who admits to being the
hypocrite, the cultivated man who is able to admit to his not being "expressed" in his "actual self", becomes the "truth" of that "moment" or state of consciousness. This term "truth" runs close to Ivan Soll's definition:

where a form of consciousness is discussed epistemologically, as a way of knowing, Hegel speaks of its object as its truth. In discussing a form of consciousness which is prima facie a way of acting, Hegel further extends the use of this idiom and speaks of its objective or goal as its truth.

(Soll, 1969; 14)

Diderot, in Le Neveu de Rameau, portrays what Hegel asserted was the "truth" of pre-Revolutionary France. In recognizing the grotesque figure Lui, who debases himself in admitting that he has no idea of what he is, and who can only be true to himself in the creation of an intended semblance of himself, as the "truth" of the age, consciousness would already have "estranged" itself from what it found to be insufficient as an object.

The lacerated consciousness is specifically the consciousness of the end of a certain world (it is perhaps a pre-revolutionary state of expressing a civilization which, becoming aware of itself, has lost all naivety, all self-confidence, and all substantiveness and which in becoming aware negates itself); it is also, generally, the final consciousness of every culture. (Hyppolite, 1974; 414)

Culture, in directing humanity away from nature to the degree that it is portrayed as doing in Le Neveu de Rameau is, then, a culture that brings about its own end.
Like Antigone, the Lui of Le Neveu de Rameau, the self-estranged consciousness, is a progressive consciousness. Though both can be seen as representative of a culture in decline, and though they are both unhappy consciousnesses, they are both consciousnesses which anticipate a higher form of consciousness. It is the admission of hypocrisy, according to Hegel, on the part of the self-estranged consciousness, which allows the condition of every consciousness under the regime of "die Bildung" to become apparent, and to thereby induce those consciousnesses to transform both themselves and their world. Language is the medium through which self-estranged spirit "expresses" itself, and it is here that the "expressivist" concerns which we encountered in Herder and Schiller become apparent once again. The individual expression of this consciousness in its witty talk [Geistreichelei] becomes a "universal" which, according to Hegel, means that it can exist for others. This "expression", by the power of its making apparent to others what was originally only apparent "inwardly" to the self-estranged consciousness, brings about the end of the regime which inflicts the tyranny of the "actual self" over the "pure self".

In such talk, this particular self, qua this pure self, determined neither by reality nor by thought, develops into a spiritual self that is of truly universal worth. It is the self-disruptive nature of all relationships and the conscious disruption of them; but only as self-consciousness in revolt is it aware of its own disrupted state, and in thus knowing it has immediately risen above it.

(P, 8528; 1977, 321)
Consciousness has become self-consciousness in the process of this "expression", which for Hegel always entails the externalization and thus transcending (Aufhebung) of the self that was, prior to this "expression", the "pure self", of what he calls "consciousness in-itself". Like Antigone, Lui expresses what is true for all consciousness in the Bildungsform which it represents in the overall development of culture as in sense (2b): universal history or humanity's development. By expressing that, by becoming its "truth" (Soll), it transcends itself and rises to a higher form. But, as in the Antigone, though it may be the "truth" of that stage, and can be classified as the progressive element, the real advancement is made by the consciousness which recognizes itself in this, what it considers to be, alien consciousness that "expresses" its condition; like Creon, the other consciousness must admit its complicity. It was in this sense that Hegel wrote that the "ethical consciousness must, on account of this actuality and on account of its deed..., acknowledge its opposite as its own actuality, must acknowledge its guilt" (F, 8470; 1977, 284). The Moi of Le Neveu de Rameau must, like Creon, see the expression and the suffering of Lui as its own, and admit:

"Because we suffer we acknowledge that we have erred."
Creon and the *Philosophe*: the other half

The emphasis in the phenomenological interpretation of these two works must return to the "other" of the consciousness which expresses the "truth" of its 'moment'. Although it is inaccurate to draw any strong parallels between Antigone and Jean François Rameau, the Nephew-Lui, aside from their structural roles in the *Phenomenology* there is an interesting parallel which can be drawn between Creon and the Philosophe, the Diderot-Moi of *Le Neveu de Rameau*. Both characters represent a similar side of the dialectical process in which they are interpreted as involved by Hegel. Although one is stretching Hegel in saying so, both Creon and the Philosophe can be seen as sharing the desire to impose a human order, at the expense of religion or the sensuous, upon their world. To adapt Nietzsche's terminology, they are both representatives of an Apollinian principle. The higher law that Antigone acts in accordance with is essentially one which owes its divinity to the chthonic gods of the underworld. The similarity between Antigone and Jean François is limited to the degree that the latter also claims the rights of the more chthonic, albeit not "higher", and even debased by comparison, elements of human nature: the desires and appetites. Towards the end of Diderot's novel, Jean François tells the Philosophe what he thinks is the fault of the rational order which he is so keen to impose on the world: that it ignores the pleasures of the senses.
Now that is your position: you think happiness the same for all. What a strange illusion! Your own brand presupposes a certain romantic turn of mind that we don't all possess, an unusual type of soul, a peculiar taste. You dignify this oddity with the name of virtue and you call it philosophy. But are virtue and philosophy made for everybody? Some can acquire them, some can keep them. Imagine the universe good and philosophical, and admit that it would be devilishly dull. So long live philosophy and long live the wisdom of Solomon – drink good wine, blow yourself out with luscious food, have a tumble with lovely women, lie on soft beds. Apart from that the rest is vanity. (Tancock, 1966; 65)

In so far as Hegel's contrast in the Phenomenology is between the hypocrite and the honnête homme, and their corresponding use of language – the former's which consists in wit and the latter's which consists in what Hegel calls "the heroism of flattery": the mechanism by which the noble self surrenders himself to the king, and devotes himself to the service of flattery which, after the fashion of the academic natura naturans, maintains the order in being which, in a sense, distinguishes the absolute monarch – he is not concerned with the Diderot-Moi. But it is rewarding to reinstate the Philosophe [Diderot-Moi] at this point because it brings Hegel's treatment of the Enlightenment into closer proximity with its antagonist in Le Neveu de Rameau. It addresses an imbalance in Hegel's treatment, because it is the Philosophe, what Hyppolite calls "universal intellection", who is the result (Hyppolite, 1974; 422) of the world of die Bildung, the character who carries the cultural development onward, the Kulturträger. This could also be said to be true of Creon the
figure who represents human laws in the *Antigone*, who can also be seen as representative of the nascent tendencies of Roman Law which Hegel sees as the *result* of the tragic 'moment' of the *Antigone*. Creon and the Philosophe could be called the concatenating figures who, though they are not the 'truth' of their culture, are their *results*; in their capacity as what Nietzsche calls "necessary links of culture" (H: I, §292) they connect the ends of one culture and the beginning of another, and must be examined in their own right.

Because human law in the polis is not concerned with the individual as such but only with the citizen, Creon represents a universality which is unstable. The laws which he imposes deserve to be followed for they are in the interests of the community: as Hegel put it, they subdue "the natural aspect and separateness" of the member of the family, and transform him into a citizen, train "him to be virtuous, to a life in and for the universal" (P, §451; 1977, 269). But because of the fault which they contain, his laws are destined to come into conflict with the divine laws of the family. In this sense Hegel was able to assert that actuality did not lie on the side of Creon's view of Antigone's action which was justified entirely by the Penates - the household gods who claim the individual back from the nation. Nevertheless, the movement in this section of the *Phenomenology* is towards a law which through its universality comes to stand opposed to the individual. Creon, then, could be seen as an embodiment of what Hegel called "the
power of the negative". The development of the Roman state and Roman Law represents the ultimate victory of this lifeless universality over the individual who shrinks into the concept of the legal person [rechtliche Persönlichkeit].

Just as previously only the Penates succumbed to the national Spirit, so now the living spirits of the nation succumb through their own individuality and perish in a universal community, whose simple universality is soulless and dead, and is alive only in the single individual, qua single.

(P, §475; 1977, 289)

Through the influence of this soulless government a new form of self develops which is the concomitant of its universalization in rechtliche Persönlichkeit, what Hegel calls "Personality": "an independence which has actual validity" (P, §479; 1977, 290). "For what counts as absolute, essential being is self-consciousness as the sheer empty unit of the person ... by its very nature without a peculiar content of its own; it finds before it a manifold existence in the form of 'possession' and ... stamps it with the same abstract universality, whereby it is called 'property'" (P, §480; 1977, 291). Thus is the first, and perhaps the most important example of the transformative power of cultural institutions which we have observed in Hegel's Phenomenology. Without threatening to remove the radical power from Antigone in Hegel's interpretation, it can be seen how it is the power of the negative, Creon the legislator, who overrules the Penates, that brings into existence the most essential element in the unhappy couple of self and culture which is carried into die Bildung.
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It is important to mark out self-consciousness's reaction to the world of Roman Law and its *rechtliche Persönlichkeit* because of its relation to that of the Philosophe's to the world of Faith after *die Bildung*, especially considering its significance for Nietzsche. Paralleling Hegel's treatment of stoical consciousness in the previous section of the *Phenomenology*, he concentrates on the tendency of the self to divorce itself from any real participation in the alien world of 'property'. What it grasps as its real world is the other world of God's kingdom, in which it posits its real citizenship. In this sense the self of Faith is diametrically opposed to the *character* of the Philosophe. Where Christian consciousness shies away from transformative activity, the Philosophe pursues the path of estrangement through his rejection of everything otherworldly and irrational.

It is in this light that one can better understand the opposition between *Lui* and *Moi* in *Le Neveu de Rameau*. Although Diderot-Moi is not the noble self which Hegel's strict dialectics makes of him for the purposes of the exposition of self-consciousness's development, he is very much a part of the culture of *die Bildung* as expounded in the *Phenomenology*. It is perhaps not so obvious owing to the simplification which Hegel reduces his cultural analysis to, for pedagogical reasons, that while *Lui* is performing his self-rending act for the reader there are other figures who remain outside the scope of this central cultural transformation. The world of Faith is
left in mid-air until the figure of the Philosophe emerges from die Bildung to engage with it. It is in the clash between the Philosophe’s concern with better worlds, and what Hegel portrays as the world of Faith in its ‘positivity’, that the further development of self-consciousness lies. The victory of the Philosophe over Faith is represented, according to Hegel, by Robespierre’s unveiling of the Supreme Being, or Etre Suprême, in 1793. Coming at the end of the section of the Phenomenology called the ‘The struggle of the Enlightenment with Superstition’, the Philosophe’s rational order culminates in a world which seems once and for all the ideal medium for self-consciousness’s development. This is described by Jonathon Robson:

At the end of the long process of the discipline of culture, the self has regained the universality which characterized ethical life [the polis], not by losing its hard-won individuality, but by looking at all there is both in heaven and in earth as serving its own interests. It has overcome the alienation of itself into two worlds and knit them into one in which spirit finds nothing opposing the self and its development. (Robson, 1977; 27)

At this level, however, a similar dialectic to the one which Hegel found expressed in the Antigone is repeated. What arises out of the work of the Philosophe is, like the "stale gas" which is exhaled by the "vacuous Etre Suprême" (P, 8586; 1977, 358), once again the power of the negative: The Terror. The legislator who must execute the individual.
The Terror stems from the fault with which Lui confronted the Philosophe, that his concepts are not applicable to all. The government which is formed under Robespierre is therefore, according to Hegel, a faction; despite its claim to representing the universal will, in its execution of governing it can only operate as a specific will. In a characteristically complex exposition of the relation between these two elements, universal and specific will, Hegel expounds his interpretation.

When the universal will maintains that what the government has actually done is a crime committed against it, the government, for its part, has nothing specific and outwardly apparent by which the guilt of the will opposed to it could be demonstrated: for what stands opposed to it as the actual universal will is only an unreal pure will, intention. Being suspected, therefore, takes the place, or has the significance and effect, of being guilty; and the external reaction against this reality that lies in the simple inwardness of intention, consists in the cold, matter-of-fact annihilation of this existent self, from which nothing else can be taken away but its mere being.

(P, §591; 1977, 360)

It is out of the "tumult" of the Terror that Spirit returns to the position which it occupied at the beginning: the "ethical and real world of culture" (P, §591; 1977, 361). Self-consciousness in its returning to a position relative to where it was at the beginning of Spirit is, according to Hegel, "rejuvenated" through its "fear of the lord and master", the negativity which Creon and the Philosophe represent in their respective Bildungsformen. This assertion of a law of limit is close to what we found in the second chorus of the Antigone:
there are certain dialectical laws which man cannot oppose in his attempt to cultivate himself. The difference, of course, is that at this stage of self-consciousness's development - which Hegel names "moral consciousness" - it has gained an understanding of how it creates for itself both its world and the seemingly divine laws which it must obey.

Moral consciousness is not, like Antigone and Creon, a character, that is, a determinate and therefore partial nature ... moral self-consciousness as consciousness of pure duty is universal consciousness ... essentially a liberation... immediateness is not here a fact of nature; it has been regained reflectively. (Hyppolite, 1974; 469)

It is this final form of the self, that comes to accept activity as essential to its being, which concludes the section of the Phenomenology called 'Spirit'. It is telling that Hegel should use Weltanschauung or 'world-view' at this point in the Phenomenology. Because it is here that consciousness takes on board the language of Kantian moral philosophy and begins its final ascent to the Hegelian concept of scientific or speculative thought. Weltanschauung seems to have been reserved for self-consciousness once it has been transformed by its contact with the "lord and master" - the self-created negative - of Creon and the Philosophe's regimes. The significance of this cannot be overestimated because this is the essential transition point from the history of consciousness, as told by Hegel, to the description - through art, religion, and finally philosophy - of what constitutes the goals of the greater and lesser self-developments which it, at
the same time, constitutes. This transition is effected by the final estrangement from the faulty Kantian divisions between pure duty and action, from the world-view which Hegel characterized as "'sublime and awful, but not beautiful and humane'" (Lukács, 1975; 222-223). It is this more comprehensive concept of the relationship between the self and culture, which incorporates what Hyppolite calls "ways of living and looking at the universe" (Hyppolite, 1974; 470), which must now be examined in Hegel's theory of the rational state and of the bourgeois individual.

Hegel's Goals for Self-Cultivation: the Bourgeois and the Rational State

"For people who have money and keep to the main highway the world is in good shape."
(Hegel to his Wife, September 18; 1822: Letters, 1934; 580)

The final cycle of the Phenomenology, in which Hegel summarizes "mankind's attempt to comprehend reality" (Lukács, supra) through art, religion, and philosophy respectively, takes the reader upwards, in an ever more intense light of dialectical reasoning, to the revelation of Absolute Knowledge. One is tempted to compare the final chapter of the Phenomenology to the closing cantos of the Divine Comedy where Dante attempts to portray heaven through ever brighter imagery, and "potential-and-act [are] tied together/ so tight they never shall be unbound" (Canto XXIX tr. Ciardi; 1977, 573). And yet there is
an abiding sense of melancholy which cannot be ignored, which culminates in the terrifying image of history as the "Calvary of Spirit". I have quoted extensively from Hyppolite because, from an almost aesthetic point of view, his Promethean "vision of humanity burdened with alienation" (Poster, 1975; 26) leads him to emphasize the more painful stations of the cross which the reader must contemplate during the course of the Phenomenology. This reading possesses a continuity which other, less downbeat, interpretations cannot match. From this perspective, Judith Shklar has given a compelling account of Hegel's attitude in the closing chapter of the Phenomenology.

He might well have ended on a note of triumph, but he did not. He looked back in reverence and resignation, like an exhausted chorus, which was a measure of his devotion to ancient Greece. (Shklar in Pelczynski, 1971; 89)

When one looks at the political correlative of Absolute Knowledge, the rational state, in his Philosophy of Right, one finds ample justification, despite the assertion of "potential-and-act [being] tied together", of Shklar's characterization. At the end of Hegel's elucidation of consciousness's journey along the main highway of Spirit, he remains aware of both the unhappiness which is to be found down some of the lesser roads, and the beautiful cities which have been left behind forever.

There is a degree of disparity in Hegel's philosophy between the harmony which is achieved at the conceptual level, and the way in which the achievements of Spirit are unfolded at the
level of everyday life: most glaringly in his aesthetic and political theory. An explication of what constitutes the goals of self-development tends to conclude with a rather ambiguously fulfilling picture of culture. Marxist interpreters of Hegel have traditionally been most concerned with this disparity for reasons which are not difficult to understand. The sore point of the latter camp is Hegel's adoption of bourgeois society as the mechanism through which the harmony of self and culture was to be realized at the socio-economic level. Lukács characterised this disparity through a rather wilful division between the utopian and realistic aspects of the Hegelian denouement.

Socially, Hegel cannot see beyond the horizon of capitalism. Accordingly, his theory of society is not utopian. But the idealist dialectic transforms the entire history of man into a great philosophical utopia: into the philosophical dream that 'externalization' can be transformed into subject. (Lukács, 1975; 333)

The disparity between the relatively utopian metaphysic and the consequences which it entails for everyday life is undeniably a shibboleth which divides the out-and-out Hegelian from, at best, the more cautious admirer. Given the nature of Hegel's metaphysic, however, it is very difficult to avoid. Because of his definition of man as "a thinking consciousness, i.e. [a being who] draws out of himself and puts before himself what he is and whatever else is" (A, Introduction; 1975, 31), there is an intimate relation between large and difficult concepts and the interpretation of the everyday life in which, owing to his
definition of man, those concepts must be expressed. The examination of the self and culture in Hegel’s rational state must, necessarily, bring into its scope some concepts which cannot be left hanging – to adapt a phrase from his *Aesthetics* – sublime above the material of everyday life. Because of the metaphysical definition of man, the activity which constitutes his being must be fully expressive of the rational conceptions which, at worst, can only be fully appreciated on a conceptual level. The degree to which Hegel believed that his philosophy was applicable to everyday life can best be learned from skimming through his letters where one finds him consoling bereaved friends in terms taken from his metaphysics. There is, then, no question that Hegel’s grandest conceptions are at the same time geared towards everyday life. In his concept of *Geist*, which we have encountered already in quotations, there is a close fit between the metaphysical and the cultural which Taylor characterizes as a strength and not an embarrassing weakness of Hegel’s system.

There is no specially odd Hegelian doctrine of a super-individual subject of society, as is often believed. There is only a very different doctrine of a cosmic subject whose vehicle is man. This is woven into a theory of man in society which by itself is far from implausible or bizarre. Indeed, it is much superior to the atomistic conceptions of some of Hegel’s liberal opponents. (Taylor, 1975; 387)

The basic insight which informs Hegel’s system is the interconnectedness of the essential characteristics of a way of life, or culture as in sense (2a), the self which inhabits it,
and what could be called its cultural institutions. Accordingly, the "manure of contradictions" in everyday life are, sometimes rigorously, and sometimes rather inadequately, exposed to the full onslaught of Hegel's speculative thought.

In the following sections I will examine the constituents of the cluster of concepts and substantial institutions which comprise Hegel's rational state, the cultural and political Bildungsform which expressed what is accomplished on a conceptual level, with some differences which I will overlook, by Absolute Knowledge. The two terms which I have used to indicate the extension of this cluster are, however, conspicuously complex and are difficult to treat briefly: Absolute Knowledge and the rational state. The relation between subject and object which is expounded at the end of the *Phenomenology* is primarily concerned with the self and history, but in that harmonious relationship is the seed of the system which Hegel elaborated in the works which followed. Thus, when one looks at the *Philosophy of Right* there is much which we have encountered already in the examination of the *Antigone* and *Le Neveu de Rameau*. The relation between the individual and the state which is found in both to be flawed because of their incomplete realizations of either of its two constituents is, through the emergence of the unified self at the end of the *Phenomenology*, transformed. There is a circulation between this self and the concept of the rational state which, Hegel believed, was radically different from its predecessors, and
which lends it a stability which they did not possess.

The principle of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself.

(PR, §260; 1942, 161)

The two most important constituents of the rational state are the bourgeois, whom Hegel considered the central figure of the modern state, and what he refers to as 'civil society', the mechanism which takes that individual and moulds him into a citizen. It is perhaps essential, in conclusion, to point out that Hegel was not, in the Philosophy of Right, describing an existent state. Nevertheless, much close analysis of existent relations between worker and regime, and reading of economic theory, informed Hegel's theory of the modern state. So that, in concluding with a brief look at the problems of modern bourgeois culture as expressed in Thomas Mann's Buddenbrooks one is able to arrive at some general conclusions about Hegel's philosophy of self and culture.

The bourgeois

The self which emerges at the end of chapter six of the Phenomenology is fully particular in every sense. It is conscious of its autonomy, which is to say that it is aware of its existence apart from society, of its importance as a bearer
of rational will, and of its distinctness from every other human being by virtue of its being solidly embodied. But it is at the same time a self which has, through its penetration of history and the institutions which constitute its culture, come to an understanding of them as an extension of itself. When Hegel asserted that the self which returns to the "ethical and real world of culture" (supra) is, at the end of the sixth chapter, "rejuvenated" he was asserting that this radically particularized self had, through its encounter with the negative, those institutions which opposed it just as radically, been "universalized". This is perhaps best illustrated through the structure which is provided by Hegel's theory of education or Gymnasalbildung. The concept of a classical education has its roots, in German culture, in the concept of Bildung. We have seen that Kant's conservative theory of self-cultivation, for example, asserted that an intimate acquaintance with classical literature would open up in the child the possibility of attaining to a degree of taste. Hegel's interest in classical studies was, given his metaphysic, quite different from Kant, but it is important to see that he regarded it as central to the achievement of a degree of universality, which in his philosophy of culture performs a very similar function to that of taste for Kant - concerned, as it was, with the sensus communis. It guides the individual towards what lies outside of his immediate experience. To quote from Gadamer, it induces the individual to deal "with something that is alien, with something that
Hegel declares the world and language of antiquity to be especially suitable for this, in that this world is remote and alien enough to be able to bring about the necessary separation of ourselves from ourselves, but it contains at the same time all the exit points and threads of the return to oneself, for becoming acquainted with it and for finding oneself again, but oneself according to the truly universal essence of spirit."

(Gadamer, 1975; 14)

These concluding words from the *Nürnberg Schriften*, written by Hegel when he was teaching at the Nürnberg Gymnasium, not only give an example of the kind of "rejuvenated" return as a universalized self to the immediate world which is so essential to Hegel's concept of Bildung, but also recalls the tradition of Bildung which - despite some obvious differences - arises out the practical concern with education which we encountered in Humboldt.

The self must be trained to identify with the universal. Hegel seems to have been convinced that this involves a degree of discipline. In his writings which deal specifically with Bildung, discipline [Zucht] occurs with a regularity which recalls the sense, which arises out of the *Phenomenology*, of "humanity as burdened with alienation" (supra). In an autobiographical vein, Hegel described the "hypochondriacal state of the adolescent" who must move outwards from the "nocturnal point... through the narrows" towards "the acceptance of daily life" (Lukács, 1975; 102); which reinforces the view that Hegel considered the movement towards action in
the modern world as one which was something less than joyous and which must involve a degree of discipline. Whoever foregoes the labour of the negative, however, and "abandons himself to his particularity is ungebildet" (Gadamer, 1975; 13). If the self does not embrace the everyday world in which it finds itself through participation in its culture’s institutions, and remains merely particular - even if it is conceived of as a sublime separation from what is felt unworthy - the self foregoes itself, in an Aristotelian sense, and remains merely adolescent. The operative principle of Hegel’s conception of man’s vocation expresses itself at this level in the concomitant concept of Sittlichkeit.

Individualism, even in its heroic, ancient form, is a fundamental misunderstanding of reality which prevents men from recognizing their essential identity, their social being, and their common humanity. (Shklar in Pelczynski, 1971; 80)

Given the culture of capitalism, as it is presented by Hegel in his concept of civil society, the self must move outwards and embrace the institutions of exchange which are at its heart. This amounts to the adoption of a career, the canalization of the self into a particular profession. It is in this regard that the importance of discipline can be reintroduced. Hegel seems to have been convinced of the degree of fragmentation which is the product of the self’s adoption of a career, but seems at the same time, to have seen it as an expression of Geist. Taylor has pointed out that Hegel’s "theory of man’s individual career"
is that we only achieve something significant by giving ourself fully to it, and that means renouncing other things. The fully realized is the particularized. Hegel's ontology and worldly wisdom come together here. (Taylor, 1975; note, 409)

The completion of *Bildung* through the adoption of a profession which we found for the first time in Goethe, is reintroduced by Hegel - perhaps even through conscious agreement with Goethe - in his *Philosophy of Right* in the division of society into classes [*Stände*]. The bourgeois is sandwiched between two classes in the rational state: the agricultural class and the civil servant class. The classes represent more than a division of responsibilities, however, and can best be understood as the unfolding of the previous concepts of the family and the state at a higher level in Hegel's dialectic. As such they represent characteristic sub-cultures, as in sense (2a), which have different constitutive sources from which they develop particular ways of life: the agricultural class is based upon the family, and through its immediate relation to nature is unreflective; whereas the civil servant class is based upon the state, and through its concern with the interests of the whole achieves a degree of universality. The bourgeois, then, occupies a middle ground between the two: he is a reflecting individual who, through the mechanism of civil society, is led to fulfil certain of the rational state's needs; he is both immediate and universal, to use Hegel's terminology. This is the principle which is described by Hegel in the *Philosophy of Right*. 
A man actualizes himself only in becoming something definite, i.e. something specifically particularized; this means restricting himself exclusively to one of the particular spheres of [the state's] need. In this class-system, the ethical frame of mind therefore is rectitude and *esprit de corps*, i.e. the disposition to make oneself a member of one of the moments of civil society by one's act, through one's energy, industry, and skill, to maintain oneself in mediating oneself with the universal, while in this way gaining a recognition both in one's own eyes and in the eyes of others. (PR, §207; 1942, 133)

This particularization of the individual would only have a significance if the self had first gone through a process of reflection. Hegel's concept of *Bildung* is not a general process, it follows the pattern of leading the self through the narrows of particularity to the universal of everyday life, but it must be completed by a final adoption of the ethos of, and acceptance by, a particular class. The Goethean completion of *Bildung* through the adoption of a particular profession, brings with it an imposition of limit upon the development of the self. As opposed to the central concept of *Bildung* in the *Phenomenology*, which Hegel defined as "the rise of [the] finite self to the absolute self... through the moments of world history" (*supra*), self-development in the *Philosophy of Right* must be completed by a return to the finite. The contrast between *Bildung* in the two works is not so marked if the Promethean burden of man is kept in mind: always to externalize himself. The bourgeois is emblematic of the process which all individuals, who are to be fully realized, must go through. The principle of *rechtliche Persönlichkeit* which arose during
the Roman State is transformed by Hegel into the foundation of the bourgeois.

In this regard the bourgeois goes through the process on the level of everyday life which the self, in the *Phenomenology*, goes through at the end of Spirit: it must accept activity as its essence. From this perspective, Lukács has called the bourgeois the *Urphänomen* of Hegel's theory of the modern state.

The man who works, then, is, to use a Goethean term which is not far removed from Hegel's dialectic, the *Urphänomen*, the primal reality of the identical subject-object, the substance which becomes subject, the 'externalization' which is reintegrated into the subject. The social reality implicit in all human praxis comes closest to a transformation into an explicit conscious reality in the satisfaction of needs through work.

(Lukács, 1975; 480)

The process of self-development which the bourgeois undergoes is central to Hegel's theory of the modern state because it mirrors what is claimed as the achieved goal of *Geist* in his metaphysics. The process of the canalization of the self into one of the *Stände* must be one which is the fulfilment of the individual, the "pure self" which was estranged in *die Bildung*. In fact, at this stage of consciousness's self-development, there is no longer supposed to remain any such division [Zwiespältigkeit] between what could be called the "pure self" and the "personality" which was found to exist in consciousness under Roman Law as well as in the realm of *die Bildung*. The process of self-development is supposed to be a natural -
although the "natural self" is never referred to by Hegel - process, insofar as all opposition is to be annulled.

The place of discipline [Zucht] in such a process is hard to locate, but not impossible to accommodate. Hegel believed in the necessity of turning outwards, and as we have seen, this process, although it must be by choice, may not be at all pleasant. An analogy, which carries on from Lukács's comparison of the bourgeois to the Goethean Urphänomen, might be helpful. In Goethe's poem, 'The Metamorphosis of Plants', there is symbolized what could be considered a primal process of development which, even though it is in response to principles which restrict the initial free growth of the leaf, is fulfilled in the flower. The principles according to which the adolescent must force itself through "the narrows" - the stem which will rise upwards - into the outer world of activity in society are necessary, yet this initial discipline is negated by the flowering of the individual into something universal which is both its own fulfilment as well as being recognized by the other members of his Stand. Picking up on the poem just after the original leaf has reached its most prodigal development, we can follow Goethe's exposition.

Yet here Nature, with her powerful hands, restrains the formative process and gently guides it towards something still more perfect. She now moderates the flow of the sap, narrows the ducts, and at once more delicate effects begin to show themselves in the shape. Quietly the outward impulse of the striving extremities is retracted, and the rib of the stem develops more fully. But leafless and swift the more delicate stalk ascends, and a marvellous formation delights the beholder. (Die Metamorphosen der Pflanzen tr. Luke; 1981, 149)

Unless the "marvellous formation" of the self is fulfilled in its metamorphosis into a bourgeois, Hegel's entire system may be said to have fallen severely short of its goal. There must be no distinction between the self and the form which it has taken from its culture.

The primary stage in this metamorphosis is the acceptance of property by the individual. What lead to estrangement at an earlier level must lead towards fulfilment. This represents the nodal point of the relationship between subject and object which, on the conceptual level, is worked out in the closing chapter of the Phenomenology. The bourgeois must accept property as the extension of his individuality in order to enter into the universal world of everyday life in the rational state. It is in this way that the self returns to the world of culture, as in Le Neveu de Rameau, it is in and through property that the self is expressed in the world. Hegel, accordingly, emphasizes the significance of property in the process of the self's development into a bourgeois.

Property is not only instrumental; as we have seen in the Realphilosophie, it is a basic requisite for man
Yet here Nature, with her powerful hands, restrains the formative process and gently guides it towards something still more perfect. She now moderates the flow of the sap, narrows the ducts, and at once more delicate effects begin to show themselves in the shape. Quietly the outward impulse of the striving extremities is retracted, and the rib of the stem develops more fully. But leafless and swift the more delicate stalk ascends, and a marvellous formation delights the beholder. (*Die Metamorphosen der Pflanzen* tr. Luke; 1981, 149)

Unless the "marvellous formation" of the self is fulfilled in its metamorphosis into a bourgeois, Hegel's entire system may be said to have fallen severely short of its goal. There must be no distinction between the self and the form which it has taken from its culture.

The primary stage in this metamorphosis is the acceptance of property by the individual. What lead to estrangement at an earlier level must lead towards fulfilment. This represents the nodal point of the relationship between subject and object which, on the conceptual level, is worked out in the closing chapter of the *Phenomenology*. The bourgeois must accept property as the extension of his individuality in order to enter into the universal world of everyday life in the rational state. It is in this way that the self returns to the world of culture, as in *Le Neveu de Rameau*, it is in and through property that the self is expressed in the world. Hegel, accordingly, emphasizes the significance of property in the process of the self's development into a bourgeois.

Property is not only instrumental; as we have seen in the *Realphilosophie*, it is a basic requisite for man
in his struggle for recognition and realization in the objective world: 'A person must translate his freedom into an external sphere in order to exist as an Idea' [PR, 841]. Through property man's existence is recognized by others, since the respect others show to his property by not trespassing on it reflects their acceptance of him as a person. Property is thus an objectification of the self which raises it from the realm of our subjectivity into the sphere of external existence. 'The rationale (Vernünftigkeit) of property is to be found not in the satisfaction of needs but in the suppression (Aufhebung) of the pure subjectivity of personality. In his property a person exists for the first time as reason' [Ibid]. (Avineri, 1972; 135-136)

With the self's acceptance of its objectification in property, the most important foundation stone of the rational state has been laid by Geist. The bourgeois, in his interaction with other objectified selves, brings about the mechanism of 'civil society' through which the desires of individuals are concatenated into a system which operates, following the principles of the classical economists, for the benefit of all.

Civil Society

In Hegel's theory of civil society lies the most difficult aspect of the rational state. Its difficulty is not, however, one of dialectical complexity - it can be very quickly and easily explained, as will be found - but, rather, the animosity between its mechanisms and the harmonious development of the individual. Accordingly, the description of Hegel's theory of civil society can lapse into criticisms which are rehearsed almost without reflection. This stems, partly, from the rather
undignified passion which Hegel takes as the starting point of his explication - self-interest \([Eigennutz]\). Lukács, for example, thinks that it is "symptomatic both of the social and philosophical origins of Hegel's thought" (Lukács, 1975; 481) that self-interest should be the principle which sets in motion the perpetuum mobile of civil society. Taking his concept of self-interest from Adam Smith, Hegel transformed it into something close to the ethos of nobility in the classical state which drew the individual into the realm of 'universal action' on behalf of the polis. In fulfilling his own needs, the bourgeois fulfils the state's.

Needs can multiply without end. But in so doing they force an even more intense social co-operation. The greater production needed requires a farther-reaching division of labour. It also pushes man to greater work; and hence to work in more complex systems of interdependence. This helps to form man, to educate him to the universal. (Taylor, 1975; 433)

And it is curious how, through this principle, the relation to wealth which was formerly considered base in the culture of die Bildung, is transformed into the public-minded equivalent of the noble's activity in the state. There is the underlying account which Hegel gives of the painful process of the externalizing of the self, however, which provides a background against which this system is elaborated. Hegel seems to have realised, through his reading both of the classical economists and of books which described the conditions which were developing in industrial England, that the tendency of capitalism was towards a stratification of classes which could
not be accounted for in utopian terms. In the *Jenenser Realphilosophie*, for example, he wrote:

"the particularization of labour increases the quantity of production; in an English manufacture, 18 people work at the production of a pin ...". (Kain, 1982; 39)

And admitted in the same work that "manufacturers and workshops found their existence on the misery of a class" (Lukács, 1975; 331). It is all too easy to accuse Hegel of having fastened upon a conservative concept of economics without realizing its drawbacks. And this seems all the more anachronistic when one considers the relative backwardness of Germany at this time, as Lukács has pointed out. It is an accomplishment, given that background, for Hegel to have perceived the fundamental nature of free trade and mass production. The chief consideration, in establishing Hegel's theory of the self and culture in civil society, should concentrate, where possible, upon the explication of the consistencies of his elaboration of the principles which we have already seen at work in previous *Bildungsformen*.

As in the polis, where the state draws the individual away from the family and moulds it into something of use through the power of its ethos, so in civil society the individual and the family itself are placed within a potentially hostile environment. This ensures that the self, which has developed into the "extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity"
(supra) is brought back into contact with the lord and master, forced to enter into relations with other selves. Nevertheless, Hegel still describes this in terms which are reminiscent of his interpretation of the Antigone.

But civil society tears the individual from his family ties, estranges the members of the family from one another, and recognizes them as self-subsistent persons. Further, for the paternal soil and external inorganic resources of nature from which the individual formerly derived his livelihood, it substitutes its own soil and subjects the permanent existence of even the entire family to dependence on itself and to contingency. (PR, §233; 1942, 148)

It is both in civil society's role of removing the individual from nature and of substituting the assured continuity of the family by contingency that it is a cultural institution as in sense (3) - part of the process of intellectual development. As Hegel said in his Lectures of 1805 - 1806 "individuals only have value to the extent which they are 'externalized' and cultivated beings, as what they have made of themselves" (Lukács, 1975; 376). This can be seen in Thomas Mann's partially autobiographical early novel, Buddenbrooks. In Mann's depiction of the downfall of the Buddenbrook family he very subtly sketches in the background at some points, and at others rather bluntly juxtaposes, the fall or rise of another family. For example, at the beginning of the novel the Buddenbrooks have just recently moved into the Meng Street mansion which a family built for themselves prior to the collapse of their family firm through misjudgments; and near the end of the novel, the Hagenströms, the family which has
definitely risen, purchase the house after Thomas has had built for him an enormous new home, using up some of the precious capital of the family which might otherwise have gone back into the firm. The movements of capital, the rise and fall of fortunes, and the importance of property are legion in civil society. And yet there is a pervading sense in the novel that the efficacy of the businessman - the exercise of the bourgeois virtues of "energy, industry, and skill" (supra) - and the success which should accompany it, is his sole value and the family, far from providing a refuge in continuity, rises and falls with him.

In his theory of civil society, Hegel seems to have accepted the necessity of penetrating into the structure of the culture which produces an individual which is entirely at the mercy of the forces of the economy. This isolation of the self in civil society is the concomitant of its full development at the philosophical level. The self is formed through its experience of this aspect of the culture of civil society; and the Latin *formatio* is appropriate here, given the presence of a degree of discipline in the self's accepting such a rebarbative mechanism. This is consistent with the way in which Hegel characterizes work in the *Phenomenology*, where, in the master-servant relationship, the slave must delay the gratification of his immediate desires in order to produce his work for the master. Even though the context of the work is transformed in civil society by its being chosen by the individual, the
dialectic of the prior relationship is recreated here, in that the bourgeois is ultimately enslaved by the property for which he works, just as the master ultimately becomes dependent upon the slave. Alexandre Kojève has developed the continuity of Hegel's thought in this respect.

To be a truly human being, the Bourgeois (who, in principle does not fight, does not risk his life) must work, just like the Slave... he works for Property taken as such - i.e. Property that has now become money; he works for Capital... Man transcends himself by projecting himself onto the ideal of private Property, of Capital, which - while being the Property-owner's own product - becomes independent of him and enslaves him just as the Master enslaved the Slave; with this difference however, that the enslavement is now conscious and freely accepted by the Worker. (Kojève, 1969; 65)

With the advent of the rational self, which is able to appreciate the sense in which it has created the very institutions which confront it, Hegel believed that the culture of the rational state could bring the self back to itself after its externalization. The individual's experience of the contingency of its livelihood, as well as the welfare of its family, upon its efficacy as a bourgeois, is very similar to the experience with the self-created negative which is emphasized by Hegel as being so essential to the complete development of the self. And furthermore, as in the structure which we found available in Hegel's theory of Gymnasalbildung, there are "exit points and threads of the return to oneself" (supra). The remaining question is whether or not these "threads of return to the self" are merely to be picked up at
the level of philosophy alone, leaving everyday life stranded in estrangement. Despite the ever present possibility of a new form of philosophy which, like religion, could reunite these estranged individuals, "in which", according to Nietzsche, "the priest, the artist and the physician, the man of knowledge and the man of wisdom, are fused into a single total" (H, II; §180; 1986, 257), there is the danger in Hegel's rational state that, as Philip Kain has written, "reconciliation occurs in thought despite estrangement in actuality" (Kain, 1982; 66).

The Parting of the Ways: Thomas Mann's Buddenbrooks

Despite Hegel's hopes for the education of the individual in the Phenomenology, he seems to have realized that something more was needed in the Philosophy of Right. It is in this regard that Hegel emphasized the significance of the state. Very simply: the bourgeois, the bearer of rational will, is externalized in private property, his will is expressed in contractual relations, and his needs are fulfilled through the fulfilling of others' needs; but there is, from the point of view of the state, the remaining matter of his duties towards it as a citizen; these are to draw him into the realm of the universal, according him rights in return, while at the same time giving him a focus for his interests. This remaining step is, as is perhaps evident even from this simplification, the locus of some of Hegel's most inspired philosophizing - what Lukács has described as a "spurious profundity and a specious
show of dialectics" (Lukács, 1975; 392). Hegel's chief concern is, at this point to reintroduce something of the *Sittlichkeit* of the Greek city state, while at the same time recognizing the different nature of the self which is represented in its citizen. The Idea, what could be called the overarching dialectic principle of harmony, must accommodate both of these constituents in its elaboration at the level of everyday life. This is especially important given the newly - since the time of the polis - developed mechanism of civil society, the economic correlative of the modern self. The significance of this is that, as we have seen, without this higher level at which the individual can identify with the universal it is in danger of remaining self-divided. The state can also, perhaps, provide some refuge from the contingencies of civil society which, though they are essential to the bourgeois's development, represent the rational state at its most rebarbative. This, I believe, goes very far in accounting for the language which Hegel lavishes on this aspect of his theory.

In introducing the dual nature of the individual as bourgeois and citizen into his theory, Hegel could perhaps be accused of reintroducing division under another name. This is precisely what he seems to have done in what Lukács has called "an extremely obscure section" of an early essay of Hegel's, 'Natural Law'. In this essay the bourgeois is counterbalanced by the citizen as darkness is to light: the "duplication" of man as 'bourgeois' and 'citoyen' appears as a tragic collision
show of dialectics" (Lukács, 1975; 392). Hegel's chief concern is, at this point to reintroduce something of the *Sittlichkeit* of the Greek city state, while at the same time recognizing the different nature of the self which is represented in its citizen. The Idea, what could be called the overarching dialectic principle of harmony, must accommodate both of these constituents in its elaboration at the level of everyday life. This is especially important given the newly - since the time of the polis - developed mechanism of civil society, the economic correlative of the modern self. The significance of this is that, as we have seen, without this higher level at which the individual can identify with the universal it is in danger of remaining self-divided. The state can also, perhaps, provide some refuge from the contingencies of civil society which, though they are essential to the bourgeois's development, represent the rational state at its most rebarbative. This, I believe, goes very far in accounting for the language which Hegel lavishes on this aspect of his theory.

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of spirit with itself, eternally posed only to be eternally annulled" (Ibid, 403). The similarities of this analysis with Hegel's interpretation of the Antigone are remarkable. So much so that it is tempting to conclude that Hegel saw this as a permanent characteristic of the relation between the self and culture. And yet this relationship needn't be considered necessarily in such a dramatic - Hegel characterized it as a 'tragedy in the realm of the ethical' - light. Which is exactly what one learns from reading the Philosophy of Right where he deals with this aspect of his theory. Picking up on the 'addition' to §261, from the point where Hegel has introduced the all-important reciprocal concept of duty and right, one finds this alternative account.

In whatever way the individual may fulfil his duty, he must at the same time find his account therein and attain his personal interest and satisfaction. Out of his position in the state, a right must accrue to him whereby public affairs shall be his own particular affair. Particular interests should in fact not be set aside or completely suppressed; instead, they should be put in correspondence with the universal, and thereby both they and the universal are upheld. (PR, §261; 1942, 162)

Hegel has presented, in this section, the structure which, it would seem, completes the culture of the rational state. If we consider civil society as the mechanism through which the self is estranged from itself then, following Hegel's model for Bildung which we have located in his Nürnberger Schriften, the "threads of the return to self" are picked up in the citizen's identification with the state. This final reintegration of the
particular and the universal would, as far as Hegel is concerned, be the completion both of the individual’s process of self-development and of the general self-development of *Geist*. The bourgeois, civil society, and the state are something like the Trinity in which, once it is completed, all three are one. “In these spheres”, Hegel writes, with characteristic dialectical flourish,

> in which its moments, particularly and individuality, have their immediate and reflected reality, mind [*Geist*] is present as their objective universality glimmering in them as the power of reason in necessity, i.e. as the institutions considered above. (PR, §263; 1942, 163)

Out of the Idea, the overarching dialectic principle of harmony, can be elaborated the principle of this Trinity. But, as Taylor has pointed out, “this is also Hegel’s way of formulating and answering the yearning of his age to unite somehow the radical moral autonomy of Kant and the expressive unity of the Greek polis” (Taylor, 1975; 388).

A necessary element in Hegel’s philosophical fulfilment of his age’s yearning for both a harmonious self and culture is a decided shift away from the definition of culture which we found in Herder. Although Hegel’s belief that the state is the chief expressive vehicle of a *Volk* is similar to Herder’s concern with the central institutions which both sustain and promote a culture, there are some essential differences between their definitions of culture. Both consider the state to be
responsible for the flourishing of what is involved in culture in sense 3: intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development. So that in discussing culture both pay close attention to what they see as the correlation between forms of government and the institutions which are related to such a development. Herder emphasises the importance of natural forces and correspondingly opens up the possibility for a difference between cultures which is not based upon conceptual principles alone.

Climate may be regarded as the soil in which the seed of human knowledge grows, where it thrives better in one place than in another; national character may more closely determine the kind of seed; whilst the political constitution of a nation in its widest sense - its laws, government, customs, and civic traditions - undoubtedly represents the close tilling of the soil, the sowing of the seed and the influence of all those natural factors without which nothing can prosper and grow. The spirit and the blossom of the sciences has varied in direct proportion to them, as the history of world shows. (Barnard, 1969; 227)

In this passage from Herder's "Dissertation on the Reciprocal Influence of Government and the Sciences" (1779) we can see the natural operation of the image of cultivation which is never far from traditional concepts of development. This could be taken as the background definition of culture against which later theories are developed. Hegel's account of the relationship between government and the institutions of "civilisation" shows a decided break with such natural images.

The state is universal in form, a form whose essential principle is thought. This explains why it was in the state that freedom of thought and science had their origin. (PR, addition to §270; 1942, 172)
This statement, part of an 'addition' to a section of the *Philosophy of Right* in which Hegel says that "the state is mind on earth" [*der Geist, der in der Welt steht*] (*Ibid*, 165), contrasts with Herder in an important way. It emphasises the essentially intellectual nature of Hegel's conception of the state, the "determinate characteristics" of which he calls "mind knowing and willing itself after passing through the forming process of education" (*Ibid*). Once *geist* has passed through the overarching self-development which is outlined in the *Phenomenology* the state could be interpreted as the vehicle through which it can be conscious of itself as a substantial entity. The particular individual who is subsumed in the state must identify with it in order for that act of self-consciousness to be completed. In this way the constitution is the central cultural institution upon which everything else depends. All other influences, aside from this central act of self-consciousness, which are allowed to particularise individual states in Herder's theory of culture, are marginalised in Hegel. That Hegel's conception of the state is central to culture cannot be ignored; he makes this principle explicit in his 'Introduction' to the *Philosophy of History*. "The universal which appears and becomes known in the state, the form into which is cast all reality, constitutes what is generally called the culture of a nation" (*PH*, 1979; 63). The Herderian principle that if "we establish arbitrary distinctions between cultures and modes of enlightenment, we are liable to lose ourselves in cloud cuckoo-land..." (Barnard,
is certainly not at work in Hegel's theory of the state. In his introduction to the *Philosophy of History*, he categorically denies such a cosmopolitan conception of culture [the state]. "A constitution is therefore not a matter of choice but depends on the stage of the people's spiritual development" (‘Introduction’, PH; 1979, 60). If the bourgeois is to be rescued from the limbo of estrangement, then the seemingly inescapable element of philosophy and universal history comes home to roost in Hegel's philosophy of culture.

The ideal of the harmonious development of all the capacities of the individual is, in Hegel's theory of the rational state, intertwined with the cultivation in the citizen of some degree of rational identification with the structure and activities of the state. The philosophical background of *Bildung* which we have examined in 'Weimar Humanism' is distinctly different in emphasis from such a theory. The distinction between the acceptance of the necessity of (and participation in) the forms of life and political structures of the rational state and the development of the individual's powers is one which Hegel attempts to avoid through his essential belief in *Sittlichkeit*. Hegel's theory of *Bildung*, as we have seen, culminates in the rejection of adolescent particularity and the acceptance of the "universal" mode of life which is embodied in the state. But this is far removed from the sentiments of Book IV of *Wilhelm Meister*, where Wilhelm looks back upon his adolescent rejection of civil society and its way of life.
"Here standest thou once more," said he within himself, "at the Parting of the Ways, between the two women who appeared before thee in thy youth the one no longer looks so pitiful as then; nor does the other look so glorious. To obey the one, or to obey the other, thou are not without a kind of inward calling; outward reasons are on both sides strong enough; and to decide appears to thee impossible. Thou wishest some preponderancy from without would fix thy choice: and yet, if thou consider well, it is external circumstances only that inspire thee with a wish to trade, to gather, to possess; whilst it is thy inmost want that has created, that has nourished the desire still farther to unfold and perfect what endowments soever for the beautiful and good, be they mental or bodily, may lie within thee."


The life of civil society receives short shrift in Goethe’s Bildungsroman. Despite the somewhat more generous treatment which it receives at the end of Book Four, it falls, essentially, within the framework which is established by Wilhelm’s early poem on the subject - The Youth at the Parting of the Ways - of the two ways of life, bourgeois and artist, striving for Wilhelm’s "most important self". Commerce is personified as "an old housewife, with the distaff in her girdle, the bunch of keys by her side, the spectacles on her nose", the ungrateful task master of the man who has to "cringe beneath her rod, and earn his slavish days-wages by the sweat of his brow!" Whereas the Muse of tragic art is "an apparition for the overclouded mind", "the child of freedom" for whom the "feeling of her own worth gave her dignity without pride" (Ibid, Book I; 33). The vocation which Wilhelm chooses is certainly the one which he considers higher, but it is just as
assuredly the one that appeals. Nevertheless, as a representation of the choice from which proceeds the chain of "amazing chance occurrences" (Schlegel, supra) which forms the fabric of Wilhelm Meister, it is a fitting beginning: the "most important self" is drawn by an "inward calling" and, accordingly, develops by its own lights in contradistinction to the particular demands of its society.

A novel which depicts a life which is lived in accordance with the commercial and rational ethos of its society, but which also vividly portrays the possible weakness of the individual which such an ethos develops, is Thomas Mann's Buddenbrooks — what is best characterized as an anti-Bildungsroman. The only character who is depicted as choosing a way of life, Tony, chooses her husbands - at least one of them, Grünlich, in particular - against her inclinations and embraces the ethos of the Buddenbrooks much to her dismay. The main character, insofar as his life is a symptom of the decay [Verfallserscheinung] of the family, Thomas Buddenbrook, never chooses to keep up the dehors, the dignity which befits a Buddenbrook, but seems to have inherited its ethos without reflection. Consequently, by the end of the novel, Thomas suffers from a sense of character loss when his business acumen fails him and his son Hanno turns out to be only another sign of the decay of the Buddenbrook dynasty: weak and hopelessly otherworldly in his dedication to the tragic muse of romantic tone poetry. When he reviews the various characters of his
ancestors, he finds himself to be devoid of any centre, of a source which could motivate him to further action in the world of civil society.

His father had united with his hard practical sense a literal faith, a fanatic Bible-Christianity which his mother, in her latter years, had adhered to as well; but to himself it had always been rather repellent. The worldly scepticism of his grandfather had been more nearly his own attitude. But the comfortable superficiality of old Johann could not satisfy his metaphysical and spiritual needs... He said to himself that he had lived in his forebears and would live on in his descendants. And this line which he had taken coincided not only with his sense of family, his patrician self-consciousness, his ancestor-worship, as it were; it had also strengthened his ambition and through them the whole course of his existence. But now, before the near and penetrating eye of death, it fell away; it was nothing, it gave him not one single hour of calm, of readiness for the end.

(Buddenbrooks, tr. Lowe-Porter; 1957, 501)

The Hegelian demands on the bourgeois, that he be "a vehicle of rational will" (Taylor, 1975; 430) fully engaged in a community which embodies reason, is lost on Thomas by the end of Buddenbrooks through the disintegration of his "personality". If Wilhelm can be said to have chosen the course of his self-cultivation by choosing to follow the inclinations of his "most important self", then Thomas has to be understood as never having asked himself what constituted his "inmost want". The "calling" or thetralische Sendung which lies at the beginning of Wilhelm Meister is paralleled in Buddenbrooks by Thomas’s calling towards the end of the novel to take leave of himself. In the passage which we have already looked at in Chapter Two, Thomas has a vision of his "personality" which he has developed
partly in accordance with his family's ethos and partly in response to the expectations of his fellow businessmen. But that vision is of his personality as a "prison" in which his "inner self" is trapped without either expression or the possibility of fulfillment.

The human being stares hopelessly through the barred window of his personality at the high walls of outward circumstances, till Death comes and calls him to freedom. (Ibid, 506)

The primary unity - to adapt Nietzsche - in the Hegelian scheme, between spirit, form and task [Geist, Form, und Aufgabe] has dissolved in Thomas's character: despite his political functions as a senator he has no sense of a higher purpose; and the task of amassing more capital on behalf of the family firm has lost its meaning. The parting of the ways in Buddenbrooks comes about during Thomas's dark night of the soul, which is to say, when he loses himself: when his "pure self" becomes estranged from his "personality". The outward signs which Thomas devotes himself to maintaining, the immaculate appearance of the senator, the enormous house, are all kept up out of a concern to satisfy the commercial ethos of his family, the demands of what he is for his fellow bourgeoisie, his "personality". But what has ceased to operate in himself, the character of the bourgeois, the motivation to fully engage in the perpetuum mobile of civil society, to practice the virtues of "energy, industry, and skill", is expressed by his stipulating in his will that, after his death,
the family firm be wound up. Civil society takes its revenge on the divided self of Thomas: when he dies the creditors close in, the business is liquidated on unfavourable terms, his great house is sold to a spinster, and his family, accordingly, consigned to oblivion.

The division within Thomas of, on the one hand, his "inner" or "pure" self, and on the other, his "personality", is a difficult one to accommodate within a Hegelian framework, unless one refers back to an earlier - Roman Law - stage of his cultural analysis. It is important, however, to attempt to bring it within the purview of what could be called his mature or final philosophy of culture. It is one thing to assert that Hegel's principal concern is with culture in a different sense from that which is relevant to Thomas's predicament, in that it is (3) predominantly a general process, and yet it would seem a major failing of that process if it did not progress beyond the Schillerian problem, with which we began, of the division of the psyche [Zwiespältigkeit]. To apply Schiller's criticism, a conception of culture "must, therefore, be wrong, if the cultivation of individual powers [die Ausbildung der einzelnen Kräfte] involves the sacrifice of wholeness" (AE, Letter 6; 1967, 43). In this manner it should be no answer to this criticism to assert that through philosophy the individual can surmount his self-dividedness - it should be remembered that Hegel believed that disunity was both "the culture (Bildung) of the age" and "the source of the need for philosophy" (supra) -
if on the level of everyday life he must remain within a framework which inflicts the same wound.

If the goal of Hegel's theory of self and culture was to reestablish the harmony of the Greek citizen and polis in the *Sittlichkeit* of the rational state, then its primary unit, the *Urphänomen* of the bourgeois, has been left in a potentially self-divided condition with the consolation - to adapt Boethius - of government. But because the necessity of the form of government is dependent upon philosophy, it is difficult to see how estrangement can be overcome unless the bourgeois becomes a philosopher. Nietzsche, in what could be called his early years as a philosopher, thought long and hard about this problem.
Nietzsche's view of Hegel was never subtle. He reduced Hegel's complex system into a small number of "Hegelisms" which, along with most of the other forces which he interpreted as operative in the contemporary non-culture of his day, he condemned as, in the strict sense, "an apotheosis of the commonplace" (UM, I; 1983, 11). There is much which is indicative of Nietzsche's philosophy of culture in this condemnation. Firstly, Nietzsche's reductive tendencies are well exhibited. True to his later writings on epistemology and the possibilities of scientific understanding, Nietzsche takes Hegel (or, more specifically, Hegelians of the mid-nineteenth century such as D.F. Strauss) as representative of a whole which is sometimes difficult to recognise in the part which he fastens upon. The metonymies and metaphors, which Nietzsche thought so fundamental to human understanding, are hardly ever judicious but display a high degree of consistency and are almost always profound. Secondly, in his juxtaposition of the divine and the mundane in this characterization of Hegel's philosophy, it is possible to see Nietzsche's abiding concern with classifications which entail some kind of hierarchy. And thirdly, in his reference to "apotheosis", one can sense Nietzsche's watchdog-like tendency to raise the alarm when he detects some kind of metaphysical
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tendency "chastely concealed behind [the] arabesque flourishes" (Ibid) of any writer whom he considers an influence upon, or responsible for, the condition of culture.

It is the latter characteristic which is most often present in Nietzsche's analysis of Hegel's influence upon German culture. But this is itself indicative of what is most essential to Nietzsche's early philosophy in general: the dual project of the analysis and criticism of contemporary culture, which he engaged in while developing his own radically different conception of culture. This emergent concept of real or genuine culture supplies a reader with a formative principle which belies the fragmentary mode of writing in which Nietzsche's philosophy is presented. In the disparate assertions and arguments which Nietzsche put forward in his published and unpublished writings before Zarathustra there is an evident attempt not only to become the philosopher that he was, the philosopher who is most prevalently known through his later works, but to arrive at a definition of "the real demands of culture" (Ibid). It is in this way that Nietzsche's philosophy of culture is preeminently one of self-cultivation. A play of verbal distinctions which is significant in Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole which, if it is possible to characterise at all, is concerned with the development of what he called "free spirits".

In my examination of Bildung in Nietzsche's early writings I will follow, very loosely, the divisions of the first book of Human.
All Too Human: 'Of First and Last Things', 'Man in Society', 'Man Alone with Himself', and 'From the Souls of Artists and Writers'. The first section will concentrate on Nietzsche's criticism of his contemporary culture in the first three essays of the Untimely Meditations. 'Man in Society' will pursue the concept of culture which arises out of the Untimely Meditations, which is developed like an offensive weapon in Human All Too Human, where Nietzsche turns upon what he sees as the opposite of real culture and the forces which maintain it. The further elaboration of that concept of culture concentrates upon Nietzsche's definition of the self, which I will examine in the third section by looking at some aphorisms from Daybreak. This latter section will be found to encompass what Nietzsche called "the history of the moral sensations". In the last section, 'From the Souls of Artists and Writers', I will attempt to characterise Nietzsche's difficult concept of the ideal of self-cultivation, the "free spirit". The Gay Science, the book which was described on the back cover as "the conclusion of a series of writings by FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE whose common goal is to erect a new image and ideal [Bild und Ideal] of the free spirit" (GS: 1974, 30), will be the source of the material examined in this final section. The relation between this ideal and the function that the aesthetic plays in Nietzsche's concept of both the self and culture, is the culmination of the relation between the moral and aesthetic which I characterised as essential to Bildung in chapter One. It is in Nietzsche's ideal of the "free spirit" that the broad sense of the aesthetic (of both art and sensation
generally) and the moral (in the sense of "what is to become of man?") are brought into mutual operation, for it is the creation which Nietzsche himself seems to have both required and valued most highly.

Thus when I needed to I once also *invented* for myself the 'free spirits' to whom this melancholy-valiant book with the title *Human, All Too Human* is dedicated: 'free spirits' of this kind do not exist - but, as I have said, I had need of them at the time if I was to keep in good spirits while surrounded by ills (sickness, solitude, unfamiliar places, *acedia*, inactivity): as brave companions and familiars with whom one can laugh and chatter when one feels like laughing and chattering, and whom one can send to the Devil when they become tedious - as compensation for the friends I lacked. The free spirits of this kind *could* one day exist, that our Europe *will* have such active and audacious fellows among its sons of tomorrow and the next day, physically present and palpable and not, as in my case, merely phantoms and hermit's phantasmagoria: I should wish to be able to be the last to doubt it. I see them already *coming*, slowly, slowly; and perhaps I shall do something to speed their coming if I describe in advance under what vicissitudes, upon what paths, I *see* them coming?--

(Preface', H; 1986, 6)

This passage from the 'Preface' which Nietzsche wrote in 1886 emphasises the presence of Nietzsche himself in the works and concepts with which we are concerned. But as opposed to recent books which have highlighted Nietzsche's presence, or instantiation, in the works which he wrote, I will not be examining the development of Nietzsche the writer. Without anticipating too much of what lies ahead, I will argue that there is a tension between the stylistic and self-overcoming tendencies of Nietzsche's concept of both culture and self-cultivation which is similar to the tension which we have seen in Schiller between
the beautiful and the sublime in 'the aesthetic discourse of individuality'. This tension is neither clearly nor easily resolved in Nietzsche's early works, which prevents one from asserting that his writerly accomplishment of cultivating himself could be held out as part of the ideal which, in his early works, he spent so much time both creating and promoting. In this manner I will refer to some of the unpublished notes of the 1870's which, despite their stylistic unfinishedness, show Nietzsche in the process of coming to an understanding of the cultural needs which he thought must be incorporated into the "enormous task" which he imposed upon philosophy: "the subjugation of the barbarizing effects" (PCP, #175; 1979, 76) which are at work within a culture.

Of First and Last Things

In his Untimely Meditations Nietzsche portrays the contemporary culture of Germany following the Franco-Prussian War. But within the three, essentially polemical, essays which we will examine (leaving the inferior 'Richard Wagner in Bayreuth' to one side) Nietzsche put forward some all but tentative propositions from which it is possible to develop a picture of his own theory of culture. Nietzsche's strongly combative tone, particularly in the first Meditation, 'David Strauss, the confessor and the writer', belies his "untimeliness". He reacted strongly, and at times violently, to the state of culture in Germany. So that it comes as no surprise when one turns to the three books which are
claimed to "erect a new image and ideal of the free spirit" - *Human, All Too Human, Daybreak,* and *Gay Science* - that his chief concern is to define an alternative culture which would be capable of producing such "free spirits". The degree of effort which went into the attainment of this goal seems to have been nothing short of a war effort which, if one takes the lead from Nietzsche’s own writings, began around the time that Germany’s war against France was successfully concluded. Nietzsche looked to the virtues which prevailed against the French, and strove to guide them towards the goal which he perceived as the most necessary for the health of a culture in the grips of "political and nationalistic lunacy" (D, §190; 1982, 111).

If it were possible to take that calm and tenacious bravery which the German demonstrated against the emotional and shortlived impetuosity of the French and turn it against the enemy within, against the highly ambiguous and in any case alien ‘cultivatedness’ which is nowadays dangerously misunderstood to constitute culture, then all hope for the creation of a genuine German culture, the antithesis of this cultivatedness, would not be lost: for the Germans have never lacked clear-sighted and courageous generals - though these have frequently lacked Germans. (UM, I; 1: 1983, 4)

While ostensibly polemicising against the "Hegelisms" of David Strauss, he puts forward some definitions of genuine culture which are more generally deployed against the barbaric tendencies which he believed constituted "the enemy within".

Into the straw man of David Strauss, Nietzsche stuffs all the evil influences which he most wants to expose as the enemy. The vituperation to which he treats Strauss is indicative, perhaps,
of Nietzsche's attempt to declare war on the culture which he saw emerging after 1871 while at the same time seeming to be on the side of "genuine German culture". This account would explain why Nietzsche establishes a correspondence between Strauss and the "cultivatedness" which has nothing to do with the victory over the French. The principal defects of this mere "cultivatedness" are held by Nietzsche to account for Strauss's popularity. These are in turn boiled down into a tasteless intellectual eclecticism which panders to the tendencies of contemporary German non-culture.

The German amasses around him the forms and colours, productions and curiosities of every age and every clime, and produces that modern fairground motley which his learned colleagues are then obliged to observe and classify as the 'modern as such', while he himself remains seated calmly in the midst of the tumult. But with this kind of 'culture', which is in fact only a phlegmatic lack of all feeling for culture, one cannot overcome enemies, least of all those who, like the French, actually possess a real and productive culture, regardless of what its value may be, and from whom we have hitherto copied everything, though usually with little skill. (UM, I; 1: 1883, 6)

So that within a very short span of text, Nietzsche has established the framework in which his discussion of culture is to be conducted. The "real and productive" culture of France which Germany has defeated is, regardless of its "value", declared undefeated by Nietzsche. The central problem which the essay addresses, the claim that Germany's victory over France is a cultural victory, becomes inextricably involved with Nietzsche's attempt to combat contemporary concepts of culture and their perceived philosophical foundations, and his attempt to
direct his reader's attention to "the German spirit" which that concept of culture has the power to extirpate. Behind this stance, however, it is possible to see Nietzsche as engaging in a philosophical analysis of the general relation between the self and culture, and the "paths" upon which he sees the "free spirit" coming, the intellectual attitudes which he believes conducive to the production of a genuine culture.

In his assertion that French culture is "real and productive" regardless of its "value", Nietzsche is very careful in his iconoclasm. Within such wording, it is possible that, although Germany possesses no culture, "the German spirit" is capable of developing a real culture of a higher value than the French. This is enforced by his quoting, or paraphrasing, the concluding entry from Goethe's conversation with Eckermann of Thursday May 3rd, 1827:

'We Germans are of yesterday', Goethe once said to Eckermann; 'it is true that we have been soundly cultivating ourselves for a century, but another couple of centuries may have to pass before sufficient spirit and higher culture has penetrated our countrymen and become general for it to be possible to say of them: it is a long time since they were barbarians'.

(UM, I; 1: 1983, 6)

Which emphasises two important strands in Nietzsche's analysis of culture. Firstly, in this conversation between Goethe and Eckermann, Goethe accounts for "the degree of cultivation" which a critic from Paris, M. Ampère, had attained by the age of "some twenty years old". As opposed to the relatively new and smaller
cities of Germany, Goethe points out that the Paris of the nineteenth century is the inheritor of the generations of "Molière, Voltaire, Diderot, and the like". But Goethe goes on to assert that French culture is so widely disseminated that it is possible to become cultivated to a high degree even if one is neither a citizen of "this metropolis of the world", nor if one has ever gone to "a classical school or a university". Goethe's conclusion is that "if a talent is to be speedily and happily developed, the great point is that a great deal of intellect and sound culture should be current in a nation" (Ibid, 200-201).

Much of this must have been present in Nietzsche's mind when he quoted the passage from Eckermann. So that when Nietzsche writes that "we are still dependent upon Paris in all matters of form, just as before" (UM, I; 1983, 6), and quotes the above passage from Goethe, he is emphasising that German culture must achieve a higher degree of development before it can even be disengaged from French culture let alone vanquish it. But the subtler distinction which emerges from the Untimely Meditations as a whole is that German culture, in so far as it can be discussed as a genuine culture, must be discussed in terms of its development. This will be elaborated in terms of a necessary self-overcoming of the tendencies which Nietzsche perceived in his contemporary Germany as arresting it at the stage of assimilation. Where Paris can absorb "the best works, of both nature and art, from all the kingdoms of the earth" (Eckermann, 1970; 200) while maintaining its distinctness, Germany becomes a "fairground motley" (supra). And where intellectual activity in Paris is
buoyed along by the current of its traditions, Nietzsche claims that German intellectual activity consists of an attempt to "observe and classify" (supra) the chaos in which it is swamped. This leads to the second strand which runs through Nietzsche's analysis of culture: the importance of choosing, taste, and style. Germans must develop a unifying taste which will enable them to choose among the disparate cultural influences in which they live, and develop a style which, like the "genuine culture" of the French, can absorb and incorporate what is foreign. As opposed to the amassing of "knowledge and learning" which Nietzsche saw as the concomitant of the passive intellectual activity of "observation and classification", he believed that culture consisted in the development of a unifying principle. The former intellectual activity was characterised by Nietzsche as a barbaric tendency which resulted in mere "cultivatedness"; whereas the development of a unifying principle was the essence of "genuine culture".

Culture is, above all, unity of style in all the expressions of the life of a people. Much knowledge and learning is neither an essential means to culture nor a sign of it, and if needs be can get along very well with the opposite of culture, barbarism, which is lack of style or a chaotic jumble of styles.

(UM, I; 1: 1983, 5-6)

Which is consistent with Goethe's point about French culture in the conversation which Nietzsche quoted: it is possible to achieve a high degree of culture in France even in a small town without either a classic or a university education.
The self which Nietzsche perceives as the exemplar of contemporary German culture is satisfied with his knowledge and ignorant of the utter stylelessness of both himself and his culture. The name which Nietzsche coined in order to describe this self, "the culture philistine", is the opposite of the "free spirit" who will emerge in the later writings. He is the enemy of the German spirit which is conscious of its necessary self-development and overcoming. Nietzsche's assault on Strauss, mere "cultivatedness", the "culture philistine" and his "lifeworld" culminates in his buttonholing of "the enemy" and laying down some distinctions between "the German spirit" and itself.

For it seeks, this German spirit! and you hate it because it seeks and refuses to believe you when you say you have already found what it is seeking. How is it possible that a type such as the cultural philistine could have come into existence and, once extant, could acquire the authority of supreme arbiter over all the problems of German culture; how is this possible, after there has filed past us a whole line of great heroic figures whose every movement, every feature, whose questioning voice, whose burning eye, betrayed but one thing: that they were seekers, and that what they were seeking with such perserverence was precisely that which the cultural philistine fancied he already possessed: a genuine, original German culture.

(UM, I; 2: 1983, 9)

The particular "cultural philistine" whom Nietzsche attacks is a representative of the right-Hegelians who, according to him, had acquired "the authority of supreme arbiter over all the problems of German culture". As opposed to the "silver-glistening idealism" of "German culture as it used to be ", which was "infused with a heartfelt repugnance for... reality" (D, §190; 111), Nietzsche accused contemporary German culture of being
complacently satisfied with itself. The attainment of that self-satisfaction is aided if not facilitated, according to Nietzsche, by the right-Hegelian school of philosophy which asserted that the function of Bildung was to form the self into conformity with, and not to transform, its culture. Nietzsche believed that the overvaluation of knowledge was at the root of the problem afflicting the development of the German spirit. The indiscriminate accretion of knowledge was the means by which the individual was turned into the "cultural philistine", the "modern" self "as such" who, through his indoctrination into "Hegelisms" was brought into conformity with its culture:

A philosophy which chastely concealed behind arubesque flourishes the philistine confession of its author invented a formula for the apotheosis of the commonplace: it spoke of the rationality of the real, and thus ingratiated itself with the cultural philistine, who also loves arubesque flourishes but above all conceives himself alone to be real and treats his reality as the standard of reason in the world.

(UM, I; 2: 1983, 11)

It is the knowledge which confirms the "cultural philistine" as the reality of the rational, the imbibing of rational history which constitutes the self's Bildung and characterises his difference from the "great heroic figures" who were "cultivated" only to the degree that they were seeking "a genuine, original German culture." In this manner, Nietzsche's campaign turned against this need for knowledge and history, and attempted to establish a theory of culture which was based upon the definition of the noble, and its embodiment in the hero or the genius. But this concept of the noble which was to be deployed against
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A philosophy which chastely concealed behind arabesque flourishes the philistine confession of its author invented in addition a formula for the apotheosis of the commonplace: it spoke of the rationality of the real, and thus ingratiated itself with the cultural philistine, who also loves arabesque flourishes but above all conceives himself alone to be real and treats his reality as the standard of reason in the world.

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knowledge and the rational was to be, at the same time, an attempt to raise the concept of the self and culture, or a people, to a higher level than that of the "culture philistine".

We have no noble philosophy, because we have no noble concept of peuple (publicum). Our popular philosophy is for the peuple, not for the public.

(tP, #29; 1979, 9)

Although his characterisation of Hegel is rather cheap, it is possible to see how the contrast between these two radically different thinkers is polarised around their corresponding concepts of the self and culture. The Hegelian self is transformed into a universal 'I' through its understanding of reason and history on the philosophical level, and its acceptance of, and identification with, the institutions of its culture in the attainment of Sittlichkeit. Like Hegel, Nietzsche poses the central problem of philosophy as the development of the self, but according to him the self cannot be transformed by knowledge or reason alone and history, specifically one which is interpreted as 'the way of reason in the world', holds out no ultimate identification of the self with culture as it exists. As opposed to the study of history which, as in Hegel, involves a degree of passivity in observing reason's self-development, Nietzsche introduces a unifying principle which does not pretend to be "the standard of reason in the world", but is instead self-consciously active in an attempt to transform a particular culture as it is known to individual selves. So that when an individual looks back upon history, he looks upon it as a way of combating the
tendency which has produced both his self and his culture as it exists. In his second "Untimely Meditation", Nietzsche invokes the martial virtue of discipline in this radically different concept of history.

The best we can do is to confront our inherited and hereditary nature with our knowledge of it, and through a new, stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and implant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that our first nature withers away. It is an attempt to give oneself, as it were a posteriori, a past in which one would like to originate in opposition to that in which one did originate: always a dangerous attempt because it is so hard to know the limit to denial of the past and because second natures are usually weaker than first.

(UM, II; 3: 1983, 76)

This history, in which the individual actively forms himself, involves a selecting out of the past which must even deny that which prevents it from transcending itself. History is subsumed under the self's development, instead of the self being subsumed under the development of reason through history. In his war effort against "the enemy within", Nietzsche enlists a new kind of history which will select from the past those "great heroic figures" and events which can serve the function of transforming both the self and culture.

The problem which is posed by the above is quite obvious. What is to be used as the criterion in choosing among the disparate cultural influences which assail "the German spirit", in selecting out from the individuals and events of history those forces which lead to the unity of style which Nietzsche has
defined as culture? The "noble" does not of itself offer any
definite criteria, as opposed to its operation in the ethos of
the polis it cannot, in Nietzsche's analysis thus far, be pinned
down. It is in answering this question that Nietzsche looked to
the Greeks.

There were centuries during which the Greeks found
themselves faced by a danger similar to that which
faces us: the danger of being overwhelmed by what was
past and foreign, of perishing through 'history'. They
never lived in proud inviolability; their 'culture'
was, rather, for a long time a chaos of foreign,
Semitic, Babylonian, Lydian, Egyptian forms and ideas,
and their religion truly a battle of all the gods of
the East: somewhat as 'German culture' and religion is
now a struggling chaos of all the West and of all past
ages. And yet, thanks to that Apollonian oracle,
Hellenic culture was no mere aggregate. The Greeks
gradually learned to organise the chaos by following
the Delphic teaching and thinking back to themselves,
that is, to their real needs, and letting their pseudo-
needs die out. Thus they again took possession of
themselves; they did not long remain the overburdened
heirs and epigones of the entire Orient; after hard
struggle with themselves and through protracted
application of that oracle, they even became the
happiest enrichers and augmenters of the treasure they
had inherited and the first-born and models of all
future cultured nations. (UM, II; 10: 1983, 122-123)

With the answer provided by the Delphic oracle, Nietzsche
attempted to develop a philosophy of the self and culture which
was founded upon the distinguishing between real and pseudo
needs. It is in this manner that Nietzsche, while still
maintaining his credentials as an interpreter of history, turns
decisively away from the Hegelian concern with the objective and
its supposed inherent rationality. Nietzsche turns to the
subject and the individual needs which, when taken from history
itself, supplies one merely with an example of how a unity was
achieved and does not exhibit, as in Hegel, how a certain set of concepts and material conditions both developed and 'went under' in the development of one's own self and culture. But there are two important things which must be noted at this point. Firstly, Nietzsche parallels knowledge of the self with the knowledge which a people can attain of itself; and secondly, in asserting that it is possible to distinguish between real and pseudo needs he is implying that self-knowledge is equivalent to some kind of ability to separate certain parts of the self and observe them. Consistent with his military imagery in the Untimely Meditations, in 'Schopenhauer as Educator' Nietzsche writes that the individual must examine himself and establish what answers to his real needs and proceed to liberate his "true nature" from "the enemy within". In this way, Nietzsche's theory of the self and culture are closely bound together.

Let the youthful soul look back on life with the question: what have you truly loved up to now, what has drawn your soul aloft, what has mastered it and at the same time blessed it? Set up these revered objects before you and perhaps their nature and their sequence will give you a law, the fundamental law of your own true self. Compare these objects one with another, see how they constitute a stepladder upon which you have clambered up to yourself as you are now; for your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which you usually take yourself to be. Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the true basic material of your being is, something itself ineducable and in any case difficult of access, bound and paralysed: your educators can be only your liberators. (UM, III; 1: 1983, 129)

What gradually develops during the course of the Untimely Meditations is a picture of both culture and individuality as
being under seige. It is interesting how the essays progress from a national war to an individual's attempt to liberate his "true nature". This movement towards the inner world ultimately focusses upon what has been loved and needed by the individual. But this movement is counterbalanced by a concern with the expression of individuality. It is too easy to characterise Nietzsche's position, through its contrast to Hegel's concern with the rational and the realised, as subjective and transcending. If one imposes the framework of 'the aesthetic discourse of individuality' upon this argument, then although it is perhaps true to say that Hegel, as we have seen, favours the principles of realised harmony, it does not ring so true that Nietzsche falls into the opposite category in which, for example, Schlegel can be slotted, that of giving priority to the transcending of immediate harmony through a favouring of sublimity. Although Nietzsche is concerned with the development of free individuals, and complains, in the second Meditation, that "there are no personalities to be seen - nothing but muffled up identical people" (UM, I; 6: 1883, 84), he goes on to write that "Individuality has withdrawn within" (Ibid). The point being that although Nietzsche emphasises that the individual must turn to the enemy within himself, he is not condoning a definition of culture which remains subjective or unrealised. Like Hegel, Nietzsche was not satisfied with a definition of culture which allowed for a division between inner and outer, which he characterised as barabarism.
The culture of a people as the antithesis to this barbarism was once, and as I think with a certain justice, defined as unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people; this definition should not be misunderstood in the sense of implying an antithesis between barbarism and fine style; what is meant is that a people to whom one attributes a culture has to be in all reality a single living unity and not fall wretchedly apart into inner and outer, content and form. He who wants to strive for and promote the culture of a people should strive for and promote this higher unity and join in the destruction of modern bogus cultivatedness for the sake of a true culture; he should venture to reflect how the health of people undermined by the study of history may be again restored, how it may rediscover its instincts and therewith its honesty. (UM, II; 4: 1983, 79-80)

So that in terms of 'the aesthetic discourse of individuality', Nietzsche, in the Untimely Meditations, is both similar to Schlegel in his promotion of a self-transcending or radical self-cultivation which favours the sublime, and similar to Hegel in his assertion that culture consists in an achieved harmony between inner and outer. As opposed to Hegel, as we have seen, Nietzsche is unambiguously concerned with the transformation of both the self and culture in its contemporary condition, there is no room for a right-Nietzschean philosophy of culture of the right-Hegelian sort which Nietzsche criticised in the first Meditation. The culture which Nietzsche criticised the right Hegelians as responsible for is not the kind of culture which one would imagine Hegel himself condoning, especially when Nietzsche points out that "the whole of modern culture is essentially subjective" (UM, II; 4: 1983, 79). But the essential distinction to be made here is that in emphasising the inherent rationality of the world, Hegel opened up, according to Nietzsche, the
possibility of the worship of contemporary culture as the product of a rational process which subjugates not only other cultures but also subjugates the other forces within both the individual and culture as a whole.

I believe there has been no dangerous vacillation or crisis of German culture this century that has not been rendered more dangerous by the enormous and still continuing influence of this philosophy, the Hegelian. The belief that one is a latecomer of the ages is, in any case, paralysing and depressing: but it must appear dreadful and devastating when such belief one day by a bold inversion raises this latecomer to godhood as the true meaning and goal of all previous events, when his miserable condition is equated with a completion of world-history. Such a point of view has accustomed the Germans to talk of a 'world process' and to justify their own age as the necessary result of this world-process; such a point of view has set history, insofar as history is 'the concept that realises itself', 'the dialectics of the spirit of the peoples' and the 'world-tribunal', in place of the other spiritual powers, art and religion, as the sole sovereign power.

(UM, II; 8: 1983, 104)

Nietzsche stresses both the importance of "unity of style" and the importance of the artistic realisation of an achieved harmony, in direct opposition to Hegel's rejection of the aesthetic as active in contemporary culture, but also retains the original importance of the picture [Bild] of god or the goal of self-cultivation which stands above the individual self or culture. It is in this manner that his philosophy of culture is so emphatically opposed to the "apotheosis of the commonplace". Knowledge of the self which is "honest" cannot, according to Nietzsche, lead to the kind of complacency which deifies the existing order. With a firmly established picture of the ideal which is provided either by art or religion, individual self-
knowledge can only amount to dissatisfaction. In the third Meditation, Nietzsche wrote: 'Mankind must work continually at the production of individual great men - and nothing else is its task.'

By coming to this resolve he places himself within the circle of culture; for culture is the child of each individual's self knowledge and dissatisfaction with himself. (UM, III; 8: 1983, 162)

With the acceptance of, on the one hand, the essential importance of a unity between inner and outer and, on the other, the primacy of self-overcoming and self-dissatisfaction in the furtherance of mankind, it becomes evident that there is a tension in Nietzsche's philosophy of culture between the aesthetic and the moral (as in the broad sense of 'what is to become of mankind?'). The concept which Nietzsche uses in order to defuse this tension, 'nobility', will be developed by him in his later, aphoristic, books as a bridge between these two opposed forces and will be embodied in the "free spirit". But the philosophy of culture which emerges out of the Untimely Meditations remains contradictory and fragmented, despite the continuous and prosaic form in which he writes. The polemical nature of the essays seems to undermine any consistent development of Nietzsche's philosophical concepts.

What does emerge with some degree of consistency is Nietzsche's emphasis upon the physis as a source for cultural knowledge. Despite the tension between the achieving of a unity of style and
the essential significance of the goal or ideal which stands above any unity of style which is immediately available, Nietzsche asserts that it is possible to transform one's own inner nature and in this way to "place oneself within the circle of culture". In the third Meditation, Nietzsche portrays Schopenhauer as one of the few examples which he will ever give - although he will later, as he so often did, revoke it - of one of those "great heroic figures" which can be held out as an ideal of "genuine culture".

He teaches us to distinguish between those things that really promote human happiness and those that only appear to do so: how neither riches nor honours nor erudition can lift the individual out of the profound depression he feels at the valuelessness of his existence, and how the striving after these valued things acquires meaning only through an exalted and transfiguring overall goal: to acquire power so as to aid the evolution of the *physis* and to be for a while the corrector of its follies and ineptitudes. At first only for yourself, to be sure, but through yourself in the end for everyone. (UM, III; 3: 1983, 142)

The *physis* stands as the pivotal point between the self and culture. Self-knowledge of the *physis*, which Nietzsche believes to be essential to self-cultivation, allows the self to "rediscover its instincts and therewith its honesty". Honesty is important here because, as Nietzsche often repeats, what constitutes a real need may not always flatter the outlook of the particular culture which has formed the individual. Regardless of his disposition to some aspects of himself, the individual has to come to understand what is necessary and what is unnecessary in his personality as it has been formed by his own culture, and
proceed with the development of the genius within himself. This is the dilemma which Nietzsche perceived at work in his own culture. When he criticises the contemporary cult of history, he criticises its dishonesty:

One would think that history would encourage men to be honest — even if only honest fools; and hitherto this has indeed been its effect, only now it is no longer! While the ‘free personality’ has never before been commended so volubly, there are no personalities to be seen, let alone free personalities — nothing but anxiously muffled up identical people.

(UM, II; 5: 1983, 84)

In his later writings, specifically in Daybreak and Gay Science, Nietzsche will examine closely what he thinks are the essential lessons which this honesty brings to light. In the Untimely Meditations, he merely repeats the essential importance of honesty to self knowledge, which is to say knowledge of the physis. This is the first thing which the individual must accomplish before the last thing, the ideal, can be achieved. But this is specifically where the individual goal of self-development and that of culture come together in the third Meditation:

the individual has to employ his own wrestling and longing as the alphabet by means of which he can now read off the aspirations of mankind as a whole. But he may not halt even here; from this stage he has to climb up to a yet higher one; culture demands of him, not only inward experience, not only an assessment of the outward world that streams all around him, but finally and above all an act, that is to say a struggle on behalf of culture and hostility towards those influences, habits, laws, institutions in which he fails to recognize his goal: which is the production of the genius.

(UM, III; 6: 1983, 163)
The perceived disparity in the individual between what he recognises as his goal and his essential inability to realise it, gives him an insight into the nature of the cultural world which he shares with others. This is in direct opposition to the Hegelian principle of the self and the historical understanding of culture. What Nietzsche characterised in the second Meditation as "present-day universal education" (UM, II; 5: 1983, 85), which depends upon the principle of universal reason, is fundamentally mistaken because it ignores what Nietzsche calls "the distress, the inner misery, of modern man" (Ibid). If Hegel's mature philosophy could be characterised as dependent upon the transformation of the Roman Law principle of property into a new basis for civil society, then it could be possible to characterise it from a Nietzschean perspective as a "Roman culture", one which emphasises the objectively "universal". Nietzsche sought to bring to his reader's attention an alternative culture which is based upon "the Greek conception of culture", one which is based upon subjective knowledge of the physis.

This is a parable for each one of us: he must organise the chaos within him by thinking back to his real needs. His honesty, the strength and truthfulness of his character, must at some time or other rebel against a state of things in which he only repeats what he has heard, learns what is already known, imitates what already exists; he will then begin to grasp that culture can be something other than a decoration of life, that is to say at bottom no more than dissimulation and disguise; for all adornment conceals that which is adorned. Thus the Greek conception of culture will be unveiled to him - in antithesis to the Roman - the conception of culture as a new and improved physis, without inner and outer, without dissimulation and convention, culture as a unanimity of life,
thought, appearance and will. Thus will he learn from his own experience that it was through the higher force of their moral nature that the Greeks achieved victory over all other cultures, and that every increase in truthfulness must also assist to promote true culture: even though this truthfulness may sometimes seriously damage precisely the kind of cultivatedness now held in esteem, even though it may even be able to procure the downfall of an entirely merely decorative culture.

(UM, II; 10: 1983, 123)

It is the honesty of the Greeks in the depth of their self-knowledge which allowed them to attain their unity of style. This is what Nietzsche calls their "moral nature". It is this conception of morality as honesty in regard to knowledge of the self and of the physis, which proves essential for his later philosophy of self and culture.

Although it is unfair to characterise Hegel's philosophy of culture as ultimately responsible for the definition of culture as "mere adornment", Nietzsche, in the Untimely Meditations, develops a picture of the first and last things, of the self and culture, which is made distinct by its contrast with Hegel and his right-Hegelian followers. In the next sections I will examine the philosophy of self and culture which Nietzsche developed - in the three books he wrote before Zarathustra - without relying so heavily upon the polemical stance which he adopted in the Untimely Meditations.
A vision. - Lectures and hours of meditation for adults, for the mature and maturest, and these daily, without compulsion but attended by everyone as a command of custom: the churches as the worthiest venues for them because richest in memories: every day as it were a festival of attained and attainable dignity of human reason: a new and fuller efflorescence of the ideal of the teacher, in which the priest, the artist and the physician, the man of knowledge and the man of wisdom, are fused with one another, with a resultant fusion of their separate virtues into a single total virtue which would also be expressed in their teaching itself, in their delivery and their methods - this is my vision: it returns to me again and again, and I firmly believe that it lifts a corner of the veil of the future. (H, II; §180: 1986, 257)

The early Nietzsche can be characterised by the expression of what could be called a humanistic concern for the general welfare of man. The numerous references to culture attest to an interest in society which seems to recede somewhat after Zarathustra. Although Nietzsche continues to be passionately concerned with culture insofar as it produces the individual and his conscious nature, that concern is not as easily related to the place of the individual within a particular society in the later books. When one reflects upon what could be called Nietzsche’s expansive moments, in the earlier books they tend to relate the individual to a larger order, either of society or nature; whereas those in the later books tend to be of a more generally life-affirming sort, in which nothing less than the sublimity of Nietzsche’s character is revealed as he rises above his afflictions like some
kind of atheistic Job after yet another bout of devastating illness. It is tempting to generalise concerning the change in the nature of Nietzsche's writings after Zarathustra, but it is relevant to the focus of the following discussion of man in society. At this point in Nietzsche's development he is concerned with culture as in all three of the senses which I have defined in chapter One, giving scope to much play between the senses of the word in his writings on culture, especially in Human, All Too Human, the book which this section will concentrate upon. The later Nietzsche tends to focus upon a radical form of culture, which is more similar to Schlegel's than to any other definition which we have encountered, and which is no longer so evidently related to the humanistic tradition which is so essential to Bildung.

Nietzsche's concern with culture in Human, All Too Human is not easily characterised. The book is, to a degree, polemical and "untimely" in the sense that it continues and broadens his assault on "the modern as such" which he initiated in the Untimely Meditations. But it is at the same time much more concerned with the development of a few particular lines of argument which relate the individual to society and, ultimately, anticipates the more close analysis of his concept of the self and the forces which can be identified as operative within it in Daybreak. Perhaps the most abiding concern of Nietzsche's in Human, All Too Human is the identification and appraisal of what he calls the "drives" within man, the "frightful energies" which
"are the cyclopean architects and road-makers of humanity" (H, I; §246: 1986, 117), the knowledge of which he elaborates as the preconditions of culture and the "ecumenical goals" (H, I; §25: 1986, 25) which characterise his humanism. These are related to the "cultural forces" [Kulturmächte] (H, II; §181: 1986, 257) which are at work within a given culture, and which it is the job of the educator to develop into some kind of harmony. It is this aspect of Nietzsche's theory of culture which is most evidently within ear-shot of the tradition which was established by Schiller's Aesthetic Education. Nietzsche seems to have echoed, for a time, the goal of culture which was put forward by Schiller: mankind's freedom to be able to "do with itself whatever it wishes" (H, II; §179: 1986, 257). And there is an added dimension to Nietzsche's concern with culture in Human, All Too Human which has not occupied us thus far in our discussion. Nietzsche makes a distinction between higher and lower cultures which is used mostly in order to undermine the particular conceptions of hierarchy which he believed to be based upon the "barbarian biases" of his age. It is in this capacity that Nietzsche appears often as a "warrior of culture" (H, II; §183: 1986, 258), as the iconoclastic underminer of any idealism which he could be said to have shared with Schiller. Nietzsche's concept of high culture is, as opposed to Schiller's spielende Gemeinschaft, "an audacious dance" in which "one needs a great deal of strength and suppleness" (H, II; §179: supra). It is the balance between the "honesty" with which Nietzsche portrays the "frightful energies" of the human psyche, and the idealism with
which he "lifts a corner of the veil of the future" which most obviously brands *Human, All Too Human* as a crucial transition point in his philosophical career.

In his concern with the ideal of "the teacher, in which the priest, the artist and the physician, the man of knowledge and the man of wisdom, are fused with one another" (*supra*), one can see the repetition of a theme which concerned Nietzsche throughout the 1870s. A humanism and optimism come together in this goal in a way which characterises the early Nietzsche's concern with *Bildung*. It is important to note that Nietzsche emphasises the importance of custom in his vision of "the attained and attainable dignity of human reason" (*supra*). His conception of education, self-cultivation, and general culture in *Human, All Too Human* stresses the necessity of the development of customs. This brings out the tendency which I noted in Chapter One concerning Nietzsche's characteristic use of 'the moral', which focusses upon the second sense of the word and emphasises the unselfconscious aspect of morality as customary practice or habit. In this regard, Nietzsche's ideal of "attainable dignity" is separable from the Kantian or the Schillerian concept of dignity which depends upon rational self-determination. The role of the teacher takes on more significance because it is the teacher who must form these habits and therefore must have firstly established which are beneficial and which are not. The "command of custom" which is established by the teachers of culture is similar to the Platonic lie upon which the Republic is
founded. The teacher is, like the philosopher in Plato's Republic, the central cultural figure. When Nietzsche turns to his contemporary non-culture, he lays the blame at the doorstep of the very institutions of which the Germans are so proud: their classical education and their universities. In the second of the Untimely Meditations, he wrote:

the German possesses no culture because his education provides no basis for one. He wants the flower without the root and the stem: consequently he wants it in vain. That is the simple truth, a coarse and unpleasant truth, truly a necessary truth.  

(UM, II; 10: 1983, 119)

Despite the tradition of education which goes back to Humboldt, Nietzsche asserted that the German is uncultivated because his education is insufficient. Which is remarkable given the Humboldt-like terms within which he describes his ideal of education in the Untimely Meditations. This is emphasised in the Third Meditation where Nietzsche, in an autobiographical vein, says that as a young man he dreamed of an "educating philosopher" who would not only discover the "central force" which needed to be cultivated in himself, but "who would also know how to prevent its acting destructively on the other forces" (UM, III; 2: 1983, 131).

During the early 1870's Nietzsche seems to have envisioned an "educating philosopher" who would be able to establish not only the central forces of the human psyche but also their necessary relationship, what he called their "higher laws of motion"
(Ibid), within the individual. Upon the basis of this microcosmic "wisdom" Nietzsche believed that the contemporary non-culture of Germany, and general culture as a whole, could be transformed into a genuine culture. The relationship between the philosopher and culture, which Nietzsche considered essential, was one which he seems to have had difficulty in characterising. In his unpublished notes he entered a title for a proposed book, 'The Philosopher as cultural Physician', under which he wrote the following entry:

For us: ... the philosopher is the supreme tribunal of the schools. Preparation of the genius: since we have no culture. A study of the symptoms of the age shows the task of the schools to be as follows:

1. The destruction of secularization (absence of a popular philosophy);
2. The subjugation of the barbarizing effects of the knowledge drive. (Thereby abstaining from this fantasizing philosophy itself.)
Against "iconic" history.
Against scholarly "labor."
Culture can emanate only from the centralizing significance of an art or work of art. Philosophy will unintentionally pave the way for such a world view.

(PCP, #175; 1979, 75-76)

In which one finds much which is developed not only in the Untimely Meditations but more explicitly in Human, All Too Human. This shows Nietzsche in the process of thinking very hard about the central problem which we encountered at the end of chapter Four: the relationship between the people - he attempted to distinguish between a peuple and the publicum in an earlier note (supra) - and philosophy. As opposed to a philosophy which underpins the endless accretion of historical research and knowledge which Nietzsche believes to have its roots "in the
Middle Ages and the ideal... of the medieval scholar" (UM, III; 6: 1983, 175), he presents a picture of the philosopher as "paving the way" for the "centralising influence" of a culture. In another note under the same title, Nietzsche wrote that although the philosopher is "able to create no culture" he is able to "prepare it and remove restraints upon it" (PCP, #170; 1979, 71). This latter function of the philosopher is combined with the definition of culture which Nietzsche gave in the Untimely Meditations as "unity of style" in a note from an earlier collection titled 'The Philosopher':

The culture of a people is manifest in the unifying mastery of their drives: philosophy masters the knowledge drive; art masters ecstasy and the formal drive; *agape* masters *eros*, etc. (tP, #46; 1979, 16)

In this note Nietzsche repeats an assertion that is made in the note quoted above and throughout the Untimely Meditations that philosophy must master the knowledge drive [Erkenntnistrieb]; and in echoing Schiller in his assertion that "art masters the formal drive", he introduces the essential way in which his conception of culture can be related to the 'aesthetic discourse of individuality'. The importance of art is not merely, as in Hegel, that it gives the individual an example of an achieved harmony, but that, as in Schiller, it is active in the achieving of that harmony. The assertion that "culture can emanate only from the centralizing significance of an art or work of art" (supra), although it overstates the significance which Nietzsche places upon art in *Human, All Too Human*, does emphasise the way in which
he conceives of "cultural demands" as persistently requiring gratification and thus of culture as a reciprocal give and take between these abiding demands. This statement emphasises the opposition between the Nietzsche of the earlier, and that of the later 1870's as regards the position which either art or science holds within a culture. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche presents a picture of the revivification of "the German Spirit" through the centralising principle of tragic art as represented by Richard Wagner, in a way which recalls Hegel's early 'System Program', in his assertion that "without myth every culture loses the healthy natural power of its creativity" (BT, 23: Kaufmann, 1968; 135). Whereas in Human, All Too Human the later Nietzsche seems to have rejected his earlier "artists' metaphysics" and even, at times, to have taken up the point of view of the scientist in, for example, his definition of artists as "the glorifiers of the religious and philosophical errors of mankind" (H, I; §220; 1986, 102). Regardless, however, of the ultimate primacy of science or art - it is difficult to be sure as to which has the upper hand at all points in Human, All Too Human - Nietzsche has certainly decided the function of philosophy: whether it is art which is given primacy or science, philosophy is the midwife of culture.

The most essential question which philosophy must confront is whether or not it is possible to know the "higher laws of motion" of the individual, the central forces of the human psyche and their necessary relationships. A characteristic of Nietzsche's
he conceives of "cultural demands" as persistently requiring gratification and thus of culture as a reciprocal give and take between these abiding demands. This statement emphasises the opposition between the Nietzsche of the earlier, and that of the later 1870's as regards the position which either art or science holds within a culture. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche presents a picture of the revivification of "the German Spirit" through the centralising principle of tragic art as represented by Richard Wagner, in a way which recalls Hegel's early 'System Program', in his assertion that "without myth every culture loses the healthy natural power of its creativity" (BT, 23: Kaufmann, 1968; 135). Whereas in Human, All Too Human the later Nietzsche seems to have rejected his earlier "artists' metaphysics" and even, at times, to have taken up the point of view of the scientist in, for example, his definition of artists as "the glorifiers of the religious and philosophical errors of mankind" (H, I; §220; 1966, 102). Regardless, however, of the ultimate primacy of science or art - it is difficult to be sure as to which has the upper hand at all points in Human, All Too Human - Nietzsche has certainly decided the function of philosophy: whether it is art which is given primacy or science, philosophy is the midwife of culture.

The most essential question which philosophy must confront is whether or not it is possible to know the "higher laws of motion" of the individual, the central forces of the human psyche and their necessary relationships. A characteristic of Nietzsche's
approach in *Human, All Too Human* is that although he specifically mentions the "frightful energies" which are "the cyclopean architects and road-makers of humanity" (*supra*), and often repeats the essential importance of self-knowledge of one's own "drives", he does not specifically develop the conception of the drives any further than those which we have already encountered above. These are very well accounted for by the name "cultural forces" [*Kulturmächte*], which are more suited to a discussion of a people than of a particular person or, at least, more suited to a man in society than man alone. The theory of culture which Nietzsche presents in *Human, All Too Human* is very much oriented towards the development of a vocabulary which can be applied to culture as in senses (1), the works and practices of intellectual activity, and (2), a way of life conceived of as particular to a people or a group or general to a period. What Nietzsche stresses is that there is a division between higher and lower cultures, the higher being characterised by their "abstraction" from, and the lower by their closer contact with, the cyclopean forces of nature. For example, the teachers of a grammar school, according to Nietzsche, "speak the abstract language of a higher culture", ponderous and hard to understand but nonetheless a higher gymnastic for the head; that concepts, technical terms, methods, allusions continually occur in their language such as young people almost never hear in the conversation of their relations or in the street. If pupils merely listen, their intellect will be involuntarily prepared for a scientific mode of thinking. It is not possible for them to emerge from this discipline as a pure child of nature quite untouched by the power of abstraction.

(*H, I; §266: 1986, 126*)
But it must be remembered that Nietzsche has already condemned the grammar schools as responsible for the poor state of culture. This is directly related to the function, once again, of philosophy, which is to assess this process of abstraction which culminates in the sciences and its effect upon the individual. It is in this manner that Nietzsche will reverse the order in *Daybreak* and write of "many higher cultures" in the context of Mexico and Peru, so that in a non-Rousseauean sense he denies, at times for specific purposes, the higher nature of abstraction. From the perspective of the original hierarchy, however, Nietzsche believed that the distinction between Europe and Asia was directly attributable to Europe's having attended the school of "consistent and critical thinking", whereas "Asia does not know how to distinguish between truth and fiction and is unaware whether its convictions stem from observation and correct thinking or from fantasies" (H, I; §265: 1986, 126). His concept of culture is quite definitely biased in this way to sense (1) to the detriment of sense (2). In *Human, All Too Human* Nietzsche's iconoclasm operates under relatively tight constraints, and it is not until his more rigorous examination of the concept of the self which is produced by the processes of rationality in *Daybreak* that he will begin to undermine the hierarchy which is left fairly intact in the earlier book. One example of his unsettling irony in *Human, All Too Human* can be seen, however, in his assertion that philosophy, in order to perform its task of mediating between the various cultural forces, should become
acquainted with their historical development.

Now, everything essential in the development of mankind took place in primaeval times, long before the four thousand years we more or less know about; during these years mankind may well not have altered very much. But the philosopher here sees 'instincts' in man as he now is and assumes that these belong to the unalterable facts of mankind and to that extent could provide a key to the understanding of the world in general: the whole of teleology is constructed by speaking of the man of the last four millennia as of an eternal man towards whom all things in the world had a natural relationship from the time he began. But everything has become: there are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths. Consequently what is needed from now on is historical philosophizing, and with it the virtue of modesty.

(H, I; §2: 1986, 13)

This aphorism stands like a warning above the doorway to the house of mirrors which Nietzsche constructs through his examination of culture in Human, All Too Human. Despite the fact that self-knowledge is portrayed through the cultural terms with which Nietzsche operates, there is a compounding of abstractions in the interaction between the self which he asserts is a microcosm of the larger cultural forces which operate within a people or Western society as a whole, and the theory of culture itself which he presents in disparate aphorisms throughout the book.

The origins of rational abstraction which Nietzsche accepts as characteristic of Western culture are unknowable because they are obscured by four centuries of history. And yet throughout Human, All Too Human there are references made to the knowledge, and its necessity, which is to be gained by introspection. Within the
development of an individual's character, Nietzsche believed that the former history of Western man in general could be traced.

Men at present begin by entering the realm of culture as children affected religiously and these sensations are at their liveliest in perhaps their tenth year, then pass over into feeble forms (pantheism) while at the same time drawing closer to science; they put God, immortality and the like quite behind them but fall prey to the charms of a metaphysical philosophy. At last they find this, too, unbelievable; art, on the other hand, seems to promise them more and more, so that for a time metaphysics continues just to survive transformed into art or as a mood of artistic transfiguration. But the scientific sense grows more and more imperious and leads the man away to natural science and history and art is accorded an ever gentler and more modest significance. All this nowadays usually takes place within a man's first thirty years. It is the recapitulation of a curriculum at which mankind has been labouring for perhaps thirty thousand years.

(H, I; §272: 1966, 128)

It is from this generalised picture of man's development which every man carries within himself that Nietzsche believes the course of humanity is to be read like "Annual rings of culture" (Ibid). There is an element of the autobiographical in this which fits in well with Nietzsche's age at the time of the composition of Human, All Too Human. Being, roughly, Nel mezzo del camin di nostra vita, and having completed his emancipation from both Wagner and Schopenhauer, it is tempting to read this section as a reflection of Nietzsche's own self-development. This is perhaps even more obvious in another aphorism from the same book of Human, All Too Human, which might specifically account for the tension between the two cultural forces which, as we have seen above, are not always easily understood as successfully mediated at this stage in Nietzsche's development as
Microcosm and macrocosm of culture. - The finest discoveries concerning culture are made by the individual man within himself when he finds two heterogeneous powers ruling there. Supposing someone is as much in love with the plastic arts or music as he is enraptured by the spirit of science and he regards it as impossible to resolve this contradiction by annihilating the one and giving the other free rein, the only thing to do is to turn himself into so large a hall of culture that both powers can be accommodated within it, even if at opposite ends, while between them there reside mediating powers with the strength and authority to settle any contention that might break out. Such a hall of culture within the single individual would, however, bear the strongest resemblance to the cultural structure of entire epochs and provide continual instruction regarding them by means of analogy. For wherever grand cultural architecture has developed, its purpose has been to effect a harmony and concord between contending powers through the agency of an overwhelming assemblage of the other powers, but without the need to suppress or clap them in irons. (H, I; 8276: 1986, 130)

It is this ability to both understand and accommodate the various cultural forces which are operative within the microcosm of the self and the macrocosm of a culture which Nietzsche considered the most essential task of culture, and culture here specifically in the sense of Bildung. Nietzsche portrayed the necessary task which confronted each individual in his age as the accomplishment of such cultural architecture within himself, thereby gaining an insight into what is a precondition for the larger goal of transforming general culture as a whole. It is in this way that Nietzsche combines self-cultivation with the most general concept of culture as (3), a process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development. But peculiar to his definition of the self and culture at this stage in his career, Nietzsche insists
on the importance of plurality by his refusal to give supreme
authority to the development of either a unifying principle of
reason, as in Hegel, or of art, as in Schiller's early concept of
aesthetic education. In this way Human, All Too Human is itself
a piece of "grand cultural architecture".

The primary importance which Nietzsche gives to the problem of
education and culture is symptomatic, perhaps, of his earlier
dependence upon not only Schopenhauer as an "educating
philosopher" who would be able to guide his development, but also
his fascination with the unifying function of myth and Wagner's
Kunstreligion. This much, at least, is obvious from reading the
first section of his Introduction to Human, All Too Human of
1886. In his approach to the problems which are posed by the
development of the self and an understanding of the forces which
are active within a culture, there is evidence of his dilemma
after such a fundamental transformation in his own character.
Nietzsche's account of the difficulties of answering either
problem fastens upon the demise of a unifying belief. The most
essential unifying belief which he examines is that in a God.
Without the more famous and dramatic entry of the madman,
Nietzsche addresses the death of God in Human, All Too Human from
the perspective of someone who has dispassionately accepted that
the event has already taken place some time ago, and who is
confronting the subsequent problems which it has left for man to
solve. This is characteristic of Nietzsche's temporal and
spatial imagery in Human, All Too Human. The dramatic events
which have formed contemporary culture are behind the individual, and the problems which he must address are those which are related to his attempt to understand both himself and his culture in the context of those past events and of the future. Nietzsche's interest in Bildung is directly related to this situation – either experienced, perceived, or imagined – and what he called the "Value of the middle of the way."

Perhaps the production of genius is reserved to only a limited period in the life of mankind. For one cannot expect of the future of mankind that it will produce all at the same time things which required for their production quite definite conditions belonging to some period or other of the past; we cannot, for example, expect to see the astonishing effects of the religious feeling. This itself has had its time and many very good things can never thrive again because it was only out of it they could grow. Thus there will never again be a life and culture bounded by a religiously determined horizon. Perhaps even the type of the saint is possible only with a certain narrowness of intellect which, as it seems, is now done with for all future time. And thus the high point of intelligence has perhaps been reserved for a single age of mankind: it appeared – and continues to appear, for we are still living in this age – when an extraordinary, long accumulated energy of will exceptionally transferred itself through inheritance to spiritual goals. This high point will be past when that wildness and energy have ceased to be cultivated. Perhaps mankind will approach closer to its actual goals at the middle of its way, in the mid-period of its existence, than at its end. Forces such as condition the production of art, for example, could simply die out; delight in lying, in the vague, in the symbolic, in intoxication, in ecstasy could fall into disrepute. Indeed, if life were ever to be ordered within the perfect state, there would no longer exist in the present any motive whatever for poetry and fiction, and it would be only the retarded who still had a desire for poetical unreality. These would in any case look back in longing at the times of the imperfect state, of society still half barbaric, to our times.

(H, I; §234: 1986, 111-112)
The image of contemporary culture as mid-way could be too easily compared with Nietzsche's similar position - of his being still half barbaric in his persistent concern with art - and what is perhaps more important is the way in which this section can be contrasted with Hegel's analysis of self and culture. As we have already seen, in his notebooks of the 1870's Nietzsche emphasised the active role of art and the aesthetic in both the self and culture as opposed to Hegel's insistence upon art's having been superseded by religion, and religion in turn, finally, by reason or philosophy. In strong contrast to Hegel, this section postulates that contemporary culture is very much the ground on which these cultural forces are all, to some degree, active. And true to Nietzsche's Platonic correlation between the self and culture as microcosm and macrocosm, he emphasises this aspect of his interpretation of contemporary culture by saying that it would only be the case that once the Republic or ideal state had been founded that art would cease to be an important cultural force.

It is from the perspective of the necessity of experiment and the establishment of some kind of replacement for the strong unifying power of religion that Nietzsche approaches the definition of the self and culture in Human, All Too Human. But that isn't to say that religion has ceased to be of importance. In what is perhaps the most hortatory section of the book, Forward, where Nietzsche is exhorting one to accept one's nature as something of a "hall of culture" in which many forces must be accommodated and the
resulting contradictory nature of one's ego, he states: "One must have loved religion and art like mother and nurse - otherwise one cannot grow wise" (H, I; §292: 1986, 135). Which accounts for the subtle contradictions which run through the book. Though Nietzsche will assert that it is out the artistic that the scientific man will develop, he asserts that in both there is an element of the religious and metaphysical which cannot be obliterated. The most obvious reflection of this is in Nietzsche's concern with the ecumenical goals which man must take into his own hands with the realisation that God is not ruling over the world. Consistent with his temporal and spatial imagery of man being in the middle, Nietzsche coins the phrase "bell-founding of culture" to portray man at the point where he must decide the course of the process of culture through the adoption of the role which had earlier been the domain of religion.

Bell-founding of culture. - Culture is fashioned as a bell is, inside a casing of coarser, commoner stuff: untruth, violence, unlimited expansion of every individual ego, of every individual nation, have been this casing. Has the time now come to remove it? Has what was molten become solid, have the good, advantageous drives, the habits of the nobler disposition, grown so secure and general that there is no longer any need to lean on metaphysics and the errors of the religions, acts of severity and violence are no longer the strongest cement binding man to man and nation to nation? - There is no longer a god to aid us in answering this question: our own insight must here decide. Man himself has to take in hand the rule of man over the earth, it is his 'omniscience' that has to watch over the destiny of culture with a sharp eye in the future. (H, I; §245: 1986, 117)

Nietzsche goes on to emphasise the importance of realising that after the demise of a religiously bounded culture there can be no
universal rule imposed upon all men; and that self-knowledge, although it may yeild an insight into the forces which are at work within general culture, cannot form the basis for such a universal rule. It is at this point that the self and the most general definition of culture come together in Nietzsche's analysis. Rather similar to the role which aesthetic education plays within the Schillerian concept of the transition from a state of necessity \([\text{Notstaat}]\) to a state of freedom \([\text{Moralstaat}]\), Nietzsche portrays self-knowledge and the understanding of the necessities involved in one's own particular self-cultivation, as leading to an insight into the plurality of higher, more general moral (as in the broad sense of what is to become of man?) rules, which must be incorporated into man's ecumenical goals. It is in this light that Nietzsche introduces the concept of a science which will be able to give standards for such a non-universal development of general culture. In an interesting way, Nietzsche develops this against the Kantian concept of mankind's vocation to act in accordance with the universal laws of reason, the concept which we found to shift Schiller's 'aesthetic discourse of individuality' away from an emphasis upon the achievement of a beautiful harmony within the individual as the paradigm of self-development.

*Private and public morality.* - Since the belief has ceased that a God broadly directs the destinies of the world and that, all the apparent twists and turns in its path notwithstanding, is leading mankind gloriously upward, man has to set himself ecumenical goals embracing the whole earth. The older morality, namely Kant's, demanded of the individual actions which one desired of all men: that was a very naive thing; as if everyone knew without further ado what mode of action
would benefit the whole of mankind, that is, what actions at all are desirable; it is a theory like that of free trade, presupposing that universal harmony must result of itself in accordance with innate laws of progress. Perhaps some future survey of the requirements of mankind will show that it is absolutely not desirable that all men should act in the same way, but rather that in the interest of ecumenical goals whole tracts of mankind ought to have special, perhaps under certain circumstances even evil tasks imposed upon them. - In any event, if mankind is not to destroy itself through such conscious universal rule, it must first of all attain to a hitherto altogether unprecedented knowledge of the preconditions of culture as a scientific standard for ecumenical goals. Herein lies the tremendous task facing the great spirits of the coming century. (H, I; §25: 1986, 25)

The Moralstaat which Nietzsche's self-education leads to will not, evidently, be anything of the Kantian sort. And it is in this manner that the culmination of Nietzsche's philosophy of self and culture returns to the problem of the confrontation between the beautiful and the sublime. If one recalls what Nietzsche looked for in his "educating philosopher" in the third of the Untimely Meditations, and what he saw as "lifting a corner of the veil of the future" in the section from Human, All Too Human with which this section began, "in which the priest, the artist and the physician, the man of knowledge and the man of wisdom, are fused with one another" (H, II; §180: 1986, 257), then it can be concluded that the scientific standards which will be employed will be those of a rather strange kind, but very much consistent with the philosopher which Nietzsche portrayed in his notebooks during the 1870's. The harmony which Nietzsche envisions is one which retains the influence of the many forces which are active in contemporary culture, and in this regard
reminds one of the ideal of self-cultivation which Humboldt put forward, in which each individual develops his own particular harmony in separation from the outside world. But more significantly, this "unprecedented knowledge of the preconditions of culture as a scientific standard" (supra), recalls the cosmopolitain, but more vague, principle of Humanität which allowed Herder to speak of a general development without at the same time laying down a pre-established rule for all cultures. This is brought forward by Nietzsche very early in Human, All Too Human when he returned to the problem which he depicted in the first of the Untimely Meditations, the motley of foreign cultural influences swamping the "original national culture" of the Germans.

Age of comparison. - The less men are bound by tradition, the greater is the fermentation of motivations within them, and the greater in consequences their outward restlessness, their mingling together with one another, the polyphony of their endeavours. Who is there who now still feels a compulsion to attach himself and his posterity to a particular place? Who is there who still feels any strong attachment at all? Just as in the arts all the genres are imitated side by side, so are all the stages and genres of morality, custom, culture. - Such an age acquires its significance through the fact that in it the various different philosophies of life, customs, culture, can be compared and experienced side by side; which in earlier ages, when, just as all artistic genres were attached to a particular place and time, so every culture still enjoyed only a localized domination, was not possible. Now an enhanced aesthetic sensibility will come to a definitive decision between all these forms offering themselves for comparison: most of them - namely all those rejected by this sensibility - it will allow to die out. There is likewise now taking place a selecting out among the forms and customs of higher morality whose objective can be the elimination of the lower moralities. This is the age of comparison! Let us not be afraid of suffering! Let us rather confront the
task which our age sets us as boldly as we can: and then posterity will bless us for it— a posterity that will know itself to be as much beyond the self-enclosed original national cultures as it is beyond the culture of comparison, but will look back upon both species of culture as upon venerable antiquities.

(H, I; §23: 1986, 24)

As opposed to Herder, Nietzsche rejects the operative power of traditions in this matter of cultural choices, and brings home the way in which the aesthetic, in its broadest sense, is to be involved in the development of the self and culture. And by a radical transformation of the way in which the aesthetic is related to the moral, Nietzsche also shows his distinctness from Schiller. It is this "enhanced aesthetic sensibility" which performs the central role in culture, the role which, in the notebooks of the 1870's, philosophy was to prepare the way for.

And yet it is in this regard, at the same time, that Nietzsche is most difficult to pin down. Because although an "enhanced aesthetic sensibility" may be called upon to select out from among the many cultural and moral (Nietzsche must mean moral here in the sense of custom once again, given his anti-Kantianism) possibilities which are on offer to the modern individual, the "ecumenical goals", "the attained and attainable dignity of human reason" remains "a task for reason on behalf of reason" (H, II(ii); §189: 1986, 357). The aesthetic must, from this perspective, be subsumed under the rational or scientific goals which it is to enable man to realise. Nietzsche, however, does not make this explicity clear. Which could be accounted for,
perhaps most favourably, by emphasising his belief that contemporary culture occupied a mid-point in the course of man's general, to the degree that it is possible to commit Nietzsche to such a concept, spiritual development. The process of rational abstraction which Nietzsche believed to characterise Europe is not yet entirely accomplished. Which enables Nietzsche to portray Europe and its culture as occupying a temperate zone among the "zones of culture", one of the few specifically geographical or spatial images in *Human, All Too Human*: half way between the "violent antitheses" of the tropics of the past and the "sharp, occasionally cold" (H, I; §236: 1986, 113) air of the future. This shows how Nietzsche has transformed Herder's concern with climate into an image of a universal intellectual development. But it must also be kept in mind that Nietzsche continually, despite the ethnocentric tendencies of such a conception of man's "ecumenical goals", repeats that what he is concerned with is European culture - a distinction which will become more important in his later books. As Nietzsche develops his concept of the "free spirit" he begins, increasingly to talk of culture as European, in direct conflict with the nationalistic tendencies of his own original national culture. But when, in *Daybreak*, he examines the self which has been produced by this process of abstraction, he is forced to drop some of what could be called the scientific optimism which occasionally blows, like an arctic wind, through the otherwise more moderate cultural climate of *Human, All Too Human*. 
On education. - I have gradually seen the light as to the most universal deficiency in our kind of cultivation [Bildung] and education [Erziehung]: no one learns, no one strives after, no one teaches - the endurance of solitude.  

(D, §443; 1982, 188)

It is tempting to see the works which Nietzsche wrote in the early 1880's as a consistent development of the concerns which are to be found in his earlier writings. The impetus for his close examination of the self in Daybreak can be seen as a direct extension of his concerns in Human, All Too Human, but there is an essential problem in being too preoccupied with such consistencies. Once certain fundamental concepts in Nietzsche's philosophy, such as those of the self and culture, have undergone a sea change, the whole emphasis of his philosophical endeavour changes radically. So that some of the concerns which were previously instrumental in his procedure, become marginalised and others disappear completely. Nietzsche's abiding concern with education and cultivation, what I have combined under the term Bildung, undergoes such a sea change in Daybreak. Although it is possible to see the above statement as a continuation of his concern with the individual in the third of the Untimely Meditations, occurring, as it does, in an utterly different context, one must be on one's guard [man sei auf seiner Hut!] - I am quoting the end of the first section of Nietzsche's 'Preface' for the second edition of Gay Science here - because there is much, in the later book, which is "wicked and malicious" toward
some of the sentiments which formed the atmosphere in which the previous books were written.

The concern with ecumenical goals which is so essential to the atmosphere in which, in *Human, All Too Human*, the concepts of the self and culture are situated, is not entirely absent from *Daybreak*. But in the latter book, the examination of the self which Nietzsche engages in changes, fundamentally, the basic vocabulary with which those goals could be spelled out. The scepticism which is present throughout *Human, All Too Human*, but in comparatively mild doses, is intensified in *Daybreak* by Nietzsche's conclusions concerning the possibility of the kind of knowledge which is presupposed in the achievement of those goals. Self knowledge of the kind which can be directly applied to all men becomes so hedged about with sceptical reservations in *Daybreak*, that those ecumenical goals recede from the purview of Nietzsche's philosophy. One of the theses which Nietzsche lays down towards the middle of the book is that evolution has nothing to do with the happiness of mankind.

Evolution does not have happiness in view, but evolution and nothing else. - Only if mankind possessed a universally recognised goal would it be possible to propose 'thus and thus is the right course of action'; for the present there exists no such goal.

(D, §109; 1982, 64)

Which is not to say that Nietzsche ceased to be interested in a plurality of goals, but that the difficulty of establishing what those goals could be led him to be more reserved in his expansive
gestures towards all of humanity. The specific ground upon which his philosophy concentrates in *Daybreak* is, therefore, the possibility of any knowledge of the self: what prevents and what promotes an understanding of man alone.

Perhaps the most essential factor which prevents the advancement of self knowledge, according to Nietzsche, is the very concept of the self which he understood as operative within the contemporary culture of Germany. This problem was first addressed by Nietzsche in the *Untimely Meditations*, where he stated, as we have seen, "that there are no free personalities - nothing but anxiously muffled up identical people" (UM, II, 5: 1983, 84).

The name which Nietzsche coined in the First Meditation for this self, the "culture philistine", is the member of a "homogenous" non-culture which he characterised as "*tutti unisono*" (U, I; 2: 1983, 8), everybody together. In the Second Meditation, Nietzsche portrayed this self as merely a receptacle for knowledge and cultural influences, without any ability to value what it receives, and able only to observe and classify. This self is in itself nothing and "only by replenishing and cramming" itself "with the ages, customs, arts, philosophies, religions, discoveries of others" does it "become anything worthy of notice, that is to say", a "walking encyclopedia" (UM, II; 4: 1983, 79).

Nietzsche calls this type of self "*homo pamphagus*" (D, §171; 1982, 104) in *Daybreak*, and drops its specific application to the "culture philistine", and calls him "modern man". Although it is perhaps mistaken to assume that what is at work in Nietzsche's
criticism in the Untimely Meditations is still operative in Daybreak, it is not until the later book that Nietzsche attempts to define "modern man" in any detail. Perhaps most relevant in his definition of "modern man" in Daybreak is the way in which he approaches the nature of commercial culture and the individual which it produces. As the brother of the "culture philistine", modern commercial man does not consider things with an eye to their value for himself either, but merely classifies them in terms of whether or not they would be of value to others: "in regard to everything made he enquires after supply and demand in order to determine the value of a thing in his own eyes" (D, §175; 1982, 106). In this almost Hegelian insight into the relationship between consciousness and its way of life, Nietzsche sees at work the hidden influence of the definition of moral actions as "'actions performed out of sympathy for others'" (D, §174; 1982, 105), and goes on to lay the failings of "modern man" at the door of morality so defined. This kind of concern for others is identified by Nietzsche as the force which is responsible for removing the differences between individual modern men, a force which he writes "is well on the way to turning mankind into sand" (Ibid, 106).

Nietzsche proceeds, in Daybreak, to see the world reflected in this grain of sand. The problem being that what he wants to see is an individual, a "free personality". In direct opposition to the definition of moral action as 'actions performed out of sympathy for others', Nietzsche's definition of morality at this
point could be summed up as 'actions performed with regard to the
task of humanity' - what I defined in Chapter One as moral in
sense (3), 'what is to become of man?'. In the third of the
Untimely Meditations he pronounced the proposition: "Mankind
must work continually at the production of individual great men -
and nothing else is its task'" (UM, III, 6: 1983, 161). It is
possible to read Daybreak as an attempt to combine the ecumenical
goals of Human, All Too Human with the "task" of the Third
Meditation. So that when Nietzsche examines the sources of
"modern man" he does so from the perspective of a cultural
philosopher who is both analysing the philosophical components of
the phenomena before him, and attempting to uncover the
pernicious effect which those components have upon the task of
mankind: the development of the "free personality", "the
individual great man", or the "free spirit". In this manner,
rather like Hegel in the Phenomenology, Nietzsche takes on the
role of being an educating philosopher. But as opposed to Hegel,
he attempts to become the educating philosopher which he looked
for in his youth, whose purpose is not to help the individual
self to climb up to the universal self, but to be a "stepladder"
(UM, III; 1: 1983, 129) upon which he may clamber up to himself,
a philosopher who will help each individual realise the task of
mankind by becoming a "free spirit".

Nietzsche returns constantly to the Greeks and the Middle Ages in
his examination of the sources of "modern man". As we have seen,
in the Second Meditation he portrayed the Greeks' overcoming of
foreign influences and organising of the chaos as a parable "for each one of us" (UM, II; 10: 1983, 123). In the same essay he contrasted this, as we have seen, with the ideal of the medieval scholar, which he saw as lying at the root of the voracious appetite of the "modern self" for knowledge. In Daybreak Nietzsche examines both pre- and medieval Christianity and its effect upon "modern man". Nietzsche identifies Christianity as one of the strongest intercessors between "modern man" and the strength of pre-Socratic antiquity—leaving to one side the most important figure, according to Nietzsche, in the destruction of that cultural inheritance. Nietzsche complains of how Christianity translated the "affects" or basic emotions of man into man's relation to God: "as love of God, fear of God, as fanatical faith in God, as the blindest hope in God" (D, §58; 1982, 36). Which is not to say that Nietzsche doesn't see something of value in the religiously bounded culture of the Middle Ages. True to the cosmopolitan way in which Nietzsche sees many different cultures as producing individual strengths which cannot be reproduced in another culture, he erects an image of a Christian self of the Middle Ages who is the opposite of the medieval scholar. In a passage which could serve as a description of Donatello's Saint Louis of Tolouse in the museum of Santa Croce in Florence, Nietzsche portrays a character who is "the figure of the higher and highest Catholic priesthood, especially when they have descended from a noble race and brought with them an inborn grace of gesture, the eye of command, and beautiful hands and feet" (D, § 60; 1982, 36). Nietzsche is so
moved by this image "produced by the continual ebb and flow of
the two species of happiness (the feeling of power and the
feeling of surrender)" that he asks:

And is this human beauty and refinement which is the
outcome of a harmony between figure, spirit and task
also to go to the grave when the religions come to an
end? And can nothing higher be attained, or even
imagined?

(Ibid, 37)

In this portrayal of a specific harmony between figure [Gestalt],
spirit [Geist], and task [Aufgabe], Nietzsche presents just the
kind of example which he takes as a paradigm of the harmony
between inner and outer which, in the Untimely Meditations,
constitutes true culture, and in this regard, self-culture. With
the loss of the world in which this harmony was possible, this
particular form of beauty is lost. And with the continuation of
the principal "affects" of Christianity into "modern man",
Nietzsche believes that the opposite of a particular harmony is
achieved. This is primarily reflected in the transformation of
Christianity into the definition of morality we encountered
above. In the Christian-influenced definition of morality,
Nietzsche sees the transformation of a balance between the two
happinesses of power and surrender into the domination of the
latter.

That men today feel the the sympathetic, disinterested,
generally useful social actions to be the moral — this
is perhaps the most general effect and conversion which
Christianity has produced in Europe: although it was
not its intention nor contained in its teaching. But
it was the residuum of Christian states of mind ... the
subsidiary belief in 'love', in 'love of one's
neighbour', in concert with the tremendous effect of ecclesiastical charity, was pushed to the foreground. (D, 8132; 1982, 82)

The source of "modern man" can be traced, in this regard, through the "history of the moral sensations".

The "sympathetic affects" are given the most thorough examination in Daybreak. Nietzsche claims that despite the pan-European shift away from Christianity, the "sympathetic affects of pity or the advantage of others" have become "the principle of behaviour" (Ibid). He specifically holds Schopenhauer responsible for this state of affairs in Germany. So that the philosopher who was held out in the Untimely Meditations as the teacher of individuality is, in Daybreak, blamed for the further advancement of the cultural force which is most detrimental to its development.

Today it seems to do everyone good when they hear that society is on the way to adapting the individual to general requirements, and that the happiness and at the same time the sacrifice of the individual lies in feeling himself to be a useful member and instrument of the whole: except that one is at present very uncertain as to where this whole is to be sought, whether in an existing state or one still to be created, or in the nation, or in a brotherhood of peoples, or in new little economic communalities. (Ibid, 83)

The tendency which Nietzsche displays by always meaning right-Hegelian when he writes about Hegel, can be accounted for by this aspect of Nietzsche's anti-Sittlichkeit, or at least, pro-individual stance. It is not appropriate to broach the very difficult subject of Nietzsche's politics here, but it can be
seen that within Nietzsche's framework in *Daybreak*, the political is subsumed under the moral. Nietzsche is anti-political to the degree that he sees the politics of his culture, in concert with a certain definition of morality, working to the disadvantage of the individual. It is important to note that Nietzsche's consistent use of 'European' in the three books which are concerned with the elements of contemporary culture which are antagonistic towards, and the preconditions which he believes productive of, the "free spirit", is an attempt to bring in some element of group-identification without its being politically determined. "European" seems to be the only concept which depends upon "this body- and membership-building drive" (*Ibid*) in Nietzsche's early writing. And this is probably a foil which, like the "free spirit" itself, Nietzsche used to hide his isolation from a culture in the grips of "political and nationalist lunacy" (D, §190; 1982, 111).

We now come to the central problem which *Daybreak* can be interpreted as attempting to solve. The "history of the moral concepts" proves, according to Nietzsche, to be the decay of the individual. It might prove, however, to be the beginning of Nietzsche's attempt to establish a "noble philosophy" which he related, in the notebooks of the 1870's, to a "noble concept of peuple (publicum)" (*tP*, #29; 1979, 9) - the problem which was introduced at the end of Chapter Four. Nietzsche picks up on his image of commercial culture when he turns to the central problem of the knowability of the self. With the operation of morality
defined according to the Christian "affects", there is a fundamental way, according to Nietzsche, in which each individual deceives himself. In a manner similar to how Nietzsche asserted that the commercial man "enquires after supply and demand in order to determine the value of a thing in his own eyes" (D, §175; 1982, 106), he interprets the individual's positing and developing of moral values in himself as the product of this dialectical relationship between the self and its concern for the other.

The vain - We are like shop windows in which we are continually arranging, concealing or illuminating the supposed qualities others ascribe to us - in order to deceive ourselves. (D, §385; 1982, 172)

This short and truly aphoristic section of Daybreak brings together all of the cultural forces which Nietzsche perceives as preventing an individual from gaining any knowledge of himself. But as we have seen in Human, All Too Human this is essential to both the individual's true happiness and the health of mankind as a whole. In order for Nietzsche's concept of morality, what was at the root of the attainability of "ecumenical goals" in the earlier book, to be able to operate, this problem must be overcome. Daybreak attempts, therefore, to come to an understanding of what he calls this "pseudo ego", in order to establish the possible "paths" upon which he sees the "free spirit" coming.
If an individual is 'to act so as to realise the task of mankind ("the production of individual great men"'), Nietzsche believes that the first thing that is required is to overcome the morality which is so concerned with the Christian command to 'love thy neighbour', and the ancillary "affects" which revolve around it. It is at this point that he introduces a concept which is only momentarily touched upon in the works before *Zarathustra*: civilisation.

Our weak, unmanly, social concepts of good and evil, and their tremendous ascendancy over body and soul have finally weakened all bodies and souls and snapped the self-reliant, independent, unprejudiced men, the pillars of strong civilisation: where one still encounters bad morality one beholds the last ruins of these pillars. (D, §163; 1982, 100)

This shows how Nietzsche attempts to move his concern with the self onto a higher plain, so that when he undermines the morality of a particular culture in his attempt to come to an understanding of the "pseudo self", he is at the same time acting in accordance with not only a higher concept of morality but also a higher concept of culture. In this manner Nietzsche's attempt to establish a more radically individual self than we have encountered so far is at the same time related to the most general sense of culture.

In attempting to understand Nietzsche's criticism of the European problem of morality and how it prevents the individual from understanding himself, it is necessary to construct what could be called the central argument of *Daybreak*. It is the same process
of abstraction which "made Europe Europe" (H, I; §265: 1986, 126) that Nietzsche sees as possibly leading to the downfall of civilisation. But in order to follow this process, it is necessary to expand the short account of section 58 of *Daybreak*. The "reason of the sages of antiquity advised men against the affects" (love, fear, etc.), but Christianity restored, exaggerated, and oriented them to man's relationship with God ("love of God, fear of God" etc.). So that in a Christian society morality was converted from the control over the "affects" of antiquity into living according to the "affects" and their relation to the knowledge of good and evil. This constituted what Nietzsche calls a "shorter way to perfection" (D, §59; 1982, 56) than that which was initially held out by the sages of antiquity. This knowledge of good and evil allowed people to live according to a series of commands which were revealed to them and saved them from having to establish their own opinions (D, §62; 1982, 37). During the course of Western civilisation's history two things happened. Firstly, these Christian "affects" became disengaged from their original concern with the relationship between man and God, and increasingly concerned with man's relation to his neighbour. And secondly, following section 132 now, with the demise of the belief in God, philosophy turned the philanthropic "affects" (which had developed by this point into 'love of one's neighbour', 'pity your neighbour' or in other words be fearful as to his well-being etc.) into moral principles. This process which, according to Nietzsche, was originally opposed by philosophy, was ultimately
completed by it. The definition of the neighbour (cf. §118, *What is our neighbour?*), his needs (cf. §119, *Experience and invention*), and the characterization of what could constitute helpful actions (cf. § 116, *The unknown world of the subject*), were made the subject-matter of moral philosophy. The latter, being dependent upon an ever more generalised concept of man, and ever more abstract and general terms to describe the very "affects" which were initially ignored.

This supplies enough of the important aspects of what, until his later *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche never intended as a systematic account, but which forms the background in *Daybreak* against which he portrayed the attempt of the individual to understand himself. The result of this process, according to Nietzsche, is that when an individual does so, he becomes involved in something like the kind of mirror-effect which I attempted to describe as being at work in *Human, All Too Human*. All that is accomplished is the compounding of abstractions which were never defined with regard to the individual's needs but became identified with the needs of others. Nietzsche's concept of "pseudo egoism" attempts to describe the focal point of such a process of abstraction.

*Pseudo-egoism*. - Whatever they may think and say about their 'egoism', the great majority nonetheless do nothing for their ego their whole life long: what they do is done for the phantom ego which has formed itself in the heads of those around them and has been communicated to them; - as a consequence they all of them dwell in a fog of impersonal, semi-personal opinions, and arbitrary, as it were poetical evaluations, the one for ever in the head of someone
else, and the head of this someone else again in the heads of others: a strange world of phantasms - which at the same time knows how to put on so sober an appearance!

(D, §105; 1982, 61)

Which both echoes the dialectical process which Nietzsche found to be at work in the economic appreciation of goods and expands the aphorism in which he applied the image of the shop window to the practice of the virtues and self-knowledge. The central source of Nietzsche's scepticism concerning morality and self-knowledge defined through what could be called "the neighbour affects", is the post-Copernican (to adapt Kant's phrase) insight that the state of perception has disrupted the whole framework within which the two are supposedly elaborated. If it is impossible to know the neighbour to which all of the "affects" are directed, then the self is isolated in fact despite the "body- and membership building drive" by which the "affects" are directed.

In what are perhaps the central sections of Daybreak, sections 105 to 119, Nietzsche attempts to undermine the framework within which a morality based upon "the neighbour affects" is elaborated. Nietzsche runs two arguments simultaneously in a counterpoint which belies the apparently fragmentary structure of his composition: the impossibility of knowing the self through the framework of "the neighbour affects", and the difficulty involved in actually helping him when one is encumbered with these misperceptions. The former argument begins with the "pseudo self" (§105), and then progresses to the more general
statement of "The so-called-ego". The "pseudo self" introduces the essential elements which are used by Nietzsche in his description of what could be called "the economic dialectic of self deception"; and the "so-called 'ego'" concentrates upon an anti-Herderian theory of language in which the individual does not express himself when he uses language but creates "a manifold hindrance" for himself when he wants "to explain inner processes and drives".

We are none of us that which we appear to be in accordance with the states for which alone we have consciousness and words, and consequently praise and blame; those cruder outbursts of which alone we are aware make us misunderstand ourselves, we draw a conclusion on the basis of data in which the exceptions outweigh the rule, we misread ourselves in this apparently most intelligible of handwriting on the nature of our self. Our opinion of ourself, however, which we have arrived at by this erroneous path, the so-called 'ego', is thenceforth a fellow worker in the construction of our character and our destiny.

(D, §115; 1982, 71-72)

With this criticism Nietzsche closes off, decisively, the continuation of the "expressive anthropology" line which runs through the tradition of Bildung and culminates in the Hegelian identification of the "real self" with the "I" expressed in language. As we have seen, the second strand of argument focuses upon the impossibility of knowing the neighbour from the post-Copernican point of view, which is given attention specifically in section 117, where Nietzsche points towards the fundamental predicament of "the habits of our senses".

The habits of our senses have woven us into lies and deception of sensation: these again are the basis of all our judgments and 'knowledge' - there is absolutely
no escape, no backway or bypath into the real world! We sit within our net, we spiders, and whatever we may catch in it, we can catch nothing at all except that which allows itself to be caught in precisely our net.

(D, §117; 1982, 73)

It is at this point, after his most sceptical statement concerning self-knowledge, that Nietzsche turns to the neighbour in the next section. With its play on the Pharisee's question, 'Who is then my neighbour?', he emphasises the isolation of each individual by virtue of the illusion upon which the "body- and membership-building drive" is based. "What is our neighbour!".

What do we understand to be the boundaries of our neighbour: I mean that with which he as it were engraves and impresses himself upon us? We understand nothing of him except the change in us of which he is the cause - our knowledge of him is like the hollow space which has been shaped. We attribute to him the sensations his actions evoke in us, and thus bestow upon him a false, inverted positivity. According to our knowledge of ourself we make of him a satellite of our own system: and when he shines for us or grows dark and we are the ultimate cause in both cases - we nonetheless believe the opposite! World of phantoms in which we live! Inverted, upsidedown, empty world, yet dreamed of as full and upright! (D, §118; 1982, 74)

Both strands of argument culminate in the story which Nietzsche tells in section 119, as a reworking of the parable of the Samaritan with which Christ answered the Pharisee's question in the Bible. Of how, when he was walking through a market-place "at eleven o'clock", he helped a man who "had suddenly collapsed right in front" of him "as if struck by lightning, and all the women in the vicinity screamed aloud." Without the least feeling of pity [Mitleid], Nietzsche "raised him to his feet and attended to him until he had recovered his speech", and then went "coolly"
on his way. The moral of this story is the teaching which Nietzsche attempts to develop throughout *Daybreak*: "Of all actions, those performed for a purpose have been least understood, no doubt because they have always been counted the most understandable and are to our consciousness the most commonplace. The great problems are to be encountered in the street" ([D, §127; 1982, 78]).

With the eradication of the belief in the efficacy of a morality based upon "the neighbour affects", Nietzsche attempts to develop a concept of self-cultivation which, accordingly, begins with the smallest, most everyday things. But instead of focusing upon the needs of others, Nietzsche emphatically insists upon the importance of first understanding one's own needs. But as the parable of section 119 should make clear, although Nietzsche is concerned with the digging out of "the neighbour affects", this does not necessarily imply that it entails not actually helping others. In many aphorisms he refers to "ideal selfishness" (e.g. §552), which can be seen as a continuation of the microcosmic and macrocosmic argument which he presented in *Human, All Too Human*. Nietzsche stresses the importance of each individual finding his own harmony between "figure, spirit, and task", and cautions against the regard for others which will "only encumber ourselves with a double load of irrationality" ([D, §137; 1982, 87]). With the frustration of the "body- and membership-building drive", and with its "fundamental remoulding, indeed weakening and abolition of the individual" ([D, §132; 1982, 83]) in its subordination to
the whole, Nietzsche believes that a subsequent knowledge of the "drives" will develop. This can be seen as the development of an argument from Human, All Too Human in which he asserted that when the working man, or modern commercial man, becomes sick he gains a wisdom which cannot be revealed to him during the course of his working day.

Value of illness. - The man who lies ill in bed sometimes discovers what he is ill from is usually his office, his business or his society and that through them he has lost all circumspection with regard to himself: he acquires this wisdom from the leisure to which his illness has compelled him.

(H, I; §289: 1986, 133-134)

A line of argument which is picked up again in Daybreak just before he makes the connection between morality based upon the Christian "affects" and commercial society. "In the glorification of 'work', in the unwearied talk of the 'blessing of work', I see the same covert idea as the praise of useful impersonal actions: that of fear of everything individual" (D, §173; 1982, 105). Not only does Nietzsche completely reject the Hegelian fulfilment of the individual in his work, and acceptance of the functional virtues which it implies, he positively stresses the importance of abstracting oneself from such a system in order to gain wisdom. In this manner yet another aspect of the definition of the concept of Bildung which Hegel developed, and which extends back to Goethe, is rejected by Nietzsche.
In direct contrast to the cultivation of the self through its orientation within a society, or what he calls "economic communalities", with its Goethean emphasis upon the ideal of manual work, Nietzsche stresses the wisdom which is to be gained from inactivity. Returning to section 119 of Daybreak, Nietzsche examines the wisdom which is to be learned from sleep. In his attempt to understand the relationship between the "drives" in an entirely immediate way, without the cultural concepts which he employed in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche examines the way in which, during sleep, the drives are able to express themselves. He attempts to discover an answer for something which strikes him as odd. Given that the stimuli are the same during each night of sleep, why "do I in this dream enjoy indescribable beauties of music, why do I in another soar and fly with the joy of an eagle up to distant mountain peaks" (D, 119; 1982, 75)? He decides that:

the explanation of this is that today's prompter of the reasoning faculty was different from yesterday's - a different drive wanted to gratify itself, to be active, to exercise itself, to refresh itself, to discharge itself - today this drive was at high flood, yesterday it was a different drive that was in that condition. (Ibid)

The conclusion which Nietzsche reaches concerning sleep is found to be at work in the understanding of what is encountered in everyday life. Which leads him to disclose the last of his sceptical series of 'so-called' terms: "all our so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastic commentary on an unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text" (Ibid). It would
seem that the great lessons which are to be learned on the street are going to be ones which involve some pretty free interpretation. And yet, this serves as a prologue to the parable of Nietzsche's doing what was needed for the stricken man and going "coolly" on his way.

There is an element of 'correctness' which cannot be ignored in Nietzsche's argument, which is not revealed sufficiently until he enters the realm of what is perhaps the one strand of Bildung which remains active at the end of Daybreak: what I have called 'the aesthetic discourse of individuality'. Nietzsche argues that with the undermining of a morality based upon "the neighbour affects" that each individual must come to an understanding of how to gratify his "drives". In a manner that recalls Humboldt's concept of Bildung which emphasises the inner garden that can only be cultivated entirely in separation from the working world, Nietzsche stresses that this self-knowledge can only be attained when man isolates himself from society and examines his particular needs. Returning to the task which he set for philosophy in his notebooks of the 1870's, Nietzsche writes that the philosophy which he is attempting to develop in Daybreak "is at bottom the instinct for a personal diet", and goes on to say that perhaps philosophies "are one and all nothing other than the intellectual circuitous paths of similar personal drives" (D, §553; 1982, 224) - an argument which will be expanded in Beyond Good and Evil. This lies behind the necessary piece of wisdom which Nietzsche puts forward as essential for self-
cultivation. He reveals this principle when he concludes that the previous connection between a morality based upon "the neighbour affects" and the beautiful has prevented the identification of individual harmonies of figure, spirit, and task, and the concomitant development of individual philosophies which can be reflected in what he will call, in *Gay Science*, individuals who "are truly in and for themselves" (GS, 23; 1974, 98). What is needed is an expanded definition of the beautiful, according to Nietzsche, which can be applied to different individuals in a way which is similar the to the diverse landscapes which are appreciated in nature.

*The realm of beauty is bigger.* - As we go about in nature, with joy and cunning, bent on discovering and as it were catching in the act the beauty proper to everything; as we try to see how that piece of coastline, with its rocks, inlets, olive trees and pines, attains to its perfection and mastery whether in the sunshine, or when the sky is stormy, or when twilight has almost gone: so we ought to go about among men, viewing and discovering them, showing them their good and evil, so that they shall behold their own proper beauty which unfolds itself in one case in the sunlight, in another amid storms, and in a third only when night is falling and the sky is full of rain. Is it then forbidden to *enjoy* the evil man as a wild landscape possessing its own bold lineaments and effects of light, if the same man appears to our eyes as a sketch and caricature and, as a blot in nature, causes us pain, when he poses as good and law-abiding? - Yes, it is forbidden: hitherto we have been permitted to seek beauty only in the *morally good* - a fact which sufficiently accounts for our having found so little of it and having had to seek about for imaginary beauties without backbone! - As surely as the wicked enjoy a hundred kinds of happiness of which the virtuous have no inkling, so too they possess a hundred kinds of beauty; and many of them have not yet been discovered.  

(D, §468; 1982, 194-195)
Nietzsche is pressing for an expanded appreciation of the individual which will enable both a higher degree of self-cultivation while at the same time promoting the strengthening of what he called, earlier in *Daybreak*, "the pillars of a strong civilisation" (D, §163; 1982, 100). It is with the transformation of the relationship between the moral and the aesthetic and its application to the individual - the relationship which is at the centre of 'the aesthetic discourse of individuality' - that Nietzsche's philosophy, in *Daybreak*, concludes. This relationship, however, is the starting point of *Gay Science*, the book in which he develops that expanded sense of the beautiful in his attempt to "erect an image and ideal of the free spirit".

*From the Souls of Artists and Writers*

Who will ever relate the whole history of narcotica? - It is almost the history of "culture," of our so-called higher culture. (GS, §86; 1974, 142)

Nietzsche is cruel at times. And it is difficult to tell whether he is being harder on himself than he is on the ideals and poetical emotions of others. But he makes it obvious why he is being cruel. He is attempting to clear the way for his own ideal. Furthermore, most of the ideals and poetical emotions which he attacks with such cruelty are ones which he has either possessed or still seems to possess. So that what makes for such
hair-raising reading is the degree to which his laceration of the enemy can be seen to be a self-laceration of the "the enemy within". I do not mean to present the following account of the concept of the self and culture in *Gay Science* as some kind of exercise in sado-masochism on Nietzsche's part, but I do think it necessary to take note of the atmosphere which pervades the last of the series of books "whose common goal is to erect a new image and ideal of the free spirit". In his attempt to paint his image, Nietzsche scrapes from his palette many of the warmer colours which are to be found in his earlier writings. If it is fair to characterise Nietzsche as being mostly - what he didn't want to be - "a warrior of culture" (H, II; §183: 1986, 258), then it can be understood that his prose is at times at war with his own tendency towards poetry. And as Nietzsche wrote, echoing his pre-Socratic master Heraklitos, in *Gay Science*: "War is the father of all good things; war is also the father of good prose" (GS, §82; 1974, 145). So that when Nietzsche writes that the history of culture is almost the same as the history of narcotics, he is attempting to scrape, once and for all, something which he has been addicted to, and has at one time devoted pages of his works to glorifying, from the palette with which he is going to portray the culture out of which the "free spirit" will emerge: the "high culture" which he helped to portray as Wagner's *Kunstreligion*. In order to understand the decisive drop in temperature in *Gay Science*, one does not have to do much rooting around in, or have a very thorough knowledge of,
Nietzsche's biography - if that is what one is interested in doing.

It is appropriate, in this context, to terminate an examination of Bildung with this rather severe book of Nietzsche's because it represents not only the culmination of a writer's attempt to develop his own philosophy of self-cultivation, but at the same time to weed out what he saw as the pernicious elements of the philosophies and processes of self-cultivation which had formed both himself and the culture in which he lived. If, in the two earlier books, Nietzsche's volte face from art to science was evident in his sceptical attitude towards the ideals which are portrayed in the Untimely Meditations, in Gay Science it is ruthlessly emphasised in sections which, despite their subtleties, are brutal. In the first section, for example, Nietzsche recapitulates some of the themes which were introduced in Human, All Too Human and further developed in Daybreak. But he establishes a much more rigorous intellectual atmosphere in which many conclusions are drawn and underlined which were, in the previous books, either rendered more accommodating or more specifically directed and therefore less alarming because less seemingly fundamental. Where Nietzsche asserts in Human, All Too Human that every "belief in the value of life rests on false thinking", he goes on to say that "the great majority" are saved from this insight into "the ultimate goallessness of man" which gives life the appearance of the "useless squandering" of the individual and humanity, by the concert between their "lack of
imagination" and the ability of the poets to "console themselves" (H, I; §33: 1986, 28-29). Nietzsche both harshens and develops his argument in Gay Science by asserting that "the great majority" are a "herd" (so much for "a noble concept of peuple"!), that all poets are "the valets of some morality" and that they are "promoting the faith in life" (GS, §1; 1974, 73-75), not merely making it bearable. But Nietzsche goes even further than this, and reveals the essential difference between the earlier and the later book. Where, in Human, All Too Human, he uses the word "squandered" [vergeudet] and writes of the horror with which such a prospect fills a man, Nietzsche quotes, in Gay Science, Aeschylus's "waves of uncountable laughter" as the mood with which such a prospect should be met. And to cap it all, consigns both attitudes to "the means and necessities of the preservation of the species" (Ibid, 76). The conclusion to be drawn from this is not, necessarily, that Nietzsche has become less compassionate (cf. §16, Over the footbridge), but that his rooting out of "the neighbour affects" in Daybreak has steeled him against the dangers of pity. If one recalls the parable of section 119 of Daybreak, then Gay Science can be seen as Nietzsche's attempt to construct a philosophy of self-cultivation which can prepare the way for the "free spirit" and, afterwards, to go "coolly", even joyfully, on his way.

In his attempt to develop a philosophy of self-cultivation which could promote the ideal of the "free spirit", Nietzsche had to reject much of the "cultural architecture" which he had
constructed in *Human, All Too Human* in order to accommodate the contending forces of science and art. If one takes, as an example, the vision which Nietzsche said returned to him "again and again" in *Human, All Too Human*, of "lectures and hours of meditation for adults, for the mature and maturest, and these daily, without compulsion but attended by everyone as a command of custom" which were to be conducted in "the churches" because they were the "richest in memories" (*H, II; §180: 1986, 257*), one finds that at almost every level his ideal of the "attained and attainable dignity of human reason" (*Ibid*) has been undermined by the time one reaches *Gay Science*. Nietzsche has definitively retreated, as we have seen, from the attempt to found a noble conception of the people, and in the third section of *Gay Science* he asserts that nobility cannot be understood by "common natures" who merely "blink when they hear of such things" (*GS, §3; 1974, 77*) and transform it into something common. In sections 22 and 55 respectively, Nietzsche explains how this transformation takes place and, in this context, what *the ultimate noblemindedness* would be - the accepting of the dialectical relationship of hypocrisy between the "noble" and the "common". The "noble person", in accordance with some "peculiar impulse", acts in a manner which is to his own advantage but which cannot be understood as such by "common natures" because they do not share that "peculiar impulse". The "noble person" stands aside when that action is accounted for by "common natures" as "noble" even though he knows that account to be the hypocritical promotion of the "common" (*cf. §22*) - simply because it is apparently to the
advantage of the "common natures" at the expense of the "noble person". By standing aside in this way, the "noble person" maintains his nobility by being "the advocate of the [hypocritical] rule" (cf. §55) that the "noble" is merely the advancement of the "common". Which makes it difficult to imagine what would constitute the "noble" subject-matter which could be the topic of such lectures, since the very publicising of the noble would be its conversion into the common. Lastly, if Nietzsche's brutal deconstruction of his vision is not yet complete, he complains of churches in section 280, "Architecture for the search for knowledge:

The time is past when the church possessed a monopoly on reflection, when the *vita contemplativa* always had to be first of all a *vita religiosa*; and everything built by the church gives expression to that idea. I do not see how we could remain content with such buildings even if they were stripped of their churchly purposes.  

(GS, §280, 1974, 227)

Following his earlier remark, in *Human, All Too Human*, that architecture is "cultural mother's milk" (H, I; §218: 1986, 101), Nietzsche rejects the "fundamental sense of the uncanny and exalted" (*Ibid*) which was intrinsically part of the beauty of the churches, and with them almost all of the humanistic elements which accrued to knowledge in the earlier book. Despite his new vision of "buildings and sites that would altogether give expression to the sublimity of thoughtfulness and of stepping aside" (GS, §280; 1974, 226-227), the wormwood is very bitter and one senses that Nietzsche's joyful science of self-cultivation is going to be one of strenuous denial.
One of the humanistic strands which is dropped by Nietzsche least reluctantly is the view of antiquity which was so essential to what I called "conservative self-cultivation". The essential premise upon which it rested was, we found, the undeniable inheritance which was to be gained from the study of the classics. Kant's assertion that it was in the "models" of classical art that one was able to pick up the strands of the possibility of a community of taste is rejected by Nietzsche along with the whole misconception upon which it is based. Nietzsche interprets this belief in the availability of the classical as a reflection of one of the fundamental "barbarian biases" (tP, #41; 1979, 13): the denial of the essential relationship between needs and taste. This was first addressed fully in Daybreak, where Nietzsche lamented, with the word which we have encountered already, the "squandering [Vergeudung] of our youth when we had a meagre knowledge of the Greeks and Romans and their languages drummed into us in a way as clumsy as it was painful and one contrary to the supreme principle of all education [dem obersten Satze aller Bildung], that one should offer food only to him who hungers for it" (D,8195; 1982, 116).

The central problem of education, according to Nietzsche, is to establish what needs the individual has which are central to him and him alone. From this perspective, which is perhaps the most essential for the individual, Nietzsche was able to discern something even more indicative of European culture. This is revealed by him in an aphorism from the Third Book of Gay Science
Need. - Need is considered the cause why something came to be; but in truth it is often merely an effect of what has come to be. (GS, §205; 1974, 207)

Because of the European tendency to learn first and then invent the need that this learning fulfilled, Nietzsche believed that it was impossible for Bildung to progress from the foundations of a "so-called classical education". This is particularly remarkable for someone whose responsibility was the teaching of classical language and culture, and another example of the degree to which Nietzsche's renunciation of his own past could go, the degree to which he would laugh off the squandering of his own youth. Consistent with his assertion in Daybreak that it is impossible to know the needs of one's neighbour through the language which has been developed to explain them, so too with what is represented by the remains of Greek culture.

Nothing grows clearer to me year by year than that the nature of the Greeks and antiquity, however simple and universally familiar it may seem to lie before us, is very hard to understand, indeed is hardly accessible at all, and that the facility with which the ancients are usually spoken of is either a piece of frivolity or an inherited arrogance born of thoughtlessness. We are deceived by a similarity of words and concepts; but behind them there always lies concealed a sensation which has to be foreign, incomprehensible or painful to modern sensibility. And these are supposed to be the domains in which little boys are allowed to run around! (D,§185; 1982, 116)

This leads to what is most essentially radical in Nietzsche's concept of culture. Although he appeals to the Greeks as a parable in the Untimely Meditations, in Daybreak and Gay Science he asserts that they are completely alien to us and that we are
deceived when we think we understand something of their culture. This runs counter to what is arguable on the basis of historical scholarship, as we found in Chapter Four where it was necessary to examine the degree to which Hegel’s interpretative or hermeneutical dialectics could be reckoned with a degree of historical validity. What Nietzsche is invoking here is what makes him the idol of relativists, a degree of scepticism which allows perhaps too much to be wiped from the slate. Essentially, Nietzsche is counterbalancing the effect upon his culture, and upon current philosophies of self-cultivation, of “the pupils of Hegel”, whom he called in Human, All Too Human “the actual educators of this century” (H, II; 8170: 1986, 252). Nietzsche’s argument is with the Hegelian value which was placed upon the introduction of the young student to the world and language of antiquity by “finding oneself according to the truly universal essence of spirit” (Nürnberg Schriften in Gadamer, 1975; 14). Nietzsche insists that the “truth” of antiquity was “experienced differently”, and that anything which is brought back from the study of their world and language is fundamentally opposed to the kind of reason which, according to Hegel, rules in the modern self.

The illumination and the color of all things have changed. We no longer understand altogether how the ancients experienced what was most familiar and frequent - for example, the day and waking. Since the ancients believed in dreams, waking appeared in a different light. The same goes for the whole of life, which was illuminated by death and its significance; for us “death” means something quite different. All experiences shone differently because a god shone through them. All decisions and perspectives on the remote future, too; for they had oracles and secret
portents and belief in prophecy. "Truth" was experienced differently, for the insane could be accepted formerly as its mouthpiece — which makes us shudder or laugh. (GS, §152; 1974, 196-197)

This argument with Hegel is fundamental to Nietzsche's philosophy, as we have already found, having its roots in the division of the self from its expression in language. Which is attested by another aphorism from Book Three of Gay Science: "Even one's thoughts one cannot reproduce entirely in words" (GS, §244; 1974, 215). The division between the self and its expression in language renders the development of a community of taste established on education through the classical languages as especially unlikely. This takes us to the central problem which Hegel's philosophy of self-cultivation was meant to resolve, and reaffirms, if Nietzsche is right, the unanswered condition which Thomas Buddenbrook expressed when he called his personality a "prison". Hegel's demand that the individual "maintain" itself by "mediating [itself] with the universal" (PR, §297; 1942, 133) and find its fulfilment therein is not, on any level, going to get started on its Bildungsweg if Nietzsche's criticism is maintained. Nietzsche's conception of taste is by contrast, like his philosophy, a matter of personal taste based upon personal needs.

What Nietzsche sees as necessary is the development of a closer relationship between what is thought and what is felt, what is needed and what is learned. This is the central thread which runs through his philosophy before Zarathustra. As early as
Human, All Too Human this element of his philosophy had already formed itself in conscious reaction against the "actual educators" of his century.

Blessed are those who possess taste, even though it be bad taste! - And not only blessed: one can be wise, too, only by virtue of this quality; which is why the Greeks, who were very subtle in such things, designated the wise man with a word that signifies the man of taste, and called wisdom, artistic and practical as well as theoretical and intellectual simply 'taste' (sophia).

(H, II; §170: 1986, 252)

This follows on from the division which Nietzsche made between a science which merely gratified the "knowledge drive" and "wisdom" which was able to set limits through its application of the principles or art. Consistent with Nietzsche's assertion that morality defined according to "the neighbour affects" leads to the mistakes of pity (as in Daybreak) or the uniformity and hypocrisy of the "herd" (as in Gay Science) Nietzsche defines education according to the "moral sensations" as the training of the individual to ignore his actual needs. The "instrumental" nature of this kind of education, which Hegel saw as a preparation for the process of identification with the originally alien institutions of civil society, is condemned by Nietzsche in section 21 of Gay Science.

To the teachers of selfishness. - A man's virtues are called good depending on their probable consequences not for him but for us and society: the praise of virtues has always been far from "selfless", far from "unegoistic"... Thus what is really praised when virtues are praised is, first, their instrumental nature and, secondly, the instinct in every virtue that refuses to be held in check by the over-all advantage for the individual himself - in sum, the unreason in virtue that leads the individual to allow himself to be
transformed into a mere function of the whole. The praise of virtue is the praise of something that is privately harmful - the praise of instincts that deprive a human being of his noblest selfishness and the strength for the highest autonomy... Blindly raging industriousness, for example - this typical virtue of an instrument - is represented as the way to wealth and honor and as the poison that best cures boredom and the passions, but one keeps silent about its dangers, its extreme dangerousness. That is how education always proceeds: one tries to condition an individual by various attractions and advantages to adopt a way of thinking and behaving that, once it has become a habit, instinct, and passion, will dominate him to his own ultimate disadvantage but "for the general good."

(GS, §21; 1974, 92-94)

Nietzsche's concept of self-cultivation begins with the contradiction of this nature which has been produced by such an education. In his notebooks of the 1870's, under the title "Philosophy in Hard Times", Nietzsche wrote "Education [Bildung] contradicts a man's nature" (PHT, #41; 1979, 104). And in Daybreak he emphasised this aspect of contradiction in how, if the individual is to be cultivated in opposition to his culture, then not only must he step aside from the activities which require "instrumental" virtues, he must also be allowed to develop into what would, according to the "general rule", be called "evil" and dangerous to the institutions of his culture.

This is ideal selfishness: continually to watch over and care for and keep our soul still, so that our fruitfulness shall come to a happy fulfilment! Thus, as intermediaries, we watch over and care for to the benefit of all; and the mood in which we live, this mood of pride and gentleness, is a balm which spreads far around us and on to restless souls too. - But the pregnant are strange! So let us be strange too, and let us not hold it against others if they too have to be so! And even if the outcome is dangerous and evil: let us not be less reverential towards that which is coming to be than worldly justice is, which does not permit a judge or an executioner to lay hands on one
who is pregnant! (D, §552; 1982, 223)

The difficulty involved in Nietzsche's assertion, after the microcosmic/macrocosmic model which we have encountered in the Untimely Meditations and Human, All Too Human, is that a culture would have to permit the very thing which would lead to its downfall. So that like Thomas Buddenbrook, such an individual could only be interpreted as a symptom of decay [Verfallserscheinung] of a culture, or what Nietzsche called a "sign of corruption" [Anseichen der Korruption] (GS, §23). The microcosm would in this regard be the sign of the corruption of the macrocosm or, at least, the reflection of a macrocosm which had not yet come into existence.

It is at this point that Nietzsche's political philosophy becomes immediately relevant to his theory of self-cultivation. As I said earlier, there is a fundamental difference between Hegel's philosophy and Nietzsche's in this respect, which is not resolved by merely saying that the former did not believe in the importance of the self's relation to society and the latter saw it as the completion of the self in its recognition of itself in at least another. Whereas one of the principal weaknesses of Hegel's philosophy is its difficult relation to the state as it exists, the principal weakness of Nietzsche's is its lack of relation to any state whatsoever, except in a negative sense. Nietzsche's response to Hegel was, it cannot be repeated often enough, largely to his right-wing students. The irony is that
the majority of the response to Nietzsche has been to his perversion at the hands of the Nazis. So that when one looks at his politics one sees him from the same point of view from which he viewed Hegel: as a cultural danger. The more interesting difference between the two is that both can be interpreted as having potentially left or right-wing tendencies (Bruce Detwiler has recently examined how Nietzsche's work can be used in both contexts in his Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism). Nietzsche, however, is almost always viewed as right-wing, or criticised from the liberal-humanist perspective as responsible for the uses to which he was put by the Nazis by virtue of the fact that his philosophy so stridently denied, most relevantly, "the neighbour affects". What is perhaps more important is the other aspect of his philosophy which is often held against him is what he called "the pathos of distance" in section 257 of Beyond Good and Evil, the belief that there must always be two tiers to a society, what we have encountered as the common and the noble, with enough space between them to allow the noble to be untainted by the common. This aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy is made more explicit in the books after Zarathustra, but is certainly present in Gay Science and earlier. The relationship between the self and its culture is negative in Gay Science, as we have seen already from his Untimely Meditations and more specifically in his definition of Bildung as essentially contradiction. I have attempted to portray Nietzsche as remaining, to some degree, humanistic in these early works because it is only gradually that he rejects the "ecumenical
goals" which characterise so many of his expansive moments in *Human, All Too Human*, and only then for the particular philosophical reasons which I have enumerated above. The most important of which is, again, the gradually emergent principle of civilisation. Although Nietzsche’s definition of culture becomes more and more abstracted from a particular way of life (sense 2), he still relates the individual to other individuals at some level. This is perhaps most evident in section 23 of *Gay Science* in which Nietzsche makes a distinction between the common and the noble, but does so within the framework of civilisation.

*The signs of corruption.* - Consider the following signs of those states of society which are necessary from time to time and which are designated with the word "corruption"... when "morals decay" those men emerge whom one calls tyrants: they are the precursors and as it were the precocious harbingers of *individuals*. Only a little while later this fruit of fruits hangs yellow and mellow from the tree of a people - and the tree existed only for the sake of these fruits... Individuals - being truly in-and-for-themselves - care, as is well known, more for the moment than do their opposites, the herd men, for they consider themselves no less incalculable than the future.

The times of corruption are those when the apples fall from the tree: I mean the individuals, for they carry the seeds of the future and are the authors of the spiritual colonization and origin of new states and communities. Corruption is merely a nasty word for the autumn of a people. (GS, §23; 1974, 96-98)

Nietzsche’s "ecumenical goals" have ceased to be defined in terms of any present society, but remain intact within the framework of a future society. Which perhaps saves, or explains what was meant in the original section of *Human, All Too Human* (H, II; §180) where his vision "lifted a corner of the veil of the
future". The question as to whether or not this humanistic vision of "spiritual colonization" justifies the undermining of morality defined according to "the neighbour affects" can only be addressed once one has understood the way in which he develops his theory of self-cultivation. Consistent with his assertion that morality can only be defined in relation to mankind's task, "the production of individual great men", Nietzsche does not shy away from the conclusion that the "herd" is of no consequence. In Gay Science, mankind is either justified by these great men or it is squandered. This is made perfectly clear in the fourth section, "What preserves the species", where Nietzsche employs a traditional image in descriptions of Bildung in a radical context.

What is new... is always evil, being that which wants to conquer and overthrow the old boundary markers and the old pieties; and only what is old is good. The good men are in all ages those who dig the old thoughts, digging deep and getting them to bear fruit - the farmers of the spirit. But eventually all land is exploited, and the ploughshare of evil must come again and again.

In this almost Hegelian argument, which concludes by asserting that both good and evil are necessary to the species, is the development of an argument which was introduced in Daybreak where he gave precedence to the evil men in calling them "the pillars of a strong civilization" (D, §163; 1982, 100). The same stress is made by Nietzsche in section 23 of Gay Science where he writes that the "strongest and most evil spirits have so far done the most to advance humanity" (GS, §4; 1974, 79). And as Nietzsche
asserted it is only possible to conclude this problem by comparing "model against model" (Ibid).

The evil appearance of the "free spirit" is perhaps the source of the necessity for what Nietzsche calls "the ultimate noblemindedness" in Gay Science. In what I have described as the "dialectical relationship of hypocrisy", Nietzsche has portrayed the way in which the "free spirit" would have to allow both himself and his actions to appear as "the advocate of the rule". The ideal of the "free spirit" would be very difficult to recognise in this case, being something like a radical version of Kierkegaard's "Knight of Faith". The "noblest selfishness" and the highest autonomy would appear as the "instrumental" selflessness of the "herd". It is in this regard that Nietzsche turns to art in Gay Science where it is given a new definition. Nietzsche means by "art" not only the ability to keep the "knowledge drive" within limits, but also to hide oneself, to wear a mask, as is necessary for the "free spirit" if he is to develop his "ideal selfishness" in contradistinction to his culture. But art means even more than this in early Nietzsche. If one returns to the notebooks of the 1870's, one finds that he asserts that "art alone is truthful".

Man's longing to be completely truthful in the midst of a mendacious natural order is something noble and heroic. But this is possible only in a very relative sense. That is tragic. That is Kant's tragic problem! Art now acquires an entirely new dignity. The sciences, in contrast, are degraded to a degree.

The truthfulness of art: it alone is now honest.
Thus, after an immense detour, we again return to the natural condition (that of the Greeks). It has proven to be impossible to build a culture upon knowledge.
(tP, #73; 1979, 28-29)

In keeping with the gradual diminution of Nietzsche's ecumenical outlook, the central concern with the foundation of a culture in the notebooks has been transformed in *Gay Science* into the establishment of the "free spirit" in contradistinction to his society or culture. But this also emphasises how art is related to what we saw as the "post-Copernican" problem of morality and knowledge in the last section. It is possible to circumvent the extreme scepticism of "Kant's tragic problem", according to Nietzsche, through the "truthfulness of art". And as we have seen above, it was this very "truthfulness" which stood between the modern self and the Greeks.

What lies at the heart of Nietzsche's interest in art in *Gay Science* is the problem which, as he wrote in his notes in 1888, "was his earliest preoccupation" and which he still could not contemplate "without holy terror": "the relationship between art and truth" (*Musarion Ausgabe*, Vol. 14; 326: Posthumous Notes of 1888). Which is no wonder when one considers how much was brought to bear upon this relationship. If in *Daybreak* Nietzsche introduced the importance of an expanded sense of beauty which would allow the appreciation of individuals without subsuming them under the mendacious categories of a morality based upon "the neighbour affects", in *Gay Science* he goes on to assert that it is art which will allow the development of those individuals
in accordance with their own necessity. In this sense Nietzsche makes art, or the aesthetic, the medium through which one relates to other people, which is the annexation of the prior domain of the moral. This principle of perception is taken further and made the linchpin upon which all reality is to be raised up to consciousness, which at the same time exemplifies Nietzsche's characteristically wilful interpretation of Kant.

_How far the moral sphere extends._ - As soon as we see a new image, we immediately construct it with the aid of all our previous experiences, depending on the degree of our honesty and justice. All experiences are moral experiences, even in the realm of sense perception.

(GS, §114; 1974, 173-174)

The "proper beauty" (D, §468; 1982, 195) which "belongs to each man" is not to be imposed upon him, however, but is to be observed and appreciated and not catalogued and condemned by this morality of experience. What Nietzsche attempts to portray in this aphorism is the degree to which "honesty" is to be brought to bear upon the post-Copernican reality in which both people and things are situated.

Following his previous program for the achievement of knowledge, which was established as early as the _Untimely Meditations_, "honesty" demands that one first attempt to come to an understanding of oneself. This, according to Nietzsche, would have to incorporate a knowledge of the smallest things in order to rise up to the level of a general understanding of the way in which individual perceptions can be accounted for. Nietzsche
does away with science's encroachment upon this area by first pointing out that anyone "who now wishes to make a study of moral matters opens up for himself an immense field for work" because in order to understand the laws which govern the individual one would need to have achieved an understanding "of the moral effects of different foods", marital status, occupation, climate, etc. (GS, §7; 1974, 82-83). He then banishes science from this field by asserting that once "whole generations, and generations of scholars" had collaborated systematically and exhausted their research, "the most insidious question of all would emerge into the foreground: whether science can furnish goals of action after it has proved that it can take such goals away and annihilate them" (Ibid). Using his architectural image which is often employed for fundamental cultural terms, Nietzsche concludes that "science has not yet built its cyclopic buildings; but the time for that, too, will come" (Ibid). This is where Nietzsche's ultimate scepsis steps in, recalling the central argument of Daybreak. It is only a complete knowledge of the physis which would enable one to understand oneself, and here he returns to the central stumbling block of morality.

Long live physics! - How many people know how to observe something? Of the few who do, how many people observe themselves? "Everybody is farthest away - from himself"; all who try the reins know this to their chagrin, and the maxim "know thyself!" addressed to human beings by a god, is almost malicious. That the case of self-observation is indeed as desperate as that is attested best of all by the manner in which almost everybody talks about the essence of moral actions - this quick, eager, convinced and garrulous manner with its expression, its smile, and its obliging ardour!...

(GS, §335; 1974, 263)
Because one cannot observe oneself impartially, it is impossible to come to a knowledge of the self or, consequently, of others. The principal stumbling block which Nietzsche elaborates in this respect, is something like that which Otto Neurath made famous in *Erkenntnis*: that one cannot evaluate the whole structure of observation while using it, one can only single out small aspects of the structure one at a time. Which makes no very helpful contribution when what is needed are "cyclopic buildings" which can accommodate the everyday lives and ultimate goals of individuals.

Nietzsche goes on to approach the problem once again. If we want to understand ourselves we must reject the development of general principles altogether and even desist from the kind of observation which is directed either by or towards such considerations and "limit ourselves to the purification of our opinions and valuations and to the creation of our own new tables of what is good" (Ibid). With its emphasis upon creating and restriction to opinions, this physics is merely another word for art. So that when Nietzsche turns to the conclusion of what will be the bases of this physics he is actually laying down the foundations for the creation of the individual. This is Nietzsche's essential credo for the artist.

We, however, want to become those we are—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves. To that end we must become the best learners and discoverers of everything that is lawful and necessary to the world: we must
become physicists in order to be able to be creators in this sense—while hitherto all valuations and ideals have been based on ignorance of physics or were constructed so as to contradict it. Therefore: long live physics! And even more so that which compels us to turn to physics—our honesty!

(GS, §335; 1974, 263-266)

This proves to be the foundation for the decisive turn in Gay Science to the powers of art. It is upon the basis of this microcosmic artistic activity that Nietzsche erects the "cyclopean building" of civilisation in the establishment of the "free spirit". The "honesty" of this art is the "seal of liberation—No longer being ashamed in front of oneself" (GS, §275; 1974, 22). As an inversion of the Schillerian doctrine of aesthetic education—that through the aesthetic state man is henceforth able to make of himself what he will, i.e. to be morally determined—Nietzsche's moral "honesty" allows the "free spirit" to create for himself, in accordance with his physis, his own table of values. Which could be seen as Nietzsche's ultimate pinching of the Kantian moralist's buttock: freedom is acting in accordance with the individual laws of one's own physis.

It is in this manner that Nietzsche turns to what I have called "the aesthetic discourse of individuality" in the Gay Science. This is particularly clear in that art, for Nietzsche, is not meant to be any particular art or artform, but a relationship between the self and his conception of himself and his world. In so far as this relationship is active, however, it is the creation of the self and the world. What one learns from looking
into the souls of artists and writers, according to Nietzsche is more important than what one learns from their particular works. One exception to this rule in *Gay Science* is in section 78 where Nietzsche says that from an understanding of the theater we learn "the art of staging and watching ourselves" (GS, §78; 1974, 133). This is introduced by Nietzsche in section 78, after he has made a distinction between northern, "narcotic", art and southern art which delights in "the mask" (GS, §77; 1974, 132). Which points towards what is perhaps the natural extension of the microcosmic/macrocosmic argument of *Human, All Too Human*. The division between the noble and the common, which is so essential to Nietzsche's analysis of society, is repeated within the soul of the individual. The common drives and impulses which the "honest" physicist has gained a knowledge of, must be concealed behind a mask in order for it to made beautiful.

*What should win our gratitude.* - Only artists, and especially those of the theater, have given men eyes and ears to see and hear with some pleasure what each man is himself, experiences himself, desires himself; only they have taught us to esteem the hero that is concealed in everyday characters; only they have taught us the art of viewing ourselves as heroes - from a distance and, as it were, simplified and transfigured - the art of staging and watching ourselves. Only in this way can we deal with some base details in ourselves. Without this art we would be nothing but foreground and live entirely in the spell of that perspective which makes what is closest at hand and most vulgar appear as if it were vast, and reality itself.

(GS, §78, 1974, 132-133)

The importance of this stressing of the theater so early in *Gay Science* brings it into close proximity with the image of the shopwindow [Schauladen] which Nietzsche employed in *Daybreak* to
portray the self-deception which he saw at work in a morality based upon "the neighbour affects". What is portrayed in this aphorism, the economic relationship in which the self comes to value in himself that which he believes will be and has been valued by his neighbour, is echoed in this section from *Gay Science*. What is learned from the theater could be interpreted as the way in which one can engage in this process without deceiving oneself, and furthermore actually pleasing oneself. This is not, necessarily, an inflation of the level of complexity with which Nietzsche is putting forth his arguments if one considers the section which precedes, and is perhaps an extension of the same argument which is to be found in, section 55 (*The ultimate noblemindedness*). In section 54, *The consciousness of appearance*, Nietzsche presents the possibility that if one were to realise that one’s life was dependent upon dreaming and illusion, was constituted by it, and could be said to have woken up in this regard, that one would be confronted by a problem: what would appearance be for one?

Certainly not the opposite of essence: what could I say about any essence except to name the attributes of its appearance! Certainly not a dead mask that one could place on an unknown x or remove from it!

(*GS*, 854; 1974, 116)

The only thing which Nietzsche conceives to be possible in such a case is to define appearance as that which successfully maintains itself, and the knowledge of its nature as merely a consciousness of the action which constitutes the illusion without anything more than that. Nietzsche concludes by revealing this as a
parable: "the sublime consistency and interrelatedness of all knowledge perhaps is and will be the highest means to preserve the universality of dreaming and the mutual comprehension of all dreamers and thus also the continuation of the dream" (Ibid). So that the possibility which is perhaps opened up to an interpretation of Nietzsche's overall argument is that through our "honesty" we - to adopt Nietzsche's plural - can recognise that we must create a table of values which can accommodate those drives which are necessary to our particular well-being, but not necessarily beautiful to contemplate. But that through the "art of staging and watching ourselves" we can "deal with those base details in ourselves" and create an image of ourselves which is "simplified and transfigured", which removes those "base details" from the foreground of our self-consciousness and incorporates them into a heroic image in which we can take pleasure. And in so far as this is elaborated against the knowledge that it is merely an appearance, we can be conscious that the only way in which we can have a knowledge of ourselves which can maintain itself in the face of a "mendacious natural order" is through such an activity. The image of the theater can be seen as the transformation of the shopwindow in this way, the acceptance and creation of an illusion which, although it still constitutes the individual does not deceive him. If one then turns to section 55 and its ultimate noblemindedness, one can see how the "free spirit" could employ this microcosmic art at the macrocosmic level and maintain his nobility by incorporating his stage play into the unself-conscious shopwindow play of the "common natures"
who surround him. In this way the "free spirit" could become what Nietzsche called, in section 54, one of "the masters of ceremonies of existence" (GS, §54; 1974, 116). This could be seen as an extension of what Nietzsche called "The comedy played by the famous" in section 30, and could even supply a biographical insight into Nietzsche's relationship with Richard Wagner. Nietzsche extends the microcosmic/macrococsmic argument to compare such men to "great cities".

Famous men who need their fame, like all politicians, for example, never choose allies and friends without ulterior motives: from one they desire the reflected splendour of his virtue; from another the fear inspired by some of the dubious qualities that everybody associates with him; from someone else they steal the reputation of his leisure, his lying in the sun, because it serves their own purposes to appear inattentive and idle at times (this conceals the fact that they actually lie in wait); now they need a dreamer near them, now an expert, now a thinker, now a pedant, as if he were their alter ego; but soon they do not need them any more. Thus the surroundings and exteriors of famous men die continually, even while everybody seems to be pushing to get near them and lend them his own character: in this they resemble great cities. Their reputation keeps changing like their character, for their changing instruments demand these changes and push now this and now that real or fictitious quality out onto the stage. Their friends and allies belong, as I have said, to these stage qualities. What they wish, on the other hand, must stand that much more firmly and unmoved, its splendour visible from a distance; and this too, occasionally requires a comedy and a stage play.

(GS, §30; 1974, 102)

The invention, concealment, and manipulation of the "wish" of the "free spirit", as "evil" or "noble" if compared to the "common natures" of whatever culture in which it happens to have
cultivated itself, could be portrayed in this Machiavellian image.

It is possible, however, to end this examination of Bildung on a less sinister note. Nietzsche's "free spirit" can be understood as the continuation of a tendency which has already been touched upon. In the earlier chapter which dealt with Schiller (to pick up Adorno's point about the shift in nineteenth century aesthetics) there was a shift away from a conservative ideal of self-cultivation, with its emphasis upon the harmonious development of the natural self, "to the expanding supremacy of the concept of human freedom and dignity" (Adorno, 1984; 92) which emphasises the radical break with both the past and nature. This was fulfilled by Schlegel's concept of radical self-cultivation with its representation of the self in autonomy from all existing orders, dedicated to an infinite self-cultivation which is an expression of its disdain for any particular style or all-too human way of life. In terms of the "aesthetic discourse of individuality" this favoured the disruptive and "absolutely great" of the sublime over the harmony of the beautiful. Nietzsche's concept of self-cultivation is not so easily characterizable in this regard. I think that the argument which I put forward above places his theory - if it is fair to call it a theory at all - quite solidly in the camp of radical self-cultivation and its association with the sublime. But there is another side to Nietzsche's self cultivation which needn't be so strenuously radical. This is the aspect of his early philosophy
which emphasises style, what Nietzsche called the one thing needful for all characters.

One thing is needful. - To "give style" to one's character - a great and rare art! It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. Here a large mass of second nature has been added; there a piece of original nature has been removed - both times through long practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly that could not be removed is concealed; there it has been reinterpreted and made sublime. Much that is vague and resisted shaping has been saved and exploited for distant views; it is meant to beckon toward the far and immeasurable. In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governed and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad is less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste!

(\textit{GS}, \S290; 1974, 232)

With this emphasis upon a "single taste" governing and forming "everything large and small", Nietzsche reintroduces into "the aesthetic discourse of individuality" the image of the individual as a work of art which is a "self-sufficient whole", which we encountered in Schlegel's criticism of Goethe's \textit{Wilhelm Meister}. But this principle of self-sufficiency might be capable of being extended to culture as a whole. If one recalls his definition of culture in the \textit{Untimely Meditations}, it is possible to find a more accommodating line which runs through the writings before \textit{Zarathustra}. "Culture is, above all, unity of style in all the expressions of the life of a people" (\textit{UM}, I; 1: 1983, 5-6).

Nietzsche's concept of style, with its concomitant concept of taste, can be seen as both a matter of individual self-creation,
bringing the same aspects of his philosophy into play which we examined above, as well as a unifying principle for a culture in a way that his mask- and stage-play cannot, so easily. It is possible, however, that style may be the prerogative of the powerful alone, in that it - consistent with Adorno's insight - requires the subordination of nature.

It will be strong and domineering natures that enjoy their finest gaiety in such constraint and perfection under a law of their own; the passion of their tremendous will relents in the face of all stylized nature. Even when they have to build palaces and design gardens they demur at giving nature freedom. (Ibid)

But although style, as the adoption of a controlling principle does require the exercise of power, and might be above the weaker or common natures, Nietzsche stresses that it is needful even for them. In this respect he asserts that style is the "One thing needful" for all people. So that even though rank, or "the pathos of distance" shines through the difference between formalised or contained nature, and wild nature, there is a way in which it accommodates the differences without necessary manipulation or hostility. The powerful might, after all, have their reasons for preferring the pleasures of wild nature too.

Conversely, it is the weak characters without power over themselves that hate the constraint of style. They feel that if this bitter and evil constraint were imposed upon them they would be demeaned; they become slaves as soon as they serve; they hate to serve. Such spirits - and they may be of the first rank - are always out to shape and interpret their environment as free nature: wild, arbitrary, fantastic, disorderly, and surprising. And they are well advised because it is only in this way that they can give pleasure to themselves. (Ibid, 232-233)
There is a more humanistic tendency in style which is brought out by Nietzsche at some points in *Gay Science*. This could be seen as a reflection of Humboldt's concern for the development of an inner garden in Nietzsche's definition of style which, despite its emphasis upon formality as the expression of power in opposition to wild nature as expressing the demurring in the face of nature's power, implies that everyone can, to some degree, take pleasure in style. And as Nietzsche stressed, this is important for everyone, even the powerful.

For one thing is needful: that a human being should *attain* satisfaction with himself, whether it be by means of this or that poetry and art; only then is a human being at all tolerable to behold. Whoever is dissatisfied with himself is continually ready for revenge, and we others will be his victims, if only by having to endure his ugly sight. For the sight of what is ugly makes one bad and gloomy. *(Ibid, 233)*

It is with this beautiful harmony between the importance of power, which characterises Nietzsche's writings after *Zarathustra*, and the humanistic tendencies which never quite fades from his earlier writings, that I conclude.
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