

# **Reconceptualising the role of schooling in intergenerational social mobility: Patterns, perspectives and experiences from rural Pakistan**



**Muhammad Arif Naveed**  
Faculty of Education  
University of Cambridge

This dissertation is submitted for the degree of  
*Doctor of Philosophy*

**Jesus College**

January 2019



## **DECLARATION**

This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of the work done in collaboration, except where specifically indicated in the text. It is not substantially the same as I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or a diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution. The length of this thesis does not exceed the prescribed word limit as given by the Degree Committee of the Faculty of Education

Muhammad Arif Naveed  
January 31, 2019



# **Reconceptualising the role of schooling in intergenerational social mobility: Patterns, perspectives and experiences from rural Pakistan**

**Muhammad Arif Naveed**

## **ABSTRACT**

Whether schooling can be a potent force for creating a just society depends on its role in improving the life chances of individuals and households. This thesis evaluates the take up of mass schooling in rural Pakistan and examines whether the agenda of *Education For All* has been sufficiently strong to promote greater intergenerational social mobility especially in such contexts where customs, traditions and economic realities of poverty play such a major part. This thesis identifies new relevant theoretical, methodological and analytical frameworks with which to analyse empirically the dialectic relationship between the role of mass schooling and the rural social structure of the country.

This thesis develops a triangulated, mixed-methods research design to offer: (a) a critical analysis of the national educational policies and economic visions during 1947-2010; (b) a statistical analysis of longitudinal datasets of rural households (1986-2014) using mobility metrics, ordered logistic regression, OLS regression and Fixed Effect models to track the patterns of intergenerational educational mobility and its role in social mobility; and, (c) insights generated from qualitative data gathered through fieldwork in a rural Punjab community using semi-structured interviews with 23 members of eight families (mothers, fathers and sons/daughters), and four key informants.

The metanarrative constructed through policy analysis uncovered the political rationale for the expansion of education in relation to economic and social goals. It illustrates the periods and critical moments, since independence, when the Pakistan government and its economic and educational policy-makers discursively framed the role of schooling as promoting the goals of meritocracy, reforming the social order, and addressing the continuing problems caused by poverty and disadvantage and social exclusion. The statistical analysis reveals the changing patterns of association of paternal schooling levels and maternal literacy with the

schooling levels of sons and daughters between 1986-2010, as well as the mediating effects of economic status and landownership. The analysis uncovers the existence of an S-shaped education system where those at the top of the educational and economic distribution maintained their advantage over generations. Those located in the middle strata experienced educational mobility, whilst those at the bottom of this stratification remained trapped, experiencing little change over generations despite the expansion of education between 1986-2010. Regression analysis establishes an increasing role of fathers' schooling in predicting sons' schooling whilst the level of mothers' literacy predicts the level of daughters' schooling. While there was a weakening of the effects of economic status on sons' schooling, these effects were strengthened for daughters' schooling during 1986-2010.

The statistical analysis also established a high rate of intergenerational economic mobility as measured by household consumption expenditure, income and wealth which was strongly mediated by the educational levels of household members. The households whose male and female members experienced upward intergenerational educational mobility over the 28 years also experienced high upward economic mobility. There were higher additional economic returns to higher levels of schooling, and the long-range returns to schooling of female family members were significantly higher than that of male members. Importantly, households that spent a higher share of their consumption expenditure on schooling experienced high long-term economic returns. The downward economic mobility of households with unschooled/low schooled members pointed towards a profound role of schooling in shaping the patterns of economic inequality over generations.

The analysis of qualitative data identified the gendered values, meanings and strategies for social mobility in the wake of the rise of mass schooling. Families seemed to prepare sons for their economic success and daughters for their marital success which is described by a concept of *maritocracy* (marriage to a more educated and higher social status husband). The village case study demonstrated the role of schooling in social mobility through the lens of social conflict and social closure. Privileged families (the landowner, the higher castes, those identified with the majority religion) adapted a range of the *exclusionary social closure* strategies to monopolise resources and opportunities. In contrast, underprivileged families relied on a range of *inclusionary usurpation* strategies to escape their domination and to secure better futures for their children. The case study illustrates that any transformative

potential of schooling is heavily mediated by local community power relations that shape life chances of individuals.

The thesis offers a model of social mobility appropriate for the study of the impact of the rise of mass schooling in economic and social change in Pakistan. It demonstrates the possibility of adapting and developing an economic and sociological understanding of intergenerational mobility models that takes account of the social forces such as the government agendas for educational expansion within low income contexts, and the ways in which various forms of rural social structure mediate the uptake of such educational expansions over generations and across gender, and the economic and social returns to such schooling. This thesis demonstrates the potential of a highly interdisciplinary approach and mixed methods research design in uncovering the microlevel social and economic change over generations resulting from the rise of mass schooling in the context of rural Pakistan.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to express my heartfelt gratitude to Madeleine Arnot for inspiring me to pursue a career in educational research, years before I arrived at Cambridge. Ever since my collaboration with her on the RECOUP project in 2009, and over the years of my PhD, she has urged me at every point to grow intellectually, think critically and to write fluidly. I had the privilege of publishing our research together which taught me so much about what genuine scholarship entails. I would not have taken up this career without her inspiration and might not have grown without her untiring support and mentorship. I was also lucky to have Anna Vignoles as my second supervisor. Conceptualising and designing this doctoral project was undoubtedly a courageous undertaking, as it involved a lot of painstaking navigation through unfamiliar territory, and I would not have been able to accomplish it without both my supervisors' support. Both Madeleine and Anna have patiently dealt with my slow navigation through the wide range of theories, methods and data sources, often involving schizophrenic shifts from one version of reality to the other. Their commitment to rigour, minute detail, and ethics taught me a great deal, which was not always an easy learning process, but will always be a source of immense strength. I could not have asked for a better supervisory panel.

My thanks also go to my advisor, Pauline Rose whose support in thinking strategically about my project at the initial stage was very useful, to Shailaja Fennell who challenged me with some difficult questions, identifying the blind spots in my approach during my registration viva. Those initial warnings usefully shaped my project. I am indebted too to several other members of the Faculty of Education who supported me intellectually throughout the course of my research including Ben Alcott, Pam Bernard, Jo-Anne Dillabough, Karen Forbes, Susan Robertson, Ricardo Sabates, Nidhi Singal and Arathi Sriprakash. I have benefitted from many stimulating and socially enjoyable engagements with fellow doctoral students and am thankful particularly to Nazipa Ayabuyeva, Vincent Backhouse, Lakshmi Bose, Charleen Chiong, Meghna Chowdhuri, Rebecca Gordon, Mona Jibreil, Aliya Khalid, Maria Khwaja, Janice Kim, Farida Lari, Siddharth Pandey, Patrick Oslen, Hanan Ramahi, Sahar Shah, Yifan Sun, Peter Sutoris, Cora Xu and Asma Zubairi, The administrative support offered by Emma Rixon was always more than I asked for. Here I also want to thank Robin Young who offered a great hospitality throughout my long supervisions with Madeleine over the years.

This project would not have been possible without the earlier financial support of the Cambridge Commonwealth Trust and the Faculty of Education who supported my *M.Phil. in Educational Research*. Gates Cambridge Trust not only offered me incredibly generous financial support for my PhD but also for provided me the opportunity to know a large number of inspiring young leaders from across the world. I am particularly thankful to my friends Anija Dockter, Asiya Islam, Vincent Kim, Ananya Mishra, Bhasi Nair, Greg Wilsnech, Njoki Wamai for making my time at Cambridge truly memorable. Thanks are also due to other Gates Scholars including Miriam Alvarado, Margaret Comer, Tariq Desai, Jerelle Joseph, Safwan Khan, Rebecca Love, and Callie Vandeweile for their support in various ways.

It is important too that I acknowledge the influence of Mahvish Ahmad whose commitment to the causes of social justice and critical scholarship has been inspiring and with whom I co-founded *Critical Pakistan at Cambridge* where we organised a number of academic events. During my time at Cambridge I was also privileged to be part of a superb academic community. I would like to thank the Fellows and staff at the Jesus College, and fellow students particularly Janani Ambikapathi Rebecca Habucha, Nungari Mwangi and Sohaib Rehman, and Abhiminyu Sharma for making the college a home for me. Several other friends have made Cambridge as a joyful place of learning for me including Elizabeth Abusleme, Taskeen Adam, Arsalan Ghani, Mariya Khan Martina Kvalja Luca Mannuchi, Amandla Mabona, , Muntazir Mehdi, Rashmi Singh and Meryem Tanwir,

This research would not have been possible without access to the quantitative data I have analysed. I am particularly thankful to the International Food Policy Research Institute for granting me privileged access to their latest data. My thanks go to Harold Alderman, Nazim Ali. Stephen Davies, Arshad Khurshed and Sohail J. Malik. I am also thankful to the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics for giving me access their datasets, particularly to G.M. Arif and Shujaat Farooq helped me greatly by dealing with my data queries. My sincere thanks to the participants of my research who generously offered me their time, attention and access to their personal life histories and valuable thoughts. I would like to thank Masood Sarwar Awan, Shakil Anwar, Sidrah Saleem and Iqra Saleem and Shakil Jappa for their support in my fieldwork. I am also thankful to Dody Riggs for the editorial support in improving my writings.

I have also enjoyed representing students at the Executive Committee of the British Association of International and Comparative Education during 2014-16 which enriched my understanding of international educational research. I am particularly thankful to Caroline Dyer and Qing Gu for their support in performing my role and particularly in hosting two doctoral conferences. During the course of my PhD, I learnt a great deal about intergenerational social relations by being a part of an intergenerational housing scheme during 2017-18 where I had a great time with Maurine, Early and other elderly residents. I am thankful to Cambridge Hub particularly to Lily Tomson for this opportunity. Also thanks to Jane Kershaw and Mathew Lost for hosting me in the last months of my PhD.

My research has benefitted from the valuable discussions with Humaira Iqtidar and Adeel Malik. My academic career owes a lot to the intellectual inspiration and personal support I have always received from Asad Zaman, and that with the mentoring by Geof Wood and Dibyesh Anand has profoundly shaped my scholarship and politics.

Lastly, my family has been a greatest source of inspiration and support throughout my doctoral journey. My heartfelt gratitude to Amma and Abba for their unwavering commitment to education of not just your own children but of so many others around them. Researching intergenerational social mobility and schooling, in a way, is my tribute to your role in opening up the life chances for me and my siblings, despite all the hardships – you are such an inspiration to us all. I also want to thank my brother Saleem for not only setting up a high bar for academic success for your siblings but also helping me through my journey in countless ways, and my brother Irfan for fulfilling my family obligations back home during my absence over so many years. Sincere thanks to Shabana, Mumtaz, Imtiaz, Khalid, Shaista and Shagufta – you are an amazing family to have.



## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

ASER: Annual State of Education Report

EFA: Education For All

FE: Fixed Effect

GMR: Global Monitoring Report

GOP: Government of Pakistan

IDEAS: Institute for Development and Economic Alternatives

IFPRI: International Food Policy Institute

IMF: International Monetary Fund

MDGs: Millennium Development Goals

MNA: Member National Assembly

MTDF: Medium Term Development Fund

OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OLS: Ordinary Least Square

PIDE: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics

PRHS: Pakistan Rural Household Survey

PPHS: Pakistan Panel Household Survey

RECOUP: Research Consortium on Educational Outcomes and Poverty

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>DECLARATION</b> .....	iii
<b>ABSTRACT</b> .....	v
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</b> .....	viii
<b>CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION</b> .....	1
<b>The Pakistan context</b> .....	10
<b>Structure of the thesis</b> .....	17
<b>CHAPTER 2 - RECONCEPTUALISING SCHOOLING AND INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY IN RURAL PAKISTAN</b> .....	20
<b>Conceptualising and investigating intergenerational social mobility</b> .....	21
<i>The origin–destination association</i> .....	22
<i>The origin–education association</i> .....	24
<i>The education–destination association</i> .....	26
<i>Intergenerational social/educational mobility research in the Global South</i> .....	27
<b>Rationality assumptions of the theoretical models of intergenerational social mobility</b> .	31
<i>Sociology’s functionalist explanation</i> .....	32
<i>Economic models of (bounded) rational behaviour</i> .....	34
<i>Models of socially bounded rationality</i> .....	38
<b>Social mobility within an agrarian social structure</b> .....	43
<i>Landownership</i> .....	45
<i>Kinship and caste structures</i> .....	47
<i>Relationships of patronage</i> .....	50
<i>Religion</i> .....	53
<i>Patriarchy</i> .....	55
<b>Concluding remarks</b> .....	57
<b>CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCHING INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY IN RURAL PAKISTAN</b> .....	60
<b>The case for mixed methods</b> .....	60
<b>The construction of social mobility in economic development agendas and educational policies (1947-2010)</b> .....	67
<b>The patterns of intergenerational educational and social mobility (1986-2014)</b> .....	71
<i>Intergenerational transition matrix</i> .....	77
<i>Quantitative data sources</i> .....	79
<b>An embedded case study of a punjabi village (2016)</b> .....	82

<i>Developing qualitative research instruments</i> .....	83
<i>Fieldwork</i> .....	85
<i>The family sample</i> .....	89
<i>Research ethics and field experiences</i> .....	91
<b>Concluding remarks</b> .....	<b>98</b>
<b>CHAPTER 4 - THE OPENING UP OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES:</b>	
<b>EDUCATION POLICIES AND ECONOMIC AGENDAS (1947-2010)</b> .....	<b>100</b>
<b>Establishing a meritocratic agenda for developing the economic infrastructure (1947-58)</b> .....	<b>103</b>
<b>Transforming social attitudes: creating the conditions for economic progress (1958-69)</b> .....	<b>109</b>
<b>The rise and fall of a distributive agenda and an islamist turn (1969-88)</b> .....	<b>116</b>
<b>International influences and the ‘drama of underdevelopment’: mass schooling takes shape (1988-2010)</b> .....	<b>123</b>
<b>A summary</b> .....	<b>133</b>
<b>CHAPTER 5 - PATTERNS OF INTERGENERATIONAL EDUCATIONAL</b>	
<b>MOBILITY (1986-2010)</b> .....	<b>143</b>
<b>The conceptual model of intergenerational social mobility</b> .....	<b>144</b>
<b>Data sources</b> .....	<b>150</b>
<i>Construction of variables</i> .....	151
<b>Methods</b> .....	<b>155</b>
<b>Schooling patterns of gender and wealth inequalities</b> .....	<b>156</b>
<b>Intergenerational educational mobility (1986-2010)</b> .....	<b>160</b>
<i>Intergenerational educational mobility metrics for sons (1986-2010)</i> .....	161
<i>Intergenerational educational mobility metrics for daughters (1986-2010)</i> .....	163
<i>Mother’s literacy status and schooling levels of sons and daughters (1986-2010)</i> ..	165
<b>Patterns and pathways: the intergenerational transmission of human capital</b> .....	<b>167</b>
<i>Sons’ schooling (1986-2010)</i> .....	167
<i>Daughters’ schooling (1986-2010)</i> .....	172
<b>Concluding remarks</b> .....	<b>177</b>
<b>CHAPTER 6 - INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SCHOOLING:</b>	
<b>1986-2014</b> .....	<b>179</b>
<b>Methodology and empirical strategy</b> .....	<b>182</b>
<i>Data</i> .....	182

<i>Variables of interest</i> .....	182
<b>Household economic status: intergenerational transition/mobility metrics</b> .....	<b>187</b>
<b>Parental schooling and intergenerational household social mobility</b> .....	<b>190</b>
<b>Returns to human capital and intergenerational mobility: an exploratory ols regression analysis</b> .....	<b>192</b>
<i>The OLS model for household per-capita consumption expenditures</i> .....	195
<i>The OLS model for household per-capita income</i> .....	197
<i>The OLS model for household wealth</i> .....	199
<i>Summary of the OLS findings</i> .....	202
<b>Fixed effect model of intergenerational social mobility</b> .....	<b>204</b>
<i>Consumption expenditures</i> .....	204
<i>Household income</i> .....	207
<i>Household wealth</i> .....	209
<b>Concluding remarks</b> .....	<b>212</b>
<b>CHAPTER 7 - SCHOOLING AND TARAQQI: A PERSPECTIVAL ANALYSIS</b> ....	<b>215</b>
<b>Notion of <i>taraqqi</i></b> .....	<b>216</b>
<i>A gendered notion</i> .....	219
<b>Social mobility and social closure</b> .....	<b>224</b>
<b>Modes of exclusionary closure</b> .....	<b>228</b>
<b>The usurpation strategies of the disadvantaged</b> .....	<b>239</b>
<b>Reflections</b> .....	<b>254</b>
<b>CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSION</b> .....	<b>257</b>
<b>Social mobility and educational provision: the official view</b> .....	<b>257</b>
<b>Intergenerational educational mobility</b> .....	<b>260</b>
<b>From educational to social mobility</b> .....	<b>263</b>
<b>From patterns to perspectives: taraqqi and schooling</b> .....	<b>265</b>
<b>Theoretical and methodological reflections</b> .....	<b>268</b>
<i>Methodological contributions of the thesis</i> .....	268
<i>Theoretical contributions of this study</i> .....	271
<b>REFERENCES</b> .....	<b>275</b>
<b>Appendix 3.1</b> .....	<b>303</b>
<b>Appendix 3.2</b> .....	<b>310</b>
<b>Appendix 6.1</b> .....	<b>319</b>

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: National progress over key educational indicators in Pakistan 1975-2015	12
Table 1.2: Educational inequalities towards the end of the EFA campaign (%)	13
Table 1.3 A broad classification of educational research in Pakistan	16
Table 3.1: Various mixed-methods design types and their main focus	65
Table 3.2: Selected policy documents (1947-2010)	69
Table 3.3: Survey rounds, sample size and coverage	81
Table 3.4: Key characteristics of the village	86
Table 3.5: Sample for semi-structured individual interviews	90
Table 3.6: Nodes and thematic codes for data analysis	98
Table 4.1: The four waves of policy narratives 1947-2010	135
Table 4.2: Policy enactment: Financial commitments, educational targets and achievements 1955-2010	138
Table 5.1: : Age and birth cohorts for parents, sons and daughters analysed (1986-2010)	151
Table 5.2: Schooling levels of sons and daughters across wealth distribution (1986-2010) – [% (No.)]	159
Table 5.3: Intergenerational educational mobility for sons (1986-2010) – [% (No.)]	162
Table 5.4: Intergenerational educational mobility coefficients for sons (1986-2010)	163
Table 5.5: Intergenerational educational mobility for daughters (1986-2010) – [% (No.)]	164
Table 5.6: Intergenerational educational mobility coefficients for daughters (1986-2010)	165
Table 5.7: Mother’s literacy status and schooling levels of sons and daughters (1986-2010) – [% (No.)]	166
Table 5.8: Ordered logistic regression for the highest schooling of sons in the household (1986-2010) [coefficients (standard errors)]	169
Table 5.9: Regression estimates for daughters’ schooling (1986-2010)	174
Table 6.1: Summary statistics of key variables: 1986-2014	186
Table 6.2: Intergenerational mobility metrics: 1986-2014	189
Table 6.3: Intergenerational social mobility from 1986 to 2014 and father’s schooling status in 1986	191
Table 6.4: OLS for log consumption expenditures in 2014	196
Table 6.5: OLS for log of per-capita income in 2014	198
Table 6.6: OLS regression outputs for wealth index 2014	201
Table 6.7: Fixed Effect Model for log consumption expenditures 1986-2014	205
Table 6.8: Fixed effect model for log income 1986-2014	208
Table 6.9: Fixed Effect Model for wealth index 1986-2014	210

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Towards a new model for studying the role of schooling in intergenerational social mobility in rural Pakistan	58
Figure 3.1: Mixed methods research design	67
Figure 3.2: Key focus of the semi-structured interviews	84
Figure 3.3: Politics–provision–perspectives: Three strands of research design	99
Figure 6.1: Strategy for the quantitative empirical analysis	185
Figure 7.1: Notion of <i>Taraqqi</i>	224
Figure 7.2: Modes of social closure	238
Figure 7.3: Usurpation strategies of the dominated	253
Figure 7.4: Social closure, schooling and social mobility in rural Pakistan	255

## LIST OF BOXES

Box 2.1: Key findings of Narayan et al. (2018)	29
Box.3.1: Core characteristic of mixed-methods research	64
Box 4.1: Islamisation objectives of the National Education Policy and Implementation Programme 1979	121
Box 7.1: Akhtar’s family: Self-perpetuating advantage	230
Box 7.2: Khadim’s family	240
Box 7.3: Bakht’s family	242
Box 7.4: Akhtar’s family	244
Box 7.5: Liaqat’s family	246

## CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

This thesis investigates the role formal schooling plays in intergenerational social mobility against a backdrop of the recent rise of mass schooling in many low- and middle-income countries of the Global South. The aim is to assess whether increased access to basic and hence secondary schooling reduces social inequality over time and generations by encouraging a more flexible and open structure in which individuals, from whatever background, can take up educational opportunities and access higher status livelihoods, and thus live more prosperous lives. Social mobility research as an international field has an implicit commitment to promote social justice through the exploration of how equally social and economic opportunities are distributed in a society. It has the potential to assess the social and economic impact of specific educational policies on the lives of individuals, families and communities, and thus to evaluate governments' changing priorities and investments in economic development and in promoting universal human rights.

In this thesis, I explore what the notion of social mobility might mean in my own country, Pakistan. My aim is to bring rural Pakistan into the main framework of social mobility research in ways that throw light on schooling's potential to transform a predominantly rural society, where power and patronage are based in landowning families, where military elites have controlled the government, and where market-led, capital-intensive industry has had to adapt to largely agricultural communities.<sup>1</sup> I explore whether the Education For All (EFA) agenda has been or could be strong enough to promote greater social mobility, especially in rural contexts where customs, traditions and the economic realities of poverty play a major part.

Whilst some might argue that the goal of economic development in the name of alleviating poverty is sufficiently difficult without diverting attention to the goal of social mobility, I believe, and thus aim to demonstrate, that this framework is a powerful tool to use for that agenda. Social mobility research as evaluative research throws the spotlight on structural, relational, cultural and personal dimensions of social change while taking a temporal dimension into consideration. It focuses attention on intergenerational aspirations and

---

<sup>1</sup> According to the National Census 2017, more than 60% of country's 220 million population lives in rural areas.

practices relative to the schooling of children, and on the dynamics of change within existing social orders. This is not to say that the framework is immediately accessible for the study of a country like Pakistan, with its chequered history forged out of a colonial past, extraordinary demographic and geographic reshaping by international governments, and powerful theocratic traditions that have shaped the national culture. Adopting the lens of social mobility for this research therefore requires a substantial extension of the frontiers of the field which is currently predicated largely on the experiences of industrialised nations. In its ambitions and its practice, therefore, I believe this thesis makes an original contribution to the scholarly agenda and methodological dimensions of this field. The originality of the study lies in promoting greater understanding of the history and practice of the politics of education and the implementation of education reform in Pakistan. It identifies new and relevant theoretical, methodological and analytical frameworks with which to analyse empirically the dialectic relationship between the uptake of mass schooling and the country's rural social structure.

Both economics and sociology have contributed to the vibrant tradition of intergenerational social mobility research by examining the extent to and ways in which individuals' life chances are shaped by their social and economic origins. These two disciplines explore in different ways how the social and economic status of one generation differs from that of successive generations in a given society, and identify the underlying patterns of access to and use of opportunities and resources across social groups. *Social fluidity* occurs when there is a *degree of openness* and *fairness*, and if the political goal is an open and just society, then social fluidity would be apparent in the extent to which any individual, through their own efforts, can achieve wealth, power and/or status, regardless of their family background. In this context, it is important to identify the macro- and micro-level structures that constrain or support prospects for social mobility.

Crucial from the perspective of social justice is the normative (although contested) ideal of creating *equality of opportunity* which lies at the core of intergenerational social mobility research. Some philosophers have argued that, to create a socially just society, equal resources must be provided to all individuals (Rawls, 1971; Dworkin, 1981), whilst others have suggested that, to create equality of valued outcomes, different resources are required to meet individuals' varied needs (Sen, 1980, 1998) so as to equalise individuals' freedom to choose over the states of being and doing that they value. The key argument here is that the societal goal is to provide equal opportunities for individuals to attain the outcomes they value and to

equalise the factors they do not control, instead of providing equal wealth or other outcomes (Cohen, 1989). Whether or not individuals chose from the opportunities thus provided was considered beyond the scope of social justice. These approaches required more information, particularly on what counts as *circumstances* to be compensated for, which is beyond what counts as individual *responsibility* and requires differentiated rewards.

‘Levelling the playing field’, as Roemer (1993) argued, requires society to compensate individuals for differences in outcomes which are beyond their control whilst at the same time respecting individual efforts through proportional rewards.<sup>2</sup> In industrialised nations, these debates gained particular salience in the post-World War II era, when the notion of *meritocracy* was presented as the means with which to achieve *equality of opportunity* (Arrow, Bowles and Durlauf, 2000). Meritocracy linked individuals’ economic and social status with their *ability* and *effort* instead of their family background and was supposed to have provided the conditions necessary for greater social mobility.<sup>3</sup> The concept promised that the relationship between individuals’ social *origins* and their social and occupational *destinations* would weaken over time, thus allowing individuals the opportunity to move across social class classifications regardless of their origin.

Given the rise of mass schooling in post-war Britain, it was believed that the association between education and social and occupational destination would *improve*, as competitive labour markets would reward high academic credentials (Devine and Li 2013). Education would become a strong ‘arbiter of social class’ (Brown, 2013) by providing individuals with higher credentials and access to economic opportunities, differentiated across their abilities and effort, thus solving the conflict between efficiency and social justice (Bell, 1976).<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Given that the two principles can be independent of each other, (Ferreira and Peragine 2015) argued that an outcome-egalitarian policy can satisfy the compensation principle while ignoring the reward principle, whereas a laissez-faire policy can fulfil the reward principle but ignore the compensation principle. They note that various combinations of these two principles can be logically inconsistent, as noted by (Fleurbaey 1995). Moreover, there are varying versions of the compensation principle. In the *ex-ante* version, opportunities are equalised for everyone regardless of circumstances, whereas the *ex-post* version rewards are equalised for equal levels of efforts made by individuals.

<sup>3</sup> In contrast to its popular contemporary use in political debates, Michael Young (1958) is believed to have coined this term satirically to invite some critical reflection (Alan 2011) on the pitfalls of transforming an ‘unjustly unequal’ society based on wealth inequalities into a ‘justly unequal’ one based on unequal distribution of abilities.

<sup>4</sup> As Rueda, Gutierrez and Vignoles, (2004) observe, due to its sole focus on equality of opportunity, meritocracy is compatible with an unequal society as it does not ensure equal outcomes.

The post-World War II expansion of mass schooling therefore had a particular role in inspiring the field of intergenerational social mobility research. Consequently, there is now a large and growing body of literature that examines the role of schooling in promoting intergenerational social mobility, particularly in OECD countries (which I discuss in Chapter 2). This literature explores the extent to which (a) social origins affect educational success and (b) educational success in turn mediates the relationship between origins and destinations. Investigations of this triangular relationship between origins-education-destination have produced important insights into the ways a fair chance for everyone could be achieved through and beyond education. A major outcome of this tradition was the political focus on hidden or explicit barriers to mobility, discriminatory practices and the protection of privilege in certain occupations. Cross-country analyses have also shown that higher public spending on education, a greater share of public rather than private sector provision of education, and generally low levels of inequality are associated with higher intergenerational social mobility (for a review of such analyses, see Blanden (2013)).

One research strand examines the ways early childhood development, including prenatal and parental care, affects educational and economic outcomes in later life (for example, Francesconi and Heckman 2016). Another strand improves our understanding of the ways in which the types of schooling, the stage of selection into various educational streams and the private costs of schooling affect intergenerational mobility through the education system (Halsey et al. 1980; Erikson and Jonsson, 1996). A key thrust of the social mobility research is to determine whether the role of schooling is a transformative or a reproductive force in society, it thus investigates the extent to which the association between education and social and occupational destinations has strengthened over time and across contexts (Breen and Luijckx 2004).

By the beginning of the new millennium, countries in the so-called Global South that traditionally had poor educational indicators began to make great strides in expanding their education systems in ways that supported the international development paradigm of *Education For All*.<sup>5</sup> The 2000 World Education Forum in Dakar holds a prominent position in the history of international education: at that Forum, 164 countries agreed to the EFA

---

<sup>5</sup> The term refers to the developing countries located mainly in the Southern-Hemisphere (UNDP, 2013).

framework which included achieving six broad educational goals by 2015. These goals were to improve early childhood care and education, universalise primary education, improve the skills levels of youth and adults, improve adult literacy, achieve gender equality and enhance the quality of education. From 2002 to 2019, UNESCO produced 15 Annual Global Monitoring Reports that tracked the progress of as many countries as possible in relation to a range of diverse education-related themes, including gender, quality, literacy, early childhood, governance, marginalisation, conflict, youth and skills, teaching and learning, achievements and challenges, people and the planet, accountability and migration. The Global Monitoring Report 2015 (UNESCO 2015) provided an assessment of the progress made from 2000 to 2015, noting that global educational progress that could be attributed to the EFA framework alone included a 17% higher increase in pre-primary gross enrolment; a 9 percentage point higher net primary enrolment rate, despite the poor progress made on this goal; less significant progress on survival rates particularly when increased enrolments were seen to slow the progress; and overall acceleration of gender parity at the primary level.<sup>6</sup> Viewed on a global scale, this is a remarkable result from the ‘big push’ that resulted from the increased global cooperation. Pakistan expanded its education system during this period, a point discussed below.

A rich body of literature explores the evolution of these international development goals and critically evaluates the conceptual and methodological underpinnings of the agenda, as well as the power relations embedded within them (see, for example, Fennell and Arnot, 2008; Colclough, 2012; Unterhalter, 2014). Unterhalter (2014), for example, noted that the results-oriented nature of the agenda tended to overlook wider concerns about social justice and global obligations. Moreover, the separation of otherwise closely linked goals generated its own contradictions. The increased emphasis on enrolment numbers appeared to have been achieved at the expense of quality. Unterhalter (2012) argued most importantly that the focus of gender under these goals meant ‘counting the numbers of girls and boys’ whilst failing to address ‘the complex relationships of power, history, emotions, or reflections that the

---

<sup>6</sup> The GMR 2015 also reported the percentage of countries that achieved these goals by 2015. As the number of countries for which data on each goal was available varied, the percentages are relevant to report here. 47% of countries (out of 148) achieved the goal for early childhood care and education; 52% (out of 140) achieved the goal of universal primary education; 45% (out of 75) achieved the goal of skills and lower secondary; 23% (out of 73) achieved the goal of adult literacy and education; and 48% (out of 170) achieved the goal of gender parity and equality.

scholarship on gender alerts us to' (Unterhalter, 2014, p. 857). The literature also noted that the goals tended to disregard the complexity of the local socioeconomic and cultural contexts.

The extraordinary expansion of education systems in countries where only minorities had achieved basic schooling calls for an analysis of the ways contemporary schooling levels interact with local social structures—that is, how schooling is mediated by them and what impact it has on them (Fennell and Arnot 2008; Colclough 2012). The origins of mass schooling are in the experiences of the Western countries that colonised most of the Global South. It is not yet clear how increased access to schooling (if not improved quality) interacts with the varied forms of social structure in these many formerly colonised countries. We also do not yet know where the new role of schooling sits relative to cultural and economic power relations, and to long-existing obstacles to meeting global education goals. The time is ripe to ask to what extent, and under what conditions, schooling plays a socially transformative role in these contexts and what obstacles and challenges have been and are being faced by those who see schooling as a means to promote egalitarian reform. From the point of view of economic development, within which these goals are framed, and of promoting social cohesion, we need to know whether increased schooling has led to increased social mobility, or whether the rise of mass schooling helped the dominant classes perpetuate their advantage.

A research agenda that tracks the social and economic status of successive generations is also important in the wake of those who wish to explore, from a postcolonial perspective, the ways the prevalent international development discourses drives public policies at a national level. Research conducted in Pakistan (for example, by Zaidi, 2002; Wood, 2013; Naveed and Suleri, 2015; Haque, 2018) illustrates the strong influence international aid agencies have over national policy-making by both setting the agenda for knowledge creation and mediating the uptake of such knowledge in public policies. Sajid Ali (2009), for example, highlighted the discursive effects the pressures of globalisation had on national educational policy-making in Pakistan by controlling international development assistance, which had material consequences. Postcolonial thinkers have increasingly demanded the acknowledgment of and challenge to the persisting colonial relations within the production of international education research (c.f., Takayama, Sriprakash, & Connell, 2017) and the breaking away from such dominance in the quest for alternative perspectives.

Having built my career as a poverty researcher and by being involved in the design and implementation of large-scale poverty-reduction projects across rural Pakistan, I have come to realise that the discourse on poverty fails to take a long-term perspective and to consider the structures that produce and reproduce poverty.<sup>7</sup> The lives of those living in poverty are not self-contained; they are shaped as much by their own negotiations and strategies as they are by the challenges set and strategies used by the non-poor. The analysis of poverty does not seem to provide a deep understanding of the factors that could explain the continuing or even new poverty of families, especially those living in underdeveloped rural areas. By locating my research in the field of social mobility instead of poverty alleviation and development studies, I believe I can offer a life-course and intergenerational approach that broadens the discursive framing of development studies. This approach will consider the distribution of wealth and power while exploring the factors associated with relative (dis)advantage. I believe my research offers insights that are highly relevant for the wider development agenda in Pakistan.

The study of intergenerational social mobility raises many theoretical, methodological and analytical challenges. First, with the exception of a few studies (Goldthorpe, 2014; Torche, 2015; Morgan, Grusky, & Fields, 2006) much of the theoretical and empirical literature has been advanced by the separate disciplines of economics and sociology. Although they may study the same context or phenomenon, the two disciplines diverge in important ways. Research conducted in the context of education and international development, which is heavily reliant on econometrics and development economics, draws from models of human capital (such as those developed by Becker and Tomes (1979; 1986)) that rest on the assumption of the *rational economic agent*. Given concerns about human rights, equality and social justice, it is important to recognise that different social structures can differently condition individuals' rationality (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), and thus limit the potential of theoretical models based on rationality assumptions. Therefore, there is a need to draw from sociological theory and empirical research to uncover the *structuring structures* (Bourdieu 1977). My starting point therefore has been to ensure that I draw from the strengths of both disciplines and try to integrate the insights of both into my data collection and my

---

<sup>7</sup> I had the privilege of contributing to the 10<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan of Pakistan (2010-15), particularly on the education-employment-poverty nexus. Engaged by the UK's Department for International Development, I have also contributed to the design of the much-acclaimed Punjab Education Reforms II (2013-18) that covered more than 50,000 schools and aimed to reach out to 13 million children, while improving the quality of schooling for the children in the province that were already enrolled. I also have contributed to the high-level consultation on poverty reduction at the Planning Commission of Pakistan in 2011-12.

analysis. Such reconciliatory efforts required me to identify the *a priori* assumptions of the scientific paradigms of the two disciplines. I developed a model which takes account of this difference in Chapter 2.

The second challenge I needed to address was the extent to which dominant economics and sociology paradigms were relevant to the context of Pakistan. This is a country where the government has been rocked by political and religious turmoil, the largely agricultural economy has struggled to grow, and ambitions for social development have been thwarted by a lack of sustained economic growth. Whilst there now are more studies available on social mobility in countries of the Global South (see Chapter 2), they have tended to use the dominant theoretical and methodological models of intergenerational social mobility research which are particularly suited to highly industrialised, urbanised societies.<sup>8</sup> These industrialised-capitalised-free market countries are often characterised by a welfare state and well-defined social class categories within a visible occupational structure. Especially relevant in the later part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century is the assumption that the state has a responsibility to offer opportunities to individuals and families over and above the disadvantages they might face. In this context, individuals and *individualised* models of intergenerational social mobility are the unit and categories of analysis in the mainstream research, and movement across occupational categories signals successful social mobility.

However, such economic, social and political transformations are less likely to have occurred in the low- to middle-income postcolonial countries, whose economic and human resources once fuelled the industrialisation of colonising countries. In the postcolonial context, these former colonies often lack industrialisation, remain largely rural and are characterised by agrarian modes of production. In many formerly colonised countries, the welfare state is not fully developed and individuals continue to depend on their immediate micro-solidarities, including household and community, which are non-egalitarian and deeply hierarchical social spaces. In such contexts, markets are not free but are embedded in a strongly hierarchical, often exclusionary social order. Responsibility for providing access to opportunities and creating conditions for social mobility are thinly spread across a wide range of formal and informal institutions, and legal rights and entitlements are non-universal (Wood, 2003; Wood

---

<sup>8</sup> This also reflects the overall tendency in the international and comparative educational research to expect researchers from peripheral societies to emulate the hegemonic Anglo-European discourses, as noted by (Takayama, 2016).

& Gough, 2006). Moreover, the occupational structures in such contexts may not fully capture the sort of social stratification envisaged by social mobility researchers.

These societal differences do not indicate the best way to understand social organisation or to grasp either the association between *social origins* and *destinations* or *the method of assessing* the role of schooling and of education more generally in reshaping the society. One could argue that the economic and cultural assumptions built into dominant models of social mobility hamper our understanding of the complex processes that mediate the movement of individuals and social groups across positions of social and economic status, particularly but not only in a rural context.<sup>9</sup> Addressing these challenges requires going beyond synthesising the literature on economics and the sociology of social mobility and engaging with national research on the local social structure.

Embedded in these challenges is the need to recognise the *collective* nature of social life in a country like Pakistan which provides a counter example to the individualised models of social mobility (Naveed and Arnot 2018). Families, not individuals, collectively experience the social hierarchy, pool resources, and make educational and economic decisions (Arnot and Naveed 2014). In such contexts, individuals rise and fall collectively as households and families. People who individually achieve mobility experience the dilemma of *standing out* of their origins but not *fitting in* to their destinations (Reay, Crozier and Clayton 2010). My starting premise, therefore, is that studying social mobility in a country such as Pakistan requires researching families and households rather than individuals, for it is there that values, aspirations, strategies, experiences and reflections on social mobility can best be understood. This approach can also prevent a misrecognition of the role women play in advancing social mobility, as they not only care for the ‘working men’ but also raise and nurture the children and contribute to the household economy in ways that are not easily documented by recognised means of economic accounting.

Methodologically, the field of intergenerational social mobility relies predominantly on identifying statistical patterns of (im)mobility in relation to schooling and other factors. Far

---

<sup>9</sup> For a discussion on rurality, education and educational outcomes, see the Special Issue of *Gender and Education*, ‘Education and the global rural: Feminist perspectives’ (Pini, Moletsane and Mills, 2014). This Special Issue also includes my co-authored paper (Arnot and Naveed, 2014) on the impact of schooling on the rural gender order in Pakistan.

more information about such patterns could be tapped by gaining access to popular understanding of the values and meanings associated with schooling and its role in supporting social mobility. It is here that the aspirations, experiences and reflections of rural families in a given social structure are as important as the hard evidence about an actual lack of social mobility. Social mobility is an outcome of complex educational and sociocultural processes which need to be attended to if we are to gain a meaningful understanding of the limits and opportunities of education reform. We need to understand how rural families strategize about schooling their children and use their own schooling to improve the family's and their children's social and economic status. Negotiating local sources of power and privilege and spaces and patterns of social exclusion in any given cultural setting play a part in reproducing, but also potentially in transforming, the social order.

My approach to these theoretical and methodological challenges included using an innovative mixed-methods research design which could simultaneously exploit the potential of both qualitative and quantitative methods. In her engagement with issues of inequality and education in the post-MDGs/EFA context, Unterhalter (2014) argued that we need to bring together methodologies that can simultaneously answer questions relating to *what*, *how* and *why*. Engaging with state education discourse and reform programmes can help us grasp how the education, economic and political systems evolved and how social justice elements were to be built into these systems. Similarly, tracking patterns of educational mobility over generations and the long-term economic returns could provide a useful measure of the precise strength of intergenerational association and mobility, changes over time and the contribution various factors make. Quasi-ethnographic qualitative methods can broaden our understanding of the opportunities individuals aspire to, how they seize them and how they engage with the local social structure (Bourdieu 1977). A mixed-methods research design which includes these various elements can add a great deal to the field of intergenerational social mobility research.

## **THE PAKISTAN CONTEXT**

I view Pakistan as a national case study of the role of schooling in a development context whilst also recognising its distinctive history, culture and development. The value in seeing it as a case study of the impact mass schooling has on social mobility is that I will be able to

explore in depth the ways various processes, factors and experiences come together in one site.

Having emerged out of the partition of British India in 1947 as a homeland of Muslims on the South Asian subcontinent, Pakistan was a *new country*, a *new nation* and a *new state*. The regions that constituted Pakistan lacked infrastructure and industry and their agriculture was underdeveloped. Creation of the new country was followed by the mass migration of 12 million people across India-Pakistan borders. Islam, the religious identity that shaped the movement of these millions of people, was an ideological force that played a vital role in defining the political structure and social fabric of Pakistan in the following decades. This historical, ideological and political context needs to be kept in mind, as the same forces shaped the country's economic and education systems.

The EFA campaign provided a great opportunity to accelerate progress in achieving this national objective. Like other countries of the Global South, Pakistan made remarkable progress in expanding its education coverage during the EFA period (2000-15). For example, in 2012, the Government of Pakistan introduced the Right to Education law under *Article 25-A of the Constitution*, which states: “The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such manner as may be determined by law”. Table 1.1 indicates that the national gross student enrolment in primary schools, which was low and sluggish from 1975 to 1990, began to improve between 1990 and 2000. In fact, gross enrolment at the primary level increased from 58.7% in 1990 to 92.4% in 2015 for both sexes—which included an increase of almost 45 percentage points in female gross enrolment at primary level.

Considerable national gains also were made in secondary school enrolment (especially but not only amongst boys), and in the time spent at the primary level by both male and female students. The enrolment of girls in secondary school rose from nearly 9% to 38.1% between 1975 and 2015. Once enrolled, children were increasingly likely to stay in school as school life expectancy for both sexes at the primary level nearly doubled from 1990 to 2015. Importantly, the expansion of education during this period included significant improvement in gender parity at all levels of schooling.

**Table 1.1: National progress over key educational indicators in Pakistan 1975-2015**

<b>Educational indicators</b>	<b>1975</b>	<b>1980</b>	<b>1985</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2015</b>
Gross enrolment, <sup>10</sup> primary, both sexes (%)	54.1	49.1	55.0	58.7	74.0	88.1	95.4	92.4
Gross enrolment, primary, male (%)	75.0	64.8	71.6	75.8	87.6	99.2	102.7	99.4
Gross enrolment, primary, female (%)	31.9	32.5	37.3	40.5	59.5	76.3	87.5	84.9
Gross enrolment ratio, primary, gender parity index (GPI) <sup>11</sup>	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9
Gross enrolment, secondary, both sexes (%)	18.1	17.0	19.6	22.0	-	26.5	35.8	44.4
Gross enrolment, secondary, male (%)	27.0	24.5	28.3	30.7	-	-	40.2	49.3
Gross enrolment, secondary, female (%)	8.8	9.0	10.3	12.8	-	-	31.0	39.1
Gross enrolment ratio, secondary, gender parity index (GPI)	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	-	-	0.8	0.8
Gross enrolment, tertiary, both sexes (%)	2.1	2.2	-	3.1	-	4.9	-	9.9
Gross enrolment, tertiary, male (%)	3.1	3.1	-	4.3	-	5.3	-	10.6
Gross enrolment, tertiary, female (%)	1.0	1.2	-	1.8	-	4.6	-	9.2
Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary, gender parity index (GPI)	0.3	0.4	-	0.4	-	0.9	-	0.9
School life expectancy, <sup>12</sup> primary, both sexes (years)	2.7	2.5	2.7	2.9	3.7	4.4	4.8	4.6
School life expectancy, primary, male (years)	3.8	3.2	3.6	3.8	4.4	5.0	5.1	5.0
School life expectancy, primary, female (years)	1.6	1.6	1.9	2.0	3.0	3.8	4.4	4.2
School life expectancy, primary, gender parity index (GPI)	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9

*Source:* World Bank Education Statistics (World Bank 2018) (accessed on October 2018)

However, the successful expansion of mass schooling did not sufficiently reduce the association between social origin and education. By the end of the EFA campaign, Pakistan was noted as one of the two poorest performing countries in the world, after Nigeria (c.f., UNESCO, 2015). By 2017, there were 22.84 million children ages 5-16 out of school in Pakistan's four provinces (National Education Census 2017, cited in the NEIMS 2018). Successive Global Monitoring Reports have highlighted the persistence of educational inequalities across the country between sexes, rural and urban populations, and rich and poor. These patterns are shown in Table 1.2 that provides an overview of these inequalities, based on 2012 data.

<sup>10</sup> Gross Enrolment: Total enrolment in primary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official primary education age. GER can exceed 100%, due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition.

<sup>11</sup> Gender parity index: Ratio of female gross enrolment ratio for primary to male gross enrolment ratio for primary. It is calculated by dividing the female value for the indicator by the male value for the indicator. A GPI equal to 1 indicates parity between females and males. In general, a value less than 1 indicates disparity in favour of males and a value greater than 1 indicates disparity in favour of females.

<sup>12</sup> Number of years a person of school age can expect to spend in the specified level of education.

**Table 1.2: Educational inequalities towards the end of the EFA campaign (%)**

Educational indicators	Gender		Wealth Quintile		Region		Province			
	Male	Female	Richest	Poorest	Urban	Rural	Punjab	KP	Sindh	Baluchistan
Youth literacy rates (15-24)	70	50	93	36	75	56	65	56	58	47
Never been to school	28	32	8	60	19	37	24	31	47	47
Out of school children	22	30	4	54	15	31	17	26	41	49
Primary completion rate	72	58	93	27	79	57	69	60	60	46
Transition rate to lower secondary	85	80	94	61	88	79	83	85		74
Lower secondary completion rate	54	42	82	12	64	39	50	46	44	23
Mean years of education	7.23	5.54	10.5	1.88	8.37	5.6	6.6	5.8	6.26	4.24
Learning basics in reading	49	52	63	51	-	50	66	39	41	49
Learning basics in mathematics	43	43	58	45	-	43	56	38	29	

Source: World Inequality Database on Education/Pakistan Demography and Health Survey 2012<sup>13</sup>

Table 1.2 shows that, by 2012, education levels for Pakistani females were significantly lower than those of males on all key indicators except learning levels. Across all indicators, the urban population fared much better than the population in rural areas, where the majority of the population lives. Inequalities between rich and poor were also deeply concerning; in 2012, rich youth were three times more likely than the poor to be literate, whereas poor children were 7.5 times more likely never to have been to school. The poor were also more than 13 times more likely to be out of school than rich children. Of the poor children who completed elementary school, their likelihood of transitioning to secondary school was two-thirds that of rich children. Once in lower secondary school, poor children were seven times less likely than rich children to complete it. Moreover, the mean years of schooling for rich children were 10.5, five times higher than for the poor.

Table 1.2 shows a high level of inter-provincial inequalities. Punjab outperforms the rest of the provinces, whereas Balochistan is the poorest performer. There also were significant provincial differences in the learning levels of both rich and poor. These statistics do not show the overlap/intersectionality of these disadvantages, such as poor rural females in Balochistan,

<sup>13</sup> See [http://www.education-inequalities.org/countries/pakistan/indicators/trans\\_prim#?dimension=all&group=all&age\\_group=|trans\\_prim&year=|2012](http://www.education-inequalities.org/countries/pakistan/indicators/trans_prim#?dimension=all&group=all&age_group=|trans_prim&year=|2012).

but they provide an important overview of the inequalities embedded in Pakistan's education system and carried over the decades, despite the rise of mass schooling.

From a social mobility perspective, it is important to note that Pakistan is not characterised only by low and unequal education, it is also world's 6<sup>th</sup> most populous country, with a population of 220 million that is reproducing at the high rate of 2.2% annually (National Population Census 2017). This implies a high influx of low/unskilled entrants into the labour market each year, well beyond its capacity. In fact, 54.4 million individuals ages 15-29 make up 41.6 % of country's labour force (UNDP, 2017), with 4 million new youth joining this group each year (p. 74). Estimates are that 1.4 million or more workers will join Pakistan's labour force in the next five years. This surplus of labour implies that the country's labour markets will be forced to choose between creating fewer high-quality work opportunities or more low-quality work opportunities:

The high employment sectors in rural areas—the agriculture sector and the non-farming sector—both offer little prospect for upward social and economic mobility. Most workers in these sectors are either low skilled, low paid labourers working on their own, without any employees, or self-employed.<sup>14</sup> (UNDP, 2017, p. 81)

### **Educational research on Pakistan**

If we turn now to educational research in Pakistan, one can find a paucity of investigation into the role of schooling in intergenerational social mobility. Only three studies (Cheema and Naseer 2013; Javed and Irfan 2014; Muhammad and Jamil 2017) have specifically examined the intergenerational dynamics of educational mobility (mobility *in* education) but they paid little attention focused on the impact of schooling on social and economic mobility. This is, however, not to suggest that there is a scarcity of educational research in/on Pakistan. There is

---

<sup>14</sup> Given the mismatch between labour demand and supply, 88% of young workers report having no choice over type of work, 76% had to start working because they could not remain unemployed and 32% reported leaving their studies to start working, due to financial difficulties (The National Youth Percent Survey 2015, cited in UNDP 2017, p. 81). The UNDP NHDR also reports that one-fourth of employed youth are engaged in casual work (such as piece-rate pay and paid non-family apprentice), which is 'typically exploitative, low-paid, with poor working conditions, no social security cover and no job security . . . Caught in the rut of working for survival, those taking up casual employment do not have the time, energy or money to invest in their own and their families' health, nutrition, education and skills' (p. 83). Such are the conditions of the labour market in which rural youth must compete for scarce decent work.

bourgeoning empirical educational research which addresses important issues as diverse as, early childhood development, various dimensions of educational access, the impact of various forms of educational provision, and the quality of learning in education.

Studies on early childhood development evaluated the impact of parenting skills, early nutrition and stimulation on schooling outcomes. There has been a strong focus, for example, on the differentiated access to education for rural-urban populations, girls and boys, and for those with special needs (for example, Singal et al. 2016). Such studies explored the relationship between wealth, child labour and schooling, identifying the effects of gender norms on girls' schooling (Hou 2009) such as parental values on the physical mobility of women and girls (Callum et al. 2012). Some studies have evaluated the impact of the conditional cash transfer programmes on female enrolment (Chaudhury and Parajuli 2010). Others have examined the effects of direct and indirect costs on the male and female enrolments (Hazarika 2001) identifying the extent to which poverty constrained the poor children to access better quality private schooling. Various studies have also examined the relative effectiveness of the public and the private schools in improving educational learning (Javaid et al., 2012; Andrabi et al., 2008; 2011; 2012).

Studies on educational financing examined the macrolevel trends in the allocation of educational resources by the government and the international development agencies, as well as the distribution of these resources across sectors of education and various socio-economic groups (Malik and Naveed 2012; Malik and Rose 2015; Asghar and Zahra 2012). There is now also research on the governance of education and the education system including school leadership, teachers' effectiveness and professional development, educational financing and the economic and social returns to schooling including the impact on poverty. Empirical literature in this category identifies the role of political patronage in recruitment and posting of teachers (Bari et al., 2013), the role of the district officials in improving educational outcomes (Habib 2015), the lack of autonomy of the head-teachers (IDEAS 2017), teacher absenteeism (Dundar et al. 2014), and the nature of employment contract of teachers and its impact on their performance (Bau and Das 2016; De Talance 2017). Table 1.3 below categorises such educational research under each of the main themes.

**Table 1.3 A broad classification of educational research in Pakistan**

Key themes covered	Some of the key publications
Financing	Malik and Naveed (2012); Malik and Rose (2015); ISAPS (); Asghar and Zahra (2012); Sabir and Abdullah (2002); Ili and Rose's (2018).
Early childhood education	Yusufzai et al. (2014); Yusufzai et al. (2016); Hunzai (2007); Khan (2008); Zaidi et al. (2018).
Access to education (wealth, gender, caste, disability)	Hour (2009); Chaudhury and Parajuli (2010); Aslam and Kingdon (2011); Qureshi (2012); Hammad and Singal (2014); Singal (2016); Farah and Rizvi (2007); Hazarika (2001); Singal et al. (2018); Tamim and Haq (2015); Cheema and Naseer (2015); Jacoby and Mansouri (2011); Callum et al., (2012).
Private provision	Javaid et al. (2012); Andrabi et al. (2008); Andrabi et al. (2012); Andrabi et al. (2017); Amjad and MacLeod (2014); Malik and Fennell (2012); Aslam (2009).
Learning levels	ASER (2010; 2018); Alcot and Rose (2015); Andrabi et al. (2011); Andrabi et al. (2017); Andrabi, Das, Khwaja and Zajonc (2017).
Governance (teachers and school leadership)	Habib (2015); Bari et al. (2013); Dundar et al. (2014); Bau and Das (2016); De Talance (2017); Karachiwala (2013).
Returns to education including impact on poverty	Majeed and Malik (2014); Arif and Farooq (2014); Aslam and Kingdon (2009), Aslam, Bari and Kingdon (2012); Jaffery et al. (2007); Aslam, De, Kingdon and Kumar (2012).

Whilst not necessarily directly addressing my key questions, such literature adds to our understanding of the various factors which might affect the uptake of mass schooling in rural Pakistan and shape its impact on the lives and livelihoods of various generations of men and women. Perhaps the most relevant for my research is the debate on the economic and social returns to schooling, and the impact of education on poverty. The research on private economic returns to schooling (for example, by Aslam et al. 2012) examines the relationship of earnings with the years of schooling, cognitive skills and ability. The authors report that returns to each additional year of schooling increase progressively. Whilst basic level literacy promotes women's entry into lucrative occupations, higher order cognitive skills are required for men (measured through tests) but these did not have higher effect on earning over and above the years of schooling. Other studies focused

directly on the impact of schooling on poverty. Arif and Farooq, for example, examined the dynamics of rural poverty during 2001-2010 using longitudinal data collected in three waves (2001, 2004, 2010). They reported that, amongst other factors, the lack of education was associated with the persistence of poverty as well as the ‘falling into’ poverty. The schooling of the household head significantly reduced the probability of chronic poverty as well as moving into poverty.

These studies contribute to the overall understanding of various aspects of schooling and its role in social mobility, signally important factors and need to be taken into account, they do not yet address the relationship between *origins-education-destinations* in a holistic manner. There is therefore an unmet need in this field to provide insights into these relationships.

## **STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS**

The puzzling case of Pakistan—with its persistent educational exclusion and inequality alongside its significant expansion of education under EFA from 2000 to 2015—is explored in detail in this thesis through the lens of intergenerational educational and social mobility, which is structured into three parts with eight total chapters. The three chapters in Part 1 describe the theoretical and methodological frameworks which have contributed to my thinking and thesis planning. Chapter 2 starts by surveying and synthesising a wide range of empirical and theoretical literature in the disciplines of economics and sociology. To make these theoretical insights relevant to the context of my study, I engage with a diverse but growing body of literature from and about Pakistan itself that provides insights into the social structure of rural areas. This chapter concludes by describing the alternative conceptual framework I developed. In Chapter 3, I balance my analysis with a reflective description of the unique mixed-methods research design I planned to use for my empirical analysis. This approach teases out the interplay between objective structures and subjective assessments by analysing (a) policy discourses; (b) a unique longitudinal rural household survey covering the 28 years from 1986 to 2014; and (c) the perspectives of family members from eight households. Using a quasi-ethnographic fieldwork method, I gathered these perspectives in 2016, six years after I first interviewed the same people in a rural community in Punjab. This chapter also develops appropriate measures of socioeconomic status to track intergenerational

mobility. Questioning the suitability of individualistic measures of social mobility, this chapter also makes the case for using households as the unit of analysis.

Part 2 begins with an analysis of Pakistan's educational policies and economic development agendas from the country's creation in 1947 until 2010. In Chapter 4, I demonstrate the value of critically engaging with official policy discourses which can offer rich insights into the evolution of the state, nation and country, and with the political structure, economic order and rollout of a more unified education system in which to situate my analysis of intergenerational social mobility. Investigating these primary sources (five-year plans and education reform documents), I identify four key waves of educational development in Pakistan that have distinct implications for intergenerational social mobility. This chapter highlights the collective national vision by tracking the concepts and language of meritocracy and equal opportunity, and their implications for access to and the use of education to advance the social and economic mobility of rural families.

Chapter 5 starts by building a conceptual model of intergenerational educational mobility to underlie the empirical statistical analysis. It then analyses two inter-linked rural household surveys that identify patterns of intergenerational educational mobility, first in 1986 and then in 2010, separately for sons and daughters. The age cohorts of mothers and fathers and of sons and daughters analysed in this chapter would have been affected by the educational and economic policy discourses outlined in Chapter 4. The statistical analysis of intergenerational mobility *in education* identifies the 'low-mobility/poverty traps', despite the expansion of education over 25 years, and compares the educational progress of sons and daughters across wealth quintiles and parental schooling. The ordered logistic regression analysis further examines the extent to which the intergenerational transmission of human capital is mediated by household economic status and demographic characteristics. Inter-temporal and across-gender comparisons of intergenerational associations provide deeper insights into the differentiated nature of the uptake of education in the wake of educational expansion.

In Part 3, I analyse the patterns of intergenerational social mobility that *result from education*. In Chapter 6, I begin to develop three household-based measures of economic status to track shifts in economic status over time. By analysing unique rural longitudinal survey data that cover the 28 years from 1986 to 2014, I am able to examine patterns of social mobility through mobility metrics. Since the thrust of this analysis is specifically on the role of

schooling in social mobility, I developed OLS regression models and fixed effect models to estimate the long-range economic returns to the various levels of schooling of household members over the 28 years. This analysis offers a robust measure of the causal role schooling plays in intergenerational mobility.

In the fourth and final data chapter, I analyse the qualitative data I gathered through fieldwork in a rural community in Punjab. Chapter 7 draws on the perspectives of 23 members (fathers, mothers, sons and daughters) of eight families and of four key informants. This chapter begins by exploring the values and meanings family members attributed to social mobility, or what locals call *taraqqi*. It then analyses family members' aspirations, perceptions and experiences in order to assess the actual role schooling has played in their lives. It illustrates the ways various facets of the rural social structure shape the impact of schooling on each family's prospects. Bringing power to the centre stage of my analysis of social mobility, I offer an analysis of the respective strategies of relatively privileged and underprivileged families in shaping the life chances of young men and women. Part 3 brings the thesis to completion. Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, then summarises and reflects on the key findings of my empirical analysis and identifies the theoretical and methodological contribution this research makes to the study of the role schooling plays in intergenerational social mobility in rural Pakistan.

I begin Part 1, Chapter 2 by locating this study in the fields of economics and the sociology of education, particularly the contributions these disciplines have made to the study of education and social mobility.

## **CHAPTER 2 - RECONCEPTUALISING SCHOOLING AND INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY IN RURAL PAKISTAN**

This chapter develops a conceptual framework that is appropriate for the study of the role schooling plays in intergenerational social mobility in rural Pakistan. It attempts to reconcile the contemporary debates in the two disciplines of economics and sociology which have a history of exploring the relationship between social origins and economic destinations. Research in these disciplines offers rich concepts, methods and analytical frameworks that can be used to explore the patterns of associations across a range of factors that affect social mobility. While studying the same phenomenon, economics and sociology diverge and converge in a number of ways, given their underlying scientific paradigms. Any attempt to develop an interdisciplinary framework which could be appropriate for my research in Pakistan therefore requires that I identify the agreements and reconcile the differences between these disciplines so as to build on the strengths of both.

However, before attempting such reconciliation, it is important to recognise that these disciplines have been developed primarily in the post-industrial, largely urban contexts of the OECD countries. I argue in this chapter that they make certain assumptions about human behaviour, social organisation, economic relationships and political arrangements which may limit our ability to understand the ways schooling can affect social mobility in the largely rural, non-industrialised context of countries in the Global South. To compensate, I identify the nature of social structure in rural Pakistan that potentially shapes the experience of education and its social and economic outcomes. I draw upon a diverse body of empirical literature on Pakistan produced in several other disciplines, including development studies, and anthropology. Such a broad interdisciplinary engagement helped me conceive of a new, more relevant approach to the study of schooling and intergenerational social mobility in Pakistan which takes into account its cultural specificity.

Intergenerational social mobility research in both economics and sociology (see below) draws upon large-scale quantitative datasets. Such analysis of the objective conditions and generalizable patterns is crucial for cross-country and intertemporal comparisons. However, equally important, I argue, is the need to focus on the subjective perceptions and assessments that are instrumental in shaping values, behaviours, aspirations and strategies in ways that can reveal more about the complex relationships between social origins and destinations, and the

role schooling can play in mediating these relationships. A focus on the subjective world of research participants promises new possibilities for broadening our understanding of the processes underlying the transformative and reproductive role schooling plays in social mobility. Attending to subjective perspectives helps ground the objective analysis within the cultural specificity of the research context, taking account of the meanings and values attached to social mobility and the role of schooling therein, whilst also identifying the structural constraints and their workings through subjectivities.

Developing an appropriate conceptual framework that takes into account these objective conditions and subjective interpretations, and the processes that determine educational, economic and occupational success over generations in ways that are aware of cultural specificity, is an ambitious agenda for a doctoral project. Such a task involves, on the one hand, rigorously reconciling the burgeoning literature in economics and sociology and, on the other, reinterpreting this reconciled literature through the lens of a specific national context. As an initial attempt in this direction, this chapter brings these different but relevant strands of literature together.

I have divided this chapter into four sections. I start with an overview of the empirical studies of intergenerational social mobility in the fields of economics and sociology. I follow in the second section with the key theoretical perspectives in both fields that are drawn upon to explain empirical evidence. I identify these core assumptions of the overall economic and sociological literature which may not be relevant in the Pakistani context. In the third section, I bring into play the rural social structure in Pakistan, allowing me in the concluding section to identify a conceptual model that I can use for the study of intergenerational social mobility in rural Pakistan. Stylistically, footnotes are used throughout this chapter to provide further information about the extensive literature on income rich countries as well as about the rural social structure in Pakistan. I start by turning to the empirical studies on intergenerational social mobility.

## **CONCEPTUALISING AND INVESTIGATING INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY**

The vast literature produced in the field of intergenerational social mobility in Western democracies in the post-war period draws on contexts in which there is some form of welfare

state, and where compulsory schooling is delivered through established education systems with near-universal coverage. The sociological and economic traditions of research on social mobility examine whether a society offers everyone an equal chance to move up from the social and economic status of their parents (however that status is defined). Often through cross-country and/or intertemporal analyses, these traditions explore the wider social-structural and macroeconomic conditions associated with higher levels of intergenerational social and economic mobility, with particular interest in the causal role of education. Much of the focus of such research is therefore to see how far individuals' socioeconomic origins affect their trajectories *through* and *out of* the education system (see Goldthorpe, 2016, for example). By tracking progress beyond compulsory schooling, such research explores whether individuals have an equal chance to achieve educational success, regardless of their social origins. This research also tends to identify the compensatory mechanism for those facing obstacles to their educational success, and it assesses the effectiveness of various policy interventions. It also explores the extent to which success in the labour market is determined by individuals' skills and abilities rather than their social class (Goldthorpe 2016).

These empirical studies on social mobility and education can be categorised into three strands:

- The strength of association between social origins and destinations
- The extent to which social origins shape educational attainments
- The extent to which educational attainments determine social/economic destinations, and hence affect the origin-destination association

Below I present the key findings of each of these strands which I argue are of value to a study of educational and social mobility in Pakistan.

### **The origin–destination association**

Despite differences in how they define and measure intergenerational social mobility, economists and sociologists have both largely been interested in the extent to which individuals' social origins shape their destinations and the extent to which people can escape their disadvantage. Sociological research has focused on the association between the occupational status (which represents the social class schema) of two successive generations.

Halsey, Heath, & Ridge (1980),<sup>15</sup> for example, reported that social class differences in the UK narrowed in absolute terms after World War II. A decade later, Breen's (2004) edited comparative study of social mobility in Europe showed a convergence in absolute mobility across countries between 1970 and 1990, with less upward mobility in the 1990s than earlier.<sup>16</sup> In Breen's volume, Breen and Luijckx (2004) compared the rigid mobility across classes in Germany, France and Italy with high rates of mobility in Sweden and Norway. They showed that England became less open and had less relative mobility over time, whereas the Netherlands became relatively open in the same period. In a recent analysis, Devine and Li (2013) reported an upgrading of the occupational structures in the UK from 1991 to 2005, suggesting more upward (absolute) mobility, the effect being a weakening of the overall association between social origins and occupational destinations (p. 777).<sup>17</sup>

In contrast to sociologists, firstly economists have focused on monetary measures of economic status, specifically income (from all sources), and earnings. In a review of the literature on the intergenerational transmission of (dis)advantage in OCED countries, D'Addio (2007) reports an intergenerational persistence in Canada and France (Fortin and Lefebvre, 1998; Lefranc, & Trannoy, 2005); a decline in intergenerational mobility in the US (Levine, 1999; Chadwick & Solon, 2002) and the UK (Blanden *et al.*, 2006); and a smaller increase in Norway (Bratberg, Nilsen, and Vaage 2005).

D'Addio's review also suggests a higher degree of persistence of family income over generations as compared to earnings. Corak's (2004) edited volume analysed North American and European countries and identified the US and Britain as the least mobile countries in the so-called developed world. At least 40% of the economic advantage of high-income parents (intergenerational elasticity of income) over low-income parents is passed on to the next generation in these two countries (p. 8), in contrast to as little as 20% in Canada and the Nordic countries. Blanden's (2013) review of the cross-country analyses finds high levels of overall inequality, with inequalities in adulthood associated with low levels of

---

<sup>15</sup> The authors used data collected by the Oxford Mobility Study which consisted of familial and educational biographies of 8,529 men from England and 1,972 from Wales, divided into four age cohorts. Three class categories including services, intermediary and working class were analysed.

<sup>16</sup> Eleven countries were included in the analysis including Britain, France, Ireland, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Poland, Hungary and Israel. A total of 117 mobility surveys from these countries covering the period 1970 to 2000 were analysed.

<sup>17</sup> The authors used the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for 1991 (with 5,143 households and 9,912 individuals) and the General Household Survey (GHS) for 2005 (starting from 1972, it has 20,000-30,000 respondents each year). Their analysis is limited to men aged 25-65 and women aged 25-63.

intergenerational mobility. Gregg, Jonsson, Macmillan, and Mood's (2017) recent study of the US and Europe indicates that, in the U.S., at least 60% of the income inequality in the parental generation persists amongst their 40-year-old sons; this number is 55% in Britain and 33% in Sweden.<sup>18</sup> These cross-country analyses also point towards the negative relationship between cross-sectional income inequality and intergenerational income/earning mobility, which differs between the Nordic countries and the US and the UK, and elsewhere (see Björklund and Jäntti 1997; Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997; Freeman and Katz 1995; Aaberge *et al.*, 1996).<sup>19</sup>

Secondly, economists have been interested in the non-linearity of the intergenerational transmission of advantage. Zimmerman (1992) reported higher mobility in the middle range of earnings distributions in the US than on the higher or the lower ends. However, this is challenged by Hyson (2003) who showed intergenerational earnings mobility to be higher at the bottom of the distribution of the father's earnings. Grawe (2004) also found higher mobility in the upper quintiles in the US and Canada than in Germany and the UK. Other studies reported variable evidence, such as low mobility in the bottom of the distribution in the US (Hertz, 2006), Britain (Atkinson, Maynard, & Trinder, 1983; Dearden, Machin, Reed, Machin, & Reed, 1997; Jo Blanden, Gregg, & Machin, 2005), and Norway (Bratsberg *et al.*, 2007). Bratberg *et al.* showed that the prospects of moving out of poverty are much lower in the US and UK than in the Nordic countries.<sup>20</sup>

### **The origin–education association**

Both economists and sociologists have focused on the extent to which individuals' social origins shape their educational attainments. Amongst sociologists, Halsey *et al.* (1980) reported that, despite increased state provision under educational reforms in the UK in the 1970s and the elimination of tuition barriers, educational expansion had primarily benefitted middle-class families rather than the working classes. Similarly, in their comparative study of

---

<sup>18</sup> This study used the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979, British Cohort Study 1970 and the Swedish Population Registry Data 1965 cohort. The authors suggest that a large part of the differences is explained by intergenerational transmission of occupations and part from the intergenerational transmission of non-cognitive characteristics.

<sup>19</sup> This inequality-mobility relationship is thought to work through higher returns to education, differentiated access to education and wider institutional characteristics.

<sup>20</sup> In the Nordic countries, the regression lines for log earnings of sons and fathers are flat for the bottom of the distribution but linear throughout distribution in the UK. Being born into poor families had little effect on the earnings of offspring.

13 industrial nations, Shavit and Blossfeld (1993) found some weakening of the origin-education effects in the Netherlands and Sweden.<sup>21</sup> In their comparative study, Müller and Karle (1993) reported low levels of such origin-education association in France, Poland and Sweden whilst finding very high levels in West Germany, Ireland and Northern Ireland.<sup>22</sup> Various other studies showed a weakening of the origin-education association in Germany (Jonsson et al. 1996; Muller and Haun 1994), Sweden (Jonsson et al. 1996), France (Vallet 2004), Italy (Shavit and Westerbeek 1998) and probably Norway (Lindbekk 1998). Some evidence supports the persistence of origin-education effects, particularly in Ireland (Breen and Whelan 1993; Whelan and Layte 2002) and the US (Jonsson et al. 1996; Hout, Dohan, Erikson, & Jonsson, 1996), and mixed patterns in post-Soviet Russia (Gerber 2000). Devine and Li's (2013) recent analysis of 1991-2005 data from the UK suggested a weakening of the association between social origins and education over time for both men and women. Changes in this origin-education association over time and space can be attributed to the private costs for secondary and higher education and the stage at which critical educational decisions are made, such as choosing between different educational routes (cf., Erikson and Jonsson 1996).

The economics literature on intergenerational mobility focuses on the pre-school factors affecting educational and economic outcomes. Work by Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, & Masterov (2006), for example, suggests that unequal societies are characterized by unequal investment in children, including in their prenatal care, parental care and education, and in the development of cognitive functioning before compulsory schooling, such that it affects their educational and economic success in the later life. This finding is also supported by Blanden's (2013b) review of cross-country analyses which shows how inequality in childhood negatively affects both educational and earning mobility. A comparative study of 22 OECD and two non-OECD countries (Russia and Cyprus) suggests that intergenerational mobility is strongly associated with access to education, and to a lesser degree with returns to education (Jerrim and Macmillan, 2015).<sup>23</sup> Higher income families have greater capacity and incentive to invest in their offspring's education when the returns to education are high.

---

<sup>21</sup> The countries covered include the US, the former Federal Republic of Germany, England and Wales, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan, Taiwan, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Israel. The authors use nationally representative surveys covering birth cohorts between 1910 and 1960.

<sup>22</sup> This study analysed nine European nations covered in the CASMIN project including the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Sweden, England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Hungary and Poland. It analysed 67,635 individuals from all countries in the 30-65 age group.

<sup>23</sup> This study uses the cross-nationally comparable dataset Programme for International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC). The sample is restricted to men aged 25-59. The median sample size was 1,453 and the national sample sizes ranged from 472 in Russia to 7,707 in Canada.

## **The education–destination association**

Given the promise of the meritocracy (see Chapter 1), this strand of research explores the extent to which education determines a person's socioeconomic status. Using occupational categories as social class schema, sociologists particularly have emphasised the extent to which education can weaken intergenerational occupational associations. Halsey et al. (1980) underscored the importance of school type in determining further educational and occupational success in the UK, with those going to selective secondary schools having a definite advantage. Early selection into different school types is reportedly associated with high inequality, whereas later selection as occurs in Sweden (Erikson and Jonsson, 1996) and Scotland (McPherson and Willms, 1987) is associated with low inequality and higher social mobility. Similarly, earlier stages of stratification into ability groups is associated with higher inequality (see Kerckhoff, 1993; Gamoran 2004). However, these strong links between educational attainment and occupational destinations in European countries have not necessarily grown stronger over time (Breen and Luijckx's 2004). In a similar vein, Devine and Li (2013) suggested a weakening of the relationship between education and social destinations in the UK from 1991 to 2005, which validates the earlier findings of Halsey and colleagues.

Several empirical studies have established a strong role for education in the intergenerational transmission of income, such as Bowles and Gintis (2002); Bowles, Gintis, and Groves (2005); Blanden, Gregg, & Machin, 2005b); Piraino (2006) and Osborne Groves (2005). Corak's (2004) analysis of North American and European countries showed that the progressive post-war educational policies increased intergenerational mobility in the US, whereas the educational reforms of the 1980s in the UK led to a reduction in intergenerational mobility. D'Addio's (2007) review of the literature on the OCED countries shows education to be a major contributor to intergenerational income mobility, with educational inequalities persisting over generations. Gregg et al.'s (2017) study of the US and European countries, which separated the education-mediated effect of intergenerational mobility from other influences, suggested that more than half of the effects of family income on children's earnings in Sweden are explained by parental education and class. This literature establishes that public provision of education, early childhood investments and sustained support for families can foster intergenerational economic mobility (D'Addio 2007; Solon 2004; Davies,

Zhang & Zeng 2005). Education system reforms in Finland from 1972 to 1977 reportedly lowered intergenerational income correlations by seven percentage points (Pekkarinen, Uusitalo and Pekkala, 2006). Low levels of spending on education and high returns to schooling therefore are associated with low educational and economic mobility (Blanden 2013, p. 62). However, while reporting education to be the key driver of intergenerational mobility in 22 OECD and two non-OECD countries, Jerrim and Macmillan (2015) found, interestingly, that a higher share of private investment in education (compared to public investment) was associated with low mobility.

There is still a significant proportion of intergenerational transmission of earnings which has not been explained by education. Bowles and Gintis (2002a, 2002b) suggest that wealth explains one-third of intergenerational transmission of earnings in the US. The relationship between wealth and intergenerational earning elasticities is also endorsed by studies such as that by Mazumdar (2002) and Askew et al. (2001). Other factors influencing intergenerational earning mobility are: neighbourhood and social conditions (Palmer 2002; Hartz 2006 for US); ethnicity and race (Borjas 1992 for US); gender of siblings (Jäntti et al. 2006); birth order, family size and family structure (Lindhall 2002; Grawe 2005a); health status (Eriksson et al. 2005) and non-cognitive skills (Blanden et al. 2006).

### **Intergenerational social/educational mobility research in the Global South**

In contrast to such traditions of social mobility research in the Western sphere, the field of intergenerational social mobility in the countries of the Global South is still in its infancy (as in the case of India, noted by Iversen, Anirudh Krishna and Kunal Sen 2017). The emergent literature on a few developing countries tends to adopt mainstream conceptual frameworks and indicators of mobility. In India, for example, Azam and Bhatt (2015), analysing the Indian Human Development Survey 2005 (with 41,544 households) which covers the 20-65 age group has also reported a significant rise in educational mobility (throughout the thesis, this term refers to intergenerational mobility in education) but with strong differences across states in India. Given the centrality of caste in the Indian context, several studies have explored the extent to which caste mediates educational and occupational mobility. Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Paul (2014), for example, reported a strong convergence between Scheduled-Castes/Schedule-Tribes (SC/ST) to non-SC/ST in both educational attainment and wages. Desai and Kulkarni (2008) also found that, although there was an equalisation of

educational attainment at the primary level, there were high levels of inequality at the higher levels of the distribution. In a similar vein, Majumder, (2010) found a strong intergenerational persistence in education and occupation for the SCs and STs, as did Singh and Motiram (2012), which suggests the persistence of father-son occupational association and a high degree of unequal opportunity. Recently, Iversen et al. (2017) found urban and upper-caste Hindus having a high probability of upward mobility and rural SCs/STs having a high probability of downward mobility.

There is a scarcity of such research in this field in Pakistan, and just three studies stand out. Muhammad and Jamil (2017) reported that the sons of urban fathers in higher occupational categories were more likely to attain higher occupational categories, whereas the sons of rural fathers in lower occupational categories were more likely to end up in lower occupational categories.<sup>24</sup> Interestingly, they reported that the sons of ‘clerks’ were upwardly mobile in urban areas but downwardly mobile in rural areas. Education and parental wealth were reportedly associated with upward mobility. Javed and Irfan (2014) earlier found a higher intergenerational association of education using a 2010 household survey which suggested that sons of unschooled fathers had a 42% chance of not attending school at all.<sup>25</sup> Attaining higher levels of education increased with the father’s schooling level. They also reported a high occupational persistence for those in agriculture and services, and strong downward mobility for the sons of technicians/associate professionals. Using retrospective information on fathers’ income, they reported very low upward mobility for those from the lowest income quintile, with lower mobility in the rural than the urban sample. Through regression analysis, they reported that more than a quarter of the economic (dis)advantage of fathers was transmitted to their sons. When Javed and Irfan controlled for sons’ education, this reduced this effect to 20.7%. After controlling for age cohorts, the authors report higher immobility for sons at lower ages. These intergenerational associations of income with education was also reported to be stronger in the urban than the rural sample.

Of particular relevance is the study of a rural sample in a district of Punjab by Cheema and Naseer (2013), who focused on the association between the educational levels of three generations. The study analysed the Sargodha Village and Household Survey 2007-08 which was conducted in 35 villages in Sargodha district. The coefficient of educational association

---

<sup>24</sup> They analysed the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey 2012-13.

<sup>25</sup> The authors cross-sectionally analysed the 2010 round of the Pakistan Panel Household Survey.

between the grandfather-father pair was as high as 0.875, which fell to 0.413 for father-son pairs. Importantly, these patterns were strongly differentiated between propertied/landed and non-propertied/landless groups which suggests the perpetuation of inequality of educational opportunities over the long run. They report that the households belonging to what they call *depressed quoms* (kinship groups) had fallen a generation behind those from the *non-depressed quoms*.<sup>26</sup> the artisan households in the 25<sup>th</sup> percentile and historically *depressed quoms* from the 35<sup>th</sup> percentile saw no change in educational attainment across three generations, despite the educational expansion in previous decades. This study shows the importance of taking the rural social structure into account while studying intergenerational social mobility in rural contexts.

These two studies provide tantalising insights into the two national contexts. They begin to bring these specific contexts into the global arena. Such comparative analysis of income mobility in countries outside the OECD members is hard to find. The World Bank study ‘Fair Progress? Economic Mobility across Nations Around the World’ (Narayan *et al.*, 2018) provides the largest international coverage, including 148 countries (one of which was Pakistan) and birth cohorts between 1940 and 1989. This is the largest study on mobility as it claims to cover 96% of the world population. It uses a wide range of cross-sectional household income/expenditure/social surveys, and panel and income dynamics surveys where available. With given data limitations, it manages to provide the estimates of intergenerational mobility in education and income. The key findings of this study are provided in Box 2.1.

**Box 2.1: Key findings of Narayan et al. (2018)**

- Absolute and relative educational mobility is significantly higher in high-income countries than in developing countries. There is high persistence at both the high and the low ends of educational distribution in all countries. Developing countries have lower relative mobility than developed countries, and the upward educational mobility is declining with increasing persistence at the bottom of the distribution.
- Within developing countries, the average relative educational mobility is reportedly lower in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa than in East Asia.
- Gender gaps in educational mobility are declining drastically in advanced countries and also declining in developing countries.

---

<sup>26</sup> *Quom* refers to the kinship group. The authors divided families into *depressed* and *non-depressed quoms* with the former referring to the low-caste status kinship group.

- Intergenerational income mobility (absolute and relative) is lower in developing countries than in the high-income ones, with countries in Africa, South Asia and Latin America having particularly low income mobility, even lower than educational mobility, pointing towards labour market deficiencies.
- Individuals' circumstances of birth, together with later life experiences and interactions, directly and indirectly influence their later life income.
- Higher inequality of opportunity is associated with lower relative intergenerational income mobility.
- Higher public spending in rich countries is associated with higher relative intergenerational income mobility.

Source: Extracted and summarised from Narayan et al. (2018, pp. 1-39).

Narayan et al.'s (2018) ambitious agenda of covering 96% of the world population through representative surveys (despite serious data limitations beyond a handful of countries) implies a lack of robustness of evidence under its 'pragmatic' approach for developing economies.<sup>27</sup> Importantly, it makes no conceptual distinction between the developing and the developed economies and uses the same approach in studying them all. The tremendous social, economic, political, cultural and historic diversity of human populations, particularly in the non-industrialised countries, is treated as a singularity and is studied using the approaches developed for studying intergenerational mobility in the OECD countries.

An exhaustive review of this comparative literature is beyond the scope of this chapter. While there is increasing appreciation of the focus on intergenerational social mobility shared by economics and sociology (as observed by Goldthorpe 2014, and Torche 2015), these efforts are sparse. I am reminded here by Lindbladh et al. (1996), who, in the field of health research, argue that developing interdisciplinary theoretical model requires an explicit engagement with the *a priori* assumptions of the scientific paradigms underlying economic and sociological analysis. For the purpose of my particular research, it is important to go deeper and ask, what scientific assumptions lie behind the theoretical models that interpret the patterns of association exposed by such studies? Consequently, in the following section I discuss what I

---

<sup>27</sup> The approach to estimates of intergenerational earning mobility is explained by the authors: 'In the absence of long-term panels, econometric methods are applied to estimate parental income earnings for a subset of economies for which the cross-sectional surveys used include data on labour income earnings for the respondents in addition to the retrospective data on education and age of the respondent's parents. The predicted parental earnings are then combined with observed respondent earnings to obtain estimates of IGM in earnings.' (p. 93)

call the ‘rationality assumptions’ behind intergenerational social mobility studies in both economics and sociology. Arguably, these assumptions need to be addressed if the models of intergenerational social mobility are to be adopted, in an interdisciplinary manner, for contexts outside the advanced Western economies.

## **RATIONALITY ASSUMPTIONS OF THE THEORETICAL MODELS OF INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY**

A useful starting point, borrowing from Lindbladh et al. (1996), is to appreciate that the focus of mainstream economic theory, in general, is individuals’ knowledge and beliefs and the benefits of taking action. Based essentially on *free choice*, economic analysis focuses on finding the general principles underlying individual behaviour. Economic agents are considered to be *rational*, although information costs and reasoning capacities imply a sense of *bounded rationality* (Becker 1976; Simon, 1997) Such rationality in economic analysis, however, is only *instrumental*, since the focus is always on the outcomes of individual actions with given resources and constraints rather than on analysing the formation of rationality itself (Sen 1977; Habermas 1984).

In contrast, to Habermas (1984), sociology is interested in *subjective rationality*, wherein the agent’s perspective is important in understanding social phenomena in light of the meanings attached to their actions, independent of the goals of those actions. Thus there is a sense of *socially bounded rationality*, given the influence of social conditions and processes of socialization on individual perceptions and apprehensions (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Whilst both disciplines study individual choice, sociology considers such choice to be socially conditioned and useful for understanding the general phenomena, and takes into account the subjectivities and perceptions which are themselves a manifestation of structural conditions (ibid.). The focus on socially structured process of decision-making (Lindbladh et al. 1996) implies that the initial socio-economic conditions shape behaviour and decision-making, beyond which individuals’ strategies are considered similar to those described by economic models. This last point offered by Lindbladh et al. provides firm grounds for reconciling the perspectives from the two disciplines in my study.

I therefore argue that there are two levels of sociological analysis of social mobility: the *macro-structural level* and the *everyday life level*, where ‘structural changes at the societal

level are studied *as they emerge in the day-to-day world of the individual*, organized and perceived from his/her position in the social hierarchy' (Lindbladh et al. 1996, p. 1823, my emphasis). In contrast, economic analysis is based on models of individual behaviour without making a distinction between *structural* and *individual* levels.<sup>28</sup> These subtle but important disciplinary distinctions which need to be taken into account in a major interdisciplinary study of intergenerational social mobility as it entails building on the strengths of each discipline. Given that the field of social mobility was first developed in sociology (Thernstorm, 1968; van Leeuwen and Maas, 2010), the initial models of social mobility attempted to develop a macro-level explanation. But later advancements, particularly with the development of household models in economics and the parallel advancement of sociological theory, provided more micro-level explanations, focusing on the individual level. Below I explore this theme by first focusing on sociology's functionalist theory that provides structural explanations, followed by human capital theory which assumes the rationality of economic agents in explaining intergenerational mobility. I then return to sociological theories that are based on assumptions of the socially bounded rationality of social actors, with a view to thinking how I might integrate these insights in my research.

### **Sociology's functionalist explanation**

The key theoretical explanation provided by sociologists about the role that schooling played in weakening the *origin-destination* relation came from the functionalist theory of industrial/post-industrial societies (see Goldthorpe 2014). The key argument was that technological and economic processes will lead employers to hire individuals based on the skills and knowledge acquired through educational qualifications (Treiman 1970). This approach suggested a weakening of the *origin-destination* and strengthening of the *education-destination* link over time. The increased demand for skilled individuals was predicted to result in the expansion of the education system which, together with progressive reforms, was meant to lead to the weakening of the *origin-education* link over time. The key argument was

---

<sup>28</sup> Lindbladh et al. (1996) also argue that economists assume that the market prices and the formal rules are the same for all and that change needs to have the same impact on all individuals, whereas sociologists tend to presuppose that 'structural changes are experienced and coped with differently within various social classes' (p. 1823). This observation about economics is, however, in contradiction to the well-developed field of 'price discrimination' in microeconomics whereby different groups pay differently for the same product. Additionally, in a review of 75 micro-econometric evaluation studies of the impact of employment programmes in the US and elsewhere, Heckman, Lalonde and Smith (1999), for example, report the heterogeneity in the impact of such programmes, with different groups affected by them differently.

that ‘‘ascription’ will progressively give way to ‘achievement’ via education, and societies will become increasingly meritocratic and mobile’ (Goldthorpe 2014, p. 267). This conceptualization of education, which is closer to the mainstream human capital approach (see below), underlies almost all major works on social mobility. However, although such functionalist sociological theory offers macro-level analysis, it does not offer micro-level explanations of the pathways along which such various associations were strengthened or weakened over time (ibid.).

There is also increasing empirical evidence of a weakening of the *education-destination* relationship in many OECD countries (cf., Breen 2004; Breen and Luijckx 2004, p. 393; Goldthorpe 1996; Goldthorpe and Jackson 2008) and increasing evidence of the persistence of the *origin-education* relation over time (Shavit et al. 2007), especially if the re-stratification of higher education reforms are taken into account (Bolivr 2011; Ichou and Vallet 2011). Goldthorpe (2014) alerts us to the fact that the *origin-destination* effects may not weaken over time as a result of education, and there is in fact no decisive evidence that the overall *origin-destination* effect has weakened over time.<sup>29</sup> He therefore argues that functionalist theory is unable to explain the new empirical evidence, particularly in relation to the weakening of the *education-destination* association over time.

Significantly, Goldthorpe (ibid.) argues for a ‘theory developed at the *micro-social* level in terms of the action and interaction of individuals that specifies the actual social processes, or mechanisms, through which macro-level associations empirically demonstrable within the OED [*origin-education-destination*] triangle are generated and sustained’ (p. 269; my emphasis). Goldthorpe argues that such a theoretical void can be filled by insights from advancements in economic theory, particularly to explain the effects of institutional factors on varying levels of social mobility.

If functionalist sociological theory neglected the micro social processes and failed to explain the emerging empirical trends, economic (human capital) theory focused heavily on individual behaviour in educational decision-making, in combination with the organisational behaviour in employment decisions. The next section therefore provides an overview of the key economic theories relevant to my research.

---

<sup>29</sup> As suggested by the review of Bernhardt (2012), a few studies show a weakening effect (such as Breen, 2004; cf. Breen and Luijckx, 2004: 385-390), whereas others suggest it persists (such as Bukodi and Goldthorpe, 2010; Chen, 2013; Falcon, 2012; Goldthorpe and Mills, 2008; Ishida and Miwa, 2008).

## **Economic models of (bounded) rational behaviour**

Economic theories of intergenerational mobility build on Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) model that suggests that children receive from their parents a number of endowments, including genetically determined ones such as ‘race’ and some elements of ability, and others such as family environment, values, family connections, reputation and networks, knowledge and skills. This model assumes that families maximize their utility over generations and that parents advance the welfare of their children by investing effort and resources in their earning potential which, combined with a luck factor in the labour market, determines the adult incomes of children.

With built-in assumptions that there are well-functioning financial markets which would help credit-constrained families borrow against children’s future incomes and that well-functioning labour markets recruit individuals based on their skills and knowledge, the model initially suggested a weakening of the effects of parental economic status on their children’s education and income. In this scenario, any correlation between incomes across generations was assumed to be due only to the inheritance of those characteristics which are rewarded in labour market. The model also suggested a long-term convergence of human capital levels across different families, as credit markets would facilitate educational investments and labour markets would create demand for education because of the private returns to schooling.

Subsequent work, such as that of Loury (1981) and Becker and Tomes (1986), recognized credit market imperfections while maintaining that long-run convergence was still the case, albeit with slow progress and a longer time span. Behrman and Tarbman (1985) and J. Behrman, Kletzer, McPherson & Schapiro (1998) demonstrated that, with credit constraints, private marginal benefit and cost curves depend on households’ economic status, suggesting that families not facing credit constraints invest in the human capital of their children until the marginal returns to such investment equal the marginal returns to financial capital. In contrast, credit-constrained families have lower levels of investment in their children’s human capital. In this sense, Becker and Tomes’s model predicted the persistence of economic inequality over generations.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> Baker and Tome’s model implied two options for public policies: weakening the heritability effects by investing in the children who are worse off, and improving access to higher education for the credit-constrained children. The subsequent analysis, however, suggested that public investment is beneficial only as long as it can

Taking account of variations across time and space, Solon (2004) extended Baker and Tomes's model, identifying the roles markets and public policy play in intergenerational mobility. He identified intergenerational mobility as a function of four key factors: genetic transmission of income-generating traits; the efficacy of investment in children's human capital; returns to human capital; and the extent to which public investment in human capital is progressive. Solon showed that changes in intergenerational mobility between countries and over time occur due to changes in any combination of these factors, as well as in the overall structure of public investment. Low levels of intergenerational mobility are associated with high heritability of traits and productive investments in human capital. He demonstrated that higher returns to schooling create more incentives for the rich to invest in education than for the poor, thus leading to low intergenerational mobility; this is also true of less progressive public investment in human capital. Similarly, when public investment in education is constant, those with higher incomes spend more on their children's education.<sup>31</sup> This model demonstrated that, by keeping all the factors constant, an increase in earning inequality increases intergenerational persistence of earnings.

This economic literature which explains the intergenerational association of human capital can broadly be classified into three types. One stream includes studies focused on identifying the exact transmission channels from one generation to the other, and measuring their *nature* and *nurture* effects and the interaction between the two (Heckman 2012). These studies focus on issues such as: genetics, income and wealth (credit constraints), values and aspirations, perceived returns, social networks and so on (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002; Björklund et al., 2006). They suggest genetics alone provide limited explanations of intergenerational transmission. Another stream explores the wider context that affects these relationships, such as overall inequality, and the functioning of markets particularly credit constraints and increasing returns to schooling (see Kruger 2004), all working towards higher intergenerational persistence. The third stream of literature focuses on whether the education

---

complement private investment, as the substitutability between the two could reduce mobility (Goldberger 1989). Additionally, as Blenden et al. (2014) summarise, Becker and Tomes's model would predict higher intergenerational mobility in countries with smoothly functioning labour markets, weaker transmission of education and occupational preferences between generations, equality of access to quality education and homogenous levels of education.

<sup>31</sup> Solon's model also suggests that, if taxes are kept constant, increased public spending on human capital crowds out private investments by parents and thus is counter-productive. Similarly, parental altruism and market returns to human capital increase parental investment in human capital.

system is egalitarian or elitist, whether it is selective or non-selective, the levels of public spending on education, classroom effects, class size, teaching quality, peer relations and so on and so on (for the effect of minimum school leaving age in UK and USA, see Chevalier (2004) and Oreopoulos et al. (2006)).

Turning to theories that explain the *origin-education* association, such as those of James Heckman, the channels of intergenerational transmission of (dis)advantage through differentiated early childhood development point towards the importance of the family in any study on social mobility. Francesconi and Heckman (2016) argue that traditional models of intergenerational mobility have tended to ignore family formation decisions and overlooked the investment of parental time. The strength of intergenerational immobility, they argue, does not simply reflect market failures such as credit constraints, as it is affected by a host of other factors associated with family income. Higher family incomes are associated with higher parental education, better schools, better parenting and better peers which may have far greater effect on child development than income alone. Francesconi and Heckman note that the earlier literature assumed that all stages of childhood were an equally effective time to invest. This theoretical tradition establishes that the intergenerational transmission of (dis)advantage is strongly influenced by non-cognitive skills, including physical and mental health, perseverance, attentiveness, motivation, self-confidence and other socio-emotional factors. Both cognitive and socio-emotional skills are formed in early childhood and are conditioned by the family and social background, making it a critical phase of the life cycle. Those born into disadvantaged families carry that disadvantage into their later life.

The concept of the ‘technology of skills formation’ (Cunha and Heckman 2008; Carneiro and Heckman 2003) is important here as it suggests that cognitive and non-cognitive skills are differentiated by family background in early childhood, even before schooling begins. These studies show that higher levels of non-cognitive skills promote cognitive skills, and even genetic expression depends in part on the environment. Age-specific skill gaps are also found to be associated with socioeconomic gaps.<sup>32</sup> The lasting impact of differentiated early

---

<sup>32</sup> The key thrust of this literature is that early childhood interventions can have significantly positive and lasting effects on cognitive and socio-emotional skills, in contrast to the later life interventions as popularly made by public policy. Earlier interventions also enhance the effect of later interventions. In his review on social mobility for *Boston Review*, Heckman (2012) make the case for the *pre-distribution* rather than *redistribution* of resources, suggesting that investing in improving the early lives of disadvantaged children is a simpler choice for achieving social inclusion, economic efficiency and productivity than later stage redistribution. These interventions can increase self-confidence, group work and discipline which are usually lacking in youth from

childhood development on later educational and economic outcomes casts doubt on the prospects for intergenerational educational and economic mobility. It also implies that, with differentiated input from parents from birth, poor children cannot escape, at least without state intervention, the fate of their parents, namely, low educational achievement and hence poor labour market outcomes.

Explaining the impact of poverty on the *origins-education* association is clearly central to my study. It is important, therefore, to note that Chusseau and Hellier (2012) tested the assumption of the convergence of human capital across families versus the social stratification that results from the traps of low/no education that poor families can be caught in for long periods. Based on the literature suggesting low intergenerational mobility at both ends of the education and income distributions, they argue that some families benefit from greater educational opportunities and subsequently from rewarding jobs, whereas others are trapped in low education and poverty that persist over generations. There is thus a strong impact of family background which varies across countries—it is high in the US and low in the Nordic countries. Chusseau, Hellier and Ben-Halima (2012) suggest that low mobility traps are caused by a range of factors, including fixed education costs, imperfect credit markets, an S-shaped education function (defined below), local externalities and the structure of the education system.

The key argument here is that inequality determines a threshold of parental human capital and that children get education only if their parents' education is above this level. If a generation for any reason fails to be educated to this threshold level, the subsequent generations remain uneducated for an indefinite period, since parents' savings remain lower than the fixed costs of education. These effects are exacerbated by the S-shaped nature of education functions. Families with initial human capital lower than the threshold level converge to the low-human capital steady levels, whereas those with initial levels higher than the threshold converge to the higher-human capital levels. Consequently, the education system becomes highly polarized, with highly educated groups coexisting with those in the low/under-educated

---

disadvantaged backgrounds. There are also strong claims made about higher economic returns to interventions made at an early stage. Later stage investments are considered to disproportionately benefit those who already have higher skills, as shown by the evidence that returns to college investments are higher for those who are more able and motivated (Cameron and Heckman 2001; Cunha et al. 2006; Carneiro et al. 2013; Eisenhauer et al. 2015). Gertler and Heckman et al. (2014) evaluated an early childhood psychological stimulation intervention for the disadvantaged children in Jamaica and reported a strong long-term economic impact of the intervention, as the adult incomes of the treatment group were 25% higher than that of the control group.

trap—a very real possibility in Pakistan where a large proportion of the population has no access to schooling. The existence of these ‘low mobility poverty traps’ questions the universality of the long-term convergence of human capital within the population (Chusseau and Hailier 2012). Certain families can be trapped in low/no-education traps despite overall educational expansion. Chusseau et al. also point to the local externalities that result among the highly educated and rich who live in the neighbourhoods that offer improved educational opportunities and a better environment for the younger generations while also offering meaningful networking. They suggest that the stage and levels of selection in the education system and the overall public resources for education result in different forms of social stratification, some of them perpetuating low-mobility traps.

There are several other models which theorise the labour market outcomes of education, such as screening and signalling theory which brings employers and workers together in determining the labour market outcomes of education (Arrow 1973; Stiglitz 1975); the job market theory of Thurrow (1976); and the incentive enhancing preference theory of Bowles and Gintis (2000). These models still rely on the assumption that individuals with more schooling are more productive and hence earn more than those without. Nonetheless, these models explain the differentiated returns to different levels of education mainly for economic rather than social reasons. While crucial for the study of intergenerational social mobility, a detailed engagement with these models is beyond the range of this thesis. What I found to be particularly relevant for my study of the role of schooling in social mobility in Pakistan are sociological theories of education such as Boudon’s theory of educational opportunity and inequality, Bourdieu and Passeron’s theory of social reproduction and Weber’s theory of social closure. These theories throw light on the nature of occupational and social power and inequality and offer a model of a socially bounded rationality to which I now turn.

### **Models of socially bounded rationality**

#### *Boudon’s theory of educational opportunity and inequality*

In his influential book, *Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality*, Boudon (1974) explained why educational expansion might not necessarily contribute to social mobility. He argued that educational expansion, even in the most meritocratic contexts, may well not lead to increased social mobility since it would intensify competition in the labour market, thereby devaluing academic qualifications unless the expansion of high-status positions is greater than

the supply of qualified individuals. He usefully distinguished between the *endogeneity* of educational distribution as determined by individuals' desire for social mobility and the *exogeneity* of the social positions which are determined by technological and organisational forces. Boudon noted a disjuncture in the transition from schooling to work (Hauser 1970) as success in the two is determined by different factors.

As more people participate in education due to their high aspirations for social mobility, the competition over status positions increases. Consequently, those with the highest level of educational distribution retain their advantage while the occupational opportunities for those at the relatively lower levels of education decline, leaving patterns of intergenerational social mobility unchanged—as noted earlier (see Chusseau et al. 2012). Moreover, such high competition over status raises middle-class aspirations for higher educational attainment.<sup>33</sup>

Boudon maintained that social stratification not only affects through the greater objective possibilities of the privileged to participate in higher education, it also impacts through their agentic/rational role. Individuals with different social origins make different educational choices because their ambitions and aspirations are shaped by those origins (Jackson et al. 2007), thus educational expansion may raise the aspirations of those already privileged more than those of the underprivileged. Boudon supported his arguments from the then available empirical evidence showing that educational choices made at particular points in the academic career are often linked to social background. Thompson and Simmons (2013) further illustrate Boudon's conceptualization by formulating six axioms: the four pertaining to education are (i) the given primary effect of stratification in a differentiated society where underlying academic ability is differentiated across social origins; (ii) academic curricula (such as routes and levels) are differentiated across social backgrounds; (iii) due to the secondary effects of stratification, the association between social origins and higher educational attainments increases; and (iv) even the expansion of education favours those already better off because of differentiated curricula. The two remaining axioms reflect the distribution of social positions of individuals from different social backgrounds: (i) any increase in social status position is slower than the increase in educational levels; and (ii) attaining a certain social status depends

---

<sup>33</sup> Thompson and Simmons (2013) argued that inequality of social opportunity relates to both absolute and relative mobility, as in the absence of absolute mobility someone has to move down for others to move up (p. 750). Educational expansion can imply greater participation of those from advantaged backgrounds in higher levels of education, thus strengthening the *origin-education* association and widening educational inequalities.

on social background, educational attainments, the availability of social positions and the composition of the educational structure. The secondary effects of social stratification have far-reaching effects on an individual's social position. The key thrust of his argument is that equalising educational opportunities alone does not tackle social and economic inequalities. Schooling may well be a factor in reproducing social inequality rather than transforming it.

### *Bourdieu's theory of cultural reproduction*

The theme of social reproduction is taken further by Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) in their book *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* which built on Bourdieu's (1977) classic theory of cultural reproduction.<sup>34</sup> Equipped with a valuable armoury of new concepts such as *field*, *habitus*, various forms of *capital* and *symbolic violence*, amongst others, this theory encourages a deeper understanding of the subtle ways in which schooling, rather than acting as a form of social mobility, serves the social functions of reproducing, legitimising and normalising the social order.

Bourdieu's (1977) earlier concept of *habitus* transcended the dichotomies of structure and agency, objective and subjective by referring to the 'mental and cognitive structure through which individuals perceive, understand, appreciate and deal with the social world' (p. 76) which functions below the level of consciousness. These mental and cognitive structures, acquired in the family, are therefore to be restructured by the socialization offered through schooling. Through an individual's ambitions, aspirations and strategies, which themselves are products of one's positioning in the social order, *habitus* influences day-to-day practices such that they reproduce an individual's (dis)advantaged position.<sup>35</sup> While *habitus* is particularly relevant to my study, so too is the concept of *capital*. Bourdieu (1986) developed this concept by extending the reductionist notion of *economic capital* and by introducing *cultural* and *social* forms of capital. He argued that cultural capital, an external form of wealth, is converted into an integral part of a person and includes, in the embodied, objectified and institutionalised forms, the durable dispositions of mind and body (*habitus*); the cultural goods such as paintings, books and instruments; and institutional recognitions and qualifications, and that it is passed on from one generation to the next. Bourdieu saw

---

<sup>34</sup> Bourdieu's theory which first appeared in his book *Outline of a Theory of Practice* was developed over the years and is spread across his major books, such as *The Logic of Practice*; *Masculine Domination*; *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*; *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, amongst others.

<sup>35</sup> See Arnot and Naveed (2014) for a discussion of the notion of a rural *habitus* in the Pakistani context.

academic ability itself as a product of an investment of time and cultural capital (p. 107) and that it involves hereditary transmission of cultural knowledge. The economic gains of education further depend on the quantity and quality of *social capital* which includes membership in various networks and groups capable of material or symbolic exchanges that individuals have access to.

In this analysis, economic capital, in a much disguised and misrecognised form, lies at the root of the other forms of capital that are derived from it through specific types of effort that often involve time labour. The time and resources needed to acquire academic capital depend on the cultural capital embodied in the entire family, including their education levels, making cultural capital the ‘best hidden form of hereditary transmission of capital’ (p. 108). Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) argue that, by increasing the use of qualifications (a product of the social order) education legitimizes the social order. It provides the privileged with the ‘supreme privilege of not seeing themselves as privileged’ and convinces ‘the disinherited that they owe their scholastic and social destiny to their lack of gifts or merits, because in matters of culture, absolute dispossession excludes awareness of being dispossessed’ (p. 210). Moreover, children from families with high cultural capital acquire social capital starting in the early stage of socialisation. Bourdieu and Passeron conclude by asking the question:

does it [the education system] not contribute towards persuading each social subject to stay in the place which falls to him [sic] by *nature*, to know his place and hold to it? (ibid., p. 42) [my addition]

Bourdieu’s framework urges us to go behind the statistics of people’s social stratification and mobility to consider the subjective realisation of their cognitive structures and understand the epistemologies directing their daily practices. With these in mind, I turned for inspiration to a strand of sociology that offers insights into the relationships between social groups—social closure theory.

### *Social closure theory*

Weber (1978), for one, introduced the idea of social closure to analyse the monopolisation of markets, power and opportunities by the dominant groups. Murphy (1984, 1986), amongst many others (for example, Parkin 1979; Collins 1976), developed the notion of *social closure*,

defining it as a 'process of subordination whereby one group monopolizes advantages by closing off opportunities to another group of outsiders beneath it which it defines as inferior and ineligible' (p. 88). Parkin (1979, p. 44) argued that through *exclusionary social closure* social groups 'maximize rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles'. Meanwhile, the counter-strategies of the dominated, which Parkin called *usurpation*, are defined as schemes 'to escape subjection, disesteem, and dispossession' and to share the dominant-monopolized resources and opportunities. While exclusion maintains the social order through the predetermined structuring of social actors, usurpation, by challenging the order, attempts to re-stratify society and thus has transformative potential.

Murphy (1986, p. 24) argued that these competing struggles provide much-needed cohesiveness to both the dominant and dominated groups. While social groups at the top of the pecking order rest on *exclusion* and those at the bottom rely on *usurpation*, the intermediary groups rely on both modes of closure, primarily using one but supplementing it with the other so that they can move up simultaneously and avoid a push down. Exclusion can be collective, such as that based on race or another identity, or individualist, such as that based on wealth and credentials; capitalist societies are characterized by both forms.

From this perspective, employing a social closure approach to studying Pakistani families' variable strategies for achieving social mobility requires first specifying various forms of exclusion. Murphy (1984, p. 555) helpfully breaks down the *forms of exclusion* by distinguishing between *principal*, *derivate* and *contingent* forms. When there is a legal arrangement backing a form of exclusion from power, resources and opportunities, it is called a *principal form of exclusion* (for example, a legal title to private property). This emerges from Weber's (1978) observation that the unequal distribution of private property privileges the property owners and, rather than offering them a monopoly, encourages them to compete for the valuable goods in society while excluding the non-wealthy. The *derivative* and *contingent* forms of exclusion are the rules which are driven directly by the *principal* form yet are distinct from it. Murphy argues that legal titles to private property serve as the principle forms of exclusion in capitalist societies.<sup>36</sup> This form of exclusion serves as 'the main determinant of access to or exclusion from power, resources and opportunities in society';

---

<sup>36</sup> Varying across societies, they are lineage in the aristocratic societies and membership and rank in the Party in communist societies.

these are the ‘rules for monopolization of opportunities’ (Murphy 1986, p. 28).

To sum up this section, it seems that both economic and sociological theories offer highly valuable insights into the nature of social inequality and the processes of social mobility. Since such theories have been developed primarily in the OECD context there is a need for a careful reinterpretation of these models, taking into account the cultural specificity and rural context of my study. With this in mind I turn to the third relevant body of research, one which focuses specifically on the Pakistani context.

### **SOCIAL MOBILITY WITHIN AN AGRARIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE**

Historically, households and communities were the central providers of welfare in what are now industrialised societies (see Parsons and Bales 1955; Goode 1963). In modern society, these households and communities are transformed by the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation which delegate the welfare role primarily to the state (Wilensky and Lebeaux, 1965). Esping-Andersen (1999) notes that the pre-industrialisation and pre-urbanisation societies were characterised by ‘local, stable, and dense networks’ which in the post-industrialisation period have been replaced by ‘complex bureaucracies, anonymous markets, and global transaction’ (pp. 47-48). The resulting individualisation and increased mobility in the latter contexts created risks that were greater than the capacity of the nuclear family. Consequently, there was ‘a shift in risk-pooling from the localistic micro-solidarities to the societal institutions such as trade unions, insurance companies, or the welfare state’ (p. 48). A significant share of a family’s welfare responsibilities were believed to be taken over by the welfare state, leading to what Espin-Anderson calls a *defamilialization* of welfare responsibilities (p. 49). This argument is however strongly contested by feminist scholars who point towards the de-commodification of women’s unpaid labour in providing care in the post-industrial era. This critique suggests that women, and hence their families, continue to provide care which is non-monetarized and unacknowledged in national income accounts (Bruyn-Hundt 1996, pp.73-74) and thus remains invisible.

This historical reference has serious implications for studies in traditional agrarian social contexts that do not share this structural transformation with industrialised societies. This profound difference between the two contexts is almost always misrecognised when using mainstream models of social mobility in the Global South (for example, Narayan et al. 2018).

In many non-industrialized, largely rural societies with agrarian modes of production, the notion of a welfare state remains a distant reality. Consequently, the immediate social networks remain dense and stable, as rural life continues to depend on the ‘localistic micro-solidarities’ (Esping-Andersen 1999). Individuals’ welfare, their access to basic services such as education, healthcare, law and order, their livelihood opportunities and their overall prospects for social mobility are heavily conditioned by their ability to form and draw upon such social networks. These networks include the immediate and extended family, caste and kinship (*biradree*) and other forms of organisation that connect families and individuals to the sources of power beyond community. The constellation of these hierarchically organised relationships gives rise to a complex, deeply organized politics of patronage in which immediate needs are met by demonstrating loyalty to the groups with corresponding duties and obligations (Wood 2003). It is in the thick of this social life that the meanings, values, aspirations and strategies for social mobility are formed, negotiated and realised.

The defamilialization of the mainstream models of intergenerational social mobility, if applied to rural contexts of the Global South (where families are the main care providers for the young and elderly with no state support), would be deeply flawed. The highly pronounced sexual division of labour and the division of sexual labour (Arnot 2002) shape the meanings, values and preferences attached to social mobility, as well as the gendering of aspirations and strategies for schooling and its economic outcomes. In such contexts, the standard approaches to estimating the private returns to schooling are highly male-centred, as they ignore the contribution of the unpaid female caring work in enabling and maintaining the largely male labour force. The unpaid caring role of women in the family in fact has implications for the labour force participation of both males and females. The prevalent modes of accounting for national and personal income do not help us monetise women’s contributions to national and household economies (Bruyn-Hundt 1996, pp. 73-74). It is essential that Pakistani women’s labour in not just preparing men’s labour, but also their role in educating their children, as well as, their direct contribution to income generating/expense saving activities is acknowledged and where possible, included in the analysis of social mobility.<sup>37</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> This is not always easy as traditional household surveys do not provide data on the ways women’s contribution to household economy.

The factors specific to agrarian societies present a convincing case for taking into account the rural social structure. Studying the role schooling plays in intergenerational social mobility in rural Pakistan requires a broad understanding of rural society, its organisation and the ways social stratification is formed, reproduced and transformed over time. Consequently, I drew on various empirical studies from the fields of sociology, anthropology, political science, history and development studies. In thinking through the dimensions I intended using to understand schooling and the Pakistani social structure and local culture, I read into studies of landownership, kinship and caste structure, the politics of patronage, and religion and patriarchy, by Pakistani and other authors. Below I explore each of these themes in turn.

### **Landownership**

Landownership is recognised as a primary factor of production in an agrarian economy and an important determinant of welfare in rural Pakistan. Various studies (such as Davis 2011; Arif 2013; Arif and Farooq 2014) have shown the inverse relationship between landownership and poverty in rural Pakistan. In 1970, Tariq Ali described five social categories in rural Pakistan that represent the class structures: the landlords; rich peasants; middle peasants; poor peasants; poor peasants/sharecroppers/rural proletariat. Based on the 1963 Agricultural Census, Ali reported the number of major landlords in Pakistan who owned more than 15 million acres of land (31.2% of the total privately owned cultivated area) to be 63,348. In a longitudinal analysis of chronic poverty in rural Pakistan from 2001 to 2010, Arif and Farooq (2014) reported a strong negative relationship between landownership and chronic poverty, with falling into poverty, but also a positive relationship with breaking out of poverty. The relationships of landownership also mediate educational achievements, as Cheema and Naseer (2013) demonstrate through a case study of a district in Punjab, where the upward educational mobility is highest amongst the landowners.

The social significance of landownership is evident in the fact that various attempts to define social class in Pakistan have used landholding as the key social differentiator (for example, Eglar 1960; Ali 1970; Alavi 1973). Reflecting on the Punjabi agrarian modes of production, Alavi (1973) identified three social classes in relation to landownership: *big landlords*, *middle peasantry* and *village servants*, with about 5% of the rural households owning more than 25 acres of land—in other words, 70% of the total land. Although some landowners were self-cultivating, most land was cultivated by the sharecroppers (ibid., p. 54). Both farm labourers

and sharecroppers were dependent on landlords for their livelihoods. In contrast, village servants, such as the barbers, carpenters, blacksmiths and potters who served everyone in the village, were not solely dependent on landlords for their livelihoods. Within these relationships, Alavi argued that landlords positioned themselves as ‘middlemen’ between the villagers and the state through their extended networks with state officials, and they also maintained close connections with political parties and urban movements (ibid., p. 56). Land inequality in rural Pakistan is thus at the core of multifaceted social and economic inequalities. As the economic policy of Pakistan has historically relied on promoting industry and transferring resources from agriculture, Khan (2003) and Alavi (1983) argue that this policy disproportionately affected small landowners rather than major landlords, who had also benefitted disproportionately from the Green Revolution of 1960s (ibid.).

The significance of land also lies in the political power it generates. In his PhD thesis, Javid (2012) argues that Punjab’s landed elites historically negotiated their privilege with colonial and post-colonial states in exchange for their political support of these regimes.<sup>38</sup> As a consequence of their unique negotiating power, these elites have perpetuated their dominance in the political, social and economic structures of Punjab. After independence, the landed elites earned state patronage and key positions in the successive political ‘reforms’ by unrepresentative governments (Alavi 1974; Waseem 1994; Javid 2012, pp. 2-3).<sup>39</sup>

Javid (2012) reported that land fragmentation resulting from the division of land among inheritors from 1925 to 2000 could not weaken the dominance of the rural economy by a small elite (Javid 2012). He found an increase in the proportion of landless workers, from 48.2% in 1972 to 50.3% in 2000, and of casual labourers, from 30% in 1972 to 44% in 2000.-

---

<sup>38</sup> Land ownership has historically been the most important factor in explaining power relations in Punjab from the Mughul Empire to British colonial rule. Well before colonialism, Mughal emperors (1526-1857), given their overall weak capacity to govern their ruled area, depended heavily upon the landed aristocracy, *jagirdars*, to collect revenues and maintain social order. Development of the extensive irrigation system resulted in the establishment of ‘canal colonies’ in previously barren regions of colonial Punjab which were then settled by millions of people migrating from other parts of the province and the country. This agricultural transformation of Punjab and the accompanying social engineering under the Land Alienation Act 1900, which gave certain groups property rights over otherwise communal/public land, (re)shaped most of the social structures of the province. Certain population groups were divided into ‘cultivating’ castes and were granted the land, whereas the rest were labelled ‘non-cultivating’ castes, including ‘artisans’ and ‘landless labourers’, and were expected to provide labour and services to the villages.

<sup>39</sup> Through the manoeuvring of the local government system by such leaders as General Ayub Khan (1958-69), General Zia-ul-Haq (1978-88) and General Parvez Musharraf (2001-08). Through their presence in the civil and military bureaucracy and the overall historic political influence they wielded, landed elites are the key constituents of what Hamza Alavi (1972) terms the ‘over-developed state’--a set of institutions essentially consisting of a civil and military bureaucracy which function with relative autonomy from the political elites.

the percentage of landed aristocracy fell from 4% to 1%, and those owning more than 50 acre fell from 25% to 14% of the total farming population from 1925 to 2000. However, recent literature also points towards the emergence of new actors in the rural social hierarchy as a result of several decades of capitalistic development. Akhtar (2008), for example, argues that, because of the Green Revolution in the 1960s, the large-scale migration of skilled and unskilled workers to the Gulf countries, and the overall rural-urban integration, new *intermediary* classes are emerging, such as shopkeepers, transport workers, contractors and middlemen in agricultural markets.

### **Kinship and caste structures**

Social mobility is, of course, also linked to the structure of kinship and caste which shapes not just schooling and its outcomes but overall life chances in rural Pakistan.<sup>40</sup> Early ethnographies on rural Punjab suggest that the then prevalent caste hierarchies included ‘cultivator’ and ‘non-cultivator’ (the landlords/*zamindar* and the service-providers/*kami*) patrilineal groups (Eglar 1964; Ahmad 1977). These caste groups have historically been linked through a system of *seyp* (Lyon 2002) which is similar to the traditional system of *jajamani* in old India, described in the beginning of this section. It is thus a relationship of economic interdependence which favours the landed groups. It acquired its social significance by the end of the 20th century and these caste divisions are now not solely dependent upon landownership. Ahmad (1977, p. 83), argues that caste is more like occupation and is well defined, distinct and somewhat confining for the village artisans, the service providers or the *kammis*. Anthropologists like Eglar (1964), Barth (1960) and Chaudhary (1999) noted that these two broad categories of castes are linked to each other through this asymmetrical relationship of reciprocity; with *zamindar* families providing food, money and favours in exchange for the services they received from various occupational groups (Lyon 2012).

---

<sup>40</sup> While the history of the caste system in the South Asian sub-continent is a lot older than the available records, institutionalisation of the caste hierarchy, despite its precolonial roots, can be traced from colonial policies and practices. The 1881 Census Report of India (Ibbetson 1883) illustrates the ways in which the very fluid caste structures prevalent in 19<sup>th</sup>-century rural Punjab (see also Dirks 1992) were brought into standardised official practices in the colonial era, making them the basis for the state’s interaction with Punjabi society. Prominent historian of Punjab David Gilmartin (1988, p. 16) records that the British colonial policy in India was based on its own understanding of the social structures in Punjabi society which attempted to be linked with the colonial state in order to maintain social order and extend its authority over the citizenry.

In contemporary Punjab, caste is manifested in kinship groups, alternately labelled as *zaat/biradree/quom*,<sup>41</sup> and ‘it is the kinship system rather than caste which embodies the primordial loyalties, structuring its social organisation’ (Alavi 1973, p. 25).<sup>42</sup> Both the social hierarchy of castes and their associated occupations persist over generations and determine individuals’ life chances (Ghurye 1969; Gazdar 2007). Caste categories reproduce themselves through the strong ties and solidarity between the kinship groups, which are often clustered together (Mughal 2014), and the historic practice of endogamy (Usman and Amjad 2013). As Gazdar (2007, p.87) writes, ‘kinship group remains a key—perhaps the key—dimension of economic, social and political interaction’. These kinship networks offer their members solidarity, group-based collective action and relative autonomy from the state and market (Gazdar 2007).

The hierarchical relationships between different *biradrees* are observed to provide a foundation for structural inequalities in rural Pakistan and thus are an important regulator of social relations. It is important to recognise that the members of a *biradree* in Punjab generally do not share property or income; however, the honour or shame of the individual member affects the status of the entire *biradree* (Blood 1994). In their investigation of Pakistan’s rural social structures, Mohmand and Gazer (2007) reported that individuals’ social status and power were associated with the ranking of their caste in the village.<sup>43</sup> Each *biradree* had its own leader representing it in collective forums, and in dealing with other *biradree*. These leaders resolved conflicts, negotiated with the state officials on behalf of the

---

<sup>41</sup> *Biradree* in Alavi’s view is comprised of those with common descent, as well as those associated with a principle of solidarity.

<sup>42</sup> Earlier writers such as Ahmad (1972, 1977), based on their work in central Punjab, argued that kinship groups were not comparable to a caste. Within the two divisions—*zamindars* and *kammis*—Ahmad divided groups into several *quoms*—extended patrilineal groups. In Ahmad’s opinion, *Quoms* did not possess a universally acceptable hierarchy and changing one’s kinship group was easily accomplished—a direct contrast with the main idea of the caste system. He dismissed the idea of seeing *quoms* as castes and instead considered village structure as a class structure with two classes—landlords and occupational *quoms*, or landlords and the rest of the village. Alavi (1972) also argued that kinship groups do not fulfil the criteria of caste structure, that is, ‘ritual pollution’ and ‘purificatory rites’, and that they also have no restrictions on day-to-day interactions (commensality) and thus should not be treated as caste. To Ahmad they were more like social classes, as they represented layers of economic hierarchy.

<sup>43</sup> In the district of Chakwal, *biradree* was the most important marker of identity and overshadowed class by the kinship solidarities (p. 11). Mohmand and Gazdar (2007) argue that, in the Muzaffargarh district, *biradrees* were spatially segregated from one another. They found *Syed* and *Jaat biradrees* at the top and *Mirasis* and *Katanas* at the bottom of the caste hierarchy. The authors also found that, in Muzaffargarh as in Chakwal, *biradrees* were significant for dispute resolution, with landlords often mediating the process.

*biradree*, and exerted political influence on their *biradree* members.<sup>44</sup> This caste structure is therefore highly relevant to the study of the role of schooling in social mobility.<sup>45</sup>

Tamim and Haq (2015) observed that, in rural Punjab and Sindh provinces, the social hierarchies prevalent outside schools permeate the school environment, leading to discrimination disguised as the ‘academic judgement’ of those teachers who discourage students from low-caste backgrounds. Given their weak social status, low-caste parents reportedly cannot hold the school teachers accountable unless the children of the rich attend the same school and the interests of both rich and poor converge to engage with the school administration. To Tamim and Haq, caste is a manifestation of social class, with caste titles used to evoke ‘the collective memory of the group’s original position in social structure, even when economic mobility has been gained’ (ibid., p. 59). It is important from the point of view of social mobility that Tamim and Haq (2015) report that it is not just landownership or economic wealth which is used for caste distinctions but also the ‘historicity of the landownership’ which is deployed as a ‘symbolic capital’ to undermine the recent economic progress of the low castes (ibid., p. 59).

By using quantitative survey data, Jacoby and Mansuri (2011) found that, where school was located in a community dominated by high-caste groups, low-caste households were less likely to send their children to school.<sup>46</sup> In other words, low-caste children were less likely to benefit from the presence of a school in the community which was dominated by the high-caste households. In contrast, low-caste children were likely to attend a local school if they lived in a community dominated by low-caste households. These authors suggested that ‘overall, where social barriers are absent, parents of differing caste status make similar schooling choices for their children, suggesting that they face similar returns to education’ (p.

---

<sup>44</sup> The authors report a direct relationship between caste and economic status: dominant *biradrees* tended to own more land than the dominated ones. While changing economic conditions meant that the labour market offered new economic opportunities to the artisan/occupational groups (*Kammis*), thus reducing their economic dependence on the dominant ones, this did not in itself ensure social equality. Landlords exerted significant influence on the low-caste *biradrees*, particularly on those who were their tenants or landless workers. Poverty among the low castes affected their collective action and they depended on others such as landlords and shopkeepers to gain credit or borrow money.

<sup>45</sup> Analysing quantitative and qualitative data from eight rural communities in Punjab and Sindh, Channa (2015) reported substantial differences in educational attainment between different caste groups after controlling for several other socioeconomic factors.

<sup>45</sup> Those from low caste groups were less likely to be literate and to have attended school than those from high castes (ibid., p. 87).

<sup>46</sup> After controlling for distance from school and household wealth, they observed a ‘settlement boundary effect’ on the attendance of 9-15-year-old girls.

18). They drew a policy implication from this research, that is, that building a new school in the settlements which were dominated by low-caste households, instead of building a school in every settlement, can boost the enrolment two times and at one-sixth the cost.

Closely related to the theme of my research is Cheema and Naseer's (2013) study of intergenerational educational mobility across caste groups in rural communities in Punjab. Using survey data, they measured the extent of intergenerational persistence/mobility over three generations of three *quoms* which represented the village hierarchy. They found overall increasing educational mobility over three generations of men; however, this was strongly differentiated by *quoms*. The propertied/landed *quoms* experienced far more mobility than the historically non-propertied *quoms* which suggests the increasingly unequal chances of benefitting from the agrarian transformation of the district. Those from the *quoms* at the bottom of hierarchy had fallen a generation behind others in terms of educational attainment. Cheema and Naseer (2013) also pointed to the strong heterogeneity in the educational transitions within various *quoms*. They found that some households in the non-propertied *quoms* had no educational mobility across three generations. Importantly they also noted that such households also exist in villages which have schools. The lack of households' demands for education was a challenge to the universalising of education in Pakistan; further research is required about the cause of these findings.

There is nonetheless some evidence of transformation over time (Chauhdary 1999) as the occupational specialisation of *kammis* has been transformed by new job opportunities created in the rural and urban economies, leading to gradual economic independence from the caste hierarchy. Nonetheless, the potential of such change seems to be limited, as occupational and landed histories continue to remain important markers of identity, governed by the rules of endogamy (marrying within one's *quom*) (Usman and Amjad 2013).<sup>47</sup>

### **Relationships of patronage**

---

<sup>47</sup> These identities are governed by the practice of endogamy, with *zamindars* marrying within their own *quom* or the other *zamindar quomes* (Usman and Amjad 2013). The rules of endogamy are strict amongst *kami quoms*, as they largely marry within their own occupational *quoms* (ibid.). These authors also report the virtual nonexistence of inter-marriages between *zamindar* and *kammi quoms*, except for few instances of *zamindar* men marrying *kammi* woman but not the reverse; even higher education of *kammi* men could not break these rules (ibid.).

If landownership and caste/kinship mediate the life chances of individuals, families and groups and shape their livelihood strategies, social mobility is affected by an even deeper social relationship, that of patronage. Wood (2003) argues that, in contexts where governments fail to provide basic rights and social security for the poor and the markets fail to ensure equal competition for everyone, thereby entrenching existing inequalities, the poor are left with only their personal relationships and community networks to ensure security in their lives and livelihoods.<sup>48</sup> Their desperate dependence on these relationships results in the postponement of their autonomous, long-term development, as they discount the future in the wake of an uncertain present and enter into dependent relationships with those who are powerful (*ibid.*). These relationships and networks can take a range of forms and include elements of reciprocity and/or hierarchy, which demand loyalty and bondage in return for security.

Of relevance here is Shami's (2010, p. 21) research on the patron-client relationship in the Punjabi context, which she describes as exchange relationship based on necessity and mutual benefit between unequal actors. In the rural context, clients are those peasants who own either no or few assets and are constantly threatened by the environment. To minimise their risks against these threats and gain other benefits, clients seek the patronage of someone who has authority and control over income-generating assets and is willing to provide security (*ibid.*, p. 22). Within these relationships, Shami suggests, the resources offered by the patron are reciprocated by the guaranteed supply of labour and social follow-up, and by clients' compliance with the electoral demands of their patrons. Patrons use these factors to enhance their own social and economic position, and to negotiate public resources with political authorities in return for guaranteed votes.

Lyon (2002) also reports on power and patronage in rural Pakistan, using his fieldwork with landlords in Punjab and North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, or KP) to explore deep-seated social inequality and hierarchical power relations. He explores the formation and fluidity of patron-client relationships and the asymmetric relationships between landlords.<sup>49</sup> He also questions the endurance of asymmetric relationships even when the

---

<sup>48</sup> Based on ethnographic insights into several communities in South Asian countries, Wood (2003) argues that uncertainty (insecurity) is the determining condition for the poor anywhere in the world.

<sup>49</sup> Lyon (2002) investigated the ways the asymmetric relationships of caste and kinship constitute the Pakistani society, in which people manipulate the power accessible to them and that of others they can access to serve their own interests. His ethnography is focused on the landlords who are somewhere in the middle of the power

conditions of dependence are absent, as in the case of people migrating abroad. In fact, he argues that the asymmetric relationships have become the *modus operandi* of Pakistani society (p. 2) where the state either has failed to provide alternative forms of organisation or it is prevented by the culture from doing so. Lyon sees the prevalence of these relationships as being strong enough to suggest that any Marxist-based class analysis is largely inadequate for studying sub-cultures in Pakistan (p. 59). Importantly, he argues that most people assume the relationships of both patrons and clients comfortably, when and where needed (p. 222). Indeed, defying the basic rules of patron-client relationships, he argues, invites serious sanctions. Lyon also argues that, even the relationships between employees and employers can hardly be understood in a purely economic sense, as they (almost always) involve social expectations and obligations (*ibid.*, p. 120) – thus, ‘the point is that when individuals meet in Pakistan, they are seeking to instantiate a particular type of patron/ client relationship because it constitutes the most stable and reliable relationship in which expectations and obligations are the clearest’ (*ibid.*, p. 222).

In a recent study based on various household datasets from rural Punjab, Chaudhry and Vyborny (2013) found that many households contacted provincial and national politicians to access basic state services, such as getting a national identity card. The landless and female-headed households that were less likely to reciprocate such favours from the patrons than the better-off households were less likely to interact with, and benefit from, politicians (p. 205). Consequently, they were left out. These patronage relationships perpetuate inequalities and suggest that the patrons routinely recommend which politicians their rural clients are expected to vote for. Similar analysis offered by Khan (2012) illustrates the detrimental effects of such relationships on the education system in KP province.<sup>50</sup>

---

structure and have tremendous power within their small geographies, yet exist in a context with others far more powerful than themselves.

<sup>50</sup> Khan’s (2012) ethnographic work in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa illustrates this ‘unofficial’ way of doing official business. By using case studies of public service provision, he examines the informal social norms of clientelism, personal relationships and moral attachment which govern the provision of basic social services in urban (and rural) contexts and shape the behaviour of public officials. Based on their understanding of the bureaucratic institutions, Khan illustrates how public officials tend to develop social and political relationships which have little relevance to their official roles (p. 177). He shows how political parties appoint their favoured teachers and educational administrators based on their family connections and political loyalties while overlooking other requirements for the job (p. 179). Such officials are then less likely to be concerned about performing their jobs efficiently. Khan reports the presence of ‘brokers’, people in rural areas who link people with politicians. On one hand, these brokers help people access public resources through politicians and other favours such as transfers, postings and appointments; in return they secure votes for these politicians (p.179). Khan shows that the devolution of the power from provincial government to the district councils under the Local Government Ordinance 2001 resulted in the rather direct involvement of politicians in the day-to-day affairs of educational service provision which enabled them to manoeuvre their personal political interest by ‘obliging’

## Religion

This brings us to the fourth dimension of the Pakistani rural social structure. The communal division of colonial Punjab in 1947 and resulting riots reinforced strong religious identities, especially through religio-nationalistic discourses, throughout the history of the country. There are many ways in which religion enters into social life, including schooling, and contributes to social structures. Providing a comprehensive picture of the social function of religion falls outside the scope of this chapter. However, in a very brief way, I try to highlight some of the aspects which could be relevant to my research. My own work on the treatment of poverty and wealth in Islamic scripture, mainly *hadith* and *Quran*, suggests that Islam considers the excess of both wealth and poverty as trials (Zaman, Naveed and Rahman 2014). In promoting ‘sufficiency as the ideal’, Islam advocates spending one’s wealth above one’s needs on dependents and those in need of help. For the poor, Islamic teaching recommends working hard and strongly discourages begging. However, Islam also advocates facing poverty with patience. Clearly this perspective does not pose external challenges to the social structures except for asking the dominant to be kind to the dominated.

Moreover, my previous work highlighted that the religio-nationalism presented in educational discourses constructs religious identities that promote pejorative attitudes towards religious others (Hussain, Salim and Naveed 2011). Not only are educational content and history distorted in their depiction of religious minorities, the children from minority backgrounds face an overall hostile schooling environment (ibid.). Moreover, discrimination against religious minorities is not confined to the schooling experience; rather, Pakistan has institutional and legal arrangements in place which lead to the persecution of religious minorities in all walks of life.

Another feature which is highly relevant to rural life in Punjab is the stronghold shrines have over everyday life. Islam spread across the subcontinent primarily through the Sufis, hence their shrines and their caretakers hold an important place in social, cultural and political life (Malik and Mirza 2015).<sup>51</sup> Darling (1928) also noted that the peasants in colonial Punjab were

---

teachers and officials (p. 183). Based on such strong support from their patrons and local elites, there were instances when teachers became too powerful to be sanctioned and held accountable (p. 185). Khan’s case study of water supply further illustrates how ‘expectations and obligations to immediate family and others expressed through concentric circles of moral attachment’ privileged kinship connections by those responsible for the delivery of public services.

<sup>51</sup> Malik and Mirza explain these relationships:

tightly controlled by the landlords, the *pirs* (successors of the Sufis) and the moneylenders.<sup>52</sup> These *pirs* in many ways resemble landlords, and with their devotees they form patron-client relationships.<sup>53</sup> The state has historically depended on the *pirs* to maintain the social order in rural Punjab during Mughal, Sikh and colonial rule; they were the greatest allies of the colonials, whom they helped to curb dissent. In return the *pirs* demanded land, public resources and state patronage. They have historically supported dictatorial regimes in Pakistan and have been part of every ruling party.

Malik and Mirza (2015) demonstrated the negative impact of shrines on literacy outcomes in Punjab, as districts with a greater presence of shrines have lower literacy outcomes. They also showed that this influence is political, as the impact of shrines is stronger in *tehsils* (sub-district administrative unit) where the shrine families are directly involved in electoral politics. Given that the influence of *pirs* has persisted historically because of ignorance, superstition and patron-client networks, it is important to see how schooling has impacted these relationships. Earlier writers on Punjab observed that these *pirs* were opposed to uplifting the poor, including through education (Darling 1928), as education would weaken the foundation of their devotion—superstition (Aziz 2001, p. 27; Lieven 2011). Although it is hard to conduct an empirical analysis of such social factors in a doctoral project, it is important to note the impact such social relations would be likely to have on individuals' life chances.

---

'The unquestionable allegiance of their followers converts them into important intermediaries between, not just God and man, but also between the state and its subjects. This power of intermediation is particularly important in peripheral regions, where, due to weak power of the central state, rulers had greater dependence on local elites for political support. Shrine elites have traditionally acted as brokers of centralized power throughout history—from Mughal rule and the Sikh interregnum to colonial India and post-partition Pakistan. While the state, its functionaries and non-religious local elites seek legitimacy from these shrine families, the guardians of these shrines, in turn, use this dependence to access state patronage and other privileges that help them to consolidate their power. In a sense, the power and influence enjoyed by shrine families resembled those of local chiefs and notables of Punjab.' (Malik and Mirza 2015, p. 18).

<sup>52</sup> The devotees provide unquestioning loyalty to these shrines and their caretakers. In the Alipur *tehsil* of Muzaffargarh district, historical analysis suggests that 'every five miles or so is the house of a tribal or religious leader, who maintains a band of retainers to enforce his influence on his poorer neighbours' (Darling 1928, p. 100).

<sup>53</sup> The influence of these *Sufis* lies in the fact that many Punjabis associate their conversion to Islam with the teaching of these medieval saints (Gilmartin 1988). These shrines play multiple roles. They offer themselves as places of worship, provide refuge to those in need and also have distributive functions by collecting donations from the rich and sharing it with the poor (ibid.).

## **Patriarchy**

Like religion, the patriarchal nature of the Pakistani society, a vital part of life in rural Pakistan, is manifested in all dimensions of the social structure—landholding, kinship, patronage and religion—which reportedly revolve around men. Patriarchy, wherein women's lives are owned by the men who dictate their life chances, is arguably the most oppressive social structure in rural Pakistan. Women can benefit from their families' advantaged position in the social hierarchy but also can suffer disproportionately if their family is disadvantaged. However, regardless of their families' relative social position they experience the disadvantage of being women because of oppressive gender relations. Differentiated access to education and its labour market outcomes between men and women are affected by the structural inequalities that shape gender relations (for example, as in the case of Tanzania as noted by Unterhalter, Heslop and Mamedu 2013). The emphasis on gender relations in a rural Southern country like Pakistan becomes even more important where, in the absence of a welfare state, women bear the brunt of caring for their family members.

Patriarchy can be seen as the tremendous power, moral authority, social privilege and economic domination of men and the subjugation of women in most walks of life. The hierarchical relationship between men and women is reflected in almost all development statistics including health, nutrition, education and economic participation. Pakistan is almost always ranked at the bottom of various indices of gender equality, such as the Global Gender Gap Index produced by the World Economic Forum (2014) which is a composite measure of economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment. Out of 142 countries on the Index in 2014, Pakistan was ranked 141; only Yemen ranked lower.<sup>54</sup> Overall gender inequality is worse in the country, as rural women experience greater discrimination than their urban counterparts (ibid.).

One way to explain the oppressive power relations between men and women is through what Amartya Sen calls *missing women*—that is, the ratio of men to women is higher than the global average.<sup>55</sup> The 1998 census-based estimates suggest that almost six million women were missing in Pakistan. This alarming demographic illustrates the all-encompassing discrimination women face which ranges from female infanticide to poor nutrition, lack of

---

<sup>54</sup> See [http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR14/GGGR\\_CompleteReport\\_2014.pdf](http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR14/GGGR_CompleteReport_2014.pdf).

<sup>55</sup> According to Sen, in the case of absolute equality between men and women, the sex ratio should be 105 women per 100 men, as in the absence of discrimination women tend to live longer than men.

healthcare, limited access to education and restrictions on women's participation in social, economic and political life.<sup>56</sup>

Various writers on gender in the South Asian context point to the interplay between the historical, cultural and economic factors that produce gender inequality (see Agarwal 1988). Kandiyoti's (1988) work, for example, provides insights into the patriarchal structures in traditional Muslim rural societies in South Asia and Africa. She describes the South Asian context as representing *classical patriarchy* wherein gender relations are reproduced through three generational patrilocal households. The cultural ideal involves senior men controlling all groups, including younger men. Here women rely on strategies which increase their security, including manipulating the affection of the men in the family. Within this traditional family structure, Kandiyoti argues, submission to male dominance is reproduced over generations and manifested in all forms. Pakistani women, especially in rural areas, are normally married at a young age and move to live with their husband's family, where they are controlled not only by the father of their husband but also all men in the family and the senior woman, their mother-in-law. Given their absolute dependence on their husband and his family, their labour remains invisible. It is also common that women give up their inheritance from their parents in favour of their brothers. In the case of severe maltreatment, divorce remains the only way to break out of such relationships. In such family arrangements, older women assert their authority over the younger (daughters-in-law) through their sons. The hardships of younger women pay off when they themselves become a mother-in-law and control their daughter-in-law.

The Rural Household Panel Survey of IFPRI/IDS (2012-13) reported that only 4% women owned land separately from their husbands, and 80% of such women reported that men in the family such as the husband or father make all the key decisions regarding land (Ahmad, Hameed, Khan and Rafi 2017). The same survey suggests that only 18% make family-planning decisions on their own, 38% make joint decisions and 40% have their husbands to make their decisions without consulting them. Other findings of this survey suggest that women from the wealthier families are not necessarily more empowered than the poor women. Nor are the higher levels of women's education associated with greater empowerment in all domains. These findings confirm and extend evidence set forth in many past studies and draw further attention to the fact that women in Pakistan are constrained in

---

<sup>56</sup> This contrasts with the world average of 104 women per 100 men.

terms of their ability to participate in decisions on their own reproductive rights, on their daughters' education and marriage, on certain types of household purchases, and on moving freely outside the home. In short, women face considerable challenges across multiple dimensions of empowerment, equality, and opportunity. (p. 418).

Any study on the role schooling plays in intergenerational social mobility within this context therefore needs to consider gender values that differentially shape men's and women's aspirations for social mobility and the strategies to achieve it—including schooling. An appropriate framework for intergenerational social mobility can, in fact, offer a unique opportunity to analyse shifts in gender relations in and through schooling over time and across generations.

In sum, the insights provided by research on Pakistan suggest that the lives of the poor and the impact schooling has on them cannot be understood sufficiently by merely looking into the economic outcomes of poverty. Poor lives are constrained in several overlapping stratifications—of landownership, of kinship, of politics, of patronage and of religious and patriarchal practices. Such a complex constellation of mutually reinforcing hierarchies determines the possibilities for persistence, or change, in the lives of the poor whilst also imposing limits on the role of schooling in intergenerational social mobility.


## **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

In this chapter, I have surveyed the research in the field of intergenerational social mobility. Synthesising the two disciplines, while challenging, provided me an opportunity to develop a comprehensive grasp of the dynamics of schooling and social mobility. Cross-country trends make the case for analysing the effects of wider economic and political contexts and various policy paradigms on the relationship between social origins, education and destinations. The assumptions within such theoretical models (developed in the OECD context), whilst valuable, do not necessarily hold in contexts such as Pakistan. I therefore moved to consider the key dimensions of the rural social structure in Pakistan.

The insights offered by the Pakistani research suggest that the relationships between the various factors that shape prospects for intergenerational social mobility, as established by the mainstream literature, are further mediated by the rural social structure in Pakistan. I have summarised the interplay between the factors mediating the relationships of *origin-*

destination, origin-education and education-destination in Figure 2.1 below. Here, the triangle represents the core *origin-education-destination* relationship that is the focus of the intergenerational social mobility research tradition. Inside the triangle, the bigger circle represents the thick of rural social life in Pakistan that is characterised by the structures of landownership, caste and kinship, the politics of patronage, religious organisation and patriarchy, all of which shape not just the schooling experiences but the social and economic outcomes of schooling. Outside the triangle are the key factors that shape the mutual relationship between the *origin-education-destination* trio as suggested by the empirical studies and theoretical literature reviewed in this chapter. An alternative framework for studying the role of schooling in intergenerational social mobility, I argue, requires borrowing intelligently from the factors presented inside and outside the triangle.

**Figure 2.1: Towards a new model for studying the role of schooling in intergenerational social mobility in rural Pakistan**



What the framework clearly requires is the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods simultaneously. As we have seen in social mobility studies, it has been possible using most available datasets to statistically establish the persistence and change along various forms of stratification. However, most of the structural and subtle forms of discrimination resulting

from the interplay of landholding, kinship, the politics of patronage, and religious and patriarchal practices, particularly for the chronically poor, can only be understood through supplementing the statistical analysis with qualitative forms of inquiry. Qualitative methods are particularly important in understanding if and how schooling might restructure the dispositions which individuals acquire through their family socialisation, how this restructuring affects their perception of their positioning in the social world and how it informs individual and family strategies used to increase the prospects of social mobility.

As a result of this exploration of research I focused on designing an innovative mixed-methods model that would allow me to understand both the bigger picture of the relationship between schooling and inequality whilst also examining the subtle ways in which a socially transformative and reproductive role of schooling in rural Pakistan.

## **CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCHING INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY IN RURAL PAKISTAN**

The key features of the research design I developed to study the role that schooling plays in intergenerational social mobility in rural Pakistan has three strands which relate directly to the three associations linking origin to education and to destination. The first research strand focuses on the role the state plays in providing equal opportunity by tracing the place of schooling in national economic development agendas since Pakistan's creation in 1947. It is here that I hoped to uncover the role that schooling was expected to have in the social and economic transformations of the country.

The second statistical strand has two parts. First, it explores the dynamics of intergenerational mobility *within* the education system in rural Pakistan from 1986 to 2010 in the context of the expansion of mass schooling during that time. This strand aims to uncover the *origins-education* relationships. The second part examines the role schooling could or did play in improving the economic status of families over a period of 28 years (1986-2014). This latter element would uncover the *education-destination* relationship.

I argued in Chapter 2 that intergenerational social mobility research requires moving beyond the traditional reliance on statistical analysis to take account of the values, perspectives, aspirations, experiences and reflections of the generations under study. My aim was to gain a deeper understanding of the enabling and constraining factors, both objective and subjective. The third strand, therefore, involves household-based qualitative research conducted in a village in the Punjab.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section justifies adopting a mixed-methods research design. The next three sections provide methodological details for each of three research strands identified above.

### **THE CASE FOR MIXED METHODS**

The opportunities opened up by the recent trend in the social sciences of merging previously distinct quantitative and qualitative methodological traditions justify adopting a mixed-methods research design for this study. A recent survey of the methodological literature in

economics (for example, Starr 2014), reports the increased use of mixed methods, particularly in the fields of poverty studies and the evaluation of social programmes in lower income countries, feminist economics, environmental economics and case studies of innovations. Rigorously conducted qualitative research, ‘quite unlike economists’ impression’, reportedly adds greatly to disciplinary knowledge (ibid., p. 238). Of particular relevance to my research are the studies on labour market conditions (such as Howitt 2002) and on poverty in developing countries that combine both quantitative and qualitative research methods (such as Bamberger 2000; Kanbur 2003; Kanbur and Shaffer 2007). Such studies appreciate the multidimensionality of poverty, whose nature and dynamics require multiple methods. Bird, Higgins and McKay (2012) have, for example, reported the advantage of using mixed methods in studying the conditions of conflict in Northern Uganda. The mixed-methods design they adopted enabled them to see that education increased resilience in the educated living in conditions of conflict, helped them mobilize many resources, and gave them better strategies to find their ways out of conflict situations than those without education. In a similar vein, Valente (2011) could explain the quantitative findings on the low benefit of land reforms in South Africa through qualitative methods identifying the poor matches between the land-use plans proposed by the policy with the skills of the land grantees. Feminist economists such as Harding (1986) have also argued that economics as a discipline can become more objective by being open to the perspectives and voices of traditionally excluded population groups (Harding, 1986).

Sociology has traditionally drawn upon both quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as mixed-methods designs (c.f., Pearce, 2012). From the 1960s onwards there was increased use of qualitative methods that drew upon ‘constructivist’ or ‘interpretivist’ rather than positivist traditions (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). However, there is now increasing appreciation of both approaches. The quant/qual divide has now been questioned with strong arguments put forward for simultaneous engagement with the objective and subjective traditions of inquiry (for example, Bryman, 1984; Smith, 1991; Denzin, 2008). Bourdieu and Nice (2004, p. 101) made a compelling case for mixed methods and encouraged researchers to use ‘methodological-polytheism’ to explore simultaneously the objective structures of society and the resulting (apparently voluntary) subjective actions which reproduce these structures.

Fries (2009), taking such a Bourdieusian approach, identifies three major steps needed in any such research design. The first step attempts to gain a wider picture of the ‘*position of the*

*field vis-à-vis the field of power*' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 104). Fries observed that various research instruments used in social research, such as coding schemes, statistical categories and typologies, are produced precisely out of those social relationships which need to be taken into account. Using this advice, I could usefully situate schooling within the economic development agendas of the state and trace the ways that the former is presented as a mechanism for creating equality of economic opportunities.

Bourdieu and Wacquant's (1992) second step is to map 'the objective structure of the relations between the positions occupied by the agents' (p. 104) in order to understand the ways these shape the educational attainment of individuals and their success in the labour market. This strand often relies on quantitative models that identify the structural correlates of a particular phenomenon, taking into account a number of relevant variables. With this in mind, I hoped to detail the patterns of educational and economic distribution through a robust analysis of quantitative data, thereby producing generalisable evidence of the differences across various social groups.

Bourdieu and Wacquant's third step investigates the habitus of agents by looking into their subjective dispositions—that is, the *internalisation of their objective conditions*. This strand draws upon qualitative methods such as collecting data through interviews and using narrative analysis. It requires exploring research participants' values and meanings of social mobility, their perceptions about the role of schooling in social mobility, their educational and economic aspirations, and their experiences of schooling and its use for moving up the economic ladder (as told in their own words). Here I could explore how individuals' dispositions are shaped by objective structures and, in turn, how they act back on them.

Such an understanding of the dialogic interplay between the objective and subjective aspects of social reality requires combining quantitative and qualitative methods in order 'to mobilize all the techniques that are relevant and practically usable' (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, pp. 226-227).<sup>57</sup> Bourdieu also argued for situating the biographies and behaviour of social

---

<sup>57</sup> Bourdieu goes beyond merely combining the positive with interpretive, the quantitative with the qualitative, and implicates researchers in the process of research:

'Social analysis must involve more than merely combining the statistical objectivation of structures with interpretive accounts of the primary experiences and representations of agents. To capture the gist of social action necessitates what I call participant objectivation: to realize not only the objectivation of the object of study but also, as I have tried to do in my own work . . . the objectivation of the objectifier and of his gaze, of the researcher who occupies a position in the world he describes and especially in the scientific universe in which scholars struggle over the truth of the social world'. (Bourdieu 1988, p. 784).

scientists relative to their research within the social inquiry to avoid a ‘slip from the model of reality to the reality of the model’ (1977, p. 29). A Bourdieusian reflexive approach to the study of intergenerational social mobility thus necessitates drawing upon both quantitative and qualitative methods in order to approach the dialectic relationship between structure and agency, what he called ‘constructivist-structuralism’ (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 123–7). It is this model of research that appeared most relevant to my research aims.

### *Tensions between methods and epistemologies*

Whilst there are many merits in developing a mixed-methods research design for this study, I was also very aware of the historic paradigm conflict that for a very long time maintained the ‘incompatibility thesis’ which suggested that various methods are inherently incompatible (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Quantitative purists, so-called positivists, believe that social observations can be treated as physical phenomena, that social inquiry is objective, that time and context-free generalizations are possible, and that the causes of social outcomes can be established rigorously (p. 14). In contrast, qualitative purists, so-called interpretivists, reject this position and argue that there are multiple constructs of reality, that generalization beyond time and context is neither desirable nor possible, and that all research is value driven, causality cannot be established, and knowledge and knower cannot be separated (ibid.). The underlying assumption is that quantitative and qualitative methods relate to different epistemological beliefs. The growing tradition of mixed-methods thus advances the idea of need for a new system of beliefs about knowledge, so-called *pragmatism* (Morgan 2007), as a paradigm for mixing quantitative and qualitative methods that brings together positivism and interpretivism.<sup>58</sup>

Having reviewed a large body of literature in various disciplines, Teddlie and Tashakkori (2008) propose mixed methods as a distinct paradigm. They initially identified some of the

---

<sup>58</sup> Some methodologists, however, have taken an opposing view from that considering mixed-methods research as a distinct paradigm of ‘pragmatism’. Bergman (2010) argues that qualitative and quantitative methods by themselves do not necessarily imply a particular epistemological belief, nor do they define the relationship between research and researchers. Bergman maintains that many research questions can be answered through different theories, concepts, methods and datasets. The association of quantitative and qualitative methods to a particular paradigm is a weak one. The prevalent methodological dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative methods has resulted from the desire to *create order where there is none, or at least very little*. Bergman suggests that if one believed in these orthodoxies of the competing paradigms and their allied methodologies, one would never be able to combine quantitative and qualitative methods, given Kuhn’s (1962) central argument that paradigms are incommensurable. Importantly, from this point of view, mixed-methods research doesn’t form a new alternative paradigm as it doesn’t offer specific concepts, principles, theories and methods—neither do mixed-methods replace mono-methods research

broad characteristics of mixed-methods research which are summarized in Box 3.1.

**Box.3.1: Core characteristic of mixed-methods research**

- Methodological eclecticism
- Paradigm pluralism
- Iterative, cyclical approach to research
- Set of basic ‘signature’ research designs and analytical processes
- Focus on the research question (or research problem) in determining the methods employed within any given study
- Emphasis on continua rather than a set of dichotomies
- Emphasis on diversity at all levels of the research enterprise
- Tendency towards balance and compromise that is implicit within the ‘third methodological community’
- Reliance on visual representations (e.g., figures, diagrams) and a common notational system

*Source:* Adapted from Teddlie and Tashakkori (2012, p. 775, Table 1)

In a later paper, (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2012) encourage an imaginative combination of multiple methods from the entire quantitative and qualitative spectra when addressing specific research questions.<sup>59</sup> They note that the mixed-methods research tradition leads to question the assumed one-on-one correspondence between epistemological beliefs and particular methods, developing instead for a pluralism of paradigms. They argue that the dialectic stance amongst the diversity of mixed-methods approaches allows a researcher to draw upon the multiple assumptions that underlie the same research designs (Greene, 2007; Greene and Hall, 2010).<sup>60</sup>

Bergman (2008, 2010) argues that, if focused on the substantive specifics of a research issue

---

<sup>59</sup> Unless done in collaboration with teams offering diverse skills, adopting a mixed-methods framework requires researchers to be skilled in a wide range of methodologies in order to avoid superficial engagement with the given methodological ‘bilingualism’ (Denzin 2003, p. 322).

<sup>60</sup> Nonetheless, critics have suggested that a mixed-methods approach can take away the critical nature of the interpretive framework of qualitative methods (for example, Denzin and Lincoln 2005, p. 9).

instead of falling into ideological debates, mixed-methods research offers exciting innovations, particularly in light of the growing popularity of multi-/inter-/cross-/trans-disciplinarity and the policy relevance of social research. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), for example, suggest that the paradigm of pragmatism can find middle ground between dogmatism and scepticism; they reject dualisms such as rationalism vs. empiricism, realism vs. antirealism, free will vs. determinism, platonic appearance vs. reality, facts vs. values, subjectivism vs. objectivism. Pragmatism recognizes the simultaneous existence of the physical world and the social/psychological world which consist of language, culture, human institutions and subjective thought.

What emerges from the various reviews of the research processes associated with mixed methods is that they often involve a cyclical, iterative approach in which inductive and deductive components inform each other. Morgan (2007) calls this ‘back and forth’ reasoning *abduction* whose rigour also leads to *intersubjectivity*—a common ground between objective and subjective traditions (see Chapter 2). Creswell and Clark's (2011) review of a large number of qualitative studies led them to classify studies into two main categories—those that merge qualitative and quantitative data in a parallel/concurrent way, and those in which one type of data builds on the other or one type of data is extended by building on the other sequentially. Table 3.1 summarises five different research designs identified by the authors.

**Table 3.1: Various mixed-methods design types and their main focus**

DESIGN TYPE	MAIN FOCUS
<b>Triangulation</b>	Qualitative and quantitative data are collected and analysed parallel to each other and are merged or compared later to gain a better understanding.
<b>Concurrent embedded</b>	A study based on one method is enhanced by including data from the other method, often used to introduce qualitative component concurrently during a quantitative data-based intervention.
<b>Explanatory embedded</b>	It starts with quantitative data and is followed up by qualitative data.
<b>Exploratory embedded</b>	The issue is first explored with qualitative methods, followed by quantitative methods, to test a certain hypothesis or generalize results.
<b>Sequential embedded</b>	It begins with qualitative data to recruit participants for a quantitative intervention which again is followed by qualitative data to explain the quantitative findings.

Source: Extracted from Creswell and Clark (2011, pp. 53-106)

There is potential overlap between concurrent and sequential mixed-methods designs although there may be difficulty in resolving discrepancies in the results of quantitative and qualitative data used by both designs. Such discrepancies, according to Creswell and Clark, may be due to errors, or they may point towards new theories or possible extension of existing theories. Researchers can privilege one form of data over the other to resolve the contradictory findings. With this in mind, I decided to develop a model that allowed for the possibility of overlapping *exploratory embedded* and then *explanatory embedded* designs. Instead of imposing one of these models and running the risk of reducing the complexity of my study, some aspects of my research were conducted in parallel whilst others were sequentially informed by each of three methods. My sequence would be: *exploratory* using policy analysis, followed by *explanatory embedded design with a* quantitative and qualitative interface and then a final aim of achieving *triangulation* across policy analysis, statistical patterns and perspectival analysis. The research design I developed which consisted of three stages of empirical analyses, each drawing on different research methods to uncover:


*Strand 1:* The construction of social mobility in economic development agendas and educational policies (1947-2010)

*Strand 2:* The national and regional patterns of intergenerational educational and social mobility (1986-2014)

*Strand 3:* A perspectival analysis; that is, a qualitative study of rural families (2016)

Figure 3.1 below shows how this sequence works in practice.

**Figure 3.1: Mixed methods research design**



Below I explain each strand of the design separately, along with their respective samples and modes of data analysis. I then reflect on the ethical and practical issues I faced while conducting this research.

### **THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL MOBILITY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS AND EDUCATIONAL POLICIES (1947-2010)**

The cross-country literature in Chapter 2 indicates that the extent to which schooling can promote social mobility, greater equality and social justice is intrinsically linked both to wider economic and social structures and to the nature of the educational system, and to the values, ethos, culture and consciousness they promote. Consequently, I built into my study a broad inter-temporal analysis of Pakistan policy texts which helps locate the shifting social and political context of schooling in Pakistan’s national development agendas since it gained independence.

A critical analysis of policy contexts serves many functions. It helps us understand the peculiarity of the Pakistani context within which the complex tasks of building a new country, a new nation and a new state were to be accomplished, which gave education a particularly crucial role.

It also illustrates an inter-dependence between the new education system and the economic order. My analysis identifies some of the collective national visions of progress and social justice, and the prescribed role of schooling to achieve such visions. Significantly, such a policy analysis makes the case for theorising the role of the state in shaping the prospects for achieving social mobility through education.

My approach to policy analysis followed Ball (1990, p. 9) who considered ‘education policy *in relation to* the political and ideological and economic, and the political, ideological and economic *in* education policy’. His analysis therefore adopts, on the one hand, a structural approach which explores the dialectic relationship between education and economy, whereas his political analysis adopts an interactionist approach to exploring the politics of education that illustrates various influences on educational policy processes. He argues for a discursive framework to help us understand the ways education policy is used to transmit particular culture (pp. 10-11). Later, Ball (1993) distinguished between policy as *text* and policy as *discourse* which is a valuable methodological distinction for my analysis. Here, policies as texts are seen as the outcomes of various compromises, including the micro-politics of their time, and negotiations and serendipity within the state and policy processes. They shift and change over time, and their meaning, representations and interpretations also change. Such an approach to policies brings the analysis of power to the centre stage.

As discourses, policies assemble various ‘regimes of truth’ about particular struggles over their interpretations and enactment, and the possibilities they determine for our thinking (p. 15). In my analysis of Pakistan’s education policies, I aimed to identify competing ideas around nation-building through education (with implications for the prospects of social mobility) and embedded within these ideas I hoped to tap the discursive framing of social justice, equal opportunity, merit and rewards, and social mobility. My goal here was to construct an analysis which offered both a chronological account of educational development over time in terms of targets and achievements on key indicators, as well as the key ideological discourses relevant to social mobility. These ideological discourses not only provide an economic rationale for certain courses of action and resource allocation in the educational field, they also perform the pedagogical task of shaping national identities and ways of being, thus redefining social relationships.

My choice of policy texts was affected by the fact that Pakistan has a rich history of writing Five-Year Plans which are the overarching policy documents that assess the state of social

and economic development at a particular point in time and set the agenda for all public policies for the next five years, with clearly defined goals and targets for each sector of the economy. These five year plans translate the political vision of the government into concrete policies, interventions, benchmarks and goals. They are coordinated by the Planning Commission of Pakistan and a large number of leading experts on each sectoral theme, whether working for the government or outside, and the heads of various ministries and national organisations are invited to contribute to these Plans. Once approved, these plans are implemented by all the public sector organisations, ministries and departments of the federal government. Educational policies, written by the Ministry of Education, conform to the wider development objectives determined by the respective Five-Year Plan and describe specific policy goals within the education sector. For my thesis, I selected ten Five-Year Plans and eight educational policies/plans covering the period 1947-2010 (Table 3.2). This period overlaps with the period in which the parental generation in the 1986 household survey (used in strand 2) grew up; their life chances were directly shaped by these educational and economic development agendas.

**Table 3.2: Selected policy documents (1947-2010)<sup>61</sup>**

<b>Economic development agendas*</b>	<b>Educational Policies**</b>
First Five-Year Plan 1955-60	Report of the First Educational Conference 1947
Second Five-Year Plan 1960-65	Report of the Commission on National Education 1959
Third Five-Year Plan 1965-70	The New Educational Policy 1970
Forth Five-Year Plan 1970-75	Education Policy 197 2-80
Fifth Five-Year Plan 1978-83	National Education Policy 1979
Sixth Five-Year Plan 1983-88	National Education Policy 1992
Seventh Five-Year Plan 1988-93	National Education Policy 1998-2010
Eighth Five-Year Plan 1993-98	Educational Sector Reforms 2000-2013
Ninth Five-Year Plan 1998-2003	
Tenth Five-Year Plan 2010-15	

\* Five-Year Plans are produced by the Planning and Development Division.

\*\*Educational policies are produced by the Federal Ministry of Education.

Methodologically, following (Fairclough, 1992), I decided to use critical discourse analysis for the social and textual analysis of policy documents. Such an approach focuses on three

---

<sup>61</sup> After identifying the key documents to be analysed, acquiring these documents was a challenge, as several are not available online. During my fieldwork in 2016, I visited the Ministry of Planning, Development and Reforms in Islamabad and requested access to the Five-Year Plans. The librarian gave me the documents which I got copied. I then visited the Academy of Educational Planning and Management, also in Islamabad. I personally knew the librarian there who found me the hard copies of most of the educational policy documents.

aspects: the text itself and the construction of language; the discursive framing of the text, particularly its shaping of meaning; and the broader social structural context, including social, political and economic, within which the dominant class exerts power through these texts. However, the broad focus of this strand of research in analysing economic development agendas and educational policies for the period 1947-2010, which are lengthy documents, necessitated some compromising in terms of the depth of analysis that could be offered.

It was important initially to sample the sections relevant for my analysis, taking into account the fact that the structure of the five-year plans changed over time. I therefore extracted and coded the sections, subsections and recommendations most relevant to education which included, for example: (a) the vision and broad objectives of the plan; (b) contextualisation of the key challenges identified; (c) the size and objectives of the plan; (d) development targets and priorities; (e) evaluation of the previous plan; (f) economic growth; (g) education and training; (h) social policy/welfare; (i) manpower/labour and employment; (j) scientific and technological development; (k) works programme; and (l) rural development. The educational policies, in contrast, required a full textual reading, with particular notes taken on their key objectives and priorities and the justifications provided. Such a broad selection from these documents provided me with a large amount of textual data.

A second reading involved a closer analysis of the thematically coded data and the notes taken, and the set of quotes extracted. I was primarily interested in themes that provided insights into the economic, cultural and the political context within which both the economic and education systems evolved; the ideas on social and economic equality, including equal opportunity, social exclusion, merit, talent and leadership; and the tensions between economic growth and its distribution. I paid attention to how these key words were used, how often and in which context, extracting key sentences and expressions. Having noted these broad linguistic and framing discourses, I moved on to investigate the role of schooling in generating economic growth and its distribution, and in promoting rural development. I attempted to identify the sub-sectoral priorities within education and, importantly, the role of schooling in shaping attitudes for promoting economic development and in creating Pakistani Muslim citizens. When reporting the contents of these policy documents, I used footnotes to elaborate on the key points.

## THE PATTERNS OF INTERGENERATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL MOBILITY (1986-2014)

The exploratory reading of policy texts helped me develop the more evaluative, second strand of my research which explored the impact of these policies on the life chances of households and individuals. The aim was to generate generalisable evidence on the extent to which social origins continue to affect opportunities *in* and *through* education. The focus of this quantitative strand of research was to map patterns of intergenerational mobility, measuring the precise strength of association between social origins, education and economic destinations, using the three dimensions outlined in Chapter 2. Such an analysis required longitudinal data that covered a length of time sufficient for the intergenerational dynamics to play out. In this section, I provide an overview of the framework I used to analyse the large quantitative data set I could access, the techniques for the data analysis, and the sources of data.<sup>62</sup>

As we have seen, economic analysis rests on a conceptual model of rational behaviour to understand various decisions made, as well as their outcomes. Models offered by Becker and Solon (see Chapter 2), for example, are widely used in the analysis of intergenerational educational and economic mobility. However, an interdisciplinary approach requires a critical engagement with such assumed *rationality* of economic agents in these models and taking into account the *social conditioning* of rationality. Only after accounting for these factors can the economic models be relied on for understanding individuals' educational and economic strategies (see Lindbladh et al., in Chapter 2). To account for these social factors, I begin by making the case for shifting the unit of analysis from the *individual* to the *household*.

### *The centrality of household*

I was keen to rethink the ways of measuring social origin such that they embrace the complex factors that shape individuals' lives. For example, questions are already being raised within mainstream intergenerational social mobility research over the intrinsic value of considering parental attributes as the key measure of social origin, pointing towards the potential dangers in relying exclusively on occupational categories and personal incomes (Hout, 2015). There thus is a demand to broaden the scope of social origins beyond parents' attributes so as to

---

<sup>62</sup> A broad overview of the interdisciplinary conceptual model I offer here is developed in Chapter 5 and extended in Chapter 6.

‘characterize as fully as possible the conditions and circumstances of early life’, which requires ‘enumerating the social facts that block opportunity and create unfairness’ so as to minimise the ‘excluded variable bias’ (ibid. p. 29).<sup>63</sup> Arguments for what I want to call the *refamilialization* (as opposed to *defamilialization* noted in Chapter 2) of the models of social mobility are even more compelling in the absence of a welfare state and in the collective nature of Pakistani rural social life (c.f., Chapter 2).

There is methodological ease in adopting a household-level analysis of quantitative data. We learn from the literature on household consumption that individuals tend to pool their resources at the household level (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002), more so in developing countries where risks are to be mitigated against at the micro/local level. It is perhaps because of such family structures that most information related to socioeconomic status in almost all surveys is collected at the household rather than the individual level.<sup>64</sup> Most economic activity in rural Pakistan inherently involves households pooling resources, allocating time, sharing opportunities, and dividing labour between productive roles and what is called home production, such that each individual’s economic positioning is contingent on that of the others in the household. The division of labour in the traditional rural Pakistani household is intricate, where the roles of individuals in enabling any economic activity are indistinguishable. With multiple, often volatile sources of income in a rural household, a major proportion of expenditures are made collectively, and durable assets are often owned and used collectively. Thus, the standard model of social mobility of father-son correlations of earnings or incomes are too individualistic for the collective context of rural Pakistan. Moreover, given that most economic activity takes place in the informal sector, it is difficult to distinguish the returns to the labour of a single household member, thus one must go beyond individualized accounting to measure resources where they are pooled by a household.

Families or households in contexts like rural Pakistan are usually large with multiple generations cohabiting, are almost always headed by a male senior or productive/working member, and decision-making is complex. This does not necessarily imply a ‘unitary’ model of households in the Beckerian (1965, 1981) sense, one with unified preferences that is run

---

<sup>63</sup> Hout (2015) recommended considering family structure when measuring the (dis)advantage that affects life chances through economic status, time and attention in childcare and socialisation.

<sup>64</sup> Examples of such information include ownership of durable assets, consumption expenditures, income from multiple sources, landownership, housing, and various indicators of living conditions.

by the ‘benevolent’ dictator of a ‘collection of individuals who behave as if they have agreed on how best to combine their time, goods purchased in the market, and goods produced at home’ (Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad, Hoddinott and Kanbur 1995, pp. 2-3). A typical rural Pakistani household can instead best be conceptualized as a *collective* model that helps smooth consumption in the wake of various economic shocks. A complementary division of roles and responsibilities, such as between men and women, helps to sustain a collective model (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2007) and thus to reconcile its members’ different preferences. It can be based on cooperative or non-cooperative relationships, and its members will be ‘motivated at times by altruism, at times by self-interest, and often by both— [they will] cajole, cooperate, threaten, help, argue, support, and, indeed, occasionally walk out on each other’ (Alderman et al., p. 15).

As Chiappori (1988) argued, households in the collective model tend to achieve a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources where decisions are made collectively and thus are shaped by the respective power of their members. In developing countries, when the household income is kept constant, a shift in the power of a member, such as contributing more to the resource pool, leads to shifts in household decision-making and expenditures (cf., Thomas and Chen, 1994; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Duflo, 2003). Nonetheless, a collective model does not always ensure efficiency and the literature identifies inefficiencies in household decision-making in developing countries (see Udry (1996) on labour decisions in Burkina Faso). Other studies have reported factors such as the misallocation of productive inputs, members contributing less than their share to household goods, imperfect risk-sharing, and strategically appropriating resources and using domestic violence (Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Anderson and Baland, 2002; Bloch and Rao, 2002; Ashraf, 2009).

Such a conceptualization is important in making the case for aggregating household resources, including economic status and human capital across individuals, without reducing the diversity and complexity of its relationships. This model helps keep intact the relational and familial nature of intergenerational social mobility in the context of rural Pakistan. It also allows me to take a relatively richer account of individuals’ social origins and the changes households may experience over time and generations in and through schooling. Nonetheless, there is a need to acknowledge that households make complex decisions on whom to school and how much which are based on several factors, including parental aspirations, economic and social constraints, employment opportunities, the expected returns to schooling, and the

perceived abilities of individual family members (c.f., Becker, Kominers, Murphy and Spenkuch 2015). Qualitative work also suggests that individuals' work-related decisions and resulting economic prospects are linked to their understanding of their family obligations and responsibilities (Arnot and Naveed 2014; Naveed and Arnot 2018). As households consist of multiple generations, it is anticipated that a household-level analysis will offer rich insights into the dynamics of inter-generational mobility.

As I noted in Chapter 2, the individualised nature of the intergenerational social mobility analysis also tends to obscure the crucial gender dynamics that shape life chances differently for men and women. It fails in particular to recognize the role women play by providing unpaid labour for care and home production which is necessary to support those who work in the labour market, even in societies with a welfare state (Bezanson, 2006). Feminist writers have pointed towards the 'shadow work' done primarily by the women in a household in order to maintain one working in paid labour; this shadow work often involves full-time work by certain female members of the households. In the absence of a welfare state that takes some responsibility for care, and of markets to pay for that care, households must fulfil these tasks privately (Bezanson 2006). Whilst the role of women is continually changing over time with increasing expectations that they will do paid labour, the expectation that they will provide unpaid labour at home continues. This gender order determines educational and labour decisions which result in gender-differentiated trajectories for social mobility.

Baker *et al.* (2004) argued for considering the *affective* system in addition to the economic, political and socio-cultural systems in which (in)equality can be reproduced. Relevant to this, there is a growing literature showing that schooling brings higher earning returns for women than men, even in developing countries.<sup>65</sup> However, the focus of such literature remains limited to *individual earnings* or, at best, *incomes*. Beyond employment/self-employment, in the formal sector, there is a need to account for the indirect contribution women make to the paid work of men and, most importantly, for their direct contribution to home production through unpaid work. In the process of intergenerational economic mobility, if we fail to acknowledge the direct and indirect economic contributions women make to the household economy, we are likely to overestimate the individual economic returns to the schooling of men and underplay women's contribution to male education and social mobility. As

---

<sup>65</sup> See, for example, Aslam (2009) for the analysis of labour market returns to education by gender in Pakistan.

demonstrated by Boserup (1989) in the context of developing countries, self-caring male workers have fewer hours to allocate to paid work than those who are taken care of by their often-female family members.<sup>66</sup> The education of caring members may add to their efficiency in caring and eventually enhance the mobility and productivity of ‘workers’. However, a shift from the individual to the household as a unit of analysis does not in itself make these power relations explicit. There are noted inefficiencies in the collective household models but, at the very least, a household-level analysis can acknowledge the often misrecognised *collectivity* underlying individualized education - economic production relationship and begin to recognise women’s labour as both a cause of social mobility through education and an outcome of female education. Otherwise, individual accounts of the labour market returns to schooling will contribute to the unjust patriarchal structures of rural households and the economic system. These models also risk forgetting women as mothers putting in major contribution to the education of their children thus contributing to their social mobility, the *hidden domestic pedagogic work* (c.f., Arnot, 1982, 2002; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990).

Rural villages in Pakistan are collections of kinship groups that represent overlapping hierarchies of landownership, caste and kinship, religious identity, ethnicity and so on. Households are horizontally and vertically integrated into community life through relationships of reciprocity and inter-dependence. Household members often jointly experience discrimination that results from the primordial solidarities offered by these social networks, which often are mediated at the household level (see Chapter 7). Focusing on individuals alone risks ignoring fundamental aspects of the social fabric of rural Pakistani society.

A household-level analysis also enables us to take into account the extent to which individuals’ life chances are shaped by the hierarchical social organisation of the community that mediates their access to basic services and opportunities, including education, healthcare and livelihoods. In the absence of a welfare state, community plays a significant role in providing welfare and social security, particularly when households fail to fulfil their welfare responsibilities because of acute poverty, various shocks (such as the death of a breadwinner

---

<sup>66</sup> In her book *Women’s Role in Economic Development*, Boserup (1989/1970) illustrates that, in developing countries, ‘as much as one-half to two-thirds of the husband’s income from his city job is spent on goods and services that were produced at home in the village, at least in part by the woman. Now she stays at home and his productivity is offset by the loss of hers’ (Zeidenstein, 1974, p. 509).

or health issues or indebtedness), unemployment and so on. Access to various opportunities is conditioned by a household's ability to form and draw upon social networks. The constellation of hierarchically organised relationships gives rise to a complex, deeply organized politics of patronage where immediate needs are met by demonstrating loyalty to elites who are often able to capture public resources and forms of state authority. As I argued in Chapter 2, schools are situated within this social-scape such that educational decisions, access to and experiences of (various types of) education, learning levels and the possibility of progressing to higher levels are shaped by these power relationships. Landowners and those from the higher caste/kinship and the majority ethnic and religious groups enjoy a privileged status and have social capital that grants them access to better educational opportunities. Landless, low-caste and religious and ethnic minorities are likely to have poor access to education and to opportunities to use education for economic gains, thus they have less possibility for intergenerational mobility. Like schools, labour markets which are deeply embedded in such social structure that further shapes the economic outcomes of education. By broadening the notion of social origins, household-level attributes enable us to incorporate the factors that enable and constrain the role of schooling in intergenerational social mobility.

#### *Intergenerational mobility—over what?*

Another important methodological challenge for the mixed methods research design and its quantitative/qualitative strands was how to conceptualise intergenerational social mobility in rural Pakistan. What would be the best indicator for measuring intergenerational mobility? I was interested in examining broad change in the social and economic status of individuals and their families over generations and the role schooling plays in such change, or lack thereof. I noted, therefore, that sociologists have focused on the relationships of economic production by tracking change in occupational categories, but such categories are embedded in post-industrial OECD countries. These studies use a social class schema in which intergenerational transition is assessed. Such occupation-based class categories though are not easily transposed to non-OECD countries, particularly to the agrarian context of rural Pakistan which has its own distinct social structure - they could not provide a robust measure of social status in the rural context of my study.<sup>67</sup> Extensive theoretical and empirical work is required to develop the culturally relevant occupational categories that tap the social hierarchy would be beyond

---

<sup>67</sup> It is a common observation in rural Pakistan that someone working in a low-ranked occupation yet enjoying high social status because of their high economic status/landownership/privileged caste, making occupational categories an ineffective measure of socio-economic status.

the scope of this thesis. Given these challenges, I decided to use economic status as a measure of intergenerational mobility whilst recognising that economic status is a latent category with a range of proxies routinely used in economic analysis, each of which has its own strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, in order to gain a comprehensive measure of economic status that might work in the Pakistani context, I have developed three measures: (a) *household income*; (b) *household consumption expenditure*, and; (c) *household durable assets/wealth*. My analyses of intergenerational economic mobility (see Chapter 6) are based on these measures using the various data sets and available methods I describe below.

### **Intergenerational transition matrix**

Quantitative economic analysis of intergenerational mobility has commonly used intergenerational elasticity, as the measure of interest. In strand 2, in order to take into account the relative mobility amongst individuals from different origins, I use an *intergenerational transition matrix* which analyses the marginal distribution of the variable of interest for the two generations. I analysed educational mobility using five educational levels and plotted the schooling levels of fathers against that of their sons and daughters at two points—1986 and 2010. A single household-level variable was constructed for schooling sons which captures the highest schooling amongst those in the household above age 16. A similar variable was constructed for daughters. For each level of fathers' schooling, the transition matrix presented the probability of their sons and daughters attaining various schooling levels. This transition matrix allowed me to compute the *absolute mobility*, *upward mobility*, *downward mobility* and *persistence* for the entire sample and for the subsamples. The cross-sectional analysis of the 1986 and 2010 data provided a separate transition matrix for each point. To infer the relative inclusiveness of the education system, comparisons were made at each point between the relative mobility of those with various schooling levels of their fathers – at both periods and separately for sons and daughters.

Secondly, because I chose the household as the unit of analysis to determine economic status, my analysis of intergenerational economic mobility required longitudinal data on households. A transition matrix for economic mobility therefore plotted household economic status in the first time period across household economic status in the second time period. The two data points which cover a period of 28 years reveal a shift in economic status over two generations. Since the economic literature favours using an average of income status over

multiple periods to capture long-run/permanent economic status, rather than for a single time period (see Solon 1992, for example), I use the five-year average of household income/consumption expenditure for the base period (1986-91) and plot it against the single-period values for 2013-14. While the schooling levels were externally given, I used the ranked categories for economic status. Households were first ranked on their five-year (1986-91) income/expenditure values and divided into quintiles of equal size, then were ranked again on their economic status in 2013-14 and divided into quintiles. Households that were in a higher quintile in 2014 than in 1986-91 were considered upwardly mobile. This rank mobility is relative in itself, however, and has the limitation of not taking into account the absolute level of mobility over the 28 years.

Additionally, strand 2 had three sets of regression analyses which are described below.

*(a) Ordered logistic-regression analysis*

This analysis explored the precise strength of association between the schooling levels of two successive generations whilst controlling for various demographic, social, cultural and economic factors that can confound this association. Such controls help assess the pathways of intergenerational transmission, including household wealth and economic status (for details, see Chapter 5).

*(b) Adopting a Mincer equation to estimate the role of schooling in economic mobility*

Strand 2 also required a strategy to measure the role various levels of schooling in the household play in household economic mobility over the 28-year period. I exploited the potential of the Mincer wage equation (Mincer 1958) in Chapter 6 which is based on the assumption that education provides individuals skills that increase their productivity in the labour market. Those with higher levels of education are therefore paid better. Treating individual earnings as a function of schooling and labour market experiences, the Mincer equation is widely used in the economics literature to estimate private returns to schooling which has useful policy implications (Patrinos 2016). Patrinos notes that an increasing number of studies are using the Mincer equation to investigate how rates of returns to

education vary across different population subgroups.<sup>68</sup> Given the usefulness of the Mincer equation in such analyses, I adopted it to investigate the long-range returns to schooling in two ways:

The OLS regression models to estimate the household level long-range economic returns in 2014 to the schooling levels of household members in 1986;

The Fixed Effects model to estimate changes in household economic status conditional upon changes in schooling levels of household members during 1986-2014 (thus controlling for the unobservable fixed characteristics of the household).

To see the effect the rural social structure had on the role of schooling in economic mobility, I used the OLS models for the subgroups created along the lines of landownership, caste and kinship and geography. Further detail about these models and the variables constructed is provided in Chapters 5 and 6.

It was important to recognise certain limitations of these models of quantitative data analysis, as they obviously miss the nuances and the categories are often reductive. Educational levels, for example, do not tell us more than individuals' schooling levels, while education is in fact a much broader concept. The same could be said about several other variables. Household income, for example, is prone to measurement errors which may not be random and may bias the models and results they produce. Using the highest schooling level of sons and daughters is also a reductive measure and it overreports upward mobility. A household that has multiple sons is counted in the higher category if only one son attains a higher level of education. At the same time, this approach helps identify acute educational deprivation as in the form of households with no son/daughter attaining a higher level of schooling.

### **Quantitative data sources**

Having defined the models of statistical data analysis, I then moved on to assess the suitability of various data sets. The choices were few and access was constrained. I began by analysing two inter-linked longitudinal surveys, one of which covered individuals and households, that covered the 25-year period from 1986 to 2010. This dataset was unusually rich in terms of its sample size and the amount of information it provided, especially considering the dearth of

---

<sup>68</sup> Traditionally, the Mincer equation has been used on cross-sectional data which implies that the earning expectations of young workers may be based on the experiences of old workers, which may not be appropriate for the rapid technological progress of the labour markets (Heckman, Lochner and Todd 2006).

good-quality longitudinal data for the low and middle-income countries. The three datasets I analysed are:

(i) *The Pakistan Rural Household Survey (1986-91)*: This is the earliest longitudinal household survey data in Pakistan. It was gathered by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) with support from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. The survey was administered in four districts, two in Punjab and one each in KP and Sindh provinces, through 14 rounds and took account of seasonal fluctuations in the rural economy. The first round had 928 households and 8,009 individuals, 4,248 males and 3,761 females of all ages. A total of 14 survey rounds were conducted from 1986 to 1991, and 726 households were retained in the 14<sup>th</sup> round in 1991. Total sample size at this stage consisted of 7,885 individuals, 4,014 males and 3,841 females from 726 households.

This survey gathered extensive information on a wide range of factors pertinent to my research, such as household composition and characteristics; landownership, agricultural production, labour force participation in farm and non-farm activities; household expenditures on production and consumption, including education; household income from all sources; asset ownership; and education levels and cognitive skills.<sup>69</sup>

(ii) *The Pakistan Panel Household Survey 2001-2010*:<sup>70</sup> This survey was administered by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) and supported by the World Bank. The first two rounds, administered in 2001 and 2004, covered the *rural* sample only, whereas the last round in 2010 also included an *urban* sample. The original sample used by the Pakistan Rural Household Survey 1986-91 was also included as a subsample of this survey. I faced a number of challenges in thinking through how to link the two longitudinal surveys which were administered by different organisations. Consequently, to cover the longest duration between the two surveys, my research drew particularly on the 2010 round of the survey which covered 16 districts in all four provinces and had a total sample of 4,142 households. My analysis was thus limited to the 2,800 rural households.<sup>71</sup>

---

<sup>69</sup> It also covered a number of other issues such as anthropometry, child health and nutrition; migration; technology adoption; and community-level characteristics including access to various services.

<sup>70</sup> In the years 2001 and 2004, it was called The Pakistan Rural Household Survey; the name was changed in 2010 when the sample was expanded to cover urban areas.

<sup>71</sup> Administered separately to male and female household members, the survey focused on household characteristics and individual information; education; employment; agriculture, including landownership, cultivation, farm technology and livestock; business and enterprise; migration; household consumption expenditures; shocks and coping strategies; health; housing; and subjective wellbeing. Importantly, no rounds of this survey gathered information on household income.

(iii) *The Pakistan Panel Tracking Survey 2013-14*: The IFPRI conducted a tracking study of its 1986-91 original sample in 2013-14, to which I was given privileged access in 2016. This latest survey attempted to track all individuals in the 726 households in the 1991 round. However, Chen, Kosec and Muller (2019) reported a household attrition rate of 4% in this survey and an individual attrition rate of under 12% which is considered comparable to those of other large panel surveys. The survey involved three phases to track and interview the original households from the 1991 round and their split-off households. The first phase, during September-December 2013, covered households used in their original 1991 location and any split-off households within the district. The second phase involved verifying the location of split-off households that were recorded during the first phase, and the third phase was when these out-of-district split-off households were visited and interviewed. Out of the 726 households from the 1991 round, members from 658 households could be tracked. Each original household in 1991 had been split, on average, into 3.43 households in 2013-14, resulting in a total of 2,256 households.<sup>72</sup>

Table 3.3 below presents a summary of the three longitudinal surveys with the sample size and geographic coverage. The summary statistics of the key variables are provided in Chapters 5 and 6.

**Table 3.3: Survey rounds, sample size and coverage**

Survey Round	Sample Size (Households)
<b>The Pakistan Rural Household Survey 1986-1991 (PRHS)</b>	975 households approximately (with 726 households in the last round). Covers Punjab, Sindh and Pakhtunkhwa District covered (4): Faisalabad, Attock, Baddin, Dir
<b>Pakistan Panel Household Survey 2010 (PPHS)</b>	4142 households (2800 rural and 1342 urban households). Covers all four provinces and 16 districts: Faisalabad, Attock, Baddin, Dir, Hafizabad, Vehari, Muzaffargarh, Bahawalpur, Nawab Shah, Mir Pur Khas, Larkana, Mardan, Laki Marwat, Loralai, Khuzdar, Gawadar.
<b>Pakistan Panel Tracking Survey 2013-14 (PPTS)</b>	2450 households. Most of the sample resided in the original districts as in 1991 but others had moved out to other districts

*Source:* Extracted from the respective survey data.

<sup>72</sup> After 22 years of the 1991 round, the tracking survey during 2013-14 gathered information on education, income, employment, assets, consumption expenditures, transfers, children's anthropometrics, migration history, subjective wellbeing and cognitive skills.

One key challenge for an inter-temporal analysis during the 1986-2010 period was the expansion of the sample from the initial sample of the 1986-91 survey with the coverage of new districts in the 2010 round. To make the PRHS and the PPHS surveys comparable, I repeated the analysis for 2010 for both the complete rural sample and the subsample of the districts that were covered in 1986-91, which consists primarily of the households from the older sample.

### **AN EMBEDDED CASE STUDY OF A PUNJABI VILLAGE (2016)**

As indicated earlier, my research design aimed to develop ways to access the subjective and perspectival world of those living in largely poor rural areas not least because of its significance for the social mobility field (see Chapter 2). Whilst the quantitative analysis would map the objective structures, the distribution of educational and economic opportunities across various groups, the objective of the qualitative analysis in strand 3 would be to assess the dialectic relationship between the *structures* of unequal distribution of opportunities and the *agency* of individuals with variable access to these opportunities. As I argued in Chapter 2, the generalisable patterns generated through the quantitative analysis require contextualisation if we are to get closer to understanding the complex relationships and pathways underlying the educational outcomes. Drawing on the Bourdieusian framework, the third strand of my research therefore aimed to uncover the subjective dispositions of individuals and their families, their internalisation of the external rural social order and in turn the impact of these processes on their dispositions. For this strand, I decided to use a village case study approach to investigate social mobility in the real-world context. Such an approach was appropriate since it was:

an empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon (e.g., a “case”), set within its real-world context—especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. (Yin, 2009, p. 18)

Merriam (1988, p. 21) defined case study in a similar way: ‘an intensive, holistic description and analysis of a single instance, phenomenon, or social unit’. With this in mind, I wanted to tap, from a household perspective, the social relations of schooling that occur in what Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 25) called a ‘bounded context’ in the case of a village. In effect, a case study approach would help me situate questions about social mobility within *context*,

addressing *descriptive* and *explanatory* questions (Yin, 2012) about the interaction between schooling and the rural social structure. The holistic case, in this context, would be a Punjabi village where I had good contacts and access, having researched it already (Arnot and Naveed, 2014). I would follow an *embedded* approach with families and with individuals as *subcases* (ibid., p. 7). Families would be the primary unit of analysis but I would also engage with individual family members. By researching the interplay between structure and agency in this setting, I could elicit deeper insights into the ways schooling and its outcomes are mediated by various power structures (caste/kinship, landownership, politics of patronage, patriarchy, religious identity, and state), whether or not they are transformed by it.

My aim therefore in the context of the village was to use qualitative research to tap in their own words the values and meanings of social mobility that participants drew upon, their educational and economic aspirations, and their experiences of schooling and its use for moving up the economic ladder. I was urged to take this approach by Chambers and Chambers (1995, p. 175) argument against normative, top-down approaches to official policies on poverty eradication where he asked: ‘Whose reality counts? The reality of the few in centres of power? Or the reality of the many poor at the periphery?’

### **Developing qualitative research instruments**

Having decided on my goals, I was more than aware of the challenges I was likely to face in the field since I had already conducted qualitative research in this village and had previously interviewed the sampled family members.<sup>73</sup> My aim this time was to glean insights into the cultural specificity, the social structure mediating the *processes* of intergenerational social mobility *in* and *through* schooling, and how schooling transforms social structures. For this voice-based research strand, which complements the analysis of national policy discourses and the statistical patterns of educational and social mobility, I was keen to tap local, popular rather than official understanding(s) of social mobility—the meanings it entailed and the values it encompassed over and above the history of government policy-making as identified in the first strand. If I were to avoid imposing my own concepts on research participants, I first needed to identify the core expressions, concepts and categories which were easily


---

<sup>73</sup> As part of the RECOUP research in 2009-10, I was part of a team of researchers and conducted semi-structured interviews 40 individuals (fathers, mothers, sons and daughters) from 10 families. This fieldwork had built on several rounds of qualitative fieldwork by the research team for various sub projects of the RECOUP prior to my engagement with the project.

intelligible to research participants. Based on my general familiarity with the wider Punjabi context and local lexicon, and my previous engagement with the participants, I opted to use the concept of *taraqqi*, an Urdu word of Arabic origin, as a substitute for the recurring notion of social mobility. *Taraqqi* can be translated literally as ‘progress’ or the improvement of social and economic status over time, and it can be applied to any unit of analysis including individuals, families and other collectivities. Depending on the way questions are framed, the concept covers various units of analysis and temporal dimensions of social mobility while also enabling exploration of the process aspects. *Taraqqi* is commonly used in nearly all local languages in Pakistan, including Punjabi, potentially capturing several implied meanings of social mobility. My aim was to use this concept to open individual semi-structured interviews by asking respondents about their understanding of *taraqqi*. It offered a way to identify its subtle dynamics, the underlying processes and the contributing/constraining factors, and the conditions (perceived by family members) under which schooling could contribute to social mobility.

Ideally, my use of qualitative methods would reveal at a perspectival level, the explanations for the *origin-education*, *education-destination* and *origin-destination* relationships identified in Chapters 2. The synthesis of the research already reviewed in Chapter 2, which had highlighted the factors that might have affected the life chances of the villagers was particularly valuable in developing the interview schedules. The main thrust of these instruments is summarised diagrammatically in Figure 3.2.

**Figure 3.2: Key focus of the semi-structured interviews**



Using this model with all its variables, I developed two semi-structured interview schedules, one for parents and the other for sons and daughters. The unstructured interviews with the key informants revolved around the key themes of this research. These schedules are provided in Appendix 3.1 and 3.2. These schedules were first developed in English and then translated, first into Urdu and then into Punjabi. These schedules were piloted on the first day of the fieldwork and subsequently revised and reduced in size. Each interview as far as possible was taped and lasted approximately 50-70 minutes.

## Fieldwork

The choice of site for my village case study was the research experience I had had on a major research project in Pakistan. That project had taught me about the value of household research and of voice-centred research methods but also the sensitivity that I needed to explore village life. The Research Consortium on Educational Outcomes and Poverty (RECOUP; 2005-10) investigated the social and economic outcomes of education for the poor in Pakistan, India, Kenya and Ghana (see Colclough, 2012).<sup>74</sup> My doctoral fieldwork<sup>75</sup> is based in the same rural village, *Chak Nagri* (a pseudonym) which was used for this study. It was part of the Canal Colonies, was established under colonial rule in the 19<sup>th</sup> century to increase agricultural production in the newly irrigated Punjab.<sup>76</sup> The village was initially inhabited by families who migrated from colonial India to farm these lands and its economic structure was predominantly agricultural. The social structure consisted of landowners, farmers, landless

---

<sup>74</sup> As a large-scale interdisciplinary programme, it followed a mixed-methods research design. In Pakistan, a large-scale household survey representative of KP and Punjab provinces conducted in 2007 was followed by a qualitative component in two districts, one in Punjab and the other in KP from 2008 to 2010. A rural village and an urban community in the Punjab district of Sargodha were chosen for the qualitative fieldwork. Access was negotiated with multiple authorities, including politicians at the district level, the head of the village council, heads of households and individual members of 10 families. These communities were chosen based on certain criteria, including low income; presence of a good road connection from the centre; adequate educational infrastructure; not too large a community; and the community's willingness to participate in the research

<sup>75</sup> My fieldwork aimed to trace the participating families of the Youth, Gender and Citizenship study that was one of the six sub-projects under RECOUP (see Arnot and Naveed 2014; Naveed and Arnot 2018).

<sup>76</sup> An insightful account of the British colonisation of Punjab, control of land, development of the irrigation system and of populating the newly irrigated areas is provided by a senior colonial official, Sir James M. Douie (1914), in an essay titled *The Punjab Canal Colonies*. The policy which underlay the scheme was explained at time to be:

(1) To relieve the pressure of population upon the land in those districts where the agricultural population has reached, or is fast approaching, the limits which the land can support. (2) To colonise the new area with well-to-do yeomen of the best class of agriculturalists, who will cultivate their own holdings with the aid of their families and of the usual menials, and will constitute healthy agricultural communities of the best Punjab type. It was decided, therefore, that the bulk of the available land should be allotted in twenty-eight-acre holdings to small peasant farmers; but some areas were set aside to be given in larger lots to agriculturalists of a somewhat higher class, who were dubbed 'yeomen', and to capitalists, who might, or might not, be agriculturalists. (p. 16)

tenants and agricultural/non-agricultural labourers, some government employees, and the owners of small businesses within and outside the village.<sup>77</sup> Educational facilities in the village in 2010 included: two government primary schools for girls and a higher secondary school (teaching up to grade 12), a primary school for boys and a high school that taught only boys up to grade 10. Two private schools offered coeducation. There were also a few small Madrasahs (seminaries) offering religious education which was common, particularly for girls.<sup>78</sup> Table 3.4 below provides a summary of the basic characteristics of the village households based on the census conducted in 2008-09.

**Table 3.4: Key characteristics of the village**

Indicator	%	Indicator	%
Total population	3,348	Household headed by women	14.7
Men	1,691	Adult doing unskilled labour	20.6
Women	1,657	Adult men working outside household	68.3
Number of households	477	Adult women working outside household	6.4
Mean household size	7.0	Household with flush toilets	64.6

Source: Jeffery (2012), Tables A1.2d and A1.3d

During the RECOUP study, I was involved in the selection of 10 families, and interviewing some 40 individual family members including parents and their sons and daughters. Given the level of information available about the village and my experience of researching there, I saw many advantages to using the same village and same households for my case study. These 10 families were not selected randomly in 2010. They were instead selected using a stratified sampling which aimed at recruiting 10 sons and 10 (unmarried) daughters (aged between 15 and 25 years) representing various levels of schooling such that their school patterns could represent the patterning of schooling in the village. These interviews provided an excellent resource for the study since the sample included poor as well as relatively well-off families, and unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>77</sup> Approximately one-quarter of the households in the village had an out-migrant member working in a city.

<sup>78</sup> The research team I led, which consisted of two males and two female members, conducted semi-structured interviews with the sampled family members. These Islamabad-based researchers were fluent in the Punjabi language and had postgraduate training in social sciences. They were provided additional training to conduct qualitative research under the RECOUP project.

<sup>79</sup> By 2013, I had analysed in-depth the data for five rural families (Naveed 2013; Arnot and Naveed 2014; Naveed and Arnot, 2018). For further details about the methods and fieldwork, see the project website: <http://ceid.educ.cam.ac.uk/researchprogrammes/recoup/>

During the course of this initial project, I had built a great rapport with the community and the participating families. In September 2016, therefore, I returned to the village and established contact with the same gatekeeper and families. My aim was to find out what paths each individual had taken, but particularly the young people. This time, I could tap the longer term impact of schooling on the social status of the sons and daughters, the longer impact of schooling and subsequent employment and marriage patterns on each family, and the reflections of family members about the role of schooling in helping them create a better life for themselves. The success of the project dependent to a large extent on how I set up the second research visit to this village.

As I had learnt that the prevailing gender norms in the village would not allow me to interview women by myself (Arnot and Naveed, 2014). Consequently, when I reached Sargodha city in 2016, I went straight to the university to find female researcher(s) who could help me interview village women.<sup>80</sup> I recruited two research assistants who were sisters, both trained in economics. One was teaching at the university and the other had just finished her postgraduate degree. We reviewed my draft interview schedules and discussed ethics and practice of conducting qualitative research over the next few days, before going into the field.

When I revisited the village I was also keen to re-establish contact with my previous key informant, Mahbub (pseudonym). Happily, I found him excited to meet me again, even after 6 years. We talked about his family and RECOUP before I briefed him about my current status as a research student at Cambridge University. I gave him a broad overview of my research project and its data requirements. When Mahbub and I took a walk through the village, the streets looked as they had six years earlier, without any noticeable change.<sup>81</sup> To seek formal permission for the fieldwork we visited the *Numebrdar*, the formal village official; he was away so Mahbub promised to talk to him on my behalf. When we knocked on the doors of the families I had interviewed six years earlier, I introduced myself and explained the purpose of

---

<sup>80</sup> I first visited Sargodha University and met with some of the academics I knew. Establishing connections with people at the university was strategically important. On the one hand, it made it easy to navigate the town without sounding like a complete stranger; on the other hand, it later proved helpful when I explained my role as a 'researcher' to the less schooled/unschooled people in the village, as everyone knew of the university in a positive way and had some idea of what people at the university do.

<sup>81</sup> The only two noticeable changes were heaps of dirt and animal dung surrounding the boys' primary school at the end of the village, and the construction of an incomplete boundary wall separating a cemetery from neighbouring fields at the end of the village.

my visit. I invited each family to participate in the follow-up study and gathered basic information about the parents, sons and daughters, and the new locations of daughters who had married. I left the village after giving Mahbub the tentative start date for my fieldwork and hoped he would be able to act as my gatekeeper.

My account of how I gained access to the village would be incomplete without a description of my 65-year-old key informant Mahbub, whom everyone in the village called *Chacha* (uncle).<sup>82</sup> He had worked as the *Chowkidar* (literally, gatekeeper) of the village for four decades and was the main contact between his fellow citizens and the state.<sup>83</sup> His formal responsibilities included registering births, deaths and marriages; collecting irrigation charges; and being the focal person when officials from government departments reached out to the village. Mahbub's friendly and accommodating demeanour earned him a trusting relationship with almost every household and he had formal and informal access to a lot of information about each member of the village which greatly facilitated my fieldwork.

Coming from a poor background, Mahbub felt strong solidarity with the majority of the poor villagers. He did his best to protect their interests and chose to be simultaneously diplomatic and vocal in relations with landlords and local politicians, albeit with limited space to negotiate power relations. This positioning enabled him to walk into any house and introduce me and ask for their time. In some cases, Mahbub could go inside and ask women for interviews even when men were not at home.<sup>84</sup>

Another of Mahbub's crucial roles in tracking the whereabouts of my research participants was to register marriages in the village. Being part and parcel of every wedding, he knew the marital details of the village men and women, including the marital homes of the daughters from the RECOUP sample. The level of trust he had won enabled him to ask parent for help in securing permission for interviews from the in-laws of married daughters. Because we had interviewed these daughters in 2010, parents were less reluctant for them to be re-interviewed.

---

<sup>82</sup> Mehbul's first marriage was soon dissolved and he married again at a late age. At the age of 65, he had seven children, the youngest was just six years old.

<sup>83</sup> He reports to *Numberdar*, who is appointed by the government but works under the head of the village council whenever local governments are functioning (they are suspended most of the time). *Chowkidar* gets the salary of the lowest public servant but it provides a regular source of income. Over a rift with the *Numberdar*, Mehbul resigned from his job a few months before my recent visit. He now spends time on his small farm where he cultivates maize and also takes care of three water buffalos.

<sup>84</sup> A reference to 2010 interviews often resulted in their willingness to be interviewed again, sometimes even with enthusiasm.

Mahbub came to every interview with the daughters living outside the village; he introduced me to their husbands and in-laws and explained the purpose of the visit. The young husbands and their families often treated us as guests from the village of their in-laws and consequently allowed us to interview their wives/daughters in-law.

Mahbub sometimes introduced me to others as his *Sahab* (boss) or as a guest of the village, while at other times he subtly displayed a sense of authority over me. One day, as we sat down in the street, he instructed me to do the paperwork for a marriage he had registered. As people passed by I noticed him showing a sense of authority over me which seemingly added to his respect in the village and also contributed to our very friendly relationship that was crucial for the completion of my fieldwork.

### **The family sample**

The day I visited the village I learnt that seven of the families were still in the village and three had moved out, one settling in a neighbouring village.<sup>85</sup> Most of the sons and daughters were now married, and most daughters now lived in other villages with their in-laws. Several sons were also away, living in various cities for their work and returning home only periodically. I decided to interview the available members of the seven families still living in the village and to find the family that had moved to the neighbouring village. Not all the previously sampled members were available but I was able to interview 23, including seven fathers and seven mothers, five sons and four daughters. The details of the sample along with occupational categories are provided in Table 3.5 below.

---

<sup>85</sup> One family, that was living in the buffalo shed of a landowner and working for them in 2010, had moved out in the last four years. We were told that they were never the permanent residents of the village. They had a work arrangement with the landowner for a certain period of time and left after their contract for another village for a short-term work arrangement; they had moved out from there too without any information of their whereabouts. Another family also had moved out and few people I talked to knew the reasons for their outmigration or their new location. Another family which had migrated out was that of Khadim, a brick kiln worker, whose case study from the previous visit was extremely important; I had written my MPhil dissertation on their data. They had moved to another village some 20 miles from the village. Khadim was related to the key informant, who agreed to contact him to arrange an interview.

**Table 3.5: Sample for semi-structured individual interviews**

Family Name	Family Member Name (Pseudonym)	Relationship status	Age in 2016	Years of schooling	Occupation	2016 Interview status and date
<b>Family 1: Bakht</b>	Bukht	Father	66	05	Brick kiln worker	In the village : interviewed , Sep 25
	Irfana	Mother	66	0	House wife	In the village : interviewed , Sep 24
	Imran	Son	27	02	Brick kiln worker	In the village : interviewed , Sep 23
	Shafaq	Daughter	26	0	House wife	Married far off: not interviewed
<b>Family 2: Liaqat</b>	Liaqat	Father	80	10	Farmer	In the village : interviewed , Sep 19
	Nazima	Mother	52	0	House wife	In the village : interviewed , Sep 24
	Ata	Son	22	05	Auto mechanic	Working away: not interviewed
	Tanzila	Daughter	26	10	House wife	Married in Sindh: not interviewed
<b>Family 3: Aslam</b>	Aslam	Father	61	10 + teachers' training	Businessman/ retired teacher	In the village : interviewed , Sep 22
	Kinza	Mother	56	10 + teachers' training	Housewife/ retired teacher	In the village : interviewed , Sep 22
	Rahim	Son	26	12	Businessman	In the village : interviewed , Sep 22
	Samina	Daughter	27	14	House wife	Married, in the city: interviewed, Sep 29
<b>Family 4: Jamal</b>	Jamal	Father	51	08	Farmer	In the village : interviewed , Sep 25
	Rahila	Mother	50	05	House wife	In the village : interviewed , Sep 25
	Kamran	Son	23	13	Electrician	Works in Lahore: not interviewed
	Sela	Daughter	24	10	House wife	Married out of village: interviewed, Sep 28
<b>Family 5: Amjad</b>	Amjad	Father	64	04	Building painter	Sick: not interviewed
	Farheen	Mother	47	05	House wife	In the village : interviewed, Sep 23
	Ali	Son	31	05	Rikshaw driver	In the village : interviewed, Sep 23
	Atya	Daughter	24	06	House wife	Married in the village: interviewed, Sep 29
<b>Family 6: Khadim</b>	Khadim	Father	58	0	Brick kiln worker	In the new village: interviewed, Sep 27
	Tabinda	Mother	56	04	House wife	Died: not interviewed,
	Najam	Son	31	05	Brick kiln worker	In the new village: interviewed, Sep 27
	Laiba	Daughter	23	06	House wife	Married in Gujranwala: not interviewed
<b>Family 7: Rehmat</b>	Rehmat	Father	47	0	Butcher	In the village : interviewed , Sep 19
	Lala	Mother	46	0	House wife	In the village : interviewed , Sep 28
	Munir	Son	26	05	Livestock trader	Working and travelling: not interviewed
	Itrat	Daughter	30	05	House wife	Married out of village: interviewed, Sep 30
<b>Family 8: Akhtar</b>	Akhtar	Father	66	05	Farmer	In the village : interviewed, Sep 19
	Kiran	Mother	56	0	House wife	In the village : interviewed, Sep 21
	Shuja	Son	31	16	Teacher	In the village : interviewed , Sep 21
	Shafaq	Daughter	26	12	House wife	Married in a distant city: not interviewed

In addition to the 23 taped interviews with family members (which averaged an hour each), I conducted four semi-structured interviews with key informants, including the female principal and a male administrator of the girls' higher secondary school, an educated man from the village who worked as an administrator at the university in the city, and my gatekeeper, Mahbub. These interviews focused primarily on trends in educational uptake in the village and the resulting social and economic change.

### **Research ethics and field experiences**

Research ethics apply to all three strands of my research albeit with greater responsibility on me for the third strand, where I had direct contact with my research participants. My research followed the British Educational Research Association ethical guidelines. The ethical concerns for my fieldwork were approved by the Faculty Ethics Committee before I left Cambridge. Below I describe how I negotiated various ethical challenges as they emerged during the course of the fieldwork.

#### *Informed consent*

Formal permission for the interviews was first sought from the head of the household (which is customary and essential in this village), then from individual participants and, in the case of married daughters, from their in-laws. The strong interdependence, trust and courtesy that existed between Mahbub and the research participants often seemed to encourage them to consent to be interviewed. My obvious friendship with Mahbub also gave the impression that I was a guest of the village and, given local norms of hospitality, declining the request of the guest would have been rude. Mahbub sometimes introduced me with purposive ambiguity as someone who had come from Islamabad or England, thus implying that the interviews were mandatory. I found these strategies coercive in ways that undermined the essence of voluntary participation, and soon after observing these dynamics at work I found ways to counter the wrong impressions, often by reintroducing myself as a student and a researcher keen to understand social issues through their perspectives, experiences and reflections. I had to indicate clearly to the participants that their participation was purely voluntary and an act of generosity, and that they could withdraw at any time with or without a reason. They never withdrew their consent, but such clarification often made the interviews more comfortable. In each case, the consent was also requested for the interview to be taped. The participants were promised anonymity, using pseudonyms and making their data untraceable. They were

assured that their data was meant for the private use of my research and would not be shared with anyone else.

### *Accumulated doubt*

While the RECOUP history helped my fieldwork go smoothly, it also had consequences that surfaced during my fieldwork and had to be dealt with carefully. One afternoon, Mahbub took me to a wedding reception in the village. One of the several men I met there was Anjum, in his late 30s, who was an official in the taxation department. He seemed suspicious of my presence and research activities in the village so I introduced myself and described the purpose of my fieldwork. He asked about the usefulness of this exercise and for the most part was dismissive of the arguments I offered. A reference to previous RECOUP experience in the village made him even more sceptical and he started asking why we came then and from whom did we seek permission. He also asked for details about the organisation we were working for, the kind of data we collected and what was done with those data. I was not expecting such questions to be asked in such an unfriendly way.

I told him how we sought permission to work in the village and negotiated access at multiple levels of authority. I also indicated that the information gathered from the families was anonymized and used confidentially. He then criticized the involvement of a non-government organization and a foreign university in the research. I told him that the organisation involved worked closely with the government and advised on policy issues. I then described some of the outputs/outcomes of the RECOUP research in terms of the books and papers, the direct contribution it made to policies in Pakistan and in training a younger generation of scholars who were contributing to educational knowledge and practice. I agreed with him on the gaps between research and policy, and policy and its implementation, but I noted that policies had an important role in public life and writing them required gathering as much evidence as possible through activities like this fieldwork. After hearing these explanations offered in a non-confrontational and friendly manner, he began to see the value of my research. He even offered his full support for my work and introduced me to several other young educated men from the village, whom I met again during the course of my fieldwork and learnt about various aspects of their village life.

### *Scepticism continued*

*Chak Nagri* is a small place where any external visitor is taken notice of. People did not talk to me directly unless I spoke to them, but they talked about me to each other, to Mahbub and to the people I interviewed, asking about the purpose of my visits.<sup>86</sup> I quickly learnt that the village streets were considered private spaces where men and women from the village moved around freely. Consequently, between appointments I took the road just outside the village and parked my car on Mahbub's farm. However, I still received a lot of attention from those commuting in and out of the village. One afternoon a man in his 50s asked for an introduction and why my car was parked there. After introducing myself, I explained my reasons for staying there. He introduced himself as the peon at the girls higher secondary school and said the school principal sent him to inquire after seeing me frequently at this spot. My presence had alerted her for the safety of the girls who took this road to school. I asked him to convey to the principal that I greatly respected her concern and that the only reason I chose that spot was to respect the norms of the village. He was pleased with my respectful manners and appreciated my decision to not wander in the streets. This interaction turned out to be useful, as the principal invited me to her office the next morning. She agreed to be interviewed after learning about my research and offered many valuable insights into girls' schooling.

The parents of the daughters who had married outside the village were happy to have my female colleagues, the two RAs from the city, interview them and my colleagues also talked to the in-laws. However, this was the in-laws' first encounter with the research, hence they met the interviewers with scepticism. In one instance, while they had agreed to be interviewed, they refused to let the RAs interview their daughter-in-law. The context for such scepticism was a recent event in which one of their relatives was kidnapped by unknown people. However, the daughters stepped in and convinced their in-laws to agree to the interviews, telling them they had previously been interviewed for a similar purpose.

### *Working with female research assistants*

As local norms did not permit me to interview the women,<sup>87</sup> I started the fieldwork by interviewing only the male family members for the initial few days which helped establish a

---

<sup>86</sup> After a few days of fieldwork, whenever I talked to anyone in the street or in shops I got a sense that people knew something about me. It was not a reason to worry as they were all friendly.

<sup>87</sup> For the RECOUP project, a team of male and female researchers, all fluent in Punjabi but based in Islamabad, went out to do fieldwork. However, this raised another issue, as male and female researchers entered the village

personal rapport with them. In subsequent days, I was assisted by the two female Ras (to interview women), whose family owned lands in a village close to Chak Nagri; in fact, most of the villagers knew their uncles, who were notables in that area. This helped the villagers locate the women in the local social and gender order which was often helpful in overcoming any concerns about the gender of the team, which was always a challenge during the RECOUP research (Jeffery 2012; Arnot and Naveed 2014). Some young men were keen to know more about the women coming with me, but on hearing that they were from a notable family and that one was a ‘professor’<sup>88</sup> at the university, their attitudes were respectful and they took the data gathering seriously. However, this called for the women to be conscious of the power relations between them (as urban, rich, educated, landowners with positions of authority) and the researched, which they countered by being highly respectful to the interviewees, dressing somewhat humbly, and proactively countering any unfavourable impression through other strategies.

### *Presenting change*

Some respondents were keen to show their achievements since the previous visit and talked proudly about the new houses they had built during this period. Some talked about their life difficulties. For example, when I knocked at Amjad’s house, his wife was sitting in the yard and asked us to walk into the house. One of her lower legs was amputated so she could not stand but she greeted us with enthusiasm. Soon after we arrived she talked about her deteriorating health because of complications from diabetes and about how difficult it was now for her to run her everyday life. However, she also showed us her new brick and concrete house that had replaced their previous mud house. She was happy that, over the six years, her sons and husband had managed to earn enough to build a decent shelter. When we visited Bakht’s family, they invited us into a newly built guest room. They were happy that their son who went abroad had helped them build this house before he lost contact with the family some three years earlier. Khadim was also happy to show his new house in another village which he built on land he bought after selling the old house in *Chak Nagri*. A new house was

---

together. People asked questions about the relationship between male and female researchers, how they travelled together and stayed in the same place in Sargodha during the course of the fieldwork. Unrelated men and women leaving their homes in Islamabad, coming to stay in a hotel in Sargodha and travelling together for days was not appreciated by the people in the village. The field team had constructed a narrative that all team members were siblings to avoid inappropriate questions.

<sup>88</sup> Teachers of college and universities are called professor across rural Pakistan even if they are lecturers.

the key marker of improvement in the peoples' lives. Since they knew my research focused on understanding the changes in their lives, they were happy to show me these improvements.

### *Interview processes*

Some interviews with men took place at their homes but most were done outside, at their workplaces. Interviews with women were always conducted at their homes. In both cases, other people often were present during the interview and the respondents could not be isolated. Although the RAs and I tried to ensure an un-interrupted, one-on-one conversation, it was not possible in certain situations. We tried to keep the observers quiet by suggesting that they offer their perspective after we finished interviewing the respondent and various family members made some sort of contribution to the conversation. In one extreme case, three people besides the interviewee contributed to the discussion.<sup>89</sup> A daughter-in-law sometimes found it difficult to open up in the presence of her mother-in-law or sister-in-law. The researchers tried to engage these additional people in other conversations so the interviewer could have a meaningful and relaxed conversation with the key respondent.

Because the study focused on social hierarchy, participants were not always willing to speak much about the power relations in the village. They were, for example, reluctant to talk about the discrimination they faced for being of a low caste and/or a religious minority. Moreover, interviewing married daughters was often not easy in their joint family homes.<sup>90</sup> Various strategies were adopted to negotiate more space for the interviews and the sensitive questions were asked when other family members were persuaded to move away—and after the respondents were assured a high level of anonymity and confidentiality.

Sharing stories of discrimination sometimes made the respondents extremely sad. A son from the religious minority broke down in tears when recalling his schooling experience which was

---

<sup>89</sup> My first appointment was with Akhtar, the father, who agreed to be interviewed in the late morning in his fields. When I arrived there, he was sitting on the *charpai* smoking *hukkah* with three other men, one of whom was his brother. In the initial conversation, I realised that asking him to move to some other place or others to move out would be extremely awkward. I therefore initiated the interview. Other participants were keen to step in despite my requests to speak only after the interview with Akhtar. The most active respondent was Akhtar's brother. After a few futile attempts to keep them quiet, I decided not to waste time stopping these individuals and instead to make the best of the situation by including them in the conversation while still keeping it focused at the key respondent. I found that the group conversation actually added great value to the insights I needed for my research.

<sup>90</sup> Where larger family units live together and include grandparents, uncles and aunts and cousins in addition to parents and siblings.

filled with harsh treatment by his peers, schoolteachers, and the villagers. Another son also appeared sad when talking about physical punishment by schoolteachers and their discriminatory attitude, and others' unfriendly behaviour towards him for being disabled and of low caste. His mother, whose leg was recently amputated, also broke into tears when asked about her aspirations for social mobility. Being asked for the first time about the educational and employment experiences of her children brought out her great sense of loss and disappointment with her life.

Situations like these were difficult, as they brought heavy emotions into the interview process. Over time, I learnt to phrase my questions in ways that would not put the respondents in a vulnerable position. When such a situation arose, however my colleagues and I offered the respondents sympathy with their situation and tried to change the topic with some light conversation. We made an effort to close the interviews with questions that made the respondents feel optimistic about life. These experiences left me challenged on ethical grounds, as I felt responsible for touching on extremely sensitive aspects of the respondents' lives—in some cases, for the first time in their lives. They opened themselves up to offer me insights on their suffering and the emotional harm, and I was unable to reciprocate.<sup>91</sup>

### *Hospitality*

Respondents were hospitable and often offered me and the RAs cold drinks. Some also went to great lengths to treat me and my colleagues as their guests. For example, one son had left for work on his rikshaw and was halfway to his destination when I reached his home. Without telling me, his family called him and he left work for the day and returned home to meet me. Such was their level of generosity despite their poverty. I persuaded the son to accept some money for losing his work day. Wherever possible, we made an effort to ensure that families did not have to bear the costs of their hospitality, which was, however, not always possible given the norms of the village.

---

<sup>91</sup> Some participants had speech disabilities and it was hard to engage in long conversations, such as in the case of Jamal and his daughter Sela. Some aspects of such interviews remained brief and one of the family members helped me understand the respondent.

## Qualitative data analysis

All interviews, each approximately one hour long, were audio-recorded with respondents' permission. These interviews were later transcribed into the language they were conducted in, mostly Punjabi but also some in Urdu. In the four years since the RECOUP project, together with Madeleine Arnot, I have developed an innovative approach for analysing qualitative data that requires carefully listening to the *polyphonic voices of the poor* (Naveed and Arnot 2018). The aim was to identify the multiplicity of meanings and interpretations in family narratives that in turn offer deep insights into the socially reproductive and transformative role of schooling. Inspired by this approach, my initial engagement with the transcripts required that I read the interview transcript for each family member carefully, individually and sequentially, without dividing them into themes. I sometimes also listened to the audio-recordings to gain a better understanding of various expressions, tone of voice, and the context of the conversation. This helped me sketch individual biographies, identify key influences and events, and construct the families' educational and economic trajectories by putting together individual stories. Once I had developed a sense of the 'bigger picture' in each family, I moved on to focus on specific themes.

Since the interviews lasted 50-90 minutes, the resulting text was overwhelmingly large and had to be *condensed* which I did through systematic coding. I started with *a priori* coding, as the initial codes were derived from the interview schedules which were themselves rooted in the theoretical and empirical literature presented in Chapter 2. The deeper insights I gained from repeated readings of the transcripts provided me with some new concepts and categories. The subsequent rounds of coding were based on grounded theory, as outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1990), using three key approaches:

*Open coding*: This involved 'breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing and categorizing data'. (p. 61)

*Axial coding*: This involved linking codes to contexts, causes, interactions and consequences, putting together data 'in new ways after open coding, by making connection between categories' (p. 96). This led to the identification of new relational categories.

*Selective coding*: This involved identifying the *core* category and 'systematically relating it to other categories, validating those relationships, and filling in categories that need further

refinement and development’ (p. 116). Selective coding helped to reduce the number of categories and find causal relationships which contributed to theory-building.

I used NVivo to code the interview transcripts without translating them into English at this stage. The list of thematic codes clustered around seven nodes is provided in Table 3.6 below. When quotes were selected, they were then translated into English (c.f., Chapter 7).


**Table 3.6: Nodes and thematic codes for data analysis**

<b>Nodes</b>	<b><i>Taraqqi</i></b>	<b>Schooling</b>	<b>Gender relations</b>	<b>Marriage</b>
Codes	Notion/meaning Gendered notion Who experiences Enabling and constraining factors Role of government Significance of local politics Role of schooling Familial aspirations Personal and familial experience of <i>taraqqi</i>	Educational aspirations Schooling levels relative to others Enabling/constraining factors, Parental influence Personal schooling experience Role/behavior of teachers Public-private schooling Unschooling Impact of caste landownership, poverty, religion	Attitudes towards girls’ schooling Schooling and women’s <i>taraqqi</i> Women’s schooling and social change	Marital decision-making Schooling and marital prospects Schooling and marital relations
<b>Nodes</b>	<b>Politics of patronage</b>	<b>Work transition</b>	<b>Change over 6 years</b>	
Codes	Accessing public offices/services Patron-client relationships Schooling and access to public office/services Schooling and relationships of patronage Political organisation of the village Schooling and political organisation Women and electoral decision-making	Ideal jobs Ideal jobs - schooling School to work Work history Work history and schooling Work/job and non-school factors Aspirations for work Work/job and <i>Taraqqi</i>	Change in village Enabling factors Beneficiaries of change Change in family Enabling factors	

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Given the focus of my study, I was keen to develop an innovative mixed-methods research design that would capture the forms, processes and experiences of social mobility in rural Pakistan. The originality of my design lay in the nexus of political, provision and perspectives which I hoped to tap using the three strands of research and triangulating their findings. Figure 3.3 below offers in simple diagrammatic form the research design I came up with.

**Figure 3.3: Politics–provision–perspectives: Three strands of the research design**



Part Two of the thesis brings us to the analysis of the politics of the education and the patterns of educational mobility. Chapter 4 draws on the analysis of policy documents and attempts to identify the national visions of social mobility and the place of schooling in such visions. Chapter 5 explores the patterns of intergenerational educational mobility during 1986-2010. Chapter 6 explore the economic (social mobility) impact of the educational patterns and the last empirical chapter, Chapter 7 presents the analysis of the perspectival qualitative data as a village case study. I start the analysis with the ways in which the rise of mass schooling in Pakistan has been shaped by its political history.

## **CHAPTER 4 - THE OPENING UP OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES: EDUCATION POLICIES AND ECONOMIC AGENDAS (1947-2010)**

The social and economic outcomes of education, and the extent to which education can promote a socially mobile society in which there is greater equality and social justice, are inescapably linked to the very nature of the state, and to the economic system and social order it takes place in. These are the conditions which determine whether individuals can move away from their social origins, with or without schooling. The dynamic relationship between schooling, society and the economy is particularly nuanced in post-colonial contexts such as Pakistan because of the need to move from a predominantly agricultural to an industrialised society and because of strong international pressures to adjust to international economic goals and the promotion of human rights. The evolving relationships of economic production and the power struggles between social groups determine the resources available for education, as well as its content, its forms of provision and the degree of inclusiveness in the system.

With this in mind, I explore in this chapter the co-evolution of the education and economic systems of Pakistan since the country was created in 1947 out of the ‘economic wasteland of India’ (GoP 1955, p. 1), and whether, and if so how, these two systems created the conditions for social mobility. Focusing on Pakistan’s education policies and economic agendas between 1947 and 2010<sup>92</sup>, I identify different phases in the development of official aspirations for economic progress and social justice. By employing content and critical discourse analysis (see Chapter 3), I explore the ways in which politicians have employed the concepts and language of equity, equal opportunity and meritocracy to argue for an investment in the talent required by the economy, in order to bridge large-scale inequality and create and sustain a new social order. My aim is to make explicit the often contested ideas of a new nation and a new state. As we shall see, as these official ideas evolve they bring a significant restructuring of the existing education system and economy to cater to the needs of schooling an entire population.

---

<sup>92</sup> Taking 2010 as a cut-off point for analysing educational and economic policies corresponds to the household survey I analyse in Chapter 5.

When researching the evolution of Pakistan's education system and the opportunities it offered for social mobility, I focused particularly on the role schooling played in relation to the vision and the goals of the changing governments. My sources are Pakistan's ten five-year plans and eight education policies (listed in Table 3.1 below). Various themes, agendas and priorities run through the chronological history of education in Pakistan, sometimes they are compatible and sometimes not, with each gaining significance in different historical phases. My decision to focus on the years from 1947 to 2010 allows me to situate the analysis of education and social mobility of the parental generation (identified in the quantitative analysis in Chapters 5 and 6) which grew up in the period soon after Independence. The post-Independence generation's educational and economic status were shaped by the earliest government policies around nation-building. Later, the educational opportunities of this generation's children were forged by increasingly conflictual political and economic agendas but also by the opening up of new schooling opportunities, especially at the basic level.

The starting point for this analysis lies in the fact that, at the time of its formation, Pakistan was not just liberated from colonial rule, it was a new nation consisting of diverse population groups geographically separated by India and a new state with little readily available administrative apparatuses. The northern and the southwestern regions of the subcontinent, that formed West and East Pakistan, lacked infrastructure, industry and urban centres, and were considered economically unproductive (GoP 1983, p. 1). Pakistan's First Five-Year Plan (GoP 1955, p. 7) reported that the overall 'systems of production, transportation, trade, and consumption yielded very low standards of living . . . with little opportunity for education, or economic development', primitive agriculture methods, non-existent industry, 'rudimentary' financial services, and extreme poverty. The new country, therefore, had an unparalleled historical backlog of underdevelopment to deal with.

The arbitrary partitioning of India in 1947 caused riots across parts of both countries which led to hundreds of thousands of people losing their lives and millions fleeing their homes. An estimated 12 million people moved across the borders (GoP 1955, p. 7), making it one of the largest enforced migrations in human history. From the education and development point of view, it was deeply significant that Pakistan lost the most educated sectors (often Hindus) of

its population, who moved into India, while the Muslim refugees migrating into Pakistan were largely peasants and craftsmen.<sup>93</sup> As the First Five-Year Plan reported:

The Muslim refugees who crossed over into Pakistan were mostly agriculturists and craftsmen. The mass departure of non-Muslims created a sudden void in many vital fields which the Muslim refugees with different occupational patterns could not always fill. Banks and insurance companies, manufacturing and commercial firms were crippled as the Hindus who had operated them left in large numbers leaving only inexperienced and lower grade staff behind them... Technical institutions, schools, colleges and universities underwent similar dislocations due to the sudden departure of Hindu teachers who had mostly manned their staff. (GoP 1955, p. 7)

The impact of these developments on the prospects for progressive and egalitarian policies linked to economic development was considerable. The new country faced the unique problem of having a tremendously large population that was reproducing at a rapid rate. There were far too many people with low-level skills to employ productively and too many schoolchildren for the number of teachers available to teach them (GoP 1955, p. 54). The demand for basic public services was arguably also too high for the state institutions' capacity to plan, administer and deliver them. The manpower skill gaps created an exceptionally large and immediate demand for tertiary and higher education, but the primary and secondary schools were unable to support such demand. These shortcomings had serious implications for equity and social mobility.

Given these initial conditions, it is clear that tensions were likely to emerge between the demand for an education system and for an economic system that could meet the need for skilled labour. The ideological discourses used by various governments provide an economic rationale for certain courses of action and resource allocation, but they also performed the pedagogic task of shaping individuals' identities and ways of being, thereby redefining social

---

<sup>93</sup> The First Five-Year Plan noted:

'The background of the Muslim refugees who arrived in Pakistan was different from that of the Hindus and Sikhs evacuees who left Pakistan. Many of the latter lived in towns and were engaged in trade, business and money-lending, or in the profession of law, medicine, engineering and business management . . . The village money-lenders, who with all their faults nevertheless provided a much needed source of credit for cultivators, largely disappeared, and the resulting absence of rural credit facilities remains a problem to this day . . . Health clinics, dispensaries, hospitals and other medical institutions suffered the same fate and at some stage essential municipal services—water supplies, electricity, conservancy—came almost to a breaking point.' (GOP 1955, p. 7).

relationships. The chronological account I offer below illustrates the political compromises that shaped Pakistan's economy and education during the next 60 years following its founding. The four waves I have identified provide glimpses of collective economic aspirations and visions of a common national future as conceived and articulated by the nation's elites, but also by the demands of popular protest movements.

I have structured this chapter into four major sections. The first section presents the earliest wave of Pakistan's development, 1947-58, which laid the foundations of the economic and education systems. The second wave mainly covers the period of the first military rule under Ayub Khan, from 1957 to 1969, that placed education at the core of economic growth. The third wave covers the period of democratisation led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the subsequent Islamisation under the military rule of General Zia in the 1970s up to 1988. The fourth wave covers the rise of mass schooling from 1989 to 2010 which includes a brief period of frequently changing democratically elected governments under Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, as well as the military rule of Pervez Musharraf until the return of democracy in 2008. In the last section I summarise these various waves in terms of their political objectives, economic goals, discursive framing of inequality/equality and the development of educational policies to address the above.

### **ESTABLISHING A MERITOCRATIC AGENDA FOR DEVELOPING THE ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE (1947-58)**

The first wave of educational development can be traced back to the Pakistan Educational Conference which opened in Karachi on November 27, 1947, with the aim of surveying 'the existing and future opportunities in the educational field and to make adequate provision for them in the light of the special requirements of Pakistan' (GoP 1947, p. 4).<sup>94</sup> The Minister for Education, Fazl-ur-Rahman, explained the objectives of the conference: 'We have now before us the opportunity of reorienting our entire educational policy to correspond closely with the needs of the times and to reflect the ideals for which Pakistan as an Islamic State stands' (ibid., p. 6). To Rahman, 'The task is no less than the building up of a modern democratic state whose citizens are equipped by the requisite training of body, mind and character to live the good life' (p. 6). A speech by Pakistan's founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah,

---

<sup>94</sup> It brought together almost 50 experts on various aspects of education and key officials from across the country.

signalled a departure from the colonial tradition of keeping large portions of the population unschooled and stressed the centrality of education in national progress, modernization, economic development and nation-building (ibid., p. 5).<sup>95</sup> Jinnah envisioned an education system that could meet the needs of the economic system and inculcate a set of values that would commit citizens to the collective idea of progress:

There is immediate and urgent need for training our people in the scientific and technical education in order to build up future economic life, and we should see that our people undertake scientific, commerce, trade and particularly, well-planned industries . . . we have to build up the character of our future generations which means highest sense of honor, integrity, selfless service to the nation, and sense of responsibility. (Jinnah, quoted in GoP 1947, p. 5)

A free and compulsory primary education was strongly emphasised as a requirement for a democratic and enlightened state in order to improve literacy rates and all education sectors (GoP 1947, p. 21). Notably, the education of women as well as the lowest and so-called backward classes were also considered.<sup>96</sup> Higher education reforms were emphasized with the aim of creating ‘a class of the elite that will determine the quality of our civilization and will direct and plan our national life’ (GoP 1947, p. 9). Consequently, secondary and higher education were expanded considerably and enrolment in primary schooling increased by 25% (Curle 1966, p. 50). A few years later, the National Plan of Education Development 1951-57 (GoP 1951) laid the foundation of the education structure at all levels and identified Islam as the moral basis for education in the country.<sup>97</sup>

---

<sup>95</sup> Jinnah stated: ‘You know that the importance of education and the right type of education cannot be over-emphasised. Under foreign rule for over a century, sufficient attention has not been paid to the education of our people, and if we are to make real, speedy and substantial progress we must earnestly tackle this question and bring our educational policy and programme on the lines suited to the genius of our people, consonant with our history and culture and having regard to the modern conditions and vast developments that have taken place all over the world’ (quoted in GoP 1947, p. 5).

<sup>96</sup> Of particular relevance to my project is the fact that the committee working on education of backward classes restricted its recommendations to the tribal and nomadic groups in various parts of the country and asked for ways to provide education to young people in these groups, mainly vocational, and to provide them with scholarships (p. 49).

<sup>97</sup> It now identified concrete targets, including the need for 86,000 additional teachers and 24,000 new primary schools, and committed the government to enrol two-thirds of the children in the 6-11 age group in primary schools by 1957 (Bengali 1999). It also aimed at making 2.8 million adults literate by the same year. Planned public expenditures on education in 1954-55 were 2.5 times the expenditures in 1948-49 (Curle 1966, p. 50). The enrolment in primary schools increased by 25% and the number of teachers more than doubled; there was considerable expansion in secondary education and three new universities were established during this period (Curle 1966, p. 50.). However, the plan could not achieve its benchmarks largely because of the lack of resources, and the literacy rate dropped by 0.1% (ibid.).

However, these early egalitarian ideas coincided with the bipolar politics of the Cold War and socialist movements across the world which in turn triggered a new politics in Pakistan. The potentially progressive tide lost momentum when confronted by political tensions and unequal distribution of wealth. Meanwhile, the political elite who had inherited power from colonial rule, like those in many newly independent countries, were threatened by the popular uprising and began to forge new global alliances. The results were to be found in the significant economic and military aid to Pakistan by the US (Zaidi, 2005; Naseem, 2008).<sup>98</sup> This in turn triggered an aggressive economic development agenda characterised by the development of an industrial, financial and commercial infrastructure. The economic policies adopted by the Pakistani government at this stage were geared toward a system of economic production built on inequality of wealth and income while maintaining tight bureaucratic control over economic affairs (Zaidi 2005; Haque 2018).

Four years after Independence, when only 14% of Pakistan's population above age five was literate (GoP 1955, p. 2), new ways of thinking began to re-emerge. A planning board established in 1953 with the mandate to plan economic and social development, including education, received support from the Ford Foundation to meet the need for human resources, analysis and planning (Gant 1959, p. 152).<sup>99</sup> A new tradition of writing five-year plans thus emerged which offered overarching policy frameworks and identified the foundations of the economic and education systems (GoP 1957). Five-year plans strengthened connections between policy-makers and experts (government officials, academics, entrepreneurs and independent) who were members of various technical groups recruited to provide their inputs to the plan, in line with the guidelines provided by key policy-makers. Due to the tremendous shortage of economic and human resources, economic planning at this early stage involved

---

<sup>98</sup> A group of countries reached out to Britain, Australia and the United States, seeking support in curbing Marxist movements in their countries. These efforts resulted in the Colombo Plan 1951 which was aimed at the transfer of physical capital, technology and skills from developed to the developing countries of South and Southeast Asia and equipping governments in these countries with deterrence to Soviet influences. The geostrategic vulnerability of Pakistan, given the hostile relationship with India following the bloody partitioning, mass migration of populations across the country, a war over Kashmir in 1948, and the desperate need for external aid for its very economic and political survival led to Pakistan joining this evolving anti-Soviet alliance.

<sup>99</sup> By this time, the Foundation was already helping build various institutions 'vital for the long-range development' of the country (Gant 1959, p. 152). This additional support enabled Pakistan to seek the services of various experts from US universities, widely known as the Harvard Advisory Group, to provide research and analysis alongside training a young cadre of Pakistani researchers (p. 153). These linkages with US universities were crucial in importing policy ideas, rationale, logic and justifications while envisioning systems for economic, social and educational development. Their advice was to have potential benefit for economic development and lasting implications for equality and social justice.

difficult choices in terms of allocating resources across various sectors while inducing resource generation. In effect, the First Five-Year Plan created incentives for a select group of elites to unleash their entrepreneurial potential while justifying social inequality using naturalistic arguments:

Equality does not mean equality of wealth or income. As long as the nature endows us with unequal *talents* and *merits*, any attempt forcibly to establish an artificial equality is bound to fail and produce disastrous consequences for the economy. . . Inequalities of income, insofar as they reflect *inequalities of natural talents* and of the services actual and potential to society, confer a net social benefit and are desirable within reasonable limits. They provide the needed incentives to effort, enterprise and the acquisition and improvement of skills. (GoP 1955, p. 3; my emphasis)

The Plan went on to say: ‘In its positive aspects, equality means recognition of human personality, and of the creative potentiality of each member of society to advance social good including his own good.’ (p.3). Within this conceptualisation, economic inequality was deemed necessary and acceptable for generating economic growth, which in turn was assumed to lead towards subsequent wealth redistribution. The First Plan justified these inequalities:

‘These limits are necessarily wide in a country where talents are yet undeveloped and technical knowledge and administrative experience and ability fall short of actual needs. Incentives for using these limited by essential resources to the farthest limits represent a social necessity’ (GoP 1955, p. 4).

Some meritocratic ambitions were nevertheless justified since there was an explicit policy intention to support ‘progressive movements’: ‘Our social and economic policy should be to promote a process by which men [sic] in the lower scale of living are raised up; a process of *levelling up*, instead of *levelling down* which will discourage progressive movement and produce stagnation’ (GoP 1955, p. 4; my emphasis). Social justice here meant making a strong case to invest in a select group of deserving talented individuals:

There should be a rational relationship between *talents* and *opportunities*, between *merit* and *rewards*, between *effort* and *earnings* so that everyone gets a reasonably

good start in life and has the fullest scope for maximum development in a peaceful and harmonious society. (GoP 1955, p. 3; my emphasis)

The First Plan further elaborated on the centrality of universal primary education not just for the economy but also for democracy and social cohesion:

A system of universal primary education is imperative. Primary education is essential to prepare citizens for the discharge of their democratic and civic responsibilities and to provide them with equal opportunities for economic and cultural advancement. It is essential to the nation as a base for the entire structure of secondary and higher education from which will come leadership in all walks of life and support for technical development in agriculture and industry. (GoP 1955, p. 545)

Educational opportunities were however not available to everyone growing up during this period but were reserved for the select few, those who were ‘talented’. Indeed, it was acknowledged that pursuing the ideal of universalising primary education was unrealistic: ‘considering the costs and the problems of supplying trained teachers, we do not think it is reasonable to expect to reach this goal in less than twenty years (ibid., p. 51). While a lack of resources was itself constraining, educational expansion was also considered undesirable as it ‘would not be sufficient to meet the needs of the children, the expectations of the parents, and the requirements of the nation’ (GoP 1955, p. 545). In this context, the plan set different priorities for basic and higher levels of education—a policy that was likely to have a lasting impact on social stratification.<sup>100</sup> For primary education, it was proposed that ‘the emphasis must be on numbers and speed, while ensuring certain minimum standards’, whereas for higher education ‘the greater must be the emphasis on quality’ (ibid., p. 337). Consequently, the primary enrolment rate remained stagnant during the period of the First Plan at just above 40% (GoP 1960).

This differentiated approach to quality meant that high achievers would gain the most by receiving funding to study in Pakistan and abroad ‘to the fullest limits of their promise and talent’ (ibid., p. 581). This approach, however, did not address the unequal distribution of

---

<sup>100</sup> The plan reported on this dilemma: ‘Choices are difficult to make: should the programme aim at higher quality, involving more time and expenditure, or be satisfied initially with a more limited content, imparted more speedily, and at less cost?’ (p. 337).

income, wealth and educational opportunities in the country.<sup>101</sup> As noted by education advisor Adam Curle (1957), primary education was particularly neglected in West Pakistan. Curle pointed out that, in contrast to East Pakistan which allocated the highest resources to primary schooling, West Pakistan spent too little on primary schooling (p. 54). He attributed this contrast to underlying social structures. Land reforms in 1954 had significantly altered the class composition in East Pakistan, whereas much of West Pakistan remained feudal and had an insignificant middle class. Overall, only 1.2% of the national income was allocated to education, out of which only 58% was actually spent (ibid p. 54).<sup>102</sup> The economic order described in the First Plan also implied transferring resources from rural to urban sectors to develop an industrial base to stimulate economic growth (Zaidi 2005). Amidst this resource transfer, the inequalities in the urban economy, including in industry, finance and trade, were deemed ‘useful’ for the country’s development (GoP 1955, p. 3).

These choices made in the early phase of development required the education system to bring about specific social changes to meet the needs of the new economy. One objective of economic planning was to steer and regulate social change in order to overcome the ‘deficiencies accumulated over centuries’ whilst preserving and promoting ‘our own basic values of life’ in the new social order (GoP 1955, p. 2). The government’s economic visions were expected to dismantle the social hierarchy, as the plan stated: ‘It connotes reduction of unequal power and privilege that originate from heredity, customs and environment that have become anachronistic, outmoded and have ceased to play any creative role in the context of the changing social order’ (p. 3). The government placed great faith in free market principles and the possibility of matching talents with opportunities and economic rewards with merit (ibid.).

In reality, despite such meritocratic ambitions for ordered social change, this initial phase of economic development was characterised by political instability, as successive changes in the

---

<sup>101</sup> When it came to funding education, the first plan privileged secondary and higher education provision and raising the primary enrolment rate from 43% to 49% (ibid.); targeted building 4,000 new schools; and proposed a 20% increase in trained primary school teachers. However, 18% were allocated for primary, 26.7% for secondary, 29.4% for college and university, and 8.7% for technical education (GoP 1957, p. 590). However, only 55% of these allocations were actually spent by the end of the plan due to political instability and the lack of administrative capacity (Curle 1957, p. 53).

<sup>102</sup> In terms of the economy, the emphasis on domestic production and import substitution led to the formation of a capitalist class under state patronage (as illustrated by Noman’s 1988 account of the political economy of Pakistan). The agriculture sector (and hence the rural areas) where the overwhelming proportion of population lived was particularly neglected in order to promote industry. Similarly, the social sector received very few resources as defence expenditures claimed the major share (ibid.).

government failed to achieve a consensus over the fundamentals of the political structure, including the National Constitution. Pakistan's first prime minister, Liaquat Alikhan, was assassinated at a public event in 1956, leading to political turmoil. The army took over the government in 1958, and General Muhammad Ayub Khan declared himself chief martial law administrator and President, a position he held for 11 years. The new regime aggressively pursued the economic growth agenda, building on the foundations laid by the First Five-Year Plan, while curbing voices of dissent and progressive political movements across the country.

### **TRANSFORMING SOCIAL ATTITUDES: CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS (1958-69)**

The beginning of the second wave of education policy was marked by the establishment in 1959 of the Commission on National Education that tried to further the *meritocratic* agenda of the First Plan by developing an education system that would guide pupils to live 'productive public lives and full personal lives, according to their talents and interests' (GoP 1959, p. 10). The Commission saw the role of the education system as providing leadership training to those identified as 'talented' and stratifying pupils by separating the *leaders* from the *vocational workforce*: 'It must give scope for the training of a leadership group and at the same time provide for the development of all the vocational abilities needed for the creation of a progressive and democratic society' (ibid, p. 10). *Talent* was believed to be a virtue of birth, and the role of schooling was to identify those with talent for leadership training:

The process of producing leaders however, requires more than education. It assumes the presence within the educational system of young men and women of the highest talent. Talent is really the raw material of leadership and it will determine the quality of the finished product just as much as the educational process by which it is converted. (GoP 1959, pp. 245-246)

It was noticeable that young women in 1959 were perceived to be a source of talent and leadership potential. Nonetheless, despite such ambitions for the school system, in effect the education system was highly stratified from the inside and the majority of the population would have attended poor quality schools during this period, when better schools were only accessible to a select minority. The goal of universalising access to primary schooling during this period was subordinate to the aim of providing good quality higher education for those who could get that far:

In our conditions, where resources are limited, it is unfortunate that for some time to come it will not be possible to provide universal education. We are suggesting that a target for the achievement of this should be set and all efforts bent towards that goal. In the meantime, we believe that the accent should be on quality, particularly at the higher levels of education. (GoP 1959, p. 12)

The solution to this situation was to provide maximum schooling to the few selected ‘first-rate’ future leaders, leading them into ‘those professions and fields that have the greatest needs for their services’ (GoP 1959, p. 247). One important social function assigned to education in Pakistan in this era was to integrate the economic needs of industrial capital with a largely underdeveloped and rural economy, and address the political needs of an incredibly diverse country. The new economic order required a significant shift from peasant relationships and agrarian modes of production to modern capitalism and industrialisation, and resources and manpower had to shift from rural to urban. Moreover, given the fragility of the political institutions, direct military intervention in government affairs kept recurring, thus the notion of education reform was considered valuable in creating popular support for the government.

Twelve years after Independence, therefore, as Ayub’s military regime began to pursue a rigorous agenda of capital development, the transformation of social attitudes was also recognized as essential to both a market economy and an authoritative state. The role of schooling in shaping new behaviours and attitudes was articulated in a nuanced way: ‘Basic changes must take place among the people of Pakistan and within our institutions before the nation can begin to realize the aspirations it holds for itself’ (GoP 1959, p. 10). Education would now be relied upon to inculcate in youth the attitudes and values that could integrate them into the evolving realities of the labour market. Rather than equalising opportunities, a stern view was expressed that promoted a submission to the hierarchy and rejecting criticism, promoting efficiency, working hard and competition as the values that needed to be inculcated in the bodies and minds of students so that they could pursue what was now seen as the *public duty* of economic growth.

The Commission on National Education (ibid.) articulated an alternative moral agenda for the era that would arguably assist in social mobility. It viewed traditional attitudes as

‘inappropriate to the circumstances’ as they ‘thwarted all our efforts at nation-building’ (p. 5). The Commission aimed to shift the education system away from the country’s colonial legacy that was seen to train people for government jobs, discourage initiative and inculcate submission (ibid.). It maintained that an anti-colonial uprisings had changed attitudes toward ‘unrelated criticism’, protest (p. 5), non-cooperation and passivity as forms of resistance (p. 6). The Commission found that attitudes in the newly independent country showed a ‘lack of acceptance of a recognized authority in public life’ and a spirit of indiscipline amongst students (p. 6). The earliest political developments were characterized by political instability and competing struggles over public office, and by demands for justice and equality between various regions, provinces and groups which the Commission saw as an ‘undignified scramble for position and a tendency to place self before service to the community’ (p. 6). Progressive political movements were looked down on as ‘disruptive forces of communalism, regionalism, and provincialism’ (p. 6).

The Commission of National Education suggested transforming four attitudes toward public order and public service: (1) passivity and non-cooperation; (2) indiscipline and non-acceptance of public authority; (3) placing of self before community; (4) and the ‘disruptive forces of regionalism and provincialism’ (p. 6). It argued that the ‘real’ factor holding people back was centuries-old traditions and attitudes that had not been undone by Independence. In a telling statement, the Commission brought social values and relations into the discussion for social change:

We did not realise then that the attitudes and habits of a hundred years cannot be altered by the scratch of a pen on a document of State. Neither did we comprehend fully that progress and patriotism reflect to a large degree basic attitudes and values. After the first great surge that launched the nation, the magic was gone. Slowly the old attitudes that had been absorbed into the bloodstream of the nation during past century returned to plague our national life and impede our progress. One by one we witnessed the reappearance of the old attitudes of passivity, indiscipline, opportunism and regionalism. (GoP 1959, p. 6)

From this perspective, the centrality of the market in day-to-day relations was not yet in the public imagination—people still expected public solutions to public and private problems. Moreover, the hold of the civil and military bureaucracies over social and economic life had

the effect of making public sector employment socially and economically lucrative and generally aspired to. Such aspirations were now seen as problematic. Policy-makers in this period wanted to discourage the demand for public sector employment and instead encourage people to value private market-based opportunities (p. 7).<sup>103</sup> The Commission also observed problematic attitudes amongst public officials and in the business community, all of whom lacked a ‘sense of national duty’ (p. 7). Calling on the education system to foster a form of consciousness that was required for the globally competitive production process, the Commission argued that

there was little recognition of the fact that at independence, the nation was thrown into competition with the rest of the world and that its future status depended upon how well it met this competition with the skills of its own manpower . . . Those within the education system failed to develop new attitudes, habits, and skills consistent with the needs of a people who controlled their own destiny. Our curricula, teaching methods, administrative structure, and system of examination continued to reflect the old ways. (GoP 1959, p. 7)

The creation of an independent nation was now seen to require the inculcation of values toward state authority, society and economic relations that would overcome ‘cynicism, lethargy, opportunism, suspicion, dishonesty, and indifference’ and unleash ‘a spirit of individual initiative, personal integrity, pride in accomplishment, trust in one’s fellow men, and a private sense of public duty’ (p. 7). It was recognised that the education system was key in bringing about such change and that it could only happen slowly. A remarkable feature of the Commission’s report was that it situated education at the core of the economic policy: ‘The concept of education as an investment in national growth or as an economic asset has been generally absent from the councils of government . . . We trust that this attitude towards education will be shared by economic planners and public’ (ibid., p. 19).

By the end of the 1950s, the implications of this shift in thinking for social mobility meant that responsibility for educational provision was being shifted from the government to the

---

<sup>103</sup> It stated: ‘Too many of those who were educated in our colleges and universities saw their career only in government service. Too few had the initiative of conceiving and carving out a career outside the protective walls of government. Though the period of foreign rule was past, the concept of a ruling oligarchy persisted in the minds of the public. Everywhere the attitudes and habits that had been forged during an earlier era reappeared in our conduct. The people looked to government for everything’ (GoP 1959, p. 7).

family domain: ‘The people must accept the fact that since it is they and their children who benefit the most from education, the sacrifices required must be born primarily by them’ (p. 19). The social relationships *within* the schooling system, its administration and day-to-day interactions were also needed to advance this agenda. The content and form of schooling would now start to inculcate in schoolchildren the values of competition, along with the ‘qualities of honesty, fairness, hard-work, and genuine interest’ (p. 19).<sup>104</sup>

Significantly, the Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) presented by Ayub Khan’s military government appeared to be supporting individual social mobility out of disadvantaged family backgrounds. It now recognised that highly talented students might be found in poor families and ‘should not be denied opportunities for further education because of their inability to pay for it’. It suggested offering merit-based scholarships for class 8 and upward (GoP 1960, p. 349). The plan stressed the need for higher education to meet the intense requirements of competitive leadership for economic progress:

The world in which the nation must achieve economic progress is highly competitive, and the leaders it produces must, therefore, be able to meet the competition. This means that those who graduate from universities in Pakistan should be comparable to those similarly trained in other advanced countries, the principle emphasis in higher education must be on quality, and efforts should be concentrated on those measures which will produce excellence in the educational programmes and ensure competence in its product. (GoP 1960, p. 348)

This plan was considered a great success in terms of economic development, as industrialisation progressed and the financial and commercial sectors started growing rapidly.<sup>105</sup> However, since economic progress under this military regime led to an even greater concentration of wealth in a few hands and in a few regions, it gave rise to mass protest movements led by trade unions, labour activists and student unions which resisted the

---

<sup>104</sup> ‘Educational progress calls for imagination, intuitive, and a spirit of daring to seek new answers to old problems, and we must nurture these qualities in every sphere and at every level of our educational system’ (GoP 1959, p. 19).

<sup>105</sup> Primary education was allocated 24.8%, secondary education 22%, technical education 13.7%, colleges and universities 14.5% of the total educational allocations (GoP 1960, p. 353). In terms of overall financial scale, it was more than twice that of the first plan; however, the allocation to education fell from 6.2% to 4% during these years (GoP 1965). Whilst all budgetary allocations were spent, only about half of primary school enrolment targets were achieved (Curle 1973).

emerging capitalist economy (Curl 1973; Noman 1988; Zaidi 2005).<sup>106</sup> Policy-makers were confronted with the difficulty of designing a dual repertoire - of sustaining economic growth whilst attending to new demands for wealth redistribution. By 1965, the Third Five-Year Plan (1965-70) attempted to reconcile these tensions. President Ayub's government's solution was to offer an economic policy which, it claimed, was based on so-called *Islamic Socialism* - a political discourse that offered a new and more meritocratic ideal that would differentially reward people with different talents and aptitudes while emphasising equality of opportunity 'to develop his [sic] natural talents' (GoP 1965, p. V). Ayub presented schooling itself, as playing a central role in creating equal opportunities:

There are three corner-stones of this policy of ensuring equal opportunities to which we are committed. Firstly, it is the *intention* of the government to *provide universal free primary education to all*. Secondly, it is our aim to ensure a system of *merit scholarships* at the secondary education level. Thirdly, we intend to provide *competitive entry to jobs* at all levels. (GoP 1965, p. V; my emphasis)

The President further stated: 'These objectives are already embodied in the Constitution. Their achievement will automatically ensure that a child gets the maximum possible opportunity for advancement irrespective of his [sic] economic or social class' (p. V). There was thus now a renewed recognition of the need for educational redistribution alongside the pursuit of economic growth. The Plan stated:

To make substantial progress towards achieving certain specific social objectives such as diminishing inequalities in the distribution of income, wealth and economic power, providing a measure of social security and promoting social and cultural change conducive to accelerated economic expansion'. (Third Five-Year Plan, p. 40)

Notably, through the language of 'social and economic justice' (p. 40), poverty and other forms of inequality entered the government discourse, albeit economic growth would provide the solution: 'It is to rapid growth that the nation must look to free itself from poverty, disease, ignorance and inequalities' (ibid., p. 40).

---

<sup>106</sup> The gains of economic growth were concentrated in Karachi and parts of Punjab in East Pakistan. East Pakistan, Balochistan, NWFP and several other regions remained under developed during this time.

This 1960s saw policy-makers give increased attention to providing improved housing, health services and education, particularly for those with low incomes, and now by promoting educational quality. The Third Plan argued that ‘experience in developing societies has already shown that in the field of education, emphasis on quality, instead of militating against quantitative expansion, can actually serve to encourage it’ (GoP 1965, p. 187). However, a notable shift occurred whereby the concept of ‘social mobility’ was mentioned for the first time in a five-year plan along with a new scholarship scheme designed to support actively talented students ‘irrespective of their socio-economic background’: ‘In a country which has not yet enough resources to provide free education at all levels, the merit scholarships programme is an important method of *securing equality of opportunity and social mobility*’ (ibid., p. 205; my emphasis).

Undoubtedly, this phase of Pakistan’s political agenda saw a strong contest between the demands of capitalism, Marxism, religious values and feudal traditions. The various choices made in the 1950s, including opting for a market-based economic system, were inevitably contested by competing groups<sup>107</sup>. The 1960s civil rights movements around the world gave impetus to progressive movements across Pakistan, especially in the wake of deepening social and economic inequalities (c.f., Maniruzzaman, 1971; Khan 2009). Student unions were at the forefront of resistance politics during this period, joined by industrial workers. Despite the impressive economic growth of the 1960s, the official evaluation of the first three five-year plans reported that the real wages of the fixed-income groups had declined as prices increased by 40%; landless labour increased with no gains in farm income, suggesting under-employment (GoP 1970, p. 13).<sup>108</sup> The elitist nature of education spending (as observed by the Fourth Five-Year Plan) favoured the ‘non-poor’ (p. 14): ‘There are at present wide differences and imbalances in the provision of education services in different parts of the country’ (p. 166). Given the number of young people in the country, those benefiting from the oft-cited scholarships represented ‘only about 2 per cent of the total enrolment above primary level’ (ibid., p. 166).

---

<sup>107</sup> East Pakistan, for example, began to demand greater autonomy and equitable distribution of political power and economic resources.

<sup>108</sup> Each new five-year plan provided an evaluation and impact assessment of the previous plan. The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1970-75) provided the collective assessment of the first three five-year plans (1955-60, 1960-65 and 1965-70).

Young people successfully passing through the school system in this period would have been affected by the increasing value placed on higher education. As the Fourth Five-Year Plan pointed out, ‘it is to the institutions of higher learning that the country looks for leadership in various walks of national life’, given the lack of facilities at its founding (p. 201). The government recognized the low number of entrants into higher education as well as the low quality of training (ibid). There were many reasons given to justify focusing on secondary and higher education at this stage, including the manpower needs of the economy, expansion of administrative, professional and managerial jobs, and the expansion of the higher education (p. 187). Given the country’s poor educational and economic base at Independence, the trade-offs policy-makers faced favoured pursuing economic growth rather than economic distribution and supported an education system that was highly competitive, selective and available only to the few. Prospects for social mobility were poor for those outside the wealthy minority. Both the education system and the economic order saw merit in *functional inequality* with the hope that the benefits of economic progress would over time trickle down to the nation’s large population.

The beneficiaries of the Ayub regime’s economic policies of the 1960s consisted of three minorities: (a) an extremely wealthy urban group that with state patronage multiplied their industrial and financial capital; (b) the owners of large agricultural lands, mainly in Punjab; and (c) civil servants, military officials and white-collar workers (Noman 1988). The drastic regional and class inequalities resulting from the economic development model pursued by the Ayub government led to violent confrontations with the poor in the late 1960s (ibid.). Rising unemployment, the aftermath of the war with India in August-September 1965, and the political strategies used for nation-building only strengthened this discontent. As a consequence, President Ayub was forced to resign, leaving power in the hands of the military. General Yahya Khan was appointed as Pakistan’s next president in 1969.

### **THE RISE AND FALL OF A DISTRIBUTIVE AGENDA AND AN ISLAMIST TURN (1969-88)**

The third wave of educational policy-making, from the end of the 1960s to the late 1980s, was fraught with political conflict. Yahya Khan’s government presented the Fourth Five-Year

Plan (1970-75) which appeared to respond to social discontent by signalling a significant shift in economic policy; economic growth was the means not the end in itself. The new emphasis appeared to now recognize the need to create a just society:

The choices open before the nation do not always dictate a sacrifice of growth objectives in seeking greater social justice . . . when there is a conflict, much greater emphasis has to be placed on considerations of social justice. Economic growth is a *means* and not an *end* in itself. It should help and not hinder the evolution of a *just society*. People would rather have a slower growth rate than tolerate a further growth in inequalities in income distribution. (GoP 1970, p. 12; my emphasis)

In the 1970s, young people and their families were to be assisted by a redistributive agenda that increased spending in the social sector (p. 14), including education and health. The Fourth Plan even acknowledged an anti-poor bias in past public provision of services, and that public provision of education had demonstrated ‘a strong tendency to subsidize the higher income groups rather than the poor’ (p. 14). A new target of universal primary education within 10 years was now aimed specifically at those in underdeveloped rural areas:

The existing disparity between the quality and standard of schools has widened the gulf between the rural and urban areas. The major shift of emphasis should, therefore, be on *expansion* and development of schools in relatively *under-developed areas* with a view to reducing the existing imbalances. This would help strengthen *national consciousness* and *unity* by providing *equal opportunities for all irrespective of place of birth*. (GoP 1970, p. 147; my emphasis)

The government’s Fourth Plan observed that poor quality education was responsible for more than half of school dropouts. It focused its attention on the importance of schooling for girls and the rural population, as well as on improving overall school quality by raising teachers’ salaries. These three agendas were connected – it commented ‘as the nation cannot afford to allow half the population to remain illiterate. This will be provided by setting up separate girls’ schools and giving extra incentives to encourage qualified women to work in the rural areas as teachers’ (p. 153).

The Fourth Plan provided an evaluation of the impact of Pakistan’s development plans since 1947 which revealed the levels of educational stratification across social groups and

acknowledged the serious repercussions for social cohesion. Of particular concern were the effects of three schooling systems.<sup>109</sup> The government-run schools charged moderate fees and were open to everyone, the privately run English medium schools were expensive and thus accessible only to high-income groups, whilst *madrassahs* offered religious education, often to the poor. It was noted that such educational stratification tended to ‘create different value systems in the society and have little in common with each other’ (GoP 1970, p. 155).

In this period, the government’s policy position had shifted somewhat, since it realised that the overwhelming emphasis on higher education led to having ‘too many people whose employment expectations cannot be met’ (p. 139). There was a need to arrest the ‘unregulated expansion’ of higher education (p. 147), given not only that was it a ‘large waste of public resources in terms of failure, [but also that] the incidence of unemployment among graduates is very high and the number is increasing at an alarming rate’ (ibid., my addition). On the one hand, there was a need to introduce technical and scientific training into higher education and, on the other hand, the plan recommended respecting manual work: ‘We must increase respect for manual labour and industrial skills, and find means to identify the educated elite with the masses, through programmes for national service’ (p. 139).<sup>110</sup> This new redistributive approach also coincided with a considerable shift in economic policy as the Fourth Plan prioritized distribution over economic growth. It debated the question of nationalizing major industries and recommended setting up large-scale industries within the public sector and greater government intervention in the private financial sector (p. 11). However, the Plan left nationalization as a political decision, as a matter for the government that would be elected in the following year.

In West Pakistan, just before the election, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto founded the *Pakistan People’s Party* that participated in the elections under the slogan *Roti, Kaprra aur Makaan* (food, clothing and shelter), thus signifying a radical distributive agenda. In East Pakistan, Shaikh

---

<sup>109</sup> Existing secondary schools fall into three broad categories. The first includes junior high/middle schools and high schools, with national and regional languages as the medium of instruction. The next category comprised model schools, residential schools, cadet colleges, missionary schools and schools managed by autonomous organisations. These schools generally provide residential facilities and teach through in English. The *maktabs* and *madrassahs* are the third category. Their main emphasis is on teaching religion and allied subjects (Fourth Plan, p. 155).

<sup>110</sup> It also identified the interdependence between secondary and primary schooling: ‘Education at this stage is also an important determinant of the quality of primary school, as most of the primary school teachers are drawn from secondary schools. These diverse functions of secondary education make this stage strategically important’ (GoP 1970, p. 155).

Mujibur Rahman, who led the *Awami League*, contested the election using a six-point agenda that demanded equitable distribution of resources across regions and greater autonomy for all provinces within a federal government structure. Both parties mobilised popular support and won overwhelming majorities in their respective constituencies. As East Pakistan had a larger population, the *Awami League* won a simple majority in the parliament. However, Yahya's military government refused to transfer power to the *League* and the consequence was severe political unrest that led to bloodshed and civil war. With India's military intervention, East Pakistan declared its independence and renamed itself Bangladesh, with Rahman as its leader. Bhutto formed a government in 1971 in the now, smaller Pakistan and pursued an aggressive nationalization agenda to tackle the narrow concentration of wealth.

Such was the blow of losing East Pakistan that the role of schooling in post-1971 Pakistan turned to even more national integration purposes. With tensions heightened, education was to act as a unifying force. The National Education Policy (GoP 1972) published in 1972 emphasized advancing an *Ideology of Pakistan* which was not clearly defined but implied a heavy reliance on religious nationalism; religion was now used in educational discourse to create national cohesion. The first two of this policy's 11 objectives were linked to 'ensuring the preservation, promotion and practice of the basic ideology of Pakistan and making it a code of individual and national life' and 'building up national cohesion by promoting social and cultural harmony compatible with our basic ideology through the conscious use of the educational process' (GoP 1972, p. 3). This occurred precisely when the 1972 National Census showed that the literacy rate for those above age five was only 21.7%, with strong gender and rural-urban disparities, 30.2% of males were literate, compared to only 11.6% of females and some 41.5% of the urban population but only 14.3% of the rural were literate.

With these figures in mind, the new policy included many unique features which would directly affect the school population and encourage greater opportunities for social mobility. It aspired to provide free and universal schooling up to grade 10 and to achieve universal primary education for boys in 1979 and for girls in 1984.<sup>111</sup> In practice, it made education free up to grade 8 in both public and private schools (the latter through subsidies). It emphasised teaching about the 'dignity of labour' (p. 7) and introduced vocational and technical skills at the elementary level. Islamic education was made compulsory up to grade

---

<sup>111</sup> It also targeted achieving universal elementary education up to grade 8 for boys in 1982 and for girls in 1987.

10. Higher education reforms were also introduced through a new University Grants Commission, and Pakistan Study Centres were established across universities to create greater national integration. The most significant feature of the policy was the nationalization of all privately managed colleges by September 1972 as part of a wider nationalization agenda that subsequently nationalized private schools (p. 19). At this point, public transportation also became free for students.

Bhutto's nationalisation agenda is important because it marginalised the industrialists and owners of private enterprises who had made their fortune in the previous decades largely under state protection. He also introduced large-scale reforms in the civil bureaucracy and aimed at military reforms (Alavi and Harriss 1989). However, the military toppled his government in 1977 which resulted in the dictatorial regime of General Zia-ul-Haq and later in the so-called 'judicial murder' of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. General Zia's regime took over the religious agenda, increasing the Islamisation of the state and society. His government introduced fundamental changes through the National Educational Policy and Implementation Programme 1979.<sup>112</sup> However, this time the concerns about the elite education model and promoting economic growth were replaced by new notions of citizenship rooted in the ideals of Islam, as interpreted by policy-makers. This policy extended the notion of citizenship toward a pan-Islamic identity with obligations and responsibilities to the global Muslim community - a strategy which suited evolving geo-politics which included the onset of the Afghan *Jihad*.<sup>113</sup> The first six of the policy's nine objectives were linked to Islamic ideals (see Box 4.1).

---

<sup>112</sup> The policy reported that nearly half of the nation's children, including two-thirds of girls, were not enrolled in primary schools, with wide rural-urban and inter-provincial disparities (Bengali 1999, p. 9). As Bengali (1999, p. 9) reported, the overall primary enrolment rates were 32% in Balochistan, 52% in NWFP, 59% in Sindh, and 56% in Punjab. For rural population, they were as low as 30% in Balochistan, 50% in NWFP, 42% in Sindh, and 48% in Punjab. Rural girls were particularly badly off, with enrolment of 10% in Balochistan, 14% in NWFP, 16% in Sindh, and 29% in Punjab. Dropout rates were reported to be as high as 50% overall and higher for girls.

<sup>113</sup> The education system was seen as instrumental in advancing this ideology, while economic policies promoting capitalism were resumed through de-nationalization. Such an ideological leaning was particularly suited to the evolving geopolitical context of the Cold War, with the Soviet Union invading Afghanistan. The subsequent years would turn Pakistan into the frontline state for the US- and Saudi-backed insurgency in Afghanistan (Afghan Jihad), also leading to 3.3 million Afghan refugees being housed in 340 camps in Pakistan (Nisar 2001).

**Box 4.1: Islamisation objectives of the National Education Policy and Implementation Programme 1979**

1. To foster in the hearts and minds of the people of Pakistan in general and the students in particular a deep and abiding loyalty to Islam and Pakistan and a living consciousness of their spiritual and ideological identity hereby strengthening unity of the outlook of the people of Pakistan on the basis of justice and fair play.
2. To create awareness in every student that he, as a member of Pakistani nation, is also a part of the universal Muslim Ummah and that it is expected of him to make a contribution towards the welfare of fellow Muslims inhabiting the globe on the one hand and to help spread the message of Islam throughout the world on the other.
3. To produce citizens who are fully conversant with the Pakistan movement, its ideological foundations, history and culture so that they feel proud of their heritage and display firm faith in the future of the country as an Islamic state.
4. To develop and inculcate in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah, the character, conduct and motivation expected of a true Muslim.
5. To provide and ensure equal educational opportunities to all citizens of Pakistan and to provide minorities with adequate facilities for their cultural and religious development enabling them to effectively participate in overall national effort.
6. To impart quality education and develop fully according to their capacity, each individual's potential . . . building their capacity to effectively manage social, natural and productive forces, consistent with the value system of Islam.

*Source:* GoP (1979, p. 1)

The three remaining objectives were not related to religion but to functional literacy and fundamental education, lifelong learning, and scientific, vocational and technological education. An important strategy of the new policy was to align the content of schooling with Islamic teachings:

High priority will be assigned to the revision of curricula with a view to re-organizing the entire content around Islamic thought and giving education an ideological orientation so that Islamic Ideology permeates the thinking of younger generation and

helps them with necessary conviction and ability to refashion society according to Islamic tenants. (GoP 1979, p. 2)

The new strategy also aimed to change women's education (but this time, not through identification of talent, merit or potential for leadership but rather by aligning it with Islamic principles about female roles: 'Curricula for female education will be related to the distinctive role assigned to women in an Islamic society, and to provide education *up to the highest level* to girls in separate institutions' (p. 3; my emphasis).

From the perspective of social mobility, this new education strategy of fusing two parallel streams of education, religious seminaries and modern schools, colleges and universities (ibid.) integrating Pakistani children's schooling into one system could potentially improve all children's access to quality education. However, the new strategy also recommended, controversially, a reversal of the nationalization of educational institutions under the National Education Policy 1972 and encouraged the government to the opening of further educational institutions by the private sector with the following rationale:

As a consequence of the previous Education Policy, a total of 3,334 educational institutions were nationalized. These included 1,828 schools, 346 Madrasahs, 155 colleges and 5 technical institutions. 25,000 teachers were included into government services. The nationalization did not result either in the expansion or qualitative improvement of education. However, the national exchequer had to bear an additional burden of more than Rs. 15 crore recurring expenditure per annum. Further investment by private sector in education was blocked. This negated the principle of community participation in the development of education. The nationalization, therefore, impeded expansion of education in the country. (GoP 1979, p. 23)

Zia's economic and educational policies were diverse and contradictory. They aimed at reversing Bhutto's nationalisation of private enterprises and industries. Nevertheless, when his government presented the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1978-83) it recognised *illiteracy* as the major reason for economic and social underdevelopment and therefore aimed to increase state resources for education from 2% to 3.1% of GDP by the end of the five years. It emphasised the need to enrol girls at all types of schools whilst also establishing separate schools for

girls.<sup>114</sup> However, by the time the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983-88) was published, the results were disappointing: overall school participation rates fell from 54% in 1977-78 to 48% in 1982-83, and public expenditure on education as a proportion of the GNP had in fact declined from 1.8% in 1977-78 to 1.5% in 1982-83 (GoP 1983, p. 338).

The Sixth Five-Year Plan took a turn with the new aim of enrolling every child in the relevant age group in grade 1 by 1988, and to increase primary school participation to 75% by 1987-88 which would put five million new children in school, particularly in rural areas. The plan strongly focused on mass literacy and targeted rural women in particular. However, little progress was reported by 1988. The Seventh Five-Year Plan reported that only 17,193 schools were opened under the Sixth Plan, compared to the target of 40,000, and only 0.8 million children were made literate, in contrast to the target of 15 million.

Overall, this phase of economic and education policy provided for educational expansion. However, the content and the form of that schooling, as well as the social relationships of economic production, had changed drastically from the first phase to Bhutto's nationalisation and distributive agenda, and then to Islamisation and deregulation under Zia's regime. Those who managed to be part of the labour market during these phases had different prospects for social mobility both in and through schooling.

### **INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES AND THE 'DRAMA OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT': MASS SCHOOLING TAKES SHAPE (1988-2010)**

The failure to initiate much-needed reforms, such as improving the tax-to-GDP ratio, taxing the agricultural sector and cutting down defence spending, often led successive Pakistan governments to borrow from international financial institutions on the condition that they would implement a narrowly defined economic reform agenda (Zaidi 2005). One distinguishing feature of Pakistan's economic policy during the fourth wave was the continuation of the economic liberalisation agenda initiated by General Zia-ul-Haq using the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programmes as the *loan conditionality*. Economic historian Akbar Zaidi (2005) noted that, after 1988, the

---

<sup>114</sup> It extended the timeline for previous policy and targeted achieving universal primary enrolment for the 5-9 age group by 1986-87. It planned to construct 12,641 new primary schools, provide furniture to 10% of the new schools and hire 75,748 new teachers.

minutest details of running the economy were provided by World Bank and IMF officials.<sup>115</sup> The reforms under the Structural Adjustment Programmes in Pakistan aimed to reduce the fiscal deficit through increased taxes and curtailed public expenditures; liberalise international trade by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers on imports while also attempting to increase exports; liberalise the banking sector; and institute a large-scale privatisation of public sector enterprises. Zaidi considered the strongest feature of these programmes to be the increased influence of international financial institutions over national policy-making: ‘It is fair to say that since 1988, Pakistan’s economic policies, management, and performance, have been almost totally determined by the country’s adherence to IMF/World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment programmes, and Pakistan’s various governments have had no independent or original economic programme of their own’ (p. 341).<sup>116</sup> Independent analyses have questioned the effectiveness of these programmes in improving economic growth, fiscal performance and industrial competitiveness and in reducing inflation (p. 343). The withdrawal of subsidies and imposition of taxes and restrictions on public sector hiring reportedly worsened conditions for poor populations (Khan 1997) by increasing unemployment, poverty and inequality (Kemal 1995).

The third wave of education policy had ended when General Zia-ul-Haq was killed in a plane crash on August 17, 1988. The subsequent decade saw a transition toward democratically elected (but frequently changing) fragile governments—those of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Although Bhutto was elected prime minister in December 1988, her own government was dismissed by then-president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Sharif won the majority in the subsequent election and took over as prime minister in November 1990. However, his government survived for only two years and seven months, since President Khan also dismissed his government. Benazir Bhutto was finally able to return to office in 1993 after a general election. This time she stayed in office for three years, only to be again dismissed by the then President Leghari in November 1996. Sharif returned to office in February 1997 with a sweeping two-thirds majority in the parliament.

---

<sup>115</sup> Caretaker governments such as that of Moeen Qureshi, himself a former IMF and World Bank official, entered into long-term arrangements with these institutions which the successive governments had to abide by.

<sup>116</sup> As a global move, these programmes were aimed at liberalising trade, reducing fiscal deficits by curtailing public sector expenditures and increasing tax revenues; privatisation of public enterprises; regulation of the financial sector; removal of protective measures to make industries globally competitive; liberalisation of agricultural prices and removal of subsidies.

Amidst this political turmoil, Benazir Bhutto's government presented a vision of economic reform under the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1988-93) that signalled a democratic transition, focusing in particular on the social services. It viewed widening social inequality as a call to recognise the lack of overall social development that had resulted from the 'difficulties in arriving at a consensual view of common objectives between a strong and wealthy modernizing elite and the relatively poorer, traditional mass of common people' (p. 15). The Seventh plan admitted that substantial economic growth did not necessarily reduce poverty and income inequality, hence the aspirations of large proportions of the population still remained unsatisfied (ibid). It suggested that economic planning in the past had failed to address the social and political realities of the country, consequently, '*social mobility remains limited, privilege often triumphs over merit, intellectual questioning is penalized rather than rewarded, and a consensus on fundamental values has failed to emerge*' (ibid.; my emphasis).

Previous policies were represented as having excluded the poor from the benefits of growth. Attaining full employment for sustained economic growth, uplifting the rural population, women and youth, alleviating poverty, and balanced regional development were amongst the 'national objectives' of the Seventh Plan. Particularly important for the education system, the plan vowed 'to promote national integration through a fundamental restructuring of education and information policy, which should be based on a well-defined concept of national culture' (ibid). This approach to poverty alleviation went beyond purely economic solutions to focus on the social mobilisation of the rural poor to prepare them for 'active participation in the social, political and economic process' (p. 16).<sup>117</sup> It was noticeable that social and economic inequalities had seriously increased from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s:<sup>118</sup>

The share of the 40 per cent of the lowest income households in total income fell from 20.5 per cent in 1970-71 to 17.9 per cent in 1984-85, whilst the share of 20 per cent households in the highest income bracket rose from 41.4 per cent to 46.7 percent during the same period. The share of the middle 40 percent households also declined .

---

<sup>117</sup> The development of the physical infrastructure, including housing for the poor, and the uplift of social sector, including expansion of education and health and agro-based industry, were taken as the major strategies for rural development. It emphasised creating employment and self-employment opportunities.

<sup>118</sup> It noted:

'Lack of employment opportunities and inequalities in the ownership of factors of production have a direct relation with poverty. Land and industrial asset concentration in the hands of a few has led to inequitable distribution of incomes. The poorest 40 per cent of the households have 16 per cent of the land and 20 per cent of the income share while the richest 20 per cent of households hold 57 per cent of all land and 50 per cent of the total income' [p. 35].

. . making the 20 per cent households with the highest income the greatest beneficiaries of economic growth during the years 1971-85. (GoP 1988, p. 35)

This new plan with a strong human capital emphasis included a chapter entitled *Human Balance Sheet* which contrasted the economic progress of the past with the wellbeing of the citizens. People themselves were now represented as both the *means* and *ends* of economic development – an inversion of past logic. It argued that hunger and poverty hampered economic progress, whereas health and education fostered economic growth by enhancing productivity, ideas, innovation and opportunities. This turnaround in public policy thinking recognised the *intrinsic* value of human beings:

For some time now the question is being asked: whom is economic development for? Less hunger, fewer child deaths, higher life expectancy and a decreasing proportion of the population in absolute poverty are being considered important objectives by themselves. It is increasingly being recognised that the benefits of economic growth must be distributed more equitably so that a majority of the population can share and contribute in the process of development. (GoP 1988, p. 81)

From a social mobility perspective, the rural-urban disparities were particularly severe; the rural literacy rate was reported to be 21.4% compared to the urban 49.1% (ibid.). The lack of school infrastructure was presented in the plan as the major hurdle in educational expansion. At this stage, as many as 85% of the primary schools lacked proper buildings and 20% had only one classroom. The average distance from home to school was still high—more than four kilometres for more than half of the villages, which was a major barrier to girls' schooling in particular. The plan took the view that 'if attainment of 10 years of schooling is considered to be a measure of investment in human capital then Pakistan with only 11 per cent of the population with 10 years of education fares poorly' (p. 84). Recognising the 'disenchantment with the failure of growth to "trickle down" opportunity and wealth, the plan proposed a three-pronged strategy to reduce poverty (with a particular focus on the rural population): (a) developing human resources; (b) rebuilding physical infrastructure and

generating employment; as well as (c) the importance of reaching disenfranchised groups, particularly women (p. 105).<sup>119</sup>

Those growing up during this period, particularly women, the poor and those living in rural areas, would have begun to see an increase in educational opportunities as a result of this Seventh Plan.<sup>120</sup> By the early 1990s, similar aspirations were reflected in the Sharif government's National Education Policy 1992-2002. The stratification within the education system was represented as having far-reaching negative consequences for the social order. The policy suggested that the nation 'cannot afford to defer mass education', nor should it allow only 'a tiny minority . . . to enjoy the luxury of schooling' while ignoring the population at large (GoP 1992, p. 1). At this point, economic returns to human capital provided the strongest rationale for educational expansion: 'In developing countries the rate of return (private and social) on human capital, by and large, exceeds the rate of return on physical capital' (p. 2).

In 1992, the policy addressed social stratification by 'adhering to the principles of equity, quality and efficiency' while placing 'added emphasis on the education of the people, who are under-privileged and live in misery' (p. 3).<sup>121</sup> Basic education was thus declared to be not just an educational goal but 'an integral part of the human development plan. The ultimate aim is to eliminate 'disparity—the drama of under-development'' (ibid.; my emphasis).

Universalising primary education and reducing rural-urban disparities in terms of access to quality education were again specifically addressed – this time in the summary. Here a strong focus could be found on improving access and learning levels, particularly for those who traditionally fell outside the education system. The core policy objectives also aimed to expand education in keeping with the aspiration to provide equal opportunities to the children

---

<sup>119</sup> The plan stated: 'The first condition for an effective national development policy for women is the recognition that no society can make real progress unless women are drawn to the mainstream of social and economic development and become equal partners in the development effort' (p. 104).

<sup>120</sup> The Eighth Plan reviewed the progress of the Seventh Plan, suggesting that the composition of the economic growth was such that, for the first time, industrial output had surpassed agriculture in country's history which pointed to a remarkable shift in the economy and labour market. Against the target of 34,613 primary and 20,000 mosque schools, 21,000 primary and 13,000 mosque schools were added to the education system. In terms of enrolment, 3.1 million additional enrolments were made in contrast to the target of 4.6 million. The shortfall was attributed to the inability of poor families to school their children, high dropout rates and the lack of legislation making primary schooling compulsory.

<sup>121</sup> Amongst the 17 key points of the *conceptual framework* of the policy in 1992, the first emphasised integrating Islamic values into education, thereby introducing an 'Islamic Order in society' through education (GOP 1992, p. 2).

of the poor and rich alike in order to promote national harmony and cohesion; to ensure the participation in education of 100% of the nation's children at the primary level by 2002<sup>122</sup>.

Taking up the challenge, Bhutto's second government, which replaced Sharif's government in 1993, launched the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1993-98).<sup>123</sup> Its key goals included attaining high economic growth, equitable distribution of the gains, generating additional employment opportunities, alleviating poverty and expanding mass schooling. Crucially, the government raised the targets for increasing overall participation in primary schooling from 85% to 95%, for girls from 45% to 82% over the five years and for increasing the literacy rates from 35% to 48%.<sup>124</sup> A recognition of the negative relationship between poverty and education this time led to the promotion of the idea that investing in girl's education could help reduce poverty, but this pointed to the need to expand mass schooling:

Empirical research has shown that socio-economic return of investment, particularly on female education, is high. Therefore, education could be used as a strong catalyst in reducing poverty. In this context the main focus of the Eighth Plan will be on universalizing access to primary education for all boys and girls of age 5-9 years, enact (...) enforcement of legislation for compulsory primary schooling for all children, removing gender and rural urban imbalances and qualitative improvements of physical infrastructure. (GoP 1993, p. 93)

From an educational point of view, an important component of the Eighth Plan was the Social Action Programme (SAP) that was launched in 1992-93 to address the neglect of the social sector under the Structural Adjustment Programmes which had been in place since the 1980s. Initially designed as a three-year programme (1992-93 to 1995-96), the SAP was later extended to cover the entire period of the Eighth Plan. With increased involvement of the community, NGOs and the private sector, this programme focused primarily on basic/primary schooling and on opening up new educational opportunities for girls and the rural poor. For example, it aimed to open 55,000 new primary schools, particularly for girls, so as to add 6.46 million new seats and increase girls' attendance from 53% to 82% by 1998. Women were

---

<sup>122</sup> This plan again called for special attention to be paid to the development of female education and literacy through formal and non-formal systems, particularly in rural areas.

<sup>123</sup> The Seventh Plan was meant to be implemented within the five-year tenure of Bhutto's government. However, given political instability, by the time of its completion, both Bhutto and Sharif had been in the government and Bhutto had formed her second government.

<sup>124</sup> While also doubling the number of technicians annually.

considered the main target of the SAP, emphasising their education, health, nutrition, training and employment. The Eighth Plan noted that:

Pakistani women are accorded esteem but like many other developing countries, they lag behind men because of cultural patterns, taboos and tradition, malnutrition, poorer health conditions and consequent low life expectancy, low education and school enrolment, high birth rates, and non-recognition of their economic work within the family. The present status of women is the result of long history of social, cultural and economic factors. Issues relating to women development are complex. (GoP 1993, p. 131)

By the 1990s, one would expect therefore to see a rise in female education and female social mobility. NGOs and women's associations were to be engaged and community centres opened in rural areas to extend the programme coverage. The plan included proposals to strengthen social welfare programmes and promote the 'survival, protection and development of children'. Women getting an education during this period were encouraged to enter the labour market. The plan noted that 'a special minimum quota of 5% in the jobs in the public sector has been set for women. Larger minimum quotas were prescribed in the public sector openings more suited for women employment like nursing, teachers' training, etc. (p. 131).'

However, within four years, Bhutto's second government was replaced via a general election by Sharif, who became prime minister in 1997. His new government launched yet another National Education Policy 1998-2010 (GoP 1998) which seems to have drawn inspiration from the World Declaration on Education For All (EFA; 1990), the Delhi Summit Declaration (1993) and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). The new education policy in fact took Bhutto's agenda forward and reaffirmed the focus on universalising primary education: 'It is envisaged that expansion of basic education at unprecedented rate shall enable the Government to promulgate and implement Compulsory Primary Education Act' (GoP 1998, p. 1). It now even targeted raising primary school participation from 71% to 90% by 2002-03, and primary school retention and completion rates of 90% by 2010 for both boys and girls (GoP 1998, p. 23):<sup>125</sup>

---

<sup>125</sup> It aimed at integrating primary with the middle to make it elementary (grade 1-8).

Elementary education, which is the bedrock and foundation of the entire education pyramid, has the highest rate of return as compared to other sectors and levels of education. Research studies indicate that rates of return to invest in education are commonly high, especially at the primary level, and argue that investment in education makes a vital contribution to economic development. Both private and social rates of return at [the] primary level are comparatively higher than secondary and tertiary levels. (GoP 1998, p. 21)

Social mobility through expanded schooling would appear to be the implicit rather than the explicit target. The lack of infrastructure and poor teaching were recognised as being responsible for keeping more than 5.5 million children of primary school age out of school and for the approximately 45% of those who dropped out of primary school. Hardly had the plan been published when the Sharif government was toppled in 1999 by a military coup staged by General Pervaiz Musharraf. Nevertheless, the liberalisation agenda originating with Zia in the 1980s continued. The global development paradigm put forward at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2004 was accepted by Pakistan which became a signatory to the UN's Millennium Development Goals. Pakistan's country-specific goals included a long list of objectives including: eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; and developing a global partnership for development (GoP/UNDP 2004).

Three ambitious sub-goals were also identified under the goal of universalising primary education by 2015: (1) raising the net primary enrolment ratio to 100%; (2) increasing the completion of grade 5 to 100%; and (3) raising the average adult literacy rate to 88% (89% for men and 87% for women). The national plan to achieve Education For All in Pakistan allied itself with the National Education Policy 1998-2010. The government's new economic development agenda envisioned in the Ten-Year Perspective Development Plan (2001-11) covered four major areas: an economic framework for growth; poverty reduction and human development; overcoming drought and reviving agriculture; and, public sector investment.<sup>126</sup>

---

<sup>126</sup> It also included a major focus on education to achieve the EFA goals. It aimed at universalising primary education, achieving 78% literacy by 2011, and improving quality education and technical education. It also aimed at opening 8,500 new primary schools and upgrading 12,000 primary schools to the elementary level;

The Education Sector Reforms 2001-05 were introduced to accelerate progress toward the EFA goals. They aimed to:

- enhance equity and quality at all education levels;
- promote non-formal basic education for adults;
- improve science education and vocational and technical education at the secondary level;
- increase private sector investments in education; and
- improve curricula and assessment systems.

The new goals were to increase literacy to 60%, net primary enrolment to 76%, middle school enrolment to 55%, secondary school enrolment to 40% and higher education enrolment to 5%. Such developments were to be reinforced by a new economic framework, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, developed in 2000 in an arrangement with the IMF and the World Bank lending facility.<sup>127</sup>

Musharraf's government also introduced a devolution plan under the Local Government Ordinance 2001 that decentralised many functions of public service delivery to the district and local levels. By 2005, the government developed the Medium Term Development Framework (MTDF) 2005-10 which is also considered to be the Tenth Five-Year Plan. The core objectives of this framework were again to sustain economic growth in order to reduce poverty and achieve the MDGs; create a knowledge economy for efficient industrial production; evolve a 'mature, tolerant, democratic society'; protect 'the rights to development of every citizen particularly those of children, youth, women and minorities'; promote equitable regional development; and minimise waste in the economy (GoP 2005). Its interest in education was reflected in a stronger emphasis on secondary schooling:

The MTDF initiatives include free education up to secondary school level, introduction of technology education as a core course at elementary level, upgradation of curricula, decentralization of teacher training institutes up to the district level and promoting public-private partnerships . . . In achieving the universal primary

---

improving teacher training; creating a curricula and examination system; establishing 40 polytechnics by 2004; encouraging the private sector to provide education at various levels.

<sup>127</sup> The core elements of this strategy were to accelerate economic growth and maintain macroeconomic stability; improve governance; invest in human capital; and target the poor and the vulnerable (GoP 2004) See <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr0424.pdf>.

education (MDG Goal 2), the biggest challenge is to ensure completion/survival rate to grade 5, i.e. to reduce the dropout rate. (GoP 2005, pp. 13-14)<sup>128</sup>

By proposing a Gender Reforms Action Programme, the MTRDF noticeably supported the idea of an empowering approach for women and more general gender reform in society:

enhancement of [the] status of women, promotion of women's rights, and ensuring women's full participation at all levels on the basis of equity with men and to serve as change agents in the society. Reducing gender inequality and mainstreaming of women in all sectors is essential to achieve empowerment of women' (p. 16).

However, Musharraf's regime was also characterised by several political developments when attention was focused on, for example, the so-called War on Terror following 9/11, which included a war in the tribal areas that caused massive internal displacement—and more than 70,000 deaths to date. Increased regional inequality and the marginalisation of the political leadership from Balochistan also caused acute political instability.<sup>129</sup> The 2008 general election, saw his government fall. That year was marked by the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto in a terrorist attack on December 27, 2007. However, since her political party had secured a majority in the parliament, it formed a government, with Yousuf Raza Gilani becoming prime minister and Bhutto's husband Asif Ali Zardari becoming president. The democratic transition and the wider international development discourse during the implementation of the MDGs and EFA goals inspired the new National Educational Policy 2008. The policy's core vision was stated as follows:

Education is a categorical imperative for individual, social and national development that should enable all individuals to reach their maximum human potential. The

---

<sup>128</sup> The MTRDF also focused on reducing poverty by adopting an integrated approach through a broad-based economic growth strategy, 'improving governance, consolidating devolution to the grassroots level and protecting vulnerable segments of the society' (p. 12). It emphasised improving health, nutrition and access to water and sanitation for a large proportion of the population. It also expanded housing for the poor, generated employment for income distribution and fostered rural development.

<sup>129</sup> For most of the Musharraf regime, the key leaders of the Pakistan People's Party and Pakistan Muslim League (N) were in exile. In a series of events, Musharraf deposed the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, followed by the removal of most judges in the apex court. This led to a powerful political movement against military rule led by the lawyers and civil society activists and supported by the mainstream political parties. As the movement grew stronger, Musharraf had to surrender to its demands and agreed to a general election in early 2008.

system should produce responsible, enlightened citizens to integrate Pakistan in the global framework of human centred economic development. (GoP 2008, p. 20)

The key thrust of the 2008 policy was to expand access to educational opportunities and equity in education (gender inequality, rural-urban divide, provincial and area disparities) by improving the quality of learning, making financial resources available for education; and expanding public-private partnerships. Strikingly, the policy identified the stratifying role of schooling in the most explicit words, even referring for the first time to social exclusion:

Education is not only about the individual, it has a societal role—a societal role of selecting, classifying, distributing, transmitting and evaluating the educational knowledge, reflecting both the distribution of power and the principle of social contract. In a country with alarming inequities of income and opportunities, reducing the social exclusion needs to be one of the principle objectives of the Policy. The educational system in Pakistan is accused of strengthening the existing inequitable social structure as very few people from the public sector educational institutions could move up the ladder of social mobility. If immediate attention is not paid to reduce the social exclusion and moving towards inclusive development in Pakistan through emancipatory education, Pakistan can face unprecedented social upheavals. (GoP 2008, p. 13)

## **A SUMMARY**

Pakistan's journey of economic and educational development over more than six decades, as these documents – the five-year plans and educational commissions and reports have shown was enormously torturous, as the particular conditions under which policy-makers conceived their visions of national progress meant that education's role had to shift continually to meet political demands. This chapter has captured that unique intent and the shifts, twists and turns in government thinking about whether to invest in higher education, basic education or scientific and technical education. Educational opportunities opened up only gradually through a complex interplay between economic, political and educational forces throughout the country's post-Independence history and still are far from universal. Table 4.1 summarises how these policy agendas and collective visions shifted over time. Although the language of universalising basic schooling, improving the quality of schooling, tackling illiteracy, female

education and regional inequalities can be found in these documents, the pressure on resources, the need to keep both elite groups and mass political movements at bay were considerable. The push for economic development is eventually counterbalanced in later decades (not least because of international pressure) by discursive framings around equality, social mobility and, to a limited extent, human rights.

**Table 4.1: The four waves of policy narratives 1947-2010**

	<b>Pre Independence</b>	<b>First wave: 1947-58</b>	<b>Second wave: 1959-68</b>	<b>Third wave: 1969-88</b>	<b>Fourth wave: 1988-2010</b>
<b>Political conditions</b>	Arbitrary division of the subcontinent; mass migration; uncertain political climate	Lack of constitutional development; political instability; frequently changing leadership; assassination of Liaquat Alikhan	First martial law of General Ayub Khan	Popular uprising; end of Ayub era; general election and political crisis; civil war and separation of East Pakistan; formation of Bhutto's government; martial-law and judicial murder of Bhutto; Cold War and Afghan Jihad	Brief democratisation in the post-Zia era; fragile governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif; military coup of General Pervaiz Musharraf; popular uprising and democratisation
<b>Educational policies</b>	Poor educational base; barely 10% literate population; outmigration of educated Hindu population and in-migration of Muslim peasantry	Establishing the national education system (1947); Islam as a moral basis for education; a desire for free and compulsory primary education; emphasis moves on secondary and higher education for meeting the immediate needs of skilled human resources; opportunities not equal but proportional to talents; maximum education for the few; a compromise on quality in basic education;	Development of a highly competitive and selective education system; deferring the goal of equalising educational opportunities for all; nuanced linked between education and economy; new moral agenda to induce behavioural shifts through education to promote economic growth as a national duty; responsabilising families rather than state for schooling; few scholarships for poor students; educational inequalities including rural-urban;	Educational expansion covering rural population, women and poor; nationalisation of educational institutions; schooling from Grades 1-8 made free; free provision of public transport for students; reversal of the focus on higher education in the past; recognition of gender inequality; Islamisation of educational for nation building; reversal of nationalisation and increased privatisation by military 1977; deepening of religious influence on education through new notions of Islamic citizenship and Islamised curricula; increased emphasis on rural population; focus on girls' schooling with religious motivation; recognition of the social and economic costs of illiteracy; large expansion of education in rural Pakistan.	The rise of mass schooling; Social Action Programme (1988); focus on equalising educational opportunities for rural population, girls, poor and those in underdeveloped regions; girls' schooling as a new strategy to alleviate poverty; reducing home-school distance in rural areas particularly for girls by building new and expanding existing schools; reaching disenfranchised groups; By 1992, recognition of educational stratification as a threat to social order; legislation for compulsory primary schooling; returns to human capital as rationale for educational investments; expansion of private sector; onset of MDGs and the EFA agendas; 6 national goals; further minimising of rural-urban, gender and wealth based educational inequalities; still a large proportion of out-of-school children;
<b>Economic goals</b>	'Economic wasteland' of British India; predominantly agricultural with low productivity	Development of the economic foundations of the country; five-year planning; state-led industrialisation and capital formation	Large-scale industrialisation; impressive economic growth; faith in 'trickle-down' effect.	Prioritisation of distribution over growth; nationalisation of industries and private enterprises under Bhutto; deregulation and privatisation under General Zia; beginning of the IMF/World Bank	Continuity of the Structural Adjustment Programmes; liberalisation and deregulation of the economy; focus on distribution and poverty reduction alongside economic growth; Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers; large-scale rural development projects

	and no industrial base			financing conditional to economic liberalisation	
<b>Discursive framing</b>		Functional inequality; growth superior to its distribution; opportunities proportional to talents	Islamic socialism; behavioural transformation through education to inculcate the principles of free-market economy	Acknowledging economic and educational inequality; need for distribution; nationalisation of private enterprises; heavy reliance on 'national ideology' after the independence of Bangladesh; creation of 'Pan-Islamic' identity in the wake of Cold War	Equality of opportunity; equity in education; focus on quality of education; identification of the socially stratifying role of education

## **Enactment of the economic policies/plans and educational agendas**

Table 4.2 below provides an overview of the enactment of the educational policies described in this chapter. In the second column I describe the overall state of education using the various indicators identified by the respective plan/policy. In the third column, I present the financial situation with details of the resources allocated for education overall, and where possible, with sectoral and regional allocations within education. The fourth column reports the educational benchmarks and targets set out for the respective plan/policy period. In certain cases, the subsequent plan/policy provided an evaluation of its preceding plan/policy. Wherever this information was available, it is presented in the last column. Where such information is not available, some of the educational indicators are reported from the relevant issue of the Economic Survey (GoP 1982; 2001) produced by the Government of Pakistan.

**Table 4.2: Policy enactment: Financial commitments, educational targets and achievements 1955-2010**

Policy Text	Situation assessment	Financial commitments	Educational targets	Evaluations
<b>The First Five-Year Plan 1955-60</b>	At primary level: 115,500 primary school teachers (40,000 untrained) and 106 training institutions with 7,500 teachers trained annually. At middle level: 13 middle school teachers training institutions training 500 teachers annually. Total 148 colleges (114 degree colleges) with combined enrolment was 64,000 (7% of those in high schools and 1.4% of those in primary schools) and 6 universities.	58 Crore Rupees (6.2% of total public sector expenditures) allocated for education; Focus on improving quality at all levels; Post-secondary scholarships for 600 boys and girls for 4 years; 25 overseas scholarships.	Primary: 4,000 new schools in West Pakistan and the improvement of 6000 schools in East Pakistan. Addition of one million enrolments at primary level increasing primary coverage from 4.14% to 47.4%. Overall addition of 515 new secondary schools to increase enrolments by 144,000. Addition of teachers training institutions: 25 for primary, 2 for middle and 2 for secondary. Adding 1600 engineers/ technicians annually towards the end of the Plan.	Primary: 2,400 schools added; enrolment increased by 0.44 million; <b>Only 7.5% increase in primary enrolment. By the end of the Plan, there were 44,200 primary schools with 4.7 million children enrolled. At secondary level, 540 new schools opened and enrolment increased by 230,000. By the end, there were 6,000 secondary schools with 1.1 million enrolments.</b> No appreciable addition in primary teacher training;
<b>The Second First-Year Plan 1960-65</b>	Resource allocation constrained by economic constraints but also by the limited supply of trained teachers and long time required for their training. High priority on quantity than quality. Gender inequality – out of 4.7 million children in primary schools, only 1.1 million were girls.	Rs. 890 million allocated for public sector education/training, half of the recurring and non-recurring expenditure divided equally between primary and secondary education, 15% each for college/universities and technical education, and the remaining 20% for training, research and other sectors. Rs. 379 million allocated for training and research	Primary: 15,200 new schools in West Pakistan, and 13,300 in East Pakistan. Adding 70,000 teachers. Increasing attendance from 42.3% to 60%, focusing on girls. Secondary: In West Pakistan - 160 new high schools, 103 middle school to be upgraded to secondary; 600 primary to be upgraded to middle. Addition of 800 qualified teaches and 650 classrooms; Increasing enrolment by 0.43 million. Improved facilities for girls. Scholarships for poor.	Financial allocations in Second Plan were increased five-times of the First Plan. <b>Two million additional children into primary schools. Target of 0.43 million secondary enrolments was achieved.</b> Significant progress made to achieve the targets at the higher levels;
<b>The Third First-Year Plan 1965-70</b>	Only 8 million out of 25 million children of school going age were enrolled. Additional facilities needed for all 33 million children; East Pakistan: 50-60% in Class 1 drop out before the end of the year; only 18% of the 1958 Class 1 reached to Class V in 1962. Reasons include: lack of transportation, child farm labour; teacher absenteeism; malnutrition; crowded schools and low quality teaching; Girls enrolment by 1965 (age 6-11): 23% in East Pakistan and 14% in West Pakistan	Increasing educational spending from 3.8% in 1965 to 5.1% of total government expenditure (a raise of 165%) in 1970. Rs. 520 million allocated for primary schooling and 205 million for middle/ junior high schooling. Rs. 410 million for secondary education, Rs. 138 million for teachers training, Rs. 637 million for technical education, Rs. 105 million on colleges (excluding intermediate colleges). Rs. 343 million for universities and Rs. 198 million for scholarships.	Primary enrolment to be raised to 70% in both East and West Pakistan. Increasing Primary enrolment from 7.3 million in 1965 to 13.10 million in 1970. Addition of 42,500 new primary schools in West Pak and 4,000 in East Pak. Secondary enrolment to increase to 15% in East Pak and 29% in West Pak, number of students increasing from 1.04 million to 2 million. Training 75,000 teachers annually. Merit scholarships to be introduced for Grades V, VIII, X, XII. Increases in engineering, medical, technical and vocational training;	Provision of social services did not fulfil aspirations of the people. <b>By 1969-70, enrolments at primary schools were 10,500,000; at secondary 2,710,000, and at colleges/universities 490,000.</b>
<b>The Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75</b>	First Plan allocated 5.5% of its total financial outlay on education; Second Plan 5.2%, and Third Plan 5.4%. Primary enrolments: 3.4 million in 1950; 5.2 million in 1960, and 10.5 million in 1970	Resources allocated for education to be 7.6% of total Plan (2.5 times that of the Third Plan). Increasing the allocation on education from Rs. 1,328 million actually spent during Third Plan to Rs. 3,665	Primary: enrolment to increase by 5 million (reaching 15.6 million). Achieve universal primary education by 1980. Increasing number of schools from 70,040 in 1970 to 97,440 in 1975.	Expenditure on education during 1971-72 to 1977-78 ranged from 1.3% to 1.8% of GNP. Within educational development expenditure, primary received only

	Secondary enrolments: 0.7 million in 1950; 0.98 million in 1960 and 2.71 million in 1970. College and universities enrolment: 40,000 in 1950; 210,000 in 1960 and 490,000 in 1970. Overall, the Grade I-VIII enrolment grew by 7.5% annually during the 1960s, higher level enrolments increased well above 10% annually, causing unemployment amongst those with general education.	million allocated for the Fourth Plan (176% increase).	Middle schools: enrolment to increase by 1 million. Number of schools to increase from 5,080 in 1970 to 7,300 in 1975 & enrolment from 1.94 million in 1970 to 2.94 million in 1975 High Schools: Enrolment to increase from 0.77 million in 1970 to 1.12 million in 1975; no. of schools increase from 5,320 in 1970 to 6,370 in 1975. Enrolment in technical institutions to increase by 280%. Raise literacy from 18% in 1970 to 28% in 1975.	13.2%, secondary 16.2%, whereas, higher education received at least 34.7%.
<b>The Education Policy 1972-80</b>	There were 3.5 million boys and 1.1 million girls in primary school, making it 48% of the total population in the age group; in middle school, 0.75 million boys and 0.75 million girls and 0.25 million girls enrolled making it only 20% of the relevant age group	A 70% increase in the total expenditure on education in the first year (compared to 1971-72), followed by an annual increase of 15%, making it 4% of GNP by 1980. Making education to be free from Grade I-VIII in all schools in the country from October 1972.	Primary: universal enrolment for boys by 1980 (2.3 million additional enrolment) and raising girls' enrolment to 70% (2.7 million additional enrolment). Adding 38,000 classrooms. Middle: 1.45 million additional boys, raising enrolments to 70%; 0.85 million girls making their enrolments to 40% of their age group (total enrolment to 33% of boys and girls in the age group). Adding 23000 classrooms. Prioritising the rural and backward regions. Additional 2.25 lac teachers needed by 1980 (75,000 to be produced by existing facilities; 75,000 through general education, and 75,000 recruited through National Literacy Corps). Secondary level: doubling the secondary enrolment (Grade IX-XII) from 10% by adding 4.5 lac to Grades IX-X and 2 lac to Grades XI-XII by 1980 – covering 15% of the age group;	Primary enrolment: total – 6,197,000 females 1,428,000. Middle enrolment: total 1,492,000, female 348,000 IX-X: total 569,000, female 138,000.  (Economic Survey 1981-82 for year 1980-81)
<b>The Fifth Five Year Plan 1978-83</b>	While primary education was always free, Grades VI-X were made free in 1972. Overall, 5.93 million enrolled in primary schools (54% of the 5-9 age group). Total of 5,031 middle and 3,202 high schools enrolling 1.42 million boys and 0.39 million girls; At primary level at least half of those enrolled in Class I drop before reaching to Class V. However, 73% of those reaching to V also progress to VI and 78% of those reaching to VIII. 60% of primary schools do not have sufficient infrastructure. There was a shortage of female teachers in rural areas;	Doubling of per-capita expenditure on education from Rs. 44 in previous Plan, with educational expenditure increasing to 3.1% of GNP. As opposed to Rs.350 million development expenditure on primary in 1972-77, the Fifth Plan allocated Rs. 3049.7 million. Allocation of (development and non-development) expenditure: Rs. 1004.3 million for primary; Rs. 8073.5 million for secondary; Rs. 698 million for teachers; Rs. 1700.1 million for technical; Rs. 3569.6 million for college; Rs. 2032.3	Major focus on primary; introduction of double shifts to meet the shortfall of 1,60636 teachers for Grades I-X. Additional enrolments of 2.68 million at primary, 0.73 million at middle and 0.21 million at high school levels by 1982-83; Opening of 12,641 new primary schools; 4,625 mosque schools; 570 private schools; 158 new high schools; upgradation of 3,866 primary schools to middle schools, and 1,236 middle schools to high schools; improvement of missing facilities, construction of additional rooms, four walls and laboratories at a large number of schools. 55,663 trained teachers needed by the	Out of total Rs. 10,323.0 million under the 5 <sup>th</sup> Plan, only Rs. 5,349.55 million were actually implemented. Out of Rs. 3,049.7 million for primary schooling, only 1,413.1 million were utilised; out of Rs. 3,257.5 million for secondary education, Rs. 1,090.1 million and out of Rs. 380 million on teachers' education, only 290.3 were utilised. <b>School participation declined from 54% in 1977-78 to 48% in 1982-83. Share of government expenditure on education declined from 1.8% of GNP to 1.5% in the same period.</b>

		million for university, and Rs. 512.9 million for scholarships.	secondary school system to meet the teacher student ratio of 1:25, and to replace retiring teachers as well as to head the new middle schools,	
<b>New Education Policy and Implementation Programme 1979</b>	Nearly half of children and 2/3 <sup>rd</sup> girls not attending school. Enrolment in Balochistan 32%; NWFP 52%, Sindh 59% and Punjab 56%; Rural girls – 10% in Balochistan, 14% NWFP, 16% in Sindh and 29% in Punjab; overall 50% drop out ratios. Within education, primary education receiving only 13.2% of development resources.	Within education, primary education to receive 32% of development expenditure annually.  The policy followed the financial allocations of the Fifth Five Year Plan.	Achievement of the 5 <sup>th</sup> Plan's enrolment targets by 1987 for boys and by 1992 for girls. Increasing retention rate to 60% by 1983; improving 17,000 existing primary schools; opening 13,000 new primary schools mainly in rural areas; establishing 5000 mosque schools; providing equipment to 12,000 existing schools; providing textbooks to all primary students; opening of 5000 Mohalla schools for girls, and 1000 Village Workshop schools to train mothers in various skills; setting up 10,000 adult literacy centers; raising literacy rate from 24% to 35% by 1983 and to 100% by 2010.	See situation assessment column for the Sixth Five Year Plan 1983-88
<b>The Sixth Five Year Plan 1983-88</b>	Overall, school participation increased from 17% to 48% in the 35 years of independence. 13.9 million (23.5%) population literate. Primary enrolment: 2 million children (30% of population) including 1.6 million boys (44% of the age group) and 0.4 million girls (11%).	Allocation of Rs. 7.8 billion for primary schooling and literacy in the 6 <sup>th</sup> Plan compared to Rs. 1.4 billion during the 5 <sup>th</sup> Plan. 7 billion for primary, 1.45 billion for vocational and technical and 2.1 billion for university education.	To increase primary school participation from 48% in 1982-83 to 75% in 1987-88 by the addition of 5 million children to the existing in the primary school. More focus on the rural areas and girls. Launching of a mass literacy programme to cover 15 million persons mainly rural population and women. Increasing participation rate for Classes VI-VIII from 26% in 1982-83 to 33% in 1987-88, and for Classes IX-X from 15% to 20% in the same period. 0.2 million primary and secondary teachers needed.	<b>More than 12000 primary schools (public and private) added and mosque schools increased by 17,000. Primary participation went up to 63.5%. Only 3% increase in literacy could be achieved. There was 2.6 million increase in enrolment in Classes 1-5 compared to the target of 5 million.</b>
<b>The Seventh Five Year Plan 1988-93</b>	Literacy rates estimated to be in between 25-30%. Only 64% of children in 5-9 age group had access to primary school; one-third had access to middle schools, and only 17% had access to high schools. Strong gender disparities at all levels. About 35% of primary schools had no buildings, and 20% had only one classroom. Children from more than half of the villages had to travel 4km or more to get to school. Only 11% of the population had 10 years of schooling.	23.1 billion (7% of the Plan) allocated for education.	Literacy rate to be raised to 40% by 1992-93; primary enrolment to increase to 80% by 1992-93; technical enrolment to 33% of those seeking admission. Provision of a primary school within a radius of 1.5 kilometres for every child in age 5-9 by 1992-93; in rural areas, addition of 22,613 primary and 20,000 mosque schools; provision of 100% of the infrastructure facilities; building for 75% of the shelter-less schools; addressing infrastructure disparity for boys/girls and rural/urban; addition of 25,000 skilled workers annually;	<b>Rs. 19.0 billion were actually spent from the allocations. Under education and training programme: 21,000 primary schools were constructed against the target of 34,613, and 13,000 mosque schools established against the target of 20,000. Primary enrolments increased by 3.1 million against targeted 4.6 million. Secondary enrolment increased by 2 million against targeted 1.88 million.</b>
<b>Education policy 1992-2002</b>	Existing primary (and mosque) schools were 124,000 with the estimated enrolment of 1.15 million. Primary school participation rate to	Public sector allocations	Universalising enrolment for 5-9 children required 10.5 million additional seats. Need for additional 107,000 primary and mosque schools;	See situation assessment column for the National Education Policy 1998-2010

	be 66.3% with high drop-out rate; low quality of literacy training. Female participation t primary – 8% in Balochistan, 26% in Punjab. In Sindh, only 33% children complete the primary cycle. Poverty, parental attitudes, illness, ignorance of parents, unattractive schools, poor quality of teachers and irrelevance of curricula are the reasons for high drop outs. Out of 10,000 science teachers in 6000 high schools, 35000 are untrained.	Primary: Rs. 51342.9 million development and Rs. 29213.78 million recurring expenditures. Literacy: Rs. 1227 million development expenditure. Secondary: Rs. 26003.18 million development and Rs. 38662.49 recurring expenditure. Higher secondary: Rs. 7235.3 million development and Rs. 6443.3 million recurring expenditure. Higher education: Rs. 2424.3 million development and Rs. 845.99 million recurring expenditure. Teachers training: Rs. 1698.31 million development and Rs. 1383.84 million recurring expenditure	265,000 additional teachers needed. Two rooms to be provided to 24,750 shelter-less schools. Primary: addition of 106957 schools; 10.3 million enrolments; 265,000 teachers. Secondary: Addition of 29,487 schools; 4.4 million enrolments; 208586 teachers; raising participation from 32.64% to 49.87%. Higher secondary: addition of 400 colleges; 382,000 enrolments raising participation from 7.3% to 14%.	
<b>The Eighth Five Year Plan 1993-98</b>	Primary enrolment increased from 0.77 million in 1948 to 12.414 million in 1993. 60 polytechnics, 540 colleges and 20 new universities established during this period. However, half of the girls and one-fifth of the boys 5-9 not enrolled in primary school; adult literacy rate still 35%; a large number of primary schools lacked proper infrastructure; about 35,000 primary schools had no shelter; many schools lacked basic facilities; education standards were noticeably low, curricula irrelevant, and teaching and testing methods outdated; drop outs and failure rates were high	Overall expenditure on the public sector development programme in education to be estimated at Rs. 69.031 billion	Primary participation to increase for boys to 95% and for girls to 82% (total for all children to be 87.7%). Addition of 5.548 million children at primary and 2.4 million at secondary schools. Secondary (classes VI-X) participation to increase from 49.7% to 54.5% for boys, and 25.6% to 30.2% for girls (total 42.7%). Increase literacy from 35% to 48%; a 50% increase in the annual production of technicians.	<b>Economic survey 2000-01 reported for the year 1998-99</b> Number of primary schools: total – 153, 300 and 56,500 for females. No. of middle schools: total – 18,000 and for females 8,000. No. of high schools: total – 12,300 and for females 4,500.
<b>National Education Policy 1998-2010</b>	Literacy rate to be 38.9% increasing at an annual rate of half a percent; 145,000 primary schools in the public sector including 37,000 mosque schools; one-third of the primary schools were female schools; 25,000 schools were without building; majority of the schools lacked toilet and water facilities as well as desks, chairs or even mats for pupils to sit on; More than 5.5 million	Raising educational expenditures from 2.2% of GNP to 4%	Increasing gross participation at primary from 71% to 90% by 2002-03 and to 105% by 2010. Increasing middle level participation from 46% to 65% by 2002-03 and to 85% by 2010. Increasing primary cycle completion up to 90% by 2010. Constructing 45,000 new formal primary schools, 20,000 mosque schools; new 242,823 non-formal basic education centres. Upgradation of 45,000 primary schools to middle/elementary; Recruitment of 99,500 additional primary teachers. Raising literacy to 55% by 2010.	<b>According to the National Plan of Action 2013-16, by 2011-12</b> Net primary enrolment rates of 5-9 years old: National – 68%; boys 73% & girls 63%. There were strong inequalities between provinces and wealth status which worsened gender inequality at the primary and other levels of schooling.

Sources: Information compiled from the respective Five-Year Plans, educational policies, and the Economic Surveys 1981-82 & 2000-01.

Although Pakistan continues to be the least educationally developed country in the world, its progress in making schools available to an overwhelmingly large population despite political turmoil and economic underdevelopment is remarkable. Young people growing up in Pakistan in the last two decades had greater access to educational opportunities than their older family members. The extent to which these expanded opportunities were stratified along the lines of social and economic status are the subject of analysis in Chapter 5.

## **CHAPTER 5 - PATTERNS OF INTERGENERATIONAL EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY (1986-2010)**

The aim of this chapter is to identify long-term trends in the distribution of educational opportunities in rural Pakistan. Chapter 4 demonstrated that the various phases of educational and economic policymaking in Pakistan encountered different challenges and created varying conditions for educational mobility. Starting from a very low educational levels in 1947, the education system that evolved subsequently was highly competitive, selective and available to only a few. While the principles of a market economy promoted high economic growth during the 1950s and 1960s, it also caused extensive inequality between social groups and regions. The late 1980s, however, saw the beginning of the expansion of educational provision, this time in association with a rising concern for rural populations, the poor and women. In Chapter 1, I included in Table 1.1 as the evidence for national progress on the key educational indicators for various years including 1985 and 2010 (period that is covered in this Chapter). In 1985, at the primary level, gross enrolments were 71.6% for males compared to 37.3% for females, with a gender parity index as low as 0.5. At the secondary level, gross enrolments were significantly lower, 28.3% for males compared to 10.3% for females with gender parity index as low as 0.4.

Mass schooling gained momentum after 2000 with the start of the global Education For All campaign such that as we saw in Chapters 1 and 4, remarkable gains were made in improving access and achievement. Various key educational indicators improved significantly by 2010 when the gross primary enrolment for boys became universal and it rose to 87.5% for girls, with gender parity index improving to 0.9. At the secondary level, the gross enrolment for boys increased to 40.2% compared to 31.2% for girls, with the gender parity index of 0.8. As illustrated in Table 1.2 below such educational progress has been marred with the high levels of educational inequality along the lines of gender, wealth, rural-urban regions, and between provinces. Keeping this broad picture of educational attainments in view, and using longitudinal data sets, I set out to discover in this chapter whether and, if so how, various social groups, generations and birth cohorts benefitted from this rise of mass schooling.

From the point of view of intergenerational social mobility, we need to ask whether and how social origins shaped the take-up of those educational opportunities. In this chapter therefore I

set about mapping how the patterns of educational distribution over generations translate into the educational paths of individuals and their families. As the country continues to struggle to universalise educational access, with millions of children still out of school, I wanted to ask who benefitted from educational reforms over the previous decades. The two linked household surveys conducted in 1986 and 2010 offered a unique opportunity for me to investigate the intergenerational dynamics of educational mobility and the ways they change over time, for sons and daughters. The key aim here is to generate generalisable evidence on the extent to which social origins continue to affect educational opportunities.

Below I first develop a conceptual model by synthesising the empirical insights and theoretical explanations offered in Chapter 2 before describing the methods, data sources and variables of interest. I then outline in sequential order, my findings in relation to: the changing patterns of educational stratification by gender and wealth from 1986 to 2010: the intergenerational mobility metrics which I used separately for sons and daughters for both 1986 and 2010 which illustrates the association of their schooling with that of their fathers and with the literacy status of their mothers. Using ordered logistic regression analysis, I then move on to estimate the precise patterns of association between the educational attainments of parents and their sons and daughters, and the extent to which these associations are mediated by the household's social and economic status during the period from 1986 to 2010.

## **THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY**

The range of theoretical perspectives offered in Chapter 2 and the methodological concerns raised in Chapter 3 generated a conceptual model with which to analyse intergenerational social mobility within the cultural specificity of rural Pakistan. As I pointed out in Part 1, households in rural Pakistan are often large *collective* units that work together to ease consumption over time in the wake of economic uncertainty, and are sustained by a complementary division of roles and responsibilities (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2007).<sup>130</sup> Run under a central decision-making mechanism which is shaped by the respective powers of individual members (Chiappori 1988), household choices are not necessarily always Pareto-efficient (cf., Duflo 2003; Haddad and Hoddinot 1995; Thomas 1994; Udry 1999; Dercon and

---

<sup>130</sup> They reconcile their members' different preferences through cooperative or non-cooperative relationships (Alderman et al., p. 15).

Krishnan 2000; Anderson and Baland 2002; Ashraf 2009; Bloch and Rao 2002). Within this relational context, households make complex decisions as to which children to school and how much. The decisions are based on several factors, including parental aspirations, relationship with the children, economic and social constraints, perceived individual ability, and the expected private labour market returns to schooling for both the household and individuals (c.f., Becker, Kominers, Murphy and Spenkuch 2015).<sup>131</sup>

However, households do not exist in isolation from each other. Individual welfare in this context was realised through dependence on micro-level local solidarity and stable networks between households (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Pakistani villages continue to embrace overlapping hierarchies of landownership, caste and kinship, religious identity, ethnicity and so on, that horizontally and vertically integrate households through the relationships of reciprocity and interdependence. The immediate and extended family, caste and kinship (*biradree*), and other forms of hierarchical social organisation collectively determine individuals' welfare and the corresponding duties and obligations (Wood 2003). Access to and utilisation of educational and other opportunities, as well as aspirations for social mobility *in* and *through* schooling, are formed within such thick social relationships and are influenced by the hierarchical position of a household vis-à-vis other households in the community.

Through an intergenerational bargain (Mcgregor, Copestake and Wood, 1999), the adult members of the household invest in the young during time period  $t$ ; in return, when the young reach adulthood in the time period  $t+1$ , they take care of their elders and any new young family members. Schooling a child with the expectation of old-age returns is thus an important concern in household decisions about education. Those who are expected to offer greater returns are more likely to be invested in than others. This has particular implications for girls' schooling, given the prevalent gender norms.

The patriarchal power relations at the core of the *collective* household model imply a 'sexual division of labour and division of sexual labour' (Arnot 2002), such that women's labour is primarily allocated to the unpaid work of providing care and home production—the full-time 'shadow work' necessary to support the men who undertake paid work in the labour market (Bezanson, 2006). The role of women, however, is continually changing over time; and as

---

<sup>131</sup> Qualitative work also suggests that individuals' work-related decisions and resulting economic prospects are linked to their understanding of their family obligations and responsibilities (Arnot and Naveed 2014).

expectations increase – it is assumed that they will take on paid labour whilst also continuing to provide unpaid labour at home continues. This gendered division of labour determines educational and labour decisions which result in gender-differentiated trajectories for social and economic mobility. Within this context, scarce household resources are allocated with a strong bias towards educating sons rather than daughters.

Keeping this context in view, we learn from Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) that children receive a number of endowments from their parents, including those that are genetically determined such as race and some elements of ability, and others such as family environment, values, connections, reputation and networks, as well as knowledge and skills. The household economic status also affects the educational outcomes of its young members in diverse ways. Educational and later-life trajectories are shaped by the differentiated early childhoods of those from different social backgrounds (Heckman and Cunha 2007; Francesconi and Heckman 2016). Higher family income is associated with higher parental education, better schools, better parenting and better peers, all of which may have a far greater effect on child development than income alone (Francesconi and Heckman 2016).<sup>132</sup> With differentiated input from their parents starting at birth, poor children cannot escape the fate of their parents (at least without state intervention), namely, low educational achievement and hence poor labour market outcomes.

Another way of formulating these differences (as we have seen in Chapter 2) is through the notion of *cultural capital* (Bourdieu 1986) which is the conversion of economic capital, the external form of wealth, into an integral part of a person. Cultural capital includes the embodied, objectified and institutionalised forms of wealth—cultural goods such as paintings, books and instruments—as well as institutional recognition and qualifications. Linked to other forms of capital, cultural capital is passed from one generation to the next in a family. Academic ability is itself a product of the investment of time and cultural capital that involves the hereditary transmission of cultural knowledge (Bourdieu 1986, p. 107).

Parents are motivated to invest in their children’s human capital for a number of reasons: to

---

<sup>132</sup> These factors differentially affect the development of cognitive and non-cognitive/socio-emotional skills, the ‘technology of skills formation’ (Cunha 2007; Cunha and Heckman 2007; Carneiro and Heckman 2003). Such skills are developed in early childhood, well before schooling begins, and affect the acquisition of human capital. Higher levels of non-cognitive skills, also linked to socio-economic background, in turn promote cognitive skills.

maximise households' collective utility and social and economic status; to ensure that their own educated and high-earning children can take care of them in old age; and to enhance the adult earning potential of their children as an altruistic goal (Becker and Tomes 1979, 1986). A household's ability to invest in human capital of its members is differentiated by the given social stratification. In rural Pakistan, there are no formal credit markets to help credit-constrained families educate their children, and informal networks of support depend on being part of a community network which is itself hierarchical and disadvantages the poor. Nor can the socially embedded labour markets promise any specific level of private returns to education, as they are likely to favour those with existing social advantage and networks. Consequently, conditions for the convergence of human capital across social groups over the long term as described by Becker and Tomes (1979) do not hold in rural Pakistan.

Families' differentiated economic and social status lead to different marginal benefit and cost curves (Behrman and Tarbman, 1985; Behrman *et al.*, 1998) which affects the efficacy of their human capital investments. The optimum level of investment—when returns to human capital investment equal marginal returns to financial capital—are achieved only by those who are not credit constrained, whereas those who are credit constrained can only make sub-optimal investments which limits their intergenerational educational mobility (Solon 2004). Under these conditions, the high returns to education raise the optimum level of investment in human capital and encourage the rich to spend more than the non-rich, thus widening educational inequality.

Gender differences in educational mobility include the fact that there are several sources of bias against girls. The first is that the intergenerational bargain favours sons over daughters. Parents in rural Pakistan traditionally live with their sons as they grow old, even after the sons are married, and are taken care of by them, whereas married daughters live with their husbands and their families. Parents thus hope to achieve old-age security by investing in their sons' human capital over that of their daughters.

The second source of gender bias works even more strongly against investing in daughters' human capital—that is, the sexual division of labour. Young men are able to participate in paid labour, whereas women are drawn into unpaid *shadow work* or *home production* from an early age. Consequently, significantly less effort and resources are invested in educating girls than sons. This trend is likely to continue until women's participation in paid work, which is

improving only gradually, equals that of men. Another potential source of change could be the expectation that parents will fulfil their cultural obligations by making the appropriate marital arrangements for their sons and daughters, including *arranging* suitable spouses. The rise of assortative marriage in the wake of men's increasing schooling levels—they now are demanding to marry educated women—may counter the traditional bias against educating daughters, regardless of their participation in the labour market. Schooling daughters thus could offer better marital prospects which is also a dependable route of social mobility.

These explanations of educational decision-making are relevant only when sufficient education facilities are already available, as private educational investment is not the only determinant of intergenerational educational mobility. This is particularly true in a context like rural Pakistan which has historically lacked educational infrastructure (as documented in Chapter 4). The initial low level of educational provision and the expansion of the education system are critical determinants of human capital in today's rural households. Given the uneven geography of development in Pakistan (Naveed and Ali 2012; Naveed et al. 2016), various regions offer different opportunity for intergenerational educational mobility (Chetty *et al.*, 2014).<sup>133</sup> Moreover, beyond the availability of a basic educational infrastructure across regions, the higher level and progressive nature of public investment in education affects intergenerational mobility (Solon 2004).

The nature of the education system also plays a central role in shaping prospects for educational mobility. The imperfection of the credit markets, the high cost of education and an S-shaped education system lead to polarisation, such that highly educated groups coexist with poorly educated groups (Chusseau, Hellier and Halima 2012). A result of such inequality is that children receive an education only if their parents' education is above a certain threshold. Parents whose education is below this level are likely unable to pay for the fixed costs of education, hence their decedents remain unschooled or poorly schooled for an indefinite period. Thus they are caught up in '*low-mobility poverty traps*' despite recent educational expansion. Like intergenerational educational mobility, the existence and concentration of poverty traps are likely to vary across regions and provinces in Pakistan, given the high regional inequality.

---

<sup>133</sup> This reflects stark regional inequalities between and within provinces (Naveed and Ali 2012; Naveed et al. 2016; GoP 2016).

Since decisions about education keep expected private returns in view, the functioning of labour markets is an important determinant of intergenerational educational mobility. When labour markets are not *meritocratic* and instead function themselves as socially embedded or sociocultural institutions (Fleetwood, 2008)—that is, where social origins rather than educational achievement is the major benchmark of occupational success—they reduce the incentive for educational investment, particularly for those who lack the social networks to succeed in such labour markets. Those already privileged are more likely to invest in education as their economic success is more likely, and are also more likely to advance their cultural capital and distinction. If education is the only determinant of success in the labour market, it is likely to raise the aspirations of all, in particular those who already have greater human capital, thus leaving the patterns of intergenerational mobility unchanged (Boudon 1974). In both cases, in the shadow of economic and social inequality, families' subjective assessments (over and above economic means) become important in decision-making as they affect aspirations and strategies for education. Those facing various forms of social subordination are less likely to invest in education when it does not guarantee occupational success. This is evident through various academic choices made in the early stage of a career which are associated with individuals' social and economic backgrounds (Boudon 1974; Jackson et al. 2007). Subjective assessments of education's potential usefulness in achieving economic success shape educational aspirations and ambitions, and thus influence educational decision-making and strategies.<sup>134</sup>

In rural Pakistani society, which is characterised by a rigid social structure and persisting inequality, those in positions of dominance—for example, those resulting from relationships of landholding, caste/kinship, religious identities, the politics of patronage, and patriarchy—tend to monopolise resources and opportunities and close them off to dominated groups (Murphy 1986; Parkins 1979). The resulting social exclusion deeply affects the aspirations, ambitions and strategies of the poor as they pursue social mobility *in* and *through* education. The key argument here is that expanding educational opportunity is a necessary condition for

---

<sup>134</sup> It is in the complexity of this social life that individuals acquire mental and cognitive structures (*habitus*) through socialisation in their early life which shapes their educational trajectories, while schooling also acts on these dispositions (Bourdieu 1976). Through individuals' subjective assessments of what is possible and appropriate for them and for people 'like them', already a product of their objective circumstances, *habitus* influences day-to-day practices so as to reproduce or transform the advantaged or the disadvantaged position (see Arnot and Naveed, 2014, for rural *habitus* in Pakistani context) with implications for their educational success.

improving educational mobility, but substantial expansion is required before it will benefit the poor. The expansion of opportunities is likely to benefit mainly the non-poor unless it is accompanied by wider progressive economic reforms that not only ease credit constraints but also reduce the real and perceived inequality of access to social and economic opportunities.

## **DATA SOURCES**

As I described in Chapter 3, my aim was to use the following surveys: the Pakistan Rural Household Survey (PRHS) 1986-91 gathered in 1986, and the last round of the Pakistan Panel Household Survey (PPHS) 2001-2010 gathered in 2010<sup>135</sup>. As one objective of this chapter is to compare the intergenerational educational mobility of different generations over time, I analyse the rural sample of the PPHS 2010. Even the rural sampling frame in 2010 was different from that in 1986 which undermines inferences drawn from the inter-temporal comparisons. The main analysis is therefore focused on the smaller subsample of the PPHS 2010 which included only the four districts covered in the PRHS 1986-91.<sup>136</sup>

Table 5.1 below describes the age and birth cohorts of the fathers, mothers, and sons and daughters above age 16 included in the analysis.

---

<sup>135</sup> Starting in 2001, the PPHS built on the initial PRHS sample whilst adding an additional sample to make it representative of rural Pakistan. In the 2010 round, the coverage was further expanded to urban Pakistan and also included Balochistan.

<sup>136</sup> The subsample in 2010 (of four districts) helps draw inter-temporal comparison with the 1986 data. This is supplemented by the complete rural sample of PPHS 2010 that generates a nationally representative generalisable picture of the intergenerational mobility in rural Pakistan. The results of the complex rural sample in 2010 are provided in the annexes to this chapter.

**Table 5.1: : Age and birth cohorts for parents, sons and daughters analysed (1986-2010)**

Age cohorts	Birth cohorts	Fathers	Mothers	Sons	Daughters
<b>1986 (%(numbers))</b>					
<b>16-20</b>	1966-1970	1.5 (13)	5.0 (41)	72.7 (1,544)	92.6 (1,260)
<b>21-30</b>	1956-1965	13.5 (115)	24.6 (200)	20.6 (438)	6.1 (83)
<b>31-40</b>	1946-1955	22.6 (193)	27.7 (225)	5.3 (113)	0.8 (11)
<b>41-50</b>	1936-1945	27.9 (238)	25.4 (206)	1.1 (24)	0.4 (5)
<b>51-60</b>	1926-1935	21.4 (183)	13.8 (112)	0.1 (2)	0.07 (1)
<b>Above 60</b>	Before 1925	13.0 (111)	3.4 (28)	0.1 (2)	-
<b>Total</b>		<b>100 (853)</b>	<b>100 (812)</b>	<b>100 (2,123)</b>	<b>100 (1,360)</b>
<b>2010 subsample (%(numbers))</b>					
<b>16-20</b>	1990-1994	0.4 (4)	2.5 (22)	28.8 (379)	49.6 (254)
<b>21-30</b>	1980-1989	9.0 (84)	18.7 (166)	48.0 (631)	40.2 (206)
<b>31-40</b>	1970-1979	20 (187)	24.9 (221)	15.7 (206)	7.4 (38)
<b>41-50</b>	1960-1969	23.7 (222)	24.8 (220)	6.2 (81)	1.8 (9)
<b>51-60</b>	1950-1959	20.5 (192)	17.8 (158)	1.0 (13)	0.4 (2)
<b>Above 60</b>	Before 1950	26.3 (246)	11.4 (101)	0.3 (4)	0.6 (3)
<b>Total</b>		<b>100 (935)</b>	<b>1000 (888)</b>	<b>100 (1,314)</b>	<b>100 (512)</b>
<b>2010 complete sample (%(numbers))</b>					
<b>16-20</b>	1990-1994	0.8 (21)	4.5 (114)	34.4 (1,110)	55.2 (748)
<b>21-30</b>	1980-1989	13.0 (348)	20.8 (532)	45.7 (1,476)	35.9 (487)
<b>31-40</b>	1970-1979	22.3 (600)	26.6 (680)	14.8 (479)	6.6 (89)
<b>41-50</b>	1960-1969	23.2 (623)	23.0 (587)	4.4 (141)	1.0 (14)
<b>51-60</b>	1950-1959	19.0 (509)	15.9 (405)	0.6 (20)	0.5 (7)
<b>Above 60</b>	Before 1950	21.8 (585)	9.3 (237)	0.2 (5)	0. (11)
<b>Total</b>		<b>100 (2,686)</b>	<b>100 (2,555)</b>	<b>100 (3,231)</b>	<b>110 (1,356)</b>

Source: Computed from the Pakistan Rural Household Survey 1986-91 and the Pakistan Panel Household Survey 2001-2010, gathered in 2010.

More than half of the fathers and close to half the mothers in the 1986 sample were born before or at the time of Independence. They have therefore experienced the evolution of the new country's education and economic systems. A crucial point to keep in mind is that, while the earliest survey analysed in this chapter was conducted in 1986, the intergenerational nature of the analysis covers a much longer period of early childhood development and schooling.

### Construction of variables

Given the objectives of this study, the requirements of the conceptual model described above, and the availability of the relevant indicators in the selected household surveys, I constructed two sets of variables: (a) household human capital and (b) measures of household social origin. Below I describe each constructed variable in detail.

*(a) Household human capital*

The dynamics of intergenerational educational mobility required some measure of human capital.<sup>137</sup> Seminal contributions to the field by Schultz (1959, 1961), Becker (1964) and Mincer (1958, 1974) helpfully provided the micro-foundations of the rational choice for investments in human capital. It suggested that the amount of an individual's human capital is 'the result of voluntary investment in acquiring skills and abilities by the individual or his/her family' (Folloni and Vittadini 2010, p. 259).<sup>138</sup> The Mincer model, that relies on years of schooling to measure human capital, also assumes that it gives equal weight to each additional year of schooling which may not depict the reality.<sup>139</sup> Nonetheless, despite not being a perfect proxy for human capital (Becker 1992; Cohen and Soto 2007), years of schooling are used widely as a proxy for the costs of acquiring human capital, and the micro-level analyses report that years of schooling have a significantly positive effect on earnings.

The household surveys used here record individuals' schooling as the highest grade completed at the time of the survey. By using years of schooling as a proxy for the latent variable of human capital, I constructed five schooling-level categories. The advantage of using levels of schooling, as shown below, instead of years of schooling is that it does not assume the same economic value from each additional year of schooling:

- No schooling or below primary (below 5 years)
- Primary schooling or below middle (5-7 years)

---

<sup>137</sup> In a survey of perspectives on the measurement of human capital, Folloni and Vittadini (2010) classify the range of approaches into two categories. First, the *retrospective* approach tries to estimate the cost of producing or rearing individuals who embody economic value that contributes to the process of economic production. Given the indirect nature of this approach and the difficulty in measuring all costs involved an unclear link between costs and outputs, questions have been raised over its usefulness. The second alternative *prospective* approach measures returns to various aspects of investments in human capital in the forms of income, and takes into account the ability, efforts, qualifications and quality of institutional contexts. However, the difficulty in measuring the costs and the unclear link between the costs and the output also raise questions about the ability of this approach to serve as the appropriate measure of human capital.

<sup>138</sup> On-the-job learning and schooling were considered the two main ways of investing in human capital. Mincer's work that measured the relationship between completed years of schooling and average lifecycle earnings has been particularly influential in the field. Several limitations of relying on years of schooling as a measure of human capital have been identified, including lack of recognition of non-accredited learning, informal learning and on-the-job training, and lack of information on the quality of schooling/learning. Further, the return to schooling can be confounded with the impact on earnings of intelligence, ability and family background. Earnings also can be affected by factors such as gender, region, race and age, all of which can affect both the level of attainment and earnings.

<sup>139</sup> Given the limitations of using years of schooling as a measure of human capital, various alternatives have been proposed and tried, such as assessing skills directly in terms of numeracy, literacy and problem-solving (c.f., OECD 1998).

- Middle schooling or below secondary (8-9 years)
- Secondary schooling or below higher secondary (10-11 years)
- Above secondary (12 and above)

The data on schooling for the household head (father), his wife (mother) and his sons and daughters was included in the analysis. Since the educational level of mothers was very low during the period under study, their human capital was measured by their literacy status (as a binary variable). Households had varying numbers of sons and daughters in various age cohorts. The young preschool children (below age 6) were excluded from the analysis. All sons and daughters age 16 and above were included in the analysis. Amongst those between 6 and 16, only those out of school at the time of the surveys were included in the analysis on the assumption that their recorded schooling was the highest they could achieve. Those under 16 who had already attained a secondary or higher level of schooling were also included in the analysis, as they already fell within the higher end of educational distribution.

Given the strong household orientation of my theoretical and methodological framework, the next task was to aggregate the individual-level measures at the household level. The highest schooling levels of sons and daughters in the household were measured separately. A household with the sons'/daughters' highest schooling level recorded as 'unschooled' means that *none* of the sons/daughters in the household within the given age limits had completed any schooling. A household with the sons'/daughters' highest schooling recorded at the secondary level means that *at least* one son/daughter in the relevant age group had completed secondary schooling (other sons/daughters in the household may have any level of schooling but not beyond secondary level). This is admittedly a reductionist measure of a household's educational achievement, as it does not fully report the schooling of each son and daughter. Nonetheless, at the lower end of the distribution these measures are robust in capturing households with acute educational deprivation. These measures are thus effective in identifying the low educational mobility traps, while also capturing any educational gains in the household in terms of progress towards higher levels.

*(b) Measures of household social origin*

Developing an appropriate measure of social origin is central to the quantitative analysis of the long-term educational stratification resulting from social and economic hierarchies. Since the underlying concept of social class that captures these hierarchies prevalent in rural Pakistan is not sufficiently developed and operationalised, measuring social origins remains a challenging task. Earlier attempts to estimate social-class size in Pakistan have developed economic class categories based on a composite index consisting the indicators of education itself, occupation, income, lifestyle and housing (cf., Nayab 2011). Keeping this multidimensionality in mind, I developed six measures to capture various facets of the social and economic hierarchy so as to see the extent to which they determine educational progress over generations.

I used six measures to capture a family's social and economic status. In order to see the differentiated effects of the *stock* and *flow* of wealth on human capital (Filmer and Pritchett 2001), I first developed a wealth index that takes into account the ownership of durable household assets and housing conditions, using Principle Component Analysis (households' scores on the wealth index are used to create wealth quintiles). Given the unavailability of income data in the 2010 survey, I then measured the *flow* of the economic status by computing monthly household consumption expenditures converted into an adult-equivalent per-capita measure to adjust for household size. A relative measure of poverty—the share of food expenditure in total monthly consumption expenditure—was also constructed with the assumption that poor households tend to spend a higher share of their income on food and less on their other needs. Another indicator was constructed to capture the gendered dimension of deprivation by identifying the households where mothers had a below-normal (18.5) body mass index at the time of the survey. The assumption here was that mothers' malnourishment could account for the biological transmission of health and nutritional (dis)advantage to their sons/daughters.

An additional measure that potentially takes into account the rural social hierarchy is that of landownership, (c.f., Chapter 2). Over and above the income earned from agricultural production, which is already reflected in household consumption expenditure and the wealth

index, landownership potentially captures social power and prestige associated with the ownership of land. A binary variable is constructed to separate those owning more than five acres of land (landowners) from those owning less/no land (landless) and is included in the analysis. Moreover, in the absence of a separate variable on caste/kinship identity, landownership also provides a proxy measure of social capital in the patronage-based networks which are reported to affect the life chances of individuals (see Chapter 2). The last measure of social status is fathers' occupational category. This variable was not captured in sufficient detail in 1986. As a result, three occupational categories are included in the analysis: (a) unemployed; (b) employed in agricultural/farm/non-farm/casual labour; and (c) employed in the public or private sector. This is admittedly an overly simplified measure but it is still expected to capture some aspects of individuals' social origins beyond their economic status.

Other variables that capture demographic features of the household were also taken into account, including the adult-equivalent household size and age of the father. Lastly, to take account of the geographic distribution of educational opportunities, the household province of residence was also included in the analysis.

## Methods

The current chapter uses two main methods, to explore long-term trends in educational stratification. Using intergenerational mobility metrics, the absolute and relative mobility rates were estimated and compared over two periods, 1986 and 2010. Ordered logistic regression was used to see the precise strength of association between the education levels of the successive generations by controlling for other factors, and to identify the pathways of the transmission of (dis)advantage.

The basic econometric model adopted for this analysis is:

$$\overline{H_{i,son,i\ daughter}} = \alpha + \beta(H_{i\ parents}) + \gamma(X_i) + \mu \quad (1)$$

It assumes that the education of sons and daughters is a function of parental education and a number of other factors. In Equation (1),  $\overline{H_{i,son}}$  is the human capital (highest schooling levels) of sons,  $\overline{H_{i,daughter}}$  is the human capital of daughters,  $\overline{H_{i,parents}}$  is the human capital of

parents,  $\overline{X}_i$  represents a set of control variables such as household size, age cohorts and province of residence, and  $\mu$  is an error term that reflects the unobservable factors that affect the formation of human capital for sons and daughters.  $H_{i\text{ parents}}$  is thus separated into the father's schooling level and the mother's literacy status (as the proportion of mothers completing any level of schooling is very low in the data). The coefficient  $\beta$  measures the effect of each additional level of parental human capital on the likelihood that sons/daughters attain a higher level of human capital, as compared to the cumulative probability of attaining lower levels of human capital. It also includes an interaction term as a product of the mother's literacy status and father's schooling levels, which captures any additional impact of both parents having more education or literacy. To assess the individual effect of a person's social origin and the extent to which social origin mediated the intergenerational transmission of human capital, a set of indicators of social and economic status are included in the regression:

$$\overline{H_{ison,i\ daughter}} = \alpha + \beta(H_{i\ parents}) + \gamma(X_i) + \delta(Y_i) + \mu \quad (2)$$

Here  $\overline{Y}_i$  represents a set of indicators of social and economic status, including landownership, wealth quintile, consumption expenditure quintile, share of food expenditure in total expenditure, father's occupational status and mother's malnutrition status. The coefficient  $\delta$  measures the cumulative effect of social origin on individuals' educational possibilities.<sup>140</sup>

The subsequent sections of this chapter present the results of the statistical analysis using both mobility metrics and ordered logistic regression.

## SCHOOLING PATTERNS OF GENDER AND WEALTH INEQUALITIES

I start by offering an analysis of the patterns in the joint distribution of wealth and sons' and daughters' schooling levels during the period from 1986 to 2010. The upper half of Table 5.2 presents the schooling levels of sons for 1986 and 2010, and the lower half shows the schooling levels of daughters for the same period. Evidently, household wealth remained an important differentiator of sons' and daughters' educational attainment during the period of

<sup>140</sup> As argued in the conceptual framework, social origins affect educational aspirations, strategies and outcomes through (a) objective conditions (what individuals have), and (b) individuals' subjective assessments of their objective conditions (what they think what they have). In an ideal scenario, with rich data at our disposal, we could separate the effects of (a) and (b). However, with the given data, we can only measure the cumulative effect of both through the coefficient  $\delta$ .

this study. Amidst the country's educational expansion over 25 years, there was a widening of educational inequality along the lines of wealth.

In both periods, the proportion of households with unschooled sons declined with the increasing wealth status of households. Nearly two-thirds of the poorest households had no schooled sons in 1986 which remained almost unchanged over this period. For the second poorest quintile, in half of the households all sons were unschooled in 1986, which was reduced to one-third in 2010, and there was a significant increase in the proportion of households with at least one son schooled to the primary or middle level.<sup>141</sup> In contrast to the two poorest wealth quintiles, households in the third and fourth wealth quintiles made substantial gains over 25 years in terms of reducing the proportion of those with all unschooled sons, and an increase in the proportion of those with at least one son reaching the secondary level or above. The richest wealth quintile maintained its relative advantage for sons for the period of this study. Overall, sons from the poorest households appeared to be excluded from the educational expansion over 25 years. The 'poverty-no education trap' seems to have persisted over this period. The major beneficiaries of the educational expansion were sons from the middle and higher ends of the wealth distribution.<sup>142</sup>

The lower panels of Table 5.2 below indicate that daughters' schooling was extremely low in 1986; nearly all households in the bottom three quintiles had unschooled daughters. Only slightly above one-quarter of households from the fourth quintile and half from the richest quintile had at least one daughter with any level of schooling. Over 25 years, daughters from the poorest quintile of households remained out of school, whereas a quarter of such households from the second quintile experienced a reduction in the proportion of unschooled. The 'poverty-no schooling' trap is larger for daughters than for sons and includes households from the poorest quintile, and from the second and third quintiles. Educational opportunities for girls seemed to open up over the 25 years from the third quintile upwards. Those from the two richest quintiles saw a massive reduction in the proportion of households with all unschooled daughters and an increase in those with at least one daughter achieving the

---

<sup>141</sup> In contrast to the subsample in 2010, the complete sample showed the persistence in the proportion of the unschooled households from the second-poorest quintile.

<sup>142</sup> While there is some apparent decline in the schooling of the richest quintile in both the complete sample and the subsample in 2010, which may be because of the small number of observations, the relative advantage of the households in this quintile over the other quintiles persists over 25 years.

secondary level and above. During this period, households from the richer quintiles increased their relative advantage over others in terms of daughters' schooling levels (particularly at the secondary level and above).

**Table 5.2: Schooling levels of sons and daughters across wealth distribution (1986-2010) – [% (No.)]**

Wealth quintile	Sons' schooling											
	1986				2010 subsample				2010 complete rural sample			
	Unschooling	Primary & middle	Secondary & above	Total	Unschooling	Primary & middle	Secondary & above	Total	Unschooling	Primary & middle	Secondary & above	Total
<b>1st</b>	65.5 (72)	25.5 (28)	9.1 (10)	100 (110)	63.1 (82)	25.4 (33)	11.5 (15)	100 (130)	61.9 (273)	26.6 (118)	11.3 (50)	100 (441)
<b>2nd</b>	50.7 (38)	30.7 (23)	18.7 (14)	100 (75)	36.8 (56)	42.8 (65)	20.4 (31)	100 (152)	47.6 (224)	34.8 (164)	17.6 (83)	100 (471)
<b>3rd</b>	43.7 (52)	31.1 (37)	25.2 (30)	100 (119)	19.7 (28)	38.0 (54)	42.3 (60)	100 (142)	32.3 (141)	36.2 (158)	31.6 (138)	100 (437)
<b>4th</b>	27.8 (35)	31.0 (39)	41.3 (52)	100 (126)	14.7 (24)	27.0 (44)	58.3 (95)	100 (163)	24.0 (88)	29.4 (108)	46.6 (171)	100 (367)
<b>5th</b>	6.8 (7)	15.5 (16)	77.7 (80)	100 (103)	11.9 (20)	23.2 (39)	64.9 (109)	100 (168)	18.2 (52)	22.4 (64)	59.4 (170)	100 (286)
<b>Total</b>	<b>38.3 (204)</b>	<b>26.8 (143)</b>	<b>34.9 (186)</b>	<b>100 (533)</b>	<b>27.8 (210)</b>	<b>31.1 (235)</b>	<b>41.1 (310)</b>	<b>100 (755)</b>	<b>39.0 (778)</b>	<b>30.5 (612)</b>	<b>30.5 (612)</b>	<b>100 (2,002)</b>
	Daughters' schooling											
	Unschooling	Primary & middle	Secondary & above	Total	Unschooling	Primary & middle	Secondary & above	Total	Unschooling	Primary & middle	Secondary & above	Total
	<b>1st</b>	94.7 (90)	4.2 (4)	1.1 (1)	100 (95)	96.4 (81)	3.6 (3)	0 (0)	100 (84)	95.5 (297)	4.2 (13)	0.3 (1)
<b>2nd</b>	98.4 (60)	1.6 (1)	0.0 (00)	100 (61)	70.7 (58)	24.4 (20)	4.9 (4)	100 (82)	82.9 (257)	14.5 (45)	2.6 (8)	100 (310)
<b>3rd</b>	86.5 (83)	12.5 (12)	1.0 (1)	100 (96)	37.5 (33)	22.7 (20)	39.8 (35)	100 (88)	61.4 (170)	18.1 (50)	20.6 (57)	100 (277)
<b>4th</b>	73.2 (71)	23.7 (23)	3.1 (3)	100 (97)	17.4 (16)	17.4 (16)	65.2 (60)	100 (92)	47.8 (107)	16.5 (37)	35.7 (80)	100 (224)
<b>5th</b>	49.3 (37)	37.3 (28)	13.3 (10)	100 (75)	12.2 (10)	7.3 (6)	80.5 (66)	100 (82)	29.8 (45)	16.6 (25)	53.6 (81)	100 (151)
<b>Total</b>	<b>80.4 (341)</b>	<b>16.0 (68)</b>	<b>3.5 (15)</b>	<b>100 (424)</b>	<b>46.3 (198)</b>	<b>15.2 (65)</b>	<b>38.6 (165)</b>	<b>100 (428)</b>	<b>68.8 (876)</b>	<b>13.4 (170)</b>	<b>17.8 (227)</b>	<b>100 (1,273)</b>

Overall, the expansion of education during this period seems to have left both sons and daughters from the poorest quintile unaffected. Sons in the middle of the wealth distribution and daughters from the middle to higher end of the wealth distribution appear to be the greatest beneficiaries of the expansion. Individuals' social origins thus are strong mediators of their educational progress over generations.

Table 5.2 above also provides insights into gendered patterns of school attendance. Overall, 38.3% of households in 1986 had all unschooled sons, compared to 80.4% that had all unschooled daughters. This proportion declined to 27.8% for sons and 46.3% for daughters in 2010 (subsample). Similarly, nearly 35% of households had at least one son schooled to the secondary level and above in 1986, compared to only 3.5% of daughters. These proportions changed to 41% for sons and 38.6% for daughters in 2010. There is thus a significant reduction in the gender gap at the higher end of the educational distribution which is differentiated by wealth. Gender gaps persisted over the 25 years in the poorest households and changed only slightly for the second-poorest quintile. However, the wealthier three quintiles experienced a drastic decline in gender inequality during this period. In the two richest quintiles in 2010, the proportion of households with at least one daughter schooled to the secondary level or above is substantially higher than for sons.<sup>143</sup>

The intersection of gender and wealth created a range of patterns in educational attainment, shedding more light on educational inequality identified by the GMR 2015 (reported in Chapter 1). Household wealth is central in explaining the patterns of educational attainment for both sons and daughters and the differences between them during the period 1986 to 2010. This centrality of social origins in the educational attainment of sons and daughters suggests a need to examine the patterns of association between the schooling levels of fathers and their sons and daughters over the same period.

### **INTERGENERATIONAL EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY (1986-2010)**

Household wealth and gender are important, but as we shall see, they are not the only educational stratifiers; for example, educational attainment can differ across parental

---

<sup>143</sup> Albeit different education levels were observed between the subsample and the complete sample in 2010, both demonstrate similar patterns in the gender gap.

educational levels. Wealth and parental schooling levels may work together to reproduce educational inequalities over generations. Intergenerational associations of education are also strongly indicative of the inclusiveness of the education system: a high association implies educational concentration in certain dynasties and a lack of it in others. The inter-temporal shifts in this association provide an assessment of public policies and whether they are creating or widening inequalities over time. Below, I examine the mobility metrics for both sons and daughters (plotting schooling levels of sons and daughters against that of their fathers at both time points, 1986 and 2010), and discuss trends and changes in them before comparing mothers' literacy status and its effects on sons' and daughters' schooling levels at the same time points.<sup>144</sup>

### **Intergenerational educational mobility metrics for sons (1986-2010)**

Table 5.3 below presents the schooling levels of fathers and the highest schooling levels of sons in the household for the years 1986 and 2010. In 1986 (top panel), 41.5% households with unschooled fathers did not have a single son schooled to the primary level; one-quarter had at least one son schooled to the primary or middle level, and less than one-third had at least one son schooled to the secondary level or above. The proportion of households with all sons unschooled dropped steadily if the father was schooled to the primary or middle level. Similarly, a high proportion of households with fathers schooled above the primary level had at least one son schooled to the secondary level or above in 1986 (50% for middle schooled fathers, 56.7% for secondary and 71.5% for above secondary).

The strengthening of the intergenerational educational association is clearly evident over the 25 years. In the 2010 subsample there was a reduction in the proportion of households with all unschooled sons and an increase in the proportion of households with at least one son schooled to the secondary level or above. However, these improvements were differentiated across the different levels of fathers' schooling.<sup>145</sup> The greatest absolute increase in the proportion of households with at least one son schooled to above the secondary level occurred when fathers' schooling reached the secondary level or above. The increased association

---

<sup>144</sup> As fewer mothers were schooled in the sample in 1986, I used the binary measure of their literacy status to assess its association with the schooling levels of sons and daughters.

<sup>145</sup> The complete sample in 2010 presents a picture somewhat similar to the one portrayed by the 1986 sample. The key difference is that a higher proportion of sons, particularly from households where the father has secondary and higher schooling, have made it to schooling above the secondary level.

between father-son schooling levels, despite the expansion of the education system from 1980 to 2010, implies that educational inequality was perpetuated over generations. The education system appeared to be less inclusive of those from families that lacked education—in other words, the system had not enabled a significant proportion of the population to break free from the ‘no-education mobility’ trap.

**Table 5.3: Intergenerational educational mobility for sons (1986-2010) – [% (No.)]**

Fathers' Schooling	Unschooling	Primary	Middle	Secondary	Above Secondary	Total
<b>Sons' schooling—1986</b>						
Unschooling	41.5 (161)	16 (62)	11.3 (44)	21.6 (84)	9.5 (37)	100 (388)
Primary	32.1 (27)	19.1 (16)	11.9 (10)	23.8 (20)	13.1 (11)	100 (84)
Middle	18.8 (6)	12.5 (4)	18.8 (6)	25 (8)	25 (8)	100 (32)
Secondary	23.3 (7)	10 (3)	10 (3)	36.7 (11)	20 (6)	100 (30)
Above Secondary	28.6 (4)	0	0	42.9 (6)	28.6 (4)	100 (14)
<b>Total</b>	<b>37.4 (205)</b>	<b>15.5 (85)</b>	<b>11.5 (63)</b>	<b>23.5 (129)</b>	<b>12.0 (66)</b>	<b>100 (548)</b>
<b>Sons' schooling—subsample 2010</b>						
Unschooling	34.4 (140)	18.7 (76)	12.0 (49)	17.0 (69)	17.9 (73)	100 (407)
Primary	22.4 (24)	28.0 (30)	15.0 (16)	20.6 (22)	14.0 (15)	100 (107)
Middle	19.2 (10)	15.4 (8)	17.3 (9)	15.4 (8)	32.7 (17)	100 (52)
Secondary	20.5 (17)	12.1 (11)	8.4 (7)	16.9 (14)	42.2 (35)	100 (83)
Above Secondary	10.1 (7)	15.9 (11)	7.2 (5)	17.4 (12)	49.3 (34)	100 (69)
<b>Total</b>	<b>27.6 (198)</b>	<b>18.8 (135)</b>	<b>12.0 (86)</b>	<b>17.4 (125)</b>	<b>24.2 (174)</b>	<b>100 (718)</b>
<b>Sons' schooling—2010</b>						
Unschooling	45.0 (579)	17.6 (227)	12.4 (159)	13.3 (171)	11.7 (150)	100 (1,286)
Primary	31.7 (84)	24.53 (65)	13.6 (36)	14.7 (39)	15.5 (41)	100 (265)
Middle	27.19 (31)	15.8 (18)	14.0 (16)	17.5 (20)	25.4 (29)	100 (114)
Secondary	24.69 (40)	10.5 (17)	12.4 (20)	16.1 (26)	36.4 (59)	100 (162)
Above Secondary	18.97 (22)	19.0 (22)	9.5 (11)	14.7 (17)	37.9 (44)	100 (116)
<b>Total</b>	<b>38.91 (756)</b>	<b>18.0 (349)</b>	<b>12.4 (242)</b>	<b>14.1 (273)</b>	<b>16.6 (323)</b>	<b>100 (1,943)</b>

One simplified way to report the patterns of intergenerational education association is offered in Table 5.4 below which shows each level of fathers' schooling for both periods. It reports the proportion of households where sons' schooling levels are lower than their fathers' schooling levels (downward mobility), equal to their fathers' (immobility) or higher than their fathers' (upward mobility).

In 1986, nearly 60% of the households with unschooled fathers had at least one son experiencing upward mobility, whereas all sons in just above 40% of households remained unschooled, like their fathers. By 2010 (subsample) there was an increase of seven percentage points in upward mobility in the traditionally unschooled families.

**Table 5.4: Intergenerational educational mobility coefficients for sons (1986-2010)**

Fathers' schooling	Sons' Mobility Metrics (%)								
	Downward	Immobility	Upward	Downward	Immobility	Upward	Downward	Immobility	Upward
	1986			2010 subsample			2010 complete sample		
Unschoolled	-	41.5	58.5	-	34.4	65.6	-	45.0	55.0
Primary	32.1	19.0	48.8	22.4	28.0	49.5	31.7	24.5	43.8
Middle	31.3	18.8	50.0	34.6	17.3	48.1	43.0	14.0	43.0
Secondary	43.3	36.7	20.0	41.0	16.9	42.2	47.5	16.0	36.4
Above Secondary	71.4	28.6	-	50.7	49.3	-	62.1	37.9	

The sum total of each row in a panel is 100%.

In households with primary schooled fathers, there was a 10 percentage point decline in downward mobility from 1986 to 2010, with a corresponding increase in the proportion of those who attained a level of education equal to their father's; the upward mobility ratio remained the same. A dramatic change over the 25 years can be seen amongst households in which the fathers had secondary schooling and above—their upward mobility was more than double in 2010, with a significant reduction in immobility.

In brief, there is an increase in the upward educational mobility rate for sons in households with unschooled fathers, and a reduction in downward mobility for the households with primary schooled fathers. However, despite the educational expansion agenda pursued over the 25 years, higher gains were made in the intergenerational educational mobility (increased upward mobility/reduced downward mobility) of better educated households—that is, with fathers' schooling at the secondary level or above.<sup>146</sup>

### **Intergenerational educational mobility metrics for daughters (1986-2010)**

Table 5.5 below shows the extent to which daughters' schooling levels are correlated with those of their fathers in 1986 and in 2010. Interestingly, in 1986 the overall high proportion of households with all unschooled daughters declined steadily with the increasing schooling levels of fathers which reflects the concerns of politicians and policymakers in the 1970s and onwards. However, only a few households had at least one daughter schooled to above the primary level, regardless of the father's schooling level. The overall significant increase in

<sup>146</sup> Compared to the subsample, the complete nationally representative rural sample for 2010 suggests less upward intergenerational mobility for sons, particularly when a father's schooling was to middle school or below, and progression to higher than secondary schooling when a father's schooling was secondary or above.

daughters' schooling levels over 25 years was differentially distributed across fathers' schooling levels. Households in which the father was schooled to the middle level or above saw a drastic reduction in the proportion of those with all unschooled daughters. There also was a sharp increase in the proportion of such households with at least one daughter schooled to the secondary level or above. There was a sizeable drop in the proportion of all unschooled daughters for households in which the father was schooled to the secondary level or above. By 2010, the largest proportion of such households had at least one daughter schooled to the secondary level or above.

**Table 5.5: Intergenerational educational mobility for daughters (1986-2010) – [% (No.)]**

Fathers' Schooling	Unschooling	Primary	Middle	Secondary	Above Secondary	Total
<b>Daughters' schooling—1986</b>						
Unschooling	86.8 (249)	8.4 (24)	2.1 (6)	2.8 (8)	0	100 (287)
Primary	77.5 (62)	16.2 (13)	5.0 (4)	0	1.2 (1)	100 (80)
Middle	55.9 (19)	32.4 (11)	5.9 (2)	5.9 (2)	0	100 (34)
Secondary	63.3 (19)	23.3 (7)	3.3 (1)	6.7 (2)	3.3 (1)	100 (30)
Above Secondary	42.9 (3)	14.3 (1)	14.3 (1)	14.3 (1)	14.3 (1)	100 (7)
<b>Total</b>	<b>80.4 (352)</b>	<b>12.8 (56)</b>	<b>3.2 (14)</b>	<b>3.0 (13)</b>	<b>0.7 (3)</b>	<b>100 (438)</b>
<b>Daughters' schooling—2010 subsample</b>						
Unschooling	58.7 (125)	11.3 (24)	4.7 (10)	13.2 (28)	12.2 (26)	100 (213)
Primary	58.7 (37)	20.6 (13)	4.8 (3)	7.9 (5)	7.9 (5)	100 (63)
Middle	13.8 (4)	6.9 (2)	10.3 (3)	34.5 (10)	34.5 (10)	100 (29)
Secondary	19.6 (10)	2.0 (1)	2.0 (1)	39.2 (20)	37.2 (19)	100 (51)
Above Secondary	17.4 (8)	6.5 (3)	2.2 (1)	34.8 (16)	39.1 (18)	100 (46)
<b>Total</b>	<b>45.8 (184)</b>	<b>10.7 (43)</b>	<b>4.5 (18)</b>	<b>19.7 (79)</b>	<b>19.4 (78)</b>	<b>100 (402)</b>
<b>Daughters' schooling—2010</b>						
Unschooling	79.3 (651)	7.1 (58)	3.7 (30)	5.7 (47)	4.3 (35)	100 (821)
Primary	67.1 (108)	16.2 (26)	5.6 (9)	6.8 (11)	4.4 (7)	100 (161)
Middle	42.6 (29)	8.8 (6)	5.9 (4)	22.1 (15)	20.6 (14)	100 (68)
Secondary	41.4 (43)	4.8 (5)	6.7 (7)	24.0 (25)	23.1 (24)	100 (104)
Above Secondary	26.7 (20)	14.7 (11)	2.7 (2)	26.7 (20)	29.3 (22)	100 (75)
<b>Total</b>	<b>69.2 (851)</b>	<b>8.6 (106)</b>	<b>4.2 (52)</b>	<b>9.6 (118)</b>	<b>8.3 (102)</b>	<b>100 (1,229)</b>

There is an obvious increase in upward mobility over 25 years across all levels of fathers' schooling, as shown in Table 5.6 below. For households with unschooled fathers, the odds of having at least one daughter schooled to the primary level or above increased by 28 percentage points. Similarly, over the 25 years there was a reduction of 20 percentage points in the number households with primary schooled fathers and all unschooled daughters. The greatest reduction in downward mobility occurred in households with middle schooled fathers. By 2010, there was a reduction of 60 percentage points in the proportion of households where the daughters' highest schooling was lower than their fathers' (below middle). Strikingly, the proportion of households with secondary schooled fathers and at least one daughter schooled to above the secondary level grew by 34 percentage points over 25

years. Similarly, for households with fathers schooled to above the secondary level, the proportion of households with at least one daughter schooled to this level increased by 25 percentage points.<sup>147</sup> While all households have benefitted from expanded education for girls over 25 years, the relative mobility rates have increased disproportionately for households with higher levels of fathers' schooling. The sum total of each row in a panel is 100%.

**Table 5.6: Intergenerational educational mobility coefficients for daughters (1986-2010)**

Fathers' Schooling	Daughters' Mobility Metrics (%)								
	Downward	Immobility	Upward	Downward	Immobility	Upward	Downward	Immobility	Upward
	1986			2010 subsample			2010 complete sample		
Unschoolled		86.8	13.2		58.7	41.3		79.3	20.7
Primary	77.5	16.3	6.3	58.7	20.6	20.6	67.1	16.1	16.8
Middle	88.2	5.9	5.9	20.7	10.3	69.0	51.5	5.9	42.6
Secondary	90.0	6.7	3.3	23.5	39.2	37.3	52.9	24.0	23.1
Above Secondary	85.7	14.3		60.9	39.1		70.7	29.3	

Trends in intergenerational mobility over time suggest that fathers' schooling above the middle level is associated with a significant reduction in downward mobility and greater progress to higher levels of schooling in 2010 than in 1986. These trends are more pronounced for daughters, as their downward mobility was much higher in 1986 than that of sons. In short, a strong intergenerational association appears to widen educational inequalities, as households lacking education in the parental generation are highly likely to have unschooled sons and daughters.

### **Mother's literacy status and schooling levels of sons and daughters (1986-2010)**

In contrast to the strong association between father-son schooling levels, there was no substantial association between mothers' literacy status and sons' schooling throughout this period, as shown in Table 5.7 below. Having a literate mother did not appear to reduce the probability of all sons in the household being unschooled at both data points. In contrast, there seemed to be a strong association between the mother's literacy status and their daughters' prospects of being schooled. In 1986, households with illiterate mothers had a 10 percentage

<sup>147</sup> Albeit with much lower improvement in education levels, the complete nationally representative sample for 2010 shows patterns similar to the subsample. Across all levels of fathers' schooling, there is a greater reduction in the subsample in the proportion of households with all unschooled daughters than for the complete sample in 2010.

point higher probability of having all unschooled daughters than households with literate mothers. Over 25 years, this gap increased to 12.5 percentage points. Mothers' literacy thus affected daughters' educational attainment during this period.

**Table 5.7: Mother's literacy status and schooling levels of sons and daughters (1986-2010) – [%(No.)]**

<b>Sons' and Daughters' Schooling by Mother's Literacy Status</b>						
<b>Sons'/Daughters' schooling levels</b>	<b>Sons</b>			<b>Daughters</b>		
	<b>1986</b>					
	<b>Illiterate mothers</b>	<b>Literate mothers</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Illiterate mothers</b>	<b>Literate mothers</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Unschool</b>	29.73 (209)	25.68 (19)	29.34 (228)	70.77 (402)	60.66 (37)	69.79 (439)
<b>Primary</b>	29.87 (210)	31.08 (23)	29.99 (233)	22.71 (129)	31.15 (19)	23.53 (148)
<b>Middle</b>	14.51 (102)	12.16 (9)	14.29 (111)	3.7 (21)	6.56 (4)	3.97 (25)
<b>Secondary</b>	16.79 (118)	20.27 (15)	17.12 (133)	2.29 (13)	1.64 (1)	2.23 (14)
<b>Above secondary</b>	9.1 (64)	10.81 (8)	9.27 (72)	0.53 (3)	0 (0)	0.48 (3)
<b>Total</b>	<b>100 (703)</b>	<b>100 (74)</b>	<b>100 (777)</b>	<b>100 (568)</b>	<b>100 (61)</b>	<b>100 (629)</b>
<b>2010 (subsample)</b>						
<b>Unschool</b>	28.16 (167)	30.43 (28)	28.47 (195)	49.54 (214)	37.08 (33)	47.41 (247)
<b>Primary</b>	17.2 (102)	22.83 (21)	17.96 (123)	14.12 (61)	19.1 (17)	14.97 (78)
<b>Middle</b>	12.98 (77)	11.96 (11)	12.85 (88)	8.33 (36)	10.11 (9)	8.64 (45)
<b>Secondary</b>	17.71 (105)	14.13 (13)	17.23 (118)	15.51 (67)	11.24 (10)	14.78 (77)
<b>Above secondary</b>	23.95 (142)	20.65 (19)	23.5 (161)	12.5 (54)	22.47 (20)	14.2 (74)
<b>Total</b>	<b>100 (593)</b>	<b>100 (92)</b>	<b>100 (685)</b>	<b>100 (432)</b>	<b>100 (89)</b>	<b>100 (521)</b>
<b>2010 rural sample complete</b>						
<b>Unschool</b>	39.74 (678)	34.97 (57)	39.33 (735)	70.14 (923)	45.03 (68)	67.55 (991)
<b>Primary</b>	17.7 (302)	19.02 (31)	17.82 (333)	11.25 (148)	19.87 (30)	12.13 (178)
<b>Middle</b>	13.36 (228)	10.43 (17)	13.11 (245)	5.47 (72)	9.27 (14)	5.86 (86)
<b>Secondary</b>	13.6 (232)	12.27 (20)	13.48 (252)	7.6 (100)	9.93 (15)	7.84 (115)
<b>Above secondary</b>	15.59 (266)	23.31 (38)	16.27 (304)	5.55 (73)	15.89 (24)	6.61 (97)
<b>Total</b>	<b>100 (1706)</b>	<b>100 (163)</b>	<b>100 (1869)</b>	<b>100 (1,316)</b>	<b>100 (151)</b>	<b>100 (1,467)</b>

The evidence presented in this section merits an explanation of the strength of association between the schooling levels of two successive generations. As better educated parents are also likely to have higher income status, it is useful from the policy perspective to assess the extent to which intergenerational education mobility is mediated by household economic status. The next section uses regression analysis to measure the precise strength of the intergenerational educational association, after controlling for various demographic factors and household socioeconomic status.

## **PATTERNS AND PATHWAYS: THE INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF HUMAN CAPITAL**

This section presents regression results for the 1986 and 2010 surveys, first for sons and then for daughters. As the regression estimates for the 2010 complete sample were not drastically different from the 2010 subsample, only the subsample results are presented here. Whilst the Tables 5.8 and 5.9 below present the values of the parameter, and odds ratios are discussed for a meaningful interpretation of the statistical results. The complete sample results for 2010 are provided in Appendix 5.1.

### **Sons' schooling (1986-2010)**

Table 5.5 below presents the results of the regression analysis for sons' schooling for both periods which are discussed below separately for each period.

#### *Sons' schooling, 1986*

Table 5.8 below presents the regression results for 1986, with the highest schooling levels of sons in the household as the dependent variable. Model 1 shows that the father's schooling level had a strong positive and statistically significant association with their sons' schooling levels. In terms of the odds ratio, each additional level of schooling the father achieved was associated with a 1.4 times increased probability of the sons reaching higher schooling levels over the combined probability of their attaining lower schooling levels. The magnitude of the association of the mother's literacy with their sons' schooling was equally high; however, due to high standard errors, it was statistically non-significant. To see the additional effect of having both parents schooled/literate, Model 2 adds a new variable to Model 1 which is the product of the mother's literacy status and the father's schooling level. As the individual effect of this variable was small and statistically non-significant, it is dropped from the subsequent models.

Model 3 controlled for various demographic features, such as household size, province of residence and father's age. After these controls, the coefficient of the father's schooling increased, suggesting that each additional level of the father's schooling is associated with a 1.6 times higher probability of their sons' reaching a higher schooling level. The positive and statistically significant effect of household size on sons' schooling points to the economies of

scale and gains from pooling resources within the collective nature of the household. It may well be that rich households can afford more children and also provide them a higher level of education. Given the uneven development in the country, geography also helped explain the educational success of sons. Those born in Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KP) province, for example, had a 1.8 times greater probability of attaining a higher level of schooling than those in Punjab. In contrast, those born in Sindh had only one-quarter the probability of those in Punjab to attain higher schooling levels. The regional inequalities in education appear to be remarkably high.<sup>148</sup>

Model 4 adds landownership to Model 3 which considers the significance of land in the social and economic milieu of rural Pakistan. Landowning families had a 2.45 times higher probability of at least one son attaining a higher level of education than non-landowning families. Landowning families had not only *greater* access to economic means but also a privileged position in the social order which increased their educational aspirations for their sons. After controlling for landownership, the magnitude of the coefficient on the father's schooling decreased to its initial level in Model 1, suggesting that some parental effects were channelled through landownership.

Model 5 introduced several indicators of economic status to measure the extent to which they mediate the intergenerational transmission of human capital. Durable wealth had the highest effect on sons' educational attainment. Each higher quintile of wealth was associated with a 1.6 times higher probability of at least one son in the household attaining a higher level of education. Consumption quintiles also had a positive statistically significant but small effect. The individual effect of relative poverty measures—share of food expenditure in total expenditures and the mother's malnutrition status—were statistically non-significant. These controls suggest that, in 1986, one-third of the magnitude of the effect of the father's schooling on the sons' schooling was channelled cumulatively by the household economic status. Father's schooling still explained one-third of the odds of the sons attaining higher levels of schooling, either directly or through factors not controlled for in the model.

---

<sup>148</sup> Admittedly, the sample is not representative of the respective provinces, as there was one district each from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh and two from Punjab. At best, we can infer that the measured inequalities represent differences between the sampled districts.

**Table 5.8: Ordered logistic regression for the highest schooling of sons in the household (1986–2010) [coefficients (standard errors)]**

Variable name	1986					2010 (subsample)				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Father's schooling	0.35** (0.08)	0.35** (0.08)	0.46** (0.09)	0.37** (0.09)	0.24* (0.09)	0.39** (0.05)	0.45** (0.06)	0.45** (0.06)	0.44** (0.06)	0.33** (0.06)
Father's schooling missing	-1.29 (1.17)	-1.29 (1.17)	2.20 (1.27)	1.81 (1.32)	1.92 (1.40)	-0.26 (0.39)	-0.31 (0.40)	0.34 (1.25)	0.18 (1.25)	0.44 (1.27)
Mother's literacy	0.34 (0.30)	0.32 (0.35)	0.38 (0.31)	0.40 (0.32)	0.30 (0.32)	-0.56** (0.21)	-0.12 (0.30)	-0.20 (0.22)	-0.19 (0.23)	-0.38 (0.23)
Mother's literacy missing						0.34 (0.27)	-0.34 (0.77)	-0.31 (0.30)	-0.32 (0.30)	-0.03 (0.40)
Household size			0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)			0.09** (0.02)	0.08** (0.02)	0.09** (0.02)
Household size missing								1.55 (0.93)	1.67 (0.93)	15.01 (714.36)
ΨProvince Sindh			-1.46** (0.23)	-1.73** (0.24)	-1.19** (0.32)			-0.93** (0.18)	-1.00** (0.18)	-0.34 (0.24)
Province KP			0.58** (0.20)	0.69** (0.20)	0.69** (0.21)			0.95** (0.18)	1.17** (0.21)	0.87** (0.23)
Father's age			0.05** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)			0.05** (0.01)	0.05** (0.01)	0.05** (0.01)
Father's age missing								2.82* (1.38)	2.88* (1.39)	2.59 (1.42)
Landownership				0.90** (0.19)	0.62** (0.19)				0.16 (0.19)	-0.15 (0.20)
Landownership missing									-0.46* (0.21)	-0.05 (0.23)
Father's occupation					-0.09 (0.16)					0.16 (0.13)
Wealth quintile					0.46** (0.08)					0.26** (0.08)
Wealth missing					1.80** (0.50)					
Consumption expenditure quintile					0.14 (0.07)					0.16* (0.07)
Consumption missing					1.99 (1.33)					

Mother's malnutrition						0.11					-0.11
						(0.22)					(0.24)
Mother's malnutrition missing						-0.52*					-0.36
						(0.23)					(0.30)
Share of food in total expenditure						-0.39					-0.02*
						(0.63)					(0.01)
Share of food in total expenditure missing											-13.63
											(714.36)
Product of parental schooling \$		0.03									-0.27*
		(0.24)									(0.13)
Parental schooling product missing											0.73
											(0.76)
Constant cut1	-0.33**	-0.33**	2.73**	2.52**	3.74**	-0.68**	-0.63**	2.60**	2.37**	2.76**	
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.87)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.76)	
Constant cut2	0.32**	0.32**	3.58**	3.40**	4.68**	0.18	0.23*	3.69**	3.47**	3.91**	
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.88)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.77)	
Constant cut3	0.82**	0.81**	4.20**	4.03**	5.37**	0.70**	0.75**	4.38**	4.16**	4.63**	
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.88)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.77)	
Constant cut4	2.26**	2.25**	5.86**	5.74**	7.21**	1.53**	1.58**	5.42**	5.21**	5.72**	
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.50)	(0.51)	(0.91)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.78)	
Observations	551	551	551	551	551	755	755	755	755	755	

Standard errors in parenthesis. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

\$ This variable is the product of father's schooling level and mother's literacy status. Ψ: Punjab is taken as reference category.

### *Sons' schooling, 2010*

As described in Chapter 3, the education system was significantly expanded during the period 1986-2010. Over these 25 years, as shown in Table 5.8 above, there was a noticeable increase in the effect of fathers' schooling on their sons' schooling. In 2010, each additional level of schooling the father attained was associated with a 1.5 times higher probability of at least one son attaining a higher level of schooling. The mother's literacy status had a statistically non-significant effect. The patriarchal nature of the rural household suggests that it was fathers' schooling that continued to have a prominent role in sons' schooling. After introducing the demographic controls in Model 3, the effects of fathers' schooling increased slightly. The negative effect on sons' schooling of being born in Sindh rather than in Punjab were lower in 2010 than in 1986. The probability of sons attaining a higher level of schooling in Sindh was 0.4 times that in Punjab. In contrast, households in KP had 2.6 times the probability of at least one son attaining a higher level of schooling in 2010 than those in Punjab (significantly higher in 2010 than in 1986). Household size also continued to have a small but significant 'economies of scale' effect on sons' schooling in 2010.

As shown in Model 4, landownership was not significant in determining the probability of sons' schooling in 2010. Educational expansion over 25 years seems to have weakened some effects of the social structure that made schooling accessible to sons from landless households. After introducing the variables measuring a household's economic status, the father having an additional level of schooling was still associated with a 1.4 times higher probability of at least one son attaining a higher level of schooling in 2010. There also was a large decrease in the effect of household wealth from 1986 to 2010, albeit with a small increase in the effect of household consumption expenditure levels and the negative effect of the share of food in total expenditures. Being in a higher quintile for level of consumption expenditure in 2010 was associated with a 1.2 times higher probability of at least one son in the household attaining a higher level of schooling. Moreover, each 1% increase in food expenditure's share of total expenditures reduced the probability of sons' schooling by a fraction of 0.98, thus suggesting a negative effect of poverty on sons' schooling. A relatively smaller portion of the effects of fathers' schooling was channelled through the household's economic status in 2010 than in 1986. Over the 25 years, there appeared to be a substantially increased direct effect of fathers' schooling on sons' schooling.

These results have serious implications for educational inequality within one generation and over the generations, at a certain point in time, and over time. Sons from poor households, those with unschooled fathers and those living in Sindh were least likely to experience intergenerational educational mobility. Given the low education levels in the country in 1980s, a strong association between household economic status and sons' schooling levels, and/or between the schooling levels of two generations, meant that the education system was less inclusive. It appears to have excluded the poor and those with unschooled parents, and thus increased educational inequalities. Over 25 years, there seems to have been a reduction in the effects poverty had on the schooling levels of sons over time. Albeit with some increase in the effect of the deprivation measure and of consumption levels, the substantial reduction in the wealth effect, as well as a drastic decline in the effect of landownership on sons' schooling levels, suggest a weakening of the effect of social and economic status on education levels over time. At the same time, there was an apparent strengthening of the intergenerational association of human capital over 25 years, despite the educational expansion described in Chapter 4. The increased direct effect of fathers' schooling on sons' schooling over this period (minus the effects mediated by household economic status) suggests a widening of educational inequality over time and over generations. The benefits of educational expansion over this period seemed to be accrued disproportionately by the families that already had human capital in the previous generation. In other words, relative intergenerational educational mobility increased by 2010 for those from households in which the previous generation already had attained higher levels of education.

### **Daughters' schooling (1986-2010)**

This section presents the regression estimates for the highest schooling levels attained by daughters for the years 1986 and 2010, using the same regression models as for sons.

#### *Daughters' schooling, 1986*

Table 5.9 below presents the estimates of the ordered logistic regression for the years 1986 and 2010. In 1986, fathers' schooling had a coefficient of 0.56 (which was substantially higher than for sons in the same year), implying that each higher level of schooling a father attained increased the probability of at least one daughter attaining a higher level of schooling by 1.8 times. Like sons, mothers' literacy status did not have a statistically significant effect on daughters' education. After the introduction of demographic controls (Model 3), each

additional level of fathers' schooling doubled the odds of at least one daughter attaining higher schooling levels. In contrast to the schooling of sons, the odds of schooling daughters were highest for those in Punjab. The odds of at least one daughter achieving a higher schooling level in KP were only 0.4 times of those in Punjab, and the odds were drastically lower for those in Sindh. These differences point to the varied gender norms across provinces that have varying effect on women's educational mobility.

In 1986, the economic and social power associated with landownership meant that landless daughters had significantly lower prospects for educational mobility. The probability of at least one daughter in a landowning household attaining higher levels of schooling increased by 1.84 times over those in landless households (Model 4). Model 5 controlled for other indicators of economic and social status. Like sons' schooling, consumption expenditures did not matter in determining daughters' educational mobility but durable wealth was important. Each higher wealth quintile doubled the probability of at least one daughter in a household achieving a higher level of schooling. Importantly, the gendered measure of poverty had a large negative effect on daughters' educational mobility. The odds of a daughter attaining a higher level of schooling in households with malnourished mothers were only one-third that of those with non-malnourished mothers. For daughters, a smaller proportion of fathers' educational effect (less than one-quarter) was mediated by household economic status.

Overall, in 1986, more than half of the odds of daughters' achieving a higher level of schooling could be explained by their fathers' schooling levels. These dynamics of intergenerational association of human capital provide insights into the nature of the education system and the educational inequalities experienced by the age cohorts schooled before 1986. The large positive effects of fathers' schooling level and household economic status, as well as the negative effects of mothers' malnutrition and the province of residence, point to a highly unequal landscape for daughters' schooling, as was recognised by the policy documents reported on in Chapter 4. These relationships show that daughters in poor households with unschooled fathers and malnourished mothers were less likely to be schooled or to attain higher schooling levels, and more likely to be in the 'poverty low-/no-schooling traps'. These traps were more likely to exist in Sindh than in KP or in Punjab.

**Table 5.9: Regression estimates for daughters' schooling (1986-2010)**

Variable name	1986					2010 (subsample)				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Father's schooling	0.56**	0.59**	0.65**	0.58**	0.43**	0.50**	0.55**	0.36**	0.31**	0.16
	(-0.11)	(-0.11)	(-0.12)	(-0.13)	(-0.14)	(-0.07)	(-0.07)	(-0.08)	(-0.08)	(-0.09)
Father's schooling missing	-12.23	-14.84	-7.09	-8.46	-8.59	0.95	0.97	-11.32	-11.76	-15.07
	(-787.32)	(-2,927.75)	(-653.4)	(-1,299.44)	(-950.31)	(-0.57)	(-0.62)	(-453.33)	(-444.8)	(-2,793.61)
Mother's literacy	-1.07	-0.16	-0.56	-0.62	-0.21	1.13**	1.66**	1.58**	1.50**	1.24**
	(-0.76)	(-0.77)	(-0.8)	(-0.81)	(-0.82)	(-0.31)	(-0.46)	(-0.36)	(-0.36)	(-0.37)
Mother's literacy missing						-0.55	-0.57	-1.79**	-2.33**	-2.02*
						(-0.48)	(-1.02)	(-0.65)	(-0.69)	(-0.91)
Household size			0.02	0.02	-0.02			-0.07*	-0.10**	-0.17**
			(-0.04)	(-0.04)	(-0.04)			(-0.04)	(-0.04)	(-0.04)
Household size missing								15.15	15.29	17.4
								(-1,003.30)	(-988.77)	(-6,817.52)
Province Sindh $\Psi$			-3.65**	-3.77**	-2.77*			-2.20**	-2.50**	-1.27**
			(-1.03)	(-1.03)	(-1.1)			(-0.31)	(-0.33)	(-0.4)
Province KP			-0.94**	-0.90**	-0.83*			1.47**	1.88**	1.73**
			(-0.31)	(-0.31)	(-0.36)			(-0.27)	(-0.31)	(-0.36)
Father's age			0.03*	0.03*	0.02			0.03**	0.03*	0.03*
			(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)			(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)
Father's age missing								14.9	15.6	18.63
								(-453.33)	(-444.8)	(-2,793.61)
Landownership				0.61*	0.49				1.16**	0.76*
				(-0.28)	(-0.3)				(-0.32)	(-0.34)
Landownership missing				-13.19	-11.95				-1.34**	-0.84*
				(-1,082.06)	(-739.8)				(-0.34)	(-0.37)
Father's occupation					-0.14					0.26
					(-0.27)					(-0.2)
Wealth quintile					0.65**					0.85**
					(-0.14)					(-0.13)

Wealth missing					1.77*					
					(-0.81)					
Consumption exp. quintile					-0.04				0.02	
					(-0.12)				(-0.11)	
Consumption missing					-11.14					
					(-1,432.00)					
Mother's malnutrition					-1.08*				0.67	
					(-0.45)				(-0.39)	
Mother's malnutrition missing					-0.18				-0.25	
					(-0.38)				(-0.55)	
Share of food in total expenditure					1.88				-0.02	
					(-1.25)				(-0.01)	
Product of parental schooling\$		-13.19						-0.31		
		(-848.51)						(-0.19)		
Product of parental schooling missing								0.04		
								(-1.05)		
Constant cut1	1.80**	1.82**	3.11**	2.99**	5.63**	0.44**	0.49**	0.73	0.39	1.62
	(-0.16)	(-0.16)	(-0.78)	(-0.79)	(-1.58)	(-0.13)	(-0.13)	(-0.7)	(-0.72)	(-1.28)
Constant cut2	3.07**	3.09**	4.49**	4.39**	7.15**	0.94**	0.99**	1.60*	1.29	2.65*
	(-0.22)	(-0.23)	(-0.81)	(-0.81)	(-1.6)	(-0.14)	(-0.14)	(-0.7)	(-0.72)	(-1.29)
Constant cut3	3.75**	3.78**	5.20**	5.10**	7.90**	1.18**	1.23**	2.02**	1.73*	3.16*
	(-0.28)	(-0.29)	(-0.83)	(-0.83)	(-1.62)	(-0.14)	(-0.15)	(-0.7)	(-0.72)	(-1.29)
Constant cut4	5.48**	5.51**	6.96**	6.87**	9.71**	2.31**	2.37**	3.57**	3.34**	4.98**
	(-0.6)	(-0.6)	(-0.99)	(-0.99)	(-1.71)	(-0.18)	(-0.18)	(-0.72)	(-0.73)	(-1.31)
Observations	440	440	440	440	440	428	428	428	428	428

Standard errors in parenthesis. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

\$ This variable is the product of father's schooling level and mother's literacy status. Ψ: Punjab is taken as reference category.

### *Daughters' schooling, 2010*

As demonstrated in Chapter 4, girls' education in Pakistan has been expanded tremendously, starting in the late 1980s, with large coverage in the 1990s of the rural population under the Social Action Programmes, followed by the EFA campaign that began in the new century. The extent to which this educational expansion was mediated by parental education and household economic status can be seen in the right panel of Table 5.9 above. Model 1 shows that the effect of fathers' schooling on daughters' schooling in 2010 was only slightly lower than in 1986. There was, however, a striking increase in the effect of mothers' literacy status on daughters' schooling. The mother's literacy status was associated with a greater than three times higher probability of at least one daughter attaining higher schooling levels than those with illiterate mothers. Over 25 years, parental human capital thus heavily mediated the expansion of girls' schooling.

The increased negative effect of household size on daughters' schooling in Model 3 (compared to 1986 but also compared to the positive effects on sons' schooling during both periods) point to the greater burden on young girls of home production restricting their educational prospects. Model 3 also suggested the continued educational disadvantage of daughters born in Sindh (albeit with a reduction in its magnitude) as compared to those born in Punjab. There was, however, a drastic increase in the probability of at least one daughter from households in KP attaining a higher level of schooling, which improved over 25 years from 0.4 times those in Punjab in 1986 to 4.4 times in 2010. Thus educational mobility increased for daughters in KP during this period. Landownership gained more importance in determining daughters' educational progress over the 25-year period (unlike for sons in 2010). Landowning families in 2010 were 3.2 times more likely to have more educated daughters than the landless (Model 4).

Introduction of the variables of economic status in Model 5 significantly reduced the effect of fathers' schooling on daughters' schooling in 2010. The effect of fathers' schooling was still positive but had only a 0.10 level of statistical significance. Mothers' literacy continued to be significant after all controls. While the positive effect of being born in KP remained large after controlling for economic status, the negative effects of being born in Sindh declined by nearly half, suggesting that much of the provincial difference in daughters' schooling was attributed to differences in economic status. There also was a substantial increase in the

wealth effect on daughters' schooling levels, from 0.65 in 1986 to 0.86 in 2010. Poor daughters were thus less likely to succeed educationally in 2010 than rich daughters, as was the case in 1986.

Over 25 years, both uncontrolled and controlled effects of fathers' schooling dropped from a very high level in 1986, suggesting a weakening of the paternal transmission of human capital over time, due to the significant number of daughters of unschooled or low-schooled fathers attaining schooling or reaching higher schooling levels by 2010. Over time, maternal human capital gained more significance in determining daughters' educational mobility, eventually exceeding the effects of paternal human capital. There also was an increase in the wealth effects on daughters' schooling during this period. Daughters from wealthy households had greater prospects for educational mobility, even when their fathers had attained low schooling levels, than those from poor households with educated fathers, and this effect strengthened over time. In a way, this mirrors the situation for sons in 1986. It appears that landowning and rich families school their children first than the others. It also suggests that households school their sons before their daughters.

## **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

In the context of the rise of mass schooling in Pakistan over the decades from 1980 to 2010, this chapter has explored the distribution of educational opportunities along the lines of gender, economic and social status, and parental schooling for men and women born predominantly during the 1950s and 1960s, and those born in the 1970s-1990s (Table 5.1 above). The changing patterns of intergenerational educational mobility in rural Pakistan suggest a significant expansion of educational opportunities in rural Pakistan for both sons and daughters during these 25 years; however, participation in higher levels of education is still far from all inclusive. A strong intergenerational association of education levels points to the S-shaped nature of educational expansion, where those at the top of the distribution maintained their privilege over time and generations, while those in the middle experienced upward mobility and those at the bottom remained disadvantaged. Choosing household as the unit of analysis has been instrumental in identifying the 'poverty/low-mobility traps' which contain a sizable proportion of the households lacking education over generations. Overall there was a reduction in gender differences; however, this was driven primarily by the increased participation of daughters with higher wealth status in higher levels of schooling.

The increasing gender equality in education may be driven by a shift in the gendered division of labour, including the greater participation of women in paid work than shadow work, or simply because increased assortative mating links higher education with daughters' increased prospects for social mobility through marriage.

The regression analysis has provided deeper insights into educational inequality between generations, across gender and over time. Sons and daughters from credit-constrained households, those with unschooled fathers and those living in Sindh were least likely to experience intergenerational educational mobility. The effect of economic status (which proxies not just the credit constraints but a range of other factors that influence educational outcomes—social status and networks, quality of parenting and early childhood development—as described in the conceptual model) on educational mobility has changed over 25 years, albeit differently for sons and daughters. The education system appeared to be increasingly inclusive of sons from low socioeconomic background, but this inclusivity sat alongside a strengthening of the relationship between fathers' schooling and that of sons, which is likely to perpetuate educational inequality for sons over generations. For daughters' educational mobility, both the uncontrolled and controlled effects of fathers' schooling decreased over the 25 years. The increased significance of mothers' literacy over father's schooling level in determining daughters' educational mobility suggests a shift in intra-household decision-making and a loosening of the gender norms and power relations over time. However, in contrast to the loosening of the wealth effects for sons, there was a strengthening of the wealth effects for daughters, suggesting that, as wealthier households were the first to school their sons in 1986, by 2010 they were also the first to benefit from the expanded educational opportunities for girls. Regional differences continue to shape sons' and daughters' prospects for educational mobility which points to the differentiated educational and economic opportunities and perhaps the cultural practices across provinces.

This chapter illustrated the ways in which a person's social, economic and educational origins mediate their educational success over time and generations in rural Pakistan. The next chapter will use a longitudinal design to explore the social and economic outcomes of such schooling, including the economic returns, for both sons and daughters and the implications for social and economic inequality in the long run.

## CHAPTER 6 - INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SCHOOLING: 1986-2014

In this chapter, I start my analysis of social mobility by exploring the relationship between the social *origins* and *destinations* of rural household members from 1986 to 2014. I am particularly interested in examining the extent to which the Pakistani schooling system has shaped rural households' long-term economic prospects. In Chapter 3, my analysis of official educational plans and reforms suggested that Pakistan, starting in 1947 as 'an economic wasteland' of British India, on the whole could be said to have adopted the principals of *functional inequality* on which to build the foundations of a new economic system. Mostly policymakers took for granted, at least up until the 1960s, the realities of social (especially rural) inequality, even of poverty and discrimination. Supporting a small group of economic elites certainly initially was considered a necessary condition to promote economic growth which, it was believed, would trickle down to the rest of the population. Consequently, the education system was highly selective and offered on the whole few opportunities to the population. The model of meritocracy was not generally supported by strong investment in expanding basic schooling, scholarships were few and far between. Access to education for the new nation's rural population, the poor and women remained exceptionally low for three decades after Independence, when universalising primary education was considered neither feasible nor desirable. The shift in official policy discourse to one of expanding educational access emerged only in the 1970s, when tackling social inequality and even social exclusion was recognised not just as a means but an end in itself. Economic growth had to include the distribution of economic opportunities.

From the late 1980s, educational opportunities opened up for marginalised social groups, however the uptake of formal schooling during this period was still differentiated. Keeping in mind this broad political and educational context, my starting point are the economic returns to education for households in the period from 1986 to 2014. I was particularly interested to discover from the perspective of intergenerational social mobility the extent to which the uptake of new (albeit restricted) educational opportunities over those three decades affected the distribution of economic opportunities and hence shaped prospects for social mobility.

The analysis, as I indicated in Chapters 2 and 3 places households rather than individuals at the centre of my models of analysis. Households here are considered to be collective entities that reconcile individual preference through cooperative and non-cooperative conflict and are sustained by intra-household (often patriarchal) power relations. Rural households in particular ensure their welfare through local micro-solidarities which are shaped by overlapping hierarchies of caste and kinship networks, landownership and religious identity—in other words they shape a complex politics of patronage. Educational and economic opportunities are therefore negotiated within this complex web of social relations which, in turn, shape prospects for social mobility.

Another key aspect of analytical and methodological significance in my conceptual framework is that individuals pool resources and make educational and economic decisions at the *household level*. This fact, combined with the informality of the rural economy, makes it hard to account for *individual* economic status unless it is aggregated at the household level. Also, the case for household-level aggregation of resources is strengthened by feminist perspectives that point to the often overlooked *shadow work* women undertake to facilitate economic production (c.f., Chapters 2 and 5). In Chapter 3, I argued that, in the given set of economic relations and means of economic accounting, the economic outcomes of an individual's schooling are inseparable from the input of other household members. Until we have the precise tools to separate these factors, attributing economic production to *all household members* (not just those active in the labour market but also those who do the *shadow work*) is the most appropriate analytical choice.

The household-focused conceptual model I detailed in Chapter 5 helped me understand intergenerational *educational mobility*. Extending this model now involves exploring the role that the schooling of various household members plays in advancing *social mobility*. It is essential to realise that success in the labour market is shaped primarily by education but returns to education in the rural Pakistani context are mediated by a number of other factors, including a household's ability to form and draw from social networks which embed labour markets. Modelling of the latter social interactions in the context of the secondary data I analysed is complicated, thus the empirical analysis in this chapter represents only a partial attempt to grasp this complexity. It continues into Chapter 7 where I draw from rich qualitative data to examine how schooling affects the rural social structure and how both factors shape the economic outcomes of individuals and their families.

This study has two major analytical caveats. First, evidence of intergenerational social mobility at the household level is somewhat indirect and *inter-temporal* — indicated by any, shift in household economic status between 1986 to 2014. However, this period also witnessed an intergenerational shift *within* households, as a significant proportion of the original households had been split into multiple units by 2014. Many fathers of working age in 1986 were too old to work by 2014, and the sons of 1986 were themselves fathers and heads of new households. It does not require a leap of logic to see this inter-temporal change as *inter-generational*. Second, the alternative measure I offer tracks changes in rural households' *economic status* as reflective of their position in the social order. For analytical coherence, I prefer to call this *social mobility*, since these measures of economic status also capture social hierarchy in the rural context of Pakistan, and perhaps do so better than the one the OECD countries focused on traditionally which was based on the occupational class schema.<sup>149</sup>

This chapter has six sections. I first describe the methodological and empirical strategy I used to analyse the longitudinal data before using intergenerational transition/mobility metrics to identify the absolute and relative rates of social mobility and the extent to which father's schooling in 1986 mediates mobility rates. I then examine the education of all household members and intergenerational social mobility before exploiting the potential of the Mincer wage function, to build an exploratory OLS regression model which I use to estimate the long-range economic returns in 2014 to the schooling of the 1986 household members.<sup>150</sup> In the fifth section, I consider the OLS model's susceptibility to the bias induced by households' fixed characteristics (that can simultaneously affect the dependent and independent variables), and go on to use a Fixed Effects model to predict changes in household economic status from 1986 to 2014 through changes in household members' schooling. I offer robust estimates of the role the schooling of various household members played in intergenerational social mobility in rural Pakistan over the three decades under study before summarising the findings.

---

<sup>149</sup> Throughout this chapter, I use the terms social mobility, intergenerational mobility, economic mobility and intergenerational economic/social mobility interchangeably.

<sup>150</sup> This section also explores how various forms of social structure such as landownership, caste/kinship and geography mediate these long-range returns to schooling, which are provided in detail in Annex 6.1.

## METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

### Data

This chapter again analyses the initial panel of the Pakistan Panel Survey which was conducted in four districts in three provinces, Punjab, Sindh and KP (then NWFP) as well as the follow-up Pakistan Tracking Survey which was conducted in 2012-13 and which tracked all individuals and households who remained from the original sample by 1991.<sup>151</sup> Similarly I again take households as the unit of analysis, but this time I construct five variables of interest - economic status, human capital and other household characteristics (land ownership, caste/kinship and geography (c.f. chapter 2) .

### Variables of interest

*1. Economic status:* The three key indicators of economic status used to track intergenerational social mobility – income, consumption expenditures, and wealth:

*Household income:* This measure includes income earned at the household level from all sources. This include earnings from (self-) employment, transfers such as remittances, farms, and other sources. Annual household income is converted into monthly income and then adjusted for household size with the adult-equivalent scale used by the Government of Pakistan.

*Household consumption expenditures:* All food and non-food consumption expenditures are aggregated at the household level and then adjusted for household size using the official adult-equivalent scale to determine monthly per-capita income.

*Household wealth:* This measure uses Principal Component Analysis to produce an asset/wealth index by aggregating all household durable assets and indicators of living conditions.<sup>152</sup>

---

<sup>151</sup> The 1986 round had 928 households and 8,009 individuals, 4,248 males and 3,761 females of all ages. In 2013-14, IFPRI revisited the original sample that was retained until 1991 and tracked all the individuals in this sample, including those who stayed in their original households or had migrated and become part of the new households. The new sample thus expanded into 2,481 households in 2013-14. These new households included those split by the expansion of household size and formation of new families due to marriages of male and female members from the original households. The individual sample in 2014 was 15,629, with 51 percent males (7,969 males) and 49 percent (7,660) females.

<sup>152</sup> In 2014, this list consisted of following household assets: TV/VCR, radio/phonograph/cassette, bicycle/motorcycle, sewing machine/washing machine, refrigerator/cooler, jewellery/ornaments, watches/camera, guns, house in village, house/building in other areas, inventory for shops/crafts, air conditioner/air cooler, armoire/cabinet, microwave oven, CD player, computer, mobile phone, land phone,

The nominal values of consumption expenditures and income were adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (World Bank 2018), with 2000 as the base year. The analysis in this chapter is thus based on real income and real consumption expenditures. Keeping in view the insights Solon (2004) offered for using longer term measures of economic status to tackle temporary fluctuations, the measures of both income and consumption used in this analysis are based on the average values for five years (1986-91). Natural log was taken for the real per-capita income and consumption expenditures for the analysis in this chapter.

**2. Household characteristics:** Two key variables were constructed to control for household demographic characteristics:

- I. *Household size:* Adult-equivalent household size considered each adult individual as 1 and those below 18 as 0.8 (this is Pakistan's official scale), aggregating at the household level.
- II. *Dependency ratio:* This variable captured the presence of an economically inactive population (below 15 or above 60) as a ratio of those of working age (15-60).

**3. Human capital:** Household human capital is central to the analysis presented in this chapter. Several measures were constructed to transform individual-level information at the household level which is the unit of analysis:

- I. *Private investments in education:* This variable is constructed using the ratio of household spending to educate its members out of total household expenditures at the time of the survey. This ratio is then converted into a percentage. It is a measure relative to household wealth and indicates the value placed on education.<sup>153</sup> Higher spending reflects a greater probability of using private over public-sector education.
- II. *Human capital of household members:* The years of schooling of household members are transformed into five categories: no schooling (0-4 years of schooling); primary schooling (5-7 years); middle schooling (8-9 years); secondary schooling (10-11 years); above secondary (12 years and more). The following indicators are constructed for each household using these educational categories:

Father's (household head) schooling

---

electric phone. The list of assets covered in the 1986-91 survey rounds was relative smaller and included: TV/VCR, radio/cassette player, bicycle/motorcycle, vehicle, sewing machine/washing machine, fridge/cooler, jewellery, watches/camera, guns, house in village, house/building outside village, and inventory for shops/crafts.  
<sup>153</sup> It is important to note that a rich household spending 5% of its total expenditures on education and a poor household spending 5% on education does not indicate spending of equal resources in real absolute terms, although they do reflect a somewhat relative significance of education in household spending.

Mother's (wife of household head) schooling

For both males and females above 16 (other than father and mother) the following separate variables were constructed:

No. of unschooled adults in the household

No. of primary schooled adults in the household

No. of middle schooled adults in the household

No. of secondary schooled adults in the household

No. of above secondary schooled adults in the household

While the analysis is focused on intergenerational social mobility and the households consist of parents and their sons and daughters, there also are extended family units that may include other members, such as parents, siblings, nephews/nieces and daughters-in-law of the household head. These members must be included in the analysis when aggregating income, assets and consumption expenditures at the household level.

**4. Landownership:** Landownership is a significant measure of social and economic status because of its relevance to the rural social structure, as detailed in Chapter 2. Landless households are particularly differently positioned in the rural landscape. A dummy variable is constructed whether a household owns two acres of land or less. Those owning less than two acres are considered landless and those owning more as landowners.

**5. Caste identity:** Caste/kinship is an important component of Pakistan's rural social structure which, together with other forms of (dis)advantage, shapes resources and opportunities in and through education. Caste hierarchy in Pakistan is highly localized, making it difficult to develop a universal caste schema.<sup>154</sup> To capture the effects this social hierarchy has on intergenerational mobility, I constructed a simplified measure which divides the sample into two groups, based on whether or not a household belongs to the village's majority caste group. Although those from the majority group are not always the village elites economically and socially, they benefitted from the dense social networks which can affect their prospects for social mobility in diverse ways. In any case, the key assumption here is that the two caste groups have different social and economic resources which may differentiate the role schooling can play in their intergenerational social mobility.

---

<sup>154</sup> A particular caste/kinship may be at the top of the hierarchy in one context and at the bottom in another. This makes it difficult to operationalize caste hierarchies for a statistical analysis.

**6. Geography:** Significant social, educational and economic inequalities are evident within the geography of multidimensional poverty in Pakistan (Naveed et al. 2016) and are likely to stratify prospects for social mobility. A variable for the province of residence helps assess whether prospects for social mobility and returns to education vary geographically.

My analysis of these data draws on the three methods I introduced in Chapter 3) but which I now describe in detail in this chapter – within the relevant section, along with the relevant statistical results. These are:


- Intergenerational transition/mobility metrics

- An OLS regression model to assess how household human capital in 1986 predicted household economic status in 2014

- A Fixed Effects model to measure the effect of changes in the human capital of various household members had on changes in household economic status from 1986 to 2014.

Figure 6.1 presents a visual summary of the empirical strategy I employed for the analysis of education and social mobility.

**Figure 6.1: Strategy for the quantitative empirical analysis**



Summary statistics for the variables included in the analysis are presented in Table 6.1.

**Table 6.1: Summary statistics of key variables: 1986-2014**

Variables	1986					2013-14				
	Obs.	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Obs.	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Household members	658	8.56	4.07	2	31	2256	6.93	3.94	1	34
Adult equivalent household size	658	7.74	3.60	2	27.4	2256	6.26	3.50	1	31
Dependency ratio	658	1.00	0.77	0	4.5	2256	1.12	0.93	0	8
Per-capita monthly consumption expenditure	657	966.8	626.6	94.6	5319.9	2254	3128.1	1656.1	327.6	46844
Per-capita monthly income	658	3297.0	3209.6	61.4	55159.8	2253	5591.2	19882.5	-9689.8	634914
Private educational investment	657	1.5	2.3	0.0	18.94	2252	1.7	2.2	0.0	18.94
Score of wealth index	658	0.04	1.69	-3.23	7.17	2252	0.0	2.2	-3.8	16.85
Log of per-capita consumption expenditure	657	6.72	0.55	4.55	8.58	2254	7.97	0.37	5.8	10.75
Log of per-capita monthly income	658	7.89	0.60	4.12	10.92	2231	8.13	0.89	0.96	13.36
Schooling level of household head	658	0.77	1.19	0	4	2256	1.43	1.53	0	4
Schooling level of mother	658	0.07	0.38	0	4	2256	0.51	1.03	0	4
No. of unschooled males in household	658	0.70	1.05	0	8	2256	0.28	0.76	0	8
No. of primary schooled males in household	658	0.24	0.54	0	3	2256	0.17	0.47	0	4
No. of middle schooled males in household	658	0.19	0.47	0	3	2256	0.15	0.42	0	3
N. of secondary schooled males in household	658	0.31	0.69	0	4	2256	0.21	0.51	0	4
No. of above-secondary schooled males in household	658	0.12	0.50	0	5	2256	0.19	0.55	0	5
No. of unschooled females in household	658	1.12	1.19	0	7	2256	0.60	0.98	0	8
No. of primary schooled females in household	658	0.12	0.38	0	3	2256	0.15	0.44	0	4
No. of middle schooled females in household	658	0.04	0.22	0	2	2256	0.10	0.33	0	3
No. of secondary schooled females in household	658	0.03	0.19	0	3	2256	0.11	0.36	0	3
No. of above secondary schooled females in household	658	0.01	0.09	0	1	2256	0.10	0.39	0	6
Majority caste	659	0.27	0.44	0	1	2256	0.25	0.43	0	1
Landless	659	0.52	0.50	0	1	2256	0.55	0.50	0	1

## HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STATUS: INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSITION/MOBILITY METRICS<sup>155</sup>

The first of my three analyses of the survey data tracks changes over time in terms of household economic status. By plotting the quintiles of household economic status in 1986 (average of 1986-91) against that in 2014, transition metrics illustrate the relationship between *origins* and *destinations*.<sup>156</sup> The households that maintain their position over time are *immobile*, and those that change their quintile are *mobile*. The latter category is decomposed into the *upwardly mobile* (those who moved up from their quintile of origin) and the *downwardly mobile* (those who slipped down from their quintile of origin). This section presents the transition metrics for consumption expenditures, income and wealth. The role of education in shaping household trajectories for social mobility is explored by dividing the sample into two groups: those with unschooled fathers in 1986 and those with schooled fathers (to primary or above) in 1986. The patterns of intergenerational mobility are contrasted for the two groups over the three measures of economic status.

The overall high rate of upward social mobility is evident in Table 6.2 on measures of consumption expenditure and income. The top panel presents the marginal distribution of consumption quintiles for households at two time periods. The columns represent consumption quintiles for 2014 and rows for 1986. The shaded diagonal cells report the proportion of households staying within their quintile of origin—those who are *immobile*. The right side of the top panel provides summary measures of the metrics suggesting the *absolute immobility ratio* (sum of values in all diagonal cells divided by total values in all cells) to be 23.5%. The off-diagonal cells suggest that up to 76.5% households moved above or below their original position during this period. Out of these, slightly more than one-third of households experienced *downward mobility*. Significantly, more than 42% of households experienced *upward mobility*, a high ratio that is comparable to that of many OECD countries.<sup>157</sup>

---

<sup>155</sup> Transition metrics are commonly used to measure the extent of mobility for a given population across different time points/generations.

<sup>156</sup> Households in the 1<sup>st</sup> quintile are the poorest and those in the 5<sup>th</sup> quintile are the richest.

<sup>157</sup> Note that studies estimating intergenerational social mobility in the OECD countries use individuals rather than households as the unit of analysis.

This high ratio of absolute mobility was differentiated across the positions of origin. In an ideal scenario of households having an equal chance of mobility regardless of their point of origin, each cell in the metrics should have 20% of households, which is not the case here. While households from all quintiles of origin experienced upward mobility, only about one-third of those originating in the two poorest quintiles reached the two richest quintiles. In contrast, around half of the households originating in the two richest quintiles in 1986 retained their advantaged in 2014.

Household income mobility is presented in the central panel of Table 6.2. The absolute mobility ratio on income is 74.5% which is close to that of consumption expenditures. However, *absolute upward mobility* has a rate that is five percentage points lower, with a corresponding higher rate of *downward mobility* in income than consumption. The marginal distribution of income status suggests that a lower proportion of those originating in the bottom three quintiles reached the top two quintiles, as the top two quintiles in 2014 remained disproportionately occupied by those who originated in these quintiles.

Wealth mobility was lower during this period than consumption and income mobility, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 6.2. Fewer than 70% of households experienced a change from their position of origin. Strikingly, only 28.6% experienced upward mobility and 40% of households experienced downward wealth mobility. The relative mobility rates also show low mobility for those from the lower quintiles of origin. The likelihood of remaining in the poorest two quintiles was drastically higher for those who originated there. On the other end of the spectrum, the odds of remaining in the top two quintiles were higher for those who originated there.

These mobility metrics provide a broad overview of the transition in household economic status that has taken place over last three decades. Shifting economic policies seem to have shifted the relative economic status of a high proportion of households, some moving upward and others falling downward. These estimates leave us questioning the extent to which the education of household members in 1986 differentiated patterns of intergenerational social mobility. By dividing the sample into households with unschooled heads in 1986 and those with some level of schooling (completed primary and above), the subsequent section attempts to determine the role schooling played in intergenerational social mobility.

**Table 6.2: Intergenerational mobility metrics: 1986-2014**

Household economic status in 1986 (Quintile)	Household economic status in 2014 (Quintile) – [% (No.)]						Absolute rates of mobility (ratio)	
	1	2	3	4	5	Total		
	Per-capita monthly consumption expenditure							
1	27.2 (118)	22.1 (96)	21.2 (92)	16.8 (73)	12.7 (55)	100 (434)	Immobility ratio	0.235
2	21.9 (127)	19.5 (113)	20.2 (117)	19.3 (112)	19.0 (110)	100 (579)	Mobility ratio	0.765
3	18.2 (99)	22.8 (124)	21.0 (114)	19.7 (107)	18.2 (99)	100 (543)	Upward mobility	0.427
4	15.2 (64)	18.0 (76)	19.2 (81)	23.7 (100)	23.9 (101)	100 (422)	Downward mobility	0.338
5	15.9 (44)	14.8 (41)	17.0 (47)	21.3 (59)	31.1 (86)	100 (277)		
<b>Total</b>	20.0 (452)	20.0 (450)	20.0 (451)	20.0 (451)	20.0 (451)	100 (2,255)		
	Per-capita monthly income							
1	25.6 (107)	24.6 (103)	21.5 (90)	15.8 (66)	12.4 (52)	100 (418)	Immobility ratio	0.255
2	21.8 (98)	20.2 (91)	22.4 (101)	20.4 (92)	15.1 (68)	100 (450)	Mobility ratio	0.745
3	23.2 (117)	21.0 (106)	23.2 (117)	17.5 (88)	15.1 (76)	100 (504)	Upward mobility	0.372
4	16.6 (74)	19.3 (86)	17.3 (77)	23.8 (106)	22.9 (102)	100 (445)	Downward mobility	0.374
5	12.6 (55)	14.6 (64)	14.8 (65)	23.1(101)	34.9 (153)	100 (438)		
<b>Total</b>	20.0 (451)	20.0 (450)	20.0 (450)	20.1 (453)	20.0 (451)	100 (2,255)		
	Household wealth							
1	41.4 (135)	22.4 (73)	20.3 (66)	8.9 (29)	7.1 (23)	100 (326)	Immobility ratio	0.31
2	30.8 (122)	28.0 (111)	18.7 (74)	15.4 (61)	7.1 (28)	100 (396)	Mobility ratio	0.69
3	21.6 (113)	22.9 (120)	21.6 (113)	19.7 (103)	14.3 (75)	100 (524)	Upward mobility	0.286
4	9.2 (44)	17.5 (84)	25.0 (120)	26.6 (128)	21.8 (105)	100 (481)	Downward mobility	0.401
5	7.1 (36)	11.9 (60)	15.7 (79)	23.2 (117)	42.1 (212)	100 (504)		
<b>Total</b>	20.2 (450)	20.1 (448)	20.3 (452)	19.6 (438)	19.9 (443)	100 (2,231)		

## **PARENTAL SCHOOLING AND INTERGENERATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SOCIAL MOBILITY**

To answer the key question, the extent to which schooling mediates the prospects for social mobility, in Table 6.3 I present a broad picture of the long-term effects of parental schooling by comparing patterns of intergenerational mobility between households that had unschooled fathers (left panel) and those whose fathers were schooled to the primary level or above (right panel) in 1986.<sup>158</sup> The findings suggest that intergenerational social mobility from 1986 to 2014 was strongly stratified by father's schooling in 1986 across all three measures of economic status. Amongst those in the poorest quintiles in 1986, for example, father's schooling made a clear difference. A higher proportion of those from the poorest quintile remained in the poorest two quintiles if the father was unschooled than of those with a schooled father. In contrast, the probability of a household in the bottom quintile in 1986 reaching the richest two quintiles in 2014 was significantly higher if the father was schooled in 1986. Those from the richest quintiles with schooled fathers had lower downward mobility than those with unschooled fathers. Across all measures, nearly two-thirds of those from the richest quintile in 1986 were in the richest two quintiles in 2014, whereas this proportion was significantly lower for the households with unschooled fathers.

Overall, for any given position of origin and for all the measures of economic status, for the households with unschooled fathers in 1986, the odds of being in the poorest two quintiles were higher and the odds of being in the poorest two quintiles were lower than for households with schooled fathers in 1986. This mere fact, even when plotted against the reduced form of paternal human capital, points to the significance of human capital in intergenerational social mobility. A detailed analysis of various levels of parental schooling and that of other family members is likely to provide a deeper understanding of the ways human capital in the household and over generations has impacted intergenerational social mobility in rural Pakistan over the three decades in question. The subsequent section therefore attempts to uncover these dynamics, using ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis.

---

<sup>158</sup> This section sets the stage for examining the long-term social mobility gains from schooling. Evidence similar to that in Table 6.3 could be presented for mother's schooling levels. However, doing so would be repetitive, as the effect of the schooling of both father and mother, and other family members, on changes in household economic status from 1986 to 2014 (while controlling for other effects) are analysed in detail in the next two sections.

**Table 6.3: Intergenerational social mobility from 1986 to 2014 and father’s schooling status in 1986**

Economic status in 1986	Economic Status in 2014 - [% (No.)]											
	Households with unschooled fathers in 1986						Households with fathers schooled to the primary level or above					
	Quintile 1	Quintile 2	Quintile 3	Quintile 4	Quintile 5	Total	Quintile 1	Quintile 2	Quintile 3	Quintile 4	Quintile 5	Total
<b>Monthly per-capita consumption expenditures</b>												
<b>Quintile 1</b>	30.47 (85)	21.51 (60)	22.94 (64)	13.98 (39)	11.11 (31)	100 (279)	20.92 (32)	23.53 (36)	18.3 (28)	21.57 (33)	15.69 (24)	100 (153)
<b>Quintile 2</b>	23.68 (94)	19.4 (77)	20.65 (82)	20.15 (80)	16.12 (64)	100 (397)	17.68 (32)	19.89 (36)	19.34 (35)	17.68 (32)	25.41 (46)	100 (181)
<b>Quintile 3</b>	18.6 (64)	24.42 (84)	26.74 (92)	19.48 (67)	10.76 (37)	100 (344)	17.33 (35)	19.8 (40)	11.39 (23)	21.29 (43)	30.2 (61)	100 (202)
<b>Quintile 4</b>	16.6 (42)	20.95 (53)	22.53 (57)	22.13 (56)	17.79 (45)	100 (253)	13.25 (22)	13.86 (23)	13.86 (23)	25.3 (42)	33.73 (56)	100 (166)
<b>Quintile 5</b>	23.19 (32)	22.46 (31)	15.94 (22)	21.01 (29)	17.39 (24)	100 (238)	8.63 (12)	7.19 (10)	17.99 (25)	21.58 (30)	44.6 (62)	100 (139)
<b>Total</b>	22.47 (317)	21.62 (305)	22.47 (317)	19.21 (271)	14.25 (201)	100 (1,411)	15.81 (133)	17.24 (145)	15.93 (134)	21.4 (180)	29.61 (249)	100 (841)
<b>Monthly per-capita income</b>												
<b>Quintile 1</b>	22.19 (67)	23.84 (72)	22.19 (67)	16.56 (50)	15.23 (46)	100 (332)	28.42 (27)	18.95 (18)	29.47 (28)	15.79 (15)	7.37 (7)	100 (95)
<b>Quintile 2</b>	26.03 (82)	23.81 (75)	20.95 (66)	17.14 (54)	12.06 (38)	100 (315)	18.95 (29)	18.95 (29)	22.88 (35)	24.84 (38)	14.38 (22)	100 (153)
<b>Quintile 3</b>	22.22 (68)	20.59 (63)	21.9 (67)	20.92 (64)	14.38 (44)	100 (306)	17.12 (25)	21.92 (32)	16.44 (24)	19.86 (29)	24.66 (36)	100 (146)
<b>Quintile 4</b>	22.03 (65)	17.97 (53)	22.37 (66)	19.32 (57)	18.31 (54)	100 (295)	13.99 (27)	21.76 (42)	14.51 (28)	21.76 (42)	27.98 (54)	100 (193)
<b>Quintile 5</b>	18.65 (36)	18.65 (36)	18.65 (36)	21.24 (41)	22.8 (44)	100 (193)	9.41 (24)	12.16 (31)	13.33 (34)	23.53 (60)	41.57 (106)	100 (255)
<b>Total</b>	22.54 (318)	21.19 (299)	21.4 (302)	18.85 (266)	16.02 (226)	100 (1,400)	15.68 (132)	18.05 (152)	17.7 (149)	21.85 (184)	26.72 (225)	100 (842)
<b>Household wealth</b>												
<b>Quintile 1</b>	44.32 (121)	22.34 (61)	19.41 (53)	8.06 (22)	5.86 (16)	100 (273)	26.42 (14)	22.64 (12)	24.53 (13)	13.21 (7)	13.21 (7)	100 (53)
<b>Quintile 2</b>	30.24 (75)	26.61 (66)	20.16 (50)	14.92 (37)	8.06 (20)	100 (248)	31.37 (48)	28.76 (44)	15.03 (23)	17.65 (27)	7.19 (11)	100 (153)
<b>Quintile 3</b>	22.67 (85)	22.4 (84)	23.47 (88)	18.4 (69)	13.07 (49)	100 (375)	18.3 (28)	24.84 (38)	16.99 (26)	22.88 (35)	16.99 (26)	100 (153)
<b>Quintile 4</b>	9.46 (28)	17.57 (52)	25.68 (76)	26.35 (78)	20.95 (62)	100 (296)	7.94 (15)	16.93 (32)	23.28 (44)	28.57 (54)	23.28 (44)	100 (189)
<b>Quintile 5</b>	7.76 (17)	16.44 (36)	17.35 (38)	21.46 (47)	36.99 (81)	100 (219)	7.14 (21)	7.82 (23)	14.29 (42)	24.49 (72)	46.26 (136)	100 (294)
<b>Total</b>	23.1 (326)	21.19 (299)	21.62 (305)	17.93 (253)	16.16 (228)	100 (1,411)	14.96 (126)	17.7 (149)	17.58 (148)	23.16 (195)	26.6 (224)	100 (842)

## RETURNS TO HUMAN CAPITAL AND INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY: AN EXPLORATORY OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS

In this section, I adopt the Mincer wage equation (Mincer 1958) to explore patterns of association between household human capital and economic mobility over three decades. It is assumed here that education provides individuals with skills that increase their productivity in the labour market if household members' earnings/incomes are treated as a function of schooling and labour market experiences. An increase in the household education level over time is therefore expected to increase its economic status. Unlike the traditional use of the Mincer equation that estimates the current economic returns to the current level of human capital, the lagged model I developed estimates the long-range future economic returns to household human capital in an earlier period so as to capture the role schooling plays in social mobility. The OLS regression model I developed is formulated in equation (1) which shows that a household's economic status  $\overline{Y}_t$  in time period  $t$  and the stock of (aggregate) human capital of its members in time period  $t$ ,  $\sum_{i=0}^n H_{i,t}$  jointly determine its economic status in the period  $t+1$ , i.e.,  $\overline{Y}_{t+1}$ .

$$\overline{Y}_{t+1} = f(g(\overline{Y}_t, \sum_{i=0}^n H_{i,t})) \quad (1)$$

One of the potential pathways by which both economic status and human capital in time period  $t$  determine the economic status in period  $t+1$  is through human capital levels in the period  $t+1$ ,  $\overline{H}_{t+1}$ .

$$\overline{H}_{t+1} = f(g(\overline{Y}_t, \sum_{i=0}^n H_{i,t})) \quad (2)$$

Chapter 5 examined household human capital levels in two time periods,  $\overline{H}_t$  and  $\overline{H}_{t+1}$ , and reported a high but imperfect intergenerational association with human capital which was increasing over time. If one assumes the inter-temporal transmission of human capital as the only pathway by which human capital in period  $t$  determines economic status in period  $t+1$ , equation (1) could be simply reduced to:

$$\overline{Y}_{t+1} = f(g(\overline{Y}_t, \sum_{i=0}^n H_{i,t+1})) \quad (3)$$

However, the pathways by which household human capital in period  $t$  influences its economic status in period  $t+1$  can be diverse and beyond the human capital alone in period  $t+1$ . It may well affect values, aspirations, social networks and various other social and economic status-enhancing characteristics. Regressing economic status in period  $t+1$  on household human capital in period  $t$  captures the effects human capital in one generation has on its economic status in the other by all possible pathways, including the intergenerational transmission of human capital. Not including human capital in period  $t+1$  amongst the determinants of economic status in  $t+1$  also addresses the potential reverse causality in the sense that richer households in period  $t+1$  may be able to afford more education in this period. In effect, this OLS model explains that the levels of economic status in 2014 are conditional on economic status and human capital at the time of origin  $t$  (1986).

Human capital is such a broad concept that the level of schooling used here is only a proxy measure. As suggested in Chapter 4, Pakistan's stratified education system implies that the content and form of learning are often differentiated by social status. The increasing privatisation of education may imply differential labour market rewards over and above the level of schooling achieved, with greater value placed on private schooling than public. With the given data constraints, I partially captured such effects by including in the model the share of private spending on education out of total household consumption expenditures.<sup>159</sup>

I argued in Chapter 2 that the life chances of individuals in rural Pakistan are shaped by micro-local solidarities that reflect the rural social structure. Labour markets, wherein human capital seeks economic returns, are embedded in such social structures. Function  $g$  in the equation (1) captures the effect of these factors on all variables in the model; economic status in period  $t$ , human capital in periods  $t$  and  $t+1$  and their association with household economic status in time period  $t+1$ . A direct implication of considering function  $g$  as a set of *conversion factors* is that, instead of using these factors as additional independent variables in the regression model, I divide the sample according to the characteristics of  $g$  and run separate regressions for the subsamples (equivalent to interactions). The key assumption is

---

<sup>159</sup> This is a relative measure; a rich household spending 5% of its total consumption expenditures on education obviously reflects different absolute spending than a poor household spending a similar percentage. At the same time, it approximates the relative value the household placed on schooling. In that poor households spend more of their total expenditures on food than on schooling than rich households, this measure also captures the impact of economic status on a household's capacity to invest in education and its long-term impact on economic returns.

that all regression coefficients vary between subsamples based on these variables.<sup>160</sup> For example, landless households are expected to have different long-range returns than landowners to the schooling of household members because of the effects of landownership. The detailed analysis of these factors is provided in annex 6.1.

The complete regression model also needs to control for household demographics, such as household size and dependency ratio (proportion of dependent members out of total household below age 16 and above 60), and therefore can be presented as:

$$\overline{Y_{t+1}} = \alpha + \alpha_1(S_{t+1}) + \alpha_2(D_{t+1}) + \beta(Y_t) + \gamma(E_t) + \delta i(\sum_{i=0}^n H_{i,t}) + \mu \quad (4)$$

Where

$\overline{Y_{t+1}}$  = household's economic status in 2014

$\overline{Y_t}$  = household's economic status in 1986 (average of 1986-91)

$\overline{S_{t+1}}$  = adult equivalent household size in 2014

$\overline{D_{t+1}}$  = dependency ration in 2014

$\overline{E_t}$  = Private educational investment in 1986 (educational spending as ratio of total household consumption expenditure)

$\sum_{i=0}^n H_{i,t}$  = human capital of the household with the following variables:

Father's schooling (schooling level of household head) in 1986

Mother's schooling (schooling level of wife of household head) in 1986

Number of unschooled males in the household in 1986

Number of primary schooled males in the household in 1986

Number of middle schooled males in the household in 1986

Number of secondary schooled males in the household in 1986

Number of above secondary schooled males in the household in 1986

Number of unschooled females in the household in 1986

Number of primary schooled females in the household in 1986

Number of middle schooled females in the household in 1986

Number of secondary schooled females in the household in 1986

Number of above secondary schooled females in the household in 1986

$\overline{\mu}$  = cumulative effect of the unexplained factors/error terms.

---

<sup>160</sup> An alternative approach that would not be so easy to present and interpret would have been full interactions of all variables.

Given the multidimensional approach I adopt to measure social mobility in rural Pakistan (see Chapter 3), the analysis offered here is based on three indicators of economic status as dependent variables—household consumption, household income and household wealth. Additionally, as fewer than 700 households in 1986 had split into 2,252 households by 2014, the original households are repeated each time they are matched with their multiple split households. To control for the bias resulting from these repetitions, standard errors from the regression models were clustered at the initial household level.

In the remainder of this section, I use a step-wise approach to build the OLS model and explain changes in the patterns of association resulting from the addition to the model of various covariates. The results of the OLS analysis are discussed separately for each of the three measures of household economic status.

### **The OLS model for household per-capita consumption expenditures**

Table 6.4 presents the OLS estimates, with the log of per-capita consumption expenditures in 2014 as the dependent variable. Model 1 estimates intergenerational consumption elasticity by regressing the dependent variable on the log of per-capita consumption expenditures in 1986. As a measure of the *degree of persistence*, it suggests a low level of overtime correlation (13%) in household consumption between 1986 and 2014. Model 2 controls for the household size and dependency ratio in 2014. Each added adult-equivalent member to a household in 2014 resulted in a 3% reduction in consumption, whereas a unit addition in the dependency ratio led to a reduction of 7% in consumption. Small current household size and a high proportion of adult members (age 16-60) were associated with higher social mobility, and vice versa.

Model 3 looks at the long-term returns to private educational investments made in 1986 and suggests that those spending a higher share of their resources on schooling benefitted in the long run.<sup>161</sup> A one percentage point increase in the share of educational spending (out of total consumption expenditures) in 1986 was associated with a 3% increase in total consumption expenditures in 2014. After controlling for demographic characteristics and previous educational investments, the correlation between consumption expenditures over time is 9%,

---

<sup>161</sup> The value of this variable ranges from 0 to 100.

which is robust to the inclusion of other variables in the subsequent models and low compared to the intergenerational transmission of individual income in the OECD countries.

**Table 6.4: OLS for log consumption expenditures in 2014**

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log consumption 1986	0.13** (0.02)	0.12** (0.02)	0.09** (0.02)	0.08** (0.02)	0.09** (0.02)	0.09** (0.02)
Adult eq. household size 2014		-0.03** (0.00)	-0.03** (0.00)	-0.03** (0.00)	-0.03** (0.00)	-0.03** (0.00)
Dependency ratio 2014		-0.07** (0.01)	-0.06** (0.01)	-0.06** (0.01)	-0.05** (0.01)	-0.05** (0.01)
Private educational investment 1986			0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Father's schooling 1986				0.04** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
Mother's schooling 1986				0.06* (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
No. of males $\Phi$ unschooled 1986					0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
No. of males primary schooled 1986					-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
No. of males middle schooled 1986					0.05** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
No. of males secondary schooled 1986					0.06** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
No. of males above secondary sch. 1986					0.06** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
No. of females unschooled 1986						0.02** (0.01)
No. of females primary schooled 1986						0.06* (0.03)
No. of females middle schooled 1986						0.07** (0.03)
No. of females secondary schooled 1986						0.11 (0.07)
No. of females above secondary 1986						0.10 (0.06)
Constant	7.08** (0.14)	7.43** (0.13)	7.56** (0.13)	7.62** (0.12)	7.51** (0.12)	7.47** (0.12)
Observations	2,252	2,252	2,252	2,252	2,252	2,252
R-squared	0.04	0.18	0.22	0.24	0.27	0.28

Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

$\Phi$ : This set of variables refers to the absolute number of males/females in the household with each level of education.

Model 4 adds parental human capital in 1986 to Model 3. Each additional level of father's schooling in 1986 was associated with a 4% increase in consumption in 2014, and that of the mother with a 6% increase. Higher levels of parental schooling in 1986 were thus associated with higher odds of intergenerational mobility. Model 5 adds the human capital of (adult) males in the family in 1986 as the number of males schooled to each educational level. The effect of unschooled and primary schooled males in the household in 1986 on 2014 consumption levels was non-significant. Each additional middle schooled male in 1986 was associated with a 5% increase in consumption, with secondary and schooling and above associated with a 6% increase in household consumption in 2014. Thus, there were higher long-range returns to the higher schooling of male household members.

Model 6 introduces the human capital of women in the household in 1986. Higher long-term economic returns were associated with the presence of women schooled to higher levels in 1986. Each primary schooled woman in the household in 1986 was associated with a 6% higher level and middle schooled with a 7% higher level of per-capita consumption in 2014; this compares to a 2% increase in per-capita consumption for an additional unschooled woman in the household. The coefficient of females schooled to the secondary level or above was even higher but statistically non-significant, probably due to the small sample.<sup>162</sup>

Households with more women schooled to the primary or middle school level in 1986 had higher per-capita consumption in 2014 than those with unschooled women. The R-square value of 0.28 suggests that more than one-quarter of the variation in consumption expenditures in 2014 is explained by the human capital and consumption levels of the household in 1986 and other control variables in the model.

### **The OLS model for household per-capita income**

Although inter-related per-capita income captures a different dimension of economic status than consumption expenditures, it is widely used in the study of intergenerational mobility. Table 6.5 reports the OLS estimates with log per-capita household income in 2014 as the dependent variable. Model 1 estimates intergenerational income elasticity (as measured by the

---

<sup>162</sup> Given more than 80% households did not have any female schooled primary or above levels, the returns to higher schooling of female remain insignificant.

correlation between household income in 1986 and 2014) of 0.32.<sup>163</sup> Model 2 shows that each unit increase in the dependency ratio in 2014 was associated with a 21% reduction in household income.

**Table 6.5: OLS for log of per-capita income in 2014**

Independent variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Long income 1986	0.32** (0.06)	0.32** (0.05)	0.26** (0.05)	0.22** (0.05)	0.20** (0.05)	0.19** (0.05)
Adult eq. household size 2014		-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Dependency ratio 2014		-0.21** (0.02)	-0.20** (0.02)	-0.19** (0.02)	-0.18** (0.02)	-0.17** (0.02)
Private educational investment 1986			0.07** (0.01)	0.06** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Father's schooling 1986				0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)
Mother's schooling 1986				0.08 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)
No. of malesΦ unschooled 1986					-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
No. of males primary schooled 1986					-0.07 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.04)
No. of males middle schooled 1986					0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
No. of males secondary schooled 1986					0.12** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)
No. of males above secondary sch. 1986					0.13** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)
No. of females unschooled 1986						0.01 (0.02)
No. of females primary schooled 1986						0.10 (0.07)
No. of females middle schooled 1986						0.19 (0.10)
No. of females secondary schooled 1986						0.39** (0.12)
No. of females above secondary 1986						0.10 (0.19)
Constant	5.61** (0.46)	6.04** (0.42)	6.39** (0.40)	6.65** (0.40)	6.78** (0.38)	6.80** (0.36)
Observations	2,231	2,231	2,230	2,230	2,230	2,230
R-squared	0.04	0.11	0.14	0.15	0.17	0.18

Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\* p<0.01, \*p<0.05

Φ: This set of variables refers to the absolute number of males/females in the household with each level of education.

<sup>163</sup> This is somewhat similar to the individual-level intergenerational elasticity of income in the OECD countries.

Model 3 shows high returns to private investments in household members' schooling in 1986. A one percentage point increase in the share of educational expenditure out of total household consumption expenditures in 1986 was associated with a 7% increase in household income in 2014. Model 4 reports a 7% increase in household income level in 2014 which is associated with each additional level of father's schooling in 1986. The long-range returns to mother's schooling were equally high but statistically non-significant. After introducing parental human capital, the coefficient on household income in 1986 dropped from 0.32 to 0.26 in Model 3, and to 0.19 in the final model, suggesting that education-related factors explained more than one-third of the *degree of persistence* (over-time correlation) in household income.

Model 5 shows that the presence of unschooled and primary schooled male members in 1986 had a negative effect on household income in 2014, while middle schooled males had a positive but statistically non-significant effect. In contrast, each male household member with secondary schooling in 1986 was associated with a 12% higher income level in 2014. Males with above secondary schooling in 1986 were associated with a 13% higher level of per-capita income in 2014. Model 6 introduces the human capital of female household members in 1986. These returns increase linearly up to the secondary level but are very high and statistically significant only for the secondary level. The presence of one female member in the household with secondary schooling in 1986 was associated with a 39% higher per-capita income in 2014.

As in the case of consumption expenditures, household human capital played a significant role in mediating the intergenerational mobility of household income. There was an apparent high penalty for no/low schooling and high rewards for the secondary schooling and above of male and of female members schooled above the secondary level, which suggests that education strongly mediated intergenerational mobility from 1986 to 2014. The poor and those lacking education in 1986 were clearly worse off in terms of household per-capita income in 2014.

### **The OLS model for household wealth**

Unlike the absolute measures of income and consumption expenditures, household wealth is a relative measure, in that principal component analysis is used to construct the asset index by taking into account the distribution of assets across the entire sample, generating z-scores.

Measured on the index of *durable assets*, household wealth fluctuates less over time than other measures of economic status which is evident from Table 6.6, that presents the OLS estimates using household wealth index as the dependent variable. Household wealth had a high *degree of persistence* over generation/over time correlation, with intergenerational elasticity as high as 0.60. Interestingly, household wealth status in 2014 was strongly and positively associated with household size in 2014.<sup>164</sup> Doubling the proportion of dependents to non-dependents in a household was associated with a one-third reduction in the asset index; however, the direction of causality can still run the other way, with the poor having more children.

There also was a high positive effect of private educational investments in 1986 on household wealth status in 2014 (Model 3). A one percentage point increase in the share of household expenditure on education out of total consumption expenditures in 1986 was associated with a 14% increase in household wealth in 2014. Each additional level of father's schooling in 1986 was associated with a 17% increase in household wealth in 2014 (Model 4), while mother's schooling had a statistically non-significant effect. Model 5 illustrates the education-inequality nexus in determining intergenerational economic mobility through the high wealth returns to schooling of male members, which increase with educational levels.

The presence of one unschooled male member in the household in 1986 was associated with a 13% *reduction* in household wealth in 2014. Primary schooled male members also had a negative and high but statistically non-significant return. The presence of a secondary schooled member in the household in 1986 was associated with an 18% increase in the household wealth index score in 2014. The wealth returns to schooling males beyond the secondary level was even higher although statistically non-significant.

---

<sup>164</sup> The causality may run both ways, with larger households being able to pool resources and accumulate wealth, and wealthier households being able to provide for a large number of members and avoid family splits. The former appeared a more plausible explanation, as the dependency ratio in 2014 had a strong negative effect on wealth.

**Table 6.6: OLS regression outputs for wealth index 2014**

<b>Independent variables</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(5)</b>	<b>(6)</b>
Asset index score 1986	0.60** (0.04)	0.60** (0.04)	0.54** (0.04)	0.50** (0.04)	0.43** (0.05)	0.44** (0.05)
Adult eq. household size 2014		0.19** (0.02)	0.20** (0.02)	0.20** (0.02)	0.20** (0.02)	0.21** (0.02)
Dependency ratio 2014		-0.33** (0.04)	-0.33** (0.04)	-0.31** (0.04)	-0.31** (0.04)	-0.31** (0.04)
Private educational investment 1986			0.14** (0.03)	0.12** (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)
Father's schooling 1986				0.17** (0.06)	0.18** (0.06)	0.18** (0.06)
Mother's schooling 1986				0.09 (0.14)	0.07 (0.14)	0.09 (0.12)
No. of males $\Phi$ unschooled 1986					-0.13* (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)
No. of males primary schooled 1986					-0.17 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.10)
No. of males middle schooled 1986					0.14 (0.12)	0.20 (0.11)
No. of males secondary schooled 1986					0.18* (0.08)	0.21* (0.08)
No. of males above secondary sch. 1986					0.25 (0.14)	0.19 (0.12)
No. of females unschooled 1986						-0.13** (0.05)
No. of females primary schooled 1986						-0.11 (0.15)
No. of females middle schooled 1986						0.52* (0.20)
No. of females secondary schooled 1986						1.04** (0.38)
No. of females above secondary 1986						1.55** (0.54)
Constant	-0.13* (0.06)	-0.95** (0.11)	-1.21** (0.12)	-1.35** (0.13)	-1.29** (0.14)	-1.27** (0.14)
Observations	2,252	2,252	2,251	2,251	2,251	2,251
R-squared	0.21	0.31	0.33	0.34	0.35	0.37

Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

$\Phi$ : This set of variables refers to the absolute number of males/females in the household with each level of education.

There also were high wealth returns to the human capital of female household members (Model 6). An unschooled female in the household in 1986 was associated with a 13% reduction in wealth status in 2014. While statistically non-significant for primary schooled females, long-range returns to higher schooling for females appear to be large. A middle schooled female member of the household in 1986 was associated with a 52% higher wealth index score in 2014. The effect size was double that for secondary schooled and tripled for above secondary schooled female members of households in 1986.

After controlling for demographic and human capital factors in the final model, the intergenerational correlation in the wealth index remained high, at 44%. Overall, wealth inequality seems not only to have persisted over time but also to have widened because of the high long-range wealth returns increasing with the level of schooling of household members.

### **Summary of the OLS findings**

Clearly, schooling of the parental generation in 1986 and that of their sons and daughters had high long-range economic returns on all three measures of economic status which contributed to household social mobility by 2014. As shown in Chapter 5, various parental generation age cohorts in 1986 and those of their sons and daughters were schooled throughout the early decades of Pakistan's history, which was characterised by a lack of educational opportunities in general, and in particular for the poor, rural populations and women. Adult members of poor households were more likely to lack human capital in 1986, and more so the female members, thus these households were less likely to allocate a high proportion of their spending to schooling their young members. These OLS estimates suggest that the members of such households had low prospects for social mobility. Households caught up in poverty low/no education mobility traps in 1986, as identified in Chapter 5, are particularly worse off over time. While receiving an education in 1986 appeared to promote economic mobility by 2014, the evidence presented in this section also suggests that it is perpetuating economic inequality in the long run.

Having presented the overall picture of the role of schooling in intergenerational social mobility, I also have attempted to see the effect of the function  $g$  in the OLS equation to

explore how social structure mediates the long-range returns to human capital. The statistical results are provided in Appendix 6.1. I summarise the main findings below.

***Caste/kinship:*** Some patterns of returns by subgroup are somewhat random, perhaps because of the smaller size of the subsamples, whereas others appear to be systematic. Caste identity appeared to be an important differentiator of the role of schooling in social mobility. Father's schooling, for example, did not have any significant long-range returns for those from the main caste, but it was significant for those not from the main caste. A higher level of schooling of males in 1986 had significant economic returns for those from the main caste, whereas for others even lower levels of schooling had significant long-range returns. Pointing to differentiated gender norms, female schooling had a greater role in the social mobility of those from the main caste than of others.

***Landownership:*** Somewhat similar patterns were observed when landowning households were compared with the landless. Higher intergenerational elasticity of economic status, particularly in terms of consumption and wealth for landowner households, suggests the continuity of their relative advantage, whereas landless households appeared to have a greater shift in their economic status. Landless households had higher long-range returns to schooling of the father in 1986, whereas landed households had significant long-range returns to the mother's schooling.

***Geography:*** Long-range returns to schooling were also differentiated across provinces. Household human capital in 1986 did not have a significant effect on the economic status of households in KP in 2014. Overall, long-range returns to the schooling of household members were higher in Punjab, followed by those in Sindh. Female schooling in 1986 also had higher returns in Punjab than in the other provinces. Sindh had higher degree of economic persistence than Punjab and KP, particularly on consumption and income.

The OLS analysis in this section has demonstrated the intergenerational transmission of economic status and the role of household human capital in mediating this transmission in 1986. However, the estimated results can be biased if they are affected by certain fixed household characteristics that are not included in the model which would cause them to affect a household's economic status and its members' human capital simultaneously. For example, households with higher ability members may both earn more and acquire more human capital,

yet the relationship between schooling and income will not necessarily be causal. It therefore is difficult to draw causal inferences from OLS models unless such household characteristics are controlled for. The next section of this chapter therefore addresses the issue of the causal role of schooling in intergenerational social mobility by using a fixed effect (FE) model.

### **FIXED EFFECT MODEL OF INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY**

The FE model provides robust estimates for drawing causal inferences to explain the role of schooling in social mobility. Modelling a change in the dependent variable against a change in the explanatory variables controls for the unobserved fixed characteristics of the households and thus reduces bias in the estimates. By using the specification developed through the exploratory OLS models in the previous section, the change in household economic status from 1986 to 2014 is modelled against a change in household members' human capital during the same period. The resulting FE model can be expressed notationally as follows:

$$Y_{t+1} - Y_t = \alpha_1(S_{t+1} - S_t) + \alpha_2(D_{t+1} - D_t) + \beta(E_{t+1} - E_t) + \gamma_j \left( \sum_{i=0}^n (H_{i,t+1} - H_{i,t}) \right) + \mu$$

where  $t$  refers to the household characteristics in 1986 (or the average of 1986-91 for income and consumption expenditure) and  $t+1$  to the household characteristics in 2014.<sup>165</sup>

This section compares the estimates of the FE models with the final OLS models presented in the previous section, and does so separately for each of the three measures of economic status. The assumption here is that the FE model is preferred, as its estimates are less biased than the OLS estimates.

#### **Consumption expenditures**

Table 6.7 compares the estimates of the FE model for the log of per-capita consumption expenditures from 1986 to 2014 (left panel) with the final OLS model from Table 6.4 (right panel). The FE estimate for the effect of household size on consumption expenditures was almost five times higher than reported by the OLS model, which confirms that the smaller the household, the higher the consumption mobility during this period. The effect of private

---

<sup>165</sup>  $Y_i$  = is the economic status;  $S_i$  = adult equivalent household size;  $D_i$  = dependency ratio;  $E_i$  = private investment in education (ratio of educational expenditure out of total household consumption expenditures);  $H_i$  = human capital of parents, and other male and female members of the family as described in the OLS section.

educational spending during the same period as estimated by the FE model was twice that of the OLS model. A one percent increase in private educational expenditures out of total household consumption expenditures increased household consumption expenditures by 4%. The *type* of schooling (measured through spending) significantly affected household consumption outcomes over and above the *levels* of schooling during this period.

**Table 6.7: Fixed Effect Model for log consumption expenditures 1986-2014**

Independent variable ( $\Delta$ ) Models	FE Estimates	Variables	OLS Estimates
		Log consumption 1986	0.09** (-0.02)
Adult eq. household size	-0.14** (0.01)	Adult eq. household size 2014	-0.03** (0)
Dependency ratio	0.10** (0.02)	Dependency ratio 2014	-0.05** (-0.01)
Private educational investment	0.04** (0.00)	Private educational investment 1986	0.02* (-0.01)
Father's schooling	0.10** (0.01)	Father's schooling 1986	0.04** (-0.01)
Mother's schooling	0.25** (0.02)	Mother's schooling 1986	0.05 (-0.03)
No. of males $\Phi$ unschooled	0.01 (0.02)	No. of males $\Phi$ unschooled 1986	0 (-0.01)
No. of males primary schooled	0.10** (0.03)	No. of males primary schooled 1986	-0.02 (-0.01)
No. of males middle schooled	0.12** (0.03)	No. of males middle schooled 1986	0.04* (-0.02)
No. of males secondary schooled	0.04 (0.03)	No. of males secondary schooled 1986	0.04** (-0.01)
No. of males above secondary	0.23** (0.03)	No. of males above secondary sch. 1986	0.04* (-0.02)
No. of females unschooled	0.04 (0.02)	No. of females unschooled 1986	0.02** (-0.01)
No. of females primary schooled	0.21** (0.04)	No. of females primary schooled 1986	0.06* (-0.03)
No. of females middle schooled	0.32** (0.05)	No. of females middle schooled 1986	0.07** (-0.03)
No. of females secondary schooled	0.35** (0.05)	No. of females secondary schooled 1986	0.11 (-0.07)
No. of females above secondary	0.37** (0.06)	No. of females above secondary 1986	0.1 (-0.06)
Constant	7.75** (0.04)	Constant	7.47** (-0.12)
Observations	4,503	Observations	2,252
R-squared (within)	0.52	R-squared	0.28
Number of NEW_PRHS_ID	2,252		

Standard errors in parentheses, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

$\Phi$ : This set of variables refers to the absolute number of males/females in the household with each level of education.

Controlling for the household fixed effects significantly increased the effects of parental human capital on household consumption expenditures over the OLS model. The FE model suggests that a rise of one level in father's schooling from 1986 to 2014 increased household consumption expenditures by as much as 10%. Mother's schooling had 2.5 times the effect of father's schooling, and it was five times higher in the FE model than the OLS model. Each additional level of mother's schooling during this period increased household consumption by 25% (a quartile jump). The change in parental human capital during this period thus was a strong predictor of household consumption mobility.

Controlling for the household fixed effects also led to increased estimates of the consumption returns to the schooling of male and female household members. With both models showing no effects of unschooled males on household consumption, the FE model reported higher returns to various schooling levels of males than the OLS model. An additional primary schooled male in the household from 1986 to 2014 increased consumption expenditures by 10%. The FE estimates for middle schooled males were even greater and were three times higher than the OLS estimates; an additional middle schooled male increased household consumption by 12%. The magnitude of returns to secondary schooling were similar for both models but non-significant in the FE model. The FE model estimated returns to the postsecondary schooling of males that were four times higher than the OLS model. From 1986 to 2014, each additional postsecondary schooled male increased household consumption expenditures by 23%. Households that could educate their male members to postsecondary levels during this period experienced particularly high social mobility.

The effects of the primary schooling of female household members were 3.5 times higher in the FE model than the OLS model. Each additional primary schooled female increased household consumption expenditure by 21%, as compared to 6% in the OLS model, which is twice the returns to schooling of the primary schooled male. The FE estimates also suggested that each additional middle schooled female in the household increased household consumption by 32%, in contrast to only 7% estimated by the OLS model, which is three times higher than the FE estimates for middle schooled males. While the OLS model estimated non-significant returns to higher levels of female schooling, the FE model suggests 35% returns to a secondary schooled female and 37% to a postsecondary schooled female during this period—this is one-third higher than returns to similarly schooled males.

Schooling of female household members thus was the strongest determinant of social mobility during this period.

The FE model also has a high R-square, which suggests that more than 50% of the (within) variation in changes in consumption expenditures from 1986 to 2014 were explained by the model. Controlling for the fixed effects thus demonstrated that household human capital—of both parents and of sons and daughters—played a greater role in intergenerational social mobility as measured by household consumption expenditures.

Overall, the FE model illustrates the causal role of schooling in intergenerational consumption mobility in rural Pakistan. A high schooling level for mothers and the postsecondary schooling of both male and female household members drastically increased household consumption expenditures. However, the effects of high economic status on intergenerational educational mobility during this period, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, pointed to the unequal distribution of educational opportunities in the first place. Households that were unable to increase their private spending on education or to improve the education levels of their male and female members were increasingly disadvantaged over the three decades under study.

### **Household income**

Table 6.8 compares the FE estimates for differences in the log of per-capita household income from 1986 to 2014 (left panel) and the OLS estimates of the final model from Table 6.5 (right panel). The effects of household size and the dependency ratio on household per-capita income dropped after controlling for the FE model as compared to the OLS model. The FE model estimated a one percent increase in income as a result of a one percent increase in the percentage of educational spending out of total household consumption expenditures during the period studied, which is one-third of the OLS estimates. Albeit lower than the effects on consumption expenditures, the FE estimates show that parental schooling had higher income effects than the OLS model; a one-level rise in schooling of the father and mother each increased household income by 8% from 1986 to 2014. Thus, there is robust evidence of the effect of parental human capital on household income mobility over the three decades.

**Table 6.8: Fixed effect model for log income 1986-2014**

Independent variable ( $\Delta$ )	FE Estimates	Independent variable	OLS Estimates
		Log income 1986	0.19** (-0.05)
Adult eq. household size	-0.01 (-0.01)	Adult eq. household size 2014	-0.03** (-0.01)
Dependency ratio	-0.07** (-0.02)	Dependency ratio 2014	-0.17** (-0.02)
Private educational investment	0.01** (0)	Private educational investment 1986	0.03** (-0.01)
Father's schooling	0.08** (-0.01)	Father's schooling 1986	0.07** (-0.02)
Mother's schooling	0.08** (-0.02)	Mother's schooling 1986	0.06 (-0.07)
No. of males $\Phi$ unschooled	-0.01 (-0.02)	No. of males $\Phi$ unschooled 1986	-0.01 (-0.02)
No. of males primary schooled	0.09** (-0.03)	No. of males primary schooled 1986	-0.08 (-0.04)
No. of males middle schooled	0.03 (-0.03)	No. of males middle schooled 1986	0.03 (-0.04)
No. of males secondary schooled	-0.02 (-0.03)	No. of males secondary schooled 1986	0.10** (-0.03)
No. of males above secondary	0.07* (-0.03)	No. of males above secondary sch. 1986	0.11** (-0.04)
No. of females unschooled	-0.04* (-0.02)	No. of females unschooled 1986	0.01 (-0.02)
No. of females primary schooled	-0.05 (-0.04)	No. of females primary schooled 1986	0.1 (-0.07)
No. of females middle schooled	0.02 (-0.05)	No. of females middle schooled 1986	0.19 (-0.1)
No. of females secondary schooled	-0.03 (-0.05)	No. of females secondary schooled 1986	0.39** (-0.12)
No. of females above secondary	0.09 (-0.05)	No. of females above secondary 1986	0.1 (-0.19)
Constant	8.08** (-0.04)	Constant	6.80** (-0.36)
Observations	4,482	Observations	2,230
R-squared (within)	0.1	R-squared	0.18
Number of NEW_PRHS_ID	2,252		

Standard errors in parentheses, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

$\Phi$ : This set of variables refers to the absolute number of males/females in the household with each level of education.

The FE model's estimated higher returns to the primary schooling of males were compared to those of the OLS model. The FE model showed that adding a primary schooled male to the household led to a 9% increase in household income, which contrasted with the negative and non-significant OLS estimates. Whereas the OLS model estimated 10% income returns to the secondary schooling of males, the FE model did not show any significant returns. Similarly,

controlling for the household fixed effects lowered the returns to postsecondary schooling of males: the addition of a postsecondary schooled male resulted in a 7% increase in household income; the OLS estimate was 11%. Overall, after controlling for the fixed effects, higher levels of schooling for males were still associated with increased household income, albeit with a higher threshold (above secondary) and lower returns, and the FE estimates of returns to primary schooling were also higher than the OLS estimates. In contrast to high OLS estimates for secondary schooled females, no significant returns were found for the schooling of females after controlling for household effects (except for a penalty for the unschooled females in the household).

Overall, the increased level of parental schooling increased household income significantly from 1986 to 2014. However, the causal effects of male and female household members' human capital were lower on income than on consumption.<sup>166</sup> Importantly, the FE model explains only 10% of the (within) variance in the changes in per-capita income, suggesting that most of the variation would be explained by factors not included in the model.

In sum, smaller household size, a smaller dependency ratio, higher parental schooling and the primary and postsecondary schooling of male household members increased household prospects for social mobility as measured by per-capita income. Households with lower levels of parental schooling, with unschooled male and female members, and those not having a male member with postsecondary schooling had low prospects for income mobility. The stratified education system that offered fewer opportunities to the poor and to the sons and daughters of unschooled parents appears to have increased economic inequality during the period under study.

### **Household wealth**

Table 6.9 compares the FE and OLS estimates for household wealth. As in the OLS model, family size was positively associated with household wealth in the FE model, although the effect size of the latter was half. The dependency ratio nonetheless had a higher negative effect on wealth in the FE model than the OLS model. The high wealth returns to the private educational investment reported by the OLS model vanished after controlling for the

---

<sup>166</sup> This may well be because of the greater difficulties in measuring household income in the informal rural economy than the consumption expenditures. There may also be dual effects of human capital in increasing household welfare measured on consumption expenditures (first on the purchasing power, and second on making consumption allocations).

household fixed effects. Returns to father's schooling were somewhat similar in both the OLS and the FE models. Each additional level of fathers' schooling added 16% to household wealth, as per the FE model. The non-significant OLS effects of mothers' schooling was even lower in the FE model.

**Table 6.9: Fixed Effect Model for wealth index 1986-2014**

Independent variable ( $\Delta$ )	FE Estimates	Variables	OLS Estimates
		Asset Index 1986	0.44** (-0.05)
Adult eq. household size	0.11** (-0.02)	Adult eq. household size 2014	0.21** (-0.02)
Dependency ratio	-0.05 (-0.04)	Dependency ratio 2014	-0.31** (-0.04)
Private educational investment	0 (-0.01)	Private educational investment 1986	0.08* (-0.03)
Father's schooling	0.16** (-0.02)	Father's schooling 1986	0.18** (-0.06)
Mother's schooling	0.03 (-0.04)	Mother's schooling 1986	0.09 (-0.12)
No. of males $\Phi$ unschooled	-0.18** (-0.04)	No. of males $\Phi$ unschooled 1986	-0.07 (-0.06)
No. of males primary schooled	0.09 (-0.06)	No. of males primary schooled 1986	-0.11 (-0.1)
No. of males middle schooled	0.19** (-0.06)	No. of males middle schooled 1986	0.2 (-0.11)
No. of males secondary schooled	0.23** (-0.05)	No. of males secondary schooled 1986	0.21* (-0.08)
No. of males above secondary	0.44** (-0.06)	No. of males above secondary sch. 1986	0.19 (-0.12)
No. of females unschooled	0.12** (-0.04)	No. of females unschooled 1986	-0.13** (-0.05)
No. of females primary schooled	0.42** (-0.07)	No. of females primary schooled 1986	-0.11 (-0.15)
No. of females middle schooled	0.42** (-0.09)	No. of females middle schooled 1986	0.52* (-0.2)
No. of females secondary schooled	-0.14 (-0.1)	No. of females secondary schooled 1986	1.04** (-0.38)
No. of females above secondary	0.77** (-0.1)	No. of females above secondary 1986	1.55** (-0.54)
Constant	-1.16** (-0.08)	Constant	-1.27** (-0.14)
Observations	4,503	Observations	2,251
R-squared (within)	0.27	R-squared	0.37
Number of NEW PRHS ID	2,252		

Standard errors in parentheses, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

$\Phi$ : This set of variables refers to the absolute number of males/females in the household with each level of education.

Controlling for fixed effects increased the effects of household members' various levels of schooling on household wealth, as in the case of consumption expenditures. There were linearly increasing wealth returns to the schooling of male members, with a penalty for the

unschooled. The FE models reported that the addition of an unschooled male reduced household wealth by 18% compared to non-significant OLS estimates. The FE model also showed high returns to the primary schooling of male members, but they were statistically non-significant. In contrast, in the FE model the addition of a middle schooled male led to a 19% increase in household wealth, compared to low and non-significant returns shown by the OLS model. Both models reported similar high returns to secondary schooling; the addition of a secondary schooled male increased household wealth by 23%. In contrast to the lower and statistically non-significant OLS returns to household wealth by the postsecondary schooling of males, the FE model reported an increase of 44% in wealth.

While the OLS model reported a penalty for an unschooled female in the household, the FE model estimated positive returns to all schooling categories. In contrast to the OLS coefficient of -0.11, the FE shows that the addition of a primary schooled female increased household income by 42% , or nearly five times the FE returns to primary schooled males. Wealth returns to a middle schooled female in the FE model were 42% (the OLS model reported 52% returns) which were twice the effect of the same level of schooling for males. The OLS returns to secondary and higher schooled females were also higher than the FE model. While non-significant for secondary schooled females, after controlling for the fixed effects, each additional postsecondary schooled female increased household wealth by 77%, which is nearly double the FE estimates of postsecondary schooled males (and half the OLS effects of postsecondary schooled females). Thus, there were linearly increasing wealth returns to the higher schooling of male and female members from 1986 to 2014. The final model had an R-square of 0.27 which is high for the educational returns model.

Overall, the FE model for wealth status reported a strong role for human capital, particularly for the postsecondary schooling of both male and female members. Such higher returns to higher schooling, especially with access to education differentiated along household wealth, can in fact lower intergenerational mobility for the poor. Economic inequality in particular seems to have increased as a result of the unequal educational system during the study period.

In sum, these FE models provide robust estimates of statistically significant, positive returns for the three measures of economic status to private educational investments, high returns to parental schooling and to the schooling of family members, particularly at higher levels. The higher FE returns to household members' various levels of schooling as compared to the OLS

estimates suggest that the change in household economic status over three decades has been strongly associated with the change in household human capital. Schooling of family members thus was an important contributor to intergenerational social mobility over three decades. At the same time, the unequal educational distribution, as illustrated in Chapter 5, particularly the existence of large ‘no-schooling/poverty’ traps that persisted over generations, suggests an intergenerational transmission of economic inequality. Households starting with low economic status in the initial decades of Pakistan’s history were less likely to have gained schooling by 1986, given the unequal nature of the education system. They also were less likely to have benefitted from the expansion of the education system from 1980 to 2010. Consequently, they were least likely to improve their economic status by 2014 with the given economic returns to schooling.

## **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

This chapter has traced the relationship between social origin and destinations in rural Pakistan from 1986 to 2014 by using intergenerational mobility metrics and exploiting the potential of the Mincer wage equation. The mobility metrics showed a high proportion of households experiencing social mobility, albeit with slightly different rates for the three measures of economic status. However, prospects for intergenerational mobility were mediated by households’ economic status in 1986. Those in the poorest quintiles in 1986 were likely to stay in the poorest quintiles, and those from the richest quintiles were likely to remain in the richest quintiles by 2014. The role schooling played in mediating intergenerational mobility was evident from the fact that, at any given point of origin, the schooling of the household head in 1986 was associated with higher levels of social mobility by 2014.

The exploratory OLS regression model I developed in this chapter, with step-wise addition of the covariates, highlighted varying degrees of intergenerational persistence over three measures of economic status. These models consistently showed that the schooling of the parental generation in 1986 and that of their sons and daughters had high long-range economic returns in 2014. There also were noticeable but less systematic differences in returns to schooling across landownership status, caste/kinship identity and geographic location of households. To estimate the causal effects of household members’ human capital, the FE model controlled for household fixed effects. The FE model suggested even higher

economic returns to the schooling of family members and generations. Such high returns to family members' schooling have serious implications for social mobility: Those who could experience upward intergenerational educational mobility or retain the existing higher educational attainment of their members over generations had greater upward social mobility. Those who could not benefit from educational expansion over time and over generations either did not experience upward social mobility or experienced downward mobility.

The analysis offered in this chapter also provides insights into the relative usefulness of the three measures of economic status. As the OLS and FE models have shown, human capital is the better predictor of both per-capita consumption expenditures and household wealth than per-capita household income. These differences may well be because of the difficulties in capturing income, that too in the rural, agrarian context characterised with informal economy (which are well known in the literature. At the same time, intergenerational elasticity is very low on consumption and very high on wealth, and is similar to the OECD countries on income which favours income. Further analysis is needed of the relative robustness of these three measures of economic status in representing both social origins and social movement over time.

While these statistics offer robust and generalisable estimates of the economic outcomes of the schooling of rural household members over three decades, they do not provide sufficient insights into the underlying processes. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the rigidity of the rural social structure mediates not just educational experiences but also the labour market outcomes of schooling. A comprehensive study of the role of schooling in social mobility in rural Pakistan therefore requires extending the analysis beyond generating limited statistical patterns, and engaging with the values, meanings, experiences and reflections of rural households, including parents and their children, and men and women. The next chapter therefore draws from qualitative fieldwork done in a rural community in Punjab to explore the processes under which schooling shapes social and economic destinations as understood within the cultural specificity.



## CHAPTER 7 - SCHOOLING AND *TARAQQI*: A PERSPECTIVAL ANALYSIS

I argued in Chapter 2 for the need to expand the field of social mobility research to take account of the values, perspectives, aspirations, experiences and reflections of different generations in order to explain objective patterns revealed by statistical analysis. Thus far, I have tracked the place of schooling in Pakistan's vision for progress and revealed statistical patterns of intergenerational social mobility *within* and *as a result of* education. It is important at this point to stop and investigate what social mobility actually *means* to rural families. Below therefore I examine the subjective dispositions of families and complement earlier analyses with a dialogic interplay between objective structures and subjective assessments which Bourdieu (1977) describes as critical. The data I bring to this chapter represent a form of triangulation that extends social mobility research from its current focus on statistical analysis and bring us closer to a holistic understanding of the role schooling plays in intergenerational mobility in rural Pakistan.

Below I present a case study of a rural community in Punjab where I explored the values and meanings attributed to social mobility by the 23 members of 8 families and by four key informants (see Chapter 3 for sample details). I was particularly interested in the educational and economic aspirations of parents and their sons and daughters, and the ways they used schooling to move up the social ladder. These data provide a glimpse of how various facets of the rural social structure shaped the impact of schooling on each family's social prospects.

I address four themes here. First I consider popular understandings of social mobility and its gendered values and meanings before drawing from Max Weber's (1978, 1922) theory of social conflict and use the concept of social closure, in order to bring power relations to the centre of my analysis. Here I focus on the strategies that socially dominant groups used to monopolise resources and opportunities and close them off to the socially disadvantaged. In the third section, I analyse the counterstrategies that disadvantaged families used 'to bite into the advantage of the dominant' (Murphy 1984, p. 548) as they pursued social mobility through schooling. I conclude with my reflections on the value of my taking this approach to the case study.

## NOTION OF *TARAQQI*

A study of the role schooling plays in social mobility in rural Punjab must pay close attention to the cultural specificity that shapes popular understanding and pursuit of social mobility. *Social mobility* is a social-scientific concept, and it is difficult to translate it into a colloquial equivalent which could be used to discuss the subject with non-academic research participants.<sup>167</sup> Therefore, to conduct a *perspectival analysis*, I had to identify the discursive tools that could provide an entry point to the rural respondents' subjectivities and grant me access to the cultural discourses underlying their experiences of social mobility. Thus the starting point must be the research participants' core expressions, concepts and categories which are used by research participants, themselves.

Based on general cultural familiarity, a local lexicon and my previous engagement with the research participants, I chose to use the concept of *taraqqi* as a reference point for social mobility. *Taraqqi* is an Urdu word of Arabic origin that is commonly used in nearly all local languages in Pakistan. It captures several implied meanings of social mobility and can be translated literally as 'progress' or 'improved social and economic status over time'. Depending on how questions are framed, the concept can refer to temporal dimensions of social mobility and to the *process*. In Punjabi, *taraqqi* is the concept closest to social mobility, and participant families commonly used it when talking about moving up the social ladder from their positions of origin. The concept has such potential power that I decided to begin individual interviews by asking what the participant made of it and what they associated it with. These conversations gradually revealed the subtle dynamics, underlying processes and contributing/constraining factors of social mobility, and what contributions to it participants felt schooling made.

The interviews made it clear that improved individual or family economic status was considered the foremost constituent of *taraqqi*, and that finding decent employment, a secure job and a livelihood were the keys to improved status, which in turn depended on schooling. Those who were unschooled and/or engaged in hard labour considered having any job an indication of *taraqqi*.<sup>168</sup> In contrast, unschooled mothers Nazima and Kiran explained that

---

<sup>167</sup> As the debate on social mobility is driven mainly by the statistical analyses of intergenerational transitions often across occupational but also on income categories, there remains a need to operationalise the relevant concepts for gathering qualitative data.

<sup>168</sup> Such as primary schooled son Nisar and unschooled son Imran.

'*taraqqi* is when children get education and government gives them jobs, their *taraqqi* happens then'. Prestige was also considered integral to *taraqqi*; this meant that an educated man had a 'high-status job' (Liaqat, F, 10), 'like the doctors, and those who do other jobs' (Itrat, D, 5), and when 'children are educated and get jobs and draw salaries' (Irfana, M, 0). Given the unregulated private-sector labour markets which often did not offer employment security, *taraqqi* was associated mainly with salaried public-sector employment.

For those who had some education but were unable to find salaried employment, *karobar* was critical, as they needed to secure their earnings through sustained livelihoods. *Karobar* referred to all economic activity, including running an enterprise of any size, self-employment and some skilled work. Many also valued the growth opportunities offered by entrepreneurship and businesses: 'If one works hard' but also has 'a lot of money', 'with one *karobar* one can always start the second one'. Education was considered instrumental to running a *karobar*, as one needed to be intelligent, have money and the right attitude. According to Farheen, 'one should be educated, have a functioning mind, have money, can buy things, this is what is *taraqqi*, that comes with hard work'.<sup>169</sup> For manual labourers, like fathers Bakht and Khadim, the two concepts were closely linked: '*Taraqqi* is the name of *karobar*; if one has a *karobar* then *taraqqi* happens'. Importantly, as unschooled mother Lala explained, *karobar* was often distinguished from unskilled labour which was considered less rewarding, exploitative, seasonally fluctuating and did not lead to social and economic uplift: '*Diharri* [casual work] is available some days and not on other days; how can *taraqqi* happen this way'?

Families of manual workers who had low-paid work often incurred debts for day-to-day living costs. *Taraqqi* here meant to have the means to fulfil familial obligations, such as sons' and daughters' weddings, which could put a serious strain on resource-constrained households. Father Khadim explained: 'I have five sons, two are married three are yet to be married. My daughters are married. How can we do *taraqqi* when all the savings are spent on their weddings'? Weddings and health shocks led the poor into indebtedness, at times trapping them in slave-like bonded labour that diminished their chances of improving their economic status. Mother Irfana explained:

---

<sup>169</sup> Farheen is a primary schooled mother.

*Taraqqi* means one should have money and wealth and can educate children. We have nothing; they [men] are doing their labour at the brick-kiln. With the Rs. 300 they earn at the end of the day, can they buy medicine for me and arrange for meals? . . . If we have to arrange the wedding of the daughter, we borrow from the kiln owner. And if for son's wedding, we again borrow from them. We married our daughter and borrowed Rs 150,000 from them. Sons are now paying back the debt. The lenders don't let you eat away their loans. They ask to pay back first and then give us money.

Some family members considered schooling important for the valuable skills it offered. In certain ways the ability to read and write was considered *taraqqi*, regardless of economic status. Son Shuja, who had a university education, explained: 'If someone doing *karobar* receives a letter that he can't read it, he might own huge land but at such times his [lack of] *taraqqi* is exposed. If he is sitting in the street and does not know how to talk then his *taraqqi* is exposed there' [my addition]. Shuja believed that 'whatever field one is in, education is very important'.

Schooling was also believed to contribute to *taraqqi* in important ways through its embodied form, what Bourdieu (1977) called *bodily hexis*. From this perspective, schooling added to personal development, awareness, consciousness, intelligence, the ability to distinguish between what is good and what is not, polite manners, comportment and self-discipline. It also created a profound distinction between the *parrha-likha* (schooled) and the *unparrh* (unschooled), with differentiated trajectories for *taraqqi*. Faisal explained: 'The more there is education, the more a person would be refined from the inside. The more education you have in your society or at home, the more you will head towards *taraqqi*'.<sup>170</sup>

For religiously oriented Shuja, *taraqqi* meant finding a balance between worldly matters and religious ones. Schooling helped him reconcile the two:

Education itself can be *taraqqi* but it is also a means of gaining *taraqqi* for us. We can improve our morals with education. When we go to some institution to get education, to achieve our goals, then education is a mean to achieve *taraqqi*.

---

<sup>170</sup> Faisal is a male postgraduate key informant.

For some parents, like Akhtar, *taraqqi* also manifested in domestic life, such as in the quality of familial relationships, parenting and household environment. As his son Shuja summarised, education improved the ‘morals’ of society alongside people’s ‘ways to communicate’; it also improved their *saqafat* (culture) and *tehzeeb* (civilization), and their *maeeshat* (economy), thus contributing to social mobility in the broadest sense. In sum, most respondents considered schooling *intrinsic to* and *instrumental in* the process of *taraqqi*—both a *means* and an *end* in the pursuit of social mobility. As we shall see, this pursuit was highly gendered.

### **A gendered notion**

Respondents’ notion of *taraqqi* was that schooling played a differential role in the lives of men and women, and in their shared goal of uplifting their families socially. Schooling was expected to prepare girls and boys separately for their respective roles in the family, community and economy. For men, *taraqqi* was associated with providing the economic means to raise their families’ prestige. For women, *taraqqi* was associated primarily with the domestic sphere and in their caring for family members whilst adding to family honour by adhering to accepted gender norms.

*Taraqqi* was an integral part of an intergenerational bargain whereby parents invested in their sons’ education to raise their prospects for social mobility so the latter could, in turn, take care of the parents in their old age. The breadwinner role changed hands across generations as older men reduced their economic activity and younger men started to earn their livelihoods, the latter were expected to both sustain and improve their family’s economic status. Sons who did not secure well-paid permanent work were a disappointment to aging parents, but also economically dependent on them:

*Taraqqi* for a young man is the completion of his education, getting a job, a permanent job and parents are also at peace that their son is at [a] job. Now our sons are crushing stone and doing labour. Recently one got sick and we ended up spending 17,000-18,000 rupees on his treatment. (Rahila, M, 5)

Being able to keep the ‘household system well-functioning’ (Akhtar, F, 5) was an utmost necessity. A good job would add to a family’s standing in the community and increase its ‘goodwill’ as people came to ‘greet them’, thus adding to their social capital (Bourdieu 1986). A son’s education was thus considered a necessity for the whole family’s social mobility.

In my conversations with family members about *taraqqi*, they often pointed out the contrast between *parrha-likha* and *anparrh* men: the former had jobs and the latter were farming or doing other forms of hard labour. The unschooled or less schooled who went on to learn a technical skill such as plumbing, electrical work, welding or driving were considered to be doing better than the unskilled who had infrequent casual work. Those who worked in agriculture and with livestock found their *karobar* (livelihood) was affected by seasonality and market fluctuations. They were expected to have the necessary skills, attitude and ability to avoid the economic shocks that disrupted income flows which could lead families into downward social mobility:

Our circumstances were good but now we are going down for the last 6 or 7 years. We bought some cattle from someone on deferred payment. We raised many cattle this year to sell at Eid but we had a loss of 70 or 75 thousand rupees. But those who lend to us will get their money back. If we pay to one, the others also demand their money. All of us in the family are exhausted, 3, 4 people in it, and gained nothing out of it.  
(Latifaan, M, 0)

Amongst the schooled, sons with higher and professional education were considered to be pursuing *taraqqi* most successfully as they could secure high-status jobs: ‘If a guy is becoming a doctor, we know, *Masha Allah*, he is doing *taraqqi*; if someone is becoming an engineer one knows he is doing *taraqqi*’ (Akhtar, F, 5). *Taraqqi* was associated, therefore, with urban professional work and skilled labour.

Clearly behind the statistics of economic mobility (see Chapter 6) lies the social scape of the village which is characterized by scarce opportunities that do not offer everyone a strategy for social mobility. Sometimes aspiring for *taraqqi* also led poor young men to leave their immediate family environment that, because of its over-emphasis on day-to-day survival rather than on long-term development, could damage their life chances. Migrating out of the village, as hard as it could be, was seen a way for resource-constrained young men to try their luck in cities which were imagined to offer opportunities, ideas and possibilities for improving one’s educational, social and economic status:

A young man should leave his village work and go to the city and get an education and find some good *karobar*. Even if his family doesn’t want to educate him, when he

goes out, he will study. He can start his own good work as he wishes after his studies. He can run his system, can find a job or set up a shop. (Itrat, D, 5)

Different meanings were attached to female *taraqqi* which also differentiated the role schooling could play in families' lives. Parents considered it their foremost cultural and religious duty to marry off their grown daughters. Only unmarried daughters could contribute economically to their parental families as the married ones contributed to their new families. Marriage thus was a crucial path to social mobility for a daughter (and arguably for her family) as it offered her a chance to move up socially while also setting the parents free from having to support her. Mother Rahila elaborated: 'I have one daughter and wedded her off after eight years of schooling; she is at her home now, thanks to Allah, good or bad whatever circumstances are there, she is at her own home.'

In any case, women could undertake paid work only if it adhered to the prevailing gender norms, avoided interactions with other men, and did not affect their primary role of caring for their families. All the families I interviewed saw a woman's *taraqqi* as largely within the domestic sphere, although those who were more religious, like Akhtar's family, emphasised women's schooling as they thought '*sharia* emphasises their education'. Such values, whilst supportive, hindered any attempt to achieve social mobility.

However, some parents did want their daughters to get a 'good education' so as to get 'good jobs'. They commented that '*taraqqi* means they should do some job after getting enough education' and they should 'become a teacher' at a public school that offered good pay and job security, or even at a low-paying private school. For economically aspiring families, women's earnings—whether from a job or a *karobar* like 'stitching clothes' or 'some kind of work at their homes like making dresses or tutoring children'—were an important, often welcome contribution to the household economy. At the same time, the social and gender order with its embedded labour markets severely limited such aspirations by restricting women's employment opportunities. In view of the power relations that shaped women's prospects for social mobility, primary schooled daughter Itrat asked, 'Is there any *taraqqi* in doing the household chores'?

Girls' schooling was nevertheless important, given the expectation that a 'good household environment' resulting from daughters' schooling would demonstrate a household's *taraqqi*.

As Akhtar pointed out, ‘one such educated woman in a family changes the entire environment of the family’. Situating women within the domestic sphere inevitably invoked the reproductive and maternal roles their schooling was expected to prepare them for. But like Akhtar, most parents believed that by schooling their daughters ‘their future generation will do *taraqqi*’. There appeared to be strong awareness of the profound role mothers’ education played in shaping their children’s values, aspirations and dispositions which were crucial to their educational and economic success. This perspective corroborates the findings in Chapter 5 which demonstrated the increasing effect mothers’ literacy had on their children’s educational mobility. Unlike the economic gains from sons’ schooling that started as they transitioned to work, daughters’ schooling was seen from a multigenerational perspective, as it contributed to the grandchildren’s social mobility. Post-secondary schooled son Rahim explained:

Young women should be well-educated, they should take care of their family and raise their children well. A child’s good nurturing depends on woman. This is the first thing a woman has to do. Getting their children ready, sending them to school; if mother is good, the child will pick good things and will be interested in studies. (Rahim, S, 13)

Here, marriage was considered an important route for daughters’ social mobility. A ‘good marriage’ could bring a young woman high social status, economic uplift and personal stability for the rest of her life, and prestige and peace of mind for her parents, while also providing families with new social networks or strengthening existing ones. In contrast, a ‘wrong marriage’ could lower a daughter’s social and economic status and lead to her continued economic dependence on her parents. The implication was that a good social mobility strategy was for families to prepare their sons to make good money and for their daughters to achieve a successful marriage: ‘Women’s *taraqqi* is for their homes, a good husband, good living conditions, good food and all kinds of facilities’ (Ali, S, 5). In this context, an educated young woman (and her family) would have a better chance at gaining upward social mobility by marrying into a well-off family, as she could offer a rich home environment, take good care of her husband’s family and raise the children intelligently. The chances of upward mobility would increase dramatically if an educated woman was lucky enough to find culturally appropriate employment, such as a schoolteacher or a doctor – she could even get a proposal from someone in the city. The proud declaration of father Khadim, an unschooled brick-kiln worker, reflected this: ‘All my daughters are educated and now

married and living in their homes. One still at home has BA; if she had found a job, she would have done *taraqqi*'. Such views offer some explanation for the significant expansion of girls' education from 1986 to 2010, as reported in Chapter 5.

Despite such views, it seemed that no profound economic transformation of women's lives through their schooling could be found in the families I interviewed. Mother Kinza was perhaps the only exception; she got a job as a schoolteacher after her secondary schooling. However, her own daughters (including one with an MA degree) were raising their children and were not working. Instead, the existing gender order appeared to be reproduced through the domestication of women's lives. At the same time, young women's schooling brought into question the very values that restricted their life chances and curtailed their prospects for social mobility. Secondary schooled daughter Itrat commented:

No woman amongst us has done any *taraqqi* . . . If women don't go outside their homes, how would they do *taraqqi*? Their families stop them. If I have something in my mind to do *taraqqi* I can do that only by going out of home, but only if no one stops me from going out . . . can do a job by going out of home, or any work such as beauty parlours, one can become doctors. There were many desires but nothing is fulfilled.

Here we get a glimpse of a shifting gender order as the arbitrariness of such values were brought into daughters' consciousness (Bourdieu 2001).


Apart from these gender dimensions, the families I interviewed offered important insights into what *taraqqi* meant at the collective village level. They often referred to the presence of 'good schools' that provided children with a quality foundation for further education as an important marker of *taraqqi*. Mother Lala, for example, explained that the '*taraqqi* of a village is with educated people. Masha Allah, there are many schools in the village and good education is happening'. College-educated son Rahim, who ran his own business, explained further:

*Taraqqi* for village means literate people, many educated people in the village. Things automatically improve with that . . . Along with education, if they do business, or some become lawyer, professor, others see them and consider that option for themselves. People think that this person is from their village and is very educated.

The availability of health facilities, ‘paved streets and sewerage system’, access to information, residential facilities for the poor, and marketplaces were also noted as manifestations of the village *taraqqi*. So was the village’s ability to resolve local disputes through its elders and notables, thus avoiding the involvement of the less trusted law-and-order and judicial institutions.

A summary of what *taraqqi* or social mobility might mean to this village is described in Figure 7.1 below

**Figure 7.1: Notion of *Taraqqi***



Clearly the conception of *taraqqi* is complex and means different things to different people— as does the pursuit of it. Below I consider the actual strategies groups of families in the village used to achieve *taraqqi*.

**SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SOCIAL CLOSURE**

Arguably, what matters most to collective and individual aspirations to pursue *taraqqi* is the competition for scarce positions of social status on an unlevel *social playing field*.<sup>171</sup> Families

<sup>171</sup> Bourdieu and Wacquant’s (1992 108–109) notion of a *field* refers to the structure of relative positions within which the family is situated and its members think, act and take positions by virtue of the volume and structure of their economic, social or cultural capital (Hilgers and Manges 2015).

deploy different levels and *forms of capital* (Bourdieu 1977) which collectively shape their aspirations for and strategies to pursue *taraqqi*. Max Weber's (1978, 1922) theory of social conflict is immensely useful in understanding the different strategies used by socially dominant and dominated groups and their consequences. Using his theory brings power relations to the centre stage of the analysis of social mobility.<sup>172</sup>

In his book *Economy and Society* Weber (1922) introduced the idea of *social closure* to analyse the monopolisation of markets, power and opportunities by the dominant groups. The concept was further developed by Frank Parkin (1974, 1979), and Raymond Murphy (1988) as a 'process of subordination whereby one group monopolizes advantages by closing off opportunities to another group of outsiders beneath it which it defines as inferior and ineligible' (p. 88).<sup>173</sup> Equally important are the counterstrategies of those dominated, of *usurpation* 'to escape subjection, disesteem, and dispossession', and to share the dominant monopolised resources and opportunities. While exclusion maintains the social order through the predetermined structuring of social actors, usurpation challenges that order in an attempt to restratify society, thus it has transformative potential.<sup>174</sup> Beneath the statistics of social mobility therefore we are likely to find the *exclusionary* strategies which dominant group use and the counterstrategies of usurpation which dominated groups use to gain some inclusion.<sup>175</sup>

In a village such as the one I studied, private property (primarily but not exclusively land) ownership represents the primary form of social hierarchy; it is thus the *principal* form of

---

<sup>172</sup> Weber pointed to the centrality of conflict in social relations, suggesting that it is 'permanent, structural' and leads to 'stratification with competing groups and individuals' in their desire to monopolise resources and opportunities (Tholen 2017). Collectives/groups can be 'conscious communities of actors sharing common cultures' (ibid.). The rural context of my research can be classified into groups of landowners, small farmers, landless workers, religious majority minorities, and those from upper and lower caste groups.

<sup>173</sup> Through *exclusionary social closure*, social groups 'maximize rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles' (Parkins 1979, p. 44).

<sup>174</sup> Murphy argues that these competing struggles provide much needed cohesiveness to both dominant and dominated groups. While social groups at the top of the pecking order rest on *exclusion* and those at the bottom rely on *usurpation*, the intermediary groups rely on both modes of closure, primarily using one but supplementing it with the other so they can move up while avoiding a push down. Moreover, exclusion can be *collectivist*, such as that based on race or another identity, or *individualist*, such as that based on wealth and credentials; capitalist societies are characterized by both forms.

<sup>175</sup> Employing a social closure approach requires first specifying various *forms of exclusion* (Murphy 1988)—the *principal*, *derivate* and *contingent*. When legal arrangements back the excluded from power, resources and opportunities, it is considered a *principal* form of exclusion, such as the legal title to private property. Property owners in capitalist societies are privileged in competition for, rather monopolize, the valuable goods in society while excluding the non-wealthy. The *derivative* and *contingent* forms of exclusion are the rules driven directly from the *principal* form yet are distinct from it, and they collectively serve as 'the main determinant of access to or exclusion from power, resources and opportunities in society' (p. 554). Murphy argues that legal title to *private property* is the principle form of exclusion in capitalist societies, as is *lineage* in aristocratic societies and *party* membership and rank in communist societies.

exclusion in the Weberian sense.<sup>176</sup> As I described in Chapter 2, landed elites have historically negotiated their power with the colonial and the post-colonial state, and in return for providing political support, have thwarted successfully the attempts for land reform (Javid 2012). Landlords are observed to have positioned themselves as *middlemen* between the villagers and the state (Alavi 1973), and despite a decline in the proportion of large and medium landholders in the period between 1925-2000, according to Javid (2012), social and economic life in rural Pakistan remains heavily dominated by landed elites.<sup>177</sup>

Noticeably, the ownership of wealth and property was considered by villagers as the main determinant of the extent to which people could aspire to and strategize in order to pursue *taraqqi*. Daughter Atya, for example, elaborated: ‘only those are doing *taraqqi* who are already rich for generations; they are the ones who can do a lot of *taraqqi*.’ Landowning families were traditionally rich for generations and were seen advancing their advantage over time. A retired teacher Kinza observed that ‘landlords are doing the most *taraqqi*...the landowners also do their own business’. In contrast, landless and poor were thought to be caught up in a struggle for day-to-day survival, such that any progress appeared distant from reality. Father Bakht, like mother Farheen, asked: ‘those who can’t fill their bellies, what kind of *taraqqi* are they to do?’ Imran, a brick-kiln worker, also highlighted the low returns to manual labour which ruled out the possibility of social mobility for the poor: ‘*taraqqi* is very difficult for the poor as everything is very expensive now. A daily wage of 200 or 300 doesn’t get you much.’

Caste and kinship hierarchies provide a secondary form of exclusion which overlaps with property ownership. Chapter 2 indicated that kinship structures create ‘primordial loyalties’ (Alavi 1973) in rural Pakistan that often are perpetuated over generations through the practice of endogamy (Mughal 2014).<sup>178</sup> They essentially are linked to the *principal* form of exclusion over long periods of time, which affects the life chances of individuals and is thus a *derivative*

---

<sup>176</sup> Social relations in rural Pakistan are influenced by, amongst other things, the colonial inheritance of the economic system, state-led capitalist formation in the post-independence era, the subsequent decades of (ongoing) economic liberalization, and agrarian modes of production. The historic salience of private property as the major source of economic privilege, prestige and power has only strengthened over decades of liberalization, as shown in Chapter 4.

<sup>177</sup> In such contexts, caste and kinship hierarchies also assign great significance to *lineage*, as does the economic control of the state to *connections with officials*, but I argue that these two forms of exclusion are only secondary to private property.

<sup>178</sup> These groups reportedly function as the key arbitrator of economic, social and political interactions, hence they provide the foundation for structural inequalities in rural Pakistan (Gazdar 2007).

form of exclusion in the Weberian analysis.<sup>179</sup> Caste hierarchies have been found to mediate not just access to but the outcomes of education in rural Pakistan (Jacoby and Mansuri 2011; Tamim and Haq 2015)—in other words, prospects for intergenerational mobility (Cheema and Nasee 2013).

From a *taraqqi* perspective, privileged caste identity gives certain families additional social networks and solidarities as they pursue intergenerational social mobility (as illustrated in Chapter 6). One villager Ali commented that the ‘*Araeen* have done the most *taraqqi* in the village . . . because they are financially well-off [and] are landowners’.<sup>180</sup> In contrast, those at the bottom of the kinship hierarchy were considered too disadvantaged to pursue *taraqqi*, as they had fewer valuable social networks: ‘Those with the least *taraqqi* are the *kammis*’<sup>181</sup> (M. Liaqat, F, 10). Daughter Atiya stated firmly that ‘those lower castes do not do *taraqqi* [because they] *can’t* do *taraqqi*’. Religious minorities have a similar disadvantage. Religious identity creates the *contingent* form of exclusion, which is closely linked to the *principal* and *derivative* forms of exclusion but not completely determined by it. Religious minorities in rural Pakistan were usually excluded from property and social networks, and their religious identity increased their disadvantage through day-to-day discrimination.

With these forms of exclusions in mind, below I explore the roles that schooling was perceived to play in social closure. Families’ perspectives about the role of schooling in *taraqqi* fall into three categories: (a) schooling was all that was needed; (b) schooling had no role at all; and (c) schooling was important but not sufficient (see annex 7.1). As the focus of this chapter is to examine the complex ways in which schooling enters into the social lives of families, it is important to first survey the range of perspectives on the role schooling can(not) play in the process of *taraqqi*. Such an overview of the perceived role of schooling in the

---

<sup>179</sup> This was particularly true in the Canal Colonies (such as the district of my research) which were set up by the colonial rule after upgradation of irrigation system to boost agricultural production. Populations migrating from other parts of India were socially structured such that the upper caste were given large land, those in the middle of caste hierarchy were given small farms, and those at the bottom of caste hierarchy were settled in as landless workers and service providers – known as *kammis*. By this logic, one may consider caste to be the *principal* form and landownership as *derivative* form. However, these caste groups were structured differently in relation to landownership mainly because of their historic command over agricultural resources, mainly land, in other parts of colonial India. Moreover, once given land, it was land that took prominence rather than caste. This is also evident from the fact that the caste-land overlaps are not universal in Pakistan, they vary across the country implying that a particular caste group may have large landownership in one village but not in another. Caste is thus a *derivate* form of exclusion.

<sup>180</sup> This is a dominant caste group in the village which is spread across Punjab.

<sup>181</sup> These are the low castes associated with manual occupations.

wake of the identified forms of exclusion (*principal, derivative and contingent*) provides the context for uncovering the various strategies families adopt to achieve social closure, either *exclusionary* or *usurpatory*, to advance their prospects for social mobility. This approach is particularly useful in revealing the dynamic process of social stratification and the sorting of individuals and groups into various positions while illustrating the role schooling plays in such processes. I begin with the strategies of the dominant groups.

## **MODES OF EXCLUSIONARY CLOSURE**

Here I demonstrate the dominant group strategies when they deploy various forms of exclusion to monopolise resources and opportunities. I describe how a differentiated education system works in their favour, how they employ social and cultural capital to distance themselves, from others, how they are able to capture state authority through their ‘political labour’ and how, using bribes and privilege (*sifarish*) to close off jobs, and how they hoard opportunities and use various symbolic closures to maintain their advantage. I begin by illustrating how the stratified education system is implicated in this process of social closure.

### *Differentiated education*

Poor families in the village were too hard-pressed by their day-to-day struggles to invest in educating their children. Given the high opportunity costs and constant need for labour on family farms/*karobar*, many could not attend even the free public schools. The desperate struggle to survive in the face of limited economic opportunities appeared to push the poor to make what Geof Wood (2003) calls a *Faustian bargain* in which short-term security goals were achieved by postponing long-term prospects for development. Such discounting of the future was elaborated by mother Lateefan:

If sons went to school, their father would say they should have handled the cattle with him or prepared meat with him, as he was alone at his shop. His focus was on his work mainly, so my sons could not study much.

An important strategy of the dominant groups to achieve social closure was their ability to have better schooling than the dominated, even in the rural context. As Chapter 3 illustrated, education policies in Pakistan have historically emphasized higher education while ignoring the quality of primary schooling, resulting in low learning levels in primary schools,

particularly in rural Pakistan. Recent education reforms which have been driven by a neoliberal agenda focused mainly on the privatization of education rather than on improving access to and the quality of learning at public schools. Increased privatisation of education in the Punjab meant that there were increasingly differentiated educational resources for the rich and poor leading to divergent trajectories toward social mobility.<sup>182</sup>

Embedded in the statistics on social mobility in Chapters 5 and 6 lie the realities that only some could afford private schools which had ‘demonstrated good results’ to survive as a business and where teachers were considered to ‘pay more attention to children’. Mother Kiran noted that ‘children go to private schools in neat uniform and sit on a clean chair, there is a lot of difference between the two’. Many respondents observed that those attending private schools were given better training which prepared them to attain more *taraqqi*, as elaborated by daughter Atya:

Private school children are very intelligent. They have had a lot of training. They give them a lot of time. They pay less attention in the public schools. In government schools, they just talk but in private [schools] they pay attention a lot.

Those who could afford transportation preferred to educate their children at better schools outside the village. Here secondary schooled daughter Sela explained:

Children from influential families either study in the city or in the [neighbouring] town . . . Only children from poor [families] go to the schools in the village. That’s how landowners have done a lot of *taraqqi*.

In Chapter 6 I demonstrated clearly that there were significantly high economic returns to private educational investment from 1986 to 2014. Differentiated education thus was instrumental in maintaining the advantage of the privileged, in terms of both years and types of schooling, such as ‘rural’ or ‘urban’ and ‘public’ or ‘private’. This village was no different.

#### *Social and cultural capital*

As villagers were aware, achieving *taraqqi* relied on having access to information about various career opportunities and a realistic assessment of what they could achieve

---

<sup>182</sup> Chapter 2 reported that a higher share of private versus public sector education is associated with lower chances of intergenerational mobility (in the OECD countries).

educationally and occupationally. Such information could affect an individual's perceptions and aspirations and potentially improve their awareness of what was possible for 'people like them' (Bourdieu 1977). However, access to such resources in the village appeared to be differentiated by a family's social and economic status. Consequently, those from disadvantaged backgrounds competed with those with more resources.

Social capital, particularly when gained through caste and kinship networks, offered additional resources which were considered immensely helpful in advancing the interest of households, including finding valued public-sector jobs. Key informant Faisal, who had a postgraduate education and worked at the university in the city, illustrated how social networks mediated the educational outcomes of the village youth:

Those who have links, or their families are connected, or come from certain *biradrees* [kinship groups] get jobs. They get guidance and help from these links and find jobs. Otherwise, they just stay in the village . . . Those who don't have these links, their survival is hard, despite their education.

Box 7.1 below presents the case study of Akhtar's family to illustrate the role various forms of capital played in his family's prospects for *taraqqi*.

**Box 7.1: Akhtar's family: Self-perpetuating advantage**

Akhtar and his wife Kinza were both secondary schooled, retired primary school teachers. Both belonged to the village's dominant kinship group, and Kinza came from a landed family. After their retirement, they invested their savings in a fertiliser business in the village which turned out to be quite successful. Kinza was also elected as a Lady Councillor on the village council; the family was thus well-integrated into the village power structure. They had two daughters and two sons. One daughter went to university to study for an MA in fine arts. Their oldest son went to work in an East Asian country after his higher secondary schooling. The youngest son wanted to be a police officer, 'to have the authority' and 'fear about him in the area', but then changed his mind. While studying for his BA, he worked at his father's fertiliser business for a couple of years and learnt about the business. He also learnt a foreign language and got a work visa, then joined his

brother overseas. After several years of working abroad and saving some money, both brothers returned to start a business back home:

We both brothers went abroad, and returned last year . . . By the grace of Allah, I saved a lot of *sarmaya* (capital/money) there. My brother also had a lot of savings. We worked hard, as a result our family funds grew a lot. Now brother has started his own work. We have started two businesses. There has been enough progress in our family, now, we will pursue further [*taraqqi*] through our children, will raise them nicely. (Rahim, 13, S)

By the time I interviewed the family, both brothers had set up their individual construction-related businesses and were very happy with their progress. Both their sisters were married, one was living in Lahore and other in the main city nearby.

Akhtar's case demonstrates the relative ease of the school-to -work- transition for sons in a family with economic, social and cultural capital. Given that both parents were teachers, the sons' educational success was natural, although the parents thought their sons did not progress educationally as much as they had wanted them to. Wealth and social networks enabled the oldest son to go overseas, and even failing to complete his BA did not limit the second son's economic opportunities. He also did not have to develop a complicated strategy to go work overseas, as did young men from poor families (described below). Given their family's property ownership, social networks and entrepreneurial experiences, the sons could take risks and start their own businesses after returning home. Their schooling and other advantages had significantly helped them to achieve *taraqqi*.

*'Political labour'—capturing state authority*

Perhaps the most important social closure strategy in rural Pakistan is manifested in the politics of patronage which historically has been the state's *modus-operandi*. Based on the primordial loyalties of kinship and dominated by relationships of property, patronage shapes the rural political organisation and is linked to the top echelons of national politics.<sup>183</sup> Village-

---

<sup>183</sup> In return for supporting ruling parties in the federal and provincial governments, lawmakers have historically influenced not just the development activity in their respective constituencies but also have manipulated nearly all government offices to sustain the political structure. These politicians shared their influence with the village elites, granting them access to public resources and opportunities, including public sector jobs, in return for votes.

level politics is manoeuvred through landowners and/or kinship heads, where access to power, resources and opportunities are further negotiated within the respective groups. These vertically integrated networks of patron-client relationships are integral in shaping the life chances of rural families. *Villages* are not *cities*, and *villagers* are not ‘*citi-zens*’ of the state who have equal rights and entitlements; to realise their citizenship rights, villagers have to ally with the competing factions of property owners.

Those within the village’s patronage-based networks who negotiate on behalf of their community do not necessarily represent everyone’s interests; their representation instead reflects the village social hierarchy. The influential exert their power both *downward* to secure political support and *upward* to maximize their share of public resources, opportunities and access to the authority of public office. This vertical integration of the landed and kinship elites into state authority grants them discretionary powers that enhance their ability to pursue their self-interests and those of their immediate social groups. They were thus most likely to pursue *taraqqi* and support their immediate groups. As Najam commented, ‘Landowners have done the most *taraqqi* because they got help from our Member National Assembly (MNA)’. The entire structure of patronage-based politics rests, it seems, on the complacency of the dominated which inevitably results in their own subjugation. Najam commented:

In our village, *Araeen* are doing the most *taraqqi* . . . Well, they own a few acres of land but we also elevate them; we make them by giving them our vote. They become *Chauhadaries* and establish a direct connection with the MNA. Then the MNA would listen only to them, not to us. Whatever they say, will happen.

Several participants talked about the exclusionary role of this politics of patronage which, by exploiting the poor at the village level, increased the monopolisation of resources and opportunities for the politically connected rich. They often talked about the influential families’ appropriation of residential land which was meant to be granted to the landless as one manifestation of such exploitative political arrangements. Mother Lala explained:

If there were any free residential plots for poor, they were given to rich. How could we do *taraqqi*? Look at this house in front of us, there are bush growing on its empty ground, it is degrading as none is living in there to take care of it. And here we don’t have enough place in our home to sit down. Nawaz Shareef’s government allotted 7 *marla* plots, and those who were meant to distribute in the village, kept them for

themselves. How are we then going to do *taraqqi*? . . . Only [the] rich are doing *taraqqi*.

Capturing state authority appeared integral to the strategies of the privileged to dispossess the poor and maximise their own control over public resources and opportunities . The notion of ‘political labour’ has been used by Collins (1975, 1979) to describe the strategies of dominant groups to capture the exclusionary, monopolistic and well-rewarded positions by forming alliances and influencing others. The consequences of such ‘political labour’ were severe for the poor as they threatened their livelihoods, whether or not they had any schooling (see the case study of Khadim’s family in the next section).

#### *Securing jobs—sifarish and bribes*

Despite the deep penetration of the neoliberal development agenda that has resulted in the continued privatization of public enterprises in Pakistan since the 1980s (c.f., Chapter 4), public-sector jobs were seen as the main pathway to social mobility for the educated. Given the unregulated labour markets, private-sector employment could be highly insecure and was characterised by extremely poor working conditions and exploitative work environments (UNDP 2018). In contrast, the public sector offered employment security and protected workers’ rights, thus were preferred by the villagers.

However, public-sector employment opportunities often excluded the poor, landless and those outside the influential kinship groups. Such perceived social closure in the labour market appears to have been achieved through at least two key instruments: paying bribes to recruiting officials or their brokers, and using *sifarish* (a personalised reference or recommendation) from an influential person. Those excluded from the privileges of property ownership and valuable social networks thought it nearly impossible to secure jobs without paying bribes and/or *sifarish*, regardless of their educational level.

Emphasizing the centrality of *sifarish* in securing jobs, secondary schooled father Liaqat noted that ‘if you have a *sifarish*, then you can do *taraqqi*. With education only, they don’t let you progress; don’t even let you in to their offices’. Brick-kiln worker Khadim, whose family had great faith in schooling, explained further: ‘Education alone is great, but in our society, it does not help . . . All my sons and daughters got good grades, but those who have *sifarish* are

successful; we tried hard but couldn't find a job'. Based on his secondary schooled elder brother's failure to secure salaried employment, unschooled brick-kiln worker Imran reiterated the point that the poor cannot pursue *taraqqi* despite their education: 'Who gives them a job? . . . From where shall we arrange the money for bribes? . . . Wherever you go, they ask to bring money and get jobs otherwise there are no jobs'.

In such a desperate situation, the poor expected that 'some kind human had helped them find a job', as 'there is no worth of the poor now; you need someone's help for [a] job and this doesn't happen here' (Itrat, D, 5). Some poor villagers even tried paying bribes but without success, as they could not offer enough or supplement the bribes with *sifarish*:

*Sifarish* is important, and you need to pay money to get a job. They ask for money and we are tired of paying bribes, even then nobody listened to us. Our son has paid bribes at many places, sometimes 15000 sometimes 18,000 and sometime 20,000 but none gave him a job, they eat away the money. (Rahila, M, 5)

Secondary schooled father Liaqat elaborated further:

[Politicians] don't let anyone progress and give jobs to the people of their own choice . . . They become MNAs with the votes by people but whether or not you vote [for] them, they don't help you. They give excuses that there is a ban on public sector jobs . . . If you don't have money, it is hard to get anything done.

The lack of the *right* kind of networks and alliances restricted the poor's prospects for social mobility—a disadvantage that schooling could not compensate for. This was particularly true for the poorest families, whose structural position was characterised by multiple forms of exclusion (such as of caste and religion). As Bakht commented, 'caste and *biradree* [kinship] also matter such that when you can't reach out to influential people, your path is itself blocked'. This '*blocked*' path precisely describes the Weberian sense of social closure. For example, the lack of valuable networks created a sense of voicelessness for father Khadim and perpetuated his family's poverty over generations: 'Nobody would listen to us. If we had money, we can get heard. Either money or *sifarish*, and we got no money'. Father Akhtar pointed to the public-sector institutions that were implicated in reproducing the social order by privileging those who had affiliations with public officials: '[The poor] lack

relationships/networks. In every office, they prefer people from their own caste/*biradree*. They try if there is someone from their own caste, they help them progress’.

The reason for the growing gap between the educationally successful and the socially mobile and those left behind living often in poverty lies in the political conditions under which the poor have had to negotiate their social mobility over generations. Their education offered them little help in terms of success; there was a sense that young men had ‘degrees without freedom’ (Jeffrey et al. 2009) - see, for example, in mother Nazima’s perspective:

There are many who are educated but could not do *taraqqi*. There are many who have BA degrees but can’t find jobs, they are hanging around, idle. They don’t get public-sector jobs. In our own family, my brother-in-law’s sons, one with 12 years of schooling and [an]other with 14 are unemployed, can’t find a job.

Such exclusion of the poor from the pursuit of social mobility made them question the purpose of education, as daughter Itrat stated:

I am telling you, previously, educated would find jobs. Now even educated are not getting jobs. Here are many with BA degrees and are cutting grass, raising cattle and have nothing else to do . . . If this is what one has to do after education, one should rather not study; if all you have to do is household chores after education then education is pointless. Their parents spend so much on their education despite being poor and if they don’t get meals at the end, then what’s the use of such education. If one has to have such a rough time, then education is useless . . . Without education, if one has some courage, one can do some business.

For the poor and those lacking the means to get jobs (i.e., through *sifarish* and bribery), education was seen as creating disincentives for undertaking work which did not match their qualifications. The result was the higher level of unemployment amongst the uneducated, as noted by father Liaqat: ‘Those who don’t have *sifarish* and money get their rough time. They can’t even go for [manual] labour. It is hard for [the] educated to carry the bucket. Even if they are educated, no-one cares’.

### *Opportunity hoarding*

Another of the dominant groups' exclusionary closure strategies involved hoarding opportunities for themselves (Tilly 1988). The valuable social capital offered by landownership, privileged caste identity and the resulting patronage networks created cohesiveness within the dominant groups. Their ability to cater to each other's interests was seen as helping them pool resources to foster social closure. Mother Lala declared that 'all *Araeen* are landowners. They all take care of each other; they pass on [opportunities] within themselves and find jobs for each other'. Son Ali made a similar observation:

They don't help, get their own things done and take their way. In whatever way it works, they get jobs for their people. Their things don't stop. They have all the facilities; they grow all the foods themselves.

The *taraqqi* that the privileged groups achieved through such monopolising strategies was not inconsequential for the poor: 'Those who don't have these links, their survival is hard, despite their education' (Faisal, KI, 16). Such social closure enabled the privileged to dominate economic opportunities in agriculture, public-sector employment and private businesses. They were seen as holding tremendous power in rural social life:

*Araeen* have done *taraqqi*. They own . . . land . . . they have all their sons at jobs, and they are themselves running shops. *Har side tun unhan di gul chaldee ae* [Their influence runs in all directions]. They own tractors, have cars, whatever you name, they have it. Then they are the ones who had to do *taraqqi*. (Bakht, F, 5)

The inability of the poor, the landless and those not from the higher castes were likely to perpetuate the cycle of their intergenerational poverty: 'Amongst the ones with the lowest *taraqqi* are those who are far from politics, did not establish the contacts, and are also behind in terms of *biradree* standing. Such people are unable to do *taraqqi*' (Shuja, S, 16). Son Shuja elaborated further on education's inability to compensate for social disadvantage: 'Given the trends in our society, even if these people get education, they are left behind. There are some examples of people succeeding with a lot of education but the majority needs connections, politicians' support, *sifarish* and bribery more than education'.

The few religious minority families in the village experienced even greater overlapping

exclusion. Discrimination based on their religious identity exacerbated the disadvantages associated with caste identity and landownership. Such a *contingent* form of exclusion made it even harder for schooling to break down the multiple layers of disadvantage and exclusion:

Caste and kinship have a role in *taraqqi*. First they don't give us a job. If they do, it is always a cleaning job; we just can't get any other job. I have struggled hard to find my 10 years schooled son a job in army. I also thought of getting him recruited in police. They don't let us in police without bribes. One who pays the bribes is given the job, those who can't, they are not given any job. (Bakht, F, 5)

Those making it into public-sector organisations through such negotiations were seen to be guarding further opportunities for members of their own group, as Shuja noted:

These people are sitting at all the key positions, when someone from their own caste goes to them for [a] job or for help on some other matters, they are more attentive to them as he is from their own caste or kinship.

### *Symbolic closure*

Social closure was also achieved and reinforced through *symbolic closure* (Tholen 2016) in the Bourdieusian sense, where the disadvantaged considered the privileges of the advantaged to be *natural*. Such beliefs deepened and maintain the domination (ibid.). Son Ali, with five years of schooling, illustrated this sense that the upper castes deserve their advantages for being wise, entrepreneurial and strategic:

*Araeen* have done the greatest *taraqqi* in the village; they had land, property, everything . . . They have businesses of all sorts. They are wise in every sense. Every *Araeen* child is clever and they save every penny.

Village butcher and unschooled father Rehmat also noted the constellation of property ownership and caste advantage, and how they shaped strategies for social mobility to make the advantages of the privileged appear natural and well-deserved:


In our village, *Araeen* have done the most *taraqqi* . . . The thing about these people is that they run a *karobar* like a *karobar*, whether it is farming, or setting up a shop, or

educating a son and sending him abroad or finding him a job.

The poor thus seemed to consent to domination by the advantaged, thus legitimising the village social order. Rehmat considered his own kinship to be responsible for their misery: ‘Our *biradree* has done a little *taraqqi* and the reason is the comfort/laziness/luxury’. As Bourdieu argues, such an understanding of power relations gave legitimacy to the social order and facilitated its reproduction. Poor families *knew* that the processes of stratified schooling, the oppressive politics of patronage and opportunity hoarding were blocking their way to *taraqqi*. This knowledge did have the implications for their strategies for *taraqqi* which I shall explain in the next section.

In sum, *taraqqi* was primarily seen to be the domain of those who owned land, had wealth in their families and came from certain caste and kinship groups. They were considered the ones who could educate their children, find public-sector jobs, work overseas and start their own *karobar*. Their economic status and their social and cultural capital gave them power in the village whilst integrating them into the structures of power at higher levels. When needed, they could draw from their social networks and monopolise scarce resources and opportunities, closing them off to those outside their groups. Such modes/strategies of exclusion and social closure are summarised in Figure 7.2 below.

**Figure 7.2: Modes of social closure**



## THE USURPATION STRATEGIES OF THE DISADVANTAGED

I have focused so far on the exclusionary strategies that the privileged groups used to monopolise resources and opportunities. These exclusionary strategies as we shall see, impacted on the life chances of underprivileged families in the village in a number of different ways, who in turn drew upon a range of their own counter-strategies. The efforts to ‘escape subjection, disesteem, and dispossession’ (Murphy 1984, p. 548), while variable in nature and form, carry in themselves the potential to disrupt the stratified social order. Drawing upon the earlier work by Parkin (1974, 1979) Murphy (1984) distinguished between *inclusionary usurpation* and *revolutionary usurpation* where the former refers to situations where the dominated demand ‘more advantageous inclusion of members in the present distributive system rather than a modification of the system itself’ (p. 560)—in other words, proportional representation within the given power structure. The latter type refers to a situation in which the dominated group ‘makes a direct attempt to change the structure of positions in society and in some cases to change the structure of nation states’ (ibid.).

The aim of this section is two-fold. First, through the case studies of the four families, I illustrate the ways and extent to which the exclusionary strategies impact upon the life chances of the families who were landless, the poor, and those from the low-caste and minority religions. I then examine the ways in which these families attempted to mobilise various resources and opportunities to expand their prospects for *taraqqi*, *in* and *through* schooling to ‘bite’ as it were ‘into the advantage’ of the privileged (Murphy 1984 p. 548). The consequences for social mobility and *taraqqi* are shown to be complex and somewhat unpredictable. These family case studies below demonstrate that, although *revolutionary usurpation* in the village appears to have been limited, the poor families I interviewed strove for *inclusionary usurpation*, seeking gradual improvements in their living conditions. I start with Khadim, one of the poorest families in the study. His son Najam’s understanding of the world was captured in the poignant phrases he used contrasting ‘a [social] order that reproduces itself’ with ‘a fortune that keeps sleeping’.<sup>184</sup>

---

<sup>184</sup> ‘Aik nizam jo chalta rehega’ and ‘kismet jo sotee rahegee’ (Najam, a primary schooled son)

### Box 7.2: Khadim's family

Khadim, an unschooled landless labourer, belonged to a low caste of potters. His wife, who passed away a year before I interviewed the family, had four years of schooling. They had four sons and three daughters. While all his children were good students, his sons dropped out in various grades because of financial difficulties, and none could complete secondary schooling. Khadim's daughters had better educational experiences than his sons. The oldest daughter completed higher secondary schooling (12 years) at the village school before getting married. The second daughter enrolled in an open university's distance-learning program and completed her BA. She was teaching at a private school in the village at the time of interview and aspired to pursue a master's degree through distance learning. Khadim's youngest daughter dropped out of school in grade 6, married and lived in a distant city. Khadim's oldest son dropped out just before finishing secondary school because of financial difficulties. He then went to Lahore to learn the plumbing trade while living with his uncle; he has been working as a sanitary worker since then.

A critical juncture in the family's history in the 1990s demonstrates the exclusionary closure they experienced, and the limits on and consequences of the *usurpation* strategies of the poor. The Government of Pakistan introduced a rural housing scheme for the landless in the early 1990s, including in Khadim's village. These residential plots, like other public resources and opportunities, were distributed through the established patron-client networks. Khadim allied with a faction of influential landowners and managed to get a plot for his family. This success, however, led to a dispute with the competing powerful faction of landowners in the village, who opposed him. Consequently, a police case was registered against him and he was put in jail which disrupted the family income, as he was the main breadwinner. Subsequent events cost the family a fortune, as they had to pay not just legal expenses but hefty bribes to the police to get him out of jail. The family was able to retain their plot; however, the total expense incurred far exceeded the market value of the land. The family was under heavy debt by the time Khadim came out of jail.

The brick-kiln industry in Pakistan is known for harsh working conditions and for the prevalence of bonded labour, which is akin to slavery. Khadim's family had borrowed money from his employer to get him out of prison. Consequently, when he returned to

work, most of his weekly earnings were deducted to repay the loan which left little for the large family's needs.

As it was not 'honourable' for his sons to continue their studies while there were 'adult sisters at home', the 'father was working alone for longer hours' and the family was 'under a massive debt', one of Khadim's sons, in order to start earning money quickly, dropped out of grade 7 and started to learn tailoring from a tailor in a nearby village. The other son left school at the same time, when he was in grade 6. He started to learn plumbing but soon left it, as it paid little. He then started working with his father at the brick kiln to repay the debt and to meet family's living costs. By the time I interviewed the family, two other sons had also joined them at the brick kiln, including the youngest who had recently dropped out of grade 8. Given the precarious nature of their work, each time the household economy had a major consumption shock the family became indebted, and additional labour was needed to pay it back:

Father was working and got indebted then I started working with him. Then I got married and got indebted again, then my brother also started working with us. Like this, by the time all brothers are married, my children will be grown up; *yeh nizam aisay chalta rahega* (this order will keep working in the same way), the life will be consumed in paying back the debts. (Najam, 5, S)

Najam's ordinary day began by dawn. His work involved moving bricks in and out of a kiln: 'You will think I am joking but you can see in my hair, there is nothing else but all dirt in there'. This work was highly seasonal, as the kiln shut down for four months annually, and Najam had to look for other casual work. He was aware of the importance of building networks and relationships to achieve *taraqqi* but thought his work did not permit that. By the time he finished work, the day had already gone and he was exhausted: 'Then in the night, we fall asleep just as the kismet of the poor sleeps'. There was just no time to attend to 'anyone's *khushi* (delight) or *ghammi* (sadness)', let alone build the valuable social networks.

This was not what Najam had thought of doing while growing up. He had aspirations to complete his education and join the army. Had his family not entered the dispute over the land for their house in the public housing scheme, they would not have incurred debt and Najam probably would not have left school; now he accepted it as 'Allah's will'. He still

aspired to break out of this harsh work but ‘only if Allah helps’ so he can ‘go to Saudi Arabia or Dubai’ and earn more.

Khadim’s case illustrates that the impact of the *principal* (landownership) and *derivative* (kinship) forms of exclusion, where control over the residential plots was used by the dominant groups in the village to monopolise precisely those resources and opportunities meant *exclusively* for the poor. When the poor resist such perceived subjugation, the backlash can be fatal to their educational aspirations and do irreparable damage to their prospects for social mobility. What is striking here is that the state apparatus—the process of distributing public land and the workings of the police and the legal system—added to the oppression of Khadim’s family. Moreover, the markets are not any less exploitative under such conditions, as is evident from the family’s fall into bonded labour and the sons’ disrupted schooling.

My next family case study illustrates a story which mixes poverty, caste, landlessness and religious exclusion where only weak inclusionary strategies around schooling were the option.

### **Box 7.3: Bakht’s family**

Primary schooled Bakht and his unschooled wife Irfana were from a religious minority and a caste traditionally associated with cleaning jobs, thus they had the lowest status in the village. They had three sons and two daughters. Bakht was a brick-kiln worker for almost 30 years. Irfana, despite her chronic illness, took care of the home and family. Using an *inclusionary usurpation* strategy, the two had high expectations that schooling their sons would help them break out of poverty and achieve *taraqqi*. Bakht’s father took a keen interest in his grandson’s schooling and kept in close contact with his teachers. Despite financial difficulties, the oldest son completed secondary schooling which was the requisite for many low-level public-sector jobs at that time.<sup>185</sup> However, the family’s low social and economic status meant there was little support available to help him secure salaried employment. The labour market in Pakistan is known to discriminate against the particular social group Bakht’s family came from that was associated with cleaning jobs. Thus the family was subject not only to the *principal* and *derivate* forms of exclusion but also the

---

<sup>185</sup> Some 15 years ago when competition over jobs was not as intense.

*contingent* form. Bakht succinctly described this multi-layered social and economic exclusion:

They don't give us job in the first instance, and when they do, they give us cleaning related jobs. We can't get other jobs. I have tried hard for my son who had 10 years of schooling to find a job in army or police. They don't let us in without bribes in police. Those who pay bribes get jobs and those who can't pay bribes don't get jobs.

After a few years of desperate efforts to find employment, Bakht's son bought a donkey cart and started supplying mud to a mill in the city which had since been his main source of livelihood. He was living in the city with his wife and children. Having failed to realise their aspirations for social mobility in two generations, Bakht hoped that his grandchildren would get a better education in the city and find some job to pursue *taraqqi* when they grew up.

Bakht's daughters did not attend school; rather, they took up the caring role in the household when they were very young, as their mother was sick. Both were married and living far from their parents when I interviewed the family. The unimpressive labour market outcomes of the secondary schooled son had implications for the schooling of his younger brothers. Shafiq, the youngest and most intelligent of Bakht's sons, was very good at his studies. However, knowing schooling was not a definitive path for *taraqqi* 'for people like him' (Bourdieu 1977), he quit school after grade 7 and pursued an alternative track. He went to the city and joined an automobile workshop, where he lived with his brother while learning to repair tractors and agricultural machinery. He then joined another workshop and learnt to repair vehicles. Through his skills and attitude, he developed a good reputation at work which gave him immensely valuable networks that were to play a crucial role in his life.

Some of the people Shafiq knew found him a work opportunity in an East Asian country and helped him travel there by lending him money. Once overseas, his new job paid him well, and he started sending his family a decent amount of money every month. With the help of this additional income, his parents were able to pay back their loans, build a new house and get medical treatment for his mother. A year before I interviewed the family,

Shafiq had lost contact with them; they had not received money from him, nor did they know how to contact him.<sup>186</sup> The family was once again living on the meagre wages from their work at the brick kiln. Bakht's middle son, Imran, with only one or two years of schooling, worked with his father and looked for casual work in the months when the kiln was shut. Imran did not like his work but thought he had no other options, and no money to start some *karobar*. He said that 'there is no improvement in our circumstances'. *Taraqqi* appeared to him nearly impossible and he thought they were 'rather becoming poorer'.

Bakht's case illustrates the extent to which *contingent* forms of exclusion exacerbate the disadvantages caused by the lack of property and belonging to a low caste. Here we see an instance of social mobility for one son but the rest of the family seems to have lost its prospects for *taraqqi*. While religious identity appeared to be a source of this family's exclusion, it played a rather strong inclusionary role in Akhtar's family's process of *taraqqi*.

In contrast to Khadim's and Bakht's families, Akhtar's sons' usurpation strategies mean that they took three different paths, using vocational training and religious education to break through social closure. These were alternative spaces for negotiating *taraqqi*. Education played a significant but different role in the family's upward mobility. For one son, this required mobilising religion-based social solidarities.

#### **Box 7.4: Akhtar's family**

Primary schooled Akhtar worked on his farm along with his brother, and their families lived together. Akhtar's wife Kiran was unschooled, and they had three daughters and four sons. All his daughters were married; one had primary schooling, another had secondary schooling and Quranic education, and the youngest had higher secondary (12 years) schooling and Quranic education. Akhtar's oldest son did not get an education and the second one terminated his studies after completing secondary schooling in the hope of finding salaried employment. Unable to find a job, he decided to learn vocational skills and started working as a helper to an electrician from his village to complete his training. Unable to earn enough through this work, he learnt to drive vehicles. Through the social

<sup>186</sup> Bakht thought Shafiq had probably married someone there so got busy in his own life, forgetting his parents. But they were also concerned about his safety. I offered to help in tracking him down by putting them in contact with the Pakistani embassy in the country, but they declined my offer.

networks he developed at work, he found a driving job in Abu Dhabi and secured his travel arrangements by borrowing money from his friends. He worked for four years in Abu Dhabi and helped his family financially. He then found a better opportunity in Saudi Arabia, where he was working when I interviewed the family. The remittances he sent regularly were crucial to his family's *taraqqi* in the village.

Akhtar's youngest son took a different route. He left school after the primary level and was working as a chef. In contrast, the third son, Shuja, was facing financial difficulties at secondary school. Knowing that formal education was expensive and it would not necessarily compensate for his family's lack of wealth or the social capital required to find a decent job, Shuja shifted to religious education. He aspired to 'become a better Muslim' and to find employment opportunities within the religious sector that would not require bribes or *sifarish*. At the *madrassah* in the city, he was inspired by the college-educated teachers, and wanted to be like them. Shuja decided to continue his formal education alongside his full-time religious education. He took higher secondary and degree exams as a private candidate and was always successful. His brother in Abu-Dhabi/Saudi Arabia constantly assured him of his support and encouraged him to get as much education as possible. In the meantime, his teachers offered him a teaching opportunity at a *madrassah*-linked academy that offered formal schooling. While teaching there, he completed his BA and MA degrees and was thinking of entering a university to pursue an MPhil degree. He earned a decent monthly salary, which his parents were very pleased with. The parents thought Shuja deserved a permanent public-sector job as he qualified for all the exams, but he failed to get one because the family lacked *sifarish* and did not pay bribes.

My final example is that of Liaqat's family, which found social mobility elusive – a failed voyage to *taraqqi*. The family also tried to use schooling wherever they could and the father and oldest son were even secondary schooled. However, neither Liaqat nor his three sons could raise the family's economic status. The process of social closure they faced led to one of his sons travelling abroad for work, but after a series of disasters, the family's prospects declined. There was little they could do to gain advantage in life.

### Box 7.5: Liaqat's family

With his secondary schooling, small farmer Liaqat was amongst the most schooled fathers in the sample. Yet he could not find a regular public-sector job 'due to poverty' and had done some casual jobs in the past. His wife Nazima was unschooled. They had four sons and three daughters; all the daughters completed primary schooling and were married at the time of my fieldwork. Their oldest son dropped out of school after eight years and, after doing various jobs, was running a rikshaw. The second son completed secondary schooling with the hope of finding salaried employment. Unable to find a job, he first joined a workshop in the city to learn to repair household electric appliances and then another to learn plumbing.

Dissatisfied with his prospects of meeting his high aspirations for *taraqqi* through the opportunities available to him, Liaqat's secondary schooled son planned to go work overseas. After borrowing the needed money, he went to Iran, where he lived for some time as he looked for work. Hoping for better opportunities, he then left for Europe via a network of human smugglers, paying them large sums with the help of his family. While entering Europe illegally, he was arrested by the Greek border forces and was sent to Turkey, where he spent a few weeks in jail before being deported to Pakistan. Back in Pakistan, his family's economic conditions deteriorated due to a lack of income and the loans taken for his failed voyage to *taraqqi*. He borrowed more to set up a clothing shop in a small town near his village and started making some money. However, to his continued bad luck, the entire market caught fire and his shop was burnt down. This led the family into further indebtedness as they borrowed more money to rebuild the shop.

Liaqat's third son was keen on studying further but the family could not afford it. He dropped out of school after grade 8 at the time his brother was trying to enter Europe. After a few years of learning skills at a workshop in a town nearby, he became an auto electrician. Through his networks at work, he found a job in a company that repaired vehicles on the Islamabad-Lahore motorway. His work hours were hard and the salary was low, but the family was hopeful that the experience he was gaining would help him either find a good job or set up his own *karobar* in the future. Liaqat's youngest son did not take an interest in his studies and instead 'got into bad company' and left school after grade 5. He was working as a chef in the same company on the motorway where his auto mechanic brother worked.

These three family histories capture some of the conditions under which resistance and usurpation strategies were developed. It was not without trying that poor families tried to overcome their social exclusion but they fell back into poverty, unable to improve their family members' access to resources and opportunities. What was noticeable was the poorest families I interviewed had high educational aspirations to help them achieve *taraqqi*, even in the wake of exclusionary social closure. All the parents hoped to break out of poverty or that their children would, or at the very least that their grandchildren would have better opportunities. Such optimism in the given circumstances was remarkable. Despite being born into poverty, parents thought of achieving higher social and economic status not only to improve their own lives but also to provide their children with better schooling. When young farmer Akhtar thought of 'going abroad to work and earn well so as to provide all the facilities to our children', his wife Kiran also wanted to provide their children with a good education. Their son Shuja, after achieving both religious and higher formal education, wished to find a public-sector teaching job. Akhtar's was a success story, but not everyone was as successful.

Aspirations for *taraqqi* were persistent, although the goal kept shifting from one generation to the next. Bakh wanted his oldest son to join the army or police and thus schooled him despite their acute poverty: 'He had 10 years of schooling, and at that time, 10 years was a lot'. His wife, Irfana, wanted to work hard to save money to school their children and wanted her sons to have 'their own *karobar*'. Their son Imran, also a brick-kiln worker, had thought 'of doing a lot of *taraqqi*, wanted to earn and feed [his] parents'. These family members saw schooling as central to realizing their aspirations but had to face the harsh reality of their disadvantaged social origin. Speaking about his oldest son, who ran a donkey cart in the city despite having secondary schooling, Bakht hoped that his grandchildren would have better schooling in the city. Similarly, butcher Rasheed had wanted his sons to study so as to 'understand themselves, understand worldly affairs, so that they can do their own good *karobar*'. His wife Lala wanted her sons to have a good *karobar* and the daughters to 'get married into beautiful homes'. Their daughter Irum 'wanted to become a school teacher' after her studies but 'there was no system at home, how could they have educated me' when 'there was a lack of money'.

Not everyone was equally optimistic or successful in sustaining such aspirations. Nazima had wished her children to 'get education, find good jobs, and have good homes' but 'none of the

dreams of my youth was fulfilled; the life is consumed in poverty and the remaining is also passing in poverty'. Primary schooled mother Fareeda also wanted her children 'to become someone, do [a] job so that people should say how her mother had raised them, educated them and helped them rise'. However, her daughter Atiya, who had wished to become a school teacher while studying, found her 'mind did not work' so she left her studies. Fareeda's son Ali wished to join the police, but he was disabled and thus unfit and could not complete his schooling. It is evident that poor parents and their sons and daughters had high educational aspirations for *taraqqi* and at some point considered schooling the most important pathway to social mobility.

The landless and poor families often started with strong faith in schooling, but their interaction with the education system was not always conducive to their success. Their children were less likely to have parental help in their studies and more likely to drop out of schools, 'frolic around' and even drop out of school against their 'family's will', especially if their family was facing economic hardships. They even got reminders from their peers that no-one in their family had previously had any education, and they were drawn into work during school hours by family members or others. The poor quality of the basic schooling they received also did not often help in their transition to post-primary schooling. Some could not cope with the shift in social relations, from the simple organisational structure of the primary school to the complex and challenging environment of the secondary school. But the families still worked hard, particularly so their sons could stay in school and at least finish secondary schooling, which was the prerequisite for most entry-level public-sector jobs.

Poor households seemed to start off with high aspirations for the schooling of their older sons, but the younger sons of Khadim, Bakht, Liaqat, Rehmat and Jamal dropped out of school in the early grades. The oldest sons' transition from school to work in the socially embedded labour markets often seemed to have shaken the younger brothers' faith in schooling and lowered their educational aspirations. Bakht's case illustrates that stigmatised religious minorities did not succeed even with an education; they were condemned to hazardous work which disesteemed them and perpetuated their disadvantage over generations. In contrast, when older sons achieved some economic success through schooling, as in Akhtar's and Aslam's families, the younger sons benefited from the older sons' economic and social support as they developed their own strategies and often pursued schooling. Here again, educational aspirations seemed to be affected by previous patterns in the family.

### *The social scape*

Pakistan's rural economy did not offer many opportunities where the social scape was unfavourable to the poor. Escaping the village to secure their livelihoods was thus an important strategy for these young men. Once in the urban environment, they developed the social networks they had lacked, which played a crucial role in opening up economic opportunities for them. Sons of Bakht and Akhtar worked in the city after learning various skills and were offered employment overseas. Their newly acquired social networks also offered them financial assistance for travel which they paid back later on. However, these networks were not always dependable; Liaqat's oldest son ended up in jail when attempting to enter Europe with the help of traffickers whose network he learned about in the city. Thus they needed to navigate new opportunities carefully to avoid traps that could exploit them and perpetuate their disadvantage.

Rural households, whether rich or poor, were deeply embedded in the prevalent politics of patronage, wherein the poor had little agency and could not engage the structures, which were not necessarily easy or beneficial for them. They were expected to provide favours to the political elites in return for their support which at times included providing labour, as Bakht explained: 'If we work for the *Numberdar* then he helps us in matters, otherwise not'. As the political power structure consisted of competing elite factions, careful navigation could grant the poor some access to valuable resources and opportunities. At the same time, the poor's agentic role could invite a strong backlash from the competing elites. For example, Khadim's attempt to manoeuvre these power relations had serious consequences for his family and cost him money, time in jail, and further indebtedness that disrupted his sons' schooling. The family's trajectory could have been different had they been able to acquire land without such a backlash.

Religion as we have seen played an important but dualistic role in the village social life. For those belonging to a religious majority but unfavourably positioned in the social structure, religion could offer an alternative, relatively egalitarian social space. Shuja wished to continue his studies after matriculating from the formal school but could not afford it. After joining a *madrassah* in city, he was able to thrive in his religious and formal education and

secured a well-paying job through these networks. At the time of his interview he was even thinking of entering the university to pursue an MPhil. His religious networks also seemed to improve his sisters' educational aspirations; they completed secondary and higher secondary schooling while reconciling their worldly education with the religious one. Religion-based solidarities offered the family a relatively egalitarian social space, in contrast to the deeply hierarchical one in the village.

In contrast, religious identity perpetuated the disadvantage faced by Bakht's family. Despite his secondary schooling, Bakht's oldest son couldn't get a decent job and was offered sanitation work. He ended up buying a donkey cart which he used to supply mud to a factory. His second son, whom I interviewed, spoke of the day-to-day discrimination in the community and when he was attending schooling. Knowing that formal schooling was not the route for his social mobility, Bakht's youngest and most intelligent son dropped out of school in grade 7 and pursued an alternative track. Unlike those from the majority religion, like Akhtar's family, Bakht's family could not easily escape the stigma associated with their minority religion and hence could not break out of their disadvantaged position, even with schooling.

#### *The gendering of usurpation and schooling*

It would be a mistake to neglect the gendering of usurpation strategies. Gender norms tied sons' schooling to its *economic returns* for the poor, while schooling of the non-poor could be associated with social status and the schooling of girls increasingly could offer new ways to break through disadvantage. Sons' schooling was valuable as long as it could offer economic rewards. However, when the expected returns diminished, the sons' schooling was disrupted, either by the parents or by the sons themselves. In contrast, daughters' schooling was not conditional on its returns in the labour market, as it was associated with domesticity and matrimonial returns. Daughters could continue their studies as long as the women in the family could manage their carer roles and the family had the means to cover the direct educational costs. Good schooling could potentially bring daughters a good marriage proposal and hence contribute to the family's *taraqqi*. When a family required additional members to provide care, the daughters' schooling suffered. Admittedly, Bakht's daughters did not go to school because their mother was sick and they had to take up caring roles. Khadim's youngest daughter and both of Rehmat's daughters had the same experience.

The usurpation strategies of Khadim, Rehmat, Akram, Jamal and Aslam, involved daughters on average having higher levels of schooling than the sons, which was at odds with the prevalent gender norms. There are several potential explanations for this pattern. First, the village girls' school offered schooling to grade 12, whereas the boys' school provided education only to grade 10. Boys had to go outside the village for further education which added transportation costs. Second, daughters in families with schooled mothers tended to have higher schooling than sons, as was the case with Khadim and Anwar; this corresponds with the increased effect mothers' literacy had on daughters' schooling from 1986 to 2010, as shown in Chapter 5. Such intergenerational gains for female schooling could be seen in this village, with potentially transforming the gender order but also providing future inclusionary strategies of the younger generation through better parenting.

From a male point of view, the gendered notion of *taraqqi* meant that the form of masculinity and notion of honour needed by young men in the village required poor sons to shoulder their family's economic responsibilities at an early age rather than prolonging their childhood by staying in school, particularly in the wake of economic shocks. Some sons like Najam did not consider it 'honourable' to stay in school whilst the rest of the family struggled economically. Sons were thus likely to drop out of school sooner than their sisters. While a reversal of the gender order might have had far-reaching effects, the sons dropping out of school meant that they could not contribute to *usurpation*—rather, it deepened exclusion over the long term. This is precisely the 'low education/poverty' trap I pointed to in Chapter 5. Sometimes securing short-term survival required sons to take up work as soon as possible, at other times they were disillusioned about schooling enabling them to break into the socially embedded labour markets that excluded the poor and left them with little incentive to pursue further studies.

Although formal schooling did not equip young men with many skills that they could use in the agrarian rural economy or urban job market, having some level of education helped them navigate the often complex and non-linear transition to work, even when not in a formal job. The literacy and numeracy they gained through even a few years of schooling helped them learn vocational and technical skills at the workshops they joined as *shagirds* (apprentices). The sons of Khadim, Akhtar and Bakht learnt various skills before finding jobs in Pakistan and abroad. These post-schooling apprenticeships, while characterised by less than ideal working conditions, have proven to be valuable pathways to a secure livelihood.

### *Maritocracy*

In contrast, a subtle social change, or the possibility of it, has resulted from changing marital norms, including a preference for educationally assortative marriage<sup>187</sup> across social groups could have long-term implications for the stratified social order. Schooling interacted with the institution of marriage in at least four ways that opened up the possibility of *taraqqi* for young women: prolonging childhood, increasing the possibility of marital consent, opening up marriage across kinships, and improving marital relationships. Child marriage is common in rural Pakistan, and whilst parents saw it as their religious duty to marry their daughters as soon as they became adults, schooling often delayed their marriages. As reported earlier (Arnot and Naveed 2014), daughters in this community actively used schooling to prolong their childhood. Once schooled, families struggled to find appropriately educated matches for their sons and daughters, further delaying their marriage. Schooling also offered sons and daughters an opportunity to be consulted about their marriage decisions, but in practice not every level of education gave them agency in marital decision-making. The opinions of those with postsecondary schooling and relatively better economic status (like Samina and Shuja) were taken into account in marital decisions.

I introduce the notion of maritocracy here to capture the role of schooling in mediating the prospects for female social mobility through marital prospects. Admittedly, this concept needs to be developed fully, for example, by tracking the changing patterns of assortative marriages induced by the differential uptake of the mass schooling. It will also be important to look into the ways such marriages improve the status of women, even within the domestic sphere, and contribute to intergenerational social mobility through the effects of the mother's schooling on that of her children. As of now, using this notion of *maritocracy* helps examine the influence of schooling on social structure through its potential restructuring of kinship solidarities.

Marriage is central to the social organisation in rural Punjab as it plays multiple roles, including the extension and protection of kinship and caste boundaries which inevitably protects property ownership and thus maintains *exclusionary social closure*. As mass schooling came to these villages, it influenced marital strategies. Some respondents saw schooling as enabling both young men and women from poor families to marry into rich ones,

---


<sup>187</sup> This refers to the phenomenon when similarly, schooled men and women marrying each other

particularly if they had a good job. Others considered schooling unhelpful, in part because of the ‘arrogance of the rich’ and in part because of the poor’s inability to have ‘a nice house’ for sons or a ‘good dowry’ for daughters, even if they had schooling.

Nonetheless, as few young people progressed to higher levels of schooling, they had fewer equally schooled matches from their kinship group, which made the case for leaping over the class and kinship divide. As Samina explained, richer families could consider a poor but educated man for their daughters as the latter’s education could offer good economic returns in the future. While this appeared to be progressive social change that made *inclusionary usurpation* possible, some families worried that such marriages would be highly disruptive of the existing kinship relations, as poor sons would be expected to leave their own families behind without fulfilling their obligations to their parents and siblings. Poor families were particularly vulnerable to such a breakdown of kinship solidarities, as pointed out by Rehmat. In any event, most respondents believed that educated women could have greater agency in their marital lives and greater voice in their domestic decision-making.

In Figure 7.3 below I summarise the *usurpation strategies* of the dominated.


**Figure 7.3: Usurpation strategies of the dominated**



## REFLECTIONS

Figure 7.4 attempts to summarise the complexity within which the meanings are constructed, and aspirations and strategies of individuals and their families are shaped in one rural community. It visualises the Weberian social conflict within which the competition over scarce resources, power and opportunities took place in the village. Mass schooling was experienced and negotiated within a constellation of social relations, hierarchies and continued struggle. From the perspective of social mobility, expanding *schooling alone*, while necessary, could not weaken the relationship between *social origin* and *education*, between *education* and *social destinations*, and between *social origins* and *destinations*. Greater transformation of the wider relationships in society, in the labour markets and between the state and rural *citizens* is needed if schooling is to play an equalising role in everyone's lives. Figure 7.4 represents diagrammatically the processes of social closure and the usurpation strategies of the excluded from gaining power and/or some form of social mobility.

**Figure 7.4: Social closure, schooling and social mobility in rural Pakistan**



Any form of *usurpation* requires mobilising the power of the dominated group to counter the *exclusionary closure* strategies of the dominant. The family cases I have offered do not suggest a strong sense of *revolutionary usurpation* amongst the poor. These poor families attempted to build their networks, alliances and social support in order to marginally increase their access to resources and opportunities for their *taraqqi*. However, these are weaker forms of *inclusionary usurpation* in which they struggled for their share of opportunities and resources. In most cases, they developed these networks outside the village social scape, often through relationships at work. This did not pose any direct challenge to the stratification order

of the village. Nonetheless, as some poor villagers accessed secure livelihoods in cities or overseas, the resulting improvement in their economic status potentially led to social restructuring. The schooling of young men to the secondary level or above was crucial in this regard although insufficient on its own. The backlash to *usurpatory* strategies to bite into the dominance of the landed elites over public resources could actually deepen a family's disadvantage, which suggests there were few prospects for *revolutionary usurpation* that could drastically redistribute resources and opportunities. Given the hegemonic influences of the principal *derivative* and *contingent* forms of exclusion, change in the rural stratification order has to be slow and, as a consequence, social mobility is likely to be incremental and occur over generations

## **CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSION**

This thesis makes an important contribution to understanding the social and economic impact of the rise of mass schooling in Pakistan since the country's founding in 1947. It addresses a number of key questions about the role of schooling relative to the nation's vision for national economic progress, and to the overall social and economic inequality experienced by various generations. It uses a range of conceptual approaches, research strategies and datasets to track the national government's priorities, the educational experiences of two successive generations at two data points, the economic returns to education during this period, and the ways the parental generation and sons and daughters of families living in a rural environment perceived their schooling to work for them.

The data I drew from to generate a robust body of evidence on the patterns of educational and social mobility consisted of (a) educational and economic policymakers' discursive framing of the role of schooling relative to goals of meritocracy, the social order, addressing problems caused by poverty and disadvantage and, latterly, of social exclusion; (b) statistical evidence of household patterns in intergenerational educational and social mobility during 1986 and 2014, as differentiated by various factors of social origin; and (c) the perspectives of family members in a rural community in the Punjab, many of whom encountered barriers to achieving successful educational careers and productive outcomes. Below I outline some of the key findings which emerged from the analysis of these three data sources.

### **SOCIAL MOBILITY AND EDUCATIONAL PROVISION: THE OFFICIAL VIEW**

Any close engagement with official development agendas provides insights into the structure of the state and the ways it conceptualises education relative to the economic system. Such official conceptualisations establish conditions for social mobility at both the structural and aspirational levels. For example, the state structures the education system to suit its purposes and at the same time it puts out messages about the value of talent and leadership, and about citizens' moral duty to the country in terms of contributing to its stability and growth. In reforming education, governments can reduce or remove, but also create, barriers to educational opportunities. The metanarrative thus constructed uncovered the political rationale of education and illustrated the historic-structural analysis of educational processes,

including, for example, the tensions around the dichotomous choices between excellence and equity, quality and expansion, and market versus public provision (Torres 1995, p. 315).

Each national context is of course unique, but few countries have faced the challenges the first government of Pakistan encountered, of simultaneously building a new nation and a new state while also developing an education system and an economic order. This unique national context was characterised by (a) high levels of underdevelopment in the regions that constituted Pakistan; (b) the enforced mass migration of 12 million people across borders, during which the most educated individuals and educators departed and were replaced by largely unskilled/low-skilled peasantry and craftsmen, resulting in an acute shortage of skilled human resources; (c) an enormous population that was growing rapidly; and (d) high ethnic diversity. Moreover, the eastern and western regions of Pakistan were geographically separated by India which made the task of nation-building especially complex. These *congenital* conditions implied that the most urgent task for the national leadership was to ensure Pakistan's survival and to build the nation amidst intense domestic political struggles over ideology, political structure and the economic order.

In this context, the goal of social mobility (although signalled at the time of Independence) was less important than producing a class of national elites to run the state and the national economy. There were thus some token ladders offered for some children to use to move up into higher levels of education in the wake of acute economic resources. The new policy regime that was in place by the early 1950s established the tradition of Five-Year Plans that put tremendous faith in the principles of a free market economy. The Plans constructed *meritocratic* commitments that offered incentives to *talented* individuals that were intended to unleash these people's entrepreneurial potential to promote economic growth. Explicit arguments were made against pursuing wealth or earning equality, thus the prospects for social mobility were particularly grim in rural Pakistan during this phase, as the process of industrialisation required transferring resources from the rural to the urban sectors of the economy.

Putting concerns about social inequality aside, the education system was expected to meet the needs of the evolving economic order by identifying and training leaders from the vocational workforce. Schooling was to help integrate the new capitalistic economic order into the rural economy to promote a shift from peasant relationships and agrarian modes of economic

production to a modern industrialising economy. The military regime also wanted to tackle dissent and progressive movements through schooling by inculcating in students the need to submit to authority, thereby legitimising social hierarchies. Educational discourse at this point emphasised promoting efficiency, hard work and competition as a way to transform *private attitudes* in order to fulfil the *public duty* of pursuing economic growth.

The lack of social mobility in Pakistani society, although normally not articulated as such, became a cause for concern when the high levels of inequality between regions and social classes became a source of popular unrest.<sup>188</sup> State responses to the unrest were complex, and the notion of *Islamic Socialism* at this stage furthered the meritocratic/naturalistic agenda of differentially rewarding people who had different *aptitudes* and *talents*. Weak versions of *equality of opportunity* were promoted which justified not universalising the provision of education; consequently, access to education, particularly for the poor, women and the rural population, was extremely limited.

Wide social and economic inequality, and indeed the need for redistributive policies, began to be acknowledged in the next two phases (from 1969 onward), at which time economic growth was acknowledged to be a *means* to an end but not an *end* in itself. This shift in the 1970s was significant, as policy-makers had begun to acknowledge the educational inequalities and anti-poor bias in public spending which was seen as subsidising the rich. Emphasis was placed on expanding educational opportunities in rural and deprived regions, and concern about girls' schooling had begun to shift from religious/familial duties toward more secular goals.

These pragmatic, more egalitarian goals were affected by the conflictual political environment that emerged when the country lost East Pakistan. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that access to schooling was increasing afterwards, in the 1970s. Zulfikar Bhutto led a strong economic redistribution agenda that opened up state provision of education, making education free up to grade 8 and providing free public transport for students. At the same time, the focus on nation-building was increasing, drawing from the religious discourse which gained strength after the military took over the government; General Zia held power from 1977 to 1988. Female social mobility through education was again made subservient to the goal of preserving female roles in a *traditional Islamic society*.

---

<sup>188</sup> Resonating with the demands of the global rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s

The return of democracy to Pakistan in 1988 brought to light the country's severe lack of social development and inequality, despite marked educational expansion. Officially recognising the need for social mobilisation of the rural poor, there was now an emphasis on creating social mobility. By 1992, there was recognition of the high economic returns to human capital which provided strong motivation to universalise primary education and address rural-urban disparities. Benazir Bhutto's 1993 Social Action Programme increased the emphasis on schooling by raising the target for male enrolment at the primary level and began to address the cultural factors that were hindering the progress of women.

By 1999, the military was back in power once again, now under General Musharraf. The subsequent period coincided with establishment of the Millennium Development Goals and Education For All. Pakistan was under increased international pressure to promote Education For All, and various reforms have since been introduced to universalise the country's primary education. From policy-makers' perspective, breaking down the barriers associated with social origin and education needed to begin by expanding basic schooling and later by targeting rural, poor and female groups. Remarkable progress has been made since the late 1990s in expanding education to the rural, poor and women, as shown in Table 1.1. However, as Table 1.2 illustrates, educational expansion has been accompanied by persisting inequalities across gender, wealth, rural and urban locations, and provinces.

This historical account raised the need to look closely at the relationship between social origin and educational attainment, and how the rise of mass schooling in recent decades has altered these relationships. To answer these questions, I turned to the statistics on educational and social mobility.

## **INTERGENERATIONAL EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY**

With these questions in mind, I set out to examine the uptake of educational opportunities in rural Pakistan by the two generations schooled throughout the history of Pakistan using two data points, 1986 and 2010.<sup>189</sup> My initial focus was to use patterns of intergenerational mobility *in* education to assess the extent to which the slow rise of mass schooling was inclusive and transformative—for example, had all households benefited by improving their

---

<sup>189</sup> The latest year for which an inter-linked set of longitudinal data were available when I started my PhD.

sons' and daughters' levels of education? Using a range of quantitative techniques, I first explored the intergenerational patterns in origin-education associations by comparing the education levels of adult sons and daughters in 1986 with those in 2010, as differentiated by their household economic status.

The most striking finding from the household survey was that, despite the expansion of education, the schooling levels achieved by both sons and daughters from the poorest quintile had not increased.<sup>190</sup> The large 'poverty/no-schooling trap' (see Chapters 2 and 5), which is larger for daughters than for sons, had persisted over 25 years. In contrast, the relatively less poor households (those in the 2<sup>nd</sup> quintile) had begun to benefit from the rise of mass schooling by 2010.<sup>191</sup> However, gender differences were noticeable. The major gains made by sons were amongst those from households in the middle of the wealth distribution. Progress also was made in the schooling levels of sons in the 4<sup>th</sup> quintile, whilst the sons from the richest 5<sup>th</sup> quintile maintained their relative advantage over the period in question. In comparison, whilst daughters from the middle of wealth distribution also benefited significantly, the greatest gains were made by girls from the richest two quintiles. Importantly, gender gaps persisted in households from the poorest quintile, but there was a major shift in gender inequality in the three richer quintiles, with more daughters than sons in the richest two quintiles reaching the secondary level and above. While government efforts during the period 1986-2010 appear to have had an important impact on the schooling of sons and daughters, it was differentiated across the families' economic origins.

During this period, strong intergenerational transmission of human capital was observed. More than 40% of households with unschooled fathers had all unschooled sons at both data points. Significantly, around 80% of households with unschooled fathers continued to have all unschooled daughters throughout the period of study. Identifying these persistent pockets of intergenerational educational exclusion, despite the remarkable educational expansion from 1986 to 2010, is the most important finding of this research. This finding suggests that the education system did not enable a significant proportion of the population to break free from

---

<sup>190</sup> At least for the population that still lived in rural Pakistan and had not migrated to cities.

<sup>191</sup> There was a significant reduction in the proportion of households with no son and/or no daughter schooled, most reaching the primary/middle school levels; the proportion of those reaching the secondary level or above remains small and unaffected.

the 'no-education/no-mobility' trap. This pattern also reflects the S-shaped nature of the education system, with a middle schooled father acting as the schooling threshold level, and parents' higher schooling associated with their sons' and daughters' higher schooling.

Regression analysis tracked the strength of the origin-education association over time and the pathways through which parental human capital influenced that of their children. Between 1986 and 2010, sons' schooling prospects were increasingly influenced by their fathers' schooling levels. In contrast, the controlled and uncontrolled effect of the father's schooling on that of their daughters was reduced from the 1986 level. Paternal schooling directly affected sons' schooling but daughters' schooling was affected primarily by the pathway of economic status. The most significant finding from the perspective of the intergenerational transmission of human capital is that mothers' literacy status became extremely important in predicting daughters' schooling by 2010, when it was associated with a greater than three times higher probability of daughters attaining higher schooling levels.

The noneconomic pathways through which fathers' schooling increasingly affected sons' schooling and mothers' literacy affected daughters' schooling suggest the increased role that cultural capital and perhaps early childhood play in the educational success of sons and daughters. These effects seem to be strengthening educational stratification over time.

Over 25 years, the effects of both landownership and economic status on sons' schooling were reduced, suggesting that sons from poor and landless families experienced greater inclusiveness in the education system. This indicates a weakening of the origin-education association for sons during this period. In contrast, this association increased for daughters: girls from rich and landed families have benefited increasingly (and disproportionately) from the educational expansion over the 25 years, more than those from poorer and landless families.

## FROM EDUCATIONAL TO SOCIAL MOBILITY

The rich description of the intergenerational dynamics of human capital and its changing patterns provided the basis for exploring the role schooling played in the patterns of association between education and socioeconomic destination, and quintile of origin and destination, between 1986 and 2014. Using three measures of economic status (consumption, income and wealth), the mobility metrics reported that, by 2014, as many as 70% of households had moved above or below their 1986 quintile of origin. This mobility rate was highest relative to income, followed by consumption, and wealth was last. Households' prospects of reaching the richest quintiles in 2014 were considerably higher for those in the higher quintiles in 1986. Education levels in 1986 mediated the patterns of intergenerational social mobility over 28 years. By 2014, for any position of origin and for all measures of economic status, the odds of being in the poorest two quintiles were higher for households that had unschooled fathers in 1986, whereas the odds of being in the richest two quintiles were higher for households with schooled fathers in 1986.

Exploiting the potential of the Mincer wage equation has been particularly useful in illustrating how education mediated the origins-destinations association. Results from an OLS model suggested low intergenerational consumption elasticity (13%), higher income elasticity comparable to OECD countries (32%), and the highest elasticity for wealth (60%).<sup>192</sup> The long-range returns to household members' schooling in 1986 provided interesting insights, but because these estimates can be influenced by households' fixed characteristics, I controlled for these fixed effects to generate robust estimates of the role schooling played in the families' economic mobility. The FE model suggested larger effect sizes than the OLS estimates. As the FE model is arguably more robust, since it controls for unobserved household characteristics that may impact outcomes and bias OLS results, I summarise the main findings.

Over the 28 years, a one percent increase in private educational spending increased household consumption by 4% and income by 1%. Households that could spend more on schooling (by

---

<sup>192</sup> The OLS model also shed light on the effects of caste/kinship, landownership and areography in mediating the long-range returns to schooling over 28 years (albeit in a somewhat less systematic manner).

choosing private over public schooling or hiring private tutors) were better off over time. Parental schooling during this period seems to have made a substantial contribution to social mobility. An increase in the father's schooling by one level was associated with an increase of 10% in household consumption, 8% in income and 11% in wealth. Strikingly, an increase of one level in the mother's schooling was associated with an increase of 25% in household consumption (a quartile shift), in income of 8% and in wealth of 16%. This is strong evidence of the social stratification caused by parental schooling levels over the 28-year period.

During this period, the schooling of other male household members also had high and linearly increasing returns to an increase in schooling levels. Each additional primary schooled male in the household increased consumption by 10%, and income and wealth by 9% each. The addition of a middle schooled male increased household consumption by 12% and wealth by 19%. A secondary schooled male increased wealth by 23%, whereas a male schooled above the secondary level increased household consumption by 23%, income by 7% and wealth by 44%.

During the same period, female schooling had a strong effect on consumption expenditures and wealth; it did not appear to affect household income.<sup>193</sup> A primary schooled female in the household increased household consumption by 21% and wealth by 42%. A middle schooled female increased consumption by 32% and wealth by 42%. Most importantly, a secondary schooled female increased consumption by 35%, and a female schooled above the secondary level increased household consumption by 37% and wealth by 77%.

In summary, the quantitative analyses make it clear that households whose members experienced upward intergenerational educational mobility over the 28 years also experienced upward social mobility during this period. Those who remained excluded from the education system, despite educational expansion, experienced significant downward social mobility. With these insights into patterns of social mobility and the profound role of schooling in shaping the odds of social mobility, we have a far deeper understanding of the processes that mediated educational mobility and the economic returns to schooling. The statistical analysis provided ample evidence of both the persistence and the transformation of educational and

---

<sup>193</sup> This may be because of the fact that household surveys fail to capture the economic role of women and income, even when aggregated at the household level, is more prone to this bias than the other measures.

economic inequality based on gender, wealth status, landownership, caste and parental human capital.

At the national level, these patterns revealed the educational levels of men and women differentiated by their positions of social origin offered them different long-range economic outcomes. However, the household surveys did not provide sufficiently rich information to determine how such patterns are lived and made sense of by those living in rural areas. Therefore, I sought out the perspectives of families living in a village in the Punjab.

### **FROM PATTERNS TO PERSPECTIVES: *TARAQQI* AND SCHOOLING**

An essential part of this thesis is the insights of those who have tried to use education as a means to build a better life—in terms of economic as well as social status and wellbeing. I gathered these insights through my field work with 23 members of eight families and four key informants. I chose as my research tool the local word *taraqqi* to help me explore culturally relevant, popular understandings of social mobility and the values and meanings attached to it. The concept of *taraqqi* carries aspirations for a better life and a good job, but it also reflects awareness of the structural obstacles which had to be faced in the powerful hierarchy and other elements of the local community. In Chapter 7, I highlighted the highly gendered nature of this notion and how assumptions about gender roles in familial and religious duties affected how sons and daughters could use schooling to pursue social mobility. Advancing economic status and meeting the needs of the family through decent work were important for men who, in an ‘intergenerational bargain’, were to provide security for their family in the parents’ old age. In contrast, daughters were not seen by their parents or their brothers as needing to provide any direct economic support, hence their schooling was not necessarily tied to labour market returns. Social mobility for women was largely perceived as being gained through a good marriage which not only could give young women economic security but also provided new social capital to the parental family and/or strengthened existing social networks. **The implications of such a gendered notion of *taraqqi* was that families prepared their sons for their economic success and daughters for their marital success.** However, despite such strongly gendered educational values, there also were glimpses of a shifting gender order as young schooled women began to question the values that appeared to restrict their life chances.

To gain a deeper understanding of the complex differentiated experiences of families whose perspectives varied, from seeing schooling as sufficient for *taraqqi* to schooling having no role in it, I drew from Max Weber's ideas of *social conflict* and *social closure*. This approach brought local power relations to the centre stage of my analysis of social mobility. I focused on the consequences of the different strategies used by socially dominant and dominated groups in their competition for scarce resources and opportunities with implications for *taraqqi*, *in* and *through* schooling. Various social structures, particularly ownership of land and property, caste and kinship networks, and religious identity, created the *principal*, derivative and *contingent* forms of exclusion. Rural families which were favourably positioned across these forms of exclusion had greater prospects for social mobility, and those who were disadvantaged by these forms had to face social closure. I illustrated in Chapter 7 that, beneath the statistical patterns of educational and social mobility described above, there lay a range of *exclusionary* strategies used by the dominant and counterstrategies of *usurpation* for the inclusion of dominated families.

Landowners and those from the privileged castes had access to better schooling, even in rural settings. They either used the relatively better quality private schools, arranged for private tutors or sent their children to schools outside the village. These dominant families were better positioned to mentor their children, given their better access to education and careers which influenced the aspirations and strategies of young people. Village-level politics relied heavily on patron-client networks and the landed and kinship elites were vertically integrated into the wider power structures in ways that helped them pursue their self-interests and those of their immediate social groups, which at times came at the cost of those low in the social hierarchy. Capturing state authority thus appeared to be a key strategy of the privileged as it maximised their control over public resources and opportunities. This supports the findings of the quantitative analysis that suggested a high uptake of schooling by the sons and daughters of those from the middle levels and above in wealth distribution.

The qualitative data also suggested that labour markets were not necessarily *meritocratic* and instead reflected the wider social hierarchy. Valued employment opportunities excluded the poor regardless of their schooling level, as securing these positions required bribing the recruiting officials and their brokers, as well as providing *sifarish*—personal references from influential people. The social capital offered by landownership, privileged caste identity and the resulting patronage networks created strong cohesiveness within the dominant groups,

adding to their ability to cater to each other's interests and closing off opportunities to those outside. Most importantly, these power relations created a sense of *symbolic closure* amongst the dominated, who considered their advantages to be *natural* and well-deserved. These privileged families were seen as those entitled to pursue *taraqqi*.

Using family case studies, I explored how this multi-layered exclusion of the poor and the landless triggered counterstrategies which they used 'to escape subjection, disesteem, and dispossession' (Murphy 1988). The dominated families attempted to broaden their access to opportunities for social mobility using strategies which were far from *revolutionary* and more *inclusionary* that aimed at gradual improvements in their life chances. It was noticeable that even the poorest families had remarkably high aspirations for their children's social mobility which they hoped to achieve through schooling. These aspirations and hopes were persistent, even when everyday realities pushed the goal for *taraqqi* from one generation to the next. Moreover, the interaction of poor, landless and low-caste families with the education system was not always conducive to their success. As the case studies illustrated, the challenges in the oldest sons' transition from school to work in the socially embedded labour markets often seemed to have shaken these families' faith in schooling. The consequence was that younger sons dropped out of school in lower grades.

The notions of masculinity and of honour that poor young men were exposed to required them to shoulder their family's economic responsibilities at an early age, particularly in the wake of economic shocks, even against the will of their family. Young men navigated the complex and nonlinear transition to work using some of the skills they learnt at school, such as literacy and numeracy. For another group, escaping the hierarchical rural social scape was an important strategy. Like the rich, the poor tried to manoeuvre the politics of patronage and resisted subjugation and exclusion. However, the backlash against such strategies sometimes had negative consequences for the education and life chances of other family members.

Religious perspectives also played a role in mediating the poor's prospects for social mobility. Religious networks could offer a relatively egalitarian social space to those who were poor but belonged to a religious majority. However, religion also could exacerbate the marginalisation and exclusion of religious minorities, even those with more education.

The family case studies revealed how the rise of mass schooling started to shift marital norms and preferences. The traditional endogamy of close-knit kinship groups came under potential threat as young people demanded to marry those with similar schooling. This progressive social change increased the possibility of inclusionary social closure and of widening kinship networks through the inclusion of those previously excluded. At the same time, it threatened the breakdown of social networks among the poor who remained unschooled. Moreover, schooling was seen to increase women's agency in marital decision-making and in day-to-day married life.

The study of one village helped considerably in rethinking the factors that might affect social mobility as a process and a lived experience. In Figure 7.1, I depict the ways local competition over scarce resources and power affected the aspirations and structural realities faced by village members that offered a narrow window of opportunity for the dominated families to rise up on the social ladder. National policy agendas were negotiated through an intense competition at the micro level that determined the strength of association between *social origin, education and destination*.

## **THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS**

Below I describe the specific methodological contributions this thesis makes to the study of schooling and intergenerational mobility. I then illustrate its theoretical contributions to academic debate.

### **Methodological contributions of the thesis**

In this thesis, I developed a research design that demonstrates the value of triangulation across different methodological traditions. It makes a significant stride forward by combining quantitative with qualitative data to illustrate the conditions under which and ways in which social origins shape individuals' educational experiences and education acts back on the social order.

The selection of policy texts provides an example of the value in reading official educational discourses in parallel with the economic agendas of their times, and situating this engagement within the evolving political conditions, including the economic order and the education system. The government's Five-Year Plans situated schooling within the economic order. The

resulting insights would not have been possible by analysing the educational policies alone, or just the economic plans. The two sets of policy documents complement each other, and reading them simultaneously exposes opportunities for, but also limits on, the shaping and uptake of schooling and thus its transformative potential.

I had privileged access to a longitudinal household survey that covered a 28-year period (1986-2014). This is unusual in the context of developing countries which often lack such a long run of longitudinal data. Analysing these data helped me generate robust evidence on the dynamics of intergenerational social mobility while inferring the role of schooling in mediating these dynamics.<sup>194</sup>

Using these data, I have been able to demonstrate that measures of human capital and economic status can be operationalised at the household level as opposed to traditional individualised models of analysis. This operationalisation has been particularly instrumental in identifying acute educational deprivation. The persistence of a large proportion of poor households with unschooled fathers and all unschooled sons/daughters points to the extreme educational deprivation many households experience. Identifying households that are intergenerationally deprived in terms of schooling would not have been possible through a conventional individual-level analysis of intergenerational mobility. In the wake of the slow uptake of schooling in rural Pakistan, this approach also helped identify the subtle educational progress in rural households, where one son or a daughter often progressed to higher levels of schooling. Using intergenerational mobility metrics with household-level measures of schooling also helped identify the S-shaped nature of the education system and pointed to a threshold level of paternal schooling, above which there was higher intergenerational educational mobility and below which there was no/low mobility.

The measures I used also helped track shifts in the patterns of gender education gaps over time in a robust way. Most importantly, adopting the household as a unit of analysis helped honour women's contribution to the household economy, rather than undermining their economic role while exaggerating the 'productivity' of male household members. It has not

---

<sup>194</sup> The 2013-14 data became accessible only in the third year of my PhD, hence my analysis of educational mobility could not include this data.

yet offered a solution that fully accounts for women's contribution to social mobility but it has taken a step in the right direction.

I have argued in this thesis against *mimicking* the occupational categories developed to analyse shifts in social class relations in the industrialised countries for use in the rural context of the Global South, as these categories do not capture the appropriate social class relations in the latter context. Developing multiple measures of social and economic status at the household level has offered a much clearer reflection of the economic and social stratification of rural Pakistani society. By analysing three distinct measures of economic status, my study offers a richer description of these households' social origins and destinations, and movement between the two.

The Mincer wage equation has been a powerful tool for estimating the extent to which human capital in these rural households mediate the origin-destination association over 28 years. Adapting this approach by using the fixed effects model provided the robust estimates of the rates of return to the various levels of household members' schooling over the 28 years, thus identifying the role schooling can play in intergenerational social mobility. The regression models I developed — the ordered logistic regression, the OLS and the FE models — have also been helpful in identifying the role that various facets of the rural social structure, such as landownership, caste identity and geography, played in mediating the life chances of individuals in and through schooling.

The qualitative fieldwork I conducted in a rural community in Punjab added tremendous value to the analysis offered in this thesis. Returning to the same families six years after conducting my initial interviews in 2010 provided me with a *qualitative longitudinal* database to draw from, although space limitations meant that I could not include all the detail I had collected from these families. Through the perspectives of different generations, these data provide deep insights into the ways various rural social structures mediate not just educational uptake but also economic and social gains, and the ways schooling impacts these structures. I have demonstrated that it is feasible to track families over time, even in rural settings and even when young people move away for work or to marry. These qualitative data sustained the intergenerational household-level design which is the hallmark of my research. The qualitative case studies provided a great opportunity to track the power dynamics within the

household, the gender relations and the patterns of social mobility across generations and gender.

I have added to the analysis of social mobility by demonstrating the power of using culturally relevant categories and concepts to gain access to the cultural discourse. Using the notion of *taraqqi* offered me great insights into the perspectives of these rural families and advanced my understanding of their values, meanings, aspirations, strategies, experiences of and reflections on social mobility. I have demonstrated that listening carefully to the voices of the poor provides us glimpses of the hierarchical power structure at the core of social stratification, which mediates not just individuals' educational experiences but the economic gains of whatever schooling they can attain.<sup>195</sup> I plan to return to these large datasets to capture additional aspects of social mobility, as I was able to analyse only a fraction of these data in this research.

### **Theoretical contributions of this study**

My thesis has contributed theoretically to the field of schooling and intergenerational social mobility in three ways.

In a desire to expand the frontiers of the field, I needed to develop an interdisciplinary theoretical framework that reconciled insights generated primarily in the disciplines of economics and sociology. Bringing the empirical evidence offered by these disciplines together with their theoretical explanations required looking at the *rationality assumptions* underlying the scientific paradigms of the two disciplines. Such a reconciliation, as I have demonstrated, offers a more fluid way of conceptualising the social, structural and cultural factors that mediate the relationship between social origins and destinations *through* education.

I have argued that mainstream theoretical models of social mobility assume a highly urbanised context consisting of a welfare state and well-functioning labour markets. This is not necessarily the case in countries which are characterised predominantly by agrarian modes of production, weak welfare states and rather socially embedded labour markets. I argue further that, even in the industrialised context, traditional models of intergenerational social

---

<sup>195</sup> I recently focused on developing new listening methods to analyse the voices of the poor using the family cases I collected previously (see Naveed and Arnot 2018)

mobility are not necessarily appropriate if one tries to use them with a rural population. The urban bias and the relative failure to address the conditions of *rurality* are persistent problems in educational research (see, for example, the Special Issue of Gender and Education (Pini, Molastane, Mills (2014)). The life chances of individuals in such contexts are shaped by a hierarchical dependence on community, where various social structures which mediate the role of schooling and its social and economic outcomes are played out (see, for example, Arnot and Naveed 2014). Conducting an empirical analysis of schooling and social mobility in such a context required doing serious work to reconceptualise the role of the family, the community, the agrarian relationships of economic production, the politics of patronage and the persistence of strong patriarchal values and practices. I have attempted in this thesis to expose economic-sociological theoretical models to the realities of rural social life and its power structure, which added new layers to the relationships of origin-education-destination. The resulting conceptual framework, which began taking shape in Chapter 2, has evolved throughout this thesis. The richness of the resulting empirical analysis exemplifies the value of undertaking such a complex theoretical task. There is much to be gained in future from developing a comprehensive theory of the role that schooling plays in intergenerational social mobility in other low income or middle income countries.

My research also drew from the politics of education through an analysis of the educational and economic policies that span the history of Pakistan. This analysis revealed the need for theoretical frameworks for analysing the role of the state in promoting intergenerational social mobility. This role remains under-theorised in international education research, which has a tendency to overlook postcolonial nation states and privileges the apparatus of international aid. Theories about the state and education tend therefore to be rooted in the experiences of advanced capitalist democracies. I have not drawn from these theories of the state, but the analysis of official policy agendas opens up an opportunity and provides a basis for theorising the macro-level politics of educational and social mobility research in countries in the Global South.

I have made an effort, wherever possible, to address the *gendering* of the conceptual and methodological frameworks used to study social mobility. This is evident in my choice of the household as the unit of analysis, the construction of variables, the design of the qualitative research and the empirical questions raised. I have demonstrated that the field of intergenerational social mobility, which already has moved away from its historic *father-son*

models, can benefit by taking into account a richer picture of patriarchal structures and the sexual division of labour (Arnot 2002). Sadly, not all the information I needed about mothers' education and their work and pedagogic roles was available in the large data sets, but where possible I analysed the impact of mothers' literacy and managed to collect the voices of mothers living in the village.

Whilst the emphasis of international research on education has gradually moved from *access* to *quality* (various GMR reports) *it has not yet sufficiently analysed the effect of such issues on the long term implications for families, especially those living in poverty.* My evaluation of the uptake of mass schooling asks what the social, structural and economic outcomes have been of the mass schooling that has been rolled out, before and after the introduction of EFA. In Pakistan, where the analysis of intergenerational mobility has been limited to educational mobility (Cheema and Naseer 2013; Tamim and Haq 2015; Malik and Jamil 2017; Jacoby and Mansuri 2015), I have extended the analysis to see the ways educational mobility improves intergenerational social mobility. At the same time, I have also provided a fresh analysis of educational mobility and its changing patterns over generations and across gender.

The fields of international education and intergenerational social mobility have avoided an analysis of micro-level power relations and social structures where all national and international agendas are negotiated and translated into peoples' lives. By drawing from the theory of *social closure*, I have demonstrated that rural lives are constrained and enabled by the provision of schools and policy narratives, and are influenced by the social hierarchies that shape the intense competition over scarce resources and opportunities. State institutions and markets are often embedded in these power relations, and they differentiate not only the levels of schooling but also what schooling can do to the lives of men and women, of rich and poor, of landowners and the landless, and of the higher and lower castes.

An important contribution that this thesis can make is to raise new policy debates about how schooling can indeed close the gaps between rich and poor. The complex interplay of social hierarchies and the enduring struggles which shape the educational experiences of young people and their economic outcomes require far more attention to be paid to the role of households, communities and labour market relations. The voices on the ground need to be heard as there lies the possibility of shaping a truly transformative agenda that can make schooling work for all. Such voices clearly ask for greater democratisation of rural communities which can loosen the social barriers that delineate very narrow windows of

opportunity to the socially disadvantaged, if any. Significantly, the power of educational and economic aspirations that poor families pass from one generation to the next, despite their marginalised position needs to be recognised and built upon. There is also a need to recognise that the take up of mass schooling and its social mobility gains are negotiated in a long, intergenerational timeframe which requires sustaining educational reforms for extended periods rather than expecting immediate results in the short term. Policy shifts and erratic moves by governments can destroy the positive effects of previous reforms. It is only through sustained efforts to create genuine enabling conditions can the strong generational associations between social origins, education and social destinations be weakened, and fair and socially just societies be created.

## REFERENCES

- Aaberge, R., Bjorklund, A., Jantti, M., Palme, M., Pedersen, P. J., Smith, N. and Wennemo, T. (1996) *Income inequality and income mobility in the Scandinavian countries to the United States*. Discussion Paper No. 168. Stockholm: Statistics Norway Research Department.
- Ahmad, S. (1970) 'Social stratification in a Punjabi village', *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 4(1), pp. 105-125.
- Ahmad, S. (1973) 'Peasant classes in Pakistan', in Hari P. Sharma and Kathleen Gough (eds.) *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia*, New York: Monthly Review Press, pp. 203-221.
- Ahmad, S. (1977) *Class and power in a Punjabi village*. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Ahmad, N., Hameed, M., Khan, H. and Rafi, S. (2017) 'Gender equality and women's empowerment in rural Pakistan', in David J. Spielman, D.J, Malik, S. J., Dorosh, P. and Ahmad, N. (Eds.), *Agriculture and the rural economy in Pakistan: Issues, outlooks, and policy priorities*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp.391-432
- Akhtar, A. S. (2008) *The Overdeveloping State: The politics of common sense in Pakistan, 1971-2007*. PhD Thesis, SOAS.
- Akhtar, A. S. (2006) 'The state as landlord in Pakistani Punjab: Peasant struggles on the Okara military farms', *Journal of Peasant Studies* 33(3), pp. 479-501.
- Alam, M. (1986) *The crisis of empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Punjab, 1707-48*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- Alan, A. (2011) 'Michael Young's *The rise of the meritocracy*: A philosophical critique'. *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 59(4), 367-382.
- Alavi, H. (1972) 'The state in post-colonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh'. *New Left Review*, No. 72, pp. 59-81.
- Alavi, H. (1972b) 'Kinship in West Punjab Villages', *Contributions to Indian Sociology: New Series*, 6 (1), pp. 1-27.
- Alavi, H. (1974) 'Rural bases of political power in South Asia', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 4(4), pp. 413-422.

- Alavi, H. (1976) 'The Rural elite and agricultural development', in Stevens, R.D., Alavi, H. and Bertocci, P. J. (eds) *Rural development in Bangladesh and Pakistan*, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, pp. 317-353.
- Alavi, H. (1982) 'State and class under peripheral capitalism', in Alavi, H. and Shanin, T. (eds.) *Introduction to the Sociology of 'Developing' Societies*, London: Macmillan, pp. 289-307.
- Alavi, H. (1988) 'Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and ideology', in Halliday, F. and Alavi, H. (eds.) *State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan*, New York: Monthly Review Press, pp. 65-111.
- Alavi, H. (1977), *Class and power in a Punjabi village*, New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Alcott, B., and Rose, P. (2015) 'Schools and learning in rural India and Pakistan: Who goes where, and how much are they learning?', *Prospects*, 45, pp. 345-363.
- Ali, T. (1970) 'Revolutionary perspectives for Pakistan', *New Left Review* I(63). Sep-Oct 1970.
- Ali, I. (1987) 'Malign growth? Agricultural colonization and the roots of backwardness in the Punjab'. *Past and Present*, No. 114, pp. 110-132.
- Alavi, H. and J. Harriss (1989) *South Asia: Sociology of Developing Societies*. London: Macmillan
- Alavi, H. (2001) 'The two biradiris: kinship in rural West Punjab', in Madan, T.N. (eds.), *Muslim Communities of South Asia: Culture, Society and Power*. New Delhi: Manohar. Pp. 1-16.
- Alcott, B., and Rose, P. (2015) 'Schools and learning in rural India and Pakistan: Who goes where, and how much are they learning?', *Prospects*, 45, pp. 345-363.
- Alderman, H., Chiappori, P., Haddad, L., Hoddinott, J. and Kanbur, R. (1995) 'Unitary versus collective models of the household: Is it time to shift the burden of proof?', *The World Bank Research Observer*, 10(1), pp. 1-19.
- Ali, I. (1988) *The Punjab under imperialism, 1885-1947*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ali, I. (1991), 'The Punjab and the retardation of nationalism', in Donald A. L. (ed.) *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan*, London: Macmillan, pp. 29-52.

Ali, I. (2002), 'Past and present: The making of the state in Pakistan', in Ali, I., Racine, J. and Mumtaz, S. (eds.) *Pakistan: Contours of state and society*, Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Ali, I. (2004) 'Historical impacts on political economy in Pakistan', *Asian Journal of Management Cases*, 1(2), pp. 129-146.

Ali, S. (2009) *Governing education policy in a globalising world: The sphere of authority of the Pakistani state*. Unpublish PhD Thesis. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh.

Anderson, S. and Baland, J.M. (2002) 'The economics of roscas and intrahousehold resource allocation', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(3), pp. 963–995. doi: 10.1162/003355302760193931.

Andrabi, T., Das, J., and Khwaja, A. I. (2008) 'A dime a day: the possibilities and limits of private schooling in Pakistan' *Comparative Education Review*, 52(3), 329-55.

Andrabi T, Das J, Khwaja A. I. (2013) 'Students today, teachers tomorrow: identifying constraints on the provision of education', *Journal of Public Economics*, 100, pp. 1–14.

Andrabi. T., Das, J. and Khwaja A. I. (2015) 'Delivering education: a pragmatic framework for improving education in low-income countries', in Dixon, P., Humble, S. and Counihan, C. (Eds.): *Handbook of international development and education*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publications.

ASER Pakistan (various years) *Annual status of education report - Pakistan*. Lahore: Idara-e-Taleem-o-Agahi.

Arif, G. M. and Ahmed, M. (2001) 'Poverty across the agro-ecological zones in rural Pakistan'. National workshop on pro-poor intervention strategies in irrigates agriculture in Asia. Lahore: International Water Management Institute.

Arif, G. M. and Bilquees, F. (2007) 'Chronic and transitory poverty in Pakistan: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey'. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 46(2), pp. 111-127.

Arif, G. M. and Farooq, S. (2012) 'Rural poverty dynamics in Pakistan: Evidence from three waves of panel survey'. Poverty and Social Dynamics Series (PSDPS) No. 2. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.

Arnot, M. (1982) 'Male hegemony, social class and women's education', *Journal of Education*, 164(1), pp. 64–89. doi: 10.1177/002205748216400106.

Arnot, M. (2002) *Reproducing gender? Essays on educational theory and feminist politics*. London: Routledge.

Arnot, M. and Naveed, A. (2014) 'Educational outcomes across the generational and gender divide: The rural family habitus of Pakistani families living in poverty', *Gender and Education*, 26(5), pp. 505–523. doi: 10.1080/09540253.2014.949635.

Arrow, K. J. (1973) 'Higher education as a filter', *Journal of Public Economics*, 2(3), pp. 193–216. doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(73)90013-3.

Arrow, K. J., Bowles, S. and Durlauf, S. N. (2000) *Meritocracy and economic inequality*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Available at: <https://press.princeton.edu/titles/6818.html> (Accessed: 30 January 2019).

Asghar, Z., and Zahra, M. (2012) 'A benefit incidence analysis of public spending on education in Pakistan using PSLM data', *The Lahore Journal of Economics*, 17 (2), pp. 111–136.

Ashraf, N. (2009) 'Spousal control and intra-household decision making: An experimental study in the Philippines', *American Economic Review*, 99(4), pp. 1245–1277. doi: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1245.

Atkinson, A. B., Maynard, A. and Trinder, C. (1983) *Parents & children - incomes in two generations*. London: Heinemann Educational Books, pp. 212.

Azam, M. and Bhatt, V. (2015) 'Like father, like son? Intergenerational educational mobility in India', *Demography*, 52(6), pp. 1929–1959. doi: 10.1007/s13524-015-0428-8.

Aziz, K. K. (2001). *Religion, Land and Politics in Pakistan: A Study of Piri-Muridi*. London: Van-guard Publishers.

- Baker, J. *et al.* (2004) *Equality: From theory to action*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, UK. doi: 10.1057/9780230508088.
- Ball, S. J. (1990) *Politics and policy making in education: Explorations in policy sociology*. London: Routledge.
- Ball, S. J. (1993) 'What is polic? Texts, trajectories and toolboxes', *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education*. 13(2), pp. 10–17. doi: 10.1080/0159630930130203.
- Bari, F., Raza, R., Aslam, M., Khan, B., and Maqsood, N. (2013) 'An investigation into teacher recruitment and retention in Punjab', IDEAS Research Report. Lahore: Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives.
- Bau, N and J. Das (2016) 'The misallocation of pay and productivity in the public sector: Evidence from the labor market for teachers', Policy Research Working Paper No. 8050. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.
- Bayly, C. (1997) *Empire and information: Intelligence gathering and social communication in India*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Becker, G. S. (1965) 'A theory of the allocation of time', *The Economic Journal*, 75(299), p. 493. doi: 10.2307/2228949.
- Becker, G. S. *et al.* (2015) 'A theory of intergenerational mobility', *SSRN*. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2652891.
- Becker, G. S. (1976) *The economic approach to human behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Becker, G. S. (1981) *A treatise on the family*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Becker, G. and Tomes, N. (1979) 'An equilibrium dheory of the Distribution of income and intergenerational mobility', *Journal of Political Economy*, pp. 1153–1189. doi: 10.1086/260831.
- Becker, G. and Tomes, N. (1986) 'Human capital and the rise and fall of families', *Journal of Labor Economics*. 4(3), pp. S1-39.

- Behrman, J., Kletzer, L., McPherson, M. and Shapiro, M. O. (1998) 'Microeconomics of college choice, careers, and wages', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. 559(1), pp. 12–23. doi: 10.1177/0002716298559001002.
- Behrman, J. and Tarbman, P. (1985) 'Intergenerational earnings mobility in the United States: Some estimates and a test of Becker's intergenerational endowments model', *The Review of Economics and Statistics*. 67(1), pp. 144–51.
- Bell, D. (1976) *The coming of post-industrial society : a venture in social forecasting*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bergman, M. M. (2008) 'Introduction: Whither mixed methods?' in Bergman, M. M. (eds.) *Advances in mixed methods research: Theories and applications*. London: Sage Publications. pp. 1–7. doi: 10.4135/9780857024329.
- Bergman, M. M. (2010) 'On Concepts and Paradigms in Mixed Methods Research', *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*. 4(3), pp. 171–175. doi: 10.1177/1558689810376950.
- Bezanson, K. (2006) 'Gender and the limits of social capital', *Can. Rev. Sociol. Anthropol.- Rev. Can. Sociol. Anthropol.*, 43(December 2004), pp. 427–443. doi: 10.1111/j.1755-618X.2006.tb01142.x.
- Björklund, A. and Jäntti, M. (1997) 'American economic association intergenerational income mobility in Sweden compared to the United States', *The American Economic Review*, 87(5), pp. 1009–1018.
- Blanden, J. *et al.* (2006) 'Explaining intergenerational income persistence: Non-cognitive skills, ability and education'. The Center for Market and Public Organisation 06/146. Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. Available at: [https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/bricmpowp/06\\_2f146.htm](https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/bricmpowp/06_2f146.htm) (Accessed: 5 October 2018).
- Blanden, J. (2013) 'Cross-country rankings in intergenerational mobility: A comparison of approaches from economics and sociology', *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 27(1), pp. 38–73. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2011.00690.x.
- Blanden, J., Gregg, P. and Machin, S. (2005a) *Intergenerational mobility in Europe and North America*. London: A Sutton Trust Report.

- Blanden, J., Gregg, P. and Machin, S. (2005b) 'Social mobility in Britain: Low and falling', *CentrePiece - The Magazine for Economic Performance*, Spring, pp. 18–20.
- Bloch, F. and Rao, V. (2002) 'Terror as a bargaining instrument: A case study of dowry violence in rural India', *American Economic Review*, 92(4), pp. 1029–1043. doi: 10.1257/00028280260344588.
- Boliver V (2011) 'Expansion, differentiation, and the persistence of social class inequalities in British higher education', *Higher Education* 61: 229–242.
- Boserup, E. (1989) *Woman's role in economic development*. London: Earthscan.
- Boudon, R. (1974) *Education, opportunity, and social inequality: Changing prospects in Western society*. New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc .
- Bourdieu, P. (1977) 'Outline of a Theory of Practice', *Cambridge studies in social anthropology*, 16(16), p. 248. doi: 10.1590/S0103-20702013000100001.
- Bourdieu, P. (1986) 'The forms of capital', in Richardson, J.(eds.) *Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, pp. 241–58.
- Bourdieu, P. (1990) *The logic of practice*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. and Nice, R. (2004) *Science of science and reflexivity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, J. C. (1990) *Reproduction in education, society and culture*. London: SAGE.
- Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992) *An invitation to reflexive sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (2002) 'Schooling in capitalist America revisited', *Sociology of Education*, 75(1), p. 1. doi: 10.2307/3090251.
- Bowles, S., Gintis, H. and Groves, M. O. (2005) *Unequal chances: Family background and economic success*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

- Bratberg, E., Nilsen, O. A. and Vaage, K. (2005) 'Intergenerational earnings mobility in Norway: Levels and trends', *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 107(3), pp. 419–435. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00416.x.
- Bratsberg, B., Roed, K., Raaum, O., Naylor, R., Jantti, M., Eriksson, T. O'sterbacka, E. (2007) 'Nonlinearities in intergenerational earnings mobility: Consequences for cross-country comparisons', *Economic Journal*, 117(519), pp. 72–92. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02036.x.
- Breen, R. (2004) *Social Mobility in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/0199258457.001.0001.
- Brown, P. (2013) 'Education, opportunity and the prospects for social mobility', *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 34(5–6), pp. 678–700. doi: 10.1080/01425692.2013.816036.
- Bruyn-Hundt, M. (1996) *The economics of unpaid work*. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
- Bryman, A. (1984) 'The debate about quantitative and qualitative research: A question of method or epistemology?', *The British Journal of Sociology*, 35(1), p. 75. doi: 10.2307/590553.
- Carneiro, P. D, J. and Reis, H. (2016) 'The value of private schools: Evidence from Pakistan', Centre for micro data methods and practice', CEMMAP Working Paper CWP 22/16. London: The Institute of Fiscal Studies & Department of Economics, UCL.
- Chadwick, L. and Solon, G. (2002) 'Intergenerational income mobility among daughters', *American Economic Review*, 92(1), pp. 335–344. doi: 10.1257/000282802760015766.
- Chambers, R. and Chambers, R. (1995) 'Poverty and livelihoods: whose reality counts?', *Environment and Urbanization*, 7(1), pp. 173–204. doi: 10.1177/095624789500700106.
- Chana, A. (2015) *Four essays on education, caste and collective education in Rural Pakistan*. Unpublished PhD thesis. London: London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Chaudhry, M. A. (1999) *Justice in practice: Legal ethnography of a Pakistani Punjabi village*, Karachi: Oxford University Press.

- Chaudhry, A. and Vyborny, K. (2013) 'Patronage in rural Punjab: Evidence from a new household dataset'. *The Lahore Journal of Economics*, 18 (Sep), pp.183-209
- Cheema, A. Khwaja, A. I. and Qadir, A. (2006) 'Local government reform in Pakistan: context, content and causes', in Pranab K. Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee (eds.) *Decentralization and local governance in developing countries: A comparative perspective*, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 257-384.
- Cheema, A. and Naseer, M. F. (2013) 'Historical inequality and intergenerational educational mobility: The dynamics of change in rural Punjab', *Lahore Journal of Economics*, 18(September), pp. 211–231.
- Chetty, R., Hendre, N., Kline, P., Saez, E. and Turner, N. (2014) 'Is the United States still a land of opportunity? Recent trends in intergenerational mobility', *American Economic Review*, 104(5), pp. 141-47.
- Chiappori, P.-A. (1988) 'Rational Household Labor Supply', *Econometrica*, 56(1), p. 63. doi: 10.2307/1911842.
- Chusseau, N. and Hellier, J. (2012) 'Inequality in emerging countries', *SSRN Electronic Journal*. ECINEQ 2012-256. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2131360.
- Chusseau, N., Hellier, J. and Ben-Halima, B. (2012) 'Education, intergenerational mobility and inequality', in Hellier and Chusseau, N. (eds.), *Growing income inequalities: Economic analyses*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 227–273. doi: 10.1057/9781137283306\_9.
- Cohen, A. (1989) 'Comparison of correlated correlations', *Statistics in Medicine*. 8(12), pp. 1485–1495. doi: 10.1002/sim.4780081208.
- Colclough, C. (2012) *Education outcomes and poverty: a reassessment*. London: Routledge.
- Corak, M. (ed.) (2004) *Generational income mobility in North America and Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511492549.
- Creswell, J. W. and Plano Clark, V. L. (2011) *Designing and conducting mixed methods research*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Curle, A. (1966) *Planning for education in Pakistan*. London: Tavistock Publications.

- Curle, A. (1973) *Educational problems of developing societies: With case studies of Ghana, Pakistan, and Nigeria*. London: Praeger Publications.
- Cunha, F., Heckman, J. and Lochner, L. (2006) 'Interpreting the evidence on life cycle skill formation', in Hanushek, E. and Welch, F. (eds.) *Handbook of the economics of education*. Oxford: North-Holland, Elsevier, pp. 697–812. doi: 10.1016/S1574-0692(06)01012-9.
- Cunha, F. and Heckman, J. J. (2008) 'Formulating, identifying and estimating the technology of cognitive and noncognitive skill formation', *Journal of Human Resources*, 43(4), pp. 738–782. doi: 10.3368/jhr.43.4.738.
- D'Addio, A. C. (2007) 'Intergenerational transmission of disadvantage: Mobility or immobility across Generations? A review of the evidence for OECD countries'. Social, Employment, and Migration Working Papers. Paris: OECD. doi: 10.1787/217730505550.
- D'Souza, R. (2002) 'Crisis before the fall: Some speculations on the decline of the Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals', *Social Scientist*, 30(9/10), pp. 3-30.
- Darling, M. (1928) *The Punjab peasant in prosperity and debt*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Davies, J. B., Zhang, J. and Zeng, J. (2005) 'Intergenerational mobility under private vs. public education', *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 107(3), pp. 399–417. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00415.x.
- Dearden, L. *et al.* (1997) 'Intergenerational mobility in Britain', *Economic Journal*. 107(440), pp. 47–66.
- Deaton, A. and Zaidi, S. (2002) 'Guidelines for constructing consumption aggregates for welfare analysis', World Bank. LSM Working Paper No. 135. Washington, D.C: World Bank.
- Denzin, N. K. (2008) 'The new paradigm dialogs and qualitative inquiry', *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*, 21(4), pp. 315–325. doi: 10.1080/09518390802136995.
- Dercon, S. and Krishnan, P. (2000) 'Vulnerability, seasonality and poverty in Ethiopia', *Journal of Development Studies*, 36(6), pp. 25–53. doi: 10.1080/00220380008422653.

- Desai, S. and Kulkarni, V. (2008) 'Changing educational inequalities in India in the context of affirmative action', *Demography*. 45(2), pp. 245–270. doi: 10.1353/dem.0.0001.
- Devine, F. and Li, Y. (2013) 'The changing relationship between origins, education and destinations in the 1990s and 2000s', *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 34(5–6), pp. 766–791. doi: 10.1080/01425692.2013.816039.
- Dirks, N. (eds.). (1992) *Colonialism and Culture*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Duflo, E. (2003) 'Grandmothers and granddaughters: Old-age pensions and intrahousehold allocation in South Africa', *The World Bank Economic Review*. 17(1), pp. 1–25. doi: 10.1093/wber/lhg013.
- Dumont, L. (1980) *Homo Hierarchicus: The caste system and its implications*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dundar, H., Beteille, T., Riboud, M. and Deolalikar, A. (2014) Student learning in South Asia: challenges, opportunities, and policy priorities. Directions in development: Human development. Washington, D. C.: World Bank Group.
- Dundar, H. Beteille, T., Riboud, M. and Deolalikar, A. (2014) 'Teacher Quality', Background Paper for *Student Learning in South Asia: Challenges, Opportunities and Policy Priorities*. Washington, D. C.: World Bank Group.
- Dworkin, R. (1981) 'What is equality? Part 2: Equality of resources', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 10(4), pp. 283–345.
- Eglar, Z. (2010) *A Punjabi village in Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Eglar, Z. (1960) *A Punjabi village in Pakistan*. London: Columbia University Press.
- Erikson, R. and Jonsson, J. O. (1996) Can education be equalized?: the Swedish case in comparative perspective. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1999) *Social foundations of postindustrial economies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/0198742002.001.0001.

- Fafchamps, M. and Quisumbing, A. R. (2007) 'Household formation and marriage markets in rural areas', in *Handbook of Development Economics*. 4, pp. 3187–3247. doi: 10.1016/S1573-4471(07)04051-X.
- Fairclough, N. (1992) 'Discourse and text: Linguistic and intertextual analysis within discourse analysis', *Discourse & Society*. 3(2), pp. 193–217. doi: 10.1177/0957926592003002004.
- Farah, I., and Rizvi, S. (2007) 'Public–private partnerships: Implications for primary schooling in Pakistan', *Social Policy & Administration*, 41(4), 339-354.
- Fennell, S. and Arnot, M. (2008) 'Decentring hegemonic gender theory: the implications for educational research', *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education*. 38(5), pp. 525–538. doi: 10.1080/03057920802351283.
- Ferreira, F. H. G. and Peragine, V. (2015) 'Equality of opportunity theory and evidence', World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7217, (March). Available at: [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2581774](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2581774).
- Filmer, D. and Pritchett, L. H. (2001) 'Estimating wealth effects without expenditure data—or tears: an application to educational enrolments in states of India', *Demography* 38(1), pp.115-132.
- Fleetwood, S. (2008) 'A trans-disciplinary (proto) model of labour markets', Centre for Employment Studies Research Working paper 12. Bristol: Bristol Business School, University of West of England.
- Fleurbaey, M. (1995) 'Equal opportunity or equal social outcome?', *Economics and Philosophy*, 11(01), p. 25. doi: 10.1017/S0266267100003217.
- Folloni, G. and Vittadini, G. (2010) 'Human capital measurement: A survey', *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 24(2), pp. 248-79.
- Fortin, N. M. and Lefebvre, S. (1998) 'Intergenerational income mobility in Canada', in Corak, M. (eds.) *Labour Markets, Social Institutions, and the Future of Canada's Children*.

- Francesconi, M. and Heckman, J. J. (2016) 'Symposium on child development and parental investment: Introduction', *The Economic Journal*, 126(596), pp. F1–F27. doi: 10.1111/eoj.12388.
- Fries, C. J. (2009) 'Bourdieu's reflexive sociology as a theoretical basis for mixed methods research', *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*. 3(4), pp. 326–348. doi: 10.1177/1558689809336660.
- Fuller, C. (1989) 'British India or traditional India? Land, Caste and Power' in Hamza Alavi and John Harriss (eds.) *Sociology of developing societies: South Asia*, Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Galindo-Rueda, F., Marcenaro-Gutierrez, O. and Vignoles, A. (2004) 'The widening socio-economic gap in UK higher education', *National Institute Economic Review*, 190(1), pp. 75–88. doi: 10.1177/002795010419000108.
- Gamoran, A. (2004) 'Classroom organization and instructional quality', In M. C. Wang and H. J. Walberg (Eds.), *Can unlike students learn together? Grade retention, tracking, and grouping*. Greenwich, CT: Information Age. Pp. 141–155.
- Gant, G. F. (1959) 'The Ford Foundation program in Pakistan', *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 323(1), pp. 150–159.
- Gazdar, H. (2007) 'Class, caste or race: Veils over social oppression in Pakistan.' *Economic and Political Weekly* 42(2), pp. 66-68.
- Ghurye, G. (1969) *Caste and Race in India*. 5<sup>th</sup> Edition. Mumbai: Popular Prakhasan Private Limited.
- Gilmartin, D. (1988) *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the making of Pakistan*. Berkeley: California University Press.
- Gilmartin, D. (2010) 'Sufism, exemplary lives and social science in Pakistan', In Ernst, C. and Martin, R. (eds.), *Rethinking Islamic Studies: From Orientalism to Cosmopolitanism*. South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press.

Goldthorpe, J. H. (2014) 'The role of education in intergenerational social mobility: Problems from empirical research in sociology and some theoretical pointers from economics', *Rationality and Society*, 26(3), pp. 265–289. doi: 10.1177/1043463113519068.

Goldthorpe, J. H. (2014) 'The role of education in intergenerational social mobility: Problems from empirical research in sociology and some theoretical pointers from economics', *Rationality and Society*. 26(3), pp. 265–289. doi: 10.1177/1043463113519068.

Goldthorpe, J. H. (2016) 'Social class mobility in modern Britain: changing structure, constant process', *Journal of the British Academy*, 4(July), pp. 89–111. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevB.80.195413.

Goode, William J. 1963. 'Industrialization and family change,' in B.F. Hoselitz and W.E. Moore (eds.) *Industrialization and Society*. Mouton: UNESCO, pp. 237-58. Gottschalk, P. and Smeeding, T.M. (1997) 'Cross-national comparisons of earnings and income inequality', *Journal of Economic Literature*, XXXV(June 1997), pp. 633–687.

Government of Pakistan. (1947) *Proceedings of the Pakistan Educational Conference, 1947*. Education Division.

Government of Pakistan. (1951) *Proceedings of the Educational Conference, 1951*. Education Division.

Government of Pakistan. (1955/57) *First Five Year Plan: 1955-60*. National Planning Board.

Government of Pakistan. (1959) *Report of the Commission on National Education, 1959*. Islamabad: Ministry of Education.

Government of Pakistan. (1960) *Second Five Year Plan: 1960-65*. Islamabad: Planning Commission.

Government of Pakistan. (1965) *Third Five Year Plan: 1965-70*. Islamabad: Planning Commission.

Government of Pakistan. (1970) *New Education Policy 1970*. Islamabad: Ministry of Education.

- Government of Pakistan. (1972). *The Education Policy 1972-1980*. Islamabad: Ministry of Education.
- Government of Pakistan. (1972) *The Education Policy 1972-80*. Islamabad: Ministry of Education.
- Government of Pakistan. (1978) *Fifth Five Year Plan: 1978-83*. Islamabad: Planning Commission.
- Government of Pakistan. (1979) *National Education Policy and Implementation Programme*. Islamabad: Ministry of Education.
- Government of Pakistan. (1983) *Sixth Five Year Plan: 1983-88*. Islamabad: Planning Commission.
- Government of Pakistan. (1988) *Seventh Five Year Plan: 1988-93*. Islamabad: Planning Commission.
- Government of Pakistan. (1992) *National Education Policy (1992-2002)*. Islamabad: ministry of Education.
- Government of Pakistan. (1993) *Eighth Five Year Plan: 1993-98*. Islamabad: Planning Commission.
- Government of Pakistan. (1998) *Ninth Five Year Plan: 1998-2003*. Islamabad: Planning Commission.
- Government of Pakistan. (2010) *Tenth Five Year Plan: 2010-2015*. Islamabad: Planning Commission.
- Government of Pakistan. (2004) *Education Sector Reforms 2001-02 - 2005-06*. Islamabad: Ministry of Education.
- Grawe, N. D. (2004) 'Intergenerational mobility for whom? The experience of high- and low-earning sons in international perspective', in Corak, M. (eds.), *Generational Income Mobility in North America and Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 58–89. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511492549.005.
- Greene, J. C. (2007) *Mixed methods in social inquiry*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Greene, J. C. and Hall, J. N. (2010) 'Dialectics and Pragmatism: Being of Consequence', in Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie, C. (eds.) *SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research*. Thousand Oaks California: SAGE Publications, Inc., pp. 119–144. doi: 10.4135/9781506335193.n5.

Gregg, P. *et al.* (2017) 'The role of education for intergenerational income mobility: A comparison of the United States, Great Britain, and Sweden', *Social Forces*, 96(1), pp. 121–152. doi: 10.1093/sf/sox051.

Grewal, J.S. (1990) *The Sikhs of the Punjab*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Habermas, J. (1984) *The theory of communicative action*. Cambridge: Beacon Press.

Habib, I. (2000) *The agrarian system of Mughal India, 1526-1701*. (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition). London: Oxford University Press.

Halsey, A. H., Heath, A. F. and Ridge, J. M. (1980) *Origins and destinations: family, class, and education in modern Britain*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hammad, T. and Singal, N. (2015) 'Education of women with disabilities in Pakistan: enhanced agency, unfulfilled aspirations', *International Journal of Inclusive Education*, 19(12), pp. 1244-1264, DOI: 10.1080/13603116.2015.1043962

Haque, N. (2018) 'Macroeconomic research and policy making: Processes and agenda', *Mahbub Ul Haq Lecture for the Pakistan Society for Development Economics Meeting 2017*. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.

Harding, S. G. (1986) *The science question in feminism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Hauser, R. M. (1970) 'Educational stratification in the United States', *Sociological Inquiry*. 40(2), pp. 102–129. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-682X.1970.tb01004.x.

Heckman, J. and Cunha, F. (2007) 'The technology of skill formation', *American Economic Review*, 97(2), pp. 31-47.

Hertz, T. (2006) *Understanding mobility in America*. Washington, D.C.: The Center for American Progress.

Hintze, A. (1997) *The Mughal Empire and its decline: An Interpretation of the sources of social power*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Hnatkovska, V., Lahiri, A. and Paul, S. B. (2014) 'Breaking the caste barrier : Intergenerational mobility in India', *Journal of Human Resources*. 48(2), pp. 435–473. doi: 10.1353/jhr.2013.0012.

Hoddinott, J. and Haddad, L. (1995) 'Does female income share influence household expenditures? Evidence from Cote D'ivoire', *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*.57(1), pp. 77–96. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0084.1995.tb00028.x.

Hout, M. *et al.* (1996) 'Two paths to educational opportunity: Class and educational selection in Sweden and the United States', in Hout, M., Dohan, D. P. and Erikson, J. J. (eds.) *Can Education Be Equalized? The Swedish Case in Comparative Perspective*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.

Hout, M. (2015) 'A summary of what we know about social mobility', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 657(1), pp. 27–36. doi: 10.1177/0002716214547174.

Hudson, V.M. and Boer, A. M. (2005) 'Missing women and bare branches: Gender balance and conflict'. ECSP Report, Issue 11. 2005. Kent: University of Kent.

<https://kar.kent.ac.uk/11409/1/WW-missingwomen-05.pdf>

Hussain, A. Salim A. and Naveed, A. (2011) *Connecting the dots: Education and religious discrimination in Pakistan*. Washington, D. C.: US Commission on International Religious Freedoms.

Husain, I. (1999) *Pakistan: the economy of an elitist state*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Hyson, R. (2003) 'Differences in intergenerational mobility across the earnings distribution', Bureau of Labour Statistics Working Paper No. 364. Washington, D.C.: US Department of Labour.

Ibbetson, D. (1883) *Punjab castes*, reprint 1974, Delhi: B.R. Publishing House.

- Ichou M and Vallet L-A (2011) 'Do all roads lead to inequality? Trends in French upper secondary school analysed with four longitudinal surveys' *Oxford Review of Education* 37(2), pp. 167–194.
- Iversen, V., Krishna, A. and Sen, K. (2017) 'Rags to riches? Intergenerational occupational mobility in India', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 52(44).
- Jacoby, H. and Ghazala M. (2011) 'Crossing boundaries: gender, caste and schooling in rural Pakistan. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5710. Washington DC: World Bank
- Kandiyoti, D. 1988. 'Bargaining with patriarchy', *Gender and Society*, 2(3), pp.274-290.
- Javid, H. (2012) *Class, power, and patronage: The landed elite and politics in Pakistani Punjab*. PhD thesis (unpublished). London: The London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Javed, S. A. and Irfan, M. (2014) 'Intergenerational mobility: Evidence from Pakistan Panel Household Survey', *Pakistan Development Review*, 53(2), pp. 175–203.
- Jeffery, R. (2012) 'Qualitative methods in the RECOUP projects', in Colclough, C. (eds.) *Education outcomes and poverty: A reassessment*. Oxford: Routledge. pp. 170–194.
- Jerrim, J. and Macmillan, L. (2015) 'Income inequality, intergenerational mobility, and the Great Gatsby Curve: Is education the key?', *Social Force*, 94(2), pp. 505–533. doi: 10.1093/sf/sov075.
- Johnson, R. B. and Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2004) 'Mixed methods research: A research paradigm whose time has come', *Educational Researcher*. 33(7), pp. 14–26. doi: 10.3102/0013189X033007014.
- Karachiwala, N. (2013) 'Social distance and learning outcomes: evidence from Pakistan, [https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db\\_name=NEUDC2013&paper\\_id=250](https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=NEUDC2013&paper_id=250)
- Karachiwalla, N. (2019) 'A teacher unlike me: social distance, learning, and intergenerational mobility in developing countries', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 67(2).
- Kemal, A. R. (1994) 'Structural adjustment, employment, income distribution and poverty'. *Pakistan Development Review* 33(4), pp. 901-14.

- Kerckhoff, A. C. (1993) *Diverging pathways: Social structure and career deflections*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Khan, S. (2012) *The un-official performance of official business in Pakistan: The interface with state bureaucracy and citizens*. PhD Thesis (unpublished). Bath: University of Bath, UK.
- Khan, M. H. (2003) 'Changes in the agrarian structure of Pakistan' in Naseem, S. M. and Nadvi, L. (eds.) *The post-colonial state and social transformation in India and Pakistan*,. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Kurosaki, T. (2003) Measurement of chronic and transient poverty: Theory and application to Pakistan. The Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper Series A No. 436., Tokyo: Hitotsubashi University Kunitachi.
- Leeuwen, M. H. D. V. and Maas, I. (2010) 'Historical studies of social mobility and stratification', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 36, pp. 429-451.
- Lefranc, A. *et al.* (2005) 'Intergenerational earnings mobility in France: Is France more mobile than the U.S.?', *Annals of Economics and Statistics*. (78), pp. 57–77.
- Levine, D. I. (1999) *Choosing the right parents: Changes in the intergenerational transmission of inequality between the 1970s and the early 1990s*. Institute of Research on Labour and Employment, Working Paper Number 72-99. Berkley: University of California.
- Lieven, A. (2011) *Pakistan—A hard country*. London: Allen and Lane.
- Lincoln, Y. S. and Guba, E. G. (1985) *Naturalistic inquiry*. London: Sage Publications.
- Lindbladh, E., Lyttkens, C.H., Hansson, H. B., Östergren, P. O., Isacson, S. O. Lindgren, B. (1996) 'An economic and sociological interpretation of social differences in health-related behaviour: An encounter as a guide to social epidemiology', *Social Science and Medicine*, 43(12), pp. 1817–1827. doi: 10.1016/S0277-9536(96)00087-1.
- Lohano, H. R. (2009) Poverty dynamics in rural Sindh, Pakistan. Chronic Poverty Research Centre Working Paper Number 157. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Loury, G. (1981) 'Intergenerational transfers and the distribution of earnings', *Econometrica*, 49(4), pp. 843–67.

- Lyon, S. M. (2002) *Power and patronage in Pakistan*. Canterbury: University of Kent.
- Majumder, R. (2010) 'Intergenerational mobility in educational and occupational attainment', *Margin: The Journal of Applied Economic Research*, 4(4), pp. 463–494. doi: 10.1177/097380101000400404.
- Malik, A. and Mirza, R. (2015) 'Religion, land and politics: shrines and literacy in Punjab, Pakistan', Pakistan Strategy Support Programme, Working Paper No. 030, May 2015. Islamabad: International Food Policy Research Institute.
- Malik, R. and Naveed, A. (2012) 'Financing education in Pakistan: The impact of public expenditure and aid on educational outcomes', RECOUP Working Paper No. 42. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, Faculty of Education.
- Malik R., Bari, F., Muzaffar, I., Mashhood T., Mansoor M. & Ali A. (2015) *Partnerships for management in education: evidence from Punjab and Sindh*. Lahore: Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives.
- Malinowski, B. 1930. 'Kinship', *Man* 30, pp. 9–29.
- Maniruzzaman, T. (1971) 'Crises in political development and the collapse of the Ayub regime in Pakistan', *The Journal of Developing Areas*, 5(2), pp. 221–238.
- McCulloch, N. and Baulch, B. (1999) 'Distinguishing the chronically from the transitory poor-evidence from Pakistan', Institute of Development Studies Working Paper No. 97. Brighton: University of Sussex.
- Mcgregor, J. A., Copestake, J. G. and Wood, G. D. (1999) 'The intergenerational bargain: an introduction', *Journal of International Development*, 12(4), pp. 336–340.
- McPherson, A. and Willms, J. D. (1987) 'Equalisation and improvement: Some effects of comprehensive reorganisation in Scotland', *Sociology*, 21(4), pp. 509–539. doi: 10.1177/0038038587021004003.
- Merriam, S. B. (1988) *Case study research in education : a qualitative approach*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

- Miles, M. B. and Huberman, A. M. (1994) *Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Mincer, J. (1958) 'Investment in human capital and personal income distribution', *Journal of Political Economy*, 66(4), pp. 281-302.
- Mincer, J. (1974) *Schooling, experience, and earnings*. New York: NBER Press.
- Mohmand, S. and Gazdar, H. (2007) 'Social structures in rural Pakistan', Thematic Paper on the Determinants and Drivers of Poverty Reduction and ADB's Contribution in Rural Pakistan. Islamabad: Asian Development Bank.
- Morgan, D. L. (2007) 'Paradigms lost and pragmatism regained', *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 1(1), pp. 48–76. doi: 10.1177/2345678906292462.
- Morgan, S. L., Grusky, D. B. and Fields, G. S. (2006) *Mobility and inequality: Frontiers of research from sociology and economics*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Mughal, M. A. Z. (2014) *Time, space and social change in rural Pakistan: An ethnographic study of Jhokwala village, Lodhran District*. PhD Thesis (unpublished). Durham: Durham University, UK.
- Muhammad, M. and Jamil, M. (2017) 'Intergenerational mobility in occupational Status', *Foreman Journal of Economic Studies*, 13, pp. 135–159.
- Müller, W. and Karle, W. (1993) 'Social selection in educational systems in Europe', *European Sociological Review*, 9(1), pp.1-23.
- Murphy, R. (1984) 'The structure of closure: A critique and development of the theories of Weber, Collins, and Parkin', *The British Journal of Sociology*, 35(4), p. 547. doi: 10.2307/590434.
- Murphy, R. (1986) 'The concept of class in closure theory: Learning from rather than falling into the problems encountered by neo-Marxism', *Sociology*, 20(2), pp. 247–264. doi: 10.1177/0038038586020002006.
- Narayan, A. et al. (2018) *Fair progress?: Economic mobility across generations around the world*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. doi: 10.1596/978-1-4648-1210-1.

- Naseem, S. M. (2008) 'Political economy of structural reforms in Pakistan', EABER Working Papers. Canberra: East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Nations, R. (1971) 'The economic structure of Pakistan: Class and colony', in *New Left Review*, I(68), pp. 3-26.
- Naveed, A. and Ali, N. (2012) *Clustered deprivations: District profile of poverty in Pakistan*. Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute.
- Naveed, A. and Arnot, M. (2018) 'Exploring educational and social inequality through the polyphonic voices of the poor: A habitus listening guide for the analysis of family-schooling relations', *Comparative Education*. pp. 1–22. doi: 10.1080/03050068.2018.1535644.
- Naveed, A. and Suleri, A. Q. (2015) *Making 'impact factor' impactful: Universities, think tanks and policy research in Pakistan*. Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute/Global Think Tank Initiative.
- Nayab, D. (2011) 'Estimating the middle class in Pakistan', PIDE Working Papers 2011:77. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
- Nayab, D. and Arif, G. M. (2012) 'Pakistan Panel Household Survey sample size, attrition and socio-demographic dynamics', Working Paper Poverty and Social Dynamics Paper Series (PSDPS) - 1. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
- Noman, O. (1988) *The political economy of Pakistan 1947-1988*. London: Kegan Paul International Limited.
- OECD (1998) *Human capital investment. An international comparison*. Paris: Centre for International Research and Innovation.
- Parkin, F. (1979) *Marxism and class theory: a bourgeois critique*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Pearce, L. D. (2012) 'Mixed methods inquiry in sociology', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 56(6), pp. 829–848. doi: 10.1177/0002764211433798.
- Parsons, T., and Bales, R. F. (Eds.) (1955) *Family, socialization and interaction process*. New York: Free Press.

- Pekkarinen, T., Uusitalo, R. and Pekkala, S. (2006) 'Education policy and intergenerational income mobility: Evidence from the Finnish Comprehensive School Reform', IZA Discussion Paper Number 2204. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor.
- Pini, B., Moletsane, R. and Mills, M. (2014) 'Education and the global rural: Feminist perspectives', *Gender and Education*, 26(5), pp. 453–464. doi: 10.1080/09540253.2014.950016.
- Rawls, J. (1971) *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Reay, D., Crozier, G. and Clayton, J. (2010) 'Fitting in' or 'standing out': working-class students in UK higher education', *British Educational Research Journal*, 36(1), pp. 107–124. doi: 10.1080/01411920902878925.
- Roemer, J. E. (1993) 'A pragmatic theory of responsibility for the egalitarian planner', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 22(2), pp.144-166.
- Seal, A. (1971) *The emergence of Indian nationalism: Competition and collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Schultz, T. W. (1961) 'Investment in human capital', *The American Economic Review*, 51(1), pp. 1-17. 
- Sen, A. (1977) 'Rational fools: A critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 6(4), pp. 317–344.
- Sen, A. (1980) *Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Volume I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sen, A. (1998) 'Mortality as an indicator of economic success and failure', *The Economic Journal*. 108(446), pp. 1–25. doi: 10.1111/1468-0297.00270.
- Shami, M. (2010) *The road to development: Market access and varieties of clientelism in rural Punjab, Pakistan*. PhD Thesis (unpublished), London: London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Shavit, Y. and Blossfeld, H. P. (1993) *Persistent inequality : changing educational attainment in thirteen countries*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.

- Simon, H. A. (1997) *Models of bounded rationality: Empirically grounded reason (Volume 3)*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Singh, A. and Motiram, S. (2012) 'How close does the apple fall to the tree? Some evidence from India on intergenerational occupational mobility', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 47(40), pp. 7–8.
- Smith, J. (1991) 'A methodology for Twenty-First Century Sociology', *Social Forces*. Oxford University Press, 70(1), pp. 1–17. doi: 10.1093/sf/70.1.1.
- Solon, G. (2004) 'A model of intergenerational mobility variation over time and place', in Corak (2004) *Generational Income Mobility in North America and Europe*. London: Cambridge University Press. pp. 38–47. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511492549.003.
- Starr, M. A. (2014) 'Qualitative and mixed-methods research in economics: Surprising growth, promising future', *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 28(2), pp. 238–264. doi: 10.1111/joes.12004.
- Stiglitz, J. (1975) 'The theory of screening, education, and the distribution of income', *The American Economic Review*, 65(3), pp. 283–300. doi: 10.2307/1804834.
- Tamim, T. and Haque, T. (2015) 'The intersection of caste, social exclusion and educational opportunity in rural Punjab', *International Journal of Educational Development*, 43 (2015), 51-62.
- Takayama, K. (2016) 'Deploying the post-colonial predicaments of researching on/with "Asia" in education: a standpoint from a rich peripheral country', *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education*. Routledge, 37(1), pp. 70–88. doi: 10.1080/01596306.2014.927114.
- Takayama, K., Sriprakash, A. and Connell, R. (2017) 'Toward a postcolonial comparative and international education', *Comparative Education Review*, 61(S1), pp. S1–S24. doi: 10.1086/690455.
- Teddlie, C. and Tashakkori, A. (2008) *Foundations of mixed methods research: integrating quantitative and qualitative approaches in the social and behavioral sciences*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

- Teddle, C. and Tashakkori, A. (2012) 'Common "core" characteristics of mixed methods research: A review of critical issues and call for greater convergence', *American Behavioral Scientist*, 56(6), pp. 774–788. doi: 10.1177/0002764211433795.
- Thernstrom, S. (1968) 'Notes on the historical study of social mobility', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 10(02), p. 162. doi: 10.1017/S0010417500004795.
- Thomas, D. and Chen, C. L. (1994) 'Income shares and shares of income: Empirical tests of models of household resource allocations', *RAND Labor and Population Program Working Paper Series* 94–08. Chicago: RAND Corporation.
- Torche, F. (2015) 'Analyses of intergenerational mobility: An interdisciplinary review', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 657(1), pp. 37–62. doi: 10.1177/0002716214547476.
- Thurow L. C. (1976) *Generating inequality*. London: Macmillan.
- Udry, C. (1996) 'Gender, agricultural production, and the theory of the household', *Journal of Political Economy*, 104(5), pp. 1010–1046. doi: 10.1086/262050.
- UNDP (2015) *The rise of the Global South: Implications for the provisioning of global public goods: Human Development Report 2013*. Available at: <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/2015-human-development-report.html> (Accessed: 30 January 2019).
- UNDP (2017) *Pakistan National Human Development Report 2017: Unleashing the potential of a young Pakistan*, Islamabad: United Nations Development Programme.
- UNESCO (2015) *Education for all 2000-2015: Achievements and challenges*. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
- Unterhalter, E. (2014) 'Walking backwards into the future: a comparative perspective on education and a post-2015 framework', *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education*. Routledge, 44(6), pp. 852–873. doi: 10.1080/03057925.2014.957040.

- Unterhalter, E. (2012) 'Trade-off. comparative evaluation and global obligation: Reflections on the poverty, gender and education Millennium Development Goals', *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*. 13(3), pp.335-351.
- Usman, A. and Amjad, A. (2013) 'Caste based endogamy in a Punjabi village in Pakistan.' *South Asia Studies*, 28 (2), pp. 341-52.
- Waseem, M. (1994) *Politics and the state in Pakistan*. Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research.
- Waseem, M. (2004) 'Muslim migration from East Punjab: Patterns of settlement and assimilation', in Ian Talbot and Shinder Thandi (eds) *People on the Move: Punjabi colonial and post-colonial migration*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. 63-75.
- Weber, M. (1978/1922) *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology*. London: University of California Press.
- Wilensky, H. J. and Lebeaux, C. N. (1965) *Industrial society and social welfare* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition). New York: Free Press.
- Wood, G. (2003) 'Staying secure, staying poor: The 'Faustian bargain'', *World Development*, 31(3), pp. 455–471. doi: 10.1016/S0305-750X(02)00213-9.
- Wood, G. D. (2013) 'Architects and contractors: political economy analysis of policy research in Pakistan', Project Paer: Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute. Available at: <https://researchportal.bath.ac.uk/en/publications/architects-and-contractors-political-economy-analysis-of-policy-r> (Accessed: 30 January 2019).
- Wood, G. and Gough, I. (2006) 'A comparative welfare regime approach to global social policy', *World Development*, 34(10), pp. 1696–1712. doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2006.02.001.
- World Bank (2018) 'World Bank EdStats (Education Statistics)', Online Dataportal. <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/education/> . Last assessed: October 12, 2018.
- Yin, R. K. (2009) *Case study research: Design and methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
- Yin, R. K. (2012) *Applications of case study research*. London: Sage Publications.

Young, M. (1958) *The rise of the meritocracy 1870-2033: An essay on education and society*. London: Thames and Hudson.

Yousafzai A. K., Obradović J., Rasheed M. A., Rizvi, A., Portilla, X. A., Tirado-Strayer, N., Siyal, S. and Memon, U. (2016) 'Effects of responsive stimulation and nutrition interventions on children's development and growth at age 4 years in a disadvantaged population in Pakistan: a longitudinal follow-up of a cluster-randomised factorial effectiveness trial', *Lancet Global Health*, e548-58. doi: 10.1016/S2214-109X(16)30100-0.

Yousafzai, A. K., Rasheed, M. A., Rizvi, A., Armstrong, R., Bhutta, Z. A. (2014) 'Effect of integrated responsive stimulation and nutrition interventions in the Lady Health Worker programme in Pakistan on child development, growth, and health outcomes: a cluster randomised factorial effectiveness trial', *Lancet* 384, pp.1282-1293.

Zaidi, S. A. (2002) 'Dismal state of social sciences in Pakistan', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 37(35), pp. 3644–3661.

Zaidi, S. A. (2005) *Issues in Pakistan's economy*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Zeidenstein, S. A. (1974) 'Reviewed work: Woman's role in economic development by Ester Boserup', *The Bangladesh Economic Review*, 2(1), pp. 507–510.

Zimmerman, D. J. (1992) 'Regression toward mediocrity in economic stature', *The American Economic Review*, 82(3), pp. 409–429.



## APPENDIX 3.1

### Parental Interview Schedule

Arif Naveed, Sep 25, 2016.

1. Name

2. Age

3. What do you do?

#### PROGRESS/MOBILITY/TARAQQI

#### 4. What is the progress/*taraqqi* in your view?

Probe: *Taraqqi* at the village level/household level/individual level.

What is *taraqqi* for young men?

What is *taraqqi* for young women?

How do families achieve *taraqqi*?

What hinders people from achieving it?

#### 5. Who has achieved the most *taraqqi* in your village?

Probe: Landowners? Caste/zaat/biradree? Previously rich?

What are the factors behind their success?

Prompt: Who has achieved the least *taraqqi* in your village?

Probe: Landless? Caste/zaat/biradree? Previously poor?

what are the factors underlying their low/less success?

#### 6. How important is schooling in achieving *taraqqi*?

Probe: Can one achieve *taraqqi* without schooling?

Is schooling enough to achieve *taraqqi*, if one does not have anything else?

What else is needed in addition to schooling?

Land/*biradree*/political connections, etc.

Prompt: How much has schooling helped those who have made the most *taraqqi*?

Would they still have this much *taraqqi* if they were less educated? How?

What are the schooling levels of those who have achieved less *taraqqi*?

Probe: *If no/low schooling*: how would their situation be different if they had (more) schooling?

What has stopped them using schooling for their *taraqqi*?

#### 7. When you were young, how much *taraqqi* did you aspire to achieve?

Probe: What were your plans to achieve it?

To what extent did you achieve your aspirations for *taraqqi*?

What helped you achieve it?

What hindered you from completely realizing your aspirations fully?

Where do see the role of your (low/no) schooling in whatever *taraqqi* you have achieved?

How do you feel now about what you could achieve and what you could not?

#### 8. When your children were young, how much *taraqqi* did you wish them to achieve?

Probe: How did you want them to achieve that?

To what extent did they achieve your aspirations for their *taraqqi*?

What helped in achieving *taraqqi*?

What hindered achieving your aspired levels of progress?  
What is the effect of your own (low/no) schooling in what they have achieved and what they could not?  
How do you see the role of your children's schooling in the level of *taraqqi* they have achieved and what they couldn't?  
How do you feel about it now?

**9. How much *taraqqi* has your family achieved over the last 6 years? In what ways?**

Probe: *taraqqi* of sons and daughters (*ask separately*)

What has contributed to/hindered this success?  
How has your family used schooling in achieving this success?  
What has hindered your family from using schooling to achieve more *taraqqi*?  
In what ways more schooling could have helped you achieve more *taraqqi*?  
Other than schooling, what else would have helped you achieve more *taraqqi*?

**10. Compared to your generation, how much *taraqqi* has your children's generation achieved?**

Prompt: How are your sons' and daughters' lives different from yours and your siblings' lives?

What is the change in economic status over generation?  
What is the change in social status over generation?

Probe: What has particularly helped make this progress?

Who have been the most significant people influencing this success?  
What is the role of your schooling in this progress?  
What is the role of schooling of your children in achieving this progress?  
Whose schooling is the most effective in achieving the most *taraqqi* in your family?  
How would additional schooling in the family affect the extent of *taraqqi* your family achieved over a generation?  
What else (other than/in addition to schooling) could have helped make the most *taraqqi*?  
Is your achieved level of *taraqqi* what you aspired for when you were at school?  
What has hindered more success/*taraqqi*?

**In your view, how much *taraqqi* will your grandchildren achieve?**

Probe: How will be life of your grandchildren different from your life? From your children's life?

Prompt: Economically/socially/educationally/politically

Probe: What gives you hope?

Do you have any fears for their *taraqqi*? What are those?

How do you see the role of the schooling of your sons and daughters in their *taraqqi*?

**B. SCHOOLING LEVELS OF SONS AND DAUGHTERS**

**Tell us about the schooling levels of your sons?**

Prompt: Schooling levels of your daughters?

**Tell us more about the son who has received the highest schooling\**

Probe: What did you think of his schooling when he was studying?  
What do you think of the role of teachers in his schooling? Prompt: How did you manage expenses for his studies?  
Probe: Who inspired him to study this much?  
Why did he stop schooling at that level? Why not more?

**Tell us more about your son who has achieved the lowest level of schooling**

Probe: How many years of schooling he completed?  
Probe: Why did he quit schooling?  
Were finances an issue?  
Could you ask for financial help from somewhere?  
Probe: How was the behavior of his teachers towards him?  
How was his own interest in studies?  
Why do you think he was not interested in his studies?  
Probe: What is he doing now?

**Tell us more about the daughter who has received the highest schooling**

Probe: How did she manage to study this much?  
Prompt: What do you think of the role of teachers in her schooling?  
Probe: Who inspired her to study this much?  
What did you think of her schooling when he was studying?  
How did you manage expenses for her studies?  
Why did she stop schooling at that level? Why not more?  
Probe: What is she doing now?  
Are you satisfied with her current status?  
Could it have been different? How?

**Tell us more about your daughter who has achieved the lowest level of schooling**

Probe: How many years of schooling she completed?  
Why did she quit schooling?  
Were finances an issue?  
Could you ask for financial help from somewhere?  
How was the behavior of his teachers towards her?  
How was her own interest in studies?  
Why do you think she was not interested in her studies?  
Prompt: What does she do now?  
Are you satisfied with her current status? Is she satisfied with it?  
Do you think her life could have been different? How?

**What is that your sons have learnt from their schooling?**

Prompt: skills, manners, attitudes, competencies, values  
What is that your daughters have learnt from their schooling?

Probe: Are you satisfied with what they have learnt?  
What else could they have learnt?  
Why could they not learn?

**What is the effect of your and your wife/husbands level of schooling on your sons schooling?**

Probe: What is the effect of your low/no/schooling on your daughters schooling?

***B-2: CHILDREN' SCHOOLING IN COMPARISON TO OTHERS***

**Compared to their peer group, how have your sons done in terms of schooling?**

Prompt: Compared to those who are rich?  
Compared to those who have more land?  
Compared to those who are from you're your own caste? What is your caste?  
Compared to those from higher caste?  
Compared to those from lower caste?

*Ask for explanation of each.*

Prompt: Compared to their peer group, how have your daughters done in terms of schooling?

Prompt: compared to those who are rich?  
Compared to those who have more land?  
Compared to those from higher caste?  
Compared to those from lower caste?

*Ask for explanation of each. Ask for both sons and daughters separately.*

**Are young *men* from low caste groups getting education to the higher levels?**

Probe: What do people in the village think of them?  
If not, why not?

Prompt: Are young men from poor families getting schooling?  
What do people in the village think of them?  
If not, why not?

Prompt: Are young men from landless families getting schooling?  
What do people in the village think of them?  
If not, why not?

Prompt: Are young *women* from low caste groups getting education to the higher levels?

What do people in the village think of them?  
If not, why not?  
Prompt: Are young women from poor families getting schooling?  
What do people in the village think of them?  
If not, why not?

Prompt: Are young women from landless families getting schooling?  
What do people in the village think of them?  
If not, why not?

**In each household/*zaat/biradree*, some get more schooling than others...**

How does it affect the relationship amongst relatives, in your village?

Prompt: How much educated help the less educated or uneducated? How  
Probe: How much educated people in the village help and guide the young and  
poor people in the village about their education and employment?

### **What is the difference between private and public schools?**

Prompt: difference between their teachers/teachers' attitudes/students/students  
attitudes?

Who sends their children to private schools?

Probe: Who learns more? Why?

Who gets higher schooling? Why?

Who gets better jobs? Why?

How do you see the increase in the number of private schools?

## **ECONOMIC/SOCIAL OUTCOMES OF SCHOOLING**

### ***Gender***

#### **What do you think of girls' education?**

Prompt: Do you see increase in girls' schooling over the last 10 years?

Probe: Why are people increasingly schooling their daughters now?

What do parents get out of schooling of their daughters?

How does schooling help girls achieve *taraqqi*?

#### **Are there any changes in the households resulting from the schooling of daughters?**

Probe: Household decision making, life style, living conditions, economic change,  
social status, marriage age of girls.

Prompt: What is the major change within the village as a result of increased schooling  
of girls?

What is the effect of an educated wife on husband, and the family overall?

Would you say there is negative effect of having an educated wife?

*Ask for examples*

Prompt: Are educated women working outside homes? What kind of jobs do  
they do?

Probe: What do you think about them?

### **Work/employment**

#### **What are the best jobs/work for men in your view?**

Probe: Who does these jobs?

How did they get these jobs?

How much education helps getting such jobs?

In addition to education, what else is needed to get such jobs?

#### **Tell us more about the son who has achieved the highest level of schooling. What is he doing now?**

Probe: If working, when did he start this work? Where did he learn it from?

Who helped him get this job?

Is it a stable source of income for him and for the family?

Prompt: Is this what you had wished for him?

*If not*, why do you think is it different from your expectations?

*If yes*, are you happy that he met your expectations?

Prompt: In your view, what is that his schooling has done in shaping his career?

How could more schooling have helped him get better career choices?

**Tell us more about the son who has achieved the lowest level of schooling. What is he doing now?**

Probe: If working, when did he start this work?

Where did he learn the required skills from?

Who helped him get this job?

Prompt: Is it a stable source of income for him/for family?

Is this what you had wished for him?

If different, why is it different from your expectations?

If it is what you wished for him, why did you not wish better for him?

Prompt: In your view, what is that his schooling has done in shaping his career?

How could more schooling have helped him get better career choices?

**Tell us about your daughter who has achieved the highest level of schooling**

Probe: What does she do now?

Is she married?

Is she settled in her life?

Are you satisfied with her life outcomes?

Prompt: What do you think is the role of her schooling in shaping her life outcomes?

**Tell us about your daughter who has achieved the lowest level of schooling**

Probe: What does she do now?

Is she married?

Is she settled in her life?

Are you satisfied with whatever she her life outcomes?

How could it have been better?

Prompt: What do you think is the role of her schooling in shaping her life outcomes?

**How has schooling affected the marital prospects of young people?**

Prompt: Can an educated man from a poor family marry someone in a rich family?

Probe: How frequently does it happen?

If not, why not?

Can an educated woman from a poor family marry someone in a rich family?

Probe: How frequently does it happen? If not, why not?

Can an educated man from low caste marry a woman from higher caste?

Can an educated woman from low caste marry a man from higher caste?

Probe: Did it use to happen in the past?

Why has this change occurred?

Prompt: How has schooling affected the marital prospects of your own sons and daughters?

**EDUCATIONAL EFFECTS ON THE POLITICS OF PATRONAGE**

**How do people in the village interact with public offices to access basic services (such as electricity, gas, education, health, law and order, justice)?**

Probe: Can people walk into the offices and get their work done?  
Why not?  
Whose help is needed?  
Why did these people help you?  
How is their help reciprocated?  
What does it cost to seek help from these people to access these services?

Prompt: Money/non-money favours

Prompt: Can you describe any time you or your family members/relatives interacted with police/law & order services? Tell us more about it.

Probe: Whose help was needed? How much did it cost?

Did your/your children's' education help in the process? How?

**Overall, how has the increasing number of the educated people affected the ways people interact with the public offices?**

Prompt: do educated people also need the help of others in accessing public offices?  
Do they also reciprocate the influential (helpers) in the same way as unschooled?

**How are the voting decisions made in the village?**

Probe: what are the key concerns in making these decisions?

Do people decide collectively?

What is the nature of political alliances?

*Biradree*/caste based?

Who makes the final decision?

Are there any repercussions to not adhere to the collective decisions?

Probe: Who decides for women's votes?

Prompt: Do you see any change in voting decisions as a result of increased education in the village?

Do educated men make voting decisions differently?

Do educated women make voting decisions differently?

## APPENDEX 3.2

### Interview Schedule Youth – Schooled & Unschooled

Arif Naveed, Sep 25, 2016

Name                      2- Age                      3- What do you do?

#### PROGRESS/*TARAQQI*

#### 4- What is progress/*taraqqi* in your view?

Probe: Progress/ *taraqqi* at the village level, household level and individual level.

What is *taraqqi* for young men/women

How do families achieve *taraqqi*?/fundamentals of achieving *taraqqi*/

What hinders people from achieving it?

#### 5- Who has achieved the most *taraqqi* in your village?

Probe: factors behind success?

Prompt: Who has achieved the least *taraqqi* in your village?

Probe: factors underlying low/less success?

#### 6- How important is schooling in achieving *taraqqi*?

Probe: Can one achieve *taraqqi* without schooling/ is schooling enough/

What else is needed in addition to schooling?

Prompt: How much has schooling has helped those who have made the most *taraqqi*?

Would they still have this much *taraqqi* if they were less educated? How?

For those making less *taraqqi* what has stopped them using schooling for their *taraqqi*?

How much would (additional) schooling help those who have not made enough *taraqqi*?

#### 7- When you were young, how much *taraqqi* did you aspire to achieve?

(Ask for some benchmarks)

Probe: How did you plan to achieve that?

To what extent did you achieve your aspirations for *taraqqi*?

What helped you achieve it?

What hindered completely realizing your aspirations?

How do you feel about it now?

#### 8- How much *taraqqi* has your family achieved over the last 6 years? In what ways?

Probe: What has contributed to/hindered this success?

How has your family used schooling in achieving this success?

What has hindered your family from using schooling to achieve more *taraqqi*?

In what ways more schooling could have helped you achieve more *taraqqi*?

What else would have helped you achieve more *taraqqi*?

#### 9- Compared to your parental generation, how much *taraqqi* has your generation achieved in your family?

Prompt: How are yours and your siblings' lives different from the lives of your parents?

What is the change in economic status over generation?

What is the change in social status over generation?

Probe: What has particularly helped you make this progress? Most significant people influencing your success?

Role of your parental schooling/role of schooling of your siblings

Whose schooling is the most effective in achieving the most *taraqqi* in your family?

How would additional schooling affect the extent of *taraqqi* your family achieved over a generation?

What else (other than/in addition to schooling) could have helped you make the most *taraqqi*?

Is your achieved level of *taraqqi* what you aspired for when you were at school? What has hindered more success/*taraqqi*?

**In your view, how much *taraqqi* will your children achieve?**

Probe: How will be life of your sons and daughters different from your life?

Prompt: Economically/socially/educationally/politically

Probe: What gives you hope?

Do you have any fears for their *taraqqi*? What are those?

How do you see the role of the schooling in your *taraqqi*?

**B. EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE (skip Q10-22 for unschooled)**

**11- How many years of schooling did you complete?**

Probe: Did you receive any training after school? Learnt any skills

Did you attend any course?

**12. How was your family's attitude towards your schooling?**

Prompt: What was your father's attitude towards your schooling?

Probe: In what ways did he help you? (financially, emphasis, teach himself, spare from household responsibilities, etc.)

Did he expect you to stop studying at some point? Ask for details

Prompt: What was your mother's attitude towards your schooling?

Probe: In what ways did she help you? (financially, emphasis, teach herself, spare from household responsibilities, etc.)

Did she expect you to stop studying at some point? Ask for details

Prompt: What was your siblings' attitude towards your schooling?

Probe: In what ways did they help you? (financially, emphasis, teach themselves, sparing from household responsibilities, etc.)

Did they expect you to stop studying at some point? Ask for details

**13. When you were young, how much schooling did you wish to achieve?**

Probe: How much did your parents wished you to study?

What hindered you achieve your educational aspirations?

What helped you complete your current level of studies? How do you feel about the gap between your aspired and actual levels of schooling?

**14. Do you remember the time when you were leaving schooling?**

Did you think about whether or not you should leave schooling?  
Did you discuss at home?  
What were the arguments in favor of staying at school?  
What were the arguments in favor of leaving school?  
Who favored your stay at school?  
Who opposed your stay at school?  
What were your thoughts soon after you stopped schooling?  
How did you feel about it?

**15. How would your father's (additional) schooling affect your own schooling?**

Probe: values/inspiration/monitoring/support/coaching/tutoring/money, others.  
Prompt: How would your father's (additional) schooling affect your own schooling?  
Probe: values/inspiration/monitoring/support/coaching/tutoring/money, others.

**16. How do you compare your educational achievement with your siblings?**

Equal/better/worse – ask for explanations  
Probe: How do you compare your educational achievement with your peer group in the village?  
Equal/better/worse – ask for explanations  
How do you compare your educational achievements with those from your caste/zaat/biradree?  
Equal/better/worse – ask for explanations  
How do you compare your educational experience with those who are economically your equals? Those who are rich? And those who are poor?  
Equal/better/worse – ask for explanations

**17. Speaking of those who have done educationally better than you, what do you think were the reasons for their success?**

Probe: economic/motivation/role model/guidance/parental support  
Prompt: Speaking of those who have done worse than you, what do you think were the reasons for their failure?

*Tell us the names of the school(s) and college(s) you have attended*

**18. What was your greatest achievement as a student?**

Probe: What are you proud of?  
Prompt: What did you enjoy the most at school?  
What did you dislike at school?

**19. How did your teachers consider you as a student?**

Prompt: Who were the 'intelligent/hardworking' children at school?  
There economic status/caste  
Prompt: How was your teachers' attitude towards you?  
Encouraging/discourage/indifferent?  
Prompt: How was their attitude towards other students?  
Whom did they like and why?  
Whom did they not like and why?

**20. How was the attitude of other students towards you at school?**

Prompt: Were they helpful/encouraging/discouraging?  
What kind of students were helpful?  
What kind of students were unhelpful?

**21. What were the greatest difficulties in continuing/doing well at studies?**

Prompt: Did you seek help from anywhere?

**22. In your age group, who are the men who have succeeded educationally?**

Prompt: their caste/economic status/landowners/parental schooling/personal intelligence/personal motivation

Probe: Who are the women who have succeeded educationally?

Prompt: their caste/economic status/landowners/parental schooling/personal intelligence/personal motivation

Prompt: Who are the men who have failed to do well in education??

Prompt: caste/economic status/landownership or landlessness parental schooling/personal intelligence/personal motivation

Prompt: Who are the women who have failed to do well in education??

Prompt: caste/economic status/landownership or landlessness parental schooling/personal intelligence/personal motivation

**What is that you have learnt from your schooling?**

Prompt: skills, manners, attitudes, competencies, values

Probe: Are you satisfied with what you have learnt?

What else could you have learnt?

.....  
**Ask if Un-Schooled**

**Why did you not go to school?**

Probe: (*If poverty is the reason*) How did other poor people of your age manage to study?

What did you think of not going to school as a child?

What did you do while being out of school?

What did your father think of your being out of school?

What did your mother think of your being out of school?

What did your siblings think of your being out of school?

**Were there other children of your age who did not study?**

Probe: What were their reasons for not attending school?

What kind of families did they belong to (landowners/caste/poor)?

**What are the greatest disadvantages of not being schooled?**

Probe: How do you see your life would be different if you were schooled?

.....  
**What is the difference between private and public schools?**

Prompt: difference between their teachers/teachers' attitudes/students/students attitudes?

Who sends their children to private schools?

Probe: Who learns more? Why?

Who gets higher schooling? Why?  
Who gets better jobs? Why?  
How do you see the increase in the number of private schools?

## **CASTE**

### **Are young *men* from low caste groups getting education to the higher levels?**

Probe: What do people in the village think of them?  
If not, why not?

Prompt: Are young *women* from low caste groups getting education to the higher levels?

What do people in the village think of them?  
If not, why not?

### **In each household/*zaat/biradree*, some get more schooling than others...**

How does it affect the relationship amongst relatives, in your village?

### **How much do educated help the less educated or uneducated close to them?**

Probe: How much educated people in the village help and guide the young and poor people in the village about their education and employment?

## **C – SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES OF SCHOOLING**

### **C1: WORK/EMPLOYMENT**

#### **What are the ideal jobs for (wo)men of your age?**

Probe: Who has these jobs?

Economic status/caste/landownership, etc.

How did they get these jobs?

What is the role of schooling in getting these jobs?

In addition to schooling, what else is needed to get these jobs?

If you had enough schooling could you get such job? If yes, how? If not, why not?

#### **Which year did you leave your studies? (*ask only if schooled*).**

What did you do afterwards? Please provide your work history.

Did you get training related to your work? Where did you get it from?

#### **Tell us more about your current work. What does it involve?**

Probe: Is it a stable source of income?

Do you see future growth for you in this work?

How did you get this work/job?

Did anyone help you? Why did they help you?

What was the role/effect of your achieved levels of schooling on getting this job/work?

How does your schooling help you perform this work/job?

#### **Is your current job/work what you aspired for when you were at school (or young if unschooled)?**

Probe: ***If yes***, what do you think has particularly helped you realize your work related aspirations?

Prompt: schooling/skills/social connections, etc.

***If not***, what do you think has hindered you from realizing your aspirations?

How do you feel about it?

**Do you think your current work/job is helping you achieve your desired level of *taraqqi*?**

Probe: If not, why?

What are your plans for the next 5 years?

What are the ways in which your schooling can help you realize these aspirations?

How could more schooling help you achieve these goals?

**C2: MARRIAGE**

**Are you married?**

Probe: When did you marry? At what age?

Who made your marriage decision?

Were you consulted for your marriage?

Did you have the opportunity to say no?

What were your parents looking for when deciding upon your proposal?

Prompt: what was important consideration: caste/job/economic status/landholding of your spouse/in-laws?

How important was the schooling of your potential spouse?

Prompt: What does your husband/wife do?

How much is your husband/wife educated?

Was your own schooling important in this marital arrangement?

**How do you compare your in-laws with your own family?**

Probe: Economically/social status/caste/landownership/education

Prompt: How did your own schooling help you adjust to these differences?

How does the schooling of your spouse help adjust to these differences?

**What are the ways in which schooling affects the relationship between husband and wife?**

Probe: Husbands schooling?

Wife's schooling?

Are there any disadvantages of having an educated wife?

Prompt: Who makes the day to day decisions at home?

Father/mother-in-law/husband/wife, jointly?

Probe: ***For daughters only***: Is your opinion considered at home?

By your husband/by your mother and father in law/by others in the family?

***For sons only***: Is your wife's opinion considered at home?

By you/by your mother and father/by others in the family?

**How has schooling affected the marital prospects/possibilities of young people?**

Prompt: Can an educated man from a poor family marry a woman from a rich family?

Probe: How frequently does it happen?

If not, why not?

Can an educated woman from a poor family marry a man from a rich family?

Probe: How frequently does it happen?

If not, why not?

Can an educated man from low caste marry a woman from higher caste?

Can an educated woman from low caste marry a man from higher caste?

Probe: Did it use to happen in the past?

Why has this change occurred?

Prompt: How has schooling affected the marital prospects of your own brothers and sisters?

**C3: EDUCATIONAL EFFECTS ON THE POLITICS OF PATRONAGE**

**How do people in the village interact with public offices to access basic services (such as electricity, gas, education, health, law and order, justice)?**

Probe: Can people walk into the offices and get their work done?

Why not?

Whose help is needed?

Why did these people help you?

How did you reciprocate their support?

What does it cost to seek help from these people to access these services?

Prompt: Money/non-money favours

Prompt: Can you describe any time you or your family members/relatives interacted with police/law & order services?

Probe: Tell us more about it.

Whose help was needed? How much did it cost?

Did your/your children's' education help in the process? How?

**Overall, how has the increasing number of the educated people affected the ways people interact with the public offices?**

Prompt: do educated people also need the help of others in accessing public offices?

Do they also reciprocate the influential (helpers) in the same way as unschooled?

**How are the voting decisions made in the village?**

Probe: what are the key concerns in making these decisions?

Do people decide collectively at some level? What is the nature of these alliances? *Biradree*/caste based?

Who makes the final decision?

Are there any repercussions to not adhere to the collective decisions?

Who decides for women?

Can they vote on their own? What will happen if they do so?

Prompt: Do you see any change in voting decisions as a result of increased education in the village?

Do educated people make voting decisions differently?

Can educated women make the decisions of their own votes?

#### **C4: GENDER**

##### **What do you think of girls' education?**

Prompt: Do you see increase in girls' schooling over the last 10 years?

Probe: Why are people increasingly schooling their daughters now?

What do parents get out of schooling of their daughters?

How does schooling help girls achieve *taraqqi*?

##### **Are there any changes in the households resulting from the schooling of daughters?**

Probe: Household decision making, life style, living conditions, economic change, social status, marriage age of girls.

Prompt: What is the major change within the village as a result of increased schooling of girls?

What is the effect of an educated wife on husband, and the family overall?

Would you say there is negative effect of having an educated wife?

*Ask for examples*

Prompt: Are educated women working outside homes? What kind of jobs do they do?

Probe: What do you think about them?

#### **C5: CHANGE OVER THE LAST 6 YEARS**

##### **What are the major changes in the village in the last 6 years?**

Prompt: Social, economic, political, cultural

Probe: Why has this change happened? Education?

Who has benefitted the most from this change? Why?

Who has benefitted the least from this change? Why?

Who has become worse off as a result of this change? Why?

##### **What are the major changes in your family, over the last 6 years?**

Prompt: Have your family members progressed educationally? Please provide details

Probe: What happened to the economic status of your family over the last 6 years? What are the major contributors to this change?

Out migration – work? Marriage?

In case son(s) got job...

What kind of job it is?

How did he/they get this job?

Who helped in getting job?

How, do you think, can he get a better job?

Thank you for your help

## APPENDIX 5.1

**Table A 5.1: Ordered Logistic Regression for the schooling of sons and daughters 2010 (complete sample)**

Variable name	Daughters' schooling					Sons' schooling				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Father's schooling	0.59** (0.05)	0.61** (0.05)	0.61** (0.05)	0.58** (0.05)	0.33** (0.06)	0.37** (0.04)	0.41** (0.04)	0.45** (0.04)	0.44** (0.04)	0.27** (0.04)
Father's schooling missing	0.87** (0.34)	1.09** (0.39)	-1.33 (0.94)	-1.29 (0.94)	-1.53 (0.97)	-0.08 (0.24)	0.01 (0.25)	-1.25 (0.84)	-1.27 (0.83)	-1.38 (0.84)
Mother's literacy	1.31** (0.21)	1.59** (0.27)	1.62** (0.22)	1.60** (0.23)	1.20** (0.23)	-0.05 (0.15)	0.38 (0.20)	0.29 (0.16)	0.26 (0.16)	-0.01 (0.16)
Mother's literacy missing	0.08 (0.28)	0.78 (0.63)	-0.85* (0.36)	-0.96** (0.37)	-0.82 (0.46)	0.26 (0.16)	0.99* (0.44)	0.54** (0.18)	0.56** (0.18)	-0.43 (0.24)
Household size			-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.06* (0.02)			0.08** (0.01)	0.08** (0.01)	0.08** (0.01)
Household size missing			0.73 (0.59)	0.74 (0.59)	11.89 (470.78)			0.27 (0.43)	0.34 (0.44)	0.16 (0.86)
Province Sindh <sup>ψ</sup>			-1.09** (0.18)	-1.11** (0.18)	-0.56** (0.20)			0.37** (0.10)	0.40** (0.10)	0.00 (0.11)
Province KP			1.15** (0.17)	1.29** (0.18)	0.87** (0.20)			1.04** (0.12)	1.13** (0.13)	0.71** (0.14)
Father's age			0.05** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)			0.06** (0.00)	0.05** (0.00)	0.05** (0.00)
Father's age missing			5.69** (1.10)	5.54** (1.10)	4.88** (1.17)			5.16** (0.91)	5.08** (0.90)	5.08** (0.93)
Landownership				-0.19 (0.20)	-0.19 (0.21)				0.33** (0.12)	-0.10 (0.13)
Landownership missing				0.85** (0.20)	0.21 (0.21)				0.39** (0.12)	0.02 (0.13)
Father's occupation				-0.71** (0.20)	-0.14 (0.21)					0.21* (0.08)
Wealth quintile					0.30* (0.13)					0.35** (0.04)
Wealth missing					0.71** (0.08)					2.35* (1.05)
Consumption expenditure quintile					-11.54 (470.78)					0.15** (0.04)
Consumption missing					0.10 (0.06)					-0.20 (0.14)
Mother's malnutrition					-0.02 (0.27)					-0.17 (0.17)
Mother's malnutrition missing					0.19 (0.26)					0.02** (0.00)

Share of food in total expenditure						-0.03**					-1.94
						(0.01)					(1.23)
Share of food expenditure missing											
Product of parental schooling <sup>§</sup>			-0.20				0.28**				
			(0.14)				(0.09)				
Parental schooling product missing			-0.81				-0.76				
			(0.67)				(0.43)				
Constant cut1	1.41**	1.42**	3.50**	3.42**	3.12**	-0.20**	0.18**	3.37**	3.26**	3.46**	
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.74)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.41)	
Constant cut2	1.93**	1.95**	4.15**	4.08**	3.89**	0.56**	0.58**	4.29**	4.19**	4.45**	
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.74)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.42)	
Constant cut3	2.27**	2.28**	4.57**	4.51**	4.39**	1.12**	1.15**	4.99**	4.90**	5.20**	
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.74)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.42)	
Constant cut4	3.27**	3.28**	5.76**	5.72**	5.73**	1.95**	1.97**	6.00**	5.91**	6.28**	
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.75)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.43)	
Observations	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	2,034	2,034	2,034	2,034	2,034	

Standard errors in parenthesis. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

§ This variable is the product of father's schooling level and mother's literacy status. Ψ: Punjab is taken as reference category.

## APPENDIX 6.1

### The effect of caste/kinship, landownership and geography on long-range returns to schooling

Given the availability of data, this section focuses on caste/kinship, landownership and geography to examine how these factors mediate the long-range economic returns to schooling in the household in 1986, thus shape the prospects for intergenerational social mobility by 2014. In order to see the effects of these structures, the sample is divided into subsamples, the OLS models are run and the results are discussed. While there are some systematic variations, some of the patterns are not that systematic which may be because of the small sample size.

### Caste/kinship identity, returns to schooling and intergenerational social mobility

Given the availability of data, I have focused here only on caste/kinship, landownership and geography. As shown in Chapter 2, caste/kinship identity affects both educational attainments and economic opportunities in rural Pakistan. Considering the challenges in developing a universal caste schema as caste hierarchy tends to be highly localised, I developed a

simplified and somewhat reductionist version of caste identity by dividing the sample into those who belonged to the ‘majority’ caste of the village and those who did not. Since a typical village consists of multiple castes, those belonging to the majority caste are assumed to have different social networks and resources compared to others which shape differentiated educational and economic trajectories. To capture these differences, I conducted OLS analysis separately for those from the majority caste and others, repeating the analysis for the three measures of economic status. The results are presented in annex A6.1.

#### *Consumption expenditure and caste/kinship identity*

As shown in the annex, Table A6.1, For those from the majority caste, the returns to father’s schooling were non-significant, secondary schooling males in the household in 1986 were associated with 6% increase in household consumption in 2014. For this group, there were high positive returns for schooling of females: 16% increase in consumption for the primary schooled and 33% for secondary schooled. In contrast, for those not from the majority caste, there were high significant long-range returns to father’s schooling, and significant positive returns to all above-primary schooling levels of males. There were however lower/non-significant long-range returns to female’s schooling probably because of the small size of sub-samples

#### *Income and caste/kinship identity*

Table A6.2 in annex shows the notable differences between the two samples in intergenerational elasticity of income (0.41 for the main caste and 0.29 for the others). For the main caste group, father’s schooling did not have significant long-range income returns, and only secondary schooled males had significant, positive and high long-range income returns, whereas, secondary schooled females in 1986 also had high positive effects on household income in 2014. For the non-main caste group, there were higher returns to father’s schooling, and secondary schooling of males and females compared to those from the main caste.

#### *Wealth and caste/kinship identity*

Table A6.3 in the annex shows profound differences across caste identities. Intergenerational elasticity of wealth was 72% for those from the main caste compared to 55% for those not

from the main caste, suggesting a higher degree of intergenerational persistence of wealth for those from the main caste. Father's schooling in 1986, non-significant for the main-caste households, increased wealth of non-main-caste households in 2014 by 24%. Male schooling in 1986 did not have a significant effect on wealth of the households from the main-caste but had increasing returns for other households along schooling levels. The coefficients on various schooling levels of females also differed between the two groups but high standard errors made these differences non-significant.

### **Landownership and intergenerational social mobility**

Here the sample was divided into landless and landowner sub-samples in 1986, with the assumption that both groups have different prospects for intergenerational mobility in and through schooling. Separate estimates of the OLS model for these subsamples are discussed below for each of the three measures of economic status.

#### *Consumption expenditures*

As shown in Table A6.4 in the annex, intergenerational elasticity of consumption expenditures was two times higher for the landowners than the landless households suggesting significantly different chances for (upward/downward) mobility. The chances of mobility (whether upward or downward) were higher for the landless compared to the landowners. Father's schooling in 1986 had slightly higher long-range consumption returns for the landless than landowners, and in contrast, mother's schooling in 1986 had higher returns for the landowners. There were higher long-range returns to middle schooling of males in the landless households and to the higher-secondary schooled males in the landowning households. There were also significantly higher long-range returns to secondary schooled females in the landless than landowning households.

#### *Household income*

As shown in Table A6.5 in annex, there were significantly higher negative long-range returns to primary schooled males from the landed households, and higher positive long-range returns for the above-secondary schooled male from the landless household. There were also visible

differences in the coefficients on various levels of schooling of daughters but high standard errors suggest the differences were non-significant.

### *Wealth and landownership*

As shown in Table A6.6 in annex, the low intergenerational elasticity of wealth for the landless meant they were experiencing mobility over generations and a high elasticity for the landowners means they maintain their advantage over generations. Father's schooling in 1986 had 2.5 times higher returns in 2014 for the landless than the landowning households, whereas, mother's schooling in 1986 had higher returns in 2014 the landowning households. The odds of downward mobility were higher for the landowner than the landless households if sons and daughters were not schooled in 1986. Secondary and above schooling of males in 1986 had significantly higher returns in 2014 for the landless than the landowners.

### **Geography and intergenerational mobility**

Because of an uneven geographic landscape of poverty and development between and within provinces in Pakistan (Naveed et al. 2016), the odds of intergenerational mobility are likely to vary spatially. Geographically varying social structures are also likely to differentiate the trajectories for social mobility. This section captures geographic differences in the role of schooling in intergenerational mobility in rural Pakistan by running the same OLS models separately for three provincial subsamples.

### *Consumption by province*

Tables A6.7 in the annex brings together the regression results for three provinces. Sindh had twice the intergenerational elasticity of consumption as compared to Punjab and KP, suggesting fewer chances of social mobility in the province which points towards the differentiated nature/working of labour market across provinces.<sup>196</sup> Father's schooling in 1986 had the highest consumption returns in 2014 in Punjab, followed by Sindh and non-significant in KP. There were high long-range returns to mother's schooling in 1986 in Sindh, reaching to the highest level in KP, and non-significant in Punjab. Beyond primary schooling,

---

<sup>196</sup> My own recent inter-temporal geographic analysis of multidimensional poverty reported the persisting nature of rural poverty in Sindh compared to other provinces during 2007-13 (Naveed, Ghaus and Wood 2016).

schooling of males in 1986 had a significant effect on household consumption in 2014 only in Punjab where secondary and higher levels of schooling were associated with 8% and 11% increase in consumption, respectively. Schooling levels of females in the household in 1986 did not matter for consumption expenditure in 2014 in KP, and no schooling and primary schooling were associated with positive returns in Sindh. In Punjab, only middle level of female schooling in 1986 had significantly positive effect on household consumption expenditures in 2014.

#### *Income by province*

Table A6.8 in the annex shows the uncontrolled intergenerational elasticity of household income was the highest in Sindh compared to Punjab and KP. Father's schooling in 1986 had the highest returns in 2014 in Sindh followed by Punjab and non-significant in KP. Males and females' schooling in 1986 did not have any significant household income returns in 2014 in KP. There was greater penalty to primary schooling of males in Punjab compared to other provinces. Secondary schooling of males had the highest income returns in Punjab, and above-secondary in Sindh. Long-range income returns to female schooling in 1986 were almost similar in Punjab and Sindh.

#### *Wealth by province*

Table A6.9 in annex presents the estimates for wealth index for 20014. In contrast to other measures of economic status, Sindh had the lowest intergenerational elasticity of wealth which is an interesting finding. Wealth returns in 2014 to secondary schooling of males in 1986 were the highest in Punjab, whereas, to middle and above levels of schooling of female were the highest in Sindh.

In brief these OLS models show considerable variation in intergenerational elasticities of economic status and the long-range returns human capital of various family members that can be attributed to the workings of various aspects of rural social structure.

**Table A6.1: OLS estimates for log consumption 2014 by kinship/caste groups**

Variables	From the majority caste						Not from the majority caste					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log of consumption 1986	0.12** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.10** (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.11** (0.03)	0.11** (0.03)	0.14** (0.02)	0.12** (0.02)	0.09** (0.02)	0.08** (0.02)	0.08** (0.02)	0.09** (0.02)
Adult eq. household size 2014		-0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)		0.03** (0.00)	0.03** (0.00)	0.03** (0.00)	0.03** (0.00)	0.03** (0.00)
Dependency ratio 2014		-0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.01)	-0.07** (0.01)		0.06** (0.01)	0.06** (0.01)	0.05** (0.01)	0.05** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
Private educational investment 1986			0.04** (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)			0.03** (0.00)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)
Father's schooling 1986				0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)				0.04** (0.01)	0.05** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
Mother's schooling 1986				0.07 (0.08)	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)				0.06* (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
No. of malesΦ unschooled 1986					0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)					-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
No. of males primary schooled 1986					-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)					-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
No. of males middle schooled 1986					0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)					0.07** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
No. of males secondary schooled 1986					0.06* (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)					0.06** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
No. of males above secondary sch. 1986					0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)					0.06** (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
No. of females unschooled 1986						0.02 (0.03)						0.03** (0.01)
No. of females primary schooled 1986						0.16* (0.06)						0.04 (0.03)

No. of females middle schooled 1986						0.07 (0.09)						0.07* (0.03)
No. of females secondary schooled 1986						0.33* (0.16)						0.08 (0.08)
No. of females above secondary 1986						0.15 (0.08)						0.07 (0.07)
Constant	7.06** (0.26)	7.35** (0.25)	7.45** (0.22)	7.50** (0.22)	7.31** (0.21)	7.28** (0.21)	7.08** (0.16)	7.45** (0.15)	7.59** (0.14)	7.65** (0.14)	7.59** (0.14)	7.55** (0.14)
Observations	562	562	562	562	562	562	1,690	1,690	1,690	1,690	1,690	1,690
R-squared	0.04	0.15	0.21	0.22	0.26	0.28	0.04	0.18	0.22	0.24	0.28	0.29

Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Φ: This set of variables refers to the absolute number of males/females in the household with each level of education.

**Table A6.2: OLS estimates for log income 2014 by kinship/caste groups**

Variables	Those from the main caste						No from the main caste					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log income 1986	0.41** (0.11)	0.39** (0.11)	0.29** (0.10)	0.29** (0.11)	0.25* (0.10)	0.25* (0.10)	0.29** (-0.06)	0.30** (-0.06)	0.25** (-0.06)	0.20** -0.06	0.18** -0.05	0.17** -0.05
Adult eq. household size 2014		0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)		0.03** (-0.01)	0.03** (-0.01)	0.03** (-0.01)	0.03** (-0.01)	0.03** (-0.01)
Dependency ratio 2014		0.20** (0.05)	0.20** (0.05)	0.20** (0.05)	0.21** (0.05)	-0.20** (0.05)		0.21** -0.02	0.20** -0.02	0.19** -0.02	0.18** -0.02	0.17** -0.02
Private educational investment 1986			0.08** (0.02)	0.08** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)			0.06** -0.01	0.05** -0.01	0.03** -0.01	0.02* -0.01
Father's schooling 1986				0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)				0.09** -0.02	0.09** -0.02	0.08** -0.02
Mother's schooling 1986				-0.17 (0.10)	-0.22* (0.09)	-0.22* (0.10)				0.13 -0.07	0.12 -0.07	0.12 -0.07

No. of males $\Phi$ unschooled 1986						0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)					-0.01 -0.02	-0.01 -0.02
No. of males primary schooled 1986						0.02 (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)					-0.11* -0.05	-0.10* -0.05
No. of males middle schooled 1986						0.10 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)					0.02 -0.05	0.01 -0.05
No. of males secondary schooled 1986						0.20** (0.05)	0.17** (0.05)					0.10** -0.03	0.08* -0.04
No. of males above secondary sch. 1986						0.12 (0.07)	0.13 (0.08)					0.13** -0.04	0.11* -0.05
No. of females unschooled 1986							0.05 (0.04)						-0.01 -0.02
No. of females primary schooled 1986							0.10 (0.16)						0.09 -0.08
No. of females middle schooled 1986							0.24 (0.27)						0.21* -0.11
No. of females secondary schooled 1986							1.01** (0.21)						0.29* -0.13
No. of females above secondary 1986							-0.39** (0.14)						0.06 -0.23
Constant	4.78** (0.87)	5.33** (0.85)	6.05** (0.79)	5.98** (0.83)	6.24** (0.78)	6.23** (0.81)	5.88** -0.49	6.25** -0.46	6.52** -0.44	6.83** -0.44	6.95** -0.41	7.01** -0.39	
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	1,675	1,675	1,674	1,674	1,674	1,674	
R-squared	0.05	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.18	0.21	0.04	0.11	0.14	0.15	0.17	0.18	

Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

$\Phi$ : This set of variables refers to the absolute number of males/females in the household with each level of education.

**Table A6.3: OLS estimates for wealth index 2014 by kinship/caste groups**

Variables	Those from the main caste						Not from the main caste					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Asset Index 1986	0.72** (0.08)	0.73** (0.07)	0.66** (0.07)	0.65** (0.07)	0.60** (0.09)	0.61** (0.09)	0.55** (0.05)	0.55** (0.05)	0.50** (0.05)	0.44** (0.05)	0.37** (0.05)	0.37** (0.05)
Adult eq. household size 2014		0.23** (0.03)	0.23** (0.03)	0.23** (0.03)	0.23** (0.03)	0.23** (0.03)		0.18** (0.02)	0.19** (0.02)	0.19** (0.02)	0.20** (0.02)	0.21** (0.02)
Dependency ratio 2014		0.34** (0.09)	0.34** (0.09)	0.34** (0.09)	0.35** (0.09)	-0.33** (0.09)		0.33** (0.05)	0.33** (0.05)	0.31** (0.04)	0.30** (0.04)	0.31** (0.04)
Private educational investment 1986			0.14* (0.06)	0.13 (0.07)	0.13 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)			0.13** (0.03)	0.11** (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Father's schooling 1986				-0.04 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.13)	-0.05 (0.12)				0.24** (0.07)	0.25** (0.07)	0.26** (0.07)
Mother's schooling 1986				0.32 (0.39)	0.32 (0.40)	0.38 (0.34)				0.01 (0.15)	-0.00 (0.14)	-0.00 (0.12)
No. of malesΦ unschooled 1986					-0.06 (0.08)	0.05 (0.07)					0.17** (0.07)	-0.12* (0.06)
No. of males primary schooled 1986					-0.16 (0.18)	-0.12 (0.17)					-0.19* (0.10)	-0.13 (0.10)
No. of males middle schooled 1986					0.17 (0.20)	0.21 (0.18)					0.15 (0.14)	0.23 (0.13)
No. of males secondary schooled 1986					0.18 (0.20)	0.26 (0.20)					0.18* (0.09)	0.20* (0.10)
No. of males above secondary sch. 1986					-0.08 (0.22)	-0.09 (0.23)					0.35* (0.16)	0.28* (0.14)
No. of females unschooled 1986						-0.22** (0.07)						-0.11 (0.06)
No. of females primary schooled 1986						0.23 (0.42)						-0.17 (0.16)
No. of females middle schooled 1986						0.67 (0.37)						0.56** (0.22)

No. of females secondary schooled 1986						3.14*							0.72
						(1.33)							(0.39)
No. of females above secondary 1986						1.60**							1.41*
						(0.37)							(0.59)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-	-1.78**	0.01	-	-	-	-	-	-
	0.50**	1.66**	1.86**	1.84**	1.81**	(0.27)	(0.06)	0.74**	1.00**	1.19**	1.11**	1.08**	(0.16)
	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.28)			(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)	
Observations	562	562	562	562	562	562	1,690	1,690	1,689	1,689	1,689	1,689	1,689
R-squared	0.26	0.41	0.42	0.43	0.43	0.47	0.19	0.28	0.30	0.31	0.34	0.35	

Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Φ: This set of variables refers to the absolute number of males/females in the household with each level of education.

**Table A6.4: OLS estimates for log consumption expenditures 2014 by landownership**

Variables	Landless						Landowners					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log consumption 1986	0.08**	0.07*	0.05	0.04	0.05*	0.06**	0.16**	0.15**	0.12**	0.10**	0.12**	0.12**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Adult eq. household size 2014		-0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	-0.03**		0.04**	0.04**	0.03**	0.03**	-0.03**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Dependency ratio 2014		-0.04**	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**	-0.03**		0.09**	0.09**	0.08**	0.08**	-0.07**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Private educational investment 1986			0.03**	0.02*	0.01	0.01			0.03**	0.03**	0.02	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Father's schooling 1986				0.04**	0.05**	0.06**				0.03**	0.03*	0.03*
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Mother's schooling 1986				0.02	0.03	0.03				0.09**	0.07*	0.06
				(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
No. of malesΦ unschooled 1986					0.02	0.01					-0.02	-0.03
					(0.01)	(0.01)					(0.01)	(0.02)
No. of males primary schooled 1986					-0.02	-0.03					-0.01	-0.02
					(0.02)	(0.02)					(0.02)	(0.02)
No. of males middle schooled 1986					0.08**	0.07**					0.01	0.00

No. of males secondary schooled 1986						(0.02)	(0.02)					(0.02)	(0.03)
						0.06**	0.04*					0.05**	0.04*
No. of males above secondary sch. 1986						(0.02)	(0.02)					(0.02)	(0.02)
						0.04	-0.01					0.07*	0.06*
No. of females unschooled 1986						(0.03)	(0.04)					(0.03)	(0.03)
							0.03**						0.02
No. of females primary schooled 1986							(0.01)						(0.01)
							0.05						0.07**
No. of females middle schooled 1986							(0.05)						(0.03)
							0.05						0.04
No. of females secondary schooled 1986							(0.06)						(0.03)
							0.30**						0.03
No. of females above secondary 1986							(0.09)						(0.09)
							0.06						0.11
Constant	7.39**	7.74**	7.78**	7.84**	7.73**	7.62**	6.97**	7.31**	7.47**	7.55**	7.42**	7.35**	
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	
Observations	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,019	1,019	1,019	1,019	1,019	1,019	
R-squared	0.01	0.15	0.18	0.20	0.24	0.26	0.04	0.20	0.24	0.27	0.30	0.31	

Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Φ: This set of variables refers to the absolute number of males/females in the household with each level of education.

**Table A6.5: OLS estimates for log income 2014 by landownership**

Variables	Landless						Landed					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log Income 1986	0.25**	0.24**	0.21**	0.19**	0.16**	0.17**	0.28**	0.30**	0.23**	0.17*	0.17**	0.16*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Adult eq. household size 2014	-	0.03**	-0.02**	-0.02**	0.02**	-0.02**	-	0.04**	0.04**	-0.04**	0.03**	-0.03**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Dependency ratio 2014	-	0.18**	-0.17**	-0.17**	0.15**	-0.15**	-	0.23**	0.23**	-0.21**	0.21**	-0.20**
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Private educational investment 1986			0.05**	0.03	0.01	0.01			0.07**	0.07**	0.05**	0.05**
			(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Father's schooling 1986				0.07*	0.08**	0.08**				0.07*	0.06*	0.06*

				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Mother's schooling 1986				0.06	0.07	0.07				0.13	0.08	0.08
				(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)				(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
No. of males $\Phi$ unschooled 1986					-0.00	-0.00					-0.03	-0.03
					(0.02)	(0.02)					(0.03)	(0.04)
No. of males primary schooled 1986					0.02	0.02					-	-
					(0.06)	(0.06)					0.20**	-0.19**
No. of males middle schooled 1986					0.08	0.07					(0.06)	(0.06)
					(0.05)	(0.05)					-0.01	-0.00
No. of males secondary schooled 1986					0.11**	0.09*					(0.07)	(0.07)
					(0.04)	(0.04)					0.13**	0.12**
No. of males above secondary sch. 1986					0.32**	0.27**					(0.04)	(0.04)
					(0.08)	(0.09)					0.02	0.00
No. of females unschooled 1986						0.01					(0.05)	(0.06)
						(0.03)					-0.01	-0.01
No. of females primary schooled 1986						0.05					(0.03)	(0.03)
						(0.12)					0.09	0.09
No. of females middle schooled 1986						0.24					(0.08)	(0.08)
						(0.14)					0.19	0.19
No. of females secondary schooled 1986						0.40*					(0.11)	(0.11)
						(0.19)					0.21	0.21
No. of females above secondary 1986						-0.12					(0.15)	(0.15)
						(0.18)					0.41**	0.41**
											(0.16)	(0.16)
Constant	6.08**	6.47**	6.64**	6.78**	6.91**	6.85**	6.03**	6.43**	6.79**	7.16**	7.21**	7.26**
	(0.46)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.67)	(0.61)	(0.57)	(0.56)	(0.51)	(0.50)
Observations	1,227	1,227	1,226	1,226	1,226	1,226	1,004	1,004	1,004	1,004	1,004	1,004
R-squared	0.02	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.14	0.15	0.04	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.18	0.19

Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

$\Phi$ : This set of variables refers to the absolute number of males/females in the household with each level of education.

**Table A6.6: OLS estimates for wealth index 2014 by landownership**

Variables	Landless						Land owners					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Asset index 1986	0.49** (0.06)	0.49** (0.06)	0.45** (0.06)	0.43** (0.06)	0.34** (0.06)	0.38** (0.06)	0.69** (0.06)	0.70** (0.06)	0.62** (0.06)	0.57** (0.06)	0.52** (0.06)	0.51** (0.06)
Adult eq. household size 2014		0.18** (0.02)	0.19** (0.02)	0.20** (0.02)	0.19** (0.02)	0.20** (0.02)		0.21** (0.03)	0.21** (0.03)	0.21** (0.03)	0.22** (0.03)	0.23** (0.03)
Dependency ratio 2014		-0.26** (0.05)	-0.25** (0.05)	-0.25** (0.05)	-0.21** (0.05)	-0.21** (0.05)		-0.43** (0.07)	-0.43** (0.06)	-0.42** (0.06)	-0.44** (0.06)	-0.43** (0.06)
Private educational investment 1986			0.13** (0.04)	0.12* (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)			0.14** (0.03)	0.14** (0.04)	0.14** (0.04)	0.14** (0.04)
Father's schooling 1986				0.25** (0.08)	0.25** (0.08)	0.23** (0.08)				0.10 (0.08)	0.10 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)
Mother's schooling 1986				-0.34 (0.21)	-0.33 (0.24)	-0.36 (0.20)				0.32* (0.16)	0.29 (0.17)	0.28 (0.14)
No. of males $\Phi$ unschooled 1986					-0.07 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)					-0.33** (0.09)	-0.23* (0.09)
No. of males primary schooled 1986					-0.07 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.12)					-0.28* (0.14)	-0.22 (0.14)
No. of males middle schooled 1986					0.15 (0.15)	0.17 (0.14)					0.15 (0.16)	0.28 (0.15)
No. of males secondary schooled 1986					0.26* (0.12)	0.25* (0.12)					0.14 (0.10)	0.15 (0.10)
No. of males above secondary sch. 1986					0.86* (0.36)	0.65* (0.32)					-0.08 (0.13)	-0.16 (0.14)
No. of females unschooled 1986						-0.07 (0.07)						-0.16** (0.06)
No. of females primary schooled 1986						-0.41* (0.19)						0.15 (0.14)
No. of females middle schooled 1986						0.38 (0.62)						0.63** (0.19)
No. of females secondary schooled 1986						1.88** (0.66)						0.34 (0.35)
No. of females above secondary 1986						1.45* (0.61)						2.21** (0.54)
Constant	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.94** (0.14)	-1.18** (0.15)	-1.34** (0.16)	-1.43** (0.17)	-1.40** (0.17)	-0.27** (0.09)	-1.09** (0.19)	-1.34** (0.20)	-1.45** (0.20)	-1.24** (0.22)	-1.28** (0.22)
Observations	1,234	1,234	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,018	1,018	1,018	1,018	1,018	1,018
R-squared	0.12	0.23	0.24	0.25	0.28	0.30	0.28	0.38	0.40	0.41	0.43	0.45

Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

$\Phi$ : This set of variables refers to the absolute number of males/females in the household with each level of education.

**Table A6.7: OLS regression outputs for log consumption expenditure 2014 by provinces**

	Punjab						KP						Sindh					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log consumption 86	0.08**	0.09**	0.06*	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.09**	0.10**	0.09**	0.09**	0.09**	0.09**	0.19**	0.15**	0.08*	0.06	0.06	0.08*
	(-0.03)	(-0.03)	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
Adult he size 14	-	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**	-	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	(0)	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**
	-	(-0.01)	(0)	(-0.01)	(0)	(0)	-	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Depend. Ratio 14	-	0.08**	0.09**	0.08**	0.06**	0.06**	-	0.05**	0.05**	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**	-	0.06**	0.05**	0.05**	0.04**	0.04**
	-	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	-	(-0.02)	(-0.02)	(-0.02)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	-	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)
Private edu investment 86	-	0.03**	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	-	0.02*	0.02*	0.01	0.01	0.01	-	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**
	-	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	-	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	-	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)
Father's edu. 86	-	-	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**	-	-	0.03	0.02	0.02	-	-	-	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**
	-	-	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	-	-	(-0.02)	(-0.02)	(-0.02)	-	-	-	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)
Mother's edu. 86	-	-	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	-	-	0.21**	0.23**	0.24**	-	-	-	0.06**	0.06*	0.04	0.04
	-	-	(-0.04)	(-0.04)	(-0.04)	(-0.04)	-	-	(-0.07)	(-0.07)	(-0.07)	-	-	-	(-0.02)	(-0.03)	(-0.03)	(-0.03)
MalesΦ unschooled 86	-	-	-	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-	-	-	0.01	0	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	0
	-	-	-	(-0.01)	(-0.02)	(-0.01)	-	-	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	-	-	-	-	-	(-0.01)	(-0.01)
Males primary 86	-	-	-	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-	-	0.02	0.01	0.01	-	-	-	-	-	0.05*	0.03
	-	-	-	(-0.02)	(-0.02)	(-0.02)	-	-	(-0.02)	(-0.02)	(-0.02)	-	-	-	-	-	(-0.02)	(-0.02)
Males middle 86	-	-	-	0.04	0.03	0.03	-	-	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-	-	-	-	-	0.03	0.02
	-	-	-	(-0.03)	(-0.03)	(-0.03)	-	-	(-0.03)	(-0.03)	(-0.03)	-	-	-	-	-	(-0.02)	(-0.02)
Males secondary 86	-	-	-	0.08**	0.07**	0.07**	-	-	0.03	0.03	0.03	-	-	-	-	-	-0.01	-0.02
	-	-	-	(-0.02)	(-0.02)	(-0.02)	-	-	(-0.16)	(-0.15)	(-0.15)	-	-	-	-	-	(-0.01)	(-0.01)
Males > secondary 86	-	-	-	0.11*	0.08	0.08	-	-	0.12	0.14	0.14	-	-	-	-	-	0	-0.01
	-	-	-	(-0.05)	(-0.06)	(-0.06)	-	-	(-0.21)	(-0.21)	(-0.21)	-	-	-	-	-	(-0.02)	(-0.03)
Females unschooled 86	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.03*
	-	-	-	-	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	-	-	-	(-0.01)	(-0.01)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(-0.01)
Females primary 1986	-	-	-	-	0.03	0.03	-	-	-	-0.03	-0.03	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.08*
	-	-	-	-	(-0.03)	(-0.03)	-	-	-	(-0.04)	(-0.04)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(-0.04)
Females middle 86	-	-	-	-	0.09*	0.09*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.04
	-	-	-	-	(-0.04)	(-0.04)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(-0.04)
Females secondary 86	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.13
	-	-	-	-	(-0.08)	(-0.08)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(-0.07)
Females > secondary 86	-	-	-	-	0.11	0.11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.06
	-	-	-	-	(-0.09)	(-0.09)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(-0.06)

Constant	7.47**	7.72**	7.81**	7.90**	7.90**	7.87**	7.12**	7.37**	7.38**	7.39**	7.36**	7.35**	6.79**	7.33**	7.69**	7.84**	7.77**	7.60**
	-0.2	-0.19	-0.18	-0.17	-0.17	-0.17	-0.17	-0.16	-0.15	-0.15	-0.16	-0.16	-0.28	-0.26	-0.25	-0.23	-0.24	-0.23
Observations	957	957	957	957	957	957	478	478	478	478	478	478	817	817	817	817	817	817
R-squared	0.02	0.13	0.16	0.2	0.24	0.25	0.04	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.27	0.05	0.18	0.25	0.27	0.28	0.29

Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Φ: This set of variables refers to the absolute number of males/females in the household with each level of education.

**Table A6.8: OLS estimates for log income 2014 by provinces**

	Punjab						KP						Sindh					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
logincome86	0.25**	0.26**	0.22**	0.18*	0.16*	0.15*	0.25**	0.28**	0.26**	0.25**	0.23*	0.23*	0.45**	0.42**	0.31**	0.26**	0.23**	0.22**
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Adult hh size 14		-0.02	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.03*	-0.02*		0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**		-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Depend. Ratio 14		-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-
		0.26**	-0.26**	0.25**	-0.23**	0.21**		0.21**	0.20**	0.20**	0.19**	0.19**		-0.15**	0.14**	0.14**	0.13**	0.13**
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Private edu investment 86			0.06**	0.04*	0.03	0.02			0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02			0.06**	0.06**	0.04**	0.04**
			(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Father's edu. 86				0.07*	0.07**	0.07*				0.02	0.01	0.01				0.10**	0.10**	0.10**
				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)				(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Mother's edu. 86				0.15	0.13	0.17*				0.26	0.34	0.35				-0.09	-0.08	-0.09
				(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)				(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.30)				(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Males Φ unschooled 86					0.03	0.02					0.03	0.02						-0.03*
					(0.04)	(0.04)					(0.03)	(0.04)						(0.02)
Males primary 86					-0.19**	0.20**					0.09	0.08						0.04
					(0.05)	(0.05)					(0.12)	(0.12)						(0.08)
Males middle 86					0.04	-0.00					-0.02	-0.03						-0.02
					(0.07)	(0.07)					(0.12)	(0.12)						(0.05)
Males secondary 86					0.17**	0.14**					0.21	0.21						-0.00
					(0.05)	(0.05)					(0.26)	(0.26)						(0.03)
Males > secondary 86					0.17	0.07					-0.11	-0.10						0.09*
					(0.11)	(0.12)					(0.43)	(0.43)						(0.04)
Females unschooled 86						0.03						0.01						0.00
						(0.03)						(0.04)						(0.02)
Females primary 1986						0.11						0.05						-0.10

Females middle 86						(0.07)							(0.13)					(0.13)
						0.19												0.18
Females secondary 86						(0.15)												(0.10)
						0.36**												0.38*
Females > secondary 86						(0.14)												(0.16)
						-0.01												0.05
						(0.26)												(0.09)
Constant	6.27**	6.61**	6.75**	7.07**	7.17**	7.20**	5.66**	5.92**	6.05**	6.11**	6.19**	6.18**	4.70**	5.23**	6.00**	6.34**	6.58**	6.65**
	(0.64)	(0.60)	(0.58)	(0.56)	(0.50)	(0.47)	(0.71)	(0.69)	(0.70)	(0.71)	(0.70)	(0.71)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.54)	(0.56)	(0.51)
Observations	951	951	951	951	951	951	471	471	471	471	471	471	808	808	808	808	808	808
R-squared	0.03	0.11	0.13	0.15	0.20	0.21	0.02	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.12	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.18

Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Φ: This set of variables refers to the absolute number of males/females in the household with each level of education.

**Table A6.9: OLS estimates for wealth index 2014 by provinces**

	Punjab						KP						Sindh					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
asset86	0.50**	0.46**	0.42**	0.33**	0.27**	0.27**	0.56**	0.54**	0.41**	0.33**	0.39**	0.37**	0.35**	0.38**	0.28**	0.21**	0.21**	0.21**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(-0.13)	(-0.12)	(-0.11)	(-0.11)	(-0.12)	(-0.12)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Adult hh size 14		0.29**	0.29**	0.29**	0.28**	0.29**		0.13**	0.13**	0.13**	0.14**	0.14**		0.25**	0.25**	0.26**	0.27**	0.28**
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		(-0.03)	(-0.03)	(-0.03)	(-0.03)	(-0.03)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Depend. Ratio 14		-0.36**	-0.37**	-0.36**	-0.31**	-0.30**		-0.27**	-0.26**	-0.20**	-0.22**	-0.22**		-0.42**	-0.41**	-0.40**	-0.39**	-0.39**
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)		(-0.07)	(-0.07)	(-0.07)	(-0.07)	(-0.07)		(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Private edu. investment 86			0.12**	0.09**	0.05	0.03			0.25**	0.21**	0.15	0.15		0.17**	0.16**	0.14**	0.14**	0.13**
			(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)			(-0.06)	(-0.06)	(-0.08)	(-0.08)		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Father's edu. 86				0.23**	0.23**	0.24**				0.32**	0.28**	0.28**				0.29**	0.27**	0.27**
				(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)				(-0.09)	(-0.1)	(-0.1)				(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Mother's edu. 86				0.02	-0.03	-0.00				2.11**	1.97**	1.99**				0.09	0.13	0.09
				(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.17)				(-0.47)	(-0.51)	(-0.52)				(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.19)
Males Φ unschooled 86					-0.10	-0.06					-0.16*	-0.18*					-0.15**	-0.10*
					(0.07)	(0.07)					(-0.06)	(-0.08)					(0.04)	(0.04)
Males primary 86					-0.33**	-0.26**					-0.02	-0.03					0.15	0.14
					(0.10)	(0.10)					(-0.16)	(-0.16)					(0.16)	(0.15)
Males middle 86					-0.15	-0.11					0.14	0.11					0.02	0.10
					(0.14)	(0.13)					(-0.13)	(-0.16)					(0.14)	(0.13)
Males secondary 86					0.34**	0.38**					0.27	0.26					-0.10	-0.13
					(0.11)	(0.12)					(-0.48)	(-0.48)					(0.09)	(0.08)

Males > secondary 86					0.69 (0.42)	0.43 (0.35)					0.43 (-0.79)	0.47 (-0.79)					0.13 (0.12)	0.03 (0.12)
Females unschooled 86						-0.11 (0.07)						0.03 (-0.07)						-0.12* (0.06)
Females primary 1986						-0.10 (0.13)						-1.04** (-0.18)						-0.03 (0.27)
Females middle 86						0.15 (0.24)												1.20** (0.22)
Females secondary 86						0.99* (0.40)												1.85** (0.43)
Females > secondary 86						1.57* (0.73)												1.30** (0.23)
Constant	-0.01 (0.08)	-1.12** (0.15)	-1.34** (0.16)	-1.49** (0.17)	-1.37** (0.18)	-1.35** (0.18)	-1.27** (-0.18)	-1.91** (-0.28)	-2.34** (-0.28)	-2.68** (-0.28)	-2.42** (-0.28)	-2.46** (-0.29)	0.65** (0.08)	-0.63** (0.19)	-0.82** (0.19)	-1.02** (0.20)	-0.92** (0.21)	-0.87** (0.22)
Observations	957	957	957	957	957	957	478	478	478	478	478	478	816	816	816	816	816	816
R-squared	0.14	0.27	0.28	0.30	0.34	0.36	0.07	0.21	0.28	0.34	0.36	0.36	0.10	0.31	0.34	0.36	0.37	0.40

Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Φ: This set of variables refers to the absolute number of males/females in the household with each level of education.

