How national identity explains the US and Chinese foreign policy in Asia-Pacific? (Post-Cold War to 21st Century)

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Abstract:

In the post-cold war era, the US and China have shaped their identities by adopting different foreign policies in Asia-Pacific. This paper takes a constructivist view to analysis the change of their identities in relations to interactions with other countries in the region. The traditional basis of US foreign policy is the zero-sum logic inherited from the Cold War, by which it perceives any other rising superpower as a threat to its security. This approach had led to the imperialist idea under Bush 41 and Bush 43, through the ‘New World Order’ and ‘war on terror’, where Clinton focused on domestic liberalizations. This essay will argue that the US identity is perceived as the ‘world policeman’ and ‘global leader’, and the Asia-rebalancing strategy under Obama reflects the ‘containment policy’ towards China. Where China constructs itself as a peacefully developing power especially in the ‘One Belt One Road‘ policy. The case study of ASEAN had reflected the change of the US and China identities through their interaction with those Southeast Asian countries. It is concluded that to achieve a sustainable world order, there needs to be more positive interactions between China and the US with bilateral cooperations instead of competitions.

Key Words: National identity, Constructivist, Foreign policy, Asia Pacific rebalancing strategy, Confucian values
1. THEORETICAL BASIS-CONSTRUCTIVISM & NATIONAL IDENTITY

National identity is defined as ‘one's identity or sense of belonging to one state or to one nation’ (Ashmore; Jussim; Wilder, 2001), and 'the sense of a nation as a cohesive whole, as represented by distinctive traditions, culture, language and politics’ according to Oxford Dictionary. A key point of the constructivist theory is its recognition of the identity of the actors, and how the identity had shaped policies. As Flockhart has kindly asserted, ‘Constructivism is a useful tool not only for understanding foreign policy, but also as a guide for prescribing foreign policy’ (cited in Smith, 2012), where the basic constructivist ideas are identity, rules, social construction & practice. Constructivism had developed in response to the failure of realism and liberalism, it had made a good attempt to solve the problems in the post-cold war order. Constructivists argue against the realist idea that the world has shaped people’s opinion, instead they suggest that it is people’s idea which had constructed the world order.

I will discuss on a constructivist basis, about how the national identities of the US and China had largely shaped their foreign policies in Asia-Pacific region. The identity of the US as a world leader to promote the free trade had shaped its policy as a hegemonic power influencing the Asia-Pacific region, mostly in the Post-Cold War era. The identity of China as a rapidly developing socialist country, with the claimed devotion to its tradition of Confucian idea of ‘peace’, had shaped its policy as a peacefully rising state seeking cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, and gaining increasing economic dominance in the 21st century.

This dissertation aims to argue that the identities of the US and China have changed through their interactions with other countries in Asia-Pacific. Western scholars draw significantly on the constructivist view of identity in their evaluation of US foreign policy. Notably, in the chapter 'Identities and US foreign policies' (Smith, 2012), Rowley and Weldes have identified the central role of identity in constructing US foreign policy, in contrast to the realist explanations of national interests as the primary factor driving US foreign policy. The literature adopts a critical social constructivist approach and argues that conceptions of US identity constitute US interests, thus providing the foundations for US foreign policy. This has drawn a link between the national identity and the national interest in relations to the foreign policy making, and identified the national identity as the initial driver of the policy making. Therefore national identity has constituted the national interest of the state, and state actors produced the foreign policies based on the national interest.

Constructivism illustrates the national interest as ‘Security-oriented’, where security is socially constructed. In my research case of the US, it has been its main national interest to confront China, which is driving by its security awareness against any potential threat. China’s identity was also shaped by its expanding cooperation with East Asian countries. However, some scholars have argued otherwise. Alexander Wendt in 1992 has rejected the realist ‘self-interested’ idea and security-oriented conception of state interest, instead he argued for ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (cited in Weldes, 1996), Wendt further argues that ‘Self-
interested’, ‘security-oriented’ conceptions are not produced by or deducible from the systemic condition of anarchy, and he had asserted the key role played by identity and interest in the social construction, and that how the rules constrain the practices in a society.(Wendt, 1992). This essay will further explain how the American identity was constructed by the state actors in relation to the US national interest. It will discuss how the Americans act towards other states based on the meanings that those states have for them, with consideration given to how foreign policy can build up the national interest.

This paper is based on the key constructivist theory asserted by Alexandrov: ‘the interests of states are shaped by their identities, while state identities themselves are subject to change in the process of interaction.’ (Alexandrov, 2003). In the context of this essay, this could refer to the regional integration process in Asia-Pacific in relations to the role of the US and China and the interaction between the agencies, in the process of the development of these countries. The US identity as a hegemonic power had been developed in its monopoly of the trades with East Asian countries like Japan and South Korea, and its military supply to the South-east Asian countries in the South China Sea dispute. Whereas China’s identity is shaped as a newly developed socialist country with increasing engagement in the economic cooperation between ASEAN and APEC.

Constructivism sees identity as how the state had differentiated friends and enemies, where actors attribute meaning to others and act accordingly (Joao, 2016). The national identities of China and the US are shaped through their interactions with other Asia-Pacific countries, and led to the change of their foreign policies in relations to each other. China has growing economic weight in the multilateral institutions like ASEAN, with its policy of ‘peaceful development’, while the US sees China as a threat to its leadership in the Asia-Pacific region and responds with expanding influence in the region, on the purpose to contain China. With the ‘containment’ policy, the US has constructed itself as a ‘world policeman’, while on the view from Beijing, it’s behaving as a ‘hegemon’ based on imperialist idea.

**China & the US National Identity**

The rivalry between China and the US is rooted from their different ideological approach, which shaped their national identities respectively. As a legacy from the Cold War, China was identified as the communist alliance with the USSR and the US as the leading liberal power in the western democratic world, playing their roles accordingly, the US focused on expanding liberal market while China concentrated on infrastructure development. It is not until the 21st century that China becomes a rising power in competition with the US. Since then the clash of the national interest between the US and China become a problem, which could be explained by the model of the zero-sum game, when one state gains in the region, the other one loses relatively in its interest.

The US had become the hegemonic power since the end of the WWII, as the predominant economic and military power in the world, it claimed to be a ‘resident Pacific power’ (Emmers,
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Since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the US had been leading the ‘War on terror’ with the aids of its western allies. In the recent decades, the US has refocused its diplomacy towards the Asia-Pacific. During the Obama administration, the world had witnessed the US retreating their interest from Europe and tend to adopt an Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy.

The US has drowned its identity on the self-styled image as the ‘leader’ of the Western hemisphere and as the global champion of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. In a further analysis, the legitimacy for US ‘world leadership’ is being tested and challenged by the new order in the region, and particularly the rise of China, which had growing economic weight in the Asia-Pacific region and had increasingly played a key role in the cooperation with other countries through the regional institutions. There are some other theories to illustrate the US national identity, notably Monten’s exceptionalism which described the US as an exception from international politics, and Ikenberry’s theorem of American hegemony, where he suggests a US-led western order by re-investing in and strengthening the existing institutions.

Whereas the national identity of China is shaped by the west, particularly during the early communist era, as ‘totalitarian and dictatorship’, and China’s rise in the globalised world as a threat to the western democratic world. The ‘threat theory’ has emphasized China’s ambition to take over the hegemony from the US. This essay will argue against those theories, as I will illustrate, since the end of the Cold War, that China is adopting a strategy of peaceful rising. With the promotion of Confucian ideas as the character of the Chinese culture, the Chinese authority is shaping the identity of the state as a peacefully developing power focusing on its domestic economy, while strengthening the cooperation with other countries in the region, and increasing its weight in the regional institutions such as ASEAN and APEC. The ‘peaceful rise’ strategy since 2000 has demonstrated an intention to work within the pre-existing international order and not against it. In relations to economics and military, China had gained substantial economic power, yet not much military power, where it demonstrates rapid development on domestic construction and a relative peace in foreign policy-making. The situation in relations to the interaction of the US and China with other Asia-Pacific countries has been depicted as ‘Increasingly, Asian countries are seeking economic ties with China; Continuously, those countries are relying on the US militarily’ (Ikenberry, 2004). This essay will argue that a sustainable world order relies on a ‘new type of relationship’ between China and the US where mutual intentions and interactions are critical in the bilateral relation, with the rejection of zero-sum competition and enhancement of positive cooperation between the two.

2. THE AMERICAN IDENTITY AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY

The end of the Cold War was marked by the collapse of the USSR, which had transformed the bipolar world order into a uni-polar order, and the US became the single superpower. The utterly structural change of global system was perceived as ‘the end of history’ by Fukuyama, which means ‘the endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of
Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.’ (Fukuyama, 1989). The US, as the leading promoter of the Western liberal value, had thus set a goal to defend the principle of ‘democracy, freedom and human rights’ and had constructed its identity to the rest of the world as ‘a world police’ against any challenge to this established universal value.

The US authority has defined itself as a global leader pursuing democracy and peace and the American people as part of this ‘imagined community’ of the US nations (Jutta Weldes, 1996). On the other hand, it has labelled those states which had posed threat to the US national interest, for example, the North Korea, as the ‘rogue state’. Based on this recognition of identity, the US had claimed to make foreign policies to form the ‘security umbrella’ in the Asia-Pacific region against the common enemies. After 9/11, the US identity was regarded as ‘reproducing and representing US leadership in a global fight for freedom against a variety of mutating threats’ (Rowley and Weldes, 2012). In the narrative of imperialist, Post-Cold War foreign policy was about the defence and expansion of US empire (ibid). Imperialism is defined as ‘the practice, theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling in a distant territory’ and colonialism as the ‘implanting of settlements on a distant territory’ (Said, 1993).

The imperialist basis of policy-making in the US follows a logic of zero-sum model, which was a legacy from the bipolar competition during the Cold War. The Zero-sum model is a logic in which ‘the winnings of some players must equal the losses of the others.’ (The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy). “With limited resources, it is believed that the policies made by the state will lead to the gain of one side and the loss of the other. Under this logic, foreign policies will be made on the basis of trade-offs between competing interests.” (Towns, 2015)

Nevertheless, the 21st century sees the US identity as a hegemon declining, with the panic that other powers are rising in Asia-Pacific (Ratner, 2013). From a zero-sum perspective, the US sees the other rising powers as a threat to its national interest and challenge to its global leadership, especially China. It is within this context that the US tends to make foreign policies which constrain growing powers in the region, and ensure its own security. Foreign policy is couched in phrases of how this helps the Americas and how it hurts their rivals. By adopting that mindset, policy creators in Washington and other capitals ensure that those results are the only ones that are acceptable. (Towns, 2015). In the imperialist narrative, ‘the US continues to engage in exploitative economic practices, political intervention, and military action in and against other states’ (Blum, 2003). This approach in US foreign policy is well represented in the 2010 Asia rebalancing strategy.

How is US identity represented in its foreign policy?

In its own construction of the identity, the US had claimed itself as the promoter of the Western market model, individualist lifestyle and Liberal Democracy spread all over the world, regarded as something of universal value. The US was trying to set up the rules and regulations in the region, it is portrayed as a declining power with ambitions to dominate Asia-Pacific region. (Wang, 1997).
**Bush 41’s administration**

The US government under George H.W. Bush, following the end of the Cold War, had seen a New World Order (NWO) which reinstates the US leadership, ‘where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind -- peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law.’ (Bush, 1991). Under Bush administration, the US identity had been enhanced as a global leader and a promoter of the free world, as Bush had addressed the Congress on January 29th in 1991: ‘We're the only nation on this Earth that could assemble the forces of peace. This is the burden of leadership and the strength that has made America the beacon of freedom in a searching world.’(Bush, 1991)

**Clinton’s administration**

Clinton had focused on the liberalization and US domestic economy, and to some extent the government had 'severely downgraded foreign policy in his priority'(Scalapino,1996). On the other hand, he had proposed the concept of ‘New Pacific Community’ in an expectation to peace in the Asia-Pacific area. Based on this concept, Clinton’s America was a period which sees less of an imperialist identity and more of a democratic strategy. This strategy was further developed as the Americans had suggested an extension of the role of APEC to include dealing with regional security issues. In relations to the development with China, Clinton strongly defended his continued policy of "constructive engagement" during the summit with President Jiang Zemin-- promoting economic and political ties, while at the same time pressing for democracy, open markets and human rights -- calling it "our best hope to secure our own interest and values and to advance China's."(Clinton, 1997).

Clinton believed that the U.S. should not be, nor could it afford to be, the ‘international police’ (Todd, 2002). This had led to a lack of commitment and respect of international institutions from the Clinton administration, which was the key instrument for the US imperialist ambitions (Ikenberry, 2006). Nevertheless, the rest of the government under Clinton did stress the high standing of the US in the world. In the article ‘The Myth of the Indispensable Nation’ from ‘Foreign Policy’, the quote of Madeleine Albright, Clinton’s Secretary of State, has been highlighted: ‘we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.’ (Albright, 1998)

**Bush 43’s administration**

The Terrorist attack on 11th September 2011 had triggered the ‘war on terror’. It is suggested that the US under George W. Bush had used the terrorist event of 9/11 to legitimize imperialism and secure long-term supremacy in both military and economic aspects. In 2012 Farewell assessed the extent to which the Post 9/11 U.S. Foreign Policy was a continuation of previously established ‘New Imperialist’ Ambitions, as the U.S. imperialism ‘presupposes the will and the ability of an imperial centre to define as imperial its own national interests and enforce them worldwide in the anarchy of the international system’ (Osterhammel, 1995). Bush’s administration had also constructed its identity against its enemies through international
interactions. With the United States cementing their military hegemony and assuming roles within international institutions, the belief that the U.S.’s position in the world was to be the ‘good’ force acting against the antagonistic ‘evil’ of the Iraqi ‘rogue state’ became widespread.’(Farewell, 2012)

While Bush’s government grants extensive military spend and political weight in fighting the terrorist, the world sees the US gradually losing influence in Asia-Pacific area. Especially after the financial crisis of 2008 lowered the US economic credibility, and the rise of China with growing economic capacity in the region, a regional imbalance regarding the US decline has appeared.

**Obama’s administration**

It was under this context that the US government under Obama recognised the necessity to reinstate its influence in Asia, and shift its focus from the war on terror to its regional leadership in Asia. Obama had put forward the Asia rebalancing strategy in 2010 to ‘Sustain a long-term strategic presence in the Asia Pacific, especially through a strong maritime focus’(Emmers, 2013). In the imperialist narrative, this is a strategy to contain China’s rising influence in the region, initiated based on a zero-sum understanding of the world politics. The economic health of the US is dependent on a strong China, but a strong China becomes a political and military threat. Zero Sum politics will exacerbate that situation and create a mirror of the two super-power systems that created the Cold War. On the other hand, however, The US could cooperate with China and move away from Zero-Sum Politics, where ‘Compromise and sensible solutions, for ourselves, our allies and the Chinese people can create a situation where there are no winners and losers, where victory is not an end in itself.’ (Towns, 2015).

The US authority had claimed that its Rebalancing Strategy mainly has four objectives. Firstly, to strengthen and modernise alliances in Asia-Pacific region. The US had established strong military relationships with Japan, Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Australia since 2009, to increase collaborations against those rising powers which poses threats to the US security and leadership. Secondly, to advance economic integrations. This intention is represented by the US initiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2016, which has been claimed as the largest trade and investment deal in the world. Thirdly, to shape regional institutions ASEAN and APEC. Fourthly, to enhance the coalition with emerging powers e.g. India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam.

From the US perspective, this policy is to construct the US identity as a defender of the global security and develop cooperations for global economy. Its relationship with China had demonstrated an intention to establish a partnership to jointly face global issues: the nuclear deterrence discussion represented by NPT, ‘the war on terror’ against terrorist group notably ISIS and the conflict in Syria, the global economy and climate change. The US had made an effort to work through these issues with China by the frequent meetings between Obama and
the former Chinese President Hu Jintao, and even proposed to form ‘a group of two’(Bergsten, 2005), as the idea of G-2 was initiated by C. Fred Bergsten in his book the United States and the World Economy.

On the other hand, the bilateral treaty obligations remain firm between the US and the rising powers in Asia-Pacific. ‘Washington’s preference has been for a series of largely discrete bilateral ties in Asia, with the US acting as the hub, enabling bilateralism to be combined into a larger operative force when necessary or appropriate’(Scalapino, 1996). The theory of ‘hub-and-spoke’ system (Ikenberry, 2004) had laid the groundwork for this view, it means the American-led system of bilateral security ties with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and countries to the South. East Asian countries export goods to America and America exports security to the region. It is important for them to build up coalition with the US, as the close security ties enable them to pursue an export-oriented development path. (Ikenberry, 2004)

The ‘hub-and-spoke’ system has enabled the US to gain diplomatic support by providing strategic protections. Scholars like Wang Jisi had pointed out that the Asia rebalancing strategy was aimed at containing and constraining China in Asia-Pacific, in the fear of a rising China challenging the US interest. (Wang, 1997). It is also part of the strategy to increase the military deployment and army bases in Asia-Pacific, and its large number of troop deployment to China’s neighbour countries had substantiated its containment policy towards China through military forces. (See Graph 1). Notably, the Philippines, the loyalist ally of the US in Southeast Asia, has played hardship on China with US support in its back.
The US ‘pivot’ in Asia was reflected by the amount of its military deployment, which has led to the instability of the region (Ratner, 2013). From a constructivist perspective, this bilateral security ties between the US and those countries in Asia-Pacific had ‘deepened’ the Beijing view that ‘the ultimate goal of the US in world affairs is to maintain its hegemony and dominance’, as argued by Wang Jisi (cited by Ratner, 2013).

Another aim of the strategy is to shape the regional institution in the US interests, as well as strengthening regional organisation and decision-making mechanisms, for example, APEC: ‘Washington is eager to make APEC into an instrument for substantive advances in regional free trade rather than merely a dialogue’ (Scalapino, 1996).
The US had constructed its identity as a democratic superpower through the coalitions in the region, as ‘American policies were promoting coalitions against what was termed the imposition of American values and standards on Asian culture’ (Scalapino, 1996). Meanwhile, the US perceives its competition with China of the influence in the region, and respond in a zero-sum logic. ‘The US views China as having already become a major influence in Asia, and important with respect to every sub-regional and regional issue’ (Ball, 2013). The US bilateral coalition in the region could be a strike-back leading to a reduction of foreign investment in China and difficulty for China to invest in others in return.

A good example is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) deal. Led by the US, the deal was signed by twelve countries in Asia-Pacific in February 2016, representing roughly 40% of the world's economic output (BBC, 2017). Obama had framed TPP, which excluded China, as an effort to write Asia’s trade rules before Beijing could, establishing US economic leadership in the region as part of his ‘pivot to Asia’ (Holland and Rascoe, 2017). This could be a counter-attack in response to the Chinese initiated Free Trade Area (FTA), acting on the zero-sum logic.

In an overview, since the end of the Cold War, the US had been taking itself as the global leader committed to building up a free world. As declared by Bush that the US has the ‘responsibility’ of being the leader of a global coalition fight for freedom, defending itself and its allies (Bush, 2001). In 1999, it had been claimed that the US leadership continues to be presented as natural: ‘people are looking to America’, to ‘American leadership and America’s troops’ to get the troop done (Clinton, 1999). Whereas in the eyes of Obama, the US acts ‘boldly’ and with ‘resolve’, has ‘responsibilities’ and ‘commitments’ (Rowley and Weldes, 2012).

The US foreign policies in the post-cold war era are in general reasserting its dominant role in Asia-Pacific, from Bush 41’s New World Order, Bush 43’s ‘war on terror’, to Obama’s ‘Asia-rebalancing strategy’, US had demonstrated ambitions of exerting influence on other countries in the region, and contain China’s rise on the purpose to maintain the US leadership in the region.

The US authority constructs its national identity as a democracy promoter to ensure the building of ‘a free world’. Nevertheless, it has undermined this identity by focusing its foreign policies in Asia-Pacific on strengthening the bilateral military ties and forming allies. This has made its construction of a democracy promoter a failure, as in the eyes of Beijing, the policy aims to ensure the US domination in the region, instead of promoting democracy (Wang, 1997). In contrast, China has developed its cooperation with partner countries in Asia-Pacific, and successfully enhanced its national identity as a peaceful developing power.

3. CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICIES AFTER THE COLD WAR:

The Cold War stands for the conflict between the Soviet-led communist camp and the US-led western alliance, ended by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to a chain-effect of
breaking down on the communist states. It was under this context that the Directive Deng considered stability as the national priority and his "24-Character Strategy" emerged in 1990 has reflected the Chinese Communist Party(CCP)'s sense of alarm following the collapse of the communist states of Eastern Europe. The strategy provided basic principles on how China should protect its national interests while increasing its interactions with the world (Acknowledge to source), and was well-followed by the peaceful rising strategy in 2000. China’s strategies had influenced the trading structure in Asia-Pacific region, which other countries are gradually integrated into. Despite its influence, China had claimed that its core strategic interest is the integrity of national territory and the development of domestic economy. Both Deng(1974) and Xi(2015) had made announcement that China will ‘Never claim hegemony’.

‘One Belt One Road’(OBOR) is the key strategy reflecting this ‘no hegemony’ claim, which China is now undertaking to represent its ‘peaceful rising’ identity. As a background of OBOR, the idea was originated from the Silk Road in Han Dynasty more than two thousand years ago. The Silk Road is an overland route from China to the West, which brought silk to Rome, connecting the east and the west, and led to a time of golden age for China’s relations with other countries. It is ‘the longest, and from a cultural-historical standpoint the most significant connecting link between peoples and continents that has ever existed on earth’(Hedin,1938).

In 2013, China’s president, Xi Jinping, proposed a modern equivalent, a network of railways, roads, pipelines, and utility grids linking China and Central Asia, West Asia, and parts of South Asia. Following Xi’s proposal, the State Council authorized an OBOR action plan in 2015 with two main components: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (See Graph 2). The Economic Belt was based on Xi’s idea of the modern Silk Road, while the Maritime Silk Road connects the regional waterways.
More than 60 countries, with a combined GDP of $21 trillion, have expressed interest in participating in the OBOR action plan. (Tian, 2016).

As to develop a win-win cooperation through the OBOR policy, China seeks to take the interests of all parties into account to generate mutual benefits, including environmental management and closer cultural exchanges (ibid). Nevertheless, Some commentators doubt the rationality of the One Belt One Road policy, asserting that the policy aims to expand its political influence in the Asia-Pacific region and compete with the US for regional leadership (Lu, 2016). These assertions are derived from the Cold War logic, with the traditional Western thought of Zero-Sum game.

The Cold-war logic sees the world resources as limited, people must compete for the consumable coal and fuel of global preservation. In contrast, the spirit of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation has accelerated the development of this ‘Silk Road’, and embedded in the new logic of ‘One Belt One Road’. The logic that win-win cooperation could be sustained between states, and construct new profit points for all the states to explore the critical resources
of human being is reflected in Xi’s statement that: ‘One Belt One Road’ is open and tolerant, we welcome the international organisations and all the countries in the world, including the US, to join in the cooperation.’(Xi, 2015). The proposition of China’s OBOR appears to be neither closed nor narrow, and reflects a difference from the US-led TPP in nature, as evidenced by Wang Jisi: ‘Thus, while One Belt One Road works to build up the Chinese Dream, it will also help the countries on the road to achieving modernization, and in this way, devote Chinese commitment to the worldwide development.’(Wang, 2016).

Additionally, the OBOR policy had reflected the necessity of building a new type of international relationship centres on cooperation and mutual benefits. On Xi’s remark to the 70th anniversary of the Second World War, he pointed out that the history of war had taught us competition and hegemony are driving human away from peace in a society of co-existence. ‘Peace not war, cooperation not confrontation, win-win not zero-sum, should be the eternal theme of peace, progress and development in human society’(Xi, 2015). Different from the old notion of confrontation and zero-sum game, OBOR advocates cooperation and win-win strategy, which has fundamental difference from the ‘cooperation’ under the hegemonic order following impartial rules (Wang, 2016).

Another key features of the win-win cooperation is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral development banks (MDB) initiated by China, officially launched on 24 October 2014. It was claimed that the AIIB ‘focus on infrastructure construction in Asia to promote regional connectivity and economic cooperation’ (Lou Jiwei, 2014). This demonstrated a different approach from the regional banks set up under the admission of the US, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank(ADB) which prioritise poverty reduction (Ba, 2014).

The regional forum of APEC was also important, Beijing has held the 26th APEC forum in 2014, with the theme: Shaping the future through Asia-Pacific partnership. On the Opening ceremony, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that China has committed to ‘build closer partnership with APEC members who are neighbours’ and ‘enhance cooperation that creates mutual benefit’ (Wang,2014). The fundamental win-win approach had been reaffirmed with APEC ‘to promote the establishment of an open, inclusive, balanced and win-win new architecture for Asia-Pacific economic cooperation’(ibid), which is a significant development from the initial aspiration of APEC: ‘benefit not only the region but to enhance worldwide economic prospects’(Evans, 1989).

The 21st century also sees an increasing weight of China in the regional economy in East Asia and Southeast Asia, this is reflected by China’s contribution in promoting the trades and enhancing regional connectivity, as ‘China’s entrance into the regional political economy has similarly been associated with the increase in intra-East Asian trade’(Ba, 2014). A clear win-win strategy works on the relationship between China and other East Asian countries, as China has offered a steadily expanding market for South-east Asian goods and services. A good example for this expanding market is the massive growth of ASEAN exports to China,
'ASEAN exports to China experienced a 138% increase between 1996 and 2002, a time when ASEAN’s export to the US and Japan were declining' (Ba, 2014).

Despite the growing influence of China in East Asia, ‘the old American hegemonic order will remain a critical component of East Asian order for decades to come[...] Even China has incentives to preserve and work within an American hub-and-spoke system in the short and medium term.’ (Ikenberry, 2004). It was unlikely that China would challenge the legitimacy of a US-dominated regional system and propose its own alternative in near future. However, commentators such as Ralf Emmers have perceived China as a threatening role because its persistent activities in maritime Southeast Asia. China’s official claim of the South China Sea was interpreted as an expansion of territory, despite China has announced that the preservation of its historical sea territory is as an act to protect its core strategic interest.

On a higher level of assessment, the rise of China could be evaluated in relations to the US decline, the degrading of the US as a hegemonic power had led to an even growing trend for a closer relationship between China and other countries in Asia-Pacific. It is a complex cause-effect relationship that leads to the dynamic of the system in Asia-Pacific in relations to the influence of the US and China. This is reflected in the case where ASEAN countries swing between China and the US. To some extent, the rise of China had caused strategic panic of its neighbor countries, and some had responded by seeking stronger security from the US, e.g. the Philippines. The other countries in the region sense the benefit of developing a stronger relationship with China, especially for their economic interests. It appears to be the long-term commission for China to convince more countries to take this interest, and in a cooperation, purse a peaceful rising development.

**Chinese identity & foreign policy**

China has constructed its national identity centred on the Confucian value of peace: China as a peacefully rising country seeking cooperation with other actors in Asia-Pacific, aims to enhance regional integration and development, and to ultimately achieve common prosperity of a peaceful world. The Confucian value was originated in China more than two thousand years ago and had a long-term impact on Asian culture and value. This is a value which emphasis group economic social interest rather than individual’s freedom and right, think highly of social stability, solve problems by reaching agreement rather than confrontation (Zheng, 2016). A significant range of countries in Asia Pacific had shared this traditional value, and China’s promotion of it was very helpful to enhance regional connectivity.

It is from this Confucius-based Asian value that China has adopted a peaceful rising strategy since 2000, developed from the 24-Character Strategy initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1990, that ‘observe the development soberly, maintain our position, meet the challenge calmly, hide our capacity, bide our time, remain free of ambitions, and never claim leadership’ (Deng, 1990). In recent decades, President Xi Jinping has furthered the ‘peaceful rising’ narrative and adopted a strategy of ‘peaceful development’ (Men, 2007) which aims to grow economic capacity,
encourage domestic business, and strengthen trade relationship with foreign actors, under the principle of win-win cooperation.

Entering the 21st century, China has become the world’s second largest economy. It has significant growth in foreign investment and trade, which helps to construct its identity as a peaceful rising power. The win-win cooperation has been enhanced as China became a key business partner with other Asian countries and actively engaged in regional institutions, e.g. ASEAN, APEC.

In the present days, the national identity is notably illustrated by the ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) policy initiated by President Xi in 2013. This initiative aims to create the world’s largest platform for economic cooperation, including policy coordination, trade and financing collaboration, and social and cultural cooperation (Tian, 2016). This policy had represented a win-win approach aimed at developing cooperation with the countries in Erosia, and in Asia-Pacific. Through this approach, the Chinese authority is constructing its identity as a peacefully rising power to other countries. This approach is also reflected by the initiative of Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the mutually beneficial bond between China and ASEAN.

Militarily, China claimed to act on the principle of self-defense, whereas some Western scholars are suggesting a ‘China threat theory’ on account of the observation of some territorial disputes relating to China, notably the South China Sea issue. In response, the Chinese government had stressed its priority of foreign policies in maintaining internal stability, and to promote the economic globalisation. President Xi had delivered the message in his recent speech in Davos, that China would be glad to lead the path of economic globalisation: ‘We will advance the building of the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific and negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership(RCEP) to form a global network of free trade arrangements.’(Xi, 2017).

China has claimed that the policy stands for a win-win approach in regional cooperation, as it was asserted that ‘China stands for concluding open, transparent and win-win regional free trade arrangements and opposes forming exclusive groups that are fragmented in nature.’(ibid).

Whereas from the western perspective, China is rising as an ambitious superpower and seeks to challenge the US leadership in the region through these policies.

In sum, China has constructed its identity as a peaceful developing power by implementing a series of foreign policies in Asia-Pacific, notably the OBOR strategy. It takes a standpoint to develop regional integration through its interaction with the ASEAN countries. Some other parts of the world see the rising of Chinese influence in the region as bearing a hegemonial ambition to challenge the US leadership. The conflict is represented in the case of South China Sea, despite China’s claim of self defence, other claimants allied with the US and embroiled in the disputed water, perceiving China as a threat.
4. ASEAN AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITIES

ASEAN, a key regional organisation in the Asia-Pacific area that promotes intergovernmental cooperation, consists of ten member states in Southeast Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Both China and the US have developed important partnership with these member states, each is making effort to shape the structure of the institution in its own way. The United States sees ASEAN as vital to its strategic rebalance to Asia (Albert, 2016). In the meantime, China regards highly of its maritime claim in the South China Sea, an ongoing issue not only involves China and the four ASEAN claimants of the territorial waters, but also the US playing a key role in the case, as an influential ally to the Philippines and other ASEAN states.

Entering the 21st century, China increased foreign investment in South-east Asian, it ‘is clearly emerging as an increasingly influential economic force for East Asian integration’(Ba, 2014). It was accounted that for ASEAN’s total exports, China-bound exports grew ‘from 4% in 2001 to 9% in 2008, while US-bound ASEAN exports dropped 7.5% in relative importance.’(ibid). Also, Chinese aid on ASEAN led to a development of regional connectivity, notably the ‘remarkable’ aid package in April 2009, included ‘a US$10 billion contribution to initiate a China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund’(Reilly,2013). Along with the prospect of a declining US domination in the region, China grows in its capacity to support East Asia’s interdependent economies, a key feature to present this potential is ASEAN-China Free Trade Area(ACFTA), implemented in 2010, which is ‘a much more deliberate effort to integrate the Chinese and South-east Asian economies’(Ba, 2014).

The Constructivist Acharya has argued that the US declined as a hegemon power in relations to ASEAN, and that ‘the decline of the structural power of the US has opened opportunities for other actors’(Acharya, 1997). Reflecting on Hurd’s theory that the structure ‘makes’ the identity of agents by shaping their interactions(Hurd,2008), the structure of system in Southeast Asia had shaped the interaction between China and ASEAN, while ASEAN was growing with the expansion of trade partners, China played a critical role as a rising power to integrate into such a regional institution for its ‘peaceful development’. On the other hand, the integration helped to eliminate the US policy of ‘containment’ towards China, where it is of strategic interest for China to engage in a multilateral cooperative security pact with ASEAN, in response to geo-political restraints come unilaterally from the America.

Through the investment and partnership, China’s identity in relations to ASEAN varies with the thickness of the institutional environment. For example, China’s enhanced collaboration with Laos and Cambodia is viewed as based on the idea of socialization(Reilly, 2012), whereas its aid to Myanmar remains largely self-interested. In the eyes of the critics, Beijing’s growing influence in those three CLM states means a sign of dominating the region, where ‘Suspicious of Chinese hegemonial ambitions, ASEAN enlargement was chiefly directed by security concerns’(Ruland, 2000), and the concern was raised further by China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the above critics had neglected the fact that ASEAN is a well-
established institution in Southeast Asia, which had its long-term organized system, unlikely to be changed by the rising influence of China in the near future.

In the case of South China Sea, there have been long-term territorial disputes between China and the other claimants in Southeast Asia. The South China Sea is valuable for its rich resources of potential oil and gas reserves, 10% global fishing production. On top of this is its strategic placement, as the Spratly islands gives the South China Sea claimants an extra fifteen hundred kilometres of influence, and the waterway was ‘one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes that carry more than $5 trillion in annual trade.’ (Mathieson, 2017).

China claimed that its legitimacy over the water is proven by a 1940s map, as a historical waterland under Chinese sovereignty. ‘China claims some 80% of the South China Sea, including various rocky reefs and shoals disputed by Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines.’(Kilpatrick, 2017). However, The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled against China's overarching claims by declaring that "historical rights" put forward by Beijing had no legal basis, while The US authority claimed that US is concerned about the freedom of navigation in South China Sea, based on the principles of The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention. In response, Beijing claims it has no intention of preventing commercial traffic, but simply protects its own territory, and makes its standpoint as in a state of self-defence.

Beijing viewed the US movement as an external interference. ‘For China, the US has created an issue over the freedom of navigation to justify an enhanced military presence in the region to contain China’(Emmers, 2013). Whereas the US was perceived as the ‘world policeman’ by the Southeast claimants, who reaffirmed the international law and defended the right of freedom as a global principle. A similar approach was expressed by US government, at the ARF in July 2010, Hillary Clinton declared that the US has a national interest in freedom of navigation(FON) in the South China Sea, where a ’strategic turn to the region fits logically into our overall global effort to secure and sustain America’s global leadership’(Clinton, 2011).

Later the situation was moderated by Obama at EAS 2011, it was restated that the US takes no side in the disputes, only preserves its interests include FON and unimpeded international commerce in the region. On Beijing’s part, there’s also a sign of moderation as Premier Wen reaffirming the freedom of navigation principle and calling for peaceful resolution of the disputes. This interaction between the US and China reflected a change from confrontation to reconciliation, and the US had declined its claim of a national interest in South China Sea and focus more on the commercial interest. However, the subsequent six FON operations to ‘test Chinese claims and assert the U.S. position that the contested features lay in international waters.’(Kilpatrick, 2017), has reflected the remaining diplomatic intentions of the US over the sea, and the US identity retained as a hegemonic power holding control over the region, trying to exert its power by allying with ASEAN countries such as Philippines, urge and supply them to confront China in South China Sea.
In sum, the Asia-rebalancing strategy had strengthened bilateral security pacts between the US and countries like Vietnam and Philippines, where additional diplomatic leverage are provided to boost the activities in confrontation with Beijing. ‘Manila has reinforced its defence arrangement with the US, increasing the amount of joint naval exercises, and asking the US to deploy spy planes in the South China Sea area.’(Emmers, 2013). China perceives this rebalancing strategy and the focus on the South China Sea as a US intention to contain China’s peaceful rise in Asia, which is associated with the increase of US allocation of troops and means to the region to strengthen the bilateral alliances.

5. DISCUSSION: THE US/CHINA RELATIONS AND THEIR IDENTITIES

Today, China commits to revive the traditional Chinese value, and especially centres on the Confucian thought, whereas the West holds the prevailing idea of ‘Might is Right’(Zheng, 2016). In the light of the identities China and the US have perceived themselves, they had established a ‘New Type of relationship’, which describe shared goals in the bilateral relationship, avoiding zero-sum competition and expanding areas of cooperation (Ratner, 2013). This relationship is a development from the idea of ‘G-2’, meaning the US and China as two superpowers in a sustainable bond, which was initiated by Fred Bergsten in 2005.

Chinese scholars like Wang Jisi had given a general negative view on the US, seeing it getting control of the Asia-Pacific region to constrain China’s influence. The US was perceived as allying with other Asian countries to contain China and eliminating its potential challenge to the US leadership, in response, this pivot in Asia had led to an insecure China (Ratner, 2013). On the US side, it gives a relatively complicated view on China. On one hand it needs to sustain a positive relationship with China for economic cooperation (especially when China becomes its biggest debtor country). On the other, the US constantly perceives China as its greatest threat to the global leadership. This speculation grounded the claims of some western commentators that China establishes regional institutions to form coalitions against the US. It is also suggested that East Asian countries rely less on the US because of China’s rise (Emmers, 2013).

The newest vision of the longstanding “China Threat Theory” draws onto the ‘thucydides trap theory’, based on the quote from ancient historian Thucydides: “It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this inspired in Sparta, that made war inevitable.”(ibid). The model was used by politics people to predict a likely warfare between two nations, China and the US are commonly identified as a pair that is potentially engaged in such a trap. The rise of China in relations to the ‘Thucydides Trap’ was first analysed by Graham Allison, who has argued that certain trap arising between the US and China in the Asia-Pacific.

In response to this ‘trap theory’, President Xi has presented himself as a constructivist, he emphasized the importance of mutual intentions and interactions between China and the US, rejected the pessimistic prospect of the competition embedded in the bilateral relation. It is, therefore, the solution to avoid the ‘Thucydides Trap’ by enhancing positive co-operations such
as OBOR. However, in the eyes of sensitive Americans, China’s ambitious “Belt and Road” strategy was nothing more than a parody of the Marshall Plan. (Mo & Chen, 2016). On reflection of this, it is the crisis of trust between the Americans and the Chinese that could lead to peril, and embroils the two states into the so-called ‘Thucydides Trap’.

6. CONCLUSION

This essay has argued from a constructivist view that China and the US identities and their foreign policies have changed through their interactions with each other and other countries in Asia-Pacific. China has constructed its identity based on Confucian idea, which gives the foundation for its ‘peaceful development’ strategy, and a cooperative approach in foreign policies, e.g. One Belt One Road (OBOR). Whereas in the eyes of some pro-west countries, China is a threatening communist power tends to challenge the existing order. The South China Sea issue has significantly reflected this kind of view as China’s claim to the water was perceived as an ambition to expand its territory. On the other side, the American identity was perceived by others as a ‘global leader’, where its allies see it as a leading power and tend to follow its order, and the US made foreign policies to strengthen the coalition and fulfil its leadership, e.g. the TTP coalitions. From China’s perspective, the US is taking a strategy to contain and constrain China, as it sees China’s rise challenging and threatening its leadership, and the US identity was shaped as an imperialist state persistent in maintaining its declining hegemony.

REFERENCES


China,


