

Mass Intellectuality of the Neoliberal State

Mass Higher Education, Public Professionalism and State Effects in Chile

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This dissertation is submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

How does the massification of higher education shape the neoliberal state in Chile? Our research looks at the state effects of the *mass intellectuality* spawned by the recent expansion of the university system. The significance of this group hinges on the dissemination of orientations of *public professionalism*, which attach political meaning to state work beyond the instrumental rationality typically attributed to the bureaucracy. While the massification of professional work is incorporated within the enlargement of the public administration, the universities as ideological apparatuses are articulated with the public administration as state apparatuses. The political consequences of mass higher education are manifested in the autonomy of a mass of *public professionals* in the state.

The research is broken into two parts. Firstly, it deals with how the neoliberal transformation of higher education affects the ideological reproduction of a *mass intellectuality*. Drawing on public data and interviews with academics, the segmentation of the university system illustrates the differentiation of sites of political socialisation of professional work. Then, it looks at how the massification of professional work shapes the autonomous rationality of the state bureaucracy and relates to political change. With data produced from administrative information of the state personnel, the professionals' positioning and rotation in the public administration are associated with the changes of governmental coalition in 2010-2014 – actually, the first changes of governmental coalition since the restoration of democracy in 1990. Complementarily, interviews with professional state workers discuss the effects of *public professionalism* on state policy.

Three theses on the *mass intellectuality* of the state are formulated. First, the divisions of the university system underlie the differentiation of *public professionalism*. Universities segmented for the elite and also public-oriented mass universities socialise *public professionalism* as expectations of political leadership through professional work. In most cases, such sites of politicisation were activated with the 2011 student movement – as the largest social mobilisation in two decades – to affirm the public value of intellectual work against neoliberal policy. Second, the massification of professional work is not randomly distributed in the public administration but configures political affinities, both in dominant and subordinated roles, along with the changes of government. Expressing the condition of state autonomy in a stage of *mass intellectuality*, changes of state policy take place through reconfigurations of the professional composition of the public administration. Third, the professionals' autonomy in the state not only engenders effects of control

but also of *production of meaning* linked to the representation of subaltern identities. Thereby, professional workers might also influence the direction of state policy, consummating the political relevance of the *mass intellectuality* of the state.

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But the research also expanded along with the social transformations of the Chilean context. The political effects of the massification of intellectual labour in higher education, the state, and society continue to unfold relentlessly. As I write this acknowledgement note, Chilean society is again mobilised against the neoliberal basis of the state. In this process, I feel that I have finally fulfilled my vocation as sociologist and I am very grateful to my supervisor, David Lehmann, for giving me the space, confidence and sense of academic purpose I needed to carry on.

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I dedicate this work to my children Manuel, Arturo and baby Victoria. They are the joy of my life and I am sure that the eldest ones who lived Cambridge, also enjoyed their lives there much. I also dedicate this to the memory of my grandfathers Gilbert Fleet (1925-2018) and Pedro Oyarce (1916-2013), who passed away while I was writing the thesis and so they represent the personal cost I paid for not being with them at the end.

¿Qué aprendió el árbol de la tierra para conversar con el cielo?

Pablo Neruda

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Chapter One

Introduction

This research links two extended phenomena, namely: the massification and differentiation of higher education and the massification of professional work in the public administration. At the basis of these trends, linking them as political affinities, a *mass intellectuality* (Lazzarato, 1996; Harney, 2002; Virno, 2004) disseminates ideals of knowledge and professionalism as orientations of autonomous professional work. While such a *mass intellectuality* is spawned in concrete universities, its political effects on the state entails the articulation of both domains, of the university and the public administration, of knowledge and politics. Moreover, the historic centrality of these institutions, as well as the expansion of the basis of middle and intellectual classes, suggests that the orientations of *mass intellectuality* are expressive of a significant dimension of societal change in Chile. As an exemplary case of post-Fordist and neoliberal transformations, the massification of professional work in Chile thus has generalisable relevance regarding its political significance upon the expansion of the state.

Our approach is in tension with the predominant focus on state elites. For Bourdieu's seminal take on the subject (1994, 1996 and 2014), state elites reproduce class power by means of exclusive higher education and other cultural privileges recognised as academic merit, professional credentials that stabilise various forms of capital, and social connections giving access to positions of political direction. Although in this theory the reproduction of state elites is circumscribed to a narrow range of relations confirming the power the dominant classes already have over the state, it provides an unavoidable reference to relate the direction of the state to the education provided in elite schools. In our case, several professional schools have formed the state elites, like the Law School of the Universidad de Chile, cradle of many presidents of the republic, or the School of Economics of the Universidad Católica, which produced the cadres that, after graduating from the University of Chicago, led the neoliberal transformations in the country. Among the experiences that sparked the interest in this research, the author was once invited to give a talk by engineering students from the Universidad Católica on higher education policy, on which occasion the interest that these students – from upper-class backgrounds – manifested on the matters of state policy seemed most expressive of the vocation of the state elite.

In conformity to our focus on the university as a site of political socialisation, Trow's (2007) notion of the 'elite' as selective higher education is adopted here as the preferred meaning of the concept. For sure, state elites and elite higher education intersect to a significant extent, as the latter exceeds the former. Moreover, the meaning of elite higher education is not restricted to the top of the university system, as it marks the differentiation with the segment of mass or non-

selective recruitment that extends the model of the bourgeois university to the working classes. Thus, the distinction between elite and mass higher education provides the main coordinates to locate the production of a *mass intellectuality*. In effect, another of those moments that motivated this research took place in a meeting with social work students from the Universidad Católica Silva Henríquez, a mass-private university of the Salesians Order that recruits students from lower to middle-class backgrounds to form them under a charisma of sanctification of the poor. Even though the profile of these students places them lower on the social hierarchy than their peers from the Universidad Católica, still it was revealing that among their aspirations there was no intention whatsoever to climb to positions of higher professional status and political responsibility, even to accede to larger rewards, but to fulfill a sense of professional authenticity in the work with the subaltern. From our perspective, a specific sense of *public professionalism*, that is, of professional work oriented as a political role, is as much expressed there as in the elite.

As the massification of professional work infuses ideals of professionalism beyond the *superior classes* (Lazzarato, 1996), the state elites no longer have the monopoly of intellectual labour, by means of which they used to exclude the majority of society – i.e. working classes – from the affairs of state (Poulantzas, 2014). So, as the framework of state elites is not capable of grasping the political orientations attached to the massification of professional work, other considerations of a new middle-class (Poulantzas, 1979; Gouldner, 1979; Wright, 1999) are not specific enough to anticipate the new trends of division of labour in the state. In this context, the framework of professional action (Marshall, 1939; Parsons, 1968; Brint, 1994; Martin, 2011; Evetts, 2013; Noordegraaf, 2015) provides a more specific approach to differentiate the orientations of a *mass intellectuality* in the state. In effect, the professional framework contains the implicit assumption that professional work might conform political orientations derived from its non-standardisable uses of knowledge and ideals of professionalism (Marshall, 1939), which are empirically observable within the occupational structure of the state (Brint, 1994). Within this framework, our research looks at the political significance of the *mass intellectuality* of the state in terms of the reproduction and differentiation of variants of *public professionalism* in the university system and the mobilisation of these orientations into political roles and influence on state policy.

As our main theoretical perspective, post-Marxist literatures attach the orientations of *mass intellectuality* to expectations of self-fulfilling work (Postone, 2003) and professional autonomy – against bureaucratic discipline (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007). Moreover, the recent wave of educational massification is seen to have generalised the capacity for critiquing as well (Boltanski, 2011). In this sense, the massification of higher education is hypothesised in terms of the politicisation of intellectual work, as *public professionalism*, into the state. In effect, as we will

discuss, a massive student movement emerged in Chile in 2011 as a consequence of the politicisation of mass higher education against neoliberal policy. While the movement defended the public meaning of professional work beyond economic return, the differentiation among universities along these lines explained their participation in the protests. Therefore, while the massification of intellectual work entails political orientations –as we aim to observe them within the state– in the disciplines and universities we search for the conditions and meanings that underlie the ideological differentiation of the *mass intellectuality*.

In Althusser's (2014) concept of *ideological state apparatuses*, the centrality of universities hinges on the ideological reproduction of intellectual labour, involving the socialisation of *intellectual* workers into ideals of action and the concentration of ideological class struggle within universities themselves. To this idea of universities' as ideological apparatuses, in the research we also take into account the empirical forms of social and ideological segmentation of universities themselves. Extending our initial impressions, we discuss the neoliberal transformations of the Chilean university system in terms of the differentiation of political projects embodied by the particular universities: conservative, liberal, left-wing, right-wing, Catholic (Opus Dei, Jesuit, Salesian), secular, among other orientations also including purely commercial interests. Such orientations are reinforced as *ideological differentiation* when reproduced for socially segmented student constituencies. Within the *professionalising* character of Chilean higher education, in which professional qualifications are completed after over five years of single-disciplined undergraduate programmes, the effect of political socialisation attributed to universities is reinforced: professional roles are differentiated as political orientations, that is, as *public professionalism* when projected onto state work. Thus, the differentiation of a *mass intellectuality* in this context underlies the ideological division of the labour of the administration of the state.

In sum, our research question asks for the political consequences of an expanding *mass intellectuality* and its *public professionalism* upon the organisation and power of the state. In other words, we ask how the massification of professional work, with its own social and political differentiation, is configured within the autonomous rationality of the neoliberal state in Chile.

The long sociological discussion from Weber, as father of the classical model bureaucratic action, to the post-structuralist approaches to the state, illustrates the movement from the autonomy of the state based on the rules of its bureaucratic organisation, to the autonomy that intellectual workers – on the basis of their knowledge, interests and practices – incorporate to the state. Within the post-structuralist approaches, the notions of post-bureaucracies (Maravelias, 2011) and post-professionalism (Martin, 2011) suggest a synthesis between bureaucracy and professional performance into one unit of self-produced governance. Along these lines, the autonomy of the

state is rendered dependent on the *mundane practices* that reproduce the universality of the state (or *state effects*) (Mitchell, 1999). The idea of *mass intellectuality* itself (Lazzarato, 1996; Harney, 2002; Virno, 2007; Vercellone, 2007) also emerges as a synthesis between structure and agency, as mass labour transcends the organisation of capital and the state to produce value relying on its own communicative resources of *living knowledge*.

As the organisation of the state relies more than ever on the autonomy of a mass of intellectual workers, it is critical to enquiry about the orientations that such a *mass intellectuality* brings to the state. Harney (2002) identifies this problem with the ontological question of management: why state workers work in the first place, and why do they work hard. The predominant sociological answer to this question has reduced the autonomy of the bureaucracy to instrumental and vested interests (e.g. Weber, 1978 and 2003; Merton, 1968; Miliband, 1970; Hecllo, 1974; Habermas, 1976; Beetham, 1987; Bauman, 1988; Bourdieu, 1994; Esping-Andersen, 1998; Ozslak, 2005). Therefore, as the trends of massification of intellectual work entail the mobilisation of normative orientations of knowledge and *professionalism*, probably to the largest extents and with the broadest scope of autonomy in the state, it remains a deficit of sociological interpretation to leave the value-oriented actions of a *mass intellectuality* outside of the effects of bureaucratic autonomy. As long as professional state work incorporates ideals of knowledge that are not reducible to *technical control* – but include interests in *mutual understanding* and *emancipation* as well (Habermas, 2004) – normative orientations animate the autonomy of a *mass intellectuality*, as an an *excess* of knowledge exerted beyond the organisational rules and material rewards of the state (Vercellone, 2007). Moreover, *public professionalism* not only operates as an ideology of social honour alone or as a latency function that moderates the professionals' behaviour in the state, but implies the orientation towards the content of public policy – hence the '*public*' of '*professionalism*'.

But the massification of professional work does not only provoke a transformation of the bureaucratic organisation of the state. The conditions of *mass intellectuality* might also entail a specific effect on the power of the state, that is, on the links reproduced between the labour of the bureaucracy with the class interests into which state policy is embedded. As informed by Marxist theories of the state (Poulantzas, 2014; Therborn, 2008), the structure of the bureaucratic organisation institutionalises class interests in an uneven fashion, in conformity to the dominant and subordinated directions of state power (state policy). Therefore, to interpret the effect of a *mass intellectuality* upon the direction of state policy, it is necessary to bring the post-structuralist discussion on post-bureaucracies, post-professions and even *mass intellectuality* back into the structural basis of state power. Uses of knowledge in the state are thus organically linked to specific interests at its basis. The ideological differentiation of a *mass intellectuality* in the university system

might as well engender roles that represent particular interests in the state, without these relations being restricted to technocratic professionalism and to the representation of dominant interests by state elites. Moreover, historic state transformations, as well as changes in the direction of the political process, are expected to be carried out by professional reconfigurations of the public administration, embodying the autonomous rationality of the organisation of the state to respond to shifts of power. Within these conditions and constraints, linked to social and political interests, a mass of state workers mobilise their own *public professionalism* into more or less effective policy influence.

The relevance the Chilean state hinges on the exemplarity of this state formation to represent the condition of state autonomy in the Latin American context (Zavaleta, 1990; Dezalay and Garth, 2002) as well as of the neoliberal transformation in the global perspective (Stepan, 1985; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 2002). In effect, the historic changes of the Chilean state confirm the theoretical expectations in terms of the transit from the classical framework of bureaucratic action, correspondent to the liberal state in the early twentieth century, to the incorporation of specific forms of *public professionalism* for the articulation of the developmental state until the 1973 military coup. Subsequently, with the imposition of the neoliberal transformation of the state by the military dictatorship, the focus of state autonomy turned to the autonomy of technocrats from social and political pressures, defining the orientation of state policy for this new framework. Indeed, neoliberalism might be then summarised as state policy that excludes organised labour, renounces to the productive function, and is imbricated with the market sphere (Silva, 1996). With the restoration of democracy in 1990, the technocratic imprint of the neoliberal state was refurbished for the new scenario – perpetuating the neoliberal architecture of the state for that matter – including the incorporation of new politico-technical elites for the administration of power in the name of market interests and the generation of new state agencies for the representation of fragmented subaltern identities. In such a context, our search for the effects of the *mass intellectuality* of the state entails a critique of the *fetishisation* of economists and other technocratised professionals, along with the value of their respective academic capital, as the very content of state power (e.g. Joignant, 2011), inasmuch as such a *fetishisation* overlooks the concrete links of the technocratic uses of knowledge with the dominant interests of the state. Again, state elites are not the *end of history* for the neoliberal state, but the massification of professional work towards the lower strata of the state also entails political effects linked to the subaltern identities at its basis.

Several questions are derived from the main question above about the effects of the *mass intellectuality* in the neoliberal state: How are variants of *public professionalism* produced and

differentiated within the massification and segmentation of the university system? How has the massification of professional work taken place within the public administration and to what extent does it express a different source of state autonomy? In what conditions are professionals incorporated into the state and in response to what kind of political demands? How is the professional composition of the state reconfigured with changes in its political direction? What relations of political affinity are observed between professional profiles and changes of government? What are the consequences of the ideological segmentation of the university system within the public administration of the state? What effects are attributable to the *public professionalism* of the *mass intellectuality* of the state?

These questions seek to represent the political significance of a *mass intellectuality* in terms of orientations that are not reduced to individual intentions (Touraine, 1966). These orientations extend to the consequences of the socialisation of *public professionalism*, as expectations of political leadership, within a socially and ideologically divided university system, upon the positioning, political affinities and autonomy of professional work in the state. In turn, our contribution in this regard consists of complementing the narrower views on state elites with a broader and substantive perspective of the political effects of professional work in the rank-and-file roles of the public administration, linked to subaltern identities at the basis of the state. In this way, we learn about the ideological effectiveness of the *mass intellectuality* of the state and of the universities that socialise them in ideals of knowledge and professionalism.

Overview

To tame the broad scope of the research we separate the observations onto different chapters, each with its own techniques of data collection and analysis. Still, the common methodological strategy consists in taking professional knowledge and action as an independent variable to explain relations of political affinity in the state. The general objective of the research is phrased as follows:

To trace the public professionalism attached to state work, from its political socialisation in the university system to its incorporation and effects upon the public administration of the state.

To undertake this objective, we apply mixed methods: both statistics and interviews were produced and analysed to interpret the transit of the *mass intellectuality* from the university to the state. With quantitative data, we associate the differentiation of the university system to the social structure. Likewise, with quantitative data, we also represent the locations and trajectories of *public professionalism* in the state. As an endeavour of data production, we built the first data sets on the

professional composition of the public administration in Chile collecting raw dispersed information from the online platforms of administrative transparency and the registers of the Comptroller of the Republic. While this information exists for other purposes than observing the composition of the public administration, by means of preparation, organisation and analysis of this data (Donoho, 2017), we illuminate for the first time the organisation and uses of professional work in the state. In turn, with qualitative research, we interpret the subjective meanings attached to the socialisation and mobilisation of professional state work. Without the perspective of the actors, both at the university and the state, our analysis would be confined to a kind of *political economy* in which the normative orientations of professional state work are excluded from the outset. The choice of mixed methods is thus adequate to this multidimensional effort of sociological analysis.

The thesis has three specific objectives and five chapters. While Chapters Two, Five and Six address the specific objectives in a direct fashion, Chapters Three and Four expand the research both theoretically and historically.

The first specific objective seeks to *differentiate the orientations of professional work by the type of knowledge and of university in which its political socialisation takes place.*

Chapter Two relates the trends of material and ideological differentiation of the university system with the academics' discourses on students socialisation in each type of university. As noted, the emergence of the 2011 student movement in Chile provides the first confirmation of student politicisation along with these trends. In effect, in Fleet and Guzmán-Concha (2017) the author has already published part of the empirical data produced for this Chapter to attempt an interpretation of the orientations of the student movement on the basis of the patterns of differentiation of the university system.

Chapter Three contains the sociological discussion on the rationality of state autonomy and the increasing autonomy of state workers within the bureaucracy. At the end of this discussion, we present our own approach to interpret the orientations of professional workers in relation to the structure and power of the state.

Chapter Four takes the theoretical discussion to the role of *public professionalism* in the historic transformations of the state autonomy during the twentieth century in Chile: political uses of knowledge provide the link between professional state work with the class interests leading the political process.

The second objective consists of observing how the massification of professional work in the public administration articulates different professional configurations with changes of governmental coalition.

At the end of Chapter Four, we address the first part of this objective, presenting the magnitudes of the massification of professional work in the state, for which we use published statistical reports. Then, in Chapter Five, two databases are produced for the research to explore the reconfiguration of professionals in the public administration with changes of governmental coalition, as noted. The data covers the period spanning from the first centre-left government of Michelle Bachelet in 2006-2010, the change to the first right-wing government in two decades under the presidency of Sebastián Piñera in 2010-2014, and the return of the centre-left in 2014 with Bachelet's second government. In total, the professional basis of political change is exposed as never before for our case study.

The third objective seeks to interpret the effects of professional autonomy on the state, particularly on the aims of policy.

Chapter Six addresses this objective relying on the views of state professionals about the kind of interventions they attempt through state work. We focus on the effects of the *production of meaning* by means of state work as well as on the generation of links with subaltern social identities to transform state policy.

The research represents the orientations of an emergent *mass intellectuality*, as the ideological expression of the expanding middle and intellectual classes in Chile today. Our perspective is limited to the period in which the fieldwork was conducted and data produced, covering the political process between 2010 and 2014, which includes the significant student movement of 2011, but without encompassing the consequences of these trends to the present date. Still, our contributions are sufficiently grounded as to objectify the social and structural conditions that explain the political significance of the *mass intellectuality* of the state, as we achieve a consistent picture of the articulation between universities, professional work and the state in Chile. The research has generalisable implications to reveal, for the first time with empirical data, how political changes are undertaken with professional reconfigurations of the public administration, as a constitutive part of the autonomous rationality of the state. The implications are not restricted to the effect of state elites, with non-instrumental uses of knowledge closer to subaltern identities also explaining the effects of professional autonomy upon (and against) the neoliberal direction of state policy.

As long as the political performance of intellectual labour within the overdeterminations of the neoliberal state offers a subject of relevance for sociological discussion, this research affirms its own relevance for other cases in which the massification of professional work affects the organisation and power of the state.

Chapter Two

The Non-Bureaucratic Basis of the Bureaucracy: Universities and *Mass Intellectuality*

The non-bureaucratic basis of the bureaucracy refers to the background of normative and political orientations of professional work, which ensure the autonomous reproduction of the organisation of the state beyond the instrumental rules inscribed in its bureaucratic administration. In our case, the neoliberal transformation of the university system provides such non-bureaucratic basis of the bureaucracy, in such a way that its trends of material and ideological differentiation shape the political socialisation of professional state work.

Interviews with academics from diverse fields of knowledge and types of universities helped us to illustrate how the segmentation of the university system along these lines differentiate particular orientations of *public professionalism* – as we refer to the political socialisation of professional work. Thus, a particular profession acquires specific ideals, occupational opportunities and expectations of leadership depending on the university where it was formed. In this process, universities fulfill the function of *ideological state apparatuses*.

Reacting to these conditions of reproduction of intellectual labour, a major student movement emerged in Chile in 2011, like nothing that had been seen in decades. The activation of the movement expressed the universities that socialised political roles, rather than the ones that suffered from the constraints of commodified higher education to the largest extent. The conversations with academics also reflected such reactions to the movement.

In this chapter, we study the political socialisation of the *public professionalism* of a *mass intellectuality* of the state, considering, first, the theoretical implications of this process; second, the techniques of data collection and analysis for our empirical case; third, the characterisation of the patterns of differentiation of the university system and; last, the emergence of the 2011 student movement.

2.1. Ideological Socialisation of the *Mass Intellectuality*: theoretical remarks

The massification of higher education transforms the traditional basis of the bureaucracy. The political implications of the *mass intellectuality* of the state then hinges on: first, the interests of new middle and intellectual classes, expressed by ideologies of *professionalism*, which are disseminated with the massification of intellectual labour – along with the generalisation of its claim for autonomy; and then, second, with the differentiation of the orientations of intellectual labour as *public professionalism* under the effect of universities as *ideological state apparatuses*.

2.1.1. Class, Professions and *Mass Intellectuality*

The question of the *non-bureaucratic foundations of the bureaucracy* (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985) raises concerns about the consistency and performance of the public administration. The point is how to counterbalance the decentralisation of the bureaucracy by embedding its operation into values and institutions sustaining strong corporate coherence (Lipset, 1952; Evans, 1995; Oszlak, 2005; Du Gay, 2005). Such a recognition of the external sources of meaning of the bureaucracy provides our starting point to hypothesise the professional socialisation of intellectual workers as the *non-bureaucratic basis of the bureaucracy*.

When the socialisation of the bureaucracy promptly gravitates towards the usual location of state elites (Bourdieu, 1996; Suleiman, 1974), its orientations are reduced to power interests, without adding much meaning beyond the organisation of the state in accordance with class dominance (Poulantzas and Miliband, 1972). But when broadening the focus onto the new middle classes in the intellectual layers of the bureaucracy – between appointed authority and routine administrative staff (Beetham, 1987) – its orientations become internally contradicted along dominant and subordinated positions (Giddens, 1975; Wright, 1999) as well as differentiated by professional occupations (Brint, 1994). Indeed, Gouldner's new class (1979) is also hypothesized as internally divided between technical intelligentsia and intellectuals. Eventually, such fragmentation of interests implies that one has to look at the professional roles to find the latent political orientations of the new class (King and Szelényi, 2004, pp.196-201; Mills, 2002, p.112).

The orientations of professional work have been problematised in the ambivalence between *professionalism* and *professionalisation* (Evetts, 2013). The perspective of *professionalism* looks at the normative rationality of abstract disciplinary knowledge as applied in concrete situations. Durkheim's professional ethics (2001); Weber's distinction between education of charisma and specialised instruction (1968, pp.119-129); Marshall's (1939) notion of professional work as non-standardisable knowledge and ethical standards and; Parsons' (1939 and 1968) view of professions as modern framework of action – i.e. 'rationality, functional specificity and universalism' (1939, p.42) – all refer to the dimension of *professionalism*. On the other hand, *professionalisation* focuses on instrumental occupational control. Etzioni's (1969a) concept of 'semi-professions' as the lack of full professional recognition; Collins' (1971 and 1979) 'credentialism' as professional conflict; Parkin's (1981) occupational closure as strategy of class power and; Abbott's (1988) interprofessional competition as jurisdictional disputes, are all variants of the dimension of *professionalisation*. Inasmuch as professional action combines normative and instrumental traits, it resembles the effect of social movements (Denzin, 1968 cited in Jackson, 1970), producing reciprocal policy influences when related to the state (Johnson, 1972).

The professional framework is challenged by the massification of higher education, which disseminates ideals of knowledge and professionalism as orientations of *mass intellectuality*, beyond the *superior classes* (Lazzarato, 1996). As professional education reaches segments previously excluded from intellectual labour, and therefore, from the state (Poulantzas, 2014), the professional basis of the state no longer represents a more or less homogeneous *new class*. The question on the origins of the bureaucracy is no longer to be answered in terms of those who possess professional knowledge and those who do not. It also depends on which variants of *professionalism* enter the state and how these are linked to different types of universities and orientations of state policy. The sources of meaning of the bureaucracy are transformed accordingly.

From a Marxian perspective, 'socialised and free' education leads to the re-appropriation of the *general intellect* objectified in the productive process. The 'mass intellect' (Neary and Winn, 2009, p.206) regains control on the orientations and productive uses of knowledge. Moreover, the *mass intellectuality* mobilises knowledge and competences that, as in the professional framework, are indivisible from subjective action and so 'cannot be objectified in the machinery' (Virno, 2007, p.6).

A claim of autonomy of intellectual work is thus disseminated among the larger public attending higher education through expectations of creativity, authenticity, and *self-fulfilling* work (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007; Postone, 2003). Therefore, the orientations of *mass intellectuality* are not different from the professional framework, but the novelty consists in their generalisation beyond the middle-class. In that sense, Martin (2011) speaks of a *professional turn* when professional work is massified and its occupational opportunities are no longer taken for granted, leading to demands for relevance in education and for political effectiveness in organisational work. Long before, already in 1972, Trow studied the effect of the massification of higher education in rendering pure academic values insufficient to ensure the motivation of the growing student population. A surplus of *relevance* had to be added onto mass higher education, by emphasising action over books, moral commitment over analysis, cooperation over solitary work, and moral positions over arid objectivity. In sum, the *mass intellectuality* generalises practical and thereby political uses of knowledge.

According to scholars of the *cognitive capitalism* approach, the subjective aspects of professional autonomy, including cultural, communicative and political competences, are transformed into productive work (Lazzarato, 1996; Virno, 2004; Moulier-Boutang, 2011; Fumagalli, 2015). As in the professional framework – that invests the entire professionals' subjectivity into work (Marshall, 1939; Parsons, 1939) – the massification of intellectual labour also 'leads to an extension of the mechanisms of extraction of surplus-value to the totality of social times which participate in

social production' (Vercellone, 2007, p.30). Therefore, the workers' subjectivity and the relations involved in its reproduction constitute a source of value as well. This premise is radicalised as education itself conforms part of the non-labour time incorporated into labour, with students regarded as workers and so subjected to relations of exploitation for that matter (Roggero, 2011; Toscano, 2013).

From the outset, students are subjected to the same artificial measurements to subsume the value of intellectual work, resulting in hierarchies of education and professional work determined independently of the meaningful intellectual activity. In conditions of *mass intellectuality*, capital is increasingly unable to *know* the content of intellectual labour, hence external indicators of performance, such as rankings, audits, credits, competences and academic output, represent its value. A permanent struggle for measurement mediates the relation of universities with the state and capital (Dominelli and Hoogvelt, 1996; Edu-factory, 2009; De Angelis and Harvie, 2009; Caffentzis and Federici, 2009). However, most of these measurements resort to the degrees of selectivity differentiating between elite and mass higher education institutions (Calhoun, 2006). Thus, the mechanisms used to determine the value of intellectual work typically stratify hierarchies of knowledge in conformity to 'existing social classes' (Vercellone, 2007, p.25).

The question remains about the orientations that a *mass intellectuality* brings to intellectual work. While there are not predefined tendencies (Edu-Factory, 2009), further specifications are taken into account to grasp the diversification of universities and variants of professionalism for students of different social origins.

2.1.2. Socialisation of Public Professionalism: Ideals and Ideology

The idea of *public professionalism* represents the orientation to exert a political orientation through professional work. Universities and the types of knowledge involved are essential for differentiating variants of *public professionalism* within an amorphous *mass intellectuality*.

What do students learn in the universities in order to meaningfully influence the state? For Bourdieu, elite professions do not remain satisfied with holding technical expertise if this knowledge is not expressive of political power as well, for which specialised training in public affairs provided. Hence, elite education reproduces the 'aesthetic, ethical, and political dispositions' sustaining the 'positions in the field of power' (1996, p.136). But the problem arises if the political effects of education are restricted to reproduction and domination. Rather than explaining the function of education within the 'field of power' in a broader sense, Bourdieu reduces it to the *field of state elites*, which is where elites hold power regardless of education. A similar bias is visible in Miliband (1970), from whom *political socialisation* is reduced to the production of ideological consent as the

ultimate function of cultural and educational institutions. While Bourdieu and Miliband's contributions remain unavoidable in studying the relation of education and the state, in conditions of *mass intellectuality*, the broader professional orientations, beyond elites' interests, must be taken into account.

To explain the socialisation of *public professionalism*, two components are distinguished. First, the differentiation of ideals of disciplinary knowledge into professional action orientations. Second, the variations of such knowledge ideals within particular universities. While the first component anchors professional consciousness in ideals that exceed instrumental interests, constituting the political substance of *public professionalism*, the second component differentiates universities in accordance with the students' social origins and the 'university projects'. In this fashion, a single profession represents different political profiles depending on the university. To the aggregated effect of the socialisation of a *mass intellectuality* in these conditions we refer to as the *ideological division of intellectual labour*.

For the first component of knowledge ideals as orientations of professional socialisation, we resort to Habermas' scheme of knowledge-constitutive interests.

Table 2.1. Habermas' Scheme of Knowledge-Constitutive Interests					
Types of knowledge	Field of enquiry	Method	Output	Related interest	Mean of organisation
Empirical analytical	Factual world	Hypothetico-deductive	Predictive knowledge	Technical control	Work
Historical-hermeneutic	Cultural tradition	Hermeneutic	Interpretations – renewed traditions	Mutual understanding	Language
Critically oriented	Ideology	Analysis – self-reflection	Autonomy – responsibility	Emancipatory	Power
Source: Habermas, 2004, scheme reworked from Atria (2002).					

Different types of knowledge – and related fields of enquiry, method and output – are linked to specific interests orienting social action: '[k]nowledge-constitutive interests preserve... the latent nexus between action and theoretical knowledge. They are responsible for the transformation of opinions into theorems and of the retransformation of theorems into action-oriented knowledge' (Habermas, 2004, p.370).

As implied in this scheme, the articulation of theoretical knowledge with social action is not reduced to instrumental rationality. As long as symbolic interaction is preserved beyond instrumental motivations and technical rules, alternative rationality oriented to the production of meaning is available for social action. This is how Habermas sustains the distinction between technical and *practical* interests ('mutual understanding'). Depending on these two interests, he aggregates a third one; the emancipatory interest that emanates from the critique of unnecessary

domination. Emancipatory interests historically mediate between technical and practical interests, infusing social struggles that seek to reshape institutions to tackle problems of integration at the level of the economic system (Habermas, 1992). Knowledge interests also relate to organisational forms. Consequently, we hypothesise the ways in which professionals engage with the bureaucratic organisation, namely, instrumental work; *illocutionary* uses language for meaning production and; power as critique and emancipation.

In relation to disciplines, knowledge interests entail not perfect correspondences, but rather combined articulations, in which knowledge interests still predominate as ideal orientations for professionalism (Becher and Trowler, 2001). Thus, Ylijoki differentiates the *moral order* acquired from studying sociology and social psychology, in which students are attached to 'the shared goals of emancipation, resistance and radicalism' (2000, p.345), from the instrumental concerns instilled by the discipline of public administration (p.348). In the same vein, Burawoy's *public sociology* (2005) revitalises the links between critical uses of knowledge and social movements. In total, the orientations of *public professionalism* vary: orientations towards optimisation, regulation, management or technical control fit with the expectations of economists, engineers, lawyers, and public administrators, whereas orientations towards identity recognition and mutual understanding, cultural contextualisation and social mobilisation, resignification of meaning and empowerment, might be attached to the work of sociologists, educators, social psychologists, and journalists. In turn, ideals of emancipation are more difficult to attach to specific disciplines. The effectiveness of a critique stands independently of whether it is made in the name of technical or practical interests. Still, the identification of social sciences and education professionals with emancipatory ideals stems from the sociological proximity of these knowledges with the subaltern, marking more pronounced critical tendencies in some disciplines for the social uses and links they produce. Paulo Freire's critical pedagogy (1972), as one of the few well-recognised applications of critical theory (Drizek, 2005), fits the point as it links knowledge, education and the interest in emancipation. In this framework, professionals elaborate the structural link between subordination and broader social contradictions into the content of a learning process, in which the subjectivity that will overcome such subordination and contradictions is affirmed. Ultimately, knowledge ideals infuse professionalism with political purpose.

The differentiation of knowledge interests along ideals of professionalism underlies the intellectual function and its political orientations. As a *re-enchantment of the world for a mass intellectuality*, new contingents of professionals are now pursuing a myriad of ideals through intellectual work. By this token, the input of *public professionalism* into the state cannot be reduced to strategic practices and power networks. At the same time, the relation with the state is also

reflected back into the disciplines themselves, as the social sciences are divided by the intention of planning and administering, on the one hand, and self-understanding and enlightenment, on the other (Habermas, 1988, p.3).

The second component of political socialisation of intellectual labour is linked to the inscription of the concrete universities within social and political relations constitutive of the mass university system as *ideological state apparatuses*.

While in abstract form universities preserve their own autonomy as unconstrained reproduction of knowledge and cultural traditions (Habermas, 1987), in relation to the concrete demands of the state and the market, they have to satisfy the requirement for productive knowledge and a competent intellectual workforce. Throughout the transition towards post-Fordist capitalism, these concrete external demands define the role of universities with more intensity, increasingly subjecting this institution to the needs of capital and to 'the state on behalf of capital' (Marginson, 2006, p.46). Still, the tension with the abstract idea of the university is irreducible. While universities create subcultures freed from motivations towards 'economic compulsion' (Habermas, 1971, p.121), they also constitute the lifeworld of students' political socialisation (Habermas, 1980). In this sense, the massification of the university is charged with the socialisation of cadres, technocracies and kinds of professionalism that deflect from the ends of capitalist domination (Habermas, 1976; Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007; Therborn, 2008). To be sure, the efficacy of the university as political socialisation is demonstrated by psychological research on the stabilisation of attitudes developed in late adolescence into adult life, as well as on the importance of informal extra-curricular relations to that effect (Gurin et al., 2002).

The differentiation between elite and mass universities inscribes them within economic and politically conditioned relations. In this fashion, the students' political socialisation might express these relations meaningfully, specifying uses of knowledge and ideals of professionalism for a given position within the social structure and their political correlates. But, on the other hand, the condition of massification might also alienate students' self-understanding within universities, as Bourdieu and Passeron's (1979) found that the internal segmentation of the mass university restricts the lower class students' academic choices precisely to the subjects where their cultural capitals are most devalued. In total, at the basis of a *mass intellectuality*, social hierarchies are educational hierarchies, which might be as well elaborated as political ones.

In Althusser's scheme of *ideological state apparatuses*, educational apparatuses, particularly universities, occupy the centre of class struggle (2014). The ideological centrality of the university entails that its political significance cannot be reduced to elite dominance. In the broader sense, *ideological state apparatuses* reproduce relations of production overdetermined by class domination

(Therborn, 1999, pp.38-39). But *ideological state apparatuses* also appeal to concrete subjects, 'such as you and me' (p.188), who work consistently to ideas and beliefs. Hence, ideology calls subjects by their name, giving them a vocation to fulfill (Althusser, 2008, p.51; Therborn, 2008, p.172). In this way, while workers take 'professional pride in work well done' and accept that 'their wages represent "the value of their labour"', intellectuals and technocrats believe 'there have to be directors, engineers, foremen, and so on to make things work' (Althusser, 2014, pp.202-203). As universities reproduce class divisions alongside elite/mass segmentation, as well as socialise professional roles into expectations of political leadership or technical servitude, an ideological division of intellectual labour is projected onto the state.

The making of the *public professional* results from relations of political socialisation, in which ideals of knowledge and professionalism are specified for the social and political relations in which universities are immersed. Instead of reducing such relations to the state elites, a broader perspective on the link of universities with the social structure and the state expresses organic relations with the interests underlying political power. In this sense, we have added an additional dimension to the role of universities as *ideological apparatuses* in its original conceptualisation by Althusser. Apart from justifying the separation between material and intellectual labour, reproducing the ideals for professional work, and concentrating ideological class-struggle, universities also conform *ideological apparatuses* as their social segmentation is attached to particular ideological orientations.

Last, if types of knowledge and universities describe different political orientations of professional work and if concrete universities resonate ideological conflict to the largest measure – particularly in the context of cognitive capitalism (Edu-Factory, 2009; Boltanski, 2011) – we should expect that conflicts involving the students' politicisation, as seen with the emergence of the 2011 student movement, have to be as well conditioned by the material and ideological differentiation embedded in the mass university system.

2.2. Data Collection and Analysis

To characterise the universities as sites of professional and political socialisation we draw on the main parameters of differentiation of the university system, namely, selectivity and regime of ownership. With the available administrative data and interviews with academics, we provide empirical content on the conditions of socialisation in each of the types of university obtained.

Anonymous interviews with 26 academics from universities in the cities of Santiago, Arica, Valparaíso and Temuco were conducted between 2011 and 2012. Table 2.2. shows the sample of interviews in accordance with a theoretically informed criterion which represents the university

system in terms of its public and private sectors, elite and mass selectivity and metropolitan and regional locations.

	University	Regime	Selectivity	Location
1	U. Adolfo Ibáñez	Private	Elite	Metropolitan
2-3	U. Alberto Hurtado	Private	Mass	Metropolitan
4	U. Andrés Bello	Private	Mass	National
5-6	U. ARCIS	Private	Mass	Metropolitan
7	U. Católica de Temuco	Public	Mass	Regional
8-9	U. Católica Silva Henríquez	Private	Mass	Metropolitan
10	U. Chile	Public	Elite	Metropolitan
11	U. Diego Portales	Private	Elite	Metropolitan
12-13	U. La Frontera	Public	Elite	Regional
14	U. Las Américas	Private	Mass	National
15	U. Los Andes	Private	Elite	Metropolitan
16	U. Mayor	Private	Mass	National
17	UMCE	Public	Elite	Metropolitan
18	U. Santiago	Public	Elite	Metropolitan
19	U. San Sebastián	Private	Mass	National
20	U. SEK	Private	Mass	Metropolitan
21-23	U. Tarapacá	Public	Mass	Regional
24	U. Valparaíso	Public	Elite	Regional
25-26	P.U. Católica	Public	Elite	Metropolitan

Additionally to the anonymous interviews, two interviews with the main higher education experts of the country are included: Andrés Bernasconi from the Faculty of Education of the traditional Pontificia Universidad Católica and José Joaquín Brunner from the Faculty of Education of the private Universidad Diego Portales.

The disciplines and professions in the sample were considered for the generic roles of *political administration* they occupy in the state. The following undergraduate programmes were included: anthropology, economics, education, civil engineering, history, law, politics, psychology and sociology. These professions do not have monopolistic jurisdictions on the public administration – with the exceptions of law, education and engineering when occupied in specialised functions. So, they fit well with the model of *organisational professionalism*, that is, when the autonomy of professional work is incorporated to the heteronomy of organisations, rather than with the classic *occupational professionalism*, defined as occupational control of a jurisdiction (Evetts, 2011). Furthermore, the selected professions might all be interchangeable as *polyvalent workers* (Vercellone, 2007) inasmuch as they are not subjected to fixed relations of subprofessionalisation (Abbott, 1988). Their positioning within the state might be conditioned by relations of political affinity as well.

The conversation with academics followed a semi-structured questionnaire, mostly lasting for over an hour, to specify the conditions and orientations of professional socialisation of students at the respective universities. The topics treated in the interviews considered the social origins of students, the orientations of professional education – in terms of ‘hidden curriculum’ (Bowles and Gintis, 1975) – and the expectations of public influence attributed to professionals. Taken altogether, the interviews provided a panoramic picture of the ideological differentiation of the university system.

In the last point, such ideological contrasts of the university system are related to the emergence of the 2011 student movement. To further elaborate the argument, a full review of statements and proceedings of the meetings of the National Student Union (CONFECH), which led the protests that year, is incorporated into the analysis.

Part of the empirical material collected for this part of the research has been previously published by the author in Fleet and Guzmán-Concha (2017), precisely to sustain this relation between the patterns of massification and differentiation of the university system with the emergence of the 2011 student movement.

2.3. Universities as Ideological State Apparatuses

In this point, we reconstruct the link between the material and ideological differentiation of the university system with the political orientations of an emergent *mass intellectuality*.

As an underlying assumption, it is expected that the massification of higher education stimulates the politicisation of intellectual labour¹. Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) test this hypothesis in the French case, whereas, as we will see, the experience of the University Reform (1967-1973) in Chile also linked rapid massification of enrolment with the claim to re-engage the public universities, and the ideals of professionalism, with the goals of societal development. In this way, the relation of the most recent wave of marketisation of higher education expansion, spanning throughout the last three decades, with politicisation of the university system has not yet been satisfactorily explained – apart, of course, from the episode of the 2011 student movement, that engendered a certain discussion about trends of student politicisation, although not necessarily linked to the patterns of ideological differentiation of the system.

To explain the ideological impact of Chilean higher education we first focus on the shift from the University Reform to the neoliberal counter-reform of the 1980s, when the model of the

¹ In fact, data from a representative survey on politicisation applied by the United Nations Development Programme in Chile (2015) does correlate well (as a medium effect size) the variables ‘level of study’ with ‘interest in politics’.

politically engaged public university is reversed with the privatisation of the university system to prevent the politicisation of intellectual labour. Then, for the current stage of massification, the political socialisation of the *mass intellectuality* is related to the material and ideological asymmetries of the system. In spite of the intention of neoliberal policy to discourage students' politicisation, the specification of ideals of knowledge and *public professionalism* even at the subordinated positions of the university system still contains the expectation of political influence.

2.3.1 University Reform and Counter-Reform: from Development to Neoliberalism

The University Reform (1967-1973) is a milestone in the realisation of the political vocation of the public university, then expressed in the orientation towards the democratisation of higher education access and the incorporation to the state-driven developmental process. For decades, higher education only represented the emancipation of the middle classes, as it enabled its own social advancement and political purpose within the state (Silva, 2008). But during the University Reform, the aspiration to open the university to the working classes reflected the centrality of the workers' movement in the developmental process. In the preceding decade (1957-1967), the *modern* professions, particularly the social sciences, underwent a significant expansion of over 50%, contrasting with the moderate increase of the technical professions (e.g. engineering) and the stagnation of law programmes (Meller and Meller, 2007). Therefore, the expansion of the social sciences might have had something to do with the expectation of articulating the middle classes with the working classes within the public university. With the University Reform, higher education enrolment tripled from 56,000 students in 1967 to 146,000 in 1973 (Brunner, 1987). This expansion was contained within the eight universities then existing in the country – two state universities, two owned by the Catholic Church and three by regional philanthropic foundations – which for all state effects were treated as public universities (Brunner, 1986).

In general, the Reform represented the way in which the mobilisation of the working and middle classes into the developmental process penetrated the university (Fleet, 2004). However, as academic barriers restricted access for the working classes, the middle classes were the main beneficiaries of higher education expansion (Garretón, 1978). Consequentially, the goals of the Reform transmuted into the politicisation of intellectual labour as representing the interests of the working classes for the radicalisation of the developmental process. In a speech at the Universidad de Guadalajara, President Salvador Allende, leader of the ill-fated *Unidad Popular* (1970-1973) that precisely radicalised the developmental process into a stage of almost revolutionary transformation, expressed the political meaning of the university in this way as follows:

We require a professional committed to social change... The obligation of studying is never forgetting that this is a university of the state, funded by the taxpayer, of whom the immense majority are workers and that, by disgrace, in this university as in the universities of my country, the presence of the sons of peasants and workers still remains very low (Allende, 1972).

Within universities, students also pushed for the redistribution of power and the improvement of academic capacities (Vasconi and Reca, 1970). Thus, together with the advance of various levels of co-government, an increase of the academic staff under the *departmentalisation* of disciplines and the professionalisation of the research function was linked to the process of the Reform (Brunner, 1987). But the resulting politicisation of public universities made them a crucial target for the military dictatorship, which in 1973 drastically ended the University Reform as well the state-led developmental process altogether.

The public universities were intervened for ideological cleansing (Brunner, 1982; Monckeberg, 2005). Students, academics and functionaries with militancy of the left paid the highest price, with many killed by the political repression. Academic authorities were replaced by the military, who suspended politicised departments and programmes, unleashing a massive purge of students and academics. In 1973-1980, universities also lost 50% of their funding and 30% of their vacancies (Brunner, 1986). Without other justification than counteracting the politicisation of the public university, one of the four members of the military government, navy-chief José Toribio Merino, explained the regime's policy of university intervention:

Universities are everywhere the centre of political education or political incubation, especially in the Latin countries... When this situation is solved, the military will leave, and the correspondent academic authorities will come, under the condition that they ensure us that universities won't be the incubators of new systems and new ideas (Merino, 1976).

But not all universities refrained from producing new systems and ideas. As a legacy of this period, the ideological differentiation of the Universidad Católica was consummated by the intellectual support provided by monetarist economists and conservative lawyers to the formulation of the neoliberal project of the dictatorship. Such a project came together in the early 1980s, involving a radical transformation of the state provoked by the abandonment of its productive function. In higher education, a new legal framework organised the privatisation and marketisation of the system. Like other *neoliberal modernisations* in the fields of labour, health or pensions, higher education markets were induced to provide a public service by private providers, pushing the state to a residual participation that made market expansion necessary. As justified by the Home Office when delivering the new legislation (CRUCH, 1981, pp.33-48), the ultimate motivation was to

reverse the conditions that led to the University Reform by introducing competition among institutions and charging student fees. In a letter in the newspaper, one of the ideologists of the neoliberal counter-reform shed more light on the sought effects of this process in terms of withdrawing the incentives for students' politicisation in higher education:

What is more notable is that in our country the state helps the organisation of agitators. Instead of allowing students the freedom to organise as they want, norms are dictated so they get together and are forced to affiliate. Why not use the same logic of freedom of the labour plan? Why not use the most elemental economic logic in higher education? (Álvaro Bardón, 1980, cited in Ruiz-Schneider, 2007).

The labour plan he refers to is the law (M. Trabajo, 1979a-d) that limited strikes to a single firm, forbidding the unions' articulation under different firms of the same owner and in productive branches. The same effect was sought in higher education, that the next wave of massification of enrolment would take place by the division of students into differentiated and rather smaller private universities, for which they also have to pay, preventing their solidarity and politicisation. Likewise, the disenfranchisement of professional associations from control on both state occupations and the free exercise of a profession also led to a de-collectivisation of intellectual labour (see 4.3.1. below). Decisions about professional qualifications were in the hands of the higher education market alone.

In detail, the Decree No. 1 of 1980 established the main parameters of the new university system with the creation of new private universities and the prohibition of the participation of students and staff in university government. Decree No. 4 of 1981 made marketisation possible by cutting the already reduced funding for the traditional universities to a half, which was compensated with a competitive subsidy of selectivity available for all universities that recruit among the 20,000 best students in the admission test – later expanded to 27,500 – and with student fees charged on a free-market basis. Last but not least, the two state universities were separated from their regional campuses, amputating the state from coordinated academic activity throughout the national territory. Later, the Universidad Católica also opted to separate three branch campuses from the main institution.

The eight public universities existing before 1981 became 25, while the new private universities reached 34 in 2011, making 59 universities in total. The university system was differentiated, on the one hand, into the traditional-public universities, comprising the most prestigious elite universities, including the Universidad de Chile and Universidad Católica, whereas most of the branch campuses separated from the state universities provided less selective access in the regions of the country; on the other hand, within the new-private universities, only a handful of institutions consolidated a position of elite recruitment, with the majority occupying the market of


mass access. Therefore, rather than the incorporation of new masses of students taking place in a common de-commodified public space, there was a growth of less selective institutions, reproducing social hierarchies by means of heterogeneous quality at this level. Furthermore, beyond market differentiation, there is also a pure ideological component: most of the new private universities created under the dictatorship were politically aligned to it, since they were funded by political supporters of the regime (Monckeberg, 2005). Thereby, conservative affinities and commercial orientations predominate in the universities identified with the right-wing, with a minority of universities installed in the private sector representing social and academic organisations². In sum, the material differentiation of the university system is linked to ideological differentiation as well, conforming divergent orientations for the socialisation of intellectual labour.

2.3.2. Massification, Marketisation and Material Differentiation

Higher education enrolment quadrupled from 249,482 students in 1990 to 1,069,101 in 2011 (MINEDUC, 2014), with the gross enrolment rate (GER)³ growing from 14.4% (Bernasconi and Rojas, 2004) to 56% in that period. So technically, the stage of massification is completed, putting the system at the gates of *universal* access – >50% GER (Trow, 2007). In conformity to neoliberal policy, massification occurred with the retrenchment of the public sector and the expansion of private institutions over 77% of total enrolment (Brunner and Ferrada, 2011) – 53% of university enrolment was at a new-private university in 2011. In the figure, while the new-private universities grew at an annual rate of 18% since 1984, the traditional-public universities grew at 3.9%.


² By this token, during January-March 1990, that is, just before the very end of the Dictatorship, some 18 new private universities were authorised to operate by the government. Within this group, commercially oriented (for-profit) universities predominated (Salazar and Leihy, 2013, p.14-15).

³ Proportion of higher education enrolment within the 18-24 years old population (INE, 2012).



Source: Ministerio Educación (2014).

The figure below shows the hierarchy of economic quintiles by their participation in higher education, indicating the progressive incorporation of students from poorer origins.



Source: Ministerio Desarrollo Social (2018).

The fifth quintile was the first to massify its access to higher education, surpassing 80% of GER in 2000 and stabilising its participation at this level for the following years. Immediately after, the fourth quintile is still expanding, but for a long time between 2003 and 2009 it stalled under the

50% threshold, only surpassed in 2011. The first three quintiles have also grown consecutively: while the third quintile initiated sustained growth from 1992 and the second quintile from 1998, the first quintile only started to expand from 2000. In effect, the first two quintiles have led the expansion of the system in 2000-2011, as the fifth quintile only added 3.8% to its own GER compared to 18.7% added by the first quintile and 18.4% by the second.

With 69% of enrolment represented by students of the first generation of their families in higher education (Orellana, 2011), a transformation of the social structure, towards the expansion of professional occupations and of the middle and upper middle sectors (Torche and Wormald, 2004), takes place accordingly. But rather than higher education producing homogenous social mobility in this group, it explains new trends of social and occupational hierarchisation (Ruiz, 2013). Selective institutions produce most (71%) of the highest professional occupations; likewise, while 67% of the children of managers and professionals were enrolled at selective universities, 63% of the children of workers and unqualified employees were recruited at non-selective institutions (Orellana, 2011).

In general terms, the massification of higher education access entails structural differentiation of the system (Trow, 2000 and 1988). But the Chilean case radicalises the effect of segmentation as the poorest students mostly attend universities differentiated for mass access, with the for-profit institutions predominating in this segment. Within these institutions, segmentation pushes to the instrumentalisation of knowledge in response to credentialist pressures that make higher education a forced option (Trow, 2007). While newcomers to higher education are also held economically responsible for paying for their education (Slocum and Rhoads, 2009) and internalising its cost as private investment (Williams, 2009; McClanahan, 2013), we might say that mass higher education, particularly in the private for-profit institutions, operates as *illegitimate* (market) *domination* (Fleet, 2011). The parameters of operation of the system confirm this condition, particularised in the exploitation of the classes that transit from material to intellectual labour through mass higher education.

Within OECD countries, Chilean universities are amongst the most expensive in relation to GDP, whereas the proportion of this cost that is funded by the students' families (85%) is also among the highest (OECD and WB, 2009). For the first three quintiles, the cost of one university student exceeds 40% of family income (Meller, 2011). Therefore, the tendency of private universities to make profit at the expense of the poorest students entails direct economic exploitation. Although profit-making is forbidden by law, several private universities⁴ use legal loopholes to extract profit

⁴ In 2013, 12 private universities: U. Bernardo O'Higgins, U. República, U. San Sebastián, U. del Mar, U. Andrés Bello, U. Américas, U. Santo Tomás, UNIACC, U. del Desarrollo, U. Finis Terrae, U. Central and U. Autónoma, were under investigation by the judiciary for illegal profitmaking:

from students' fees, such as renting buildings at overpriced rates from companies belonging to their same owners (Monckeberg, 2007). For-profit transnational companies, like Laureate Education Inc., also have the largest participation at the mass level.

Another mechanism of economic exploitation was introduced with the state-sponsored business of student loans. Since 2005, the 'State-Backed Loans' were provided by private banks with no risk, boosting private-mass enrolment: in 2010, loans were given to 23% of students, from which 84% were from the three poorest quintiles and 42% were captured by new-private universities (World Bank, 2011, pp.39-40). With interest rates above 6%, 'indebtedness rose to an average of 180% of students' projected annual income and monthly payments amounted up to 18% of wages for fifteen years' (Fleet and Guzmán-Concha, 2017, p.166). To complicate matters, the loan only covers a *reference fee* below the real fees charged to students – the differences averages 21.3% in the private universities and 16.3% in the traditional-public universities (World Bank, 2011, p.24). The neoliberal rationale of this system clearly manifests as the aim of developing a profitable business for universities and banks takes precedence over considerations of efficiency of public spending: in 2009 the state spent more money to guarantee the loans to the banks than what students actually received that year (DIPRES, 2011a, p.35). It would have been cheaper to directly give scholarships to students, but the generation of an *exploitative* loan market has been the policy choice for the development of the higher education system and for the individual responsabilisation for its cost.

Drawing on the variables of selectivity and ownership, the material patterns of differentiation of the university system are represented. Selectivity is operationalised with the score in the admission test PSU (*Prueba de Selección Universitaria*). As this indicator is correlated with social class (family income) (Contreras et al., 2007), the way universities recruit students within a given range of PSU scores describes its link with the social structure. We use a 590 PSU score to demarcate between elite and mass selectivity. In turn, ownership is differentiated by the traditional public (pre-1981) and new private (post-1981) universities. With selectivity as the vertical axis and ownership as the horizontal one, four coordinates are obtained: public-elite; private-elite; private-mass and public-mass. A further subdivision within the private-mass differentiates the non-for-profit stakeholders from the commercially-oriented interest that predominate in this segment.

<http://www.latercera.com/noticia/nacional/2013/05/680-522928-9-fiscal-revela-a-comision-que-universidades-investigadas-por-lucro-ya-son-12.shtml>, checked on September 2013.

Table 2.3. Material Differentiation of the University System, 2011

ELITE	
<p>(A) Public-elite (traditional) Six State, two Catholic and two philanthropic regional foundations. Enrolment: 173,135 597-697 PSU 26% private-school students</p> <p>52 students per PhD faculty full-time (*) 1 academic hired-per-hour per full-time academic (*) 560 state-funded research grants (FONDECYT**) mean: 56(+) </p> <p>16.6% first-year drop out (+) 86% employability, first year after graduation (+) £1,093 income, fourth year after graduation (+)</p>	<p>(B) Private-elite (conservative/liberal) Six universities owned by private foundations, conservative Catholic movements and corporations. Enrolment: 52,835 592-660 PSU 71% private-school students</p> <p>130 students per PhD faculty full-time (*) 4 academics hired-per-hour per full-time academic (*) 41 state-funded research grants (FONDECYT**) mean: 8.2 (+)</p> <p>15.6% first-year drop out (+) £1,281 income, fourth year after graduation (+)</p>
MASS	
<p>(E) Public-mass (regional universities) Ten State, four Catholic and one philanthropic foundation Enrolment: 136,198</p> <p>504-588 PSU 8% private-school students</p> <p>115 students per PhD faculty full-time (*) 1.5 academics hired-per-hour per full-time academic (*) 96 state-funded research grants (FONDECYT**) mean: 6.4 (+)</p> <p>18.1% first-year drop out (+) 84% employability, first year after graduation (+) £903 income, fourth year after graduation (+)</p>	<p>(C) Private-mass (commercially-oriented) 23 universities predominantly owned by national and transnational corporations and investments groups Enrolment: 267,817 436-573 PSU 12% private-school students</p> <p>663 students per PhD faculty full-time (*) 5.6 academics hired-per-hour per full-time academic (*) 19 state-funded research grants (FONDECYT**) mean: 0.8 (+)</p> <p>32.4% first-year drop out (+) 78% employability, first year after graduation (+) £792 income, fourth year after graduation (+)</p> <p>(D) Private-mass (public-socially oriented) Five universities owned by corporations, NGOs, academic organisations and progressive Catholic movements Enrolment: 31,877 489-589 PSU 14% private-school students</p> <p>228 students per PhD faculty full-time (*) 4.6 academics hired-per-hour per full-time academic (*) 15 state-funded research grants (FONDECYT**) mean: 3</p> <p>23.4% first-year drop out (+) 82% employability, first year after graduation (+) £815 income, fourth year after graduation (+)</p>
<p>Source: own elaboration based on MINEDUC (2014) excepting (*) CNED (2014); (+) indicates unweighted averages. Conversion from Chilean Pesos to Sterling Pounds, February 2015. Previous version in Fleet and Guzmán-Concha, 2017, p.167 ** Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnológico.</p>	

While the public-elite (A) contains the selective traditional universities of the state, Catholic church and philanthropic foundations, the private-elite (B) represents the conservative religious movements (Opus Dei and Legionaries of Christ) and foundations/corporations linked to the entrepreneurial classes, one right-wing political party and stakeholders of liberal orientation. In turn, the private-mass subdivides into two groups, as noted: the commercial sector (C) predominantly

owned by national and transnational – for-profit – corporations and a public-oriented sector (D) of progressive Catholic movements, academic organisations and NGOs. Last, the public-mass (E) mostly comprises the regional state and Catholic universities separated from the traditional-elite institutions.

The material differentiation of the university system is expressed with indicators of input, conditions of operation and output. Starting with the indicators of input, complementary to the PSU score as a measure of selectivity and social class, the proportion of students graduated from private secondary schools, attended only by 7.3% of the population (MINEDUC, 2012), also reflects the upper-class origins of students. Thus, the overwhelming predominance of private secondary schools in the private-elite (71%) is an unmistakable indicator of its *elitisation*, contrasting with the smallest (8%) proportion of the upper-class students in the public-mass sector. As pointed out by Ball et al. (2002), choosing a higher education institution is a matter of opportunities and class culture. Likewise, for Bourdieu (1996, p.136) students accede to the universities that replicate their social, cultural and political dispositions. In effect, the social segregation of the elite segment also affects the public institutions. While public-elite universities accumulate the second-largest proportion of private school students (26%), this is mostly attributed to the Pontificia Universidad Católica, with a proportion of private school students (66%) that is similar to the private-elite. Still, the proportions are very high for the Universidad de Chile, with 37.4% from private schools. Thereby, the public role of the traditional universities might be questioned altogether by the limited social diversity of its best institutions. In total, student input reflects the self-selection of students in terms of the best PSU scores and upper-class social origins in the elite institutions, with the non-selective institutions recruiting more variedly from the middle and lower classes⁵.

Notoriously, the measures of selectivity are consecrated as representations of quality within the inequality of the system. Apart from the abovementioned subsidy to the best 27,500 PSU scores, in a study by the author (Fleet et al., 2014) the PSU score also was the variable that explained most

⁵ Meneses et al. (2012) graphically represented the segregation of the system by locating the addresses of students from universities of Santiago in a map of the city. While universities *Católica* (group A) and *Los Andes* (group B) have the majority of their students recruited from the northeast area of the city, where the richest and most conservative neighbourhoods are located, the Universidad de Chile from group A as well as private universities from groups C and D, like the private universities Andrés Bello and Alberto Hurtado, recruit students from all areas of the city, reflecting the more varied social backgrounds of their respective constituencies. In turn, universities like the public-mass Universidad Tecnológica Metropolitana (group E) figure with its students coming from all areas of the city, excepting the richest neighbourhoods of the northeast. See www.mideuniversidad.cl [checked on October 2018].

variations of the ranking of university quality generated from institutional accreditation. Therefore, universities recruiting the highest scores are *ipso facto* rewarded as the best quality by the state. As discussed, such incentives and indicators represent *artificial measures* of value imposed independently of the utility of the intellectual labour reproduced in the higher education institutions (Dominelli and Hoogvelt, 1996; Vercellone, 2007; De Angelis and Harvie, 2009; Roggero, 2011).

In turn, huge asymmetries are observed in the variables representing the conditions of operation. While the public-elite universities have 52 students per each PhD faculty on full-time contracts, in the private-mass commercially-oriented universities there are 663 students per PhD fulltime. The latter also have the highest proportion of academics on per-hour contracts: 5.6 by each academic hired full-time. The lack of academic departments indicates the extraction of excedent from student fees that are not invested in the academic conditions of operation. Derived from these asymmetries, the research output indicates the quality of the academic experience. Again, the public-elite tower above the rest with an average of 56 state-funded research projects by university, whereas the private-mass commercially-oriented universities only averages 0.8 grants each. Thus, a characteristic pattern of higher education expansion has tended to exclude the masses of students from access to research-informed teaching in the private sector.

Last, regarding outputs, the simple average of the first-year dropout also reflects the social inequality of the system as 74.1% of students in this situation were the first generation in higher education (Urzúa, 2012). This rate is consequentially higher in the mass-segment. Still, in the private commercially-oriented universities this indicator is almost two times the situation in the public-mass universities, where students' social origins are similar. For the sake of comparability, indicators of employability and salaries – after one and four years of graduation respectively – exclude the fields of arts, health and sciences. Differences are not quite so extreme in this regard, as they reflect the situation immediately after finishing a programme. Still, the highest salaries obtained in the private-elite exceed by about 60% the salaries of the private-mass. In the most complete study on higher education employability for the Chilean case, Hastings et al. (2013) concluded that selectivity determines the economic returns of most programmes. However, while some programmes in the fields of health report a positive economic return regardless of selectivity, in law, social science, technology and business programmes positive earnings only occur in selective institutions.

For one of the higher education experts interviewed for this research, the differentiation of professional outcomes is interpretable as a process of semi-professionalisation (cf. Etzioni, 1969a). The original concept of occupations that still have not captured sufficient professional recognition is here stretched to situations of loose professionalisation at the mass level of an occupation that enjoys high professional recognition in the elite:

It's about professions that have been historically constituted as such, that remain powerful in the top, but toward the bottom, which is the part that's growing the most, are [experiencing a process of] semi-professionalisation, because they don't control a knowledge platform, don't have autonomy to work, earn lousy incomes and don't even achieve middle-class status (Higher education expert 1, 2011).

To the material asymmetries of professional socialisation, we add the dimension of ideological differentiation, which precisely results from a profession that represents different status, roles and orientations depending on where it was formed. To the aggregated effect of universities in differentiating orientations for the same profession based on the material and ideological segmentation of the system, we refer to as *ideological division of professional work*.

2.3.3. Patterns of Ideological Differentiation

While the commodification of higher education along neoliberal policy has generalised an instrumental relation with knowledge and professional work – as 'skills enabling the incorporation to a world defined and dominated by others' (Faletto, 1999, p.75) – it is also observed that the education commodity is sold all over place attached to values of intellectual labour and upward social mobility (Simbürger, 2013). Indeed, universities flood the urban landscape with slogans to motivate the prospective students' preferences: *come to study with us, change the world, you can do it, leave your mark, lead the changes of the 21st century*, and so forth. In total, the ideology of the mass higher education system is always more than the commodity it sells. As discussed, higher education is linked to values constitutive of a professional subject, as an *excess* of meaning that anchors higher education expansion to a subjective level, even if this meaning is predominantly instrumental.

Our analysis moves on to represent the different orientations linking universities with a shared social basis and related expectations of professional work. In effect, the ideological pluralism of the Chilean university system never ceases to impress. There are public and private universities; traditional and new private; secular and confessional from different religious movements and for different social classes; central and peripheral; national and regional; elite, middle-class and popular; for academic excellence and social mobility; exclusive and pluralistic; prestigious and stigmatised; research-based and teaching-only; philanthropic and for-profit; conservative and radical; entrepreneurial and communitarian; right-wing and left-wing, etc. But the pluralism of the system is not necessarily experienced within universities themselves. In this sense, the ideological quality of the university system lies in the specification of ideals of knowledge and professionalism for segregated publics.

While we assume that the universities' orientations are transferred to professional socialisation, other conditions of the Chilean system, like the fixation of a profession onto a single disciplinary programme, as established by constitutional law (MINEDUC, 1990), also contribute to this effect. As undergraduate programmes also are quite long, considering over seven years of real times of graduation, we can speak of deeply overspecialised professional socialisation (OECD, 2009).

Programme	Years
Anthropology	8
Civil Engineering	8
Economics and administration	7
Education	6
History	6
Law	8.5
Psychology	7
Sociology	7
Source: Ministry of Education, 2014	

But universities' ideological projects are seldom formulated in the missional statements (Atria, 2010). Hence, we draw on the orientations that owners and stakeholders assume within the patterns of differentiation of the system (table 2.3), as represented by the academics' discourses. We find that while elite-universities and also public-oriented universities of the mass segment tend to elaborate particular university projects and expectations of intellectual leadership for their students, private-mass universities of the commercial sector tend to focus on the technical professionalisation, avoiding the elaboration of expectations of political leadership attached to professional work.

As higher education expansion has been justified by the discourse of human capital – which relates the increases in the stock of human capital to personal efficacy and collective development (Brunner and Elaqua, 2003; Salmi, 2001) – private-mass institutions validate their role by incorporating the students that elite-universities left out from the chance of developing as human capital. According to an academic from one of the main private-mass universities:

The Universidad de Chile made a decision: that it was not going to be a national public university for the ascendant middle classes, but the best scientific university of Chile. We do what in other countries public universities do (Academic 1, private-mass [commercially-oriented] university, 2012).

In these conditions, the tendency of mass higher education is to offer a basic and technical version of the elite model. According to the other higher education expert interviewed, the focus of these universities is put on leveling students, leaving no room for further ideological elaboration of political roles beyond technical professionalisation:

When you have students with learning disadvantages, almost all the effort, energy and dedication have to be invested in the basic things, and the basic is to master the technique, the profession, the job. It's not a problem of a lack of will to define a project. It's because all the time is occupied in forming these elemental dispositions which in this university [Católica] are taken for granted (Higher education expert 2, 2012).

Regarding the lack of a political elaboration in the less selective universities, Gramsci's critique of the Popular University of Turin is suitable as he saw this institution degenerated into an inauthentic replica of the bourgeois university rather than fulfilling its purpose of forming organic intellectuals for the working class:

What causes them [the directors] to act is a mild and insipid spirit of charity, not a live and fecund desire to contribute to the spiritual raising of the multitudes through teaching... They know that the institution they run has to cater for a specific category of people who have not been able to follow regular studies at school... They find a model in the existing cultural institutions: they copy it, they worsen it... The Popular University, as they run it, is reduced to a form of theological teaching... where knowledge is presented as something definitive, self-evident and unquestionable (Gramsci, 1988, p.65).

As Gramsci puts it, inasmuch as the mass university does not specify its mission for the intellectual formation of the working classes, it tends to treat knowledge as revelation and not as the product of work. In this sense, the lack of development of the research function observed at the mass universities appears as a symptom of political subordination. Furthermore, while elite-universities produce *organic* intellectuals inasmuch as knowledge is taught upon the culture and interests of the upper classes, the tendency of mass universities is to de-contextualise knowledge from the lower classes, breaking with the students' social origins by emphasising goals of social mobility pursued by means of compensatory education.

According to one of the experts, the ideological diversity of the university system is not fully-fledged yet. In his view, every university dragged by market competition wants to do the same, but since they do not have the same means to do it, different outcomes are obtained – which are justified as 'democratisation of access' or 'social mobility', that is, as values subordinated to 'academic excellence' within the human capital discourse. But,

by sociological force and of the social structure, we might reach a phase of real differentiation, where [universities] will directly say: *I'll serve this type of student and generate this type of product* (Higher education expert 2, 2012).

In total, trends of ideological differentiation capable of producing specific orientations for the socialisation of intellectual labour are not to be taken for granted. We identify three effects of ideological differentiation attributed to (1) the owners, (2) the students, and (3) the profession.

(1) The effect of the owners is attributed to their interests in higher education. For instance, the entrepreneurs' interests might be characteristically differentiated between 'the business of preserving the entrepreneur as a social actor; of preserving the power role of the entrepreneurial class' (Ibid.) as it takes place among the elite universities, and the business of making a profit from the lower-class students, as it predominates in the mass segment. The role of the Church also stands out for instilling certain leadership to its students, even at the less-selective institutions.

The U. Alberto Hurtado [D] is Jesuit, and they always aspire that their people are driving the train, not behind the train. They've always wanted to produce leaders, although perhaps they're not going to declare that... the Opus Dei is the same; in a dialogue with an administrator of the [Universidad de] Los Andes [B], we were talking about the humanities and he candidly told me – an academic wouldn't say it that way – *we need to have philosophy, history, literature because we cannot leave to them – to secularism – the discursive dominion of these fields*. They're very aware of this, so they are Gramscian to their guts! And they also deploy lots of resources in this direction. Therefore, in these projects, I believe there's a deliberate strategy to introduce, even to smuggle, into the 'hard disk' of students some obsessions and principles of action that aspire to be transformative of society. Jesuits, Salesians [D], and in general all universities that have religious underpinnings have this aspiration. And that's probably much designed, standardised and operationalised for each social level because that's part of their charisma and of what they believe being Christian is about (Ibid.).

The way the interests of the owners relate to the views of the academics leads us to differentiate between universities of academic pluralism, encompassing here most of the universities of the public segment (A and E) where the academic career takes places with independence of the interests of the owners, and universities with more reduced academic contingents, where the alignment with the interests of the owners is reinforced as part of the academic career.

(2) Since there is not an official ideology of the state as the owner of sixteen universities, what emerges as a common ethos of the state universities is the enrichment of university life by the spontaneous social and political organisation of students. According to an academic of a state-regional university from the south, students' political socialisation takes place in such a context, which fosters the elaboration of competences of 'management, social compromise, knowledge,

articulation, and service to society... all these experiences related to *university life*... give them training that is complementary to that of the disciplines, and leads toward more critical and transformative visions of society' (Academic 2, public-elite [state-regional] university, 2012). Academic departments are also key in this respect as, according to this academic, the incorporation of students in projects with social impact is critical for their intellectual and political formation.

(3) Ideological differentiation also results from the specific professions and respective knowledge interests. In particular, the social sciences, education and humanities have typically fuelled critical politicisation (Habermas, 1980; Boltanski, 2011). In this regard, for one of our experts interviewed, the politicisation of the public-oriented private-mass universities 'has to be understood as *ideological apparatus*' (Higher education expert 1, 2011) in itself, which is precisely attributable to the specialisation in those professions:

Among the most massified and semi-professionalised professions are education and pedagogy, and nevertheless they maintain something of ends and ideals. If [the student] works in a marginal neighbourhood and is interested in the idea of, for instance, 'memory' and perhaps has read Salazar⁶ and understood his work in a special manner, but understood it 'for something' that in his community is useful, then it provides a certain status (Ibid.).

The patterns of ideological differentiation specify ideals of knowledge and *public professionalism* depending on the universities' position in these trends. Professional roles might be socialised with expectations of intellectual and political influence or subordinated to technical professionalism oriented to social mobility. A key to distinguish types of socialisation then hinges on whether the students' backgrounds are relevant for their formation or, conversely, the abandonment of previous knowledge and *habitus* is necessary to enable professionalisation.

(A) Public-Elite

Public-elite universities are oriented to reproducing the intellectual and political leadership of the country: that is its political substance. From this group, we interviewed academics from the state universities of Chile, Santiago, La Frontera, Metropolitana de Ciencias de la Educación, Valparaíso, and from the non-state Pontificia Universidad Católica. An academic of engineering in the Catholic university affirmed such orientation towards leadership as primarily based upon the students' interest and vocation, upon which nothing less than the country's development depends:

Without technological vocations this country is doomed, so if the guys with the highest I.Q. don't choose to be the most efficient and to have technological ideals, in this country there

⁶ Gabriel Salazar is a Chilean historian specialised in social movements and popular actors.

won't be innovation or interesting ventures, and we'll be lagging in our economic development (Academic 3, public-elite [Catholic] university, 2011).

Moreover, as these students are not satisfied with their technical role (cf. Bourdieu, 1996), they also undertake several social initiatives with a political impact:

Students enter here with a clear consciousness that they belong to the intellectual elite of the country and will occupy important positions... many of the social initiatives undertaken during recent years were led by students from this university (Ibid.).

While political engagement seems to be predominantly inspired by the conservative ideals of 'Christian leadership', the students' initiatives include the well-known *Techo-Chile*⁷, whose political effect exceeds voluntary work with the formation of young leadership for a broader ideological spectrum, ranging from student leaders to techno-political cadres of the state.

The state universities add more pluralistic and progressive orientations since students are recruited from more varied social origins and universities also are democratically organised by their academics. As we will see in the next point about the student movement, while in the Universidad Católica student unions have been predominantly in the hands of conservative organisations, in the state universities have been historically led by students of left-wing affiliation. For an academic from a less selective and much-politicised state university, the students political socialisation is again reaffirmed by their interests and spontaneous organisation:

the search for another perspective, another meaning, is not given by the academy, but it's acquired by experience or by other collectives... in the informal realm [students] tend to gather in collectives, groups of reflection, as independent organisations (Academic 4, public-elite [state] university, 2011).

In turn, for an academic of education in a state-regional university, the formation of leadership out of students that are not of upper-class origins takes place by the education of 'decision-making capacity' and hermeneutic and critical uses of knowledge in the voluntary participation in social projects and student organisations.

When [students] assume a role in the direction of a political, social or educational organisation, they'll be aware and concerned, on the one hand, with doing things right,

⁷ Techo-Chile is a non-for-profit organisation created by Jesuit priests in the late 1990s to do voluntary community work with university students, having a focus on alleviating the housing problem for settlers of camps and urban occupations (*pobladores*). According to one of our interviewees who works with movements of *pobladores* in the right of housing, Techo-Chile is: 'first, the most efficient cadre school that the right-wing has today in Chile... all politicians and all the people that have been linked to the model we have today have passed by the *Techo*' (Sociologist, public-elite [Catholic] university, 2012).

being good teachers, working, delivering, that things have to work, have to be organised, and that they have to act correctly, honestly and with participation. On the other hand, they ought to have a concern for social change, for an integral education of their students, for working in a community with their colleagues, knowing that they have to articulate knowledge and to recognise popular and indigenous knowledge (Academic 2, public-elite [state-regional] university, 2012).

Much of the idea of *public professionalism* is captured in the statement above. The normative orientations of knowledge are only effective if they relate to the technical dimension of professional action. It is in the balance between specialised knowledge and political purpose where leadership and influence through professional work are affirmed. Moreover, inasmuch as the goal of social mobility is not determinant of the horizon of the public-elite, at least not to the extent of neglecting the students' culture and knowledge, these orientations are organically linked with the groups formed as professionals. In this academic's words: 'what's to be done is to open them up to opportunities so without leaving what they really are, they turn into relevant actors of social change' (Ibid.).

(B) Private-Elite

The ideological differentiation of the private-elite is in part explained by the fact of having the largest concentration of upper-class students, with most of its institutions entrenched in the richest areas of the city, at the Andes foothills, the farthest from the city-centre. Therefore, orientations towards social mobility are not significant there. Their segregation is also reinforced by the lack of democratic academic and student organisation, reducing the options for more pluralistic political socialisation. The ideological orientations then are directly expressed by the interests of the actors organically linked to them and by the narrow academic and student constituencies. From this group, we interviewed academics from the universities Adolfo Ibáñez, Los Andes, and Diego Portales. The latter, the Universidad Diego Portales (UDP) is an exception in this group. While it maintains its links with the entrepreneurial actor (represented in the board) and neither is it governed by the democratic rule of academics, it has advanced towards a richer academic composition and public-oriented research. Unlike this group, the UDP is hardly identified as right-wing university and has the lowest proportion of private-secondary school students – still a large indicator of 50%. As put by Dezalay and Garth: the UDP transited from producing business-oriented lawyers to the concern on human rights and the formation of public-interest lawyers (2002, p.55).

In Bourdieuan fashion, the interviews illustrate the consistency between the students' cultural backgrounds and the universities' orientations. In this sense, one academic identified 'all the

entrepreneurial dimension of the University [as] clearly a target, and also the discussion with the political actors of the government' (Academic 5, private-elite university, 2011). In this context, seminar discussions take the use of power for granted: 'if you were minister, what would you do in this situation? Who would be affected by your decision? What would be the unintended consequences?' (Ibid.). Indeed, such questions would be unthinkable in a mass university. But in the private-elite, seminar discussions are based on the 'critical sensibility' of students, which our interviewee rephrases as a critical-liberal political orientation, built upon the background of families used to being informed and argue their positions, to travel and speak English, and to write and participate in public debates – e.g. publishing letters in the newspaper.

With the highest proportion of students from private secondary schools (91%), the university of a conservative Catholic order educates students into a 'radical search for truth illuminated by faith' (Academic 6, private-elite university, 2011). In the case of psychology, the approach of 'Christian psychology' consists of the critical interpretation of psychological research from readings of classical philosophers and religious thinkers: Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas and Pope Gregory I. Such a quest for a 'deeper' understanding of the human soul against the 'partial truths' of pagan knowledge, equips students with solid hermeneutic formation unlike anything in Chile.

A perspective from a sociology academic in this group also emphasised the students' cultural backgrounds: 'the situation of being the first professionals in the family is not as present... in a Bourdieuan sense... their parents made the work of legitimating themselves socially so they [students] are in another type of search' (Academic 7, private-elite university, 2011). On this basis, students develop creativity and sophistication as recognised values of elite education:

There's a blend of social researchers, innovators and from a well-acknowledged private university, that's liked outside and fits with many interesting consultancies in topics of environment, consumption, gender, lifestyles... They've been acknowledged for their capacity to integrate methodological instruments with rigour and creativity (Ibid.).

But, as implied in the extract, such orientations, expressive of the cultural *habitus* of an upper class, tend to be co-opted as 'market research intelligentsia' (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979, p.89), harming the expectations of *public professionalism* in relation to the state.

In sum, the private-elite socialises intellectual labour with students of the highest class origins in accordance with conservative and liberal outlooks and sophisticated elaborations as the hallmark for this kind of higher education. While the relation to the state is ambiguous – surely determined by who is in government, as suggested in the interviews – the university restricts its orientations to its own constituencies and their interests.

(C) Private-Mass/Commercially-Oriented

Within the largest segment of the system, the variant of commercially-oriented institutions also constitutes the biggest group. The lack of clear ideological orientations for the universities of this group might be attributed both to the poorly established academic departments as well as to the predominance of the market and managerial interests of the corporations that loom large among its stakeholders. Consequentially, the limited elaboration of expectations of intellectual and political leadership for students that are recruited in non-selective fashion yields to instrumental relations with knowledge under goals of social mobility. At the same time, the academic conditions of operation, as noted above, tend to concentrate the contradictions of the marketisation of higher education to the largest extent. Academics interviewed in this segment represent the universities of Las Américas, Andrés Bello (both from the Laureate conglomerate), Mayor, San Sebastián, and SEK.

The deficit of academic departments appears internally justified in affinity with managerial orientations to efficiency and as a condition for the articulation with the world of work – by means of hired-per-hour teachers that replace the academic function: ‘it’s quite important to not have full-time [academics]. The only one hired full-time is me. The rest have to be working because they can’t come here to talk about theory!’ (Academic 8, private-mass [commercially-oriented] university, 2011). A more practical, less theoretical, higher education pedagogy is then appraised.

In turn, the lack of ideological elaboration tends to the imitation of the elite model, as discussed above. According to one academic, his programme had been firstly copied from the Universidad Católica, which means to appeal to a quite different reality than the one this programme is supposed to be targeted on:

We couldn’t offer the same curriculum as the *Católica*, our students didn’t end up being bilingual, didn’t trade assets in New York, rather they work in municipalities, public services, and in the free exercise of the profession (Academic 1, private-mass [commercially-oriented] university, 2012).

Hence, the professional formation does not contain its own seal:

On the first floor, there’s a way of being a lawyer in Chile that’s relatively homogenous: there aren’t two law schools. Probably this also pushes toward a conservative profession. But, on the second and third floors, there are law schools that seal their students with a clearer ideological hallmark... We’re not on that second or third floor, the *Católica*, *Chile*, *Portales*, *Los Andes* are there (Ibid.).

Expectations of basic professionalisation and social mobility consummate the instrumentalisation of the academic experience and the renunciation of intellectual and political specificity:

There's a tension in an institution like this one, because of its owners, its structure, and the expectations of its public, which is to obtain a credential to improve their economic situation... Everything aims to Bologna 4.0 injected directly into the vein, people for the market, who work well in companies, period! (Ibid).

In this context, professional socialisation operates as a kind of acculturation for students of working-class origins, which knowledge and backgrounds are devalued in the university.

A basic civilising task is undertaken: we're talking about people that most likely were the worst students from the worst schools, who don't even know how to talk. One is certain that if they're to have occupational success it's necessary to change the way they dress, the way they use their hair (Ibid.).

Within this cultural asymmetry, the interests and motivations that students bring from their class backgrounds are not expected to contribute to their professional socialisation, but only reinforce the instrumental orientations that prevail in this segment.

Students bring a very neoliberal logic, regarding how they relate to others and to knowledge. This is the logic of a consumer... They don't have the idea of education as a right, but of education as a service they pay for. Regarding the relation of students with knowledge, they have given up any power and that power is totally left to teachers, so these are students with scarce levels of intellectual autonomy (Academic 9, private-mass [commercially-oriented] university, 2012).

The usual response of non-selective higher education of this kind to cope with the cultural abyss that their students represent – with respect to the mold of class culture represented by elite students – has been to provide leveling courses oriented to shorten such a gap. For an academic in engineering, it is important to point out that these courses are not only technical but also: 'compensate the shortcomings that [students] have "as persons", in order to equip them or to develop their human competences' (Academic 10, private-mass [commercially-oriented] university, 2011). The focus on students' handicap reminds us of Bernstein's critique (1970) of compensatory education, which might as well apply to mass higher education. From this perspective, the emphasis that compensatory education makes on the students' cultural limitations – instead of working the links between their knowledge and cultural backgrounds – would reinforce the experience of higher education as a foreign culture that leads to the reproduction of educational inequality and professional subordination in the mass segment. In this sense, academics complain about the lack of

contextualisation of academic programmes, as one interviewee critiqued that a course on organisations is concerned with the increase of productivity rather than issues of exploitation, alienation and unemployment that are closer to the students' context. Such a weak, un-elaborated link with the students' social origins holds no expectations of intellectual or political leadership:

Students don't want to read... that their position in the world is underprivileged, they tell themselves a fairy tale and don't do anything to change their position, actively participating in their own defeat... They alienate themselves because they want to be like a psychologist of the [universities of] *Chile* and *Católica* (Academic 9, private-mass [commercially-oriented] university, 2012).

(D) Private-Mass/Public-Oriented

The public-oriented variant of the private-mass obeys the orientations of the owners, the specialisation in social sciences, humanities and education, and the incorporation of lower and middle-class students with progressive political interests. As put by one of the academics within this group, his students might be characterised for their 'openness to the social, advanced social thinking, and politically of the left' (Academic 11, private-mass [public-oriented] university, 2011). Interviews with academics of this group include the Jesuit Universidad Alberto Hurtado, the Salesian Universidad Católica Siva Henríquez, and the secular (once linked to the Communist Party) Universidad Arcis. The orientations developed within these institutions engender expectations of intellectual leadership, whereas the goal of social mobility is eclipsed by the links with the popular and middle-class contexts to which students belong. Still, these universities are subjected to the contradictions of the private-mass, which resonate in the over-politicised ways of students in this group. If in the commercially-oriented institutions students relate to education as a commodity, in the public-oriented ones they claim it as a political value.

Professional socialisation particularises ideals of mutual understanding and emancipation for the underprivileged contexts to which students relate. For instance, a history programme recruits its students for their roles in preserving the popular world from its disintegration under neoliberalism and marginalisation. Students' backgrounds are seen as assets rather than as a handicap:

In this popular world, there's... people concerned about rescuing their neighbours from 'pasta base'⁸, and in recovering the public space from drug dealers through cultural offensive. In this sense, I'd say the interview is more relevant than the PSU score... The majority of these students organise cultural work, music, dance, sports, according to a social and political interest (Academic 12, private-mass [public-oriented] university, 2011).

⁸ 'Pasta Base': drug made with dross from cocaine, prevalent in marginal neighbourhoods.

In this sense, the purpose of this programme was described as to forming 'organic intellectuals':

Historians started to believe they have a mission in the world... to reconfigure the tribes fractured by the Dictatorship, restore their memory and give them the possibility to reconstruct their project. This school is formed in the perspective of forming cadres of organic intellectuals, who operate in the community, from a critical approach and oriented to produce subjectivity (Ibid.).

A sociology programme inspired by social Christianity aims to 'empower individuals and groups, to make them able to deal with their own problems' (Academic 13, private-mass [public-oriented] university, 2011). At the same time, such expectations are linked to the students' biography and to their most likely occupation in the contexts to which they already belong: 'there's a will to not socially detach the student from their roots' (Ibid.).

The kind of *public professionalism* produced in this segment aims for political spaces, either in the state or the third sector, and to intermediate or subordinated positions of power. As put by the academic of the Jesuit university:

people that graduate from here are not top, but they actually are in key positions of the administration... so although the state is managed by someone of the right-wing it has its own specific weight that is not controlled by those who want to give it a different political orientation (Academic 11, private-mass [public-oriented] university, 2011).

Likewise, from the perspective of the academic of the history programme:

There's something related to the [students'] criticism and argumentative capacity that allows them to occupy spaces where policy is discussed: they don't see themselves as policy distributors, but rather as policy-makers. They're not always contentious to policy, because they are critical but not idiots (Academic 12, private-mass [public-oriented] university, 2011).

The sense of political leadership is unmistakable, even if not exerted from a position of power. The pedagogy used to achieve this kind of political purpose aims for specialisation in subjects of social policy. For instance, a sociology programme specialises in marginal identities, while the history programme focuses on 'problems' like neoliberalism, the state, the popular subject and ethnic-history.

In contrast to the public occupations, where a certain *public professionalism* as autonomy for decision-making, intellectual agency and political purpose is preserved, the private sector offers grimmer prospects of routine work. In this regard, for the sociology academic, part of his alumni are only 'solving problems of subsistence by going into consultancies' since 'the work in consultancies is precarious and very hard' (Academic 13, private-mass [public-oriented] university, 2011).

Returning to the perspective of one of our higher education experts, he considered that the ideological orientations and the leadership reproduced in this segment fits the type of organic intellectual that is overlooked in relation to the elite referents of the system. So, with the 2011 student movement such orientations emerged from below to interpellate the intellectual elite – and the higher education policy that consecrated the inequality of the system. His amusing synthesis of this irruption highlighted the under-explained politicisation of this group:

Then we have everyone in the streets and we are terrified. What's this all about? Where did they come from? Where were they educated, if none of them were reading us! They're not reading us and they'll never read us! And if they read us, they'll say: 'this is useless!' (Higher education expert 1, 2011).

(E) Public-Mass

The public-mass segment is mostly specialised in the provision of less selective higher education in the regions of the country. However, derived from this regionalist vocation, this group also tends to suffer the invisibilisation of its contribution before the state, contrasting with the political prestige of the renowned elite universities of the capital city. By this token, reduced public funding has also pushed several institutions in this group to market-oriented strategies of expansion, with detrimental consequences to their institutional integrity⁹. All in all, as these institutions, especially the state universities, are democratically governed by their academics, students also are immersed in a kind of university life that enriches political socialisation. Such orientations are enmeshed with a marked emphasis in the technical aspects of professionalisation, with the expectations of influence calibrated to roles of intermediate leadership. From the public-mass, we interviewed academics from the state-regional Universidad de Tarapacá in Arica, the northernmost city of the country, and the Universidad Católica de Temuco, in the middle south.

For the perspective of the state university, the emphasis on technical control is the main seal instilled in students of lower-class origins. The technical emphasis is not to be taken as the renunciation of a political contribution, but as deliberated orientation onto street level work:

People who graduated from the *Católica*, because of their social origin, don't have the ethical urgency we do. They're not going to work with the poorest but with their own people, and might generate theoretically beautiful policy programmes, but in practice everyone does whatever they want, provoking laughs among those who are actually doing

⁹ In research conducted with the participation of the author, unregulated market expansion was observed with the creation of branch campuses of dubious quality. The main responsible parties were universities of the private-mass and public-mass groups (Zapata et al., 2003).

the jobs. Not us, we're in the first line, working with people, not with ideas and projects (Academic 14, public-mass [state-regional] university, 2011).

Another view from the state university relates similar tendencies to the private sector. Far from the leadership of elite engineers, the public-mass engineers embody the middle-class virtues of hard and disciplined work which, at the end of the day, result in their subordination to organisational powers falling out of their control:

Where the engineer from the *Católica* is a chief manager, and the industrial engineer of the *Chile* is a technical manager, the logic of the one from here is of a very hard working dedicated professional, centred in the process. Throughout the programme, we have highlighted the technical character of the professional, perhaps in detriment of the softer tools of management... the focus is on the task (Academic 15, public-mass [state-regional] university, 2011).

Technical professionalisation pushes broader intellectual and political concerns to a second plane – or functionalises them as *soft skills*. Still, the key orientation within this group assumes the perspective of the one who does the job as a critique of power. The view from the Catholic university in this group also illustrates the formation of such a critical stance, exerted from an intermediate or subordinated position of power:

There hasn't been participation at the level of the highest positions in the formulation or implementation of public policy or state cadres. Rather, there's been a production of an anthropologist with a critical vision towards the models implemented to promote the development of indigenous communities... Definitely, the anthropologists that graduate from here occupy posts in the programmes, but at a middle or local level (Academic 16, public-mass [Catholic-regional] university, 2012).

In sum, the ideological differentiation of the university system entails specific orientations for a *mass intellectuality* of professional workers, ingrained in ideals of knowledge, professionalism and variable expectations of leadership. Along these lines, ideals of technical control are differently sustained at the elite universities, where they are supposed to provide the basis of national development, than in the mass universities, where they are instrumentalised as means for basic professionalisation. Likewise, orientations of hermeneutic and critical knowledge represent intellectual sophistication, preservation of traditions, or transformative charisma at the top of the system, whereas at the less selective institutions provide identification with popular struggles – or *soft skills* within a framework of compensatory education. The expectations of influence attached to professional work vary from the vocation of power manifested in the elite segments to the counter-power sustained in the public-oriented universities of the mass segment and the technical

subordination that also predominates in this segment, particularly at the commercially-oriented institutions. The question of the political orientations of the *mass intellectuality* is answered in terms of such variants of *public professionalism* socialised in an ideologically differentiated university system.

The political significance of the material and ideological differentiation of the university system stems from its effect in embedding the division of labour of political administration, as its *non-bureaucratic basis*. *Public professionalism* links the disposition towards autonomous influence within the state with the normative orientations elaborated in the universities. Moreover, the divisions of the university system contain political and social cleavages organically linked to the basis of state power. In this framework, the ideological efficacy of the university system materialises in the influence attained by *public professionals* in the state, differentiated in dominant and subordinated positions and politicised under the directions of state power.

But the trends of differentiation of the university system are subjected to change, especially as a reaction to these very conditions. With the 2011 student movement, discussed in the next point, the student critiques rendered intolerable the marketisation and inequality inscribed in the operation of the higher education system. Consequentially, reforms introduced with second Bachelet's presidency in 2014 in the wake of the student demands, particularly a policy of free education for the poorest students, will surely affect the patterns of material and ideological differentiation of the system in the longer run, although a detailed analysis of the effect of these reforms is not part of the present discussion.

2.4. The 2011 Student Movement and the Politicisation of Intellectual Labour

The generalisation of profitmaking and student indebtedness in higher education configured the crisis leading to the 2011 student movement (Figueroa, 2013; Jackson, 2013). The largest cycle of social mobilisation since the restoration of democracy took over the streets by the thousands during the winter and spring of 2011 to protest against the marketisation, commodification and inequality of higher education. From our perspective, this movement reflected the rapid transition towards intellectual labour and the critiques of the universities' roles in this context. To close this chapter, we discuss the effect of the material and ideological differentiation of the university system upon the articulation of this movement.

As argued above, with the neoliberal transformation of the higher education system, the retrench of the state universities in favour of a state-sponsored expansion of the market of private institutions also sought to prevent the students' politicisation. It was then sustained that a politically unified student movement, like in the University Reform, was no longer possible, giving way to a

diversity of sectorialised student movements (Brunner, 1985). In fact, this diagnosis remained valid until 2011, as students mobilisations were restricted to the state universities, expressive of a highly militant but increasingly minority community of interest. But after three decades, the higher education system eventually generated the conditions of solidarity that enabled the emergence of a unified movement. What did make the 2011 student movement a watershed? For one of its leaders, the fact that it mobilised people beyond the traditional public universities, representing the unification of interests of a diverse mass university system, and so the protests were not only coming from 'the usual privileged groups' (Jackson, 2013, p.68).

But the articulation of the protests into unified collective action is not the automatic effect of the massification of higher education, as assumed when the ideological differences of the system are overlooked (e.g. Somma, 2012). The distinct types of socialisation and political traditions within universities entail an unequal distribution of the capacities for collective action, with independence of where the grievances denounced by the movement are felt hardest. As discussed in Fleet and Guzmán-Concha (2017), the articulation of the 2011 student movement confirms the political effects of the ideological differentiation of the university system. As an anticipation of the political role of *public professionals*, participation in the movement provided a test of the trends of political socialisation. Students socialised in the public and public-oriented universities, motivated by uses of knowledge that go beyond expectation of economic return and sustain a vocation of political leadership, were mobilised with the protests, whereas the mass universities oriented towards instrumental professionalisation for the sake of social mobility, suffered the contradictions the student movement was denouncing to the largest extent, but without motivating contentious mobilisation. In turn, the conservative orientations of the private-elite universities also were at odds with the protests. The following extracts of interviews express positions towards the movement based on the universities' ideological differentiation.

The perspective of an academic from a state-regional university, which in its position of intermediate selectivity is representative of the wider public segment, informs of massive democratic participation in the movement through assemblies, strikes and occupations: 'this is a university that has a lot of student mobilisations, and I think important cadres of direction are formed thereby' (Academic 2, public-elite [state-regional] university, 2012). The notion of 'cadres of direction' reminds us of the Gramscian sense of moral and political leadership of organic intellectuals who, in this case, identify with the movement as their own work.

A view from the private-elite is given by an academic in sociology, who also spoke for his experience in the public-oriented private-mass universities: 'although [students] don't go to the protests, the majority of them are aware of these issues, are conscious, and in many ways are in

favour of reforms, but obviously they're not as radical as, for example, students from the Universidad Alberto Hurtado or ARCIS [group D]' (Academic 5, private-elite university, 2011). Therefore, the lack of participation of students from the private-elite universities in the movement is not conditioned by a deficit of political socialisation, since they were intellectually motivated by the protests. Their distance is rather the result of particular orientations, closer to the conservative-liberal spectrum of right-wing politics, that ultimately aligned with the right-wing government as the main target of the movement's contention.

In turn, the mass-private commercially-oriented institutions were symptomatically de-attached from the movement. In one of the most marginalised universities, students did not feel at all politically motivated by the events.

Regarding class consciousness and acknowledging that problems are collective, they practically don't have that. That's why these students didn't participate in the student movement, because they thought it had nothing to do with them. After knowing these students, one wonders why did they stay at the margins, not only in terms of action but also in terms of thought. They don't have a clue, don't read, don't get involved (Academic 9, private-mass [commercially-oriented] university, 2012).

Another view from a private-mass university represents an individualistic and discouraging stance towards the movement: 'if you make the decision to go the protests, be responsible, assume that you'll be hit and don't say *oh, how bad the police, they hit me*' (Academic 8, private-mass [commercially-oriented] university, 2011).

But despite the divergent responses to the movement, its claims were generalised for the whole university system. The document 'Social Agreement for Chilean education' presents the movements' demand in the most elaborated form, claiming for a public, free, democratic, and quality higher education (CONFECH, 2011h). It is noteworthy that the demand for free education was not rhetorical, but an actual claim for state-funded higher education as a social right.

In a publication written during the peak of the protests (Fleet, 2011), we linked the orientations of the student movement to the interests of a new middle intellectual class. While the massification of higher education is in the hands of market interests, the claim for the restoration of the role of the state in this realm sought to regain control of the material and ideological reproduction of the class. In a similar interpretation, while students were seen transcending the differences derived from the stratification of higher education, acting as a 'more or less compact group with common interests' (Ruiz, 2013, p.91), they represented a kind of vanguard of intellectual workers, since a movement of this magnitude would be unlikely to take place in the occupational hierarchies that fragment the interests of the class.

From the perspective of the *mass intellectuality*, the student movement reflects the massification of orientations towards meaningful intellectual work ranging, as we have seen, from aspirations of social mobility and professionalisation to ideals of knowledge, intellectual leadership and *public professionalism*. The conflict emerges as such expectations of meaningful intellectual labour are contradicted by the marketisation of the university system, which forces the individual to think of the cost of higher education as private investment and reduces the value of intellectual labour to its economic return. The student movement thus emerges as a struggle for the value of intellectual labour beyond the commodity form. Furthermore, the defence of the value of intellectual labour opposes concrete forms of exploitation of higher education, like the abovementioned loan scheme and the poor quality of education provided to students of lower class origins. In total, the movement put together the demand for public higher education with the discontent arising from expectations of meaningful professionalism and social mobility that are shattered by the marketisation of the system.

Two unrelated events articulated the movement beyond the politically active public universities: first, a minor conflict on the delay in the assignment of benefits to students from the Universidad de Chile, and second, the strike of students from the private-mass Universidad Central (group D) against an attempt to sell half of its property to a private investment group (Figueroa, 2013). The solidarity of the National Student Union (CONFECH) linked the conflict sparked in one of the most 'public' of the private universities with the mobilisation capacities and left-wing orientation of the student organisations of the public universities (Guzmán-Concha, 2012). Another decisive factor was the participation of the traditionally more conservative student union of the Universidad Católica. As noted above, for decades that student union had been in the hands of the *gremialista* movement of supporters of the Dictatorship. But in 2011, this federation was controlled by left-wing students, that later even formed their own party *Revolución Democrática* (see 5.1. below). The involvement of the Universidad Católica was fundamental to extend the appeal of the movement to the less radicalised sectors of society (Figueroa, 2013).

Massive demonstrations succeeded on an almost weekly basis. All the universities of the public segment (groups A and E) were mobilised by strikes and occupations (CONFECH, 2011j), and so were joined by the public-oriented universities of the private-mass (Group D) (Movimiento Generación 80, 2011). Notably, the federations of the regional universities within CONFECH adopted the most radical positions (Figueroa, 2013), leading to an internal confrontation with the leader of the Universidad Católica (Jackson, 2013). In turn, as argued, the private-elite and private-mass commercial universities were not mobilised. There are exceptions in parts of the UDP which, as noted, has a less elitist and more liberal profile within group B, as well as two universities from

group C with partial mobilisations (Movimiento Generacion 80, 2011). In effect, most of these private institutions inhibit student organisations (Bellei et al., 2013) as part of their authoritarian and managerial centralisation. Moreover, in the private-mass, student organisations are further disarticulated by separation in branch-campuses.

We draw on the proceedings of the CONFECH to discuss the movement's critiques of the neoliberal university system, on which its claims are based. To be sure, the success of the movement, its 'rise towards generality' (Boltanski, 2011, p.37), is as much attributable to the massification of higher education as to the capacity to relate to a number of other political issues: democracy and participation, constitutional reform, tax reform, social rights and citizen participation. As a rule, 'student political activism tends to be aimed at societal issues and broad political concerns rather than campus questions' (Philip Atlbach, 1993 cited in Martin, 2011, p.79). As sustained by one of the interviewees for our research on state work, the spread of the student movement rejuvenated the polity altogether:

Before the student movement, our position was of an increasingly naturalised and therefore accepted order... with very weak counterhegemonic possibilities... the difference with this stage of organisation is that the notion of movement emerges again, thanks to a subject [education] a kind of synergy and domino effect is generated, reinforcing notions of right, associative notions, expectations of change (Humanities 1, public-elite [Catholic] university, 2011).

Two critiques elaborated by the movement that point out the *contradictions* of higher education were central for its *generalisation* as political conflict, reflecting the orientations of the universities that led its articulation. The first critique of the commodification of higher education sought to restore the normative value of intellectual labour as a *self-fulfilling activity* (Postone, 2003, p.37). After decades in which higher education expansion was justified by values of *human capital* and economic gain – or, as put by President Piñera in the midst of the protest, as a 'consumption good' – students' demand for *free higher education* could only be justified by non-instrumental and public uses of intellectual labour. Thus, the demand for free higher education was linked to the 'formation of subjects, professionals, technicians and intellectuals of excellence, with critical capacity and professional ethics' (CONFECH, 2011h). In the CONFECH, the claim for free education was persistently defended in terms of the social value of professional work: 'professionals should work at the service of the people. The petit-bourgeois should give back to society'. Thus, free higher education was expected to produce a 'change [of] the vision we have of society, how we want to build a different subject' (CONFECH, 2011e).

By looking at the normative foundations of free education, we take an alternative explanation to the instrumental approach to social movements. For one of those instrumental perspectives, since the demand for free education ‘only started to appear systematically after August’ (Salinas and Fraser, 2013, p.31) in the newspapers, it was inferred that its adoption was part of the tactical framing of student leaders. In our perspective, as it is plausible that the frames of the movement were strategically adjusted throughout the mobilisations, it is misleading to imply that the late diffusion of the claim for free education in the press resulted from tactical decisions of student leaders, as if they would have suddenly judged that bringing this motto was the most effective way to succeed in the conflict with the government. Such an imputation obscures the link with the formulation of this demand. The proceedings and statements of CONFECH clearly showed that the aspiration for free higher education was adopted from the beginning of the protests. While in April free education was the ‘horizon’ of the movement, CONFECH demanded scholarships for the poorest 60% of the population and differentiated fees for the richest 40% (CONFECH, 2011c); in June the claim for free education was reaffirmed, reiterating the conditions demanded in April (CONFECH, 2011d), whereas in the definitive statement of July, when the movement had its largest support, an initial implementation of free education was proposed through scholarships for the poorest 70% and low-interest loans for the richest 30% (CONFECH, 2011h). Therefore, rather than obeying to tactical framing, the focus of this claim was broadened on the basis of the participating federations in the movement. While in the early statement free education was claimed for the state universities only, it was later extended to all public universities, to finally include all the university system.

The second critique was against the fragmentation of higher education by market and political interests beyond society’s control. The critique denounced the ‘explosive’ and ‘inorganic’ expansion of the system without consideration of a ‘plan of national development’ (CONFECH, 2011h). Universities motivated by business interests were distinguished from those oriented by a public role (CONFECH, 2011a); while the former was seen as perpetrating the ‘scam’ of HE (CONFECH, 2011i) in detriment of the students and ‘families’ ‘welfare’, only the public-oriented institutions were esteemed able to provide free education to satisfy the ‘needs of the people’ (CONFECH, 2011d). The opposition to the attempt to sell the private-mass Universidad Central (group D) was crucial in this regard. CONFECH issued a statement in defence of this university’s ‘public meaning’, attacking the ideological and for-profit interests threatening the academic autonomy of public higher education (CONFECH, 2011b). For the first time, CONFECH was extending the notion of public education beyond the institutions traditionally considered public, recognising the public vocation of students and academics from the private sector, in spite of the interests controlling their respective institutions. During the protest, CONFECH integrated student unions

from private universities, not without controversy, as noted by a student from U. Central when their affiliation was discussed:

Now we have the same opportunities of demands, the logic of discriminating is not understandable. The only difference we have with you is that [the U. Central] was created after 1981. The university is not-for-profit because it's owned by its workers... In CONFECH, the citizens victimised by this system are discriminated: we weren't asked if we wanted to pay for our education. You're seeing us as responsible; this discussion is embarrassing because this CONFECH doesn't have the spirit that has been embodied by the students of the Universidad Central (CONFECH, 2011f).

In another meeting, a student from a regional-public university summarised the orientations that the student movement had in this respect: 'the student movement is understood as a process of inclusion into education... there's no reason to exclude the fellows from the private universities just because they attend these' (CONFECH, 2011g).

According to this critique, state funding, including free education, was demanded only for public-oriented universities, that are non-for-profit, produce research, preserve their autonomy and pluralism from ideological particularisms, and guarantee democratic participation. This implies extending the orientations of public higher education into the whole system. For one of our experts, this is more difficult than satisfying the demand for free higher education as it challenges the constellation of particular interests and cultures behind the ideological differentiation of the educational superstructure:

The student movement is totalising, in the sense that it challenges the idea that pluralism is what you get by the total sum of particularising university projects, many of which are not entirely pluralistic. Instead, the student movement expects every university to embrace a universalistic concept of the university which would include unrestricted pluralism. But I think their cause is doomed, given the history of education in Chile, which has always consisted of the aggregation of educational projects stemming from different educational philosophies in the public and private sectors (Higher education expert 2, 2012).

In hindsight, he was right. The movement lost in exhaustion in 2011, but it paved the way to Michelle Bachelet and the centre-left's return to power in 2014, with the promise of free higher education in the political programme. In 2016 the state began to fund higher education for the poorest 50%, advancing to 60% in the following year. However, far from transforming the private sector, the free-higher education policy has functioned as a subsidy for market operation, granted as vouchers rather than as conditioned institutional funding, perpetuating the neoliberal framework and the ongoing expansion of the private universities.

The question on the *non-bureaucratic basis of the bureaucracy* looks for the sources of unity and consistency sustaining the autonomy of the state organisation beyond bureaucratic rules. But instead of restricting the focus onto the typical places of elite reproduction, our observation of the Chilean case is more complex and ideologically diverse. When taking the political purpose of the university system into consideration, we cannot ignore that the main forces shaping higher education are not moving in the direction of elitisation but towards massification. Hence, today it is unsatisfactory to reduce the relation between knowledge and power, between the university and the state, to a matter of elite schools. The Chilean case adds more ingredients: the lack of a formal school to enter the bureaucracy, which means that universities are the basis of the state apparatus; the market segmentation, which fragments the system into hierarchies of *living labour*; and the particular university orientations, reflecting the project of the owners, the diversity of university life, and the specification of knowledge ideals for variants of *public professionalism*. Thereby, the question of the *non-bureaucratic basis of the bureaucracy* takes us to the ideological efficacy of a mass university system.

The material asymmetries of the university system, reproduced along with the differentiation between elite and mass recruitment, acquire an ideological dimension when crossed with the division between public-traditional and new-private universities. In this context, universities differentiate types of *public professionalism* – as we call to the orientation towards political influence through professional work. The conversation with academics illustrated the orientations reproduced in each category, representing an ideological division of intellectual labour. While the reproduction of elite leadership in the top conveys expectations of political influence, the private segment leans towards more conservative orientations linked to the narrower constituencies and interest groups predominating in these institutions. In turn, while the mass segment is constrained by the instrumentalisation of higher education for social mobility, within the private sector this tension is exacerbated as the group of commercially-oriented institutions lacks expectations of political leadership beyond technical professionalisation and compensatory education. Not without difficulties, the public-oriented private sector and the traditional-public institutions at the mass level reproduce a sense of political purpose oriented to intermediate and subordinated professional roles.

With the 2011 student movement, we observed a reaction to the conditions of material and ideological differentiation of the university system. The relevance of this process hinges on the assertion of professional work as a source of normative and political value – constrained by the

marketisation/commodification of the system – and the defence of the sense public higher education – against ideological differentiation. Confirming the link between massification of higher education and politicisation of intellectual labour, the movement showed the specific ways in which this process has taken place within Chilean universities as the movement itself was not led by the universities that suffered the most from the contradictions of the system, but by those public and public-oriented universities in which intellectual labour is socialised into the most accomplished *public professionalism*, that is, for political leadership exceeding the instrumentalisation of knowledge for economic return and social mobility.

Chapter Three

The Shift of State Autonomy: From Formal Bureaucracy to Autonomous State Work

After establishing that the massification of professional work disseminates its own sources of meaning and politicisation, we move on to study the effect these orientations have in the state in Chile. A theoretical framework is then needed to assess the autonomy of a *mass intellectuality* of professional workers within the state and in relation to social and political interests at its basis.

In this chapter, we discuss the long span of sociological theories on bureaucracy and state autonomy. From the broadest perspective, it is possible to observe the shift in the rationality of state autonomy – i.e. the internal logic and organisational principles of the structure and function of the state – from the formal rules and hierarchies of the bureaucratic organisation to the autonomy of professional state work. At the basis of this trend, the massification of intellectual labour in the state not only pushes against the classic forms of bureaucratic organisation but entails that the labour of a *mass intellectuality* increasingly mediates the links of the state with society as well.

In three sections, this chapter follows the sequence starting with the Weberian classical framework of bureaucratic action, and its functionalist critique; then it moves to the Marxist and post-Marxist views of state autonomy in advanced capitalism, with an excursus on the technocratic reappraisal of the effect of separation from dominant class interests; and concludes with the post-structuralist approach on the massification and flexibilisation of professional work in the neoliberal state and the post-bureaucratic organisation. In the end, the theoretical discussion is reassessed in terms of its usefulness to interpret the political significance of the *mass intellectuality* of the state.

3.1. The Classical Framework of Bureaucratic Action and its Functionalist Critique

In this point, the original elements of bureaucratic work and state autonomy are established. Weber's *classical framework* sets the basic categories to interpret all action that is carried out with administrative means within the modern legal-rational domination, whereas the functionalist critique provided the first systematic attempt to flexibilise this framework in the light of the larger autonomy bureaucratic actors have within organisations.

3.1.1. Weber's Classical Framework

Max Weber interpreted the state by its rationality of action, i.e. the subjective meaning its members attach to it. Hence, he defines the bureaucracy as the 'means of transforming social action into rationally organized action' (1978, p.987). What we call the *classical framework* of bureaucratic action brings together Weber's ideal types of legal-rational domination of the state with the instrumental rationality of its members in the public administration. In short, the *classical*

framework represents the identity between the instrumental orientations of the bureaucracy and those of bureaucrats themselves.

The formal character of the bureaucracy has its historic root with the capitalists' interests as well as the 'democratic movements that demanded equality before the law and legal guarantees against arbitrariness in judicial and administrative decisions' (Bendix, 1977, p.437). Thereby, the qualities of efficiency, impartiality, calculability and unambiguous administration – 'without regard to persons' (Weber, 1978, p.975) – link the bureaucracy with the basis of the legitimacy the modern capitalist state. The bureaucracy sustains the autonomy of the organisation of the state as 'a system of continuous purposive activity' (Weber, 1964, p.151). As long the bureaucracy is subjected to strict hierarchies, technical rules and formal procedures, the state preserves its unity and capacity for autonomous action.

The *classical framework* implies the total submission of work under administrative routines. Its enabling condition – marking the departure from the patrimonial administration – consists in the strict separation of the official from 'ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his position' (1964, p.334). However, less sharp is the separation between the technical knowledge possessed by the bureaucrat and the knowledge acquired from experience in office (1978, p.1418). Both kinds of knowledge eventually coincide, especially as the requirements for technical qualifications were continually increasing (1964, p.335). Since bureaucrats are hired as appointed rather than elected officials, their position is tied to functional considerations (1978, p.961), a related salary and fixed career prospects. The content of the *classical framework* is prescribed by rules and assigned duties, administrative commands and written documents, and hierarchical and technical division of administrative labour (pp.956-958).

In this framework, bureaucratic discretion is prone to the expansion of the bureaucratic machinery. In Weber's words: 'the performance of each individual worker is mathematically measured, each man becomes a little cog in the machine and, aware of this, his one preoccupation is whether he can become a bigger cog' (Mayer, 1944, p.126). Such an instrumental orientation only has detrimental consequences when involved with the political matters of the state. Weber depicted the 'creative' discretion of state officials as oriented to manipulate the reasons of the state for their own vested interests (1978, p.979). A typical situation of this kind was observed when the bureaucracy played the game of opposing the interests represented in the parliament to increase its own power (p.1397). As the bureaucracy also resisted external supervision, it made the parliament chronically deprived of technical information about the state (pp.1417-1423). Weber's greatest worry was on the 'rule by officials' (2003, pp.330-331), as its lack of value convictions and disregard

for the national interests 'failed completely whenever it was expected to deal with political problems' (1978, p.1417).

Professions appear marginally in this framework, without making a difference with respect to the instrumental rationality of bureaucrats themselves. However, the effect of professional discretion might be specified. For instance, in Weber's view, lawyers mobilise their pecuniary interests and sense of prestige to resist the total formalisation of written law and the bureaucratisation of the administration of justice (1978, p.979). In turn, Weber was most concerned with the political influence of economists as: 'the highest problems that can move a human breast are transformed here into questions of technical-economic "productivity" and are made into the topic of discussion of a *technical* discipline, such as economics is' (Weber cited in Marcuse 1988, p.202).

In our perspective, the underlying ingredient of the classical framework lies in the political neutrality of the social base of the administrative staff, which resembles Hegel's conception of civil servants as *universal class*, whose position is freed 'from other kinds of subjective dependence and influence' (Hegel, 2003, pp.333-335). In this way, without political interests of their own, state officials were either reduced to the autonomy dictated to their own vested interests in the state, or to the business of administration *sine ira et studio*¹⁰ (1978, p.225). Put differently, the lack of political content of the *classical framework* stems from a bureaucracy that does not incorporate class interests and cultural values of their own, failing to attach political meaning to its work in the state.

But the formal quality of the *classical framework* is eventually challenged by the incorporation of social demands into the state, leading to larger economic and social intervention (Weber, 1978, p.226).

The propertyless masses especially are not served by the formal 'equality before the law' and the 'calculable' adjudication and administration demanded by bourgeois interests. Naturally, in their eyes justice and administration should serve to equalize their economic and social life-opportunities in the face of the propertied classes. Justice and administration can fulfil this function only if they assume a character that is informal because 'ethical' with respect to substantive content (1978, p.980).

A shift in the rationality of state autonomy is initiated with the incorporation of substantive orientations within the formal rationality of the bureaucracy. But instead of decreasing the ascendancy of bureaucracy on political matters, it produced the opposite, expanding the scope of

¹⁰ 'Without hatred or passion'.

the legal-rational domination. The bureaucracy underwent sustained enlargement, empowerment and politicisation of its staff, at the expense of the formal rationality of the *classical framework*.

3.1.2. The Functionalist Critique

Functionalism upgraded Weber's study of the bureaucratic organisation into a dominant research programme. But at the same time, the *classical framework* is critiqued because the subjection to prescribed administrative rules was no longer considered sufficient to secure the functional integration of increasingly complex organisations. Functionalism exposed the limitations of the *classical framework* to account for the larger spaces of bureaucratic agency opened before unforeseen circumstances. The focus then moved onto the separation of the orientations of the bureaucrats with respect to the organisation, paying more attention to the effect of bureaucrats' behaviour in organisational outcomes.

Merton's concept of *ritualism* (1968) is central in the functionalist critique of the Weberian model. *Ritualism* describes the typical bureaucratic personality committed to fulfilling the prescribed rules of his task as ends in themselves. But since bureaucratic rules do not provide effective orientation for action in all cases, the *ritualist* bureaucrat ultimately is a source of dysfunction for the organisation, undermining its capacity to adapt to new situations. Greater capacities of individual innovation become functional imperatives for bureaucratic effectiveness. Moreover, *ritualism* might also represent the reaction of bureaucrats that fail to impose their own political definitions, retreating to the purely technical work, dissociated from value implications (1968, p.273). In a similar vein, for Crozier (1964) *ritualism* represented an ambivalent response to problems of integration of centralised organisations. In the gap between prescribed commands and the actual requirements of a task, *ritualism* represents the experience of individual alienation – to which claims for more creative administration are attached – or the political reaction before bureaucratic authoritarianism: 'ritualism [...] is also a very useful instrument in the struggle for power and control and in the protection of a group's area of action' (1964, p.199). In total, while for the *classical framework* ritualist behaviour constitutes a stable characteristic of the bureaucracy, for functionalism it expresses the critical separation of the actor with respect to the organisation. The latent dispositions of bureaucrats to influencing the policy implications and protecting their collective interests in their jobs change the pole of gravitation of the autonomous rationality of bureaucratic organisations.

Other researches have focused the functionalist approach onto studying the contribution of bureaucrats' behaviour, beyond prescribed rules, to the development of organisations. For Lipset (1952), the social background of bureaucrats themselves constitutes an emergent variable to explain

the direction of their interventions in the state, representing, at the same time, a crucial factor of policy outcomes. In turn, Selznick (1966) illustrated the autonomous capacity of organisations to adapt to – and co-opt – its social environment by means of active bureaucratic leadership exerted in the ‘shadowland of informal interaction’ (p.137). Last, Gouldner (1954) related divergent patterns of bureaucratisation to the knowledge incorporated by bureaucrats: while knowledge derived from office tended to create ‘punishment-centred’ patterns of bureaucratisation, imposing rules as ends in themselves, workers’ expertise tended to generate ‘representative’ organisations attached to substantive ends.

While there is nothing the *classical framework*, apart from technical knowledge and power interests, that bureaucrats bring into the organisation, in the functionalist approach, the direction of organisations appears increasingly conditioned by the social relations workers mobilise from before they are integrated into such spaces. Still, the Weberian inspiration remains, as the functionalist critique shares the mistrust against bureaucratic domination and the limitation of individual freedom (Bendix, 1945). Hence, the greater emphasis functionalism gives to individual action, which leads to interpreting the autonomy of organisations as a property of its own agents as well. In the background, the extension of the bureaucratic domination was confronted by what Crozier identified as ‘the growing sophistication of the individual in an increasingly complex culture’ (1964, p.297).

3.2. Marxist and Post-Marxist Theories on State Autonomy in Advanced Capitalism

The administration of the state represents the culmination of the separation between material and intellectual labour (Poulantzas, 2014; Marx and Engels, 1998), hence its *relative autonomy*. Now, while state autonomy is functional to the reproduction of capitalism and the interests of the capitalist classes, it also has the capacity to ‘react back’ upon its economic base (Althusser, 2014, p.54). In this point, we elaborate on the Marxist distinction between *state apparatus* and *state power*.

The state apparatus emerges as the historical crystallisation of relations of state power. State power, in turn, is the effect of class conflicts upon the direction of state policy, which also transforms the organisation of the state apparatus. In the process, the state apparatus assumes ‘a material existence, efficacy and inertia which are to a certain extent independent of current state policies and class relations’ (Therborn, 2008, pp.34-35). The distinction between state power/apparatus pertains to a strategic consideration for political action since seizing state power might happen ‘without affecting or modifying the state apparatus’ (Althusser 2014, p.73) whereas

taking over the state apparatus may not lead to a transformation of state power (Poulantzas, 2014, pp.142-143).

The continuity with Weber's *classical framework* stems from the ideology of *bureaucratism*, upon which the bureaucracy's own internal unity and the relative autonomy of the state apparatus is based (Poulantzas, 1978). From the perspective of the interventionist state, Poulantzas (2014) added to the Weberian model the strategic function of the bureaucracy in the reproduction of capitalism, which operates on the separation between the top civil service, which legitimises the dominant class interests as a matter of technocratic ideology, and the lower segments of the bureaucracy, linked to the popular masses.

Our review of Marxist theories focuses on how the autonomy of the state apparatuses is articulated along with the enlargement, qualification, differentiation and politicisation of the bureaucracy of the interventionist state, determining new directions of state power.

3.2.1. Relative Autonomy and State Power

The state apparatus has no independent power with respect to class relations (Poulantzas, 1978, p.115; Therborn, 2008, p.132). No Marxist theory would say otherwise. But there are differences within Marxism about the effect of state autonomy.

As a starting point, traditional Marxism reduces state autonomy to an extension of capitalist class interests. Marx regarded the state an illusory community (Marx and Engels, 1998), instrumentalised by the capitalist class (Marx and Engels, 2002), ultimately as its repressive tool (Marx, 2010; Carnoy, 1984). Hence, the only thing the revolution ought to do with the bureaucratic-military machine, Marx wrote to Kugelmann (1871), was 'to smash it'. The autonomy crystallised in the state indeed constitutes a 'distinct reality' (Lefebvre, 1972), but at the end of the day determines no more than 'the degree of violence required by the proletariat in overthrowing it' (Avineri, 1969, p.49).

The movement beyond traditional Marxism – towards neo-Marxism – hinges on the observation that the relation between class and state power is mediated by the role of intellectuals in the state apparatus, which then acquires a unity and *relative autonomy* with respect to social classes. At the same time, state power is also seen as not totally dependent on univocal class interests, but as the outcome of a larger spectre of class relations. Last, post-Marxist explanations of state autonomy appeal to the imperative of reproduction of capitalism as a whole, beyond particular class interests.

Marking the movement towards neo-Marxism, Gramsci considered the state by its links with civil society and the role of intellectuals in developing such links. For Gramsci the state and civil

society are ‘one and the same thing’ (1988, p.210), so ‘by ‘state’ should be understood not only the apparatus of government, but also the ‘private’ apparatus of ‘hegemony’ or civil society’ (1988, p.234). Therefore, state power is articulated under the ‘hegemony’ of the dominant classes, that is, the political and intellectual leadership they accomplish as historical bloc. The role of intellectuals in this context is defined ‘in a broad sense, to include all those who exercise directive or high-level technical capacities in society, whether in the field of production, in that of culture or in that of politics-administration ... [including] not only ‘thinkers’ but civil servants, political leaders, clerics, managers, technocrats, etc.’ (Femia, 1981, p.131). In total, intellectuals are ‘functionaries of the superstructure’ (Gramsci, 1988, p.306), who work organising hegemony, ‘educating’ consent (Gramsci, 1978, p.259), and unifying the state under a political direction that is organically linked to the historical bloc – and to the ‘needs of the productive forces for development’ (1978, pp.258-259). Most importantly, the task of hegemony implies the incorporation of the subordinate classes to the state. In this fashion, the state not only performs a repressive function (night-watchman state) but also economic (interventionist state) and cultural (ethical or cultural state) functions. Certainly, the intellectuals’ role is most marked in the latter functions, by means of which the state protects society against the ‘excesses of capitalism’ (1978, p.262) and *universalises* its ‘bourgeois’ culture onto the population. In so doing, intellectuals enjoy relative autonomy – hence the ‘organic’ and not ‘mechanical’ relation with the social structure – shaping the cultural consciousness of the dominant classes (Portelli, 1977). Moreover, as the organic intellectuals expand throughout the ‘democratic-bureaucratic system’ beyond productive needs, in response to ‘the political necessities of the dominant fundamental group’ (Gramsci, 1988, p.308), they enter in contradiction with the layers of ‘traditional intellectuals’ (Portelli, 1977, p.100) – without links to the social structure¹¹. Along these lines, it becomes a political necessity for the working classes to develop organic intellectuals of their own, in *counterhegemonic* fashion (Gramsci, 1978). As the state is no longer the passive instrument of univocal capitalist class interests, but a decisive moment in the organisation of otherwise fragmented class power, *Gramscians* insist that: ‘the socialist determination of the working class does not arise spontaneously but depends upon the political mediation of intellectuals’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.85).

Following Gramsci, Althusser differentiates the structure of the state in accordance with its specific functions and the role of intellectuals therein. While the centralised state apparatus – ‘the

¹¹ Gramsci warns that the officialdom might constitute a conservative force when their organic ties with society are weakened (1988, p.219). For instance, the phenomenon of *bureaucratic centralism* describes the situation of an *organic crisis* in which state functionaries assume an authoritarian role, substituting hegemony with dictatorship in the direction of the historical bloc (1978, p.189).

government, administration, army, police, and specialized repressive corps' (Althusser, 2014, p.93) – fulfils a repressive function – as *Repressive State Apparatus* – there is not meaningful intellectual mediation whatsoever. But at the level of decentralised *Ideological State Apparatuses* (ISAs) – 'scholastic, religious, familial, political, associative, cultural, the news and information apparatus, and so on' (2014, p.93) – the mediating role of intellectuals predominates, especially in the wake of the massification of educational institutions, as discussed in Chapter Two. The ISAs are spaces for class struggle and hegemony, where the exploited classes can conquer positions of resistance (2008, p.21).

Poulantzas embraced Althusser's ISAs, but rejected his notion of *Repressive State Apparatuses*, as it reduced the state to physical violence and *mystification*¹². As Poulantzas wrote from a context in which the state had centralised economic functions, its relative autonomy implied a more decisive productive direction, larger than the Marxist perspective had originally observed (Jessop, 1987). For Poulantzas, state autonomy was deposited in the bureaucracy, constituting a political phenomenon which, as never before, had expanded both in importance and in number not only as a requirement of the larger economic function of the state, but in response to the burden of political and ideological functions that accompanied this process (1978, pp.344-345).

For Poulantzas the autonomy of the bureaucracy stems from the strategic representation of capitalist class power. Now, this function is not primarily attributable to the expertise concentrated in the higher levels of the bureaucracy¹³, but to the *material framework* of the state (2014, p.141), which means that the legal unity and purposeful rationality of the bureaucracy are bounded to the imperative of capitalist reproduction. Furthermore, the *asymmetrical* relations of power institutionalised within the bureaucracy – into differentiated functions and agencies – entail organic links with dominant and subordinated class interests. Therefore, predominant policy outcomes are those strategically linked to the interests of the dominant capitalist classes and to the reproduction of the capitalist relations of production (Therborn, 2008, p.161).

By framing the strategic orientation of the bureaucracy within the *material framework* of the state, Poulantzas was not neglecting its active political role. But Poulantzas' position has been presented as *hard-structuralism* (Barrow, 1993), particularly by his debate with Miliband (Poulantzas and Miliband, 1972). There Poulantzas criticised his interlocutor for explaining the capitalist

¹² For Poulantzas: '[t]he state also acts in a positive fashion, *creating, transforming and making* reality' (2014, p.30). For example, "'bourgeois" statistics cannot be treated as mere mystification, but constitute elements of state knowledge to be used for the purpose of political strategy' (p.32).

¹³ Other non-Marxists theories, like Parkin (1981) have emphasised the *technical expertise* of state autonomy as the long-term *intelligence* of the bourgeoisie.

character of the state in terms of the class situation, (political) socialisation, and inter-personal contacts of the elites that led to the *instrumental occupation* of the state apparatus – hence Miliband’s perspective is labelled as *instrumentalist*. While these characteristics are not false, Poulantzas said, they are merely descriptive and overlook that state power is structured upon the predominance of the capitalist class within the organisation of the bureaucracy – as inscribed within its *material framework*. Thus, capitalist state power is exerted with independence from the variables that Miliband took into account. Still, in his last statement on ‘Democratic Socialism’ (2014), Poulantzas moved his position closer to Miliband, granting strategic importance to the class affiliation of the bureaucracy upon the direction (and potential transformation) of state power (see 3.2.[b] below).

For sure, the label of *hard-structuralism* does not make justice to the greater autonomy of action that the bureaucracy assumes within the *material framework* of the capitalist state. With the ascendance of monopolistic capitalism, the executive power of the state is more actively involved in securing of the capitalist relations of production and private capital accumulation as ever before, ‘marking the passage from the liberal to the interventionist state’ (Poulantzas, 2014, p.217). The bureaucracy is not only enlarged in these conditions, but it also gains more agency: ‘the state bureaucracy is becoming not merely the principal site, but also the principal actor in the elaboration of state policy’ (p.224). In effect, the bureaucracy represents the long-term interests of the power bloc, with sections of the administration devoted to networking and organising monopoly capital, and others focused on legitimising such hegemonic interests before the subordinated classes, presenting them as ‘general’ or ‘national’ by means of ideological interventions, typically in the educational system (1978, p.53). At the same time, as the distinction between administrative and political decisions is blurred, the state-bureaucracy is increasingly targeted by social demands, producing chronic crises of legitimacy (2014, pp.244-245). Although for Poulantzas’ the *ex-post* articulation of state policies is structurally aligned with the reproduction of capitalism (Jessop, 1987), the mediation of the bureaucracy in the implementation of the interventionist state might as well put the direction of class hegemony at risk.

Post-Marxist interpretations of the welfare state also resorted to the constraint of capitalism reproduction to explain the prolific and contradictory interventions of the bureaucracy. As noted, the state both *represents* the interests of the ruling class and *mediates* the exploitation of the subordinated classes (Therborn, 2008). Therefore, its intervention had to secure private capital accumulation before ‘the increasingly social character of the productive forces’ (2008, p.54) and to make this process compatible with the demands of social integration, upon which the legitimacy of the state depended. To support the process of accumulation, the state personnel had ‘to recognize

and select the general interests of the capitalist class amid the competition of special interests' (Barrow, 1993, p.101). In turn, social policy had to be justified by generalisable interests for the continuity of capital reproduction (Hicks and Esping-Andersen, 2005) and the expansion of 'aggregate demand' (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.74). As the consequence of the ongoing expansion of the administration in the midst of such contradictory ends, firstly a crisis of rationality constraints the state to adequately steer the economic system (Habermas, 1976). According to Offe (1993), the state was forced to choose between retreating to its formal-legal rationality (ritualism) or committing to the effectiveness of its economic interventions, typically adopting suboptimal short-term policy solutions as outcomes of this dilemma (Barrow, 1993). Secondly, a legitimisation crisis also resulted from the participation of the administrative system in the economic system, as it implies that the socialisation of the cost of production for private appropriation of surplus value is not sufficiently validated by means of formal democracy (Habermas, 1976, p.133; Cohen and Arato, 1994, p.13). In this context, state interventions on cultural traditions and symbolic interaction (e.g. educational planning) undermine the capacity of such spheres for un-constrained self-legitimation (Habermas, 1976, pp.70-71). Therefore, the *crisis of legitimation* also came with the understanding that bureaucracies, as instrumental action through administrative means, cannot effectively produce meaning in behalf of the state.

Habermas and Offe moved even farther from the original Marxist axiom of the state as the instrument of the ruling class, to depict it as the representation of the capitalist system as a whole. By representing the capitalist society within the state (Luhmann, 1990), the latter has to 'implement and guarantee the collective interests of all members of a class society dominated by capital' (Offe, 1993, p.120). This entails the administrative production of collective use-value, the re-politicisation of class relations within the state apparatus, and the rationalisation of the state administration itself, as every new policy has to adapt onto ongoing organisational complexity. Thus, the need for agency and substantive rationality that the imperative of capitalist reproduction imposes on the bureaucracy is definitely higher than what the label of *hard structuralism* bluntly suggests.

3.2.2. Transformations of the State Apparatus

With the expansion of the interventionist state, its bureaucracy is reconfigured along with two internal trends: **[a]** the qualification of the administrative staff and; **[b]** its organisation and politicisation along class lines.

[a] The qualification of the state personnel explains both the differentiation of a managerial technocracy as a high layer of command and the expansion of a new middle-class of intellectual workers. In both levels, the incorporation of substantive knowledge and professional work

undermines the formal character of the bureaucracy. As put by Therborn, the hierarchy of the administration of the state appears to have 'has been undermined both from above and from below' (2008, p.93), resulting in two dislocated entities, while the orientations of state work are not totally given by administrative rules or political command, but from specialised knowledge that professionals incorporate on their own.

Technocrats impose state power representing the interests of the capitalist class (Poulantzas, 1979) as well as the reasons of science and technique (Touraine, 1974). Such substantive orientations, Therborn (2008) suggests, entail significant discretion in determining policy ends, pushing against the legal framework – and legal professionals – of the state. Given the amounts of critique and politicisation that universities engendered towards the late sixties, the conditions were also created to form what Poulantzas called a *left-wing technocracy* (1979, p.291), capable of influencing the state in non-capitalist directions (Therborn, 2008, p.56; Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p.162)¹⁴.

At the lower echelon of the bureaucracy, the qualification of state work takes place with the incorporation of masses of professionals to the welfare services – which are external to the bureaucracy, so are capable of unionising as well (Therborn, 2008, p.93). At the same time, masses of *intellectuals* are also incorporated within the state administration, but 'no action of which may easily be controlled by the classical means of bourgeois bureaucratic hierarchy' (p.177). These intellectual state workers, *subaltern intellectuals* in a way, make the bureaucracy dependent on their knowledge and professionalism. The tensions between the old bureaucratic organisation and the new contingents of salaried intellectuals might escalate to open conflict, in which the latter undertook the anti-authoritarian struggle against 'the bureaucratisation and fragmentation of mental labour' (Poulantzas, 1979, p.291), demanding the modernisation of the *administrative relations of production* towards more autonomy and creativity at work, less bureaucratic discipline, and status based in knowledge and credentials rather than in office and seniority (Touraine, 1974).

[b] Regarding the organisation and politicisation of state personnel in relation to class lines, Poulantzas differentiated between the 'heights' of the bureaucracy, which are occupied by personnel of bourgeoisie affiliation in charge of the 'centres of capitalist power of the state', and the subaltern strata, which are occupied by the petty-bourgeoisie, linked to the subordinated classes and popular struggles (1978, pp.335-339).

Regarding the functionaries at the heights of the state, typically they are not recruited from the dominant class of the power bloc (monopoly bourgeoisie) but from subordinated classes therein

¹⁴ For instance, the policy-making activity of intellectuals is considered to have contributed with proposals (e.g., guaranteed annual income) that eliminate incentives to work (Barrow, 1993, p.53).

(non-monopoly bourgeoisie) (1979, p.185), which acts as 'class in charge' not on their own power, but representing the interests of the dominant classes in the centres of state power (1978, p.336) and adopting the ideology of technocracy in this function (1979, p.180). The 'class in charge' provides a defence mechanism from political crises which otherwise reach the core of state power (2014, p.91).

In turn, the lower segments of the state, administered by personnel of the petty-bourgeoisie, give access for popular struggles into subordinated *centres of resistance*. But again, the class affiliation of the personnel at these *centres of resistance* does not mobilise power of its own. The capacity to change the direction of state power – against the dominant bloc – lies in the popular struggles, with the politicisation of the petty-bourgeoisie playing a strategic role in support of such struggles. In this way, the bureaucracy is seen as taking part in the class struggle in accordance with the class-affiliations of the personnel and the proximity to the interests they represent from the basis of state power. Certainly, the participation of members of the bureaucracy in class conflict can be only expressed within its own autonomous rationality, in the form of 'quarrels' among members of the various state apparatuses and branches' (p.155), and where the support given to social struggles in particular is limited by the 'neutrality' and 'formality' of the bureaucracy (p.157). Nonetheless, in spite of these limitations, Poulantzas emphasises the key political significance that agencies representative of popular demands and other 'wrongly called 'secondary' struggles (women, ecology, etc.) have in a process of state transformation (p.264). Seizure of state power is not accomplished just by taking (parts of) its apparatus, as the power of the upper centres of the dominant classes might migrate to other agencies, without changing state power itself. Thereby, Poulantzas' testament on 'Democratic Socialism' comprised the reinforcement of alliances between the popular classes and the petty-bourgeoisie to move state power from the upper centres of the dominant bloc to the centres of resistance, incorporating the self-management of the popular masses throughout the political transformation (pp.258-264).

3.2.3. The Technocratic Rediscovery of State Autonomy

As an excursus within the Marxist discussion, we address some issues of the institutionalist approach to state autonomy. Actually, the institutionalist approach not only pays tribute to Marxism but also to Weber and functionalism to reappraise state autonomy as the capacity to generate policy outcomes beyond dominant class interests. Putting Marxism *back on its head*, institutionalism situates the state bureaucracy, and not class interests, as the *independent variable* of state policy (Amenta, 2005). But, as Harney (2002) puts it, it is not a matter of neglecting Marxism. On the contrary, as long as the structural separation of the state from the relations of production is taken as

a desirable condition for its optimal organisation and policy effectiveness, institutionalists attempt a technocratic reception of the Marxist (Poulantzian) take on state autonomy.

With a strong focus on state elites, this approach still makes strong points on the effect of bureaucratic autonomy upon state policy. Notably, Skocpol (1985) retrieved the work of Hecló (1974) to explain that among the factors determining the evolution of welfare policy – including political parties, interest groups, socio-economic changes and the specialised staff – it was this latter, the autonomous involvement of staff in correcting and developing social programmes, that proved most consistent and predominant. At the times when interventionist states collapsed before a burden of social legitimation and fiscal constraints, institutionalists were concerned with finding that kind of bureaucratic effectiveness, looking at the conditions that make it possible within autonomous state apparatuses.

Among the conditions associated with successful bureaucratic interventions, institutionalists emphasised the isolation of state elites from the dominant classes (Barrow, 1993). As long as state elites are neither recruited from, nor personally tied to, the dominant classes, and so they preserve a sense of ideological purpose and strong *esprit de corps* along their career paths, the state holds the capacity to intervene society. But, as we have seen, Poulantzas' notion of 'class in charge' already represents the idea of an autonomous technocracy, but one that in spite of not being recruited from the dominant class, remains organically linked to it. The point of the ideological purpose and *esprit de corps* of the state elites is also questionable since the reproduction of these elements, at the distance from the dominant classes, is no guarantee of political independence. As Suleiman (1974) concludes his research in the formation of state corps in France: instead of providing state autonomy, the corporate unity of these elites, based on common educational and professional backgrounds, has facilitated their co-optation by political parties.

In the quest for effective autonomy, Evans provided a fresh perspective by elaborating the conditions of the Weberian bureaucracy, particularly with regards to meritocratic recruitment and long-term careers, as determinant factors of successful state involvement in industrial transformation (Evans, 1995) and economic growth (Evans and Rauch, 1999). Therefore, when the bureaucracy lacks such conditions of autonomy and corporate coherence, like in situations of rapid rotation of the personnel or when the bureaucracy is taken altogether as the governments' spoil, the state posed the major obstacles to economic development. But, on the other hand, Evans (1995) also emphasised the informal networks with social groups as equally relevant factors of effective interventions. Thereby, the institutionalist approach provides the missing link with the post-structuralist approaches (next point), concerned with the greater contingency and performance incorporated to the bureaucracy. In effect, the embeddedness of state policy in networks with

mobilised social groups eventually undermines the corporate coherence of the bureaucracy. Hence, the deeper the state's intervention in social and economic life, the more necessary it is to find the *non-bureaucratic foundations of bureaucratic functioning* (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985). As advanced in Chapter Two, the rather Durkheimian notion of *non-bureaucratic basis* resorts to the social and educational institutions in which the ideological orientations of state elites are reproduced, constituting the ultimate source of coherent state autonomy. Beyond the institutionalist focus on technocratic elites, the question of the *non-bureaucratic basis* is ever more relevant to address the orientations and effects of state autonomy under conditions of *mass intellectuality*.

3.3. Post-Structuralist Approaches: *Mass Intellectuality*, Neoliberalism, Post-Bureaucracies

Unlike Marxism, post-structuralist approaches do not read the state in correspondence to the class structure, but in relation to the hegemonical articulation of social and political actors that escape from the mould of class (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). Along these lines, post-structuralist theories give much attention to the effect of what we have referred to as *mass intellectuality* of the state. Tendencies of the *petty bourgeois* elements of the bureaucracy to push against administrative rules and hierarchies – in the name of a democratic, rational, humane and meaningful administration (Poulantzas, 1979, pp.291-293) – are generalised into the capacity of a *mass intellectuality* to transform the traditional bureaucracy into flexible post-bureaucratic organisations. The transit towards *post-bureaucracies* describes new forms of organisational work that rely less on rules and hierarchies and more on the creative input of intellectual workers. At the basis of these transformations, the movement towards neoliberalism constitutes the underlying structure of the *post-structure*.

3.3.1. *Mass Intellectuality* as labour and critique

The orientations of the *mass intellectuality* look back at two sources of politicisation of work. The first one, as seen in the previous chapter, stems from the 'general rise in the educational levels' of the population (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p.71), particularly by means of the massification of higher education, leading to a critique of the uses of knowledge in the technocratic capitalist society (Hardt and Negri, 1994). The other comes from the exhaustion of working productivity based on the de-skilling and fragmentation of labour, motivating a rebellion against industrial discipline. For the context of post-May 68, Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) saw both sources of politicisation of the *mass intellectuality* converging in the demand of *cadres* – professional managers of public and private administrations – for creative self-fulfilling jobs. In what the authors called the *artistic critique*, the

orientations of an emergent *mass intellectuality* were synthesized against the constraints of bureaucratic and Fordist work: subjects' involvement in the organisation has to be freed from authoritarianism and preserve enough autonomy to ensure that personal self-realisation contributes to the fulfilment of collective goals. The *artistic critique* not only rendered tight organisational control outdated and intolerable, but also constituted a new normative basis for work performed in the name of intellectual ideals. Hence, the *critique* is also directed against the elevation of profit as predominant – and admittedly not very inspiring – motivation for work¹⁵.

The reorganisation of the relations of production since the 1980s integrated the *artistic critique*: firms and organisations re-engaged workers by granting them more autonomy, responsibility and recognising their qualifications. In exchange, a regime of flexible work was imposed by transferring the burden of uncertainty onto wage-earners and personally committing them to put their personal qualities at the service of organisational goals, beyond labour times. Working productivity is then enhanced by eroding working security (Toscano, 2013) and internalising organisational discipline as self-control – reducing supervision costs for that matter (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007). In sum, the recuperation of the *artistic critique* into what Boltanski and Chiapello call the *new spirit of capitalism* entailed 'a significant increase in the intensity of work for an equivalent wage' (p.245). In turn, demands for creativity and authenticity are also derived to the realm of consumption.

By the same token, Lazzarato's (1996) concept of *immaterial labour* also stresses the autonomy and creativity of workers as conditions to produce the cultural content of commodities. As part of a general re-definition of the function of intellectuals in production – that follows from their extended presence in society – more autonomy and creativity are then necessary to incorporate the skills, knowledge and even the consumption preferences (taste, fashion, public opinion, etc.) that produce the self-valorisation of labour. Workers are no longer required to behave like 'machines', but to become 'subjects', capable of communication, decision-making and self-management, all of which results in the overcoming of the traditional separation between design and execution, consumption and production, and labour and creativity in the productive process. Eventually, such an expansion of the workers' subjectivity entails that the uses of intellectual labour

¹⁵ Inglehart (1990) provides a parallel to this discussion: students, young professionals, managers, civil servants and technocrats have a tendency towards post-materialist values, prioritising autonomy, solidarity and democracy before 'materialist' concerns about security and economic achievement. His research shows these groups 'favor equality, [but] they are reluctant to use the state to bring it about... [a] possible way out of this dilemma might be through decentralizing the state' (p.304).

also *exceed* the valorisation of capital. In this sense, Virno (2004) considers that the political uses of such an excess of autonomy of intellectual labour tend to be captured by the state.

3.3.2. Neoliberal State Power

Neoliberal state power resides in the *de-institutionalisation* of the corporatist representation of the working class. Rather than decentralising its power and resources (Castells, 2010, p.334), the neoliberal state has decentralised the institutions of civil society that used to mediate the state, like political parties and unions. Therefore, in neoliberalism, 'not the State, but civil society has withered away!' (Hardt and Negri, 1994, p.258). At the same time, instead of the crisis of welfare states resulting in shrunken states, within neoliberalism the state has expanded continuously, reinforcing its authority on social and economic intervention. For sure, the orientations of state power change dramatically once its productive function is abandoned. But again, this does not mean the withdrawal of the state as such, since subsidiary, regulative and representation functions expand in exchange for the productive ones. In this context, private markets are spawned to provide for services hitherto attributed to the state, which entails that the state function of social integration is restricted to compensate for the limits or failures of market distribution.

The exclusion of the 'category' labour and of the productive functions from the direction of state power suggests the comeback of the traditional Marxist notion of the state as external (unproductive) instrument of capitalist interest. In fact, to secure the function of capital accumulation, the state ensures the continuity of economic performance within a global division of labour that falls out of its control, limiting the room of manoeuvre for economic policy to the maintaining of favourable conditions of competitiveness (Castells, 2010, p.316; Touraine, 2000, p.5). Therefore, as the neoliberal state no longer organises the relations of production, it appears as a parasitic organisation altogether (Hardt and Negri, 1994, p.383), separated from the autonomous capacities of self-valorisation of mass intellectual labour vis-à-vis capital. The relative autonomy of the state is consequentially limited to the sphere of the market and to the regulation and representation of values already in circulation (p.304).

3.3.3. New Public Management, Post-Professions, Post-Bureaucracies

The movement away from the *Fordist* organisation was also triggered by technological advances to estimate changes of demand in real time, which made Fordist planning – oriented to create that demand – redundant. Organisations had to flexibilise their structures and incorporate information about performance in order to react more effectively to the diversified clients' needs (Murray, 1993 and 1988). In parallel, managerial practices and standards of efficiency adopted from

the market to the state, under the label of *New Public Management (NPM)*, transformed the *administrative relations of production*. In this context, post-professions and post-bureaucracies emerge as reciprocal trends of the autonomisation of intellectual work within organisations.

Sociology (Lipsky, 1980), policy-making (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993) and management (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973) scholars had already demonstrated that administrators and street-level bureaucrats anyway operate with significant discretion beyond the rules of organisations. Therefore, the generalisation of such autonomy as constitutive of flexible post-bureaucracies means to attach its operation and outcomes to greater amounts of uncertainty and performance (Harney, 2002; Hummel, 2008). In these conditions, only the massification of post-professional work would provide the skills (Albo, 1993), governance (Hoggett, 2005), inventiveness (Murray, 1993; Goodsell, 2005), networks (Clegg, 2003), and representativeness (Panitch, 1993) that ensure overall organisational efficacy. We discuss these trends in three points: **[a]** New Public Management, **[b]** post-professions and **[c]** post-bureaucracies.

[a] The NPM resorts to abstract measurements to control and incentive bureaucratic work towards goals of efficiency and accountability (Hood, 1991). Along these lines, the NPM changes the focus of organisational productivity from the administrative processes (*ritualism*) to results of professional performance. By importing business practices into public services, NPM also seeks to slow down public spending, making organisations more competitive within the framework of neoliberal states. But the resultant *administrative relations of production* are not necessarily more efficient for that matter, although for sure are re-organised for the managerial control of professional autonomy. In effect, the orientation of the NPM towards the maximisation of output – *doing more for less* – has been charged with the erosion of both the moral value attributed to traditional bureaucracies (Olsen, 2005; Hoggett, 2005) and the non-standardisable quality of professional performance (Le Bianic, 2011).

[b] The massification of professional work within bureaucracies entails a degree of conflict between professionalism and bureaucratic supervision (Marshall, 1939; Davies, 1983). While the professional bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1979) contained this conflict by remaining outside of the bureaucratic career, the NPM entails the subsumption of all professional work, including professionals of first-line as well as professional bureaucracies, by means of measurable activities and goals (Dominelli and Hoogvelt, 1996); foreign managerial controls (Bezes and Demazière, 2011); internalisation of external standards (Le Bianic, 2011) and control of individual performance (Evetts, 2011). Therefore, although NPM operates upon the professionals' autonomy and self-regulation, it poses a threat to professional autonomy itself.

The NPM remains an intrinsic professional phenomenon as the imposition of managerial controls to professional work is undertaken by some professions over others. While some professions are equipped to exert managerial authority, other kinds of professionalism are subordinated to these orientations while, in the manner of *organic intellectuals*, its resources remain linked to the subaltern targets of social policy. Still, the massification of professional work for tasks of political administration entails the combination of specialised knowledge and managerial controls to variable extents in each case. By this token, new forms of *organisational* (Evetts, 2011 and 2013) and *hybrid* professionalism (Noordegraaf, 2015) internalise professional and managerial orientations in one single form of professional work. Similarly, but with a more political feel, the *post-profession* emerges from conditions of *mass intellectuality*, in which professional knowledge ‘no longer suffices’ (Martin, 2011, p.73) to enable effective professional autonomy. Hence, the *post-profession* has to undertake political performance to ensure its impact in organisational contexts and retain the control on its own political concerns – otherwise in the hands of managers alone. Thereby, post-professionalism not only integrates specialised knowledge with organisational control, but also aligns political interests with the orientations of professional work. Our own take on *public professionalism* is tributary of the notions of hybrid and post-professionalism, particularly of the latter as it also connects the political orientations and performance of professional workers with their socialisation in higher education.

[c] The image of the *post-bureaucracy* synthesises the post-structuralist hypotheses on the organisation of the state. It depicts the dilution of bureaucratic hierarchies into horizontal and flexible networks (Reed, 2005; Castells, 2010), cutting across the public and the private sectors (Salaman, 2005) and democratising the public administration by means of citizens’ participation. In this context, professionals are invoked to secure the coherence of state policy implemented through ‘dispersed public action’ (Goodsell, 2005, p.39).

The critical management approach has studied the experience of post-bureaucracies focusing on the double-edged dynamic of professional autonomy. On the one hand, post-bureaucracies operate as *self-management* (Lopdrup-Hjorth et al., 2011), which not only involves instrumental roles, but also non-instrumental uses of knowledge for the production of meaning (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p.63). As Harney narrates his experience at the Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat, bureaucratic work there ‘was cultural work, linguistic work, and the work of pleasure’ (2002, p.20). Since state work involved such a personal commitment with the ends this Secretariat represents, professionals assumed the political and managerial responsibility for the *ethical state* (2002, pp.64-65). But, on the other hand, as post-bureaucracies abolish the Weberian separation between the official and the office (Maravelias, 2003), *self-management* involves the internalisation

of the anxiety for constantly acting, taking initiatives, being motivated, healthy, self-disciplined, and working overtime to fulfil personal and organisational goals (Maravelias, 2011). With the use of performance indicators, this anxiety also fuels competition among peers in work.

Eventually, the autonomous rationality of the bureaucracy is transferred to the autonomy of its professional workers. But the question remains about the orientations and effects that post-professional work incorporates into the post-bureaucracy and the direction of policy implementation.

Bourdieu (1994) attributes bureaucratic work with the capacity for production of meaning (communication, classifications, codes, etc.) and the monopoly of *symbolic* violence, which combined generate the *effect of universality* of the state. Therefore, as the most general assumption of the post-structuralist perspectives, the issue of the *relative organisational autonomy* of the state appears as a series of abstract representations embedded in the instrumental practices of bureaucratic work. Mitchell's (1999) influential dissertation on 'the state effect' (1999) reinforces the point as he also frames the *illusion* of state autonomy as the effect of state work. Admittedly Mitchell was inspired by Foucault in this regard, for whom: 'the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think' (1991, p.103). The *effect* of autonomy is thus a consequence of mundane practices carried out within the state. So, one is left wondering what is it contained in state practices, and within the state workers who undertake them, that produces such a metaphysical appearance of autonomy, universality and legitimacy. Mitchell appeals to the no less metaphysical Foucauldian notion of *disciplinary powers*. Foucault adds the idea of *governmentality*, as the knowledge and method to govern objectified relations with the population and the economy in which the autonomous 'reason of the state' is deposited. With his concept of *habitus*, Bourdieu (1994) contributes with more concrete content to interpret the state practices by resorting to the reproduction – typically in elite institutions – of categories of thought and action which, like neutrality or disinterestedness, enable bureaucrats to project the *effect of universality* in the public administration. But beyond these transcendental logics, we cannot find substantive orientations that speak for the directions in which professionals influence the autonomy of the state.

Our approach to the political role and ideological effectiveness of a *mass intellectuality* within the state is constructed upon the whole theoretical discussion given in this chapter. It is the succession of the theoretical perspectives, diachronically moving from liberal to neoliberal state

formations, that illustrates the shift in the autonomous rationality of the state towards the enlargement and autonomisation of intellectual work. At the same time, in synchronic fashion, the shifts of state autonomy converge in the organisation of the bureaucracy, integrating and opposing diverse rationalities therein. The *classical framework* remains as the basic rationality of the bureaucracy, although it is confronted by the massification of professional knowledge from outside the bureaucratic career. Likewise, in spite of the flexibilisation of bureaucratic discipline and the incentives to professional performance might ameliorate the effect of *ritualism*, still the tension between formal rules and substantive ends re-emerges under managerial controls imposed on professional state work. Along these lines, the Marxist approaches made the most decisive contribution to our theoretical position on the problem of state autonomy, in the sense that the organisation of the state, its own internal rationality, is linked to social and political interests at its basis. Therefore, in spite of the fact that neoliberal states abandon the productive function and the representation of the working classes, we cannot neglect the organic links the state maintains with dominant and subaltern interests, constituting the basis of power upon which state policy is embedded. Furthermore, the Marxist idea of autonomy as the organisational inertia that results from the historic crystallisation of power relations upon the state apparatus reaffirms our understanding of the bureaucracy by the synchronic consideration of the continuities and breaks among theoretical approaches.

From the post-structuralist perspective, we confirm the displacement of state autonomy from the framework of bureaucratic rules to the emancipation of state work. Thereby, the state seems to rely more on the autonomous orientations of a *mass of intellectuality*, built upon their previous socialisation, than in the formal rationality of the bureaucracy. Moreover, in conditions of *mass intellectuality* not only the view of the state as a monopoly of intellectual labour is outdated, but also the focus on state elites as the source of policy effectiveness is rendered incomplete. As the sources of state autonomy are externalised to the knowledge and interests of a *mass* of professional state workers, the socialisation of this group into *public professionalism* – as we have called the orientation towards political influence through professional work – becomes a significant variable to interpret the effects of state autonomy and the influence on the direction of state policy. Furthermore, as such a political socialisation takes place in the university system, and so it precedes the incorporation into the state, its effects also exceed the functional insertion in the bureaucracy, making the state a particular case of the broader orientations and roles the *mass intellectuality* assumes in society.

But in conformity to our theoretical synthesis, we do not buy the post-structuralist approach in its entirety. Particularly, we take a sceptical stance towards the image of the post-bureaucracy,

since it often overlooks the organic links with the social structure. The social and political interests that predominate in the neoliberal state – in the wake of the exclusion of the productive function from state policy and the imposition of the NPM as the yardstick of state work – are not abstract, but express concrete affinities between professional work and the internal organisation and political direction of the state. Likewise, the idea of *mass intellectuality* as abstract *living knowledge*, which in some point is co-opted by the public administration (Virno, 2004), overlooks the political orientations and links with social and class interests it brings to the organisation of the state. In this point, we return to the structuralist perspective – putting post-structuralist approaches *back on their feet* – by reaffirming the relation between state apparatus and state power. As Therborn concludes from his reading of Wright (1993): ‘what is needed is... a theoretical orientation... that provides a systematic understanding of the relationship of social structure to the internal organizational processes of the state’ (2008, p.33). From our perspective, the *public professionalism* reproduced in the university system links the *mass intellectuality* to the social structure, differentiating the roles that configure the autonomous organisation of the state.

The kind of autonomy that professionals exert in the state, and their influence on state policy, are necessary questions, but which rarely are answered directly. By default, this autonomy is attributed to a kind of *bureaucratic politics*, by means of which bureaucrats seek to fulfil their vested interests within the spaces opened up within the *classical framework* (Suleiman, 1984; Beetham, 1987; Lipsky, 1980; Esping-Andersen, 1998; Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993; Oszlak, 2005). For sure, *bureaucratic politics* is no false explanation of state autonomy, but it is an incomplete one. Our approach assumes the politicisation of the *mass intellectuality* in the state beyond vested interests, in accordance with ideals of knowledge and professionalism. As researched by the *sociology of professions*, variants of professionalism are empirically attached to differentiated roles and political affinities in the state (Brint, 1994).

To empirically interpret the effect of *public professionalism* in configuring the autonomy of the state, we revisit the Miliband-Poulantzas debate (1972) on the *problem of bureaucracy* for the conditions of *mass intellectuality*. As noted, in this debate Poulantzas critiqued Miliband for attributing the capitalist character of the state to the class situation, political socialisation and personal contacts of the elites that occupy the state. In Poulantzas’ perspective, the composition of the bureaucracy explains nothing about the autonomy and direction of the state, which is already given by the unity of the bureaucracy within its capitalist framework. But, as argued, Poulantzas eventually gave more attention to the political significance of the class affiliation of the bureaucracy, particularly as he saw that the politicisation of its petty-bourgeois segments with the popular struggles might unleash changes on the direction state power, away from the dominant classes. In

our perspective, in conditions of *mass intellectuality*, the social and professional composition of the state bureaucracy might be even more relevant. In the first place, as researched in Chapter Two, the massification of higher education produces professional roles for segmented social origins, which then articulate a particular class affiliation, with ideals of professionalism and a certain political performance, all of which conforms specific roles and functions within the state. Subsequently, as professional work is massified in the state, the political uses of knowledge are no longer a prerogative of state elites, but are disseminated towards the lower segments of the public administration too, making possible the articulation of *public professionalism* with subaltern interests at the basis of the state. Newer functions of the neoliberal state fit well with what Poulantzas (2014) identified as *centres of resistance*, which represent ‘wrongly called *secondary struggles*’ (gender, ecology, ethnicity, etc.) in the public administration, and where a kind of politically engaged *professionalism* prevails (Brint, 1994). In total, the professional configuration of the bureaucracy along with political changes tells much about how the autonomous organisation of the state is linked to the social and political interest at its basis of power. By the same token, the professional composition of the bureaucracy also expresses the ideological efficacy of the universities, kinds of knowledge and variants of *public professionalism* in terms of the dominant and subordinated positions they occupy in the state.

By relating the professional composition of the state to the university system that produced it in the first place, we bring the state back into the social structure. In the next two chapters, we thus adopt a structuralist (Marxist and Post-Marxist) stance, to represent the political affinities of professions and universities within the state and the organic links with its basis of power. While in Chapter Four we look at the historic role of professions in the construction of state autonomy and the mobilisation of class interests therein, in Chapter Five we illustrate the reconfiguration of its professional composition along with political changes. In Chapter Six we move onto a post-structuralist focus on the political performance of professional work, grounded on the perspective of professional state workers themselves, to generate an empirical view on the efficacy of *public professionalism* to produce *effects* of state autonomy, beyond the rules of the organisation and also beyond the technocratic elites.

Chapter Four

The Labour of State Transformations: Public Professionals and Political Process

Our theoretical discussion – on how bureaucratic autonomy is transferred to the knowledge and interests of professional state workers – is taken to the case of the Chilean state. It will be noted that the historic changes in the Chilean state, and the disciplinary and political discussions that problematised them at the respective times, correspond quite well to the sequence of approaches that succeeded in the theoretical discussion from the previous chapter, diachronically advancing from the Weberian model to functionalism, Marxism, neo-institutionalism, and post-structuralism.

The labour of what we have called *public professionals* in the state since the 1930s shows the effect of specialised knowledge in configuring successive *moments of state autonomy* that depart from the *Weberian classical model*. As Therborn stressed ‘that different types of class relations and of class power generate corresponding forms of state organization’ (2008, p.35), the work of *public professionals* in shaping the organisational rationality of the state is both expressive of their own ideals of knowledge and professionalism as well as of the class and political interests struggling to impose the direction of state power.

Focusing on the recent transformations of the neoliberal state in Chile, the effects of the massification of professional work upon this new stage of autonomy are also addressed. As class interests are transformed at the basis of state power, disarticulating the political organisation of the workers and popular classes, the bureaucracy is reshaped to meet diversified markets and fragmented social identities. In this framework, the massification of intellectual labour entails changes towards a post-bureaucratic administration. The exponential growth of professional labour within the public administration is made possible through flexible and precarious state work, enabling the incorporation of specialised knowledge contingently to policy changes. At the same time, new *administrative relations of production* promote greater subjective involvement of professional state workers to ensure the responsiveness of the bureaucracy before diversified demands. As our thesis in this chapter, we sustain that the rationality of state autonomy is configured by means of *policy changes undertaken through the incorporation of professionals that represent the interests at the basis of the state power. A mass intellectuality today mediates between state apparatus and state power.*

In this chapter we discuss: first, the suitability of the concept of state autonomy to speak about the organisation of the Chilean state; second, the work of *public professionals* in state transformations from 1930 to 2010, and; third, the neoliberal transformation of the *administrative relations of production* of the state and the massification of professional labour since 1995.

4.1. State Autonomy in Chile and Latin America

To assess the suitability of the very concept of state autonomy for our empirical case, we discuss two perspectives about state autonomy in Chile and Latin America. The first retrieves the work of the Bolivian sociologist René Zavaleta, who adapted the Poulantzas-Miliband debate for the Latin American context. The second draws in the Bourdieusian work of Dezalay and Garth on the role of knowledge and power networks in the construction of Latin American states. Both views articulate dialectic interpretations about the processes that underlie the concept of state autonomy, rejecting mechanical explanations from the outset.

4.1.1. State Autonomy in Latin America

The condition of state autonomy is not foreign to Latin American states but inherited from the bureaucracy of the colonial rule, which precedes the organisation of national societies (Faletto, 1993; Garretón, 2006; Boeninger, 2007). Upon this irrevocable legacy, Zavaleta – among other sociologists of his generation – analysed the variable degrees in which Latin American states organised as objective and autonomous structures. Crucial in that respect was the articulation of developmental states – i.e. the Latin American version of the interventionist state – since the 1930s, as it entailed the progressive attainment of social entitlements by the subordinated classes, extending the organic links of the state beyond the dominant classes. As discussed by the sociological field, the condition of state autonomy was then taken to another level of organisational agency and articulation of class power. Developmental states compensated for the lack of industrial output of the domestic bourgeoisie, organising capitalist accumulation and engendering a middle stratum of administrators in the process. In so doing, the state promoted the organisation of social and political actors under its developmental project, consolidating its hegemony over civil society (Lechner, 1977; Touraine, 1987; Faletto, 1989; Larraín, 2008).

For this context, Zavaleta attempted a synthesis of the theoretical positions of the Poulantzas-Miliband debate (1972). In his view, Latin American states conform a compound reality between moments of structural autonomy and instrumental occupation/colonisation. Admittedly, the moment of structural autonomy corresponds to a superior stage of state development. According to Zavaleta's discussant, Tapia-Mealla (2002), the latter does not mean that an instrumentalist approach is more convenient to explain underdeveloped Latin American states, whereas structuralist approaches are more suitable to speak about its European counterparts. Zavaleta's point is, instead, that structural and instrumental perspectives of the state do not constitute definitive frameworks but different moments, which conditions are differentiated in

accordance to the specificities of the respective states and so cannot be taken for granted – especially for tactical purposes (Zavaleta, 1990).

For Zavaleta, the conditions for state autonomy depend on the degree in which economic surplus is appropriated for the development of state structures, particularly of a rational bureaucracy as the knowing subject of the state. State autonomy then realises through a bureaucracy that, by virtue of its organic links with social classes, is capable to turn society into its object, producing strategic knowledge, translating particular interests into policy outcomes and articulating state power in the process. Zavaleta sustains that in Latin America, Chile is the country that has fulfilled these conditions to the largest extent. His explanation of Chile's supremacy in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) pointed to the fact that the adversary countries of Bolivia and Peru had not yet developed the administrative capacity to mobilise their respective national societies, failing to obtain the necessary support for the war (Tapia-Mealla, 2002, p.340). Therefore, differences related to the integration between state and civil society, and not differences of military capacity, explain the outcome of this war. For Zavaleta, there is a dogma of the state in Chile (1990, p.179), which is why during most of the twentieth century, political mobilisation had been contained by the state. Indeed, there is a common sense that the state constitutes the main institution in the country, pervading the public sphere and exerting inexorable political hegemony for most of the twentieth century (UNDP, 2002). The uncontested predominance of the state in the Chilean experience – where 'the state is all and society not so much' (Zavaleta, 1990, p.191) – contrasted with the Argentinean case, characterised by a strong civil society but where the state only acquired certain autonomy over the latter by negating it, in Bonapartist fashion (Tapia-Mealla, 2002, p.210).

In turn, the moments of instrumental occupation of the state, typically undertaken by members of new classes in the public administration, reshape bureaucratic structures. Interestingly, as Poulantzas' disregarded that the occupation of the bureaucracy by members of subordinate classes would change the capitalist direction of the state, he made an exception for developmental states, since the bureaucracy there exceptionally acquired the economic and political power of a class within the state:

These economic functions [of the state] have sometimes appeared capable of attributing to the bureaucracy (in certain cases) a specific place in the relations of production... A good example is the case of the *state bourgeoisie* in certain developing countries: the bureaucracy may, through the state, establish a specific place for itself in the existing relations of production, or even in the not-yet-existing relations of production (1978, p.334).

In Latin America, the occupation of the state by the middle classes was decisive in enabling them to forge an economic base of their own and so to impose politically at the basis of state power

(Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). In the Chilean case, such an occupation went hand in hand with the institutionalisation of a class-based party system, that provided the political basis of the developmental state (Lechner, 1977). Notably, upon such a structure of political representation, collective identities and organisations (unions, students, *pobladores*, peasants, etc.) were articulated, linking their interests and orientations to the state-led developmental process (Garretón, 2002).

However, inasmuch as the developmental state crystallised moments of bureaucratic autonomy with instrumental occupation, its organisation was increasingly contradicted from within (Faletto, 1989). Indeed, the *dogma* of the Chilean state showed its harshest face in 1973: while the advance of the left posed a threat of rebellion against the state itself, the ruthless reaction came from 'its repressive guarantee, which is the army' (Zavaleta, 1990, p.190). With the dictatorship that followed, the state amputated its developmental functions, retreating to securing its longstanding ascendancy on the national identity by enforcing a background of strong authority and public order (UNDP, 2002; Salazar et al., 2014). The point of state autonomy is made: taking over the state apparatus is not enough to change its power away from the dominant classes (cf. Althusser, 2014; Poulantzas, 2014; Therborn, 2008).

4.1.2. Knowledge, Networks and Elites in Latin American States

Dezalay and Garth (2002) looked at the transformations of Latin American states – Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico – from the perspective of its strategic occupation by professional elites. The observation: 'it is clear that the people who serve developmental states... do not have the same profile as those who serve the neoliberal democracies' (p.17) turns into a variable to explain the direction of state power: 'law is at the core of the processes that structure, produce, and reproduce the field of power' (p.5). In this perspective, the direction of state power derives from the knowledge of its elites and the political orientations they mobilise from international networks of universities, funding institutions and 'imperial' geopolitical crusades.

Dezalay and Garth's analysis also differentiates moments of autonomy and occupation of the state apparatus. While their approach focuses on the moments of occupation, they also acknowledge that, in order to be effective, such occupation has to engage with the established rationality of the state. Therefore, it is not just a matter of taking over the state in a direct fashion, as an exercise of pure power. A dynamic concept of state autonomy emerges when its occupation has to be done by means of specialised knowledge and academic networks. Like Zavaleta, Dezalay and Garth see crucial differences among the studied countries on this regard: 'with no established state institutions, there was nothing in Argentina to seize except political power. Entry into the state,

therefore, came only from playing politics and from becoming sources of patronage for Argentine-style camarillas' (p.41). For Chile, conversely, influencing state power demanded interventions at the universities that formed the established and emergent state elites.

The starting point of the analysis was placed in the rule of the gentlemen lawyers. These professionals represented 'a kind of aristocratic ideal of government' (p.18), well attuned to the formal quality of the liberal state, and expressive of the rationalistic leadership of the most influential sectors of the middle-class, particularly when based in the prestige of the School of Law of the Universidad de Chile. Consequently, interventions in state power had to aim to the School of Law as well. Since the 1950s, the Ford Foundation and the U.S. Agency for International Development – as part of the U.S. anti-communist policy for Latin America – implemented an encompassing framework to export legal and economic knowledge from American universities in order to diversify the reformist capacities of domestic state elites. Two schemes of post-graduate funding spawned from this initiative: the 'Law Project' for Law Schools and the 'Chile Project' for economists. In the aftermath, the Chile Project outlived the Law Project, surely for the reluctance of the gentlemen lawyers, with their vested interest in the traditional establishment, to embrace the knowledge of social engineering. Consequentially, lawyers progressively lost terrain before the ascendance of economists¹⁶ and ended up representing an obstacle to the advance of the developmental bureaucracy (cf. Therborn, 2008).

Sociology also developed with the support of international cooperation during the 1960s. Again, with the aim of diversifying the knowledge of reformism and encouraging competition among professions in the state, the Ford Foundation – and other sources like the Rockefeller Foundation, UNESCO and the Organization of American States – supported the professionalisation of sociology to replicate the functionalist North American model. The emergence of sociology fitted perfectly with the state's need of personnel to articulate the reformist agenda with the urban proletariat and the peasants (Brunner, 1988). However, as the developmental process led to the overpoliticisation of the state: 'Chile and its expertises began to be part of the political explosion' (Dezalay and Garth, 2002, p.115). The authors also charged the international academic networks as the cause of the politicisation of state professionals: 'the [Ford] foundation initiatives kicked off a process of professionalization of militant activism that further politicization only served to accelerate' (p.127).

With the military coup, sociology schools were closed and most of its politically active practitioners persecuted (Puryear, 1994; point 2.2.1. above). Consequently, economists ended up reigning alone on the technocratic cusp of the state. The most effective outcome of the Chile Project

¹⁶ 'The number of economists in Chile rose from around 120 at the beginning of the 1960s to more than seven hundred by 1970' (Dezalay and Garth, 2002, p.113).

then was a batch of radical monetarist economists, the *Chicago Boys*, mostly composed by alumni from the Universidad Católica who, within an agreement of cooperation with the Chicago School of Economics from 1956, completed graduate studies under the supervision of notorious neoclassical economists. As the *Chicago Boys* resorted to formalized mathematical knowledge, and excluded other knowledge from economic policy, the question of development was reduced to a concern about economic growth (Dezalay and Garth, 2002, p.74). Thanks to the laboratory-like conditions imposed by the dictatorship, the *Chicago Boys* passed into history as the precursors of neoliberalism, setting the example to follow for other neoliberal transformations carried out 'in Portugal and Spain and eventually the United States and Great Britain' (p.82) and increasing international influence of the University of Chicago for that matter.

During the military dictatorship, interventions targeting intellectual elites continued. The Ford Foundation redirected its economic support to the defence of human rights, turned into international concern in the wake of the political repression in the country. Lawyers again appeared in the picture, but with different clothes; a new type of *public interest lawyer* achieved predominance by defending those repressed by the regime. Again, the Chilean state, and the struggles directed against it, provided an exemplary case which international organisations, like Amnesty International, used as a platform to increase their global reputation.

Dezalay and Garth observe a final shift with the emergence of the *technopol*, as the heir of the *Chicago Boys* but with the political sensibility to ensure the continuity of the neoliberal legacy under new democratic conditions. By acknowledging human rights and criticising the *Chicago Boys'* alliance with authoritarianism, the *technopols* refurbished the neoliberal state with the motto: 'growth with equity'. Orbiting around the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, *technopols* formed a new epistemic community of advisers, consultants and administrators (Castells, 2010; Huber and Stephens, 2005; Silva, 2004; Van Dijck, 1998; Centeno, 1994, Haas, 1992) that advocated neoliberal reforms of second generation on state capacity, accountability and stability. As the *technopols* tied global financial integration and economic growth to the efficacy of democratic institutions, Chile became an international model of 'liberal democracy' (Dezalay and Garth, 2002, p.141).

In sum, both Zavaleta and Dezalay and Garth interpret the autonomous organisation of the Chilean state within the Latin American context. While Zavaleta frames the autonomy of the state within the instrumental rationality of the bureaucracy (*classical framework*), Dezalay and Garth go further to show how, in a time span of fifty years, the rationality of state autonomy changed several times due to its strategic occupation by dominant professional orientations. However, the limited focus of Dezalay and Garth on state elites obscures the perspective on the social basis of the state,

hence the excessive weight given to the international networks in the politicisation of state professionals. In the next point, we take into account the organic links of the knowledge and professional work of the state with the social classes that propel its transformations.

4.2. The Labour of State Transformations

The rationality of state autonomy is constructed in conformity to the intellectual ideals and the class and political interests that *public professionals* represent in the state. *Public professionals* are not agents for themselves alone. Their historic labour in the transformation of the state consists in providing the technical means and intellectual leadership to carry out state policy in the name of interests linked to the dominant and subordinated directions of the political process.

Since the articulation of the developmental state – departing from the traditional bureaucracy – three *moments* of state autonomy have been associated with predominant forms of professionalism: the developmental progressive bureaucracy; the neoliberal authoritarian technocracy and; the technocratic orientations of the cadres and technopols of the post-dictatorship.

In this point, the literature reflects the sociological discussions on the state given at each period, in correspondence, as suggested above, to the sequence of approaches from the theoretical discussion in the previous chapter. While the analysis of the developmental bureaucracy synthesises elements of functionalism (e.g. Parrish, 1971; Cleaves, 1974; López-Pintor, 1975) with Marxism (e.g. Petras, 1969; Faletto, 1981) – with the Weberian model in the background –, the neoliberal transformations under Pinochet’s dictatorship are interpreted by institutionalist discussions (e.g. O’Donnell, 1978; Stepan, 1985; Silva, 1996). Last, approaches on technocratic state elites predominate for the period of post-dictatorship (e.g. Puryear, 1994; Dezalay and Garth, 2002; Silva, 1991; Joignant, 2011). Some of these approaches also contribute with historic insights and interpretative elements (e.g. Silva, 2008; Garretón, 2013, Salazar et al., 2014) that enabled us to articulate the *longue durée* perspective on the *public professionalism* of the state.

4.2.1. Developmental Bureaucracy (1938-1973)

The labour of *public professionals* at the developmental state was the form in which the interests of the popular, middle and industrialist classes were organically represented according to the technical and political imperatives of the developmental process. The increasingly professionalised bureaucracy provided a continuous background that contained social mobilisation, although towards the end of this cycle, the politicisation of the developmental state also affected the bureaucracy itself. The process of the developmental bureaucracy is addressed in three parts: [a]

the internal determinations of professional expansion; **[b]** the trends of functional differentiation, and; **[c]** the politicisation of its personnel.

[a] The expansion of the developmental state was internally regulated by a constellation of interests and mechanisms. First, the middle-class had privileged access to the state bureaucracy, as only ones that met the entry requirements: complete secondary school for the administrative occupations and higher education for the professional ones¹⁷.

Second, a multiparty structure facilitated the political patronage upon the state, with each party seizing a portion of the bureaucracy. The lack of a formal recruitment system contributed to configure this variant of the *spoils-system*, which was anyway functional for the stability of the state (Cleaves, 1974; Petras, 1969; Parrish, 1971; Hopkins, 2002; Faletto, 1981).

Third, the professional bureaucracies of social services and technical functions were controlled by the respective professional associations (health professionals, teachers, engineers, architects, etc.), which had among its prerogatives allowing only affiliated members to work for the state. Hence, jurisdictional conflicts among professional associations animated a great deal of the unavoidable effect of bureaucratic politics (Cleaves, 1974)¹⁸.

Last, as the university system was predominantly public, the Universidad de Chile – then the main university of the country – also functioned as a regulator of the professional expansion of the civil service (INSORA, 1966). Professional identities transformed the sources of solidarity of the public administration accordingly: ‘surveys of professionals within public agencies confirm the proposition that loyalty to the profession took precedence over loyalty to the institution’ (Valenzuela, 1984, p.256).

[b] The expansion of the bureaucracy took place by the decentralisation of a modern sector of autonomous developmental agencies from the *traditional* centralised ministries. As a process of functional differentiation, it produced a *dual structure* of the state. On the one hand, the decentralized agencies advanced key developmental policies on industrialisation, social planning, agrarian reform, education, popular promotion and housing, among others¹⁹. With the incorporation of specialised technical and political roles for professional work, the modern sector conformed

¹⁷ 75% of state professionals identified themselves with the middle-class (Petras, 1969, p.291).

¹⁸ Occupational conflicts between architects and engineers underpinned the creation of the Ministry of Housing in 1964, as an offspring of the Ministry of Public Works. Architects controlled the new ministry, escaping from subordination to engineers at the Ministry of Public Works. Then, the sanitary engineers refused to move to the Ministry of Housing, calling for the intervention of their professional association (*Instituto de Ingenieros*) to protect them from falling under the architects’ jurisdiction (Cleaves, 1974, pp.154-167).

¹⁹ By 1962, 44% of public employees were working at the decentralized bureaucracies (INSORA, 1966).

alternative centres of power of the developmental state. On the other hand, the traditional bureaucracy was seen as ‘an unwanted remnant of the oligarchic order’ (Silva, 2008, p.75).

In 1939, the decentralised state agency CORFO was created to implement industrial policy, installing numerous state industries in the strategic economies of oil, power, steel, transportation, alimentation, among others. Through CORFO, industrial sectors were represented in state policy (Silva, 1996), joining the Institute of Engineers of Chile (professional association) with a chair on the directive board. The engineers from the Universidad de Chile that staffed CORFO worked with wide autonomy, without interference from the executive, to put forward a national plan of industrialisation, overseeing the articulation of the productive branches. According to Cavarozzi, ‘CORFO engineers... were... more... convinced of the necessity and convenience of industrial development than Chile’s industrialists themselves... they also seem to have provided the “industrializing ethos” that the industrial bourgeoisie was clearly unable to articulate by itself’ (cited in Silva, 2008, p.98). For Salazar et al. (2014), engineers at CORFO – and also at the highest positions of the public administration, manufacturing industry, commerce and railways – spawned a technocratic ideology of industrialisation, with the state mediating a *virtuous* relation between productive factors and distribution mechanisms. In Poulantzian fashion, these professionals served *as class-in-charge*, representing the industrial bourgeoisie at the developmental state. Hence, when the right-wing government of Alessandri (1958-1964) broke the engineers’ predominance at CORFO by replacing the head of this agency with a businessman, the autonomy of CORFO was compromised, politicising industrial policy altogether. In other words, as the *class-in-charge* is replaced by the dominant class in the state, political crises directly reach the centre of state power.

Eventually, the virtuous circle between production and distribution advanced by CORFO engineers was damaged by escalating inflation and relatively stagnant industrial output. Keynesian economists and sociologists then advocated for structural reforms of the developmental state. Rather than representing the interest of a specific class fraction – in the way engineers represented the industrialist bourgeoisie – these professionals committed to fulfil the conditions of capitalist accumulation as a whole (cf. Offe 1993). On their recommendation, since Frei-Montalva’s government (1964-1970), inflation was used as a mechanism to realign accumulation and redistribution, counting on the cyclical mobilisation of organised labour to secure wage increases (Salazar et al., 2014), but configuring an increasingly delicate political balance for that matter. Structural reforms that would eradicate the traditional obstacles to the modern economy were thus fundamental to recover productivity, further fostering administrative decentralisation. By this token, a process of agrarian reform – i.e. expropriation and redistribution of latifundium – was radicalised to increase the productivity of the land and counteract inflation in support of industrialisation. Two

decentralised agencies, the Corporation of the Agrarian Reform (CORA) and the National Institute for Agricultural Development (INDAP), were created to that effect. The first cohorts of sociologists in the country found in these agencies a privileged space to combine professional practice with militant participation in the reforms (Brunner, 1988). Thus, professionals of social sciences and also educators fulfilled a political role that the technocratic leadership was unable to satisfy.

As put by Salazar et al. (2014, p.160), a shift in the rationality of the developmental state was observed from industrial engineering to social engineering. The acceleration of land expropriation was buttressed with a strategy of social and political mobilisation of the peasant (Parrish, 1971). To that end, a method of *popular promotion* – developed from the reception of the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church by the school of sociology of the Catholic University (Silva, 2008) – sought to tackle social exclusion by combining redistributive policy with the recognition and mobilisation of the targeted groups as political actors. It was actually by looking at the methods for alphabetising peasants developed by a functionary of INDAP within this framework that Paulo Freire developed his *critical pedagogy* (1975)²⁰. *Popular promotion* fitted well with the Christian Democrats' reformism, which sought to implement structural transformations capable of containing social mobilisation, in corporatist fashion. Architects from the decentralised agency CORHABIT (Corporation of Housing Services) also resorted to *popular promotion* to work with *pobladores*, trying to prevent them from undertaking illegal occupations of private property, counteracting more radicalised leftist politics on housing policy for that matter (Cleaves, 1974). But the mobilisation potential released by the structural reforms soon surpassed the predefined political limits. *Popular promotion* also fuelled politicisation of professionals beyond their bureaucratic roles.

As engineers articulated the industrialist fraction, Keynesian economists aligned with the imperative of capitalist reproduction, and sociologists, architects and teachers promoted the incorporation of subaltern actors within developmental policy, we find that the kind of autonomy that *public professionals* brought to the decentralised bureaucracies configured *organic intellectuals*, who distinguished themselves from the traditional intellectuals of the central bureaucracy – typically lawyers without links with the social basis of state power. The performance of the decentralised bureaucracies was also attributed to the orientations of bureaucrats themselves, regarding the social composition of the respective agencies (Cleaves, 1974), the lifestyles and values of the

²⁰ Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed was inspired by Gabriel Bode's (from INDAP) development of a system of codifications that accelerated the alphabetisation of peasants with dialogic structures used to connect their *felt needs* with a meaningful understanding of its causes (1975, pp.87-88). In oppressive conditions, knowledge and discourses are best developed when making sense of the situation of domination and projecting the subject's politicisation against the injustice of such relations.

personnel (Petras, 1969) and the traditional (formalist; ritualist) or modern character of the predominant professions (López-Pintor, 1976)²¹.

Expectably, the logic of administrative decentralisation also fuelled conflicts of *bureaucratic politics*, expressing the polarisation of the administration into centres of state power. During Frei-Montalva's government, rival bureaucracies competed with each other for resources and priority within the executive's agenda. Seeking to counteract bureaucratic politics, the National Planning Office (ODEPLAN) was created to coordinate the state under a cohesive developmental strategy. In a way, ODEPLAN represented the attempt to institutionalise the developmental project as centre of state power. However, the initiative proved unsuccessful. In a defence of the traditional bureaucracy, the parliament amputated ODEPLAN from its capacity to interfere in the normal administrative process (López-Pintor, 1975). Thus, rather than ODEPLAN limiting the proliferation of bureaucratic politics, it became a victim of it. An Economic Committee was then formed to arbitrate economic disputes within the bureaucracy (Cleaves, 1974, p.82-98). Apart from ODEPLAN and the President of the Republic, the State and Central banks, and the ministers of Finance, Economy and Agriculture also participated CORFO. Eventually, the power of the Ministry of Finance, with its focus on inflation control, predominated within the Economic Committee, relegating the developmental agenda of ODEPLAN and CORFO, concerned with stimulating economic growth rather than controlling inflation, to a subordinated place. But as the Ministry of Finance imposed itself within the Economic Committee, its decisions were more and more difficult to validate due to increasing politicisation.

[c] The bureaucracy politicised to the point of assuming the exacerbated class conflict, in the wake of the crisis of the developmental state, as its own.

In the first place, associations of public employees and professional bureaucracies grew in affiliation and militancy, with their demands moving from unionist grievances on salaries and working conditions to become increasingly articulated to workers, peasants and urban poor mobilisations in support of the acceleration the reformist agenda. From all organised labour, 'the largest strikes, the most massive, the lasting longer ones, the most organized, with the major impact, were not undertaken, however, by the workers, but by the public employees' (Salazar, 2011, pp.101-

²¹ López-Pintor (1976) analysed the degree of *formalism* of bureaucrats – i.e. their attachment to norms and procedures as ends in themselves – concluding that the profession was a crucial variable to that effect: technical professions are less formalist than the lawyers from the central bureaucracy. The function of a state agency, if subjected to the main bureaucratic line or specialised in a field of intervention, also explained higher and lesser degrees of formalism, respectively.

102). Within the state, the associations of teachers and health service workers were amongst the most militant (Salazar et al., 2014, p.87).

In turn, professionals and intellectuals were seen as instigators of the polarisation and ideological inflation that sought to 'sharpen the differences between political alternatives' and to load politics with expectations of class emancipation (Puryear, 1994, p.20). While the process of University Reform (see 2.2.1.) instilled such a sense of political purpose, the professionals' participation in the social reforms further motivated political militancy. The case of the cadres of the Agrarian Reform under the Christian Democracy government is illustrative in this regard, as they split from that party to form the radicalised *Movement of Popular Unified Action* (MAPU), that eventually joined the government of the leftist *Unidad Popular* of President Allende (1970-1973).

As Allende's government excluded the capitalist class from access to the state (Silva, 1996), the working classes participated directly in the public administration, but in proportions that have not been studied – and that presumably were not as high as in the rhetoric of the government. Therefore, the interests of the working classes were more prominently represented by the radicalisation of state professionals. Mostly sociologists, but also engineers, agronomists, teachers, architects and anthropologists changed the profile of state cadres. Economists, who had privileged ascendancy at Frei-Montalva's technical cadres, saw their influence diminished during Allende's administration compared to the greater involvement of the social sciences at the service of socialist transformation (Silva, 2008). Political contradictions became a matter of ideological differentiation within professions, like between Keynesian and free-market economists (Montecinos, 1998) or *popular promotion* and *popular power* among social scientists (Salazar et al., 2014).

At the gates of the institutional breakdown, the question about the function of the bureaucracy in containing social mobilisation came to the fore. Its technocratic quality (before contesting political positions) (Silva, 2008); its capacity to co-opt social movements (Parrish, 1971; Cleaves, 1974); and the moderated character of its members – at least before the peak of politicisation (López-Pintor, 1975; Valenzuela, 1984; Petras, 1969)²² – made it a potential alternative before the exacerbation of class conflict towards the crisis of the developmental state. The bureaucracy served as a latent political actor, which could have played its own part as a third force between the popular and dominant classes to maintain the conduction of the reformist agenda

²² Before the government of the *Unidad Popular* (1970-1973), while state workers represented a moderated position with respect to the political process, they supported the expansion of state ownership and the strategy for social change, being the professionals the most radicalised in this regard. Professionals were more in favour of expanding state ownership (74%) than administrators (67%) (Petras, 1969, p.291).

within the radicalised political process. But, in the end, the bureaucracy did not assume that kind of leadership.

4.2.2. Authoritarianism, Neoliberalism and the Economists of Financial Capitalism (1973-1990)

With the military coup of 1973, the occupation of the state by a batch of neoliberal technocrats led to a dramatic transformation of its organisation and basis of power. The *Chicago Boys*, as these technocratic elites are known, fulfilled the conditions of autonomy and *esprit de corps* that institutionalist scholars (cf. Skocpol, 1985; Evans, 1995) find so determinant of effective state interventions. But instead of this kind of autonomy resulting from the isolation of policymakers from all social pressures, it was attained upon the repression of popular struggles and the overrepresentation of the financial capitalist interests in the state. Thus, we define neoliberalism as taking place when the inertia of the state is *ipso-facto* aligned with the interests of dominant financial capitalism.

O'Donnell's (1978) concept of the bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) state – based on the cases of Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico – expressed the initial orientations of the dictatorship, as a reaction to the politicisation of preceding state forms. The primary aim of the BA state then was repressing popular mobilisation and depoliticising their demands into technical problems, managed by a reduced technocracy. In so doing, the social sciences were promptly excluded from the state (Puryear, 1994), while the number of civil servants was drastically reduced (Lehmann, 1990)²³. Beyond this point, the Chilean case deflects from O'Donnell's framework: as he saw BA states deepening the developmental model of industrialisation, Chile was the first country in the region to reverse state-led development by privatising the public enterprises, dismantling its welfare services and commodifying its relations with society (Garretón, 2013; Silva, 1996; Stepan, 1985; Lechner, 1983).

The repression of popular struggles – for the threat to private property they posed – was so prodigiously performed that it secured loyal support from the capitalist and landowning classes throughout the period of the dictatorship (Silva, 1996; Faletto, 1999). Hence, the dictatorship itself is often seen as a case of Bonapartism (Stepan, 1985). Moreover, as the neoliberal transformations undertaken by the regime affected the industrial bourgeoisie with the most radical programme of market liberalisation, the notion of the military dictatorship as an exemplary case of state autonomy, with a cohesive and isolated technocracy, was reaffirmed and mystified henceforth. Effectively, while the local industrialist lost the protection that he had enjoyed under the developmental state, the support to the regime was maintained, showing the impressive political alignment of the class

²³ About 30% of civil servants were sacked and their salaries were curtailed (Waissbluth, 2006, p.70).

(Faletto, 1999). But for the regime, the destruction of this productive sector was functional to weaken the organisation of the working class (Silva, 1996). As noted, the Chilean dictatorship and its technocratic cadres constituted a moment of occupation of the state by particular class interests rather than of autonomous policymaking. Therefore, the Chilean BA state was not a case of *Bonapartism*

The *Chicago Boys* belonged to the internationalist-financial fraction of the capitalist-landowning coalition that provided the basis of support to the dictatorship (Silva, 1996). Therefore, the *Chicago Boys* acted as organic intellectuals for this dominant class fraction within the state, with their reforms implying a tremendous increase of material and political power for their own basis of class. The regime also relied upon the participation of the *gremialist movement* from the Law School of the Universidad Católica – the same university from which the *Chicago Boys* originally graduated. This movement provided state cadres and organised the main political party of supporters of the dictatorship, the Independent Democratic Union (UDI). Its leader, lawyer Jaime Guzmán, also was the intellectual father of the Constitution of 1980. Together with the neoliberal reforms put together by these technocrats, a new material framework for the public administration was produced, determining the orientations of state autonomy for the decades to come.

Between 1975-1983, the radicalisation of neoliberal economic policy included ‘drastic deflation, swift privatisation of state-owned companies, rapid deregulation of markets (especially in the financial sector), and deep and fast reductions in protectionism’ (Silva, 1996, p.97). The privatisation of state enterprises emptied the productive function carried out by CORFO²⁴, benefiting the highest state functionaries who conducted those privatisations and bought public companies at artificially deflated prices, seizing monopolistic positions in strategic economies²⁵.

The predominance of the financial capitalist fraction was expressed through the power gained by the Ministry of Finance (Silva, 1996). For the first time, this structure exerted uncontested power upon the state apparatus. With the *Chicago Boys*’ takeover of ODEPLAN, its developmental function changed to designing the marketisation reforms and focalised social policies. ODEPLAN also provided a space for the political formation of cadres under the tutelage of the *Chicago Boys* and the political affiliation to UDI (Silva, 2008). While the Ministry of Finance aligned the state to the interest of the financial capitalist fraction, the sectoral ministries (agriculture, mining, economy and public works) provided subordinated representation to the other capitalist sectors, businessmen and landowners that were less radicalised in relation to neoliberal policy (Silva, 1996).

²⁴ 725 public enterprises were privatised between 1973 and 1990 (Cámara de Diputados, 2004).

²⁵ Among the functionaries benefiting from privatising public enterprises: ‘economists and some civil engineers predominated... politically speaking, militants and sympathizers of UDI abounded’ (Monckeberg, 2015, p.28).

The neoliberal transformations culminated with a pack of so-called ‘seven modernisations’ implemented between 1979 and 1981. These reforms sought to marketise and decentralise the state to prevent the politicisation of social demands around public services and social entitlements (Puryear, 1994; Stepan, 1985). Apart from the privatisation of higher education discussed in Chapter Two, these privatisations also included the fields of health care and social security, a new labour legislation, the displacement of primary and secondary education to the municipal level, the reform of the judiciary, the internationalisation of agriculture and the decentralisation and regionalisation of the public administration (Silva, 1991, p.395).

The abovementioned 1980 Constitution completed the institutionalisation of the neoliberal state and its subsidiary role – burying the productive function of the developmental state. Thereby, the ends of the state shifted to supporting the marketisation of public services and pursuing fiscal discipline and macro-economic stability (Hopenhayn, 1993). In so doing, the interest of financial capitalists to attract foreign capital and make wealth, but without pursuing a developmental goal, engendered a new neoliberal rationality of the state. Public services were provided only where the market fails to do so, typically at the lowest quality possible and focalised on the most deprived population. While the market constitutes the predominant principle of social interaction, the right to property takes precedence over social rights (Garretón, 2013, pp.74-76).

In this framework, political legitimisation was made dependant on the generation of a ‘consumers’ society’. The stage of radical neoliberalism was buttressed by a cycle of economic growth crowned by a triumphal discourse of ‘rising consumption’ (Silva, 2008, pp.159-163). Hence, the economic crisis of 1982 marked the end of radical neoliberalism, the exclusion of the *Chicago Boys* from the direction of the Ministry of Finance and the reincorporation of the less radical business sectors at the centre of state policy. The economic crisis also reactivated the struggles in opposition to the dictatorship. The articulation of a political opposition willing to negotiate with the less radical fraction of the military government paved the way to the plebiscite of 1988 that restored democracy in the country.

4.2.3. Technocratic orientations of the Neoliberal State of Second Generation (1990-2010)

With the restitution of the democratic regime in 1990, the centre-left governing coalition *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (1990-2010) – henceforth *Concertación* – occupied the state in the midst of worries about its capacity to efficiently administrate the state (Lehmann, 1990) and the direction state policy would take with respect to the capitalist classes (Garretón et al., 2003). But the new rulers not only preserved the fundamental tenets of the neoliberal state (Silva, 2008; Silva, 1996; Puryear, 1994) but also corrected them for new democratic circumstances (Garretón,

2013). In so doing, the cadres of *Concertación* entered the public administration to perfect a neoliberal state of second generation, in which they adopted the features of technocratic state elites (Silva, 1991; Centeno and Silva, 1998).

The transition to democracy assumed the form of a tacit elite's pact, in which the 'commitment to a minimalist state', the emphasis on economic growth, the marketisation of public services and the predominance of business associations and internationalised financial capitals at the basis of state power were maintained (Silva, 1996, pp.232-234). While the Ministry of Finance provided informal but continuous access to the pragmatic neoliberal coalition to state policy, preserving its power within the organisational architecture of the state, popular struggles remained excluded from relevant participation in state policy – with organised labour only acceding to the subordinated Ministry of Labour (Boeninger, 2007; Silva, 2004; Montecinos, 1998). Consequentially, the competitive advantages to attract investment, including low wages and weak labour organisation, were also maintained as conditions of the economic model (Silva, 1996).

The *Concertación* embraced the subsidiary (neoliberal) framework of the state from the outset. Its first economic programme 'emphasized macroeconomic stability and economic growth, accepted the validity of free-markets and private property, rejected a strong role of the state in production, and sought full incorporation into the world economic system' (Puryear, 1994, p.119). In turn, social policy focused on the poorest population, with means-tested programmes segmented for poverty reduction. Specialised markets – protected, regulated, promoted and directly financed by the state – expanded the public services to reach the rest of the population. In addition to the markets for pensions, education and social security created during the dictatorship, and the several other privatised industries in that period, like energy, communications, and telephony, the *Concertación* also created markets for water, highways, child protection, jails and student loans, among others. The arrival of the *Concertación* defined a moment of *state autonomy*. More than occupying the state to transform it, the cadres of *Concertación* put the state of the dictatorship into operation. The new ruling class assumed the function of a *class-in-charge*, that is, members of subordinated fractions that represent the interests of the dominant classes in the state. Such a condition makes this group different from the cadres of Frei-Montalva and Allende's governments, who represented themselves (as middle-class) and the popular classes, and certainly different from the *Chicago Boys*, affiliated to the financial fraction of the capitalist-landowning coalition. With their political project restricted to the administration of the state for a democratic context, the contribution of these cadres was depicted as producing a 'technocratized and *depoliticized* democracy, in which social problems are translated into technical terms' (Silva, 2008, p.22).

The origins of the cadres of the *Concertación* are found in the social and academic worlds that participated in the opposition to the dictatorship. Sociologists and political scientists linked to the socialist party contributed to articulate the political strategy for the recuperation of democracy separated from the popular mobilisation strategy carried out by the most radicalised opposition to the dictatorship. Furthermore, economists from the think tank CIEPLAN were central to perfecting neoliberal economic policy, since they 'had to demonstrate they could run the economy with as much technical skills as the *Chicago Boys*, but with greater equity' (Puryear, 1994, p.67). In relation to the social world, Delamaza (2011) found that unlike other Latin American countries, where social leaders returned to their grassroots organisations after serving the state, during the *Concertación* the intelligentsia that moved from civil society to the state did not return, but stayed there for good. Transits within this group only took place within the state and, in some cases, towards the business sector. Delamaza observes that once the state elites lost their ties with the social movements, these were replaced by fluid links with the 'highest entrepreneurial leadership' (2011, p.77; cf. Miliband, 1970), reinforcing the assumption about this group as *class-in-charge*. Consequentially, the *Concertación* provoked the weakening of social organisations, in a classic logic of co-optation by the state (see 6.3.1. below).

The professional profile sustaining the technocratic orientations of the *Concertación*, particularly in the first two Christian Democrats governments of Aylwin (1990-1994) and Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000), included economists, engineers and some *technocratised* social and political scientists in possession of postgraduate credentials from American universities. In their work, the neoliberal framework not only was adopted in the field of economic policy (Dávila, 2011) but also extended to the technocratic administration of social and cultural policy (Silva, 2011; Ossandón, 2011). Therefore, through networks that transcended political affiliations, such technocratic orientations were materialised upon different policy fields. Other profiles were incorporated into the following socialist governments of Lagos (2000-2006) and Bachelet (2006-2010) (Silva, 2008). Whereas Lagos relied on the advice of sociologists of the *Segundo Piso* – second floor of the house of government – Bachelet combined citizen participation with the input of experts – mostly engineers and economists – in commissions formed to deal with critical issues of the political agenda (Aguilera and Fuentes, 2011).

Complementarily to the technocratic orientations of the cadres of the *Concertación*, Joignant's use of the concept of *technopols* (2011) focused on the fact that prominent professional politicians in this period possessed both academic and political capitals, highlighting the hybrid character between the technocratic and political leadership of the *Concertación* for that matter. While this observation remains accurate, it is problematic to take the individual possession of these

capitals, particularly of the academic capital, as an independent variable to explain the power of *technopols* in the state, as indicated by the time that ministers stayed in office. As we have argued, the preponderance of the Ministry of Finance in the state obeys a structural feature of the neoliberal state, not the academic or political capitals of the minister as an individual. In fact, the Minister of Finance was almost unremovable in each presidential period. As we count that there were only five Ministers of Finance between 1990 and 2010, we appreciate how social conflicts focused on other sections of the state apparatus, like the Ministry of the Interior, with nine ministers in the same period, or the Ministry of Education, with ten²⁶. By the same token, the higher value of economists' academic capitals is inscribed in the 'regime of objectivity' installed by economic knowledge at the neoliberal state (Garretón et al., 2010, p.82). Therefore, interpretative problems emerge when the direction of state power is reduced to the possession of certain individual capitals, overlooking that their function is inscribed in the autonomy of the neoliberal state, representing specific interests within this framework.

The *Concertación* governments perfected the neoliberal state through reforms of *second generation*, including the modernisation of the state (Waissbluth, 1996) and its public services (Santiso, 2001); the improvement of key systemic areas, like health and education (Navia and Velasco, 2003) and; the regulation of the new markets of privatised public services (Manzetti, 2000). A consistent focus on poverty amelioration towards a progressive enlargement of a liberal welfare regime (Silva, 1996; cf. Esping-Andersen, 1998) should be also added. As the main reform of second generation, the *modernisation of the public administration* attempted to align the occupation of the bureaucratic apparatus by the *Concertación* with the goals of the neoliberal economic model (Garretón, 2013, p.116). Consequently, the process of modernisation entailed the enlargement of the bureaucratic apparatus and the proliferation of new specialised state agencies, representative of social identities and regulative of privatised markets (Tello, 2011, Waissbluth, 2006). These new kinds of agencies are integrated by specialised professionals, who bring a renovated autonomy to state work, engaged in direct interaction with external clients, the state, and – in the case of regulatory agencies – private providers.

²⁶ With only one exception, in all governments of the *Concertación* since 1990 the Minister of Finance remained in office immovable for the whole presidential periods. With the right-wing government of President Piñera (2010-2014) this condition of the neoliberal state was not changed. Only with the second government of Bachelet (2014-2018), there were three ministers of finance, which is even more than the number of ministers of education this government had.

The neoliberal state of *second generation* constructs its parameters of effectiveness by administratively processing social demands in the manner that Laclau (2005) calls 'democratic', that is: maintaining them isolated²⁷. The effect of the neoliberal state is then observable in the disposition to prevent the articulation of a hegemonical social subject, like the workers' movement was for the developmental state (Garretón, 2002). In this regard, the Chilean state has differed from other Latin American countries that since the 2000s transited away from neoliberalism towards neo-populisms, like in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela.

4.3. New Administrative Relations of Production and Mass Intellectuality of the State

A *mass intellectuality* of the state has developed surreptitiously within the expansion of the neoliberal state, diversifying professional profiles that reach newer functions and lower echelons of the bureaucracy. Such de-elitisation of intellectual labour is reproduced outside of the state apparatus, following the trends of higher education expansion, as seen in Chapter Two. As our thesis in this point, this new stage of state *autonomy* under conditions of *mass intellectuality* implies that every policy development, differentiation in the organisational structure of the bureaucracy and change in the political direction of the state is undertaken through shifts in the professional personnel, which technical and political significance is embedded in the social hierarchies and ideological orientations of the university system.

The efficacy of the public administration in these conditions is ensured by new *administrative relations of production*, that resort to technocratic and managerial values to subsume the subjective involvement of a *mass of public professionals* into state work.

4.3.1. Modernisation of the Administrative Relations of Production

The *modernisation of the state* is the name given in Chile to the reorganisation of its *administrative relations of production* along the lines of the *New Public Management* (NPM) to increase the capacity and efficiency of the public administration of the post-dictatorship.

Hand-in-hand with the neoliberal turn of state policy, the dictatorship also reshaped the public administration crucially. The imposition of the subsidiary state sought to depoliticise and decentralise the public administration as a focus of social demands. Thereby, the developmental bureaucracy was dismantled to give way to the advance of the business sector. Hitherto bearer of

²⁷ 'We will call a demand which, satisfied or not, remains isolated a democratic demand. A plurality of demands which through their equivalential articulation constitute a broader social subjectivity we will call popular demands – they start, of a very incipient level, to constitute the 'people' as a potential historical actor' (Laclau, 2005, p.74).

overarching goals of collective transformation, the public administration was cornered into formal *ritualistic* roles. New legislation was enacted to discipline professional state work as individual and technical performance.

Professional associations were removed from their means of corporate control upon the public administration (M. Justicia, 1981). This was achieved by: first, eliminating compulsory association and monopolistic control on an occupation; second, submitting the professional associations under the rules of trade associations, which according to the labour code (M. Trabajo y Previsión Social, 1979a-d) were not allowed to undertake political activism; third, eliminating their faculties to solve jurisdictional conflicts; fourth, eliminating affiliation to a professional association as requisite to work in the state, and; fifth, eliminating the prerogative of charging fees to affiliated members.

Another major reform affecting the organisation of the state was the decentralisation of school education to the municipal level (M. Educación, 1980). So, the whole guild of school teachers, with a combatant unionist tradition, was extirpated from the centralised state. Since most municipalities lacked the means to administrate public schools, the working conditions and professional prestige of public teachers were permanently damaged.

In total, the authoritarian regime affected bureaucratic behaviour by means of a strong hierarchical command that enlarged the distance between decision-makers and executors, compromising the responsibility and transparency of the whole bureaucratic apparatus (Faletto, 1989). Subsequent laws enacted until the end of the dictatorship reinforced such a *classic* bureaucratic character. While the Organic Constitutional Law on the public administration only invoked values of efficiency, promptness, correctness and probity when addressing the civil servants' autonomy of action (M. Interior, 1986: art.54) – contrasting with the ideals of social change that motivated the developmental bureaucracy – the Administrative Statute prohibited unionism, political activism and strikes in the public administration (M. Interior, 1989-2005: art.78). The Administrative Statute also reaffirmed personnel recruitment on a decentralised basis, according to the needs of each ministry. It is noteworthy that a limit of 20% was set to hire personnel on yearly fixed-term-contracts for each ministry (art.9). As we will see, the public administration systematically exceeded such a limit after the end of the dictatorship, initiating a new pattern of growth of the state apparatus that extends up to this day.

By the restoration of democracy in 1990, a public administration with diminished capacities to undertake the political agenda was inherited. The bureaucracy had lost its sense of purpose, with its capacities concentrated in the technocratic elites of the Dictatorship – which used them in their favour, as discussed. Therefore, the *Concertación* governments had to recover the bureaucratic

apparatus to restore efficient service provision and democratic representation (Lehmann, 1990; Faletto, 1989; Silva, 2011). Some key services were a priority in this respect, starting by a sound tax collection to implement the social policy committed by the government. Following the initiatives of a group of managers from a handful of public services²⁸ – nicknamed as the “Archangels” – new business practices and values, like client satisfaction, transparency and measurable performance, were disseminated to the state apparatus (Tello, 2011).

New public agencies were also created to represent emerging social issues, including the National Service of Women, National Corporation of Indigenous Development, Fund of Solidarity and Social Investment, National Fund for Disability, National Institute of Youth, Agency of International Cooperation, the National Commission of Environmental Issues and the Secretary of the Presidency – with a Division of Social Organisations. Although such an opening of the state might be also interpreted as a co-optation of the demands of the democratic movement of that time (Guerrero, 2004), the new agencies seemed to invigorate the bureaucracy (Waissbluth, 2006) providing niches for *public professionalism* in subaltern social policy.

The *modernisation of the state* only delivered a consistent programme, central to the abovementioned neoliberal reforms of second generation, since the second government of the *Concertación*. President Frei Ruiz-Tagle, himself an engineer and entrepreneur, instilled a technocratic imprint to this process (Garretón, 2013), calling the “Archangels” to write the chapter on the modernisation of the public administration of his political programme. A Committee was established for this task, integrated by the ministers of Interior, Finance and the Secretary of the Presidency – which led the Committee²⁹. The purpose of the modernisation of the state then was to validate the expansion of the bureaucracy as positive for economic growth – only insofar managerial values, along the lines of the NPM, oriented this process. Apparently, the very reorientation of the public administration towards more efficiency makes it more attractive for the incorporation of young professionals (Pliscoff, 2009). In turn, by looking at similar processes in the US and Canada, rather than the goal of efficiency meaning less cost for more state work, it has increased the size and

²⁸ Tax Revenue Service; Civil Registration Service; National Health Fund; Institute of Public Pensions and; School Meal Service (Navarrete, 2008).

²⁹ The guidelines of the *modernisation of the state* were: (1) increase of the efficacy of the public administration; (2) promotion of leadership within each public agency to support the process of modernisation; (3) incorporation of new technologies of management and organisation; (4) management oriented to results; (5) focus on the needs and demands of external clients and beneficiaries; (6) greater transparency; (7) optimisation of the use of public resources and; (8) improvement of the qualifications of state workers and of its individual functions (Garretón, 2013, p.121).

complexity of the public administration altogether (Harney, 2002). In both senses of more professionalisation and more complexity, Chile's case has not been different.

The Direction of Budget of the Ministry of Finance (DIPRES) provided most of the content to the modernisation of the state by developing a system of management control and incentives of performance. Thereby, all public agencies have to define missional statements and report annual indicators of performance on a yearly basis. Also, a series of Programmes of Improvement of Public Management (PMG) (M. Hacienda, 1998), assigned a portion of variable salary up to 11% upon the collective attainment of performance indicators by each public service. For the more sceptical, it is not clear whether the PMGs really enhanced productivity – or just disguised salary increases – since a large amount of 75% functionaries reached the maximum variable salaries (Waissbluth, 2006, p.72), whereas personnel with poor performance were not removed within this scheme (Garretón, 2013, p.120). But on the other hand, the topics introduced by the PMGs, like the programme on gender coordinated by the National Service of Women (SERNAM), succeeded in disseminating substantive political goals in the administration.

Eventually, DIPRES displaced the Secretary of the Presidency from the conduction of the *modernisation of the state*. By this token, considerations of efficiency predominated over other political goals, in correspondence to the role of the Ministry of Finance as centre of state power (Marshall and Waissbluth, 2007). While during Frei Ruiz-Tagle's government the *modernisation of the state* succeeded in increasing the coverage and efficiency of public services, the framework of state action was reaffirmed in instrumental terms, reducing citizens to clients and promoting the technification of policy making (Garretón, 2013, pp.124-125).

During the Lagos government, a crisis of misappropriation of public funds forced him to seek for support in the political opposition (right-wing), in exchange of which a new agenda for the modernisation of the state was committed, with an emphasis on issues of probity.

Thus, the bureaucratic career was adjusted to grant more recognition to technical competences and individual merit – seeking to reduce the weight of political patronage and ameliorate the sense of lethargy among civil servants³⁰. The competitive promotion of civil servants was then extended to positions of middle-management (3rd hierarchical level), hitherto reserved for politicians (M. Hacienda, 2003a). However, the new career opportunities were only available for tenured bureaucrats, leaving the growing mass of fixed-term functionaries aside.

³⁰ According to a study of the Institute of Sociology of the *Universidad Católica* of 1997, 97% of public functionaries did not believe their efforts led to job ascensions, 66% agreed that the system of evaluation of public workers did not measure actual performance and, 45% believed public workers did not put effort into their work (Waissbluth, 2006, pp.72-73).

Probably the most relevant reform on the state at that time, a new agency, named *Civil Service* (M. Hacienda, 2003a), was introduced to professionalise the bureaucratic career, starting with the creation of a competitive system of recruitment of high public managers. However, in spite of the increasing scope of this system, it has failed to retain state cadres with independence from government changes. After the defeat of the *Concertación* in the presidential elections of 2010, the new government sacked 75% of managers and 43% of professionals recruited with this system (Inostroza et al., 2011). Another relevant addition of the *Civil Service* has been a web platform for the diffusion of public contests for state administration, which relies on the voluntary adhesion of public services to tender their vacancies there.

Also, during Lagos' government, a points-based online system, known as *Public Market*, was introduced to conduct state purchases and tendering (M. Hacienda, 2003b). *Public Market* reduced the potentially incompatible negotiations as it prohibited functionaries to buy goods and contract services from providers linked to them. As a consequence, in this new framework, the structure of opportunities was restricted for specialised research centres related to social movements to develop stable working collaboration with the agencies that represent them in the state, weakening the links between both parties.

Advances in other lines include the implementation of state policy across different sections of the bureaucracy. In particular, the *Chile Solidario* policy articulated state agencies and municipal governments in a network of social programmes for the extremely poor. The experience showed the confrontation of different rationalities: between the model of vouchers for focalised cash transfers of the Direction of Budget (DIPRES) and the social promotion approach of the Ministry of Planning. The tension between knowledge and orientations was also noticeable at the level of implementation: municipal workers, with 'less ideological commitment and more bureaucratic attitudes' contrasted sharply with the incorporation of younger professionals, street-level bureaucrats 'highly motivated by the type of work, [hired] on short-term contracts' (Palma and Urzúa, 2005, p.24).

However, the integration among fields of policy also had its limit. Garretón et al. (2010) studied the research hired by the state (1992-2005), concluding that while the social sciences had a predominant presence informing state policy, its critical orientations regarding totalising views on social change were excluded from the framework of 'efficiency, rationality, focalisation and evaluation that orient much of the public policies in the context of the modernisation of the state' (pp.87-88). The knowledge demanded by the state had to fit the disaggregation of society into fields of administration, contributing to the efficiency of focalised programmes. Gone were the years when

critical concepts of the social sciences – like development and social promotion – inspired the public administration.

The Bachelet government, the last of the *Concertación*, gave the final touch to the modernisation of the public administration with a law on transparency that granted public access to information about the state (M. Secretaría General Presidencia, 2008). The names of state workers and political authorities were for the first time available to the public, including information about their salaries and qualifications. Moreover, any citizen was entitled to access information about the state operations on request upon an online platform. The significance of this policy is that it limited the effect of secrecy in the legitimisation of bureaucratic authority. Knowledge of the state could no longer be claimed as a monopolistic resource. Together with the ongoing professionalisation of the public administration, which reduces the distance between the higher technocracies and lower state workers with regards to the uses of knowledge, this new law implied that such a distance also decreased in relation to the wider society.


In total, the *modernisation of the state* developed new *administrative relations of production* for the neoliberal state. Managerial orientations for state work, alongside the criteria of economic efficiency, technical fitness and transparency, took precedence upon other political considerations, in conformity with the preponderance of the Ministry of Finance within the state and the process of modernisation itself. Its outcomes include the improvement of performance indicators of public services and the generation of a more transparent environment for the public administration. On the downside, the ends of economic efficiency and probity seem to have undermined the links between state agencies and social movements, as well as limited the capacity to systematically elaborate critical knowledge into state policy. In turn, the conditions of the bureaucratic career were not changed significantly, which meant that the expansion of the state apparatus took place beyond the pre-existent administrative structures, by means of the incorporation of professional personnel with fixed-term contracts. Thus, the state also lost the opportunity to modernise the bureaucratic career as a whole.

Nevertheless, the enhanced productivity of the neoliberal state of second generation is less inscribed in the rules of a modernised public administration than in the knowledge autonomously mobilised by a growing *mass* of state workers. So, the links between the state and the interests and identities it represents are actively reproduced by the subjective involvement of *public professionals*, whose political roles are already aligned to either dominant or subordinate directions of state power in accordance to the orientations attached to the knowledge and universities in which they are socialised.

4.3.2. Rapid Professionalisation of the Public Administration

Since 2006, DIPRES publishes in a printed format the first aggregated information on the personnel of the public administration in time series of ten years. From this source, we are able to analyse the growth of the bureaucracy and its professional personnel between 1995 and 2015. To make other basic descriptive analysis, the database of the series 2006-2015 was also obtained from DIPRES. In our analysis, we only consider the regular civil personnel of the state, including tenured (*planta*) and fixed-term (*contrata*) workers, and excluding the population of short-term contracts.

Figure 4.1. shows the expansion of the state personnel from 130,599 to 236,736 individuals between 1995-2015, representing an increase of 81.3% (3% annual rate of growth).




Source: DIPRES (2006-2016)

The authorities – 83% of them labelled as ‘professional’ managers in 2015 – remained constant in the period, limited by the number of positions available. The administrative and auxiliary staff, in its turn, stagnated with a total growth of 16%, which is less than 1% of annual increase. Thus, the strata of technicians and professionals explained the sustained expansion experimented by the state. While technicians grew in line with the whole apparatus, reaching a total growth of 86%, the professionals virtually propelled the expansion of the state, increasing by 190% during this period. In 2015 the professional echelon almost tripled the size it had in 1995. With an annual growth of 5% – 6.2% in 2006-2015 – professionals continuously gained predominance within the public administration from representing 27% in 1995 to 43% in 2015, representing the predominant

echelon of the executive, legislative and judiciary powers altogether. The pace of expansion of the professionals is only matched by the rate of growth of the university system, with an annual average of 5.8% during 1995-2015. These trends reflect the ongoing professionalisation of the public administration, making the professional strata increasingly constitutive of the autonomous rationality of the state. In our view, the incursion of the state into new policy fields has unavoidably entailed the constant expansion of the professional echelon above the rest of the public administration.

In spite of the growth of the public administration in the last two decades, its compared size with respect to total employment, 11.2% in 2015 (ILO, 2017), still lies below the median of the OECD (2017) (18,1%). In any case, the OECD numbers include more information than the DIPRES data, adding military personnel, public enterprises and municipal governments as well. If the central government is considered alone, its sizes encompasses between 2 and 4% of the labour force in 2013 (INE, 2013), which is low in the regional perspective if we compare it to the largest public administration in the region: Uruguay with 10-12% (Cortázar et al., 2014). The effect of the removal of teachers to the municipal level surely explains its small size in a comparative perspective. As a point of reference, during the 1960s, the public sector represented between 13 and 14% of total employment (López-Pintor, 1975; Valenzuela, 1984).

Figure 4.2. shows the growth of the state by working regime, evidencing a transposition of the polarity of expansion from the tenured (*planta*) to the fixed-term (*contrata*) functionaries.



Source: DIPRES (2006-2016)

A bizarre situation is indeed represented in the figure. While the *planta* administrators are the only proper members of the civil service – integrated into the bureaucratic career – their relative

size decreased from 70% in 1995 to 34% in 2015, representing a shrinking minority within the state. The decrease of this group is tied to the retirement of civil servants, that are not replaced in equal rate. Therefore, the data shows that the rationality of the public administration is decreasingly dependent on the operation of the traditional bureaucracy.

In turn, while the Administrative Statute (M. Interior, 1989-2005) established a limit of 20% of fixed-term functionaries, already in 1995, the *contratas* were 25% of the public administration; in 2015, they represented 64%. As expected, the expansion of professional echelon has been the most affected by these trends: in 2015, 77% were hired in fixed-term contracts with only 22% integrated into the civil service as *planta* functionaries.

The *contratas* meant to fulfil the contingent needs of the public administration, so the observed patterns suggest a misuse of a working regime to occupy the state. The expansion of this category initially conformed to the mistrust of the *Concertación* toward the tenured functionaries that continued from the dictatorship (Rajevic, 2014; Grindle, 2010). But since then, the *contratas* have just provided more flexible access to state work for increasingly professionalised personnel in response to ongoing political demands. As a consequence, the bureaucracy separates into two worlds, one traditional, unmovable and of lower technical profile, and the other, of disorganised expansion, without formal recruitment, and subjected to flexible, unstable and ambiguous rules, but that incorporates specialised professional knowledge to answer the political challenges of the state (Waissbluth, 2006).

Following Rajevic (2014), the situation with the *contratas* is more acute in the central administration, that is, considering the executive power alone. Moreover, within the central administration, the health services are a special case considering the larger number of tenured functionaries therein. In effect, Health occupations typically enjoy higher jurisdictional control than generic professionals (*polyvalent workers*) in the functions of political administration. Thus, excluding the health services, between 2006 and 2015, *planta* functionaries decreased from 48 to 28%, whereas *contratas* rose from 49 to 69%. Focusing on the professional echelon, the proportion of *plantas* decreased from 36% to 14% in the same period, whereas the *contratas* rose from 62% to an impressive 83%.

As the expansion of the state is bounded to the political process, the increase of professional state workers in such a flexible manner is expressive of the features of the post-bureaucratic organisation, capable of making *just-in-time* adjustments in its professional configuration before changes of state policy. In these conditions, we reaffirm the political role of professional state work and its effect in reproducing the autonomy of the state, inasmuch as policy changes take place through professional re-configurations of the public administration, mediating the social and

political struggles on state power. For sure, professionals in these conditions are less independent from the incumbent political authority and more susceptible to political changes, particularly changes of government. Still, although changes of government might pull the trends of professionalisation in different directions, its own inertia is already embodied in the rationality of the state, constituting a determinant mean of the political process.

The lack of a bureaucratic career for the vast majority of the state professionals constitutes their ultimate separation with respect to the bureaucratic organisation. But such conditions of state work have also enabled professionals to autonomously reproduce the effects of the state into unforeseen circumstances and represent specific interests in their fields of policy, alternating closer affinity and latent opposition to predominant political directions, as expressed in their mobility in and out of the public administration.

Keeping the focus on the executive power, it is also noticeable that in the last decade the administrative staff (traditional bureaucrats of routine work) has decreased its presence from 19% to 15%, suggesting that their roles are increasingly peripheral and subordinated to the expansion of the professional occupations. In effect, as the largest proportional reduction in the *planta* functionaries takes place among the administrative roles, it seems that their presence is condemned to decrease in time. Thus, the political presence of the administrative staff only remains relevant when organised as a pressure group, through the associations. As argued by the NPM enthusiast Waissbluth (2006), the associations of functionaries have been the major obstacle to further flexibilisation and *modernisation* of state work.

Table 4.1. shows the proportional increase of the central administration by state function in 2006-2015. The columns consider, respectively, the total personnel, the professional echelon and the professionals under *contrata* working regime. The lines divide the state branches according to functions, namely: political, technical and social/cultural (Poulantzas, 1978) (see 5.2.2. below).

Table 4.1.: Increase of Total Staff, Professionals and <i>Contrata</i>-professionals by State Branch, 2006-2015 (%)			
	Total	Professionals	Contrata-professionals
Political	26	53	115
Technical	36	73	102
Social/Cultural	48	86	147
Total	38	72	115

Source: DIPRES 2016

While all branches expanded in the period, the social/cultural function had the largest proportional increase of professionals (second column) – mostly caused by the expansion of social services (nursery, health services) and less so by the new agencies created in the period in the wake

to social demands (e.g. superintendence of Education). In turn, the proportional increase in the *contrata*-professionals (third column) reveals the flexible responses to the external demands in each branch. Therefore, the largest distance between the increase of *contrata*-professionals with respect to the totals and professionals in the political and social-cultural functions (first and second columns) indicates the deployment of professional work delivered in an unstable manner, anticipating a higher turnover of personnel from government to government.

Table 4.2. shows the agencies with the highest proportion of professionals: 133 agencies under 22 ministries are counted in 2015, with a total proportion of professionals of 43% and a median of 61.7%. Represented in the table, 65 agencies were in or above to the median.

Table 4.2.: State Agencies with the Highest Proportion of Professionals (>61.7%) by type – 2015		
Representation of social and cultural demands (9)	Regulative (20)	Other technical and social functions and services (36)
Corporation of Foment of Production: 62% National Corporation of Indigenous Development: 63% National Institute of Sports: 63% Under Secretariat of Regional Development: 68% Fund for Solidarity and Social Investment: 68% National Service of the Elderly: 71% Direction of Labour: 71% Institute of Agrarian Development: 71% National Service of Women: 72%	National Council of Television: 65% Direction of Budget: 67% Eight superintendences (pensions; education; banks; social security; sanitary services; environment, etc): 67%-93% Regulatory agencies of school and higher education: 75% Economic competition agency: 81% Public market: 86%	Tax Services: 63% Intelligence agency: 63% 13 Undersecretaries (housing, education, energy, communications, prevention of crime, environment, tourism, social evaluation, etc.): 63%-78% Research Council: 64% Economic analysis: 65%
Source: DIPRES 2016		

While the agencies under the median mostly belong to the politico-administrative functions and social services, those above the threshold tend to be newer and more specialised agencies of the social/cultural and technical functions, also including strategic political functions (DIPRES, Ministry of Finance) appropriate to the neoliberal state of second generation. From the 15 newly created agencies since 2006, five are below the median and ten are above, ranging from 62 to 98% in this indicator. In sum, apart from the specific function, the newness of an agency naturally explains the higher level of *professionalisation*. Most agencies with roles of regulation (20) and representation of social movements (9) are placed among the most professionalised. Conversely, among the less professionalised agencies, there are only three representing social interest (youth, cultural actors and the disabled), and two performing regulation (electricity and consumers). The most professionalised sector is also integrated by 36 other organisations performing highly specialised functions and coordination of social services.

4.3.3. The Moment of *Mass Intellectuality*

The moment of *mass intellectuality* is configured by the increasing presence of new contingents of professional workers in the state apparatus to perform political administration. In this sense, the significance of this moment of state autonomy is not particularly attributable to the already established professional bureaucracies conformed by health professionals, applied engineers, teachers and architects with occupational jurisdiction within the public administration and relative independence from the dynamics of political administration. Instead, the moment of the *mass intellectuality* constitutes an emergent force within the roles of political administration, hitherto in the hands of traditional bureaucrats and public administrators (Valenzuela, 1984), which then are increasingly transferred to the performance of a broader spectrum of *public professionals*. Thus, as the traditional bureaucrats remain in the background of state transformations, new professionals attach their knowledge, interests and ideological orientations to state policy, moving in and out the public administration contingently to the shifts in the political process. In sum, the moment of *mass intellectuality* takes place when a mass of professional state workers embodies the rationality of the public administration before political changes, constituting a new stage of autonomy that reshapes the state towards post-bureaucratic forms of organisation.

The condition of *mass intellectuality*, and the situation of professional expansion that explains it, are not directly attributable to a political intention: it neither resulted from the intervention of academic-political networks nor from a manifested political will of the state. But it has evolved as the not-expected consequence of the neoliberal direction of the administrative superstructure, including the effect of higher education expansion – predominantly in accordance with market interests – upon the organisation of the state. Since the origins of this particular moment lie in a segmented mass university system, the *mass intellectuality* is differentiated into an ideological division of intellectual labour. Therefore, dominant and subordinate roles of political administration, as well as the functional organisation of the bureaucracy altogether, are configured along with the ideological affinities between knowledge, universities and political process.

At the basis of the *mass intellectuality*, we have argued that the professional qualification of an expanding new-middle/professional classes conforms the bureaucracy of professional services as the most expansive segment of the social structure. Within the bureaucracy, the middle-class of routine administrative work has had the highest probabilities to transit into the new professional classes by means of investing in higher education for their children (Torche and Wormald, 2004). But the heterogeneous qualities of the higher education credentials determine the occupation in positions of differentiated social hierarchy (Ruiz, 2013), ranging from higher-managerial to lower-

administrative services (Torche and Wormald, 2004). It is noteworthy that as the opportunities of social mobility for the middle-class used to be a function attributed to the state bureaucracy and public employment (López-Pintor, 1975; Faletto, 1989), it is now the main function attributed to higher education.

Unlike the technocracy of the *Concertación*, the new mass of professional state workers is not necessarily linked to dominant capitalist interests in the state. Certainly, they do not represent a cohesive class constituted as such in the bureaucracy, in the manner of the middle-class of the developmental state. The new mass of state professionals also diverges from the old professional solidarities which – together with clear political affiliations – described the sources of cohesion of the developmental bureaucracy (Valenzuela, 1984). In fact, professional associations are no longer relevant for the public administration today, whereas professional state workers, hitherto trained at a public university system, reflect the material and ideological differences of a heterogeneous higher education system. As described in Chapter Two, the *mass intellectuality* represents a new, fragmented and still unfolding *non-bureaucratic basis of the bureaucracy* for our empirical case.

The implications of this moment of state autonomy are the subject of the remainder of the research, bridging the gap between the reproduction of the material and ideological basis of the public administration at the mass university system and the autonomy of professional state work – and its forms of *public professionalism* – at the service of the diverse interests of state policy. In other words, we follow the effects of the de-elitisation of political uses of knowledge in the state, as disseminated through a broader, more heterogeneous and less determined *mass intellectuality*. Since the mass intellectuality does not represent a univocal direction of state policy, such a de-elitisation of public professionalism and of the political uses of knowledge, as well as its organic links with social interests and its influence upon state power, are not to be taken for granted.

The *mass intellectuality* exceeds the boundaries of the public administration, starting with the fact that their knowledge and orientations are developed from outside the state. As higher education becomes directly constitutive of professional state workers' position and function in the *administrative relations of production*, including the orientation towards influencing state policy, the separation between education and labour is blurred altogether. While the technocratic levels are not subjected to the bureaucratic career and often enter in tension with the formal boundaries of the state (cf. Therborn, 2008), the subordinated public professionals that expand the *mass intellectuality* of the state neither are totally regulated by the bureaucratic career and their transit through the public administration is fluid. As illustrated, the professionalisation of the public administration has mostly taken place within a precarious contractual regime that paradoxically excludes the vast majority of professionals from the civil service. Consequentially, large sectors of

this *mass intellectuality* might feel closer to the situation of the social actors they relate to in the subordinated agencies of the state than with the political parties and the interests served by the technocracies operating at the centres of state power (Salazar et al., 2014, p.307).

The question on the influence that, in the name of *public professionalism*, a *mass intellectuality* of professional state workers exerts on state policy is only answerable by means of empirical research. The lines of research on implementation studies (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Hecl, 1974; Lipsky, 1980; Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993; Harney, 2002), post-bureaucracy (Murray, 1993; Goodsell, 2005; Reed, 2005) and post-professionalism (Evetts, 2011; Martin, 2011) already confirm the greater involvement and influence of state workers in policymaking, beyond formal bureaucratic rules and political mandates. As hypothesised, the expansion of professional state work – against the background of routine-administrative staff – extends the opportunities of policy influence towards the lower echelons of the public administration, in such a way that the autonomous rationality of the state is made increasingly dependent on the *public professionalism* of state workers themselves.

Likewise, as knowledge and secrecy hitherto reproduced an external demarcation between the technocratic cusp and the lower administration, under conditions of *mass intellectuality*, such a demarcation is necessarily broken. Therefore, political uses of knowledge cease to demarcate between the technocratic elites and the subordinated positions. The differentiated orientations of such uses of knowledge, conditioned by the type of knowledge in particular – not only technical, but also critical and hermeneutical – in what university was it acquired, and the respective professional ideals, thus converge in potential political effects linked to the political process and the interests at the basis of state power. In effect, as conflicting class interests resonate in the divisions of the public administration (cf. Poulantzas, 2014), the knowledge and orientations that *public professionals* mobilise into the state embody these conflicts within the autonomous rationality of the state, by means of organic links with social interests and political uses of knowledge which, beyond administrative routines and technocratic policymaking, entail potential consequences from the perspective of state power.

In the moment of *mass intellectuality*, the positioning and predominance of a specific profession in the public administration cannot be reduced to occupational strategies or academic capitals alone, as it also relates the internal organisation of the state and the interests pulling the political process. Consequentially, variations in the professional configuration of the state from government to government allow us to understand the knowledge and interests that underlie the direction of state power. As a matter of definition, in the moment of *mass intellectuality*, policy changes are undertaken through the reconfiguration of the professional composition of the state.

We have grounded the theoretical discussion on the shifting rationality of state autonomy onto the Chilean state. Not only did we find that the notion of state autonomy is meaningfully embedded in our empirical case, but also that its rationality has changed in accordance to the theoretical discussion: from the classical Weberian model to functional differentiation, then from the critical contradictions of developmentalism to neoliberalism. In these stages we have also found that historic forms of *public professionalism* have emerged as the substance of organic intellectuals: lawyers of the liberal state; engineers of the entrepreneurial state; Keynesian economists of the developmental state; sociologists, educators and architects for popular promotion; monetarist economists of the neoliberal authoritarian state and; technocrats and technopols of the post-dictatorship.

The massification of professional state work – into the conditions of *mass intellectuality* – evolves at the backs of explicitly formulated political will. The post-bureaucratic organisation, that regulates the *administrative relations of production* for such an increasing professionalisation of the bureaucracy, emerges from a somewhat loose combination between the flexibilisation of working conditions, the adoption of the NPM and its goals of efficiency as ends of all state work, and the differentiation of professional roles for representing interests and identities within the state. The neoliberal and technocratic orientations of the state are thus preserved, but at the same time, parts of its autonomous rationality are transferred to the *professionalism* that state workers bring from outside of the bureaucratic organisation.

In conditions of *mass intellectuality*, we do not know the directions in which professional work might influence state policy. To start, the neoliberal state is defined by the exclusion of the working class, whereas fragmented interests and identities take its place therein. In turn, the interventions directed from the Ministry of Finance for the modernisation of the public administration have emphasised the technical aspects of state work, seeking to control and maximise its measurable output, but without redefining the political role of the public administration. Last, we do not know the number of public functionaries allocated at the state in the name and interest of political parties³¹, constituting a missing variable of our analysis. Therefore, the professional affiliations, the allocation in the public administration, and the actual political uses of knowledge by the *public professionals* provide us with the main points of reference to differentiate and interpret the political orientations attributed to state work.

³¹ Information about individual political militancy is private and cannot be publicly disclosed.

Data so far shows the ascending number of professionals, but it cannot explain its specific relation with state power. It is possible to see an expansion of the social/cultural functions of the state fuelled by the enlargement of *contrata*-professionals. But apart from that, the growth of professional labour follows steady patterns, independently from incumbent governments. We can still assume that every new direction of state policy takes place through the enlargement and reconfiguration of the professional composition of the public administration, reproducing the organisational rationality of the state.

In the next chapter, we interpret the political affinities of the professions by looking at the probabilities that professionals have of entering and leaving the public administration with respect to the changes in the direction of the state – from government to government. Behind the ascending slope of professionalisation of the public administration, there are constant and, so far, invisible changes of personnel, enabled by the flexible conditions of state work. These changes constitute shifts in the professional configuration of the public administration which might follow its own inertia and also align with the policy of incumbent governments. Under the conditions of *mass intellectuality*, the emergent rationality of state autonomy implies that the professional configuration of the public administration is organically linked to the basis of state power. Thus, changes in the professional configuration of the public administration also inform about changes of state policy. Thus, not only do we have a case for a *sociology of the state*, in the sense of the organisational forms assumed by the neoliberal state, but also for the *sociology of professions*, considering the political roles that professionals perform in affinity or contradiction to the predominant orientations of the state.

Chapter Five

Professional Configurations of Political Change and the Ideological Division of Intellectual Labour in the Chilean Public Administration

We have claimed that the autonomy of the public administration is increasingly mediated by the autonomy of professional state workers. In effect, the transit from the *classical Weberian model*, in which bureaucratic autonomy is homologated to the formal rules and corporate ideology of the administrative staff, to the *post-bureaucratic* organisation, entails the transference of autonomy to the subjective involvement of a mass of state workers. In this framework, state workers' knowledge and interests ensure both the inward integration of the organisation – between policy design and implementation – and the outward adaptation to democratic demands. Moreover, a *mass intellectuality* of professional state workers – *public professionals* in our formulation – pushes the operation of the bureaucracy beyond formal rules and organisational routines, engaging directly with the ends of state policy and the interests at its basis. But while most literatures have asserted the historic role of technocrats and professionals in unifying state policy throughout political transformations, no attention has been given to recent trends of the public administration toward the massification of state professionals.

We argue that the orientations of state power are expressed within the public administration through specific professional configurations, which then constitute its autonomous organisational rationality. Under conditions of *mass intellectuality*, the state resorts to the technical and ideological resources made available by the mass university system to fulfil its own organisational imperatives. The lack of a centralised training and recruitment system for the public administration bestows universities with the responsibility of forming its professional personnel. Not only the public-elite universities – that had the monopoly on the formation of the professional civil service – are involved in this process, but also the newer private-mass institutions that animate the professional massification of the public administration onto subordinated roles.

This research is situated in the first change of governmental coalition during the democracy of the post-dictatorship, from the centre-left to the right-wing and back to the centre-left. By putting together sources information on the state personnel, also for the first time for the Chilean case, we could observe the dynamics of re-colonisation of the state bureaucracy, particularly for a political sector, the right-wing, that had not occupied the public administration in decades. At the basis, we confirm that changes of state power, according to changes of government, lead to reconfigurations of the professional composition of the public administration.

Like sociological trends, or constellations of interests, the socialisation of *public professionalism* in an ideologically divided university system entails relations of political affinity – or

political opposition – with changes of government. Likewise, the social and political cleavages reproduced through the university system also underlie the structuration of the state along with the dominant and subordinated roles of political administration. Hence, we speak of an *ideological division of professional state labour* to refer to the ideological profiles that are differentiated for the same profession on the basis of the university of origin, entailing divergent political affinities and occupations in the public administration. In sum, this chapter gives a second demonstration about the effects of political socialisation in the Chilean university system – the first demonstration was the articulation of the 2011 student movement, discussed in Chapter Two.

In four sections, we observe the changes in professional composition of the public administration between 2009 and 2014 by, first, looking at the professional profiles of the presidential cabinets in this period; second, specifying the methodological challenges involved in the production of data about the Chilean bureaucracy; third, analysing the professional reconfigurations of the public administration with each change of government and; fourth, assessing the effect of the university system in this process.

5.1. Changes of Coalition: Bachelet (2006-2010), Piñera (2010-2014) and Bachelet (2014-2018)

In 2010, the businessman Sebastián Piñera's succeeded the last government of the Concertación under the presidency of Michelle Bachelet, interrupting twenty years of centre-left governments in the country and also leading the first right-wing coalition to democratically win the presidency since 1958.

In spite of this political shift, the public administration continued expanding at the same, if not higher, pace. The autonomous rationality of the state is visible already when its occupation by a new government takes place through the increase and replacement of its professional personnel. Actually, the only narrative proclaimed by Piñera's government consisted of installing a 24/7 managerial style of the best and most qualified technocracy, which meant to mark opposition to the traditional politicians of the *Concertación*. Hence, the massive layoff of state workers was then justified by the need of removing the 'political operators' – i.e. professional politicians of the *Concertación*. But this technocratic exaltation was eventually slaked by the largest social mobilisations since the restoration of democracy. In Poulantzian fashion, the right-wing government was targeted by social movements – particularly by the 2011 student movement – for systemic contradictions that had been there long before, but because this particular government was regarded as part of the dominant class and not as the mere administrators, the contentious mobilisation was seen as reaching the very core of state power.

The social movements paved the way for Bachelet's comeback in 2014. Her political programme committed some of the movements' flagship demands: free higher education, a new constitution and tax reform. A new incumbent centre-left coalition, the *Nueva Mayoría*, widened the old *Concertación* by adding the participation of the Communist Party and a handful of left-wing movements. The government was also equipped with cadres of left-wing specialists attracted by the reformist policies, notoriously former functionaries from the *Concertación* – and student leaders from the Universidad Católica in 2011 – organised under their own political movement *Revolución Democrática*, as noted in Chapter Two. Having authored most of the programme of educational reforms adopted by Bachelet, they entered the state to work on its implementation. As social scientists with the vocation of functionaries, these cadres represented organic intellectuals of the student movement at the state, although of course they were also accused of selling out to the government.

To introduce the affinities between professions, universities and the orientations of state policy in the first two changes of governmental coalition since the restoration of democracy in Chile, Table 5.1. compares the professional profiles of the respective ministers' cabinets between 2006-2018, indicating the professions, university and secondary school of each minister.

	Bachelet (2006-2010)				Piñera (2010-2014)				Bachelet (2014-2018)			
	Total		PhDs		Total		PhDs		Total		PhDs	
Economists	10	22.2%	4	8.9%	14	31.8%	4	9.1%	11	26.2%	4	9.5%
Lawyers	15	33.3%	2	4.4%	13	29.5%	2	4.5%	13	30.9%	2	4.8%
Civil Engineers	3	6.7%	1	2.2%	11	25%	1	2.3%	1	2.4%	1	2.4%
Social/political sc. & humanities	7	15.6%	0		1	2.3%	1	2.3%	10	23.8%	1	2.4%
Medicine	5	11.1%	1	2.2%	1	2.3%	0		3	7.1%	0	
Teachers	2	4.4%	1	2.2%	0				0			
Artists	1	2.2%	0		1	2.3%	0		1	2.4%	0	
Natural resources	0				0				2	4.8%	0	
No degree	2	4.4%	0		3	6.8%	0		1	2.4%	0	
Elite universities	41	91.1%	9	20%	39	88.6%	8	18.2%	36	85.7%	7	17%
a. Universidad de Chile	22	48.9%	4	8.9%	9	20.4%	1	2.3%	20	47.7%	3	7.1%
b. P. Universidad Católica	11	24.4%	3	6.7%	27	61.4%	7	15.9%	8	19%	3	7.1%
c. Other	8	17.8%	2	4.4%	3	6.8%	0		8	19%	0	
Mass HEIs/no degree	4	8.9%	0		5	11.4%	0		6	14.3%	1	2.4%
Private secondary schools	16	35.6%	5	11.1%	31	70.5%	6	13.7%	9	21.4%	0	
Public/subsidised sec. schools	29	64.4%	4	8.9%	13	29.5%	2	4.5%	33	78.6%	8	19%
Total	45	100%	9	20%	44	100%	8	18.2%	42	100%	8	19%
Total ministries	22				23				23			

Source: own elaboration based on <http://www.gob.cl/ministros/>

The first row shows the larger proportion of economists in Piñera's cabinet (32%) compared to Bachelet's (22% and 26% in the respective periods). Although such a difference is expectable, the number of economists holding a PhD (4) is equivalent. In effect, as it is true that Piñera's cabinet has a more technocratic profile (Dávila, 2011) when comparing the number of PhDs in each government, differences are not observed. Likewise, there are no significant differences regarding the presence of lawyers, reflecting its transversal role regardless of the government.

The most striking difference appears at the row of engineers, that represented 25% of Piñera's cabinet, 7% of Bachelet's first government and 2% of the second. While engineers served as specialised professionals for the centre-left – only leading technical ministries in Bachelet's governments –, for the right-wing they exerted generalisable leadership. Under Piñera, engineers headed ministries at political, technical and social/cultural functions alike.

Another contrast is observed with the social/political sciences and humanities professionals, who represented 16% of the cabinet of Bachelet's first government and 24% of the second, mostly serving in social/cultural ministries. But with Piñera, these professionals only represented 2% of the cabinet, with the social/cultural ministers mostly in the hands of economists, engineers and lawyers. Certainly, the social sciences and humanities did not constitute a source of high political leadership for the right-wing.

Universities of graduation also configure political affinities and reproduce class affiliations – already cemented in the secondary schools – in correspondence with the governments' social base. The leadership of traditional-elite universities is confirmed in all cabinets: between 91% and 86% of ministers were formed in this segment. It should be noted that all but one minister holding PhDs graduated from an elite university. There are relevant distinctions among elite higher education institutions too. In Bachelet's cabinets, the Universidad de Chile predominated above the more conservative and elitist Universidad Católica in a relation of 49%/24% in the first government and 48%/19% in the second. Piñera's cabinet, in turn, had an absolute majority of graduates from the *Católica*: 61% to 21% from the Universidad de Chile. The proportion of graduates from private secondary schools is also the highest among Piñera's ministers: 71%, compared to 36% and 21% of Bachelet's first and second governments, respectively. The school of graduation turns out to be a predictor of the level of academic achievement: in Bachelet mark I and Piñera's cabinets, ministers coming from private secondary schools are more likely to hold a PhD. As exemplary reproduction of a shared social origin, from the 27 of Piñera's ministers graduated from the Universidad Católica, 20 also came from a private secondary school. In Bachelet's cabinets, the relation between social origin and higher education institution is less determined: only 5 out of 11 graduates from the Universidad

Católica in the first government and 2 out of 8 in the second also attended private secondary schools, expressing a different social base for the political leadership of the centre-left.

5.2. Production of Data on the Chilean Public Administration and Considerations of Analysis

As the political relations among knowledge, professions and universities with the direction of the state are not limited to the highest positions in the cabinet, we assume that the massification of professional state work entails its own political affinities within the public administration. But unravelling such relations of political affinity represents a methodological challenge due to the lack of data (Colonnelli et al., 2018). So, to expose these relations, an effort of data production aimed to solve the problem of lack of information by generating databases with the members of the Chilean public administration, exposing for the first time the political affinities of its trends of recruitment and turnover from government to government. As with most endeavours of data production of this kind (Donoho, 2017), data was collected and prepared from sources for which the original purpose was not the study of the public administration, making specific procedures and consideration of analysis necessary.

5.2.1. Data Production

To analyse the professional configuration of the public administration, two databases with all the available information about individual state workers were produced for this research. Since the 1960s, previous research had worked either with aggregated data or surveys on samples of public functionaries. Thus, this data represents the first time that information is produced and analysed at an individual level to represent the Chilean public administration as a whole.

In 2009, the Transparency Act published hitherto unavailable individual information of public functionaries, albeit in screen-printed lists, reported separately by each public service and without conforming one integrated database for the state. We collected this information from its original source to produce the integrated database that was missing, conforming our primary source of information. A secondary database was put together from the registers of the Comptroller of the Republic, of which neither had been integrated and analysed before as a database, generating another original source that complemented information not available in the first one.

From the stage of data collection, we learned that the state has developed information about the public administration to fulfil different ends, such as auditing purposes or standards of administrative transparency, neither of which aims to the self-observation of the state as such. In this chapter, we attempt to compensate for such a deficit of self-understanding of the state.

With our focus on following the changes of personnel in the public administration, we had to be aware of problems of missing and broken data, which made precautions were necessary in order to preserve the maximum information possible while excluding cases that might not be safely attributable to real changes of personnel. The aggregated information obtained from DIPRES at the level of ministries and agencies (4.3.2. above) was useful to find missing data in our own databases. In such cases, we removed the whole agency/ministry to avoid confusing missing data with actual movements within the public administration. Table 5.2. shows the exclusions from both databases. Also, for reasons of theoretical scope, we excluded the health services from both databases, and the Prison-service from the transparency data. Information about military staff is confidential, so it is unavailable for both databases.

Table 5.2. Exclusions from Analysis of the Professional Composition of the Public Administration	
Transparency Data	
Ministries	Agencies
Defence Health Labour Mining Public Works	Council of Cinematographic Qualification Council of University Rectors <i>Chile-Compras</i> Fund of Solidarity and Social Investment National Board of Scholarships National Commission of Accreditation National Service of the Disabled National Service of the Elderly Service of Elections Superintendence of Education Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions Tax Revenues Treasury Under-secretariat of Agriculture Under-secretariat of Social Services **** Health-Service Prison-Service
Comptroller Data	
Agencies	
Agency of International Cooperation <i>Casa de Moneda</i> CORFO Customs Defence/Police Retirement Offices Enterprise for the supply of extreme zones Institute of Labour Security Local offices of education Law Office Public Works National Board of Aeronautics National Commission of Accreditation National Commission of Energy	National Council of Television National Fund of the Disabled National Oil Company National Service of the Disabled Service of Interior Service of Elections Superintendence of Broken Firms Regional Service of Housing Under-secretariat of Small Enterprises Under-secretariat of Agriculture *** Health-Service

[a] *Transparencia Database*

Produced in 2014-15, libraries in R programming language were used to retrieve and convert the lists published in the transparency online links (in html format) into 1,949 exportable tables (in .csv format). The main challenge at this stage stemmed from dissimilar formats and broken links entailing lost information. Apart from the abovementioned exclusions, to deal with this problem a long and painstaking process of cleaning of missing and repeated information was also applied to eliminate false cases. The resulting database incorporates 64,742 cases, from all strata of the central administration in 2009, 2012 and 2014.

The variables created from this dataset are name, ministry, agency, gender, working regime (*planta, contratada*), strata (directive, professional, technician, administrative, auxiliary), profession, salary and year of occupation. While the variable profession was coded upon assorted labels referring to occupations and qualifications, the variable sex was imputed on the individual names.

It must be noted that the information on the *profession* variable was progressively registered in the original sources, improving the completeness of this information towards the last years of the sample (2012-2014). Hence, missing values for this variable are prevalent among functionaries leaving the state before 2012. Furthermore, the year 2014 reflects a moment of transition between two governments, complicating the attribution of the variations in the public administration that year to one government alone.

[b] *Comptroller Database*

Produced in 2013 as the first database of the research, it is secondary for our analysis since it contains fewer cases than the transparency data and does not include the year 2014 either. The Comptroller data was sourced from the computer-based files, in excel format, of professional functionaries for the years 2009 and 2012. After exclusions, 34,930 cases are counted.

This dataset makes a unique addition to our analysis as it includes information on the university of graduation of state professionals. But since this particular information has not been registered in a systematic fashion – covering only one-third of the available cases – regression analysis was used to find a subsample in which the data of the university of graduation is aleatorily distributed among the cases, avoiding unwarranted biases in the analysis.

The created variables include name, function, service, ministry, profession, university, sex and age. As with the Transparency data, the coding of the profession and university variables crunched assorted labels for the same categories, whereas the variable sex was imputed upon individual names. Additionally, the age of each case was imputed on the national ID number.

The way we acceded to the Comptroller’s data was fortunate. One of our interviewees led us to it via the chief cabinet of the Comptroller, who, in turn, made the contact with the informatics department, which produced 73 excel reports with the required data for our research.

While data production involved personal information – already published in the transparency lists anyway – the names and IDs of state workers were only processed to validate, classify and match the information, without knowing and disclosing individual identities in the process.

5.2.2. State Functions

As discussed in the previous chapter (4.3.2. above), our analysis relies on the differentiation of state functions, as follows.

Political	Technical	Social/Cultural
General Secretariat of Government	Ministry of Agriculture	Ministry of Education
General Secretariat of the Presidency	Ministry of Economy	Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Defence	Ministry of Energy	Ministry of Labour
Ministry of Finance	Ministry of Housing	Ministry of Social Development
Ministry of Foreign Relations	Ministry of Lands	Ministry of Sports
Ministry of Interior	Ministry of Mining	National Council of Culture
Presidency of the Republic	Ministry of Public Infrastructure	National Service of Women
	Ministry of Transportation	

This classification is conventional. Poulantzas distinguished three ‘modalities of state function’ (1978, p.50), namely, the political function at the level of class struggle; the technico-economic function at the economic level, and; the ideological function at the cultural level. In this framework, the political function *overdetermines* the other two, ensuring the unity of the state vis-à-vis class conflict. Following this consideration, we classified the Ministry of Finance in the political function for its role in organising state policy in accordance to dominant class interests, therefore, as centre of state power (cf. Silva, 1996). In addition, our classification is also based on the expectations of correspondence with predominant occupations of state workers, so while the political ministries are expected to concentrate the roles of political administration, the technical ministries should also concentrate the technical occupations whereas the social/cultural ministries are the place for the social and cultural professions as well³². Our consideration of the occupations contributes to a more

³² Joignant (2011) offers a similar classification. But he referred to several *technical ministries* in our classification as *economic ministries*, also locating the Ministry of Finance in this category. In spite that he might be right in labelling the Ministry of Finance as *economic*, we maintain it in the *political* function for its

accurate classification of the actual functions of the state. In this way, by differentiating the state in terms of its functions not only can we specify changes in the public administration that might be overlooked in the general observation, but we can also relate them to the affinities of professional work in each case.

5.2.3. Problem, Questions, Hypotheses

In this chapter, the research problem is addressed in terms of the significance of professional state work in relation to political change, involving both its positioning within the state apparatus along trends of massification, and the reconfiguration of these positions by means of the mobility of professionals in and out the state with changes of government. While recent research has focused on state elites and technocrats, the political significance of an increasingly professionalised bureaucracy remains neglected. As discussed, our problem is further complicated by the lack of data about the changes in the public administration. Additionally, since the bureaucracy is not a 'manifest' political actor, but one that underlyingly determines the rationality of the state and influences state policy, we must resort to objective variables in order to interpret its political significance. Thus, in this chapter we empirically interpret the political affinities of professional state workers by the objective characteristics of this group, looking at how professions themselves and the respective educational backgrounds align with the organisation and political changes of the state. Our questions here are:

- To what extent does the professional composition of the public administration vary with political changes (of government)?
- Which professions tend to remain in office in spite of governmental changes, constituting the professional constant of the state, and which tend to rotate, constituting the variable professional leadership for changing directions of state power? Which professions assume dominant and subordinated roles in this process?
- How do the professional reconfigurations of the public administration differentiate throughout state functions, reinforcing or undermining them?

role as centre of state power. Further differences with Joignant's classification are appreciated as we incorporate the dimension of occupation. For instance, Joignant allocates a number of ministries in the *social function*, which we put within the *technical* category in our classification. In our perspective, regardless of the social impact that ministries like Housing or Health have, the technical occupations predominating therein enable us to classify them in the *technical* function. Indeed, these ministries have as much social impact as Public Works or Transportation, which Joignant classified as *economic*. Moreover, the Ministry of Lands, classified as *social* by Joignant, has little to do with social/cultural functions or occupations.

- How does the distribution of professionals, in conformity to their universities of graduation, differentiate positions, roles and relations of political affinity within the public administration?

To answer these questions, our main hypothesis assumes the unity between the ideological apparatuses conformed by a segmented university system and the professionals politically socialised therein, and the state apparatus, including its political direction and bureaucratic organisation. Changes of government are expected to trigger changes in the professional configuration of the public administration, incorporating professionals (and through them, representing universities) that are in affinity with the direction of the state and excluding (and subordinating) those that are not. Such tendencies would affect the *rank-and-file* public administration and not only the higher levels of political authority. We might then reject this hypothesis if the circulation of state professionals is not related to changes of government, or when it only takes place at the level of the state elites and governmental authorities, without affecting the broader public administration.

Specific hypotheses suggest specific professional alignments to political change.

1. It is expected that the movements of most politicized professions, in and out of the public administration, are correlated to changes of government. In contrast, other administrative or more technically specialized occupations and professional bureaucracies are not expected to respond to political change in the same manner, remaining in office in spite of changes of government.
2. The differentiation of state functions follows specific professional compositions. Hence, state functions might also react differently to political change. On this regard, Joignant (2011) sustains that the economic ministries are less likely to rotate its higher personnel – given the political value of their academic capitals (degrees in economics). While this observation may be true for the Minister of Finance, it remains to be seen whether state functions entail variations in the occupational stability of *rank-and-file* state workers.
3. It is expected that the political alignments of the university system are expressed through the distribution of their professionals in the public administration. The public and private cleavage might differentiate affinities towards centre-left and right-wing governments, respectively, whereas the elite-mass cleavage reflects the social differentiation of the public administration into dominant and subordinate roles.

5.3. The Professional Basis of Political Change

This section uses the Transparency database to represent the professional reconfigurations of the public administration throughout the changes of government.

5.3.1. Personnel Turnover

Our analysis starts determining, for the first time with actual data, the magnitudes of personnel rotation, under two changes of government, within the strata and functions of the public administration.

Table 5.4. Transitions of Personnel Through Political Changes by Strata and State Function 2009-2014			
	2009	2012	2014
Political function			
Managers	514 (100%)	364 (70.8%)	346 (67.3%)
Professionals	2,893 (100%)	2,268 (78.4%)	2,143 (74.1%)
Administrative staff, technicians, auxiliary	2,463 (100%)	2,084 (84.6%)	1,971 (80%)
Sub-total	5,870 (100%)	4,716 (80.3%)	4,460 (76%)
Technical Function			
Managers	747 (100%)	437 (58.5%)	415 (55.6%)
Professionals	5,539 (100%)	4,443 (80.2%)	4,126 (74.5%)
Administrative staff, technicians, auxiliary	5,167 (100%)	4,303 (83.3%)	3,912 (75.7%)
Sub-total	11,453 (100%)	9,183 (80.2%)	8,453 (73.8%)
Social/cultural function			
Managers	634 (100%)	302 (47.6%)	260 (41%)
Professionals	9,356 (100%)	7,203 (77%)	6,227 (66.6%)
Administrative staff, technicians, auxiliary	15,093 (100%)	12,955 (85.8%)	11,660 (77.3%)
Sub-total	25,083 (100%)	20,460 (81.6%)	18,147 (72.3%)
Total			
Managers	1,895 (100%)	1,103 (58.2%)	1,021 (53.9%)
Professionals	17,788 (100%)	13,914 (78.2%)	12,496 (70.2%)
Administrative staff, technicians, auxiliary	22,723 (100%)	19,342 (85.1%)	17,543 (77.2%)
Grand total	42,406 (100%)	34,359 (81%)	31,060 (73.2%)
Source: own data collection and elaboration from Transparent Government.			

As the last row of the table indicates, in a period of four to five years the state lost more than a quarter of the personnel it had in 2009. There are no sharp differences among state functions on this regard, but there are large ones among strata, and particularly among strata by state functions. While managers left the state in about 42% between 2009 and 2012, professionals did so in about 22% and administrative staff, technicians and auxiliary in 15%; by 2014, 46% of 2009 managers were gone as were 30% of professionals and 27% of administrative staff, technicians and auxiliary. In this manner, we confirm that political changes affect managers to a greater extent, but also affect the continuity of professionals. With regards to the administrative staff, technicians and auxiliary, we cannot exclude the possibility that political changes also determine their continuity in the state, but definitely to a lesser extent and surely combined with other trends, like the retirement affecting the relative reduction of *planta* functionaries, as discussed. In the social/cultural ministries,

both managers and professionals are more susceptible to leaving the state: it is indeed impressive that in such a short period of time, 59% of managers and 33% of professionals vanished from the public administration. Between the technical and political functions, there are no marked differences. Managers in the technical ministries are not staying more than in the political ministries, proving Joignant's point wrong in this regard. However, on the other hand, professional occupations from the technical ministries are the most stable among all state functions.

From 35 OECD countries covered in the report *Government at a Glance* (2017), Chile figures with the largest turnovers of state managers with changes of government. A survey differentiated four levels of management – from senior to middle –, adding 'ministry's advisors' as the fifth category. From all 35 countries, 21 including Chile, recognised the removal of *all* (95-100%) advisors; nine countries, also including Chile, admitted the removal of *all* senior management and; only three countries, with Chile among them, declared the replacement of *many* (50-94%) middle managers. Last, Chile was the only country declaring the replacement of *many* (50-94%) of the lowest level middle managers. Interestingly, as shown above, the magnitudes of managers turnover between 2009 and 2012 are less extreme (42%) than what is declared in the survey. While the OECD survey did not consider the professional level, the 23% of professionals leaving the public administration between 2009 and 2012 correspond to *some* state workers – under 50% in the categories of the survey – which continuity is affected by governmental change. As noted in the report, Chile's commitment to improving the stability of its managerial positions was materialized through the *system of civil service*, which we discussed in the previous chapter for its failure to produce a stable managerial leadership in the state.

As discussed in Chapter Four, the Chilean case has featured the mechanism of *political patronage* of the appointment of civil servants (Petras, 1969; Parrish, 1971; Valenzuela, 1984; Rajevic, 2014). In this, the situation of Chile does not differ from the circumstances of its region (Grindle, 2010). Actually, in spite of the fact that within the OECD the Chilean public administration is the less stable, within the Latin American context, it appears as one of the most meritocratic and career-oriented systems (Cortázar et al., 2014). Following the index of development of civil service (Longo, 2002), it is shown that Chile made more steps forward in the regional context, but basically for the implementation of reforms that have not reached the whole bureaucratic apparatus as the restriction for *political patronage* has been limited to the minority of *planta* functionaries, whereas the system of selection of high managers, as noted above, has been subjected to the same political vulnerability as political appointees. In other words, as argued by Grindle (2010), it is the implementation of systems of bureaucratic career, and not its design alone, which ultimately restricts the reach of *political patronage* upon the public administration.

Several studies for the Latin American region (Colonnelli, 2018; Schuster, 2016; Negri, 2015; Scherlis, 2010) specify the mechanisms with which political parties control the appointment and permanence of public functionaries. For the Chilean case, Ferraro (2008) unravels the political influence of congressmen on the hiring of higher civil servants. We assume that the power to recommend the appointment of state managers rests on the affiliation of the members of parliament to incumbent political parties. As Ferraro demonstrates, the recommendations conformed networks ranging from ten to forty higher civil servants by each political boss. But it is less clear to what extent such a practice – actually prohibited by the Constitution, but constitutive of the ‘unwritten rules of Chilean democracy’ (2008, p.110) according to this author – reaches the ordinary public administration. As shown so far, while the rotation of higher civil servants’ is more directly linked to changes of political authority, *rank-and-file* professionals might be indirectly affected by them, via the managers’ authority to hire and remove personnel. It is also expectable that political affiliation determines the continuity of professional personnel too, but without access to information on political militancy, the observation of the professions and academic backgrounds that circulate with changes of government is the closest we get to interpret the political significance of the public administration. In this way, the political significance of professional composition of the public administration, and the effect that professional knowledge has therein, particularly in terms of linking the direction of the public administration with the political process, do not take place against *political patronage*, but next or within the mechanisms of control that political parties exert on the state.

5.3.2. Professional Reconfigurations

To analyse the changing professional configurations of the public administration, we exclude the residual categories of the professional variable – i.e. no degree, no info, not identified professions. As noted, the ‘not identified professions’ are prevalent among the functionaries leaving in 2009-2012, so with the exclusion of this category, we limit the analysis of leavers of the period, also reducing the number of cases for 2009. The next two tables show the proportional distribution of professions in the state, describing the professional basis of state functions in general fashion, considering its dominant and subordinate roles, and representing its dynamics of change in time.

	Political			Technical			Social/cultural		
	2009	2012	2014	2009	2012	2014	2009	2012	2014
Public admin.	8.2%	8.5%	8.9%	3%	3.2%	3.5%	3.3%	3.7%	3.7%
Architecture	.3%	.7%	.7%	3.2%	3.4%	3.4%	.6%	.9%	1%
Art	.1%	.2%	.3%	.1%			.9%	1%	1.1%
Soc. Work	1.6%	1.8%	2.3%	2.4%	2.3%	2.3%	4.6%	5%	5.4%
Sciences	.3%	.3%	.3%	2.6%	2.8%	3.2%	.3%	.3%	.4%
Law	17.7%	17.3%	17.3%	5.8%	7.3%	7.3%	5.1%	6.1%	4.7%
Geography	.8%	.8%	.9%	.8%	1.1%	1.3%		.1%	.1%
Humanities	1.9%	1.8%	1.9%	.1%	.1%	.1%	.4%	.5%	.6%
Engineering	4.8%	6.8%	5.3%	6.2%	8.6%	8.4%	1%	1.8%	1.8%
Economics	10.7%	11.6%	11.4%	3.9%	4.7%	4.7%	2.2%	3.3%	2.9%
Education	2.9%	2.5%	2.6%	2.2%	2%	1.9%	36.4%	33.5%	33.8%
Communication	3.1%	4.2%	4.6%	1.4%	2%	2%	1.8%	2.5%	2.8%
Psychology	1%	1.9%	1.9%	.3%	.5%	.6%	2.5%	3.3%	3.6%
Natural Resour.	1.1%	1.3%	1.4%	20.1%	18.1%	18.6%	.3%	.4%	.4%
Health	.3%	.4%	.3%	.3%	.3%	.2%	2.9%	2.7%	2.8%
Sociology/Anthr.	.8%	1.3%	1.2%	.4%	.4%	.5%	1%	1.2%	1.4%
Technology	5.3%	5.6%	5.5%	11.8%	11.9%	11.3%	2.1%	2.7%	2.7%
Admin. semipro.	35.2%	29.4%	29.7%	22.5%	20.6%	20.3%	14.1%	14.6%	14%
Soc. Technicians	.6%	.6%	.6%	1.2%	1%	.9%	18.3%	13.9%	14.2%
Technicians	3.4%	3.3%	2.9%	11.6%	9.5%	9.5%	2.1%	2.5%	2.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	3,311	4,485	4,897	6,985	9,994	10,829	12,062	15,579	15,366

Source: own data collection and elaboration from Transparent Government.

The political function is mostly conducted by lawyers, economists and public administrators; their predominance there is not matched in other state functions. It is noteworthy that the presence of economists in the political function – where the Ministry of Finance is classified – is proportionally much larger than in the technical function, confirming that *technical ministries* are more technical than economic. The political function also features majority participation of *administrative semi-professions*, corresponding to a variety of non-university tertiary qualifications, such as accountancy.

At the technical function, the exclusion of the ministries of Health, Public Works and Mining eclipses the undisputed predominance of health professionals in the first ministry, and of engineers in the two latter. Still, data shows the largest proportional presence of engineers in this function compared to the other two. The predominance of natural resources and technology professionals also configures the specific professional profile of the technical ministries. Last, the category ‘technicians’, encompassing all sorts of non-university tertiary qualifications for technological occupations, has its highest participation in the technical ministries.

The social/cultural function operates with an overwhelming majority of teachers and social sciences professionals, mostly social workers and psychologists. The specificity of the social/cultural function is also visible in the majority participation of *social technicians*, representing non-university qualifications for social services.

To appreciate the political significance of professional reconfigurations, we observe the increases and decreases throughout the changes of government, with the right-wing moment of 2012 marking a breakpoint in relation to the adjacent years. Engineers and economists move in such a manner throughout all state functions, increasing their proportional presence from 2009 to 2012 and then moving back closer to their initial participation in 2014 – with the exception of the social/cultural function in 2014. The same pattern is verified with lawyers at the social/cultural ministries, illustrating the affinities of these professions with the shift towards the right-wing. In turn, social sciences professionals tend to experiment sustained increases in all functions. In general, constant increases in the participation of most professions takes place at the expense of the decrease of the administrative semi-professions. Anyway, expressing a configuration in the opposite direction, that is, leaning towards the centre-left, education professionals decrease their relative presence in 2012, recovering part of their participation in 2014 – with the exception of their constant decrease in the technical function – whereas the reconfiguration of sociology/anthropology in the social/cultural function also indicates a clear reduction of their proportional participation in 2012, which is recovered in 2014.

The next table repeats the observation on the managerial level, where professional reconfigurations might be more directly tied to changes of government.

Table 5.6. Professional Configurations by State Function, Managers 2009-2014

	Political			Technical			Social/cultural		
	2009	2012	2014	2009	2012	2014	2009	2012	2014
Public admin.	16.3%	12.2%	12.2%	5.1%	2.4%	3.5%	7.1%	5.5%	5.3%
Architecture	.6%	.4%	.6%	5.3%	6.4%	6.4%	1.6%	2.2%	1.8%
Art	.6%	.4%	.4%					1.2%	.7%
Soc. Work	1.9%	3.3%	3.1%	2%	1.5%	2.2%	1.6%	2.5%	3.8%
Sciences				2.4%	2.4%	3.2%			.2%
Law	28.8%	26.1%	26.8%	9.6%	16.4%	15.6%	23%	15.9%	17.4%
Geography	.6%	.9%	1%	.2%	.9%	1.7%	.4%		
Humanities	1.3%	.9%	1.4%			.1%	.8%	1%	1.1%
Engineering	4.8%	7.1%	4.9%	8.7%	14.4%	12.7%	2%	5.7%	5.9%
Economics	15.7%	17.8%	15.7%	8.5%	10%	10.8%	7.1%	8.5%	8.2%
Education	1.3%	1.1%	2.4%	2.7%	1.7%	1.8%	19.4%	25.9%	29.4%
Communication	1.9%	2.7%	3.1%	.2%	.4%	.6%	1.2%	3.5%	2.4%
Psychology	.3%	1.8%	1.2%	.2%	.1%	.1%	.8%	3%	2.7%
Natural Resour.	.6%	.7%	.2%	21.4%	18.6%	17.6%	.4%	1%	1.3%
Health	.3%	.4%	.6%		.3%	.4%	6.7%	5.2%	2.9%
Sociology/Anthr.	1%	.9%	1.4%	.7%	.1%	.5%	3.6%	2.2%	3.7%
Technology	2.6%	2.9%	3%	11.6%	10%	8.2%	1.6%	1.2%	1.3%
Admin. semipro.	19.9%	18.7%	20.3%	18.7%	12.8%	13.2%	20.2%	12.9%	10.1%
Soc. Technicians		.2%	.2%	.4%	.3%	.2%	2.0%	1.5%	1.3%
Technicians	1.3%	1.3%	1.6%	2.2%	1.3%	1.3%	.4%	1%	.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	312	449	508	449	751	834	252	402	547

Source: own data collection and elaboration from Transparent Government.

The proportions above have to be contrasted with those in the table 5.5., so we see which professions are dominant in the sense that their presence is larger at the managerial level than in the total proportions. Only four professions: public administration, law, engineering and economics, consistently present a relatively larger presence in the managerial level compared to their total participation, configuring dominant professional roles. In some functions, such predominance is more pronounced than in others. Public administrators have their largest participation among the political managers – although this might be the case of administrative positions rather than political roles as such. In turn, the transversal leadership of lawyers is comparatively less relevant at the technical function, whereas economists have reduced participation at the social/cultural function. Engineers predominate, with their more specialised direction, at the technical function. Conversely, a situation of subordinated professional roles is configured once their proportional presence in the managerial level is comparatively lesser than in the total proportions. As observed, social sciences and education professionals tend to have minor proportional participation in the managerial level, conforming subordinated professional roles, even at the social/cultural ministries, where these professionals might be closer to having established jurisdictions. For instance, while in 2009 lawyers represented 5.1% and teachers 36.4% of social/cultural ministries, among managers the former represented 23% versus 19.4% the latter. The situation of sociology/anthropology – classified together both for reasons of affinity and small numbers – is exceptional in this regard: while their total participation is similar in the social/cultural and political functions, in both segments their access to the managerial level is comparatively higher – with the exception of the political function in 2012, which suggests that these professionals were less regarded for managerial roles in the political ministries under the right-wing government. Moreover, while social workers tended to have a larger proportional representation among managers of the political function for all observations, communication professionals also had a proportionately larger participation in the managerial level of the social/cultural function in 2012.

As anticipated, at the managerial positions, reconfigurations are more clearly appreciated in relation to changes of government. Engineers and economists show pronounced tendencies to increase during Piñera's government and to decrease back to their original position with Bachelet in 2014. Lawyers, in turn, decrease their participation among the political and social/cultural managers. So, from the perspective of the general professional configuration of the political and social/cultural functions, engineers and economists seem to provide most of the new leadership for the right-wing government. In the technical function, movements in affinity to the right-wing are mostly verified with engineering and law. With regards to the social sciences professionals, which did not display

clear patterns in the total proportions, they do it at the managerial level. While psychology and communication move in a similar pattern to engineering and economics in the political and social/cultural functions, increasing their participation with Piñera and decreasing back in 2014 – with the exception of communication in the political and technical functions in 2014 – sociology/anthropology follow the opposite trend, decreasing with Piñera and restoring part of their leadership in 2014 in all functions. Social work also follows a similar pattern in the technical and social/cultural functions. Thus, instead of the right-wing prescinding from the social sciences at the managerial levels – as it does in the ministers’ cabinet – it resorts to some of the social sciences professions, privileging psychologists and communication professionals for that matter. The decrease of public administrators relates to a decline of administrative roles in favour of specialised ones. Within trends of professionalisation, the jurisdiction of public administrators is challenged by *hybrid professionalism* that, while mastering specialised fields of knowledge, also assumes roles of political administration (Evetts, 2011; Martin, 2011; Noordegraaf, 2015).

5.3.3. Exits and Hires

Comparisons of exits and hires focus on the actual movements of the personnel. From this point on, the analysis is limited to professional personnel only, excluding administrative semi-professions and technicians, as well as the administrative, technical and auxiliary strata. To the nine professions indicated in the following tables, a tenth residual category aggregates all the specialised technical, scientific and artistic professions.

In the next three tables, one for each state function, we find that the larger the distance between exits and hires for a given profession, the clearer is the political affinity in relation to changes of government.

	Exits 2009-2012		Hires 2009-2012		Exits 2012-2014		Hires 2012-2014	
	All	Managers	All	Managers	All	Managers	All	Managers
Public Admin.	3.3%		10.6%	6.8%	8.5%	10.8%	12.4%	12.4%
Social Work	4.6%		3.6%	4.5%	2.7%	2.4%	5.9%	4.1%
Law	44.1%	50%	20%	30.8%	21.5%	31.3%	22.9%	32%
Engineering	2.6%	3.6%	13.2%	13.5%	17.2%	15.7%	5.2%	6.2%
Economics	17.8%	28.6%	17.5%	22.6%	17%	20.5%	15.8%	13.4%
Education	3.3%	3.6%	1.6%	1.5%	2.9%	1.2%	3.6%	5.2%
Communication	10.5%	3.6%	9.8%	6%	10.3%	4.8%	12%	7.2%
Psychology	1.3%	3.6%	5.2%	6%	5.1%	4.8%	4.4%	4.1%
Sociology/Anthr.	2%	3.6%	3.4%	1.5%	3.6%	2.4%	3.1%	5.2%
Specialised prof.	10.5%	3.6%	15.1%	6.8%	11.2%	6.0%	14.6%	10.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	152	28	1,036	133	447	83	676	97

Source: own data collection and elaboration from Transparent Government.

While lawyers represent 50% of leavers of the political function in 2009-2012, they account for 20% of hires, indicating a declining presence, particularly among the newcomers with the incumbent government. But instead of economists capitalising on lawyers' decline, since they left and got hired in equivalent proportions, engineers advanced more with the new government. This profession left in a proportion of 2.6% in 2009-2012, but accumulated 13.2% of hires. Journalists and psychologists also increased their participation in the hires in relation to the exits in 2009-2012, gravitating towards the right-wing government. In turn, as public administrators did not register leavers at the managerial level, we reaffirm the point about this profession as predominantly occupied in administrative positions, which are less responsive to changes of government.

The following period 2012-2014 marks the return of the centre-left with an exodus of lawyers, economists and engineers. But while lawyers and economists are replaced with relatively similar proportions of hires, engineers are not to an equivalent extent, diluting their participation in the political function. In the case of sociology/anthropology, although the proportion of leavers is higher than hires in the total proportions, their presence increases with the managers' hires of 2014.

	Exits 2009-2012		Hires 2009-2012		Exits 2012-2014		Hires 2012-2014	
	All	Managers	All	Managers	All	Managers	All	Managers
Public Admin.	5.9%	7.7%	5.1%	1%	3.3%	.7%	5.3%	5.6%
Social Work	3.2%	2.6%	2.5%		3%	1.4%	2.9%	3.1%
Law	34.8%	25.6%	15.4%	24.4%	17.8%	28.6%	15%	20%
Engineering	6.3%	7.7%	17.2%	21.8%	13.8%	16.4%	11.6%	14.4%
Economics	9%	20.5%	8.5%	12.4%	9.5%	12.1%	7.6%	14.4%
Pedagogy	2.3%	2.6%	1.5%	1.3%	1.5%	2.9%	1.1%	2.1%
Communication	5.4%	2.6%	4.3%	.7%	5.2%	1.4%	4.9%	2.1%
Psychology	1.4%		1.3%	.3%	.6%		1.3%	
Sociology/Anthr.	1.4%		.8%		1%	.7%	1.2%	2.1%
Specialised prof.	30.3%	30.8%	43.3%	38.1%	44.3%	35.7%	49.0%	36.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	221	39	2,558	307	939	140	1,503	195

Source: own data collection and elaboration from Transparent Government.

As a majority within the technical function, specialised professions predominate both in exits and hires, but in a rather constant way, without describing sharp contrasts attributable to political affinities. Then, lawyers, economists and engineers explain most variations. Most characteristically, as engineers show little de-affiliation in 2009-2012 compared to lawyers and economists, they also bring larger proportions of new personnel. While exits of 2012-2014 affected mostly lawyers and engineers, both professions also led the hires – after the specialised professions –, but in a smaller proportion than in 2009-2012 – especially engineers. In turn, the contrasts between exits and hires

for the social sciences confirm its marginal position in the technical ministries, yet with a certain affinity for Bachelet governments.

Table 5.9. Exits/Hires by Profession, Social/Cultural Function – Total and Managers

	Exits 2009-2012		Hires 2009-2012		Exits 2012-2014		Hires 2012-2014	
	All	Managers	All	Managers	All	Managers	All	Managers
Public Admin.	1.8%	5.6%	5.1%	3.6%	5.6%	5.7%	5.2%	3.2%
Social Work	2.4%	5.6%	6.8%	3.2%	5.2%	5.7%	8.1%	7.4%
Law	11.8%	30.6%	11.3%	21.3%	11.1%	13.2%	12.5%	18.9%
Engineering	1.4%	2.8%	4.6%	9%	5.5%	11.3%	6.1%	6.5%
Economics	2.4%	16.7%	7.7%	10.9%	8.1%	8.5%	5.1%	8.8%
Education	61.8%	22.2%	36.1%	34.4%	38.2%	34.9%	31.8%	38.2%
Communication	4.8%	2.8%	5.5%	4.1%	5.3%	6.6%	7.6%	3.2%
Psychology	2.4%	2.8%	6.8%	4.5%	5.7%	2.8%	7.7%	4.1%
Sociology/Anthr.	1.4%	2.8%	2.5%	1.4%	2.5%	.9%	3.8%	4.1%
Specialised prof.	9.7%	8.3%	13.7%	7.7%	12.8%	10.4%	11.9%	5.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	626	36	3246	221	1449	106	1562	217

Source: own data collection and elaboration from Transparent Government.

The social/cultural function differentiates clearer political affinities: on the one hand, between the social sciences professions and education with Bachelet governments and, on the other, between the more *positivistic* professions of engineering and economics with Piñera's government in 2012. Regarding the first type of affinities, the proportional hires of social sciences and education professionals are comparatively lower in 2009-2012 than in 2012-2014 – with the exception of teachers' hires. The tendencies are the opposite for the second group: its hires are higher in 2009-2012 than in 2012-2014 – with the exception of engineers' hires in 2014. Expectably, the change to the right-wing government represented a jurisdictional challenge for the social sciences and teaching professions, with more or less established niches at the social/cultural ministries.

Differences between the two types of alignments are also observed at the managerial level. Economists are overrepresented in those positions in all hires, whereas engineers only predominate in the hires of 2009-2012. Still, these professions, including law, decrease their proportional hires in 2012-2014 compared to 2009-2012. In turn, the social sciences and education professionals had proportional increases in the managers' hires of 2012-2014 compared to 2009-2012 – with the exception of psychology and communication. Only the cases of sociology/anthropology and education were overrepresented in the managers' hires of 2014. As observed in the political function, journalists and psychologists also appeared as the preferred choice of social sciences professionals for managerial roles under a right-wing government in the social/cultural function, with sociologists/anthropologists leaning towards the centre-left at that level.

To close this point, we present a total panorama of the hires in the two periods, distinguishing total proportions from the managerial level as done so far. Proportions are read by row, comparing newcomers with stayers, observing the changes within professions themselves.

	Professionals				Managers			
	New	Old	Total	N	New	Old	Total	N
Public Admin.	37.0%	63%	100%	1091	21.1%	78.9%	100%	95
Social Work	31.6%	68.4%	100%	1019	36.1%	63.9%	100%	36
Law	45.4%	54.6%	100%	2132	53.6%	46.4%	100%	304
Engineering	52.5%	47.5%	100%	1380	64.4%	35.6%	100%	163
Economics	45.6%	54.4%	100%	1418	48.7%	51.3%	100%	189
Education	23.6%	76.4%	100%	5209	67.2%	32.8%	100%	122
Communication	55.8%	44.2%	100%	704	65.5%	34.5%	100%	29
Psychology	48%	52%	100%	642	90.5%	9.5%	100%	21
Sociology/anthropology	49.1%	50.9%	100%	279	35.7%	64.3%	100%	14
Specialized prof.	32.7%	67.3%	100%	5225	38.9%	61.1%	100%	368
Total	35.8%	64.2%	100%	19099	49.3%	50.7%	100%	1341

Source: own data collection and elaboration from Transparent Government.

The table shows that 36% of all professionals and 49% of managers were new at the state in 2009-2012, with journalists and engineers holding the largest probabilities – over 50% – of being hired. Only in the cases of social work, education and the specialised technical and artistic professions, the proportions of newcomers are below the total proportion of hires in this period. Some variations of these trends are observed at the managerial level, particularly as most psychologists (91%) were new hires for that period.

The case of engineering seems crucial to explain the colonisation of the state in 2012. Looking at the specific state functions, we find that while in the political function engineers had 48% of newcomers in 2012, 39% of this latter group only worked for the right-wing government, leaving before 2014. Then, in the technical function, 51.3% of engineers were new in 2012, but of which 20% left before 2014, expressing a more stable occupational link with the technical roles at the state. Last, at the social/cultural function, where an impressive 62% of engineers were new in 2009-2012, 37% of them had left before 2014, indicating nothing but political loyalty with the right-wing government. The 37% of engineers only working for Piñera’s government is the largest among all professions in the social/cultural function. As argued, a jurisdictional challenge took place at the social/cultural function of the state, by means of positivistic professions contingently displacing the work of hermeneutic types knowledge within the public administration. That is the way in which a right-wing government occupied the state to make social/cultural policy.

	Professionals				Managers			
	New	Old	Total	N	New	Old	Total	N
Public Admin.	20.2%	79.8%	100%	1215	25%	75%	100%	120
Social Work	18.6%	81.4%	100%	1135	47.3%	52.7%	100%	55
Law	25%	75%	100%	2302	30.7%	69.3%	100%	361
Engineering	21.7%	78.3%	100%	1412	29.4%	70.6%	100%	163
Economics	20.6%	79.4%	100%	1460	27.9%	72.1%	100%	215
Education	10.3%	89.7%	100%	5233	48.9%	51.1%	100%	188
Communication	33.7%	66.3%	100%	811	52.9%	47.1%	100%	34
Psychology	24%	76%	100%	707	59.1%	40.9%	100%	22
Sociology/anthropology	30.8%	69.2%	100%	321	58.1%	41.9%	100%	31
Specialized prof.	18.9%	81.1%	100%	5413	23.3%	76.8%	100%	400
Total	18.7%	81.3%	100%	20009	32.0%	68.0%	100%	1589

Source: own data collection and elaboration from Transparent Government.

Last, during the transition back to the centre-left, the hires in 2012-2014 describe larger proportions of new personnel, particularly for journalists and sociologists/anthropologists. While these numbers might combine both Piñera and Bachelet's governments in our data, they still suggest indications of the affinities of the social sciences. We find these tendencies reinforced with social work, education, communication, psychology and sociology/anthropology also having the largest proportions among the newly hired managers.

5.3.4. Rewards of Political Change

Dominant and subordinated professional roles, established through political affinities with government changes, express their differences in wages too. Table 5.12. shows wages means for 2012-14 – 2009 is excluded from the analysis due to lack of information.

	2012		2014	
	Professional	Managers	Professional	Managers
Public admin.	2,462	4,340	2,543	4,246
Social Work	2,051	3,685	2,167	3,797
Law	2,671	4,987	2,758	5,149
Engineering	2,707	5,235	2,813	5,071
Economics	2,609	5,373	2,738	5,375
Teaching	1,855	3,258	2,063	3,367
Communication	2,183	3,494	2,276	3,815
Psychology	2,114	3,640	2,179	4,020
Sociology/Anthr.	2,204	3,923	2,348	4,330

Frequencies start > £1,200; Conversion from Chilean peso to British Pounds: www.oanda.com, 02/13/2018

Source: own data collection and elaboration from Transparent Government.

The values confirm the dominance of lawyers, engineers and economists – public administrators too, but from a lower place. Within the social sciences, sociologists/anthropologists catch the largest rewards.

With the change of government back to the centre-left in 2014, the social sciences and teaching professions had the largest salary increases compared to 2012. Teaching and sociology/anthropology had the largest proportional increase at the professional level: 11% and 7%, respectively. At the managerial level, psychology, sociology/anthropology and communication led the increases, with a positive difference of about 10%, contrasting with the 3% reduction of engineering and the 0% increase of economics.

5.3.5. Regression Models

A series of multivariate logistic regression models represent the chances professions have of leaving and entering the public administration when a new coalition comes into office, indicating the intensity and direction of the correlation between professions and the political orientations of the state. The following table summarises the variables introduced into the regression models.

Table 5.13. Variables for Regressions Models Predicting Leaves and Hires of the Public Administration	
Dependent variable	
Absence from an adjacent period as indicator of entry or leave from the public administration	
Predictors	
Input variables	Reference categories
Professions: Social Work Law Engineering Economics Teaching Communication/Journalism Psychology Sociology/Anthropology Other: specialised technical/artistic professionals	Public administration
Gender Female	Male
Stratum Managers	Professionals
Working regime Hired-by-year (<i>Contrata</i>) / Other	Career/tenured bureaucracy (<i>Planta</i>)

While the variable ‘professions’ is at the centre of our analysis, the control variables – gender, strata and working regime – increase the robustness of the models, adding alternative explanations to the functionaries’ rotation. Thus, regression models synthesise the net effect of each variable over changes of personnel.

'Public administration' defines the reference category for the profession variable – against which the *odds* of leaving and entering the state are compared. Although public administrators occupy dominant positions in the bureaucracy, their attachment to administrative roles fundamentals the expectation that these professionals are less reactive to political change, making them a suitable yardstick to measure the movements for all the rest.

Table 5.14. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Leaves and Entries to the State by Function

	Political function				Technical function				Social/Cultural function			
	Leave 2009- 2012	Entry 2009- 2012	Leave 2012- 2014	Entry 2012- 2014	Leave 2009- 2012	Entry 2009- 2012	Leave 2012- 2014	Entry 2012- 2014	Leave 2009- 2012	Entry 2009- 2012	Leave 2012- 2014	Entry 2012- 2014
Predictors (Odds Ratio)												
Profession (ref.: Public administration)												
Social Work	9.331***	1.814*	1.384	2.075**	.779	.539**	1.406	.782	.657	.683**	.525***	.915
Law	6.956***	.986	1.340	.995	3.223***	1.576**	2.475***	1.345	3.214***	1.676***	1.260	1.467*
Engineering	1.132	1.686**	2.897***	.527**	.444*	1.438**	1.470	.843	2.419	2.418***	1.961***	2.248***
Economics	3.830**	1.115	1.403	.881	1.052	1.105	1.956**	.969	1.483	1.697***	1.393*	.904
Education	4.398*	.733	1.887	1.426	.648	.526**	.927	.448**	2.398**	.534***	.567***	.572***
Communication	10.415***	3.053***	3.044***	2.444***	2.560*	1.779**	3.166***	1.721**	4.306***	1.728***	1.270	2.108***
Psychology	3.367	3.436***	2.606**	1.628	2.571	2.414**	1.224	1.247	1.211	1.145	.834	1.290
Sociology/Anthropology	8.221**	4.636***	3.730***	2.423**	1.680	1.200	2.335*	1.664	2.045	1.208	1.020	1.669*
Other: specialised prof.	2.878*	1.194	1.129	.964	.359**	.613***	1.108	.813	2.212*	.990	.796	1.131
Gender (ref.: male)												
Female	.799	.775**	.896	.797*	.730*	1.031	.822*	1.092	1.736***	1.045	.855*	.871*
Stratum (ref.: professionals)												
Managers	3.301***	5.208***	4.539***	3.993***	2.807***	8.207***	2.331***	7.817***	4.848***	20.071***	2.374***	19.039***
Working regime (ref.: planta)												
Contrata	3.109***	8.010***	3.231***	4.815***	1.256	7.044***	1.490**	5.747***	1.852***	7.314***	1.149	5.165***
Intercept	.009***	.094***	.044***	.077***	.063***	.115***	.083***	.050***	.016***	.091***	.219***	.045***
-2 log-likelihood	973.654	3234.532	2302.101	3027.377	1551.076	8213.532	5270.245	7145.326	4090.258	11180.820	7854.200	7832.315
Cox & Snell R Square	.042	.144	.049	.066	.043	.094	.021	.033	.019	.107	.027	.068
Nagelkerke R Square	.098	.197	.084	.101	.127	.127	.038	.051	.043	.149	.047	.115
Sample size	1,870	2,782	2,782	3,071	4,235	6,664	6,664	7,286	7,085	9,589	9,589	9,586
*p< .05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.												
Source: own data collection and elaboration from Transparent Government.												

The table contains twelve regression models, four by three state functions, predicting changes of personnel for the exits 2009-2012; hires 2009-2012; exits 2012-2014 and hires 2012-2014. The columns indicate each prediction, with rows indicating the *odds ratio* of the predictor variables. Full models are available in the statistical appendix.

Starting with the first series of models for the political function, our control variables of stratum and working regime provide significant predictors of the rotation of personnel, with the managers and *contrata* explaining greater *odds* – between three and eight times than the respective reference categories – of moving in and out the public administration in all models. In turn, the category ‘women’ is not a significant predictor of the leaves, whereas it predicts negative *odds* of entering the state in both periods 2009-2012 and 2012-2014.

Focusing on the professions, exits for 2009-2012 are best predicted by communication, social work and law. Indeed, these professions have, respectively, ten, nine and seven times more *odds* than public administration of leaving the state in this period. With lower significance, sociology/anthropology, economics, education and specialised professions also have more *odds* than the reference category of leaving the political ministries under Piñera’s government. In the second column, we find that social sciences professionals, namely sociologists, psychologists and journalists, have the highest *odds* of being hired in 2009-2012, with engineers and social workers immediately after them, although with lower significance to that effect. In fact, those professions accrued the largest proportions of new personnel within their ranks at the political function in 2012 – between 66 and 46%. Within this group, journalists and engineers are the more numerous, with more than a hundred newcomers. The model for the exits of 2012-2014 confirms the affinities of the professionals hired in the previous period, as sociologists/anthropologists, engineers, journalists and psychologists – in that decreasing order from highest to lowest *odds* – predict the leaves from the political ministries before the change to the centre-left. The last model on the hires 2012-2014 completes the observation on the political function with journalists, sociologists/anthropologists and social workers as significant predictors – with more than two times more *odds* than the reference category – to explain the incorporations in this period. Notoriously, engineers contribute with negative *odds* of being hired in 2012-2014.

In total, the changing of orientations of political ministries are best characterised by the negative *odds* engineers have of reaching the state in 2012-2014 – contrasting with the movements of this profession in the previous observations, namely, as a not significant predictor of leaves in 2009-2012, and as a significant predictor of hires in 2009-2012 and leaves in 2012-2014. Engineers provide proof of the alignment with the changes of government, whereas social sciences professionals appear in constant rotation at the political function. Noteworthy, economists are not

significant predictors of the turnover of functionaries for the periods considered – with the exception of leaves of 2009-2012. Therefore, it seems that in relation to the other predictor variables, this profession has become more expressive of the administrative rationality of the political function, rather than of its contingent colonisation. Economists appear closer to the behaviour of lawyers in the political function than of engineers as far as the occupation of the state by the right-wing is concerned.

At the technical function, we also find that managers and *contratas* are significant predictors of the rotations of functionaries in most observations – excepting *contratas* in the leaves of 2009-2012. In turn, women represent negative *odds* of leaving the state in the respective observations.

Regarding the professions as predictors of the changes of personnel in the technical ministries, lawyers and, with lower significance, journalists are the only professions predicting leaves in 2009-2012. While engineering and the specialised professions have negative *odds* of leaving by 2012, their established position in the technical function is confirmed. The hires of 2009-2012 are best predicted by psychologists, journalists, lawyers and engineers, with social workers, teachers and specialised professions having negative *odds* to that effect. Leaves of 2012-2014 are best predicted by the same professions with the highest *odds* of being hired in the previous period: communication and law, with economists and sociologists/anthropologist also joining them. Last, hires of 2012-2014 are only predicted by the communication professionals, who in this way circulate in and out the technical ministries in all periods. Education also appears with negative *odds* of being hired in 2012-2014.

In sum, as lawyers and journalists are the most consistent predictors of the rotations of personnel, and while engineering and the specialised professions, which are actually predominant in this function, are not particularly fluctuant, we find that the professional configuration of the technical function appears as less dependent on the political affinities established with the changes of government. Indeed, with one exception, the models for the technical function have lower predictive capacity than for the other functions.

Last, at the social/cultural function we also find that managers, *contratas* and women significantly predict the rotation of personnel – characteristically women appear with 70% more *odds* than men of leaving the state in 2009-2012, without predicting the hires of 2009-2012.

Regarding the professions, journalists and social workers appear as the best predictors of leaves in 2009-2012, with education and the specialised professions also joining them but with lower significance. Hires of the same period are characteristically led by engineers, with more than two times more *odds* than public administrators of entering the social/cultural ministries. As anticipated, this prediction is exemplary of the changes undertaken by the right-wing government in the

social/cultural function. Also, journalists, economists, and lawyers feature with significant *odds* of reaching the social/cultural ministries, whereas social workers and teachers have negative *odds* to that effect. In the subsequent period 2012-2014, the affinity of engineers with the right-wing is confirmed as this profession again holds the highest *odds* predicting exits from the state – followed by economists. As noted, engineers had the largest proportion of personnel that only stayed for Piñera’s government in the social-cultural function. For the same period, teachers and social workers again appeared with negative *odds* of leaving the state, which is an indication of these professions as the most established core of the social/cultural function. Then, the hires of 2012-2014 defy the tendencies, as engineers again appear with the highest *odds* of being hired, followed by journalists and, with lower significance, sociologists/anthropologists and lawyers. In turn, teachers display negative *odds* of entering the state. As we bear in mind that 2014 provides a more complicated observation, with trends attributable to both Piñera and Bachelet governments, it is also visible that the *odds* of engineers predicting hires in 2012-2014 are less than in 2009-2012. With the participation of sociologists/anthropologists and the exclusion of economists as predictors of the hires of 2012-2014, a different professional configuration for the social/cultural function is anyway expressed in this observation with respect to the hires of 2009-2012.

The following table integrates the regression models for all state functions, incorporating them as predictors – with the technical function as reference category – to find out whether these variables contribute to explain the net effect of professions in the turnovers before political changes.

Table 5.15. Integrated Logistic Regression Models Predicting Leaves and Entries to the State				
	Leave 2009-2012	Entry 2009-2012	Leave 2012-2014	Entry 2012-2014
Predictors (Odds Ratio)				
Profession (ref. cat.: Public administration)				
Social Work	.964	.680***	.770	.911
Law	3.902***	1.435***	1.549***	1.274*
Engineering	1.076	1.788***	1.680***	1.023
Economics	1.818*	1.304**	1.522***	.934
Education	2.410***	.500***	.732**	.510***
Communication	4.434***	2.000***	2.038***	2.039***
Psychology	1.376	1.309*	1.156	1.208
Sociology/Anthropology	2.381**	1.484**	1.622**	1.739***
Other: specialised prof.	1.116	.801**	.944	.924
Gender (ref.: male)				
Female	1.225**	.997	.852***	.944
Stratum (ref.: pros.)				
<i>Managers</i>	3.705***	9.143***	2.702***	8.216***
Regime (ref.: planta)				
<i>Contrata</i>	1.939***	7.268***	1.604***	4.792***
State Function (ref.: technical function)				
Political function	1.126	.936	1.031	1.121*
Social/cultural function	1.184	1.122**	1.421***	.983
Intercept	.018***	.094***	.092***	.056***
-2 log-likelihood	6735.184	22863.616	15552.933	18219.661
Cox & Snell R Square	.025	.099	.022	.048
Nagelkerke R Square	.061	.135	.039	.078
Sample size	13,190	19,035	19,035	19,943
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.				
Source: own data collection and elaboration from Transparent Government.				

The integrated models confirm the managers' propensity to rotate in relation to professionals, as well as of *contratas* in relation to *plantas*. In turn, women only slightly predict the leaves of 2009-2012, whereas they also have fewer *odds* of leaving the state in 2012-2014. Regarding state functions, the rotation of functionaries of the social/cultural ministries appears more directly affected by political change, inasmuch as both the hires of 2009-2012 and leaves of 2012-2014 are better predicted by these ministries – with the political function only significantly predicting the hires of 2012-2014, but with a small effect, above the technical function.

With regards to professions, tendencies summarise and confirm the affinities with political changes. By far, journalists predict more *odds* – more than two times than public administrators – both for entering and leaving the state for all observations. It may no longer be possible to find this profession aligned to one political tendency – although the coefficients suggest a certain affinity to the centre-left. In the same way, the movements of lawyers also provide significant predictions for all observations, but without describing consistent affinities. In turn, the cases of education, social

work, psychology and the specialized professions represent minor movements in and out of the state in relation to the reference category. Thus, the clearest political affinities expressed in the integrated models are verified with the cases economics and engineering. The *odds* of these professions appear clearly aligned with Piñera's government, with engineering leading the predictions of the hires of 2009-2012 and the exits of 2012-2014. Last, the case of sociologists/anthropologists might be more complicated since these professionals deliver significant predictions of all observations, similarly to journalists and lawyers. However, while its predictive capacity has lower significance in the first three observations, this group proves as a highly significant predictor of the hires of 2012-2014, confirming the affinity expressed with the centre-left in the models by state functions as well as in the descriptive analysis.

5.4. Towards an Ideological Division of Professional State Labour

Our final observation represents the ideological affinities of the universities by the distribution of their professionals in the public administration. We speak of an *ideological division of professional state labour* when the differentiation of professional roles across state functions and roles not only obeys occupational reasons, but also represents the political orientations and social backgrounds crystallised in different types of universities. Typically, the leadership of the state is tied to the elite universities representing its dominant interests (Suleiman, 1974; Bourdieu, 1996). But under conditions of *mass intellectuality*, the *ideological division of professional state labour* is not exhausted by dominant roles, but reaches subordinated ones as well. In effect, professionals from mass universities tend to occupy functions that are closer to subaltern interests. Thereby, one same profession, but with different academic backgrounds, might serve divergent interests within the state. Through the *ideological division of professional state labour*, the universities represent the social and political interests underlying state power.

But information on the university of graduation of public functionaries is scarce. The data gathered from the Comptroller registers is the only source of information available in this regard, even when this particular variable has only been partially registered. In order to analyse this information without unwarranted biases two logistic regressions were applied, one for each observation: 2009 and 2012, seeking for trends that would explain the possession of data about university of graduation, using gender, ministry and profession as predictors to that effect. The regressions were applied on subsamples under an estimated age of 39 years old for the cases of 2009 and 36 for 2012. Since age is estimated by the functionaries' IDs at the time of data collection, the subsamples are integrated by cases of similar age in each year. The rationale of selecting subsamples of young civil servants rested on the assumption that this group is more educated than

the older generations, with higher education degrees more prevalent. Also, for cases of 2012, the functionaries continuing in the registers from 2009 were excluded, only taking new cases for that year into account. In total, the subjects in the subsample are more likely to have informed their professional qualifications, and the institution from where these were obtained, more recently as well. As a result, few categories were significantly biased to possessing information on the university of graduation. But rather than eliminating these categories, we take them as limitations of the analysis. In both models, sex did not entail significant differences in this regard. However, in 2009, psychologists had more *odds*, although with the lowest significance, of having this information than the reference category (other professions). Also, two ministries were significant in this respect. With only 21 members within the subsample, the Ministry of Energy had more *odds* than the reference category (Ministry of Lands) of having information about the university of graduation of its functionaries, whereas the Ministry of Finance had negative *odds* of doing so. Yet, these biases should compensate each other, as they did not affect the aleatory distribution of this information in the remaining professions that year. In 2012, the Ministry of Finance maintained its bias towards having less information about university of graduation, with the Ministry of Mining also joining in this effect. In turn, two professions, engineering and communication, also resulted in significant predictors on the possession of this information. We take these differences as an accurate expression of the changes undergone by the public administration in 2012, precisely as engineers and journalists had the highest probabilities of being new hires that year (table 5.10.). Full regression models are available in the statistical appendix.

In conformity to these limitations, and also because 2009 has less information on the university variable than 2012, only a global comparison between both subsamples is presented.

Table 5.16. Distribution of Type of University of Graduation of State Professionals by Year (sub-sample)		
	2009+	2012++
Public-Elite	29.3%	31%
Public-Mass	22.6%	20.1%
Private-Elite	2.9%	6%
Private-Mass (commercially-oriented)	19.1%	17.2%
Private-Mass (public-oriented)	6.9%	4.8%
Supreme Court	6.3%	11.5%
Non-University HEIs	12.9%	9.4%
Total	100%	100%
N	969	5,394
+: age < 39; ++: age < 36 & not registered in 2009		
Source: Own collection and elaboration from Comptroller of the Republic's data		

The types of universities in the table correspond to the same categories of Chapter Two. Nevertheless, the category *Supreme Court* is used by the Comptroller to refer to the institution that

formally graduates lawyers in the country – in spite of the fact that they are trained in the universities, which thus remain uninformed for this profession.

From 2009 to 2012 the proportion of elite universities increases at the expense of the mass and non-university higher education institutions. The increase in the proportion of lawyers also suggests a relevant trend that is consistent with the hires shown with the transparency data. Significantly, the increase of the public-elite follows the advance of the Universidad Católica within this group, from 8.8% in 2009 to 20.7% in 2012. As the counterpart of this shift, professionals from the Universidad de Chile decreased their proportional participation in the public administration, from representing 21.1% of the public-elite in 2009 to 17.6% in 2012. Such reconfiguration is consistent with the tendencies observed at the ministers' cabinet in the same period (table 5.1). Moreover, while the private-elite segment – characterised in Chapter Two by its links to entrepreneurial guilds, right-wing politics, conservative religious groups, and the upper-class – duplicates its presence in the state in 2012, we then find that the sub-sample of young professionals verifies the political affinity between the most elitist and conservative universities with the right-wing government. In turn, both the public-mass and private-mass public-oriented universities also reduced their proportional presence with the right-wing government, which is in perfect correspondence with the orientations socialised in these institutions, particularly in the latter group, as seen in Chapter Two. In total, we confirm that the political affinities of universities are not limited to the political authorities but determine the presence and organisation of the professional stratum of the state as well.

The following table represents the distribution of universities and professions by state functions in 2012 (to be read by rows). It should be noted that professions not listed in the table are excluded from the analysis, slightly changing the distribution of the types of universities.

Table 5.17. Professions and Universities by State Functions 2012 (sub-sample++)								
	Public. Elite	Public. mass	Private elite	Private-mass (commercial)	Private-mass (public oriented)	Sup. Court	Other HEIs	N / 100%
Political Function								
Public Admin	53.5%	9.9%	21.1%		15.5%			71
Social Work	18.8%	29.7%	3.1%	23.4%	4.7%		20.3%	64
Law	1%					99%		194
Engineering	46.6%	27.2%	5.8%	10.7%	2.9%		6.8%	103
Economics	59.2%	11.7%	17.5%	8.7%	2.9%			103
Education	44.4%	11.1%		38.9%			5.6%	18
Communication	32%	9.3%	28%	28%	2.7%			75
Psychology	19.2%		30.8%	26.9%	23.1%			26
Sociology/Anthr	58.6%	6.9%	10.3%	3.4%	20.7%			29
Sub-total	31.5%	11.3%	10.7%	10.4%	5.0%	28.1%	3.1%	683
Technical Function								
Public Admin	70.2%	7.9%	3.5%	1.8%	16.7%			114
Social Work	8.1%	32.4%		35.1%	8.1%		16.2%	37
Law	0.6%	0.6%	1.1%	1.1%		96.6%		176
Engineering	54%	24.9%	4.6%	7.8%	1.4%		7.2%	346
Economics	45.4%	20.4%	11.1%	19.4%	3.7%			108
Education	27.3%	22.7%	9.1%	18.2%	13.6%		9.1%	22
Communication	32.1%	13.6%	21%	29.6%	2.5%		1.2%	81
Psychology	26.1%	2.2%	19.6%	32.6%	19.6%			46
Sociology/Anthr	60%	10%		5%	25%			20
Sub-total	39.6%	15.7%	6.5%	11.5%	5.3%	17.9%	3.6%	950
Social/Cultural Function								
Public Admin	68%	8.2%	6.6%	1.6%	15.6%			122
Social Work	16%	25.5%	2.6%	26.1%	8.8%		20.9%	306
Law	0.8%					99.2%		256
Engineering	50.6%	18.2%	11.7%	10.4%			9.1%	154
Economics	43.8%	20.7%	14.8%	17.8%	3%			169
Education	14.1%	33.8%	1.4%	27.2%	5.6%		17.8%	764
Communication	26.5%	21.4%	16.2%	28.2%	6%		1.7%	117
Psychology	19.1%	13.6%	12.3%	43.2%	11.8%			220
Sociology/Anthr	58.3%	10%	5%	6.7%	20%			60
Sub-total	23.2%	21.7%	5.5%	21.6%	6.4%	11.7%	10%	2,168
Grand Total								
% by university	28.8%	18.3%	6.7%	17%	5.9%	16.2%	7.1%	100%
N	1,093	696	254	648	223	616	271	3,801
++: age < 36 & not registered in 2009								
Source: Own collection and elaboration from Comptroller of the Republic's data								

The hegemony of public-elite universities, verified in all state functions and in almost all professions, stems from the long-standing identification of these universities with the state. But this predominance is challenged with the incorporation of the new private universities into the public administration. The small segment of private-elite universities marks its presence in the political function (10.7%), whereas the commercially-oriented private-mass institutions have their niche at the social/cultural function (21.6%). Also, in the social/cultural function the public-mass (21.7%) and the public-oriented private-mass (6.4%) attain their most frequent allocations. By contrast, the

hegemony of the public-elite universities is more extended in the technical function (39.6%). Considering the traditional-public universities altogether, both elite and mass (groups A and E in the classification in Chapter Two), they control 55.3% of the professional positions there, reducing the private universities to their lowest participation (23.3%). Thus, while the irruption of the private universities has been more effective at the political and social/cultural functions, it has been less so at the technical function, where technical expertise surely raises the conditions of entry.

Types of universities also determine the specific roles of professions at the state functions. In the political function, the leadership of the public-elite universities is notoriously realised through economists, who attain their largest proportional representation at this function (59.2%). The hegemony of the public-elite in the political function is also exerted by the positioning of public administrators and engineers. In turn, the largest incorporation of graduates from private-elite universities at the political function takes place through public administrators (21.1%), economists (17.5%), journalists (28%) and psychologists (30.8%). Consequently, these professions provide the means for the small private-elite segment to attain political influence in the state under a right-wing government.

The predominance of the traditional-elite universities at the technical function mostly takes place through engineers. As suggested, the technical function is less exposed to the political challenge of the private universities, at least in the more *technical* professions, like engineering. This is confirmed when observing how much easier it is for engineers from private universities to accede the political and social/cultural functions compared to the technical function. In contrast, the public-mass universities also have a visible presence at this function through engineering and particularly economics, reaching their largest participation with this last profession there in comparison to the other two state functions.

The social/cultural function is the only one in which the presence of the public-elite is matched by the public-mass and private-mass commercially-oriented institutions. In other words, if the political ministries are mostly led by elite graduates, the social ministries are the place of the non-elite ones. Through social work and education, the predominance of the mass institutions is pervasive. Private-mass commercial universities are also represented there by a high proportion of psychologists, who presumably embody different professional profiles than the psychologists from the private-elite at the political ministries.

As observed above, the incorporation of engineers in social/cultural function was particularly expressive of the affinity with the right-wing government, judging by the largest proportion of these professionals that left before the end of that administration. As a token of that effect, we clearly see that the participation of engineers from the private-elite also reaches the

highest proportion in this function, as compared to the political and technical functions. Something similar happens with the engineers from the private-mass commercially-oriented institutions, that also attain their largest participation in the political function, as noted.

Our evidence shows that professionals are occupationally differentiated in response to the type of university in which they were formed, which implies the reproduction of particular social backgrounds, political orientations, and expectations of leadership, constitutive of specific variants of *public professionalism*, which are functionally imbricated with the organisational rationality of the state. As we have seen, certain professions constitute the main vehicle for universities to participate in the state, like social work and education from mass universities at the social/cultural function; or economists from the public-elite at the political function. At the same time, one single profession might represent different profiles considering the university of graduation and the positioning in a specific state function. For instance, psychologists from the private-elite have more chances of occupying the political function, whereas in the social-cultural function, they are more likely of having graduated from a private-mass institution. Similarly, engineers alternate political and technical roles depending on the university of graduation – and the particular political affinities these contain.

The *ideological division of professional state labour* unfolds through the specification of *public professionalism* conditioned by a socially segmented and ideologically differentiated university system. While the university and not only the professional qualification by itself might explain the chances of professionals to exert dominant or subordinate roles aligned with the direction of the state, such positions also become privileged means for universities to assert their public influence, giving political effectiveness to the interests they represent. In conditions of *mass intellectuality*, when massification of the professional roles within the public administration goes hand-in-hand with the dissemination of political uses of knowledge, the opportunities for policy influence are also broadened. Thus, as the positions of leadership are typically reserved to professionals from the elite, the subordinated positions, filled by graduates from mass institutions, might also develop influence of their own in relation to the interests they represent in the state.

Our main hypothesis has proposed the unity of the state apparatus with the ideological apparatuses that reproduce its professional personnel. Thus, the affinities expressed among professions, universities and the composition of the ministers' cabinet throughout periods of political alternation (from centre-left to right-wing and back) confirm part of the social and

ideological distinctions attributed to the university system. To complete this analysis onto the whole state apparatus, unprecedented quantitative data was produced to reveal the professional profiles that explain the reconfigurations of the public administration in relation to political changes. Not only did we find that the organisational rationality of the state is actualised through professional reconfigurations that involve political affinities with changes of government; we also observed how professions and universities serve as means for representing political/social interests within the state. Through the massification of professional state work, the public administration becomes a medium for the universities differentiated since the dictatorship to acquire ideological ascendancy.

We would reject our main hypothesis if professional reconfigurations in relation to changes of government only concentrate at the managerial level. But our analysis shows that while the rotation of managers between 2009 and 2014 is higher – 46% of 2009 managers had left before 2014 – professionals rotate with political changes too – 30% of 2009 professionals also left in that period.

For the analysis of professional reconfigurations, the occupation of the state by the right-wing government in 2012 constituted a milestone to observe the political affinities of *public professionalism*. From a descriptive approach, that year some professions increased their presence in the public administration, reinforcing their alignment with the right-wing by leaving in 2014 when the centre-left returned to the state. Conversely, the professions that decreased their participation in 2012 reveal their political affinities by recovering part of their presence in the state with the return of the centre-left in 2014. At the managerial positions, these trends appear with more intensity, reflecting the closer affinity professions establish with the political direction of the state. The case of engineers fulfilled these trends with unmistakable gravitation towards the right-wing government – with economists also moving in the same direction in all state functions, but with less intensity. While engineers were among the professions with the largest proportions of newcomers in 2012, decreasing their participation back in 2014, they also marked the distance between exits and hires in relation to the right wing moment of 2012 – so, while the proportion of exits was low and the hires where high, such configuration changed to the opposite direction as the centre-left returned to power. In turn, the social sciences professions represent more subtle trends towards the centre-left. While in the total proportion, clear political reconfigurations were difficult to observe, these were more clearly appreciated at the managerial level, particularly with the case of sociology/anthropology, for which participation in the political and social/cultural functions decreased under the right-wing government and increased back with the return of the centre-left. Still, in the social/cultural function the contrast of professionals' alignments to political change appears more clearly considering the hires of engineers and economists in relation to the right-wing,

on the one hand, and the hires of the social sciences professionals under the centre-left, on the other. Moreover, the alignment of social sciences professionals with the centre-left is reinforced as their managers also hold the largest probabilities of being newcomers to the state in 2014. Last, the political affinities also are illustrated by the wages' increases with the change to the centre-left in 2014, favouring the social sciences and education professionals with respect to lawyers, economists, engineers and public administrators that year.

Following our specific hypothesis, differential responses of professional state work before political change were observed. The first specific hypothesis proposed that certain professions would assume political roles in a more prolific fashion. A series of logistic regressions synthesized the predictive capacity of nine professions over personnel turnover before political changes; public administrators defined the reference category for the respective comparisons. With the specific models by state function, some of the trends observed with the descriptive analyses are confirmed, particularly the affinity of engineers with the right-wing in the political and social/cultural functions. The integrated models predicted movements of personnel mostly attributable to economists', engineers' and sociologists'/anthropologists' affinities with the changing directions of the state; while the first two professions – especially engineers – anticipated the rotation of functionaries in relation to the right-wing government, the sociologists/anthropologist did it, although in not so clear fashion, in affinity to the centre-left in 2014. As countertendencies, the movements of teachers, psychologists, social workers and the specialised professionals did not describe significant patterns with respect to political change in most cases; in the case of journalists and to an extent lawyers, constant movements were predicted regardless of the government.

The second specific hypothesis suggested that state functions react differently to political change. In effect, each state function presents its own specific professional composition, with the technical function having a slightly more stable professional administration – with a relatively minor proportion of layoffs for the professional strata compared to the other two functions. In turn, the integrated regression models showed significant differences in this regard, particularly as the social/cultural ministries were more likely to react to political change by both incorporating and losing personnel than the technical ministries. The specificity of the technical function might be also expressed by the fact that three out of four regression models on the technical function produced weaker predictions, meaning that the same professions did not explain rotations of personnel there as much as in the other functions. It might be also suggested that under the right-wing government, the predominance of engineers at the technical function was generalised to the other functions as well. In this way, the direction of the state in 2012 somewhat altered the professional basis of the differentiation among state functions.

Last, the third hypothesis sustains that the representation of universities through the positioning of its graduates at the state follows the political alignments and social distinctions contained in the *ideological division of the university system* itself, conditioning the organisation of professional state work accordingly. Drawing upon all the available information on the university of graduation of professional state workers, we associated the transition from a centre-left to a right-wing government with an increase in the proportion of graduates from the private-elite universities, and from the Universidad Católica within the traditional-elite, both cases representative of upper-class backgrounds and conservative political affinities. Conversely, the proportional decrease of the public-oriented universities in the mass segment also reflects the right-wing moment. Focusing on 2012, we found that the predominance of traditional-elite universities is the least challenged by private universities at the technical function, whereas private-elite universities have a more marked presence in the political function and private-mass universities predominate in the social/cultural function. An *ideological division of professional state labour* takes place through the specification of roles for one same profession according to the university of graduation, like for engineers from private universities, who were more likely to enter the state at the political and social/cultural functions than at the technical function. Or in the case of psychologists, as their origins in the private-elite increased their chances to perform as political administrators whereas when graduated from a private-mass institution were more likely to occupy jobs of social services.

The increasing professionalisation of the public administration in the long run and the rampant precariousness affecting mostly the professional stratum, have enabled the state capacity to undertake policy changes through flexible reconfigurations of the personnel, in *post-bureaucratic* fashion. But in practice, the political agency attributed to state work takes place through the transference of the organisational autonomy of the public administration to the subjective involvement of state workers. To understand the way in which the *public professionalism* of the *mass intellectuality* enacts the organisational rationality of the state, the final chapter draws on interviews with professional state workers to discuss their autonomy within the public administration. The unity between professions and universities as ideological apparatuses and the state apparatus is thus narrated by the actors that articulate such unity on a daily basis.

Chapter Six

Administration and Emancipation: Intellectual Ideals and Autonomous Action of Public Professionals of the State

In this chapter, bureaucratic autonomy is interpreted from the perspective of professional state workers themselves. While in the previous chapter the professional reconfiguration of the public administration represented political affinities with respect to the direction of the state, in this chapter we move on to enquiry about the subjective orientations that professionals attach to state work in order to find the ideological efficacy that their knowledge and professionalism attain upon the state. The specific levels of analysis elaborated so far, from the socialisation of public professionals to their location in the administration, converge in the professionals' discourses on the autonomy of state work.

The massification of intellectual labour at the basis of the state comes forward through a *mass intellectuality*. In these conditions, the autonomy of intellectual workers is reaffirmed by the differentiation of substantive professional orientations against the background of formal bureaucratic rationality. *Public professionalism* provides such substantive orientations, sustaining positions of policy implementation and giving specific meaning to an otherwise amorphous, or purely bureaucratic, *mass intellectuality*.

The content of professional autonomy varies in relation to the position within the public administration and the orientations professionals bring from their social and academic trajectories. Thus, the professionals' involvement with state policy exceeds the centres of decision-making, extending its influence from subordinated positions as well. As long as *public professionalism* is linked to interests and identities at the basis of the state, opportunities to make sense of state work and to influence the direction of policy implementation are available. Along these lines, we seek to represent the relations between subaltern identities and interests with the autonomous uses of knowledge by state professionals and its effects on the organisation and power of the state.

Interviews with professional state workers expressed a range of topics and concerns about their roles in the state. We focus on the commonalities that best represent their ideals of *public professionalism*. As the interviews were conducted, between 2011 and 2015, the state was affected by the first right-wing government and by the major episodes of social mobilisation since the restoration of democracy. Such a context provided a unique insight into how political changes resonate upon professional state work.

In five sections, we follow the idea of *public professionalism*, first in theoretical discussions on its political orientations; second, by referring to the procedures of data collection and analysis;

third, in its locations and variants within neoliberal *administrative relations of production*; fourth, in its relations of subsumption and alienation and; fifth, in its influence upon state power.

6.1. Administration and Emancipation

Under the suggestive antinomy between administration and emancipation, we resume the post-structuralist discussion on the post-bureaucratic organisation and link it with our own take on the *public professionalism* of the *mass intellectuality* of the state. The dialectic of administration and emancipation synthesises both the emancipation of workers from bureaucratic discipline and the emancipatory orientations they attach to uses of knowledge in the state. Therefore, the articulation of the state with external social actors also depends on the emancipation of state workers from the bureaucracy, so their ideals of *public professionalism* are autonomously and meaningfully linked to the interests and identities at the basis of state power.

6.1.1. Dialectic of Professions and Bureaucratic Organisation

As professional work is subordinated to the processes and ends of organisations, the dialectic between these two terms is no different from the subsumption of all labour. What then makes this dialectic special is the claim for autonomy that professional work incorporates into the organisation. The massification of professional work unleashes organisational transformations towards greater professional autonomy – but paid at the price of internalisation of control and intensification of work.

Our discussion started with Weber's *classical model* of bureaucratic action as the point in which state work is totally subsumed by the inexorable instrumental *reason of the state*, from which neither values nor political goals are obtained (Weber, 2003). But it is precisely this quality which constituted the bureaucracy as the most accomplished technology of societal domination. Its mechanism hinged on unescapable tendencies to bureaucratic expansion, paradoxically triggered by (emancipatory) demands for substantive justice and economic redistribution (Weber, 1978, p.980). Regardless of the ends that the bureaucracy assumes as its own, the consequence is the enlargement of its instrumental domination over society. Along these lines, Hannah Arendt critiqued the welfare state, for it implied 'the rule of the administration, which can become the most tyrannical form of all' (Cohen and Arato, 1994, p.186). Likewise, Habermas denied the 'expectation that one could use administrative means to arrive at an emancipated form of life' (1990a, p.13).

While the transformation of the classical model is determined by the ongoing bureaucratic expansion, trends of qualification of the personnel (Etzioni, 1969b; Therborn, 2008) incorporate professional knowledge as an external source of rationality and authority within the organisation,

short-circuiting its formal rules and hierarchy (Parsons, 1968). Professional and bureaucratic work imply quite different rationalities. As normatively motivated (Parsons, 1939), collectively oriented (Champy and Israël, 2009), unstandardised activity (Marshall, 1939), professional action escapes from being reduced to instrumental self-interest (Davies, 1983). Moreover, as professionals incorporate the 'whole personality' in work (Marshall, 1939; Parsons, 1968; Maravelias, 2011), the Weberian principle of separation with the office is subverted (Du Gay, 2000). Professional work infuses the bureaucratic organisation with ideals of professionalism (Bloor and Dawson, 1994), contributing with specialised knowledge (Marshall, 1939), occupational control (Johnson, 1972), discretionary judgements (Lipsky, 1980) and 'ethical conduct' (Albo, 1993). However, the subordination of professional work to the organisation configures a 'readily recognizable sociological problem' (Davies, 1983, p.177), which takes place as 'the salaried professional often has neither exclusive nor final responsibility for his work' (Wilensky, 1964, pp.146-147), representing situations of ideological proletarianisation and deprofessionalisation of professional work (Johnson, 2015; Friedson, 1983; Caria, 2013).

Due to the 'rise in the educational levels' of organisational workers, a generalised claim for professional autonomy renders bureaucratic discipline as 'an outdated mode of organization' (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p.71). So, an *artistic critique* sought to liberate workers' motivation and creativity within organisations. Thereby, the professionals' involvement in the organisation is ultimately claimed as an opportunity 'for creating meaning' and developing 'their personal autonomy' while contributing 'to the collective project' (p.63). A *new spirit of capitalism* redefined the ideals of autonomy for *post-bureaucratic* work by means of creative jobs, flexible times, horizontal networks, continuing education, authentic performance and fulfilling goals (Donzelot, 1991; Virtanen; 2004, Pedersen, 2011; Lopdrup-Hjorth et al., 2011; Ruiz, 2017).

But, as discussed, the flexibilisation of work along the lines of the *artistic critique* is exchanged for less security and overall precarisation. Moreover, the intensification of work also takes place by expanding it to non-labour times and internalising the controls and incentives for the self-exploitation of performance (Harney, 2002; Maravelias, 2003; Salaman, 2005; Adams, 2012; Evetts, 2013; Toscano, 2013).

A transition is then verified from a phase of real subsumption of intellectual labour, under the *classical framework* of bureaucratic action, to situation in which intellectual labour is no longer dispossessed from its specialised knowledge, in relation to which organisations become structurally ignorant (Vercellone, 2007; Roggero, 2011; Moulrier-Boutang, 2011; Fumaggalli, 2015). In total, the massification of professional autonomy internalises and transmutes the instrumental rationality of

the bureaucracy into substantive orientations of knowledge and expectations of meaningful agency, which are retrieved by the organisation to reinforce the productivity of work.

6.1.2. Professional Work as Political Action

The political significance of professional work is associated both with the political differentiation of the bureaucracy and the effects of professional autonomy as the political performance of the *mass intellectuality*.

As discussed, the professional differentiation of the new middle-class undermines its political unity in the state (Wilensky, 1964; Perkin, 1990). In Brint's analysis, the only safe generalisation of the political orientations of professional work can be made in relation to the actual occupations. Hence, 'liberal views' – generalised by Gouldner (1979) as orientations of the new class – are only found among the social professions of the public sector and 'human services occupations' (Brint, 1994, p.13). In turn, the most radical positions dwell at the lowest bureaucratic occupations.

professionals who fall lower on the ladders of economic success are more often the carriers of the "public service" ethic... This is still more true of those who find themselves at the margins of the professional world – particularly in the sphere of "proletarianized" academic, artistic and social service work. Here nominally professional workers are often in self-conception critical intellectuals, and may consider themselves not simply the protectors of the less advantaged, but also their uncompromising advocates (Ibid, p.80).

In a similar vein, King and Szelenyi argue that the more professionalised occupations are, the more likely they share hegemonic views of capitalist society. Conversely, the more professionals act '*as organic intellectuals of the underdog*' (2004, p.200), the less they enjoy of professional autonomy. While this generalisation is correct in several respects, it overlooks that *professional bureaucracies* (Mintzberg, 1979) of well-established occupational jurisdictions are not necessarily identified with the capitalist direction of the state. At the same time, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, professional jurisdictions are rarely closed within a politicised public administration. Still, as in conditions of *mass intellectuality* professional autonomy is not restricted to the dominant positions of the state, the differentiation of professional state work is reinforced along with gains in autonomy and political performance that appeal to the wider spectrum of state workers. However, while the political effect of professional work is extended through a *mass intellectuality*, its orientations might be less clear.

The *mass intellectuality* replaces the de-skilled and fragmented Fordist worker with the skilled and *polyvalent* immaterial worker (Vercellone, 2007) who preserves his/her own knowledge, orientations and forms of organisation in the labour process (Hardt and Negri, 1994; Morini and

Fumagalli, 2010). Consequentially, production takes place on 'a new primacy of living knowledge, mobilized by workers, in contrast to the knowledge incorporated in fixed capital and the managerial organization of firms' (Vercellone, 2009, p.120). As the *mass intellectuality* also mobilises cultural content and political competences of a communicative kind (Lazzarato, 1996), labour adopts the features of political action (Virno, 2004). Among the competences configuring labour as political action, Virno considers the 'capacity to face the possible and the unforeseen, the capacity to communicate something new' (p.63); 'communication, abstraction, self-reflection of living subjects', 'dialogical *performances*, linguistic games, [and]... public intellect... as cooperation' (p.65); and, certainly, 'professionalism' as the ability to transform 'precariousness' into creativity. Competences of this kind are attributable to the subjectivation of workers' autonomy, in the wake of their socialisation *beyond work* (p.85).

From the perspective of *post-professionalism*, the effectiveness of work is ensured with the incorporation of managerial orientations, consummating the dialectic of professions and *post-bureaucratic* organisations. Indeed, Marshall (1939) already sustained that professions and the public administration were assimilating each other. Along these lines, the point of view of *post-professionalism* stresses the fact that the massification of professional labour entails a loss of relevance of traditional professionalism (Kritzer, 1999) that makes it necessary to incorporate politically intended uses of knowledge and managerial competences to sustain professional autonomy (Martin, 2011). Thus, while managers absorb interpretative competences, professionals combine managerial control and meaningful performance, enriching standards of efficiency with substantive content and effective articulations (Noordegraaf, 2000, 2007, and 2015). Moreover, the managerial reconfiguration of the *administrative relations of productions*, along the lines of the NPM, entails further differentiation among professions (Bezes et al., 2011; Le Bianic, 2011; Evetts, 2011). Managerial controls are not exerted from abstract organisations, but by some professions – economists, lawyers, engineers – over others – social sciences professionals (Parding et al., 2012; Halliday et al., 2009).

The consideration of professional work as political action concerns competences engendering political effects and internalising organisational performance. But less attention is given to the ends of work, contained in its own sources of knowledge and the differentiated roles within the state. A perspective on the ends of professional state work is needed.

6.1.3. Public Professionalism: Orientations and Effects

Our take on *public professionalism* links the orientations of more or less specialised knowledge with the ends of state policy. The discussed experience of the developmental

bureaucracy provides many examples in this regard, like the specialisation of social sciences professionals in the mobilisation of peasants and urban poor into the developmental process. Since the agrarian reform was needed to ameliorate the inflationary pressures of an exhausted cycle of industrialisation, the knowledge and political orientations elaborated into a method of *popular promotion* were crucial to accelerate the reform as well as to renew the motivations of the developmental process itself. The distance between the instrumental end of inflation control and the emancipatory orientations of *popular promotion* could only be closed by the autonomy of professional workers and the politicisation of their ideals in the state.

In conditions of *mass intellectuality*, the expectation of self-fulfilling work (Postone, 2003) is disseminated as the political substance of *public professionalism*. Within organisations, 'self-fulfilment possesses meaning only as the achievement of... ends that are worth fulfilling... these ends cannot be purely individual; in order to be legitimate and worth the sacrifices they demand, they must be inscribed in a collective' (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p.432). Hence, as long as ideals of *public professionalism* are oriented to intellectual and political influence, they link self-fulfilling work with collective ends. That is why our analysis of political socialisation in the universities led us to search for its effects on the state. That is also why for Virno the state constitutes the centre of political gravitation for the *mass intellectuality*, explaining the *hypertrophic growth of the administrative apparatus* (2004, pp.67-68).

As *public professionalism* expresses the orientation towards political uses of knowledge, it contributes with more content and capacities to state work than the fixed reservoir of bureaucratic rules and routines. Moreover, its orientations and effects also are more dependent on the type of knowledge professional work mobilises than in the hierarchy and jurisdiction within the state.

In Chapter Two, we drew on Habermas' scheme of knowledge-constitutive interests to differentiate ideals of professional work. Thus, interests in *technical control* relate mostly to the ideal orientations of economists, engineers, lawyers, and public administrators, although its ascendancy is transversal with the managerial dispositions of state work. Interests in *mutual understanding* relate to professionals of the social sciences, education and humanities, contributing with capabilities for generating consensus, renewed traditions, legitimations and representations, as outputs that 'diminish the coercive aspect of the state' (Panitch, 1993, p.15). Hence, the representation of social movements is made compatible with the bureaucracy by hermeneutic uses of knowledge, including arguments, successful speech acts and authentic self-presentations (Habermas, 1990b). Interests in *emancipation* and *critical uses of knowledge* justify the autonomy of subaltern groups from unjustified domination. While no profession is critical in-itself, as discussed, there are marked critical tendencies in the social and education professions. *Public professionalism*

sustains normative and political positions through instrumental work, being able to critique the role of politicians and managers in a field of policy, giving political meaning to professional autonomy and motivating performance beyond the boundaries of state work.

In the context of cognitive capitalism, the idea of an *excess of knowledge* expresses the orientations of a *mass intellectuality* to work beyond prescribed courses of action. The concept *excess* originally means autonomous production of value (Vercellone, 2007; Roggero, 2011; Moulier-Boutang, 2011; Fumagalli, 2015). In the state, it then connotes the autonomous reproduction of the administration by means of the knowledge professionals incorporate to their work. In a similar vein, Mitchell's concept of *state effects* (1999) has rendered the reproduction of the state dependent on the *mundane practices* of state workers, as discussed in Chapter Three. We agree on this perspective, but without reducing such *effects* to domination. Therefore, the notion of *excess* needs to be attached to the knowledge professionals mobilise into effects exceeding the instrumental reproduction of the state. *Public professionalism* thus represents such an *excess of knowledge* in state work, which cannot be reduced to instrumental interests. The *excess of public professionalism* also entails overtime work to make sense of the policy ends state professionals are serving.

The effects of the *excess* of knowledge in the state are distinguished between the *production of meaning*, related to the interests in mutual understanding and emancipation, and *standardisation*, related to technical control. Such *effects* manifest even in the most modest and occasional opportunities of influence (Brint, 1994), when the behaviour of professional state workers is not predefined and the implementation of state policy is opened to intervention and performance.

In particular, as effects of *production of meaning* spring from autonomous state work, interests of mutual understanding and emancipation linked to subaltern groups might exceed the reproduction of state domination. Still, such an *effect of production meaning* seems difficult to take place without being captured within the instrumental framework of the bureaucracy. For instance, while Poulantzas (2014) affirmed – against Althusser – the creative capacities of the state beyond repression and concealment, outputs of knowledge still are structurally subordinated to class domination. Likewise, both Bourdieu (1994) and Habermas (1976) reduced production of meaning by means of administration, respectively, to *symbolic violence* and systemic constraints. In our perspective, the *effects* of *standardisation*, oriented to optimise policy instruments and decision-making, submit the production of meaning to interests of technical control. In total, the subsumption of professional work in the state is not exerted in the name of impersonal rules alone, but takes place among hierarchised and often opposed variants of *public professionalism*.

A politically unpredictable *mass intellectuality* is observed in the work of *public professionals* of the state. The political significance of professional state work in these conditions hinges on its autonomy from the dominant direction of the state – beyond the *high priests of the ruling ideology* (Althusser, 2008, p.7). The sources of differentiation of the *mass intellectuality* at the university system and the locations in dominant or subordinate positions of the public administration, entail variants and oppositions of *public professionalism* in the state.

6.2. Data Collection and Analysis

Data collection comprised anonymous interviews with 35 professional state workers from Santiago, Valparaíso and Temuco. Seven additional interviews included members of NGOs and social movements. Although most interviews correspond to 2011-12, seven were conducted in 2013-2015 to confirm trends of analysis (Bryman, 2012). Table 6.1. summarises the *theoretical sampling*.

Profession		University					State Function			
		Public-elite	Private-elite	Public-Mass	Private-Mass	n/a	Pol.	Tech.	Soc./cult.	NGOs
Economics	4	1	2		1		2		1	1
Education	5	2		1	1	1			4	1
Engineering	4	3				1			2	2
Law/admin.	6	3		1	1	1	1	1	4	
Arts/humanities	4	2	1		1		1		2	1
Social sciences	19	12	1		6		1	2	13	3
Total	42	23	4	2	10	3	5	3	26	8

Frequencies in the table reflect the focus on social science professions at the social/cultural function of the state. As seen in the previous chapter, in the social/cultural function we saw professional reconfigurations expressing political alignments in the clearest fashion. By this token, the sample also has a larger number of professionals from agencies of representation of social movements (8).

Interviews followed a *semi-structured* set of questions, lasting for over an hour of conversation. Three topics were discussed: academic backgrounds and occupational hierarchies; the sense of *public professionalism* of state work, and; autonomy and influence within the organisation.

6.3. Locating *Public Professionals* in the State

We first locate *public professionalism* in the agencies representative of social movements that emerge from the fragmentation of democratic demands (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) in the wake of the exit of the workers' movement from the neoliberal state (Garretón, 2002). The effectiveness

of such spaces has depended on the professionals' capacity to mobilise non-instrumental orientations and generate *state effects of production of meaning* in representation of subaltern identities. But, the subordination of such functions within the architecture of the state also entails the subsumption of the labour of representation to the managerial controls and the *effects of standardisation*, ultimately exerted from the Ministry of Finance. Within the framework of the *modernisation of the state*, *public professionalism* contains the tension between the authentic representation of social movements and efficient state management.

The perspective is subsequently generalised onto the variation of *public professionalism* along with its proximity to the subjects of state policy and centres of decision making. Our focus is placed on the effects of professional autonomy closer to the subject of policy and far from the centres of decision making, as an exemplary location of the *mass intellectuality*. While academic backgrounds determine the positioning and orientations of state work, these locations also are overdetermined by the political conflicts of the state.

6.3.1. Between Authentic Representation and Efficient Management

The first *Concertación* government configured a moment of *democratic opening* (Van Halsema, 1998) that institutionalised social movements in the state. As noted in Chapter Four, agencies representative of social movements created in that period included the National Service of Women (1991)³³, the National Institute of the Youth (1991) and the National Corporation of Indigenous Development (1993) along with other administrative divisions in social organisations, intercultural education and cultural promotion. Later, agencies in sports (2001), culture (2003), human rights (2005) and the environment (2010) were also instituted.

As a rule, this process appeals to a specialised professional: 'social movements often identify social problems, which later become potential expert work. Professionals are often leaders in these movements; in other cases, lay leaders gradually turn into professionals' (Abbott, 1988, pp.149-150). In this vein, Radcliffe and Webb (2015) studied the indigenous professionals from the Division of Intercultural Education of the Ministry of Education. Albeit that they were *subaltern bureaucrats*, their specialised knowledge – and ethnic origins – constituted them as authentic agents of intercultural education, outplaying managers and politicians. These professionals had their own position to critique intercultural policy as 'formal and cosmetic' (p.267), for which they compensated with hermeneutic uses of knowledge in relation to indigenous and bureaucratic agents. Only with the substantive input of these professionals' autonomy, did this unit fulfil its function in the state.

³³ Renamed in 2016 as National Service of Women and Gender Equality (SERNAMEG).

The cases considered in this point – the National Service of Women; the National Institute of Indigenous Development and; the National Council of Culture and Arts³⁴ – show that the institutionalisation of social movements and the trajectories of the respective agencies are conditioned by the professional composition of the staff. In effect, the professional composition explains the capacity to preserve substantive uses of knowledge linked to the represented movements, particularly before the political and managerial pressures of the state. Consequentially, professionals themselves become the embodiment of social/cultural policy, to the extent that policy changes are undertaken by the replacement of functionaries.

Social movement and NGO professionals transited to the state from opposing the dictatorship to developing and staffing new fields of policy (Lehmann and Bebbington, 1998). In this process, they have confronted a range of tensions with the bureaucracy, including clashes with its formalities, times, regulations, working styles, leadership and agendas (Lira, 2005). Much learning had to be invested in getting acquainted with the logics of the state. As a downside, the absorption of these specialised professionals undermined the very capacities, relevance and survival of social organisations before the state (Delamaza, 2011).

According to the head of an NGO in the field of *urban pobladores*, NGO professionals conformed a kind of *organic intellectual* that could not retain its role, since:

the political logic in Chile ultimately implied that professionals returned to their... traditional places [i.e. the public administration],... since this kind of social work did not lead to a career, there were not important salaries, therefore, from the perspective of the professional, thinking of himself as a professional of a new kind implied almost a kind of social militancy, with fewer opportunities for recognition, valuation, academic career, salary increases (Humanities 1, public-elite [Catholic] university, 2011).

Therefore, with the restoration of democracy, it became difficult to sustain *public professionalism* outside the public administration. Contrasting with the 'golden age' of NGOs in the 1980s, when these organisations enjoyed sustained funding, political purpose and professional autonomy; since the 1990s, the world of NGOs was fragmented by competitive funding schemes and limited to the execution of state programmes. For the state: 'the issue of participation was seen with a certain reluctance... the fundamental fear was always the explosion of demands, which ultimately NGOs with other groups would be able to articulate, leading to more social mobilisation, therefore the dominant political tone was other: *this is done technically, by the central state*' (Ibid.). Eventually, the room of action for NGOs was taken over by the state itself:

³⁴ Renamed in 2018 as Ministry of Cultures, Arts and Patrimony.

[S]ocial development, from the point of view of equilibriums, is regulated by the Ministry of Finance, and from the point of view of social action, by specialised ministries and technical organisms. Therefore, the space for NGOs to form the intellectuals and professionals that think and elaborate drastically decreases (Ibid.).

The National Service of Women (SERNAM) illustrates these tendencies *avant la lettre*, with additional considerations as gender policy is seen as disadvantaged within a bureaucracy that is 'inherently masculine, and thus that women qua women are losers in these organizations' (Due Billing, 2005, p.263). SERNAM was created and staffed by the women's movement of the *Concertación*, which was linked to the respective grassroots organisations, NGOs and research centres. According to one of them, the professional cadres that moved from the women's movement to SERNAM possessed autonomous expertise on the subject of gender and shared a political purpose: 'SERNAM had that quality of having much compromise of the professional teams, so that ministers ended up motivated by such a compromise and *putting the shirt on*, committing for the cause of gender' (Education 1, unknown university, 2012).

The first challenge SERNAM professionals had to confront was to become public functionaries. The pejorative nickname of *femocrats* was attributed to them by feminists that stayed out of the bureaucracy. But for another SERNAM professional: '*femocracy* plays a role that no other actor plays, which is a blend between the feminist movement and the state apparatus, with all its obstacles and advantages' (Sociologist 1, public-elite [Catholic] university, 2012). As she continued, the bureaucracy had a strategic role to advance gender policy: 'the feminist movement might have all you want, but its range of influence is relatively limited. But by means of the state, its influence is given by state policy, which is not autonomous influence, but you effectively have the possibility of reaching quite a large universe' (Ibid.).

Eventually, the focus of SERNAM action was placed onto the state apparatus itself. One of SERNAM's main impacts was to work across divisions of sectorial policy to implement gender policy – fulfilling one of the expectations of the *modernisation of the state* for that matter (cf. Waissbluth, 2006). Such was an effort of effective articulation and *production of meaning* assumed by the professionals themselves:

... to convince the ministries was very hard at the beginning... to talk about how to promote women's ventures... was a titanic task. It's not easy to produce such changes, because... the changes had to be carried out by the other ministries... this implies that functionaries understand what these changes mean for women' (Education 1, unknown university, 2012).

The effect of *production of meaning* here consisted of engendering categories to redefine the relation of the state with subaltern groups. With the category of 'female headship' it was

possible to articulate policy frameworks with the Ministry of Economy to recognise and support the greater difficulties that single mothers have to form small ventures: ‘the subject of “female headship” was one of the most successful things that was introduced as an analytical category’ (Ibid.).

The definitive product of SERNAM was the incorporation of a line in gender within the *Programmes Management Improvement* (PMG). As discussed in Chapter Four, the PMGs were implemented within the *modernisation of the state* to improve workers performance with an economic incentive granted on the attainment of collective goals. Coordinated by SERNAM with the Direction of Budget, but implemented by ministries and agencies in a decentralised fashion, the gender PMG brought unprecedented influence for SERNAM in the state. For the public administrator in charge, the real impact was the re-engagement of state workers with their jobs:

[G]ender allows you to have a more complete diagnosis of reality, and therefore it enables you to make more accurate decisions, and allows you, to the same extent, to save resources, being more efficient, being more effective in the sense that your objective is accomplished in more direct manner, not from what you imagine, but from knowing reality and also as you generate citizen participation (Public administrator 1, unknown university, 2012).

This professional gives the example of the Direction of Roads, a male-dominated office initially reluctant to develop a gender approach, but that in order to justify its position, conducted a diagnosis that surprisingly found that women’s needs with regards to roads indeed were different from men’s: while men demanded faster roads, women demanded security, sidewalks and pedestrian crossings. In our view, the experience of PMG exemplifies well the *post-professionalism* that enriches managerial processes with substantive content.

But the focus on the state is symptomatic of the separation of the agency from its original social basis. Such a separation from the women’s movement was also conditioned by the reduced size of SERNAM, which limited the formation of feminist intellectuals and the deeper studying of the subject of gender by the state (Garretón et al., 2010). According to one of the interviewees, there were two other crucial ways in which this process of separation was consummated. One was the elimination of the space for collective self-education on gender, as imposed during the Lagos government by ‘the discourse of efficiency’ (Education 1, unknown university, 2012). The other was the pressure to not hire research centres of the women movement: ‘[it was] a political pressure so the government was not accused of hiring the same NGOs. Those NGOs were hired because they had competences, so organisations without knowledge of gender began to be hired’ (Ibid.). Along the lines of the *modernisation of the state*, the intention was to make SERNAM an efficient and politically neutral structure, without preferences for its original social basis.

But beyond SERNAM's limitations, when compared to the experience of the National Corporation of Indigenous Development (CONADI), it still makes a valid case of professional autonomy. Although we could not interview informants from CONADI, an external comment was given to us by a specialist from a state-regional university. This informant emphasises the theme of *co-optation*. Unlike SERNAM, where *co-optation* took place as a longer process of *bureaucratisation*, with the creation of CONADI, the state co-opted the totality of indigenous leadership that put forward the resistance during the dictatorship, and that later participated in the creation of the new indigenous law, all these people passed, from one day to the other, to be functionaries of the state (Anthropologist, public-elite [state-regional] university, 2012).

According to our interviewee, at its beginning, during the Aylwin government, CONADI functioned as a faithful representation of indigenous leadership: 'at that time you could discuss with them... the indigenous movement and the place of the indigenous people in the national state. But after that, when the leaders were *professionalised*, it was not possible to discuss with them' (Ibid.). In this perspective, *professionalisation* meant nothing more than becoming a public functionary. As the majority of indigenous leaders lacked professional education, a priority for CONADI was to generate access to programmes and certifications. The process of co-optation was completed with the integration of indigenous leadership into political power:

[it's been] a mess to try to define if the national direction belonged to the socialist party, the Christian democracy or the PPD³⁵... Everything that had to do with projects, funding for studies, initiatives, scholarships, depended on your militancy to which party, and whether the national director belonged to that party (ibid.).

The shift to the right-wing was rock bottom for CONADI, with the imposition of political managers totally foreign to indigenous policy.

The contrast between CONADI and SERNAM makes the point about the significance of the professional staff to explain these agencies' trajectories. In CONADI, the lack of professional cadres implied that immediate political power instrumentalised indigenous policy. Conversely, for SERNAM's professional cadres the main dilemmas were not about primarily political parties but on the influence on the state, the relation with the social movement before managerial pressures, and the limits to the gender agenda – before political conservatism.

But professionalisation beyond political patronage is not an antidote against the politicisation of functionaries, which anyway occurs as they assume the responsibility for the tasks of representation of particular policy interests. In the National Council of Culture and Arts (CNCA) the professionals' link with artists and cultural guilds made them vulnerable to changes of government.

³⁵ All centre-left political parties of the *Concertación* (1990-2010). The PPD stands for Party For Democracy.

For a journalist from the CNCA, functionaries of this agency are people whose option was to work in culture rather than being functionaries in the first place:

They aren't any public workers that have a job in the state. These are public workers that also have this very special component. There are *gestores*, artists, teachers, journalists linked to the world of culture... people that bring in their background the need for the state to commit to the subject of culture (Journalist 1, private-mass [public-oriented] university, 2012).

As functionaries were massively sacked with the change of coalition in 2010, what ultimately suffered is the integrity of cultural policy. The post-bureaucratic quality of these agencies manifests in the undifferentiation between workers and the state. Hence, the usual policy the incumbent government adopts in a field that falls outside its control is to expel functionaries for the interests they represent. Changing state professionals is *ipso facto* policymaking.

The professional representation of social movements, based on substantive knowledge and links with subaltern identities, is eventually subordinated to managerial controls which, by definition, are ignorant of the content of state work. While the subsumption of specialised work under indicators of performance entails de-naturalisation of its content and links with social movements, it falls on professional autonomy – and its excess of knowledge beyond strict labour times – to restore the value of state work.

Professionals resent the compulsive fulfilling of indicators that have little to do with real work. For a social worker in a programme in neighbourhood revitalisation, the blame falls on the 'usual technocrat':

They make policies as the marvel of the world, and then take them to the neighbourhoods, to the grassroots, and demand of you indicators to accomplish... like 50% citizen participation: but we never achieved 50%, and that's the clash, and we had to accommodate the form to try to generate some change within that neighbourhood which, by history, was a struggling neighbourhood during the dictatorship... but with the post-dictatorship, all grassroots organisations died... Then a young man comes and says, *let's do this*, they don't believe you anymore! (Social worker, private-mass [public-oriented] university, 2013).

But eventually, 'one has to fulfil the goals and, of course, goals are registers, and they don't care whether the impact that you're generating... is effectively taking place' (Ibid.). At the interface of substantive work and managerial control, *hybrid professionalism* is compelled to improve the 'content of control' (Noordegraaf, 2007, p.778), incorporating parameters, initiatives and meanings that draw on the professionals' autonomy in the state. As put by this professional, it is up to his own

effort and creativity to 'fit the pieces of a puzzle that doesn't fit' (Social worker, private-mass [public-oriented] university, 2013).

The system of managerial control exerted from the Direction of Budget (DIPRES) uses a methodology of *logical framework* to measure the productivity of state work. The methodology consists of a matrix of indicators that disaggregate policy programmes into inputs of objectives, products, beneficiaries, and outputs of efficiency, economy, quality, etc. Often, the difficulties to translate programmes into this methodology entails that professionals doing the actual job yield the control of its measures to other professionals, namely the economists and engineers from DIPRES that subsume the labour of the state. With the *logical framework*, apart from very political functions – e.g. Foreign Office – there is no field of policy that escapes the managerial control of DIPRES professionals. According to one of these economists: 'there are certain topics that escape [from the logical framework], but we try to focus its objectives and indicators to measure them as much as possible, basically for the programme not to fall into a sham' (Economist 1, public-elite [State] university, 2012).

DIPRES professionals illustrate the *effect of standardisation*, which also takes place as *excess* beyond prescribed state work:

there's an individual motivation to do a good job... there aren't descriptions of functions, so sometimes there's a grey zone about until what point one might go, but one has to get a good evaluation... to get results that are useful for the authorities' decision-making, information that's useful, that's well obtained and well quantified (Ibid.).

Thus, *standardisation* results from the autonomous mobilisation of technical knowledge – and of certain political criteria – to systematise representations of the value of state work within a template designed for its control:

we've got to have an important analytical capacity to detect certain areas that are specific for certain programmes in order to be able to highlight them [since] they won't always fit the methodology (Ibid.).

Between the *production of meaning* by agencies representative of social movements and the *standardisation* in the name of efficiency, a relation of domination is established. As discussed, for the work of SERNAM it entailed the estrangement with its social basis and fragmentation of its political ends. According to one of our interviewees:

Women with more history of movement had political ideas more strongly linked to the changes relative to women... [but] their presence was weakening, also because the *Concertación* governments got more and more bureaucratic and were much more concerned about themes of productivity and that kind of thing... about measuring

bureaucratic things, of efficiency of the state, rather than changes and that really changes take place (Education 1, unknown university, 2012).

In turn, the disaggregation of programmes by the *logical framework* is negatively assessed by the other interviewee from SERNAM:

All that crumbling that the logical framework demands, makes you arrive at indicators that when you try to recompose that, to re-integrate it, re-assemble it, it won't necessarily arrive to the objective that you defined in the first place... and the norms of the format you were asked to fulfil, it led you to too much quantification and with the quantification, the subject of gender was getting lost to a great extent (Sociologist 1, public-elite [Catholic] university, 2012).


Moreover, SERNAM attempts to broaden its studies from a focus on women to a larger concern on gender relations were curtailed by DIPRES, 'on the basis of the idea that... the state acts, the state executes, the state promotes public policy, but the state doesn't create knowledge' (Ibid.).

6.3.2. Positions and Orientations of State Work

To interpret the orientations that *public professionalism* incorporates into the state, we have focused on the social/cultural function and agencies representative of subaltern identities. From there, we aim to generalise the trends that differentiate the positioning of variants of *public professionalism* as an *excess of knowledge* on the state, expressing both the relation with the origins in the university system and the political conflict on the direction of state power.

With the interviews, we found that the motivations for professional state work were more frequently attached to the subject of policy. At the same time, not one interviewee argued economic motivations, whereas political motivations were formulated as such among roles closer to decision-making and incumbent government. That is how we differentiate variants of *public professionalism* in the state: in a horizontal axis, between the proximity to the subject of policy and managerial control and, in a vertical axis, between the proximity to decision-making and subordination. The locations obtained are in a continuum, as this is precisely the point about *post-professionalism* as the articulation of specialised and managerial competences. Our interest is placed on the periphery of decision-making, at the subordinated locations of the social/cultural function, where a strong sense of professionalism, related to the subject of policy, preserves its autonomy to produce state effects.

Figure 6.1. Locations of Public Professionalism



The distance between decision-making and subordination in the public administration is based on the distinction between the elite and mass university, as a correspondence of infra and superstructure of professional state work. But it is not that elite-professionals are not located in the subordinated categories below, but more that mass-professionals typically do not reach the superior locations, unless as professional politicians. As put by the economist from DIPRES, which does not belong to the social/cultural function, but is well representative of the centre of state power: ‘here it’s the [universities of] Chile and the *Católica* and stop counting!’ (Economist 1, public-elite [State] university, 2012). In turn, the distinction between subject of policy and management entails a correspondence with the effects of *production of meaning* and *standardisation*, respectively. While in the proximity to the subject of policy both effects of *production of meaning* and *standardisation* are possible, in the pole of managerial control only *standardisation* is predominant.

In the top segment, *professionalism* remains linked to the political authorities and the labour of government. As seen in the previous chapter, the professions of economics, engineering and law predominate at that level, albeit not without tensions in relation to expert control on the subject of policy and their politicisation with the changes of government.

(1) The first quadrant combines specialisation in the subject of policy with access to the centres of decision-making, representing the highest level of *public professionalisation* available, where the capacity to exert political decision making by means of professional state work is in its

optimal relation³⁶. The effect of professional autonomy at this level aims to the specification of policy frameworks. For a lawyer with an important role in the implementation of the Transparency Law, specialised knowledge and personal networks with the expert community provided him with ‘opportunities to define the nuances of state policy’ (Humanities 2, public-elite [Catholic] university, 2012). To specify the transparency framework, this professional researched the citizens’ preferences to access public information, enabling him to resignify the standards for the operation of administrative transparency and the dissemination of public information accordingly. A dimension of substantive legitimacy was added to an otherwise bureaucratic application of this law:

there was a procedure in which I, as an institution, decided: let’s make an emphasis on the citizen’s use of information and not on the administrative procedures... and that’s a methodological and value decision. It’s to put the citizen at the centre of policy (Ibid.).

Thus, policy specification combines substantive knowledge on the respective subject with a share of decision-making.

A journalist from the area of contents of the CNCA illustrates the specificity of the social/cultural function at this level, where the knowledge on the *subject of policy* draws clear occupational lines. From his perspective, the interaction with professions of managerial control is typically disruptive: ‘the most structural part of the Council, the departments of legal affairs and planning, there’s a little world of engineers who have nothing to do with content, no! They spoil it every time when messing up with the contents’ (Journalist 2, public-elite [state] university, 2012). From this critical view on managerial control, we move into the second quadrant specialised in such function.

(2) In the second quadrant professional work remains close to decision making but without specialised access to the subject of policy, representing the professionalism of managerial control over other professions’ work. For a young economist that graduated from a private-elite university to work for the Ministry of Education under Piñera’s government, his destination to an area about which he did not know much was not an impediment to making his professional contribution:

My support consisted of... facilitating the ultimate end which was learning improvement. I realised that there’s a world of curricular management to which economists can contribute...

I took over all the operational hassle, which for economists is easier, and let the team work

³⁶ From outside the social cultural function, a lawyer of the competition agency is eloquent in this regard: ‘here theory is really applied and that’s the cool thing that competition law has... when you’re in the agency it’s marvellous and that’s why I think that people enter the agency; the agency is composed of many young guys or people that return from studying abroad... because you’ve got a good chance of influencing real decisions... you really apply what you learned’ (Lawyer, public-elite [state] university, 2012).

with the texts. Now, I always revised them! I believe I facilitated the pedagogical task as an economist, my job was to lead the programme... in terms of management, that the goals were accomplished (Economist 2, private-elite university, 2015).

Despite the distance with the subject of policy, this professional was involved anyway in the content of the books produced by curricular specialists, making sure that the goals he defined were fulfilled. As his intervention might have helped to produce results in a forgotten area of policy, it anyway meant the specialists' subordination to external managerial control.

From the interviews, we retrieve one history, told by a rank-and-file professional of the Ministry of Education, about the autonomisation of managerial control from substantive policy. During Bachelet's first government, several poor municipalities threatened to return their schools to the state due to structural indebtedness. To solve the problem, Bachelet opened a contingent line of funding of the Ministry of Education to pay the municipalities' debts. But before apprehensions of the Ministry of Finance about giving money to the municipalities without committing objectives of performance, this fund had to be eventually justified under the name of 'Support to the Improvement of Educational Management'. Since the Minister of Education was not clear about how to spend the fund, the problem was left to the professionals' implementation, who assumed the position of the Ministry of Finance – against Bachelet's position – that the fund should not finance structural debts of municipalities and only support management improvement. Most of the money was required to be spent on buying computers and one particular software to calculate the cost of each student – in order to optimise educational management. As an extreme of red tape, since the municipalities could not formulate funding applications in the format of objectives of performance, part of the money also had to go to hire personnel in the municipalities that could assume the administration of these resources in such a managerial fashion. When the right-wing government took office in 2010, the fund returned to its original intention of transferring liquidity to the municipalities in a 'no questions asked' approach, prescinding from the layer of professional excess that refracted the implementation of this policy. This tale's moral is that the managerial framework of the public administration appeared to be more internalised by professionals representing the reason of the state under the direction of the centre-left, than by the right-wing government that occupied the state in the name of its own basis of power.

(3) In quadrant three, professional work neither is close to the subject of policy nor to decision-making. Public administrators are typically positioned in this fashion, as they conform a large proportion of the bureaucracy specialised in management control – but from an administrative rather than strategic approach. While this group experiments less mobility in changes of government, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, quadrant three configures the least

politicised location of state work. While the perspective on post-professionalism emphasises the managerial competences added to professional performance, less is said about the traditional administrative professionals seeking involvement with the subject of policy. In this regard, a public administration from the CNCA declares:

I'm grateful for the possibility of changing of area because until last year... we didn't have the possibility of interacting with the more programmatic subjects of the CNCA... where I'm now, instead, I have suddenly met and interacted – not really intervened – with the people responsible of programmes, with the lines of work that I used to see from a bit farther away. Now I get to work with them and [see] how in definitive they provide the product to the citizens. That's been very interesting' (Public administrator 2, public-elite [state] university, 2012).

Therefore, the satisfaction about approaching the subject of policy is understandable by the marginalisation of the traditional bureaucratic positions in specialised agencies of the state.

(4) The last quadrant compensates the distance to decision-making with closer identity with the subject of work, as the main source of *public professionalism* at this level. As put by a sociologist from the regulatory agency on television: 'I don't know whether I want to ascend to higher instances to where I'm at the moment or to get positions of more responsibilities... I'm satisfied because I'm allowed to work on what I like. Other instances incorporate administrative and political stuff that I'm not interested in... I've been working on this topic since my undergrad thesis' (Sociologist 2, mass-private [public-oriented] university, 2012). Predominantly occupied by social sciences and education professionals, the non-instrumental core of the social/cultural function of the state is here preserved.

The sense of *public professionalism* is reaffirmed by the separation from political authority. A sociologist from the CNCA makes it clear:

'I feel like a state functionary, with a public vocation. If I've been told that I'm working for the government, I wouldn't be here. I'm interested in working for the state independently of who is [in government]. Obviously, it helps that your boss has the same political position one has' (Sociologist 3, private-mass [public-oriented] university, 2012).

In this testimony, we find much of what we attribute to *public professionalism*: the identification with the subject of work by invoking a public vocation, formulated with independence from government, but still articulated as a political position, derived from the actual role and also in affinity with her direct boss.

To illustrate the *effects of production of meaning* at this level, we start with an elite-professional who works with fiction writers also at the CNCA, resembling Bourdieu and Passeron's

image of a job that 'requires no competence more specific than competence in class culture' (1979, p.89).

I'm hired there for content and for having a capacity for bureaucratic management. When I was interviewed one of the key questions was whether I had sensibility with literature, knew the demands of the world of writers, how these guys live and suffer, because I'm the one who pays their salaries, makes them juries, grants them prizes, and has to manage their homages... It has to be done carefully, I have an excel table, but this table is full of writers and I ought to have affection for each one of these guys, that are the patrimony of Chile, that are doing cultural work (Psychologist 1, private-elite university, 2012).

This professional often sees himself going beyond duty to ensure the authenticity of his work, such as in designing the poster that advertises the national literary contest:

Maybe it's not a minor thing, a bloody poster that's going to be the image of the contest, and it's a poster that I like, and I was there so I was going to like it, and so I had to fight the bureaucracy and the designer that had another style. These are minimal gestures that one can defend to preserve a certain style. It's where one can intervene (Ibid.).

Albeit there is not a visible transference of disciplinary knowledge but of cultural dispositions in such intervention, still this professional's autonomy is oriented in clear *post-professional* fashion by aesthetic ideals attributable to both an emancipatory interest as well as to its origins in elite higher education. Without this input, the contest might have suffered from unauthentic representation, with a jury integrated by political rather than literary reasons and also advertised like any other state product, missing the artistic dimension of this *state effect*.

As we move into to the lowest levels in this quadrant, towards the bureaucracy of social services, the recognition of professional knowledge is not to be taken for granted, as one mass-professional told us: 'with my degree of social education I was applying to the same jobs than before, when I had no degree' (Education 2, private-mass [public-oriented] HEI, 2012). Consequentially, mass-professionals feel devalued under the prestige of elite-professionals, regardless of the knowledge and professionalism mobilised into state work, as put by the professional of the neighbourhood programme:

I come from a private [university], that's OK. But I feel there are too many universities and every day social workers, sociologists, psychologists are graduating and we're populating a market that's not that big. And, of course, it causes harm that there are a thousand million social workers and my worth doesn't matter. I had the chance to get [to work with] people from the [universities of] Chile, Católica... we had a way of working and got along, but individually, it is noticeable the issue of separation... always with that stamp of prestige, and

one feels bad. At the end of the day, we have the same knowledge, but there's always a separation (Social worker, mass-private [public-oriented] university, 2013).

As seen in Chapter Two, professional formation in mass higher education often aimed to the public administration as the only place in which a sense of professionalism is preserved – compared to the precarisation of the private sector. Along these lines, according to a psychologist that works for the National Children's Service (SENAME), mass-professionals fulfil a function that would be unauthentic for elite-professionals to perform. In her case, the work with marginal young offenders seems more appropriate for mass-professionals to perform:

I've always heard critiques against [my] university, that private universities don't teach like the public ones do and all that stuff, but I'm convinced that the professional doesn't make the person. Here we're all-terrain, and not by coincidence the majority come from universities that don't teach you like the Universidad Católica, there are people from the ARCIS, Humanismo Cristiano [universities from group D], therefore we're people formed differently, more social, more communitarian; otherwise, it's harder to achieve success; otherwise, you go with a face of disgust to see the kids (Psychologist 2, private-mass [commercially-oriented] university, 2015).

Once professional work at this level is directed to *the production of meaning*, it typically exceeds the managerial controls of the state. Keeping with the psychologist cited above, her working autonomy is directed to resignify the meaning of young offenders' behaviour, without being commanded to do so by the state:

We're paid for judicial accompaniment, in any minute you're prescribed that you have to talk with the mother of the young, because the mother is not fulfilling her parental role... You do that on your own, and depending on your profession you deal with it. Psychologists tend to do a bit more of intervention, to open up subjects, unsolved conflicts, grievances, so depending on the profession, we make the intervention in a personal way, absolutely personal initiative (Ibid.).

Her *excess* reflects the orientation of affective labour (Hochschild, 2003); in her words: 'I believe in treating the boys with more *affection*, being more maternal with them, the link as more real... as more maternal, stricter, we set limits' (Ibid.). Indeed, the *affections* of this mass-professional demarcate the outskirts of the state, where marginal young offenders find their closest representation. As *excess*, such interactions take place without the state even noticing them: 'it's very far for me to say that I'm working for SENAME. SENAME appears every two months to check the boys' folders and it's *totally numeric*. SENAME doesn't represent me in any minute' (Ibid.).

Another example from SENAME, from a mass public-oriented academic background, illustrates the orientation by emancipatory ideals, as follows:

The political path is to advance the construction of a subject, that a self-definition is attained by the families we intervene, including the boys. And there it stops making sense for us to interrupt the infringing behaviour. The infringing behaviour is a residual of the s**t the family is living... we could be ending up validating the infraction of law by the boys if they would make sense of it... but it's very difficult that the hegemonical discourse would include that as valid. But, definitely, in the intervention you find validations of that experience of marginality, disruptive of the hegemonical, that make a lot of sense... to provide tools to enhance the reflection of the own actors of this story, I believe it contributes to the construction of a subject there, a critical subject, with action capacity, there in the popular sectors (Education 2, private-mass [public-oriented] HEI, 2012).

But the prevention of infracting behaviour, and not the political awakening of young offenders, is the job for which this professional is hired: SENAME is 'not interested in this other reflection or plus value the team could give them' (Ibid.). Interestingly, he calls *plus value* to what we have referred to as *excess*. So, where is this *surplus* going? To the instances of self-care of the working team in which they develop a critical approach of intervention, called socio-cultural – opposed to the *systemic* approach of SENAME – and to write publications with colleagues. In his words, the professionals working with him: 'don't stop doing what they are asked for, but do more than they are asked for' (Ibid.). So again, the sense of *excess* transcends the knowledge of the state: 'this is not established in the technical basis... what the chaps from SENAME eventually are going to measure is the diminishing of the infringing behaviour. What has to do with the improvement of the quality of life, with the re-signification of the violent codes is *nickel-and-dime* [for SENAME]' (Ibid.). Since the development of a critical intervention approach is anchored in the *self-care* activities of the group, the element of *affective labour* also reappears as a catalyst of the orientations that mass-professionals, at the lower links of the state, give to their *excess* of autonomy.

As discussed in Chapter Three, policy implementation in this segment takes place as professional discretion, typical of street-level bureaucracies. Therefore, even residually, there is a potential of professional action to imprint a specific orientation to policy frameworks that are not totally defined for concrete applications and unforeseen situations³⁷. Thus, the political effectiveness

³⁷ Regarding the critical orientations of policy implementation, we retrieve a recent study by Muñoz and Pantazis (2019) about the resistance of NGOs social workers to neoliberal social policy. While this study rightly frames the effect of resistance in the critical knowledge that professionals put in practice in their work, the

of the professional orientations incorporated to this level of discretion might be as well activated in relation to emergent social demands. Situations of emergent implementation provide special occasions to reorient the state before an emergent crisis, generating responses that are close to the social basis of the problem. As we see with more detail in the last point, in such situations it is possible to see how the orientations of *public professionalism* entail political effects onto the basis of state power. In particular, the irruption of secondary students' protests represented an opportunity for two professionals from the Ministry of Education to elaborate such an emergent design of policy implementation. According to one of them, a situation of crisis marked a break with his previous job as school supervisor, closer to quadrant three of *ritualistic* bureaucratic control: 'the scope of action of supervisors was rather restricted, basically to follow public policy and be part of a model, which is completely designed, with scarce intellectual participation for those who execute it' (Education 3, public-elite [Catholic] university, 2011). That until:

A field was opened where it was possible to design public policy or generate ideas or even intellectual production, this was when the system itself had a void with respect to an emergent need... when the policy, the design, the annual planning was not capable to cope with educational reality in concrete practice, it was there where... professionals were called to say: what do we do with this? (Ibid.).

As argued throughout this dissertation, the political implications of the distribution of *public professionalism* in the state hinge on the organic links of professional knowledge – and of the ideological divisions of the university system – with the political conflicts that overdetermine the direction of the state. Thus, to the structural view of the bureaucracy as politicised along its centres of decision making (expressive of dominant interests of the state) and its subordinated segments (expressive of the popular struggles) (Poulantzas, 2014), we have added the consideration of the professional profiles that, under conditions of *mass intellectuality*, materialise such links to the dominant and subaltern interests of state power. Along these lines, the political shift to the right-wing government is signified by the professional discourses in terms of the circulation of professionals from elite universities, most notably with the arrival of graduates from the Universidad Católica. We count with various impressions of the professional reconfiguration of the Ministry of Education with the change of government. For one sociologist that left shortly afterwards: 'the profile of the Piñera's functionary was completely different... chaps with *no street*, people that came directly from *Libertad y Desarrollo*³⁸ to a cabinet... after graduating from the *Católica*' (Sociologist 4,

lack of impact of the professionals' excess at this level retains the problem of resistance to a matter of the political potential of the professionals' orientations.

³⁸ Right-wing think tank founded in 1990 by a former minister of the Dictatorship.

public-elite [Catholic] university, 2015). Another perspective from a line professional referred to the new functionaries as ‘recently graduated from the university, that don’t know even how to work [and] win more than three million³⁹... the head of the division of general education is an engineer. I have nothing against engineers but, what can an engineer know about education? That’s the ideology of the system today’ (Public administrator 3, public-mass [State] university, 2011). While the lack of experience of the newcomers under Piñera’s government is stressed, the perception of the incorporation of engineers to education as *ideological* entails a critique of technocratic knowledge in education.

From the other side, for one of those engineers from the Universidad Católica that entered the Ministry of Education to work as a decision-maker for Piñera’s government, the type of professionalism he represented mostly came to the state pursuing political motivations: ‘this government... has some special characteristics that made more people from the *Católica* to come, but before that, the one that came to the government was very rare... in my generation, several ended up working here, but rather motivated by a political project than by a story of public service’ (Engineer, public-elite [Catholic] university, 2013). In effect, when this interview was conducted in 2013 – one year before Piñera’s government ended – the professionals that also participated in his team – the majority from the Universidad Católica, a lawyer from the Opus Day private elite university *Los Andes*, and a philosopher from the Universidad de Chile ‘but that took a PhD in philosophy in Germany after that anyway’ (Ibid.) – were already starting to leave. Thus, the political activation of professionals at the direction of the state is clearly different from what happens at the subordinated positions of the public administration, where *public professionalism* is affirmed with independence of the government, particularly by the proximity to the subject of policy and the interests there represented, as noted.

Regarding the political activation of the subordinated segment, the cited professional of the NGO reflected on the effect of the professional radicalism, produced in the public-oriented mass universities, in the state, as follows:

Many professionals from these universities... end up working at the State... because the capacity of absorption of NGOs is too low... When they advance too much, enter in contradiction with the institution and end up in conflict... Many of these professionals, social workers, psychologists, teachers, geographers, historians... probably participate in an ideology that favours changes and participation, but they are mixed with an institutional system that gives them little autonomy, so this autonomy is rather played in the practical meaning of their most everyday actions and not necessarily in political definitions... I believe

³⁹ More than £3,500 monthly.

that effectively there's a critical mass lying at the very basis of the state, in the municipalities, the social ministries, you'll find thousands of people that participate in a more critical outlook, and that sometimes join social movements or some protests, but [without] spaces of articulation... so I think it's an effect of fragmentation (Humanities 1, public-elite [Catholic] university, 2011).

This formulation says it all really: from the allocation of professionals with critical orientations at the lower segments of the state to their reduced autonomy and fragmented influence into minor interventions and occasional participation with social movements. At the basis, the public-oriented mass universities exert their own determinations onto the administrative superstructure.

6.4. Alienation of Professional State Work

As an unexpected outcome of the conversations with state workers, the topic of alienation emerged as the association of diverse pathologies of organisational work, like subordination, formalism and burnout, to the truncated potential of professional autonomy. In a brief excursus, we discuss these views within the political significance of *mass intellectuality*, and its *public professionalism*, as *excess*.

As argued, when professional work is subordinated to organisations, it is as well subsumed to relations of exploitation that alienate its specific rationality. But, such an experience of alienation is different from what Marx thought for material labourers. For Marx, the *real subsumption* of material labour to capital is independent of the content of the activity, which only counts for its capacity to produce value in return for means of subsistence (Roggero, 2011, p.101). But with intellectual labour, the content of the productive activity matters, it is not external for the worker that performs it. Likewise, the ends to which intellectual labour works for are internalised as part of the content of its activity, so the *excess* of labour beyond material retribution might be also oriented in relation to such ends. Therefore, while the process and ends of material labour remain external the material worker – which is why for Gramsci the party had to re-engage workers with their political role (Virno, 2004) – for intellectual labour, the political role is already incorporated to the relations of production. The experience of alienation might be managed by the intellectual worker with occasional control of the working conditions and re-engagement with (or influence on) the collective (organisational) ends that he/she is contributing to attaining. In an extreme situation, the autonomy of professional workers is accomplished vis-à-vis their identification within the ends of the organisation. As for material workers, politicisation has nothing to do with political affinities with the firms/owners for which they are working, for intellectual workers, ideological identification within

the organisation in which they work might be the ultimate indication of consistency and autonomy and, thereby, of professionalism and prestige. As 'status is increasingly frequently assessed according to their capacity for self-fulfilment' (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p.429), we also find that the disposition to self-fulfilment neither is limited to instrumental uses of knowledge nor to the heights of the organisation, but transversally attached to the political signification of professional work.

Inasmuch as taylorised intellectual labour (Gramsci, 1978) loses contact with the ideals that motivate it, reducing itself to pure instrumental output, bureaucracies also de-attach from the ideas that justified them in the first place (Habermas, 2005). Therefore, the transformation of the (post)bureaucracy along the lines of 'multiprofessionalisation' (Abbott, 1988), decentralisation of decision-making, life-long re-skilling of workers, relaxation of authoritarian discipline and increasing spaces for creative and self-fulfilling autonomy (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007), counteracts the instrumentalisation of intellectual labour therein. Fragmented and de-skilled labour is replaced with autonomous intellectual and political performances, which might be as well incorporated into the organisation 'as universal servile work' (Virno, 2004, p.68). Consequentially, the function political parties had in Fordism of reconnecting labour with political self-understanding is rendered redundant. Intellectual work might become political work in itself.

Relations of real subsumption – i.e. 'renunciation, compensated by the wage, by the workers to any claim on the property of the product of their labour' (Vercellone, 2007, p.33) – are transformed by the massification of intellectual labour, making production of value inseparable from the subjectivity of the worker, as discussed. Since value production and also organisational performance are dependent on the initiatives of intellectual workers, professional autonomy tends to overtime work (De Angelis and Harvie, 2009; Maravelias, 2003). From the perspective of individual workers, working overtime might be justified by personal responsibility with the ends of the organisation or competitive relations among peers. As long as working overtime is oriented to regain control of the conditions and product of labour, it might also seek to overcome the alienation of professional work.

The expectations of state workers to materialising their intellectual ideals at the organisation explains their sense of alienation. Therefore, the alienation of professional state work is consummated as a means to the realisation of meaningful (political) ends, which thus demand an excess of autonomy and overtime work to be fulfilled. From the interviews we find that the sense of alienation had to be solved by exceeding the role of functionary, either within or outside the state, seeking to influence the content of state policy.

In the next two illustrations, alienation is experienced in relation to bureaucratic work. In the first case, alienation is attached to frustrated expectations of promotion. An economist from a private-elite university, that worked in a programme of digital government, took pride in the autonomy he had to achieve objectives in his work. But operative labour made him impatient about his career prospects. Eventually, he argued with his boss to reclaim for his professional realisation:

I need extra hands. If you want me to keep doing the operative tasks... I need you to hire me a person... I also had an opinion about how to improve things and little room to accomplish it... so I told him that he could reduce my wage to hire someone to help me with the operative tasks, and I basically asked him for space so I could create, and be more involved in the decisions (Economist 3, private-elite university, 2015).

As this professional explained, he envisioned himself leading the platform of web-based services for which he was working. While his career ambitions were high, it is no less authentic expression of professionalism that he asked to reduce his salary for a share of creativity and decision-making.

Another private-elite professional, from the field of arts, worked in a public website of digitalised historic documents. While the conversation with this professional swung from the importance of her work for the democratisation of culture to the frustration for changing the career of an artist for a bureaucrat, she eventually revealed the way to sublimate her alienation from the role of the functionary by expressing the interest of the artist. As argued above, her solution involved working beyond duty:

I get to have this book in my hand... and I'm asked to digitalise an extract, and I consider the book is interesting as a whole and so I go and say, let's digitalise it and upload it as a whole in the website. These are the smallest actions, where one goes putting meaning to the job. But if you stick with the public functionary, you rot (Arts, private-elite university, 2012).

A micro-resistance to instrumental work takes the form of a surplus of labour, as an aesthetic contribution to society, while adopting the artist persona to impose its normative criteria against the bureaucracy. Such a normative orientation of state work indeed falls off the radar for instrumental perspectives on bureaucratic autonomy.

Two other illustrations represent the alienation from political ends. A member of the CNCA during Piñera's government processed his own political views – on the left of the government – in the Mertonian fashion of 'regarding his function as purely technical and without value-implication' (Merton, 1968, p.273).

I think the state buys part of my capacities, the techno-operative ones, and in the Department, we're doing great, we have good ideas, we develop them well, but it doesn't

buy the head. Otherwise, I wouldn't even work in the state. It harms me to put it that way (Journalist 2, public-elite [state] university, 2012).

The overcoming of moral harm is again achieved by means of *excess*, providing the highest quality of creativity at the operative level of work. So, the solution to alienation here is directed to calibrate the intellectual orientation given to work.

For an education professional from the Ministry of Education, alienation is exacerbated by the lack of control on policies imposed from above:

There's a superior level in the Ministry, and there's a lot of production: there they might discuss and use all their experience to transform it into public policy... but that doesn't occur downwards, those that are down, what do they do? It's just soldiery that has to apply, apply, apply. So, in order to not tear yourself morally and emotionally, you search for points of fugue... to channel your production (Education 4, public-elite [state] university, 2011).

To overcome moral impairment, our interviewee explains, some functionaries give university lectures and others relate to centres of critical discussion on educational policy, linked to the participation in the student movement. But inside the state: 'you start to operate with the logic of the bureaucrat, I have my critical view of the question, but nobody considers it, so I just obey' (Ibid.). Therefore, rather than aiming to regain influence from within the state, the excess of autonomy is in this case directed to the enrichment of civil society by means of academic production, which anyway implies further work in relation to state policy. As noted above and further elaborated in the next point, this professional once had a major influence on educational policy when he mediated the articulation of the demands of the 2006 secondary student movement with the state. Therefore, also in Mertonian fashion, the *ritualist* retraction might be as well the consequence of previous involvement in policymaking, but that resulted in a lost dispute with the authority. This case fits the handbook.

Last, alienation was also attached to precarious state work, like in the experience of a social worker who worked with poor families in a private institution on behalf of SENAME for a salary of about £800. While his working team tried to instil a *constructivist* approach of intervention, the implementation of this approach promptly clashed with the working conditions: monthly meetings ended up as catharsis of the experiences they have to cope with. In his words:

These jobs alienate you; you turn into a machine... It might sound awful, but I'm tired already of hearing every day that boys are raped, beaten, which is dreadful, I'm also a person and need a break... with this work, I enter the houses and confront the smell, how they live, and somehow you take all that burden despite the fact it's a job... nobody comes and asks you how you're doing, No!... You're simply seen as an instrument of this policy...

The professional is drifting. If you burn out, bad luck... And whether one wants to write or not: well no, I don't want to, I don't feel like it, because I receive nothing in exchange (Social worker, private-mass [public-oriented] university, 2013).

Precarious working conditions set a limit to the overcoming of the sense of alienation. Also drawing on the other interviewees from SENAME, the capacity to re-signify state work seems quite fragile indeed, depending on the working team, the boss, and even the management of affections, as determinant conditions for the preservation of autonomy and professionalism at this level.

At the basis of the sense of alienation, the disposition to regain professional autonomy by means of an excess of state work, in relation to the content of policy, is shared by the different professional profiles, as a generalisable *emancipatory* orientation incorporated to the bureaucratic organisation. Even when the opportunities to resignify professional work are more restricted at the street-level, mass-professionals anyway struggle to preserve their *public professionalism*, in which cases, affective rationality serves as a catalyst to renew the sense of autonomy in the state. In turn, among the differences observed in the empirical cases – without attempting generalisation – we find that while the graduates from private-elite universities seemed less affected by the political conflicts of the state, the graduates from the public-elite universities suffered from being too conscious about the political overdeterminations of their work. For sure, such differences fit our considerations about political socialisation in the university system. Either way, the grievance that organisational heteronomy provokes on professional state workers is experienced as such from the perspective of the knowledge, university education and expectations of autonomous self-fulfilling work. Without the preceding intellectual and political socialisation outside the state, sentiments of alienation would surely be more tenuous.

6.5. Influence on State Power

Finally, we attempt to answer the big question on the influence of professionals' autonomy upon state power. As argued so far, professionals' autonomy is not only interpretable by the orientations of workers alone, but also by the interests they represent in the state. Hence, the influence professionals might exert on the direction of state policy is mediated by the capacity to articulate intellectual ideals with interests and demands for the transformation of state power. In that sense, policy influence is not reserved to technocratic elites and technical ideals, but *public professionalism* exerted at the subordinated positions of the administration might also influence state power with non-instrumental orientations linked to social movements.

To make our point, we rely on only two cases from the Ministry of Education. The first tells the experience of two young education professionals who graduated from public-elite universities:

one from the Universidad Católica, which in the field of education actually represents a less elitist profile. The other comes from the state-owned UMCE, which is the closest position to the public-mass segment in our classification, while representing a tradition of political activism. As introduced above, these professionals used to work as school supervisors but in 2005 ended up working on behalf of the Ministry of Education with the secondary student organisations that later, in 2006, emerged as the then largest social mobilisation against neoliberal policy since the restoration of democracy. The second case is opposed to the first one, both in terms of the professional profile and for representing the technocrat that had to deal with the consequences of social mobilisation. An illustrative case indeed this one is; an engineer of the Universidad Católica highly motivated to work for Piñera's government, remaining within the staff of advisors and policymakers of the Ministry of Education only for that period – embodying the profile of engineers that occupied the social/cultural administration under the right-wing government. The political formation of this professional is traced back to the voluntary association *Techo-Chile*, which, as noted above, also represents quite well the profile of elite leadership that is formed with engineers from the Universidad Católica. The contrast between these two illustrations reveals the political efficacy of orientations of mutual understanding and emancipation attached to social struggles and of efficiency and technical control sustained at the centre of decision-making. Counterintuitively, the first pair of professionals eventually had more impact than the later on the direction of state policy, catalysing the most crucial critique of neoliberal policy in decades.

Since professionals do not play the part of political actors, their influence on state policy is not direct. Drawing on their knowledge and orientations, professionals develop interventions and processes that mediate the generation of *state effects* in relation to the interests mobilised by state policy⁴⁰. Indeed, in these two cases, while the education professionals sought to recognise and articulate the students' demands, clashing with the authorities' disposition towards conflict control, the technocratic advisor sought to balance social demands with efficient policymaking, also clashing with the ascendance students had on the policy agenda. Before the social and political contradictions of state policy, these professionals anyway put together substantive processes to try to solve them.

Starting with the two professionals that worked with the secondary students, for reasons of completeness, we only reference the interview with the professional from the Universidad Católica. Since the 2001 protests of secondary students against the privatisation of their pass for public transportation, it became 'common to see protests convened by secondary school students against

⁴⁰ According to Noordegraaf (2015), the orientations of hybrid-professionalism are typically expressed in the form of *sound processes*, that generate articulation of procedures, values and actors.

the deteriorating infrastructure of the schools, rising transport fees and other specific issues' (Donoso, 2013, p.7-8). While the protests lacked an overarching demand and responded to divided student organisations – without transcending the traditional public (emblematic) schools – in 2005 the number of protesters anyway increased. As a reaction, the Metropolitan Secretary of Education – tired of 'initiating dialogue from scratch' (Donoso, 2013, p.8) with students every year – offered a platform of dialogue with students. But, unsurprisingly, the design of such *Dialogues* was not defined. 'In 2005 it was very incipient, so we had complete freedom to work with the *boys*... there was no design, no planning... I was called basically for being *young*, they didn't even know me... that was the only reason, probably because of the long hair' (Education 3, public-elite [Catholic] university, 2011). Thus, the two professionals embodied the reaction of the state to 'an emergent necessity... in a rather intuitive manner' (Ibid.). It is before such conditions where 'the clarity of the functionary has to emerge, of the professional that is *in there*' (Ibid.).

The *Participative Dialogues in Public Education* was the name the platform received, anticipating the participatory approach Bachelet was putting forward in the campaign that took her to the Presidency in the following year 2006. For the professionals involved, it meant an opportunity to take students participation seriously, to make citizen formation and open spaces of discussion. They actually claim responsibility for the whole design of the *Dialogues*, with their bosses only commenting on details. Among the elements of design, an orientation towards mutual understanding sought to produce: 'a space of collective construction, where the different actors give meaning to what they're doing, more than someone from the outside, from the intellectual elite, that comes and imposes on you what to say' (Ibid.). They also encouraged participation beyond the emblematic schools, promoting the incorporation students from peripheral and technical schools to the *Dialogues* as well. The main purpose of this instance was to:

legitimise the boys' demands, systematise them, organise them in a document, not only with the end of participation by participation, but with the commitment that we will answer those demands, take them to the respective units that, according to the organisational structure, had to deal with them (Ibid.).

It was expected that all demands would receive an honest answer, 'independently these were satisfactory or unsatisfactory' (Ibid.).

The consideration of the satisfaction of the user was then reinforced with a political critique of the fragmentation of the educational crisis into isolated problems: 'everybody could see that education was falling to pieces... so who better auditors than students themselves' (Ibid.). So, to overcome the particularisation of students' demands into the logic of the customer – typical of the NPM – notions of democracy, participation and civic education were incorporated into the formation

of student leadership. The students' capacity to diagnose education problems was also strengthened, while encouraging the solidarity of interests in this process. Students worked to identify the critical problems affecting education and experts were invited to link the discussion to a broader diagnose. At this point, orientations turned emancipatory.

The logic was different, it was how to empower an actor, as an actor and not as a person, that could be interlocutor with the government and in the space of decision-making. It's completely different to the assistentialist logic of solving problems one by one, but to see how a collective construction of public policy is made, and how actors can participate and construct this public policy (Ibid).

As expected, the *Dialogues* culminated with a document that systematised the student demands. In the aftermath, this process proved effective to generate unconstrained communication, protected from top-down manipulation and to recognise and articulate students as a collective actor in relation to state policy. But the expectation of bridging students' participation in decision-making was unsuccessful.

The emergence of secondary student (Pingüino) movement in 2006 has been studied in the wake of the articulation prompted by the *Dialogues*. It is argued that the elaboration of the document with the students' demands in November 2005 materialised capacities of reflection and action that were constitutive of the movement in 2006 (Ruíz, 2013, p.56). Furthermore, the impact of this instance is also considered in terms of the formation of students as interlocutors of the state, with expertise in key problems of the education system (Donoso, 2013). While in December 2005 the largest student organisations agreed to put their differences aside, one might think that the completion of the document of the *Dialogues* the month before might have had something to do with that. Thus, as this document was disregarded by the new Minister of Education that came to office with Bachelet's government in March 2006, not only the participatory approach of the *Dialogues* was disappointed, but it also precipitated the protests with unheard force. Our interviewee does not want to overestimate the effect of the *Dialogues* on the articulation of the Pingüino movement, but thinks that it did 'accelerate it a bit, in the sense of how we failed' (Education, public-elite [Catholic] university, 2012). As the students' grievances were recognised, articulated, but left unanswered at the end, the outrage of those that participated in the *Dialogues*, and politicised in the process, was justified. Interviewed by Donoso, one of the leaders of the movement declared that when they learned that the Minister 'did not have a clue about the existence of the proposal, secondary school students were infuriated' (2013, p.8). Reinforcing the unity gained with the *Dialogues*, after the denial of the Minister of Education, students joined forces into a single organisation, sparking the movement (p.9).

The building of a communicative space for students' articulation did much for the transformation of state power against its neoliberal basis. Donoso claims that Bachelet's citizen participation approach provided a political opportunity to justify the movement. While that remains true, in our view, it was the work of these two professionals which gave the concrete opportunity for the articulation of students under a democratic approach. And they did this before the Bachelet government, neither following the dictates of the authority nor their own career interests, but in conformity to autonomous intellectual ideals – or *public professionalism*. Secondary students managed to centralise their critique to the framework of market education institutionalised by constitutional law, demanding its derogation. Moreover, their critique of educational inequality was directed to the democratisation of higher education access (Donoso, 2013). In this way, the secondary student movement is the closest antecedent to the university student movement that a few years later, upon the basis of the same generation of students, took over the agenda in 2011. Therefore, we find that the secondary student movement anticipated the orientations of a growing mass of students whose unequal educational opportunities were generalised as a conflict into the state, as consummated with the 2011 university movement. In 2005 students had good allies in these professionals of the Ministry of Education, who contributed to the maturation of their orientations, democratic organisation and formulation of demands.

After the 2011 university student movement exploded, politicising the educational conflict to the largest extent, we find that its effects expressed in the challenge posed to the ideals of efficiency within the state. Paradoxically, the challenge to technical efficiency intensified during a right-wing government, when the presence of the professionals that represent these orientations was at its peak. Drawing on the perspective of the elite engineer working as a policymaker in the Ministry of Education, the affinity between technical ideals and the neoliberal framework is expressed in the notion of keeping state intervention to a minimum. In his words, the political challenge consists in how certain restriction of *liberties* is necessary 'in order to generate better policies' (Engineer, public-elite [Catholic] university, 2013). As *liberties* indicate the extent to which the market predominates in most fields of policy, minimal state intervention has to be controlled by its demonstrable efficiency compared to market provision. This engineer is actually proficient in methodologies to that effect – J-Pal randomised evaluation. Hence, the demand for free higher education was rejected by its demonstrated inefficiency:

Take the same story of gratuity, when you have different alternatives to finance higher education, in general gratuity was discarded by a criterion of efficiency, because there is the conviction that you can reach a level of equity that's equal or better in access, without the necessity of increasing the spending of resources (Ibid.).

But, as discussed in Chapter Two, the claim for free higher education was not for efficient policy but for de-marketisation and de-commodification of a key sphere of society.

The scope of the student demands situates the two cases revised in this point in a same plane, as the challenge of ideals of understanding and emancipation, earlier mobilised from the lower levels of the Ministry of Education in support of the student mobilisation, to the ideals of efficiency dwelling at the top floor in the Minister's Cabinet. As put by the engineer:

Efficiency is like a bad narrative... nobody thinks their lives are defined by more or less efficient use of resources... different actors and interest groups are concerned with reaching another type of objectives... Besides, in politics, it's not enough to have a very good technical solution that's also efficient. No... Therefore, if you want to defend something from the perspective of efficiency, you will probably fail (Ibid.).

Still, this professional responded by designing sound processes with efficiency as a central concern. Apart from proposing a technical solution to bypass the demand of gratuity, he also put together a formula to calculate the reference fees of higher education, which was presented as the first time that a funding scheme was 'going to be only centred in variables that affect the student, as *a new system of fees... centred in the student... that's a different narrative*' (Ibid.). Thus, in compensation for the shortcomings of efficiency as a political value, a strategic use of language was intentioned. But, as discussed, marketing language will not compensate for the deficit of legitimacy that the politicisation of unsatisfied social demands generates in the state (cf. Habermas, 1976; Offe, 1993).

Moreover, as the university students' demands went beyond expressing education grievances to directly impose policy solutions, technocratic powers were further challenged.

Even when there was a certain consensus that the solutions one was proposing could be reasonably good, I think there also was a phenomenon that made certain interest groups to have overtaken the public agenda in their hands during the whole government... I always found the citizens' movements were very rich to diagnose like malaise, problems... but it turned from help to diagnose problems, discontent, invisible crisis, into a bunch of solutions and recipes in which there is not so much space for dialogue (Engineer, public-elite [Catholic] university, 2013).

It is interesting that the problem of dialogue is brought to the fore, precisely as students learned from the experience of 2006 that dialogue was ineffective to antagonise state policy. In effect, our interview accuses a problem in the strategic uses of language: 'I think there's a language, something in the channel of communication that fails and provokes that there's no trust' (Ibid.). As a consequence, student leaders were seen as a threat to the criterion of efficiency to define the

priorities of state spending in a democratic society: ‘while looking to the problem that affects me, me, me, they forget they are in a context with diverse problems affecting to a lot of groups of people, and that has a bit to do with efficiency, with the good use of public resources’ (Ibid).

First-person views show how orientations towards efficiency institutionalised at the centre of decision-making are challenged by alternative views mobilised from the subordinated levels of the state work, linked to external social demands. While this *state effect* is occasional, fragmented and unsuccessful in some respects, still it paved the way to historic changes of state policy. In the aftermath, both secondary students succeeded in reforming the constitutional law of school education as well as university students installed free higher education as state policy. As Poulantzas (2014) sustained, changes in state power away from dominant capitalist interests have a strategic ally in the subordinated structures of the state, that institutionalise *secondary popular struggles* – administrated by functionaries of petty-bourgeois affiliation. In this case, the social basis of functionaries is expressed by professional orientations and the universities where they were socialised. The effectiveness of these orientations, its potential influence on the direction of the state, depends on the capacity of state professionals to linking to social demands targeting the state. Furthermore, political divisions take place in the state by means of opposed orientations of state work. Certainly, these ideological clashes do not unfold in a horizontal milieu – both in the university system and in the public administration, elite segments and its technical orientations are predominant. But, as we have seen, non-instrumental orientations mobilised at the distance from the centres of power also have the potential for triggering policy changes. In conditions of *mass intellectuality*, educational divisions are social and ideological divisions.

We have added the dimension of subjective action orientations to the analysis of the professional basis of state autonomy. The orientations of the *mass intellectuality of public professionals* are expressive, on the one hand, of the inner rationality of the state organisation alongside ideological divisions of state work and, on the other hand, of uses of knowledge linked to dominant and subordinate interests of state power.

The political effectiveness of professional autonomy is not given as direct political interests, but as ideals of knowledge and professionalism. Historically, the representation of social movements by the state has depended on the articulation of professional cadres in specialised agencies – albeit subordinated to the managerial control of the state. Generalising this effect for the condition of *mass intellectuality*, we express it in a concept of *public professionalism*, which captures the

motivations of professional state work towards the ends of policy. In response to the question about why state workers work and work hard (Harney, 2002, p.163), we claim that it is not only because of a sense of professionalism as professional honour alone (Weber, 1978) but of professionalism engaged in the subject of policy, that is, *public professionalism*.

The discourses on the professionals' autonomy match the dots between the reproduction of the *mass intellectuality* at the university system and its ideological effects on the administrative superstructure. In conditions of *mass intellectuality*, the opportunities for political influence are not reserved for the top layers of the bureaucracy, at the centres of decision-making typically occupied by professionals from the elite universities, but also depend on the meaningful articulation with social demands from the lower segments of the public administration, where professionals from the mass universities also exert their autonomy of action. With the notion of *excess of knowledge*, professional work engenders autonomous *effects* that reproduce the scope of the state administration, either as technical control (*standardisation*) or as meaningful links with social groups (*production of meaning*). The continuity of student movements at the basis of the state, from the 2006 secondary protests to the 2011 university student movement, is most illustrative in this regard. Not only it is relevant to the extent that the public professionals that worked with the movement in 2005 contributed with *effects of production of meaning* to its political maturation. But also, because it concatenated to changes in the rationality of state autonomy: ideals of technical efficiency, identified with the neoliberal state and technocratic rule, were called into question. Eventually, the same critiques that students launched with regard to the conditions of educational inequality, affect the direction of the state as well. However, such effects are not direct, but mediated by the ideals of the *mass intellectuality* of the state.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion

Looking back at the original motivation of this research, we wanted to unravel the very idea of intellectual work as normative oriented action, that affirms its autonomy upon the knowledge it incorporates into the instrumental rationality of the state. In this rather Habermasian enquiry, we hoped to see the day-to-day labour of professional state workers inspired to the most modest but meaningful autonomous interventions. Indeed, we expected a fascinating sociological observation of the classic dialectic of agency and structure, particularly one in which the pragmatic effects of knowledge within the *system* would be revealed. And that is what we found in abundance: political proclamations of intellectual work as *self-fulfilling* agency in the university and student movement, together with several illustrations of professional autonomy as resistance and subsidy to the operation of the state bureaucracy. But in the empirical research, we also found much more than that. The professional autonomy in the state is in fact mediated by several social and political conditions, which needed to be explained. On the one hand, the massification of professional work into *mass intellectuality* incorporates the social and ideological differentiation of the university system in its own orientations. Therefore, if knowledge inspires action, we found that it also depends on the kind of university in which such knowledge is reproduced, whether it is an institution for the upper, middle or lower classes, and to what extent *professionalism* is socialised for political roles, that is, as *public professionalism*. On the other hand, the state is the arena of social and political struggle. Thus, to explain the autonomy of professional work in the public administration, letting alone its effects on state policy, we had to understand the state by its links with the interests that underlie state power, and the variants of *public professionalism* that represent them within the bureaucracy. In this way, the social and political divisions of the university system are also part of the divisions of the state. So, to interpret the meaningful professional agency within the state, we ended up researching the political significance of a *mass intellectuality* vis-à-vis its political socialisation in the university system and its effects of *public professionalism* on the neoliberal state in Chile. In this endeavour, we also reflected the dynamics and contradictions of the post-Fordist transformations of Chilean society.

We argued that the massification of intellectual work – beyond the higher classes – entails the differentiation of the political orientations for an emergent *mass intellectuality*, attached to the ideals of knowledge and professionalism socialised in an ideologically divided university system and incorporated to specific roles within the administration of the state. Hence, the orientations of the *mass intellectuality* are not reducible to the ascendance of state elites. By the same token, the differentiation of the *mass intellectuality* points to the substantive orientations that the

professionals bring as part of their own autonomy *exceeding* the instrumental framework of the bureaucracy. Thereby, we entered into the *classical* sociological concern about the political orientations of the intellectual and professional classes – renewed today in the discussion on the emancipatory effects of the *excess of knowledge* within the hypothesis of cognitive capitalism (cf. Virno, 2004; Roggero, 2011; Boltanski, 2011). As our main thesis argues, such orientations are primarily attributable to the types of knowledge (cf. Habermas, 2004) that infuse professional work with specific interests and variants of *public professionalism* in relation to state policy. But, as noted, on top of this formulation, the empirical research takes several layers of social and political conditions into account. Our main question then sought for the organic links established between the massification of professional work and the configuration of the public administration in Chile. Moreover, the question also sought to explain the political roles that a mass of professional workers assumes in the state. Eventually, the contribution of the research stems from representing the political consequences of the differentiation of an emergent *mass intellectuality* in the university system onto the professional configuration of the public administration and the autonomy that professionals exert therein. Under the specific objectives of the research, we refer to our main findings.

Our first objective sought to relate the trends of material and ideological differentiation of the mass university system to the students' *political socialisation* into *public professionalism*. The universities' owners and the social origins of the students that attend them provide the main coordinates to locate such trends of differentiation. Crucial expressions of these are the links of the universities with particular stakeholders and political projects; the variability of democratic and pluralistic university life – reinforcing or counteracting the particularism of certain institutions – the specialisation in certain areas of knowledge, like business or social sciences, and; most crucially for the recent conflicts in Chilean higher education, the segregation of the perverse effects of profit-making in the less selective universities, attended by the poorest students. In these asymmetrical conditions, the value attributed to the respective credentials is fixed to the students' social origins. The interviews with academics related these trends to the orientations of professional and political socialisation. The notion of *public professionalism* is observed here as the expectations of political leadership exerted through professional work. While the elite universities are *by default* oriented to the formation of the intellectual leadership, mass universities are more restricted for that matter by the instrumentalisation of knowledge towards goals of social mobility. The orientations instilled by the type of university condition this effect. In general, the public universities affirm their public purpose along with the more pluralistic and democratic environments they provide, although there is a clear hierarchisation derived from the selectivity of these institutions which explains the relative

subordination of the roles formed in the less selective universities. In turn, the private-elite universities tend to conservative affinities in most cases in conformity to the social segregation of these institutions to the upper classes and its links with conservative stakeholders. Last, the segment of private-mass universities appears divided between the instrumental orientations reproduced in the group of commercially-oriented universities – considering the corporations and for-profit interests that predominate therein – and the politicised handful of universities owned by social and academic organisations. Our special focus on the less selective universities stems from the fact that the *public professionalism* socialised therein often takes the state as the only place to exert creative and meaningful work, due to the lack of market opportunities these professionals have (cf. Poulantzas, 1979). The presence of the Catholic Church in universities from all segments also deserves special mention: regardless of the position within the system, the Church preserves the pretension of ideological impact through the intellectual roles it produces. In total, the ideological division of universities underpins the socialisation of variants of *public professionalism* for dominant and subordinated roles of the public administration, constituting the *non-bureaucratic basis of the bureaucracy*.

The massification of higher education entails a political phenomenon in itself. Before testing this effect in the state, we had the opportunity to observe the efficacy of the ideological differentiation of the university system with the articulation of the 2011 student movement. While this conflict engendered the major social mobilisation in more than twenty years of democratic regime, directed against the asymmetrical conditions of exploitation and poor quality that neoliberal policy imposes on the mass university system, the mass-private commercially-oriented universities that were most affected by these grievances were not mobilised with the protests. Rather, students from the public and public-oriented universities – that instil *public professionalism* with certain political leadership – were the ones that led the movement. In turn, the conservative institutions of the private-elite stayed at the margins of the movement for the political affinities they represent. Thus, the political substance of the student movement in 2011 stems from the representation that the mobilised institutions gave to the grievances affecting the whole system, particularly those universities that were not mobilised and suffered its effects to the largest extent. In so doing, a normative sense of *public professionalism* and public-oriented university were generalised as a critique of neoliberal higher education.

Our second objective looked at how the trends of professional massification are configured within the state in terms of the links between the professions (and universities) with the interests dwelling at its basis of power. In Therborn's (2008) structuralist synthesis, forms of state organisation are the product of specific relations of state power. Hence, the *mass intellectuality* does

not stand for univocal orientations within the public administration. The political significance of the massification of professional work in the state hinges on the differentiation of professional uses of knowledge linked to the interests and identities that underlie to the political direction of state policy. Therefore, both the hierarchisation of the bureaucracy into dominant and subordinated professional roles – linked to dominant and subaltern state policy – as well as the rotations of personnel taking place within the changes of government resort to the social and political distinctions crystallised in higher education, making them part of its own organisational rationality.

The quantitative research on the changes of the professional composition of the public administration led us to assemble and analyse, as has never done before in Chile, the movements of professional workers within the political process of the state. In this sense, the production of the data implies an empirical contribution in itself to illuminate the organisation of *public professionals* in the state.

In conformity with the lines of analysis, firstly, the trends of professional massification of the public administration in the last two decades are confirmed in terms of the separation of the *bureaucrat* from the bureaucratic career. The expansion of the state between 1995 and 2015 has been propelled by the enlargement of the professional stratum – by three times in this period, only matched by the rate of growth of the higher education system. In turn, this process has mostly taken place outside the formal bureaucratic career, with more than 80% of professionals of the central administration – excluding health services – hired on fixed-term contracts (*contratas*). The Chilean state assumes the shapes of a *post-bureaucracy* when it constantly incorporates personnel to respond to emergent political demands in such a flexible manner.

Secondly, by looking at the reconfigurations of the professional personnel of the public administration in relation to political changes, we formulated the following thesis: under conditions of *mass intellectuality*, the autonomous rationality of the state is observed as the changes of state policy are undertaken through professional reconfigurations of its public administration. In this perspective, we related the historic political transformations in the country to the rationality that dominant and emergent forms of professionalism incorporated into the state, representing class and political interests and configuring successive moments of bureaucratic autonomy. The last moment (of *mass intellectuality*) takes place under the predominance of neoliberal policy, with the Ministry of Finance – and its cadres of economists, engineers and other *technocratised* professions – representing the centre of state power, and an expanding social/cultural function with a *mass* of *public professionals* representing subaltern identities in the state. With statistical analysis, we observed a relatively unstable public administration – compared to the OECD countries –, where mechanisms of *political patronage* determine the rotation of the managerial positions and surely

also affect the professionals' turnover, albeit in an indirect fashion. But the politicisation of the public administration along these lines is not at odds with its professionalisation. Rather, professional profiles become expressive of observable political affinities. By looking at the first shift to a right-wing governmental coalition since 1990, we confirmed the rotation of specific professions against the background of administrative roles and specialised professional bureaucracies. In part economists but mostly engineers moved towards the state to support this administration in 2010, also having the greater chances of leaving the public administration with the return of the centre-left in 2014. In the opposite direction, sociologists/anthropologists showed the clearest trends within the social sciences professionals of leaving the state with the right-wing and returning with the centre-left comeback. As these trends are expressed within the specific state functions, the presence of engineers is reinforced as the mark of the right-wing moment in the political and social/cultural functions alike. The jurisdictional challenge of the engineers to the social sciences professionals at the social/cultural function not only represents the colonisation of the right-wing with loyal personnel, but also expresses political conflicts in the ideals of knowledge and professionalism that differentiate the *mass intellectuality*, configuring a dynamic dimension of the autonomous rationality of the neoliberal state in this stage.

Thirdly, we also found the trends of ideological differentiation of the university system expressed within the public administration with the shift to the right-wing. While the most conservative university of the public-elite and the whole private-elite segment expanded their participation in the state, the state universities reduced their presence, as well as the public-oriented institutions of the private-mass segment. In this way, the ideological efficacy of the universities on the administrative superstructure is confirmed. By the same token, an *ideological division of professional labour* configures the structure and functions of the public administration as one same profession acquires a different role depending on the university of graduation. Returning to the case of engineers, while the traditional-public universities retain this profession as a technical occupation in the state, for the private institutions it provides a vehicle for other political and social roles. As our own take on the Miliband-Poulantzas debate (1972) for the conditions of *mass intellectuality*, we find that as long as the political uses of knowledge are not limited to state elites and dominant capitalist interests, the composition of the bureaucracy by professionals of diverse academic backgrounds and social origins also entail potential influence upon state policy, even when this influence is exerted by the professionalism dwelling at the lower segments of the public administration, closer to the subaltern identities to which they are linked.

Last, our third objective stuck to the first person narrations about the kind of autonomy *public professionals* have within the spaces of discretion and performance opened up by the *post-*

bureaucratic state. From this perspective, we provided a partial reply to what Harney (2002) framed as the *ontology* of state work, or *why state workers work and work hard*. In our research, the orientation to the subject of state policy appeared as the most common source of meaning and prestige of professional state work, justifying the professionals' creative input, beyond bureaucratic rules and labour times, as an *excess* of knowledge, upon which the autonomy of the organisation of the state is ultimately based. *Public professionalism* thus represents the varied orientations by means of which professional work assumes a particular position and exerts certain autonomy to influence the implementation of state policy. Before the managerial controls of the neoliberal state, that subsume the value of state work in abstract measurements of performance, it is up to the professionals' autonomy – as *excess* – to restore the unity of its purpose in the state.

Our focus in this point was on the social/cultural function of the state – particularly in the agencies representative of social movements – and the effectiveness of *public professionalism* to *produce meaning* that represents subaltern identities therein. The considered agencies show relevant differences with regards to the professionals' capacities to preserve the link with the social movements. In the case of the National Service of Women, the professionals illustrated the resistance to the managerial pressures to de-politicise this structure of the state, whereas in the National Corporation of Indigenous Development the lack of a professional base made it an easy prey of political cooptation. In turn, the National Council of Culture and Arts showed that the personal identification of professionals with state policy made them vulnerable to be expelled from the public administration with a change of government. The generalisation of this effect onto the social/cultural function attaches the professionals' opportunities to exert policy influence, even from the lower strata of the administration, to the links with the politicisation of the subaltern identities of state power.

Our final last observation followed the impact that two education professionals of the Ministry of Education had on the articulation of the 2006 secondary student movement. This episode was the first major social mobilisation – then the largest since the restoration of democracy – directed against neoliberal education policy, setting the precedent for the 2011 university student movement that came a few years later – on the basis of the same generation of students. The professionals' role in this movement illustrates a rare case of a successful link between the lower echelon of the bureaucracy with social struggles to transform state power – in the manner Poulantzas signals the way to the *Democratic Road to Socialism* (2014). But in spite of this being a rare case, it is inspired by the common orientations of *mass intellectuality* to exert a normative position towards influencing state policy based on professional work. In this case, beyond any vested interests, the autonomy exerted by these professionals was oriented to generate a framework of

recognition and understanding for the student demands. Nurtured by non-instrumental excess of knowledge, this movement – and its sequel of 2011 – challenged the justification of neoliberal policy by the ideals of efficiency and technical control of a technocratic elite. While the transformation of state power falls on the shoulders of social movements, its links with professionals of the public administration expressed the social struggle into the uses of knowledge within the state. The experience of the rank-and-file professionals of the Ministry of Education is exemplary of the effects of *public professionalism* mobilised in the name of emancipatory ideals upon state power.

We sum up the contribution of the research in the effort to represent the orientations of the *mass intellectuality* of the state beyond the restricted focus on state elites. In that way, the dissemination of ideals of knowledge and professionalism in the mass university system is projected onto the reproduction of the autonomous rationality of the state. While our theoretical strategy resorted to types of knowledge to differentiate the orientations of a mass of intellectual workers, these considerations are meaningless if not referred to the concrete social origins, educational institutions and professional values in which these orientations are empirically reproduced. In this sense, our contribution to the literature on *mass intellectuality*, as well as to the sociology of professions and of the state, consists of representing the links between the socialisation of variants of *public professionalism* – as we have called the synthesis of professional work with political roles – in the conditions of social and ideological segmentation of the university system, with the organisation of the neoliberal state in Chile. As our study on the university system explains different orientations for a profession, the approach to the state shows the ideological efficacy of such roles linked to the hierarchical organisation of the public administration, the differentiation of state functions and the changes of government. Under conditions of *mass intellectuality*, the way in which the professions and universities are distributed within the public administration explain their own affinities with the political direction of the state. Specifically, political changes are undertaken through professional reconfigurations of the state, as a token of its own autonomous rationality and of the ideological efficacy of professional roles therein. In turn, the agency of the *mass intellectuality* in this context exceeds the positions of state elites by producing meaning in relation to the subaltern interests of state policy.

In the closing paragraphs, the limitations of the research are referred to as a future research agenda. The main limitation on this regard lies in the research focus on the state as the site of policisation of professional work, whereas the expansion of the new professional class has taken place mostly in the bureaucracy of the private sector (Torche and Wormald, 2004). Of course, the state remains as the political centre of society, and the incorporation of the *mass intellectuality* appears as an inexorable trend, both theoretically as well as historically. Still, the ideological division

of intellectual labour embedded in the university system projects its effects on the broader society, from which the state constitutes a particular, albeit significant, case.

Another significant limitation derives from the generalisation of trends of ideological differentiation, in the university system and the state, that are not necessarily expressed in all cases at the individual level. It is certainly a matter of the scope of the research, with its aim placed in the conditions of socialisation and politicisation of the *mass intellectuality* and the individual narrations serving as illustrations in this context. So we must remind ourselves that the consequences of the differentiated university system upon the state represent conditions, but no determinations, for the articulation of the *mass intellectuality*.

Within the limitations, we must also consider the ongoing transformation of the conditions in which we have explained the massification of professional work in the state – as reactions to those very conditions, that exceed the scope of the present research. The realisation of the fieldwork at the times of the 2011 student movement led to highlight the issues of segmentation and politicisation we were describing, but among its consequences, a new legal framework for higher education, including a free education policy for students from the 60% poorest population, alter the conditions of operation of the higher education system altogether. In spite of the fact that the direction of these reforms has not changed, but has arguably reinforced, the neoliberal rationality of higher education policy, the patterns of differentiation of the university system will surely be modified. In effect, trends of institutional *isomorphism* (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) might be reinforced as a result of the intensification of state regulation in response to the students' demands. We might also take into account the increase in the numbers of *advanced human capital* that might impact on the size and diversity of academic departments; universities competing for prestige and accreditation might incorporate personnel that eventually reshape their established profiles, as it is occurring with the conservative universities of the private-elite, the commercial universities of the private-mass segment, and the regional public universities.

Regarding the recruitment and stability of state personnel, it is possible that due to more frequent changes of coalition, the initiative to improving the permanence and meritocratic recruitment of the public administration will gain support. Admittedly, since fieldwork was conducted no relevant changes have taken place that would significantly alter the conditions of the professional strata of the state bureaucracy. All in all, the limited range of observations to the changes of personnel (in 2009, 2012 and 2014) might be extended to the following years to appreciate more consistent trends of rotation and stability in time.

Last, due to limits of space, gender relations were excluded from the analysis – with the exception of the regression models. Gender relations conform a specific dimension to interpret the

orientations of *mass intellectuality*, considering the majority of women in the massification of higher education, in the enlargement of professional roles in the social/cultural function of the state, and the contrast with the minority participation of women among the managerial positions. The political significance of gender relations within the *mass intellectuality* of the state constitutes a necessary line of enquiry in future research on the subject.

Future research will compensate for the limitations of the present study. The social and ideological implications of the massification of intellectual work convoke an unfolding research agenda to which the present study fits well, with a number of lines of enquiry. Apart from the abovementioned limitations that require more study to clear them up, we attach the present subject to three main lines of development.

First, the relations between the university and the state emerges as a problem of the mechanisms, measurement, and standards that represent the value of work and reproduce the inequalities of the social structure (e.g. De Angelis and Harvie, 2009; Vercellone, 2007; Boltanski, 2011; Fumagalli, 2015). From our research, the concern on the social and professional hierarchies might be further extended to its effect in constituting the organisation of the state, and also the effect of state policy in reinforcing these patterns of differentiation.

Second, the question of the politicisation of the *mass intellectuality* (e.g. Harney, 2002; Edu-Factory, 2009; Boltanski, 2011; Martin, 2011; Roggero, 2011) in the university, the public sphere and the state, is certainly susceptible of further investigations about the links between knowledge and political ends, as we have proposed with our take on *public professionalism*. In this regard, our focus on the autonomy of professional state workers and the effect of their normative orientations on the direction of state policy might be further developed for a broader set of cases and comparative analyses. In our perspective, the foundations of bureaucratic autonomy in the *excess* of knowledge and professionalism – and not in the vested interests of bureaucrats themselves– still represents a crucial finding against instrumental and elite approaches to the bureaucracy.

Lastly, our original contribution in terms of representing the structure and interests of the state by the affinities configured in the professional composition of the public administration might be worked into a progressive line of research. The professional reconfigurations of the public administration reflect the shifts of the rationality of the state upon changes in the correlation of forces that anticipate the directions of state power. Thus, the representation of the dynamics of change of the neoliberal state in Chile by the knowledge, professions and universities that implement its political directions, is expandable with research that describes larger trends in time, attempts specific case studies of state policy and undertakes comparative analysis to other states structured upon the rapid massification of professional work.

As long as ideals of knowledge and professionalism attached to state work bring ideological effectiveness for a mass intellectuality, the study of the implications of professional massification adds a new dimension of political relevance to disciplines, universities and the public administration upon the dynamics of social and political change.

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Statistical Appendix

Appendix 1. Coefficients, standard error of B, and ratios of regression models predicting exits end hires of public functionaries to the political function												
	Exits 2009-2012			Hires 2009-2012			Exits 2012-2014			Hires 2012-2014		
	β	S.E.	O.R.	β	S.E.	O.R.	β	S.E.	O.R.	β	S.E.	O.R.
Profession (ref. Public administration)												
Social Work	2.233***	.619	9.331	.596*	.263	1.814	.325	.362	1.384	.730**	.238	2.075
Law	1.940***	.472	6.956	-.014	.149	.986	.292	.206	1.340	-.005	.155	.995
Engineering	.124	.683	1.132	.523**	.173	1.686	1.064***	.221	2.897	-.641**	.224	.527
Economics	1.343**	.497	3.830	.109	.155	1.115	.338	.215	1.403	-.126	.167	.881
Education	1.481*	.653	4.398	-.310	.309	.733	.635	.352	1.887	.355	.271	1.426
Communication	2.343***	.534	10.415	1.116***	.203	3.053	1.113***	.246	3.044	.894***	.192	2.444
Psychology	1.214	.867	3.367	1.234***	.267	3.436	.958**	.309	2.606	.487	.257	1.628
Sociology/Anthr.	2.107**	.775	8.221	1.534***	.335	4.636	1.316***	.351	3.730	.885**	.310	2.423
Other: specialised prof.	1.057*	.524	2.878	.177	.161	1.194	.121	.231	1.129	-.037	.171	.964
Gender (ref.: male) Female	-.225	.184	.799	-.254**	.089	.775	-.110	.112	.896	-.227*	.095	.797
Stratum (ref.: professionals) Managers	1.194***	.283	3.301	1.650***	.173	5.208	1.513***	.201	4.539	1.384***	.181	3.993
Working regime (ref: planta) Contrata	1.134***	.233	3.109	2.081***	.144	8.010	1.173***	.174	3.231	1.572***	.152	4.815
Intercept	-4.688***	.495	.009	-2.367***	.176	.094	-3.131***	.232	.044	-2.558***	.185	.077
-2 log-likelihood			973.654			3234.532			2302.101			3027.377
Cox & Snell R Square			.042			.144			.049			.066
Nagelkerke R Square			.098			.197			.084			.101
Sample size			1,870			2,782			2,782			3,071

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Appendix 2. Coefficients, standard error of B, and ratios of regression models predicting exits end hires of public functionaries to the technical function												
	Exits 2009-2012			Hires 2009-2012			Exits 2012-2014			Hires 2012-2014		
	β	S.E.	O.R.	B	S.E.	O.R.	β	S.E.	O.R.	β	S.E.	O.R.
Profession (ref. Public administration)												
Social Work	-.249	.489	.779	-.617**	.193	.539	.341	.279	1.406	-.246	.212	.782
Law	1.173***	.317	3.223	.455**	.141	1.576	.906***	.210	2.475	.297	.151	1.345
Engineering	-.812*	.399	.444	.363**	.138	1.438	.386	.213	1.470	-.171	.154	.843
Economics	.051	.372	1.052	.100	.151	1.105	.671**	.224	1.956	-.032	.167	.969
Education	-.434	.544	.648	-.642**	.224	.526	-.076	.339	.927	-.804**	.288	.448
Communication	.940*	.428	2.560	.576**	.190	1.779	1.152***	.252	3.166	.543**	.193	1.721
Psychology	.944	.693	2.571	.881**	.320	2.414	.202	.475	1.224	.221	.313	1.247
Sociology/Anthr.	.519	.683	1.680	.183	.329	1.200	.848*	.421	2.335	.509	.317	1.664
Other: specialised prof.	-1.024**	.317	.359	-.489***	.124	.613	.103	.197	1.108	-.206	.135	.813
Gender (ref.: male) Female	-.315*	.154	.730	.031	.056	1.031	-.196*	.076	.822	.088	.062	1.092
Stratum (ref.: professionals) Managers	1.032***	.273	2.807	2.105***	.156	8.207	.846***	.158	2.331	2.056***	.209	7.817
Working regime (ref: planta) <i>Contrata</i>	.228	.224	1.256	1.952***	.137	7.044	.399**	.134	1.490	1.749***	.194	5.747
Intercept	-2.771***	.359	.063	-2.165***	.178	.115	-2.487***	.229	.083	-2.996***	.229	.050
-2 log-likelihood			1551.076			8213.532			5270.245			7145.326
Cox & Snell R Square			.043			.094			.021			.033
Nagelkerke R Square			.127			.127			.038			.051
Sample size			4,235			6,664			6,664			7,286

*p< .05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Appendix 3. Coefficients, standard error of B, and ratios of regression models predicting exits end hires of public functionaries to the social/cultural function												
	Exits 2009-2012			Hires 2009-2012			Exits 2012-2014			Hires 2012-2014		
	β	S.E.	O.R.	β	S.E.	O.R.	β	S.E.	O.R.	β	S.E.	O.R.
Profession (ref. Public administration)												
Social Work	-.420	.407	.657	-.381**	.132	.683	-.644***	.176	.525	-.089	.161	.915
Law	1.168***	.334	3.214	.516***	.130	1.676	.231	.155	1.260	.383*	.153	1.467
Engineering	.883	.469	2.419	.883***	.172	2.418	.673***	.187	1.961	.810***	.183	2.248
Economics	.394	.409	1.483	.529***	.140	1.697	.332*	.165	1.393	-.100	.179	.904
Education	.875**	.316	2.398	-.626***	.110	.534	-.567***	.136	.567	-.558***	.136	.572
Communication	1.460***	.369	4.306	.547***	.152	1.728	.239	.182	1.270	.746***	.169	2.108
Psychology	.191	.409	1.211	.135	.138	1.145	-.181	.175	.834	.254	.164	1.290
Sociology/Anthr.	.715	.468	2.045	.189	.184	1.208	.020	.225	1.020	.512*	.201	1.669
Other: specialised prof.	.794*	.338	2.212	-.010	.120	.990	-.228	.150	.796	.123	.151	1.131
Gender (ref.: male) Female	.551***	.109	1.736	.044	.053	1.045	-.156*	.064	.855	-.138*	.064	.871
Stratum (ref.: professionals) Managers	1.579***	.245	4.848	2.999***	.177	20.071	.865***	.157	2.374	2.946***	.215	19.039
Working regime (ref: planta) Contrata	.616***	.156	1.852	1.990***	.134	7.314	.139	.105	1.149	1.642***	.196	5.165
Intercept	-4.121***	.347	.016	-2.396***	.168	.091	-1.520***	.162	.219	-3.098***	.232	.045
-2 log-likelihood			4090.258			11180.820			7854.200			7832.315
Cox & Snell R Square			.019			.107			.027			.068
Nagelkerke R Square			.043			.149			.047			.115
Sample size			7,085			9,589			9,589			9,586

*p< .05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Appendix 4. Coefficients, standard error of B, and ratios of integrated regression models predicting exits end hires of professionals and managers to the public administration												
	Exits 2009-2012			Hires 2009-2012			Exits 2012-2014			Hires 2012-2014		
	β	S.E.	O.R.									
Profession (ref. Public administration)												
Social Work	-.037	.272	.964	-.386***	.096	.680	-.262	.135	.770	-.093	.108	.911
Law	1.361***	.204	3.902	.361***	.079	1.435	.438***	.105	1.549	.242**	.088	1.274
Engineering	.074	.276	1.076	.581***	.087	1.788	.519***	.113	1.680	.023	.099	1.023
Economics	.598*	.232	1.818	.265**	.085	1.304	.420***	.111	1.522	-.068	.098	.934
Education	.880***	.206	2.410	-.692***	.077	.500	-.312**	.104	.732	-.674***	.091	.510
Communication	1.489***	.240	4.434	.693***	.102	2.000	.712***	.126	2.038	.713***	.105	2.039
Psychology	.319	.303	1.376	.269*	.104	1.309	.145	.140	1.156	.189	.117	1.208
Sociology/Anthr.	.867**	.334	2.381	.395**	.139	1.484	.483**	.171	1.622	.553***	.143	1.739
Other: specialised prof.	.109	.214	1.116	-.221**	.074	.801	-.058	.101	.944	-.079	.083	.924
Gender (ref.: male) Female	.203**	.076	1.225	-.003	.035	.997	-.161***	.045	.852	-.058	.040	.944
Stratum (ref.: professionals) Managers	1.310***	.150	3.705	2.213***	.095	9.143	.994***	.094	2.702	2.106***	.111	8.216
Working regime (ref: planta) <i>Contrata</i>	.662***	.112	1.939	1.984***	.079	7.268	.472***	.075	1.604	1.567***	.100	4.792
State Function (ref.: technical function)												
Political function	.118	.121	1.126	-.066	.053	.936	.031	.067	1.031	.114*	.058	1.121
Social/cultural function	.169	.103	1.184	.116**	.043	1.122	.351***	.056	1.421	-.017	.051	.983
Intercept	-4.045***	.230	.018	-2.366***	.104	.094	-2.390***	.119	.092	-2.877***	.126	.056
-2 log-likelihood			6735.184			22863.616			15552.933			18219.661
Cox & Snell R Square			.025			.099			.022			.048
Nagelkerke R Square			.061			.135			.039			.078
Sample size			13,190			19,035			19,035			19,943

*p< .05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Appendix 5. Coefficients, standard error of B, and ratios of logistic regression models predicting the possession of information on university

	2009+			2012++		
	β	S.E.	O.R.	β	S.E.	O.R.
Professions (ref.: others)						
Public administration	.024	.149	1.024	-.203	.171	.816
Social Work	.244	.140	1.276	-.197	.173	.822
Law	-.113	.156	.893	.275	.152	1.316
Engineering	-.118	.147	.888	.557**	.167	1.746
Economics	-.036	.173	.964	.332	.188	1.394
Education	.169	.133	1.184	.019	.172	1.019
Communication	.026	.210	.974	.964**	.289	2.621
Psychology	.401*	.167	1.493	.354	.226	1.424
Sociology	-.265	.316	.768	.674	.402	1.962
State ministry (ref.: Bienes Nacionales)						
Energy	1.946**	.572	6.999	-.219	.858	.804
Interior	.348	.409	1.416	-.169	.463	.845
Justice	-.457	.378	.633	-.229	.449	.796
Mining	.785	.435	2.193	-1.730***	.491	.177
Foreign Office	-.407	.466	.666	-.455	.559	.635
Public Infrastructure	-.491	.397	.612	-.169	.465	.844
Transports/ Telecommunications	-.532	.519	.587	.236	.601	1.267
Environment			N/A	-.240	.475	.786
Economy	-.069	.398	.934	-.910	.474	.403
Health	.496	.374	1.643	-.251	.451	.778
Culture	.022	.514	1.022	.434	.672	1.544
Social Development	-.077	.407	.926	-.343	.468	.710
Labour	-.010	.387	.990	.700	.510	2.014
Housing	.084	.443	1.088	-.873	.495	.418
Sec. Government	-.352	.461	.704	-.463	.510	.630
Sec. Presidency	-.923	.699	.397	-.454	.684	.635
Women/Gender	-.018	.481	.982	.752	.730	2.121
Finance	-1.694**	.496	.184	-1.126*	.445	.324
Education	-.079	.374	.924	.022	.448	1.022

Agriculture	.029	.386	.1030	-.449	.466	.638
Gender (ref.: male)						
Female	.052	.080	1.053	-.176	.093	.839
Intercept	-1.793***	.367	.166	2.382***	.434	10.828
-2 log-likelihood			5441.843			3939.202
Cox & Snell R Square			.021			.024
Nagelkerke R Square			.038			.048
Sample size			6857			6022

*p< .05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.; +: age < 39; ++: age < 36 & not registered in 2009