The Anglo-American Relationship: Race and the Perception of German Threat 1890-1910

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This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Preface

This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work
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It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted
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further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being
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Abstract

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This dissertation set out to examine whether a relationship existed between ideas of race and great power politics, specifically as it influenced the perceptions of key American and British political leaders towards each other and Germany, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It examines private correspondence, key public statements, and contemporary publications, analyzing where theories and fears regarding race influenced the thinking of key individuals during critical international incidents. The dissertation uses a model to conceptualize race as seen by contemporary leaders that incorporates both biological and cultural elements. From here, it furthermore proposes that it is indeed possible to identify at least certain key moments when breaks occurred between Anglo-Saxon and a broader conceptualization of Teuton to political leaders. It first examines contemporary thought on race as seen by these leaders, looks at specific crises in the Americas, Africa, and Asia, and concludes with an analysis of how race impacted views on contemporary immigration to the United States and the process of amalgamation between races. Moreover, it reveals that the weighting of the cultural and biological elements shifted, moving from viewing race as Anglo-Saxon to the paradigm of the English-speaking races. The dissertation highlights that especially during the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, race indeed increasingly influenced the thinking of the United States and Britain with respect to foreign policy, especially through concerns of migration and settlement, and created a perception of seemingly disproportionate threat from Germany. In doing so, the United States and settler colonies became of paramount importance in this rivalry with Germany, in part due to their ability to turn migrants from Europe into members of the English-speaking race.
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Introduction

Justification and Methodology

This dissertation began to investigate the questions of why geopolitical relations developed as they did at the turn of the last century, specifically: why was Germany excluded from the Anglo-American racial and political relationship? Through analyzing and researching this question, a number of pertinent and overlapping sub-questions emerged. Most importantly, the dissertation was focused on identifying what role contemporary views on race had on influencing geopolitics, having found race one of the more conceptually underutilized tools scholarship examining the era. Furthermore, it was important to ask how these views impacted contemporary perceptions of threat? Why did racial divisions between Anglo-Saxon and Teuton more broadly occur and when these divisions take place? How did key contemporary policymakers use race to understand the world? What might this reveal in understanding the Anglo-American relationship and the broader relationship between Great Powers at the time? Why was racial ideology even able to influence Great Power relationships?

Why states and leaders perceive threat is potentially key to understanding contemporary Great Power politics in the late 19th and early 20th century. Additionally, questions remain as to why relations between the America and Britain and Germany moved from one of cordiality and optimism to bitter antagonism. The British and American governments executed foreign policy that was not easily explained solely through the use of traditional arguments regarding balancing and Great Power politics. Why, given Britain’s pre-eminent position, was there a perceived sense of closeness with the United States, and why was Germany eventually excluded? Ultimately, there was great importance in the fact that such an unabashedly racist, social evolutionary, and exclusionary ideology might have impacted not just the American policy towards Britain, but its reaction to numerous international crises and even how it viewed itself in broader geopolitical context.

Theodore Roosevelt wrote as early as 1882 in his history of the war of 1812 that “The first point to be remembered in order to write a fair account of this war is that the difference in fighting skill, which certainly existed between the two parties, was due mainly to training, and not to the nature of the men…The combatants were men of the same race, differing but little from one another…the descendant of the German becomes as much an Anglo-American as the descendant of the Strathclyde Celt has already become an Anglo-Briton…It must always be kept
in mind that the Americans and the British are two substantially similar branches of the great English race, which both before and after their separation have assimilated, and made Englishmen of many other peoples.” I suspected that Roosevelt’s view then produced a strain of thought that influenced the manner in which he saw contemporary crises as they developed during his rise to power and eventually the Presidency.

I propose that race is an underutilized but conceptually essential ideology that can provide a framework from which to begin to examine the problem of relations between Germany, Britain, and America in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Although I approached this thesis as a work of history, certain scholars have also noted that similar gaps exist in the field of international relations theory and attempted to address this even with respect to Anglo-America2 or with respect to racial constructions.3 Of these, constructivist scholars in particular have examined race as it pertained to the global color line.4 Early in my research, I suspected that there was a relationship between the exclusion of Germany from Anglo-Saxonism and the growing Anglo-American friendship and perceived hostility with Germany. Although there is a limited body of scholarship examining race and the Anglo-American friendship, unlike previous scholars I examined this development as it pertains to divisions among the great powers – specifically with respect to Germany. I analyzed the writings of key contemporary architects of foreign policy, particularly in the United States, to investigate whether there was indeed such a connection. Were the policies they chose to implement influenced positively towards the each other and negatively towards Germany due to these ideologies and racial views? Was the Anglosphere a racial construct stemming from perceived mutual racial and ideological interest? If race and Anglo-Saxonism are responsible, why was Germany excluded from this construct? Why Germany as opposed to other powers? I addressed these questions not as a work of intellectual history, but of the history of geopolitics. Rather than examine how the ideas themselves developed, I attempted to examine how they influenced the geopolitical views of key leaders.

I decided that an empirical approach using historical analysis and examination of primary material, some of it archival, would be the best approach to address the proposed research

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questions. This was for three reasons. First, the work focused on the ideology of key political leaders, requiring analysis of correspondence and public statements by individuals. An examination of their views on race, particularly given the diverse and nature of the contemporary concept itself, required extensive contextualization; the ideas needed to be situated within the correspondence. Second, the sheer quantity of written material at hand, most of it completely irrelevant to this kind of analysis – Theodore Roosevelt alone wrote over 100,000 letters over the course of his lifetime that are still available in some form to researchers – meant that the task was not to survey all available material, but to find key statements at key moments. Even if ontologically central, race was not the only factor influencing these policymakers nor did it necessarily indicate that they would sacrifice other interests for the sake of race. Rather, I suspected that race predisposed leaders to favoring certain outcomes and relationships. Thirdly, I was of course also influenced by the kind of knowledge I wished to create and what sort of sources I found intrinsically interesting. I found that while work in intellectual history and international relations theory, particularly in the realm of constructivism, had done much work to push the idea of race as a significant motivator in geopolitics, there was a need to fill a space with respect to the views of influential leaders.

I then decided to select key moments and issues during the time period which were most likely to reveal information regarding the thought of these leaders: Imperial Federation, the Venezuela Crises, the Spanish-American War, and the Boer War. Migration was intended to be an afterthought. As research progressed, I shifted towards having a chapter on the earlier political ideas Anglo-Saxon Expansion as pertaining to other powers, a chapter on the Americas largely centered on the Spanish-American War, a chapter on the Boer War, one on Russia and the East, and one dedicated to how immigration fit into visions of geopolitics. This was both as contemporary priorities became clearer and as I discovered interesting information regarding how they thought cohesively about related matters.

The Boer War and ideas of Immigration proved vastly more significant than initially expected, particularly as to the importance of settlers and their racial characteristics. Understanding the threat of the German required brief exploration of the threat seen from Slavic peoples and from the East. In the end, this both illuminated key commonalities running through the chapters and also raised a host of new questions for future research. However, McKinley’s papers proved both disorganized and unhelpful with respect to his willingness to explore ideas such as these in writing. Much time spent trying to find evidence of the Venezuela crises being
when the break between German and Anglo-Saxon occurred – as was initially hypothesized – revealed less than hoped in correspondence.

Methodologically, I also expected to find more of a difference between correspondence and published work. Excepting certain moments – notably Roosevelt’s recollection of the Second Venezuela Crisis (not the actual correspondence at the time) and Roosevelt’s public statements and private correspondence during the Russo-Japanese War, contemporary leaders were equally open regarding issues of race in private correspondence and in public works. Even in these two exceptions, the divide was not one of race, but willingness to discuss the issue at all, largely due to diplomatic sensitivities. This itself highlights the ontological centrality of race – using race to ground a world view was in no way controversial or a point of embarrassment. With the exception of limited scholarship that argued that race stopped being of significance by the early 20th century, I do not disagree with existing historiography so much as hope to expand upon it. The task I intended was to investigate a geopolitical question using more recently available tools to conceptualize race, hopefully opening room for further investigation.

Literature Review

The scholarship examining this topic from this framework is limited but includes several particularly significant and useful works around either the conceptual or temporal periphery. In sum, historians have certainly investigated race and have also certainly looked at not only the general period in question, but also most of the case studies I used. However, historians have largely, with a few exceptions noted below, not used the lens of race to attempt to explain the divisions among great powers – in this case the Anglo-American relationship and Germany – at this time period. While the existing scholarship has proved useful, there is much room for additional contribution. While I have covered the key literature here, much of the discussion on the thematic and theoretical material is in my first chapter; additionally, some historiography regarding specific cases alone are reserved for their respective chapters.

Most notably, there are several works examining the Anglosphere or Greater Britain that use race to examine the origins of an Anglo-American world\(^5\) that posit questions which served as a starting point to my research.\(^6\) Additionally, there are some works using racial frameworks to examine the construction of political orders on a significantly larger scale discussing the

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\(^6\) Katzenstein, *Anglo-America and Its Discontents: Civilizational Identities Beyond West and East,*
consequences of the “global colour line.” There has also been a significant resurgence in the past few years of using race analytically with respect to a host of historical and international relations questions, though some of these questions had also certainly been raised much earlier, for example regarding Joseph Chamberlain’s racial views. While there is extensive scholarship on the ‘Special Relationship,’ there is also scholarship about this period that centers on the Rapprochement, including by Stuart Anderson using Race as an explanation for Rapprochement. Paul Kramer more recently presented an updated argument for the commonality and affinity in imperial policy between the British and American empires during this period, again using race as a lens. Stuart Anderson argued for the centrality of race to rapprochement, however, he posited that Anglo-Saxonism ceases to be significant in 1905. Moreover, although Anderson correctly identified that Anglo-Saxonists viewed the French, Germans, and Russians as racial threats for supremacy, he concluded that the ‘Slav’ was seen as the greatest threat. However, aside from brief discussion of the Slavic issues, the space discussing division among the Great Powers on racial lines is minimal, despite the place, as we shall see, Germans held in Anglo-Saxon racial hierarchy.

Other historians have provided detailed diplomatic histories of Anglo-German relations during the time period, and have explicitly found sufficient explanatory power in the diplomatic maneuverings of the period, without requiring race, including extensive work attempting to explain the collapse in relations between Britain and Germany. Perhaps unsurprisingly, scholars focusing on American history and expansionism have also have examined the relationship between American Manifest Destiny and race or various American political leaders and race – especially Theodore Roosevelt. Nancy Mitchell has written convincingly, about

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8 Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam, Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line.
American perception of German threat, though not with respect to the issue of race. Similarly, collected essays have examined Roosevelt’s relationship to Europe, including both with respect to race and imperial character and with respect to Roosevelt’s relationship with the Kaiser personally. In short, while all these works have done begun the task of asking important questions regarding these issues, there is still plenty of room for further inquiry.

The most extensive scholarship on this issue from a conceptual standpoint has recently been by Duncan Bell and Srdjan Vucetic. I borrow conceptually from and attempt to engage with both scholars more substantially in the first chapter. I propose to use a similar argument regarding the centrality of race. However, I try to explain the disassociation of Germany from Britain and America and how this disassociation impacted perceptions of global order. Ultimately, my research differed in three key respects. First, especially outside of the first chapter, I am investigating a somewhat different set of individuals that some intellectual histories have focused upon. Rather than the theorists of race and Greater Britain, I instead hope to examine the individuals executing foreign policy, especially in the Roosevelt administration. Second, my proposed narrative is more concerned with the role played by the perceptions of other powers, specifically Germany. Third, I am most interested with the alignments and divisions within the European races and peoples rather than between Europe and the rest of the world. Bell’s biocultural assemblage model was most critical in understanding how contemporary leaders viewed geopolitics and forms the basic model of race I use in this dissertation. Although, to repeat, my dissertation remains a history of geopolitics, not a work of intellectual history or

international relations theory, it provided a frame from which to assess contemporary geopolitical thinking: a frame that even they lacked. I also found the argument that more attention was needed to the role of settler colonies compelling. Consequently, as the most comprehensive work on the English-speaking settler world, I also found James Belich’s *Replenishing the Earth* indispensable in understanding what that world in fact looked like—contemporary figures themselves often being ill informed despite any certainty in their world view. Crucially, I investigate not how the colonial world might actually have been, but how these contemporary figures envisioned race and the future of the world; these visions often were wildly inaccurate, both in their understanding of race and in their ideas of what might actually be happening at any time in various parts of the world. This divide between vision and reality was, as shall be seen, especially stark during the Boer War.

After Bell, Vucetic, and Belich, the work of John Hobson on analyzing race also proved critical in informing the conceptualization of race that I use—both in his examination of a precise hierarchy that at least broadly aligns with how contemporary figures viewed racial categories and his work on applying race and other ideologies to craft a non-traditional geopolitical world view. Indeed, his distinction of “cultural conversion” as opposed to “containment” as a cornerstone of British policy towards its empire and the East was influential in forcing me to examine whether this paradigm could perhaps apply outside the empire to the other white races. Additionally, the racist-realist and offensive-racist structures from Hobson’s work were also significant in similar ways, especially as to whether the mode of analysis could be extended among white races.

Additionally, Dino Buenviaje’s recent work utilizes the lens of race to better understand American entry in to the First World War. While the time periods and methodologies do not overlap completely, his research and mine are largely complementary in many ways. Buenviaje tends to focus on the positive construction of Anglo-Saxonism and the Anglo-American relationship, deciding that “Anglo-Saxonism” was ultimately responsible for overriding the important questions of how the United States ended up intervening on the side of Great Britain.

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Despite Irish-Americans and German-Americans. While I began my research with similar questions, I focused more on the negative construction within Teutons, specifically the issues of racial competition, settlers, and the long-term fears of a narrower set of contemporary leaders. Additionally, Buenviaje does not engage with the models for race present in Bell’s, Vucetic’s, or Hobson’s work, resulting in a somewhat different conceptualization of how race operated in the time period. Michael Hunt’s chapter on the “Hierarchy of Race” was useful in conceptualizing certain elements of the East-West divide, but ultimately was more helpful in understanding empire than great power relations. Gary Gerstle’s various works on immigration, race, and American nationalism also proved key in my research – both sharpening my thinking and laying the groundwork for examining race in the context of American nationalism. Limited work has also been done on Roosevelt and assimilation outside of Gerstle’s chapter, including examination of Roosevelt and ‘the Frontier Myth’ to assimilate immigrants rather than race. Immigration to the United States, and particularly its relation to race and whiteness, has been covered extensively by numerous authors. The scholarship surrounding both construction of American national identity and the formation of an international idea of whiteness have both examined the topic in sophisticated detail and analysis. Jacobson’s *Whiteness of a Different Color* traces the evolution of the identity of immigrants and how it contributed to, and was itself impacted by, an ongoing narrative regarding surrounding whiteness in America. This idea of whiteness has itself been examined from numerous angles, not merely as its own construct but as it stands in the color line against black Americans and in the context of class. For the purposes of this dissertation, the most relevant literature is also fairly exhaustive, concerning how immigrants to

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the United States became white – and how the concept of white was expanded to include them.\textsuperscript{36} This literature was critical to informing this dissertation, particularly in the fifth chapter.

In working within this framework and the understanding that the ontology of the period was racial,\textsuperscript{37} the geopolitics of the era still has much room for new investigation, using race as an explanatory tool for how political leaders saw the world. I hope to address how the policies of the United States and British Empire might have been guided by ideologies, largely racial, that influenced its interests towards reacting antagonistically towards Germany. Several works have already examined the basics of both racial politics and the race-based ideology, although notably, generally as a division either between Europe and the rest of the world\textsuperscript{38} or, in the case of Britain, to explain the formation of a particular identity as opposed to Catholic France.\textsuperscript{39}

Britain clearly did not see the French as they did the various Indian peoples or as France did the Senegalese.\textsuperscript{40} Rather race was the terms under which competition – between states, empires, and civilizations – all took place. It framed the world view of the elite that governed states, influencing how they saw Germans, the French, the Latins, the Slavs, etc. all as competitors for power and success in what they understood as a matter of survival. Additionally, despite the racial hierarchies Europe and America saw amongst themselves, there was broad agreement that all of these races were superior to the races of the rest of the world. These hierarchies were unquestionably white-supremacist with respect to how contemporary leaders viewed the peoples of India or Africa the status of their respective civilizations. However, even in India and Africa there were further hierarchies of race. Historians have examined this during the late 18\textsuperscript{th} and early 19\textsuperscript{th} century,\textsuperscript{41} and much work has already also been done to give credence to the theorists of Greater Britain as laying the groundwork for the imagination of a new order.\textsuperscript{42}

Moreover, much of what this dissertation has revealed supports the notion that despite the origins of a potential Anglosphere and shared Anglo-American fears regarding Germany, the


\textsuperscript{38} Lake and Reynolds, \textit{Drawing the Global Colour Line}.

\textsuperscript{39} Linda Colley, \textit{Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707 - 1837}, 2. ed (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Nota Bene, 2005).

\textsuperscript{40} Interestingly, in the 1908 Franco-British Exhibition during the London Olympics, each empire brought a model village from their respective empires to London in order to demonstrate the benefits of empire to the world. France chose a Senegalese village, while Britain brought an Irish village. The contemporary British perception of the Irish was a complicated one that also may not fit into the traditionally European side of the hierarchy. See: Alexander C. T. Geppert, \textit{Fleeting Cities: Imperial Expositions in Fin-de-Siècle Europe} (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).


United States was not particularly interested in the formation of an alliance with Britain, although Britain was much keener on preserving a strong relationship with the United States. To Roosevelt, alignment with Britain was possibly desirable but the United States did not require it – arguably it was only after the start of the First World War that Roosevelt finally decided that the United States and Britain should be allied.\(^{43}\) Even the idea of the Rapprochement, although certainly still valuable as following First Venezuela Crisis and the Spanish American War contemporary American leaders viewed the British responses as behaving with friendly intent, is ultimately limited when parsing the actions and beliefs of contemporary leaders. Other scholars have certainly noted that Anglophobia was itself potentially as strong as any idea of Anglo-American alignment,\(^{44}\) though often with the incorrect conclusion that Anglo-Saxonism fades after 1904.\(^{45}\) American leaders could see British victory as a victory for their race, and vice-versa, and even diplomatically supported each other in crisis. However, conflict between the two powers, while tragic, always remained possible at this time.

This is neither to question the importance the racial divide contemporary figures viewed between the white peoples of European ancestry and the rest of the world, particularly in domestic context or in the construction of certain elements of empire, nor argue that the division between English-speaking races and the German was the only significant divide. Indeed, in the evolutionary contest among peoples that certain contemporaries imagined, there were similar divisions with the other European peoples, to include France and Russia, the latter of which is examined by this dissertation in detail. As historians have noted, race played a role in the development of contemporary cosmopolitan projects such as the United Nations, particularly as an outgrowth of imperial ideology and through figures such as Jan Smuts.\(^{46}\) James Bryce was himself a key architect of the League of Nations, and through it, the modern international system including the United Nations. Moreover, it could be argued that projects such as Imperial Federation – of course never able to fully conceptualize how to deal with India – were themselves an attempt to create an Anglo-Saxon nationalistic core to the Empire so as to stave off competition from other powers. The genealogy of race in the construction of this has already been examined, both with respect to a titular Anglosphere and other geopolitical


constructions. However, this dissertation does raise whether divisions on the white side of the color line were more important in constructing geopolitical rivalries between the great powers.

It is in the aforementioned conflict in Europe, particularly as it relates to racial questions, that could further provide illumination to a fundamental question – in drawing a ‘color line,’ why was it that the United States and Britain found themselves on one side of the political relationship and Germany on the other? With much contemporary discussion on the nature of a Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon world, why then was the outcome an Anglosphere - that excluded the German element of the Saxon – and not a Teutonosphere? Was it as simple as the circumstances of geopolitical rivalry, in which case why were the US-UK conflicts not decisive, or could there actually be a division between an English-speaking world and a German-speaking world that sparked fears in the minds of political leaders in America and Britain in a way that geo-political competition with the United States did not? Of course, traditional views of the hostility between Germany and Britain centered on diplomatic and geo-strategic concerns remain relevant, but I hope to demonstrate that issues such as race pre-disposed a political leader’s choices.

Lastly, the color line is both an important historical and historiographical fact and one critical to understanding the history of race. Most of the contemporary figures I examine were of course oblivious to the formal term, having predated its creation by W.E.B. DuBois. Extensive literature has discussed the role of the color line since – not merely in the aforementioned global context, but notably also in its application to the United States, the creation of whiteness, and the fundamental challenges of American nationality. Apart from the consequence to foreign policy, the notion that a narrowly – and varying – defined notion of white Americans needed to maintain supremacy was hardly a unique one at this time or since.

Related Themes

In addressing this topic, it is essential to acknowledge certain related themes. In furtherance to the aforementioned use of the biocultural assemblage, many cultural concepts fit into the racial framework of contemporary figures. The issues of Liberalism, Religion, and Gender are all closely tied to race, and the issue of black Americans, especially in the American South, warrants special mention. Numerous scholars have addressed the rise of the Dunning School in

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47 Vucetic, The Anglosphere.
ill revising Reconstruction history and the consequences in allowing the catastrophic rise of Jim Crow laws and segregation in the South – and while it is not the intent of this thesis to discuss these issues in depth, it is necessary to discuss in passing for a simple reason: for the time period covered in this thesis, the most significant racial question in the United States was not one of Anglo-Saxonism. It was the construction of a racist political structure in much of the country that excluded the black African-American population from the political and social fabric of the rest of the country in horrific and coercive ways with consequences that persist to this day. As Comer Vann Woodward famously established, segregation was neither a pre-existing social situation that became entrenched nor inevitable and was instead actively implemented.50 In his greatest failing as President, Theodore Roosevelt, in office as much of Jim Crow legislation reached their apex, did little to block their development. Although he was perhaps verbally unsympathetic to what he saw as the backwardness and obstinacy of the South and the Democrats in pursuing segregation, even in his fabled antagonism with William Jennings Bryan, Roosevelt refused to expend much political capital to address the issue. Much like Jefferson a century before him (a President whom Theodore Roosevelt ironically frequently mentions as despising), he assumed that the question will resolve itself. Even the now famous meeting with Booker T. Washington in the White House resulted in an unfortunate outcome. Although he wrote often blaming Southern politicians for creating such an uproar, he never expended political influence to push back and instead gave up on the effort. Roosevelt’s views towards black Americans was not the focus of this research, but the issue was unavoidable. The unfortunate conclusion that can be drawn from much of his correspondence was that Roosevelt was willing to see a singular black man reach the same heights and perhaps even become a member of the English-speaking race as a single individual but did not give black Americans the benefit of doubt as a whole or work to improve their civil rights. Moreover, it is clear from his correspondence that he was fully aware of the abhorrent conditions faced by black Americans in the South, to include lynching and the establishment of an apartheid state through Jim Crow legislation, and yet refused to challenge the situation significantly.

This contrasts dramatically with his response to foreign policy questions that he felt were of racial significance, to include pressuring the Congress on resolutions regarding the Boer War, friendliness regarding Britain after the Spanish-American War and the Venezuelan crises, the annexation of Hawaii, or his mediation of the Russo-Japanese War. By self-admission, Roosevelt was interested in pursuing the primacy of foreign policy. Moreover, although an issue too broad

to properly assess here and perhaps more a topic for future research, it is worth questioning to what extent Roosevelt’s disdain for the ‘millionaire classes’ and famed domestic policies, such as trust-busting, may also have stemmed from a desire to avoid decadence and complacency in the face of foreign racial challenge. Additionally, it is important to note that foreign policy, segregation, and racism in the US towards black Americans were not separate issues. As Eric Love has pointed out, rather than creating the notion of a civilizing mission, in the United States, racism instead acted as an obstacle to imperialism, particularly in the Americas, as racists feared the ability of the United States to assimilate non-white populations.\textsuperscript{51}

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the privilege of assimilation was afforded to the majority of black Americans living in the United States; Roosevelt even noted during his Presidency “I have plenty of evils to fight here at home, evils connected with race prejudice, especially against the negro.”\textsuperscript{52} However, despite acknowledging the “dark blot of slavery” and the impossibility “to justify the American action in these cases,” Roosevelt argued regarding the US annexation of Texas and other territories from Mexico that “it was of course ultimately to the great advantage of civilization that the Anglo-American should supplant the Indo-Spaniard.”\textsuperscript{53} While the issues of race as a matter of geopolitical contestation was one Roosevelt was willing to devote great time to, the issue of black Americans and their suppression especially in the South was not seen as directly related. Unlike the angst regarding the immigrant population in the United States, Roosevelt did not feel particularly threatened by the black population already in the United States – at least geopolitically. While he saw individual black Americans as capable of achieving comparable civilizational levels to the English-speaking races, he did not tend to hold this view towards the community writ large. To contemporary Democrats in the Congress and Senate, conversely, this was of course the paramount racial issue facing the United States and the ties of these groups to later white supremacists cannot be discounted or ignored.

The failure of contemporary political leaders in addressing the form of racism that in many ways has been America’s original sin is not the intent of this thesis – and a vast array of


\textsuperscript{52} Theodore Roosevelt to George Otto Trevelyan, 13 May 1905. Elting E. Morrison, ed., \textit{The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt}, vol. 4 (Harvard University Press, 1952), 1173 Note: Most of the letters from Roosevelt in this research have been cited from this collection. Morrison’s collection appears to be comprehensive of most of Roosevelt’s substantive letters - a matter I attempted to verify through comparison both at the Library of Congress and with respect to other collections.

scholars have attempted to examine this in far more adept fashion. In examining the white side of the “color line,” this research does not aim to suggest the color line did not exist. Nor does it discount that while racism between these white peoples were of great geopolitical significance, the racism the white side of the color line to the other was often far more brutal in nature. Moreover, while this thesis uses the term “race” and “racist” and “racial” and “racial theory” and many others like it, it uses them all interchangeably to refer to the same idea—a concept of race, consisting of the *biocultural assemblage*. It does so, because contemporary figures use these terms interchangeably referring—broadly—to the same concept. It is not identical to notions of race a hundred years before or a hundred years since. That said, much of modern racism—and to a much greater extent the kind of racism horrifically evidenced during the late 1930s and early 1940s in fascist Europe—stem from similar conceptual ground. This dissertation, in calling their thinking at times “racial thinking” or similar does not in any way attempt to morally justify their though or absolve them of judgement. Historical research is conducted in the present, is therefore informed by it, and must in turn inform it.

**Liberalism was not unproblematic for Roosevelt, as he found that “The growth of liberalism undoubtedly unfits us for certain work.”** Nevertheless, he repeatedly found in comparison with Russia in particular, racial advancement as inextricably tied to development of self-governance and abandoning absolutism—without abandoning absolutism, despite a range of advantages accompanying it, advancement was impossible. Nevertheless he acknowledge this may not be universal, particularly with respect to Germany, writing that “Liberalism has some great vices, and the virtues which in our opinion outweigh these vices might not be of weight in Germany.” Thus to contemporaries and Roosevelt in particular, liberalism was racial.

Gender was a similarly critical issue and additionally tied to race as it was simply assumed that masculinity in a race was a virtue, as was ensuring limitations on roles for women—a point Roosevelt even keenly pointed to a Japanese delegation as something they needed to learn from the United States. As Michael Kimmel argues regarding racist groups in the present, various ideas of masculinity frequently draw people to political viewpoints, particularly in ways tied to xenophobia and race in search of a form of belonging. Whether this modern form of tying masculinity to racism has origins in the era examined by this research is unclear and for a much different analysis to determine—however contemporary figures indeed viewed masculinity as a

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key feature of race. The intersectionality between these issues has been examined, both with respect to Roosevelt, and with respect to the Spanish-American war and the Philippine-American War. Indeed, Roosevelt argued in defense of woman’s suffrage that “A great many self-styled woman’s champions revolt, not against the laws of man, but against the laws of nature,” as to him, women already faced the most dangerous duty in society through childbirth. To contemporaries, obsessed with population growth as a means of racial competition, “The first duty of woman is the duty of motherhood” and moreover Roosevelt argued “a race is neither fit to cumber the earth nor able to do so, unless its women breed. Work – fight – breed-a race may do all these things, and yet be worthless; but unless it does them, it certainly must be worthless.” Once again, the ideas were not entirely separable – gender was racial and vice-versa. Maintaining a masculine nature became a key source of angst to Roosevelt, though he continued in the same letter “So far then as the movement for woman’s rights represents a revolt against either common sense or morality. It should be smashed. But we are no more justified in opposing it because there is this element in it, than we would have been in championing slavery because there was a similar element in the abolition movement.” This sort of tension was a common theme in Roosevelt’s writing. However, it did not feature similarly prominently across all contemporary racial thinkers, and even Roosevelt tended to subsume gender values as a feature of race – a feature that he saw as beneficial, and, like all other features of race, one that was not purely biological and one that could be acquired or lost through behavior and lineage alike.

Lastly, it is undeniable that a component of this assemblage, religion, was itself in crucial in its own right. Much of this has been covered in extensive detail by Andrew Preston, most remarkably regarding American Imperialism and the Spanish-American War. However, other scholars as well have examined linkages between culture, empire, religion, especially in the context of how America interacted with its colonial possessions and even with how American influence extended well beyond its territorial limits through these means. Undoubtedly to Root and McKinley in particular, religion formed a key component of their world view. However,

60 Theodore Roosevelt to Helen Kendrick Johnson, 10 January 1899. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 1951, 2:904.
61 Theodore Roosevelt to Helen Kendrick Johnson, 10 January 1899. 2:904.
62 Theodore Roosevelt to Helen Kendrick Johnson, 10 January 1899. 2:904.
religion and race were also inextricably tied. Among the most driven crusaders of the era was Senator Albert Beveridge, but even to him, race and religion were related, as he argued during the Spanish-American War

Mr. President, this question is deeper than any question of party politics; deeper than any question of the isolated policy of our country even; deeper even than any question of constitutional power. It is elemental. It is racial. God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration. No! He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns. He has given us the spirit of progress to overwhelm the forces of reaction throughout the earth. He has made us adepts in government that we may administer government among savage and senile peoples. Were it not for such a force as this the world would relapse into barbarism and night. And of all our race He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world.55

Beveridge notably tended to see less distinction between English-speaking and Teuton, seeing both as serving the purposes of God. Similarly, Jason Tomes has argued regarding the significance of both race and religion to Balfour’s foreign policy.66 To Roosevelt, Puritan traits formed a key component required to form English-speaking races out of immigrant populations, writing that “the English, and especially the Puritans made the mold into which the other races were run.”67 This concept of the ‘mold’ and the manner it assimilated migrants is a key topic of the fifth chapter. Personally, Roosevelt considered himself a lifelong member of the Reformed Church, and frequently referred to his heritage from the Dutch Reformed Church, though he struggled to find a congregation for most of his life – a fact he occasionally lamented. He most frequently attended Christ Church in Oyster Bay, near his beloved Sagamore Hill estate. It was at this Episcopalian church, the denomination of his wife Edith, in which his funeral service was conducted prior to his burial at Oyster Bay. Despite the personal importance of religion, he also frequently remarked that religion failed to inspire him, particularly with respect to artwork where he preferred landscapes to pictures of divinity, failing to find anything holy even in the “Italian masters,” excepting Gustav Doré, whom he praised “alone represents the Christ so that your pity for him is lost in intense admiration and reverence.”68 However, even religion, to Roosevelt, was another critical trait that fit into his definition of racial traits. Not only was religion critical, it too could be inherited and could shape subsequent generations, just like values of masculinity, liberty, decadence, and militarism.

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Finally, it is worth addressing why to use the frame of the *biocultural assemblage* rather than using one of aforementioned components or the more umbrella term of ‘civilization?’ Indeed, Frank Ninkovich has examined both Roosevelt and the period in detail, arguing for the centrality of ideology in both Roosevelt’s world view and contemporary geopolitics, generally using ‘civilization’ as the central frame.\(^69\) Indeed, Ninkovich’s civilization itself is an assemblage of various economic, cultural, and social factors that engaged with the international world, albeit without race as an operating element and even at times in opposition to race as an ideology.\(^70\) The considerations for using the *assemblage* were the contemporary usage of the language of race, pre-existing literature, and the flexibility offered by the term over various time periods and regions without losing the core theme. The contemporary usage of language, was often jumbled, varied, and wildly inconsistent, but nevertheless, they used the term with intent. Roosevelt struggled with the question when discussing racial differences between various peoples from around the world, especially when dealing with the rise of Japan, and attempted to categorize the various features as the differ “physiologically,” by “creed,” by whether they were “white,” by “culture,” by “historic associations,” by “inherited governmental and social tendencies,” by “blood,” by “tongue,” or “ethnically.”\(^71\) At the time, Roosevelt concluded that different categories combined in different ways led them to be closer or more distant to his own race, referring to the English-speaking race as he conceptualized it then, and each race would thus face their own successes and pitfalls. Indeed, he concluded that at times “the non-Christian and non-Aryan, Far-Eastern Japanese were in some essentials closer to us than their chief opponents” and therefore saw no issue with the rise of Japanese power in principle, although of course security concerns in the Pacific are a different matter that shall be discussed later. In sum, Roosevelt concluded at the time that “I never know whether to be more astonished at the complete divergence between portions of the same race which have adopted antagonistic creeds and cults, or at the complete change in which creed and cult suffer when adopted by a different race.”\(^72\)

Moreover, as discussed, there is an extensive literature discussing the impact of gender, religion, and even the various ideas of imperialism – although there is certainly more work to be done into these spaces as well, particular with respect to gender, that is not the aim of this thesis. Lastly the *biocultural assemblage* is a framework in which race is the ontologically central component and in

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which not just social and cultural values but also biological assumptions influence each other. Race was cultural as much as race was biological - a social value was biologically inheritable, and a biological trait was socially modifiable.

**Terminology**

**Race and Racism**

The most important terms to define for this thesis are those of ‘race’ and the concept of ‘racism’. The former, because of its conceptual centrality, the latter because of its broader significance. I use race, racial theories, racial perspective, etc. rather than use the term racism or racist. This is not because I am in any way suggesting these concepts, and the way contemporary figures used them, are not racist – they unquestionably are and are nearly always also white-supremacist. However, it is not how contemporary figures themselves used the term. Moreover, ‘racism’ has rightly come to signify a negative judgement. While I personally may agree with this judgement, it becomes difficult to write a historical work when the word forces one to be drawn to judge before analyzing what it meant to contemporary thinkers. Moreover, it is important to note that these contemporary views of race have certainly been discredited. The existence of race itself as a meaningful biological concept is dubious at best. In analyzing how contemporary figures viewed it, I in no way endorse these deeply flawed, and generally horrific, ideas on race. The scarcity of the word ‘racist’ and the prevalence of the word ‘race’ is precisely what was at heart – thinking along racial lines was neither exceptional nor damning at the turn of the last century. Second, the terms racism and racist have much closer association in the United States especially with the treatment of black Americans. Although a key part of understanding race more broadly, that is not the focus of this thesis. That said, there are rare moments where this thesis does use the term ‘racist’ – and intentionally so in these instances.

Regarding ‘race’ itself, I have used the biocultural assemblage model from Duncan Bell’s research to conceptualize how contemporary thinkers viewed race. This has been discussed in other parts of this thesis, including briefly in the methodology section of this introduction and in detail in the first chapter. That said, it is critical that contemporary leaders and thinkers alike lacked this construct. There is, fundamentally, an immense lack of consistency in their usage of race, and how they grappled with the concept is a key theme of this research.

I of course do not reject the explanatory power of the color line in all circumstances, but I do propose that divisions on one side of it were more significant in driving geopolitical rivalries
among the great powers. There were unquestionably hierarchies of racial categories that clearly divided white and not-white. Nevertheless, it is important to see if the framework of race can be used to narrate not just the horrors caused by conflict between white racial categories and the rest, but also the antagonism caused by the most important divisions of the time – that between the English-speaking races and fears of competition from other white races.

To these political figures, race was not just a causal factor or an explanatory element, but rather a paradigm through which they viewed the world. Events, most notably the rise and fall of civilizations, could be explained or predicted by race; yet the rise or decline of a power could also indicate change taking place within a race. This paradigm, infuriatingly circular though it seems, was by no means static, proving remarkably resilient and adaptable in the face of challenge. Moreover, while it would be difficult to claim any of the major foreign policy interventions were conducted by these powers solely because of race, they undoubtedly played a role in facilitating certain events, limiting options, and in coloring perceptions of threat. Race not only nudged leaders into seeing other powers from a lens that seems alien to the present, it justified their own response in terms of racial survival, against which, in their minds, few other moral factors could legitimately challenge.

Anglo-Saxon, Teuton, and the English-speaking Races

Contemporary sources and the secondary literature use Anglo-Saxon, Teuton, the English-speaking Races, and other racial terms, with varying degrees of consistency and to mean a wide variety of definitions. Generally, I use Anglo-Saxon nearly synonymously with the English-speaking peoples or English-speaking races, although the transformation from one to the other is a theme of this dissertation. When I use the term, it does not include Germany unless otherwise indicated. Particularly in the case of the American political leadership, they rather consistently use the term Anglo-Saxon to not include Germans. This is not the case with many political theorists or with the British leadership. I consequently have chosen to use the narrower delimitation, and for the same reason, generally prefer to use ‘English-speaking races’ unless the sources I am referring to themselves use Anglo-Saxon in that context. This means that when I use ‘Teuton’ I do mean it to include Anglo-Saxon, and not just German. ‘Germanic’ however does not include Anglo-Saxons. ‘English-speaking Peoples’ is a term that begins to replace the term ‘Anglo-Saxon’ in contemporary usage, although itself it had been in use for decades as well, including my such notable political leaders and writers as Charles Dilke. The adoption on the American side of the Atlantic is more complicated, as it was at times synonymous, but at other times, clearly signified a change in meaning. Arguably, the weighting
in the biocultural assemblage perhaps shifts, weighing at times the cultural component and at others the biological as more significant. In general, I attempt to use the term more prevalent in the contemporary correspondence – and if discussing Anglo-Saxonism specifically, use that term, but as the term English-speaking races or peoples appeared, I tend to prefer it, all else being equal.

Nations and Countries

Throughout the period examined, contemporary figures use various interchangeable names for peoples and nations. For example, most of the individuals I examine use the terms Britain, the United Kingdom, Great Britain, and England more or less interchangeably – Andrew Carnegie of course being a notable exception. Roosevelt tended to write using these terms entirely interchangeably. I use the United Kingdom and Britain generally interchangeably, although I am aware at this time the United Kingdom incorporated all of Ireland. I generally do not use the term England to refer to the country. Regarding the Americas, I use both the United States and America to refer to the country interchangeably, as was common usage then and now. If I use the term ‘Americas,’ I use it to mean the continents and countries of the Western Hemisphere, though I tend to avoid the term or specify clearly when possible to avoid confusion. Germany refers to the German Empire. Similar usage applies to Russia, Japan, etc. However, given the topic of this thesis, the people from a particular country, i.e. Germans, are not necessarily synonymous with political boundaries.

Spelling Standards

In general, I use the American spellings for most words. The figures I examine tend to themselves lack consistent with this, at times even inventing their own spellings or abbreviations, but usual adhere to standards recognizable today, as most of the American-English spelling divide had already emerged. I preserve their spellings in quotations wherever possible – I do not convert British English to American English in quotations, nor do I correct spelling in quotations. All typographical errors within quotations are as written in the source material, including spelling and capitalizations. The only exception has been in replacing the ‘long s’ – or ‘ſ’ - in the rare early material from a period that still used it. I use contemporary place names as these have become themselves entered historical memory as part of various events. Transliterations are slightly more complicated; I used modern transliteration conventions, such as they exist, for Russian and Japanese names, however, within quotations themselves I have again preserved transliterations as in the source material.
Of note regarding Roosevelt’s closest correspondences was that they were often to individuals with whom Roosevelt mixed a personal friendship and a professional relationship – including individuals from both Germany and Britain. Some, such as his friendship and close correspondence with Henry Cabot Lodge, hardly require additional mention. The closeness cannot be exaggerated and has received extensive mention in nearly all discourse and literature surrounding Roosevelt. However (rather alarmingly to modern diplomatic sensibilities) the influence of others such as Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice is hard to underestimate – much of his correspondence on these theories during this period are directly tied to the execution of American foreign policy, to include instructing the arriving new American Ambassador to Russia, George von Lengerke Meyer, just as American mediation efforts were beginning that Spring-Rice would visit him. Moreover, Roosevelt clarified that not only did Spring-Rice know Roosevelt’s mind on all these issues, but Meyer was free to talk to Spring-Rice “without any reserve” and that with respect to the “Oriental complication” that England and the United States shared identical interests to be communicated by Spring-Rice – a situation that Meyer was told to accept from Spring-Rice as the default one unless told otherwise by Roosevelt. In effect, American policy regarding Asia in Russia was coordinated by a British diplomat.

The close relationship between Spring-Rice and Roosevelt thus informed US diplomats – and through them the British and American diplomatic efforts during this conflict. For example, at this time Spring-Rice was the British Charge d’Affaires in St. Petersburg and Roosevelt had written to him that “my policy must of necessity be somewhat opportunist: although as a matter of fact I have very definitely concluded what I intend to do if circumstances permit, so far as this far eastern question is concerned. I do not like to write my conclusions even to you; and unfortunately there is no one in your embassy here to whom I can speak with even reasonable fullness. I wish to Heaven you could come over, if only for a week or two; and I think it would be very important for your Government that you should come over.” Later the next year Landsdowne appointed Spring-Rice as a special envoy to the US President in the United States, although it is unclear whether this request – or others like it Roosevelt had made over the previous year – had a direct impact on this appointment.

74 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 27 December 1904. 4:1082.
Regarding his trust of Spring-Rice, one of Roosevelt’s most important relationships and the person with whom he engaged in conversation regarding race most frequently, he directly noted that “Let me ask that you take especial care not to let my letters be left around. I need not say that there is nothing that I am ashamed of in them: but I have felt both because of my relations with you, and because of my view of what the relations between the United States and Great Britain should be, that it was desirable for me to write you with extreme frankness, and if through any accident any portion of these letters get out it would inevitably cause irritation and possibly pain to, for instance, both the Kaiser and the Czar.”

Spring-Rice thus became one of the few individuals that Roosevelt not only trusted to discuss third party countries with, but while President even instructed American diplomats to take direction from.

Roosevelt and his family maintained a similarly close friendship with Hermann Speck von Sternberg, writing to him that “Let me at the outset thank both you and your wife for your great kindness in wanting Ted. But the little fellow is now off at school in the winter, and in the summer we do not feel as if we could spare him…. I am rather surprised to find how often the children speak of you, and how constantly they say they wish you could be with them at Christmas again. Both of you must surely know how welcome you will be when you get back to America. I hope it will not be too long hence. I feel that at Washington your field of usefulness would be peculiarly large.” In fact he felt this usefulness sufficiently large that he passed word to the Kaiser that he should be sent here, but felt that although the Kaiser responded with courtesy, “my impression is that they do not want to have anyone over here whom they would regard as being too close to me.” Nevertheless, eventually Roosevelt got his wish as even the Kaiser eventually took advantage of this mutual relationship, sending von Sternberg to represent Germany during the Venezuela crisis, during which Roosevelt concluded in a (possibly unsent) letter to his son that “Nice little Baron Speck turned up as the representative from Germany. I do not believe he can do anything in the Venezuela matter, but if he can I am sure his influence will be on the side of a good understanding.”

However, it must be noted that Roosevelt’s relationship with John Hay, despite the close bond between them, was not intimate as that between Roosevelt and Spring-Rice or Roosevelt and Lodge. An illustrative moment occurred regarding debates surrounding the canal when Roosevelt wrote to Hay praising him, saying “You have been the greatest Secretary of State I

75 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 24 July 1905. 4:1283.
77 Theodore Roosevelt to Hermann Speck von Sternberg, 6 March 1902. 3:239.
78 Theodore Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., 1 February 1903. 3:415.
have seen in my time – Olney comes second – but at this moment I can not, try as I may, see that you are right. Understand me. When the treaty is adopted, as I suppose it will be, I shall put the best face possible on it, and shall back the Administration as heartily as ever; but oh how I wish you and the President would drop the treaty and push through a bill to build and fortify our own canal!”

A common mistake in much of existing literature has been to assume that Hay and Roosevelt agreed regarding the Anglo-American relationship. Indeed, contemporary accusations that Hay was biased towards Britain in all respects are not without some grounding. This was not shared by Roosevelt, despite his belief in the English-speaking peoples as a construct. Indeed, while mourning Hay’s death to Lodge, although praising his “name, his reputation, and his staunch loyalty” and describing him as “a real asset to the administration,” he continued that “in actual work I had to do the big things myself, and the other things I always feared would be badly done or not done at all. He had grown to hate the Kaiser so that I could not trust him in dealing with Germany. When, for instance, the Kaiser made the excellent proposition about the integrity of China, Hay wished to refuse and pointed out where the Kaiser’s proposition as originally made contained what was inadvisable. I took hold of it myself, accepted the Kaiser’s offer, but at the same time blandly changed it so as to wholly remove the objectionable feature.”

Thus, while Roosevelt respected Hay as a titan in the field of diplomacy, Roosevelt often felt the need to circumvent Hay rather than work through him.

These individuals also frequently corresponded to each other, though Roosevelt did not allow his Cabinet, Congress, or his other representatives such as Ambassadors to decide issues on his behalf. Moreover, key contemporary leaders were used to the idea of close personal trans-Atlantic relationships, to include a number of marriages. The sheer quantity and significance of marriages and the relationships they forged is remarkable. Perhaps most famously, Winston Churchill’s mother was American Jennie Jerome. Consuelo Vanderbilt was tragically coerced into marrying the Duke of Marlborough, a relationship that later ended in regret, divorce, and annulment. George Curzon married American Mary Leiter, making an American the Vicereine India, arguably making her highest peeress in the realm, after only the Queen. With respect to the individuals most directly related to the research here, Roosevelt’s close friend, correspondent, and German Ambassador to the United States in 1903, the aforementioned Hermann Speck von Sternberg, was married to Lillian Langham of Kentucky. Indeed, Spring-Rice was Roosevelt’s best man at his second wedding. It is likely that these relationships impacted how these individuals viewed each other, but this must be noted with

three important caveats. First, in the interconnected world of the late 19th century elites, this was common between all the European powers – especially the aristocracy. The only particularly new element was, perhaps, the inclusion of wealthy Americans into the European elite. Second, when it came to perceptions of race, the ability to see other peoples as a peer civilization was often more a source of fear rather than sympathy – the notion of the English-speaking peoples being at existential risk from a non-white race was as absurd to contemporary leaders as the notion of marriage, though not without exception, between one of these leaders and a counterpart on the other side of the color line.

Lastly, this dissertation became more focused on the United States and Roosevelt than initially intended, largely by necessity due to the sheer volume of relevant material. While this brings certain strengths – as contemporary racial ideas in politics are incoherent enough as they are – it also leaves open certain nuances regarding British policy, especially as to the East, that bear further discussion. While Britain’s voice was examined in detail during the Boer War and has been examined by other scholars regarding the Americas, British policy towards Japan and Russia as an imagined East – similar to how the American side was examined in this research – might prove an illuminating avenue for future research.

**Scope and Limitations**

There are of course a number of issues outside the scope of this dissertation, despite its broad remit – these limitations have been further defined in each chapter as needed. It does not purport to be a comprehensive history of Anglo-American relations, particularly prior to the 1890s. It also does not attempt to provide a comprehensive history of Anglo-Saxon ideology, race, and history dating to its origins whether in the 8th century or ‘time immemorial.’ Although of necessity there is discussion of contemporary theory, as mentioned this work is intended as a study of the history international relations and of geopolitics, not as an intellectual history. However, the first chapter does discuss the development of intellectual thought that later influenced political leaders. The dissertation primarily examines foreign policy, although in the immigration chapter there is a large domestic component – but even then, an argument that highlights the role of race in immigration as a geopolitical manner. The foreign and domestic line is one that of necessity must be blurred when discussing contemporary notions of race. This was not just because domestic and foreign policy are themselves often intertwined – on many issues surrounding race and competition between races, the line between domestic and foreign did not exist as it exists today. The future of the world was not conceptualized in terms of
domestic, foreign, or international, but in terms of interracial. Nevertheless, the distinction still mattered because to contemporary leaders thinking about the future of race, all the countries of the English-speaking races were certainly not identical and offered different challenges and opportunities.

It is additionally worth noting that key actors on both the British and American sides were largely members of specific political factions – the Liberal Unionists and their alliance with the Conservatives on the British side, and the Republican Party in the United States. Nevertheless, this was not exclusive and in order to best examine an ontologically central theme that ran across the Atlantic, I found that bringing the electoral considerations of so many political leaders would merely distract from the common threads. This dissertation also largely concludes with the end of the Roosevelt administration, as it allowed for greater depth in analyzing the evolution of this idea – content was simply not lacking. Extending the research forward to Taft and Wilson, or perhaps even including a closer examination of Williams Jennings Bryan could be a task for future research but would have been detrimental at this stage. Some of the aforementioned historiography does cover a broader period, but by merging the three (or four, including McKinley) administrations, it presents an unwarranted image of a stronger “Special Relationship” or “Rapprochement” than I propose and also tends to underestimate the extent to which other races were seen as threatening during this time. The First World War distorted perceptions of Germany to such an extent that contemporary figures seemed to even revise their own recollections of earlier events, complicating research of, for example, Bryan during his tenure as Secretary of State. The issue of Anglo-American cooperation indeed runs through all four administrations, but its constancy in presence, however important, should not be conflated with constancy in strength. That said, this dissertation does raise important questions that could then be applied to these other figures in later research.
Chapter One – From the Language of Race to the Race of Language

“Consider Britain, this little island in the North Sea, and its pendant, Ireland, a territory that could be placed in the middle of the one state of Texas, and yet all the cotton that the world uses grown upon the rim left outside. Can a more startling statement be made than that this isle holds under her flag about one-fourth of the earth’s whole surface, and the same proportion of its population? So much for the land. As for the water, no power on earth can peep its head out beyond the neutral three leagues from shore, except by her august permission. How has this miracle been performed? There is only one answer. The English-speaking race is the “boss” race of the world. It can acquire, can colonize, can rule. It establishes law and administers justice everywhere it settles, where before there was neither the one nor the other. It tolerates all religions and encourages a free press; it makes free men in free states. This breed of men landed at Plymouth Rock and speedily pushed out all the other races, and established here one of the centers of its own race.”

By the nature of its birth, the nascent American Republic was in many respects hostile to its mother country. Despite various attempts at conciliation, and famous internal disagreement between politicians favorable to Britain or France, the first century of America’s history remained marked by suspicion, fear, and at times outright hostility towards Great Britain, to include open war in 1812. By the turn of the century, much of this had changed, and had become enmeshed with a particular racial discourse. Moreover, geopolitics had fundamentally shifted. French power had been repeatedly shattered, from Napoleon at Waterloo to Napoleon III at Sedan. The Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires faced a succession of internal challenges, while Germany and Italy united to form new powers on the continent. Germany and the United States in particular, by 1900, were in unparalleled ascendancy, potentially challenging Britain for the position of pre-eminence she had wielded for a century. Yet the challenge from the United States was substantially different from that from Germany. Why did Britain and America react to this changing world in the manner they did? Both the nature of the first century of Anglo-American relations and the emerging centrality of race prior to 1900 are key to preparing to analyze this question. Race informed the ontology of geopolitics, informing key political figures of how history moved and the terms on which it would develop. From this paradigm, these figures tended to imagine what the world would be, and thus, see threats, realities, and inter-state behavior broadly along these lines.

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On two continents, similar strands of thought created a template by which both countries would subsequently react to a series of international incidents. In America, oft conflated – and at times synonymous - Germanic and Anglo-Saxonist thought helped to justify slavery, genocide, and the colonization of a continent. Meanwhile in Britain, racial political thinkers facing the pressures of a global reach and a changing power dynamic in Europe attempted to recast the empire into new forms. Both aspired to universalist ambitions, within which were embedded fundamental fears. From the start, the distinction between Anglo-Saxon and German were blurred. Yet the distinction mattered, when pushed by political leaders. Ultimately, one final question also remains – even if Anglo-Saxon race theorists politically split Anglo-Saxons from Germans, why did Germans become the enemy? Anderson argues, referring to “race-thinkers” that “Some of them tried to come to terms with the difficulty in a fashion consistent with the tenets of Anglo-Saxonism. They suggested that the Germans and Anglo-Saxons had been separated for so long that they should no longer be thought of as kin. Or they argued that Germany had been seduced by absolutism and had lost the freedom-loving Teutonic spirit; or that the Germans had been corrupted through intermarriage with Latin peoples. Most race-thinkers, however got around the problem by simply refusing to speak of competition with Germany in racial terms.” However, to the contrary, political leaders and “race-thinkers” wrestled often with the issue of competition with Germany. Race was not just a veneer that tainted contemporary thought but also a foundational tenet. These issues help understand of relations between the contemporary Powers. How did America and Britain come to see Germany as threats? Why would certain actions taken by one state be seen as threatening to another, or vice-versa. While there is certainly no one single answer to these questions, this chapter attempts to do tie racial theories and the ontological central role that they played to a narrative of British and American political expansion and threat perception.

Although the answer to why, or even whether, this truly happened will require a much longer discussion in subsequent chapters, certain elements emerge early. This chapter aims to lay out the significance of the Teuton in Anglo-Saxonist thought and to elaborate on the early consequences of race to the relationship between the United States and Britain. It also attempts to tie the theories of some of these intellectuals to similar thought by certain political leaders. The most significant of these consequences is the role that race plays in how political leaders view Germans as opposed to the Slavic peoples, and the preconceptions this generated in the mind of political leaders before the international crises the United States was involved with.

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83 Anderson, Race and Rapprochement, 67.
during the turn of the last century. Additionally, as later discussed, the flexible interpretations of race by contemporary leaders allowed for not just concepts such as ‘amalgamation’ to address crises of settler colonization, but also a general transition from Anglo-Saxon to English-speaking.

**Destiny and Anglo-Saxon Expansion**

The late 19th and early 20th centuries were replete with international crises. In the sphere of great power relations between the United States and the United Kingdom, the period witnessed a marked improvement of relations that historians have dubbed “the Great Rapprochement.” The late 19th century was not the first thaw in relations between Britain and America. A century earlier, a series of diplomatic overtures and maneuvers between both states led to brief moments of cordiality. The revolution wiped away previous notions of social and political order, removing immediate barriers to westward expansion placed by Britain. Fearing the damage to republicanism from commerce and concentration of wealth in North-eastern cities, Jefferson envisioned a continent in which small agrarian landowners would constitute the foundations of political economy.

Envisioned by Jefferson as the ultimate bulwark against tyranny and the solution to slavery, the Louisiana purchase and subsequent acquisitions by Jeffersonian democrats aimed to provide nearly boundless space across the continent for settlement. The earliest heroes of this age included a range of Europeans, from the Marquis de Lafayette to Casimir Pulaski. Although revolutionary ideologies remained in many ways the primary factor in American society, race, from the inception of slavery on the continent, was among its most dominant features. Indeed, as Guyatt notes, race may not have been separable at all from early revolutionary ideology. The legends of earlier eras such as Abraham Lincoln were even used consciously to construct the foundations of Anglo-Saxonism as a geopolitical instrument. The early racial categorizations – among the most nefarious and persistent – were centered on the question of slavery. Meanwhile, prominent political leaders in the South viewed the spread of the institution of

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slavery across the South and the Caribbean as a necessary step to the continuation of American
civilization,91 not just as part of the Golden Circle separatists, but also as part of a nationalist
project in the pre-Civil War United States.92 However, the racial epistemology underlying
expansion was that of Anglo-Saxonism – and an Anglo-Saxonism still viewed as fundamentally
Germanic. These ideologies were intertwined not just with ideas of liberty, slavery, and
civilization but with American destiny. The United States, meanwhile, continued to prosper and
expand seemingly without end across the continent. Although eventually the formal frontier had
vanished by 1890, settlement of the interior still continued. Moreover, westward expansion and
the images that accompanied it influenced individuals like Roosevelt deeply. Anglo-Saxon and
Germanic racial ideology, mixed with new and developing theories of Aryan expansion,
converged into a narrative of progress. This narrative, and the intellectual development that
presaged it has been covered extensively by Reginald Horsman in his work Race and Manifest
Destiny. Although discussing the entire story of Anglo-Saxonism here would be repetitive, there
are certain elements of particular note regarding the evolution of Germanic racial identity as
opposed to – or as synonymous with – Anglo-Saxon racial identity that are worth isolating.

Despite the revolutionary impetus, even Jeffersonian thought was tied with visions of
early Anglo-Saxon institutions and its perceived affinity for liberty and small communities,
drawing from a rich heritage of Germanic-centered visions of liberty that informed the early
American Republic as much as the legacies of the Roman Republic. Anglo-Saxonism broadly
certainly predated its successors of the 20th century. Ideas of race and Germanic heritage date
harkened back to an Anglo-Saxon and Protestant counterpoint to fears of Papal oppression.
Medieval foundation myths were de-emphasized and “antiquarians of the early seventeenth
century linked the English arguments to the general Germanic movement in Europe and
ultimately to Tacitus.”93 Notably, Tacitus in fact argued that the racial homogeneity of the
German tribes was a source of weakness, stating “German peoples have never intermarried with
alien stocks, but have always stood forth as a race rooted in the soil, pure and unlike every other.
This is why, extraordinarily numerous as the Germans are, they all possess precisely the same
physical characteristics...they have not a corresponding power of endurance for hard work.”94

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92 Matthew Karp, This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016).
Yet, this narrative became flipped by myth, and by the 18th century, visions of liberty and common law, particularly as exercised by famed jurist Edward Coke, were often intertwined with an ancient view of Germanic heritage that was “reinforced by the image of the Germanic peoples that originated with Tacitus and was elaborated by a whole series of post-Reformation Continental writers.” The myth, eventually blurred into the assumptions of the legal foundations of liberty, became a cornerstone of racial ideology in early America.

Various popular theories of multigenesis pushed the development of the idea that if Creation occurred separately, the various points of creation must not all be equal – or at the least the paths of evolution since creation were not equal. Even James Cowles Prichard, who famously defended monogenesis, ceaselessly argued that certain peoples, notably of Germanic decent, were superior to other branches of humanity, writing, “in moral energy the German race was so superior to the rest of mankind, and the Romanized nations so prostrate before their arms, that the old stock of inhabitants might eventually have been exterminated from Europe, if German dynasties and German colonies established in conquered provinces had not changed the condition and renewed the vigour of the subdued people.”

Although much intellectual thought diverges from this over the next several decades, many political leaders harken back to this fundamental angst about the fall of Rome. Simultaneously in science, various developments such as phrenology and Lamarckian evolutionary theory reinforced these beliefs such that “the biblical account of Creation had its staunch and influential scientific defenders throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, but by 1850 there were very few scientists prepared to defend the inherent equality of the different races of the world.” Into the latter part of the 19th century, Lamarckian evolution continued to be seen, if erroneously, as a complimentary predecessor to Darwin. Biological and historical narratives of race thus converged, to set the stage for the ontological centrality of race.

The idea of Anglo-Saxon institutions that contributed to ideas of English liberty were often the same ideas that found new life in the new American republic. By the mid-19th century, the language of “Manifest Destiny” adopted the justification of Anglo-Saxonism, this time with a more overtly expansionist and racial nature. Although Anderson argues that “the antebellum

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96 George W. Stocking, Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology, Phoenix (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 68 also see chapter 3 for more on the tradition of multigenesis and anthropology.
98 Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Philosophie Zoologique, 1809.
brand of Anglo-Saxonism in the United States differed considerably from what it was to become in the late nineteenth century,” suggesting that Anglo-Saxonism was used to justify nationalism rather than a vision of history, the Anglo-Saxonism of the period was indeed a key predecessor the latter. Moreover, these Germanic and Aryan visions of racial triumph, oft conflated, carry well into the present day. The overtly Nordic and Germanic appeal of white supremacy in the modern United States, often finding purchase with the same mythos as the racial thinkers of the 19th century, was distorted by both the events of the 20th century and sheer intellectual ineptness.

As this occurred, however, relations between the United States and Britain remained cordial at best. While the early rapprochement and the presence of Anglophiles in the early republic had soothed some of the injuries of the Revolution and the War of 1812, the Civil War once again strained relations between the United States and Britain to crisis. Early in the war, fears mounted in the Union that the Southern strategy of obtaining European aid, despite the fallacy of relying on cotton exports, might persuade European powers to intervene in the war. British willingness to construct commerce raiders for the Confederacy, such as the infamous CSS Alabama, were seen as signs of British attempts to play the American continent against itself for purposes of geopolitical gain. This would have immense implication for immigrants to the United States and their political significance. Carnegie found expansion an essential component of racial characteristics, finding common ground between the behavior of Anglo-Saxons in Britain and in America “in regard to territorial acquisition.” To Carnegie, Britain and America had behaved nearly identically in that they conquered all territories that they desired and encountered, finding this thus a racial commonality. There was, however a key difference between Anglo-Saxons in Britain and America “in the gratification of their land hunger” – to Carnegie, the United States was largely contiguous, and thus, “formed one compact solid nation….forty-five nations in one without a visible dividing line.”

Carnegie recognized that this land into which Britain and America expanded was already inhabited, including most notably to him by the various indigenous peoples of North America and Oceania. However, rather than recognize this as an obstacle, Carnegie instead argued regarding the process of satisfying Anglo-Saxon “land hunger” that it would be best for the “strict moralist” not to enquire as to exactly how this land had been acquired as he admitted that process was “best described by saying 'by hook or by crook.'” Beyond his willingness to

102 Carnegie, 131.
103 Carnegie, 133.
simply set aside the morality of the question, Carnegie found that the acquisition and administration of these new territories by Anglo-Saxons not just in the broader interests of humanity, but part of a natural process. With respect to both the displacement of the Native American by settlers and the Maori by “the intelligent, industrious citizen, a member of our race,” Carnegie described the process as not just “right and proper” but elaborated “It is an evolution, the fittest driving out the least fit; the best supplanting the inferior; and the interests of civilization rendered the acquisition of the land necessary.” 104 The racial theories underpinning elements of American expansion had not vanished – rather they began to justify the expansion into the West remarkably not with ignorance of the moral consequences, but with horrifying awareness. The question of Native Americans was thus answered – native land was often seen as terra nullius for the purpose of settlement, at best. At worst, it was an issue to be acknowledged and ignored for the purpose of expanding settlement. This was recognized even outside the United States, with Joseph Chamberlain writing in 1877, “England could never Anglo-Saxonize Ireland, but America has already Anglo-Saxonized California, Louisiana, and Texas, and will some day Anglo-Saxonize Mexico.”105 America’s ability to Anglo-Saxonize a continent in the face of Britain’s inability to do so in especially Ireland was a key issue for Chamberlain. One of the most important British politicians of his time holding offices including Secretary of State for the Colonies, Chamberlain was not only notoriously imperialist, but opposed to Irish Home Rule, and opposed to free trade in favor of tariff reforms for Imperial Preference – issues over which Chamberlain managed to divide the Liberal Party, create the Liberal Unionist Party, ally it with the Conservatives, and then fracture the Liberal Unionists and Conservatives alike during the course of his career.

Thus, by the time the United States and Germany rose to challenge the great powers on the world state, racial thinking was already entrenched. This paradigm then intersected the demands of great power politics, particularly in the Western Hemisphere due to the limited geographic ambitions and reach of the contemporary United States. How then did these strains of thought impact policymakers? While much of this will be more easily examined through a study of various international crises, certain key figures had already developed theories about the future of international conflict as it related Anglo-Saxonism and to other powers, most notably Germany and Russia.

104 Carnegie, 133.
If the theories of race were ambiguous and easily adapted to a range of incoherent principles and objectives among contemporary intellectuals, the problem was only magnified in the hands of policy makers – excepting perhaps few such as Arthur Balfour. To those like Chamberlain, tariff reform, federation, alliance with Germany or the United States, or numerous other proposals could be justified through his racialized world view. To those like Theodore Roosevelt, ideas of race were merged into entirely other ideological concerns regarding the American republic. Nevertheless, even then there were important threads that still pointed towards a particularly racial vision of the Anglo-American world.

Roosevelt found much persuasive with respect to racial origin, writing “The Germanic strain is dominant in the blood of the average Englishman, exactly as the English strain is dominant in the blood of the average American. Twice a portion of the race has shifted its home, in each case undergoing a marked change, due both to outside influence and to internal development; but in the main retaining, especially in the last instance, the general race characteristics.” The first instance of the race ‘shifting’ its home refers to the migration of the Angles and Saxons to Britain. In this, Roosevelt and his contemporaries and correspondents embraced the notion that Germanic heritage contributed to the vitality of the Anglo-Saxon, although melding it with American notions of immigration and assimilation. However, although the color line thus plays a significant role in Roosevelt’s domestic politics, particularly with respect to the American South, in his foreign policy Roosevelt was primarily concerned with racial confrontation on the white side of the color line. For Anglo-Saxonists political leaders, everyone in America that was not black could eventually become not just white, but Anglo-Saxon. This is not to suggest he saw no such line, but rather that peoples on non-white side of the color line, with certain exceptions, were rarely a compelling threat to him.

In describing both the lineage of his own family and the racial history of the United States, Roosevelt writes in one of his key works regarding American expansion westward that “There was but one land whereof the winning made a lasting addition to Germanic soil; but this land was destined to be of more importance in the future of the Germanic peoples than all their continental possessions, original and acquired, put together. The day when the keels of the low-Dutch sea-thieves first grated on the British coast was big with the doom of many nations. There sprang up in conquered southern Britain, when its name had been significantly changed to England, that branch of the Germanic stock which was in the end to grasp almost literally world-

107 See Chapter Four
wide power, and by its overshadowing growth to dwarf into comparative insignificance all its kindred folk.” However, even in this narrative, the story of the Anglo-Saxon began to diverge with that of the German, noting not just that the introduction of Celtic and Scandinavian blood had changed the racial makeup of the Germanic peoples in Britain, but also that “England had grown to differ profoundly from the Germanic countries of the mainland…. More important still were the radical changes brought by the Norman conquest; chief among them the transformation of the old English tongue into the magnificent language which is now the common inheritance of so many widespread peoples.” The matter of the English language was fundamentally a racial categorization. The importance of this point can hardly be overstated – as the language of race shifted from that of Teutonomania, to Anglo-Saxonists, to eventually the prominence of the term “English-speaking peoples,” race remained the central issue, albeit a race of language.

This was not merely a linguistic distinction or institution, but the next evolution of the same racial narrative, especially when certain terms such as “Anglo-Saxon” fell out of popular usage in the early 20th century. The term was in use as early as the late 1860s, with the British theorist and politician Charles Dilke opening his description of his travels, in large part in America, Canada, and Australia, writing, “In 1866 and 1867, I followed England round the world: everywhere I was in English-speaking, or in English-governed lands. If I remarked that climate, soil, manners of life, that mixture with other peoples had modified the blood, I saw, too, that in essentials the race was always one.” Carnegie had begun using the term at least by 1895. Roosevelt and his correspondents began switching by 1898 and by roughly 1905, had nearly abandoned Anglo-Saxonism. Indeed, Roosevelt made this choice consciously, even writing that he should never have used it after Teutonism had lost popularity in the late early 20th century. Although some scholars have made the mistake of assuming this and the decline of fears about Russia suggest the end of race as a factor in Great Power relations, it in fact was a continuation of the same paradigm. The legacy of Anglo-Saxonism as a racial structure was replaced by the English-speaking races decrying the militarism or barbarity of Germany. Though Teutonism continued to matter, the Germans, if nothing else, did not speak English – at least until they arrived on American shores.

109 Roosevelt, 23.
112 Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement*. 

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Yet for all the mutability that contemporary intellectuals ascribed to race, and despite the overlap between these intellectuals and the political elite, the foreign policy elite exhibits an even greater tendency to inconsistently define racial categories. To some, the biological elements were paramount; to others, particularly in the United States, social and institutional factors could lead to the manufacturing of race. The nature of this vagueness contributed to the inconsistency. However, to most, even in the United States, the institutional factors of race did have limitations. Few argued that, for example, a non-white person could actually become Anglo-Saxon, though some, like Roosevelt, did envision them reaching a comparable level of ‘civilization’ under certain circumstances – but always as individuals, never as a community. As will be discussed later, the exception was, of course, Japan. Anglo-Saxon ideology, whether inclusive of Germans or not, was for most, unabashedly and massively white supremacist: while there was disagreement as to the exact ordering in the various hierarchies of race promulgated at the time, there was consensus that white races featured higher than non-white races. Nevertheless, the existence of the color line did not preclude divisions on the white side of the line, and for the purposes of great power politics, these divisions were of great significance. While in some sense Germans could indeed become Anglo-Saxon if they emigrated to the United States, they could not be part of the Anglo-Saxon vision of world order. Moreover, in crisis after crisis, German policy simply did not align with that of either the United States or Germany. Though race could color the way a nation was threatening or not, it by no means overshadowed state interest.

Race had been used to justify slavery in the South and envision it expanding across the Caribbean basin,113 opposition to immigrants in the North, and the colonization of the American continent, with the accompanying extermination or relocation of its native populations, under the banner of Manifest Destiny. Yet underneath this all was that distinctly Teutonic element. As Horsman summarizes, “in Great Britain, throughout her colonies, and in the United States the Anglo-Saxons were apparently completing that march begun in the dawn of history by Aryan tribesmen. It was this aspect of the new Teutonism that also found most fertile ground on the other side of the Atlantic in the United States. There, ideas and dreams indigenous to American history melded with a variety of themes from Europe to transform Revolutionary idealism for human progress into an ideology of continental, hemispheric, and even world racial destiny for a particular chosen people.”114 This universalist ideal, and its fusion of expansion with race, was

113 May, The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, 1854-1861.
not limited to the United States, and in a different form, appeared in British and Commonwealth thought.

**The Federation Response**

As Anglo-Saxonists in the United States saw their theories confirmed as Americans hurled themselves across an entire continent, contemporary Anglo-Saxonists in Britain saw Anglo-Saxons as peopling the entire world. The vast explosion of expansion reinforced the ideas of race – not just of heritage, but also the institutions of religion and liberty. Institutions were not superseded by race, but rather a subsidiary characteristic to be subsumed under the broader categorizations of race. The concept of the *biocultural assemblage* as proposed by Duncan Bell fits the contemporary understanding, especially as it evolves towards the latter part of the century. As he writes, “Race, then, was usually figured as a *biocultural assemblage*, a hybrid compound of ‘cultural’ and ‘biological’ claims about human evolutionary history, individual and collective character, comportment, physiognomy and mental capacity.” This incorporated not just the commonalities of biological origin, as contemporaries imagined it, but also the features of Protestantism, common law, historical experience, and a host of other significant concepts that was sublimated into a broader idea of race. Combined with this was the aforementioned views of Germanic heritage, and as James Belich argues, “Some English had long thought that their Anglo-Saxon forebears were prone to energy, liberty, and progress, and that the Germans were in who shared these characteristics. Other views contested this up to the eighteenth century. But in the nineteenth century, Anglo-Saxonism flowered alongside other rising racialisms.” Despite challenges, Germanic and Teuton characteristics remained an indelible feature of Anglo-Saxon identity. Indeed, Teutonists were consistently Anglo-Saxonist, but not all Anglo-Saxonists remained Teutonist.

Theorists and political leaders in Britain and the Dominions, most notably Canada, began to question the future of the Empire in terms of race. Anglo-Saxons were no longer simply challenged by the historical rivalries of France or Russia, but by a unified power in Germany, and a new and also Anglo-Saxon power in the United States. These latter two showed promise, growth, and as they saw it, vitality in a way that most of the old powers of Europe clearly could not. British supremacy of over a century was clearly challenged, and as Bell lays out, “Three

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115 Bell, “Beyond the Sovereign State: Isopolitan Citizenship, Race and Anglo-American Union.”
116 Bell, 420.
117 Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, 63.
countries in particular generated concern: Germany, Russia and the United States. Although the perceived threat differed in each case, the collective power – military and industrial – of this triad led to a reappraisal of Britain’s global role, and spurred the development of a mosaic of schemes for colonial unity.”

Unlike in the United States, Celtic and immigrant populations were not always seen as Anglo-Saxon, and the element of Germanic heritage remained much stronger both in the minds of racial thinkers and political leaders. As early as the 18th century, the division between Celt and Teuton with respect to race entered into prominence with Pinkerton’s *Origin and Progress of the Scythians and Goths*, in which he spends half of the work arguing how Germanic peoples had replaced the inferior Celts, claiming that in Britain they “know the Celts to be mere radical savages, not yet advanced even to the state of barbarism; and if any foreigner doubts this, he has only to step into the Celtic part of Wales, Ireland, or Scotland and look at them, for they are just as they were, incapable of industry or civilization, even after half their blood is Gothic, and remain, as marked by the ancients, fond of lies, and enemies of truth.” However, as he notes, certain works had already begun to establish a divergence between German and Anglo-Saxon. The most notable of these was arguably Sharon Turner’s *History of the Anglo-Saxons*, in which he saw Anglo-Saxons as a more sophisticated, though of course subsidiary category, variant of German, particularly as pertaining to Anglo-Saxon law and property.

The arrival of Darwinian and other forms of natural selection introduced, in a form often misinterpreted by contemporary political leaders, one of the most critical components for race to influence foreign policy – the competitive element. Darwin moved the competition among races from referring solely to species in the natural world to the various races of the human world. In *The Descent of Man*, Darwin wrote that “At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, the civilized races of man will almost certainly exterminate and replace the savage races throughout the world” He further wrote specifically regarding the English and the United States that “The remarkable success of the English as colonists, compared to other European nations, has been ascribed to their “daring and persistent energy;” a result which is well illustrated by comparing the progress of the Canadians of English and French extraction….There is apparently much truth in the belief that the wonderful progress of the

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118 For more on the issue of competition and democracy see chapter 2: Bell, *Idea of Greater Britain Empire and the Future of World Order.*

119 John Pinkerton, *A Dissertation on the Origin and Progress of the Scythians and Goths Being an Introduction to the Ancient and Modern History of Europe* (London: John Nichols, 1787) Note: alphabet has been standardized to modern English with respect to the long s.


United States, as well as the character of the people, are the results of natural selection.”\textsuperscript{122} The idea that men would compete for survival during the march to civilization was further promoted by a range of thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic such as Benjamin Kidd\textsuperscript{123} and even given a Christian element by the American Josiah Strong.\textsuperscript{124} Rather than deny evolution, Darwinian competition and the subsequent triumph of Anglo-Saxons as the representatives of God’s will were tools through which God’s plan would become manifest. However, much of this might be attributed to the fact that the United States itself was not a Power on the global stage until later in the century. These preceding events certainly do not vanish - and visions of Anglo-Saxons populating and policing the world are not entirely discontinuous from Confederate dreams of white slave-holding farmers populating the American continent.

Within the empire, this expansion spurred a wave of thought by the second half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. Alexis de Tocqueville famously wrote in Democracy in America that, “The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the people; the Russian centres all the authority of society in a single arm. The principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting-point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.” Yet a range of authors presented an alternative, from James Bryce’s American Commonwealth to the vision of Dilke’s Greater Britain or the narrative of famous historian John Robert Seeley’s The Expansion of England. These, and others such as Froude’s Oceana, presented by the mid 1880’s an alternative to this future, but “demanded the translation of the virtues of the early Roman republicans into the contemporary world,”\textsuperscript{125} - a concept of virtue in race and civilization similar to arguments both Roosevelt and Balfour both found compelling.

This vision, through its myriad paths has been traced by a number of scholars. However, some of the historiography, including that of Stuart Anderson’s suffers from Tocqueville’s famous prediction and an over emphasis on the significance of Russia, which seemed prescient then during the Cold War. It is unquestionable that contemporary thinkers and politicians alike indeed viewed the threat from Russia, at least until 1905, as among the most significant. However, as the fourth chapter discusses, it was a threat perpetually on the very distant horizon.

\textsuperscript{122} Darwin, 142.
\textsuperscript{125} Bell, Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire, 313 See: “Republican Imperialism.”
It was seen as a calamity that may or may not befall the Anglo-Saxon world, but one that did not immediately threaten the security of the United States or Britain. However, Britain still required a response to both this distant threat and more immediate fears. The aforementioned American ability to manufacture more Anglo-Saxons did not exist in Britain or the empire. A new lens to understand the world was required. To many theorists and political leaders alike, Imperial Federation was the answer – the creation of a federal state, that would unite with the United States informally, or to the most ambitious formally, to police the world and create a perpetual peace unchallengeable by even a combination of all of the remaining powers. This was, of course, not universal even among staunch Anglo-Saxonists. Other theorists proposed a looser confederation or even a trade league among the English-speaking peoples – indeed options less extreme than the creation of a federal state were usually by far the most acceptable and popular, though in many ways no less Utopian. The Utopian nature of these ideas was critical.126 Carnegie, during the Venezuela crisis, found that a treaty of arbitration between Britain and America was a path to perpetual peace, arguing to the British public that should the British political leadership not accept the treaty of arbitration proposed by Cleveland and Olney, the fault for war still being possible between the two countries instead of forever forestalled was that of Prime Minister Salisbury and the leader of the Commons, Arthur Balfour.127 Indeed, he concludes that race underscored the divide between Britain and the United States regarding geopolitical questions in the Western Hemisphere, writing with respect to America that “their regard for the ties that bind the English-speaking race together are not less strong nor less general than that of the people of Britain; but being of that dominating race, the American is sensitive in regard to the affairs of this continent.”128 In effect, arbitration favoring the United States was to Carnegie only natural given racial characteristics and should this fail, the “European mode of settlement, war, follows.”129 Thus to Carnegie, the issue posed by the Venezuelan Question had two critical elements. First, while Britain and America were bound by racial ties, these same racial ties predisposed an attitude towards domination – racial proximity explained America’s willingness to conflict in the Western Hemisphere as much as it explained natural friendship with Britain. Second, America’s defense of Venezuela through arbitration was not merely an expression of defending geopolitical, but a precursor to removing war as a means to

127 Carnegie, “The Venezuelan Question,” 143–44.
128 Carnegie, 143–44.
129 Carnegie, 143–44.
settle conflict and replacing it with peaceful alternatives, as adjudicated by the United States, in the entirety of the Western Hemisphere.

The theories of Greater Britain and the role they play in creating a new vision for world order and empire have been examined at length by Duncan Bell.130 The Utopian ideas of racial expansion found their way into political circles, as Senator Albert Beveridge wrote in defense of imperialism during the Spanish-American War, “The founders of the nation were not provincial. Theirs was the geography of the world. They were soldiers as well as landmen, and they knew that where our ships should go our flag might follow. They had the logic of progress, and they knew that the republic they were planting must, in obedience to the laws of our expanding race, necessarily develop into the greater republic which the world beholds today, and into the still mightier republic which the world will finally acknowledge as the arbiter, under God, of the destinies of mankind.”131 The ontologically central issue was racial, and the interpretation of its vision by political leaders became further conflated by the twin issues of trade and security.

In his key work The Expansion of England, Seeley saw the growth of other peoples as creating a stark choice, arguing that, “I merely point out that two alternatives are before us, and that the question, incomparably the greatest question which we can discuss, refers to the choice between them.” These alternatives were the same the preoccupy other thinkers of the generation – that Britain will be eclipsed by the rise of vast continent sized unified polities. The ideas Seeley proposed driving this choice, population, settlement, and where on the globe the history of the English-speaking peoples would take place in the upcoming centuries, were the foundations of much of the world view embraced by Roosevelt and other political leaders years later. However, Seeley saw an alternative, continuing that “England may prove able to do what the United States does so easily, that is, hold together in federal union countries very remote from each other. In that case England will take rank with Russia and the United States in the first rank of state, measured by population and area, and in a higher rank than the states of the Continent.”132 This was to Seeley one of the most important functions of Federation.

The idea of a federation of the race did not emerge from a vacuum – to many the example of the United States already provided a model. Arguably, even the vision of federation

130 Bell, Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire; Bell, “Unity and Difference: John Robert Seeley and the Political Theology of International Relations”; Bell, Idea of Greater Britain Empire and the Future of World Order.
in the United States had the universalist aim to change the laws by which states operated.133 Jefferson saw no end to the expansive property of a federal republic, arguing in his 2nd inaugural address that, “the acquisition of Louisiana had been disapproved by some from a candid apprehension that the enlargement of our territory would endanger its union. But who can limit the extent to which the federative principle may operate effectively? The larger our association the less will it be shaken by local passions; and in any view is it not better that the opposite bank of the Mississippi should be settled by our own brethren and children than by strangers of another family?”134 The Jeffersonian Republican vision was itself an argument for a new world order of imperial scale.135 Indeed, as Bell argues, “the magnetic attractions of America – or at least the idea of America…offered the most pertinent example of a working federal polity, a dynamic country stretched over vast territorial expanse and governed by representative institutions. It was the obvious practical template for a federal Greater Britain.”136 As historians have pointed out, even during the time of the American Revolution, attempts for peace such as those proposed by the belated Carlisle Commission advocated for a confederal arrangement with the American colonies in many ways similar to that held by the Dominions over a century later.137 The influential Scottish-American industrialist Andrew Carnegie maintained that the founders of the United States preferred to remain part of the British state and that “these great men never ceased to proclaim their loyalty to, and their desire to remain part of, Britain; and they disclaimed any idea of separation, which was indeed accepted at last, but only when forced upon them as a sad necessity.”138 However, despite frequent attempts to encourage amity between Britain and America and famously flying a flag with the Union Jack on one side and the Stars and Stripes on the other, Andrew Carnegie was decidedly against Imperial Federation, particularly involving the United States. This tradition in fact extended significantly further into the past – indeed, the political thought of imperial federation hearkens back even earlier to the legacy of Rome and Greece, a constant and recurring presence in contemporary thought.139 Yet underlying all of this

133 Onuf and Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World.
139 Bell, Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire, 119.
in America and Britain by the late 19th century was race, and as with the earlier examples, a racial characterization that was fundamentally Germanic.

Similar thought also existed in the white settler colonies, though often like in the United States, the creation of the Anglo-Saxon was not necessarily impossible. George Parkin, the Canadian imperialist wrote regarding Anglo-Saxon expansion that “The flux of civilized population, by which new and great centres of human activity are created, has since that time been so overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon that nearly all minor currents are absorbed or assimilated by it. Teuton, Latin, Scandinavian, with one or two limited but well-defined exceptions, lose their identity and tend to disappear in the dominant mass of British population which has flowed, and continues in scarcely abated volume to flow, steadily away from the mother islands to occupy those temperate regions which are manifestly destined to become in an increasing degree centres of the world’s force.”\(^{140}\) Indeed, political leaders in the United States also noticed the same perceived trend – that the changing force in geopolitics was the spread of Anglo-Saxons across the globe into new centers of industry and power. However, to a political leader that saw this expansion as the source of power for the future, it would only be natural to expect that other nations and races would seek to obtain similar advantage.

It must be noted that all of these thinkers did not share identical views for either Greater Britain or the role that the United States would play in it. Goldwin Smith, for example, famously advocated arrangements bound more by less formal ties of morality than the more united polity viewed by Seeley. Freeman’s pragmatism prevented him from ever supporting Imperial Federation. This chapter does not aim to rehash these distinctions as they have already been examined extensively.\(^{141}\) It is worth noting that a few thinkers, notably Freeman and John Fiske, held a particularly Teutonic viewpoints that tended to run in parallel to racist angst about immigration that felt “the Teutonic greatness of the people was threatened by an influx of racial inferiors.”\(^{142}\) As Bell notes, both enjoyed popularity and influence in the United States, although their popularity declined with that of Teutonism during the turn of the century. The sense that a greatness of a people was threatened by an influx of immigrants was a recurring theme to political leaders, but significant divergences existed also regarding how America in particular could assimilate migrants – a concept further discussed in the fifth chapter.


\(^{141}\) Bell, Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire, 176.

\(^{142}\) Bell, 339.
A critical component that eventually influences the political actors was the notion that these ideas were not just designed to bring the race closer together, but that they were necessary extremes in the face of overwhelming external and at times existential pressure. This threat, at times from Germany, Russia, or even the United States, spurred agonizing over the future of the British Empire. How could Britain remain, as Seeley characterized, a “world-state” and not merely a regional actor that dwindled to insignificance? One of the answers was the aforementioned federation with the Dominions. This was, of course, not a universally held opinion. Freeman, notably argued that such an arrangement would serve but to antagonize the United States, instead envisioning a world resembling the aligned city-states of Ancient Greece rather than a federation modeled on either the United States or Germany. Moreover, Commonwealth theorists did not see the United States purely as a competitor – Freeman in particular favored an Anglo-American connection despite not favoring federation. Though American federation was seen as both a model and competitor, it was also “the great schism of the Anglo-Saxon race” and “The idea that the separation of the United States from Great Britain was a pure gain to either country or to the world may, however, be distinctly challenged.”

Numerous strains of intellectual thought fed into a contemporary conception of race, particularly as pertaining to Anglo-Saxonism. To Anderson, in examining Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations identifies the key strains were distilled to racial Darwinian, Teutonic origin, and theories of Imperial Federation. This has fortunately been developed with more nuance since – since his work was published, key developments in understanding contemporary thought, to include the role of role of race in imperialism and understanding theories of common citizenship have substantially advanced understanding of how race operated in contemporary discourse. Most importantly, these theories were not confined to intellectual or academic circles. Not only was the distinction between intellectual and public servant uniquely blurred during the period, political leaders on both continents read these theories. As early as 1852, long before his premiership, Benjamin Disraeli, notably ethnically Jewish, wrote that “Progress and reaction are but words to mystify the millions. They mean nothing, they are nothing, they are phrases and not facts. All is race. In the structure, the decay, and the development of the various families of man, the vicissitudes of history will find their main

146 Bell, “Beyond the Sovereign State: Isopolitan Citizenship, Race and Anglo-American Union.”
solution.” As race theories developed, political leaders engaged directly with theorists, developed their own views, and contributed to the broader discourse. Alfred Milner wrote regarding the notion of common citizenship in a document that was found published after his death “I find myself a citizen of the Empire. I feel that Canada is my country, Australia my country, New Zealand my country, just as much as Surrey or Yorkshire.” This imperial citizenship too was, of course, racial. Milner indeed noted that although the Empire lacked a “judicial” connection tying it together as a state, he argued “It is only a question of time when the expansion of the race will compel a new judicial conception, that of a common citizenship of all the countries which that race inhabits or controls.” This imperial citizenship, leading to a new judicial treatment of members of that citizenship, too was clearly racial, excluding other parts of the Empire not seen as Anglo-Saxon. To Milner, this was not just a matter of ambition but one of “practical necessity,” as he found no subdivision of the UK or the entire UK was was “no longer the power in the world which it once was, or in isolation, capably of remaining a power at all. It is no longer even self-supporting. But the British Dominions as a whole are not only self-supporting. They are more nearly self-sufficient than any other political entity in the world, that is, if they can be kept an entity, if their present loose and fragile organization can be made tenacious though elastic.” Race was therefore not merely the sense of commonality but a necessity to be acknowledged as necessary for survival. The political structure Milner envisioned for survival were themselves centered around race.

The views of these thinkers transcended the world of political thought into politics and governance. Chamberlain envisioned the future of the project decades before attempting to arrange an alliance with Germany or a rapprochement with the United States, as one where political unity was modelled on German unification, and wondered if there would ever be an “Anglo-Saxon unifactor whose greatness shall exceed the greatness of Bismarck or Cavour by as much as the field of his achievement shall exceed theirs” However even then, Chamberlain saw a distinction between this Anglo-Saxon federation and that already manufactured in Germany, yet in the end he found that this dream of unifying Britain and America into political union was unlikely as he found “The political notions and material interests of the different

149 Milner.
150 Milner.
151 Chamberlain, “A Dream of Anglo-Saxondom.”
branches of the race are too diverse to admit of consolidation under one government. But there is actually no reason apparent to the ordinary mind why, at some future time, there may not exist a great commercial and political Anglo-Saxon league – an offensive and defensive alliance to maintain Anglo-Saxon civilization against the world. Under the flag of this mighty confederation, the British kingdom and the American republic, joined by the sovereign commonwealths of Canada, Australia, and Africa, will work together in fulfilling such purposes of empire as the mind of man has never yet conceived.” Chamberlain thus even exceeded Milner, joining together the United States into his racial alliance, if not into his vision for racial political union – political alliance of the Anglo-Saxon states was necessary in the face of Germany precisely because political union was impossible.

This vision of Anglo-Saxon power exercised in the common interest also gained popularity not just with Chamberlain’s political allies but with elites on both sides of the Atlantic. The industrialist Andrew Carnegie, pushed the idea of Anglo-Saxon unity both in his publications and in private correspondence to William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, writing to McKinley in 1898, “Mr. President I have ventured to say that in supreme crises the racial element will be found most potent, and it is that that will control action.” In his writing on the matter, Carnegies argued that “In race – and there is a great deal in race – the American remains three-fourths purely British. The mixture of the German, which constitutes substantially all of the remainder, though not strictly British, is yet Germanic. The Briton of to-day is himself composed in large measure of the Germanic element, and German, Briton and American are all of the Teutonic race.” Carnegie simply saw this as further cause for amity between Britian and America, writing this in a piece dedicated to arguing that the political division between the two nations was an unfortunate tragedy. To Chamberlain, and in a point noticed by the American press, alignment with America was critical for the same utopian vision seen by Carnegie. He pronounced that their “cousins across the Atlantic” was joining Britain in a mission it was no longer capable of conducting alone, and that it was first and foremost necessary to “to draw closer the bonds which unite us to other members of the English-speaking race and to promote their co-operation in the great work of civilization, which appears to be the mission of the Anglo-Saxon race.” This mission was of course to Chamberlain identical to Empire – and he imagined the United States joining in the Empire’s continuation and defense. Tapping into

152 Chamberlain.
154 Carnegie, “A Look Ahead.”
George Dewey’s defense of Britain’s imperial policies as a benefit to civilization, Chamberlain argued that “it will not be longer the imperial policy of England alone, for all the nations that have sprung from our loins will share in the task which has hitherto fallen upon our shoulders alone.” Although seemingly incredible that the United States would join Britain in the defense of its empire for the sake of the English-speaking peoples, as later seen during the Roosevelt administration, this exact logic indeed crossed Atlantic, with the settler elements of the Empire having been seen as critical to the broader success of the English-speaking peoples.

In this vision, the members of the race were always “English-speaking” or “Anglo-Saxon” – while this transition from the latter to the former was important, it in either case excluded Germany and Teutonism. The result of this was that to British political leaders, especially to Arthur Balfour and Joseph Chamberlain, there prevailed an instinct in which alignment with Germany was always secondary to that with the United States. Germany, politically, remained distinct from this analysis. In sum, of the various options available for the future of history, ranging from formal federation among the English-speaking peoples, informal alignment including trade leagues, integration of the Dominions into the Empire with the exclusion of the United States, and perpetual peace involving Anglo-American alliance, the inclusion of Germany was problematically difficult – even more so than including the United States.

Some historians have famously attributed this to the failures of German diplomacy and the oft erratic overtures by German leadership. However, American political leaders simply did not share the same sympathy with Germany – investigating why is a key goal of this dissertation. If British leaders were forced to choose, they would choose America for reasons of both of strategic imperative and a predisposed motive stemming from racial ideologies. With the project of federation having receded, the question becomes whether – and why – America forced that choice. Certainly, these theorists were not preoccupied solely with the question of Germany, and most saw Germany as broadly compatible with Anglo-America. Political leaders in the United States, however, viewed this quite differently. In sum, of the various options available for the future of the English-speaking world, ranging from formal federation among, informal alignments including trade leagues, and integration of the Dominions into the Empire with the exclusion of the United States, the most obvious common ground became merely the agreement the English-speaking races had a future together.

156 “CHAMBERLAIN ON AMERICANS: British Statesman Rejoices at the New Departure of This Country.”
Race and Great Powers

Ultimately, these ideas of federation were created as a vision for the future not just to handle the problems of empire, but also in response to fears of racial eclipse. Nevertheless, the Darwinian element should not be exaggerated – particularly among theorists and historians, a wide range of motivations and ideologies spurred their thinking. Even if the ontology of their theories were consistently racial, the proposed solutions were not always centered on fears of either Russia or Germany. A key distinction between many of these thinkers and the visions of political leaders influenced by these theories was that but the political leaders remained committed to a paradigm of threat and security. Race and security concerns were inseparable. As Anderson correctly claims, “The Germans were seen as the enemies of the Anglo-Saxon countries, despite the theoretical racial affinity of all Teutonic peoples.”

However like the thinkers he examines, he struggles to explain why, instead choosing to claim that “In short, while Germany was clearly a powered to be reckoned with by the English-speaking countries, it was not the most serious challenger for racial preeminence and world domination. That distinction went to the Slav.” If this is the case, why the divergence with Germany? Was this divergence simply with all racial categories? Ultimately, the Slav was absolutely seen as a threat, but of more distant temporal proximity and of more questionable inevitability.

While the Slav was certainly seen as a threatening other, the more dangerous threat was from the race that could be seen by contemporaries as actually being vital enough to challenge their own. To Anglo-Saxonists, this could only be the Germans – at least in the near term. Certainly, Britain and the United States could also threaten each other – a possibility theorists were more open to than politicians and diplomats. The key question was in part population, both in quality and quantity, as Theodore Roosevelt writes to influential British diplomat and close friend Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, “The one ugly fact all over the world is the diminution of the birth rate among the highest races. It must be remembered, however, that Ireland has shown conclusively, as Italy still shows, that a very large birth rate may mean nothing whatever for a race; and looking at the English-speaking people I am confident that as yet any decadence is purely local.”

Rather easier to explain were American and British views towards France. While concern regarding the low French birthrate was prevalent in France itself, France was, of course, unavoidably a Power both in Europe and throughout the reach of her Empire. Nevertheless,

157 Anderson, Race and Rapprochement, 67.
158 Anderson, 68.
France’s power had been repeatedly curbed, and while having enjoyed a brief resurgence during the Crimean War, Napoleon III’s reign ended with France’s retreat from the United States in Mexico and her humiliating defeat at the hands of Bismarck’s Prussia. Combined with the lack of population growth in France, it simply could not threaten Britain or America in the future. This issue plagued Roosevelt for years. Dyer writes regarding the idea of ‘race suicide’ and Roosevelt that although initially “he had proclaimed the existence of a powerful and mighty American race which could triumph over all historical circumstances and all racial stocks…..he perceived the possibility of an impending racial disaster.”\textsuperscript{160} Although Dyer does not discuss the actions taken by the United States during this period in detail nor Roosevelt’s thinking as regards Germany excepting brief mention, he is correct in identifying one of his fundamental fears.

The issue of population – and a particularly male centered perception of vitality – was central to whether a nation continued to have relevance in the future. This concern was not limited to the Americas, and as James Froude discussed regarding his concerns in \textit{Oceana}, population growth and expansion were critical to remaining relevant in European politics. However, he found that while “Germans, Russians, Americans were adding yearly to their numbers, and they had boundless territory in which millions could mature into wholesome manhood” population growth in England alone was a disadvantage as England was “already full to overflowing.”\textsuperscript{161} This led him to concluded that since population expansion was critical to influence, to avoid fading into “a second Holland,” England’s solution must be that “she had her colonies, and in her colonies she had soil, air, climate, all she needed to eclipse every rival that envied her.”\textsuperscript{162} Thus, the settler colonies were the key to maintaining maintenance of British power.

Roosevelt frequently expressed similar angst at the changing population demographics of Europe and America, often seeing colonial enterprises as the source of salvation, writing that “The diminishing rate of increase of the population is of course the feature fraught with most evil….Probably some time in the Twentieth Century the English-speaking peoples will become stationary, whereas the Slavs as yet show no signs of this tendency, and though they may show it, and doubtless will in the next century, it certainly seems as if they would beat us in the warfare of the cradle.” This ‘warfare of the cradle’ cast both a positive light on the expansion of Anglo-Saxon settler colonies and colored any expansion, even imagined, by rivals as of paramount concern. As he continued, “However, there are still great waste spaces which the English-

\textsuperscript{161} James Anthony Froude, \textit{Oceana, or, England and Her Colonies} (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1886), 201.
\textsuperscript{162} Froude, 201.
speaking peoples undoubtedly have the vigor to fill. America north of the Rio Grande, and Australia, and perhaps Africa south of the Zambesi, all possess a comparatively dense civilized population, English in law, tongue, government and culture, and with English the dominant strain in the blood. When the population becomes stationary I shall myself feel that evil days are probably at hand; but we need to remember that extreme fecundity does not itself imply any quality of social greatness. That numbers alone did not guarantee racial strength was key; simply being out-populated was not the sole source of threat. This was not just a source of angst regarding outcompeting external rivalry, but as shall be seen in the fifth chapter, a perpetual worry of increasing internal racial weakness and therefore of relative decline.

From a geopolitical standpoint, this helps explain a key question – how did Germany end up on the other side of the racial divide? The answers constructed by Horsman, Anderson, Dyer, and others correctly posit that Germanic and Anglo-Saxon narratives were intertwined yet fail to understand that to key leaders they had divided. Although intellectually Anglo-Saxon and German remained nearly synonymous in the earlier years, by the first decade of the 20th century, there is a clear break. Here, examining the writings of political figures reveals an unfortunate conflation of perception and reality. Indeed, these racial categorizations appear to diverge completely by the late 1890s. The key to parsing this division may be have originated with the biological nature of the assemblage and the rise of Darwin, Lamarck, and others to scientific prominence making competition needlessly absolute and zero-sum. The comparison to the natural world happened throughout this era, not just in competition but even in the hope of racial resurgence; Roosevelt wrote to Arthur Balfour regarding decadence, decline, and immigration, “It is hopeful of course to think how peoples to revive now and then; peoples doubtless partly the same in blood as those that fell, and at least with the ancestral inheritance of language, of culture…..The intrusion of an alien race into another civilization, its growth and supremacy and dying away, is if course curiously paralleled by what we see in the animal world, and the parallel is complete in at least one point – that is, in the fact that in each case the causes may be shrouded in absolute darkness.” Political leaders thus created an artificial convergence between biological competition and social competition, naturally in their minds, centered on the state.

164 This is discussed in detail in Chapter Five
There is no doubt that various key figures indeed envisaged some form of threat from Russia. The specter of the Slav populating the world indeed did figure into the world view of various important politicians. However, two key factors prevented this from significantly influencing either the Anglo-American alignment or any antagonism with Germany. Indeed, for much of the period, fears centered on an eventual German-Russian alliance providing both powers with free reign. The first of these were the aforementioned civilizational differences. While certainly not as extreme as that between, for example, Japan and Britain, the Russian civilization was seen as less advanced – even if catching up rapidly. While Russia was seen to eventually become a threat of massive scale, particularly should Russia be allowed to occupy the straits or dominate China, it was a threat that would materialize at some indeterminate later time. Meanwhile German power, whether to merely menace or to challenge, was immediate, pressing, and unquestionable.

Well before he became the Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt already contemplated that a conflict with Germany might even be to be desired, writing that, “Frankly, I don’t know that I should be sorry to see a bit of a spar with Germany; the burning of New York and a few other seacoast cities would be a good object lesson on the need of an adequate system of coast defences; and I think it would have a good effect on our large German population to force them to an ostentatiously patriotic display of anger against Germany.” Admittedly, as becomes evident in an analysis German immigration to the United States, Roosevelt was constantly preoccupied with what he perceived as political obstructionism from German immigrants – but eventually saw German immigration to the United States as necessary. Nevertheless, he was willing to seek hostility with the German state for the purpose of forging loyalty – and therefore racial unity – among German immigrants, which in his mind would bring them to his world view. Ultimately, the extensive writings regarding Russia, examined in a later chapter, tended to come to a singular conclusion – the threat from Russia was too distant to be of immediate concern. That there was indeed a threat was unquestionable and Roosevelt wrote as early as 1897 that “Now, about the Russians, who offer a very much more serious problem than the Germans, if not to our generation, at least to the generations which will succeed us. Russia and the United States are friendly, but Russians and Americans, in their individual capacity, have nothing whatever in common.” Roosevelt continued that he thought the British looked upon Russia as he believed Russia desired to be seen by the other powers, as “huge, powerful

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166 This is the main topic of Chapter Four
barbarians, cynically confident that they will in the end inherit the fruits of our civilization, firmly believing that the future belongs to them.” 169 However, Roosevelt did not feel the as Spring-Rice particularly regarding the inevitability of Russian power and argued that “I look upon them as a people to whom we can give points, and a beating; a people with a great future, as we have; but a people with poisons working in it, as other poisons, of similar character on the whole, work in us.” 170 It was already clear to Roosevelt that the racial strengths and weaknesses of the Russians were not the same. The fear of the Russian overrunning the peoples of ‘European blood’ appeared superficially prevalent, even at this time perhaps more so than the Germans – though with the key caveat that this could be a problem to the “generations which will succeed us.” Moreover, this idea that a people might have “poisons” of various kinds – became key to the way his view on race develops and becomes one in which traits can develop but also by virtue of being racial, be inherited. He continued regarding competition with the English-speaking peoples, however:

Well, there is a certain justification for your view, but the people who have least to fear from the Russians are the people who can speak English. They may overrun the continent of Europe, but they cannot touch your people or mine, unless perhaps in India. There is no such difference between them and us as there was between the Goths and Byzantines, it will be many a long year before we lose our capacity to layout those Goths. They are below the Germans just as the Germans are below us; the space between the German and the Russian may be greater than that between the Englishman and the German, but that is all. 171

This fear was again one that occurs in the far future and only once Russia advanced sufficiently to be considered at that top echelon of the hierarchy, if it even ever reached that point. The concept of advancement, at this time with the English-speaking races featuring higher than the German and the Russian, was key to whether American and Britain could still “lay out” challengers as if like the Goths. Underpinning this all for Roosevelt was a Whiggish theory of history that claimed that “We are all treading the same path, some faster, some slower; and though the Russian started far behind, yet he has traveled that path very much farther and faster since the days of Ivan the Terrible than our people have traveled it since the days of Elizabeth. He is several centuries behind us still, but he was a thousand years behind us then.” 172 Clearly the pace of progress was significant, and contemporary figures noticed that Russian advancement had perhaps accelerated. Nevertheless, Roosevelt continued to struggle in balancing the fears of

the Russian Slav with, in his mind, the ever persistent threat of German aggression, continuing to write in one of his most revealing letters:

I am by no means sure that I heartily respect the little Kaiser, but in his colonial plans I think he is entirely right from the standpoint of the German race. International law, and above all interracial law, are still in a fluid condition, and two nations with violently conflicting interests may each be entirely right from its own standpoint.173

This was one of the most important concepts Roosevelt developed over the years. The idea that interracial law exists itself was a challenge to the prevailing norms of behavior between the Great Powers – and one embraced by contemporary figures including Andrew Carnegie, Joseph Chamberlain, Alfred Milner, and others. Roosevelt envisioned a future in which the dominant world order and the primary means of geopolitics would take place not between nations but between races. The difficulty of conceptualizing the world in race but dealing with nations is one that contemporary figures wrestled with extensively, as will be seen in the third chapter regarding the British leadership during the Boer War. Fundamentally, it justified actions on the world stage according to the logic of race, as Roosevelt continued:

If I were a German I should want the German race to expand. I should be glad to see it begin to expand in the only two places left for the ethnic, as distinguished from the political, expansion of the European peoples; that is, in South Africa and temperate South America. Therefore, as a German I should be delighted to upset the English in South Africa, and to defy the Americans and their Monroe Doctrine in South America.

This distinction between ethnic and political expansion featured heavily in the remainder of Roosevelt’s analysis regarding the role of race and laid the groundwork for his understanding of his “interracial law.” German challenge in these theaters was threatening, but also perfectly logical and understandable. Given the challenge, the logic of the response by Britain in South Africa and the United States in the Western Hemisphere was similarly clear:

As an Englishman, I should seize the first opportunity to crush the German Navy and the German commercial marine out of existence, and take possession of both the German and Portuguese possessions in South Africa, leaving the Boers absolutely isolated. As an American I should advocate – and as a matter of fact do advocate – keeping our Navy at a pitch that will enable us to interfere promptly if Germany ventures to touch a foot of American soil.174

Here then, at least in the period before the Presidency and the Spanish American War and many of his latter claims to fame, was Roosevelt’s view on Germany, from the standpoint of race. Not only was the German race, due to conflation perhaps with the German state, entirely distinct

from the Anglo-Saxon, Roosevelt viewed it as nearly inevitable that a rational thinking German would challenge the established interests, as he saw it, of the Anglo-Saxon people. Moreover, unlike the fear of the Russians, which had been mere decades away for decades, this fear existed in the immediate calculus of great power relations. A conflict between the Anglo-Saxon and the German was not just expected, it was justified — and even welcome. Yet this took place just a year between the famous attempt at the Anglo-German alliance, suggesting that Roosevelt and his British counterparts diverged dramatically on expectation.

Of course, while other contemporaries that were key in the policies of at least two Presidential administrations clearly agreed with Roosevelt, such as Elihu Root and Henry Cabot Lodge, people in private enterprise such as Andrew Carnegie, and even influential military thinkers like Mahan, aligned strongly with this racial thought as well. Indeed, Mahan advocated for an Anglo-American Alliance early, concluding with a colleague in the Royal Navy, that “What is coming in the near future, who can tell? But will anybody deny that an alliance such as is advocated here would do much to insure the continued peace and prosperity, not only of the Anglo-Saxon race, but of the entire civilized world.” 175 While race was thus an explicit explanatory element to some, for others such as John Hay it seems a more implicit influence. An archival examination of the correspondence of John Hay revealed the expected consummate diplomat, who served four Presidents form Lincoln to Roosevelt with distinction. Unquestionably, Hay expressed long-standing affinity for closer relations with the United Kingdom and his generally anti-German preferences. Indeed, his feeling that Britain and America shared a common people was in some ways so ingrained as to never be questioned — however during these crises, it also meant it was rarely articulated. Nevertheless, even Hay does at times express thoughts on the matter, largely surrounding his mistrust of German-Americans. However, my archival research did not reveal the strength of opinion on the matter as suggested in either Anderson’s book or Thayer’s collection of letters. 176 This also appears to hold true for McKinley, whose papers suggest that he did not like to put much of substance on the topic in private correspondence whatsoever — however archival limitations with the nature and timing of


176 William Roscoe Thayer, Life and Letters of John Hay, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915); William Roscoe Thayer, Life and Letters of John Hay, vol. 2, 2 vols. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915) Note: This work has been cited on occasion in the research, but generally with caution. Published in 1915, Thayer’s collection of letters, and accompanying analysis and commentary, is better served as a window into anti-German sentiment following the start of the First World War rather than an objective analysis of Hay’s views. Indeed, Thayer even argued that historians will eventually uncover evidence of German conspiracy to manipulate German-Americans and claimed that Hay too saw this conspiracy, despite admitting he could find little evidence of it yet.
the papers preserved may have been an obstacle and this might be an issue that warrants future re-examination.

After around 1900 the racial divide becomes clearer and more pervasive. Arguably even before that time, among many both in policymaking and among intellectuals, there was a tendency to group America and Britain closer, at the expense of Germany. While Anglo-Saxon and Teuton could be subsets of each other and could be nearly synonymous, there were subtle differences particularly surrounding the common language meaning that if the question was ever forced, the division would place Britain and America on one side and Germany on the other. Indeed, while they were clearly once synonymous, particularly in the first half of the 19th century, they became distinct in the face of rising German power. However, did rising power alone cause the divide? Logically, such an explanation, although offered by historians of German power in the American continent, is unsatisfying. British power too spanned the American continent.

Among leading influential intellectuals, this question was not necessarily exclusionary. It would be possible to adhere to ideas of common racial stock, and especially in an immigrant community like in the United States, see little conflict between Anglo-Saxons and Teutons. However, to individuals dealing with questions of foreign policy, Teutons as a race were not solely represented by this immigrant population in the United States, but also immigrant populations elsewhere in the world, and most importantly, represented by an increasingly powerful European state in the German Empire. Similarly, both the United States and the United Kingdom themselves represented their respective branches of the Anglo-Saxon people through massively powerful states and empires. Competition was a matter of survival that drove visions of the future and ideals of civilization. Here, even the slightest questions of differences in race became important.

However, there is an unexplained tension between racial Darwinian thought and the popular notions of Teutonism, which perhaps helps explain why even in its racial origins, proponents of Imperial Federation did not envision their federation ever encompassing Germany in any form. Despite the popularity of Teutonic origins, the common element that underscored all of the visions of race and its importance to imperial and foreign policy was that of competition, understood in terms of ‘fitness’ derived and distorted from the natural sciences of evolution. Races that could not successfully compete would stagnate, wither, and perish. This was a future that could also happen to Britain and America. While the common Teutonic origins led to many seeing Germany as equally vital – though certainly despite roots not having had identical institutions or patterns of expansion – it was clear that a triumph for Germany at
the expense of Britain or America was not a triumph for Anglo-Saxons. To these leaders, Anglo-Saxons, independently, needed to thrive and populate the world for political leaders in America and Britain to consider it a triumph for the race.

By the late 19th century, a form of Teutonomania, centered on the idea that the most vital races of the world were of Teutonic origin, enamored thinkers in both the United States and the United Kingdom. Indeed, an obsession with all things German extended to both sides of the Atlantic, finally receding gradually over the first decade of the 20th century and dealt a death blow by the First World War – although many elements of Teutonism indeed faded much earlier. However, this distinction is not one that excludes admiration of Germany but one that requires both admiration and antagonism. Moreover, the affinity and obsession with German education and its accompanying Teutonomania did not necessarily influence American politicians as it did academics. Indeed, Roosevelt notably complains regarding his alma mater that “I think President Eliot’s attitude in some respects a very unfortunate one for the College. His opposition to athletics and his efforts to Germanize the methods of teaching work real harm. The main product we want to turn out of our colleges is men. Incidentally let them be professors, chemists, writers, anything you please, but let them be men first of all, and they can’t be turned out if we don’t have the instructors themselves men, and not bloodless students merely.” Roosevelt’s continued linking of racial vitality with masculinity with the future of American society thus led him to view certain German intellectual traditions as damaging.

This possibly correlated with an increase in the significance of the cultural element of the assemblage and its increased conflation with the biological. Particularly in the United States, Anglo-Saxons could be forged, whether or not they were of Teutonic origin. In places, what is already a white supremacist ideology becomes explicitly more so – in the end, non-whites certainly could not become Anglo-Saxon. Yet perhaps to some of these elites, the various immigrant populations from Europe could. However, this was not without fear that this might dilute the racial origins of the Anglo-Saxons. Of course, this did not hold true for every figure at the time. Both Joseph Chamberlain and Cecil Rhodes tended to often favor Germany in their imperial policies, at the least so long as it did not interfere with British imperial policies. The Rhodes Scholarship, Rhodes’ investment in German colonial empire, and Chamberlains numerous attempts to negotiate an alliance with Germany as late as 1898 suggest both a strategic

178 Bell, Idea of Greater Britain Empire and the Future of World Order, 46.
and racial affinity, though as discussed earlier, even to Chamberlain the racial affinity between German and the English-speaking peoples had clear limits.

Part of this was explained by a simple power calculus, albeit one with elements of long-standing American dreams of expansion. Roosevelt wrote in 1897 regarding the threat from European powers that “We should acquire the Danish Islands, and by turning Spain out should serve notice that no strong European power, and especially not Germany, should be allowed to gain a foothold by supplanting some weak European power. I do not fear England; Canada, is a hostage for her good behavior; but I do fear some of the other powers.” On this Roosevelt was undoubtedly correct. Britain could not any longer hope to defend Canada against the United States, no matter what Britain’s capacity in other theaters may be. However, Britain during this time had extant imperial interests throughout the Caribbean and the Americas – unlike Germany. Yet still in 1897 he found that Germany was the most probable adversary, arguing “I entirely agree with You that Germany is the Power with which we may very possibly have ultimately to come into hostile contact. How I wish our people would wake up to the need for a big navy!” as justification for his constant desire to expand the US Navy. Thus, these visions for the future were not just dreams of a utopia, but fears of an apocalypse, the latter of which centered on the races of Europe explicitly other than those of the English-speaking peoples.

By the turn of the century then, the question of racial divisions between Anglo-Saxon and Teuton can be seen to have three very important consequences. The first, of course, was that the United States and Britain were seen as not entirely foreign peoples when compared to the other nations of Europe, including – if only marginally – Germany. Second, was that because of the closeness between Anglo-Saxon and Teuton, it was the Germans that were seen as the most similar and most dynamic. Many contemporary theorists did not necessarily view the English-speaking world as isolated from Germany, including it often not just in the same racial hierarchical position, but often even viewing a common Teutonic origin. This resulted in the minds of some leaders a transition from Anglo-Saxonism to trying to conceptualize the English-speaking races. Although most of Roosevelt’s writing at this time embraced the idea of an Anglo-Saxon race, he began switching to the idea of an English-speaking people at least during the Venezuela crisis, arguing in a speech that “The sentimentalism that says we are of one people is false. We all belong to English-speaking peoples, but we differ by blood. We contain

180 Theodore Roosevelt to Bowman Hendry McCalla, 3 August 1897. I:636.
strains of English, Irish, Dutch, and other bloods – but these become valuable only when they cease to retain their originality and become parts of American blood.” This formed the core of Roosevelt’s support for Cleveland and his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.

Unlike the other great powers of Europe, Germany could not easily be relegated to a respectively less advanced or less dynamic racial category. The eventual shift – clearest after the Boer War – was one centered on a perception of competition governed by racial ideology. While this allowed elites to view those other countries as foreign and potential rivals, in the end, they also adopted similar attitudes towards a far more dangerous Germany. The fusion of traditional security threats experienced by leaders in positions of power with the ideological prognostications of racial theories created a uniquely dangerous situation. The lessons are manifest in the 20th century. The fears of a state became one with the fears of a people. The consequences were not just the creation of an alliance structure and hostility among the most powerful nations, but the erosion of the concept of the state itself. Race created compelling rationale for geopolitical action by the state and a lends through which to understand, however erroneously, the behavior of other powers. Britain and especially the United States viewed the slightest encroachment by Germany with undue terror.

Chapter Two - The Leap of the Panther in the Western Hemisphere

“I feel most we should above all things beware of letting a foolish hatred of England blind us to our own honor and interest. Nothing is worse for a country than to shape its policy with the desire of either gratifying or irritating another country, the latter quite as much as the former. Germany, and not England, is the power with whom we are most apt to have trouble over the Monroe Doctrine.”  

The literature of Rapprochement frequently turns to Venezuela and the Spanish-American War as the source of amity, whether racial or otherwise, between Britain and the United States. Moreover, the two Venezuela crises and the Spanish-American War, in conjunction with a range of other issues such as the canal, formed the foundation of American fears towards Germany, both racial and geopolitical. In conjunction with these explanations, however, there is the issue of how these powers saw threat from other powers. The question attempted here is not “why the Spanish-American War happened” or “why America intervened in Cuba” or even an attempt to explain the origins of American Empire. It is instead an attempt to address why fear of continental, mainly German, intervention or interference in the peace influenced how America thought of the war. These issues were in transition and while it was mere months immediately preceding the event that several key figures correspond in terms of long-term threats to the perceived English-speaking race, as discussed in the previous chapter, it was during this time that they began to blend racial theories with diplomatic realities. By the end of the conflict, American leaders in particular would see ample evidence for three themes – Anglo-Saxon unity, German political obstruction to this unity, and most importantly, German encroachment on the Western Hemisphere. Consequently, this chapter is largely concerned with the Spanish-American War, but will conclude with a discussion of the two Venezuela Crises.

Although the transatlantic discourse on race motivated discussion of Anglo-American unity by 1895, diplomatically, the United States remained isolated. Despite its diplomatic and military weakness, it had emerged as an economic colossus – notably the world’s largest by the end of the century. The United States defended its perceived hegemony of the Western Hemisphere, long enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine, as being threatened by re-energized European Imperialism. The centrality of the Monroe Doctrine as a framing mechanism throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries American Imperialism has of course been examined

before by historians, though not with a focus on race. In 1895, a boundary dispute between British Guyana and Venezuela threatened to spark a British intervention in South America, an eventuality which the United States viewed as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The Cleveland administration successfully negotiated a resolution in which the British government agreed to an American led Commission to arbitrate the dispute. The Boundary Commission eventually, with little reasoning given, awarded the vast majority of the disputed territory to Britain. However, most parties viewed this incident for years as Britain conceding to American primacy in the Western Hemisphere. Seen as a critical and watershed moment by historians of the Rapprochement, the event has also been examined for its Anglo-Saxon racial ties by some scholars. The racial issues present during this conflict were more the positive construction of Anglo-Saxonism—with no easily discernable break between English-speaking and German. Nevertheless, the incident was referred back to as a symbol of racial cooperation for years.

The crisis, eventually, was viewed as evidence of potential British friendliness and kinship, finally starting to end hostility with Great Britain. However, the preeminent factor in American foreign policy remained the Monroe Doctrine. American leaders continued to view other European powers, and at times even Britain, with continued suspicion involving the Western Hemisphere. The American intervention in the Anglo-Venezuelan border dispute sharpened in American minds the notion that European powers would continue to seek to establish imperial control over regions of the North or South American continents while simultaneously alerting European powers to a United States with dramatically increased capacity to interpret the Monroe Doctrine as it saw fit. This fear that European powers would expand into the Western Hemisphere was at the foundation of Roosevelt’s concerns. As late as February 1898, with tensions mounting over Cuba, Roosevelt still insisted “that of all the nations of Europe it seems to me Germany is by far the most hostile with us. With Russia I don’t believe we are in any danger of coming into hostile contact; but with Germany, under the Kaiser, we may at any time have trouble if she seeks to acquire territory in South America.” The oldest European imperial power in the Americas, however, long preceded not just the Monroe Doctrine, but the existence of the United States itself.

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184 The Commission consisted of five members, two members representing Britain but selected by the British Government, two members representing Venezuela but chosen by the US Supreme Court, and a fifth member that was in theory chosen by Venezuela, but as was expected the Venezuelan choice was not Venezuelan, but instead the Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court.
Perceptions of Savagery and Unity

Spanish rule over Cuba and Puerto Rico was the last bastion of a transatlantic empire that once spanned the Americas. Having lost all her remaining other possessions by 1833, Spain clung to Cuba despite the Ten Years War from 1868-1878 and the Little War from 1879-1880. The Cuban independence hero José Martí established outposts in the Florida, unifying emigre opinions around Cuban independence, and despite his death in 1895 during the Battle of Dos Rios, the Cuban War of Independence that he helped launch continued unabated. After continued failure to quell the uprisings, the Spanish government appointed the now-infamous Valeriano Weyler as governor of Cuba in 1896. Weyler’s use of ‘reconcentration’ to fight guerilla rebels – dividing Cuba into safe zones he could protect and those he could not and moving hundreds of thousands of civilians accordingly – provided those in the United States who were interested in war, most famously the papers of Hearst and Pulitzer, with an opportunity to galvanize the public.

This act prompted much discussion regarding the role race played in Spanish governance as opposed to imperial rule by other races, most notably those of the English-speaking nations. Primarily, this discourse centered on two themes: the savagery of the Latin peoples, evidenced not just in Cuba but even in Spain itself, and the imperial role the Anglo-Saxons could play in ‘civilizing’ the races on the other side of the color line, most notably, by the Philippine-American War. Indeed, even starting in the late 16th century, contemporary historians and propaganda alike had helped construct then notion of the Spanish Black Legend, itself closely tied to discourses on race.186 Jose Marti himself criticized this vision of Anglo-Saxonism, viewing it and its treatment of black people and native Americans as evidence that it would be nothing but a danger to Cuba and formerly Spanish America.187 While historians have indeed assessed the role of race in imperial construction in great detail – and repeating it is not intended here – it also played a role in relations between the Powers, as seen by the contemporary political leadership.

There were several components to the views of Latin inferiority, including preconceived notions that predate the war itself. Henry Cabot Lodge, during a visit by the Senator to Madrid in 1895, wrote to Theodore Roosevelt that the people “are beaten, broken and out of the race and are proud and know it. They depress and repel me like their landscape.”188 Later on in the

187 Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, 106.
trip, he continued, writing to Edith Carow Roosevelt after describing the brutality of bull fights that he witnessed, “It is the last remnant of Rome surviving in an age where it has no place. The Spaniards love it. It is about all they are fit for and if the world were suddenly put back 400 years the Spaniard is the only person who would find himself at home. He would not do in the Roman time for the Roman if bloody could also fight and govern and the Spaniard nowadays can do neither. I have a terrible suspicion I wrote all of this to Theodore before.”

This perception that the Latins were comparatively backwards continued directly through the war. Roosevelt writes to a German correspondent in 1899 that, “Do you think that you are the best hated nation? Sometimes I think we are, and sometimes I think England is. But thank Heaven! you and I both belong to nations with a great future; whereas, the Latin races must hereafter dwell mostly in the past.” The importance of these differences to Roosevelt cannot be underestimated – it was the very core of why American and British colonialism were justifiable or even necessary – a theme that re-emerged during the Russo-Japanese War. As Michael Patrick Cullinane rightly argues, “imperialism was a means of survival for Roosevelt. According to his neo-Lamarckian idea of acquired and inherited traits, TR admired certain qualities that he believed could be passed on to future generations and prolong civilization’s survival.”

Thus, both Cullinane and Kramer are correct with their argument that colonialism in the Philippines was closely intertwined with race. However, as this chapter argues, these ideas feature also in competition with the closest of the other powers.

There is of course, a range of extremely complex race and gender issues underlying the color line and its role in empire, but as Kramer puts it, “The decisiveness of the land battles and the crushing superiority of the U.S. Navy had demonstrated America’s Anglo-Saxon vigor and manhood, particularly when contrasted with the decadent, feminized, Latin, Spanish empire against which so much British Anglo-Saxonism had been forged.” Although most of this chapter does not address Roosevelt’s correspondence from the time he is in Cuba, as most of it was less concerned with geopolitics than with the character of the men serving under his command, it unquestionably impacted his view on race. Amy Kaplan has written extensively on the matter, and correctly argues, “It would be historically inaccurate and theoretically simplistic

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Sons, 1925), 187 Note: Unlike many similar collections, this one was edited by one of the authors: Henry Cabot Lodge.

189 Henry Cabot Lodge to Edith Roosevelt, 23 October 1895. Lodge, 1:194.
190 Gustav Adolf Von Gotzen: an attaché in Washington 1896-1898. He also was an observer attached to Theodore Roosevelt during the war in Cuba. He remained a close correspondent with Roosevelt.
to collapse the relations of the imperial United States to Filipinos, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Hawaiians, and African Americans into a monolithic model of colonized and colonizer.”

Indeed, it must be noted that there was absolutely not a monolithic opinion on the matter, even among prominent Anglo-Saxonists. Most notably, Andrew Carnegie vigorously opposed American annexation of and colonialism in the Philippines, instead advocating that the islands be placed under the protection of something akin to the Monroe Doctrine to keep out other powers, but to refrain from active colonization. Carnegie believed that the “Filipinos” had been willing to fight for independence, and as a consequence, had earned an attempt at self-governance—a project they and all races, including the English-speaking race, could only achieve through repeated failure. Crucially, Carnegie argued for a vision of history in which, “No superior race ever gave it to an inferior without settling and merging in that race—the two becoming one. In the Philippines, and in the tropics generally, this is impossible. The intruding race cannot be grown there, and where we cannot grow our own race we cannot evolve civilization for the other. We can only retard, not hasten, their development.” This presented a somewhat different vision of history than that held by Roosevelt, Spring-Rice, and Lodge—but it agreed on the importance of ‘growing’ the English-speaking race. Settler colonies were still paramount, and Carnegie could not envision the Philippines as a settler colony. Nevertheless, it is not on this debate, whether the Anglo-Saxon race had a responsibility to colonize and bring ‘civilization’ to the Philippines alone on which the decision to seize the islands lay.

After the outbreak of the conflict, numerous individuals on both sides of the Atlantic expressed that the new found amity between Britain and the United States as branches of the Anglo-Saxon race would be among the greatest consequences of the war. As Anderson argues, many Americans and Britons viewed the conflict as one “pitting the robust civilization of the Anglo-Saxon United States against the decadent semicivilization of Spain.” Although he argues that the Spanish-American war was the apex of Anglo-Saxonism, it was rather the beginning of its role in geopolitics. Chamberlain and Balfour in Britain had long been proponents of closer relations with the United States, and ever since Venezuela, Balfour had argued in favor of a “pan-Anglo Saxon cause” and viewed a potential conflict with the United

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199 Anderson, Race and Rapprochement, 118.
States with horror. Shortly after the war began, Chamberlain proposed in a speech in Birmingham, reportedly to cheering crowds, that Britain’s priority was “to maintain bonds of permanent amity with our kinsman across the Atlantic,” noting that “They speak our language, they are bred of our race. (Loud cheers.)” Not only did he conclude that maintaining this racial amity was Britain’s “next duty,” he judged it to the closer the relations between Britain and America, the better it would be for the future of the world. Indeed, the war with Spain was itself was part of this vision. Chamberlain argued that “terrible as war may be, even war itself would be cheaply purchased if in a great and noble cause the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together (loud and prolonged cheers) over an Anglo-Saxon alliance.” War with an external power, in this case Spain, was an opportunity. Without doubt, the Spanish-American war, and the British response, spurred public goodwill within the United States to Britain, and vice versa, although overt claims of Anglo-Saxonism of the kind made by Chamberlain sparked distrust among other immigrant populations in the US and among those who feared that such directness would in fact be counterproductive. Roosevelt and his cohort generally welcomed Chamberlain’s world view. This of course is not to suggest that the United States would suddenly view Great Britain as a friend – Anglophobia remained strong, as did Anglo-Saxonist Anglomania. With respect to how race impacted the British or American views of Germany and their respective roles in the future of world of order, its influence was just beginning.

Although this issue certainly was of great significance, particularly in establishing the role of white supremacy in the creation of American empire, concerns regarding Germany and fears of a racial “Greater Germany” drove geopolitical decisions from another angle. A weak Cuba was an obvious prize to stronger European powers and the United States. Roosevelt wrote comparing the situation to the sale of Louisiana to the United States under Jefferson, “the principle which our statesmen then announced was in kind precisely the same as that upon which we should now act if Germany sought to acquire Cuba from Spain, or St. Thomas from the Danes.” When a weaker European power ceded authority over territory in the Western Hemisphere, the worst case result to Roosevelt was if a European power increasing in strength were to instead obtain control over that territory rather than the United States.

200 Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy, 118.
201 Joseph Chamberlain, “Mr. Chamberlain In Birmingham,” The Times, May 14, 1898, 12.
202 Chamberlain, 12.
203 Anderson, Race and Rapprochement, 194.
204 Tuffnell, “Uncle Sam Is to Be Sacrificed,” 91.
205 Covered in detail in Chapter 5
In the United States, public perception of the Cuban War of Independence nearly universally favored Cuba. Theodore Roosevelt advocated intervention in Cuba as early as 1896, writing during the Venezuela crisis that, “I wish our people would really interfere in Cuba; but the President (who by the way has just written me a rather long letter, for no particular reason) shies off from anything except Venezuela. We ought to drive the Spaniards out of Cuba; and it would be a good thing, in more ways than one, to do it.”\(^{207}\) Although support for Spain was practically nonexistent in the United States, the choice to intervene was significantly more controversial. European powers instead saw American intervention as likely; although a range of ideologies influenced the direction in which countries aligned their interests – from conservatism, monarchism, to even suspicions about Protestantism as against Catholicism – the European powers nearly unanimously supported the Spanish position. European reaction to American involvement in the Cuba crisis was decidedly negative. These reactions are largely documented by other historians.\(^{208}\) The notable exception, of course, was the United Kingdom.

In what would later be looked on, along with the first Venezuela crisis, as the start of true rapprochement between the United Kingdom and the United States, British diplomacy remained consistently friendly to the United States throughout the course of the war. During the Spanish American War, however, Germany diplomacy recognized the importance a pan-European approach to both the potential conflict and trade, petitioning several times for the formation of a “continental European economic union to promote common interests that were perceived to be under assault from aggressive American or ‘Anglo-Saxon’ expansionism.”\(^{209}\) This approach continued into the negotiations with Spain, where the Kaiser’s advisers, including Bülow, Eulenburg, and von Holstein, agreed that Germany should be seen to stand with the rest of Europe in attempting to prevent American intervention.

Indeed, contemporary documents suggests that Germany diplomacy at least in part succeeded, drawing even Britain into a multilateral proposal signed by representatives from Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Italy for a de-escalation form violence.\(^{210}\) McKinley promptly reacted of course by replying “The Government of the United States appreciates the humanitarian and disinterested character of the communication now made on behalf of the Powers named, and for its part is confident that equal appreciation will be


\(^{208}\) For detailed assessment of various European reactions, to include by Spanish republicans and the press in France, Britain, Russia, and Germany, see: Sylvia L. Hilton and Steve Ickringill, eds., *European Perception of the Spanish-American War of 1898* (Bern; New York: Peter Lang, 1999).

\(^{209}\) Hilton and Ickringill, 16.

\(^{210}\) William McKinley, 6 April 1898. *William McKinley Correspondence Received*, MSS32268, Library of Congress.
shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty to humanity by ending a
situation, the indefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable.”

British participation on this was effort was led by Pauncefote, despite doubts by Balfour as evidenced by his writing
to Chamberlain, “I confess to be in great perplexity. The representatives of the Powers at
Washington and the Austrian Ambassador in London appear to wish us to give the United States
a lecture in international morality. If Pauncefote had not associated himself with the policy, I
confess I should have rejected it at once.” Chamberlain promptly telegraphed in reply,
correctly predicting the response in Washington, that “Am convinced message will do no good
and will be bitterly resented. Americans insist Spain should leave Cuba nothing less will satisfy
them Spain will rather fight Message practically takes part with Spain at critical juncture and will
be so understood both in America and this country.”

German diplomatic initiatives even attempted to bring the Pope to mediate the crisis.

Although President McKinley initially attempted a negotiated solution to the impending
crisis, the Spanish government had long considered Cuba an integral part of Spain and refused to
consider Cuban independence. The US government similarly found Spanish offers to end the
‘reconcentration’ insufficient. McKinley, in an attempt to avoid direct intervention began
negotiations with Spain as to the future of Cuba and sent the USS Maine to Havana as a
demonstration of support for American commercial interests in Cuba and to reassure American
citizens living on the island. On 15 February 1898, the USS Maine mysteriously exploded in
Havana bay, allegedly at the time due to a Spanish naval mine, resulting in the near inevitability
of strong US action against Cuba and triggering widespread calls for war, famously encapsulated
in the phrase “Remember the Maine, to Hell with Spain.” Some, including Roosevelt, were
confident of the cause and the result, writing to Henry White, the first Secretary at the London
Embassy and a close correspondent that “There is absolutely but one possible solution of a
permanent nature to that affair, and that is Cuban independence…If we can attain our object
peacefully, of course we should try to do so; but we should attain it one way or the other
anyhow.”

Although not yet the President of the United States, or the Governor of New York
or even the Vice-President, Roosevelt’s impact on the war is difficult to overestimate. From his

211 William McKinley, 1898. William McKinley Correspondence Received, MS832268, Library of Congress.
212 Arthur Balfour to Joseph Chamberlain, 16 April 1898. Arthur Balfour-Joseph Chamberlain correspondence MSS
49773-74, British Library.
49773-74, British Library.
214 Lewis L. Gould, The Spanish-American War and President McKinley (Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas,
1982), 45.
215 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry White, 9 March 1898. Henry White Papers, MSS45328 Box 28, Library of
Congress.
post as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt’s “frenzied efforts to set in motion the Navy’s war-plan were facilitated by Secretary Long’s decision to leave all “technical matters” to those bureau chiefs who were Roosevelt’s intimates.” This assessment was borne out in Roosevelt’s papers and records, most notably during an incident in February 1898 recorded in his autobiography where Roosevelt rather remarkably uses the opportunity of Secretary Long taking a day off for rest to send a telegram to Dewey to “Order the squadron, except the Monaoy, to Hong Kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands. Keep Olympia until further orders.” Subsequently, the US Congress and Senate adopted resolutions in favor of using the military to enforce Cuban independence. After Spain responded that any incursion would be considered an act of war, on April 25, 1898, the Congress declared that a state of war existed between the United States and Spain.

Countering German Neutrality

Prior to the escalation after the loss of the Maine, Cuba had long been a preoccupation for American policymakers who feared renewed European imperialism in the Americas – and saw American expansionism as a potential solution. To this end, Roosevelt wrote to his sister as early as January 1897, “I am a quietly rampant “Cuba Libre” man. I doubt whether the Cubans would do very well in the line of self-government; but anything would be better than continuance of Spanish rule. I believe that Cleveland ought now to recognize Cubas independence and interfere; sending our fleet promptly to Havanna. There would not in my opinion be very serious fighting; and what loss we encountered would be thrice over repaid by the ultimate results of our action.” Roosevelt of course did just that as soon as the war began. The American fleet arrived in Manila by 1 May 1898. The US Navy took longer to reach Guam, only arriving in late June. Famously, the garrison mistook shots fired by the USS Charleston at the old Spanish fort as a salute, having not been informed of the start of the war, and since they lacked ammunition to return the salute, sent a boat manned by the only US citizen on the island, Francisco Portusach, to apologize for the lapse in protocol and a messenger to the contemporary capital at Agana to inform the governor of visitors. Portusach was left as the governor, due to

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his being the only American on the island, however, he was promptly deposed once the USS Charleston departed.219

During this period, several individuals in Britain and America viewed the situation as one firmly entrenched in the context of broader issues, most notably to include the fear of German encroachment in the Americas. Even with respect to the Maine, months before it was sent to Havana, Roosevelt wrote form the Navy Department to Richard Wainwright, the recently appointed commander of the ship, that “I wish there was a chance the Maine was going to be used against some foreign power; by preference Germany – but I am not particular, and I’d take even Spain if nothing better offered.”220 The crisis Roosevelt received in war with Spain was one he would have preferred have occurred with Germany.

Although broader German diplomatic efforts of the era were focused on two objectives – the isolation of France and bringing Britain into an alliance, both measures were pursued in rather haphazard and inept fashion, resulting, eventually, in the failure of both objectives. As to the Spanish-American war, German press and public opinion maintain its objections to the Monroe Doctrine as implemented during the first Venezuela crisis in 1895 and the subsequent acquiescence by Britain of American interest in the Caribbean. Roosevelt had already decided that ousting Spain from the West Indies and the Caribbean was necessary in order to keep European powers out of the Americas, writing “turning Spain out should serve notice that no strong European power, and especially not Germany, should be allowed to gain a foothold by supplanting some weak European power.”221 At least in the Pacific, there was agreement between Roosevelt, Mahan, and Long, writing in the same letter that “I suppose I need not tell you that as regards Hawaii I take your views absolutely, as indeed I do on foreign policy generally. If I had my way we would annex those islands tomorrow. If that is impossible I would establish a protectorate over them…. As regards Hawaii I am delighted to be able to tell you that Secretary Long shares our views. He believes we should take the islands, and I have just been preparing some memoranda for him to use at the Cabinet meeting tomorrow.” Although the government of the Republic of Hawaii had advocated for annexation into the United States, and the islands were broadly under US influence since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1893, Hawaii was not yet a part of the United States.

219 Frank Portusach, “History Of The Capture Of Guam By The United States Man-Of War ‘Charleston’ And Its Transport,” Proceedings Magazine United States Naval Institute, April 1917.
221 Theodore Roosevelt to Alfred Thayer Mahan, 3 May 1897. 1:607.
Spring-Rice, at this point in the British Embassy in Berlin, also noted the conflict with interest, corresponding extensively with diplomats and politicians in Britain and America over the next year. In an immediate follow-up to the series of letters in which Spring-Rice and Roosevelt discussed the fears of a “Greater Germany” extending to the Americas and the need to divert German migrants to the United States, Spring Rice wrote:

I have been very much interested in watching the view taken here about Cuba. As far as I can judge the feeling in official circles is much as follows. To begin with there is the feud that every official German has with America which is regarded as a huge machine for teaching Germans English and making them republican.

The idea of America as a machine for turning Germans into English-speaking peoples was critical to Roosevelt and Spring-Rice. Clearly, the issue of where German migrants travel resonated in his mind as one that could influence German action during the war – though Spring-Rice’s interpretation of “every official German” may not be indicative of German policy, it certainly is indicative of contemporary fears. However, it is not just these factors he views as potentially inciting Germany to hostility with the United States and he proceeds to discuss an array of issues, from economic protectionist disagreements, sympathy with the Spanish Monarchy as opposed to the American Republic, and the role of the sugar lobby in viewing normalcy in Cuba as a challenge to Prussian sugar growers, concluding that ultimately “Chaos is in their interest.” However, despite these factors, Spring-Rice did not envision Germany as willing to intervene on the side of Spain, even subtly and in limited fashion, as he concluded Germany was averse to that risk even though it desired an outcome on the side of Spain.

Moreover, Spring-Rice noted that the European powers were largely aligned against the United States but told Roosevelt that “As for a European coalition I suppose that it would at a stroke settle all your domestic troubles and unite everyone in the same cause. But I dont think there is much chance. Everyone would like some one else to bell the cat. I’m afraid you will have been disappointed in this respect!” Although somewhat exaggerated, Spring-Rice was not incorrect in guessing that his friend Roosevelt may well welcome such a coalition of the continental European powers. Spring Rice further argued that the British and American race would have a moral obligation to intervene writing, “I am glad to say that the press of England at any rate recognizes that it is rather hard for people of our blood to sit quiet with such things going on at the door. I saw an article in the Manchester Guardian, the Liberal paper of the North which said that if it were jingoism to object to massacre and robbery it hoped for the credit of the race and

222 See Chapter 5
223 Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice to Theodore Roosevelt, 3 November 1897. CASR I 9/1, Churchill Archives Centre.
224 Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice to Theodore Roosevelt, 3 November 1897. CASR I 9/1, Churchill Archives Centre.
language that all America would go Jingo-mad; it would wipe out some of the stain of Armenia.”

Ultimately, the interpretation passed to Washington through Hay and Roosevelt was that Germany would be unwilling to intervene directly. However, this did little to assuage American fears – Germany stood to gain not by directly fighting in favor of Spain, but by using its neutrality to bargain for an expansion in the Pacific or the Caribbean. Roosevelt’s urgings within the US administration and quietly to the US Senate for the previous year at least hinged on these fears. In early 1898, he articulated his views towards the European presence on the continent, still consistent with his views of the past year, stating, “I should myself like to shape our foreign policy with the purpose ultimately of driving off this continent every European power. I would begin with Spain, and in the end would take all other European nations, including England. It is even more important to prevent any new nation from getting a foothold.” He extended this specifically to Germany, but as he attempted to summarize, “I am not hostile to any European power in the abstract. I am simply an American first and last, and therefore hostile to any power which wrongs us. If Germany wronged us I would fight Germany; if England, I would fight England.” The trouble, of course, was that he viewed Germany as the power most likely to wrong the United States. This was clearly seen in the lead up to the war with Spain, when he wrote to a leader in the railway sector arguing that while Russia had been “uniformly friendly” to America out of self-interest and France and England had at various times been hostile to the United States, “As for Germany, I think she of all powers is the one with which we are most apt to have friction.” Roosevelt acknowledged that historically Britain and France had been the powers threatening the United States, but by the end of the century decided that Germany was the power most likely to challenge the Monroe Doctrine. Both the reference to entangling alliance and the reiteration of the Monroe Doctrine suggest that Roosevelt intended the United States to continue to adhere to certain of its early foreign policy principles, including avoiding alliances. Even immediately after the loss of the Maine, he wrote to Henry White “I am sure that the English have genuinely sympathized with us. I am glad there seems to be so friendly a feeling between the two countries, though I don’t believe that we ought to have an alliance.” Nevertheless, with respect to the perceived threat, it appears that it is in cases where both the diplomatic element and the racial theories align that

225 Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice to Theodore Roosevelt, 3 November 1897. CASR I 9/1, Churchill Archives Centre.
227 Theodore Roosevelt to Charles Arthur Moore, 14 February 1898. 1:772.
Roosevelt was most consistent. Although his views changed frequently, Germany, unlike most of the other powers, loomed large in the Western Hemisphere, even by 1898.

Roosevelt, actively and ultimately successfully, attempted to pull the administration in the direction of his views, not just through writing to a number of public figures but through sidestepping the administration with numerous private letters he insisted were his views only and not that of the administration. Throughout this series of correspondence, the chief objective remained to seize these islands. Among the letters he wrote at this time was to Senator William Pierce Frye, in which he stated, “I should hate to see us pay a dollar to Spain as a reward for having during the past three years revived the policy of Alva and Torquemada at the expense of the Cubans, and it seems to me that the time has come for us to fight, and that this fight will be of great advantage to the nation, both from the moral lift it will give us, and because it will mean that we shall acquire both St. Thomas and Hawaii.”229 Roosevelt continued using this analogy Alva and Torquemada in writing to James Bryce comparing the situation in Cuba with the failure to intervene in Armenia – a theme that had by this point repeated itself on both sides of the Atlantic.230 Roosevelt’s reaction was to resolve that “we should drive Spain from the Western World.” Of note, Roosevelt also praised not just Anglo-American unity regarding the war, writing, “there seems to be a gradual coming together of the two peoples. They certainly ought to come together” but once more saw opportunity in seizing Hawaii ad condemned any reluctance to do so.231

German ambitions towards Danish possessions in the Caribbean and ongoing interest in acquiring colonial bases were seen as ongoing and persistent threats by American policymakers, fearing a German leap across the Atlantic that would intensify by the time of the Second Venezuela Crisis a few years later. This fear was seconded, possibly encouraged, by Spring-Rice in his correspondence during the war. This emerged most clearly in a series of letters between John Hay, at the time the US Ambassador to the United Kingdom, and Spring-Rice, who while still in Berlin was preparing for transfer to Constantinople. Using German neutrality during the Turco-Greek War and the Sino-Japanese War as examples Spring-Rice argued to Hay that “In both cases she spent neither men nor money but reaped more advantage from the struggle than either combatant. It is no wonder that such a policy should be thought the right one. Now to

230 At this time, James Bryce was a Member of Parliament. He would later be appointed Ambassador to the United States, after which he developed a closer friendship with Roosevelt and others in the United States. Although he succeeded in strengthening the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, the period of Bryce’s Ambassadorship and Roosevelt’s Presidency overlapped by only roughly one year.
apply this to the present case. In a naval war it must be inevitable that at the end even the conqueror is worse off than at the beginning of the struggle. Ships are not built in a day and are destroyed in a minute. After the struggle is over, America will not be in a position (or may not be) to resist demands which she would have scouted before.”

In sum German neutrality came with a price, which he assumed to be “Samoa, or some position in the Pacific” – and to avert the cost, the US needed to annex Hawaii immediately.

Interestingly, Spring-Rice’s letter found purchase, and Hay responded agreeing, “It jumped so precisely with my own ideas that I sent the substance of it off to the President (McKinley). I cannot fathom the stupidity of those senators, who, preserving the Cleveland tradition, still fight the annexation, but gegen die Dummheit, etc. Of course, I need not say, I did not give you away.”

Spring-Rice responds reiterating that the behavior of the German government after the aforementioned wars would serve as a template for how Germany would profit after this one. However, he also adds the news of victory at Manila, “How curious it is – the continuity of history, the struggle that began 400 years ago of which we are seeing the last chapter. How the historians criticize Cromwell for siding against Spain! It was the divine instinct ingrained in the race which has brought us where we are.”

Well into the war, he still continued to see the war, at least on some level, as part of some broader narrative of Anglo-Saxons eroding Spanish power, even seeing it as a righteous continuation of Cromwell’s Western Design to seize the Spanish West Indies. Moreover, this was not contained to Hawaii and the Danish Islands. Rather, fears similarly involved other places in Latin America erupting during the war, as “Another point which will probably come up is Brazil. A revolution may break out at any moment. There is a large population of Germans in Rio Grande del Sul. The colonial papers are already clamouring for a coaling station there à la Kiao-Chow. They point out that if America makes conquests outside America the Monroe doctrine has ceased to exist – for it must be two-sided.” These concerns were not limited to Spring-Rice, Hay, and Lodge – Mahan had similar fears for the better part of a decade, and “by late 1897 Mahan’s concern was genuine. The German seizure that year of Kiaochow in China, and the subsequent Lüders affair in Haiti, undoubtedly made a strong impression on him, as they did on other naval officers and

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233 Likely a reference to Friedrich Schiller, the Maid of Orleans (1801), “Mit der Dummheit kämpfen Götter selbst vergebens,” popularly translated to English as “Against stupidity, the very gods themselves contend in vain”


government officials.” Indeed, the Lüders affair presaged the Second Venezuela Crisis the manner German warships were used in the Caribbean to force diplomatic issues.

Shortly thereafter, on 7 July 1898, the McKinley administration decided to annex Hawaii. Although not directly part of the Spanish-American war, it was clear that concerns that German neutrality would cost the United States Hawaii, spurred by an influential British diplomat stationed in Berlin, had at least made it to the Presidency. This victory for Spring-Rice was communicated promptly to Senator Lodge. Spring-Rice argued that there was a “new order” that was, understandably and appropriately from the challenger’s perspective in the Pacific attempting to replace “English civilization (I mean yours as much and more than mine).” It was explicitly irrelevant whether this “new order of things” was better or worse: it was not theirs and therefore the United States and Britain had “the right and duty to defend what we most certainly have fairly won on the American, Australian, and Chinese coasts.” This was the core of not just Spring-Rice’s views, but the aforementioned fears of various other British political leaders – that England was not likely to “remain comparatively strong enough to defend English civilization alone” but that the various institutions, to include language, were not “courtiers at the throne of London” and thus solely England’s responsibility to defend nor solely her benefits to enjoy. American expansion to the Pacific was emblematic of this, with Spring-Rice welcoming “any step which America takes outside her continent because it tends to the increase of the common good.” Clearly English civilization had come to include the United States, but not from a point of an alignment of interest so much as a threat to what was by definition the same interests.

The annexation of Hawaii and the American victory in the Spanish-American war had was seen as “proof you have given that people who talk English can still fight. It seems to be regarded on the continent as an exploded idea – and you at any rate for your part of the world have proved that it isn’t. It’s more pleasant than you can have any idea of to hear of the devotion and courage of people who have everything to lose by it and nothing to gain – sons who volunteer and fathers who encourage their sons.” America’s victory against Spain in even the Pacific would thus hopefully give pause on the continent. Lodge’s response is equally enthusiastic about the common future, arguing that “The annexation of Hawaii I believe to be a

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good thing not only for the United States but for the world. I feel as you do about the fate of the civilization of the English-speaking people,” and “The movement you describe as going on in the East is undoubtedly true, and I Cannot but think that our appearance in that quarter of the globe will strengthen England, which of necessity, must always remain the great eastern power. One of the general results of the war has been the coming together of the English-speaking people, and I am optimist enough to believe that it is going to last.”

However, this would not be the most significant impact on this triangular relationship – even if it was the most concrete.

Although the reaction from the German side is largely outside of the scope of this analysis, it is important to note that work done by other historians does appear to provide some evidence that Spring-Rice’s views were not entirely ungrounded. While perhaps not a correct interpretation of actual German policy, it was the interpretation conveyed back to leaders in both the United States and Britain. The reaction in various sectors in Germany has been detailed by Markus Hugo – to include the “harsh protest by nearly all conservative and nationalist papers in Germany.” Although the response from various sectors varies, and it appears information of German fleet movements in the Pacific didn’t feature heavily in the German public consciousness, most pertinently, two features identified by Spring-Rice in his correspondence with London and Washington appear to be corroborated. The first of these is the view of the Pan-German factions that the war presented an opportunity that “in their mind, Imperial Germany was entitled to ‘compensations’ whenever another Great Power gained a new sphere of influence.” The second of these that bears mention was the perception of a “Germanic-Latin Duel.” This features among those who supported both sides of the conflict, as “Germans who sympathized with the American fight welcomed the victory of the Teutonic race. They felt their own status enhanced by the American triumph…. By contrast, most German conservatives argued that the future struggle would be among the branches of the Teutonic race. They predicted Germany would have to oppose an Anglo-Saxon alliance, which in their view had been greatly reinforced during the Spanish-American War.”

This assessment proved ultimately to be correct – not only did British and American leaders indeed view it as evidence of future unity, those who felt Germany would materialize as the ultimate threat felt validated.

244 Hugo, 83.
245 Hugo, 89.
The Legacy of Manila Bay

Among the most celebrated events of the Spanish-American War was Admiral Dewey’s victory at the Battle of Manila Bay early in the war on 1 May 1898. The battle, caused by the rapid deployment of an American cruiser squadron to the Philippines, proved to be a decisive and unambiguous American victory. The entire Spanish squadron defending Manila Bay was destroyed, with the only American casualties being seven injuries and one death from heat stroke. Dewey received widespread praise and for his victory was in 1899 promoted to the rank of Admiral of the Navy, a rank greater than the usual rank structure and created specifically for Dewey, leaving him to this day, even after the appointment of five-star Admirals during the Second World War, the most senior Naval officer in US history.

There is little doubt that Manila was a key target of the United States even before the war started – Roosevelt wrote before the opening of the conflict regarding his priorities for the Navy that “I would regard a war with Spain from two standpoints: first, the advisability on the grounds both of humanity and self-interest of interfering on behalf of the Cubans, and of taking one more step toward the complete freeing of America from European dominion; second, the benefit done our people by giving them something to think of which isn’t material gain, and especially the benefit done our military forces by trying both the Navy and Army in actual practice. … from my own standpoint, however, and speaking purely privately, I believe that war will have to, or at least ought to, come sooner or later; and I think we should prepare for it well in advance. I should have the Asiatic squadron in shape to move on Manila at once.”246 As the war progressed, he deviated not in the least from this perspective, writing “I earnestly hope that no truce will be granted and that peace will only be made on consideration of Cuba being independent, Porto Rico ours and the Philippines taken away from Spain”247

A series of events surrounding the victory, however, cemented in the minds of many Americans that Germany had ulterior motives during the conflict and hostile intentions towards the United States. These events escalated over the course of May and June in 1898. The first of these incidents was a case where a small launch flying the German flag approached the American fleet at night, requiring the fleet to stay on alert.248 The close activities of German ships forced American ships to use spotlights and other measures that lowered their effectiveness against

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247 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 25 May 1898. Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1925, 1:301.
Spanish forces. Following this, German ships started arriving in Manila Bay, including by June Admiral Otto von Diederichs, the man who replaced Tirpitz as commander of the German East Asian Squadron and of Kiauchau fame. Claiming to be there “by order of the Kaiser”249 the German squadron, in Dewey’s eyes, violated the rules of the blockade imposed on Manila by the American fleet. Furthermore, Diederichs allegedly visited the Spanish captain-general and the German ships and Spanish garrison exchanged salutes with each other. In July, a German detachment landed ashore and, according to Dewey, interfered with insurgents against Spanish rule – Dewey viewed this as highly problematic as according to him, “This was, of course, contrary to my policy to allow the insurgents to weaken the Spaniards as far as possible, and it was, besides, a breach of neutrality by a neutral power.”250 This proved to be the last straw, and Dewey insisted with Diederichs upon the appropriate enforcement of the blockade and the right of the American fleet to inspect all ships approaching Manila, and accused the German squadron of exceeding their rights as a neutral party. Diederichs maintained he acted within neutral rights and insisted upon a conference of all the represented nations harboring ships in the Bay. Critically, a representative from the only other nation to attend the meeting, Britain, agreed with Dewey’s position. According to Dewey, the German squadron ignored this ruling and attempted one more approach, but withdrew after a warning shot, thus ending the crisis. According to later reporting, Dewey famously told Paul von Hintze, Diederich’s representative to Dewey, that “By the way, you can tell your Admiral, too, if he really wants a fight he can have it now.”251

The importance Dewey placed on this incident was not unreasonable. Not only had Germany been eyeing a base in the region for years, but Diederich had cabled back to Minister Bülow on May 11 that a rebellion might be successful in the Philippines and that they might then be interested in placing themselves under the protection of Germany.252 Furthermore, the Kaiser replied to Bulow that should another power gain the Philippines, Germany would require a comparable compensation,253 and German press were pushing that a new independent Philippines would owe a harbor to Germany,254 thus confirming Spring-Rice’s suspicions in Berlin.

249 Dewey, 257.
250 Dewey, 264.
253 Corry, 132.
254 Corry, 208.
Rather significantly, Dewey narrated this story as he remembered it in 1916 – by which point perception in the United States had decidedly and obviously turned anti-German. Nevertheless, at least one other historian has corroborated elements of the story by looking at Diederichs correspondence and German archives, particularly as to the involvement with Diederich’s squadron with insurgents in the Philippines as early as 1896. Indeed, it is possible that in the two years preceding the battle, the German East Asian Squadron, led at the time by Admiral Tirpitz, had been involved in the Philippines. Thus, any significant embellishment by 1916 seem unlikely – but even if Dewey did so to further his reputation, the fact is that even contemporary to the Spanish-American War, the story that that the German fleet interfered with American goals in Manila persisted, with numerous newspapers reporting parts of the events, most notably the ‘Irene Incident’ where Dewey ordered a shot fired across the bow of a German ship to force it to stop.

Spring-Rice, stationed in Berlin as Diederichs and the East Asian Squadron operated in Manila Bay, certainly also noted the movements of the German forces in the region and tried to communicate with the German government that “the presence of the large German force at the Philippines was plainly regarded in America as a threat, and was likely to lead to unpleasant incidents. Was Germany prepared to face the consequences and had the Government counted the cost?” The representative of the Foreign Office, and a travel companion of the Kaiser, with whom he had this dialogue responded regarding the Kaiser’s views that “he quite agreed with the view I took, that it was unfortunate that the ships had been sent, but that it was difficult to withdraw them. It had been necessary to make a display of force to satisfy public opinion at home.” Whether this actually represents the Kaiser’s views, Spring-Rice continued writing to Hay in London that he explained the “disparity between the interests and the force sent” would be problematic. However, Spring-Rice communicated to Lodge that “Germany has no desire whatever to provoke a conflict – rather the contrary – that the Authorities are alarmed at the state of public feeling in America which is attributed wholly to English press intrigues – and that they are anxious to explain the presence of the German ships at Manila.” Moreover, the German ambition to acquire a coaling station in the Pacific, a theme that also emerged with

respect to the Samoa incidents, seemed to be pervasive in Spring-Rice’s view of German policy, and he concluded that that Germany would attempt to acquire this station through threat if peaceful means failed. In sum, in the British view as communicated to the United States, Germany had no desire for a direct conflict, but was willing to antagonize the United States, even if it blamed this antagonism on British influence, to acquire a foothold in the Pacific.

This suggests that the German government was aware of the actions taking place in the Pacific, and that Diederichs insistence he was there at the Kaiser’s command was accurate. A year later, Roosevelt writes with respect to a “disagreeable experience” regarding a speech by Captain Joseph Coghlan that “I confess that if I had been the President I should have told Germany that until the apologized for what Admiral Von Diederichs did, they need not worry themselves about what Captain Coghlan said. …. The attitude of the Staats-Zeitung has been infamous; also that of some of the professional Irish leaders.” Although Coghlan was reprimanded for the, speech in which he described the confrontations between Dewey and Diederichs and allegedly generally spoke negatively about the German attitude to the United States, Diederich’s actions had rapidly become infamous. Moreover, much of the condemnation of Captain Coghlan was in the German language press like the Staats-Zeitung, which Roosevelt often distrusted in its entirety.

The Monroe Doctrine and Venezuela

The Venezuela crises are notable for several reasons, primarily because of the involvement of Germany. In private correspondence, it is clear that that Germany was indeed one of the main if not principle targets of fear surrounding colonization in the Americas and the Monroe Doctrine – yet racial fears regarding Germany still did not specifically manifest. However, race more broadly was still ontologically central – as Carnegie wrote regarding the first Venezuela crisis, “In order to know this and understand it, we have only to consider one leading characteristic of the English-speaking race, common to each of the two nations which comprise the whole of the domineering, aggressive, conquering, and prevailing strain to which we belong – their land hunger.” This ‘land hunger’ was inextricable from both his tolerance of British

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261 Captain Coghlan commanded the Raleigh during Battle of Manila Bay and was responsible for taking some of the early expeditions to capture Spanish fortifications before the general assault on Manila.
263 For more on contemporary newspapers, including in New York City, see: Julia Guarneri, Newsprint Metropolis: City Papers and the Making of Modern Americans, Historical Studies of Urban America (Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2017).
264 Carnegie, “The Venezuelan Question,” 129.
expansionism in the Americas, but also his ultimate conclusion that Britain must defer to American in the hemisphere.

Moreover, the Second Venezuela Crisis of 1902-1903 was seen by contemporary figures as a continuation of earlier policy towards Venezuela, even though the circumstances involving owed debt by the new government was rather different than the long-standing border dispute that led to the crisis in 1895. Indeed, following the conclusion of the second crisis in 1902, Roosevelt wrote that he explicitly viewed it as a continuation of the 1895 incidents, particularly as related to the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover, during the second Venezuela crisis, Roosevelt was known to focus on Germany and the Kaiser. Not only did he support Cleveland’s policy with respect to the Doctrine, in 1906 he wrote to the former President from the White House regarding his own support earlier that “It is just six years since you took action in the Venezuela case. I have always been proud of the fact that I heartily backed up what you did; and reading over in a little volume I published called American Ideals, my views on the Monroe Doctrine written in support of your position, I am pleased to see how closely what I therein said foreshadowed what I have said about the Monroe Doctrine in my two messages to Congress and in my note to Germany about the Venezuela case. It seems to me that you have special cause for satisfaction in what we have succeeded in accomplishing this time in connection with getting England and Germany explicitly to recognize the Monroe Doctrine in reference to their controversy with Venezuela.” Although a full examination of the Doctrine and its relevance is both beyond the scope of this dissertation and has been extensively covered by historians, there are key points worth illustrating.

The 1895 crisis was a watershed moment in relations between the United States and Great Britain. To the topic of this dissertation, however, it is of somewhat lesser significance, covered mainly to highlight two themes. First, that American political leaders, despite earlier protestations of Anglo-Saxon unity, were largely and without reservation willing to engage in hostility with Britain. Second, the crisis reinforced the absolute centrality of a broad and interventionist interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine in the minds of these same leaders, not necessarily as targeted against solely Britain, but against all the European powers, including most prominently to Roosevelt, Germany.

By 1895, Venezuela and Britain had been engaged in an ongoing border dispute over the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana for decades, having inherited disagreements from the Spanish Empire and Dutch possessions in South America, respectively. In 1887, after Britain claimed that the relatively recently interpreted Schomburgk Line was the only border between the two territories, Venezuela severed diplomatic relations. In 1895, the United States became involved in the dispute through resolution from Congress and formal statement insisting upon arbitration, the unquestionable involvement of the United States, and the pertinence of the Monroe Doctrine. Cleveland’s Secretary of State Richard Olney wrote to Thomas Bayard, the US Ambassador to Britain in a letter forming the foundation of the famous Olney Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, famously claiming “To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.” As Olney continued, the reasons for this practical sovereignty had little to do with the behavior of the United States or any unique powers of civilization or justice or other traits the United States exhibited in its diplomacy but, rather in addition to those qualities, America’s “infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers.” The enviable position of the United States thus required its isolation on the Western Hemisphere from the other powers.

This letter, critical to the history of American foreign policy towards Latin America, has often been used to argue that America claimed hegemony over the Western Hemisphere in imperial fashion. However, the context under which this takes place was not merely for the exclusion of the powers for the maintenance an American sphere of influence, but fears regarding how European incursion into the Americas would have undermined the very fabric of American society. Olney envisioned the “struggle now going on for the acquisition of Africa might be transferred to South America” and this would result in the various American republics being converted into European colonies. Moreover, with the presence of a power such as the United States on the continent, and the competition with other European powers, any colonizing empire would have required an extensive military presence to safeguard their settlements. This was a potential catastrophe to Olney, who felt that with rivals on the American doorstep,

267 Also known as the Olney Memorandum, the Olney Interpretation, the Olney Declaration, and various other names.
America would be forced to embrace what it had been spared thus far – the need for “immense standing armies” and “huge warlike establishments” that would change not cost wealth, but change the very character of the United States, forcing it to “convert the flower of our male population into soldiers and sailors, and by withdrawing them from the various pursuits of peaceful industry we too must practically annihilate a large share of the productive energy of the nation.”

Olney concluded, “how a greater calamity than this could overtake us it is difficult to see.” Thus the real geopolitical dangers to allowing European expansion in the Western Hemisphere, regardless of the power, was the destruction of luxury of the Atlantic, forcing the United States into behaving as any other power did at the time.

This message, circulated widely among contemporary policymakers, was critical to understanding the fears of European expansion in Latin America. Whether the fears were of a German colony or of British intervention, the logic was that should any power gain a foothold in Latin America, they all would. This, to Olney and others, was indisputable and inevitable. Not even Anglo-Saxon amity could stand in the face of this fear – as Roosevelt wrote regarding Olney’s message, “I am very much pleased with the President’s or rather with Olney’s message; I think the immense majority of our people will back him …. Let the fight come if it must; I don’t care whether our sea coast cities are bombarded or not; we would take Canada.”

Roosevelt reiterated similar messages repeatedly throughout the year, even adding that, “I earnestly hope our government do’n’t back down. If there is a muss I shall try to have a hand in it myself! They’ll have to employ a lot of men just as green as I am even for the conquest of Canada; our regular army is’n’t big enough.” Although Roosevelt was in New York as the Police Commissioner, the conflict was formative in two ways. The first being that by its conclusion, he had developed keen sympathy for the British – but one based on the reality, as he saw it, that Canada was perpetually held hostage by the United States in the event of a conflict – a view he maintained into his Presidency. The second being, that despite said sympathy, it stoked many of the ambitions he would later realize during the Spanish-American War. The key to these policymakers was always the notion that war with Britain was preferable to opening the door to broader European settlement and conquest of Latin America.

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274 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 20 December 1895. Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1925, 1:200.
The involvement of other European powers in the Western Hemisphere was central to Lodge as well, as he wrote, “If Great Britain is to be permitted to occupy the ports of Nicaragua and, still worse, take the territory of Venezuela, there is nothing to prevent her taking the whole of Venezuela or any other South American state. If Great Britain can do this with impunity, France and Germany will do it also.” The legislation that Lodge put in front of the Senate was also enthusiastically supported by Roosevelt a point he not only communicated directly to Lodge, but to Henry White, both one of the most important diplomatic voices in the era particularly regarding relations with Britain during the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations, and an individual Roosevelt later considered among the most useful members of the diplomatic services. As Cleveland wrote in an address to Congress in December 1895, “In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred, and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow. I am nevertheless firm in my conviction that while it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the onward march of civilization.” While unity among the English-speaking peoples was desirable, it in no way over-rode the fear of European colonization in South America. Roosevelt repeated this message again and again, including in a letter to the Harvard Crimson, arguing that the Venezuelan case came “within the strictest view of the Monroe Doctrine” and that “If we permit a European nation in each case itself to decide whether or not the territory which it wishes to seize is its own, then the Monroe Doctrine has no real existence.”

What then does this then mean for the contemporary interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and relations with Britain? Although most of the American policymakers involved in fact tended to look at Britain favorably, even with racial affinity, this fell apart with respect to fears of European colonization. Even amity with Britain could not be maintained should the consequence be the loss of American hegemony in the hemisphere. Not only was it unacceptable “when England goes wrong, as was the case in the Venezuela incident,” Roosevelt concluded that “still less would I submit to anything from Germany, France, or Russia which

278 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 6 December 1895. Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1925, 1:199.
281 Roosevelt, “Letter from Mr. Roosevelt: He Defends the Policy of the Administration on Venezuela.”
was aimed at the interests of this country.” 282 Thus, rapprochement was not a construction without limits – it would only work should Britain never test that hegemony. Nevertheless, certain prominent figures in American society saw it as laying the groundwork for racial rapprochement, most notably Carnegie. He viewed the British aggression towards Venezuela as a natural feature of “the propensity of the English-speaking race to absorb as much of the land of the world as it possibly can,” and he proposed that the case in Venezuela was an example of the “powerful grasping from the weak, not as an English trait, but as a race trait.” 283 The race in America had done similar to what it was doing with respect to Britain and Venezuela, but, Carnegie found that the American through intermixture of blood with races less strongly possessed of the dominating spirit. He offers arbitration.” 284 To Carnegie the greater aggression in the British side of the race and the loss of this aggression through the inheritance of immigrants in America, both had explanatory power in Venezuela and presented a potential solution. Roosevelt late wrote extensively regarding the nature of immigration and “intermixture” in America – a topic this thesis discusses in a later Chapter.

However, even he found cause to doubt whether Britain could truly support the English-speaking peoples in the Americas, arguing regarding Canada and Jamaica “England prevents her colonies from coming to life, and she will do so with her South American colony.” 285 Carnegie, however, not only saw race as explaining why Britain challenged Venezuela, but also why it needed to withdraw. Britain, having expanded across three continents “in obedience to their instinct for expansion” was naturally attempting to expand further into the Americas but had uniquely encountered in the United States defense of Venezuela “their own race and equals in the art of acquisition of territory.” 286 Carnegie was explicit that he did not see this as a British attempt to instigate a rivalry with the United States. Indeed, Carnegie argued that the conflict might result not just in rapprochement, but a new understanding of international relations in which the United States convinced Europe that the Monroe Doctrine was not merely a part of international law, which Carnegie acknowledged it was not, but rather the “more potent fact” the Monroe Doctrine was “a deep rooted instinct inherent in the blood of the larger half of our dominating race.” 287 Carnegie desired to divide the world between Britain and America, reminiscent of the Papal Bull Inter caetera in 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 splitting

282 Theodore Roosevelt to Francis Cruger Moore, 5 February 1898. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 1951, 1:768.
283 Carnegie, “The Venezuelan Question,” 134.
284 Carnegie, 134.
285 “MONROE DOCTRINE DEBATE: Discussion Before the Political Science Club ADDRESS BY THEODORE ROOSEVELT Praise for the Stand President Cleveland Has Taken.”
286 Carnegie, “The Venezuelan Question,” 141–42.
287 Carnegie, 141–42.
the world between Portugal and Spain. Carnegie argued that Great Britain, the “other half of her race,” was free to acquire any land in Europe, Asia, and Africa and that the United States would even look upon the expansion “with pride and satisfaction” so long as the United States was free to “superintend territorial changes upon the American continent,” through the aforementioned “doctrine of peaceful arbitration” that was a product of immigration to the half of the race in the Americas. Carnegie’s racial vision for the future required not just expansion and satisfaction of a racial need to expand, but for the portions of the English-speaking race in Britain and America to acknowledge their respective domains, thereby creating much like Roosevelt a foundation for his own theory of ‘interracial law.’

The racial rapprochement was, thus, conditional – requiring the Britain accept that America would become, at least in the Western Hemisphere, the dominant representative of the English-speaking race. However, once the British accepted American hegemony, the incident was eventually recalled by Balfour as “those dark days of the Venezuela controversy” and that “the time would come when all speaking the English language and sharing the Anglo-Saxon civilization would be united with a sympathy which no mere political divergencies could permanently disturb…..if I am right, and that common sympathy be implanted deep in the breasts of these two great nations, there cannot be a greater guarantee for future peace, freedom, progress, and civilization, not only of this or that country or community alone, but of the whole human race.” Britain in thus pursuing the course of action Carnegie hoped for, secured exactly the aim for the English-speaking race that Balfour and Chamberlain had envisioned for years.

The first Venezuela crisis and the Spanish-American War also shaped Roosevelt’s understanding of the Monroe Doctrine on the eve of his Presidency. Specifically, by 1900, Roosevelt’s fears regarding the European powers had begun to crystallize. Although the broad fear of European intervention in South America remained, Roosevelt began to specifically fear German intervention above all consistently using it as the most likely case, writing that, “I believe we intend to build up a good navy, but whether we shall build up even a respectable little army or not I do not know; and if we fail to do so, it may well be that a few years hence, should Germany try to establish herself in South America, we shall have to learn a bitter lesson; for I firmly believe our people would fight in such a contingency.”

288 Carnegie, 141–42.
Isthmian canal project, yet undecided between Nicaragua and Panama, the fortification of the canal was paramount, with Roosevelt concluding that it would be better to not construct the canal rather than have it unfortified, specifically citing fears of European powers carving Brazil.\textsuperscript{291} Even joint operation or ownership of the canal was placed in the context of “Southern Brazil or Argentina” and worrying that Germany having the same rights in the canal would necessarily mean that they would have equal rights in the “partition of any part of Southern America.”\textsuperscript{292} Repeatedly, it was Germany over other powers that Roosevelt found himself concerned with, particularly in the scenario he described as, “If Germany seizes South Brazil and puts a couple of hundred thousand men there, we of course could not touch her at all unless we could whip her fleet, and after we whipped her fleet, if she had retained mastery of the sea long enough to get her men down there, it would be a desperate task to develop an army capable of putting them out.”\textsuperscript{293}

Why this preoccupation with Germany? Much of this will be discussed in a later chapter\textsuperscript{294} regarding destination and nature of German migrants, but one point is critical to note here. Although Roosevelt quite regularly claimed to be friendly to England,\textsuperscript{295} her policy in the Western Hemisphere was not to a challenge to the Monroe doctrine for rather different reasons, writing “the fact remains, in the first place, that fundamentally we are two different nations; but yet the fact remains, in the first place, that we are closer in feeling to her than to any other nation; and in the second place, that probably her interest and ours will run on rather parallel lines in the future.” More important to him, as he continued, however, was that “as far as England is concerned I do not care a rap whether she subscribes to the Monroe doctrine or not, because she is the one power with which any quarrel on that doctrine would be absolutely certain to result to our immediate advantage. She could take the Philippines and Porto Rico, but they would be a very poor offset for the loss of Canada.”\textsuperscript{296} Despite friendliness towards Britain, and any possibly sense of Rapprochement, in the end Roosevelt dismissed Britain as a threat in large part because of his absolute confidence that in conflict with Britain, the United States could seize a far larger prize. Settler colonies remained at the heart of his world view, and the largest, most prosperous, European settler colony was already in the Western Hemisphere, was already

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\textsuperscript{291} Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 2 March 1900. 2:1208.
\textsuperscript{292} Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay, 18 February 1900. 2:1192.
\textsuperscript{293} Theodore Roosevelt to William Sheffield Cowles, 2 March 1900. 2:1208.
\textsuperscript{294} See Chapter 5
\textsuperscript{296} Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 19 June 1901. 3:97.
\end{flushright}
English-speaking, and moreover, was easily acquirable by the United States in event of even the slightest military conflict.

On at least two occasions in the summer of 1901, Roosevelt conveyed his views to the German Government. The first of these instances was to the German Consul General before he returned to Germany to see the Kaiser. Roosevelt summarized this meeting to Lodge, saying that he told the Consul General that he was even willing to accept see Germany not just involved commercially in South America but even that should a large German-speaking community emerge, he would not object to it existing as an independent state – so long as it had no political ties to Germany itself. 297 His views towards Germany as regards the Monroe doctrine were absolute, and as he told the Consul General, he “would do all in my power to have the United States take the attitude that no European nation, Germany or any other, should gain a foot of soil in any shape or way in South America, or establish a protectorate under any disguise over any South American country.” 298 While a German-speaking community of its own might be acceptable, one that was serving in disguise as a German protectorate was not. This was Roosevelt’s primary fear – which he articulated to other correspondents more directly. Although he claimed to view a German-speaking state in South America as acceptable so long as totally independent, he did not think total independence from Germany was in fact a credible possibility. Moreover, Roosevelt wrote in July to Spring that although “that exceedingly pernicious idiot, Smalley, has simply infected the London Times and other English papers with the theory that when I speak of the Monroe doctrine I have especial reference to England,” the Monroe Doctrine as he viewed it did not concern British power in the Western Hemisphere and that “the only power that needs to be reminded of its existence is Germany.” 299 Roosevelt conveyed these views to the German Ambassador as well, explaining that while he protested against any commercial advantage of any power or another in the Americas, he “most emphatically protested against either Germany or any other power getting new territory in America – just as I am certain England would object to seeing Delagoa Bay becoming German or French instead of Portuguese.” 300 Similar to Carnegie, Roosevelt viewed German expansion in the Americas as he viewed German expansion in Africa - the Western Hemisphere was for the American branch of the English-speaking race and Africa for the British branch – German encroachment on either was problematic. Moreover, during these conversations and correspondences, Germany was explicitly, clearly, and consistently on his mind more than any

297 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 19 June 1901. 3:97.
298 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 19 June 1901. 3:97.
other power with respect to the Monroe Doctrine, the construction of the canal,\textsuperscript{301} and the development of American naval capacity.

By 1902, Venezuela again had become a source of tension regarding fears of German colonial ambitions in the United States. In part due to perceived actions of Diederichs at Manila, tensions between the United States and Germany had remained high. Sensitive to this, the German government sent Prince Henry\textsuperscript{302} to the United States to reduce tensions and mistrust, which Roosevelt acknowledged in a possibly unsent letter had “wiped out the memory of Admiral Diederichs at Manila” before continuing however that “I do not understand with sufficient clearness the relations of Germany, Russia, France, and England, to be able to say exactly how much permanence there can be in the direction of the United States and Germany working with an absolutely frank understanding and for an absolute common end.”\textsuperscript{303} A combination of Diederich’s aforementioned alleged actions, conflicting interests regarding the Open Door policy, the purchase of the Danish Virgin Islands, and other interests in Latin America had turned much of American public opinion against Germany.

In Venezuela, President Cipriano Castro refused to repay debts incurred by the country for decades but exacerbated greatly in a recent civil war known as the Revolución Liberal Restauradora, in which Castro marched on Caracas with a private army in 1899 and effectively seized power. Francis Loomis, who was then the American Minister to Venezuela (1897-1901) and later the Assistant Secretary of State (1903-1905), anticipated issues regarding Venezuela’s debt. While in Venezuela, Loomis predicted Venezuela’s mounting debt would make it vulnerable to foreign efforts to either refund the debt in exchange for concessions or to use the debt as an excuse to establish formal or informal rule by another power over Venezuela. To Loomis, Germany was particularly most worrisome, as he wrote to John Hay:

I should consider it very unfortunate if the money to refund the national debt of Venezuela were to come from Germany. I fear that unpleasant if not grave international complications would grow out of the transaction; and that The Germans would have control of custom houses which might readily be increased, if they sought opportunities for so doing, to such a degree that in a course of a few years the German Government could exercise the functions of a financial and even partial political protectorate over Venezuela, in fact, though not in name. The hand that controls the custom revenues has the key to the problem of government here and may, by exercise of due wisdom and adroitness do much towards ruling the country.\textsuperscript{304}

\textsuperscript{301} Theodore Roosevelt to Hermann Speck von Sternberg, 12 July 1901. 3:115.
\textsuperscript{302} Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of Kaiser Wilhlem II and career naval officer in the Imperial German Navy.
\textsuperscript{304} Francis Loomis to John Hay. Unknown date between 1899 and 1901. Stanford Special Collections.
This concern clearly laid the groundwork for the famous 1904 Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The issue of debt was paramount, creating a vulnerability from two angles. The first was that debt provided an excuse for the Germans to establish a direct protectorate. However, the second fear was that the collection of debt through customs revenue would hand the government of Venezuela to Germany – thus why the United States insisted in 1904 that future debt collection be taken by the United States on behalf of any other power. Loomis further viewed that eventuality as one which would give Germany cause for expansion, arguing:

From a political point of view, the result would be in all probability a hundred fold more serious, for it cannot be doubted that Germany would be delighted to have a practical ascendency in the affairs of so desirable a South American country as Venezuela – a country that has about a thousand miles of coast line on the Caribbean sea with a number of good harbors. I have observed the trend of events here with much care and it is my opinion that within ten years a preponderating foreign influence will be exercised in the political affairs of Venezuela, and that it will be exercised by either Germany or Italy unless, in the meanwhile, some check be interposed by the United States either by means of an emphatic reassertion of the principle of the Monroe doctrine or by taking advantage of opportunities that seem to offer themselves to us.  

To Hay and Roosevelt’s view, as counseled by Loomis, no action taken by a European Power regarding Venezuelan debt was in isolation and rather needed to be seen in the context of broader resistance to the Monroe Doctrine. Loomis’ warnings proved prophetic and in December 1902, the European Powers, led by Britain and Germany foremost, but also with significant involvement of Italy, launched a joint blockade of Venezuela with the intent of forcibly collecting owed damages and debts. Initially, Roosevelt seemed amiable towards European intervention, writing to his friend and later German Ambassador to the United States, Hermann Speck von Sternberg, “I do not want the United States territorially to aggrandize itself in South America, and neither do I want to see any European country so aggrandize itself. If any South American State misbehaves towards any European country, let the European country spank it; but I do not wish the United States or any other country to get additional territory in South America. It would be a misfortune all around.” As long as Germany and Britain refrained from territorial acquisition, the United States initially implied it would not object. However, over the course of the blockade a series of incidents, including the incursion of the SMS Panther (the same ship that would later infamously be involved in the Agadir Crisis in 1911) into Lake Maracaibo, the subsequent destruction of Fort San Carlos by the SMS Vineta, and British and German seizures of small islands and outposts soured the United States towards the blockade. Roosevelt remained personally undecided on the matter at least through the end of

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305 Francis Loomis to John Hay. Unknown date between 1899 and 1901. Stanford Special Collections.
the year, resolving in November that “I will not commit myself on the Venezuela matter until I see Secretary Hay.”307 By this point, Hay’s views were likely informed at least in part by the aforementioned correspondence with Loomis. Nevertheless, it is clear that the fear of European territorial acquisition was already on his mind, although the United States had yet to oppose the blockade.

Roosevelt’s immediate response as President was less clear, though he found that that his “chief difficulty at the moment is the Venezuela matter in which Germany takes an impossible stand.”308 This incident too was an extension of both the Monroe Doctrine and the First Venezuela crisis. Roosevelt remained concerned that acknowledging “the power of the Hague court or of any other tribunal or of any other power to overrule us” was problematic purely due to the nature of the Monroe Doctrine, as he had interpreted it, as “the cardinal feature of American foreign diplomacy.”309 In a note in December 1902, Roosevelt noted explicitly to both Britain and Germany that any resolution of the crisis and any reward gained from Venezuela in redress to the claims of the European powers specifically “must not consist in the acquisition of territory.”310 Although Roosevelt was keen to not hinder “the collection of an honest debt” by a European Power, he was determined that “there should be no territorial aggrandizement by any European power under cover of the collection of such a debt”311. This was in his mind a continuation of, and consistent with, the policies he laid out to Cleveland in 1896, in past communication with Germany in 1902,312 and one he continually reminded Germany of through the rest of his Presidency, even as late as 1905.313

The key to Roosevelt, in line with Loomis’s missive, was that even international arbitration or a joint venture such as that the British and Germans had put forward ran the risk of European control over Venezuela. Even American involvement with a European Power in debt collection did not mitigate this risk. Indeed, Hermann Speck visited in March 1903, bringing such a proposal from his superiors in Berlin, arguing that a joint force collecting Venezuela’s debt would remove the need for “punitive expeditions by European powers” and that he “hoped America would take the initiative in such a movement.”314 However, Roosevelt remained wary of any such proposal, including any “syndicate which should take possessions of

307 Theodore Roosevelt to David Jayne Hill, 29 November 1902. 3:386.
309 Theodore Roosevelt to Albert Shaw, 26 December 1902. 3:396.
310 Theodore Roosevelt to Albert Shaw, 26 December 1902. 3:396.
311 Theodore Roosevelt to George Wheeler Hinman, 29 December 1902. 3:399.
312 Theodore Roosevelt to George Wheeler Hinman, 29 December 1902. 3:399.
the finances of Venezuela” or collective action by the Powers. 315 Although Roosevelt did not immediately respond to Speck after his visit, he wrote later that day to Secretary Hay that he instinctively was reluctant to support such a measure – too Roosevelt, the Monroe Doctrine meant “that no European power should gain control of any American republic,” and he argued that such an arrangement would “reduce Venezuela to a condition like that of Egypt” – a nominally semi-sovereign part of the Ottoman Empire that for all practical purposes was controlled and occupied by European Powers. 316 Thus although Roosevelt claimed that the United States should not hinder the collection of debt, he ultimately viewed the entire justification of “guaranteeing or collecting a debt” as a flimsy “pretense” and argued that “the American people will never consent to allowing one of the American Republics to come under the control of a European power by any such subterfuge.” 317 The Roosevelt Corollary which emerged from this was not merely a way of ensuring American supremacy in the Western Hemisphere, but in Roosevelt’s mind, truly was necessary to deprive European powers of this colonial pretext.

Roosevelt’s fears on the matter extended beyond Venezuela – as he continued in his conversations with Hay, who had also spoken to Henry White about the same matter, “Both the Dutch and the Danish possessions in America will be constant temptations to Germany unless, or until, we take them.” 318 Both this matter and building the Navy were explicitly aimed at depriving Germany of temptation. By 1906, Roosevelt even came to view the involvement of the other powers, particularly that of Britain, as being merely an accessory to German ambitions in the Western Hemisphere, and recalled that in 1903, Britain had “permitted themselves to be roped in as an appendage to Germany in the blockade of Venezuela.” 319 Indeed, he even recounted telling the German Ambassador during the crisis, at the time Theodor von Hollenben, to convey to the Kaiser that “unless an agreement for arbitration was reached” he would move Dewey’s fleet based in the Caribbean and publicly announce it would object to anything but the briefest German occupation of any Venezuelan territory – a threat he claimed “brought him to terms at once.” 320 Although he repeated this recollection later in 1906 321 and in far more dramatic detail in 1916, 322 it should be noted there does not appear to be anything concrete in his

315 Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay, 13 March 1903. 3:446.
316 Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay, 13 March 1903. 3:446.
317 Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay, 13 March 1903. 3:446.
321 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry White, 14 August 1906. 5:357.
correspondence in 1903 during the incident itself that definitively corroborates an action that can definitively be construed as an ultimatum – however, the secrecy mentioned in all of these subsequent letters seems plausible. Regardless, however, the importance for the rest of his Presidency was that this was indeed how he recalled – and for the following decade – recalled the events to others, with Britain an unwitting tool of an aggressive Germany.

Venezuela must thus be discussed in the same context as the rest of the Americas as the crisis hearkened more to fears of German settlement elsewhere. To Roosevelt, the options and policies available to him – and the context in which they stood – was completely decided and clear before the conflict even began. The formulative incidents in his mind appear to have taken place in the previous years. Vucetic suggests that it was during this crisis that a clear break between English-speaking peoples and German should have been most evident. Unfortunately, despite the fears of German settlement and the clear involvement of the German state, the available evidence does not seem to conclusively support this hypothesis. This perhaps could be due to limitations in available evidence. Clearly in the years before the crisis, this form of hostility had begun to emerge, playing into long-standing American angst regarding the Western Hemisphere. It seems plausible that by 1901 and the conclusion of the Boer War, the opinions of American leaders had already settled.

Rapprochement literature has accurately argued that, especially on the racial front, the United States and United Kingdom move closer during this period – particularly after the first Venezuela crisis during the Cleveland administration. However, the close relations between certain individuals on both sides of the Atlantic, and their insistence on viewing racial commonalities and differences as key to the character of their respective national futures, at the least influenced American action during the course of the war. This occurred not from aspirations to build alliances, long an aversion for American policymakers, but out of fear. The consequence, and important finding of this dissertation, was that the assumed racial ties of the English-speaking peoples begins to shift from being a positive construction, where it remained in 1895, to one which is constructed in opposition to fears of foreign power. Anglo-Saxonism was only just beginning the process of becoming limited to English-speaking peoples as opposed to a subset of Teutonism. Although this was just beginning in the Spanish-American War, it only

323 Rather unfortunately for examining Roosevelt’s views on really any issue, but especially anything pertaining to geopolitics, Sprin-Rice was at this time in Iran and it was during this brief time that Roosevelt’s and Spring-Rice’s correspondence reached a nadir in both geopolitical substance and frequency – of note, however, are interesting exchanges regarding ‘Oriental’ culture and the East, some of which has been addressed in Chapter Four. Additionally, although the Loomis papers at Stanford were examined for this research, the entirety of Loomis’s correspondence with Roosevelt was missing from the archives and librarians were unable to locate them, although records showed they should have been there. Hopefully the papers have not been lost to history.
intensified during the Boer War, where both sides of the conflict were on the same side of the Teutonic family.
Chapter Three – The Boer War and the Geopolitics of ‘Fusion’

“You make me rather uneasy about the German war! I have always regarded Germany while the present Kaiser lives as our most probable serious opponent, and we are capable of such infinite folly in this country that we may not prepare as we should. I do hope that neither the nation nor the navy accepts the war with Spain as anything but a warning. If we permit ourselves to relax in our exertions to bring the navy higher and higher, and if we do not build up the army and the forts, we should have a terrible time against Germany. If instead of Spaniards and Filipinos the army had gone against foes like the Boers, we should have eaten just such bitter bread as the English are now eating.”

The origins of the second Boer war itself has been attributed to numerous causes, ranging from the personal ambitions of Alfred Milner and Joseph Chamberlain to long-term strategic aims of maintaining British supremacy to economic concerns regarding the economic value of the colony and its mining wealth. These factors were not mutually exclusive, and this chapter does not seek to settle a causal question regarding the origins of the war. Instead, I argue that Anglo-Saxon fears of being outmatched in settler competition with other Teutons motivated key political leaders to remain supportive of the war and drove a wedge between the English-speaking races and the other Teuton races, including Boer and German. Moreover, as the war dragged on, it in turn influenced Roosevelt’s views on race, forcing him to rationalize the fact that Britain for years failed in its ambitions in South Africa and spurring him to create new visions for how the English-speaking races could handle this challenge. It is from watching this conflict that Roosevelt developed his thinking regarding “‘interracial law’” – a concept he constructed while thinking about colonial expansion in both South America and in South Africa. He wrote “If I were a German I should want the German race to expand. I should be glad to see it begin to expand in the only two places left for the ethnic, as distinguished from the political, expansion of the European peoples; that is, in South Africa and temperate South America.”

Notably, Roosevelt distinguished between the political expansion of imperial territory and the colonial project of settling lands with European settlers.

The historiography of the conflict contains numerous explanations as to the start of the Second Boer War. Peter Henshaw elaborates, arguing that the origins of the war arose from

three loci – the economic developments in South Africa, geopolitical concerns of decision makers in London, and the “man on the spot” theory, largely centered on the role played by Alfred Milner. This model, initially proposed by Ronald Hyam is worth mentioning here not necessarily because of its explanatory power, but because it highlights the confusion felt by contemporary figures in the United States regarding how the war began and in attempting to identify its origins. In fact, most of the American actors at the time did not fully understand how the war started and did not find it particularly important to justifying its prosecution. Roosevelt in particular, eventually after years of arguing in favor of the British, concluded in passing that the origins were unfortunate, and found both the actions of Chamberlain and Rhodes “one huge blonder.” However, once the war had begun Roosevelt pivoted towards the British as “that now the fight is on, it is earnestly to be hoped that England will put great masses of men in South Africa and that the war will be finished speedily” The question of why he supported the British in this endeavor is a key theme of this chapter.

Despite the ontological centrality of race at this time, race was not nearly the only factor in play, especially within Britain. British reasons for engaging in the conflict are numerous and have been covered extensively by a variety of scholars. Possibly one of the most written about conflicts of the period, the Boer War has attracted attention from a range of historians writing from myriad theoretical positions. Most of these works are extensively researched. Porter’s work on examining the top-down decision making from Chamberlain’s position in many ways most resembles the approach taken in this thesis, albeit with a focus on examining the racial question. Iain Smith attempts to provide an alternative explanation to Porter’s and attribute the conflict in part to economic reasons, both with a top-down decision making analysis and an examination of the local conflict in South Africa – in Smith’s case certainly not ignoring race. Other portrayals of the war focus on Chamberlain losing control to Milner resulting in unintentional escalation and the details of Cabinet politics. Biographers of Chamberlain also inevitably discuss the issue, although some fail to discuss race in any great significance, while

others discuss the course of the war from figures on the ground from the perspective of usually neglected figures.\textsuperscript{334} Denis Judd in particular, despite excellent coverage of both the South African conflict and numerous contemporary figures including Balfour and Chamberlain, discusses race primarily with respect to the white settler colonies.\textsuperscript{335} Specifically with respect to the Boer War and Chamberlain, often the politics of Cabinet intricacies are given primacy over broader thematic concerns.\textsuperscript{336} Pakenham’s coverage, although earlier than many of the other work’s discussed, examines nearly every aspect of the war in masterful detail.\textsuperscript{337} Ultimately, all of these explanations carry some merit and while many neglect elements of race, this thesis does not purport to adjudicate between the various explanations for the war. Rather than examining the cause of the war, it instead examines how the war was viewed in the context of racial rivalry between the great powers by Britain and especially the United States.

During the Boer War, both correspondence and public statements by leaders on both sides of the Atlantic highlighted two key themes. The first, was that although the Boers were clearly Germanic alongside Anglo-Saxons, this was insufficient for political alignment, and rather, was cause for increased alarm. This then fueled a split in racial perception between Anglo-Saxon and German as competitors. The second, and perhaps more important, was that here, arguably more clearly than any other contemporary crisis, it was evident to leaders on both sides of the Atlantic that Anglo-Saxons should not merely act in unity or espouse common interest, but to act against the encroachment of German power. This encroachment, through the Jameson Crisis and the Second Boer War, was realized in the Boers. The Boers became not just a minor resistance to British expansion, but an expression of the peoples against which Anglo-Saxons were seen to be competing around the world.

In the United States, American public opinion frequently swung back and forth towards the Boers due to their status as underdog republics. Notably, the United States also had a narrower definition of its own direct interests at the time, largely centered on the Western Hemisphere, and especially after the Spanish-American War, in East Asia. By 1900, the United States was clearly the world’s largest economy and by 1905, the United States had engaged in military operations not just throughout the Western Hemisphere, but as far away as in China – a topic that will be discussed in the next chapter alongside Russia and the East. Nevertheless,

\textsuperscript{335} Denis Judd, \textit{Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution 1874-1932} (Faber and Faber, 2015).
correspondence from contemporary leaders suggests that the US leadership struggled to embrace the nation’s status as a global power even after the victory with Spain. Obviously excepting a long and complicated history with Liberia – itself hardly mentioned in correspondence by this time – Africa was at best poorly understood, and at worst, also considered terra nullius. Outside of the racial context, the only other reasons American policymakers even had strong opinions regarding the Boer war was if they had an interest in learning from the military experiences of the British military. Often, as in the case of Roosevelt, these interests were mutually reinforcing. Although the American public favored the Boers and the American state’s interest had little ability or will to project commerce or power to South Africa, American policy remained firmly and consistently favorable to Britain. Why then was this the case?

The culmination of Britain’s longstanding conflicts with the Boers in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, the Boer War placed Britain in the situation America was in during its recent war with Spain – isolation in Europe.\footnote{Keith M. Wilson, ed., \textit{The International Impact of the Boer War} (Chesham: Acumen, 2001).} However, despite European sympathies, similarities between Boer and American settler cultures, public opinion, and Boer attempts to secure assistance from the United States and other European countries, US policy remained firmly sympathetic to the British Empire.\footnote{Anderson, \textit{Race and Rapprochement}; John Henry Ferguson, \textit{American Diplomacy and the Boer War} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1939); Richard B. Mulanax, \textit{The Boer War in American Politics and Diplomacy} (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994).} In Britain itself, even Joseph Chamberlain, who had and would continue to appeal to bringing racial unity between the British and Dutch settlers feared that “It was a contest for supremacy; but for what kind of supremacy? The supremacy of the Boers means, as we know, the inferiority of every other race. Our supremacy, so far as we have been able to use it, has been used and will be used in order to secure the equality of the white races and justice for the black.”\footnote{Joseph Chamberlain, speech before the House of Commons, 5 February 1900. Joseph Chamberlain, \textit{Mr. Chamberlain’s Speeches, with an Introduction by Austen Chamberlain}, M.P., ed. Charles W. Boyd, vol. 2 (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1914), 58.} The immensity of the stakes could hardly be understated despite the lack of direct conflict between the European powers.

Additionally, given this thesis’s purpose of examining racial divisions among the European powers, the Boer War provides example not just of an Anglo-Saxon power subduing a white-settler nation, but also a situation where there was notable German interference and a US President for the latter part of the war who was of Dutch descent but still appeared to consider himself Anglo-Saxon. Indeed, this sympathy was later noticed by the Boers – Roosevelt wrote 1901 that “I have felt more and more melancholy over the South African business. A good many of the Boer leaders have called upon me, most of them with a certain dignified sorrow that
though I was of Dutch blood, I seemed to have no sympathy with them when they so earnestly believed in the righteousness of their cause. As a matter of fact, I had and have the warmest personal sympathy with them, and yet I have always felt that by far the best possible result would be to have South Africa all united, with English as its common speech; and I believe that at present it cannot stand alone and that it can «do» infinitely better under Great Britain than under any other great power.”

Although Roosevelt’s personal struggle with this relationship may eventually have led him to the conclusions towards amalgamation he reached in the latter part of the conflict, at the early stage, he found it more a source for despair while he continued to conclude that the English needed emerge triumphant. Existing historiography on the Boer War largely does not focus on race, and the exceptions examine it as a case of ‘Rapprochement.’ Anderson in particular approaches the issue as one of Anglo-Saxonist collaboration stemming from the amicability following Spanish-American War, which, unfortunately, misses the existential nature of how political leaders viewed the long-term threat. Anglo-Saxonism did not remove antagonism between Britain and the United States merely by fostering a positive relationship after the Spanish-American War. It instead created a larger threat epitomized in the Boer. In this sense, the Boer presence in South Africa was exactly what the United States had feared in Latin America – a Germanic settler colony.

It cannot be ignored of course that the Boers are not German. However, they were indeed Germanic and they were decidedly not of the ‘English-speaking races.’ Moreover, as the war continued, the continued relative success of Boer forces convinced the United States that the Boers were indeed Teutonic and belonged to that tier in their racial hierarchies, particularly as to martial ability. Moreover, since the Jameson Raid, the Kruger Telegram had reinforced the ideas that the Boers could be a proxy for the German state itself. German attempts to purchase Curacao from the Netherlands or the Danish Virgin Islands were a mirror on the other side of the Atlantic – and whether Germany might supplant the Dutch in at least Africa a test case for the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, there remained considerable support for the Boer from the German administration, among the German public, and as Dedering notes a, “romanticised image of the Boers gained wide currency in Wilhelmine Germany. They were depicted as Teutonic 'blood-brothers' in the African diaspora, who fought for survival in the wilderness, under constant pressure from 'perfidious Albion.'”

In short, it was not that the Boers were identical with German colonists, but that they were not Anglo-Saxon – at least, not yet. Lastly,

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the existing historiography examining American policy towards the Boer War, even when acknowledging the role of Anglo-Saxonist thought as both Anderson and Tichin do, seems to conclude largely when Hay and Roosevelt decided to be friendly towards the Boer – at least in Roosevelt’s case, a much more interesting transformation takes place towards what he sees as the answer to the question of race in South Africa.

The arc of the Second Boer War – expanded to include the Jameson Raid – thus presents a fascinating trajectory for the American view on Anglo-Saxons. John Hay and Theodore Roosevelt in particular remained staunch Anglo-Saxonists. The former, despite being the consummate diplomat, never diverges from his traditional view advocating closer relations with the United Kingdom. The latter, who during this brief period ascends from being the Police Commissioner of New York City to the Presidency, shifted from seeing the Boer as the embodiment of the German threat he saw in the mid-1890s, to having those fears confirmed in realizing how well the Boer’s resisted the British, to deciding that the future for resolving the racial threat from Germany was to make the Germanic races Anglo-Saxon. This creates an important methodological issue for this chapter that must be addressed. Although much of this thesis is already heavily dependent on Roosevelt’s writings, it is from this juncture they become most heavily relied upon. This is for the simple reason that from 1901 onwards, Roosevelt is simply unquestionably the most important figure in American foreign policy. Not only were his foreign policy views frequently pre-eminent even prior to his Presidency, he was a President that, as mentioned by his own admission in his correspondence, was interested more in foreign policy than in domestic affairs. The result was that for the duration of Roosevelt’s Presidency, his views on foreign affairs were synonymous with America’s behavior in foreign affairs. Public opinion did occasionally constrain his domestic policy particularly and most damningly regarding racial politics in the South, but rarely, if ever, his foreign policy. Moreover, Roosevelt tended to assume that public opinion agreed with his views on the world, or if they did not, that they would soon be convinced – particularly after his ascension to the Presidency. Thus, the reversal, from Anglo-Saxons being a part of a Germanic umbrella, to viewing Germanic peoples as potential Anglo-Saxons, became the cornerstone of how he and numerous of his correspondents including in Britain address this perceived threat.

**British Intervention**

Although Dutch settlers had lived in South Africa since the 18th century, by the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain gained permanent control over Cape Colony. In an event later
referred as one of the key milestones in the development of Boer identity, thousands of Boer settlers of the now British Cape Colony migrated North and founded the first Boer republics. A series of conflicts involving the British and the Zulu resulted in the annexation of Natal and smaller republics, however, by the late 19th century, two Boer states remained – the Orange Free State and the South African Republic.343 After the Anglo-Zulu wars in the 1879, Britain attempted to assert control over the Transvaal in the First Boer War – and failed spectacularly, resulting in one of Britain’s most notable colonial defeats since the American Revolution.

By 1895, British policymakers largely had little interest in further Imperial expansion, having just raced across of the African continent along with the other European powers in the ‘Scramble for Africa.’ Nevertheless, certain politicians continued to remain interested in expansion for a variety of reasons – notably Rhodes and Milner who, along with their personal interests, believed in “a future British Empire that would become a sort of worldwide super-state.”344 Chamberlain too, characteristically, remained interested in imperial expansion. However, the assessment by certain historians that “it may well be doubted that Chamberlain was in earnest when he suggested that the three Teutonic peoples – the British, the Germans and the Americans – were destined to become joint rulers over the indigenous peoples of the world”345 and that Chamberlain advocated peace with Germany to remove a European adversary and allow expansion in Africa are, as discussed in the first chapter, likely underestimating the significance of the racial angle to his world view. Nevertheless, regardless of Chamberlain’s reasonings, he was undoubtedly one of the stronger proponents for annexation of the Boer republics and maintaining the British position of supremacy as the ‘Paramount Power’ established in 1884 by the London Convention.

In the 1890s, gold mining expanded explosively in the Transvaal. This produced two geopolitical concerns for the British. The first was that the wealth of gold mining could potentially result in a much stronger Transvaal that could use Portuguese Delagoa Bay (itself a long-standing concern for British policymakers) to “weaken Britain’s dealings with it’s European rivals, particularly German but also France and Russia.”346 The second and more important was the issue of the ‘Uitlander’ – the Boer term for other white settlers, usually English-speaking and

343 The South African Republic (SAR) was informally known as the Transvaal Republic or the Transvaal. This thesis refers to it as ‘Transvaal’ or ‘the Transvaal,’ as most of the contemporary primary sources in Britain and the United States use that name, almost exclusively. In fact, at times sources in America in particular seem to use ‘Transvaal’ to refer to both Boer Republics.
345 Mommsen, 3.
mostly British, in the Transvaal that immigrated en masse along with the discovery of gold in 1886. Eventually, the Uitlanders came to dramatically outnumber the resident voting Boer citizenry – yet President Kruger refused to extend the franchise without extensive residency requirements, himself fearing that the Uitlanders would vote to end Transvaal independence in favor of Britain. Nevertheless, this issue provided to perfect pretext to Milner and others to eventually start the Boer War.

Thus, in 1895, using the pretext of the Uitlander cause, troops under the employ of the Alfred Beit and Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company entered the Transvaal and marched on Johannesburg, hoping – and utterly failing – to start an insurrection among the Uitlanders. Along with the censure of Beit, the removal of Rhodes from the chairmanship of the Company, the further ascent of Milner, the Raid also set the stage for further damaging relations between Britain and Germany. After the raid, the Kaiser famously telegraphed President Kruger congratulating him on repelling the raid. Although the Kaiser claimed in his memoirs in 1922 that others were the impetus behind the telegram and that he signed only reluctantly, contemporary correspondence suggests that at least the British diplomatic establishment felt the Kaiser personally supported the telegram. Shortly after the Kruger Telegram, Spring Rice conveys the fury of the Kaiser in Berlin at the news to his friend and the Assistant Undersecretary at the foreign office Francis Villiers, writing that “The Emperor received the news of the invasion with a transport of fury and is reported to have made some remarkable statements, for instance, that he would send back his British uniform, as it was only fit to be worn by robbers, etc., etc. It was quite certain that if he was excited he would do or say something.” With respect to whether the German ministers or the Kaiser was responsible for the missive, Spring-Rice concluded that “Accordingly he produced this telegram. So it is certain that in its terms the authorities approve of the telegram. As to sending it at all, it is equally certain that the Government here disapproved.” Clearly at least, the British considered this representative of official German position at the Imperial level.

Throughout these events, Spring-Rice – who was still with the Foreign Office in Berlin – conveyed back to Villiers in London that the Kruger telegram and the European response to the Jameson Raid was evidence of a plot against Britain. The European response to this and the

547 Including a range of important commercial and corporate interests, see: Henshaw, 10–15.
549 Francis Villiers was one of Spring-Rice’s friends at the Foreign Office and at this time the Assistant Undersecretary
551 Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice to Francis Villiers, 11 Jan 1896. Gwynn, 1:188.
later incidents of the Boer War convinced British policymakers that at the least outside the European continent, Germany gaining at the expense of Britain was a favorable outcome to European powers. In fact, Spring-Rice and Villiers continued to speculate as to the existence of broader consequences, the possible presence of a scheme, and argued “I don’t think it is possible to deny that a plot of some sort existed….For the last two years the papers have been full of allusions to the Boer kinsmen and, of course, the Emperor’s utterances have been clear enough for some time. Rhodes is continually abused as the enemy of Germany, and ‘all he wants is to keep Germany out.’ The Official Press have for some time been singing the same hymn in various notes—that Germany has united herself with France and Russia and forms the trait d’union between them and the Triple Alliance.” 352 What then would be the purpose of such an enterprise? Spring-Rice feared that the alliance would decide that “All European questions are to be shelved. But the Powers are to be free to carry on their enterprises in the rest of the world – that is, at the expense of England. And where shall Germany’s share come in? Somewhere, evidently. No one who read the German Official Press during the last month could doubt that there was a plot against England on an enormous scale.”353 This plot represented Britain’s deepest longstanding geopolitical concern – a continental settlement aimed at challenging Britain around the globe. As clear in the conversation with Villers, the British diplomatic circles were increasingly concerned about where Germany fell in the European alliance structure.

However, race did not necessarily feature preeminent in all of their concerns – while it was persuasive to Balfour and Spring-Rice, it was far less so to Lansdowne or Pauncefote. Similar sentiments were echoed at the highest levels in London, where Chamberlain wrote to Balfour that the political inquiry regarding the incident should include not just “The circumstances of the raid itself, and the responsibility of Dr. Jameson …. The origin of, and all the facts connected with, the agitation in Johannesburg ….The alleged complicity with both the attempted insurrection and with Dr Jameson’s raid of Mr Rhodes and the Chartered Company” But also “The alleged plot between the Germans + the Government of the Transvaal to oust British influence.”354 The suspicion that the Boers were secretly in league – or could one day become a proxy of Germany – underlay many of Britain’s fears regarding the situation, similar to America’s fears of German settlement in the Western Hemisphere.

352 Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice to Francis Villiers, 11 Jan 1896. Gwynn, 1:188.
353 Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice to Francis Villiers, 11 Jan 1896. Gwynn, 1:188.
Shortly after the Jameson Raid, Roosevelt began to believe that the Boer situation was likely to continue due to Britain’s unwilling to push the Boers after the failed raid, writing to Henry White that “I think that all of England’s troubles in the Transvaal now are due to her having at first disregarded the rights of the boers, and then under the lead of Gladstone having made a cowardly retreat before them; that is the kind of magnanimity which dose nothing but evil. It looks to me, I regret to say, as though the English had serious trouble ahead of them at the Cape and in South Africa, generally.” Roosevelt saw this as fundamentally problematic and an unsustainable situation – and one he tied very early to race. He continued, “I am very sorry for this, for though I greatly admire the boers, I feel that it is to the interest of civilization that the English speaking race should be dominant in South Africa, exactly as it is for the interest of civilization that the United States themselves, the greatest branch of the English speaking race, should be dominant in the Western Hemisphere.”

The colonial project of settling lands with settlers was critical to Roosevelt, while non-settler political expansion of imperial territory was rather a distraction. Historian James Belich persuasively argues that in fact, the British colonial experience in South Africa was not one in which white immigrants to the colony substantially outnumbered immigrants from elsewhere in the Empire. Nevertheless, the false perception of South Africa as among the last places possible to settle was critical to Roosevelt’s views. He elaborated that “Therefore, as a German I should be delighted to upset the English in South Africa, and to defy the Americans and their Monroe Doctrine in South America. As an Englishman, I should seize the first opportunity to crush the German Navy and the German commercial marine out of existence, and take possession of both the German and Portuguese possessions in South Africa, leaving the Boers absolutely isolated.” Most importantly, Roosevelt thus saw German imperialism as not only threatening, but perfectly understandable and necessary for the Germans. Conflict between the English-speaking peoples and the Germans was an eventuality that neither could nor should be avoided. Moreover, his views regarding the British fleet revolved around the need to split this burden in a hemispheric division of labor – the British would counter the Germany Navy and deal with German possessions in Africa while the United States would take the burden of policing the Western Hemisphere and keep it free of German colonies. Thus, before the onset of the main

356 Roosevelt initially wrote ‘best’ here and crossed this out
358 Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*.
portion of the Second Boer War, Roosevelt’s views towards British expansion against the Boer Republics already tended towards favoring Britain.

This line of thinking continued to inform politicians on both sides of the Atlantic through the next few years – that ultimately, the British were correct to attempt to turn South Africa into the domain of the English-speaking races. British policy pursued a separate path with Germany for a few years, including an attempted alliance overture led by Joseph Chamberlain, settlements regarding Tsingtao in China, and a settlement regarding Samoa with both Britain and America. The 1898 Anglo-German Convention attempted to settle certain regarding the British and German positions in South Africa, particularly as related to how both states would handle the Portuguese possessions on the continent. Crafted by Chamberlain, Salisbury, and Balfour, the 1898 agreement indeed succeeded in isolating the Transvaal. Delagoa Bay and the ability of the Boer Republics to bypass Cape Colony by trading through Portuguese possessions were longstanding concerns of British policymakers. However, by 1899, a host of considerations once again led British policymakers to consider an invasion of the Transvaal. Arthur Balfour, at this time the First Lord of the Treasury and tasked with directly handling the crisis in the Transvaal and Joseph Chamberlain, still the Colonial Secretary, dominated much of Britain’s foreign policy. Salisbury, the Prime Minister, chose to hold the Foreign Office portfolio and allowed the First Lord of the Treasury to fall to Balfour. However, despite Salisbury’s interest in Foreign Policy, he was often ill by this point in his life and would at these times Balfour to control the Foreign Office. During the Boer conflict in particular, Balfour took a leading role, along with Chamberlain after the war began. In response to a dispatch written by Chamberlain to the Cabinet, Balfour wrote in a memorandum to the Cabinet, “Our difficulties with the Transvaal arise, not out of the recollections of Majuba Hill or of the Raid, but out of the very essence of a situation, quite unparalleled, so far as I know, in history.” He continued, elaborating regarding this situation, “No case ever occurred in which the majority of a community are alien in blood, different in language, superior in cultivation and wealth, to a minority which constitutes the original national stock to whom the country political belongs.” This theme – that the status of the Uitlander was unusual and exceptional reoccurred in both American and British correspondence. Whether or not it was in fact the primary motivator for the conflict, it was undoubtedly a key contemporary justification. Most interestingly, Balfour also acknowledged in

360 Judd, Radical Joe, 214.
361 Decisive final battle and Boer victory over British forces at the end of the First Boer War
the same memorandum that what the Boers feared was precisely what the British government was asking of them. In the case of granting the franchise to the Uitlander, Balfour recognized that while “we describe this process as one of electoral reform” it would be perfectly reasonable for the Boers to “describe it as a transfer of nationality.” Similarly, he acknowledged that the British requirement to teach English in schools, while to him “a natural and proper request” as the source of education funding was contributed by Englishmen, “it practically means, and must mean, that the national language will in no short time be eliminated an alien language put in its place.” Balfour was perfectly aware that both the extension of the franchise and the teaching of the English language would instantly turn the Boer into a minority political faction speaking a minority language. To the British government, of course, this was necessary – the present status quo of “Boer supremacy” was ultimately untenable. “The South African Republic may last forever, but it cannot for very long be a Boer Republic. … were I a Boer, brought up in Boer traditions, nothing but necessity would induce me to adopt a constitution which would turn my country into an English Republic, or a system of education which would reduce my language to the patois of a small and helpless minority.” The task of the British policy in South Africa therefore became explicitly to create this necessity and bring about the end of any Boer Republic. The British government clearly recognized that the acceptance of the demands by the Transvaal would result in the Boer being supplanted by English-speaking peoples – and that consequently these demands, if presented as described in the memorandum were impossible for any Boer state to accept. Moreover, Balfour was not alone in identifying the consequences of this action and in even trying to justify military action in order to bring about its accomplishment.

It was also acknowledged by contemporary discussion in the Cabinet that this state of affairs was not only unprecedented, as Balfour described it, but required extraordinary justification. In continuation to the memorandum, Balfour wrote to Chamberlain that “My perplexities arise largely from the fact that if the Transvaal were to be dealt with on ordinary principles, there does not seem to me to be anything like a causus belli established……Are there then any peculiarities in our relation to the Transvaal which would justify us in submitting it to more summary treatment than any ordinary Foreign State?” Balfour acknowledged that the upcoming ultimatum to the Transvaal, its expected rejection, and the subsequent British invasion potentially exceeded expected international norms under the European diplomatic system. It

367 Arthur Balfour to Joseph Chamberlain, Dictated, 6 May 1899. Drus, 175.
therefore seems likely that the diplomatic isolation following the intervention in Transvaal Britain faced from the various powers, excepting the United States, was rather expected. In attempting to find a rationale that might cause for different laws of declaring war, Balfour continued, “I do not think that any such peculiarity arises out of the Convention except in regard to the matters in which the Convention itself has been broken?...Such peculiarity, if it exists, therefore, can only be found in the fact that Englishmen are not merely a majority of one town, but are a majority of the whole population of the Republic. This state of things, without parallel in history, may perhaps be a sufficient ground for exceptional measures.”

While Roosevelt’s understanding of “interracial law” excused this in his mind, Britain expected, and received, diplomatic opposition from every other power.

The ultimatum that was eventually sent to the South African Republic, the drafts discussed by the government, and contemporary correspondence, all suggest that this struggle was the key question in the minds of political leaders. Although a great many factor precipitated the conflict, the issue of the Uitlander replacing the Boer, and that this was a desirably outcome, surfaced constantly. The language of the draft noted that the previous Conventions, including the “new concession of 1884” were created “in the hope of securing better relations and the entire obliteration of race feeling.” In laying out the grievances the British government saw as the Transvaal having committed, the ultimatum elaborated that “The General result of the policy pursued by the Government of the South African Republic has been willing to place all white men in the Transvaal other than burghers in a position of humiliating and vexatious inferiority, with no political rights of any value, and no effective means of obtaining redress for their grievances….The treatment of Her Majesty’s subjects of African descent and of British Indians has been much worse than that of European birth.” However, the white population remained the issue of primary concern to political leaders in London. It continued that the British government had no choice but to conclude that “the promises of equal privileges and rights for all the white inhabitants of the Transvaal made by President Krüger and his colleagues, at the time when the Convention of 1881 was signed, have been broken” and also that the manner that the Transvaal had implemented the Conventions “have failed to secure the objects

368 There are two Conventions likely referred – the 1881 Pretoria Convention which ended the First Boer War, and the 1884 London Convention which updated the Pretoria Convention and largely offered more generous terms to the Boers. Contemporary British leaders tended to see the 1884 Convention as an updated version of the earlier agreement rather than an independent document.


of British policy, and the rights and privileges of the majority of the population.” Still referring of course to the majority only with respect to the white population, it directly attributed the tensions between the Boer and the Uitlander to the “the constant imposition of new burthens and restrictions on the Uitlanders; and the preferential treatment accorded to the burghers as compared with persons of other nationalities,” claiming that these policies “are in striking contrast to the policy pursued by Great Britain in its South African possessions, and thus racial animosity, which it has been the continual object of Her Majesty’s Government to prevent, has been created and encouraged” As Balfour was well aware, the peaceful resolution of this ‘racial animosity,’ as they saw it, would have benefited only Uitlander power.

Even with these grievances listed to the Transvaal, an ultimatum would of course not have been much of an ultimatum without demands. The demands were extensive, ranging from “most favored nation status” to limiting the Transvaal’s foreign engagements in a number of ways. However, although these were more extreme than the 1881 and 1884 Conventions, there were elements that were milder than Balfour’s memorandum, if only because it would have resulted in the eventual long-term decline of Boer identity as opposed to the instantaneous shift in political power Balfour initially proposed. The first demand made, however, was the repeal of legislation since 1881 seen to privilege the Boer population and in the same clause was accompanied by a demand that the Uitlanders be able to use their own language – English – in “Legislature and in the Law Courts” and a “redistribution in some reasonable proportion to the population.” This redistribution likely referred to the expansion of the franchise to the entirety of the Uitlander population; effectively, this would put wealth, political power, and the predominant language in the hands of the Uitlander population. Along with a demand for “most-favoured-nation rights not only in commercial matters but in all matters affecting British interests or the position of British subjects, whether white or coloured” this would have made the majority population of the Boer Republics subject to British adjudication. Although the British Government was willing to discuss in the short-term measures that might “prevent the old burghers form being immediately swamped by the new population” the long-term conclusion was inevitable and desirable to the British Government – that the Boers would indeed be swamped by the Uitlanders.

It was also expected, as seen in the aforementioned Balfour memorandums, that the Transvaal would reach the same conclusion and find the demands impossible to accept. Michael Hicks Beach commented on this draft, arguing regarding what he considered the most important piece of the proposed ultimatum, “The repeal of all legislation affecting the rights and privileges of the Uitlanders since 1881 with a provision as to any necessary safeguards in view of the increase of population since that time, but with the equality of the white races as its basis. This last principle established, even the present independence of the Transvaal would do no real harm in practice.”

Even a Transvaal that was formally outside the control of British political empire was acceptable so long as the Uitlanders were given comparable political rights to the Boer settlers. As he clearly noted, there was certainly no consideration that any non-white people be given further rights. However, the “equality of the white races” he proposed was with the understanding that this would result in control of the Transvaal government being given to British settlers. Britain was primarily concerned with the white population, and when speaking of a minority ruling over a majority, it is important to note that this refers to a white minority ruling over another white minority. It was expected that a white settler population would eventually come to dominate South Africa – the contest as they saw it, regardless of the actual reality in South Africa, was one to determine which white population would gain primacy. It was inconceivable to them to question whether one would come to dominate the area at all. Alfred Milner wrote in late 1899 largely agreeing, that “One thing is quite evident. The ultimate end is a self-governing white Community, supported by well-treated and justly governed black labour from Cape Town to Zambesi. There must be one flag, the Union Jack, but under it equality of races and languages. Given equality all round, English must prevail, though I do not think, and do not wish, that Dutch should altogether die out.”

Of course to Milner, even the term ‘races’ only refers to white races – equality of races certainly did not include the black population, which was relegated to the eternal role of governed labor. Nevertheless, he still required the primacy of English, arguing that even that in Cape Colony, whose Constitution at the time guaranteed political divisions according to Dutch and English populations, that this maintained “racial bitterness” and “aggravates the race split by making it also the dividing line of political parties.”

To most of the key leaders in Britain, the political equality of English and Dutch – resulting in the political domination of the people of English descent in the Cape and the Uitlander in the Boer Republics – was unquestionably desirable.

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It could admittedly be argued that this was floated as an impossible condition in order to create that “unprecedented” *actus bellii* and therefore allow Britain to prosecute the war for other reasons while ostensibly protecting the Uitlander. However, two factors suggest that at least to these individuals, the Uitlander issue was indeed of critical importance. First, the contemporary discussion surrounding the documents seem to corroborate that, even in documents that the Transvaal Government could never have seen, British leaders seem concerned with the fate of the Uitlander and what that would mean to the racial makeup of South Africa. Second, without making this demand, the British Government could quite probably have achieved any other economic or security concession it wanted from the Transvaal without having to resort to war. This is not to suggest that Milner, Rhodes, Chamberlain, and others that have been accused perhaps rightly, both contemporaneously and in the century since, for having profited privately from the war did not do so. However, more importantly, the equality of the Uitlander with the Boer was the only issue on which both the Transvaal and Britain could not compromise on, leaving the ultimate racial makeup of the area as the only objective which required war for Britain to achieve. Moreover, despite accusations of impropriety, even Milner consistently argued for a British racial supremacy in South Africa, ideally under a federated imperial British state.377 As Geyser notes in his analysis of Alfred Milner and Jan Smuts, Milner wrote that “I attach the greatest importance of all to the increase in the British population. British and Dutch have to live here on equal terms. If, ten years hence, there are three men of British race to two of Dutch, the country will be safe and prosperous. If there are three of Dutch to two of British, we shall have perpetual difficulty.”378 The British political and diplomatic leadership by 1899 had not only seen Germany as a rival power in the area for years, but the war was consciously and purposefully aimed to replace the Boer as the dominant settler population, through a process of both migration and assimilation, in South Africa. More surprisingly, perhaps, the leaders in the United States were sympathetic to this endeavor.

**America and the Boer**

The interest, even at times obsession, of contemporary American policymakers in the Boer War is not immediately obvious. Indeed, although British political leaders obviously spent far more effort in prosecuting the war and understanding its minutiae in a way that US leaders would never truly reach, US leaders seem to bring the issue up repeatedly. US leaders noted at

378 Alfred Milner to Hantburty Williams, quoted in Geyser, 424.
the time, the American national interest in the Boer was distant and the American public often sided with the Boer issue. This was certainly of concern to the primary drivers of US policy towards the Boer War, John Hay and Theodore Roosevelt, albeit from different perspectives. John Hay’s perspectives towards the conflict have been covered either by historians Bradford Perkins379 or William Tilchin.380 As is corroborated by archival evidence, they conclude that Hay, as arguably the most significant foreign policy voice in the McKinley administration, was driven by a decades long friendliness towards Britain. Although he saw a formal alliance with Britain as impossible domestically, he frequently wrote favorably about its potential. In 1899, he wrote to Henry White about relations with Germany, mentioning regarding the Boer conflict that “Have you seen Bourke Cockran’s fool letter to the President demanding that we shall side with the Boers against England? I declined to answer it, except by acknowledging receipt, and he then printed it. All the Irish, and many Germans, take the same attitude. But of course we shall do nothing of the kind. I hope, if it comes to blows, that England will make quick work of Uncle Paul. Sooner or later, her influence must be dominant there, and the sooner the better.”381 Hay’s views never deviated far from that perspective. Notably, he saw the German and Irish immigrant population to the United States as siding with the Boers – Hay in fact frequently cited the German immigrant population in particular as problematic with respect to foreign affairs, making an alliance with Britain impossible. However, his desire for such an alliance was less motivated by fear of the Boer or German than unwavering long-standing affection for Britain for decades. Roosevelt, while having developed similar sympathies towards Britain due to the Spanish-American War and the previous years of British friendliness classically characterized as the Rapprochement, consistently approached the question from a different angle in which he wrestled with kinship with the Boer and why exactly he desired English speakers to populate that corner of the globe.

Especially in the earlier part of the war, Britain did not expect the Boers to be capable of mounting a serious resistance to British military might. Rather than a loss against the Boers or an endless war of attrition, the most pressing of the perceived dangers to Britain was the same as that faced by the United States in the Spanish-American war – diplomatic isolation from the great powers. On the American side however, Lodge noted by December 1899 that “I should say that England was having a bad time in the Transvaal, and the papers this morning give an

account of a worse repulse than they have yet had at all.” 382 Britain of course had noticed the same issues and had replaced the military leadership by early 1900. However, the reasons attributed for the failures were different and substantially racial on the American side. As Lodge argued to Roosevelt, “The face is that they have been whipping hill tribes and Dervishes so long that they have forgotten how white men fight and underestimate their antagonist. They also overlook the fact, which always weights enormously with me in judging anything of this sort, that history for three hundred years had shown that there we no tougher or more stubborn fighters on the face of the earth than Dutchman and Huguenots. I doubt if there are any people who have exhibited a greater capacity for holding up under defeat and resisting odds than the men of these two stocks, and yet everyone I saw in London last summer talked perfectly lightly about it, as if they had nothing to do but fight one or two short actions and then walk into Pretoria.” 383 Unlike to Britain, to Lodge and Roosevelt, the fact the Boers were resisting the British so successfully was not surprising, but rather to be expected given the racial traits they expected in any Germanic population. This highlighted a contemporary discrepancy that both Roosevelt and Lodge were aware of – that Britain did not necessarily acknowledge the fighting abilities of the Boers yet. Yet as was repeatedly noted in the correspondence among American leaders, there was general assumption that the American public – and the Congress - would naturally side with the Boer republics. For the most part, this was in fact correct - yet why then did American policy remain friendly to Britain?

This was questioned numerous times over the next two years, as Roosevelt wrote, “By the way, when you see accounts of anti-British or pro-Boer meetings being held and addresses being made by Senators, Congressmen, etc., remember that these same Senators and Congressmen are the ones who make addresses and introduce resolutions on behalf of the Filipinos and praise Aguinaldo as a second Washington, just as they do my very remote kinsman Oom Paul.384 385 This was likely of at least some political significance, as Roosevelt felt forced to use political pressure in order to prevent Congress from passing a pro-Boer resolution and worried that the growth of pro-Boer sympathy in the Senate might be beyond his ability to control. 386 Roosevelt certainly acknowledged that the Boer republics had valid elements in their claims, arguing that “On the surface the side of the Boer republics seems very strong, and though there is a very real friendliness for England here, largely as a result of her attitude in the

382 Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, 16 December 1899. Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1925, 1:429.
383 Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, 16 December 1899. Lodge, 1:429.
384 Oom Paul - “Uncle Paul” - was a popular Afrikaans nickname for Paul Kruger.
Spanish-American war, yet the average man who thinks hurriedly is apt quite sincerely to believe that the Boers are in the right, and that it is a case of two valiant little republics fighting against a giant empire which desires to conquer them for the sake of the gold fields. The very unfortunate proceedings connected with the Jameson raid undoubtedly tended to foster this impression.”

Nevertheless, Roosevelt ultimately accepted Milner’s longstanding cases for intervention against the Boer republics, and continued that, “On the other hand, there are plenty of men who, as a former major of my regiment phrased it, believe that England is simply doing towards the Boers what the United States would do in one moment towards, for instance Nicaragua or Costa Rica if they treated Americans as the Uitlanders have been treated in the Transvaal.”

Interestingly, this even helped to explain the perplexing empathy, as Roosevelt and Hay saw it, of the American public and European diplomacy with the Boer cause. While it in no way challenged the legitimacy of British action, he did admit that, “Of course, the average person who does not think is inclined to sympathize with the Boers, just as if under similar circumstances we started to invade Nicaragua or Costa Rica, sympathy would go against us. The average individual is shortsighted and in a hurry, and all he sees is the two small republics which have put practically all their able-bodied men at the front and are making an exceedingly game fight against a mighty Empire which if victorious will certainly annex them.”

Notably, however, this was something that Roosevelt classically attributed to the rash mob and he concluded “but of course all cool-headed and farsighted people realize that the war probably had to come: that it was impossible for England permanently to submit to the way the Uitlanders were treated, exactly as it would be impossible for us permanently to submit to similar treatment of American citizens in Nicaragua, for instance; and that the interests of the English-speaking races and of civilization demand the success of the English arms.”

This sentiment was frequently reinforced, when even after he emphasized his “keen sympathy with our friends of the British Embassy” he continued that “The trouble with the war is not that both sides are wrong, but that from their different standpoints both sides are right. The Boers feel themselves to be fighting for the same principles for which their ancestors and ours fought three centuries back against the Spaniards; whereas the English fight just as we should fight if, in Mexico for instance, the Americans were treated as the Uitlanders were treated in the Transvaal.”

Thus, the Jameson Raid and the American experience with the British in the Spanish-American War
formed the early foundations of how American policymakers were inclined to act towards the British.

Although the American public was easily able to empathize with the cause of the smaller Boer Republics, the policymakers attributed this as a feature of the thinking of the average citizen – a matter distinct from their responsibility as those elected to govern. Although not the focus of this thesis, it certainly suggests a complex view of the relationship between the governing official and their responsibilities regarding the will of the public as they found “the man in the street naturally does not look as far ahead as this. All he sees is the two tiny little republics making an extraordinary fight against a great Empire. ... In consequence you would find the feeling here rather mixed. If the British Empire had been pitted against a great nation, I am sure American sympathy would have been with her entirely.” While the public might have sided with the Boer, Roosevelt saw it as the responsibility of the administration to side with the cause of the Uitlanders – seeing commonality with the cause of American citizens elsewhere in the Americas.

Why then did the Roosevelt feel able to resist this pressure and pursue their own agenda regarding the Boer conflict? Roosevelt in particular more so than Hay continued to be troubled by this and saw the British friendliness in the Spanish American war as the key that kept the American public manageable. As William Tilchin argues, the rapprochement of the early 20th century “was advanced by a number of major events – very prominently including the Boer War, as this essay contends – but perhaps the single most critical episode was the Spanish American War.” This conclusion is certainly not unfounded. Roosevelt indeed agreed on this point in writing to Henry White, “Take the Boer war. If it had not been for England’s attitude in ’98 I believe that this country would have been swept by such a gust of sympathy for the Boer republics that trouble would almost inevitably have followed. As it is the bulk of the sentiment has been unquestionably in favor of the Boers: but it has been tempered by a very strong friendly feeling toward England. I am not now going into the question whether this sentiment is right or wrong; but it exists.” Nevertheless, as later correspondence shows, he most certainly did not agree with that sentiment in favor of the Boers. Anti-English sentiment was similarly dismissed from the Senate and the House as he claimed, “I have no patience with the Senators and Representatives that attend anti-British meetings and howl about England. I notice that they are

392 Theodore Roosevelt to A. J. Sage, 9 March 1900. 2:1214.
393 Tilchin, “The United States and the Boer War,” 108.
generally men that sympathized with Spain two years ago.”\textsuperscript{395} Although this was an exaggeration of the degree of sympathy for Spain in the US Congress – and perhaps underestimates sympathy for the Boers, Roosevelt and Lodge continued to expend political capital in pressuring the legislature to side with Britain for several years.

In the end, the parallel to American fears in Latin America was inescapable; the British experience in South Africa was not just troubling for the reasons already mentioned, but because he envisioned that the exact same scenario could repeat itself in Latin America should America not build up its naval power in particular. Elaborating, Roosevelt wrote, “I believe we intend to build up a good navy, but whether we shall build up even a respectable little army or not I do not know; and if we fail to do so, it may well be that a few years hence, should Germany try to establish herself in South America, we shall have to learn a bitter lesson; for I firmly believe our people would fight in such a contingency.”\textsuperscript{396} This, or a similar refrain, reoccurred constantly in reference to the Boer War. Almost without exception, the cause of the Uitlander was seen as similar to the possible cause of an American citizen in Latin America, and the Boer position was consistently compared to an imaginary German presence in South America.

Moreover, even to American leaders, the long-term necessity was still seen as the settlement of South Africa with English settlers that would replace the Boer. As Roosevelt advocated months earlier, “If only you can send enough settlers to Africa and let some men like Kitchener deal in his own way with the Boers, if it is absolutely necessary, I think that the future of the African continent will lie in your hands and be under your direction. And at a splendid work this will be! It is enough of itself to establish a race for all time.”\textsuperscript{397} The significance of this extended beyond merely the desire to settle Africa. Roosevelt at this time was, without reservation, supporting the British approach. Indeed, he actively suggested letting “Kitchener deal in his own way with the Boers” – a ‘way’ which included the early use and arguable invention of the modern concentration camp. Whether Roosevelt knew of the extent of these atrocities is not clear. However, at the start of the conflict, he saw it as nothing less than the height of racial achievement, in which the United States shared, for Britain to settle Africa. John Hay similarly attributed the concentration camps “to the stubborn unwillingness of the Boer to give up the fight.”\textsuperscript{398} Although later he hinted at ignorance, Roosevelt continued that “Of course, I do not know exactly what is going on in South Africa. Evidently new field tactics must

\textsuperscript{395} Theodore Roosevelt to William Wingate Sewall, 24 April 1900. 2:1269.
\textsuperscript{396} Theodore Roosevelt to John St. Loe Strachey, 27 January 1900. 2:1143.
\textsuperscript{397} Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 11 August 1899. 2:1049.
\textsuperscript{398} Tilchin, “The United States and the Boer War,” 108.
be learned. I should suppose Kitchener was the man to learn them. Of one thing I am certain, every regiment that can be raised should be put into South Africa as soon as possible, and in a mass.”

Lodge had at the least agreed that Kitchener was invaluable, writing earlier in criticism that “they do not employ Kitchener, who struck me when I met him, as one of the finest types of the effective fighter that I have ever met.” The human cost was of course the same one which the United States itself imposed on the Native populations for decades, including through the use of forced marches and internment camps. The hypocrisy of American policy towards the concentration camps serves as a reminder to the danger of tying a state’s policy to a constructed race. The term itself was popularized as a translation from Spanish during the Spanish America War, and although American political leaders were keen to criticize their use in Cuba, they were promptly deployed in the early 1900s in the Philippines – where Roosevelt consistently saw a parallel to the English experience with the Boers. Similarly, the Germans shortly later used concentration camps for the genocide of the Herero and Namaqua in Namibia, again for the purpose of populating a white settler colony.

Although the causes for the war in Britain were complicated, it can be concluded that American diplomacy was broadly grounded in race. Furthermore, the certainty that the English-speaking peoples needed to populate the continent was always challenged by the racial similarity of the Boers – most clearly evidenced in the continued martial success of the Boer republics against the British. It was as the war dragged on that even the most stalwart defenders of the Boers in the United States began to look on the war with less enthusiasm. In the United States, even Roosevelt began to develop sympathy with the persistence of the Boers, although he continued to argue “I think they are battling on the wrong side in the fight of civilization and will have to go under. I have not been a bit surprised at the English defeats.” Nevertheless, this letter is remarkable in that it was during this time that Roosevelt begins to see positive qualities in the Boer resistance. As mentioned earlier to von Speck, Roosevelt empathized with that cause, but nevertheless, required the Boer to be replaced. Even though he considered, “The Boers are belated Cromwellians, with many fine traits. They deeply and earnestly believe in their cause, and they attract the sympathy which always goes to the small nation, even though the physical obstacles in the way may be such as to put the two contestants far more nearly on a par than at first sight seems to be the case,” he eventually concluded that “it would be for the

400 Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, 16 December 1899. Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1925, 1:429.
advantage of mankind to have English spoken south of the Zambesi just as in New York, and as I told one of my fellow knickerbockers the other day, as we let the Uitlanders of old in here, I do not see why’ the same rule is not good enough in the Transvaal. The Boers are marvelous fighters, and the change in the conditions of warfare during the past forty years has been such as to give peculiar play to their qualities.” Roosevelt clearly saw the Boer as peers in their martial capabilities, if not superior, yet he saw them as still a danger to the future of the English-speaking race. What he saw as the project of the United States and the British Empire – the project put to test in South Africa – was the establishment of the “English-speaking peoples” as a global Rome. A test, to whether as Latin once conquered the Mediterranean, it was to be English that conquered the globe.

His contemporary correspondence to his sister corroborated much of his thought on the conflict. Although he often preferred to discuss these matters with correspondents such as Lodge, White, Root, or Spring-Rice, his discussions with his sister Anna, whom he referred to as Bye, tended to often present his less bombastic side on similar issues. Roosevelt confessed to his sister that “The South African business makes me really sad. I have a genuine admiration for the boers; but the downfall of the British Empire, I should regard as a calamity to the race, and especially to this country. I am not an optimist; but there are grave signs of deterioration in the English speaking peoples, here and there; not merely in the evident lack of fighting edge in the British soldier, but in the diminishing birth rate here and in English Canada, as well as Australia; in the excessive urban growth; in the love of luxury, and the turning of sport into a craze by the upper classes. All these things may pass; but they would be greatly added to by the race humiliation of a great catastrophe.” The “calamity to the race” in question was one he feared specifically for the English-speaking races. However, despite this despair and acknowledgement that an attempt by McKinley to mediate would certainly be rejected, American neutrality in the Boer War never wavered. As Lodge added in response to a letter from Roosevelt in which he expressed once again his despair over the conflict and praise for the Boer fighting ability, “I think we shall manage to keep our neutrality, and that the government will be kept from doing anything in the way of meddling in the Transvaal war. There is a very general and solid sense of the fact that however much we sympathize with the Boers the downfall of the British Empire is

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402 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 2 December 1899. 2:1103.
403 Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 17 December 1899. 2:1112.
404 Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick Courteney Selous, 19 March 1900. 2:1233.
something which no rational American could regard as anything but a misfortune to the United States."\footnote{405 Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, 2 February 1900. Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1925, 1:446.}

This sentiment was noticed on the British side of the Atlantic as well, and Balfour exclaimed in a speech, “True the war in South Africa is disappointing….On the other hand, the war has knit together every branch of the English-speaking race, making all feel that they have a great, common destiny, which it is their duty to accomplish.”\footnote{406 “MR. BALFOUR ON THE CRISIS,” New York Times (1857-1922), January 10, 1900, https://search.proquest.com/docview/95944656?accountid=9851.} The policy consequences - with Roosevelt and Hay in influential in the administration and with Lodge in the Senate – were simply that the United States continued to maintain neutrality in the Boer conflict, unlike the more predatory stances taken by nearly every other European power. Moreover, the melancholy attitude he adopted led to the eventual transformation in his views towards the racial questions separating Germany. If the English-speaking peoples could not replace the Boer, Roosevelt needed another solution to the conflict and to avert the eventual decline of the English-speaking peoples in South Africa.

New York in Africa

By early 1900, the early visions of the British sweeping aside the Boer had clearly proven to be a fantasy, both on the part of British leaders and Roosevelt and his cohort in the United States observing the conflict. A problem had clearly emerged in that the Boers were not going to be simply accept being displaced by the English settlers, even with the military backing of the British Empire. Moreover, to Roosevelt, they had validated their status in the racial hierarchy and therefore could not simply be ignored as they presented a serious challenge to the future of civilization. What then was rationalized as a way to ensure the supremacy of the English-speaking peoples in South Africa? Intriguingly, the answer seems to have been to turn the Boer into an Anglo-Saxon.

Already by March of 1900, the narrative of the Boer war had begun to shift within Roosevelt’s circle in the United States. The early cause of Uitlander oppression, which Roosevelt empathized with, was muddled with the other more personally beneficial (to certain British political leaders) causes of war. Moreover, Roosevelt began to question whether war might have been the best course of action at all writing that, “when this South African war broke out,
though I had a very keen sympathy with the Boers and a great respect for them, I felt that even from the standpoint of their own ultimate good, no less than from the standpoint of the advance of civilization, which to my mind is wrapped up in the advance of the English-speaking race, it was best that the English should triumph. I hated to see the two splendid races fighting, & I was proud of the «valor» of my kinsfolk.\textsuperscript{407} The kinship that Roosevelt felt for the Boers, seen even in the manner in which he occasionally referred to Paul Kruger as Oom Paul, was certainly an important feature of how his racial thinking evolved – and will be discussed further in a chapter on immigration to the United States. However, the appreciation for the fighting quality of the Boer was a theme Roosevelt mentioned frequently to numerous correspondents for years following including instances in which Roosevelt began to see the fighters, particularly from foreign detachments\textsuperscript{408} on the Boer side of the conflict, as useful recruits to the US Army to be deployed to the Philippines.\textsuperscript{409}

Although his belief that English victory was necessary for civilization rarely wavered, as the war continued, Roosevelt began to question, “Now if there really was no warrant or an utterly insufficient warrant for the war, I should like to know it…. Were the grievances of the Uitlanders such that they warranted war, or was the general situation such that the English and the Dutch had to fight it out, so that one or the other type of civilization might prevail throughout South Africa?”\textsuperscript{410} Having seen the result by early 1900, Roosevelt began to question whether war was the best way to advance the racial cause he believed in or whether there were other options – however, this was one of the few times he questioned, however, haphazardly, whether other motives for the war may indeed have influenced the British choices to use force. Consequently, he began to seriously examine what end goal he saw in South Africa beyond just the primacy of British power and the dominance of the English-speaking peoples. He continued that although he was, “speaking as a friend of England and a believer in the fact that it is for the good of the world that the English-speaking race in all its branches should hold as much of the world’s surface as possible” the result of the long drawn out conflict had made him “melancholy” and that he felt that “The two races are so near together; they both fight with such valor; they both have such splendid qualities. It seems dreadful, when there is so much evil to combat in the world, that the powers that ought to tell for good should be employed in

\textsuperscript{407} Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick Courteney Selous, 7 February 1900. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 1951, 2:1175.
\textsuperscript{408} Fighters from numerous European nations travelled to the Transvaal to fight for the Boers during the conflict, most numerously from the Netherlands and Germany, but also notably to Roosevelt from Ireland.
\textsuperscript{409} Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root, 5 December 1900. Elihu Root Papers, MSS38307 Box 162-163, Library of Congress.
\textsuperscript{410} Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick Courteney Selous, 7 February 1900. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 1951, 2:1175.
mutual destruction.” 411 This then was what he hoped the war would end with – that the two races, as he saw it, were close enough that should a conflict not result in the victory of the English-speaking races, then there had to be another solution found that could unite them.

Having abandoned the vision of a rapid British consolidation of Africa in favor of grudging appreciation of the Boer martial powers, Roosevelt and similar thinkers were forced to construct a new vision of what he saw as the solution to the racial threat to Anglo-Saxon survival. In an early instance of this, Roosevelt writes that, “Of course, as you say it is worth while to fight against such brave men, but it makes me rather melancholy to read of the killing being done between the representatives of two such splendid races whom I have always hoped to see amalgamate in South Africa just as they have done in this State of New York, for instance.” 412 This then became the solution Roosevelt found regarding his concerns of how the English-speaking peoples might outcompete the Germanic peoples around the world. If they were unable to simply displace them, as seemed evident during the British experience in South Africa due to Boer resilience, they needed meld them into the English-speaking peoples. His template for this was the United States, writing, “Most certainly the Boers are as fine fellows as one could wish to see, and now if peace could come quickly surely each side should have learned to respect the other, and we can hope that there will grow up in White Man’s Africa a great commonwealth where the Dutch and the English shall mingle just as they have mingled here in New York.” 413

This had implications for American foreign policy. The US Senate, as discussed, had long harbored more sympathy towards the Boer case – yet Roosevelt was sufficiently motivated by his vision to use political capital to end these motions. He wrote in postscript to Arthur Hamilton Lee, “Many of my friends need to understand that if the British Empire suffer a serious disaster, I believe in five years it will mean a war between us and some one of the great continental European military nations, unless we are content to abandon the Monroe doctrine for South America. Most peoples are shortsighted, and especially the English-speaking peoples.” 414 Should the British have lost the war in South Africa, Roosevelt believed the United States would have find itself in conflict with a European nation, as often stated before, likely to be Germany, over colonization in the Americas – with South Africa lost, only the Americas remained for expansion. To Roosevelt, shortly before he accepted the nomination to the

411 Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick Courteney Selous, 7 February 1900. 2:1175.
413 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 2 March 1900. 2:1208.
Republican candidacy to the Vice President, this was one the most important foreign policy issues and one he continued to press during the course of his Presidency.

Although Roosevelt’s most revealing letters were often to his friends Spring-Rice and Lodge, he occasionally did write similarly detailed analyses in response to articles or to the editors of journals. In once such instance, in correspondence with John Strachey, a British journalist and editor of British papers over his career to include *The Spectator*, it is possible to see much of the conflict between the variants of Germanic heritage and how they impact Roosevelt’s thinking. Critically, it was after two years of observing the Boer conflict, that Roosevelt, once so bombastically in favor of swift British victory, began to rationalize how the racial question might explain Boer resilience and whether there might be another way to for Anglo-Saxons to secure the future of South Africa. Once again explicitly comparing to himself as amalgamation of racial heritage similar to the Boers and of “the same blood” and that now had become of the English-speaking race, he wrote to John Strachey, that, “I cannot help believing that the Boers down at bottom have the great basic virtues of the Teutonic races; and I had long hoped, with Selous that the same peaceful intermixture and fusion would take place in South Africa that has taken place here, for instance, where the men of Dutch stock are now wholly indistinguishable from the men of English stock, and where the same process is going on very rapidly among the children and the grandchildren of the German and Scandinavian immigrants.”

This became Roosevelt’s vision of how to handle the Boers in South Africa - to do with them what he saw as happening in the United States – to turn them into Anglo-Saxons. The model was already present in the United States, and had been clearly used to great success in his own ancestry. Roosevelt saw it as progressing well with respect to other immigrant populations and therefore saw no reason it could not work for South Africa.

The role of immigration to the United States thus began to impact Roosevelt’s views on foreign policy as he began to sympathize with the Boer cause. Roosevelt’s determination to see this to fruition was not an idle one - the Selous he refers to, Frederick Courtney Selous, was a British explorer and hunter in South Africa, frequent correspondent of Roosevelt and Spring-Rice, and the man Roosevelt would later tell “How I wish you could be made administrator of all South Africa! Somehow I feel that you could do what no other man could do and really bring about peace.” However, despite this sympathy where he admitted “I can thoroughly

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413 Roosevelt also frequently cited *The Spectator* as a paper he admired.
414 John St. Loe Strachey, British journalist and at this time the editor of *The Spectator*. Also a frequent correspondent of Cecil Spring-Rice
understand the Boers feeling that their side of the question is the right one; for, as I think will be the verdict of history about our war of 1812, each side to a war may really be in the right from its own standpoint,” he continued that “Nevertheless, I feel very strongly, in the first place, that it is the interest of the English-speaking peoples, and therefore of civilization, that English should be the tongue South of the Zambesi, and that the peaceful fusion of the races and the development of South African civilization can best go on under the British flag.” This idea of ‘fusing’ races quickly over the course of 1900 began to dominate his thinking regarding the conflict – that ultimately political supremacy needed to be with Britain, but that rather than the English and Uitlanders replacing the Boer, which was Balfour’s initial ambition, that they needed to meld into becoming of the same race.

Indeed, Roosevelt acknowledged that he saw that Boer situation as no different than that of the expansion of the United States across the American continent, particularly as it came into conflict with native populations and Mexico. Admitting that the rights of the populations may be different based on their racial qualities, as he saw it, he wrote that “I had been inclined to look at the war as analogous to the struggles which put the Americans in possession of Texas, New Mexico and California. I suppose the technical rights are about the same in one case as in the other; but of course there is an enormous difference in the quality of the invading people; for the Boers have shown that they have no kinship with the Mexicans!” In Texas in particular he saw an explicit comparison between American settlers who migrated there prior to Texan independence and the Outlander population in the Transvaal, but however he wrote regarding the comparison between these two situations that “In Texas the Americans first went in to settle and become citizens, making an Outlander population. This Outlander population then rose, and was helped by raids from the United States, which in point of morality did not differ in the least from the Jameson raid – although there was back of them no capitalist intrigue, but simply a love of adventure and a feeling of arrogant and domineering race superiority.” This arrogant and domineering feature he describes as a racial quality, echoing Carnegie’s notion of a “boss race,” was by no means a negative trait to Roosevelt – in fact it was critical to what he saw as the survival of the English-speaking peoples. If, however, faced with an opponent, such as he saw in the Boers, where simple victory of this nature was not possible, he concluded again that they should unite, writing “If the two races (Dutch and English) are not riven asunder by too intense antagonism, surely they ought to amalgamate in South Africa as they have done here in North

420 Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick Courteney Selous, 19 March 1900. 2:1233.
421 Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick Courteney Selous, 19 March 1900. 2:1233.
America, where I and all my fellows of Dutch blood are now mixed with and are indistinguishable from our fellow Americans, not only of English, but of German, Scandinavian and other ancestry.” And that “it would be a great deal better if all the White people of South Africa spoke English, and if my Dutch kinsfolk over there grew to accept English as their language just as my people and I here have done, they would be a great deal better off.”

His views that the Outlander and the Texan were similar in character were also of course not absolute. Moreover, he began to doubt the causes for which the war was started, especially by 1901. A few months later, when he was now the Vice President, he wrote to his son, another correspondent like his sister with whom Roosevelt more willing shares doubts rather than his usual attempts at trying to persuade others to his viewpoints, and confessed that his initial conviction of the need for British supremacy in the early part of the war had been challenged. Specifically, Chamberlain’s personal interests in the matter, what he considered the “domineering folly of Milner” and the various military failures the British had faced since late 1899 convinced Roosevelt that “the English had no right whatever to go into this task as they did, for their capacity and the justice of their cause taken together did not warrant their position.” Although Roosevelt claimed to an ongoing sympathy with the Outlanders, which he saw as not just putting on a valiant struggle themselves but “having been oppressed” he concluded “one cannot help admiring the way the Boers have kept on in the face of the overwhelming material supremacy of the British Empire. It is as gallant a struggle as has ever been made.” By the end of the conflict, Roosevelt found not just sympathy for both sides, but potentially valuable traits to be harnessed. These doubts about Britain and its ability to subjugate the Boers had already caused one other point of concern for Roosevelt in the preceding months, echoing some of the ‘National Efficiency’ discourse in Britain. While he suggested that the Cape Colony, a place he frequently referred to as being a sort of multi-ethnic model for governance, might one day become like the United States, he continued writing the same piece of correspondence that “It has been a sad war, although glorious from the valor of the combatants, and the frenzy of England’s continental critics has to my mind furnished a measure of the disaster which it would be to the civilized world and the progress of mankind if the British Empire were to lose its strength.”

Fundamentally, although he still continued to hold race as central to how he saw the future of international relations developing, he began to doubt whether Britain could long be

422 Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick Courteney Selous, 19 March 1900. 2:1233.
424 Theodore Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., 9 April 1901. 3:47.
425 Theodore Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., 9 April 1901. 3:47.
the key standard bearer for this, eventually concluding that “it seems to me that there will have to be a fundamental reform in the British character, if she is to continue to stand in the front rank and to bear her burden of vast and widely extended empire.”

John Hay expressed similar – if not more extreme – views, writing that “I have the greatest admiration for the Boers’ smartness, but it is their bravery that our idiotic public is sniveling over. If they were only as brave as they are slim, the war would have ended long ago by their extermination. We do occasionally kill a Filipino, but what man has ever yet seen a dead Boer? Your friend Bryan…. says the Boer War is an issue in our campaign – I suppose because the British are 16 to 1…The serious thing is the discovery – now past doubt – that the British have lost all skill in fighting; and the whole world knows it, and is regulating itself accordingly. It is a portentous fact, altogether deplorable in my opinion; for their influence on the whole made for peace and civilization. If Russia and Germany arrange things, the balance is lost for ages.”

Hay was again still concerned with the domestic view of the Boer war and suspected that the American public still empathized with the smaller Transvaal over the British Empire. To Hay, the British people losing the ability to fight, long a concern of Roosevelt’s and Spring-Rice’s, was the loss of a racial bulwark for the United States and ended in disaster from Germany and Russia.

The sympathy that Roosevelt developed was rooted in what he saw as the racial qualities that lead to Boer success – qualities that given his views on race, were not just similar to those he saw in Anglo-Saxons, but qualities that could be melded into it from other backgrounds. He writes regarding the Boers that they “they possess at bottom the same qualities that the English and Scotch, Scandinavians, Netherlands and Germans all have, and I earnestly hope that, when the war is over and South Africa south of the Zambesi under one flag…. then the process of amalgamation will begin which will turn the country into an English-speaking commonwealth like Australia; where the descendants of the Englishman and the Dutchman will live together side by side, gradually growing indistinguishable from one another until they become fused just exactly as they have become in the United States.”

The United States, and the British settler colonies were thus the solution to the years of angst that Roosevelt had voiced regarding the racial future of the English-speaking peoples.

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His thoughts on this eventually encompassed what he came to see as broader project around the world. As a President primarily and self-confessedly preoccupied with foreign policy, Roosevelt’s thinking on race did not distinguish between foreign and domestic politics. He continued pressing these questions after his election to the Vice-Presidency in late 1900, during which he wrote nearly identical statements in a series letters responding to congratulations messages, mere days after his electoral victory, “I earnestly hope that the Boer war is about over, and that now in a few years we shall see in South Africa the same fusion of races that has gone on here”430 and “I hope now that it is virtually over, and that in a few short years the races will begin to fuse in South Africa as they have done in America”431 predicting again that finally “then the two races will amalgamate just as they have done on this side.”432 Roosevelt hardly doubted that such a solution would disadvantage the Boer any more than he had been in New York, writing to Henry White that “I do hope every effort is made to convince the South African Dutch that they are to be treated on an equality with the English.”433 Should this have worked, it had the potential to completely transform the nature of the Boer in South Africa. Despite the support for the Boer in Germany during the war, in dealing with Boer settlers who to German South West Africa afterwards, as Dedering notes, the German administration “soon found out that the same Boers, who had been embraced as 'low Germans' by their admirers in Germany, insisted on their own cultural identity and stubbornly refused to integrate into German settler society.”434 What then was necessary for the Boer – or another race, Teuton or otherwise – to ‘fuse’?

America became his model for how the race was to survive around the world when faced with competition it could not immediately overcome; furthermore, it had become a question he felt he could not escape even when considering the start of his Vice Presidency. Rather than concluding that on the exact same martial values he valued so highly the inferiority of his own race, as he saw it, he saw it as a possible opportunity for blending. The first concern was what he determining “who settles upon and holds the soil” – something he found the domain of the Boers, while the Englishmen “gather in the towns” just as he found they did in America.435 This distinction did not inhibit the settlement of the interior of Africa, however, just as “the settlement of North America and of Australasia goes on and the remaining waste places of the two continents will be practically occupied in our own life time. Portions of a race may go

430 Theodore Roosevelt to John St. Loe Strachey, 19 November 1900. 2:1424.
431 Theodore Roosevelt to Edward North Buxton, 19 November 1900. 2:1427.
432 Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick Courteney Selous, 23 November 1900. 2:1440.
forward while other portions don’t.” Dividing a race into portions that fulfilled different tasks, merged, and split again was radically different than that espoused later by such as Madison Grant – explored a little further in the fifth chapter. Given what he had also begun to see as deterioration in the qualities of the English-speaking races, despite ongoing signs of “vigor” in America and Australia, the amalgamation had become critical in settler colonization where he argued the future of the races would be decided – in the interior of the continents. 438 In writing to Spring-Rice Roosevelt detailed what he viewed as the future for South Africa, no longer as one where the Anglo-Saxon replaced the Boer, but harnessing the traits of the Boer as well, as he detailed, “In South Africa I earnestly hope that when the present dreadful muddle is ended a process of amalgamation may go on which will build up a great English-speaking commonwealth south of the Zambesi.” 439 Roosevelt’s English-speaking world south of the Zambesi now required the Boer as well. Moreover, Roosevelt wanted and expected Britain would continue similar projects and “continue her supremacy” in Asia and Africa, but the experience of the Boer War led him to conclude that even should a localized failure happen to amalgamate or thrive in Africa or to the US endeavors, as he saw them, in the Philippines, such a result “to the great bulk of the race would not be by any means a fatal blow.” 440 Despite racial ‘fusion’ being based on cosmopolitan centers such as New York, the agrarian idea of “holding the soil” was crucial to whether a race actually controlled an area, and the more broadly the English-speaking race made this attempt, the more easily Roosevelt thought it could survive occasional setback. In this manner, Roosevelt’s views on race in history continued to evolve; accordingly, he developed from this crisis his solution to what he saw as the best solution to the Germanic threat – to make them of the English-speaking races.

The solution, while uniquely successful in the United States, was not considered as necessarily uniquely American. The attempt to make the English-speaking race the dominant language through subjugation and replacement had failed. The model for the settler colonies would have to instead become another New York. However, this was never a plausible reality - the demographics of immigration to South Africa pointed to first, the colonists not being white much less Anglo-Saxon, and second, the reality that Anglo-Saxons tended to not emigrate to places where they would be a minority. Nevertheless, the fiction endured in the minds of those...
in power in the United States and Britain. Shortly before his death, Alfred Milner concluded in his aforementioned Credo, that:

I am a British (indeed primarily an English) Nationalist. If I am also an Imperialist, it is because the destiny of the English race, owing to its insular position and long supremacy at sea, has been to strike roots in different parts of the world. I am an Imperialist and not a Little Englander because I am a British Race Patriot. It seems un-natural to me – I think it is impossible from my point of view – to lose interest in and attachment to my fellow-countrymen because they settle across the sea. It is not the soil of England, dear as it is to me, which is essential to arouse my patriotism, but the speech, the tradition, the spiritual heritage, the principles, the aspirations of the British race. They do not cease to be mine because they are trans-plant ed. My horizon must widen, that is all.  

The idea that settling across the world would create a new nationality or race was an impossibility to Milner – perhaps explaining much of British policy towards the Uitlanders. It was in this context that he had advocated the notion of common citizenship for the white settler colonies. However, Milner also recognized that not all settlers went to territories under the political control of Britain, creating the potential for catastrophe that had only nearly been averted, continuing:

This brings us to our first great principle – follow the race. The British State must follow the race, must comprehend it, wherever it settled in appreciable numbers as an independent community. If the swarms constantly being thrown off by the parent hive are lost to the State, the State is irreparably weakened. We cannot afford to part with so much of our best blood. We have already parted with much of it, to form the millions of another separate but fortunately friendly State. We cannot suffer a repetition of the process.  

Milner maintained his entire life that the various British settler colonies, including in South Africa where he argued that the Cape Colony and the Boer Republics should be “one dominion” in part because of this viewpoint – that the flow of migrants and the growth of population in a race determined their success. Nevertheless, Milner’s attitude thus mirrored how Spring-Rice viewed the need to divert the German emigrant population to the United States.  

Even more critically regarding Roosevelt was that rather than simply advocating the “arrogant and domineering race superiority” he had for most of his writings prior to the Boer War, even in his early theorizing regarding the inception of “interracial law” he began to consider that other races were conceivably on the exact same tier of competitive value – or possibly even higher – than his own. Roosevelt was of course not capable of believing this should lead to the downfall of the United States but rather began to alter his perception of threat accordingly,

442 Milner.  
particularly regarding the way he viewed the Russian as opposed to the German. Roosevelt was not yet President during much of the Boer War, only being inaugurated to the office after the assassination of McKinley in September 1901. Although the Second Boer War continued for several more months, US policy was already set in the direction Roosevelt desired and Roosevelt continued with many of the same cast of characters in his Cabinet that he had leaned on in other Cabinets for much the previous decade. Even were it not, there was little time in the early months of his Presidency to radically change US policy on the matter. However, Roosevelt would take the lessons he learned regarding his views on race – the consequences of competition and his ideas of amalgamation – and take them into his Presidency.
Chapter Four – Roosevelt, the East, and ‘The Real Fortress of Our Race’

“Remember that personally I do not think our greatness is vanishing. France has gone down relatively to England. The Russian growth – the growth of the Slav is slow. At the same time that the German Empire has been built up, the German race in Austria has gone back relatively to both the Magyar and the Slav. …. I do not think it possible that in the long run Germany which has to face the Slav on land and the English-speaking peoples on the sea, can take the first place. Russia’s day is yet afar off. I think the twentieth century will still be the century of the men who speak English.”

Russia played a unique role in the minds of contemporary political leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom. Unlike the perception of powers of the ‘Latin’ races, most commonly focusing on France but also Italy and Spain, contemporary political leaders saw the threat from Russia as vastly more significant. The Latin powers were seen as in decline, with France in particular experiencing plummeting birth rates – damning to political leaders theorizing about racial vitality. Even nations such as Ireland and Italy, which experienced rapid population growth, were instead used as examples of why population growth alone was not sufficient to pose a racial challenge as “the one ugly fact all over the world is the diminution of the birth rate among the highest races” but adding that “It must be remembered, however, that Ireland has shown conclusively, as Italy still shows, that a very large birth rate may mean nothing whatever for a race; and looking at the English-speaking people I am confident that as yet any decadence is purely local.” Conversely Russia was indeed seen a racial threat not just because of population growth but because of the characteristics, oft collectively described as “barbarism” that combined to pose a threat.

Although this dissertation has thus far focused on the relationship between Britain, the United States, and Germany when examining the role of race in predisposing the perception of threat between the powers, clearly the Germanic and English-speaking divide was not the only one in the minds of contemporary thinkers. A similarly complicated hierarchy also existed on how these individuals saw the peoples on the other side of the color line. Particularly in the British case, this quite explicitly divided the world even on the other side of the color line into a stratified ladder in which the ‘martial races’ of India especially were close to the top and populations in parts of Africa featured at the bottom. While an examination of the relationship

between all the categories in this racial hierarchy are well outside the scope of this thesis, the relationship with one country, Russia, warrants some further examination, both because of the unique role it played in the mindset of American leaders and because the British angle through Balfour has been much more thoroughly examined in existing historiography. The conflict has not lacked historical coverage and indeed, certain works such have examined it using race as part of a broader projects. Indeed, the from a diplomatic angle, the conflict attracted attention nearly immediately and continued to do so for decades. Military histories of the conflict also abound, particularly given the significance of Tsushima to naval warfare, but this of course is entirely outside the scope of this dissertation.

Therefore, this still leaves one of the early questions posed in this thesis. Why then did Germany become the focal point of their fears? Why did Britain eventually ally with France and Russia instead of with Germany? Why, in brief, does this thesis not focus on Russia? Thus, the question of ‘why not Russia’ becomes nearly as important as the question of ‘why Germany’. Fortunately, in examination of the contemporary correspondence, it becomes clear that there were indeed both plausible and well-articulated reasons for this discrepancy. Moreover, it is with this question that Roosevelt’s views on race evolve the most, due to the manner in which the question of Russia becomes closely intertwined with the question of Japan. Over the course of two years, Roosevelt’s pre-existing views on race, which had been largely static for the past decade, are forced to deal with the realities of the Russo-Japanese War.

Additionally, American leaders expressed angst about what might happen should Russia have access to the populations of China. While in most of the other chapters this was not particularly significant in the major contemporary crises between the powers, since Russia was seen as something akin to transitional – certainly white but with slightly different racial characteristics that enabled them to somehow absorb the East – Russian encroachment on Asia was similar to German colonialism in South America, albeit with a vastly longer time scale. While this thesis discusses the fears of Russia in the East, it does attempt to stay focused to the perceptions of threat at the turn of the century. Moreover, the conflicts of this time begin a change in racial thinking among American political leaders – while race became no less significant, the conflicts contributed to the characteristics of race becoming more malleable.
amorphous, and able to absorb traits as required. The theories of race that Roosevelt and his correspondents subscribed to were often lacking in coherence. Nevertheless, like many other forms of racism, they were unquestionably influential in parsing America’s relationships with all of these powers in the Pacific.

The rise of Japan was of great fascination and deeply challenged many contemporary views on race; while race became no less central in this time period, it became less rigid. Seemingly confirming his near-Lamarckian views, Roosevelt saw Japan’s geopolitical ascent as proof that a people could change features of biology through collective behavioral action and commitment. Similarly, it stoked fears that traits, particularly a form of barbarism that he valued, could be lost the same way. However, many other features of race remained rigid. Similar to his view regarding black Americans, Roosevelt’s rationalizations never fully explained contradictions expressed from one moment to another. However, unlike the case of black Americans, where it seems Roosevelt decided after the earliest weeks of his Presidency that he was, at best, uninterested in investing political capital on the issue, Japan was a matter of foreign policy and therefore to him an issue of great significance.

The Responsibility of the Russian Problem

Ironically, the first question to ask in investigating why Russia was not the primary fear at the time instead of Germany is: why especially consider Russia at all as opposed to any other contemporary power? Ultimately, even if it did not end up featuring in the minds of American leaders in the same way as Germany did, clearly there were unique features that placed Russia in a different paradigm than France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, or any of the other major powers. These questions were undoubtedly entangled with issues of liberalism, authoritarianism, religion, gender, and a whole host of contemporary cultural issues that were tied into race. Once again, the biocultural assemblage model best explains the centrality of race – religion, gender, and liberalism were not seen as separate from the biological nature of race. Not only did they stem from race, they also fed back into it in a continuous loop. If the English-speaking peoples or the Slav were to embrace the traits that let them out-compete other races, then those traits could over a matter of a handful of generations become biological – a notion embraced in Russia itself by Trofim Lysenko and the Soviet Union decades later. Other historians have examined the cultural and religious linkages, to include the cultural movement inside America to convert and
reform Russia’s faith as an attempt to civilize it. These traits were not necessarily universal or on an identical trajectory – a concept Roosevelt struggled with, at times claiming that Russia was on a racial path of progress identical to the English-speaking peoples, at times suggesting the opposite. As early as 1896, it was clear to Roosevelt that “Indeed Russia is a problem very appalling. All other nations of European blood, if they develop at all, seem inclined to develop on much the same lines; but Russia seems bound to develop in her own way, and on lines that run directly counter to what we are accustomed to consider as progress. If she ever does take possession of Northern China and drill the Northern Chinese to serve as her Army, she will indeed be a formidable power. It has always seemed to me that the Germans showed shortsightedness in not making some alliance that will enable them to crush Russia.” In this sense, Germany’s insistence on colonial expansion to South America and Africa – as the United States saw it, however inaccurately – not only threatened the future of the English-speaking peoples, but shirked responsibility in allowing ultimate dominion over the future to Russia.

This theme reoccurred consistently on both sides of the Atlantic – that while German colonial ambitions were threatening to Britain and America, Germany was also being shortsighted in not comprehending and appropriately dismantling the inevitable threat from Russia. The threat from Russia was seen as significantly greater to Germany than to Britain and America as “Even if in the dim future Russia should take India and become the preponderant power of Asia, England would merely be injured in one great dependency; but when Russia grows so as to crush Germany, the crushing will be once for all.” Roosevelt saw only two clear options for why Germany did not take the opportunity to crush Russia while it still had the resources and capacity to do so. The first, was that “if Germany has definitely adopted the views which some of the Greek States, like the Achaean League, adopted toward Rome after the second Punic War…… These Greek States made up their mind that Rome had the future and could not be striven against, but they decided to take advantage of whatever breathing space was given them by warring on any power which Rome did not choose to befriend, hoping that Rome might perhaps spare them, and that meanwhile they would stand high compared to all the States but Rome.” This combined force was to Roosevelt the worst case scenario, representing an almost inconceivable situation – the English-speaking peoples beset by a unified front of Slav and German, a fear also famously argued, in concert with contemporary fears of the ‘yellow peril’

452 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 5 August 1896. 1:552.
and German encroachment in the Americas, by Halford Mackinder.\(^{453}\) However, despite its expression here, Roosevelt did not appear to have entertained this fear except in the far reaches of speculation, and it does not seem to have occupied his mind for long. Certainly, in Britain, the idea of Germany playing Greece to Russia’s Rome, ironic as it may be, did not gain much traction even to Spring-Rice.

However, the first notion, that Germany should have crushed Russia while it had the chance, was one that Roosevelt returns to repeatedly in the years before his Presidency. This frequently was Germany’s sin in the minds of Roosevelt and his correspondents – failing to understand where the true racial threat lay. Moreover, this was a threat for which resolution had an extremely limited window of opportunity as, “a few years ago Germany could certainly have whipped Russia, even if, in conjunction with Austria and Italy, she had had to master France also. Of course it would be useless to whip her without trying to make the whipping possibly permanent by building up a great Polish buffer State, making Finland independent or Swedish, taking the Baltic Provinces, etc. This would have been something worth doing.”\(^{454}\) It is of course likely that German strategists saw a similar future as, approximately twenty later, that was nearly identical to what the German Empire imposed on the Russian Empire with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk – and in some sense again the response to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the same letter, Roosevelt brought the consequences back to the United States and Britain and argued that while Germans may “look down” on Americans and while Americans might look at Germans “with humorous contempt,” in the end with the fact that “The English-speaking races may or may not be growing effete,” a point that Roosevelt had not fully conceded, that “may not ultimately succumb to the Slav; but whatever may happen in any single war they will not ultimately succumb to the German, and a century hence he will be of very small consequence compared to them.”\(^{455}\) Clearly, the temporal proximity of these threats differed greatly, and consequently, merited different responses in immediate foreign policy. In sum, Germany was capable of threatening the United States immediately in the context of an immediate war, but this threat, at least as he saw it at this time, potentially paled in comparison to what the Slav might impose on the English-speaking peoples in the distant future.

The very fact that this eventuality was so distant itself raised doubt about whether Russia could indeed remain a threat, especially since Russia had yet to face the dangers already


\(^{455}\) Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 13 August 1897. 1:644.
encountered by as he describes, the “free republic of the United States, free monarchy of England” or the “unfree monarchy of Prussia, the unfree Republic of France” – the dangers, as he saw it, of densely populated and settled cities.456 Cities, themselves not an inherent evil to Roosevelt as they enabled the increase of population and industry he saw as so vital, were however sources of incredible potential danger as they simultaneously enabled the rise of commerce and the “moneymaking classes” and led to the race growing “effete” and the race growing martially weak. As discussed in the first chapter, these factors such as commerce and civilization were subsumed and merged into racial traits. Roosevelt even allowed for Russian civilization to diverge entirely from the West and presciently even predicted that should Russia “resist the growth of liberalism” it would “experience a red terror which will make the French revolution pale.” 457 Yet in the same letter, Roosevelt immediately turns back to the racial factor, even citing the Monroe Doctrine as being against Russia as against any other power, writing that “Meanwhile, one curious fact is forgotten: The English-speaking people have never gone back before the Slav, and the Slav has never gone back before them save once…. The American – the man of the effete English-speaking races – has driven the Slav from the eastern coast of the North Pacific.”458 Indeed, Roosevelt assumed that the danger seen from Russia at that time was nearly identical to what Roosevelt saw in Germany – that Russian settlers would establish a thriving population base in the American continent. Still in 1897, this factor remained critical – and as it informed his thinking regarding the previously discussed fear of German settlement in Africa or South America, it similarly informed his thinking regarding Russia. However, when tested against the English-speaking people, at least those in the Americas, the Slav had clearly already proven to not be an immediate threat, having “gone back” before American settlers. Still, the fear persisted as race was not perception but a matter of intrinsic and cultivated substance, concluding this series of correspondence arguing that the “Sometimes I do feel inclined to believe that the Russian is the one man with enough barbarous blood in him to be the hope of a world that is growing effete.” 459 Roosevelt seemed to waver mostly on one element – whether the English-speaking peoples, especially those in America, could withstand the challenge of barbarism and martial ability.

This barbarian quality the Roosevelt fascinatingly viewed as somehow a feature in civilization is something he recognized as present in the United States, describing Americans as being “barbarians of a certain kind” but adding that “what is most unpleasant we are barbarians

with a certain middle-class, Philistine quality of ugliness and pettiness, raw conceit, and raw sensitiveness. Where we get highly civilized, as in the northeast, we seem to become civilized in an unoriginal and ineffective way, and tend to die out. Nevertheless, thanks to the men we adopt, as well as to the children we beget, it must be remembered that actually we keep increasing at about twice the rate of the Russians.” 460 This rate of population growth was critical, especially in areas with settlement populations in competition, as for example in the aforementioned American Northwest. Despite his apparent disdain for the ‘civilized’ parts of the Northeast, it was in discussing the New York Police Force, the Navy, the construction yards, engineers, shipyard workers, etc. that he found “an impression of abounding force, of energy, resolution and decision,” assessing that “these men are not effete, and if you compare the Russians with them (and of course exactly the same thing would be true if you compared the Russians with corresponding Englishmen) I think you would become convinced that the analogy of the Goth and the Byzantine is forced. These men would outbuild, outadminister and outfight any Russians you could find from St. Petersburg to Sebastopol or Vladivostock.” 461 Of course at the time, the Northeast had the highest concentration of American naval and industrial capacity, certainly in comparison to Roosevelt’s beloved West. Roosevelt rarely appeared cognizant of this contradiction – that the commercial and as he saw it “effete” part of the country simultaneously provided its capacity for production and war. As he concluded, “both the English and the Americans are less ruthless, and have the disadvantages of civilization. It may be that we are going the way of France, but just at present I doubt it, and I still think that though the people of the English-speaking races may have to divide the future with the Slav, yet they will get rather more than their fair share.” 462 Although at most hyperbolic Roosevelt certainly saw great potential in the challenge from Russia, even in 1897, it was consistently in the distant future and in a distant future where even in the worst case scenario he saw a future for a thriving English-speaking race.

Geopolitical and strategic considerations were similarly tied into race, influencing Roosevelt’s strategies regarding on which issues Britain and America might cooperate. Although after the Russo-Japanese War Roosevelt became less enthusiastic about this prospect, in the late 1890s, Roosevelt yet felt that Anglo-Saxon racial interests might lead to political cooperation. With respect to Asia, however, not only did Roosevelt recognize that Britain’s power was vulnerable, he concluded that the United States would have been unable to significantly assist,

telling Spring-Rice that Asia was “the very place where America could least help you.”
Moreover, Roosevelt concluded that while Russia’s expansion “over barbarous Asia” was “a real
and great advance for civilization,” this advance threatened the “great calamity” of curtailing
British power. 463 Perhaps mirroring thinking that Chamberlain undertook the following year in
seeking an alliance with Germany, Roosevelt argued that Germany, of all the Powers could still
“striker her down while it is yet time” and proposed again carving off Finland, the Baltics, and
Poland either as independent states or even in “alliance with the Germans against the orthodox
Slav.” 464 While Germany thus could provide the solution to the Russia problem, as envisioned
by Roosevelt, timing was critical, and the responsibility lay with Germany to curb Russian power
before it grew to challenge Britain or America. Roosevelt proposed, however, that there was a
deeper challenge to Russian expansion than just curtailing British power, as since Germany did
not seem likely to challenge Russia, “the steady ethnic growth of Russia in Asia” in contrast with
Britain’s “purely administrative and political growth” Asia would actually be populated by
Russians whereas British territories would not be populated in that continent by the English-
speaking race. 465 Settler colonies again were paramount in Roosevelt’s views of the world, but he
did find that if Britain were “driven from Asia” by Russia, that “the blow instead of cowing «the»
English-speaking race would serve thoroughly to arouse and anger all their communities.” 466
Although the English-speaking race in the United States would leap to the defense of the British
Empire in Asia was questionable, and in these conversations with Spring-Rice, Roosevelt
remained remarkably consistent with his fears for the next two years, frequently discussing the
issue and reiterating similar points. As late as 1899, these points emphasized three things, that
“no other European power can in the long run contest with Russia the control of the destiny of
Asia” and that “Russia is not yet so organized as to be able to exert anything like her full strength
in offensive movements,” an event he also notes may not happen within the generation, and that
“unless the unrest within her takes too destructive a form, sometime in the future, her position
must become one of overshadowing power.” 467

By 1901, anxiety had begun to disperse as Russia’s weaknesses became clear – worries
regarding Germany and its perceived failure to contain the Russian threat, however, did not. It
was, however, clear even in the US that Britain did not necessarily agree that the Russian threat
was not of immediate concern. In the case of Spring-Rice, Roosevelt attributed this to where

Spring-Rice had spent his career, even claiming that it led Spring-Rice to disproportionately fear Russia, continuing that “I think that Russia has an enormous part to play, a great destiny before her, but I do not think she is as near that destiny as you do. For a generation or two, probably for the present century, Germany may show herself an even more formidable rival of the English-speaking peoples; perhaps in warlike and almost certainly in industrial, competition. I think that Russia’s power of offense is at present overestimated.” However still in 1901, Roosevelt made an exception in this letter, and argued that should Russia continue to expand into Asia, “Japan is the power most menaced by it” — not the other European powers or the United States. In the end of this letter – quoted in this chapter’s epigraph – Roosevelt’s vision for political struggle over the coming century came to questions of whether the Slav, German, and English-speaking peoples had “gone back” before each other. Key to Roosevelt’s understanding of both German and Slavic expansion was whether they had “gone back” before each other or the English-speaking peoples. To ensure that the English-speaking races similarly not surrender ground to another race required the maintenance of the various character traits.

Arthur Balfour on the British side of the Atlantic shared many of these fears, having since the early 1890s seen a clear military challenge from both France and Russia, on the former largely regarding naval competition and on the latter envisioning similarly apocalyptic futures as Roosevelt. As Jason Tomes’s chapter on the “Franco-Russian challenge” elaborates, at least as envisioned by Balfour the British view differed somewhat from the American, being far more invested in the immediate consequences of Russian expansionism to the Far East, India, and the Near East. Balfour similarly, though less bombastically than Chamberlain, approached the idea of closer relations or even a possible alliance with Germany with the intent of countering Russian power and finding alignment with Germany with respect to interests in China. As he concluded, Balfour considered with sincerity the idea of an Anglo-German alignment, with Balfour arguing that the Kaiser, “is in moral fright of Russia.” The result was Balfour allowing

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468 Spring-Rice had indeed spent much of his career at this point in Germany, Russia, and Iran and tended to correspond to Roosevelt from these places. However, this was one of the rare, if not only, instances in which Roosevelt questioned whether Spring-Rice’s views were biased in some way. Usually, he instead assumed it representative of the view of the British government and elite – blaming any disagreement on inaccurate newspapers and propaganda in London.


472 Tomes, 116.

Chamberlain to conduct informal alliance talks in 1898, eventually resulting in the 1898 Anglo-German Agreement with respect to Portuguese possessions in Africa.

Spring-Rice, from St. Petersburg where he had been stationed since 1903, remained concerned regarding both Russian expansion towards China longer than Roosevelt, but also remained warier of considering Germany as a potential ally than Chamberlain or Balfour. Indeed, Spring-Rice perhaps more strongly than any of the other major political leaders considered Russia aligned with Asia, writing that “it is the natural destiny of the Russian people to live supreme and solitary in Asia….ultimately they will obtain the control they desire – for really there is no possible obstacle; and when they do, the empire which will succeed to the empire of China will as usual be governed by Chinese ideas.”474 In the same letter, Spring-Rice spoke of admiration regarding the ambition of Russian in aiming for an empire encompassing “the whole of Asia and half Europe! and all Russian,” 475 and whether Russia absorbed China or China absorbed Russia, as it had done to so many of its conquerors, was a rather moot point to Spring-Rice.

Clearly, British political leaders disagreed on this point, even Spring-Rice, who generally tended to find common ground with Roosevelt on most issues, even if only through persuasion. But as Roosevelt acknowledged, Britain was in a vastly different position than the United States, particularly with respect to geographic proximity.476 Although the fact that the Russian had “gone back before” the English-speaking peoples was still important, Roosevelt realized that Russian ascendency in Asia would damage the British position in India and its scattered possessions around the world. Moreover, the “work” of colonialism in the East was seen as part of a project in which the character of the English speaking-peoples could be maintained, both in the case of the United States in the Philippines and the English in India.477 Indeed, race played a role in empire, not just in its creation, but in the effect its maintenance had on the racial characteristics of the English-speaking peoples so that they could better compete with rivals. British disagreement, however, did not come from merely the differences in opinion, but experience with Russia as a power on the European stage. Merely a century earlier, Russia challenged France, in concert with other European powers, for supremacy on the continent. In

the 19th century, Russian troops suppressed revolution in several European uprisings. Rather than a distant eventuality, to Britain, Russia was a constant reality.

However, while British leaders worried more about Russian power, American political leaders instead saw Russia as a threat that had loomed unchangingly for decades – a threat that always seemed to be decades away. The fear of Russia, especially as it was seen to industrialize, explode in population, and potentially even reform, was one which had long been present. However, unlike Germany, while the Russian people were seen to have the potential to catch up with the English-speaking peoples and threaten their dominance, Russia’s ascent was seen to happen decades in the future and therefore not something the foreign policy of America or Britain needed to address immediately. Consequently, Russia being problematic was itself ultimately a cause for antagonism between the English-speaking peoples and Germans. Not only was Germany not engaged in, as Roosevelt saw it, its due diligence in crushing Russia, a pan-Teutonic alliance had failed to emerge in any of the forms hoped for by even the most skeptical of American Anglo-Saxonists.

The Challenge of Japan

By the early 20th century, the pending threat from Russia was seen as credible, even if America did not foresee an immediate danger. To Britain, unlike America, the growth of Russia was one of more pressing concern from the aforementioned two angles – the first being Russia’s proximity to British possessions throughout Asia and the second being the long-standing British fear of continental domination, in this case fear that rather than German and Russia weakening the other, they would somehow unite and pose a nearly insurmountable challenge to British power. However, events of 1904-1905 rapidly ended those concerns. Although Russia was still seen as a distant threat, the events of these years resulted in the immanency of that threat being pushed into the future nearly indefinitely. Of equal significance, the success of Japan in the early part of the century, particularly against Russia, challenged many long-held beliefs regarding race, forcing them to adapt.

In the thirty-five years since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan changed from a Shogunate governed agricultural society to a rapidly centralizing military and industrial powerhouse, able to exert significant force regionally. After the Japanese victory over China in 1895, Japan became the dominant regional power in East Asia. However, the conflict concluded with a key Japanese war aim, the acquisition of Port Arthur, unfulfilled, due to the triple
intervention of Russia, Germany, and France. The diplomatic consequences of this intervention were enormous, eventually encouraging Japan to form the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, Britain’s first formal alliance in nearly a century. This alliance was explicitly designed, from the Japanese perspective at least, as bulwark against further European intervention against Japan, particularly from Russia. In 1898, Russia managed to acquire Port Arthur. In 1900, Japan and Russia, along with Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the United States and Austria-Hungary collectively intervened in China during the Boxer Rebellion as part of the Eight-Nation Alliance, and a large Russian military force remained in Manchuria, despite assurances for their withdrawal, effectively bringing Manchuria under Russian influence. By 1903 Japan found this situation intolerable and attempted to find a negotiated settlement regarding the division of Russian and Japanese interests in Asia. By 1904, however, it had become clear that Russian overtures that seemed overtly conciliatory were likely instead attempts to buy time to ready the military – although this chapter does not seek to address every element leading up to the war, Kaiser Wilhelm II famously pressured Tsar Nicholas II into responding aggressively towards Japan, arguing that were Japan not curbed, Japan would lead a “yellow peril” of Chinese soldiers led by Japanese officers and industry that would overrun the world order. Japan, however, had the 1902 Alliance with Britain, which stipulated that should another power assist Russia in the East, Britain would intervene, effectively locking France out of the conflict. With Japan having felt that Russian diplomacy was not genuine, on 8 February 1904, it declared war on Russia and attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur a few hours before the declaration of the war.

Throughout the course of the war, Roosevelt expressed two notable opinions consistently. The first was that he remained confident that Japan was more likely than Russia to win the war, influenced by his aforementioned belief in Japan’s racial rise. Second, Roosevelt was in fact eager to see a Japanese triumph, having long found Russia problematic, writing to his son that “I am greatly interested in the Russian and Japanese war. It has certainly opened most disastrously for the Russians, and their supine carelessness is well-nigh incredible. For several years Russia has behaved very badly in the far East. Her attitude toward all nations, including us,

478 I hoped that this intervention in response to the Boxer Rebellion might provide another opportunity to examine the racial attitudes of at least American leaders, since it was the first time America had participated in such an expedition outside the Western Hemisphere and in concert with other powers. While there were interesting notes regarding the nature of early American diplomacy towards China and the conduct of troops from various nations, to include the “savagery” of German troops, there was little in the correspondences extrapolating more broadly from these remarks, perhaps because all the powers involved were on the same side.

479 France had been allied to Russia since 1894. It also likely locked Germany out of the conflict due to the Royal Navy. By this time the major powers were allied as followed: Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy since 1882 in the Triple Alliance, France and Russia through a series of agreements starting in 1891 and solidified by 1894, and Britain and Japan since 1902. These treaties had numerous stipulations and did not require allies assisting each other in all areas of the world or under all conditions. The United States still remained formally neutral.
but especially toward Japan, being grossly overbearing. We had no sufficient cause for war with her. Yet I was apprehensive lest if she at the very outset whipped Japan on the sea she might assume a position well-nigh intolerable toward us.”  

Roosevelt still saw a distant threat from Russia, once again on the other side of the globe, but potentially disastrous should Russian power expand further. He continued that “I thought Japan would probably whip her on the sea, but I could not be certain; and between ourselves – for you must not breathe it to anybody – I was thoroughly well pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.” This was written in reference to the Japanese assault on Port Arthur – still over a year before the decisive military victory at Mukden and naval victory at Tsushima. The vital element, however, was that Roosevelt finally saw a power acting as he had long desired of Germany – attempting to crush Russia before it became a threat.

Remarkably, Roosevelt did not envision the conflict ending with a mere reduction of Russian power but, presciently, ending with the restructuring of the entire geopolitical situation in East Asia, including the colonial spheres of the various Powers and the creation of an entirely new brand of racial futures centered on Japan. A month after his letter to his son, he wrote to Spring-Rice extensively regarding how the United States and the United Kingdom needed to conceptualize these possible futures. Roosevelt assessed that the increased threat was because of two factors – first that Japan could focus all of here attention on Asia, the second, that if “Japan seriously starts in to reorganize China and makes any headway, there will result a real shifting of the center of equilibrium as far as the white races are concerned.” To him “The Slav is a great and growing race,” but a Japanese victory was potentially introducing an even greater force in the form of a growing race of a “different type from our civilization.” The idea of civilizational type was another element that Roosevelt began to incorporate into his “mold” finding that “race taken by itself” would not cause “such a tremendous difference” but that “the weight of their own ancestral civilization will press upon them, and will prevent their ever coming into exactly our mold.” Along with religion, biology, law and others, ancestral weight had also begun to creep into the assemblage of race. Ancestry, like biology, was furthermore inheritable. A powerful Japanese race, then, was substantially different than a Slav one, but resulted in a similar consequence – a new challenge for the English-speaking race. Although he acknowledged this might all be “speculation” and that there was a possibility that if both sides

481 Theodore Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., 10 February 1904. 4:723.
482 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 19 March 1904. 4:759.
483 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 19 March 1904. 4:759.
484 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 19 March 1904. 4:759.
battled each other thoroughly there would no be “the creation of either a yellow peril or a Slav peril,” this was not a likely outcome to Roosevelt. Roosevelt thus imagined a future in which the options for the world were either this “yellow peril or a Slav peril.” Moreover, it is worth nothing that all of this discussion was in the context that he thought a Japanese victory preferable. Most surprisingly, Roosevelt saw the rise of this civilizational racial challenge in entirely different terms than he saw the previously discussed challenges from Germany and Russia. Unlike at other times analyzed during this dissertation, when Roosevelt was but a highly significant voice in foreign policy, it is at this time that he was perhaps at his greatest personal influence. This mindset – balancing the creation of a “yellow peril or a Slav peril” while extrapolating the consequences of a Japanese victory – was on his mind as he approached the ultimate negotiations that ended the conflict.

Even before he was asked to mediate the conflict, Roosevelt took these views and fears into his conversations with the Japanese government. A few months after this letter with Spring-Rice, Roosevelt met with Takahira Kogorō and Kaneko Kentarō and warned them of his fears regarding Japanese overextension and aggression. However, he also agreed that he thought Japan should and would become a power with its own “paramount interest” in the Yellow Sea similar to that of the United States in the Caribbean. Moreover, Roosevelt when brought up his fears regarding the “Yellow Terror,” while the Japanese delegation attempted to assuage Roosevelt that Japan itself had itself suffered the “Yellow Terror” under the Mongols and that Japan should not be classified as barbarians similarly – to which Roosevelt responded that his own ancestors “had been part of the “white terror” of the Northmen….and that as we had outgrown the position of being a White Terror I thought that in similar fashion such a civilization as they had developed entitled them to laugh at the accusation of being part of the Yellow Terror”

Kentarō almost certainly understood the nature of appeal likely to be effective in persuading and manipulating the United States – Roosevelt famously received a copy of *Bushido*:

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486 This letter was Roosevelt conveying the contents of this meeting to Spring-Rice, urging the need for confidentiality repeatedly. It was one of the few letters with Spring-Rice where Roosevelt, despite his openness with Spring-Rice, exercised some discretion and at one point said he was hesitant to put more on paper.
487 Takahira Kogorō was a Japanese diplomat and at this time the Japanese Minister to the United States.
488 Kaneko Kentarō was a Japanese diplomat, statesman, and peer who was assigned as the special envoy to the United States during the Russo-Japanese War. Although Kaneko was a student at Harvard at the same time as Roosevelt (who refers to “Baron Kaneko” in letters as a “Harvard graduate”), they were not introduced until 1889.
490 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 13 June 1904. 4:829.
491 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 13 June 1904. 4:829.
The Soul of Japan by Inazo Nitobe from Kentarō when he requested a book to help him understand the Japanese character. Indeed, Kentarō’s influence during this conflict, and the detailed public and private diplomacy he conducted, has been an oft understudied topic in the limited historiography of the conflict in English literature – however, it has been substantially more investigated in Japanese historiography.492 It is quite likely that this view of the samurai and Japanese heritage presented in this book helped shape Roosevelt’s views towards Japan. Indeed in a later letter to Lodge in which he encloses numerous communications from most major players in the negotiations, he adds regarding Japan that “she is a great civilized nation; though her civilization is in some important respects not like ours…She will be as formidable an industrial competitors, for instance, Germany, and in a dozen years I think she will be the leading industrial nation of the Pacific….Whether her tremendous growth in industrialism will in course of time modify and perhaps soften the wonderful military spirit she has inherited from the days of the Samurai supremacy it is hard to say.”493 Roosevelt feared that even Japan would succumb to the erosion of character he attributed to industry and commerce, but saw the ‘samurai’ traditions as a bulwark. Roosevelt continued to the Japanese delegation that he “hoped to see China kept together, and would gladly welcome any part played by Japan which would tend to bring China forward along the road which Japan trod, because I thought it for the interest of all the world that each part of the world should be prosperous and well policed; I added that unless everybody was mistaken in the Chinese character I thought they would have their hands full in mastering it – at which they grinned and said that they were quite aware of the difficulty they were going to have even in Korea and were satisfied with that job.”494 Again, it appears as if Roosevelt had been largely persuaded as to Japanese paramountcy in the region.495

After this conversation, Roosevelt was at his most conflicted point with respect to his views regarding race, and came closest to abandoning the biological component entirely and veering to a model of learned and inherited cultural traits, briefly arguing even that the Japanese case had convinced him that cultural creed and personal morals counted for more than race. Indeed, although in March of the same year he had written regarding how Japan was a different “civilizational type” than the United States, he argued by June that, even if Japan and the United States and Britain were likely to enter into conflict should Japan win, “I am not much affected by

495 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 13 June 1904. 4:829.
the statement that the Japanese are of an utterly different race from ourselves and that the Russians are of the same race.” Indeed, he even suggested to Spring-Rice that “I suppose we have all outgrown the belief that language and race have anything to do with one another” and proceeded to argue that regardless of race or background or the standards he had placed them on with respect to expectation, “a good man is a good man and a bad man a bad man wherever they are found.” In this at least, Roosevelt’s conversation with Kentarō seems now to have been pivotal. Moreover, this idea meshed with the way Roosevelt considered immigration – and how he granted the benefit of doubt to white immigrants as being able to become English-speaking peoples en masse, while immigrants from China and even black Americans could only reach this standard on an individual basis.

Indeed, by this point Roosevelt seems at least partially persuaded that the Japanese could in fact be as racially similar to the English-speaking races as the Russian – a development that would have consequences with respect to how Roosevelt handled specifically Japanese immigration to the United States, a topic addressed in the next chapter. Moreover, Roosevelt acknowledged that allowing Japan to replace Russia as the dominant great power in Asia might result in an eventual conflict with the United States, but ultimately, he found it an acceptable risk. In the context of his reaction to the possibility of European powers, especially Germany, establishing presences in South America or Africa that could challenge English-speaking peoples, this was rather remarkable. Although, he briefly dismissed both race and language here as something he had “outgrown” – despite fretting over the nature of the Slav as a “great and growing race” earlier that same year – it was clear that much of what the rise of Japan challenged in Roosevelt’s mind was still the biological element of race. Furthermore, he continued that that “I think the Japs may be desirable additions” and that although “there are large classes of the Japanese who will sometimes go wrong, that Japan as a whole will sometimes go wrong, I do not doubt….But I see nothing ruinous to civilization in the advent of the Japanese to power among the great nations.”

It was during these years, facing both the rise of Japan and corresponding with Spring-Rice in Persia that Roosevelt furthered his understanding of how cultural and social tendencies could influence the mélange that contributed to racial characteristics at times more strongly than biologically inherited ethnicities – and superseded his ideas of civilization, as discussed in the introduction. Japan could thus be welcomed fully. During the years of Spring-Rice’s posting in Persia prior to his deployment to St. Petersburg, Roosevelt and Spring-Rice exchanged numerous texts, translations, and letters attempting to assess, as they saw it “the

496 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 13 June 1904. 4:829.
497 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 13 June 1904. 4:829.
robustly Occidental type of mind” and “Oriental people, or a non-Aryan races” in attempts to categorize his world view and determine whether the Japanese, despite religious and ethnic difference, might be “in some essentials” closer to the English-speaking races than other powers, questioning the relationship between “creed and cult” and race. Ultimately, the original model of race used by this dissertation bio-cultural assemblage still accurately and effectively describes the nature of race as conceived by contemporary Roosevelt. The theoretical flexibility given by that model, allowing for the central concepts to persist while acknowledging that elements within it may wax and wane, are necessary to understanding views of race during this crisis. However, Roosevelt lacked this concept in his contemporary thinking, and struggled to reconcile biology with culture in a particularly coherent manner. Within a year, he readopted the language of “yellow races” and “Slav races” and “English-speaking peoples” in discussing the future. While in that postscript he explored in great detail why he decided that the biological element race was no longer critical, unfortunately there does not appear to be a subsequent letter that explains in detail why he reverted to his earlier views of race in which the biological component again played a key role. It is possible the earlier letter was merely an aberration. However, it was more likely that although Roosevelt had begun to realize that his model for race was lacking, he was still wrestling with the consequences of that realization and never reached a satisfactory conclusion – the various components of what he categorized as racial waxed and waned as he needed them to fit circumstance and his tendency to place race in an ontologically central position. Lacking an alternative at this time, once his attention wandered away from Asia to areas that more easily conformed to his views, he may simply have defaulted to his long-held previous assertions.

Neutrality and Negotiations

Roosevelt had developed his viewpoints towards Russia – and more recently Japan – in two phases, first in the late 1890’s as part of his general theorizing towards race and how that informed his geopolitical viewpoints, and second 1903 onwards as the crises began in China between Russia and Japan. By mid-1904, however, Roosevelt was clearly no longer just an observer, having been involved in diplomatic overtures to nearly every power regarding the conflict. Despite insisting on American neutrality and maintaining publicly that the United States was neutral, his personal correspondences indicate that from the earliest days of the conflict, he was desirous of a Japanese victory. Indeed, American neutrality enabled Japan – in August 1904, Roosevelt gave explicit instructions to Hay, Adee, Conger, and Goodnow that the US (and the

Navy in particular) was not to interfere in case of conflict between Russia and Japan in a neutral Chinese port, explicitly pointing out that Chinese neutral ports must not become safe havens to which their assets could flee from Japan if followed.499

By August, Roosevelt was convinced that Japan would win the war, writing even to Hay that “the Russians think only with half a mind. I think the Japanese will whip them handsomely. To judge from the Russians’ attitude at present, if they were victorious they would be so intolerable as to force us to take action?”500 Roosevelt’s beliefs regarding the various strengths of the powers and the manner in which their aforementioned racial characteristics compared led him to prophesize Japanese triumph at a time (Port Arthur had still not fallen and Kuropatkin seemed indecisive) when Britain and most of the other powers were insistent upon a Russian triumph.501

This view was not necessarily shared by his correspondents on the other side of the Atlantic – Spring-rice continued to insist that throughout much of the conflict that Germany either would become a menace in Europe or would use the conflict to acquire gains elsewhere. In early 1904, he wrote to Ronald Ferguson502 “the view of Russians is that the Emperor is above all the world, as he is above Russia itself, and that the mission of Russia is to conquer Asia” concluding in the same letter that this might end up involving Britain and “Germany may be in a position to get any terms out of us which she wishes. I fear she will have to be bought off…. We must play up to the alliance with Japan, or else we lose our position entirely; but we can’t afford to have rows with Russia and Germany at once.”503 Spring-Rice in particular voiced the British concern to Secretary Hay, fearing that “If Japan is badly broken – as seems very possible now – autocracy will have taken a large step in advance.”504 To Spring-Rice existing fears of Slavic supremacy were fused with, as he saw it, the wealth and manpower of Manchuria, Chinese industry, and the problem that “The Russian and the Chinaman together are the two most malleable instruments of despotism which it is possible to find on this degenerate earth. I think this is the real yellow peril.”505 Germany, to Spring-Rice, was complicit in this, arguing to Lodge that not only did “Government circles” in both Germany in Russia despise America as well, but that the “two Emperors have the idea of one taking the Atlantic and the other the Pacific” – to

500 Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay, 29 August 1904. 4:913.
501 Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay, 19 September 1904. 4:946.
502 British politician, later Governor-General of Australia
Spring-Rice, the British Empire was at risk at destruction in the face of this onslaught, concluding that “I believe the U.S. to be the real fortress of our race and it is an infinite satisfaction to see its prosperity and power.”\textsuperscript{506} On numerous other occasions, Spring-Rice even suspected that while Russia conquered Asia, Germany was to police unrest on the borders and even within European Russia, noting this to not just Hay\textsuperscript{507} but also Roosevelt, to whom he wrote he suspected “Germany is rapidly acquiring a very strong position in Russia. The occupation of Kiao-Chao and the Polish frontier, make it essential for Germany to be on good terms with Russia, and Russia hopes to get money from Germany, to use her police to suppress Russian Liberals in Germany, and eventually to use her help in the Far East against the Chinese, English, etc.”\textsuperscript{508} The nightmare scenario was thus the combination of a Greater Germany displacing the English-speaking peoples, acting in concert with Russia to create a new autocratic “yellow peril.” To Spring, Rice, the United States as the “real fortress of our race” was critical as even if his and Roosevelt’s worst fears regarding the racial future of the English-speaking peoples came true, and faced a Slavic Asia or a Germanic settler empire that displaced the British in Africa and the United States in South America, it seemed likely to him that the United States would have continued as a final bastion.

By the end of the year, however, Roosevelt’s thinking had changed on two key areas: He was increasingly convinced that Japan might eventually be hostile to the United States and Britain, and he had begun to worry that this would conflict would further the potential of the English-speaking peoples being outmatched by an alliance of the other powers. On this latter, he had also begun to doubt the unity of the English-speaking races in withstanding a combination of powers, particularly with respect to Britain but also with respect to the character of the American people. In combination, this had at least one significant consequence – particularly after Tsushima when Roosevelt was responsible for mediating the end to the conflict, though still desirous of Russian defeat, he became wary of an unmitigated Japanese victory. While still certain of Japanese victory even in late 1904 before Tsushima, he was no longer quite as eager to witness its arrival.

Over the course of 1904 Roosevelt became increasingly convinced that Japan viewed the people of the United States and Britain as fundamentally similar in character as those of Russia or Germany – a problematic grouping for Roosevelt. He wrote to George von Lengerke

\textsuperscript{508} Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice to Theodore Roosevelt, ~June 1904. Gwynn, 1:422.
Meyer that “I believe that the Japanese rulers recognize Russia as their most dangerous permanent enemy, but I am not at all sure that the Japanese people draw any distinctions between the Russians and other foreigners, including ourselves. I have no doubt that they include all white men as being people who, as a whole, they dislike, and whose past arrogance they resent: and doubtless they believe their own yellow civilization to be better.” In a letter to Spring-Rice the following day he lamented that the Americans and British were lumped in with Germans, Russians, and others as “simply as white devils inferior to themselves not only in what they regard as the essentials of civilization, but in courage and forethought, and to be treated politely only so long as would enable the Japanese to take advantage of our various national jealousies, and beat us in turn.” However, Roosevelt understood that this antagonism, while unfortunate, was not unexpected and was “most natural” given the behavior of the other powers towards Japan in the preceding decades, writing that and further noting personally that “Springy, you and I will both admit that our traveling countrymen, not to speak of the inhabitants of Continental Europe, are not always ingratiating in their manners towards the races which they regard as their inferiors.” Speaking in hypothetical terms he argued if the racial roles had been reversed, and England and America had been dominated by “one yellow race for a long term of years” and had then triumphed “over another yellow race” he could not expect English or American soldiers to “have shown any great courtesy or consideration toward men of the first yellow race.” Of course, it is historically questionable at best whether England or the United States were particularly innocent from ‘lording over’ Japan, but nevertheless, while he thus found it infuriating for the English-speaking peoples to be categorized alongside what he found to be the other races of Europe, he also found it understandable. He maintained this sympathy into the next year following the Japanese victory at Tsushima, writing both that he could not trust the Russian government and that “the Japanese I am inclined to welcome as a valuable factor in the civilization of the future. But it is not to be expected that they should be free from prejudice against and distrust of the white race.”

509 Meyer was technically still the Ambassador to Italy, but by 1904, Roosevelt had started corresponding with him regarding the situation with Russia. In April 1905, he became the US Ambassador to Russia – however, he actually arrived in St. Petersburg in February 1905 and began diplomatic work at least at that time. This sort of correspondence with diplomats outside of their assigned lane was not unusual for Roosevelt. Most notably, Henry White, only finally Ambassador to Italy in 1905, had for years advised Roosevelt as to the diplomatic angle regarding various issues.


511 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 27 December 1904. 4:1082.


514 Theodore Roosevelt to George Otto Trevelyan, 13 May 1905. 4:1173.
point of trust regarding Russia had been a long-standing one, with Roosevelt accusing her of “fathomless mendacity” and arguing eventually that “they are hopeless creatures with whom to deal. They are utterly insincere and treacherous; they have no conception of truth, no willingness to look facts in the face, no regard for others of any sort or kind, no knowledge of their own strength or weakness; and they are helplessly unable to meet emergencies.” This element of trust, often pinned on the government, and particularly, the Czarist autocracy, was not necessarily tied to race unlike the ‘barbarism’ or tendencies towards despotism or even the expansionist tendencies he had seen in Russia to this point. On the other hand, although he explicitly noted he had found them truthful and that “their diplomatic standards have been made good” he caveat ed that “Yet Japan is an oriental nation, and the individual standard of truthfulness in Japan is low.” Despite having in the previous year briefly wavered, it is evident that Roosevelt still saw racial characteristics as indicative of how a nation would behave in the future. Moreover, the rise of Japan reconstructed the importance of the color line – except in fears that Japan would only see all powers equally on the other side of it.

The second key development by this time, that Britain or the United States would face hostile alliance of Russia or Japan after this conflict, was one he found improbable but not impossible. Indeed, were such a circumstance to arise, he advised to the American Ambassador to St. Petersburg that “they might have Germany or France or both in with them……Germany and France for their own reasons are anxious to propitiate Russia, and of course care nothing whatever for our interests. England is inclined to be friendly to us and is inclined to support Japan against Russia, but she is pretty flabb y and I am afraid to trust either the farsightedness or the tenacity of purpose of her statesmen; or indeed of her people” He also voiced the same worry, that Japan and Russia might find common ground, towards Spring-Rice, pointing out that the Japanese were “disappointed and unfavorably impressed by the English vehemence of speech and exceeding moderation of action in the Hull fishing fleet affair.” However, he ultimately considered the a Russo-Japanese alliance at the least unlikely for three reasons. First, he concluded that despite the fact Russia was untrustworthy and “Russia for a number of years has treated the United States as badly as she has treated England, and almost as badly as she has

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515 Theodore Roosevelt to George von Lengerke Meyer, 26 December 1904. 4:1078.
516 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 5 June 1905. 4:1202.
517 Theodore Roosevelt to George von Lengerke Meyer, 26 December 1904. 4:1078.
518 Theodore Roosevelt to George von Lengerke Meyer, 26 December 1904. 4:1078.
519 The Hull fishing fleet affair, also known as the Dogger Bank incident, was a minor crisis during which the Russian Baltic Fleet mistakenly attacked a British fishing fleet en route to Asia, nearly causing war between Britain and Russia. Although war was averted through several diplomatic measures, Britain used this and the 1902 Alliance to deny the use of the Suez Canal to the Russian fleet heading towards Asia, greatly delaying its arrival.
treated Japan,” Russia was incapable of harming the United States anywhere, even in the Philippines. Conversely, Japan’s primary interests in Asia that he had long since conceded should be a Japanese domain necessitated, at least as Roosevelt concluded, that Japan’s “natural enemy” would become Russia. This would only not be the case were Russia and Japan to align and Japan challenge Britain and the United States at sea, requiring Japan to assume the totality of the risk for minimal gain in such an alliance - a fact he pointed out. 

It was likely, given their relationship, that Roosevelt was also conveying his disappointment in the British – he noted the next day referring to Britain that he would “hesitate in counting upon the support of Your Government and your people. I am not quite sure of their tenacity of purpose, of their fixity of conviction, of their willingness to take necessary risks, and at need to endure heavy losses for a given end. …. Moreover, in large parts of both of our countries there is undoubtedly too much softness.” As seen in his correspondence since the early 1890s, Roosevelt was not new to worrying that commerce and urban areas and other traits of what he considered civilization would also erode the ability of the English-speaking peoples to wage war. The weakness he saw in Britain and the United States at this time was not unexpected – nor was an expected future threat from Russia.

Roosevelt’s hesitation regarding the reliability of other powers had only strengthened. Although he still continued to think in terms of the English-speaking peoples with respect to threats and the settler colonies, he had concluded that any friendship between nations could only work based upon strength and that Russia and Japan would only “yield to either England or the United States” exactly that amount of deference and respect they earned through strength not through alliances – a sentiment he would repeat several times over the next year. Common threat might still have existed, but America foreign policy was increasingly unconvinced that Britain was even capable of being a reliable ally.

**Tsushima and the Aftermath**

As Roosevelt’s views on race evolved, his involvement in the crises which spurred these changes similarly intensified. In the act that would eventually earn him the Nobel Peace Prize,
Roosevelt became deeply involved in the Russo-Japanese War, eventually mediating the end of the conflict. Although Roosevelt is cautious to only write to trusted confidents about race during this time, his views on the topic likely impacted the positions he took in the conflict and influenced his mediation efforts. Despite outward attempts to appear impartial, Roosevelt began diplomatic overtures with personal assumptions regarding the options available to the Russians and continued holding expectations regarding how the Russians and Japanese were capable of behaving in negotiations. Most critically for his views regarding Germany, he also saw the Kaiser as being particularly helpful despite ongoing misgivings about German reliability and found the British to be intransigent in placing diplomatic pressure and unreliable. While the minutiae of diplomatic exchanges are not the aim of this dissertation, some of them reveal what Roosevelt saw as the stakes for the future.

The gradual theorizing, slowly shifting perceptions on race and alliances, and attempts to prophesize the future of the world order based on the respective characteristics of the Japanese and Russians reached a critical point by 1905. The result of the Battle of Tsushima both reshaped the threat from Russia and brought Germany and Britain back into consideration. With the war having already gone badly on land and sea and with Russian naval assets in the Pacific largely blockaded within Port Arthur by late 1904, Russia decided to send her Baltic fleet under the command of Admiral Rozhestvensky to the Pacific to break the Japanese blockade of Port Arthur. Due to the British denial of the Suez Canal as a response to the aforementioned Hull fishing fleet affair, the fleet was forced to Steam around the Cape of Good Hope. By January 1905, before the arrival of the fleet, the Japanese had taken Port Arthur. By the end of February and the Battle of Mukden, the Japanese had established a clear victory on land and had seized most of the Korean peninsula. The fleet was then re-tasked to engage the Japanese fleet and bring about a decisive Russian naval victory. Although Roosevelt expected Japanese victory, he anticipated a drawn-out conflict in which although Japan would triumph, they risked defeat. Indeed, he saw Japan as “anxious to make peace,” finding the Russian fleet “in matériel is somewhat superior to theirs.” In Britain, Balfour had not expected the Japanese to emerge victorious whatsoever.

In late May, the two fleets engaged each other in one of the most significant naval battles of the century. The result was a devastating Japanese victory, and eventually, Roosevelt’s

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525 Often transliterated in contemporary English, including by Roosevelt, as Rojestvensky.
527 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 15 May 1905. 4:1179.
528 Tomes, *Balfour and Foreign Policy*, 122.
mediation ending the conflict. Initially, Roosevelt was skeptical either his personal or American involvement in mediation would be of any use, preferring to encourage diplomacy behind the scenes. However, he acknowledged that this process had resulted in little beyond Russian obstinacy and a diplomatic situation in which Japan had achieved nearly total victory, leaving Russia with little with which to bargain; as he acknowledged, even most who expected a Japanese victory expected the Japanese fleet to be battered and did not envision the sheer totality of the Japanese victory at Tsushima. As he wrote in a confidential letter to Lodge, Takahira secretly requested that Roosevelt make the offer to mediate and hide the fact Japan had requested this of him in a meeting immediately after the battle. The Russian minister Cassini had also seen Roosevelt then, but was, in Roosevelt’s mind, unable to decide what exactly the Russian government even expected.

Roosevelt continued to include Spring-Rice in his closest deliberations, even informing him that Japan secretly requested the mediation, telling him that Lansdowne and Balfour should also be informed but that the secret should spread no further, adding in a parenthetical “not Chamberlain – his ideals and mine are different.” Although he still found Britain unreliable as a political ally, Roosevelt conveyed to Edward VII in a letter sent through Henry White, along with “some studies of mine in our western history,” that “I absolutely agree with you as to the importance, not merely to ourselves but to all the free peoples of the civilized world, of a constantly growing friendship and understanding between the English-speaking peoples.” Nevertheless, he repeatedly discounted the idea of a formal alliance with Britain, constantly putting American security throughout this crisis against Russia, Germany, or Japan, in the idea that the United States would remain safe should her people maintain the racial characteristics of strength he had come to place faith in, most importantly to him exhibited by the maintenance of a strong navy.

Although influential individuals in Britain still saw Germany as both a potential disaster or a wall against Russia, Roosevelt had transferred this role to Japan. He wrote in reply to the earlier letter from Spring-Rice letter that “In one of your last letters you speak of the German army as being a bulwark for civilization against disorder in view of the breakup in Russian affairs.

529 Theodore Roosevelt to Andrew Dickson White, 1 June 1905. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 1952, 4:1200.
530 Theodore Roosevelt to Andrew Dickson White, 1 June 1905. 4:1200; Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 5 June 1905. 4:1202.
531 He told Lodge in this letter that “you are the only human being who knows that they have asked me except Edith, though I shall have to in the end tell both John Hay and Taft”
534 Theodore Roosevelt to Edward VII, 9 March 1905. 4:1135.
I doubt if I really have as strong a feeling for Germany as this that you thus by implication express."535 Roosevelt continued to hope for assistance from Germany regarding Japan and Russia, but the role of Germany he once envisioned in tearing apart the Russian Empire as having passed.536

While Roosevelt agreed that “with Russia weakened Germany feels it can be fairly insolent within the borders of Europe.”537 he no longer found the idea that Germany intended to construct a “continental coalition” against England as he had found plausible a few years earlier, concluding that the Kaiser was more likely to be a “to be exasperating and unpleasant than a dangerous neighbor” and that he lacked “the Bismarckian continuity of policy and resolution of purpose.”538 It is possible that Roosevelt had mellowed regarding Germany, in part because he had found the Kaiser’s vagaries, in this instance, to be helpful rather than hurtful to his efforts regarding Russia and Japan; he also notes that the Kaiser’s actions in Morocco and elsewhere have not appeared to keep the other European power, especially France and Russia, aligned with Germany against Britain.539 Much of the discourse around this time was surrounded by misinformation and speculation – some of it possibly intentionally caused as a tool to manipulate the other powers. At one tense moment, the Kaiser was concerned that Roosevelt believed that there was a Russian-German alliance behind the conflict aiming to crush England and Japan – a claim that Roosevelt had to deny to both Germany and England, and that the “German Government believes that Russia is circulating this report in both Japan and the United States so as to cause a hostile feeling to Germany.”540 Later in 1908, the Kaiser evidently gave an interview to a New York Times reporter, who decided to pass the information to Roosevelt, detailing what he thought the consequences of the conflict had been:

He exprest himself with intense bitterness about England and said that very shortly Germany would have to go to war with her, and that he believed the time had nearly come, and that England was a traitor to the white race, as had been shown by her alliance with Japan. With fine consistency he added that he was helping the Mohammedans in every way in giving them rifles and officers because he thought they would be a barrier against the yellow peril, about which he discoursed at length. He said that now everybody recognized that Russia had been fighting for the entire white race, but that she had fought very badly and that if German battalions had had to do the fighting, the Japanese would have been worsted. He stated that within a year or two we,

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536 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 13 May 1905. 4:1177.  
537 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 15 May 1905. 4:1179.  
the Americans would certainly have to fight the Japanese; that he was glad we were preparing for it. ⁵⁴¹

Despite the inconsistencies that the reporter pointed out sarcastically, the Kaiser interestingly viewed the conflict as key to the future “yellow peril” that the “white race” would have to fight and continued to believe this years after the war. To Roosevelt, Russia and the difficulties of dealing with it still preoccupied his attention early 1905, writing before Tsushima that the Russians have “shown a fairly Chinese temper for the last year or two. Their conduct in Manchuria was such as wholly to alienate American sympathy” and also having made “evident that they intended to organize China as a step toward the domination of the rest of the world.” ⁵⁴²

At this time, he still saw Russia’s ambitions in Asia as broadly threatening to the state of the world. Although he criticized against the Kaiser’s temper in speaking publicly about the dangers of a ‘Yellow Peril,’ clearly the progress of the war to that point had not altered Roosevelt’s earlier fears of Russia mobilizing the population of Asia against the other powers. However, the change after Tsushima seems undeniable. Shortly after the battle, he concluded that “Well, it seems to me that the Russian bubble has been pretty thoroughly pricked…. I have never been able to persuade myself that Russia was going to conquer the world at any time … I suppose this particular fear is now at an end everywhere,” although it is unclear whether his audience, Spring-Rice, who just a few months earlier had still be arguing that Germany was constructing a continental alliance against the English-speaking peoples, was in fact similarly convinced. ⁵⁴³

Indeed, he rather presciently returned to an argument he made in 1897, arguing that not only did Nicholas II desperately need to accept peace, “If he does not I believe that the disaster to Russia will be so great that she will cease to count among the great powers for a generation to come – unless indeed, as foreshadowed in your last letter, there is a revolution which makes her count as the French did after their revolution.” ⁵⁴⁴

With the ‘Russian bubble’ thus ‘pricked’ and Germany, while still threatening, seen as perhaps manageable, Roosevelt found himself having to resolve the questions raised regarding the future of Japan and the United States. Roosevelt felt the threat from Japan should be manageable so long as America remained strong, but he repeatedly fell to an old fear regarding the corruption of racial values, arguing that “if as Brooks Adams says, we show ourselves “opulent, aggressive and unarmed,” the Japanese may sometime work us an injury.” ⁵⁴⁵

⁵⁴¹ Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root, 8 August 1908. Elihu Root Papers, MSS38307 Box 162-163, Library of Congress.
⁵⁴⁵ Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 5 June 1905. 4:1202.
belief that strength lay in avoiding opulence and embracing martial values, apparent since at least the mid-1890s, still dominated Roosevelt’s analysis when forced to deal with new paradigms. He summed these fears, writing to Spring-Rice that within a few years, Britain, America, and Germany “will each have to dread the Japanese more than they do any other nation.”

Drawing parallel with the manner in which the white powers had treated China for decades, Roosevelt concluded that such a similar approach treating Japan as “an inferior and alien race” would “invite disaster,” having been persuaded not just to Japan’s current power, but its future capabilities.

Crucially, Roosevelt argued that even after achieving this strength and heights of civilization, Japan would have “motives and ways of thought which are not quite of those of the powers of our race.” This theme reappeared frequently in 1905, with Roosevelt having finally been convinced that there could be multiple avenues to civilization for a race – rather a stark departure from his thinking in the mid-1890s when he argued that races were all on a common trajectory. Japan, to him, could not be racially identical, yet he could also not disregard that Japan had managed to exhibit the characteristics he so admired. He found this undoubtedly threatening – particularly in light of the theme he always returned to – that “occidental civilization” including the civilization “of America and Australia no less than of European nations, west of Russia” suffered from the same malaise he saw as plaguing “Hellenistic civilization of the centuries succeeding the death of Alexander, no less than the civilization of the Roman world during the first century of the empire.”

Although the rapprochement literature indeed turns on roughly this time period, race was tied to foreign policy not solely through rapprochement, as this dissertation has extensively shown. While the Russian threat dissipated, this was not an indicator of the reduction of race as a significant factor – whether as a security concern or in encouraging friendliness with Britain – but rather an indicator of Russia no longer presenting a significant challenge in the near-term. Additionally, Anglo-Saxonism as a term itself had fallen out of favor by 1905. Indeed, as seen in earlier chapters, this shift had largely begun even by 1898. However, the underlining racial paradigm had not fallen out of favor – merely the term. The term of ‘English-speaking peoples’ replaced it rather thoroughly and remained popular for decades – Churchill famously later envisioning history as having developed on those terms, as did Andrew Roberts. Moreover, the Russo-Japanese led to a brief nadir in Roosevelt’s opinion of Britain, due to its reluctance to

547 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 16 June 1905. 5:123.
548 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 16 June 1905. 5:123.
549 Theodore Roosevelt to Whitelaw Reid, 11 September 1905. 5:18.
pressure its now-ally Japan to accept peace. Despite his support of the second Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1905, owing to their refusal to pressure Japan during the Russo-Japanese War, Roosevelt concluded that Britain was needlessly intransigent and instead found the Kaiser the foreign leader he explicitly found the most helpful. This is not to suggest that his views on race regarding Germany or Britain shifted significantly after 1905, although they did regarding Japan and Russia. Rather, if one were to analyze race in American and British foreign policy purely on the terms of rapprochement, 1905 would indeed seem a point when race became less significant. However, it was instead rapprochement that became less significant while race remained critical. Additionally, the unfortunate history of the following four decades would suggest that race, and the idea of struggle between races, had certainly not fallen out of favor.

However, by 1905, the status of race in politics, while not diminished, had clearly changed. Although Russia and the Slav were once seen as threats that caused angst in an almost apocalyptic sense, with contemporary leaders having assumed that Russia might overrun much of the world, by 1908, this had become much diminished. Roosevelt pointed out that year that while “Of course the Slavs may have the future as theirs; but remember that for two centuries everyone has been prophesying of Russia a growth of power that has never come to pass, and has believed that she held a menace to the rest of the world which has never been made good,” deciding that in history Russia had never actually successfully broken another power, though he admitted the exception of Swedish power, which he acknowledged Russia had destroyed. 551 Although the historical accuracy of this is certainly questionable – at the least with respect to the Napoleonic Wars, Roosevelt was generally happy to credit that victory to the English-speaking peoples. To Roosevelt, Russia would either steer a course to power in which it was no threat, or it would collapse into the extremes of Tsarist absolutism or anarchy and “Tolstoyism” on the other end. 552 While as discussed a few years earlier he thought that “Tolstoyism” option could still threaten the status quo of the other powers, by 1908 this fear too had diminished. The fear of Russia, so prevalent through 1905, was thus to Roosevelt forever pushed into the indefinite future, the lesson finally having been learned that Russian growth would likely not come to pass in a manner that threatened the rest of the world. Moreover, a Russian colony in South America or Africa was nigh inconceivable. Rivalry with Germany was an unfortunate reality of contemporary views of racial competition, while rivalry with Russia was an issue for future

generations. Even if Russia could overrun India or China, it was the settler colonies that were seen to be of paramount importance to the future of the English-speaking peoples.

Thus, threat of Russia had indeed galvanized the biological elements of Anglo-Saxonism, and with its decline, Anglo-Saxonism in a limited sense waned. However, the removal of that threat did not suddenly and inexplicably change the paradigm under which these political leaders had been viewing the world for over a decade. Instead, it forced a re-calculation as to which peoples – and powers – were actually capable of presenting a threat in the coming decades. Rather, the reality was that the two most significant forces were from Germany, which had affirmed existing racial thought in the preceding years and Japan, which challenged it – both of these were realities in the present in a way Russia could not be, particularly to the United States. Combined with the ongoing trend (by this time in progress for most of a decade) of political leaders preferring the term ‘English-speaking peoples’ over that of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ – Roosevelt even wrote in 1900 that “Anglo-Saxon is of course an utterly unscientific word”\(^553\) in reference to the racial makeup of the United States – views of racial competition that had influenced these leaders remained significant in geopolitics for decades.

During the course of the mediation, Roosevelt’s public statements differed somewhat from his private correspondence – the only time over the course of my research that seems to have been substantively the case, perhaps due to the delicate nature of negotiating between these Powers. Roosevelt acknowledged repeatedly in his private correspondence that America needed to remain neutral and that the American public was sympathetic to the Japanese. While his public statements are generally rather dry and diplomatic, his private correspondence reveals similarities to themes he had expressed for the past fifteen years. Roosevelt concluded even during the course of the war and the subsequent negotiations that the Japanese were civilizational ascendant, in accordance with his views regarding racial evolution, and that their ability to defeat the Russia indicated that the Slav was set back once again. The consequences for the negotiations, as he expressed privately in letters that he insisted could not be made public, were that he spent extraordinarily little effort in protecting Russian interests. Throughout this, of course, he considered Japan merely on the approach to civilization, not having quite achieved it, placing upon it a higher burden of respect and prestige that it needed to acquire from the international community. Nevertheless, by the end of the conflict, the result was clear – Japan acquired nearly every one of her stated goals, with the exception of the indemnity that Roosevelt

had privately already told the Japanese that they should not seek, and more importantly, Russian power in China was permanently crushed ending forever the perils that Roosevelt had long seen from that state – and long thought it the German responsibility to deal with. From this point forward, Roosevelt viewed Japan as the only state in the Pacific with which American or British power need contend.

Germany was not absent from the Pacific during these years, although the consequences to the Russo-Japanese war were indeed minimal. However, German ambitions in this region, largely centered on trade with China, participation in the Eight Nation Alliance, and the dispute over Samoa did not seem to trigger much angst about the racial future of the English-speaking peoples – especially in comparison to the angst caused regarding South America or South Africa. The issue of trade with China was one which the United States was comfortable with advocating free trade, despite unrelated trade and tariff disputes with Germany that took place in 1905. German participation in the Eight National Alliance only served to fuel Roosevelt’s views of the German as militaristic but potentially lacking in other civilizational areas. Roosevelt generally only wrote about this conflict in racial terms when describing the character of the various soldiers of the participating nations -something he did quite frequently – in a similar manner as he was fond of doing in Cuba and during the Boer War. However, the reports he was receiving were scattered at best, and unlike in those earlier cases, he did not extrapolate this thinking into broader geopolitical concerns. The conflict regarding Samoa has been covered extensively by Paul Kennedy, particularly regarding it’s diplomatically ‘tangled’ nature. However, the disagreement, unlike issues concerning Africa and South America, did not escalate into concerns of German competition with the English-speaking peoples. However, these are areas that certainly might merit further investigation in the future.

Roosevelt and contemporary correspondents never explicitly provided a reason for this discrepancy, but a likely reason was that neither German contention for trade nor a base on Samoa primarily useful as little more than a coaling station presented a threat outside what was the baseline for Great Power maneuverings. Samoa could never become an Australia. Fears regarding Russian absorption of China were discussed earlier in this chapter, but Germany was rarely seen as carving out Chinese territory for a settler colony. Indeed, on this both British and American leaders had for years made little exception in their behavior towards any other power, including each other. Despite a decade of friendliness, rapprochement, and common purpose

regarding the envisioning of a common racial future, America and Britain forged neither a common polity nor an alliance when given opportunity to do so or when individuals such as Roosevelt were directly in power. Instead, the shared racial interests led to a common perception of threat only. Simple boundary disputes, contesting for coaling stations, trading outposts, etc. were normal and acceptable and rarely cause for undue alarm unless they could be a precursor to a permanent expansion of racial power such as a settler colony. For the United States, the pressing threat on this front were any ambitions in South America. For Britain, this was often in Africa. Russian presence in North America was seen to have been easily displaced before the English-speaking peoples. Russia was a unique threat in that its settler ambitions extended into Asia and created fears, however absurd, of a Slavic fusion with the old Yellow Peril, stoking fears that eventually Russia would be in a position to challenge the survival of the English-speaking peoples. To stave off this distant conflict, America and Britain initially hoped for German alliance with Britain and German dismemberment of the Russian Empire in Europe. Instead, Britain received Japan as an ally and America mediated as Japan obliterated Russian power in the Pacific.
Chapter Five – ‘Not Merely another Branch of the English Race’

“I would not go into the abstract rights or wrongs of it, I would simply say that we did not intend to have the Germans on this continent, excepting as immigrants whose children would become Americans of one sort or another, and if Germany intended to extend her empire here she would have to whip us first.” 555

Throughout the previous chapters, a running theme has been the angst regarding the racial characteristics not just within other nations and how they relate to the English-speaking peoples, but the changing nature of racial characteristics within the United States in particular. This has been a long-running theme in American history, reaching well into the present – and an exhaustive examination could span volumes. For the purposes of this thesis, the two issues of significance are why immigration during this time period was seen to weaken or strengthen American racial characteristics as related to other states and races and how emigration to the US from Germany in particular was seen in relation to German emigration to other locations. Was emigration from Europe, and Germany in particular, to the United States notably different than emigration to Africa or South America or elsewhere? This is addressed here in the context of how it impacted geopolitical views in relation to other powers – but notably also in how the development of the idea of an English-speaking ‘mold’ in America and elsewhere could be used to address a perceived threat from German emigration.

Although immigration has been a theme that has surfaced throughout this thesis, particularly during the Boer War, it warrants its own chapter for a variety of reasons. The protagonists of this thesis themselves saw a commonality between foreign and domestic policy. The cause of the ‘English-speaking peoples’ in South Africa was synonymous with that of emigration to Australia or keeping Germans out of Brazil just as much as it was with ensuring that New York City continued to assimilate people to the United States successfully. This matter was seen as a solution to the problem of German emigration – colonial or otherwise – on both sides of the Atlantic. To Roosevelt, Chamberlain, and Spring-Rice alike, the United States provided a safety valve to which emigrants could go and no longer be German. Moreover, the character of these immigrants was of immense concern to Roosevelt, who, while believing in this potential for transformation, constantly fretted that it would change the American character. This fear, of course, was not new. Benjamin Franklin, at least as early as 1751 and in an essay titled “Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, &c,”

questioned with respect to the various British military units, supplied by the American colonies and often quartered in homes there, “why should the Palatine Boors be suffered swarm into our Settlements and, by herding together, establish their Language and Manners to the Exclusion of ours?”  

One of the issues so cited as a cause for independence that the US Constitutions’ Bill of Rights specifically forbids the practice of quartering troops, Franklin thus feared that sending German troops to the colonies, in a manner that concentrated them into communities, would effectively render German another language in the colonies. Franklin was most worried with respect to Pennsylvania, his own state, where he feared they “will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them, and will never adopt our Language or Customs any more than they can acquire our Complexion.”  

Franklin, although writing long before most of the racial theorists read by the political figures of the early 20th century, consequently espoused surprisingly similar fears and feared that the “Number of purely white People in the World is proportionably very small” and wished “their Numbers were increased.”  

Moreover, it is critical to note that Franklin’s idea of whiteness was very narrow. Indeed, he ordered the peoples of the world into various categories, in his words, of “black,” “tawny,” “swarthy,” and “White.” Of these categories, he found Africa populated by members of the “black or tawny” race, “Asia chiefly tawny,” and the Native populations of the Americas entirely “tawny.”  

Franklin grouped “Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians, and Swedes” into the “swarthy Complexion” category, where he also grouped most Germans. He concluded only the English and the Saxons of Germany, from whom the English were descended, were “White.” Notably no other German population met this standard. Of course, Franklin’s thinking on these issues stems from a vastly different background than that Roosevelt or the current era – and have been assessed by other historians. Although Franklin, the figures surrounding Roosevelt, and many in the present world are all racist, at least from the standpoint of believing one group of humans biologically superior and distinct from another group of humans, it is important to note that the justifications for this racism certainly evolved over time.

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556 Benjamin Franklin, *Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, &c* (Kneeland in Queens St. Boston., 1755; Tarrytown, New York: William Abbatt, 1918) Note: the original publication indeed lists “Tarrqtown” as the location, most likely a typographical error for “Tarrytown.”

557 Franklin.

558 Franklin.

559 Franklin.

560 Franklin.

To Franklin, immigration from Germany was undesirable as Germans could not conceivably assimilate, continuing to speak and act German in a manner incompatible with the existing English settlers. A component that Franklin lacked but was critical by the late 19th century was the scientific notion of evolution – particularly Lamarckian evolution. As discussed in earlier chapters, this resulted in three fears, the latter two of which were unknown in the late 18th century. The first – a remarkably resilient angst that was present in the 1700s and seems to persist to the present day – was that immigrants would not ‘assimilate’ and that Pennsylvania, for example, would in effect become a German-speaking colony rather than an English-speaking one. The second, perhaps logically incompatible with the first yet somehow still powerful, was that assimilation would in fact occur but result in a nation where the dominant characteristics were weakened, and the country would lose the virtuous (and as Roosevelt often put it – “manly”) characteristics that made it powerful. The last was that because of whatever process the first two fears resulted in, the weakening of racial characteristics or the lack of immigrants to assimilate would result in the displacement of the English-speaking peoples in a competitive, existential, and evolutionary sense. To an observer in the present, these fears – among other more nuanced features of their racist thinking – do seem difficult to reconcile with each other. Nevertheless, despite any logical dissonance, they often surfaced simultaneously.

The US Naturalization Act of 1790 limited acquisition of US citizenship to “any alien, being a free white person,” effectively barring the acquisition of citizenship for non-white Americans for decades. Despite minor revisions, the first substantial change to this came with the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution during Reconstruction, allowing for birthright citizenship. Although largely deciding the question regarding the black population of the United States, the potential for non-white immigrants to get citizenship was not legally fully resolved until United States v. Wong Kim Ark in March 1898, when the Supreme Court ruled that the child of a Chinese immigrant who was born on US soil would in fact be a US citizen.

Evolution, as discussed in the first chapter, was not Darwinian as understood in the modern sense. While scientists had largely accepted that the most likely evolutionary theory was indeed that of natural selection, with random mutation and selection pressure over immense time scales serving as the mechanism of action, political theorists were often sloppy in adapting ideas from scientists. Worse, contemporary political leaders were in turn sloppy in adapting those political theories about race into their own views on immigration. The result was that to these

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563 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
leaders, evolution could take place over a few generations; to some, even a single generation was sufficient to pass on characteristics. ‘Gains’ made by a race could be lost just as quickly. Race was biological, but its position in the hierarchy was not static. Just as the Slavs could advance, immigration to the United States or Australia could propel people into being Anglo-Saxons. The closer one was already, the faster this process would have taken place. At the same time, to some there was the risk of a race being dragged back down in the same way. Roosevelt generally assumed that America was capable of adapting immigrants into his English-speaking citizenry. While he feared dilution of sorts, and oft expressed value in the influx of “barbaric” qualities, he rarely feared that immigrants alone would lead to a Lamarckian failure of the English-speaking race. Rather more important to him was that Americans generally, using immigrants to assist when possible, retain the characteristics he saw as vital to maintaining the top position in racial hierarchy – martial ability, democracy, individualism, masculinity, and even to a lesser extent Protestantism. While immigrants could alter this, the threat came from internal factors such as his ever-present fear of commerce and urban weakness, as much as from foreign populations. However, immigrant populations could in his mind certainly exacerbate or alleviate the problem.

Fears persisted that immigrants of various sorts would dilute key civilizational traits, interfering with the project of Anglo-Saxon utopia. Unlike the various other groups who migrated to the United States in massive numbers at this time – most notable in comparison with the Irish – Germany itself was a power that rivaled and threatened the United States. American leaders were not especially concerned about the foreign exploitation of, for example, Irish immigrants by the United Kingdom or certainly not any other force in Ireland. While large numbers of Italians and other nationalities were beginning to arrive at this time, the sheer number of German immigrants dwarfed that of all others. Indeed, to this day, the single largest source of self-reported national origin for Americans is still German – outstripping the original English colonists, involuntary slave migration, and modern immigration from Mexico and Latin America alike.564 And just as certain people in Britain and America viewed the population of the world by Anglo-Saxons for the benefit of mankind, they similarly feared there were likeminded individuals in Germany who thought the same of populating the world with Germans – especially in America and South America.

Closely intertwined with numerous domestic political matters, the German immigrant population was not unrelated to foreign policy issues. Various individuals such as Root, Hay,

and Roosevelt felt limited by the political leanings of German-Americans. Moreover, their political nemesis, Bryan, was seen as stirring accusations of Anglomania against the administration, attempting to break German-Americans from the Republican vote. On the British side, as late as 1914, Cecil Spring-Rice remained concerned that the German-American population would prevent America from actually becoming sympathetic to the British cause.

**The Inheritance of Race**

Roosevelt’s understanding of Germans in the United States and their contribution to the racial characteristics of either the Anglo-Saxons or English-speaking peoples evolved greatly over time. During the 1880’s and early to mid-1890s, when Roosevelt was more involved with politics in New York than necessarily at a national level, Germans were seen not just as a racial issue but a political one. As he wrote to Lodge in the mid-1880s, Roosevelt noticed that “my support among the Republicans (and decent people generally) is very strong, but there is a very serious defection from us among the Germans.”

It is, unfortunately, nearly impossible to disentangle these factors – that Germans were threatening to Roosevelt not just from a racial competition and foreign policy standpoint, but also on a political level. Consistently throughout his career, Roosevelt attacked critiques from German-language newspapers and found German immigrants most susceptible to Democratic politics or defection within the Republican party.

James Bryce’s *American Commonwealth*, published in 1888, was contemporarily considered a successor to Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America*, despite its relative current obscurity. Bryce directly engaged with the question of racial origin in immigrant populations, and argued for the “quality of the earlier immigrants, Irish and Teutonic,” finding them of such desirability and their qualities so well known that they required no further detail. Bryce also found that the Scandinavians were “intelligent peasants, of strong stocks, industrious, energetic” but more importantly “capable of quickly accommodating themselves to the conditions of their new land and blending with its people” – the latter quality being the element he found lacking in other immigrants, to include the Slavs and Italians. This analysis, that there was a hierarchy of desirable racial origins, and particularly the manner in which German and Irish immigrants were of superior quality than later immigrants was one repeated frequently in contemporary public discourse and private correspondence alike. Of course, it must be noted that this fits the

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trajectory in which earlier waves of migrants to the United States were seen as desirable *after the fact* and that newer arrivals were seen as disruptive to that order – a trajectory that has continued to the present. Nevertheless, the concept of race bringing with it a “grade of civilization” fit well with, and likely greatly influenced, Roosevelt’s then developing views on race. Roosevelt not only read the book, but internalized many of its lessons, for years speaking to others about its merits. Indeed, in early 1888, Roosevelt wrote effusively to Bryce regarding the popular comparison to Toqueville and found it a “great injustice” as “It has all of De Tocqueville’s really great merits; and has not got, as his book has, two or three serious and damaging faults. No one can help admiring the depth of your insight into our peculiar conditions, and the absolute fairness of your criticisms.”

The “peculiar conditions” were a direct rejection of Franklin’s fears and were key to Roosevelt’s faith regarding America’s ability to function as a mold, as he continued to Bryce, “You have also thoroughly understood that instead of the old American stock being “swamped” by immigration, it has absorbed the immigrants and remained nearly unchanged. Carl Schurz, even, has’n’t imported a German idea into our politics; Albert Gallatin had something of the Swiss in his theories; our present Mayor Grant, of Irish blood, will serve New York, whether well or ill, solely by American principles.”

Roosevelt thus by 1888 had already developed certain foundations to his understanding of immigration to the US, often based upon individuals with whom he had personally interacted. Rather than immigrant populations overwhelming the local populations, as he often feared by the late 1890s regarding Latin America and Africa, in the case of the United States he fully accepted the notion that while certain political issues may remain problematic for a generation or two eventually America was capable of absorbing immigrants and retaining its characteristics as a nation. While there were moments over the next two decades where this conviction was tested, he never wavered particularly far – at least as regarding white immigrants from Europe.

While he never doubted that it was possible to absorb immigrants, he however frequently expressed extremely anti-immigrant viewpoints when discussing either foreign policy or political initiative he personally was invested in – usually also related to foreign policy of some sort.

568 Carl Schurz was a German Revolutionary during the revolutions of 1848, a Union General during the American Civil War, the First German-American US Senator (R – Missouri), and the US Secretary of the Interior. By 1888, he had had become a leader in the Mugwump movement in the Republican party.
569 Albert Gallatin was a Swiss-American politician and diplomat. Deceased by this time, he was prominent politician in the former Democratic-Republican Party, once the US Minister to the UK and to France, the Secretary of the Treasury, and was elected as first a US Congressman and then a US Senator (Pennsylvania).
570 Hugh Grant was the soon to take office (in 1889) Democratic Mayor of New York. Irish-American born in New York City.
Particularly for first generation immigrants, Roosevelt suspected throughout the 1890s that people maintained some of the political loyalties of their ancestors, fearing that “But I do not think that the Irishman as a rule loses his active hatred of England till the third generation” even though those nothing that he thought those same Irish immigrants were willing to elect Americans of English descent to Congress. 572 He did fear that those issues could potentially impact foreign policy in particular, by causing Senators or Cabinet members to appeal to these voters by altering American policy. Two years later, in reference to the Bering Sea dispute 573, Roosevelt did complain to Lodge regarding Charles Foster, then the Secretary of the Treasury, that “in truckling to the foreign vote he has chosen pretty poor sticks to investigate the all-important problem of the immigrants who come here form Europe.” 574 To Roosevelt, this issue was indeed a problem, as he argued that “We emphatically do want to get rid of all foreign influence,” but it was one for which he believed he had a solution. 575 If instead at least the second generation of immigrants could be induced to forget their earlier national sympathies and “become Americanized” – the best method for which he found to be “teaching them early a genuine and fervid devotion to the flag” – the risk of foreign influence was potentially removed, once again leaving only racial questions. 576 This became one of the cornerstones of his world view, that the key to ensuring the creation of Americans was the cultivation of American patriotism and the notion that being an American citizen was inherently superior to being a European citizen. 577 His views on this patriotism went beyond mere nationalist rivalry and became tangled with his views regarding the development of a civilization, arguing that “This is not to blind us at all to our own shortcomings; we ought steadily to try to correct them; but we have absolutely to ground to work on if we don’t have a firm and ardent Americanism at the bottom of everything. It may possibly be that patriotism is only a middle stage in the development of mankind precisely as it may possibly be that this is true of property and marriage.” 578

Roosevelt did not seem to consistently view racial connections between various peoples, to include the commonality he saw among the English-speaking peoples, as creating a new polity. Despite his close ties to Britain, including Spring-Rice in particular, and the close

572 Theodore Roosevelt to James Bryce, 6 January 1888. 1:134.
573 A dispute between Britain and the United States in the 1880s regarding fisheries between the United States and Canada. The issue was settled in 1893 by commission arbitration, largely in favor of Britain.
574 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 22 July 1891. Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1925, 1:256.
575 Theodore Roosevelt to Osborne Howes, 5 May 1892. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 1951, 1:278.
576 Theodore Roosevelt to Osborne Howes, 5 May 1892. 1:278.
577 Theodore Roosevelt to Osborne Howes, 5 May 1892. 1:278.
578 Theodore Roosevelt to Osborne Howes, 5 May 1892. 1:278.
marriage ties between the various elites on both sides of the Atlantic, American policymakers continued to view American patriotism as explicitly critical. It would be a worthwhile avenue of future research whether British and Imperial leaders were willing to embrace a broader cosmopolitanism more readily – the fallout of the Imperial Federation project at least suggests that perhaps while British leaders might have been more amenable to such a notion, many in the white settler Dominions, like in the United States, saw this as undesirable. Notably, this belief did not waver much during the subsequent decades, and constantly underpinned Roosevelt’s foreign policy commitments, writing in sum that, “Nations may, and often must, have conflicting interests, and in the present age patriotism stands a good deal ahead of cosmopolitanism.”

Alfred Milner later echoed these sentiments and began his Credo with the claim that “I am a Nationalist and not a cosmopolitan. This seems to be becoming more and more the real dividing line of parties. A Nationalist is not a man who necessarily thinks his nation better than others, or is unwilling to learn from others. He does think that his duty is to his own nation, and its development. He believes that this is the law of human progress, that the competition between nations, each seeking its maximum development, is the Divine Order of the world, the law of Life and Progress.”

With respect to Roosevelt’s and Milner’s “development of mankind,” were German immigrants or immigrants from another particular background particularly troublesome? The answer to this was not straightforward. In moments of political crisis, he did find himself prone in the case of German-Americans to make rather extreme and uncharacteristically poorly considered exclamations such as “The Farmers’ Alliance is giving our people serious concern in Kansas, Nebraska and South Dakota; and ditto, the Germans in Illinois and Wisconsin. I feel like making a crusade against the latter. I wish the cholera would result in a permanent quarantine against most immigrants!” That said, Roosevelt never in any policy pursued either a crusade against German immigrants or advocated a permanent quarantine against immigrants. Even after aforementioned crises, while he worried about the possibility of subversion, he generally concluded that German-Americans were loyal, writing after the Spanish-American war that, “… in two or three generations, the great bulk of the descendants of the immigrants of non-English origin, become absolutely indistinguishable from other Americans and share their feelings exactly. This is markedly so with the Scandanavians and most of the Germans of the

581 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 25 September 1892. Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1925, 1:290.
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second and all of the Germans of the third generation, who practically all during 1898 felt toward Germany and England just exactly as other Americans did.”

He maintained this attitude even through the Boer War. After noting that many Americans were indeed in favor of the Boer Republics and lamenting Congressional support for the Boers, he yet concluded “I am amused when I see the Kaiser quoted as saying that the German-Americans would not allow us to go to war with Germany. Those that are born here would practically without exception back up America in the most enthusiastic way were we to get into a struggle with Germany.”

This issue was among the foremost on Roosevelt’s mind in the days after his election to the Vice-Presidency on the McKinley ticket, writing several detailed analyses on the matter at a time when most of his letters are responding to congratulatory notes. During the course of the campaign, Roosevelt felt that the two parties appealed to the immigrant population, and especially the German one, in dramatically different fashion, remarking that “If Germany became involved in war with the United States practically the entire German population here would be loyal, and the young Germans of American birth would throng to volunteer just exactly as their fellow Americans of native origin would. But they are of course susceptible to argument tending to show that we are hostile to Germany in England’s interest.”

It was this particular nuance that was of concern to Roosevelt – one which impacted his political career deeply. Roosevelt was not concerned by German disloyalty or insurrection, having long been skeptical that the Kaiser had any sway over German migrants in the United States.

However, he feared that the German immigrant population might swing the election towards populism and the Democrats, by being susceptible to the issue of England and Germany as a political foil. This, to Roosevelt, was nothing short of a disaster, writing that “Bryan is the very lightest weight this country has ever seriously considered for such an office. I feel that his election would be a great disaster both to us at home and to our position in national life. We have very serious elements to contend with. The German and Dutch elements are against us very largely because they think we have been pro-English and they have an entire, though I fear wrong-headed sympathy, with the Boers.”

It was during this time that Roosevelt wavered the most between his earlier inclinations to wish to end or pause German immigration and his later views towards the matter. John Hay maintained his views against German-Americans even longer than Roosevelt, writing to him as late as 1903 that, “It is the singular

584 Theodore Roosevelt to John St. Loe Strachey, 27 January 1900. 2:1143.
585 Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick Courteney Selous, 19 March 1900. 2:1233.
ethnological and political paradox that the prime motive of every British subject in America his hostility to England, and the prime motive of every German-American is hostility to every country in the world, including America, which is not friendly to Germany…..the Irish of New York are thirsty for my gore. Give it to them, if you think they need it.”

Roosevelt, however, allowed his views on German immigrants – to the United States only – to change more rapidly.

Why then did Roosevelt change his mind in the end? As he saw it the results of the election vindicated one instinct over the other, as “One gratifying feature of the campaign was that the victorious party (my own) made no appeal to class, race, creed, or national prejudice or international antipathies. No republican of any prominence made any allusion to England, for instance, save in an entirely friendly spirit. Bryan sought to arouse and trade on Irish, German and Dutch hostility to England, but I do not think he accomplished very much.”

Of course, this is only Roosevelt’s naturally biased perception on the matter – but when discussing why he slowly lost fears regarding German subversion from within, the vindication of the election featured notably. Regarding Germany, Roosevelt felt that Bryan particularly appealed to a sense of unfairness, and wrote that “The sons of the German and Scandinavian immigrants, for instance, as a rule adopt English as their mother tongue and identify themselves wholly with this country. It is not fair to expect that they should in one or two generations become so completely divorced of memory of their ancestral lands as to be wholly indifferent to them.”

Roosevelt also remained convinced that in the case of conflict against Germany, the vast majority of these immigrants would side with America against Germany or any other power, but there was the possibility that they would become “jealous” should they feel their home country was “discriminated against in favor of England.” Roosevelt concluded that Brian was attempting to spark this feeling of discrimination in favor of Britain, but failed to do so. This sense of fairness regarding these immigrants from Europe is telling, as shall be discussed later, because Roosevelt did not grant this same benefit of “one or two generations” or feelings of jealousy to immigrants from Asia.

While German-Americans were often misguided or problematic in domestic politics to Roosevelt, the possibility that German-Americans might be disloyal to the United States, even in the event of war with Germany, was rather distant. Rather, the perceived Anglophobia of the administration, particularly in relation to Germany, was a potential sore point to German-

589 Theodore Roosevelt to John St. Loe Strachey, 19 November 1900. 2:1424.
590 Theodore Roosevelt to John St. Loe Strachey, 19 November 1900. 2:1424.
American voters. Indeed, Roosevelt admitted that during the recent campaign his side was openly in favor of friendliness with Britain, although not formal alliance.\textsuperscript{591} While he occasionally fretted, Roosevelt consistently reverted to believing that the assimilation process would result in the creation of loyal Americans from Germans. Spring-Rice too worried about the German-American electorate swaying American policy, writing after Prince Henry’s aforementioned visit “The Germans make representations to Congress on the subject of the purchases of mules\textsuperscript{592} and say the administration will lose a million German votes if they don’t do as they are told. This is rather a serious threat but it probably defeats its own end by alarming those who are not Germans and don’t want to have their policy dictated to them by foreigners.” However, although Spring-Rice saw this sort of appeal to the German-American voters in the US as self-defeating, he did see a threat to the Anglo-American relationship, continuing in the same letter that “the visit was made use of to organise still more the German vote, and the work is being continued by the Pan-Germans under the same influences as the work in Austria. Only, though they may possibly influence the administration to do unfriendly things to England (by which they won’t profit in the least) they will never for one moment be able to induce the American Government to be favorable to Germany at the expense of America.”\textsuperscript{593} It should also be noted that these views did change somewhat after the start of the First World War, Lodge, Spring-Rice, and even Roosevelt all worried once more about potential subversion by German-Americans, particularly regarding how they would vote in elections. However, the process of their long-term assimilation still applied. This of course raises the question of how, in contemporary thought, this assimilation process worked?

\textbf{Roosevelt and Assimilation}

Assimilation was a concept that Roosevelt articulated precisely and in detail, even writing in publications on what it meant to be American before his thought on immigration had matured as it would in later years.\textsuperscript{594} The idea of incorporating settlers was fundamental to his understanding of American nationhood and its differences as a country from Britain (though not necessarily in all respects Canada or Australia). This was an ability that America and Americans possessed, and as he argued, “it must also be remembered that we are not merely another branch

\textsuperscript{591} Theodore Roosevelt to Henry White, 23 November 1900. 2:1435.
\textsuperscript{592} This was likely a protest to the enormous number of horses and mules shipped from America to South Africa on British ships to support the South Africa War.
Roosevelt wrestled with the fact that although England founded the United States, it clearly was no longer populated solely by the English. His own descent, as he repeatedly pointed out in correspondences and published works, was of Dutch descent. He placed himself in the category of Americans who “have but little English blood in their veins” but whose ancestors had been in the United States so long that they were “indistiguishable from the Americans of pure English blood.” Of second and third generation immigrants he found that there were “large bodies of perfectly good American citizens” especially in the populations descended from “Germany, Ireland, and Scandinavia.” Yet the import of the English-speaking races as a concept was in no way diminished. Indeed, it was in grappling with this conundrum that Roosevelt largely abandoned the use of “Anglo-Saxon” as at term and began using the term of “English-speaking peoples.” This was no less racial as a category, nor given his understanding of evolutionary traits, was it less inheritable – but it was perhaps less grounded in biological traits and more in social traits. However, it was also amorphic.

Although he often noted minor variations in this theme, the key was the malleability of race. As he explained, the percentage of English blood in 1810 versus the present was not particularly important as “the English, and especially the Puritans made the mold into which the other races were run. They therefore gave the vital tum to our development; while on the other hand the mere fact that this development was in a new land, and that there was an admixture of other races, made it certain that we would be what we now are, a distinct nation with its own peculiar individuality.” This concept of the mold into which other races could be poured and become of the previous race was critical to Roosevelt, and the basis of much of his racial thinking regarding America and the British settler colonies. He noted that although even the nature of immigration to the United States – and even the racial makeup of England itself – had changed over the years to now be mostly German, Irish, and Scandinavian, among others, he also expected these new races of migrants to ‘fuse’ into the English-speaking races through this mold. This was not a new idea – indeed, Charles Dilke wrote nearly identically several decades earlier, “In America, the peoples of the world are being fused together, but they are run into an English mould.” It is probable that Roosevelt borrowed both the idea of racial fusion and the idea of running races into a mold in America at least in part from Dilke. However, Roosevelt expanded on this idea, especially regarding how he viewed the relationship with race, language and

596 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry White, 23 November 1900. 2:1435.  
597 Theodore Roosevelt to Harry White, 23 November 1900. 2:1435.  
598 Theodore Roosevelt to Robert J. Thompson, 30 April 1900. 2:1273.  
599 Dilke, A Record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries during 1866-7, 1.
nationality. To Roosevelt, they were certainly not identical, and he claimed it “a purely artificial idea it is that nationality coincides with race and language.” 600 However in the various “old stocks,” in which he included his own Dutch heritage from settlers in New York and the English settlers of New England alike, “nationalities have fused” and that the various early settler blood had intermingled to the point that “the population as a whole represents a mixture.” 601

With respect to the second generation immigrants, in particular from Germany and Scandinavia but including other areas, he equally found them “absolutely indistinguishable in feeling interest, and above all, in patriotic devotion” from those whose ancestry arrived prior to independence. 602

This notion that nationality did not coincide with race or language did not suggest to Roosevelt a decrease in the significance of these concepts or that they did not require reconciliation with each other. As he explained, it meant that nationality did not necessarily equate with race. He elaborated that even an individual of Dutch descent who often celebrated Dutch songs and certain Dutch Christmas traditions to his children – like Roosevelt himself – could be of the English-speaking peoples and American alike, so long as there was a mold available to shape the racial traits, as at least in New York “the people of Dutch stock have fused completely, exactly as the people of German and Scandinavian stock are now fusing with those from the British Isles.” 603 This fusion took a few generations, as he often noted, but it could always occur and it moreover was to the benefit of both the immigrants and original population. Indeed, he argued it was “to the great advantage in the long run” to the descendants of the original Dutch settlers of New York that it “should first have passed under English rule and thereby in the end become part of the United States, so as to make us all inheritors of a great language, a great literature and a fund of great race traditions.” 604 To Roosevelt, the English mold enabled all immigrants to inherit those race traditions, regardless of ancestry.

However, he was often more perplexed with how certain traits he valued, including often the military characteristics of German immigrants and having long seen the need for more militaristic traits among the English-speaking peoples, did not fuse as expected. Roosevelt expressed confusion at why in his experience “I am entirely unable to detect any improvement in the Germans as fighting policemen, because of the military training that their fathers for the last generation have been receiving in the old world. I cannot on any philosophical ground explain why the average Irishman certainly makes a better policeman in an emergency than the average

601 Theodore Roosevelt to Robert J. Thompson, 30 April 1900. 2:1273.
602 Theodore Roosevelt to Robert J. Thompson, 30 April 1900. 2:1273.
603 Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick Courteney Selous, 7 February 1900. 2:1175.
604 Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick Courteney Selous, 7 February 1900. 2:1175.
That military training and martial acculturation received to parents should be *inherited* by immigrants to the United States was critical element of his views towards immigrants. When his ideas were not borne out in even his estimation of the police in New York and his view of German-Americans fighting in the Civil War, he concluded that, “After one, or at most two generations the difference dies out. The children and grandchildren of the German and Irish immigrants, whom we appoint on our Force, are scarcely distinguishable from one another, and the best of them are not distinguishable from the best of the appointees of old American stock. But it certainly does seem to take a generation to make the German, in point of fighting capacity, come up to the Irish, or native American.” By “native American” Roosevelt referred to the earlier Anglo-Saxon races. It appears then that this was the greatest difference Roosevelt was able to observe in the long-term regarding German-Americans – merely that in his estimation, they took a generation more to reach the qualities he saw in “old American stock.”

Where then does this leave Roosevelt on the question of Germans migrating to the United States? At least as of the 1890s, while clear he saw German migrants as potentially problematic, they were problematic in the same terms as commerce and urban cities, and other similar issues which Roosevelt had seen as troublesome contributors to the decline of American racial characteristics. While Roosevelt lamented that the militaristic qualities did not manifest as he hoped, in the end, the delay was not problematic, eventually concluding during the Boer War that “we all are Americans, and nothing more. In two generations you cannot tell the average man of German or Scandinavian descent from the average man who is descended from those who came over on the Mayflower.” Indeed, German migrants became part of his envisioned solution to the urban and rural problem he saw in the United States.

**Race and Settlers**

While this discussion of Roosevelt’s views on race as he assumed the Presidency is interesting, why was it of significance to geopolitics? The most obvious answer is that, as discussed in the previous three chapters, it impacted how he saw colonies around the world. Moreover, it specifically colored the importance of other British settler colonies, which to Roosevelt also produced the ability to form a racial mold, much as the United States did. The aforementioned relative advancement of the German as compared to the Slav was seen as a

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606 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 5 August 1896. 1:552.
source of threat not merely of commonality. Not only was the German closer in capacity, but consequently likely to exhibit similar aims. The immediate threat to the Anglo-Saxon peace was that the settler colonies of the world would not be Anglo-Saxon but German. As Spring-Rice wrote to Roosevelt in 1897, “Germans cant catch Russian absolutism or South American anarchy. But they are extremely liable to catch Anglo-Saxon liberalism especially when imported by their own returned emigrants. You see the argument. At least you can guess at its working in the official mind. Well then, what is the remedy? At first the answer was, Colonies. After 14 years the most populous colony they possess is South West Africa with a population of 2000 whites of whom more than half are officials or soldiers and the rest more than half English or Dutch. In the mean while emigration to non-German countries continues. It is impossible to stop the stream. But it can be diverted.”

The logic held that surely the Germans would seek similar racial expansion to the Anglo-Saxon. Indeed, these fears tended to dominate much of Roosevelt’s foreign policy in years to come. These fears were not just of German immigrants not assimilating in the United States, but that this stream of immigrants might find a home elsewhere. Spring-Rice argued regarding this stream of migrants in this discussion with Roosevelt:

If the Germans cannot be kept from leaving the country and cannot be induced to go to German colonies the only alternative is to induce them if possible to go to those places where, besides making money, they have a chance of keeping their nationality. In many places as you have seen there are colonies of Germans living together, speaking their own language and forming a community apart. Where this takes place far from the sea in a strong country with energetic and efficient administration such communities are certain in the end to be absorbed in the general mass.

America, Australia, Canada, and most other communities where Germans settled the interior were thus safe – and indeed as earlier discussed, potentially strengthened an existing community of English-speaking peoples, even if the community maintained their own languages as German communities in the American Midwest did. Moreover, the migrants could be actively persuaded to go to these areas, where they would be fused into the broader population as earlier settlers had. What then if they did not settle in an inland area or in a country with a less effective administration? Spring-Rice detailed this possibility, writing:

But if they can be or are established within reach of the sea, in the territory of a Government which is neither efficient nor energetic, the case is very different. Both South America and South Africa offer in different ways possibilities of this description. But suppose such a community existing with the same sort of potentialities for Germany as Texas had for the US, the thing to do

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608 Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice to Theodore Roosevelt, 1 August 1897. CASR I 9/1, Churchill Archives Centre.
609 Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice to Theodore Roosevelt, 1 August 1897. CASR I 9/1, Churchill Archives Centre.
to carry out this policy of the extension of German influence is to have a sufficient force to protect these outposts of Germany in case of need. So the dream of greater Germany which is a worthy and honourable one having failed in finding a realization in the extension of the German colonies is on the brink of finding it here.\textsuperscript{610}

This then was the ultimate threat to the racial Anglo-Saxon vision – that Greater Britain might be supplanted by a Greater Germany. The locations of concern shared two traits: they were coastal, and they were in countries that the United States and Britain at the least did not trust to effectively administer their own territory. Unsurprisingly, they were also indicative of the aforementioned crises of the next several years. If the German migrants went to South America or Africa, they could create a rival to Anglo-Saxon federation. If the migrants went to the United States, they would safely become Anglo-Saxons. They may even have been seen as desirable, as Belich writes, “Anglos usually regarded Germans as good immigrants, second only to Britons themselves, and perhaps even ahead of the Catholic Irish. The German predilection for Anglo destinations was matched by an Anglo predilection for German migrants.”\textsuperscript{611} It was in this set of conversations with Spring-Rice developed the aforementioned theories regarding “interracial law.”\textsuperscript{612,613} Immigration not only guaranteed the promise of the United States, to some, it was the last hope of infinitely creating Anglo-Saxons. It was not sufficient to avert the indefinite future of a world dominated by Russia, but to ensure that the bulwark against that future was Anglo-American and not German.

As alluded to in the chapter on the Boer War, there was an additional complication to immigration to the United States that resulted in similar conclusions but operated with a different rationale. Rather than requiring migrants to come to the United States to avoid the expansion of German settler colonies, it was also required to build the English-speaking settler societies, both to maintain populations and to import racial traits. As Roosevelt wrote regarding the Boer War, during some of his earlier thinking on the matter, “the Afrikander will grow up like the Australian, the Canadian and the American. Here our people of different race origin do get fused very soon.”\textsuperscript{614} While he had long posited this regarding the United States, by the eve of his Presidency, Roosevelt had also begun to see Australia and Canada as operating from the same mold and hoped to see South Africa adopt this mold as well. This was not just an issue of availability of land to settle upon – indigenous populations rarely even featuring in consideration – but that the specific races he saw as being involved contributed to the project of settlement,

\textsuperscript{610} Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice to Theodore Roosevelt, 1 August 1897. CASR I 9/1, Churchill Archives Centre.
\textsuperscript{611} Belich, Replenishing the Earth, 63.
\textsuperscript{612} See Chapter One
\textsuperscript{613} Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 13 August 1897. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 1951, 1:644.
\textsuperscript{614} Theodore Roosevelt to John St. Loe Strachey, 27 January 1900. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 1951, 2:1143.
notably including the “Boer and the British Afrikander are such fine fellows that I want to see the two stocks unite into a great race, just as the Dutch and the English have united here – just as the Irish and English have united and are uniting in Australia.”

The solution was the to create the equivalent of a New York immigrant mold for the world. As Roosevelt drew from his experiences in New York, he envisioned a similar future for South Africa, arguing that “it has been an enormous advantage for us of Dutch blood here to become part of the great English-speaking race, and that in the same way it would be of great advantage for the Dutch themselves if in White Man’s Africa South of the Zambesi all men became welded together in an English-speaking nationality.” Moreover, this was not just to be limited to the South African and American contexts. Roosevelt mentioned Australia constantly, having seen it the ability to recreate the American continental mold once more. As he pointed out to his British correspondents, “To you India seems larger than Australia. In the life history of the English-speaking people I think it will show very much smaller. The Australians are building up a giant commonwealth, the very existence of which, like the existence of the United States, means an alteration in the balance of the world and goes a long way towards ensuring the supremacy of the men who speak our tongue and have our ideas of social, political and religious freedom and morality.”

The discussion of the need for the United States to absorb the stream of German migrants and of the hope for South Africa and Australia to turn into another America under British Imperial auspices revealed another vital element to contemporary immigration. Roosevelt’s frequent fretting about the nature of cities and the manner in which they sapped racial martial characteristics was not without awareness that he himself, having grown up in the cosmopolitan eastern seaboard, having acquired his experiences out West, returned to New York to continue his life. This model, which he found the dominant one amongst Americans of English descent, was not to him neither sustainable or desirable. His writing regarding the “old American stock” is indicative of one of the largest ongoing inconsistencies in his own theorizing of race and civilization – that he sees the rural settler population as the most desirable sort of people to cultivate and the urban commercial cities as the source of corruption, but his own political futures and policies more broadly align with the same cities and industry than they do with agrarian farmers. As he noted in postscript to Spring-Rice, perhaps surprisingly to him, while the “old American stock” farmers were supporting what he considered the dangerous

615 Theodore Roosevelt to A. J. Sage, 9 March 1900. 2:1214.
616 Theodore Roosevelt to A. J. Sage, 9 March 1900. 2:1214.
policies of Bryanism and creating “a menace to the country in the present election,” and while they were backed by “the Scandinavians, Scotch & English,” the Irish did not and the Germans are among the chief props of sound money. The settler colonies he so feared and envied around the world were not just limited to those established by other powers – instead, Roosevelt maintained a long fascination with settling the interior of the American continent, even lamenting the failure of new settlers in Oregon to colonize away from the urban centers in the way Kentucky had originally been settled. He drew from his own experiences, where he found that the vast majority even in the cattle business he saw out west were in the West from Britain or the East Coast to make a profit and then return either home or elsewhere to an urban center.

He noted that “they did not have their womenkind with them” and that the “men from Oxford and Cambridge, Harvard and Yale, who went into cattle growing on the Great Plains,” that he valued so much during the Spanish-American war and for their character “did just as I did” – that is return to the East Coast, and fail to settle the interior. Who then would in the end settle these areas? To Roosevelt, it was clear that “the real population of the future in the valleys of the upper Missouri, the Platte and the Rio Grande, will be composed of the sons of their companions who were themselves descendants of small farmers in Texas, Missouri and Illinois, or of workingmen from Scandinavia or Germany.” The United States needed these immigrants for new population growth, as otherwise the only settlement was from the already existing populations of other agrarian communities nearby. To Roosevelt, cities and commerce were signs of racial weakness and eventual failure – the martial strength he thought the United States needed was to be found in settled agrarian areas. As he continued, “The doubtful, and to my mind the most melancholy, element in the problem is what you bring out about the Englishman no longer colonizing in the way that the Boer does. In our Pacific States, and even more in Australia we see the same tendency to the foundation of enormous cities instead of the settlement of the country districts by pioneer farmers.” This set of problems required others to comport to the racial mold and then settle the interior of the American continents.

Rather than fearing population growth, contemporary leaders required rapidly increasing populations and viewed them as a sign of racial and civilizational vitality. Roosevelt even sought

618 “Sound money” to Roosevelt was rather a compliment, having long found the contemporary populism of appealing to the silver standard among the greater evils of Bryan’s proposed policies.
621 Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick Courteney Selous, 19 March 1900. 2:1233.
622 Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick Courteney Selous, 19 March 1900. 2:1233.
623 Theodore Roosevelt to Frederick Courteney Selous, 19 March 1900. 2:1233.
to ensure during his Presidency that German immigrants would not be totally excluded, despite virulent anti-German sentiments from other elements in the Republican party. He wrote regarding immigration legislation in 1903 that “As for Lodge’s bill, 624 I do not know the details, I never saw it, I am in no way responsible for it. He informs me that the purpose is precisely what we have all of us agreed and approve. He informs me, for instance, that his bill would not keep out any German immigrants at all, but would restrict immigration of some undesirable elements.” 625 Roosevelt’s view on immigrant traits generally came back to the same concerns he had now expressed for nearly a decade. In 1896, Roosevelt argued regarding Brooks Adams’ book and his argument regarding the decline of Rome that as long as “As long as the birth rate exceeds the death rate, and as long as the people of a nation and show some capacity of self-restraint and self-guidance in political affairs, it is idle to compare that nation with the dying empire which fell because there sprang from its loins no children to defend it against the barbarians.” 626 What Rome lacked, and what modern nations had, notably excepting France and Spain to contemporary leaders, was that its populations were growing rapidly and so thus could resist any future ‘barbarians.’

Population was, of course, key in defending a polity against external threat. With respect to the United States specifically, his fear was not merely that the birth rate might decline, as he found already true of New England and France, but that America would become “isolated from the struggles of the rest of the world” and “immersed in our own material prosperity” to the extent that it risked becoming effete” and might lose that moral spring, which no matter how bent will straighten out a really great people in adversity, if it exists in them.” 627 These ideas remained vibrant in Roosevelt’s mind a decade later during his Presidency. The idea of population growth was the final component in influencing contemporary views towards immigration as they impacted geopolitical rivalries. However, as he wrote in his glowing review of the said book by Brooks Adams, Law of Civilization and Decay, “There are, it is true, influences at work to shake the vitality, courage, and manliness of the race; but there are other influences which tell in exactly the opposite direction….If our population decreases; if we lose the virile, manly qualities, and sink into a nation of mere hucksters, putting gain above national honor and subordinating everything to mere ease of life; then we shall indeed reach a condition worse than

624 Lodge had introduced an amendment to add a literacy test to the attempted General Immigration Act of March 3, 1903. The bill, however, never made it out of committee.
627 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, 5 August 1896. 1:552.
that of the ancient civilizations in the years of their decay." Therefore, civilizations would decline without a rapidly growing population.

This was something Roosevelt concluded early in his Presidency, writing “What he says about the reduced birthrate receives a grim commentary in the stationary population of his own country, Australia. The Roman Empire fell because of 1) decline in population 2) decline in military spirit. All other causes were merely accessory.” The parallel with Rome was one he and other contemporary leaders on both sides of the Atlantic had used for decades and continued to use in the future, but one which Roosevelt found flawed, arguing in disagreement with Brooks Adams that the key difference was that unlike ancient empires, the modern states were full of “thronging millions” in which most of the population were “wage-earners who themselves decided their own destinies” and could thus field vast armies “composed exclusively of its own citizens, more numerous than any which the world has ever before seen, and with a record of fighting.” Population alone was thus not sufficient – certainly ancient empires had their own ‘thronging millions,’ but the population needed to be martial, ‘wage-earners,’ invested in their state, and assimilated into its values.

Decline of a race therefore required more than population, critical though it was. Indeed, Balfour argued similarly in theorizing about ‘Decadence’ in the Henry Sidgwick Memorial Lecture delivered at Newnham College in January 1908. Balfour was not alone in articulating these views. Balfour conveyed the text of this lecture to Roosevelt who wrote in reply, “Thru Arthur Lee I have just received the copy of Decadence, and thank you for it. I confess I began to read it with some apprehension lest it might have something to do with some phase of French literary thought. Naturally, therefore, I was glad when the first few lines showed that my fears were groundless. It seems to me that you are eminently right in seeing that it is good to give a name to something of vital consequence, even tho in sense the name only express our ignorance….Most emphatically there is such a thing as “decadence” of a nation, a race, a type; and it is no less true that we cannot give any adequate explanation of the

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629 Referring to Alexander Sutherland. Roosevelt had just read his book, The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct (London, 1898) and was disagreeing with Sutherland’s views about the “practical effects” of his work.
631 Theodore Roosevelt to Whitelaw Reid, 11 September 1905. 5:18.
phenomenon.”

Roosevelt had long seen declining population growth as coupled with the agrarian vs urban problem as the critical failing of the race and empathized with Spring Rice in 1901 about being “depressed over the future both of our race and of our civilization,” that even though there were causes for both optimism and pessimism, “I should be a fool if I did not see grave cause for anxiety in some of the social tendencies of the day: the growth of luxury throughout the English-speaking world: & especially the gradual diminishing birth rate.”

Roosevelt felt he had already witnessed these mechanisms in operation. The reasons for which he constantly feared the United States becoming weaker as a race in relation was the same fear he once expressed in relation to the German or Slavic races and the weakening he saw in Latin peoples. Roosevelt argued during his Presidency that even though he found “The decline in the birth rate I should put as the chief cause as well as the chief symptom of what is evil” in respect to the decline of the Latin peoples, he noted the Italian and Spanish populations were certainly not in decline and yet found the state of both of those nations entirely unacceptable.

What Roosevelt feared could cause disaster, even in the case of a growing population, was the traits of the people, as he described it repeatedly to include “softening of fibre, the selfishness, the luxury, the relaxation of standards,” which he attributed in particular to anti-imperialists – all traits he repeatedly found concerning and potentially concerningly prevalent in “the English-speaking peoples, as well as in France.”

Thus, population growth was critical but by no means sufficient for success or even to avert disaster. Population concentrated in the commercial and comfortable cities was an issue that Roosevelt certainly found complicated as even though he did not find “the average American multimillionaire a very high type” he still found “The most marvelous growth in population and material prosperity, and, I believe, in the average of human happiness, that the world has ever seen in any race, has taken place among the English-speaking peoples since the time when Goldsmith gave poetic expression to the general feeling of gloom which prevailed among educated men at what they were pleased to consider the morbid growth of the cities and the decadence of the men in England”

This decadence of “vice, luxury and levity;” was crucially not a matter he saw as equal among the races, and found for years that Germany had a unique resistance, writing to Spring-Rice in 1908 after bemoaning the state of the English-speaking peoples that “I agree with you that Germany alone among the modern nations of high

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637 Theodore Roosevelt to Whitelaw Reid, 11 September 1905. 5:18.
civilization has been able thoroughly to organize her powers, has been able successfully to combat the more dangerous tendencies that have been at work among other peoples for the last half century.” However, even the Germans were not necessarily immune, as he continued in the same letter, finding them “beginning to be infested by the vices of industrialism” along with the Japanese. Roosevelt found some comfort in this notion, however, and noted that the “the extraordinary growth in power and efficiency, alike in military and in industrial affairs, on land and on sea, which has marked her career for the last forty-five years” did not represent much of German history prior, noting that a race could recover from decadence.

The decline of a race being followed by a potential rise later assuaged some of Roosevelt’s fears, writing to Balfour slightly earlier the same year a revised view of his earlier theory for historical progress – where all civilizations tread on the same path at different rates – that, “It is a rather irritating delusion – the delusion that somehow or other we are all necessarily going to move forward in the long run no matter what the temporary checks may be. I have a very firm faith in this general forward movement, considering only men of our race for the past score or two centuries, and I hope and believe that the movement will continue for an indefinite period to come; but no one can be sure; there is certainly nothing inevitable or necessary about the movement.” As a counter to this fate, the colonization of the American interior was a long obsession of Roosevelt and one he ultimately held as a model for progress. As he elaborated, these dangers were ones dangerous to all of the English-speaking countries, not merely the United States:

The English-speaking peoples have a wholly different set of evil tendencies to combat. I believe that we shall work through our troubles and ultimately come well out of them: but there are plenty of anxious times ahead, and there are many serious evils to face. In England, in the United States, in Canada, in Australia, and in the English parts of South Africa there is more and more a tendency for the men who speak English to gather into the cities and towns, so that these grow at the expense of the country folk, now in the past the man on the farm has always proved to be the man who, in the last analysis, did best service in governing himself in times of peace, and also in fighting in times of war. The city-bred folk, and especially where the cities are of enormous size, have not yet shown that they can adequately fill the place left vacant by the dwindling of the country population. Moreover, the diminishing birth rate among our people is an ugly thing. In New England, for instance, the old native stock is not quite holding its own. Here the results are not visible owing to the great immigration, but in Australia the effect is alarming, for the population is increasing slowly and moreover at a constantly diminishing rate, in spite of the fact

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642 Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur James Balfour, 5 March 1908. 6:959.
that the great island continent is very sparsely populated, and in spite of the two or three very large cities. However, these problems he saw elsewhere were alleviated in the United States precisely because “although here they are hardly as bad in their effects because we have a whole continent to work on and draw an immense mass of immigrants from abroad.” The immigrant populations from Scandinavia and Germany in particular were critical to resolving the crisis, as he saw it, of population decline and of urbanization. From being a source of angst, in the span of a few years and with the victory of McKinley and Roosevelt in 1900, German migrants became a potential reservoir of strength to be tapped ideally at the expense of German colonies elsewhere.

Later, in describing the nature of Anglo-Saxon, Roosevelt wrote regarding the feeling of friendship between Britain and America that “You are quite right in saying that it is not an Anglo-Saxon race feeling. I am not an Anglo-Saxon myself, for instance. We are making a new race, a new type, in this country – a type with good and with bad characteristics, of course. But we and you have a common language, essentially a common culture, and as you so well say, much the same kind of religious feeling; and above all, the same kind of way of looking at the great matters that count most in securing just and free government.” This creation of a new race, and the incorporation of language into race, was critical in Roosevelt’s views and policies towards immigration.

The East in the West

During this time of mass immigration to the United States, there was in the West another source of large-scale immigration to the United States – largely in the West, from China and Japan. Did Roosevelt’s views on race, particularly as pertaining to Japan, impact US policy? Despite his aforementioned positive views of the Japanese as a race, did he convey this to the issue of immigration or did the Color Line re-emerge? By the early 20th century, both Japanese and Chinese immigrants had been entering the United States for decades, largely as laborers involved in constructing American Westward expansion, most famously helping to construct the Trans-Continental Railroad. By the 1870s, tens of thousands of Chinese immigrants lived in San-Francisco alone. Following the Meiji Restoration, this was followed by large numbers of Japanese immigrants. Following the aforementioned, United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898),

645 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry White, 14 August 1906. 5:357.
the Supreme Court had ruled conclusively that the children of Asian immigrants born in the United States were indeed US Citizens. The result was eventually a series of legislation\textsuperscript{646} in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, all largely upheld by Supreme Court Cases.\textsuperscript{647} Chinese Exclusion Act was already signed into law in 1882. However, this was only for a period for 10 years, renewed in 1892, and made permanent with no end date in 1902 under Roosevelt. Mostly, however, at the turn of the century, much of the responsibility for handling these questions fell to state level legislation.

Roosevelt’s views on these matters differed based on whether the question involved the Japanese or Chinese immigrants, due to two reasons: first, the racial views as to the Japanese and their evolution during the Russo-Japanese War, and second, because of Japan’s geopolitical significance. Regarding Chinese immigration, Roosevelt never directly challenged the Chinese Exclusion Acts, and indeed, largely supported it in principle and argued that while it was in their interest to allow Chinese merchants and students should enter the United States, he was worried about the possibility that “Chinese laborers will come here under pretense of being students or merchants” and believed that “It is very much against our interest that Chinese laborers should come here and compete with our own workmen.”\textsuperscript{648} However, regarding Japanese immigration, particularly after the Russo-Japanese war, he declared that “I regard them as a highly civilized people, and their feats of heroism in the present war should be an example to us and to all other nations. I am keenly mortified that any Americans should insult such a people.”\textsuperscript{649} The insult he spoke of, was the response of California, Congress, and the Courts regarding Japanese immigration – while the children of Japanese immigrants were US citizens since 1898, the immigrants themselves could not be naturalized. Initially, Roosevelt felt the issue not one for the Presidency, arguing a sense of powerlessness and preferring to defer to the courts.\textsuperscript{650} Nevertheless, with his views on the Japanese having changed in the last few years, he found this a source of embarrassment in relations between the United States and Japan, writing “I am utterly disgusted at the manifestations which have begun to appear on the Pacific slope in favor of excluding the Japanese exactly as the Chinese are excluded. The California State Legislature and various other bodies have acted in the worst possible taste and in the most offensive manner

\textsuperscript{646} Most notably the, Immigration Act of 1917, passed over Woodrow Wilson’s veto with a Congressional supermajority (also known as the Literacy Act and the Asiatic Barred Zone Act) and the Immigration Act of 1924, signed into law by Calvin Coolidge (also known as the Johnson-Reed Act, and included both the National Origins Act and the Asian Exclusion Act).

\textsuperscript{647} Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) and United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923).


\textsuperscript{649} Theodore Roosevelt to George Kennan, 6 May 1905. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 1952, 4:1168.

\textsuperscript{650} Theodore Roosevelt to George Kennan, 6 May 1905. 4:1168.
In sum, excluding the Chinese did not bother him – but excluding the Japanese who despite the aforementioned racial issues discussed, did. Roosevelt criticized the actions taken by the locals on the West Coast in postscript to Lodge as to “grossly to insult the Japanese and to keep out the Japanese immigrants on the ground that they are an immoral, degraded and worthless race” despite their interest in trade with the Japanese, and described the measures “as foolish as if conceived by the mind of a Hottentot." Moreover, This was not merely a matter of integration, however, as he saw appeasing Japan as critical to America’s Pacific security and a reason to continue strengthening the Navy, describing Japan as a “power jealous, sensitive and warlike, and which if irritated could at once take both the Philippines and Hawaii from us if she obtained the upper hand on the seas." In the Senate, Lodge had long taken a harsher stance against immigrants, particularly those from Asia arguing “I am utterly against both Chinese and Japanese labor but we should at least behave like gentlemen and see that by decency alone can we hope to carry our point,” objecting to the events in California and the Western States on the grounds that they might “cost us our markets.” He continued later in the year, summarizing, “The attitude of the Pacific Slope toward the Japanese seems incomprehensible at this time from every point of view. We must treat the Chinese more civilly too. I am heartily in favor of barring out coolie labor whether Chinese or Japanese but it must be done discreetly and reasonably."

Predictably, Roosevelt was more attuned to foreign policy than Lodge, seeing the immigration issue with Japan as “The immediate source of danger to the relations between us and Japan arises from the labor question, which is itself only one phase of the race question…..If the influence of Japanese laborers to the United States goes on it is certain to be stopt by law within a few years; and very possibly the stoppage will be accomplished by acts of international bad breeding which will make trouble." Nevertheless, this did not dissuade him from pursuing restrictions to immigration on racial grounds, writing in a somewhat heated letter, “I had hoped that we could do it only in the course of a general immigration restriction bill, by which we could keep out all people who have difficulty in assimilating with our own…But it is evident I can get

651 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 15 May 1905. 4:1179.
652 Hottentot was a contemporary racial slur used to describe the black peoples of South Africa by British and Dutch Settlers. More specifically also used as a racist term for the Khoikhoi, the non-Bantu indigenous population of South Africa. In Europe, it was also used as a generic term roughly synonymous with ‘savage.’
654 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 5 June 1905. 4:1202.
655 Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, 3 June 1905. Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1925, 2:126.
no such bill, and I have to recognize facts – one fact being governmental conditions as they actually exist in a democracy, and the other being, what so many sentimentalists tend to forget, the great fact of difference of race.” While he had hoped to address all immigration concerns at once, he was left being forced to deal with the issue of Japanese immigration separately – an issue that preoccupied him for years.

Eventually, in 1906 when California began legislation aimed at segregating the Japanese, particularly in schools, excluding Japanese from employment, and if possible, attempting to include Japanese and Korean laborers under the Chinese Exclusion Acts. Roosevelt found this unacceptable – and concluded with Japan in 1907 what is now known as the Gentlemen’s Agreement. Although lacking any force of law, Roosevelt reached a diplomatic agreement with the Japanese Government that he would attempt to reverse legislation in San Francisco as possible and prevent nation-wide implementation of similar law, but in return, the Japanese government was to cease issuing passports to Japanese laborers wishing to emigrate. Roosevelt summarized the intent of the agreement as to serve several purposes. First, was to stop “all immigration of Japanese laborers,” which he expected to occur unless California prevented this agreement, in which case he argued “this immigration will go unchecked.” Second, Roosevelt felt that the only terms in which Japan could agree, and that America could honorably demand, was that of mutually equal treatment – that each side could ban the other’s labor, but that America give to “Japanese students, travelers, scientific and professional men, in short all Japanese who are actually here, exactly the same treatment that we should expect Americans in Japan to receive.” Third was to maintain “friendly relations with the great Island Empire of Asia” – both critical to Roosevelt given the geopolitical realities of naval power in the Pacific as well a goal achievable unless California again blocked it due to its local policies. The Agreement was thus the best compromise Roosevelt felt he could reach between the need to treat with Japan as a power and to deal with concerns of Japanese immigration.

This was an issue that was viewed as not purely one of concern to the United States, and one regarding which the American, British, Australian, and Canadian political leaders all corresponded and coordinated. Indeed, Roosevelt corresponded with leadership in the British Empire regarding Japanese emigration to Australia, Canada, and the United States with equal concern, writing to Balfour that despite the rise of Japan as a Great Power, “One practical

658 Theodore Roosevelt to John St. Loe Strachey, 21 December 1906. 5:531.
659 Theodore Roosevelt to James Norris Gillett, 11 March 1907. 5:610.
660 Theodore Roosevelt to James Norris Gillett, 11 March 1907. 5:610.
661 Theodore Roosevelt to James Norris Gillett, 11 March 1907. 5:610.
problem of statesmanship, by the way, must be to keep on good terms with these same Japanese and their kinsmen on the mainland of Asia, and yet to keep the white man in America and Australia out of home contact with them. It is equally to the interest of the British Empire and of the United States that there should be no immigration in mass from Asia to Australia or to North America.”

He followed this a few months later with a similar letter to King Edward and proposed a unified approach writing that “I feel very strongly that the real interests of the English-speaking peoples are one, alike in the Atlantic and Pacific; and that, while scrupulously careful neither to insult nor to injure others we should yet make it evident that we are ready and able to hold our own.”

The details of this approach, once again strengthening the idea of a common English-speaking people in the face of a foreign racial threat, were to avoid the contact of labor markets and to avoid large demographic influxes – the opposite approach as taken to German migrants. As Roosevelt continued to the King, he argued that “In no country where the population is of our stock, and where the wageworkers, the laborers, are of the same blood as the employing classes, will it be possible to introduce a large number of workmen of an utterly alien race without the certainty of dangerous friction. The only sure way to avoid such friction, with it’s possible consequences of incalculable disaster, is by friendly agreement in advance to prevent the coming together in mass of the wageworkers of the two races, in either country.”

Fascinatingly, Edward VII replied to Roosevelt acknowledging these concerns, and wrote that, “I entirely agree with you that the interests of the English speaking peoples are alike in the Atlantic and the Pacific, and I look forward with confidence to the co-operation of the English speaking races becoming the most powerful civilizing factor in the policy of the World…..The question of the immigration and competition of coloured races in other Countries is one which presents many difficulties, and especially to me, who have so many coloured subjects in my Empire.”

However, the King concluded to Roosevelt that so far “friendly negotiation” had proven the solution and that he maintained confidence in his Government’s recent alliance with Japan – and that he had faith Japan would carry out its obligations loyalty.

Even in in the Western Hemisphere this view was not limited to the United States – the now revered Prime Minster of Canada, Wilfrid Laurier, wrote to Roosevelt regarding the matter on the Pacific Slope at the time that, “Unfortunately we know, from experience, that wherever on this continent, as well as in other lands, labourers of Asiatic races come in competition with labourers of the Caucasian races, serious troubles immediately arise, and that for many years and

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663 Theodore Roosevelt to Edward VII, 12 February 1908. 6:940.
664 Theodore Roosevelt to Edward VII, 12 February 1908. 6:940.
665 Edward VII to Theodore Roosevelt, 5 March 1908. 6:940.
perhaps many generations the only way of preventing those troubles is to restrict, to the narrowest limits possible, the contact of those races in the labour market of our continent.\textsuperscript{666}

Furthermore, Roosevelt, noted to Arthur Hamilton Lee that he agreed with Laurier and advocated such a unified response, writing in summary that:

\begin{quote}
I think this expresses the view, which, with all possible courtesy and consideration for Japan, those responsible for the welfare of Canada, Australia, and the United States should take. In other words, there should be no immigration in mass of Orientals to the countries where the English-speaking peoples now form and will form the population of the future…we are quite right in protecting our working classes, our wageworkers, farmers, and small traders, from an influx that would mean the submergence of our own people. When I say “we,” in this instance, I mean all the English-speaking people of America and Australia.\textsuperscript{667}
\end{quote}

As Roosevelt later famously remarked, “there is no room in this country for hyphenated Americans. When I refer to hyphenated Americans, I do not refer to naturalized Americans. Some of the very best Americans I have ever known were naturalized Americans born abroad. But a hyphenated American is not an American at all.”\textsuperscript{668} Nevertheless, clearly this was as aspirational as it was an item of faith. Indeed, the same year that he made that speech, he noted privately to Lodge that he couldn’t be a candidate in 1916 as “the German-Americans, the professional hyphenated-Americans of every kind and the whole flapdoodle pacifist and mollycoddle outfit would be against me”\textsuperscript{669} and again a few days later “as you know, I feel that the course I have followed about hyphenated-Americanism, and especially the German-American vote, is such as absolutely to preclude the possibility of nominating me as a candidate.”\textsuperscript{670} Perhaps the most remarkable possibility about contemporary attitudes about immigration to the United States was that unlike in Africa or Latin America, it appears that contemporary leaders were far more willing to accept the notion of the ‘mold’ in creating new members of the English-speaking race.

Clearly not all peoples were clearly eligible for this mold, at least \textit{en masse}. Japanese and Chinese migrants escaped segregation by the narrowest of margins. The question of internment camps during World War II similarly highlights the lack thereof in either of the World Wars for German-Americans. Black Americans were increasingly segregated in this era, eventually facing even the segregation of the federal government under Wilson – Roosevelt did generally not use

\textsuperscript{666} Wilfred Laurier to Theodore Roosevelt, as quoted by Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur Hamilton Lee, 6 March 1908. 6:965.
\textsuperscript{667} Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur Hamilton Lee, 7 March 1908. 6:965.
\textsuperscript{668} Roosevelt, Theodore. Speech to the Knights of Columbus, reported in the New York Times, 13 October 1915.
\textsuperscript{670} Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, 7 December 1915. Lodge, 2:466.
the term ‘mold’ or ‘fusion’ to apply to their prospects, and it is difficult to imagine Roosevelt imagining the expanses of the West being settled by black Americans. Roosevelt seemed perfectly willing to acknowledge that individuals, whether for example black Americans he corresponded with or Japanese students, could reach the same racial heights and perhaps even become a member of the English-speaking peoples on an case-by-case basis, Roosevelt did not afford this opportunity to black Americans or Asian immigrants as a group the same way he did to immigrant labor from Europe. On the question of immigration to the United States, the solution envisioned to the geopolitical problem of competition between English-speaking peoples, Germans, Slavs, and other perceived races, required the maintenance of the color line. In sum, at home, contemporary politicians, whether for reasons of racism in the South or for reasons of geopolitical fears regarding German imperialism, were actively interested in maintaining the idea that not only did whiteness exist, but that it could only be achieved by white immigrants from narrow and specific sources.
Conclusion

This dissertation has revealed several key narratives regarding the Anglo-American relationship and the evolution of race as involved in geopolitics from the early 1890s through the end of the Roosevelt administration. Racial theories and their impact on American and British expansionism formed the ontological basis upon which contemporary political leaders saw the world. From this perspective, political leaders, most notably Roosevelt and his administration, but also certain key figures in London, conceptualized a world in which interracial relations and interracial law could supersede that of nations. By 1910, not only were Britain and the United States increasingly politically aligned, the idea of a broader ‘Teutonic’ category had dwindled. Certain threads highlight the way the idea of world order was not merely racialized, but also realized. Racial ideologies constructed the groundwork for a world envisioned on fears of competition as much, if not more so, than any sense of commonality. Moreover, to Roosevelt, the idea of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ slowly transitioned into the idea of the ‘English-speaking peoples,’ itself borrowed from theorists and leaders from years earlier in Britain. Although he used the term English-speaking peoples or races earlier, often nearly synonymously with Anglo-Saxon, as the appeal of Anglo-Saxonism faded, the term English-speaking gained coherence and provided an alternative. While both were racial at their core, various elements of the *biocultural assemblage* were weighted differently. Although ancestral traits still could produce certain desirable or undesirable results, increasing concern was devoted to the idea that social characteristics could produce inheritable biological qualities.

Political leaders subsequently approached two key theaters of expansion, the Western Hemisphere and South Africa, with the notion that the English-speaking races needed to outcompete the other powers of the world. Crises in these areas forced the question of competition between ‘races’ to address the issue of divisions between Anglo-Saxon and Teuton more broadly. While American triumphs in the Western Hemisphere solidified the idea of the supremacy of English-speaking races, it was only in the Boer War that the perceived racial characteristics were put to test against another Germanic race. This forced the question to leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, who found the triumph of Britain necessary.

Simultaneously, however, the initial failures of the British required both explanation and a new solution. To Roosevelt, the solution was obvious: the amalgamation of races in South Africa, modeled on New York – the result might not be entirely Anglo-Saxon, much like in the United States, but the new race would still be of the English-speaking races. Thus, the Boer War
became the period during which the unique characteristics of the English-speaking races diverged from the Germanic – both due to forced competition in both hemispheres and due to the possibility of creating an amalgamated race. This was closely interwoven with broader views on immigration, particularly to the United States. Of course, the Germanic threat was not the only external challenge faced by the English-speaking races. For decades, the looming specter of a perceived Slavic expansionist destiny had caused angst to racial theorists and political leaders alike. However, by the early 1900s, this fear dissipated, both as racial thought evolved and through the defeat of Russian power in the Russo-Japanese War.

The importance of the settler and migrant in geopolitics was magnified by notions of racial competition. The United States became not merely another branch of the Anglo-Saxon nations, but one which had the potential to effectively create infinite members of the new English-speaking race by pouring migrants from across Europe into an English-speaking mold. This mold was not without limits, reaching a straining point, in the minds of many contemporary leaders, nearly from its inception in the face of non-white immigrants. However, with respect to geopolitics, this then became the solution to the Germanic threat – to take the migrants that might create a Greater Germany across the globe and incorporate them into a Greater Anglo-America. This power was not uniquely American – contemporary figures such as Laurier and Roosevelt saw similar potential in Canada and Australia, respectively.

Race thus provides a critical lens through which to illuminate perspectives of leaders in understanding the formation of contemporary geopolitics at the turn of the last century as they conceptualized world order. Initially, the races seen as having the characteristics to dominate the future of the planet were the Slavic and the Teutonic races, including Anglo-Saxons, although other races at various times were given credence and consideration. Rather than the positive construction of a new international polity or a rapprochement based on Anglo-Saxon kinship, racial paradigms generated shared perception of Teutonic threat from Germany. Even Olney’s famous proclamation of American sovereignty in the Western Hemisphere requires addressing, with a world view ontologically based on race, what exactly sovereignty entailed.

The most determinative period for a break between German and Anglo-Saxon seems to be the Boer War, when Theodore Roosevelt managed to crystallize his world view with little complication as far as the exercise of American power was concerned – unlike the earlier incidents, America engaged little either militarily or diplomatically. While before the Second Boer War the idea of an English-speaking race in competition with other races in settler colonies certainly existed in Britain, it was less evident in the United States. By 1908, it came to
encompass even Roosevelt’s views towards immigration to America. However, in examination of these cases, it is still in some ways difficult to come to a satisfying answer, largely because the disconnect in the perceptions of race between the theorists envisioning Anglo-Saxon unity and the political leaders who were attempting to fit those ideas to their own world views. Contemporary leaders were remarkably well versed and engaged with contemporary theorists, often blurring any line between these as professions. Nevertheless, they lacked consistency in the formulation of their own theories and would manipulate and adapt their theories to circumstances as required. Practically, Germany was in many ways never part of an Anglo-Saxon world as far as the United States was concerned, merely tied to its heritage. Certainly, by the switch to English-speaking peoples that emerged after the Spanish American War and the Boer War, the idea was dead in the minds of the most prominent political leaders on the American side. British leaders may have embraced the concept for longer, but they were forced to deal with an uninterested America and an Empire which was struggling to keep even the English-speaking elements unified.

Unexpectedly, it seems that perhaps the issues of migration and settler colonies most dramatically impacted the perception of racial threat in the minds of contemporary leaders. It was the colonial fear – that settlers from an equally competitive race such as the Germans, might colonize some corner of Africa or Latin America, thus out-competing the English-speaking races. Russia posed its own threats, but consistently had ‘gone back before’ the English-speaking races. Japan provided a case that challenged the nature of the color line in adopting key racial traits, but never broke that line. In the case of immigration, Roosevelt viewed acquisition of German settlers as an eventual, through at times problematic, benefit – allowing for the settlement of the interior of the North American and Australian continents while simultaneously pouring them into an Anglo-Saxon mold that severed political connections with the German Empire.

Unlike existing literature using race to explain imperialism from the white side of the color line to the rest of the world, the greatest conflicts envisioned by these leaders focused largely on competition from within the white half of the line. However, even this interpretation was challenged by Japan, further problematizing the role of race in international relations. Nevertheless, the perceptions were clearly important, however ill-grounded. To these leaders, domination by the English-speaking races was of course a victory for humankind in which a sort of eternal peace would lead to perpetual prosperity guaranteed by the overwhelming power of the English-speaking races. However, this was not just a utopian vision for global peace as
enforced by the joint might of the United States and the British Empire; it was also a fearful reaction to stave off an apocalyptic alternative in which the English-speaking races were forever outmatched its competitors. The realization of decadence within the English-speaking peoples was the loss of racial vitality potentially indefinitely. The loss of racial characteristics key to competition was not just unfortunate, but a German or Slavic victory, tied to the German and Russian states, and the potential end of the English-speaking peoples in the long run. What does all this mean for the legacy of world order as constructed in this era? The events of 1945 tend to erase in American memory at least that geopolitical visions of world order were racial in Britain and America as well. The ‘work’ of populating the North America or Australia or maintaining racial characteristics through the ‘work’ of civilizing the Philippines or India was also part of this narrative, and one that had brutal consequences. American, Canadian, and Australian nationalism, and their attitudes towards immigration, race, and indigenous populations has not escaped this legacy.

Ultimately, in 1908, no special relationship materialized, and no unified federation existed even among the British Dominions - for all the power of Anglo-Saxon unity, it succeeded in conceptualizing mutual threat, not in constructing a truly unified polity. In times of crisis, it caused the United States and Britain to treat each other with exceptional friendliness or sympathy, but this was always in the face of shared danger. A formal alliance never materialized. Even within the British Empire, dreams of federation fizzled, with leaders in Australia and Canada envisioning a future at least somewhat apart from the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, this was not without consequence – even if the dreams of a unified Anglo-Saxon led world never appeared, political leaders indeed internalized aspects of the vision, manifesting in the idea of an English-speaking peoples for whom victory for one was victory for the other. Even as a collection of independent Dominions and the United States, much of the 20th century was forged through common action by these powers.

All of this has additional consequence towards the construction of ‘whiteness’ as a concept within the United States. The extensive literature on the matter, covered briefly in the introduction, does much justice to the topic. However, certain aspects of this scholarship could certainly benefit by further study, needing to consider the geopolitical consequences of racial antagonisms. Whiteness in the United States had a foreign policy component in its construction – just as a non-white American identity was in part created after the Second World War by American leaders fearing Communist advance should America not resolve issues such as segregation in the US military. In the context of contemporary politics between Progressive
Republicans, Mugwumps, Republicans, Democrats and various other factions, perhaps this isn’t surprising. Over the course of less than a generation, the Republican Party moved from the radical Republicans to tacitly allowing the construction of Jim Crow in the Democratic South. Less than a decade after Roosevelt, the United States elected a segregationist to the Presidency – Woodrow Wilson, the first Southern Democrat since the Civil War to reach that office, and famously anti-German. Certainly, Roosevelt’s geopolitical fears, unwillingness to spend political capital fighting racism in the South, and the appearance of Jim Crow and segregation during the era of his greatest influence were not entirely unrelated. Was there indeed some sort of consensus regarding whiteness between the political parties, each of which approached the question from a different angle? Unfortunately, that issue is far too broad to be answered here, but this research has raised it and a number of other critical questions that ideally would face further examination. Both Taft, especially given his experience as Governor of the Philippines, and Wilson, with his long association with racial politics, could particularly benefit from further investigation in future projects.

This opens further avenues to examine the role of ideology and race in geopolitics. This dissertation has attempted to identify a space for historical research, particularly of the history of geopolitics, between intellectual history and international relations through examining how a contemporary idea shaped the contemporary world order. In doing so, it blurs the line between domestic and international – showing at least one instance in which leaders viewed aspects of a traditionally domestic matter such as immigration through the same lens they assessed matters of foreign policy. Indeed, the notion of interracial relations creates a new set of borders in world order, allowing for both cooperation between branches of a race in different states as between Britain and America, but also for divisions along racial lines within a state as with the Transvaal. This dissertation also raises questions regarding race in other time periods and regarding other peoples that warrant examination in future. This competition was not merely one between Germans and the English-speaking peoples in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Although the ideas of evolution that spurred the nature of competition at this time were unique, race has arguably been a factor in geopolitics for much longer – and both the temporal extent and the geographic scope of this warrant examination. Britain was certainly not the first power to establish settler colonies. Despite the idea of a racial mold forming a cornerstone to American views towards immigrants in a geopolitical context, both migration and race as ideas long predate this. While the development of evolutionary ideas and its deployment into social context was critical for the geopolitical rivalries examined during the range of this dissertation, how did race function in geopolitics before the development of some of these ideas?
Lastly, despite the inhumane consequences of these visions of racial competition, perhaps there are still experiences to be harnessed for modern geopolitics from the scale of their visions. Roosevelt and his government, the theorists of Imperial Federation, and the architects of an imagined Anglo-Saxon utopia for all of their flaws certainly did not lack in either imagination or ambition. In some sense, the 20th century was indeed dominated by an alliance of the English-speaking race bent on out-populating the other peoples of the planet, reserving for themselves the right to arbitrate world affairs. The security architecture of the 20th century was doubtlessly arbitrated by the combined might of the United States and the British Empire as envisioned by racial thinkers. Contemporary warnings regarding Russian power, communist revolution, and the scale of conflict should the powers ever fully engage in a continental battle for supremacy all proved prescient.

Whether writing of past conflicts or discussing contemporary threats, competition between Britain and the United States was seen as normal behavior engaged upon by great powers and could be handled under the aegis of Anglo-Saxon growth. Competition with most other European powers as potential enemies was threatening, but not so to the Anglo-Saxon vision of world order and could ultimately be managed. Competition with Germany, however, was competition with a potential equal. When competition between races was seen as central to the successes of civilizations, similar and dynamic also meant threatening and dangerous in a way that Italy despite its new-found nationalism or France with its historical revolutionary fervor or even Russia for all its seemingly boundless expansionism perhaps were not. The significant consequences were not only the alliance that would arbitrate world affairs for the next century and the ideas that formed the core of American nationality, but the fears that helped conceive the titanic conflicts of the 20th century.
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