


Empathy, Ethics, and Justice in Children's War Literature

Vera Nelleke Veldhuizen



Homerton College

November 2019

This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Declaration

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

This dissertation does not exceed 80,000 words in length.

Empathy, Ethics, and Justice in Children's War Literature

Abstract

Vera Nelleke Veldhuizen

Using cognitive narratology, this theoretical thesis examines how the three linked concepts of empathy, ethics and justice are created and communicated in children's war literature. Due to the divisive nature of war literature, the basis of this thesis lies on the in- and outgroup theory of empathy, according to which the extend of our empathy is strongly tied to who we identify as "like us" (ingroup) or "unlike us" (outgroup). The limits of our empathy have a direct influence on both our moral frameworks and our ability to perceive the ethical implications of textual actions and characterisation; if we are not empathically engaged, the consequences of a character's motivations and actions are irrelevant to us. In complex situations like those in war stories there is another layer of moral importance; justice. The reason for going to war, how it is conducted, and how it is resolved are so specific that they have their own justice philosophy. Children cannot be assumed to be aware of this, or to have the power to influence it. Yet it plays a significant part in children's war literature. This thesis argues that in children's war literature empathy, ethics, and justice build on each other in a bottom-up manner. It then further examines how this is achieved in the genre, and what its potential impact on the reader may be.

The thesis examines this by analysing the construction and communication of each concept separately in a bottom-up approach, starting with empathy and ending with justice. These sections are divided up into two chapters dedicated to the narrative techniques most relevant to the concept analysed, in a top-down approach, starting with narrators and ending with scripts. A different novel is analysed for each technique, both to demonstrate the argument using the most appropriate example, and to showcase the patterns within the genre. The thesis concludes that through these narrative techniques a complex web of empathy, ethics, and justice is constructed, in which each technique plays a direct role in the concept communicated to the reader. Because young readers are still developing cognitively, as well as building their life experience and reading skills, children's war literature can provide a strongly influential training ground for them to learn and grow as empathic and moral people.

Acknowledgements

Somebody once told me that doing a PhD is rather like running a marathon: it takes ages; it hurts a lot; if you stop before finishing you leave with nothing; you become dreadfully boring to talk to because outside of it you will have no life; you are alone most of the time; and ultimately nobody cares that you are doing it or why. Having reached my own finish line at last, I find that I agree with one addendum: during most of this proverbial marathon, you are on fire. Therefore, this acknowledgements section, rather like one's internal monologue during a fiery marathon, goes out to the countless volunteers and water stations that made this whole thing possible.

It's so cliché to write an acknowledgement to your supervisor, to the point where words do not necessarily even reflect how important they actually are to both the project and the person behind it. I will try to overcome that to make clear that there is simply no way I would have made it through without Maria Nikolajeva. I am deeply indebted to her work, yet somehow even more to her as a person. Her dedication to her students, emotionally and professionally, puts us all to shame. "That's perfectly normal" was her common response every time I felt lost and hopeless, and somehow that helped. Without her I would never have felt part of the children's literature community, never have felt like an academic, probably never even have finished. She taught me so much more than I ever thought I could learn in just three (ish) years, with endless kindness and academic ruthlessness, and I will be eternally grateful.

Although a PhD is typically a lonesome affair, I was lucky enough to have found friends in Cambridge and beyond whom even in the worst of times I could not bore away. My brilliant, understanding, and loving PhD comrades Madeleine, Maya, and Catherine, who formed the bond of friendship with me as they suffered through the same; and Thomas, Gus, Eze, Aimee, Ségo and of course Nic who made everything more fun and are some of the sweetest people I have ever met. I knew that if I ever needed any one of you, you'd be there, and we could laugh, cry and watch terrible films together. Thank you all for keeping me (mostly) sane. A special thanks is also due to everyone at Homerton for making it truly feel like home. As much as I am ready to move on, it will be with the bittersweet feeling of loss. It is because of you alone that I will miss this place.

Many thanks are also due to people I met within the (cognitive) (children's) literature community, who through friendship, encouragement, and support made me feel like I am part of something bigger. Sara van den Bossche, Melanie Keene, Zoe Jacques, Malin Alkestrand, Clémentine Beauvais, Anna Savoie, Frauke Pauwels, Jen Aggleton, Katy Day, Meghanne Flynn, Michael Burke, Astrid van den Bossche, Lisa Zunshine, and Helma van Lierop-DeBrauwier are among the many. You make conferencing feel like homecoming more than anything else. Then there are my colleagues at my job in Groningen University, who hired me and believed in me even before I was close to finishing at all. Pablo Valdivia, Alberto Godioli, Jeanette den Toonder, Camilla Sutherland and Sanna Buurke, thank you for placing your trust in me! I hope (partially through producing this document) I will live up to your expectations. Of course, a thank you to my colleagues in European Literature and Culture as well; your kindness and support have helped me more than you probably know.

En natuurlijk mijn ouders, zonder wiens hulp, steun en liefde dit hele gebeuren niet mogelijk was geweest. Inge, mijn kleine zusje die nu toch echt niet meer zo klein is en nu zelf aan haar eigen marathon begint; veel succes, je weet me te vinden. Brams knuffels waren de beste manier om te ontspannen en onze vele boswandelingen hielpen me zowel na te denken en te bedaren. Het waren geen makkelijke jaren en jullie waren er altijd voor me. Nu dat ik dan echt klaar ben, kan ik er eindelijk voor jullie te zijn. Het is de hoogste tijd.

And of course, always and forever, thank you to Alex, *chuisle mo chroí*. It is your turn now.

Contents

Acknowledgements	iii
Children's War Literature: More Than Meets the Eye	1
I've Got the Power!	2
Wait, What Are We Talking About Again?	4
War as Child's Play?	9
Why Bother?	10
My Tripartite	11
Corpus Selection	22
Outline	24
Part I. But Why Should I Care? Narrative Empathy	26
1. I Get So Emotional	28
What is This I'm Feeling?	28
What are Basic Emotions?	30
Read All About It	32
How Are You Feeling, Child?	36
Battling Emotions	37
I Feel It in My Bones	38
Terror and Hatred	44
Love Hurts	51
Is All Fair in Love and War?	57
2. Your Side Has Been Chosen	60
You've Got Your People, and I've Got Mine	61
Lines in the Sand	64
Pitting Children	65

Getting It in Perspective	67
Out Of the (Horse)Box	68
So Many Sides	71
How I Live Now	76
We're All in This Together	80
Part II. I Know What's Right: Narrative Ethics	82
3. You Are Such A Character!	84
Good Little Children	85
It Only Hurts Because You Care	87
What Even Are You?	88
Putting the Pieces Together	93
You Don't Look Right	94
I Like the Way You Think	96
Talk Me Through It	97
I Could See It in Your Eyes	100
If You Think So	105
Whatever You Say, Say Nothing	109
Can You Hear Me Now?	114
4. Actions Have Consequences	116
The Answers to Life, the Universe and Everything	117
Why Would You Do That?	119
You Shouldn't Have Done That	120
Desperate Times, Desperate Choices	121
Ain't No Rest for the Wicked	127
Listen to Me!	133
Loud Actions, Loud Words	137

Part III. Wait, That's Not Fair! Narrative Justice	140
5. Tales of the Script	142
It's All in Your Head	143
Constructing Justice	145
It's Simply a Matter of Good Versus Evil	148
How Could We Do War Justice?	153
6. That's <i>Jus</i> For You	156
<i>Jus</i> Reading	158
Just War Scripts	159
The Enemy Is You	160
Question Everything	170
They're <i>Jus</i> Kids, Man	180
Who Cares?!	183
How Did We Get Here?	184
Wait, Aren't We Missing Something?	185
So What Is War Good For?	187
Appendix A Primary Sources Considered	190
Works Cited	197
<i>Primary Sources Analysed</i>	197
<i>Secondary Sources</i>	199

Children's War Literature: More Than Meets the Eye

It is conspicuous that in a traditionally didactic field such as children's literature, texts dealing explicitly with violence and powerlessness such as war stories are as widespread as they are. Historically, the implied reader of children's literature was presented with protectionist stories (Sainsbury 2013, 6-7) and morals (Mills 2014, 1), and characters who were models of desired behaviour rather than empathy-conducive creations (Barker 2014, 102). However, as exemplified by the increased complexity of many contemporary children's stories, this is no longer the case. Empathy, which as a concept has become popular to the point of becoming a buzzword, has become a priority both in entertainment and scholarship. Children's literature protagonists are now allowed to be flawed, engaging beings rather than simple moralistic devices, and texts employ deliberate techniques to encourage empathy between reader and text. Allowing for flawed characters and difficult empathy further paints the ethical picture of children's war literature.

The rise of narrative empathy in children's literature is not reserved only for the protagonists, or even characters presented to be "like" the implied reader. An increasing challenge is placed on readers to empathise with both those "like" and "unlike" them, which is particularly evident in children's war literature. Whereas Captain Biggles was wholly devoid of empathy for "the enemy", some more modern novels like Michael Morpurgo's *Friend or Foe* (1977), Jan Needle's *A Game of Soldiers* (1985), and Paul Dowsell's *Eleven Eleven* (2012) purposefully aim for the reader to empathise with both the in- and the outgroup. With this increased complexity comes a potentially higher ethical ambiguity; it is no longer necessarily the case that a war is waged between clearly set up Good Guys and Bad Guys, or even that the protagonist is a Good Guy at all. Child characters can perform horrible acts, like Ender in Orson Scott Card's *Ender's Game* (1977/1991), or Todd and Viola in

Patrick Ness' Chaos Walking trilogy (2008-2010). Yet their status as children inevitably changes the dynamic in the war text: they cannot be assumed to have the same agency, or understanding of the situation, as an adult character. This difficult dynamic is majorly complicating for the ethical framework and impact of the story a war novel is trying to tell.

I've Got the Power!

Power is an inevitable issue in children's literature, again highlighted by war stories. Children do not yet have the life experience of adults (Nikolajeva 2014a, 15), and in most Western societies are in positions of relative powerlessness compared to adult authority over their lives. This power dynamic bleeds into the nature of texts written for children, as children's literature is generally produced, edited, and selected by adults for children. As a result, adults shape both the text and the audience of children's literature; children's literature is written for the adults' understanding of what children are and need, rather than specific children. As summarised by Clémentine Beauvais, post-Jacqueline Rose's landmark *Case of Peter Pan* (1984), children's literature scholarship has largely been divided into two problematic models or theories of childhood: the difference model, and the deficit model (2015, 16). Both models are based and focused on the same thing; claiming that either the main difference between adults and children is power, or the main thing children are lacking is power (17-18). Both models assume an inherent powerlessness of the child. It is in response to the debate surrounding these models that Maria Nikolajeva coined the term aetonnormativity, which refers to the "adult normativity that governs the way children's literature has been patterned from its emergence until the present day" (2010, 8). Beauvais aptly notes that adult-child theories differ inherently from other power theories because unlike power theories based on generally less flexible distinctions such as race, the division between the child and the adult is based on "the passing of time" (18) and adults and children have distinct yet overlapping temporalities. She therefore proposes another childhood model based not on power but on time either left or lived instead (ibid). In this model children are "mighty" because we as adults do not know what they *might* do with the time they (and we do not) have left.

Beauvais sees the didactic discourse inherent in children's literature as a request made of the child reader, a question without the possibility or even expectation of a definite answer:

When the overtly didactic adult asks the child to do something, they are implicitly asking the child to carry that something into another temporality.

And why are they doing so? Because it is a time that adults cannot access: it is

a temporality that is out of their power. They can influence it, but not act upon it directly; that power is the child's. This gesture implicitly indicates an awareness of child might (Beauvais 2015, 19).

Admittedly I am much more cynical in my view on this relationship than Beauvais, in that I contend that this model of child might as opposed to adult power is still inherently about a power difference between the adult and the child – something Beauvais does not dispute but considers a side effect of the issue of time. Although through the passage of time this power can be acquired, and the theorisation of this power can therefore not be the same as theorisations of other power criticisms, within their child-temporality children are disempowered in the eyes of an aetnonormative society.

I would be remiss to not mention here an alternative approach to child-adult power dynamics proposed by Marah Gubar; the kinship model. She argues that the difference and deficit models are insufficient because they do not allow for individualism; in both models, she claims, children and adults are considered as two homogenous groups (2016, 299-301). Certain combinations of identities, for instance sex and race, she argues may make an adult more disenfranchised than a child (301). She proffers her kinship model as a solution to a potentially essentialist approach to child-adult relations and differences. The model does admit that there are differences and “deficiencies” between children and adults, but aims to shift the emphasis to general humanist commonalities rather than the differences between the two. Although I agree with Gubar that both the deficiency and difference model are potentially harmful to children as they can cause Othering, I cannot employ her kinship model for this project because in aetnonormative societies (which Anglo-American cultures are) children are considered in these disenfranchised ways. Especially in the case of ethics children are seen as lacking (Sainsbury 2013). Considering I am analysing not real children but the implied reader of children's war literature, which is considered marginalised whether maliciously or not, the kinship model would be inappropriate. The narratives I analyse are constructed in certain ways with the aim of socialisation in mind, considering the implied reader subjects rather than agents. Gubar's model is interesting and challenging to both children's literature and childhood scholarship, but not suitable here.

The power imbalance between the child and the adult is a prominent and contentious feature of children's literature. This literature does not come from a neutral place; one of its primary goals is socialisation (Nikolajeva 2014a, 31). Its form and content serve to communicate to the generation after us what we want them to believe when they become

adults, which is why historiographical analyses of children's literature can reveal norms and values held by the society that produced the text. Included in this are "counter-ideological" texts, which argue against certain values (and often preach to the choir); these narratives' reaction against the societal norm reveals which norm they are reacting against. The expectation that reading impacts children's development comes from the belief that children are incomplete projects of socialisation (Beauvais 2015, 55); that they are "becoming" rather than being (Hollindale 2011, 12). Aetnormativity also means that adult morals are seen as the norm and must be taught to the child in order to change their (from the adult perspective) naïve and "primitive" beliefs.

Another important factor to consider regarding the ongoing child project of children's literature is that literature is a safe zone in which readers can train their empathic skills and Theory of Mind (Keen 2007, 350-351) or mind-modelling skills (Stockwell, Mahlberg 2015, 132), and play with ethical choices without the fear of extra-textual consequences (Vermeule 2010, 6-7). Cognitively, the implied readers of children's literature are both vulnerable to narrative strategies and undergoing tremendous development and change. The challenging and playful environment created by reading potentially sets up a valuable scenario where young readers can learn about themselves, others, and the way the world around them works. Filling the narrative gaps engages the implied child reader cognitively, an activity which potentially leads to intense personal development. Empathic engagement with a narrative can open up the possibility of moral engagement and learning, leading to an increased conceptual and practical understanding of empathy, ethics, and justice. War is a narrative situation which can serve to foreground these three issues; empathy and ethics are problematised by the nature of war, which equally foregrounds the perceived need for justice and retribution. Engaging with war literature therefore has an incredible potential impact on the child reader's cognitive development.

Wait, What Are We Talking About Again?

War is an important and prevalent theme, subject, and genre of literature. Laura Ashe and Ian Patterson state that "war was the first subject of literature; at times, war has been its only subject" (2014, xi), Catherine Savage Brosman concurs by claiming that "[w]ar and narrative have been wedded to each other from the earliest sacred books and other literature of the Mediterranean and India" (Brosman 1992, 75). This begs the question: what *is* war literature? In this dissertation I am analysing children's war literature as a genre, and therefore need to clarify what it is that I am working with. A definition of war literature is unfortunately hard to

come by, as generally sources talking about it phrase it as war *in* literature or avoid a definition in general. For example, Jay Winter simply stated the following:

Kipling' s tales drew on wartime legends and tell, in a highly ambiguous manner, of the spiritualist way of remembering the dead after the war. Other writers did so too. Poetry conjured up the dead in metaphors common to all languages. In later years, the publication of soldiers' writings, both fiction and autobiography created a new genre of 'War literature'. Much of this prose was in itself a kind of war memorial, a ritual entombment of and separation from those who had fallen by those who had survived (Winter 2014, 73).

Although this “definition” hints at potential functions of war literature (a memorial site and a space to work through war caused trauma), it is still incredibly vague. Do we consider *any* soldiers' writing as war literature? What if it is not about war at all? Reed Bonadonna continues this thought by considering war literature to be, roughly “[l]iterary depictions of the soldier's experience” (2008, 241). Both scholars ground their definition of war literature with the author and exclude narratives which are not written by someone with soldiering experience – a feature of their working definition which is highly problematic. Like Winter, most scholarly work on war literature roots its definition of the genre firmly in extra-textual historical wars, not defining the term *war literature* but using it in conjunction with particular events, such as the Vietnam War (Newman 1996); WWI (Winter 2014); the American Civil War (Hutchison 2015); and the Cold War (Seed 1999; Matthews 2016), or as personal accounts of war experience (Caddick 2018). This is the most common way that scholars view war literature; for example, although Alex Houen and Jan-Melissa Schramm refer to the genre as “the literature of different military conflicts” (2018, 2) in the introduction to their book on sacrifice in modern war literature, the essays collected in it only look at literature based on extra-textual military conflicts. However, this narrow focus leaves out any speculative fiction, fantasy and science-fiction (unless it was written by a veteran); genres in which war often plays a prominent role.

The issue with defining war literature as a genre is not limited to “adult” fiction, however. The importance of war as a genre remains acknowledged, yet the slipperiness of what constitutes genre membership stays problematic. For example, the *Continuum Encyclopedia of Young Adult Literature* states about war that:

The topic of [war] is covered in multiple ways. Specific [wars] may be referred to, from the Trojan [war] to current world upheavals [...]. The themes of good versus evil is fairly consistent in [war] novels, although whether [war] is evil in and of itself is also examined (Cullinan, Kunzel, Wooten 2005, 732).

Although this does acknowledge the prevalence and importance of war in children's literature, it does not provide a definition of war literature. The *Cambridge Guide to Children's Books in English* defines "war stories" as "[t]ales featuring armed conflict, usually from an anti-war perspective [...]. War stories are inherently didactic: they inculcate patriotic moral values or, more often, question the morality of war" (Watson 2001, 737). However, if this is true, any and every story containing armed conflict, such as J. K. Rowling's *Harry Potter* series (1997-2007), J. M. Barrie's *Peter Pan and Wendy* (1911), or J. R. R. Tolkien's *The Hobbit* (1937), could be considered a war story. Although I do agree that the war aspect of these narratives is not to be ignored, it would be difficult to put *Peter Pan and Wendy* in the same category as Ian Serrailier's *The Silver Sword* (1960). Therefore, it is important to consider the difference between war as a *theme* and as a *genre*.

Living in a Box

Genre theory itself is grounds for quite the lively debate, and my purpose here is not to "solve" genre theory nor to produce a brief summary of the field. However, within genre theory there are many different conceptions of genre, and although I am only working with prose text, I do need to address how I classify the texts I have selected and why. There is no single, agreed upon definition of *genre*. Yet, although it seems incredibly difficult to grasp what genres *are*, especially because of their fluidity, it is even more impossible to imagine a text, or any media, outside of any genre (Derrida 1981, 61): we always mentally categorise every text we consume. The task then is to see *how* we categorise them. Wolfgang Iser keeps his definition quite simple, stating that genre is form (1974, 59) and that form is a means of communication with the reader (57). In *Genres in Discourse*, Tzvetan Todorov likewise argues that "[genres] are classes of texts" (1990, 16), and "nothing other than the codification of discursive properties" (18). These definitions do not allow for *content* to play any part in genre classification, however. There would then be only the Platonic poetry, drama, and prose. This is not sufficient for my purposes, as it does not properly account for the intrinsic difference between Frances Hodgson Burnett's *A Little Princess* (1905/2012) and Robert Cormier's *Heroes* (1998/1999), for instance. Maria Nikolajeva stated that genres are

“categories into which we sort literary texts according to certain principles” (2005, 49). These categories and principles are fluid, however, and nearly impossible to define.

Historical genre theorist Ralph Cohen suggests the following working definition of genre:

A genre is a group (or groups) of texts historically characterised by components in interaction toward some general purpose containing features that are intertextual, the whole forming an identity that can become a subgenre or can be the source of new genres. Genres occur in every language and many cross national borders. They are procedures for organizing knowledge, and for communicating it. They express our thoughts, feelings, and actions with regard to that knowledge (Cohen 1998/2010, 184, emphasis in the original).

The argument that it is both content and form that categorises a text as being part of a specific genre (as opposed to another) is also put forward by Gérard Genette, who claims that it is, amongst other things, paratextuality that leads to our categorisation of genre (1997, 94). Both within and without the text are genre indicators, to borrow the term from Garin Dowd (2006, 12). Indicators within a text may include point of view, plot structure, typical outcome, and so on. Continuing this thought, literary scholar John Frow stated that genre “is a set of conventional and highly organised constraints on the production and interpretation of meaning” (2015, 10). He taxonomises genre as having the following dimensions: “a set of *formal features*”; thematic structure drawing on “a set of highly conventional *topics* or *topoi*”; the “*situation of address*”; the required background knowledge of the reader to make sense of the text; rhetorical function; and the physical setting of the text (9-10, emphases in the original). Again, my purpose is not to offer a solution to genre theory, however, by providing this overview I aim to both explain why genre theory is important to my corpus, and how I have come to my selection.

The difficulty with defining a genre is highlighted by Peter Stockwell, who adds that “Genres can be defined socially, historically, functionally, authorially, politically, stylistically, arbitrarily, idiosyncratically, or by a combination of any of these (Stockwell 2002, 28).

However, he also includes the crucial, yet easily overlooked remark that besides your conception of genre, genre identification and definition also depends on “which common feature of its elements you have decided to foreground as being most salient” (ibid). Through this, he introduces a cognitive approach to genre definition; as a narrative device

foregrounding has a particular cognitive effect on our perception. The perception of genre perhaps most useful for my purposes of identifying the type of text I am working with relies on prototypicality. According to this cognitive psychological account of classification, categories are understood through typicality (Paltridge 1997, 53), making a prototype most easily identifiable with the category (Frow 2015, 59). The further we move away from the prototype, the less clear the category lines and identification become. Therefore, for children's war literature a prototypical text may be Paul Dowsell's *Eleven Eleven* (2012) because of its form and content. This means that categorisation then depends on likeness to this prototypical text, and novels such as Diana Wynne Jones's *Howl's Moving Castle* (1986/2009), although featuring a war subplot, are too far removed from the prototype to be considered primarily as a children's war literature text.

To deselect any story that mentions war I could argue that the novel needs to be set during the war and foreground combat. However, Michelle Magorian's *Goodnight Mister Tom* (1981/2015) does not focus on the war in terms of soldiers or battles at all and instead tells the story of a young boy finding parental love for the first time, yet this story is entirely predicated on war-based evacuation and can therefore be considered a war story. A narrative can fit into multiple genres at once; Meg Rosoff's *How I Live Now* (2004/2010) is amongst others a romance, a survival story, and a war story. In my definition I will follow in the footsteps of Laura Ashe and Ian Patterson's broader definition, in the preface of their *War and Literature* collection, where they seem to take as a working definition of war literature "[w]riting about war, or in war, or because of war, or against war" (2014, xii). For my purposes this is still too broad, especially considering I will be leaving the actual author out of my research; as unless explicitly stated young readers cannot be expected to have had the level of education necessary to recognise a text as being written because of a war, or during a war. Additionally, I will filter out novels which simply feature a war. This selection is not objective; however, it is based on my prototypical understanding of war as a genre indicator as opposed to a theme.

Therefore, for this project I consider as war stories *narratives whose main plot is completely dependent on war*, or for which the presence of a war is integral to significant choices made by main characters, whether they take place on the battlefield or not. That said, an important caveat is that I will only consider as war an extended political act of violence, involving multiple parties and battles; other usages of the term "war", like Robert Cormier's *The Chocolate War* (1974) I consider metaphoric and therefore fall outside of the scope of

this project. Literature about the Troubles in Northern Ireland I will include, however, as I consider this armed political conflict a war. Not included in this definition is Shoah literature, as this genre both has its own particular empathic and moral issues, and has been analysed extensively in previous scholarship (Kertzer 1999; Baer 2000; Kertzer 2002; Jordan 2004; Martin 2004; Kidd 2005; Kokkola 2013; Kerman 2014). This is not to say that Shoah scholarship is without value; this type of literature holds important insights and analytical models, and some ethical issues are similar.

War as Child's Play?

Children's war literature differs from (aeto-)“normal” literature because of one simple thing: the child. By this I mean both the child figure in the text, and implied child reader. Although a child protagonist is both not exclusive to children's literature, nor a requirement, it is more common in children's literature than it is in any other kind. Putting the child central in a war story changes it in many profound ways; the child character cannot be assumed to understand what a war is nor its implications the way an adult can, which means that their level of responsibility for the consequences of their actions are ambiguous as well. Additionally, the child's small social world (Nikolajeva 2014a, 16), generally consisting of immediate family, a few friends or neighbours, and school depending on age, is both problematised by the large scale of war and heightens the importance of the in- and outgroups that war tears apart. It is precisely in the areas of empathy, ethics, and justice that the figure of the child complicates a war story.

The implied child reader equally sets children's war literature apart from its adult counterpart because of empathy and moral concerns. A young reader, for instance, may not be assumed to be able to understand the complexities of war, because of which the situation may be grossly oversimplified to Good versus Bad, lack historical background or the understanding of the difference between fact and fiction. Additionally, the young reader, although susceptible to narrative strategies, may misinterpret or misjudge characters (Nikolajeva 2002, 156), skewing their understanding of the war presented and the moral implications of the characters' actions. *Nota bene* that this does not mean that adult readers are expert readers; they too may be lacking in knowledge, empathy, or cognitive development. The concept of novice and expert readers was proposed by Nikolajeva to combat the issue of a generalised view on children and adults as static objects with homogenous skills and development. Instead of talking about adult reader, then, Nikolajeva proposes to use the term expert reader, meaning “an abstract, hypothetical recipient of a

literary text who possesses a capability of realising to the full extent the potential afforded by the text” (2014a, 15). Instead of child readers, Nikolajeva refers to novice readers, who do not have this capability (ibid). The expert reader may be an idealised version of what we imagine adult readers to be rather than a realistic expectation of adult readers, and likewise child readers are not homogenously novices.

The potential vulnerability of the implied young readership of children’s war literature also opens up debate about the ethics of reading the genre: how much violence is appropriate for young audiences? Questions surrounding this issue can be traced from Nicholas Tucker discussing fear in 1976 (116-117), to Perry Nodelman discussing fairy tales and children’s television in 1992 (139, 303), and Kimberley Reynolds summarising concerns surrounding depictions of wartime atrocities (2011, 122). As Betsy Hearne and Deborah Stevenson write in their guide for adults *Choosing Books for Children: A Commonsense [sic] Guide*;

There is certainly a valid place for concern about the horrors to which children can be exposed, but many controversies seem to have nothing to do with real horrors [...]. Most objections center around occasional profanity or mild sexuality, which are regular parts of a child’s real world. [...] It’s what we ourselves have trouble dealing with, not what *children* have trouble dealing with (Hearne, Stevenson 1999, 180, emphasis in original).

Concerns about suitability for children come hand in hand with children’s literature in general as highlighted above, and these concerns spring from adult conceptions of appropriateness. This is a difficult issue; adults want to inform, but not scar, and scholars want to be mindful that they do not talk down to children, yet must take into account that there are things child audiences should not be exposed to. The discomfort and difficulty surrounding depictions of violence for children, combined with the enduring prevalence of stories featuring violence, is in part why children’s war literature specifically is fascinating: it uses a narrative situation to foreground empathy, ethics, and justice which also problematises all three *and* is precarious in respect to these three concepts because of the implied readership inherent to the genre.

As I treat war as a narrative setting in this case, for this project I do not concern myself with real readers or authors. Although both, and especially real readers, play an important ethical role in literature and reading (Booth 1988, 8; Nussbaum 1990, 3-5), my interest lies with the narrative structures of the text. How does the narrative situation of war construct, foreground, and communicate empathy, ethics, and justice to young readers? For this line of

enquiry real people are not strictly relevant. However, when talking about empathy and morality, especially with young readers, neglecting the potential impact the narrative may have on the reader's cognition would mean leaving out both a fascinating and vital element of the reading process. Empathy is, after all, both a cognitive and an affective process (for how can it be possible to have empathic engagement without engaging with our emotions?). Therefore, I discuss only *potential* impact and *implied* readers, unless indicated explicitly, and when referring to particular empirical research. By approaching children's war literature in this manner, I want to demonstrate the narrative strategies used to construct and communicate empathy, ethics, and justice specific to this genre.

Why Even Bother?

Researching children's war literature from a cognitive perspective has, as hinted at so far, not been done before in an explicit and extensive fashion. Instead, research on children's war literature, like research on (aeto-)normative war literature is, as stated above, often studied from a thematic or historical perspective, like in Elizabeth Galway 2016 and David Budgen 2018. Additionally, some cognitive scholarship has already flirted with children's war literature; Nikolajeva (2017) analyses Patrick Ness' Chaos Walking trilogy (2008-2010) for both emotions and moral strategies, and Lisa Sainsbury (2017) analyses the potential moral impacts of thought experiments in, amongst non-war texts, *Carrie's War* (Bawden 1974) and *A Game of Soldiers* (Needle 1985). However, none have cognitively analysed children's war literature proper.

The cognitive approach I conduct in this research is not comprehensive; there are many possible methodologies and concepts which fall within cognitive poetics (such as Text World Theory, spatiality, and evolution-based approaches). The concepts which I focus on and the methodology I employ are simply specks within the wider constellation of the field. These specks are however, as I argued above, particularly significant in both children's literature in general and war literature specifically. By analysing children's war literature from a cognitive perspective for the construction of and relationship between empathy, ethics and justice, I am able to achieve certain specific insights with particular implications for both academia and the wider, "real" world. Before I continue with my taxonomy and further necessary groundwork before the research proper, let me demonstrate that it is not for nought by explaining how this research may change the world (for the better).

For children's literature scholars, this research adds a more formalist and technical insight into the *how* and *why* of certain topics of interest. Ethics and empathy especially have been analysed by influential scholars both within and outside of the field of children's literature, such as Nikolajeva (2012; 2014a; 2017), Claudia Mills (2014), and Lisa Sainsbury (2013). However, besides the groundwork laid by Nikolajeva regarding empathy, this scholarship is generally not concerned with the narrative techniques behind the concepts. An approach which maps out how narrative strategies and layers create specific empathic and moral engagement strengthens other analyses of these concepts and adds further depth to the discussion. Understanding the ways form supports and constructs content, specifically of the empathic and moral kind, increases the field's comprehension of these concepts as well as their implications. Similarly, for cognitive poetics an analysis of children's war literature adds the still often neglected part of child and youth cognition and literature. As childhood reading is highly formative, a cognitive analysis of children's war literature specifically fills in a part of that initial and important phase of our reading lives. Through this, this project adds to the wider understanding of cognitive poetics.

There are also more political reasons behind the importance of this work, now in particular. Division is common in humanity; we categorise and ostracise each other often and based on many factors. Especially in the current political climate in most Western countries, we are seeing the extreme negative effects these divisions can have on society. Protests against racist police brutality are met with violent force across the USA and in some European cities; neo-Nazi, fascist and other "far-right" organisations are on the rise politically across Europe (and, again, the USA); extremist verbiage is normalised across not only the Internet but also political discourse and general media outlets; and the Covid-19 crisis has put increased strain on the already much maligned European Union, which because of increased nationalism has recently lost a member state. To divide, to create in- and outgroups is innate, however, a lot of who we group in or out and how we treat them accordingly is learned behaviour. A cognitive analysis of children's war literature, of literature which is so formative *and* highlights the impact of division on ethics and what is considered "just" behaviour, allows me to study the beginnings of what is at play in the world right now, and can perhaps serve as a way to find soft, slow-burning solutions to pressing cultural concerns.

My Tripartite

Up until this point I have referred to empathy, ethics, and justice with an assumption that it is clear what it is that I am talking about. However, much like the genre I am studying the

concepts that are central to this research are used by many and in different ways. Before I can proceed, I must therefore explain what it is that *I* mean when I refer to my concepts and demonstrate on what basis I got to these working definitions.

Empathy

The term “empathy” was introduced to the English language in 1909 by Edward Titchener as a translation of the German word *Einfühlung* (Koopman, Hakemulder 2015, 83), which if literally translated means “in-feeling”. As stated above empathy has become a distinctly popular area of research and public concern; although not a new topic of interest, cultural attention is currently particularly focused on empathy:

The interest in empathy from a philosophical perspective is nothing new; Aristotle was highly concerned with it as an emotional and aesthetic response to art. However, around the 2000s it arose with a new vigour as a paradigm within the academic perspective, which can be explained partially by cultural/historical developments (multiple financial crashes, 9/11) and by the discovery of mirror neurons and other major developments in cognitive sciences (Breger, Breithaupt 2010, 7-10).

Yet despite its current popularity, empathy does not enjoy a unified definition. There are different classifications of and different ways of looking at empathy, taking the approach of psychology, sociology, or literature for instance, and even within these fields scholars have differing understandings of what empathy is. As this research is narratology based, the definition of empathy I am concerned with comes from the literary approach. The first collection of work on specifically literary approaches to empathy actively avoids providing a pure definition of empathy, focusing instead on a definition of literary empathy studies, stating that “we hesitate to insist on a narrow definition of empathy. What we can say is that literary empathy studies investigates how ‘thinking with’ or ‘feeling with’ another happens within literary texts or because of literary texts” (Hammond, Kim 2014, 1). This definition of literary empathy studies does, however, provide a vague definition of empathy as “thinking with” or “feeling with” another. In her foundational work *Empathy and the Novel*, Suzanne Keen builds on psychological understandings of empathy to apply them to literature, and defines empathy as “the spontaneous, responsive sharing of an appropriate feeling”, or sharing of affect (2007, 5). This definition is quite similar to developmental psychologist Ronit Roth-Hanania et al’s conception of empathy as “a vicarious socio-emotional response that is induced by the perception of another individual’s affective state. It entails feeling an emotion that is similar to the one likely experienced by the other person” (2011, 448).

“Appropriate feeling”, a vague turn of phrase, appears to be bound to expectations of how both the other and the self are *supposed* to feel (2007, 5). This is a mildly problematic definition to adopt, as it is not particularly clear. For instance, if in a novel the protagonist’s parent gets shot, is it appropriate to feel sad or angry – or even happy if the parents were abusive, or the situation is comical? These are distinctly different feelings, and it is possible for the protagonist’s reaction to not be the same as the reader’s. Keen refers to “the more complex, differentiated feeling for another as sympathy” (ibid), an observation I take umbrage with especially in the case of literature considering narrative empathy is complex and may result in a differentiated emotion. However, although simplistic, this definition is a good point to start with as this work is fundamental to narrative empathy research and therefore forms the base of most if not all following work.

Martha Nussbaum defines empathy as “the ability to see the world from another’s viewpoint” (2010, 36). However, this definition is lacking as it does not include the affective impact that empathy has on the empathiser, which I consider central to the process. There is a key difference between perceiving and feeling, and without impact empathy cannot take place. Recognising the importance of emotion in the experience of empathy, Patrick Colm Hogan argues that empathy is to feel emotion because of someone else’s emotion, where the source of your own emotion is that of the other person, rather than the *cause* of their emotion (2011, 64-65). Or as Blakey Vermeule simply puts it: “the capacity to feel someone else’s feelings” (2010, 42). This distinction between the emotion and the cause thereof is important, because to feel an emotion due to the cause of another’s emotion is not empathy but immersive identification (Nikolajeva 2014a, 85). In the case of literature, this means that readers absorb the role of the character (Keen 2007 75-80) and become “unable to liberate themselves from the subject position imposed by the text” Nikolajeva 2014a, 85). This identification is problematic as it is limited to the reader’s experience rather than the character’s, and prevents the reader from recognising anything beyond their own experience. Although it could be seen as a beginning form of empathy, it does not endorse it, as it blocks the possibility of assessment. Therefore, I subscribe to Hogan’s definition with an addendum, and see empathy as *an emotional response to another’s emotional state, whilst recognising that the other’s state is not your own.*

I’m Not Crying, You’re Crying

An underlying presupposition of cognitive narratology is that textual and extra-textual experiences are processed in much the same way (Stockwell 2002, 152). For empathy this

means that yes, readers are able to experience empathy through reading. There is considerable empirical research done on this, as evidenced by Eva Maria Koopman and Frank Hakemulder (2015, 84), and Keith Oatley (2016, 619-620). One of the main reasons which emerges from this reading as to why we are able to respond to reading even fiction in this fashion is the relatively new finding of mirror neurons. When, for instance, we see someone scratch their own arm, mirror neurons fire up and create an echo of the same feeling for ourselves; it is as if we are scratching our arm too (which may explain why seeing someone scratch themselves makes us feel itchy). Seeing another person emote in a certain way causes our mirror neurons to react as if we were doing the same ourselves (Hogan 2011, 49). These neurons are activated not only by seeing an action (Heath and Wolf 2012, 145), but also by reading about it (Speer et al 2009). This cognitive response to fiction allows the reader to interact with characters as if they are extra-textual beings, ascribe to these blots on paper mental states (Zunshine 2006, 10), personalities, motivations, and even free will (Nikolajeva 2014a, 76). As Maria Nikolajeva elegantly puts it: “through mirror neurons, our brains are capable of responding to fictional worlds as if they were actual; capable of making sense of a linguistically constructed world by connecting it to our empirical or mediated knowledge of the actual world” (2014, 23) because of which we can learn about the real world through literature.

It is not just because of mirror neurons, which are a relatively new discovery (Gallese, Goldman 1998) and not uncontroversial, that we cognitively engage with textual worlds and people as we do with our extra-textual experiences. All cognitive functions required for making sense of extra-textual life, such as memory, attention, script building, and mind-modelling are required for comprehending fictional events and characters. The process of comprehending extra-textual life requires the cognitively demanding and fatiguing work of constant structuring, sorting of information, and prioritising memories (Nikolajeva 2014a, 24). Additionally, besides being able to engage with a textual world as we do with the extra-textual world because of our cognitive makeup, this engagement is less demanding and less troublesome than the extra-textual equivalent. After all, a fictional world is presented pre-structured and organised, presenting only relevant information (ibid), which makes engagement with the textual world easier than with the extra-textual world.

It is not uncontroversial to state that as readers we necessarily look at fictional characters as if they are real people. Part of the reason why is because “literary characters do not necessarily have to behave the way real people do, and they do not necessarily follow the

prescribed behavioristic patterns or the observed course of mental disturbances” (Nikolajeva 2002, 9). They are textual constructions put into the narrative to serve a purpose and fulfil a role, no matter how unlikely or contrived. They are also “always incomplete” (154); they exist only in the text and the reader is only privy to what the narrative reveals to them. That said, as argued by Lisa Zunshine (2006, 10), this does not take away from the fact that intuitively our minds attempt to create a full, real person out of these constructions by constructing identities for them, including motivations and backgrounds. Additionally, although the information given about fiction characters is by definition limited, we similarly also always work with limited information about extra-textual people, filling in the gaps for them in the same way as we do for their fictional counterparts. As argued by Hogan, fiction may actually provide the reader with a more complete and understandable picture of somebody’s identity and interiority than we receive in extra-textual engagements (Hogan 2011, 68).

Empathy Controversies

Empathy, which seems like a good thing on the surface, and for reading is fundamental, is interestingly not uncontroversial. Mostly this is because of the claims of empathy enthusiasts that empathic engagement with a narrative can potentially lead to the reader becoming a better, or at least more empathic person in the extra-textual world. This is the result of our ability to “compare, as it were stereoscopically, with aspects of our everyday world, to suggest insights we might not achieve by looking with the single eye of ordinary perception” (Oatley 2016, 618), and enhancing our understanding of others through emotional engagement and insight into their perspectives (618). Proponents of this view include Martha Nussbaum (1990, 1995, 2001), and Keith Oatley (2016), and many empirical studies have been conducted to prove it (Mar et al. 2009; Mar et al. 2010; Djikic et al. 2013; Bal, Veltkamp 2013; Kidd, Castano 2013; Koopman 2015; Vezzali et al. 2015; Oatley 2016; Black, Barnes 2015; Mumper, Gerrig 2017). These studies, however, have been criticised mainly on two grounds: firstly, that the empathic effects of reading are measured soon after reading, and secondly because the readers may have been primed (Oatley 2016, 621). Oatley maintains that, considering the studies use differing methods and measure different outcomes, and there were also longitudinal studies, we can still claim that narrative fiction specifically has a marked effect on reader empathy (ibid). I agree that fiction has this impact, however, I do not share the optimism that it makes us better people.

Empathy critics, such as Peter Goldie (2000) and Paul Bloom (2016, 2017) argue that viewing empathy as a net positive force for change in the world is wrong, and that empathy is

even harmful in that it biases us to care more for those close to us or like us. Empathy, Bloom argues, has a “spotlight value”, through which empathy could potentially entrench racist or other oppressional divisions (Bloom 2017, 26). Additionally, there is the general research focus on empathy for suffering or pain as opposed to pleasure, which may skew one’s perspective on empathy as a negative term. However, as a literary scholar I cannot view empathy in that way, as it is a base requirement for narrative emotional engagement of all kinds. The risks of empathy are real, and so are its pleasures. Although I cannot take the fully optimistic view that empathic engagement with narratives produces better people, I also cannot agree that empathy necessarily enhances our biases. It *can*. But it can also produce the opposite effect. Empathy is a neutral concept, a term necessary to denote the cognitive and affective work done by our minds to make sense of the world, both textual and extra-textual.

Knowing Me, Knowing You, It’s the Best I Can Do

Defining the concept of ethics poses more of a problem than even a definition of empathy does. Roughly, ethics deals with what we as individuals and societies have to do to live “well”. The question of what rules one is to abide by to live well or correctly is one of the fundamental questions of philosophy (Blackburn 2001, 1; Hogan 2011, 62), discussed by philosophers and scholars since the pre-Hellenistic era to the modern day. It is possible to debate ethics still because there is no one single answer to the question of what correct living is: although there are some generally shared beliefs, for instance that murder for pleasure is wrong, there are many different accounts of ethics or “goodness”. According to ethical philosopher Hugh LaFollette, the study of ethics entertains “theories about human nature, explore[s] the nature of value, discuss[es] competing accounts of the best way to live, ponder[s] the connections between ethics and human psychology, and discuss[es] practical ethical quandaries” (LaFollette 2000, 1). Following this the study of ethics can be divided up into three distinct forms of philosophical debate: meta-ethics, the philosophical analysis of morality as a concept; normative ethics, the study of the principles, rules, and guidelines by which to live; and practical ethics, which is a direct application of normative ethics to specific situations (1-2). In my approach I agree with philosopher Shelly Kagan in that the line between normative ethics and practical ethics is nondistinctive at best (1998, 12), and therefore only differentiate between metaethics and normative ethics. While there is an argument to be made against a clear distinction between these two modes of ethical enquiry as well (Darwall 1998, 12), for the sake of this work I will treat the two approaches as distinct as meta-philosophical musings about morality are not relevant for the study of what ethical

guidelines are communicated to the implied reader through children's war texts. Therefore, throughout the rest of this work I operate within the realms of normative/practical ethics. When I use the word "ethics" further on, I refer only to this normative/practical ethics and not metaethics, as metaethics is not an ethics in its own right. Furthermore, I use the word "morality" as a synonym for "ethics", as is common in ethical literary inquiry.

To be able to assess the ethics of an extra-textual action or situation one needs more information than is generally available. Information regarding the actor's background, the context for the situation, what the consequences are and for how many people, and why the actor did what they did are rarely available for situations where the actor is not the analyser. To learn about ethical behaviour a potential analyser needs to be able to assess ethical dilemmas, as well as differing approaches to right and wrong. Because the ethical lives not just in action and consequence but also in the internal life of those who act, the narrative form provides an excellent site for exploration of ethical debates. According to literary critic Blakey Vermeule, fictional characters function in part to let the reader "sort out basic moral problems" (2010, xii). Although I agree that fiction and its characters most certainly have this function, I do not believe that this is limited to "basic" moral problems (it is also fair to question what constitutes a "basic" moral problem in general). Fiction provides the opportunity for an in-depth dissection of life (and death), which necessarily includes a portrayal and discussion of ethical existence in its entirety, not just the "basics". Fiction potentially allows a look into the lives of others, complete with their emotional states and reactions to others, and their thoughts regarding actions or characters. Especially in the case of an omniscient narrator, the literary character has their morality on display in ways which are impossible for us to ever comprehend people in reality. As Nussbaum points out:

in the activity of literary imagining we are led to imagine and describe with greater precision, focusing our attention on each word, feeling each event more keenly – whereas much of actual life goes by without that heightened awareness, and is thus, in a certain sense, not fully or thoroughly lived (1990, 47).

Nussbaum is correct in pointing out that reading engages us in a different, more focused way than extra-textual life does, because as Nikolajeva phrases it, fiction "puts its characters in situations where ethical issues are inescapable, and moreover, in fiction these issues can be amplified and become more tangible" (2018, 84). This means that in fiction, the ethical is

inevitable, amplified, and portrayed in a holistic way which is impossible to achieve in the everyday extra-textual world.

Young readers, who are still in the early stages of their moral development, may be aided by literature in their personal growth and understanding of the ethical. Literature functions as a training ground for empathy, which is intimately combined with and the reason for it also being a training ground for ethical issues; because we cognitively process fiction much like extra-textual reality. According to Nikolajeva, this is because the texts have the potential to offer their young readers guidance to empathic and ethical inferences (2014a, 177; 2018, 83-84). It is because the reader can engage empathically with the text that they can also engage morally with it (see Sainsbury 2013, 11) and “more clearly appreciate the moral significance of the situations deployed in the story and the narration” (Mejía, Montoya 2017, 383) than if there is to be no empathic engagement. In her discussion on ethics in children’s literature Lisa Sainsbury stresses the importance of empathic engagement by arguing against its opposite, indifference, claiming that: “moral education is redundant if indifference negates care” (2013, 11). It is clear that it takes caring about the characters of a story to have an interest in what makes up these characters’ moral being: their desires, motivations, and actions.

War literature complicates the ethical element of narrative; as put by war literature scholar Adam Piette:

War makes literature ethical in this strict sense: the spectacle and imagining of the death of others in state-sponsored conflicts demands writing that pays due witness to that suffering, accompanies that suffering with the attention due to extreme and lethal experience, and accomplishes representation of that suffering without recourse to the usual contractual conventions that govern polite engagement with a sophisticated and jaded readership (Piette 2012, 2)

Piette here highlights the heightened ethical element of respectful representation of conflict; again, as shown above in my survey of war literature definitions, war literature is here taken to refer only to representations of historical wars. The ethical demands placed on the narrative because of this are important, but not the main focus of this project. I have included this argument here to demonstrate my awareness of that aspect of the narrative’s ethics, but shift my focus to the ethics created through the narrative specifically regarding characters. The reason for this is that I cannot assume that the implied reader of a children’s war narrative will

place the ethical demands that Piette describes on a text; I can, however, analyse what it is the reader is presented with in terms of moral frameworks, as the reader is always engaged with the text if not with its context. War has a severe impact on this narrative ethics, and although Piette was not necessarily referring to the same type of impact as I am his phrasing on the influence of war on the narrative it is in remains powerful and accurate: “War tends to alter the genres it inhabits, like a cuckoo in the nest. It stretches and distorts the normal obligations and expectations, and gives the genre a special ethical edge, as well as menace and dark intention” (Piette 2012, 6). War changes the narrative inherently; it changes the demands placed on the narrative and the reader, both empathically and morally. Summing up this section, in this project I will use ethics and morality interchangeably as is common practice in literary studies to refer to guidelines, principles or rules to follow to live a good or correct life, paying particular heed to the impact of war and the child.

Oh It's Not Fair, And It's Really Not Okay

When explaining my thesis to my mother she asked the challenging question “but aren't justice and ethics the same thing?” Questions of justice are questions about what people are due, but what that means in practice depends on the situation. Depending on context, the formal question of what people are due is answered by principles of just desert, reciprocity, equality, or need. Justice, thus, is a constellation of elements that exhibit a degree of integration and unity (Schmidtz 2006, i). Is this not the same thing as ethics? The way I conceptualise ethics and justice, it is not. Rather, ethics generally deals with large, abstract concepts and ideas exemplified through specific examples, whereas justice is concerned with concrete issues. Following this, justice is a subsection of ethics, an aspect of correct living. Like ethics, it defies a clear definition. The consensus appears to be that justice is the concern of “what people are due” (Schmidtz 2006, 8; Sandel 2009, 6-9), or treating people how they “deserve” to be treated (Gensler 1998, 203). There are different approaches to and interpretations of due-ness, and what it takes for society or actions to be just. Political philosopher Michael J. Sandel holds a distinctly modern point of view when he argues that “a just society respect[s] each person's freedom to choose his or her own conception of the good life”, stating that in ancient Hellenic discussions of justice the concern was virtue, whereas modern justice emphasises freedom (2009, 6-9). This view on justice betrays the deeply temporal and cultural nature of justice, and the complex relationship it has with ethics; is “the good life” referring to individual happiness, or to moral correctness?

Justice, according to psychologist Martin L. Hoffman, “pertains broadly to the moral rightness of a person's due, a person's treatment by others and by nonhuman forces” (2002, 223). It includes concerns over distribution of society's goods and services, be it following merit or need, property ownership rights, “temporary possession of property”, and the allocation of punishment (ibid). Also important is the recognition of human rights (2002, 223). Philosopher Kok-Chor Tan, in recognition of this, states that justice has to be concerned with personal choices (2012, 82). An example of the concern for balance in justice is restitutive justice, in which justice is achieved by repairing or replacing what was lost (Spinner-Halev 2012, 160). This is a problematic approach because it does not repair the harm done and side-steps the issue of justice (184), in which case recompensation may be considered a way to restore balance and life itself is reduced to monetary value. This approach therefore highlights the difficult and multi-faceted nature of justice. For this project, I do not aim to solve the philosophical problem of what justice *is*. Rather, I will look at how justice is constructed through narrative, and how this may impact the young reader. For this purpose, my working definition of justice is based on the notion of due-ness, combined with fairness. Therefore, when I use the word justice, I am referring to *an applied ethical framework based on the notion of fairness in distribution of goods, duties, and rights, with a recognition of human rights*. This comes in specific forms in the war debate, as the desire for justice is an inherent part of war and problematises it at the same time.

The just war tradition is a two-thousand-year old debate (Bellamy 2006, 2), and generally does not aim to glorify or justify war as an action, but rather analyses how states and other groups should act during war in order to behave in morally just ways (Bellamy 2006, 3; Kamm 2012, 3-7). Justice in war can be divided up into four distinct aspects, as neatly defined by military philosopher James L. Cook (2013). *Jus ad bellum*, or “how to go to war justly”, *jus in bello*, or “how to fight [and behave] justly once in war” (Banita 2012, 32; Cook 2013, 152), *jus post bellum*, “how to establish a just peace”, and *jus ante bellum*, “the need to teach those involved with the war about just war theory” (Cook 2013, 152). Here my working definition of justice is already slightly challenged; going to war “for the right reasons” and how to behave during armed conflict do not fit neatly into the package of justice as fairness of distribution. However, below the surface it makes more sense; going to war and one's behaviour during it are demonstrations of the underlying understanding of fairness and human rights, with war generally presented as a reaction to a perceived unfairness of distribution or conduct by the Other. Justice, in this case “right” or “just” conduct, is therefore

crucial to warfare. It is equally crucial to war literature. The discussion of war in literature highlights empathy, and ethical and justice issues (Minx 2008, 338; Piette 2012, 2). This is because war itself emphasises these concepts in practice, combined with the foregrounding of empathic engagement between reader and character, and the intrinsic ethical nature of literature.

My definitions of these three concepts are all working definitions; all three are still widely debated within a multitude of fields, and my project is not an aim at “solving” philosophy, or psychology. Rather, I employ all three of them both together and separately as a means to analyse children’s war literature. This tripartite is not uncontroversial, as empathy sceptics as mentioned above may disagree that ethics depends on empathy (although I have found none that disagree that justice depends on ethics). However, in my conceptualisation of empathy, ethics and justice they do rely on each other. This is one of my core arguments underlining the project; in order for us to be morally engaged with a narrative, we need to *care* first, which depends on empathy. Justice builds on this dependency by specialising further on ethical concerns. I support this in my chapters firstly by the theoretical background I provide, but also secondly by the analyses which support my argument. Having defined my fundamental concepts, I now move on to the corpus selection.

Corpus Selection

For my analysis of these three concepts in children’s war literature I draw from a large pool of primary texts. As I am interested in the narrative structure of empathy, ethics, and justice, focussing on the impact of us versus them grouping, rather than strictly the war portrayed, I use both historically based and imaginary war narratives. The grouping works in the same way regardless of the narrative’s relationship to extra-textual events and achieves, I argue, a similar enough effect. Additionally, creating a clear distinction between the two is difficult to justify, as authors may draw from historical events in their construction of “pure fiction” wars, thereby blurring the lines between reality and fiction. Joe Haldeman’s *The Forever War* (1974/2010), for example, is a science-fiction novel about an intergalactic war between a united humanity and many different types of aliens. Set mostly in space, the novel may read as purely fictional; it discusses impossible worlds, beings, and technologies. It is, however, also directly based on the author’s experiences as a Vietnam War veteran. Haldeman in his foreword even points out another issue with writing reality-based war literature for young readers: they may not understand the references and interpret the story as purely fictional. Haldeman writes:

Twenty-five years [after its original publication], most young readers don't even see the parallels between *The Forever War* and the seemingly endless one we were involved in at the time, and that's OK. It's about Vietnam because that's the war the author was in. But it's mainly about war, about soldiers, and about the reasons we think we need them (1974/2010, x).

For my corpus selection I follow much the same line of thinking as Haldeman describes here; although a novel may be "about" a specific war, depending on the novel it may be first and foremost about war itself. Those are the novels I am interested in; the ones that are about war and for a young audience, and that highlight empathy, ethics, and justice concerns. This includes speculative fiction; my concern is the war, not the relative realism of the text.

The scope of this project is limited to contemporary Anglo-American children's literature. This is because both the concepts I am analysing and war itself are temporally and culturally bound. The same is true for conceptions of the form and function of children's literature, as well as our understanding of children's cognitive and moral development. By limiting the scope of my research to Anglo-American novels, I keep the image as clear as possible, without inviting too many contrasting cultural backgrounds, yet still demonstrating the patterns within the genre of children's war literature at a large scale. With "contemporary" I mean post-WWI, as the Great War was a landmark in conceptions of war, and current understandings of childhood are also a result of that time. Additionally, as explained by Reynolds in *A Very Short Introduction to Children's Literature*,

While in the past, war stories tended to offer clear-cut and jingoistic versions of events as typified in the novels of G. A. Henty (1832–1902), this is a genre that has produced many of the most powerful and ethically challenging works for children in recent decades. Since the 1970s, war stories have been less likely to be told from the victor's position than they were for most of the history of children's literature, and often the boundary between friend and foe is difficult to recognize (Reynolds 2011, 121).

The narrative, ethical, and empathic complexity of modern children's war literature Reynolds describes here is what makes this genre so interesting. Some of the novels I will discuss are from before the 1970s however, yet they are still excellent examples of the narrative strategies I am studying here.

Children's literature I use as an umbrella term, including young adult (YA) literature. This is partially because the distinction between children's and YA literature is a fairly recent one, and undergoing many shifts in trends and tropes (Cart 2016, 1-80). It is also because although a novel may be marketed for a specific age group it is not restricted to that group and may be read across the board (just as children may read "adult" literature and adults may read children's). However, I am not addressing the challenge that comes from the multi-modality of picturebooks or illustrated novels, nor in non-fiction, poetry, or drama. Although interesting and definitely in need of study, the scope of this project is merely to lay the foundation of such research through focussing on prose fiction. I therefore only analyse *contemporary, Anglo-American children's war fiction prose*. I compiled these sources through different means: blogs specifically on children's war literature, consulting librarians from different libraries, shop recommendations, EmpathyLab recommendations, and word of mouth. From this pool, which is available in the appendix, I have selected novels which I consider to be excellent examples of the narrative strategies I want to foreground in my research. The selection was not based on literariness or quality of the prose, as these are aspects which are not directly relevant for the in- and outgroup based empathy which forms the basis of my approach. Through my selection I want to demonstrate the breadth of the genre and the patterns in the strategies used. This project is thus comprised of many novels, coming together in cognitive constellations of children's war literature's narrative strategies.

Outline

Part I of this work is concerned with empathy. This is because I consider empathy as a prerequisite for ethics and justice. Without caring about the people, or characters, involved, it is surely nigh impossible to care about the outcome of a situation or action. In this belief I am following in the footsteps of Martin Hoffman (2000), Patrick Colm Hogan (2011), Lisa Sainsbury (2013), and Maria Nikolajeva (2014a). This relationship between empathy and ethics is emphasised in reading; if there is no extra-diegetic empathy the ethical ramifications of a character's behaviour most probably leave the reader cold, as the character itself is a mere instrument of the narrative. In my treatment of empathy, ethics, and justice I employ a bottom-up approach, where empathy is the foundation and I work my way "up" to justice. However, in my analysis of narrative strategies concurrent with this line of reasoning I employ a top-down approach; in the analysis of empathy the most crucial narrative strategies I focus on are narration and focalisation. Thus, Part I is comprised of two chapters that guide through to ethical concerns: chapter one explains narrative empathy focusing on narration, the

cognitive aspect of reading, and emotional theory and philosophy, and chapter two analyses the impact of focalisation on narrative empathy.

Ethics, being born from empathy, is central in Part II of this dissertation. Of particular concern here is characterisation; why is the implied reader supposed to empathise with certain traits and what does this say about the ideology of the narrative? How are the characters' actions and their consequences portrayed and what does this communicate to the implied reader? All narratives have ideological leanings, yet these are not necessarily consistent throughout. The tension between different ethical frameworks held by different characters, or a difference between the ethics held by the characters and the narrator, can create a lively ethical debate within a narrative (Hollindale 1988, 14; Stephens 1992, 43; Bal 1997, 31). With my substantial focus on character in this second part of the thesis I continue my combination of bottom-up and top-down approaches. In chapter four I explore the ethical ramifications of characterisation. Chapter five is dedicated specifically to actions and consequences.

Especially in the case of war literature, any discussion on actions and consequences leads to a study of justice. Both ethics and justice are concerned with right and wrong, and may be confused with one another. Similarly to how empathy is required for ethical understanding and behaviour, it is not possible to consider the distribution of punishment, goods, or services without having a moral framework dictating the justice process. Justice is an ethical action, but mores are larger than that and do not necessarily have to show through action, whereas justice does. War is particularly useful in having (mostly) clear distinctions between the broader concept of ethics and the more applied sense of justice, in that there are specific codes and rules at play. Additionally, the heightened stakes of a war scenario in literature creates an increased desire for justice distribution. Justice is the peak of this thesis' concept pyramid, and is the focus of Part III of the project. Delving deeper into the narrative strategies employed, beyond narration, focalisation, characterisation, and actions and consequences, this part deals with the underlying cognitive strategies explored through script theory. First, in chapter six, I analyse the main justice scripts of children's war literature. In chapter seven I narrow down to include the roles of *jus ante bellum*, *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello*, and *jus post bellum*; the preparation and education of those who will be involved with the war; the concern of what makes a just decision to wage war, the just way to conduct war and the ethical issue of post-war peace processes (Cook 2013, 152). Now, having slogged through the careful setting-up of the research, it is time to delve into empathy.

Part I

But Why Should I Care?

Narrative Empathy

1.

I Get So Emotional

Reading is an emotional experience. The whole spectrum of emotion is touched by the cognitive engagement that is reading; joy, disgust, boredom, and fear are all possible reactions to written texts. Regarding this, Patrick Colm Hogan claims that: “narrative is intimately bound up with emotion. Literary stories, especially the stories we most admire and appreciate, are structured and animated by emotions” (2003b, 5). Although I agree I do feel the need to point out that it is not just literary stories that are closely linked to emotions, and that our appreciation of the stories has very little to do with it. Storytelling through other arts, such as visual arts, music, dance, film, but also modern advertisements rely heavily on emotional engagement and reaction. Emotions are central to the human experience, and the arts, including literature, reflect and build on this. As Nussbaum states: “[e]motions shape the landscape of our mental and social lives” (2001, 1). Why am I talking about emotions all of a sudden when this part is on empathy? Because empathy is based on emotions, the ability to recognise and experience them. Therefore, I will first acknowledge what emotions are and how they work in a narrative before moving on to the more complex issue of empathy.

What is This I’m Feeling?

The discussion regarding emotions and their definition is a lively and, as is the case with the other concepts I am juggling in this thesis, an as yet unresolved debate. For a comprehensive outline of modern emotion theories, I recommend Michael Burke’s 2011 *Literary Reading, Cognition and Emotion: An Exploration of the Oceanic Mind* chapters one and two. For my project, a brief overview will suffice. When we think about emotions it may, initially, seem quite simple. After all, we all know what it means to feel sad or happy. However, when we consider the nature of what an emotion is it rather quickly becomes more complicated. Why do we feel the way we do? What triggers our emotions? How do we process and experience them? As argued by Joseph LeDoux, emotion “is not merely a collection of thoughts about

situations. It is not simply reasoning. It cannot be understood by just asking people what went on in their minds when they had an emotion” (LeDoux 1998, 71). As pointed out by Antonio Damasio, before modern emotion theory the general consensus was that emotions are not a cognitive activity and get in the way of reason (1994/2006, xxv). Empirical research in the past century has demonstrated, however, that emotions are both affective and cognitive responses to situations and/or people. This is because:

emotion is the combination of a *mental evaluative process*, simple or complex, with *dispositional responses to that process*, mostly *toward the body proper*, resulting in an emotional body state, but also *toward the brain itself* (neurotransmitter nuclei in brain stem), resulting in additional mental changes (Damasio 1994/2006, 139, emphasis in original).

To experience an emotion, then, is a complex cognitive affair, based on our embodied experience of the world and ourselves and involving different belief systems and images. In the distilled words of Nussbaum, we may call this experience “cognitively laden, or dense” (Nussbaum 2001, 65).

But when, or rather why, do we experience these cognitive and affective responses we call emotions? According to Nico Frijda emotions “result from the interaction of an event’s actual or anticipated consequences and the subject’s concerns” (1986, 6), meaning roughly that emotions occur when something happens which impacts something we have beliefs about. This is further supported by the philosophical perspective that “emotions embody not simply ways of seeing an object, but beliefs – often very complex – about the object” (Nussbaum 2001, 28). In his 1992 landmark study *Best Laid Schemes: The Psychology of Emotions* Keith Oatley builds on this when he posits that emotions occur at “significant junctures in plans” (Oatley 1992, 25), plans which can even be thought of as scripts (33).

Each goal and plan has a monitoring mechanism that evaluates events relevant to it. When a substantial change of probability occurs of achieving an important goal or subgoal, the monitoring mechanism broadcasts to the whole cognitive system a signal that can set it into readiness to respond to this change. Humans experience these signals and the states of readiness they induce as emotions (Oatley 1992, 50, emphasis in original).

These goals mentioned by Oatley can refer to obvious examples like say, finishing a PhD thesis, becoming a millionaire author, or slaying a dragon. They also refer, however, to more

abstract goals such as survival, or being with loved ones. If for example I am walking through town and hear a not so distant shriek of something otherworldly, this impacts my goals and plans of staying alive and sane. It will elicit some cluster of emotions, fear being the most obvious. In a similar vein however, if I were to be served a pancake which I saw was dropped on the floor earlier, this also threatens my goal of survival, or at least health goals.

The fear response in particular conjures up the chicken and egg debate regarding emotions and our bodily response to them: do we experience fear because we are running away from danger, our hearts pounding and hairs raised as argued by William James (1884, 189-190)? Or is our physical response the result of our emotion? Viewing emotions as disturbances of plans and goals, as is now common in emotion theory, demands that we both accept and reject James' theory. We reject it because emotions are not a result of *just* immediate physical reflexes; those bodily responses occur only after a rapid assessment of the occurrence and its impact on our beliefs and goals. For example, if I were to discover a bomb the fear I experience is not the result of the physical image of the mine only; that image is linked to my belief that bombs explode and will kill you, making them highly dangerous. As Oatley says, "[e]motions occur in distinctive circumstances, but the events that elicit them are not purely physical. Rather, they are psychological" (Oatley 1992, 19). We cannot, however, reject James' perspective completely as some emotions (which James himself called coarse) are indeed "associated with bodily disturbances" (Oatley 1992, 7), which can be so strong that they cause an emotional response. It is an early hint at one of the fundamentals of cognitive theory; we are embodied beings, and our cognition and affect are both the result of and impact our embodiment.

What are Basic Emotions?

In the taxonomy of emotions, it is possible to distinguish two categories: basic and social emotions. The most debated of these two is basic emotions, as the definition thereof is generally based on the notion of universality. "For many, basic emotions are defined by universal facial expressions that are similar across many different cultures" (LeDoux 1998, 112). This universality refers to both the emotions and experience of them, as well as facial expressions (ibid). Happiness or joy generally result in upraised corners of our mouths and slight squinting of the eyes, disgust in recoil and a scrunching up of the nose, mouth, and brows. Another presumed universal is, according to Oatley, the language we use to describe our emotions (1992, 59-61). Because of this universality many scholars use the term basic emotions to refer to those emotions that are innate or hard-wired into all humans. Or as Oatley

says it, a basic emotion “is physiologically and expressively distinctive and that it has a biological basis” (55). However, amongst scholars who adhere to the concept of basic emotions the exact taxonomy is not agreed upon. The eight emotions most often referred to within this category are anger, fear, joy, sadness, disgust, contempt, and possibly “interest” and “surprise”. However, I have to agree with Oatley (1992, 59-60) in that I am not convinced by the conceptualisation of “interest”, “surprised, nor “contempt” as emotions. Therefore, for my project I will adopt Oatley’s proposed taxonomy of the five basic emotions constituting anger, fear, joy, sadness, and disgust.

Accepting the existence of basic emotions is, however, not uncontroversial. Basic emotions are problematic according to Hogan, because although “some emotion *terms* are basic within certain limited domains” it does not make sense which is basic and which is derivative (2003b, 79). This appears to be an issue of terminology and semantics, however, rather than an issue of cognition. That said, LeDoux’s summation of the conflict surrounding basic emotion theory adds a needed note of nuance to this view:

[Basic emotion theorists] simply say that some emotions and their expressions are fairly constant in all people. The social constructivists can then counter with the fact that a given individual may express a basic emotion, like anger, differently in different situations – overt anger is more likely to be displayed at those below than those above one in a social hierarchy (LeDoux 1998, 117).

Here LeDoux adds to the relatively simple issue of language and translation the complicating factor of social context. Stating that there is such a thing as a basic emotion thus appears to deny social, temporal, and cultural contexts to emotions, reducing all complexities of human existence to our bodily makeup – which is equally not universal. This is why scholars such as J. Keith Vincent take issue with “universalizing claims about the way the human mind works” (2015, 199), or claim “a distrust [...] in human universals” (2015, 348). Although I acknowledge the importance of context and individuality to emotional experience and expression, I agree with Oatley (and most emotion scholars post-Oatley 1992) that emotions come from a disjuncture in our plans and goals, an inevitable facet of all life.

As proposed by Michael Burke, a significant number of psychological scholars focus on the division between basic and social emotions (2011, 44-45), hotly debating what basic emotions are and their very existence. Much of this questioning is based on the specific brain functions that are concerned with emotions. However, although the brain’s processing of and

reaction to emotions is important to cognitive poetics, it is equally important to consider *when* these emotions occur. Basic emotions occur as a reaction to situations or things, not necessarily people. This to me adds another important layer to their status as basic; they stand outside of the complexity of the human context mentioned above which informs and shapes social emotions. As stated by Nikolajeva: “[s]ocial emotions involve two or more agents whose separate emotional needs have to be negotiated” (2014a, 82), which makes social emotions more cognitively demanding. Social emotions such as love and hatred, contempt, envy, jealousy, guilt, pride, and pity are not hard-wired, which means that they are learned and can be trained. Because of this they can also be called higher-cognitive emotions. Emotion theory remains a vibrant field of study (see for instance Oatley 2017; Freudenberg et al 2019; Zysberg, Raz 2019; Lambie 2020; Xu et al 2020), and without extensive empirical research it is difficult to propose new approaches to emotion. However, the aim of my research is not to put forward a definitive theory on emotions; it is to analyse children’s war literature from a cognitive perspective. Therefore, although I acknowledge that my decision to do so is not uncontroversial, I will continue from here with a separated approach to emotions in children’s war literature, distinguishing between emotions prompted by events and things, and those prompted by other people. These two different categories, in my approach, correspond to basic and social emotions respectively.

Read All About It

Emotions are part and parcel to both literature and our reading experience. In some ways, as stated by Blakey Vermeule empirical research has shown “in spectacular fashion that humans cannot reason or even think without emotion—indeed, without narratives” (2010, 23). This is because emotions “are not on the periphery but at the centre of human cognition” (Oatley 1992, 3), and they are at the centre of literature as well. Different scholars have analysed what our emotional response to literature is based on, most notably Burke and Hogan. Emphasising the importance and complexity of the elements of a narrative which can cause our emotional responses, Hogan claims that “[i]nsofar as an emotion operates as an outcome emotion in a narrative, its eliciting conditions are most crucial for the generation and reception of that narrative” (2003b, 92), and that our emotional response to these narratives “is a matter of trigger perception, concrete imagination, and emotional memory” (185). In another publication he goes further to emphasise the importance of memory specifically, claiming that “personal memories are crucial to our emotional response to literature” (2003a, 158). This focus on memory specifically is reflected in both cognitive empirical research (Levine 1997;

Levine, Pizarro 2004; Van Boven, Robinson 2012) and Burke's theories (2011, 13). What Joseph LeDoux dubbed "emotional memory" or the low road to emotion Burke dubs "affective cognition" (2011, 44), which he describes as a cognitive process "where emotion plays a dominant role" (ibid). Burke goes on to argue that this affective cognition is particularly important when we engage with the arts, including literature (ibid; 156). Hogan however states that this is only in the visual arts and not literature (2003, 176). I disagree with Hogan here, as Burke argues quite convincingly that:

Because an engaged act of literary reading is a largely non-conscious activity, and given that literary reading crucially involves emotion and the body, we must conclude that much of the memory active during such episodes of reading is implicit, and much of the emotion has an affective cognitive nature (Burke 2011, 156).

However, as both are focused on general adult literature neither explores the interesting difficulty this raises for children's literature; if emotional memory is indeed central to our reading experience, and the implied child reader does not yet *have* much emotional memory or experience, how is their reading experience problematised? How is emotion communicated to such an audience?

One of the central fundamentals of cognitive theory is that of embodiment, that "reason (as well as perception, emotion, belief and intuition) are literally **embodied** – inextricably founded in our bodily interaction and experience with the world" (Stockwell 2002, 27, emphasis in original). As Ellen Spolsky states, "[t]he recognition that in order to function cognition requires the resources of not only the brain, but also the rest of the body in continuous interaction with its various environments, is the foundation of cognitive literary scholarship" (2015, 2). This notion of embodied cognition underlines all cognitive poetics, and in cognitive understandings of emotions rejects Cartesian dualism, "i.e. the strict separation of (material) body and (immaterial) mind" (Grosz 1994; Pirlet, Wirag 2017, 47; Bullen, Moruzi, Smith 2017, 2-3). The notion of embodied cognition is informed by "the role of perception, emotion and affect in 'intellectual' cognition" (Benedi 2014, p. 132). For narrative emotion the notion of cognitive embodiment has the particular impact that, through referencing the body in expressions of emotion our mirror neurons are activated, causing us to echo the same body expressions. So, if a character for example "shivers, the hairs on his arm raise, his eyes widen, his heart pounds, he trembles", we as readers feel that without experiencing it ourselves. Because our mind, including our emotions, and body are

interlinked, this translates to us also experiencing an echo of the emotion expressed. In this embodied representation, the emotion would be fear.

There are other ways through which children's literature narratives attempt to negotiate these issues and communicate emotion to their audiences. Unlike with general literature, where the narrative may rely on the readers' emotional memory, children's literature relies on telling rather than showing, because of which it "tends to have a strong narrative agency, possibly because authors do not trust their audiences to make inference from showing" (Nikolajeva 2014a, 88). Because children's literature by definition has to take the implied reader's cognitive development into account, the narrative cannot rely on its intended audience fully comprehending the emotions portrayed. Therefore, there may be a heavy reliance on overt emotion portrayals; a taking by the hand of the child audience. Here the importance of the narrator is foregrounded, as the narrator is the first narrative-shaping strategy the reader encounters.

Since the events and characters are conveyed through the filter of the narrator, it is the narrator's way of telling (or showing) that will influence the story which unfolds. In constructing the story world, the reader has to take the teller of the tale into account in order to interpret events and characters (Golden 1990, 72).

Everything the reader encounters in the text is purposefully put there by the narrator, colouring and guiding the narrative along. Using the narrator to state the character's thoughts and feelings rather than leaving it to the readers to decode is a basic and unsophisticated way to communicate emotion, much like character statements ("I am so happy!" said Hermoine), a form of metarepresentation (Zunshine 2006, 32) where no risks are taken regarding potential misinterpretation. One of the reasons potentially for the prevalence of narratorial statements regarding emotions is because "conventional children's literature, with its openly didactic tone, tends to have a clear narrative voice, moreover, an authoritarian adult voice which can manipulate young readers toward a correct understanding of the depicted events and characters" (Nikolajeva 2005, 180). Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the narrator will be assumed to be an adult. As argued by Paul Harris, children believe what adult authorities communicate to them to be true (2012, 136). This works both implicitly and explicitly; the key factor, as Harris demonstrates, being that what an adult through language expresses as an *assumed* truth, the child will unquestioningly adopt as truth also (2012, 180). Therefore, if the assumed adult narrator states that "Smaug was angry", the (child) reader will most likely

accept this as true. This tendency is especially prevalent in narratives focused on interiority (Nikolajeva 2014a, 88).

The faith put in a narrator's description of a character's emotions is problematised by unreliable narration. The most obvious examples of unreliable narrators in children's literature are first person narrators, necessarily limited to their own subjective perspective on the story (Nikolajeva 2014, 253). Young narrators are particularly unreliable, as they lack experience (ibid), world knowledge, "stable views and opinions, the capacity for self-evaluation and self-reflection, and so on" (2000, 5), and are therefore "naturally unable to evaluate events and people around him and instead relates them from his naïve, inexperienced perspective" (2005, 179). What this means for emotions is that the child narrator is by definition unreliable in their portrayal of emotions, as the narrator themselves (if the perspective is taken successfully) does not yet have significant emotional experience, knowledge, vocabulary or memory. Therefore, the child narrator may not report on their own emotions clearly or successfully, and they are inaccurate in ascribing and recognising emotions in other characters as well. Unreliable non-omniscient adult narrators have the slightly different problem where they can be assumed to have this knowledge and experience, but they are not omniscient and are therefore flawed in their interpretation and depiction of the characters' emotions and mental states, as we are in extra-textual life. Unreliable omniscient adult narrators on the other hand do know the characters' inner life but cannot be trusted in their report about them. It is also possible to have an ironic narrator; a narrator who knows more than the characters and/or the reader. A narrative can have further instances of irony if the readers (are supposed to) know more than either the characters or the narrator. An ironic narrator has a complicated relationship to reliability and is a different issue, as child readers may not be able to understand it as being such (Nikolajeva 2005, 178). Verbal irony recognition generally develops between the ages of five and six, when children become able to pass second-order false belief tests (Wilson 2013, 44). However, accuracy in recognising the presence of and true meaning behind irony continues to develop during adolescence (Glenwright et al. 2017). It thus remains a tricky technique in children's literature narration; although young children from the age of five onwards *may* be able to recognise and understand irony, an ironic narrator may remain elusive to child readers until (late) adolescence.

Both Zunshine and Nikolajeva highlight that for cognitive and affective purposes, unreliability can be quite the effective tool. This is because unreliable narrators enhance the

cognitive demand of a narrative, as they require active searching for source tags if the unreliability is caught (Zunshine 2006, 79-80). Incomplete or contradictory information triggers the readers' curiosity, causing them to apply high-order mind-modelling (Nikolajeva 2014a, 93). Although or rather because the emotions reported by the narrator cannot necessarily be trusted, the reader is stimulated to analyse the character's mindset, motivation, embodiment and more so they can arrive at their own conclusion about the character's emotions. Whether or not this is the same as the narrator's testimony is irrelevant; the reader is cognitively challenged and engaged, and through that potentially gains valuable emotional knowledge and experience.

How Are You Feeling, Child?

As with most everything else, children's literature complicates emotion theory. This is because the implied child reader does not yet have enough life experience to be well versed in recognising their own emotions, others' emotions, and may not even have experienced many emotions yet (Nikolajeva 2014a, 16-17). Although young children are able to recognise basic emotions (Harris 2008, 320-323), more complex social emotions may be harder to interpret or recognise, and contradictory information further complicates emotion representation (Nikolajeva 2014a, 90). Childhood emotion is not an apolitical concept; it is during childhood that we are taught "how to manage their feelings and how to express emotion. Children are taught what they should feel and when, where, and for whom particular feelings are appropriate" (Bullen, Moruzi, Smith 2017, 5). This may sound particularly grim and undermining to the validity of childhood emotional experiences, however, the argument here is not that children do not experience authentic, intense, and individual emotions; to say so would fly in the face of copious amounts of both anecdotal and empirical evidence. Rather, emotions are a realm in which children are socialised and conditioned by the adults in their lives. "In contrast to adult readers and their texts, child and young adult readers occupy—although do not necessarily conform to—a developmental and experiential spectrum, an assumption reflected in the implied audience and pedagogical dimensions of texts produced for them" (Bullen, Moruzi, Smith 2017, 7). Children's literature reflects the developmental and experiential stage that the implied audience is assumed to be in, necessarily complicating representations of emotions.

As young readers' ability for slow, rational and structured cognitive processing (the "high path") is not as well developed as their less accurate but quicker processing ("low path") (Blakemore, Frith 2005; Byrne 2003) they are more likely to process external sensory

information through the low path. Because of this, the child readers' emotional response to fiction may be both quicker (by fractions of seconds) and stronger than their cognitive response (Nikolajeva 2014a, 16). The strong emotions and deep attachment relationships of childhood may also entrench evaluative beliefs about ourselves and the world around us, further colouring our emotional lives (Nussbaum 2001, 36). Acquiring emotional knowledge and vocabulary is not dependent solely on emotion experience; we also require "an awareness of what caused it and a knowledge of its accompaniments and consequences" (Oatley 1992, 79). Through this, rather than knowing "I cried and my fingers and cheeks tingled", we enrich our knowledge by adding "when my dog died I cried and my fingers and cheeks tingled; I was sad". The additional information, awareness and experiences necessary to gain true emotion knowledge are provided expertly by literature, where, unlike extra-textual life, the cause, denotation and consequences are generally presented with equal attention. The strength of children's emotional responses is even further emphasised by the extreme scenario of war.

Battling Emotions

The genre of the narrative colours our view of the emotions that occur in it; it "often 'prefocuses' our attention, understanding, and response – including the priming of memories and correlated generation of *rasa*" (Hogan 2003b, 65). That said, it cannot be assumed that the implied child reader has read enough war stories to have formed a comprehensive expectation of what the genre *is* (Nikolajeva 2014a, 16), let alone what emotions are common for it. This does not mean that the prevalence of or emphasis on particular emotions in the genre is devalued; rather, it means that the implied child reader could approach each war story as a standalone, as it were, without contextual knowledge about the genre. As a result, the extreme situation and emotions depicted may be analysed as a new or original encounter. So what emotions are most common in children's war literature? As the genre has, up until this project, not yet been defined it is no surprise that there is also no list anywhere of the most common emotions within it. The same holds true of general or "adult" war literature; it is therefore more fruitful to start by looking at what emotions are most often discussed in scholarship.

For adult war literature, commonly researched emotions include loss and sadness (Bogdańska 2014); disenchantment (Frayn 2018); fear (Ashe, Patterson 2014, xi-xii); and the difficult tangled emotions that come with trauma (Houen, Schramm 2018, 13-14) such as anger and guilt, as well as the seeming lack of emotion causing a sensation of numbness. Disenchantment and trauma are less common in writing for children than they are for adults,

although they do exist. Perhaps as a result, children's literature scholarship unfortunately appears to be focused not on particular emotional and traumatic experiences by characters in war scenarios. Although that research is definitely out there, it does not appear to be significant in scope nor presence. Instead, reflecting the didactic nature of children's literature, most research is concerned with how the genre could or has been employed as a means of instruction (Goodenough, Immel 2008; Subrtová 2009; Reynolds 2013; Galway 2016). I will therefore turn to my corpus, acknowledging its temporal and cultural biases, to find out which emotions are most common in the genre. Within my corpus, I recognise five emotions as generally predominant: guilt, anger, fear, sadness or grief, and love. This may be because children's war literature is a rare occasion where child characters can have profound and lasting impacts on people they may not even know, potentially leading to guilt, and war threatens the small social world of the child, which is based on love and when threatened causes any range of emotions from anger to fear or grief. These emotions are not exclusive to children's war literature; they occur in general children's literature, adult literature, and adult war literature as well. However, within my corpus they appear to be predominant, and are complicated and emphasised by both the war scenario and the young implied readership.

I will next put my theories on emotion in children's war literature to practice by exemplifying through three analyses. The first focus lies on the basis of emotion theory; embodiment. As such, I analyse Robert Cormier's *Heroes* (1998/1999) to see how the text encourages embodied cognition and represents emotions through the body. Next, I move on to two prevalent basic emotions of the genre: fear and anger, which through the enhanced lens of war become terror and hatred. I demonstrate how these two emotions are represented in narrative through an analysis of Jan Needles' *A Game of Soldiers* (1985). The final analysis of this chapter is of Kate Saunders' *Five Children on the Western Front* (2014), and in this section I move up to the last type of emotion which can be portrayed; social emotions, particularly grief and love.

I Feel It in My Bones

Robert Cormier's *Heroes* (1998/1999) is an excellent and graphic example of the embodied reading experience and its impact on empathy. It tells the story of Francis Cassavant, a WWI veteran who has returned to his hometown after throwing himself on a grenade and sustaining major injuries and disfigurements as a result. His aim, as is revealed slowly in the novella, is to find and murder Larry Lasalle, the man who raped Francis' girlfriend at the time, Nicole; the act which caused Francis to enlist at age 15 because he wanted to die but could not

commit suicide. Much of the narrative is dedicated to Francis' disfigurement, with the novella opening with the following introduction to his character:

My name is Francis Joseph Cassavant and I have just returned to Frenchtown in Monument and the war is over and I have no face.

Oh, I have eyes because I can see and ear-drums because I can hear but no ears to speak of, just bits of dangling flesh.

[...] If anything bothers me, it's my nose. Or, rather, the absence of my nose.

My nostrils are like two small caves and they sometimes get blocked and I have to breathe through my mouth. This dries up my throat and makes it hard to swallow. I also become hoarse and cough a lot (1).

This description is both lengthy and gory, and through this places a specific demand on the reader. The explicit references to Francis' body are separated from him as a person, as he talks about his eyes, ears and nose as if they were separate entities to himself. This description does not portray any emotion; Francis the narrator is mechanically showing his face to the reader before he opens up about his emotions. The extract also makes clear that this is not a text for particularly *young* readers; for many people, this graphic and gory a description would be wholly unthinkable for child readers. Although I am using this novella as an example for how embodied emotional representation works in children's literature as a whole, I do need to point out that the implied reader here is an adolescent. Throughout this analysis, I will point out when it is relevant that this text is for an older reader than some other texts I will analyse for this work, and support my overall arguments with scholarship (both empirical and theoretical) about the relevant age group. However, I will also include scholarship which demonstrates that although this novella has an older implied readership, the narrative strategies and functions of embodied emotional representation are not limited to this readership only.

Emotional Representation Through the Body

Francis, the narrator, uses few words to state how he feels; instead he refers to experiences his body goes through. Two prime examples occur when Francis confronts Larry, and when he seeks out his ex-girlfriend for the last time. The conversation with Larry, the driving force of the plot, ought to be highly emotional. Yet, as is common in the novella, emotive words are limited, instead left for inference through dialogue and embodiment. When Francis meets Larry, he says that his "heart quickens at the possibility" that Larry is afraid of him (78);

during the conversation Francis' "lips tremble" (81). The context and topic of the conversation steer the reader towards a certain expectation regarding the emotional experience of the scene; Francis finally confronts Larry after three years of anger and guilt, fulfilling his purpose within the narrative, meaning the quickening heart is most likely an expression of joy rather than fear. Additionally, Francis' trembling lips, a motion which may cause one to get teary eyed even if there is no other context for that emotion, is most likely to infer sadness. The narrative attempts to make sure the reader infers sadness by also expressing it with one of the most explicit emotive sentences, stating "a deep sadness settles on me, as if winter has invaded my bones" (79). Double representation of the same emotion like this, first through embodiment only and then again through narratorial interjection, is a technique which is particularly common in children's literature across the ages as many narratives do not trust their young reader to fully understand embodied emotions. Even this narratorial interjection refers back to the body through a metaphor.

Francis, although he desires nothing more than to murder Larry, falters and is unable to shoot and kill him. However, as Larry points out to him, Francis was successful in his mission of destroying him because he has driven Larry to suicide. Knowing that he both failed and succeeded in causing Larry's death, Francis does not explicitly state what he feels as a result of it but instead provides a bodily description:

I close the door, my face hot and flushed under the scarf and the bandage. The coldness of the hallway hits the warmth of my flesh and I shiver. It seems that I have done nothing but shiver since I returned to Frenchtown (84).

Does the "hot and flushed" betray a rush of excitement, anger, or intense shame? The shivering could be simply because of temperature changes, or emotions such as sadness, disgust, or even joy. The addition of "It seems that I have done nothing but shiver since I returned" implies that it is an emotional bodily experience rather than just an environmental one. By adding this sentence, the narrative pushes the reader to interpreting the entire bodily description in an emotional fashion, without adding any emotive words. This ambiguity places a high cognitive demand on the reader, as it strains their mind-modelling skills. Because of this demand, as Patrick Colm Hogan states, the narrative may potentially direct the readers' attention "to particular 'nuances of emotional expression' and thus train our empathic and ToM abilities" (Hogan 2011, 68). By placing an increased demand on our cognitive abilities, ambiguity and narrative gaps thus train our mind-modelling abilities

(Koopman, Hakemulder 2015, 79). This is exacerbated by the heavy focus on faces as they are the primary way through which we decode others' emotions.

However, a higher cognitive demand also imply an older readership, as cognitive challenges are only pleasurable to a certain extent, after which readers may "switch off" from the text they are reading because they cannot understand it. Empirical research has indicated that children start to become more adapt at recognising embodied, facially expressed emotion at the ages of seven to ten (Garcia, Tully 2020). However, there is a distinct positivity bias, with young children identifying happiness or joy more easily than negative emotions and struggling to recognise sadness much at all (14). Additionally, the more "intense" the emotional expression, the more likely the child is able to accurately interpret the emotion (ibid). The ability to recognise facial emotion expression develops rapidly in early adolescence (11-15), after which it becomes much more accurate during adolescence (Meinhardt-Injac et al. 2020, 9). Full adult accuracy, which *nota bene* does not mean full accuracy but simply the same amount of accuracy we would expect from an adult at peak yet median cognitive performance, is reached at 20-25 (ibid).

Level One: Reader's Emotions about Francis' Body

Francis' disfigurement is significantly foregrounded by the novella; it is the first thing we are introduced to, and Francis himself keeps referring back to it as a central element of his being. Especially because of how extreme his disfigurement is, it will cause an emotional reaction from the reader, as it deviates significantly from our expectations of protagonists who are generally able-bodied. As argued by Susan Wendell, able-bodied readers (which most implied readership is) struggle intensely with disabled characters because of their cultural associations being full of fear, pity, and disgust (1997, 248). The emotions evoked by the descriptions of Francis' disfigurement may thus range from disgust or fear to pity or sadness. Simply by reading descriptions what his body looks like without any explicit internality, the reader is emotionally responding to and engaged with the narrative. These emotions are culturally programmed based on a binary distinction between able-bodied and visibly disabled. However, because they are cultural, scholars can not necessarily assume that an inexperienced child (or, in this case, young adult) reader has these associations; they could potentially respond very differently to Francis' disfigurement.

That said, the words used to describe his wounds, especially the focus on snot and the leaking open wound of his nose, are highly likely to inspire disgust in the reader. This is

because of a combination of its strong diversion from the reader's expectations of protagonists, who are able-bodied and do not leak mucus from holes in their faces throughout the narrative, and the breakage of the reader's own well-being or survival plans. As Oatley argued, emotions occur as a result of obstructions in our plans, with disgust occurring when our survival or health "plan" is threatened. Francis' nose has no direct link to our extra-textual health at all; its presence or lack is always just a combination of blots of ink. However, because of the way we process this written lack of nose, with our mirror neurons activating and making us experience Francis' descriptions as if it were our own nose, it *does* cognitively feel as if it is an obstruction of our own plans. Our minds make us feel the emotions we would for this major disruption of our health goals because we imagine, or simulate, what it is like to have Francis' disfigurement.

Level Two: Narrator's Emotions about Francis' Body

Francis the narrator talks about his body in ways almost entirely devoid of emotion; in the fragment above the only clue that Francis has any feelings at all about his body is the clause "if anything bothers me". Francis the narrator stylistically attempts to replicate an omniscient, non-intrusive third person narrator. Yet it is extremely unlikely that Francis the character has no feelings about the state of his body, and as he is a first-person narrator his silence regarding his emotional experience is both purposeful and unreliable. Triggered by the narrator's unreliability regarding his emotional experience, the reader is encouraged to question what he does and does not state, and therefore to figure out what Francis' emotions are. The reader is thus required to employ their mind-modelling skills to fill in this narrative gap and infer how Francis may feel about his disfigurement. The emotional gaps to be filled in by the reader may be both basic and social; the basic emotions the reader may mind-model on Francis could be fear, sadness, disgust or even anger (it is unlikely that the reader infers joy). Socially, Francis spends a significant amount of energy and effort in hiding his face from others by continuously covering his face and lurking in the shadows. Especially before the reader is told Francis is home specifically to murder Larry, they may mind-model Francis the character to be ashamed of his new features, scared to spark disgust or fear in those around him. Yet this emotion is left ambiguous by the narration because of Francis' Remarque-esque matter-of-fact narration.

An important clue can be found in the scene where Francis is in a bar with fellow veterans, all of whom have and voice insecurities about their futures, and bitterness about their lot. These men accept Francis into the fold and purposefully do not ask him about his

experiences, yet Francis does not show his face or join in with conversation. Even though they accept him as one of their own, he does not consider himself in that way. Francis' social withdrawal indicates strong emotions, both basic and social, which are unvoiced. The narrative requires the reader to infer by engaging with their mind-modelling skills. Near the end of the novella, Francis the narrator reveals that he only joined the army to die, and his disfigurement is the result of him throwing himself on a grenade as an attempted suicide. He survived, however, and was seen as a hero who performed the act to save his fellow soldiers. Even then, he does not voice his emotion, and it is up to the reader to infer what he feels about being mistaken for a hero; considering he disputes the title hero preferring to remain incognito, he may be ashamed, or bitter because he is still alive. Nevertheless, the reader may also infer that he experiences conflicting emotions of pride for being considered a hero, and shame because of how he earned the title. This inference all depends on the reader's mind-model of Francis, in which they receive little guidance. Because of this heavy demand on the reader, the narrative stimulates high cognitive engagement with the reader, most probably leading to enhanced mind-modelling skills.

Level 3: Empathy

The lack of emotion portrayed combined with the heavy focus on embodiment results in both a push and pull of empathy; the reader requires emotion for empathy and it is not there, yet the embodied nature of the description declares a "just like you (except much worse), dear reader"-ness which potentially creates a bond between the reader and Francis. This is possible because of mirror neurons, which fire up when we either perceive or even simply imagine someone experiencing something, be it movement or interaction (Burke 2011, 45); or seeing someone express an emotion and feeling an echo of when we experience it ourselves (Hogan 2011, 49). By referring to eyes, ears, and noses which the reader is assumed to have, as well as issues which the reader may have experienced in their lives as well (hoarseness, coughing, a blocked nose, and difficulty swallowing are common enough every winter), the narrative may activate the readers' mirror neurons as they both imagine and remember experiences with their own body. Through this, a cognitive affective link with the reader is established (Pirlet, Wirag 2017, 38). Additionally, the horrific nature of Francis' injuries may spark pity in the reader. Pity is not empathy, as the emotions of the other reacted to are in a way irrelevant. It is, however, a strong emotional reaction to a character.

Francis' body may complicate extra-diegetic empathy to the point of impossibility. Again, this is in part due to the difficulty the general implied reader has empathising with

disabled protagonists (Wendell 1997, 248). Francis' wounds may Other him too much for the reader to be able to transcend. Additionally, an ugly or sick character, invoking fear or disgust, alienates the reader (Nikolajeva 2014a, 87). For expert readers this should prevent identification whilst still allowing empathy, however, for the implied novice reader this is not the case (ibid) as they may be turned off completely by Francis' body. Although they have a strong emotional response to the narrative, these responses are alienating and cognitively and emotionally problematic.

Although Cormier's *Heroes* is a great example of embodied emotion representation, it is not singular in its usage of this technique. Especially for the intense basic emotions of fear, anger, love and joy common in children's war literature, emotion may be portrayed through embodied descriptions. Yet as Cormier exemplifies, social emotions too can be portrayed in this fashion. Children's war literature is not the only genre to have either embodied emotions nor to display these particular emotions; however, the dangerous reality of the situation makes the emotions more visceral than in other genres. For young readers, embodied emotions may be hard to decode as they have limited experience with their own bodies and of emotions, and how bodies can express emotions. Additionally, as novice readers they may struggle with understanding subtle narrative clues and are still rapidly developing their limited mind-modelling skills. Embodied portrayals of emotions equally do not automatically translate to extradiegetic empathy, although the explicit referencing of the body and its functions potentially engages the readers' mirror neurons, causing embodied cognition, through which the likelihood of shared emotions is greatly enhanced.

Terror and Hatred

As demonstrated with the analysis above, embodiment is a powerful way to show emotions. However, it is a subtle narrative technique and as such a narrative that relies mostly on embodied emotion portrayals may be overly difficult to understand for novice readers. When readers cannot recognise the emotions of text, it is unlikely that they have any emotional engagement with it, let alone empathic. Therefore, most (children's) texts employ a combination of techniques to portray emotion. In the following analysis I demonstrate how a narrative can deploy a combination of narratorial statements, embodied emotions, and character statements to portray emotion. The emotions I focus on here are both basic and social, and both are amplified by the extreme narrative situation of war. Fear and anger are, as stated above, standard emotions in children's war literature. Yet they do not necessarily appear in their most basic form. Terror is a magnified form of fear, and due to the position of

relative powerlessness of the child in a war situation is a common emotion to occur in children's war literature. Hatred is more complex, as it is a social emotion. Hatred cannot occur without a second party to feel hatred for, although some may say and genuinely feel that they hate themselves, this is a massively complex issue outside the scope of this research. Hatred combines multiple basic emotions; anger, disgust, perhaps even fear. Hatred is an exceptionally intense emotion, due to which it is always noticeable when present in children's fiction. The extreme nature of war allows for enhanced portrayals of such an intense emotion as hatred.

Although Jan Needles' *A Game of Soldiers* (1985) is a short and relatively simple story, it has some striking portrayals of intense war-based emotions. It tells the story of Michael, Sarah, and Thomas, three children living through the Falklands war. While playing on the moors, they stumble across a wounded Argentinian soldier slowly dying of exposure. After the children discover the soldier, they swear to murder him; however, when confronted with him they instead attempt to nurse him back to health. Both Michael and Thomas suffer a form of domestic abuse; Michael is neglected, and Thomas is actively beaten and terrorised by his alcoholic father. Additionally, the novel opens with an attack on the children's hometown, an experience which shakes all three of them. These experiences underline their emotional reactions to finding the Argentinian soldier. This narrative, unlike Cormier's *Heroes*, has an implied young, child reader of around nine or ten. This is made evident by the ages of the protagonists, who are all young children (although only one of them has his age made explicit), the relative simplicity of both the plot and the language used, and the way through which the emotions are depicted.

The most significant instances of terror originate in Thomas, who aged eight is the youngest of the three children. As an abused child put in danger both in a domestic sense and because of the war, Thomas spends most of the novel in a near constant state of terror. The reader is first introduced to this in the first chapter of the book, when the village the children live in is under bombardment. Thomas had fallen asleep outside of his parents' door, longing for parental comfort. His terror is portrayed through a combination of dialogue, embodiment, and narratorial statements:

Before he could stop himself he had shouted.

'Mum! Mum!'

Panic stricken, he scrambled to his feet. From inside the bedroom he heard the squeak of springs. Gripping Red Bear by the leg, he scurried quietly back

towards his own door.

His father's voice came; loud, angry.

'Thomas! If you're outside here!'

As he scuttled into his room, he heard his parents' door jerked open. He stood against the cold bedroom wall, trying to pant without a sound. It was half a minute before the other door was closed and he could burrow back in between the blankets (14).

Initially Thomas starts this excerpt experiencing fear. His fear is not labelled explicitly for the reader but left implied, requiring the reader to fill in the blank. The main indicators that Thomas is experiencing fear are that he shouts out for his mother, and that he does so involuntarily. Calling for his mother signposts that Thomas needs to be comforted or protected from something; doing so "before he can stop himself" betrays a multitude of factors. Firstly, that Thomas' need for comfort and protection appeared suddenly, meaning that the instigating event was unexpected. Secondly, it shows that Thomas is reluctant to call out for his mother; it is something that he knows he should not do. Yet his immediate response to the danger of the bombs overrides his control over his voice. The unexpected bombing suddenly presents an obstruction for Thomas' basic "biological goal", as Oatley would say it, of survival (1992, 191). In the reader's mind-model of Thomas, the combination of the danger and Thomas' uninhibited cry for his mother most likely include fear as well as an attachment for his mother, a potential or desired source of safety.

The next line opens with a narratorial statement that Thomas is "panic stricken". Panic is not a basic nor a social emotion; it is a response to an unexpected and undesired emotion or action. The panic as stated by the narrator is further elaborated upon through embodied emotions; Thomas "scrambles to his feet", and "scurries" and "scuttles" quietly back to his room. Scrambling is an inelegant, messy motion, betraying a sense of sudden urgency to move, whereas scurrying and scuttling are small, rapid steps connoted to fleeing crustaceans, rodents, or small children. Particularly the addition of "quietly" to the scurry adds to the sense of urgency first planted by the words "scramble"; Thomas is fleeing his parents' bedroom door and he feels the need to do so without detection, upping the sense of danger in this scene but shifting it from the bombs to the domestic sphere. This shift is further emphasised by Thomas' gripping of his bear plushie; whereas he started the scene calling for his mother's comfort as a direct and involuntary response to his fear of the bombs, a different fear causes him to seek comfort from a toy. The focus shifts from something outside of the home to

something inside, namely Thomas' abusive father, adds another layer of danger to the situation, enhancing the emotion displayed. Thomas' initial fear for the bombing is left unaddressed and uncomforted, and his panic and further fear of his father are added to it, creating a sense of terror.

The scene is rounded off by an embodied portrayal of emotion, as Thomas attempts to "pant without a sound". Again, much like the quiet scurry, the need for silence combines with Thomas' rapid movement to create a sense of urgency and danger. It stands in stark contrast with his loud father, who both speaks loudly and moves loudly, jerking the door open. This contrast of loud versus quiet demonstrates a power imbalance; the father feels no need to control his volume and even weaponizes it against his son, who in contrast constantly attempts to make himself small, unheard and unseen. The father's anger is indicated by, again, a narratorial statement ("loud, angry") but it also requires higher-order mind-modelling; Thomas is modelling his father's emotion, as indicated by his own immediate physical and emotional response. The contrast between the father and the son again enhances the sense of danger, this time coming from the father. His domineering presence is foregrounded by the son's docility. Thomas' terror and powerlessness are further enhanced by the animal connotations of the verbs used to describe his motions; scuttling, scurrying and burrowing are all linked to notions of both smallness and animals searching safety. This first passage of terror is particularly effective because of its combination of techniques. Fear is exacerbated in the face of anger because it originates from a sense of powerlessness; a situation that can only worsen in the face of an angry adult that the child is scared of. The contrast between Thomas and his father serves to further enhance the terror in the narrative, both because it foregrounds the powerlessness of Thomas' situation, and because it adds another element to be afraid of.

When the children discover the soldier in the moors, Thomas is once again terrified. They first notice the soldier's presence because he fired a warning shot at them from behind them, before he realised they were children.

Before they turned, at last, Michael and Sarah looked at each other, with wide eyes. Thomas' were closed, screwed tightly, as were his fists. But as the others turned, so did he. As he opened his eyes, he began to make a sound.

It was a high, whining noise, a jerky squeaking, and it was quite nerve-racking. Sarah and Michael, wound up like wire strings, could hardly bear it, it was so unhuman. Whatever little courage they had left was being drained by it (46).

Whereas the older children stare at each other as if in acknowledgement of what just happened to them, Thomas' closed eyes and fists betray an extreme form of fear resulting in terror. His eyes are not merely closed, which would indicate an unwillingness to see and therefore face reality, they are *screwed shut*. Thomas does not want to face reality, yet he is painfully aware of it, and it scares him. His fists are clenched as an automatic fight or flight reaction. His scream is unhuman, primal. This display of terror relies more on embodiment than the previous one, however, it is easy for interpretation because it is not the first portrayal of terror, allowing the reader to build from their previous mind-model of Thomas' emotions. His scream is "nerve-racking" and drains the other two of their courage; much like the spread of panic amongst soldiers on the battlefield, terror saps and spreads. The impact of Thomas' terror on the other children again requires higher-order mind-modelling; the reader is responding to Sarah and Michael's response to Thomas' emotion. The impact of Thomas' emotion validates its narrative presence and highlights just how extreme his terror is. Higher-order engagement with literary portrayals of emotions like this enhances cognitive engagement with the text as it is more demanding, and through that may enhance emotional engagement as well, as long as the level of embeddedness is manageable for the reader.

For most neuro-typical adults the manageable orders lie at around five or six (Zunshine 2006, 563). This higher order cognition is terribly complex, for example; I think that character B believes that character A is sad because character C is angry at character A for loving character B. Even written in a sentence this trail is hard to follow; in narratives the orders are less directly presented, enhancing to the level of complication. This type of embeddedness is cognitively straining "on both writer and reader alike" (Vermeule 2010, 69). Most narratives will not be this complex, however, multiple layers of embeddedness are standard in any form of literature. According to Zunshine (2006, 563) and Vermeule (2010, 37) an average adult reader can automatically keep track of three or four orders of embeddedness. For children, the manageable orders can be presumed to be much less; Nikolajeva even hypothesises that for most children the limit lies at the second order of embedment (2014a, 91); I think that the character is sad, for example. However, childhood is a very broad period of intense cognitive development, and although very young children may be limited to second order embedment, "tweens" for instance may not be. I can therefore not agree that most children are limited at the second order of embedment; however, I must emphasise that because of the reader's state of development manageability of those levels of embedment is of prime concern of any children's narrative.

A final way through which the narrative merges emotion portrayals is a combination of embodiment and interpretation by another character. Sarah, while rushing with Thomas to the shed where they had left the soldier to fetch supplies, turns back when Thomas falls behind. There she sees that “he was lying on a grassy knoll, his head covered by his arms [...]. He looked terror-stricken” (77). Again, Thomas’ body language expresses fear to the extent of incapability to face the situation; lying on the ground and covering one’s head are yet another flight or fight response to his own emotional experience. Sarah’s assessment that Thomas “looked terror-stricken” requires higher-order mind-modelling, and finally puts the word “terror” together with Thomas’ emotional reactions. Telling the reader the term for how Thomas is feeling is unsubtle, and an overreliance on this technique runs the risk of potentially limiting emotional and empathic engagement. However, it being combined with lengthy descriptions of the same emotion relying on anything but narratorial statements lead it to have a different effect; instead of leaving a shallow emotion, the narrative introduces the reader to its form of terror. The implied reader will not have experienced true terror; besides bad dreams, they will not have been in physical danger. By allowing lengthy descriptions of terror and readerly engagement therewith, and then following that up by putting a name to it, the narrative both successfully creates terror and communicates it to the reader.

Hatred, being a social emotion, is more nuanced than terror. Whereas terror is, in essence, an extreme form of fear, hatred is a combination of emotions, particularly anger and disgust. The most exemplifying character for this emotion is Michael. Michael particularly hates the Argentinian soldier; this emotion is built up to slowly. When the children stumble across the soldier and discover that he is injured, Michael immediately wishes to murder him: “Michael, staring at him fascinated, whispered to Sarah: ‘He’s useless! We could rush him! We could get that gun and kill him! I—’” (48). Through this reaction, Michael dehumanises the soldier. He stares at the soldier as if he is *something* else, Other than him. The adverb “fascinated” further adds to this dehumanisation as Michael objectifies the soldier. Here Michael does not display hatred; he is simply fascinated. His excitement about having the opportunity to kill this man is more likely to be mind-modelled as rooted in the basic emotion of joy. This emotion is portrayed through both the narrator’s statement of “fascinated”, and Michael’s own dialogue. The short sentences marked by exclamation points read as a boy overwhelmed by excitement.

Trying to convince the other children that they should kill the soldier, Michael says that:

'They've ruined everything, and we didn't *ask* them in, did we? They've invaded us and mucked the place up. They've smashed the radios, and the phones, and they've stole stuff and killed sheep and messed up lots of houses. And there's mines all over, and the beaches are ruined, and the lot. They've wrecked the place' (55).

Michael's language use here is notable because it enhances engagement with the character. The grammatical error of "stole" instead of stolen; the overuse of the word "and"; as well as the use of "the lot" indicating that Michael could not think of any other words all combine to create dialogue indicative of how a child at the time may have spoken. As a result, the reader, also implied to be a child, may be moved closer to Michael. The emotion of this speech is ambiguous, however; Michael is still joyful at the prospect of potentially murdering the soldier and is using this speech to manipulate the other children to go along with his plan. This desire to manipulate is made explicit through narratorial statements. To do so, he is trying to appeal to their sense of anger towards the enemy, placing the blame for the war on this particular soldier. The words "ruined", "mucked up", "smashed", "killed", and "wrecked" are all negative, and may indicate that Michael is angry himself. However, in the mind-model of the character the reader has already had to take into account his long-standing sense of joy, as well as his using this speech to attempt at manipulation. The reader is therefore not supposed to trust Michael here, resisting his anger-rousing speech. The resistance is further enhanced by Sarah's rejection of Michael's manipulation, as she sees what his real intent is, as well as Thomas' immediate acceptance of its face-value. Sarah being older than Thomas is portrayed as being wiser, whereas Thomas' neediness and naivety make it so that the reader is unlikely to follow along with Michael's manipulation. The reliance on narratorial statements in portraying Michael's emotions betrays an insecurity on the part of the narrative that the reader would be able to recognise the complexity of Michael's emotions.

The emotion of hatred is invoked after Michael attempts to kill the soldier. He approaches him with determination, but upon making eye contact with the wounded man is unable to pull through. This breaks up his "kill the enemy" goal. As a direct result "[r]age and shame filled Michael. He had failed. He turned away racked with anger and self-disgust. He hated the soldier, lying there, grey-faced and despairing, he hated him enough to ..." (76). The emotions portrayed here are mostly expressed through direct narratorial statements, explaining to the reader that Michael is experiencing "rage" (an extreme form of anger); "shame" (a social emotion); "anger"; "self-disgust"; and "hate". Yet these statements are

supplemented by embodiment and metaphor; rage and shame fill him up, as he turns away from the soldier in disgust. Describing Michael as being filled by rage and shame both invokes an image of him as initially void of emotion, and as taut with negativity. Turning away from something which disrupts our plans can be because of fear or disgust, however, the narrative emphasises that it is self-disgust Michael is feeling. He cannot turn away from himself, yet because he is experiencing a form of disgust as a direct result of the soldier disrupting Michael's plans, he turns away from him as the source of the disgust. The heavy use of emotion words combines into hatred, at the same time explaining that it is a combination of anger, disgust, and perhaps shame. The portrayal of shame here is quite didactic; the authoritative nature of the narratorial statements explains both what hatred is and that it is an extremely negative emotion.

Love Hurts

Besides terror and hatred, two emotions take centre stage in children's war literature; the social emotions of love and grief. An excellent definition of grief is provided by Hogan, who states that "grief is marked by moments of panic, when one wishes more than anything to take some action to change things, but cannot" (2011, 113). Grief is therefore extreme sadness, combined with panic and powerlessness. Grief is connected to love, as it is the loss of a loved one which causes grief. Love is a complicated emotion which occurs when multiple goals are achieved; our goal of happiness, and our goal of belonging and comradeship. Its basic emotion foundation is joy, but because it is a social emotion it is more complex than that. Both grief and love are prominent in children's war literature and form the basis of the novel I discuss next. Kate Saunders' *Five Children on the Western Front* (2014) is a sequel to Edith Nesbit's children's classic *Five Children and It* (1902). In this modern version, the Psemmatid returns as the world of the children plummets into the chaos of WWI. In keeping with Nesbit's style, Saunders introduces the eldest four children with a summary of their character:

Cyril was a handsome, adventurous boy of twelve. Anthea, aged eleven, was kind, and liked looking after people. Robert, aged nine, was serious but with flashes of silliness, and seven-year-old Jane was a thoughtful, sharp-eyed little girl who worked hard at keeping up with the others (2-3).

The other two children are Hilary "the Lamb", a baby member of the original Five Children, and this novel's addition of Edie. These two are the main characters after the first chapter, as the story fast-forwards nine years to the start of WWI, when the four older children are

twenty-one, twenty, nineteen, and seventeen. The Lamb is antagonistic to the Psammead, unwilling to indulge its selfish and callous worldview and selfishly desiring fulfilment of fanciful wishes. Edie is adoringly devoted to the Psammead and self-sacrificingly loyal. Again, the ages of the protagonists and the narration's style indicate a young implied readership, whom the narrative considers in need of explicit characterisation and emotion representation.

The story starts when Cyril is about to set off to the Front for the first time, creating a tension that the rest of the narrative is built on. The Psammead returns at the same time, indicating that the children are, or will be, in great need. "Everyone was wondering if the sand fairy had returned because Cyril was going away to where the fighting was" (33). This need is emotional and caused by the war; eventually, both Cyril and Robert leave for the front, and both Anthea and Jane redefine themselves and their aspirations because of the war. Robert's war effort is hugely unsuccessful; he leaves his Cambridge scholarly career to go to the Front, and is reported dead, only to be revealed to be blinded and maimed. His family grieves not once, but twice; first because of the false belief that he is dead, but then because he is disabled through the War. Surprised and joyful that he is alive, the children initially are "almost scared to look at him, in case he'd changed too much" (270). They are happy to be reunited; one of their main goals (that of being together) is achieved. Yet although introduced through Robert's storyline, the main source of grief, and the emotional centre of the story, is Cyril's War plot. Although the focus throughout largely is on the Lamb, Edie, and the Psammead, Cyril maintains an underlying presence through written correspondence and occasional leave. His story is a constant backdrop against which the main story is set, which comes to the foreground at the end of the narrative. The underlying, unspoken fear that the whole family experience throughout the novel become reality when both Cyril and the Psammead die, plunging the remaining characters into grief.

The six children spend most of their time together throughout the novel, engaging emotionally with each other over long stretches of time, thus enhancing their attachment to each other. By attachment here I mean a sense of belonging, security and joy through an emotional connection; the "goal" then is to be together with this person. High levels of attachment lead to increased trust (De Rosnay 2009, 759) and empathy "arising out of relational security" (Stern, Cassidy 2018, 7), starting in infancy. Attachment therefore is a requirement for both love and grief. Even the Psammead has an attachment to Cyril, as one of the original five-children-entity. The defining moment of initial attachment with Cyril for

both the children and the Psammead, as well as the reader, lies in the White House where all three parties are introduced to each other. As Patrick Hogan argues, “we often define our present emotional place by its distance from the beginning” (2011, 112). This distance is highlighted, in *Five Children on the Western Front*, by use of temporal distance. The Psammead and all children besides Cyril are suddenly transported from their home (where, importantly, their collective ties with Cyril are established and based) to the Front, where they witness Cyril writing his goodbye letters before heading into battle. In his letter to his girlfriend, Mabel, he writes that “If it’s possible to be a ghost, I’ll come and visit you in your garden in Oswestry, among those prize-winning pink roses of yours; you’ll feel a slight breeze on the spot below your left ear where I like to kiss you, and that will be me” (301). Here Cyril, and the narrative through him, highlight the attachment that is so central to grief. The children seeing him write this knowing that he is about to go into battle are unable to read on and face what is about to happen, their voices “choked” (301) in reluctant admission of the foreshadowing. The “choking” is an embodied portrayal of sadness. Combined with the love felt for Cyril, however, this sadness transforms into grief.

After witnessing this, the Psammead warns them that instead of going home they will be transported again, this time to Mabel’s house which neither the characters nor the reader have visited before, further stretching the distance between the current temporal, geographic and emotional place of the characters, and the House where they set off from. This increase in distance fills all five children with “a strange, heavy feeling of dread”, immediately followed by a scene where they see Mabel in her garden “stopped in the middle of cutting roses and glanced up sharply, letting out a little gasp as her hand touched the spot just below her left ear” (304). Her strong attachment to Cyril is foregrounded here, foreshadowing her soon-to-be grief. No reflection is allowed to the children before this scene is rapidly followed by another temporal transportation to the hospital where they witness their brother dying as a result of shell wounding. However, the reader does have the freedom that the characters do not have and may take a moment to process the scene that just occurred, experiencing the emotional reaction to Cyril’s implied death when the characters’ reactions are not available. Immediately after Cyril and the Psammead pass away, the children are transported back to the House. Returning to the original anchor of attachment further serves to highlight the distance between what was then and what is now and enhances the emotional response to Cyril’s passing.

The children are fundamentally unable to change Cyril's situation for two main reasons. Firstly, they are only witnesses to his death through metalepsis, and cannot change the past. This is because, secondly, they do not have any magical abilities themselves and the Psammead's magic is reversed at sunset, making Cyril's death therefore irrevocable. Although the children are able to notify Cyril of their presence and to ask him, simply, what happened, they are not able to say goodbye to him or to engage with him further. The realisation both of what is happening and that they cannot change it leaves the children "pale and dumb with dread", unable to comfort Cyril, and "staring at each other in breathless silence" (305-307). They are, as Hogan would phrase it, experiencing action paralysis in the face of imminent grief (2011, 117). The "breathlessness" and paleness are embodied portrayals of both fear and potentially sadness. The reader is in even less of a position to change Cyril's fate, as they are merely presented with the text. Although they can close the book and refuse to read what happens to him, they will not be presented with any other option for Cyril. The helplessness both the children and the reader experience when faced with Cyril's deathbed, a situation they presumably would want to change, further serves to enhance the feeling of grief both parties may experience. However, the reader may also resist this and not have an emotional reaction to Cyril's death at all.

Cyril's death marks the end of the story. Between it and the epilogue, which details what the children's adult lives are like, the reader is presented with two brief snippets from diegetic newspapers. The first details that two desert rocks nicknamed "the lovers" collapsed and came together as rubble. Earlier in the narrative, it is revealed that these were actual people and lovers whom the Psammead turned to stone as a punishment, never to be joined again. The Psammead's moral lessons, culminating in his death, freed these lovers from his curse. The second snippet tells us that Anthea married a soldier named Ernie, these two being modern stand-ins for the ancient lovers for the Psammead's lessons. The narrative swiftly moving from the intense grief of the loss of Cyril onto the joining of two sets of lovers is a form of mood shift, a strategy of coping with intense negative emotion. Both love and grief have attachment at their core, and moving from grief to love can serve to both provide comfort to the reader to prevent them from wallowing in grief and the powerlessness (and hopelessness) that comes with it, as well as highlighting both the negative and positive sides to such strong attachment. The dead are dead, but there is hope in the living, who still have a lot of love to give. The love hinted at from these newspaper snippets, however, is presented not in emotive language and descriptions, but in the neutral style of reporting. Through this,

the emotion of love that the narrative is trying to confer is left as a narrative gap for the reader to fill in. Switching straight from an elaborate, sixteen-page scene of grief to a one-page report of love and joy allows the reader a potential small reprieve from the grief without undermining its lasting impact.

The sudden shift to love and joy is also symptomatic of the almost compulsive emphasis on happy endings in children's literature. It is even identified as one of the main characteristic features of a children's text by Perry Nodelman (1996, 190). The presence of a happy ending is often seen as one of the hallmarks of a children's text. How to wrap up a story is an ethically charged choice, and as such the seemingly common decision to end it on a happy note is not ethically neutral. There is a moral case to be made for providing the cognitively immature reader with a happy ending, as in the study of ethics the emotion of happiness is the goal of all actions, be it for the individual or for the group. The Nikolajevan novice reader (2014a, 15-16) may be exceedingly distressed from negative endings, or be left with a sense of hopelessness and despair. Approaching the issue of the happy ending in this manner Nikolajeva argues that this type of ending may be considered ethical "not merely because it makes the reader happy, which is beneficial as such, but also because it presents happiness itself as a virtue" (193) whereas tragic endings which are less usual in children's literature "are unethical or at least ethically ambiguous, because, apart from condemning a character for wrong choices, they leave the novice reader with a sense of frustration" and without hope (ibid). Viewed from this angle, closing a story on a happy note is the right thing to do when addressing a cognitively sensitive readership. However, happy endings are also a culturally determined; whereas a child's death would have been a happy ending in 19th century literature, it would now be either ambiguous or sad. Here, in *Five Children*, it is considered sad enough to warrant an emotion shift back to happiness in order to provide that ever desired happy ending.

It is possible too to see happy or at least modestly hopeful endings as an inescapable part of the nature of children's literature, which Nikolajeva calls "one of the great paradoxes of children's literature" (2014a, 194; 2018, 94). Even in cases where the characters die, the reader presumably lives on. The hope lies then not in the characters, but in the message of the novel, like in Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front* for example; the death of the protagonist Paul reaffirms the futility of the War and its deaths. Hopefully the young reader then, ruminating on the narrative, takes the messages of the narrative with them into extra-textual life. In this way, hope lives on. If this reader is part of the assumed demographic

of young people, they themselves probably still have a lot of time to recuperate from the narrative and to potentially heed the warnings of the text and apply the empathic and ethical skills they trained through reading in real life. This is another way through which any ending of a children's text can be framed as not devoid of all hope: the text continues through the impression it has left on the reader. Children's literature by definition targets young people, and it usually features young protagonists too. The youth of the reader and possibly of the character as well is crucial here, because as they still have more life to live and to apply the experiences they've had in the story to there is time for them to recuperate from the tragedy of the narrative (Nikolajeva 2018, 94). The inherent futurity of the young reader (those who mature beyond childhood) is both an aspect of hope and of power (Beauvais 2015, 3; 49). The young reader (or "mighty child") is empowered by the amount of life yet un-lived (18). This empowerment and hope, both based on futurity, inherently add a possibility for positivity to the any type of ending of a children's text: even the closed ending continues in the reader. The continued impact of the narrative ending also holds true in the case of open endings, which are philosophical thought experiments as the reader is left with an eternal gap and is thus to speculate about what happened after the supplied "ending" (Nikolajeva 2014a, 194). Such philosophical activity enhances the ethical development of the reader and thus impacts the ethical implications of the text.

Scenes of grief are common in both war literature and in children's literature. In the former loss is a regular feature of the plot, and attachment between either family, friends or fellow soldiers is often a highlighted element. In children's literature grief may occur when the narrative touches on the death of either grandparents, friends, pets, siblings, or even parents. This grief is then often the main subject of the story, as the child has to learn how to deal with this emotion and those peripheral to it. However, in children's war literature, grief takes a slightly different form, both because the higher chances of death in the violence of the setting, and because of the enhanced feeling of powerlessness in the entire situation. In the face of death, most literary characters are completely powerless, opening them up to the same frustrations as we experience in extra-textual life. In the case of death caused by war, the child character experiences an extra layer of powerlessness as they generally have no control over nor input in the situation; although a child may fight in the war, they usually do not have the power to either start it, end it, or change its circumstances. A common soldier does not have this power either, yet as an adult they may experience at least the illusion of control that a child cannot. The five children's witnessing of Cyril's death demonstrates this powerless

grief; they have no control over where or when they are, they cannot stop the War (an option they discussed), and they cannot save Cyril's life. However, although it is a sad situation, grief is not without hope.

The epilogue reveals that although they miss their brother, the remaining five children's lives after his passing are happy and fruitful, as, importantly, the tales of the Psammead and the War are told on to Anthea's daughter. Thus, the story ends with a child, its promise of a potentially better future, and the reaffirmation of the positive side of strong attachment – this time, the attachment between a mother and her daughter. The focus on the promise of the child at the ending demonstrates Beauvais' claims regarding endings in children's literature; because the narrative cannot know what a child *will* do there is inherent hope in what they *might* do (2015, 46-47). Even in the case of death, there is still hope in the child reader; the way they respond to the narrative and take it with them into adulthood places hope in them as well (48). Additionally, the reader is shown that one *can* move on from active grief, and that this is not a bad thing. Although the novel could have ended after Cyril's death, leaving a strong emotional impact on the reader, instead the narrative attempts to mood shift away from grief, having the final impression be one of love and hope.

Is All Fair in Love and War?

Emotions underline both the stories we tell and consume and our empathic engagement with them. In children's war literature the emotions depicted are intensified by the clear and present danger of the war scenario; the ongoing threat to both the individual's wellbeing and their larger social network acts as an amplifier for the emotions common to children's literature. Jan Needle's Thomas does not simply experience fear, he displays terror. Michael is not just angry at the soldier; his anger is mixed with disgust, culminating in true hatred. The intensity of their emotions forms a solid basis for empathic engagement; they are easier to identify for a novice reader than subtle and nuanced emotions, and strong emotional prompts cause strong emotional responses. For this, children's war literature is particularly good at creating emotional engagement with the reader. Stories of war are stories of bodies, and the emphasised role of the body enhances the chance of empathic engagement. The extreme situation of a war scenario further enhances this possibility because of the intensity of the emotions at play.

In this chapter I did not discuss any of the extra-textual factors which may impact the reader's emotional reading experience, such as their surroundings, their mood going into the

reading, or their personal beliefs or memories. This is because, as stated in the introduction, I am looking purely into narrative techniques and not talking about real readers in this project. I must acknowledge, however, that these factors all play a role in any readers' reading of a text, and therefore also with their empathic engagement with the narrative. Nevertheless, while analysing the purely narrative construction of emotion in children's war literature I have discovered that the main emotions common to children's war literature of grief, love, terror and hatred can be demonstrated through a variety of strategies. Underlining all is the fundamental notion of embodiment; although it is possible to talk about emotion without involving the body in some way, this makes emotional engagement difficult to the point of nigh impossibility.

Discussing emotion is fundamental to discussing empathy; without the one, you cannot have the other. In literature, however, the emotion presented to the reader is mediated through multiple narrative techniques and voices. Each has a particular impact on the reader, which in children's war literature is filtered by the extraordinariness of the dangerous setting of the story. Therefore, having explored the range, implications, and portrayal of emotions in children's war literature, the question that follows is why certain emotions take precedence over others? In this chapter I delved into the first of the narrative strategies that construct and underline the novels we read. This first "voice" presented to the reader is that of the narrator, the one that determines, as Gérard Genette stated, who speaks in the story (1983, 65). The mediation of emotion through a narrator adds particular elements to interpretation and determine what the story presented is. Who is this "person" telling us this story? And what if we cannot trust them? A further lens through which our conception of a story is filtered is that of focalisation, the level of the narrative which most strongly influences the grouping so central to children's war literature.

2.

Your Side Has Been Chosen

One of the main reasons why emotion stands at the centre of both literary experiences and cognitive narratology is because without it, we could not experience empathy. As stated in the Introduction, my working definition of empathy is: *the ability to attribute emotional states to another whilst differentiating between the self and the other, and having an emotional reaction in response*, thus avoiding immersive identification. This means that empathy requires Theory of Mind or mind-modelling skills, emotions, and emotional knowledge. There are different kinds of empathy, most notably in the case of literature diegetic and extra-diegetic empathy. Diegetic empathy concerns empathy *within* the text; empathy between characters. Extra-diegetic empathy is the empathy that occurs *outside* of the text, between the reader and the characters in the text. Establishing these forms of empathy requires particular techniques, which may or may not be concurrent with each other. The form of empathy on which I focus in this project covers both diegesis and extra-diegesis and is particularly important for war literature: in- and outgroup empathy.

The exact moment at which empathy in general becomes possible is difficult to pinpoint, as there are many factors which determine this cognitive emotional development. Parenting and education, for instance, are particular cultural elements of a child's life which are highly influential in the development of emotion expression and regulation, and empathic response specifically as well (Geangu 2015, 552). In addition, even within a culture each child develops in its individual way. However, research has indicated that although infants are already able to resonate emotionally to the emotions of those around them (551) and indicate sympathetic concern during their first three years of life (ibid), empathy itself does not manifest in a way which adults recognise until around the age of four (Tully, Donohue, Garcia 2015, 126). Four is also the age when Theory of Mind, a necessity for empathy to exist, develops rapidly (Nikolajeva 2017, 83). As the child develops this empathy becomes more

sophisticated and complex; adolescence in particular is a crucial moment for empathy development (Doherty 2009). However, the foundations become visible in infancy and recognisable at four.

You've Got Your People, and I've Got Mine

The basic foundation of in- and outgroup empathy theory is that we as humans (*nota bene* that I am not speaking for animal empathy theory) as a form of reflex group others as either like us, or unlike us. Empirical research has shown that humans have a clear preference for those they consider as more or less like themselves (Prinz 2011, 226), their in- and outgroup respectively. This preference starts showing obviously at around four (Tousignant et al 2017, 8), however, even before then babies demonstrate a preference to their caregivers over those they may consider strangers (Stern, Cassidy 2018, 9). The membership of these groups can be decided in a manner we may consider quite arbitrary; some research projects create group membership simply by dividing children up into two named groups, like group A and group B (Dunham et al 2011). This happens often in schools where there may be two classes of the same year group, for instance (for example, in my last year of primary I was in group 8b and I would never consider anyone from 8a even close to a friend). In a less artificial manner, people may base their group membership on elements like skin colour, hair colour, sexual orientation, dietary preferences or requirements, nationality, religion, age, and so on. There are nigh infinite ways to divide ourselves up into in- and outgroups, which is a thing we all do almost instantly.

However arbitrary the division may be, the impact it has on human thinking and behaviour can be tremendous and quite horrifying. A great example of this is Dennis Gansel's film *Die Welle* [The Wave] (2008), based on schoolteacher Ron Jone's social-psychological experiment from 1967. In this film, the teacher attempts to explain how the Holocaust could happen to a group of people who believe it to be impossible any innocent, normal people would go along with extremist ideology. To demonstrate how the Nazis were able to successfully demonise those they considered lesser, the teacher separates the class into blue-eyed and brown-eyed students, giving preferential treatment and higher status and authority to those who with blue eyes. This experiment gets completely out of hand, as the students slowly lose themselves in a harrowing echo of Nazi behaviourisms. Because of many reasons, not least ethical rules and stipulations, this type of experiment cannot be replicated at this point. However, the empirical work done so far does explain several facets of human thought and

behaviour which are impacted heavily by our reflexive grouping of people as either in- our outgroup members.

One of the key elements of in- and outgroup empathy is that we empathise more with our ingroup members. The preference which babies demonstrate for people they know over strangers mentioned above is not only manifested early, but also stays with us throughout our life. Research has demonstrated that not only do we prefer people we identify as ingroup (Decety 2015, 4), we are more likely to interpret their emotions in a positive way (Bennet et al. 2004, 135). Our interpretation of these emotions is also heavily skewed based on group membership; empirical research has demonstrated that emotion recognition is higher for those who are from our ingroup (especially culturally and racially) than those who are not (Elfenbein, Ambady 2002). Children also demonstrate this ingroup bias (Segal et al. 2019). This has direct implications for people's lives and safety, as research has also demonstrated that when viewing a video of a white man pushing a black man, and a black man pushing a white man, the black man is considered aggressive and dangerous, whereas the white man is considered playful and harmless (Kunda 1999, 347). Similarly, in experiments people are more likely to harm those they consider outgroup members and aid ingroup members (Kteily et al. 2014).

Why does this grouping influence the way through which we view other people? Patrick Colm Hogan hypothesises that it is because in the case of responding to a salient ingroup member, we "are likely to use a combination of simulation and inference in our theory of mind responses regarding that person, with simulation as the default" (2013, 37), which then tends to lead to empathy. With outgroup members, however, he claims it may be more likely for us to "shift to inference even if we spontaneously begin with simulation. Specifically, the outgrouping itself may create enough of a processing contradiction to inhibit simulation" (ibid). Essentially, then, in Hogan's perception of the empathic impact on ingroup and outgroup membership, we are more likely to empathise with our ingroup because we view them as human and well-rounded as characters, whereas the outgroup is rigidly Other, "flatter" characters (2013, 37). In the case of war, all Orcs, Germans, or Catholics are the same, whereas the people in the ingroup are individuals we are more likely to care about.

These claims are supported by cognitive psychology. As neuroscientist Jean Decety argues, this formation of empathy-binding groups in society may be a fundamental aspect of human social life:

The roots of empathy are subsumed in the evolution of parental care and group living, which explains why empathy is influenced by social context, especially group membership. The value humans place on group membership is exemplified by the ease with which humans form groups and favor ingroup members, across cultures and from a very early age (Decety 2015, 4).

Not only, then, is grouping fundamental to human life; it is also rooted in childhood. Although this discussion may make it seem that group membership is a permanent fixture, it is flexible. Some memberships are quite fixed, like skin colour (although characters like Rachel Dolezal attempt to be flexible in that aspect of their identity, and changing skin colour may be possible in fantasy and science-fiction narratives). Others, however, are by their very nature less defined; sexual orientation changes throughout one's lifetime, as do identifiers like age, profession or vocation, and size. However, the main important flexibility of group membership identification lies more in the fact that it is impossible for others to be completely like or unlike us. Additionally, no two people hold the precise same understandings of what their identity concepts mean, although there may be an overlap (Hogan 2004, 11).

According to Hogan it is our act of extending our own definitions to include others which creates the in- and outgroup categories (2004, 8-9). Especially religion is a good example for this, as it is a highly individual experience with personal conceptions, yet is often extended to include others regardless of individual differences of potentially even fundamental issues. This notion is taken to its logical extreme in an infamous Northern-Irish joke about an American tourist travelling to Belfast, where he is stopped and asked, "are you a Protestant or a Catholic?" Replying that he is a Jew, he is then asked "aye, but are you a Protestant Jew or a Catholic Jew?" So, the label of Protestant or Catholic has lost all connotations to religion and refers instead to presumed shared ideals and values of a community in conflict. The Northern-Irish joke also exemplifies that in- and outgroup categorisation is nonsensical because it relies on a "single axis framework" (Crenshaw 1989, 140). This means that it does not take intersectionality into account. Individuals have multiple potential group identities which compete depending on context. If, for example, I am a Protestant woman living in Derry in 1986, but I identify with the nationalists calling for a united Ireland, this would go against the assumed connection of Protestant equals nationalist, and Catholic equals unionist.

Context is therefore key to creating our in- and outgroups (Hogan 2011, 71). If I am meeting with new colleagues at work, my grouping of being a children's literature scholar

may be most important to the way I approach new people. Similarly, if I am walking home alone in the dark and I spot a group of people further along the street, my identity as a woman becomes most important to me. My identity as a Protestant has never been relevant to me; however, in Northern Ireland it would be one of the main bases of group membership. Although it is nonsensical, grouping ourselves and others based on assumed identities is a fundamental element of human society as well as our reading experience.

Lines in the Sand

Empathy grouping does not only impact our extra-textual life; it also impacts the way we read fiction. Because we treat fictional characters as if they are real people (Vermeule 2010, x-xi), we group them into in- and outgroup members like we do with people in our extra-textual lives. As we read, our brain responses adapt to the new “normal” of the text world (Gerrig, Mumper 2017, 244). Therefore, our judgements of the characters are adapted to this text world normality and impact our perception of similarity (254). As is the case with extra-textual groupings, however, textual characters are unlikely to be completely in- or outgroup to the reader. Especially when a character becomes individualised by the narrative, this “almost inevitably leads an author away from simple outgroup reduction and toward elaborated individualization” (Hogan 2011, 71). Individuating outgroup characters may therefore be a particularly useful strategy for a narrative attempting to demonstrate that outgroup members are not purely outgroup and may be empathised with.

When we read our engagement with textual characters is greatly affected by the group categorisations we use for extra-textual life; we use more empathy for the ingroup than the outgroup and consider the outgroup as more homogenous than the ingroup. The main difference between textual and extra-textual grouping, however, is that the narrative creates the context which determines what identity groupings become foregrounded. This foregrounding is entirely flexible; some categorisations take priority in certain scenes whilst being only in the background for others. By this I mean that a narrative, through different techniques, can encourage the reader to focus on particular elements of identity and base their membership on those strategies. For example, as recently argued by Anna Savoie in her doctoral thesis (2019), young adult literature featuring minorities can use the identity of the implied reader as being a teenager to manipulate them into empathising with the (generally) teenaged protagonist/focaliser. Through shifting the focus of membership to the particular element of age rather than, for instance, race or ability, it may be possible for a text to enable

the reader to (strongly) empathise with characters they would otherwise class as outgroup members.

It is also possible for a narrative *not* to have shifting foci of membership, in which case the narrative employs what Suzanne Keen calls “broadcast strategic empathy,” which means that it “calls upon every reader to feel with members of a group by emphasizing common vulnerabilities and hopes through universalizing representations” (2007, xiv). This type of group empathy is simple and unchallenging and leads to “easy empathy”. Easy empathy is when there is a readerly desire to empathise with a likeable character (Leake 2014, 177). More complex narratives which *do* challenge the reader, however, are cognitively much more demanding. The reader will have to swap their empathic focus and re-evaluate the priorities of the identity categories of both the textual characters and themselves. “Characters that challenge readers’ identification or affection, or those that challenge affection or identification with other characters within the novel, can expose the jagged edges of reductive approaches to understanding human empathy” (Mitchell 2014, 132). Challenging the empathic status quo can push us towards questioning the boundaries we previously set on our empathy. Narrative strategies can therefore manipulate group characterisations and the cognitive challenge placed on the reader. The more challenging the empathy, the more the reader will have to actively engage their empathy, and the more they are training their empathy and mind-modelling skills.

Pitting Children

In children’s war literature there are two main identity markers which are by the genre’s definition always on the foreground; age, and which side of the conflict they are on. Of course, when discussing empathy and children’s literature, there are added complications to the already intricate system of narrative in- and outgroup empathy. These complications come down to the simple facts that children’s empathic ability is fluid and developing, that their literature is often written with expressly didactic and socialising purposes in mind, and that the concepts of “child” and “children’s literature” are not only central to the debate; they are also highly historically and culturally bound. The idea of the child, who can be one and what this means qua rights and duties, has changed significantly over time and is constantly in flux – as a result the texts that are created to “train” these people for life as adults are equally different over time and across cultures. It is therefore important to clearly delineate exactly what implied audience and which literatures one is analysing and for what purpose. Especially

in the case of cognitive criticism, there is a strong risk of universalist assumptions leading to overgeneralisation.

In his brief discussion on the impact of children's literature on empathic development of young readers, Hogan argues that the attachment schemas picked up in early childhood are relatively permanent (2011b, 50), meaning that our in- and outgroup understandings are set early on. This does not necessarily mean, though, that our in- and outgroups themselves are set; these are social above all else, and as our social lives and worlds change over time, the groups we identify with do too. Stories do help with our construction of prototypes (301), which determine the way we conceptualise and understand the world. The stories we read as children, Hogan claims, "are more likely to affect emotion systems that undergo critical developments in adolescence or later" (301). Early reading, or children's literature, is particularly influential in the development of a person's emotional and empathic capabilities. This is in no small part because (early) childhood is the stage on which our earliest impressions of what the social world does and should look like are set (Stern, Cassidy 2018, 9). The analysis of children's literature, then, reveals who we are encouraged to empathise with, what emotions are deemed appropriate, and also shows how these concepts are communicated to young audiences confronted with this socialising material.

Especially in children's war literature the ingroup versus outgroup empathic divide is of vital importance; children's in- and outgroups become increasingly selective over the course of their lives, and the rigidity of these groups determines the constraints on their empathic ability. War stories necessitate the grouping of us versus them, the creation of radically divided and violently engaged in- and outgroups, and the way through which the narrative handles this divide can gravely impact the implied child reader's desire and ability to empathise across group borders. Additionally, antagonistic in- and outgroup categorisations (as are by definition the case in war literature) increase in significance and importance (Laszlo, Somogyvari 2008, 123). Literature has the potential to cultivate empathy for both the in- and outgroup, and to challenge the original divides and the ideologies behind them (Hogan 2011b, 75). Therein lies both the promise and danger of literature, and specifically war literature: not only can they "foster an openness to empathy; they may also foster an inhibition of empathy through identity categorization" (Hogan 2011b, 70). The implied child reader's assumed low resistance in the face of narrative strategies means that the depictions of the goodies and the baddies of a war story may be assimilated with no or little questioning. It is thus crucial to consider what a story does regarding in- and outgroup empathy, and what

strategies it employs to achieve its desired effect. War stories, because of the overt grouping necessary for the plot, highlight these strategies like no other genre.

Getting It in Perspective

Of all narrative strategies it is the focaliser which most filters how the story is communicated to the reader; which events and characters are depicted and how. It is the lens through which we see the narrative; often through the perspective of the protagonist (Abbott 2002, 64-65). There are different types of focalisation: nonfocalised, external focalisation, and internal focalisation (Genette 1972/1980, 189-190). A nonfocalised narrative would traditionally be called the omniscient perspective, in which the narrator can present the story through the perspective of all characters at any time and switch between them (Nikolajeva 2002, 61-62). The narrator knows more than the characters (Golden 1990, 60). External focalisation would traditionally be labelled as objective perspective, where the reader is presented with the character's "literal, perceptual point of view, but not their thoughts and feelings" (Nikolajeva 2002, 62). The narrator presents less than what the character knows (Golden 1990, 60). Internal focalisation, or an introspective narrator, is focalised by the narrator themselves (Nikolajeva 2002, 62). A narrative can, however, have multiple internal focalisers as long as it has multiple narrators (Golden 1990, 59). Focalisation pushes the reader towards a certain grounding point for projection and empathy (Stockwell 2002, 172). If, for instance, inside views of characters other than the protagonist are minimal or not present in the narrative, potential empathy for the protagonist is enhanced because of fixed focalisation (Booth 1961, 249; Chatman 1986, 191-194) and empathy for other characters is minimised (Bal 1997, 146-8). Manipulating the focalisation is a powerful way of manipulating extra-diegetic empathy. Switching focalisers can potentially lead to empathy because it foregrounds certain aspects of the plot (Kümmerling-Meibauer 2012, 131). Additionally, fixed focalisation provides less overt opportunities for cross-boundary empathy, whereas focalisation from the Other's perspective foregrounds their experience and enhances the chance of empathy.

The reader, including inexperienced readers, may however resist focalisation. Although there is a trend to assume that children are at the mercy of a narrative this is both silly and quite ill informed. On the other hand, it is equally silly to assume that an adult reader is entirely resistant to narrative techniques; most adults are not the expert readers we all hope them to be. Lydia Kokkola and Eva Fjällström (2014) have demonstrated the child reader's ability to resist narrative techniques through an empirical research project analysing focalisation resistance in Swedish teenagers. The sixteen-year old participants were presented

a text in English, their second language in which they had limited proficiency. However, although the participants struggled with certain cultural knowledge gaps (399), they were still able to resist the narrative focalisation at points (408-407). A sixteen-year old's cognitive and reading abilities are significantly different from a ten-year old's, however, because these participants were reading in a language in which they have limited abilities they were more prone to manipulation than they would have been in their mother tongue. We may therefore draw from this study to tentatively state that focalisation is not binding to a child reader in what perspective they take. Therefore, it is equally possible for a reader to reject a narrative's manipulation towards empathy with certain groups.

Out Of the (Horse)Box

Michael Morpurgo's *War Horse* (1982) is perhaps one of the most famous children's war novels in the Western Anglophone world; it was even adapted to the stage, a Broadway musical, a film, and was featured at the London Olympics. This narrative, aimed at a young audience of nine and up, tells the story of Joey, the titular war horse, who gets sold by the farmer who owns him to the British army. From there he is sent to the Western Front of WWI, as part of an archaic approach to modern warfare. The cavalry quickly defeated, Joey and his horse comrade Tophorn are taken by the German army and placed in an occupied French farm. Soon, Joey and Tophorn are taken to the Front again, where Tophorn dies from heart failure. Now alone again, Joey experiences a terrifying episode of shelling and feeling chased by gunfire and tanks. Running injured and afraid, Joey stumbles into no-man's land. There a significant episode occurs, where a German and a Welsh officer meet in the middle to contest who gets to take Joey with them. Joey is won in a coin toss by the Welsh officer, and taken to a British veterinary hospital, where he is reunited with Albert, the son of Joey's owner before the war. After the war the horses are auctioned off, and Joey is sold to the French farmer he stayed with during his German stint. The farmer "sells" Joey back to Albert for a penny and a promise, and Albert and Joey arrive back home victorious war heroes.

Joey is both the protagonist and the focaliser, which is unusual in children's literature where most focalisers are human children (although there are many famous examples of exceptions to this rule, like Anna Sewell's *Black Beauty* from 1877). He is not a magical horse in the sense that he is unable to speak to the people around him and is in servitude to whoever claims him. He can, however, understand all languages spoken to him. He lives with and serves English, German, and French people in WWI, which allows these characters to be represented in the text, provides an insight into their interests and concerns, and facilitates

empathy for all of them. It also places Joey outside of the in- and outgroups of the war; although he does form attachments for specific characters, it is with them as individuals, unrelated to what side of the combat they are on. Through this the narrative theoretically places the reader in a position where they can observe the grouping without necessarily feeling aligned with a specific one – if this were not a WWI novel written for an English audience. Although the level of knowledge of the reader cannot be assumed, the implied English child reader is more likely to identify with the English characters more than the Germans or the French, and therefore consider the English their ingroup. This initial ingrouping is pushed further by the narrative's opening; the first chapter details Joey's pre-war life in England, establishing his deep friendship with Albert, his first owner's son. Additionally, Joey's initial war experiences are with the English army – as is the ending. Through this the narrative grounds Joey in England first and foremost, establishing the English as the original ingroup. It does this on purpose however, as the rest of the novel then focuses on breaking down the divides between the ingroup and the outgroups.

Placing focalisation with a horse lets the human characters speak freely (in direct speech), as the horse is a silent observer and is assumed not to understand. Direct speech is also a narrative technique which marks the text as intended for a young audience, as it indicates a lack of trust in the reader to understand implied meanings and sentiments. In this direct speech many of his owners, from all sides of the conflict, openly contemplate the irrationality of the war and of hating the Other just because they are on the other side of the War. The following was said by a German officer directly to Joey:

‘How can one man kill another and not really know the reason why he does it, except that the other man wears a different colour uniform and speaks a different language? And it's me they call mad! You two [horses] are the only rational creatures I've met in this benighted war, and like me the only reason you're here is because you were brought here’ (Morpurgo 2007, 108-109).

The soldier, notably an adult, acts like a mouthpiece figure for the narrator. As argued by Nikolajeva, young readers are supposed to empathise and learn lessons with young protagonists, meaning that the protagonist cannot be a mouthpiece for the author's beliefs and opinions “but rather wisdom must necessarily come from a secondary character, whether an adult or a child” firmly guiding the reader to what they are supposed to take away from the lessons (Nikolajeva 2002, 36). Adult characters hold more authority than child characters, betraying the didactic nature of children's literature and the age of the intended audience. *War*

Horse is a perfect example for this, as Joey's muteness by definition necessitates others to speak for the narrative.

Crossing the us versus them divides is the main focus of the novel, foregrounded by both the mouthpiece characters and Joey as an ostensibly neutral focaliser (Nilson 2019, 44). One of the most significant and didactic scenes occurs when Joey runs into no-man's land in a blind panic, at which point the German and British forces have a peaceful meeting to discuss who gets to take the horse. Both the German and the Welsh officer come out of their trenches to, symbolically, meet in the middle by the horse. There, luckily, they are able to converse in English. The officers decide on a coin toss to see who gets the horse, and reflecting on the civility of this solution the Welshman comments that '[w]e could have settled all this peaceful like, Jerry – the war I mean – and I'd be back in my valley and you'd be back in yours. Still, not your fault I don't suppose. Nor mine, neither come to that' (131). This statement foregrounds two things to the reader; the mention of their respective valleys foregrounds the similarities between the enemies, and the narrator's message that none of the soldiers were to blame for the devastation of the War. The propagation of these messages, the blamelessness of the soldiers and the crossing of us versus them grouping is further foregrounded after the horse is won by the Welshman, and the German respectfully says goodbye:

'The horse is yours. Take good care of him, my friend,' and he picked up the rope again and handed it to the Welshman. As he did so he held out his other hand in a gesture of friendship and reconciliation, a smile lighting his worn face. 'In an hour, maybe, or two,' he said. 'We will be trying our best again each other to kill. God only knows why we do it, and I think he has maybe forgotten why. Goodbye, Welshman. We have shown them, haven't we? We have shown them that any problem can be solved between people if only they can trust each other. That is all it needs, no?' (133).

This overly didactic mouthpiecing is typical both of Morpurgo's work in general, and of modern children's war literature which is generally anti-war (Budgen 2018, 145-146) and most often is focused on the futility of the War and its destructive effects on all sides. This is again emphasised by the ending, when Joey and Albert return to England. "Both of us were received like conquering heroes, but we both knew that the real heroes had not come home, that they were lying out in France alongside Captain Nicholls, Topthorn, Friedrich, David and little Emilie" (182). Joey here "speaks" for both himself and Albert in a statement which equates all the victims of the War as having equal weight to them; the English, the horses, the

Germans, the youths, and the French. This is only possible because Joey is allowed to bond with all parties without affronting the reader as a traitor. Through this bonding the narrative encourages the reader to engage empathically with all the victims of the War, regardless of which side they were on.

In most cases, focalisers in children's war novels are human children, because of which Joey's horseness is foregrounding by definition. Although Joey has allegiances to the people he serves and horses he befriends, because he is a horse, humans around him assume he cannot (and in fact, he does not) have loyalties to either side of the conflict. Because of this it is possible for both the English and the Germans to befriend him and use him in combat. Additionally, Joey cannot speak, which leaves him a mute Other on which the human characters project their emotions as they monologue at him. All languages spoken at him, however, are recorded in the text. Both these factors, Joey serving and befriending multiple sides and characters revealing their feelings to him, allow for the narrative to lay bare the humanity of both sides of the conflict; something which would have been difficult if Joey were human. Because Joey is an animal he is placed outside of the political responsibilities of the war, and his muteness in the face of the other characters equally places him outside of the in- and outgroup divisions which form the basis of the war and the narrative itself. Through animal focalisation *War Horse* can demonstrate and comment on war based in- and outgrouping from the perspective of an outsider; an outsider perceived as inherently innocent above all. Through this the narrative can override us versus them binaries set up by war and promote extra-diegetic empathy with all sides involved. It is a particularly effective strategy; however, it is not the only one. Another way to attempt to override grouping is through multiple focalisation, which I will analyse with the next text.

So Many Sides

Ruta Sepetys' *Salt to the Sea* (2016) is another novel based on an historical event. It features four protagonists on their way to escape from the Baltics to Eastern Germany on the ship the *Wilhelm Gustloff*. Emilia is a pregnant Polish fifteen-year-old, attempting to escape ethnic cleansing. Joana is a young nurse fleeing from the rise of the Red Army in Lithuania, who blames herself for accidentally setting the NKVD on her cousin and her family, potentially causing their deaths. Florian is a Prussian art restorer smuggling a valuable statue he stole from the Nazis. Alfred is a Nazi officer who works on the *Wilhelm Gustloff*. The four protagonists are also the focalisers for the novel, which is unusual for children's literature as, as John Stephens says, "the majority of children's fictions employ only one focalizing

character” (2010, 56). The implied reader of *Salt to the Sea* is, however, not a young child but an adolescent, as indicated by the ages of the protagonists, the complexity of having multiple focalisers, and the themes of sex, rape, pregnancy, abortion, genocide and other war crimes. Therefore, although multiple focalisation is uncommon in children’s fiction as a whole, it is not too exceptional here in a YA novel.

The novel’s four protagonist-focalisers’ narratives are divided up and clearly represented in short chapters titled only by their names. One of the potential results of divvying up focalisation in war literature, and often a clear aim of the narrative, is to represent a conflict from contrasting perspectives. Nodelman writes that multiple focalisation complicates empathy (he uses the term “identification” but based on how he uses it, it is clear he means empathy, so that is the term I will use) because attention is pulled away from the emotional experience towards the aesthetic experience (2017, 7). By shifting away from a clear emotional experience and the expected fostering of emotional engagement, the polyphony of this type of narrative forces the reader to an awareness of difference and self-reflection (ibid). Nodelman argues that because multiple focalisation inherently results in dyssynchronous information, the reader is pulled away from empathy through irony (10). However, when discussing novice readers this is not something we should assume, as irony is not necessarily something novice readers understand (Nikolajeva 2005, 178). In children’s war literature, I argue, the purpose of multiple focalisation is not necessarily to pull away from empathy, but instead to promote empathic engagement with all sides represented. Through this, multiple focalisation can be a tool through which the narrative can criticise the focaliser’s limited worldview and engage the reader in a more sophisticated ethical discourse (Cadden 2000, 146-147).

Multiple focalisation can also cause asymmetrical information, where some characters have more knowledge about a situation than others, or even the reader. Moving away from their point of focalisation may increase a sense of tension and suspense. Also, as stated by Nodelman, providing four different, equally authoritative versions of the same events pushes the reader to mistrust of all focalisers (2017, 99). This appears to be the main purpose of multifocalisation in *Salt to the Sea*; each chapter is very brief, often only a few pages, and usually ends on a cliff hanger. Additionally, the sections focalised through Joana, Florian and Emilia foreground their untrustworthiness; they often mention keeping secrets from the other characters, and express fear of being found out. Their secrets are also kept from the reader until the characters confide in each other, offering only breadcrumbs to their true meaning;

“I’m a murderer” (42), whispers Joana to Florian at the end of one of her chapters. The reader is not provided with any further information other than the emotion of guilt Joanna feels about her murder(s) until she explains that she feels responsible for accidentally providing information to the secret police regarding her family, potentially leading to their deaths. Florian often states that he is dangerous to be around; “She had no idea. It wasn’t ‘safer’ for anyone to be with me” (80), and that he has some form of secret in his bag with him. His untrustworthiness is again foregrounded by his performing of the Hitler salute (although he does eventually express a distaste for it) and possessing a German uniform and papers – yet he is not in the army and does not clarify his role for the majority of the novel. Through this foregrounding both in form and content the reader is primed to mistrust the focalisers and thus spend more attention to the narrative, which enhances cognitive engagement and could potentially lead to more emotional engagement as well.

There is an effort to establish similarities between the four characters; all four are described as “young” in some way or another, for instance. Emilia is the only one whose age is clearly stated, as fifteen. Florian is secretive about his identity and a forger, so the only clue as to his age the reader is provided with is when Joana, his love interest, and another evacuee estimate him to be either nineteen or twenty, which is younger than herself. Alfred is simply described as “the young sailor” (175). Additionally, when the characters are first introduced in their respective chapters their driving forces are made clear this is done in simple sentences of the same structure; Joana is driven by the emotions of guilt: “Guilt is a hunter” (Sepetys 2016, 1). Florian is the hero: “Fate is a hunter” (3). Emilia’s defining emotion is shame: “Shame is a hunter” (5). Alfred’s is fear: “Fear is a hunter” (7). For Joana, Emilia and Florian the form is even the same; all their chapters are in first person present tense, and of the same lengths. In a most obvious way, the characters are also all bound through the plot; Joana, Emilia and Florian are all three unhomed by the war and are seeking escape through the *Wilhelm Gustoff*, which is the ship Alfred works on. By creating these links between four characters representing different sides of a conflict, the narrative seems to set up equal weight to these sides, allowing for enhanced understanding regarding the impact of the conflict on society at large. However, the three voices of Joana, Emilia and Florian are emotionally and stylistically homogeneous; and Joana and Florian’s are cognitively similar as well. Although Emilia is fifteen her style reads significantly younger than the others’, placing her on at least the outer circle of their ingroup. Homogeneity reduces the potential effect of multi-focalisation (Nikolajeva 2014b, 262); instead of providing four different perspectives and consciousnesses

there are only three. Even more limiting is that there are in effect only two sides of the conflict represented.

The differences between the four are most important to the narrative, however, and shape the empathic impact of the narrative. Although all four characters are from different backgrounds, with Joana a Lithuanian woman who looks to Germany for refuge, Emilia a Polish girl raped by Russian soldiers, Florian a Prussian forger and Alfred a young Nazi sailor, they are not created equal. Joana, Emilia and Florian are set up in opposition to Alfred, in effect reducing four sides to two. In relation to the war, Joana, Emilia and Florian look to escape it and express distaste for it, whereas Alfred adores it and is a true believer of Nazi ideology. Whereas Alfred is isolated from the other three characters, they are brought together within the first few chapters and act as a team throughout the rest of the novel. The result of this is that understanding of the complexity of the conflict is reduced, even though there are still nuances in the differences in their respective backgrounds. The mistrust placed in the focalisers and the focus laid on difference rather than similarity which is foregrounded mostly regarding Alfred sets up a clear Good versus Bad dichotomy and tension between the two parties. The three characters only come into contact with Alfred midway through the novel, at which point their unity is semi-solidified, and the reader has had insight into Alfred's dangerous mind for several chapters. Instead of complicating the image by adding an equally attractive, other side to the story, Alfred serves simply as a clear antagonist.

Alfred is made as repulsive to the reader as possible. He is a coward, not respected by his colleagues, and prone to violence. The majority of his chapters are epistolary; letters written to Hannelore, the woman he loves, aggrandising his role in the smooth operation of the ship he works on. Alfred's is an epistolary account, the only one in the novel, up until the point where he encounters the other characters. Through this he is isolated from the other three focalisers in both form and content. The events Alfred mentions in the letters which would make him potentially seem heroic or likeable to the reader are generally framed in an ironic fashion; immediately counteracted:

Imagine, my darling, your Alfred is saving two thousand lives.

“Have you cleaned the toilets yet, Frick?”

“Not yet,” I replied (Sepetys 2016, 85, italics in original).

The difference between Alfred's epistolary version of himself and his reality is made clear through visual differentiation of levels, as is common in YA literature (Nikolajeva 2014a, 251). His letters are also mental fabrications not just in content but also in essence.

Alfred's intense unlikability is cemented when it is revealed that Alfred is not only a true believer in Hitler's beliefs; he also reported Hannelore's Jewish father to the Hitler Jugend, believing that because her mother was a gentile Hannelore would side with him and be saved. Instead, she denounced him at the end as she was arrested and transported to the concentration camps. Alfred's delusional reports on himself, combined with his repulsive ideology and betrayal of the woman he loved, make him an extremely unlikely source of empathy. Whereas multi-focalisation in children's war literature often serves the purpose of promoting difficult empathy with the enemy, humanising the Other, in this novel it does the opposite. The focus lies not on the characters but the action; Alfred's focalisation cements the view of the Nazis as inherently and unrepentantly evil, and functions to enhance the suspense and drama of the action. The resistance to empathising with the Other is, ironically, made explicit through one of Alfred's letters: "*It confounds me when people don't assist or even welcome those on their own team. But it troubles me more when people welcome those from an opposing team*" (305, italics in original). Alfred's usage of the word "team" is a clear metaphor for "race", as he directly links it to Hannelore's gentile mother's "perfection" being "chipped away" because she married Hannelore's father. Through its depiction of Alfred, the novel practices exactly this approach to in- and outgroups put forward by Alfred. This also supports Robyn McCallum's criticism that multifocalised narratives often contain a privileged, dominant focaliser which prohibits the reader from engaging with all equally (1999, 56). In this case it is not one singular dominant focaliser, but one dominant side of the conflict; that of Joana, Emilia and Florian. Because the majority of the focalisers are in stark opposition to Alfred both in ideology and power, and Alfred is made as repulsive as possible to the reader, his focalisation fails to provide a valid opportunity for the reader to engage with the situation from his perspective.

Multifocalisation is a powerful tool to show insight into the different sides of a story, and potentially even allow empathy with them through engagement with their emotions. In the case of war literature, this provides an opportunity to humanise the Other and complicate the perception of war as Us versus Them, Good versus Bad which is damaging to society and also limits empathic skills. "Generally speaking, novels for young people with alternating narratives tend to characterize cultural registers of difference, and especially class and race, as

barriers to be ignored or transcended” (Nodelman 2017, 188). The purpose of multifocalisation, then, is to clearly demonstrate in- and outgroups in order to potentially defy them. In *Salt to the Sea*, however, this effect is muddled; although the narrative demonstrates similarities between the Lithuanian, Polish, and Prussian characters who are from very different backgrounds, in the context of the war the groupings of Us (victims) versus Them (the Nazis) is foregrounded and reaffirmed. The novel employs multifocalisation not as a tool to allow for challenging empathy with the Nazi as well, but instead uses it to enhance tension and a sense of danger for the other characters. Through this, it limits its empathic potential for the Other, betraying an anxiety for empathy with a Nazi believer. So far, I have analysed novels with focalisers aimed at providing the enemy with a platform. These types of focalisers are not the only ones present in children’s war literature; there is also the more restrictive focaliser, only focused on one side of the conflict. This is the type of narrative to which I turn next.

How I Live Now

Meg Rosoff’s *How I Live Now* (2004) is a YA novel about and focalised through a fifteen-year-old anorexic girl, Daisy, who is sent by her American father to stay with her cousins in England. While she is there, a war breaks out. Although this starts out as a realist novel, the identity of the enemy is unclear as they are never described in detail; when the enemy interacts with the protagonist (which is very rare) they do speak her language, and their appearance or any possible accents are not commented on. Lourdes López-Romero argues that the novel’s generic ambivalence means that it is not often discussed in critical debate (2018); however, it has been analysed mostly thematically, particularly for its dystopian elements (Hanssen 2017), interiority (Franzak 2009; Lockney 2013), and anorexia (Tsai 2014). Yet *How I Live Now* is an interesting novel for analysis of focalisation, because the protagonist/narrator/focaliser’s unreliability of her account influences her narrative to the point where it reads as stream of consciousness. This overtly complex narration style already marks the novel as intended for an adolescent audience, as does the age of the protagonist, the generic ambivalence, and the ambiguous emotional representations and ending; it is most likely cognitively too taxing for young children to either grasp or find pleasurable (and therefore “worth reading”).

Additionally, Daisy tells her story in retrospect, six years after the war takes place, with a synchronising transition into present tense at the very end. This distance between the events taking place and her report on them heightens her unreliability as her report is filtered

by memory and time. However, it also provides a presumably more knowledgeable and wiser narrator who can reflect on their young experiences (Nikolajeva 2014b, 253). The novel is written in first person past tense, a testament of what happened to her in the war. The title implies the significance of a gap between the narrative and the narration (Nikolajeva 2014b, 255). Immediately a question arises: who is this account for? During the novel she points out that this is her story, and occasionally acknowledges that she leaves out parts that are uninteresting, foregrounding her unreliability.

But the summer I went to England to stay with my cousins everything changed. Part of that was because of the war, which supposedly changed lots of things, but I can't remember much about life before the war anyway so it doesn't count in my book, which this is.

Mostly everything changed because of Edmond.

And so here's what happened (Rosoff 2004, 3).

Here the artificiality of the narrative is foregrounded (“in my book”), and Daisy’s heavy hand in editing the story is made clear. Hers is a claustrophobic focalisation; the reader is never allowed access beyond what Daisy deems interesting as she is evidently in control of the narrative presented, both in form and content. The form adds to the feeling of claustrophobia, as Daisy’s stream of consciousness results in sentences that can run for over a page long, trapping the reader in their meandering ways. This attention demanding syntax is foregrounded particularly when traumatic events happen. After England is occupied, Daisy and her young cousin Piper “were driving home through the usual checkpoints” (112) when a fellow teenager, Joe, decided to “get show-offy” and “started shouting obscenities at one of the checkpoint guards” (ibid). Then, the guard shoots Joe in the face. The description of the consequences of this mostly takes place in a sentence which spans 29 lines. Because Daisy foregrounds that she chooses to tell her story her way, this syntax is an active representation of Daisy forcing the reader to stay painfully close to her. This closeness is further emphasised through the narration, as it is in first person past tense. First person narration, focalising through the protagonist is a common way through which especially YA narratives attempt to get the reader to engage empathically with the character – although generally in present tense (Nikolajeva 2014b, 251). This is because the first-person perspective is a narrative tool “used to emulate self-knowledge and self-reflection” (Nikolajeva, 2014b, 253). As adolescence is a period of life during which we are suddenly and intensely concerned with our conceptions of self, the predominance of first-person perspective narratives reflects a perceived need in the

audience. According to Nikolajeva, the shifts in the narrative (temporal as well as stylistically from realist to unrecognisable), which are caused by the war, serve to defamiliarize the reader from Daisy to encourage thought experiments and an exploration of emotions, memory and empathy (2014b, 255).

This closeness and defamiliarisation may be necessary to enable empathic engagement with Daisy, as she is set up as an unlikeable character. She is entirely solipsistic, disregarding anybody's emotions that do not deal directly with herself. Her father has sent her away from America because he cannot handle her selfish emotions anymore, and she at least pretends to not care about him or anybody else. The way she presents herself in the narrative is focussed solely on herself. The war foregrounds this even further, as she makes her apathy about it exceedingly clear:

I didn't spend much time thinking about the war because I was bored with everyone jabbering on for about the last five years about Would There Be One Or Wouldn't There and I happen to know there wasn't anything we could do about it anyway so why even bring the subject up (19).

Interesting here is the tense shift as well; the narrative is in past tense, yet she writes that she knows they were powerless in present tense. This implies that her present, narrator self is aware of her past, narrated self's limited and narcissistic worldview and is potentially trying to justify it in post. Although the reader is primed to like and empathically engage with protagonists (Nikolajeva 2013, 102), it is possible that Daisy's initial flippant attitude to the war is off-putting to the reader. Additionally, her unlikability and eating disorder alienate the reader (Nikolajeva 2014a, 87), further complicating extra-diegetic empathy. However, as Lourdes López-Ropero argues, it is because of the war and its extreme impact on Daisy's life that Daisy has to change, and her growing capabilities and strength in the face of extremity make her a more admirable character (2018).

The narrative attempts to address the difficulty of empathising with Daisy by tackling her anorexia as well. As her eating disorder is potentially alienating, and earlier on in the novel is glamorised by Daisy, forced starvation because of the war cures her of her disordered thinking: "somewhere along the line I'd lost the will not to eat" (159). This redress of Daisy's alienating disorder both acknowledges her anorexia for the first time, but it also removes the obstruction to empathy which her disease previously posed. Additionally, Daisy and Piper's struggles to survive echo Daisy's earlier anorexia when she first starts to indicate empathy:

[...] and for the first time I noticed how skinny Piper was which once upon a time I would have thought was a good thing and now I thought was just what happens when you're nine years old and don't have enough food to grow properly (141).

Because Piper's emaciated state is the trigger for Daisy's mental change, the narrative indicates that Daisy's selfishness may also be changing. Although she has been travelling with Piper, taking care of her throughout the novel, she never took her physical wellbeing truly into account – as is indicated by the “for the first time”. Daisy slowly opening up to empathy puts her in a different light for the reader; it makes her more likeable. By chipping away at her unlikability the narrative makes Daisy a more suitable character for extra-diegetic empathy.

The novel expands on this by literally asking the reader to put themselves in Daisy's shoes, in seemingly a direct plea for empathy:

Put yourselves in our shoes for a minute, walking into this deserted place on a glowering grey autumn day when it should be filled with animals and people and life but what you find is nothing, no sign of people, just the eeriest lack of noise possible and nothing moving except the big black birds in the air and legions of crows standing absolutely still, watching us (Rosoff 2004, 151).

Although this appears to be a call for empathy for Daisy, especially following her slow change of character enhancing the potential for empathy, or Piper, it does not have to be. There is no overt emotion represented in this excerpt; the only emotive word is “eerie” linking to the emotion of fear. The focus of the excerpt is not the characters; their bodies are not representing emotion, and Daisy does not insert any judgements other than eerie on the scene described. Instead of asking for empathic engagement with the characters, the narrative pushes for empathy with the civilians in war in general. Daisy's alienating personality and narration stand aside here, and the purpose of the story is made clear for the first time; the reader does not have to care about Daisy. Instead they are provided an insight into the horrors of war. Empathy for Daisy is not necessary, the focus point is the war.

However, although empathy for Daisy may be complicated, she is ultimately still ingroup to the reader. This is mostly because of the war context; because the enemy Other is not identified or given any platform whatsoever, the focus lies solely on Daisy. As a victim of the war, she is put in stark opposition to the enemy, who commits several war crimes during

the novel. Through this opposition, her position of ingroup is solidified. The suffering Daisy and her cousins go through because of the war lead her to develop her empathic skills, increasing her likeability and the potential of extra-diegetic empathy. Daisy being a white teenage girl potentially further places the reader in her ingroup, as most readers of YA fiction are cis-gendered, white teenage girls (Epstein 2012, 291). By not allowing any humanising of the Other at all and firmly placing Daisy in the implied reader's ingroup, and holding the reader claustrophobically close to Daisy's perspective, the focus is not on potentially crossing the boundaries between in- and outgroup. Instead, it demonstrates how the extreme situation of war can lead to enhanced ingroup identification, and through that allow for difficult empathy with challenging characters.

We're All in This Together

This chapter has demonstrated several issues. Firstly, although empathy may be considered a force for inevitable good by some (Nussbaum 1990, 1995, 2001; Oatley 2016), or an inevitable evil due to its preferential nature by others (Goldie 2000; Bloom 2016, 2017), it is a neutral force. It *could* potentially lead to empathy with the Other, or it *could* entrench the boundaries between in- and outgroups. Because of the way we cognitively process literature, this works the same in both extra-textual life and through reading. In children's war literature, groups are necessitated by the nature of the conflict; there will always be an us versus them based on the political situation. Similarly, because the genre is *children's* war literature and therefore (at least aiming or claiming to be) from the child's perspective, there is also always a division based on age. Therefore, the effects of in- and outgroup empathy are particularly foregrounded within this genre, making it both crucial to the way the narratives function and a potentially fruitful ground of learning and personal growth. Fiction provides a valuable chance for readers to train their empathic and mind-modelling skills, an opportunity which is of particular importance to young readers. This is because during adolescence, the brain is in a use-it-or-lose-it setting, meaning that abilities which are not used or trained are lost, greatly reducing the potential empathic abilities of these individuals after puberty (Blakemore, Choudhury 2006, 307). Therefore, reading war literature which challenges previously established groupings may enhance the extra-textual ability of the reader to transgress them later in life, as promoted by war narratives such as Morpurgo's *Friend or Foe*; Needles' *A Game of Soldiers*; Westall's *Machine Gunners* and many more. In a similar vein, however, narratives which do not promote this transgression and instead reaffirm the us versus them mentality inherent in war literature may stunt this development. A text like *How I Live Now* is

complicated in this regard, as it does allow for empathy with a character previously presented as unlikeable and through that trains difficult empathy, yet it does not provide opportunities for in- and outgroup transgression. Because of this it both enables and inhibits empathic growth.

The most important narrative strategy for establishing and potentially challenging these groups is focalisation. The choice of focaliser(s) establishes what side of the conflict the reader is presented with, which characters are in- and which are outgroup members to the protagonist(s), and whether or not this grouping is challenged in the narrative.

Multifocalisation is a popular technique used to encourage empathy for the other by quite literally showing the other side of the story; however, it can also be employed to reaffirm the Otherness and evil of the other side, thus hindering further possibilities of empathy. In Sepetys' *Salt to the Sea*, for example, there are four protagonist-focalisers. Set during WWII, one of the three is a German soldier, which could potentially lead to a humanised image of the German individual during the War. However, this character is made as repulsive as possible to the reader; he is a cowardly psychopath, misogynistic, antisemitic and racist, and suffers from unnamed mental illnesses. The chapters focalised through him serve two purposes; to enhance the sense of tension and danger for the other characters, as they do not know his violent desires, and to further cement any notions of the German soldiers as evil. Whether or not this strategy has this effect cannot be said definitively, however, this is the most likely outcome.

Manipulating the reader to empathise or not with specific groups is, in itself, a strategy with wide ethical implications and impacts. Without access to someone's emotions, our assessment of their actions may be wildly different. We may, for example, gaze as outsiders consider a woman delivering supplies to the resistance acting in a morally just way, assuming she is acting for the greater good of her country. If, however, focalised through her we know that she is doing this because she is acting out of spite towards a family member and she does not care about the resistance's objectives or perspective, our moral assessment of her is changed. Additionally, a narrative may lead to empathy for a member of a terrorist organisation. Empathy, emotion, narration and focalisation feed into the narrative ethics. Narration and focalisation have great impact on how emotions are displayed in the narrative, and whose we are privy to. Delving deeper into the individual level of the text, analysing characters, we can see how these earlier strategies influence this ethical element of the narrative.

Part II

I Know What's Right

Narrative Ethics

3.

You Are Such A Character!

Literature, like all human action and creation, is inextricably ethical. There is an ethics of creation (why do we write this text, what is its purpose, how do we write it), an ethics *in* the creation, and an ethics of reading (see Booth 1992; Nikolajeva 2014a, 177-224). These issues are highly emphasised in children's literature because of the power inequity inherent in its nature. Although all literature is inherently ideological, the debate surrounding the ethics of children's literature differs from similar analyses in normative "adult" literature. The reason for this is the special status which the child holds in modern Western culture; as people children are not seen as existing in a state of being, but rather in a state of becoming (Hollindale 2011, 12). As an unfinished project of socialisation and subject of education, the child will, if they get to live a full life, inevitably grow up into adulthood and join the adult society which raised them. Children's literature plays a key role in the socialisation and education process, and particularly in the case of moral development this raises the issue of responsibility. As Clémentine Beauvais states, "ethical instruction has always formed part of children's literature" (2015, 108), and literature plays a strong role "as a facilitator of ethical life, as a companion in ethical choices, and more generally as a participant in the ethical climate of a given society" (109). The socialisation project of children's literature implies a certain perceived moral malleability of the child, or at least the adult's desire to impart moral lessons on the child reader to shape the potential future adult. At least one goal of children's literature is to instruct the implied child reader. It does this, in part, through its narrative structures. The morals it communicates and how are important particularly because of its readership.

Every narrative element plays a role in the construction of the narrative's ethics and the way it is communicated to the implied reader; the narrator determines what story is told, the focaliser decides what side of the story is shown, and the characters are the ethical actors

in the tale. In analysing this narrative ethics, it is important to follow the advice put forward by Peter Hollindale in his analysis of ideology in children's literature (2011, 28-51), which was later echoed by Claudia Mills when she said that ideology in literature can be deliberate and overt; undermine an interpretive community's reading, or be undermined by the work itself (2014, 5-6). "Moreover, that a book contains a main character, or even a narrator, who expresses certain values is not enough for us to say that these are the values expressed by the work as a whole" (ibid). Thus, the morals put forward by a narrative are not always clear-cut and may be undermined by other narrative elements. Joe Haldeman's *The Forever War* (1974), for instance, suffers from moral ambiguity because of this. In this novel the narrator-protagonist claims to support sexual liberalism, yet he recoils in horror when his own mother comes out to him as queer. The implied readership of children's literature is cognitively still developing and may not yet have the mind-modelling skills necessary to correctly ascribe character's intentions, emotions, and therefore moral frameworks (Nikolajeva 2018, 83). They may therefore struggle with these clashes of morality, but also gain much cognitive training and progress from them.

Good Little Children

The ethics of literature has been of crucial importance to children's literature since its beginnings. According to Claudia Nelson (2014) this is because "[f]or many adults, children's preeminent 'unadultlike' quality, their 'need' is the lack of a sufficiently rich, complex, and nuanced moral code, an ethical compass that can be relied upon to help them navigate the difficult world of maturity" (24). The way for adults to resolve that need is through character education, for which children's literature has classically been instrumental. The origins of children's literature lie in overt moral didacticism (Sainsbury 2013, 6-7; Mills 2014, 1; 181), as texts written for children were done so with the sole purpose of instructing social norms and mores, and other educational lessons. Instead of teaching children *how* to think, the goal was to tell them *what* to think (Sainsbury 2013, 6-7). In her exploration of the history of moral didacticism in children's literature, Lani Barker argues that the aim for children's literature in this period was moral perfection, taking the form of lack of transgression (Barker 2014, 102). She states that "[v]irtue was rewarded, vice punished with suitable poetic justice, and moral virtue seldom overlapped with transgressive behavior [sic]" (102). In early children's literature, characters were presented as models of behaviour; not fully rounded and conceptualised characters for the reader to empathise with. Examples include Thomas Day's *The History of Sandford and Merton* (1783), Mary Martha Sherwood's *History of the*

Fairchild Family (1818), and Maria Charlesworth's *Ministering Children* (1854). Barker goes on to state that in this early form of children's literature the moralising adult narrator judges the characters' behaviours morally while their minds and emotions are largely closed off and flat, a narrative strategy which highlights the particular virtues and vices the text aims to teach (102). Claudia Nelson suggests that this type of overt moral didacticism became less popular in children's literature during the mid-nineteenth century when the turn towards entertainment began (2014, 15). The development away from pedantic moralising has continued, as according to Lisa Sainsbury post-WWII children's literature has started to allow the child reader to philosophise about what they consider right and wrong, and why they think that is so (2013, 6-7). However, following Sainsbury's argument, due to the nature of children's literature moral didacticism will always be an element of texts written for children.

The adult authority is important to an analysis of ethics in children's literature because of the didactic nature of the interaction with the implied child reader. As cognitively inexperienced readers are more vulnerable to adult narrative authority, the implied child reader may be less likely to resist the narrator when they deliver a certain ethical stance or viewpoint, which can be done either through the didactic narrative voice or an adult character (Nikolajeva 2014a, 90). Therein lies the ethical danger of children's literature: whatever ideology or moral viewpoints the adult authority puts forward, the implied child reader may (be supposed to) accept without questioning. Moral debates in children's texts are particularly pronounced in genres like war literature, as war inherently entails many ethical problems which defy easy solutions, and children's attitudes towards war are not yet fully formed, especially if they have not experienced it first-hand. These attitudes, which are still under formation during adolescence, are, as Susan Rahn suggests, influenced by accounts of both imagined and historical wars (2014, 163). Fictional accounts of war for children can have their particular impact on the child because they can be "cast in terms that a four-year-old can understand" (2014, 163), and thus make the moral stakes comprehensible for the implied reader. However, because of this the ethical danger of children's literature is more pronounced in this genre as well, since war is an inescapable element of human existence and a narrative may shape child readers' moral attitudes towards war in a form that they cannot easily resist through the authority of the hidden adult, a term coined by Perry Nodelman (2008) to account for the adult authority underlining all children's literature.

However, although it may be assumed that the hidden adult authority is merely presenting pre-packaged moral questions with their respective answers in children's texts, and

in a large number of cases this is true, it may also invite the implied child reader to explore conceptions of morality through thought experiments. Such texts purposefully leave ethical issues unresolved and without hints for the readers as to how they *should* interpret them to be morally correct, allowing the implied reader to develop their own moral reasoning through experimentation. Writing about children's texts which are also philosophical thought experiments, or have those embedded within them, Lisa Sainsbury states that they commonly have:

the functional opening of a philosophical theatre in which antecedent adult knowledge (the authoritative structure building the experiment) is presented to mighty [cf Beauvais] children. Confronted with a thought experiment, the child is invited to *think* and *experiment* – these are not adult tasks – and to move beyond the book in the direction of *subsequence* (Sainsbury 2017, 160).

Following Sainsbury's argument regarding thought experiments in children's literature would then mean that literature of this kind is purposefully empowering the implied child reader through liberation from overt moral didacticism. This is, of course, a didactic act in and of itself. However, I agree with Sainsbury in the sense that morally open-ended literature has different aims and potentially different impacts on the implied child reader. As stated above, early children's literature did not have the goal to make children morally autonomous beings. Modern literature does tend to shy away from overt moralism, yet however it is presented the entire structure as well as content of a children's text is presented through the filter of aetonnormativity.

It Only Hurts Because You Care

Narrative ethics is not a dry element of a narrative; it is an inherent aspect of literature closely linked to engagement. As Maria Nikolajeva states, the notion that the emotions and ethics are separate has been debunked and their close relation made explicit (2017, 82). Literary scholars such as Suzanne Keen (2007), Blakey Vermeule (2010), Patrick Colm Hogan (2011), and Maria Nikolajeva (2014a; 2017), as well as, before them, literary philosophers like Wayne C. Booth (1992) and Martha Nussbaum (1990; 2001) all theorise about the importance of emotions in ethical decision-making and the role this plays in literature and readership. Interesting specifically for cognitive (ethical) narratologists is the link between ethics and empathy. A developed sense of empathy may allow one to understand the other and their ethical standpoints better, which can, in certain scenarios, create feelings of individual

responsibility and call for ethical action (see Sainsbury 2013, 92-93). This is not just true for extra-textual empathy, as textual empathy also has this potential effect on its readership (Hogan 2011, 62). This may be why Patrick Colm Hogan states that empathy is “the origins and groundings of ethics” (2011, 62). Additionally, empathy makes the reader a participant to the events and the narrative, which makes it an excellent avenue for ethical analysis (Nussbaum 1990, 46).

In talking about readers and engagement in this fashion, we are talking about consciousness. Considering the connection between ethics and empathy, Nikolajeva states that “[e]thical values are an essential part of any consciousness and thus motivate people’s behaviour and relationships with other people, as well as with the physical and social environment. Understanding other people’s ethical beliefs is therefore a vital constituent in theory of mind and empathy” (2017, 84). However, as Nikolajeva points out, when talking about children’s literature we are talking about a group of readers who are both inexperienced readers and still cognitively developing (2014a, 15-16). Nuance may thus be missing in the inexperienced reader’s understanding of ethics, which is why a significant amount of a narrative’s ethics takes place in action and dialogue. Additionally, it is specifically regarding ethics that the risk of identification is important, as when a reader identifies and engages too closely with a character (a higher risk for novice readers) it may become difficult for them to distance themselves enough not to adopt ethically problematic aspects of that character.

What Even Are You?

To be able to assess the ethics of an action or situation one needs more information than is generally available. Factors like the actor’s background, the context for the situation, what the impact is and for how many people, and why the actor did what they did are very rarely available for situations where the actor is not the analyser. To learn about ethical behaviour a potential analyser needs to be able to assess ethical dilemmas, as well as differing approaches to right and wrong. Because the ethical lives not just in action and consequence but also in the internal life of those who act, the narrative form provides an excellent exploration of ethical debates. According to Blakey Vermeule, fictional characters function in part to let the reader “sort out basic moral problems” (2010, xii). Although I agree that fiction and its characters most certainly have this function, I do not believe that this is limited to “basic” moral problems (it is also fair to question what constitutes a “basic” moral problem in general).

Fiction provides the opportunity for an in-depth dissection of life (and death), which necessarily includes a portrayal and discussion of ethical existence in its entirety, not just the “basics”. Fiction potentially allows a look into the lives of others, complete with their emotional states and reactions to others, and their thoughts regarding actions or characters. Especially in the case of an omniscient narrator, the literary character has their morality on display in ways which are impossible for us to ever comprehend people in reality. As Nussbaum points out: “in the activity of literary imagining we are led to imagine and describe with greater precision, focusing our attention on each word, feeling each event more keenly – whereas much of actual life goes by without that heightened awareness, and is thus, in a certain sense, not fully or thoroughly lived” (1990, 47). This supports an argument on the premise of literature, which as Maria Nikolajeva phrases it, “puts its characters in situations where ethical issues are inescapable, and moreover, in fiction these issues can be amplified and become more tangible” (2017, 84). This means that in fiction, the ethical is inevitable, amplified, and portrayed in a holistic way which is impossible to achieve in the everyday world.

Child readers, who are still in the early stages of their moral development, may be aided by literature in their personal growth and understanding of the ethical. Literature’s position as being a training ground for empathy is combined with the reason for it also being a training ground for ethical issues. According to Nikolajeva, this is because children’s narratives have the potential to offer their young readers guidance to empathic and ethical inferences (2014a, 177; 2017, 83-84). It is because the reader can engage empathically with the text that they can also engage morally with it (Sainsbury 2013, 11) and “more clearly appreciate the moral significance of the situations deployed in the story and the narration” (Majía, Montoya 2017, 383) than if there is to be no empathic engagement. In her discussion on ethics in children’s literature Lisa Sainsbury stresses the importance of empathic engagement by arguing against its opposite, indifference, claiming that: “moral education is redundant if indifference negates care” (2013, 11). It is clear that it takes caring about the characters of a story to have an interest in what makes up these characters’ moral being: their desires, motivations, and actions.

An important and oft discussed characteristic of adult agency in children’s literature is the transmission of ideological messages through the text. The presence of a specific ideology in the narrative need not be overt or even intentional; much of the hidden adult’s presence or influence within a text lies in assumptions and unspoken understandings. The reinforcement

of the dominant culture's ideology through literature is not exclusive to children's texts; it is an aspect of all literature. As is the case with narrative ethics, ideology is an aspect of every story in both an overt and covert fashion (Hollindale 2011, 9). Peter Hollindale argues that ideology is present in children's literature in three ways: in the explicit(ly stated) beliefs of the author (36), in the author's unexamined assumptions (39), and in the "shared understanding" of the world, a matter of zeitgeist. Hollindale names this "organic ideology" (42), organic because they are underlying for the functioning of the world and are unquestioned by both the narrator and the characters, and therefore assumed to be shared beliefs between the narrative and the reader.

On the discourse level this implicit ideology is the easiest to pin down in the analysis of setting, characterisation, and narrative gaps. The way through which the implied reader is supposed to or does fill in the narrative gaps suggests an internalisation of implicit ideologies (Stephens 1992, 10). The presence of such an ideology is inevitable, as every narrative's construction must have gaps, and these gaps must be filled by the implied reader. Filling in these gaps takes cognitive activity, which allows space and time for growth. However, the implied form of ideology is particularly effective in children's literature because novice readers are unlikely to be able to identify it as they consume it and are therefore unable to critically engage with it. Ethics in literature is not an innocent, passive phenomenon; it actively communicates itself to the implied reader through the narrative's structure, language, and plot. "Above all, as an ethics, narrative is performance or act" (Newton 1995, 7). The study of such underlying ideological messages, in combination with more overt expressions of particular norms and values, attempts to reveal the ideological intentions and/or possible impacts of such texts on the implied child reader.

The idea that implicit ideology is particularly impactful on children is further supported by developmental psychologists and empirical research. Child psychologist Jean Piaget argued that children develop their moral understanding in two phases: the heteronomous stage, which he argues lasts until roughly the ages of seven or eight and in which the child's morality is based on adult authority, which is followed by the autonomous stage, in which morality is based on mutual decisions made between peers (1965, 135-137; 408). Although stage-based developmental theories put forward by Piaget and further developed by Lawrence Kohlberg are at this point old-fashioned and put into question, Hing Keung Ma showed in his 2013 empirical study that although there are multiple factors at play in the child's moral reasoning and decision making, adult authority does indeed play a major

factor in it (Ma 2013). Piaget and Kohlberg, and others who built on their stage-based models of development, should not be discarded fully. Combining the above with Paul Harris's argument that children assume implied language to reflect truth (2012, 136), this approach of children's moral development then provides support for Stephens' and Hollindale's theories regarding implicit ideologies in children's literature.

Empirical research on the development of morality in children has shown that although moral decision making is considerably complex, children and adolescents "weigh and coordinate moral and nonmoral features of situations when making judgments" like adults do (Killen, Smetana 2007, 242). Moral behaviour is demonstrated by children as young as two years old (Sparks, Schinkel, Moore 2017, 243), and develops throughout an individual's life. Multiple research studies employ characters in realistic fictional stories as a way to gauge children's "cognitive perspective taking" and moral judgement, finding that children as young as four can successfully link intentionality to moral judgement of the actions of fictional characters performing similar activities with differing motives, coded by the researchers as either morally "good" or "bad" (Lane et al. 2010, 873). The process of fine-tuning the implied child reader's ability for cognitive perspective taking is of crucial importance to protecting this reader from the ethical dangers of straightforward identification, as opposed to empathy. If the implied reader cannot differentiate between the self and the character, the ability to identify and possibly distance oneself from the character's shortcomings and moral failings is put into jeopardy (Nikolajeva 2012, 5).

That said, there is a strong cognitive link between empathy and affiliation, and moral decision making. Affiliation, particularly identifying characters and people as being either in one's in- or outgroup, has a strong impact on moral judgement. Young children, beginning at age four, are more generous towards their ingroup than their outgroup. Even infants as young as fourteen months demonstrate a preference for actions performed by ingroup members as opposed to those in the outgroup (Buttelmann et al. 2013). Children are also more likely to think positively of and remember the positive actions of ingroup members as opposed to people in the outgroup (Dunham et al. 2011), and are less likely to assign blame to ingroup members (Dunham, Emory 2014). Moral judgement of individuals in the outgroup is more negative than the ingroup in cases of ungenerosity, and higher levels of generosity are expected from the ingroup (Dunham et al. 2011; Sparks, Schinkel, Moore 2017, 246). Young children, aged thirty-two months and up, exposed to moral dilemmas experienced by fictional characters in stories are able to distinguish between physical, material, and psychological

needs of these characters – all factors which influence the child’s moral reasoning (Lane et al. 2010, 885). What this means is that children from a very young age onwards have demonstrable moral reasoning and judgement which develops through their lives and can be both analysed and influenced through stories. This moral behaviour is strongly linked to empathic engagement, and both empathy and morality are subject to cognitive development as the child ages through adolescence to adulthood.

Considering the role of stories in child morality, the importance of children’s literature is made apparent: as children are moral beings under development, the stories they read and engage with allow them to enhance their cognitive moral reasoning and judgement skills along with their empathy (Mejía, Montoya 2017, 372). Stories can offer the guidance young readers need to navigate complex moral dilemmas and issues (Nikolajeva 2014a, 195). Through analysis of the moral contents and form of the texts children consume, it is possible to uncover the impact certain narrative strategies have on child reader’s moral cognitive development. The child’s normal moral quandaries are typically presented in terms of “goodness” and “badness”, or “naughtiness”, in a manner of prosaic ethics (Sainsbury 2013, 27). These general standards are far exceeded in cases of war.

Hopefully, in the normative, implied child reader’s life, moral choices and consequences do not reach the importance they have in war scenarios. In this way, war literature adds an amplifying effect to the ethical function of fiction in general: where fiction can amplify ethical issues, war in turn increases this further. For although “evil is not the kind of thing we bump into every day” (Eagleton 2010, 128), the moral stakes are heightened in children’s war literature because of the ramifications of every act involved. To place the label of evil on war is to pass moral judgement on the act of war, through which I remove myself from academic objectivism. Three points here, however. Firstly, I do not believe it to be a controversial claim, at least in literary criticism circles, to call war an evil of humanity. Secondly, in my belief there is no morally neutral war, no distinct “good guys” or “bad guys”. I, therefore, in my literary analyses, do not favour any particular side to the conflict described. Thirdly, the evil element in children’s war literature goes beyond the war itself, as the extreme scenario of war brings out both the best and the worst of the people living through it. Evil lives not in war, but in the human character.

Putting the Pieces Together

A character's, or person's, traits are what makes them who they are and inform both the way we view them and the way they behave. From an empathy perspective, particular traits may be more desirable and therefore empathy inducing for the reader, whereas others are repulsive. A character with minimal traits, even if those present are considered good, may be equally unlikely to induce empathy. In war scenarios, certain traits may be expected to be framed as more desirable; bravery and loyalty for example. The weight of these traits is based on the emotions foregrounded in the genre and narrative; because fear is one of the core emotions of children's war literature, bravery, the trait indicating an overcoming of fear and danger for the good of others, is equally foregrounded. From an ethical perspective what characters we are supposed to empathise with demonstrates the narrative's ideology; what traits are framed as positive and how is this performed by the narrative? Is bravery expected from child characters in a narrative; are they expected to put themselves at risk when they could avoid it? What is the result of the dominance of such traits on the moral framework of a narrative? How does a collection of traits come together to form a character? There are two main different approaches to this. The first is Seymour Chatman's approach of seeing a character's traits in a paradigm (1978, 126), which means registering every trait of a character and adding it up, changing our perception of that character based on the changes in the summation (ibid). The second approach is to see characterisation as a network of traits coming together to form the image of the character described (Rimmon-Kenan (2002, 59). Viewing a character in this manner means the traits observed are not changed by later traits but adds to the pattern a layer of complexity to the character which may otherwise be blanketed out (ibid). Additionally, the network approach allows for character development, whereas Seymour Chatman's paradigm of traits implies character as being static (Rimmon-Kenan 2002, 39; Nikolajeva 2002a, 157).

The main two different ways of indicating character traits are through explicit definition, or implicit indication (Golden 1990, 39; Scholes, Kellogg 1996, 171-176; Rimmon-Kenan 2002, 59-60). In explicit definition, the narrator or another character may say "character X is brave". In implicit indication the trait is shown rather than told. Although implicit indication is more complex and potentially more stylistically desirable, explicit definition can be useful for quicker characterisation. Additionally, because explicit definition may be stated by the narrator, it can carry a lot of weight for the reader (Rimmon-Kenan 2002, 60). This is particularly important in the case of children's literature because of the

previously mentioned adult-child divide; the (implied adult) narrator's word can be more powerful than the inferences made by the (implied child) reader. This is the case even with a first-person narration.

Traits are not “datable occurrences in a person's history, but dispositions” that can be exhibited (Roberts 2012, 174). Traits can be indicated through any element of the text, including action, either one-off or habitual (Rimmon-Kenan 2002, 61); speech, internal or external (63; 64); external appearance (65-67); the reaction to or interaction with the character's environment (Chatman, 1978, 138; Golden 1990, 38; Rimmon-Kenan 2002, 65-67; Nikolajeva 2002a, 167); and the “characters' participation in the resolution” (Nikolajeva 2002a, 167). The importance of these many different ways of characterisation depends on the level of internal opacity: the more opaque the character, the more important the other narrative elements become in the revelation of that character's traits (Scholes, Kellogg 1996, 171). The repetition, similarity, contrast, and implication of traits also enhances characterisation (Golden 1990, 35; Rimmon-Kenan, 2002, 39; Nikolajeva 2005, 160). Traits, such as worldview, speech and actions, not only construct character; the treatment of traits also helps build the work's ideology (Rimmon-Kenan 2002, 38). In children's war literature, character traits can therefore reveal the impact of war on what behaviour is deemed appropriate or desirable. However, as important as our interpretation of characters is for our understanding of the narrative, this interpretation is culturally and temporally bound (Nikolajeva 2002a, 17), as is our understanding of the character's function and style (Scholes, Kellogg 1996, 166-167). Captain Biggles, who was an acceptable character in the 1910s and 20s, would be questioned now for not only traits and ideology, but opacity as well. Understanding character, being able to construct a character based on the presentation of their traits, is also part of literary competence (Nikolajeva 2002a, 17) and a skill that can and must be learned. In children's literature the implied reader may therefore misinterpret or misjudge characters (156), which could potentially reframe the narrative's ideology entirely. Next, I discuss the three more covert forms of characterisation; speech, internal representation, and physical description. These three sources of information are all “indicators for inferences about [the character's] mental and moral features” (Margolin 2007, 77), which both in their own way and together construct the network of traits we read as a moral agent.

You Don't Look Right

The most superficial and opaque form of characterisation is through external representation. Through this technique, the reader is reduced to knowing as much about the character

described as another character would know (Nikolajeva 2002, 182). Because of this it is a mostly old-fashioned and authoritative way of characterisation, as it implies a lack of trust in young readers' abilities to characterise through more nuanced ways (183). Descriptions of characters are put there for a purpose, as all of fiction is carefully structured and manufactured. However, a character's physical description does not *have* to reveal any inner life at all; it may not be put there for any other purpose than to create a more complete image of the character (Docherty 1983, 9-42). Physical descriptions will also have different impacts in mimetic or nonmimetic fictions (Nikolajeva 2002, 183). In fairytales blond hair indicates goodness, much like white hats in Westerns; black hair, or black hats, indicate badness (where, as theorised by Midas Dekkers in 2011, does this leave the redheads?). In mimetic fictions, the character may simply wear a black hat. However, clothing, wounds or other deviating features do still connote a special meaning. The rise of physical descriptions as a means of characterisation comes from the late eighteenth-century theory of physiognomy which directly linked appearance to psychology (Nikolajeva 2002, 183). Although discredited completely, it still influences fiction (Rimmon-Kenan 2002, 65).

The body is a charged field of judgement, particularly in children's literature. Descriptions of a character's physical features and clothing are often shorthand for that character's mental and moral states; from Miss Honey and the Trunchbull to Harry Potter, the body is a place of meaning. In children's war literature, the war often has a direct impact on the character's bodies, either because they are actively involved with combat, or because the war has severe influences on the character's wealth and access to personal hygiene or clothing. Clothing is of particular importance to children and teenagers; certain styles or items of clothing are needed to "fit in" and therefore bely affluence and hip-ness, whereas a lack of these items may be considered to imply poverty or counter-cultural attitudes. Sharp contrasts between characters and their dress can then be used to foreground the differences between the characters' personalities, as well as the different ways through which the war impacts them. They can also serve more obviously as demarcations of in- and outgroupings in the form of uniforms. Particularly in a war scenario in- and outgrouping based on fashion and appearance becomes foregrounded; race, age, sex, or military memberships are expressed through the body and therefore categorise a character. The intensification of grouping in war contexts foregrounds this form of characterisation. Descriptions in dress, age, sex, ability, race, or any other physical characteristic immediately place a character in a particular group. Especially when these descriptions are foregrounded, highlighting differences or similarities, the

grouping of characters within the narrative through physical features is emphasised. Physical grouping can have real and damaging effects on extra-textual lives; racism, sexism, ableism and many other means of oppression based on physical differences are borne from similar focussing on physical appearance.

Physical appearance can also be used to signal a character's change of personality. One of the most famous examples of this can be drawn from Frances Hodgson Burnett's *The Secret Garden* (1911), where both the protagonist Mary and her cousin Colin go through personality changes so significant that their bodies change. Mary goes from sallow, yellow-tinged and skinny to plump, flushed and healthy; Colin's change is so profound that he is "miraculously cured" from his disability. The body then acts as almost a direct metaphor for character development; if a character is described as looming large, this may have been that they are domineering, if on the other hand a character is described as small (especially if put in direct contrast with a large character) this may signal their status of powerlessness or submission to the other character.

I Like the Way You Think

Although in fiction physical representations may be used to hint at a character's morality, most of our ethical lives are internal; the judgments we make of others, our self-analyses and our construction of our own ethical frameworks are all based in our minds. The same counts for characters; provided we are granted access to their interiority, their minds show the reader their reasoning, motivations, judgments and norms and values. "Narrative fiction is the only literary genre, as well as the only kind of narrative, in which the unspoken thoughts, feelings, perceptions of a person other than the speaker can be portrayed" (Cohn 1978, 7). It is also the most insightful way for us to consider ethical issues, as we are not normally privy to the other's internal life which informs their decision making. Interiority as a means of characterisation is both the most complicated and cognitively demanding (Nikolajeva 2014a, 80). Characterisation through interiority strongly invites empathy and mind-modelling engagement (ibid), as "it seems that the more we know about characters' interiority, the stronger we engage with them emotionally" (81). However, it is not often the focus of fiction, which instead concentrates on action (ibid). When interiority is not represented in the narrative, the ethical image is opaque and dependent on authoritative narratorial interjections and characters' speech and actions. The reader's mind-model of the character, particularly their morality, is not entrusted to the reader but instead handheld by the narrator. When interiority is represented however, the reader is freed to engage with the character's emotions,

opinions, judgements and beliefs, and compare those to the character's actions, other characters, or even the narrator's statements. This increases the cognitive demand on the reader, as they have more elements to employ their empathic and mind-modelling skills on.

The character's internal life functions in two ways; it can place them as either in- or outgroup depending on the values they hold, and it can demonstrate the narrative's ideology. The first function is relatively straightforward; if the character holds values or has motivations that are portrayed in a negative fashion by the narrative (generally through narratorial interruptions) or considered negatively by the reader themselves, this character will be considered outgroup. Mental illnesses or other forms of disturbed interiority can also repulse the reader away from empathy, placing that character in the outgroup unless manipulated otherwise. As a result, the ethics of that character's actions is judged significantly differently. We are kinder and more forgiving in our moral judgements of our ingroup than we are of our outgroup (Lane et al. 2010, 885). Although we do not necessarily view the outgroup as more negative than the ingroup, we do consider them in less positive terms (Vezzali et al. 2015, 109). Using a character's interiority to place them in the reader's outgroup therefore has strong implications on the way the reader views the character's morality.

Secondly, a character's interiority can demonstrate the narrative's ideology through its construction of a moral framework. What norms and values are considered ingroup worthy, as demonstrated by other means of narrative empathy manipulation, or are overtly praised by the narrator or other characters, belies the narrative's underlying ideologies. In order to overcome the issue in children's literature that an inexperienced reader may not pick up on the desired traits or agree with the narrative's ideology, the narrative may resort to authoritative narratorial interruptions to emphasise the ethical point being made. Additionally, once a character is established as ingroup, their moral judgments of other characters or events are more likely to be adopted by the reader. Most often, the reader is supposed to align themselves with the protagonist. Although the reader may be expected to resist the negative traits of a character, this cannot be assumed with inexperienced readers. Through aligning themselves with a character they may identify with them and adopt their belief system fully, warts and all. Through this, the ideology of the text may be reproduced in the reader as well.

Talk Me Through It

Dialogue can reveal character motivation and morals: truthfulness of the dialogue, what is disclosed and what is not, and which characters are interacted with; all reveal the ethical

framework in which the character operates. In this sense speech is an action and carries similar ethical implications as action does. Which characters are allowed to speak, are spoken with, and what is said to them reveals the ideology of a narrative. A thorough exploration of how speech can act as characterisation can be found in Nikolajeva's *The Rhetoric of Character in Children's Literature* (2002). My aim here is not to reinvent the wheel, nor is it to regurgitate her findings there. Instead, I will provide a brief overview of them and then move on to the ethical elements. The primary distinction to be made is between direct and indirect speech; the difference between "'You can piss off, Yank', came a voice from the other side of the plane" (Dowswell 2012, 27), and "someone told him to piss off". Indirect speech allows for perspective ambiguity as well as ambiguity between speech and thought (Nikolajeva 2002, 224). The tag connected to direct speech can also add to the reader's mind-model of the speaking character; "'Or she wanted a pee,' *snarled* Gregson" (Westall 1989, 190, emphasis added). Additionally, the narrator may add an adverb to the speech tag to further add to characterisation: "'I believe it could replace the horse,' said Leonard *proudly*" (Pratchett 1997, 103, emphasis added). The tags "being the narrator's statements" may not (completely) reflect the character's interiority (Nikolajeva 2002, 227). Although the narrator's interjections do add to characterisation, they may clash with or present a false image of the character's interiority, which creates ambiguity regarding who should be believed and thus heightens cognitive demands on the reader. Direct speech is simple to read, yet cognitively demanding "since the [relative] absence of narrative agency leaves readers without guidance" (231); it is left to the reader to interpret whether a character is truthful or not, and if not to infer why they may be lying.

One of the most ethically charged and ambiguous speech acts is lying. Lying is generally not seen as an ethically desirable trait, with a lot of emphasis placed on truthfulness as a virtue especially for children, and having a protagonist openly be a liar may make them morally ambiguous and complicated. However, as demonstrated at length by Kerry Mallan in *Secrets, Lies and Children's Literature* (2013), lying itself holds an ambiguous place in children's literature and culture alike, and "to dismiss or condone lying as deception as 'natural' or to condemn all lying as morally reprehensible simplifies and obscures other factors which account for why we often choose to lie or deceive rather than tell the truth" (212). Through the act of lying, children can transform themselves into active, empowered subjects resisting adult domination (ibid.) Additionally, as stated by Bettina Kümmerling-Meibauer and Jörg Meibauer, lies are only potentially morally ambiguous, and if a child does

not learn how to lie this indicates disordered development (2011, 164). The ability to lie is expected from neuro- and socially typical children, sometimes even necessary for survival, and can therefore not be seen as inherently evil.

As is the case with literacy and other cognitive skills, the detection of deception or lies with socio- and neurotypical readers is dependent on experience and cognitive development, and through that, age. Empirical research by Joan Peskin has shown that three-year-olds are able to recognise pretense and pretend-play, but unable to predict false belief (1996, 1746); as this is a skill relying on a sophisticated use of Theory of Mind necessary for detecting deception. Slightly older children, however, when presented with a truth narrative which later clashes with an informant's claims, "may readily infer that the speaker has a deceptive communicative intent" (Kang et al. 2002, 1700). Theory of Mind, or mind-modelling in the case of literature, as argued extensively by scholars such as Lisa Zunshine (2012) and Maria Nikolajeva (2015), is a skill which can be trained both through extra-textual and textual engagement; it first starts at roughly four years old and develops throughout one's lifetime, theoretically increasing one's ability to detect deception.

The contents of a character's speech are not only important when they are not truthful, however. It is through speech that both characters and the implied author can espouse ideology. Through adult characters (including the narrator) the narrative can perform its didactic goal and reveal its own ideologies (Nikolajeva 2002, 234). Characterisation occurs on the moral plane through speech content as well; characters express their own moral judgements and beliefs (235), and when their reactions to situations clash with other characters' comments, all parties involved are characterised through contrast (234). The style through which characters talk also adds to the reader's mind-model of them (237), as they can sound haughty, old-fashioned, stupid or arrogant, or anything else. Dialect or slang used by characters also adds to our mind-model (238-239), as we can place them in age, class, or geographical groups (or any other groups). Through this the characters are placed in our in- or outgroups, either enhancing or limiting the reader's potential empathy for them.

To allow for a full understanding of the mechanics of characterisation focusing on the three concepts of physical description, dialogue and interiority, I next analyse three novels. For physical description, I turn to Michelle Magorian's *Goodnight Mister Tom* (1981/2015). Like embodied emotions, physical descriptions can function as a base for characterisation; they are important, and the first thing we notice about other people. In terms of fiction, physical descriptions are structured in to serve a particular purpose. Having established this

basis, I then move on to interiority in Robert Westall's *The Machine Gunners* (1975). Interiority is slightly harder to grasp but more explicitly ethical, as it concerns motivations and internalised ideologies. I finish the analyses section with a discussion of speech in Siobhan Dowd's *Bog Child* (2008). Speech, especially when combined with interiority, displays how we engage with the world around us based on our situation and ideology. Through these close readings I demonstrate both how characterisation influences the ethics of a narrative, and how the war scenario impacts these specific techniques as well. I round off the chapter by considering my findings and transitioning to the next chapter, which delves deeper into both characterisation and ethics by adding the explicitly ethical element of action (and reaction).

I Could See It in Your Eyes

One of the most common war stories in British literature is the evacuee story. This type of narrative is notable mostly because it deals directly with concerns of identity, thus inherently displaying a focus on characterisation. As Gillian Lathey argued, the need to establish a role in a new setting, both social and cultural, may result in insecurity as well as empowerment in a unique and forceful breaking of family ties and necessary the resulting "reappraisal of one's identity" (Lathey 1999, 173). A prime example of that comes from Michelle Magorian's *Goodnight Mister Tom* (1981/2015). This novel is an evacuee story set in 1939, when eight-year-old Willie Beech is evacuated to Little Weirwold, where he is taken in by Tom Oakley (Mister Tom). Although its protagonist is quite young, the novel foregrounds the very heavy theme of child abuse on several levels and in a shockingly explicit fashion, culminating in a seemingly potential murder of the child protagonist. Therefore, although the writing style is fairly easily accessible and the language used is not difficult, the implied reader for this narrative is most likely to be 12 and up.

The first significant descriptions of both Willie and Tom occur when they are introduced to each other. Their physical appearances are described from the other's focalisation. In the description there is an emphasis on the act of gazing on the other: "Tom took a second look at the child. The boy was thin and sickly-looking, pale with limp sandy hair and dull grey eyes" (Magorian 2015, 3). Tom's view of Willie is centred on health; he notices first his malnutrition, then his uncleanliness, followed by his plainness. Ordering the observation in this manner both puts forward Tom's priorities and values and sets up the contrast between the two characters. For Willie's description of Tom there is a mixture of the narrator's authorial version, and Willie's perception: "Tom was well into his sixties, a

healthy, robust, stockily-built man with a head of thick white hair. Although he was of average height, in Willie's eyes he was a towering giant with skin like coarse, wrinkled brown paper and a voice like thunder" (ibid). The narrator provides the "authentic" version of Tom, putting him into stark contrast with Willie by equally focussing on health. Starting the second sentence with the author stating that "although" Tom was not exceptionally tall, he was imposing to Willie characterises Willie; he is intimidated by what the narrator sees as an average, healthy man. Thus, the reader can infer that Willie is an easily scared child.

The importance of physical description is further developed through the focus on clothing. Willie is purposefully dressed in grey, dull clothing which is inappropriate for the weather. His best friend, Zach, stands out in the narrative because of the way that his appearance is described:

It was the boy's appearance more than anything which attracted Willie's attention. He was taller than him but at a guess about nine years old. His body was wiry and tanned and he had a thick crop of black curly hair which looked badly in need of cutting. All he wore was a baggy pair of red corduroy shorts held up by braces, and a pair of battered leather sandals. Several coloured patches were sewn neatly around the seat of his pants. Apart from these, his back and legs were completely bare. Willie could not take his eyes off him (57-58).

This description of Zach's clothing especially is repeated shortly after through Tom's authoritative adult focalisation, emphasising to the reader that Zach's appearance is indeed noteworthy and different even in the story world. Zach's appearance also stands in direct contrast with Willie's; sickly and thin versus wiry and tanned, sandy limp hair versus unruly black curls indicate that Zach could not be further from Willie's introduction. It communicates to the reader firstly that Zach's personality is indeed significantly different from Willie's, but it also characterises Zach as an outdoorsy child, physically active, unruly, and, perhaps based on the black curls, Jewish. The most foregrounded element of Zach's appearance is his wild fashion, again emphasised because of its contrast with Willie's clothing; bright and colourful, for the time indecently uncovered, and as signalled by the carefully sown patches, well taken care of. Throughout their friendship in the village, Willie is always the shy, quiet child whilst Zach is the loud extrovert.

The differences between Zach and Willie could serve to place Zach permanently in Willie's outgroup. However, because the two of them are very close friends, they override this boundary between them, placing Zach in Willie's ingroup whilst maintaining difference. A subtle technique, this demonstrates a moral slant in the narrative: do not judge a book (or boy) by its cover, and do not let seeming differences dissuade you from engaging in friendships. The ingrouping of Zach is further foregrounded after Zach dies. Willie slowly learns how to accept both Zach's death and through that, the extroverted sides to his own personality. When he asks Zach's foster mother for his bike, "[s]he was about to say that he looked and sounded a little like Zach. He had an extrovert air about him, and that was unusual in Will" (432). Willie's personality change is represented directly in his appearance; here, his adoption of some of Zach's traits lead to him starting to look like his late friend as well. Through this, the lines between self and Other are further blurred, showing the reader that not only can you like and engage with an Other who may seem outgroup at first; you are or can be like them yourself as well. By subtly counteracting the in- and outgrouping the narrative set up itself, it espouses an ideology of openness and care for others.

Both Willie and Tom have to re-evaluate their identities because of the war; Willie is freed from the clutches of his abusive mother for the first time, while Tom, who was unable to have children with his late wife, suddenly has to care for a young boy in need. Willie becomes healthier and develops his own personality, slowly building confidence. The change in Willie is clearest when put in contrast with other characters, as when he is called home to his mother and she does not recognise him anymore:

She had been looking for a thin little boy dressed in grey. Here stood an upright, well-fleshed boy in sturdy ankle boots, thick woollen socks, a green rolled-up jersey, and a navy-blue coat and balaclava. His hair stuck out in a shiny mass above his forehead and his cheeks were round and pink. It was a great shock to her (264).

Again, Willie's physical description is focalised through an adult, adding authority to his image. The description emphasises the difference between Willie before he left and after he came home by firstly reminding the reader of what Willie was like before his changes; they were gradual after all and after 200 pages of following Willie the reader may not be able to remember what Willie originally looked like. After emphasising Willie's new confidence ("upright"); health ("well-fleshed", "round and pink" cheeks and shiny hair); individualism (his coloured clothing as opposed to dull grey); and his being well taken care of (new, good

quality clothing), the narrator tells the reader that all of these positive developments were a shock to Willie's mother. This both characterises Willie and his mother; it foregrounds the changes he has gone through, and because she is shocked despite all of these changes being positive, her abusive nature is brought forward as well. The reader is supposed to be put off by Willie's mother whilst approving of his physical changes; creating clear boundaries between both Willie and his mother as well as the reader and his mother, Willie is more firmly placed in the reader's ingroup whilst she is firmly placed outside of it. As moral judgements of those Other to us highlight the negative and downplay the positive (Dunham et al. 2011), the reader is supposed to judge Willie's mother strongly and severely.

Tom's physical and character changes are first described by another adult character, with heavy focus on the act of gazing:

Mrs Fletcher looked steadily into his eyes. His forehead had lost its old furrowed look. The deep pitted wrinkles above his head had softened outwards. Behind his scowling manner was a kindly old man and if it hadn't been for the arrival of a rather insipid little boy, she might never have known, nor might anyone else for that matter (192).

This description is dripping with adult authority, brought forward in the first line. By highlighting that it is an adult's focalisation through which the description is delivered, the narrative attempts to communicate to the reader that this account accurately describes Tom's character and physique. The excerpt, like the other cases of physical characterisation, is based on contrasts, which in this case are based on adjectives directly linked to character traits: "scowling", "kindly" as well as "softened" directly link the body to the character. The way Willie, who at the end of the narrative reinvents himself as Will or William, views Tom reflects the change in both of them. When they are first introduced, Willie is scared of Tom whom he sees as a looming, dominant presence directly opposed to his own self-perceived insignificance. However, after re-evaluating his own identity Will finds that he has grown, both physically and emotionally. "As with the sudden discovery of the lowness of his peg Will noticed now how old and vulnerable Tom looked. It unnerved him at first, for he had always thought of him as being strong" (448). Will's discovery of his own significance, revealed to him through his new identity, also changes the way that Tom appears to him; focalised through Will as a confident person, Tom is no longer the terrible giant he was, instead being "reduced" to the old man he always was.

Physical descriptions like this are always present as a form of characterisation in literature. However, in children's war literature and in this case evacuee stories, there is an added element to them. The characters in these stories are, through the war, plunged into new, challenging situations, their family ties broken. As a result, they must reconsider their own identities and personalities, because of which the narrative focus on characterisation is foregrounded as well. Wartime bodies reflect the intense influence war has on the character developments of children's war literature. Through the changes and contrasts depicted in the physical descriptions of characters the narrative displays some of its underlying ideologies, as well as who is in- or outgroup. In *Goodnight Mister Tom*, the internal transformations of both Tom and Willie are reflected in positive changes in their appearance also; Willie gains a healthy appearance, and Tom starts to physically show his kindness. Stating that this is a good change, although it may seem obvious, is already a form of ethical discourse: Willie's building confidence and self-sufficiency are not a positive in the eyes of his mother and may be framed negatively in different cultures and/or times. Additionally, Tom's change (at least in the eyes of Willie) from a strong domineering figure to a vulnerable old man could easily be framed as a negative, as he has lost his power and virility. This change is based on both his care for Willie and Willie's own maturation. However, by framing it in a positive light the narrative espouses an ethics not of the power and might of adulthood, but of gentleness and empathy.

Additionally, the reader may be moved to pity or empathy for Willie based on the way his looks are described, particularly when put in contrast with how he improves under Tom's care. Through placing emphasis on this change, the narrative pushes the reader to engage emotionally with a character who is severely abused. The implied reader may not have experienced such abuse, so through reading this novel and having the ramifications foregrounded in part through Willie's body, they are encouraged to care about Willie's situation. Through this, the narrative has an ethical purpose; to talk to a child audience about child abuse, showing (some of) the signs, and stating that it does indeed happen. This is further encouraged by placing Willie in the reader's ingroup; he is one of the protagonists, so we are presumably supposed to like him, and he is young, like the implied reader. However, physical description is a narrative strategy which acts as just one in a constellation of characterisation. Physical descriptions display an assumed personality and morality; however, through fiction we can have access to this interiority hinted at through the body. It is to this interiority I turn next.

If You Think So

Robert Westall's *The Machine Gunners* (1975) is a WWII novel placed in England, telling the story of Chas McGill who loots a machine gun from a downed German plane and sets up a fortress with his friends so they can defend their town from the Germans. Its early chapters appear to set up a stark binary between the English and the Germans – which is challenged later in the novel through the humanisation and focalisation of the German bomber, Rudi. This falls into line with other narratives such as Michael Morpurgo's *Friend or Foe* (1982), Jan Needle's *A Game of Soldiers* (1985) and Westall's *Blitzcat* (1989). The Germans are Othered; they are not known, seen, or heard of by the characters nor the reader until the appearance of Rudi midway through the novel, and throughout the novel are framed by the adults as villainous. All English adult characters, who hold authority over the child characters, both have and express intensely negative views of the Germans, which they do not hide from the children. Through this strong in- and outgroup divisions are created. The children then are expected to pick up on this attitude, and generally do. When the children set up their fort in Nicky's garden, their (mostly) pretend play is that they are holding the fort against German enemies, whom they intend to and do gun down when a fighter plane flies over. The implied child reader of this novel is of a comparable age as was the case with Needle's analysed above; they deal with similar themes in a similarly straightforward fashion. The young protagonist, fairly simple plot and accessible levels of embedment and emotion expression mark the implied reader as around ten years old.

Access to Chas' mind complicates our ethical image of him, as it adds ambiguity and nuance. This is most strongly exemplified when Chas has to lie to his father, who is "the only one Chas could never have deceived" (43). Chas asks his father if he can swap his trainset for his friend's telescope, which is much more valuable than the trainset. After hearing Chas and his friend got approval from his father, Mr McGill enthusiastically approves, and offers to make a tripod for it so it can stand up. However, Chas never wanted the tripod for the telescope, instead intending to use it for the machine gun. Additionally, Chas' friend's father was never involved in the made-up transaction between telescope and trainset. This lie makes Chas feel like "a rat. It was a much worse pain than parting with his beloved railway" (110). Chas chooses to lie to his father in order to have the machine gun repaired, juggling his moral beliefs on the importance of the machine gun and "doing your bit" for the war, and his view and beliefs on his father as a formidable figure of authority. As Mallan would phrase it, Chas chooses "to become an active subject with the power to resist [adult] domination" (2013,

212), his father's domination, which foregrounds Chas' moral dilemma. Admitting that he needs his father's help with the machine gun, rather than a camera tripod, would result in the loss of the machine gun and all of the children involved getting in trouble. Lying would mean that the machine gun gets repaired, and nobody gets in trouble (in Chas' eyes at least). From the perspective of doing what you can to defend for your country, this lie could be entirely justified. This is where Chas' interiority becomes important, however, as Chas' love for the machine gun does not come from a "doing your bit" focus on its importance in the war; it is the one piece that makes his war souvenir collection the best in the land. Therefore, Chas' defence of and attachment to the machine gun is not morally "pure", and his lie is equally ambiguous. Highlighting Chas' intense negative emotions resulting directly from his lie against his father potentially makes it more palatable for the reader, however; especially the comparison to the feeling of loss of a beloved toy serves to strengthen extradiegetic empathic engagement.

The Machine Gunners is focused on empathy and wanting to do right by others, even the enemy Other. However, the narrative does not extend this empathy to all characters and considers some as lesser, and therefore not deserving of empathy or moral action. Covert communication of ideology, which Hollindale labelled organic ideology (2011, 42), is the strongest and potentially most dangerous as the implied reader, especially an inexperienced reader, is more susceptible to that than to overt means. In *The Machine Gunners* the most covert and unaddressed ideologies are classism and an undercurrent of racism. The classism is the most apparent when Chas sees a lower-class family in the beginning of the novel when he is hunting for war souvenirs. Chas immediately dehumanises them:

The family were scurrying around *like ants* from a broken nest, making heaps of belongings they had salvaged, and then breaking up the heaps to make new heaps. *Chas watched them as if they were ants, without sympathy, because they were a slummy kind of family*; a great fat woman in carpet slippers and a horde of boys of assorted sizes; hair like lavatory brushes, coarse maroon jerseys that wouldn't fasten at the neck and boots with steel heelplates (Westall 1975, 4-5; emphasis mine).

The comparison of the family to ants is a means to picture them explicitly as an Other, or outgroup, as grotesquely different to the ingroup. As cognitive psychological research has demonstrated, ingroup membership greatly limits the ability to empathise with and act ethically towards outgroup members (Sparks, Schinkel, Moore 2017, 246), which Chas

demonstrates by his disgust for the lower-class family. Here the family is dehumanised first in free indirect discourse, which blends the authority of the (implied adult) narrator and the opinions of the child character. The effect of this is that a character's opinion may come across as true, and as this is the first description the reader gets of this family it potentially has a lasting impression of them as Other and lesser. The following sentence clarifies that it is Chas who passes the classist judgement on them.

The narrator's interjection of "without sympathy" is interesting as it both criticises Chas for dehumanising the family and at the same time implies that sympathy is an appropriate emotion to experience while gazing at a working-class family. Additionally, the next clause passes further judgement on the family once again in FID. Therefore, although the narrator appears to find and present Chas' views of the family as disagreeable, the narrative perpetuates these views itself by presenting Chas' classism through the medium of the narrator's authority. Classism forms a part of the text's underlying ideology, which although it is foregrounded by the narrative remains unresolved. Therefore, as Hollindale would say, the questionable values of classism which "seemed to be on trial" (2011, 48) are reaffirmed by the narrative. By foregrounding but not resolving the issue of classism, the narrative communicates not only that such values and judgements exist, but potentially that this is not a negative viewpoint to have.

The power balance between adults and children informs the ethical impact of a narrative on an inexperienced reader in the discourse, as the age gap between narrator and focaliser influences the way readers are presented with the ethical discourse (Fjällström, Kokkola 2014). As Mieke Bal argues: when the narrator is not a child, but the focaliser is, this highlights the difference between the two roles (1997, 148). Additionally, the focalised character "will have an advantage over the other characters. The reader watches with the character's eyes and will, in principle, be inclined to accept the vision presented by that character" (Bal 1997, 147). Thus, as the implied reader is presumed to empathise the most with the focalised character, they are also likely to adopt that character's moral views. The discourse of *The Machine Gunners* is particularly interesting in regard to this child-adult ethical power relationship and its empathic basis. For most of the narrative, the focaliser is either the protagonist Chas or another of the children. However, there are also many, albeit brief, instances mentioned above where the chief focaliser of a chapter is an adult. The first of these is in chapter four which is from the perspective of English teacher Stan Liddell. Before this chapter, Liddell is introduced as "Mr Liddell, the English master", "The English master",

and “Captain Liddell of the Garmouth Home Guard” (13). Yet chapter four refers to him by his first name exclusively, and through his subordinate relationship with the Headmaster portrays him as similar to the children in that regard.

School teacher Stan Liddell gets several chapters and sub chapters dedicated to his attempt to recover the missing machine gun, suspected to be taken and hidden by Chas, and to prepare the Home Guard for invasion. In all but the last chapter, Stan’s focalised chapters portray him as “awkward” (31) and uncomfortable with authority. This is a narrative strategy aimed at achieving multiple things: creating the potential for extradiegetic empathy with the (adult) man who is trying to apprehend Chas by infantilising him to an extent, and the linked goal of opening the ethical horizons of the narrative so it is not limited to Chas’ ethical framework. It also forms the opportunity for an ethical dialogue within the narrative; and generates narrative tension by adding a cat-and-mouse element to the story. During the adult focalised parts of the narrative the adults only interact with other adults, and the child characters’ actions and minds are hidden from the reader. By hiding actions and emotions, both of which are all ethically charged, the narrative foregrounds a different moral framework at different points of the narrative. The main framework shown and developed throughout most of the story is that of Chas, because of which it is safe to say that the narrative favours Chas’ moral development over the other characters’. The arrival of Rudi, again, is an intended complication to this setup.

Rudi is introduced to the narrative midway through the novel, at which point focalisation is split almost evenly between Rudi and Chas. The language Rudi uses mirrors the language German characters would have used in English boy’s magazines and comics of the time (Lathey 1999, 225), with its unrealistic grammatical errors and misspelled “evil German” phrases (like “Hande hoch!” instead of Hände hoch, or “Dumkopf” instead of Dummkopf). Using this language provides a more modern reader insight into the ideology of the time, which Othered Germans and would have reduced Rudi to an unrepentant, purely evil Nazi. However, access to Rudi’s emotions, thoughts and fears for extended periods of time demystifies him and moves against simplistic Othering (ibid). Providing this much focalised insight into Rudi’s character is a narrative strategy with the aim of enhancing the chances of empathic engagement with a German character who would previously be considered the enemy, and therefore evil, and through that broadens the moral frameworks and implications within which the narrative operates.

In *The Machine Gunners*, the narrative constructs an attempt at crossing us versus them boundaries by allowing friendship between the English children and the German soldier, and by providing focalised insight into the emotions and beliefs of both sides. However, through the interiority of Chas combined with the narrator's injections, in- and outgroups are also constructed and fortified; the classism of the narrative is an underlying ideology made clear precisely because of our access to Chas' mind. Characters' interiority can thus add significantly to both characterisation and the story's ethics; by providing the reader insight into the beliefs and motivations of characters, the reader can add significantly to their mind-model of those characters. Those beliefs and motivations also lay bare the internalised ideologies of the characters, as well as their judgements of others and reasoning behind their own behaviour and circumstance. Ethics lies mostly in the mind; the reasons why we believe what we are doing is right originate from that key word *believe*. Through inner rationalisation and prioritisation, we are able to consider our moral frameworks. The context of war enhances the importance of interiority because of the foregrounded focus on in- and outgrouping. The unusual situation of war, for the implied reader at least, foregrounds interiority because characters now have to re-evaluate and be mindful of both themselves and their situation in ways they did not previously. By allowing insight into these machinations, the narrative equally foregrounds the importance of interiority and its ethical ramifications. As hinted at in the brief discussion on interiority and lying, speech is an enactor of our ideologies. Therefore, it is the focus of my next analysis.

Whatever You Say, Say Nothing

Siobhan Dowd's *Bog Child* (2008) is a novel about the Troubles, telling the story of Fergus, whose brother Joe is imprisoned for being an IRA member and currently on hunger strike. In the novel, Fergus himself becomes involved with the IRA as well. Already, there is an intense ethical element to this novel; the IRA are, by many, understood to be a terrorist organisation. This novel is, like *Heroes*, a YA novel targeted at an older audience. With its themes of resisting the status quo, finding your own voice and power in the face of institutionalised oppression, young love and sexual awakening, and a complex portrayal of terrorist involvement, *The Bombs* clearly implies an adolescent audience. Having said that, terrorism is not an off-limits topic for younger audiences. By implicating the protagonist with the IRA, the reader's empathy is challenged; do we want to be ingrouped with terrorists? Joe's situation is surrounded by secrecy and lies, as Fergus is attempting to move on to Scotland and leave the Troubles behind him once and forever; if everyone was to know the truth, this would become

impossible. Because of this, as well as the danger implied when talking about the IRA to the wrong people, speech is intensely charged. There are four distinct areas where speech, or silence, is vital in this novel: Fergus' relationship with his love interest and her mother; his friendship with a Welsh soldier; his own involvement with the IRA; and Uncle Tally and Joe's deceit.

Silence is an important side to the speech coin, and one which Fergus employs a lot. His silence acts as an erasure of his brother's existence, a rewriting of truth. Cora, Fergus' love interest, and Felicity, her mother, are from the Republic of Ireland, staying at Fergus' mother's B&B while Felicity does archaeological research on Mel, a bog body Fergus finds. For reasons not made explicit to the reader, Mam tells Fergus not to mention Joe to them: 'And remember: not a word to the guests' (72). The reason for this could be, as Fergus explains earlier in the novel, that the B&B business is failing, and they desperately need the income. Cora and Felicity may not desire to stay at a business with direct IRA links. Fergus omitting Joe is not a direct lie; he does not state that he does not have a brother, he simply does not mention him at all. He is, however, rewriting a version of the truth narrative; in this version, Joe never existed. Cora and Felicity have no reason to question this; they have strong affective ties to Fergus, which leads to enhanced trust (De Rosnay 2009, 759), and he has not previously provided inaccurate or false information (as far as they are aware). Throughout his young relationship with Cora, he never reveals the truth to her. Ethically, this is a highly ambiguous situation; it is understandable, perhaps, why Fergus would not reveal the full truth. Additionally, he is told not to by his mother. However, his decision to never tell the truth to Cora means that if their relationship were to manifest (it does not), it would be based on a lie – which would necessarily at some point come out. Fergus' moral framework, then, allows for deceit even with loved ones.

Owain is a Welsh soldier Fergus befriends during his runs on the mountain. To him, Fergus presents yet another version of the truth: he *does* have brother, but he is on holidays in Rome. Owain and Fergus' relationship is more complicated than that between Fergus, Cora and Felicity; because of the nature of the Troubles Owain and Fergus are, as a Brit and a Republican, enemies at opposite sides of a conflict. They like each other, yet they are constantly cautious and hyper aware of their situation. There is also a power difference between the two: Owain is an armed border guard, Fergus a Republican teenager. After their first encounter, which was entirely friendly, Fergus fears Owain may shoot him in the back. Although their trusts build up, it is on shaky grounds throughout their tentative friendship.

Fergus also lies to Owain about his runs up the mountain; he does not admit for a significant time that his runs are to smuggle packages across the border for the IRA. He does, however, reveal this to Owain after a bombing leaves Fergus morally mortified that he was responsible for innocents' deaths. At the same time, he reveals that his brother is imprisoned and on hunger strike. So, where Fergus could not be truthful to Cora and Felicity, he can with somebody who is more obviously in his outgroup.

After telling the truth to Owain, he asks to be shot, arrested, or any way to get out of his situation. Owain replies:

'Fergus, I don't know if I'm going to turn you in.'

Fergus stared at Owain, wide-eyed. 'What?'

'You're in one trap, I'm in another.' As he spoke, Owain sliced the silver blade roughly through the tape. Grey fluff from the bag's padding floated out. 'You and me – we're like two rats in two cages looking across at one another' (250).

While expressing a similarity and closeness so significant to him that it interferes with his duty of service, Owain meaningfully also emphasises their difference; they are rats in separate cages, and although they are similar, they can only gaze at each other. It turns out that it was not Semtex, but condoms that Fergus was smuggling. After laughing together about the situation, Fergus runs off as Owain shouts at him: "‘You bloody bog-eyed Irish taig,’ he called" (252). Again, Owain foregrounds difference and distance between the two: taig is a slur against Catholics in Northern Ireland, and foregrounding his Irishness combined with the swearwords Owain's speech does not imply closeness, unless it is to be taken ironically as the characters just spent some time laughing together, and this would be a shocking mood switch. Novice readers cannot, however, be expected to understand irony. The speech tag is equally vague, as "he called" reveals nothing about the emotion behind Owain's statement; is he angry? Joking? The difference in intonation would significantly change the implications of his statement – and through that the reader's mind-model of him.

Fergus is approached by his brother Joe's old friend, Michael, who intimidates him into smuggling for him. Fergus does not accept the offer until Michael implies that he can help Joe stop his hunger strike, something Fergus deeply desires:

You're a fit man. We've watched you. You run like the wind. There's only ever one squaddie posted up there. At most. And easy to dodge. I promise you,

you'd be helping the Cause big time. And helping the hunger strikers. It might even be the saving of them. Of Joe. Len. And the rest (70).

Michael never goes into any specifics; Fergus assumes this is because the IRA relies on secrecy and does not pry. Michael never tells him what he is smuggling nor who he is smuggling for; when Fergus assumes it is for the IRA and it is to do with explosives, Michael also does not correct him. He is instead smuggling condoms and birth control for Michael himself, for financial gain. Is this lying? It is certainly morally dubious, and its negative ethical implications are foregrounded because they deeply affect the protagonist.

The more complex deception around Joe's imprisonment is centred around Uncle Tally. At several points in the novel Fergus asks Uncle Tally why he does not ever come to visit Joe. He asks Joe the same question, and both claim that they have had a falling out about a girl. Fergus, who again has strong affective ties with both characters, has no reason to mistrust this. Joe is no longer lucid due to his hunger strike and has proffered false information on many occasions. However, this information was always about his state of hunger, never about his life before imprisonment. Further, both he and Uncle Tally, another not fully trustworthy character, have previously in the novel mentioned a particular, unnamed girl as being quite significant to their lives. Connecting these dots, Fergus trusts both in their claim. The implied reader is also meant to believe this, as the narrative is focalised through Fergus. Uncle Tally and Joe's relationship appears peripheral to the story and its themes, and as this is not in the detective genre there is no reason for the reader to question everything, including side plots. Fergus' faith in his brother and uncle may therefore translate to the reader. However, it is later revealed that Uncle Tally, who explicitly told Fergus that he was not a member of the IRA, yet is strangely respected throughout the town, is in fact an IRA bombmaker. This is revealed suddenly to both the reader and Fergus at the same time, and only right before Fergus discovers that Uncle Tally resisted arrest and was shot to death by British police. After Owain is targeted in a bombing and dies, Fergus connects the dots and reveals the truth to himself and the reader:

And he saw the funeral party around the Sheehans' family plot, the men in balaclavas.

The Provos with the Drumleash slope to their shoulders. The man at the end, who'd reminded him of Joe.

And then he knew. The local bomb-maker, Deus. Thaddeus.

Part of him had known it all along. The smell of Christmas in Uncle Tally's

room had been of marzipan, almond-flavoured: the smell of Sementex (Dowd 2008, 314-315).

The reveal of the truth here is much in the style of a detective novel, however, unlike a detective both Fergus and the reader were not primed from the beginning to question every single character and clue. It is therefore unlikely that the implied reader, who is supposed to adopt Fergus' trust in the narratives presented by Joe and Uncle Tally, would arrive to this vision of the truth much before Fergus does. Ethically, again, this situation is extremely complex. Joe and Uncle Tally kept their terrorist activities from Fergus, and directly lied to him; both about the reason why Uncle Tally does not visit Joe, and Uncle Tally about not being an IRA member. Both characters are highly sympathetic to Fergus and are firmly in his ingroup. Their lies, as well as them being implicated not only in the deaths of innocents, but also in the death of Owain, a character who was also close to Fergus, complicate their moral standing.

The choice for an IRA story in my analysis of speech is perhaps on the nose, particularly considering their slogan (and this analysis' heading) of "whatever you say, say nothing". The specific war scenario in which this novel is set foregrounds both the power and danger of speech; who you can talk to and what about is determined by the context of the Troubles. Fergus' story is based on deception; he lies to his love interest and her mother, his parents, his friend Owain, and is lied to himself by his uncle Tally and Joe's friend. Their reasons for lying are complex and demonstrate the moral quandaries that come with the in- and outgrouping central in war stories; Joe, the subject of most of Fergus' lies, is presumed to be in the outgroup for Owain, Cora and Felicity. As Fergus' brother, however, he is firmly in his ingroup. Fergus also wants to add Owain, Cora and Felicity into his ingroups as well, however, because of the dangerous war context they are in he believes that any knowledge of his brother's (and through that, close ingroup) IRA ties would destroy any possibility of them being ingroup as well. He therefore has to lie to them. The silence in the novel also reflects the oppressive war context; the purpose Fergus' smuggling is kept from him and he does not ask for it, and Joe and Uncle Tally keep their true IRA roles from him as well. Not speaking here is powerful, but also multipurpose: Fergus is silent because of fear, Rafters is silent to instil fear, and Joe and Uncle Tally keep quiet presumably to protect both themselves and Fergus. All acts of speaking and not speaking are shaped by the war and demonstrate complex ethical decisions. War increases the ethical ambiguity of lies and enhances the power of

silence. Through the context of war, this characterisation strategy increases the ethical complexity.

Can You Hear Me Now?

In this chapter I analysed the three main ways of covert ideology characterisation; speech, internal representation, and physical description. Because we care about these fictional characters and are emotionally engaged with them, their characteristics and behaviours are important to us. The type of people they are and their conduct form a network of traits charged with moral implications; because we are emotionally affected by them, their character shapes and betrays the ideology of the text. These forms of characterisation are temporally and culturally bound; however, that does not remove the fact that they are supposed to say *something* to the reader.

In children's war literature these three sources of characterisation information are adapted and foregrounded. For speech, who is spoken to and who has a right to speak is directly shaped by the war scenario. Where normally this element of characters' speech demonstrates the narrative's ideologies, in children's war literature it also clarifies even further the in- and outgroup demarcations. Speech also serves this function in general children's literature; however, in war the element of dangerous repercussions for fraternisation with the wrong people is emphasised. Additionally, as per the IRA threat "whatever you say, say nothing", during war the functions of speech to inform or to conceal are stressed, and given added moral elements. A character can be truthful, deceitful, or ambiguous in their speech. Contrasts between when the truth or deceit are framed as positive lay bare the narrative's moral framework. Internal representation on the other hand provides the reader access to the character's motives, beliefs, norms and values. Again, the choice of which character traits are framed as positive shows the narrative's ideology. The way through which the narrative can frame traits as positive is mostly clarified through which characters the narrative attempts to manipulate the reader to empathise with, and potential narratorial or character statements. Physical descriptions work in much the same way; they imply characters' mental and moral states in an implied fashion and are mostly clarified through narratorial and character statements, and manipulations through empathy.

As is the case with all narrative elements, the three forms of characterisation I discussed here do not operate separately; they may even provide contrasting information, which further complicates the moral framework constructed and opens discussion about the

ethics of the text. Discussing them in this way, however, I aimed to demonstrate just *how* they work to construct the narrative's ideology. Additionally, there are two further main means of characterisation which I have not yet discussed: action, and reaction. Their absence in this chapter may seem glaring, considering the strong ethical judgments placed on actions. However, by laying the foundation of characterisation with these "soft" sources of trait information, I aimed to demonstrate how a narrative's covert ideology is constructed before moving on to the more active, direct and overt nature of action. The result of having these two layers of overt and covert ideology is a complex and often ambiguous or contradictory picture of both characterisation and ethics, which I discuss in the following chapter.

4.

Actions Have Consequences

The two remaining central elements of characterisation are action, and reaction. In her extensive work on character, Nikolajeva states that actions “and events are elements of discourse that indicate a change of state” (2002, 198). Events are relevant to characterisation because they prompt a reaction from the character, which in turn reveals the character’s inner life, motivations and intentions just as much as actions do (ibid). All elements of actions are relevant to characterisation; the “physical, mental and communicative” all indicate the character’s mental and moral features (Margolin 2007, 77). However, action-based characterisation, unlike the forms discussed in the previous chapter, is external and authorial (Nikolajeva 2002, 198). Like with other forms of characterisation, this form of characterisation can be implicit or explicit. In the case of actions, the difference between these two is the clearest when combined with the previously discussed narrative techniques; is the reader privy to the character’s motivations, intentions, or beliefs about their own actions? This is decided by the narrator and the focaliser, and greatly influences both the characterisation and the ethics of the act. For example, a simple narrative like “a boy shoots dead his brother” is likely to lead the reader to an interpretation of the boy as an evil murderer. If more insight is allowed and the narrative turns into “a boy shoots dead his brother, knowing that it was the only thing he could do to save him” both the characterisation and the ethics of the act are greatly altered. I argue that this is because the ethics of the act *are* the characterisation. This is because to act is to act ethically. There are no actions, large or small, without ethical consequences nor any without moral consideration before, even if they are not conscious.

How actions form characterisation is highlighted through two common means; through either repetition or juxtaposition. The functioning of these two kinds of action is relatively

straightforward; repeated actions can indicate a character's stubbornness, determination or perseverance (Nikolajeva 2002, 198). For instance, if a character chooses to (and every action is a choice) carry her little brother's heavy rucksack for twenty miles, a couple of days in a row, this evokes a certain image of said character. Juxtaposition can highlight a contrast between characters or between situations (Nikolajeva 2002, 199). If normally a character runs into a shelter at the first siren, but upon seeing their pet stuck outside runs towards them before getting both into the shelter, this is a strong indicator of how the reader is supposed to see the character. Similarly, if the reader is shown two characters in this same scene, both aware of the pet but only one of them runs to save the pet, both characters are fleshed out through one character's action. Characterisation through action seems so obvious a means that it is often unexamined (Nikolajeva 2002, 222). Perhaps it is more fruitful to approach the subject through a philosophical perspective.

The Answers to Life, the Universe and Everything

The study of ethics entertains "theories about human nature, explore[s] the nature of value, discuss[es] competing accounts of the best way to live, ponder[s] the connections between ethics and human psychology, and discuss[es] practical ethical quandaries" (LaFollette 2000, 1). Within normative ethics, which studies the principles and guidelines to a "correct" life (LaFollette, 1) there are three main identifiable strands which focus either on consequence, motivation, or virtues as the sole indicator of correctness or incorrectness (Baron, Pettit, Slote 1997). Thus, the study of ethics can be divided up into consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. For the pure consequentialist it is only the consequences of actions that make them ethically correct or not (Sinnott-Armstrong 2003). Neither intention nor the act itself are a factor for this strand (Baron, Pettit, Slote 1997, 92-174). Deontological ethics, popularised by Kant, stands in stark opposition to this as it is mainly concerned with intentions. This is underlined by a sense of duty and obligation, or dignity. At its heart, deontology sees adherence to or deviation from a series of absolute rules as that which determines the morality of both action and character (Baron, Pettit, Slote 1997, 3-91). As summarised by Larry Alexander and Michael Moore, "deontology falls within the domain of moral theories that guide and assess our choices of what we ought to do (deontic theories), in contrast to those that guide and assess what kind of person we are and should be (aretaic [virtue] theories)" (2016). Virtue ethics is separate from both of these approaches and has its focus not on action but on character instead. A virtue philosopher, such as Aristotle, considers what traits make one "good" and how one can best allow them to realise their particular "purpose" (Baron,

Pettit, Slote 1997, 175-238). As emphasised by moral philosophers Rosalind Hursthouse and Glen Pettigrove, “virtues and vices will be foundational for virtue ethical theories and other normative notions will be grounded in them” (2016).

These are clear and different approaches, and although a character may lean towards or purport a certain strand more than another, or even as the only correct one, in practice these strands often get mixed. According to ethics philosopher and scholar Robert Roberts this is because: “Unlike actions, traits of character are not datable occurrences in a person’s history, but dispositions: temporally extended qualities that are *exhibited* presently in action, intention, desire, thought, and emotion” (2012, 1744). Instead of having solidified moral thoughts combined with “fixed possibilities” (Mahon 2017, 108), most people’s applied morality is vague and flexible. Consequently, the study of what is ethical in a psychological sense concerning human interaction tends to go beyond mere condemnation of an action or a thing as being either “good” or “bad”; instead it is the study of the philosophical virtues, of nuances and grey areas, of both intention and consequence (ibid.). Although the categories of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics are useful tools to analyse the ethics of a character or action, merely labelling someone as one or the other misses the nuance that is part of all human motivation and action. This nuance can be analysed at length in literature, which unlike extra-textual life provides a complete overview of what is deemed relevant to the events and characters engaged with ethical problems.

These underlying philosophical frameworks are unlikely to be translated directly to the young reader, and do not need to be. Although an analysis of any given text may seem to suggest that a narrative blatantly states “deontology is bad, virtue ethics and consequentialism are good”, that is both untrue and not the intention of such a reading. Rather, studying and verbalising these underlying and historical philosophical concepts reveals the presence and potential pervasiveness of certain moral attitudes, norms and values in society. For literature is a form of societal self-preservation: desirable mores are written down to be taught to future generations in attempts to socialise them within these moral frameworks. Self-sacrifice, for instance, is argued to be a classic moral lesson of children’s literature, taught both overtly and covertly from the inception of the field (Barker 2014, 102-103); though this position is not universally agreed upon (Nikolajeva 2014a, 185). In children’s war literature, the context of the emotionally (as well as morally and physically) extreme situation brings these moral frameworks to the foreground and reveals clearly what it is that we desire the child audience to learn.

Why Would You Do That?

Actions are ethically relevant due to their impact, as well as the motivation behind them. Insight into that is provided through interiority, discussed above. However, action does not necessarily come with interiority. In this case, much like in extra-textual life, the reader has to mind-model a motivation onto an opaque character. The nature of fiction complicates this, as it is necessarily structured and overtly so, unlike in extra-textual life. The expectation with fiction is that any action which is depicted must be relevant in some way (Nikolajeva 2002, 175); either for the plot (as Nikolajeva argues), or thematically. This indicates that as readers, there is a much higher demand on and expectation of causality and intentionality in fiction than there is in extra-textual life (ibid). There must be a reason for this action to take place; there must be a motivation for the character to behave in this way. The readerly expectations based on fiction's artificiality push us to engage our mind-modelling skills and come up with motivations for characters even when they are not provided; the expectation is that they must be there, otherwise the action would not be represented. We engage with fiction in this way and create mind-models for opaque characters even though there may not be any characterisation to be drawn from actions, as particularly in children's literature they may be fully demanded by the plot (Nikolajeva 2002, 177)

In children's literature causality is both foregrounded and complicated. As Nikolajeva argues, "children place still higher demands on causality as compared with adults (children often ask the question 'Why did he do so?'. Therefore, the way events and actions are combined in children's fiction is of overall importance" (2002, 175). Additionally, Nikolajeva states, children's decisions and actions are not as major as those adults perform, as any failures "are usually followed by success" and if they are not there still remains hope for reparations in the future, meaning a child's actions can never be truly a failure (2002, 173). This statement pre-echoes Beauvais' argument on children's literature being hopeful by definition, even in the case of death (2015, 46-49). The futurity of the child diminishes the (moral) consequences of their actions. Speaking of the child character rather than the reader, children's war literature complicates this approach to child characters' actions. The violence of war, even if not experienced on the battlefield itself, dramatically changes the potential consequences of (in)action; although a character can recuperate, death can (in realist fiction) not be reversed, lost limbs cannot be grown back. The moral consequences of (in)action are heightened, and although the child character is inherently hopeful, the intense social emotion of guilt can forever be a mark on a character's mind.

You Shouldn't Have Done That

Guilt is a social emotion based on action, whether enacted or imagined, which impacts another. Guilt depends on both an empathic understanding of another's distress, as well as self-identified causality of said distress (Parker, Thomas 216). In his extensive discussion on guilt in literature (2011, 175-220), Hogan states that "guilt is bound up with compassion" (180), and inherently focussed on the past act (218). Compassion differs from empathy in that it is based on negative emotional states of others (whereas empathy can be for any emotional state), it does not require an understanding of another's emotion, and it pushes to action. I disagree here with Hogan's claim, as guilt can come from empathy as well and does not necessarily lead to action. However, later in his chapter he switches to using the more appropriate term of empathy, stating that guilt is "a response to an aversive event in which there is a victim with whom one feels empathy" (216). Guilt is dependent empathy, because of which it is also moderated by it. By this I mean that because our outgroup empathy is limited, our in- and outgrouping severely influences the amount of guilt we can experience (Hogan 2011, 216-217). Narratives which promote cross-binary empathy may therefore equally allow for guilt regarding the impact our actions have on the Other. In a similar vein, however, narratives which occlude empathy for the Other diminish or even remove the ethical element, and thus the guilt, of our actions towards those in our outgroup. Guilt is a social emotion based on an action (perceived to be) directly impacting another, because of which it is an inherently ethical emotion as well.

Hogan also argues that guilt is moderated by degrees of salience in causality (216-217). However, this is not the case in children's literature, as children often feel guilty about others' (especially adults') behaviour (Nikolajeva 2014a, 200). Although complicated by children's literature, the causality factor of guilt cannot be ignored; as Nikolajeva argues, "[g]uilt derives from accidentally or deliberately harming someone, especially the object of desire" (2014a, 82). She expands the idea of harm by stating that guilt is caused by "[a]n action that prevents another individual's happiness" (83). Here she leaves out the crucial element of empathy; it is perfectly possible for people or characters (like, say, Patrick Bateman) to harm people without experiencing any guilt whatsoever. Characters which do experience guilt may do so to an extent with which the reader is not familiar, providing an opportunity to experience in proxy the emotions resulting from action from a cognitive, affective, and ethical perspective (199).

Guilt is omnipresent in children's fiction, even though it can be hard for the novice reader to understand as they cannot be presumed to have fully developed their understanding of the moral issues at stake, nor their empathy and mind-modelling skills (Nikolajeva 2014a, 199). Children's war literature is particularly complex regarding the issue of guilt, as it necessarily foregrounds an us versus them narrative and enhances the consequences of actions. The war scenario also problematizes the empathy necessary in order to feel guilt, as it is possible to feel guilty regarding people you have not met. A guilt for the victims of a war you took part in or feel in some way responsible, for example (Sanders 2008, 198-200). Because there is guilt there is a presupposed type of empathy, however, this may be for people the character has never met, or for a considerably large amount of people. Because of its empathic and moral implications and consequences, guilt is a powerful if complex form of characterisation as well as ethics formation.

In order to gain a deeper understanding of the impact of actions, I will first analyse the way through which a combination of contrasting emotions and motivations as well as different forms of (in)action influence both the ethics and characterisation of a text. For this, I turn to Brian Conaghan's *The Bombs that Brought Us Together* (2016), a story about both war and terrorism. To this I next add an analysis regarding guilt in Nina Bawden's *Carrie's War* (1973). I finish my discussion of actions, ethics and characterisation by analysing the impact of overt didacticism in Michael Morpurgo's *Friend or Foe* (1977).

Desperate Times, Desperate Choices

At several points above, both in the empathy section and the previous chapter, I have posed the difficult question that arises when we as readers are asked to empathise with terrorists. This moral conundrum is foregrounded in Brian Conaghan's *The Bombs that Brought Us Together* (2016). In this novel, fourteen-year-old Charlie Law's town (named Little Town) is invaded by Old Country, prompting a conflict in loyalties and emotions in Charlie. This novel is told in first person past tense by Charlie himself, who as a young boy is automatically in the reader's ingroup. He foregrounds this himself through the style of narration; highly colloquial and containing many jokes, he stylistically purposefully attempts to relate to the reader. The implied reader is the same as for *Bog Child*: adolescent. Charlie's status as a teenager foregrounds this, as do the themes (which are much the same as in *Bog Child*), and narration style. This is most obvious when he goes to a bookshop and encounters the girl he desires:

Guess who I spied flicking through the books at the *Teenage Reading Section: Girls?*

Eh?

None other than the amazingly stunning and utterly gorgeous Erin F.

YES, *THAT* ERIN F. (67, emphasis in the original).

The hyper stylised narration both creates an “authentic” teenage voice and characterises Charlie. He is funny and chatty as a narrator, which leads to an image of him as a character being equally funny and chatty; the kind of character the reader is supposed to like and want to consider ingroup to themselves. The intrusive nature of his narration also complicates the nature of the narration; is he writing his account down or telling it to someone? Why, and who to? It is not clear how much time difference there is between narrator Charlie and narrated Charlie. However, past tense first person narration by definition implies unreliability, as it relies on the narrator’s memory of their own story (Nikolajeva 2014, 257). This unreliability is enhanced by the intrusiveness of his narration, and complicates his image as being truly ingroup. Is he trying too hard to sound like a teenager, or like a likeable person? The morally complex situation Charlie gets involved in may explain why he would want to create a more likeable version of himself; his heavy hand in telling his own story creates doubt as to whether he has an equally heavy hand in editing either the events, himself, or both.

The reliability of Charlie’s account of himself as a likeable person becomes particularly important for the ethics of the story, as several extreme and confronting situations occur. First, before the invasion takes place, Charlie is confronted with an outgroup member in the form of Pav, who is a refugee from Old Country and his new neighbour. Charlie does not take an immediate liking to Pav and focuses on his appearance and accent as markers of Pav’s Otherness, firmly placing him in the outgroup. However, this is immediately contested in their first conversation, as Pav swears in Charlie’s language (albeit with a heavy accent), states he is the same age as Charlie and reveals that they will be going to the same school. As Charlie loves swearing (but censors himself in his account), this already puts Pav at least on the fringes of Charlie’s ingroup, to the point where Charlie vows to help Pav at school:

‘I no like school’

‘Don’t worry Pav, I’ll look after you. Anyway, we still have loads of the summer to go before we think about school.’

The idea of getting in some decent work experience and helping Pav with the lingo popped into my head. He would need a helping hand in case he made a

complete arse of himself at school. And for reasons that baffled Mum and Dad, I wanted to be a teacher when I left school (21-22).

Charlie's statement that he will help Pav is a moral act; he is promising actions in the future which will benefit Pav, because he recognises him as ingroup. However, again the reader is confronted with unreliability; does Charlie vow to help Pav out of kindness, or out of a self-centred desire to train himself as a teacher? The uncertainty there sparks doubt on whether or not Charlie considers Pav ingroup at all. It also complicates the moral framework which Charlie operates in; if he is concerned with doing good for goodness sake or out of empathy, which is possible depending on the reader's mind-model of Charlie, he would slot into the virtue ethics approach. However, he himself focuses on the outcome of his help, foregrounding a consequentialist approach. In this approach his selfish motivations do not matter; it brings happiness to Pav and prepares Charlie for his dreams of becoming a teacher. By presenting both as options, they are put into conflict, and the reader's mind-model of Charlie as a moral character depend on their own assessment of his motivation. The characterisation, and ethics, of Charlie are thus significantly complicated, depending on the reader's mind-model of him as either honest or duplicitous.

Over the course of time Charlie and Pav do develop a friendship, which is most clearly expressed when Pav gets in trouble at school. Because he is Other, and specifically from Old Country which is considered a violent danger to Little Town, Pav gets bullied significantly at school. It is as a result of that the first important ethical act occurs, as well as the foregrounding of unethical inaction. After Old Country invades Little Town, the danger Pav, being an Other from Old Country, appears to pose to the other children at school vastly increases, to the point of violence. Charlie is warned by a friend that Pav was attacked by the school bullies and that he is alone, Charlie immediately rushes to action:

As soon as she said the word *alone* I was on my heels. I dropped my book, legged it outside and immediately saw the small gathering. A growing circle had formed. Not one of them doing anything to help. I couldn't hear a kind or sympathetic word being uttered. No warm hand. No words of comfort. What was wrong with these people? Little Town people. My people (231).

Charlie's immediate action of rushing over to provide aid to Pav, who is foregrounded as Other because of the violence the nation of his birth inflicted on the people of Little Town, is a clear ethical act. He could potentially put himself in danger of violence as well if he is seen

to aid the Other, and the lack of thought he puts into the action belies his moral framework and priorities. He acts out of sense of deontological duty as well as virtue, neglecting his own interest for the welfare of, and out of loyalty, to his friend. Again, however, this is Charlie's own account so he may have edited out a period of time during which he debated what he should do – or not. A reluctance to help would remove the virtuousness from his act; if he helps out of duty more than anything else, he displays loyalty and nothing more. His unreliability could potentially significantly change the reader's mind-model of him as a moral person. However, young readers may not question the narrator's reliability at all times, and the immediacy of the danger caused by the situation of war foregrounds underlying morality to the point where Charlie's action necessarily feeds into the reader's mind-model of him.

The quote above also foregrounds the unethical inaction of the bystanders. Charlie foregrounds the things they do not do, thereby expressing what he had expected from them instead; physical as well as emotional support for Pav, the severely injured Other. His covert expression of what he had expected from them reveals two things: firstly, that how he would have acted in this situation would demonstrate that he considers Pav an ingroup member, and secondly that he is surprised that the others do not. On the one hand it is surprising that they do not, as empirical studies have shown that when violence against the Other (particularly the ethnic Other) is caused by an ingroup member this results in anger at those members (Iyer, Schmader, Lickel 2007; Leach, Iyer, Pedersen 2006), and that similarities to violent perpetrators (leading to ingroup categorisation) cause feelings of anger and guilt (Gordijn et al 2006). It is of course possible for outgroup members to help one another, and the negative emotions caused by violence against the ethnic other may lead to reparative action. On the other hand, however, aid is more readily given to ingroup than to outgroup members (Sierksma 2018, 95-97). Additionally, as found by Nakia Gordon and Samantha Chesney (2017), the more intense these negative emotions, the more likely it is that it results in emotional suppression (214). The bystanders' inaction, although infuriating to Charlie, makes sense and accurately displays the outcome of the intense emotions caused by violence against ethnic Others.

Charlie himself foregrounds the complexity of those emotions when he becomes involved with the Big Man, a Mafioso-type character responsible for most of what happens in Little Town. After "gifting" some furniture to Charlie and Pav to put in their clubhouse, the Big Man manipulates Charlie into terrorist actions. He starts by clearly delimitating us versus

them distinctions between the “innocents” from Little Town and the “aggressors” from Old Country:

‘Do you love Little Town?’

LOVE? NOT REALLY.

‘Yes,’ I said, out of fear more than anything.

‘And are you willing to do things to protect it?’

NO.

‘Erm ... depends.’

‘What if it is a *them* or *us* situation?’ He waited for an answer, which I didn’t have. ‘You’d pick us, right?’ he said.

‘Erm ... right ... I guess.’

‘Well, that’s the shitstorm we now find ourselves in. it’s *them* or *us*, Charlie.

Us or *them*. So you’ve got to ask yourself: which side are you on?’ This was a massive question. The Big Man demanded an answer. The correct one.

‘I suppose I’m on the *us* side,’ I said (269).

This entire conversation serves as an emphasis of the us versus them divide which is at the core of war narratives; however, it also complicates this because although Charlie does not agree with the Big Man (as he makes clear through his interiority), he is pushed by fear to subscribe to the ideological division proposed by the Big Man. The Big Man also foreshadows that because of the clear distinctions between Us and Them (as he sees it, at least), as well as the danger posited by Them, protective action is called for. The ethics he espouses demonstrate what Blanka Grzegorzcyk found in terrorist children’s narratives; namely that “the retributive cycle of violence and counter-violence that depends on the anachronistic binary division between ‘us,’ who are never terrorists, and ‘them,’ who are, and against whom, therefore, violence is justified in the name of self-defence (2018, 575-576). Because the Big Man subscribes to and imposes this binary division, the protective action of violence he proposes is in his eyes both necessary and entirely justified. However, because Charlie does not see Old Country and Little Town as clearly in- and outgroup due to his friendship with Pav, he cannot view the violence asked for as morally justifiable. His agreeing to at least outwardly act as though he agrees, however, creates an ethically complex image of terrorism and intergroup violence.

As Little Town continues to suffer under the oppression of Old Country, Charlie is trained to use a gun in order to assassinate a major military target in a terrorist attack. He is

seduced by the feeling of power he gets from the gun but is shocked to find out the target is Pav's sister. Again, it is his closeness to Pav, overriding the us versus them binary necessary to justify terrorist behaviour, which stops him from fully believing in the Big Man's rhetoric. As Charlie finishes his training, he stows away the gun and again reveals the complexity leading to his situation:

I didn't want to do it.
But,
I needed to do it.
Mum needed me to do it.
Pav needed me to do it.
The Big Man was making me do it.
But,
I didn't want to do it (300-301).

Charlie's actions, in choosing to accept the Big Man's help knowing that it would come at a cost, choosing to give in to fear and accept the assassination job, are enriched by the knowledge the reader has of his emotional experience of them. In the excerpt above, Charlie reveals that he is acting against his own desires both out of fear for the Big Man and out of love and loyalty for two people he has strong attachments to in his ingroup; his mother and his friend. This combination of fear and love lead to a complex moral image of Charlie's terrorist behaviour; he is acting against his own wishes in a form of self-sacrifice for the Greater Good, which is a blend of deontology (duty towards Little Town and the Big Man) and consequentialism (the act is bad but the results will be good), but part of his motivation comes from fear. Additionally, this is a self-edited account, and his unreliability is especially important in this regard. The narrative is pushing the reader to empathise with a terrorist character, whilst expressing continuously that he does not believe in the rhetoric and his motivations behind his actions are muddled. His motivations are what ultimately colour the moral image of Charlie as a character, yet they are only available through his own intrusive narration. Ultimately, they are unreliable.

Charlie does not end up murdering Pav's sister; instead, the day before he is supposed to do it, he comes clean to Pav who then comes up with a plan through which Pav's sister is saved and the Big Man is shot instead by someone other than Charlie – preserving his innocence. *The Bombs that Brought Us Together* puts the reader to the test by manipulating them to empathy with a character who, although he does not end up fulfilling his initial plan,

has terrorist intentions. He had planned to go through with it, yet out of fear and loyalty for his friend he stopped before it came true. Charlie's morality is ambiguous throughout; he is in the reader's ingroup, because of which the reader is supposed to side with him, yet his unreliability and mixed motivations prevent him from being a wholly "good" character. However, his (eventually) genuine care for Pav most clearly expressed by his immediate action when Pav is in danger does cross the in- and outgroup divides set up and foregrounded by the narrative and belies an empathy which is framed as good. His actions, however, when he is embroiled with the Big Man complicate this image, as his main motivator of fear is self-centred rather than empathically other-centred. Because the reader is presented with the motivations behind his actions, even if unreliable and muddled, the ethics behind his actions are enhanced and become especially important in the reader's mind-model of him. However, the narrative stops before Charlie can fully contemplate the ethics of his own behaviour and have the opportunity to experience guilt. Because of this, the reader does not know if Charlie would have felt guilty and therefore condemn his behaviour; they can only guess. The next novel I analyse is focused specifically on guilt and its impact.

Ain't No Rest for the Wicked

Carrie, the protagonist of Nina Bawden's *Carrie's War* (1973/2014), is consumed by guilt. Hers is an evacuee story, as adult Carrie returns to the site of her evacuation with her children and relates to them the story behind her all-consuming guilt caused by "the worst thing" she has ever done. Although the story is framed around adult Carrie, the majority of the story is focused on child Carrie. This as well as the simple language used, themes (including the heavy focus on guilt and naïve perspective on responsibility and causation) and heavily present narrator mark this as a novel for children of around eight years old. The evacuation basis of her story foregrounds particular concerns: as argued by Lathey the child character is torn from their usual surroundings and required to refigure their identity (1999, 172-174), foregrounding the importance of mind-modelling and the negotiation of moral frameworks as the character has to find their place in their new home. It takes until the end of the novel for Carrie to reveal what it is that she feels guilty about, as the narrative portrays the complete duration of her stay in Wales, detailing her relationships there and her difficulty with defining her new identity. The foregrounding of her guilt combined with the prolonged delay in explaining what it is that she feels so guilty about leads Barbara Freedman to state that "*Carrie's War* depends on gaps regarding what it was that Carrie feels guilty about" (1991, 37-38), meaning that the tension underlining the narrative (what *is* the worst thing Carrie has

ever done, that has led her to decades of guilt?) depends on leaving it unrevealed for as long as possible. Although this may to an extent be true, because the focus of *Carrie's War* lies on both her guilt *as well as* her personal experiences during her evacuation, tension derives from both, and both are equally important in the mind-model constructed of Carrie over the course of the novel. Additionally, the focus on guilt emphasises the ethical and emotional consequences of our actions, placing ethics firmly on the foreground of the narrative.

Carrie's War is told in third-person past tense; it is also an embedded story. Although all narration throughout is in the same tense, the first and last chapters are narrated by an unknown narrator, while the rest appears to be told by adult Carrie in the third-person, explaining her evacuee history to her children. As Lathey writes, this type of narration foregrounds the temporal distance between adult Carrie and child Carrie “while authenticating [narratorial] comments on Carrie’s responses to events and occasional interior monologues [...]. The adult Carrie is an omniscient narrator who allows us to share the younger Carrie’s misinterpretations and understand her behaviour” (1999, 175). I agree that the effect of Carrie’s narration is both a reflective distancing and a narratorial authentication of Carrie’s experiences; the narrator in this way separates adult and child Carrie as characters, making it possible for adult Carrie to narrate child Carrie’s story. However, as a personal narrator Carrie can never be omniscient; although she believes she is better informed as an adult, she cannot access other characters’ minds.

Because the majority of the novel is narrated by adult Carrie, a façade of objectivism is created which allows both adult Carrie and the reader to judge child Carrie for her beliefs, naïveté and mistakes. However, as a personal narrator she is also unreliable, as she can choose to present herself and events in certain ways and depends on memories of thirty years ago to tell her story; she may lie, omit, or misremember her own story. Sainsbury points out that the conversational mode of the embedded narrative allows the unknown narrator to pose modal questions to Carrie’s children (and through that, the reader as well) which emphasise ethical concerns of the narrative related to family duty and loyalty (Sainsbury 2017, 163). Would they have been scared too, like Carrie was (Bawden 1973/2014, 202)? Would they have believed the “old tales” that led to Carrie’s guilt (206)? These modal questions are aimed directly at Carrie’s children and thus demand of them to empathise with Carrie and reflect on the ethical situation. The ethics is foregrounded by direct and implied questions to characters as well as readers. Sainsbury’s approach emphasises the importance of both narrative gaps and modal address in engaging the reader cognitively; the narrative asks the reader to make up

their own mind and consider the morality of the situation fully (2017, 166-167). Through this, the reader is provided the opportunity to develop their own moral understanding of guilt and conflicting empathy.

The social (and ethical) emotions of shame and guilt are pervasive throughout Carrie's narrative. When she and her little brother Nick arrive in the town and their group of schoolchildren is to be divided amongst the town's residents, Carrie meets Albert Sandwich for the first time. He is recalcitrant in a way typical for teenaged boys, refusing to participate in what both perceive as a dehumanising activity. Reflecting on this, child-Carrie wishes that she could behave in a way similar to him, but "she had already begun to feel ill with shame at the fear that no one would choose her" (21). Being introduced to a new community through evacuation enhances the emotions Carrie experiences to the point where her fear and shame are physically making her ill; a reaction which may be understandable. The reader's mind-model of Carrie may, in light of her situation, not contain a particularly harsh judgement of her for this. However, Carrie's shame, guilt and fear are continuously foregrounded as responses to the smallest things. When after being sorted she is taken to her guardian's home, she is immediately intimidated by the cleanliness of the house: "She thought she would never dare touch anything in this house in case she left marks. She wouldn't dare *breathe* – even her breath might be dirty!" (25). Even the knowledge that "it wasn't her fault" when their shoes leave marks on some white cloth (25) does nothing to alleviate her feeling of guilt. These instances both highlight that Carrie's situation is extremely stressful to her, causing her to overthink everything; they also lead the reader to construct a different mind-model of Carrie. The consistent emphasis on shame, guilt and fear when her goals are not clear and there is no perceivable threat create an image of her as cowardly and desperate to please others.

By characterising Carrie in this way, emphasising that her responses of shame, guilt and fear are often disproportionate to the situation, the narrative sows seeds of doubt on the severity of "the worst thing" that Carrie has done. Although she has experienced severe guilt for over 30 years and the situation that triggered it caused her trauma (Sainsbury 2017, 162), the reader has reason to distrust her assessment of the situation. The priming of this distrust is based on the reader's mind-model of Carrie, and the clashes between her emotional response to situations and the reader's moral evaluation of them. Carrie herself complicates her own emotions before she tells her story, as she attempts (in direct speech) to explain her experience of guilt to her children:

I thought I *had* changed, that I'd feel differently now [I'm older]. After all, what happened wasn't my fault, *couldn't* have been, it just didn't make sense. That's what I've been telling myself all these years, but sense doesn't come into it, can't change how you *feel*. I did a dreadful thing, the worst thing of my life, when I was twelve and a half years old, or I feel that I did, and nothing can change it (11).

In this excerpt Carrie constantly goes back and forth between stating something as factual, and then undermining it. "It wasn't my fault – *but* I feel that it was"; "I did this terrible thing – *but* maybe not". Already the reader is presented with a particularly conflicting situation and is pushed to both doubt and believe Carrie. As a result, there is a cognitive demand on the reader to engage actively with the moral questions the narrative proposes. This is a complex setup, particularly for a children's novel, as it requires the reader to doubt the character's own judgements rather than to trust the protagonist. A certain resistance to focalisation is therefore expected, in order for the reader to grasp the ethical complexity of Carrie's character and actions. Although child readers are not fully at the mercy of the narrative and its techniques, they can also not be assumed to be as resistant as the idealised expert reader is. Because of this, the moral mind-model of Carrie is problematized; it requires a novice reader to have the skillset of an expert reader, which they may or may not have.

The reader's mind-model of Carrie becomes particularly important when the narrative reveals what "the worst thing" Carrie has ever done, is. At the centre of this act lies a conflict between two adults; Carrie's guardian, the cold and cruel Mr Evans, and Hepzibah, the kind and matronly (and implied witchy) caretaker for Mr Evans' elderly sister. Mr Evans blames Hepzibah for manipulating his sister into letting her stay in the house, and after his sister dies evicts Hepzibah as well as her mentally disabled friend Johnny. While Mr Evans is cold and emotionally abuses his younger sister Lou, who lives with him and the children whom he resents, Hepzibah is warm and welcoming to them. Still, Carrie empathises with Mr Evans and attempts to understand why he is the way he is, even unknowingly helping him in his plot to remove Hepzibah from the house and his life. However, when he evicts Hepzibah and Johnny Carrie switches sides and aims to harm Mr Evans. She does this by dropping an old skull into a well and, as she believes, placing a curse on the house which now belongs to Mr Evans.

Carrie's thoughts were like bits of a jigsaw, whirling round in her head.

Separate pieces but all fitting in, one to another. Albert throwing a stone and it

falling. Bombs falling on cities, houses crumbling like sandcastles. Horrible, but somehow exciting to think of. *Walls crumbling* – and the curse the African boy had put on Druid's Bottom if his skull ever left it. It had been taken out once and all the plates cracked, and the mirrors. Then they brought it back and the house had stood safe ever since, just so Mr Evans could live here and fill it with his meanness and greed. But the horse pond was bottomless ...

Carrie lifted her arm and threw the skull as hard as she could. It sailed high, in an arc, then plopped into the pond. A few ripples, then nothing ...

She stood, staring out at the pond and the dark Grove rising up the mountain behind it. She was shaking all over (184-185).

In this moral contemplation, Carrie blends three images: the War, the curse story, and the house. In so doing, she conflates the violence of the war with a domestic issue and views the curse as a supernatural solution to her problem. The form of this contemplation displays Carrie's internal moral debate; as Carrie states her thoughts are a jigsaw, and they are represented as such as well. Sentences linking to different events, trailing off into ellipses, and an interjected italicised phrase; both visually and in content Carrie's motivation is displayed. Already, however, her action leaves her "shaking all over" – a physical representation of an emotion which is left to the reader to uncover, based on their mind-model of her. Carrie's action is significant because of the way it clashes with her character as described so far; she is a coward, and prone to follow orders even when she knows they are meaningless or come from malicious people. Her shaking will therefore most probably be construed as an expression of fear – but also possibly excitement. Carrie's immediate emotional response is left ambiguous, and its meaning depends on the reader's mind-model of her as a character. Therefore, the ethical ramification is equally dependent on that previous characterisation.

All of Carrie's actions depend on her empathy (Sainsbury 2017, 162-163). Because Carrie empathises with Mr Evans, she endeavours to overlook his personal flaws, and aims to improve his disposition by increasing his happiness. She does this by relaying his sister's dying words, as she had asked Carrie to do. However, Carrie's friend and brother see this as a deep betrayal of both Hepzibah and themselves, as it puts Hepzibah in danger. Carrie had not considered that as an option; her focus lay on ensuring Mr Evans that his older sister had loved him regardless of their falling out and lack of communication. Her approach to him is an intricate blend of virtue ethics and deontology; unlike her younger brother she feels a sense of duty regarding Mr Evans, as he is their guardian. She expresses this by following his orders

and rules even if she does not agree with them or see their point, and by defending him against her little brother, even when she does not like Mr Evans much herself. Yet equally, she holds the virtues of loyalty and empathy highly, again expressed through her faithfulness to Mr Evans. She does not just sheepishly follow his command; she *wants* to see the good in him, and with every cruel action he commits attempts to find a sympathetic motivation for it. She equally, as expressed through her foregrounded emotions of guilt and shame, highly values the idea of goodness, and fears wickedness to the point where this fear causes her severe emotional turmoil. Her acting against Mr Evans, breaking her deontological sense of duty and loyalty to him, demonstrates her virtue ethics; without considering the consequences of her actions, she decides that his character flaws are too significant to support anymore as she sides with the Good character of Hepzibah. Carrie's concern with the act is not to bring happiness to anyone, rather, it is to remove the house (which she views as a source of happiness) from Mr Evans, and through that remove herself from Mr Evans.

The novel further complicates the ethics of the act by seemingly making the curse come true, as the house burns down as soon as Carrie and her brother leave. Looking out of the window on the train, Carrie sees it "blazing away" (199), and assumes that the innocent Hepzibah, Johnny, and her friend Albert are caught in the fire and burned to death.

She said, between sobs that seemed to tear her chest open, something that sounded like, 'All my fault ...' He [her little brother] knew it couldn't be that because it didn't make sense but there was no point in asking her what she had said because she was crying too hard (199).

The reader's view on Carrie's guilt depends on their belief in the curse story, which is never fully clarified. Although this is a realist novel, Hepzibah is often described as witchy, particularly in her gaze: "*Witch's eyes*, the oldest boy thought" (206, emphasis in original). The curse is also never authoritatively stated to be untrue; adult, narrator Carrie has not resolved this issue for herself, or may be unwilling to take a stance. Its ambiguity is both important and irrelevant to the ethics of Carrie's act. It is crucial because if the curse is not true, it is evident that Carrie has nothing to do with the fire and therefore carries no blame. The reader may take pity on Carrie for holding herself responsible for an accident. However, it is irrelevant because it is the story of her guilt, and her belief that she caused the fire and potential death of her loved ones is the emotional crux of the novel. The reader may then, based on her deontological behaviour before, morally judge Carrie for her behaviour as a

sense of betrayal; her loyalty to Mr Evans caused significant harm to the people who treated her the best.

The ambiguity of the novel asks the reader to engage morally and cognitively with the questions it poses, both implicitly and explicitly. Carrie's sense of duty harms the people she loves best and causes her emotional pain for over thirty years. Particularly in a war and evacuation setting, both duty and loyalty are foregrounded; here they clash directly. The war thus forces both Carrie and, through the thought experiments the reader, to engage actively with issues of morality. Yet the reader's judgement on deontology as a framework is dependent on both their mind-model of Carrie as a young evacuee who has to define her identity in a new setting, and to some extent on their understanding of the curse as either real or not. Through the gaps in the narrative, and the foreground of the emotional ramifications of actions, the reader is pushed to high cognitive engagement, which leads them to further their own understanding of the difficult emotion of guilt, as well as the complex nature of ethics in practice. *Carrie's War* is notable for placing this high a cognitive and moral demand on the reader; it demonstrates a trust in the reader's ability to understand and engage with the narrative on a deep level. Children's war literature does not always place this trust on the reader, however. The impact of a more overtly didactic approach on both characterisation and ethics I analyse next.

Listen to Me!

The two novels I analysed above place a lot of demand and responsibility on the reader to engage with the narrative and come to their own understanding of the moral issues at hand; both had intricate blends of conflicting moral frameworks, and through either foregrounded unreliability or narrative gaps pushed the reader to moral ambiguity. Michael Morpurgo's *Friend or Foe* (1977) avoids such moral ambiguity, instead displaying an overt didacticism. Although all children's literature is by nature didactic (Nikolajeva 2014a, 179), overt didacticism is in modern Anglophone culture "often seen as an artistic flaw" (Nelson 2014, 15). This does not mean that overt didacticism is not present in modern children's literature; it has simply gone out of style. *Friend or Foe*, being a slightly older text, still displays an unabashed authoritative approach to morality which now would be considered unfashionable. However, considering the cognitive status of its implied audience and the ongoing presence of overt adult moralising in children's literature, an analysis of the impact of an overtly didactic approach to morality in children's war literature adds an important piece to the overall image of ethics within the genre.

Friend or Foe is narrated in third person, past tense. Immediately this implies the authority of an adult, as “the third-person narrator is always an adult” (Nikolajeva 2002, 258). Additionally, third person narration provides the opportunity that “the focalised child character is not seeing everything there is to see or possibly not understanding events in the various ways they might be understood” (Nodelman 2008, 20). An adult narrator for a child’s focalised story therefore provides space for overt didacticism; the narrator may interject to judge a character or point out particular events the narrative wants to foreground. *Carrie’s War* also had a third person narrator; however, the majority of the narration was done by adult Carrie, a character in the novel herself. In *Friend or Foe* there is an additional distance between the reader and the narrator, as a nameless extradiegetic adult narrator holds a façade of reliability. The extradiegetic, adult narrator holds the strongest authority (Nikolajeva 2014a, 80), meaning that there is limited space for moral ambiguity where the child reader can discover their own moral understandings. Instead, they are supposed to align with the adult narrator’s beliefs.

The adult narrator is not the only place where the hidden adult can voice their beliefs and opinions; mouthpiece characters serve this function as well. *Friend or Foe* is focalised through its young protagonist, David, whom the readers are supposed to identify as an ingroup member and therefore empathise with. David, as a child focaliser, has to personally perform the actions which form the moral framework of the narrative and learn its lessons; he can therefore not be the mouthpiece himself. Instead, secondary characters (either adult or child) “explain, preach, and warn, seldom leaving the readers room for further contemplation” (Nikolajeva 2002, 36). In *Friend or Foe* there are several mouthpiece characters aimed at guiding both David and the reader on the “right” moral path; David’s friend Tucky, the German soldier they encounter, and Ann Reynolds, the boys’ guardian during their evacuation. David himself is strongly deontological in his approach to (war) ethics; his categorisation of the Germans and English as enemies creates deep divides between the in- and outgroup, to the point where he dehumanises the Germans regularly. The main reason for this is that his father died in the war. When Tucky points out that a fighter plane which crashed nearby must have men on board, David cruelly states that he hopes they’re dead: ““They must’ve killed hundreds of people in Plymouth tonight. I hope they’re dead. They deserve it”” (56). This indicates that he has Othered the Germans so severely that he wishes for their death, without considering them as people like Tucky does. His Othering allows him to hold a deeply deontological approach; because he does not empathise with the Germans, he

does not take their side into consideration in his moral framework. The war which strengthens his emotions through both his evacuation and the loss of his father also allows him to frame his moral framework and anti-German sentiment as the cause of a deontological sense of duty: “they were Germans, enemies; it was a duty to make sure they were captured” (76). The consequences do not matter for him. The war enforces his grouping; he hates the Germans because of what “they” have done, holding all responsible for the war, which unshakeably places them in the outgroup and makes his ingroup morally right. His ingroup is threatened by the outgroup because of the war, enhancing his sense of duty.

David’s approach to the Germans is challenged when he almost drowns on the moors and is saved by a lost German bomber and his injured comrade. These characters are as far outgroup from David as possible; not only are they German and therefore, in his eyes, despicable, they are the soldiers who the night before bombed Plymouth. They are, therefore, directly responsible for violence against David’s ingroup. However, David’s strong deontological approach complicates his moral framework at this point; because one of the Germans saved him he finds himself indebted to him, creating a sense of conflicting duty and loyalty:

David looked at them both. There was nothing threatening or frightening about them, they were just two exhausted, pale-looking men with sad eyes and kind faces. They were faces he should hate. Perhaps these were the men who had shot down his father over the French coast and cheered as they watched him crashing into the beaches. These were the men who had bombed London and Plymouth and killed thousands. Yet one of them had saved his life (73).

This moral re-evaluation of David’s own position regarding these specifics forces him to consider them as potentially ingroup. The narrative foregrounds this by forcing David to consider the Germans’ humanity through their physicality. However, this excerpt also illustrates David’s moral dilemma: although he can consider the Germans as human after all, he immediately switches back to his sense of duty to both his country and his father (he “should hate” them after all) – only to add the complicating factor of indebtedness to the German soldier for saving his life. The soldiers ask David to help them, as they are lost on the moors and one is injured. Without help, they will die. The immediacy of their need increases the moral demand placed on David; he has to act and decide soon.

In his dilemma on whether or not he should help the soldiers, the soldier who saved him acts as a mouthpiece character:

‘Help you!’ David was almost shouting. He pulled himself to his feet, gathering the greatcoat around him. ‘Help you? After what you’ve done? You come here bombing and killing and you want us to help!’

‘It is a war,’ he replied sadly. ‘In war people die – on both sides’ (74).

As a German and an adult he is firmly in the outgroup for both the reader and David, however, he does carry the authority of the implied adult author. Him being firmly outgroup may prohibit the reader from taking on his argument, in which case their ethical understanding concern never stretches to include him. The narrative attempts to counteract this by continuously providing the same message in different forms. Later, the soldier adds: ‘I am sorry, my friends. *Perhaps when you are older* you will understand that we all do things we know we should not do. But perhaps you have learnt that already’ (103, emphasis mine). This statement repeats the moral (that both sides in a war are equally implicated and bear a similar ethical burden) again and makes his status as an adult explicit. The tone, through this, turns overtly didactic. ‘Perhaps when you are older’ you will be wiser than you are now is a denigrating approach to didacticism, an assumption that the child is lacking in knowledge and understanding, and in need of a (moral) lesson. The adult authority reveals themselves overtly.

In an attempt to ensure that, although the German soldier is outgroup, the reader grasps the moral lesson, there are two other mouthpiece characters who further attempt to enhance this image. Tucky, David’s friend, does not have the authority of an adult character. He is, however, firmly in the ingroup; he is an English child, and David’s school friend. Tucky has an almost Kantian approach to ethics, as he ‘kept on reminding David that the German had saved his life, that you couldn’t turn on someone who had saved your life, no matter who he was’ (76). Tucky espouses an ethics of duty, a strict following of rules without any bending. It is always right to help those who help you; it is always wrong not to. Tucky is deontological in his approach just as David is, if not more; whilst David experiences severe moral dilemmas, Tucky is always certain of what to do, and his understanding of right and wrong is always based on the same prescriptive rules. His deontological approach just so happens to cross in- and outgroups; it could just as easily not have. The strictness of Tucky’s rules, combined with the soldier’s unwavering emphasis on their cross-binary humanity does not allow for any moral ambiguity; David has to cave in, he has to give in to a different form

of deontology. The final lesson comes from another adult, Ann, who is in David's ingroup. As his guardian, she is both emotionally close to him and holds moral authority over him. When she encounters the German, she only foregrounds their similarity: "Ann came closer to the German and looked up into his face. 'Just people, just ordinary people, like you and me,' she said" (110). The combination of these three different mouthpiece characters closes off any moral ambiguity, pushing both David and, with him, the reader to only one possible moral framework.

Friend or Foe continuously pushes the reader to condemn David's Othering of the Germans yet may end up achieving the opposite. David, the protagonist with whom the reader is supposed to empathise, never gets comfortable helping them. His attitude initially is so hostile that it is hard to move away from in a believable manner, and he never extends empathy to them. The mouthpiece characters may be off-putting to the reader, as they may resist the overt didacticism offered by them; particularly as one of the most prominent mouthpieces is that firmly Othered German himself. "Was it wrong?" Tucky said quietly. "'Tis never wrong to do what you feel is right, Tucky,' said Mr Reynolds, ruffling his hair" (121) – unless what you feel is right does not comply with the narrative's, in which case you need to change it. Without narrative moral gaps, the reader is not as cognitively engaged as they could be; taking their hand and pushing them towards a specific morality ensures that there is no danger of the reader taking away the "wrong" understanding of the text. Their mind-modelling is tightly controlled, the "correct" message conveyed. However, this results in an unsophisticated story, which through its lack of cognitive demand on the reader does not result in moral engagement. The reader does not have to think, does not have to play with thought experiments in which they are pushed to analyse their own morality as they attempt to decipher the characters' (Sainsbury 2017, 157-159). Without such engagement, their philosophical development may not flourish, and the story's ethical potential is drastically limited.

Loud Actions, Loud Words

Philosophical concepts such as consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics are unlikely to be a part of the implied child reader's understanding; although children are absolutely ethically aware people who hold particular and individual moral frameworks, the philosophical labels themselves will not be part of their moral considerations. That said, analysing the ethics of a narrative in this way provides that one layer deeper in the ethical framework as a whole; these three concepts represent the different approaches to ethics we

can have, and their conflicts in specific narrative situations reveal what we expect from the child character and audience. These approaches are only analysable through a consideration of actions; although motivations may play a part, characters have to act in order for us to judge them according to normative ethical standards.

The importance of actions and reactions is particularly foregrounded in children's war literature, firstly because children's literature is traditionally action based rather than character based. Although in more modern children's literature there is a shift towards more character-based literature, especially for older children and teenagers, the focus on actions is still prominent in children's stories. In war literature, these actions are foregrounded even further. This is partially because the emotions of war literature are intensified by the extreme situation of war, enhancing the emotional element of characterisation. Additionally, the actions themselves are foregrounded because their consequences have increased importance. Child characters in war stories have more responsibilities weighing on them than characters in more prosaic settings, and the choices they make influence other characters' lives in crucial ways. Their actions have direct impacts on the survival of others, which is a situation specific to children's war literature.

The analyses in this chapter all demonstrated that the nature of war leads to conflicting moral frameworks. *The Bombs that Brought Us Together* asks the reader to empathise with a potential terrorist, who is unreliable in his account of himself as a good person pushed to horrible acts. Charlie remains morally ambiguous, even though the reader is supposed to consider him ingroup and empathise with him. Similarly, the reader's ethical mind-model of Carrie is abstruse as well; the narrative's modal approach combined with her moral dilemmas do not provide any answers for the reader. *Friend or Foe*, however, demonstrates that without this ambiguity, removed by an obtrusive adult authority, there is less opportunity for cognitive engagement. Unwavering grouping and moral directness mean that there is no space for philosophical thought experiments – or readerly development. All three protagonists display a focus on deontology; they all have a strong sense of duty, and whilst *The Bombs that Brought Us Together* and *Carrie's War* push the reader to question their characters' approach, deontology itself as a whole is not condemned. *Friend or Foe* does not put David's approach up for questioning; instead, it pushes him to change the rules within his approach to other, similar ones. War does enhance the sense of duty, to one's country, and to the ingroup. It is therefore not surprising that it is so pervasive in children's war literature.

The normative ethics underlying the moral framework of children's war literature provides an insight into what is presented as important for the child audience in physically and emotionally extreme situations. Evacuee stories add the pressure of re-evaluating identities, pushing the characters to reconsider their ethical approaches in light of their new situation. These frameworks inform the actions and reactions of characters and combined with other characterisation techniques create a full mind-model of who these fictional people are. There is, however, one more moral layer foregrounded in children's war literature. How are we to view the violence? How can we excuse it, or make sense of it? And what should be done afterwards? There is also more to stories than narrators, focalisers and characters; the deeper layer fundamental to our understanding of ourselves, our extra-textual lives, and narratives. It is to this layer I turn next.

Part III

Wait, That's Not Fair!

Narrative Justice

5.

Tales of the Script

So far, I have built up to this final part of my thesis by demonstrating how ethics is dependent on empathy, and how children's war literature complicates the nature of both in distinct ways. Justice as a concept is, like empathy and ethics, not exclusive to children's war literature; issues of fairness are not the remit of violence alone, nor of children's literature. However, in the case of war the figure of the child, both as a character and as the reader, foregrounds the problem of justice. Children, as demonstrated above in Part II, are morally complex. From a very young age on, they are morally engaged and exact moral judgements on others and themselves (Sparks, Schinkel, Moore 2017, 243). However, cognitively and empathically they are still developing – and these are factors which play crucial roles both in an individual's understanding of what justice is or should be, as well as in their own judgements of others and the situations they are part of. As I explained in my introduction, ethics and justice are closely connected. Whereas I had to make a case for the link between ethics and empathy, and there are scholars who disagree with this take on ethics (Wood 2003, Prinz 2011), I do not have to make the same case for justice. Instead, the issue becomes almost semantic in nature. The everyday verbiage for both ethics and justice is interchangeable: right and wrong, fair and unfair can be used to denote either. Yet, philosophically there is a distinct difference. Whereas ethics is concerned with living well, justice denotes an issue of distribution of goods or services (Hoffman 2002, 222-224). In this, justice is more specific in its focus than ethics is.

The difference between ethics and justice is not just philosophical, however; it is narratological as well. Ethics and justice, like empathy, live in many narrative elements, seeing a narrative function as a sum of its parts, all influencing each other. However, the most important narrative elements for the construction of ethics lie in characterisation; the *type* of

people the reader is supposed to side with and against, their motivations, and their actions. There is no ethics without thought and/or action, without character. Justice is not only more specific than ethics – it is also more abstract. In a narrative, justice cannot be said to lie with any particular narrative element. Character actions are a part of it; however, the structure of the narrative is even more important. The events which are depicted and the way through which that is done all add to the overall build of justice in a narrative. The construction and impact of justice is therefore fundamental to all of a narrative's elements. Therefore, justice is best analysed through the element which underlies it all: scripts.

It's All in Your Head

Script theory is one of the core ideas underlining cognitive poetics. Script theory accounts for the mental abstractions of our social experience (Mar, Oatley 2008, 176). These abstractions account for our structures of understanding of all concepts and extra-textual life (Stephens 2011, 13). Scripts therefore explain the way that we understand both the world around us as well as fiction. There are two main concepts at play in script theory: scripts, and schemas. They serve the same function, namely providing shortcuts for our brains in order to make sense of what occurs around us, whilst differing in one basic way: a schema is static, whereas a script is dynamic (14). An example of a schema in children's war literature would be, for instance, a soldier. Depending on our socio-cultural background, we have a particular image which is conjured up when we think of the concept "soldier"; in most Western cultures this image would be relatively young, male, white, able-bodied and heterosexual. An image of a child soldier, or a geriatric or feminine soldier, then clashes with the schema of a soldier which we hold. This clash foregrounds the child soldier; they are remarkable because they are unexpected, they are unexpected because of our schema. An example of a script could be a bombardment. Especially informed by WWI stories, a bombardment script would follow the steps of sirens, followed by gathering of emergency supplies and documentation, hiding in a (Anderson) shelter, a period of loud sounds and trembling ending in significant damage to property and potential death. The first experience of a bombardment requires significant cognitive expense in the form of planning and careful (or in this case, fearful) execution; increased experiences of bombardments turns the plan into a script. Through this, although the fear may be maintained, the experience becomes less cognitively fatiguing; you know what to do and what to expect. The bombardment script is an example of what Stockwell calls a situational script (2002, 77). There are two other types of scripts: personal, and instrumental (ibid). Personal scripts inform how we are expected to behave within particular social norms

A children's war literature personal script could be how to act as a soldier, or as a child. Instrumental scripts refer, as the name implies, to literally how we should do things. Within this genre the reader can expect instrumental scripts referring to how to fire a gun, or how to heal a wounded soldier.

Fiction is script-based. Because of this, according to Marek Oziewicz, fictional stories are information clusters which allow for human understanding of both tasks and the world (2015, 53). Scripts in fiction "express how a sequence of events or actions is expected to unfold" (Stephens 2011, 14). Fiction reading in itself becomes script based, as previous reading experiences create readers' expectations of both plot and character development (Stephens 2011, 15). This is because scripts inform and are based on memory. Therefore, "readers' accumulated memories have a substantial impact on their narrative experiences" (Gerrig, Mumper 2017, 239). These memories can be from both extra-textual life and fiction (240). Ellen Spolsky argues that when "faced with unfamiliar sense images, readers will normally fill in gaps by analogies and inferences that make use of their individual store of memories" (Spolsky 2015, 32), which are "not recovered or recalled but reconstructed" (49). This means that when readers encounter unfamiliar schemas or scripts, they understand them based on their own constructed memories. That memories are constructed implies an artificiality behind them; memories are built on our scripts and schemas, which are in turn shaped by our memories. This system may explain the cultural dependency of scripts and schemas; without memories of difference, this difference does not inform scripts, which in turn inform memories. To clarify: the schema of a soldier as a youngish, adult, heterosexual, able-bodied white man can only change if there is enough exposure to different types of soldiers. The memory basis of scripts can be significantly harmful; cultural understandings (based on memories, and therefore scripts) of land wars led to the deployment of cavalry in WWI, even though trench warfare and modern weaponry made cavalry dangerously outdated, leading to infamously significant casualties of both soldiers and horses.

Scripts form noticeably early on in child development. Emotion scripts, which inform which emotions particular situations call for, are demonstrated by 18-month-old children; an 18-month-old understands that when someone breaks a toy, the expected emotion is sadness rather than happiness (Chiarella, Poulin-Dubois 2015). Harking back to the different types of scripts (situational, personal, and instructional), the scripts children develop early on inform not only how to perform certain actions or what to expect in particular situations; they concern in- and outgrouping as well. By the age of nine months, it is already easier for babies

to recognise faces of people when they are the same race as their parents (Kelly et al., 2007). Racial grouping, and the scripts which come with that, starts early. Childhood reading then can either preserve, reinforce, disrupt, refresh, or add to these scripts (Stockwell 2002, 79) which children are already in the process of forming. Fiction can therefore either alter or entrench pre-existent patterns (Dunn 2015, 1), which for childhood development is particularly important, as it could potentially free young readers from limiting ways to view the world. John Stephens is an optimist in this regard, claiming that children's literature generally is disruptive of oppressive scripts and schemas, in order to "intervene in culture to affirm multicultural models of human rights and human equality" (2011, 13). Savoie disagrees, arguing instead that although children's literature *can* perform this function, it reflects general literature in that "is, in general, script preserving" (2019, 149). I agree with Savoie; although there is the possibility of script disruption promoting cross binary empathy and moral behaviour, most children's literature remains conservative in that regard.

Children's war literature further complicates this issue. The implied reader of the genre will not have first-hand experience with war or its schemas, meaning that most of their cognitive structures underlining their understanding of the situation are developed through engagement with war representations, such as media, education or fiction. Disruptive and progressive scripts can promote broad worldviews and cross-binary empathy in general children's literature, and are cognitively the most stimulating (Bullen, Moruzi, Smith 2017, 7-8). As a result, the reader's empathy skills are enhanced. However, the ability to do so in children's war literature is limited. Because the script of war demands strong us versus them grouping, it will always be there in fiction, and therefore in the reader's war scripts. If the reader's war scripts are mostly based on war fiction, the way through which these narratives build up empathy and ethical behaviour are particularly important, as scripts inform our understanding both in the text and extra-textually. Fiction of course does not exist in a vacuum, and over the course of an individual's life they will be exposed to war narratives in different forms as well (for instance through the news and schooling). However, my focus here lies on the formative nature of children's war fiction specifically, and the crucial part it plays in the construction of children's war scripts.

Constructing Justice

An important part of this formation is in the form of justice scripts. A key argument as to why justice functions through scripts is that scripts frame our understanding and expectations of situations and concepts based on causally linked sequences (Oziewicz 2015, 4), as in,

narratives. Justice is most overtly causally linked; because Billy stole the apples he deserves to be punished, and because Katie aided the resistance she deserves to be rewarded. These base examples also already demonstrate the ambiguity of justice, and its need for an explicit and complete image of the situation: did Billy steal the apples out of spite, or to give to a starving horse? What are the ethics of Katie's resistance, who are they resisting, and how did she aid them? As I said above, concerns of justice are not limited to children's war literature, as issues of fairness and due-ness are reflected in many children's texts. Children's literature has "been an important carrier of justice scripts" (4), and all forms of it add to our construction of justice as a concept. However, the special situation of war foregrounds justice concerns. Its overt causality, enhanced emotions and ethical concerns, and inherent violence lead to heightened demands for retribution and/or resolve. Justice scripts become part of cognitive development from an early age and are immediately connected to issues of empathy. Children are able to recognise fairness and unfairness by the age of fifteen months, but are not as likely to recognise unfairness when the individual on the receiving end of it is of a different race than the child themselves are (Burns and Sommerville, 2014). In- and outgrouping is thus central to the construction of justice scripts. This is another way through which justice is foregrounded in children's war literature particularly.

In my approach to justice scripts I am overtly indebted to Marek Oziewicz's *Justice in Young Adult Speculative Fiction* (2015), the first work to analyse justice as a script. In it, he posited that "human understanding of justice is script-based" (6). As such, justice is moulded through exemplary or stereotypical narratives which include the full interiority of the actors involved (ibid). Justice scripts are thus culturally informed, and temporo-culturally sensitive. In his approach, Oziewicz asks himself the question why literary understanding can be applied to scripts.

The answer is that just as scripts are not consciously created by authors, so too they are not consciously registered by readers. At the same time, both authors and readers draw on scripts in structuring and deciphering causal and motivational links in stories. This automatic processing of strings of events into patterned narratives, whose elements resonate—through contrast or analogy—with the already stored patterns and categories in the author's and reader's mind make scripts a Schrödinger's cat of the literary experience (Oziewicz 2015, 9).

I am torn about this excerpt. On the one hand Oziewicz is right in stating that scripts live in both the author and the reader in a subconscious fashion; once acquired, they are simply ways for us to make sense of the world around us and the stories we tell ourselves. However, I disagree quite strongly with Oziewicz's claim that scripts are not consciously constructed. As demonstrated by Stephens (2011) and Savoie (2019), children's literature can *choose* to be subversive of expectations. Expectations are expressions of internalised scripts. In order for a narrative to be able to surprise the reader, it must deviate from those scripts. Although it is true that deviation can be based on cultural changes, which are often temporal in nature, fiction can also aim to break with cultural expectations. Whether or not this is successful is a different story; the point I am making here is that the desire for subversive children's literature requires a conscious breaking with and substitution of old scripts.

Although I am highly indebted to Oziewicz's work on justice scripts, my approach is significantly different. Firstly, his focus lay on speculative fiction, whereas I include realist as well. Secondly, Oziewicz dedicates most of his work to the identification of six types of narrative scripts: poetic (2015, 87-88), retributive (114-115), restorative (142), environmental (169), social (198), and global (226). The purpose of this work is to both demonstrate that justice functions as a script, and to provide a taxonomy for different justice scripts. Although a useful exercise and an important contribution to both cognitive and children's literature scholarship, the taxonomy itself is of no use to my project. Applying his concepts, based on a corpus significantly different from mine, would limit my approach. Instead of analysing justice scripts based on empathy and ethics, underlining all other narrative strategies, I would attempt to identify which strands of justice a particular narrative fits into. Therefore, although I am informed by Oziewicz's work, I do not base my own analysis on his methodology. Instead, I analyse how justice scripts function in children's war literature specifically. I do this based on my analyses of empathy and ethics in children's war literature, in order to discover how the war situation foregrounds particular emotions, ethical concerns, and empathic groupings.

Unlike the previous chapters, I will analyse only one novel. I do this because again, I am not looking to identify different types of justice scripts; I am only interested in analysing how justice functions as a script in children's war literature. To discover this, I turn to *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe* (Lewis 1950). This novel has been analysed before using a variety of lenses; it was even part of Oziewicz's analysis of Lewis' restorative justice tendencies (2015, 142-149). Interestingly however, the crucial element of war and its

influence on the empathy and ethics which underlie the justice scripts in *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe* are never addressed. Instead, the focus lies on Lewis' Christianity. By adding my analysis to the pre-existing wealth of scholarly discourse, I am able to deepen the understanding of the cognitive impact and structure of this text. Another thing of note is that, although I claimed in my introduction that I consider realist and speculative fiction as equal in my approach, this is my first fantasy analysis. There is no particular reason behind this; I selected novels based on appropriateness of analysis regarding specific narrative elements, and through that selection only approached fantasy at the final stage. Although fantasy significantly changes a narrative, the in- and outgrouping which is central to my approach, on which I have constructed my argument, functions in the same way. Through this analysis I demonstrate the significance of grouping even for justice, regardless of subgenre.

It's Simply a Matter of Good Versus Evil

The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe (1950) is generally seen as plot-driven rather than character-based, with a clear division between good and evil (Nikolajeva 2014a, 127). The apparent lack of interiority and the overt and seemingly inflexible in- and outgrouping makes that the novel appears "simple". However, as argued by Nikolajeva, it is still cognitively demanding and complex (ibid). The same counts for its approach to war. The war in the novel can be described as "the war between good and evil in its purest form" (Rahn 2014, 169). The positioning of the Christlike figure of Aslan on one side, and the White Witch on the other appear to clearly delimitate which side should be preferred by the reader. The divide between the two sides is augmented by their allies; the most important allies Aslan has are the Pevensie children, the focaliser-protagonists. As the reader is supposed to empathise and side with the protagonist, and particularly the focaliser, placing all of them on one of two sides also sides the reader. Additionally, the Witch's allies "include only creatures inherently evil by nature" (Rahn 2014, 169). The Other is therefore seemingly made as repulsive as possible, and the in- and outgrouping is clear. Additionally, any action against the Other is justified because it is never wrong to act against evil. This seemingly simplistic approach to war and in- and outgrouping, as well as the lack of interiority indicate that the implied reader is likely around ten years old.

Before turning to the script underlining the construction of justice in the story, I must first consider the schemas which play a part in it. On the side of evil, there is the White Witch. Within the war setting, she combines two schemas: the witch, and the Other invader. The evil nature of the White Witch is partially conjured up by the schema connected to the word

“witch”, which is generally associated with evil (Nikolajeva 2014a, 130). Already through the name “the White Witch” (for although her real name does feature in other Narnia novels, it does not in this one) the schema of “witch” is strongly attached to her persona. It is emphasised by her engagement with both seductive and destructive magic throughout the novel, as well as general cruelty. When the White Witch is first spoken of by Tumnus, he states that if he does not help the Witch, she will exact extreme violence against him:

And she’ll have my tail cut off, and my horns sawn off, and my beard plucked out, and she’ll wave her wand over my beautiful cloven hoofs and turn them into horrid solid hoofs like a wretched horse’s. And if she is extra and specially angry she’ll turn me into stone and I shall be only a statue of a Faun in her horrible house (1950/2011, 118).

The excessiveness of this punishment, combined with its graphic physical violence as well as the foregrounding of negative uses of magic affirm the evil element of her witch-ness. Her witch-ness enhances her Otherness as well, particularly as the protagonists are normal children entering her world. Although the children are technically Other in Narnia, the story is focalised through them, making the Witch the Other for both the protagonists and through them, the reader. In their eyes, the Witch is an evil invader. Her presence, as explained by the Beavers, is both not requested and not welcome; the Witch claims to be human in order to crown herself Queen, which she is not. Because of which “she’s bad all through” (147), according to the Beavers. Is she bad all through because she is not human at all, or because she claimed the throne on false pretences? Both are possible to the point of irrelevance; the Witch is evil and is stated to be so by all Narnians. The evil element of the witch schema is foregrounded by her seduction and enchantment of Edmund, the traitorous Pevensie brother. Her beauty and seductive nature come from a particular schema of witch-ness which may contrast with other, more Baba Yaga informed images, but falls in line with the beautiful witch of the Grimm brothers’ evil (step)mother. On the whole however, the Witch portrays a recognisable witch schema.

The side of good has both the children and Aslan. Of the children, the two most prominent are Lucy the innocent and Edmund the traitor. They fit into relatively simple schemas of “innocent little girl” and “recalcitrant middle son”. However, because they are, much like the implied child reader, normal children, the reader is unlikely to actively engage with the child schemas. Instead, their relative lack of development (although Edmund is the only of the Pevensie children to develop in any sense) may reaffirm any pre-existing schemas

of normal children (including gender roles), as they do not cause cognitive engagement questioning their status as children. Aslan the Christ figure is introduced by the Beavers as “the King” (146), “the Lord of the whole [of Narnia]” (ibid). Before it is revealed that he is a lion, he is appointed the king schema, particularly in fantasy settings, which adds an Arthurian element to his schema. This is enhanced by the prophecy that, like Arthur, Aslan will return when his people need him most:

*Wrong will be right, when Aslan comes in sight,
At the sound of his roar, sorrows will be no more,
When he bares his teeth, winter meets its death,
And when he shakes his mane, we shall have spring again* (146).

Aslan’s goodness is, through his Arthurian schema, linked to a magical goodness. This is only reaffirmed later in the novel when the children encounter him in his sublime awesomeness, as he sacrifices himself for both Edmund’s sins and the freedom of Narnia. The Christlike and Arthurian elements of his schema, although obvious to an expert reader, may not be explicit knowledge for a young reader. However, based on readerly expectations linked to the fantasy genre, the reader is likely to either already have a king schema in this sense, or will have it established through the mysticism and awe in the way Aslan is described by the Narnians.

Through focalisation and grouping, the reader is sided with the Narnians. Because none of the Narnians welcome the Witch, and the children immediately side with the Narnians, the Witch and her side of the conflict are portrayed as the evil Other. The only child who questions this grouping is Edmund; however, his questioning is clearly presented as a bad thing, as his siding with the Witch is based mostly on his overtly selfish desire for more Turkish delight and the promise to be made a prince. Yet, although he does side with the Witch Edmund remains in the ingroup, as his brother states: “[h]e is our brother after all, even if he is rather a little beast. And he’s only a kid” (149). As both a child and a close relative of the other children, Edmund can never be closed off from empathy. All of the Narnians are equally unwaveringly on the “right” side; as explained by Lucy, all Narnians “hate” the Witch (136). Because the in- and outgrouping is unshakeable even in the case of the traitorous Edmund (as he never adopts the Witch’s beliefs), the moral framework is equally unambiguous.

The war script is set up as soon as all children first go into Narnia together. Before then, Lucy is provided with the Narnians’ perspective of victimhood, and the Witch’s

terrifying threats and seductive promises of Turkish delight. Only from the Beavers are the children provided with the story of the Witch's false claim to the throne, and the promise of Aslan's heroic saving of Narnia. The Beavers also reveal that Witch's claim is based on the prophecy which implies the children's (divine) right to rule, further cementing the rightfulness of their cause. The set up for the war is therefore clear; the evil Witch is a wrongful and cruel invader who both corrupted the heroes' brother and the innocent country of Narnia, and both the children and Aslan are required to remove her perverting force in order to re-establish peace.

One of the main issues at the heart of justice depicted in this novel is forgiveness (Oziewicz 2015, 148). First, Edmund must be forgiven for his treachery. He is returned to the other children and Aslan, who has to sacrifice his life so that Edmund may live. The forgiveness Edmund receives is not examined deeply. Aslan, whose mind is completely closed to the reader, simply states that "there is no need to talk to him about what is past" (174) and does not bring it up again. When Edmund meets with his siblings, he shakes their hands and apologises to each in turn, after which "everyone wanted very hard to say something which would make it quite clear that they were all friends with him again" (ibid). This appears superficial, and potentially disingenuous, as the reader is not privy to anybody's emotions or reflections on Edmund's treachery. The image of a boy shaking the hands of everyone he's wronged and apologising, and them saying "[t]hat's all right" (ibid) is reminiscent of schoolchildren forced to apologise when they are not sorry at all. Yet, because Edmund had started developing empathy which overpowered his desire to overlook the Witch's evil nature, and his siblings always wanted to return him to them, there is no reason to doubt their forgiveness. However, the score is settled in this regard, and Edmund is accepted back into the fold without any questions. The moral punishment Edmund receives instead comes in the form of blood distribution; according to the old laws of the land the Witch owns all traitors who come to her freely and is owed a kill if they defect. Justice, therefore, is to honour these laws by providing her a kill – Aslan. The justness of this distribution of blood is never questioned by anyone except for Lucy, who is rebuked by Aslan "with something like a frown on his face. And nobody ever made that suggestion to him again" (176). The unavoidability of justice, particularly from the perspective of the ingroup, is complete; although it may be deeply unpleasant, justice must be honoured.

The other main issue is that of retribution; the Witch's corrupting force in Narnia is a wrong that must be righted. First, her influence over the land is reversed, as Winter makes

way for spring. After which, all of the Narnians she had turned to stone are returned to their living forms. However, the ultimate affront to Narnia is the Witch's presence; as all of the Narnians are on Aslan's side, and all on the Witch's side are pure evil, they must be removed from Narnia as well. Therefore, the novel calls for a retributive war against the enemy Other. The Witch is not offered forgiveness herself; instead, during the final battle of the novel, Aslan kills the Witch, and "[m]ost of the enemy had been killed in the first charge of Aslan and his companions; and when those who were still living saw that the Witch as dead they either gave themselves up or took flight" (192). Because this killing is framed as Good, embodied by Aslan, versus Evil, embodied by the Witch, Aslan is able to act without any moral retribution. The Witch is purely evil and responsible for Narnia's suffering, because of which Aslan's kill is justified and he remains untarnished. The battle itself is described as horrible, full of bloodshed and death. Edmund himself is on the brink of death; a moment of redemption where he demonstrates his true loyalty to his siblings. The terror of the battle is, however, shown as a necessary evil both to restore peace to Narnia and to the siblings. All mature through their experience, and through the battle, Edmund "had become his real old self again" (193). Thus, although war is terrible, it is also a positive force which is required at times.

The defeat of the Witch is not the end of the retribution; after the war is won and the siblings are installed as the rightful kings and queens of Narnia, Aslan leaves and Narnia is mostly peaceful. Yet still, "much of their time was spent in seeking out the remnants of the White Witch's army and destroying them [...]. But in the end all of that foul brood was stamped out" (194). The forgiveness shown to Edmund is therefore only applicable to the ingroup: once an enemy, always an enemy, and enemies are deserving only of death. Oziewicz writes that mythopoeic fantasy such as *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe* relies on retribution and poetic justice, but that Lewis was uncomfortable with the emphasis on retribution because of their religion, leading to a toning down through "forgiveness and reconciliation" (2015, 127-128). Yet in this novel the only forgiveness and reconciliation are shown to Edmund and Tumnus, both characters who sacrifice themselves for redemption. The focus remains on retribution as demonstrated by the stamping out of the enemy Other long after the battles have ceased. This is only possible because the Other is never allowed to be anything but Other; they are demonised "foul brood" and "evil things" (194), and never allowed to plead their case. Because the us versus them barriers are never crossed, and the reader is never allowed access to the Witch's troops' minds or emotions, there is no reason to

question the need and justness of eradicating them. The treatment of the Other in *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe* is a cleansing, which is framed as just because they supported a Lady with a false claim to the divine right to rule.

The justice script here is therefore formed through a combination of factors. Firstly, there is the in- and outgrouping. As I explained throughout the analysis, this grouping is essential for the way through which the Other's side is shown as being either morally right or wrong; because the binary cannot be transgressed (although Edmund flirts with the idea, he never fully crosses over) there is no space for moral ambiguity either, as you are either fully on Our side or fully on Theirs. Secondly, the focalisation reaffirms the effect of this grouping; because the Other remains opaque, the motivations behind their actions entirely unclear. Although some of the Witch's thoughts and emotions are revealed in order to make her evil nature and intent unambiguously clear, her army does not enjoy this same treatment, particularly after the final battle is won. If the novel had allowed insight into the emotions of the "foul brood" they may have ended up humanised, and their cleansing made unethical. As it stands, they remain monsters who deserve only death. Thirdly, there is the temporal order of right and wrongful actions, the actual overarching justice script. First, before the children enter Narnia, the Witch invaded Narnia with a wrongful claim to the throne. She exacted cruel punishment to both the landscape and its inhabitants. After entering Narnia, Edmund is seduced by the Witch into betraying his siblings and Lucy sides with the Narnians. The Beavers reveal the depth of the Witch's cruelty, then discover Edmund's betrayal and set out to rescue him from the Witch, aided by Aslan. Aslan sacrifices himself for Edmund, who is forgiven and accepted back into the fold. Aslan returns, and all together the ingroup defeats the outgroup, killing all and returning peace and stability to the land through the divine right to rule. The concept of justice in this narrative thus underlines the whole story, and every action, motivation and narrative strategy builds up to the overall image of what is right and what is wrong, as well as what action is called for to return balance to the land.

How Could We Do War Justice?

Before Oziewicz's work on speculative YA, nobody had looked at justice as a script. However, to my knowledge nobody has analysed justice scripts in children's literature yet. Additionally, I see no need for a separation between realist and speculative fiction in this regard. The bases of justice, namely ethics and empathy, function the same way in both realist and speculative fiction. Script theory underlies both the way we perceive ourselves and the world, and the way we read fiction. Similarly, in my approach to justice the basis lies in the

genre over-arching in- and outgrouping. Without desiring to add to Oziewicz's taxonomy or design a new one, my aim in this chapter was threefold: firstly, to demonstrate how justice builds on the previously established concepts of empathy and ethics as well as their respective narrative techniques; secondly, to provide an overview of script theory and how the concept of justice can be analysed as a script; and thirdly, to show how this functions through a textual analysis.

I have found that the war script begins functioning as soon as an Other is presented as dangerous to the political status quo. Grouping is, therefore, crucial to war scripts. As demonstrated in this analysis, focalisation is key in this initial establishment of who is Good and who is Evil; the children are Other to Narnia, but are in the reader's ingroup, the focalisers and the protagonists, so the reader is supposed to side with them. The Witch, however, is an evil Other. It is with her introduction, therefore, that the war script begins. The grouping both influences and is influenced by the schemas which inform the justice script; the Witch is already marked as dangerously Other because of her witch-ness, and the children (and anyone they consider ingroup/allies) are marked as ingroup because of their regular child-ness. These schemas are not challenged, as the characters remain firmly within their moral bounds. Further enemies and allies are clearly delimited; with the exception of Edmund, after Tumnus' confession there is no ambiguity about who is on whose side. The enemies are firmly evil; the heroes are unwaveringly good. The division between these groups is unsurmountable; even though Edmund flirts with evil, he remains firmly ingroup.

The morality of the war on the whole is therefore presented in a clear cut fashion; the Witch and her allies are evil, and the violence they enact on Narnia is as well and must be stopped. Aslan and the inhabitants of Narnia through opposition are morally right, the innocent victims of the Witch's violence. It does not matter that these children, as well as Aslan himself, kill for the cause of good, as it is always good to fight evil. The script of the war itself is clear: a violently successful invasion by the enemy, the heroes arrive, rebellion, ending in a victory leading to expulsion of the enemy. The reason why it is so clear is because of in- and outgrouping leading to explicit moral frameworks, which can only result in a straightforward type of justice. The concept of justice built up through this script is both retributive and selective; the Witch caused harm to Narnia and its inhabitants, so she and all who associate with her must be rooted and destroyed. No second chances are given to anyone who was not already in the ingroup. This enhances the pre-existing cognitive processing due to which people judge moral issues differently based on group identification; although fiction

has the potential to overcome these binary modes of thinking, it can also entrench them. The justice scripts of this novel belong in the latter category. As scripts are shortcuts for the way we view the world, and can be learned and updated through reading, the war in *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe* can therefore establish the reader's understanding of war as well as justice. This includes issues of invasion, rebellion and what counts as right and wrong. The depiction of the Other as unwaveringly evil, although an oversimplification of extra-textual war scenarios, could therefore bleed into the reader's conceptualisation of justice in these war scenarios.

6.

That's *Jus* For You

Up until this point, I have established an approach for empathy, ethics, as well as justice through cognitive narratology. So why is there another chapter? Surely the previous chapter covered justice through scripts? It did. However, there was one glaring component missing, which I see as the top of the empathy-ethics-justice pyramid, particularly with regards to war literature: just war theory. Just war theory is a modern approach to an ancient debate, dating back to Plato (Quabeck 2013, 12). It stems from a desire to “distinguish between the morally acceptable and the morally unacceptable in wars and ways of fighting” (Lee 2012, 2). It is thus based on complex ethical issues, however, it is a concern of justice because of its specificity and focus on distribution. Like in the chapter above, there are foregrounded concerns of punishment and the distribution of goods and services. There is also, however, the “distribution” of violence. What kind, how much, against whom and why are justifiable, for all issues of distribution, are at the core of just war theory.

One of the key figures of modern just war theory is Michael Walzer, who started the modern movement with his fundamental book *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977). In it, he claims that there is a need for a specific just war theory because history shows that the law does not apply during war, as war is a state of moral anarchy (1977/2015, 3). He observes that regular justice, represented by the law, leaves a vacuum; although there is a “state of moral anarchy”, there is still a desire for moral judgement. Acknowledging this, he states that:

War is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt. The first kind of judgement is adjectival in character: we say that a particular war is just or unjust. The second is adverbial: we say that the war is being fought justly or unjustly (21).

Thus, Walzer provides the two foundational elements of just war theory; the analysis of *jus ad bellum*, and *jus in bello*. *Jus post bellum* was coined by Michael J. Schuck in 1994 to account for a country's conduct once the war stops (982-983). The further addition of Cook's notion of *jus ante bellum* (2013, 152) rounds off the current linear view of just war, including preparation, reasons for attack, conduct during the war, and conduct after it.

Like any of the other concepts I discussed so far, just war theory is hotly debated, not a single agreed upon theory, and full of contradictions (Fotion 2014, 86-87). O'Driscoll takes particular issue with the clear temporalities implied by just war scholars, as they talk about before, during, and after, when war is often messy and its ending may be entirely unclear (2019, 907). Victory is a fundamental issue of just war theory, as stated by Walzer: "A just war is one that is morally urgent to win, and a soldier who dies in a just war does not die in vain" (1977/2015, 110). However, already in this initial definition the notion of "winning" causes problems: "But if it is sometimes urgent to win, it is not always clear what winning is" (ibid). Regarding victory Mona Fixdal only stated that wars should end in a form of peace which is more stable and just than the peace which existed before the war (2012, 1). Taking issue with the idea of neat endings, O'Driscoll continues to argue that although just war theorists take the condition of victory for granted, wars are unlikely to "conclude with a clear winner and loser, but can instead be expected to drag on in a ragged fashion to the point where it is difficult to discern not just who won, but whether the war is even over" (2019, 901). An example of this is Berwick-upon-Tweed, which was excluded from the 1856 peace treaty following the Crimean War, a situation which was only rectified in 1960. Except, there was never any certainty regarding the validity of this story. More violent examples can be drawn from the current situations in Afghanistan and Iraq, where there appear to be no winners and equally no ending.

The main complicating issue at the core of just war theory, however, is the problem of responsibility/accountability. It is crucial to know who is held accountable before we can form a moral judgement. Considering *jus ad bellum* governs a seemingly purely political event, only political leaders (or whoever is in charge) are responsible in that element of just war theory (Parsons 2017, 752). It is their decision to wage war, and even though political leaders act within a wider socio-cultural context (blame may be assigned to the media, for example), as leaders the responsibility for strategy and policy is theirs. During the war, however, both political leaders and soldiers are held accountable (ibid). Again, political leaders are in charge of the policies and strategies which govern the soldiers' movements in

its most basic terms, which would leave the soldiers as blameless puppets. However, the soldiers themselves are now directly involved in combat, and their actions become morally judgeable. There is as of yet no agreed upon measure for much responsibility the soldiers carry for the wars they fight in or their conduct within it (ibid), although it is certainly a topic of difficult moral debate. To draw another couple of examples from extra-textual life, although the Dutch government has been found to be partially responsible for the genocide in Srebrenica during the Bosnian war, none of the soldiers themselves have been charged with anything. Several of the soldiers involved with the torture practices at Abu Ghraib, on the other hand, were held individually accountable. Difficult scenarios such as these are why James Dubik explained just war theory to be a theory of applied, practical morality for the single most complex human activities (2016, 5).

Jus Reading

Justice can be argued to be the objective of war, the effort to achieve a perceived just outcome. However, as an endeavour necessarily involving conflict, violence, and side-taking, war transgresses due-ness and fairness. Therefore, any text dealing with this topic must negotiate its stance on what counts as justice. However, as demonstrated above, the issue of just wars is infinitely complex and not possible to grasp with one single approach. Therefore, the narrative's approach to justice is dependent on and formed by the ethical stance taken by the narrative on the whole; the moral frameworks within which each character operates, and the judgement placed on them because of it. Therefore, justice is also delimited by empathic engagement: who is the reader supposed to empathise with, why, and how does this frame rightness and fairness in the text? Through engagement with the text, the reader is also engaged with the concept of justice. The narrative's construction of justice then, through and because of the reader's engagement with the text, could potentially influence the reader's understanding of what justice is, particularly with young readers.

Just war theory is a moral analysis of specific wars rather than a theory on war in general, which makes literature particularly useful for just war scholars. This is because each war story provides a structured presentation of a war which can be revisited time and time again. The clear temporal structure of most children's novels especially allows for an equally clear structure of *jus ante bellum*, *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello*, and *jus post bellum*; the structure of the novel follows the structure of the war and its justice issues. Children's fiction can thus portray the clearest image of just war issues. Additionally, unlike extra-textual wars, wars in fiction are not subject to conflicting reporting; although fiction can never be objective, the war

presented in a particular narrative is always presented in the same way. The readings of war narratives allow both scholars and lay readers to engage with different wars framed with different moral frameworks and judgements, which challenging cognitive engagement may potentially lead to a developed conception of what a just war is. Children's literature, because of its formative nature, provides an especially fruitful opportunity for this.

Just War Scripts

Adding just war theory to the justice scripts of the previous chapter allows for a more precise analysis of justice in children's war literature, as it places the emphasis on *war*. Whereas justice scripts can be seen and analysed in any (children's) narrative, the war element of this genre both demands a different approach to justice and foregrounds the importance of its scripts in extra-textual life. Just war theory has, to my knowledge, never been handled as a basis for script analysis. Presumably this is because up until Oziewicz's 2015 work nobody had even considered justice scripts, let alone just war theory scripts. Additionally, the nature of just war theory appears to prevent its applicability in script theory; if it can only be applied to analyse particular wars and not as an umbrella approach, how could it possibly be a script? However, the core of the just war theory debate makes it perfect for script analysis. It has a clear structuring of *jus ante bellum*, *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello* and *jus post bellum*, which goes hand in hand with the script of war itself; preparation, attack, battle, and resolution. Viewing war and just war theory in this way makes both scripts; much like the scripts we have for our daily lives or for reading, we have expectations of how wars develop and should be handled. These expectations, like with any other scripts, are based on previous exposure.

However, the implied reader is unlikely to have had any extra-textual war experience, meaning that their war scripts are based entirely on cultural experiences like reading. Therefore, their war scripts will be based, at least in part, on the highly structured and artificial form war takes in fiction. As will, at the same time, their scripts and therefore understanding of war justice. Additionally, the young reader (and dare I say even most adult readers) are unlikely to be actively aware of just war theory, or to be educated in it in an explicit manner. This places a heavy moral weight on the just war scripts in children's literature; whereas the implied reader is highly likely to be exposed first-hand to differing justice scripts, they may never gain any non-structured just war scripts. Yet they will, eventually, become politically empowered people who may base their behaviour and voting, for example, on the just war scripts they encountered in the past. The narratives of war justice in children's literature are therefore both complex and important.

These final analyses will demonstrate exactly that; the function of just war scripts in children's war literature. To do so, I once again turn to speculative fiction. Unlike the previous chapter, however, my decision to do so here is not coincidental. Rather, the science-fiction elements of the novels I analyse specifically function to allow the child characters more responsibility than their realist peers. Because the characters are directly involved with combat as well as strategy, both conflicting sides of just war theory are represented in these novels. This is not to say that realist fiction does not feature just war scripts, or that all speculative war fiction overtly does so; rather, the novels I selected foreground them most overtly because of the power the child holds. The first novel I analyse is Orson Scott Card's *Ender's Game* (1977/1991). The issue of just war theory stands at the heart of this novel and is approached from different perspectives. The final novel I analyse is Terry Pratchett's *Only You Can Save Mankind* (1992). This novel, like most of Pratchett's work, is deeply satirical (Hunt 2001, 86-90), specifically of novels like *Ender's Game*. As such, it problematises the concepts and scripts of *Ender's Game* by reframing them and providing a counternarrative. Ending the chapter with this analysis I am able to demonstrate the complete breadth of just war scripts in children's war literature.

The Enemy Is You

There is no better text I can think of which better demonstrates the functioning of just war scripts than *Ender's Game*. The setup of the story already shows the complex nature and foregrounded importance of justice for this narrative; Ender, the protagonist, is a child soldier persuaded to leave behind his life on Earth to train for an intergalactic, preventative war against an alien Other who has previously driven humanity to near extinction. There, Ender is trained brutally through unfair war simulations, and is ultimately tricked into committing unknowing xenocide (genocide against aliens). Because the story is about war empathy and ethics are already foregrounded, however, as the protagonist is a very young child (Ender is only six when he leaves for military training) the problematic elements of war justice are emphasised even further. The usage of such intensely young child soldiers both demonstrates and problematises the justice of the narrative. It shows that the adults of this story world are willing to use children as military weapons, regardless of their age or understanding. As it forces a character with traditionally very little power or responsibility to act in morally profound ways, the novel also inevitably comments on this type of approach to war where any means are justified to secure the win. The narrative is thus overtly highly concerned with just war theory, and questions it at every turn. *Ender's Game* is also quite complex regarding who

the implied reader is. The novel was initially marketed at adults, but has since crossed over to children. Presumably this is because the protagonist is very young, and the gaming element of the narrative makes it highly marketable to young adolescent boys specifically. The approach to in- and outgrouping appears to be as straightforward as *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe*, but gets complicated further along in the novel. The language used is fairly accessible for young ages, yet Ender's siblings reference philosophy and political concepts which most adults would miss. Thus, the novel has almost two implied readers: an adult, and a child reader of around 10 years old.

Jus Ante Bellum

The concept of *jus ante bellum* was coined by Cook in his 2013 analysis of *Ender's Game*. As a reminder, this concept deals with "the need to teach those involved with the war about just war theory" (152). It is thus the moral responsibility, on the side of those political leaders which decide to wage war, to ensure that anybody who is involved with the war to come be it on a combat or strategic level is aware of the moral frameworks within which they will operate. Although I find Cook's wording to be mildly problematic, as I do not think there is always the need to teach about just war theory specifically, I agree that moral education is a site of responsibility regarding preparations for war. I would like to add to this definition, however, any training and selection of troops in preparation for warfare, accounting for example for age, sex, or class distinctions in recruitment, and conduct during/set-up of training. It is not surprising that this comes forward in an analysis of *Ender's Game*, as it is one of the most foregrounded elements of the novel. Ender is selected for military training specifically because of his young age and abnormal intelligence and empathy. Steffen Hantke emphasises Ender's age as key to his selection:

The military intervenes before adulthood can dilute Ender's pure and natural impulses. Military training appears as nothing more than a specialized form of socialization. The disciplinary system the child is subjected to provides a concrete context for his skills and counteracts the childish obstacles in Ender's path to becoming a perfect fighting machine: short attention span, disappointment during the socialization process, unwillingness to see the necessity for "sacrifice" (in the form of isolation, e.g.) (1998, 506).

Hantke's analysis is interesting in that the military most certainly purposefully selects young children and uses military training to socialise them. However, Hantke appears to forget that

Ender is not a normal child; he has no demonstrative short attention span, or any other “child-like obstacles”. Military training instead is a gruelling and painful process through which Ender has to learn the moral chaos of war and everything that goes with it.

Although there are several elements to Ender’s military education, the central one takes place through the wargames, where the children are divided up into teams which have to compete in mock-battles in zero gravity. Once Ender becomes the leader of his team, at an unusually young age even for Battle School, the battles he partakes in are purposefully made unfair through unusual frequency and clashing with previously established rules. This results in Ender’s frustration and a loss of belief in previously established moral rules; he is in a way forced to act ignobly and does not display generally correct moral behaviour (Day 2012, 221). Eventually, the School’s unfairness completely breaks Ender away from the desire to act morally: “I don’t care if I follow your rules. If you can cheat, so can I. I won’t let you beat me unfairly – I’ll beat you unfairly first” (292). This tendency to behave against social mores is already present in Ender before he goes to Battle School, and is part of the reason why he was selected. However, the unfairness of the games is purposeful and overt. Therefore, Ender’s turn against previously established mores is a desired outcome of his military socialisation; it is because he “cheats” at the “games” that war ends in human victory. However, the severe consequence of that is that a break from what he considers moral behaviour is demonstrated as necessary and even desirable in military conduct.

The main concern regarding Ender’s military education/humanity’s preparation for war is that Ender is made purposefully unaware of the reality of his situation. After Ender graduates from Battle School to Command School aged eleven, the games he plays change from combat simulations to tactical strategy games, which he plays against the hero held responsible for humanity’s victory after the previous attack by the aliens. For his “graduation” from Command School Ender fights a final battle in front of an audience, where his troops are outnumbered “a thousand to one” (292). Convinced this is yet another unfair battle, Ender breaks away from any concern regarding acting morally completely. “Fairness wasn’t part of the game” (ibid). He decides to use a morally forbidden weapon of mass destruction to completely destroy the enemy’s home planet, thinking this breaking of rules will get him expelled. The realisation that he instead committed xenocide is overwhelming to him:

Real. Not a game. Ender’s mind was too tired to cope with it all. They weren’t just points of light in the air, they were real ships that he had fought with and

real ships he had destroyed. And a real world that he had blasted into oblivion (297).

Ender commits an atrocity without any knowledge about it; he had even been engaged with actual warfare without being aware of it. Because of this lack of awareness Ender could not have engaged empathically with his enemy; his moral framework never stretched to include the Other because the Other was merely a simulation created to spite him. The adults later explain that they had to trick him into believing it was a game, because he would not have committed this atrocity.

Any decent person who knows what warfare is can never go into battle with a whole heart. But you didn't know. We made sure you didn't know. You were reckless and brilliant and young. It's what you were born for" (Card 1991, 298).

By denying Ender awareness the adults in charge of his military education equally denied him the choice to act morally. By foregrounding this issue throughout the novel, the narrative emphasises the importance of moral military education. Ender is the protagonist and, most of the time, the focaliser. He is also very young, and therefore closer in age to the implied reader than the adults in charge of Ender's education. Ender is therefore in the reader's ingroup, and they are supposed to side with him. Thus, Ender's emotions of betrayal and grief over the murders he unknowingly committed are supposed to signal to the reader that the adults' treatment of Ender was not just. Although the war ended in human victory, it came at too high a cost: Ender's morality.

Jus Ad Bellum

Much like the *jus ante bellum*, the narrative problematises *jus ad bellum*; both are subject to adult lies. Before the events of the novel take place, Earth was subject to two failed yet destructive invasions by the aliens, which left humanity on the brink of extinction. After these attacks, humanity has lived with the fear and uncertain knowledge that a third invasion will come. In just war theory, the threat of a devastating attack in the light of two previous attempts at genocide would count as a just reason to take to arms; this war would be defensive rather than retributive, and a necessary evil to ensure human survival. The precedent set by the two previous attacks further cements the justness of taking to arms; the aliens did not provide any diplomatic means to resolve the conflict, nor did they provide any motivations behind their attacks. The violence appears both senseless and unavoidable. When Colonel

Graff comes to recruit Ender for Battle School, he reaffirms this view of the wars both past and to come:

The buggers may seem like a game to you now Ender, but they damn near wiped us out last time. They had us cold, outnumbered and outweaponed [...]. We've scraped together everything mankind could produce, a fleet that makes the one they sent against us last time seem like a bunch of kids playing in a swimming pool [...]. But it might not be enough, even so. Because in the eighty years since the last war, they've had as much time to prepare as we have (25).

The extreme need of the situation is clear; humanity must act with everything it has to defend itself against extinction. Graff voicing this to Ender in an attempt to persuade him to abandon his life on Earth for the military is itself unethical; as a six-year-old, although of exceptional intelligence and ability Ender is not or should not be treated as if he is cognitively able to comprehend what it means to do either. Going to Battle School means removing himself from the family home entirely; being in the military implies a willingness both to kill and be killed. Graff's pressing message regarding the danger humanity is in is manipulative, and morally deplorable. However, if the need is indeed that high and humanity is at the brink, sacrificing the happiness of one child may be considered excusable in both a deontological and a consequentialist perspective; Ender *is* exceptionally bright and seemingly aware of the implications, and if his unhappiness ensures human survival, it may be justified.

However, Graff eventually reveals that there is no threat of a third invasion. Much like the games Ender plays, the third invasion people on Earth are told may happen any day is an adult fiction. After the second invasion, the aliens pulled back and never attacked again. Graff reveals this to Ender after Ender refuses to play any further games in an attempt to once again persuade him, this time to return to Battle School.

“So we're not waiting for the Third Invasion.”

“We *are* the Third Invasion.”

“We're attacking them. Nobody says that. Everybody thinks we have a huge fleet of warships waiting in the comet shield —”

“Maybe they gave up and they're planning to leave us alone.”

“Maybe. You've seen the videos. Would you bet the human race on the chance of them giving up and leaving us alone?” (250).

This problematises the *jus ad bellum* significantly. In the case where there is indeed a significant threat against humanity from an established and intimidating enemy, any means may be deemed necessary to protect the inhabitants of Earth. However, the aliens have not indicated any further penchant for violence. They have also, however, not communicated with humanity in any other way. Considering the severity of the previous wars and the lack of clarification regarding the sudden absence of violence, it may be understandable that the aliens are still considered a threat in the eyes of the adults who lived through the previous wars. However, it is significant that they lie about who is invading whom, not only to Ender but to everybody on Earth. As discussed in chapter three, lying is a morally ambiguous activity. In this case, lying about the reason for going to war extends that ambiguity to the justification of warfare. Why lie if the cause is just? This type of ambiguity demands high cognitive engagement in order to make sense of the many layers of embedment and their implications for the ethics of the narrative; the usage of child soldiers is less easily justified if there is no pressing threat calling for everything mankind has to offer.

Although the scripts of both war and just war theory are highly temporal in nature, *Ender's Game* further complicates this issue of *jus ad bellum* by providing the Other's perspective after their defeat. The aliens, called Formics, communicate telekinetically. After Ender destroys them all, the last remaining queen finds a way to communicate with him in the same way.

We are like you; the thought pressed into his mind. We did not mean to murder, and when we understood, we never came again. We thought we were the only thinking beings in the universe, until we met you, but never did we dream that thought could arise from the lonely animals who cannot dream each other's dreams. How were we to know? We could live with you in peace. Believe us, believe us, believe us (321).

Although the narrative already problematised the *jus ad bellum*, this further complicates the matter in two ways. Firstly, it emphasises again that the Formics were no threat after the second invasion; they realised that humans have sentience and had no intention of attacking again. Humanity was not to know this, as the Formics could not communicate with them. However, here the Formic queen affirms what Ender suspected earlier, because of which it is foregrounded for the reader. Secondly, and additionally, this first insight into the Formics' mind and emotions allows for empathy with them for the first time. Their misunderstanding of humanity excuses their earlier transgressions but does not erase their violence. The narrative

promoting empathy with the Formics, and potentially sympathy for their fate, may push the reader to further disagreeing with humanity's aggression towards them. Thus, the justification for war is both foregrounded and problematised.

Jus in Bello

Ender is not engaged in combat in the space war, nor is the reader privy to the conduct of his soldiers. As the combatants themselves are in spaceships, combat does not occur face to face, meaning that the responsibility for *jus in bello* does not lie with them. The true immoral behaviour is on Ender's side, particularly his committing of xenocide. Ender is told during his training that that the weapon of mass destruction "Little Doctor" "could never be used on a planet" (272). In rebellion against the unfairness of what he thinks is his final test, Ender decides to cheat by using Little Doctor against the enemy's home planet. Once it's revealed to Ender that his simulation game was reality, the moral gravity of his actions immediately becomes clear to him:

"I killed them all, didn't I?" Ender asked [...].

Mazer leaned in close. "That's what the war was for."

"All their queens. So I killed all their children, all of everything."

"*They* decided that when they attacked us. It wasn't your fault. It's what had to happen" (297, emphasis in original).

The narrative thus foregrounds the significance of Ender's actions, even if he was not aware of them. Ender is devastated by this, and as the narrative's protagonist and ingroup to the reader, his extreme negative emotional reaction to the xenocide communicates that in his eyes, the act was not just. Because the reader is supposed to be aligned with Ender at least empathically, they are likely to equally consider this questioning stance. The narrative therefore communicates that completely eradicating your opponent is not justifiable.

However, a complicating factor to this view of *jus in bello* is Ender's pre-Battle School perspective on victory. At school, Ender is approached by a group of bullies, whom he knows intend to beat him up. Ender fights the leader off, working him on the ground, after which the bully's cronies backing off. Yet, Ender does not finish using violence at that point:

Ender knew the unspoken rules of manly warfare, even though he was only six. It was forbidden to strike the opponent who lay helpless on the ground; only an animal would do that.

So Ender walked to Stilson's supine body and kicked him again, viciously, in the ribs. Stilson groaned and rolled away from him. Ender walked around him and kicked him again, in the crotch (1977/1991, 7).

Ender's reflection on and conscious refusal of acting according to established moral rules regarding warfare foregrounds the moral anarchy of war mentioned by Walzer. Ender knows that if he holds to the mores regarding just warfare, the bullies will come back for him later, perhaps more violently; if he ends the conflict through a devastating demonstration of violence now, there will be no conflict anymore in the future. A situation echoing this one occurs in Battle School, when Ender is cornered by a rival captain, Bonzo, and his crew mates. Ender knows that Bonzo aims to kill him, and again beats him into complete submission in order to secure no further aggression. After, Ender cries that he never wanted to hurt anyone, yet he does not consider any other solution. It is later revealed that Ender killed both Stilson and Bonzo, information which is kept from him. This behaviour is both commended and admonished by the adults; reflecting on his approach to winning there is an argument in which they state both that "The kid is scary" (ibid) and that "Ender Wiggin isn't a killer. He just wins – thoroughly" (226). The image of morally just behaviour here is highly complex; Ender hates the violence he enacts, yet he sees it as an inevitable necessity. In his eyes, he is justified in his behaviour both because he does not choose to put himself in violent situations, and because he prevents any further aggression by exacting excessive violence on a single occasion. It is possible that the reader follows this line of thought; although it is deeply unpleasant, it is sometimes just to act excessively violent in order to prevent further aggression.

Ender's moral framework regarding his personal "battles" may therefore complicate the image of *jus in bello* in the space war. Ender's outrage about his xenocide indicates that he does not agree that it was a justifiable act; yet he does consider this type of behaviour justifiable when it comes to his personal encounters. The xenocide is an enhanced, extreme version of his encounters with Stilson and Bonzo; outrageous and complete destruction in order to prevent any further need for violence. Ender is protected from making that decision himself because the adults refuse to give him the responsibility that would have come with awareness. However, there is no reason to assume that Ender would not extend his personal mores to the battlefield. It is simply because it is kept from him that he is not able to make that decision. Therefore, the reader is faced with a highly intricate image of just behaviour in battle; Ender's behaviour is framed as both a necessary evil and "scary" – he hates behaving

in a violent fashion himself, yet feels both like he has to and is right to do so. However, when it comes to the war itself Ender does not approve of this same moral framework. This contradictory morality represented may be challenging for the reader and demands high cognitive engagement. The difficult nature of *jus in bello* in this narrative foregrounds it. There is no proper “answer” given to the question of what is or is not correct behaviour in warfare; instead, the reader is only shown the complicated nature of it. The reader is therefore not provided “the” script for just behaviour in war. Just war theory after all does not provide “the” answers to what it discusses. Instead, the reader is prompted to consider their own conceptions about just wars.

Jus Post Bellum

Victory, as explained above already a contentious issue in just war theory, is equally problematic in *Ender’s Game*. The aim of Ender’s gruelling military training and experience is to ensure victory for humanity, yet it is unclear how this is to be achieved, or even what it means. Through the unfair war simulations Ender learns that the end goal of victory must be achieved no matter what and can be achieved through loose interpretations of or ignoring the rules. At Ender’s final battle simulation in Battle School, he is pitted against two combined armies. Instead of fighting them, he decides to sacrifice all of his troops in order to have enough to complete the game. “Therefore, by one way of thinking, you could argue that the ending ritual *was* victory. The battleroom certainly recognized it as the end of the game” (218, emphasis in original). This is an early foreshadowing of the complicating nature of victory in the actual space war; through the game the question of what exactly constitutes victory is foregrounded both diegetically and extradiegetically. The problematised image of victory is further enhanced in Command School, as Ender goes into his final battle there. Ender decides once again to “cheat” in order to achieve his desired outcome. “If I break this rule, they’ll never let me be a commander. It would be too dangerous. I’ll never have to play a game again. And that is victory” (293). He considers victory here in purely selfish terms, again because he does not consider the battle to be real; for him, victory is freedom from the military and their influence in his life. This may seem insignificant in comparison to the war scenario, yet by bringing up the issue of victory in unfair scenarios, the narrative foregrounds the ambiguity of victory; Ender cheats to achieve it, and his understanding of what victory is, is limited to his own experience.

Victory in the war against the Formics takes the form of xenocide, and the assurance that there will be no further violence exacted against humanity. However, this is again the

result of cheating, in this case the adults cheating Ender out of an awareness of the situation, and therefore moral ambiguity.

“Ender, for the past few months you have been the battle commander of our fleets. This was the Third Invasion. There were no games, the battles were real, and the only enemy you fought was the buggers. You won every battle, and today you finally fought them at their home world, where the queen was, all the queens from all their colonies, they all were there and you destroyed them completely. They’ll never attack us again. You did it. You” (297).

Although horribly excessive, the xenocide *does* ensure humanity’s survival. And again, the humans were unable to communicate with the Formics, and could therefore not know that there was no threat at all to speak of. The deception at the heart of the victory complicates its depiction; responsibility is placed on Ender, yet he cannot fully bear it as he was unaware. Although the adults, and all of humanity back on Earth, do celebrate Ender’s victory over the Formics, Ender does not share in the festivities. He is despondent and dreams of “eyes that grieved for a billion, billion murders – but they were his own eyes, and he was content to wear them” (301). Again, the notion of victory is problematised; humanity’s survival of this foe is ensured, yet the “hero” responsible for it cannot celebrate it and views it as an affront to justice. Again, Ender is the protagonist and focaliser, and as a young child is closer to the reader’s ingroup than the adults who celebrate his “victory” are. Therefore, the reader is likely to prefer Ender’s unambiguous view of this seeming military victory over the adults’ perspective.

Instead of celebrating the xenocide, Ender proposes a different form of justice all the way at the end of the novel: reparation. After successfully communicating with the Formics, Ender makes it his mission to re-establish their existence; there is one cocoon with a living queen left, which if placed in the correct environment could allow the Formics to return to life.

“I’ll go from world to world until I find a time and a place where you can come awake in safety. And I’ll tell your story to my people, so that perhaps in time they can forgive you, too. The way that you’ve forgiven me” (321).

As the person responsible for their destruction, he also assumes responsibility for their restoration. He also, however, assumes responsibility for humanity’s understanding of the Formics’ perspective. The form of justice Ender here espouses is therefore reconciliatory and

based on forgiveness; righting the wrongs, undoing his xenocide by repairing the Formics' existence. There are therefore two main competing forms of *jus post bellum* present in the novel; a celebration of the complete destruction of the Other, and a desire to instate a new peace based on tolerance, empathy and cohabitation between the in- and outgroup. The adults are aligned with the former, and carry the weight of adult authority. Ender espouses the latter, and carries the weight of the ingroup. Both, however, are deceptive, do not play by the established rules of either society or war, and both have a tendency to violence. "Far from simply being the good, innocent, justice-seeking opposites of deceptive adults, the young characters [...] also demonstrate a capacity for cruelty, dishonesty, and injustice" (Day 2012, 208). Ender's behaviour in his personal battles combines with the adult perspective on war victory to provide a strong narrative supporting victory as complete destruction of the other; it is only all the way at the end of the narrative that the alternative is provided. Therefore, the reader is only presented with a single just war script for the majority of the novel, even if it is problematised throughout. The result is a highly complex, and cognitively demanding perspective on *jus post bellum*.

The just war script put forward by this narrative is highly complex and ambiguous. The intricate elements of justice linked particularly to war concerns in this novel are portrayed as difficult to navigate, demonstrating the moral chaos war causes. The novel deals clearly with all four aspects of war and has an equally clear temporal outline of the stages of war. The just war script follows this clear temporality: there is a need for just training and education of the troops in preparation of the war; there must be a good reason for going to war; the conduct during the war must be morally right; and after the war is over there is foregrounded need for correct behaviour as well. The narrative does not have to be unambiguous about its perspective of what "just" conduct is in these stages; simply foregrounding the need for it at each phase forces the reader to engage with the issue themselves. Therefore, the reader is able to build a script about complex issues. There is no answer to just war theory; justice itself is complex enough. The need for moral reflection at each phase of warfare is the just war script put forward by the narrative.

Question Everything

In Terry Pratchett's *Only You Can Save Mankind* (1992), Pratchett, the satirist (Hunt 86-90), problematises the setup of Card's *Ender's Game*. While computer and physical games are forms of training for the children in Battle School, in Pratchett's novel the war takes place entirely through the videogame. This echoes Ender's belief that he is playing a game whilst

unknowingly fighting battles against the Formics. However, Pratchett's hero Johnny Maxwell is made aware early on in the game that his battles have a real impact on his "enemies".

Unlike Ender, Johnny is not exceptional in any way. He is also a bit older than Ender, as he is first involved with the war aged 12. Additionally, Pratchett's novel is set during the Gulf war. Johnny's preoccupation with his videogame-based war is purposefully contrasted with the documentation of the Gulf war, which provides a fruitful basis for analysis. The importance of the two contrasting wars is summarised neatly by Lykke Guanio-Uluru, who argued that "juxtaposing these situations in the design of the novel, the implied author invites the reader to make a similar mental and empathic shift relative to the victims of not only fictional but also actual wars" (2016). However, as the concern with justice as a script lies with Johnny's space war, I focus solely on that here. The setup for this analysis is the same as it was for *Ender's Game*, in order to demonstrate how the novel problematises justice scripts in its own right, and to show how a purposefully different approach to empathy and ethics results in a different construction of justice whilst maintaining the same structured just war script.

Just Ante Bellum

Johnny's engagement with his education is not great; he mentions homework from time to time and discusses with his friends how they can cheat their way out of spending any time on it. As for moral or war education, Johnny was never *meant* to engage with war first-hand. His education is therefore general, unlike Ender's. It seems therefore that *jus ante bellum* does not play a role in the just war script of this novel. However, the videogame itself is framed as just war education. Because Johnny is forcefully plunged into intergalactic warfare, he has to adapt rapidly and apply any previous knowledge he has got; in this case, his main concerns are controlling his spaceship and understanding what other human "players" understand of the ScreeWees' and war's ontological status. This knowledge is founded entirely on videogames; he can successfully mind-model for the other human "players" based on his own previous mindset in playing videogames and has vague notions regarding the functions of his spaceship through other gaming experience. The narrator does, however, comment ironically on this educational role of videogames:

You never said to your parents, 'Hey, I really need a computer because that way I can play *Megasteroids*.'

No, you said, 'I really need a computer because of school.'

It's *educational* (26, emphasis in original).

Contrasting school education with videogame entertainment, there appear to be two main meanings to this comment; firstly, the lie about needing a computer for formal education undermines a belief in the formative value of videogaming. This could be because the narrator mind-models that the reader's parents may not believe in that value, however, it could also be because the narrative does not believe in it itself. Johnny's relative failure with formal education could support this understanding. However, secondly, the notion of education through videogames is suggested here as well; "it's educational" is not presented in speech form and can therefore be read as either "your" thoughts, or the narrator's commentary on the educational value of videogames. The link between videogames and formative education, however, is foregrounded regardless of the irony which young readers may not recognise in the first place.

Like Ender, Johnny learns his battle strategies through what he believes are game simulations and is only confronted with reality after the fact. However, Johnny is embroiled in a war when he first has this confrontation. The poignant moment when it is suggested that all space war videogames are not simulations at all occurs when Johnny and the ScreeWees encounter the wreckage of a Space Invader. These aliens have gone extinct, and Johnny is forced to create a link between the enemies he fought in the past, and the ones he is forced to empathise with and protect in the present. The result, for *jus ante bellum*, is confrontational; these videogames provide battle training but not pre-emptively. The combatant is not prepared beforehand, but must learn both strategy and the empathic and moral implications during the conflict. Because Johnny is put in contact with the ScreeWees from the beginning of the novel, they are able to immediately express their emotions and desires, therefore emphasising the problem with a lack of proper education. Because the human players are unaware of the reality of their wars, they cannot and do not empathise with the enemy. They are Other in the most complete sense; they are presumed not to exist at all. Forcing Johnny, who is in the reader's ingroup, to empathise with the ScreeWees, the narrative equally forces him to reconsider his moral frameworks; all wars he thought were fake turn out to be real, fought against sentient and moral beings. The reader, through empathy with Johnny, is also forced to consider their own empathic and moral standing regarding all wars, whether against a real or imagined enemy. This moral lesson is made clear near the end of the novel:

'I'm not even sure there *are* aliens. Only different kinds of us. But I know what the important thing is. The important thing is to be exactly sure about what

you're doing. The important thing is to remember it's not a game. None of it. Even the games' (235).

This moral lesson can be boiled down to a specific cry of *jus ante bellum*; it does not matter whether or not you are engaged with a simulation, as all wars require moral engagement. It is impossible to form a full, practical morality without the necessary preparation, without "being sure about what you are doing", as what you are doing is killing an Other. Without an understanding of the moral implications of this killing, war is indeed reduced to a moral anarchy. By placing the reader's ingroup, in the forms of Johnny and his friends, in this moral anarchy and forcing them to face and make up for their previous empathic and moral failures, the narrative foregrounds the need for the proper war education which the characters did not enjoy themselves.

Jus Ad Bellum

The issue with *jus ad bellum* for the initial war between humanity and the ScreeWees is complicated from the beginning of the narrative and foregrounded by two particular occurrences; Johnny's empathy with the ScreeWees, and the ScreeWees' own conflicting perspectives on just warfare. Johnny, like presumably all other human players, initially does not know that he is in combat with sentient beings. As far as he is aware, he is playing against a virtual enemy devoid of emotions and beliefs; engaged in a purely entertaining exercise. The war against the ScreeWees can therefore not be just in any conception of justice; the combatants are not aware of the ramifications of their actions, there is no point to the violence (victory would be meaningless except for a fleeting sense of individual satisfaction), and the human side is so successful that the ScreeWees face extinction if the violence is not stopped. Although Johnny chooses to play a videogame, he does not choose to kill sentient beings; the conflicting emotions and forced shift of his moral framework foreground the injustice of this war. This issue is further emphasised by the internal conflicts of the ScreeWees. Unlike in *Ender's Game*, the aliens enjoy focalisation from the beginning of the conflict. In these sections, it is revealed to the reader that it was the Captain's decision to surrender to Johnny and cease all combat against humanity. She remains steadfast in this, even when other human "players" continuously attack and destroy ScreeWee ships. This leads to conflict with her underlings, who feel a need to protect what remains of their people:

'No! We must fight on!'

'And then we die,' said the Captain. 'We fight, and then we die. That's how it

goes.'

'Then we die gloriously!'

'There's an important word in that sentence,' said the Captain. 'And it's not the word "gloriously".'

The Gunnery Officer went light green with rage.

'He's attacked hundreds of our ships!'

'And then he stopped' (28).

This conflict continues throughout the novel and results in an attempted mutiny. The severity of this issue is thus highlighted, and the ambiguity of this decision is foregrounded. The ScreeWees would be justified in protecting themselves against extinction. Additionally, the Captain's decision to trust Johnny, an enemy single-handedly responsible for the death of hundreds if not thousands of their kind, is not easy to accept for the other ScreeWees. Johnny is in the outgroup for them, and previously established himself as a direct physical threat to their wellbeing and existence. Accepting him as a protector would mean both accepting him as ingroup, and an implied forgiveness of his previous violent transgressions against them. This is highly demanding both empathically and morally. However, the Captain emphasises that although it is difficult to accept help from a previous enemy, it is preferable to the death of their entire species. Her contention is not that waging war against the humans would be unjust, as it would be defensive. At the same time, however, she implies that it would be unjust because of the impossibility of victory. In her moral framework, survival trumps righteous violence. Extradiegetically it requires high cognitive engagement to understand both sides of the conflict, particularly because it comes from an alien Other.

Johnny's war with the ScreeWees ends after they establish contact in the beginning of the novel. From then on, he is on their side and thus does not fight against them anymore. Instead, he turns his violence against other human players who *are* aggressive against the ScreeWees. These human characters, although largely name and faceless, are in Johnny's ingroup; they are human, gamers, and presumably of a similar age. However, Johnny forces himself to view these human "players" as his outgroup by constantly telling himself that these humans are both not physically present in the war and therefore in a way not real, and that they are not aware of the ScreeWees' ontological status. Johnny was only able to consider them as real after they surrender to him (Guanio-Uluru 2016, cf). Waging war against his ingroup enemies is therefore justifiable, because they do not truly suffer any physical nor emotional consequences from their perceived deaths. Johnny is also forced to wage combat

against these human characters because of his regrouping with the ScreeWees; because the Other has submitted to him completely, they will not fight against any other human “players”, not even to defend themselves. Johnny, now forced to empathise with the ScreeWees, has a deontological duty to protect them as they will not use force to protect themselves because it would break their social and moral contract of submission with Johnny. The enemy he thought was virtual reveals their real suffering; his ingroup remains virtual in this warfare.

Although turning against the ingroup is an empathically and morally complex act, in this case there are two mitigating factors; firstly, they do not know Johnny, who enjoys anonymity and therefore reduced accountability. Secondly, they do not suffer the consequences of war to which the ScreeWees are subject. Therefore, Johnny’s usage of violence against his ingroup is entirely justified. Johnny’s violence against his own ingroup affirms the ScreeWee Captain’s perception of *jus ad bellum*; she was right to trust him, even if he is not properly prepared and slow to help them. His turn against his own kind both complicates and clarifies the narrative’s perspective of *jus ad bellum*; the ScreeWees could not possibly win their defensive war and are therefore right to shift the responsibility of violence to Johnny, however, it requires him to turn against his ingroup. The burden of moral responsibility is partially lifted from Johnny as he knows that he is not truly hurting his ingroup; the violence against them remains solely virtual. That said, the ScreeWees remain outgroup to the reader. Their moral debates were focalised, which allows the reader to engage empathically with them. Through this empathy, Johnny’s as well as the reader’s moral framework must be extended to include the ScreeWees’ concerns (Guanio-Uluru 2016, cf). It remains, however, cognitively challenging to accept violence against the ingroup in order to protect an alien Other previously believed to be entirely virtual. This challenging moral aspect of war, combined with Johnny’s previous unknowing combat against sentient beings, foregrounds the narrative’s concern with *jus ad bellum*.

Jus in Bello

When the ScreeWees first contact Johnny indicating a desire to talk, he is confused and believes it to be either a glitch or a feature of the game mechanics. Although the ScreeWees do not engage in combat with him, breaking with the previously established war scripts, and instead invite Johnny to enter into negotiations with them, Johnny can initially not be moved to anything other than violence.

Johnny fired the laser one more time. *Swsssh*. He didn't really know why. It was just because you had the joystick and there was the Fire button and that was what it was *for*.

After all, there wasn't a Don't Fire button.

We Surrender! PLEASE! (16).

Johnny's lack of military education/awareness, and therefore failing *jus ante bellum*, here feeds into a failure of *jus in bello*. The enemy has ceased all violence against Johnny, yet he continues to engage in combat with them because he cannot imagine any other action. He fails to behave justly here firstly because he cannot experience empathy for the ScreeWees yet (he does not know that they are sentient), and secondly because he is unable to break from his previously established war script. He fights because he cannot imagine any other way to engage with an enemy; there is no thought and therefore no moral consideration behind his actions. The ScreeWees' plea for a ceasefire is a break from this script, and therefore foregrounded. Breakage with previously established scripts is highly challenging and cognitively demanding and required by the ScreeWees' surrender. The issue of *jus in bello* is consequently emphasised through the setup of the story.

When Johnny finally does engage with the ScreeWees, they surrender and show him images of themselves and their children in order to persuade him of their desire to live. This requires, however, that he can view them as sentient in the first place. Again, this requires a break with a previously established script. "You don't listen to the enemy. The enemy's there to be shot at. That's why it's the enemy. That's what the enemy's *for*" (34). Johnny's war script thus requires violence to the point where non-combat-based engagement with the Other is unthinkable, it is also based on a difference in realities. In order for Johnny to cease conflict with the ScreeWees, he must break with all previously held schemas and scripts. As argued by Farah Mendlesohn, this is largely made possible by Johnny's own blankness: "Johnny becomes a hero in part because he is ill-defined. He is willing to let the virtual world around him define itself, to see the world through others' eyes" (Mendlesohn 2000, 149). It is possible for Johnny to break with his own beliefs and scripts early on in the novel because they are not clearly set in the first place; as a nigh *tabula rasa* Johnny is able to change his moral framework radically in ways more drastic than would be possible for the reader. The perceived impossibility of the situation (the idea of Space Invaders being sentient seems to belong firmly in the realm of science-fiction) is based on established scripts and schemas held

by the reader. Johnny, as the protagonist and the reader's ingroup, must break with these cognitive shortcuts in order to foreground the *jus in bello* of the narrative.

The ScreeWees explain to Johnny that although he "lives again" in the game after his avatar is killed, they cannot come back. During their first conversation, during which Johnny becomes confused about reality, Johnny agrees to provide the ScreeWees safe conduct home. However, Johnny does not know what safe conduct is, or where the ScreeWees come from. Now burdened with protection of the ScreeWees, Johnny has to fight against other human "players" to protect the ScreeWees. When he first destroys a human enemy in defense of the ScreeWees, Johnny experiences moral conflict for the first time in the game. The only way for him to manage the moral complexity of turning against the ingroup is by emphasising the lack of consequences his actions have against his ingroup: "That's all it is, Johnny told himself. Just things on a screen. It's not real. There's no arms and feet spinning away through the wreckage. It's all a game" (36). However, this emphasis betrays an uncertainty; if Johnny was truly certain of the unrealism of his killing, there would be no need to remind himself of it. Johnny repeats this mantra to himself at several points in the novel. This emphasis on the human "players'" virtual nature combined with the ScreeWees breaking the ontological schema of videogame enemies is crucial to the reader's mind-model of Johnny. There is enough evidence that Johnny is not entirely sure that his human enemies are not just as sentient as the ScreeWees; Johnny's behaviour in the videogame war increases in physical consequences in his real world as his engagement with the ScreeWees continues. This greatly changes the moral implications of Johnny's violence against human enemies; if Johnny's killing of his ingroup could have "real life" implications, it is no longer morally safe behaviour.

The *jus in bello* is therefore complicated in this novel; Johnny's continued violence against the ScreeWees, after they attempt to surrender to him, is clearly unjust. This injustice is foregrounded later on in the novel, as Johnny engages empathically with them and is forced to consider the reality of the consequences of his actions against them. However, the continued confusion regarding the ontological status of those involved with the videogame's war further complicates the moral implications of his actions. Violence against the ingroup is more problematic than it is against the outgroup; the possibility that Johnny is truly harming his ingroup members is brought forward by the ongoing ontological confusion. Because it remains unclear, the issue is foregrounded without providing an "answer". Johnny must protect the ScreeWees because of their empathic and moral connection; yet he must act

against people with whom he has an implied, similar connection. Although I am not analysing the connection made with the Gulf war in this novel, I will take the liberty to indulge in one further quote regarding the thorny nature of *jus in bello*:

‘I mean – the whole world seems kind of weird right now. You watch the telly, don’t you? How can you be the good guys if you’re dropping clever bombs right down people’s chimneys? And blowing people up just because they’re being bossed around by a looney?’ (158).

Johnny here extends his moral confusion from the videogame war to the “real” war he sees on television. The purpose of this blurring between science-fiction ontological thought experiment is to push the reader to consider their own conceptions of empathy, ethics and justice. This is fundamental to changing any element of a just war script. The focus on breaking previously held schemas and scripts therefore foregrounds the intricate nature of *jus in bello*.

Jus Post Bellum

The war between Johnny and the ScreeWees is essentially finished at the start of the novel; after he accepts their surrender, they no longer engage in combat. The war then shifts to being between Johnny and the other human “players”. The ending of the conflict between Johnny and the ScreeWees is sudden and complete; although Johnny is confused about the reality of the situation he does maintain a clear moral framework regarding surrender: “[h]e wondered if he should launch a missile or something ... No, hang on, they’d surrendered” (31). After accepting the surrender, further violence is unacceptable. Further *post bellum* Johnny must now serve as an escort for the ScreeWees, the basis of their surrender contract. The place the ScreeWees must go to is beyond the game’s “Border”; once beyond this artificial division between fair game and open space, the ScreeWees are perceived to be “safe. Of course” (212). The principles of *jus in bello* bleed into the *jus post bellum* of the narrative; all of Johnny’s actions take place post conflict with the ScreeWees. Any other combat takes place between Johnny and other human “players”, which although part of the ScreeWee situation could be construed as a separate conflict. However, as discussed above, the ontological status of these human characters is ambiguous, which also complicates *post bellum* considerations; how can one consider moral obligations regarding people who may not exist in the first place? The novel ends once he upholds his end of the surrender agreement, further removing the need for any consideration of *jus post bellum* with the human “players”.

Johnny and his sceptical companion for the latter part of the rescue mission are faced with a moral dilemma right when it seems they have successfully reached their objective; the ScreeWees are heading to the Border, behind which the humans are not sure they can exist or return to their own reality. When they are about to escape the ship, a mutineer threatens to kill the Captain and continue leading the ScreeWees in their war against the humans, effectively dooming the ScreeWees to extinction, so Johnny believes. Therefore, Johnny has to choose, with some immediacy, if he wants to risk his own existence to ensure the ScreeWees' survival. He returns to the deck and confronts the mutineer, who is violent against both humans. This adds another factor and immediacy to the situation, which was previously much vaguer. Now, Johnny would potentially sacrifice himself not only for an alien Other, but also for a friend. After the mutineer threatens to kill Johnny's friend, Johnny kills him. After shooting the mutineer, Johnny confirms this action thrice. This repetition foregrounds the importance of this event. The third time, Johnny expands and reiterates: "Yes, I shot him. I shot him. I wish I didn't have to, but I had to. He was alive and now he isn't" (230). This is the only time that Johnny engages in physical combat himself. Killing the mutineer both requires Johnny to accept his reality, and to therefore consider his death as final. The act of killing is thus morally significant; Johnny is no longer innocent of murder. The sacrifice Johnny had to make for the ScreeWees' freedom is then moral ambiguity; the killing previously was always ontologically vague. The human characters may never have experienced any negative effects from Johnny's behaviour. The ScreeWee mutineer, however, is unambiguously dead.

Jus post bellum is complex and ambiguous in this narrative, both because of the confusing concept of videogame reality versus "real" reality, and because most of the novel is preoccupied with a blending of *post bellum* and *in bello*; although the ScreeWee war is over with regards to Johnny's involvement, there is no guarantee that it will not continue as long as the game exists. Although the narrative assures that the ScreeWees "escaped, for ever" (237), the final page consists of an image asking, "NEW GAME (Y/N)?" (238). This poses a thought experiment, like the ones Sainsbury argues encourage young readers to actively engage both cognitively and morally (2017, 160). Therefore, *jus post bellum* is problematised; if the war may never be over, as argued again by O'Driscoll (2019, 901), how can we consider justice *post war*? Even in Johnny's engagement with the ScreeWees the war is not truly over; although he does not fight them anymore, combat does continue. The main change is who is considered the enemy; however, this also changes the *jus ad bellum*, as the desired outcome,

the requirement for victory, changes from defeating all ScreeWees to escorting them to safety. *Jus post bellum* is therefore made almost impossible to consider fully. Morality is, however, foregrounded to a main concern of the narrative, and the reader will attempt to complete their just war script. Not finishing the script with *jus post bellum* would be like following the restaurant script without paying the bill. Cognitive responsibility for the script is therefore placed with the reader. This responsibility therefore enhances cognitive engagement, and although it does not provide a manual for just war, it does engrain a just war script in which the four issues of *jus ante bellum*, *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello* and *jus post bellum* are necessary steps which must be followed.

They're *Jus* Kids, Man

Just war theory is not “the answer” to what is and what is not just in war; it is an approach which evaluates the moral aspects of specific wars step per temporal step. In that sense particularly just war scripts are a logical extension of justice scripts in war; the “moral anarchy” of war demands its own methodology, and the highly temporal setup of war makes script theory the best way to analyse the way we both understand and write justice in war. Justice is built up to through empathy, which determines the moral framework within which the characters operate. This moral framework is then put into specific, practical considerations of what is fair and unfair. As demonstrated by the analyses above, the narrative techniques I analysed for empathy and ethics all feed into the image of justice, as a narrative is consumed as a whole rather than a sum of its parts, especially by non-expert readers. Script theory therefore underlies and is constructed of all other narrative elements, as justice is the result of empathic and ethical concerns. In children's war literature, justice concerns are foregrounded as both empathy and ethics are problematised; the in- and outgrouping which stands at the basis of war also determines who the reader can empathise with, and therefore how particular characters are judged within the narrative's moral framework. Justice is of high importance in children's lives, and a skill, like empathy, which children develop steadily from a young age onwards (Sparks, Schinkel, Moore 2017, 242-244). Just war theory, an extension of justice concerns, is a skill the implied reader of my corpus most likely will develop through the highly structured form of literature, because of which the importance of scripts is emphasised again.

Both *Ender's Game* and *Only You Can Save Mankind* foreground the issue of justice through a similar thought experiment; what is the impact on empathy, ethics and justice on a narrative when the protagonist believes they are involved with a simulation? As argued by

Sainsbury (2017), thought experiments encourage high cognitive engagement (158). They are thus particularly effective in the reader's potential development of just war scripts. Me analysing two novels with different concepts of just war theory based on the same setup does not mean that just war scripts only come into play in narratives based on this thought experiment. However, it does make them the most appropriate for analysing the functioning of the script. *Ender's Game* complicates the issue of justice in war through its focus on deception; because Ender commits his act of excessive violence under the false impression that it is not real, he cannot be truly held accountable, and the moral repercussions may not be fully his. However, the reader is given clues to indicate that Ender may have acted in the same fashion if he *had* known. Although Ender was selected for his purpose because of his exceptional ability and empathic skills, his moral framework remains complex and relatively ambiguous. The Formics' absence from the novel until the very end leaves the interpretation of what is just behaviour against them with a past which Ender only encounters through propagandistic media and is revealed to be misinterpreted. Johnny, in *Only You Can Save Mankind*, is not exceptional. He is so unexceptional that the moral framework of the novel cannot be based on him but must be built around him. The confusion at the heart of Ender's great guilt is set to the extreme in Johnny's case, and the ontological ambiguity at the centre of the ScreeWee war forces the reader to high cognitive engagement. Although both wars enjoy the highly structured nature of fiction, they also demonstrate the consequences of ambiguity central to the moral anarchy of war. No answers to the question of justice are given, and the moral and cognitive responsibilities are left with the reader.

These just war scripts underlining these novels are based on the same concerns of ignorance and restoration, demanding high cognitive engagement from the reader. Because they inherently problematise every step of the just war theory script (preparatory, commencing, conduct during, and peace building after) these novels both foreground their respective scripts. However, I analysed both to demonstrate how particular changes to a narrative setup cause drastic deviations for the just war scripts underlining the story; because Johnny is immediately provided communication with the alien Other who surrenders to him, the empathy and ethics of the narrative stretch to include them as well, even turning Johnny against fellow humans. Ender's *jus in bello* is drastically different from Johnny's based on this main difference; he cannot know and therefore empathise with the enemy (so neither can the reader), which may justify his violence against them, even if he is not aware of it. Just war theory may denounce application to wars in general, however, as these novels demonstrate,

just war theory is a script, a culmination of the empathic and moral concerns of war literature as well as all narrative elements on which the narrative is based. These scripts become a part of the way through which readers understand war justice both in fiction and extra-textual life.

Who Cares?!

Reading literature, whether it be escapist fantasy stories where we delight in pure Good defeating pure Evil or gritty and horrifying realist stories of suffering in the trenches, impacts us significantly. This is because we react to fiction and reality in much the same way (Stockwell 2002, 152); we treat fictional people, cognitively if not intellectually, as if they are real. What this means is that cognitive skills like empathy and mind-modelling, as well as many others, are both necessary for and trained through our engagement with fictional texts. This impact has been argued by many scholars and demonstrated by a plethora of empirical studies. Like any other psychological research, these studies come with their own challenges and pitfalls. As stated by Oatley (2016, 621), many short-term causational studies which claim to demonstrate the impact of reading fiction on higher levels of empathy (for example Kidd and Castano 2013; Black and Barnes 2015) could be considered unconvincing because of the potential issue of priming. However, in addition to these short-term studies a convincing amount of longer-term ones were undertaken, such as Bal and Veltkamp (2013), Koopman (2015), and Vezzali et al. (2015). Considered together, both long and short-term studies do demonstrate that fiction has an important, potential impact on empathy ability (2016, 621). Because of this our moral framework, too, is shaped in part by our reading (Hoffman 2000, 63-93).

The formative nature of reading highlights the importance of children's literature. As readers, children are cognitively, affectively, and morally developing people. Their limited life experience directly impacts their emotional maturity and script building, making the knowledge and training they derive from reading all the more pertinent and ethically charged. This also includes adolescents, who like younger readers are also still developing their mind-

modelling skills, empathy, and moral frameworks. (Moshman 2011, 80). However, I must again emphasise that unlike what optimistic cognitive scholars like Hoffman (2002) or Keen (2007) may want to believe, it is not a given that reading makes us better people. The actual empathic and moral impact of any given narrative is dependent on too many factors, of which textual strategies is just one. That said, it is equally undeniable that reading has a strong, potential impact on these aspects of childhood development, which can be carried from childhood through to adulthood. In my project, my aim was to analyse the way through which the extreme setting of war influences the potential cognitive impact of children's literature in terms of empathy, ethics and justice – the three concepts foregrounded by war.

How Did We Get Here?

The foundation of my project lay with empathy; the basis for ethics, it was imperative to discuss it first. Emotions, in turn, are the basis for empathy; they are central both to stories and empathy. War intensifies these emotions because of its threat to the characters' goals and plans. The main emotions common to children's war literature I found to be grief, love, terror and hatred. These intense emotions, amplified by war, are easy to identify for novice readers and cause strong emotional reactions in turn. Therefore, the empathic engagement is emphasised. Empathy is then delimited through in- and outgrouping. This grouping is at the core of war, as there is always an "us" versus a "them". Children's war literature could potentially encourage the reader to empathise with the Other, developing the reader's binary crossing empathic skills. It could also, however, entrench previously internalised boundaries between in- and outgroups. Because the genre is *children's war literature*, there is always an age-based grouping on top of any other grouping caused by the war. Therefore, the effects of in- and outgroup empathy are particularly foregrounded within this genre. Focalisation is key to in- and outgroup empathy; it pushes the reader to empathise with one particular side over the other and could potentially encourage challenging empathy.

The characters the readers are manipulated to empathise with are fleshed out through five main characterisation techniques: speech, interiority, physical description, actions, and reactions. These techniques come together to form a network of traits charged with moral implications. The basis of the moral implications lies again with emotion. It is the reader's emotional affect by the character which shapes and betrays the ideology of the text. The characterisation techniques of speech, interiority and physical description construct covert ideologies particularly. War, again, acts as an amplifier for these three techniques. In children's war literature speech not only demonstrates the narrative's ideology; it also further

entrenches and clarifies the in- and outgroup demarcations at the basis of the narrative. Interiority then potentially provides the reader direct access to the character's motives, beliefs, norms and values. These internal representations demonstrate the narrative's ideology further. Physical descriptions reveal characters' interiority in an implied way, and are mostly clarified through narratorial and character statements, as well as empathic manipulation. The overt ideological characterisation techniques of action and reaction allow the narrative to create normative ethical activity. Through these two elements narratives thus construct consequentialist, deontological and virtue ethics approaches to ethics. Action is foregrounded in war literature, as their consequences are enhanced, increasing the responsibilities child characters face. My analyses all demonstrated Walzer's moral anarchy (1977), but also showed that the ambiguity that comes with this anarchy enhances cognitive engagement.

Although there is a moral anarchy in war, there is still a desire to judge the correctness and acceptability of scenarios, behaviour and actions in it. This is the realm of justice, which is the most specific of the three concepts. Although it is the most specific, however, it underlies the entire narrative in script form. To my knowledge, I am the first to analyse justice scripts in children's war literature. For my approach I am deeply indebted to Oziewicz's work, which I took as a starting point for my own analysis. War stories lend themselves particularly well to script theory analysis because of their temporal nature; wars are generally understood to have clear beginning, middle and ending parts – as do scripts. Scripts form the basis of both our perception of extra-textual life, and all narratives; they are mental shortcuts which we establish through both fiction and extra-textual experiences. Again, because the implied reader of children's war literature will likely not have any extra-textual experience with war, their justice scripts will be based entirely on fiction. The in- and outgrouping first analysed in the second chapter forms the basis of these justice scripts, demonstrating the overarching importance of empathy strategies for all moral engagement. Just war theory adds a further depth to the construction of justice scripts in war, as it evaluates the morality of war at clearly delimited temporal steps.

Wait, Aren't We Missing Something?

Cognitive narratology allowed me to analyse the potential impact of children's war literature on the implied child reader. In order to do so I provided a first working definition of the genre *an sich*, as well as a step by step analysis of each element which informs its empathic and moral importance. However, this study was not conclusive and does not provide the answers to every question raised. Because both the concepts of the child and of war are temporally as

well as culturally bound there are many avenues which can be taken after this project; my focus was solely on contemporary Anglo-American literature, omitting a significant amount of children's war literature. Analyses of children's war literature from different cultures and times would enhance the overall understanding of the genre, whilst at the same time providing insights into these cultural differences. Additionally, analyses of children's war literature from different cultures and times may serve to reveal whether or not there are universalities in approaches to empathy, Othering, ethics and justice.

Another limitation of this study which leads to further, exciting directions is that of form; my project was concerned only with prose fiction, even excluding short stories. Nonfiction, theatre, poetry and short stories all would provide highly different and valuable approaches of both war and the three concepts analysed. Cognitive analyses of these forms must be fundamentally different from the one I conducted here, as the forms themselves are constructed in different ways and with different strategies, and would be valuable additions to the overall image of children's war literature. Similarly, non-written media such as film, television, tabletop games and videogames do not shy away from war narratives and play an important part in childhood media consumption. These forms of storytelling engage their audiences in entirely different means from written texts, and are cognitively highly demanding. Particularly play-based narratives demand a different approach to empathy, foregrounding the grouping and just war issues even further as the child actively takes part in the war they imagine. All of these other forms are analysed in their own rights; however, as the genre of children's war literature was never defined nor approached as I have in this project, these forms have not been put into a network together based on this core issue: the cognitive influence of war narratives on the implied child reader.

My methodology for this project was theoretical, rather than empirical. At this point, after 184 pages, that is not a surprise, but I bring it up to acknowledge the questions raised by my analyses. I spoke about *potential* impacts the narratives *may* have on child readers, my project being too large to encompass through a single empirical study. However, the constellation of empirical studies necessary to prove my findings would add to an overall understanding not only of the impacts of war literature, but also on empathy, ethics and justice development in children in general, as well as through their reading. The importance of literature which I stressed throughout this work could be tried and proved through empirical study, which would have wider implications on the way we treat literature, war media, and children as moral actors. Similarly, the approach to just war theory as a script was to my

knowledge never attempted before, at least in children's cognitive poetics. Through this project I hope to both demonstrate how these scripts and concepts function in children's war literature, but also to pave the way for further just war script analyses. My just war scripts are an addition to Oziewicz's ground-breaking justice script approach; an element of cognitive poetics which can be applied to any form of narrative. It would be interesting to see my approach applied to "adult" war literature as well, to see how our understanding and construction of empathy, ethics and justice either deviates from what we can see in children's (war) literature or not; and to see through my project the impact of our childhood war stories on the way we perceive just war in later life.

So What Is War Good For?

The potential real-world effect of skills and knowledge trained and gained through reading makes childhood reading both powerful and ethically charged. Child readers are cognitively, emotionally, and socially developing rapidly. This means that texts which are aimed at them as an audience necessarily have to consider the level of development of the reader; deep levels of mind-modelling embedment will most probably soon become too confusing to keep track of for the implied child reader, leaving them confused and frustrated. Complex or contradictory emotions such as someone may experience from the betrayal of a friend out of loyalty to a cause cannot be expected to make immediate sense, or to be easy to comprehend for a child reader. Additionally, some of the choices, settings, or character relations that come to the fore in war stories are most probably not an aspect of most Anglo-American child readers' lives. This means that the narrative has to adapt its setting in order for the reader to make sense of it whilst maintaining that which is needed for a challenging and engaging war story. However, challenging readers is also a means to keep them interested and invested; as argued by Zunshine (2006, 18), one of the many reasons we can derive pleasure from reading is the sense of satisfaction we experience when we interpret emotions and mental states, regardless of if we are correct or not.

Because of the potential real-world effects of the narrative strategies on empathy, ethics and justice I discussed in this dissertation, there are several ways through which this research may be relevant outside of academia. In a general sense, any work which demonstrates the long lasting impact which reading has on people may influence the way legislators and educators approach literature for young people. Highlighting and critically discussing emotions and the divisions made between characters in a narrative foregrounds that this is happening and may also lead to more critical engagement with in- and outgrouping

(and the moral behaviours that follow from that) in real world interactions. There are more specific potential applications for this particular work as well. In the Netherlands, reading for young people is falling more and more out of fashion. The way literature is taught focuses not on literature as a cultural artifact, nor on the way it can shape us as we do it. Instead, literature is a check box which students suffer through as they “prove” they have read certain canonical works. Removing the human engagement from literature in this way removes not only the joys from reading, but also precisely those formative moments this entire dissertation has focused on. Hopefully, this dissertation makes clear to the Dutch Ministry of Education and Culture just how important the link between Education and Culture is, and that a change in how literature is treated in the curriculum can lead to a more critically engaged and cognitively self-aware populace.

Such a populace is crucial at this very moment. Besides the rise of populism, and the extremist politics and the normalisation of their lingo mentioned in the Introduction, social developments such as cancel culture show that nuance is not a priority of modern popular discourse. Political issues have become ideological concerns, and lines drawn in the sand based on disagreements over issues ranging from trivial to vital have become steel walls. Important discussions are finally held, yet strongly divided ideological “camps” have led to separations which stand in the way of true interaction instead of supporting it. This research elucidates how extreme group membership identification, whether in war scenarios or socio-political discourse, leads to a decrease in both care and moral responsibility for the outgroup. Unfortunately, however, because this research is concerned “only” with narrative techniques in children’s war literature it cannot offer concrete solutions to these pressing social issues as they lie mostly in the “Responsible” Adult World.

However, this methodological limitation may be circumvented by further research, for which this project will be the backbone. In my follow-up project, I will be looking at conflicting truth narratives, and how “truth” is constructed in increasingly complex narratives for young readers. Although it is early days I can still speculate on the importance of that project and how this dissertation feeds into it. Using the knowledge I have gained through this work on both the cognitive impact of different narrative techniques and the intricate relationship between empathy, ethics and justice, I will analyse how readers are supposed to recognise “truth” in children’s literature for different ages and at different levels of complexity. By scaling up the age and complexity of the narratives discussed, I will be able to both reflect on how young people are trained to discern truth from deceit, and how post-truth

has come to dominate most Western societies. The basis laid through this work will be crucial for further investigation into both what children are taught through literature and how this manifests itself. Other scholars may similarly find this dissertation useful for further research; for cultural studies, children's literature, cognitive poetics, or general literature studies this step-by-step discussion of the role form plays in the (social) education and entertainment of children, our adult lives, and the remarkable ways texts and group membership influence each other and the ways we view ourselves and the world around us.

Children's war literature is a difficult genre to explore. It is a difficult genre even to taxonomise. With this project, I am the first to attempt to define it. It is also an important genre to analyse and engage with critically. Although it is never a given that the implied child reader takes away from the text what the narrative appears to aim for, there is always the possibility or even risk that they will. Any given narrative may enhance the readers' empathic subtlety and skill, or reduce it by entrenching othering mindsets, employ violence and horror to highlight the complexity of human life and the moral choices we must make, or reduce the readers to voyeurs. I am the first to analyse empathy, ethics and justice in children's war literature from a cognitive narratological perspective. Additionally, my approach of dividing these three concepts up into the narrative techniques is equally novel. This may be because such a division appears to create artificial detachments between techniques which in reality function through conjunction; however, through my methodology I was able to foreground specific effects of particular techniques, whilst demonstrating how they build up to each other at the same time. Through my analyses I have found that the extreme setting at the basis of children's war stories necessarily complicates and foregrounds the three concepts of empathy, ethics and justice, through which there is an enhanced possibility of the reader being affected on these grounds. Amidst the violence, chaos, hopelessness and presumed powerlessness there is a beautiful opportunity for personal growth and cognitive development, combined with a deeper understanding of the complexities of war. War! Huh. What is it good for indeed?

Appendix A

Primary Sources Considered

Author	Title	History based?	Type of war story	Location	Date
Abercrombie, Joe.	The First Law series.	No	Military	UK	2008-present
---	Shattered Sea trilogy.	No	Survival/military	UK	2014-2015
Adams, Richard.	<i>Watership Down.</i>	No	Survival/military	UK	1972
Adlington, L. J.	<i>The Diary of Pelly D.</i>	No	Survival	UK	2005
Ashley, Bernard.	<i>Little Soldier.</i>	Yes	Survival/encounter	UK	1999
Anderson, Laurie Halse.	<i>Chains.</i>	Yes	Survival	US	2008
Aveyard, Victoria.	<i>Red Queen.</i>	No	Survival	US	2015
Ballard, J. G.	<i>Empire of the Sun.</i>	Yes	Survival	UK	1987
Barclay, James.	<i>The Cry of the Newborn.</i>	No	Military	UK	2006
Bawden, Nina.	<i>Carrie's War.</i>	No	Timeslip	UK	1973
Beattie, Geoffrey.	<i>The Corner Boys</i>	Yes	Survival	UK	1998
Borden, Louise.	<i>Greatest Skating Race: A World War II Story from the Netherlands.</i>	Yes	Survival	US	2004
Bradley, Kimberly Brubaker	<i>The War that Saved My Life.</i>	Yes	Evacuee	UK	2015

Brenaman, Miriam.	<i>Evvy's Civil War.</i>	Yes	Survival	US	2002
Breslin, Theresa.	<i>Remembrance.</i>	Yes	Military	UK	2002
Butcher, Jim.	<i>Furies of Calderon.</i>	No	Military	US	2005
Card, Orson Scott.	<i>Ender's Game.</i>	No	Military	US	1977
Carroll, Emma.	<i>Letters from the Lighthouse.</i>	Yes	Evacuee/encounter	UK	2017
Chambers, Aidan.	<i>Postcards from No Man's Land.</i>	Yes	Evacuee	UK	1999
Chan, Gillian.	<i>A Foreign Field.</i>	Yes	Military/survival	CA	2002
Collier, James Lincoln.	<i>My Brother Sam is Dead.</i>	Yes	Military/survival	US	1974
Collins, Suzanne.	<i>Gregor the Overlander.</i>	No	Military	US	2003
Conaghan, Brian.	<i>The Bombs that Brought Us Together.</i>	No	Survival	UK	2016
Cook, Glen.	<i>The Black Company.</i>	No	Military	USA	1984
Cooper, Susan.	<i>Dawn of Fear.</i>	Yes	Survival	UK	1970
Cormier, Robert.	<i>Heroes.</i>	Unclear	Veteran	USA	1998
Davies, Andrew.	<i>Conrad's War</i>	Yes	Timeslip	UK	1978
Dickinson, Peter.	<i>AK.</i>	Yes	Military	UK	1990
Dowd, Siobhan.	<i>Bog Child.</i>	Yes	Survival	UK	2008
Dowswell, Paul.	<i>Eleven Eleven.</i>	Yes	Military	UK	2012
Erikson, Steven.	<i>Toll the Hounds.</i>	No	Military	CA	2008
Forbes, Esther.	<i>Johnny Tremain.</i>	Yes	Adventure	US	1943
Foreman, Michael.	<i>War Game.</i>	Yes	Military/encounter	UK	1993
Gardner, Sally.	<i>Tinder.</i>	No	Veteran	UK	2013
Garfield, Brian.	<i>The Paladin.</i>	Yes	Military	US	1980

Giff, Patricia Reilly	<i>Genevieve's War</i>	Yes	Survival	US	2017
Greene, Bette.	<i>Summer of My German Soldier</i>	Yes	Encounter	US	1973
Haldeman, Joe.	<i>The Forever War.</i>	No	Military	US	1974
Hughes, Dean.	<i>Soldier Boys.</i>	Yes	Military/encounter	US	2001
Hughes, Shirley.	<i>Hero on a Bicycle.</i>	Yes	Survival	UK	2012
Ireman, M. D.	<i>The Axe and the Throne.</i>	No	Military	US	2014
Jacques, Brian.	Redwall series.	No	Military/survival	UK	1986- 2011
Johansen, Erika.	<i>The Queen of the Tearling</i>	No	Military/survival	US	2015
Johns, W. E.	<i>Biggles Defies the Swastika!</i>	Yes	Military	UK	1965
Kearney, Paul.	<i>The Ten Thousand.</i>	No	Military	US	2008
Klinge,le, Lindsey.	<i>The Broken World.</i>	No	Military/survival	US	2017
Lawrence, Iain.	<i>Lord of the Nutcracker Men.</i>	Yes	Military	CA	2003
Larson, Kirby.	<i>Dash.</i>	Yes	Survival/evacuee	US	2014
---	<i>The Last Battle.</i>	No	Military	UK	1956
Lewis, C. S.	<i>The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe.</i>	No	Military	UK	1950
Lowry, Lois.	<i>Number the Stars.</i>	Yes	Survival	US	1989
Lu, Marie.	<i>Legend.</i>	No	Military	US	2013
Magorian, Michelle.	<i>Goodnight Mister Tom.</i>	Yes	Evacuee	UK	1981
---	<i>Back Home.</i>	Yes	Evacuee	UK	1984
Mazer, Harry.	<i>A Boy at War: A</i>	Yes	Survival/encounter	US	2001

	<i>Novel of Pearl Harbor.</i>				
Miéville, China.	<i>Un Lun Dun.</i>	No	Survival/military	UK	2007
Molloy, Michael.	<i>The House on Falling Star Hill.</i>	No	Military	UK	2004
Moon, Elizabeth.	<i>Sheepfarmer's Daughter</i>	No	Survival/military	US	1988
Moore, Brian.	<i>Lies of Silence.</i>	Yes	Survival	UK	1990
Morpurgo, Michael.	<i>Friend or Foe.</i>	Yes	Encounter	UK	1977
---	<i>War Horse.</i>	Yes	Military	UK	1982
---	<i>Private Peaceful.</i>	Yes	Military	UK	2003
---	<i>The Best Christmas Present in the World.</i>	Yes	Military/survival	UK	2004
---	<i>The Amazing Story of Adolphus Tips</i>	Yes	Survival/evacuee	UK	2005
---	<i>Shadow.</i>	Yes	Encounter	UK	2010
---	<i>An Eagle in the Snow.</i>	Yes	Military/survival	UK	2015
---	<i>Flamingo Boy.</i>	Yes	Encounter	UK	2018
---	<i>In the Mouth of the Wolf.</i>	Yes	Military/encounter	UK	2018
---	<i>Our Jacko.</i>	Yes	Military/encounter	UK	2018
---	<i>Poppy Field.</i>	Yes	Military/survival	UK	2018
Myers, Walter Dean.	<i>Fallen Angels.</i>	Yes	Military/survival	US	1988
Needle, Jan.	<i>A Game of Soldiers.</i>	Yes	Encounter	UK	1985
Ness, Patrick.	<i>Chaos Walking Trilogy.</i>	No	Military	US	2008-2010

O'Shea, Pat.	<i>The Hounds of the Morrigan.</i>	No	Military	IE	1986
Park, Linda Sue.	<i>When My Name Was Keoko.</i>	Yes	Survival	US	2002
Paterson, Katherine.	<i>Rebels of the Heavenly Kingdom.</i>	Yes	Survival	US	1983
Pearson, Kit.	<i>The Sky is Falling.</i>	Yes	Evacuee	CA	1989
Peet, Mal.	<i>Tamar.</i>	Yes	Military/encounter	UK	2006
Pennypacker, Sara.	<i>Pax.</i>	Unclear	Survival	US	2016
Peyton, K. M.	<i>Flambards.</i>	Yes	Evacuee	UK	1967
Pratchett, Terry.	<i>Only You Can Save Mankind.</i>	No	Military	UK	1992
---	<i>Jingo.</i>	No	Military	UK	1997
---	<i>Thud!</i>	No	Military	UK	2002
Reedy, Trent.	<i>If You're Reading This.</i>	Yes	Survival	US	2014
Reilley, Keith.	<i>Ahoy For Joy.</i>	Yes	Encounter/survival	UK	2015
Riordan, James.	<i>When the Guns Fall Silent.</i>	Yes	Military	UK	2000
Rosoff, Meg.	<i>How I Live Now.</i>	No	Evacuee	UK	2010
Rowling, J. K.	<i>Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows.</i>	No	Military/survival	UK	2007
Rubinstein, Gillian.	<i>Space Demons.</i>	No	Military	UK	1985
Sanderson, Brandon.	<i>The Way of Kings.</i>	No	Military	US	2011
Saunders, Kate.	<i>Five Children on the Western Front.</i>	Yes	Timeslip	UK	2014

Scalzi, John.	<i>Old Man's War.</i>	No	Military	US	2005
---	<i>The Ghost Brigades.</i>	No	Military	US	2006
---	<i>The Last Colony.</i>	No	Military	US	2007
Sepetys, Ruta.	<i>Salt to the Sea.</i>	Yes	Survival	US	2016
Serrailier, Ian.	<i>The Silver Sword.</i>	Yes	Survival	UK	1960
Sherlock, Patti.	<i>Letters from Wolfie.</i>	Yes	Military/survival	US	2004
Sherman, Zachary.	<i>Bloodlines: Heart of War.</i>	Yes	Military	US	2013
Skurzynski, Gloria.	<i>Virtual War.</i>	No	Military	USA	1997
Sutcliffe, William.	<i>The Wall.</i>	Yes	Encounter	UK	2013
Voake, Steve.	<i>The Dreamwalker's Child.</i>	No	Survival	UK	2005
Wallace, Michael.	<i>The Red Sword.</i>	No	Military/survival	US	2017
Walsh, Jill Paton.	<i>The Dolphin Crossing.</i>	Yes	Survival/encounter	UK	1967
---	<i>Fireweed.</i>	Yes	Evacuee/survival	UK	1969
Wein, Elizabeth.	<i>Code Name Verity.</i>	Yes	Survival	US	2012
Welch, Ronald.	<i>Tank Commander.</i>	Yes	Military/veteran	UK	1972
Westall, Robert.	<i>The Machine Gunners.</i>	Yes	Encounter	UK	1975
---	<i>Blitzcat.</i>	Yes	Survival/encounter	UK	1989
---	<i>Gulf.</i>	Yes	Survival/encounter	UK	1992
---	<i>A Time of Fire</i>	Yes	Encounter	UK	1994
Wolff, Virginia Euwer.	<i>Bat 6</i>	Yes	Encounter	US	1998

Works Cited

Primary Sources Analysed

- Bawden, Nina. *Carrie's War*. 1973. London: Puffin, 2014.
- Card, Orson Scott. *Ender's Game*. 1977. New York (NY): Tor, 1991.
- Conaghan, Brian. *The Bombs that Brought Us Together*. London: Bloomsbury, 2016.
- Cormier, Robert. *Heroes*. 1998. London: Penguin 1999.
- Dowd, Siobhan. *Bog Child*. Oxford: David Fickling, 2008.
- Lewis, C. S. *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe*. 1950. London: HarperCollins, 2011.
- Magorian, Michelle. *Goodnight Mister Tom*. 1981. London: Penguin, 2015.
- Morpurgo, Michael. *Friend or Foe*. London: HarperCollins, 1977.
- , *War Horse*. London: HarperCollins, 1982.
- Needle, Jan. *A Game Of Soldiers* London: Collins, 1985.
- Pratchett, Terry. *Only You Can Save Mankind*. London: Doubleday, 1992.
- Rosoff, Meg. *How I Live Now*. 2004. London: Penguin, 2010.
- Saunders, Kate. *Five Children on the Western Front*. London: Faber & Faber, 2014.
- Sepetys, Ruta. *Salt to the Sea*. London: Penguin, 2016.
- Westall, Robert. *The Machine Gunners*. London: MacMillan, 1975.

Other Primary Sources

- Barrie, J. M. *Peter Pan and Wendy*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1911.
- Burnett, Frances Hodgson. *A Little Princess*. 1905. London: Penguin, 2012.
- , *The Secret Garden*. London: Heinemann, 1911.
- Caesar, Julius, and H. J Edwards. *The Gallic War*. [*Commentarii de bello Gallico*] Cambridge (MA): Harvard UP, 1997

Cormier, Robert. *The Chocolate War*. London: Gollancz, 1974.

Dowswell, Paul. *Eleven Elven*. London: Bloomsbury, 2012.

Haldeman, Joe. *The Forever War*. 1974. London: Gollancz, 2010.

Jones, Diana Wynne. *Howl's Moving Castle*. 1986. London: HarperCollins, 2009.

Ness, Patrick. Chaos Walking Trilogy (*The Knife of Never Letting Go*, *The Ask and the Answer*, *Monsters of Men*). London: Walker, 2008-2010.

Pratchett, Terry. *Jingo*. London: Gollancz, 1997.

Rowling, J. K. Harry Potter series (*The Philosopher's Stone*, *The Chamber of Secrets*, *The Prisoner of Azkaban*, *The Goblet of Fire*, *The Order of the Phoenix*, *The Half-Blood Prince*, *The Deathly Hallows*). London: Bloomsbury, 1997-2007.

Sewell, Anna. *Black Beauty*. Norwich: Jarrold & Sons, 1877.

Tolkien, J. R. R. *The Hobbit, or There and Back Again*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1937.

Secondary Sources

Abbott, H. Porter. *Cambridge Introduction to Narrative*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Alexander, Larry, M. Moore. "Deontological Ethics". (2007). *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 2016. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/>

Ashe, Laura, Ian Patterson. "Preface". *War and Literature*. Laura Ashe, Ian Patterson eds. Essays and Studies 2014. Cambridge: Brewer, 2014.

Baer, Elizabeth Roberts. "A New Algorithm in Evil: Children's Literature in a Post-Holocaust World". *The Lion and the Unicorn*, 24(3), 2000, 378-401.

Bal, Mieke. *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative*. (1985). Toronto ON, Toronto UP, 1997.

Bal, P. M., M. Veltkamp. "How Does Fiction Reading Influence Empathy? An Experimental Investigation on the Role of Emotional Transportation". *PLoS ONE*, 8(1), 2013, e55341. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0055341>

Banita, Georgiana. *Plotting Justice: Narrative Ethics and Literary Culture after 9/11*. Lincoln (NE): University of Nebraska, 2012.

Barker, Jani L. "Virtuous Transgressors, Not Moral Saints: Protagonists in Contemporary Children's Literature". *Ethics and Children's Literature*. Claudia Mills ed. Burlington: Ashgate, 2014. 101-124.

Baron, Marcia W., P. Pettit, M. Slote. *Three Methods of Ethics*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.

Beauvais, Clémentine. *The Mighty Child: Time and Power in Children's Literature*. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2015.

Bellamy, Alex J. *Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq*. Cambridge: Polity, 2006.

Bennett, M., M. Barrett, R. Karakozov, G. Kipiani, E. Lyons, V. Pavlenko. "Young Children's Evaluations of the Ingroup and of Outgroups: A Multi-National Study". *Social Development*, 13, 2004, 124–141.

Black, J. E., J. L. Barnes. "The Effects of Reading Material on Social and Non-Social Cognition". *Poetics*, 52, 2015, 32–43.

- Blackburn, Simon. *Ethics, A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001.
- Blakemore, S.-J., S. Choudhury. “Development of the Adolescent Brain: Implications for Executive Function and Social Cognition”. *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry*, 47(3), 2006. 296–312.
- Bloom, Paul. *Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion*. New York (NY): Ecco, 2016.
- , “Empathy and Its Discontents”. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 21(1), 2017, 24-31. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2016.11.004
- Bogdańska, Olga. “Terrible Beauty: Aesthetics of Death in Polish and Japanese War Literature”. *IAFOR Journal of Literature & Librarianship*, 3(1), 2014, 93-113.
- Bonadonna, Reed R. “Doing Military Ethics with War Literature”. *Journal of Military Ethics*, 7(3), 2008, 231-242. DOI: 10.1080/15027570802277730
- Booth, Wayne C. *The Rhetoric of Fiction*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.
- , *The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction*. 1988. Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1992.
- Breger, Claudia, Fritz Breithaupt. “Introduction”. *Empathie und Erzählung*. Claudia Breger and Fritz Breithaupt eds. Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 2010.
- Brosman, Catherine Savage. “Reading Behind the Lines: The Interpretation of War”. *The Sewanee Review*, 100(1), 1992, 69-97.
- Budgen, David. *British Children's Literature and the First World War : Representations Since 1914*. London: Bloomsbury, 2018.
- Bullen, Elizabeth, K. Moruzi, M. J. Smith. “Children’s Literature and the Affective Turn: Affect, Emotion, Empathy”. *Affect, Emotion, and Children’s Literature Representation and Socialisation in Texts for Children and Young Adults*. Elizabeth Bullen, Kristine Moruzi, Michelle J. Smith eds. London: Routledge, 2017. 1-16.
- Burke, Michael. *Literary Reading, Cognition and Emotion: An Exploration of the Oceanic Mind*. New York (NY): Routledge, 2011.

- Burns, M. P., J. A. Sommerville. "The Impact of Fairness and Race on Infants' Selection of Social Partners". *Frontiers in Psychology*, 5(93), 2014. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00093>
- Butler, Andrew M. "'We Has Found the Enemy and They Is US': Virtual War and Empathy in Four Children's Science Fiction Novels". *The Lion and the Unicorn*, 28(2), 2004, 171-185.
- Buttellmann, D, N. Zmyj, M. Daum, M. Carpenter. "Selective Imitation of In-Group over Out-Group Members in 14-Month-Old Infants". *Child Development*, 84(2), 2013, 422-428. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01860.x.
- Cadden, Michael. "The Irony of Narration in the Young Adult Novel". *Children's Literature Association Quarterly*, 25(3), 2000, 146-154.
- Caddick, Nick. "Life, Embodiment, and (Post-)War Stories: Studying Narrative in Critical Military Studies". *Critical Military Studies*, 2018, DOI: 10.1080/23337486.2018.1554942
- Cart, Michael. *Young Adult Literature: From Romance to Realism*. 3rd ed. Chicago (IL): Neal-Schuman, 2016.
- Chatman, Seymour. *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film*. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1978.
- , "Characters and Narrators: Filter, Center, Slant and Interest-Focus". *Poetics Today*, 7(2), 1986, 189-204.
- Coats, Karen. "Young Adult Literature: Growing Up, In Theory". *Handbook of Research on Children's and Young Adult Literature*. S. Wolf, K. Coats, P. Enciso, C. A. Jenkins eds. New York: Routledge, 2010. 315-329.
- Chiarella, S. S., D. Poulin-Dubois. "'Aren't You Supposed to Be Sad?' Infants Do Not Treat a Stoic Person As An Unreliable Emoter". *Infant Behavior and Development*, 38, 2015, 57-66. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infbeh.2014.12.007>
- Cohen, Ralph. "What Are Genres?" *Genre Theory and Historical Change: Theoretical Essays of Ralph Cohen*. John L. Rowlett ed. Charlottesville (VA): University of Virginia Press, 2017. 170-186.
- Cohn, Dorrit. *Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction*. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1978.

Cook, James L. "Ender's Beginning and the Just War". *Ender's Game and Philosophy: The Logic Gate is Down*. Kevin S. Decker and William Irwin eds. Chichester: Wiley, 2013.

Crenshaw, K. *Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics*. The University of Chicago Legal Forum, 140, 1989, 139–167.

Cullinan, Bernice E., B. L. Kunzel, D. A. Wooten (eds.) *Continuum Encyclopedia of Young Adult Literature*. London: Continuum, 2005.

Damasio, Antonio. *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain*. 1994. London: Vintage, 2006.

Darwal, Stephen L. *Philosophical Ethics*. London, Routledge, 1998.

Day, Sara K. "Liars and Cheats: Crossing the Lines of Childhood, Adulthood, and Morality in *Ender's Game*". *ESC*, 38.3-4, 2012, 207-225.

De Rosnay, Marc. "Young Children's Trust in Their Mother's Claims: Longitudinal Links With Attachment Security in Infancy". *Child Development*, 80(3), 2009, 750-761.

Decety, Jean. "The Neural Pathways, Development and Functions of Empathy". *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences*, 3, 2015, 1-6.

Dekkers, Midas. *Rood: Een Bekoring*. Amsterdam: Contact, 2011.

Derrida, Jacques. "The Law of Genre". *Critical Inquiry*, 7(1), 1981, 55-81.

Djikic, M., Oatley, K., & Moldoveanu, M. C. "Reading Other Minds: Effects of Literature on Empathy". *Scientific Study of Literature*, 3, 2013, 28–47.

Docherty, Thomas. *Reading (Absent) Character: Toward a Theory of Characterization in Fiction*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1983.

Doherty, Martin J. *Theory of Mind: How Children Understand Others' Thoughts and Feelings*. Hove: Psychology Press, 2009.

Dowd, Garin. "Introduction: Genre Matters in Theory and Criticism". *Genre Matters: Essays in Theory and Criticism*. Garin Dowd, Lesley Stevenson, Jeremy Strong eds. Bristol: Intellect, 2006. 11—27.

- Dubik, James M. *Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory*. Lexington (KY): University Press of Kentucky, 2016.
- Dunham, Yarrow, J. Emory. "Of Affect and Ambiguity: The Emergence of Preference for Arbitrary Ingroups". *Journal of Social Issues*, 70(1), 2014, 81-98.
- Dunham, Yarrow, A. S. Baron, S. Carey. "Consequences of 'Minimal' Group Affiliations in Children". *Child Development*, 82(3), 2011, 793-811. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01577.x.
- Dunn, P. A. *Disabling Characters: Representations of Disability in Young Adult Literature*. New York (NY): Peter Lang, 2015.
- Eagleton, Terry. *On Evil*. New Haven (CT): Yale UP, 2010.
- Elfenbein, H. A., N. Ambady. "On the Universality and Cultural Specificity of Emotion Recognition: A Meta-analysis". *Psychological Bulletin*, 128, 2002, 203-235.
- Ellos, William J. *Narrative Ethics*. Aldershot: Avebury, 1994.
- Epstein, B. J. "We're Here, We're (Not?) Queer: GLBTQ Characters in Children's Books". *Journal of GLBT Family Studies*, 8(3), 2012, 287-300.
- Fixdal, Mona. *Just Peace: How Wars Should End*. New York (NY): Palgrave, 2012.
- Fjällström, Eva, Lydia Kokkola. "Resisting Focalisation, Gaining Empathy: Swedish Teenagers Read Irish Fiction". *Children's Literature in Education*, 46(4), 2014, 1-16.
- Fotion, Nick. *Theory vs. Anti-Theory in Ethics: A Misconceived Conflict*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2014.
- Franzak, Judith K. "Social Upheaval and Psychological Scarring: Exploring the Future in Meg Rosoff's *How I Live Now*". *ALAN Review*, 36(2), 2009, 34-39.
- Frayn, Andrew. "Social Remembering, Disenchantment and First World War Literature, 1918-1930". *Journal of War & Culture Studies*, 11(3), 2018, 192-208.
- Freedman, Barbara. "The Writer and the Reader in *Carrie's War*". *Children's Literature in Education*, 22(1), 1991, 35-43.

Freudenberg, M., D. N. Albohn, R. E. Kleck, R. B. Adams, U. Hess. "Emotional Stereotypes on Trial: Implicit Emotion Associations for Young and Old Adults". *Emotion*, 2019. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/emo0000626>

Frijda, Nico H. *The Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986.

Frow, John. *Genre*. 2nd ed. New York (NY): Routledge, 2015.

Gallese, V., Goldman, A. "Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading". *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 2(12), 1998, 493–501.

Galway, Elizabeth A. "What Shall We Tell the Children? Narratives of War in First World War Children's Literature". *Writings of Persuasion and Dissonance in the Great War: That Better Whiles May Follow Worse*. David Owen and Cristina Pividori eds. Leiden: Brill, 2016. 237-251.

Garcia, Sarah E., E. C. Tully. "Children's Recognition of Happy, Sad, and Angry Facial Expressions Across Emotive Intensities". *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, 197, 2020. DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104881.

Geangu, Elena. "Empathy during early Childhood Across Cultures, Development of". *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*. Paul Baltes ed. 2nd ed, Volume 7. 549-553.

Gennette, Gérard. *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method*. 1972. Jane E. Lewin trans. Ithaca (NY): Cornell UP, 1980.

---, *Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.

Glenwright, Melanie, B. Tapley, J. K. S. Rano, P. M. Pexman. "Developing an Appreciation for Sarcasm and Sarcastic Gossip: It Depends on Perspective". *Journal of Speech Language and Hearing Research*, 60(11), 2017. DOI: 10.1044/2017_JSLHR-L-17-0058.

Goldie, Peter. *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000.

Gensler, Harry J. *Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction*. London: Routledge, 1998.

Golden, Joanne M. *The Narrative Symbol in Childhood Literature: Explorations in the Construction of Text*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1990.

- Goodenough, Elizabeth, Andrea Immel. "Introduction". *Under Fire: Childhood in the Shadow of War*. Elizabeth Goodenough and Andrea Immel eds. Detroit, (MI): Wayne State UP, 2008.
- Gordijn, E. H., V. Yzerbyt, D. Wigboldus, M. Dumont. "Emotional Reactions to Harmful Intergroup Behaviour". *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 36(1), 2006, 15-30.
- Gordon, Nakia S., S. A. Chesney. "On the Outside Looking In: Distress and Sympathy for Ethnic Victims of Violence by Out-Group Members". *Journal of Cognition and Culture*, 17(3-4), 2007, 199-217.
- Grzegorzcyk, Blanka. "Radical children, radical fctions: terror and extremism in Sam Mills's Blackout and Malorie Blackman's Noble Conflict". *Neohelicon*, 45, 2018, 575–586.
- Guanio-Uluru, Lykke. "War, Games, and the Ethics of Fiction". *The International Journal of Computer Game Research*, 16(2), 2016.
- Gubar, Marah. "The Hermeneutics of Recuperation: What a Kinship-Model Approach to Children's Agency Could Do for Children's Literature and Childhood Studies". *Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures*, 8(1), 2016, 291-310.
- Hammond, Meghan Marie, Sue J. Kim. "Introduction". *Rethinking Empathy Through Literature*. Meghan Marie Hammond and Sue J. Kim eds. New York (NY): Routledge, 2014.
- Hanssen, Jessica A. "How I Live Now: The Project of Sustainability in Dystopian Young Adult Fiction". *Studier I Pædagogisk Filosofi*, 6(2), 2018, 41-57.
<https://doi.org/10.7146/spf.v6i2.102084>.
- Hantke, Steffen. "Surgical Strikes and Prosthetic Warriors: The Soldier's Body in Contemporary Science Fiction". *Science Fiction Studies*, 25(3),1998, 495-509.
- Harris, Paul. "Children's Understanding of Emotion". *Handbook of Emotions*. 3rd ed. M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, L. F. Barrett eds. New York (NY): Guilford, 2008. 320-331.
- , *Trusting What You're Told: How Children Learn from Others*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard UP, 2012.
- Hearne, Betsy, Deborah Stevenson. *Choosing Books for Children: A Commonsense Guide*. Urbana (IL): University of Illinois Press, 1999.

- Heath, S. B., & Wolf, J. L. "Brain and Behavior: The Coherence of Teenage Responses to Young Adult Literature". *Contemporary Adolescent Literature and Culture: The Emergent Adult*. M. Hilton and Maria Nikolajeva eds. Farnham: Ashgate, 2012. 139-154.
- Hoffman, Martin L. *Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000.
- Hogan, Patrick Colm. *Cognitive Science, Literature, and the Arts: A Guide for Humanists*. London: Routledge, 2003a.
- , *The Mind and its Stories: Narrative Universals and Human Emotion*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003b.
- , *Empire and Poetic Voice: Cognitive and Cultural Studies of Literary Tradition and Colonialism*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004.
- , *What Literature Teaches Us about Emotion*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011.
- Hollindale, Peter. *Ideology and the Children's Book*. Stroud: Thimble, 1988.
- , *The Hidden Teacher: Ideology and Children's Reading*. Stroud: Thimble, 2011.
- Houen, Alex, Jan-Melissa Schramm. "Introduction: Sacrifice and Modern Warfare". *Sacrifice and Modern War Literature: From the Battle of Waterloo to the War on Terror*. Alex Houen and Jan-Melissa Schramm eds. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2018.
- Hunt, Peter. "Terry Pratchett". *Alternative Worlds in Fantasy Fiction*. Peter Hunt and Millicent Lenz eds. London: Continuum, 2001. 86-121.
- Hursthouse, Rosalind, G. Pettigrove. "Virtue Ethics". (2003). *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 2016. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/>
- Hutchison, Coleman. *A History of American Civil War Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2015.
- Iser, Wolfgang. *The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett*. Baltimore (MD): John Hopkins, 1974.
- Iyer, A., T. Schmader, B. Lickel. "Why Individuals Protest the Perceived Transgressions of their Country: The Role of Anger, Shame, and Guilt". *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33(4), 2007, 572-587.

- James, William. "What Is An Emotion?" *Mind*, 9(34), 1884, 188–205.
DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/os-IX.34.188>
- Jordan, Sarah D. "Educating Without Overwhelming: Authorial Strategies in Children's Holocaust Literature". *Children's Literature in Education*, 35(3), 2004, 199-218.
- Kagan, Shelly. *Normative Ethics*. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Kamm, F. M. *The Moral Target: Aiming at Right Conduct in War and Other Conflicts*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Kant, Immanuel. "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy". 1797. *Moral Philosophy*. Lewis White Beck ed. trans. Chicago (IL): University of Chicago Press, 1949. 346-50.
- Keen, Suzanne. *Empathy and the Novel*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007.
- Kelly, D. J., P. C. Quinn, A. M. Slater, K. Lee, L. Ge, O. Pascalis. "The Other-Race Effect Develops During Infancy". *Psychological Science*, 18(12), 2007, 1084–1089.
- Kerman, Judith B. "Use of the Fantastic in Literature of the Holocaust." *The Fantastic in Holocaust Literature and Film: Critical Perspectives*. Judith Kerman and John E. Browning eds. Jefferson NC: McFarland, 2014. 13-24.
- Kertzer, Adrienne. "'Do You Know What 'Auschwitz' Means?": Children's Literature and the Holocaust". *The Lion and the Unicorn*, 23(2), 1999.
- , *My Mother's Voice: Children's Literature and the Holocaust*. Ormskirk ON: Broadview, 2002.
- Kidd, Kenneth. "A" is for Auschwitz: Psychoanalysis, Trauma Theory, and the "Children's Literature of Atrocity". *Children's Literature*, 33, 2005, 120-149.
- Kidd, D. C., E. Castano. "Reading Literary Fiction Improves Theory of Mind". *Science*, 342, 2013, 377–380.
- Killen, Melanie, J. Smetana. "The Biology of Morality: Human Development and Moral Neuroscience". *Human Development*, 50, 2007, 241–243. DOI: 10.1159/000106413
- Kokkola, Lydia. *Representing the Holocaust in Children's Literature*. New York NY: Routledge, 2003.

- Koopman, E. M. "How Texts About Suffering Trigger Reflection: Genre, Personal Factors, and Affective Responses". *Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts*, 9(4), 2015, 430–441.
- Koopman, E. M., Frank Hakemulder. "Effects of Literature on Empathy and Self-Reflection: A Theoretical-Empirical Framework". *Journal of Literary Theory*, 9(1), 2015, 79-111.
- Kteily, Nour, Sarah Cotterill, Jim Sidanius, Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington, and Robin Bergh. "'Not One of Us': Predictors and Consequences of Denying Ingroup Characteristics to Ambiguous Targets". *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, 40(10), 2014, 1231-1247.
- Kümmerling-Meibauer, Bettina. "Emotional Connection: Representation of Emotions in Young Adult Literature". *Contemporary Adolescent Literature and Culture: The Emergent Adult*. M. Hilton, M. Nikolajeva eds. New York (NY): Ashgate, 2012. 127-138.
- Kümmerling-Meibauer, Bettina, J. Meibauer. "Lügnerwerb und Geschichten vom Lügen". *Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik*, 41(162), 2011, 114-134.
- Kunda, Ziva. *Social Cognition: Making Sense of People*. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1999.
- LaFollette, Hugh. "Introduction". *The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory*. Hugh LaFollette ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.
- Lambie, John A. "The Demanding World of Emotion: A Gestalt Approach to Emotion Experience". *New Ideas in Psychology*, 56, 2020 (forthcoming).
- Lane, J. D., H. M. Wellman, S. L. Olson, J. LaBounty, D. C. Kerr. "Theory of mind and emotion understanding predict moral development in early childhood". *British Journal of Developmental Psychology*, 28(4), 2010, 871–889. DOI: 10.1348/026151009X483056
- Lászlo, János, I. Somogyvari. "Narrative Empathy and Inter-Group Relations". *Directions in Empirical Literary Studies*. Sonia Zyngier, Marisa Bortolussi, Anna Chesnokova and Jan Auracher eds. Amsterdam: Benjamin, 2008. 113-125.
- Lathey, Gillian. *The Impossible Legacy: Identity and Purpose in Autobiographical Children's Literature Set in the Third Reich and the Second World War*. Berlin: Peter Lang, 1999.
- Leach, C. W., A. Iyer, A. Pedersen. "Anger and Guilt about Ingroup Advantage Explain the Willingness for Political Action". *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 32(9), 2006, 1232-1245.

- Leake, Eric. "Humanizing the Inhumane: The Value of Difficult Empathy". *Rethinking Empathy through Literature*. Meghan Marie Hammond and Sue J. Kim eds. New York (NY): Routledge, 2014. 175-185.
- LeDoux, Joseph. *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life*. New York (NY): Simon & Schuster, 1998.
- , "Foreword". *Elusive Brain: Literary Experiments in the Age of Neuroscience*. Jason Tougaw ed. New Haven (CT): Yale UP, 2018. ix-xii
- Lee, Steven P. *Ethics and War: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012.
- Levine, L. J. "Reconstructing Memory for Emotion". *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 126, 1997, 165-177
- Levine, L. J., D.A. Pizarro "Emotion and Memory Research: A Grumpy Overview". *Social Cognition*, 22 (5), 2004, 530-554.
- Lockney, Karen. "Progressive Presentations of Place-Based Identities in Meg Rosoff's *How I Live Now*". *Children's Literature in Education*, 2013, 44, 311-325. DOI: 10.1007/s10583-013-9198-3
- López-Romero, Lourdes. "Of Risk and Youth: Exploring Discourses of Adolescence Through Meg Rosoff's *How I Live Now*". *Children's Literature in Education*, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10583-018-9365-7>
- Ma, Hing Keung. "The Moral Development of the Child: An Integrated Model". *Frontiers in Public Health*, 1(57), 2013. DOI: 10.3389/fpubh.2013.00057
- Mahon, Áine. "Moral Education and Literature: On Cora Diamond and Eimear McBride". *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 51(1), 2017, 102-113. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9752.12183
- Mallan, Kerry. *Secrets, Lies and Children's Fiction*. New York (NY): Palgrave, 2013.
- Mar, R. A., K. Oatley, J. B. Peterson. "Exploring the Link Between Reading Fiction and Empathy: Ruling Out Individual Differences and Examining Outcomes". *Communications*, 34, 2009, 407-428.
- Mar, R. A., J. L. Tackett, C. Moore. "Exposure to Media and Theory of Mind Development in Preschoolers". *Cognitive Development*, 25, 2010, 69-78.

- Margolin, Uri. "Character". *The Cambridge Companion to Narrative*. David Herman ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 66-79.
- Martin, Michael J. "Experience and Expectations: The Dialogic Narrative of Adolescent Holocaust Literature". *Children's Literature Association Quarterly*, 29(4), 2004, 315-328. DOI: 10.1353/chq.0.1342.
- Matthews, Kristin L. *Reading America: Citizenship, Democracy, and Cold War Literature*. Amhurst (MA): University of Massachusetts, 2016.
- McCallum, Robyn. *Ideologies of Identity in Adolescent Fiction: The Dialogic Construction of Subjectivity*. New York (NY): Garland, 1999.
- Meinhardt-Injac, Bozana, D. Kurbel, G. Meinhardt. "The Coupling between Face and Emotion Recognition from Early Adolescence to Young Adulthood". *Cognitive Development*, 53, 2020. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2020.100851>.
- Mejía, Andrés, Silvia Eugenia Montoya. "On the Meeting of the Moral and the Aesthetic in Literary Education". *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 51(2), 2017, 370-386. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9752.12237
- Mendlesohn, Farah. "Faith and Ethics". *Terry Pratchett: Guilty of Literature*. Andrew M. Butler, Edward James, and Farah Mendlesohn, eds. Reading, UK: The Science Fiction Foundation, 2000. 145-61.
- Mills, Claudia. "Introduction". *Ethics and Children's Literature*. Claudia Mills ed. Burlington: Ashgate, 2014. 1-13.
- Minx, Björn. "Literature and Ethics: Social Critique and Morality in the American War II Novel". *Ethics in Culture: The Dissemination of Values through Literature and Other Media*. Astrid Erll, Herbert Grabes, Ansgar Nünning eds. New York NY: De Gruyter, 2008. 337-354.
- Mitchell, Rebecca N. "Empathy and the Unlikeable Character: On Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* and Zola's *Thérèse Raquin*". *Rethinking Empathy through Literature*. Meghan Marie Hammond and Sue J. Kim eds. New York (NY): Routledge, 2014. 121-134.
- Moshman, D. *Adolescent Rationality and Development: Cognition, Morality, and Identity*. New York: Routledge, 2011.

- Mumper, M. L., R. J. Gerrig. "Leisure Reading and Social Cognition: A Meta-Analysis". *Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts*, 11(1), 2017, 109–120.
- Nelson, Claudia. "Transmitting Ethics through Books of Golden Deeds for Children". *Ethics and Children's Literature*. Claudia Mills ed. Burlington: Ashgate, 2014. 15-28.
- Newman, John. *Vietnam War Literature: An Annotated Bibliography of Imaginative Works About Americans Fighting in Vietnam*. 3rd ed. London: Scarecrow, 1996.
- Newton, Adam Zachary. *Narrative Ethics*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1995.
- Nikolajeva, Maria. *The Rhetoric of Character in Children's Literature*. Lanham (MD): Scarecrow Press, 2002.
- , *Aesthetic Approaches to Children's Literature: An Introduction*. Oxford: Scarecrow, 2005.
- , *Power, Voice and Subjectivity in Literature for Young Readers*. New York (NY): Routledge, 2010.
- , "Guilt, Empathy and the Ethical Potential of Children's Literature". *Barnboken: Tidskrift för Barnlitteraturforskning*, 35, 2012. DOI: 10.14811/clr.v35i0.139
- , *Reading for Learning: Cognitive Approaches to Children's Literature*. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2014a.
- , "Voicing Identity: The Dilemma of Narrative Perspective in Twenty-first Century Young Adult Fiction". *Modern Children's Literature: An Introduction*. 2nd ed. Catherine Butler and Kimberley Reynolds eds. New York (NY): Palgrave, 2014b.
- , "Emotions and Ethics Implications for Children's Literature". *Affect, Emotion, and Children's Literature Representation and Socialisation in Texts for Children and Young Adults*. Elizabeth Bullen, Kristine Moruzi, Michelle J. Smith eds. London: Routledge, 2017. 81-95.
- Nilsen, Kristin Osdal. "The First-Person Horse: A Study of Narrative Perspective, Empathy, and Animal Welfare". 2019. University of Bergen, MA Thesis.
- Nodelman, Perry. *The Pleasures of Children's Literature*. New York (NY): Longman, 1992.
- , *The Hidden Adult: Defining Children's Literature*. Baltimore (MD): John Hopkins, 2008.

- , *Alternating Narratives in Fiction for Young Readers: Twice Upon a Time*. New York (NY): Palgrave MacMillan, 2017.
- Nussbaum, Martha. *Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990.
- , "Objectification". *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 24(4), 1995, 249-291.
- , *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001.
- , *Not For Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities*. Princeton (NJ): Princeton UP, 2010.
- Oatley, Keith. *Best Laid Schemes: The Psychology of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992.
- , "Fiction: Simulation of Social Worlds". *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 20(8), 2016, 618–628.
- , "Art as Emotional Exploration". *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 40, 37-38.
- O'Driscoll, Cian. "Nobody Wins the Victory Taboo in Just War Theory". *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 42(7), 2019, 901-919. DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2019.1588118
- Oziewicz, Marek C. *Justice in Young Adult Speculative Fiction: A Cognitive Reading*. New York: Routledge, 2015.
- Paltridge, Brian. *Genre, Frames and Writing in Research Settings*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1997.
- Parker, Stephen, R. Thomas. "Psychological Differences in Shame vs. Guilt: Implications for Mental Health Counselors". *Journal of Mental Health Counseling*, 31(3), 2009, 213 –224.
- Parsons, Graham. "The Dualism of Modern Just War Theory". *Philosophia*, 45, 2017, 751–771. DOI: 10.1007/s11406-016-9790-z.
- Piaget, Jean. *The Moral Judgment of the Child*. New York (NY): Free Press, 1965.
- Piette, Adam. "Introduction: The Wars of the Twentieth Century". *The Edinburgh Companion to Twentieth-Century British and American War Literature*. Adam Piette and Mark Rawlinson eds. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2012. 1-10.

- Prinz, J. J. "Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?" *Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives*. A. Coplan and P. Goldie eds. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011. 211-229.
- Rahn, Suzanne. "Lewis, Tolkien, and the Ethics of Imaginary Wars". *Ethics and Children's Literature*. Claudia Mills ed. Burlington: Ashgate, 2014. 163-180.
- Quabeck, Franziska. *Just and Unjust Wars in Shakespeare*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013.
- Reynolds, Kimberley. *Children's Literature: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011.
- , "Books We Forgot to Remember: Left-wing Publishing for Children in Interwar Britain". *European Literature for Children and Young Adults: Trends and Developments*. J. Mikota, A. Muller, and S Planka eds. Germany: SEKL, 2013, 17.
- Rimmon-Kenan, Shlomith. *Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics*. 2nd ed. London: Methuen, 2002.
- Roberts, Robert. "Narrative Ethics". *Philosophy Compass*, 12(3), 2012, 174-182. DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00472.x
- Rose, Jacqueline. *The Case of Peter Pan: Or the Impossibility of Children's Fiction*. Philadelphia (PA): University of Philadelphia, 1984.
- Roth-Hanania, Ronit, Maayan Davidov, Carolyn Zahn-Waxler. "Empathy Development From 8 to 16 months: Early Signs of Concern For Others". *Infant Behavior & Development*, 34(3), 2011, 447-58. DOI: 10.1016/j.infbeh.2011.04.007
- Sainsbury, Lisa. *Ethics in British Children's Literature: Unexamined Life*. London: Bloomsbury, 2013.
- , "'But the Soldier's Remains Were Gone': Thought Experiments in Children's Literature". *Children's Literature in Education*, 48, 2017, 152-168. DOI: 10.1007/s10583-016-9274-6
- Sandel, Michael J. *Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?* New York (NY): Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.
- Sanders, Mark. "Culpability and Guilt: Child Soldiers in Fiction and Memoir". *Law & Literature*, 23(2), 2011, 195-223.

- Savoi, Anna Duffy. *Ingroup, Outgroup, or All of the Above: The Advantages of Young Adult Literature for Empathic and Cognitive Engagement with Minority Protagonists*. 2019. Cambridge University, PhD dissertation.
- Schuck, Michael. "When the Shooting Stops: Missing Elements in Just War Theory." *Christian Century*, 1994, 982-983.
- Schmidtz, David. *Elements of Justice*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006.
- Scholes, Robert, R. Kellogg. *The Nature of Narrative*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996.
- Seed, David. *American Science Fiction and the Cold War: Literature and Film*. Edinburgh, Edinburgh UP, 1999.
- Segal, Shira C., B. N. Reyes, K. C. Gobin, M. C. Moulson. "Children's Recognition of Emotion Expressed by Own-race versus Other-race Faces". *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, 182, 2019, 102-113.
- Sierksma, Jellie. "Costs of Helping Only Influence Children's Intention to Help Ethnic Outgroup Peers". *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, 173, 2018, 85-99.
- Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. "Consequentialism". (2003). *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 2015. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/>
- Sparks, Erin, M. G. Schinkel, C. Moore. "Affiliation Affects Generosity in Young Children: The Roles of Minimal Group Membership and Shared Interests". *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, 159, 2017, 242-262.
- Speer, N. K., Reynolds, J. R., Swallow, K. M., & Zacks, J. M. "Reading Stories Activates Neural Representations of Visual and Motor Experiences". *Psychological Sciences*, 20(8), 2009, 989-999.
- Spinner-Halev, Jeff. *Enduring Injustice*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012.
- Spolsky, Ellen. *The Contracts of Fiction: Cognition, Culture, Community*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Stephens, John. *Language and Ideology in Children's Fiction*. Harlow: Longman, 1992.
- , "Narratology". *The Routledge Companion to Children's Literature*. D. Rudd ed. New York (NY): Routledge, 2010. 51-62.

- , "Schemas and Scripts: Cognitive Instruments and the Representation of Cultural Diversity in Children's Literature". *Contemporary Children's Literature and Film: Engaging with Theory*. Kerry Mallan and Clare Bradford eds. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 12-36.
- Stern, Jessica A., Jude Cassidy. "Empathy from Infancy to Adolescence: An Attachment Perspective on the Development of Individual Differences". *Developmental Review*, 47, 2018, 1-22.
- Stockwell, Peter. *Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Stockwell, Peter, M. Mahlberg. "Mind-Modelling with Corpus Stylistics in David Copperfield". *Language and Literature*, 24(2), 2015, 129-147.
- Subrtová, Milena. "When Children Die in War: Death in War Literature for Children and Youth". *Bookbird*, 47(4), 2009, 1-8.
- Tan, Kok-Chor. *Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012.
- Titchener, Edward B. *Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of Thought-Processes*. New York (NY): Macmillan, 1909.
- Todorov, Tzvetan. *Genres in Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990.
- Tousignant, B., F. Eugène, P. L. Jackson. "A Developmental Perspective on the Neural Bases of Human Empathy". *Infant Behavior and Development*, 48, 2017, 5-12.
- Trites, Roberta Seelinger. "Growth in Adolescent Literature: Metaphors, Scripts, and Cognitive Narratology". *International Research in Children's Literature*, 5(1), 2012, 64-80.
- , *Literary Conceptualizations of Growth: Metaphors and Cognition in Adolescent Literature*. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2014.
- Tsai, Hsin-Chun "Jamie". "The Girls Who Do Not Eat: Food, Hunger, and Thinness in Meg Rosoff's *How I Live Now* and Laurie Halse Anderson's *Wintergirls*". *Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures*, 6(1), 2014, 36-55.
- Tucker, Nicholas. *Suitable for Children?: Controversies in Children's Literature*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1976.

- Tully, E. C., M. R. Donohue, S. E. Garcia. "Children's Empathy Responses and their Understanding of Mother's Emotions". *Cognition & Emotion*, 29(1), 2015, 118-129. DOI: 10.1080/02699931.2014.898614.
- Van Boven, Leaf, M. D. Robinson. "Boys Don't Cry: Cognitive Load and Priming Increase Stereotypic Sex Differences in Emotion Memory". *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 48(1), 2012, 303-309. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.09.005>
- Vermeule, Blakey. *Why Do We Care About Literary Characters?* Baltimore (MD): Johns Hopkins UP, 2010.
- Vezzali, L., S. Stathi, D. Giovannini, D. Capozza, E. Trifiletti, E. "The Greatest Magic of Harry Potter: Reducing Prejudice". *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 45, 2015, 105–121.
- Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. 1977. 5th ed. New York (NY): Basic Books, 2015.
- Watson, Victor. *Cambridge Guide to Children's Books in English*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001.
- Wendell, S. "Towards a Feminist Theory of Disability". *The Disability Studies Reader*. J. Davis ed. 1st ed. New York: Routledge, 1997. 260-278.
- Wilson, Deirdre. "Irony Comprehension: A Developmental Perspective". *Journal of Pragmatics*, 59, 2013, 40-56. DOI: 10.1016/j.pragma.2012.09.016
- Winter, Jay. *Sites of Memory Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014.
- Wood, Marcus. *Slavery, Empathy, and Pornography*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003.
- Xu, G., W. Li, J. Liu. "A Social Emotion Classification Approach Using Multi-model Fusion". *Future Generation Computer Systems*, 102, 2020 (forthcoming), 347-356.
- Zunshine, Lisa. *Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel*. Columbus: Ohio State UP, 2006.
- Zysberg, Leehu, S. Raz. "Emotional Intelligence and Emotion Regulation in Self-induced Emotional States: Physiological Evidence". *Personality and Individual Difference*, 139, 2019, 202-207.