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Doing Drag in Blackface

Hermeneutical Challenges and Infelicitous Subjectivity in Courasche, or: Is Grimmelshausen Still Worth Reading?

Sarah Colvin | ORCID: 0000-0002-2776-3185

Jesus College, Cambridge, England

sjc269@cam.ac.uk

Abstract

This article acknowledges racism and sexism as ethical problems in Grimmelshausen's novel *Courasche*. Its charismatic protagonist is not only old and a woman (and therefore arguably a witch), but adds racialised exclusion to her portfolio when she narrates her autobiography in blackface. Here the author interrogates Grimmelshausen's narratorial masks using Medina's conception of the *infelicitous subject*, who has a paradoxical double function: infelicitous subjects simultaneously demonstrate how things should not be done and sow seeds of doubt about the practices and beliefs of the normative economy. Recognising the problem racism and sexism represent in *Courasche* raises the question whether Grimmelshausen's engagement with knowledge is conventional or innovative; whether *Courasche* merely reproduces, or also destabilises, epistemic injustice. *Courasche* as a protagonist is an exemplar of transgression. But is her transgressive infelicity epistemically constitutive – does it contribute to the creation of new discursive contexts?

Keywords

Grimmelshausen – epistemic injustice – gender – racism – blackface

Grimmelshausen's novels fit the category now called autofiction: they offer a bottom-up perspective on central European life during the Thirty Years' War.* That gives them a clear historical value. Students, however, normally encounter

* I am grateful to my colleague, Dr Charlotte Woodford, for invaluable discussions and feedback.

the texts (primarily the picaresque novels *Simplicissimus Teutsch* and *Courasche*) as literature; that is, as part of a cultural reservoir of stories deemed 'worth reading'. In the face of the gendered and racialised issues raised by *Courasche* in particular, to leave that categorisation unchallenged would seem to imply that sexism and racism are inevitable historical details in the 'great' work of a canonical writer; that they are of only minor ethical and no aesthetic importance. In what follows I will not in fact suggest that Grimmelshausen is now not worth reading, though I accept that others might disagree and I welcome those discussions. Here I want to propose that if "ethics and aesthetics are one" (to quote another canonical writer),¹ and if the work is to be read and taught as *literature* by scholars who see that term, as I do, not least as marker of ethical value,² then it becomes necessary to acknowledge ethical problems in the work, and to explore and give reasons for its continued aesthetic categorisation as literature.

Literary writing is often held to be recognisable by the curiously accessible complexity with which it makes space for competing knowledges: Jane Adamson has called that quality literature's "untidiness", Michael Eskin its "capaciousness".³ For the reader-response theorists of the 1980s, resistance to interpretation was a key quality of literary texts, which might even provoke "a certain nervousness in the reader".⁴ So when commentators suggest that Grimmelshausen is so squarely or uncomplicatedly positioned within 17th-century epistemic norms that his protagonist *Courasche* *must* be read straightforwardly as a perpetrator and sinner, that seems to raise a question about the novel's literary credentials.⁵ Richard Schade, who acknowledges the ethical challenges of the work, wonders about "Grimmelshausens Tendenz, zeittypische Vorurteile als Scheinlösungen für eine tiefgreifende Problematik anzubieten".⁶ Yet if Grimmelshausen really is just offering *Scheinlösungen* based on the epistemic biases of his time, it again becomes difficult to make not only the ethical but the aesthetic case for *Courasche*.

The basis for ethical epistemologies, argues José Medina, is the *epistemic friction* that is created by competing knowledges.⁷ In her review of the *Simplician cycle*, Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly makes the case for Grimmelshausen as a writer of deliberate epistemic complexity ("What does 'I' mean? Who are you,

1 Wittgenstein, 1922: 88.

2 See e.g. Eskin, 2004; Adamson, 1998; Colvin, 2016.

3 Eskin, 2004: 587; Adamson, 1998: 107.

4 Iser, 1989: 3.

5 See e.g. Hillenbrand, 2002; Schade, 1981.

6 Schade, 1982: 231.

7 Medina, 2011: 21.

reader? Is there such a thing as a true story? Are there not simply different points of view, with the person who writes them down playing the part of the scribe-cum-voyeur?”).⁸ Jumping off from Watanabe-O’Kelly’s assessment of the novels’ epistemic complexity, I would like to use Charles Mills’ thinking about whiteness and alternative epistemologies, and Miranda Fricker’s articulation of *epistemic injustice* to explore problems and possibilities in the novel’s treatment of gender and ‘race’. Drawing on Medina’s conception of the *infelicitous subject*, I will make a provisional argument for continuing to read and teach Grimmelshausen as a literary writer.⁹

1 The Paradox of Infelicitous Subjectivity

Infelicitous subjects are at the normative margins of our practices. They are *border people* [...], used to discipline not only our agency but also our very identity.¹⁰

Grimmelshausen’s *Trutz Simplex: Oder ausführliche und wunderseltzame Lebensbeschreibung der Ertztrügerin und Landstörtzerin Courasche* (1670) is regularly received as a puzzle – in Dieter Breuer’s words, “einer der rätselhaftesten Texte der Literatur der frühen Neuzeit”.¹¹ In 2002 an international colloquium addressed (largely gender-oriented) controversies sparked by the text, without resolving them.¹² Critics have wrestled with the question whether the novel is a rebuttal of gendered discourses that incites sympathy for a charismatic female transgressor, or an exercise in seventeenth-century misogyny whose very title reduces women to the c-word. For much of the twentieth century, scholars tended to the latter view, without seeing much wrong with that – Grimmelshausen, they found, had produced an intelligible portrait of feminine inconstancy.¹³ In 1968 John W. Jacobson, in a “Defense of Grimmelshausen’s *Courasche*”, was moved to critique scholarship that reproduces epistemic injustice rather than questioning it. Jacobson found it “peculiarly ironic that *Courasche*, who suffers keenly and repeatedly at the hands of men in the

8 Watanabe-O’Kelly, 2015: 196.

9 Mills, 1988; Mills, 1997; Mills, 2007; Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2006: 170.

10 Medina, 2006: 170.

11 Breuer, 2002: 11.

12 The proceedings of the colloquium “Kontroversen um Grimmelshausen’s ‘*Courasche*’” appeared in *Simpliciana* 24 (2002).

13 See e.g. Ermatinger, 1925; Lochner, 1924; Streller, 1957; Hiller, 1964. All cited in Jacobson, 1968.

novel, has also been singularly ill-used by literary critics".¹⁴ But his defence is not only of the protagonist. In 1968, in the context of a nascent women's movement, Jacobson defended her author by arguing that Grimmelshausen, rather than being a purveyor of conventional sexism, shows "an intriguingly modern emphasis upon male responsibility for female immorality which sets him apart from both earlier and later German prose writers of the seventeenth century".¹⁵ It is unclear which prose writers Jacobson is referring to; the notion that men are responsible for women's behaviour was certainly put forward in the school dramas of Daniel Casper von Lohenstein, notably *Cleopatra* (1661) and *Sophonisbe* (1680),¹⁶ and had underpinned the Shrovetide plays of writers like Hans Sachs in the sixteenth century.¹⁷ Rather than genuinely establishing Grimmelshausen's distinctiveness among early modern German writers, Jacobson's claim seems primarily designed to tell readers in 1968 that Grimmelshausen was still worth reading.

The consensus among the majority of recent critics is that *Courasche*, even more than its much longer predecessor in the Simplician cycle, *Der abentheuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch* (1668), is epistemically complex – that it is difficult consistently to distinguish what its author is presenting to us as true knowledge. Grimmelshausen's well-known irony exists in tension both with a rich vein of slapstick humour, and with a profoundly religious early modern world view. Critics waver between accepting narratorial claims that these are serious stories, merely "sugared" with farcical or titillating moments of spectacle ("daß ich aber zuzeiten etwas possierlich aufziehe, geschiehet der Zärtlinge halber, die keine heilsamen Pillulen können verschlucken, sie seien denn zuvor überzuckert und vergültdt"),¹⁸ and suspicions that those claims are disingenuous, and the spectacle is in fact the main show.

Jacobson and others who have sought to defend *Courasche* and her author do so in the face of narrative problems that exacerbate the issues raised by the spectacular content. First, Grimmelshausen sets his protagonist up to fail in her narrative intention. In J. L. Austin's terms, "happy performatives" are speech acts that achieve what they set out to do. *Courasche*'s narrative is unhappy, or infelicitous – it is a *misfire*,¹⁹ and does not convincingly achieve its declared aim of enacting revenge on Simplicissimus. Second, the protagonist is set up to fail as a fictional autobiographer. The autobiographical pact

14 Jacobson, 1968: 42.

15 Jacobson, 1968: 51.

16 Colvin, 1999: 83–103.

17 See e.g. Brauner, 1991; Classen, 2003.

18 Grimmelshausen, 1975: 485.

19 Austin, 1976: 15–17.

rests on trust,²⁰ and Courasche declares herself a liar on multiple occasions, as well as being designated an arch-fraudster (*Ertzbetrügerin*) on the title page. She narrates from within a Romani community, in the context of widespread prejudice about the dishonesty of such communities;²¹ and she is personally discredited in two fictional interventions at the story's end (where, as Hayden White established, narrative credibility relies heavily on "the moral authority of the narrator"²²). Third, the fictional Courasche narrates her autobiography in blackface, a theatrical and much-overlooked detail in the story that evokes culturally deep-rooted, racially prejudiced associations with both devilry and foolishness.²³ Lynne Tatlock has called the novel a "drag act":²⁴ Grimmelshausen ventriloquises,²⁵ and therefore arguably impersonates, a woman narrator (who sometimes dresses up as a man). Intradiegetically, however, the narrative is a blackface act: the fictional Courasche is consciously impersonating a North African²⁶ 'gypsy' as she tells her story ("ich [fing] an, mich mit Gänsschmalz, Läußsalbe und andern haarfärbenden Unguenten also fleißig zu beschmieren, daß ich in kurzer Zeit so höllrieglerisch aussahe, als wann ich mitten in Ägypten geboren worden wäre", 124).²⁷

I want here to interrogate Grimmelshausen's narratorial masks and hermeneutical elusiveness using Medina's conception of *infelicitous subjects*. Such subjects offer "nonconforming performances of identity" and have a paradoxical double function. On the one hand, there is a social disciplinary function: infelicitous performers

play a special role in the normative economy of a practice as living and walking *exemplars of infelicity*, of how things should not be done, and of what can happen to you – to anyone – if you are not careful enough to comply with the established norms and the accepted patterns of behavior.²⁸

20 Lejeune, 1989.

21 Kalkuhl/Sohns, 2002: 214, 219. See also Saul, 2007: 2–3.

22 White, 1981: 20.

23 See Hornback, 2007.

24 Tatlock, 2003: 280. Katja Strobel describes it as literary cross-dressing; see Strobel, 1995: 84. Maren Lickhardt writes of "a male author donning a female narrator's mask". Lickhardt, 2018: 132.

25 Feldman, 1991: 74.

26 "Zi[e]geuner" was believed to be a corruption of "Egyptianer". See Saul, 2007: 2.

27 Grimmelshausen, 1971: 124. All further references to this edition are given in the text.

28 Medina: *Speaking from Elsewhere*, p. 170. Italics in original.

On the other hand, their infelicity is creative and constitutive, because it “becomes an *exemplar or prototype of transgression*”. Infelicitous subjects point to what might be, thus “contributing to the creation of new discursive contexts”.²⁹ Fiction (as Ulrike Zeuch has observed with reference to *Courasche*) often presents us with a thought experiment – what happens when a 13-year-old girl who has grown up in sheltered circumstances is pulled, without any kind of protector or adviser, into the thick of a brutal war?³⁰ *Courasche* models an answer to that question, and part of the answer is that she becomes, in Medina’s terms, a walking exemplar of “how things should not be done”. At the same time *Courasche* – as a novel, not as a protagonist – arguably presents its readers with a “prototype of transgression”: a narrating subject who sows some seeds of doubt about the practices and beliefs of the normative economy.

2 The C-word Which Is Not One

Courasche’s given name is Libuschka – her nickname, Courage or (in its Hessian variant) *Courasche*, is coined in the context of a fight, yet it refers less to the courage she genuinely demonstrates and more to her euphemistic use of the word to indicate her genital area (23). That persistent double meaning of her name constitutes her as a paradoxical representative of the sex which is not one.³¹

In Judith Butler’s terms, naming is “an act of constitution: the address animates the subject into existence”.³² *Courasche*’s nickname is given her by her first lover, a young cavalry captain. Butler points to the potential violence of naming: even if the subject resists, as *Courasche* does when she tries to shake off her unwelcome nickname, the name “continues to force itself upon you, to delineate the space you occupy, to construct a social positionality. Indifferent to your protests, the force of interpellation continues to work.”³³ “Gleichwie mir’s aber zu Wien war gangen, also gieng mir’s auch hier,” *Courasche* complains after seeking refuge in an unnamed town, “ich konnte abermal des Namens ‘Courage’ nicht loswerden, wiewohl ich ihn unter allen meinen Sachen am allerwohlfeilsten hinweggeben hätte” (47–48).

29 Medina, 2006: 179. Italics in original.

30 Zeuch, 2009: 143.

31 Irigaray, 1977.

32 Butler, 1997: 25.

33 Butler, 1997: 33.

In the seventeenth-century context, courage is a masculine attribute (and the French word is masculine in gender, as Kaminski points out).³⁴ Courage is also a key attribute of the early modern *femme forte*: the popular fantasy of a chaste warrior woman who serves the cause of men, a patriarchal god, or the fatherland.³⁵ Courasche, however, joins battle not for the cause but because she enjoys it, just as she initiates sex because she enjoys it. Richard Schade has read her as a parodic Maria Aegyptiaca;³⁶ but she is also a parodic version of the quintessentially chaste and patriotic *femme forte*.³⁷ In the early modern imagination, the antithesis of the *femme forte* is on the one hand the (never named) *homme faible*,³⁸ whom she implicitly puts to shame, and on the other hand the witch. Where the *femme forte* is normally high on the social ladder, witches are normally low. The former is chaste, the latter sexually deviant; the former serves a god-fearing patriarchy, the latter the devil; the former is driven by a desire for justice and order, the latter by personal vengefulness.³⁹ Grimmelhausen's obvious familiarity with the discourse of witchcraft, and the frequent textual allusions to it, make it tempting to read Courasche as a witch. But other evidence suggests that Grimmelhausen in fact defies a quintessentially binary early modern imaginary by creating a deviant *femme forte* who is *not* a witch.

Historically speaking, the idea of witchcraft is on the way to being *passé* in western Europe by the late 1660s, where the witch craze peaked between 1580 and 1650.⁴⁰ Italo Michele Battafarano has used a close reading to demonstrate that while many of the men in the novel read Courasche as a witch, Grimmelhausen does not support their position, but instead offers a critical exposé of men's use and opportunistic abuse of the witch trope. The trope is invariably activated, Battafarano observes, by men who feel threatened in their gender identity: for example, when Courasche's third husband is hanged for desertion after failing to beat her into submission, Grimmelhausen shows us the men in her camp choosing superstitiously to believe that she is magically responsible for his death – even though it has been made perfectly clear that her husband was grossly at fault and no witchcraft was or is in play.⁴¹ They name

34 Kaminski, 2009: 230.

35 See e.g. Le Moyne, 1647; also Maclean, 1977; Plume, 1999 and Colvin, 1999.

36 Schade, 1992: 228.

37 Compare also Kaminski on the "Bedingung der Jungfräulichkeit" for mythical warrior women. Kaminski, 2009: 231–232.

38 Colvin, 1999: 19.

39 Colvin, 1999: 125–179.

40 Briggs, 1996, Map 2.

41 Battafarano, 2002: 190; see also Zeuch, 2009: 159 and Battafarano/Eilert, 2003.

her “Strahl-Hex” (44); the force of that appellation is potentially lethal, and Courasche subsequently fears for her life in the regiment.

At work here is what Fricker calls *testimonial injustice*: the (intradiegetic) disadvantaging of Courasche via her *credibility deficit* as a woman, where men enjoy a *credibility excess*⁴² that is lethally at work in the discourse of witchcraft. Epistemic privilege has vicious real-life consequences,⁴³ and in *Courasche* Grimmelshausen shows us men who use the idea of the witch, propagated in ‘scholarly’ tomes like the *Malleus Maleficarum*⁴⁴ as well as in popular discourse, to advantage themselves and disadvantage a woman who threatens their masculine status. In a notorious episode, a major whom Courasche once captured in battle justifies subjecting her to gang-rape by naming her “Blut-Hex”. He is well aware of the lethal epistemic power he is wielding, and wonders whether to use it vengefully, and have her tried for witchcraft. Battafarano demonstrates how reading Courasche as a witch is used *intradiegetically* by men to legitimise their behaviour, without mapping straightforwardly on to an authorial perspective.⁴⁵ The major’s credibility as a witch-hunter disappears in a puff of smoke when a social superior, the sympathetic Danish cavalry Captain, calmly dismisses as nonsense the claim that Courasche is a witch. He too was captured by her in battle, he explains, and that experience tells him that her soldierly skills, not witchcraft, were the reason for his defeat.⁴⁶

Both episodes *depict* gendered epistemic injustice without letting it pass as justified. However, even Battafarano’s detailed reading cannot account for the totality of Grimmelshausen’s novel, nor even for the totality of its references to witchcraft. Courasche may not be a witch, but she is on the path to eternal damnation, which is not a trivial fate. Springinsfeld’s attempts to bring about Courasche’s death by throwing her into the fire not only conjure witch-burning⁴⁷ but prefigure a metaphysical future in hell. And close reading does not reveal Springinsfeld as the primary offender in the encounter with Courasche. Her assumption of the upper hand in their non-marriage evokes the early modern nightmare of social chaos that is the *verkehrte Welt*, and nothing in the Springinsfeld episode problematises that emblematic signal of dangerous disorder. There are further difficulties: how should we read the *spiritus familiaris*, for example, which gives devilish aid to Courasche until

42 Fricker, 2007: 17.

43 Medina, 2013: 57. Italics in original.

44 Cramer/Sprenger, 1970.

45 Battafarano, 2002: 191.

46 Compare Battafarano, 2002: 190–191. See also Wade, 2010: 30.

47 Article 109 of the Constitutio criminalis Carolina of 1532 prescribed burning as punishment for malicious magic.

she passes on the damnation it brings with it to Springinsfeld? Battafarano blames Courasche's abuse of Springinsfeld on her *Verbildungsprozeß* as a young woman in wartime;⁴⁸ but Courasche as narrator declares that she was attracted to deviant behaviour even before the war intervened in her upbringing: "ich bin von Jugend auf genaturt gewesen, am allerliebsten zu sehen, wenn es am allernärrischen hergieng" (18). She usurps the traditional male prerogative of naming when she makes Springinsfeld take a name of her choosing, rather than accepting his name in marriage. She uses the moment of naming him to have sex with a young ensign, thus inhabiting the phallic right to sexual self-determination (75–77). As others before me have observed, invading the masculine space of sexual agency does not save her from being repeatedly raped.⁴⁹ Some bodies, Nirmal Puwar explains, are considered to have "the right to belong, while others are marked out as trespassers",⁵⁰ and therefore implicitly always at risk of violence. As a woman and later a member of a racialised minority group, Courasche fits Puwar's conception of the space invader. Her bravery is read not as heroism but as a threat: the perceived castrating force she represents is visualised in the nightmare image of a soldier she beheads in battle, "daß er noch etliche Schritte ohne Kopf mit mir ritte" (42). Most of the men in the novel develop an exaggerated fear of her, even though she is far more at risk from them than they are from her, as Grimmelshausen has her narrative reveal (45–46). Space invaders are always at risk of pseudo-prophylactic violence, engendered by that "paranoia which projects the intention to injure that it itself enacts".⁵¹

Gesa Dane has remarked on how unusual it is to find an early modern novel narrated in a woman's voice, and Battafarano and Eilert declare Courasche the first German-language "Ich-Erzählerin [...] überhaupt".⁵² The latter claim overlooks the first-person poetry of a writer like Catharina Regina von Greiffenberg – a historical, rather than fictional, female voice that thematises the problem of speaking as a woman.⁵³ It also overlooks the fact that thousands of women's life stories, told in the first person, were in circulation in the German-speaking lands in the early modern period. These were the confessions of convicted witches, extracted under the criminal law (the *Constitutio criminalis Carolina*) of the time, read out at their executions, and

48 Battafarano, 2002: 196.

49 See Becker-Cantarino, 1994: 39; Feldman, 1991; Wade, 2010.

50 Puwar, 2004: 8.

51 Butler, 1993: 19.

52 Dane, 2009: 375; Battafarano/Eilert, 2003: 23.

53 See Falkner, 2001.

often distributed in the form of woodcuts and pamphlets.⁵⁴ There was, Lyndal Roper observes, “an appetite for the salacious details of the witch’s crimes and her fearful end”.⁵⁵ As the magistrate (*Schultheiß*) in Renchen from 1665, Grimmelshausen would not have been involved in witch trials – the last to occur in the Baden-Baden area were in 1642–1644, and the last execution there was in 1631 (though in neighbouring Baden-Durlach, where far fewer witches were prosecuted and executed, the last trial was in 1669).⁵⁶ He will nonetheless have been aware of the area’s history: Markgraf Wilhelm of Baden-Baden executed 231 witches between 1626 and 1631, and his persecutory energy was only curtailed by the Swedish invasion of the territory in January 1632, in the context of the Thirty Years War.⁵⁷

Like Courasche’s story, the narratives extracted from accused witches were ventriloquised by men (the interrogators) and written down – sometimes at great length – by a scribe. The confession documents reflected, as Roper notes, fear and fantasy far more than women’s lived experience. Nonetheless, like the confession documents of other offenders – “including in particular prostitutes, cross-dressers, and sexual offenders of all types, especially women” – they set out to offer detailed life histories, with insights into motivations and the factors behind an individual’s “fall”.⁵⁸ The accused faced questions “about their parents; about who had first seduced them; where and when intercourse had taken place; what they had been promised”; a “personal profile” was required, explaining “who had first corrupted her, whether it was love of money or material goods which had led her astray”.⁵⁹ The stories thus extracted were not merely standardised, but “peppered with detail drawn from the witch’s own experience and coloured by her own emotions”.⁶⁰ Even if, as Battafarano and others have convincingly argued, Grimmelshausen is not primarily trying to characterise Courasche as a witch, structural similarities between her narrative and the criminal confessions or *Urgichte* of accused witches remain.

In his study of Grimmelshausen’s Silesian contemporary, Lohenstein, Adalbert Wichert observes structural overlaps between the stage and the courtroom.⁶¹ The dramatic protagonist is ‘tried’ before an audience-jury,

54 See Blackwell, 1986: 99–100. See also Morton, 2017: xli and 119; Briggs, 2013: 15.

55 Roper, 2004: 52.

56 Schneider, 1994.

57 Schneider, 1994; see also Schneider, n. d.

58 Roper, 2004: 45–46.

59 Roper, 2004: 46.

60 Roper, 2004: 52.

61 “daß Dramen nach der Struktur von juristischen Prozessen auf Beurteilung hin konzipiert sind und vielfach Prozesse zu ihrem Gegenstand machen”. Wichert, 1991: 267.

motives are revealed and weighed in the context of the action, and a confession is offered before punishment is meted out. I have argued elsewhere that the confessions of Lohenstein's Cleopatra, Agrippina, and Sophonisbe recall the *Urgichte* of witches.⁶² In Grimmelshausen's novel the narrative voice emphasises that Courasche's story is *not* a confession – at least not in the religious sense (she is not seeking reconciliation with a divine order). And still it can be read as a narrative of guilt in the legal sense. Like Lohenstein's strong-minded women protagonists, Courasche is presented to us in the dock. Like theirs, her sexualised female body is exposed to the judging male gaze, and associated with Circe, witchcraft, and the related ideas of danger, sex, and fire (and, like Lohenstein's Cleopatra, Courasche is linked to the disruptive goddess Venus).⁶³ Whether or not Grimmelshausen, living in the southwestern territories, was aware of Lohenstein, working in the northeast, his take on the witchcraft debate is similar in that witchcraft is understood as a metaphor for men's heterosexual impulses (“die Wollust ist die Cirz”, Lohenstein explains in his “Widmungsvorrede” to *Sophonisbe*).⁶⁴ Men who can curb those impulses have the power to make women behave properly, Lohenstein's dramas and Courasche's narrative consistently demonstrate.

Unlike Courasche, Lohenstein's women protagonists link their confessions to remorse. Both religious and legal confessions are supposed to be linked to contrition, as a precondition for spiritual or social redemption. Courasche echoes her picaresque predecessor, Úbeda's *Pícara Justina*,⁶⁵ by declaring her guilt while rejecting penitence explicitly (“Das, so mir manglet, ist die Reu”, 15). Where Lohenstein's heroines are punished for their failings by death, in the tragic mode, Courasche is punished in the comic mode, by her low-status final marriage into a Romani community (unlike Lohenstein's heroines, Courasche neither dies young nor stays pretty). That may not be the end of her punishment, however. In the context of seventeenth-century epistemology Courasche's sinfulness and lack of repentance constitutes a double-whammy that is literally damning.⁶⁶ A key difference between Grimmelshausen's best known pícaro, *Simplicissimus*, and his pícara, Courasche, is that the former's teleology is redemption, while the latter seems set (up) to burn in hell.

62 Colvin, 1999: 277; on the *Urgichte* see Morton, 2017: xli and 119; also Briggs, 2013: 15.

63 On Cleopatra as Venus see Colvin, 1997; on Courasche as Venus see Weydt, 1971: 179.

64 Lohenstein, 1957: 117.

65 Grimmelshausen may have been inspired by Francesco López de Úbeda's *La Pícara Justina* (1605). He had read the German translation by 1675 at the latest. See Zaenker, 1998: 631 and Meid, 2002: 20.

66 Becker-Cantarino, 1994: 36.

In this life, Courasche uses the resources available to her in a masculinist society to survive. Most obviously, she uses the institution of marriage as advantageously as she can. Courasche's social descent through her marriages has regularly been read as a sign of her progressing moral degradation,⁶⁷ but it is also a sign, as her narrative makes perfectly clear, that in a patriarchal sexual marketplace youthful beauty and/or wealth are preconditions for 'marrying up'.⁶⁸ As the war deprives an inevitably ageing Courasche of her husbands *and* her money, 'marrying down' is not a choice but a necessity, if she is to gain the relative safety, for a woman, that marriage brings.

Taking a break from marriage when Springinsfeld's obedient devotion makes that possible, she nonetheless enables her commercial activity by naming him head of her household:

Ich wußte wohl, daß der Mann (welchen mir Springinsfeld aber nur pro forma repräsentieren mußte) das Haupt meiner Markedenterei darstellte und daß ich unter dem Schatten seiner Person in meiner Handelschaft agierte, auch daß ich bald ausgemarkedentert haben würde, wann ein solches Haupt mir mangelte.

GRIMMELSHAUSEN, *Courasche*, 99–100

For, here and elsewhere, Courasche also uses the discursive resources available to her for survival. She consciously engages the popular trope of the Amazon to justify her participation in actual battles ("Wann man mir viel verweisen wollte, antwortet ich, es wären wohl ehe Amazones gewesen, die so ritterlich als die Männer gegen ihren Feinden gefochten hätten", 43). On trial for prostitution, she defends herself with such rhetorical fluency that educated men are alarmed: "Ich konnte schwätzen wie ein Rechtsgelehrter," she explains, "und meine Wort und Protestationes fielen so scharf und schlaue, daß sich Verständige darvor entsetzten" (118).

Grimmelshausen's protagonist is certainly an example of how things should not be done. The question remains whether, in allowing his protagonist to live up to the hermeneutical complexity of her name, he is simultaneously "contributing to the creation of new discursive contexts".⁶⁹

67 See e.g. Battafarano/Eilert, 2003: 17.

68 See also Hamidouche, 2006.

69 Medina, 2006: 179.

3 Speaking from – Where?

Part of the hermeneutical challenge of *Courasche* is disentangling the fictional speech act that is Courasche's and Grimmelshausen's and the fictional scribe von Trommenheim's narrative. Medina posits that the discursive practices we participate in, and our participation in them, are inevitably polyphonic, involving discursive elements we do not control or own. It is, therefore, "*not possible to speak in a single voice*".⁷⁰ Polyphony becomes peculiarly tangible in the fictional autobiography of a woman speaking in blackface, her words recorded by a fictive male scribe, and both of them the inventions of a white male writer. But how epistemically polyphonic is that polyphony? Butler suggests that no first-person narrator has a story of their own "that is not also the story of a relation – or a set of relations – to a set of norms".⁷¹ Norms feed power relations, and while Grimmelshausen may be constrained as a storyteller by his relation to a set of epistemic norms, as an educated white man in central Europe he is simultaneously massively empowered by them. I will begin here with the issues raised by his narrative "drag act", and then move to the problem of speaking in blackface.

In the context of gendered power relations, Grimmelshausen's ventriloquism of Courasche's narrative can be read as an egregious instance of "speaking for others".⁷² Like Tiresias in the Greek myth, Grimmelshausen purports to reveal 'secret knowledge' about women – which turns out to overlap predictably with dominant preconceptions. When Courasche confides to the reader that No does *not* mean No ("Doch wehrete ich mich ritterlich, nicht zwar, ihme zu entgegen oder seinen Begierden zu entrinnen, sondern ihn recht zu hetzen und noch begieriger zu machen", 24), epistemic violence is at work. She further confesses that women weep only to be manipulative, evidencing her claim with a popular song that is cited twice in the novel:

Die Weiber weinen oft mit Schmerzen
Aber es geht ihn' nicht von Herzen,
Sie pflegen sich nur so zu stellen,
Sie können weinen, wann sie wollen.

GRIMMELSHAUSEN, *Courasche*, pp. 34–35, p. 62

⁷⁰ Medina, 2006: 135. Italics in original.

⁷¹ Butler, 2005: 7–8.

⁷² Alcott, 1991.

Women, readers learn, cannot be trusted because they constantly dissimulate – we watch Courasche practise laughing, weeping and sighing in front of the mirror (29). And, just as men have always feared, women are sexually insatiable: Grimmelshausen has Courasche claim “unmäßige Begierden” (43), and, when she contracts syphilis, explain that her illness is the result of an “unersättlichen Natur” (113). For the implied heterosexual male reader that is probably titillating rather than actually threatening – what is offered here is comfortable reassurance, from the ventroloquised horse’s mouth, that men’s beliefs about women are *true*.

There is inevitably a strong temptation to read the charismatic protagonist of *Courasche* as if ‘she’ were a real-life woman rather than a highly sexed puppet, animated and ventriloquised by her author. In Battafarano’s analysis, Courasche’s narrative responds to her social silencing as a woman: “Gegen diese virile Unmündigkeitserklärung ihrer Person rebelliert Courasche literarisch, d. h. autobiographisch, indem sie sich mündlich legitimiert”.⁷³ That would constitute a convincing reading of a real-life autobiography; but is the *fictional* Courasche really legitimised by an authorially managed act of speaking? From the perspectives of Nirmal Puwar and Pierre Bourdieu, the language Grimmelshausen’s Courasche uses is *not* legitimate. Legitimate language is formal, and recognisable as the “voice of reason”;⁷⁴ Courasche’s is informal, with plenty of colourful idioms and vulgarities. Legitimate language signals credibility, but Courasche is characterised on the title page as an *Erzbetrügerin*, and Grimmelshausen has her discredit herself as a liar with a regularity that suggests readers are not supposed to forget it. For a picaresque narrator to be unreliable is not unusual; but Courasche is also doubly discredited in two codas to her narrative. The first, called “Zugab des Autors”, is probably to be read as a postscript from Courasche’s fictional scribe, Philarchus Grossus von Trommenheim auf Griffsborg – an anagrammatic cousin of Christoph von Grimmelshausen. Grimmelshausen lifted the text verbatim from the German translation (by Aegidius Albertinus) of Tomaso Garzoni’s *Piazza Universale*.⁷⁵ Again, that is hermeneutically opaque – is the scribe showing off his learning with the citation, or is the author leaning on or perhaps ironising borrowed moral authority? The borrowed text offers a vicious attack on women in general, addressed to fellow men. It ends the narrative without being quite the last word, however, for it is followed – after the marked ending of the story – by a second short intervention, titled “Wahrhaftige Ursach und kurzgefaßter

73 Battafarano, 2002: 201.

74 Puwar, 2004: 111; see also Bourdieu, 1992: 45.

75 Speier, 1964: 45. Garzoni’s *Piazza Universale* appeared in German as *Allgemeiner Schau- platz* in 1619.

Inhalt dieses Traktätleins". Some authorial irony seems to be in play in this fictional "true account" of the story's origin and content; but in effect it once again discredits the fictional narrator, Courasche. She is characterised as a vengeful, slutty ("liederlich") woman who brings shame on any man who does not respond to her with proper disgust ("[sich] zu besudeln kein Abscheuen getragen", 131). The ironic message of both codas, sent well after the horse has bolted, is that readers who are now closing the book in their hands *should not have been reading this story at all*. Courasche's story is transgressive; but so now are its readers, by association. They walk away "besudelt" because they have engaged imaginatively with the protagonist, rather than turning away in disgust from this contaminating "body out of place".⁷⁶

The "Zugab" is the first departure in the novel from the first-person narrative voice. It lifts the reader out of Courasche's energetic pseudo-autobiography and drops them into a cold bath of gynophobia:

Darum dann nun, ihr züchtige Jüngling, ihr ehrliche Witwer, und auch ihr verehrte Männer, [...], lasset euch auch fürterhin diese Lupas [= she-wolves, SC] nicht betören; [...] man [wird] erst gewahr, aber zu spät, was man an ihnen gehabt, wie unflätig, wie schändlich, lausig, grindig, unrein, stinkend beides, am Atem und am ganzen Leib, wie sie inwendig so voll Franzosen und auswendig voller Blatter gewesen, daß man sich endlich dessen bei sich selbst schämen muß [...].

GRIMMELSHAUSEN, *Courasche*, 130–131

The misogynist hyperbole has been read as part of the presentation of Courasche as a *Frau Welt* figure.⁷⁷ There is certainly something disturbing (to me) about the Baroque *Häufung* of pointers to female filthiness. Looking back to the novel's opening, however, we find that Courasche's narrative voice has already anticipated the epistemic injustice that an older and socially dishonored⁷⁸ woman will face in heteropatriarchal contexts; the story's beginning predicts its two codas. Setting the stage for her story, the fictional narrator refers to herself as "die alte Schell" (13), pointing to age and sex as conditions that will cause her narrative to be discounted as mere noise, like the ringing of a bell. "Speaking from elsewhere can be negatively characterized as speaking from a not-yet recognized discursive context and with a not-yet recognizable voice", Medina explains.⁷⁹ It always risks being discounted as mere noise: the bab-

76 Nirmal Puwar points with this phrase to Douglas, 1991. See Puwar, 2004: 143.

77 Notably by Feldges, 1969. See also Schade, 1981; Feldman, 1991.

78 Dane explores in detail Courasche's loss of honour and its consequences. See Dane, 2009.

79 Medina, 2006: 179.

ble of the barbarian,⁸⁰ the clanging of an old bell. *Picaros* and *picaras* are by definition fictional versions of people who in real life would never be listened to.⁸¹ And *Courasche* is not only old and a woman, but adds racialised exclusion to her portfolio when she appears in blackface.

4 Folly in Blackface

We put on blackface when we had something crazy to say.⁸²

Courasche opens with the protagonist speaking *ad auditores*, in the familiar mode of the Fool. She promises a story of folly (“überhäufte Torheiten”, 13). This is not the unworldly foolishness of *Simplicissimus* at the start of his narrative – *Courasche* is distinguished from her male counterpart by her claim that she was always in thrall to *worldly* foolishness (“ich bin von Jugend auf genaturt gewesen, am allerliebsten zu sehen, wenn es am allernärrischen hergieng”, 18). Like *Simplicissimus*, she offers for her readers’ enjoyment the transgressive self-degradation of German theatre’s “lustige Person”, who traditionally belches and farts (“die Leibsdünste trängten mich dergestalt, daß sie endlich den Ausgang mit Gewalt öffneten und eine [...] liebliche Stimm über Tafel hören ließen”, 81), reassuring the audience by establishing its superiority in morals and manners. She encourages readers to laugh at the spectacle of Springinsfeld trying to throw her into the fire (“ein schönes, lächerliches Einsehen und närrisches Spektakul”, 105).

It is a moment that links her with hellfire, where devils and fools have a long-shared history.⁸³ Like Goethe’s *Mephistopheles* a century and a half later, *Courasche* combines devilry with foolery (and like *Mephisto* she adds to her charismatic charm by unpacking the dishonesty and failings of conventional discourse in her unreliable narrative). One part of the long-shared history of devils and fools in European culture is their regular portrayal as black. Blackface was a “commonplace mark of foolishness” in early modern drama: Robert Hornback points to a cultural tradition that “associated blackness with degradation, irrationality, prideful lack of self-knowledge, transgression, and, related to all of these, folly.”⁸⁴ Virginia Mason Vaughan notes the racist “associ-

80 Boletsi, 2007: 68.

81 Colvin, 2017: 455.

82 Lhamon, 1998: 18.

83 See e.g. Hornback, 2007 and Stanford, 1996.

84 See Hornback, 2007: 47; also Hornback, 2018.

ation between black skin and damnation” in early modern English culture, and Luis Schuldes has demonstrated that the German tradition goes back at least to medieval drama.⁸⁵ Lyndal Roper remarks that Grimmelshausen draws on an established “shorthand” when he invokes the “cultural tradition to which he was heir, the representation of the figure of the witch as an infertile, lubricious and avaricious old woman”⁸⁶ – but there is another established, epistemically violent shorthand in play as Courasche narrates theatrically in blackface.

I am unconvinced by Kalkuhl’s and Sohns’ suggestion that Grimmelshausen distances himself from racist beliefs;⁸⁷ blackness has repeated negative associations in the narrative. Courasche notes aphoristically as she opens her narrative that the devil’s colour is black: “gleich und gleich gesellt sich gern, sprach der Teufel zum Kohler” (16). Indeed, her narrative intention to co-incriminate Simplicius as “gar des Teufels Schwager” (130) depends on her capacity to present devilishly. Grimmelshausen quickly establishes colour as a marker of moral status:

Sollte sich die Courage wohl einbilden dürfen, ihre alte, zusammengerumpelte Haut, die sie [...] beim Feuer schwarz geräuchert [...] wiederumb weiß zu machen? Sollte sie wohl vermeinen, sie werde die eingewurzelte Runzeln ihre lasterhaften Stirn austilgen und sie wiederumb in den glatten Stand ihrer ersten Unschuld bringen, [...]?

GRIMMELSHAUSEN, *Courasche*, 13–14

Innocence is white, while the blackening of her skin goes hand-in-hand with perfecting her skills in lying and stealing (124). As Charles Mills observes, however, the Racial Contract “makes the white body the somatic norm, so that in early racist theories one finds not only moral but aesthetic judgments”,⁸⁸ and Courasche also associates whiteness with beauty. The first lieutenant she marries is “weiß von Haut, und in meinen Augen so schön, daß ihn kein Maler hätte schöner malen können” (38). The idea that whiteness of skin is a desirable state, blackness undesirable, was established in Europe by the early sixteenth century: Andrea Alciati’s emblem collection of 1531 includes an emblem with the title *IMPOSSIBILE*. The caption reads: “Abluis Aethiopem quid frustra? ah desine, noctis/ Illustrare nigrae nemo potest tenebras”, which in the German edition is translated:

85 Vaughan, 2005: 24; Schuldes, 1974. See also Barthelemy, 1987.

86 Roper, 2004: 169–170.

87 Kalkuhl/Sohns, 2002: 217.

88 Mills, 1997: 61.

Vergebne Arbeit.

Was badt sein Moren lang umb sunst?
 Hör auff es ist verlorn all Kunst
 Dann niemand der duncklen Nacht kan
 Dick Finsternuß erleuchten thon.⁸⁹

The image's ongoing familiarity in the German-speaking world is testified to in Johann Christian Hallmann's *Urania* (1666) and *Adelheide* (1684); blackness and whiteness also dominate the metaphorical system of Hallmann's late play *Liberata* (1699),⁹⁰ as well as the Dido episode in Lohenstein's *Arminius* (1690), as Thomas Borgstedt has shown.⁹¹

Later Courasche marries another lieutenant, this time a Romani or "Ziegeuner". It is at this point in the narrative that readers might start to suspect that Courasche has failed, in Charles Mills' terms, "successfully to become a white person".⁹² Like her failure to conform to feminine sexual and social mores, this failure is presented as, to at least some extent, both voluntary and emancipatory. Assuming blackface to become part of her husband's Romani community releases her from a previous requirement to wear whiteface in line with central European conventions of beauty ("ich [...] hatte diesen Vorteil, daß ich weder Oleum Talci noch ander Schmiersel mehr bedorfte, mich weiß und schön zu machen, weil sowohl mein Stand selbsten als mein Mann diejenige Coleur von mir erfordete, die man des Teufels Leibfarb nennet", 124). It also implicitly supports her characterisation as a fool – the first "gypsy" character to be portrayed in central German literature, Donald Kenrick observes, is a fortune-teller who is described as "nährisch".⁹³ Yet Courasche's blackface performance departs from conventional blackface buffoonery because she is not a dupe; on the contrary, she dupes members of mainstream society who are self-deceiving enough to believe her fraudulent claims.

Like the "drag act" Grimmelshausen performs extradiegetically in the context of gendered power relations, Courasche's intradiegetic blackface act is complex in that it is both epistemically transgressive and epistemically violent.

89 Henkel/Schöne, 1967: col. 1087.

90 Hallmann, *Siegeprangende Tugend Oder Getrewe URANIA*, 111, 434; Hallmann, *Die Schaubühne des Glückes Oder Die Unüberwindliche ADELHEIDE*, 1, 116. Both in Hallmann, 1987. See also Colvin, 1999: 126–147.

91 Borgstedt, 1992: 223.

92 "part of what it requires to achieve Whiteness, successfully to become a white person [...], is a cognitive model that precludes self-transparency and genuine understanding of social realities." Mills, 1997: 18.

93 Kenrick, 2004: 79.

Grimmelshausen as author once again speaks (damagingly) for others when the narrating Courasche reveals ‘inside knowledge’ that chimes with antiziganism. Where he offered his reader undercover ‘knowledge’ about women via his performance as Courasche, he provides another epistemically violent ‘insider view’ via her performance as a ‘gypsy’. Courasche’s narrative concludes not only with a reflection on her personal corruption and devilishness, but just prior to that with a related reflection on Romani people, tantalisingly packaged as a secret that ‘just slips out’ and delivered in the first-person plural as a sign of its authenticity:

ich [habe] mich mein Lebtag über nichts mehrers verwundert, als daß man uns in den Ländern gedultet, sintemal wir weder Gott noch den Menschen nichts nützen, noch zu dienen begehren, sondern uns nur mit Lügen, Betriegen und Stehlen genähret, beides, zu Schaden des Landmanns als der großen Herren selbst, denen wir manches Stück Wild verzehren. Ich muß aber hiervon schweigen, damit ich uns nicht selbst einen bösen Rauch mache [...].

GRIMMELSHAUSEN, *Courasche*, 130

As always, epistemic violence has potential real-life consequences for its targets.

5 Conclusions

I have spent most of my life, after all, watching white people and outwitting them, so that I might survive.⁹⁴

“So that I might survive” is an important rider to James Baldwin’s statement of 1961. Exclusion and subalternity are always potentially life-threatening. There is no question that *Courasche* as a novel reproduces – both critically and uncritically – the violent prejudices of central European epistemology (not only) in the seventeenth century.

Epistemic injustice, Fricker maintains, “not only blocks the flow of knowledge, it also blocks the flow of evidence, doubts, critical ideas and other epistemic inputs that are conducive to knowledge”.⁹⁵ To ignore or dismiss racism and sexism as inevitable historical details in the work of a master storyteller would

94 Baldwin, 1993 (1961): 217.

95 Fricker, 2016: 162.

be to participate in blocking that flow of critical ideas conducive to knowledge, and thus in epistemic injustice. Recognising the problem racism and sexism represent in *Courasche* raises the question whether Grimmelshausen's own engagement with knowledge is conventional or innovative; whether *Courasche* merely reproduces, or also destabilises, epistemic injustice. *Courasche* as a protagonist clearly represents an exemplar of transgression in Medina's terms: she is an infelicitous subject. But is her infelicity epistemically constitutive – does it contribute to the creation of new discursive contexts?⁹⁶

The *Deutsches Wörterbuch* defines *Trutz* (or *Trotz*) as “herausfordernd” and “widerspenstig”.⁹⁷ *Courasche*'s fictional performance in *Trutz Simplex* is both of those things: it challenges and seeks to defy dominant epistemology. As Linda Martín Alcoff has observed of Western philosophy, the society in which most of the narrative plays out “seems to be composed exclusively of white males, so that one wonders how it reproduces itself”.⁹⁸ *Courasche*'s story not only plays *in* that society, but is addressed *to* it: the narrative opens and closes by addressing men specifically. Yet her opening assertion is that everything the “Herren” (*qua* the authorities she must address) think they know about her is wrong. And readers are engaged to attend to the story of this “body out of place”, even as it potentially sows the seeds of epistemic doubt.

“Do not associate yourself with infelicitous subjects and stay away from their distinctive ways of producing speech acts”, Medina articulates a conventional “rule of thumb”.⁹⁹ Elements in Grimmelshausen's narrative – particularly the moments that deictically link *Courasche* with hellfire and the two monitory postscripts – seem to warn readers not to try this at home. This is an unrepentant narrator who outwits dominant culture; but in a Christian worldview she cannot outwit God. Readers are urged to distance themselves – but only *after* *Courasche*'s story has already been told. Prior to offering dire, if brief, post-hoc warnings of her corrupt contagiousness, Grimmelshausen deploys comic techniques and picaresque conventions that seem designed to keep his readers engaged and entertained.

I opened with the observation that *Courasche* fails both in her narrative intention to avenge herself on *Simplicissimus*, and as a fictional autobiographer; she is an example of how not to do things. *Courasche* also fails as a conventionally gendered body, however, and she fails “successfully to become a

96 Medina, 2006: 179.

97 Online: http://woerterbuchnetz.de/cgi-bin/WBNetz/wbgui_py?sigle=DWB, accessed 15th October 2020.

98 Alcoff, 1996: 2.

99 Medina, 2006: 170.

white person”; two failures that put her not only outside of mainstream society, but epistemically ahead of it. She outwits the gendered and racist economy with her conscious performances of masculinity, femininity, and ‘gypsy magic’ (when she wants to trick a white woman out of her jewels). Courasche is playing the fool, but the woman she dupes is portrayed as the abject fool (“Tröpfin”, 125) for believing in Romani magic, a racialised superstition that is revealed to be “nährisch” and attracts the comic punishment of being robbed.¹⁰⁰

Extradiegetically, then, Courasche has the paradoxical credibility of the fool or picaro, who is *both* epistemically excluded *and* has the capacity to reveal mainstream society’s epistemic failings and dishonesty. That helps explain Battafarano’s otherwise puzzling assertion, “Courasches Selbstdarstellung ist wahr”.¹⁰¹ There are, as Mills contends, areas of experience that are rarely or never accessed by members of hegemonic groups; subordinate subjects, by contrast, access *both* mainstream *and* subaltern knowledge, which “gives them a more veridical picture of the dynamics of the social system”.¹⁰² Subaltern subjects can gain an epistemic advantage because they have to work harder cognitively, maintaining “two cognitive perspectives simultaneously”.¹⁰³ In Mills’ summary, hegemonic groups “characteristically have experiences that foster illusory perceptions about society’s functioning, while subordinate groups characteristically have experiences that (at least potentially) give rise to more adequate conceptualization.”¹⁰⁴ As a subaltern fraudster and fool, Courasche lacks credibility; simultaneously she has a level of self-transparency and a perception of social realities that far exceeds that of the white men who dominate her narrative.

Like fools and other comic performers, picaros are artistic devices for framing uncomfortable knowledge. In choosing a narrator “from elsewhere” Grimmelshausen potentially enables epistemic friction and a “pedagogy of disruption” that opens a path to alternative knowledge production.¹⁰⁵ The view from elsewhere always has the potential to cause a discursive disturbance, “to exploit the openness of discursive contexts and practices”.¹⁰⁶ It has the potential to generate epistemic friction,¹⁰⁷ which, even where it is not “liberating”,¹⁰⁸

100 Kalkuhl/Sohns, 2002: 217.

101 Battafarano, 2002: 198.

102 Mills, 1998: 245.

103 Medina, *Epistemology*, pp. 32–34.

104 Mills, 1988: 246. See also Mills, 2007: 17.

105 Rossing, 2016: 615.

106 Medina, 2006: 194.

107 Medina, 2011: 21.

108 Medina, 2006: 194.

is potentially counter-reductive. The particular achievement of literary and other works of art, suggest Izabella Penier and Anna Suwalska-Kolecka, is that they offer “more or less extreme acts of transgression and provocation that allow societies to evolve and expand”.¹⁰⁹

I suggest that *Courasche* defies tidy interpretation because it is epistemically both conventional and innovative: the socially empowered Grimmelshausen chooses to speak “from elsewhere”, in drag and in blackface, and thereby creates both an ethical problem (the problem of “speaking for others”, and of using dominant discourse to do it) and an epistemic possibility. The novel both exposes and perpetrates epistemic injustice; it challenges some of the things its implied readers think they know. As a text it has generated epistemic friction, which will hopefully continue to trouble scholarly and seminar discussions.

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¹⁰⁹ Penier/Suwalska-Kolecka, 2016: 11.

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