Decolonisation, Africanisation, and Epistemic Citizenship in post-Rhodes Must Fall South African Universities

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This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Declaration

I hereby declare that the dissertation entitled: *Decolonisation, Africanisation, and Epistemic Citizenship in post-Rhodes Must Fall South African Universities,*

- Is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the preface and specified in the text.

- Is not substantially the same as any work that has already been submitted before for any degree or other qualification except as declared in the preface and specified in the text.

- It does not exceed the prescribed word limit (80000) for the Politics and International Studies (POLIS) Degree Committee.
Abstract

Having received renewed intensity from student movements across the South African higher education landscape, *decolonisation*, as an intellectual project, remains a popular emancipatory framework within universities, disciplinary communities, scholarly networks globally and in South African higher education. In South Africa, demands for a decolonised African university are not new and are often inscribed within multiple genealogies and intellectual traditions that examine the relationship between colonial formations and the politics of knowledge production. Given this historicity, there is often a rich inheritance of diverse frameworks, idioms, and vocabularies that articulate collective efforts to transcend what decolonial theorists call the ‘coloniality of knowledge’. Given this historicity, there is always a pressing need to continually interrogate these inheritances in the ever-changing world in which they are deployed. One such idiom of decolonisation is Africanisation, which it conceives as a project of *making X— disciplines, universities, knowledge about Africa, etc*—*more African*. Among advocates of intellectual decolonisation in African Studies, Africanisation intuitively registers discourses of Africa-centredness and African renaissance as avenues to epistemic justice and relevance. It is a process of attenuating the extent to which universities and disciplines, as sites of discourse on and about Africa, are overdetermined by Western discursive formations. Although much has been done to advance this project, it often raises questions riddled with tension, particularly around the issue of identity. Although an intuitive concept on the surface, the grammar of Africanisation raises complexities pertaining to the subject of decolonisation—that is, the African for whom representation is sought.

Locating my discussion in the post Rhodes Must Fall context in South African higher education, I participate in ongoing conversations around decolonising the university by asking, in a dual sense, whether decolonisation *is* Africanisation. Firstly, the question is descriptive, and examines the dimensions in which decolonisation is premised on the insufficiently African character of universities in South Africa and what this means. The more critical dimension of this question is normative and interrogates the perceived limits of Africanisation as an idiom of decolonisation. By employing the interrelated notions of citizenship and belonging, I develop a concept of *epistemic citizenship* to explore the boundaries of Africanity within the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion observable in efforts to decolonise universities in South Africa. Building on debates in the University of Cape (UCT) Town and Stellenbosch
University (SU), I argue that while an inclusive Afropolitan sensibility and epistemic identity exists as an intellectual aspiration, one also observes contestations over perceived exclusions along configurations of race, nation, and indigeneity such that within the decolonisation-as-Africanisation paradigm, successfully claiming Africanity is far from a fait accompli.

**Keywords:** decolonisation, Africanisation, epistemic citizenship, politics of belonging, South Africa
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In the best of times, a doctorate is a wonderful journey of learning and self-discovery. In the worst of times, it is a devilishly Sisyphean sunken place that suspends one in a whirlpool of loneliness and self-doubt. Here, one is unable to sink to the bottom or swim to the top. In these good and bad times, there are a community of people that deserve recognition, acknowledgement, and ultimately gratitude.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANCYL</td>
<td>African National Congress Youth League</td>
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<tr>
<td>AZAPO</td>
<td>Azanian People’s Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>Black Academic Caucus</td>
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<td>BCM</td>
<td>Black Consciousness Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Centre for African Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Curriculum Change Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCWG</td>
<td>Curriculum Change Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRASSH</td>
<td>Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DASO</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance Student Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHET</td>
<td>Department of Higher Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDP</td>
<td>Extended Degree Programmes</td>
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<td>EE</td>
<td>Employment Equity</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>Fees Must Fall</td>
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<td>HBU</td>
<td>Historically Black University.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HWU</td>
<td>Historically White University.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUMA</td>
<td>Institute for Humanities in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>PASMA</td>
<td>Pan-Africanist Student Movement of Azania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFA</td>
<td>Rethinking Economics for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMF</td>
<td>Rhodes Must Fall</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTC</td>
<td>Royal Technical College</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASO</td>
<td>South African Students’ Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>Student Representative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>Stellenbosch University</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCKAR</td>
<td>The University Currently Known as Rhodes</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCT</td>
<td>University of Cape Town</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>UEA</td>
<td>University of East Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UJ</td>
<td>University of Johannesburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>UWC</td>
<td>University of the Western Cape</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wits</td>
<td>University of the Witwatersrand</td>
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1. Background

In March 2015, the South African higher education landscape was subject to a wave of student protests. At the UCT, the Rhodes Must Fall student movement presented a powerful critique of the university as constituted by a resilient colonial and colonising orientation (Booysen, 2016; Nyamnjoh, 2016; Jansen, 2017; Chikane, 2018). Although students mobilised initially around the removal of the statue of Rhodes, the protests morphed into a broader call for the decolonisation of the university. In this call, the object of critique was the colonial university as an institutional form that had been entrenched and reproduced under apartheid, one that was perceived as being very much alive in the post-apartheid dispensation. Decolonisation became a multifaceted phenomenon, anchoring claims pertaining to race, inequality, representation, institutional culture, citizenship (belonging), and epistemic injustice. Although the Fees Must Fall movement that came after shifted the focus to issues of financial access in higher education and an end to outsourcing of workers, it retained the (ideological) epistemic theme and critique of the colonial university as an institutional form, demanding a free decolonised university education (Booysen, 2016).

As an institutional form, the colonial university was critiqued for its institutional racism and epistemological Eurocentrism, foregrounding a discursive and symbolic terrain of resistance. Aesthetically, these critiques resulted in the fall of the Rhodes statue at UCT, in addition to ongoing official and unofficial name changes at the Universities of Johannesburg (UJ), Witwatersrand (Wits), and Cape Town. Moreover, the movements intensified conversations around representation in the teaching staff and professoriate, in addition to critiquing Eurocentric curricula and syllabi. The fallist student movements were productive in raising critical questions around the coloniality of ‘what is taught’; ‘who is teaching’; and ‘how we teach’ (Swartz et al., 2018).
Although the fallist protests began at UCT, they struck a national and transnational chord. At Rhodes University, students formed the Black Student Movement in solidarity with RMF, notably foregrounding issues of gender and rape culture in its vision of transformation. They advocated for changing the name of the university, and it is now informally known as ‘the University Currently Known As Rhodes (UCKAR)’ (Knowles, 2020). At historically white Afrikaans-medium universities like Pretoria and Stellenbosch, decolonisation resonated as a politics of language regarding the retention of Afrikaans as a medium of teaching and learning in higher education, and its role in an exclusionary institutional culture (Jansen, 2017). In Stellenbosch University, this culminated in the formation of the Open Stellenbosch movement, which defined itself as ‘a collective of students and staff working to purge the oppressive remnants of apartheid in pursuit of a truly African university’ (Open Stellenbosch Collective, 2015b). At Oxford University, the debate centred on institutional and epistemic cultures through the symbolism of the Rhodes statue at Oriel College (Kwoba et al., 2018). At Harvard Law School, the allied student grouping ‘Royall Must Fall’ called for the changing of the school’s shield, which was intimately bound up with slavery (Beeman, 2019). As a critique of the colonial university, the use of decolonisation in South Africa resonates with wide ranging conversations on and around how histories of race, empire, and colonialism inflected and continue to inflect disciplinary knowledge production and intellectual traditions (Bell, 2016, 2019; Bilgin and Ling, 2016; Grosfoguel, Hernandez and Velasquez, 2016; McLaren, 2017; Bhambra, Nişancıoğlu and Gebrial, 2018; Bragato and Gordon, 2018; Mignolo and Walsh, 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020; Meghji, 2021; Shilliam, 2021). Having studied at UCT until my Master’s degree, part of my attraction to the University of Cambridge for doctoral studies was my sense that it too was grappling with issues of decolonisation and would thus contribute towards a stimulating intellectual environment. These conversations were taken up, for example in the ‘Decolonising the Curriculum in Theory and Practice’ seminar series at the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities (CRASSH) in addition to department-based working groups that contemplated the entailments of institutional change.1

The Fees Must Fall movement began at Wits, initially in response to a proposed 10.5% fee increase at the university for the 2016 academic year. On 14 October 2015, students occupied the Wits administration building to campaign against the fee increase, and the hike was eventually suspended three days later in an agreement between the university council and the

Student Representative Council (SRC). Following national student marches on parliament in both Cape Town and Pretoria that called for a zero per cent increase in university tuition fees, then President, Jacob Zuma, announced there would no fee increases for the 2016 academic year. Capitalising on this momentum, student demands evolved into calls for free higher education. The language of decolonisation was retained in this new phase, with students mobilising around demands for a free decolonised education.

Social movements are often significant not so much in their achievement of concrete goals and objectives, but in the kinds of productive conversations they enable (Branch and Mampilly, 2015). While the fallist movements are non-existent today or at the time I began this research, they nonetheless had a profound impact on the higher education landscape. Decolonisation is now a popular discourse of social change, as academics and university management look to respond to student calls for changes in the curriculum, syllabus, and institutional culture of South African universities. At the same time, decolonisation has not gone uncontested. At UCT for example, a Curriculum Change Working Group (CCWG) was established in 2016 to engage critical curriculum transformation in response to student protests. Its recommendations were received with mild and acerbic criticism from students and staff on issues related academic freedom, epistemological relativism, and disciplinary expertise, which I discuss in Chapter 5. To briefly illustrate the issue of academic freedom for example, it was argued that (a) the lack of clarity around the (un)official status of the working group’s report and (b) its narrow theoretical approach to decolonisation with reference to its perceived constriction within the Latin American decoloniality school combined to court an orthodoxy that flirted with authoritarian dogmatism (Hull, 2019b). Equally, some students mobilised to form the collective Progress SA and launched the hashtag campaign #IsUCTFree? They put up posters across the UCT campus lamenting an intolerant intellectual environment in which the university as a space for free speech and debate was being closed off by radical student politics.

1.2. Object of Analysis

This project is about the contested discourse(s) on and around the decolonisation of South African universities post Rhodes Must Fall. Between 2015 and 2017, student movements like Rhodes Must Fall, through a demand for a free decolonised education, mobilised decolonisation as a conceptual and pragmatic intervention on issues of material inequality,
institutional culture, belonging, and epistemological transformation. These movements were productive in their impact on the higher education landscape, foregrounding several important issues that have since been taken up by students, academics, and university management. They have also left a rich archive of published and grey literature, including a social media trail, and have set afoot much decolonisation talk and attempts at practice across university institutions. One can therefore talk of a decolonial consciousness visible in debates on institutional identity, disciplinary interrogation, and curriculum renewal across South African universities. In a negative light, one can also talk about a decolonial consciousness that is perceived as a virus infecting the academic health of the university (Benatar, 2021). Therefore, my object of analysis is not so much the RMF/FMF movements themselves, but on the contested efforts to inscribe decolonisation with meaning as an intellectual project. It takes up the challenge handed down by students to continually define, interrogate, revise, and pursue the decolonisation of universities as colonial in their institutional form.

1.3. Research Problem

Contemporary talk of decolonising universities, institutional cultures, and knowledge production have a long history in debates on Eurocentrism, neo-colonialism, and multiculturalism (Fanon, 1967b; Nkrumah, 1970; Mafeje, 1971; Césaire, 1972; Rodney, 1972; Y ansanè, 1980; Chinweizu, 1987; wa Thiongò, 1992; Oyéwùmí, 1997; Asante, 2003; Mbembe, 2017). Post-colonial universities in Africa have often sought to engage epistemological decolonisation by questioning the rootedness of universities in Africa (Zeleza, 2006a; Mamdani, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017). In South Africa, one of the major accomplishments of the fallist movement(s) was to shift the vocabulary that containerised these conversations from ‘transformation’ to ‘decolonisation’. Anchored in a distinction between reform and genuine emancipation, RMF students critiqued transformation as wedded to a pacifying neoliberal logic underpinned by gradualism and surface level change that did little to undermine the status quo (RMF, 2015, cited in Nyamnjoh, A., 2017).

The historicity of such struggles means that the concepts, frameworks, and categories often employed in this project of decolonisation have historical lineage. One such enduring framework is Africanisation, put simply as the process of making X (universities, disciplines, knowledge about Africa) more African (Falola and Jennings, 2002). Decolonisation and
Africanisation are often seen as co-constitutive. To decolonise is to Africanise and vice versa. In the nation-building phase of the post-independence period, Africanisation entailed a process of indigenisation. Universities were seen as vital symbols of independence, hence the urgency of universities that were national in name and composition. In terms of epistemological transformation, the disciplines of history and philosophy were vibrant sites of debates on Africanisation as I discuss in Chapter 3. Mobilising a philosophy of African nationalism, the post-independence nationalist historiographical tradition was concerned with displacing the then hegemonic colonial historiography by affirming both Africa’s historicity and the vitality of African agency, initiative, and adaption in this history (Dike, 1956; Ranger, 1968; Falola, 2000, 2003). Historians sought to inscribe the ‘African factor’ in historical development of the continent (Temu and Swai, 1981). These processes of Africanisation were multifaceted. For example, they involved rethinking the methodological assumptions of African history and the role of colonialism and imperialism in either negating African history’s existence altogether or overdetermining what was studied and how (for overviews, see Vansina, 1985, on oral tradition; and Osaghae, 1991, on colonialism as episodic vs epochal). It also meant establishing African universities as leading centres in the production of historical knowledge about the continent. In philosophy, Africanisation, concerned efforts to foreground the philosophical credentials of African identity. This too was in response to colonial racism. In the post-independence period, this Africanisation included contested efforts to define African philosophy and consider its location in folkloric traditions, sages, anti-colonial intellectuals, individual critical activity, and indigenous languages and cultures (Ebousi-Boulaga, 1977; Towa, 1979; Mudimbe, 1985; Oruka, 1990b, 1990a; Masolo, 1994; Hountondji, 1996; Wiredu, 1996, 1998).

This concern with inscribing an African factor would continue well into the dependency, Marxist, and feminist historiographical traditions, demonstrating that Africanisation is itself often inflected by varying ideological configurations. Within these latter traditions, Africanisation had a more critical edge, foregrounding the question and subject of representation (i.e., who stands to be liberated) within the category African particularly along class and gender fault lines. This critical edge was developed against the nationalist historiographical tradition, which, epistemologically ‘… had neither the conceptual tools nor the ideological inclination to deal with class or gender hierarchies, exploitation and struggles in African history’ (Zeleza, 2005, p. 217). From a class perspective for example, debates in East Africa (Dar es Salaam school) sought to understand and explain the continuance of
imperialism in neo-colonial formations that rendered decolonisation (in its full emancipatory potential) illusory for most Africans. Because nationalist historiography was seen to gloss over the socio-economic contradictions of the glorious African past it vindicated, it had a limited potential to explain the failure of ordinary Africans to experience the fruits of political decolonisation. As such, it tended to produce a history increasingly relevant to political elites eager to prove a historical capacity for political and economic development in a world of nation-states. By linking decolonisation to a reconstitution of the global order, some sections of the dependency school foregrounded the material contradictions between the national bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the working class and peasantry, on the other hand, which it linked to a broader neo-colonial subordination to imperial forces on the world stage. In this way, it pointed to the vertical relationships that undermine ‘African’ and by extension nationalism as a unitary category (Mamdani, 1976; Shivji, 1976). The emphases of other historians in this school—(Rodney, 1972; Nabudere, 1977; Tandon, 1982)—can be seen to maintain ‘African’ as a unitary category. In critiquing external dependency, decolonisation is emphasised as an anti-imperialist struggle not confined exclusively to national class struggles. “The national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie were equally oppressed by imperialism and, therefore, had a chance of joining the popular united front against imperialism during the phase of the ‘new democratic revolution’ (Rugumamu, 2020, p. 247). Nonetheless, both perspectives emphasise the task of the historian in producing historical knowledge that would demystify the subordination of working-class and peasant Africans in a neo-colonial imperial global order.

With the emergence of the fallist movements, engagement with a decolonisation-as-Africanisation paradigm is visible in South Africa, even if the term ‘Africanisation’ is not always explicitly used. This notwithstanding, there is generally an overriding preoccupation with the rootedness (relevance) of universities in Africa (Heleta, 2016; Msila and Gumbo, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Zondi, 2016). Furthermore, universities have largely interpreted the demand for decolonisation as an opportunity to re-affirm an African orientation institutional and epistemological self-styling. Two prominent commentators on decolonisation in South Africa and globally made interesting commentary at the time of the student protests. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni argued that the student movements were continuous with colonial and post-colonial struggles for a truly African university (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017). He observed the recurring challenges to this historical project, positing that the present task lies in dislodging the neoliberal university and its embeddedness within a colonial matrix of power. For his part, noting that articulations of decolonisation rarely go uncontested, Achille Mbembe asked the
critically productive question of whether decolonisation and Africanisation are the same thing (Mbembe, 2016, p. 33). On the one hand, he notes Fanon’s suspicion and political critique of Africanisation as a discourse of inversion anchored in the tendency of African nationalism to devolve into a retrograde nationalism and chauvinism, what Francis Nyamnjoh (2016) has conceptualised as ‘ever diminishing circles of inclusion’. On the other hand, Mbembe observes a more optimistic note in Ngugi wa Thiongo’s use of decolonisation to foreground the creation of ‘new Africans’ and recentring Africa through a politics of language that questions the unassailable position of European languages as the sole vehicles of knowledge production and bearers of intellectual traditions. In this sense, Africanisation, as African-centredness, is tied to an emancipatory project of self-definition and self-affirmation through the medium of language (wa Thiongò, 1994).

In terms of mapping the problem warranting intervention and the nature of said intervention, Africanisation remains a popular idiom for decolonisation, often evoking interrelated themes of authenticity, relevance, and African-centredness (Brizuela-Garcia, 2006). Although much has been done to advance these themes, the idiom of Africanisation is riddled with tensions particularly around the issue of identity. A lingering indeterminacy lies not only in questions around what makes knowledge African, but equally who counts as African. Therefore, although an intuitive and appealing concept on the surface, the grammar of Africanisation raises complexities pertaining to the subject of decolonisation—that is, the African for whom representation is sought. Often at stake are tensions around the boundaries of Africanness regularly inflected by race, gender, class, geography, and discourses of indigeneity. These are worth interrogating to enhance the possibility for decolonisation as a truly inclusive praxis.

1.4. Research Question(s): Is Decolonisation Africanisation?

This tension invites the question of whether decolonisation is Africanisation, a question that has descriptive and normative dimensions. In the case of the former, it regards the extent to which issues of Africanity characterise the problem and vision of a decolonised university in South African universities profoundly impacted by the fallist student movements. The normative dimension is more salient and constitutes the core intervention of this dissertation. If intellectual decolonisation, broadly defined, constitutes efforts to identify and dismantle the immediate and enduring legacies of colonial-imperialism in the university, then what are the perceived limitations of Africanisation as the foundational idiom for such a project? What do
the emergent meanings, debates, tensions, and flashpoints on decolonisation in post-fallist South African universities say about the limits of Africanisation as an anchoring framework for pursuing decolonisation in terms of the subject that it foregrounds?

1.5. Research Value

In this dissertation, I participate in conversations around decolonising South African universities to which the fallist movements gave renewed intensity. There are two general themes in which I situate my work. Broadly speaking, they form part of broader attempt to articulate the limits of contemporary decolonisation discourse in South Africa post RMF. The first regards questions around the appropriateness of the frameworks and terminologies used to map the problem of intellectual decolonisation in South Africa. The second describes decolonisation as the cultivation of an ethical subjectivity and raises the question of appropriate normative intellectual dispositions. I outline these themes below, in addition to specifying the nature of my intervention—the concept of epistemic citizenship, which I use as a tool to interrogate the boundaries of Africanity and subject of decolonisation in discourses of Africanisation.

1.5.1. Are the vocabularies we deploy adequate to the task at hand?

By interrogating Africanisation as a vocabulary of decolonisation, this project participates in efforts to think critically about the frameworks through which the problem of decolonisation is generally mapped out. These frameworks include the range of binaries that feature prominently in contemporary discourses of decolonisation, such as ‘African vs Euro-America; Western vs non-Western, Northern vs Southern, and indigenous knowledge vs science’, among others. Recently, Achille Mbembe and Jonathan Jansen raised questions about the suitability of these conceptual inheritances to the exigencies of the modern global economy we inhabit (Jansen, 2019; Mbembe, 2019). Observing that the epistemic world that is the object of change is itself possessed by an indefatigable dynamism, they render up for debate the terms by which we understand the knowledge problem posed by projects of decolonisation and the capacity for these frameworks to accurately capture and enable us to navigate this ever-changing world. The problems raised thus far are not new and include worries around the enclosure of African scholarship, over-determination; essentialism, and taken-for-granted claims regarding knowledge ownership.
As an example of contestations around enclosure, the argument has been made that we can accept that the distinction between Western and non-Western discursive formations is intelligible, but challenge the properties typically ascribed to each side of the binary. For example, Gädeke challenges the characterisation of African philosophy as collectivist and Western normative philosophy as individualist. For Gädeke, this contrast between individualism and collectivism obscures the point that the more salient ethical value in African ethics tends to be that of relationships. Moreover, she shows how the emphasis on relationality in normative thought registers with neo-republican normative theories in the Western philosophical tradition (Gädeke, 2019). Therefore, if we take the problem of decolonisation in philosophy as a failure of relevant contributions from African Philosophy to register in global philosophical debates despite the universality of its themes, then the meta-relevance of Gädeke’s argument is an awareness of the extent to which the rigid binaries that typify conventional understandings of decolonising philosophy effectively erect barriers between African philosophy and the broader discipline (Hull, 2019).

This invites one to probe further: do vocabularies, like the insistence on Africanness, undermine this desired integration? Given the precise context of epistemic decolonisation prior to and in the immediacy of the post-independence period, it was certainly necessary to emphasise both the *African* and philosophical credentials of work done by Africans, simply in virtue of the prevailing racist arguments one was rebutting. However, recognising this does not ‘preclude asking from the vantage point of the present whether the continued emphasis on Africanness in African Philosophy has not also had some perverse consequences’ (Hull, 2019, p. 4). Locating this question in the intellectual history of African philosophy, Hull suggests while it made sense to insist on substantive African credentials when ethnophilosophy was the prevailing mode of African Philosophy, this might be altogether out of place for those who insist on African Philosophy as individual critical activity, for which such credentials need not be seen as prerequisites, especially because they court dangers of intellectual enclosure (Hountondji, 1996; Dübgen and Skupien, 2019). Therefore, this latter critical universalist tradition steers away from the view that one’s Africanness confers authentication by default, and that not having an African identity or salient African credentials means one is an

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2 The worry being a limiting account of authenticity in which African philosophy and philosophers can only cover certain topics
illegitimate interlocutor. While this point is made in debates on African Philosophy, it has a broader transdisciplinary relevance of epistemological significance in terms of the over-determinative power ascribed to identity in practices of meaning making. The key point is that an integration into global networks—that is a vision of knowledge production and validation as a global endeavour—could be forestalled by a conception of Africanity hermetically sealed. Of course, this has force only on the assumption that the problem of decolonisation is indeed one of registering African voices within a global discourse of philosophy (for example). Alternatively, however, decolonisation as Africanisation could be informed by very specific identity claims: We want something that is ours. This is not our philosophy, and so it has no place here (Said, 1994). Contrary to this view, and as I later note on the idea of ‘decolonisation-as-appropriation’, some argue that these identity pre-occupations and the ownership claims embedded within them concede too much ground to the discursive formations and traditions typically called Western. These assumptions of ownership and identity, they would argue, take for granted the Westernness and non-Westernness of putative Western and non-Western traditions (Allais, 2016).

**Essentialism**

Precisely because discourses of Africanisation both seek and make identity claims, they often invite criticisms around the tendency for grammars of decolonisation to exhibit essentialist thinking. Wahbie Long argues that attempts to Africanise psychology in South Africa are characterised by an unhelpful obsession with what it means to be African, often framed in ‘racially and culturally exclusive ways that make it difficult for non-blacks to imagine a place for themselves in the field’ (Long, 2016, p. 429). In suggesting that black people are unique psychological subjects in need of a special ‘African’ psychology, they conjure uncomfortable reminders of colonial discourses of difference. On one level, therefore, such concerns register a worry that our frameworks can reproduce colonial thinking and its paradigm of alterity. At the same time, the vocabularies employed can also obscure a proper diagnosis of the problem: Being “African” has less to do, surely, with cultural uniqueness than material exploitation—and an “African” psychology that ignores this, does so at its peril (Long, 2016, p. 431, see also 2018). In effect, the argument here resonates with the familiar debate about the merits of a politics of recognition or redistribution as loci of a proper emancipatory politics (Fraser and Honneth, 2003)
Similarly, interrogating the promotion of Zulu under the auspices of Africanisation at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Stephanie Rudwick objects to the essentialist discourses employed by language policy rhetoric (Rudwick, 2018). Decolonisation often raises the question of whether African universities can be African without taking indigenous African languages seriously. The notion of a ‘truly African university’ is sometimes deployed as justificatory grounds for the intellectualisation of putative African languages in teaching and learning. Rudwick observes that language is often ensnared in a politics of race and polarising identity politics. Furthermore, beyond the essentialist conceptions of identity and authenticity implied by notions of ‘truly African’, Rudwick also notes its racially divisive nature, documenting both a restrictive racialisation of language in which African identity is unavailable to whites and non-blacks, and in which interventions like compulsory Zulu courses alienate Africans within the university. Such observations help illuminate a question of critical importance that will resonate throughout this dissertation when evaluating discourses of Africanisation: who is able to successfully have their claims to Africanity recognised? This question is often an undercurrent of debates on language and the tendency to see language as attached to stable ethnic and racial identities (Mphahlele, 1964 Achebe, 1975; Desai, 1993; Rudwick, 2018b). These debates in turn raise questions such as whether work written in a European language have any aspirational claim to Africanity or whether Africanity should be determined by principles of absolute autochthony (Jeyifo, 2018).

Most notably, the question features in Chapter 4 when reflecting on the interaction between the ideological pillars of fallism—Black Consciousness, black radical feminism, and Pan-Africanism—as an attempt to work out a heterogenous subject of decolonisation. In Chapter 6, it features in a discussion of epistemic citizenship and key flashpoints on recruitment and language policies in the current climate of decolonisation.

Some argue that it is possible to talk about Africanness in non-essentialist ways. For Thaddeus Metz, calling something African need not conjure worries around essentialism and unanimism. Rather, ‘… to call something “African” or “sub-Saharan” implies neither that it is to be found only south of the Sahara Desert, nor that it is everywhere present in that locale. These terms signify merely that something is particularly frequent or noticeable there, not necessarily that it is single or static’ (Metz, 2017, p. 21).
Another counterargument contends that pejorative charges of essentialism are too easily levied against discourses of decolonisation. Essentialism is far more complex than critics make it out to be, varying in form and function. By extension, it is also variable in its effects and how one might judge those effects (Kurzwelly, Rapport and Spiegel, 2020; Rapport, 2020; Spiegel, 2020). Writing about decolonising anthropology, Hylton White gives us some reason why the charge of essentialism is sometimes misplaced,

An axiom of critical analyses is that the content of a cultural form is the socio-political work it does. If colonial anthropology is known by its colonial work, why is decolonising anthropology not known in terms of the decolonising work it does—but rather by repeating an established critique of colonial ethnology?... If the culturalism of colonial ethnology can be understood with reference to its historical and political entanglements, in the project of colonial rule, why is the same careful gesture of historical and political contextualisation not extended to decolonising versions of cultural reasoning as well? (White, 2019, p. 150).

Essentialist arguments that reject English or some other cultural form as colonial and therefore non-African, often entail a contradiction in which they instantiate the very essentialism that they critique—for they fix the identity and significance of English as a European and colonial language, foreclosing the possibility that a thing can transcend its originary context. As such, one essentialises essentialism. The fact that colonial/apartheid governance routinely developed essentialist thinking does not mean the practice is intrinsically colonial. Fred Halliday observes that recourse to essentialism is hardly a peculiar feature of colonialism, for it is historically a prerogative of the dominated as much as the dominant (Halliday, 1993, p. 161). In some informal contexts, I have encountered the argument that decolonisation entails the renunciation of ‘English’ names because they constitute a colonialised subjectivity. But such an argument can only work if it fixes and collapses the significance of naming practices as singularly colonial or decolonial—that is, if it fails to offer an appropriate historical and political contextualisation as White (2019) notes. Despite his protestations, I can choose to name my offspring Adam not so much out of a manifest colonial mentality, but to honour the sagacity and mentorship of my doctoral supervisor.
Overdetermination

Essentialist critiques take other forms, such as those who question the confinement of Africa and the Global South within the straitjackets of peripherality. For Jansen (2019) these binaries are guilty of perpetuating an over-determinist narrative regarding an enduring colonial present. By identifying different knowledge regimes—that is, dominant and authoritative form(s) of knowledge which determine what counts as official knowledge—in South African higher education, Jansen warns against the reduction of complex problems to a single knowledge regime,

Colonialism was only one influence on knowledge and curriculum. It follows that to label every institutional problem as in need of decolonisation is to render the word impotent whether for the purposes of analysis…or progressive action… It is, moreover, to deny the complexity of power and authority that shaped, and continues to shape, what counts as knowledge in the post-apartheid period… This does not mean that there are not vestiges of colonial thought and knowledge in our institutions… But it does mean that when we speak of colonial knowledge—and what to do about it—this requires the critic to be specific about the relevant knowledge regime and its consequences in the present (Jansen, 2019, pp. 59–60).

For Jansen, the failure to acknowledge discrete knowledge regimes can foreclose productive conversations. As he explains,

…knowledge, as codified in disciplinary curriculum, is a fascinating product of intellectual legacies from the colonial past, struggle knowledge from resistance histories, knowledge exchanges from collaborations with international research partners, and the research of (in this case, African) scholars. To target the South African curriculum as “colonial” or “Western” is to ignore the many ways in which knowledge is produced, challenged and changed over the course of time; but the undiluted view of a colonial present in the democratic curriculum makes for good politics (Jansen, 2020).

Jansen is also particularly interested in refuting the tendency to assume passivity and dependence on hegemonic knowledge, thereby reacting against the vocabulary of dependency theory that sees the global knowledge economy as constituted by asymmetrical relations between a hegemonic ‘core’ and marginalised ‘periphery’. The claim is not that there is no
basis for intellectual decolonisation, but rather whether our inherited frameworks and vocabularies adequately capture the exigencies of knowledge production and validation both historically and contemporaneously. In this regard, he provides contemporary examples of high-profile research programmes in the Global South led by South Africans in diverse fields as a way of foregrounding a consciousness of agency in Africa and the Global South. This is significant because it destabilises the standard script of passivity in the ‘periphery’. It would be easy to dismiss these examples because the analysis does not interrogate the depth of representation, which would look at the socio-epistemic relations that characterise these spaces of putative Southern/African leadership. Nonetheless, Jansen’s argument does resonate with more detailed international studies on knowledge and global power in which South African academics have been involved. An example is *Knowledge and Global Power: Making new sciences in the South* (Collyer et al., 2019). While acknowledging the asymmetries of power in global knowledge production, it unsettles the narrative of an omnipotent Global North and powerless Global South by offering thick descriptions of how agency is exercised by actors against the backdrop of this structure of domination and marginality. Notably, it demonstrates the agency and power that scholars in the Global South are able to negotiate in research fields such as HIV/AIDS, climate change, and gender studies (for example, see Borland, Morrell, and Watson, 2018).

The form of over-determination thus far is premised on the belief that acknowledging the coloniality of knowledge does not necessarily entail the automatic success of colonial imposition (Said, 1993; Bhabha, 1994). This form often undergirds interest in resistance as an instantiation of agency. It is on this basis that Siseko Kumalo, echoing similar efforts around constructing a ‘shared text of blackness’ in sociology (see Mangcu, 2016), argues that claims of epistemicide and linguicide paradoxically perpetuate the erasure of indigenous thinkers. Khumalo’s point is that there is a wealth of untapped endogenous knowledge, such that claims of linguicide and epistemicide are overstated in the final analysis (Kumalo, 2020).

The combination of essentialism and over-determinism of binary vocabularies equally obscure historical and contemporary realities of entanglement (see Cooper and Morrell, 2014 on entanglement), cross-fertilisation and common historic influences (Jansen, 2017; Soudien, 2019; Hull, 2019c). There are diverse ways in which one can draw out the salience of the entanglement discourse. In one sense, it precludes the idea of stable essences implied by the discrete components of the binary (e.g., African vs Western). Appealing to the existentialist
dictum ‘existence precedes essence’, I note Sartre’s claim that there is no general account of what it means to be human, because meaning is decided in and through existing itself (Sartre, 1980). In this vein, Africanity is not an already existing essence that we can recover and rehabilitate. It is something that emerges within (and thus entangled with) concrete historical and contemporary constraints—that is, it is an open question (Diagne, 2001). Against tendencies of essentialism, entanglement discourses look to posit Africanity as fundamentally emmashed within fluid configurations and interpretations of past and present in an open-ended process that rather stresses becoming African. Afropolitanism as an ethical orientation, discussed briefly in Chapter 6, is one such example.

Vexing flawed assumptions of ownership

Furthermore, criticisms of binary thinking which foreground entanglement also make the additional point that this vocabulary cedes too much ground when articulating knowledge as a mode of power. Discussing the Africanisation of professional philosophy, Lucy Allais notes that these binaries are often imbued with assumptions of ownership that foreclose the possibility for decolonisation as appropriation (Allais, 2016). Typically, when we talk of decolonisation as enlargement (see Soudien, 2019)—i.e., adding voices within disciplinary traditions and canons—we take for granted the neat division of things that are ‘African’ and ‘Western’. However, one needs to vex these assumptions of ownership, and interrogate the Westernness and non-Westernness of ostensibly Western and non-Western intellectual traditions (Bilgin, 2008, p. 5). This thinking has often grounded a critical re-appraisal of Western philosophy’s origin story. A similar point can be made with ubuntu as a substantive, African-centred, non-Western alternative ethical and theoretical framework on personhood. There has been much debate about how this putative African theory of relational autonomy might inform institutional, curricula, and pedagogic decolonisation (Ramose, 2004; Venter, 2004; Horsthemke and Enslin, 2009; Le Grange, 2011; Enslin and Horsthemke, 2016; Tavernaro-Haidarian, 2018; Waghid, Waghid and Waghid, 2018). In contrast, Piet Naudé unsettles ubuntu’s claim as a marker of African authenticity (Naudé, 2019). By noting the salience of relational autonomy in political thought endogenous to the European intellectual terrain, he argues that such claims of authenticity rely on the homogenisation of African and European discursive formations.
The deeper point here is that an intellectual history which unsettles the taken-for-grantedness of the markers ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western/African’ might reveal histories of co-production, albeit in fundamentally unequal encounters, such that when we talk of decolonisation-as-enlargement, this is flexible enough to entertain decolonisation-as-appropriation. In the latter, marginalised epistemic agents claim hegemonic epistemic traditions as their own by inscribing their historical presence within it (Allais, 2016). This resonates with Abiola Irele’s essay In Praise of Alienation on the question of navigating European discursive influence,

We must not forget, too, that African labor and resources went into the building of the material prosperity of the West. In many ways, therefore, we have a claim upon Western civilization, as well as a considerable stake in it, as the instrument for the necessary transformation of our world. It is in our interest to make good that claim, to adopt strategies that will make our stake in that civilization pay handsome dividends (Irele, 1992, p. 222).

Posing the question of ‘What is an African curriculum?’, the late Prof. Harry Garuba (2015) of UCT gives us an example of this appropriation discourse. He appeals to Edward Said’s notion of ‘contrapuntal’ reading/thinking, which considers ‘… the perspectives of both the colonised and the coloniser, their interwoven histories, their discursive entanglements – without necessarily harmonising them or attending to one while erasing the other’ (Garuba, 2015). He goes on to elaborate, ‘[A] transformed curriculum is one that encourages contrapuntal thinking and pedagogy. For example, next time your philosophy professor teaches you Hegel’s “master and bondsman” and does not mention Haiti, ask him why.’ In this example, Haiti offers an avenue through which to inscribe Africa’s entanglement within dominant genealogies of liberty in global political thought (James, 2001; Buck-Morss, 2009).

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While I have tried to discuss interrelated notions as discrete problems with the vocabularies of decolonisation, it is my contention that the fear of enclosure is the overriding concern. Whether we are questioning essentialism and over-determinism, foregrounding entanglement, or questioning logics of ownership in vocabularies of decolonisation, the result is a discourse of African-centredness seeking to unshackle the intellectual project from rigid, narrowly bounded accounts of identity. Here, the notion of entanglement functions to destabilise discrete binaries like ‘African/non-Western and Western’. In so doing, it would seem that ‘Knowledge can
become African-centred despite its place of origin. But they do so only when they get entangled in African realities, lexicons and matrices and are shaped by these contexts’ (Cooper and Morrell, 2014, pp. 4–5).

Why situate my project in these conversations? Like the contributions above, I am critically engaging with vocabularies of decolonisation. I interrogate the perceived limits of Africanisation as an idiom of decolonisation and the conversations above are concerned with how African-centredness is articulated. On my part, I develop epistemic citizenship as the key conceptual contribution of this research. Through this concept, I argue that how decolonisation is articulated has varying implications both for what it means to be African and equally how belonging in this category is regulated as a politico-ethical matter. Regarding the former, recall that the inscription of universities in Africa within global networks of knowledge production means that Africanisation is sometimes dismissed as a form of particularism unsuited to this global context (Botha, 2010). This raises the question of what being an African university means in the globalised context of higher education. On this matter, Chapter 5 shows how an intellectual Afropolitanism can be read from debates at UCT. The significance of this orientation lies in resisting Africanity as enclosure. Here, while there is an acceptance of the interrelationship between knowledge, power, and identity that often underpins the politics of knowledge characteristic of decolonisation, there is also a desire to arrest nativism and radical relativism as forms of enclosure. In this regard, Africanisation entails a critical universalism rather than a walled segregation. Regarding the latter (i.e., regulation of belonging), much of Chapter 6 resonates with the politics of belonging often highlighted in critiques of essentialism as politically divisive. On this matter, epistemic citizenship describes the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion visible in the contested articulation of decolonisation in post-fallist South African universities. In this way, the concept helps to further inflect the research question as follows: When decolonisation is framed as a project of making universities in Africa more African, what are its limitations in the sense of its perceived inclusionary and exclusionary dimensions? Who is included and excluded within the category ‘African’?

1.5.2. Decolonisation as the cultivation of an ethical subjectivity

The underlying premise here is the recognition that calls for a more African-centred university, discipline, and/or epistemic culture invariably position thinking as an ethical activity. This means that beyond the mantra of decolonising this or that, one is often called upon to cultivate varying dispositions that are often given ethical significance. When universities therefore seek
to consolidate their African identity in the name of decolonisation, it is my contention that the ethical orientations underpinning this identity will become subject to contestation. That is, what this African identity authorises by leveraging decolonisation is subject to debate. This theme is important in this dissertation because it is the bedrock for the concept of epistemic citizenship and the politics of belonging which the concept anchors. Herein, particularly in Chapter 6, epistemic citizenship is deployed to unpack the inclusive and exclusive dynamics of decolonisation when seen through the idiom of Africanisation.

This section surveys some other ethical commitments authorised by Africanity in contemporary discourses on decolonisation. They include civic responsibility, (trans)disciplinarity, excellence, relevance, and a celebration of incompleteness. I discuss them below to make clear by contrast the nature of my intervention. While this dissertation is situated within a recognition of decolonisation as an ethical project, its difference lies in its inflection by the politics of belonging as an analytical framework. Contrary to debates over the varying ethical dispositions of epistemological significance authorised by Africanity, I am interested in the very contours of Africanity as a category of representation. In other words, who ought to be represented, as a matter of primacy, in the truly African university?

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Civic responsibility

To call into question the Africanness of African universities is, ethically speaking, to re-centre and interrogate the civic role of universities in Africa (Divala, 2017). This is to ask whom the university serves and privileges such that Africanness is manifested by discharging a range of civic responsibilities (Kessi, Marks, and Ramugondo, 2020). This civic role was a staple of post-independence higher education discourse, notably in the idea of the ‘development university’, which embraces the instrumentalisation of universities for national and pan-African priorities like socio-economic development, democracy, citizenship, and nation building (see Yesufu, 1973). Today, a key debate here revolves around the extent to which this development model is undermined by the neoliberal globalised higher education context in which African universities operate. That is, what is the extent to which a corporate university model undermines the development model by privileging the market and economic functions of higher education at the expense of its socio-political functions (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017)? This notwithstanding, relevance need not be tied explicitly to development objectives. In the case of Africanising philosophy, Hull gives a more open-ended account of relevance as simply
‘enlarging the set of problems addressed by philosophers, so that the discipline is of equal interest and relevance to people from all regions of the world’ (Hull, 2019c, p. 10; see also Brizuela-Garcia, 2006).

**Excellence and relevance**

This matter of the ethical relationship between universities, intellectuals, state, and society is also foregrounded by Mamdani who brings the history of intellectual decolonisation in East Africa and South Africa to bear on the contemporary South African context (Mamdani, 2016). His synthesis between the figure of the ‘public intellectual’ and ‘scholar’, governed by ethical commitments to ‘relevance’ and ‘excellence’ respectively, is a direct response to the question ‘what kind of ethical subjectivity ought to be cultivated by an African scholar?’ Utilising Walter Rodney and Ali Mazrui as examples of these respective orientations, the scholar as representative of excellence is marked by universalist aspirations which casts the university as the home of the intellectual fascinated with ideas. By contrast, the public intellectual is often partisan, ‘rooted in his time and place, and deeply engaged with the wider society’ (Mamdani, 2016, p. 72). In the post-independence historical context that is the taproot of this distinction, relevance captures the responsibility of the intellectual in consolidating the gains of nationalism by cultivating a deep intimacy with the socio-economic development aspirations of the post-colonial state.

These respective orientations were equally implicated in debates around the necessary architecture of knowledge for the *African* university, particularly around the relative ethical merits of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity. Some of the reforms included the introduction of interdisciplinary programmes in development studies, which were eventually criticised as being one-sided, favouring a technocratic approach (problem solving) to university education as opposed to producing ‘reasoning graduates’ (Kimambo, 2003, pp. 5, 7). Similar deliberations now memorialised as the ‘Mamdani Affair’ took place at UCT with the close of the 1990s and sought to institutionalise the study and teaching of Africa through an interdisciplinary core course at the undergraduate level. In the process, it raised questions around the place of South Africa in the study of Africa, questions animated by the lingering spectre of South African exceptionalism. More importantly, considering South Africa’s strongly racialised context, there was a need to reflect on the construction of Africa as an ‘area’ within a broader paradigm of difference, and the ways in which race structured how one engaged with Africa as an object of study and a source of knowledge. Critiquing the form of a proposed interdisciplinary core course on Africa at UCT, Mamdani observed a dual
Eurocentrism. On the one hand, its structure reproduced a racialised Africa, dividing the continent into North (Arab), Equatorial (Bantu) and South (White). In addition, it reproduced the notion that African Studies was the study of black Africa, thus delineating African Studies as Bantu Studies instead of a critical African Studies (Mamdani, 1998a). Interdisciplinarity was thus reminiscent of a racialised intellectual division of labour, where the disciplines studied the white experience, while interdisciplinary area studies studied native experience from the perspective of a settler observer (Mamdani, 2016, pp. 69, 75–6). The second instance of Eurocentrism regarded the syllabus content and the observation that not a single African author was prescribed. This promoted a view that Africa had no intelligentsia, which was particularly ludicrous considering the many debates in historiography and political economy, for example, that Africans had initiated (Mamdani, 1998a, 1998b).

Read through a Hegelian lens, the challenge to decolonisation within the tension between excellence and relevance is a kind of epistemological alienation. Here, I understand alienation as a deficient mode of relationality. In this case, the deficiency is one-sidedness (Jaeggi, 2014; Nyamnjoh, A., 2017). As noted earlier, relevance in the mode of interdisciplinarity can overemphasise a problem-solving approach to university education, at the expense of critical reasoning (indexed as excellence). Mamdani is also persuasive in positing that an overly strong emphasis on excellence risks being insufficiently attentive to power dynamics and the reality that the higher education landscape is influenced by resilient colonial and colonising material and symbolic interactions (Nyamnjoh, 2012a). After all, the ‘global’ is hardly a neutral space. At the same time, relevance stresses the importance of context, and rightly so. Yet life transcends politics, and a retreat into the particular risks isolation, limiting the potential of African universities as centres of global study. In the cultivation of an ethical intellectual subjectivity, therefore, decolonisation is fundamentally about bridging the gap between the public intellectual and the scholar (Mamdani, 2016; see also Brink, 2018, on convergence of relevance and excellence).

**Disciplinarity and incompleteness**
Others have also interrogated the normative relationship between decolonisation and disciplinarity as an institutional inheritance. For example, there is an attempt to foreground trans-disciplinarity as a decolonial ethic, often with varying justifications. Ratele et al. see trans-disciplinarity as a pathway to a critical African psychology, which they define as ‘… an endeavour whose objective is to harness psychological knowledge in, by, for, and with Africa,
as well as the world, but also to critically think Africa into psychology’ (Ratele et al., 2021, p. 430). Their justification for the appropriateness of this pathway is that it espouses the very epistemic pluralism that decolonisation looks to foreground, because it rejects both disciplinary decadence (Gordon, 2015) and the ‘… politics of differentiation and exclusion upon which the bordering and disciplining of knowledge depends’ (Ratele et al., 2021, p. 435).

Similarly, Francis Nyamnjoh’s (2017) notion of ‘convivial scholarship’ taps into popular African moral epistemologies of personhood based on incompleteness, which he sees as important in counteracting the introverted and exclusionary tendencies of disciplinary knowledge,

Conviviality is recognition and provision for the fact or reality of being incomplete... Not only does conviviality encourage us to recognise our own incompleteness, it challenges us to be open-minded and open-ended in our claims and articulations of identities, being and belonging. Conviviality encourages us to reach out, encounter and explore ways of enhancing or complementing ourselves with the added possibilities of potency brought our way by the incompleteness of others (human, natural, superhuman and supernatural alike), never as a ploy to becoming complete (an extravagant illusion ultimately), but to make us more efficacious in our relationships and sociality (Nyamnjoh, F., 2017, p. 256).

The notion of ‘incompleteness’ resonates with the disdain for essentialism. Positing incompleteness as a normal order of being is instructive for cultivating non-essentialist formulations of identity. One is incomplete not because one is deficient in some sense, but because of the inherent dynamic and endless possibilities of being. Such an ontological commitment emphasises identities as composite and often cobbled together, thus likely to entail plurality, fluidity, and contradiction. In other words, not only is it illusory to conceive of identities, like African, as grounded in some absolute, autonomous, enduring unity, this also obscures the reality of mutability and multiplicity inherent in any identity (see Nyamnjoh, 2019).

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The preceding are examples of ethical orientations that presumably ought to ground the intellectual identities deployed in service of a decolonised African university. They effectively
respond to the question: *what is an African identity authorised to do/be in pursuit of decolonisation?* My intervention is to inflect this question by interrogating the politics of belonging that emerge when decolonisation is seen through the lens of Africanisation. As such, I explore the *subject of decolonisation*: who is Africanisation, as an idiom of decolonisation, authorised to represent? In this regard, using the notion of epistemic citizenship in Chapter 6, I illustrate how South Africanisation and indigeneity feature as contested ethical orientations undergirding the ambivalence of the category ‘African’ on matters of language policy and academic recruitment.

### 1.6. Research Methodology and Data Collection

At a philosophical level, this project is grounded in an interpretivist epistemological orientation about what kind of knowledge of the social world is possible. Interpretivism affirms the schism between the natural and social worlds, often maintaining the inappropriateness of using principles and ideas associated with the former to understand the latter. For the interpretivist, one gains knowledge of a particular subject matter by understanding the meanings attached to it (O’Reilly, 2009; Jackson, 2010). In this regard, I am particularly interested in the understandings and meanings attached to decolonisation as an intellectual project. The term ‘attached’ should be taken in a very active sense, for interpretivists would typically maintain that humans actively make sense of the ideas they encounter—like decolonisation and Africanisation—rather than passively receive them. In this sense I was interested in what participants intended when they contextualised the relevance of decolonisation and associated terminologies like Africanisation in their teaching, learning, and research. These ideas are actively engaged in disciplinary and curriculum interrogation, where disciplines and curricula are understood as sites where knowledge is contextualised. They are equally actively engaged in official institutional spaces like working groups, specialised research hubs, university senate committees, and informal networks like reading groups.

This philosophical outlook is coupled with a qualitative research design, which is often seen as conducive for research looking to understand the meaning individuals and groups ascribe to social action and phenomena. Qualitative forms of inquiry generally favour an in-depth appreciation of the context in which meaning is forged, and thus the ways in which ‘subjective meanings are negotiated socially and historically’ (Creswell, 2014, p. 8). In this regard, a key source of data was a series of semi-structured interviews averaging 75 minutes per interview.
Between August 2019 and March 2020, 31 participants were interviewed across three universities—UCT, UWC, and SU. These were postgraduate students and academics located across various departments, mostly in the Faculty of Humanities. The majority were from UCT (24), followed by UWC (4), and SU (3). This small number, especially at the universities other than UCT, is explained by the SARS Covid-19 pandemic restrictions which presented a major challenge during my fieldwork in terms of recruiting participants, particularly academics as they adapted to the new demands of university teaching in this environment. Case in point, most of these interviews (21) were conducted between August and November 2019 in person. The rest (10) were conducted sporadically over zoom between April and December 2020. I contacted my interviewees primarily through snowballing from personal connections, as I had studied at UCT between 2011 and 2017. Furthermore, through participant observation, I was aware of various networks, such as Rethinking Economics for Africa (REFA) and the Decolonising Social Sciences reading group among others, where decolonisation was debated. Following these observations, I would get in touch with the students and academics involved. In addition, I also looked to contact scholars at these universities working on themes related to intellectual decolonisation. This was done through a google scholar search.

Regarding the interview schedule, the participants interviewed offered thick descriptions of their understanding of decolonisation and its relevance to their disciplines, teaching, and research during these interviews. Furthermore, they provided accounts of the limits of current decolonisation discourse and its institutionalisation in their universities (see Appendix).

Given the challenges of the pandemic, I decreased my reliance on interviews by drawing on multiple sources of information like the rich archive of academic and grey literature on decolonising the university generated in response to the fallist demands for a free decolonised education. These included books, journal articles (particularly special issues), government policy documents, and university faculty and committee reports. I also drew on court judgments such as those on university language policies, in addition to online and social media.

1.6.1. Case studies

The initial choice of UCT, SU, and UWC as fieldwork sites offered an important point of comparison. This is because they canvassed the varying institutional legacies of apartheid on higher education. UCT and SU are historically white English- and Afrikaans-medium universities, respectively. UWC for its part, is a historically black university. As such, initially,
these cases had the potential to observe how varying institutional histories shape how decolonisation is framed and articulated. However, given the impact of the pandemic on my fieldwork, I adapted to focus primarily on UCT and Stellenbosch to illustrate the tensions within Africanisation as a vocabulary of decolonisation. Given the very small number of people interviewed at Stellenbosch, I relied entirely on secondary sources to illustrate the contested linguistic dimensions to decolonisation.

Both sites have rich institutional histories and critical incidents on transformation that resonate with contemporary discourses on decolonisation in their attempts to define post-apartheid transformation beyond changes in the racial demography in the student and staff composition. Given the institutional history of Stellenbosch university, language has been a key site of these debates. Furthermore, it resonates with contemporary themes on belonging and institutional culture on which decolonisation is brought to bear because it highlights the tensions between transformation and the sense of precarity and alienation among Afrikaners (Brink, 2006).

At UCT, notable critical incidents include the Mamdani and CAS affair. As noted earlier, the Mamdani affair centred on critical issues around disciplinarity, pedagogical expertise, and colonial conceptions of Africa as an object of study and source of authoritative knowledge about the continent in the context of self-styling as a world-class African university (Ensor, 1998; Hall, 1998; Jansen, 1998; Mamdani, 1998b; Kamola, 2011). Incidentally, I was at the University of Cape Town on 22 August 2017 when Prof. Mamdani, at the university’s invitation, delivered a lecture on decolonising the post-colonial university in Africa. Recalling Mamdani’s resignation back in 1998, enthusiastic students at the lecture loudly called on the then vice-chancellor to offer an official apology on behalf of UCT. While this was not forthcoming, UCT’s CAS marked its celebration of Africa Day on 25 May 2018 by appointing Mamdani as honorary professor.

The CAS affair (2011) refers to the controversy around alleged plans to dis-establish the university’s Centre for African Studies (Nhlapo and Garuba, 2012). At the time, there were ongoing conversations around the creation of a new school for critical inquiry in Africa by merging the CAS with the university’s Africa Gender Studies Institute and departments of linguistics and anthropology (MacFarlane, 2011). The ensuing defence of a dedicated institutional space for teaching and research in Africa resonates with today’s discourses on
African-centredness as an idiom of decolonisation. As the Concerned CAS Students’ collective described the stakes at the time,

Our question is simple: Does post-apartheid UCT need a Centre for African Studies? As students in support of the Centre, our resounding “YES!” is obvious. We affirm our support of a uniquely multi-disciplinary department that cultivates critical intellectual work, which interrogates the study of Africa, the African Diaspora, and the global South; a department that centralises Africa and its varied, nuanced and many times disparate intellectual histories and ways of knowing in order to challenge disciplinary paradigms and the relations between power and knowledge production.3

1.7. Research Ethics

There are two key ethical considerations in this study. The first is encapsulated by the university’s ethical assessment process, including conflicts of interest and payment to research participants, of which there were none in this study. In addition, all research participants gave informed consent prior to being interviewed, and all except one has been anonymised in the dissertation. This is done with their consent, because they are discussed in reference to their scholarly work in the public domain. I have also taken care to meet data security obligations for all research materials.4 When participants are cited, they are referenced by a code that contains their pseudonym, university, faculty, and year in which the interview was conducted. Some debates I discuss took place internally via private email communication at UCT. These form a core part of the data analysed in Chapter 6, and consent was obtained from the author who also consented to being named.

At the same time, the university’s rather bureaucratic ethical procedures are inadequate because they tend to obscure the realities of power and exploitation that typically combine to constitute research as a conventionally extractive enterprise. This is linked to a broader ethical question of whom this study is for and whose interests it serves. At this level, the ethical considerations grounding my research approach began before my doctoral studies. In preparation for my time

3 https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/does-post-apartheid-uct-need-centre-african-studies
4 UK’s Data Protection Act (1998) and South Africa’s Protection of Personal Information Act (2013)
at Cambridge, I co-authored a methodological paper that drew on the possibilities for research as a freedom-enhancing endeavour. We distinguished interactive, participatory, and emancipatory approaches to research along a continuum of ownership of the research process (Swartz and Nyamnjoh, 2018). Herein, emancipatory research had the most radical potential, obliterating the gap between researcher and research participants by relinquishing ownership typical of mainstream research. Collectively, these approaches all belong to a broad family of critical qualitative research with a social justice orientation that typically emphasise mutual learning and a collaborative relationship between researcher and research participants, a theme usually echoed by decolonial methodologies (Freire, 1996; Smith, 2012). As one moves from interactive to emancipatory research, this collaboration intensifies. Key aspects of the research process—problem definition, research design, data collection and analysis, impact evaluation—are led by the participants recasting the researcher in a facilitative role. This level of inclusion, it is assumed, pays validity, practicality, empowerment, and sustainability dividends.

Unsurprisingly the opportunities for such extensive collaboration in a Ph.D. are limited, given its structures and requirements, particularly its individualised nature. This notwithstanding, the emphasis on collaboration points to a normative account in which research ought to embrace an ‘intentional ethic of reciprocation’ (Swartz, 2011; Swartz and Nyamnjoh, 2018). As such, I incorporated multiple opportunities for ‘giving back’ to make the research process valuable for my interlocutors.

In cultivating a general orientation towards mutual learning, I drew on active interviewing, that is, non-neutrality and mutual self-disclosure as an interactional practice during the interviews (Gubrium and Holstein, 2003). While I strived to be neutral in the general sense of avoiding leading questions, I often intervened to offer my own thoughts, experiences, and counter-arguments on some of the claims and insights made by participants. There are diverse approaches to neutrality in qualitative research. On some accounts, it is an essential practice that guards against undue bias and data contamination. On other accounts, neutrality undermines the possibilities for deep disclosure by maintaining a hierarchical relationship between the interviewer and interviewee by constructing the latter as research object (Rapley, 2004). Intuitively, the ethic of collaboration and mutual learning espoused in this project is at odds with conventional understandings of neutrality. In this project, I am persuaded by the view that neutrality is a misguided practice. In theory, one can abstain from countering
arguments or offering one’s own experience during an interview. In practice however, one is always active, exercising overarching control in the final analysis. This was very clear in my own experience of the interview process. Through my silences, tokenistic ‘OKs’ and questions, it was I who decided what aspects of the participant’s response need to be followed up on. The idea of contaminating knowledge presupposes it exists in some pure form outside the interview in which it is produced (Gubrium and Holstein, 2002). As Rapley explains (2004, p.20),

> From this perspective, the binary of ‘neutrality/mutual self-disclosure’ no longer holds. They are no longer polar opposites, but just part of the range of interactional practices that interviewers can, and do, draw on. You do not have to worry if ‘that question was far too leading’ or wonder whether ‘If I'd been more open about my actual feelings on the topic he would have shared a different side of himself.’ Just get on with interacting with that specific person. Try and explore their thoughts, ideas and experiences on the specific topic and, if you feel it is relevant, offer your thoughts, ideas and experiences for comparison. When it comes to analysing the interviews, you should analyse what actually happened – how your interaction produced that trajectory of talk and how specific versions of reality are co-constructed.

Drawing on this constructionist approach to interviewing I went beyond simply asking participants to ‘say more’ or clarify certain arguments when eliciting responses to my questions. I probed on the perceived limits of their claims and insights, thereby providing a space for mutual influence on our respective views and thus reciprocal learning.

While there were limited avenues to include participants in the definition of the problem and core issues at stake in contemporary discourses of decolonisation and their associated vocabularies like Africanisation, all interviews concluded with the question ‘Is there anything you’d like to add or wish that I had asked you?’ Participants generally felt that the interview schedule was comprehensive and expressed interest in reading the end-product. Of course, there is at least some temptation to cynically dismiss this as a conventional politeness on their part.

Upon request, I provided participants with transcripts of our conversation. Some requested the transcripts during the interview as some lines of questioning helped them clarify their own thoughts or got them to probe further on certain issues to which they had not given much
thought. This was generally part of a member-checking strategy which is often seen as a quality control process used by the researcher to improve the accuracy, credibility, and validity of the recorded interview (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Byrne, 2001; Creswell, 2007). In addition to these dividends, I also adopted this practice to diminish power-differentials between the researcher and research participant to affirm the research as a collaborative, participatory endeavour (Swartz and Nyamnjoh, 2018). It involves research participants ‘checking’ whether they have been accurately represented, and the significance I attached to their utterances. During the interview, often after a particularly long and staggered response, I would occasionally restate and summarise the information and then question the participant to determine its accuracy. After the interview, I sent transcripts and memos, seeking participant verification, feedback, and validation (Morse et al., 2002; Rager, 2005).

Another example of mutual learning and reciprocation regards the mutual exchange of literature. This was especially helpful when I interviewed participants in disciplines outside my field of expertise. Some participants with expertise in archaeology, health sciences, and linguistics recommended writings relevant to decolonisation in these fields. There were a few cases where I recommended literature to graduate students working on a similar topic.

Finally, noting that one of the spaces where I recruited participants was a Southern theory reading group at UCT, I continued to participate in this group even after completing my fieldwork and I am presently a member. One of its members invited me to present my project at the university’s Centre for Social Science Research where they worked. After my presentation, a graduate student in the health sciences expressed interest in my work and offered to be interviewed, thus exemplifying a methodological reciprocation.

1.8. Structure of the Dissertation

Over the course of seven chapters, I assess the possible limits the demand for decolonised university encounters when analysed in the idiom of Africanisation. Chapter 2 assembles citizenship, belonging, and epistemic injustice into a conceptual framework. These concepts are used to account for both the emergence of decolonisation as a demand of student movements and the perceived limits of Africanisation as a framework for decolonisation. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the basic themes that characterise Africanisation as an idiom
of decolonisation. Illustrated with debates in African history post-independence and pre-RMF transformation discourses in South African higher education, I discuss counter-hegemony, autonomous African identity, and critical African scholarship as key concerns of Africanisation. In Chapter 4, I contend that issues of citizenship and belonging constituted the bedrock of calls for the decolonisation of universities in South Africa. Connecting citizenship to a ‘felt sense of belonging’, the demand for decolonisation intervened to illuminate and disrupt unequal citizenship in the university and the country more generally. In critiquing South African universities as colonial in their institutional form, students used decolonisation to contest unjust regimes of inclusion and exclusion—largely anchored on race—seen as continuous with colonial-apartheid histories. Chapter 5 reflects on the post-fallist context, considering how decolonisation is understood and contextualised in various disciplines as spaces of teaching, learning, and research. Often emphasising themes of African-centredness, I survey the kind of critiques being made at disciplinary and institutional levels, and how decolonisation is foregrounded with processes of continuous curriculum renewal. More importantly, I consider the debates and disagreements that decolonisation has occasioned in terms of the contestation over its meaning and entailments. This discussion is grounded in my fieldwork at the University of Cape Town, in conjunction with an analysis of university records of institutional engagement on this topic. In Chapter 6, I develop the concept of epistemic citizenship to show how the debate in South Africa illustrates the tensions within Africanisation as a grammar of decolonisation. First, I draw back on elements in Chapter 5 to illustrate aspirations to an inclusive epistemic citizenship on the one hand. On the other hand, I show how key flashpoints in the articulation of decolonisation—such as recruitment and language policy—raise key issues of representation in relation to the Africanisation paradigm. Illustrated by dynamics at UCT and Stellenbosch, I contend that the idiom of Africanisation raises difficult questions about the African for whom representation is sought and who can successfully claim Africanity. The chapter thus explores the social relations of decolonisation as an epistemic project, and thus its perceived exclusions along configurations of race, nation, and indigeneity. Chapter 7 concludes by offering a summation of my core argument, its relevance and the opportunities for further research encountered while conducting this research.
Chapter 2

Conceptual Framework

This chapter weaves epistemic injustice, citizenship, and belonging into a single conceptual framework. Together, these concepts are relevant to the primary and secondary objectives of this dissertation. In the case of the latter, I will argue in Chapter 4 that citizenship and belonging can serve a master framework to explain the emergence and significance of decolonisation as grammar of deep change in South African higher education. On this note, experiences of epistemic injustice are integral to the perception of an exclusionary institutional and epistemic culture. In terms of the primary objective of this dissertation, it is worth noting that citizenship, as expressed through the dominant imaginary of the nation-state, is a key context within which calls for decolonisation are articulated. As such, it is important to note that the university in Africa has often been a key institution in the construction of national citizenship. This ties to an expectation that existing registers of citizenship invariably shape discourses of decolonisation, particularly the subject of decolonisation as a primary interest in the idiom of Africanisation. Put simply, nationalism invariably shapes the contours of Africanity. Furthermore, as an analytical frame, the politics of belonging highlights the subject of decolonisation as a contested phenomenon and therefore relevant to politico-ethical matter of ascertaining the African for whom representation is sought.

2.1. Citizenship and Belonging

Citizenship often denotes rights-based political membership. A key aspect of this political belonging is *claim-making* because, in practice, asserting one’s belonging to a particular community creates possibilities for making claims on that unit and thus shaping the flow of resources to persons and social groups. As such, Frederick Cooper defines citizenship not simply as a practice of claim-making, but equally as a right to claim rights (Cooper, 2018). While citizenship is a form of belonging, not all kinds of belonging amount to citizenship. Notably, as a form of claim-making, citizenship is different from other forms of belonging like subjecthood and kinship. In noting this, I am sensitive to the maligned tendency to equate
belonging with citizenship (Antonsich, 2010b). The language of rights often dominates the grammar of citizenship, such that ‘citizens’ tend to be qualitatively distinguishable from ‘non-citizens’ by their possession of a range of rights and/or obligations vis-à-vis a particular political community. This is one possible limitation of my use of citizenship, in that framing claims in the language of rights was notably absent in student discourses on decolonisation in South Africa. If anything, as I observe in Chapter 4, South Africa’s liberal constitutionalist rights regime was under sustained critique, even if this critique did not entail an explicit departure from the salience of rights discourse (Ahmed, 2018). However, although students demanding decolonisation did not phrase their demands in the language of rights, I have argued elsewhere that decolonisation can be interpreted as a right to academic freedom, extending a concept typically applied to a professoriate to students as well (Nyamnjoh and Luescher, 2022, forthcoming).

Citizenship discourses are so ubiquitous that we tend to assume that everyone belongs somewhere. This is built upon another more fundamental assumption that the nation-state constitutes the primary locus of belonging. Within this framework, citizenship has vertical (a tie between states and citizens) and horizontal (citizens are connected to other citizens) dimensions (Cooper, 2018). This primacy of the nation-state, often called methodological nationalism, has and is being destabilised in historical and contemporary analysis (Cooper, 2012, 2016; Wilder, 2015). Global politics (international law, mass migration, global dimensions of commerce, etc.) is increasingly characterised by a disillusionment with the nation-state as a framework to protect the rights of citizens or accommodate the nuanced phenomenon of belonging. Evidently, concepts such as flexible (Ong, 1999; Nyamnjoh, 2006, 2007), post-national (Soysal, 1994; Sassen, 2009), cosmopolitan (Benhabib, 2004, 2005; Held, 2010), and imperial citizenship (Cooper, 2016, 2018) bear testament to this assessment by suggesting that citizenship and belonging have a much longer history and potential than the nation-state. Moreover, critical traditions such as feminism and postcolonial criticism expose the nation-state as a site of mutually reinforcing contradictions between horizontal (citizenship) and vertical (e.g., race, class, gender, ethnicity, etc.) relationships. Scholarship on citizenship in Africa often highlights the tension between local, ethnic, and participatory conceptions and practices of belonging and alternative national, trans-ethnic, and transnational understandings and practices (Ekeh, 1975; Mamdani, 1996; Halisi, 1997; Neocosmos, 2010; Cooper, 2012; Aminzade, 2013; Hunter, 2016). From a global perspective, therefore, key debates on citizenship have involved questions not only around the nature of political community (i.e., the
locus of citizenship), but also the relationship between citizens and political community (i.e., varying emphases on rights and participation).

These conceptual debates notwithstanding, citizenship, particularly the normativity of the nation-state inflects contemporary debates on the decolonisation of the university. Decolonisation is rarely articulated in a vacuum. Noting this, the nation-state is an example of the already existing framework within which decolonisation is articulated as a politico-epistemic project (i.e., facticity). Therefore, the idiom of Africanisation and its broad philosophy of African nationalism raise questions around the contours of Africanity, particularly the ways in which the subject of decolonisation is articulated through national configurations. Recalling the question of what is authorised in the name of Africanity, I show later in this dissertation that Africanisation-as-South Africanisation remains a contested understanding of decolonisation (Chapter 6). Furthermore, as language debates illustrate, even if national identity delineates the authentic subject of decolonisation, there are still internal hierarchies of a racialised nature. Put simply, as the language debate on Afrikaans shows, not all South Africans feel included in the drive for a decolonised African university.

In Chapter 4, I also use citizenship and belonging as a framework to explain the emergence of decolonisation as framework for deep level change in South African higher education. Put simply decolonisation is emerged as a tool to expose and disrupt unequal citizenship. In critiquing South African universities as colonial in their institutional form, decolonisation is used to contest unjust regimes of inclusion and exclusion—largely anchored on race—seen as continuous with colonial-apartheid histories.

2.1.1. Belonging and the politics of belonging
Yuval-Davis distinguishes between belonging and the politics of belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2011). Belonging is linked to citizenship-as-identity and solidarity, foregrounding the felt aspects of community membership. A felt sense of belonging is an emotional attachment analogous to feeling at home whereby ‘home’ conjures familiarity, comfort, and security (hooks, 2009) Without diminishing the reality that homes are often sites of violence for some, Michael Ignatieff describes this aspect of belonging in terms of protection from violence: ‘[w]here you belong is where you are safe; and where you are safe is where you belong’ (Ignatieff, 1994, p. 25). Discussing ‘place-belongingness’ (i.e., attachment to a place), Marco Antonsich identifies several constitutive factors of belonging. These are autobiographical
(personal experiences, relations, and memories), relational (relationships: personal and social ties), cultural factors (e.g., language, faith), economic factors (safe and stable material condition), and legal factors (Antonsich, 2010a). Place belonging conjures up helpful images of rootedness. This imagery can be applied to both students and universities. Decolonising the university is both about whether universities are rooted in Africa and whether their institutional and epistemic cultures enhance or undermine a felt sense of belonging. Illustrations of this dual sense of belonging are evident in Chapters 4 and 5 which together illustrate some of the critiques made by students and academics of South African universities as colonial in their institutional form.

There is another aspect of belonging that constitutes the critical dimension to the question of Africanisation as an idiom of decolonisation. Yuval-Davis identifies several analytical dimensions to the study of belonging. Belonging can be a matter of social location whereby membership maps onto socio-economic locations in various historically specific configurations of power. Belonging is equally about identification and attachment, which captures the narrative, performative, and dialogical aspects of identity formation. Furthermore, social location, collective identity, and attachments can be assessed and valued in different ways. As such, one can also interrogate the ethico-political evaluative values and symbols used in these assessments and valuations. (Yuval-Davis, 2011) It is this transition to the ethico-political that puts one squarely in the domain of the ‘politics of belonging’, which refers to the ‘… specific political projects aimed at constructing belonging to particular collectivity/ies which are themselves being constructed in these projects in very specific ways and in very specific boundaries’ (Yuval-Davis, 2011, p. 10). It describes discourses and practices of socio-spatial inclusion/exclusion, and can be seen as the (often dirty) work of creating, maintaining, and disrupting boundaries of belonging (Crowley, 1999; Englund and Nyamnjoh, 2004; Adebanwi, 2009; Geschiere, 2009). It is this aspect that reflects my interest in the subject of decolonisation, that is, the African for whom representation is sought.

2.2. Nationalism, Citizenship, and Higher Education

This section considers how universities in Africa have often been key institutions in the construction of national citizenship. Universities are generally acknowledged as powerful influences, shaping relationships that individuals share with each other and their communities.
This capacity is often recognised in relation to broader questions about the roles and obligations of universities in relation to their societies. In this sense, higher education is often a key site of citizenship and citizenship education with the potential for political, economic, and ethical dividends (Nussbaum, 2002; Arthur and Bohlin, 2005; Haigh, 2008; Luescher-Mamashela, 2011; Luescher-Mamashela and Mugume, 2014; Davids and Waghid, 2016; Waghid and Davids, 2018).

African nationalism has been a profound historical influence on the growth universities in Africa and their envisioned role in society, shaping both citizenship and citizenship education in the process. This link between universities and nationalism can be illustrated at two levels: (a) the creation and expansion of higher education in Africa; and (b) the role of nationalism in defining and constraining the intellectual agenda of higher education. In both instances, there are clear implications for conceptions of citizenship and belonging.

Historically, in British colonial Africa for example, higher education was a key platform for nationalist demands which, until the 1940s, were largely resisted by the colonial administration. Some of the earliest demands include the call for the creation of a West African University during the colonial period in the latter half of the 19th century. While African nationalists were united in this demand, they tended to differ in terms of their visions for the nature and character of the African university. On the one hand, African nationalists like James Africanus Horton argued for a wholesale transplantation of European universities, with very little accommodation of African languages, history, and culture. By contrast, Edward Bylden and J. E. Casely Hayford saw the university in Pan-Africanist terms, as instrumental in the promotion and preservation of African identity, which they discussed through core ideas of ‘African personality’ and ‘African nationality’, respectively. In common, they saw the intellectualisation of African languages, history, art, culture, and oral traditions as areas of major scholarly concern in the envisioned university (Ashby, 1964, pp. 12–14). The arguments of Blyden and Horton have noteworthy implications at the intersection of Africanity and citizenship. The good citizen was one who successfully retained their Africanity by resisting the prevailing pressures of assimilation and westernisation. Here, higher education assumed a culturally nationalist mandate.

As nationalist pressure influenced a general shift in colonial policy towards development and devolution, the demand for higher education would regain some initiative in the 1930s and 40s.
This shift in policy aligned with the interests and aspirations of African nationalists looking to forge a reality in which educated Africans would participate in self-governance. In this sense, access to higher education was pivotal to Africanisation (indigenisation) of the civil service and thus the de-racialisation of citizenship political rights in the colonies. This expectation also influenced the substance of demands, particularly the issue of standards. African nationalists were insistent that these universities be of the same standard as first-class British universities. In today’s discourses around decolonising the university, this mimetism would likely be scorned as Eurocentric. However, because higher education was tied to prospects of self-government, this demand was in effect a critique of the efforts at post-primary education made by colonial administrators. These provisions tended to be seen as inferior alternatives to higher education, offering qualifications that only had local currency, thereby fuelling the perception that the lack of university education would constitute a basis for continued discrimination. As such, it is interesting to note in relation to today’s context that, during this period, the idea of ‘adapting universities to African conditions’ was met with some scepticism among African nationalists who suspected that this was an attempt to further institutionalise their exclusion from self-government (Ajayi, Goma, and Johnson, 1996; Falola, 2003).

Nonetheless, there was still some expectation that these universities would not be lifeless imitations of British universities and would be African in spirit (Ajayi, Goma, and Johnson, 1996, p. 52). These pressures—for a ‘first class West African university’—were addressed by the Asquith and Elliot commissions established in 1943 to investigate the potential for higher education in the British empire and British West Africa generally. The latter commission resulted in the creation of the colonial university colleges in Ghana (1948), Nigeria (1948), and Sudan (1949). The De la Warr commission of 1937 recommended the establishment of a university college at Makerere, which was established as such in 1949. These universities conferred degrees through the University of London under a special relationship scheme.

To further illustrate the link between nationalism and higher education beyond the initial creation of university colleges during this colonial period, it was worth noting the extent to which the demand for universities was entangled in the actualisation of both territorial and supranational identities. For example, in line with British intentions to decolonise East Africa as a community, Makerere was initially intended as an inter-territorial college providing a common service (higher education) in East Africa. This followed the established pattern of the inter-territorial provision of services administered through supranational institutions (Kithinji,
This federal architecture was initially embraced by East Africans on account of a perceived shared colonial experience, Pan-Africanist ideology, and political language (Southall, 1974). At the same time however, European settlers in Kenya reacted negatively to the perceived liberal education provided by Makerere, maintaining that it contributed to moral degeneration for Africans. Instead, they expressed a preference for vocation (technical) education. Within the racially segregated context in East Africa, Indians saw Makerere as an African institution and established the Ghandi Academy for Arts, Science and Commerce. European and Indian interests coalesced in the formation of the Royal Technical College (RTC) in 1951, which offered subjects in technology, economics, and commerce in contrast to Makerere’s emphasis on basic Arts, Science, and Medicine. Nonetheless, the RTC functioned as an inter-territorial college. The idea of inter-territoriality was further consolidated through the Carr-Saunders and Lockwood working parties in 1955 and 1958, respectively (Kithinji, 2012). The former recommended the development of Makerere, Nairobi, and Dar-es-Salaam as three federally co-ordinated university colleges of East Africa sharing responsibility for different faculties through specialisation (Ajayi, Goma, and Johnson, 1996, p. 59). The latter elevated the RTC, renamed Royal College, into the second inter-territorial university college and founded the University College, Dar es Salaam, in 1961 following pressure in Tanganyika for the immediate establishment of a university college there. Despite territorial demands for their own universities, African nationalists positively received plans for a supranational university while nonetheless advocating for territorial independence, envisioning the UEA as instrumental in the cultivation of a Pan-African consciousness. The 1958 Lockwood report recommending the association of these East African colleges into a single regional university materialised in June 1963, birthing the University of East Africa which also ended the special relationship these individual institutions had as affiliate colleges of the University of London. However, this regionalism failed to survive the politics of post-independence. proving incompatible with ‘… the ideals of national sovereignty as the post-independence governments in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania embarked on achieving their own individual social, political and economic priorities. The regional university arrangement was undermined by the fact that East Africa had gained independence not as a single federal state but, rather, as disparate sovereign states with distinct and at times competing national priorities and interests’. (Kithinji, 2012, p. 211).

The actualisation of territorial (national) identities is also observable in British West Africa and the rejection of plans for a single West African university (Livsey, 2016). The Elliot
commission produced two conflicting reports in response to demands for higher education. While the majority report recommended the formation of university colleges in Ibadan (Nigeria) and Achimota (Ghana), and the modernisation of Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone, the commission’s minority report favoured the establishment of a single West African university college at Ibadan, supported by the creation of satellite territorial colleges with extramural functions in Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone. In Ghana (Gold Coast), nationalist opinion shifted, initially supporting the minority report but eventually settling on the recommendations of the majority report. Gold Coast nationalists initially thought the university would be located in Achimota and moved to support the majority report when they learned the university would be based in Ibadan. While the colonial office initially supported the minority report, it would bow to nationalist pressure, adopting the majority report by March 1947 (Emudong, 1997, pp. 143–44; Falola, 2003).

Although these colonial university colleges (Asquith colleges) did respond to demands by Africans, they were nonetheless foreign implantations in that they were based on the model of British civic universities as underpinned by a British philosophy of education. Eric Ashby summarises the core characteristics of these exports, noting that: ‘In Constitution they were autonomous, deliberately detached from the State. In Standards and curriculum, they emphasised the thin stream of excellence and the narrow specialism. In social function they regarded themselves as restricted to an elite’ (Ashby, 1964, pp. 11–12). In the post-independence era, these features of the university would come under attack as nationalism became an ideology of higher education. In this regard, universities were expected to further the ends of national consciousness—development, nation-building, and freedom from foreign domination.

Keen to assert universities as symbols of national independence, the nationalist governments jettisoned the affiliation of these colleges to metropolitan universities, thereby establishing them as autonomous degree-granting institutions. It was generally felt that universities should be controlled by the government as this would contribute to national unity. However, this would later bring national identity and academic freedom into conflict as post-independence countries took an authoritarian turn (Mamdani and Diouf, 1994; Mkandawire, 2005). In line with a policy of Africanisation in which universities would contribute to the nation’s manpower development needs, nationalist governments departed from the elitist philosophy of education that underpinned the creation of universities in Africa. In British colonies, this elitism is evident.
in the residential nature of universities which burdened these institutions with the cost of providing essential and municipal services to academics, administrators, and students. Expansion was thus often costly, leading to inevitable complaints about the slow pace of Africanisation (Ashby, 1964). Nationalist governments therefore generally expanded higher education by both increasing student intake and creating new universities (Ajayi, Goma, and Johnson, 1996).

National independence entailed both the Africanisation of the university staff and the curriculum renewal. The curriculum was criticised as colonial because it was externally controlled and because it had not been adapted to local needs. At the time, this referred to a narrow curriculum and nationally relevant courses that were in short supply or altogether absent, such as engineering, law, banking, and applied and social sciences. Furthermore, nationalism shaped the intellectual agenda through an emphasis on national relevance in ways that would both enhance and constrain intellectual life. On the one hand, it foregrounded, of interdisciplinary African Studies and Development Studies, the operationalisation of Africanisation as adaptation to local imperatives. More importantly, it grounded the role of the African intellectual in a conception of responsible citizenship that entailed accepting a social responsibility to contribute towards national development and emphasised clearly in the idea of the ‘development university’ (Yesufu, 1973; Ki-Zerbo, 2005; Mamdani, 2016). At the same time, it also constrained intellectual life. An equivalence came to be drawn between the state, nation, and development, such that national identity spelled trouble for institutional autonomy and scholarly freedom through political censorship. Equally, while the emphasis on national relevance rehabilitated Africanity as an epistemological category (see the example of nationalist historiography in African history, Chapter 3), the premium on national unity as a homogenising discourse elided over the differences constitutive of Africanity and so resulted in epistemological blind spot towards other social concerns such as gender studies (Mama, 2005; Zeleza, 2005)

African nationalism also struck a Pan-Africanist register at the confluence of citizenship and higher education evident in the kind of student and scholarship universities sought to foreground. At its founding conference, for example, the Association of African Universities, defined the role of higher education in Africa as a commitment to ‘ensure the unification of Africa, to encourage elucidation and appreciation of African culture and heritage, and to dispel misconceptions of Africa through research and teaching of African studies; and to evolve over
the years a truly African institution of higher learning dedicated to Africa and its people, yet promoting a bond of kinship to the larger human society’ (UNESCO, 1963, cited in Ajayi, Goma, and Johnson, 1996, p. 98).

2.2.1 Relevance of citizenship and belonging to this study

In this dissertation, I treat universities as the targets of claim making around citizenship and belonging in the demand for a decolonised African university. That is, I examine decolonisation as a discursive tool used to make claims about belonging in the university context specifically, and more generally about the limitations of existing registers of belonging. I employ this lens to discuss how issues of belonging inflect two aspects of this demand for decolonisation: (a) the emergence of decolonisation talk in higher education; and (b) the subject of decolonisation. In the case of the former, Chapter 4 explores the emergence of decolonisation as a response to historical and contemporary experiences of unequal citizenship in the university and South African society more generally. Regarding the subject of decolonisation, I explore the politics of belonging internal to the category African. That is, who is the African for whom representation is sought in the decolonised African university?

In showing the link between nationalism and higher education historically, I have considered how nationalism has shaped the contours of citizenship in higher education in Africa. My discussion about the subject of decolonisation is situated within this theme. If the preceding shows how nationalism and higher education are historically entwined, notably in the post-independence period, I endeavour to show what issues and debates are raised by the afterlives of African nationalism in the current demand for an African-centred university. These include, as discussed in Chapter 6, the challenge of forging of conception of Africanness that resists enclosure within various configurations of race and nation. Furthermore, I consider how debates at two South African universities illustrate the perception that decolonisation is unfolding along narrow configurations of Africanness along ever diminishing circles of inclusion. This discussion will therefore strike a chord with a broader history in which nationalism, as an ideology of higher education, is both enabling and threatening.
2.3. Epistemic Injustice

Epistemic injustice is a diagnostic concept that brings together diverse fields of inquiry such as critical race theory, postcolonialism, feminism, political philosophy, and ethics. By focusing on injustice rather than justice as a point of departure, it emphasises the ubiquity of injustice, observing the former and not latter as the norm in societies (Fricker, 2007). The concept marks out a distinctly epistemic dimension to social relations of domination and oppression. In this regard, it captures ‘… a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as knower’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 1). There are different ways in which epistemic injustice conceptually aids an analysis of the discursive operation of ‘decolonisation’ as an epistemic emancipatory project. I illustrate its thematic, methodological, and practical utility in relation to concerns such as ‘decolonising African studies’ by which I simply mean the disciplinary and interdisciplinary study of Africa; and ‘decolonising South African universities’.

Firstly, epistemic injustice foregrounds the co-constitutive relationality of knowledge, power, and identity, in addition to their discriminatory effects, and thus provides a language to articulate the problem of decolonisation. In so doing, it provides a framework to describe the set of issues that necessitate decolonial attention. Colonialism and structures of domination more generally often involve the mobilisation of knowledge as a mode of power (Said, 1978, 1993; Chinweizu, 1987; wa Thiongò, 1994; Wiredu, 1998). Knowledge and discourse are thus terrains in which the afterlives of colonial power persist. Anchored in the aforementioned themes, epistemic injustice provides a vocabulary with which to ask critical questions about the ‘subject of knowledge’ (Tuana, 2017) such as,

Who has voice and who doesn’t? Are voices interacting with equal agency and power? In whose terms are they communicating? Who is being understood and who isn’t (and at what cost)? Who is being believed? And who is even being acknowledged and engaged with? Epistemic injustice refers to those forms of unfair treatment that relate to issues of knowledge, understanding, and participation in communicative practices (Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus, 2017, p. 1).

Miranda Fricker, for example, distinguishes between testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. The former has an interpersonal flavour, referring to situations in which prejudice, on account of one’s social position, results in unfair distributions in credibility and authority, positing
credibility deficits and excesses as forms of discrimination. While testimonial injustice is primarily theorised as interpersonal, it can also be systemic when it is patterned into the fabric of institutions such that they exclude without a distinctly conscious decision by someone to do so. In relation to a subject matter like the decolonisation of African studies, testimonial injustice, whether interpersonal or patterned, foregrounds questions such as ‘who can produce authoritative knowledge about Africa?’ For example, in genealogies of African studies, it has been historically common to trace its origins of institutionalised area studies as part of US national security imperatives during the cold war. However, this is a historical erasure of the role of historically black universities and the diverse set of interests, often emancipatory, that motivated the professionalised study of Africa (Amofo, 2016; Allman, 2019). Another example, in relation to calls for decolonising South African universities, can involve an architecture of teaching and learning (curriculum-pedagogy interface), that constructs some knowers (black) as deficient in the design of degree and disciplinary programmes or in the social dynamics that characterise interpersonal communication within the classroom, even if such an architecture is the result of well-meaning efforts to attend to the unjust educational legacies of the apartheid past (Morreira, 2017a). In both instances, epistemic injustice would be conceptually relevant in unpacking the historically evolving relations between identity (race, class, nation, geography, gender, etc.) and knowledge, and the ways in which power is inscribed in these circuits and results in experiences of alienation and marginality.

The harms constitutive of epistemic injustice, generally termed ‘epistemic violence’ (Dotson, 2011a), include,

- exclusion and silencing; invisibility and inaudibility (or distorted presence or representation); having one’s meanings or contributions systematically distorted, misheard, or misrepresented; having diminished status or standing in communicative practices; unfair differentials in authority and/or epistemic agency; being unfairly distrusted; receiving no or minimal uptake; being co-opted or instrumentalized; being marginalized as a result of dysfunctional dynamics (Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus, 2017, p. 1).

Beyond harms to individuals and groups in their capacity as knowers, epistemic injustice equally catalogues the way systems of thought and cultural practices are related to one another and situated in hierarchies of worth, attention, and significance. As such, it is equally
productive in interrogating Africa as a source of knowledge in discourses of decolonisation in South African universities. Discriminatory distributions of credibility and legitimacy not only raise questions about the subject with capacity to produce authoritative knowledge about Africa, but equally foreground questions such as ‘what kind of knowledge comes from Africa’. For example, in the elaboration of epistemic injustice in settings like development aid, the asymmetry between local and ‘international’ experts suggests that the local is often seen as deficient and in need of external refinery (Koch, 2020). Development and peacebuilding practices have been likened to a civilising mission, and hence notions like ‘local ownership’ have emerged as a cardinal virtues meant to contest the construction of development spaces as epistemological blank slates (Chandler, 2002; Paris, 2002; Ginty and Richmond, 2013). Another example is in the intellectual project ‘Southern theory’. Among its key claims, it postulates an unequal intellectual division of labour in which theory is produced in the Global North while the Global South is relegated to banal empiricism (Connell, 2007b) As such, the push here would be to establish Africa as a legitimate base upon which theory, as a distinct form of knowledge in contrast to pure description, can be produced (i.e., Africa as a discursive locus of enunciation for global theorising) (Hountondji, 1990a, 1997b; Connell, 2007b; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017).

In contrast to testimonial injustice which is largely interpersonal, another important form is hermeneutical injustice, which refers to ‘the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 155). In this regard, it is necessarily structural, prevailing when a society lacks the interpretive resources to make sense of a speaker’s experience because members of a social group have been prejudicially marginalised in meaning-making activities (Fricker, 2007; Anderson, 2012). Noting this, hermeneutical injustice hampers the ‘ability to utilize persuasively shared epistemic resources within a given epistemic community in order to participate in knowledge production and, if required, the revision of those same resources’ (Dotson, 2012, p. 24).

For example, Hull argues that the Black Consciousness Movement’s (BCM) theorisation of ‘spiritual poverty’ as an effect of apartheid is a diagnosis of hermeneutical injustice (Hull, 2017a). This is significant to the extent that contemporary discourses of decolonisation in South Africa draw on the BCM tradition. Exploring key themes within the idea of Africanisation in Chapter 3, the drive to make X more African can effectively be seen as a response to
hermeneutical injustice. In the context of the discipline of history as an interpretive resource for example, colonial/imperial historiography obscured a collective understanding of African pasts on account of racist-imperial ideologies. To make African history more African, a philosophy of African nationalism was initially adopted, and nationalist historians emphasised African agency and initiative in their efforts to rehabilitate the continent’s historicity (Ranger, 1968). As a response to hermeneutical injustice, African historiographical traditions like nationalist historiography sought to assert African pasts as scientifically intelligible and communicable. It sought to destabilise a sense of dissonance—that is, a mismatch between one’s history and the hermeneutical resources available to make sense of historical experience—cultivated by colonial historiography. The significance being that, in relation to the then unfolding collective experience of decolonisation in the 1960s and 70s (in all its dimensions), an incomplete command of one’s historical/cultural repertoire undergirded by an education affirming Eurocentrism was unlikely to help Africans, in their assertion of agency, regaining of initiative, and consolidation of autonomy in a global order predicated on asymmetrical integration.

2.4. On the Overarching Coherence of these Frameworks

Citizenship, belonging, and epistemic injustice are lenses through which to engage both the emergence of decolonisation as a critical discourse in South African higher education in terms of an epistemological critique of South African universities as colonial in their institutional form. In addition, the grammar of citizenship provides an avenue into the politics of belonging undergirding Africanisation as an idiom of decolonisation. It is a lens through which one can observe the perceived limits of making universities more African in terms of the subject this includes and excludes. Beyond contributing to these respective themes, they have an overarching conceptual coherence in the ways they contribute to overlapping analyses. Epistemic injustice is a causal component of experiences of unequal citizenship and non-belonging that undergirds calls for a truly African university as illustrated in Chapter 4. In addition, responses to epistemic injustice like Africanisation have citizenship implications in terms of who is recognised as the subject for whom decolonial representation is sought. This discussion is carried out by developing a notion of epistemic citizenship, which I discuss in Chapter 6.
In this chapter, I consider a few themes that usually typify the use of Africanisation as a vocabulary of intellectual decolonisation. If I oscillate between ‘Africanisation’ and ‘the idea of Africanisation’, it is because, although some may not use the term Africanisation, they may nonetheless be invested, often quite explicitly, in a process of making something more African, and/or with the qualitative nature of Africanity, thereby calling into the question the presence or absence of Africanness, for example, in the production of knowledge on and about Africa or the epistemological culture of universities in Africa. As such, other notions like African-centredness and even African Renaissance are nominally synonymous or enjoy a close affinity with Africanisation. In the discipline of history for example, one may not always find the term Africanisation but might see a preoccupation with an autonomous African philosophy of history or with inscribing the African factor in African history (Ranger, 1968; Temu and Swai, 1981; Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; Ogot, 2009). What might it mean to make X—whether a university, curriculum, disciplinary tradition, or knowledge from and about Africa more African? I consider several themes that have historically characterised the decolonisation-as-Africanisation paradigm in higher education and intellectual life. I argue that Africanisation is a counter-hegemonic discourse that foregrounds both a desire for an autonomous African identity and critical African scholarship. Furthermore, interrelated notions of authenticity and relevance often revolve around its orbit (Brizuela-Garcia, 2006).

3.1. Introduction

The grammar of Africanisation is visible in both the apartheid and post-apartheid era in universities and political discourse more broadly. In the former, Africanisation was inscribed in the way citizenship was conceived and resisted, that is, in the ideological rationale for separate development and the resulting nationalist responses to apartheid as a structure of domination. Regarding the former, the idea of Africanisation was appropriated in service of the apartheid ideology of a racially differentiated political, economic, and social order. In this regard, race and ethnicity functioned as key markers of political identity circumscribing the
boundaries of citizenship and belonging (Mamdani, 1996). As part of its policy of separate
development, rationalised as the preservation of cultural difference and authenticity (both in
terms of Afrikaner and African nationalism), the apartheid government mobilised categories
like ‘tribe’ and ‘ethnicity’ to create various Bantustans (tribal homelands) for members of
designated ethnic groups, simultaneously reconfiguring and denying citizenship through
denationalisation (Neocosmos, 2010). This involved a dual process of racialising and
ethnicising citizenship, which combined to exclude blacks from (white) civil society as a site
where civil and political rights were presumably enjoyed. These twin processes of
denationalisation and ethnicisation foregrounded, ideologically speaking, a cultural defence of
separate development institutionalised through law.\textsuperscript{5} Separate development posited the
impossibility of a common multi-racial South African identity on account of the
incompatibility of ‘European’ and ‘African’ personalities (Muller, 1963). While customary
authority was seen as authentically African and attuned to a putative African personality, civil
society was seen to be culturally European. This cultural logic underpinning separate
development offered only a veneer of intellectual respectability to an institutional policy of
racial segregation by displacing the focus from racial difference to cultural difference. At
bottom, race was the means and end (Moodie, 2017). Apartheid was thus ideologically
mystified as the Africanisation of governance, a mode of rule more suited to Africans whereby
authenticity was worked out in terms of primordially conceived ethnic differences. This logic
provided the basis for the creation of the ‘bush colleges’ (tribal universities) that
exemplified the racialised inequality within higher education provision in apartheid South Africa.

This overarching segregated structure no doubt influenced the nature of opposition and
nationalist resistance to apartheid oppression equally foregrounds the language of
Africanisation. The formation of the African National Congress and its demands are relevant
in terms of an Africanisation of citizenship that premised nationhood on a de-racialised and de-
ethnicised individualised African identity. Furthermore, the Africanist turn and eventual split
within the ANC was in part a critical comment on the \textit{insufficiently African} character of African
nationalism that developed in response to apartheid domination. The formation of the ANC
Youth League notably deployed a conception of Africanism that called for the Africanisation
of national liberation. It was particularly concerned with the identity of leadership and the

\textsuperscript{5} 1951 Bantu Authorities Act; 1959 Bantu self-government Act; 1970 Black Homelands Citizenships Act; 1971
Bantu Homelands Constitution Act
ideological frameworks of national liberation, rejecting ‘foreign leadership’ and ‘the wholesale importation of foreign ideologies into Africa’ as part of its insistence on African self-determination (African National Congress Youth League, 1944). The Africanist turn, which resulted in the formation of the ANCYL is explained in relation to the thorny issue of the role of non-Africans in the struggle against apartheid. The eventual split which resulted in the formation of the PAC constituted a visceral rejection of the ANC’s multiracial unionism articulated in the 1955 Freedom Charter (Halisi, 1997b). The charter posited a multiracial citizenship in which South Africa belonged to all who lived in it. The PAC refused to accord equal rights to both coloniser and colonised, insisting on the primacy of Africans, premising this on a reading of the apartheid situation as a colonial dispossession of the African majority. On this issue of the putative Africanness of national liberation therefore, the category of ‘African’ was often perceived to function as a marker of race and indigeneity such that Africanism was both a citizenship discourse of black nationalism and indigenisation. However, PAC leaders like John Pokela, Gora Ebrahim, and Zeph Mothopeng often reiterated ‘African’ as a cultural rather than racial or ethnic marker. In this regard, it was theoretically open to whites and not automatically inclusive of all blacks (Mantzaris, 1990).

Within the terrain of higher education, the apartheid state would mobilise the broader architecture of state institutions in its racial and ethnic interpellation of South Africans. This would filter through in educational policy, with the creation of universities reserved for blacks in tribal homelands in the mid-1970s and 1980s. Some of these included the University of Transkei, originally a satellite campus of Fort Hare and later taken over by Ciskei; the University of Venda; the University of the North; and the University of Bophuthatswana. Following a commission of enquiry to investigate university needs and requirements of urban blacks in South Africa, Vista University was established in 1981 as way to accommodate this group within townships as opposed to the campuses reserved for other population groups (Subotzky, 1997). In this context of racial domination, Africanisation also involved the instrumentalisation of the academic programme to preserve a spuriously conceived Africanity, that is, an education fitted to the African personality (Hirson, 1979, p. 45). This is clear in the vision of native education articulated by the man often regarded as the architect of ‘grand apartheid’—Hendrick Verwoerd, who served as Minister of Native Affairs and later as Prime Minister in the National Party,
It is the policy of my department that (Bantu) education should have its roots entirely in the Native areas and in the Native environment and Native community. Bantu education must be able to give itself complete expression and there it will have to perform its real service. The Bantu must be guided to serve his own community in all respects. There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. Within his own community, however, all doors are open. For that reason it is of no avail for him to receive a training which has as its aim absorption in the European community while he cannot and will not be absorbed there. Up till now he has been subjected to a school system which drew him away from his own community and practically misled him by showing him the green pastures of the European but still did not allow him to graze there. This attitude is not only uneconomic because money is spent on education which has no specific aim, but it is even dishonest to continue with it. The effect on the Bantu community we find in the much-discussed frustration of educated Natives who can find no employment which is acceptable to them (Behr, 1988, p. 36 emphasis mine).

Just like in the political domain, resistance within higher education at times employed the vernacular of Africanisation, particularly at some of the historically black colleges. For example, between 1968 and 1972, students at the Turfloop campus at the University of Limpopo (then University of the North) engaged in anti-apartheid mobilisations in which they employed ideas influenced by Black Consciousness to bring attention to issues of representation at the university. They called for the Africanisation of teaching staff, university leadership, and curriculum (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017). On the other hand, at the historically privileged (white) universities, the idea of Africanisation functioned as a framework to critique the Western image often underpinned by racist assumptions in which these universities were perceived to be modelled on (Jansen, 1991). As the legal proscription of blacks at these universities eased mildly in the 1980s,

Black students complained bitterly about an alien and paternalistic curriculum… These criticisms elicited official promises that the focus of the curriculum would be shifted towards 'Third World' concerns … In the event, ‘Africanisation’ was confined mainly to remedial-type Academic Support Programmes which operated outside the mainstream curriculum (Davies, 1994, p. 256).
3.1.1. Africanisation and post-apartheid transformation

In the post-apartheid context, Africanisation in higher education has developed within multiple discourses. These include discourses of *transformation*, which is the term for the multidimensional project of identifying and redressing unjust legacies of the apartheid past. Equally, Africanisation is foregrounded within the notion of *African renaissance* notably articulated by Thabo Mbeki and is itself a sub-discourse of the broader transformation imperative (Makgoba, 1999; Seepe, 2004; Odora Hoppers, 2006). Finally, Africanisation is inscribed within discourse on and around the *globalisation* of higher education, particularly in debates around its perceived tension with internationalisation (Botha, 2010).

Africanisation is often deployed as a vehicle for the nebulous programme of *transformation*—the more popular term, at least prior to the student movements, for the project of deep social change and restitution in post-apartheid South Africa. At universities, transformation-as-Africanisation typically encompasses change with regard to: (a) the demographic profile of universities, especially the historically white universities (Cooper and Subotzky, 2001; Cooper, 2015); (b) curriculum and pedagogy; and (c) research profile and conceptions of ‘excellence’ (Moulder, 1995; Horsthemke, 2004). These constitutive elements suggest that transformation-as-Africanisation goes much deeper than a demographic de-racialisation of higher education (equity of access), a process often referred to as indigenisation in the broader political history of decolonisation on the continent. That is, one can include more black South Africans without fundamentally dealing with the historical effects of exclusion—which requires reconstituting the space in which one is being included.

What does this more substantive Africanisation entail when it comes to Africanising the study of Africa? Using nationalist historiography as an instance of Africanisation, I show that three themes are often prominent in discourses of Africanisation. I use this case to illustrate the often recognised role of African history as a progenitor of struggles for intellectual decolonisation, evident in the accomplishments of the Ibadan, Dakar, and Dar es Salaam schools (Zeleza, 2006b). Abstracting from the debates within and in response to this historiographical tradition, I outline three prominent aspects of Africanisation beyond its reference to demographic indigenisation that persist in discourses of decolonisation in South Africa. I argue that Africanisation is a *counter-hegemonic discourse* that often engages in a search for an autonomous *African identity* while endorsing *critical African* scholarship.
3.2. Africanising African History: Nationalist Historiography and its Critics

History will have its say one day – not the history they teach in Brussels, Paris, Washington or the United Nations, but the history taught in the countries set free from colonialism and its puppet rulers. Africa will write her own history, and both north and south of the Sahara it will be a history of glory and dignity (Lumumba, 1961, p. 231).

The emergence and success of anti-colonial nationalist movements influenced the intellectual climate within which historical knowledge about Africa was produced. In the 1950s and 1960s, nationalist historiography constituted a noteworthy attempt to Africanise the production of historical knowledge about Africa by dethroning the colonial/imperial historiographical tradition. Nationalist historiography was not simply the intellectual component of pro-independence movements in African states. It was itself an ideological response to the racism of colonial historiography (Adeniji, 2005). As an anticolonial ideology that often produced vindicationist discourses to counter colonial narratives of Africa’s past, nationalist historiography was institutionalised in several universities on the continent. In Anglophone scholarship, these included the Ibadan and Dar es Salaam schools with notable figures like Kenneth Dike, Ade Ajayi, Terence Ranger, Bethwell Ogot, and Arnold Temu. The (then) University of Dakar was the flagship Francophone institution, represented by the likes of Cheikh Anta Diop and Abdoulaye Ly (Ochwada, 2005).

European colonial historiography constituted the object of nationalist historiographical critique. Its key features were the denial of African agency and historical consciousness, which often occurred through negation and/or appropriation. The former refers to the outright denial of African history as an object of study, portraying Africans as peoples without history, coupled with ‘vulgar notions of stagnation and barbarism’ (Eriksen, 1979, p. 77). Often racist, such denials were based, for example, on the primacy of writing as a marker of historical consciousness. This primacy accorded the written word incorrectly conflated writing history with living it (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2013). It is in relation to this primacy that the field of African history registered a significant disciplinary contribution by enhancing the scientific merits of oral tradition as a legitimate scientific resource and historical archive (Dike, 1956; Vansina, 1985; Feierman, 1993a). Furthermore, this emphasis on writing and its role in the negation of African historical consciousness tended to elide the continent’s Islamic heritage, overlooking the historical fact that ‘the Arabic language, as the language of Islamic learning
and liturgy, was the glue holding together large populations of the Maghreb, the Sahara, and sub-Saharan Africa’ (Kane, 2016, p. 7). The denial of historical agency through appropriation refers to the routine externalisation of historical agency and achievement. Africa was represented as having no history of significance outside of European activity on the continent. Furthermore, where historical achievement was recognised, its causes were often racially externalised as evidenced by the Hamitic hypothesis for example (Zachernuk, 1994). The prevailing tendency was to study African history through the prism of European activity, thus implying that only external intervention gave historical life to an otherwise inert Africa.

The success of nationalist struggles saw deliberate attempts to cultivate an emancipatory ethic that vindicated African historicity (Neale, 1985). Having witnessed the role of nationalism, as an anti-colonial ideology, in extolling unity against foreign domination, historians sought to produce a ‘usable past’ that would consolidate the gains of African nationalism by conferring national histories upon newly independent nations (Jewsiewicki, 1989). Historians were keen to show not only that Africa had a history worthy of scientific inquiry, but equally that Africans were conscious historical subjects active in shaping their history. In countering the racism and Eurocentrism of imperial historiography, the guiding principle of nationalist historiography was the restoration of agency to African peoples. In essence, nationalist historians sought to decolonise by illustrating and vindicating Africa’s rich historical past (Diop, 1974; Skinner, 1999; Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; Mazrui, 2005; Ogot, 2009). In so doing, it would centre African sources and African peoples as the elements that animated African history. This inscription of the ‘African’ factor in African history culminated in a research agenda committed to the documentation of ‘African activity, African adaptation, African choice, and African initiative’ (Ranger, 1968). Kenyan historian Bethwell Ogot summarises the intellectual agenda of the period,

We demonstrated that African societies had well organised states, practiced democracy, socialism, family planning and engaged in long distance trade with properly organised markets. We proved to our satisfaction that Africans had religions, philosophies, military organisations, legal systems, medicines, and technologies. In short, we tried to demonstrate that Africa had a rich and significant past (Ogot, 1978, p. 29).

Such anti-racist counter-narratives in the Anglophone schools were complemented by efforts in the Dakar school. Both Anglophone and Francophone schools, in figures like Ajayi and Diop
and in their heavy focus on precolonial Africa, were significant in bracketing the colonial experience as episodic in relation to the long history of Africa (Ajayi, 1974). Cheikh Anta Diop’s contribution lies in efforts to reclaim Egypt as an African civilization (Diop, 1974). This had a strong racial significance, postulating Egypt as a black population that incorporated new elements over time. This reclamation equally foregrounded Africa’s claim to civilisational genesis premised on the place of Egypt in both African and Mediterranean civilisations. While these claims are contested as pseudo-historical, they are nonetheless significant as efforts to undermine the racist dimensions of colonial historiography.

Given the prejudices of the time, one imagines a great deal of doubt surrounding the capacities of Africans for self-government. As such histories of indigenous political and economic development (i.e., centralised political authority and trade) were ideologically significant, meant to instil pride and confidence regarding the task at hand upon entry into a global system of nation-states. As Neale observes (Neale, 1985, p. 11) ‘… as the successful management of nation-states was seen as the test of equality with whites, it seemed important to establish that this form of government was not a wholly alien one, handed down by the imperial powers, but that it was in some sense the natural culmination of an indigenous development’.

Although nationalist historiography countered racist falsifications of African pasts in its subversion of colonial historiography, it still reproduced Eurocentric assumptions evident in evolutionist patterns of thinking for example. Historians largely accepted the Western template of historical achievement and civilization, castigating instead the picture of barbarism and stagnation produced by this template. It tended to focus on and endorse processes entailing the centralisation of a single political authority, culminating in an account of progress (achievement) in the idiom of modernisation in which political development entailed a transition from segmentary organisation to a centralised political system (Wrigley, 1971; see Amadiume, 1997, for similar critique of Diop’s work). Neale (1985) illustrates this historical evolutionism at play in a key area of African initiative in nationalist historiography—the study of religious movements as instances of resistance. For a long time, religious movements were treated as an intermediate stage (between primary resistance and mass nationalism) in a political development that culminated in the independence of nation-states. In this regard, it replicated a modernisation logic in which one transitions into properly modern outlets for political participation—in this case the party machinery.
For nationalist historians, the decolonisation of African history foregrounded the question of sources, and with this, questions of authenticity and identity. After all, it was very much concerned with the locus of agency, that is, who the shapers of African history were. Because colonial historiography largely located agency in European activities, it was insufficiently African.

In due course however, nationalist historians would also be criticised in terms of the Africans in whom historical agency was subsequently located. To counter narratives that negated African historical achievement, Africans were shown to have built centralised states and empires such as Ghana, Mali, Kanem-Bornu, and Songhai. While nationalism extols unity against a foreign oppressor, this unity is often in danger of riding roughshod over intra-group differences (Mkandawire, 2005; Mama, 2007). In producing a history of kings and kingdoms, nationalist historians conflated the state (ruling class) and the people. An interrogation of the identity of the African inscribed in this decolonised African history exposes the contradictions in and irrelevance of holding up ancient African independence as a basis for pride and strength, especially in a context of growing disillusionment with a truncated decolonisation process (Neale, 1985, p. 47). Similarly, Ifi Amadiume contends that Cheikh Anta Diop’s macro-history of precolonial Africa is

… based on the histories of super empires, such as ancient Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Mossi, Songhai, and Cayor, and their famous cities such as Timbuktu, Gao, Ghana, Djenné, Meroe, and so on. In spite of the fact that he was concerned with the writing of macro history, his celebration of the glories of empires based on the wealth and power of cities, kings and queens, meant that Diop failed to develop a critical analysis of two important factors. One is the economic basis of the power of these empires. The second is the structural relationship between these city-based centres of power or accumulation and the surrounding villages and region… He placed emphasis on the kings and queens and not the people; he looked at cities and not the villages; he focused more on centralized systems and not what he called the clan systems, that is, the decentralized systems—in short, African communities (Amadiume, 1997, pp. 15, 19).

This foregrounds a failure to show the determinants and contradictions of people’s interactions (Temu and Swai, 1981). Equally, the bias towards political centralisation as the ideal creates a dichotomy between civilised African empires/kingdoms and primitive societies on the
periphery, thereby resulting in a discourse limited by the ‘colonial library’ (Mudimbe, 1988). Moreover, it is ideological, failing to analyse the nature of relations (e.g., exploitative, imperial) between empires and tribes on the periphery (Amadiume, 1997, p. 13). In being insufficiently critical, nationalist historiography was labelled bourgeois empiricism, limiting the decolonisation of African history to the search for new evidence (Bernstein and Depelchin, 1978; Temu and Swai, 1981). By neglecting issues of class and political economy (i.e., the material and social relations of production), it robbed African history of the dynamism that characterised social and economic change while aiding and abetting the post-independence political elite (Depelchin, 1977). In essence, nationalist historiography became irrelevant, remaining trapped as an ideological rejoinder to colonial historiography and thus unable to speak to the social and economic issues of modern Africa (Temu and Swai, 1981, p. 28). While it might have remained theoretically relevant to the nation-building state project, it did not fully appreciate the vertical relationships that constrained the unity that it extolled.

More specifically therefore, the irrelevance of nationalist historiography is ascertained in the observation that it had proved its case, and the changing exigencies of post-colonial Africa necessitated new parameters of relevance. After all, it is worth recalling that these limitations were articulated in the context of growing disillusionment around the failed promise of political decolonisation, which had failed to deliver the economic kingdom that Nkrumah had promised. Amidst poverty and material insecurity, a relevant history was one that explained and enhanced understanding of this reality. In this context, the dependency and Marxist schools enjoyed popularity in the 1970s. It explained underdevelopment as an externally induced dependency, the result of unequal relations of exchange institutionalised through an asymmetrical international division of labour in the global order. Through the idea of dependent development, underdevelopment was the result of Africa’s unequal integration into a global economy, often with the complicity of a national bourgeoisie, in which development in the core/metropole was dependent on underdevelopment in the periphery (Rodney, 1972; Amin, 1974, 1976; Wallerstein, 1976). These critiques therefore raised productive questions around the African represented in the Africanisation of knowledge. The vindicationist narrative, while historically necessary, had limited relevance to an increasingly poor African population (i.e., working class/peasantry) for whom the fruits of decolonisation were proving illusory. From this concrete example of the rise and decline of nationalist historiography, one can distil several themes constitutive of Africanisation as a radical intellectual project. I argue that
Africanisation is a counter-hegemonic discourse that often engages in a search for an autonomous African identity while endorsing critical African scholarship.

3.2.1. Africanisation as counter-hegemony

Given the context in and purposes for which they are invoked, discourses on Africanisation often counter hegemonic practices of resistance that aim to critique and dismantle hegemonic power. Counter-hegemony refers the development of ideas and discourse to challenge dominant assumptions, beliefs, and established patterns of behaviour. In the example above, colonial historiography and its denial of African agency and historicity was the object of contestation.

Calls to make universities, curricula, and knowledge from and about Africa more African are about how historical manifestations of power (colonial-imperialism, neoliberalism, etc.) have constituted an unequal world. These discourses usually adopt a key tenet of critical theory, which is the observation that knowledge is both an instrument of power and a mode of power. This much is evident in the recognition that colonialism was as much a domination of the mind as it was of space and bodies. The domination of body and space also required an ideological apparatus that shaped subjectivity (identity), understanding, and meaning making (knowledge)—which the captures the coloniality of being and knowledge, respectively. As such, discourses of Africanisation, as counter-hegemonic, draw attention to the distribution of authority in the production, circulation, and validation of authoritative knowledge. They contest assumptions pertaining to the capacity of Africans as epistemic agents, the construction of Africa as an object of study and source of knowledge, and, in the final analysis, the intellectual position of Africa in a global discourse of humanity (Creary, 2012). Such stakes can be gleaned through questions like ‘who can produce authoritative knowledge about Africa’; ‘where does authoritative knowledge about Africa come from’; or ‘what kind of knowledge comes from Africa’. Nationalist historians tackled these issues head-on in terms of a question of sources.

In the case of the biography of authoritative knowledge, racial identity often inflects the distribution of epistemic authority both historically and in the present. Within North American traditions, genealogies of African studies for example, Jean Allman notes importance of race in dominant narratives about the history of African (area) studies as an interdisciplinary field of inquiry (Allman, 2019). The tendency to see the origin of professional African studies as a
cold war national security imperative elided older traditions of the study of Africa by African-Americans at historically black colleges in the US as well as the histories of African studies on the African continent (Zeleza, 2003; Olukoshi, 2006). Furthermore, Allman notes the racialisation of scientific validity and credibility that institutionalises gatekeeping. Citing the figure of the first president of the African Studies Association, Melville J. Herskovits, who ‘affirmed the central, primary role of white American scholars in the study of Africa in the United States and anointed those scholars with the sacred signs of objectivity and neutrality few others could possess or attain’ (Allman, 2019, pp. 7–8). This often involved the delegitimisation of African-America scholars as propagandists (Gershenhorn, 2004). Therefore, one sense of Africanisation problematises the Africanness of African Studies at the level of representativity and the marginality of African voices in discourses on and about Africa. The foregoing example describes this by mobilising race as an analytic category. In this regard, it describes a racialised status quo that produces and reproduces African marginality in knowledge production, circulation, and validation, suggesting an enduring impact of race on who is recognised to produce authoritative knowledge about Africa as well as representation within the regulative institutions of African Studies (e.g., journal editorial boards, disciplinary associative networks, etc.). There are, of course, other facets of a racialised status quo which are also the object of counter-hegemonic engagement. They include efforts to foreground critical questions like how race shapes Africa as an object of study and a source of knowledge. In the case of the latter for example, one can contrast Africanist with continental traditions of African studies. The former originates in Euro-America (particularly North America) and tends to limit Africa to sub-Saharan Africa. The latter is a reaction to the intellectual hegemony and racial arrogance of Africanists and notably insists on studying the continent as a whole (Martin and West, 1999, p. 15). Recall that the narrow and racialised construction of Africa as object of study limited to Africa south of the Sahara was a key issue in the Mamdani affair on curriculum decolonisation at UCT (Mamdani, 1998b, 1998a).

Another code for hegemony is Eurocentrism. This captures the extent of the ideological distortion whereby universities in Africa, as well as knowledge from and about Africa, is overdetermined by the West (Diawara, 1990; Mafeje, 2000; Nyamnjoh, 2012a; Lebakeng, 2018). That is, as a counter-hegemonic project, Africanisation resists Eurocentrism because it distorts knowledge from and about Africa through a series of control images and binaries—theorised as a ‘colonial library’—by which Africa and Africans are epistemically othered, inferiorised and marginalised (Mudimbe, 1988, 1994; Desai, 2001). Subsequently, one may seek to recover
interlocutors and narratives historically erased/silenced by this distortion and/or insist on a critical methodological outlook that stresses decentring the West and recentring Africa.

This anti-ethnocentric insurrection also ventures critically into the geography of authoritative knowledge with concepts like *extraversion, scientific dependency* (Hountondji, 1990b, 1997a), and *imperialism* (Ake, 1982). These predominantly problematise a deference to external sources of epistemic authority. Such positions lament the extent to which knowledge about Africa tends to be understood not on its own terms, but through an uncritical imposition of concepts, theories, categories, and methodologies developed elsewhere (Wiredu, 1998). For Archie Mafeje, this grounds the need for endogenous scholarship that undermines epistemologies of alterity (Adésinà, 2006, 2008a, 2008b). In the famous example in the fields of literature and literary studies, Ngugi wa Thiongò problematises Eurocentrism as anchored in the unassailable position of European languages in knowledge production (Mudimbe, 1982; wa Thiongò, 1994). As such, Africanisation might look to establish (indigenous) African languages as legitimate vehicles of intellectual, scientific, and pedagogic activity in Africa, thus displacing the dominance of European languages.

I want to conclude this discussion by highlighting some nuances within the counter-hegemonic dimensions of Africanisation. Firstly, counter-hegemonic critiques of Eurocentrism are far more complex than a reductive problematisation of the alleged *foreignness* of epistemic tools. Put simply, one ought to focus on the distortive nature of the influence, and not the fact of external influence in and of itself. For example, much of wa Thiongo’o’s critique centres on themes of relevance and audience through an account of the exclusionary dynamics of European languages which exclude African publics. The relevant distortion is anchored in questions about the beneficiaries of knowledge produced in a language inaccessible to the vast majority in the society in which this knowledge seeks to gain a foothold. Equally, Ake’s critique of political development and modernisation theory is an ideological one for it unpacks the Western-centric assumptions infused in the framework. In this regard the distortion he identifies is the complicity of social scientific knowledge in the furtherance of imperialism. Therefore, it is not simply the case that Africanisation entails a banal obsession with the provenance of one’s epistemic repertoire. One ought to pay attention to what exactly is distortive about the biography of these intellectual resources.
Secondly, resistance is not automatically counter-hegemonic. It can sometimes strengthen and even reproduce the hegemonic elements of the status quo against which it is deployed. This criticism has been levied against some forms of anti-colonial resistance. For example, notwithstanding its merits, critics of Negritude contend that it maintains the (colonial) binary opposition presumed to separate European and African as categories. As such, its limitation is ideological, residing in being a discourse of inversion in the way that it acquiesces to racial stereotypes (Adotévi, 1972; Towa, 1979; Mbembe, 2002). Furthermore, when translated as a political consciousness, some argued that Negritude promoted neo-colonialism by legitimising myths of African inferiority conducive to relations of intellectual and economic dependence. Senghor’s concepts of a distinct African sensibility, summed up in part in his maxim ‘Emotion is African, as Reason is Hellenic’, are seen as particularly amendable to a political discourse that affirms the necessity of European tutelage given the exigencies of development. Furthermore, like nationalist historiography, generalist talk of reclaiming an African identity tends to gloss over internal differences among Africans, thereby obscuring how the African elite are often agents of neo-colonialism.

3.2.2. Africanisation as a search for an autonomous African identity

The pursuit of an autonomous African identity is a part and parcel of the counter-hegemonic impulse of Africanisation and its resistance to over-determination. This concern with the autonomy of African discursive formation often manifests as a call for self-determination and self-definition (More, 2002; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). This emphasis on ‘self’ underscores counter-hegemony as a process of reconstituting African subjectivity, thereby rendering identity a key site where autonomy is negotiated. As Fanon poignantly observes, ‘Because it is a systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the other person attributes of humanity, colonialism forces the people it dominates to ask themselves the question constantly, “In reality who am I?”’ (Fanon, 1967a, p. 128).

In epistemological terms, what is of concern is a dissatisfaction with the identity of knowledge from and about Africa and the rootedness of universities in Africa. The nationalist historiographical tradition exemplifies this theme, concerned with rehabilitating the historical and civilisational credentials of African societies. However, by looking for the same elements of civilisation in Western societies—such as political centralisation—the vindication of African pasts was limited in its capacity to transcend the colonial library.
African identity is itself subject to internal contestation. That is, Africanisation often involves making identity claims about what and who is African. When we talk of making X more African, this conjures a range of questions at the intersection of citizenship and Africanity,

What does it mean to be African? Who qualifies to claim Africa? Is being African or claiming Africa an attribute of race and skin colour (black, white, yellow), birth (umbilical cord, birth certificates, identity cards, passports), geography (physical spaces, home village), history (encounters), culture (prescriptive specificities), economics (availability and affordability, wealth and deprivation), sociology (social configurations and action, inclusion and exclusion), psychology (mindsets), philosophy (worldviews), politics (power relations), collective memory (shared experiences and aspirations) or a category through which a world that is not rigidly geographical, racial or cultural is constructed, to name just a few of the many possibilities? (Nyamnjoh, 2010, p. 75)

Historically, such questions are especially foregrounded in disciplines like philosophy, literary studies, and sociology (Mphahlele, 1964; Achebe, 1975; Akiwowo, 1986; Oruka, 1990a; Masolo, 1994; Wali, 1997; Magubane, 2000; Amoko, 2010). Consider some of questions on the debate around English and what constituted of African literature,

Was it the geographical origin of the work, making any literature written in Africa eligible? Was it literature which was predominantly set in Africa? Did African literature necessarily have to reflect ‘African’ values or themes? Was it only the literature of black Africa or would it include Northern Africa, making Saint Augustine one of the first African writers? And did the language in which the literature was written affect its eligibility in the canon of African literature? (Desai, 1993, p. 4).

In post-apartheid South Africa, the quest for universities rooted in Africa gravitated towards emphases on authenticity and relevance. As one former South African university vice chancellor argued,

The major principle of a South African university should be to capture and encapsulate the essence of Africa. This should define the essential character of an institution versus a similar institution in another continent or culture. All our universities should be
African by drawing their inspiration from their African heritage and environment, not transplanted trees, but ones growing from the seeds that are planted and nurtured in the African soil (Makgoba, 1996).

Debates on the identity and orientation of post-apartheid South African universities were particularly influenced by former president Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance (AR) political discourse of which his 1996 ‘I am an African’ speech and associated texts were emblematic. The AR discourse touches on the issue of ‘what it means to be African’ by conjuring metaphors of rebirth, renewal, and regeneration in the twin contexts of globalisation and Afro-pessimism. Mbeki notably advanced a multicultural and cosmopolitan conception of Africanness, endorsing an inclusive approach that moved that away from narrow configurations of race, nation, and ethnicity (More, 2002, p. 64). While the speech had globalist, pan-Africanist, and culturalist registers, its broader significance lies in its inscription within ‘a longer struggle to articulate and actualise an African identity and consciousness’ (Maloka, 2001; Bongmba, 2004, p. 294). In this regard, it is historically continuous with attempts like Negritude and Pan-Africanism (Ahluwalia, 2002). This need not imply a unanimity with regards to African identity. Rather, such a struggle simply stresses the need to contest the perceived extraversion (i.e., deference to external sources of authority) characteristic of African identity and subjectivity (Hountondji, 1990b).

In higher education, the debate in South Africa centred on both a critical evaluation of the notion of an African renaissance and the role of higher education in articulating and actualising said renaissance (Higgs et al., 2000; Seepe, 2004). In 2003, Mbeki convened a meeting with university vice chancellors on institutional transformation and it is in this context where principles for an African renaissance in higher education were laid out. Africanisation was taken to entail the ‘process of translating the African identity and vision in higher education’ and the adaptation of African scholarship to ‘the social structure and the cultural environment of Africa by also producing knowledge that takes the African condition and the African identity as its central problem’ (Makgoba and Seepe, 2004, pp. 40, 19). This project emphasised the need for Africa-centred intellectuals, a dominant theme at the 1998 African Renaissance Conference (Makgoba, 1999). Furthermore, certain resources were seen to be vital in this project. At the University of South Africa (UNISA), the Centre for African Renaissance Studies served as an institutional space for transdisciplinary research and launched the *International Journal for African Renaissance Studies—Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinary*—
in February 2006 (Gutt, 2006; Odora Hoppers, 2006). Among other things, the project was also seen to entail the promotion of development and democratic governance (Mangu, 2006, 2012; Teffo, 2014), the intellectualisation of African languages (Alexander, 1999, 2003, 2007), repositioning of indigenous knowledge systems (Odora Hoppers, 2002), and the development of a South African philosophy education grounded in African philosophy (Letseka, 2000; Higgs, 2003; Ramose, 2004; Van Wyk and Higgs, 2004).

There are some recurring concerns that have dogged this project of self-definition and self-writing, such as nativism, atavism, and essentialism. Broadly conceived, they can be seen as injunctions against thinking about African identity in certain ways. In this regard, I submit that one of the main perceived limitations of the quest for an autonomous African identity relates to fears of intellectual enclosure. Africanness as intellectual enclosure can take multiple expressions, such as the constriction of legitimate interlocutors and objects of inquiry. That is, an insistence on Africanness can narrow the pool of legitimate interlocutors and the concerns/topics considered proper objects of inquiry for African scholars. I will demonstrate two expressions of this caution against Africanity-as-enclosure. They include (a) an emphasis on endogeneity as opposed to indigeneity and (b) a perceived tension between international standards and Africanisation.

Firstly, consider the conceptual substitution that grounds Africanisation as a pursuit of endogeneity rather than indigeneity. Believing that it does not help to racialise or ethnicise concepts of knowledge, Peter Crossman maintains that endogeneity has nothing to do with race, ethnicity (as sources of rigid boundedness), or some prior original authentic state. Instead, endogeneity more aligned with contextualisation and adaptation, and

…the development of African universities and their processes of production along lines consistent with the cultural orientation and material situation (themselves in constant change) of the groups of people to whom they belong or whom they serve. It is understood then that the orientation and structures of the institutions may then develop, taking on new directions and forms, in relative material and intellectual autonomy—though never isolation—from global forms of education. In fact, one might better speak to the appropriation and transformation of ‘external’ factors according to ‘internal’ principles that define orientation, values and practices (Crossman, 2004, pp. 325–6).
Discussing the significance of substituting indigeneity with endogeneity, Letsekha affirms the intention to escape

...counter-productive dialogues on identity – expressed in questions such as: what is African, native, local or indigenous? – or the irresistible tendency to position indigenous knowledge in an archaic, ahistorical and primitive past – as often transpires when one makes use of the term ‘tradition’ – as though current industrial societies did not possess their own, particular epistemologies (Letsekha, 2013, p. 12).

Secondly, fears of intellectual closure characterise some of the constraints on Africanisation perceived by African scholars. To illustrate this point, it is important to note the ‘standards’ critique typically levied against discourses of Africanisation. African scholars sometimes fall into a psychological trap of conflating global currency and universal truth. Here, negative attitudes around Africanisation result from the belief that one is forsaking genuine intellectual activity by Africanising, to the extent that ‘genuine intellectual activity’ is determined by international standards (Crossman, 2004). The standards argument demonstrates the perceived inferiority of an Africanised education and scepticism about its ability to compete in a globalised world, hence the many debates on whether Africanisation is compatible with processes of internationalisation and globalisation (Botha, 2010). A similar observation is possible with African renaissance political discourse itself, where some interpret the renaissance as a return to a Hobbesian state of nature because of a prior discursive context that constructs Africanity as a series of pathological political and socio-economic deviations (More, 2002).

Nonetheless, in today’s global context, the idea that in Africanising scholars are alienating themselves from the rest of the world does raise an important ethical question. Affirming epistemological pluralism and polycentrism, Africanisation will invariably have to contemplate the desired relationship between self and other. If Africanisation is the invocation of national identity, an invocation of the right to be African, then one could ask what this means for how this reconstituted African self relates to its designated others. What is authorised by national identity as an expression of freedom: an intimate return to and obsession with the self, or certain kinds of relations with others? According to Crossman, some see in the valorisation of the particular an act of self-exclusion from a global community where genuine intellectual activity is perceived to take place. Here, Africanisation is an obstacle to a desired dissolution
in the universal. Yet, it is worth remembering some of the tenets from the discussion on counter-hegemony. What often animates the demand for Africanisation is precisely the realisation of particulars masquerading as universals—that is, a phenomenon of pseudo-universalism. As Zeleza contends, African scholars and economies have suffered from too much rather than too little exposure to the external/international, whether in terms of academic standards and currencies (Zeleza, 2003).

The quest for an autonomous African identity need not be tantamount to insularity and the nationalist impulse internal to Africanisation is not necessarily incompatible with a universalist orientation (e.g., Getachew's, 2019, description of African nationalism as ‘worldmaking’). It recognises that knowledge production is a co-operative human activity while recognising that what is currently constituted as global is saturated by power and thus hardly neutral. That is, the global as a discursive landscape is not always democratic. In illustration of this middle ground, responses to the ‘standards’ argument typically note that Africanisation simply recalibrates the basis on which one engages the world, as opposed to shutting off oneself. I suspect this is what universities in Africa mean when they talk of leveraging African scholarship as a marker of global excellence. A similar ethic is evident in calls for the intellectualisation of African languages in a rejection of linguistic nativism. In Ngugi’s project of decolonising the mind, for example, one is simply recovering and rehabilitating one’s context, culture, and languages as a platform to participate in a truly democratic global discourse of humanity. These kinds of responses are simply contending that ‘knowledge is first local before it is global’, and as such, explicitly endorse the idea of endogeneity as a guarantor of international relevance (Adésinà, 2008b, p. 135). Therefore, an African intellectual identity is neither ‘a walled segregation into the particular or a dissolution into the universal’ (Césaire, 2010)

3.2.3. Africanisation as critical African scholarship

Critical scholarship simply refers to knowledge work invested in revealing and challenging power structures. In this regard, despite its putative emancipatory thrust, it is also important to consider what discourses of Africanisation conceal and the power relations they obscure. It is important that the inscription of an ‘African factor’ should not amount to its authentication by default (Falola and Jennings, 2002). The same critical activity that unmasksl Eurocentric ideology should equally be applied to Africanisation in the sense of interrogating its constitutive interests. This is observable in the charges against nationalist historiography,
particularly when one inquires into the African ultimately represented in this epistemic project. Precisely because it places a premium on unity and solidarity as a philosophy of decolonisation, African nationalism tends to elide the gendered, ethnic, class, and racial fault lines internal to the category ‘African’ (Mkandawire, 2005; Mama, 2007). Nationalist historians, it was argued, were particularly guilty of conflating the ruling class and the people. Its empiricism meant it was particularly unsuited to explaining relations of neo-colonialism that maintained peasant and working class domination and in which African elites were complicit (Fanon, 1967b; Mamdani, 1976; Shivji, 1976). Mbembe has also pointed to the limits of nationalist and Marxist traditions in the reconstitution of African subjectivity. He is particularly critical of conceptions of Africanness predicated on a ‘cult of victimisation’ where the conditions of alienation, dispossession, and dehumanisation are perceived as always externally determined (Mbembe, 2002). Such an externalisation of responsibility is insufficiently self-reflexive as it fails to contemplate the internal dimensions of these phenomena. A notable example is Ali Mazrui’s critique of ‘Tanzaphilia’ as reflective of an uncritical attitude towards post-independence nationalist governments (Mazrui, 1967). Equally, part of the Great Debate in Dar es Salaam in the 1970s was precisely over whether Africans all stood in the same relation of oppression vis-à-vis neo-colonial imperialism (Tandon, 1982). The question was whether there were significant material contradictions between the national bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the proletariat and lumpenproletariat, on the other hand, or whether they were all equally oppressed as Africans vis-à-vis imperial domination. At stake therefore was the necessity of a ‘double critique’ of both neo-colonialism and one’s local context (Khatibi, 2019).

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter provides an overview of some the key concerns that characterise Africanisation as an idiom of decolonisation. Looking at registers of Africanisation in African Studies (nationalist historiography) and South African higher education discourse prior to RMF, I contend that the idea of Africanisation often envisions a counter-hegemonic project that cultivates an autonomous African identity while foregrounding the need for critical African scholarship.
Chapter 4

Fallism, Decolonisation, Citizenship, and Belonging

In this chapter, I explain the emergence of decolonisation as an emancipatory framework in South African higher education. Drawing on student publications, archives, and protest repertoires associated with ‘fallism’, as well as academic literature and fieldwork interviews, I argue that citizenship constitutes the bedrock of calls for decolonising universities in South Africa. Understanding citizenship as claim-making around a ‘felt sense of belonging’, decolonisation is a critical intervention that functions to expose and disrupt unequal citizenship. In critiquing South African universities as colonial in their institutional form, decolonisation is used to contest unjust regimes of inclusion and exclusion—largely anchored on race—seen as continuous with colonial-apartheid histories. This citizenship can be articulated both in relation to the university and the nation-state. Concerning the latter, decolonisation is continuous with an intellectual history focused on, among other things, the relationship between citizenship and liberation. In this regard, decolonisation constitutes a set of claims and a practice of claim-making characterised by disillusionment with how this relationship unfolded in the post-1994 dispensation. Recognising this, I echo arguments that decolonisation constitutes an ideological crisis in which current registers of belonging in South Africa like rainbowism and liberal constitutionalism are being challenged. While universities can be seen as microcosms of state-society contestations, it is also important to note the direct ways in which universities themselves are objects of claim-making. In this regard, decolonisation is also a vehicle for university citizenship, offering a discursive and capacious space to work out both who belongs and what it means to belong to a South African university both materially and ideologically. I conclude on the significance of these citizenship struggles in terms of representation as a key feature of modern politics. In denoting belonging/membership to a (political) community, citizenship, and representation are intimately bound up. Often, citizenship struggles are struggles for and over representation. This co-constitution is often worked out in the grammar of recognition and rights such that the status of ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’ are felt as varying degrees of effective representation. I argue that as a praxis of citizenship, decolonisation is underlined by a crisis of representation, signifying a loss of faith in the traditional governance structures of universities charged with securing a felt sense of belonging.
4.1. Introduction

The contemporary prominence of discourses of decolonisation in South African higher education has its origins in ‘fallism’, an emergent decolonial ideology that has its genesis in the student movements of 2015/16. Its diverse usage suggests that fallism is a descriptive term, a philosophy, and an identity. It describes the collection of hashtag activisms and student mobilisations where participants articulated their claims in the form X Must Fall. Philosophically, fallism also refers to an emergent decolonial framework that weaved together intellectual traditions like Black Consciousness, black radical feminism, and Pan-Africanism in conjunction with a protest culture of disruption to critique South African universities as colonial in their institutional form. Finally, many students identified with and formed attachments with the politics of these movements. As such, at some point, it became intelligible to identify as a fallist, or to repudiate said identity altogether (Ahmed, 2019). Foremost among the fallist movements were ‘Rhodes Must Fall’ and ‘Fees Must Fall’. Together, they foregrounded a demand for a ‘free decolonised education’. I argue that this demand can be understood primarily in terms of unequal citizenship manifest as the absence of a felt sense of belonging with onto-epistemic dimensions. Citizenship and belonging provide a comprehensive interpretive and explanatory framework to attend both to the emergence and significance of discourses of decolonisation in South African higher education.

4.2. The Material and Ideological Dimensions of Unequal Citizenship and Belonging

The range of claims encompassing the clamour for a ‘free decolonised education’ in South African higher education signals an ‘organic crisis’ of material and ideological proportions (Badat, 2016). The decolonisation discourse initially foregrounded a phenomenology of alienation, institutional racism, epistemic injustice, and black pain within the context of historically white universities. At these universities, students, workers, and academic staff employed decolonisation to raise questions around who belongs to the university, and what it means to belong. The grammar of decolonisation is noteworthy as a historical inheritance. In positioning exclusion as historically produced, the emergent question of citizenship includes the following: what would it take for those formerly excluded to really belong? What would the university—recognising itself as reflecting a set of cumulative effects as a function of this historical exclusion—look like if a genuine substantive citizenship beyond mere physical
access was offered in the case of historically white universities? What does it mean to address
the view that universities did not only exclude some people, but embodies an identity that is
constituted precisely by the historical fact of exclusion?

With this genesis of decolonisation in mind, there tends to be an assumption that cultural and
epistemological issues of belonging and alienation are more relevant to HWUs while material
hardships are the essence of HBU student struggles. One explanation (and example) is how
members of HBUs conceive their own institutional identity in historical terms. Universities
like UWC, proudly maintain that their institutional history fostered a distinctly anti-apartheid
identity and intellectual project. As such, it is perceived to have always espoused what would
today be considered a decolonial consciousness.

In general, the assumption of decolonisation as relevant only to HWUs is contradicted by the
fact that across universities of various institutional histories, students and academics have taken
up the mantle of decolonisation as an intellectual project. As such, despite the differential
emphases on the content of student struggles, it does not follow that decolonisation as an onto-
epistemic project is irrelevant at historically black universities. The more reasonable
conclusion is that those who understand their experiences of inequality, alienation, and non-
belonging as distinctly racialised simply live and feel these experiences differently. As such—
in the sense of patterns of emphasis—issues of access and what it means to belong to a
university are worked out differently. For example, while students at UCT or Wits foreground
imperatives of Africanisation at a cultural level, students at the University of Limpopo
understand decolonisation to mean getting the same quality education as HWUs, which is
perceived as more adequately preparing students for a modern economy because they have
better infrastructure and academic staff (Malabela, 2017). As such, different institutional
histories inflect the meaning of decolonisation. In this instance, HBUs like UL are struggling
against a legacy in which HBUs are associated with inferior education for poor black students.
They maintain that their universities' curricula are continuous with that of the apartheid era,
designed to produce ‘black bureaucrats to work for the homeland governments, and to be
teachers and nurses in their communities’ (Malabela, 2017, p. 114). In this sense, students at
UL also foreground an understanding of South African higher education as distinctly racialised,
whereby black universities are associated with inferior education for poor black South Africans
and white institutions are associated with quality education for whites and middle class blacks.
Beyond the fact that different institutional histories produce different understandings of
decolonisation, what is also interesting, as Malabela notes in the case of Limpopo, is the curious situation in which one set of students desires the very thing that others are rejecting (Malabela, 2017).

Equally, differential emphases do not mean that unequal citizenship at the level of material reality is out of place in historically white universities. Often, there are common material struggles across HBUs and HWUs, as evident in student experiences with the administration of financial aid and material wellbeing in the form of student housing (Jansen, 2017; Langa, 2017). Rather, as decolonisation gained currency, especially in form of virally contagious fallist hashtag activisms, diverse actors in concrete ideological and material situations saw in it a capacity to foreground a range of specific claims that were immediately relevant. As a praxis of citizenship therefore, decolonisation displayed both material and ideological dimensions. The grievances included the exclusionary cost of higher education, and the exclusionary nature of institutional and epistemic culture, which are all seen to exclude black, often poor students.

4.2.1. Economic crisis

The demand for free decolonised higher education is the culmination of the longstanding twin pressures of declining state subsidies and massification (Badat, 2016; Booysen, 2016; Jansen, 2017; Habib, 2019). Over time, both entail a displacement in the responsibility of funding higher education, a burden increasingly saddled on students. Massification itself is a nuanced phenomenon. After all, if universities were enrolling large numbers of students who could adequately fund themselves, there would not be a problem of this scale. As such, part of the issue is the entry into higher education of large numbers of poor and middle-class students for whom university education is unaffordable. Moreover, state assistance primarily through the funding body NSFAS is often inadequate, inefficient, and insufficient (Jansen, 2017, pp. 178–80).

These twin pressures are distributed unevenly across universities with some universities having a higher intake of students for whom higher education is financially inaccessible. Noting this, the emergence of FMF as a nationwide student movement exposed class inequality in higher education. While student protests around financial access have been endemic to HBUs, these protests did not receive anywhere near the same attention as protests did at HWUs (Langa, 2017; Chikane, 2018). In the context of massification therefore, specifically the case of
increasing numbers of poor students across universities, one can say that issues that had more intensity at HBUs have penetrated the historical privilege of HWUs. Put simply, the significance of the class profile of massification is that it brings ‘previously excluded problems onto campus and along with it the struggles and conflicts besetting poorer communities’ (Jansen, 2017, p. 173). If this conjures a discourse of contamination, it is an indictment of a society perceived to be anti-poor.

In this cocktail of declining public investment and massification, the welfarisation of South African universities is another important facet to the material dimensions of this crisis. This welfarisation captures the perception of universities (as public institutions) as extensions of state welfare, especially for students for whom welfare has been a key component of their relations with the state. Going to a university is as much about getting a degree as it is about securing one’s material wellbeing (food, shelter), rendering higher education an immediate and long-term escape route from poverty. Welfarisation, according to Jansen (2017), also explains student entitlement, and this need not be read in the pejorative sense of the word. Welfarisation simply illuminates why students see universities as legitimate targets of their material complaints, whereby belonging to a university entails material security. This is especially clear with student protest repertoires like the #Shackville protests of February 2016 at UCT, where decolonisation was rendered capacious enough to reckon with student accommodation crises as constitutive of the alienation of black students. Students erected a dwelling constructed from material typically used to build ‘shacks’ in South Africa, with ‘UCT Housing Crisis’ painted on the walls of this structure. The Shackville protest symbolically highlighted financial exclusion and homelessness. In both senses, the university was seen as culpable for failing to provide for poor black students and thus contributing to their dislocation and sense of alienation (Ndelu, 2017; Coetzee, 2019). The homelessness of black students was also seen to symbolise the broader historical condition of colonial dispossession with regards to land. As such, in this historical connection, Shackville is an aesthetic creative protest highlighting a perceived coloniality of being in which dehumanisation is linked to dispossession.

One may conclude therefore, that higher education is desirable in South Africa because of its perceived benefits for social mobility and material wellbeing. And yet, experienced increasingly as a student burden, fees often exclude poor black students from participating in and benefitting from higher education. Furthermore, given the shame associated with performing one’s poverty in the hope of financial assistance, the range of experiences of
financial exclusion suggest that the (black) poor do not belong at universities. The commodification of higher education means that those who belong at the university are those who can afford it. And even when in university, both the absence of material security and experiences of racialised material inequality can profoundly undermine one’s felt sense of belonging (Luckett, 2016).

4.2.2. Ideological crisis
The transition from RMF to FMF is often seen as a movement from the ideological to the material in the character of claim-making. While FMF retained the grammar of decolonisation, its emphases tended to be more material (fees, insourcing of workers and student services). In contrast, the decolonisation discourse of RMF foregrounded issues of alienation, institutional racism, epistemic injustice, and black pain within the context of historically white universities. Here, the call to remove colonial-apartheid iconography and symbolisms morphed into a wider call to reflect on and disentangle the university from its embeddedness in colonial histories of domination and dispossession. As such, at the core of decolonisation is an attempt to disrupt the unjust legacies of the past. Before decolonisation gained currency, ‘transformation’ was the dominant vocabulary for these kinds of conversations. However, the RMF student movement critiqued transformation as a liberal discourse aimed at reform and repair rather than revolution and rupture,

We have begun to understand the need for a new language that challenges the pacifying logic of liberalism. This logic presents itself to us in these ideas of ‘reform’ and ‘transformation’, which are legitimised by the Constitution—a document which violently preserves the status quo. Transformation is the maintenance and perpetuation of oppression, hidden within meaningless surface level change. We have recognised that what is needed instead is the radical decolonisation of this institution, which is necessarily linked to the black condition, both nationally and internationally (cited in Ndelu, 2020, p. 139).

Even while noting this problematisation of ‘transformation’, I would argue, based on passing observation, that ‘transformation’ remains resilient as an all-encompassing framework for socially inclusive change and redress in higher education. Universities like Cape Town and Stellenbosch still produce transformation reports, and decolonisation is simply an element
within the broader ambit of transformation. This means that in listening to the range of claims made under the umbrella of decolonisation, university management largely interpreted decolonisation as a call to ramp up their transformation efforts, fostering more inclusive communities that conferred equal recognition and belonging to all its constituent members—students, workers, academics.

To provide an account of an ideological crisis fomented by unequal citizenship is to inquire into the subject of decolonisation as an emancipatory praxis. In the context of the colonial university, who belongs in the category of oppressed and thus stands to be emancipated through this notion of decolonisation? On the whole, decolonisation is a racialised discourse of emancipation in South Africa. The subject belongs to the capacious, contested, and ultimately heterogenous category ‘black’. While black subjects negotiate belonging in the (South) African university, belonging within this category is also subject to contestation and negotiation. This means that in addition to disrupting unequal citizenship along racial fault lines, decolonisation can also be a politics of belonging in which the subject is shaped by varying configurations of race, class, gender, nation, sexuality, and Africa. To engage with this thematic is to interrogate the kind(s) of citizenship both contested and produced by discourses of decolonisation. Despite the centrality of race, it would be an oversimplification to say that the foregoing description of decolonisation as racial politics rigidly encloses it as a ‘black affair’. This would belie the character of the student movements, which began as multi-racial and multi-class alliances that ultimately took on a national character, even if this eroded over time. Moreover, decolonisation obviously has a transracial significance with practitioners and advocates across the spectrum of racial identification. Of course, this can all be true while equally observing decolonisation’s racialised spirit of animation. That is, in the South African context, decolonisation brings together a range of claims that describe universities as exclusionary institutions entangled in a resilient and ever-mutating colonial present (i.e., coloniality). Furthermore, these discourses are propagated by racialised subjects who understand exclusion and negotiate inclusion primarily in racial terms.

4.3. Decolonisation-as-citizenship: Race and non-Belonging

Animated by race-based claims of alienation and exclusion, decolonisation indexes a project of racial emancipation. The significance of race to a politics of decolonisation relies implicitly
and explicitly on a theorisation of race as a colonial identity. A constitutive feature of a world shaped by European imperialism and colonialism is the division and placement of the world’s population into racialised hierarchies (Quijano, 2000, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). As Achille Mbembe contends, ‘race has been a powerful, if destructive, force in the making of the modern world. It has separated masters from slaves, colonizers from colonized, settlers from natives, citizens from subjects’ (Mbembe, 2015a, p. 1). The construction and hierarchisation of racial identity functioned to delineate the boundaries of the category of ‘human’, conferring membership to some while dismembering others. Race and racialisation are thus aspects of subjectivity that survive formal colonial administration. Echoing Sylvia Wynter, decolonisation is a quest for autonomy where autonomy is defined as a struggle against ‘whiteness’ as a master signifier (Wynter, 2003; McKittrick, 2015). If the university is the site for the study of the human, this quest for autonomy critiques the self-deceiving notion of the ‘undifferentiated human’ and the racialised hierarchies it renders invisible (Mamdani, 2016).

Much of the early commentary explained the insurgent student decolonial consciousness in terms of race, citizenship, and belonging. Describing fallist decolonial rhetoric as ‘… a collective project of resistance of normative memory production’ through counter-memory evident in the contestation of hegemonic constructions of the past …’, Bosch notes the role of social media in cultivating ‘a new biography of citizenship characterised by more individualised forms of activism’ (Bosch, 2017, pp. 221, 230). For Xolela Mangcu, calls for decolonisation are responding to the de-emphasisation of race and racial inequality as the major fault line in South Africa. This is itself the effect of liberal and Marxist discourses that give primacy to colour-blindness and class. For Mangcu, it is significant that the sentiments animating #RhodesMustFall and others like #OpenStellenbosch were initiated in historically white universities, in addition to cutting across class boundaries (Mangcu, 2017b). Kathy Luckett contends that decolonisation is animated by grievances having to do with unequal access to civil society. Unequal citizenship is thus constituted by the contradictions faced by black students who are structurally and culturally conditioned, and differentiated as members of ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society. Non-belonging thus has material and ideological (cultural) dimensions, with members of political society feeling the combination of both more acutely (Luckett, 2016). Similarly, Mbembe (2016) and Lange (2019) describe decolonisation as entailing the cultivation of ‘pedagogies of presence’ in terms of a democratisation of access. As Mbembe explains,
But when we say access, we are not simply thinking in demographic terms, although these are crucial. When we say access, we are also saying the possibility to inhabit a space to the extent that one can say, ‘This is my home. I am not a foreigner. I belong here’. This is not hospitality. It is not charity (Mbembe, 2016, p. 30).

Noting the context of these critiques (HWUs), decolonisation emerged as a framework through which racialised affective communities interrogated experiences of exclusion in their universities. It foregrounds the question of belonging in South African universities, interrogating the regimes of inclusion and exclusion constitutive of their institutional and epistemic cultures. Institutional culture refers to the ‘…deeply embedded patterns of organizational behaviour and the shared values, assumptions, beliefs or ideologies that members have about their organization or its work’ and constituting ‘… the “way of life” of the university, known by those who work and study in the university environment through their lived experience’ (Peterson and Spencer, 1990, p. 6; Steyn and Van Zyl, 2001). On this understanding, insurgent discourses like decolonisation are championed by black students and academics ‘who are consciously aware that they are functioning within an academy that did not have them in mind as equal participants’ (Khunou et al., 2019, p. 3).

4.3.1. Black pain

Our existence as black people is defined by a violent system of power. The University’s processes and language naturalise that colonial system. Therefore, if we wish to get rid of that system of power, we have to destroy the processes altogether. Decolonisation is this very destruction (cited in Ndelu, 2020, p. 139).

What is the content of claims pertaining to an exclusionary institutional culture? As a notable conceptual contribution of fallism as a nascent decolonial ideology, the notion of ‘black pain’ provides the argument for an exclusionary institutional culture, an argument developed in student activist publications and protest repertoires. It is also evident in academic intellection on fallism, even if the term black pain is scarcely used.

The RMF mission statement references black pain as the locus of student grievances, and the concept is employed to refer to the dehumanisation of black people. One only has to look at the student protest repertoires to see what is at stake in this regard. The Rhodes statue was seen
to represent a glorification of a past that constructed blacks as sub-human and dehumanised them accordingly, thus pointing to the violence and pain symbolised by the statue. Even before the formation of RMF, UCT was in the process of reviewing its iconography and artworks when it established a task team on symbolism, signage, and heritage in January 2015 following public criticism in 2014.

During protests, other aesthetic expressions of black pain were evident. Student activist, Sandile Ndelu, describes and interprets a protest art installation titled #DeathOfDream at UCT,

Students created human figurines, wrapped them in body bags and scattered them all over Jammie Plaza – the focal point of the university. Students then sat and sang morbid struggle songs mourning the ‘death of their dreams’. The installation was intended to make visible the ‘social death’ that black students at the university are subjected to generally, as well as the specific untimely death of the academic futures of those students who were subject to legal or quasi-judicial proceedings following the tumultuous #Shackville protest in February 2016 (Ndelu, 2017, p. 78).

Accounts of racialised exclusion are often tied to the belief that those who really belong to the university are white. Such accounts of racialised hierarchies of belonging mean that white domination constitutes the other side of black alienation. A research participant describes decolonisation as a framework that visibilises white domination as the master signifier in South African society,

The first thing that comes to mind for me is, is that it's a call for people to realize that things are not normal, there is something that's amiss and when one does a very quick scanning through of the situation, it reminds them of the fact that white supremacy in this society is still something that [s] it's still the master signifier. Even though of course this is how the social order works it hides itself in many ways. So, the call to decolonize reveals those hidden places in which the master signifier which is white supremacy is operating in a way that many people might have overlooked over the years or decided for political expedience to not care about (Bongani, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

Reflecting this, some student protest repertoires took the form of anti-white sentiments. During the student protests, ‘fuck white people’ as well as other variations like ‘fuck white privilege’
and ‘fuck white racism’ was spraypainted on T-shirts and walls of university campuses like Wits and UCT. A notable case is Zama Mthunzi, a Wits FMF student activist who was photographed in 2016 wearing a T-shirt inscribed with ‘being black is shit’ and ‘fuck white people’ on the front and back respectively. He was threatened with expulsion and a case before the South African Human Rights Commission. Furthermore, Dean Hutton, inspired by Zama Mthunzi’s T-shirt, created an installation titled ‘fuck white people’ curated as part of Iziko South African National Gallery’s exhibition titled ‘The Art of Disruption’. The installation consisted of a wall and chair plastered with the words ‘fuck’ ‘white’ ‘people’ serialised in alternating lines. Responding to the FMF protests of 2016, Dean wore a suit printed with the same words as a catalyst to start everyday conversations around white supremacy, racism, and privilege, in addition to destabilising white spaces, to make the attitudes and prejudice of white people visible (Hutton, 2017). The exhibition was vandalised by the separatist Cape Party in Cape Town, with the artist subsequently referred to the Equality Court on charges of hate speech and unfair discrimination. These charges were dismissed by the court but did raise questions about the provocative and antagonistic dimensions of such rhetoric. The court concluded that Hutton’s art installation was provocative in a productive sense, calling for dialogue around dismantling race and racism in South Africa (De Vos, 2017).

Different institutional histories inflect the nature and emphasis in claims of an exclusionary institutional or epistemic culture. At historically white Afrikaans universities like Stellenbosch and Free State, claims around alienation and exclusionary institutional identity centred on the taaldebate (language debate) and its intersecting issues of language, race, and belonging. Following the birth of RMF, the Open Stellenbosch movement was formed, describing itself as ‘[A] collective of students and staff working to purge the oppressive remnants of apartheid in pursuit of a truly African university’ (Open Stellenbosch Collective, 2015b). In a YouTube video titled ‘Luister’ (Listen in Afrikaans), black students at the university chronicled the discrimination and racism experienced on campus. At the centre of these ‘oppressive remnants’ was an articulation of Afrikaans as a tool of exclusion (Contraband Cape Town, 2015).

Accounts of racially exclusionary institutional cultures can also be found in academic literature situated in the context of fallism and the imperatives of decolonisation. Studying while Black: Race education and emancipation in South African universities tracks the journeys of 80 students (74 of which were black) across 8 universities over between 2013 and 2017 (Swartz
et al., 2018). The authors find that race and class profoundly affect students’ lives and university experiences,

… many reported incidents and practices that reveal deep racial cleavages on campus. These include differential treatment of students by lecturers based on race, racial stereotypes, and the racialised nature of access to resources, student housing allocation, financial security and ability to pay fees. Furthermore, Black students struggled with feelings of inferiority and felt unwelcome in universities—many of whom retained colonial symbols and names as markers. Many students had never been taught by Black Professors, although junior staff members were frequently Black. Students were able to clearly discern the skewed racial make-up of staff, the privileging of English (and sometimes Afrikaans) on campus and the absence (or marginalisation) of African scholars and knowledge (Swartz et al., 2018, pp. viii–ix).

Similar findings are echoed on race, transformation, and citizenship in higher education both prior to and after the discursive hypervisibility of decolonisation (Walker, 2005b, 2005a; Department of Education, 2008; Kessi and Cornell, 2015; Walker and Loots, 2016; Cornell and Kessi, 2017; Jansen, 2017; Habib, 2019). Alienation and non-belonging equally characterise the experience of academic staff members. Situating itself in the current decolonial moment, the edited collection Black Academic Voices: The South African Experience provides personal accounts of predominantly black women in this regard. One of its contributors captures experiences of racial precarity,

Entering and participating in spaces not constructed with our bodies in mind often means that we attempt some form of justification for our presence. And so we engage in self-surveillance practices that cause us further anxiety and distract us from the real work of getting on with our development in both professional and personal capacities (Kiguwa, 2019, p. 20).

Among other things, the contributors situate the absence of a felt sense of belonging in their underrepresentation, the entrenchment of colour-blindness, the gendered definitions of achievement, and experiences of epistemic injustice. Writing in the context of a HWU, Grace Musila notes how some attitudes towards transformation engender interlocking narratives of ‘compulsory black exceptionalism’ and ‘compulsory success’. Default associations of
blackness with inferiority create the need to exceptionalise oneself as a non-beneficiary of transformation imperatives (Musila, 2019). This thus creates pressures and expectations of compulsory success in which failure is not an option for black academics. Accounts of epistemic injustice note the extent to which black women are seen as less than competent knowers. Sometimes, this is a socio-linguistic phenomenon, where the combination of one’s race and accent is seen as a marker of intellectual inferiority. In other accounts, some contributors note the credibility deficits that come with the regulation of affect in which certain kinds of affective dispositions function as bases of exclusion. In this regard, control images like ‘angry black woman’ or the general dismissal of women as emotional serves to undermine their epistemic credibility. This is often frustrating because institutional cultures elicit the very anger that is subsequently the basis of misrecognition (Khunou et al., 2019, p. 7).

4.3.2. Epistemic culture

The use of decolonisation to critique South African universities as colonial in their institutional form has strong epistemological dimensions. Herein, the central claim pertains to an exclusionary epistemic culture. South African universities, it is argued, are yet to take seriously issues of epistemological transformation as universities continue to bear and perpetuate a coloniality of knowledge often indexed as Eurocentrism. The post-apartheid higher education reform agenda has largely focused on the externalities of knowledge—issues of access in terms of representativity (equity) and throughput rates, mergers, qualification standards—while issues of epistemical coloniality and curricula content, it is argued, have often been marginal (Department of Education, 2008; Lange, 2017; Jansen, 2019).

At Wits university, student activists staged a protest in which they washed their course readers as a way of bringing attention to the need to ‘cleanse’ disciplinary curricula of its perceived colonial imprint. Course readers are compilations of textbook excerpts, book chapters, and journal articles given to students as part of their course material. As part of the protest, the activists painted their bodies and faces white, a symbolic reference to the assimilationist pressures that alienate black students. In a final act, the water used to wash the course readers was also used to wash the paint off their faces and bodies, signifying ‘… the decolonisation of the mind alongside that of the curriculum’ (Godsell et al., 2016, pp. 110–11).

Decolonisation as an intellectual project tended to be expressed in the idiom of African-centredness and calls for a university rooted in Africa is often seen as evidence of Pan-
Africanism as a key ideological pillar of fallist decolonial discourse, in addition to Black Consciousness and black radical feminism. Pan-Africanism is inferred from some of the long-term goals of the various student movements. In its mission statement, RMF, among other things, called on UCT to take seriously its ‘African positionality’ in order to transform itself as an African university, as opposed to a university in Africa. Similarly, following the momentum generated by events at UCT, Open Stellenbosch was formed as aspired to a ‘truly African university’. Both objectives see South African universities as ‘outposts of empire’ or ‘Europe in Africa’, such that university curriculum and pedagogy became key battlegrounds for foregrounding Africanity, with students asserting the need to,

Implement a curriculum which critically centres Africa and the subaltern. By this we mean treating African discourses as the point of departure – through addressing not only content, but languages and methodologies of education and learning – and only examining western traditions in so far as they are relevant to our own experience (cited in Ahmed, 2019).

At UCT, these demands were notably advanced by the Pan-Africanist Student Movement of Azania (PASMA). It described the university as afflicted by ‘Eurocentric epistemological and pragmatic ways of doing, embedded in westernized pedagogy, research and westernized forms and patterns of teaching and learning’ (cited in Ahmed, 2019, p. 139). In the days following Maxwele’s protest against the Rhodes statue, a seminar titled ‘What is African about UCT’ was convened (Institute for Humanities in Africa (HUMA), 2015). As such, among the many conversations fallist discourse created space for was the issue of the Africaness of African universities. I take up concretely this discourse of African-centredness in Chapter 5, which laments the hermeneutical marginalisation of African scholarship in teaching and learning, and the disciplinary communities to which academics in South Africa are integrated.

It is worth noting the role of terminologies like epistemic violence and epistemic injustice in articulating the kinds of exclusionary experiences that would warrant a critique of the South African university as colonial in its institutional form. These experiences employ configurations of race and Africa to argue that blacks and Africans are often constructed as less than competent knowers. Thus, one can suffer a testimonial injustice in the form of routinised credibility deficits as this student describes,
… you know back when I was still in first year, there was always that very patronizing but genuine compliment when the black kid in the class says something very, very, very basic, it's not remarkable at all. But because it was a black kid who says it, the tutor will be so like wonderful towards contribution in class. But if we're being honest this is a very basic contribution, any white kid could have made it and they've been making that contribution, but you don't congratulate them in the same way. But shame, it's a genuine thing because they try to sometimes encourage those one would call the ‘odd one out’ in class to be able to contribute more, but at the same time you can see it's patronizing because they don't say anything remarkable but because you are black you are doubted so much so that the most basic contributions are considered remarkable. It's remarkable that you would say it because we feel that you know nothing (Bongani, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

Equally, epistemic injustice can also take the form of what Kristie Dotson calls ‘testimonial smothering’, which effectively amounts to self-censorship (Dotson, 2011b). A student participant notes that while she feels quite radical about issues of decolonisation, she often feels coaxed towards a centrist disposition, truncating her real views to avoid being considered irrational,

So, I think that's just become my analytical point of view where I’ll argue for different tools rather than saying like we need to have a black agenda… I have to censor myself or no one will read my work past the introduction. So many times, I want to say something like ‘this is explicitly a way in which the West uses these tools to keep the Global South dependent’, but I obviously can’t say that. So, first I have to give a good analysis, an impartial analysis and then an impartial conclusion that hits. This is something that I've learned in reading most African political economists or development economists. All of them have the same kind of tone, where if you want to be listened to, you have to be quite centrist. Even though you're really angry, you can’t just you know… (Lerato, UCT, Commerce, 2019).

Similarly, reflecting on his experiences as a student of Philosophy, the participant below notes self-silencing in the kinds of examples he feels he can use in his work,
I am often aware that examples that would be close to home, close to a particular
cultural practice that people might not understand, and I saw that those examples would
be problematic to how people interpret my work. The result of that is for me to kind of
refrain from using things that are closer to home and using things that are broader and
more generic…I had to censor myself in a lot of ways, I had to censor the relevance of
my context and what it can contribute to the discipline. Because now, if you read my
work as much as I try to make it as you know [s] I guess that's the thing, if you read my
work and you're like this person is trying to make his work as broadly applicable as
possible, right. And there are certain elements in which your work should be broadly
applicable, but that shouldn't necessarily mean that your work cannot use things that
are applicable to particular contexts, right (Kagiso, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

In this atmosphere in which the putative Africanness of African universities is called into
question, curricula and pedagogical transformational instruments like extended degree
programmes were criticised as sites of epistemic injustice in their construction and
stigmatisation of black learners as less than competent knowers. These programmes have their
origins in academic support programmes designed to offer additional support to black students
given the deficiencies of Bantu education under apartheid. In the UCT Humanities faculty for
example, these programmes offer foundational courses developed and implemented in
partnership with faculties, with the aim of providing students with the requisite critical
analytical tools to engage with concepts and texts in their mainstream courses. Those enrolled
in these programmes tend to be students in ‘equity’ categories who do not meet Faculty
entrance criteria but are nonetheless seen to have the potential to succeed with supplementary
academic interventions. Furthermore, interventions like extended degree programmes (EDPs)
attend to student retention, academic success, and racial disparities in throughput rates.

Shannon Moreira (2017) offers a decolonial critique of the deficit model upon which these
interventions operate despite their noble intentions. EDPs are complicit in the representation
of black students as deficient because they lack the cultural capital required by the university.
This discourse of deficiency is used to make sense of low completion rates among first
generation black learners. In so doing, it displaces responsibility, expecting individual
responsibility for structural problems. That is, it is a discourse of students needing to adapt, as
opposed to a Eurocentric university curriculum/pedagogy/syllabus that has failed to adapt to
the cultural resources that students bring (Morreira, 2017, pp. 289–90). Employing the notion
that disciplines essentially create knowers through the cultivation of a particular disciplinary gaze, such that the humanities and social sciences are fundamentally concerned with both knowledge and identity, the need for decolonisation obtains when Eurocentrism is central to the construction of ‘ideal knowers’. ‘[A]ttempts to shift the curriculum, then, need to do more than deal with the supposed deficiencies of the knower: rather, they need to unearth the power dynamics at play in the curriculum itself… if transformation is to take place’ (Morreira, 2017, p. 292).

For example, in terms of universities adapting to the cultural resources that students do bring, language is of immense decolonial significance. It is often maintained that decolonisation requires unsettling the dominance of European languages in knowledge production by intellectualising African languages (Finlayson and Madiba, 2002; Prah, 2017a). This dominance tends to be seen as a marker of intellectual colonisation within discourses of decolonisation. Noting that student protest repertoires like songs and placards were often multilingual, several scholars in South Africa attach a sociolinguistic significance to fallist calls for a free decolonised education. They argue that these modes of communication are in sharp contrast to classroom spaces in historically monolingual universities. As such, decolonisation provides an opportunity to re-invigorate interventions like multilanguaging and translanguaging (Antia, 2015; Makalela, 2018a; Mwaniki, 2018; Antia and Dyers, 2019; Antia and Van der Merwe, 2019; Stroud and Kerfoot, 2020).

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‘Who belongs in the South African university’ is therefore a core issue in fallist discourses of decolonisation. The core thesis revolves around a racialised exclusion—dubbed black pain—of material, pyscho-social, and epistemological proportions. At the same time, it is worth noting that students went beyond etudialist concerns by foregrounding the university citizenship of non-academic staff through campaigns to end outsourcing initiated by union workers. Across a number of universities, an alliance of workers, left-leaning academics and students demanded that cleaning, gardening, catering, and security workers, who were contracted through private companies, were employed directly by the university. In addition, they called for a dignified living wage across all public institutions. For example, RMF called ‘on all students employed by their respective universities to “Down Tools” on the 6th of October 2015 as we band together to demand that insourcing become a principled commitment of the decolonised African public university’ (Ahmed, 2019, p. 34, emphasis mine).
Outsourcing absolved universities of a direct relationship with workers. Instead, worker issues are addressed by the management company that employed the workers to perform various services at the university. Therefore, in insisting that the university (and not private companies) be the primary locus of accountability, insourcing is significant because it confers belonging by making workers fully fledged members of the university community.

In earnest, the foregoing account only gives a flavour of the claims pertaining to an exclusionary institutional and epistemic culture I explore further in Chapter 5. While it is not exhaustive, it represents the range of experiences intelligible in the grammar of epistemic injustice and captured by a key conceptual contribution in fallist discourses—the notion of *black pain*. Black pain is the conceptual repository of non-belonging and unequal citizenship. Decolonisation is envisioned to centre black pain, which is emblematic of the dehumanisation of black students (Ahmed 2019).

Noting this definition by substitution, some argue black pain remains an undertheorised conceptual contribution despite being a central feature of the grievance of black students. Contrasting *ostensive* and *stipulative* explanations, Crain Soudien sees black pain as a conceptual contribution that was insufficiently developed in student discourses,

> An ostensive explanation is essentially one that invokes what are thought to be examples of a phenomenon to define and explain the phenomenon itself… A stipulative definition constructs the content of the phenomenon and then goes to look for it… It is essentially self-validating. ‘Black pain’ in most explanations rests on whatever the subject says it is. This is where, I suggest, decoloniality in South Africa struggles (Soudien, 2020, p. 45).

It is not immediately clear why the development of decolonial thought places primacy on a stipulative account of black pain. Perhaps this comes from the imputation of understandable anxieties around standpoint epistemology. In its formal definitions, institutional culture is often presented as accessible, in part, through lived experience. This is noteworthy as, in principle, the intuition behind standpoint epistemology is the belief that in certain dimensions of social relations, those who have first-hand experience of particular phenomena (e.g., racism) enjoy an epistemically privileged position in relation to its articulation.
Soudien’s worry might be that indulging in ostensive accounts of black pain flirts with an uncritical epistemology of deference (Táiwò, 2020). That is, one is uncomfortable with black pain being whatever the subject says it is. To some degree, this worry is also evident in Achille Mbembe’s early critique of black pain. For him, the equation of selfhood and pain was ontologically disturbing in its narcissism and tendency to mythologise whiteness. Moreover, this, narcissism, as a fusion of self and affect, sometimes serves to stifle argumentation: ‘Personal feelings now suffice. There is no need to mount a proper argument. Not only wounds and injuries can’t be shared, their interpretation cannot be challenged by any known rational discourse. Why? Because, it is alleged, black experience transcends human vocabulary to the point where it cannot be named’ (Mbembe, 2015b). However, Naidoo (2020, p. 88) has scathingly countered that the ‘... point of putting a language to black pain was not directed at white people, asking for their pity, it was to ignite and build (black) consciousness and analysis towards (black) solidarity and action.’

If pain is the basis of solidarity such to be black at HWUS is often to be part of an affective community bound by shared experiences pain, rage, alienation, what are the limits of such experiences as epistemic resources? Does pain give one knowledge of racism, how it works and how to dismantle it? Such questions about the relation between affect and cognition are motivated by a sense of some unproductive dimensions of affect. Affect can sometimes be an epistemic hurdle not just in the way that Mbembe describes, but also in the sense that one can internalise one’s oppression to produce insights undesirable in any meaningfully transformative sense. As such, the affective dimensions of lived experience have only an ambivalent productivity. Charitably, therefore, lived experience and its affective composition is at best necessary but insufficient for revolutionary knowledge. From the theoretical perspective of standpoint epistemology, belonging to an oppressed group by itself does not confer the kind of privileged insights necessary to dismantle it, as debates about racism in British higher education demonstrate following the publication of the Sewell report by the Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities. This notwithstanding, it is also important to note that lived experience (and its affective dimension) is more often a starting point from which one builds insights about the workings of oppression with a view towards dismantling it. This is to say that there is often a significant investment of intellectual labour in distilling such experiences into a revolutionary epistemology.
Noting but not dismissing these worries, I opt for a charitable interpretation of black pain as the basis of calls for a free decolonised education in South Africa. In the final analysis, these collective ‘ostensive’ accounts often portray a phenomenology of blackness (i.e., black pain) as an excluded affective community characterised by affective dispositions like rage, shame, pain, and ultimately alienation. The ‘black’ in black pain refers to a mode of consciousness that primarily understands these exclusionary experiences as racialised.

4.4. Fallism, Decolonisation and Citizenship

Fallist calls for the decolonisation of higher education had a broader significance for state–society relations. They mirrored the existential citizenship struggles that shape South Africa at a national level, thereby re-invigorating the national question (Webster and Pampallis, 2017). As such, the claims constitutive of decolonisation call into question the prevailing norms and regimes of citizenship that have typically configured the experience of belonging in South African more broadly. These primarily include the interlocking registers of rainbowism and liberal constitutionalism. In the process, universities are reconfigured as theatres staging national struggles against the coloniality of citizenship and belonging.

4.4.1. Death of the rainbow

Many have noted that the emergence of decolonisation, as a locus of emancipatory energies, symbolises the unsettling of rainbowism as a post-1994 legitimating ideology and as emblematic of the failures of South Africa’s negotiated consensus (Msimang, 2016; Lester, Osborne and Smith, 2017; Chikane, 2018; Gillespie and Naidoo, 2019; Kenyon and Madlingozi, 2022). Rainbowism, the discursive avatar of the country’s institutionalised reconciliatory approach to transitional justice and nationhood, has over time been called into question in different ways. Generally, these manifest as scepticism toward the extent of genuine integration, such as Grant Farred’s illustration of the partially unsuccessful national interpellation of coloured South Africans (Farred, 2001). Discourses of reverse racism, politically prominent in the DA opposition party in its commitment to individual rights, interpret redress measures like affirmative action and employment equity as a re-racialisation of South African society and thus undermining social cohesion. Another common mode of critique is rainbowism-as-ideology in the Marxist sense of a form of political consciousness that is self-deceiving, self-deceiving because it obscures economic hierarchies by sacrificing
restitution at the altar of reconciliation. It also masks the status hierarchies that characterise belonging experienced by those who live and work in South Africa. For example, feminists observe that women’s daily experiences of precarity and insecurity expose the gendered exclusions masked by the myth of a rainbow nation. Pumla Gqola has explored the relationship between gender violence and citizenship, illustrating how rape, rape culture, and sexual violence more generally construct a ‘female fear factory’ that renders women and black queers unable to feel safe in public spaces (Gqola, 2015, 2021). Equally noteworthy is the dissonance between xenophobia (Afrophobia) and rainbowism, a reality in which the enclosure of the nation is predicated on the precarity of refugees and African migrants (Nyamnjoh, 2006, 2016; Desai, 2008; Neocosmos, 2010; Everatt, 2011; Landau, Arian and Fauvelle-Aymar, 2011). Fallist articulations of decolonisation are equally situated in this critical approach towards the legitimating myths of nation-building. Recalling the ‘fuck white people’ protest repertoire, it is noteworthy that one of its variations included ‘fuck Mandela’s rainbow’ (Swartz et al., 2020; see also Kenyon and Madlingozi, 2022, on fallist critiques of Mandela’s mythologisation and rainbowism). Describing the ideological nature of rainbowism, fallist and former UCT SRC president Ramabina Mahapa notes,

In the new democratic dispensation, we have only been concerned with the ‘rainbow nation’ rhetoric and singing ‘kumbaya’ while our economy still reflects the same socio-economic disparities of the apartheid era. Democracy has granted a few blacks at the table; the rest are still fighting over breadcrumbs falling off the table (Mahapa, 2018, p. 12).

Chikane also contests the metaphorical value of rainbowism, showing up the limits of its imagery,

The failure of the rainbow nation motif can be seen, ironically, in its strongest symbolic attribute: its imagery. The colours of the rainbow never intersect. They merely blend together at their fringe, creating white hues where they do. The image reinforces the belief that we must co-exist with one another yet ensure that our diversity runs infinitely parallel without every truly integrating...Using the idea of the rainbow nation, we as a society, have trapped ourselves in a false understanding of our social reality...Instead, we are encouraged to ignore difference to make it easier for us to co-exist...It priorities
the acknowledgement of our differences over the understanding of them (Chikane, 2018, p. 5).

In this regard, he can be situated within attempts to provide more appropriate characterisations of South African society. For example, I’ve come across the critical description of South Africa as a ‘cappuccino society’—a black mass at the bottom with a dash of cream and chocolate sprinkles at the top—an ostensible reference to the racial profile of the economic elite, and how transformation has succeeded in de-racialising only the apex of the class structure (Chigumadzi, 2015). Long before the wave of student activism, others like Neville Alexander had wondered whether rainbowism was ever an apt metaphor to aspire to anyway. He maintained that the rainbow nation metaphor obscured the contradictions that characterise post-apartheid South Africa and offered the Gariep river as an alternative national metaphor to aspire to (Alexander, 1996). Like the river, which runs from the Lesotho mountains in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west, the idea of South Africa as a national entity ‘... is constituted by the confluence of many different tributaries, which have their origin in different catchment areas and which are constantly changing and being changed both by the formation of new tributaries and by the back wash effects from the mainstream, which flows majestically into the great ocean of humanity’ (Tayob, 1998, p. 108).

4.4.2. Decolonisation as the contestation of the past and present

One can situate fallist calls for decolonisation in a broader disillusionment with how questions of citizenship and liberation were worked out in anti-apartheid struggle. The exclusionary dimensions of nation and citizenship in colonial and apartheid South Africa were met with resistance under the broad umbrella of African nationalism, which produced various alternative conceptions of nationhood and citizenship. These variations reflect differing emphases on the nature of oppression and domination, as well as the necessary character of emancipatory oppositional politics. Emancipatory struggle was thus characterised by competing definitions of the people and belonging within the nation. In this historical context, Clyde Halisi distinguishes two rival images of citizenship, belonging, and national identity: multiracial unionism and black republicanism; the former is espoused by the ANC (in its alliances with the SACP and UDF) and the latter associated with PAC, AZAPO, and BCM (SASO). These two visions differ in the extent to which nationalist conceptions are race conscious as opposed to non-racial. There is some ambiguity about the meaning of non-racialism. Like Soske (2015), one can ask,
Does non-racialism entail the elimination of racial inequality or the disappearance of racial identities altogether? In other words, would a non-racial South Africa be a fundamentally African society where the majority could shape the national identity through democratic means or should the distinction between majority and minority lose all relevance? (Soske, 2015, p. 3).

In the early years of the ANC, anti-apartheid resistance was shaped by liberal political philosophy and liberal gradualism. Oppression and domination were understood in terms of a racialised denial of democratic citizenship and labour exploitation. As such, the liberation agenda was formulated as the extension of equal citizenship across racial divides. By the 1940s, the ANC espoused a social democratic politics that incubated a nascent non-racialism—a vision of the nation that it embraced at its founding conference in 1912. Given that nationhood and citizenship were premised on racial and ethnic exclusions, the founding of a national congress sought to transcend distinct ethnic identities through a unified African people. By de-racialising and de-ethnicising citizenship, it hoped to forge an African identity premised on individualistic rights. On this account, one could argue that ANC political praxis operationalised non-racialism as the elimination of racial inequality in citizenship and belonging within the nation. In this regard, over time, it came to advocate an oppositional politics premised on interracial solidarity—a broad coalition that functioned as a united front against racial domination by advocating for the deracialisation of civil and political rights. It thus imagined a liberated South Africa as a multiracial union, with these commitments notably captured in the 1955 Freedom Charter.

This nascent non-racialism would be contested by an Africanist current championed by the ANC Youth League (ANCYL). No doubt in response to the increasing alienation of black South Africans under intensified state repression in the face of demands for the de-racialisation of citizenship, the CYL remains central to an alternative national conception premised on racial nationalism. This younger generation criticised its elders for their liberal gradualism, elitism, and failure to develop a national character, among other things. The formation of the Congress Youth League was envisioned to impart on the ANC ‘truly national character’. Its manifesto asserts that: ‘[T]he Congress Youth League must be the brains-trust and power-station of the spirit of African nationalism; the spirit of African self-determination; the spirit that is so discernible in the thinking of our Youth’ (ANCYL, 1944). It took on the task of raising national
consciousness and foregrounded the imperative of National liberation of Africans by themselves. Reading the oppressive relations as rooted in the colonial dispossession of Africans, Africanists tended to call for black unity in response to racial domination. This racial solidarity was wedded to a metaphysical discourse of African spiritual and cultural uniqueness: ‘We believe in the unity of all Africans from the Mediterranean Sea in the North to the Indian and Atlantic oceans in the South – and that Africans must speak with one voice’ (Ibid).

At stake therefore was the issue of who belonged to a liberated South Africa. In contrast to the Charterist multiracial unionism in which South Africa belonged to all who lived in it, black republicanism offered an account of citizenship based on exclusionary configurations of race, nation, and Africa. For Halisi: ‘Black republicans believed that citizenship should be rooted in African communal identities, values, and virtues. For the black republican, a true Azanian must be African either by descent or commitment. To be an Azanian implied a genuine identification with the right of the African people to self-rule and to reclaim all of their ancestral land’ (Halisi, 1997b, p. 68).

Bringing this history to bear on the fallist protests, Gillespie and Naidoo (2019) situate the delegitimation of rainbowism against the backdrop of a historical context in which the ANC’s multiracial unionism has attained hegemonic status—consolidated in a liberal constitutionalist order. In developing this vision of a South Africa that belonged to all who lived in it, the ANC-SACP alliance offered a distinct account of South Africa’s oppressive social order as ‘colonialism of a special type’, which framed emancipation in terms of a two-stage revolution comprising a national democratic revolution (NDR)—the democratisation of citizenship rights—and a socialist revolution from capitalist exploitation. For Gillespie and Naidoo, fallist discourses around decolonisation are significant because they suggest a revolt against the assimilationist requirements of the NDR as the avatar of a multiracial political order. The emergence of decolonisation as an anti-assimilationist ‘politics of blackness’ signifies a disillusionment with how the relationship between citizenship and liberation was worked out, with assimilation into a liberal democratic order becoming an end in itself, insufficiently examining and transforming the thing into which one was assimilating. They argue,

The assimilationist project of having black people enter the existing state and economic infrastructure no longer holds as the first stage of a necessary development toward socialism or any other radical future. The assimilation has become an end in itself. It is
understood not as an unfolding of social contradiction explicitly mobilized toward a more just future but as a pervasive status quo, a stuckness (Gillespie and Naidoo, 2019, p. 233).

This disillusionment sustains the critical energies that undermine the idea of rainbowism through a process of ‘collective conscientisation’. The protests around decolonisation were a creative pedagogical process in that a key dimension to the disruptive politics espoused by students was the creation of alternative spaces and platforms for teaching and learning (Naidoo, 2015). In engaging the university as a pedagogical arena, classroom boundaries were expanded as students took leadership and ownership in educating themselves, often through performance art and reading groups. The RMF movement at UCT notably had an education sub-committee, where an occupied space christened ‘Mafeje room’ served as an intellectual incubator where readings on Black Consciousness, black radical feminism, and Pan-Africanism were debated (Chikane, 2018; Ahmed, 2019).

Equally important is that this process of collective conscientisation embodied memory work, or more specifically counter-memory. Carli Coetzee notably explores the movements through the lens of ‘memory’ and the metaphor of ‘blood’, subsequently describing fallists as engaging in ‘multi-directional memory’, demonstrating their competencies as skilled readers of the past and the ‘blood’ of their parents. Similarly, Naidoo (2020, p. 16) contends that through ‘collective critical reflective labour’ and ‘creative disruptions’, RMF produced black student intellectuals. In questioning how the past is remembered, fallists inscribed themselves as part of a national collective conscientisation process about the limits of South Africa’s post-apartheid negotiated consensus, contesting South Africa’s past and present, and the various labels by which it is memorialised, such as ‘post-apartheid’, ‘rainbow nation’, and ‘born frees’ (Chikane, 2018; Coetzee, 2019; Naidoo, 2020).

The NDR is consecrated in a liberal constitutional order which forges a new national identity through democratic citizenship via the deracialisation of the rights and, broadly speaking transformative constitutionalism. Kayum Ahmed posits that liberal constitutionalism and its grammar of human rights are equally subject to contestation for its failure to confer meaningful citizenship in both its material and affective dimensions. Interrogating the interplay of racial politics and human rights, Ahmed tentatively observes the rejection of a human rights framework in addressing racial oppression. Instead, the student activists adopted
‘decolonisation’, arguing that human rights in general and the South African Constitution in particular are exclusionary and anti-black. In this regard, decolonisation is not necessarily a repudiation of the idea of human rights, for example, as protections against the excesses of the state and market (Ahmed, 2018, 2019). As Chikane (2018, p. 31) states, ‘the rejection of the rainbow nation is not the rejection of the belief in equal liberties and freedoms. It is the rejection of the normalisation of injustice despite these liberties’. The demise of the rainbow nation ideology is a rejection of what these frameworks are perceived to symbolise in post-1994 SA today—an entrenchment of racial privilege and thus exclusionary citizenship, and thus an ideological framework masking a suspended and incomplete liberation—what African intellectuals have criticised on the continent more broadly as flag independence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). Such claims foreground the coloniality of citizenship and belonging by showing the limits of South Africa’s negotiated consensus.

As much as an analysis of fallism supports the argument of ‘falling rainbows’ (Lester et al., 2017), it is important to acknowledge that this argument admits some qualification. In the course of this doctoral project, I co-authored a paper which examined the attitudes of a nationally representative sample of South Africans to the ‘fuck white people’ phenomenon discussed earlier (Swartz et al., 2020). Citizenship and belonging feature strongly in responses and attitudes towards this rhetoric. On the one hand, the Equality Court saw Hutton’s provocation as enhancing social cohesion and nation building, thus contributing to attenuating the racialised vertical relationships that impinge on citizenship as a relationship of equality (Thulare, 2017). On the other hand, according to the study, an overwhelming majority (81%) of South Africans adopted negative attitudes towards such rhetoric. Within this camp, 26% based their rejection on a social cohesion argument, maintaining that such rhetoric significantly undermined chances of inter-racial racial harmony in South Africa. Such responses are significant, suggesting ‘… that some South Africans are committed, at least rhetorically, to the ideal of a rainbow nation and therefore support “peace” and “civility”, however ideologically laden, in the midst of social transformation’ (Swartz et al., 2020, p. 18). In fact, only 4% felt such rhetoric should be praised for bringing attention to racism in South Africa.

Furthermore, noting debates around language and race in Stellenbosch University, the defence of Afrikaans often appeals to rainbow nation ideals and the right to mother tongue education provided for within the liberal constitutional order. As a sort of counter-memory to the prevailing memorialisation of Afrikaans as a language of oppression, its defenders foreground
its multicultural, rainbow-like history, positioning it as a bearer of cultural diversity and thus underscoring its potential for nation-building. Equally, the constitutional order is the legal framework that enshrines employment equity as a tool of transformation and redress, to the extent that arguments around the nurturing of a black professoriate have legal backing. Nonetheless, these qualificatory examples are consistent with my overall argument on the premise that it is rather the illumination of the ideological nature of rainbowism and liberal constitutionalism, rather than their outright rejection, that is the matter at hand.

4.5. Fallism, Decolonisation, and the Politics of Belonging

To further illuminate the significance of the emergence of decolonisation in terms of citizenship and belonging, let us again return to the question: *Who is the subject for whom emancipation is sought?* As much as decolonisation intervenes against unequal citizenship to emancipate a black subject, *it is also characterised by conflict-prone attempts to foreground a capacious and heterogenous account of blackness*. I propose to unpack this by looking at how decolonisation emerged ideologically. In this instance, I focus on the decolonial framework developed by Rhodes Must Fall. Its critique of UCT as colonial in its institutional form erected Black Consciousness, black radical feminism, and Pan-Africanism as ideological pillars of Fallism. They do not necessarily represent three different factions of students. Rather, their complementary and contradictory relationship tell us how students sought to understand race as a category in its relationship to a project of decolonisation. Therefore, in noting the regimes of inclusion and exclusion characteristic of fallist discourses of decolonisation, I illuminate decolonisation-as-citizenship as a *politics of belonging*.

4.5.1. Black Consciousness (BC)

It is unsurprising that Black Consciousness would feature in a discourse of racialised alienation and emancipation. In critiquing the post-apartheid university as racially exclusionary in material and ideological terms through the grammar of ‘black pain’, the influence of BC on fallism manifests as race consciousness, racial solidarity, and a re-evaluation of white allyship in anti-racist struggle. Mabogo More contends that ‘[Q]uestions of liberation from oppression involve questions about the means to overcome that oppression. Throughout the ages of struggle against racial oppression, for example, collective black identity and solidarity has been one of the favourite responses and rallying call for racial justice and liberation’ (More, 2009,
The Black Consciousness Movement notably developed by Steve Biko is one such example: ‘We are oppressed not as individuals ... we are oppressed because we are black. We must use that very concept to unite ourselves and to respond as a cohesive group. We must cling to each other with the tenacity that will shock the perpetrators of evil’ (Biko, 1978, p. 97).

In responding to institutional racism through racial solidarity, fallists appropriated Black Consciousness discourse in a number of ways. We have already noted the issue of black pain as the vocabulary for racialised experiences of exclusion, despite criticisms that it is lacking in stipulative conceptual depth (Soudien, 2020). In addition, one of the legacies of BCM is its reconstitution of ‘black’ as a category. Biko notably refashioned black as a political identity, inclusive of all oppressed groups in South Africa, that is, ‘those who are by law or tradition politically, economically and socially discriminated against as a group in South African society and identifying themselves as a unit in the struggle towards the realisation of their aspirations’ (Biko, 1978, p. 52). This meant that black was inclusive of all the apartheid population groups racially interpellated as inferior in a social order anchored in white domination (i.e., Coloured, Indian, black African (previously rehearsed as Bantu)). The popular terminology for this political identity today is ‘Biko-black’. Fallist mission statements did gesture towards this BC political vocabulary. For example, in a rather unfortunate use of American terminology, RMF acknowledges blackness as a political identity and defines black as ‘all people of colour’. Equally, Biko’s category of ‘non-white’ is mobilised to critique the colonial university,

It is saddening to see institutions of higher learning, like UCT, being the hub of massive creation of non-whites (blacks who worship at the altar of whiteness). UCT’s environment propagates Uncle Toms (i.e., black subservients) who will take every opportunity to ridicule blacks who speak of the problem of racism; they claim it is class antagonisms. Liberal institutions are the factories that offer blacks who aspire to be white, despite their pigmentation, an opportunity to do so (Mahapa, 2018, p. 14).

Another important feature of BC was its position on white allyship and critique of ‘white liberals’ in anti-apartheid struggle. Recalling the Africanist debates of the 1940s and 50s, it is clear that the involvement of whites in anti-apartheid struggle was a major source of disagreement within the ANC. This issue gained even more importance in the leadership vacuum intensified by apartheid repression. BCM, like the Africanists who would eventually
constitute the PAC, tried to move away from a mode of politics that appealed to the moral sensibilities of whites. Although the category of ‘white liberal’ was often so capacious as to be analytically unhelpful, the more productive dimension to what it indexed was a problematic account to integration as the aim of struggle. Integration was seen to mask an asymmetrical assimilation-type politics, such that white liberalism was simply a pejorative for a mode of anti-apartheid struggle aimed at relaxing certain oppressive legislations and to allow blacks into a white-type society (Turner, 1972, citing SASO Manifesto). This is tendentious integration is obscured by the liberal endorsement of non-racialism (Biko, 1978, p. 21). In student protest discourse, we find similar critiques of ‘white liberalism’. In a poem titled ‘I am so tired’, for example, Ntokozo Qwabe (2018, pp.1–2) opines,

I am tired of ‘progressive’ white liberals who spend time trying to save us when the white community needs the most saving.
I am tired of white liberals whose ‘activism’ is for woke points and an eternal shield from their own white supremacy ever being problematised/engaged with.
I am tired of white liberals who want us to ‘teach’ them what to do.
I am so tired. (pp. 1–2)

The foregoing does not mean that decolonisation, in adopting a BC framework, is a black affair. While blacks are called upon to reflect on ‘the cause of their oppression—the Blackness of their skin—and to operate as a group to rid themselves of the shackles that bind them to perpetual servitude’, BC can be seen to entail a moral division of labour (Biko, 1978, p. 91). For Swartz, following from BC, ‘[W]hite people, on the other hand, should reflect on their acts of racism (individual and institutional), and on the privileges that racism confers on them, and come up with ways to cease their practices and relinquish these privileges in order to build an equal society’ (Swartz, 2016, p. 49). Put simply, even if crudely, Black Consciousness ought to inspire a White Consciousness. This lays the groundwork for true integration and mutual recognition, which Biko describes in the following words,

One does not need to plan for or actively encourage real integration. Once the various groups within a given community have asserted themselves to the point that mutual respect has to be shown then you have the ingredients for a true and meaningful integration. At the heart of true integration is the provision for each man, each group to rise and attain the envisioned self. Each group must be able to attain its style of
existence without encroaching on or being thwarted by another. Out of this mutual respect for each other and complete freedom of self-determination there will obviously arise a genuine fusion of the lifestyles of the various groups (Biko, 1978, p. 27).

The RMF mission statement equally calls for a dual struggle requiring both Black and White Consciousness. It emphasised the necessity of a black-led movement, limiting white involvement so long as that participation took place on their terms. As I have shown, this is very much in tune with the historical debates of the BC intellectual tradition. At UCT, white consciousness, as described above by Biko, took the form of the White Privilege Project, which later renamed itself Disrupting Whiteness, which committed itself to allyship and self-work (Disrupting Whiteness, 2015).

This moral division of labour generated a political praxis very much built upon ‘safe spaces’, and it was not uncommon that white students in mass meetings would be asked to ‘shut up and listen’ or be expelled altogether. Nonetheless, its significance at the level of citizenship and belonging is clear. In a context of unequal citizenship (non-belonging), we see that disaffected members of the university community create alternative spaces of belonging that create new dynamics of inclusion and exclusion.

Race consciousness, racial solidarity, and the role of whites in anti-racist struggle are all elements that show the appropriation of the Black Consciousness tradition in the demand for a free decolonised education. While everyone stands to be emancipated from unjust racialised orders, Black Consciousness is primarily focused on blacks as the primary locus of emancipatory agency. Noting this, a BC approach to decolonisation raises some critical questions more generally. What are the limits of racial solidarity as a response to racial oppression? One could be sceptical about any racial basis for solidarity. Such reservations tend to build on the scientific invalidity of race as a category, and racial solidarity is often critiqued on the basis of its potentiality for nativism, essentialism, and ultimately racial nationalism (Appiah, 1993). Moreover, for some, BC’s inclusive reconstitution of blackness overlooks its strains of commitment. In the recent Twitter fallout from former Wits VC Adam Habib’s use of the n-word, some interpreted the incident as demonstrating the limits of Biko-blackness on two interrelated grounds: the incommensurability of racialised discrimination among those it envelops and the obfuscation of ingroup racism (Ebrahim, 2021). These responses were notably
counteracted by an insistence on the inclusive, political conception of blackness foregrounded by the Black Consciousness Movement.

Another question regards whether racial solidarity in and of itself is dialectically productive in the journey towards a non-racial society (Lamola, 2017). Part of this touches on whether the praxis of safe spaces is a temporary or permanent phenomenon; and if they become permanent, do they differ from segregated spaces? I remember reflecting on this issue when Ngugi wa Thiongò visited UCT to speak on language and decolonisation on 3 March 2017 at the launch of the Institute for Creative Arts (ICA) Great Texts/Big Questions Lecture Series. The lecture was silently disrupted by a student who sat beside him throughout the evening while holding up a placard that read ‘South African education is exiling poor black disabled people.’ During the question-and-answer session, the chair Xolela Mangcu rejected calls to expel white members in the audience on the grounds that black students could not be expected to sit among their oppressors. Interestingly, Mangcu would later chastise the interruption from an African-centred perspective. Appealing to ‘respect for elders, he argued that ‘[D]ecolonisation that assaults African values is not worth its salt’ (Mangcu, 2017a). I remember thinking that at the intersection of safe spaces and solidarity is the possibility for a praxis of belonging defined along diminishing circles of inclusion. For in a world mapped out in terms of oppressors and oppressed, one is always part of networks that guarantee simultaneous membership to putatively oppressed and oppressive groups. As such, although the call for expulsion was a racial one, it seemed to me that taken to its logical conclusion in a fluid network of oppressors and oppressed, there would be no one left to hear Prof. wa Thiongo’o speak. Perhaps at some point, he himself might have had to leave the room.

The politics of belonging is very much tied to this question on the limits of racial solidarity. One simply has to reflect on the question—*who is the black for whom representation is sought?* There is a potential for hierarchies of blackness such that one’s blackness can be called into question. Although BC reconfigures blackness into an inclusive political category, distinctions like ‘non-white’, ‘Biko-black’, ‘black-black’, and ‘coconut’ employ a combination of phenotype, ideological, and class-based qualifications on one’s blackness as Chikane (2018) and Ahmed (2019) demonstrate in the case of RMF at UCT. Responding to exclusion, decolonisation sometimes produces its own regimes of inclusion and exclusion in the form of contestations around just how black one is. Apartheid racialised categories like Indian and Coloured tend to be considered Biko-black, while ‘black-black’ denotes a configuration of race
and Africa—the racialisation of Africanity—that produces the category ‘black African’, which tends to be perceived, not without contestation, as the reservoir of authenticity.

4.5.2. **Black radical feminism and the politics of intersectionality**

While Black Consciousness, Pan-Africanism and intersectionality served to provide some ideological unitary grounding, there were accusations that race tended to be seen as the sole locus of oppression to the exclusion of gender and sexuality (Mpofu-Walsh, 2016; Matandela, 2017; Xaba, 2017; Knowles, 2020). In this ideological grounding, intersectionality—a conceptual innovation in the black radical feminist tradition—is often mobilised as a check against the excesses of Black Consciousness/race thinking. The intersectional approach was significant in expanding the content of ‘black pain’, to encompass experiences of sex and gender inequality and sexual violence, foregrounding both racism and patriarchy as intersecting structures of oppression and targets of decolonisation. Intersectionality proved a conceptual resource for avoiding the strategic essentialism of a singular black experience, employed as a way of ‘taking into account that we are not only defined by our blackness, but that some of us are also defined by our gender, our sexuality, our able-bodiedness, our mental health, and our class, among other things’ (Rhodes Must Fall, 2015, in Ahmed, 2019). Notably, there was an intersectional audit committee in RMF’s organisation that was charged with mainstreaming intersectionality in fallist decolonial praxis and the political education of its members.

In practice, intersectionality functioned to critique the erasure of black women in the struggle both historically and contemporaneously. Matandela (2017), writing as a fallist on the experience of black women in RMF and FMF at UCT, contends that both movements were tense spaces of liberation and alienation. Illustrating the limits of BC, Matandela invokes intersectionality as an analytical tool to (1) resist the tendency to privilege the male subject and (2) expose the complexity of oppression often rendered invisible by the aforementioned privileging. Similarly, Hlengiwe Ndlovu (2017, p. 68), a fallist at Wits, ethnographically describes picket-lines as a ‘contested space that privileges masculinity while womxn’s bodies are often objectified’ erasing their labour and significance in building the Fees Must Fall movement (Ndlovu, 2017, p. 68). As demands for a free decolonised education increasingly became violent, some student activists offered gendered criticisms of violence as a disruptive strategy. For Wanelisa Xaba (2017), the violent turn was symptomatic of dominant hyper-masculinist modes of resistance that marginalised other forms of protests advocated by feminist and queer subjectivities. Student protest repertoires equally demonstrate attempts to centre
women and sexuality in fallist discourse. For example, Ndlovu (2017) gives an account of the naked protest of 4 October 2016, where the women’s bodies were employed to perform vulnerability in order to arrest violence. Equally, in March 2016 on the one-year anniversary of RMF at UCT’s Centre for African Studies (CAS), trans activists disrupted a commemorative photographic exhibition to protest their erasure from the movement (Ahmed, 2019, p. 49).

4.5.3. **Pan-Africanism**

Pan-Africanism is possibly the least developed framework ideological pillar of fallist calls for a free decolonised education. As we have already noted, it is often inferred from student demands for African-centredness in the university’s institutional and epistemic culture. It is also inferred from student protest repertoires and the ways in which they connect past and present. An example is the use of the name ‘Azania’ as an alternative designation for a liberated South Africa made popular by both the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and BCM (Halisi, 1997).

In a context where decolonisation was used to foreground a racial politics to negotiate more equitable citizenship and belonging in higher education, underlying the adoption of Pan-Africanism is a desire to cultivate an internationalist ethic within the politics of blackness. As such, if BC advances the necessity of racial solidarity, Pan-Africanism looks to develop this along transnational lines. This internationalism mitigates against South African exceptionalism and in so doing, legitimates shared collective continental and diasporic experiences of colonial and imperial histories of oppression and dispossession. Furthermore, in a context like South Africa with its history of xenophobic enclosures of the nation through physical violence, political rhetoric, and legal exclusion, this ideological pillar is significant especially considering the affinity for Africanity in institutional self-presentation. Despite this, some question the extent to which a Pan-Africanist ethic was successfully cultivated by noting the absence of a theoretical link between decolonisation and contemporary xenophobia in South Africa (Nyamnjoh, 2016; Kasembeli, 2020).

Pan-Africanism provides an ideological basis that calls into question the Africanness of South African universities. Africanity serves as a basis for a renewed institutional identity, foregrounding an Africanisation discourse that is not new in South African universities. It has often been pursued under the broader neoliberal imperative of ‘internationalisation’, with universities looking to hire scholars from the continent and encouraging co-operative
relationships with universities and scholars on the continent. Thus, even prior to the hypervisibility of decolonisation, there was at least a prevailing Pan-African rhetoric that sought to position universities in South Africa as African (Seepe, 2004).

Beyond questioning the rootedness of the university in Africa on epistemological grounds, materialist claims are also at stake. In a context where fees are marked as racially exclusionary, an argument that seems to have gone under the radar is the question of international fees. Here, internationalisation is situated within the context of a neoliberalised higher education landscape that increasingly places the responsibility of funding on fee-paying students. In this regard, international students are a notable source of funding, given that they pay much higher fees which often cross-subsidise the state and its ostensible nationals. However, for some African international students in South Africa, the call for a free decolonised education was lamented as a distinctly South African affair, leaving them unsure about the possibilities for their participation. Thus Raghuram, Breines, and Gunter, (2020, p. 95) argue that ‘… if decolonisation is to go beyond national boundaries and to incorporate pan-African visions fees must fall, not only in South Africa, but also for international students. Yet, international students and their financial situations are often overlooked in discussions over fees as they are seen as foreigners, or as privileged and seeking to reproduce advantage through international study’. Such arguments rely on positing national boundaries as colonial arrangements and outcomes of imperial competition, and thus the sort of thing that a decolonial praxis ought to transcend.

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When taken together, these ideological pillars are significant with respect to a politics of belonging as they are the tools through which one works out the subject of decolonisation. This exercise can proceed along inclusionary and exclusionary trajectories, such that decolonisation, from the perspective of citizenship and belonging, is an opportunity structure of myriad possibilities demonstrated by its varied claims and forms of claim-making. If discourses of black pain nominally foreground a black subject, the interaction between these three pillars insists on a capacious and heterogenous conception of blackness (Naidoo, 2020). Moreover, this nascent decolonial ideology suggests that belonging and non-belonging are articulated at two levels—black students on the periphery of HWUs and black students within putative spaces of emancipation like RMF (Ahmed, 2019; Naidoo, 2020).
The interaction within this triadic ideological framework suggests that the subject of decolonisation is shaped by configurations of race, nation, gender, and Africa, and each pillar offers various degrees of inclusivity while retaining potential for exclusion. BC is notably inclusive by its reconfiguration of blackness as a political identity to include all oppressed apartheid population groups. Black radical feminism centres a racialised and gendered subjectivity by challenging the tendency to privilege the male subject in emancipatory discourse. Equally, Pan-Africanism looks to escape the nationalisation of decolonisation by considering how Africans beyond South Africa feature in debates and conceptualisations of a decolonised university. In this regard, put crudely, racism, patriarchy, and Afrophobia, among other things, are articulated as notable obstacles to a decolonial subjectivity.

At the same time, the foregoing is not a seamless unity as these pillars are often in tension with one another. A full appreciation of their tensions underlies the regimes of inclusion and exclusion internal to decolonisation as an emancipatory project. RMF students often debated the relationship between Pan-Africanism and intersectionality informed by historically recurring critiques of Pan-Africanism as obfuscating gendered and class fault lines, among other things. Equally, the inclusivity of BCM is undermined by distinctions like ‘coconuts’, black African and Biko-black which provide the raw materials for hierarchies of blackness which can translate into inequities in felt senses of group membership. Moreover, even when unity among these population groups is achieved, it could ultimately be restricted on the basis of nationality. Of course, there is always a spectrum of internal variation along various axes among members of any group. But the issue here appears to be the facility with which difference is seduced by notions of hierarchy. Intersectionality sometimes lends itself to regressive interpretations resulting in a cult of victimhood often termed ‘oppression olympics’ or ‘competitive victimhood’ (Hancock, 2011; Young and Sullivan, 2016). Misreading intersectionality as theorising a hierarchy as opposed to the matrix of oppression, marginalised groups sometimes proceed to determine the weight of their many intersectionalities of oppression in order to delineate the ultimate victim—the true reservoir of authentic revolutionary agency. This is exclusionary because its alienating potential invariably invalidates the experiences of others in the race for the gold medal (Yuval-Davis, 2012; A. Nyamnjoh, 2017).
4.6. Decolonisation-as-citizenship: Crisis of Representation?

By discussing decolonisation as a praxis of citizenship and belonging in South African higher education, I have tried to show the content of claims pertaining to unequal citizenship, in addition to the constitutive politics of belonging characteristic of the fallists’ ideological framework. Building on this, I wish to note an added significance of such illustrations. It is my contention that these issues of unequal citizenship and belonging are undergirded by issues of representation. In denoting belonging and membership to a political community, citizenship is intimately bound up with representation. Often, contestations over citizenship are struggles for and about representation. This co-constitution is often worked out in the idiom of recognition and rights, such that the status of ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’ are felt as varying degrees of effective representation. Seen from this perspective, the emergence of decolonisation as a popular vocabulary for change directly and indirectly foregrounded a few important questions linked to issues of representation within the university. These include questions like ‘Am I/Are we effectively represented in existing governance mechanisms’ to ‘what does it mean to be represented in substantive terms.’

To begin with, the discourse on the decolonisation question is: ‘Who is represented in South African universities and the nation more generally?’ In illustration, I have talked about registers of belonging and regimes of inclusion and exclusion along racial, class, and gender fault lines. Furthermore, this emergent decolonial consciousness equally interrogates the content of representation—that is, the substantive claims the bestowment of which confer representation. I have shown the material and ideological issues illuminated in this regard.

Equally at stake is an evaluation of the existing governance mechanisms meant to enforce citizenship, representation, and belonging. That is, does the university actually have the capacity to deliver on the claims animated by decolonisation. This pertains to the efficacy of how one is represented. First, one should note the proliferation of groups like RMF, FMF (in its dimension as a student-worker alliance), and the Black Academic Caucus, which lie outside traditional governance structures like Student Representative Councils, Faculty Councils or the university Senate, and trade unions. Equally, the organisation of RMF and FMF and their collective preference for horizontal, direct governance structures suggests a mode of political participation that signals a lack of faith in traditional vertical governance structures (Booysen, 2016; Jansen, 2017; Habib, 2019). Comparing FMF and the Marikana workers strike (2012),
for example, Camalita Naicker observes a significant appropriation of forms of popular politics existing outside the ‘official domain’, representing an emerging political praxis similar to urban social movements and independent strike committees as opposed to traditional forms of representation like political parties (and their student branches), SRCs, and trade unions (Naicker, 2016).

Furthermore, on the how of governance, the character of fallist protest culture as a non-partisan, multi-racial, multi-class, national, and leaderless movement has a representative significance. It is true that this character withered with time, increasingly eroded by a violent turn and the encroachment of party politics and affiliation (Everatt, 2016; Habib, 2019). Nonetheless focusing on the perceived absence of clear leaders is significant in terms of an experimental democratic praxis and democracy as a mode of political representation. Noting the preceding argument about the perceived inadequacies of traditional governance mechanisms, Fallists could themselves be read as making democratic claims. That is, traditional university governance is insufficiently democratic. There is scope for further research here on the theme of decolonisation (and associated student movements and discourses) as a democratic process. For example, Daryl Glaser employs a dimensional analysis of democracy to ascertain whether Fallist advocacy for direct participatory democracy in student governance (through mass meetings) represents a defensible alternative democratic system. He concludes that at best, it can supplement rather than displace existing practices because its credentials on other desirable democratic virtues like representation and pluralism are questionable (Glaser, 2018). He suggests for example that even though Wits FMF was nominally ‘leaderless’, its claims to advocate direct/unmediated participatory democracy are questionable given the eventual emergence of charismatic leaders (Glaser, 2018, p. 133). This is echoed in the reflections of the former vice chancellors of the Universities of Witwatersrand (Adam Habib) and Free State (Jonathan Jansen). While Habib (2019) reflects on the intuitive democratic appeal of the leaderless horizontal structure of FMF, he is nonetheless emphatic that political organisation requires a delicate balance of representation and participation because leaderless structures can be hijacked by factions. This is echoed by Jansen (2017), who reflects on the difficulty of negotiating with unstructured and shifting political groups.
4.7. Conclusion

There are three conclusions worth emphasising in this chapter. Firstly, I have presented an understanding of why and how decolonisation emerged as an emancipatory framework in South Africa, processing the core claims through a conceptual machinery of citizenship and belonging, and concluding on the significance of this argument in the grammar of representation. A modest reason for this explanatory indulgence is my sympathetic endorsement of decolonisation as an emancipatory project. Noting this, I reflexively acknowledge that I am often worried by the tendency to dismiss decolonisation ‘because it is any and everything’, eschewing the virtues of conceptual precision and referential parsimony. In trying to accommodate all these claims and their significance through a framework anchored in citizenship, belonging, and representation, my response to this brand of cynics is to substitute their demand for conciseness with an appreciation of the comprehensiveness of decolonisation as an emancipatory project.

Secondly, the use of citizenship and belonging here looks to transcend the conventional state-centric lens that often characterises their usage. Within this convention, universities are not sites of citizenship in and of themselves. Instead, they are instruments of nation-building, charged with cultivating a kind of civic consciousness whether democratic, nationalist, multicultural, or cosmopolitan. While it may be said that unequal citizenship within the university is often a microcosm of the wider set of social relations and status hierarchies in relation to the nation-state, it is still important to note the multiple loci of citizenship as a meaningful concept—especially in this case of decolonisation as a process of working out who belongs and what it means to belong to a South African university.

Finally, in the foregoing account, one does observe a discourse of Africanisation. Responding descriptively to the research question, Africanisation remains a popular framing for decolonisation as an intellectual project. This is evident in the deployment of decolonisation to question the putative Africanness of universities in South Africa, whereby calls for a truly African university ground both material (international fees) and ideological claims (epistemic culture). I explore the latter dimension in more detail in the subsequent chapter.
Chapter 5
Decolonisation-as-Africanisation post RMF

Key debates in the pursuit of an African-centred intellectual project

In this chapter, I consider how decolonisation is understood and contextualised in various disciplines as spaces of teaching, learning and research. Emphasising idioms of Africanisation, I survey the kind of critiques being made at disciplinary and institutional levels, and how decolonisation is foregrounded with processes of continuous curriculum renewal. More importantly, I consider the debates and disagreements that decolonisation has occasioned in terms of the contestation over its meaning and entailments. To achieve this task, I explore observations from my fieldwork at the University of Cape Town, in conjunction with university’s records of institutional engagement on this topic (e.g., task team and senate reports).

5.1. Introduction

The resulting debates occasioned by student movements like Rhodes Must Fall on decolonising knowledge locate this project within a politics of knowledge sceptical about the neutrality of knowledge. As such, the imperative of decolonisation reflects the interrelation between knowledge, power and identity, a relationship that gains specific salience once situated in historical legacies of colonialism and apartheid, in addition to the contemporary asymmetries of a globalised world partially constituted by these histories. What is at stake, therefore, are the perceived inequalities that characterise the material, discursive, and social relations of knowledge production. As a politics of knowledge, decolonisation is a critical intervention in the biography and geography of authoritative knowledge, interrogating assumptions around who can produce it, and where it comes from. Most, if not all interventions on intellectual decolonisation have these themes in common (Heleta, 2016; Mangcu, 2016; Msila and Gumbo, 2016; Cross and Ndofirepi, 2017b, 2017a; Msila, 2017; Le Grange, 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018; Jansen, 2019; Ratele, 2019; Kessi, Marks and Ramugondo, 2020).
Interventions in the South African academic terrain collectively deploy several critical vocabularies, like Eurocentrism, epistemic violence, and epistemic injustice with the basic claim being that universities in Africa are insufficiently African because their institutional form, curricula content, pedagogical, and epistemological orientation are extraverted, taking inspiration from a Eurocentric modernity. In this framing, decolonisation is about creating a truly African university in composition and intellectual orientation. For example, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni posits that decolonisation, as an intellectually reflexive project of Africanisation, involves ‘securing Africa as a legitimate epistemic base from which Africans view and understand the world’, and decentring the ‘geography and biology of knowledge’ from Euro-American hegemony, through ‘epistemic disobedience’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017, pp. 43, 53). Beyond a general call to centre Africa, Africans, and African scholarship in university curricula and pedagogy, one observes a diverse account of the resources fundamental to this counter-hegemonic project. These include African languages (Prah, 2017a, 2017b; Makalela, 2018a, 2018b; Antia and Dyers, 2019; Stroud and Kerfoot, 2020), anticolonial and anti-apartheid archives (Hull, 2017b, 2019c; Matthews, 2018), indigenous knowledge systems and thinkers (Msil and Gumbo, 2016; Msila, 2017; Kumalo, 2020), African philosophy (Higgs, 2016; Waghid, Waghd, and Waghid, 2018; Manthalu and Waghid, 2019), and popular cultures prevalent outside the academy (Nyamnjoh, F., 2017; Nyamnjoh, 2019). Decolonisation is also being institutionalised, evident in the thematic of research grants and the creation of the Journal for Decolonising Disciplines housed at the University of Pretoria.

5.2. Decolonisation and African-centredness at UCT

At the height of the 2015/2016 student calls for the decolonisation of the university and a free decolonised education, the UCT executive formulated a new strategic five-year plan as part of its Strategic Planning Framework 2020 Vision, which was approved by the university council in December 2016 (University of Cape Town, 2018a). Among other things, this vision signalled a commitment to engage decolonisation at an institutional level, as the university outlined plans to rethink both its institutional identity and core functions of teaching, learning, and research. Speaking on UCT’s ambition to build a new inclusive identity for example, the then DVC Loretta Feris explained: ‘We want a student and staff body that is more representative of the profile of country and continent, and for students and staff to see themselves – their cultures, values, heritage and knowledge systems – reflected at the
university’ (University of Cape Town, 2018b). Decolonisation appears to be a pillar of this new inclusive identity. In this regard, a range of high-level objectives were formulated as part of a commitment to understand, debate, and engage with the idea of decolonisation as an ontological and epistemic project.

Rhetorically, decolonisation functions as a vector through which the university re-affirmed African-centredness in its self-styling as a research-intensive institution. It posits Africa-centredness as global, defining the task as one of advancing and disseminating knowledge that addresses South African, continental, and global challenges, in addition to positioning academics on the continent as international thought leaders. As a statement of values, this vision equally commits to unsettling the coloniality of knowledge by taking seriously the politics of knowledge production and the interlocking relationship between knowledge, power, and identity. It resolves to promote the academic interrogation of disciplinary boundaries, knowledge traditions and power relations to ‘interrogate ways in which current curricula may marginalise particular identities and perpetuate dominant cultural assumptions and philosophies of knowledge’ and ‘provide opportunities for students to engage around contemporary local and global political and social issues and the continued legacy of apartheid and colonialism’ (UCT Strategic Planning Framework, 2016, p.14). A noble goal indeed!

In brush strokes, I examine in the following discussion some of the dimensions of Africa-centredness and the politics of knowledge foregrounded in the deployment of decolonisation. In pursuit of an African university, decolonisation is instrumentalised for disciplinary interrogation, representativity in thought, speaking to context, and problematising narratives on and about Africa. This takes place across diverse fora such as reading groups, research networks, institutional processes of curriculum renewal and disciplinary teaching and learning.

5.2.1. Knowledge, power, and disciplinary interrogation

The range of claims related to Eurocentrism and epistemic injustice are sometimes related to a broader set of reflections around the embeddedness of the modern university and its institutional form in histories of colonialism and imperialism—a hand-in-glove relationship between knowledge and empire. As one participant notes, the development of modern universities is entangled with a set of ‘interests, ideological assumptions, material expectations and normative deliberations …’ associated with the imperatives of an imperial global order such as capitalist extraction and native control,
… don't tell me that Wits’ Geology and Mining School had nothing to do with the particular interests after the mineral revolution. Don't tell me that you know the language Departments in UCT didn't have anything to do with the codification of the ‘kafir’ language. Obviously political, material, and ideological assumptions underline the way particular institutions are structured. And the division of intellectual fields in terms of its code of expertise, it’s kind of, the fictions of discipline, that itself comes out of a very particular kind of history of colonial expansion, classification of the world, accessing the world in terms of you know, useful knowledge… So it is that thin boundary between the colonial and the modern that the university inhabits (Ramesh, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

Similarly, another participant echoed one possible meaning of Africanisation as a critical inquiry into the relationship between knowledge production and imperialism in the contemporary global order,

So that's another sense in which one might understand Africanisation, thinking about what role does research in the university play in the global political economy, and is it playing a role which leads to the exploitation of Africa specifically or areas in the global South, or is it playing a role which actually leads to development? Because that was, I think that was the counter to that kind of political economy eurocentrism, the idea of developmentalism at that time in the 50s, 60s and 70s, you know, going into the 80s. So that's another side. I think that makes a lot of sense as well, to think about what the economic effects of research actually are, the economic effects of the types of courses that people take and so graduate from. Would there be a way in which any, those effects could be made more equitable globally? (Martin, UCT, Humanities, 2019)

In the department of psychology, Shose Kessi and Floretta Boonzaier (2018) illuminate the role of the discipline in legitimating slavery, colonialism, and apartheid, particularly with regard to the production and reproduction of racial science and its oppressive representation of Africans. It is against this historical context that they reflect on the possibilities for a decolonial feminist psychology that produces ‘knowledge and tools for imagining and promoting just and equitable social relationships and social structures’ (Kessi and Boonzaier, 2018, p. 299). To serve this purpose, the department at UCT launched the ‘Hub for Decolonial Feminist
Psychology’, a transdisciplinary intellectual space that ‘works with and against the historical and contemporary silences, erasures and omissions in psychological theorising and research’ to produce knowledge relevant to the ‘particularities of the African context’ (Kessi and Boonzaier, 2018, pp. 299, 304). Its research agenda foregrounds issues like institutional racism; transgenerational trauma (i.e., impact of historical trauma on contemporary identities and ways of being); urbanisation, gentrification, and the stigmatisation of the poor; the limits of institutional responses (like the TRC) to healing psychological wounds of apartheid. Its activities—like team supervision, co-publishing, mentoring, writing workshops, networking, research ethics, exchange programmes and teach-ins—espouse an intentional pan-African ethic that looks to cultivate relationships with other universities on the continent pursuing transformative psychology.

5.2.2. Representativity in thought: Decolonisation as critique of Eurocentrism

Beyond noting the historical entanglement of knowledge and empire (and other oppressive formations), one finds diverse articulations of the Eurocentric character of the university. Below, Ramesh describes his experience of his department, particularly when he first joined,

… a sleepy English village in the outpost of the empire. I mean my experience of the academics of England was much more progressive than what I encountered here. It seems it was caught in the time warp and the kind of issues and discussions people were still working on were slightly strange. I remember some of the student presentations I would sit through, and the kinds of arguments I would hear. I was like really? It was very difficult to get adjusted to this, to get adjusted to a largely almost exclusively white postgraduate class and the kind of you know bad and good halves of the empire that have contributed some positive things. It seemed in a way silent, banal, and in a way very theoretically impoverished (Ramesh, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

Upon clarification the participant described his department as fastened to a mode of social history which was quite progressive in 1980s Britain (notable figures including E. P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm), but had nonetheless failed to theoretically develop this with new insights, especially from postcolonial historiography. In particular, he lamented that the subaltern studies intervention had failed to register a methodological impact within the department. I understand subaltern studies as an intellectual project that emerged within Indian historical scholarship and critiqued the elitist nature of both colonial and nationalist historiography.
These histories are argued to be insufficiently representative because they produce elitist narratives that truncate the autonomous political culture of a subaltern class (wherein subalternity indexes a position marked by a lack of socio-economic agency). As an intellectual project, subaltern studies maintains the possibility of recovering and repositioning a subaltern historical consciousness that has otherwise been erased by elite hegemony. It is on this understanding that I interpreted/understood the participant’s example on the limited uptake of subaltern studies scholarship. One way this comes out in the interview is his recollection of a departmental discussion on a book launch of *Marikana: A View from the Mountain and a Case to Answer* which took place in the aftermath of the Marikana massacre of 16 August 2012 (Alexander et al., 2013). He bemoans a perceived uncritical assumption about nationhood among the intellectual left, recalling

> What the intellectual left seemed to lament about is that how come a black government opened fire on black workers. Now I understand the intensity of that betrayal, but at the same time coming from a country which has been decolonized formally at least 70 years ago, we grew up much more cynical and didn’t have this romance with the state and this expectation of the state to act in the interests of the nation (Ramesh, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

In addition, this participant gave some insight into initiatives at curriculum renewal. A common argument around cultivating African-centredness regards the intellectualisation of African languages. In the field of history, this has added relevance as a way of decolonising the archives. In Chapter 3, I used the emergence of different historiographical traditions in the study of African history to develop an account of Africanisation. In the case of nationalist historiography, Africanisation concretised as a desire to inscribe an ‘African factor’ centred on cardinal notions of African agency, adaptation, and initiative to disrupt an imperial historiography that negated, diminished, and externalised African historical achievement and agency (Ranger, 1968; Ogot, 2009). This naturally involved a question of sources, resulting in a number of methodological interventions like the rehabilitation and scientific validation of oral history (Dike, 1956; Vansina, 1985; Feierman, 1993b). Against this backdrop, the ‘History Access’ programme in the UCT department of Historical Studies is a noteworthy intervention that touches on the intersection between decolonisation, language, and historical sources. The programme is an ‘attempt to operationalise a set of concrete, sustainable and institutionally implementable transformative practices which can creatively respond to the perceived
disconnect between the academic discipline and the public lives of the pasts in the fraught context of South Africa”. It comprises two clusters—‘vernacular universals’ and ‘everyday archives’—which aim to redress the ‘[A]nglo-normativity of postgraduate research and training’ and the ‘obsolescence of the conventional forms of articulating academic research’. While the second cluster focuses on promoting technologically accessible and innovative presentation of historical research, the first cluster, through intensive coursework and workshops, prioritises African language sources in order to facilitate original historical research and produce multilingual South African historians. Equally, in addition to standard textual outcomes like books and journals, the programme also aims to produce a ‘critical multilingual conceptual lexicon’ to be integrated within the curriculum. Discussing the significance of this cluster, the participant explains,

… I found it a matter of shame that in this Department there wasn't anybody who could use vernacular sources, South African vernacular sources to write histories of Southern Africa. It would never happen, you know, in the Native American context, it would never happen in any Asian context. So, one of the things that I did is I thankfully managed to convince Mellon to fund a project where we actually build on the vernacular skills, rather than an easy project of translating. We are trying to kind of develop our conceptual lexicon, through students who are working with early 20th century, 19th century archives… you know that's a concrete thing, like to think in a particular language, bringing that word and through that word the conceptual, the life world of the concept, think about that and then question. Not necessarily to reject; you don't necessarily need to make it commensurate, but to be able to think on different places. This is the kind of stuff I'm trying to push for, a space where people should be able to write in their own language and get passed. So, we still don't have students who want to do that. But this is stuff that we kind of are trying to push, so language remains a very important thing, and that is a part of the skill building thing…But I would like to see, I think a lot of what needs to be done is the language thing, because that's where the real, where the real kind of work is. If we want to release South African history from the echo chamber without turning to English sources, then that's exactly where I see the real work happening (Ramesh, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

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6 http://www.historyaccess.uct.ac.za/ha/about
7 Ibid
8 Ibid
Staying within this theme of language and literacy, another participant outlines the meaning of decolonisation in her teaching and research. For her, decolonisation is a helpful framework through which one critiques ‘the systemic failure in education to actually take the African child, the African language speaking child as the norm and to build a curriculum from there’ (CM 2019, UCT, Humanities). She begins with the example of the monolingual bias that characterises the field of language acquisition and childhood development, in effect asking, as another participant in African Studies puts it by citing Dipesh Chakrabarty (Chakrabarty, 2000): who is the ‘sovereign theoretical subject’ of my discipline,

So in my own disciplinary area over the last 15 years, we have been coming to terms with the monolingual bias in theorizing has actually meant that a lot of the research that's been done—for example on a topic like language acquisition or learning a language, first language acquisition when infants are born and learn language and then later language learning—and what people have recognized is that in fact because most of the theorists and the researchers were themselves in North America and in the UK were themselves white monolingual English speakers, they actually took as the norm that the ‘normal’ child is the infant who is born to a family where both parents, nuclear family speak one language, and that that language is most often English. So, we have a field called first language acquisition and the development, which is set the milestones for child language development is basically built upon that western middle class monolingual child as the norm (Jessica, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

She proceeded to explain the disconnection between this ‘false universal’ and the South Africa context, providing a cautionary note on the dangers of irrelevance,

… what is very typical actually is early bilingualism and early multilingualism. So many children are growing up with two languages in the home. Say for example each parent comes from a different language background. Or the parents have got the same language background but with the environment around them, there are other children in homes around them and so on who are using other languages. And so, the norm for them is a multilingual home…So, in the field of psycholinguistics, understanding child language acquisition, a false norm, a false universal has been put in place which really actually doesn't match what we have in for example South Africa or in many other
contexts of multilingualism and which are also often colonial and postcolonial contexts, right. So, in my teaching about language acquisition, I look at what has happened in terms of our field, asking ‘how has who makes the knowledge influenced the development of that field and what has it excluded?’ And what that means is that there's a whole lot of research there that is actually pretty useless in a way. Not useless, that's pushing it too far perhaps, but that really can't be used in our own context very easily, right (Jessica, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

This danger of irrelevance is amplified by increasing standardisation because of globalisation’s impact on education. She explains,

So, I think that the consequence, well, whether it's in higher education or in schooling around the world, there's a huge push towards standardization. And these international benchmark tests of literacy—like the PIRLS (progress in reading literacy), or TIMSS (Trends in international mathematics and science study) or the PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment)—you know these are all tests which are assuming that you can actually apply the same test in different countries and that you can benchmark people against each other. So, I completely reject those kinds of tests. I think that all they test is basically people’s cultural capital or their opportunity to learn. And there's a very important principle for me in assessment, and that for me is the concept of opportunity to learn. If people have not had the same opportunity to learn, then the assessment is not actually fair. So, a lot of those I would say are invalid in our context, and not only invalid, but because they come with donor funding, and all sorts of things, they actually work to, I don't want to say de-educate, but miseducate possibly. So, when USAID says, as they do in different parts of Africa, ‘OK! You will only get funding for literacy projects if you follow this early grade reading assessment that was developed in the States, and you follow this pedagogy, what they're actually doing is deskill and actually turning children away from meaningful learning opportunities, which could be worse than leaving them without that (Jessica, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

In the previous chapter, I noted arguments around how a ‘deficit model’ in higher education displaces and individualises responsibility for transformation by constructing some students as less than competent knowers constitutes an epistemic injustice (credibility deficit) and a locus
of critiques around the perceived coloniality of the university (Morreira, 2017b). Echoing this point at the intersection of language and decolonisation, the participant explains,

So, most of our children then get treated as actually deficient monolinguals, deficient English monolinguals because there is no space for them to use their African language resources, their wider linguistic repertoire. They’re only allowed to use English in schooling. So, for me, decolonizing within language and literacy education is partly enabling my students to see that the deficit is not in the child, the deficit is in the system, it’s in the policy...taking this into higher education and teaching in the University, I mean we have a case where lecturers would say well there's a problem with my students writing or they struggle to express themselves, or you know what have you. So, at no point do lecturers say well I am a problem for my students because I don't, I am not fluent in the language that they are most comfortable in. My English dominance is a limitation in my teaching. So instead of it being a limitation on the Academy, that we are not teaching in more accessible ways and producing knowledge in languages that are familiar with people, it becomes the deficit of the student rather (Jessica, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

This push for multilingualism is reflected in UCT’s renewed commitment (even if predominantly rhetorical) to build an inclusive institutional identity. As part of its 2020 vision, it sought to ‘expand opportunities for, and encourage students to acquire communicative competence in a South African indigenous language as well as opportunities for students to learn other major world languages – especially those in use in the rest of Africa’ (UCT Strategic Planning Framework, 2016, p. 31). One department where the former is pursued is the College of Accounting, which produces concept videos that can be viewed in English and up to three other African languages. Another noteworthy example is the teaching of the Khoekhoegowab language (an indigenous Khoisan language) within the Khoi and San Research Unit in UCT’s Centre for African Studies (CAS). In 2020, UCT launched South Africa’s first certified foundational Khoekhoegowab language course.⁹

The issue of Eurocentrism and representativity in thought is palpable in perception of the university’s department of philosophy. The range of complaints are manifold. Some students,

⁹https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2020-12-21-first-certified-foundational-khoekhoegowab-course-for-sa
reflecting on their journey through the department, spoke to the notable absence of African scholars on topics of global relevance across the various courses on offer. Others noted the nonexistence of African Philosophy as field of inquiry within the department. Finally, there was the charge that the department had failed to engage with some of the critical topics that African philosophers have taken up over the years and that with few exceptions, its research profile was largely apolitical.

At the time of the protests, the department, together with the Centre for African Studies (CAS), convened the seminar series ‘Philosophy in Africa, Africa in Philosophy’ throughout the 2016 academic year to debate, broadly speaking, the place of African philosophical production within the discipline. Prior to this and the calls for curriculum decolonisation, the department had introduced ‘Philosophy of Race’ (PHI2045S), a second-year undergraduate course, which in the current climate aligns with the conceptualisation of decolonisation as the uptake of social justice scholarship. Students note that since the protests, some courses in the department have begun to pursue representativity in philosophical thought. One student I interviewed noted that the third-year course ‘Philosophy of Language’ was the first time she encountered the work of an African Philosopher. The philosopher in this case was Kwasi Wiredu, noted for his work on the distortive colonial legacies in language and the extent to which philosophical problems are language bound. Another student, recalling his course ‘Great Philosophers’, noted efforts to venture outside the Western canon by engagement with philosophical work from Asia.

In this context, there was a hope that the aforementioned seminar series would provide a platform to feed into the Centre for African Studies’ own response to student demands for decolonisation. The mission of CAS in its current form, according to its current chair Lungisile Ntsebeza, has been,

… to promote African Studies across departments and faculties at UCT and beyond, particularly within the African continent and the global South. This mission is in line with the notion of CAS as creating an interdisciplinary environment facilitating discussions, research and teaching on Africa, while at the same time taking a leadership role in establishing and consolidating links with universities across the African continent and the global South in particular (Ntsebeza, 2019, p. xi).
The Centre, of course, is an institutional repository of previous debates around decolonisation, most notably regarding what have been coined the Mafeje and Mamdani affairs. In the latter case, UCT established the AC Jordan Chair in African Studies, a position initially filled by Mahmood Mamdani, to steer the integration of African Studies into research, teaching, and learning. This agenda was fraught with tension, with Mamdani eventually resigning after a three-year tenure. After his resignation in 1999, the Chair was vacant until the appointment of Prof. Ntsebeza in 2012. Between this period, CAS has had a rather precarious existence, with various attempts made to close the centre. These attempts to disestablish CAS in effect inspired efforts to re-assert the institutional importance and legitimacy of CAS. In 2011 on the annually celebrated Africa Day, a panel discussion titled ‘The Study of Africa in the Post-colonial African university’ provided a forum to debate ‘… the study of Africa in an African university in the post-colonial, post-apartheid period and on the appropriateness of institutional arrangements to encourage and enable this.’(Nhlapo and Garuba, 2012, p. vi). The student protests for a free decolonised education are thus significant against this backdrop, re-invoking this historical context, coinciding with CAS’s own explorations into resuscitating the teaching of a university-wide course on Africa in addition to justifying its own precarious existence. In some sense, the call for decolonisation provided the centre with a new lease of life. This would later morph into discussions for the elevation of African Studies as an undergraduate major degree subject, which materialised in 2017. It was hoped that the department of philosophy would play an important role in this undergraduate programme, contributing to the teaching of African philosophy at the second-year level. Prior to the protest, the department had identified African Philosophy as an area where it could expand its teaching and research, and a proposal was submitted to create a new post within the department with specific expertise in this field. Unfortunately, this was rejected by the Faculty of Humanities.

5.2.3. Problematising narratives about Africa

Building on the previous theme of decolonisation as a critique of Eurocentrism, let us see how decolonisation is understood in response to diagnoses of Eurocentrism. Eurocentrism, as an epistemological ethnocentrism, is a structuring condition of possibility for knowledge on and about Africa. This problematique posits that knowledge on and about Africa is externally (Euro-America) overdetermined (Diawara, 1990). As such, a battleground for decolonisation is the very image/idea of Africa (Mudimbe, 1988, 1994). Decolonisation can thus take the form of myth-busting—that is, a project of counteracting distortive colonial narratives about Africa. Much of the early post-independence efforts at intellectual decolonisation did precisely this. In
arguing that Africa had a history of scientific study, or that there was such a thing as African philosophy, scholars sought to dismantle pathological constructions of Africa(ns).

Similar efforts are ongoing in the contemporary invocation of decolonisation as an epistemic project at the university. A participant in the discipline of archaeology discussing the myth of externalised historical agency, linking this to contemporary debates on development. In this regard, he talks about challenging a historically continuous narrative in which development (political, economic, social), is always externally induced,

We tend to underplay the role of history, but history is very important in terms of shaping imagination. So, if we study, right, early state formation and then we are told that in Africa all the states, you know you can talk of Ghana, Mali, Songhai, and so on. What are the major causes [of this political development]? Classic literature says it is the Trans-Saharan trade. Right, you go to the South, what is the cause? It is the gold trade. So, the common theme that permeates through all of, I mean Africa south of the Sahara, is that Africa’s fortunes always pivoted on giving away resources. So, Africa could not use, they didn't have the know-how, they didn't have the skill, they didn't have the brain, they didn't have the need you know, to process that gold, to use it, and so on. So that's a trope, that's a narrative (Simba, UCT, Science, 2020).

He later explicates more on this narrative,

So, the way we then teach at the University is very important. It is one thing to say that Africa produced its own stuff, but it also traded and exchanged with others, right. Which is normal, everyone does that isn't it? But that is one thing. It is another thing to then say that, you know, for all these cultural developments to take place, Africa needed the outside world. What we are saying then is that Africa did not do it. It is still the outsiders. Because in terms of causality, yes, it's still coming from, it's still coming from the outside. So, Africa has never done anything. We are still at the same circle in the same place. So that then needs to be changed. That needs to be, you know, yes you challenge and then you also change that to say, ‘no, no, no, how about if we flip that?’ We first of all start by documenting you know, asking—what are the things that Africans were doing, and also talking about local measures of prestige, local measures of you know inequality and also local ideologies, and then think about how local people
might have interacted with goods, ideas and commodities that are coming from the outside. And not make them powerless to the point that without glass beads, you can't have a state. That's ridiculous in my opinion (Simba, UCT, Science, 2020).

The thrust of this view is clear. It attempts to link the externalisation of historical agency to a narrative of dependency as a legacy of colonialism. At the same time, it deploys tropes themselves worthy of critical interrogation, such as the racialisation of Africa. The term ‘Africa south of the Sahara’ might be a shorthand for ‘black Africa’, the intention being to articulate the racial dimensions of the dependency that is subject to criticism. But in the spirit of charity, one can take on board the essence of the point being made, a point that resonates with the idea of the ‘development university’ of the 1970s (Yesufu, 1973). If we read the participant as reflecting on the question ‘What kind of archaeological knowledge is necessary for decolonisation in Africa?’, his response is rather simple: The kind that enhances the autonomous capacity of Africans for development. To simplify, this foregrounds decolonisation as a praxis of using local knowledge to empower local actors. Through this claim, he contends that a legacy of colonialism, as a process of unequal global integration, are the debilitating forms of dependency that characterise the social and material relations of development discourse. In his words, ‘we have lost the ability to help ourselves’ (Simba, UCT, Science, 2020).

Let me take a moment to engage further with this point. Invoking ‘extraversion’ as a theory of international relations (Bayart, 2000), one could accept this charitable interpretation while nonetheless cautioning against an account of dependency as externally over-determined, as extraversion posits the active complicity of local elites in the production of the continent’s marginal global position. Such a critique rallies against the imputation of passivity in discourses of Africa and Africans. If I were to speak on behalf of this participant however, I would note that while this rebuttal is well taken, it can easily be placated. After all, there is nothing about decolonisation that requires us to always ascribe external causation to the condition of marginality—political, economic, epistemological—that it seeks to transcend. One can recognise colonial continuities and their reinforcement of a (neo)colonial condition like underdevelopment, while recognising that the causes of this continuity can also be internal. To critique one-sided dependency is separate from a judgement about where the causes of this dependency lie, and this structure of domination can be reproduced both endogenously and exogenously.
The participant clarifies his position, maintaining that,

… there is nothing wrong with combining different knowledge as long as the people are benefiting. But what has been the major problem is that in terms of the universities, there is no space for other knowledges. Especially the one which is amongst Africans and their communities as broadly defined. So, part of decolonization then has to be alert to the fact that we also need to bring part of that knowledge into the mainstream. Even if it means coming up with a hybrid system, even if it means coming up with a syncretic system…So, *if the dependency can make me unable to help myself without your intervention or you know you can't help yourself without my intervention, but in the past, you used to be able to help yourself and you could actually make goods to trade with me. So that's, that's part of where decolonisation then is important* (Simba, UCT, Science, 2020, emphasis mine).

To be clear therefore, it is a specific kind of dependency that is an issue. After all, one is familiar with claims that dependency is our default ontology, meaning that one ought to celebrate the permanence of debt and indebtedness (Graeber, 2012; F. Nyamnjoh, 2017). The dependency at issue is one characterised by a one-sidedness that undermines one’s own autonomous capacity.

The point above is relevant to the concept of *epistemic citizenship* that I develop in the next chapter, which articulates the varying configurations of inclusion and exclusion (belonging) that often accompany calls for decolonisation made in relation to knowledge production and in virtue of one’s capacity as a knower. If Africanisation is the empowerment of African actors against the limitations of one-sided dependency constitutive of the continent’s marginal global position, what forms of belonging does this articulate regarding the relations between Africa(ns) and the world? Much of what the participant articulates implies that critiques of dependency need not imply insular and enclosed conceptions of autonomous African identity. In floating the possibility for ‘hybrid’ or ‘syncretic’ systems, his position is one that resonates with the rejection of nativist understandings of belonging.

### 5.2.4. Decolonisation as speaking to context

Decolonisation often has a twin emphasis on decentring Northern/Western discursive formations while recentring Southern/African ones as a response to perceived Eurocentrism.
Together they can be seen as efforts at (re)contextualisation. Consider the following examples. In the 2017 academic year, the department of English Literary Studies introduced new courses that were meant to signal a de-emphasisation of ‘metropolitan’ literature. Contextualising its significance as a response to the decolonisation imperative, the department explained,

The new ELL courses have been designed, in part, as a response to the imperative to decolonise the curriculum and transform the UCT classroom into a space that signals its welcome to a new generation of diverse, engaged students through its curriculum design and pedagogy. The new courses reflect a shift away from what used to be called ‘metropolitan’ literature – that is, the British literary canon, with its particular chronological and epistemological framework and sense of canonicity – to a curriculum that prioritises areas and critical methods of literary and cultural studies that would engage black South African students and enable them to pursue Africa-centred and decolonial inquiry. We have chosen to move away from the limiting frameworks of periodisation and geographical ‘area studies’ that dominate the discipline in the North and, instead, to approach literary history within each course by offering students a set of compelling ideas or problems as focal points for engaged literary study (empire and resistance, literature and the work of memory, literature and historical movements, and so on) so that students can develop the capacity to interrogate assumptions about modernity and canonicity within the discipline, even at undergraduate level (Senate Teaching and Learning Committee, 2019a, p. 57).

Similarly emphasising this dynamic of decentring and re-centring, a new curriculum was designed in 2018 for the property studies programme within the department of construction economics, to be implemented in 2020. One participant described its engagement with decolonisation as a process of contextualisation in which one is sensitive to both alternative conceptions of property and the material realities of South Africa society,

OK, so we have a new curriculum and one of the things we had to clearly deal with was what is this decolonization thing of this curriculum that we're talking about. Property studies is what I teach. And, what we said—and we agreed and debated this issue—was that when you say property, the received western view which is reflected in the way we understand property studies, is your freehold individual private property. OK, so what property studies has been this idea that property is something that is registered and
privately owned. It's your Sandton, it's your Canal Walk, you know and so forth. So, the curriculum is geared towards looking at that as property. So, in our context, when we engage the idea of what it meant to decolonize our curriculum, it was about perspective. You see that property in an African and in our own context is that many Africans have customary, other forms of ownership that are less individualistic, more communal, customary, not recorded. That's one, two, we have many people who are in informal settlements, they don't have a title deed and so on. Therefore, it’s recognizing that property in our African context is different from a European where there is a lot of emphasis on private and so forth, private ownership and individuals (Musonda, UCT, Commerce, 2019).

The sensitivity to ‘African particulars’ in this example of property studies appears to be a similar point of emphasis in the department of archaeology’s course titled ‘Architecture, Planning and Geomatics’. It looks to align itself with South African reality by focusing on African customary tenure as well as the rights and tenure for the poor and marginalised in society. While generally sceptical of categories like ‘African knowledge’ and ‘African ways of knowing’ for their flirtation with relativism and insularity, the participant nonetheless concluded on the relevance of decolonisation if limited to the affirmation of African particulars as a basis for building theoretical knowledge,

… my sense of decolonization and its potential, that is, where it really matters, is in the moments where when you engage with questions of value, you know, of what is right, what is better and what is not. When you begin to put values on things, then decolonization becomes important because this is when the language of superior and inferior comes into place. For example, there may be a discourse that says if you don't have a title to property for example then that is wrong, that you should aspire to have your property registered, that society should aspire to have private ownership. That is a value judgment! It's a judgment that elevates a particular view, maybe a western view over an African view. That to me is where decolonization is relevant. Decolonization is about power and value. It's not so much about driving knowledge production, it’s about attitudes, it’s about minds, it’s about values, it's about affirmation—affirming the parity, affirming the equalness of African particulars (Musonda, UCT, Commerce, 2019).
I want to change course slightly to highlight some of the emergent spaces in which these kinds of thematic conversations are occurring at the university. Although still largely articulated from within specific disciplines, the clamour for African-centred knowledge at the university has resulted in the creation of formal and informal spaces to debate and pursue epistemic decolonisation. These include reading groups, research hubs networks of students, academics, and professionals. These spaces are windows both to the foregoing themes and well as the range of theoretical and analytical frameworks deployed to make sense of decolonisation as an intellectual project.

5.2.5. Southern theory

In pursuit of a new inclusive identity, universities in South Africa often position themselves not only as African, but equally of the Global South, proceeding to mobilise these identities as distinct loci of enunciation through which to intervene in the politics of knowledge production. The significance of a notion like the Global South, in my view, is the horizontalisation of dependency. If coloniality is theorised as a debilitating academic/scientific dependency in the material and social relations of knowledge production—in effect a vertical relationship between West and non-West, North and South, as relational, asymmetrical markers of power and authority (as opposed to geographical nodes and things in themselves (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012)—then one strategy is to not only reduce this verticality, but to supplement it with efforts to spread out one’s dependency and ‘diversify one’s epistemic portfolio’ in a sense. Hence decolonisation can also mean learning across the non-West/South (Keim, Çelik, and Wöhrer, 2016). Thus, it is unsurprising that the discourse coined ‘Southern theory’ emerges as another framework to think through decolonisation. It is not immediately antithetical to discourses of Africanisation, for Africa intuitively and in actuality, is often positioned within the Global South which functions as a discursive marker of peripherality. Some participants do map the geopolitical inequalities in knowledge production, circulation, and validation using the grammar of Southern theory. Equally, in the course of my fieldwork, I encountered and participated in a Southern theory reading group started by Prof. Robert Morrell, the director of UCT’s Next Generation Professoriate (NGP) programme. The NGP is a staff development and support programme for mid-career academics launched in September 2015 with the goal of helping its members become associate and full professors. As a transformation imperative, the NGP thus addresses demographic inequalities in the academic hierarchy by nurturing a black professoriate. While some of the reading group’s membership comes from the NGP on account
of its affiliation to Prof. Morrell, it is open to the wider university community. Broadly speaking, the group explores the limits and possibilities of Southern theory as an intellectual project in the politics of knowledge and its members have foregrounded Southern theory in their work within fields like urban planning, climate research, and gender studies (Watson, 2014, 2016; Borland, Morrell, and Watson, 2018; Collyer et al., 2019; Jaga, 2020; Stumbitz and Jaga, 2020; Le Roux and Rughubar-Reddy, 2021). As such, it is an example of how discourses of decolonisation are pursued within spaces outside the classroom like staff development.

5.2.6. Rethinking Economics for Africa

In the field of Economics, the clamour for African-centredness is evident with the creation of the UCT chapter of the Rethinking Economics for Africa (REFA) network. Broadly speaking, REFA is an international network that is relevant to contemporary discourses of decolonisation for its advocacy of epistemological pluralism in economics. It describes itself as a ‘a network of students, academics and civil society organisations – whose purpose is to challenge how economics is taught and learnt in universities, and how it is practiced in the real-world of research and policymaking. REFA is about making economics accessible to everyone; giving a platform to different points of view and making sure that the economics curriculum is relevant to the real world’.10 It is organised as university chapters at South African universities, and its modus operandi involves public debates and reading groups. It hopes to incorporate other activities like curriculum reviews, which will no doubt prove vital archival resources in the institutionalisation of debate on epistemic decolonisation.

I interviewed some of its student members at UCT, in addition to a senior lecturer who presented at a REFA virtual conference in 2020, who provided accounts of the relevance of decolonisation (in the idiom of Africanisation), to the discipline of economics. Describing the marginalisation of African scholarship, a student in development economics explains,

I'm part of an organization called Rethinking Economics for Africa and we're looking at how the economics curriculum is Eurocentric and all of the fundamental hypotheses or whatever. The assumptions of the discipline are Eurocentric. So, when African students are using Eurocentric frameworks to analyse African problems, that's why

10 https://sites.google.com/view/refafestival2020/what-is-refa
we're not being very successful in like producing African-centered solutions because the underlying assumptions that we are being taught are not helping … I also think that we are not really taught to believe that anything that isn't European is of much value or is worth pursuing. I was even told by lecturer that most of the research work that we are going to be doing is going to be sold to a European market anyways. So, there is no real necessity for needing to study African ways because learning the European form is better in general for your career. So yeah, I think that the institution puts blinders on you, and it just puts the end goal as this European standard that you must adhere to if you want to get ahead. And I think that it funnels and restricts you in that it puts you on the straight line because the funding for heterodox opinions are very minimal, so you end up just not doing it or it's not well taught or it's not accessible (Lerato, UCT, Commerce, 2019).

Speaking on the broader problem of the lack of representativity in thought in her Master’s programme, she observes,

So, for example, this year in my development economics Masters course—a field that is actually quite a problematic in itself because development economics was called colonial economics before it like changed for political correctness. But all of the studies, cases, literature that we've read, none of it has been on Africa. So, the bulk of it has been on the global South but it all has been writers, western writers. Of the global South writers that we've read, it's been like one Caribbean black man and one Indian writer. So, in a development economics course at the University of Cape Town, the best University in Africa that is supposed to be answering and preparing us to answer African problems, we are being given western literature, just replicating what has always been done. Also, we are being taught by all white staff who don't have a very broad perspective of what is going on. So, it's white upper middle-class staff who are quite removed from the realities of the country and these are the people preparing us to be the next economists and to solve African problems. So, yeah, I just think the system keeps replicating itself. We're given western centric problems, western centric tools to solving our problems and there hasn't been a significant change on this state of affairs, which is problematic (Lerato, UCT, Commerce, 2019).
My engagement with Grieve Chelwa, now formerly of the UCT Graduate Business School, took place in an interview in which we discussed his REFA presentation in relation to some of his written work on decolonising economics. He speaks to a few issues, which include the pathologisation of Africa in development discourse and the dominance of neoclassical approach which he considers as Western (Chelwa, 2016a, 2016b). In the latter case, he echoes a former graduate student who contends that the university’s department of economics constructs the subject as an amoral inquiry into mechanistic questions on optimising efficiency, and is thus partially responsible for the country’s pervasive anti-poor narrative (Bassier, 2016). In addition, Dr Chelwa has also critiqued the underrepresentation of Africa-based scholars in economics scholarship on Africa, both in terms of research output and on the editorial boards of leading journals (Chelwa, 2021). This means that when we ask questions such as: (a) who is writing about Africa and (b) who the arbiters of knowledge about Africa are, ‘African scholars are virtually absent from the debates that ultimately shape development scholarship and policy about the continent’ (Chelwa, 2021, p. 79). This is salient because it is illustrative of gatekeeping, a phenomenon compounded by the disproportionate impact of Northern economics research on policymaking in Africa. Another interesting observation is that this marginality is also a feature of Africa-based journals raising questions about their efficacy in tackling underrepresentation. In the final analysis this underrepresentation perpetuates a faux consensus, the pervasiveness of hegemonic theories, and a crowding out effect in the domain of research questions.

Our conversation on pathologisation regarded the narrative of chronic growth failure in development discourse, and the perception that explanations often overemphasised ‘internalist’ explanations,

… is it things that are intrinsically African? Is it the African way of life or is it some stuff that has got to do with the outside? It's always, this is how the problem is always couched. Are there things within African themselves or within African countries themselves that we ought to fix or is it stuff that has got to do with the outside? .... And given that the dominant voices in economics, even in development economics tend to be folks from the North, there is always an overemphasis on emphasising the internal explanation, right. For example, it is the Cameroonians who are messing up, right? It's got nothing to do with Cameroon's interaction with the world, the fact that Cameroon is part of a larger global economic system. It's really the fact that Cameroonians on the
inside or messing up. And this messes up how Cameroon interacts with the rest of the world, right. So there seems to be a very big emphasis once you read the sort of development economics quite closely, you will realize that folks who write especially from the North or Northern economists, they tend very much to emphasize this internal, they might not be so explicit as to say this is an internal thing, but everything that they want to fix is something that is internal (Grieve, UCT, Commerce, 2020).

His review of Morten, Jerven’s *Africa: Why economists get it wrong*, builds on this diagnosis of the field (Jerven, 2015). Agreeing for the most part with Jerven’s analysis on the often-ahistorical misdiagnosis of chronic failure by economists, he nonetheless critiqued Jerven arguing,

But when you read the book—pretty much he's right—but he's talking about *Northern* economists. But even he is caught up in this coloniality because he can't, in fact I asked him. I asked him when I met him, I wrote a review and I asked him, I said Morton, when I read Mkandawire or I read you know Carlos Lopes, or I read some of these other economics who tend to be African, they write much more thoughtfully. So, what's going on here? (Grieve, UCT, Commerce, 2020).

The accusation that Jerven is caught up in this coloniality comes from a perceived oversight on his part to call for an active engagement with African economists to remedy the aforementioned malaise in development economics, given that most of what he critiques has been authored by North American and European economists and that Jerven’s own critique builds on the contributions of Malawian economist, Thandika Mkandawire. More specifically, it is not that Jerven builds on this work without acknowledgement. Rather, it is that he fails to locate the misdiagnosis as predominant in estern literature about development in Africa. As such, he contends that the book is more appropriately titled ‘why *western* economists get it wrong’ (Chelwa, 2016b).
5.3. Curriculum Change Working Group (CCWG)

Having considered a small sample of the kinds of critiques decolonisation is deployed to make in various fields of inquiry, let us consider some of the critical debates it brought out by looking at the university’s engagement with the work of the CCWG. The CCWG was created in 2016 at the height of student calls for a free decolonised education in South Africa to engage in ‘critical curriculum transformation’. The working group was black led on the basis of the view that this would enhance the legitimacy of its work. Reporting directly to the Vice Chancellor, the teaching and learning committee of the university senate, and the university council, the CCWG was mandated to coordinate and promote conversations that would culminate in a guiding framework for curricula and pedagogical transformation. In this regard, the CCWG self-styled its role as one of foregrounding the legitimacy of an African and Southern epistemic identity thereby positing epistemic decolonisation as an orientation that takes seriously the university’s location in Africa and the Global South.

A few things stand out regarding the conceptual and analytical resources deployed to think through curriculum decolonisation. The CCWG adopted a decolonial framework as theorised in Latin American scholarship (increasingly visible in South Africa), employing recognisable concepts like the ‘coloniality of being’, ‘coloniality of power’, and ‘coloniality of knowledge’ to theorise UCT as colonial in its institutional form. It employs the ‘coloniality of power to theorise a global terrain … constructed and constituted into an asymmetrical, modern power structure, resulting in unequal relations of power between the Euro-American world regarded as the “zone of being” and the non-Euro-American world experienced as the “zone of non-being”’ (CCWG, 2019). The coloniality of being theorises colonial legacies on subjectivity and subject-formation, indexing the violence, dispossession, and dehumanisation attendant to the European colonial project. And finally, the coloniality of knowledge is used to theorise the biogeography of authoritative knowledge by critically evaluating the norms and assumptions around who can produce knowledge and where authoritative knowledge comes from. The working group also sought to contribute to and extend this theoretical framework by conceptualising the ‘coloniality of doing’, which ‘finds expression through mimicry, where the colonial subject responds to the civilizing mission by emulating the oppressor, even when this means denying the self-ontological density’ (CCWG, 2019, p. 21).
The ‘coloniality of doing’ is in some sense plausible to the extent that one can imagine some cases in which emulation and mimicry subscribe to colonial logics of internalised inferiority and superiority. While I am sympathetic to this conceptual contribution, one could make the rebuttal that lurking behind the ‘coloniality of doing’ is the possibility of a simplistic over-determinacy. This over-determinacy would be problematic because it undermines ‘African agency’, which is a rather strange outcome for a concept developed in the spirit of decolonisation. The concept posits ‘mimicry’ and ‘emulation’ as evidence of coloniality. However, as Taiwo (2019) has recently argued, we ought to express caution in this regard. Are mimicry and emulation necessarily instances of a colonial mentality? By virtue of such conceptualisations, he argues, one risks inscribing coloniality and colonialism where it has no business. Taking the example of language, one could ask whether the use of European languages constitutes the ‘emulation of the oppressor’ or the denial of one’s ‘ontological density’. As seen earlier in Chapter 3, the idea that languages are stable markers of identities is contested within African Studies, evidenced by those arguments that foreground the possibility of appropriation, that is, making something of foreign provenance one’s own. In a way, these debates are analogous to feminist debates and the critique of liberal feminists who, having constructed religious cultures like Islam as inherently oppressive, perceive it unlikely that a proper subjectivity (freedom) can be realised internal to religious tradition (Mahmood, 2001, 2012). Much like English is rendered necessarily colonial, Islam is configured inseparable from oppression. In either situation, the possibility of agency is foreclosed. For Taiwo, to see European languages as unAfrican foregrounds a conception of Africanity that forecloses the possibility that formerly colonised peoples might find foreign artefacts useful and that this need not imply a colonial mentality. This echoes Amilcar Cabral’s claim, on the interconnection between culture and national liberation, that ‘[A] people who free themselves from foreign domination will be free culturally only if, without complexes and without underestimating the importance of positive accretions from the oppressor and other cultures, they return to the upward paths of their own culture’ (Cabral, 1973, p.42). In this case, mimicry does not necessarily undermine agency and thinking otherwise only reinforces an assumption of ‘teleological Westernisation’. In fact, mimicry can itself be subversive, intentional, or otherwise (Bhabha, 1984, 1994). In International Relations for example, Pinar Bilgin shows how being like the West and embracing the modernity symbolised in having a nuclear bomb signifies a post-colonial security imperative that guards against the possibility of Western intervention (Bilgin, 2008).
Back to the matter at hand, the CCWG’s framework document (CCF) also draws on postcolonial theory, particularly Homi Bhabha’s notion of a ‘third space’ to conceptualise sites of emergent and generative curriculum innovation at UCT. It is also flavoured with notes of critical realism (CR), notably its description of the world as characterised by a layered ontology, which offers a way of theorising the existence of resilient transfactual colonial structures and its constitutive values, beliefs, and attitudes (Bhaskar, 1975, 1993). Finally, it developed a theory of change that identified ‘contestation’, ‘repositioning’, ‘reconstruction’, ‘reconstituation’, and ‘reflection’ as five distinct phases of decolonisation.

Without intending to be cynical, the CCF outlines the conventional articulation of the problem, positing that ‘colonial ontological and epistemic logics undergird’ UCT’s curricula landscape (CCWG, 2019, p.36). In this regard, UCT is an outpost of empire in an epistemic sense, its institutional axes rotating within a Eurocentric discursive orbit. This is because, putatively, it valorises ‘Western’ modes of thinking while marginalising and silencing both knowers and knowledge outside the Western canon. After engaging sites (exclusively in the creative arts and health sciences) where this ‘coloniality of knowledge’ is being contested, it concludes on a series of recommendations that, in essence, exhorts transdisciplinarity, a heightened awareness of positionality and knowledge production as a site of power, in addition to rendering as core reading material texts from the ‘epistemologically disenfranchised’ (CCWG, 2019, pp.56–62).

5.3.1. Debating the CCWG’s curriculum change framework

There is no doubt that the CCWG created a discursive space to debate and engage with decolonisation as an intellectual project. Notwithstanding its limitations, it served as a fodder and an institutional reference point for competing visions of what decolonisation ought to entail in an epistemological sense. The CCF was opened up to the broader university community for critical comment, and these conversations were subsequently archived in a report compiled by the Senate teaching and learning committee which generated a number of emergent principles to take curriculum change forward. In what follows, I will graft insights from my fieldwork onto the productive debates elicited by the CCF. In this way, I present a series of charges against that featured in these debates with a view towards excavating some of the emergent critical issues and ethical sensibilities that are visible as this project of decolonisation gets worked out.
Attendant to the release of the CCF, there was some confusion about its status, with the name ‘framework’ giving the impression that the document constituted UCT’s official policy on curriculum. Given that the CCF espoused what some perceived to be a very narrow approach to intellectual decolonisation, this lack of clarity, some argued, threatened authoritarian dogmatism (Hull, 2019b). There is a double charge here. First, there is the claim that the CCF nails its colours to the mast too strongly, enclosing itself within the Latin American decoloniality school and its theoretical framework, which foregrounds access to transformative ontologies via being-in-the-world (read lived experience). Within this rigid enclosure, the CFF fails to consider other theoretical framings for an account of decolonisation—there was a disappointment in some corners around the dearth of South African and African scholarship in its theoretical contextualisation—and in so doing, undermines its own commitment to institutionalising an inclusive and pluriversal epistemic community. Considering the compounding effect of the uncertainty around the document’s (un)official status, one can see how one could forecast the threat of dogmatism, even if great care was later taken to emphasise the document’s status and role as simply one of galvanising critical discussion. Nonetheless, these issues are significant as they touch on latent issues of academic freedom, in the view that academics should not be constrained in pursuing the myriad ways through which intellectual decolonisation can be analysed. A key issue, therefore, is to preclude the emergence of decolonisation-as-orthodoxy.

The idea that decolonisation is framed narrowly is shared by the analysis of Niall Reddy and Michael Smith, two UCT alumni (now pursuing doctoral studies in North America), who worried that the CFF had squandered the opportunity secured by the hard gains of the student movements (Reddy and Smith, 2019). While Hull sees Latin American decolonial theory as the basis of this narrowness, Reddy and Smith focus on the CCF’s postcolonial taproot as an offshoot of a postmodern intellectual current. Both sets of critics share the view that these theoretical leanings (Heideggerian existentialism and postcolonialism) are rather ironic. The thrust of irony is based on a perception that notions of purity and authenticity often play a strong role in discourses of decolonisation, notably in its identitarian dimensions. As such, to allege the Westernness of putative non-Westernness discourses of epistemic decolonisation, as

11 See Vice Chancellor, Mamokgethi Phakeng, addressing student worries in https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/teaching-at-uct-a-reply-to-progress-sa
they do, serves to rhetorically undermine the latter. In effect, given the CCWG’s mapping of the problem, Reddy and Smith think it is significant, as an internal critique, to point out postcolonialism’s *Western genealogy* as it undermines the group’s perceived fetish for authenticity in terms of centring African epistemologies. Similarly, I suspect Hull’s account of irony lies in situating the decolonial project next to a white German philosopher of a Nazi persuasion given their perceived shared endorsement of lived experience as epistemologically authoritative. This is not a particularly devastating argument, but relevant nonetheless because it highlights the perception of decolonisation as identity politics gone rogue. To foreground this point, let me engage these genealogical excavations further.

The genealogical premises of these respective arguments might themselves be subject to contestation. In fact, one participant in my fieldwork made some points of relevance on this matter (Balogun, UCT, Humanities, 2019). In framing the problem of decolonisation as the marginality of African voices in global knowledge production, he explains that modern disciplines, despite their emergence being coterminous with a historical context of empire, nonetheless travel, in the same way Edward Said speaks of ‘travelling theory’ (Said, 1983). And when they travel, they become reconstituted in their new geographies. As such, his point on marginality was that the many debates constitutive of this disciplinary interrogation and reconstitution, because of Africa’s marginality, failed to register and find integration in the broader intellectual currents of the time, like poststructuralism and postmodernism. On this account of the problem, ‘decolonizing would mean starting with attention to and learning from the specific, concrete debates that have taken place in specific locations in Africa and global Africa’ as Adam Branch has argued with regard to the decolonisation of African Studies Centres as institutions (Branch, 2018, p. 88). On one level, it may seem like I am simply reiterating the Westernness of postmodernism and postcolonialism and thus not making the intended counter-argument. That is, doesn’t the participant’s observation that the posts (modernism, structuralism, etc.) did not integrate insights from disciplinary integration in Africa prove the Westernness of these traditions? No! In my view, this cedes too much ground, for this historical exclusion only means that a *new* decolonised intellectual history of these traditions would *now* undermine their ostensible Westernness by showing the multiple discursive locations within which its insights were produced and extended (see for example, Magubane, 2005).
Moreover, granting the alleged Westernness of postcolonialism as an offshoot of postmodernism, what is more important, for me at least, in capturing the stakes in contemporary debates on decolonisation in South Africa is to reiterate why the authors felt the need to make these criticisms (on irony), even if in passing fashion. They are undoubtedly responding to the set of issues I will collectively containerise as *epistemic citizenship*, that is, the set of norms that govern decolonisation as process of forming epistemic communities, and thus, a politics of belonging. What they describe as irony functions to reject a view of decolonisation where notions of authenticity function to create hermetically sealed intellectual identities. In my view, as a stylistic device, irony invariably makes a case for flexible as opposed to narrow conceptualisations of African and African-centredness. In the case of Reddy and Smith, they lament the ‘subordination of the politics of decolonisation to the agenda of postcolonialism’, arguing that it ‘… offers neither a realistic means of getting to decolonisation nor an appealing vision of what it entails’. For them, the postcolonial rendition of the decolonisation project because it ‘collapses quickly into civilizational binaries: conflict is viewed as originating in the inherent oppressiveness of ideas and subjectivities associated with “western modernity” while solutions turn on promoting ideologies that are authentically “black” or “African”’ (Reddy and Smith, 2019, p. 22). This speaks to worries around the crude essentialism and nativist impulses perceived to characterise this mapping of the problem. The illustration of irony only makes sense in relation to a perceived praxis of decolonisation marked by nativism and a fixation on purity in the provenance of thought.

This injunction against nativism and insularity is evident in my fieldwork, where several participants caution against enclosure in their conceptions of African-centredness. As such, if decolonisation conjures a politics of knowledge that critically interrogates the co-constitution of knowledge, power, and identity, to caution against nativism is to problematise the ethics regulating conceptions of identity in this equation. In this way, a lot of effort goes into saying what decolonisation [Africanisation] *is not*:

You see, you know as I've always said, once you begin from a particular location, looking into the world or the discipline from that particular location gives you a sense of the kinds of issues and questions you should be asking. Because asking the right questions often steers you in a direction, not towards insularity but towards expansiveness. But if you start off with saying that knowledge is contained in this kind of thing [identity], so this is where everything begins and ends, then you lose the plot.
In fact, in the Nairobi revolution, remember that what Ngugi and his colleagues were proposing is that you put Kenya and Africa at the centre of knowledge production and then you move outwards, you know you deal with Europe, you deal with the African diaspora, you deal with the world. There was no time in which they wanted to retreat into a self-created cocoon which is what nativism does. So, when you say Africanization, you’re not thinking of Africanization in essentialist terms but in terms of location and history and context (Balogun, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

This injunction often emphasised the global nature of decolonisation as an intellectual project:

Yeah, it [decolonisation] must be a global project. Because you see, once you self-insulate, that is the death of anything because the way the world works and the way that knowledge works is that you know, knowledge is coming from every part of the world. The fact that yours had been marginalized and rendered you know, useless, does not mean that you then must sleep in that. You must enter into it as a way to open it up into a more global context. And, you see, the way that knowledge has developed is such that many of the tools, concepts, and disciplines that we all inhabit have been created out of Europe, right, and they’ve had all these histories with them, and when you’re taking your own discipline, you’re opening up a discursive conversation. And that discursive conversation is happening within the bounds of a modern university. So, you cannot completely ignore the outside world and the histories of these disciplines. Nativism tries to essentialize cultures and societies, and that kind of self-essentialization is good if you’re going to put it on display, you know, in a museum of Natural History or you're performing it for a tourist audience right— oh this is how Zulu beer was made 200 years ago or 100 years ago. But it’s absolutely useless in terms of the modern contemporary issues that face all of our societies, and the issues of knowledge production within our social worlds, the social worlds we inhabit (Balogun, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

Another participant adds, ‘I do not believe that localization means to think the particular instead of the universal. I think that the universal has to be thought from the place where you are, with the tools, historical experience, and sociological weight of your circumstances’ (Mary, UCT, Executive, 2019). Professor of Media Studies, Herman Wasserman, echoes a similar point, upon receipt of the Georg Foster award:
South African media research tends to be quite parochial. This grant offers an important opportunity to study African media within a broader, global context…If we say we want to ‘decolonise’ media research, that cannot mean to become more inward looking or rejecting epistemologies from elsewhere out of hand. Instead, it requires us to examine the global power relations impacting upon our local situation, the history of how we got to where we are, and the ways in which we can speak back to global discourses (cited in Simon, 2017).

Similarly, speaking on language literacy education, a participant argues below that although an Africa-centred approach in South Africa would mean the promotion of African languages within a multilingual framework, this does not amount to linguistic nativism:

I'm very strongly arguing for increasing the status of African languages and that they be used in schooling and in higher education, and for the validation of multilingualism. I also, you know argue very strongly that we must be bilingual at least, and English has to be one of those languages because in terms of the job market, and the economic advantages that people have, I can’t as an English speaker say, ‘Oh yes it's fine for me, but for you, you should rather have your African language.’ I mean, that's also exclusionary. So, what we have to recognize is that unfortunately English has become this hugely powerful language, and it does actually lead to economic advantages for many people if they have that proficiency. But it's about how do we actually give people meaningful access without having to denigrate who they are and their languages. And how is it that we can also have English speakers not be monolingual English speakers, but to also be Bi and multilingual, so that they can also work multilingually. So, for me it's not English versus African languages, it's about both. About having a multilingual repertoire. And the onus should not only be on multi on non-English speakers to learn English, but it should be with everybody (Jessica, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

This injunction equally features in curricula decision making. Speaking about curriculum reform in undergraduate history teaching and the desire to foreground ‘connected histories’, one participant explained,
… so, our first year, our two first year courses, one is called ‘Connections and Interactions 1500-1800’, and the other ‘Empires and Modernities’ which is basically 1800 to the contemporary period. So, if you think about Connections and Interactions, right, all the modern world history and European history which is fascinating, amazing work, but it talks about connected history. It doesn't talk about the massive interruptions in this history that as slave exporting societies we experienced here. So, we kind of, we try to teach students dialectically that these connections are being possible only at the cost of interrupting certain connections. In the second semester course we teach empires and modernity where we see that well, formally empires are passed but much of these ideas are actually now secularized and presented to us in the form of modernity. So how do we now kind of think about this. So, if you look at these courses which kind of all teach world history from a global south perspective, so, when we teach the American Revolution, we teach more for example from the perspective of Native American and when we teach French Revolution, we teach we give a little more emphasis on the Haitian Revolution (Ramesh, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

In describing the undergraduate curriculum, the emphasis on connected histories and history as entanglement is distinctly noteworthy and worth discussing for several reasons. Nominally, this framing of decolonisation employs vocabularies like Global North and South to map intellectual hegemony and frame decolonial interventions. In this case, the antidote to Eurocentrism is a horizontalisation of academic dependency, which in this case involves both centring the Global South and learning across the Global South. Furthermore, there is the matter of the kinds of epistemic communities being foregrounded in the name of decolonisation. In short, how does one conceive Africanity both as an identity and a relation to non-African others? Consciously or unconsciously, therefore, how we understand, for example, the decolonisation of curricula reveals assumptions, aspirations, and rejections of distinct kinds of ethical sensibilities (epistemic citizenship). Take this example of some ethical deliberations by the same participant,

So, for example, the kind of debates we have for example amongst, I'm just telling you about my friends, my colleagues in the Department. So, do we want to, like if we want to teach a course on say African intellectual history, do we keep only African writers and we keep only black African writers or do we also read people who are, you know related to this field, but may not be black Africans? (Ramesh, UCT, Humanities, 2019).
Underneath emphases on entanglement and connectedness, is a worry that notions like Africanisation entail some kind of enclosure evident in latent anxieties around nativism shaped by configurations of race, nation, and Africa (Mbembe, 2002; Cooper and Morrell, 2014; Dübgen and Skupien, 2019). This worry is historically salient, and mirrors debates, for example, about what constitutes African philosophy in the 1970s. Debates about what it means for something to be rooted in Africa naturally entered the domain of ontology and identity, which were understandable in a context occupied with transcending colonial discourse and the colonial subjectivities it cultivated. At the same time, critiques of ethnophilosophy noted that essentialist constructions of identity, on account of a preoccupation with ideals of authenticity, were in danger of endorsing particularism and intellectual enclosure by virtue of the static conceptions they developed (Ebousi-Boulaga, 1968, 1977a; Towa, 1979; Hountondji, 1996).

Rather than Africanisation signalling a walled segregation into the particular (constructed along racial, ethnic, national, or autochthonous lines—with these themselves often obscuring gendered, class, and other fault lines), emphases of connectedness or entanglement attempt to demonstrate African-centredness as a locus of enunciation through which one can participate in a truly global discourse of humanity. Decolonisation therefore presents a choice between narrowly bounded epistemic communities and flexible (Afropolitan) forms of epistemic citizenship. This dilemma or choice is evident in the participant’s reflections on the learning objectives of the revised undergraduate history curriculum,

So, what we're trying to tell them, is that the world is connected, right, and the thing is that I don't want students to as an effect of decolonizing curriculum, I don't want them to know less about French revolutions, I don't want them to know less about you know, the Great Depression of 1929 in America, because these are important factors globally, but I want them to find out the connections. So, in a way, how can we redeem Europe of its own narcissism and actually show the unequal and strange ways these histories are connected. So that's one thing that I think we're trying to do, because in certain cases it [decolonisation] can develop as something like why would I read a white historian, or a white theorist right? I mean I’ve heard these questions like why would I read Marx who was white, now why would I read Foucault who was white? (Ramesh, UCT, Humanities, 2019).
The same participant comes to the following conclusion on strong identitarian approaches to decolonisation/Africanisation, where enclosure manifests as ‘rehearsing a given line’,

So often in the academia, I think this kind of approach can take very exclusionary forms, right. I mean I can say that I'm not talking to the others, I'm excluding these particular groups because they have been historically prevalent, or I'm not going to touch these traditions, which I can understand. But I don't think that in the long term this is a very useful strategy, because, you know, one of my favourite kind of thinkers—Roland Barthes once said—‘when men do not have loaves, they steal’. So, if we do not have that particular language, I'll steal it. And I have the same ethics. I really do think that we have to learn from everywhere and everybody to make our own projects rather than just rehearsing kind of a given line (Ramesh, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

Beyond this issue (i.e., nativism and insularity as a function of binary vocabulary), Reddy and Smith also posit postcolonialism as ideological, perpetuating a form of consciousness that is self-deceiving in its mystification of the real causes of institutional racism. Like Long (2018), a member of the department of psychology at UCT, they argue that postcolonialism’s key weakness is its tendency to ‘… disconnect symbolic and discursive concerns from material realities …’ which often results in an inflation of the causal significance of culture and discourse. In their view, what we end up with is an account of UCT apprehended only in terms of ‘ontologies’ and ‘epistemologies’ (in effect UCT as discourse), which diverts attention away from locating the origins of racism and systemic exclusion in institutions and policies, as well as political and economic relationships. Long (2018) problematises this disconnect (discourse vs materiality) in a different way. His claim is that decolonisation ends up being insufficiently representative, excluding working class concerns. This means that the perceived privileging of culture over material reality is itself an ideological play masking the class character of advocates of decolonisation. This is a criticism that seems to follow the discourse at historically white universities. When we start asking ‘who is the African for whom representation is sought’, we start to see the significance of this critique of the postcolonial renditions of decolonisation (Long, 2018).

The preceding resonates with the familiar debate around the relative primacy of recognition and redistribution (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). I recall during my time in South Africa when the protest pulse still registered, the question paraphrasable as, ‘Who is more oppressed: the
man of the street without food, or the black lecturer who walks down the street with no one believing they could possibly be a lecturer?’ I hasten to dodge these cul-de-sac ruminations. Instead, I note that the overarching relevance of the claims raised in the previous paragraph is really around the *illustrative and explanatory sufficiency* of the frameworks and tools used in mapping the problem of decolonisation. The desire to foreground materiality of whatever kind is more certainly a dissatisfaction with the perceived *generalist* account of decolonisation that roots marginality and institutional racism not in concrete norms, institutions, and practices, but in a ‘transhistorical metaphysics of coloniality’ (Reddy and Smith, 2019).

5.3.1.2. A decolonisation insufficiently grounded in curriculum theory

Another set of debates critiques the CCF for being limited in its capacity to further curriculum decolonisation because it was insufficiently grounded in curriculum theory. Two respondents in the school of education explained in their submission to the CCWG,

Our expectation of a curriculum change framework is that it would be principally guided by a theory of curriculum that demonstrates how power and control is expressed at three levels: at the level of knowledge production (this includes the activities and products of research and scholarship); at the level of curriculum (this includes the selection, sequencing and recontextualising of knowledge for the purposes of teaching and learning); at the level of pedagogy (this includes the pacing of teaching and learning, evaluation of learning and social relations in the classroom). We would expect a curriculum change framework to distinguish between these levels and interrogate each level in terms of how and what knowledge is produced, distributed, recontextualised and evaluated. We would also expect a curriculum change framework to recognize that the different disciplines that make up the contemporary university have different knowledge structures and curriculum forms; manifest power and control in different ways to maintain disciplinary boundaries; and consequently, have different curriculum change entailments. *Further, we would expect a curriculum change framework to provide a robust, accurate and historically informed assessment of what curriculum currently exists in the university prior to proposing the need for change. First, because the past engagements and contestations around curriculum change may contain valuable lessons for the present exercise; secondly, to avoid re-inventing the wheel* (Galant and Hoadley, 2018).
On these expectations, they conclude,

However, the CCF does not locate its understanding within any consistent, coherent or relevant theory of curriculum as such. In short, in relation to its terms of reference, it neglects to provide adequate scholarly detail of its own processes in making the arguments it does; it fails to engage seriously with historical or current interventions and innovations; and it does not provide principles or tools to help academics review existing curriculum and consider possibilities for change. The actual curriculum thinking around how to decide what knowledge to select, how to sequence it, pace it, what and how to assess it at either course / programme level, remains to be done. So too, in relation to pedagogy, the report offers little guidance on how to establish productive and respectful relations between teacher and taught in lectures and tutorials, and how to conceptualise the ‘ideal student’ that decolonized curricula seek to produce (Ibid, emphasis mine).

There are two things to say here. The first revolves around the debate under inspection—that argues that current talk of epistemic decolonisation is insufficiently grounded in curriculum theory. In the current clamour for an African-centred university, the curriculum has been marked out as a strategic vehicle for decolonisation. There are those who, situating educational change within a teacher–learner–content triad, argue that curricula change that focuses on just one aspect to the detriment of others will likely fail (Sayed et al., 2019; Vandeyar, 2020). Often, these contributions react against the disproportionate focus on matters of content as opposed to pedagogy. On the other hand, there is the argument that more generally, the prevailing talk around decolonisation and African-centredness is insufficiently grounded in curriculum theory, which translates into a gap between substantive curriculum change and high-level metapistemological debates (Hoadley and Galant, 2019; Morreira et al., 2020). As such, in South Africa, several contributions look to articulate decolonisation in the grammar of curriculum theory (Jansen, 2019; Luckett et al., 2019; Luckett and Shay, 2020). For their part, Galant and Hoadley (2018) maintain that beyond general statements pertaining to the relation between knowledge and social position (race, gender, geography), the CCF offers no systematic account of what curriculum theorists call a ‘regulative discourse’, that is, the wider set of norms and values in which curriculum content is embedded. There is no account of the principles of selection governing existing curricula and pedagogical decisions.
Having established this, the key question regards what this injection of curriculum theory would add to the broader project of cultivating an intentional African-centred epistemic identity as part of intellectual decolonisation. Curriculum theory can impact (a) how one frames the problem of decolonisation and (b) how one articulates a theory of change. With regard to the former, for example, Jonathan Jansen has used the notion of knowledge regimes to caution against reducing complex epistemological problems to a single knowledge regime (Jansen, 2019). Therefore, in terms of framing the problem, the vocabulary of curriculum theory helps preclude over-determination, which in this case means bestowing undue causal powers on colonialism.

The issue of over-determination, in my view, also lurks quietly behind the expectations outlined above by Hoadley and Galant earlier, who point out that ‘curriculum’ is a far more expansive concept that transcends issues of course content, as seen in their references to the pedagogical interface and the technicalities of curriculum design. My observation is that in the absence of the theoretical contextualisation these commentators are seeking from initiatives like the CCWG, an explanatory vacuum exists in which colonialism and coloniality have their causal powers inflated, inscribed anywhere and everywhere. For example, when they note insufficient attention to other curricula issues of sequencing, pacing, and assessment (their duration and coherence)—that is, the more technical aspects of curriculum design—it is true that they are making the broader point that curriculum renewal is not only about knowledge in a single course, but requires programme coordination within and across faculties. At the same time, one can mobilise this point to subsequently question whether student estrangement is the result of a pervasive coloniality or a product of poor curriculum design in the technical sense. Is the demand for curriculum renewal actually a response to a perceived Western education or badly organised degree programmes? It is likely both, but this is obscured by the singular explanatory focus on coloniality. That is, in reducing alienation to coloniality, one risks bundling causes of alienation that ostensibly have nothing to do with colonialism. At the very least, one would have to show the coloniality of decisions around sequencing, pacing, degree duration, and coherence, which seems a tall order at face value. I suspect that equally, one is likely to tiptoe away from the responsibility of stipulating what African or African-centred forms of duration and coherence look like. To be clear, this worry about overdeterminacy does not deny the coloniality of knowledge perceived to characterise higher education and student discontent. It only shows that when one talks about decolonising the curriculum, an inattentive
grounding in curriculum theory risks ham-fisted statements and misrepresentations of the nature and current constitution of academic curricula.

The second benefit is that curriculum theory provides a vocabulary for thinking about the different levels of change within which an intentional project of decolonisation could make its mark. It is thus vital to articulating a theory of change. Within the sociology of education, for example, some in the university’s school of education make use of Basil Bernstein’s distinction between the instructional and regulative discourse of curricula. While the former regards the explicit content and skills taught, the latter catalogues the social and moral order underpinning the curriculum. They argue that academics tend to focus on the former while taking the latter for granted, in contrast to subaltern students who are often more acutely aware of the regulative discourse underpinning university curricula (Luckett, Morreira, and Baijnath, 2019). Similarly, Lis Lange has contrasted the academic and institutional curricula as discrete sites of change. Using the Mamdani affair at UCT in the late 90s to illustrate, Lange argues that the former is notoriously difficult to transform, and that decolonising the academic curriculum does not automatically spill over into the institutional curriculum (Lange, 2019). Hoadley and Galant, focusing on decolonisation as it relates to themes of power and control, the rules by which we select, classify, transmit, and evaluate educational knowledge are core stakes and up for grabs in the current clamour for curriculum decolonisation (Hoadley and Galant, 2019). They use distinction between ‘classification’ and ‘framing’ (Bernstein, 1973) to argue that contemporary discourses of decolonisation in South Africa tend to focus on shifts in content and organisation (framing), leaving untouched the evaluative rules around what counts as disciplinary knowledge (classification). Perhaps this is similar to Mbembe’s critique of current discourses, which he argues fail to develop a substantive theory of knowledge (Mbembe, 2019).

5.3.1.3. The charge of relativism

In response to discourses of Africanisation, critics are often quick to raise the spectre of relativism, often on the presupposition that knowledge and truth are not relative to one’s identity. Though some critics of the CCF accepted the basic premise around the relationship between knowledge, power, and identity, they nonetheless worried that the framework document reduced all knowledge to expressions of power. It is in this sense that a charge of radical relativism is applied against emergent understandings of decolonisation at the university. The term ‘critical universalism’ can be a helpful way of characterising this position which rejects radical relativism (Dübgen and Skupien, 2019). While accepting the historical
phenomenon of pseudo-universalism, it nonetheless retains faith in the possibility for universal validity in knowledge production: ‘A process of curriculum review would thus include an interrogation of universal claims of knowledge without eschewing the possibility that some truth claims (not only “Western”) do carry over across cultural and historical contexts’ (Senate Teaching and Learning Committee, 2019b).

This critique of relativity is also evident in my fieldwork, registering as an ambivalence toward the grammar of Africanisation. Some worry that this kind of relativism only serves to reproduce the radical alterity of Africa. Consider the following description of Africanisation as a fraught vocabulary,

> It is an analytical trap. It's like a booby trap that is set up. One must be very careful, because if you say oh, economics works differently [in Africa], so are you saying that Africans don't produce, because economics is the study of production and distribution and society and exchange, right? And societies have always done these kinds of stuff (Grieve, UCT, Commerce, 2020).

Others assert a strong commitment to a universalist approach to knowledge resulting in confusion around terminology like ‘African ways of knowing’ among others,

> I’m concerned about the suggestion that there could be an African, uniquely African way of arriving at knowledge, you know, or that there is knowledge that is African. Because I do not, I cannot imagine how knowledge can be African, you know… I do not believe there's such a thing external to us Africans that can be seen as intrinsically or objectively African knowledge, such that therefore there has to be an African way of knowing it. Even if there was, let’s say there as something like, there was something distinctly African. What does that mean? How do we know it to be African? Does it mean that if there’s something distinctly African, objectively so, extended to the knower? Does it mean that the people who are working outside of Africa or from Europe cannot access that or should not access that? (Musonda, UCT, Commerce, 2019).

It is the last point that is the most striking, as the series of questions build up to a broader anxiety around intellectual nativism as discussed earlier, in this case of a more profoundly
epistemological nature. Informed by a sense of knowledge as universal, the potential for *non-communicability/accessibility* grounds a worry of a hermetically sealed epistemic identity and praxis in which Africans are intellectual authorities unto themselves, enclosed from the rest of the world.

Another sense of relativism, which flows from the perceived centrality of lived experience in decolonisation discourses, is the view that the CCF tacitly endorses social positionality as a basis of legitimacy when making knowledge claims. On this point, commentators sometimes pointed to and saw as potentially divisive the CCWG’s insistence that being black-led would ensure its legitimacy. It was also argued that, more generally, this relativism ‘… has the potential to frame debates and encourage disagreement to focus not on the matter of the disagreement but only on the underlying divergence in positionality. In other words, while a radical relativising of knowledge in the CCF is posited as an attempt to allow all voices to be heard and hence to open up discourse, its emphasis on positionality also entails the potential to silence.’ (Senate Teaching and Learning Committee, 2019b).

Another worry regards the absence of clarity on the reach of lived experience and how far it ought to ground knowledge claims. Pointing to a failure to set these boundaries anticipates a rogue version of standpoint epistemology. The issue here regards the working group’s engagement at the Michaelis School of Fine Arts, where it documents that ‘students felt that while white academics had expertise in specific areas, they could not claim authority on blackness, black pain, African ideology, course material and productions, or as overseers of curriculum’ (p. 40). In my own fieldwork, it was not uncommon for students to question the legitimacy of white academics teaching about Africa, thus foregrounding racialised conceptions of Africanity and epistemic citizenship. A commentator worried that such claims endorsed ‘a general hierarchy of epistemic authority based on a person’s position within intersecting matrices of social domination, even hinting at a colour bar for teaching positions at certain levels and in certain areas’ (Hull, 2019a). It is worth emphasising that this is different from the employment equity legislature aimed at addressing demographic inequalities at the level of representation and the colour bar here refers to functions like course design, curriculum oversight, or the teaching of African writers and theorists. This anxiety around a colour bar generated some consternation, with the student group Progress SA petitioning the Vice Chancellor through media outlets to clarify its position in relation to this. In February 2019, they wrote,
Another potential issue with the Framework document is its apparent endorsement of the idea that a colour bar should be introduced, to prevent lecturers of the “wrong” race from taking charge of curriculum in general, or else in certain disciplinary areas… The Framework document does not distance itself from this proposal. On the contrary, it echoes it in its statement that the Curriculum Change Working Group itself needed to be ‘black-led’ in order to have ‘legitimacy’. The introduction of a colour bar for teaching would have grave moral and Constitutional implications.\textsuperscript{12}

They called on the Vice Chancellor to clarify the position of the CCWG’s framework document and affirm both its commitment to academic freedom and against a colour bar, which she did.\textsuperscript{13}

Some members of the university community also critique the CCF’s radical relativity on account of its dismissal of disciplinary expertise. Without implying the inviolability of this expertise, this seemed a challenge against a perceived primacy on lived experience, in this case the lived experience of students. It is almost as though decolonisation is a pedagogical battle and lecturers are trying to wrestle back epistemic authority perceived to have been ceded to students, in this case arguing that lived experience cannot be the sole basis upon which one conducts curriculum design or makes and evaluates knowledge claims. Sometimes, there is an assumption underneath some proponents of this argument that the end result of decolonisation is impoverished scholarship, poor standards, and ultimately unemployable graduates,

\begin{quote}
UCT must decide if it will continue to do high quality academic work (both as regards teaching and research) in engineering and the sciences, or not. It can produce degrees in these topics that make students employable, as at present, or it can produce “decolonised” science and engineering degrees that are not worth the paper they are written on. The graduates will be unemployable. The CCWG report is a political document that does not face up to this basic fact (Ellis, 2019).
\end{quote}

The issue, therefore, is whether the core point around the politics of knowledge—that knowledge is not neutral because it constitutes and is constituted by power asymmetries—

\textsuperscript{12} https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/please-dont-introduce-a-colour-bar-for-teaching-at
\textsuperscript{13} https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/teaching-at-uct-a-reply-to-progress-sa
necessarily commits one to a repudiation of disciplinary expertise as just another mystification of power. The senate teaching and learning committee’s own synthesis was to seek some kind of equilibrium in which a concern for the agency of ‘African’ students does not mean ‘diminishing the responsibility of academics for the production and transmission of knowledge and the induction of students into that knowledge’. In this regard, disciplinary expertise could function precisely to ‘to assist students to make sense of the gap between the “powerful knowledge” of the disciplines and their lived experience’ (Senate Teaching and Learning Committee, 2019b).

Some commentators also pointed to difficulty in understanding the technical vocabulary of the CCF’s theoretical framework, arguing that in different ways that it was exclusionary. This is a rhetorically damaging critique for an intellectual project that espouses inclusivity. What is the nature of this exclusion? One form of this critique suspects that this impenetrable language is probably more readily graspable in the social sciences and humanities. In this sense, it reflects the exclusion of other disciplines in the debate on decolonising the curriculum and this was also identified as a problem with the CCWG’s methodology which engaged only a limited section of the university in disciplinary terms. Reddy and Smith provide another form of the exclusionary language argument, contending that the CCF’s ‘obscurantist and elitist jargon is another convenient reminder that postcolonialism belongs more to the world of Derrida than of Rodney and Cabral’ (Reddy and Smith, 2019).

5.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I sought to unpack the meanings and debates around decolonisation as an epistemological project in the post RMF South African higher education landscape. In this regard, I considered its deployment at UCT to foment an African-centred ethic, where decolonisation-as-Africanisation is undertaken for the sake of identity, justice, relevance, and disciplinary interrogation.

In the next chapter, I build on some of these critical debates to illustrate the idea of epistemic citizenship, which maintains that efforts to create an African university are undergirded by various ethical sensibilities. These ethical considerations govern how one understands and evaluates Africanity—both in the sense of who can claim it, and what kinds of relations with
non-African others are authorised in the name of this identity. When people articulate their understandings of decolonisation and its relevance to teaching, learning, and research in their discipline, when they account for what decolonisation is not and the problematic directions it could take, when they account for its perceived limitations in their current institutional locations, I argue that they make claims that have an interpretive significance in terms of epistemic citizenship, a concept I develop further in the subsequent chapter. When decolonisation is framed as a project of Africanisation, these deliberations work out what normative African epistemic subjectivity looks like. When one cautions against radical relativism and nativism, they are acutely aware of the varying configurations of race, nation, and Africa that shape narrow forms of epistemic citizenship.

The broader challenge of the next chapter is to build a more comprehensive picture of this concept by considering the contestation over the different kinds of epistemic citizenships authorised by talk of an African university. To do this would be to explore the normative dimensions of the research question ‘Is decolonisation Africanisation’—for it would involve engagement, through the grammar of citizenship, with not only the inclusive aspirations of Africanisation, but its perceived exclusiveness as well.
Chapter 6
Decolonisation and Epistemic Citizenship

Who is the ‘African’ for whom representation is sought?

6.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I build on the idea of *decolonisation as the cultivation of an ethical subjectivity*, a theme that can be formulated through a series of questions. If our critical vocabularies, for hermeneutical expedience, make distinctions between us and them and ours and theirs, how should a putative African epistemic identity relate to non-African intellectual traditions? Furthermore, and more important in this chapter, how are the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ regulated, and are attempts to situate oneself in the ‘us’ camp always successful? I use the institutional inflections of decolonisation at UCT and SU in thinking through these questions.

These questions are inspired by Edward Said’s discussion on academic freedom delivered at the University of Cape Town’s annual T. B. Davie lecture on academic freedom (Said, 1994). Said notes that what is often at stake in the diverse discourses on academic freedom is the *national and cultural identity* of universities. Within African Studies, epistemic decolonisation has also been articulated in the idiom of academic freedom, which in this instance is the freedom to be intellectually African unencumbered by Eurocentrism (Mazrui, 1975; Mamdani and Diouf, 1994; Zeleza, 1997; Murove and Mazibuko, 2008). Precisely because decolonisation has historically co-opted universities as instruments in shaping national identity, Said invites us to ask, as an ethical matter, what *ought* to be the relationship between one’s national (African) identity, however defined (nationalist, Pan-African), and other identities external to this core (Western, Northern). In other words, what is national identity authorised to do in pursuit of academic freedom, or for our purposes, epistemic decolonisation? He asks,

… what kind of authority, what sort of human norms, what kind of identity do we then allow to lead us, to guide our study, to dictate our educational processes? Do we say: now that we have won, that we have achieved equality and independence, let us elevate
ourselves, our history, our cultural or ethnic identity above that of others, uncritically giving this identity of ours centrality and coercive dominance? Do we substitute for a Eurocentric norm an Afrocentric or Islamo- or Arabo-centric one? (Said, 1994, p. 13).

One finds a similar critical inquiry in Samir Amin’s critique of Eurocentrism and the culturalist projects that aim to decentre Western hegemony (Amin, 2011). While Amin expressly rallies against the nativist tendencies of such projects, Said’s own conclusion to these questions conjures the image of the migrant/traveller. This is based on a vision of the academic enterprise as the joint discovery of the self and other. For Said, notwithstanding the decolonial significance of nationalism and national identity as an anti-colonial ideology, making education subservient to it unjustifiably limits the human horizon,

To assume that the ends of education are best advanced by focusing principally on our own separateness, our own ethnic identity, culture, and traditions ironically places us where as subaltern, inferior, or lesser races we had been placed by nineteenth-century racial theory, unable to share in the general riches of human culture… A single overmastering identity at the core of the academic enterprise, whether that identity be Western, African, or Asian, is a confinement, a deprivation (Said, 1994, p. 16, emphasis mine).

This vision of the traveller has much in common with the ethical positions discussed earlier around transdisciplinarity and incompleteness in Chapter 1. These positions are united in an anxiety around the enclosure of African identity in which identity limits the possibilities for intellection through tropes of authenticity. Said’s insights bring two interrelated questions to the fore. Firstly, when one registers one’s membership within an ‘African’ epistemic community, what does that mean for one’s relationship with non-African traditions? Furthermore, what are the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion internal to the construction of an ‘African’ identity? In this chapter, I will develop an account of epistemic citizenship as a framework with which to engage these questions, particularly the latter. If decolonisation is understood to be a project of Africanisation, what forms of epistemic citizenship are subsequently defended and resisted? What are the struggles over what is authorised in the name of a truly African university?
I argue that viewing contemporary debates on decolonisation in South African universities through the idiom of Africanisation reveals various tensions pertaining to the inclusionary and exclusionary dimensions of the category African. One of the one hand, building on the previous chapter, I observe that individual and institutional deliberations over the decolonisation of the curriculum can be seen to foreground an Afropolitan epistemological sensibility that is antithetical to Africanity-as-enclosure. In this regard, I interpret the rejections of nativism and radical relativism seen in the previous chapter as epistemological efforts to foreground an inclusive cosmopolitan conception of Africanity to the effect of militating against intellectual enclosure. Here, an Afropolitan epistemic citizenship is undergirded by a critical universalist orientation. I then show other debates on decolonisation, which, when cast in the idiom of Africanisation, demonstrate the perceived exclusions over the African for whom representation is sought along various configurations of race, nation, and Africanity. In the case of Stellenbosch University, I examine discourses around the retention of Afrikaans as a language of higher education to illustrate a contestation about the inclusivity of the category ‘African’. By dealing with the possible claim that decolonisation excludes the Afrikaans speech community, in conjunction with debates around the indigenous status of Afrikaans, I engage the question of who can successfully claim Africanity when speaking of making universities in South Africa more African. In addition, I use a key flashpoint at the University of Cape Town to illustrate another perceived exclusionary, parochial, and autochthonous sense of Africanity, this time along configurations of race and nation. This flashpoint relates to constriction of decolonisation as the South Africanisation of the university.

6.2. Epistemic Citizenship

Going forward, I want to build on the critical questions advanced by Said by (a) developing the notion of epistemic citizenship and then (b) unpacking this notion in relation to debates on Afropolitanism and curriculum decolonisation. Foster (2012) uses epistemic citizenship to talk about ‘the ways in which privileges and responsibilities are being claimed and granted in unequal ways based upon whose knowledge matters most to neoliberal economies’ (Foster, 2012, p. 4). The concept foregrounds the relationship between citizenship as claim-making, on the one hand, and the knowledge–power–identity nexus, on the other. Primarily looking at the nation-state as the locus of citizenship, Foster situates practices of epistemic citizenship in the increasing tendency of the state to expand its regulation and control of knowledge and
knowledge production, for example, through legal mechanisms like intellectual property rights. In this context, epistemic citizenship captures the construction and mobilisation of ontological identities to make claims for recognition and rights on the state based on claims to knowledge. This produces regimes of inclusion and exclusion where certain forms of knowledge, and by extension knowers, are privileged and recognised by the law. Foster (2012) developed this concept in relation to the patenting of biological materials derived from indigenous San peoples’ knowledge of the *Hoodia gordonii* plant. In seeking political recognition of their indigeneity and claims to indigenous knowledge, indigenous peoples can make claims on the state that vary from a right to protection of their knowledge, culture, and heritage, to rights of benefit sharing from the patenting of indigenous knowledge. In the latter case, indigenous peoples ‘become willing participants in the commodification of their cultural knowledge in order to make claims for rights and recognition’ (Foster, 2012, p. 16). The resort to indigeneity itself disrupts existing regimes of citizenship in Southern Africa that rely on the racial and ethnic interpellation of subjects. As such, San appeals to indigeneity, entangled with discourses of authenticity and origin, itself challenges surviving apartheid racial categorisations like ‘coloured’. In a nutshell, the politics of epistemic citizenship describes both the practice of claim making based on claims to and over knowledge, as well as the shifting regimes of inclusion and exclusion in relation to how worth and recognition are distributed among epistemic actors and communities (e.g., scientific vs indigenous communities).

Building on Foster’s account, I use the idea of epistemic citizenship—*seeking inclusion/recognition/belonging in one’s capacity as a knower*—to draw out two interrelated dimensions to decolonisation:

(1) Over time, discourses of decolonisation index a *community of actors* engaged in counter-hegemonic behaviours animated by shared histories of domination and dispossession. In this regard, epistemic actors (students, academics, intellectuals) leverage epistemic identities, like ‘Southern’ or ‘African’ to negotiate inclusion in scientific communities (like disciplines, universities, journals) and expose regimes of exclusion in these communities that prejudicially construct some knowers and geographies of knowledge as deficient. In African Studies for example, the critical questions constitutive of these exclusions include: (a) *who* can produce authoritative knowledge about Africa or (b) how is Africa constructed as an object of study—that is, *what kind of knowledge comes from Africa?* In the case of the latter question, consider the example of Southern theory where Africa would be
discursively positioned in the Global South. When scholars lament that the Global South is overdetermined by Northern concepts, theories, and methodological assumptions, they sometimes challenge the assumption that only a certain kind of knowledge comes from Africa—raw data—and lament the epistemic construction of Africa as a site of experimentation (Hountondji, 1990b, 1997a; Connell, 2007a). Subsequently, part of the thrust of a project like Southern theory is the assertion that the Global South can be the basis for certain kinds of knowledge—theory, concepts, and global narratives. This is intelligible in the grammar of citizenship and belonging, for what is at stake is the discursive place-belongingness of Africa in both a global discourse of humanity and intellectual division of labour. As such on one level, epistemic citizenship conceptually indexes struggles for inclusion in virtue of one’s capacity as a legitimate knower within shared communities of intellectual praxis.

(2) At the same time, these epistemic identities—Africans, non-Western, Southern etc.—are often, in themselves, discursive terrains for a contested politics of belonging in which boundaries are created, policed, and revised by varying configurations of race, nation, and Africanity. As such, claim-making under the rubric decolonisation-as-Africanisation implicitly and explicitly involves a set of ethical deliberations both about (a) the nature of African epistemic communities and their boundaries and (b) how different epistemic communities ought to relate to one another in preservation of these boundaries. Taking this into consideration, decolonisation as an intellectual project can manifest as different regimes of epistemic citizenship ranging from bounded to flexible, based on the ways in which claim making is inflected by appeals to race, geography, indigeneity, and Africanity. Consciously or unconsciously, therefore, how we understand, for example, the decolonisation of curricula and university, reveals assumptions, aspirations, endorsements, and rejections of distinct kinds of epistemic citizenship.

The participants below sum up the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion that I attempt to tease out with the aforementioned concept. Critiquing Africanisation as a grammar of decolonisation, Priyanka explains,

I don’t know what the strict definition of Africanisation is, but as a brown person, I find that my space within that is very unclear. Who is African? Is it only black Africans that are African? I feel very much that I’m African but I’m being told very often that I’m not
African. And then you come to a place like UCT where we have employment equity clauses, etc. African people from out of South Africa, are not considered African enough. It’s a really weird space. It really should just be about your commitment to a particular set of principles, rather than identity. I don’t know. That my view. People would argue differently and have different reasons for arguing differently. So I think that Africanization is a discourse that I think can be quite restrictive. Even when I look at structures at UCT, there was a time when I was part of the Black Academic Caucus which had quite a strong Africanisation agenda and I found it quite alienating. We have very similar politics but end up making assumptions based not on your principles but on the colour of your skin. You know, it's like excluding men from gender debates. But that’s not helpful and men have to be part of the discussion. You need, you need to have everybody involved in questions of Africanisation, not just African, you know. The definitions I think bring in too many boundaries (Priyanka, UCT, Science, 2019).

Similarly, Martin argues,

I think clearly, there is a danger with a term like Africanisation. It could lead to or be understood as drawing lines between people who belong, ideas which belong in particular countries or particular continents and ones which just don't because they are not indigenous. And I think that both at the time of earlier discussions of intellectual decolonisation and in the current moment in South Africa, there are maybe some people who explicitly understand Africanisation or decolonisation in that way. And sometimes, even when people don't explicitly say so, there can be that sort of implicit understanding in the way the discourse is used. And I think that that’s something to push back against (Martin, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

Although one may consider oneself African, to be recognised as such is something that is negotiated within a community of others who also lay claim to that identity. Given that recognition underscores the extent to which we are vulnerable to the perceptions of others, it is worth noting recognition can fail or be withheld (Taylor, 1994). In this sense, a key aspect of the politics of belonging involves who can successfully lay claim to Africanity. In the case of the first participant who is an Indian South African, her Africanity is hardly a fait accompli, as she notes how race and nation often impinge on who can claim Africanity. I develop this idea of epistemic citizenship to discuss the politics of belonging she observes within
Africanisation as an idiom of decolonisation. Broadly speaking, I inquire into the African for whom representation is sought.

6.2.1. Epistemic citizenship and Afropolitanism

Building on the idea of decolonisation as the cultivation of an ethical subjectivity, I wish to invoke ‘Afropolitanism’ as a register of African identity in contemporary discourses on Africa, with a view towards broadly specifying its main epistemological implication— escaping intellectual enclosure.

Afropolitanism intuitively conjures before the mind a portmanteau comprising ‘African’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’, potentially signifying a cultural expression of cosmopolitanism (Santana, 2016). Genealogically, I locate my discussion in a set of debates occasioned primarily by the essays penned by Taiye Selasie (2005) and Achille Mbembe (2007) and their subsequent interlocutors. This of course is not to imply that cosmopolitanism is a new phenomenon on the continent, a belief undermined by the historical archive (Kopytoff, 1987). Rather, Afropolitanism is an attempt to authorise an alternative conception of African identity in the mode of multi-local AND extra-local forms of belonging. I stress ‘alternative’ in order to register its own discursive continuity with the multiple inventions and reinventions of Africa (Mudimbe, 1988; Mazrui, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). For Gikandi (2010), these Afropolitan alternatives seek to transcend Afro-pessimism in order ‘to rethink African knowledge outside the trope of crisis’. Selasie (2005) notably used the term ‘Afropolitan’ to describe the multiple felt senses of belonging among a generation of Africans in the diaspora whose migration and mobility resulted in a composite sense of heritage. She writes, ‘like so many African young people working and living in cities around the globe, they belong to no single geography, but feel at home in many’ (Selasie 2005). In this way, she sought to foreground the multiplicities constitutive of African identity. This project is similarly taken up by Mbembe, who seeks to disentangle Africanness from race and nativist traditions (and the cult of victimhood in which they are anchored), which he associates with previous emancipatory traditions like nationalism, Négritude, Pan-Africanism and Afro-radicalism (Mbembe, 2002). While these racialised discourses did indeed play an important role in the decolonisation project, he and many others often posit their failure to venture outside the rigid contours of race (Falola and Essien, 2014). This racial constriction limits their capacity to espouse a universalism that would open up Africanity to the facticity of ‘… flows of global networks and worldly hybridities’ (Balakrishnan, 2017, p. 7; see also; Eze, 2014, 2018). As
such, Afropolitanism began as a project of space clearing for forms of self-styling engaged in the construction of alternative accounts of African that are not overdetermined by narratives of loss, objecthood, and tropes of crisis.

As part of a commitment to de-essentialise and de-territorialise what it means to be African, advocates of Afropolitanism often posit the anachronistic nature of oppositional conceptions of African identity (e.g., Africa vs West). Equally, they caution against the lurking danger of nativism and autochthony within discourses of Pan-Africanism and Négritude as pillars of black emancipatory politics (Mbembe, 2001, 2002). These limitations render their resulting conceptions of Africanity stale and unsuited to the exigencies of modern existence in a post-colonial globalised world marked by the intensified dynamism of mobility and intermixing.

Without necessarily endorsing the argument above, it is nonetheless significant that such a point is emphasised, if only as a counter-argument to those who insist on Afropolitanism’s own anachronism as part of the debates the concept has occasioned. Among other things, these counter-arguments rely on recognising and deploying the longstanding historicity of cosmopolitanism in Africa to argue that new terms for these enduring practices and identities are redundant, for they are sufficiently encompassed in existing terminologies like ‘African’ and ‘Pan-African’ (Santana, 2016). This perceived redundancy is captured by Grace Musila who asks,

Why the need to qualify one’s cosmopolitanism? The very necessity of qualifying Africans’ being in the world only makes sense when we assume that, ordinarily, Africans are not of the world. I am yet to hear of Europeans terming themselves Europolitans, or Americans as Ameropolitans (Musila, 2016, p. 112).

This resonates with Chimamanda Adichie’s exasperation: ‘I am tired of this word. I am African. There are two things that seem curious to me: first are Africans so outside of the general history of humanity that they must be designated by a particular word when they travel or are found in the capitals of the world ...’ (cited in Santana, 2016, p. 122). In my view, I think it depends on what one believes, to be doing the qualificatory work in this terminology. If, as I think it is, that Mbembe and Eze use cosmopolitanism to define Africanity, as opposed to foregrounding some distinct African cosmopolitanism, then its relevance lies precisely in the very real instances in which Africanness is conceived of as hermetically sealed and reified in
discourses of race, nativism, blood, and autochthony. Simply pointing to a historicity of cosmopolitanism on the continent does not erase this. Therefore, I contend that though Muslia’s description of Afropolitanism as ‘Africa lite’ is meant to insightfully draw attention to the pathologisation of ‘African’ being insufficiently cosmopolitan on its own, it perhaps elides over the very real ways in which understandings of Africanity have failed to espouse a continental and even transnational cosmopolitanism.¹⁴

Afropolitanism evokes varied responses from the celebration of connectivity and hybridity to a cynicism towards its perceived valorisation of privileged globetrotters. This latter attitude is very evident in critiques of its exclusionary politics. While Wainaina (2012) highlights the culture of commodification it cultivates which robs it of a substantive political consciousness, others have lamented its elitist and exclusionary dimensions. Ede (2016), for example, evaluates Afropolitanism as myopic in virtue of its individualistic political effects, maintaining that it ignores the materiality of the postcolonial condition of most Africans. In this regard, it is a deceptive political consciousness whereby ‘individual self-empowerment … mutates into an ironic and symbolic collective black self-negation, couched as a celebration of hybridity and transnationalism’ (Ede, 2016, p. 90). Echoing this elitist accusation, Muslia observes that,

… we get the sense that the term references people of African descent who are globally mobile. But does this include all globally mobile Africans? … the term Afropolitanism seems to come with a certain glow of access, affluence and mobility in the global north that signals particular class and cultural inflections which would therefore not be extended to … the many African migrants who attempt the Mediterranean passage into Europe. Afropolitanism then, seems to reference a particular kind of affluent mobility in the global north, as opposed to all global mobility (Musila, 2016, p. 111).

In virtue of this privileged position, as a function of the symbolic and cultural capital that accrue Afropolitans in their capacity to shape narratives about Africa, one finds warnings against the

¹⁴ Muslia (2016, p. 110) writes: ‘It seems to me that, in its pairing of African and cosmopolitan, this concept is haunted by anxieties about the “African” on its own not being deemed cosmopolitan enough; and the cosmopolitan on its own suggesting the erasure or over-integration of the African into a cosmopolitanism which does not fully reference difference. In some sense then, Afropolitanism seems to be about embracing just enough of Africa to retain a certain flavour that sets one apart from the norm – presumably Euro-American – but not so much as to be too “African”. Like Coke Lite or a lite beer, Afropolitanism seems to promise Africa lite: Africa sans the “unhealthy” or “intoxicating” baggage of Africa.’
danger of a single Afropolitan story with the effect of sidelining the voices of the majority who remain on the margins (Dabiri, 2016).

This brushstroke account of the Afropolitan debate demonstrates issues of inclusion and exclusion that can be probed further in the conceptual vernacular of citizenship and belonging. On the one hand, Afropolitans seek to unshackle Africanity from its enclosure within the rigid contours of race, nation, and territorially and associated tropes of loss, victimhood, and crisis. This is a move that, at bottom, seeks to de-substantialise accounts of Africanity by renouncing Africa as a pre-constituted self expressed afterwards in writing. Instead, it insists on Africanity as an open question—continuously created through the very process of writing (Diagne, 2001, 2002). On the other hand, the Afropolitan current is also seen to have exclusionary potential, affirming only a limited register of transnationalism along the contours of class and geography, thereby raising the issue of the African for whom representation is sought in such discourses.

6.2.2. Afropolitanism as an epistemic identity

In the context of this dissertation, Afropolitanism can be seen as a possible orientation within the broader ambit of Africanisation as an intellectual project. This juxtaposition of Afropolitanism and Africanisation may seem counter-intuitive only if grounded in the uncritical assumption that Africanisation is necessarily parochial. For my purposes, what is particularly noteworthy (praiseworthy?) about Afropolitanism is its dimension as a distinct ethical sensibility—a position in the world and a disposition towards others (Eze, 2014, 2015, 2016). In short, it is a mode of being African in the world. It is characterised by an openness and flexible mobility that dovetails Nyamnjoh’s notion of ‘incompleteness’ discussed briefly in Chapter 1. This expansiveness of African self-perception is visible in noble platitudes such as Selasie’s (2005) proclamation: ‘We are Afropolitans; not citizens, but Africans of the world.’ Similarly, Eze defines the Afropolitan as,

… one who, on the strength of birth or affinity, can call any place in Africa his or her place, while at the same time being open to the world… One does not need to have crossed geographical boundaries to be Afropolitan; one only needs to cross the psychic boundaries erected by nativism, autochthony, heritage, and other mythologies of authenticity…The Afropolitan is one who stakes moral claims to Africa and the world, and conversely admits that others can lay the same claim to Africa… being African is expansive (Eze, 2016, pp. 114–5, 117).

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Mbembe (2007, p. 28) offers a similar description of this ethical sensibility, positing Afropolitanism as an

Awareness of the interweaving of the here and there, the presence of the elsewhere in the here and vice versa, the relativisation of primary roots and memberships and the way of embracing, with full knowledge of the facts, strangeness, foreignness and remoteness, the ability to recognise one’s face in that of a foreigner and make the most of the traces of remoteness in closeness, to domesticate the unfamiliar, to work with what seem to be opposites – it is this cultural, historical and aesthetic sensitivity that underlies the term ‘Afropolitanism’.

Against the backdrop of these debates, what might an Afropolitan ethical sensibility entail in the context of decolonising knowledge and universities in South Africa? Put differently, when it comes to the production, circulation, and legitimation of knowledge, why might one seek to foreground the cosmopolitan constitution of Africanity as an epistemic identity?

An answer could be found in revisiting some of the debates broached in the preceding chapter. Looking back at the institutional debates at UCT in the CCWG, in conjunction with insights from my fieldwork, there is a lot to be gleaned from the emphasis on what decolonisation is not and the risky directions that interlocutors strain to steer away from. In this regard, the rejection of a perceived nativism and radical relativism associated with the idiom of Africanisation is noteworthy. In the case of relativism, for example, some responses to the CCWG, keenly aware of its exclusionary potential, were reluctant to make social position (e.g., race) the sole basis for legitimating knowledge claims, notwithstanding a serious recognition of the interrelation between knowledge, power, and identity. Recall the worries around the institutionalisation of a colour bar through racialised construction of epistemic authority in the idea, for example, that white academics could not claim authority on ‘African ideology’.

I also showed worries around the enclosure of Africanity in a way that forecloses external critique and communication. For some, Africanisation and the idea of ‘African’ knowledge also raised worries around non-communicability (vis-à-vis non-Africans, however defined) resulting from the erection of boundaries between intellectual traditions considered to be African and non-African. Foregrounding the ambivalence of Africanisation, recall the
participant who asks whether putatively African knowledge is accessible to Europeans and those outside the continent.

The rejection of nativism was evident in the emphasis on the global nature of decolonisation as an intellectual project, moving out in concentric circles from local to global. This is evident in participants for whom adopting Africa or the Global South as a locus of enunciation does not entail a ‘walled segregation’ and is open to the domestication of outside influences. For example, recall the argument against linguistic nativism in the promotion of African languages. More broadly, nativism is seen as an insidious politics that limits the revolutionary potential of decolonisation insofar as it foregrounds insularity through essentialist accounts of Africanity. As one participant explains,

You see, for example, you know the Yoruba have a deity of lightning called Shango. As developments in the world go on, he starts off as the school of lightning. At the time that Shango began there was no electricity, but when there is electricity he becomes god of electricity. And so in traditional thoughts, there is no insularity and kinds of dichotomies that we create now. But if you are a nativist, you will say ‘oh, electricity is foreign, this is foreign’. Nativism divides the world into what is contained within a bounded territorial, cultural identity, and everything else outside of it is foreign, right. But traditional thought does not recognize those dichotomies. I’ll give you another Yoruba example. When Ogun lived, there were no aircrafts, there were no motorcars. Ogun was the god of iron because they made you know, the iron forge and smitheries were quite by common. From being God of iron, he becomes god of motorcars, he becomes god of aeroplanes. You see, the traditional imagination in its original form does not see those things as foreign, they're just new developments that get incorporated into the thinking of the culture and the society. But nativism sees those things as foreign, as something outside of what we're doing. And this is my problem with that kind of thinking, that it insulates and creates a world that in reality does not exist. Discursively, it can be very dangerous (Balogun, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

Rejections of relativism and nativism are united in a disdain for conceptions of Africanity as hermetically sealed, something Aimé Césaire notably rejected with poetic clarity in his famed resignation from the French Communist Party in 1957,
There are two ways to lose oneself: walled segregation in the particular or dilution in the “universal.” My conception of the universal is that of a universal enriched by all that is particular, a universal enriched by every particular: the deepening and coexistence of all particulars (Césaire, 2010, p. 152).

Recall that I framed these ethical sensibilities in terms of a critical universalism, the essence of which is captured by the participant below,

So, I do not believe that localization means to think the particular instead of the universal. I think that the universal has to be thought from the place where you are, with the tools and historical experience, and sort of sociological weight of your circumstances (Mary, UCT, University Executive, 2020).

Taking these features into consideration, I submit that an Afropolitan ethical sensibility is fundamentally concerned with precluding intellectual enclosure and isolation whether as a function of identity or place. This vision espouses a critical universalism intent on rehabilitating Africa, through the Africanisation of South African universities, as a legitimate discursive terrain and locus of enunciation through which to participate in a truly global discourse of humanity. This indexes an aspiration to what may be described as cosmopolitan pluriversalism, which contends that ‘decolonization does not mean purifying African thought from its European influence, but rather it entails an insistence of putting local knowledge forms on a horizontal platform with the North Atlantic ones that are typically considered the basis of universal knowledge’ (Newell and Pype, 2021, p. 6).

Take one of the debates in the current literature around whether the binary/oppositional grammar of Africanisation is appropriate to the exigencies of modern existence. What is being pointed out is the extent to which these rigid binaries are undermined by contemporary Afropolitan sensibilities that stress overlapping communities of fate (Mbembe, 2016). At the same time, the critical debates internal to the Afropolitanism concept described earlier forecast the possibility that this presumably more expansive African self-perception can also be undercut by regimes exclusion, notably around the Africans rendered visible in these discourses. This notwithstanding, in epistemological terms at least, Afropolitanism is significant in authorising a conception of Africanity that is fundamentally inclusive because it jettisons enclosure and insularity.
Although Afropolitanism potentially vacillates an inclusionary and exclusionary ethic, I wish to foreground the former as the aspiration within contemporary understandings of decolonisation. The critical universalism possible within Afropolitan discourses is a principle that would intuitively garner much support. The idea that knowledge is only partially as opposed to wholly determined by one’s social position, and that a transcendence of some sort is possible, is an attractive equilibrium. Here, the particularities of social position—race, class, geography, gender—are recast as loci of enunciation through which one participates in a truly global discourse of humanity. This gestures to a universalism that is neither a free-floating signifier nor exhausted by situation (Sekyi-Otu, 2019). An Afropolitan epistemological sensibility marked by a critical universalist orientation is therefore an illustration of an inclusive conception of epistemic citizenship given the epistemic community it builds in the name of decolonialisation is sensitive to the both the pathologies of difference—closure that risks absolute separatism by conflating contact with contamination—and the pathologies of universalism—such as the violence towardness otherness (Cronin, 2000). Put simply, the discursive rehabilitation of Africa as a legitimate base for knowledge production and validation need not rule out the pursuit of universal goals and the discovery of common concepts, values, and orientations (Diagne and Amselle, 2020).

In fact, it is worth linking this to debates on African Philosophy, particularly Hountondji’s critique of ethnosophistry and the broader significance of his conceptualisation of African philosophy. His critique is grounded in an acute awareness that understandable efforts to resist the coloniality of knowledge can often enclose Africanity within alterity and a cult of difference where the significance of ‘African knowledge’ is limited to its particularity. There are numerous instances of enclosure he critiques, such as the sealing off African philosophy within the contours of ‘tradition’ and the potential of this to exclude those who do not subscribe to cultural identity prescribed as authentic. Furthermore, the collectivism of ethnosophistry signified an enclosure within a shared philosophy dubbed African, which subsequently constrains the development of a healthy pluralism (Hountondji, 1996).

Hountondji notably offered a contested geographical definition of African philosophy as philosophical texts written by Africans. The productiveness of this provocative minimalist definition lies precisely in vexing the expectations and assumptions of identity—that African philosophy must be different from elsewhere. This demystification of Africanity, as nothing
more than a set of philosophical texts emanating from the continent, ‘opens up the possibility for a plurality of philosophical traditions and objects of inquiry that the African philosopher might turn to, by not making him or her the prisoner of any identity-based prescriptions of what “authentically” African approaches and themes have to look like’ (Dübgen and Skupien, 2019, p. 38, emphasis mine).

Hountondji’s scholarship is emblematic of what I discuss as intellectual Afropolitanism. Africanisation as a rootedness in Africa and its problems does not preclude the cultivation of an ethical sensibility that transcends the continent’s real and imagined borders by being open to diverse intellectual genealogies (Hountondji, 2017). Contrary to enclosure and insularity, Hountondji personifies Africanity as transcultural—critically ‘engaging with a set of universalisable questions, with a global significance, from a defined location’ (Dübgen and Skupien, 2019, p. 2). The mandate of intellectual decolonisation thus regards how we ‘… respond to the challenge of cultural imperialism without imprisoning ourselves in an imaginary dialogue with Europe, how to re-evaluate our cultures without enslaving ourselves to them, how to restore the dignity of our past, without giving room to a passivistic attitude’ (Hountondji, 1983, pp. 142–143).

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Notwithstanding this inclusionary ethic that reaches out into the world from an African-centred locus of enunciation, contemporary debates on decolonisation in South African universities, when seen through the framework of Africanisation, illuminate several contestations over its exclusionary dimensions. This can be illustrated by examining the question: who is the subject (African) for whom decolonisation is sought? While talk of exclusion should not immediately be seen as pejorative, I argue that as a vocabulary of decolonisation, Africanisation raises issues of exclusion in relation to two nationalisms. Using flashpoints at UCT (Lushaba affair) and Stellenbosch (Change in Language policy), I argue that both events can be interpreted to portray Africanisation as an exclusionary black nationalism that constructs Africanity along exclusionary configurations of race, nation, and indigeneity.

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6.3. Race, Nation, and Africanity: Epistemic Citizenship and the African for Whom Representation is Sought

This section serves as an introduction to my use of Pan-Africanism as a point of departure in which I locate the discussion on the exclusionary potentials of Africanisation as a vocabulary of decolonisation. In this regard, I briefly sketch two debates. One the hand one is the charge that Pan-Africanism ossifies African identity along ever-diminishing circles of inclusion. This is most relevant to the debate on language and decolonisation in Stellenbosch and the question of who can successfully claim Africanity. The other debate relates to the historical aspirations to convert nationalism into Pan-Africanism in the deployment of African nationalism as an anti-colonial and decolonial resource. This debate will highlight the conjunction of race and nation in inflecting the African for whom representation is sought and is most relevant to the Lushaba affair at UCT.

6.3.1. Race, nation, and Pan-Africanism

Groups facing oppression and domination are invariably faced with the question of how to effectively respond to this predicament and initiate its transcendence. Collective unity and solidarity among the oppressed are enduring historical and contemporary responses to domination in this regard (More, 2009). This premium on unity is a hallmark of Pan-Africanism as political thought and praxis (Abrahamsen, 2020). Hakim Adi (2018, p. 4) defines Pan-Africanism as those ‘ideologies and movements that have at their centre the unity and advancement of Africa and its diaspora’. As a response to colonial and imperial domination, African nationalism had a distinctly Pan-Africanist character to the extent that it called for unity among Africans and those of African descent in the pursuit of an equitable and just global order. As Julius Nyerere famously noted, ‘[A]frican nationalism is meaningless, is anachronistic, and is dangerous, if it is not at the same time Pan-Africanism’ (cited in Shivji, 2006, p. 209). The relevant debates in which I situate an evaluation of Africanisation in the grammar of citizenship require one to see Pan-Africanism as worldmaking in the sense of articulating visions of world order (Getachew, 2019) These visions include ‘a world of continental unity and transnational solidarity; a world of national sovereignty; and a world of racially defined units’ (Abrahamsen, 2020, p. 56).

Regarding the first two visions, a recurrent debate in the intellectual history of Pan-Africanist political thought regards the failure of African nationalism in converting nationalism into Pan-
Africanism (Shivji, 2006, 2011; Abrahamsen, 2020). This goes back to varying articulations of what unity entails. Kwame Nkrumah notably articulated the indivisibility of sovereignty and unity, foregrounding a continental unity and transnational solidarity that rejected colonial borders. Others like Nyerere believed in this vision of continental unity but opted for a gradualist approach that decoupled unity and national sovereignty. In the process, Nyerere accorded primacy to the latter, maintaining that national independence was a step on the journey to continental unity. On occasion, the contemporary postcolonial condition in Africa is read as a kind of suspended revolution in which national sovereignty became an end-in-itself (Shivji, 2011). In this sense, the Pan-Africanist character of African nationalism is continually eroded by exclusive territorial nationalism, which, according to Issa Shivji (2006, p. 209), ‘tends to degenerate into chauvinism at best, racism and ethnicism at worst’. In Chapter 4, I noted that Pan-Africanism was a key ideological pillar in the Rhodes Must Fall movement. Through critiques of Eurocentrism, students questioned the place of Africa and Africans in the university, arguing that universities in South Africa were colonial in their institutional form. In this way, their visions of change resonated closely with Nabudere’s conceptualisation of the Pan-African university (Nabudere, 2003). Furthermore, they also raised critical questions around how Africans outside of South Africa featured in the call for decolonisation. As such, Pan-Africanism was conspicuous as an antidote both to discourses of South African exceptionalism and narrow nationalism. A few months after the protests began in 2015, South Africa was engulfed in a xenophobic outburst. Juxtaposed against the prevailing calls for a decolonised African university, one is immediately attuned to the fact that Africanisation is not inherently progressive as the category ‘African’ can be mobilised in inclusionary and exclusionary ways. An instance therefore of a Pan-Africanist political praxis was the decision by students to protest outside the Department of Home Affairs, demanding that the Minister of Home Affairs condemn the xenophobic attacks. This tension between Pan-Africanism and nationalism serves as a backdrop for the first part of my discussion, illustrated with the case of UCT, on how ideas of nation inflect discourses of decolonisation and influence the African for whom representation is sought.

The second debate regards the place of race in the constitution of a global order free of relations of domination. As Abrahamsen (2020) explains, elements of Pan-Africanist political thought also envisioned a world of races and racial difference, ‘a nativist imaginary of a world of distinct races or authentic groups of people each inhabiting their own territory and living according to their own traditions, cultures, and religions’ (Abrahamsen, 2020, p. 67). Early
Pan-Africanists tended to accept a racialised view of the world but questioned the race-hierarchy thesis constitutive of slavery and European colonialism. This appropriation of racial discourse and categories made sense in historical context. Given the main historical contexts that have influenced Pan-Africanist thought in the diaspora and on the continent—the Trans-Atlantic slave trade and European imperialism (colonialism)—race was, historically, a foundational basis of unity such that Pan-Africanism initially developed as an internationalist black nationalism (Eze, 2013).

However, while acknowledging the gains of movements like Negritude and Pan-Africanism, the primacy of race is seen as untenable and unsuited to the exigencies of modern existence in a globalised world (Appiah, 1993; Mbembe, 2001, 2002). Pan-Africanist thought has been singled out for an underlying nativism that tends to turn identities into essential categories by articulating a co-constitution of race and Africanity. Africanness is equated with blackness and vice versa. The Afropolitan tradition, as seen earlier, is a fertile ground for critiques against this tendency to reduce African identity to skin colour, geographical origin, historical victimhood, and cultural roots. This perceived constriction of African identity, it is argued, ‘ignores the impact of current configurations and interdependencies that shape Africa and African diasporas in the world’ and thus the diversity shaping African identity. (Kasanda, 2016, p. 190) Whereas Pan-Africanism is critiqued for maintaining an anachronistic opposition between inside (African) and outside (for example Western), Afropolitans foreground a conception of African identity shaped through inward and outward flows of people and influence (Mbembe 2007). As such, the debate on the anachronism of Pan-Africanism regards its ossification of African identity and whether it is sensitive to the on-the-ground multiplicity and diversity constitutive of African identity, and which refuses to be contained within reified racio-geographic markers. Through this critique, Afropolitans centre agency by affirming ‘the responsibility of individuals in the choice and configuration of their own identity as well as their contribution to local and collective identities including African identities’ (Kasanda, 2016, p. 191). Therefore, if Africanity is not anchored within some already existing pre-constituted self but is effectively up for grabs and an open question, then these debates on Africanity are an entry point into the tensions undergirding the question of who can successfully claim Africanity. I illustrate this with the debate on language policies and decolonisation in Stellenbosch University.
6.4. The Lushaba Affair: Decolonisation as South Africanisation?

I think South Africanisation is completely useless for us. In a sense that South Africa is fundamentally an unethical entity. There is no such thing as a rainbow nation, there is no way that we can argue that we belong, that this land belongs to everyone, even those who took it away from us who are still part of the same politic without any ramifications for what they've done. So, in that level as an unethical entity itself, we cannot have a political project that wants to embrace South Africa. We must have an ethic that wants to completely destroy South Africa for this reason, in addition to the same old pan-African rhetoric that borders are not our borders in any way. Therefore, for us to embrace an ethic that wants us to re-emphasize our patriotic alliance to this nebulous and unethical entity which is South Africa, I don't think it's going to have any good ramifications for the decolonial project (Bongani, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

Let me reiterate once more that I am using the idea of epistemic citizenship to probe the forms of inclusion and exclusion authorised in the idea of an African university as part of decolonisation. Informed by a Pan-Africanist political consciousness for example, Bongani above rejects the authorisation of South-Africanisation as the primary articulation of belonging. Given that the Africanisation of the university draws on the revolutionary potential African nationalism, I have, in the previous section, noted the open-endedness of what this nationalism could entail by noting that it has historically produced several visions of world order. Equally therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate that talk of decolonisation will also involve competing claims on what an African subjectivity ought to be. In epistemological terms, I have suggested that the critical debates around curriculum decolonisation at UCT attempted to foreground an Afropolitan ethical sensibility anxious of enclosure and underpinned by a critical universalism. While identity is recognised as locus of power in the social relations of knowledge production, circulation, and validation, I demonstrated a reluctance among members of the university community to radically enclose the legitimacy of knowledge claims within social identities, whether racial, national, or autochthonous.

Despite this normative Afropolitan sensibility, its inclusionary potential is far from a fait accompli in terms of how decolonisation is understood as an emancipatory project (i.e., who it emancipates). As such, it should not elide its perceived exclusions along configurations of race and nation, even if talk of exclusion is not necessarily pejorative. I use the fallout from the
appointment of a new Dean of Humanities at UCT to illustrate contestations over what ought to be authorised in the name of Africanisation.

On 1 November 2019, following a special council meeting, the university executive appointed Prof. Shose Kessi as the new Dean of the Faculty of Humanities at UCT. Prof. Kessi had occupied this position in an acting capacity from 1 March 2019, following previous unsuccessful attempts to fill the position. The process of finalising her appointment was fraught with controversy, with her selection seen to undermine the university’s stated commitment to transformation and decolonisation in some quarters.

The recruitment and selection procedure for a new dean typically involves the establishment of a selection committee that meets to decide on the search methods. Once the position is advertised, applications are received, and candidates are shortlisted based on whether they are suitably qualified and in line with the university’s employment equity policy. Subsequently, an open faculty presentation takes place, where appropriate, and the shortlisted candidates undergo final interviews. The selection committee completes its work by making a final recommendation to the Faculty Board whose members vote on the recommended candidate by secret ballot. Before the recommendation can be taken forward, a 60% majority of those voting, exclusive of those who abstained, must be in support of the candidate. If this majority is secured, the process moves forward to the university’s the Institutional Forum (IF), which is charged with verifying the selection process followed, with particular attention going to the steps taken by the selection committee to meet equity targets. The IF then submits its report to Council validating the process that has been followed, with any further recommendations. Finally, the Council receives the full report on the recruitment and selection process from the selection committee, together with the Faculty Board outcome and the IF report. The appointment is then ratified by the Council through a simple majority, although it is allowed to insist on a greater majority in certain cases. If the recommended appointment is not approved, the matter is referred to the selection committee for further consideration.15

Following previous unsuccessful attempts in 2016 and 2018 to appoint a new dean, a selection committee met in March 2019 and shortlisted four candidates: Grace Khunou (University of Johannesburg), Shose Kessi (University of Cape Town), Rosabelle Boswell (Nelson Mandela

15 http://www.hr.uct.ac.za/hr/recruitment/exec_appointments/deans
Metropolitan University), and Adam Haupt (University of Cape Town). In line with transformation imperatives, the committee recommended Grace Khunou, a professor of sociology and female black (African) South African. However, she only received 27% of the vote from the Faculty Board at its meeting on 30 May 2019.

The committee then proposed Prof. Kessi, a black female Tanzanian and professor of psychology. On 11 June 2019, the Faculty Board attempted to vote on her appointment, but this meeting was disrupted by Dr Lwazi Lushaba of the Department of Political Studies. It was reported that he tore up and trampled on the ballots, and other accounts suggested that he ate some ballot papers.

Between June and September 2019, Dr Lushaba penned letters to the Humanities Faculty, selection committee, and University Council in protest of both the decision to snub Prof. Khunou and her replacement with Prof. Kessi. The letters were written on behalf of the ‘27% Group’—a name of self-referential coinage referring to the 27% members of the faculty board who voted for Prof. Khunou and were dissatisfied with the democratic outcome of the process. Equally, in a letter to the faculty on 7 June 2019, Dr Lushaba gave the impression of speaking on behalf of black African South Africans, as the letter begins ‘The 27% Group of 87% of our Country. STAND UP!’ and goes on to elucidate regarding the vote of May 2019,

We interpret this vote as unjust and immoral. It demonstrates no knowledge or sensitivity to the history of colonial and Apartheid racism. It demonstrates a ‘double-standards’ when ‘rules and rationality’ are applied to African people in this Faculty. It demonstrates arrogance, insensitivity and disrespect to the ably qualified African candidate, Prof. Grace Khunou.

Not all the reactions to this controversy are relevant to the question at hand. The VC indicated that Dr Lushaba received a letter of reprimand for ‘unacceptable, inappropriate and disrespectful’ conduct. The Democratic Alliance Student Organisation (DASO), the student wing of the Democratic Alliance (DA) political party, anchored its response based on a right to education. Fearing that the 27% group were threatening a shutdown and withdrawal of academic-related activities, they petitioned the VC to affirm the right to education by disciplining Dr Lushaba. It also based its response on university governance, arguing that Lushaba was undermining democratic processes.
The more relevant issues lie at the intersection of decolonisation and the politics of belonging. When read through the grammar of Africanisation, the 27% Group are very clear on the question of the African for whom representation is sought. The Faculty Board is chastised for not just voting against any African candidate, but specifically a black (African) South African one.

The overwhelming majority rejected its [selection committee] proposal to nominate, Prof. Grace Khunou as Dean – the only South African born African woman! And we must ask why? Why have a Selection Committee process if the faculty members (with lesser information) can over-turn the process without clear and rational reasons for its rejection? Is it not about self-interested groups who want people they like or know to be Dean?

This emphasis on race and South African birth/descent resonates with the affirmative action prescriptions within university policy and national legislation, specifically the Employment Equity Act. In this context, affirmative action encompasses those redress measures pursued for the sake of equitable representation of suitably qualified persons from designated groups. The designated groups, at the level of national legislature and UCT’s own EE policy, are blacks (Africans, coloureds, Indians), women, and people with disabilities. UCT’s implementation of the Employment Equity Act takes the spirit of the law as addressed to South African citizens. In this regard, its EE policy gives the following specification to the category ‘designated groups’,

‘Designated groups’ mean black (i.e., African, Coloured and Indian) people, women and people with disabilities who are citizens of South Africa by birth or descent; or became citizens of the Republic of South Africa by naturalisation: before 27 April 1994; or after 26 April 1994 and who would have been entitled to acquire citizenship prior to that date but were precluded by apartheid policies. It also includes Chinese employees who are citizens of South Africa by birth or descent; or became citizens of the Republic of South Africa by naturalisation: before 27 April 1994; or after 26 April
1994 and who would have been entitled to acquire citizenship prior to that date but were precluded by apartheid policies.\textsuperscript{16}

This emphasis on South African by birth or descent and pre-1994 naturalisation is noteworthy. In fact, it is suggested that one of the shortlisted candidates was considered ‘un-appointable’ on account of this. As Lushaba notes in a letter to the Council,

The published advertisement for the post of the Dean of Humanities was explicit in seeking to particularly attract black (African, Coloured, and Indian) South African candidates. This was in line with established EE policy of the government and the University. This intention was confirmed when it was announced that Professor Rose Boswell was not an appointable candidate. Why? Because, her citizenship was granted after 1994, and by implication, did not experience generations of systematic state racism towards Black and African people born in South Africa. We were also therefore rightly concerned that the second candidate, A/Prof Shose Kessi, who would be considered un-appointable, was presented to the Faculty Board. Due process was also not followed. Horrendously, the second candidate was presented to the Faculty Board without any questions raised about the first candidate being properly addressed, leading to the second, follow up Faculty Board meeting ending in crisis (emphasis his).

Given that the published advertisement for the post was explicit in seeking to attract a black South African candidate as Dr. Lushaba emphasises, one can understand his claim that the decision to reject Prof. Khunou represents a missed opportunity for transformation and decolonisation. As he explains ‘UCT has been found lacking in adhering to Employment Equity legislation in the appointment of staff from the designated groups. UCT’s own Employment Equity Plan 2019–2021 notes the low numbers of black academics as a serious concern. Only 29\% of academic staff is black, with those identified as African black, constituting a mere 9\%.’

At the same time, the foregoing also illustrates that primacy is placed on the black African South African (BASA) as the African for whom representation is sought. This configuration of race and nation has a subtle appeal to indigeneity, in which bona fide South Africans are

\textsuperscript{16} http://www.uct.ac.za/main/explore-uct/transformation/plans-policies#ee-documents
those with a direct connection (through birth or descent) to apartheid victimisation which fallist students conceptualised as ‘black pain’. Although this is largely consistent with national legislature and university policy, I would argue that there is one notable difference. ‘Black’, ‘African’, and ‘South African’ are worked into a framework of ‘competitive victimhood’ that produces intra-racial and national hierarchies. First, Lushaba argues that

Anyone with a cursory understanding of South African history knows its particular targets, accomplished with Nazi-like, ‘blunt instrument’-like efficiency, against a whole people: Yes, we know that Coloureds and Indians were horribly discriminated too, but the sign of ‘African’ or Native’ or ‘indigenous African’ – the 87% majority whose ancestors fought in the wars of defense – bore the brunt of targeted state and civil society hatred and racism for 350 years! This expressed itself in daily life: today a face of scorn, tomorrow a smile hiding hatred, in pass laws restricting movement, exclusion in education, in the violence of townships, hours and hours of travel to work for whites, and Indian and coloureds elites… and yes, the liberal mask of UCT witnessed it all, from up on high, on the hill of Rhodes, only to walk away from its role in all of this.

The above recognises, in the Biko tradition, ‘black’ as a politically ameliorated category that includes Africans, coloureds and Indians. At the same time, it intimates that the status of ‘indigenous’ and ‘ultimate victimhood’ are most authentically situated in the category black African. This point may be well be historically true, even if politically unproductive, but it is worth noting that the university’s equity policy is expressly against competitive victimhood and its implied hierarchies. While I was not able to determine whether this stipulation was explicitly known at the time given that university equity policy is reviewed every three years, a practice note meant to assist recruitment and selection committees on meeting equity targets nonetheless clarifies that ‘The EEA and UCT EE Policy does not recognise degrees of disadvantage amongst “Designated Groups”, and as such no hierarchy of “Designated Groups” exist. Instead, the EEA advocates “equitable representation” in occupational levels in the workforce in line with the Employment Equity Plan and targets.’

The issue of competitive victimhood and its relation to the category ‘African’ and nation is perhaps better discussed in relation to accusations of xenophobia (Afrophobia) as a dangerous articulation of decolonisation. Underscoring the importance of a Pan-Africanist orientation to
Lushaba’s letters show a clear awareness that the 27% Group are perceived as xenophobic. When I asked participants about the problematic understandings of decolonisation taking root at the university, those who identified ‘nativism’ and ‘narrow nationalism’ all cited the Lushaba affair. Speaking on nativist renditions of Africanisation, one participant explains,

I'm talking about the emphasis on black African South Africans without a recognition that this is a constructed identity that is inherited from colonialism. It is the essentialization and nativisation of that kind of identity that I find highly problematic, and it is being espoused, you know, by some of the most brilliant people around without an interrogation of what that means and without an interrogation of the fact that when you craft tools for a struggle, you need to continually refine and question those tools. Josie Fanon asks ‘where is the revolution if you're going to limit each other to race, to black south African?’ Joe Slovo is one of the heroes of the South African revolution, of the new South Africa, and you know, when say black South African, is Joe Slovo part of it? What does that mean basically? So, you need to continually interrogate and
refine and sharpen to told of your struggle. Otherwise, you fall into essentialism and nativism (Balogun, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

On the truncated revolutionary potential of nativism, the same participant explains,

Just imagine if the Algerians had said that Fanon was not Algerian. People who are really at the core of these struggles understand that these identities are constructed and stupid because they are involved in struggle and politics on a daily basis. They know! That’s why the Algerians were not bothered that Fanon was from Martinique, that he was not even African. In the midst of the war, they took his coffin and they made sure that the buried him on Algerian soil. (Balogun, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

Another participant criticised South Africanisation as an unhelpful discourse of South African exceptionalism and enclosure,

If we want to truly decolonise, we need to rethink how we understand the nation state. And so no South Africanisation for me. Because South Africanisation in 2008 was buying proudly South African products and it was incredible for nation building, but then months later, there was those xenophobic attacks. And so it's unhelpful insofar as we exceptionalize ourselves... In my department, we had an incredible HOD. He's Ghanaian and he was pushed out of being HOD because he wasn’t black enough, and that was from the South African Blacks. Whereas I am like ‘no!’: He knows what colonialism is, he knows what white supremacy is. I can't stand it. So I don't think it's helpful because it exceptionalises us... It means that no one can enter. And so for me South African-ness includes and excludes. It also implies that there’s a right South African, and so a person who lives in these two worlds isn't the right South African. So it’s very unhelpful (Unathi, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

Furthermore, the student group Progress SA described Prof. Lushaba’s disruption as motivated by ‘nationalist fervour’ and called on the university to affirm its position against ‘xenophobia and racial nationalism’. This condemnation however demonstrated a penchant for self-sabotage not uncommon among political liberals in South Africa as it was tied to a liberal meritocratic non-racialist ideology that affirmed a de-politicised competency as opposed to nationality or skin colour as the basis for appointments. This position elides over the fact that UCT’s
affirmative action policy is at bottom a system of racialised preference for *suitably qualified candidates*. As such, competency is built in.

Against these accusations of racial populism, Lushaba reiterates a legal emphasis that underpins the position of the 27% group,

> We view UCT’s failure to adhere to the national laws meant to appoint black South Africans as tantamount to epistemic violence and contrary to the ideals of our struggle. We reject with all the contempt it deserves, the idea that it is xenophobic to call on UCT to respect and adhere to South African legislation of Employment Equity.

For Lushaba, this position is consistent with a general Pan-Africanist and Southern solidarity in the struggle against coloniality. This notwithstanding, the primacy on black (African) South Africans still flirts with a discourse of competitive victimhood that is based on non-commensurate lived experiences. In June 2019, responding to detractors who ask ‘what about people of the global South’, Lushaba retorts,

> but did these people experience generations of Apartheid racism until 1994? And why not give people who never had the chance, for once, to serve in some authority in the country of their birth? How many African South Africans get academic positions in other countries, and if not here, where?

In a letter to the council in September 2019, he further adds that,

> solidarity in struggle (from afar and in different conditions) is not the same and can never substitute for that experience of the 87%! To take back *our* country, to be represented in all *our* institutions, and to sincerely rebuild a vision of *our* society on that amazing strength of the historically downtrodden, and do so, using democratic processes is what we have chosen and what we stand by. Once again, UCT and the Humanities Faculty has thrown this in *our* face. We are only 27%; we are a “minority of power” in the land of *our* birth, this is what this vote barks-out loud to *us*. (Emphases mine)
These gestures at competitive victimhood should also be seen in relation to allegations made against the BAC by Dr Lushaba, who attributed the decision to appoint Prof. Kessi, to factions ‘hell-bent on pushing their own group interests and political agenda, and the deliberate by-passing of South African national legislation and policy addressing Employment Equity to address the wrongs of Apartheid’. Given Prof. Kessi’s pivotal role in founding the BAC, it is implied that she was group’s ‘official’ candidate. And given that the BAC is committed to fighting institutional racism and unequal representation, the idea that it espouses a ‘nefarious agenda consciously pits itself against South African national legislation of addressing Employment Equity: to correct and redress apartheid injustices and the exclusion of blacks from professional occupations and senior positions’ is a particularly damaging accusation.

In a statement to the media, the BAC chairperson would reiterate that there was no BAC stance on any candidate and that it would have been satisfied with any outcome, as all the shortlisted candidates were black. Reflecting on the ensuing controversy, she laments,

Most unsettling is that black women are being made to bear the brunt of it. It has reached the point of personal attacks, which we find disturbing. We find these allegations anti-black, *Afrophobic* and disappointingly vindictive. We reiterate that we unapologetically support all black scholars and will not accept the level of intimidation and divisive tactics we have witnessed during this process. As the BAC, we will continue to play our part in addressing structural racism at UCT in all its forms.17

(Emphasis mine).

In statement on their Facebook page, the BAC defended themselves against allegations by re-affirming their core mandate,

The BAC is a collective of scholars at UCT. It is not a closed organization, nor is it an individualist project. It has over the years achieved what it has because of all black scholars and progressive forces in the student movements. We persist in tackling racism at UCT and will remain vigilant against divisive forces. In accordance with the BAC constitution, we will continue to advocate for increased number/s of black academic staff employed by the university, particularly in the professoriate and for an increase in

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South African black staff; we continue to advocate for increased representation of black academics in the governance of the university; challenge traditions of patriarchy; and the misrepresentation of black academics in discourses of standards and academic excellence.

Furthermore, it rejected Lushaba’s claims which portrayed its members as obstacles to measures designed to ensure equitable representation for black South Africans. To counter this point specifically, the BAC recalled its recent support for Prof. Elelwani Ramugondo, a female black African South African who was shortlisted for the DVC for Teaching and Learning position but considered ‘unappointable’—a fight they took to court but ultimately lost.

Another important BAC counterclaim is the argument that Lushaba’s rhetoric fosters isolation and division among black scholars. The BAC statement reads,

We state categorically, that while we work tirelessly to change the humiliating, isolating and racializing nature of UCT, even if takes us to the courts, we will not accept any rhetoric that divides us as black people, nor will we accept the level of intimidation in the said e-mail. The ad hominem attacks in it are unwarranted and destructive. We reject the way in which “black” is used in such a divisive, violating, homogenizing way, thrusting us into absurd apartheid-style compartments. The e-mail is framed as a representation of the views of Black South African scholars at UCT. Assuming a separatist position and misappropriating the ideas of Bantu Biko, the e-mail blames a number of black scholars for the outcome of the initial voting in this third selection process for the position of Dean of Humanities.

This division, as we have seen in appeals to competitive victimhood, is shaped by configurations of race and nation. Africanisation is rarely developed in abstraction and once contextualised in the South African context, picks out black citizens as the beneficiaries of decolonisation. But even within this category of black citizens (i.e Biko-Black), there is sometimes emphasis on a particular type of victim of apartheid and colonialism—the black African South African.

Is this an example of an exclusionary Africanisation, that is, an enclosure of the subject of decolonisation along narrow circles of inclusion? The question remains whether it is
appropriate to see this fallout as xenophobic (Afrophobic) and whether I am correct to interpret this controversy in relation to the ideological tensions between Pan-Africanism and nationalism. While African nationalism foregrounds unity and solidarity, the Lushaba affair seems to show the ambivalence of unity with regards to its progressive or conservative orientations. That is, unity can be used to pursue very different political projects that may be incompatible to some extent. For example, transnational solidarity and national sovereignty, when accorded individual primacy, are at odds because they make competing ethical demands. This does not necessarily posit a sharp binary between a world order of multiple sovereign states and a union of African states. Rather it points to the likelihood that what flows from unity will involve an uneasy balance of various combinations. To illustrate, while African nationalists pursued and institutionalised national self-determination, they also recognised the urgency of continental solidarity and regional integration as a buffer against domination (Getachew, 2019). Moreover, as noted earlier, while unity and sovereignty were indivisible from Nkrumah, Nyerere’s gradualism, which decoupled unity and national sovereignty, stands in stark contrast.

A key evaluative question then becomes whether the Lushaba affair reflects long-standing tensions between different levels of belonging/community and different political visions within African nationalism as an ideology of decolonisation. To counter accusations of xenophobia, one could say that the primacy of black (African) South Africans precisely reflects the embeddedness of the nation-state (and its territorial nationalism) in our political imaginary as the normative articulation of political belonging. If, as Abrahamsen (2020, p. 61) observes, ‘the story of Pan-Africanism is frequently told as a contest between supporters of continental unity and promoters of national sovereignty, where the former ultimately lost to the latter’, then one could argue that we ought to take this defeat seriously as the facticity grounding moral and political arguments and commitments on and around decolonisation. The nation-state constitutes the core prism by which we articulate belonging today, and so there is a very facile and intuitive sense in which one should be on board with a nationalist account of the beneficiaries of Africanisation. That is, it seems obvious to say that South Africans citizens should be the primary beneficiaries of the contextualisation of Africanisation in South Africa. It is very possible that when transformation was the dominant vocabulary for these conversations in South Africa, a nationalist consensus that indexed South African citizens as the beneficiaries of transformation was the common-sense position. If this speculation is accepted, then the intervention of decolonisation as a key vocabulary of institutional change is
significant because it throws up new questions of belonging in the *African* university and provides an opportunity structure for non-South African Africans to ask about their position in the truly African university. This is analogous to the way in which the alliance of material and ideological grievances in the call for a ‘free decolonised education’ raised questions about the beneficiaries of this demand precisely because it was articulated in the idiom of decolonisation. That is, did the slogan ‘Fees Must Fall’ apply to non-South African Africans whose exorbitant international fees effectively subsidised national fees? The language of decolonisation, if informed by a vision of Pan-Africanism that exhorts continental unity and transnational solidarity, provides an avenue for Africans from the rest of the continent to stake their claims as beneficiaries on account of the colonality of inherited borders. In this way, the idea of ‘international’ fees (even if attenuated by regional affiliations) is capitalist mystification—a neoliberal tool that divides ‘Africans’ to legitimate a price discrimination made necessary by declining state investment in higher education.

Alternatively, it could be that these putative tensions between Pan-Africanism and nationalism are solved by asserting their reconciliation in an intellectual division of labour. Precisely because the nation-state constitutes the conventional articulation of belonging, the arrangement of this division of labour could be one where the curriculum is ostensibly Pan-African and/or Afropolitan in the most expansive sense—a veritable reaching out to the world from an Africa-centred locus of enunciation. The one place where South Africanisation as the sole focus is out of place is in matters knowledge production, consumption, and circulation. However, when it comes to distributing the material benefits of Africanisation—deciding for example *who* will be paid to teach a decolonised curriculum or take on leadership positions the remit of which involves the promotion of intellectual decolonisation—primacy is accorded to black African South Africans. This resolution can be stated as a theoretical position—*Pan-Africanism in the curriculum, nationalism in recruitment*.

A third position attempts to derive a Pan-Africanist ethic from (territorial) nationalism. Consider the example below of a student supportive of Lushaba’s position and defending it as deducible from the Pan-Africanist premium on solidarity. Discussing whether nationalism has limits as a response to coloniality, she counters the suggestion that decolonisation-as-South Africanisation is necessarily nativistic and xenophobic. Citing and endorsing a lecturer of hers in the department of political studies, she contends that it is possible to derive South Africanisation from a broader Pan-Africanist ethical commitment. This would require one to
take seriously the perception that there are historically salient disparities in levels of education
and cultural capital between continental Africans and South Africans. She explains,

He says that African scholars negate the fact that they have more power to exist because
they are usually second-generation scholars, because they, from whatever countries,
had more closer relationships with the centre. So, their parents could go to France, and
I mean, I have family members all over the world who are in the US, who are in Canada
and what not. That level of access means that if they come here in South Africa, and
they fight for a role with a South African who is a first generation, that is not

camaraderie. That is not actually saying South Africans are starting way back, because
while the Africans were still under coloniality, they were still being given an education
at par. These people [South Africans] started at bantu education. So, they are
experiencing for the first time what it means to be academics, what it means to lead
academic knowledge. So, a kind of African or pan-African perspective will allow for
us to see why it may be necessary for someone within the Department to say we first
need to give South Africans, as first-generation scholars, a chance for them to catch up,
and then for us to reconsider (Noxolo, UCT, Humanities, 2019, emphasis mine).

Echoing a similar notion of competitive victimhood, camaraderie/unity/solidarity means
recognising the privileges continental Africans have over black South Africans, which she
frames as a ‘power to exist’ in intellectual terms.

Certainly, I would argue, there were lots of African intellectuals who went, for example, to
Paris from French colonies and Britain from the English colonies. But this is true also of South
African intellectuals. And the point on the ‘power to exist’ may not be true for some other
countries. Given establishing this would be an empirical distraction, it is productive to take the
argument on board in the spirit of charity. That said, it can be said that even if there were strong
intellectual links between the core and the colony in the rest of Africa, and that these persisted
into post-independence period, this argument elides over the 1980s as a period where higher
education across most of Africa was shattered by structural adjustment programmes (Zeleza,
1997; Mamdani, 2007). As such, the putative advantage of these contexts was invariably
undermined by neo-colonialism. As such, while liberation came earlier across the continent
and facilitated endogenous knowledge production, this was later broken down and fragmented,
leaving many scholars to find refuge in university systems that would take them, which were, unsurprisingly, in the core (especially US/Canada but also former colonisers).

While the participant was happy to include continental Africans in constructing the nation, she eventually she argued that ‘prioritising who gets to be one step ahead or one step forward is a different conversation’. She proceeds to endorse the argument from her professor,

And when I heard that, I said you sir have done the work of studying South African politics in relation to the context, because although South Africa has a thriving economy, the education of the masses and the people sets them way behind many African states who just have a problem of economic instability. Because if they were fine, I argue that the same African scholars who are fighting for space here, wouldn't be here. So, if they had a functioning economies and democracies or whatever it is, they wouldn't be here. … I don’t think I want a decolonisation that doesn’t include a camaraderie of having nuance... South Africans are first generation scholars, Ghanaian scholars, third generation. If you're third generation and you're fighting a first-generation scholar to actually create that cycle of possibility, I don't think that that is pan-Africanism in its true essence (Noxolo, UCT, Humanities, 2019).

There are two points worth mentioning here. Firstly, continental Africans ‘fighting for a role’ with South African scholars does invariably play into popular xenophobic tropes of ‘immigrants stealing jobs’. More pertinently, it does not address the question of structures (why are there a paucity of jobs) and blames individuals (foreigners) for the problem. Moreover, precisely because this is a debate on decolonisation and what African unity entails, the idea that other scholars from other African countries would not be in South Africa if they had functioning democracies and economies is rather troubling, for it takes at face value the problems often rooted, among other explanations, in the histories of colonialism and neocolonialism. This is analogous to a Zambian or Tanzanian in the 1970s/80s saying, ‘Well, I don't really like it when the ANC exiles in Tanzania are coming and taking our jobs. If they had a functioning democracy, they wouldn't be here.’ I would argue that genuine solidarity only really makes sense precisely when there is that kind of problem, such that saying ‘we'd be in solidarity if everything was fine’ is no solidarity at all.
Let me conclude by saying that I am not arguing that the Lushaba affair symbolises xenophobia. By taking seriously a participant that shares his position, I have only shown that one risks deploying xenophobic tropes in articulating the primacy of black (African) South Africans as primary beneficiaries of a decolonised, Africanised university. In situating the Lushaba affair in the context of decolonisation at UCT, what was significant for my purposes was that some members of the university community saw it as intra-racially divisive and a problematic instance of narrow nationalism. In this discursive ecosystem, the Lushaba affair signifies, in some corners, an attempt to foreground the black (African) South African as the subject for whom representation is sought. This category is perceived to alienate two intellectual traditions—Black Consciousness and Pan-Africanism. For my part, while I do understand that post-apartheid South Africa has a conspicuous xenophobic political culture, I find it difficult to agree that the Lushaba affair is xenophobic precisely because I am embedded in the common-sense normativity of the nation-state. To say this is to affirm that decolonisation is never articulated in a vacuum and as such, the hegemony of the nation-state is an example of the political facticity in which we forge intellectual, moral, and political commitments of decolonisation. This of course is not to say one cannot imagine alternatives to the nation-state. These alternatives, however, are invariably formulated digging where we stand—which is a world in which the nation-state has achieved the status of common sense.

Despite an ambivalence of whether this flashpoint constitutes xenophobia, the recourse to competitive victimhood so evident in attempts to delineate the proper subject of decolonisation does risk constructing Africanity along ever-diminishing circles of inclusion (Nyamnjoh, 2016). We are left, albeit without resolution, with the pressing questions posed by Francis Nyamnjoh in relation to the emergence of decolonisation as a locus of emancipatory struggle in South African in the wake of Rhodes Must Fall. Most notably, he contends that the emphasis on a particular type of victim of colonisation begs a few questions about the context in which the demand for decolonisation is inserted,

When does decolonisation entail Africanisation? And when does it mean South-Africanisation only, without the whiteness? When does decolonisation as Africanisation enter into a meaningful conversation with decolonisation as whiteless-South-Africanisation? Above all, when does decolonisation as whiteless-South Africanisation and Africanisation enter into worthy epistemological conversations with decolonisation as a universal aspiration…? This is an important question as neither
South Africa nor Africa can claim monopoly over victimisation by colonisation, imperialism, and apartheid as a racialized technology of subjugation and domination. (Nyamnjoh, 2016, pp. 129–130).

Recognising decolonisation as a universal aspiration, he leaves open the possibility that decolonisation ‘… may or may not coincide with being African or with being South African, in both the general, generous and inclusive sense and the exclusionary, parochial and autochthonous sense of these identities.’ (Ibid, p.130) My task has been to precisely show these perceived tensions of inclusivity and exclusivity as decolonisation takes root in UCT by considering (a) the epistemological attempts, at the level of curriculum decolonisation to foreground an Afropolitan epistemic identity and (b) the challenge to conceptions of Africanisation deemed to undermine racial unity, solidarity (where race is a political identity) and foster narrow nationalism. I will now turn to the case of Stellenbosch and the debate around its language policy. The issue of the African for whom representation is sought is still the critical question. At the same time, the distinct issues at Stellenbosch modify the question to ask: who can successfully claim Africanity?

6.5. **Die Taaldebat: Open Stellenbosch, Africanisation, and Language Politics**

Another example of the exclusionary potential of Africanisation can be found in the debate around the retention of Afrikaans as a language of higher education. This debate, I argue, shows that one cannot take for granted the African for whom representation is sought in the drive for a decolonised African university. The debate on language politics can therefore be seen as a contestation about the inclusivity of the category ‘African’ within contemporary discourses of decolonisation. Foregrounding the question of who can successfully claim Africanity, I argue that debates on language show that decolonisation-as-Africanisation can be initially critiqued for excluding the Afrikaans linguistic community from the category African by ringfencing indigeneity, an exclusion that is racially layered in the sense of excluding white and coloured Afrikaans speakers. The charge of an exclusionary conception of Africanity, however, is riddled with its own contradictions. The recognition of the Africanity of Afrikaans may be strategically withheld precisely to illuminate the language ideologies that underpin the racial and class fault lines of belonging among Afrikaans speakers. Exposing the internal contradictions of belonging within Afrikaans as a linguistic community opens the possibility
to rehabilitate the Africanity of Afrikaans through a formal de-racialisation and linguistic re-standardisation.

To make this argument, I begin by briefly accounting for why language is an important site of intellectual decolonisation in South Africa. This relates to its role as a site of apartheid domination and post-apartheid transformation. Furthermore, I consider how language politics featured in student calls for a decolonised university at Stellenbosch, juxtaposing student grievances against previous debates on the university’s language policies, notably the perceived decline of the status of Afrikaans in higher education and the sense of precarity it generates among Afrikaners. Subsequently, I briefly consider the complex social history of Afrikaans—its creolisation and nationalist appropriation—and the ways it contributes to the questions around its Africanity through the framework of indigeneity. Finally, I develop the argument on linguistic standardisation through an argumentative strategy of charges and counter charges that pivot on the internal tensions of belonging within the Afrikaans speaking community.

6.5.1. The importance of language

South Africa’s colonial-apartheid history is replete with examples of language as an instrument of control, oppression, and exploitation, as well as anti-colonial and anti-apartheid resistance. Language played a key role in some of the major political struggles in South Africa’s political history, notably the Afrikaner nationalist struggle and state capture against British imperialism, and black mass struggles against Afrikaner linguistic chauvinism and racism in the 1970s and 1980s. The latter was brought to the fore by attempts to impose Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black schools. Furthermore, language was a key part of both the ethno-national self-definition of Afrikaner nationalists and how it classified others within the framework of apartheid political ideology as evidenced by its resolution of the native question through the ethnicisation of citizenship. Historically, Afrikaans-medium universities like Stellenbosch University (SU) were constitutive of and constituted this emergent ethno-linguistic nationalist consciousness. While it began as an English-medium university, it began to cultivate an Afrikaner identity in 1918, and its transformation into an Afrikaans single-medium university was seen as one of the successes of the second Afrikaans language movement that looked to enhance the socio-political and intellectual status of Afrikaans. In addition to being an Afrikaans-medium university, SU is generally seen as a major intellectual hub of Afrikaner
nationalist apartheid ideology. Every South African prime minister between 1919 and 1978 had been an alumnus of the university either as student, professor, or chancellor.

Against this political history, a key part of the transformation discourse in post-apartheid South Africa, in which the decolonisation discourse has now inscribed itself, has been to attend to this linguistic legacy of racialised exclusion in the post-apartheid dispensation. In this regard, the various higher education policy frameworks have tended to foreground multilingualism as the basis of a renewed commitment toward equity, access, and an inclusive national identity. This is anchored within a broader constitutional framework, as the South African Bill of Rights affirms a right to mother-tongue education which is qualified by parameters of equity, practicality, and redress.

The RMF call for a decolonised education inspired similar calls at other universities across the country. While the form was essentially the same (i.e., demand for an African-centred university), the contents of these calls were inflected by varying institutional histories. At historically Afrikaans-medium universities like Stellenbosch (SU), Pretoria (UP), and Free State (UFS), decolonisation had a strong linguistic dimension, challenging, among other things, the status of Afrikaans as a language of teaching and learning. This was reflected in the social media character of the student protests, evident in ‘Afrikaans must Fall’ hashtag. The Open Stellenbosch movement (OS) tied the creation of a truly African university with, to put simply, the replacement of Afrikaans with English as the medium of instruction. Foregrounding issues of equity and access, it argued that the university’s 2014 language policy fostered an institutional culture that marginalised black students and impeded their academic achievement (Open Stellenbosch Collective, 2015). As Christopher Stroud and Quentin Williams observe, the student produced Luister (Listen) documentary that details these grievances, ‘highlights the subtle and complex ways in which language “produces” black bodies in white spaces for whites, forming the racialised experience of black students who suffer under the white oppression with epidermal differentiation’ (Stroud and Williams, 2017, p. 173). These grievances transcend language and are linked to the very identity of the university and its legacy as a hub of Afrikaner nationalism and race science. The recent book Fault Lines: A Primer on Race, Science and Society (2020) edited by Jonathan Jansen and Cyrill Walters offers an

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institutional and intellectual audit of Stellenbosch University as the historical and contemporary home of race science and eugenics (Jansen and Walters, 2020). The book pivots on two key flashpoints—the discovery in 2013 of an old set of measuring tools in the university’s Sasol Museum which bore the name of Eugene Fischer (Nazi physical anthropologist and noteworthy exponent of eugenics), and the 2019 study by Stellenbosch University researchers who reported on low cognitive functioning of coloured women linked to low education levels and unhealthy lifestyles. Rallying around the university’s language policy, OS articulated claims of racialised marginality within an overall charge of an exclusionary institutional culture (Open Stellenbosch Collective, 2015b).

6.5.2. Post-apartheid transformation, the perceived decline of Afrikaans, and calls for decolonisation

The loss of state patronage for Afrikaans and Afrikaners in the post-apartheid dispensation has seen the re-inscription of narratives of loss and victimhood ubiquitous in late 19th and early 20th century constructions of Afrikaner identity. In this regard, a key part of Afrikaner ethno-linguistic mobilisation revolves around the lamentation of a subaltern whiteness undergirded by a socio-cultural precarity (Steyn 2004). The indices of this decline and precarity include, among others, a perceived weakening of constitutional protection for minority rights and the monolingual anglicisation of the civil and corporate spheres. In higher education, it includes the decline of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction amid a globalised Anglo hegemony, whereby accommodations like dual and parallel medium teaching are perceived to erode the language character of historically Afrikaans universities. In addition, critique of this decline is made difficult by a discursive landscape in which pro-Afrikaans sentiments are easily dismissed as apartheid nostalgia (Giliomee, 2004; Webb, 2010).

Prior to RMF, transformation and not decolonisation was the popular term in post-apartheid South Africa for addressing the unjust legacies of the apartheid past in higher education and society more generally. On matters of language, the transformative constitutionalism anchored in the post-apartheid Constitution promotes multilingualism as a response to previously exclusive constructions of nationhood along lines of race and ethnicity. The Constitution confers equal status to all 11 official languages, while recognising, given the historical marginalisation of other indigenous languages, the need for ‘practical and positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of these languages’ (Section 6(2)). Within the parameters of equity, practicality, and redress, the Constitution enshrines the right of South Africans to
receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions.

Invariably, pro-Afrikaans language activists have tended to see transformation in oppositional terms, coming at the cost of Afrikaans. Language policies sensitive to changing demographics and the normativity of multilingualism are seen to forecast the demise of Afrikaans. At the same time, discourses of transformation typically represent Afrikaans as a language of oppression and exclusion. This representation appeals to the social history of Afrikaans, particularly the interrelationship between Afrikaans and Afrikaner nationalism (Webb and Kriel, 2000; Louw, 2004). They note the role of Afrikaans in fomenting a racially exclusive ethno-linguistic national consciousness. Prior to the emergence of fallism, this anxiety around the declining status of Afrikaans was evident in cyclical language debates around SU’s language policy.

In the post-apartheid context of transformation, the taaldebate (language debate) refers to the debate around the retention of Afrikaans as a medium of higher education, a debate that tends to be concentrated at the historically Afrikaans-medium universities. Since 2016, universities like Pretoria and Free State have, because of the student calls for decolonisation, all moved away from parallel-medium teaching, instituting English as the primary medium of instruction. Previously, in undergraduate teaching and learning, these universities tended to use Afrikaans and English within a dual and/or parallel medium configuration, occasionally supplemented by an ‘African’ language. Within these configurations, Afrikaans and English had equal status in principle, with multilingualism employed within an expanded tutorial system. In the case of the UFS, while its decision to move to English was legally challenged by Afrikaner interest groups like Afriforum, the Constitutional Court agreed with the reasoning that parallel-medium instruction was impracticable because it imperilled racial harmony, as separate lectures in English and Afrikaans (predominantly demanded by black and white students respectively), were seen to foster racial segregation and antagonism. In the case of Gelyke Kanse’s (Equal Opportunity) challenge to Stellenbosch’s 2016 language policy, a policy which maintained parallel-medium instruction while reconfiguring dual medium by assigning primacy to English, the Constitutional Court concurred with the evidence of the alienating and stigmatisating effects of the pre-2016 (i.e., 2014 language policy).
6.5.2.1 Language politics between 2002 and 2019

Following the publication of several higher education policy frameworks that sought to enforce the use of all official South African languages across all institutional functional domains in higher education (scholarship, administration, teaching, and learning), notably the Higher Education Act (1998) and 2002 Language Policy for Higher Education (LPHE), Stellenbosch University adopted a language policy and plan in 2002 that specified three language options—Afrikaans-medium (A), as the ‘default’ language option; English-medium (E, only in specified conditions); and dual medium (the so-called T-option).

There was intense outrage over the term ‘default’ language, which was seen to signal an erosion of the university’s linguistic identity. Language activists called for Afrikaans to be designated instead as the university’s ‘anchor’ language (Van der Waal, 2012). In 2005, the increased use of the T-option in the Arts and Social Sciences was also seen to ominously forecast the replacement of Afrikaans with English. In protest, 3,500 students and staff signed a petition, and 143 Afrikaans authors signed a letter remonstrating against the demise of Afrikaans which they presented to the University Council. In an authoritarian turn, some maintained that the university was not doing enough to compel student and lecturer proficiency in Afrikaans. Some gains were made, with the alumni association successfully mobilising to elect four language activists onto the University Council (Ibid). In 2009, the introduction of parallel medium instruction, itself a compromise that maintained a 60% use of Afrikaans in undergraduate teaching, intensified these debates and was seen as further evidence that the university was using multilingualism as a cover for English dominance. This assessment is based on the belief that only single-medium instruction guaranteed ‘… the survival of a local or regional language in a school or a university, given the need to coexist with a universal language such as English’ (Giliomee, 2009). Furthermore, the assessment is informed by the belief that the university is responding to market pressures by attracting white English-speaking fee-paying students (Ibid). Other members of the university community however argued that through its self-styled siege mentality, Afrikaans was becoming a locus of identity politics that only fostered division within the university and diversion from the pressing global context and challenges influencing knowledge production (Van der Waal et al., 2009).

On 29 September 2014, the University Council approved a new language policy designed to make the university more inclusive for English-speaking students. Under the policy, both Afrikaans and English had equal status as languages of teaching and learning and were
employed within in a configuration of dual (with real time interpretation) and parallel-medium
learning predicated on student numbers, affordability, the nature of subject, and the lecturer’s
language proficiency.

Despite these inclusive intentions, the Open Stellenbosch movement that emerged in the wake
of calls for decolonisation at UCT highlighted a racialised unequal distribution of burden
between Afrikaans and non-Afrikaans speaking students. Based on numbers from the 2015
first-year intake, it was shown that while almost all Afrikaans speakers were sufficiently
bilingual to learn in English, the same could not be said of the capacity of English-speakers to
learn in Afrikaans. Moreover, most English-speakers unable to learn in Afrikaans were black
(African), as per the university’s racial classification. In addition, an overwhelming majority
of the first-year Afrikaans-speaking students were white. A very small fraction of the first-year
intake were coloured students, of which most were English speaking. Therefore, the majority
of black (African) students could not learn in Afrikaans (Open Stellenbosch, 2015).

Furthermore, noting this student breakdown, the implementation of the policy had unintended
exclusionary effects. More than half of the modules were offered in the ‘T-specification’,
which is a dual medium teaching option requiring the balanced use of Afrikaans and English
in one class group, with the Afrikaans offering at least 50%. However, Open Stellenbosch
argued that this T-option placed a much greater burden on the English-speaking students who
could not understand Afrikaans than on the Afrikaans-speaking students who were sufficiently
proficient in English. This is because the T-option tended to involve translations from
Afrikaans to English, as there were many more modules and enrolments in the ‘A + i
specification’ (i.e., Afrikaans with real time translation), than in the ‘E+ i’ (i.e., English with
real time translation) specification. Therefore, noting again the relative bilinguality of English
and Afrikaans speakers noted earlier (i.e., Afrikaans speakers can learn in English whereas
English speakers can’t learn in Afrikaans), the burdens of access were thus distributed unfairly,
culminating in a stigmatisation effect. It tended to be non-Afrikaans speakers making use of
interpretive and translation services, which, it is further argued, were often poor in quality.
Afrikaans speakers rarely made use of translations in the E + i specification, given they are
often sufficiently bilingual. Understandably, non-Afrikaans speakers, the majority of which
were black (African), felt marginalised and excluded. For these reasons, in addition to the
limited investment in Xhosa, Stellenbosch University was argued to be an Afrikaans-medium
university masquerading as multilingual.
The university considered moving to full parallel-medium instruction, but this was deemed unaffordable as it would entail a 20% increase in student fees. On 22 June 2016, after consultation and deliberation with its stakeholders, the Stellenbosch University Council approved a new language policy, the effect of which was to ensure 100% English offering across undergraduate modules, thereby advancing the university’s goals of equal access, multilingualism, and integration. In addition, it reiterated a commitment to maintaining and preserving Afrikaans as an academic language within the parameters of demand and the university’s available resources. While still foregrounding English and Afrikaans as the core languages of teaching and learning, there is a notable primacy placed on English language instruction. The university has a strong preference for parallel-medium teaching (separate lectures in English and Afrikaans) followed by dual-medium teaching, which gives primacy to English as the language of instruction, supplemented by summaries and content emphases in Afrikaans. In a limited range of circumstances—such as the nature of subject matter, lecturer language proficiency, or unanimous secret ballot vote by students—the policy allows single-medium lectures in either English or Afrikaans. In these situations, translations from either English to Afrikaans and vice versa will be made available to students, universally in the first undergraduate year and based on demand and SU resources after that.

Gelyke Kanse (Equal Opportunities), is a voluntary association initially formed to oppose the 2016 policy. It has since become an advocate for mother-tongue education which it conceptualises as indispensable to community empowerment. The interest group approached the Western Cape High Court to review and set aside the 2016 policy and ultimately reinstate the 2014 policy. The High Court dismissed the application, contending that the university’s obligations regarding the provision of Afrikaans education was limited by the constitutional criterion of equity, practicality, and redress as per section 29(2) of the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, it concurred with the university’s assessment on the discriminatory effects of the 2014 policy and the 2016 policy’s consistency with the national LPHE. Gelyke Kanse subsequently approached the Constitutional Court for direct leave to appeal, asking the Court to set aside the 2016 policy (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2019). In their view, the policy violated section 29(2) of the Bill of Rights, which stipulates a right to education in the official language(s) of one’s choosing. In addition, the 2016 policy was argued to be in violation of other equality-related provisions the Constitution, such as sections 6(2) and 6(4) (Ibid). The former acknowledges the historical marginalisation of indigenous languages and
calls for their advancement and elevation in status. Similarly, the latter requires that all official languages enjoy parity of esteem. Notably, the question of Afrikaans as an indigenous language did enter the debate. Gelyke Kanse appealed to the 2002 Ministerial LPHE which encourages the development of all indigenous languages through multilingualism. Furthermore, by invoking section 6(2) of the Constitution, it affirmed the indigeneity of Afrikaans even though it accepted that Afrikaans had not been disadvantaged by historically diminished use and status as per the clause. The court seems to concur with this claim to indigeneity, citing the social history of Afrikaans as a creole to posit that Afrikaans was indigenous to South African from a linguistic standpoint (Ibid, p. 12).

On 10 October 2019, the appeal was dismissed by the court, which supporting the university’s reasoning that the cost of Afrikaans-medium education for black students was higher than the cost of English-medium education for brown and white Afrikaans-speaking students. While it recognised that the policy was effectively a downward adjustment of Afrikaans albeit defensible in the interests of racial equity and access, this should not be conflated with the elimination of Afrikaans. And while the court recognised the precarity of Afrikaans and the other South African official languages in relation to English dominance in the contemporary global order, it contended that this could not be made the university’s burden (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2019).

6.6. The Politics of Belonging: Who can Successfully Claim Africanity?

6.6.1. A brief social history of Afrikaans

Afrikaans as a creole

Afrikaans emerged in the Dutch Cape Colony, initially as pidgin invented to fulfil communication needs between Dutch settlers and the indigenous Khoikhoi population. Its development took place in the highly multicultural and polyglossic context of the Cape Colony following the establishment of a refreshment station in 1652 by the Dutch East India Trading Company. The key groupings in this multicultural context that influenced its development included European settlers, mainly Dutch and later French Huguenots following the 1658 edict of Nantes; the indigenous Khoi and San peoples with whom settlers traded and who also served as interpreters, domestic servants, and labourers; and African and Asian slaves and indentured
labourers imported between 1658 and 1808 from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Angola. The resulting communicative arrangements in this context was twofold. Firstly, it shaped the emergence of Afrikaans as a creole. Secondly, this language entailed a language shift for the descendants of the slave and Khoisan population for whom Afrikaans became a mother tongue (Kriel, 2018).

Three discernible dialects are evident in the creolisation of Afrikaans. They include the southwestern, northwestern, and eastern varieties of Afrikaans. Given that Afrikaans entered a period of modernisation and standardisation not long after its birth, the differences between these varieties are not substantial. Nonetheless, what is worth emphasising is that the standardisation associated with the first and second Afrikaans language movements associated with Afrikaner ethnonationalism was based on the eastern dialect. This dialect was notably associated with the eastern migration of the white *trekboere* extending Dutch colonial rule. Following British of the Cape, those escaping British imperial rule—the *voortrekkers* would carry this eastern variety of Afrikaans northwards to present-day Pretoria and Johannesburg. The south and northwestern dialect constitute the non-standard varieties of Afrikaans. The former is notably associated with the slave population and their descendants and is distinct in its Malay, Portuguese, and Arabic influences in vocabulary and phonetic features. By contrast, the northwestern variety is influenced by the Khoisan language (Kriel, 2018).

As such the social history of Afrikaans is undergirded by a multicultural and multilingual heritage, with roots in Dutch, Malay, Portuguese, Arabic, and Khoi-San languages (Van der Wouden, 2012; Van Rensburg, 2018). And although decolonisation, as a critical discourse constitutes an ideological assault on the rainbow-nation mythology (Chapter 4), this heritage has occasionally been instrumentalised to cast Afrikaans as a rainbow language and thus an avatar of the visions of social cohesion internal to the idea of a rainbow nation. Moreover, it is the recognition of the creolisation constitutive of the development of Afrikaans—albeit eventually appropriated by ethno-nationalists—that constitutes the bedrock of its attempted inscription within the contours of indigeneity and thus Africanity. There is a direct claim to indigeneity in that the development of Afrikaans is indigenous to southern Africa and that it is a mother tongue of indigenous populations like the Khoisan and coloured South Africans who can trace their roots these populations; and an indirect claim which points to its linguistic influences from indigenous Khoisan languages.
Contemporary discourses of transformation and decolonisation, as noted earlier, typically represent Afrikaans as a language of oppression and exclusion. This representation appeals to the social history of Afrikaans, particularly the interrelationship between Afrikaans and Afrikaner nationalism. They note the role of Afrikaans in fomenting a racially exclusive ethno-national consciousness in which ‘Afrikaner’ indexed a racial and linguistic identity (Van Rensburg, 1999; Webb and Kriel, 2000). This social history is one in which a relatively low-status lingua franca composed of various sociolects was hijacked by white nationalists (Kriel, 2018). This linguistic ethno-nationalism developed in response to British imperialism and rendered language a key site for political and status struggles within the post-union white community by providing the cultural and material ingredients for the enhancement of Afrikaner national consciousness. The acute poverty induced by the second Anglo-Boer war created a need for mass education as a means of socio-economic upliftment, a need that could not be fulfilled by Dutch (jure language), given its status as a language of high culture and thus its inaccessibility to the urban and rural Afrikaner proletariat (Giliomee, 2004). At the same time, Afrikaans still had to cast off the stigma of being a second-class language. This was largely achieved through a culture campaign (historicised as the First and Second Afrikaans language movements) from the late 19th century that involved the proliferation of literary production in Afrikaans. Afrikaans would replace Dutch as one of the official languages of the Union in 1925, and its development reached even greater heights under the state patronage provided by the National Party.

A key aspect of this nationalist appropriation involved the denial of the creole history of Afrikaans. Staunch nationalists tended to deny its creole nature, asserting that Afrikaans was a pure Germanic language. This would influence its standardisation under political patronage, a process that was heavily reliant on assimilating to Dutch morphosyntactic patterns (Odendaal, 2014). It also involved the exclusion of coloured South Africans, many of whom could trace their roots to the Cape Malays and Khoisan peoples and for whom Afrikaans was a mother tongue (van Heerden, 2016; Willemse, 2016, 2018).

In the contemporary debate on decolonisation in South Africa, Mamdani (2019) has argued provocatively that a lot can be learned from the historical development of Afrikaans—from a folkloric language to bearer of an intellectual tradition—in relation to the current drive for the intellectualisation of African languages. This development,
… would not have been possible without a vast institutional network—ranging from schools and universities to newspapers, magazines and publishing houses, and more, all resourced through public funds. This vast affirmative action programme lifted Afrikaans from a folkloric language to a language of science and scholarship, high culture, and legal discourse in the short span of a half century. It is no exaggeration to say that Afrikaans represents the most successful decolonising initiative on the African continent. Not only did this happen under apartheid, the great irony is that it was not emulated by the government of independent South Africa (Mamdani, 2019, p. 24)

6.6.2. Is Afrikaans an African language?

While there are diverse reasons offered for the retention of Afrikaans in South African higher education, I am especially interested in the attempts to negotiate for it an African identity. When maintaining that SU’s 2016 language policy violated section 6(2) of the Bill of Rights, Gelyke Kanse’s appeal to the Constitutional Court positioned Afrikaans as an indigenous African language. If Afrikaans is an indigenous African language, it would indeed seem strange that a process of Africanisation would entail its demise. If Afrikaans is an indigenous African language, surely it would have a place in the establishment of a truly African university in South Africa. Debates on indigeneity are often a key theme in the politics of belonging and citizenship discourses in Africa. In this specific case, indigeneity is deployed as a basis for Africanity.

In South African higher education, Bantu languages are more readily considered African languages. Afrikaans is rarely what comes to mind in delineations of Africanity. And yet, as Webb (2010, 355) explains,

a reasonably strong claim can be made for Afrikaans to be regarded as ‘an indigenous (African) language’ (but not, of course, a Bantu language): Afrikaans came about in (south) Africa; it is significantly spoken only in Africa; many of its lexical items are African in origin—also in the sense that their meanings reflect the African environment; and some of its structural features are also of African origin (and are not merely the products of the structural simplification/over-generalisation of 17th century Dutch features) (Webb, 2010, p. 355).
Two points here are key. First, both historically and contemporaneously, the primary Afrikaans speech community is in South Africa, as well as Namibia and parts of Botswana. Secondly, as seen in the previous section, the claim to Africanity involves establishing links to indigeneity as a function of the dynamic process of creolisation constitutive of the social history of Afrikaans.

However, the revisions to the language policy framework in the aftermath of student calls for decolonisation suggest that Afrikaans has a hard time legitimating its claims to Africanity. In 2018, the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) released a revised draft language policy for higher education. Its express intention was to promote the status of indigenous official languages within higher education, thus establishing their parity (presumably with English), as languages of scholarship, teaching, and learning, as well as official communication and administration. In relation to South Africa, it defined indigenous languages as ‘a language that is native to a region or country and spoken by indigenous people’ (Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET), 2017). Here, interestingly, Afrikaans was listed as one of the indigenous official languages of South Africa in this draft. However, in the promulgated Language Policy Framework for Public Higher Education Institutions (2020), the definition is noticeably different. Indigenous languages are defined as

Languages that have their heritage roots in Africa (also referred to as African languages in literature and some policy documents) that belong to the Southern Bantu language family, where ‘Bantu’ is used purely as a linguistic term. An indigenous language is a language that is native to a region or country and spoken by indigenous people (Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET), 2020, p. 7).

In an earlier 2015 DHET report, the term ‘indigenous African languages’ is used to refer to African languages of the Southern Bantu language family (Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET), 2015). The use of Bantu as a linguistic term in this context invariably excludes Afrikaans, which lexically borrows from Khoi and San languages. The 2020 Language Policy Framework does foreground the instrumentalisation of higher education to promote Khoi and San languages. But its account of indigeneity excludes these languages. This is immediately strange, given that the archaeological history of the Khoisan dates to 25000 BC and they are generally believed to be the first inhabitants of Southern Africa prior to the Bantu expansion. Although they tend to be studied as a single ethnic group, the Khoikhoi and San are
distinct in that the former were livestock farmers who lived in villages, while the latter were nomadic hunter gatherers (Kriel, 2018, p. 138). This also has implications for the Africanity of Afrikaans, given that one argument for its indigeneity is the role of the Khoisan in the development of the language. More expressly, the argument would be that Afrikaans is spoken by indigenous peoples of South Africa and people who can trace their roots to these indigenous populations. Afrikaans began as a pidgin when the Khoikhoi tried to learn Dutch words given their contact with Dutch seafarers. This first Afrikaans, dating back to 1595 and dubbed ‘Khoi Afrikaans’, had something of Dutch and Khoi in it and was used as a language of trade and conflict resolution. Today, many words from Khoi Afrikaans are still part of Cape Afrikaans which constitutes a non-standardised variety of Afrikaans spoken predominantly within communities racialised as coloured in the Cape. Some words from Khoi Afrikaans have equally been absorbed into Standard Afrikaans (Van Rensburg, 2018). Despite this, the new language policy framework quite clearly contends that while Afrikaans is one of South Africa’s official languages, it IS NOT an indigenous South African language.

Informed by its own commitment to inclusive multilingualism, Stellenbosch University indicated its strong support for the indigenous status of Afrikaans in response to the DHET’s revised Language Policy for Higher Education draft, and lamented that universities were not given the opportunity to comment on the final version of the Language Policy Framework for Public Higher Education Institutions. This support for the indigeneity of Afrikaans (as well as Khoi and San languages) was reiterated at a council meeting on 21 June 2021, in a motion requesting that SU’s management to take appropriate steps to engage with the DHET to address this issue.¹⁹

As a result of these policy changes, the Africanity (indigeneity) of Afrikaans is the subject of much debate. The Democratic Alliance (DA) opposition party accused the Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology (Blade Nzimande) of promoting the hatred of Afrikaans. They reiterated that defining Afrikaans a foreign language—effectively stripping it of indigenous status—was unscientific and unconstitutional, and called on the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) to compel recognition from the Minister.²⁰ Equally, in

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February 2021, the Thabo Mbeki foundation met with 12 Afrikaner organisations (Solidariteit/Solidarity Movement) to discuss the sense of alienation and exclusion felt by Afrikaners in South Africa. They would issue a statement that outlined 11 priorities critical to social cohesion and economic development in South Africa. Among these were the promotion of all indigenous languages in education and the recognition of Afrikaners as an African cultural community (Thamm, 2021).

6.6.3. Claiming Africanity: Afrikaans, Africanisation, and the tensions of epistemic citizenship

In this section, as an argumentative strategy, I will provide an account of the tensions embedded in discourses of the Africanity of Afrikaans through a series of charges and counter charges.

To reiterate the conceptual frame of epistemic citizenship once again, recall the overarching question: who is the African for whom representation is sought in the current clamour for a decolonised African university? In this distinct case of language and Africanisation, it can also be expressed as: who is able to successfully claim Africanity? In the previous illustration at UCT, I showed contestations over the primacy of the category black (African) South African. Thus far, on this issue of language and decolonisation in higher education, I began by noting the Bantu bias and the limited recognition of Afrikaner and Khoisan claims to indigeneity.

Let me begin by stating the putative tension between Africanisation as a vocabulary of decolonisation and Afrikaans in the form of an accusation. When framed in idiom of Africanisation, decolonisation can be accused of foregrounding an exclusionary conception of Africanity that exiles Afrikaans and Afrikaners from any claim to indigeneity. This exclusion elides the historical development of Afrikaans in southern Africa, and the continued presence of its primary speech community in this region. In the current climate of decolonisation, the Bantu-isation of Africanity, which excludes Khoisan from conceptions of linguistic indigeneity is both arbitrary and exclusionary. It not only ignores the role of Khoisan languages in the development of Afrikaans. It also fails to recognise Afrikaans as a language of indigenous southern African populations and contemporary citizens who can trace their roots to these populations.

Furthermore, given the historical role of Afrikaans in resistance against British imperialism, members of this speech community could argue that English is the only colonial language in South Africa. Both historically and contemporaneously, white Afrikaners have often
constructed a subaltern whiteness, articulating Afrikaner identity in a zero-sum game—which they are now losing—that posits English as a locus of oppression through tropes of victimhood (Steyn, 2004). In this sense, Afrikaner ethno-linguistic nationalism can even be argued to be the first anti-colonial African nationalism on the continent (Miller, 2015).

Further to this, it is important to acknowledge the scepticism that occasionally attaches to the idea of English as a language of equity and access. The binary discourse between Afrikaans and English can have a depoliticising effect, eliding the colonial baggage of English (Dube, 2017). Moreover, some may see the replacement of English with Afrikaans as essentially trapped within a colonial matrix as it simply substitutes erstwhile colonial masters. Put simply, it would be unsurprising to find some befuddlement towards the portrayal of English as a language of decolonisation and tool of inclusion. Contrary to the claims of Open Stellenbosch, the choice of English in pursuit of an African university is bound to be met with some incredulity. It is clear in moments where I have interjected in these debates more generally (e.g., Chapter 5), that I understand, but reject this common-sense incredulity. I have commented against the position that because X is instrumental in perpetuating a colonial ideology, its persistence can only be an instance of a colonial mentality. In so doing, I concurred with those arguments that see this thinking as constituting the erasure of African agency through an essentialist understanding of language. In this sense, one risks, through this essentialism, inscribing in histories of colonisation an over-determinative power that assumes that the persistence of a ‘foreign’ language always exists as an imposition, and that ex-colonised peoples cannot appropriate artefacts of putative foreign provenance (Táiwò, 2014, 2019)

Another critique of the inclusionary credentials of English which a (white) Afrikaans speaker might offer resides at the intersection of race and class. Given the apartheid stigma associated with Afrikaans, one strategy of Afrikaans language activism involves shedding the stigma of this history of racial exclusion through a de-racialisation of belonging by co-opting coloured South Africans in the siege mentality defence of Afrikaans. For example, the increasing turn towards parallel medium learning at Stellenbosch in 2009 was explained as an economic decision meant to attract English-speaking students who could afford fees while excluding working-class coloured students (Giliomee, 2009). In higher education debates on equity in educational development for example, socio-economically disadvantaged coloured South Africans who are not proficient in English are constructed as especially marginalised by Anglo
dominance. Decolonisation and its preference for English, it is argued, excludes (Biko) black (coloured) and white Afrikaner South Africans. This class critique is damaging in principle, for what is repudiated is an implementation of decolonisation that paradoxically excludes those at the margins of society.

This co-optation of coloured Afrikaans speakers is relevant to a negotiation of the inclusion of Afrikaans within the decolonised African university. This is because the Afrikaans linguistic community is forced to reckon with its insufficient representativity sourcing from its own historical exclusion of coloured South Africans. Language activists cannot ignore the reality that most Afrikaans speakers in South Africa are Biko black (i.e., politically black), or more precisely those racialised as coloured. 21 This inclusive turn within Afrikaans requires not only a formal extension of the racial boundaries of the Afrikaans speech community but attending to the linguistic boundaries which are the cumulative effect of this exclusion, and which were constructed through a standardisation process backed by the patronage of the apartheid state.

As noted earlier, the appropriation of Afrikaans was a key part of Afrikaner ethno-linguistic nationalism. Through standardisation, this appropriation notably excluded and rendered subaltern other varieties of Afrikaans (Ponelis, 1993; Van Rensburg, 1999; Willemse, 2016; Kriel, 2018; Van Rensburg, 2018). As such, language standardisation is a political phenomenon, often prescribing ideal forms of speech and writing as the basis of cultural exclusion (Odendaal, 2014). Recognising this political nature of language standardisation is important in responding to preceding accusations of exclusion. Put crudely, it offers a political defence for suspending recognition of the Africanity of Afrikaans. While the claims to indigeneity of Afrikaans is historically intelligible, suspending this recognition is itself a political act meant to draw attention to the racialised exclusions within the Afrikaans speech community. The argument I sketch here is entirely theoretical.

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21 I use the term ‘Biko-black’ in reference to Steve Biko’s amelioration of the social categories constitutive of apartheid oppression and its deprivation of agency (Epstein, 2019). Biko read apartheid as constituted by an all-encompassing white/non-white dichotomy, subsequently breaking out of this through a socio-political definition of blackness. Herein, blackness was less about pigmentation and more about positive self-identification and an attitude of defiant struggle against oppression. What was particularly noteworthy about this definition was its inclusivity, which transcended conventional apartheid understandings of racial difference by embracing those the apartheid system would have otherwise indexed as Indian and coloured.
Historically, the transformative potential of African nationalism lay in the capacity of the category *African* to foment the de-racialisation and de-ethnicisation of belonging, transcending race and ethnicity as technologies of colonial governance (Mamdani, 1996). While this promise of inclusivity was never fully realised, today's discourses of decolonisation provide opportunities to keep probing and extending the boundaries of Africanness. If this is the hope—that *African* transcends the colonialisity of being (identity)—then one ought to be attentive to the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion around race and ethnicity, and their role as colonial identities. In this regard, appealing to indigeneity in the historical development of Afrikaans by recognising both creolisation and the place-belongingness of the primary Afrikaans speech community in Africa is a *necessary but insufficient* to claim Africanness.

Claims to Africanness would require a de-racialisation of Afrikaans linguistic identity by embracing coloured Afrikaans speakers, which has largely been achieved today. Taking seriously demands for recognition of Afrikaans as constituting an African cultural community, in a critical sense, requires that one also interrogates the *African* within this community for whom representation is sought, as is inflection along racial and class fault lines.

As such, it is still worth distinguishing between a *formal* and *substantive* de-racialisation. Both take representation as the point of departure by positing that both standard Afrikaans communication in addition to the dominant nationalist historical narrative on the linguistic development of Afrikaans are insufficiently representative of the entire Afrikaans speech community. Formal de-racialisation recognises coloured South Africans as belonging to the Afrikaner community linguistically, often foregrounding hidden (black) histories of Afrikaans in contrast the hegemonic white nationalist version. These hidden histories reveal the role of Afrikaans as a language of political communication, religious instruction, anti-apartheid, and anti-capitalist activism among poor black South Africans (Van Heerden, 2016; Willemse, 2018)

By contrast, a substantive de-racialisation requires addressing the cumulative effects of exclusion to transform the very community into which one is being included. This substantive inclusion begins by recognising that the nature of the community from which one was excluded was fundamentally shaped by this very exclusion—that is, what is considered standard Afrikaans is shaped precisely by the exclusion of those racialised as coloured. It stands to reason therefore that to avoid an add-and-stir approach, inclusion must itself transform the
nature of the community into which one is included and confront the linguistic standardisation as a political process. As such, substantive de-racialisation would attend to the role of race and class in the construction of language ideologies shaped by the linguistic norms of powerful groups (in this case white Afrikaners) and which are based on political rather than linguistic factors (Cooper, 2018). Against this hegemony of standard (white) Afrikaans, formal representation alone will be seen as opportunist. While meaningful for the historical record, it can also be cynically dismissed as co-optation if it is not tied to a linguistic re-standardisation that recognises and integrates historically inferiorised and marginalised varieties of Afrikaans (like Afrikaaps). In this sense, the decolonisation of Afrikaans can be seen to demand its re-standardisation. This process can be articulated in the idiom of democratisation and involves making the standard language a more representative and democratic tool of communication. As Gerda Odendaal explains,

The re-standardisation of Afrikaans thus entails that Dutch should no longer be used as norm for Afrikaans. Over the years there has also been greater realism with regard to the influence of English on Afrikaans, but there are still many English loans missing in Standard Afrikaans which have been prevalent in the vernacular for many years. The re-standardisation of Afrikaans should lead to a greater acceptance of English influence on Afrikaans, as English often has an enriching effect on Afrikaans. Disregard of this influence may alienate speakers to such an extent that they decide to use English because they have difficulty acquiring Standard Afrikaans. Lastly, there has also been an increased acceptance of other varieties of Afrikaans into the standard. However, much still needs to be done, since especially coloured speakers of Afrikaans feel like strangers in their own language. Standard Afrikaans should be broadened to include not only lexical items from the vernacular varieties of Afrikaans, but also give recognition to grammatical differences. Re-standardisation would further require that norms be determined in a democratic manner, so that all speakers may have a say in the structure of the standard. In this way, re-standardisation can be utilised to reform Standard Afrikaans in order to serve the entire speech community, thereby reflecting the democratic ideals of society (Odendaal, 2014, p. 656).

In conclusion to the debate around the retention of Afrikaans in higher education, I have explored the tensions inherent in negotiating the Africanity of Afrikaans. I did this through a series of positions and counter-positions. Beginning with the question of who can successfully
claim Africanity, I argued that decolonisation in the idiom of Africanisation can initially be critiqued for excluding the Afrikaans speakers from the category African by ringfencing indigeneity, an exclusion that is racially layered. Although language activists include white and coloured Afrikaans speakers, the latter are notably co-opted and portrayed as even more subaltern in this configuration. This initial charge, however, is riddled with its own contradictions. The recognition of the Africanity of Afrikaans can be theoretically suspended precisely to shed light on the language ideologies that underpin the racial and class fault lines of belonging among Afrikaans speakers. This theoretical suspension foregrounds the critical necessity for Afrikaans to rehabilitate its Africanity through a formal de-racialisation and linguistic re-standardisation. In principle therefore, these positions jointly vex the category African as a category of decolonisation, invariably demanding that it represent more people than it is initially seen to. Put simply, to claim Africanity, it is necessary to decolonise Afrikaans. This discussion has another dimension that should be mentioned briefly. It regards the portrayal of English in these debates on decolonisation and the African university. Note that thus far, English is simultaneously represented as a language of inclusion and exclusion from competing points of view—black non-Afrikaans speakers and white Afrikaans speakers respectively. In the former case, there are grounds to interrogate the putative inclusionary credentials of English and a failure to do this risks depoliticising its role within discourses of decolonisation (Dube, 2017). Beyond the argument that Afrikaans functioned as a tool of exclusion, Stephanie Rudwick has also demonstrated how the preference for English among members of OS equally reflects a cosmopolitan ethical sensibility, explaining that English is perceived to facilitate one’s inscription within global flows and networks by providing access to a global audience. By contrast, the language and ethnic politics around Afrikaans yields a more parochial identity around it. On a very intuitive level, this makes sense as there are only so many Afrikaans speakers one can engage with (Rudwick, 2018a). However, Rudwick invites us to raise critical questions around the facility with which some languages are constructed as cosmopolitan and others parochial. This invites an interrogation into the inclusionary limits of English as an academic lingua franca in the current clamour for a decolonised African university (Ibid). Much like the debate around varieties and hierarchies of Afrikaans, the same can be said for English as an academic lingua franca. One example involves the intersection of language and race in instances of racio-linguistic profiling (Rosa and Flores, 2020). Recall that when describing the causes of the student protest in terms of belonging and epistemic (testimonial) injustice in Chapter 4, I briefly cited experiences of the worth attached to one’s accent. In these examples, one’s accent can become a racialised marker
of epistemological inferiority or superiority, culminating in credibility deficits and excesses. Such experiences suggest varieties and hierarchies of English, forcing one to ask whether all Englishes enjoy equal cosmopolitan dividends. The term ‘coconut’ is often used derogatorily to refer to black African South Africans (often by other black South Africans) with ostensible markers of whiteness like accent and socio-economic privilege. By rendering intelligible the idea of white and black accents, the term implies that to speak in a ‘black accent’ undercuts one’s epistemic credibility and points to the general devaluation of accents categorised as ‘African’, where African is co-eval with black (Hunter, 2019). By extension, to speak with a ‘white accent’ is to suspend stereotypes of inferiority. At the same time, to be a coconut is to be seen as inauthentically black, and in this regard, one often faces charges of elitism within one’s racial community. Put simply therefore, one cannot take for granted the inclusionary credentials of English in these debates around the retention of Afrikaans.

6.7. Conclusion

This chapter engages with normative component of the question ‘Is decolonisation Africanisation.’ It uses citizenship and belonging as an evaluative framework to excavate the regimes of inclusion and exclusion enmeshed in the demand for decolonised African universities. After formulating a distinct notion of epistemic citizenship, I build on the debates at UCT to illustrate the desire for an inclusive epistemic citizenship. Here, Africanisation authorises an expansive Afropolitan ethical sensibility that is fundamentally concerned with precluding insularity and enclosure. At the same time, I use key flashpoints at UCT and Stellenbosch to consider some of the ways in which decolonisation, when interpreted through the grammar of Africanisation, raises questions around the subject of decolonisation. I illustrate perceptions around exclusionary configurations of race, nation, and indigeneity in response to the question of the African for whom representation is sought.
Chapter 7
Conclusion

7.1. Project Summary

Over the course of 2015 and 2016, students and sympathetic staff in South African universities mobilised to demand a decolonised African university. Through this demand, they critiqued universities in South Africa as colonial in their institutional form, registering narratives of alienation and epistemic injustice in the process. The varying institutional circumstances and histories of these universities inflected the specific issues critiqued by fallists, such as the language and institutional culture at historically Afrikaans-medium universities. These claims continue to reverberate today, as universities continue to engage with decolonisation at institutional, curricula, and pedagogical levels. Universities are re-articulating institutional transformation in the grammar of decolonisation. In addition, they are incentivising decolonial research through research grants and the creation of research networks. New task teams and existing institutional fora have focused on articulating conceptions of decolonisation that can inform the institutional and epistemic cultures of South African universities. Many academics are themselves engaged in processes of curriculum, rethinking their syllabi, and pedagogy. New courses and degree programmes informed by an African-centred sensibility are being created.

During this research, I was particularly concerned with these reverberations and the productive conversations that fallists enabled. Their own nascent decolonial ideology, premised on pillars of Black Consciousness, black radical feminism, and Pan-Africanism showed both the many issues at stake, and the existence of numerous analytical frameworks that inflect the content and praxis of decolonisation. Given that decolonisation is not a new demand or project, it is evident that its advocates often draw on diverse concepts and intellectual traditions of profound historicity. Noting these choices, there is the problem of how one frames and pursues decolonisation as an intellectual project, and as such, the limitations of the frameworks we deploy in its service.
In this regard, I considered Africanisation as a popular vocabulary of decolonisation. If intellectual decolonisation, broadly defined, constitutes efforts to identify and dismantle the immediate and enduring legacies of colonial-imperialism in the university, then what are the perceived limitations of Africanisation as the foundational idiom for such a project? What do the emergent meanings, debates, tensions, and flashpoints on decolonisation in post-fallist South African universities say about the limits of Africanisation as an anchoring framework for pursuing decolonisation?

I answered these questions by looking at debates related to the institutionalisation of decolonisation at two historically white South African universities—UCT and Stellenbosch. These questions were particularly inflected by the twin concepts of citizenship and belonging. They shaped the question by articulating ‘limitations’ in the grammar of inclusion and exclusion, and thus the socio-political relations that attend to decolonisation as a politics of knowledge production. Put simply, when decolonisation is articulated in the idiom of Africanisation, who is African for whom representation is sought? Who can successfully claim Africanity?

7.2. Findings, Contribution, and Significance

One of the main contributions of this dissertation is conceptual. It develops epistemic citizenship as an analytical tool in debates on decolonisation. The idea of epistemic citizenship, as used in this essay, maintains that how decolonisation is articulated reveals a lot about the subject of decolonisation. The concept is therefore a framework through which to examine the envisioned beneficiaries of decolonisation in a concrete sense and the ethical subjectivity foregrounded. In Chapter 4 for example, I briefly noted how the three pillars of RMF—Black Consciousness, black radical feminism, and Pan-Africanism, are attempts to foreground a capacious and heterogenous account of blackness and thus subject of decolonisation that transcended racial, gendered, and national fault lines. To recap, epistemic citizenship develops from the following premises:

1. Decolonisation is a framework through which one can seek epistemic citizenship—that is, representation, recognition, and a felt sense of belonging in one’s capacity as a knower (i.e., epistemic agent).
2. Those who make claims around decolonisation come to constitute a community of actors engaged in counter-hegemonic behaviours animated by shared histories and experiences of alienation, domination, and dispossession. In this regard, epistemic actors (students, academics, intellectuals) leverage epistemic identities, like ‘Southern’ or ‘African’ to negotiate inclusion in scientific/knowledge communities (like disciplines, universities, journals) and expose regimes of exclusion in these communities that prejudicially construct some knowers and geographies of knowledge as deficient. Building on (1), epistemic citizenship can be used to foreground struggles for inclusion in virtue of one’s capacity as a legitimate knower within shared communities of intellectual praxis.

3. Epistemic identities like ‘African’ often become discursive terrains for a politics of belonging in which boundaries are created, policed, and revised by varying configurations of race, nation, and indigeneity which inflect Africanity and thus the subject of decolonisation. As such, claim making under the rubric decolonisation-as-Africanisation implicitly and explicitly involves a set of ethical deliberations about what is authorised in the name of an African university. These include ethical deliberations about both who is African (the authentic subject) and how Africanity, however defined, relates to non-African others in the articulation and preservation of these boundaries.

4. Taking this into consideration, decolonisation as an intellectual project can manifest as different regimes of epistemic citizenship ranging from bounded to flexible, based on the ways in which claim making is inflected appeals to race, geography, indigeneity, and Africanity. Consciously or unconsciously therefore, how we articulate and debate, for example, the decolonisation of curricula, reveals assumptions, aspirations, endorsements, and rejections of distinct kinds of epistemic citizenship.

Thus, if we see the issue as one of unpacking the contestations over what Africanity authorises in this demand for representation and belonging within the decolonised African university, I made two significant observations. On the one hand, there is an attempt to foreground an inclusive Afropolitan epistemic citizenship evident in the debates at UCT. This manifests as a desire to preclude Africanity-as-enclosure. This means that a renewed Africa-centred intellectual project need not imply nativism (e.g., linguistic) or radical relativism. In this sense, African-centredness foregrounded a discourse in which place and identity (Africa, race) were
simply platforms upon which to participate in knowledge production as a global activity as opposed to markers of insularity. While there was an acceptance that power inflects the social, epistemic, and material relations of knowledge production as legitimate, there was a reluctance to enclose the significance of knowledge claims as the only expressions of power was significant in terms of grounding a critical universalism.

Secondly, I observed contestations over the subject of decolonisation. At UCT, a flashpoint around the appointment of a new dean surfaced accusations of xenophobia and the undermining of black solidarity through divisive language. In the process, it raised issues of Afrophobia and conceptions of Africanity predicated on exclusionary configurations of race and nation. On my part, I hesitated from concluding that the Lushaba controversy was xenophobic and opted for the modest claim that decolonisation, and by extension the concrete subject of decolonisation, is often inflected by the facticity of existing ideological registers of belonging. Recognising the nation-state as the hegemonic register that informs the context in which today’s decolonisation is articulated, it is unsurprising that Africanisation manifests as an insistence on *South Africanisation*. At the same time this does not go uncontested as African nationalism is itself ambivalent between territoriality and continental solidarity. As such Pan-Africanist registers of belonging, particularly those oriented toward continental solidarity and informed by the critique of territorial borders in Africa as colonial, and South African exceptionalism offer a different orientation to Africanisation. Some participants would effectively argue, as I saw graffitied on the office door of a UCT academic: *No African is a foreigner in Africa.*

At Stellenbosch, the linguistic element of decolonisation illuminates another dimension to Africanisation as exclusionary. Here, the core issue regards an Africanity that putatively excludes Afrikaans speakers through configurations of race and indigeneity. Given the status of language as a marker of representation and belonging, the debate around the retention of Afrikaans in higher education negotiates the distinct issue of the Africanness of Afrikaans and thus who can successfully claim Africanity. This is evident in efforts to argue that Afrikaans deserves protection and promotion linked to its contested status as an indigenous South African language. I argue that decolonisation in the idiom of Africanisation can be initially critiqued for excluding the Afrikaans linguistic community from the category African by ringfencing indigeneity through a privileging of Bantu languages. Furthermore, this putative exclusion is racially layered. Although language activists include white and coloured Afrikaans speaker, the latter are notably co-opted and portrayed as even more subaltern in this configuration. This
initial charge of a linguistically exclusionary African university, however, is riddled with its own contradictions. The recognition of the Africanity of Afrikaans can be theoretically suspended precisely to shed light on the language ideologies that underpin the racial and class fault lines of belonging among Afrikaans speakers. This theoretical suspension foregrounds the critical necessity for Afrikaans to rehabilitate its Africanity through a formal de-racialisation and linguistic re-standardisation (i.e., decolonisation). Put simply decolonising Afrikaans can be a means towards legitimating its Africaness.

In a nutshell, what then are the perceived limitations of Africanisation? In the first instance, I have shown how anxieties around enclosure motivate an Afropolitan epistemic sensibility that eschews nativism, radical relativism. Secondly, I have shown worries around the construction of Africanity along narrow circles of inclusions. As an idiom of decolonisation, Africanisation is perceived as limited by narrow nationalism in South Africa. This narrowness is shaped by varying configurations of race, nation, indigeneity, and Africanity.

7.3. Epilogue: Decolonisation as a freedom to negotiate inclusion

Questions of Africaness are deeply entwined with debates on citizenship, identity, and belonging, and their dynamics of inclusion and exclusion regarding rights and entitlements (Mamdani, 1996; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Hunter, 2016). Hierarchies of race, nation, gender, ethnicity, and indigeneity are often mobilised towards exclusionary forms of Africanity in which many are called but few are chosen. The challenge for decolonisation thus remains one cultivating practices of inclusion rather than regimes of exclusion along configurations of race, indigeneity and Africanity as observed in this dissertation. Building on the idea of ‘flexible mobility’ as a descriptive marker of historical and contemporary realities of border straddling, Francis Nyamnjoh has often argued for the de-essentialisation of citizenship and belonging in favour of ‘flexible citizenship’ and ‘flexible indigeneity’, both of which underscore their contested nature (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 2001; Nyamnjoh, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2016). In the process, he makes the case for citizenship, belonging and indigeneity as processes subject to re-negotiation. This inflects contemporary conversations around decolonising the university by interrogating the relative freedom it offers both individuals and communities to negotiate inclusion (Nyamnjoh, 2012b).
South Africa appears to be on course to continue limiting these possibilities for inclusion as xenophobic rhetoric ramps up. Rising anti-immigrant sentiments have coalesced into “Operation Dudula”, a non-profit organisation calling on South African shop owners to hire only South Africans.\footnote{\url{https://www.enca.com/news/operation-dudula-push-100-south-african-employment}} In January this year, the Department of Home Affairs withdrew the blanket waiver of April 2016, which allowed foreign graduates at South African universities studying towards degrees in designated critical skills areas to apply for permanent residence without needing to acquire five years of post-qualification experience (Department of Home Affairs, 2022). In a surprising move considering his usual stance against xenophobia, Julius Malema’s decision to audit the ratio of foreign nationals at restaurants in Johannesburg was denounced as opportunist and xenophobic. He rationalised this exercise, unclearly in my view, as a defence against the exploitation of workers: “Let the enemy not distort the message. We are not fighting against fellow Africans. Those are the people we are protecting because they are being exploited. This is not about the Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, or people from Lesotho. It’s about locals. Everywhere you do business, hire locals.”\footnote{\url{https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2022-01-19-hire-locals-malema-visiting-restaurants-to-check-how-many-workers-are-foreign-nationals/}} Considering this as a context in which decolonisation and its associated idioms like Africanisation are articulated, I wonder whether demands for a decolonised African university will result in a similar auditing of South African universities, thereby limiting possibilities for a negotiation of inclusion.

Hierarchies of citizenship and belonging are global and not just African issues. Almost everywhere, the nation is increasingly emphasised in exclusionary terms along configurations of race, religion, ethnicity, gender, geography, and class and codified in which authentic citizenship is claimed to the exclusion. I say this to both recognise and vex the intuition that the grammar of Africanisation and the issues of epistemic citizenship discussed herein may not seem to have much relevance beyond Africa. After all, the question of whether decolonisation is Africanisation, if affirmative, raises immediately the question how it compares, and its relevance, in non-African contexts. On this note, I maintain that the subject of decolonisation (i.e., who stands to be represented) would be an interesting basis for comparison between South Africa and the UK, with decolonisation presumably inflected by the latter’s own dynamic interplay of race, ethnicity, class, gender, and geography. For example, one could interrogate the hierarchies of belonging with “BAME” (Black Asian and Minority Ethnic), the collective term for ethnic minorities in the UK, which I found typically led debates on institutional racism,
decolonisation, and representation in UK higher education. Furthermore, during my time in Cambridge, I attended various departmental-based meetings and seminars broadly unified on the topic of decolonisation. In these gatherings, one interesting argument I encountered was the criticism that talk of decolonisation often centred Black American experience. Furthermore, where it did privilege British experience, it gave primacy to British Caribbean experience while eliding British African experience. These are just some of the possibilities for comparative study in terms of the subject of decolonisation and its perceived and contested hierarchies. In the final analysis, such studies could be premised on theorising the emancipatory dimension of discourses of decolonisation in terms of the relative freedom they offer to negotiate inclusion.
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## Appendix

### Interviewees

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