


Diplomatic Pressure and Interstate Socialization at the United Nations

Department of Politics and International Studies

University of Cambridge



This thesis is submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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Girton College, Cambridge

Easter Term 2022

Declaration

This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the text.

It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my thesis has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as specified in the text.

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Naif Al-Mulla
Easter Term 2022

Diplomatic Pressure and Interstate Socialization at the United Nations

Thesis Summary

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This thesis tests an agent-centric, social constructivist perspective on interstate socialization. I draw upon diplomacy at the United Nations—especially, at the General Assembly—as the focal point for that socialization in a global, multilateral context. My research question concerns how states can initiate a socialization process that cumulatively builds a consensus on an issue over time. My argument is that a “core” coalition of states can create a spotlight of diplomatic pressure that draws into focus an issue. That diplomatic pressure sets in motion a process of collective legitimization, which assumes a life of its own and creates common expectations that make support for a particular position “legitimate”. Over time, these expectations can incline other states—in particular, those opposing or otherwise “on the fence”—towards joining in on a common position, leading to a convergence in expectations in relation to the issue. What results is interstate socialization that takes place in the sense that public—though not necessarily private—viewpoints converge around a common, more legitimate or socially sustainable stance on the issue. The outcome reflects a social compromise in which socialization subjects eschew public association with the “illegitimate” or socially unsustainable position. Socialization subjects do not necessarily take to heart and change their own private views.

To evaluate this theoretical argument, my thesis considers three issue areas as case studies: racial discrimination in South Africa from 1946 to 1961, the United States’ embargo on Cuba from 1991 to 2016, and the ban on nuclear weapons from 1946 to 1961. The former two case studies demonstrate empirical support for my theoretical argument, provided the contribution of certain empirical factors specific to the case studies. These two case study chapters advance my theoretical argument in reference to specific examples of states that were moved by the core coalitions’ diplomatic efforts. The latter case study considers the ban on nuclear weapons as an issue area where socialization does *not* occur. The point in studying a nonpositive case study is to add nuance to my theoretical argument and empirical tests by considering the conditions under which socialization will and will not occur. I posit that an agent’s perceived integrity on an issue can make socialization efforts more or less influential. Specifically, socialization efforts are more likely to fail when proponents lack that integrity—and are therefore seen to be hypocritical—because the target states do not see a political downside to maintaining the status quo. By integrity, I mean a social constructivist (and not a rationalist) take on “reputation”, which relates to the extent to which a potential socialization subject regards a socialization agent as a trustworthy advocate of a cause.

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My analysis has led me to conclude that the United Nations is an important body worthy of our best attention. What happens there matters in some ways that are not often understood. What happens in the United Nations shapes matters in the long run rather than in the short run. What happens in the United Nations shapes attitudes in cumulative ways. The specifics are less important than cumulative impact. The United Nations shapes agendas and focuses world attention and assumptions about what is and is not possible in what is euphemistically called the community of nations

To the proposition that the United Nations is an important body, I would add that I believe that in the long-range ways the patterns of alliance that develop inside the United Nations and the rhetoric that is used there are influential all over the world. They influence interactions and agendas in bodies as remote as the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of American States, and ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations). They influence questions on the foreign policy agendas of nations as remote as Burundi and as major as the Soviet Union (Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick 2007, 97).

Introduction

The General Assembly is the “chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations” (A/RES/60/1; A/63/959, A/67/936; *et al.*). For some seventy-five years, states have converged on its platform to consider issues of common concern. Yet from the focal points of discussion, patterns of interaction emerge. Certain states seem to work in lock-step with others, expressing support for each other across issue-areas regardless of what is at stake. Recently, for example, some small island states stood alongside the United States to oppose international censure of a decision to relocate an embassy to Jerusalem (A/ES-10/PV.37; A/RES/ES-10/19). These same small island states also stand alongside the United States across a raft of other issues. Irrespective of the issue area, some need to preserve a relationship with the United States seems to persist among these states.

Allegiances of this nature have long been the subject of international relations research endeavors. For some time, international relations scholars have drawn attention to the more divisive patterns of interaction among states at the General Assembly—often with implications for the distribution of material capabilities in the international system. Some scholars then take these patterns to speak to the “larger realities and forces governing world politics” (Dixon 1981, 57). This main empirical research emphasis appears in the literature across its historical trajectory. That trajectory includes—but is not limited to—three main empirical clusters that draw attention to the following interstate bloc formations: East versus West, North versus South and the United States versus the rest of the world. A fourth empirical research cluster relates to a more specific focus on the cohesion of members states of certain intergovernmental organizations such as BRICS, ASEAN and the European Union. These four clusters are one way to encapsulate the research and present a common thread: that is, an emphasis on bloc politics as the main feature of how states relate to common issues in the global, multilateral context at the United Nations.

This long-standing empirical research focus on interstate, bloc politics is “wrong” in the sense that it is incomplete, as Lida Dixon observed (Dixon 1981). It underscores certain conflicts of interests among states in global, multilateral diplomacy but pays less attention to how states can find common cause on the issues despite the position one may associate them with within some bloc-like formation. The main research focus thus overlooks the extent to which socialization can take place among states overall, and follow from social effects that cut across the bloc formations that may exist at the time. This is to say that the main research emphasis overlooks the extent to which such socialization can prevail and shape the manner in which states relate to the issues. The shortcoming seems most pronounced where an interstate consensus on an issue seems develops across blocs, in a manner independent from the use (or threatened use) of material resource inducements. Yet the formation of and potential build in an interstate consensus can entail a more universal sense of community, where common expectations prevail and shape how states relate to the issues.

This thesis speaks to that notion of community. Building on my MPhil thesis at the Department of Politics and International Studies, it tests a social constructivist argument on interstate socialization using the United Nations—especially, the General Assembly—as the focal point for that socialization (Al-Mulla 2015). My research question relates to how states can initiate a socialization process that cumulatively builds a political consensus on an issue over time. By consensus, I mean an overwhelming *public*—and not necessarily private or internalized—extent of agreement among states on an issue. I ask, in other words, how a groundswell of interstate public opinion can develop on common issues at the United Nations. I also attend to how certain theoretical and empirical “conditioning factors” can facilitate socialization over time (Tocci 2008a; 2008b; 6.11.2018).

To address my research question, I proceed with the following chapters. My first chapter takes stock of what international relations scholars have said about the patterns of interstate interaction that develop in diplomacy at the General Assembly. I find a main research focus on interstate, bloc politics: namely, on political or otherwise allegiance formations that take shape across issue areas. My take is that an empirical research focus on interstate, bloc politics is incomplete. It assumes that certain bloc formations are the main feature of how states relate to common issues at the expense of an overall perspective on socialization. To put it another way, an empirical focus on interstate bloc politics lacks attention to how states can find common cause on the issues in a manner that cuts across the bloc formations that one may associate them with. Yet the “bipartisan” or “multi partisan” nature of the interaction entails a wider sense of interstate community, which can influence how states relate to each other and position themselves on the issues. My concern is *not* with some idyllic notion of harmony, to be sure. It is with how states—in coalition with other states—contend over common expectations to win over the interstate community’s support as a whole. Contestation over these expectations, as Monika Hakimi suggests, purports to “speak not just for oneself but on behalf of a group” (Hakimi 2017, 320). The contestation thus “helps construct the group by presupposing it exists and then purporting to define its attributes” (Hakimi 2017, 320).

My second chapter reviews the most pertinent theoretical commentary on interstate socialization from the social constructivist research tradition in international relations. I see an important—albeit far from absolute—distinction between structure and agent centric perspectives. The former perspectives look at how social structure shapes how state actors interact with each other. The latter perspectives look at how state agents draw upon, modify and/or create social structure throughout the course of interaction with other states. The latter perspectives are more relevant to my empirical focus on the United Nations. Within these accounts, I see an important—but again not absolute—distinction between two more bodies of literature that both focus on how non-material and non-coercive factors can advance socialization. One body of literature more closely attends to the normative processes of norm construction and diffusion. A second body of literature tends to focus more on the strategic processes. I synthesize ideas from both bodies of literature and most most closely with the latter. Specifically, my empirical research and theoretical analysis most closely speaks to Ian Hurd’s account on the strategic use of the norms of liberal internationalism, which “straddles the realms

of strategic choice and of norms” (Hurd 2005, 497; 2008, 137-138). Hence constructivism and rational choice are complements to each other from this theoretical perspective (Hurd 2009, 13-14).

Chapter Three presents a theoretical argument in reference to diplomacy in a global, multilateral context. In particular, chapter three contours a social constructivist argument for how a core coalition of states can cumulatively build a consensus on an issue at the United Nations. I submit that a “core” coalition of states can create a spotlight of diplomatic pressure that draws into focus an issue. That diplomatic pressure gives rise to a process of collective legitimization, which assumes a life of its own and creates common expectations that make support for a particular position “legitimate”. Over time, these expectations can incline other states—in particular, those opposing or otherwise “on the fence”—towards joining in on a common position, leading to a convergence in expectations in relation to the issue over time. Interstate socialization takes place in the sense that public—and not necessarily private—viewpoints converge around a common, more “legitimate” or socially sustainable stance on an a particular issue (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 47; Petrova 2016, 387). The outcome reflects a social compromise in which socialization subjects shun association with the “illegitimate” or socially unsustainable position (Mantilla 2020b, 27-28; Petrova 2016, 388; Schimmelfennig 2001, 65). What does *not* necessarily result, to be clear, is a more “progressive” outcome that improves the state of international relations.

The mobilization of diplomatic pressure can exert a continuum of non-material and non-coercive social effects that start with more content-neutral, relational concerns for a need to conform and extend to more content-based, normative concerns for the issue’s substance. The former effects have more to do with the preservation of a certain relationship with or “role” within a community than a sense of conviction on the issue in question (Checkel 2005; Goodman and Jinks 2013; Johnston 2005). The latter social effects overlap with and extend further than the former. Pressure to conform remains relevant, with ostracism (or isolation) as its social sanction, but to the further extent that the state subject in question develops a sense of attachment to the issue in circulation. Whereas the former effects are more content-neutral, the latter effects churn up a more content-based perspective in support of the issue as “legitimate”. The associated social sanction then relates to disapprobation, with ostracism *and* a sense of shame for failure to uphold what resounds as legitimate within the interstate community. This is to say that diplomatic pressure can give rise to socio-strategic as well as socially mediated normative concerns in the acceptance of an otherwise undesirable position.

Chapter Three also discusses theoretical “conditioning factors” (Tocci 2008a; 2008b; 6.11.2018). These are factors that contribute to my theoretical argument to produce interstate socialization. I posit that an agent’s perceived integrity on an issue can make socialization efforts more or less influential. Specifically, socialization efforts are more likely to fail when proponents lack that integrity—and are therefore seen to be hypocritical—because the target states do not see a political drawback to maintaining the status quo. By integrity, I mean a social constructivist (and not a rationalist) take on “reputation”, which relates to the extent to which a socialization subject regards a socialization agent as a trustworthy advocate of a cause. I stress that my use of

the concept is intersubjective. It calls into question to what degree a potential socialization subject views a socialization agent as meaning what they say—namely, as “talking the talk” and “walking the walk”—on the specific issue.

Chapter Three also considers limitations and caveats to my theoretical argument. These relate to what the extent to which a theoretical process of collective legitimization captures what happens in the “real world”, and how strong an influence one should expect it to command throughout the course of interstate relations. My argument is not determinative; it does not anticipate a relatively homogeneous pattern of interaction to follow from a core coalition’s efforts. State subjects can be affected by common elements of social structure but nevertheless have a more unique threshold (or “tipping-point”) in relation to how social structure affects them individually. Some states, moreover, will not be affected by a core coalition’s diplomatic efforts. An example is states that commonly adopt a “renegade attitude” against international norms on an issue, as Giovanni Mantilla writes (Mantilla 2018, 331).

Chapter Four considers how to test my theoretical argument in empirical case studies. I open the chapter by addressing an empirical puzzle derived from my empirical literature review chapter. The empirical literature suggests a thematic focus on interstate, bloc politics at the General Assembly. This research focus has been incomplete. It has much to say about where certain cleavages among states can come from, but lacks attention to how states can find common cause on the issues despite the position one may associate them with within some bloc-like formation. More importantly, the main research focus also overlooks the extent to which socialization can take place among states overall, and follow from diplomatic pressure that cuts across the political or otherwise alliance formations that may exist at the time. I then present a broad overview of diplomacy at the General Assembly—which, consistent with a social constructivist research orientation—draws interstate social consensus into focus. I suggest that that there has been a general increase in the number of resolutions that states have agreed upon over time. There has also been a general increase in the proportion of resolutions unanimously agreed upon. My point is that interstate consensus has become an increasingly prominent feature of diplomacy at the General Assembly, and accordingly ought to receive more scholarly attention.

I then set out several scope conditions for my empirical case study chapters. These scope conditions suggest empirical issue areas where my theoretical argument applies. The scope conditions require a study of resolutions that present a clear and concise issue, and also have a recurring character. In addition, I also suggest institutional scope conditions drawn from Giovanni Mantilla’s analysis on “forum isolation” (Mantilla 2018, 329). The conditions are the universal participation of states (featuring a one-state-one-vote rule), decision making by majority vote (or consensus procedures in the shadow of majority vote), and publicity. Based on these scope conditions, I suggest three empirical case studies: racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa (1946-1961), the United States’ embargo on Cuba (1991-2016), and the ban on nuclear weapons (1946-1961). I also consider selection bias in my research design drawn from scholars who stress the limits of selecting on the dependent variable (Achen and Snidal 1989; Geddes 1990; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; *et al.*). I contend with this literature and in turn

point out the variance in my own research design, which includes a study of a “nonpositive” case study in my third empirical chapter. The Data and Methods chapter also outlines a three-step research procedure that structures my empirical case study chapters. In brief, the procedure is to zero in on the diplomatic agitation that a core coalition of states undertake in support of a cause, consider the extent to which this activity influences a target interstate audience, and then consider empirical and/or theoretical counter-arguments to my claims. This fourth chapter finally presents my primary sources and considers the relevant limitations. The main limitation relates to the extent to which one can infer intentions from national foreign policy statements.

Chapters five, six and seven consider my social constructivist argument in relation to three empirical case studies. My case study on South Africa from 1946 to 1961 demonstrates that a core coalition of states’ proactive diplomatic efforts pressured the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada into adopting a clear and unequivocal position against apartheid by April 1961. Newly independent states from Africa and Asia in the late 1950s and early 1960s accelerated the respective changes in position. My case study on Cuba embargo from 1991 to 2016 demonstrates that a core coalition of states aggressive diplomatic efforts pressured the Russian Federation, the United States, and several small states into a clear and unequivocal position against the embargo. I adduce empirical conditioning factors specific to each respective example. For the Russian Federation, the most relevant empirical conditioning factor is the resurgence of Russian nationalism in the mid 1990s. For the United States, the most relevant empirical conditioning factor is Latin American opposition to the embargo and the election of President Barack Obama in 2008. For small states, the most relevant empirical conditioning factor was the Helms-Burton Law of 1996. My assertion in both case studies is that close observation of the manner in which foreign policy positions change suggests evidence for an interstate socialization process, set in motion by the core coalition of states. Hence my theoretical argument’s observable implication—following Ian Hurd’s 2005 and 2008 works—comes from the specific manner in which state representatives express changes in national positions.

And finally in Chapter Seven, I examine an issue area where the “dog does not bark”—as Jeffrey Checkel puts it (Checkel 339, 1998). For my purposes, the term refers to coverage of an issue area where interstate socialization does *not* occur on an issue. The idea is to sharpen my general argument for the conditions under which socialization will and will not occur. I do this by considering the extent to which theoretical factors can contribute to socialization. The applicable theoretical factor has to do with a potential socialization agent’s integrity: interstate socialization follows from the efforts of agents with more perceived integrity on an issue. Socialization fails when the potential socialization agents patently lack that integrity. I weigh this theoretical proposition in relation to proceedings on nuclear weapons at the General Assembly from 1946 to 1961. The chapter follows the structure of the previous two case study chapters, with an introduction and three parts. My focus is on how the core coalition’s diplomatic efforts on the nuclear weapons were unsuccessful. I specifically look at India and the Soviet Union as advocates of the ban. I aver that these states’ integrity was in significant doubt, and consequently undermined the extent to which their efforts could have influenced other states’ positions. Hence the campaign to ban the bomb failed because those leading it lacked integrity in the eyes of target

states, thanks to their own nuclear arsenal or potential to develop one. The evidentiary basis for my argument comes from observations made by Canadian, Australian and American officials about the Soviet Union and India as advocates of the ban.

How does the thesis advance the theoretical literature? Empirical testing is my major contribution to theoretical knowledge on international relations. In particular, my thesis most closely associates with and tests Ian Hurd's analysis on the the strategic use of the norms of liberal internationalism and the interstate socialization that can ensue (Hurd 2005; 2008). I also bring to bear a wealth of social constructivist scholarship on socialization to add theoretical precision to the argument as well as my empirical tests on select issues at the United Nations. The most significant insights come from works by Inis Claude, Ronald Krebs and Patrick Jackson, Giovanni Mantilla, Margarita Petrova, and Frank Schimmelfennig. Further important theoretical insights come from works by Jeffrey Checkel, Nicole Deitelhoff, Martha Finnemore and Katheryn Sikkink, Richard Price, Elvira Rosert, and Alexander Wendt. Continuous feedback from my primary supervisor Jason Sharman and secondary supervisors Aaron Rapport and Ayse Zarakol have also been important influences on my work.

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Chapter One

Empirical Literature Review

The prevailing image portrays the United Nations as an arena mirroring the exogenous forces of international politics. This image is wrong only in the sense that it is incomplete. There is much more to be learned about the U.N.'s role in the world community, but significant progress seems unlikely until we recognize the implications of narrowly framed research questions and redefine our conceptual vantage points accordingly (Dixon 1981, 59).

Chapter Outline

This empirical literature review takes stock of what international relations scholars have said about the empirical patterns of interaction that characterize diplomacy at the General Assembly. I contend that the main empirical research focus has been on interstate, bloc politics: namely, on political or otherwise allegiance formations that take shape across issue areas. Much of the empirical literature assumes that certain allegiance formations are the main feature of diplomacy in a global, multilateral context. To advance this critique, I proceed as follows. I first encapsulate what I mean by block politics at the United Nations. Second, I then overview how this empirical research emphasis finds expression in the literature across its historical trajectory. That trajectory corresponds although is not limited to three main clusters, which draw attention to the following interstate, bloc formations: (i) East versus West, (ii) North versus South and (iii) the United States versus the rest of the world. A fourth empirical research cluster relates to a more specific empirical focus on the cohesion of members states of certain intergovernmental organizations. These clusters are my own way to identify themes in the literature and are not absolute generalizations.

I finally draw out implications from the literature for this research project. My point is that an empirical research focus on interstate, bloc politics is only wrong in the sense that it is incomplete (Dixon 1981). Despite its fecundity, the prevailing research focus in the field comes at the expense of an overall perspective on interstate socialization—which, can follow from interstate social pressure that transcends bloc politics. Hence states can also see themselves as belonging to a more universal interstate community that shapes how they relate to each other and to common issues.

Block Politics in a Nutshell

Much of what has been said about the empirical patterns of interaction that characterize diplomacy at the General Assembly has been drawn towards accounts on bloc politics. The main idea is that political and/or otherwise alliance formations take shape among states to various degrees, often regardless of the issue area. Hence there has been substantial descriptive analysis on notions of “camps”, “caucuses”, “cleavages”, “clubs”, and the like (Alker 1964; Ball 1951; Bueno de Mesquita 1975; *et al.*). Thomas Hovet’s *Bloc Voting at the United Nations* is among the earliest, most extensive such accounts and encapsulates the broad research focus. For Hovet, bloc politics predominate interstate politics at the General Assembly (Hovet 1960, 29). He defines

a “bloc” as a “group of states, which meets regularly in caucus... and the members of which are bound by the caucus decision” (Hovet 1960, 30). Hovet also distinguishes a bloc from regional groups, interest groups and caucusing groups—each of which relates to the cohesiveness or formal nature of a particular political or otherwise allegiance formation (Hovet 1960, 29-46). The work proceeds to make an empirical case for various such formations, and also offers a suggestion as to how they form. For Hovet, for example, a state’s membership in a certain bloc can develop out of necessity. It provides “an opportunity to create a combined voting power which can be a critical factor in negotiating with other groups” (Hovet 1960, 114). States thereby keep step with a particular alliance formation to hedge against or somehow counteract others.

Themes

The first empirical theme centers around a concern for an East vs. West, interstate pattern of bloc politics (Alker 1964; Gareau 1971; Rai 1971; *et al.*). Some scholars, among other things, draw attention to the formation of “Soviet” and “Western” blocs that counteract each other across issue-areas. Hayward Alker’s *Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly* is an early example. The work makes the case that East-West cleavages “dominate most issues before the United Nations, with the exception of budgetary concerns” (Alker 1964, 647). It avers that the cleavage constitutes some sixty-four percent of all “explainable” interstate alignments, and underscores how it takes shape across a host of issues (Alker 1964, 647; 657; 650). The work also goes on to suggest a “two-way process of interdependence”, whereby certain trade, foreign aid, and/or military relationships—that is, with either the United States or Soviet Union—serve as a bellwether of where states stand in relation to the two blocs (Alker 1964, 654-655). Alker contends, for example, that Soviet foreign aid was at the time “strongly related to East-West voting alignments in the United Nations” (Alker 1964, 656). And the author points to “buying votes” and/or “rewarding friendship” as potential reasons for the outcome (Alker 1964, 655). Hence the work can speak to one main empirical research cluster that draws attention to an interstate, East-West bloc formation. A comparable, more recent variation of this empirical focus comes from Martin Mosler and Niklas Potrofake, who examine the “voting behavior of Western allied countries in line with the United States over the period 1949 until 2019” (Mosler and Potrofake 2020, 481).

Another main research cluster comes from an empirical emphasis on a North-South, developing-developed world interstate cleavage at the General Assembly. This cluster suggests that interstate, bloc politics are not necessarily limited to a Cold War context. Instead some scholars point to the growing collective strength of “Third World” states—especially in the context of decolonization—as pushing the development of new alliance formations (Lida 1988; Kim and Russett 1996; Seabra and Sanches 2018; *et al.*). As Soo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett write, “the East-West division no longer prevails in General Assembly deliberations; a North-South cleavage has superseded cold war alignments, giving rise to state preferences defined along developmental lines” (Kim and Russett 1996, 629). The idea is that this alignment, as Pedro Seabra and Rodrigues Sanches write, is “deeply rooted in a strong sense of common solidarity over global governance, economic and development issues...often against Northern-led conceptualizations of the international order” (Seabra and Sanches 2018, 586).

Keisuke Lida's *Third World Solidarity: The Group of 77 in the UN General Assembly* is an example of this research focus. That work, in a more explicit neorealist tradition, puts emphasis on the distribution of material capabilities among units as a "binding constraint on the foreign policy of nation-states" (Lida 1988, 379). That material constraint, for Keisuke Lida, leads to at the following perspective:

Nation-states, which are most concerned with self-preservation, are expected to ally with the weaker side to prevent the stronger side from dominating them. While it is slightly different from alliance behavior because it is not concerned with self preservation, a similar logic may be extended to solidarity. Economically weak states are threatened by strong states economic domination. They try to cooperate with other weak states to protect themselves from domination. Thus, the weaker they are, the more united they will be (Lida 1988, 379).

Lida makes two more specific points. On one hand, "when Third World states feel that they are losing power, they step up their efforts to coordinate their policy positions so that they will increase their bargaining power" (Lida 1988, 394). On the other hand, "when their power is growing, they have less need for presenting a unified front" (Lida 1988, 394). In whichever case, Keisuke Lida's work speaks to the broader research emphasis on bloc politics. States keep rank or maintain "solidarity" with a particular alliance formation to hedge against or by some measure counteract others, culminating with an empirical emphasis on a North-South, developing-developed world interstate cleavage.

A third empirical research cluster suggests a cleavage involving the United States and the rest of the world. The empirical focus is on the reconfiguration of material power relations in international relations following the Cold War, particularly in the context of resistance to the United States (Datta 2009; Schaefer and Kim 2013a; 2013b; 2018; Voeten 2004; *et al.*). The basic idea, as Monti Datta suggests, is to explore "the impact of anti-Americanism within the United Nations, the General Assembly of which serves as the collective voice of its nearly 200 member-states" (Datta 2009, 4). "States seek to balance against the unipolar might of the United States—not in the traditional sense of using military buildups, war-fighting alliances, or transfers to military opponents—but through 'soft balancing', in which states leverage international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to counterbalance U.S. hegemony" (Datta 2009, 5).

Erik Voeten's *Resisting the Lonely Superpower: Responses of States in the United Nations to U.S. Dominance* is a noteworthy example. That work underscores a "unilateralist turn" in American foreign policy, with the United States altogether opposing multilateral engagement with the rest of the world. It also underscores what appears to be an interstate preference gap continuum, with the United States on one end and the rest of the world on the other. The work charges that "widespread foreign backing for the U.S. position on issues of global concern has become somewhat of a rarity over the course of the post-Cold War period" (Voeten 2004, 729). "The preference gap between the United States and the rest of the world widened considerably and at a constant rate between 1991 and 2001" (Voeten 2004, 747). Voeten adds,

The increase in the gap is not a phenomenon limited to states from particular parts of the world, and there is not much evidence that some states have chosen to bandwagon with the United States. It appears that U.S. hegemony has elicited almost universal resistance (Voeten 2004, 747).

Voeten attributes this preference gap in large part to “structural phenomena”, less affected by temporal variations in American foreign policy (Voeten 2004, 747). The point is that this work is similar to those referenced above in that it emphasizes the existence of a bloc-like cleavage between states, which takes shape across issue areas.

The previous paragraphs suggest three empirical research clusters for international relations literature on the General Assembly. What remains is a final cluster that has to do with a more specific empirical focus on the voting alignment of other groups of states. This research cluster includes a focus on the cohesion of members states of certain intergovernmental organizations such as BRICS (Dijkhuizen and Onderco 2019; Ferdinand 2014a; Hooijmaaijers and Keukeleire 2014; *et al.*), the European Union (Burmester and Jankowski 2014a; 2018; Luif 2003; Jin and Hosli 2013; *et al.*) and ASEAN (Burmester and Jankowski 2014b; Ferdinand 2014b). One key focus is on the extent to which member states of intergovernmental organizations like these “speak with one voice” at the General Assembly. An example is Bas Hooijmaaijers and Stephan Keukeleire’s work, which analyzes the “degree of voting cohesion among the BRICS in the General Assembly in general and in its various main committees in the period 2006-2014” (Hooijmaaijers and Keukeleire 2014, 389). The BRICS, the authors suggest, “found each other in their commitment to counter, according to them, the “unjust” Western-dominated multilateral world in which they are in general underrepresented” (Hooijmaaijers and Keukeleire 2014, 393). The point is that this work is similar to previously mentioned works in that it sets out to investigate the extent to which a certain bloc like formation exists among states across issue areas.

Implications

I have shown that much of what has been said about diplomacy at the General Assembly has been drawn towards accounts on bloc politics. The main idea has been that political and/or otherwise allegiance formations take shape among states to various degrees, often regardless of the issue area in question. This empirical research focus on interstate, bloc politics is incomplete. It assumes that certain bloc formations are the main feature of diplomacy in a global, multilateral context at the expense of an overall perspective on socialization. This is to say that it lacks attention to how states can find common cause on the issues in a manner that cuts across the bloc formations one may associate them with. This can entail the presence of some wider sense of interstate community, which can influence how states relate to each other and position themselves on common issues. Though this does not, to be sure, amount to a concern with some notion of harmony. It means, as we shall later see, attention to how states contend with each other to win support for certain issues in a manner that cuts across bloc politics.

This latter point on interstate socialization has some immediate traction in the pertinent empirical literature on the General Assembly. Steven Holloway and Rodney Tomlinson, for

example, emphasize that the end of the Cold War—and subsequent emergence of a new world order—has not only been about resisting the lonely superpower. The two authors draw attention to a marked turning-point in interstate relations, whereby certain bloc formations unravelled to make way for what some referred to as an overarching “spirit of accommodation” (Holloway and Tomlinson 1995, 252). That spirit of accommodation entails a “positive transformation... in substituting a policy of cooperation for that of confrontation”; it amounted to newfound concerns for “wide consensus”, “shared common interests”, “family of nations”, and the like (A/46/PV.1). The two authors then demonstrate the extent to which some concern for that spirit of accommodation finds expression across issue areas. Holloway and Tomlinson thus entertain the possibility for some notion of interstate socialization at the General Assembly. Other international relations scholars seem to have in some part moved in that direction. David Bearce and Stacy Bondanella have spoken to this perspective, with emphasis on overall interstate “interest convergence” in connection with the work of international organizations more broadly (Bearce and Bondanella 2007). Diana Panke and Samuel Brazys have more recently also in some part touched upon it via a notion of international “pull” factors, which in their most applicable sense refer to efforts to avoid interstate isolation (Panke 2014; Panke and Brazys 2017).

I also think that much of the literature above is incomplete because of its general emphasis on quantitative methods, which compartmentalizes how states see common issues to more water-tight “yes”, “no”, and “abstain” vote categories. This focus is unfortunate, since some then use these categories to definitively mark where states stand in relation to each other on those issues. Yet inferences drawn from those methods have limited value. They oversimplify how states relate to the issues by overlooking how delegations interpret and express their own positions, including in direct conversation with other delegations. Fastidious attention to and thorough analysis of these exchanges reveals that more is at stake, including intersubjective expectations that start with the common choice to converge around the given focal point of discussion in the first place. If this common “convergence” is any indication, then intersubjective expectations are central to how states see the issues, even for those states that seem to stand in opposition to each other as the juxtaposition of “yes” and “no” votes would indicate. As such, those latter states can share more in common than certain categorical distinctions allow and thereby invite commentary on the social construction of interstate relations. In short, the positions states express in conversation with each other are more meaningful than—and can therefore extend well beyond the confines of—select vote categories at the United Nations.

Chapter Two

Theoretical Literature Review

The world of international relations is not fixed like the natural world, a world which exists independently of human cognition. The international system... is still a system whose rules are made and reproduced by human practices. Only these intersubjective rules, and not some unchangeable truths deduced from human nature or from international anarchy, give meaning to international practices (Guzzini 2000, 155).

Chapter Outline

The previous chapter presented a critique of the long-standing empirical focus on bloc politics at the General Assembly. My point was that this empirical research focus is incomplete and comes at the expense of a more universal perspective on interstate socialization. States can also see themselves as belonging to a more universal interstate community that shapes how they relate to each other and position themselves on common issues. My interest in this interstate, inter subjective sense of community falls within the social constructivist research agenda, which has long drawn attention to the social construction of international relations. This theoretical review chapter thus encapsulates the most relevant social constructivist theoretical literature on socialization. I do so in four steps.

First, I start off by weighing the case for social constructivism in international relations, which follows from what neorealist scholars have said about “anarchy”. I briefly distance myself from neorealist theory in its emphasis on anarchy’s relatively homogenous causal effects on interstate interaction. In particular, I disagree with the notion that such anarchy necessarily exists, and exerts causal effects so strong as to incline states towards a relatively homogenous pattern of interaction characteristic of the security dilemma. I thus concur with social constructivist scholars who assert that states shape and are shaped by a world of international relations that can be but is not necessarily anarchical. I also concur that social structure shapes how states relate to each other and to common issues.

Secondly, I then review the most pertinent theoretical commentary on interstate socialization from the social constructivist research tradition in international relations. I see an important—but far from absolute—distinction between structure and agent centric perspectives. The former perspectives look at how social structure shapes how state actors interact with each other. The latter perspectives look at how state agents draw upon, modify and/or create social structure throughout the course of interaction with other states. The latter perspectives are more relevant to my empirical focus on the United Nations. Within these accounts, I see an important—though far from absolute—distinction between two more bodies of literature that both focus on how non-material and non-coercive factors can advance socialization. One body of literature attends more to the normative processes of norm construction and diffusion. A second body of literature tends to focus more on the strategic processes. I synthesize ideas from both bodies of literature and most most closely with the latter. Specifically, my empirical research and theoretical analysis most closely speaks to Ian Hurd’s account on the strategic use of the norms

of liberal internationalism, which “straddles the realms of strategic choice and of norms” (Hurd 2005, 497; 2008, 137-138). Hence constructivism and rational choice are complements to each other from this theoretical perspective (Hurd 2009, 13-14).

I then allude to the rich array of social constructivist commentary on theoretical factors that can contribute to socialization. And finally, I consider the main theoretical antagonist to social constructivist accounts on interstate socialization. The main antagonist relates to analysis on material resource inducement.

Anarchy in International Relations

The starting point for social constructivist perspectives on international relations develops in response to what neorealist scholars have said about anarchy, or the absence of a “government over governments” to regulate the relations between states (Claude 1971, 14; Mearsimer 1994, 10). The main assertion is that anarchy does not exert causal effects so strong so as to incline states towards relatively homogeneous patterns of interaction characteristic of the security dilemma. Alexander Wendt best states the case. “Anarchy *as such* is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic; anarchies only acquire structure as a function of what we put in them” (Wendt 1999, 249). Moreover there is “no such thing as a ‘logic of anarchy’” (Wendt 1999, 247). Nor is there necessarily anything “inevitable” in the status quo; the patterns of interstate interaction that neorealist scholars expect are endogenous, developing from within a course of interstate interaction (Hacking 1999, 6-7). Within that process, the ideational or “soft” elements of international relations become more relevant than those scholars allow, as a significant tradition of social constructivist literature suggests (Checkel 1998; Johnston 2001; Wendt 1999; *et al.*). The point is that “people act towards objects, including other actors, on the bases of the meanings that the objects have for them” (Wendt 1992, 396). Hence states develop and reinforce or reject common expectations in response to interaction with each other. This creates an interstate “social structure”, prescribing (or mediating) common norms of conduct. What common expectations prevail—concerning, for example, the survival imperative—then make up the patterns of state-to-state interaction that the above neorealist scholars suspect.

This is to say that states are embedded in a social environment that they shape and are shaped by. This social environment is then not all that “soft”, as some scholars suggest (Hurrell viii in Bull 1977; Waltz 1979, 126). It can develop in conjunction with “hard” experience and confront states with the horizon of possible activity—providing the medium through which states conceive of and orient themselves in relation to common issues. The interstate social structures that develop then are among numerous possible outcomes, as Alexander Wendt points out in his three “cultures of anarchy” (Wendt 1999, 251-312). A social consensus among states—and not the exogenous causal influence of anarchy—transmits and reproduces the patterns of interaction that ensue. Even states that aim to isolate themselves from certain socially preferred expectations must nevertheless live and even interact with the majority of states that do not (Hurd 2008, 187; 2011, 2-3). States cannot, as Darren Weinberg would suggest, take a “time-out” from the prevailing social context (Weinberg 30.1.18; 5.2.18). Hence a key distinction from neorealism is that actors (states or otherwise) can create and eventually alter (social) structure and the effects it

produces. In neorealist perspectives, states cannot—at least not until a world government emerges. Until then, anarchy and its causal effects remain inescapable, inclining states towards relatively homogeneous patterns of interaction. The neorealist perspective on interstate “socialization” is then not what it entails for social constructivists, as João Resende-Santos points out (Resende-Santos 2007, 84-85).

Social Constructivism and Socialization

What is the nature of interstate interaction according to social constructivists? The literature addresses this point in numerous ways, including with commentary on socialization (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Checkel 1998; 2005; *et al.*). Jeffrey Checkel provides a definition of socialization, which involves a “process of inducting actors in the norms and rules of a given community” in a manner that is “quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions” (Checkel 2005, 804). There are structure centric and agent centric perspectives on socialization. The former perspectives look at how social structure shapes how actors interact with each other. An example is Audie Klotz’s *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Klotz 1995). The latter perspectives look at how agents can proactively draw upon, modify and/or create social structure throughout the course of interaction with other actors. An example is Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change* (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The latter perspectives are more pertinent to this thesis’ empirical focus. There are at least two more specific bodies of literature within these perspectives. The first body of literature focuses more on the normative processes of norm construction and diffusion, while the latter body of literature tends to focus more on the strategic processes. I encapsulate three examples from each body of literature below. As we shall see, both bodies of literature emphasize how non-material and non-coercive factors advance a socialization process.

The most relevant theoretical starting point is Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s “norm cycle”. The now classic work charges that “norms do not appear out of thin air; they are actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 896). This begs the question as to how these norms develop and eventually congeal as social structure. The two authors point to a three-stage international norm cycle. The most relevant stage is the first stage, when norm entrepreneurs seek to convince an audience to support some cause. The dominant mechanism in this first stage is persuasion, which relates to “chang[ing] the utility functions of other players to reflect some new normative commitment” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 914). More broadly, “persuasion is the process by which agent action becomes social structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes the intersubjective” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 914). Finnemore and Sikkink contend that the process requires that socialization agents create an issue using common standards of “appropriateness” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897-901). The authors refer to this as “framing”, or as the “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897; Keck and Sikkink 1999, 90; MacAdam *et al.* 1996, 6). Importantly,

The construction of cognitive frames is an essential component of norm entrepreneurs' political strategies, since, when they are successful, the new frames resonate with broader public understandings and are adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding issues (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897).

Hence the point is that nesting issues within common notions of appropriateness can make them more congenial to a target audience. If norm entrepreneurs manage to persuade enough members of the audience, more and more members follow suit in what culminates with a "norm cascade". Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that a cascade can ensue for three main reasons, all of which relate to identities as members of an international society (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 902). These reasons are legitimation, conformity and esteem. For reference, Richard Price makes similar theoretical points with respect to his analysis on "grafting" (Price 1998).

A more recent constructivist account on socialization is Nicole Deitelhoff's analysis on "islands of persuasion". By islands of persuasion, Deitelhoff means "approximations of discourse in certain phases and between certain actors during negotiations" (Deitelhoff 2009, 45). The definition relates to Finnemore and Sikkink's point about framing: the idea is that agents can use norms to further the chances of persuasion (Deitelhoff 2009, 33). Referencing social constructivist literature, Deitelhoff advances the point in relation to non-governmental organizations:

Constructivist studies on normative change have repeatedly pointed out how NGOs frame issues within negotiations to make them resonate with ...a common frame of reference to which actors within negotiations can allude in evaluating arguments. Specifically, when broking rights and duties, as with ICC negotiations, only those norms that are in principle universally acceptable lay claim to validity (Deitelhoff 2009, 44-45).

Deitelhoff also suggests that non-governmental organizations working in concert with (small and medium size) like-minded states to frame issues increases the likelihood of persuasion (Deitelhoff 2009, 44). She makes the argument in relation negotiations on the International Criminal Court. Islands of persuasion "had an impact on the kind of arguments perceived as appropriate within negotiations: the more dominant the public interest frame became, the less support alternative frames attracted" (Deitelhoff 2009, 58-59). Effectiveness in the negotiations "did not entail special interests or responsibilities, but universal application based on equality and impartiality" (Deitelhoff 2009, 59). Importantly, "interests and attitudes changed within the [negotiation] process. This kind of change is captured by the concept of persuasion promoted by constructivists" (Deitelhoff 2009, 61). For reference, Nicole Deitelhoff makes similar point in a later work (Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012, 354-355).

A final, recent social constructivist account on socialization comes from Elvira Rosert's work on "norm emergence as agenda diffusion". Rosert's analysis offers more theoretical precision to the first phase of Finnemore and Sikkink's norm cycle. Similar to those two authors, Rosert asks the reader to contemplate a socialization process that begins with a "normatively undesirable condition": an agent "perceives a discrepancy between what the status quo is and what they think the status quo should be according to their values" (Rosert 2019, 1106; 1108).

Certain factors contribute to an agent's decision to publicize the issue, with the aim of leveraging social influence on the norm addressees and mobilizing public support for the cause (Rosert 2019, 1108). Rosert refers to this activity as "issue creation" in stage two—which, as Finnemore and Sikkink, as well as Deitelhoff would concur—involves that an agent frame an issue (Rosert 2019, 1108-9). To be effective, framing requires issue centric and actor centric strategies. The issue centric strategies require that an agent specify, categorize and emotionalize the issue (Rosert 2019, 1109). Rosert also contemplates actor-centric strategies, which includes reference to social influence. By social influence, Rosert means "public exposure and criticism of the problem-causing behavior" (Rosert 2019, 1109). Stage three, "candidate norm creation", is a final relevant component to Elvira Rosert's work. It refers to when the respective issue appears on the "institutional-deliberative agenda" (Rosert 2019, 1109). A more unique theoretical point—which, diverges from Finnemore and Sikkink—is that "public mobilization and social pressure... might be counterproductive" (Rosert 2019, 1109-1110). Echoing Nicole Deitelhoff, Rosert suggests that "coalition building" becomes essential (Rosert 2019, 1109-1110). Taken together, these efforts contribute to socialization.

Elvira Rosert and the previous scholars' perspectives are key social constructivist accounts on socialization, which attend more to the normative processes of norm construction and diffusion. A second body of literature tends to focus more on the strategic processes. As we shall see, agents strategically manipulate norms to pressure an audience into support for a cause. Importantly, as Frank Schimmelfennig writes, socialization agents "are not interested, per se, in changing the beliefs of their opponents and audience but primarily seek to induce cooperative or compliant behavior through the use of persuasion (Schimmelfennig 2003, 206). "Rhetorical actors are satisfied if the audience and opponents stop opposing their claims (whether or not they are really convinced) and behave accordingly (that is, as *if* they genuinely believed in their truth or rightness)" (Schimmelfennig 2003, 206). Thus socialization subjects respond to rhetorical action primarily due to socio-strategic and/or socially mediated normative concerns. In short, socialization subjects "calculate the consequences of norm conformance rather than reflecting on its appropriateness" (Schimmelfennig 2005, 34). Socialization efforts accordingly culminate with public acquiescence, not necessarily private internalization. The focus remains on how non-material and non-coercive factors advance a socialization process.

A starting point for this latter body of literature is Ian Hurd's "strategic manipulation of liberal institutionalism" (Hurd 2005; 2008, 137-170). Hurd makes the case that strategically manipulating common norms can initiate socialization. Hence Hurd avers that "resistance works best when presented in terms borrowed from the language of the authority, and where the point is ... to argue that the existing authority is not being true to its professed values" (Hurd 2005, 502-503). Though unlike authors from the previous subsection, Hurd asserts that common expectations are always "under construction" (Hurd 2002, 45-47; 2005, 502; 2008, 137-138; 2014, 8-9). This "construction" is never complete in the sense that "all the relevant actors accept the construction, or accept it in the same way, or that it is self-perpetuating" (Hurd 2005, 502). Thus Hurd asserts that "constructivists have often overstated the consensus that exists over norms" (Hurd 2005, 501). This incompleteness can create what Johnstone, Elster, and Risse call

a “discursive opening” for states to manipulate norms to their own advantage (Elster 2007, 406; Johnstone 2003, 454; Risse 2000, 22).

In Hurd’s words, “opponents of the status quo can use the natural incompleteness of authority to undermine the existing power relations in the system” (Hurd 2005, 502). “That an institution is a process that is never complete means there is “enabling power” for subordinate actors to intervene in the process and to shape the course of the reproduction of the institution” (Hurd 2008, 166). Hurd demonstrates the point in relation to Libya’s response to the Security Council’s sanctions, which was to leverage norms of liberal internationalism to galvanize interstate support against the sanctions. In particular, Libya presented an “alternative image between the sanctions regime and the international community, one which Libya appeared as the defender of liberal internationalism and the United States and United Kingdom “outliers” (Hurd 2005, 509). These efforts encouraged—or even “emboldened”—some third states to support Libya’s position (Hurd 2002, 46; 2005, 519). This threatened to undermine the Security Council’s legitimacy as a whole, and accordingly pressured the United States and United Kingdom to abandon the sanctions regime (Hurd 2005, 520-521; 2008, 163).

Margarita Petrova presents a more recent social constructivist perspective. Petrova looks at the United Kingdom’s change in position on the cluster munitions ban, which began with acting as spoiler to becoming a champion of the treaty. She contends that British diplomats found themselves “rhetorically entrapped as well as enticed into participating in and eventually claiming ownership of the process” (Petrova 2016, 60). Petrova attributes the change in position to two factors. The first factor relates to small states and non-governmental organizations strategically structuring negotiations to disadvantage opponents. It involves that socialization agents set the agenda of negotiations, focusing on aspects they favor and excluding their opponent's viewpoint (Petrova 2016, 389). This first factor in part speaks to the Hurd’s commentary on the strategic manipulation of international norms:

In their early work, NGOs had demonstrated the severe civilian impact of cluster munitions and thus helped define the humanitarian imperative of negotiations. NGOs drew the analogy between unexploded submunitions and the already banned landmines, thus increasing the resonance of the advocated prohibition by “grafting” it on the prior landmine stigmatization. The humanitarian imperative became the avowed motivation for participation in the negotiations. Importantly, it also established the common normative framework and the range of arguments regarded as legitimate in the negotiations (Petrova 2016, 392).

The second factor in Petrova’s analysis relates to NGOs “shaming and praising” to define desirable policy (Petrova 2016, 387). Those efforts involve altercasting and rhetorical entrapment. Altercasting can have positive or negative connotations. The idea is that agents cast a certain position as characteristic of a particular role relationship in a community, creating a social incentive or disincentive for others to accept the norm (Petrova 2016, 390). These efforts can in turn induce rhetorical entrapment (Petrova 2016, 390). “Although values matter...actors often adopt new positions not because they are sincerely convinced of their merits, but because they lack ‘socially sustainable’ counterarguments” (Petrova 2016, 387).

A final pertinent perspective comes from Giovanni Mantilla's "forum isolation", which is contingent upon the formation of majority (or supermajority) coalitions in interstate negotiations (Mantilla 2018, 329). Mantilla's perspective resonates especially with Ian Hurd in its emphasis on political contestation as a vehicle for interstate agreement. Specifically, Mantilla sets out a realist-constructivist model of international humanitarian lawmaking, "fleshing out the claim that "unresolved contestation and social conflict (Hakimi, 2017a; Wiener, 2014) can act as productive engines of international agreement..." (Mantilla 2020a, 4). The argument zeroes in on the "diplomatic struggle" that majoritarian interstate coalitions can engage in to get other states to support a cause (Mantilla 2020a, 6). These majoritarian coalitions isolate other states and "exert powerful social opprobrium pressures that compel outcast state delegates to shift their public positions and otherwise acquiesced to otherwise undesired agreements" (Mantilla 2018, 319). "Importantly, forum isolation elicits not a change in preferences but a socio-strategic reaction on the part of the 'concerned' actors who devise covert ways to salvage their self-interest and save face" (Mantilla 2018, 329). Mantilla refers to this latter strategic reaction as "leadership capture", which entails that the target states not just acquiesce but also take the lead in support for the particular cause to salvage their interest (Mantilla 2020a, 6; 35). This latter point seems to resonate especially with Petrova's point about the United Kingdom eventually assuming a leadership role in the negotiations on the cluster munitions ban. Empirically, Mantilla demonstrates the argument with respect to the development of rules of international humanitarian law (Mantilla 2018; 2019; 2020).

For reference, Frank Schimmelfennig's 2001, 2003 and 2005 works as well as Ronald Krebs and Patrick Jackson's 2007 work are also especially relevant to this second class of literature that tends to focus more on the strategic processes of norm construction and diffusion. These works are important to this thesis and receive much attention in my theoretical argument chapter. For now, I acknowledge an additional body of literature on stigma management in norm construction and diffusion (Adler-Nissen 2014; Zarakol 2010; 2014; *et al.*). Although important, I have not found this work especially relevant to my empirical studies.

What Makes Socialization Work?

The previous subsection encapsulated the most relevant perspectives on interstate socialization. An overall theme has been on how agents draw upon norms to initiate socialization, and how non-material and non-coercive factors advance the process. The question remains as to what contributes to the success of socialization efforts. International relations literature addresses the point in at least three ways. The first relates to the issue that underlies socialization. Some scholars like Elizabeth Hooghe suggest that socialization is more likely given some "large and diffuse" issue-area and when the material stakes are low or non-existent (Hooghe 2005, 871). The latter point relates to an assumption that rational choice models tend to prevail in more immediate situations. The former point assumes that rational choice prevails where perceived material consequences follow. Other scholars seem to be at odds with Elizabeth Hooghe's perspective, at least as it relates to an issue's specific content. For Jeffrey Egro, for example, those details seem more important. He addresses those details, and implies three specific criteria that can make certain issue-areas (in particular, norms) more amenable to

socialization than others. These are specificity, durability and concordance (Legro 1997, 34-35). Specificity refers to how clear the particular expectations are to the target audience. Durability refers to how long those expectations have been around. And concordance refers to how widespread an acceptance the expectations in question enjoy. All in all, the more specific, durable and widely endorsed the given expectations, the stronger a socializing influence they can have.

More recent social constructivist works further address the point about issues that are more amenable to socialization. Nicole Deitelhoff and Linda Wallbott suggest that issues that are regulative in nature and easily lend themselves to moral argument are more amenable to positive agreement (Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012, 363). “To put it bluntly, while it might be perceived as appropriate to engage in hard-nosed bargaining on the amount of GHG emissions, it would provoke outrage to start bargaining on the number of deaths required to talk of genocide” (Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012, 364). Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann make a distinction between contestation over a norm’s application and contestation over a norm’s validity (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2020, 51). The two argue that “if the core of a norm is increasingly questioned, noncompliance is likely to spread and go unquestioned, leading—over time—to weakening of norm robustness” (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2020, 52). Contestation over a norm’s application, by contrast, “can strengthen a norm’s robustness, since they give rise to learning processes among addresses regarding the claims that a norm makes and the meaning of these claims” (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2020, 70).

Other international relations scholars delve into more detail as to an issue’s specific content and the extent to which it may prove amenable to socialization. Erik Goodman and Rodney Jinks are an excellent reference. They indicate three factors, based on significant empirical findings elsewhere, that influence the extent to which an issue can evoke the frames Finnemore and Sikkink suspect (Goodman and Jinks 2004; 2013). The first relates to “centrality”, or how central the ideas in question are to the target audience. The second concerns “experiential commensurability”, or the extent to which those ideas are commensurate with the audience’s own experiences. And the third concerns “narrative fidelity”, or the extent to which the ideas comport with those already present in the audience’s social context. Furthermore, within this framing process, the two authors suggest that successful persuasion can also result from “cuing”: that is, from certain agents providing others with new information with which to contemplate in relation to the issue. In particular, they suggest that cuing works best within “highly institutionalized social environments wherein new information is routinely and systematically linked to broadly shared attitudes” (Goodman and Jinks 2004, 637). Cuing can also work best, the two authors suggest, if it comes from some authoritative, perhaps even educational source.

A third strand literature that addresses what makes socialization more likely comes from commentary on the duration and intensity of the process. Jeffrey Checkel, for example, suggests that socialization is more likely under two concomitant conditions (Checkel 2005, 810-811). First, agents are in a setting where contact is long and sustained. Second, agents are in a setting where the contact is intense. Jan Beyers also suggests that the two conditions must work hand-in-

hand, since “duration as a variable does not say much about the quality of involvement or the social mechanism that leads to socialization” (Beyers 2005, 210). Thus Beyers contends that time-demanding (or intense) and long-lasting (or dense) interaction are key contributing factors to watch out for (Beyers 2005, 210). In this vein, Ian Johnston suggests that persuasion is more likely to take route “when the actor is exposed to counter-attitudinal information repeatedly over time” (Johnston 2001, 499).

A Theoretical Alternative: Material Resource Inducement

The previous subsections encapsulated the most relevant perspectives on interstate socialization. An overall theme has been on how agents draw upon norms to initiate socialization, and how non-material and non-coercive factors advance the process. The chapter then considered literature on what can make socialization work. What remains is a consideration of the main theoretical counter-point to the above perspectives. This comes from materialist accounts on socialization, which emphasize how agents deploy certain material (rather than ideational) resources to initiate a socialization.

Research on material coercion and interstate socialization dates back to at least the English School’s concern with the expansion of European International Society (Bull 1977; Bull and Watson 1984; Buzan 2001; *et al.*). According to those accounts, acceptance of a certain “standard of civilization” (like certain norms on cooperation in international relations) served as the price of admission to that society. As some scholars comment, some states achieved this via material coercion—including with resort to a threat or use of physical violence—throughout the age of imperialism (Bull and Watson 1984, 118; Suzuki 2004, 142-146). Shogo Suzuki, for example, emphasizes the “coercive conditions” under which certain European states incorporated Japan into the international society; according to Suzuki, Japan was “coerced into signing unequal treaties and stripped of its sovereign prerogatives” (Suzuki 2005, 149). Attempts to resist were “often met by military retaliation, and the Japanese were made painfully aware of... their inability to counter the ‘foreign’ threat” (Suzuki 2005, 149). In light of these immediate material circumstances, Japan like other non-European states acquiesced to the expectations in question, contributing to a wider process of socialization at the time.

John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan further explicate this theoretical point on material resources as inducements to socialization. For Ikenberry and Kupchan, socialization can occur when hegemons manipulate material incentives to coerce smaller states to change policies (Ikenberry and Kaplan 1990, 290). After smaller states adjust their policies, socialization takes route when ruling elites in those small states acquiesce and gradually embrace the hegemons’ policies as indeed rightful (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 290). This is to say that when socialization does occur, it comes about primarily as a consequence of the coercive exercise of power and not before it (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 284). The two authors suggest three factors that make this notion of socialization more likely (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 292-294). First, the hegemonic state must seek to recast the international order in a way that is more compatible with its interests. Second, domestic conditions in the subject states must make ruling elites receptive to the importation of ideas. And third, ruling elites in small states must be

driven to embrace ideas articulated by the hegemon for materially instrumental reasons. Whatever the factor, Ikenberry and Kupchan's point is that material inducement triggers socialization, although that subsequent socialization process is not necessarily explicable in terms of those material inducements (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 284). A comparable, more recent perspective comes from Jeffrey Lantis, who characterizes norms as "interdependent with great power norm stewardship, subject to bounded manipulation and refinement by actors that have sufficient material power" (Lantis 2016, 387).

There is at least one more relevant strand of literature in addition to the scholarly accounts above. This literature comes from accounts on material side-payments or "gift exchanges", which states provide or receive as compensation for adopting certain policy positions in connection with some multilateral context (Lundborg 1998). Some international relations scholars have drawn attention to positive and/or negative incentives that relate to World Bank projects, IMF loans, foreign aid, and other forms of material resource inducements (Adhikari 2019a; 2019b; Dreher and Strum 2012; Woo and Chung 2017; *et al.*). Other scholars consider the extent to which a state's foreign aid can influence the support it gains from other states on issues at the General Assembly. The main focus has been on China (Abudula 2018; Stüver 2016; Xun and Shuai 2018) and the United States (Carter and Stone 2015; Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2008; Woo and Chung 2017; *et al.*). An example of the latter is David Carter and Randal Stone's work, which considers the effectiveness of a some three decades old United States legal stipulation to link foreign aid with how states vote on certain issues at the United Nations. The two authors make the case that democracies are more likely to comply with United States voting preferences than autocracies, because the United States is more likely to deliver on promises to manipulate aid if the target country is a democracy (Carter and Stone 2015, 29-30). A more recent focus on the United States includes Anastassia Obydenkova and Vinicius Rodrigues Viera's work, which considers the extent to which American-sponsored regional development banks influence the views of developing states (Obydenkova and Viera 2020). The authors suggest that "the higher the material capabilities of a borrowing state that takes loans, the less likely it is to align with the United States at the UN General Assembly (UNGA)" (Obydenkova and Viera 2020, 130).

Conclusion

Where do I stand on the literature? The perspectives on socialization are most relevant for my purposes. In particular, my thesis most closely speaks to Ian Hurd's analysis on the strategic manipulation of the norms of liberal internationalism. This makes sense empirically and theoretically. Empirically, my focus is on *interstate* socialization in connection with proceedings at the United Nations. This entails a focus on how states contest over norms that relate especially to that empirical context. The norms include the content of the Charter, as well as the more universal propositions contained within the resolutions of various political bodies such as the General Assembly and Security Council. Giovanni Mantilla's empirical analysis is also close to my own empirical research focus. Less applicable is Mantilla's (and to an extent Margarita Petrova's) commentary on leadership capture, which seems to relate most to international lawmaking negotiations that entail legally binding obligations.

Theoretically, Hurd's analysis is most relevant because it "straddles the realms of strategic choice and of norms", suggesting that constructivism and rational choice are complements to each other rather than antagonists in international relations scholarship (Hurd 2005, 497; 2008, 137-138). This theoretical approach winnows out the claim that state agents manipulate common norms for socio-strategic reasons. State subjects respond to these efforts for "strategic" concerns, which have been constructed (or "constituted") by the particular social context. Hurd writes,

There is no reason that the study of international norms by constructivists is inherently mutually exclusive with the study of strategic behavior. The social construction of actors may well create instrumental, goal-seeking agents who pursue their goals in part by comparing costs and benefits, and their behavior cannot be understood apart from that process of construction. In other words, it is a mistake to separate the study of the logic of consequences from the logic of appropriateness (cf. March and Olsen 1998). The more strictly that separation is enforced, the less insightful is the empirical research that can result (Hurd 2009, 13-14).

Hence strategic manipulation of international norms can help cultivate an interstate social context that inclines a target audience towards support for a certain viewpoint. Support for the viewpoint becomes "strategic" in the sense that it entails certain interstate social ramifications, which can be "socially unsustainable" as Margarita Petrova puts it (Petrova 2016, 387).

This thesis' theoretical research focus is on how diplomatic pressure can operate as a consequence of a coalition of states' strategic manipulation of the norms of liberal internationalism. My interpretation of the literature is that diplomatic pressure can exert effects—especially "powerful social opprobrium pressures", as Giovanni Mantilla puts it—that nurture a socially mediated, normative commitment to the cause (Mantilla 2018, 319). Specifically, diplomatic pressure can exert a continuum of social effects: starting with more content-neutral, relational concerns for a need to conform and extending to more content-based, normative concerns for the issue's substance. The latter social effects overlap with and extend further than the former to produce deeper socialization effects. These socialization effects need not necessarily culminate in "internalization", meaning that norms "achieve a 'taken-for-granted' quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 904). Nor is it necessary that subjects "adopt new positions because they are sincerely convinced about their merits" (Petrova 2016, 387). Demonstrating these latter two points can anyways prove elusive—or "methodologically intractable", as Krebs and Jackson assert—because it requires "unmediated access to people's minds" (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 40; Petrova 2016, 388). The important point is that diplomatic pressure can give rise to socio-strategic as well as socially mediated normative concerns in the public embrace of an otherwise undesirable position. Thus interstate socialization takes place in the sense that public—and not necessarily private (or internalized)—views coalesce around a common, more "legitimate" interpretation of an issue.

Comparable theoretical perspectives come from numerous studies on socialization. Jeffrey Checkel emphasizes "growing empirical evidence to suggest that what starts as strategic, incentive-based cooperation within international institutions often leads at later points to

preference shifts...” (Checkel 2005, 814). Checkel cautions that it is more useful to view certain socialization mechanisms—particularly strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion—as “nominal rather than ordinal categories” (Checkel 2005, 814). Similarly Richard Price asserts that “in the generation of a new norm... the role of moral persuasion and the social pressure arising from identity politics and emulation are particularly crucial” (Price 1998, 616). Elvira Rosert more broadly asserts that:

...norm-setting processes are neither open-ended nor designed for mutual persuasion (Hanrieder, 2011: 403–404). Rather, they move towards a pre-established goal and rely on unidirectional persuasion with the norm entrepreneurs as the persuaders and the norm addressees as the persuadees. Moreover, the Oslo Process demonstrates that in contentious processes, arguing can be expected to increase and channel the support of norm-supporting addressees (and it did so in the Oslo Process) but social pressure and rhetorical entrapment are more promising in achieving at least the declaratory acceptance of norm-rejecting addressees (Rosert 2019, 1123).

Finally Ian Hurd suggests that the normative content of an issue can be central to interstate socialization, emphasizing that “those individuals who hold a genuine commitment to a symbol are often in a position of relative weakness next to others who do not but who are willing to manipulate them strategically” (Hurd 2008, 166). Moreover “there is greater freedom of action for the hypocrite than for the true believer” (Hurd 2008, 166). The important point is that the manipulation of norms in support of a cause can generate diplomatic pressure, which can in turn give rise to socio-strategic as well as socially mediated normative concerns in the acceptance of a new position. I revisit this point in the next chapter.

For now, what remains is a response to the main theoretical antagonist to the above agent centric, social constructivist (or realist-constructivist) perspectives on socialization. I acknowledge that material resource manipulation can also elicit support for certain issues especially in a global, multilateral context. More broadly, I also acknowledge that certain material, interstate relationships can influence where that support comes from. In my view, though, what ensues is not necessarily an “epiphenomenal” reflection of those same material resources. The reason is because those who resort to material resource manipulation seek to produce social effects in the end to adjust the *appearance* of interstate public support on a common issue. Thus Carter and Stone, for example, emphasize that “US policy is not buying votes to ensure or block passage of resolutions; rather, the United States is buying votes to appear less isolated and to purchase legitimacy on key foreign policy initiatives” (Carter and Stone 2015, 2). This makes theoretical sense. There would seem no need to buy out counterparts, mete out side payments, trade horses and the like if not to achieve some social objective in the end. The use of certain side payments then seems an exercise embedded within a social context that owes its particular form to the common interstate expectations that sustain it. This implies that the manipulation of those material resources is a more finite and thereby more costly, end-of-pipe measure to build a groundswell of support for an issue. Even for the most materially capable, such support seems out of reach absent the indispensable *non-material* support from other states. This returns the research focus back to the overall social environment that prevails among states, and consequently has some resort to more concealed, asocial measures to countervail its influence.

Noteworthy is that the social constructivist (and realist-constructivist) works above have their own responses to the material resource critique. Nicole Deitelhoff, for example, highlights a socialization process that takes place in a manner that is inexplicable in terms of material resource inducement. Deitelhoff contemplates “normative conditions conducive to persuasion”, which involve strategies “initiated by alliances between middle powers and non-state actors who lack sufficient leverage compared to the major powers” (Deitelhoff 2009, 35). Ian Hurd addresses the material resource critique in reference to Richard Haas’ policy brief on “sanctions fatigue”, which entails that “sanctions regimes have a natural tendency to erode and that the costs of maintaining an enforcing coalition increase” (Hurd 2008, 163). Hurd contends that “rising costs to maintaining the sanctions regime were indeed decisive in pushing the pro-sanctions states toward a compromise. But the nature of and change in these costs cannot be explained except with reference to Libya’s manipulations of international norms” (Hurd 2008, 163). Finally Giovanni Mantilla’s work “runs against the expectations of prominent realist and critical scholarship”, arguing that materially weaker states can have a meaningful influence on international rule-making processes against the wishes of more materially powerful states” (Mantilla 2020a, 8). Mantilla proceeds to suggest numerous empirical cases in which “major powers faced negative odds in multilateral settings and remained engaged without deploying exit options, coercive threats, or linkage strategies” (Mantilla 2020a, 10). Importantly, the eventual acceptance of a new position is a “grudging, socially pressured move” (Mantilla 2020b, 171).

Chapter Three

Theoretical Argument

People are guided to act in certain ways, and not others, on the basis of the projections, expectations, and memories derived from a multiple but ultimately limited repertoire of available social, public and cultural narratives (Somers 1994 in Neuman 2002, 636).

Chapter Outline

My research interest has been on how states can initiate a socialization process that cumulatively builds a consensus on an issue over time. I draw upon proceedings at the United Nations—especially, the General Assembly—as the locus for that interstate socialization in a global, multilateral context. This chapter posits a social constructivist argument for how a core coalition of states can cumulatively build a consensus on a select issue at the United Nations. By consensus, I mean an overwhelming public—and not necessarily private or internalized—level of agreement on an issue. This notion of consensus closely tracks but is distinct from procedural notions of consensus in diplomacy that require unanimity (Mantilla 15.10.2021, 2).

I draw upon literature from the previous chapter and most closely associate with Ian Hurd’s argument on the strategic manipulation of the norms of liberal internationalism (Hurd 2005; 2008). I also bring to bear a wealth of social constructivist scholarship on socialization to add theoretical granularity to the argument. My argument is that a core coalition of states can create a spotlight of diplomatic pressure that draws into focus an issue. That diplomatic pressure sets in motion a process of collective legitimization, which assumes a life of its own and creates common expectations that make support for a particular position “legitimate”. Over time, these expectations can incline other states—in particular, those opposing or otherwise “on the fence”—towards joining in on a common position, leading to a convergence in expectations in relation to the issue. Interstate socialization takes place in the sense that public—and not necessarily private—viewpoints converge around a common, more legitimate or “socially sustainable” stance on the issue.

The chapter has five main components, which unpack my overall theoretical argument. The first component conceptualizes my focus on a “core” interstate coalition as agents of socialization. My proposition is that such coalitions exist by virtue of a shared, initial extent of support for a position on an issue. The second component to this chapter comments on the proactive diplomatic efforts that a core coalition of states can undertake in an attempt to gain more interstate support for a cause. My point is that core states can do so by strategically manipulating normative rhetoric, which can bring diplomatic pressure to bear on a target audience. The third component of this chapter considers how these diplomatic efforts can initiate socialization. My assertion is that mobilizing diplomatic pressure gives rise to a process of collective legitimization, which can in turn incline a target interstate audience towards support for a cause.

I then proceed to a discussion of theoretical “conditioning factors”, which combine with my theoretical argument to contribute to interstate socialization (Tocci 2008a; 2008b; 6.11.2018). I posit that socialization efforts can be more successful when a state agent enjoys a sense of integrity on the issue. By contrast, socialization efforts are less influential when the target audience sees the socialization agents as hypocritical.

I finally consider limitations and caveats to my theoretical argument. These relate to what the extent to which a theoretical process of collective legitimization captures what happens in the “real world”, and how strong an influence it can wield in international relations.

The Core Coalition

My focus on a core coalition is a theoretical construct, which does not necessarily require a coalition’s formal formation. I take core coalitions to exist by virtue of a shared, initial extent of support for a stance on an issue. This is to say that a core interstate coalition takes shape by virtue of its initial convergence around support for a cause. This initial support for the cause can lead those states to fashion themselves as proactive representatives of the given position, and in turn conjure up expectations that at some level appeal to those of the wider community of states. A core coalition assumes this totemic role *ipso facto*, not necessarily thanks to some wider endorsement of their moral leadership on the issue. What matters is that the coalition nevertheless projects the views as such. This can put the coalition—in particular, its more fired up “spokespersons”—in position to mobilize diplomatic pressure in support of the position. Nicole Deitelhoff and Linda Wallbott make a similar point. With respect to the Alliance of Small Island States in climate negotiations, for example, the two scholars emphasize that:

...delegates of of AOSIS regarded themselves not just as partners or negotiating bodies, but also as the ‘moral voice’ and ‘the moral authority in negotiations’ in the negotiations. The AOSIS presented itself as an advocate of global public goods which was trying to push things forward in the long-term interests of the developed countries, future generations, and the ‘fate of the world’ (Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012, 358).

For further reference, numerous social constructivist scholars have emphasized the significance of coalitions—namely, among like-minded states as well as non-governmental organizations—in socialization processes (Deitelhoff 2009, 58; Price 1998, 623-627; Rosert 2019, 1109-1110; *et al.*). More recently, Giovanni Mantilla has emphasized the “protagonism” of interstate coalitions in the development of certain rules of international humanitarian law (Mantilla 2018, 2019; 2020a; 2020b). Note that Ian Hurd’s specific attention to Libya’s strategic manipulation of the norms of liberal internationalism is distinct from this theoretical and empirical focus on coalitions as agents of socialization (Hurd 2005; 2008).

Why core coalitions of states converge around support for a cause is beyond this project’s specific theoretical focus on how states can initiate a socialization process that cumulatively builds a consensus on an issue over time. Yet it is still important to emphasize that the formation of a core coalition is *not* necessarily contingent upon a like-minded, wholehearted commitment to upholding a norm as some social constructivist scholars suggest (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 896; Price 1998; 615, Rosert 2019, 1108-1110; *et al.*). From a social constructivist

perspective, there are numerous other theoretical reasons why the coalition can consist of some states and not others. One reason can relate to certain status and leadership aspirations (Mantilla 2020a; 2020b; Petrova 2016; 2019). Giovanni Mantilla, for example, comments that post-war international diplomacy led by states from the developing world “had clear and competitive status-seeking goals pursued through skillful coalition-making and vociferous public rhetoric” (Mantilla 2020b, 21). “Decolonization... was an international social and diplomatic struggle, as much as a set of ‘domestic’ wars of self-determination” (Mantilla 2020a, 23).

I find that a most relevant reason for a core coalition’s formation can relate to pre-existing interstate relationships in a given historical context. For example, a sense of “friendship” can make some states more supportive (or sympathetic) towards each other where at least one raises a public complaint on an issue. This is intuitive, as two or more “friends” seem more likely to understand—and thereby support—each other’s point of view than two or more “enemies”. In other words, in times of crisis two or more friends seem more likely to backstop each other than two or more rivals or enemies. This point relates to Alexander Wendt’s social theory of international politics, which makes a distinction between “enemies”, “rivals”, and “friends” as key determinants for how states interact with each other at particular points in time (Wendt 1992, 396-397; 1999, 246-308). For Wendt, these political cultures are not necessarily uniform across the interstate system; multiple interstate role relationships can exist at the same time such that “states act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends...” (Wendt 1992, 397). What political cultures prevail between states can in the first place shape how they relate to certain issues, especially if those issues are specific to—or even “attack”—a particular state. This implies a socio-strategic element to the composition of a core coalition, which may not necessarily form based on a response to a “normatively undesirable condition” *per se* (Rosert 2019, 1108).

A brief empirical example helps demonstrate the point. Recently, the United Kingdom brought a complaint to the United Nations about the use of chemical weapons in Salisbury (S/PV.8203; S/2018/218; S/PV.8224). According the Foreign Secretary, the effort was part of an attempt to “organize a response from the international community” (Johnson 2018). The United Kingdom castigated the attack, carried out an investigation, and suggested it was “highly likely” that Russia was responsible (S/2018/218, 2). The initial extent of support for that position came from some twenty other states, including from those that view the United Kingdom as part of an airtight “friendship” (Dewan, Veselinovic and Jordan 2018). They include the United States, which shared this observation with the Security Council:

We are here today to discuss the use of a chemical weapon by one Council member on the territory of another Council member. Let me make one thing clear from the very beginning — the United States stands in absolute solidarity with Great Britain... No two nations enjoy a stronger bond than that between the United States and the United Kingdom. Ours is truly a special relationship. When our friends in Great Britain face a challenge, the United States will always be there for them (S/PV.8203, 4).

Australia, Canada, Germany, and France shared similar sentiment (S/PV.8203; S/PV.8224; Nair and Heffer 2018). Other states—namely, those which did not see themselves as part of such a

friendship—by contrast took a more reticent position on the United Kingdom’s complaint. They include China, which was terse in its call for a “comprehensive, objective and impartial investigation based on the facts and in accordance with the relevant rules” (S/PV.8203, 7-8). It also included the likes of Bolivia, Kazakhstan and Iran. This is to say that how states view each other—whether as friends, enemies, rivals or otherwise—can also help “construct” how they view certain issues. In the present example, the United Kingdom’s initial, most enthusiastic supporters seem to have been those it calls “friends”. They constitute a core coalition by virtue of their initial, common position to bring the Russian Federation to book for the attack in Salisbury.

The Core Coalition and Rhetorical Action

My theoretical argument speaks to Thomas Risse’s point about “rhetorical action”, which is distinct from mutual socialization (Risse 2000, 9-10). The idea is that state agents do *not* engage in “truth-seeking with the aim of reaching a mutual understanding based on a reasoned consensus” (Risse 2000, 1-2). Agents are more or less inexorable, unprepared to change their own positions. They do not necessarily view each other as equals and strategically manipulate normative rhetoric to win over a wider audience to support a cause (Risse 2000, 9-10). Another notable rendition of the concept comes from Frank Schimmelfennig, who explicitly refers to rhetorical action as “the strategic use of norm-based arguments” to back up selfish goals and delegitimize opponents (Schimmelfennig 2001, 48). Similarly Margarita Petrova presents a case for “strategic arguing” (Petrova 2016). A more recent albeit implicit presentation of the concept comes from Giovanni Mantilla’s analysis on “frontal diplomatic struggle”, which involves “clear and competitive status-seeking goals pursued through skillful coalition-making and vociferous public rhetoric” (Mantilla 2020a 4; 21). The underlying theoretical observation is that political actors can “rarely take tangible steps or advance policy positions without justifying those stances and behavior—in short, without framing”:

Politics may entail coercion or distribution, but at the same time it involves the struggle over meanings. Meanings, however, cannot be imposed unilaterally or through the exercise of material power alone. They are, by their very nature, intersubjective (Laffey and Weldes, 1997), and the effort to forge shared meanings implicates some audience in the process (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 45).

How can socialization agents engage in rhetorical action that can cumulatively build a consensus on an issue over time? My argument emphasizes three basic steps, drawn from the previous chapter’s review of literature. The first step relates to the practical measures agents can take to “create” an issue. These measures entail that state agents expose an undesirable condition to the public to leverage its influence on the target audience (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897; Schimmelfennig 2001, 64; Rosert 2019, 1109-1109; *et al.*). At the United Nations, issue creation typically entails “information politics” that follow from an agent’s opposition to the status quo (Rosert 2019, 1108-1109). Common strategies include publicly expressing a complaint informally via remarks to the media and/or formally via an intervention in a political body. Information politics can also entail that a member state circulate a note verbale, request that a topic be included in the agenda of a regular meeting session, and/or present a draft resolution for other delegations to consider, cosponsor and eventually take action on. These efforts can

structure the conversation that ensues around the agent's viewpoint, and away from their opponent's viewpoint (Petrova 2016, 389). To be effective, information politics requires that socialization agents specify, categorize and emotionalize an issue to be effective (Rosert 2019, 1108-1109). Specifying an issue means "defining what the current and the desired situations are and pointing out the discrepancy between the two", as well as "identifying the scope and the causes of the problem and those actors responsible for developing and implementing the solutions" (Rosert 2019, 1109). Categorizing means "sorting the problem into a broader category of problems" (Rosert 2019, 1109). My empirical case study chapters allude to these two points on information politics by way of introduction.

Emotionalizing an issue means "pointing out the features of a problem that are expected to invoke the audience's feelings, for example, threats to moral values or bodily harm" (Rosert 2019, 1109). It more broadly speaks to literature on normative "framing", "grafting", and "nesting" (Price 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Deitelhoff 2009; *et al.*), as well as to literature on the strategic manipulation of international norms (Schimmelfennig 2001; 2003; Hurd 2005; 2008; Petrova 2016; *et al.*). This strategy is central to my theoretical argument and relates to a second step in a proactive socialization effort: "rhetorical action", which entails that an agent manipulate the "norms of liberal internationalism" to pressure an audience into support for a cause (Hurd 2005; 2008). Socialization agents do *not* have unlimited latitude to "fabricate" rhetoric. The general idea is that socialization agents must *appear* to exclude public appeals to private interests to be effective (Elster 2015, 403). John Elster writes,

In a public debate, a speaker who said, "We should do this because it is good for me" would not persuade anyone, and would, moreover, be subject to informal sanctions and ostracism that would make her less effective in the future. Even those who are motivated solely by interest are constrained by the public setting to present their policy proposals as motivated by more impartial values (Elster 2015, 403-404).

Similarly, socialization agents must also draw upon the "normative repertoires" present in their environment to be effective (Schimmelfennig 2003, 196). Ronald in Krebs and Patrick Jackson observe,

... speakers may not say just anything they would like in the public arena: rhetoric is not are not free to deploy utterly alien formulations in the course of contestation: such arguments would fall, almost literally, on deaf ears. The available space for rhetorical contestation is, therefore, locally bounded, and the parties to a contentious episode cannot introduce entirely novel arguments. They must configure their appeals utilizing rhetorical tools drawn from a chest that is, in the short term, effectively fixed (Swidler, 1986) (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 45).

At the United Nations, one specific way a coalition of states can engage in rhetorical action is via appeals to some "stamp of political approval or disapproval" with respect to a cause (Claude 1966, 372). Agents can do this by situating an issue within some previously agreed upon interstate normative framework such as the norms present in the Charter as well as the more universal propositions contained within resolutions of various political bodies at the United Nations. The aim is not to push the wholesale development of a new international norm but rather to claim ownership over "normative terrain", interjecting the cause within normative

parameters such that the two become seen as one and the same (Price 1998, 629). This can make the cause seem less strident (or “outrageous”) than it would otherwise be, and thereby more possible that the target audience countenance the issue in comparable normative terms (Price 1998, 629; Deitelhoff 2009, 44-45). Importantly, manipulating a normative frame can introduce a more palpable sense of legitimacy into the conversation because it strikes a chord with what other states have recognized as such. This projection of legitimacy is critical, since third states cannot “see” it save through “an assessment of whether the audience acknowledges it” (Finnemore 2009, 61-2; Hurd 2008, 31). If successful, rhetorical manipulation can thus tap into the social pressure that sustains these normative frameworks.

Socialization agents can amplify this social pressure by “cuing”. This is the third step in my theoretical argument. Rodney Goodman and Derek Jinks refer to cuing as a strategy that involves an agent prompting a target audience to “think harder” about the merits of a counter attitudinal message” (Goodman and Jinks 2013, 25). It is based on the assumption that the introduction of new information can prompt subjects to examine, defend and even change their beliefs (Johnston 2001, 496; Goodman and Jinks 2013, 25). Goodman and Jinks adduce numerous studies to substantiate the claim. Yet cuing can have normative as well as socio-strategic connotations. A socialization agent can also present new “information” to make the status quo appear increasingly at odds with common notions of legitimacy. Hence continuous informational cues can give the impression that more and more is at stake within the interstate social context of the time. Ian Hurd suggests a similar idea: Libya trumpeted new violations of the sanctions regime as evidence that the American and British position was increasingly “out of step with the [international] community” (Hurd 2005, 513; 2008, 154). Libya also made it a point to publicize its efforts as a “good international citizen” to further substantiate the point (Hurd 2005, 512; Hurd 2008, 153). At each indication, Libya’s rhetorical purpose was to make it seem as though it was increasingly supported by and in support of the “‘mainstream’ of international opinion” (Hurd 2005, 512; Hurd 2008, 153). Presenting these rhetorical “cues” continuously called the status quo into question, and prompted the target audience to consider its interstate social ramifications.

It is important to emphasize that the rhetorical action can be mendacious but nevertheless influential, as Ian Hurd suggests (Hurd 2005, 499). Similarly, “it does not matter whether actors believe what they say, whether they are motivated by crass material interests or sincere commitment”, as Ronald Krebs and Patrick Jackson argue (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 42). What matters is how the target audience responds to (or tolerates) certain normative claims, and the extent to which “mere rhetoric” can have the power to move governments into acceptance of otherwise undesirable foreign policy positions (Hurd 2008, 164). Thus rhetoric can affect “political outcomes even when all actors are cynical operators with little interest in genuine deliberation” (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 42).

The Core Coalition and Interstate Socialization

This chapter has so far conceptualized my point about a core coalition of states as agents of socialization. I then suggested practical measures socialization agents can take to “create” an

issue, as well as the normative rhetoric that they can manipulate in an attempt to eke out more interstate support for the cause. In this subsection, my assertion is that these diplomatic efforts can exert diplomatic (social) pressure upon the target interstate audience. This diplomatic pressure gives rise to a process of collective legitimization, which can in turn incline a target interstate audience towards support for a cause. For reference, social pressure refers to a “form of attempted, nonmaterial influence by some (source) actors upon other (target) actors, designed or tending to force the target’s hand (conduct) to accord with a social expectation”, as Giovanni Mantilla writes (Mantilla 2020b, 19).

My concern with diplomatic pressure is especially relevant to a specific empirical focus on diplomacy at the United Nations. Consider the following observation. In a recent seminar here at the University of Cambridge, John Baird—Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2011 to 2015—spoke to the nature of diplomacy in that context. In Baird’s view, “pressure to go along is so real in the United Nations. The pressure is so significant. There aren’t enough countries that base decisions on the force of conviction” (Baird 11.1.2018). Baird went on to caution against “moral relativism”, suggesting that “speaking truth to power” ought to be—but is often not—how states relate to common issues (Baird 11.1.2018). I agree. How the states in question see the issues in a global, multilateral context can be heavily influenced (or “constituted”) by the interstate social context of the time. What the Foreign Minister could also emphasize is that diplomatic pressure is not an “inevitable” feature of diplomacy. Pressure to go along to get along is an interstate social construct; state agents proactively construct and reinforce that environment in an effort to incline others towards support for a cause. That third states like Canada complain of feeling pressured to comport with a more common interstate position suggests evidence of those general social effects, which seem more pronounced in an institutional context such as the United Nations.

The operation of social pressure in global, multilateral diplomacy is contingent upon the assumption that:

... human beings are social or “community beings.” As community members, they seek social approval and respect from the other community members. In other words, they want to be recognized as legitimate. Conversely, they are sensitive to social disapproval and disrespect. They are concerned with their image and reputation in the community and do not want to be regarded as unreliable or illegitimate. If community member P is able to demonstrate that member O violates the community standard of legitimacy to which he subscribed, O will be induced to conform with the standard (Schimmelfennig 2003, 218).

More specifically, diplomatic pressure operates on the assumption that a state subject cares about its self-identity as a member of the international community and sees a need for collective approval by state counterparts at the United Nations (Claude 1966, 370; Hurd 2008, 164). Inis Claude was among the first international relations scholars to stress the significance of collective approval at the United Nations.

While statesmen [and stateswomen] have their own ways of justifying their foreign policies to themselves and their peoples, independently of external judgments, they are well aware that such unilateral determinations do not suffice. They are keenly conscious of the need for approval by as large and impressive a body of other states as may be

possible, for multilateral endorsement of their positions—in short, for collective legitimization. Moreover, it is a political judgment by their fellow practitioners of international politics that they primarily seek, not a legal judgment rendered by an international judicial organ (Claude 1966, 370).

Numerous international relations scholars have echoed the point (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 903; Schimmelfennig 2001, 49; Hurd 2005, 501; 2008, 138; *et al.*). Notably Frank Schimmelfennig has made the case that “in an ‘institutional environment’... political actors are concerned about their reputation as members and about the legitimacy of their preferences and behavior” (Schimmelfennig 2001, 49). Recently, Giovanni Mantilla has made an important assertion that “social pressure operates upon state diplomats because it taps on to key status anxieties at a particular historical moments...” (Mantilla 2020b, 11). My point is that on some level, states subscribe to common norms by virtue of their membership at the United Nations as *member* states. These norms (or “symbols” more broadly) reflect a sense of community and can inculcate a “currency of power because enough individuals believe that others believe in them” (Hurd 2002, 37). Thus associating or disassociating with the community’s common norms can have “powerful” interstate social ramifications.

More importantly, manipulating common norms via rhetorical action can exert diplomatic pressure on third states—especially those otherwise “on the fence”—that inclines them towards support for an issue. Diplomatic pressure stems from the “revelation of a broken social expectation”, as Giovanni Mantilla writes (Mantilla 2020b, 19). The revelation of a broken common expectation can entail significant social consequences—such as casting certain discourses and/or behaviors as “illegitimate”—that bespatter a subject’s integrity vis-vis other states (Mantilla 2020b, 20). Moreover, diplomatic pressure can accumulate and become more pronounced as other states with lower subjective thresholds (or “tipping points”) for a policy change join in opposition to the status quo. These latter states can include those that may have been more sympathetic to the cause from the outset, as well as those that support it for other reasons. Ian Hurd makes a similar point, suggesting that Libya’s strategic manipulation of international norms gave certain states the legitimate “tools” (or arguments) that “emboldened” them to change course on the international sanctions regime (Hurd 2008, 163). These initial changes came from states with strong reasons to oppose the regime from the start, but refrained from doing in view of potential damage to their relationships with the pro sanctions states (Hurd 2008, 163). As such, Libya’s cumulative efforts in the end increased the diplomatic pressure on the pro sanctions states to abandon the regime. This is to say that a socialization agent’s efforts can amplify social anxieties over time, which increase the pressure on an audience to comport with a certain common expectation. Margarita Petrova suggests that social pressure of this nature can have especially strong effects when about 50 percent of all states change positions, which can in turn amplify social anxieties about remaining an outlier (Petrova 2019, 591).

In response to these social anxieties, many states will seek to at least avoid the appearance of challenging or being insouciant to the given common expectation. “States indifferent to or adversely affected by the norm are more likely to accept it gradually to avoid being left behind than to rush in cascade-like” (Petrova 2019, 591). This can entail that a state reaffirms the value in the common expectation, even where that same state is suspected to have

implicitly or explicitly undermined it (Weinberg 30.1.18; 5.2.18). Thus prior public commitment to the expectation “locks in” a state subject in the process of argumentative exchanges and scrutiny from other state interlocutors; a subject cannot argue against the already accepted expectation without losing face (Petrova 2016, 387). Interstate socialization takes place in the sense that public—and not necessarily private—viewpoints converge around a common, more legitimate (or “socially sustainable”) stance on the issue (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 47; Petrova 2016, 387). The outcome reflects a social compromise rather than a “reasoned consensus” or a fundamental readjustment in preferences (Mantilla 2020b, 27-28; Petrova 2016, 388). Socialization subjects do not necessarily take to heart and change their own internal views on the issue; at a minimum, they eschew public association with what has become an “illegitimate” or socially unsustainable position (Schimmelfennig 2001, 65). Socialization subjects may very well acquiesce publicly to the position even as they maintain opposing views privately (Mantilla 2020b, 12). This means that a socialization agent’s argument:

...‘wins’ not because its grounds are ‘valid’ in the sense of satisfying the demands of universal reason or because it accords with the audience’s prior normative commitments or material interests, but because its grounds are socially sustainable — because the audience deems certain rhetorical deployments acceptable and others impermissible (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 47).

Note that this theoretical assertion does not hinge on a distinction between a logic consequences and a logic of appropriateness, as the previous chapter suggests. The mobilization of diplomatic (social) pressure can exert a continuum of non-material and non-coercive effects that start with more content-neutral, relational concerns for a need to conform and extend to more content-based, normative concerns for the issue’s substance. The former effects have more to do with the preservation of a certain relationship with or “role” within a community than it does with a sense of conviction to the issue in question (Checkel 2005; Goodman and Jinks 2013; Johnston 2005). The latter social effects overlap with and extend further than the former. Pressure to conform remains relevant—with ostracism (or isolation) as its social sanction—but to the further extent that the state subject in question develops a sense of attachment to the issue in circulation. Whereas the former effects are more content-neutral, the latter effects churn up a more content-based perspective in support of the issue as “legitimate”. The associated social “sanction” then relates to disapprobation, with ostracism *and* a sense of shame for failure to uphold what resounds as “legitimate” within the community. In sum, diplomatic pressure can nurture socio-strategic as well as socially mediated normative concerns in the acceptance of an otherwise undesirable position. Hence socio-strategic and normative concerns complement each other (Hurd 2005, 497; 2008, 137-138; Hurd 2009, 13-14).

What Can Make the Theoretical Argument Work?

This subsection suggests theoretical “conditioning factors” that contribute to socialization. I borrow the term from Professor Nathalie Tocci (Tocci 2008a; 2008b; 6.11.2018). The previous theoretical review chapter suggested several factors that relate to an issue’s material stakes, an issue’s specific content and the intensity/duration of the issue’s consideration. I have not found empirical evidence in favor of or against these theoretical propositions in my

empirical research. Thus my theoretical proposition relates to a separate, more empirically relevant factor: a socialization agent's *perceived* integrity on an issue. By integrity, I mean a social constructivist (and not a rationalist) rendition of "reputation", which relates to the extent to which a socialization subject regards a socialization agent as a trustworthy advocate of a cause (Mantilla 15.10.2021, 3). I stress that my use of the concept is intersubjective. It calls into question to what degree a potential socialization subject views a socialization agent as meaning what they say—namely, as "talking the talk" and "walking the walk"—on the specific issue. Otherwise put, integrity entails that a target audience perceives an agent's rhetorical action as consistent: namely, that the agent's arguments and actions are seen to match, that the agent's arguments used in different times and in different contexts are seen to match, and that the agent's arguments are seen to internally match (Schimmelfennig 2003, 221).

The important point is that an agent's perceived integrity on an issue can make socialization efforts more or less influential. Specifically, socialization efforts are more likely to fail when proponents lack that integrity—and are therefore seen to be hypocritical—because the target states do not see a political downside to maintaining the issue's status quo. "A participant who is seen as choosing norms à carte, and discarding them whenever they work against him, will undermine himself in the long run" (Elster 1992 in Schimmelfennig 2003, 221). Furthermore, when an agent "fails to remain faithful to her 'initial projection'...she causes a 'disruptive event' likely to discredit her image and to lead to a breakdown of the interaction (Goffman 1959: 12)" (Schimmelfennig 2003, 197). "Some of the assumptions upon which the responses of the participants had been predicated become untenable, and the participants find themselves lodged in an interaction for which the situation has been wrongly defined and is now no longer defined" (Goffman 1956, 6). The underlying assumption is that a socialization agent's potential social influence—that is, vis a vis the target states—emanates from (an implicit or explicit) "credible threat" to win over a third state audience to support its own position on a select issue (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 47). Recall that the crux of that position is to manipulate common norms to mobilize public opposition to those who appear to have "broken social expectation" on the issue (Mantilla 2020b, 19). Socialization agents cannot effectively mobilize such opposition if they themselves appear to have broken that same expectation.

This theoretical proposition, to be clear, draws upon existing theory within constructivist literature on international relations. For reference, numerous other international relations scholars speak to the point (Checkel 2005, 813; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 901; Johnston 2001, 497; *et al.*). Ian Johnston, for example, emphasizes that "information from sources that are liked is more convincing than from sources that are disliked. Liking will increase with more exposure, contact and familiarity" (Johnston 2001, 901). Alexandra Gheciu similarly argues that NATO influenced states' acceptance of certain international codes of conduct "by virtue of the authority enjoyed *qua* the key security institution of the Western community" (Gheciu 2005, 980). That some states recognized NATO as a "legitimate normative guide" made certain reforms especially desirable (Gheciu 2005, 983). Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink apply the point to state agents, drawing attention to the influence that "critical states" can have to socialization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 901). The two argue that a state's "moral stature" on a particular

issue—like Nelson Mandela’s South Africa on the land mine treaty—can add social appeal to a cause. South Africa’s support was “very influential, especially with other states in Africa but also globally” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 901). Importantly, Nicole Deitelhoff and Linda Wallbott contend that the “success of coalitions might be a result of pure numbers, for example a maximized pooling of bargaining resources, but of their perceived legitimacy in the negotiation process...” (Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012, 349). And more recently, Margarita Petrova asserts that “who delivers the message may be more important than the message’s content” (Petrova 2016, 388-389).

In my view, one could also consider a socialization agent’s first-hand exposure to the status quo as another way to conceptualize the point about perceived integrity. A complaint that at least one state derives from its own, immediate national circumstances can seem more trustworthy than a complaint drawn from another’s immediate national context. The presence of at least one such state in a core coalition of states coalition can to an extent substantiate the sincerity of the complaint, and thereby lend more credence to an appeal to change the status quo. This suggests that the more third states see that state—whether individually or in coalition with other states—as adversely affected by the status quo the more credence a complaint can have.

Theoretical Limitations and Critiques

I suggest at least two theoretical limitations to this chapter’s argument. First, the chapter’s theoretical assertion about a process of collective legitimization is an ideal type that does not occur in pure form (Risse 2000, 3). The theoretical discussion above therefore is not an absolute account for what takes place. The social world is complex, with an “indefinitely large number of things about which observations can be made and an indefinitely large set of observations to make about them” (Schegeloff 1999, 578). What matters is the extent to which the above theory captures that complexity. My second theoretical limitation relates to how strong social structure operates in my theoretical argument. Social structure, to be clear, refers to the diplomatic pressure that a core coalition of states brings to bear on an issue (and ultimately culminates in a process of collective legitimization). The strength or weakness of that pressure refers to the extent to which it operates “over and above” interstate relations and shapes how they position themselves on the issues. In my view, diplomatic pressure is not determinative; it is at most socially influential. My theoretical focus on diplomatic pressure is at best a preliminary interpretation of circumstances, which may in the end lead to analysis paralysis or prove “too complex to theorize” in certain contexts (Bennett and Checkel 2012, 6). More importantly, my theoretical perspective is not that diplomatic pressure exerts as consequential an influence on states as the structure in neorealist theory (which, contemplates relatively homogeneous outcomes). Hence I do not anticipate that diplomatic pressure influences all states equally or even at all. I thus allow for more heterogeneous outcomes.

My argument hinges on the extent to which a state subject places a premium on its standing on a particular issue. Yet certain states may care more or less about the “consequences of public embarrassment to their self-image, status, and reputation” (Mantilla 2020b, 177). As Giovanni Mantilla writes, the former states are more “socially vulnerable” because they wish to

be seen as “‘good’ standing as members of the ‘international community’, particularly among social competition” (Mantilla 2020b, 177). On the other hand, diplomatic pressure can have no effect on states with little or no concern for how they are seen vis-a-vis other states on the particular issue. This second point alludes to states that maintain a certain position, despite the manifest interstate social repercussions that prevail. A state that does not care about those repercussions—in particular, as they relate to maintaining an intersubjective sense of legitimacy on the issue—is less likely to come around for that reason. Ambassador Nikki Haley’s recent observation demonstrates the point: “we are proud to buck the mob when it comes to the principles we believe in” (Haley 3.11.18).

This is to say the extent to which a state values its own legitimacy in the international community matters (Mantilla 2018, 331). If a state commonly adopts a “renegade attitude” towards international norms—for example, by boasting about its status as an outcast on an issue—it is less likely to be moved by diplomatic pressure and more likely to remain outside the ambit of what resounds as “legitimate” at a particular point in time (Mantilla 2018, 331). Thus a state subject’s renegade attitude towards the international community on an issue can enervate diplomatic pressure. Similarly, the absence of an audience whose general approval is sought by the state subject can also render diplomatic pressure inefficacious (Petrova 14.10.2021, 3). For reference, Ian Hurd makes a similar point (Hurd 2008, 166).

Diplomatic pressure can also weigh down on state subjects but nevertheless not lead them towards support for a policy change due to other priorities. This outcome speaks to states that are inclined to support the given position, but acquiesce to an alternative position given certain material inducements. Prime Minister Imran Khan’s recent observation about attributing state responsibility for the Jamal Kashoggi assassination demonstrates the point: “we are desperate for money” (Khan in Sengupta 2018). “Unless we get loans from friendly countries... we’ll have real, real problems” (Khan in Sengupta 2018). This is to say that diplomatic pressure cannot operate in as decisive a manner as certain material resource inducements. In sum, my proposition is that state subjects can be affected by common elements of social structure but nevertheless have a more unique threshold (or “tipping-point”) in relation to its effects on the issue in question.

There are also certain lines of criticism that one can level at this chapter. This subsection addresses three. The first relates to the point that a core coalition acts as the interstate socializing agent: as Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni asks, why does pressing others into acceptance of a position require a *coalition* of states rather than a single state (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 14.08.18)? There are two points to consider in response to this question, one theoretical and the other empirical. The theoretical point is that I do not dismiss the influence that a “one-state wrecking-crew” can have in initiating a socialization, as the previous subsection on success factors suggests. I allow the theoretical possibility that a single state *can* do most of the legwork and exert such influence, including in concert with those that share some initial support for the given cause. The empirical point is that states that look to facilitate a socialization process seem often to not stand alone, in complete isolation from others. Even for the “rogue” (or “maverick”) state, complete isolation on some issue seems rare from a social constructivist perspective. Hence even

Ian Hurd's analysis on Libya's strategic manipulation of liberal institutionalism is open to a theoretical perspective on how a coalition of states can also act as socializing agents. Hurd comments, for example, that the likes of Libya from 1992 to 2003 and Iraq from 1990 to 2003 stood in opposition to an international community that was "largely" (but not exclusively) decided in its opposition to them (Hurd 2008, 139). This is to say that the two states could have acted as a ring leaders alongside other states—if not at least alongside each other—to bring about an end to the sanctions regime. Although Hurd's work does not explore that possibility, what matters most in the work is the influence that strategic rhetorical manipulation can have on other states.

A second line of criticism comes from a perspective on mutual interstate socialization, meaning that socialization occurs among states that simultaneously socialize and in turn become socialized (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 14.8.18). Thomas Risse, for example, makes the case for argumentation, deliberation and persuasion as a process by which "human actors engage in truth-seeking with the aim of reaching a mutual understanding based on a reasoned consensus" (Risse 2000, 1-2). This perspective speaks most to a negotiation setting, in the sense that the actors in question are prepared to change their own position to reach the above reasoned consensus. It has less to do with contexts that involve rhetorical action (or "loudspeaker diplomacy"), where at least one agent is not and instead keeps up some persistent effort to win over a wider audience in support of its own position (Risse 2000, 9-10). That latter context best relates to what my chapter contemplates, because it implies some interstate campaign to muster support for a cause where the agents see themselves as "hidebound" or *not* being willing or able to make concessions. The socialization that can ensue is then not simultaneous per Risse's main point. It is more on par with Ian Hurd's commentary on Libya, where the agents in question exploit diplomatic discourse in a more cynical manner (Hurd 2005, 499). This becomes clear upon examining how those agents' positions remain invariable over time in spite of decided opposition.

In addition to the above two critiques, one can also question: who precisely are the state actors in this section (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 14.8.18)? Are they executives, foreign offices, individual state representatives, specific stake holders, and/or all of the above? There seem two important points to make in response to this question. First, this section's main concern is the social construction of interstate interaction in a global, multilateral context. It contemplates how those state units relate to each other rather than how they come into being. Hence my thesis assumes that states exist as unitary actors, as Alexander Wendt does in his social theory of international politics (Wendt 1999, 193-245). This leads to a second point about what exactly my chapter means by "state". By state, the chapter means governments, which includes the diplomats who represent the government in an official capacity. This includes heads of state (and/or heads of government), ministers (or secretaries), special envoys, ambassadors and/or less senior diplomats. Whatever the specific government official, what matters is that the common position or "company line" she expresses marks that of the state in question.

On this latter point, some may still question this section's theoretical emphasis on states as the fundamental units of analysis. This is because individual state representatives—not some unitary concept of a state—are those who set the direction of national foreign policy. Since it is

these individuals doing the acting, this section needs to focus on their role in how the states that they represent assume an array of national positions. My supervisor, Professor Jason Sharman, first raised this point with me in Lent Term 2018. Margarita Petrova suggests a further challenge that “if the ‘state’ has been socialized, one will have to show how its practices have been constrained despite the individual preferences of those representing it later on” (Petrova 14.10.2021, 2). In the literature, this general line of criticism can also come from Ian Johnston, who contends that social constructivism demands that individuals serve as the units for socialization (Johnston 2001, 507).

I accept that these critiques can in part offer insight into the present research question on at least two accounts. First, state representatives, wherever stationed, can prove effective in pushing the adoption of a particular foreign policy position among their “back bench” or colleagues at headquarters—perhaps, for example, by transmitting to them the effects of the diplomatic pressure outside in the external international environment. These effects can then influence decision makers higher up in the food-chain, much as one would expect them to influence the states in question. Second, individual state representatives themselves can enjoy a certain extent of autonomy from headquarters—as much work on principal-agent theory expects—and can thereby be the ones to affect and be affected by outcomes (Pollack 2007, 59). By this latter account, it is the state representatives themselves who are both the agents and/or subjects of socialization and therefore require more research attention.

These two critiques do not detract from the theoretical focus on states as the units of analysis in this section. That individual representatives serve as the agents and subjects of international socialization seems to affirm their position at the “cutting edge” of their respective state’s foreign policy; the individuals would still seem to remain subject to the broader diplomatic pressure “out there”, beyond the cutting edge. Thus the representatives would still have to contend with an international social environment as the presumed “states” would have to do. An emphasis on individuals in the research procedure therefore seems a more fine-grained perspective on interstate interaction in relation to certain issues. Yet even if these individuals were in fact the ones to drive the bargain, their participation in an international context seems only to gain currency if attributable to that of the respective state in question. This makes intuitive sense. What Donald Trump and Nikki Haley have had to say about the final status of Jerusalem before taking on their respective governmental roles seems hardly to have generated much international attention. As representatives of the United States of America, however, the matter had been quite different. This is to suggest that individuals, if not representatives for their respective states, seem to alone have more limited diplomatic influence.

I also emphasize that my theoretical argument requires only that the individuals who comprise a state—that is, at a specific “bounded” point in time—acquiesce to otherwise undesirable foreign policy positions (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 41). My argument does not necessarily need to culminate with internalization, which may very well demand that future government officials adhere to the foreign policy positions that previous ones grudgingly accepted. Future officials, for example, may assume a more “renegade” attitude towards the international community on the issue in question. Yet this does not detract from a focus on states.

A change in attitude of that nature would still presuppose the continued presence of diplomatic pressure, sustained by other states whose individual representatives may very well have also changed. Hence my focus on states remains relevant. Nevertheless I am still reluctant to characterize socialization as lasting “in the sense of forestalling normative contestation over the long run”, as Ronal Krebs and Patrick Jackson contend (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 41). “Norms are inherently subject to challenge and that the rhetorical arrangements sustaining norms are never fully stabilized and are at best *relatively* stable” (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 41). For reference, Ian Hurd makes a similar point (Hurd 2002, 45-47; 2005, 502; 2008, 137-138; 2014, 8-9).

Chapter Four

Data and Methods

Basic to the interpretative or hermeneutical understanding of science is that the very human action which counts as significant in the social world, cannot be apprehended without interpretation, that is, without understanding the meaning that is given to it (Weber, 1988 [1922])... In other words, meaning is not limited to the actor itself, but must comprise the significance given to it by other actors, and also observers (Sparto, 1992: 102–3). Meaning is not something idiosyncratic to be studied through empathy. (Guzzini 2000, 160-161).

Chapter Outline

This chapter considers how to test my theoretical argument. I take the reader through the steps of my research process in its successive order. The chapter opens by addressing an empirical puzzle derived from my empirical literature review chapter. My point was that the literature suggests a thematic focus on interstate, bloc politics at the General Assembly. I then present a broad overview of diplomacy at the General Assembly—which, consistent with a social constructivist research orientation—puts emphasis on interstate social consensus. I suggest that there has been a general increase in the number of resolutions that states have agreed upon over time. There has also been a general increase in the proportion of resolutions unanimously agreed upon. Hence interstate consensus has become an increasingly prominent feature of diplomacy at the General Assembly, and accordingly ought to receive more scholarly attention.

I then set out several scope conditions for my empirical case studies. These scope conditions suggest empirical issue areas—as embodied in resolutions—where my theoretical argument applies. The scope conditions require a study of resolutions that present a clear and concise issue, and also have a recurring character. In addition, I also suggest institutional scope conditions drawn from Giovanni Mantilla's analysis on forum isolation (Mantilla 2018). The conditions are the universal participation of states (featuring a one-state-one-vote rule), decision making by majority vote (or consensus procedures in the shadow of majority vote), and publicity (Mantilla 2018, 329). Based on these scope conditions, I suggest three empirical case studies: racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa (1946-1961), the United States' embargo on Cuba (1991-2016), and the ban on nuclear weapons (1946-1961). I also consider the important question of selection bias, drawn from scholars who point out the limits of selecting on the dependent variable (Achen and Snidal 1989; Geddes 1990; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; *et al.*). I contend with this literature and in turn point out the variance in my own research design, which includes attention to a “nonpositive” case study in my third empirical chapter on the diplomatic campaign to ban nuclear weapons.

Next I outline a three-step research procedure that structures my empirical case study chapters. In general, the procedure is to zero in on the diplomatic agitation that a core coalition of states undertake in support of a cause, consider the extent to which this activity influences a target interstate audience, and then consider empirical and/or theoretical counter-arguments to my claims.

I finally present my primary sources and consider its limitations. The main limitation relates to the extent to which one can infer genuine intentions from foreign policy statements in a global, multilateral context.

What's the Puzzle?

According to Dina Zinnes, puzzles in international relations are “pieces of information, the belief that pieces fit together into a meaningful picture but the inability to fit the pieces together initially” (Zinnes 1980, 316). This thesis speaks to a puzzle. To see how, recall my commentary in the empirical literature review chapter. The chapter suggested a thematic focus on interstate, bloc politics at the General Assembly. My suggestion was that the research focus has been incomplete. It tends to focus on potential conflicts of interests among states. However it pays less attention to how states can find common cause on the issues, despite the position one may associate them with within a bloc or bloc-like formation. The main research focus thus overlooks the extent to which socialization can take place among states overall, and follow from diplomatic pressure that transcends the political or otherwise bloc formations that may exist at the time. This is to say that the main research focus does not give rise to an expectation that such socialization can prevail and shape the manner in which states relate to common issues. This shortcoming seems most outstanding where common ground seems to expand among states on certain issues. Conflicts of interest—such as those defined by certain political or otherwise allegiance formations—may very well prove inherent to that build in consensus. Nevertheless a main focus on those cleavages overlooks the extent to which exogenous social effects can operate, and exert overall pressure upon the states in question.

My second point concerning the puzzle relates to my previous discussion of side-payments (or “gift exchanges”) at the United Nations. Recall that this literature deals with certain states making use of material resources to exact support for or at least acquiescence to certain positions. Yet the agents of such activity can nevertheless see interstate support nevertheless take shape against their own positions, despite at times explicit material threats made against target states that are to some extent dependent on certain economic and/or military relationships with the agents in question. Hence more widespread positions can take shape and move in a direction *against* what we would expect to see if the usual suspects were to employ the side payments in a successful manner. This in turn suggests that the use of side payments have either minimal affect on these positions, or that it is instead the unusual suspects that have been using them towards their advantage. The latter point entails that the materially less capable states—rather than materially more capable states—are the ones that manage to leverage material resources towards outcomes in their favor. That perspective is not compelling, and does not dovetail with what one would expect from the material capabilities-based focus in the literature on side payments in global, multilateral diplomacy at the United Nations.

A noteworthy recent example helps explicate my point. In the lead up to the Assembly’s Tenth Emergency Special Session’s consideration of the Status of Jerusalem, the United States vowed to “take names” and go as far as withhold hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars

in foreign assistance to states that oppose its position on the issue (Landau 20.12.2017). Ambassador Nikki Haley wrote the following in an email to other member states:

As you know, the General Assembly is considering a resolution about President Trump's recent decision on Jerusalem. As you consider your vote, I encourage you to know the president and the U.S. take this vote personally.

... The president will be watching this vote carefully and has requested I report back on those who voted against us. We will take note of each and every vote on this issue (Haley in Landau 19.12.17).

On Twitter, Haley wrote went on:

At the UN we're always asked to do more & give more. So, when we make a decision, at the will of the American ppl, abt where to locate OUR embassy, we don't expect those we've helped to target us. On Thurs there'll be a vote criticizing our choice. The US will be taking names (Haley 2017 in Landau 20.12.2017).

The United States gained nine affirmative votes in support of its position, while many of its largest foreign aid recipients of the year went as far as to altogether oppose it (e.g. Egypt, Jordan, and Afghanistan) (USAID). Yet states that may have stood alongside the United States on the issue, as they have on related issues, seem to have been put off by the Trump Administration's threats. Canada's former Permanent Representative, for example, observed the following:

The United States will be putting a great deal of pressure on its allies but... I think it's going to succeed only in isolating itself. That's generally the kind of provocation that gets people to tell you to go to hell (Heinbecker in Dyer 2017).

Granted the Trump Administration achieved success in altering the eventual outcome, as unusual no shows from other large foreign aid recipients of the year suggest (e.g. Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia) (USID). The opposing positions seen in Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Naurau—states most dependent on United States foreign aid as a percentage of GDP—seem to further suggest a similar conclusion (Vinograd 22.12.2017). Even states that may have been more receptive to the United States' efforts seem to have gone about it in a more surreptitious manner, as if to avoid being seen as having taken a position that they may not have otherwise taken. This also suggests that whatever the material resource inducement, it would need to remain on the table to garner and sustain such support in the future.

A materialist-oriented account on side-payments thereby only bucks the trend. Positions on the issue were generally unfavorable to the United States in the end, with numerous delegations emphasizing that their views remained "unchanged" in spite of the material implications that surrounded the resolution's consideration (UN Meetings Coverage and Press Release 21.12.2017; UN Web TV 21.12.2017). The European Union's Federica Mogherini, for example, made the point on behalf of the Organization's twenty-eight member states:

The European Union has a clear and united position: we believe that the only realistic solution to the conflict between Israel and Palestine is based on two States, and with Jerusalem as the capital of both the State of Israel and the State of Palestine.

I discussed this with [US] Secretary [of States, Rex] Tillerson during his visit to Brussels on Tuesday. I have made clear our disagreement with this decision, as did all the Foreign Ministers of the 28 Member States of the European Union that met him with me the same day.

The European Union and its Member States will continue to respect the international consensus on Jerusalem, until the final status of the Holy City is resolved through direct negotiations between the parties (Mogherini 7.12.17).

What this issue and others suggest is that a focus on material side payments has its limits. Not only does it have its limits, but it also miss out on the social construction of diplomacy in a global, multilateral context. Hence the literature on side payments overlooks the extent to which a particular social context—which in this example, relates to positions on the status of Jerusalem—can shape how states relate to each other, and to issues of common concern.

Diplomacy at the General Assembly

According to the Charter, the General Assembly is the “chief deliberative, policymaking and representative organ” of the United Nations. Central to the history of diplomacy at the Assembly has been development and perhaps at times even solidification of bloc politics among states, as the empirical literature review chapter has shown. Yet also central to diplomacy in this context has been a parallel, overall expansion of the extent of consensus its member states reach over time. This becomes apparent upon taking a step back from the ocean of quantitative information available on bloc politics to examine the big picture, which indicates a general broadening of common ground among states over time. I use summary statistics in this subsection to provide a general overview of diplomacy at the General Assembly.

Refer to the Appendix. As figures one, two, and three indicate, the number of resolutions that states have agreed upon has been on the rise since the First Session (1946-1947). This is apparent in that the median number of resolutions adopted overall exceeds that of each of the first thirty-two sessions, and that the highest three quarters of resolutions passed per session have come after the Fifteenth Session (1960-1961) with just one exception. It also seems apparent in that the lowest quarter of resolutions passed per session all occur before the 22nd Session (1967-1968). This is to say that the most number of resolutions passed per session in the General Assembly have come towards the latter end of its history, as is further confirmed by the positive slope of the trend line and leftward skew presented in figure three. Otherwise put, the frequency of interstate agreement has in general been increasing since the General Assembly came into existence. A look at the proportion of resolutions that have per session met unanimous interstate approval suggests that the extent of that agreement has also been expanding. As figure four indicates, the slope for this figure is also positive. And as figures one, two, three and four indicate, the upper quartile proportion of unanimous resolutions passed per session all fall within the last twenty-eight years. Hence the General Assembly has, for better or for worse, become the scene of increasing interstate “transaction” over the years. Some extent of interstate agreement therefore seems to have in general become a more prominent feature of diplomacy in that context.

This takeaway requires emphasis and should not be taken for granted—perhaps, as some might suggest, as an accumulation of sunk costs over the years that has amounted to a natural growth in work activity (Keohane 1984, 100-103; Stinchcombe 1968, 119-129; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2003, 315-32; *et al.*). There are no material, coercive measures imposed on states to converge on the United Nations year after year to participate in its proceedings and with increasing frequency. Nor are there manifest, materially coercive circumstances that cannot but lead states to weigh in on and eventually express support for resolutions session after session. Where these suggestions lead—that is, towards disengagement from the United Nations, towards decreasing or perhaps even a general erosion of agreement among states over time—are not hypothetical conjecture, as the 19th Session (1964-1965) demonstrates. That session culminated in a halt to General Assembly’s work, dragging states through what the then Secretary-General U Thant described as a “dark valley of discord and enmity” (Thant in Cordier 2010, 5). Some scholars at the time went as far as to even question whether the year would “go down in history as the beginning of gradual atrophy or debilitation” of the United Nations (Nathanson 1965, 623). The crises suggests that the general increase in the frequency and extent of agreement reached among states over time has not been an inevitable, steady progression (or digression) down a path-dependent route without a break in sight.

Some path-dependent trajectory may have been relevant, perhaps by helping ensure a pattern of continued engagement given the alternative costs of establishing a new, more effective general assembly. A path-dependency critique offers insight into why states may continue to engage other state counterparts year after year for some seven decades now. Yet the question remains as to how that activity results in a general conclusion of more (and not less or a roughly equal number of) agreements throughout this same time period. The specific nature of interstate engagement—namely, its positive, rather than neutral or negative direction—problematizes the critique as alone incomplete, as a significant strand of sociological literature on formal institutions suggests (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Finnemore 1996; Meyer and Rowan 1977; McNamara 2002; Parsons 1960; Suchman 1995, *et al.*). In this literature, one finds traction in a perspective on how certain common expectations can sustain interstate engagement and push it in the direction that my theoretical commentary suggests. One finds, for example, accounts that make the case that “legitimacy leads to persistence because audiences are most likely to supply resources to organizations that appear desirable, proper, or appropriate” (Suchman 1995, 574).

A further challenge to the path-dependence critique relates to the strong, positive relationship between the number of resolutions agreed upon per session and the expansion in membership at the United Nations. The increase in membership has been strongly associated with the increase in resolutions agreed upon per session at the General Assembly. Note the Pearson’s correlation coefficient in figure four. A possible implication is that newly independent states have broadened the gambit of issues at the forum, and also contributed to the conclusion of more resolutions among its membership. It is not apparent that a relationship of this nature comports with a path-dependent logic, as new member states would not have been “bound” by concerns for sunk costs incurred throughout previous sessions of the General Assembly. Hence a

path-dependent logic does not seem most applicable to newly independent member states, and especially their reasons for bringing new priorities to the platform.

Scope Conditions and Case Study Selection

My empirical study considers specific resolutions as case studies, each of which fall within the below scope conditions. These conditions make qualitative requirements on the project and suggest the kind of issue areas that this thesis addresses. The first condition is that the thesis needs to examine issues that have a consistent recurring character, especially as embodied in the aforementioned recurring resolutions. This condition addresses an empirical limitation: issues that do not come up for consideration in a repeated manner lack the kind of periodic updates on state positions that certain resolutions provide. These recurring issues or resolutions need not necessarily extend across a certain tract of time. Nor do they need to encompass subject areas that come up for consideration under the same resolution title verbatim or even as points of discussion inside the United Nations context. This condition means only to ensure a constant “paper trail” of the positions states take in relation to the same issues over time. The criteria therefore addresses a theoretical assumption in this thesis: periodic evidence of state positions on similar if not identical issues is essential to weigh a perspective on interstate socialization.

This leads to the second scope condition: within the applicable resolutions, some clear and concise issue be apparent. My second condition addresses the need to evaluate a theoretical perspective on interstate socialization, which also requires attention to how state positions converge (or fail to converge) on an issue over time. Hence my requirement is that there is indeed a “constant” focal point for interstate consideration, helping concentrate on and perhaps even accentuate the surrounding interaction. This in turn allows insight into what affect, if any, this state to state interaction has on the subsequent positions states take in relation to the particular issue. It also to some extent controls for alterations in a focal point of discussion that may or may not enter into the conversation among states. Though this second condition does not, to be sure, dismiss the importance of the precise wording of a resolution that states may or may not respond to. It rather helps ensure that the language central to the resolution does not undergo significant changes such that its substantive point assumes a new direction. This allows peripheral variance in language to factor into (or fail to factor into) the conversation, though not to the extent that it changes the focal point of proceedings. My second scope condition therefore relates to a resolution’s specific focus or “anchor”, providing that it must address a consistent point throughout the course of its consideration with some underlying consistency.

Giovanni Mantilla suggests a further relevant set of institutional scope conditions in his analysis on forum isolation (Mantilla 2018, 329). The conditions are the universal participation of states (featuring a one-state-one-vote rule), decision making by majority vote (or consensus procedures in the shadow of majority vote), and publicity. For reference, Nicole Deitelhoff and Linda Wallbott suggest empirical support for Mantilla’s first two conditions (Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012, 363). “Small states coalitions’ ability to impact on negotiation outcomes will increase in negotiations operating with majority decision rules (and decrease in those that rely on consensus or unanimity)” (Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012, 364). Mantilla goes on to suggest that

these institutional conditions “work both as enablers and ‘sharpeners’ of diplomatic pressure when a contingent phenomenon occurs: the formation of majority (or supermajority) coalitions during negotiations” (Mantilla 2018, 329). I agree. These institutional conditions are relevant to my empirical case studies. The formation of a majority coalition can be but is not necessarily applicable to my current empirical focus on the General Assembly, where member states can adopt resolutions without the support of an absolute numerical majority in principle. The reason is because the procedural requirement for a resolution to pass—and therefore come up for consideration again—is two-thirds of member states only “present and voting” (Rule 83, Rules of Procedure). Present and voting refers to member states that cast an affirmative or negative vote, not those that abstain or are absent from voting (Rule 86, Rules of Procedure). Thus abstaining or absent member states can outnumber those those that are present and voting.

With the above scope conditions in mind, we can now contemplate what empirical case studies to examine. The “universe” of resolutions from which to base these studies is vast, with some twenty thousand to date at the General Assembly alone. My suggestion is to select these series of resolutions: (i) racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa from 1946 to 1961, (ii) the United States embargo on Cuba from 1991 to 2016, and (iii) the ban on nuclear weapons from 1946 to 1961. In the former two cases, my research interest is in how a core coalition of states can build an interstate consensus on the respective issues over time. This is to say that my focus is on how the process unfolds in those two positive cases of interstate socialization. For reference, my focus on process resonates with other social science works (Elster 2007, 35-42; Gerring 2007, 177-178; Hedström and Swedberg 1998, 7-11; Merton 1968, 39-45; *et al.*). Note that the first two case studies address “positive” examples of interstate socialization, while the latter case study covers a “nonpositive” or inconclusive example.

I select these three issue areas as case studies for methodological and theoretical reasons. My methodological reason is that the three cases meet the scope conditions above. My theoretical reason is that the two positive studies present relatively “hard” cases for social constructivists, but should have been relatively “easy” cases for empirical or theoretical approaches that emphasize material power (Petrova 2016, 391; 2019, 617-618). As we shall see, both of the former two positive studies relate to interstate socialization that proceeds against the wishes of the more materially capable states or states closely aligned with them. In the first case study, a core coalition of states helped build an almost unanimous consensus against apartheid from 1946 to 1961. This consensus took shape despite staunch opposition from many of the more materially capable states at the time, including each of the world’s former colonial powers. Similarly in the second case study, a core coalition of states helped build an almost unanimous consensus against the Cuba embargo from 1991 to 2016. This consensus also took shape despite staunch opposition from the United States, which included explicit material threats towards third states to refrain from supporting a common position against the embargo. Thus both of these positive case studies showcase the limits to materialist focuses on diplomacy at the United Nations. I shall return to my rationale for selecting the final case study on the nuclear weapons ban.

For now, my selection of the first two case studies begs the question of selection bias, since interstate support increases for the respective issues over time. Numerous scholars comment on the limits of “selecting on the dependent variable” in social science research (Achen and Snidal 1989; Geddes 1990; Lieberman 1991; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; *et al.*). A common caution is the lack of variation in outcomes allowed in such studies. This lack of variation prevents researchers from gaining a true sense of what independent effects the suggested causal variables exert on the outcome of interest. It follows that researchers can only generalize valid inferences from case studies selected by some rule or criteria not correlated with the outcome (Geddes 1990, 135). I acknowledge this important body of scholarship, but nonetheless see promise in proceeding with the work set out for the following two reasons.

First, other social science scholars acknowledge the value in selecting on the dependent variable as a valid research practice (Dion 1998; Collier 1995; Collier and Mahoney 1996; Garfinkel 1981; Most and Starr 1982; Rogowski 1995; Seawright and Gerring 2008; *et al.*). David Collier and James Mahoney, for example, contend that:

No-variance designs play an invaluable role in generating new information and discovering novel explanations, which in terms of a larger research cycle provides indispensable data for broader comparative studies and new hypotheses for them to evaluate (Collier and Mahoney 1996, 73-74).

I am particularly interested in Collier and Mahoney reference to Alan Garfinkel’s concept of “contrast space”, which advocates some examination nonpositive cases to create a frame of comparison and gain more analytic leverage within the particular research design (Collier and Mahoney 1996, 67-69; 74; Garfinkel 1981). I incorporate the concept into my research design in my third case study chapter on the nuclear weapons. Studying this latter inconclusive case study is also a response to Jeffrey Checkel’s call to examine empirical circumstances where the “dog does not bark” (Checkel 1998, 339). My point is to gain more insight into the conditions under which socialization will and will not occur, by weighing in on the extent to which certain independent theoretical factors are influential. My theoretical argument chapter refers to these independent theoretical factors as “conditioning factors”. The term comes from Professor Nathalie Tocci (Tocci 2008).

Yet studying an empirical context where the “dog does not bark” requires caution. A secondary investigation of this kind runs the risk of examining a theoretically inconsequential case where the outcome of concern is both not present and applies to a lesser proportion of cases. This can raise an unavoidable question about the relevance of the examination, as the project would spend time and energy on the circumstances of a case that somehow rendered the outcome impossible (Clarke 2002; Mahoney and Goertz 2004). A way to navigate this potential challenge is to adhere to James Mahoney and Gary Goertz’s “possibility principle”, which suggests that studies on nonpositive cases examine contexts where the outcome of interest has a “real possibility of occurring—not just those where the outcome has a nonzero probability” (Mahoney and Goertz 2004, 654). It follows that “nonpositive” case studies are most useful when they resemble positive cases to “control for background features and thereby achieve greater leverage for causal analysis” (Mahoney and Goertz 2004, 655).

Thus my third nonpositive case study on the nuclear weapons ban replicates—to the extent it is possible—the conditions under which socialization took place in the first positive case study on apartheid. I allude to the same agents and subjects of socialization as case illustrations as much as the source work allows. This enables me to control for a host of actor properties, such as those that relate to regime characteristics at the particular time period. I also examine the same time period—namely, from 1946 to 1961—in both my positive and nonpositive case studies to control for a host of historical factors that can affect the success of socialization. In the two case studies, the most prominent of these historical factors is decolonization, which led to a substantial increase in membership at the United Nations in 1960 and 1961. Importantly, almost all of these new member states—hailing from Africa and Southern Asia—lent further support to the core coalition’s diplomatic efforts on the respective issues. Controlling for decolonization thus controls for the added potential social effects—such as those that can follow from an increased sense of isolation—that a core coalition’s numerical expansion can have on an interstate audience. I also examine the time from 1946 to 1961 to ensure that interstate socialization on the issue had a “real possibility of occurring”, as per my first case study. Some may question whether a state’s possession of nuclear weapons would have abnegated support for the ban. Here I emphasize that the two are *not* necessarily incompatible. A state can possess the means to engage in certain modes of warfare but nevertheless hold that doing so runs counter to select common expectations.

One may question my choice of the Cuba embargo from 1991 to 2016 for my second positive case study chapter. Margarita Petrova, for example, suggests that selecting all three cases from the same time period could control for “world time” and help draw into focus theoretical factors relevant to socialization dynamics (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 909; Petrova 4.10.2021, 4). I make two points in response. The first is that I refer to numerous country case illustrations within my positive case studies, which allows me to test theory across distinct empirical country examples while ensuring sufficient historical consistency. My second point is that a positive case study on an alternative empirical context ensures that my theory tests are not just contingent upon a particular historical context and thus have greater external validity.

Means of Analysis

I require the use of an interpretive approach to make sense of how diplomatic pressure can operate. This primarily draws me to exchanges between diplomats, which for the most part, have been recorded in the written documentation that I outline below. I pay close attention to “what actors say, in what contexts, and to what audiences”, as Krebs and Jackson call for (Krebs Jackson 2007, 36). Analyzing these exchanges requires the use of discourse analysis: a means of analysis most concerned with the interpretation of “social reality”, examining empirical evidence against the “horizon” of inter-subjective meaning (Bos and Tarnai 1999; Elo and Keingas 2008; Holsti 1968; Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Krippendorf 2004; Neuendorf 2016; Weber 1990; *et al.*). Although serving a variety of research purposes, this particular research approach shares a theme in its attention to the inference of social phenomena from text. As Klaus Krippendorf writes,

A text means something to someone, it is produced by someone to have meanings for someone else, and these meanings therefore must not be ignored and must not violate why the text exists in the first place. Text—the reading of text, the use of text within a social context, and the analysis of text—serves as a convenient metaphor in content analysis (Krippendorff 2004, 19).

Analytic deconstruction or “unpacking” of written documentation to the point where one gets a sense of what inspired its creation is central to content analysis and the line of work set out in this thesis. Each piece of text addresses a particular audience in a particular context at a particular point of time. Such text, as Darren Weinberg suggests, is not a “thing that exists independently of the occasions of its use but as an element of social life” (Weinberg 23.1.2018, 2). It is social practice in action; the conversation it expresses consists of “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault 1972, 49). This is to say, to paraphrase Jennifer Milliken, that things do not mean but rather people construct the meaning of things in conversation with each other (Milliken 1999, 229). The catalogue of possible meaning thereby becomes more constrained to the social context in question. Meaning is accordingly not, as Stefano Guzzini argues, “limited to the actor itself, but must compromise the significance given to it by other actors, and also observers” (Guzzini 2000, 161). Although the actors in question need not see meaning the same way, there nevertheless seems some basic acceptance as to what it entails for the conversation to exist in the first place.

This thesis conducts discourse analysis via my own three step procedure that each of the case study chapters follow. My entry-point for the analysis is a “belief” of how a particular process has come about and how it comports with some meaningful picture (Zinnes 1980, 312). That belief is the subject of my investigation and, as the reader knows, suggests a role for a coalition of states in exerting diplomatic pressure on other states to forge acceptance of a common viewpoint on an issue. From this entry-point, the first step in the empirical investigation has two parts. The first part of step one relates to making the case for a core coalition of states in support of a particular issue. In connection with the United Nations, such a coalition can take shape upon the issue’s initial consideration. This can be apparent in that it comes up for consideration in connection with a resolution with an explicit reference to certain member state cosponsors. It can also be apparent in that certain states, alongside others, act as “spokespersons” for the cause (for example, by being especially vocal about a particular position). Though this does not necessarily imply that these spokespersons—thanks to the support of their member state counterparts—enjoy some acceptance of their moral leadership on the issue. As the previous chapter suggests, socialization agents can take on the role *ipso facto*, owed to the relative silence of others that also support the given position.

My point in this latter paragraph is *not* that the composition of a core coalition needs to remain constant. The composition of a coalition can of course change, especially in view of the many newer actors that have become independent states throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. This is apparent in the membership count at the United Nations, which grew almost four-fold from fifty-five in 1946 to one hundred and ninety-three in the present. There are numerous examples where one could make the case for the existence for a certain core coalition and its change in composition along these lines. The above case study that relates to the Union of

South Africa is one such example. What matters most is how a change in a coalition's composition can affect its campaign in support of a cause, particularly as it relates to its momentum and/or the extent to which it marks the start of a new interstate campaign with an alternative direction. Whatever the case, one can draw insight from careful focus on the specific issue that some states create and have others evaluate over the years.

The second part of step one in the research procedure is to make sense of the positions for which the spokespersons campaign. This involves applying my discussion on content analysis to the primary source-work under examination, with the aim of identifying core positions advanced by the support base. There can be some degree of variation across miscellaneous positions, to be sure. Nevertheless that these states converge on support for the same general position suggests that there are certain baseline elements in common. I accordingly zero in on the specific manner in which states express these positions. The task is to encapsulate normative rhetoric that the coalition manipulate in support of a cause. This task is analytic rather than descriptive; the coalition of states will not themselves theorize their own views, complete with reference to the literature. That is for me to infer by applying the above discussion on content analysis to the primary source-work available. Note that the analysis does not require that the coalition push for positions on the basis of the facts. Their activity can very well amount to humbuggery: a "performance of delusion", "theater of absurd", "shameful lies", "parade of hypocrisy", a propaganda salvos, and so on (Haley 3.11.18; Hehir and Neuer 25.1.18; Green 2017; Netanyahu 2017; Udayakumar 2017; *et al.*).

Step two in the investigation procedure accordingly looks to zero in on the effects that the core coalition's diplomatic activity has on other states. This second step looks in particular at states that have either opposed or have been otherwise "on the fence" on the issue in question. It attaches primary importance to the manner in which these states express newfound positions in ways they have not done before. However, these positions may or may not be associated with changes in a particular voting option. What matters is *how* these more recent state positions get expressed, and to what extent they seem to develop in response to other state positions already established on the issue. This emphasis on "how" states express themselves—including in relation to changes in state position—is similar to Ian Hurd's emphasis on the effects Libya's strategic activity had on other states meant to uphold a Security Council sanctions regime (Hurd 2002; 2005; 2008). For Hurd, and similarly for my empirical investigation, observing how states express changes in position suggests empirical evidence of these social effects. Similarly, Ronald Krebs and Patrick Jackson contend that "we cannot observe directly what people think, but we can observe what they say and how they respond to claims and counter-claims" (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 42). Hence the manner in which states express changes in position is the observable implications for my theoretical argument. In particular, what counts most are changes in position that echo and thereby respond to the interstate conversation that prevails. This step in the research procedure also considers corroborating, circumstantial primary and secondary source-work in support of my theoretical interpretations.

The final step in my research procedure is to cross-check inferences against the broader historical context and especially consider counter-arguments from alternative theoretical

perspectives on international relations. This step is in part a response to calls for process tracing methods to “consider a wide range of alternatives despite the effort it entails” (Bennet and Checkel 2010, 21). More importantly, it is also a response to those scholars who emphasize that social science cannot “see” in minute detail social action as it happens, even in connection with some phenomena that seems more analogous to that of a “chain of events” or “domino effect” (Bennet and Checkel 2012, 12; Bennet 2010, 2; Mahoney 2012, 587). This latter point suggests that alternative takes on the phenomenon of interest can appear at every witch-way, and that the most this investigation can do is remain open to potential counter arguments, grapple with them (or, as some argue, “soak and poke” about their implications), and put together the most compelling case for what has happened (Bennet and Checkel 2012, 22). The task of this final step is therefore to address skepticism that seems to most occur to the reader, taking into consideration the extent to which certain circumstances—including “exogenous shocks”—intervene and render the analysis more or less compelling. I anticipate this skepticism from certain perspectives in international relations theory (like those covered in the theoretical literature review), studies on the practice of the United Nations (in particular, the General Assembly and Security Council), work on the historical context of the case study in question, and conversations with faculty members here at Cambridge: including my supervisor Jason Sharman and secondary supervisors Ayse Zarakol and Aaron Rapport.

Primary Sources

Most of my source-work is available online via the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISNET), Official Document System (UNODS), Audiovisual Library, Digital Library, Yearbook, Webcast, and Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. The lion’s share of source-work comes from resolutions, reports, statements, “explanations of vote” (before and after the vote), rights of reply, verbatim records, note verbales, press briefs and interview transcripts that relate to the specific issue in question. Moreover, the previous section emphasis on state actors permits the research investigation to cast its empirical “net” beyond the United Nations archival system to include news outlets, governmental sources (online and otherwise), historical archives, and my own written and oral exchanges with the applicable representatives if necessary. This allows an interstate conversation to ensue that can extend beyond the United Nations, including articulations in foreign policy positions from as broad a slate of state actors as possible. On this latter point, the increasing use of certain online platforms by state actors in more recent years will help. Twitter is a good example. Online platforms like these provide further opportunities to engage in the kind of interstate conversation analysis that my project addresses.

It is worth considering the potential limitations in my primary sources. Numerous scholars have cautioned against the examination of national statements made by states, especially in connection with diplomacy in a global, multilateral context. The criticism seems to run along the lines of a view that “talk is cheap” and so cannot serve as a reliable way to consider what states mean or mean to communicate in relation to each other. In particular, with regard to the United Nations, critiques on garrulous proceedings seem to come especially from scholars concerned with the international legal status of the pronouncements that states make in the form of

resolutions. Arangio-Ruiz suggests that member states tend to ingratiate themselves with the wider interstate audience, trying to “get away from every session with as good an image as possible” (Arangio-Ruiz 1972 457-459). “Potential or natural opponents are often reluctant to face the risk of besmirching their own image by opposing a proposal openly or by casting a negative vote” (Arangio-Ruiz 1972 457-459). Stephen Schwebel similarly comments that delegations often express support for “much of which they actually disagree”; they do so “because it is politically unpopular to do otherwise” (Schwebel 1979, 301-302). And Michael Byers adds an emphasis on member states “saying things which are different from what they do” (Byers 1999, 40-43; 135-136). These scholars, alongside others with more generic views on the subject, suggest a challenge in looking at public statements to consider what states (or social actors more broadly) “really think” on the given issue.

Yet this challenge is “serious, but not unsurmountable” for at least the following two reasons (Elster 2015, 48). First, the criticism highlights rather than detracts from the central concern of my thesis: namely, the social construction of interstate relations. Unlike the above scholarship—which, seems held back by concerns for evidence of general practice accepted as law—my research investigation takes head-on intersubjective notions of “image”, “popularity”, and “hypocrisy” in international relations. We remain in business if delegations indeed tend to pontificate and make much of how they are “seen” in relation to other state counterparts. I take much interest in where intersubjective concerns like these can come from and how to expect them to shape how states formulate ideas on the issues. That some states prevaricate or misrepresent their positions out of concern for besmirching their own image, losing popularity and/or coming across as hypocritical seem effects of the time’s interstate social context. The insincere use or misuse of language in the presentation of governmental positions therefore makes my investigation all the more interesting, since it suggests that mere conversation can exert pressure on states to accept positions that they otherwise would not. Ian Hurd makes a similar point (Hurd 1999, 381; 392; Hurd 2008, 164; Hurd 2015, 54). More recently, Giovanni Mantilla suggests that hypocrisy can act as a “productive engine” of socialization (Mantilla 2020b, 177). The interesting theoretical proposition then is that governmental positions do not develop exclusively within some national context but rather are in some part constituted (or “constructed”) by the wider interstate social context. I accordingly see the challenge as further invitation to international relations research analysis, including wherever a need to “read between the lines” appears.

This leads to a second point on the available primary source-work. There are a number of ways to grapple with what national statements actually mean and do not mean. Even so there is no definitive, formulaic solution to the concern that talk is cheap. The best way to address the concern is to examine the source-work in as judicious a manner as possible and in accordance with a clear step-by-step procedure for others to scrutinize. My emphasis here is therefore to explicate the due diligence in my research procedure. One way to do this is by examining what states say in the conversation’s context, and consider the extent to which it is consistent with prior positions or positions taken in other contexts. If for example, a state expresses a position as a matter of principle, then one should expect to find prior consistency in that position in relation

to the issue or set of issues under consideration. If that is not the case, and the position taken in principle seems to have come about in a more sudden manner, then it can very well seem that something is up. The position that the state expresses—if, among other things, an echo of that same principle—can then seem in some part a response to some interstate social circumstances rather than its own wholesale expression of the position. Whatever the particular case, the manner in which the state expresses the position, as the above research process emphasizes, can provide hints as to its motivations.

A final way to address the empirical concern is to cross-reference analysis against the broader historical context. Cross-referencing can entail attending to the extent to which states “talk the talk” *and* “walk the walk”. Jon Elster, among other scholars, suggests two specific techniques. The first technique is to contemplate the “objective interests” of the state in question and assume that they coincide with the given statement in the absence of compelling evidence that suggests the contrary (Elster 2015, 48). The second technique is to focus on the “actual consequences” of the statement and assume that, in the absence of contrary evidence, they match what the state intends to say (Elster 2015, 48). Both of these techniques seem useful and will make their way into the research investigation, insofar as there are “objective interests” and/or “actual consequences” available for study. Still none of these techniques necessarily provide a solution to “take to the bank” and alone count on. My intent in their use is to help stir up further discussion in the later case studies, embracing some degree of uncertainty in an account that nevertheless seems most persuasive.

Chapter Five

Racial Discrimination in the Union of South Africa

1946-1961

Enquires indicated that if we abstained, we would find ourselves alone. There would be serious and world-wide misrepresentations, and Australia would incur a solitary hostility among African and Asian nations. The choice was therefore between my own own personal position, which became one of humiliation, and in fact exposed me to considerable ridicule, and the general repute of my country. Under these circumstances, we decided that, with reservations orally indicated by our representative, we would vote with the United Kingdom (Prime Minister Robert Menzies 1961 in PREM 11/3598, 9).

Chapter Outline

Recall that my aim is to test a social constructivist perspective on interstate socialization. I draw upon diplomatic history at the United Nations—and especially, the General Assembly—as the vortex for that interstate socialization in a global, multilateral context. My research question concerns how states can initiate a socialization process that cumulatively builds a consensus on an issue over time. By consensus, I mean an overwhelming public—and not necessarily private or internalized—extent of agreement among states on an issue. My argument is that a core coalition of states can create a spotlight of diplomatic pressure that draws into focus an issue. That diplomatic pressure sets in motion a process of collective legitimization, which assumes a life of its own and creates common expectations that make support for a particular position “legitimate”. Over time, these expectations can incline other states—in particular, those opposing or otherwise “on the fence”—towards joining in on a common position, leading to a convergence in expectations in relation to the issue. What results is interstate socialization that takes place in the sense that public—though not necessarily private—viewpoints converge around a common, more “legitimate” or socially sustainable stance on the issue. Socialization subjects do not necessarily take to heart and change their own internal views. At a minimum, they publicly repudiate what has become an “illegitimate” or socially unsustainable position.

I now test this argument on my first empirical case study: “apartheid” or racial discrimination in South Africa. This case study can span a half century of proceedings the General Assembly from the mid 1940s to the mid 1990s. I cannot weigh my theoretical point in relation to all those proceedings. Instead, I maintain focus on a specific time period, from 1946 to 1961. I focus on this tract of time for the following empirical reason. 1946 was the First Session of the General Assembly and was also the session that member states first considered the question of racial discrimination in South Africa. 1961, on the other end, was the year that member states reached an almost unanimous consensus on the issue.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The introduction suggests a compendious empirical background for this case study. This acclimates the reader with the empirical context, including with how the Government of India alongside other core states created a global, multilateral “issue” out of the status quo in South Africa. My commentary alludes to theoretical argument chapter’s analysis on “information politics”, particularly as it relates to the requirement that socialization agents specify and categorize an issue (Rosert 2019). The introduction also considers international relations literature on South Africa. The most relevant theoretical work is

Audie Klotz's *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid*. Although the work applies to a different period—namely, from the mid-1960s onwards—the section distances itself from Klotz's work in its theoretical emphasis on the diffusion of a global norm on racial equality. The reason is because one can already make the case for a universal *interstate* acceptance of that norm by the First Session of the General Assembly in 1946.

Following the introduction, I proceed to the chapter's three main parts. Each of these parts corresponds to the three-step means of analysis in the data and methods chapter. Part one makes the case for a “core” coalition of states—namely, a support base—on the question of racial discrimination in South Africa. The main proponents of the position were the Soviet Union (as well as states associated with the Eastern Bloc) and states that later formed the Non-Aligned Movement. India and the latter were among the coalition's most vocal proponents. I identify these core states from proceedings on South Africa in 1946 at the United Nations. Those states took a clear, unequivocal stance on the issue in that year and in each subsequent year until 1961. I also identify these states given their more vocal support for the position throughout those years. My task is to theorize the views that those states express. I take a close look at the discursive practices (or “rhetorical action”) that the socializing agents use to pressure others into support for the cause. As we shall see, agents manipulate common norms in an attempt to galvanize interstate support against racism in South Africa. This point does not mean that the agents necessarily stand on some moral high ground. It allows the theoretical suggestion that the agents engage in rhetorical action for more cynical reasons.

Part Two considers the extent to which the core coalition of states' efforts influenced other state positions on the question of racial discrimination in South Africa. It pays attention to how those latter positions change, with particular attention to states that were in previous years not in favor of a clear, unequivocal stance on the issue. I comment on the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada respectively as examples. I use these three states as illustrative country cases for empirical reasons. The first reason is that Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom were among the states that had been on the fence. Put otherwise, these three states had not taken a clear and unequivocal stance against apartheid throughout all but the final year of study. I also refer to Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom because these country cases present an abundance of empirical evidence to examine. As we shall see, each one of these examples provides access to a rich and even rare set of primary materials.

My empirical argument is that close observation of the manner in which these positions change suggests evidence for an interstate socialization process set in motion by the core coalition of states. This is to say that my theoretical argument's observable implication—following Ian Hurd's 2005 and 2008 works—comes from the specific manner in which state representatives express changes in national positions on apartheid. Hence how state representatives articulate ideas against the status quo makes the difference; it makes some states potential socialization subjects and others not. The observable implication does *not*, to be clear, come from the fact that “everyone condemned South Africa”. In addition, my observable implication also comes from a collation of supplementary primary source-work that lends more direct support to the interpretation. This latter strand of evidence also helps contemplate the influence of certain empirical conditioning factors, namely factors that contribute to the eventual interstate consensus against apartheid by April 1961 (Tocci 2008). In this chapter, the most important empirical conditioning factors are the emergence of newly independent states from

Africa and Asia, South Africa's unwillingness to make concessions, and South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth.

In Part Three, I finally cross-check my inferences against alternative perspectives. These alternative perspectives come from international relations critiques addressed in the theoretical literature review. The most relevant is the point on material resource inducement, which can serve as a theoretical antagonist to the present social constructivist account. Other alternative perspectives come from historical accounts on the present empirical circumstances, including South Africa's insistence on maintaining its apartheid policies.

Introduction

Racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa first came onto the agenda at the United Nations in 1946, during the First Session of the General Assembly. It is important to note that the issue did not gain the platform thanks to some universal interstate concern for racial discrimination, as can now seem the case from the commemoration of Nelson Mandela International Day (A/RES/64/13). Nor did the issue become and remain an "issue" worth interstate attention thanks to a global abhorrence to apartheid, as the more recent interstate unanimity on the matter can suggest (A/RES/44/244; A/RES/48/233; A/RES/44/27; *et al.*). The issue was from the outset disputatious. It became a subject of global, multilateral concern owed to the Government of India's specific complaint about racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa (A/68; A/68/Add.1). Absent India's (and later Pakistan's) diplomatic efforts, it is unclear—at least, until the late 1950s—how else racial discrimination in South Africa would have come onto the agenda. Thus in 1946, there was no inevitable trajectory on the agenda item's eventual life-span. It was from the onset high-maintenance, requiring significant interstate support to remain in the global, interstate "spotlight". Absent that support, the issue lost its airtime, as was the case at the Second Session of the General Assembly in 1947.

The substance of India's complaint pointed to racial discrimination in aspects of socio-economic and political life in the Union of South Africa (A/68; A/68/Add.1; A/C.1&6/SR.1-6, 52-131). It toured the relevant albeit by then long-standing pieces of national legislation, which culminated with the Land Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act (or "Ghetto Act") in 1946. For India, that most recent measure gave "permanent recognition to the principle of segregation", which was the subject of its protest since the late eighteenth hundreds (A/68, 30-1). That protest took various forms and came up in imperial conferences, roundtable meetings, correspondence, and various attempts at negotiation, compromise and agreement (A/68; A/68/Add.1; A/167; *et al.*). As early as 1875, for example, the then Secretary of State for India was adamant that formerly indentured persons become "free men in all respects with privileges no whit inferior to those of any class of Her Majesty's subjects resident in the colonies" (A/SPC/SR.7, 24). The Government of India maintained that position over the years, but saw that it was not one to which the authorities in South Africa—both before and after it became a union of former colonies in 1910—had been amenable (A/68; A/68/Add.1; A/577; A/PV.50; A/1794). Accordingly by 1946, the Union of South South Africa defended the practice of racial segregation (A/167). "Necessary measures [were] introduced from time to time to meet the needs of the day, and which are mainly concerned to relieve the tensions caused by the residential juxtaposition of different races, with clashing creeds and cultural dissimilarities" (A/167, 1).

India saw its turn towards the United Nations as a last resort. At the General Assembly, its delegation sought to organize an international response to the status quo and leverage its diplomatic pressure on third states, as my theoretical argument chapter suggests. In Ambassador Vijayalakshmi Pandit's words,

...over many years my government irrespective of its constitution and character, has appealed complained, protested sought compromises and agreements and finally has been forced into retaliation and to bring this matter before the bar of world opinion. The Union Government has taken no step, and even during the proceedings in this Assembly, despite the suggestion we have thrown out, has not given the slightest indication that it contemplates even the temporary suspension of even the latest installment of its offending legislation (A/PV.50, 1016-1017).

The "bar of world opinion" took shape in response to a draft resolution named after India's complaint in 1946: "Treatment of People of Indian Origin in the Union of South Africa" (/RES/44(I); A/RES/265(III); A/RES/395(V); *et al.*). The resolution addressed a specific issue over the some thirteen years, from 1946 to 1959. As the title suggests, it invited other member states to evaluate life for people of Indian origin in South Africa. And it also called on India and South Africa to talk things out, including via a good offices mediation initiative (A/205; A/1548). Aside from that, the resolution left the rest open for other states to consider, which they did both in connection with that resolution and another on the Future Status of Southwest Africa (A/RES/65(I); A/RES/141(II); A/RES/227(III); *et al.*). In 1952, India and other states threw another, more explicit resolution into the conversation: "The Question of Race Conflict ... in the Union of South Africa" (A/2183; A/2610; A/3722; *et al.*). That resolution spoke to more recent circumstances at the time: the introduction of a policy of "apartheid" by Prime Minister Daniel Malan's National Party in 1948. The resolution was more explicit on the question of racial discrimination, but for consecutive sessions put in writing what had been in conversation from the outset, as we shall later see. The applicable time period for that latter agenda item is from 1952 to 1961.

Empirical case studies on the Union of South Africa have been the subject of disparate research efforts in the international relations research tradition. The most theoretically relevant is Audie Klotz's *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (1995). From a social constructivist perspective, the work asks how the diffusion of an international norm on racial equality by the mid 1960s led to interstate sanctions policies by the mid 1980s (Klotz 1995, 6). It makes the case that the increasing strength of a global norm on racial equality provides a systemic explanation for the adoption of military and economic sanctions against the Union of South Africa. The work argues, for example, that the United States' eventual adoption of sanctions against South Africa came in response to global pressures for racial equality (Klotz 1995, 93-111). The United States "responded to rather than initiated... global pressures for racial equality" (Klotz 1994, 93). "Racial equality became a prerequisite for attaining material goals. The norm redefined U.S. interests" (Klotz 1995, 111). Notwithstanding Klotz's empirical concern with material sanctions, which speaks to a time frame that this thesis cannot cover, the work remains the closest theoretical counterpart to this chapter. It provides a social constructivist account on how common expectations shaped the adoption of material sanctions against the Union of South Africa, and in a manner inconsistent with rationalist accounts on international relations.

In theoretical terms, I distance myself from Klotz's analysis on one key point: the assertion that a common interstate position on racial equality had been strengthening from the mid 1960s onwards. The reason is because an already strong, virtually unanimous *interstate* norm on racial equality existed by the First Session of the General Assembly (1946-1947). In Resolution 103(I), for example, member states expressed virtually unanimous common cause in an Egyptian proposal to call for "an immanent end to... racial persecutions and discrimination", and thus to "take the most prompt and energetic steps to that end" (A/RES/103(I)). France, like other member states, was clear and unequivocal:

I belong to a country which is particularly proud of the fact that its laws have never recognized any inequality of treatment on racial grounds. I may add that our way of life and our national thought are, and always have been, radically opposed to any such conception.

The French delegation will therefore vote wholeheartedly for the proposal of the representative of Egypt (A/PV.48, 975).

Throughout the year's plenary meetings, numerous delegations also reaffirmed credence in the same ideas via articles one, thirteen, fifty-five and fifty-six of the Charter (A/PV.6; A/PV.7; A/PV.8; A/PV.9; *et al.*). They also further set out those ideas with work on what culminated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (A/PV.183). This is to say that racial equality *per se* was an uncontroversial interstate expectation by the time the United Nations came into existence.

This also seems more so the case if one takes a step back to consider what member states at the time made of experiences in World War Two, which for most were part and parcel with notions of racial discrimination. In consideration of Resolution 103(I), Poland was among those to draw out the point:

The Polish nation was for six years under nazi occupation, and knows what racial discrimination means. Six million of our citizens perished during that occupation; more than three million of these were Jews. We welcome, therefore, the spirit of the resolution (A/PV.47, 959).

Some norm on racial equality may have flourished (or strengthened) in the years to come, as Klotz argues, and as a series of other unanimous resolutions can indicate (A/RES/1536(XV); A/RES/1780(XVII); A/RES/18/1904; *et al.*). However those resolutions, which have been succeeded by others until today, hardly seem to have drawn upon a more hard-pressed intersubjective backdrop than what came from World War Two. By the First Session of the General Assembly, some interstate expectation on racial equality was therefore already strong. The issue was by then, as one delegation put it, a "burning question" on the global interstate agenda (A/PV.47, 959).

Some member states may not have initially manifest support for the expectation at the time in relation to South Africa. But it does not follow that those states did not "take to heart" or were ambivalent towards an interstate norm on racial equality. On the contrary, some states were more inclined to stand alongside South Africa in its "stiff fight" with India, and were therefore more willing to at least remain in a "shell of reserve" on the substantive matter (*Times*, 25.3.1960 in Dubow 2011, 1111; *Times of India*, 10.3.1948). From a social constructivist perspective, the reason speaks back to the point that Alexander Wendt makes about "friendship". The main idea

was that the presence of certain friendships can make some states more supportive towards others in relation to some common issue, especially if that issue concerns or “attacks” the specific state. That political sense of friendship seems prevalent in the present case study. For example, a number of delegations on India’s complaint were proud to point out the close socio-economic, political and military relationships with South Africa—including in connection with a position against fascism in World War Two and communism in the nascent Cold War (A/AC.53/SR. 32, 172; A/AC.61/SR.11,54; A/SPC/SR.87, 17; A/SPC/SR.86, 8-9; A/SPC/SR.123, 173; *et al.*). It is intuitive to suppose that sense of friendship in turn made some states—at least in 1946—more sympathetic towards South Africa’s position than India’s. Hence an interstate norm on racial equality *per se* was present from the outset, but was nevertheless not a byword for a common intergovernmental position on South Africa given other priorities. As the next section postulates, that synonymousness took the proactive efforts of a coalition of states to construct.

Part One

The Core Coalition

India was from the outset was central to creating the global, multilateral issue out of racial discrimination in South Africa and opening up the possibility for its prolonged treatment at the United Nations. India, however, was not alone in the endeavor. A core coalition of states coalesced around shared, unequivocal opposition to racial discrimination in the country in 1946 and in each subsequent year until 1961. This section takes a close look at that coalition of states—in particular, its more outspoken members—as the first step in its research procedure. Per my theoretical argument, I make the case for rhetorical action: the core coalition strategically manipulated common norms in an attempt to mobilize more interstate opposition to the status quo in South Africa.

As set out in my theoretical argument chapter, one specific way that a core coalition of states can achieve this is via an appeal to some “stamp of political approval or disapproval” in relation to a particular situation. This means that the core states attempt to situate or “frame” an issue within some already accepted *interstate* normative framework, such that the two become seen as one and the same. In the present case study, the coalition’s efforts can speak to this theoretical point. Some states consistently held out the status quo in South Africa as a normative question—in particular, one that resonates with a wider, interstate moral abhorrence to racial discrimination (A/PV.50, 1019; A/PV.51, 1029; 1038-1040; A/C.1/SR.107; A/PV.120, 1146; A/PV.360, 329-330; *et al.*). In 1946, the Indian delegation’s perspective encapsulates the point:

The bitter memories of racial doctrines in the practice of States and Governments are still fresh in the minds of all of us. Their evil and tragic consequences are part of the problems with which we are called upon to deal (A/PV.37, 732).

Six weeks later, at the plenary meetings, the Indian delegation made the further point:

We appreciate fully the difficulties and embarrassment of many countries on different questions, but on this question, there has been little basic difference of opinion, and abstention in this instance can only indicate to the world a lack of concern in a vital human problem. I ask you not to abstain. Let us have the courage of our convictions and vote for the Charter (A/PV.50, 1018).

As the commentary suggests, the Indian delegation pushed for a notion of appropriateness that could come across as more congenial to third states. The status quo was not just abhorrent to India or its coalition counterparts; it was abhorrent in reference to some wider intersubjective, interstate consensus on racism. The “bitter memories of racial doctrines” were held out to have been “still fresh in the minds of all”, and were by extension resonant with a normative stance against racial discrimination in specific relation to South Africa. Hence India also claimed “little basic difference of opinion” on the issue. India and other states were also more explicit in its appeal to some “stamp of political approval or disapproval”. Its delegation pointed, for example, to the recent adoption of Resolution 103(I) as evidence of “couching the unanimous will to wipe out all sorts of discrimination, whether due to race, religion or creed” (A/PV.51, 1037).

This is to say that a core coalition of states made an attempt to project a sense of legitimacy into a position against the status quo in South Africa by manipulating its resonance (or “frame”) within a common norm on racial equality. It also amplified that intersubjective resonance by “cuing”, namely by prompting other delegations to see dissonance between the status quo and interstate expectations on racial discrimination. A coalition of states did this by making that dissonance appear as though it was from the outset becoming more and more stark, such that its interstate repercussions were becoming more and more “abhorrent” (A/PV.315, 532; A/PV. 401, 336; A/577, 4; Nehru in Trumbull 1949, 19). In 1946, the Soviet Union was among those to hammer on the point:

Over a period of many decades, in South Africa as well as in the South African Union, and in the separate South African Republics even before the creation of the Union, discrimination was systematically fostered and continues to be fostered; furthermore, it is increasing year by year, becoming more and more acute and assuming a more and more provocative and acute character (A/PV.52, 1041).

India’s delegation pushed even further to insist that “the case ... contained in its racialism the seeds of the next war” (Pandit in *NY Times* 1.12.1946). One can refute the social construction of this position, for example by suggesting that racial discrimination in South Africa was abhorrent in its own terms. One could then also contend that the status quo was in fact deteriorating at the time in reference to the kind of national legislation being put into force. That legislation could relate to the later outline of a policy of “apartheid” by Daniel Malan’s National Party in 1948. Yet it is not obvious that those later apartheid policies were by 1948 in themselves any more “abhorrent” than those that preceded them. There are at least three reasons why.

First, South Africa’s own position did not alone spell out some inherent abhorrence to racial discrimination at the time. As South Africa’s delegation emphasized in October 1946, “the Government was determined to maintain its Christian civilizing mission in South Africa and would not allow the work of centuries to be undone” (A/167, 15). “The Indian Memorandum... [contains] no recognition of the economic, social and educational advantage which the Indians in South Africa have enjoyed, which have placed them far in advance of their kind in India” (A/167, 1). “The presence of a large Indian population in South Africa is the physical proof of their satisfaction with the conditions of Natal” (A/167, 3-4). One can make the same point about Prime Minister Malan’s vision for apartheid. In the National Party’s own words, apartheid sought the “welfare of South Africa, and to promote the well-being and happiness of its citizens, both white and non- white” (National Party 1947). It was to “safeguard the future of every race in the

country”, and regard “any policy of oppression or exploitation of the non-whites by the whites as ... unacceptable” (National Party 1947). This remained the position of later prime ministers Johannes Strijdom and Hendrik Verwoerd. As Hendrik Verwoerd put it in August 1960, “the policy of separate development is not based on the desire to suppress any non-white group. To the contrary it is seen as a solution by means of which Whites would not dominate any of the colored peoples” (Verwoerd 1960 in Menzies 1968, 203).

Second, on the deterioration point, the policies of apartheid were not a departure from what had been by 1946 a familiar experience in area. In 1952, the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa reached that conclusion in its extensive study. The Commission emphasized, for example, that “the racial problem in the Union of South Africa... is no new thing in the life of the nation and did not begin when the Nationalist Party conceived and began to apply the so-called *apartheid* doctrine” (A/2505, 115). “Apartheid” was then only a repackaged, local substitute term for racial “segregation” that meant to “breath new life into an old concept” (A/2505, 53). Apartheid then was only a “recent development of an old situation” (A/2505, 58). This point is also consistent with the National Party’s own outline of the policy, which emphasized that apartheid was a “concept historically derived from the experience of the stablished white population of the country” (National Party 1947). Thus for these two reasons, one *can* suggest that a coalition of states from the outset projected the atmospherics of a deteriorating situation in South Africa. That projection tapped into—and in turn accentuated—a pre-existing, collective sense of abhorrence to racism.

A corollary to the core coalition’s rhetorical action were normative assertions against apartheid that were meant to supersede procedural assertions against the United Nations’ competence on the issue. The specific line of argument was that the normative ramifications of racial discrimination in South Africa were so abhorrent that they warranted unequivocal interstate condemnation, despite the norms on non-intervention that some delegations insisted on (A/PV.50, 1019; A/PV.51, 1039-40; A/PV.360, 329; A/PV.52, 1042; *et al.*). As India’s Ambassador Pandit argued,

The issue brought before you is by no means a narrow or local one. Nor can we accept any contention that a gross and continuing outrage of this kind against the fundamental principles of the Charter can be claimed by anyone, and least of all by a Member State, to be a matter of no concern to this Assembly of the world’s peoples (A/PV.37, 732).

A more explicit formulation of the position came from the Kingdom of Iraq’s delegation:

This is not a question of internal affairs... It is a much bigger issue, a human question in which Asiatic is against the Westerner, colored against white—vast international implications extending far beyond the shores of Cape Town. Unless the people of Korea, Indo-China, and elsewhere in Asia feel the United Nations stands for brotherhood among men, all our work here will be in vain (Jamali in *The New York Times*, 15.11.1950).

This is to say that a core coalition of states asserted that the issue’s normative ramifications were so ignominious—or, as India’s delegation put it, “grave and momentous”—that they demanded immediate interstate attention and by extension unequivocal denunciation (A/C.1&6/SR.1-6, 26). The issue was therefore “by no means a narrow or local”, as India’s delegation put it in 1946 (A/PV.37, 732). It presented a problem that was of “deep international concern”, “supreme

importance to all our countries”, “affected all nations and all the peoples of the world”, and so on (A/C.1&6/SR.1-6, 23; A/PV. 120, 1146; A/PV.212, 430; A/PV.213, 432).

The abhorrence to racial discrimination meant to supersede and in turn vitiate certain delegations’ procedural position against the United Nations’ competence on the issue. A common reference for this procedural position was article two section seven of the Charter, which asserts that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”. Accordingly some delegations held that apartheid was not a global, multilateral concern (A/PV.50, 1010-12; 1031; A/PV.51, 1032; *et al.*). The following intervention by the French delegation provides an example of the viewpoint:

When the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly considered our agenda item entitled “The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Union of South Africa”, the French delegation stated its view that that question fell essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Union of South Africa...

The policy practiced by the government of any Member State towards its own nationals, within its own frontiers, is an intrinsic part of the sovereign rights reserved for the jurisdiction of each State and jealously safeguarded against even the best intentioned incursions by the organized collectivity of the other members of the international community. By committing one violation of those rights, no matter how important the particular case may be, the United Nations collectively commits a breach of the Charter and at the same time endangers the security of each Member (A/PV.401, 335)

Notice that this intervention is at most tepid about opposition to the status quo but does not challenge head-on the common norm on racism that the core coalition of states put into question. As the Polish delegation observed in 1946, “it is difficult of course for many delegations to say: ‘We are in support of racial discrimination; we are in support of the oppression of the Indians in the Union of South Africa’” (A/PV.120, 1162). Thus the latter position allows normative sentiment to reverberate unopposed year after year, and opens the door to rhetorical “self-entrapment” at the United Nations. I say self-entrapment because the proponents of the latter arguments drew from near identical norms in other contexts, but would not support them in relation to South Africa. An example includes the United Kingdom and its later position on decolonization some twelve years later, as we shall discuss in the next section.

Part Two

We just paid close attention to the more proactive members of a core coalition of states that took shape by virtue of a shared, initial position against racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa in 1946. We now consider the extent to which those efforts pressured other states to take similar positions, with particular attention to how third state positions change over the next decade and a half. I argue that the core coalition’s diplomatic efforts set in motion a process of collective legitimization, which in turn inclined third states into adopting a clear and unequivocal stance against apartheid in 1961. I refer to the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada as illustrative country cases.

The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is one example of a state that seems to have been influenced by India and other states' cumulative efforts since the First Session of the General Assembly in 1946. The most relevant facts are as follows. In April 1961, the United Kingdom took a clear and unequivocal position against apartheid after some some fifteen years of reservation. At the Special Political Committee, its delegation made the following point:

Apartheid confronts us with the circumstances which are, so far as I know, unique in the annals of this Organization. We see the deliberate adoption, retention and development of a policy specifically based on total racial discrimination. This is further distinguished by the circumstance that it is discrimination amongst and against the permanent inhabitants of the country itself. Such a policy, which is a deliberate exaltation of discriminatory principles, stands alone in its category (Smithers in De Lint 1976, 17).

At the later plenary meetings, the United Kingdom's delegation made the further point:

The United Kingdom delegation, upon further consideration, decided to vote in favor of the draft resolution...We consider that this is essentially an aspect of apartheid which is now no longer of purely domestic concern, for reasons we have explained elsewhere in the United Nations (A/PV.981, 261).

Throughout that same session, the United Kingdom's delegation further clarified its position with votes in favor of the then two resolutions on South Africa. Those resolutions recalled all prior resolutions on the issue, and in one case took an explicit position against racial discrimination in the country (A/RES/1663(XVI); A/RES/1662(XVI)). As Commonwealth Relations Office observed, the position was "a new departure of policy" from a long-standing position on South Africa (PREM 11/3598). Otherwise put, the United Kingdom's stance was a move "off the fence", as a 1961 news piece from *The Guardian* put it (*The Guardian*, 6.4.1961).

The first observation one must make about the position is what it does not in its own terms suggest: a concern for—or "discovery" of—the policies of apartheid in South Africa. If that were the case, then one would expect to find some previous interstate proceedings that demonstrate as much. Apartheid had been an explicit policy for some for some fifteen years, and drew from explicit segregation laws that had beset the country for many more years before. This leads to the question as to whether there had been some change in the domestic circumstances to encourage the above position. This was in some part the United Kingdom's view, as its time-specific reference to "now" can suggest. There is some traction in the perspective, as the by then one year-old Sharpeville incident can suggest. On those terms, one would need to expect that the incident was so abhorrent that it alone countenanced condemnation in the above manner. One would also then need to expect that comparable incidents—that is, those which involve mass casualties at the hands of the local authorities—were also abhorrent enough to warrant condemnation in a comparable manner. That condemnation would entail some manifest opposition to similar such incidents since 1946, the first of which was the Witwatersrand Strike (Dubow 2008, 67-8). Yet no such opposition to those incidents exists at the United Nations, as the United Kingdom's previous engagement with interstate proceedings on South Africa indicates. In fact, throughout those years—and in light of those circumstances—the United Kingdom was so far removed from the interstate conversation that it "refused to identify...in any

way with the discussion on the substance of the matter or with the draft resolutions arising from it” (A/PV.401, 334). This suggests that some change in circumstances—for example, as measured by mass casualties brought on by local authorities—was alone not enough to render the status quo so exceptional to warrant clear, unequivocal condemnation.

One can further substantiate this point in reference to the United Kingdom’s position on Sharpeville at the time. At the General Debate, the United Kingdom had in the past acknowledged the occasion as an “annual debate upon the state of the world where we together survey the achievements and the failures of the past twelve months” (A/PV.758, 144). Yet in 1960, its delegation was not taken aback by the incident. It did not raise Sharpeville—nor the status quo in South Africa more broadly—as a cause for global, multilateral concern (A/PV.877, 223-227). Moreover at the Security Council, the United Kingdom’s immediate position was to abstain on a resolution that other states brought to the table a month after the incident. That resolution called on South Africa to bring about “racial harmony based on equality in order to ensure that the present situation does not continue to recur” (S/4300; S/PV.853, 21-23; S/PV.856, 13). At most, the United Kingdom’s immediate position on Sharpeville was to express “deep sympathy with all the people of the Union of South Africa in the tragic events which have taken place” (A/PV.853, 21). It was also, on the flip side, to recognize the “indisputable right and the duty of any Government to use the forces at its disposal to maintain law and order within its own territory” (A/PV.853, 21). This is to say that the United Kingdom’s immediate position was not a clear, explicit stance against apartheid. Sharpeville was thus not an inflection point. It was not a significant, empirical conditioning factor in the United Kingdom’s move “off the fence”—contrary to what the above statement can suggest.

This allows for a preliminary, social constructivist interpretation of the above stance against racial discrimination in South Africa. The empirical basis for that interpretation comes from *how* the position articulates a stance against the status quo. The articulation of that stance seems influenced by India and other states’ efforts at the First Session of the General Assembly, and at each successive session since. The first reason is that it echoes a specific set of ideas that those states had long been in favor of. Like the core states, it argues that the status quo in the country was so “unique”—or, “grave and momentous”, as India’s delegation put it in 1946—that it warranted unequivocal condemnation. As those states had done, the position suggests a socially mediated, normative ramification to racial discrimination in South Africa that was so abhorrent that it ought to supersede all other considerations (including procedural considerations on the United Nations’ competence). This became more apparent when the British delegation emphasized its own “repugnance for the theories underlying the practice of racial discrimination in South Africa” (A/SPC/SR.339, 66). Moreover like the core states, the position also sees the status quo as so abhorrent that it warranted unequivocal *interstate* condemnation. It finds that the nature of racial discrimination in South Africa was not a “purely domestic concern”, or “by no means a narrow or local” as the India put it in 1946. It was one which “concerned all nations of the world”, as the Mexican delegation put it that same year (A/C.1&6/SR.1-6, 23). Hence the specific manner in which the United Kingdom formulated ideas against the status quo suggests that it was moved by the diplomatic pressure that a core coalition of states brought to bear on the issue.

A second reason to support this social constructivist interpretation relates to the nature of interstate proceedings from 1960 to 1961. An indication comes from the large expansion of

membership at the United Nations, as Newell Stultz emphasizes (Stultz 1991, 4-6). From 1960 to 1961, thirteen out of fourteen new member states came from Africa. And from 1961 to 1962, all four new member states again came from Africa. Admission of these new member states amounted to a some twenty-two percent increase in membership at the United Nations. This expansion of membership matters, because those states were ardent about questions of racial discrimination, and even more so in relation to South Africa. Sir Brian Urquhart, then Under Secretary-General, made a relevant observation:

The fall of 1960 was a turning point. The balance in the General Assembly was radically changing, reflecting a new and very different world from the polarized East-West state of affairs of the 1940s and 1950s. New interest and new forces were coming into play. Power vacuums were occurring in sensitive areas of the world in the wake of decolonization (Urquhart 1987, 171).

These new states are thus an essential, empirical conditioning factor. They added significant momentum to the coalition's diplomatic campaign against apartheid, which exerted its influence with more intensity thanks to their support. This seems apparent in what some delegations—that is, those otherwise on the fence—observed to be the “more bitter” tone of interstate proceedings on South Africa (A/SPC/SR.241, 72). More importantly, it also seems apparent in what the United Kingdom made of its own position on South Africa before making it public. In 1961, for example, the Foreign Office made the following observation in a confidential telegram to its Permanent Mission in New York:

Our position, both generally in the United Nations and in relation to the Afro-Asian powers, would be much strengthened if we could vote in favor of the Indian resolution. If we failed to do so, it would be widely resented and misunderstood, particularly in light of the Prime Minister's remarks in the House of Commons (March 22) to the effect that apartheid had become a matter of more than domestic interest in South Africa (PREM 11/3598, 52).

In that telegram, the Foreign Office went on to emphasize the “strong political case for changing our policy in respect of the apartheid issue” (PREM 11/3598, 53). There are at least two key points to make on the statement. One is that it evidences a concern for the United Kingdom's position on apartheid vis-a-vis a global, multilateral audience of states. The other point is that it evidences a specific, more newfound concern for that position vis-a-vis an African and Asian interstate audience. The Foreign Office puts the two concerns together to envision an intersubjective sense of wide resentment towards its long-standing position, as well as a subjective sense of rhetorical entrapment given the need to maintain consistency with more recent positions on decolonization set out at the General Assembly in 1959 (A/PV. 798, 23). On this last point, the British Mission in New York was more direct, stating in another confidential telegram that the status quo was socially unsustainable: “to continue to abstain would be embarrassing” (PREM 11/3598, 19). This further supports the interpretation that the United Kingdom's eventual position on South Africa was influenced by the more normative aspects of the interstate social environment at the time, which India and other states first brought to bear on the issue in 1946.

Further empirical support for this interpretation comes from another confidential telegram written by Alec Douglas-Home, the then Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. While

on an official visit to Nigeria, the Commonwealth Secretary made the following point to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in support of India's position on racial discrimination in South Africa at the United Nations in April 1961.

I am sure it would be a mistake to abstain or vote against paragraph 5 of [the] Indian resolution. These resolutions are never wholly satisfactory to everybody and should, I think, be looked at as a whole. The effect of our voting for the first time in favor of a resolution deploring apartheid would be considerably diminished if we started quibbling about the exact wording (PREM 11/3598, 41).

Douglas-Home's observation further supports the point that the United Kingdom was influenced by the core coalition's diplomatic pressure on South Africa. It suggests that its decision makers meant to announce a stance against racial discrimination in the country, based on the significance that other states like Nigeria attached to it. That sense of significance, the observation suggests, in turn pressured policy makers like Douglas-Home to see the issue in those terms. Procedural concerns about competence, wording and the like become relatively unimportant as a result of those efforts. Hence the Commonwealth Secretary's main emphasis is on the interstate, social "effect" that support for a position against racial discrimination in South Africa meant to produce at the United Nations. The Commonwealth Secretary made another, more explicit observation in relation to newly independent states from Africa:

I spoke yesterday to Abubakar about our future attitude towards apartheid. I said that we would probably be prepared to vote for a suitable resolution condemning South Africa's racial policies provided it did not contain demands for sanctions or other positive measures. He welcomed this and thought there would be great advantage from [the] point of view of our relations with African states if we and they could vote for an agreed resolution drafted on those lines. He added that this would naturally not repeat not prevent [sic] Nigeria from supporting in addition other resolutions of a stronger kind.

This latter observation speaks back to the point about the momentum that new states from Africa adding brought to the diplomatic campaign against racial discrimination in South Africa. It further substantiates the claim that the United Kingdom's move off the fence also given the position's particular significance to African states. Thus the Commonwealth Secretary contemplates an intersubjective, "great advantage" vis-a-vis African states as relevant to a stance against racial discrimination in the country.

There are several secondary sources one must consider in relation to the above interpretation on interstate socialization. The most relevant is Ronald Hyam's and Peter Henshaw's historical account on the United Kingdom's bilateral relationship with South Africa, which includes attention to proceedings at the United Nations (Hyam and Henshaw 2003, 146-167). The two authors make an important point: the United Kingdom's move off the fence in April 1961 was primarily motivated by a need to maintain a sense of "moral leadership" in overseas territories, especially to ensure that states about to emerge from colonial rule would remain in the Commonwealth (Hyam and Henshaw 2003, 161). That sense of moral leadership "was being so gravely cast into doubt by the British stand on the South African disputes", and perhaps even more so given its increased isolation on those issues (Hyam and Henshaw 2003, 161). Hyam and Henshaw write,

Progress towards independence, instead of being geared to local political development, accelerated under the influence of political changes elsewhere. And with each further grant of independence in Africa or Asia, international pressure on the colonial powers, instead of being eased, intensified as the ranks of the newly independent nations swelled at the UN (Hyam and Henshaw 2003, 161).

Hence Hyam and Henshaw emphasize a concern for moral leadership, and suggest an external interstate political context that called it into question. A concern for moral leadership entails a relational concern for the interstate political context that may or may not recognize it as such. This point supports the above theoretical interpretation that the United Kingdom's position on South Africa was moved by the interstate social environment of the time. Were that not the case, British officials would have been content with their own notion of moral leadership and been done with it. But as the two authors emphasize, that was not the case. The architects of British foreign policy saw that "more harm is being done to our reputation as a Colonial Power by our attitude on these South African items, than is being done by any troubles that may occur in the Colonies themselves" (Lloyd 1960 in Hyam and Henshaw 2003, 162).

Hyam and Henshaw also imply a particular concern for some notion of moral leadership vis-a-vis African states because some of them were former British territories or in the process becoming independent. Moral leadership on questions of racial discrimination would have been especially important to keep those states within the Commonwealth. This lends credence to the previous point on newly independent states adding momentum to the persistent diplomatic campaign on South Africa. A similar perspective comes from Saul Dubow, who suggests that the potential spread of communism throughout Africa was a motive to formulate an eventual position against racial discrimination in South Africa in light of Prime Minister MacMillan's 1960 Winds of Change address. "Adoption of a coherent African policy was judged vital in a context where colonial influence was dissipating and where the ensuing power vacuum invited African nationalists to seek the support of communists" (Dubow 2011, 1096). Hence "Macmillan's disapproval of apartheid had more to do with the difficulties this posed for Britain's position in the rest of Africa, the Central African Federation in particular, than its effects on black South Africans" (Dubow 2011, 1099). To support the claim, Dubow cites the Cabinet Secretary's observation that "it was wise to make our position clear, because of our responsibilities elsewhere in Africa" (PREM 11/3073 in Dubow 2011, 1099). This latter account adds further empirical granularity to the point on moral leadership vis-a-vis African states, suggesting a need to maintain it also to avoid a spread of communism throughout the continent.

Yet one cannot take the point on moral leadership too far and assume that social anxieties with respect to African states was decisive enough to move or "lead" the United Kingdom towards its position against South Africa in April 1961. If it was, then one would expect it to have backed or "followed" their more extreme position in support of socio-economic and political sanctions that same month. One would thus expect the United Kingdom to have been in some way part of that new interstate campaign, with a new core coalition of states that supported but sought to push the initial campaign in a new direction (A/SPC/SR.230, 17; A/SPC/SR.239, 59-60; A/SPC/SR.240, 66-67; A/SPC/SR.243, 80-84; *et al.*). Yet in 1961, and the immediate years thereafter, the United Kingdom stood in clear opposition to that campaign (A/SPC/SR.274, 69-70; A/SPC/SR.339, 66-7; *et al.*). The Commonwealth Secretary made that point clear in the

above telegram. Moreover in another confidential 1961 telegram, the Foreign Office made the following observation specific to proceedings at the United Nations:

Three Commonwealth Governments (India, Ceylon and Malaya) have tabled a moderately worded resolution, while a large number of Africans have tabled one which gets on to such obnoxious proposals as boycotts and the severance of diplomatic relations.

... a failure to support this moderate resolution would be misunderstood both internationally and in Britain. The resolution will be interpreted by world opinion as being no more than a condemnation of apartheid as a policy which is what we should in any case have to say in speaking in the debate. Moreover it seems to us important to give as much encouragement as we can to the moderates and to strengthen our hands in dealing with objectionable resolutions involving proposals for the United Nations action and interference (PREM 11/3598, 50).

This perspective from the Foreign Office further suggests that the United Kingdom was primarily influenced by the “moderate” interstate campaign on South Africa, which dated back to India and other states” efforts in 1946. Newly independent states from Africa in 1961—all of which were radically opposed to racial discrimination in South Africa—made an influential albeit residual impression on the United Kingdom. These states may have forced the United Kingdom’s hand. Yet the fact remains that the manner in which the United Kingdom formulated ideas against the status quo spoke to India’s long-standing position, suggesting that India’s efforts were in the end most influential. Accordingly the United Kingdom’s position was more consistent with support for the Indian perspective, not the African one.

Further empirical evidence for this interpretation comes from what other state representatives made of India’s efforts vis-a-vis the United Kingdom. The most important observations come from representatives that worked in coordination with the United Kingdom on issues related to South Africa. Australia, for example, was especially concerned about India’s social influence on Britain’s perspective on South Africa from 1960 to 1961. In a personal letter to his spouse Dame Pattie, Prime Minister Menzies lamented that “the simple fact is that Harold is much more concerned to be right with Nehru than he is to be right with me” (Menzies 1961 in Martin and Hardy 1993, 428). And Menzies also emphasized “I am really very sick about Harold Macmillan’s statements. He will do anything to placate India but thinks nothing of embarrassing me in my own country” (Menzies 1961 in Martin and Hardy 1993, 428). Menzies’ Department Secretary evidenced similar discernment:

... the truth is that the United Kingdom is defending, somewhat grimly, its standing and authority in the world. For this purpose, which is political rather than economic, it requires a certain amount of keeping in tune with India in particular (Bunting 1961 in Goldsworthy 2002, 113).

Both of these these observations support the suggestion that India’s efforts were influential in shaping the United Kingdom’s outlook on South Africa in April 1961. As close counterparts, the Australian side would have been well-positioned to see it operate.

Australia

Australia is another example of a state that was influenced by the core coalition's efforts. Here are some important facts. Under Prime Minister Robert Menzies (and previously Ben Chifley), Australia did not take a clear, unequivocal stance against racial discrimination in South Africa until April 1961 (A/PV.315, 532; A/AC.53/SR.32, 171; A/AC.72/SR.36, 182; A/AC.76/SR.44, 211; *et al.*). Like the United Kingdom, the main reason was on procedural grounds: namely, that racial discrimination in South Africa was a domestic concern, and was therefore not other states' business to discuss. That was Australia's position on proceedings at the United Nations, the Commonwealth and in its own political context. As Menzies put it, "*apartheid* (or separate development) was a domestic matter and that we in other countries should not interfere" (Menzies 1968, 193). "I felt that, in a multi-racial community, it was a matter for political judgment... whether development should be based upon the separation of races, or upon their integration" (Menzies 1968, 193). The furthest departure from that position came in 1957, when the Australian delegation at the United Nations reaffirmed a general position against racial discrimination in connection with proceedings on South Africa. As its Permanent Representative put it, "while the Australian delegation had never entered into a discussion of the substance of the item before the Committee, such an attitude did not imply Australia's support for racial discrimination" (A/SPC/SR.15, 67).

In April 1961, however, Australia did take a clear and unequivocal stand on the issue. At the committee meetings, its delegation in New York expressed support for India's long-standing position on South Africa "in order to demonstrate its hostility to the policy of *apartheid*" (A/SPC/SR.244, 85). "The Australian delegation... felt most serious disquiet at South Africa's racial policies and deplored the results of the application of those policies" (A/SPC/SR.241, 72). Moreover concerning the resolution about Indian people, the Australian delegation made the broader observation that:

It has become apparent that even abstention is open to to misinterpretation of indifference to the human issues involved. In substance, this issue has affinities with the question of *apartheid* which the General Assembly is also dealing with at the present session. The Australian delegation has already explained its attitude on this point in the First Committee. It does not support or condone the policy of *apartheid*, of which the matter here at stake—the treatment of people of Indian origin—is one aspect. It shares the view that the most hopeful means of a solution to this problem lies in the negotiations which are recommended to the South African Government in the draft resolution before us.

To make this attitude clear, my delegation will vote in favor of this draft resolution (A/PV.981, 265-266).

This sentiment broke with some fifteen year-old opposition to or abstention on almost identical resolutions. Moreover for the first time, it also manifest an unmistakable stance on the substantive complaint against racial discrimination in South Africa. As a news piece from *The Guardian* put it, the move was a "volte-face by Mr. Menzies Policy on S. Africa" (*The Guardian* 10.4.1961). "Australia's decision to vote for a United Nations resolution rebuking South Africa

for its apartheid policies...does mean a marked change in Mr. Menzies' attitude" (*The Guardian* 10.4.1961).

The first observation one must make about this "change in attitude" is that it does not represent an inherent, normative "hostility" to racial discrimination as practiced in the Union of South Africa. Empirical evidence for this assertion comes from the absence of such sentiment throughout participation in previous interstate proceedings on the issue from 1946 to 1961 (A/PV.315, 532; A/AC.53/SR.32, 171; A/AC.72/SR.36, 182; *et al.*). This raises the question as to whether the position was a response to the March 1960 Sharpeville killings one year before. There is limited empirical evidence for that interpretation as well. I say limited because from March 1960 to April 1961, the Australian delegation made no point to emphasize an abhorrence to what happened in Sharpeville. At the Security Council, one month after the incident, the Australian delegation was not among the twenty-nine others to initiate proceedings to condemn what took place (S/PV.856). Moreover at a parliamentary debate in early April 1960, Prime Minister Robert Menzies "refused to condemn apartheid in specific terms, and at a press conference on the 10th April he reaffirmed his Government's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of South Africa" (PREM 11/3112, 11-12). And six months later in the General Assembly, the Prime Minister did not raise Sharpeville in the General Debate (A/PV.888, 434-437). Hence the suggestion is that Sharpeville was not the main reason for Australia's "volte-face" on South Africa. One year later in April 1961, the Australian delegation did observe that "the events which had occurred since 1959 had given added urgency to the question being examined before the Committee" (A/SPC/SR.241, 72). Yet that sentiment acknowledges that those events had only "added" significance, not a significance enough to sanction a new articulation of position on South Africa.

The manner in which Australia expressed a stance against racial discrimination in South Africa allows for a preliminary, social constructivist interpretation. There are two empirical justifications for why. The first empirical justification comes from *how* Australia articulated its position. The reasoning here is similar to what has been covered in the previous subsection on the United Kingdom, and so does not require further discussion. The main point is that Australia's eventual articulation of position seems influenced by the coalition's efforts, because after years of silence on the substantive question, it echoes a specific set of ideas that those states had long been in favor of. Moreover the position also evidences a response to the interstate outcry against racial discrimination in the country, since "it has become apparent that even abstention is open to misinterpretation of indifference to the human issues involved". In response to that outcry, it implies an intersubjective need to "speak out" and reaffirm a stance against the status quo. This suggests that silence on the substantive question became socially unsustainable, taken by other states to represent insouciance (or a "lack of concern in a vital human problem", as India's delegation put it in 1946). For reasons similar to the United Kingdom, a core coalition of states seems to have been influential with respect to Australia. It helped inculcate an intersubjective, interstate atmosphere that in turn mobilized otherwise muted normative sentiment against racial discrimination in South Africa.

The second, more direct empirical justification for this theoretical inference comes from what Australian authorities made of the position on South Africa before making it public, particularly before learning about the United Kingdom's move off the fence April 1961. Australia's views began to change when Arthur Tange (Secretary of External Affairs) received a

report from Jim Plim (Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York). According to the Tange, “the estimated voting intentions of other countries was a major factor in the final decision” (Tange 1961 in Hearder 2015, 131). “It enabled advice to the Prime Minister that, if a resolution criticizing apartheid was supported by all except Australia, there would be ‘serious misunderstanding world-wide about Australia’” (Tange 1961 in Hearder 2015, 131). The Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies then made that sentiment known in “private and personal” correspondence with Harold MacMillan and Duncan Sandys (the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations). In that correspondence, Robert Menzies set out Australia’s reasons to change its stance on the status quo in South Africa. In an April 1961 letter to Macmillan, Menzies made the following point:

We have been studying to-day the two draft resolutions on Apartheid now before the UN Assembly. I think there will be widespread opposition to the extreme African resolution. However we understand that you may be contemplating only abstaining on the fifth paragraph of the Three Power resolution and thereafter voting in favor. I hope you will not adopt this course. This is substantially the same resolution which you voted against last time (1959) at which time Australia abstained. I want you to realize that if the UK not vote in favor, with New Zealand presumably following suit, it would leave Australia quite isolated. This would render my own position intolerable (PREM 11/3598, 9).

One month later, after adopting a new stance on South Africa, Menzies wrote the following personal letter to Duncan Sandys:

After considerable reflection, I feel it necessary to put a few matters to you regarding the recent General Assembly of the United Nations, and in particular the three power resolution regarding South Africa. In November, 1959, the United Kingdom voted against this resolution. Australia, rightly or wrongly abstained. This year we were proposing once more to abstain when, without any notice from the United Kingdom and without any United Kingdom consultation with us, our own representative at the United Nations informed us that he had learned that a change of vote by the United Kingdom from opposition to straight out support was being recommended and supported. Having regard to certain events that had happened, this clearly involved me in most grievous difficulties. I at once cabled Mr. MacMillan, but, for all substantial purposes, this proved too late. In the result, we at this end had to make most painful and embarrassing decisions.

Enquires indicated that if we abstained, we would find ourselves alone. There would be serious and world-wide misrepresentations, and Australia would incur a solitary hostility among African and Asian nations. The choice was therefore between my own personal position, which became one of humiliation, and in fact exposed me to considerable ridicule, and the general repute of my country. Under these circumstances, we decided that, with reservations orally indicated by our representative, we would vote with the United Kingdom.

But I should make it clear that I deeply resent the way in which these circumstances arose. I can see no possible excuse for the failure to consult us, since the United Kingdom government must have known that the question of South African policy would come up, as it had in previous years. I think that you just forgot about us, in a matter in which I had been greatly and unsuccessfully involved in London only a week or two previously (PREM 11/3598, 8-9).

There are numerous important observations one must draw from Menzies' communications. One is that the United Kingdom was an important empirical "conditioning factor" in Australia's eventual stance on South Africa. Menzies felt left behind by Harold MacMillan and as a result saw a need for Australia to reevaluate its own position on South Africa.

Another key observation from Menzies' writings is that it also evidences a direct concern for the interstate political context on the question of racial discrimination in South Africa. Given the United Kingdom's new stance, it takes a fresh appraisal of the nature of interstate proceedings on the issue. Given that appraisal, Menzies finds Australia "alone" in that context. As the first passage indicates, Menzies saw isolation and its subsequent appearance vis-a-vis other African and Asian states as socially unsustainable or "intolerable". This sense of isolation is more apparent in the Prime Minister's personal writings to his spouse Dame Pattie, in which he explains that maintaining Australia's long-standing position on South Africa "would give rise to enormous political difficulties and would lend support to the people who are ever ready to say that I have become a "lone wolf" in the Commonwealth" (Menzies 1961 in Martin and Hardy 1993, 428). Note that Menzies' sense of isolation (or being seen as a "lone wolf") was *not* just socially unsustainable or "intolerable" in a relational sense. As the second passage above suggests, it was intolerable to the further extent that the substantive issue—namely, racial discrimination in South Africa—was also relevant. Hence Menzies also expresses a sense of "embarrassment", "humiliation", "ridicule", "hostility" and a challenge to Australia's "general repute" in specific connection with the absence of an affirmative stance against racial discrimination in South Africa. This further sheds light on what motivated Australia's socially mediated, normative sentiment against apartheid shown above. It also supports an interpretation on the interstate, social construction of that position.

The most relevant secondary account one must consider in relation to this interpretation on interstate socialization is Annemarie Devereau's *Australia and the Birth of the Bill of Human Rights*. Among other things, the work addresses Australia's stance on South Africa at the United Nations in April 1961. Devereau makes two relevant points. The first point is that Prime Minister Menzies and Garfield Barwick (then Acting Minister of External Affairs) "were reluctant to draw any adverse conclusions about the Sharpeville Massacre" (Devereau 2005, 220). "Both men refused to support a resolution in the House of Representatives condemning South Africa" (Devereau 2005, 220). This supports the assertion that domestic circumstances in South Africa were not enough of a reason to adopt a position on South Africa. The second relevant point that Devereau makes is that "Australia's decision was taken reluctantly after being taken unawares by the United Kingdom's change of heart" (Devereau 2005, 220). "Faced with the risk of being the only country not to vote for a resolution, and the attendant risk of misrepresentation of Australia's motives, Cabinet authorized Australian delegates to vote in favor of General Assembly action" (Devereau 2005, 221). This latter point supports the interpretation that the United Kingdom's "change of heart" was a significant empirical conditioning factor, leading Australia to reconsider its own position on South Africa. In reconsidering that position, Devereau's latter point also allows the interpretation that the interstate political context at the time was a decisive consideration.

What Devereau's account lacks, however, is the social constructivist assertion that that political context was not "inevitable" in April 1961. On that score, as we have seen, India and other states efforts had been critical to the "construction" of that context since 1946. These core

states were by extension critical to Australia's eventual stance on South Africa. Yet Australia's eventual stance on South Africa was not just based on a relational need to avoid interstate isolation, as Deverau suggests. It was also based on a socially mediated, normative concern for the issue's actual content. Robert Menzies, for example, expresses deeper social anxieties of "embarrassment", "humiliation", and "ridicule" in reference to the particular question of racism on South Africa. Menzies' sentiment thereby suggests social anxiety over Australia's specific stance on racism, not on other issues that Australia was also numerically isolated on at the time. Thus Australia's change in position took place primarily because of socio-strategic as well as socially mediated, normative concerns for what resounded as "legitimate" at the United Nations.

Canada

Canada is my third and final example of a socialization subject. Consider these facts. From 1946 to 1958, the Canadian delegation did not support India's complaint against South Africa on procedural and factual grounds (A/C.1&6/SR.1-6, 11-12; A/AC.61/SR.20, 112-113; A/AC.72/SR.35, 177; *et al.*). The closest it went was to reaffirm a general position against racial discrimination throughout those proceedings from 1952 to 1958 (A/AC.72/SR.35, 177; A/AC.61/SR.20, 112; A/AC.76/SR.47, 231; *et al.*). In 1958, Canada's delegation went further by voting for that year's two resolutions on South Africa (A/RES/1302(XIII); A/RES/1248 (XIII)). The most explicit of those resolutions was A/RES/1248 (XIII), which expressed "regret and concern" over the continued policies of apartheid (A/RES/1248 (XIII), 7). Favorable votes on those resolutions were a subtle change in Canada's stance. On one hand, it was consistent with previous positions. The reason is because Canada's delegation saw those resolutions as conciliatory, meaning that they did not *per se* outline forthright condemnation of the status quo (DEA/6-1959/2). Moreover support for the two resolutions was consistent with previous reservations that the "General Assembly should not ignore the provisions protecting States from interference in their internal affairs" (A/SPC/SR.92, 35). On the other hand, however, support for the two resolutions was a break with the past. In contrast with previous years, the Canadian delegation joined with the Indian delegation to draft one of the resolutions and at least imply a stance against racial discrimination specific to South Africa.

In April 1961, the Canadian delegation went further. It made the clear and unequivocal point that "Canada felt obliged to protest against the policy of apartheid" (A/SPC/SR.243, 79). Later in November, the delegation went on to insist that:

The defenders of "apartheid" had spoken of the benefits received by the non-white population in South Africa: low-cost housing, hospital and medical facilities, economic improvements and educational facilities. Whatever the importance those benefits, however, they did not alter the intrinsic evils of a system which asserted the racial superiority of one group over another within the national community...the Assembly was faced here with an evil philosophy which could, in the final analysis, be overcome only by moral persuasion (A/SPC/SR.285, 132).

This position was a more explicit turning-point in Canada's stance on South Africa at the United Nations. It broke with years of reservation, and made known an unmistakable normative position against the status quo.

The first empirical observation one must make about this gradual change in position is that it does not represent an inherent, normative “protest” against racial discrimination in the Union of South Africa. Like the previous two examples, the empirical evidence for this assertion comes from the lack of such sentiment throughout participation in previous proceedings, especially while the policy of apartheid was in force from 1948 onwards (A/C.1&6/SR.1-6, 11-12; A/AC.61/SR.20, 112-113; A/AC.72/SR.35, 177; *et al.*). This raises the question as to whether the historical circumstances at the time were unique to sanction the above change in position. The most apparent change in circumstances was Sharpeville in March 1960. The empirical record indicates that Canada’s delegation did not see those events as grounds to change course at the United Nations (DEA/7060-40). The Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was explicit, making the case that “the conclusion of the government is that at this time no beneficial purpose would be served by diplomatic protests or by even more extreme measures to intervene in this tragic situation” (Diefenbaker 1960 in Tennyson 1982, 146). Hence the empirical record does not suggest that Canada’s stance on South Africa was based on a categorical normative abhorrence to apartheid, nor motivated by events in Sharpeville.

This allows for a preliminary, social constructivist interpretation that India and other states’ efforts were influential. There are two empirical justifications as to how. The first comes from the manner in which the Canadian delegation articulated a position on South Africa at the United Nations in April 1961. The reasoning here is similar to the previous two subsections, and so does not require further discussion. The point is that the position seems influenced by the Indian coalition’s efforts because after years of reticence on the substantive question, it echoes a specific set of ideas that those states had been agitating for. The second empirical justification comes from how Canadian officials arrived at that position. Empirical evidence for this assertion dates back to 1946, when the Indian delegation first brought its complaint to the United Nations. Substantial empirical evidence does suggest that the core coalition’s efforts were gradually influential, particularly in nurturing a sense of *contretemps* and pressuring the Canadian delegation to change course. In a confidential communication, for example, Lester Pearson (then Undersecretary for External Affairs) emphasized that India’s complaint was “an embarrassing one especially for Commonwealth countries” (Pearson 1946 in Tennyson 1982, 117). Louis St. Laurent (then Prime Minister) made a similar observation:

Canada’s position in regard to the status of East Indians here is not above criticism and we are at present time receiving communications protesting against it. It would be unfortunate, therefore, if we took any initiative which served to concentrate attention on our own position and extend the controversy to include us (St. Laurent 1946 in Tennyson 1982, 117).

In 1952, the empirical record also suggests that Canadian officials felt this sense of embarrassment as a result of India and other states’ other resolution on the question of “race conflict”. As Lester Pearson put it (then as Secretary for External Affairs), “the Canadian Delegation might let other delegations know in informal discussions that the inclusion of this item on the final agenda would cause us embarrassment” (Pearson 1952 in PCO 288).

Throughout the above years, Canada’s response was “to delay and possibly prevent bitter discussion on the merits of the question” (Pearson 1952 in PCO 288). By the mid to late 1950s, however, Canadian officials saw the sense of “embarrassment” as socially unsustainable and

reason to change course accordingly. In 1956, the Department of External Affairs urged a review of Canada's stance on "colonial issues" at the United Nations (Henshaw 1999, 27). They argued that:

Canada's prestige at the UN and its relations with newly-independent states could only be harmed by the continuation of a reactionary stand on these issues, especially when Canada was placing itself in the company of an increasingly isolated group, most of which were colonial powers (DEA in Henshaw 1999, 27-8).

In late 1957, the Canadian delegation made a similar observation in a confidential assessment of proceedings:

At the Twelfth Session there seemed to be renewed interest in these [South African] items probably because of the gradually swelling voice of the African nations... however, they can be increasingly embarrassing to the European members of the Commonwealth, who will be under constant pressure to take positive steps to induce South Africa to change its ways (DEA/5475-DW-52-D-40).

On proceedings in 1958, when Canada supported a common position on South Africa, Harold B. Robinson (the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs) made a further observation in a policy guidance memorandum approved by then Prime Minister John Diefenbaker:

International opinion is becoming more outspoken on this question, mainly because South African policies are increasingly antipathetic to current international conditions in which non-white peoples are becoming more important and are demanding recognition of the equality of all races... Reflecting this changing atmosphere, ten Western nations (including the United States, New Zealand and Italy as well as Canada) switched their votes from abstention to the affirmative on the apartheid resolution in 1958 and there has been a similar shift on the other two items (Robinson 1960 in DEA/7060-40).

These three observations explicate how Canadian officials began to see reason to change course on South Africa by 1958. Among other things, it suggests some sense of "embarrassment", and demonstrates a manifest concern for how other states—especially states from Africa—saw Canada's position on South Africa. This suggests that social anxieties about how Canada was seen on questions of racial discrimination was a critical empirical conditioning factor in how its officials arrived at the eventual position.

Yet like with the United Kingdom and Australia, social anxiety with respect to new African states alone was *not* decisive enough to move Canada towards a clear and unequivocal national stance on racial discrimination in South Africa. If it was, then one would expect Canada to have been more consistent with their more extreme position in favor of diplomatic sanctions in (e.g. South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations) (A/SPC/SR.86, 7-8; A/SPC/SR.90, 23; A/SPC/SR.91, 29-30; SPC/SR.123, 173-174). New African delegations made such sentiment known throughout proceedings in 1958, 1959, as well as throughout the General Debate in 1960 (A/SPC/SR.140, 67-68; A/SPC/SR.146, 94; A/SPC/SR.172, 212-213; *et al.*). Nevertheless in those years Canada's delegation still favored a conciliatory approach, namely to "abstain on resolutions directly critical of the Union" and to show "by voting affirmatively on some paragraphs and by our statements in the debate that we in principle disapproved of racial

discrimination” (Robinson 1960 in DEA/7060-40). Hence the influence of newly independent African states does not seem to have been alone pivotal in 1958.

This is to say that the core coalition’s cumulative efforts were more influential vis-a-vis Canada by 1958. In the first place, those core states were the ones to insist on annual treatment of the situation in South Africa, creating the focal point around which the interstate response could organize and pressure others to follow suit. In the second place, the empirical record also in more direct terms supports the interpretation that India’s efforts were influential in exercising a “moderating influence” over the extreme elements of the interstate campaign, so that it could in turn appeal to the likes of Canada to join suit. In 1959, Canada’s delegation wrote a confidential report that sheds light on how that took place:

With the experience of the thirteenth session in mind, a large group of African-Asian delegations led by India this year introduced a similar resolution in the hope that they would be able to win the support of an equal or greater number of delegations. The Indians and Ceylonese told us (and it may well be true) that the African members of the African-Asian caucus were pressing for a much stronger resolution (and indeed Liberia threatened publicly in committee to introduce a resolution warning the Union of possible expulsion from the UN). However, our informants say the Asians persuaded the Africans that by sticking with the present relatively mild resolution, a sweeping majority vote could be obtained. When it came to be known that Australia and Belgium might switch from a negative vote to an abstention this year, the elated sponsors were anxious not to lose Canada's vote and the Indians went so far as to make formal representations in Ottawa to this effect (DEA/5475-DW-52-D-40).

This latter observation demonstrates the influence that core states like India had on new members of the coalition, as well as over third states like Canada. It shows that states like India were influential in keeping the focus on a common position against apartheid, and in providing an avenue through which Canada could support it. Although Canada did not support an identical resolution on South Africa in 1959, against Diefenbaker and the Canadian delegation’s express wishes, the empirical point remains that India and other core states’ efforts were most influential at the time (Henshaw 1999, 30).

The question remains as to how Canada arrived at its forthright national position against apartheid in April 1961. There is some indication that the position had to do with South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth in March 1961. Peter Henshaw, for example, makes the point that John Diefenbaker had been a progressive influence on Canada’s apartheid position since he took office in June 1957 (Henshaw 1999, 27-36). With South Africa gone from the Commonwealth, Diefenbaker no longer saw an obstacle to making the Canadian national position clear and unequivocal on apartheid (Peter Henshaw 1999, 35). “This action, taken on 15 March 1961, immediately transformed not only the character of the Commonwealth but also the course of the South African disputes at the UN” (Peter Henshaw 1999, 35). Peter Henshaw’s perspective is important to keep in mind. It emphasizes that some Canadian officials—in particular, John Diefenbaker—had been themselves for years uneasy about the status quo. It also emphasizes that South Africa’s longtime membership within the Commonwealth was what kept Diefenbaker from elevating those views to the level of Canada’s national foreign policy.

I agree, to a certain extent. One the former point, the empirical record suggests that John Diefenbaker's views against apartheid date back to at least 1952, when he made the point as a member of parliament that "the commonwealth, with five to one of those who are members... being colored races, should do everything possible to assure freedom from discrimination" (Diefenbaker 1952 in Henshaw 1999, 28). As a prime minister, however, the empirical record does not substantiate the interpretation that those personal views were decisive. The reason is because Diefenbaker himself was unwilling to elevate those views to the level of national policy. "On a number of occasions, he intimated that were he not head of government, he would express his own abhorrence of apartheid in stronger terms" (Freeman 1997, 23). Accordingly under the Diefenbaker government—which, assumed office in June 1957—Canada's immediate stance on South Africa did *not* change. This reservation was apparent in proceedings at the United Nations in October 1957 (A/SPC/SR.56, 71). It was also apparent elsewhere, such as in September 1957, when Diefenbaker turned down a request by Martin Luther King Jr. and Eleanor Roosevelt to join in other world leaders in condemning apartheid (Tennyson 1982, 141). "They were told pointedly that Canada disapproved of racialism everywhere and saw no reason to single out any one country" (Tennyson 1982, 141). This is not to say that Diefenbaker's personal views were insignificant. Diefenbaker's were significant, but not to the extent that they were a leading influence on Canada's eventual stance on apartheid.

On Henshaw's second point, I agree that South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth was critical. However if that is the case, then one must also emphasize the decisive influence that the core anti-apartheid states—and new states from Africa—in the first place had on the withdrawal, and by extension Canada's subsequent stance on apartheid at the United Nations. This requires a look at proceedings in connection with the May 1960 and March 1961 Commonwealth conferences, both of which dealt with a custom that states seek majority approval for readmission after a change in form of government (Diefenbaker 1989, 220). By 1961, new states from Africa and Asia—all of which were dead set about opposition to apartheid, and later South Africa's readmission—became the majority in the Commonwealth (Freeman 1997, 19; Hayes 1980, 472). The main point is that Canada was *not* most influential in that process, especially given that majority (Freeman 1997, 19-29). The core anti-apartheid states and new states from Africa conjured up the diplomatic atmosphere in which support for—or even perceived equivocation on—South Africa's continued membership became socially unsustainable. As Linda Freeman writes,

In fact, leadership in securing South Africa's withdrawal had been taken not by Diefenbaker, but by the leaders of India, Ghana, Nigeria, and Malaysia (Malaya). In closed sessions, India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stood out, leading "with clarity and conviction" [Robinson 1989, 186]. He never wavered in his understanding that South Africa's racial policies were incompatible with a multi-racial Commonwealth, and that this principle was more important than the convention that the domestic policies of Commonwealth members should not be discussed (Freeman 1997, 27).

Harold Robinson, who was an advisor to the Prime Minister's at the March 1961 meetings observed that:

Although Diefenbaker was the most sympathetic of the white prime ministers to the positions of the non-white, he can hardly be said to have played the leading role in the drama of South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth. The dominant figures were

Nehru and Macmillan, the former because he knew his objectives and pursued them with clarity and conviction, the latter because of his chairmanship in a series of exceedingly delicate situations (Robinson 1989, 186).

More importantly, a member of South Africa's delegation emphasized that:

The rock upon which South Africa finally came to grief was that same Nehru. We had watched him in conclave with his sister, Mrs. Pandit, then High Commissioner for India in London, and other Afro-Asians, unrelenting and unsmiling, and I for one had the feeling that nothing Verwoerd could propose would meet with their approval (Meiring 1973, 165).

To be sure, John Diefenbaker's decision to break ranks with prime ministers Harold MacMillan, Robert Menzies, and Walter Nash was influential in undermining compromise proposals to altogether avoid even considering the general question of racial discrimination (Dubow 2017, 299; Freeman 1997, 26; Henshaw 1999, 34; *et al.*). However Diefenbaker's own approach was to "temporize", as Jawaharlal Nehru put it (Menzies 1968, 214). Moreover as Harold Basil Robinson put it, "nothing had been more consistent in Diefenbaker's approach than his search for a tolerable way of averting South Africa's withdrawal" (Robinson 1989, 187). Hence the point remains that India's prime minister—alongside other prime ministers from Asia and Africa—were most influential in the decision to leave. By extension then, these states were most influential in changing Canada's foreign policy on apartheid.

One can retort that the Canadian government—particularly throughout John Diefenbaker's administration—was in any case inclined to express a clear and unequivocal stance against apartheid prior to the March 1961 Conference (CCC 2.3.1961). As early as May 1960, for example, the Prime Minister made that known to South Africa's Prime Minister Eric Louw at the May 1960 Commonwealth Conference. "You can't carry on like this. Your nation's stand will turn the whole continent of Africa, with the exception of the Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia, against you. Your policies are not only wrong, but dangerous" (Diefenbaker 1989, 211). I emphasize two points in response. The first point is that the the Prime Minister, as well as the Cabinet, had been in favor of a stance against apartheid only in the context of closed-door proceedings. Hence days before the March 1961 conference John Diefenbaker was *not* clear and unequivocal on the position, making the assertion that "no one would like to sit in judgment on his fellow member" and that "any association that hopes to play an effective role in the world must... endeavor to bring about cooperation and understanding between races" (Diefenbaker 1961 in Freeman 1997, 25). This suggests that there was still some equivocation in Canada's apartheid position in the lead-up to the March 1961 Commonwealth Conference.

Even if there was no such reservation, there is still substantial evidence to suggest that the position was "constructed" by the interstate political context from 1960 to 1961. The empirical justification for this assertion comes from two strands of evidence. The first strand of evidence relates to how Canadian officials—in particular, aids to the Prime Minister—began to advocate for a clear and unequivocal stance against apartheid from 1960 to 1961. The point is that some of those officials urged a change in position based on the views of other state officials from Asia and Africa. Among those former Canadian officials was Robert Bryce, the Secretary to the Cabinet and Clerk of the Privy Council. According to Harold B. Robinson (an aide to the Prime Minister), Bryce took the position that Canada should take a more forthright stand against

apartheid given its implications for the future integrity of the Commonwealth. In April 1960, Bryce made the suggestion to the Prime Minister that “Canada should consider initiating South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth so that its non-white members could hold up their heads” (Robinson 1989, 124). A few months later, Robert Bryce’s resolve grew. He met with delegations from India and Ghana, both of which made the point that “the presence of South Africa would deter other African and Asian countries from joining the Commonwealth” (Robinson 1989, 178-179). “On the basis of this experience, Bryce remained as convinced as ever that Canada should take the lead in denying readmission to South Africa” (Robinson 1989, 179).

Similar perspectives came from members of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet, emphasizing that “the important thing was to try to keep the colored nations within the Commonwealth and confident in the Commonwealth” (CCC 11.4.1960, 3). Given these concerns for the Commonwealth’s future, the Cabinet also urged a strong stance on South Africa on social grounds:

Although theoretically apartheid and readmission were separate issues, in practice they could not be divorced. The apartheid aspect was by far more important, and an equivocal position on civil rights would be damaging to Canada’s international position and to the Prime Minister’s national position (CCC 25.2.1961, 3).

The same Cabinet Conclusion also made the point that a failure to take this position “would be damaging to Mr. Diefenbaker and to the Conservative party in Canada, because it would seem incompatible with the public position he had taken for many years on equality of rights” (CCC 25.2.1961, 2). This latter observation also speaks to the Prime Minister’s domestic political pressures from opponents on South Africa. Yet those domestic political pressures also drew from the interstate political context at the time. The leader of the Liberal Party, for example, insisted that “the course actually taken set Canada in opposition to India and damaged Canada’s influence in Africa and Asia” (Pearson 1960 in *The Guardian* 6.2.1960).

Hence the empirical record still indicates that key Canadian officials—in particular, those close to the Prime Minister—were significantly influenced by African and Asian officials’ views on South Africa from 1960 to 1961. The second empirical justification for how Canada’s position throughout those years was “constructed” by the interstate political context relates to the Prime Minister. The reason is because the Prime Minister himself justified a position against apartheid in reference to that interstate political context of the time. In his memoirs, for example, Diefenbaker recalled the following point made at the March 1961 Conference:

On March 13, I told my fellow Prime Ministers there could be no gainsaying that the long history of close relations between Canada and South Africa had recently been clouded by the racial policy of the Union. This policy was repugnant to the Canadian people. So long as it was possible to regard this as a purely internal affair of South Africa, the Canadian government had not expressed any serious criticism, but now any racial question was bound to have international repercussions, and the attitude of Commonwealth countries to this question would be closely watched all over the world... South Africa’s racial policies had such far-reaching effect that their impact was international rather than domestic (Diefenbaker 1975, 218-219).

Diefenbaker's observation indicates that the interstate political context from 1960 to 1961 was critical to his eventual decision to express a clear and unequivocal stance against apartheid on behalf of Canada. It qualifies a position against the practice, particularly given its normative significance to other states. This is to again emphasize the interstate social construction of Canada's position on apartheid, which became clear and unequivocal by April 1961.

Part Three

The previous section made the case for an interstate socialization process set in motion by a core coalition of states in 1946 and throughout subsequent years. I now turn towards the third and final step in my research procedure: the cross-check. I weigh my inferences from part two against the most prominent theoretical and empirical counter-arguments. The theoretical counter-arguments come from materialist accounts on international relations, as discussed in this thesis' theoretical literature review. The empirical counter-arguments come from the empirical circumstances in the case-study, as well as the most relevant secondary historical accounts.

A focus on material side-payments can serve as one theoretical counter-argument to the present chapter. A possible rendition of the account may have to do with a claim that some states—in particular, those states that this section associates as belonging to the core coalition—took it upon themselves to manipulate certain material incentives and/or disincentives in favor of or against a position on South Africa. Those efforts, according to this theoretical perspective, would then in turn shape the eventual constellation of support for the common position against racial discrimination in South Africa. A potential ring-leader for those efforts is the Soviet Union, which according to the Canadian delegation, sought to “exploit... color sensitivity and lingering anti-colonial sentiment in an effort to woo the new nations, particularly in Africa” (Robinson 1960 in DEA/7060-40). One could point to a number of newly independent states from Africa—in particular, from 1960 to 1961—as especially vulnerable to those efforts, and brought to support a particular position thanks to some material resource manipulation. To substantiate the point, one could collate the extent of military and economic relations that new states like those had with the Soviet Union before and after independence.

I concede the plausibility of this theoretical interpretation, but push back on two key points. The first point is that third states most vulnerable to the influence of some material resource manipulation were anyways categorically—and seemingly inexorably—opposed to racial discrimination in South Africa, for reasons independent of those efforts. One reason is that almost all of those states saw themselves as victims of racial discrimination, not unlike what they saw in South Africa. For reference, the more acrimonious positions taken by Libya, Morocco, Ghana and Somaliland are among those that substantiate my claim here (A/SPC/SR.92, 33; A/SPC/SR.16, 74; A/SPC/SR.93, 38-9; A/SPC/SR.243, 84). The point is that the “experiential commensurability” between what some developing states saw in their own national experiences and the ideas in question was profound (Goodman and Jinks 2013, 25). This is apparent in that the positions those state took—that is, upon initial participation in the interstate conversation on apartheid—evidence no hesitation or ambivalence on the issue. It also seems apparent in the manner in which those states inveighed against the status quo. Some subsequent material resource manipulation would thus not have made a step-change difference. Even if it did, the question would remain as to how more martially capable state subjects—such as the Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom—could have been influenced by those same efforts. Moreover

the question would remain as to why the more materially capable state agents—such as the United States throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s—would not have also engaged in material resource manipulation to move interstate support towards a position more favorable to NATO allies.

Another relevant materialist counter-argument can proceed from the contention that intergovernmental organizations are epiphenomenal, which means that their proceedings reflect some distribution of material power in the interstate system. This point can relate to the previous paragraph, as well as the theoretical review chapter's commentary on the English School. In this chapter, this theoretical interpretation would assert that interstate proceedings on South Africa—in particular, from 1946 to 1961—were in some part underpinned by the distribution of material threats balanced or balancing against each other at the time. By this account, one would expect to associate some East versus West cleavage with the nature of interstate proceedings and their eventual outcome. There seems some traction in this more neorealist theoretical interpretation. For example, one could point to the fact that states in some way aligned with the Soviet Union from the outset took an unequivocal stance against racial discrimination in South Africa. States aligned with the United States, on the other hand, were at the outset reluctant to do so. One could then also point to South Africa's position within an interstate political, economic and military alliance against the Soviet Union (and the spread of communism, more broadly) as indicative of the epiphenomenal nature of global, multilateral engagement with the issue.

This theoretical interpretation has its merits. It helps understand the initial interstate convergence around support for a position on South Africa. It can also help understand how it was that some self-declared “neutral” states—including Austria—had a lower, subjective “tipping point” on the issue than other states. Yet this interpretation also falls short in the following two respects. The first respect is that it glosses over the “non-partisan” nature of the core coalition's efforts on the issue from the outset in 1946. As shown in section one, critical to those efforts was a manipulation of and appeal to common notions of “right” and “wrong” that could in turn exert diplomatic pressure upon all states. In other words, some states—in particular, those that would come to form the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961—from the outset cast the question of racial discrimination in South Africa as above an east-west divide. What is more, those states couched the issue as such in an attempt to win others over, regardless of the constellation of material threats balanced or balancing against each other at the time. As India's delegation put it in 1946, “there are standards and principles and ideals that transcend ... the exigencies of the kind of power politics that has proved so calamitous in the past” (A/PV.85, 137). This is to say that an emphasis on some material constellation of material capabilities misses out on how the core coalition saw the issue from the outset.

This last point suggests a second key shortcoming in this latter materialist counter-argument: the non-partisan nature of subsequent interstate proceedings. I say non-partisan because the states that took an eventual stand against racial discrimination in South Africa seem to have done so “as if” moved by what it meant for a relationship with a wider interstate community, as the previous section contends. The manner in which those states and others expressed support for the cause suggests that certain cross-cutting expectations were critical, and seemingly more so than a need to validate a position within a material balance of threats. This seems consistent with the fact that states aligned with the United States supported a common position on South Africa, even though it was a position that states aligned with the Soviet Union

had long been associated with. Yet if interstate proceedings on the issue were by and large epiphenomenal—reflecting some balance of or balancing in material threats—it is unclear as to how an almost unanimous interstate consensus on the issue would have come about.

The previous points in this section address what seem the most relevant counter-arguments to this chapter drawn from international relations theory. One can also level counter-arguments based on the empirical circumstances unique to this case study, as well as what some historians have said about them. One main line of criticism can relate South Africa's own position on apartheid. In particular, one can point to its intransigence on the issue as being increasingly "off color" to states otherwise on the fence. This would frustrate those states' willingness to shield South Africa from global, multilateral censure. It would also seem to in turn make those states more willing to join in that censure. In this chapter, the empirical counter-point can apply to each of the state subjects from the last section. Canada and the United Kingdom are the examples where the critique applies most. The reason is because the prime ministers from both countries had both been ticked off at South Africa's intransigence, and suggested that they were willing to maintain the status quo had South Africa been willing to make concessions (Diefenbaker 1975, 216; MacMillan 1972, 298). This was especially true at the March 1961 Commonwealth Conference. Harold MacMillan, for example, recalled the following point:

It was Dr. Verwoerd's attitude and method of arguing his case, as well as the inflexibility of his dogmatic position, which finally turned the balance. Had he made the slightest concession, for instance regarding, the acceptance of diplomatic representatives of African states... the mood might have easily changed (MacMillan 1972, 298).

Prime Minister John Diefenbaker made a similar observation (Diefenbaker 1975, 216).

I agree that South Africa's intransigence was a significant empirical conditioning factor in how states arrived at an almost universal interstate consensus on apartheid by April 1961. However one cannot apportion too much significance to this particular factor. The reason is twofold. First, the empirical record refutes the suggestion that the "slightest concession might have easily changed the mood" of other state representatives. It indicates that India (alongside other African and Asian states) had been clear and unequivocal about opposition to apartheid, and would not in any case compromise on the position. Empirical justification for this assertion comes from the South African delegation's views on the matter, as shown above example on Canada (Meiring 1973, 165). It also comes from Robert Menzies, who observed that that Eric Verwoerd *was* willing to accept a conciliatory proposal at the March 1961 Commonwealth Conference.

Thirty or forty minutes later Macmillan re-entered the Conference room looking happy, and said to me, in a low voice, "it's all in order. Verwoerd will accept the suggested communique". My pleasure was short-lived. No sooner had Verwoerd said that he would accept the draft, than Nehru was heard to say that he would not; that he was not prepared to temporize; that he would never let the matter rest; that not only at Prime Ministers' meetings but at every opportunity that presented itself, he would wage war on apartheid and the country which practiced it. It was clear to Verwoerd that they day was lost; his application was going to be rejected. So, after the discussion, and with great dignity, he did the only thing he could do; he begged leave to withdraw his application... The

decision was one of expulsion, not in form, of course; but in fact and in substance, it could have no other meaning (Menzies 1968, 214).

This observation highlights the limits of an empirical emphasis on South Africa's intransigence as a trigger to the United Kingdom's stance against apartheid in April 1961. It suggests that South Africa's position was *not* all that intransigent according to Harold MacMillan, and that whatever "compromise" communique the former was willing to accept was in fact enough for the latter to maintain the status quo. It therefore cannot follow that South Africa's intransigence was a significant influence on the United Kingdom's decision to come out against apartheid in April 1961.

In Canada's example, the empirical counter-point is more persuasive. The empirical record *does* suggest that some key Canadian officials—such as Harold Basil Robinson—saw South Africa's intransigence as one reason to change course. As Robinson wrote, "there is no evidence whatever that Canada has influenced South African racial policies in the past or that we are likely to do so in the near future" (Robinson 1960 in DEA/7060-40). One can point to Verwoerd's refusal to make concessions in private consultations with Diefenbaker—that is, in May 1960 and in March 1961—to further support the empirical counter-point. This would suggest that South Africa's intransigence made a significant contribution to Canada's eventual stance against apartheid in April 1961.

Although South Africa's position was influential, it was not decisive in relation to Canada. Successive South African governments were in any event not willing to heed or even entertain substantive recommendations from other state counterparts, as proceedings in the General Assembly and Security Council indicate. This was apparent in 1946 as it was in 1961. At the March 1961 Commonwealth Conference, South Africa was most explicit. "The Prime Minister of South Africa ... deplored the accusations of racial discrimination leveled against South Africa by member countries, which he alleged were themselves guilty of such practices" (Verwoerd 1961 in Hayes 1980, 474). Hence a suggestion that Canada (or other states) grew impatient—and for that main reason turned on South Africa—rings hollow. For Canada, South Africa's continued intransigence from 1960 to 1961 may have been "the last straw". Nevertheless the question would then remain as to how South Africa's intransigence throughout those years—that is, in contrast to the years before—became a most relevant consideration to Canadian officials. As the previous section shows, the interstate political context in the first place put South Africa on the spot, and into a position where it could not make substantive concessions.

Another empirical counter argument to my argument can follow from a focus on the domestic political pressure that governmental officials from the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada felt on apartheid. This potential empirical critique speaks to Audie Klotz's analysis on the diffusion of transnational, global norm on racial equality by the mid 1960s (Klotz 1995). According to this potential critique, British, Australian and Canadian officials would have felt and primarily responded to transnational—and not necessarily international—diplomatic pressure. One could make this critique especially in reference to Sharpeville massacre, and the high-profile public protest that followed. In my view, there is limited empirical evidence for this critique. As this chapter has shown, the historical record suggests that the governmental officials in question were neither moved by Sharpeville, nor the surrounding transnational protest that

followed and lent further momentum to domestic political pressure to change course on apartheid. This is to say that British, Australian and Canadian officials primarily responded to *interstate* social pressure. The primary source work above provides direct evidence for this assertion. An additional piece of evidence comes from a letter written by Prime Minister Harold MacMillan to the Queen, which suggests that domestic political pressure was not a leading concern in the formation of the United Kingdom's stance on South Africa (MacMillan 1960, in MacMillan 1972, 486-487). The Prime Minister wrote the letter a month after Sharpeville on April 3rd, 1960, and referred to a meeting of the Security Council concerning the incident:

In my absence, although without not without frequent communication with me by telegram, my colleagues had to make a decision about the question of the discussion of South African affairs in the Security Council of the United Nations. The dilemma is easy to state, but difficult to escape. If we rest too much upon the legal and constitutional position, we shall certainly please old Commonwealth countries like Australia and of course South Africa itself, but we risk gravely offending the Asian and African members. I was rather alarmed to see Sir James Robertson's report of the feeling in Nigeria...

I am not anxious about the pressure of public opinion at home, whether in or outside Parliament. We have the strength, I think, to hold to whatever course we think right. I feel my supreme task is to try to street the Commonwealth through this crisis and to avoid anything in the nature of disintegration (MacMillan 1960 in MacMillan 1972, 486).

Chapter Six

The Embargo on Cuba

1991 - 2016

In supporting in 1994 and 1995 the General Assembly resolution of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba, the Russian Federation was, and continues to be, guided by the firm consensus on the matter among members of the United Nations. Almost the entire world community, with few exceptions, regards the continuing commercial and economic embargo against Cuba as a manifestation of the outdated mentality of confrontation between blocs (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations in New York 1995 in A/51/355, 31).

Chapter Outline

I now test my social constructivist, theoretical argument in relation to another empirical case: the political, economic, and financial embargo imposed by the United States on Cuba. I focus on opposition to the embargo from 1991 to 2016. My empirical analysis begins in 1991 because that was the year when member states first considered the embargo as an agenda item at the General Assembly. It ends in 2016 because that was the year when the United States changed its stance on the embargo at the United Nations. The chapter avers that a core coalition of states set in motion an interstate socialization process that cumulatively built a clear and unequivocal consensus against the embargo throughout that time period. I adhere to the structure of the previous case study chapter. The introduction suggests an empirical background. This acclimates the reader with the empirical context, especially with how Cuba (and other core states) made the embargo an “issue” for global, multilateral concern at the United Nations. The empirical background, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the continued application of American sanctions legislation against Cuba. My introductory commentary again alludes to theoretical argument chapter’s analysis on “information politics”, requiring that socialization agents specify and categorize an issue (Rosert 2019).

Following the introduction, I proceed to the chapter’s three main parts, each of which corresponds to the three-step means of analysis in the data and methods chapter. Part One makes the case for a core coalition of states—that is, a support base—against the United States embargo on Cuba. I identify these core states from proceedings on Cuba in 1991, given their stance on the issue in that year and in each subsequent year. I also identify these states given their more vocal support for the position throughout those years. Aside from Cuba, the core coalition includes Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, and states from the former European Community. The point is to theorize the views that the core states express in opposition to the embargo. I take a close look at the “rhetorical action” that the socializing agents engage in to pressure others into support for the cause. As we shall see, agents manipulate common norms in an attempt to galvanize interstate support against the embargo.

In Part Two, I look at the extent to which the core coalition’s diplomatic efforts pressure other states into positions against the embargo over time. I pay close attention to how positions change, with particular attention to states that were in previous years not in favor of a clear, unequivocal stance on the issue. I refer to the Russian Federation, the United States, and several small states taken together as illustrative country cases. I use these states as illustrative country

cases for empirical reasons. The first reason is that the Russian Federation, the United States, and the small states in question had been on the fence for years. The second reason is that these illustrative country cases allow access to a wealth of empirical source work.

My empirical argument is that close observation of the manner in which these positions change suggests evidence for an interstate socialization process, set in motion by the core coalition of states. This is to say that the theoretical argument's observable implication comes from fastidious attention to the manner in which state representatives expressed changes in national positions on the embargo. The empirical record suggests that interstate social concerns were central to the formulation of these positions. This means that the Russian Federation, the United States, and numerous small states defended positions against the status quo primarily in reference to where other states stood on the issue. How these state representatives justify a change in position—that is, by suggesting a concern for its interstate social ramifications—makes the difference. My inference is that the relevant changes in position comport with a process of collective legitimization, which the core coalition of states set in motion in 1991 and throughout subsequent years. The Russian Federation, the United States, and numerous small states took positions against the embargo primarily in reference to socio-strategic as well as socially mediated, normative concerns for what resounded as “legitimate”. Interstate socialization takes place in the sense that public—but not necessarily private—viewpoints converge around a common, more “legitimate” stance on the issue. Socialization subjects do not necessarily take to heart and change their own internal views; at a minimum, they dissociate from what has become a socially unsustainable position.

My observable implication does not, to be clear, come from the fact that “everyone condemned the embargo”. What matters is the particular way in which condemnation of the embargo crystallized into a common position. What also matters are empirical conditioning factors, which are unique to each example and offer further insight into how the respective state subjects arrived at their respective positions. Part Two also corroborates its findings with a collation of secondary source-work. This source-work helps contemplate the influence that certain empirical conditioning factors have on the eventual unanimous interstate consensus against the embargo by December 2016. I adduce empirical conditioning factors are specific to each respective example. For the Russian Federation, the most relevant empirical conditioning factor is the resurgence of Russian nationalism in the mid 1990s. For the United States, the most relevant empirical conditioning factor is Latin American opposition to the embargo and the election of President Barack Obama in 2008. For small states, the most relevant empirical conditioning factor was the Helms-Burton Law of 1996. To my knowledge, there is no relevant empirical circumstance that was influential across examples.

Part Three cross-checks the chapter's inferences against alternative perspectives. These alternative perspectives come from international relations critiques addressed in the theoretical literature review. The most relevant is the point on material resource inducement, which can serve as a theoretical antagonist to the present social constructivist perspective.

Introduction

The United States embargo on Cuba first came onto the United Nations agenda in 1992, at the 47th Session of the General Assembly. The issue did not gain that platform thanks to a

unanimous interstate concern for the “extraterritorial” application of American legislation, as may now seem the case from more recent reports of the Secretary-General (A/RES/73/8; A/RES/72/4; A/RES/71/5; *et al.*). Nor did the embargo become and remain an “issue” worth interstate attention thanks to some universal predilection for “constructive engagement” with Cuba, as may now seem the case from more recent interstate proceedings on the matter (A/73/PV.30; A/72/PV.38; A/70/PV.40; *et al.*). The issue was from the outset disputatious. It became a subject of global, multilateral concern owed to the specific protest of a handful of member states (A/47/273; A/47/272; A/46/193). In August 1991, the Cuban delegation was the member state to propose that this protest become a subject of discussion at the United Nations the following Session (A/46/L.20; A/46/193; A/46/PV.46, 1-22). This was in spite of explicit, bilateral *démarches* (or “transparent threats”) from the United States Department of State that other states reject the item’s inclusion onto the annual agenda. As the State Department put it, support for Cuba’s position “threatens your good relationship with the United States” (A/46/PV.46, 3; 16).

The substance of Cuba’s initial complaint spoke to a complex, albeit by then a long-standing category of legislation known as the “embargo”. The complaint toured some three decades of sanctions policies, and provided extensive details to that effect (A/46/193; A/46/193/Add.7). For Cuba, those policies were “the most serious of the diverse forms of aggression that the Government of the United States has been waging against Cuba” (A/47/PV.70, 4-5). By August 1991, the date of the initial complaint, the applicable pieces of legislation were the Trading with the Enemy Act (1917), the Foreign Assistance Act (1962), the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (1963), the Food for Peace Act (1966), and the Jackson-Vanick Amendment to the Trade Act (1974). This body of legislation culminated with the “Torricelli” or Cuban Democracy Act in October 1992, which meant to encourage a “peaceful transition to democracy” in the country (A/47/179, 3). For Cuba, this latter piece of legislation amounted to a “set of new measures geared to[wards] reinforcing the blockade and tightening the siege by which the United States has, for more than three decades, been attempting to strangle Cuba” (A/47/PV.70, 3). It was also further evidence of the embargo’s extraterritorial reach, namely that the United States “aimed...to compel Cuba and other States, as well as companies and individuals outside territory of the United States, to comply with Washington’s political decisions” (A/47/PV.70, 3).

The sense of urgency with which Cuba brought its complaint to the United Nations came from changes to its international relations throughout the early 1990s, particularly those that relate to the collapse of the Soviet Union. As the Cuban delegation observed,

... For many years Cuba was able to mitigate the consequences of that [embargo] policy through its foreign transactions and the economic and commercial relations that it established with the socialist countries with which it came to conduct 85 percent of its trade.

With the recent break in those relations, Cuba’s entire foreign trade is now exposed to the pernicious effects of the blockade policy pursued by the United States, whose Government constantly persecutes each and every one of my country’s commercial operations, obstructs Cuba’s access to external sources of financing and tries to block potential involvement of foreign capital in Cuban development projects.

While this immoral, illegal, and inhuman policy has not been and will never be capable of bending Cuba’s will, it is none the less, in the present circumstances, doing severe

damage to the economic and social development of the country, to consumption levels and to the general standards of living of the Cuban people (A/47/PV.70, 16-17).

Numerous secondary accounts attest to what the Soviet Union's collapse brought to Cuba. Andrew Zimbalist, for example, documents the decline in trade relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union throughout those years. From 1989 to late 1991, Zimbalist notes that Cuban imports from the Soviet Union fell from \$5.52 billion to \$1.74 billion (Zimbalist 1992, 408). This meant a reduction in Cuba's total import volume by some sixty percent—leading to shortfalls in basic commodities, significant declines in the “productive apparatus in Cuba's economy”, and “widespread demoralization” (Zimbalist 1992, 409).

Cuba saw its turn towards the United Nations as an opportunity to organize an international response to the status quo and leverage its social influence on third states, as the theoretical argument chapter would suggest. In the Cuban delegation's words,

...our intention in proposing this draft resolution is not to put delegations in an uncomfortable position. But—to put in the simplest terms, it is our duty to demand justice for Cuba and for its people and to seek the solidarity necessary to achieve it, and we will carry out that duty in this Assembly and in other international forums (A/46/PV.46, 16).

At the United Nations, the focus of these efforts came from a draft resolution entitled “Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial, and Financial Embargo Imposed by the United States of America Against Cuba” (A/47.L.20/Rev.1). As the title suggests, the resolution's point was clear and concise. For some twenty-four consecutive years—namely, from 1992 to 2016—it demands that the United States embargo end (A/RES/47/19; A/RES/48/16; A/RES/49/9; *et al.*). It also requested that member states reject the embargo's stringent measures, and report to the Secretary-General on the resolution's implementation on an annual basis. All in all, it is important to point out a contrast with the previous empirical case study (Sharman 4.12.19; 17.12.19). In this case study, the prime mover (Cuba) had more of a direct stake and interest in the suspected socialization process. This is less so the case with India's diplomatic efforts in relation to racial discrimination in South Africa.

Part One

The Core Coalition

I now take a close look at that interstate coalition as the first step in my empirical research procedure. I take a particular look at the more vocal members of that coalition and make the case for the strategic manipulation of the norms of liberal internationalism (Hurd 2005; 2008). My point is that the interstate coalition manipulated normative rhetoric in an attempt to win over more support for the cause. Aside from Cuba, the core coalition includes Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, and states from the former European Community.

As set out in the theoretical argument chapter, one way that a core coalition of states can manipulate common norms in a global, multilateral context is via appeals to some “stamp of political or disapproval”. This means that the core states attempt to situate an issue within some accepted interstate normative framework, such that the two become seen as one and the same. This is not to push the wholesale development of some new interstate norm, but to claim

ownership over its space such that the two become seen as one and the same. The states in question can thereby tap into and deploy the social pressure that sustains the normative framework at stake. Socialization agents can in turn project a sense of legitimacy into support for a particular cause that appeals to a more palpable perception of legitimacy—that is, because it seems to resonate with what states have recognized as such. This projection of legitimacy is critical, since other states cannot perceive that legitimacy save through “an assessment of whether the audience acknowledges it” as such (Finnemore 2009, 61-2; Hurd 2008, 31).

The core coalition’s efforts speak to this theoretical point in two respects, each of which relate to a specific international norm. The core coalition made two central normative arguments in opposition to the embargo. The first normative point was that the embargo’s existence called into question a norm on state sovereignty. The assertion was that sovereign, independent states—namely, those represented at the United Nations—have the right to determine their own foreign policy, especially their own trade relations with other states (A/47/PV.70; A/47/PV.71). As Mexico’s delegation put it, “a State’s decision to establish trading links with another [state] is a full expression of its sovereignty and consequently is not subject to the will of third States” (A/47/PV.70, 29). The issue was, as Tanzania’s delegation put it, “about the right of countries, whatever their size, ideological persuasion or level of development, to choose without reference from any quarter, their partners in international economic and commercial relations” (A/47/PV.70, 43). “We don’t think one country has the right to tell another who they can trade with”, as a French diplomat put it (McGillion 2005, 103 in Morley and Morrison 2005).

According to the core states, the United State’s embargo was at variance with this norm on free sovereignty because its application had adverse implications for third states or third entities’ trade relations with Cuba. The most relevant pieces of legislation were the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and later the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996. The 1992 law included a prohibition against any vessel from engaging in trade with the United States, if the vessel has entered a port entered a port in Cuba during the previous 180 days (A/47/273, 2). The 1996 law included Title III, which allowed lawsuits in American courts against foreign companies that invest in businesses that were once owned by American nationals but seized by the Government of Cuba on or after January 1st 1959 (U.S. Public Law 104-114, Statute 814-821). For the core coalition, the point is that the embargo was an attempt to “intrude on the sovereignty of third countries and to regulate unilaterally international trade and shipping” (A/47/654). As the Canadian delegation emphasized, it amounted to “inappropriate attempts assert extraterritorial jurisdiction” (A/47/PV.70, 86). Uruguay’s delegation drew out the point:

...if every State in exercise of its sovereignty is totally free to decide with which other State it wishes to trade or to cease trading, it is then not possible to accept that a State might seek to extend to other states the effects of its domestic legislation, thus improving [sic] or threatening to impose damages against those third States for trading with the State that was the subject of such domestic legislation.

We are of the view that to apply such a policy is tantamount to seeking to extend the territorial jurisdiction of a State, that it is in effect interference in the internal affairs of other States; and that it runs counter to the principles and norms of international law governing the freedom of trade and navigation (A/47/PV.70, 87).

As the commentary indicates, Cuba, Uruguay and other core states fashioned the status quo as objectionable in manipulation of some international norm on sovereignty, particularly as it relates to a state's right to determine its own foreign and trade relations. Hence the embargo was not just objectionable to the core coalition, but rather objectionable to "every state in exercise of its sovereignty" given common expectations as to how it ought to pursue foreign/trade relations. On this specific point, the Cuban delegation was also more explicit in its manipulation of some "stamp of political approval or disapproval". In its report about the embargo's extraterritorial application, for example, it emphasized that "no one yet has questioned the accuracy of the information it contains" (A/46/PV.46, 4-5).

This is to say that the anti-embargo coalition made an attempt to project a sense of legitimacy into a position against the status quo by manipulating its resonance (or "frame") within a norm on state sovereignty and what it entails for international trade/navigation. The coalition also amplified that intersubjective resonance by "cuing", namely by prompting other delegations to see an incongruence between the embargo's extraterritorial measures and some interstate norm on free trade/navigation. The coalition did this by making that incongruence appear as though it was from the outset growing more and more divergent, such that the given norm was being increasingly undermined by the embargo's extraterritorial measures. In 1992, Cuba was among the delegations to hammer on the point in reference to the Cuban Democracy Act:

With regard to Cuba, extraterritoriality is not a recent phenomenon but a characteristic that has been present in the blockade policy since its very beginning and includes the efforts that the Government of the United States has been making for decades to secure the cooperation of other countries with that policy. The difference is that now, by means of a pseudo-legal formula, extraterritoriality is more openly proclaimed and more explicitly extended to those third countries that have links, no matter how legitimate, with Cuba (A/47/PV.70, 16).

Throughout subsequent sessions, the Cuban delegation kept up these efforts with periodic reports on the embargo's effects, including its extraterritorial effects on third states (A/48/258; A/48/259; A/49/451; *et al.*). One can refute the social construction of this position, for example by suggesting that the embargo was in its own terms an affront to some international norm on free trade/navigation. One could then point to the embargo's explicit, extraterritorial measures aimed at third state entities in 1992 (and later in 1996) as evidence (A/47/654).

In my view, there is one critical reason to stick to a social constructivist interpretation: support for certain norms on sovereignty—in particular, as it relates to some right to free trade/navigation—was not tantamount to opposition to the United States embargo on Cuba in 1992. In other words, there was no unanimous interstate consensus on the embargo in 1992, even given those pre-existing norms of sovereignty that relate to free trade/navigation. The main bone of contention was whether the embargo was an issue "appropriate" for consideration in a global, multilateral context such as the United Nations. As the American delegation put it, "the United States embargo of Cuba is not an appropriate issue for discussion at the United Nations" (A/46/193, Add.7, 1). Japan was among the states to take the same position (A/47/PV.71, 8; A/48/PV.48, 13; A/49/PV.45, 14; *et al.*). Its delegation went on to emphasize that "this question is very complex in nature, and Japan wonders if the resolution... properly addresses such complexity. If

not, the question will remain unresolved until a better way is found to arrive at an appropriate solution” (A/48/PV.48, 13). This is again to emphasize the social constructivist nature of the core coalition’s “rhetorical action”. In this instance, the coalition made a consistent effort to manipulate certain norms of international law—in particular, norms of international law on free trade/navigation—in support of a “legitimate” position against the embargo.

The core coalition of states made two central normative points in support of a position against the embargo. The first point was about a norm on sovereignty, particularly as it relates to a state’s right to engage in free trade/navigation. The second central normative point is about “constructive engagement”, meaning dialogue. The assertion was that constructive engagement—rather than “confrontation”—was how the United States ought to work out its differences with the Government of Cuba, including with respect to the promotion and protection of human rights in the country. In 1992, Brazil was among the delegations to make the assertion:

The end of the cold war, the disappearance of East-West confrontation, and the strong trend towards democratization, both within and between nations, have opened the way for a changing international situation with renewed prospects for understanding and international cooperation. This international atmosphere has encouraged negotiated solutions of persistent conflicts, as well as the overcoming of historical divergences. The same should apply in the case of Cuba. A renewed dialogue would facilitate change and help resolve pending problems in accordance with international law. In this spirit, Brazil stands ready to cooperate so that Cuba can more easily overcome its current difficulties in peace, justice, freedom and democracy (A/47/PV.70, 31-32).

A more explicit articulation came from Norway in 1993, which like other European states, was forceful about the position:

Norway to a large extent shares the same objectives the United States is seeking to advance in relation to Cuba... the Norwegian Government strongly deplores the violations of human rights and the lack of democratic rights that still characterize the situation in Cuba. The experience we have gained in Europe, however, indicates that it would not be appropriate to isolate Cuba. Emphasis should instead be placed on involving Cuba in greater cooperation with a view to bringing about changes in the internal situation that could contribute to respect for human rights and democratic processes (A48/PV.48, 14).

The above two interventions suggest a further normative aspect to the core coalition’s diplomatic campaign on the embargo. In this latter instance, the focus drew from an intersubjective sense of how states ought to interact with each other in a real or imagined, new “era” of international relations after the Cold War. Steven Holloway and Rodney Tomlinson refer to this as a “spirit of accommodation” , which meant a “positive transformation among most states in substituting a policy of cooperation for that of confrontation” (A/46/PV.1, 17; Holloway and Tomlinson 1995, 252). The point is that a core coalition of states made a persistent effort to make others see the embargo as an archaic Cold War issue, belying the normative preference for constructive engagement in the years that followed.

Part Two

We just paid close attention to the core coalition' of states that took shape by virtue of a shared, initial position against the United States embargo on Cuba. I now consider the extent to which the coalition's diplomatic efforts influenced other states to assume similar positions over time. I submit that the Russian Federation, the United States, and a handful of small states were influenced by the core coalition's efforts.

The Russian Federation

The Russian Federation is one example of a state that was influenced by Cuba and other states' cumulative efforts since the 46th Session of the General Assembly in 1991. In terms of context, it is important to emphasize the following facts. In December 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, and the new Russian Federation's leadership contemplated a "revolution" in its relations with other states. This change in foreign policy outlook was apparent at the United Nations, when President Boris Yeltsin made this observation to the Security Council in January 1992:

Russia regards the United States and the West not as mere patterns but rather as allies. This a basic prerequisite for, I would say, a revolution in peaceful cooperation between progressive nations...

It is a historic irony that the Russian Federation, a state with centuries-long experience in foreign policy and diplomacy, has only just appeared on the political map of the world. I am confident that the world community will find Russia, as an equal participant in international relations and as a permanent member of the Security Council, a firm and steadfast champion of freedom, democracy and humanism (S/PV.3046, 48).

There are two important components to this perspective. The first is that Boris Yeltsin saw an improvement in Russia's relationship with the United States (and "West") as central to a "revolution" in international relations. Hence as Mervyn Bain writes, "in the early to mid-1990s Moscow's foreign policy became much more western looking, when compared with the Soviet era" (Bain 2016, 333). "Boris Yeltsin's government repeated Gorbachev's willingness to embrace new ideas and concepts which... was central to the end of the Cold War" (Bain 2016, 333).

The second important component to President Yeltsin's perspective is what it entails for Cuba. Recall from the introduction that Russia's relationship with Cuba fell apart in the early to mid-1990s. The point here is that this break-down in relations was inextricable from the new Russian Federation's drive to improve ties with the United States (Bain 2005, 776-778; 2010, 131; 2016, 333; 2018, 257; *et al.*). In short, that drive to improve ties "negated close relations with Havana because of the continued strained nature of Cuban-American relations" (Bain 2010, 131). According to another scholar, "in order to improve political ties, Washington demanded that B.H. Yeltsin that he must cut ties with Cuba. This course of action dominated the 1990s" (Larin 2007 in Bain 2018, 257). Primary source work also substantiates this latter assertion, and dates back to at least 1991. Boris Pankin, Soviet diplomat and Foreign Minister from August 28th to November 19th in 1991, explicates the perspective in his memoirs:

...our relations with Castro had always had an emotional and romantic content over and above the politics of the situation. In the eyes of the Soviet elite he was a true hero who

reminded us of our Soviet traditions of heroism. His appeal was not unlike the appeal of Nelson Mandela in some Western circles: here was a leader fighting for the rights of little people against gigantic forces. All this had to give way to the recognition that we could not longer afford either to sustain him economically, or to exacerbate the American obsession with Cuba. The faithful Fidel had to be sacrificed on the alter of Soviet self-interest (Pankin 1996, 116).

This “sacrifice” of Cuba was evident in the Russian Federation’s support to the United States’ initiatives against Cuba at the United Nations, among other things. From 1992 to 1995, for example, the Russian Federation stood four square behind United States’ resolutions to denounce the human rights situation in Cuba at the Human Rights Commission (Miller 2005, 71 in Morley 2005). In February 1992, the Russian delegation went as far as to “apologize” for its previous support for Cuba (Miller 2005, 71 in Morley 2005). Moreover at the General Assembly, the Russian Federation was also supportive of the United States’ human rights resolutions against Cuba each year from from 1992 to 1995.

With respect to the embargo, the Russian Federation was silent or abstained on Cuba’s resolutions from 1991 to 1994 (UNYB 1992, 802-803; UNYB 1993, 852-854; UNYB 1994, 1106-1107; *et al.*). At the General Assembly, the Russian delegation voiced support for the United States’ position that the “embargo of Cuba is not an appropriate issue for discussion at the United Nations” (A/46/193, Add.7, 1). As the Russia’s delegation put it in December 1992,

The Russian delegation will abstain in voting on the draft resolution in document A/47/L.20/Rev.1 because we believe that, in order to resolve issues relating to trade and economic relations, it is more appropriate to consider them within the context of bilateral negotiations between States rather than in international forum (A/47/PV.70, 83).

Hence global, multilateral stricture of the embargo was *not* “appropriate” according to the Russian Federation. For Russia, the issue was primarily a bilateral dispute, as the United States had been emphasizing (A/47/PV.70, 75-77; A/48/PV.48, 11-12; A/49/PV.45, 11-12; *et al.*). The previous two paragraphs are to emphasize that a drive to improve ties with the United States was a significant influence on Russia’s positions on Cuba throughout the 1990s, and that influence was not favorable towards Cuba’s opposition to the embargo.

A change in position came in October 1994, when the Russian Federation first took a stand against the embargo in a clear and unequivocal manner. The empirical evidence comes from correspondence with the United Nations Secretary-General from October 1994 to July 1997. In October 1994, the Russian’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York made the point that:

In supporting the General Assembly resolution, the Russian Federation based its position on the fact that a consensus on the issue had already emerged in the international community. The Russian Federation, the Latin American countries, the majority of developing countries in Asia and Africa and the Western European States view the embargo as a throw back to the Cold War and an ongoing source of tension between Cuba and the United States (A/50/401, 25).

In 1995, Russia’s Permanent Mission made the further point that:

In supporting in 1994 and 1995 the General Assembly resolution of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba, the Russian Federation was, and continues to be, guided by the firm consensus on the matter among members of the United Nations. Almost the entire world community, with few exceptions, regards the continuing commercial and economic embargo against Cuba as a manifestation of the outdated mentality of confrontation between blocs (A/51/355, 31).

And finally in July 1997, Russia's delegation again made the same sentiment known:

In supporting since 1994 the General Assembly resolution on the necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba, the Russian Federation takes account of the firm consensus on that matter among members of the United Nations.

Almost the entire world community regards the continuing commercial and economic embargo against Cuba imposed by the United States as a manifestation of the outdated mentality of confrontation between blocs. Most of the States of the world express their disagreement with the attempts by the United States to tighten up the embargo by associating the international community with it through the implementation of the Cuba Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 12 March 1996. This act is rightly described as discriminatory and incompatible with the norms of international law and the principles of free trade (A/52/352, 26).

There are several observations one must draw from these communications. The first relates to what the communications do not in their own terms suggest: a sudden "remembrance" that the Cold War had come to an end, and its implications for international relations with Cuba. The Cold War had been over for almost three years, without the Russian Federation positioning itself with other member states in support of Cuba's resolutions. This is not to say that some prior sympathy for engagement with Cuba was irrelevant to the position, particularly in its post-Cold War context. It was relevant, but not to the extent that it warranted clear and unequivocal condemnation of the embargo at the United Nations (A/50/401, 25-26; A/48/PV.48, A/48/448, 22-23; *et al.*).

This leads to the question as to whether there had been some deterioration in circumstances—for example, in the embargo's more extensive extraterritorial application—to encourage the above change in perspective. To my knowledge, there is limited empirical traction in the suggestion given the applicable date of October 1994 (which, was two years after the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992 and two years before the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act in 1996). Even if there was, it would pail in comparison to the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, which strengthened an embargo that had been in place for some three decades. Hence if the some three decades-old embargo and explicit measures to strengthen it was not enough in the first place, it then seems implausible that an incremental increase in sanctions measures could have made the embargo objectionable *en toto*. As the Cuban delegation put it in 1992, "extraterritoriality is not a recent phenomenon but a characteristic that has been present in the blockade policy since its very beginning..." (A/47/PV.70, 16). "The difference is that now, by means of a pseudo-legal formula, extraterritoriality is more openly proclaimed and more explicitly extended to those third countries that have links, no matter how legitimate, with Cuba" (A/47/PV.70, 16).

This allows for a preliminary, social constructivist interpretation of the Russian Federation's move against the embargo in line with a process of collective legitimization. The empirical justification comes from *how* the Russian Federation articulated its position, lending direct empirical support to a theoretical interpretation that the core coalition's efforts on the embargo were influential. I say influential because each communication evidences a manifest concern for an interstate "consensus" on the issue—particularly as it relates to the previous normative point about "constructive engagement" with Cuba—and stresses its relevance to the Russian Federation's subsequent position. That relevance was decisive, as the commentary indicates. In the first instance, the Russian Federation "based" its position on positions other states had taken. In the second instance, it was and continued to have been "guided" by what it saw as a consensus among member states on the embargo. And in the third instance, the Russian delegation again emphasized the same point, "taking account" of a "firm consensus" in its formulation of position. The inference is that in each instance the Russian delegation justifies support for Cuba's resolution, given its significance to the wider "community" of states. Each communication, more specifically, expresses a socio-strategic as well as socially mediated normative justification to oppose the embargo on "legitimate" grounds. Hence the empirical record supports the interpretation that the interstate social context of the time was influential in moving the Russian Federation's towards its stance on the embargo. It also supports the interpretation that the core states were influential, given references to the countries that comprised it: "Latin American countries, the majority of developing countries in Asia and Africa and the Western European countries" (A/50/401, 25).

To be clear, my claim is *not* determinative: that the Russian Federation opposed the embargo *because* of concerns for the interstate social context of the time. There is at least one other significant empirical conditioning factor one must consider: the rise of Russian nationalism in the mid-1990s. Mervyn Bain makes the point. According to Bain, an "upshot" in Russian nationalism came in December 1995, when Yevgeny Primakov replaced Andrei Kozyrev as foreign minister (Bain 2018, 258). Bain cites several reasons for this rise in Russian nationalism, including discontent with NATO expansion, NATO action in Yugoslavia, and a failure to receive promised aid assistance from the United States (Bain 2010, 135; 2016a, 333; 2016b, 19; 2018, 258). The main point is that the previous foreign minister had been a "strong advocate of the pro-Western foreign policy", while the new foreign minister had sympathies for both Russia's Soviet past and even Cuba" (Bain 2018, 258). "When coupled with nationalistic tendencies within Russia, the result of this change was Moscow wanting to reassert itself internationally, especially in a number of areas in which the Kremlin had influence in during the Soviet era" (Bain 2018, 258).

Mervyn Bain makes the further point that these nationalistic tendencies had direct implications for Cuba. By improving relations with Cuba, the Russian Federation sought to show the United States that it "once again had global influence" (Bain 2016a, 334). Bain goes on, "it appeared as if the geostrategic importance of Cuba for the Kremlin was increasing. This is not to suggest it returned to the level of the Cold War, but Moscow did wish to "tickle the Americans' underbelly' with closer relations with Cuba achieving this aim (Sosnovsky 1996, 5)" (Bain 2016a, 334). Hence according to Bain, Russian nationalism was a significant influence on the Russian Federation's stance on Cuba. Improving relations with Cuba—and by extension, taking a clear and unequivocal stance against the embargo—would have been a means by which Russia

could assert its independence from the United States. Improving relations with Cuba would have also been a means through which the Russian Federation could hedge against American foreign policy positions it saw as objectionable.

In my view, Bain's view makes sense to a certain extent. It points to domestic political circumstances as inspiration for taking a more independent stance on Cuba. The perspective, however, falls short in two key respects. The first respect relates to the time trajectory. If Yeavgeny Primakov's becoming foreign minister marked an upshot in Russian nationalism in December 1995, and consequently was a decisive influence on Russia's stance on Cuba, then one would expect the empirical record to indicate as much. On that score, for example, one would expect there to have been a concomitant and contemporaneous recalibration in the Russian Federation's stance on Cuba. The empirical record, however, indicates no such synchronize: the Russian Federation's change in stance on the embargo was in October 1994, over a year *before* Primakov became foreign minister. This was at a time when the Russian Federation still stood in favor of resolutions that the United States underwrote to chastise the situation of human rights in Cuba in 1994 and again in 1995. It is true that Russia's positions on Cuba—namely, on the embargo and on human rights—harmonized in 1996, after Primakov became foreign minister. Yet, given the time trajectory, the empirical record cannot suggest that *both* issues were associated with a decisive upsurge in Russian nationalism that peaked in December 1995. Hence even if there was an upsurge in Russian nationalism, the empirical record still suggests that it was not a decisive influence on Russia's eventual stance against the embargo.

The second shortcoming in Bain's perspective pertains to the "smoking gun" touched upon in previous paragraphs. This point does not require further explication, save a further emphasis that the most relevant empirical source work lends explicit support to the interpretation that the interstate social context at the time was the "basis" for the Russian Federation's position in October 1994 (A/50/401, 25). Even by July 1996, an interstate consensus on the issue still "guided" the Russian Federation to the position (A/51/355, 31). And by July 1997, "a firm consensus on the issue" was what the Russian Federation "took account of" in the formulation of its position (A/52/352, 26).

The United States

The previous subsection suggested that the Russian Federation was influenced by the core coalition's efforts to take a clear and unequivocal stance against the United States' embargo on Cuba. I now suggest the United States as another example of a state that was influenced by the core coalition's efforts. The most relevant facts are as follows. Since 1991, the United States main justification for the embargo was the lack of democracy and human rights in Cuba. As the American delegation put it in 1992,

...the United States chooses not to trade with Cuba because of our concerns about human rights abuses and the lack of democracy in Cuba. We believe that the future of Cuba should be determined by the Cuban people and not by a regime imposed upon them.

Cubans should be able to enjoy freedom of speech and association and the basic human rights recognized by this institution. Unfortunately, the behavior of the Cuban Government has not become more reasonable with the passage of time. In contrast to the

policy of the Cuban government towards its own population, the United States embargo is not designed to hurt the Cuban people (A/47/PV.70, 73-75).

This was the United States' position in 1992 under the Clinton Administration, as well as from 2000 to 2008 under the Bush Administration (A/56/PV.64, 17-18; A/57/PV.48, 3-4; A/58/PV.54, 5; *et al.*). It was also for a time the United States' position under the Obama Administration (A/64/PV.27, 19; A/65/PV.36, 20; A/66/PV.41, 21-22; *et al.*). As the American delegation emphasized in 2011, "the embargo represents just one aspect of United States policy towards Cuba, whose overarching goal is to encourage a more open environment in Cuba and increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" (A/66/PV.41, 21).

A change in position came some twenty-five years later in December 2016, when the American delegation chose to abstain on Cuba's resolution and call for an end to the embargo. In explicating the position, Permanent Representative Samantha Power made the following point:

For more than 50 years, the United States had a policy aimed at isolating the Government of Cuba. For roughly half of those years, Member States voted overwhelmingly for a General Assembly draft resolution condemning the United States embargo and calling for it to be ended.

The United States has always voted against this draft resolution; today the United States will abstain. Let me explain why.

... the draft resolution being voted on today is a perfect example of why the United States policy of isolation towards Cuba was not working—or worse, how it was actually undermining the very goals it set out to achieve. Instead of isolating Cuba, our policy has, as President Obama has repeatedly said, isolated the United States, including right here at the United Nations.

Under President Obama we have adopted a new approach: rather than to try to close off Cuba from the rest of the world, we want the world of opportunities and ideas to open its doors to the people of Cuba. After over 50 years of pursuing the path of isolation, we have chosen to take the path of engagement, because, as President Obama said in Havana, we recognize that the future of the island of course lies in the hands of the Cuban people (A/71/PV.32, 15).

Power went on to assert that "the United States and Cuba must continue to find ways to engage, even as our differences persist. Today we will take another small step to be able to do that. May there be many more—including, we hope, finally ending the United States embargo once and for all" (A/71/PV.32, 17). This announcement of position was significant. It drew cheers from delegations at the General Assembly, and broke with some twenty-five years of policy at the United Nations. It was a "big deal", as Erik Voeten put it (Voeten 26.10.2016).

The empirical record lends direct support to the theoretical interpretation that the core coalition's efforts were decisive in how the United States developed the position. There are two strands of evidence to consider. The first strand of evidence dates back to the mid-1990s, when the Helms-Burton Law came into effect in 1996 under the Clinton Administration. One strand of evidence shows that certain core states had been influential in pressuring successive administrations to oppose certain provisions of the embargo. A relevant provision included Title

III of the Helms-Burton Law (1996), which allowed lawsuits in American courts against foreign companies that invest in businesses that were once owned by American nationals but seized by the Government of Cuba on or after January 1st 1959 (U.S. Public Law 104-114, Statute 814-821). Another relevant provision is Title IV, which denies entry visas to individuals found to “confiscate” or “traffic” in such property (U.S. Public Law 104-114, Statute 822-824). The point here is that certain core states found the provisions especially objectionable, and managed to pressure presidential administrations into waiving them on a periodic basis (under the Presidential Suspension of Right of Action). We know those efforts were influential for two reasons.

The first reason is that the core states were effective in nurturing anxieties among American officials about the extent to which America’s stance on the embargo was socially unsustainable. Dennis Hays, Director of the Office of Cuban Affairs at the State Department, made the following observation about Helms-Burton:

Oh God, another headache. First it was Iran, now we’re going to do more to Cuba and then its going to be Iraq, and then what about Libya. To these guys it was just one more issue, just one more pariah country and do we really want to piss off the EU over yet another of these matters (McGillion in Morley and McGillion 2005, 100-101).

Another high-ranking official in the State Department’s Office of Cuban Affairs made a similar observation in a confidential interview with Professor Chris McGillion: “whenever senior level officials from the White House, State, or any other agency traveled overseas they were hit with this” (McGillion in Morley and McGillion 2005, 103). The international criticism was “the most undiplomatic language I’ve ever seen”, as another official put it (McGillion in Morley and McGillion 2005, 103). “It was hugely controversial in our relations with the Europeans who were saying ‘that sounds like extortion to us’” (McGillion in Morley and McGillion 2005, 103). Stuart Eisenhower, President Clinton’s envoy on Cuba, made a similar observation: “it would be hard to overstate to you the level of anger and resentment in Europe and Latin America about this issue based on what they see as the principle of extraterritoriality from their perspective more so than any practical damage to their actual interests” (McGillion in Morley and McGillion 2005, 108).

The diplomatic pressure felt by American officials had observable effects on successive presidential administrations from the mid-1990s onwards. This leads to the second reason to suggest that the core coalition’s efforts were influential throughout this time period: the Clinton (and later Bush) Administration moved to waive Helms-Burton’s Title III in view of that pressure from core states. Empirical evidence for this assertion has been documented by Chris McGillion, who has conducted original interviews that speak to the matter (McGillion in Morley and McGillion 2005, 97-147). McGillion finds, for example, that an EU threat to bring its complaint against the embargo to the World Trade Organization was influential in the Clinton administration’s decision to hold off on Title III. According to McGillion, one State Department official made the following point: “Politically, we couldn’t let the EU proceed with the WTO challenge” (McGillion in Morley and McGillion 2005, 108). The official went on, “the WTO was already under fire and being questioned by members of Congress. And our attempt to get others to join the WTO, and our efforts to build the WTO up as a credible organization would

have been completely undermined” (McGillion in Morley and McGillion 2005, 108). Another American diplomat made the point that “proceeding further with this matter would pose serious risks [to the WTO, which was still] a very fragile institution” (McGillion in Morley and McGillion 2005, 109). McGillion also refers to John Howard, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s director of international policy, who questioned why the Clinton Administration was willing to risk “an unnecessary fight at the WTO of our own making, when we have so much else at stake in the global trading system” (McGillion in Morley and McGillion 2005, 123).

In addition, there have been press releases from the U.S. Department of State that explicate presidential decisions to waive Title III of the Helms-Burton Law. Some of these press releases also demonstrate the point that the core states were influential. A 1997 statement by President Bill Clinton is an example:

Last July, I allowed Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Libertad Act) to come into force but suspended for six months the right it grants to American nationals to bring suit against foreign firms trafficking in confiscated properties in Cuba. I took this step so that we could have time to develop a more common approach with our allies and trading partners to promote democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba. We and our allies agree on the vital need for a transition to democracy on the island, but differences over how to achieve that aim have often overshadowed the goal itself. That is why I decided to make maximum use of Title III to increase pressure on the Castro regime by working with our allies—not against them—to accelerate change in Cuba (Clinton in Rannenber 3.1.1997).

A July 1999 press release is another example:

The president allowed Title III into force on August 1, 1996, but suspend for six months the provisions that would permit American nationals to bring suit against persons trafficking in confiscated properties in Cuba claimed by U.S. nationals. He did so in order to work with our friends and allies to develop a multilateral approach to advance democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Cuba (U.S. Department of State 16.7.1999).

Although this latter piece of empirical evidence is not direct, it nevertheless suggests that certain “friends and allies” were central to the decision to modify aspects of the embargo. More direct evidence for these states’ influence on the decision comes from recently released documents at the Center for Legislative Archives in Washington D.C. I found several such documents in my visit to the Center in the Spring of 2020. The most important document is an email dated May 28th, 1996. The email is between members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and speaks to when the Clinton Administration first opted to waive certain embargo provisions. On May 29th, 1996, Daniel Fisk wrote the following about Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1993 to 1997.

The Administration is expected to announce tomorrow that exclusion provision (Title IV) of Helms-Burton has gone into effect.

...Reports have it that senior Canadian and Mexican officials met at the White House today on Helms-Burton. I don’t know if the meeting with them [is] to hear from the Administration or for them to blast the US for implementing the law.

Marc, rumor has it that tomorrow's State press briefing will concentrate on Helms-Burton implementation.

Finally, sources inside State blame Turnoff for the foot-dragging and lack of more forceful enforcement of Helms-Burton. Turnoff—and others I'm sure—want to do the minimum in order not to offend our “allies” (especially the Euro weenies) while pretending, for our sake, that they're enforcing the law (Fisk 28.5.1996).

This email communication offers further empirical evidence for the theoretical interpretation that certain core states—especially, the “Euro weenies”—were influential in the Clinton Administration's decision to withhold application of certain embargo provisions. It presents direct evidence that the Clinton Administration was moved by those efforts and responded accordingly. As Mexico's Foreign Ministry emphasized, the Clinton Administration's decision “constitutes an effort to respond to the unanimous opinion of the international community” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico in Lippman 4/1/1997).

I extend this same analysis to the George W. Bush Administration's decisions to waive the same embargo provisions, based on the Administration's own commentary (CNN 16.7.2001). Empirical evidence for this assertion comes from the Morley and Morrison volume. According to Chris McGillion, European opposition to the embargo was again influential. McGillion cites a State Department European Affairs official, who made the following point:

It's assumed on both sides, or at least on the European side, that the U.S. will continue to renew the Title III waiver...Now if, for whatever reason, the U.S. was not to renew the waiver again, then of course, the WTO case would come back. But for the moment I don't think anyone in the administration would be advocating that we stop renewing it (McGillion in Morley and McGillion 2005, 127).

Moreover McGillion cites a EU official, who made a similar point:

Our assumption is that a regular waiver is part of the understanding. So we're assuming that things are ok and the U.S. is aware that if things, for whatever reason, turn out not to be ok then there's the WTO and other things [that we would do] and that would just sour everything (McGillion in Morley and McGillion 2005, 127).

This commentary demonstrates the point that the core states—in particular, states from the European Union—were influential in moving the Bush Administration to oppose certain aspects of the embargo. The officials indicate that the Administration arrived at that stance in response to interstate opposition from Europe.

I have so far dealt with one strand of empirical evidence, suggesting that the core coalition of states had been influential in pressuring successive administrations to oppose certain provisions of the embargo. The two relevant provisions were Title III and Title IV. My point was that certain core states found the provisions especially objectionable, and managed to pressure presidential administrations into waiving them (under the Presidential Suspension of Right of Action). I made the point that those efforts were influential for two reasons. The first reason was that the core states were effective in nurturing anxieties among American officials about the extent to which America's stance on the embargo was socially unsustainable. The second reason

is that the Clinton and Bush administrations moved to waive Helms-Burton's Title III in view of diplomatic pressure from certain core states.

What remains is a discussion of how the Obama Administration moved to oppose the embargo at the United Nations by December 2014. There is substantial empirical evidence to suggest that the core coalition's efforts were influential given how Obama Administration officials justified the United States' change in position. Consider the following interventions, each of which suggest that the interstate social context on the issue was a decisive influence on the United States' eventual position. The first intervention comes from a senior official in the Obama Administration:

There's the annual vote on whether or not the U.S. embargo should be lifted at the United Nations. That took place earlier this year. I believe the vote was something along the lines of 192 to 2. I think we were joined by Palau in that vote. The rest of the world has gone from this set of policies, and I think this will be good for the United States and not just the hemisphere, but in the world and in international fora generally (Senior Official, Obama White House 17.12.14).

A second important intervention comes from Roberta Jacobson, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs:

Our previous approach to relations with Cuba over a half century... isolated us from our democratic partners in this hemisphere and around the world.

...We believe that this policy had become such an irritant in our work with other Latin American countries, with our European allies, that it also enables us to work more effectively with them.

...We believe this is going to be an important turning point in countries engagement, especially countries which have a history of working on these issues in the region, which have been afraid to work too closely with us because of not wanting to appear aligned with our previous policy (Jacobsen 15.2.15).

And a final important intervention comes from Ben Rhodes, President Obama's Deputy National Security Advisor and lead negotiator on Cuba:

For more than fifty years, the United States pursued a policy of isolating and pressuring Cuba. While the policy was rooted in the context of the Cold War, our efforts continued long after the rest of the world had changed. Put simply, U.S. Cuba policy wasn't working and was well beyond its expiration date.... The United States was isolated within our own hemisphere — and in the wider world — which disagreed with our approach (Rhodes 18.2.16).

Rhodes made the further point in an interview with the BBC:

We got an extraordinary amount out of this. First of all, the symbolic anchor of our Cuba policy we cut loose. So Our standing in Latin America, our standing in the world improved because of our shift in the Cuba policy (Rhodes 17.12.17).

There is one critical observation one must make about these three interventions: each justifies a position against the embargo in explicit reference to the interstate social context on the issue. In

the first intervention, a senior administration official highlights a roll-call vote at the General Assembly and emphasizes that the “rest of the world has gone on from this set of policies”. In the second intervention, Roberta Jacobsen emphasizes that the embargo “isolated us from our democratic partners in this hemisphere and around the world” and that “countries...have been afraid to work too closely with us because of not wanting to appear aligned with our previous policy”. And in the third intervention, Ben asserts that “the United States was isolated within our own hemisphere—and in the wider world—which disagreed with our approach”. This is to say that the empirical record lends direct support to the interpretation that interstate political context of the time was a decisive influence on the Obama Administration’s position on the embargo. Leading officials saw America’s position as socially unsustainable and moved to change course accordingly.

It is important to emphasize that the change in position was not just relational. The Obama Administration also advocate for a socially mediated normative position against the embargo, as the a process of collective legitimization set out in this thesis suggests. President Obama made the point that “today we are making these changes because it is the right thing to do” (Obama 17.12.14). Some American officials emphasized the novelty in the Obama Administration’s “new approach” to Cuba (A/71/PV.32, 15). Yet that approach was not novel at the United Nations. It was to appropriate the same *normative* preference for “constructive engagement” that the core coalition of states had been in favor of since the early 1990s. As Samantha Power put it, “rather than try to close off Cuba from the rest of the world...we have chosen to take the path of engagement” (A/71/PV.32, 15). This is to say that the socially mediated, normative content present in the Obama Administration’s perspective—that is, its normative preference for constructive engagement with Cuba’s Government—suggests that a process of collective legitimization was central to the position. This suggests that the core coalition’s efforts were influential to the further extent that the issue’s substantive content became relevant.

There are several secondary accounts that one must consider in relation to this chapter’s perspective. The most relevant comes from Professor Leogrande’s “Normalizing US-Cuba Relations: Escaping the Shackles of the Past”. Leogrande makes two key points with respect to the Obama Administration’s stance on the Cuba embargo. The first is that “for years the diplomatic cost of hostility towards Cuba was relatively low...” (Leogrande 2015, 487). Although the UN General Assembly had voted overwhelmingly against the embargo for each of the past 23 years, most countries were not willing to make bilateral relations with Washington contingent on a change in US-Cuban relations” (Leogrande 2015, 487). The second important point that Leogrande makes is that “the cost of maintaining the status quo went up significantly as US relations with Latin America founded on the shoals of US policy towards Cuba. The depth of Latin America’s anger and frustration over the issue became apparent to Washington only during the 2012 Cartagena Summit, a few months before Obama decided to open the secret dialogue with Cuba” (Leogrande 2015, 488).

I have a twofold response to Leogrande’s perspective corresponding to the two points above. On the first point, I disagree with the assertion that the “diplomatic cost of hostility

towards Cuba was relatively low” for some twenty-three years, and that most countries were not willing to make bilateral relations with the United States contingent upon the embargo’s end. Certain core states *were* explicit that the embargo—in particular, its extraterritorial effects—was objectionable and would stymie bilateral relations if it continued. In 1992, for example, the European Community wrote the following to the Department of State: “the European Community and its Member States consider that the enactment by the US president of this legislation would cause grave damage to bilateral EC/US economic and trade relations” (Delegation of the Commission of European Communities 7.10.1992). Canada, Mexico and the United Kingdom voiced similar complaints and coupled them with concrete measures to undermine the embargo’s application (McGillion 97-147 in Morley and McGillion 2005). Moreover, as previous paragraphs have shown, we know that those efforts were influential in nurturing a sense of unease among American officials to at least waive some of the embargo’s provisions. This applies to both the Clinton and Bush administrations. Hence Leogrande’s first point about relatively low diplomatic costs to the United States throughout the 1990s and 2000s is misleading.

Leogrande’s other key point is to assign decisive agency to Latin American states following the 2012 Cartagena Summit. For Leogrande, Latin American states were particularly influential in moving the Obama Administration towards a clear and unequivocal position against the embargo. I agree with Leogrande’s interpretation that Latin American states were influential. For example, empirical evidence for the assertion can come from commentary by Ambassador Susan Rice:

... We sometimes forget, but when Obama took office, the United States standing in Latin America had suffered. Hugo Chavez and anti-American voices were ascendant. And our outdated Cuba policy was a big reason why. Time after time, meeting after meeting, leaders from Mexico to Uruguay criticized our approach to Cuba, it was a constant drumbeat—a perennial irritant—as we sought greater cooperation with our neighbors. Thanks in part to our normalization policy, and an approach to the region based on cooperation and shared values, relationships between the United States and countries in the hemisphere are as good now as they’ve ever been (Rice 14.10.16).

As Ambassador Rice suggests, social anxieties—that is, especially vis-a-vis Latin American states like Mexico and Uruguay—were a significant influence on the United States’ stance on Cuba. In my view, however, the empirical record does not suggest that these Latin American states’ influence on the Obama administration was decisive. My reasoning is twofold.

The first reason is that most Latin American states—including Mexico and Uruguay—had been vehement about their opposition to the embargo from the outset in 1991, and also took explicit measures to counteract the embargo’s application (Morley 180-223 in Morris and Morley 2005). For example, Morris Morley writes the following about Mexico:

The hemispheric clamor against Helms-Burton was even more vociferous and hostile than earlier demonstrations of the CDA [namely, the Cuban Democracy Act]. No government was more scathing of this latest piece of legislation than Mexico, Washington’s partner (together with Canada, another very public critic) in NAFTA. Clinton’s decision to sign Helms-Burton outraged the Zedillo government and ended

sympathy in Mexico City for America's Cuba policy. In June 1996, the Mexican Congress began drafting "antidote" legislation to protect local companies from the global "reach" of Helms-Burton. At the same time, President Zedillo broached the possibility that Mexico would adopt a law not dissimilar to Canada's, blocking companies from complying with the reporting provisions of Helms-Burton and forbidding them from paying any fines levied by U.S. (Morley 200 in Morley and Morrison 2005).

Mexico's staunch opposition to the embargo—which, Morley describes as one of "outrage"—remained invariable throughout the Obama Administration's tenure. Hence if Latin American states were decisive in the United States' eventual stance on the embargo, then it is unclear why they would have been more influential throughout the Obama Administration's tenure rather than previous administrations. The more significant empirical conditioning factor was the Obama Administration's greater emphasis on restoring America's sense of moral leadership in the world, and therefore greater willingness to heed the groundswell of interstate opposition to the embargo. Empirical evidence for this assertion comes from multiple sources, including Secretary Hilary Clinton who insisted that the Obama Administration "repaired America's tarnished reputation. We shaped old alliances and started new partnerships. We got back to the time-tested values that make our country a beacon of hope and opportunity and freedom for the entire world" (Clinton 31.7.2015).

Leogrande could retort that Latin American opposition to the embargo grew as more states normalized relations with Cuba, and so was a more significant influence on the United States by the time that the Obama Administration assumed office. With that argument, however, one would still have to contend with the fact that most Latin American states began normalizing relations with Cuba throughout the 1990s, as Morris Morley indicates (Morley 180-234 in Morley and McGillion 2005). Moreover one would still have to contend with the lack of explicit empirical evidence to suggest that certain Latin American states—that is, those which had recently normalized relations with Cuba—exercised a decisive influence on the Obama Administration's eventual stance on Cuba embargo. In fact, the empirical record suggests that those states' influence was residual, meaning they added momentum to the mainstay of interstate opposition that had been around since 1991. The evidence for this assertion comes from Leogrande's own work, where he references senior American officials who emphasize the significance of the policy change to Latin America in general and not in particular to Latin American states that had recently normalized relations with Cuba (Leogrande 2015, 482).

My second reason to disagree with Leogrande's interpretation comes from the empirical source work, some of which has become available after the publication of Leogrande's work in 2015. The point is that much of that source work is explicit in its suggestion that the interstate social context of the time—in particular, its global, multilateral reach—was influential in moving the Obama Administration towards its position against the embargo. In other words, the empirical record suggests that concerns for how the United States was seen by other states in that context was central to how Obama Administration officials arrived at a position against the embargo. The evidentiary basis for the claim comes from the interventions above, each of which apportion prime significance to the United States' standing within that particular social context.

An explicit example comes from Josh Earnest, Spokesperson for the Obama White House. In 2014, Earnest made the following point to a news reporter at a press conference:

But here's the principle, Jon. The sanctions regime that we've had in place against Cuba is unilateral... The rest of the world is actually on the other side of this issue. They criticize our sanctions regime policy against Cuba, and it actually interferes with our ability to bring to bear pressure from the rest of the international community on the Castro regime to better respect human rights in Cuba... And that's why we believe that a strategy—a fundamental strategy change was necessary (Earnest 2014).

This is not to say that some social concern vis-a-vis Latin American states was insignificant. It is to say that social concerns vis-a-vis Latin American states was just one component to a larger social concern vis-a-vis the “international community” at large.

Small States

We have so far postulated that the Russian Federation and the United States were subjects of the interstate socialization process that core coalition of states set in motion from the early 1990s onwards. In both examples, the core coalition of states was influential in moving the Russian Federation and the United States towards a clear and unequivocal position against the Cuba embargo, in a manner consistent with a process of collective legitimization. Given particular empirical conditioning factors, the observable implications for the claim was based on how the respective officials expressed positions against the status quo. In both examples, the respective officials were explicit: the interstate social climate of the time was a decisive influence on the eventual positions that the two governments took.

I now turn towards a third and final empirical example: small states. Wikileaks's 2015 release of confidential diplomatic cables necessitates touching upon small states as a whole. The reason is because the release of the documents provides rare insight into diplomacy at the United Nations. The nature of the resource, however, is disperse and does not allow the same depth of analysis that the previous subsections achieve. I accordingly touch upon one small state example, and then take a step back to examine research findings in more general terms in relation to four other small states. The context from which the wiki leads cables is the United States' petitions (or diplomatic demarches) to other governments, asking that they oppose or at least abstain on Cuba's embargo resolutions at the United Nations. The cables are between the Department of State, its diplomatic staff abroad, and foreign ministries (in particular, international organizations departments). American diplomats abroad meet with foreign ministry officials, deliver the diplomatic demarches, and report back to the Department of State. In this research project, the most relevant findings come from how foreign ministry officials respond to the diplomatic demarches. Consider the following examples from small states.

The United Arab Emirates had been among a handful of states in the Middle East that were silent on Cuba's annual complaints against the embargo at the United Nations. This was the case from 1991 to 1998. In its first explication of vote, the Emirati delegation in New York made the point that:

The United Arab Emirates emphasizes that all States must enjoy the freedom of trade and navigation in all international sea lanes. Therefore, the United Arab Emirates does not apply any economic, commercial or financial embargo on Cuba and does not allow application of these measures outside the context of international legitimacy (A/66/114, 95).

There are several observations one must draw from this intervention. The first is what it does not suggest: “discovery” of a norm on “freedom of trade and navigation”. The embargo had been in place for each of the previous seven years, with a norm on free trade and navigation in question. The United Arab Emirates, however, did not position itself in favor of or against the embargo.

This leads to the question as to whether there had been some deterioration in circumstances—for example, in the embargo’s more extensive application—to encourage the above change in position. This would be the case had the change in position occurred in more reflexive manner, in 1992 or 1996. The empirical record does not support that interpretation, as the above statement also suggests. Moreover there is no direct evidence to suggest that either one of those pieces of legislation was an inflection point for the United Arab Emirates. Even if the two pieces of legislation were an inflection point, a focus on them would gravitate towards a “push comes to shove” analysis, whereby the some three-decades old sanctions measures that were in place from the outset were not enough to countenance a clear and unequivocal anti-embargo position. That suggestion is not persuasive: the preponderance of evidence suggests that states which suffered or anticipated suffering from the embargo— such as Canada, states from the European Community and Latin America—were steadfast about it from the get-go. It therefore seems doubtful that an incremental increase in the embargo’s application—for example, via the Helms-Burton Law in 1996—would have made the difference. At most Helms-Burton may have been influential, and as such qualify as a significant empirical conditioning factor. However the empirical record cannot suggest it was the basis for how the United Arab Emirates developed its eventual stance against the embargo.

This allows for a preliminary social constructivist interpretation of the above foreign policy change on the embargo. The empirical justification is twofold. The first comes from how the United Arab Emirates articulated its position, which suggests that it was moved by the socially mediated, normative aspects of the core coalition’s campaign. The reason is because it echoes a specific set of ideas that the anti-embargo coalition had long been in favor of. Like the core states, it finds that a norm on the “freedom of trade and navigation” is relevant to a position against the embargo. The embargo became objectionable given common expectations on how states ought to conduct trade relations with each other. Hence the specific manner in which the United Arab Emirates formulated ideas against the embargo suggests that it was moved by the interstate social influence that a core coalition of states brought to bear on the issue.

The more direct empirical justification comes from diplomatic cables in Wikileaks entitled “Demarche Instructions for Cuba Embargo Resolution at the UNGA”. The cables include exchanges between American diplomats and Emirati officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and relate to a request that the United Arab Emirates withhold support for Cuba’s complaint at the United Nations:

Econchief declined refel démarche to MFA International Affairs Director Yacoub Al-Hosani on October 28, the first day Al-Hosani was available to meet. Econchief highlighted the human rights situation in Cuba and urged the UAE to vote against or abstain on the UNGA resolution. Al-Hosani asked what the results were on the 2006 resolution. After Econchief explained that the resolution passed by a vote of 183 to 4, Al-Hosani stated that he did not believe the UAE would change its vote... He added “don’t push us” to oppose an overwhelming international consensus, adding its not logical.

... “He commented: “people like America, but not your policies” (ABUDHABI1812_a).

This communication highlights the basis of the United Arab Emirates’ embargo position. The important point is that the communication justifies a stance against the embargo primarily in reference to its interstate social ramifications. The International Affairs Director is explicit: there is “logic” in supporting an anti-embargo position primarily because to do otherwise is to “oppose an overwhelming international consensus”. Moreover, Al-Hosani’s comments evidence further social concerns: citing what “people like” as further justification to oppose the embargo and not for any other reason (such as the embargo’s past or present material effects on trade relations with Cuba). This supports the social constructivist interpretation that appearing to abstain on or be indifferent to the embargo was socially unsustainable, and that the core coalition’s diplomatic efforts were a decisive influence on how the United Arab Emirates changed course.

The United Arab Emirates is one example of a small state that seems to have based its position on the embargo primarily because of the diplomatic pressure on the issue. There are several other examples, all of which follow from the State Department’s demarche instructions. The following are noteworthy, but for a lack of space will skip ahead to the more direct empirical evidence. Each example includes states that had been for years silent on Cuba’s complaint. This cable concerns Jordan:

1(C) Poloff delivered refuel talking points October 30 to Ayman Al-Amiri, Acting Head of the International Organizations Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Amiri promised to closely review our request to oppose or abstain on the resolution, but admitted that it was “unlikely” that Jordan would break consensus with other Arab states and the European Union on this issue (03AMMAN7088_a).

This cable concerns the Bahamas:

1. (C) Bahamas Prime Minister Hubert Ingraham received refel demarche from Charge late October 4. PM Ingraham took on-board USG points regarding the UN having great potential for progress if like-minded countries would agree to work together on balanced and reasonable UN resolutions and other initiatives.

2. (C) However, PM Ingraham robustly defended specific Bahamian votes on important resolutions that had differed from USG votes in previous UNGA sessions. Ingraham began by stating that the “U.S. stands alone on the Cuban Embargo.”... (08NASSAU709_a).

This cable concerns Poland:

1 (C) Pol External Chief delivered refuel demarcate November to Mariusz Lewicki of the MFA UN Department. After consulting widely within the MFA and contacting the Polish Mission in New York, Lewicki responded late in the evening that the GOP had decided

the “highest priority was to maintain the common EU position”. Poland would therefore... support the overall Cuba resolution...

Comment: Poland is attempting to repair relations with EU partners such as Germany and France, while at the same time assuaging concerns in Brussels that the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party is Euro-skeptical. This is compounded by the perception in Europe since the beginning of OIF that Poland is too much of a U.S. surrogate within the EU... (06WARSAW2370_a).

This cable concerns Denmark:

Danish MFA Deputy Head of Department for Asia and Latin America (DAS-equivalent) Lars Bredal reaffirmed October 26 Denmark's commitment to a firm EU policy in support of human rights and democracy in Cuba, and indicated that the Danish government welcomes U.S. interest in joint action with the EU (Ref A)...From Denmark's perspective, Bredal said, the challenge of open U.S.-EU collaboration will be in avoiding the image of the West “ganging up” on Cuba —also in the eyes of other Latin American countries (COPENHAGEN 000988).

And this final cable concerns Romania:

1 (C) Deputy Palcons on 8 November delivered demarche on the Cuba Embargo Resolution (ref a) to MFA Director for UN Affairs Petru Dumitriu and Deputy Director Eugen Mihut...

2 (C) Comment: ... Romania even prior to formal EU entry in January 2007 has begun to march in close step with the EU on this matter (and on many other issues), and will want to maintain its bona fides by hewing closely to the EU common position (BUCHAREST001706_a).

Each one of these interventions asserts a stance on the embargo in reference to its wider interstate social implications, meaning how the wider community of states sees the respective positions. The first intervention emphasizes Jordan’s refusal to “break ranks with the other Arab states and the European Union”. The second intervention emphasizes the Bahama’s refusal to withhold opposition to the embargo, because the “U.S. stands alone on the Cuba embargo”. The third intervention emphasizes Poland’s need to oppose the embargo because the “highest priority was to maintain the common EU position”, and avoid the “avoid the perception in Europe... that Poland is too much of a U.S. surrogate within the EU”. The fourth intervention emphasizes a similar social anxieties, emphasizing the significance of “avoiding the image of the West ‘ganging up’ on Cuba—also in the eyes of other Latin American countries”. And the final intervention again highlights social concerns, indicating Romania’s need to “march in close step with the EU”. In each example, the respective state actors justify a position on the embargo primarily given concerns for its interstate social ramifications, and not for any other main reason. Hence the communications each demonstrate a manifest concern for how other states—especially, member states from the European Union—see their own position, which in turn suggests that social concerns were a decisive influence on the respective state subjects.

Part Three

I now turn towards the third and final step in my research procedure: the cross-check. I weigh inferences from the previous section against the most prominent theoretical and empirical counter-arguments. The theoretical counter-arguments come from materialist accounts on international relations, as discussed in this thesis' theoretical literature review. The empirical counter-arguments come from the empirical circumstances in the case-study, as well as the most relevant secondary historical accounts.

A theoretical focus on material side-payments can serve as one theoretical counter-argument to the present interpretation. A possible rendition may have to do with a claim that some states—in particular, those that this section associates as belonging to a core coalition—took it upon themselves to manipulate certain material incentives and/or disincentives in favor of or against a position on the embargo. Those efforts, according to this theoretical perspective, would then in turn shape the eventual constellation of support for a common position against the embargo. A potential ring-leader for those efforts is Cuba, which according to Morris Morley, sought to expand its trade relations with other countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are numerous states that would have been susceptible to those efforts, especially in Latin America. As Morris emphasizes, “in 1990, Cuba conducted only 5 percent of its total trade with the region; by 1994, the figure increased sevenfold to 35 percent...” (Morley 199 in Morley and Morrison 2005). An example is Argentina, which struck a future investment accord with Cuba that enabled it to remove some \$1.25 billion in debt (Morley 198 in Morley and Morrison 2005). The implication here is that a deal of this magnitude would have made Argentina more sympathetic towards a position against the embargo than it otherwise would have been.

I concede the plausibility of this theoretical interpretation, and allow the possibility that numerous states had their own material reasons to oppose the embargo. Nevertheless I push back on two key points. First, even if Cuba were successful in some form of resource manipulation, it would pale in comparison to what the United States could achieve. The reason is obvious: the United States' material capabilities by far outweighed that of Cuba's. Moreover, we know that successive American administrations *did* manipulate those resources to ensure that other states at least not oppose its position on Cuba. An explicit example comes from Chile:

When Chile announced the exchange of ambassadors with Cuba in April 1995, Washington combined expressions of “disappointment” with the threat of economic sanctions. One State Department official warned that it “won't make things easier” for Chile's application to join the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Morley 191 in Morley and Morrison 2005).

Thus if some form of material resource manipulation were a significant influence on how states positioned themselves on Cuba, we would expect states to have been more sympathetic to the United States' stance throughout the 1990s and 2000s and not Cuba's.

Another materialist critique can relate to the neorealist assertion about the “epiphenomenal” nature of international organizations, as set out in the theoretical review chapter. The critique would emphasize that the eventual constellation of opposition against the embargo reflected some material balance of threats balanced or balancing against each other. The

most relevant rendition of the critique would proceed along the lines of the uni-polar, anti-American analysis from set out in this thesis' theoretical literature review chapter (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017; Potrafke 2009; Voeten 2004; *et al.*). There is some traction in this potential critique in that opposition to the embargo was almost exclusively, by definition an anti-American position. The problem with that perspective, however, is twofold. The first respect is that it glosses over the “non-partisan” nature of the anti-embargo coalition’s efforts since 1991. As shown in section one, central to those efforts was a manipulation of *common* notions of “right” and “wrong” that could in turn exert diplomatic pressure upon all states. In other words, a coalition of states from the outset cast consideration of the embargo as above an anti-American cleavage. Moreover those states couched the issue as such in an attempt to win others over, regardless of the constellation of material threats balanced or balancing against each other at the time. This is to say that an emphasis on some constellation of material capabilities overlooks how the core states saw the issue from the outset.

The second limitation in the neorealist critique pertains to the manner in which the relevant state subjects formulated a position against the embargo. The reason is because states that took an eventual stand against the embargo seem to have done so “as if” moved by what it meant for a relationship with the wider interstate community, as the previous section argues. The empirical record suggests that the primary concerns were social; the applicable state subjects took stands against the embargo in explicit reference to its significance to the wider community of states. When pressed to justify his views, for example, Vietnamese diplomats main defense on Cuba was that “the GVN position is consistent with the majority of countries that support the Cuba embargo resolution” (06HANOI2833_a). One can make a similar point based on interventions from the previous section. This is to say that this chapter’s “smoking gun” evidence lends direct empirical support for the theoretical argument that this thesis advances.

Another potential materialist critique of this chapter can come from an emphasis on “sanction’s fatigue” (Haas 1998). This critique may run along the following lines. Maintaining sanctions policies against Cuba was expensive in material terms and perhaps increasingly so as their effects remained elusive at most. In this case study, the basis to oppose the embargo would then be material in nature and not social. I concede that sanctions are expensive, and that there was clear material incentive to not support the United States’ sanctions policies against Cuba. I also concede the possibility that there would have been more of a material incentive to oppose sanctions policies against Cuba, as its economy recovered following the Soviet Union’s collapse. In defense of my empirical argument, I nevertheless offer the following two points. First, as Ian Hurd may argue, the nature of the relevant changes in position cannot be accounted for except with reference to the anti-embargo coalition’s efforts (Hurd 2005, 521). The manner in which certain states opposed the embargo suggests that the coalition’s efforts were influential. As Hurd would suggest, the coalition gave the other states the “tools” with which to oppose a key aspect of American foreign policy. As Hurd would also suggest, some states might still have opposed the embargo, but at a greater cost to their relationship with the the United States. Hence the coalition gave rise to an intersubjective “safe space” within which third states could oppose the embargo without appearing to confront the United States.

One could extend the sanctions fatigue argument to the Obama Administration’s decision to oppose the embargo. Yet there are also limitations to this potential critique. The reason is threefold. First, the Obama Administration’s decision to oppose the embargo was not conditioned

on the embargo's demise. Embargo legislation has remained in place until today. Second, given that lifting the embargo was never an immanent possibility, it is doubtful that material interests were a significant influence on the Obama Administration's decision. Professor William Leogrande makes a similar point, emphasizing that the "Cuban market was small and poor... once US agricultural interest won an exception to the embargo in 2000, allowing them to sell food to Cuba, business pressure for a policy change receded" (Leogrande 2015, 487). The third reason comes from what the "smoking gun" evidence demonstrates, lending direct support to the present social constructivist assertion that material interests were not a decisive influence on the respective state positions.

A historical critique may relate to President Trump's election and subsequent change in stance on the embargo following the Obama Administration departure from office. The Trump Administration reportedly undertook more than 200 initiatives to tighten the embargo (Marsh 3.3.2021). At the United Nations, the American delegation once again opposed the annual embargo resolutions (A/72/PV.38; A/73/PV.30; A/74/PV.28). This revert back to long-standing policy on the embargo would seem to refute the suggestion that the core coalition's diplomatic pressure was influential. My response to this potential critique refers back to my theoretical argument's limitations set out in the theoretical argument chapter. Recall that my theoretical argument hinges on the extent to which a state subject attaches significance to its stature on a particular issue. I referenced Giovanni Mantilla to support the theoretical point that certain states may care more or less about the "consequences of public embarrassment to their self-image, status, and reputation" (Mantilla 2020b, 177). The former states are more "socially vulnerable" because they wish to be seen as "'good' standing as members of the 'international community', particularly among social competition" (Mantilla 2020b, 177). The latter states, on the other hand, are less socially vulnerable and so diplomatic pressure can have no effect on these states. This includes states that maintain a certain position, despite the negative interstate social repercussions that prevail. A state that does not care about that diplomatic pressure—in particular, as it relates to maintaining an intersubjective sense of legitimacy on the issue—will not for that reason come around. More importantly, if a state commonly adopts a "renegade attitude" against international norms—for example, by boasting about its status as an outcast on the issue—it is unlikely to be moved by diplomatic pressure (Mantilla 2018, 331).

This theoretical caveat is relevant to the United States' position on the embargo under President Trump for two reasons. The first reason is that we have strong reason to believe that American officials during the Trump Administration—like officials under previous administrations—still felt the weight of diplomatic pressure to oppose the embargo. As evidence, I suggest a communication from several senators to President Trump. The communication is dated October 31, 2017 and was authored by Patrick Leahy, Chris van Hollen, Sherrod Brown, Elizabeth Warren, Jeff Merkley, Amy Klobuchar, Jack Reed, Edward Markey, Al Franken and Sheldon Whitehouse. The senators state make the following observation before the General Assembly's vote on the embargo in the fall of 2017.

Next month, the UN General Assembly will vote on a resolution calling for an end to the United States embargo against Cuba for the 26th time. As you know, last year the United States abstained from voting on the resolution for the first time, as it has become abundantly clear that our effort to isolate Cuba has instead isolated us from the international community and particularly from allies and partners in this hemisphere. We

recognize that because the embargo is still U.S. law, the Administration is unlikely to support the resolution. However, as one of the only two nations that did not vote in favor of the resolution, we urge you to direct our UN Ambassador to again abstain in order to prevent further isolation of the United States.

Our failed embargo against Cuba has been repeatedly and publicly condemned by the international community as ineffective and harmful to the people of Cuba. The longer we maintain this outdated Cold War policy the more our international regional credibility suffers.

...One vote on a Un resolution cannot replace the legislation required to end the embargo. Only Congress can repeal this outdated policy. It does, however, signal to the international community that the United States remains open to dialogue and further negotiation with Cuba (U.S. Senate 31.10.2017).

The senators point to the United States' diplomatic isolation on the embargo and resulting damage to America's intersubjective sense of credibility around the world. These interstate social ramifications, as the senators importantly emphasize, warranted renewed opposition to the embargo.

My second reason is that an abundance of empirical source work suggests that the Trump Administration adopted a "renegade attitude" towards the international community on the embargo despite the diplomatic pressure on the issue. As we have seen, this attitude stands in sharp contrast to that of the Obama Administration, which attached utmost significance to maintaining an intersubjective sense of legitimacy on the embargo. Consider the following observations by Ambassador Nikki Haley, the Trump Administration's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. One such observation comes from remarks to the General Assembly in November 2017.

One year ago, the United States abstained in the voting on resolution 71/5, under this item. The reason given was that the continuation of the embargo was not isolating Cuba but was, in fact, isolating the United States. It is true that we had been left nearly alone in opposition to this annual resolution. No doubt there will be some here who do not understand how we can take such opposite positions, separated by just 12 months. They will wonder how we could passively accept this resolution last year and energetically oppose it this year. To those who are confused as to where the United States stands, let me be clear. As is their right under our Constitution, the American people have spoken. They have chosen a new President, and he has chosen a new Ambassador to the United Nations. As long as the Cuban people continue to be deprived of their human rights and fundamental freedoms and as long as the proceeds from trade with Cuba go to prop up the dictatorial regime responsible for denying those rights, the United States does not fear isolation in this Hall or anywhere else. Our principles are not up for a vote. They are enshrined in our Constitution. They also happen to be enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. As long as we are Members of the United Nations, we will stand for respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms that the Member States in this body have pledged to protect, even if we have to stand alone (A/72/PV.38, 92).

Another observation comes from remarks at the following Session in November 2018.

Last year, we were joined by just one nation in voting against resolution 72/4, and that is fine; we were in very good company. We have no problem with standing alone on behalf of the things that we believe in and will proudly do so again today if necessary. But the most regrettable fact of this draft resolution each year is not that the United States may not stand alone in opposing it, but that the draft resolution is a waste of everyone's time. It is one more time that countries feel they can poke the United States in the eye. But they are not hurting the United States when they do this; they are literally hurting the Cuban people by telling the regime that their treatment of their people is acceptable.

To the people of Cuba, I once again say that the United States will continue to stand with them, regardless of what others do. We will stand with them until the day comes that we can stand together as free peoples in our shared neighbourhood (A/73/PV.30, 8-9).

And finally, Haley expressed the following observation in an op-ed in the *New York Times*:

The unfortunate thing is not that the United States was left, once again, standing virtually alone on behalf of human dignity at the United Nations. To the contrary. We are proud to buck the mob when it comes to the principles we believe in (Haley 3.11.18).

Each one of these observations, in contrast to the Obama Administration, demonstrates a sense of pride in being seen as an outcast on the annual embargo resolutions at the General Assembly. The first intervention acknowledges a sense of being "alone" but nevertheless emphasizes a commitment to principles that the United States supports "even if we have to stand alone". The second intervention is more explicit, emphasizing that "we have no problem with standing alone on behalf of the things that we believe in and will proudly do so again...". And the third intervention is even more explicit, insisting that "we are proud to buck the mob when it comes to the principles we believe in".

Chapter Seven

The Ban on Nuclear Weapons

1946 - 1961

For some time much emphasis had been placed upon the existence of a moral opinion among the smaller nations that could be brought to bear, and thus restrain the main protagonists in the struggle between the Communists and the free world. Many who were aware of the difficulties inherent in the conduct of bilateral negotiations on the disarmament issue hoped that nations not immediately aligned side or the other might prove helpful... Yet when the Soviet Union suddenly resumed tests on an extensive scale, and action with threats of 100-megaton bombs, the reactions of the neutral or non-aligned countries at Belgrade and again, to some extent, at the General Assembly of the United Nations were so mild as to be wholly inconsequential. As a result, their position as “guardians” of the world's conscience was greatly weakened (McCloy 1962, 343-344).

Chapter Outline

I now turn towards a third and final empirical case study. In contrast to previous two case studies, this case study chapter examines an issue area where the “dog does not bark” (Checkel 339, 1998). My adaptation of the term refers to coverage of an issue area where interstate socialization does *not* occur: an almost unanimous, clear and unequivocal interstate consensus does not eventuate. The point of presenting an inconclusive case study speaks to this my research design, as the data and methods chapter has shown. The idea is to sharpen up the thesis’ general argument for the theoretical conditions under which socialization will and will not occur. Recall my previous theoretical proposition that an agent’s perceived integrity on an issue can make socialization efforts more or less influential. Specifically, my proposition was that socialization efforts are more likely to fail when proponents lack that integrity—and are therefore seen to be hypocritical—because the target states do not see a political drawback to maintaining the status quo. By integrity, I meant a social constructivist (and not a rationalist) version of “reputation”, which refers to the extent to which a socialization subject regards a socialization agent as a trustworthy advocate of a cause. I stressed that my use of the concept is intersubjective. It calls into question to what degree a potential socialization subject views a socialization agent as meaning what they say—namely, as “talking the talk” *and* “walking the walk”—on the specific issue.

I test this theoretical proposition in relation to proceedings on nuclear weapons at the General Assembly. Studying the issue can be complex, encompassing some seventy-five years of intensive discussion from 1946 to the present. For simplicity, I focus on one clear and concise issue: the moral right to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in war. I also pay particular attention to the same time period as my first case study—namely, from 1946 to 1961—in response to James Mahoney and Gary Goertz’s commentary on the “possibility principle”. That the principle, as we have seen, asks for nonpositive case studies that resemble positive cases to “control for background features and thereby achieve greater leverage for causal analysis” (Mahoney and Goertz 2004, 655). I thus examine the same time period to replicate the conditions under which socialization took place in my first study and control for a host of historical factors that can affect the success of socialization. In the two case studies, the most prominent of these historical factors is decolonization, which led to a substantial increase in membership at the

United Nations in 1960 and 1961. These new member states—from Africa and Southern Asia—lent further support to the core coalition’s diplomatic efforts on apartheid, as well as on the nuclear weapons ban. Controlling for decolonization thus controls for the added potential social effects—such as those that can follow from an increased sense of isolation—that a core coalition’s numerical expansion can have on an interstate audience. I also allude to the same agents and subjects of socialization as case illustrations as much as the source work allows. This allows me to control for a host of actor properties, such as those that relate to regime characteristics at the particular time period.

Nonpositive case studies are most useful when they address empirical contexts where the outcome of interest has a “real possibility of occurring—not just those where the outcome has a nonzero probability” (Mahoney and Goertz 2004, 654). I accordingly also examine the time from 1946 to 1961 to ensure that interstate socialization on the issue indeed had a “real possibility of occurring”, as per my first case study. Some may question whether a state’s possession of nuclear weapons would have altogether abnegated support for the ban. Here I emphasize that the two are *not* necessarily incompatible. A state can possess the means to engage in certain modes of warfare but nevertheless believe that doing so runs counter to select common norms.

This chapter follows the structure of the previous case study chapters with an introduction and three parts. The introduction has two components. The first component provides an empirical background for the case study. This acclimates the reader with the empirical context, especially with how certain core states—particularly India and the Soviet Union (as well as states associated with the Eastern Bloc)—made the nuclear weapons ban an issue for global, multilateral concern at the United Nations. My introductory commentary again alludes to theoretical argument chapter’s analysis on information politics, requiring that socialization agents specify and categorize an issue (Rosert 2019). The second component considers literature on nuclear weapons from the social constructivist research tradition in international relations. The most relevant work comes from Professor Nina Tannenwald, who zeroes in on the role of a “taboo” on the use of nuclear weapons (Tannenwald 1999; 2005; 2007; 2018a; 2018b). By Taboo, Tannenwald means a “normative inhibition against the first use of nuclear weapons” (Tannenwald 2018a, 89). In response to Tannenwald’s work, I emphasize the limits in that taboo, drawn from my empirical focus on the United Nations. I suggest that there has long been some general aversion to nuclear weapons at the interstate level. More importantly, I also emphasize that this general aversion to nuclear weapons has not been synonymous with a diminution in the belief in the moral right to use (or threaten to use) nuclear weapons in self-defense. This is to say that an unanimous, interstate consensus against the right to use nuclear weapons does *not* exist. Interstate socialization has accordingly not occurred on this issue.

Part One makes the case for a core coalition of states’ diplomatic efforts as advocates of a clear and unequivocal stance against the right to use (or threaten to use) nuclear weapons in war. The chapter identifies the coalition from proceedings on nuclear weapons at the United Nations, which date back to 1946. The main proponents of the position were the Soviet Union (as well as states associated with the Eastern Bloc) and states that later formed the Non-Aligned Movement. India and the latter were among the coalition’s most vocal proponents. Part One suggests the existence of a core coalition that took shape by virtue of a shared, initial stance against the moral right to use (or threaten to use) nuclear weapons in war. Like in the previous two case studies, the main task is to theorize those views. The section does this by taking a close look at the

“rhetorical action” (namely, the discursive practices) that the potential socialization state agents use in an effort to influence other states. As we shall see, these agents manipulate common norms in an effort to pressure an audience into support for a cause.

Part Two considers how the core coalition’s diplomatic efforts on the nuclear weapons ban were unsuccessful. My point relates to the Soviet Union and India’s sense of integrity on nuclear weapons as advocates of the ban. I submit that these states’ perceived integrity was in significant doubt, and consequently undermined the extent to which their efforts could have influenced other states’ positions. This is to say that the campaign to ban the bomb failed because those leading it lacked integrity in the eyes of target states—that is, NATO member states—thanks to their own nuclear arsenal or potential to develop one. My general conclusion is that socialization efforts fail when proponents are seen to be hypocritical. Empirical evidence for this argument comes from observations made by American, British, and Canadian officials about the Soviet Union and India as advocates of the ban. I use these three states as illustrative country cases for empirical reasons. The first reason is that Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States were had long opposed the ban in contrast to the Soviet Union, states associated with the Eastern Bloc, and states that later formed the Non-Aligned Movement. The second reason is that these three country cases allow access to insightful empirical source work, as we shall see.

Part Three turns towards the third and final step in this thesis’ research procedure: the cross-check. I weigh points from the previous section against the most prominent theoretical and empirical counter-arguments. The theoretical counter-arguments come from materialist accounts on international relations. The main materialist counter-argument to the chapter would proceed from the assertion that intergovernmental organizations are “epiphenomenal”, meaning that their proceedings reflect some constellation of material power in the interstate system. This theoretical interpretation would assert that interstate proceedings on nuclear weapons—in particular, from 1946 to 1961—reflect the East-West, Cold War cleavage of the time. Hence interstate proceedings on the issue were anyways not amenable to a divergence from that cleavage, as long as the states in question saw themselves as aligned with one side or another. The point is that the national defense imperatives would by and large define positions on nuclear weapons. A potential socialization agent’s perceived integrity on nuclear weapons would therefore have little or no influence on the positions that other sates took on the issue. I make two points in response to this potential critique. The first point is that the Cold War’s end has not been associated with an arresting change in positions on the issue, particularly by states that have not opposed the right to use (or threaten to use) nuclear weapons from the outset. The second point is that the critique overlooks the manifest social anxieties that potential socialization subjects expressed upon evaluating the issue at the United Nations.

Introduction

The question of nuclear weapons first came before the General Assembly at its First Session, when member states unanimously voted to create the Atomic Energy Commission in 1945. Among the Commission’s aims was to make “specific proposals” on disarmament efforts, including nuclear disarmament efforts (A/RES/1(I), 9). Yet the Commission did not set out to outlaw the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In 1946, the Soviet Union was the member state to first raise and advocate for that proposition in a communication entitled “Draft international convention to prohibit the production and employment of weapons based on the use

of atomic energy for the purpose of mass destruction” (AEC/ 7). The draft convention referred to the status quo in undesirable terms: the “great scientific discoveries in the sphere of atomic energy carry with them a great danger, first of all, for peaceful towns and the civilian population in the event of these discoveries being used in the form of atomic weapons for the purpose of mass destruction” (AEC/ 7, 1). The document also sorted the issue into a broader category of problems posed by other weapons that had been banned because of their especially destructive nature. “International agreements have already prohibited the use in warfare of asphyxiating, poisonous and other similar gases, as well as all similar liquids, substances and processes, and likewise bacteriological means...” (AEC/ 7, 1). At the time, however, the Soviet Union’s efforts were a minority viewpoint. In 1948, for example, the Soviet draft resolution to ban nuclear weapons was rejected by the General Assembly with forty member states against the proposition (A/PV.157, 468-469; UNODA 1970, 22).

The Atomic Energy Commission was eventually dissolved and replaced by the Disarmament Commission in 1952, which envisioned a “system of guaranteed disarmament [where] there must be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces...and all armaments including atomic” (A/RES/502(VI), 2). Creation of this commission was more controversial, with eighteen out of sixty member states not supporting the resolution to establish it (A/PV.358). One reason for the controversy, as the Soviet Union put it, was that the “resolution contains nothing that could give any kind of ground for regarding it as an attempt to prohibit atomic weapons” (A/PV.358, 300). The Soviet delegation went on,

You will see how cunningly all this is worded, so cunningly that it may be searched completely in vain for any actual prohibition of atomic weapons, for the simple reason that there is no question here of any real prohibition...Its purpose is the legalization of further uncontrolled production of atomic weapons and the use of atomic bombs for the mass destruction of people.

If the delegations headed by the United States which sponsored this resolution indeed wished to prohibit atomic weapons... why can they not say so clearly and definitely in their resolution, as is proposed in the amendment of the USSR delegation... (A/PV.358, 300).

For reference, the United States’ position had been to withhold support for a ban on nuclear weapons until the establishment of an effective international control regime (A/PV.358, 309-311; A/PV.17, 260-3; UNODA 1970, 12-13; *et al.*).

At the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly (1959-1960), the Soviet Union and other member states again pushed for acceptance of a draft resolution that would condemn the use of nuclear weapons in November 1960 (UNYB 1960, 24; A/C.1/L.254). Vote on the draft resolution was held off until the following Sixteenth Session in 1961, when new non-aligned member states added further political support to the cause (A/4942/Add.3, 4-5). Secretary-General U Thant saw these new, non-aligned member states as exercising a “moderating and catalytic influence” (Thant 1962 in Cordier and Harrelson 2010, 206). The resolution was entitled “Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons” (A/RES/1653(XVI), 4). A journalist from *The Guardian* referred to the motion as the “ban the bomb” declaration (Pick 10.11.1961). Among its key propositions was the by then familiar assertion that the “use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and

aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations' (A/RES/1653(XVI), 5). Another key proposition was a request that the Secretary-General "consult the Governments of Member States to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening a special conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes..." (A/RES/1653(XVI), 5). These two provisions and others were again controversial. Fifty-five delegations voted in favor of the resolution, while fifty-six six delegations either abstained or outright opposed it (A/PV.1063, 808). The United States, for example, did not mince words about its opposition to the declaration. The American Permanent Representative, among other things, emphasized that it was "suicidal" for states to give a blanket pledge not to use (or threaten to use) nuclear weapons (*The New York Times* 11.11.1961).

The controversial "ban the bomb" declaration was an inflection point in the diplomatic campaign against nuclear weapons at the General Assembly. Since then, the resolution has been a reference for similar efforts at the United Nations. These efforts include the Sixteenth Session in December 1962, when the same coalition of states reaffirmed the content of the ban the bomb declaration and again pushed for the convening of a conference where member states would commit to prohibit the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons (A/5174; A/5174/Add.1; Add.2; *et al.*). In that session, the issue was once again controversial (A/RES/1801(XVII); A/PV.1192). It was again controversial the following Seventeenth Session in 1963 (A/RES/1909(XVIII); A/PV.1265), as well as in the Twenty-first Session in 1966 (A/RES/2164(XXI); A/PV.1484). The focus on the moral right to use (or threaten to use) nuclear weapons in war returned in 1978 during the Thirty-third Session, with a resolution entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war" (A/RES/37/71B; A/33/PV.84). In substance, the resolution was not new. It was a more concise formulation of the 1961 resolution. One hundred and three member states supported the resolution, while forty-nine did not. The resolution remained controversial throughout ten more subsequent sessions (A/RES/34/83G; A/RES/35/152D; A/RES/36/92I; *et al.*).

In 1982, another reaffirmation of the 1961 ban the bomb declaration came from another resolution entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons" (A/RES/37/100C; A/37/PV.101). This resolution has been considered for some thirty-five subsequent sessions at the General Assembly (A/RES/38/73G; A/RES/39/63H; A/RES/40/15F; *et al.*). A corollary to these diplomatic efforts was a request for (and subsequent follow-up on) a legal opinion from the International Court of Justice in 1994 (A/RES/49/75K; A/49/PV.90; A/49/699). Seventy-eight member states supported the initiative, while one hundred and seven did not (including forty three that directly opposed the request) (A/49/PV.90). The diplomatic campaign against nuclear weapons at the United Nations has culminated in partial support for the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (A/CONF.229/2017/8; A/RES/72/57). Some seventy out of one hundred and ninety three member states did not vote in favor of the motion (A/72/PV.62). Forty delegations even boycotted the subsequent proceedings on the Treaty (Aljazeera 27.3.20).

It should now be apparent to the reader that diplomatic efforts to "ban the bomb" have been controversial at the General Assembly. Against this empirical backdrop, the next paragraphs turn towards a discussion of social constructivist literature on nuclear weapons. The most relevant reference is Professor Nina Tannenwald, who emphasizes the role of a taboo in the non-

use of nuclear weapons since 1945 (Tannenwald 1999; 2005; 2007; 2018a; 2018b). By taboo, Tannenwald means a “normative inhibition against the first use of nuclear weapons” (Tannenwald 2018a, 89). The taboo “stems from a powerful sense of revulsion associated with such destructive weapons” (Tannenwald 2018a, 890). The main argument is that this normative prohibition on nuclear weapons has “developed in the global system, which, although not yet a fully robust norm, has stigmatized nuclear weapons as unacceptable weapons of mass destruction” (Tannenwald 1999, 433). Tannenwald writes,

The normative branding of nuclear weapons as “unacceptable” and “inhumane” weapons is strong today, and has been actively reinforced in recent years by the campaign at the UN that has sought to highlight the devastating humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons (Tannenwald 2018a, 92).

Without this sense of normative stigma, nuclear weapons might have been used more often since 1945 (Tannenwald 1999; 2005; 2007; 2018). Tannenwald makes this argument in particular relation to the United States’ experience with nuclear weapons, and references other international relations studies to further support the argument (Tannenwald 2018a, 90). Nevertheless Tannenwald qualifies the taboo by emphasizing its controversial nature: the “delegitimization of nuclear weapons has always been incomplete” (Tannenwald 2018a, 93). “Although widespread support for the further stigmatization of nuclear weapons—as the achievement of the nuclear ban treaty in July 2017 shows—the general opprobrium is far from universal” (Tannenwald 2018a, 93).

I make two points that underscore the taboo’s limitation in response to Nina Tannenwald. The first point is that there has long been some general, moral revulsion associated with nuclear weapons at the interstate level. Empirical evidence for this assertion dates back to at least 1946, with proceedings on the Atomic Energy Commission (A/PV.17; A/12). Those proceedings—as well as those throughout subsequent years—demonstrate unanimous interstate agreement on nuclear weapons belonging to a most destructive class of weapons that should be eliminated from national arsenals (A/PV.17; A/PV.101; A/PV.155; *et al.*). For this reason, member states empowered the Commission to make proposals for the “elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction” (A/RES/1(I), 9). Thus the destructive nature of nuclear weaponry—and its especially harmful humanitarian effects—has not been in dispute. In other words, there has not been a time when member states saw nuclear weapons as “just another weapon”. Even the United States, the world’s most known nuclear power at the time, was not an active proponent of nuclear weapons use. In 1946, its delegation drew attention to the “problems presented by the discovery of atomic energy and of the other forces capable of use for mass destruction” (A/12, 4). The American delegation also called for “measures which would permit and promote the use of these forces for peaceful and humanitarian purposes under security conditions which will protect the world against their use for destructive purposes” (A/12, 4).

The second point that this section makes in response to Nina Tannenwald’s perspective is to emphasize that a longstanding revulsion associated with nuclear weapons has *not* diminished the belief in a moral right to use (or threaten to use) nuclear weapons in self-defense. This is to say that a belief in a moral right to use nuclear weapons—that is, in spite of their especially destructive potential in war—has been the position of many states throughout the course of some

seventy-five years. Empirical evidence for this assertion comes from proceedings on the controversial resolutions referenced above. More recently, France, the United Kingdom and the United States made the following observation about the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017:

France, the United Kingdom and the United States have not taken part in the negotiation of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. We do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to it. Therefore, there will be no change in the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons...

This initiative clearly disregards the realities of the international security environment. Accession to the ban treaty is incompatible with the policy of nuclear deterrence, which has been essential to keeping the peace in Europe and North Asia for over 70 years. A purported ban on nuclear weapons that does not address the security concerns that continue to make nuclear deterrence necessary cannot result in the elimination of a single nuclear weapon and will not enhance any country's security, nor international peace and security (US Mission to the United Nations New York).

The 2017 Treaty was historic in the sense that an unprecedented number of member states expressed support for a ban on nuclear weapons. Yet the statement—like others—demonstrates the limits of that support, which has never applied to more than two-thirds of the membership at the United Nations. Moreover the continued public nature of the sentiment also undermines the suggestion that nuclear weapons have been stigmatized as “unacceptable weapons of mass destruction”. This is to say that the issue remains controversial in a global, multilateral context. An interstate consensus against a moral right to use nuclear weapons does *not* exist. Hence interstate socialization has not occurred in relation to this issue area.

Part One

I now suggest the existence of a core coalition of states as proponents of a ban on the right to use (or threaten to use) nuclear weapons in war. I pay close attention to the more outspoken states in that coalition as potential socialization agents. In 1946, the most vocal proponents of the position were the Soviet Union (as well as states associated with the Eastern Bloc) and states that later formed the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. These latter core states include India. The ban's detractors, to be clear, were NATO member states such as Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. This section theorizes the views that the core states express in support of the ban on nuclear weapons. The chapter does this by taking a close look at the norms that the core states manipulate in an attempt to influence the target states' views on the issue.

As set out in the theoretical argument chapter, one specific way that a core coalition of states can achieve this is via collective legitimization, via an appeal to some “stamp of political approval or disapproval” in relation to a particular situation. This means that the core states attempt to “frame” an issue within some already accepted *interstate* normative framework, such that the two become seen as one and the same. In the present case study, the coalition's efforts can speak to this theoretical point. Since the First Session of the General Assembly in 1946, some states agitated for a clear and unequivocal normative stance against the right to use nuclear weapons in war. The assertion was that the use of nuclear weapons in war entails excessive

human suffering. The scale of that human suffering is so abhorrent (or “inappropriate”) that it negates the membership’s highest aspiration: to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”, as the Charter’s first sentence outlines. This in turn precludes a state’s right to use (or threaten to use) nuclear weapons in war. In 1946, the Soviet Union was the main proponent of this position. Its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, made the point to the General Assembly:

It is common knowledge that the atomic bomb was used against such towns as Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The populations of these Japanese towns experienced the cruel effect of the atomic bomb. But the atomic bomb has not yet been used anywhere for action against troops. And this is not fortuitous. If, however, there are plans to use atomic bombs against the civilian population of towns and, moreover, to use them on a large scale, as certain newspapers babble, one should not foster any illusions with regard to the international effect which would result from the carrying out of atrocious plans of this kind. Justified indignation would sweep over honest people in all countries, and the sanguine hopes regarding the decisive importance of the atomic bomb in a future war may lead to political consequences which will mean the greatest disillusionment, above all for the authors of these plans.

...After the first World War, already, the nations agreed to prohibit the use for military purposes of poisonous gases, bacteriological preparations and other inhuman means of war. It is all the more necessary to prohibit the use for military purposes of atomic bombs as well as any other means for the mass extermination of people, which in this case means the wholesale destruction of the inhabitants of towns and civilians in general, since a merciless blow will fall mainly on children, women, sick persons and old men (A/PV.46, 842-843).

In 1946, the Soviet Union’s delegation coupled this sentiment with a proposal to create a draft convention banning the use (or threat of use) of nuclear weapons in war. This is an excerpt from the preambular paragraphs:

... Fully realizing that the great scientific discoveries in the sphere of atomic energy carry with them a great danger, first of all, for peaceful towns and the civilian population in the event of these discoveries being used in the form of atomic weapons for the purpose of mass destruction;

Recognizing the great significance of the fact that international agreements have already prohibited the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other similar gases, as well as all similar liquids, substances and processes, and likewise bacteriological means, rightly condemned by the public opinion of the civilized world, and considering that the international prohibition of the use of atomic weapons for the mass destruction of human beings corresponds in still greater measure to the aspirations and the conscience of the peoples of the whole world... (AEC/ 7, 1).

These two interventions encapsulate the crux of the interstate campaign against the right to use nuclear weapons in war. Similar sentiment has been advanced by states that later formed the Non-Aligned Movement. The most outspoken sentiment came from consideration of the “ban the bomb” resolution in 1961 (A/4680; A/4942/Add.3; A/PV.1063; *et al.*), as well as communications to the Secretary-General in response to it (A/5174; A/5174). India was among the more outspoken proponents, emphasizing that it has “always been, and continue to be, totally

opposed to the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons” (A/5174, 22). “The total prohibition of such use is essential to the welfare and, indeed, the survival of humanity” (A/5174, 22).

As the interventions suggest, a core coalition of states pushed for a normative stance against nuclear weapons. The core states did this by framing the issue within a common notion of appropriateness drawn from an abhorrence to excessive human suffering in war, as had most recently been seen in World War Two. The right to use nuclear weapons was not just objectionable to the core states; it was objectionable given common humanitarian concerns for how states ought to conduct war. Hence the interventions above are explicit in an appeal to common notions of appropriateness to support the cause. They point to interstate agreements on “inhuman means of war”, nuclear weapons use as producing “indignation... [among] honest people in all countries”, and nuclear weapons non-use as corresponding to the “aspirations and the conscience of the peoples of the whole world”. This is to say that a core coalition of states made an attempt to project a sense of legitimacy into a position against nuclear weapons by manipulating the position’s resonance within a more widespread abhorrence to excessive human suffering in war.

A coalition of states also amplified that intersubjective resonance by “cuing”, namely by prompting other delegations to see dissonance between the right to use nuclear weapons and humanitarian concerns. Some states have done this by calling for studies that investigate the humanitarian (and later environmental) effects of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.260/REV.1; A/RES/33/91/D; A/RES/43/75N; *et al.*). At the General Assembly, the first initiative for a study into the humanitarian aspects came from the Soviet Union and states associated with the Eastern Bloc (A/C.1/SR.1119; A/C.1/SR.1120; A/C.1/SR.1134; *et al.*). In November 1960, Poland’s delegation was the one to make the request with a draft resolution entitled “Universal dissemination of information on the consequences of nuclear war” (A/C.1/L.260/REV.1). The resolution called for a “team of consultants specialized in the theory and practice of physics, chemistry, medicine and technical sciences” (A/4680, 10). The team’s task was to “prepare a report on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, in particular with regard to human life and health and the material and cultural heritage of mankind” (A/4680, 10). It then fell upon delegations to “widely distribute the report... and to disseminate it by all possible means” (A/4680, 10). This is to say that “cuing” was also an aspect of the core coalition’s efforts to cast doubt on a moral right to use nuclear weapons. Other states have been behind similar initiatives in subsequent years (A/RES/31/70; A/RES/33/91/D; A/RES/43/75N; *et al.*).

Part Two

I have so far emphasized that an unanimous, interstate consensus against a right to use nuclear weapons does *not* exist. I now contemplate how the core coalition’s efforts on nuclear weapons were unsuccessful. I suggest that certain theoretical conditioning factors were not prevalent, and so were not influential to interstate socialization. The applicable theoretical conditioning factor relates to the Soviet Union the non-aligned states’ perceived integrity on nuclear weapons as advocates of the ban. I argue that these states’ integrity was in significant doubt, and consequently undermined the extent to which their efforts could have influenced other

states' views. This is to say that the campaign to ban the bomb failed because those leading it lacked integrity in the eyes of target states—namely, NATO member states—thanks to their own nuclear arsenal or potential to develop one. My general conclusion is that socialization efforts fail when proponents are seen to be hypocritical by the relevant audience. Empirical evidence for my argument comes from observations made by Canadian, British and American officials about the Soviet Union, India and non-aligned states as advocates of the ban. I use these three states as illustrative country cases for empirical reasons. The first reason is that Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States were had opposed the ban in contrast to the Soviet Union, states associated with the Eastern Bloc, and states that later formed the Non-Aligned Movement. The second reason is that these three country cases allow access to insightful empirical source work, as we shall see.

As for the Soviet Union, the empirical record suggests that its integrity as an advocate for a ban on nuclear weapons was in significant doubt, which in turn undermined the extent to which its diplomatic efforts could have been influential. As we shall see, the impression was that the Soviet Union's views on nuclear weapons were insincere, especially given its continued nuclear weapons development and testing. Empirical evidence for this interpretation comes from the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. These three states were among those which did not support the ban, since the General Assembly's First Session in 1946 and throughout subsequent sessions. They shared a moral aversion to the use (or threat of use) of nuclear weapons in war, but would not support the ban. The idea was that international control measures were more appropriate, and should precede commitments to a ban (A/PV.17; A/PV.358; A/PV.1063; *et al.*).

Empirical source work from the United States includes commentary by its delegation to the United Nations in New York, as well as officials from the Department of State and Department of Defense. The commentary addresses the Soviet Union's perceived integrity on nuclear weapons. The following interventions are noteworthy. In January 1961, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates made the following observation before the House of Representatives. The observation concerns Nikita Khrushchev's diplomatic efforts on disarmament, including his "general and complete disarmament" proposition to the General Assembly on September 18th, 1959 (A/PV.99, 31- 38). According to foreign officials, one of Khrushchev's main ideas was that "nuclear weapons would continue to be produced until Western powers agreed to a ban" (Burns 1972, 39). In response, Secretary Thomas Gates offered the following reflection:

I do not think people are going to take very seriously the idea that the Russians are going to throw away all their arms and have a foreign policy based on no military strength. We are not taking it very seriously in the Department of Defense... In the disarmament proposal be made to the United Nations it was pretty blanket elimination of every bit of military power. I think this is only a tactic and that the long-range objective remains unchanged (Gates 1961 in Burns 1972).

Another relevant observation comes from American Ambassador Arthur Dean while a diplomat in the American delegation to the United Nations in New York. The observation relates to the Soviet Union's support for the "ban the bomb" declaration at the General Assembly in 1961:

...Of at least incidental interest to this Assembly might be the fact that the Soviet Union has carried out not some thirty nuclear tests in the current series, starting on 1 September, but instead has carried out approximately fifty-I repeat, fifty-nuclear tests in its recent series in the months of September, October and November. No one of course, except the Soviet Union, because of its secret society, knows precisely how many nuclear tests it has carried out, or in precisely what environments (A/PV.1063, 799).

Ambassador Dean also commented that:

I say this carefully because the Soviet Union, as it has indicated in this Assembly, has not the slightest intention of paying any attention to this draft resolution, despite the enthusiastic support which the Soviet Union gave to it in the Committee. How do I know this? We know it from the Soviet representative's own statements in the Committee that the Soviets openly intend to use nuclear weapons at the sole discretion of the Soviet Union, if that country considers the use necessary. The delegation of the United States and other delegations quoted Mr. Khrushchev's statement to this effect. So there can be no doubt of the Soviet intentions in this matter. So, just as in the case of the uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium resolutions on the subject of nuclear testing, the Soviet Union votes for this draft resolution with every intention of violating it, if for its sole purposes it suits it to do so (A/PV.1063, 798).

Ambassador Dean further emphasized that the Soviet Union “will continue to rattle its rockets and to threaten other countries with thermonuclear destruction” (Brewer 25.11.1961). The United States’ Permanent Representative Adlai Stevenson offered similar sentiment, emphasizing that “we have seen the double-dealing of the Soviet Union in respect to nuclear testing, and now the detonation of an enormous [sic] with the consequence—the dire consequences for the human race...” (Wagganer 13.11.1961).

Source work from Canada and the United Kingdom suggests further support for this interpretation, and also reaffirms the Soviet Union’s perceived lack of integrity on the issue more generally. A 1961 observation by J.B. Godber—a member of the United Kingdom’s delegation to the United Nations—serves as an example:

The arguments which have been advanced by Soviet representatives in the First Committee seeking to justify their vote in favour of such vague declarations as that envisaged in the draft resolution before us, are specious. The point quite clearly made by Mr. Khrushchev himself... [was] that the Soviet Union would use nuclear weapons in self defence if it found itself at a disadvantage in any war, including what is usually called a conventional war. I find it impossible to understand how any representative of Mr. Khrushchev or his Government can then justify casting a vote in favour of a draft resolution which says among other things that “...any State using nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is to be considered to violate the Charter of the United Nations”. This must surely be taken as a declaration by the Soviet Government of their readiness to violate the Charter. It can mean nothing else.

...I cannot call other than hypocrisy actions which are, in fact, hypocritical in this way. We are told that the Soviet Union is supporting this draft resolution, in light of these remarks of Mr. Khrushchev, then I cannot see any other explanation for that action (A/PV.1063, 803).

Other relevant observations come from Canadian officials. In 1961, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs wrote the following in a confidential memo to its Permanent Representative in New York. The memo also addresses the Soviet Union's efforts on nuclear weapons at the United Nations:

Since the end of the 15th Session, Soviet policy on questions of disarmament and nuclear tests has reflected an uncompromising position which it will be important for the Western Powers to attack effectively at the forthcoming session. The latest Soviet move in unilaterally abandoning their commitment to abstain from nuclear tests makes forceful Western action even more imperative. Moreover, in view of the degree of international tension engendered by the Berlin crisis – which may well increase during the period of the General Assembly – it will be important for the Western allies to be as united as circumstances will permit in their approach to problems of this kind, where the Soviet Union is not on firm ground and is likely to try to discredit the Western position by “unmasking” an alleged unwillingness to get on with disarmament and by seeking to “uncover” points of difference within the Western side (Green 1961 in DEA/50189-C-40).

Lieutenant General E.L.M. Burns, leader of Canada's delegation on all disarmament proceedings between 1960 and 1968, evidences another relevant observation about the Soviet Union's international standing on nuclear weapons:

What comes through very clearly, in the annual debates in the United Nations General Assembly and in the innumerable conferences and demonstrations held throughout the world is the the nations which don't possess nuclear weapons want the nuclear powers to abolish them... From the beginning of these negotiations, in 1946, the Soviet Union, by its continuous advocacy of the prohibition of all use of nuclear weapons, and their total abolition, has presented itself in a favorable light to the non-possessing nations, especially in the Third World. The United States, in contrast, has often been made to look as if its policy was really “love the Bomb.” But the Soviet Union's continued build-up of its nuclear armory has somewhat eroded, as of recent years, the noble image that its “Ban the Bomb” propaganda may have created” (Burns 1972, 8).

These latter observations suggest further empirical support for the assertion that the Soviet Union's integrity on nuclear weapons was in significant doubt, and consequently undermined the extent to which its diplomatic efforts could have been influential. The United Kingdom's representative emphasizes the Soviet Union's “hypocrisy” as reason to cast doubt on the integrity of its efforts in support of the ban. Canadian officials make a similar observation. The Soviet Union is “not on firm ground” on the question of nuclear weapons, as Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs put it. Moreover the Soviet Union's “noble image” as an advocate of the ban had increasingly “eroded”, as Canada's chief advisor on disarmament put it. This suggests that the Soviet Union's stature on nuclear weapons was indeed in significant doubt, and undercut its own diplomatic efforts in support of the ban.

The previous paragraphs presented empirical evidence for the Soviet Union, which was a more proactive member of the coalition of states that stood against the right to use nuclear weapons in war. Other more proactive members of the coalition included states that made up the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. Like the Soviet Union, the empirical record suggests that these states' integrity on nuclear weapons had also been thoroughly discredited. This lack of integrity also undermined the extent to which its diplomatic efforts on nuclear weapons could have been

influential. The most relevant empirical evidence for this assertion comes from diplomatic sources, particularly from the United States and Canada. Useful source work from the United States includes observations made by John J. McCloy, President John F. Kennedy's Advisor on Disarmament. McCloy's observations address states from the Non-Aligned Movement's standing on nuclear weapons. This observation addresses non-aligned states' perceived integrity on nuclear weapons:

...For some time much had been placed upon the existence of a moral opinion among smaller nations that could be brought to bear, and thus the main protagonists in the struggle between the Communists and the free world. Many who were aware of the difficulties inherent in the conduct of bilateral negotiations on the disarmament issue hoped that nations not immediately aligned side or the other might prove helpful. All through 1960 and 1961 movements were developing in many parts of the world against any resumption of nuclear or thermonuclear testing, and some of them were couched in rather high moral tones. These were mainly directed against the United States. It appeared one reason for this was to counteract the mounting criticism within the United States against continuing a self-imposed, unpoliced moratorium on testing. Yet when the Soviet Union suddenly resumed tests on an extensive scale, and action with threats of 100-megaton bombs, the reactions of the neutral or non-aligned countries at Belgrade and again, to some extent, at the General Assembly of the United were so mild as to be wholly inconsequential. As a result, their position as "guardians" of the world's conscience was greatly weakened.

The tendency of these nations seems to have been to moderate their criticism against those whom they fear and to direct their main blasts against those whom they do not fear; or at best to seek to equate differences in action between the powers rather than to judge them. This, too, has substantially compromised the force of neutral and non-aligned opinion as a helpful factor in the solution of the disarmament problem. The Goa incident did not help. A leading neutral's cynical attitude in respect to the use of force, and the tacit acceptance of the dangerous doctrine of good wars and bad wars, put still more in doubt whether a strong moral opinion in fact exists among the neutrals and whether even where it does exist it counts for very much. It may have been a delusion from the beginning to suppose that the newer independent nations would, in a pinch, act otherwise than in what seemed to them, however shortsightedly, their own self-interest. At any rate, some rather elaborate pretensions were shattered and what had been a hope for helpful objectivity has been weakened (McCloy 1962, 343).

John McCloy also makes another relevant observation about the non-aligned states' integrity as advocates for the ban on nuclear weapons. This observation relates to the non-aligned states' competence on the issue:

A word may be in order as to the role of other countries, whether they participate in these negotiations or express their views from the outside. Unfortunately, very few of them have done or are prepared to do the work which is involved in making a real contribution to the subject. Very few have even one man, much less an adequate staff, whose whole time and preoccupation are applied to the problem. Such a highly technical and frequently abstruse subject demands knowledge, thought and considerable research. Those who sit on the sidelines and merely chant "general and complete disarmament" without putting their minds to mastering the difficulties of the problem neither make much of a contribution nor are they apt to influence those whose efforts are more serious.

It would be a real mistake for these nations to assume that their only role is to press others to take action or merely to line up with one side or the other. In addition to doing the independent homework needed for making a real contribution, they can in a number of cases, by their own concrete example, indicate the affirmative steps which they believe the international community must take. Such action would be much more persuasive than an exhortation to others to take risks they are not prepared to take themselves. The situation of Pakistan and India is only one of many cases which come to mind. The full disarmament process will take a long time to complete (McCloy 1962, 358-359).

Other American officials add credence to John McCloy's assessment. Ambassador Arthur Dean, for example, made two relevant observations that corroborate McCloy's account. The first observation concerns India and other non-aligned states' integrity as advocates of "general and complete" disarmament:

...there are those who have impatiently advocated speed in dismantling the defenses of the West and have brushed aside efforts to ensure specificity in the agreements as unnecessary and even deliberately provocative. It should be noted that these states often do not advocate equal speed in their own disarmament or in solving their own regional disputes. Nor do many of them refrain from asking for U.S. military aid or economic aid for projects which release their own funds for armaments. These remarks are not made to be querulous or critical but merely to point out that the intimate connection between national security and disarmament clicks into focus easily enough when it is one's own problems that are involved, as in the case of India's and Pakistan's concern with Kashmir (Dean 1966, 66-67).

Dean makes another especially relevant observation, which relates to India and other non-aligned states response to the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons testing.

This is not to say that we relied on a misty, vague "world opinion" to deter the would-be violator. We realized well enough that the nation which will be curbed by world opinion is usually the one that least needs curbing. Furthermore, we had before us the example of the conference of the nonaligned at Belgrade in September 1961, the members of which had protested only very mildly when the Soviet Union broke the voluntary moratorium on testing that had been in effect for almost three years, and also the example of the session of the UN General assembly that year where India, a self-proclaimed "nonaligned" state, led the fight against any censure of the Soviet Union (Dean 1966, 82-83).

Arthur Dean makes the same point again to emphasize India's hypocritical stance on nuclear weapons:

Khrushchev had declared on earlier occasions that the first country to break a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing would take upon itself an enormous moral and political responsibility and expose itself in the eyes of all nations. Now, in 1961, the Soviet government would resume nuclear weapons testing. The text of the statement and the rapidity with which the tests followed revealed that the talks had been deliberately misused as a screen for rest preparations—a situation which we had begun to suspect early in the spring of 1961. We persevered in our efforts in spite of this action; on September 3, 1961, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan joined in calling upon the Soviet Union to cease further atmospheric testing, to accept a treaty barring such tests without any international controls, and to return to the discussion table to work

out a comprehensive treaty. On September 9, 1961, Premier Khrushchev categorically refused. Our ears were assailed that fall with the reverberations of continued Soviet testing, which the UN General Assembly only “noted with regret,” as Krishna Menon of India did his best to prevent any criticism of the Soviet Union’s flagrant violation of the moratorium (Dean 1966, 89-90).

The above source work suggests that the non-aligned states’ sense of integrity on nuclear weapons was doubtful, which in turn undermined the potential influence that their diplomatic efforts could have as advocates of the ban. Further empirical support comes from Professor George Perkovich’s work on India, a putative leader of the Non-Aligned Movement. Perkovich’s findings are apposite in two respects. The first respect is that India’s stance on nuclear weapons was actually seen as duplicitous. As Perkovich writes,

Indian legend and commentary generally deny that the quest for nuclear power was ambiguous from the beginning. Typically it is said that Nehru intended for India to use nuclear technology and know-how exclusively for peaceful purposes...

Perhaps Nehru’s image as a world leader of singular moral stature, the heir to Mahatma Gandhi, would have been tarnished if he were shown to have embraced the military usefulness of nuclear power. Thus, according to conventional wisdom, it was Bahba, the brilliant and ambitious physicist, not Nehru, who gave the dual military and civilian purpose to the Indian nuclear program...

Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that Nehru also accepted, albeit reticently and ambivalently, the potential military deterrent and international power embodied in the nuclear weapons capability... (Perkovich 1999, 13-14).

George Perkovich references a 1946 speech by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to support the argument:

As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and use the latest scientific devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will develop her scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal...(Nehru 1946 in Perkovich 1999, 14).

Perkovich also references a 1948 speech:

... if we are to remain abreast in the world as a nation which keeps ahead of things, we must develop this atomic energy quite apart from war—indeed I think we must develop it for the purpose of using it for peaceful purposes. It is in that hope that we should develop this. Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of us will stop the nation from using it that way (Nehru 1948 in Perkovich 1999, 20).

The second relevant point that Perkovich makes is that foreign officials—including from the United States—were aware of India’s contradictory stance of nuclear weapons. Perkovich provides numerous sources as empirical evidence. The following two examples seem most important. The first involves an exchange with Gerard Smith, the State Department’s atomic energy advisor:

The physicist Isador Rabi, serving as chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's General Advisory Committee, conveyed concerns about India's intentions to the State Department's atomic energy adviser, Gerard Smith, in a 1955 discussion: "Rabi said that we must get these controls [safeguards] working before our reactors are constructed abroad. He believed that even a country like India, when it had some plutonium production, would go into the weapons business... (Perkovic 1999, 31).

A second example involves a conversation between Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (Dr. Homi Bhabha), Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and the senior army member of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Committee (General Kenneth D. Nichols) (Perkovich 1999, 36). The exchange took place in 1960 in India. It concerns a meeting to discuss plans for building India's first nuclear power reactor. For that meeting, Dr. Bhabha asked General Nichols to explain the "advantages of opening competition to the U.S. suppliers". General Nichols then recalls that Prime Minister Nehru turning to Dr. Bhabha to ask,

"Can you develop an atomic bomb?". Bhabha assured him that he could and in reply to Nehru's next question about time, he intimated that he would need about a year to do it. I was really astounded to be hearing these questions from the one I thought to be one of the world's most peace-loving leaders. He then asked me if I agreed with Bhabha, and I replied that I knew of no reason why Bhabha could not do it. He had men who were as qualified or more qualified than our young scientists were fifteen years earlier. He concluded by saying to Bhabha, "well, don't do it until I tell you to" (Perkovich 1999, 36).

These two exchanges provide further empirical evidence of India's contradictory stance on nuclear weapons. The point is that India's leadership was actually *not* categorical about its opposition to nuclear weapons. Foreign officials were aware of the ambiguity, and saw India as a potential nuclear weapons state. India's efforts to ban the bomb were thus seen to be hypocritical, as John McCloy's commentary suggests. This manifest sense of hypocrisy in turn rendered the core coalition's diplomatic pressure ineffectual. The campaign's target interstate audience—that is, NATO member states—accordingly did not perceive a significant political downside to maintaining positions against the nuclear weapons ban.

George Perkovich's commentary on India's dual stance on nuclear weapons resonates with that of other historians. Bharat Karnad, for example, lends further empirical support to the assertion that Indian officials had in fact entertained the idea of developing nuclear weapons—that is, in conversation with other governmental officials—since the 1950s at the United Nations (Karnad 2008; 2018). Konrad writes,

Western policy-makers and strategic community alike have portrayed the resumption of testing by India and its decision to come out of the closet as a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 as both unexpected and unsettling and contrary to expectations and the Indian government's pronouncements, and as a result India was dubbed a "nuclear pariah." The surprise is that there was this kind of reaction at all considering that Indian representatives had since the 1950s consistently iterated in nonproliferation and disarmament forums that India would acquire nuclear weapons if the nuclear-weapon states did not disarm fully... Nehru's confidante and the country's Defense Minister, V. K. Krishna Menon, spearheaded the campaign in the international circles. In a speech, for example, before the UN General Assembly in October 1954, he laid down disarmament

markers. Other than declaring that measures such as the 1954 Partial Test Ban Treaty were not a substitute for disarmament, Krishna Menon asked for “general and complete” disarmament, with the elimination of nuclear weapons to be realized in lockstep with conventional military drawdowns on the basis of “equitable reduction” in terms of “quantums and qualities.” This was to ensure that a world freed of nuclear weapons was not made safe for conventional war, and did not advantage states with superior conventional military might. As an interim measure, he demanded that an agreement on the nonuse of nuclear weapons—the first faint intimation of India’s subscribing to the No First Use principle as a nuclear weapon power—be speedily facilitated along with an “armaments truce.” He also specifically warned that if these disarmament goals were not met, India could and would acquire nuclear weapons at one-tenth the cost, given the labor and other comparative advantages it enjoyed. India could not have been clearer about what it intended to do (Karnad 2008, 60).

Konrad’s analysis goes further than Perkovich’s in that it highlights that Indian officials went as far as to openly announce an openness to develop its own nuclear weapons, specifically in conversation with other diplomats at the United Nations in New York. This came at a time when Indian officials also advocated for a blanket ban on nuclear weapons. Hence India’s stance on nuclear weapons, as John McCloy and Arthur Dean suggest, did not inspire confidence; it smacked of hypocrisy and in turn cast significant doubt on its integrity as an advocate of the ban.

There is also strong reason to believe that India—as well as other non-aligned states—was not in any case seen as a whole-hearted proponent of the ban on nuclear weapons, especially in comparison to other issues before the United Nations throughout the early 1960s. In my first case study chapter, I emphasized that these years saw a large expansion of membership at the United Nations. From 1960 to 1962, eighteen new member states were admitted, seventeen of which were from Africa. Admission of these new member states amounted to a some twenty-two percent increase in membership at the United Nations. Recall that this expansion of membership mattered because those states were especially passionate about questions of racial discrimination, and accordingly added substantial momentum to the diplomatic campaign against apartheid. My point now is that these non-aligned states were seen to be hypocritical, as well as less committed to the cause of a nuclear weapons ban in 1961. Sir Brian Urquhart, then Under-Secretary-General, made the following observation:

A constituency was emerging which had little direct interest in European affairs, disarmament or in the East-West relationship. It was a radical, angry constituency, in which newly acquired independence had only served to accentuate the feeling of vital time and opportunities lost through colonial status. It was a constituency which strongly resented the established, profitably industrialized, dominant Old World... (Urquhart 1987, 171).

Urquhart’s observation suggests that non-aligned states were less committed to the ban on nuclear weapons than other issues at the time. This perceived lack of commitment to the cause—that is, in comparison to other causes—would have furthermore reduced the political downside for target states to oppose the ban.

Part Three

I now turn towards the third and final step in my research procedure: the cross-check. I weigh points from the previous section against the most prominent theoretical and empirical counter-arguments. The theoretical counter-arguments draw from materialist accounts on international relations, as discussed in my theoretical literature and empirical literal review chapters. The main materialist counter-argument to this chapter would proceed from the assertion that intergovernmental organizations are “epiphenomenal”, meaning that their proceedings reflect some constellation of material power in the interstate system. In this chapter, this theoretical interpretation would assert that interstate proceedings on nuclear weapons—in particular, from 1946 to 1961—reflect the East-West, Cold War cleavage of the time. Hence interstate proceedings on the issue were not amenable to a divergence from that cleavage, as long as the states in question saw themselves as aligned with one side or another. Empirical evidence for this potential critique can come from the history of voting patterns on the issue, which to an extent demonstrate an interstate cleavage along East-West lines. Empirical evidence for the critique can also draw from the nuclear defense policies that certain states have espoused, especially states associated with NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The point is that the national defense imperatives of the time would by and large define state positions on nuclear weapons. A potential socialization agent’s integrity on nuclear weapons would therefore have little or no influence on the positions that other states took on the issue.

There are at least two limitations to this critique. The most apparent is that the Cold War’s end has *not* been associated with a pointed change in positions on the issue, particularly by states that have not supported the ban on nuclear weapons from the outset. Those views remained unchanged, as the as the chapter’s introduction has shown. Hence one would expect a more incontrovertible change in views if the Cold War was a more decisive influence in the formation of positions on nuclear weapons. The second main limitation in the above critique is that it overlooks the manifest social anxieties that potential socialization subjects expressed upon evaluating the issue at the General Assembly. The potential socialization subjects were manifestly concerned about the interstate social ramifications of their stance on nuclear weapons, and saw a need to adjust although not change the position in view of the core coalition’s diplomatic efforts. This is also to say that the potential socialization subjects saw the core coalition as an audience whose general approval they to an extent sought (Petrova 14.10.21, 3). Harold MacMillan demonstrates the point in his memoirs (MacMillan 1972). MacMillan recalls a communication that relates to Nikita Khrushchev’s efforts at the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly in September 1959:

Mr. K has made a speech about disarmament in the U.N. “Scrap the lot” is his policy. The passages about “control” are vague. But as a “propaganda” effort it seems pretty good. We must, however, follow it up (along the lines of the Foreign Secretary on Thursday at U.N.) and not seem to oppose K. but rather to pin him down to concrete plans (MacMillan 1959 in MacMillan 1972, 90).

Although MacMillan goes on to call Khrushchev’s intervention a “great propaganda performance” and a “Russian trap”, he still emphasizes that “it sets us quite a problem. We must not be cynical about it; but we must not be naive...” (MacMillan 1959 in MacMillan 1972, 91). The point is that mere rhetoric at the United Nations would not pose “quite a problem” to other delegations at the highest level of government were the social ramifications *not* a central

concern. On the contrary, one would expect more unambiguous opposition to the diplomatic campaign on nuclear weapons, including in relation to efforts on the ban.

Further empirical support for this point exists in governmental records from the United States and Canada. Noteworthy examples of American sources include a formerly confidential document written by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. The document is entitled “U.S. Strategy in the 16th General Assembly” and provides notes on a confidential conversation between President John F. Kennedy, Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (Special Assistant to President Kennedy). The notes record the following exchange in August 1961:

Ambassador Stevenson thinks it is very important for the United States to be for disarmament in a very positive way. We must take the initiative on this and put the Soviets on the defensive.

Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Cleveland argued these two points of view are readily reconcilable: an attractive vision of Utopia must be featured, but it must not be confused with practical next steps or be regarded as related in some way to next year’s Defense budget (Cleveland 5.8.1961).

Cleveland’s commentary is pertinent in that it demonstrates a concerted attempt to navigate the interstate social ramifications of the United States’ stance on nuclear weapons. Ambassador Stevens emphasizes the importance for the United States to be “for disarmament in a very positive way” and the Soviet Union to be put “on the defensive”. Similarly Schlesinger emphasize the importance of the United States’ association with “an attractive vision of utopia”. This is to say that Stevens and Schlesinger’s emphasis on projecting a “positive” (or even “utopian”) perception of the United States on nuclear weapons is social in nature. Considering how to maintain such an image would not be necessary, were it not to appeal to the wider global, multilateral audience at the United Nations. On the contrary, one would expect a more forthright defense of nuclear weapons regardless of how “positive” or “negative” it made the United States appear on the issue.

I suggest two more American sources to further demonstrate the point. The first is a formerly confidential national intelligence estimate report— entitled “Attitudes of Key World Powers on Disarmament Issues”—supports the interpretation that American officials were concerned about the interstate social ramifications of their stance on disarmament issues, including nuclear disarmament issues. The report was published on April 6th, 1961 and was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations from the State Department, the armed forces, the Joint Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency. The report’s assessment states,

It is clear that the Soviet leaders see, in agitation of the disarmament issue, a prime opportunity to further their political purposes in the non-Communist world. What is not so clear is the extent to which they may actually desire to conclude agreements on disarmament...

... the Soviets have a most lively sense of the political uses of talking about disarmament. Realizing that the intricacies of the subject are little understood, they have hit upon their proposal for general and complete disarmament as a way to capture the universal

yearning for peace and, at the same time, to label the West as “against” disarmament. It is not a proposal which they expect to make good on, but it is a highly potent instrument of political warfare (NIE 4-2-61, 35-37).

The second source is an observation from Ambassador Arthur Dean, who had served at the United Nations in New York.

... we suggested to Washington that the United States put forward a proposal for general and complete disarmament. Though hardly a practical proposition for negotiating under existing conditions, it would vein our own deep interest in ending the arms race and in reducing tensions. It would also cut down the propaganda returns which the Soviet Union was at the time reaping from its declared position as an advocate of general and complete disarmament, while we appeared in the role of a reluctant suitor or captious quibbler in favor only of “arms control” or “arms reduction” or “limitation” (Dean 1966, 24-25).

Note that the first document acknowledges the potential social influence that the Soviet Union’s diplomatic efforts could have, suggesting that its diplomacy could have been a “highly potent instrument of political warfare”. The second document makes a comparable assessment, evidencing an explicit concern for how the United States “appeared” thanks to Soviet diplomacy. Hence the core coalition’s efforts, although unsuccessful, nevertheless heaped diplomatic pressure on the likes of American officials. That pressure, as the observations above suggest, gave rise to manifest social concerns that American officials at least felt a need to navigate. This interpretation is consistent with the American delegation’s general approach to the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly (1961-1962), which was in essence social:

On September 19, 1961, nearly every major issue of American foreign policy will be before the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations.

This would be largely true even if we did not want it that way. It is all the more true because we have deliberately decided, on some very important matters, that the United Nations must be the central forum in which to pursue our objectives.

... The United Nations is the only loom on which the western world and the Southern Hemisphere can “weave the fabric of common interests” so wide and so strong that it can some day contain—and then suffocate—the East-West struggle (Cleveland, Sisco and Wilson 22.7.1961).

The previous paragraphs treated primary source work from American and British officials that relate to proceedings on nuclear weapons at the General Assembly in 1961. The point has been that this section’s critique overlooks the manifest social concerns that potential socialization subjects expressed upon evaluating the issue. A more detailed primary account comes from a Canadian source: Harold Basil Robinson, aide to Canada’s Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. Robinson’s account specifically relates to diplomatic efforts on nuclear weapons at the General Assembly in 1961. Robinson references the following Canadian officials: Howard Green (Secretary of State for External Affairs), General E.L.M. Burns (advisor and lead disarmament negotiator), and Douglas Harkness (Minister of National Defense).

Despite reminders from the president and the impatience of the defense authorities in both countries, no progress was made on nuclear policy in the late months of 1961. A partial reason for this lay in the agenda of the UN General Assembly, where a series of

resolutions aiming to end nuclear testing, prohibit the use or spread of nuclear weapons, and advance the prospects for disarmament required decisions with clear implications for Canada's defense policy... For the most part, it fell to the minister of external affairs to decide how Canada would vote, and since Green was personally so devoted to the cause of peace through disarmament, it was to be expected that under his guidance the Canadian delegation would be instrumental in or associated with "peaceful" initiatives. The minister took full advantage of this state of affairs.

Apart from being frustrating for Harkness and the Department of National Defense, the situation was also uncomfortable for the prime minister. It was Green's normal practice to seek Diefenbaker's approval for votes on tactical moves which had policy implications. Occasionally the two did not connect. Once, for example, there was a contretemps over a resolution urging a complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The resolution had been put forward by a group of non-nuclear countries and it was clearly at cross purposes with NATO defense policy, which depended for its effectiveness on the US nuclear deterrent. The obvious choice from the defense point of view would have been to cast a vote against it. But Green, strongly pressed by the government's disarmament adviser, General E.L.M. Burns, instructed the Canadian delegation to abstain in the vote, a middle course which placed Canada in the company of a group of political moderates but fell short of unswerving solidarity with the prevailing NATO line.

...On 23 November, before the final vote, I noted: "P.M. called at 5:30 p.m. and I gave him the latest items including the current dilemma over whether we should change our vote in the General Assembly on resolutions dealing with the use and spread of nuclear weapons... P.M. is obviously doubtful of the wisdom of voting in a way which throws doubt on our solidarity with NATO defense policy. The minister of national defense is not drawn into this and I think the P.M. hopes the U.N. votes can be left in a special compartment and not treated as creating an inherent contradiction in our foreign and defense policies. At the time that note was written I was not aware of what, if anything, the Prime Minister would do. I presume (but cannot be certain) that he persuaded Green to alter the Canadian position because, when the final vote was taken, General Burns was obliged to explain the change in Canada's vote from an abstention to a vote against the resolution. It was a tactical defeat for Green which did not go unreported in the Canadian press (Robinson 1989, 232-234).

Harold Robinson's account is apt in that it provides insight into how Canadian officials arrived at a position on the nuclear weapons ban at the General Assembly. As Robinson's commentary indicates, formulating a stance against the ban was not an "obvious" accord with defense policies vis-a-vis NATO. On the contrary, the issue was "frustrating", "uncomfortable" and posed a "dilemma". Among the reasons for this, Robinson suggests, is because "it was to be expected... that the Canadian delegation would be instrumental in or associated with 'peaceful initiatives'". The implication is that opposition to the ban was at variance with these expectations. Accordingly the Prime Minister goes as far as to entertain a contradiction in Canada's foreign and defense policies, suggesting that the issue "be left in a special compartment...". This is to say that the *social* ramifications of opposing the ban were a manifest concern for Canadian officials. The empirical record would evidence more unambiguous opposition to the ban were this not the case.

Conclusion

This thesis tested social constructivist theory on interstate socialization and drew upon diplomatic history at the United Nations—and especially, the General Assembly—as the locus for that socialization in a global, multilateral context. My research question concerned how states can initiate a socialization process that synergistically builds a consensus on an issue over time. By consensus, I meant an overwhelming public—and not necessarily private—extent of agreement among states on an issue. My argument was that a core coalition of states can create a spotlight of diplomatic pressure that draws into focus an issue. That diplomatic pressure sets in motion a process of collective legitimization, which assumes a life of its own and creates common expectations that make support for a particular position legitimate. Over time, these expectations can incline other states—in particular, those opposing or otherwise “on the fence”—towards joining in on a common position, leading to a convergence in expectations in relation to the issue. An interstate socialization process accretes in the sense that public—but not necessarily private—viewpoints converge around a common, more “legitimate” (or “socially sustainable”) stance on an a particular issue. The outcome reflects a social compromise, in which socialization subjects dissociate from the “illegitimate” or (socially unsustainable) position.

As we have seen, states can act in coalition with each other to mobilize diplomatic action on issues in international relations. A general conclusion from my case studies is that coalitions of states can initiate global, multilateral socialization processes in a manner that is independent from the constellation of material power relations at a given point in history. In particular, coalitions among materially weaker states can pressure third states—including materially stronger third states—into acceptance of certain positions that they would otherwise disagree with. Hence numerically superior coalitions often among states from the developing world have the potential to act as protagonists in global, multilateral diplomacy. My conclusion, to be sure, does *not* entail that the “power of ideas” prevails in these diplomatic contexts. I will return to this point in the next subsection. The important implication is that diplomatic pressure can mediate the influence that norms can have on an interstate audience; fortunately or unfortunately, it can operate in favor of certain norms (and issue areas) at the expense of others. Another important implication is that the architects of socialization processes tend to include the more illiberal and non-democratic states in international relations. These are states—identifiable, for example, from Freedom House’s annual “Freedom in the World” report—that may not strike scholars as the truest believers in the norms of liberal internationalism. This supports Ian Hurd’s assertion that the truest believers in norms have relatively less freedom of action in international relations (Hurd 2008, 166).

Lessons Learned

I take away several lessons from my research experience. One lesson relates to the availability of primary source work, which limits the extent to which we can conduct studies on states as subjects of an interstate socialization. In short, regime type matters. More liberal and democratic regime types—including Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are more amenable to this line of research than other regime types. A basic definition of a liberal and democratic regime is a “political system marked not only by free and fair elections,

but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property” (Zakaria 1997, 22). In my research experience, these regimes tend to disclose confidential source work after specified periods of time. The same is not true of less liberal and democratic regimes. One potential reason for this difference may relate to divergent norms on public accountability: liberal and democratic regimes are often more accountable to their publics, and therefore may see greater value in allowing public insight into their diplomatic activities at some point in time. The practical research implication is that the majority of the world’s states often times cannot serve as subjects for analysis on interstate socialization in a global, multilateral context. Giovanni Mantilla makes a similar point, for reference (Mantilla 2020b, 178). This is a challenge that future interstate socialization studies must contend with.

I see two potential ways to navigate this empirical research challenge. One is to maintain an empirical focus on the more liberal, democratic states as subjects of socialization—especially in more distant historical contexts such as those in chapters six and eight. There is still lot of ground to cover at the United Nations, as the primary source work available is voluminous. We will return to this point. Another way to navigate is to rely on the personal accounts of former diplomats from less liberal and democratic regimes. Personal memories and/or interviews can be helpful in this respect, provided that researchers have the adequate foreign linguistic resources at their disposal. Evaluating source work of this nature requires caution, given the political background of officials from more autocratic regimes. An important concern is self-censorship; divulging otherwise privy information can entail significant personal risk to the official as well as to researchers, especially if the information is collected from within the applicable national context. My advice is to obtain the sought after information from former officials who have relocated to more liberal, democratic countries. Another way to navigate the research challenge is by paying fastidious attention to diplomatic leaks, such as those made by Wikileaks. These leaks can be insightful, as we have seen in Chapter Seven’s Part Two. Identifying subjects in as much detail as possible can lend more credibility to the information. I am not saying—to be clear—that the more liberal, democratic regimes are always transparent and therefore more amenable to studies on interstate socialization. There are certain, more recent issues in international relations where that transparency is absent and as such poses comparable challenges to research.

Another lesson learned from my research is that “truth”—for example, as established by more independent fact-finding or investigative bodies at the United Nations—alone seems a relatively inconsequential influence on how states formulate changes in positions in a global, multilateral context. Consider the empirical evidence presented in the case study chapters, which closely documents how the applicable state changed positions on the issues. As we have seen, references to independently established facts are limited despite extensive factual studies being presented to the respective interstate audiences. In brief, facts seem to matter only in as much as the interstate audience wants them to matter. Accordingly further studies on interstate socialization should maintain focus on *social* facts, meaning facts that exist by interstate agreement only because state representatives believe them to exist (Searle 1995, 1). More importantly, further socialization studies should also focus on what state representatives make of those social facts. Paying less attention to extensive factual reports—and more attention to what states make of the facts—can save international relations scholars valuable time and energy. A related point is that norms in themselves are a relatively inconsequential influence on how states

formulate changes in positions on the issues. As we have seen, state representatives often express normative concerns in association with these foreign policy changes. Yet as we have also seen, claiming these normative concerns as justification for foreign policy changes can alone seem rich given that they are *not* timely—addressing issues that are at the time familiar, longstanding and based on empirical circumstances that have not undergone significant changes. Hence the diplomatic context of the time mediates the significance (or insignificance) that a norm can have for a particular issue. As we have seen, diplomatic pressure—which, operates via a process of collective legitimization—is a critical avenue by which norms gain international currency.

Another important lesson from my interstate socialization studies is that tracing state positions on an issue can involve a cacophony of source work. One cannot alone count on an international organization’s delineation of agenda items to curate the issue’s consideration over time, since the issue may come up in more than one organizational context. An example is the annual General Debate at the United Nations, where delegations often touch upon issues that they later raise in the more substantive intergovernmental committees at the General Assembly. Scholars who conduct studies on interstate socialization—particularly, in connection with an institutional context—need to be aware of this. The depth and breadth of primary source work available may be larger than originally thought. My suggestion is to consider source work referenced in the Index to Proceedings of the General Assembly, which contains a subject index and a delegation speeches index. This resource helps pinpoint where delegations discuss issues across organizational contexts. Another useful primary resource is the United Nations Yearbook.

Further Theoretical Questions

My theoretical argument has emphasized how a core coalition of states can mobilize diplomatic pressure in support of a cause, which can in turn set in motion a composite socialization process. I qualified my argument with theoretical limitations and theoretical conditioning factors in Chapter Three (Theoretical Argument), as well as empirical scope conditions in Chapter Four (Data and Methods). In Chapter Two (Theoretical Literature Review), I provided an overview of literature on theoretical factors that can facilitate socialization, which include factors that relate to an issue’s material stakes, an issue’s specific content and the intensity/duration of the issue’s consideration. My empirical case studies have not found evidence in favor of or against these propositions. I accordingly suggested an empirically relevant theoretical (“conditioning”) factor that can contribute to my theoretical argument’s success (Tocci 2008a; 2008b; 6.11.2018). The conditioning factor was a socialization agent’s perceived integrity on an issue: agent’s perceived integrity on an issue can make socialization efforts more or less influential. Specifically, socialization efforts are more likely to fail when proponents lack that integrity—and are therefore seen to be hypocritical—because the target states do not see a political downside to maintaining the status quo. I weighed this proposition with respect to the diplomatic campaign to ban nuclear weapons from 1946 to 1961 in Chapter Seven.

I suggest that further research consider additional theoretical conditioning factors relevant to studies on socialization in a global, multilateral context. My suggestions are twofold. First, further research could benefit from a closer look at the composition of interstate coalitions, and consider how it influences the extent to which a coalition can bring diplomatic pressure to bear on third states. Based on my two positive case studies, my hunch is that socialization is more

likely the more representative the core coalition is of what Ian Hurd calls “‘mainstream’ international opinion” (Hurd 2005, 512; Hurd 2008, 153). One way to conceptualize representativeness is geographically. My proposition is that the more geographically representative a core coalition of states—for example, as measured by membership in regional intergovernmental organizations—the more it can generate interstate diplomatic pressure with universal reach. By contrast, interstate coalitions that consist *only* of states from a more antagonistic geopolitical bloc-like formation would seem less capable of extending diplomatic pressure to third states. Empirical examples of these latter coalitions may include the Eastern Bloc or the Western Bloc. A more recent example may include member states from ALBA, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America. For reference, Nicole Deitelhoff and Linda Wallbott make a similar point with respect to negotiations that led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court:

The coordinated strategies of the coalition, especially in the regional forums, diminished the role of traditional lines of confrontation within the negotiations. In multilateral settings, negotiations are often characterized by an almost rigid confrontation and mistrust between different groupings such as the Western group, the non-aligned movement or the Arab group. Usually, in such settings outcomes reflect the lowest common denominator. In the Rome process, however, regional allegiances played a negligible role owing to the emergence of the LM coalition as a coalition of small and middle states from all regions, thus cutting across traditional cleavages...(Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012, 354-355).

More recently, Giovanni Mantilla has made a similar point in an interview with the *Cambridge Journal of Political Affairs*.

...you have to look at what happened in the room to understand the multilateralism’s social dynamics beyond Great Power leadership or heavy-handedness. There are for instance social categories of states that are recognized at different points of time as being “undesirable” to vote with. Thinking about the 1970s, there were a few clear “pariah” states then—Israel, South Africa, and Portugal. There were states that were allied with these “pariah” countries that disagreed with these negative notions, but which still recognized their social validity at the international level. I suppose that is simply trying to understand social positioning in the context of negotiations; to understand how, in terms of social groupings and positioning, where are the markers of legitimacy and illegitimacy. But there is no formula for it; you just sort have to triangulate in different ways (Mantilla 13.4.2021).

Some may take the proposition here to suggest that a more successful core coalition must represent a “median” preference among states, which is another way to view the point (Thompson 2006; 2015). Professor Aaron Rapport made this suggestion to me in August 2018 at Cambridge (14.8.2018). I hesitate to embrace the term given its association with rationalist perspectives on international relations.

For reference, Robert Keohane implies two other ways to conceptualize a coalition’s representativeness (Keohane 1965). One way is to consider how often a state has voted alongside the majority at the General Assembly. States that have in the past taken positions more in line with the majority may appear more representative of “mainstream” international opinion (Keohane 1966, 14). Positions that these state take can signal to third states where mainstream

opinion stands and will continue to stand on the issues. Hence the presence of these states in a diplomatic coalition would seem to help generate social pressure with universal reach. Keohane also suggests that the absence of a colonizing history is another way to conceptualize an interstate coalition's representativeness. This characteristic can facilitate an appearance of representativeness in that it can mark a sense of solidarity with a more widespread historical experience among states. In other words, Keohane's suggestion is that a core coalition that consists of almost exclusively present or former colonizing powers would seem more likely to appear as representative of some conspiratorial project than of mainstream public opinion. Some may retort that there are numerous interstate experiences—that it, other than a colonizing history — that are more representative than others, and so may also enter into the present conversation. I agree. Yet what matters most is what counts as representative in an intersubjective, interstate context. Fortunately or unfortunately, the absence of a colonial history at certain times in history seems among the foremost of those factors at the United Nations. As Keohane suggests, states without such a colonial history can appear as *not* having an “ax to grind”, and therefore would seem more capable of having others defer to them on some issues (Keohane 1966, 35).

The previous theoretical proposition relates to socialization agents. I suggest that further research also contemplate the individual characteristics of potential socialization subjects, and consider the extent to which the characteristics make them more or less prone to succumb to diplomatic pressure. I suggest two theoretical characteristics, which would serve as further theoretical conditioning factors in socialization processes. One characteristic relates to a state subject's administrative capacities, specifically its “dearth of the requisite scientific, technical, bureaucratic, and financial wherewithal” (Chayes and Chayes 1993, 193-195). My suggestion is that the more capacity limitations that a state has the less able and by extension willing it is to consider the purview of common issues at length. These states therefore seem more amenable to diplomatic pressure on certain issues, particularly on issues that they see as lacking immediate application to their own national contexts. My commentary on small states in the second empirical case study seems to support this point. A potential way to identify certain capacity limitations would be to consider the composition of a state's permanent mission to the United Nations. Another way would be to consider the extent to which a national delegation participates in proceedings from session to session. On this latter point, one could look to the Index of Proceedings—in particular, the Member State Speech Index—to collate how often certain states make interventions across the gamut of issues.

Further Empirical Research

My research is most interested in how diplomatic activism can set in motion a socialization process that cumulatively builds an interstate consensus on an issue over time. That consensus is political in the first instance; it can but does not necessarily have to culminate with the promulgation of an international legal instrument. My theoretical focus on consensus thus allows for broad empirical latitude in selecting case studies, especially at the United Nations. I am confident that my argument can be applied to more such issue areas, given the empirical research challenges and provided that Chapter Four's scope conditions are met. My preliminary suggestion is to further explore “decolonization” politics at the United Nations. By decolonization politics, I mean coverage of issue areas where materially weaker, developing world states act as rigorous (and often bellicose) advocates of a cause, as we have seen in Chapter Five. I suggest further coverage of this particular diplomatic context because it coincides

with the substantial growth in membership at the United Nations—most notably since the late 1950s—and formation of majoritarian interstate coalitions on certain issues. These numeric increases can accentuate diplomatic pressure and thereby enhance the prospects of socialization. This empirical focus will help advance the latest research on interstate socialization. Giovanni Mantilla, for example, has recently suggested a similar empirical focus (Mantilla 2018; 2019; 2020a; 2020b). Specifically, Mantilla attends to the “golden era” of international law-making—i.e. the immediate postwar decades, 1950-1980—which often featured fierce and effective Third World participation and opposition vis-a-vis the leading Great Powers amid Cold War tensions” (Mantilla 2020a, 11). Similarly Margarita Petrova comments that “decolonization changed the dynamics of international politics by ushering in a new significant audience, something that may help understand why international agreement starts growing from the 1960s” (Petrova 14.10.2021, 3).

At the General Assembly, further interstate socialization studies may include proceedings that relate to South Africa like the question of Southwest Africa (Namibia), assistance to or solidarity with the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, and support for international sanctions against the apartheid government. One can break down the universe of other potential case studies according to thematic issue areas. I suggest four substantive categories: self-determination, disarmament, human rights and general norms of interstate relations. Socialization studies on self-determination may include Southern Rhodesia, territories formerly under foreign administration, and select issues contained within the annual agenda item on the “Question of Palestine”. Studies on disarmament may include various nuclear disarmament questions such as bans on nuclear weapons in certain geographical regions (such as in Latin America), declarations of nuclear free zones (such as in the Indian Ocean), nuclear non-proliferation globally and in certain regions (such as the Middle East), and the comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing. Other disarmament issue areas may include the placement of arms in outer space, chemical and biological weapons, and the development of new weapons of mass destruction. Studies on human rights may include proceedings that call into question the relationship between human rights and disarmament, globalization, and “unilateral coercive measures”. And finally, socialization studies on general norms of interstate relations may include the declarations on the “Definition of Aggression”, “Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, and “Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”.

We have seen that the General Assembly can serve as a focal point for interstate socialization in a global, multilateral context. I am also confident that my theoretical argument can extend to diplomatic focal points outside the United Nations, provided that my scope conditions are met. My argument requires that a core coalition of states engage in rhetorical action—manipulating the common norms of a particular interstate community—as part of a persistent diplomatic campaign to gain an audience’s acceptance of a cause. Attention to proceedings of less universal intergovernmental organizations may prove theoretically useful. A potential use, for example, would be to shed further light on a coalition’s composition and focus on how its participants coalesce around support for a cause in a more regional context. One could then further delve into how this support can percolate up to diplomacy in a global, multilateral context and become a focal point for socialization.

Appendix

Figure One
Historical Trajectory of Resolutions at the UNGA

Session of the UNGA	UN Voting Membership	Number of Resolutions Adopted	Number of Resolutions Adopted Unanimously	Proportion of Resolutions Adopted Unanimously
1st Session (1946-1947)	55	141	97	68.8%
2nd Session (1947-1948)	57	104	55	53.9%
3rd Session (1948-1949)	58	142	54	38.0%
4th Session (1949-1950)	59	120	23	19.2%
5th Session (1950-1951)	60	162	29	17.9%
6th Session (1951-1952)	76	135	19	14.1%
7th Session (1952-1953)	76	134	30	22.4%
8th Session (1953-1954)	76	118	30	25.4%
9th Session (1954-1955)	76	117	29	24.8%
10th Session (1955-1956)	76	99	38	38.4%
11th Session (1956-1957)	80	137	35	25.5%
12th Session (1957-1958)	82	116	42	36.2%
13th Session (1958-1959)	82	133	57	42.9%
14th Session (1959-1960)	99	135	45	33.3%


15th Session (1960-1961)	99	152	67	44.1%
16th Session (1961-1962)	104	139	74	53.2%
17th Session (1962-1963)	110	138	68	49.3%
18th Session (1963-1964)	113	134	75	56.0%
19th Session (1964-1965)	115	14	14	100%
20th Session (1965-1966)	117	165	82	49.7%
21st Session (1966-1967)	122	154	64	41.6%
22nd Session (1967-1968)	123	144	61	42.4%
23rd Session (1968-1969)	126	156	62	39.7%
24th Session (1969-1970)	127	176	71	40.3%
25th Session (1970-1971)	127	174	61	35.1%
26th Session (1971-1972)	132	193	57	29.5%
27th Session (1972-1973)	135	199	65	32.7%
28th Session (1973-1974)	135	194	76	39.2%
29th Session (1974-1975)	138	199	97	48.7%
30th Session (1975-1976)	144	236	119	50.4%
31st Session (1976-1977)	147	277	167	73.6%
32nd Session (1977-1978)	149	289	170	58.8%

33rd Session (1978 - 1979)	151	317	171	54.9%
34th Session (1979-1980)	152	325	190	58.5%
35th Session (1980-1981)	154	368	210	57.1%
36th Session (1981-1982)	157	373	211	56.6%
37th Session (1982-1983)	158	385	199	51.7%
38th Session (1983-1984)	158	356	189	53.1%
39th Session (1984-1985)	159	380	210	55.3%
40th Session (1985-1986)	159	377	202	53.6%
41st Session (1986-1987)	159	345	165	47.8%
42nd Session (1987-1988)	159	348	180	51.2%
43rd Session (1988-1989)	159	351	190	54.1%
44th Session (1989-1990)	159	369	226	61.2%
45th Session (1990-1991)	159	367	258	70.3%
46th Session (1991-1992)	166	338	240	71.0%
47th Session (1992-1993)	179	329	246	74.8%
48th Session (1993-1994)	184	367	293	79.8%
49th Session (1994-1995)	185	351	274	78.1%
50th Session (1995-1996)	188	348	244	70.1%

51st Session (1996-1997)	188	319	239	74.9%
52nd Session (1997-1998)	188	298	229	76.9%
53rd Session (1998-1999)	188	303	242	80.0%
54th Session (1999-2000)	188	341	271	79.5%
55th Session (2000-2001)	189	253	210	83.0%
56th Session (2001-2002)	189	360	293	81.4%
57th Session (2002-2003)	191	351	278	79.2%
58th Session (2003-2004)	191	324	248	76.5%
59th Session (2004-2005)	191	325	254	78.1%
60th Session (2005-2006)	191	295	219	74.2%
61st Session (2006-2007)	191	305	219	71.8%
62nd Session (2007-2008)	192	281	201	71.5%
63rd Session (2008-2009)	192	317	241	76.0%
64th Session (2009-2010)	192	303	232	76.6%
65th Session (2010-2011)	192	321	248	77.3%
66th Session (2011-2012)	193	305	235	77.0%
67th Session (2012-2013)	193	310	238	76.7%
68th Session (2013-2014)	193	316	252	79.7%

69th Session (2014-2015)	193	335	254	75.8%
70th Session (2015-2016)	193	312	237	76.0%
71st Session (2016-2017)	193	334	251	75.1%
72nd Session (2017-2018)	193	321	226	70.4%
73rd Session (2018-2019)	193	354	244	68.9%
74th Session (2019-2020)	193	315	220	69.8%
75th Session (2020 - 2021)	193
Totals	193	18,918	11,565	61.1%

Figure Three
The Proportion of Unanimous UNGA Resolutions



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