

**From Victory to Defeat: The Chinese Mission in Japan,
1946-1952**

Kan Lee

St. Catharine's College

Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies

University of Cambridge

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DECLARATION

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Abstract

Through the lens of the Chinese Mission in Japan, this dissertation explores how the Chinese Nationalists (Kuomintang) under Chiang Kai-shek adjusted to the post-war international order between 1945 and 1952. The history the governmental delegation representing the Republic of China (ROC) in Tokyo during the allied occupation of Japan reveals a hitherto overlooked aspect of post-war China and East Asia's Cold War history, one coinciding with the seven-year period that witnessed the military defeat of the Kuomintang. As the Kuomintang fought to retain control of the Chinese mainland between 1945 and 1949, the Chinese Mission vied for influence in Japan with the three leading Allied powers—the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union—and participated in trying war criminals, obtaining reparations, and concluding the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. The Chinese Mission thus endeavoured to be an active member of the “Big Four” as envisaged by President Franklin Roosevelt in the final years of World War II.

However, the standing and eminence of the Chinese Mission in Japan ebbed away as the Kuomintang lost ground in the Chinese Civil War and eventually retreated to the island of Taiwan in 1949. Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October of that year, the fundamental legitimacy of the Chinese Mission came under threat as the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union continuously challenged its position in Japan. Despite the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952, which officially ended the war between China and Japan and recognized the ROC as the legitimate Chinese government in the eyes of Japan, the perception of the ROC in the minds of most Japanese, in comparison to the new regime in Beijing, was little different to that of any other defeated power. The title of this dissertation “From Victory to Defeat” not only characterises the history of the Chinese Mission in Japan, but also alludes to the fate of the Kuomintang and ROC during those seven years.

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INTRODUCTION: POSTWAR CHINA AND POSTWAR JAPAN

On February 15, 1952, Ho Shailai (何世禮), head of the Chinese Mission in Japan, attended a memorial service held for George VI, the King of the United Kingdom who had died a week or so earlier, on February 6.¹ Held at Tokyo's Holy Trinity Church, the sombre ceremony was a significant event that attracted a number of important guests. Amongst the people paying tribute to the late King were heads of various foreign missions to Japan and General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander of the United Nation Forces in Korea and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.² As another of the commemoration's noted attendees, Ho later recounted an episode in his diaries:

At 11 am I attended the memorial service for the British monarch George VI at Holy Trinity Church. It was organized by Australia, Canada and New Zealand. At first, I was extremely reluctant to go. Upon my arrival, I was guided into the auditorium by staff from the Australian Embassy, and everything was fine. As the service ended, ambassadors of these countries stood at the front door, where Denning, the UK ambassador, stood between the heads of the Canadian and Australian missions. After I shook hands with the Canadian, I was lucky that I did not reach out my hands towards when Denning [Dening] - when he saw me he immediately turned his face away. I took his behavior as being very mean. I was invited by Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and I was polite enough to attend. I did not anticipate that the UK ambassador would behave in this way, which lost the manner of such a big country.³

This episode happened at a special moment and spoke volumes about the status of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1952. The UK government, along with the governments of the other allied countries who had fought Japan during the Second World War, had just signed a peace treaty with their former enemy the previous year, in 1951, while a separate treaty between China and Japan remained under negotiation.

¹ Chinese names in this dissertation have been transliterated using the internationally accepted pinyin system of romanization. An exception has been made for some names more widely recognized by other forms. For example: Chiang Kai-shek is used rather than Jiang Jieshi, and Ho Shailai is used rather than He Shili.

² "World Bows in Tribute to Britain's Late Ruler," February 16, 1952, *Nippon Times*.

³ Diaries of Ho Shailai (DHSL), February 15, 1952. The diaries are now in the author's possession in Taipei. They are available for other researchers upon request.

The difficulty faced by negotiators of that unresolved issue centered on which Chinese government - either the People's Republic of China (PRC) or the Republic of China- the Japanese should conclude the treaty with. As the first Western European country to recognize the Chinese Communist regime in 1950, the UK hoped to have Japan conclude the treaty with the PRC, while the US favored the other claimant, based in Taiwan. Facing strong pressure from Washington, the Japanese government reluctantly obeyed the Americans. It was against this background that Esler Dening, the British Political Representative to Japan, belittled his counterpart from the ROC with the unkinglike refusal of a handshake at the service honoring the recently departed monarch. This episode was typical in the way it symbolized the contemporaneous status of the ROC not only in Japan, but also in the world.

Using the lens provided by the history of the governmental delegation representing the ROC in Tokyo during the allied occupation of Japan, this dissertation explores how the ROC adjusted to the postwar international order between 1945 and 1952. The history of the ROC's Chinese Mission in Japan (Chinese Mission, hereafter) reveals a hitherto overlooked aspect of postwar China and East Asia's Cold War history, one coinciding with the seven-year period that witnessed the military defeat of the Kuomintang (KMT) amidst the final phase of its incessant struggles with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For as the KMT fought to retain control of the Chinese mainland, the Chinese Mission at the same time vied for influence in Japan with the three leading Allied powers—the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union—and participated in trying war criminals, obtaining reparations, and concluding the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. In this way the Chinese Mission endeavored to make China become an active member of the “Big Four” as envisaged by President Franklin Roosevelt in the final years of WWII. However, as the KMT began to lose the Chinese Civil War and was eventually driven to the island of Taiwan by the CCP in 1949, the Chinese Mission's standing and eminence in Japan gradually ebbed away. Following the establishment of the PRC in October of that year, the fundamental legitimacy of the Chinese Mission was threatened as it was challenged continuously by the CCP and the Soviet Union. Despite the signing in 1952 of the

agreement which officially ended the war between China and Japan and also recognized the ROC as the legitimate Chinese government in the eyes of its Japanese counterpart, to most Japanese the genuine image of the ROC, in comparison to the new regime in Beijing, was little different to that of any defeated power. The title of this dissertation “From Victory to Defeat” not only alludes to the history of the Chinese Mission in Japan, then, but characterizes the fate of the KMT and ROC during those seven years as well.

OVERVIEW OF STUDIES ON POSTWWAR CHINA, 1945-1952

Scholarship generally fits Chinese history after the start of the Chinese Civil War in 1945 into the standard, post-Second World War Cold War framework. This approach has typified chronological narratives written in both Chinese (produced in either Taiwan or mainland China) and Western historiography.⁴ However, the general classification of Chinese history in this period as a part of a broader Soviet-American Cold War history overlooks the role of the country that probably had the biggest and most influential impact on China in the early twentieth century: Japan. As a result, and following its capitulation in 1945, Japan’s role in Chinese history during the immediate postwar years is largely invisible, and Japan only becomes discernable again after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952. In writings concerned with the Chinese Civil War, Japan’s relevance to those events are barely considered. Where Japan does appear in discussions of the period, it is in relation to the two core issues which have most interested scholars of those immediate postwar years. First, those concerning Japanese reparations, and, second, the Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Trial). But both those important histories have, by and large, been portrayed in isolation, as events that only have limited, if any, links to the Civil

⁴ E. R. Hooton, *The Greatest Tumult: The Chinese Civil War, 1936-49* (London: Brassey’s, 1991); Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Zhang Xianwen (張憲文), *Zhonghua Minguo Shi* (中華民國史) [The History of the Republic of China] (Nanjing: Nanjing Daxue Chubanshe, 2006), vol. 4.

War then unfolding in China.⁵ There are, however, stories of much historical interest awaiting to be written if the typical Cold War framework used to look at China's immediate postwar history (dominated, of course, by the Civil War) is adjusted to incorporate the nation who waged war against her for much of the previous two decades. As Hans van de Ven has demonstrated, China's war with Japan did not end formally in 1945, but continued until a peace deal was signed seven years later, and only after the bilateral relationship between the two neighbors had become increasingly entwined within a geopolitical environment in which representatives of both sides struggled for agency and influence.⁶ The history of the Chinese Mission in Japan thus serves as an alternative and multivalent body for understanding postwar Chinese history by means of its links to both Japan and the larger regional and international contexts.

Essentially, the Chinese Civil War coincided with the Allied occupation of Japan after the Second World War. These two contrasting histories—one of war and one of postwar reconstruction—have rarely been juxtaposed by historians of China's modern history. In his study of the Chinese Civil War, a conflict which began almost immediately after China's victory over Japan in 1945, Arne Westad procedurally places the Chinese Civil War into the framework of postwar US-Soviet rivalry and argues that significant decisions of both the CCP and KMT leaderships were linked to the attitudes and desires of the powerful supporters guiding the two sides from behind the curtain.⁷ Typically regarded as the origin of the Cold War in China, is the struggle between the KMT and CCP for control of Northeast China, as Jiang Yongjing (蔣永敬) records.⁸ Not long after war between the two militarized political parties broke out,

⁵ In recent years, China's participation in the Tokyo Trial has generated new scholarship, including the Shanghai Trial prior to the Tokyo Trial. See Timothy Brook, "The Shanghai Trials, 1946: Conjuring Postwar Justice" (Taipei: War in History and Memory, 2015). For China's subsidiary role in the Tokyo Trial, see Barak Kushner, *Men to Devils, Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).

⁶ Hans van de Ven, *China at War: Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018).

⁷ Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950*.

⁸ Jiang Yongjing (蔣永敬), *Jiang Jieshi Mao Zedong de Tanda yu Juezhuan* (蔣介石毛澤東的談打與決戰) [The Negotiations and Fighting between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong] (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2014)

General Marshall was dispatched by Washington in late 1945 to mediate between them, albeit in vain. The KMT then began to lose its predominant position as the Civil War progressed and spread across Chinese territory. After becoming Secretary of State upon his return to the USA, Marshall's "Europe Centric" policy and frustration with Chiang Kai-shek's KMT regime then had an undoubted effect on the White House's China policy and the direction of the civil war.⁹ Indeed, there was a divergence in opinion within the US government in 1948 on whether or not Washington should assist Chiang's Nationalist government—in favor of supporting the Nationalists were the so-called "Far Eastern faction" (Douglas MacArthur and Albert C. Wedemeyer), while the "Europe faction" (Dwight D. Eisenhower and George Marshall) opposed providing the KMT with further backing.¹⁰ The quarrel would not end with the victory of the CCP in 1949, but lasted until the outbreak of the Korean War the following year. In the meantime, there were also internal disputes over whether the United States should rebuild Japan so that it might replace China as the bastion from where burgeoning communism in East Asia could be contained. As this dissertation will demonstrate, events occurring in China and US policy directed towards the divided Chinese people were not limited to China itself, but also deeply influenced the postwar occupation of Japan, and vice versa — what happened in Japan impacted events as they unfolded in China.

Immediately after the Second World War the ROC under KMT leadership was designated to become a major participant in rebuilding the new postwar order in East Asia. As Rana Mitter has noted, the Sino-Japanese War "earned China the right to help shape the postwar world."¹¹ The Allied Council for Japan (ACJ), a consultative committee composed of representatives from the ROC, United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, was endowed to lead the ambitious task. However, as Michael Schaller and many scholars have pointed out, the occupation of Japan was a

⁹ George C. Marshall and Lyman P. Van Slyke, *Marshall's Mission to China, December 1945-January 1947: The Report and Appended Documents* (Arlington: University Publications of America, 1976)

¹⁰ Lin Tongfa (林桶法), *Yijiusiji Dachetui* (一九四九大撤退) [The Great Retreat in 1949] (Taipei: Lianjing Chubanshe, 2009), 75.

¹¹ Rana Mitter, "The Postwar Reconstruction of Asian Order and the Legacy of the War of Resistance in Contemporary East Asia" (Taipei: War in History and Memory, 2015), 2.

“nominally Allied but de facto American Occupation.”¹² Melvyn Leffler also determines that Japan was “firmly in the grasp of US occupation authorities under General Douglas MacArthur”.¹³ “One of the most pernicious aspects of the occupation,” wrote John Dower in his renowned book *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II*, “was that the Asian peoples who had suffered most from imperial Japan’s depredations – the Chinese Koreans, Indonesians, and Filipinos – had no serious role, no influential presence at all in the defeated land.”¹⁴ As a consequence, memoirs published by SCAP officials and scholarship dealing with the occupation of Japan have barely noted the role of the Chinese representative to the ACJ.¹⁵ Moreover, despite the fact that recent years have witnessed increasing interest in studies of the occupation, the role of Chinese activity in Japan is still scarcely touched upon.¹⁶ One scholar, Nathaniel Thayer, points out that the goal of the Chinese Mission was, very simply, to “put priority on disarming Japan and bringing war criminals to trial”.¹⁷ Most Chinese historians also perpetuate the straightforward image that the function of the Chinese Mission was to deal with Japanese reparations and the Tokyo Trial.¹⁸ Such presumptions, though, obstruct a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the interaction between postwar China and occupied Japan.

CHINA AND THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

¹² Michael Schaller, “The United States, Japan, and China at fifty,” in Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler eds., *Partnership: the United States and Japan, 1951-2001* (London : Kodansha International, 2001), 34.

¹³ Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945-1952”, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Vol. 1, 77.

¹⁴ John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II* (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 27.

¹⁵ Except for those in SCAP who had dealt with affairs involving China, very few people even mentioned the Chinese representative’s existence. One exception is William Sebald, the State Department officer attached to General MacArthur’s staff in Japan, who discusses interactions with the Chinese representative in his memoir. See William Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan; a Personal History of the Occupation* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965)

¹⁶ Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, “Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945-1960,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. 1, 246-251.

¹⁷ Nathaniel Thayer, “The American Ambassadors, 1945-72,” in Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler eds., *Partnership: the United States and Japan, 1951-2001*, 63.

¹⁸ Lu Fangshang (呂芳上) ed., *Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzhengshi Xinbian* (中國抗日戰爭史新編) [New History of China’s War of Resistance against Japan] (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2015).

The scarcity of research on China's role in Japan after the Second World War drew to a close is not difficult to understand on the grounds that the Allied occupation was *de facto* dominated by the Americans, and especially by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur himself.¹⁹ Yet for the Chinese, taking part in the occupation alongside the other allies was a real feather in the Nationalist government's cap, and the KMT was eager to wield some power in helping to demilitarize and transform Japan. But the Chinese Mission in Japan, set up in May 1946, was almost immediately forced to concede that its voice amongst the Tokyo-based occupiers was negligible. As several scholars have noted, Soviet Russia's late entry into the war against Japan diminished its bargaining position with the Americans, blunting their efforts to help plan and then enact occupation policy. By the same token, though China had borne the brunt of Japan's aggression before the attack on Pearl Harbor brought the Americans into the war, its efforts were not viewed as the main cause of Japan's surrender. Additionally, China's internal chaos deriving from the Civil War meant Japanese affairs were put on the back burner by Nationalist officials after 1945. Thus, not only the Chinese Mission, but Chiang Kai-shek himself, soon realized that China had little option but to wholeheartedly support US policy in Japan, instead of naively believing that the ROC was genuinely one of the "Big Four" powers sharing equal status with the United States. Domestic concerns also prodded the KMT to side with the United States so as to counter the Soviet Union's support for the CCP threat. It was against this background that Zhu Shiming (朱世明), the first head of the Chinese Mission, actively echoed General MacArthur's policy line in order to give a helping hand to the Americans in their own attempts to contain Russian influence in Japan. By doing so, Zhu believed he could improve the Chinese Mission's status in Japan as well as aid the civil war effort at home. Observing the subtleties of this relationship, William MacMahon Ball, head of the British Mission in Tokyo, noted in his diaries that

¹⁹ For studies on the occupation of Japan, see Grant K. Goodman, *America's Japan: The First Year, 1945-1946* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005); Roger Buckley, *Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States, and Japan, 1945-1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

“[a]pparently the Americans feel that they can generally rely on Chu’s [Zhu’s] support and are very anxious to be able to isolate the Russians.”²⁰ The US political advisor to General MacArthur, William Sebald, also described his impression of Zhu:

Lieutenant General Chu Shih-ming [Zhu Shiming], the Chinese representative, was an erect and proper professional military man. Although the only non-American member on whom SCAP could count at that time for support, he also had moments of protest. General Chu [Zhu] usually remained quiet and impassive during fiery debate, regarding the proceedings with an air of detached boredom. Yet he was quickly conscious of prerogative, and his smooth, rather youngish face did not always hide the disdain he appeared to harbor for the diplomatic spectacle he was obliged to witness.²¹

At certain points, and to avoid infuriating the Russians, the Chinese Mission sought to ride the narrows between the world’s two emerging superpowers and not be dashed against the rocky outcrops of either shore. Yet in general, the Chinese Mission cooperated with US representatives and SCAP over most issues, especially after the KMT’s defeat in the Civil War in 1949 prompted the Chinese Mission to again demand US support. Still, even though the direction and content of occupation policy was firmly controlled by General MacArthur, the Chinese Mission did have important concerns in Japan outside of the well-known war crime trials and reparations issues. The Chinese Mission’s agenda also included concerns about a new “Japanese history textbook” and how the Japanese were looking to interpret the Sino-Japanese War in the realm of education. Besides this particular matter, the Chinese Mission was interested in a number of miscellaneous issues like land reform, the new Japanese Constitution (promulgated in January 1947), parliamentary elections, and the dissolution of Japan’s *zaibatsu*, its industrial and commercial conglomerates. The staff of the Chinese Mission diligently submitted reports on all of these occupation issues, but, as far as archival materials have demonstrated to date, SCAP mostly ignored the input of the Chinese when making and implementing decisions. For many historians

²⁰ William MacMahon Ball, *Intermittent Diplomat: the Japan and Batavia Diaries of W. MacMahon Ball* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1988), 36.

²¹ William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 128-129.

and people who experienced the Allied occupation of Japan, the Chinese Mission and its contributions to that history are seemingly viewed as being of little importance. However, as contemporary scholars struggle to construct a more nuanced examination of postwar China from an international perspective, the history of the Chinese Mission in Japan is actually of immense significance.

That significance comes mostly from the fact that the Chinese Mission allows historians to glimpse how, post-Second World War, China and Japan were not only two separate countries striving for revival after suffering horror and destruction on unprecedented levels, but were neighbors and former-enemies whose present and future remained unavoidably intertwined. For instance, historians might be in agreement that the founding of the PRC in 1949 was “one of the dividing points in world history and its repercussions spread over the whole of East Asia.”²² And it is viewed almost without controversy that Nationalist China’s muddle in the Civil War shifted US policy-maker attitudes towards favoring Japan and encouraging her rapid economic revival. These events, which undid restrictive policies directed against the Japanese as support in Washington for the KMT dwindled, had an incalculable impact on fate of both nations. Unsurprisingly, some people blamed the United States for abandoning its Nationalist China ally in favor of Japan, its former enemy, and inevitably contributing to the decline of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. The outbreak of the Korean War then strengthened Japan’s position at the forefront of anti-communism efforts in East Asia. Though the ROC, after being restricted territorially to Taiwan after fleeing the Chinese mainland, benefited from the first heating-up of the new Cold War, its strategic value to the United States had declined sharply. The interpretation of these historical events brings up the value of combining the research on postwar China and the US occupation of Japan within a framework of international Cold War studies.

The fact that the US government appointed staff to serve in Tokyo who possessed working experience in China further illustrates this point. On September 7, 1945, the

²² Ian Nish ed, *The British Commonwealth and the Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952: Personal Encounters and Government Assessments* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 7.

Chinese newspaper *Dagongbao* (大公報) noted that the United States would put George Atcheson, Jr, and John Service in charge of US Far Eastern Policy, especially towards Japan.²³ Atcheson was the first chairman of the ACJ who spoke fluent Chinese and had worked in China prior to being assigned to Tokyo in 1945. In China, Atcheson had been in sharp conflict with Patrick Hurley, US Ambassador to China from January to September of 1945, over China policy and was later accused by Hurley as being a CCP-sympathizer.²⁴ As Michael H. Hunt noted, “Hurley had struck Mao a blow by publicly announcing exclusive American political, economic, and military support for the Nationalist government. And somewhat earlier, Hurley had begun what was in time to become a full-scale purge of the government’s China experts, whom Mao and his colleagues had carefully cultivated.”²⁵ It was largely this purge that had brought both Atcheson and John Service to Japan. Service had served in the US Consulate in Chongqing during the war and participated in the Dixie Mission, a United States Army Observation Group aiming to establish relations with the CCP in Yen’an started in 1944. Service was accused of divulging secret intelligence and was recalled to Washington, but later being dispatched to Japan. In addition, US diplomat John K. Emmerson became the “official contact man with the Japanese communists” in SCAP, owing to his experience at Yen’an in 1944 interrogating Japanese prisoners of war in the CCP’s hands and befriending future Japanese communist leaders there.²⁶ The commission of these US officials to Japan was never coincidental, for MacArthur was in huge demands of US specialists on Japan, most of whom were transferred to China during the war. Their sympathies lay with China, either to the KMT or CCP. This caused them to support strict occupation policies for the defeated Japanese as a result. For instance, William Sebald

²³ “Mei Chongni Yuandong Zhengce (美重擬遠東政策) [Redesigning US Far Eastern Policy],” September 7, 1945, *Dagongbao*(Chongqing) (大公報) .

²⁴ Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1981), 217.

²⁵ Michael H. Hunt, “Mao and Accommodation with the U.S.,” in Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs eds., *Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 195.

²⁶ Roger Bowen, *E. H. Norman: His Life and Scholarship* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 7. For Emmerson’s personal account, see John K. Emmerson, *The Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service* (New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978).

summarized Acheson's views:

Inevitably, George A. carried his China background and sympathies into the Occupation. Although he was quick to size up factual situations and usually was correct in his analyses, he represented at that time the "old China hand" belief in a tough policy for Occupied Japan. Another official sharing this viewpoint, John Stewart Service, was executive officer of the mission. Born in China, thirty-six years earlier, Jack Service also spoke Chinese fluently and had served most of his career in that country. During the war he was political officer on the staff of General Joseph W. ("Vinegar Joe") Stilwell. Service was a man of quick perception and prodigious output.²⁷

However, some Chinese Nationalists were dissatisfied with this arrangement. In their eyes, a CCP-sympathizer sitting in the ACJ office in Tokyo might inconvenience the Chinese Mission. Shen Jinding (沈覲鼎), a consultant to the Chinese Mission in Japan, recounted his reaction when he saw Acheson in an ACJ meeting. Shen asked how could a person expressing such obvious sympathies for the CCP be endowed with such a crucial position in Tokyo. Zhu Shiming responded that Acheson's old colleagues were here as well because the State Department believed them to be "China experts" and China was important with regard to Japanese problems. Shen speculated that Acheson played a role in things like the release of Japanese Communists from detention, and his attitude towards such issues must be noted.²⁸ Despite these doubts by the Nationalists over his credibility, Acheson's reputation for being a Far-Eastern specialist was well-known and widely accepted. For instance, Yoshida Shigeru (吉田茂), who later became Japanese premier between 1946 and 1947 and once again between 1948 and 1954, expressed his own admiration for Acheson in his memoir:

Mr Acheson was a career diplomat who had been stationed for many years in China and had a reputation in the U.S State Department as a specialist on Far

²⁷ William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 43.

²⁸ Zhongguoguoimindang Zhongyangweiyuanhui Dangshiweiyuanhui (中國國民黨中央委員會黨史委員會) [Party History Committee of the KMT Central Committee] ed, *Zhonghuaminguo Zhongyaoshiliao Chubian* (ZHMZYSCLB, hereafter) (中華民國重要史料初編) [Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China], Series 7, Vol. 4, 656.

Eastern questions. He was a man of sterling qualities and, since he lived in the former mansion of the Sumitomo family quite near to my official residence during the time that I was Foreign Minister, we became very friendly.²⁹

Tragically, Acheson died in an air crash in 1947, after which Shang Zhen (商震), the second head of the Chinese Mission, expressed the “profound sympathy of the Chinese people.”³⁰ It is impractical to evaluate the full extent to which the likes of Acheson and John Service influenced United States policy toward China and Japan, as the *Dagongbao* had sanguinely anticipated that Acheson would “explain Chinese people’s viewpoints toward Japan to General MacArthur.”³¹ It is also difficult to gauge whether MacArthur’s attitude towards China was influenced by them, given the fact that from the beginning of the occupation he had been keeping his eyes on events playing out there. Evidently, their backgrounds in China no doubt played a role in their appointment to occupy Japan. The point is, the idea of appointing “Old China Hands” to Japan reflects how deeply postwar US policies to Japan and China were interconnected.

In the meantime, some of MacArthur’s policies were in part responses to events in China. For instance, actions forbidding Japanese workers from striking in 1948 were caused by the increasing likelihood of the CCP’s military success in China. As Gary D. Allinson noted, MacArthur was “also growing distressed by the influence of Communists in Japan at a time when the Cold War was intensifying and Communists in China were nearing a takeover of the mainland. In his mind these conditions called for order and stability, rights be damned.”³² From an economic perspective, trade between China and Japan in the postwar era was viewed as an important part of revitalizing their war-ravaged commercial and industrial bases. For instance, silk-production areas in China’s Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces suffered substantial losses of silkworms and mulberry plants during the war, and productivity was reduced

²⁹ Yoshida Shigeru, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973), 56.

³⁰ “Allied Council Pays Tribute To Acheson,” August 21, 1947, *The New York Times*,

³¹ “Meichongni Yuandong Zhengce,” September 7, 1945, *Dagongbao (Chongqing)*.

³² Gary D. Allinson, *Japan’s Postwar History* (London: UCL Press, 1997), 71.

to 10% and 20%, respectively, of the prewar period. New silkworms and mulberry plants were sent by SCAP from Japan to help revive Chinese production.³³ The abovementioned examples show just some of the connections between postwar China and Japan that involved the United States and its occupation authority in Tokyo.

Japan and Germany have been regarded as two of the most important outposts at the inception stage of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. In focusing on China's role in the occupation, I have no intention to detract from the paramountcy of the United States in the occupation of Japan, nor do I endeavor to overestimate China's role in the occupation of Japan. In other words, examining the Chinese Mission's role during the occupation and several fateful events expands our historical grasp of how the international order in East Asia was formed. The Chinese Mission Japan was a microcosm of the ROC's postwar fate in a way similar to how the ACJ was for Cold War history in East Asia. As Gordon Daniels points out:

No one would claim that the Allied Council for Japan was a major agency of international co-operation. General MacArthur and the Kleig lights [might refer to SCAP] saw to that. Nevertheless its history is a significant litmus of changing antagonisms in East Asia. In particular the alienation of the Chinese delegate from his people, is a powerful allegory of Nationalist decline.³⁴

LITERATURE REVIEW

Due to China's apparently limited contribution to the Allied Occupation of Japan, previous scholarship on the topic has barely taken China's role into consideration. In fact, the term 'Chinese Mission in Japan' has rarely appeared in published research. Gordon Daniels, for example, delineated the KMT's policies toward Japan under the occupation in his article published in 1976 using the records of the ACJ.³⁵ The utilization of ACJ materials certainly opens another window onto the landscape of

³³ ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 471.

³⁴ Gordon Daniels, "Nationalist China in the Allied Council; Policies Towards Japan, 1946-52," *The Hokkaido Law Review*, vol. 27, no. 2 (November 1976), 183.

³⁵ Gordon Daniels, "Nationalist China in the Allied Council; Policies Towards Japan, 1946-52," 165-188.

postwar China-Japan history, but without using Chinese sources I contend that one could sufficiently outline KMT policy by simply relying upon ACJ records.

Also, in Chinese-language scholarship, the Chinese Mission in Japan rarely appears. The only publications are a book edited by the Chinese Mission itself dealing with its struggle to obtain reparations from the Japanese and an analysis of the Japanese textile industry.³⁶ Accounts and memoirs about people inside the Chinese Mission are relatively scarce. Zhu Shiming and Shang Zhen apparently left nothing behind, while only two other members of staff included something in their memoirs. Shen Jingding published a long article sketching out the major contributions of the Chinese Mission. And Zhong Hanbo (鍾漢波), a military attaché, published a memoir in which he focused on the restitution of looted Chinese items.³⁷ Some overseas Chinese stationed in Japan during the Occupation left many stories, but the Chinese Mission is only briefly mentioned and its staff are generally dismissed as little more than “redundant personnel”.³⁸

The first scholarly study of the Chinese Mission was published in 2009. In it, Taiwanese scholar Yang Zizhen (楊子震) sketched out its functions by using archival materials located in Taiwan and Japan.³⁹ Yang places the Chinese Mission into a binary, China-Japan and Taiwan-Japan, structure and argues that through the lens of the Chinese Mission one can discover the fact that postwar China-Japan relations in

³⁶ Zhonghuaminguo Zhuridaibiaotuan (中華民國駐日代表團) [The Chinese Mission in Japan] ed., *Zairi Banli Peichang Guihuan Gongzuo Zongshu* (在日辦理賠償歸還工作綜述) [Overview of Dealing With Reparations and Restitution in Japan] (Taipei: Wenhai Chubanshe, 1980); Zhonghuaminguo Zhuridaibiaotuan Riben Peichang ji Guihuan Wuzi Jieshou Weiyuanhui (中華民國駐日代表團日本賠償暨歸還物資接收委員會) [Committee of Receiving Japanese Reparations and Restitution of the Chinese Mission in Japan] ed., *Riben Fangzhi Gongye zhi Fazhan ji qi Waixiao zhi Yingxiang* (日本紡織工業之發展及其外銷之影響) [The Development of Japanese Textile Industry and Its Effect on Export] (Taipei: publisher unknown, 1950).

³⁷ Zhong Hanbo (鍾漢波), *Zhuwai Wuguan de Shiming—Yiwei Haijun Junguan de Huiyi* (駐外武官的使命：一位海軍軍官的回憶) [The Missions of a Military Attaché - Memoir of a Naval Officer] (Taipei: Maitian Chubanshe, 1998).

³⁸ Tian Baodai (田寶岱), *Tian Baodai Huiyilu* (田寶岱回憶錄) [Memoir of Tian Baodai] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2015).

³⁹ Yang Zizhen (楊子震), “Zhongguo Zhuridaibiaotuan zhi Yanjiu: Chutan Zhanhou Zhongri Tairi Guanxi zhi Eryuan Jiagou (中國駐日代表團之研究：初探戰後中日台日關係之二元架構) [A Study of the Chinese Mission in Japan: The Binary Structure of the Relationship of China-Japan and Taiwan-Japan in the Postwar Period],” *Bulletin of Academia Historica*, vol. 19, 47-85.

fact overlapped with Taiwan-Japan relations, laying the foundation for the ROC's reincarnation on Taiwan after 1949. In all, Yang illuminates the contours of the history of the Chinese Mission in Japan previously ignored, yet leaving much room for more detailed study.

Recent anglophone scholarship on postwar East Asia has also begun to notice the significance of China's early postwar period, during which the role of the Chinese Mission has slowly come to the surface. In *Accidental State: Chiang Kai-shek, the United States and the Making of Taiwan*, published in 2016, Lin Hsiao-ting demonstrates that a series of accidental events led to an "unexpected" fate for Taiwan. By exploring masses of archival material in the United States, Lin introduces the role played by SCAP in influencing US Taiwan policy and KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek, as well as the Chinese Mission's role in coordinating communication between Taipei and SCAP. In *Men to Devils, Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice*, Barak Kushner examines how the KMT and CCP utilized their trials of Japanese war criminals for military and propaganda purposes. Kushner points out that the function of the Chinese Mission in Japan was to assist the extradition of Japanese criminals and support the secret White Group mission. As to other functions of the Chinese Mission in Japan, Lin focuses on its cooperation with General MacArthur and SCAP, while Kushner stresses its participation in the repatriation of Japanese charged with war crimes. In *The Hijacked War: The Story of Chinese POWs in the Korean War*, David Cheng Chang brings up the Chinese Mission's subsidiary role during the Korean War, especially in arranging Chinese linguists to South Korea to participate in psychological warfare.⁴⁰ These studies have opened a door through which new studies of the Chinese Mission, like the present one, might now appear.

While the Japan policy of the United States form the nucleus of studies on the occupation of Japan, in recent years historians have begun to examine the relations between Japan and the other countries which took part in the occupation. Most works have focused on the nations of the British Commonwealth, especially the dominant

⁴⁰ David Cheng Chang, *The Hijacked War: The Story of Chinese POWs in the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020), 125.

role of the United Kingdom. However, diverse attitudes taken by Commonwealth countries towards postwar Japan, especially those of Australia and New Zealand, have generated studies on the unique relations between Japan and countries separate from the Commonwealth as a whole.⁴¹ In general, the focus of such studies has been how those Commonwealth countries eagerly dispatched troops to Japan, the war crimes trials, and the conclusion of the peace treaty.⁴² A parallel might be found for the present study in writing on the UK's involvement in the occupation of Japan, since many matters that concerned the British overlapped with those of the Chinese. But the stories of China's occupation in Japan are undoubtedly far more multi-faceted due to the unique and historic relationship between the East Asian neighbors.

GENERAL HO SHAILAI

General Ho Shailai (何世禮), also named Robert Shai Lai, is the protagonist of this dissertation. Born in 1906 in Hong Kong, Ho was the third son of Sir Robert Ho Tung (何東), an extremely influential Eurasian merchant in Hong Kong who had a close relationship with the British ruling class.⁴³ Ho received home tutoring in English and Chinese and attended Diocesan Girls' School from the age of eight. In 1925 Ho became a student at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, and was admitted to the Second Battalion of the Royal Tank Corps at Farnborough in Great Britain before returning to China to join Zhang Xueliang's (張學良) army in 1930.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Peter Lowe, *Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies towards Japan, China, and Korea, 1948-1953* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); Ian Nish, *The British Commonwealth and the Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952*; Ann Trotter, *New Zealand and Japan, 1945-1952: the Occupation and the Peace Treaty* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012).

⁴² Peter Bates, *Japan and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, 1946-52* (London: Brassey's, 1993); Laurie Brocklebank, *Jayforce: New Zealand and the Military Occupation of Japan, 1945-48* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997); James Wood, *The Forgotten Force: the Australian Military Contribution to the Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952* (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1998).

⁴³ For introduction of Robert Ho Tung, see John Mark Carroll, *Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong* (Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 2005); Irene Cheng, *Clara Ho Tung: A Hong Kong Lady, Her Family and Her Times* (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1976); May Holdsworth and Christopher Munn eds., *Dictionary of Hong Kong Biography* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012).

⁴⁴ *The Sphere*, February 14, 1931; "Robert Ho Tung to Mr. J. H. Thomas," UK National Archives, CO

After Zhang's political downfall following the Xian Incident in 1936, Ho joined a military corps under General Xue Yue (薛岳), a Cantonese general, and was sent to Hong Kong to work in the intelligence service. When the United States joined the Chinese theatre of war in the early 1940s, Chinese generals with an English background like Ho's were in high demand. Moreover, Ho had personal ties with several US Military Officers with whom he had befriended during his years at the military academy. With these advantages, Ho was dispatched to Kunming to participate in the operation of the Chinese Expeditionary Forces to Burma under the command of General Joseph W. Stilwell. Despite openly expressing his disdain for Chiang Kai-shek, Stilwell described Ho years later as the "ablest logistics man in China."⁴⁵

Owing to his incessant disputes and increasing misunderstandings with Chiang, Stilwell was replaced by Albert C. Wedemeyer in late 1944. Ho got along well with Wedemeyer and assisted him in securing US aid to China and improving the logistical system of the Chinese army. As a result of his effectiveness, Ho was promoted the Vice Commander of Logistics Bureau with Lieutenant General military rank in 1945. In the aftermath of the war, Ho was then dispatched to Northern China to conduct repatriation affairs. First, Ho was appointed Port Commander of Huludao (葫蘆島) and Qinhuangdao (秦皇島), two ports in Northern China, and placed in charge of arranging the repatriation of 1,000,700 Japanese soldiers over a period of nine months. Moreover, he was put in charge of conducting KMT troops in battle against the CCP in the north region. In 1949, Ho returned to Southern China to coordinate logistical operations for transference of materials to Taiwan. In 1950, Ho was then promoted to Vice Minister of National Defense and sent to Japan to lead the Chinese Mission. According to Ho's son:

"Chiang said to my father: 'You go to Japan.' Soon after that the Korean War broke out. General MacArthur was the top man in Japan then and my father

448/36/26.

⁴⁵ "Chinese Captives Held Nationalists," November 23, 1950, *The Baltimore Sun*.

became very friendly with him. MacArthur was much more senior than my father but treated him like a protégé. I only met MacArthur once. He would always call my father 'Ho'. Never by his first name."⁴⁶

Ho left Japan in 1952 after the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty. One year later, he was appointed as ROC's representative to the United Nations' Military Staff Committee. During the Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1958, Ho was entrusted to utilize his connections to American officials to purchase ammunitions for KMT troops. As Ho's son recounted:

"Oh yes, my father played an important role on both the military and political side for Taiwan. He got the US to agree to supply aid at the beginning and then the ammunition to repel an attack from the communists across the Strait. They were using artillery to bomb some of the islands and my father got the weapons to return the fire. It's a long complicated story. But he did get what his government wanted."⁴⁷

Ho retired in 1962 and returned to manage his family business in Hong Kong. He then travelled frequently between Hong Kong and Taipei. In Taipei, General Ho and my family became neighbors in the same building, where I met him when I was very young. The impressions I have of him are that he was tall and sturdy, and I remember how, because I was a child unused to seeing foreigners, Ho's striking Eurasian appearance left me somewhat startled. Before he passed away in 1998, Ho handed his diaries to my father, a man who was one of his most trusted friends, and gave him permission to use the contents of them for future academic research. The diaries were then preserved on my father's bookshelves for twenty years, until I read them before coming to the University of Cambridge to pursue my PhD. Over the years, my father also received many letters from General Ho and listened to many of his stories. For instance, General Ho once told my father that when he served as a lieutenant to Zhang

⁴⁶ "Family History: General Robert Ho Shai Lai and Hesta Hung," <http://www.roberthnho.com/en/FamilyHistory/The-Ho-Tung-Family/General-Robert-Ho-Shainbsp-Lai-and-Hesta-Hung>

⁴⁷ "Family History: General Robert Ho Shai Lai and Hesta Hung," <http://www.roberthnho.com/en/FamilyHistory/The-Ho-Tung-Family/General-Robert-Ho-Shainbsp-Lai-and-Hesta-Hung>

Xueliang's Army in the Northeast, Zhang's soldiers laughed at his Cantonese-style Mandarin accent when he was giving orders on the parade ground. Ho also said that the reason why he became the ROC's representative to the United Nations Military Council in 1953 was because American officials had argued on his behalf by saying that "Ho Shailai is not corrupt." Those stories may not have appeared in Ho's son's own reminiscence of the past, but certainly such anecdotes add color to and enrich people's understandings of modern Chinese history.

It is meaningful to compare the three heads of the Chinese Mission in terms of their previous backgrounds. Zhu Shiming was China's military attaché to Moscow.⁴⁸ Shang Zhen was a seasoned general who studied in Japan and possessed experiences in dealing with Japan during his service as a governor of Northern China in early 1930s. In 1944, at the same time Ho worked with General Albert C. Wedemeyer, commander of US forces in China, Shang became head of the Chinese Military Delegation to the United States. Obviously, having experience in dealing with foreign military officers were amongst the prerequisites for being appointed to lead the Chinese Mission in Japan.

Regardless of their common military service backgrounds, Ho was very different from Zhu Shiming and Shang Zhen. Ho was a Chinese general with a Eurasian appearance that made prejudiced Chinese generals wary of him. We could surmise that the reason Ho's features did not, however, hinder his promotion up the ranks was due in part to his lengthy military training and the influence of his father, Robert Ho Tung. Moreover, Ho had connections with high-rankings US generals whom he had known back when he was in the United States. It was against this background that Ho was chosen by the United States to work with General Wedemeyer, and then assigned to the United Nations in 1953. Due to his unique background, Ho possessed multiple layers of national identity. First, he regarded himself a Hong Kong native and a British compatriot. But, when he entered the Chinese military bureaucracy, Ho abandoned his British citizenship and identified as a Chinese patriot of the KMT -

⁴⁸ John W. Garver, *Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 43.

while maintaining his Hong Kong origins. How Ho Shailai's identity evolved and was shaped by history is beyond the scope of this study, but Ho was indeed extremely loyal to the ROC despite of his family's century-long ties with the British.

The historical value of General Ho's diaries is incalculable. General Ho never wrote a memoir, nor did he ever participate in any oral-history projects. To date there exist two books on the life of Ho Shailai. One is a scholarly biography reliant on newspaper sources written by the Hongkong historians Zheng Wan-tai (鄭宏泰) and Wong Siu Lun (黃紹倫). Another is a quasi-biography of Ho Shailai written by a member of the Ho family, but many annotations inside the book are problematic and some of the stories are obviously exaggerated.⁴⁹ These two books both lucidly delineate Ho's life, but many pivotal points, and particularly his service in Japan between 1950 and 1952, are missing.

General Ho's diaries, which he kept from the first day of his arrival in Japan on June 11, 1950, until his last day in Tokyo, July 26, 1952, reveal substantial amounts of information about his time at the Chinese Mission.⁵⁰ Their content focuses on discussions with people whom Ho met and his feelings about them. The topics he exchanged opinions with others entail nearly every important issue facing the ROC, including the Korean War, the peace treaty with Japan, restitution of Chinese property, the identity of overseas Chinese, and China's image among the Japanese public. It is remarkable how detailed the accounts are of Ho's interactions with foreign diplomats in Tokyo and Chinese officials in Taipei. Ho also recorded a series of disputes about his suitability for the role as leader of the Chinese Mission. Opponents of the appointment in Taipei were concerned about Ho's lack of knowledge about Japanese political affairs and culture. After months-long debates, Chiang Kai-shek eventually made up his mind to have Ho retain his position until the conclusion of the peace treaty on the grounds that Ho had good relations with SCAP officials. The philosophy

⁴⁹ Ho Sen (何森), *Heshili Jiangjun de Chuanqi Yisheng* (何世禮將軍的傳奇一生) [The Legendary Life of General Ho Shailai] (Self-published by Ho Sen, 2011).

⁵⁰ By far there exist only the diaries of William MacMahon Ball, the United Kingdom representative in Japan, which divulged the life of a diplomat who took part in the occupation of Japan. See William MacMahon Ball, *Intermittent Diplomat: the Japan and Batavia Diaries of W. MacMahon Ball*.

exemplifies the fact that postwar Sino-Japanese diplomacy was to a great extent affected by the United States. Although Ho himself was not a diplomat per se, as long as he was favored by the US officials, Chiang would retain his services for the Chinese Mission. Last but not least, Ho also wrote about his leisure activities while in Japan. These included playing tennis with foreign diplomats as well as hosting and attending tea parties.⁵¹ These vivid descriptions allow an historian using the diaries to also glimpse the colorful daily life of the important historical actors who populated this unique period of the past.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The dissertation is comprised of eight chapters. The first chapter describes the activities of the Chinese Mission during the Chinese Civil War. It explores how the Chinese Mission lobbied General MacArthur to secure military assistance for KMT troops as the military fortunes of the KMT under the command of Chiang Kai-shek declined. Unlike previous writers who have largely neglected MacArthur's role in the Civil War, this chapter places MacArthur in the context of China's political crisis and argues that his attitude toward China, not only in the Civil War but also in the later Korean War, was to a certain extent influenced by the Chinese Mission. This chapter was published first in the *Journal of Chinese Military History* in 2019 with the title "The "China Lobby" in Tokyo: The Struggle of China's Mission in Japan for General Douglas MacArthur's Military Assistance in the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1949."⁵² Some revisions have been made to that paper after including additional archival sources from the United States in this period, and these are included in the present dissertation. Another difference with the earlier paper is that chapter one only covers events between 1946 and 1948, leaving 1949 to the second chapter because events

⁵¹ William Sebald recalled that the Occupation "quickly rehabilitated Japanese recreational facilities, from gold links to ski lodges, and they were well patronized." See William Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 105.

⁵² Kan Lee, "The "China Lobby" in Tokyo: The Struggle of China's Mission in Japan for General Douglas MacArthur's Military Assistance in the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1949," *Journal of Chinese Military History*, vol. 8-1 (2019), 29-51.

that happened in that year require special treatment. Chapter two traces MacArthur's attitude towards and support for the KMT in late 1949, after the KMT regime had been driven to Taiwan. The KMT sought MacArthur's support to settle the dispute over the island's status, and the General assured that the status quo would not be challenged. These promises laid the foundations for MacArthur's Far Eastern Policy before and after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.

Chapter three examines how the Chinese Mission dealt with SCAP to arrange the repatriation of Japanese soldiers and citizens who had remained in China (mostly in Manchuria) at the end of the war. It also looks at how the Chinese Mission became involved in the dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union over the latter's refusal to collaborate and repatriate Japanese left in Siberia. Chapter four looks at how the Chinese Mission served as the communicative channel between SCAP and Nanjing in dealing with extraditions of Japanese criminals to be sent either in Tokyo or Nanjing for trials. It further explores how the Chinese Mission scrambled to gather evidence in favor of having Japanese war crimes prosecuted so as to have the B and C classes of war criminal trials conducted by the Chinese Mission in Yokohama. Finally, this chapter brings out Shang Zhen's attitude as he witnessed the executions in Tokyo. To some extent this event signifies China's revenge on its Japanese aggressors, while some Chinese believe that the results of the Tokyo Trials were disappointing.

Chapter five deals further with the reparation issue and the involvement of nearly all the countries inside the Far Eastern Commission as negotiations became extremely convoluted. It has a special focus on the distribution of Japanese compensation between the four countries and how representatives clashed over these issues – as well as America's generosity to the Chinese. For example, on April 7, 1947, Wang Shijie reported that the conference on reparations could not be convened because of a disagreement about how Japanese reparations would be distributed. However, with the support of the United States, China obtained a fifteen percent share from the

demolition of Japanese factories.⁵³ The Chinese Mission had been actively investigating and visiting factories in Japan to make their wish-lists, which were in urgent demand in China not only for economic revival but for military purpose. The first five chapters tackle with the Civil War, repatriation, war crime trials, and reparation respectively, but in general they are tightly correlated and constitute the main accomplishments of the Chinese Mission between year 1946 and 1949.

The outbreak of the Korean War caused the United States government to pour resources into Taiwan to protect the Nationalist regime from attack by the Communists. The Korean War's impact on the modern history of the Chinese mainland has generated a great amount of scholarship in the past decades. As for Taiwan, the main questions relating to the Korean War have been about how it forced the United States to adjust its stance towards China and ensure Taiwan's survival.⁵⁴ Another question has been the Nationalist's role in the Korean War. As John Spanier has written, immediately after the outbreak of the conflict, Chiang was eager to send KMT troops to join the war, but his idea was initially rejected.⁵⁵ However, following the poor performance of UN forces under the command of General MacArthur in subsequent months, Chiang's idea was floated again by US officials and garnered support from Senator Joseph McCarthy and Henry Cabot Lodge.⁵⁶ As James McGovern has pointed out, in early 1951 Joseph Martin, a Republican congressman, allied himself with General MacArthur to support the idea of relieving some of the pressure on US-led forces by using Chiang's forces to open a "Second Front."⁵⁷ However, neither proposal was adopted by President Harry Truman. Instead, MacArthur's military strategy, his disregard for Washington's orders, and his alliance

⁵³ Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyangweiyuanhui Dangshiweiyuanhui (中國國民黨中央委員會黨史委員會) [Committee of the Party's History of the KMT's Central Committee], *Guofang Zuigao Weiyuanhui Changwuhuiyi Jilu* (國防最高委員會常務會議記錄) [Minutes of Conferences of the Supreme Committee of National Defense], vol. 9, 218-219.

⁵⁴ Zhang Shuya (張淑雅), *Hanzhan Jiu Taiwan? Jiedu Meiguo Duitai Zhengce* (韓戰救台灣? 解讀美國對臺政策) [Did the Korean War save Taiwan? Interpreting the US policy on Taiwan] (Taipei: Weicheng Chubanshe, 2011)

⁵⁵ John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1959), 70-71.

⁵⁶ James McGovern, *To the Yalu; from the Chinese Invasion of Korea to MacArthur's Dismissal* (New York: Morrow, 1972), 138-139.

⁵⁷ James McGovern, *To the Yalu*, 164-167.

with the Republican's on the Taiwan issue was, for Truman, unpalatable, and eventually led to the head of SCAP's dismissal in 1951. By using Ho Shailai's diaries in chapter six, I delve into the details of the interactions between Chiang Kai-shek and MacArthur, regarding such events as MacArthur's visit to Taipei in July 1950 as well as Chiang's ceaseless proposals to dispatch his own troops to join the Korean battlefield and General MacArthur's responses. Through the lens of Ho Shailai, one could review the ROC's role in the Korean War from an entirely different angle. Small and insignificant it may have been, the Chinese Mission and Ho did play a crucial role in a specific juncture of the conflict.

Chapter seven discusses some invisible battlefields, apart from the Korean War, in which the Chinese Mission were deeply engaged. In 1950, the Chinese Mission immersed itself in an attempt to prevent the CCP from replacing the KMT as the occupant of the ACJ's "Chinese seat," and a similar effort to unseat the Nationalists inside the United Nation. In addition, the Chinese Mission endeavored to secure overseas Chinese support in Japan by means of keeping a close eye on the activities of the CCP and the Taiwanese Independence Movement. The climate in which the Chinese Mission operated by this time had changed, and it faced challenges on many sides as a consequence of the KMT's accruing failures in the civil war.

After Taiwan's safety was secured by US support and a potential military invasion from Communist China was, at least temporarily, deemed unlikely, the KMT could focus on consolidating its Cold War position in the pro-American camp. Japan became extremely significant for the Taiwanese, since the Korean War had changed Japan's status from defeated Second World War enemy to frontline Cold War ally. On September 8, 1950, Truman asked John Foster Dulles to undertake negotiations and organize an official peace settlement with the Japanese as soon as possible. The resulting treaty was signed at the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference. This treaty has been widely regarded as a watershed moment in East Asia and Cold War history, one marking the beginning of a "partnership" between Japan and the United States.⁵⁸ While the Americans saw the treaty as an obvious goal well-worth pursuing, the

⁵⁸ Akira Iriye and Robert Wampler eds., *Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951-2001*.

problem of which government should be the Chinese representative infuriated the Anglo-American alliance; Michael Schaller has referred to it as the “biggest hurdle” the US had to overcome to get the treaty enacted.⁵⁹ That the UK and US were unable to reach a consensus on whether Communist China or Nationalist China should represent the Chinese side meant that neither Mao Zedong’s government nor Chiang’s participated in the conference.⁶⁰ As a consequence, the United States urged Japan to deal exclusively with Taiwan after the Treaty of San Francisco had been agreed, annoying many Japanese who would have preferred to sign a deal with the PRC. Michael Schaller argues that pressure from “Taiwan’s many friends in the U.S. Senate” convinced Dulles to force Yoshida Shigeru to conclude a treaty with Taiwan, even though it displeased the British.⁶¹ The “Yoshida letter” to Dulles was regarded as a compromise by the Japanese government under American pressure, and provoked a great deal of opposition within the Japanese administration.⁶² Continuing chronologically, chapter eight moves on to examining the Chinese Mission’s efforts to ensure the ROC’s status and relations with Japan would not be damaged by the signing of the agreement in San Francisco Treaty and the ROC’s own treaty. Facing with a general attitude of reluctance and opposition within the Japanese government ahead of the signing of the unilateral agreement, General Ho Shailai actively campaigned in Tokyo and Taipei to improve relations and the Nationalist’s position ahead of the negotiations. Like the opening chapter, much of this chapter has also been published previously. It was initially published in Chinese in *The Journal of History, National Cheng-Chi University* (Taipei) in 2018, but the revised version included here is augmented by a framework which discusses the central issues within a broader international framework, especially the role played by John Foster Dulles

⁵⁹ Michael Schaller, “The United States, Japan and China at Fifty,” in Akira Iriye and Robert Wampler eds., *Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951-2001*, 40.

⁶⁰ Rana Mitter, “The Postwar Reconstruction of Asian Order and the Legacy of the War of Resistance in Contemporary East Asia,” (Taipei: War in History and Memory, 2015), 9.

⁶¹ Michael Schaller, “The United States, Japan, and China at fifty,” in Akira Iriye and Robert Wampler eds., *Partnership: the United States and Japan, 1951-2001*, 41.

⁶² Marc Gallicchio, “Occupation, Dominion, and Alliance: Japan in American Security Policy, 1945-69,” in Akira Iriye and Robert Wampler eds., *Partnership: the United States and Japan, 1951-2001*, 123.

and President Truman.⁶³

The central argument running through the sum of this dissertation's seven main parts, as I summarize in the conclusion, is that post-Second World War Chinese history should not be placed only in the single, China narrative of Civil War, the Korean War, and the Taipei Treaty, but should be examined using a broadly inclusive approach in which the countries of the United States, Japan, and China were all deeply interconnected. For the United States, as Nathaniel Thayer has summarized, the status of Japan shifted from that of "an enemy state to being a reluctant ally to being an equal partner".⁶⁴ The Sino-Japanese relationship followed the same course, an evolution best represented by changing role of the Chinese Mission in Japan. At the beginning, the Mission's role was that of victor and superior. With the changing status of Japan in the year that followed, however, the Chinese Mission had to adjust itself to a new geopolitical environment. To a great extent, the negotiations prior to the signing of the Taipei Treaty were a humiliation for the Chinese Mission, a body whose position had fallen to that of "petitioner" rather than the proud "victor" it had been immediately after the War of Resistance against Japan had been won.

⁶³ Kan Lee (李戡), "He Shili yu Zhongri Heyue de Qianding-Zhonghuaminguo Zhuri Daibiaotuan de Juese (何世禮與中日和約的簽訂—中華民國駐日代表團的角色) [Ho Shilai and the Signature of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty: The Role of the Chinese Mission in Japan]," *The Journal of History, NCCU* (Taipei) Vol. 49 (May 2018), 93-134.

⁶⁴ Nathaniel Thayer, "The American Ambassadors, 1945-72," in Akira Iriye and Robert Wampler eds., *Partnership: the United States and Japan, 1951-2001*, 62.

CHAPTER ONE: THE “CHINA LOBBY” IN TOKYO

Immediately after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, China was committed to dispatching its own force to occupy Japan for the dual-purpose of demonstrating its new international status and appeasing the Chinese people's desire for revenge. After preparation lasting nearly a year, this plan was eventually laid aside by the ruling KMT government as the progress of the Chinese Civil War became less certain. Indeed, as the KMT's military fortunes in that conflict declined under the command of Chinese President and head of the KMT Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Mission in Japan was given an additional assignment: lobby General MacArthur in order to secure military assistance from SCAP. The Chinese Mission received this order after US President Harry Truman terminated his country's provision of aid to Chiang's regime following the failure of the Marshall Mission in 1947. Hence, then, the urgent need to turn to General Douglas MacArthur, who, as the most influential American representative in Asia, was thought to be in a position to continue military aid to the KMT in some form. The subsequent interactions between the Chinese Mission in Japan and General MacArthur during the Civil War years of 1946 to late-1948 constitutes the main focus of this chapter, with the events of 1949 and after covered in the next chapter. From MacArthur's viewpoint, although Chinese affairs were beyond his domain of responsibility, events occurring within the borders of Japan's former foe and the US' wartime-ally would strongly influence his occupation policy. As a result, MacArthur grudgingly became involved in the unfolding Chinese Civil War. It was therefore against this background that the Chinese Mission in Japan began to serve as a second “China Lobby” in Tokyo, operating while the official one in Washington actively urged President Truman to reconsider his decision to withdraw American assistance given to Chiang's faltering regime.

ZHU SHIMING, WANG ZHI AND THE CHINESE OCCUPATIONAL FORCES

Because the position was a symbol of China's victory over Japan after decades

of Japanese aggression in China, Chiang Kai-shek paid special attention to the selection of his representative to the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ). And the appointment was doubly crucial for Chiang because the person selected for the role would also serve as the head of the Chinese Mission in Japan. The Chinese Mission was composed of four sections, which were in charge of military, diplomatic, economic and overseas Chinese affairs. There were approximately 120 staff in the mission, most of whom were selected from the Chinese government.

Based on his abundant experience in foreign military affairs, in February 1946 the Executive Yuan appointed Zhu Shiming to what was a new and important position.⁶⁵ Born in 1898, Zhu studied at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Virginia Military Institute and received his PhD degree from Columbia University. After returning to China in 1926, Zhu became an aide to Chiang. Then, from 1937 to 1943, Zhu served as the Military Attaché to the Chinese Embassies in Moscow and Washington.⁶⁶ As a representative whose role required him to negotiate with both the Russians and Americans, Zhu's background in those two countries, as well as his fluency in English, made him perhaps the most suitable candidate for the job of leading the Chinese Mission and representing China at the ACJ.

Amongst the other candidates perhaps considered by Chiang, Wang Zhi (王之) may have been one likely option. When the United States joined the Second World War's East Asian theatre in 1942, a communication channel was set up between the military headquarters of General MacArthur and Chiang Kai-shek. Wang, a West Point graduate who was stationed in the Philippines before the start of the Pacific War, was the person placed in charge of ensuring communication flowed freely between the two allies.⁶⁷ A scholar summarized his wartime résumé as follow:

Because of Wang's ability in English and his affiliation with West Point, Chiang

⁶⁵ "Waijiaobu to Guominzhengfu Wenguanchu," February 7, 1946, Guoshiguan, 001-032134-00001-001.

⁶⁶ "Chiang Kai-shek's Telegraph," October 5, 1937, Guoshiguan, 002-010300-00006-017; "Chiang Kai-shek to Xu Yongchang," January, 24, 1941, Guoshiguan, 002-010300-00042-014.

⁶⁷ Donald J. Young, *The Battle of Bataan: A History of the 90 Day Siege and Eventual Surrender of 75,000 Filipino and United States Troops to the Japanese in World War II* (Jefferson, McFarland & Company, 1992), 200-201.

Kai-shek appointed him as China's liaison officer to the United States Army under General MacArthur in 1941. During the Second World War, Wang was stationed with the U.S. forces in the Philippines and Australia. On October 25, 1943, he flew from Perth to Sri Lanka and over the "hump" to the wartime capital of Chongqing (Chungking) to personally deliver MacArthur's battle plans to Chiang Kai-shek. During the signing of Japan's formal surrender on the *Missouri*, Wang was one of four members of the Chinese delegation.⁶⁸

After the Allies' victory, Wang served as the Chief Chinese Liaison in Tokyo, arranging postwar affairs while Allied-occupational policy remained unclear. On September 30 Wang provided a update of the latest information about the situation in Japan under MacArthur's rule, reporting that he had asked SCAP to keep close tabs on former Chinese officials of the Manchukuo puppet regime who had fled to Japan but were now awaiting repatriation to China.⁶⁹ As the British representative in London noted, "Military Liaison Mission (To SCAP) under General Wan Chih [Wang Zhi], still existing independent of Chinese Member of Council. Nine members including two Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives. On good but not intimate terms with SCAP."⁷⁰ Yet despite Wang Zhi's two-year work experience stint serving under General MacArthur, it is debatable whether Chiang might have chosen him to lead the Chinese Mission and act as representative to the ACJ. One explanation for Chiang's final choice may be that Wang had little experience working in the sphere of China's domestic affairs, which, in the end, would made him a less suitable choice than Zhu.

According to the Potsdam Declaration, China could send troops to partake in the Allied occupation of Japan. In the wake of the Japanese capitulation, when assessing the feasibility of having Chinese troops sent to Japan for the occupation, the US Commanding General China Theater reported on November 10, 1945, that "due to unsettled conditions in China it would not be possible to send Chinese occupational forces to Japan for several months and that "the Gimo regrets very much inability to

⁶⁸ Stacey Bieler, *"Patriots" or "Traitors"?: A History of American-Educated Chinese Students* (Armonk, NY : M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 63-64.

⁶⁹ Wang Zhi to Chiang Kai-shek," September 30, 1945, Guoshiguan, 002-090105-00013-296.

⁷⁰ "United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan to Foreign Office," April 15, 1946, UK National Archives, FO 371/54327.

participate and will do so should local situation clarify”.⁷¹ He spoke just at the time General Marshall was in the midst of conducting mediation between the KMT and the CCP, and Marshall did not anticipate the impending Chinese Civil War impeding Chinese troops being transferred to Japan - as he indicated to President Truman on February 9, 1946: “China should announce her intention to send troops into Japan. Generalissimo was previously forced to state his inability to do this, but under present and prospective circumstances I think he will make the offer shortly, on my suggestion, the movement to be initiated about May 1.” Marshall also stressed the necessity of sending Chinese troops to occupy Japan in order to demonstrate its international standing: “China would now be ready to carry the Manchuria issue to the Far Eastern Commission, with definite evidence of unification, with the embarrassment of the presence of American combat troops removed, and with her status dignified by the fact of her troops having joined the Allied Occupation Forces in Japan.”⁷² On the other hand, as Shang Zhen told Gu Weijun on February 18, 1946, General Albert Wedemeyer opposed the idea of dispatching Chinese troops to Japan. Both Shang and Gu believed his opinion was groundless, and Gu believed that China must put all efforts to fulfill its obligation since China’s status as a big country was obtained with bitterness.⁷³

Many Chinese officials, including Zhu Shiming, shared a view similar to Marshall’s, believing that even though Civil War was seemingly inevitable, occupation troops should still be dispatched to Japan. As MacMahon Ball recounts in his diaries, Zhu told him that “he would be very glad when the Chinese military forces arrived to share in the occupation. He thought it desirable to have more troops here in case there were disturbances by the ‘extreme left.’ This suggested to me that perhaps he shares something of MacArthur’s aversion to communists.”⁷⁴ Dai Jian (戴堅), who had led the Chinese expeditionary army in fighting the Japanese in Burma, was

⁷¹ “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman),” November 21, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 6, 863.

⁷² “General Marshall to President Truman,” February 9, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 9, 429.

⁷³ Gu Weijun, *Guweijun Huiyilu* (顧維鈞回憶錄) [The Memoir of Gu Weijun] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1987), Vol. 5, 655.

⁷⁴ W. Macmahon Ball, *Intermittent Diplomat*, 29-30.

selected to command the Chinese Occupation Force, which was composed of General Du Yuming's (杜聿明) Honorary Second Division, later renamed the sixty-seventh Division. As the *Nippon Times* noted, "Maj. Gen. Chien Tai [Dai Jian], Division Commander of the Chinese troops to occupy Japan, accompanied Gen. Chu and Gen. Lee, and will head the advance echelon for the Chinese Occupation Forces".⁷⁵ On June 16, a Chinese newspaper noted that the Chinese occupation forces were already stationed in Shanghai and ready to depart.⁷⁶ One month later, on July 15, Dai Jian reported Chiang that his forces were ready and "the morale was high."⁷⁷ On July 20, 1946, a draft agreement on the function of the Chinese Occupation Force in Japan was signed by Zhu and General Paul J. Mueller, who acted as General MacArthur's representative. This agreement anticipated the size of the Chinese Occupation Force:

It is understood that the strength of the Chinese Occupation Force will be determined by inter-governmental decision. It is also understood that the Chinese Occupation Force will maintain a basic organization of one Infantry Division with suitable ground service supporting elements and will probably total approximately 15,000 personnel...It is also understood that progressive reduction will be made in the Chinese Occupation Force from time to time in conformity with progressive reductions in other Allied Forces in Japan.⁷⁸

In MacArthur's original blueprint, as Macmahon noted in his diaries, the Nagoya area was reserved for the expected Chinese Occupation forces.⁷⁹ However, objections to China sending troops were raised by other allies, especially the United Kingdom. In June 1946, Robertson, a British officer, "expressed great anxiety about what would happen when the Chinese Division arrived in Japan. He thought it unlikely that they were properly trained to be occupation troops and probably very much ill-feeling

⁷⁵ "China Generals Back from Trip," May 30, 1946, *Nippon Times*.

⁷⁶ "Shiwen Jianxun (新聞簡訊)[News Summaries]," June 16, 1946, *Yishibao (Tianjin)* (益世報) [Social Welfare].

⁷⁷ "Daijian to Chiang Kai-shek," July 15, 1946, Guoshiguan, 001-072470-00018-007.

⁷⁸ "The Acting Secretary of State to the Chinese Ambassador (Koo)," October 4, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 8, 330-331.

⁷⁹ W. Macmahon Ball, *Intermittent Diplomat*, 157; The agreement between Zhu and Mueller also stipulated that the Chinese Occupation Force "will be initially allocated Aichi Prefecture, Honshu Island". See "The Acting Secretary of State to the Chinese Ambassador (Koo)," October 4, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 8, 330.

would develop between them and the Japanese people.”⁸⁰ Despite British concerns, it was the ensuing Chinese Civil War, rather than opposition from the United Kingdom, that stopped Chinese troops being sent to Japan. Instead, the Chinese Occupational Force was dispatched not to Japan, but deployed to fight the Communist forces of Mao Zedong in China.⁸¹ As Samuel C. Chu, son of General Zhu Shiming, summarized, “the Chinese had ordered an occupation force of 10,000 men, drawn from Chiang’s elite force, to assemble in Shanghai in preparation for passage to Nagoya. But again this force was never sent, in part because China lacked both the funds and the ships to carry out this scheme. Instead a unit of thirty men was sent to Tokyo as guards for the Mission. Subsequently even this token unit was withdrawn.”⁸² As one historian pithily summarized, the KMT “too had initially hoped to contribute military forces; but, in spite of inducements, the increasing civil war there made this impossible.”⁸³

KMT historiography intentionally ignores the fact that Chiang was firm in his desire to dispatch troops to Japan, and claims, rather, that Chiang, after the end of the conflict with Japan, rejected the chance to dispatch troops to Japan in order to prevent the Russians from occupying Hokkaido, in northern Japan. Zhang Weihuan (張維翰), a KMT member, even claimed years later that “The Japanese people still believe to date that if the Soviet Army stationed in northern Japan, even if Japan escaped the communist fate of the Chinese mainland under Mao, it would still inevitably separate into two countries, such as is the case in Korea, Vietnam and Germany.”⁸⁴

As a victor of the Second World War, dispatching its own troops to occupy Japan was of great psychological significance to the Chinese. Besides dealing with the chief issues of war crime trials and Japanese reparations, in 1946 the major concern of the

⁸⁰ W. Macmahon Ball, *Intermittent Diplomat*, 70.

⁸¹ Wang Chaoguang (王朝光), *Zhongguo Mingyun de Juezhan* (中國命運的決戰) [The Final Battle of China’s Destiny] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2013), 253.

⁸² Samuel C. Chu, “General S. M. Chu on the Allied Council and Sino-Japanese Relations,” in Thomas W. Burkman ed., *The Occupation of Japan: The International Context* (Norfolk: MacArthur Memorial, 1984), 33.

⁸³ Ian Nish ed., *The British Commonwealth and the Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952*, 2.

⁸⁴ Shen Jinding (沈觀鼎) ed., *Bainianlai Zhongri Guanxi Lunwenji* (百年來中日關係論文集) [Essays on One Hundred Years of Sino-Japanese Relations] (Taiwan: Unknown Publisher, 1968), 43.

Chinese Mission in Japan was that of the occupation forces. Yet, the plan faced many obstacles and was eventually abandoned once negotiations between the KMT and the CCP broke down in late 1946. After that development, not only could the Nationalist government no longer contribute troops to the occupation, but it itself required additional military assistance from SCAP. It was against this background that the Chinese Mission in Japan began to approach MacArthur to secure his support for Nationalist China.

THE FIRST CONTACT: GAUGING MACARTHUR'S ATTITUDE

The first confrontation between the KMT and CCP after the War of Resistance had been won was over the recovery of areas that, during the war, had been occupied by the Japanese army and to whom the Japanese should surrender. Given the mission of coordinating the surrender of Japanese forces in Asia, MacArthur urged, in line with the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, the soldiers of the imperial army to surrender themselves to the Nationalists, but not to the Communists.⁸⁵ A message sent from President Truman to Chiang also stated that "General MacArthur will direct the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to have Japanese forces in China, other than those opposing the Russians, surrender unconditionally to you or your subordinate commanders."⁸⁶ Despite airing his thoughts about the Japanese surrender in China, MacArthur himself did not want to become involved in the Chinese affairs. According to General Wedemeyer, for example, MacArthur rejected a proposal that he deployed seven divisions to Manchuria to counter-balance the Soviets.⁸⁷ At that moment in time, MacArthur was clearly immersing himself entirely in Japanese affairs; the strife in China was outside of his immediate purview.

Only when Soviet actions became aggressive, as when Soviet forces raided Japanese assets in Northeast China (Manchuria), did MacArthur begin to pay attention

⁸⁵ Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-50* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 308.

⁸⁶ "The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Hurley)," August 11, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 7, 496.

⁸⁷ Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-50*, 306.

to the Soviet Union's movements on the Asian mainland. On February 1, 1946, MacArthur exchanged opinions on Soviet industrial demands in Manchuria with Averell Harriman, who had just completed a three-year posting as American ambassador to the Soviet Union, and was then on his way back to the United States. When Harriman read to MacArthur cables he sent to Washington in which he urged opposing Soviet demands in Manchuria with "every means at our disposal", the general replied to the diplomat that, "I wouldn't change a word."⁸⁸ But MacArthur still had no intention of getting directly involved in the tussle for Northeast China. On February 22, when Marshall asked MacArthur whether he could "spare sixty junior officers and equal number of noncommissioned officers to run the elementary school for infantry and artillery officers and for division and corps staff officers", MacArthur rejected the proposal.⁸⁹

Nevertheless, while immersing himself in Japan's affairs and showing little concern for the situation on the ground in China, MacArthur was still willing to meet with Chiang Kai-shek as soon as circumstances would allow. On March 23, Wang Zhi reported that MacArthur had expressed his willingness to meet with Chiang at a ceremony to be held in the Philippines on July 4, marking the day of national independence, and at which, he and President Truman would both be present.⁹⁰ July 1946 was also the month when Marshall advised the US government to cease the provision of military material to the Nationalist government in order to preempt any communist charge that US assistance was arming Chiang Kai-shek's army.⁹¹ For the KMT, seeking assistance from MacArthur quickly became an alternative option for receiving foreign military assistance when the truce between it and the CCP finally disintegrated and Civil War resumed on July 13. Soon after combat between the two sides resumed, the KMT forces were dealt a significant blow in Northern Jiangsu by

⁸⁸ Edmund S. Wehrle, "Marshall, the Moscow Conference, and Harriman," in Larry I. Bland, Roger B. Jeans, Mark F. Wilkinson eds., *George C. Marshall's Mediation Mission to China, December 1945-January 1947* (Lexington: George C. Marshall Foundation, 1998), 84-85.

⁸⁹ Marc Gallicchio, "About Face: General Marshall's Plans for the Amalgamation of Communist and Nationalist Armies in China," in Larry I. Bland, Roger B. Jeans, Mark F. Wilkinson eds., *George C. Marshall's Mediation Mission to China*, 397.

⁹⁰ "Yu Jishi to Chiang Kai-shek," March 23, 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00042-033.

⁹¹ Wang Chen-main, "Marshall's Approaches to the Mediation Effort," in Larry I. Bland, Roger B. Jeans, Mark F. Wilkinson eds., *George C. Marshall's Mediation Mission to China*, 39.

CCP forces under the command of Su Yu (粟裕), triggering the request of assistance from MacArthur. Soon after, on August 11, a proposal for strengthening contact between the Chinese Mission and MacArthur was written by Wang Zhi. As Wang wrote, even though China was one of the four allied powers occupying Japan, it did so in name only. Wang urged the Mission to develop and pursue its own standpoint. Wang believed that it had become paralyzed between the two Superpowers and was only busy maintaining benign relationships with them. Wang suggested that the Chinese Mission had adopted a “sit on the fence” attitude, which would lead neither to it obtaining assistance from the Soviet Union, nor to it gaining the full confidence of the United States. Wang thus broached the idea of paying greater attention to obtaining practical benefits, rather than struggling for purely-superficial status; Wang’s report offered two solutions:

- (1) The Mission should strengthen military and economic connections between our country and General MacArthur’s Headquarters. We should obtain military assistance and materials from Japan, and in the future these can be used in the preparation for international wars.
- (2) The Mission should understand MacArthur’s unique power in governing Japan and immediately request to take possession of factories, dockyards, and machine equipment that have already been listed as Japanese reparations. For instance, Kawasaki dockyard, Kure dockyard, Kobe steel factory, and Mitsubishi fourteenth aircraft factory are all on the list of reparations. However, some machines are damaged because our country failed to have them transported back to China at the earliest possible time. The scale and equipment of Japan’s scientific research institutions – especially institutions for aircraft manufacturing – are nearly equal to those of England and the USA. These institutions could be used as reparations as well, and we should try to obtain them as soon as possible.⁹²

This proposal had a significant impact on the KMT. After reading this Wang’s ideas, Chen Cheng, chief of staff of the KMT army, asked Chiang Kai-shek to order the Chinese Mission to revise its “sit on the fence” attitude, repeating the term that

⁹² “Wang Zhi to Chiang Kai-shek,” August 11, 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-061. Zhu’s “sit on the fence attitude” toward the US-Soviet rivalry within SCAP was observed by MacMahon Ball as well. See W. Macmahon Ball, *Intermittent Diplomat*, 39-40.

Wang had used, and recommended China send another person to serve as Chiang's special envoy to MacArthur.⁹³ At this point time, however, MacArthur's support was not sought urgently, since KMT troops were still dominating the battlefields even after the reverses in Northern Jiangsu. Still, to counter-balance Marshall's increasingly cool treatment, the KMT wanted to establish a connection with MacArthur to maintain close relations with at least one senior US military figure as a way to win support for their military campaigns against the communists. Although fully-occupied in Tokyo, MacArthur apparently kept one-eye on events unfolding in China and, given the opportunity, adopted a friendly posture to the Chinese people. In July MacArthur told James Forrestal, US Secretary of Navy, that "the administration ought to do more to halt the Communist advance in China."⁹⁴ MacArthur also told him that while Chiang and his regime "might not be the best in the world," they "were on our side and should be supported."⁹⁵ As Sebald recalled, "[a]lthough the General seldom attended the frequent social functions which characterized official life, he was on hand early with Mrs. MacArthur for the Chinese celebration of the traditional Double Ten (October 10) national holiday in 1946."⁹⁶ MacArthur's ambivalence towards Chinese affairs was identified by American journalist Mark Gayn, who recounted how a member of "MacArthur's Inner Circle" told him, in November of 1946, that:

General MacArthur firmly believes that Japan has replaced China as the pivot of our policy for Asia. He believes the Chinese Nationalist administration to be incompetent and shot through with corruption. He fears that if we identify ourselves with it, we may "lose face" throughout Asia. But if he firmly believed in nonintervention in China before, he has gradually been coming over to the view that military force should-and could-be employed to halt the spread of Chinese Communism.⁹⁷

Although the accuracy of this information divulged by somebody from

⁹³ "Chen Cheng to Chiang Kai-shek," August 26, 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00534-088.

⁹⁴ Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 126.

⁹⁵ Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General*, 159.

⁹⁶ William Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 58.

⁹⁷ Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary*, 450-452.

MacArthur's "inner circle" might be questionable, it does represent the mentality of MacArthur in the years to come. The question would be to what extent would MacArthur become involved in Chinese affairs if the worsening situation in China affected Japan's revitalization, and to what degree would he let that involvement encumber him? For MacArthur, the ideal solution would surely be for directly military assistance to continue coming from Washington, without responsibility being passed through his hands.

Back in China, in late 1946 KMT troops recovered Zhangjiakou, Siping, and Andong. With these successes, the KMT firmly believed its military predominance would soon bring them victory in the Civil War. As a consequence, despite setting up a direct connection with MacArthur, no specific request for military assistance was made by the Chinese Mission. In the months that followed, the KMT became more conscious of MacArthur's attitude toward China, particularly after Marshall announced his departure on January 6, 1947. One day later, on January 7, Zhu Shiming wrote a report to Yu Jishi (俞濟時), a close confidant of Chiang, in which he gauged MacArthur's stance toward China:

The policies on China in the United States government belong to Marshall, who is quite influential with the Secretary of War. MacArthur should be wary of it and will not go further. Besides, MacArthur is quite satisfied with his current tasks in Japan and is not interested in Chinese affairs, except for the issue of Northeast China with regard to the Soviet Union, and does not have any opinion on them. I will further investigate his attitude and meet him in the near future.⁹⁸

In fact, MacArthur disavowed Marshall's mediation in China. As Michael Schaller summarized:

In meetings with Dwight Eisenhower, Herbert Hoover, and James Forrestal during 1946, MacArthur said little about Japan's economic muddle. He spoke, instead, about oriental psychology and American politics. Eisenhower, he charged, was a "slave to the press," a poor chief of staff, and an "enemy" of West Point. Instead of wasting time on a "2000 to 1" shot mediating China's civil war

⁹⁸ "Zhu Shiming to Yu Jishi," January 7, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-090103-00005-317.

(and generating publicity for a presidential campaign!), Marshall ought to send military aid to Chiang....By undermining Chiang Kai-shek and pushing radical nostrums on SCAP, the administration would force Tokyo "to go Communist both to get free and secure Russian protection." Truman's main interest seemed sabotaging MacArthur's effort to construct an "ideological dam in the Pacific...against the Asiatic tide of Communism".⁹⁹

Zhu's motivation of keep abreast of MacArthur's thinking was not because the Nationalists wanted him to take part in the Civil War, but to use his status in Washington to either maintain US support to China or to assure certain significant American individuals would offer their support to the Nationalists if and when needed. Within a week, Zhu successfully "investigated" MacArthur's viewpoints. On January 15, 1947, Zhu paid a visit to MacArthur and summarized their conversation in a report to the Foreign Ministry. They discussed twelve issues but none of them directly involved the Chinese Civil War. According to Zhu, MacArthur strongly praised Chiang for the completion of China's constitution. Besides this, MacArthur invited the Chinese government to dispatch two warships to participate in the occupation. With regards to Washington's China policy, MacArthur "slightly criticized" the last speech Marshall made in China while stating that Senator Arthur Vandenberg's speech, made a few days before Zhu met with MacArthur, represented the majority opinion within the United States.¹⁰⁰ The Senator's speech to which MacArthur referred was one made on January 11 in which Vandenberg urged the US government take a more sympathetic posture toward Chiang.¹⁰¹ It is difficult to evaluate, though, whether Vandenberg's opinions was predominant amongst the political class in the United States, as MacArthur told Zhu it was. MacArthur also echoed Vandenberg's opinion of increasing assistance to the Nationalists. Again, however, MacArthur believed that any assistance should come directly from Washington, not Tokyo.

SHANG ZHEN AND THE INCREASING DEMAND FOR US SUPPORT

⁹⁹ Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General*, 139.

¹⁰⁰ "Zhu Shiming to Wang Shijie," January 16, 1947, Guoshiguan, 001-066220-00010-027; "Zhu Shiming to Foreign Ministry," January 15, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-073.

¹⁰¹ James Fetzer, "Senator Vandenberg and the American Commitment to China, 1945-1950," *The Historian*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1974), 285.

In 1947, the Nationalist's military position deteriorated rapidly. In January and February, Nationalist troops suffered massive losses in the Lunan (魯南) and Laiwu (萊蕪) battles in Shandong, after which Chiang reprimanded his high-ranking generals for their frailty and selfishness.¹⁰² The fiasco in Shandong may have alerted Chiang to the need to re-think the issue of obtaining military assistance from the United States. On February 22, 1947, the same day he scolded his generals for their ineptitude, Chiang cabled Zhu asking him to return to Nanjing in late February "to discuss something."¹⁰³ The details of the meeting have yet to be made public, but it is likely that Chiang wanted Zhu to travel to the United States to make a new case for providing the KMT with military assistance. Zhu then spent his final weeks in Tokyo finishing up his work before departing. Then, on March 5, he proposed a topic for discussion for a meeting of the ACJ: "Policies and Programs for Repatriated and Demobilized Persons".¹⁰⁴ Zhu used the meeting to promote his accomplishments in Japan. For MacMahon Ball "[the meeting] was only interesting in that Chu reappeared after some month's absence. *Time* and visiting Chinese journalists were also there, taking photos of Chu [Zhu]."¹⁰⁵ On April 15, the Executive Yuan made the decision to replace Zhu with General Shang Zhen.¹⁰⁶

Like Zhu, Shang possessed experience in international affairs, but he also had more experience than his predecessor in China's domestic administrative and military affairs. As a significant figure within the Yan Xishan (閻錫山) clique, Shang had joined Chiang's faction in 1931. During the War of Resistance, Shang participated in several battles and became the commander of the Sixth War Zone in Hunan in 1940, before being appointed as the director of the Military Affairs Commission Foreign

¹⁰² Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, February 22, 1947.

¹⁰³ "Chiang Kai-shek to Zhu Shiming," February 22, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-010400-00005-011.

¹⁰⁴ "Verbatim Minutes of the Twenty-Seventh Meeting Allied Council for Japan," March 5, 1947, UK National Archives, FO 371/63675.

¹⁰⁵ W. Macmahon Ball, *Intermittent Diplomat*, 184-185.

¹⁰⁶ "Chiang Kai-shek to Guominzhengfu Wenguanchu," April 16, 1947, Guoshiuan: 001-032134-00001-008. Chiang had already ordered Shang Zhen to return to China for "additional mission" from the United States on February 28, 1947. See "Chiang Kai-shek to Gu Weijun," February 28, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-010400-00005-017.

Affairs Bureau in 1941.¹⁰⁷ As the director in charge of all foreign interactions with Chinese troops, Shang worked closely with General Joseph W. Stillwell, who called him a “stooge staff general.”¹⁰⁸ In 1943, Shang accompanied Chiang to attend the Cairo Conference.¹⁰⁹ Thereafter, Shang’s role in China’s international affairs increased in prominence, and he was later appointed as Chief of the Chinese Military Mission to the United States in 1944, where he frequently pleaded with his hosts, on behalf of the Nationalists, for US weapons to help repulse Japanese attacks.¹¹⁰ In 1946, Shang served as the chief Chinese delegate to the Military Staff Commission of the United Nations, with He Yingqin (何應欽) replacing him that October.¹¹¹ The reason why Chiang wanted Shang to replace Zhu as head of the Chinese Mission in Japan is debatable, but Shang’s experience in dealing with the US and acquiring military aid to China during the War of Resistance may have played a role. Despite his warlord background, Shang was also closer to Chiang.

As Shang succeeded Zhu in Tokyo, the fighting in China’s Northeast continued. On May 13, CCP troops under the command of Lin Biao (林彪), commander of CCP’s Northeastern Army, initiated a fifth offensive. On the same day, Shang and MacArthur met in Tokyo, with MacArthur showing his concern for the situation across the China Sea. Shang replied that the Nationalists were confident of defeating the CCP forces. According to a telegram sent to Chiang, Shang told MacArthur:

There is progress everywhere in China. Shandong is the place where the major forces of bandits [CCP] are located, the Nationalists troops are encircling them with armies and air force. Several days-ago our army conquered Tai’an, and

¹⁰⁷ “Junshi Wei yuanhui Waishiju Zuzhi Tiaoli (軍事委員會外事局組織條例) [Organizational Clause of the Military Affairs Commission’s Foreign Affairs Bureau],” December 1941, Kuomintang Archives: 防 004/0068.

¹⁰⁸ Hans van de Ven, *War and Nationalism in China, 1925-1945* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 31.

¹⁰⁹ On July 1, 1947, Chiang cabled He Yingqin asking whether if there was a position available for Zhu Shiming. See “Chiang Kai-shek to He Yingqin,” July 1, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-070200-00023-085. But this proposal was rejected by He Yingqin. See “He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek,” July 1, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-090103-00001-201.

¹¹⁰ “Heavy Weapons Asked,” July 22, 1944, *The New York Times*.

¹¹¹ Howard L. Boorman, *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970), vol. 3, 90.

there will be bigger successes in the following days. While the situation in Shanxi is a little bit tense, forces in Suiyuan and Shaanxi could assist if need be. The victory in Shandong will easily solve the problem in Shanxi.¹¹²

Shang also passed-on the information that, MacArthur showed his “admiration for Chiang’s determination and colossal excitement” after hearing the news, and told Shang to cooperate closely with him and meet him at any time to discuss anything.¹¹³ However, Shang’s prognostication was immediately proved wrong. Three days after the meeting in Tokyo, the CCP were victorious in the Battle of Menglianggu (孟良崗) in Shandong, in which the seventy-fourth division, one of the five best-equipped divisions of KMT troops, was exterminated. This catastrophe shook the KMT’s confidence and greatly encouraged the CCP.¹¹⁴ On May 20, a large-scale student demonstration opposing the Civil War was dispersed by the police. This demonstration was followed by series of student movements in China’s major cities, most of which were organized by the CCP and greatly harmed the image of the KMT. In the Northeast, the Battle of Siping (四平) broke out on June 11, and the CCP were again the victors, conquering the city on June 22. Yet, while the CCP was forced to retreat again eight days later, the battle resulted in significant KMT casualties and the near-total depletion of American supplies in the Northeast. The bad news certainly reached MacArthur, as he told news correspondents that events in China were to the “misfortune to Japan.”¹¹⁵ A report written by the Canadian representative in Japan in mid-October underlined MacArthur’s feelings: “He believes China is currently in a mess. He rebuked the corruption and ineptitude of the current government. While saying so, he still believes that it would be a mistake for the USA not to assist the Nationalists more effectively in the war against the Communists.”¹¹⁶

¹¹² “Shang Zhen to Chiang Kai-shek,” May 13, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-085.

¹¹³ “Shang Zhen to Chiang Kai-shek,” May 13, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-090103-00001-198.

¹¹⁴ Jiang Yongjing, *Jiang Jieshi Mao Zedong de Tanda yu Juezhuan*, 162.

¹¹⁵ “Maikese Shuo Zhongguo Bu’an Wei Ribenbuxing (麥克阿瑟說中國不安為日本不幸) [MacArthur Said China’s Unease is Japan’s Misfortune],” June 28, 1947, *Dagongbao (Shanghai)*.

¹¹⁶ “Jia Zhuri Daibiaotuan Baogao Jia Waijiaobu yu Maishuai Huitan Jingguo (加駐日代表團報告加外交部與麥帥會談經過) [A Report by Canada’s Mission in Japan on Talks between the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and General MacArthur],” October 16, 1947, Guoshiguan, 001-062510-00001-001.

Around the same time, MacArthur cabled John Leighton Stuart stressing that, “although I uphold democracy in Japan I never oppose China obtaining US support,” adding, “I deeply agree with the concurrent anti-communist battle in China and am hopeful this will dissipate Nationalist China’s misunderstanding of me.”¹¹⁷ Within three months, MacArthur’s attitude toward the Chinese Civil War had rapidly changed following the KMT losing the upper-hand in Shandong. When MacArthur became fully-aware of the KMT’s military ineptitude, which was so evident that Shang had no opportunity to refute it, Zhu Shiming was extremely active in the United Kingdom and the United States. Duan Maolan (段茂瀾), Minister-Counselor of the Chinese Embassy in London, disclosed the purpose of Zhu’s activity in an informal conversation on September 16, 1947:

General Chu Shih-ming [Zhu Shiming] had left London September 15th by air for New York. According to Tuan [Duan], Chu is going to New York for the ostensible purpose of serving as one of China’s delegates to the general Assembly meeting of the United Nations. However, his real mission, according to Tuan, is to assist Dr. Wang Shih-chieh [Wang Shijie], Chinese Foreign Minister, in talks which the latter hopes to have with the Secretary. The purpose of these talks, Tuan said, would be to seek American aid for China.¹¹⁸

By September 1947, the CCP and the Red Army were in the ascendancy in China. “The Government had made little progress in its campaign against the Communists,” recounted a document relaying a speech made by Zhu in London. “The Government’s campaign against the Communists had taken a favorable turn in Shantung [Shandong] just before his departure from China. But even in Shantung the Government forces had suffered several reverses and there had been four changes of commanders in recent months,” it continued. Moreover, Zhu had also “remarked that the American Military Advisory Group in China had contributed little to the training of Chinese forces, adding that the group was concentrated in Nanking and that General Lucas had virtually no access to the Generalissimo and that he rarely saw General Chen

¹¹⁷ “Zheng Jiemin to Chiang kai-shek,” August 18, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-098.

¹¹⁸ “The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Hawkins) to the Secretary of State,” September 16, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 7, 283.

Cheng.”¹¹⁹ In his words, then, Zhu was attributing the military failures of the KMT to the inefficiency of American assistance and implied that the situation would deteriorate further if the United States could not provide more and better assistance.

On September 30, Wang Shijie met Truman in Washington to discuss the critical situation in Northeast China. Wang mentioned that some people were proposing that the KMT abandon the Northeast in order to shorten their battle front, something to which the KMT would never agree.¹²⁰ Nor did Truman favor this solution, but he still refused to offer direct military aid to China. Frustrated and irritated, Wang Shijie paid a visit to MacArthur in Japan in October. Before Wang’s arrival, on October 20, MacArthur received a personal note from General Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer had just finished an investigative tour of China. In the letter, he warned how acute the situation in China was, “[w]e are focusing our attention and efforts in Western Europe while dangerously destructive forces are moving successfully forward in the Far East.”¹²¹ This warning put MacArthur in a dilemma. As the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, MacArthur’s main task was to rebuild Japan as a reliable ally of the United States while Chinese affairs were not, as we have seen, within his jurisdiction or responsibility (As Michael Schaller summarized: the General “commanded military occupation forces in Japan and southern Korea and, after 1947, the regional Far Eastern Command. He did not, however, exercise authority over American forces in China.”¹²²). However, as the KMT was about to lose Manchuria, potential Soviet dominance over the region would directly threaten Japan. According to a Chinese newspaper, MacArthur clearly believed by this time that the situation in Asia was, from an American perspective, deteriorating sharply, particularly as the southern half of Korea had fallen into the hands of the communists while China’s fate remained unsettled. This Chinese source accurately sensed that “internal turmoil in China severely hampered economic revitalization in Japan.” For instance, over the course of

¹¹⁹ “Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Drumright),” September 3, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 7, 275.

¹²⁰ Jiang Yongjing, *Jiang Jieshi Mao Zedong de Tandai yu Juezhuan*, 169-170.

¹²¹ Keith E. Eiler, “Devotion and Dissent: Albert Wedemeyer, George Marshall, and China,” in Larry I. Bland, Roger B. Jeans, Mark F. Wilkinson eds., *George C. Marshall’s Mediation Mission to China*, 111.

¹²² Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General*, 121.

the previous fifteen years, Japan had relied upon grain and other foodstuffs being shipped from Northeast and Northern China, but this supply line had been cut by the civil war. By the same token, exports of Japanese textiles and light industrial products were significantly circumscribed.¹²³ Despite this, MacArthur endeavored for as long as possible to remain aloof from the Chinese Civil War, even as its influence on Japan, both politically and economically, began to spread.

THE FALL OF THE NATIONALISTS

On December 6, 1947, Tang Zong (唐縱), a high-ranking official in the Military Intelligence Bureau, proposed the idea of using Japanese bullet-production machines to produce artillery in China. Shang Zhen was ordered to realize this proposal.¹²⁴ Nearly a week later, on December 12, Chiang telegraphed Shang to “negotiate with General MacArthur.”¹²⁵ After negotiations in Japan, Shang could only reply, however, that the machines were to be destroyed in accordance with an earlier ruling by SCAP. Shang then proposed that Wellington Koo negotiate with the Far Eastern Committee to convince them to make an exception for China. But Shang also pointed out that there was, amongst the 9,447 machines China had already received from Japanese reparations, a portion that could be used to produce ammunition.¹²⁶

If the year 1947 can be regarded as the turning point of the KMT-CCP civil war, 1948 would be a precipitous catastrophe for the Nationalists. Early that year, the CCP initiated a winter offensive in Northeast China, posing the greatest threat to KMT forces in Manchuria since the end of the War of Resistance. On February 15, a final attempt to revive the idea of mobilizing the remnant Japanese troops in local areas was once again proposed. In fact, the idea of using Japanese soldiers had been adopted earlier – after Chiang had begrudgingly given permission – with “Japanese

¹²³ “Maikē Ase Renwei Yazhou Xingshi Yanzhong (麥克阿瑟認為亞洲形勢嚴重) [MacArthur Believes the Situation in Asia is Serious],” November 12, 1947, *Dagongbao (Shanghai)*.

¹²⁴ “Tang Zong to Chiang Kai-shek,” December 6, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-113.

¹²⁵ “Chiang Kai-shek to Shang Zhen,” December 12, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-090105-00015-247.

¹²⁶ “Shilue Gaoben [The Archives of President Chiang Kai-shek: Basic Biographical Documents],” December 6, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-060100-00231-006.

soldiers doing guard duty or even patrolling the streets.”¹²⁷ And with the situation in the Northeast becoming increasingly unfavorable for the KMT, Chiang had no option but to again adopt the idea. Yet Chiang ordered specifically that the matter not be relayed to SCAP.¹²⁸ The Generalissimo clearly understood that MacArthur would oppose the use of Japanese forces by the Nationalists.

At about that same moment, MacArthur was in the midst of contemplating whether or not to compete in November’s US presidential election. When Zhu Shiming approached the General about the possibility of him being elected, the General replied that, “it would be a miracle.” After Zhu enquired further about what the outcome would be if such a “miracle” happened to occur, MacArthur answered, “it would be the best opportunity for your country as well as President Chiang.”¹²⁹ While the veracity of this conversation might be doubtful, it is not unrealistic to assume that MacArthur would offer more assistance to China to contain the spread of communism in East Asia if he were elected to the White House. In practical terms, however, what MacArthur was able to do at this moment was show his generosity to China. While disapproving of its quest for an increased share of Japanese reparations, MacArthur did appropriate the American’s share for Chinese use. On February 28, 1948, Chiang cabled MacArthur to thank him for his assistance in both selling and giving US surplus war material from the Pacific Area to China.¹³⁰ MacArthur’s support for the KMT also encouraged Republicans in the United States. On March 3, Gu Weijun cabled Chiang to inform him that “the House of Representatives and the press are now paying attention to MacArthur’s claim that he is concentrating on the Chinese question.”¹³¹ As one historian has summarized, MacArthur, along with Wedemeyer, formed the “Far Eastern faction,” which with backing by Republicans in

¹²⁷ Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950* (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 71-72.

¹²⁸ “Xue Yue to Chiang Kai-shek,” February 15, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00325-036.

¹²⁹ “Maikese Ruguo Dangxuan Jiangwei Zhongguo Zuihao Xiaoxi (麥克阿瑟如果當選將為中國最好消息) [Good News for China if MacArthur is Elected],” March 10, 1948, *Dagongbao* (Shanghai).

¹³⁰ “Chiang Kai-shek to Douglas MacArthur,” February 28, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00045-008.

¹³¹ “Gu Weijun to Chiang Kai-shek,” March 3, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00042-095.

the United States, argued for continued military aid to China.¹³² On March 6, Chiang wrote in his diary that “the debate on military assistance to China in the US Congress has come to boiling point. MacArthur strongly countenanced the idea of assisting us with convincing arguments. Although the final result is not yet known, Marshall has already agreed to sell to us urgently needed machine guns and several kinds of munitions.”¹³³ Receiving news of the conclusion of the United States’ Foreign Act, Chiang wrote a letter to MacArthur to express his gratitude in May:

Dear General MacArthur:

I wish to express to you my appreciation for the support that you gave to the China Aid Act of 1948 in your testimony before the Congress, which greatly contributed to its speedy passage. The successful implementation of the Act, I am sure, will not only help to alleviate the sufferings of the Chinese people, but will also go a long way toward furthering the close co-operation between our two countries.

Sincerely yours,

Chiang Kai-shek¹³⁴

In the months that followed, MacArthur magnanimously allowed Chinese troops to transfer American ammunitions stored in Okinawa to Shanghai for use in the civil war.¹³⁵ In a conference on March 21, MacArthur said he “considered the situation in China today as deteriorating, but not yet hopeless.” Also, MacArthur advocated the “release at once to the Chinese Government, of all U.S. military surpluses in the Pacific Area. This release should be a gift-not a sale.” As George F. Kennan noted,

He feels certain there are large reserves of equipment still available and that such equipment will be considered obsolete for American Forces by the time another war comes. He said he himself does not expect to fight in Japan, and if he does, he has sufficient reserve equipment under his control in Japan to take care of his own needs.¹³⁶

¹³² Lin Tongfa, *Yijiusijiu Dachetui*, 75.

¹³³ Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, March 6, 1948.

¹³⁴ “Zhu Shiming to Chiang Kai-shek,” June 9, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00042-115.

¹³⁵ Yang Zizhen, “Zhongguo Zhuridaibiaotuan Zhi Yanjiu,” 68-69.

¹³⁶ “Conversation Between General of the Army MacArthur, Under Secretary of the Army Draper, and Mr. George F. Kennan,” March 21, 1948 (Amended March 23, 1948), FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, 711.

As part of the same conversation, MacArthur also argued that the US government should dispatch officers to supervise the delivery of US surplus war material and provide “moderate economic and financial assistance” on the grounds that the US “would have everything to gain and very little to lose by furnishing moderate support to the Chinese Government at this critical time.”¹³⁷ Kennan summarized, too, that MacArthur “is somewhat doubtful of the eventual outcome [of the civil war], since he is not certain that China’s Field Commanders still retain the “will to fight”. Nevertheless, under the circumstances, he feels that all-out aid to China at this time is decidedly a worthwhile gamble for the United States.”¹³⁸ From MacArthur’s perspective, one can sense the fact that the General believed it would suit US interests to assist the KMT at this point, not the extent that hampered his project to revitalize Japan.

Some Republican politicians also mulled over the feasibility of MacArthur’s serving as a special military adviser to Chiang in 1948. By using British Foreign Office archives, Michael Schaller noted that:

He [MacArthur] told British diplomats in Tokyo “he would not be adverse to adding this responsibility to his present one in Japan.” As for the idea of leading American troops into Manchuria to drive out the Chinese Communists, MacArthur boasted he “could accomplish this in six months by air action with a force of 1000 suitable aircraft.” He might then occupy Manchuria as a “trustee” for the Nationalists and, thereby, safeguard all Asia from communism.¹³⁹

MacArthur’s doubts about the willingness of the KMT generals to fight were not groundless, and the support that did come from the United States came too late – for the KMT was already on the brink of collapse. On April 21, 1948, KMT troops in Yan’an retreated and the forces in the Northeast were encircled in several cities. Other battles in northern, central, and eastern China did not go well for the KMT either. Eventually, Chiang sent an emergency signal to MacArthur. On June 9, after a

¹³⁷ “Conversation Between General of the Army MacArthur, Under Secretary of the Army Draper, and Mr. George F. Kennan,” March 21, 1948 (Amended March 23, 1948), FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, 711.

¹³⁸ “Conversation Between General of the Army MacArthur, Under Secretary of the Army Draper, and Mr. George F. Kennan,” March 21, 1948 (Amended March 23, 1948), FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, 712.

¹³⁹ Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General*, 160.

lobbying mission had seen him sent to Japan as Chiang's special envoy, Zhu Shiming reported to Chiang on a meeting he had with MacArthur:

I met General MacArthur at noon today and handed over the President's letter to him. The meeting lasted about an hour, in which MacArthur showed his honest attitude and promised to try his best to help. He also mentioned that one year ago there were surplus weapons that could equip ten to fifteen divisions in his zone of control, among which half had been transferred back to the United States and half dispatched to other forces in Japan. Now the amount of remnant munitions has sharply decreased, but the number of riffles is still satisfactory. He then ordered his logistics staff to confer with me and asked that this information be kept absolutely secret.¹⁴⁰

It was at this crucial moment that Chiang requested MacArthur's immediate and direct input on the Chinese battlefield without first obtaining Washington's approval. On July 24, He Yingqin, in a cable to Chiang, proposed the Chinese Mission in Japan negotiate with MacArthur and obtain any remnant Japanese weapons.¹⁴¹ The next month, on August 21, Zhang Qun (張群) visited Japan to meet with MacArthur. According to Zhang's own account, MacArthur said he heard that the Nationalist Chinese would abandon Northeast and Northern China and focus on defending Southern China, a rumor which he hoped was not accurate. MacArthur urged the KMT to "Never give up! Give up nothing!" and wished to meet Chiang Kai-shek in person.¹⁴² However, Chinese newspapers did not mention Zhang and MacArthur exchanging opinions about the deteriorating condition of the Civil War; rather, the readers were left to read about on Zhang's wiliness to visit Japanese politicians and his extension of an invitation to them to visit China.¹⁴³ Information about another two-hour meeting between the two men was also not disclosed to the public.¹⁴⁴

It is not at all farfetched to assume that the purpose of Zhang's visit to Japan was

¹⁴⁰ "Zhu Shiming to Chiang Kai-shek," June 9, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00042-115.

¹⁴¹ "He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek," July 24, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00331-079.

¹⁴² ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 678.

¹⁴³ "Maike Ase Zuoyan Zhangqun (麥克阿瑟昨宴張羣) [MacArthur Yesterday Entertained Zhang Qun]," August 23, 1948, *Dagongbao (Hong Kong)*.

¹⁴⁴ "Zhangqun Zaiwu Maike Ase (張羣再晤麥克阿瑟) [Zhang Qun Met MacArthur Again]," September 2, 1948, *Dagongbao (Tianjin)*.

to find other grounds for hope after speaking directly with MacArthur. On September 7, Chiang cabled Zhang to inquire whether the KMT could purchase 50,000 to 100,000 strong horses in Japan for use in the civil war.¹⁴⁵ To Chiang's great discomfort, one week later, on September 16, Shang reported back that Japan lacked horses and there wasn't any available to be sent to China. SCAP's response to the Chinese request was that it could only "probably collect 200 to 300 stallions."¹⁴⁶ When Zhang Qun visited MacArthur on September 10, MacArthur impressed on the Chinese that under no circumstances could the KMT abandon Northeast and Northern China and the KMT should bolster its anti-CCP campaign. MacArthur believed all the CCP's munitions were coming from the spoils of war seized by the Soviet Union from the Japanese army and that additional ammunition produced in Siberia were insufficient. Thus, the CCP could not continue their stand for too long and might soon pursue peace. As long as the KMT could persist in the Civil War, US military production would supply China incessantly, and some other necessities could be shipped from Japan as well.¹⁴⁷

In spite of those predictions, the CCP launched the Liaoshen (遼沈) Campaign in Northeast China's Liaoning province on September 12, 1948. The CCP quickly conquered Changli and disabled the Jinyu railroad, isolating KMT forces in the Northeast and cutting them off from outside military assistance. After Chiang's ultimately ineffective struggle to obtain comprehensive military support from Japan, the Chinese Mission was assigned the task of surreptitiously investigating the exact amount of military materiel left by the Japanese Kwantung Army after its withdrawal from China and to see what could be used for the repulse of the Liaoshen Campaign.¹⁴⁸ On October 4, 1948, a document listing the amount of Japanese artillery left in Northeast China drafted by the Chinese Mission was sent to Nanjing: "ammunitions total 20,000 tons, which could supply the needs of ten divisions in

¹⁴⁵ "Chiang Kai-shek to Shang Zhen and Zhang Qun," September 7, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-010400-00010-009.

¹⁴⁶ "Shang Zhen to Chiang Kai-shek," September 16, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00547-064.

¹⁴⁷ ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 682-683.

¹⁴⁸ "Chinese Mission to Foreign Ministry," October 4, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-152.

battle....petrol for aircraft could be used for one month.” According to the report’s closing sentence, “All the ammunitions mentioned above are worth approximately five trillion Japanese dollars.”¹⁴⁹ The entire investigation was undertaken without MacArthur being informed because such inquiries apparently violated SCAP regulations. However, Chiang’s last-ditch attempt to reverse his military disadvantage in the Northeast was, in the end, fruitless. Less than a month after the report was written, the KMT’s forces were totally defeated. On November 2, 1948, the Liaoshen Campaign ended in Communist victory. For the first time in modern Chinese history, the CCP took full control of the country’s Northeast.

CONCLUSION

As Michael Schaller summarized, “As the tide of battle in China turned in the Communists’ favor, most Asia specialists in Washington opposed further American involvement. MacArthur, by contrast, argued for increased assistance to the crumbling Nationalist regime.”¹⁵⁰ This chapter argues that the objective of the Chinese Mission in Japan evolved significantly as the Chinese Civil War progressed, particularly with regards to committing itself to obtain additional support from MacArthur. The appointments of Zhu Zhuming and Shang Zhen demonstrates that postwar Sino-Japanese relations were significantly influenced by the policy of the United States. By and large, every request the Chinese Mission made of MacArthur was closely related to developments in the Chinese Civil War. For instance, during the early stages of the war, MacArthur’s attitude toward China was not of major concern to the KMT since Chiang and his government firmly believed that the arrival of victory was just a matter of time. The first time the KMT took a serious interest in MacArthur’s stance was in January 1947 when Zhu was asked to gauge MacArthur’s reaction the day after Marshall announced his departure from China following his failure to mediate between the two belligerents of China’s destructive civil conflict -

¹⁴⁹ “Chinese Mission to Foreign Ministry,” October 4, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-080103-00065-008.

¹⁵⁰ Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General*, 140.

the KMT sensing there and then that the end of the Marshall Mission sowed seeds of uncertainty as to the KMT's fate. The Chinese Mission then requested military assistance during the Shandong battles in early 1947 and again during the Liaoshen Campaign in late 1948, two of the most decisive battles in the Chinese Civil War. Despite these political maneuverings, they would have little effect on the final outcome of the Civil War, although the strenuous lobbying made MacArthur wary of the chances of the KMT's survival.

MacArthur's eventual and grudging involvement in the Chinese Civil War was in great part due to its effects on the occupation of Japan. Then, the later shift in US occupation policy was also in great part due to the outcome of the Chinese Civil War, as Kazuo Kawai has summarized:

Along toward the end of 1947 or the beginning of 1948, the emphasis of the Occupation shifted from that of reforming a vanquished enemy to that of building him up as a potential ally of the United States. The intensification of the Cold War obviously was primarily responsible for this change. As the drift of China toward the Communist orbit became unmistakable, Americans began to conceive of Japan, rather than China, as the new major force in the Far East for peace, democracy, and friendliness toward the United States.¹⁵¹

From the outbreak of the Civil War to Chiang Kai-shek's retreat to Taiwan, General MacArthur was an active, if initially reluctant, supporter of the KMT. However, as the chief architect given the job of rebuilding postwar Japan, MacArthur did not want to help China to the detriment of Japanese (and American) interests, which was his primary focus. Thus, while MacArthur showed sympathy to Chiang's plight, he usually took a hands-off approach towards the fighting on the Chinese mainland because he believed that it was Washington who was obliged to lend China a hand, not SCAP. When MacArthur eventually decided to lend his assistance to China in mid-1948, Chiang's ultimate military failure had already decided. With mainland China apparently lost, beginning in 1949, MacArthur began to pay much more attention to the defense of Taiwan as well as the survival of the defeated KMT

¹⁵¹ Kazuo Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 27.

regime.

CHAPTER TWO: FROM MAINLAND TO FORMOSA

The previous chapter suggests that from the outset of the Chinese Civil War, MacArthur was active in urging Washington to support the KMT while attempting to curtail his and SCAP's own involvement in Chinese affairs. If the Chinese Civil War period between 1946 and 1948 was not regarded by MacArthur as being, as the previous chapter concludes, a thorny issue in which he needed to intervene, 1949 therefore represents a watershed in his attitude toward events on the Asian mainland, as the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's regime eventually galvanized him into action. For SCAP, the CCP's anticipated victory against the KMT constituted a great threat to the recovery of Japan and, as a consequence, MacArthur began to fix his attention on defending the KMT's regime after its retreat to the island of Taiwan.

This chapter is comprised of four sections: Nationalist China's continued lobbying of MacArthur; the General's understanding of contemporaneous events in China in 1949; the debate over the status of Taiwan; and Ho Shailai's involvement in the Chinese Civil War and the activities of the shadowy White Group before his appointment as head of the Chinese Mission in Japan in 1950. These sections discuss MacArthur's strategy with regard to the defense of Chiang's regime on Taiwan, as well as Taiwan's reliance upon the General before the outbreak of the Korean War. To a great extent, the outcome of the Chinese Civil War laid the foundation for MacArthur's East Asian policy before and after the Korean War began in June 1950.

THE FINAL ATTEMPT

According to Congressman Walter Judd, when he visited MacArthur in Japan in October 1948, the General was "deeply puzzled by the Chinese situation."¹⁵² On November 3, one day after the KMT's defeat in the Liaoshen campaign which raged whilst Judd was meeting with the American General, Chiang ordered Wang Zhi to

¹⁵² "Maike Ase Dui Zhongguo Qingshi Pogan Kunnao (麥克阿瑟對中國情勢頗感困惱) [MacArthur Troubled by the Situation in China]," October 7, 1948, *Dagongbao*(Chongqing).

visit MacArthur in Japan to ask for immediate aid. “The military situation is very urgent now,” noted Wang, “the American assistance will still take time, and we should ask for MacArthur’s direct assistance from Japan.”¹⁵³ A few weeks later, reporting on comments made by the son of Sun Yat-sen, Sun Fo [Sun Ke], Ambassador Stuart said that, “China must be prepared to make any reasonable concession in order to obtain major American military assistance as soon as possible and mentioned General MacArthur as possible supreme military adviser to be given full powers.”¹⁵⁴ Within a month, MacArthur had sent his evaluation of the CCP’s victories to Washington. He viewed the US positions in Japan “as weakened materially by the flanking Communist positions in the north on the Kuriles and Kamchatka and Sakhalin, and in the south in China. Additional troops, ships and planes are needed if our position in Japan and the Ryukyus to the south is to be secure....”¹⁵⁵ At this point MacArthur foresaw the irreversible defeat of the KMT in mainland China, and thus envisioned setting up what, using an anachronistic term, we might call a “fire wall” between China and Japan. As news correspondent Hanson W. Baldwin accurately summarized: “Apparently General MacArthur does not feel that much, if anything, can now be done to arrest the sweep of communism in China; his report is concerned primarily with strengthening the insular bases of American power in the Orient now that large portions of the Asiatic mainland have come under the dominance of unfriendly regimes.”¹⁵⁶

The forthcoming catastrophe not only verified MacArthur’s prediction but crushed the KMT’s last hopes of retaining a toehold on the Chinese mainland. From late 1948 to early 1949, KMT troops were repeatedly crushed in the Liaoshen, Pingjin (平津), and Huaihai (淮海) campaigns. Consequently, on January 21, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek resigned as president of the ROC, and was succeeded by Li Zongren. A few

¹⁵³ “Wang Zhi to Chiang Kai-shek,” November 7, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00545-061.

¹⁵⁴ “The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State,” November 29, 1948, FRUS, 1948, Vol. 7, 608.

¹⁵⁵ “M’Arthur Warns U.S. On China Trend,” December 12, 1948, *The New York Times*; “Gongjun Gongshi Nanyi Ezu (共軍攻勢難以遏阻) [The Communist Army’s Offensive is Difficult to Stop],” December 13, 1948, *Dagongbao (Hong Kong)*.

¹⁵⁶ “M’Arthur Warns U.S. On China Trend,” December 12, 1948, *The New York Times*.

days later, and on what was his sixty-ninth birthday (January 26, 1949), General MacArthur addressed friends about the current situation in East Asia, as the *New York Times* recorded:

“While unable to estimate the military potentialities because of the many yet undetermined and imponderable factors beyond my assessment or control,” he asserted, “I can and do give complete assurance that with the firm spiritual support of the American people, this frontier outpost of democratic freedom, regardless of the tide of conflict upon the adjacent mainland, will not yield before the political or social pressure of communism or any other concept of enslavement.”¹⁵⁷

The potential communist threat from mainland China led to rumors that MacArthur was attempting to reconstitute the Japanese army, but these were apparently “totally without foundation.”¹⁵⁸ Even more so than MacArthur, Chiang Kai-shek was understandably anxious about the situation in China. Despite his formal resignation, the Generalissimo was still operating politically from “behind the curtain”. The KMT was planning to retreat to Taiwan if necessary, and Chen Cheng had been appointed as the provincial governor of the island on January 5. Later that month, and two days prior to MacArthur’s birthday celebrations, a telegram had been sent to the head of the Chinese Mission in Japan in Tokyo, Shang Zhen, requesting that he secretly invite Wedemeyer to Taiwan.¹⁵⁹ Shang met with Wedemeyer in early February and afterwards cabled Chiang to report that the American had shown a willingness to visit Taiwan and offer assistance to the KMT.¹⁶⁰ Not long after, on March 5, Shang was unexpectedly replaced as the head of the Chinese Mission in Japan by Zhu Shiming, the man who was also his predecessor.¹⁶¹ The reason behind Chiang’s removal of Shang has not yet been made public, but according to one

¹⁵⁷ “Japan to Bar Reds, M’Arthur Says,” January 27, 1949, *The New York Times*.

¹⁵⁸ “U.S. Flatly Denies Rumors that SCAP Seeks Japan Army,” January 1, 1949, *Nippon Times*.

¹⁵⁹ “Chen Cheng to Shang Zhen,” January 25, 1949, Guoshiguan, 008-010101-00003-209.

¹⁶⁰ “Chen Cheng to Chiang Kai-shek,” February 8, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-090300-00199-001.

¹⁶¹ “Shilue Gaoben,” March 5, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-060100-00250-005. However, according to Cai Mengjian (蔡孟坚), a high-ranking staff in the KMT Central Investigation Bureau, Shang was dismissed because he married a Japanese woman as his concubine. See Cai Mengjian, “Yi Heshili yu Wo Zhuri Gonghuannan Gushi (憶何世禮與我駐日共患難故事) [Recounting the Story of Ho Shailai and I in Japan],” *Zhuanji Wenxue* (傳記文學) [Biographical Literature], 74:2(1999), 54-58.

Chinese source, Shang was frustrated with the downfall of the KMT regime and resigned in 1949 to focus on managing a business in Japan.¹⁶²

MacArthur now began to place a higher strategic value on Taiwan than mainland China. In a meeting on February 16, MacArthur said if Formosa falls into the hands of the CCP, then the “whole defensive position in the Far East” for the US would be “definitely lost” and “could only result eventually in putting our defensive line back to the west coast of the continental United States.” The General also pointed out that Formosa “was astride the line of communications between Okinawa and the Philippines, that it outflanked our position on Okinawa and, in the hands of the Chinese Communists, broke through the island wall which we must have along the Asiatic “littorals” in order to maintain, in a strategic sense, a defense line in the western Pacific.”¹⁶³ MacArthur viewed the KMT’s failure as irretrievable, but Taiwan would nevertheless need to be secured on the grounds that it was pivotal to the US line of defense in East Asia. When asked for his opinion on the possible retreat of Admiral Badger’s forces from China, the General seemed to be more interested in incorporating Badger’s forces into his command in Japan.¹⁶⁴

In April, Nanjing fell to the CCP, and KMT officials began the retreat to Southwestern China. Attempts at compromise between the CCP and KMT ended in failure later that same month, as the KMT refused to accept the CCP’s demands. MacArthur sensed that defeat was now inevitable, and began to contemplate steps to mitigate the consequences of the KMT’s loss. As *The New York Times* noted, “General MacArthur today promised to help bring Americans out of China if necessary. “The evacuation of American nationals from China is a responsibility of the Commander of Naval Forces of the Western Pacific,” he said.”¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² Zhang Lingao (張令澳), *Wo zai Jiang Jieshi Shicongshi de Rizi* (我在蔣介石侍從室的日子) [My Days in Chiang Kai-shek’s Secretary Office] (Hong Kong: Mingbao Chubanshe, 1995), 230.

¹⁶³ “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Bishop),” February 16, 1949, FRUS, 1949, Vol. 7, part 2, 656-657.

¹⁶⁴ “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Bishop),” February 16, 1949, FRUS, 1949, Vol. 7, part 2, 657.

¹⁶⁵ “MacArthur Aids Evacuation,” April 25, 1949, *The New York Times*.

CHINESE CIVIL WAR'S EFFECTS ON JAPAN

Alongside the military threat and fears of communist infiltration, the anticipated CCP victory struck a decisive blow to Japan's economy. A report in the *Nippon Times* noted:

The increased goal was worked out recently between the Japanese Government and General MacArthur's key industrial officials. The Communist capture of North China's important coal areas has developed a serious hitch in the development of Japan's steel program and Japanese officials were understood to have pleaded that production beyond 1,500,000 tons for next fiscal year would be virtually impossible without authorization for additional blast furnaces.¹⁶⁶

Japan's trade with China had also constituted a significant part of MacArthur's original blueprint for the future. While supporting blockades and boycotts of China, the General had to contend with Japan's reliance on the China market. As Michael Schaller put it, the General "tried to have it both ways, demanding authority to ban Sino-Japanese trade while actually encouraging the mutually profitable commerce."¹⁶⁷

On the political front, the victory of the CCP bolstered the morale of the burgeoning Japanese Communist Party. In the Diet election which took place on January 23, 1949, the Japanese Communist Party won 35 seats in the House of Representatives, occupying 9.76 % percent of the parliament - nine times more than its previous level. As the *Nippon Times* wrote, "It was a test closely watched by Gen. Douglas MacArthur and the headquarters. The Communists made decided gains by capitalizing on China war and domestic unrest but some quarters felt the combination of these developments might have given them even more political power."¹⁶⁸ Due to the severity of the situation in East Asia, some in US congressional coteries suggested MacArthur be called upon to visit Washington to report on the situation.¹⁶⁹ This suggestion was not enacted.

¹⁶⁶ "Two More Mills Resume Output," January 21, 1949, *Nippon Times*.

¹⁶⁷ Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur*, 168.

¹⁶⁸ "Red Chief Urges 'People's Front'," January 26, 1949, *Nippon Times*.

¹⁶⁹ "MacArthur May Fly Home For F.E. Strategy Report," February 14, 1949, *Nippon Times*.

MacArthur also demanded more troops be sent to Japan. A source noted that MacArthur had “submitted a secret report on the American military situation in Japan in view of Communist victories in China” and he was believed to “have asked for more troops and airplanes.”¹⁷⁰ Washington turned down the request. As the CCP began to drive the KMT deeper into southern China, the defense of Japan became MacArthur’s priority. As one editorialist wrote in April, MacArthur was “stepping up defensive measures in Japan following the recent advance of the Chinese Communists who, apparently will not only occupy Shanghai but also sweep farther south” and had said that “the occupation of the Chinese coastline by Communists under Soviet influence would certainly lead to many difficulties in Japan—which is compelled to maintain trade relations with a free China in order to rehabilitate itself.”¹⁷¹ In evaluating MacArthur’s performance in Japan, *Time Magazine* noted that “Japan’s continuing poverty and the Communist victories in China have exposed Japan to communism’s appeals” but “the Communists would have far greater cause for mirth if Douglas MacArthur had never come to Japan.”¹⁷²

THE FINAL PHASE OF THE CIVIL WAR

Full-scale Civil War resumed as peace negotiations between Li Zongren and the CCP broke down in late April, 1949, and soon after the CCP initiated its new offensive, crossing the Yangtze River. By June 2, the CCP occupied the cities of Nanjing, Wuhan and Shanghai, crushing the KMT’s hopes of holding on to the economic heartlands around the Yangtze River Delta. Thus, the last mainland bastion held by the KMT was in Southern China, and, as a consequence, the defense of the southeastern coastline as a consequence became of utmost importance. At this point, MacArthur became Chiang’s last hope for material support, and he was eager to meet MacArthur in person and bolster the General’s determination to assist Taiwan. On August 1, Chiang cabled Zhu Shiming:

¹⁷⁰ “U.S. Army Spurns Request by SCAP For More Troops,” February 17, 1949, *Nippon Times*.

¹⁷¹ “SCAP Held Boosting Defenses of Japan,” April 27, 1949, *Nippon Times*.

¹⁷² “Time Article on Japan,” May 9, 1949, *Nippon Times*.

I will be visiting Korea at President Lee's invitation in a private capacity in the following days. Due to the urgent domestic situation, I must fly directly to Korea from Taipei in order to return as soon as possible. I apologize for not being able to visit General MacArthur in Japan due to time constraints. Please forward my respect to General MacArthur and keep it secret.¹⁷³

On August 4, Zhu cabled Chiang to report on his meeting with MacArthur the previous night. MacArthur acknowledged Chiang's visit to Korea and Philippines and regretted Washington's limited support for China. According to Zhu, the General suggested that Chiang make a "touching" joint statement with Elpidio Quirino and Rhee Syng-man, the Presidents of the Philippines and Korea, respectively.¹⁷⁴ The next day, the United States issued the China White Paper in which it placed the onus for the military failure in the Civil War on the KMT. Despite the fact that Truman made it clear that the United State would not again become involved in Chinese affairs, the KMT nonetheless continued to pursue support from MacArthur.

Military disasters continued to dog the KMT during August. In the first week of that month, men under the command of Cheng Qian (程潛) in Hunan deserted the KMT and joined the CCP's military forces, shattering the former's defensive line in southern China. Wu Tiecheng (吳鐵城), serving as Chiang's special envoy, arrived at Tokyo on August 12 in order to visit MacArthur, and some people speculated that SCAP might promise Wu that the KMT would "receive US aid if they held Canton a few months longer."¹⁷⁵ Some sources believed that Wu's visit to Japan was to confer with MacArthur on the proposed "anti-Communist Pacific union."¹⁷⁶ All such speculation was later confirmed by a report presented to Chiang written by Wu himself. On August 13 and 18, Zhu Shiming accompanied Wu to a meeting with MacArthur. According to Wu's report, MacArthur suggested that US Far Eastern policy will "become clear in the next six weeks", and in six months there will be

¹⁷³ "Chiang Kai-shek to Zhu Shiming," August 1, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-090103-00009-053.

¹⁷⁴ "Zhu Shiming to Chiang Kai-shek," August 4, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00034-023.

¹⁷⁵ "The Chargé in China (Strong) to the Secretary of State," September 11, 1949, FRUS, 1949, Vol. 8, 525.

¹⁷⁶ "China Presses for Pact," August 11, 1949, *The New York Times*.

“concrete exemplification”. The Chinese government has no need to request US aid, for “it will come without asking” at the proper time. When the time is ripe, said MacArthur, he would also come to help them as well. The General also told Wu to “count on me.” MacArthur also conveyed to the Chinese that he believed the China White Papers had been published at an “inappropriate” time, with no benefit to either country. Speaking of the Civil War, MacArthur hoped the Chinese government could hold Huanan (Southern China) for six months. MacArthur urged them to “Fight! Fight! Fight! Never compromise! Never compromise! Never compromise!” The General also suggested the KMT strengthen its air force and navy activities. If possible, the KMT should achieve a great victory. If not, then at least a “middle scale victory.” If still not possible, then at least several small victories could change the international image of the KMT. Lastly, MacArthur stressed that “unless you crash in yourselves no one could defeat you.”¹⁷⁷ Wu’s report might be the frankest expression of MacArthur’s attitude toward the Chinese Civil War as it manifested itself in 1949. But, of course, MacArthur’s anticipation of a KMT military victory – great, middle scale, or small – was not realized. In August, the PLA occupied Fuzhou, severely hampering the KMT’s defense of the southern coastal region.

As things continued to go badly on the Chinese mainland, in Japan, MacArthur remained the biggest concern for the Chinese Mission. In general, the tactics that the Chinese Mission in Japan adopted in dealing with SCAP were similar to those of previous years, the only change being additional requests to defend Taiwan and ally with other East Asian countries. To the Nationalists, every step taken by the General might have a significant impact on Taiwan’s chances of survival. On September 17, Zhu cabled Chiang to report that according to an unofficial source, MacArthur had suggested that the United States government restart its provision of military assistance to China by offering 500 planes to Claire Lee Chennault to help with a naval blockade of China’s coastline.¹⁷⁸ MacArthur’s plan included “(1) issuance of a ringing declaration that the U.S. will support any and everyone who is opposed to

¹⁷⁷ “Wu Tiecheng to Chiang Kai-shek,” August 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00066-004.

¹⁷⁸ “Zhu Shiming to Chiang Kai-shek,” September 17, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00044-188.

communism; (2) placing 500 fighter planes in the hands of some “war horse” similar to General Chennault; (3) allowing volunteers to join such a fighting force without penalty; and (4) assigning surplus ships to the Chinese Navy sufficient to blockade and destroy China’s coastal cities.”¹⁷⁹ China’s news agency was soon eager to know if Chennault would visit Japan to discuss these issues, and especially the 500 fighter planes, in November.¹⁸⁰ The CCP also kept a close eye on any Chennault activity in Japan, with one newspaper believing that his conversation with MacArthur included nothing but “business and war conspiracy.”¹⁸¹

On October 1, Mao Zedong announced the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, marking the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. Conversely, Chiang was in the throes of total defeat and struggling to defend the coast with the navy and air force. On November 10 Chiang cabled Zhu Shiming to arrange for American staff to visit Hainan Island.¹⁸² Perceiving that the loss of mainland China was now inevitable, MacArthur showed what was rare interest in assisting the KMT defense of Hainan.¹⁸³ Despite this, Hainan was ceded to the CCP in April 1950. In the meantime, Li Zongren had fled to Hong Kong, where he became “inclined toward [a] decision [to] temporarily stay [in] Hong Kong [to] seek [the] promise [of] direct and substantial support from MacArthur, which, if forthcoming, would allow [the] Kwangsi clique [to] organize [its] own political party independent of [the] Generalissimo and continue [the] civil war.”¹⁸⁴ As later chapters will demonstrate, at this juncture many political factions within China began to approach MacArthur as they had relatively few alternatives.

¹⁷⁹ “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth),” FRUS, 1949, Vol. 9, 559.

¹⁸⁰ “Chennade Jiang Furi yu Maike Ase Huishang(陳納德將赴日與麥克阿瑟會商) [Chennault Will Go to Japan to Meet MacArthur],” November 9, 1949, *Dagongbao (Chongqing)*.

¹⁸¹ “Chennade Laigang Heshi Dong Xianguang Beizu Jichang (陳納德來港何事 董顯光被阻機場) [What is Chennault Coming to Hong Kong for? Dong Xianguang Stopped at the Airport],” November 19, 1949, *Dagongbao (Hong Kong)*.

¹⁸² “Chiang Kai-shek to Zhu Shiming,” Novemer 10, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-090103-00006-249.

¹⁸³ An account reveals that MacArthur favored Sun Lianzhong (孫連仲) to defend the Hainan Island, however, no evidence could support this claim. Liu Fenghan (劉鳳漢) ed., *Sun Lianzhong Xiansheng Nianpu Changbian* (孫連仲先生年譜長編) [Chronology of Sun Lianzhong] (Taipei: Academia Historica, 1993), Vol. 6, 3187.

¹⁸⁴ “The Consul General at Hong Kong (Rankin) to the Secretary of State,” November 21, 1949, FRUS, 1949, Vol. 8, 603.

MacArthur, though, disapproved of fighting with the CCP on the Chinese mainland. Instead, he emphasized the defense of Taiwan as he believed the island was of great strategic importance and was the only and final hope for the KMT's survival, as Michael Schaller summarizes:

He [MacArthur] dispatched Colonel Stanton Babcock to tell the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the JCS that he considered it "of the greatest importance that Formosa not fall under communist control."....."By hook or by crook, we must keep it out of Communist hands." MacArthur proposed several schemes, including putting the island under American trusteeship, under the control of some other "safe nation," or even returning it to the Japanese (e.g. SCAP).¹⁸⁵

THE TRUSTEESHIP AND DEFENSE OF TAIWAN

As peace became impractical and the result of the Chinese Civil War became increasingly unpredictable following the failure of the Marshall mission in early 1947, the status of Taiwan began to be raised as a concern in Washington. While not being regarded as a major issue in comparison to myriad other China questions, some policymakers contemplated whether or not there was an alternative option for postwar Formosa. In the meantime, worries about the resumption of the Chinese Civil War generated rumors, spreading through Taiwan, that MacArthur hoped to claim the island again for Japan.¹⁸⁶ The February 28 Incident of 1947 had already decreased local Taiwanese population's inclination towards mainland China; after which rumors and speculation about the possibility of Taiwan being placed under the United Nations or SCAP trusteeships also began to circulate. As General Wedemeyer noted such opinion in a report on August 17, 1947, "There were indications that Formosans would be receptive toward United States guardianship and United Nations trusteeships. They fear that the Central Government contemplates bleeding their island to support the tottering and corrupt Nanking machine and I think their fears

¹⁸⁵ Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General*, 165-166.

¹⁸⁶ Lin Hsiao-Ting, *Accidental State: Chiang Kai-shek, the United States, and the Making of Taiwan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 46.

well founded.”¹⁸⁷ Michael Schaller described the position of Taiwan thus: “With increasingly less to do in Tokyo, MacArthur turned his attention to other parts of Asia. He expressed growing fear of the Chinese revolution and increasing interest in protecting Taiwan.”¹⁸⁸

On February 10, 1949, MacArthur received General Sun Liren (孫立人) in Tokyo. This meeting has attracted much scholarly attention over the decades but, regrettably, the full details have yet to be revealed. One can only surmise that MacArthur might have exchanged opinions with Sun about the Chinese Civil War and the status of Taiwan, and Sun might have told MacArthur that the military defeat of the KMT was inevitable.¹⁸⁹ As the CCP consecutively occupied major cities while moving from north to south in early 1949, MacArthur began to openly claim that the Americans should defend Taiwan at all costs. As William Sebald summarized, “It was public knowledge, however, that MacArthur frequently told visitors Formosa should be saved at all costs, if only for its strategic position, while some Washington officials seemed reconciled to its probable loss.”¹⁹⁰ The feasible options proposed by MacArthur included “putting the island under American trusteeships, under the control of some other “safe nation,” or even returning it to the Japanese (e.g. SCAP)”¹⁹¹ Amongst these possible options, the only one which received serious consideration from Washington was the idea of placing Taiwan under the trusteeships of either SCAP or the United Nations. From MacArthur’s standpoint, the strategic position of Taiwan was of such importance that the United States could not bear the consequences of losing it. Although MacArthur had supported Chiang during the Chinese Civil War, as discussed in chapter one, when he sensed the irreversible defeat of the KMT, rather than maintaining Chiang’s position on the mainland, saving Taiwan became MacArthur’s top priority.

MacArthur’s plans for Taiwan reached Chiang’s ears. On June 15, 1949, the KMT

¹⁸⁷ Department of State, *United States Relations with China: with Special Reference to the Period 1944-49* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 309.

¹⁸⁸ Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur*, 157.

¹⁸⁹ Lin Hsiao-Ting, *Accidental State*, 88.

¹⁹⁰ William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 122.

¹⁹¹ Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur*, 166.

leader received a report from the Department of National Defense. The report informed him that, according to the head of the Chinese Mission, there was a “ridiculous opinion” being floated which favored placing Taiwan under trusteeships, as proposed by SCAP.¹⁹² On the same day, Chiang also received letters from his wife mentioning a similar plan.¹⁹³ Furious at the proposal, three days later Chiang expressed his determination to “defend the island at all costs” and made it clear he would never let Taiwan be placed under allied trusteeships.¹⁹⁴ To make sure SCAP understood his position, on June 20 Chiang instructed Zhu to meet MacArthur to stress the important status of Taiwan, a place which could be the “new political hope of the anti-Communism movement in China.”¹⁹⁵ In his diary entry for that day, Chiang also noted that he had expressed a willingness to make “a last-ditch defense” of Taiwan.¹⁹⁶

The progress of the Civil War had convinced MacArthur that Chiang’s retreat to Taiwan was already in progress. If Chiang could safely bring his remaining naval and air forces to Taiwan, it would be unnecessary to place Taiwan under trusteeship. MacArthur also revealed his dissatisfaction with Chiang’s ineptitude in terms of leading troops, as well as his corrupt officers and generals.¹⁹⁷ General concerns about Chiang’s ability to hold Taiwan against the communists meant Sun Liren had been deemed by SCAP the most suitable person to replace Chiang. Despite this, MacArthur continued to back Chiang while he retained overall control of the KMT. In late 1949 MacArthur was believed to have allied himself with Secretary of Defense of the United States, Louis A. Johnson, so as to utilize the defense of Taiwan as leverage to reversing Washington’s position on the issue.¹⁹⁸ MacArthur’s reply to Zhu in June, verified his position and delivered a clear message to Chiang Kai-shek about what was expected. Zhu also said in October that he found “a great improvement in morale

¹⁹² “Shilue Gaoben,” June 15, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-060100-00253-015.

¹⁹³ Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, June 15, 1949; Lin Hsiao-Ting, *Accidental State*, 97.

¹⁹⁴ “Shilue Gaoben,” June 18, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-060100-00253-018.

¹⁹⁵ “Shilue Gaoben,” June 20, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-060100-00253-020.

¹⁹⁶ Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, June 20, 1949; Lin Hsiao-Ting, *Accidental State*, 98.

¹⁹⁷ David Michael Finkelstein, *Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-1950: from Abandonment to Salvation* (Fairfax: George Mason University Press, 1993), 224.

¹⁹⁸ Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 107.

of Nationalist troops” in Taiwan.¹⁹⁹ Ironically, some people doubted that the visits of Zhu Shiming and Wu Tiecheng to Taiwan occurring at the same time was purely coincidental, and rumor had it that Zhu’s visit was related to the island potentially being placed under trusteeship. Zhu nevertheless clarified that his visit was undertaken to help encourage trade between Taiwan and Japan.²⁰⁰

It was also believed that MacArthur was interfering with affairs on the island. As one KMT source noted, at their meetings in Tokyo, MacArthur asked Wu Tiecheng to promote two Taiwanese men, Lin Xiantang (林獻堂) and Xu Bing (許丙), to high positions in the KMT’s Taiwan administration. Chiang accepted Lin but refused Xu on the grounds that the latter supported Taiwanese independence. Also, a source noted that MacArthur had suggested a Taiwan Joint Government be set up by the US to replace the government of Chiang and Chen Cheng.²⁰¹ As a source pointed out, “There are recurring rumors in Taipeh [Taipei] that there is a group within the top inner circle that would like to end Chiang’s arbitrary control, but not many people believe them capable of doing it.”²⁰² This speculation seems to be corroborated by Gu Weijun’s memory that the General wanted Chiang to “take a trip abroad.” In addition, General Willoughby visited Taiwan to discuss the possibility of an “officer from General MacArthur’s staff” serving as an adviser.²⁰³

Ironically, MacArthur’s suggestion that Taiwan be placed under trusteeship raised doubts about whether he was actually in a position to support Taiwan’s independence. In a meeting between Dong Xiangguang (董顯光) and MacArthur, held in November 1949, the latter firmly rebuffed the rumors of granting Taiwan independence, saying that the independence movement must be “firmly prohibited.”²⁰⁴ In the meantime, though, the Formosan League for Independence urged MacArthur to “oust the

¹⁹⁹ “Hong Kong Held Easy ‘Red’ Prey,” October 21, 1949, *The Evening Sun* (Baltimore, Maryland).

²⁰⁰ “Wu Tiecheng Zai Taibei Piyao (吳鐵城在台北闢謠) [Wu Tiecheng Refutes Rumors in Taipei],” October 16, 1949, *Dagongbao* (Chongqing).

²⁰¹ “KMT Sources Say MacArthur Seeks to Control Taiwan,” December 14, 1949, General CIA Records, CIA-RDP80-00809A000600270392-7.

²⁰² A. Doak Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1963), 307.

²⁰³ Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur*, 170.

²⁰⁴ “Dong Xiangguang to Chiang Kai-shek,” November 25, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00029-130.

Chinese Nationalists from Formosa and occupy that island until it obtains freedom.”²⁰⁵ Elsewhere, Senator H. Alexander Smith openly supported the idea of sending US troops to occupy Taiwan, claiming that the idea had received support from MacArthur.²⁰⁶ Approaching MacArthur, as well as using MacArthur to rationalize political viewpoints, revealed how important MacArthur was in influencing Washington’s policy in East Asia.

Still, President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson held an entirely different view. Believing that any direct intervention on Taiwan would push the CCP closer to the Soviet Union, Acheson favored offering only limited support to the Chinese Nationalists on the island. Then, on January 5 1950, Truman announced the end to “military aid or advice to Chinese forces” on Taiwan. On January 12, 1950, Acheson declared Taiwan outside the US defense perimeter. Endeavoring to change Acheson’s position, MacArthur invited him to Tokyo. Recalling the moment in his memoirs, the General wrote:

I felt that the Secretary of State was badly advised about the Far East, and invited him to be my guest in Tokyo. I had never met Dean Acheson, but felt certain that his own survey of the Asiatic situation would materially alter his expressed views. He declined the invitation, saying that the pressure of his duties prevented him from leaving Washington. He did, however, visit Europe eleven times during his stay in office.²⁰⁷

Pressure from the US President and Secretary of State did not alter MacArthur’s mind. The General insisted on pursuing his bold policy, although some critics believed he did so simply to embarrass Washington. William Sebald’s account also offers a reasonable explanation for MacArthur’s stance on Taiwan in early 1950:

It was public knowledge, however, that MacArthur frequently told visitors Formosa should be saved at all costs, if only for its strategic position, while some Washington officials seemed reconciled to its probable loss. Almost as quickly as they established control over the mainland, the Chinese Communists made the

²⁰⁵ “Formosan Plea to MacArthur,” December 4, 1949, *The New York Times*.

²⁰⁶ “Senator Urges U.S. To Take Formosa,” December 2, 1949, *The New York Times*.

²⁰⁷ Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscence* (Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, 1965), 322.

capture of Formosa a major goal. MacArthur's attitude on this point was well-expressed during a talk with Karl L. Rankin, who visited Tokyo in July, 1950..... Speaking of Chiang, MacArthur told Rankin: "If he has horns and a tail, so long as he is anti-Communist, we should help him. Rather than make things difficult, the State Department should assist him in his fight against the Communists—we can try to reform him later!"²⁰⁸

To MacArthur, as long as Chiang Kai-shek could hold the island, there was no need to fret about the fate of Formosa. To be sure that the KMT could, though, MacArthur strongly advised the United States to help by making the famous argument that Taiwan was an "unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender."²⁰⁹ MacArthur expressed his thoughts to the Department of the Army on May 29, 1950,

In the event of war between the United States and the USSR, Formosa's value to the Communists is the equivalent of an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender, ideally located to accomplish Soviet strategy as well as to checkmate the offensive capabilities of the central and southern positions of the FEC [Far Eastern Command] front line.²¹⁰

In general, although MacArthur did not support providing military aid to Chiang, he urged Washington to "take some measures to prevent Communist seizure of Taiwan or else prepare to reinforce its positions in the Far East."²¹¹ This viewpoint accompanied MacArthur until his removal by President Truman in April 1951. Prior to that, MacArthur had even considered having KMT troops stationed on Taiwan participate in the Korean War. In analyzing MacArthur's evolving attitude towards Taiwan from 1947 to 1950, one must weigh up how he saw Chinese affairs having an effect on his policies in Japan during the occupation - after all Japan always remained his focus. Yet as a Republican, MacArthur's alliance with the China Lobby in Washington and its battle with the Truman administration to vie for influence in Chinese affairs, was also decisive in shifting MacArthur's attitude. The continuous

²⁰⁸ William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 122.

²⁰⁹ Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 129.

²¹⁰ John Lewis Gaddis, "'Defensive Perimeter' Concept, 1947-1951," in Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs eds., *Uncertain Years*, 89.

²¹¹ James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War* (Washington, DC : Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998), 18.

lobbying by the Chinese Mission in Japan might also have played a role in shaping MacArthur's policy direction on China, but the degree to which it did so is difficult to evaluate and thus should not be overestimated. For the Chinese Mission in Japan, at least, its assignment to lobby MacArthur on the KMT's behalf was successful. But although the status of Taiwan under the KMT was secured, the legitimacy of the Republic of China and the Chiang regime remained shaky.

HO SHAILAI'S APPOINTMENT

After victory over Japan was secured, Ho Shilai was assigned to the post of commander of the Huludao Port headquarters and was in charge of the repatriation of Japanese nationals embarking from there. In June 1946 Ho was then promoted to Vice Commander of the Combined Logistics Command, a newly-established organization which coordinated logistics across different services.²¹² For his role in "securing the port which assured the logistics at the frontline during the anti-bandit battles in the Northeast," Ho was awarded a medal in September 1947.²¹³ A while later, Ho was dispatched to the north to combat the CCP, but details of his assignment have proved difficult to uncover.²¹⁴

In April 1949, KMT Secretary General Zheng Yanfen (鄭彥棻), cabled Jiang Jingguo (蔣經國)—Chiang Kai-shek's son who was then head of the KMT's branch in Taiwan—with news that he had asked Ho Shilai to seriously considered a proposal, and the latter had replied that if "he is in demand objectively and everyone believes he should be in charge than he would accept the appointment" and hope to "obtain full cooperation from former staffs."²¹⁵ The vagueness of the telegram makes clarifying

²¹² "Diaodong Jiangzuo Yipi (調動將佐一批) [Transfer of High-Ranking Officers]," July 1, 1946, *The Kung Sheung Daily News*.

²¹³ "Zhang Qun to Guominzhengfu Wenguanchu," September 24, 1947, Guoshiguan, 001-035100-00014-034.

²¹⁴ Zheng Wan-tai (鄭宏泰) and Wong Siu-lun (黃紹倫), *Xianggang Jiangjun He Shili* (香港將軍何世禮) [Ho Shilai: A General from Hong Kong] (Hong Kong: Sanlian Shudian, 2008), 190.

²¹⁵ "Zheng Yanfen to Jiang Jingguo," April 4, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00659-046.

to which appointment it referred difficult. After, weighing-up Ho Shailai's activities in late-1949 and early-1950, though, it is very likely that the post mentioned by Zheng was head of the Chinese Mission in Japan. But before his eventual appointment to that position, Ho was nominated as commander of the Keelung Port in northern Taiwan in October 1949.²¹⁶

After the Battle of Guningtou (古寧頭), Ho had accompanied Chen Cheng to investigate Kinmen (Quemoy) when the Communists Kinmen laid siege to the island from October 25 to October 27.²¹⁷ In a KMT meeting in October, Chen Cheng's proposed nominations for the Consolidation of the Taiwan Plan Research and Drafting Group (Gonggu Taiwan Fangan Yanjiu Qicao Xiaozu 鞏固台灣方案研究起草小組) were sanctioned. Within this group, Sun Liren was placed in charge of military affairs, while Ho oversaw economic affairs.²¹⁸

In 1950 General Ho Shailai was given more significant assignments as a consequence of the dramatic defeat of the Nationalist forces on the mainland. According to a report by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in early January 1950 Ho paid a short visit to Tokyo, where he apparently noticed the "Communist affiliations" of the man whose job he would soon take, Zhu Shiming.²¹⁹ Yet prior to that role, in April 1950, Ho was promoted to the Vice Minister of the Department of Defense. This appointment received much press attention:

Lt. Gen. Ho Shih-li (Ho Shai-lai), son of Sir Robert Ho Tung, a British knight in Hongkong, has been appointed administrative vice minister of national defense in the Nationalist cabinet. Sir Robert is 80 years old. He recently toured Europe and visited George Bernard Shaw. He is founder of the Industrial and Commercial Daily News, a Chinese newspaper in Hongkong. Although non-partisan, the paper still uses "the 39th year of the Chinese republic," instead of "1950" at the top of

²¹⁶ "Jilong Gaoxiong Liang Gang Jue Chengli Silingbu (基隆高雄兩港決成立司令部) [Ports in Jilong and Gaoxiong to Set Up Headquarters]," October 15, 1949, *Huaqiao Ribao* (華僑日報) [Overseas Chinese Daily News].

²¹⁷ "Chen Cheng Zuo Fei Jinmen Shicha (陳誠昨飛金門視察) [Chen Cheng Flies to Jinmen for Inspection]," October 28, 1949, *Dagongbao* (Chongqing).

²¹⁸ "Minutes," October 13, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-110701-00010-015.

²¹⁹ "Reasons for Removal of CHU Shih-ming as Head of Chinese Mission to Japan," May 29, 1950, General CIA Records, CIA-RDP82-00457R005000100007-2.

each page.²²⁰

Xu Yongchang (徐永昌), a senior figure in the KMT who just resigned from the Minister of National Defense, ran into Ho when he visited Bai Chongxi on April 5, and they exchanged opinions on Vietnam and MacArthur's activities in Japan.²²¹ Chiang Kai-shek received Ho the next month, on May 21, but details of the meeting are not disclosed in Chiang's diaries.²²² But on June 4, Chiang did write that he had "had a conversation with Ho Shailai and censor the name lists of weapons."²²³ It is unclear, though, whether the latter part of the sentence is linked to Ho's chat with Chiang. Two days later, on June 6, Chiang received Ho to discuss issues regarding SCAP and the forthcoming visit of Louis Johnson, the US Secretary of Defense, to Japan.²²⁴ At last, on June 11, Ho arrived at Tokyo to become the fourth, and the last head of the Chinese Mission in Japan. The following morning, General MacArthur held a lunch meeting with both Ho and his predecessor Zhu Shiming. "General MacArthur looks tired," Ho wrote in his diary. "And his wife speaks with good manner and honesty. I am pleased to hear the General says that he welcomes me to Japan permanently."²²⁵

Over the next few days, Ho met a variety of commanders and influential foreign diplomats in Tokyo. Besides meeting General MacArthur, Ho also paid a visit to C. Turner Joy, Commander of the Naval Forces in the Far East.²²⁶ As for other SCAP officials, on June 12 Ho visited William J. Sebald, a man with whom he maintained a close relationship until the end of his term in Tokyo. On the same day, Ho met with Louis J. Fortier, Director Theater intelligence Div., Far East Command. Fortier told Ho that Washington was paying much attention to the defense of Magong (馬公) and

²²⁰ "Son of Prominent Chinese Publisher Given Defense Job," April 06, 1950, *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*.

²²¹ Xu Yongchang, *Xu Yongchang Riji* (徐永昌日記) [Diaries of Xu Yongchang] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1991), Vol. 10, 41.

²²² Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, May 21, 1950.

²²³ Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, June 4, 1950.

²²⁴ Qin Xiaoyi (秦孝儀) ed., *Zongtong Jianggong Dashi Changbian Chugao* (總統蔣公大事長編初稿) [Affairs of President Chiang Kai-shek, First Edition] (Taipei: Zhongzheng Wenjiao Jijinhui, 2002), Vol. 9, 170.

²²⁵ DHSL, June 12, 1950.

²²⁶ DHSL, June 15, 1950.

the Pescadores on the grounds that the PLA had just blockaded Shantou (汕頭) and might directly attack Magong and then look to land at Kaohsiung (高雄). If that happened, Taiwan island would be defenseless.²²⁷

On June 16, Ho visited Walton H. Walker, commander general of the U.S. Eighth Army, a force which would play a significant role during the first stage of the Korean War. It was also a chance for the two men to reminisce about their first meeting in Tianjin, nineteen years earlier.²²⁸ Ho also befriended the heads of Missions from other countries – men such as the famous historian Egerton H. Norman of Canada, the seasoned diplomat Maurice Dejean, from France, and Gastao do Rio Branco, from Brazil.²²⁹ As later chapters will show, these relationships enabled Ho to play a significant role during his time in Tokyo.

Examining Ho's activities in early 1950 can help clarify details about important events that have long been disputed. For instance, scholars have tended to rely upon Gu Weijin's memoirs or a Columbia University oral history project when investigating Chiang Kai-shek's dealings with the Americans in 1950. For example, Gu Weijun claimed that Ho Shilai told him in 1970 that in May and June 1950 Chiang was asked to deploy several thousand members of the armed forces to South Korea "in anticipation of a northern invasion," but, because Chiang demanded so much in monetary payment, "discussions were still going on when the war in Korea actually broke out." Citing Gu's account, Michael Schaller has commented that "If true, this suggests that MacArthur had embarked on a private foreign policy in Asia before June 1950."²³⁰ Based on Ho's diaries for June, as well as Chinese and English archival materials, however, Gu's account appears to be misremembered. As a later chapter will demonstrate, the offer to dispatch troops to South Korea was in actual

²²⁷ "Ho Shilai to Chiang Kai-shek," June 12, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00031-002.

²²⁸ DHS, June 16, 1950. Walker served at American Barracks in Tianjin from 1930 to 1933. For a brief introduction of Walker's military career, see Wilson A. Heefner, *Patton's Bulldog: The Life and Service of General Walton H. Walker* (Shippensburg: White Mane, 2001).

²²⁹ DHS, June 20-22, 1950. For the history and scholarship of E. H. Norman, see Roger Bowen, *E.H. Norman: His Life and Scholarship* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016); For introduction of Maurice Dejean's diplomatic career, see Sophie Davieau-Pousset, "Maurice Dejean, Diplomate Atypique," *Relations Internationales*, jui/sep 2015, Issue 163, 79-94.

²³⁰ Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur*, 177.

fact raised by Chiang and turned down by MacArthur.

THE WHITE GROUP

When looking at the KMT's efforts to combat the CCP after 1949, it is important not to omit the role played by the White Group, an extremely secret organization composed of former Japanese militarists who undertook a mission to train soldiers in Taiwan. While many scholars have been trying over the years to verify the activities of the White Group, owing to the scarcity of historical materials, a concrete and detailed study has yet to be written. A significant question relating to the story involving the Chinese Mission in Japan can, though, be explored in this dissertation: What was the Chinese Mission's involvement in the secret endeavor?

The idea of the White Group could be traced back to 1947, when Lieutenant General Lin Xunnan (林薰南), a military counselor to the Chinese Mission, suggested utilizing Japanese soldiers to fortify China's national defense.²³¹ Previous studies have focused on Cao Shicheng (曹士澂), the military attaché of the Chinese Mission in Japan as well as a special representative dispatched by Chiang Kai-shek to coordinate the mission in Tokyo.²³² On June 30, 1949, Cao Shicheng wrote a report suggesting Chiang Kai-shek establish an Anti-Communist Frontline in East Asia and make Tokyo the nucleus. Furthermore, Cao suggested setting-up an Anti-Communism Intelligence Bureau in Tokyo, as well as a sub-Bureau in Manila or Singapore, after which an Allied Chief of Operations would be established in Taiwan or the Philippines.²³³ Cao's proposals might have won support from Zhu Shiming, who was at that point still head of the Chinese Mission, but it is unclear whether or not Cao had conferred with SCAP on the issue before submitting his plan to Chiang - since SCAP,

²³¹ "Ribei Jinghua Guofang Rencai Xuanjian Baogaoce (日本精華國防人才選薦報告冊) [Reports on the Selection of Japanese Elites in National Defense]," October 10, 1947, Guoshiguan, 020-010118-0007.

²³² Nojima Tsuyoshi (野島剛), *Zuihou de Diguo Junren: Jiang Jieshi yu Baituan* (最後的帝國軍人：蔣介石與白團) [The Last Imperial Empire: Chiang Kai-shek and the White Group] (Taipei: Lianjing, 2015), 148-149; Lin Hsiao-Ting, *Accidental State*, 219.

²³³ "Cao Shicheng to Chiang Kai-shek," June 30, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00064-003.

and especially MacArthur, would never have expressed support for such a proposition at that moment. On September 8 Zhu also reported to Chiang on the idea of recruiting Japanese soldiers to fight in the Chinese Civil War, an idea which had been repeatedly proposed but would be unfeasible as it contradicted SCAP regulations. However, South Korea was organizing 30,000 volunteers for participation in the battle for China on the side of the Nationalists.²³⁴

According to another report, dated July 22, Cao Shicheng was ordered by Chiang to meet Hou Teng (侯騰) in Guangzhou in order to confer with him about a plan to use Japanese soldiers (as suggested by Zhu Shiming). This report remarks that the First Section of the Chinese Mission in Japan should recruit exceptional Japanese soldiers to form a special advisory group, and pursue a mission to collect intelligence on the Soviet Union, Japan, Korea, as well as Northern and Northeastern China, for use by the Allied Anti-Communism Corps in East Asia that would have to be set up. It should also strengthen its anti-communist capabilities in Japan and counter the expansion of Japanese communism. According to this proposal, expenses and communications equipment would be supplied by the Second Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense.²³⁵ Additionally, Zhu Shiming and Cao Shicheng were to serve as the chief and vice-chief of the group in Japan.²³⁶ Chiang sanctioned this proposal immediately, after which Cao began to put it into effect. In another report written by Cao on July 31, the name of the Japanese actor involved in this operation was added. The name, which was not unfamiliar to the Chinese, was Okamura Yasuji (岡村寧次).²³⁷ Another member of the operation was named Nemoto Hiroshi (根本博). He had served as private counsel to Tang Enbo during the Battle of Gunningtou in October 1949.²³⁸

²³⁴ "Zhu Shiming to Chiang Kai-shek," September 8, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00034-047.

²³⁵ "Hou Teng to Chiang Kai-shek," July 22, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00064-005.

²³⁶ "Cao Shicheng to Chiang Kai-shek," July 31, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00064-005.

²³⁷ "Cao Shicheng's report," July 31, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00064-005.

²³⁸ Huang Jiamo (黃嘉謨) and Chen Cungong (陳存恭), *Lao Shenghuan Xiansheng Fangwen Jilu* (勞聲寰先生訪問紀錄) [The Reminiscences of Mr. Lao Sheng-hwan] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1988), 70.

Nemoto's activities had already attracted the attention of SCAP. In September 1949, a report revealed that "General Nemoto and a Lt. Colonel were smuggled aboard a Chinese vessel which left Yokohama for Formosa on June 27th in the guise of crew members. They later proceeded to Amoy."²³⁹ The report also speculated that the Chinese Mission in Japan was behind this, as it reported that besides Nemoto, "an insignificant number of senior and junior Japanese officers have subsequently been similarly smuggled out to Formosa probably with the connivance of the local Chinese Mission."²⁴⁰ Subsequently, an investigation was made to "determine the full scope of the operation and the extent to which the Chinese Mission in Tokyo might be involved."²⁴¹ It was speculated that the Chinese Mission was recruiting ex-Japanese soldiers, just as another report noted:

Chiang is said to have converted 4 million United States dollars into yen on the black market in Tokyo, and Head of Chinese Mission in Tokyo is said to be offering a quarter of a million yen per man as initial payment to pilots. General Wu when recently in Tokyo is alleged to have sought unsuccessfully an interview with Yoshida.²⁴²

British intelligence gave credence to the Chinese account, while the concrete amount of funds offered by Chiang Kai-shek remains unconfirmed. Zhu Shiming also publicly denied the accusation that Nationalist China was "recruiting Japanese pilots."²⁴³ The investigation into the matter conducted by SCAP might have restrained the operation but did not put an end to it. CCP propaganda accused MacArthur of dispatching fifteen Japanese soldiers to assist the KMT in Taiwan, so they perhaps also believed that Ho Shailai's visit to Japan in December of 1949 was for recruiting the "Japanese voluntary army."²⁴⁴ The Chinese Mission continued to deny the existence of and such operation. In February of 1950, the spokesman of the

²³⁹ "From Tokyo to Foreign Office," September 16, 1949, UK National Archives, FO 371/75770.

²⁴⁰ "From Tokyo to Foreign Office," September 16, 1949, UK National Archives, FO 371/75770.

²⁴¹ "From Tokyo to Foreign Office," September 17, 1949, UK National Archives, FO 371/75770.

²⁴² "From Foreign Office to Tokyo," September 14, 1949, UK National Archives, FO 371/75770.

²⁴³ "Denies Nationalist Gov't Recruiting Nippon Fliers," September 14, 1949, *Nippon Times*.

²⁴⁴ "Ribben Guwentuan Di Taiwan(日本顧問團抵台灣) [Japanese Advisory Body Arrives in Taiwan]," February 1, 1950, *Dagongbao (Hong Kong)*.

Chinese Mission in Japan issued a statement denying that the KMT was recruiting Japanese pilots and Chiang Kai-shek was looking to at Japan as a safe haven to flee to. As quoted in the *Nippon Times*:

“Both in regard to the rumor that volunteers for the Chinese Army are being recruited and the one that Gen. Chiang and other Nationalist leaders are looking for houses to take refuge in Japan, suggest operations of vicious brokers. The Chinese Mission has no knowledge whatever or either,” the spokesman said.²⁴⁵

From this point onward, Cao Shicheng became more covert in coordinating the operation. In January 1950, Cao submitted an updated report to Chiang in which he suggested they establish the “Far Eastern Anti-Communism College.”²⁴⁶ The venture to establish the East Asia Anti-Communism Corp was implemented by Wu Tiecheng, personal envoy of Chiang Kai-shek, during his visit to Tokyo and Seoul in April 1950. The International News Service noticed the Chinese presence in Seoul:

Reports from Tokyo last week said that Nationalist officials are seeking to obtain continental bases in Korea from which Nationalist naval and air forces could attack Communist North China and Manchuria. In return, these reports said, the Nationalists were offering air support for President Syngman Rhee’s “little civil war” against Communist forces of North Korea.

These reports said that Gen. Wu Te-Chen, member of Gen. Chiang Kai-shek’s “super-cabinet”; Gen. Chu Shih-Ming, chief of the Chinese Nationalist mission in Tokyo, and Maj. Gen. Tsao Shih-Chen, also a member of the Tokyo Mission, were negotiating in Seoul.

However, Mr. Ryce said that although General Wu and Chu recently visited President Rhee, they did not offer any proposals regarding a military alliance between the two Governments.²⁴⁷

Although the plan to form an allied corps against the communists turned out eventually to be an abortive one, the White Group plan continued. In February 1950, seventeen Japanese ex-soldiers arrived in Taiwan to begin the job of military

²⁴⁵ “Chinese Mission Refutes Rumors,” February 12, 1950, *Nippon Times*.

²⁴⁶ “Cao Shicheng to Chiang Kai-shek,” January 22, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00064-013.

²⁴⁷ “Military Accord with Chiang not Planned, S. Korea Says,” April 25, 1950, *Nippon Times*.

education and training programs under the leadership of Tomita Naosuke.²⁴⁸ With Zhu Shiming suspected of having pro-CCP leanings, and following his resignation in 1950, the White Group operation was strictly confidential, involving only Cao Shicheng and his staff in the First Division of the Chinese Mission. Ho Shailai apparently knew of the existence of this operation but was not closely involved with it – an assumption supported by his diaries. For example, in his diary entry for August 21, 1950, Ho wrote down a news item stating that several Japanese were arrested by the police at a harbor where they were departing for Taiwan and joining KMT forces. They had been paid 13,000 yen each, and, working behind the scenes, the person organizing them was Nemoto.²⁴⁹ While Ho met Okamura Yasuji frequently in Japan, they barely discussed anything relating to the White Group. In late 1951, Ho noted that he had become “entangled” in the affair through Nemoto and his colleagues because Japanese who did not receive their salaries from Taipei began asking the Chinese Mission to pay.²⁵⁰ Thus, it seems fair to judge that Ho did not know a lot about the details of the White Group mission, while Cao disclosed as few details as possible to Ho about the White Group. While Ho was entrusted by Chiang to conduct extremely important missions between Tokyo and Taipei, other secret operations led by other officials were in progress simultaneously. Chiang’s philosophy for managing his staff, as many scholars have observed, meant he never entrusted individuals with full responsibility for, and knowledge of, the complete picture. Whether a diplomat or a general, Chiang’s men would be placed under surveillance and kept working in competition with one another.

CONCLUSION

Michael Schaller has summarized it best: “Before 1950, the public, the press, and the Congress lavished far more attention on the dramatic Chinese civil war (where

²⁴⁸ Lin Hsiao-Ting, “U.S.-Taiwan Military Diplomacy Revisited: Chiang Kai-shek, Baituan, and the 1954 Mutual Defense Pact,” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 37 (5), 976-977.

²⁴⁹ DHSL, August 21, 1950.

²⁵⁰ DHSL, December 15, 1950.

American involvement remained minimal) than on the unglorious routine of reconstructing a shattered Japan.”²⁵¹ Looking back over that period, this chapter has analyzed MacArthur’s grudging involvement in Taiwan’s affairs as the Chinese Civil War continued towards its conclusion in 1949. In summation, before 1949 the General was inclined to “sit on the fence” and showed little concern for the progress of the Civil War. However, as the threat that the CCP might pose to Japan developed to a degree of seriousness that it could no longer be ignored, MacArthur paid much greater attention to what was happening in China.

At this juncture, there were two lines developing in MacArthur’s mind. First, MacArthur kept his eyes on the final phase of the Civil War and pondered its potential effects on East Asian political order. In the meantime, since the KMT was about to lose the war, the strategic significance of Taiwan became increasingly apparent. It was believed that MacArthur was involved in a debate over trusteeship of the island, internal affairs in Taiwan, and he even, as some studies have suggested, advocated the replacement of Chiang Kai-shek with more “open-minded” figures. As the war came to an end, the General also began to receive more Chinese Nationalist guests as a way to gather information about Taiwan, William Sebald recalling that “Instead of personal observation, MacArthur familiarized himself with his command through voracious reading and close, shrewd questioning of innumerable visitors.”²⁵²

As for MacArthur own writings, he barely mentioned proposals relating to Taiwan in his memoirs. However, analyzing the KMT’s retreat to Taiwan, the General resignedly wrote:

The decision to withhold previously pledged American support was one of the greatest mistakes ever made in our history. At one fell blow, everything that had been so laboriously built up since the days of John Hay was lost. It was the beginning of the crumbling of our power in continental Asia-the birth of the taunt, “Paper Tiger.” Its consequences will be felt for centuries, and its ultimate disastrous effects on the fortunes of the free world are still to be unfolded.²⁵³

²⁵¹ Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 22.

²⁵² William Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 105.

²⁵³ Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscence*, 320.

To a great extent, these words laid the foundation for MacArthur's approach to East Asian affairs and Taiwan over two years which followed. As the next chapter will discuss, MacArthur finally demonstrated tangible support for Chiang with the outbreak of the Korean War. General Ho Shailai's work during the Chinese Civil War will also be rendered more-fully, for he would be the main Chinese representative dealing with MacArthur as the American general at last came to the aid of the Chiang and his Nationalist regime.

CHAPTER THREE: THE CHINESE AND SOVIET REPATRIATION

The repatriation of Japanese nationals from China to Japan was perhaps uppermost on the list of tasks assigned to the Chinese Mission in Japan between 1946 and 1949. Theoretically, the entire operation was not expected to be too testing for the KMT. An internal report speculated that only six months would be needed to carry out the operation. However, it turned out to be a more time-consuming and convoluted one than they expected. This chapter examines the role played by the Chinese Mission in Japan in the repatriation of Japanese nationals with two focuses. First, the repatriation of the Japanese nationals from Northeast China.²⁵⁴ The reason that the repatriation in the Northeast should be studied separately from the repatriation operations which took place in other areas is due to the fact that repatriation from Manchuria was complicated significantly by the Chinese Civil War, a conflict in which the Soviet Union and the Americans played supportive roles behind the scenes.

The second focus of the chapter is the Soviet's reluctance to cooperate with the repatriation of Japanese troops from the USSR and the almost constant disputes that this caused in Tokyo. Both American and Soviet representatives in the Japanese capital exploited this issue, using it to make accusations against the other while attempting to gain support among the Japanese public – something which became increasingly obvious as the US-Soviet relationship sharply deteriorated in 1950 with the onset of the Cold War. In order to gain the upper hand in this dispute, the Americans secretly approached the head of the Chinese Mission in Japan and Chinese representative to the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) from June 1950, Ho Shailai, convincing him to support proposals that the US would make in an important meeting of the ACJ. But prior to that, between 1946 to 1949, the Chinese Mission in Japan, under the leadership of, first, Zhu Shiming and, then, Shang Zhen, coordinated the Chinese repatriation of the defeated Japanese army between Tokyo and Nanjing.

²⁵⁴ In SCAP's archives, Manchuria is regarded as part of Northeast China. For instance, Dalian (大連), then under the control of the Soviet Union, was not recognized as part of Manchuria. Given the fact that the amount of Japanese residents in Dalian was relatively low, in this chapter the term Manchuria is equal to Northeast China.

THE AMERICAN-LED REPATRIATION FROM CHINA

According to Article 9 of the Potsdam Declaration, “The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.” After the Japanese surrender in September 1945, ensuring the repatriation of approximately 3,000,000 Japanese nationals in China became one of SCAP’s top priorities. The United States’ postwar China policy sought to assist Chiang Kai-shek rebuild his regime so that he could take firm control of China, something which “could not be accomplished as long as the security of China was threatened by the presence of large numbers of Japanese troops.” As was written by a member of the SCAP staff, “large numbers of Japanese were located in areas of conflicting interests of the French Government, Viet Nam, Chinese Nationalists, and Chinese Communists, making early evacuation of these groups imperative to prevent their being used as pawns in the various political disputes.”²⁵⁵ For the Chinese government of Chiang, the urgent repatriation of Japanese nationals was also necessary for a more practical reason: to reduce national levels of food-consumption – just as He Yingqin, one of the KMT’s most senior figures, wrote in a report. According to He’s estimation, the repatriation required ship-tonnage measuring in the millions and could be finished in six months.²⁵⁶ This estimation soon proved overly-optimistic, for He did not foresee the task of repatriation being impeded so significantly by the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War in Northeast China.

Due to the level of urgency, an interim plan was implemented in October and “a more complete organization for repatriation was developed by SCAP through a series of conferences, in which the Chinese and United States ground and naval commanders in China were integrated into the SCAP repatriation system”²⁵⁷. As

²⁵⁵ Douglas MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur* (Washington, D.C.: For Sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966), Vol. 1 Supplement, 170.

²⁵⁶ “He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek,” October 16, 1945, Guoshiguan, 002-020300-00027-057.

²⁵⁷ Douglas MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur*, Vol. 1 Supplement, 172.

Michael Schaller put it, “Under American naval supervision, the Japanese assembled a transport fleet of nearly four hundred ships that spent months repatriating these displaced persons.”²⁵⁸ The Americans mobilized their forces at the behest of SCAP, Naval Command in the Pacific, and United States Forces in China, while the Chinese Nationalists played a subsidiary role by arranging for the transfer of Japanese men and women to the ports assigned for embarkation by the Americans. A telegraph sent by Shang Zhen (who would assume the leadership of the Chinese Mission in Japan in 1946) from the Office of the Military Committee to He Yingqin exemplified the degree of Sino-American cooperation on the issue. In the telegram, Shang reported that, according to notices from the Americans, three Japanese ships arriving in Tanggu could each evacuate 5,000 Japanese. That being the case, the Chinese should send 15,000 Japanese to the ports in time for the scheduled dates.²⁵⁹ At that moment in time, of course, the Chinese Mission in Japan had yet to be established, and thus communication between China and SCAP proceeded through standard diplomatic channels. Any information had to pass through several stations before arriving with the intended recipients. For instance, the Ministry of National Defense of China telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek with information about fifteen Japanese nationals who had received political training from the Chinese Communists in Zhangjiakou and were now aboard a ship leaving from Tanggu for Japan. The Ministry of National Defense therefore wished to advise Chiang that he might inform the Americans who would then, in turn, pass this intelligence on to SCAP and the Japanese so that they could make the appropriate preparations for the arrival of potential political agitators.²⁶⁰ The establishment of the Chinese Mission in Japan would soon facilitate a more efficient exchange of information between Nanjing and Tokyo.

The joint Sino-American repatriation of Japanese nationals proved generally efficient and well-ordered for most parts of China. Indeed, by June, 1946, “the greater part of China was cleared.”²⁶¹ On October 31 of that year, a British report

²⁵⁸ Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 27.

²⁵⁹ “Shang Zhen to He Yingqin,” October 1, 1945, Guoshiguan, 002-090105-00012-282.

²⁶⁰ “Zheng Jiemin to Chiang Kai-shek,” May 14, 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-090105-00012-273.

²⁶¹ Douglas MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur*, Vol. 1 Supplement, 173.

summarized the progress of repatriation: “Peiping Headquarters Group announced the completion of mass repatriation from China (including Manchuria). There remain some stragglers, retained technicians, and released former war crimes suspects, whom the Chinese have been urged to repatriate by 31 Dec 46.”²⁶² Two months later, on December 31, 1946, another British report noted, “SCAP-controlled repatriation shipping was withdrawn.”²⁶³ According to SCAP’s own record, “mass repatriation from Chinese areas was completed by the end of December 1946, with some 3,101,700 Japanese returned home.”²⁶⁴ While the mass repatriation from China had been all-but completed, as announced officially, what was left uncompleted, especially in Manchuria, proved to be burdensome and onerous for the Chinese government. The newly-established Chinese Mission in Japan therefore became the cushion between Chinese Nationalists and SCAP, and was the recipient of the bulk of petitions from the Japanese public eager to see Japanese nationals still in China – whether soldier or civilian – return home.

REPATRIATION EFFORTS IN MANCHURIA

While the repatriation of Japanese nationals in most parts of China proceeded smoothly, the operation in Manchuria was impeded by the resumption of the Chinese Civil War. Immediately after the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Chinese Communists occupied several cities in Manchuria with assistance from the Soviet Union. Because of this development, and as SCAP were well aware, “[b]y comparison with the rest of China, repatriation from Manchuria proved the most difficult.”²⁶⁵ On September 8, 1945, when asked by the Japanese how 800,000 Japanese residents in Manchuria and Northern Korea would be protected, Richard Sunderland, MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, replied frankly that, “this is a big problem. I see your difficulty, but I have no good

²⁶² “Repatriation and Demobilization,” December 12, 1946, UK National Archives, WO 208/3909.

²⁶³ “Repatriation and Demobilization,” January 23, 1947, UK National Archives, WO 208/3909.

²⁶⁴ Douglas MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur*, Vol. 1 Supplement, 176.

²⁶⁵ Douglas MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur*, Vol. 1 Supplement, 174.

idea.”²⁶⁶ As the struggle between the KMT and CCP for the Northeast progressed, the repatriation of Japanese nationals became more complicated. “Due to the special circumstances of the Northeast,” wrote He Yingqin in a report to Chiang Kai-shek on December 15, 1945, “the repatriation in that area has not been included in the repatriation operation as a whole.”²⁶⁷ Furthermore, the number of the Japanese nationals in Manchuria had been miscalculated, because many were transferred to prison camps in the Soviet Union as the war ended. As a SCAP report noted, “It is NOT clear how many Japs who surrendered to the Soviets in Manchuria still remain in the area.”²⁶⁸ A British report written in April 1946 then projected that, “Prospects of the repatriation of Japanese from Manchuria and Northern Korea seem brighter, but it appears that only civilians are available for repatriation, since the Japanese soldiers (who were the majority) are no longer in those areas.”²⁶⁹ A Marshall Mission notification from 1946 elaborates further:

Japanese forces, totaling some 700,000 are for the most part disarmed but their whereabouts is obscure. The Russians have made no reply to U.S. queries as to their intentions to repatriate these Japanese forces from Manchuria. On the contrary, reports indicate that extensive use is being made of Japanese military in the construction of fortifications at Vladivostok as well as Manchuria.²⁷⁰

The *Nippon Times* (April 13, 1946) also reported that, “Thus far, no Japanese have been returned from Manchuria, Northern Korea, the Kurile Islands, Sakhalin, North Indo-China, or Canada.”²⁷¹ The repatriation procedure in Manchuria, as well as a more precise calculation for the number of Japanese nationals, only began after the KMT managed to reclaim territory in Manchuria in April 1946. The KMT’s

²⁶⁶ Yokote Shinji, “Soviet Repatriation Policy, U.S. Occupation Authorities, and Japan's Entry into the Cold War,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 15, no. 2 (2013), 34.

²⁶⁷ “He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek,” December 15, 1945, Guoshiguan, 002-090105-00014-060.

²⁶⁸ “Repatriation from China and Manchuria of Japanese,” 1946, UK National Archives, WO 208/3909.

²⁶⁹ “United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan, Periodical Report No. 4, April 1946,” in R. L. Jarman ed., *JAPAN: Political & Economic Reports 1906-1970* (Slough: Archive Editions Limited, 2002), Vol 9, 163.

²⁷⁰ “Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East,” 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 9, 943.

²⁷¹ “Repatriation Move Speeded Up Greatly,” April 13, 1946, *Nippon Times*.

bittersweet victory in the Battle of Siping forced the CCP to retreat northward and enabled the repatriation of Japanese nationals to proceed without obstacle from the port of Huludao, in Liaoning. SCAP calculated the number of Japanese in Manchuria at 1,603,000 – of which 59,000 were scheduled for repatriation by the end of April.²⁷² On May 12, Du Yuming, the KMT military commander in the Northeast, announced that on May 6 the first shipment of Japanese had left Manchuria.²⁷³ According to the *Nippon Times*, and based on a Chinese-American agreement, repatriation was the “direct responsibility” of the KMT and happened “without the aid of United States Marines in North China.”²⁷⁴ In reality, however, the Americans played a central role in the endeavor. General Keller Rockey, commander of the US First Marine Division, admitted that marines were on-hand “to help in the repatriation of Japanese and to guard American property.”²⁷⁵ “During this period every effort was made to push repatriation in order to complete the program in Manchuria before the port of Hulutao was frozen in,” SCAP later summarized, before adding:

Out of the 1,300,000 believed to be in the area, only 469,000 Japanese, mostly civilians, had been repatriated by mid-August 1946. During the summer repeated attempts were made to secure evacuation of Japanese from central and north Manchuria under Chinese Communist control. Early in September evacuation from Chinese Communist areas was at last made possible; the outflow from Hulutao increased to 10,000-15,000 daily during the next two months. By the end of October all Japanese had been evacuated from Manchuria except the 250,000 under Soviet control and some 68,000 unaccounted for in the interior.²⁷⁶

As regards those 300,000-plus people either “under Soviet control” or simply “unaccounted for,” the United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan’s Periodical Report had already stated, in February 1946, that “The fate of Japanese in Manchuria and the Russian zone of Korea, of whom nothing has been heard since the surrender, has been the subject of repeated appeals to S.C.A.P. by the Japanese Government.”²⁷⁷ Relatives

²⁷² “110,450 Repatriates Arrive During Week,” April 29, 1946, *Nippon Times*.

²⁷³ “Japanese Leave Hulutao,” May 13, 1946, *Nippon Times*.

²⁷⁴ “Japanese Leave Hulutao,” May 13, 1946, *Nippon Times*.

²⁷⁵ “Rockey Denies Reports,” May 16, 1946, *Nippon Times*.

²⁷⁶ Douglas MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur*, Vol. 1 Supplement, 174.

²⁷⁷ “United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan. Periodical Report No. 2, February 1946,” in R.L.

of some of those “accounted for” people had begun to petition the Chinese Mission in Japan in order to obtain information on their whereabouts and plead for their return. The Japanese government had also been trying to find ways to rescue its missing compatriots in Northeast China. For instance, on September 9, 1945, the Japanese government proposed that MacArthur reopen “railway communication between Northeast China (Changchun and Mukden) and Southern Korea (Pusan).”²⁷⁸ Aside from seeking help from the Americans, the Japanese government communicated with Soviet representatives in Tokyo, but to no effect. It is unsurprising therefore that Japanese individuals began turning to SCAP and the Chinese Mission for assistance. On November 20, 1946, the Chinese Mission in Japan cabled the Foreign Ministry in Nanjing, reporting that they and the ACJ had been receiving numerous petitions asking about the repatriation of Japanese soldiers. “These kinds of petitions are placed in a tiny room in the ACJ Secretary’s office and are piled several feet tall now, among them are letters signed with blood and several hundred signatures, proving how the Japanese care about this issue.”²⁷⁹ A month previously, in a letter written in English to the political advisor of the Chinese Mission, Shen Jinding, Japanese petitioners requested that the “authorities of the Allied Powers, especially your country, the Republic of China to sympathize with us and arrange for early repatriation of those who are still abroad to let them see, as soon as possible, their parents, wives, husbands, sisters, brothers, children and friends who are longing for their return to their home.” Four key demands were also put forward:

1. That the repatriation of those who remain at Dairen and the vicinity, over 300,000 in number, through the ports of Dairen, Shahokuo, Tafangshen and Chinchow be arranged at the earliest possible [time].
2. That the repatriation through Hulutao of those who are in Manchuria be continued; and protection against the cold on the way of transportation be provided.
3. That the repatriation from North Korea, Saghalien, the Kuriles and Soviet

Jarman ed., *JAPAN: Political & Economic Reports 1906-1970*, Vol. 9, 129.

²⁷⁸ Yokote Shinji, “Soviet Repatriation Policy, U.S. Occupation Authorities, and Japan's Entry into the Cold War,” 34-35.

²⁷⁹ “The Chinese Mission to Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” November 20, 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010118-0013.

territories be expedited.

4. Should they be obliged to spend another winter, adequate provisions against the cold be provided.²⁸⁰

While expressing their gratitude to the Republic of China, these petitioners perhaps overestimated the abilities of the KMT to do anything to resolve the issue of Japanese nationals still in Manchuria, and especially those in the Soviet-controlled areas needing to “be expedited”. The end of the Battle of Siping was followed by a cease-fire agreement extracted by Marshall so that a degree of “calm prevailed in the Northeast throughout the summer and on through September” of 1946.²⁸¹ During this period, a massive repatriation of Japanese nationals was indeed undertaken in Manchuria. On October 11, the KMT regained Zhangjiakou, a Northern city with significant strategic value, and continued to broaden its attack by marching on Andong. From the perspective of the KMT, expending energy on locating and repatriating the 300,000 “missing” Japanese nationals at this point would not have been to their immediate benefit in the fight against the CCP. Hence, even after receiving numerous petitions, the KMT did not look to accelerate the frequency of repatriations from Manchuria.

Besides, the number of Japanese nationals found in the KMT-controlled areas was far less than the 300,000 indicated by the Japanese petitioners. As Xiong Shihui (熊式輝), the KMT military chief in Northeast China noted, “In Northeast China 773,764 Japanese have been repatriated, among which 242,872 were in CCP-controlled zone. Except for the CCP-controlled zone the number of remaining Japanese is unclear, in our zone there is 30,902 Japanese who are now undergoing the repatriation procedure.”²⁸² The Civil War meant, of course, Japanese nationals in Manchuria were divided by being located in areas occupied by the KMT and CCP, respectively. Published on January 15, 1947, a KMT report offered some figures for the new status

²⁸⁰ “The Representatives of Families and Relatives of Japanese Nationals Abroad to C. T. Shen,” October 27, 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010118-0013.

²⁸¹ Harold M. Tanner, *Where Chiang Kai-Shek Lost China: The Liao-Shen Campaign, 1948* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 40.

²⁸² “Xiong Shihui to Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” December 28, 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010118-0013.

quo:²⁸³

	Already Repatriated	Awaiting to be Repatriated	Port	Date
KMT	773204	30902	Huludao	May 7, 1946 to August 15, 1946.
CCP	242524	CCP:42119	Huludao	August 21, 1946 to December 1946.
		Soviet:270000		

This calculation corresponded to the statistics given by Xiong and also revealed another fact: those 270,000 Japanese residents were all in Dalian, a city which, from 1945, had been occupied by the Soviets following “a legalistic interpretation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty.”²⁸⁴ In the meantime, SCAP also made a calculation, which to a great extent matched the KMT’s. In January 1947, it speculated that “about 40,000 Japanese still remain in the Chinese National Government-controlled areas of Manchuria and about 55,000 in Chinese Communist-controlled territory.”²⁸⁵ As these calculations demonstrated, the majority of the Japanese nationals were stationed in the CCP and Soviet-controlled zones, where the KMT had no influence. Faced with this predicament, Zhu Shiming, the first head of the Chinese Mission in Japan, openly asked General MacArthur “what had been done about recommendations on repatriation and demobilization programs.”²⁸⁶ The dilemma was clarified by SCAP thus:

This dilemma was epitomized in a SCAP report,

The problem of repatriating Japanese stragglers in Manchuria still existed, however; in a G-3 report of 29 April 1949 it was estimated that there were slightly more than 60,000 Japanese still in the Chinese Communist controlled areas of Manchuria. Their repatriation could be accomplished only if they were able to infiltrate into Nationalist areas and then be transported to ports on the

²⁸³ “Junshi Tiaochu Zhixingbu to Chiang Kai-shek,” January 15, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-072. I have simplified the original table by omitting some less relevant factors such as the Korean nationals and the division between the Japanese POW (Rifu, 日俘) and Japanese nationals (Riqiao, 日僑).

²⁸⁴ “Implementation of Soviet Objectives in China [Includes Map],” 1947, Digital National Security Archive - DNSA: Document Records (unstructured), 1.8.

²⁸⁵ “Repatriation and Demobilization,” January 23, 1947, UK National Archives, WO 208/3909.

²⁸⁶ “Chinese Delegate Queries M’Arthur,” February 28, 1947, *San Pedro News-Pilot*.

coast. General MacArthur was prepared to send shipping whenever there were sufficient number of Japanese available for repatriation.²⁸⁷

Another SCAP report continued on the theme: “Small numbers of technicians and their dependents, who are released, may continue to be repatriated through southern ports on shipping available to the Chinese.”²⁸⁸ This information revealed that the repatriation of some Japanese nationals, like skilled technicians, was prioritized. What this SCAP report did not reveal was the fact that some Japanese nationals with influence, power, and connections had sought other ways to be evacuated from Manchuria. The case of Takasaki Tatsunosuke (高崎達之助) was typical and deserves attention.

Takasaki was born in 1885 and became a key figure in the puppet state of Manchukuo, serving as the president of the Manchuria Heavy Industry Development Company. After the war, Takasaki stayed in Northeast China to “help” with the recovery of the local economy as the CCP assumed control over the area. To this end, he was coerced by the Soviet Red Army into “preparing an affidavit transferring the Manchurian Heavy Industry Company to the Soviet Union.”²⁸⁹ When the CCP was forced to retreat by the KMT in 1946, Takasaki stayed on, and served as a counselor dedicated to the economy and also began managing repatriation operations. As Mayumi Itoh has written, “In the absence of government help, several Japanese civilian leaders who had remained in Manchuria organized self-help organizations to facilitate the repatriation of Japanese. The representative of these voluntary groups was Takasaki Tatsunosuke, who patiently negotiated with the ROC government, the Soviet Army, and other concerned authorities.”²⁹⁰ On October 4, 1947, after Takasaki’s family had asked for his return, SCAP approached the Chinese Mission directly to help with his repatriation:

²⁸⁷ Douglas MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur*, Vol. 1 Supplement, 176.

²⁸⁸ “Repatriation and Demobilization,” January 23, 1947, UK National Archives, WO 208/3909.

²⁸⁹ Chang Kia-ngau, *Last Chance in Manchuria: the Diary of Chang Kia-ngau* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 101.

²⁹⁰ Mayumi Itoh, *The Making of China’s Peace with Japan: What Xi Jinping Should Learn from Zhou Enlai* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 15.

The Diplomatic Section presents its compliments to the Chinese Mission in Japan and has the honor to request information regarding a Japanese national, Mr. TAKASAKI Tatsunosuke.....It is reported that he desires to return to Japan and that his family also is desirous of his repatriation in order that he can take care of certain outstanding family affairs. It would be appreciated if the Chinese Mission could furnish this Section with information as to Mr. Takasaki's present status and the possibility of his early repatriation to Japan.²⁹¹

At this point it is safe to say that the Japanese nor SCAP knew the true status of Takasaki and the full extent of his activities in Manchuria. That is, Takasaki was one of the leaders of a secret group operating in Northeast China and overseen by the KMT and Chinese National Bureau of Investigation and Statistics. The group's mission was the surveillance of the activities of their compatriots who were awaiting repatriation and undertake counter-espionage in the Chinese-Korean border area against the Japanese and Korean communists who were operating there. The results achieved by Takasaki and his group satisfied Chiang Kai-shek to the degree that he sanctioned sending a Chinese official to Japan, serving as a counselor to the Chinese Mission, to undertake similar intelligence gathering operations.²⁹² It is still unclear how the Chinese Mission replied to SCAP with regard to repatriating Takasaki, but it is certain that it would not have let SCAP know about the man's involvement in the secret group.

With relevance to the cases mentioned above, the Chinese Mission in Japan were also aware that some Japanese residents repatriated from Siberia had received training from the Soviets and been ordered to open shops and work in factories in Hokkaido in order to gather information on the American's military facilities.²⁹³ This information was reported to the Ministry of National Defense and later to Chiang Kai-shek in December 1947. It was still unknown whether the Chinese Mission informed SCAP about this group.

A similar case can be found in a note from SCAP dated October 21, 1947, in

²⁹¹ "Diplomatic Section to the Chinese Mission," October 4, 1947, Guoshiguan, 020-010118-0013.

²⁹² "Mao Renfeng to Chiang Kai-shek," March 19, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00327-020.

²⁹³ "Zheng Jiemin to Chiang Kai-shek," December 29, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00323-078.

which it asked the Chinese Mission to arrange the return of Colonel Temiaki Hidaka. “This Officer was chief of the Information Bureau of the Japanese North China Army Headquarters at the time of Japan’s surrender and is now an adviser employed by the Chinese War Department at Peiping. The Colonel is most eager to rejoin his family in Tokyo and his services are also desired by this Headquarters.”²⁹⁴ No further information on Hidaka can be located in the Chinese archive and how the Chinese Mission replied to SCAP remains unclear, but it was extremely likely that Hidaka, like Takasaki, remained in China and continued to work for the Chinese.

Petitions hoping for the return of loved ones poured into the office of the Chinese Missions in Tokyo. In some cases, petitions were delivered to the Diplomatic Section of SCAP, rather than to the Chinese Mission. As a result, the Diplomatic Section had to forward the letters to the Chinese Mission and request that they deal with them. When, for instance, the Chinese Mission received a memorandum from SCAP on May 20, 1948, they were informed that the occupation authorities had been sent a letter from “the Yokohama Branch of the Diplomatic Section requesting repatriation of her husband, a radio operator, from China.” Elaborating further, the missive reads, “The letter is enclosed for consideration by the Chinese Government and such action as may be possible.....When the matter has been appropriately investigated, information would be appreciated in order that a reply can be sent to Mrs. Watada.” After a month, He Yinqin replied to the Department of Foreign Affairs that the Japanese could be repatriated when “there is a ship next time.”²⁹⁵

With assistance from the Chinese Mission in Japan, the amount of the Japanese nationals in Northeast China had been reducing sharply between 1946 and 1948. According to the calculations of the United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan, by October 1948 only 60,316 Japanese remained to be evacuated from Manchuria.²⁹⁶ Yet as the military fortunes of the KMT in Northeast China began to collapse, the repatriation of Japanese nationals slowed to a crawl. In a report from the Mukden Consulate-General dated September 13, 1948, only 54 Japanese were in a group of

²⁹⁴ “Diplomatic Section to the Chinese Mission,” October 21, 1947, Guoshiguan, 020-010118-0013.

²⁹⁵ “Diplomatic Section to the Chinese Mission,” May 20, 1948, Guoshiguan, 020-010118-0013.

²⁹⁶ “Special Intelligence Report,” October 20, 1948, UK National Archives, WO 208/3909.

refugees who had just left Changchun and were heading to Mukden, from where they would be “flown to Chinchow, for repatriation by a ship expected to leave Hulutao [Huludao] towards the end of this month.”²⁹⁷

From the perspective of SCAP, after 1948 the repatriation procedure in Manchuria was a secondary issue comparing to that in Siberia. In an official announcement marking the realization of Japanese demilitarization, “All that remains to be done is the repatriation and demobilization of the Japanese servicemen still being held in areas under Soviet control. This action is the last in a series taken by the Japanese under compulsion of SCAP instructions.”²⁹⁸ In their eyes, the amount of the Japanese left in Soviet-controlled areas was such that those in Manchuria could no longer register in comparison. As a British report on June 3 noted, of those who were waiting to be repatriated, “676,831 are being held in Soviet-controlled areas in camps distributed from the Caucasus to the Maritime Province of Siberia and on the island of Sakhalin, plus a few thousands in Dairen and North Korea. In addition, there are about 65,000 to be returned from Manchuria.....”²⁹⁹

In general, beginning in April 1946, the repatriation operation had proceeded effectively. However, after Marshall’s failure and the resumption of civil war in 1947, repatriation was significantly disturbed by the conflict between the KMT and CCP. For instance, in the week of June 22 to 29, only 24 Japanese were repatriated from Manchuria.³⁰⁰ In the week of January 9 to 15 of 1948, this number decreased to one.³⁰¹ In fact, throughout the entirety of 1948, and even until the total defeat of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in 1949, the number of Japanese awaiting to be repatriated, approximately 60,000 in total, had not decreased significantly due to the severity of the fight for control of China – on September 27, 1949, 60,000 Japanese were still estimated to be in Manchuria awaiting repatriation.³⁰² Another source also noted that

²⁹⁷ “Extracted from Mukden Consulate-General,” September 13, 1948, UK National Archives, WO 208/3909.

²⁹⁸ “Demobilization Board Goes Out of Existence,” June 19, 1948, *Nippon Times*.

²⁹⁹ “United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan to The Director of Military Intelligence, War Office, Whitehall, London,” June 3, 1948, UK National Archives, WO 208/3909.

³⁰⁰ “More Repatriates Return,” July 7, 1947, *Nippon Times*.

³⁰¹ “645 Repatriated During Week,” January 21, 1948, *Nippon Times*.

³⁰² “Repats Arrive from Red China,” September 27, 1949, *Nippon Times*.

in May the number was 60,000, but “it is difficult to tell whether these Japanese, many of whom were reported to have fought with Nationalist or Communist forces, were still in Manchuria, had gone south into North China, or had been moved to Siberia.”³⁰³ This burden of dealing with the problem had by then become the CCP’s; the Chinese Mission in Japan could do nothing. Three years later, by the end of May 1952, there were still 59,028 Japanese in mainland China.³⁰⁴

It is worth noting here, too, that repatriation was not as homogenous an experience as the tables of figures make it out to be. In its 1946 annual report, for example, the Chinese Mission dealt with the repatriation of twelve Japanese who were suffering from leprosy in Tianjin.³⁰⁵ As John Dower has observed, “Diseases ravaged many groups of returnees, and as a consequence repatriation became delayed by the need to conduct medical examinations, immunizations, and occasional quarantines.”³⁰⁶ That is just one example of the many aspects of the Chinese repatriation operation still awaiting scholarly investigation. In KMT historiography, however, the difficulty of repatriating the overseas Japanese in Manchuria is rarely mentioned while the overall success of the operation is celebrated. He Yingqin, who nominally coordinated repatriation operations, later claimed, “I devoted my biggest efforts to repatriating 1.2 million Japanese soldiers and 850,000 citizens back to Japan in ten months.”³⁰⁷ He also stressed that China had used 300,000 tons of Chinese shipping, an amount which accounted for eighty percent of the entire Chinese capacity, to repatriate the Japanese.³⁰⁸ By saying so, He Yingqin downplays the role played by SCAP as a way to develop a sense of gratitude to the KMT from among the Japanese public.

The story of repatriation under the KMT has also been utilized to criticize the

³⁰³ Robert A. Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-50* (New York: Macmillan, 1950), 15.

³⁰⁴ “H. A. H. Cortazzi to F. W. Marten,” December 3, 1952, UK National Archives, FO 371/99523.

³⁰⁵ “Sanshiwu Niandu Benzu Jingban Yewu Jianbao (三十五年度本組經辦業務簡報) [Group Business Briefing, 1946],” 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010121-0006.

³⁰⁶ John Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 51.

³⁰⁷ He Yingqin, *Riben Fangwen Jiangyan Xuanji* (日本訪問講演選集) [Selected Speeches on Visit to Japan] (Taipei: Zhongri Wenhua Jingji Xiehui, 1959), 50.

³⁰⁸ He Yingqin, *Riben Fangwen Jiangyan Xuanji*, 64.

way the return of Japanese nationals was being handled by the CCP and the Soviet Union. Okamura alluded to the difference when he asked, “whom should we be thankful for allowing two million Japanese in China to return home in less than a year peacefully, even being allowed to bring private objects and blankets?”³⁰⁹ The quote also refers to He Yingqin allowing the Japanese to carry 30 kg of luggage back to Japan, although Okamura was asked by SCAP to decrease the luggage allowance since it complicated train transportation.³¹⁰ Okamura, as well as some Japanese who benefited from He Yingqin and Chiang Kai-shek, praised the KMT to show their dissatisfaction with the progress of repatriation from mainland China’s CCP-held regions and the Soviet Union.

REPATRIATION AND THE SOVIET UNION

Due to the relatively small numbers, the repatriation effort in CCP-controlled Manchuria after 1949 was not a major concern for SCAP. In contrast, however, the issue of repatriating Japanese nationals detained in Soviet-controlled territory was heatedly debated in Tokyo. The issue was exacerbated, of course, by the Soviet-American rivalry in Tokyo, and became something of a bargaining chip.

In June 1946 George Atcheson had reported that the number of Japanese captured by the Soviets and their whereabouts were “unknown to General Headquarters.”³¹¹ Similar to the case of those Japanese left in China, anxious relatives of the Japanese soldiers now in the Soviet Union joined the Japanese government and SCAP in prodding the Soviet Mission in Tokyo for their swift repatriation. On December 19 of that year, Derevyanko signed an agreement, according to which the Soviet Union promised to repatriate 50,000 Japanese prisoners on a monthly basis. However, progress was slow and the Soviets were far from forthcoming with replies to requests for information sent by the Japanese government. Then rumors began to spread that the Soviet Union was slowing the progress of repatriation in order to indoctrinate the

³⁰⁹ He Yingqin, *Riben Fangwen Jiangyan Xuanji*, Appendix p.2.

³¹⁰ He Yingqin, *Riben Fangwen Jiangyan Xuanji*, Appendix, 26-27.

³¹¹ William Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 137.

prisoners with anti-American and anti-SCAP ideology.³¹² In the spring of 1947, the Soviet Mission in Japan openly denied accusations that the USSR was purposely delaying repatriation of Japanese nationals.³¹³ In spite of the denial, the allies' doubts were far from eased. Though according to William Sebald, the Soviets "were completely isolated on this issue. The British Commonwealth and Chinese members fully supported SCAP during the Council meeting."³¹⁴

The strife between the sides then escalated when the Americans seized on the Soviet's apparent insincerity as regards the repatriation of Japanese nationals so as to garner support from the Japanese public, with SCAP frequently lamenting the Soviet's constant delays.³¹⁵ On the other side, the Soviets complained about the hostile attitude of the Japanese press and draw attention to the "anti-democratic measures of the Japanese Government" as a way to counter-balance the negative impact of criticism. Demonstrating the Soviet's frustrations, in December 1949 General Derevyanko urged both the Japanese and American governments to not "publish fabulous figures of the Japanese still not repatriated from the USSR and disseminate other slanderous insinuations with regard to the conditions of the Japanese prisoners" because it incited Japanese hostility towards the Soviet Union. Derevyanko also requested the "anti-democratic" issue be placed on the agenda of that same ACJ meeting.³¹⁶ After Derevyanko had interrupted the meeting several times, Sebald, the chairman, stated that "The General is out of order." Derevyanko then left the meeting in protest, leaving only Sebald, Zhu Shiming and Hodgson behind. Sebald then scolded the Soviet Union for not obeying the Potsdam Declaration with regard to the repatriation of foreign nationals, noting for the record that "as of today, a total of 316,617 Japanese remain to be evacuated from Soviet-controlled areas, including Dairen, Karafuto, the Kuriles, and Siberia, but not including Manchuria, which is

³¹² John Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 52.

³¹³ "Su Zhuri Daibiaotuan Fouren Chiqian Rifu Shuo (蘇駐日代表團否認遲遣日俘說) [Soviet Mission in Japan Denies Delaying Japanese Repatriations]," March 8, 1947, *Yishibao (Shanghai)*.

³¹⁴ William Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 140.

³¹⁵ "Mengjun Zongbu Ze Su Yanchi Qianfan Riren (盟軍總部責蘇延遲遣返日人) [SCAP Scolds the Soviets for Delaying Japanese Repatriations]," May 15, 1948, *Yishibao (Shanghai)*.

³¹⁶ "Verbatim Minutes of the 132th Meeting," UK National Archives, FO 371/83811.

statistically charged with 60,312 unrepatriated Japanese.” (According to American calculations, in sum, the total number of Japanese nationals still held by the Russians was 370,000; the Soviet regime “strenuously denied these accusations.”³¹⁷) To buttress his argument, Sebald asked the Secretary-General of the ACJ to bring a part of the “petitions, letters and postcards received to date” into the meeting room. Sebald then asked him “How many bundles of that size do you have?” In reply, the Secretary-General said, “There remain 102 more bundles similar to each of these four.” After that, Sebald made a long statement scolding the Soviet’s for their distinct non-cooperation and, at the end, urged members of ACJ to “give all possible assistance to the SUPREME COMMANDER and his General Headquarters in the urgent and vital task of tearing the veil from the ugly countenance of the repatriation problem that should have been resolved long since, and of discovering the secrets which have been hidden from us for so long....” ³¹⁸

Asking the members of the ACJ for assistance, Sebald referred to Zhu Shiming, since only Nationalist China knew the details of the situation in Dalian and Manchuria. After answering questions from Hodgson, Sebald again spoke, “GENERAL CHU, do you care to make any comment?” Zhu Shiming did indeed care to, adding,

.....In a subsequent meeting, October 1947, the then MEMBER FOR CHINA stated that the Chinese Government had with only certain exceptions almost completely repatriated the Japanese nationals to their homeland. I have nothing to add to that statement except I want to strike out the word “almost”. Now we have completely repatriated the Japanese Nationals which were in our hands after the war.

By replying that China had completed its own repatriation operation in KMT-controlled areas, Zhu perhaps misread Sebald’s intention. Nevertheless, Sebald certainly wished to prompt Zhu to support his argument by making use of the KMT success by portraying it in contrast lack of progress on the part of the Soviet Union. And as Sebald recounted later, with “the strong support of the British and Chinese

³¹⁷ Max Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 144.

³¹⁸ “Verbatim Minutes of the 132th Meeting,” UK National Archives, FO 371/83811.

members on this issue, SCAP continued to press the Soviets on repatriation throughout 1950.”³¹⁹

Certainly, in January of that year, this dispute had not reached anything like a compromise. Then from February 1 onwards, the Soviet representative refused to attend the ACJ meetings because “the inclusion on the agenda of the question of repatriation of Japanese appears unlawful.”³²⁰ During an ACJ meeting held in May, a Chinese representative named Lee Dai-chin spoke: “At present, I don’t think I can propose any competent method to complete the big job but I only hope the Japanese repatriation can be completed very soon, the sooner the better.”³²¹ On August 2, Ho Shailai, now head of the Chinese Mission in Japan, joined the meetings. Ho began by stating that Nationalist China’s “handling of the Japanese repatriates was done efficiently and without any feeling of enmity or bitterness.” Ho was clearly conscious of the US-Soviet tension that had risen around the repatriation issue, as well as the opportunity that it presented the Chinese Nationalists. Ho also observed wryly that the Soviet Government had “established a new form of diplomatic practice by referring formal communications from foreign governments, to news reports on such a serious matter as this.”³²² This practice was summarized by Robert A. Fearey:

On April 22 Tass News Agency announced the “completion” of Japanese repatriation from the Soviet Union, stating that, with the exception of 2,458 persons connected with war crimes and 9 cases of illness, no more Japanese prisoners of war remained in Soviet custody. This statement, confirming that of May 1949, produced a sharp reaction in Japan and strengthened fears that 310,000 Japanese still unaccounted for in Soviet territories, and about 60,000 in Manchuria, were dead. On April 29 the Chief of SCAP’s Diplomatic Section sent a note to the Soviet member of the Allied Council again requesting the Soviet Government to furnish information on Japanese prisoners of war and internees who had come under Soviet control. The Soviet member of the Allied Council absented himself from all meetings of the Allied Council at which the repatriation issue was to be discussed, and remained away from the May 24 and June 7 meetings, even though the repatriation item was not on the agenda.³²³

³¹⁹ William Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 147.

³²⁰ “Verbatim Minutes of the 116th Meeting,” UK National Archives, FO 371/83812.

³²¹ “Verbatim Minutes of the 113th Meeting,” UK National Archives, FO 371/83812.

³²² “Verbatim Minutes of the 119th Meeting,” UK National Archives, FO 371/83813.

³²³ Robert A. Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan*, 194.

According to his own diary entry for July 29, in a discussion with the vice head of the Chinese Mission, Ho thought about how he should reply if the repatriation issue was raised at the next meeting of the ACJ.³²⁴ Then, at an ACJ meeting held on November 8, the Chinese Mission proposed a ‘plan A’. The Soviet representative opposed the plan, claiming that the Chinese representative had no right to vote on any issue. After also being rejected by Sebald, the Chinese representative offered a ‘Plan B’ which did find favor with the other members of the ACJ.³²⁵

Deeply antagonized by the outbreak of the Korean War and the Soviet’s refusal to recognize the official status of the Chinese Nationalist government, Ho began aggressively criticizing the Soviet’s repatriation claims. On the ACJ meeting of December 20, Ho chastised and even satirized the Cominform:

.....But, as everyone knows, the Soviet Government has adamantly refused to permit any such investigation for one reason or another which convinces nobody. The Russians, true to their usual pattern, are trying to cover up their crimes against humanity and human rights and believe that lies and falsification of facts can hide the truth.....MR. CHAIRMAN, the Allied Council for Japan, unlike the Cominform, does not force any of its members to do what it does not want to do, but by the Soviet refusal to permit an investigation one fact can be established.....

Continuing to display his cynicism, Ho closed his reprimand with a right-hook of a suggestion:

.....By detaining so many Japanese in Russia could it be that these so-called “volunteers” will one day “volunteer” to engage in subversive activities in Japan. MR. CHAIRMAN, I recommend that this Council call the attention of the SUPREME COMMANDER to this possibility of a new variety of so-called “volunteers”. That is all.

As usual, the Soviet representative did not want to confront this issue under

³²⁴ DHSL, July 29, 1950.

³²⁵ DHSL, November 8, 1950.

discussion but raised instead the “anti-democratic” discourse used to critique the US. Ho responded by listing several examples showing how rude the communists were and how the Soviet was unqualified to criticize others,

.....The entire world knows that the achievements of the Occupation under the executive authority of the SUPREME COMMANDER are vast and epochal and that the political and economic health of Japan and her people have steadily improved. This progress of Japan has been made possible despite the obstructionism and non-cooperation of the Soviet Government as represented on this Council. The record of this Council shows that what criticism the SOVIET MEMBER has given has been destructive rather than constructive, what advice he has given has been cynical rather than sincere.

After hearing this, Kislenko, the Soviet representative, suggested that Sebald “cool down these Kuomintang representatives who represent nobody, resort to insults, slanderous attacks and practice in cynicism and rudeness.”³²⁶ In his diaries, Ho mentioned the effort he had put in order to act well during this meeting. Ho received the news that Sebald would be raising the issue of Japanese convicts in USSR at the next get-together of the ACJ five days before. Ho felt perturbed and immediately convened a meeting with his own staff to flesh out a way to deal with this proposal ahead of time.³²⁷ Two days later, Ho convened another meeting to discuss the issue further.³²⁸ The next day, on December 18, Ho wrote down a secret request he had received from Sebald ahead of the meeting of the ACJ,

Last Saturday I sent Liu Yutang to SCAP Diplomatic Section to ask what attitude shall we take in the next ACJ minute and had not received any reply. Today the Diplomatic Section asked Liu in to have a conversation. According to Liu, Sebald hoped I would try to stop the Soviet member taking the floor and hope me to offer full assistance, which obsesses me. The reasons are (1) The Russian do have the right to take the floor. (2) Limiting the ACJ members ability to take the floor will significantly effect the policies made by the ACJ in the future. Since the Diplomatic Section asks me to do so and since it has good relationship with me, it seems that I cannot refuse to support it. As a result, I have to figure out best to

³²⁶ “Verbatim Minutes of the 129th Meeting,” UK National Archives, FO 371/83813.

³²⁷ DHSL, December 15, 1950.

³²⁸ DHSL, December 17, 1950.

react to this.³²⁹

On the eve of the ACJ meeting, Ho summoned the staff of the Chinese Mission to his residence to discuss the issue and translate his speeches into Chinese, something they did until midnight.³³⁰ Ho's speech the next day clearly satisfied Sebald. Writing in his diary that night, Ho revealed that his speech was meant to "assist Sebald to admonishing the Soviet representative" and his performance would have "at least make a little contribution to the American [aims]."³³¹ The following day, Ho received a call from Sebald who expressed his sincere gratitude to Ho for the support he had demonstrated in the meeting. Sebald was, so Ho recorded, extremely touched by the "similarity between Ho's speech and the American's." Reflecting on Sebald's reaction, Ho speculated in his diary, "at least this might verify that I am able to offer concrete assistance to SCAP after our friendship has developed during the past several months."³³² As the next chapter will demonstrate, Ho's desire to cooperate closely with the Americans at this point in time was in great part due to the progress of the Korean War, during which the Chinese Nationalist regime, now based in Taipei, had been urgently seeking support from Washington.

CONCLUSION

As Okamura Yasuji recounted in a discussion with He Yingqin, the KMT army equipped with American equipment which was dispatched to Manchuria was mainly composed of soldiers from South China – men who ate rice and were not accustomed to the foods and climate of the northeast. Since transports were occupied with repatriating Japanese soldiers, southern rice could not be sent to Manchuria for the KMT units from the south, something which hugely disadvantaged KMT army. As

³²⁹ DHSL, December 18, 1950.

³³⁰ According to Ho's diaries, those staffs were Chen Qingwen (陳清文), Liu Zenghua (劉增華), Song Yuelun (宋越倫), Liu Yutang (劉毓棠), Wang Xinzong (王信忠), Deng Zhenxu (鄧振緒), all of whom were leaders of Sections under the Chinese Mission in Japan. See DHSL, December 19, 1950.

³³¹ DHSL, December 20, 1950.

³³² DHSL, December 21, 1950.

Okamura claims, “repatriating the two million Japanese in a short period of time required the Chinese making significant sacrifices.”³³³ The resumption of the civil war in the Northeast impeded further repatriation and so Japanese nationals left in that region - either those transferred to the Soviet Union or those remaining within the borders of mainland China - became a thorny issue for American and Russian diplomats in Tokyo for years to come.

Between 1946-1948, Huludao served as the main port of embarkation for Japanese nationals leaving Manchuria. It was also the port placed under the charge of future head of the Chinese Mission, Ho Shilai. Ho was appointed Port Commander of Huludao and Qinhuangdao in March 1946.³³⁴ One of his core missions was to arrange the repatriation of 1,000,700 Japanese soldiers within nine months. As a person who visited the ports in Huludao in April 1947 recalled, the dock could berth five 10,000-ton steamships.³³⁵ In this period, Ho followed Chiang’s “meet hate with compassion” directive and treated the Japanese soldiers well, just as a Japanese journalist described,

During the examination of Japanese by Chinese soldiers before the boarding. Gen. Ho used to stand by to see that no inconvenience was given by men under his command. More than once he reprimanded his officers for failing to obey this instruction to be kind to the Japanese. Though they were enemies only a few months ago, Gen. Ho always used to pick up Japanese in his car whenever he came across them.³³⁶

During his time in Huludao, Ho made friends with many Japanese and, as his diaries reveal, remained in contact with a number of them during his stay in Tokyo from 1950 to 1952. On November 26, 1950, Fukushima, a man who had got to know

³³³ He Yingqin, *Riben Fangwen Jiangyan Xuanji*, 65.

³³⁴ “Qinhu Liang Yaogang Siling He Shili Beifai Lüxin (秦葫兩要港司令何世禮北飛履新) [Qinhuangdao and Huludao Commander Ho Shilai Flew North to Assume New Post],” March 27, 1946, *The Kung Sheung Daily News*.

³³⁵ Shen Yunlong (沈雲龍), *Ling Hongxun Xiansheng Fangwen Jilu* (凌鴻勛先生訪問紀錄) [The Reminiscences of Mr. Ling Hung-hsun] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1997), 215.

³³⁶ “Nippon Gov’t to Thank Gen. Ho for Kindness in Repatriation”, July 29, 1950, *Nippon Times*.

Ho whilst in Huludao as part of a crew working for the Manchuria Railway Company, paid a visit to the head of the Chinese Mission in Tokyo. Ho wrote candidly in his diary, “I have not met him for several years and could not have believed I would meet him again here.”³³⁷ Similarly, on June 24, 1951, a Japanese named Kimura, whom Ho had also met in Huludao, pleaded with Ho for funds totaling ten thousand yen that could pay for his daughter’s wedding. In his diary, Ho wrote of Kimura, “I think he made many contributions in Huludao. Only after he sent the last group of Japanese nationals aboard did he himself leave, a fact which deserves compliment. As a consequence, I decided to collect ten thousand yen to send to him as a way of showing that our government has not forgotten him.”³³⁸ When Ho was coordinating the repatriation efforts in Huludao in 1946, the Nationalist-led China was still one of the Big Four Powers. Four years later, however, as he assumed the leadership role at the Chinese Mission, and even though internationally they were still recognized as the legitimate Chinese regime, the Nationalists had lost the civil war and been driven to Taiwan. In 1952, the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty weakened the status of the Nationalists fundamentally. As Ho frequently wrote in his diary, his professional experience is a lens through which the changing fortunes of the Chinese and Japanese governments in the post-war period can be observed. What’s more, Ho Shailai’s involvement in the dispute between the ACJ’s American and Soviet representatives opens a window on the growing US-Soviet Union rivalry during the opening stage of the Cold War.

³³⁷ DHSL, November 26, 1950.

³³⁸ DHSL, June 24, 1951.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE TOKYO TRIAL

To the Chinese, obtaining reparations from Japan and punishing Japanese war criminals responsible for atrocities committed in wartime were amongst the top priorities of postwar policy. According to a member of staff from the Chinese Mission, the main focus of China's policies toward Japan included the "removal of the emperor, reparations to be paid, participation in the actual administration of the Japanese home islands, punishment of those guilty of war, [and] removal of the influence of the zaibatsu."³³⁹ The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), also famous for its synonymy as the Tokyo Trial, was established in 1946 to try Japanese war criminals. The Tribunal was a long and complicated process during which a variety of competing views and opinions prosecuting the offenders were sharply debated. Though the final results of the Tokyo Trial seemed satisfactory to the Chinese representatives, the bitterness and numerous unresolved problems deriving from it did not easily dissipate. In addition, after the establishment of the PRC in 1949, trying and reeducating Japanese accused of war crimes who remained in mainland China became a propaganda weapon wielded as a way to demonstrate the legitimacy of the CCP.³⁴⁰

Due to its historical and political significance, controversies over whether the Tokyo Trial was a demonstration of "victor's justice," whether or not it conformed with international laws in regards to force, how it contributed to the development of later international laws, and how it compared with the Nuremberg Trial, have made it the nucleus of scholarly studies for decades.³⁴¹ In the China Studies field, however, scholarly studies have, unsurprisingly, focused on the Tokyo Trial's ties with the

³³⁹ Samuel C. Chu, "General S. M. Chu on the Allied Council and Sino-Japanese Relations," in Thomas W. Burkman ed., *The Occupation of Japan: The International Context*, 32.

³⁴⁰ See Barak Kushner, *Men to Devils, Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice*.

³⁴¹ Richard H. Minear, *Victors' Justice: Tokyo War Crimes Trial* (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2015); Kerstin Von Ling, *Transcultural Justice at the Tokyo Tribunal: The Allied Struggle for Justice, 1946-48* (Boston: Brill, 2018); Timothy P. Maga, *Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials* (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2001); Yuma Totani, *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008); Madoka Futamura, *War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice: The Tokyo Trial and the Nuremberg Legacy* (London: Routledge, 2008); Arnold C. Brackman, *The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials* (New York: Morrow, 1987).

Japanese invasion of China and, more pertinently, the Nanjing Massacre.³⁴² As the Trial relates to what occurred in the winter of 1937 in Nanjing has been examined by Timothy Brook, who looks to “understand how the tribunal chose to interpret the Rape of Nanking as part of its strategy to determine Japan’s war criminality.”³⁴³ China’s direct participation in the Tokyo Trial has only been superficially studied because the role played by Chinese men such as Judge Mei Ru’ao (梅汝璈) and Prosecutor Xiang Zhejun (向哲濬) was relatively limited. A passage from John Dower on the American dominance in the Tokyo Trials aptly summarizes the current understanding of the field:

An international panel of judges did preside and the president of the tribunal was Australian, but the Tokyo trial was a predominantly American show. Americans dominated the “International Prosecution Section” that set the agenda for the tribunal, and they brooked scant internal dissent from other national contingents.³⁴⁴

In recent years the publications of Mei’s diaries and Xiang’s papers, however, have offered another angle to explore China’s role during the Tokyo tribunals. In these documents, the Chinese Mission is mentioned occasionally. For example, Mei usefully recounted his life in Japan from March to May of 1946, frequently mentioning his interactions with the Chinese Mission in Japan.³⁴⁵

This chapter introduces stories from behind the scenes of the IMTFE which, in the opinion of the author, deserve scholarly attention. As a Japanese academic has summarized, the United States “seized the initiative in the management of the trial,

³⁴² Cheng Zhaoqi (程兆奇), “Songjing Shigen de Zhanzheng Zeren Zaijiantao-Dongjing Shenpan Youguan Nanjing Baoxingzui Beigaofang Zhengci Jianzheng Zhiyi (松井石根的戰爭責任再檢討——東京審判有關南京暴行罪被告方證詞檢證之一) [Re-Evaluation of Iwane Matsui’s War Guilt: Verification of Testimony on the Nanjing Massacre Given by Defendants at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials],” *Jindaishi Yanjiu* (近代史研究) [Modern Chinese History Studies], 2008, No. 6, 4-23.

³⁴³ Timothy Brook, “The Tokyo Judgment and the Rape of Nanking,” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (2001), 673.

³⁴⁴ John Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 74.

³⁴⁵ Mei Xiaobao (梅小璈) and Mei Xiaokan (梅小侃) eds., *Meiruo Dongjing Shenpan Wengao* (梅汝璈東京審判文稿) [The Tokyo trial manuscripts of Mei Ru’ao] (Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotongdaxue Chubanshe, 2013).

including the preparations, the appointment of judges and prosecutors, and all the other details of setting up the court.”³⁴⁶ Thus, with the United States dominating proceedings, other nations participating in the Trial were merely present in supporting roles: “the work of the war crimes sections established in the British Foreign Office, in America, in Australia, in Canada, in New Zealand, in China, and among the exile governments of the Netherlands and in liberated France was basically confined to the identification of those responsible and to the collection of evidence bearing on their activities.”³⁴⁷

It is therefore undisputable that the Chinese voice in the IMTFE was relatively weak and could not ultimately influence court proceedings, but this does not mean that the Chinese accepted the arrangement and outcome *fait accompli*. Indeed, the Chinese counterpart to the Tokyo Trial – The Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal held in the Nationalist’s capital in 1946 brought to the fore the contentious issues of jurisdiction and authority over the right to try the war criminals. It was against this background of contending international actors that the role of the Chinese Mission in Japan became significant. Serving as a channel between Tokyo and Nanjing, just as it had done for the repatriation issue, the Chinese Mission frequently transmitted messages requesting that certain Japanese war criminals be tried or called to give testimony. The Chinese Mission also served as the residence of the Chinese prosecutors and consultants attending the trial in Tokyo and the staff assisted with the gathering of information and administration. By analyzing several cases, this chapter looks at the Chinese attitude towards the trials of Japanese war criminals with an special focus on the key role played by the Chinese Mission.

CONTROVERSIES OVER JURISDICTION

Authorization for trying Japanese war criminals was first stipulated in Article 10

³⁴⁶ C. Hosoya, N. Ando, Y. Onuma, R. Minear eds., *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International Symposium* (Kldansha International Ltd., 1986), 80.

³⁴⁷ R. John Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds., *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1981), Vol. 1, xii.

of the Potsdam Declaration:

We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.³⁴⁸

On August 29, 1945, the United Nations War Crimes Commission issued “Draft Summary of Recommendations Concerning Japanese War Crimes and Atrocities,” in which Article 3 stated that,

... those Japanese who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting part in, the crimes or atrocities committed in, or against the nationals of, a United Nation should be apprehended and sent back to the countries in which abominable deeds were done or against whose nationals crimes and atrocities were perpetrated in order that they may be judged in the courts of those countries and punished.³⁴⁹

This stipulation later led to a debate over whether Nanjing or Tokyo had the judicial authority to try Japanese war criminals. On September 7, the Chinese government listed 82 Japanese war criminals “holding key positions” and were “all Generals or Lieutenant Generals, including such notorious characters as Yamashita, Homma, Doihara, Terauchi, Matsui, and Honjo.”³⁵⁰ On October 20, the Chinese government presented a list of 12 major Japanese war criminals and inquired if the US government had any objection to it. If no objection was forthcoming, the Chinese government announced it “will telegraph General MacArthur as Supreme Allied Commander and request that these men be arrested and detained as major Japanese

³⁴⁸ Potsdam Declaration. July 26, 1945,

<https://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/hiroshima-nagasaki/potsdam.html>.

³⁴⁹ “Draft Summary of Recommendations Concerning Japanese War Crimes and Atrocities,” August 29, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 6, 915-916.

³⁵⁰ “The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State,” September 9, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 6, 923.

war criminals.”³⁵¹ On November 6, 1945, the Chinese established the War Criminals Handling Committee (*Zhanzheng Zuifan Chuli Weiyuanhui* 戰爭罪犯處理委員會), a body composed of representatives from the Military, Diplomatic and Juridical departments. At the conference to determine how the Chinese government should respond to requests from SCAP to arrest and extradite Japanese POWs held on November 13, the Committee consented to the arrest of POWs whose whereabouts in China were known, but for those suspected of committing offences in China, it agreed that they must be prosecuted first before then being extradited to Japan.³⁵² Until the founding of the Chinese Mission in Japan in May 1946 greatly simplified the procedure, such negotiations between Nanjing and SCAP proceeded via the Chinese Military Committee headed by Albert C. Wedemeyer. But after the KMT established their new post-war Mission, Nanjing and Tokyo could communicate much more effectively.

FINDING THE MISSING JAPANESE AND EXTRADITION

For the purpose of arranging the trials, SCAP instructed the Chinese Mission in Japan to investigate and repatriate a number of Japanese military criminals still in China. According to the annual reports of the Chinese Mission, this task became a monthly duty. Approximately six to seven cases were thus included in monthly reports. Based on Chinese-language archival material, several cases will be introduced in this section. Insignificant they might be, nevertheless, these cases still reflect the ad-hoc and disorganized character of the military trial.

The first example concerns Yonegaki Kogyo (米垣興業), who was the Japanese consular official in Canton in 1945. Several months after the Japanese surrender, Yonegaki had yet to be repatriated to Japan and his family were eager to learn of his

³⁵¹ “The Charge in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State,” October 20, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 6, 948.

³⁵² “Zhanzheng Zuifan Chuli Weiyuanhui Dibaci Changhui Jilu (戰爭罪犯處理委員會第八次常會紀錄) [Minutes of the Eighth Congress of the War Criminals Handling Committee],” November 13, 1945, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0042.

whereabouts. His family therefore petitioned the Chinese Mission in the hope that information about him might be revealed. A memorandum from SCAP also requested that the Chinese Mission investigate the whereabouts and circumstances of several Japanese nationals, including Yonegaki:

1. This Section is in receipt of a letter from Japanese Central Liaison Office requesting release of certain former Japanese Diplomatic and Consular personnel in China.
2. It is requested that information be furnished this Section as to whether the subject personnel are being detained as War Criminals or any other reasons causing the delay of their repatriation.
3. The names and duties of the subject personnel are listed below:
 - a. HIRAIDE, Hiizu. First secretary of the Embassy, sent to Peking on an official mission before the termination of the war.
 - b. YONEGAKI, Kogyo. Consul-General at Canton.
 - c. KONAGAYA, Ryosaku. Chief of the consular police station and police superintendent at Canton.
 - d. ARINO, GAKU. Consul-General at Tsinan.
 - e. MAEDA, Teruzo. Chief of the consular police station and police superintendent at Tsinan.³⁵³

SCAP also asked the Chinese Mission for information on the whereabouts of another suspected criminal named Kuwajima Joichi (桑島正一). Apparently, though, the Chinese Mission had no prior knowledge about the individual, and even after checking a list of all influential Japanese figures during the War of Resistance was unable to find a name with the same pronunciation. The Chinese then asked the Japanese Foreign Office to trace this person and they found a possible match. While it was vacillating over whether this was the suspect SCAP had been searching for, SCAP got in contact to notify them that the request was the result of a misunderstanding.³⁵⁴

In another example, SCAP sent a memorandum on March 24, 1947 to the Chinese Mission and asked for the repatriation of a suspect in Taiwan named Su

³⁵³ "SCAP to the Chinese Mission," May 6, 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0033.

³⁵⁴ "The Chinese Mission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," August 19, 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0023.

Xinren (蘇新任). But this time the Nationalist government refused to cooperate, the Ministry of Justice replying that there was no criminal activity recorded against this person. Concrete evidence from SCAP would be required before the individual's extradition could be discussed. Finally, after a few months interval, on August 18, 1947, the Chinese Mission cabled the China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inform them that SCAP had failed to provide sufficient evidence against Su.³⁵⁵

Extradition of certain Japanese criminals from Tokyo to Nanjing was conducted by the First Group of the Chinese Mission after requests were granted by SCAP. The Chinese Mission required the extradition of Isogai Rensuke (磯谷廉介), the commander of the Battle of Taierzhuang (台兒莊) in Shandong, and the man who later served as the Governor-General of Japanese-occupied Hong Kong, and one Tani Hisao (谷壽夫), a military figure implicated in the Nanjing Massacre. Chang Jiakai (常家鎧), a lieutenant colonel from the First Group of the Chinese Mission, escorted them both to Shanghai in July 1946.³⁵⁶ Isogai was sentenced to life in prison but was released in 1952, while Tani received a death sentence before he was executed in 1947 in Nanjing.³⁵⁷ The Chinese Mission also requested the extradition of Tanaka Gunkichi (田中軍吉), who was accused of killing Chinese citizens in Nanjing. Tanaka was arrested by SCAP in April and escorted to Shanghai in May of 1947;³⁵⁸ he was executed in 1948.³⁵⁹

In another case, the Chinese government planned to dispatch its gendarmes to

³⁵⁵ "The Chinese Mission to the Foreign Ministry," August 18, 1947, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0023.

³⁵⁶ "Sanshiwu Niandu Benzu Jingban Yewu Jianbao (三十五年度本組經辦業務簡報) [Group Business Briefing, 1946]," Guoshiguan, 020-010121-0006; "Jigu Lianjie Gu Shoufu Zuo Zhuanjie Nanjing (磯谷廉介谷壽夫昨轉解南京) [Isogai Rensuke and Tani Hisao Escorted to Nanjing Yesterday]," October 3, 1946, *Dagongbao (Shanghai)*.

³⁵⁷ Xu Zhuoyun (許倬雲) and Qiu Hongda (邱宏達) eds., *Kangzhan Shengli de Daijia* (抗戰勝利的代價) [The Price Paid for Victory in the War of Resistance] (Taipei: Lianjing, 1986), 164-173.

³⁵⁸ "SCAPIN-1633: Apprehension of Suspected War Criminals," SCAPIN-DB, Nagoya University; "Ri Zhanfan Tianzhong Junji Zuori Yajie Dihu (日戰犯田中軍吉昨日押解抵滬) [Japanese War Criminal Tanaka Gunkichi Escorted to Shanghai Yesterday]," May 20, 1947, *Yishibao (Shanghai)*.

³⁵⁹ "San Zhanfan Qiangjue (三戰犯槍決) [Three War Criminals Executed]," January 29, 1948, *Dagongbao (Shanghai)*.

Japan to escort several Japanese criminals, including Nara Akira (奈良晃) and a group of Chinese traitors, back to China. The officers' entry to Japan was handled by the Chinese Mission. The only problem that needed resolving was that of transport. The Chinese government wanted the gendarmes to take a US transport plane to Japan, but the request was turned down because passengers on the flight were not permitted to carry weapons. The Chinese government then enquired whether its own Air Force could provide the men with transport, only to receive the reply that the only available plane was a bomber. That proposal was also rejected – because the weaponry on the aircraft itself would have to be removed.³⁶⁰ Only some five months later were the criminals able to finally be extradited to China.³⁶¹

But not all requests from Nanjing were granted by SCAP because a number of suspected war criminals were already being tried in Tokyo. Ogisu Rippei (荻洲立兵), for instance, served as the Taiwan Army's Chief of Staff under Japanese rule between 1935 and 1937, and he later commanded the Japanese Sixth Army at the Battle of Nomonham, where he was defeated by General Zhukov. Because of this background fighting against the Soviet Union, Ogisu was already being cross-examined by Russian prosecutors for his part in Nomonham, and so the Chinese were thus denied access to him.³⁶² In December 1948, the Chinese Mission also asked SCAP to extradite Kagesa Sadaaki (影佐禎昭) from Japan. SCAP refused on the grounds that, due to poor health, Kagesa was unfit to travel. In such cases, China's requests for extradition were turned down by SCAP.

ASSEMBLING EVIDENCE

Besides locating Japanese war criminals, SCAP also requested that the Chinese

³⁶⁰ “Wo Pai Xianbing Furi Tijie Hanjian Zhanfan (我派憲兵赴日 提解漢奸戰犯) [Gendarmes Dispatched to Japan to Escort Traitors and War Criminals],” January 31, 1947, *Xinwenbao*.

³⁶¹ “Zhongyao Zhanfan Liuren Yasong Hankou Shenxun (重要戰犯六人押送漢口審訊) [Six Important Criminals Escorted to Hankou],” November 14, 1947, *Dagongbao (Shanghai)*.

³⁶² “Pacific War Phase Will Open Shortly,” May 28, 1947, *Nippon Times*.

Mission help collect evidence and send it on to the Tribunal in Tokyo. In May, the prosecution asked the Chinese Mission to gather evidence of Japan's build-up of troops in Manchuria and Northeast China before the July 7th Incident of 1937.³⁶³ The Chinese Mission reported that Prosecutor Xiang Zhejun had accused several figures of conducting the war against China but demanded evidence of atrocities conducted by Doihara Kenji (土肥原賢二), Hashimoto Kingoro (橋本欣五郎), Hata Shunroku (畑俊六), Itagaki Seishirō (板垣征四郎) and Matsui Iwane (松井石根), as well as about atrocities committed after the cities of Guangzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, Hengyang, Guilin and Liuzhou had fallen into Japanese hands.³⁶⁴ The Chinese government struggled with these requests, however, because gathering the required evidence proved difficult. For instance, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ye Gongchao (葉公超), admitted that the Chinese government could not present any evidence concerning Doihara to the Tokyo Tribunal. Ye revealed that "we do not know anything about what Doihara had said or written to Zhang Zongchang (張宗昌) and Sun Chuanfang (孫傳芳)." Qin Dechun (秦德純), as relayed by Ye, once said that although every three-year-old kid knows Doihara was guilty, this could not be used as evidence.³⁶⁵

On February 1, 1947, SCAP's Diplomatic Section asked the Chinese Mission to collect back-issues of three Japanese newspapers published in Shanghai during the war: *The Shanghai Nippo*, *The Shanghai Nichi Nichi*, and *The Tairiku Shinpo* with issued date ranging from February 1, 1938 to November 22, 1944. SCAP also requested a book entitled *Record of the Facts of Illegal Acts and Resistance Accompanied with Destruction Committed by the Chinese Communists*, and "the order of the Chungking Government for the beginning of guerilla warfare against the

³⁶³ "Zhu Shiming to Foreign Ministry," May 22, 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0030.

³⁶⁴ "Zhu Shiming to Foreign Ministry," May 22, 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0030.

³⁶⁵ "Waijiaobu Dui riheyue Shenyihui Tanhuahui Jilu (外交部對日和約審議會談話會紀錄)," September 30, 1947, in *Zhongguo Dierlishidanganguan* (中國第二歷史檔案館) ed., *Zhonghuaminguoshi Danganziliao Huibian* (中華民國史檔案資料彙編), Nanjing Guominzhengfu Shiqi (南京國民政府時期), Vol. 5-3, 386.

Japanese forces in China, promulgated in or about the year 1938” and “a copy of every trial for atrocities or mistreatment of prisoners of war in which former members of the Japanese military forces have been the accused before Chinese Tribunals in China since the termination of hostilities.”³⁶⁶

The Chinese Mission transmitted the message back to China. The post-war Shanghai government was tasked with the collection of these materials but barely found anything, leaving the Chinese Mission to submit only very limited material evidence to the IMTFE. The Tribunal was extremely dissatisfied with what appeared to it to be a lack of cooperation shown by the Chinese side. In a report dated January 10, 1948, it is stated that the Tribunal had received a total of 3,700 documents and pictures as case evidence, but only 30 items had been submitted “to sustain numerous charges laid by China against the 25 Japanese A-Class war criminal suspects.” The report warned that China’s failure in submitting enough concrete evidence might place KMT-led China in an unfavorable position at the trial. The report further analyzed the reason why China was unable to submit suitable evidence:

The Chinese prosecution section, in an interview with Central News, attributed the lack of atrocity evidence to the “un-cooperative and indifferent” attitude of the competent authorities in China toward the trial in Tokyo, adding that evidence is difficult to obtain in Japan and time does not allow it to acquire more evidence which are permitted by the Tribunal to be introduced in summation and rebuttal stage.³⁶⁷

Although material evidence was lacking on the Chinese side, in-person representation was not, and the Chinese kept dispatching aids to Tokyo to participate in the Tribunal. As *The New York Times* reported on June 17, 1947, there was a Chinese vessel departing Shanghai for Kobe carrying “sixteen Chinese officials assigned to the International Military Tribunal at Tokyo.”³⁶⁸ The Chinese Mission was instructed to assist the Chinese prosecutor teams to gather information. SCAP

³⁶⁶ “The Diplomatic Section, SCAP, to the Chinese Mission,” February 1, 1947, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0026.

³⁶⁷ “China’s Evidence of Atrocities,” January 9, 1948, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0026.

³⁶⁸ “Chinese Ship to Visit Japan,” June 18, 1947, *The New York Times*.

asked the Chinese Mission to provide accommodation to the four counselors required by Xiang Zhejun, and only after the Chinese Mission agreed to house them would SCAP grant them entry to Japan. The Chinese Mission then asked the Foreign Ministry whether it could recruit those four counselors as special members to the Mission.³⁶⁹ Several days later, Xiang intervened and canceled the request on the grounds that accommodation and entry into Japan were proving “very difficult.”³⁷⁰ However, as the burden on the Chinese increased, in Tokyo internal conflicts among the Chinese representatives began to develop. Each side believing that the other was treading on its toes. Xiang Zhejun, for example, did not get along with the staff of the Chinese Mission, and when the Tokyo Trial was over, the Chinese Mission immediately requested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to demote the Chinese prosecutor team.³⁷¹

The Chinese Mission kept an eye on several witnesses from China who would testify at the Tribunal. For instance, the last emperor of imperial China, Pu Yi (溥儀), was brought to Japan by the Russians on August 9, 1946. Pu Yi was “in close Russian custody” and whoever wanted to interview him had to gain permission from the Soviet Embassy.³⁷² In court, Pu Yi testified on “why he was a puppet” on August 19, 1946.³⁷³ The last emperor denied the charge that his departure from Tianjin to Manchuria in 1931 was of his own volition rather than after being coerced by the Japanese.³⁷⁴

In September 1947, the Chinese Mission finished an updated report with information about the Tokyo Trial. In it, the Chinese Mission stressed two points. First, if any of the allied countries found new evidence against the major war criminals, then the individual could be extradited to that country. Second, SCAP had begun to

³⁶⁹ “The Chinese Mission to the Foreign Ministry,” December 27, 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0026.

³⁷⁰ “Xiang Zhejun to Foreign Ministry,” January 6, 1947, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0026.

³⁷¹ “The Chinese Mission in Japan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” June 15, 1948, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0026.

³⁷² “PUYI, Puppetruler, In Tokyo To Testify,” August 10, 1946, *The New York Times*.

³⁷³ “Pu Yi Tells Tribunal Why He Was A Puppet,” August 19, 1946, *The New York Times*.

³⁷⁴ Brian Power, *The Puppet Emperor: The Life of Pu Yi, Last Emperor of China* (London: Peter Owen, 1986), 205.

release suspected criminals against who evidence was flimsy. Fifteen Japanese criminals were expected to be released if the Chinese government did not themselves request their extradition.³⁷⁵ In a meeting organized by China's Foreign Ministry, one representative complained that SCAP had been releasing many Japanese figures culpable for war crimes. In reply, another representative gave the reason as being that the prisons were full and China's difficulties with collecting sufficient evidence were preventing it making requests for extradition. SCAP had been urging the Chinese government to come forward with evidence but receiving no answer, thus it had little option but to release numerous suspects.³⁷⁶

Courts in Yokohama where B-Class and C-Class war criminals were tried permitted the allies to partake in the procedure whenever the case related to that country. A member of the Chinese staff was dispatched to conduct prosecutions, but there was no Chinese judge. As a result, SCAP asked the Chinese Mission to send one military officer who was fluent in English to serve as a judge. The Chinese Mission dispatched Wang Gongwu (王公五), a colonel in the First Group of the Chinese Mission, to serve in Yokohama.³⁷⁷ Despite the Chinese occupational force was not dispatched, this section, composed of several military officers, was still in charge of military affairs in Tokyo. Some Chinese military officers without a background in law were asked to serve as judges in Yokohama court. In 1948 Lei Yanjun (雷炎均) became a judge who sentenced three Japanese criminals who were accused of torturing and killing overseas Chinese in wartime Japan to be hanged.³⁷⁸

TRIAL OF OKAMURA YASUJI

³⁷⁵ "Zhongguo Zhuri Daibiaotuan Guanyu Dongjing Chuli Riben Zhanfan Gaikuang Baogao (中國駐日代表團關於東京處理日本戰犯概況報告)," September 22, 1947, Zhongguo Dierlishidanganguan ed., *Zhonghuaminguoshi Danganziliao Huibian*, Nanjing Guominzhengfu Shiqi, Vol. 5-3, 360.

³⁷⁶ "Waijiaobu Dui ri Heyue Shenyihui Tanhuahui Jilu," September 15, 1947, in Zhongguo Dierlishidanganguan ed., *Zhonghuaminguoshi Danganziliao Huibian*, Nanjing Guominzhengfu Shiqi, Vol. 5-3, 378-379.

³⁷⁷ "The Chinese Mission to The Ministry of National Defense," November 10, 1947, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0026.

³⁷⁸ "Nuesha Huaqiao Rifan Sanren Bei Jiaoxing (虐殺華僑日犯 三人被絞刑) [Three Japanese Criminals Hanged for Slaying Overseas Chinese]," October 14, 1948, *Yishibao (Tianjin)*.

A striking example of the disputes surrounding just who had jurisdiction over the trial of Japanese war criminals was the case of Okamura Yasuji, the former Japanese Commander-in-Chief in China. At the inception of the postwar period, the Chinese had anticipated that the Japanese involved in perceived war crimes would be tried and executed. Okamura Yasuji, as the leader of the Japanese forces, was regarded as the number one villain responsible for the wartime atrocities which China's population suffered, but, to many people's surprise, he was not immediately prosecuted. Instead, the KMT protected Okamura in order to utilize his experience battling against the CCP during the War of Resistance – something – which the KMT valued in the new, postwar milieu after the Japanese surrender.³⁷⁹ Many studies have already documented the KMT's use of Okamura's abilities and the fact they led his exemption from prosecution in the trials.³⁸⁰ But how and why did SCAP assent to this? This section traces the wheeling and dealing between the SCAP and the Chinese Mission in Japan on this very issue.

Okamura's collaboration with the KMT has attracted academic interest over the past decades.³⁸¹ Beginning on June 1, 1946, Okamura was placed under the command of General Chen Cheng.³⁸² Chen's opinion was then decisive in determining Okamura's fate. When the Committee under the Executive Yuan in charge of Japanese War Criminals asked Chiang Kai-shek on July 4, 1946, when Okamura should be arrested, five days later Chen advised Chiang that Okamura should be "prosecuted with mercy." Yet, in order not to arouse misunderstandings either domestically or internationally, Okamura should still be prosecuted as a criminal - but with the caveat

³⁷⁹ The fact that Chiang utilized Okamura's advice in the Chinese Civil War has widely been mentioned by scholars in mainland China. See Jin Chongji (金冲及), *Zhuanzhe Niandai- Zhongguo 1947* (轉折年代—中國 1947) [Generational Shift: China in 1947] (Beijing: San Lian Shudian, 2017), 15.

³⁸⁰ Kato Kiyofumi, "The decline of the Japanese empire and the transformation of the regional order in East Asia," in Barak Kushner and Sherzod Muminov eds., *The Dismantling of Japan's Empire in East Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 25.

³⁸¹ Suzanne Pepper, *Civil War in China: the Political Struggle, 1945-1949* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 10-15.

³⁸² "He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek," May 30, 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-055.

that he be tried “only with clauses that alleviate his crimes.”³⁸³ It seems that Chen was determined that Okamura be prosecuted in China and was opposed to him being sent back to Japan. Chiang replied that the Committee could arrest Okamura “after he accomplishes his missions” for the KMT.³⁸⁴

In Japan, the military tribunal convened on April 29, 1946, and the court requested that the Chinese Mission in Japan have the Chinese government send Okamura Yasuji and Matsui Takuro to testify in the trial of Shunroku Hata, Field Marshal of the Japanese Army during the Second World War. The main focus of Hata’s trial was on whether or not he should be held responsible for the atrocities committed in Nanjing in December 1937 because the defendant’s representatives argued that “not only is Field Marshal Shunroku Hata not a Class A war criminal but he actually was one of the Japanese army’s sternest disciplinarians who was sent to Nanking to restore order among Japanese troops who committed the infamous rape.”³⁸⁵ Any testimony from either Okamura or Matsui was therefore viewed as potentially decisive in determining whether Hata was indeed accountable. However, the Chinese Nationalists had no intention of cooperating on the grounds that Okamura was too important a personage to be allowed to leave China. On November 29, Chen Cheng reported to Chiang that although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the idea of sending the two Japanese to testify for a specified period only, Chen himself was of the view that only Matsui could go. In Chen Cheng’s view, and as Chiang had told the Committee, allowing Okamura to leave China would severely disrupt the latter’s missions in China. Furthermore, Chen pointed out, to have Matsui testify was sufficient and would not break the regulations on the arraignment of witnesses.³⁸⁶ Upon hearing of this suggestion from Chen, Chiang immediately sanctioned it.³⁸⁷

The court in Tokyo could not perceive the real intention of the Chinese

³⁸³ “War Criminals Handling Committee to Chiang Kai-shek,” July 4, 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-059; “Chen Cheng to Chiang Kai-shek,” July 9, 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-060.

³⁸⁴ “Chiang Kai-shek to War Criminals Handling Committee,” July 15, 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00308-062.

³⁸⁵ “Wrong General Hata on Trial, Claims Defense,” June 27, 1946, *Nippon Times*.

³⁸⁶ “Chen Cheng to Chiang Kai-shek,” November 29, 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-067.

³⁸⁷ “Shilue Gaoben,” November 29, 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-060100-00218-029.

Government, however, and kept making requests for Okamura and Matsui to attend the proceedings through the Chinese Mission. On February 24, 1947, the Diplomatic Section of SCAP noted:

It is noted that the Chinese Government has advised that Neiji Okamura is at present unfit for travel and that his presence in China is required by the Chinese Government. If his health permits and if the Chinese Government will allow him to return to Japan for one month, it would be appreciated if he could be brought to Japan under the same circumstances as Matsui. Should this course prove impracticable, the Mission is requested to advise this Section in order that alternative arrangements may be made.³⁸⁸

As Chen Cheng suggested, Matsui was allowed to go to Japan for one month and return to China after giving his testimony. Okamura, on the other hand, was not permitted to go. However, on May 14, and due apparently to illness, the Department of National Defense decided not to allow Matsui to go to Japan either. Two days later, on May 16, the Diplomatic Section sent another message to the Chinese Mission,

Reference is also made to the Mission's memorandum No. CMF/189, dated December 23, 1946, and note verbale, dated May 13, 1947, the former stating that the illness of Neiji OKAMURA prevented his repatriation, and the latter indicating that Takuro MATSUI was unable to travel to Japan due to the state of his health. It would be appreciated by the Diplomatic Section if the Mission would initiate the necessary procedure to return to Japan the persons mentioned above as soon as the state of their health permits.³⁸⁹

Clearly, the "health issue" had been used as an excuse for Okamura not returning to Japan. In the end, the Military Tribunal tried Hata without the two key witnesses, sentencing him to life imprisonment as a Class A war criminal.³⁹⁰ Still, as time went on, more and more voices emerged criticizing the delay in placing Okamura on trial and requested that he be found guilty. To the KMT's official explanation for Okamura's on-going state of liberty did not, of course, mention his usefulness for the

³⁸⁸ "Diplomatic Section to the Chinese Mission," February 24, 1947, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0023.

³⁸⁹ "Diplomatic Section to the Chinese Mission," May 16, 1947, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0023.

³⁹⁰ "Shunroku Hata," May 11, 1962, *The New York Times*.

fight against the CCP in the Chinese Civil War. In a press conference in June 1947, Dong Xiguang, head of the Information Bureau, explained that Okamura first had to “assist the Chinese government deal with surrender issues and repatriate Japanese soldiers and residents,” but, in order to appease mounting mass anger, he promised that Okamura’s ultimate destiny “would be decided within a few months.”³⁹¹ Okamura eventually faced prosecution in China but was acquitted – a verdict which led to a subsequent anti-KMT propaganda drive. The CCP blamed the KMT for betraying the Chinese people who had suffered during the Japanese Invasion. As for Okamura himself, he rarely mentioned the verdict which shaped his fate nor his secret missions in postwar China. Okamura did, though, openly express his gratitude to He Yingqin for supporting the repatriation, but failed to comment of the potential death sentence he was saved from by Chiang Kai-shek.³⁹² Immediately after his acquittal, Okamura was sent back to Japan.³⁹³

THE CASE OF TAKASHI SAKAI

Takashi Sakai (酒井隆) was a Lieutenant General in the Imperial Japanese Army who conducted the battle of Hong Kong in 1941, and who then served as the governor of Hong Kong until 1942. Held accountable for Japanese atrocities in Hong Kong, Takashi was put on trial by the Military Tribunal in Tokyo. At the time Takashi was detained by the Chinese, SCAP probably did not know of his whereabouts. But on January 18, 1946, when MacArthur ordered the arrest of 100 suspected war criminals, Takashi’s name was amongst those listed.³⁹⁴

To the British in Hong Kong, to try Takashi either in Nanjing or Tokyo essentially made no difference. Noticing that Sakai was now in the hands of the Chinese, the British Embassy in Chongqing expressed a willingness to offer evidence against the

³⁹¹ “Gangcun Ningci Mingyun Shuyue nei Ke Jueding (岡村寧次命運數月內可決定) [Okamura Yasuji’s Fate Could be Decided in Several Months],” June 19, 1947, *Xin Wenbao*.

³⁹² He Yingqin, *Riben Fangwen Jiangyan Xuanji*, 24-30.

³⁹³ “Gangcun Ningci Yihui Riben (岡村寧次已回日本) [Okamura Yasuji Has Returned to Japan],” February 1, 1949, *Dagongbao (Shanghai)*.

³⁹⁴ “Plans Completed for Trial of Tojo,” January 18, 1946, *The New York Times*.

Japanese to Chinese officials.³⁹⁵ The British authorities in Hong Kong, reinstated after the war, also sought to have Takashi tried in Hongkong - but the request was rejected. Still, because “so many residents in Hong Kong and both British and Canadian soldiers who were involved in this case,” the British nevertheless requested the Chinese furnish them with a full and detailed report on the trial proceedings.³⁹⁶ During the prosecution, Major General Sir Francis Festing, Commander of British Forces in Hong Kong, generously supplied evidence of atrocities which were believed to have been committed against the Chinese by Japanese acting under Takashi during his term in Hong Kong.³⁹⁷ After a months-long investigation, the Nanjing court passed down the death sentence on August 27. As the *New York Times* reported, “Sakai was accused of mass [a]trocities in Hong Kong as well as conspiring to bring about early Japanese encroachments in North China. Other charges included the massacre and torture of wounded war prisoners and the looting and plundering of civilians. The tribunal denied Sakai’s request for a postponement of judgement.”³⁹⁸

Upon receiving this news, SCAP immediately requested that China postpone the execution in order to have Takashi testify in the Tokyo Trial. Perceiving that Takashi might not return to China to face his punishment, Xiang Zhejun visited the Chinese Mission in Japan and suggested that Nanjing execute Takashi immediately, using a “telegram delay” as the excuse.³⁹⁹ Takashi was executed on September 30, 1946, becoming the first Japanese war criminal sentenced to death by the Chinese military tribunal in Nanjing.⁴⁰⁰

The American’s shifting attitude toward Japan in 1948 also affected the Tokyo Trial, as one scholar has noted: “By 1948, the cold war between the United States and

³⁹⁵ “British Embassy in Chongqing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China,” February 5, 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0033.

³⁹⁶ “Francis Luting to Wang Shih-Chieh [Wang Shijie],” June 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0033.

³⁹⁷ “Jiujinglong Baoxing Zhengju Xianggang Dangju Songdao Jing (酒井隆暴行證據香港當局送到京) [Evidence of Atrocities Committed by Takashi Sakai Sent to Nanjing],” June 20, 1946, *Zhongyang Ribao* (中央日報) [Central Daily News].

³⁹⁸ “Dooms Japanese General,” August 28, 1946, *The New York Times*.

³⁹⁹ “The Chinese Mission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” September 5, 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0033.

⁴⁰⁰ “Qiangjue Jiujinglong Zuo Zaijing Zhixing (槍決酒井隆昨在京執行) [Takashi Sakai Executed in Nanjing Yesterday],” September 14, 1946, *Zhongyang Ribao*.

the Soviet Union had intensified even in the Far East. The United States and Great Britain quickly lost their zeal for pursuing Japan's responsibility for the war and for punishing wartime leaders. This led to the policy of ending Class A war crimes trials."⁴⁰¹ On November 14, 1948, the Court sanctioned the death sentence of seven Japanese who were believed to be involved in the war against China. When asked by news correspondents for his opinion about the verdict, Shang Zhen, head of the Chinese Mission in Japan, replied that he was satisfied.⁴⁰² With this verdict, the Tokyo Trial came to an end, but the task of repatriation continued, and would last for several more years.

THE EXECUTION

Staff from the Chinese Mission in Japan were allowed to attend the trials. One of them, Shen Jinding, wrote down his thoughts on proceedings and included them in his memoirs:

The defendants that have attracted my attention were the following persons: Hideki Tojo, he was one of the prime culprits of the China invasion war and the Pacific War. Certainly, he has lost his previous glory but he seemed to be trying his best to maintain his mighty appearance. Seishirō Itagaki, he was one of the main designers of the Manchurian Incident and possessed a careerist appearance. Although he is about to receive death sentence, he still smiles grimly. Iwane Matsui, he was swaggering around when the Japanese troops invaded Nanjing, but now he looks old and clumsy. Most of the other defendants have no expressions on their faces. As for Mamoru Shigemitsu, he looks calm.⁴⁰³

The Chinese government also requested that they send representatives to witness the executions but were refused by MacArthur. The General gave his explanation in his own memoir:

⁴⁰¹ C. Hosoya, N. Ando, Y. Onuma, R. Minear eds., *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International Symposium*, 83.

⁴⁰² "Ribei Zhanfan Dingyan Shang Zhen Biaoshi Manyi (日本戦犯定讞 商震表示滿意) [Shang Zhen Satisfied with Verdict on Japanese War Criminals]," November 14, 1948, *Xinwen Bao*.

⁴⁰³ ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 661-662.

I was besieged with requests for permits to allow press photographers to record the actual executions. I refused on the grounds that such a spectacle would outrage the sensibilities of the Japanese, and high-minded people everywhere...The uproar soon died away, but to reassure the people of the world that the executions had actually taken place, I invited the members of the occupation advisory group – the Allied Council-to attend as official witnesses. All accepted, although reluctantly.⁴⁰⁴

As a result, only Shang Zhen, as leader of the Chinese Mission and Chinese representative to the ACJ, was invited to witness the execution. On December 21, 1948, MacArthur handed over four letters to Sebald and asked him to deliver them to the four members of the ACJ. A part of the letter read:

The war criminals condemned to death by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East will be executed at Sugamo Prison on Thursday, December 23, in the early morning hours.

Inasmuch as the execution will carry out in pertinent part the judgment of the Allied Powers represented on the Tribunal, I request your attendance thereat as official witnesses for the said powers in order that you may thereafter certify to the executions of that phase of the Tribunal's judgment.⁴⁰⁵

Only Sebald, Patrick Shaw (British Commonwealth representative to the ACJ), Derevyanko, Shang, and "a doctor and prison authorities" were present.⁴⁰⁶ Sebald vividly recounted the reactions of the ACJ members upon receiving this special invitation in his memoir:

Upon reading it, Pat Shaw swallowed hard, turned pink, and said, "Let's have a whiskey!" General Derevyanko merely said, "Yes, I will come." He readily agreed to be alone, although I had never seen him previously without an aide or an interpreter. General Shang turned a bit pale but said, "Of course I will come. What shall I wear?" I suggested that he wear his uniform.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁴ Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 318-319.

⁴⁰⁵ William Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 171.

⁴⁰⁶ "Eyewitness Account of Japanese War Criminal Executions Recounted," December 23, 1948, *The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*.

⁴⁰⁷ William Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 172.

After the execution, all witnesses refused to reveal their thoughts to the press. Sebald did reveal, though, that it was “the most difficult experience in my life,” and the British representative told his secretary that he refused to meet anyone “especially newspaper staff.” Derevyanko and Shang also remained silent.⁴⁰⁸ A Chinese newspaper noted that Shang was extremely tired after watching the execution and refused to receive guests on the following day.⁴⁰⁹ Although there is no written account left by Shang, we can surmise that the execution may have affected him in a more complex fashion than it did the others, the reason being that the first man executed that day was Doihara, the leading figure in designing Northern China’s “autonomy” in the 1930s. Back in that period, Doihara frequently approached Shang, who was then governor of Hebei province, to ask for his cooperation. Shang loyally refused to cooperate with the Japanese while preserving his own power and was rewarded with several posts by Chiang Kai-shek during the War of Resistance. For Shang, then, Doihara’s execution was much more personal, and signified at last the termination of China’s war with Japan, but marked, too, the beginning of a perhaps even more complicated period for his country.

CONCLUSION

Neither the Chinese Mission in Japan, nor judge Mei Ru’ao or prosecutor Xiang Zhejun contribute much to the progress of the IMTFE outside of supporting role. As Samuel Chu, son of General Zhu Shiming, has summarized, “The other Chinese concerns for Japan, punishment of the war guilty and sanctions against the zaibatsu, were effectively carried out by SCAP in the early years of the Occupation, without any input [input] from the Chinese.”⁴¹⁰ However, there was some “input” from the Chinese side worth noting. As has been shown, there was the extradition of certain

⁴⁰⁸ Xiang Longwan (向隆萬) ed., *Xiang Zhejun Dongjing Shenpan Handian ji Fanting Chenshu* (向哲浚東京審判函電及法庭陳述) [Hsiang Che-Chun's Letters, Telegrams and Statements at the Tokyo Trial] (Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotongdaxue Chubanshe, 2014), 28.

⁴⁰⁹ Xiang Longwan ed., *Xiang Zhejun Dongjing Shenpan Handian ji Fanting Chenshu*, 285.

⁴¹⁰ Samuel C. Chu, “General S. M. Chu on the Allied Council and Sino-Japanese Relations,” in Thomas W. Burkman ed., *The Occupation of Japan: The International Context*, 33.

Japanese criminals conducted by the First Group of the Chinese Mission, the transmission of communication between the courts in Nanjing and Tokyo, and the witnessing of the executions of the A-class Japanese war criminals. The Chinese Mission was placed in charge of the B-Class and C-Class trials in Yokohama, although the results of which were not of great concern to the Chinese.

Another detail that exemplified Chinese government's eagerness to play a major role in trying Japanese war criminals was the status and experience of the diplomatic representatives that it wanted to send to Tokyo. Two months after the Japanese surrender, the Chinese government was eager to dispatch its political representatives to Japan at the earliest possible date. Before Zhu Shiming was selected, a suggestion had previously been made in November 1945. According to US records, "The Chinese Embassy made a similar request to appoint Hsu Mou [Xu Mo (徐謨)] as head of a special Chinese mission to be attached to General MacArthur's headquarters and was advised that the matter would be brought up before the Far Eastern Commission."⁴¹¹ A Chinese source also noted that Xu Mo and Chen Jie (陳介) were selected to serve in Japan as Chinese representatives.⁴¹² Xu had read law at Peiyang University (北洋大學) and George Washington University in the United States. Upon his graduation, Xu became a scholar in Nankai University and later served as a judge in Shanghai. In 1928, Xu entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and began his career as a diplomat with jurist background. By 1945, he had already become an elite Chinese jurist who, representing the ROC, participated in the works of the Committee of Jurists of the United Nations.⁴¹³ Chen Jie also was a seasoned diplomat who had served as China's ambassador to Germany between 1938 and 1941 and had later become ambassador to

⁴¹¹ "The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)," October 13, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 6, 751.

⁴¹² "Xu Mo Chen Jie Canjia Guanzhi Riben (徐謨陳介參加管制日本) [Xu Mo and Chen Jie Participate in Overseeing Japan]," November 5, 1945, *Yishibao (Chongqing)*.

⁴¹³ Zhao Guocai (趙國材), *Guoji Fayuan Shouwei Zhongguoji Faguan Xu Mo: Shengping Ji Gongxian* (國際法院首位中國籍法官徐謨 (1893-1956) : 生平及貢獻) [The Very First Chinese Judge Hsu Mo (1893-1956) of the International Court of Justice: His Life and Contribution], *Junfa Zhuankan* (軍法專刊) [The Military Law Journal], Vol. 60:6 (2014), 140-178.

Brazil and Mexico.⁴¹⁴ It was perhaps his three-year experience in Germany that had made him a suitable candidate to participate in China's occupation of postwar Japan. The idea of sending Xu and Chen to Japan, despite never being fulfilled, demonstrates the importance that China placed on the issue of Japanese war criminals at the end of the cataclysmic war with their neighbor.

Similar to the case of Japanese repatriations, the Soviet Union was eager to utilize the war trials of the Japanese military and political figures for propaganda purposes, as Yoshida recounted in his memoir:

.....when Pu-Yi, the ex-Emperor of Manchukuo, was summoned as a witness, it was proposed by the Soviet representative in the Allied Council for Japan that the Emperor of Japan should also be summoned to appear, and it was the Supreme Commander and the Chief Prosecutor, Mr Joseph Keenan, who opposed such a step.....⁴¹⁵

In sharp contrast to the Russians, the Chinese did not express any willingness to prosecute Japan's emperor, following instead Chiang Kai-shek's instruction of "returning virtue for malice (*Yi De Bao Yuan* 以德報怨)." The focus for the Chinese was on the prosecution of major Japanese war criminals. And, despite the trials ending in 1948, the repercussions continued. In February 1949, the CCP accused MacArthur of interfering in China's domestic affairs by having 260 Japanese war criminals sent back to Japan from China to serve prison terms instead of handing them to the CCP for trial.⁴¹⁶ Nevertheless, when the PRC was established in October of that year, the trials of Japanese on the mainland no longer took place under the aegis of the KMT. From then on, war criminals and other Japanese still in China became an issue for the CCP to resolve.

⁴¹⁴ Chen Yutang (陳玉堂), *Zhongguo Jinxiandai Renwu Minghao Dacidian* (中國近現代人物名號大辭典) [A Dictionary of Modern and Contemporary Chinese Personages] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Guji Chubanshe, 2005), 671.

⁴¹⁵ Yoshida Shigeru, *The Yoshida Memoirs*, 50.

⁴¹⁶ "Communists Accuse MacArthur," February 5, 1949, *The New York Times*.

CHAPTER FIVE: REPARATION AND RESTITUTION

China's loss and suffering during the War of Resistance between 1937 to 1945 were so colossal that the request for reparations was the top priority of the Chinese government's postwar foreign policy towards Japan. From the Cairo's Conference in 1943, at which leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and Republic of China conferred about the blueprint of postwar Japan, to the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952, according to which the Nationalist Chinese government relinquished its claims on reparations from Japan, Republic of China had been struggling to obtain miscellaneous types of reparations and restitution for Chinese properties looted by Japan, only to receive disappointing results. Policies regarding reparations from Japan were discussed and made in the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in Washington D.C., and the Allied Council of Japan (ACJ) in Tokyo was obliged to execute the decisions made by the FEC. However, for nearly three years members of the FEC could not reach consensus on the disposition of the Japanese properties extracted for reparations. In spite of this fact, the US government still favored China in taking the largest amounts of reparations from Japan in comparison to other claimant countries. It was against this background that the Chinese Mission in Japan made some progress in receiving reparations and making restitution for looted Chinese properties, although the final results were still dissatisfying to the Chinese government.

Much research to date has focused on the calculation of the Chinese damages in wartime. However, in view of the principles of postwar Japanese reparations policies designed by the United States, the miscellaneous calculations methods undertaken by the Chinese government, regardless of being made before or after the Japanese surrender, regional-level or national-level calculation, turned out to be meaningless on the grounds that the United States eventually determined to dispose thirty percent of the reparation items to China. This philosophy was expressed in Edwin Pauley's report on reparations from Japan, in which he suggested that "reparations be estimated on the basis of Japan's ability to pay, not on the cost of the war damage it had

done.”⁴¹⁷ In other words, no matter how colossal the amount of the damages claimed by the Chinese government was, China could only obtain a fixed percentages from Japan’s items extracted for reparations purpose. In studying Allied Occupation policies in Japan, the functions of the FEC have been well examined by previous scholars. The FEC was indeed successful in making several decisions, but it made relatively limited progress on issues with regard to reparations. In the case of China, Gu Weijun (Wellington Koo), China’s ambassador to the US, also served as the Chinese representative in the FEC and his opinions were influential in the FEC meetings. But in general, incessant controversies in the FEC meetings made progress on reparations from Japan extremely ineffective. Furthermore, the function of the FEC became of little importance as the US government adjusted its policies on Japan in 1948. For the purpose of supporting economic revival of Japan to contain the brewing communist threat in East Asia, the US government unilaterally announced the termination of the Japanese reparation program, which thoroughly disappointed other allies. In general, the reparations policies between 1945 to 1948 remained in disarray, and the effects of which were relatively limited. By examining the role played by the Chinese Mission in Japan in dealing with reparation issues in the ACJ, this chapter examines what the Chinese actually obtained in reparations from Japan and their preferences of items they wished to acquire.

To a great extent, postwar reparations and restitution were two sides of the same coin. As China vied for its share of Japanese reparations with other allies, restitution of looted Chinese properties was progressing in Tokyo. As the biggest victim of the Japanese invasion, substantial amounts of Chinese treasures, such as ancient books and antiquities, were taken by the Japanese army and shipped back to Japan. As long as the Chinese government could identify or submit credentials of those items being looted during war, SCAP granted their return back to China. This operation proved far more effective than the reparations, as China faced little dissent from other allies. As the US halted the reparation program in 1949, the Chinese Mission kept working on

⁴¹⁷ Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 70.

restitution. Among those miscellaneous items that China wanted to retrieve, the former Manchukuo assets left in Japan were of great significance to the Chinese Mission. This chapter suggests that a “Northeastern nostalgia” existed in the Chinese Mission in Japan that prompted the Chinese Mission to pay massive attention to issues with regard to Northeast China. The retrieval of items not only was based on their economic benefit, but also to a meaningful political significance.

OUTLINE OF REPARATION POLICIES

China’s main objective of reparations from Japan was always industrial-production equipment. At the Cairo Conference, Chiang Kai-shek proposed to President Roosevelt that “a part of the reparation Japan was to pay China after the war could be paid in the form of actual properties. Much of Japan’s industrial machinery and equipment, war and merchant ships, rolling stock, etc., could be transferred to China.” Upon hearing this request, President Roosevelt “expressed his concurrence in the proposal.”⁴¹⁸ On September 18, 1945, the Chinese government sent a memorandum to both the US and the Soviet Union expressing its willingness that when “various assets within Japan are divided up among the Allied nations as partial compensation for their losses, China should be given a good percentage of them, together with priority for the delivery of these goods.”⁴¹⁹ A proposal in 1945 noted that except for allowing industry for peaceful means to continue to exist in Japan, the remnant equipment should be transplanted to China as a part of reparations.⁴²⁰ On the other hand, reparations from Japan were expected to alleviate the economic crisis spreading in postwar China.⁴²¹ The Chinese government made a grandiose plan for reparations from Japan. In his report on March 4, 1946, Weng Wenhao, the Minister of Economy, even anticipated that all of Japan’s industrial and

⁴¹⁸ "Roosevelt–Chiang dinner meeting, 8 p.m., November 23, 1943,” in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), 324.

⁴¹⁹ Chang Kia-ngau, *Last Chance in Manchuria*, 139.

⁴²⁰ ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 638.

⁴²¹ ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 452.

mining equipment be transplanted to China.⁴²² At this point, the Chinese government optimistically believed that China could claim all, or at least the majority of, reparations from Japan and would not have to share with other allies on the grounds that China's damages during the war were the largest.

Another factor strengthening China's confidence in gaining reparations from Japan came from the report written by Edwin W. Pauley, the representative of President Truman in the investigation of postwar Japan's industrial capacity. On November 13, 1945, Pauley's investigation team arrived at Japan to begin its one-month inspection, during which Pauley paid a visit to China and met Chiang Kai-shek on November 22. Four days later, Pauley wrote Chiang that he would like to send his staff to Chongqing to inquire about China's industrial capability and means to take over reparations from Japan.⁴²³ In Pauley's report, one can discern his sympathy with China, as he stressed that "the allocation of surplus Japanese industrial potential to countries entitled to reparations, especially neighboring Asiatic countries, should improve the economic balance, and contribute to the political stability, of Eastern Asia as a whole."⁴²⁴ Among the specialists in Pauley's team, Owen Lattimore was in the position of having China particularly benefit from reparations from Japan.⁴²⁵ The kindness showed by Pauley and Lattimore made the Chinese sanguine about utilizing Japan's items to rebuild the country.

After Pauley's return to the United States, a member of Pauley's Mission named Hubert G. Schenck attended a cocktail party held by the Chinese Mission in Japan. As William MacMahon Ball, the UK representative to the ACJ, noted, "He seemed to have been very impressed on the one hand with the tremendous industrial potential of Manchuria and on the other hand with the thorough way in which the Russians had stripped industrial plant and thereby crippled the present productive power of the

⁴²² ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 474.

⁴²³ "Pauley to Chiang Kai-shek," November 26, 1945, Guoshiguan, 001-112000-00007-004.

⁴²⁴ Edwin W. Pauley, *Report on Japanese Reparations to the President of the United States, November 1945 to April 1946* (Washington D.C.: Department of State, Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, 1948), 3-4.

⁴²⁵ Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 56.

region.”⁴²⁶ Indeed, it was at the time “when U.S. policy-makers were still planning that other nations in East Asia, led by China, would establish a new balance of power and would make good use of Japanese reparations.”⁴²⁷ It was against this background that the newly-established Chinese Mission in Japan began to survey those Japanese properties it would like to take over.

With Pauley’s report submitted to President Truman in December 1945, an Interim Program of reparations from Japan, which largely based on the suggestions made by Pauley, was published in early 1946. The next procedure would be the percentage of reparations from Japan each claimant country would possess. This decision was to be discussed and made in the FEC, which was composed of eleven countries that had had wars with Japan. As China envisaged the transplant of Japan’s industrial equipment as reparations, other allies held the same view. Members of the FEC agreed that reparations from Japan should be paid through the transplant of industrial equipment, and the basic principles were to disintegrate Japan’s industries for a military purpose while maintaining the minimum level of industrial capacity upon which Japan could survive. Thus, the questions being discussed in the FEC were “the level to which Japanese industry must be cut back” and “what should be the various percentage shares of industrial equipment thus removed from Japan which each claimant country should receive as reparations.”⁴²⁸

Undoubtedly, members of the FEC could not reach any agreement on the percentage of the disposition. As Esler Denning noted, the FEC “suffered also from the difficulty of reaching agreement between so many powers, more particularly on the subject of reparations.”⁴²⁹ From May to December of 1946, a series of interim reparation policies were made in the FEC, but “the subsequent inability of the Commission to agree on a schedule of shares for division of the facilities among the claimant countries prevented implementation of the decisions.”⁴³⁰ In order to prevent

⁴²⁶ William MacMahon Ball, *Intermittent Diplomat*, 71.

⁴²⁷ Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan*, 71.

⁴²⁸ Samuel S. Stratton, “The Far Eastern Commission,” *International Organization*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (February 1948), 9.

⁴²⁹ Esler Denning, *Japan* (London: Benn, 1960), 87.

⁴³⁰ “Text of U.S. Note Halting Further Japanese Reparations,” May 13, 1949, *The New York Times*.

the stalemate, the US government unilaterally declared a disposition scheme and acquired the FEC's approval in April 1947. In this proposal, thirty percent of Japanese industrial plants would be immediately used for reparations, among which China could obtain half and the United Kingdom, Dutch Far Eastern territories and the Philippines share the other half.⁴³¹

In Tokyo, General MacArthur announced in January 1946 the seizure of "all Japanese arsenals and special war plants to be held for reparations in accordance with the recommendations of the Interim Program."⁴³² In January 1947 a source noted that SCAP had 1,000 plants earmarked for reparation but removal and shipment might constitute a problem to the claimant nations such as China and Philippines.⁴³³ While the FEC decided the "quantity" of the reparations from Japan to the allies, as a Chinese source vividly described, General MacArthur determined the "quality" of them.⁴³⁴ SCAP "tentatively designated 1,110 industrial plants as subject to removal for reparations and, on authorization of the United States government, actually started to distribute a small number of these plants as interim instalments to several claimant countries."⁴³⁵ With his dominance in Japan as well as his sympathy with the Chinese Nationalist, MacArthur treated the Chinese delegates in Japan in a friendly way comparing to others. With the latest instructions from the FEC, SCAP began to arrange tours for the allies to inspect the items they preferred to take over. As a news report noted, "Delegations, at their own request, are being conducted on tours of selected Japanese thermal power and machine tool industries which eventually may be claimed for reparations. The industries now are in SCAP custody."⁴³⁶ According to a report written by the Chinese Mission, the purpose of the tours was merely to "make allies understand the current conditions of the items preserved in factories." Despite so, the Chinese Mission still actively participated in the inspection tours, even set up

⁴³¹ Joseph Z. Reday, "Reparations from Japan," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 18, No. 13 (June, 1949), 147.

⁴³² Edwin W. Pauley, *Report on Japanese Reparations to the President of the United States, November 1945 to April 1946*, Log of the Mission.

⁴³³ "SCAP Ready to Move Goods Immediately," January 13, 1947, *Nippon Times*.

⁴³⁴ "Lüdong Duoshi (旅東掇拾) [Picked Stories on a Visit to Tokyo]," *Diangongtongxun* (電工通訊), August 1946.

⁴³⁵ Kazuo Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude*, 141.

⁴³⁶ "FEC Sets Up Status for Trade Envoys," March 26, 1947, *Nippon Times*.

seven sub-division, including arsenal, chemistry, steel, ship building, electricity, machinery, communication and transport, to enhance its efficiency.⁴³⁷ Based on the practical economical situation in China, the Chinese government inclined to ship back 14,744 pieces of machines, two ship-building factories, six steel-production factories, eleven chemical industry factories, eight electronical factories, and ten light metal factories. The total cost of shipping and building factories in China were estimated to be nearly 48 million US dollar.⁴³⁸

After a grandiose plan of utilizing reparations from Japan in rebuilding postwar China's economy, the new FEC decision was a striking blow to the Chinese. In a report made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 1947, it noted that the US government had ordered SCAP to extract thirty percent of Japanese industrial reparations to distribute to the allies, among which China could obtain half. Despite being disgruntled, it was still better than nothing. The Chinese government then dispatched five representatives to Japan to work on the details, and preparations for receiving these industrial plants, such as transportation, distribution, installation, were also being made in China.⁴³⁹ The Chinese government was sanguine about the reparation from Japan, as Wang Shijie reported in the National Assembly in May, 1947:

The items we receive in the future might be colossal, from which many problems derived. For instance, how to ship back those items to China and how to properly utilize them after which being shipped back to China. If we lay them aside and do not use them, the lost will be great. The Executive Yuan is now planning the ways in which we dispense and utilize the items from Japanese reparations, which will not only be dispensed to state-owned factories, some of which will be dispense to

⁴³⁷ "Zhuri Daibiaotuan Disanzu Saliunian Yiyuefen Gongzuo Baogao (駐日代表團第三組卅六年一月份工作報告) [Chinese Mission in Japan Third Group Work Report, January, 1947]," 1947, Guoshiguan, 020-010121-0008.

⁴³⁸ "Xingzheng Yuan Guanyu Kangzhan Sunshi he Riben Peichang Wenti Baogao (行政院關於抗戰損失和日本賠償問題報告) [The Executive Yuan's Report on War Damage and Japanese Reparations]," February 1947, in Zhongguo Dierlishidanganguan ed., *Zhonghuaminguoshi Danganzilio Huibian*, Nanjing Guominzhengfu Shiqi, Vol. 5-3, 238-239.

⁴³⁹ "Waijiaobu niti guomincanzenhui shizhengbaogao (外交部擬提國民參政會施政報告) [Ministry of Foreign Affairs's Proposed Report to the National Assembly]," May 1947, Zhongguo Dierlishidanganguan ed., *Zhonghuaminguoshi Danganzilio Huibian*, Nanjing Guominzhengfu Shiqi, Vol. 5-3, 9-10.

private-owned factories.⁴⁴⁰

To coordinate plenty of requests from the claimant countries, a committee entitled Reparations Technical Advisory Committee (RTAC) was set up on May 22, 1947 in Tokyo. The RTAC were allowed to “make recommendations regarding administrative procedures for inspection, claims, allocations, dismantling, crating and transportation” as well as make protests to the decision made by SCAP, but the latter had “final authority.”⁴⁴¹ The RTAC were composed of representatives from the eleven countries which were also the members of the FEC. The Chinese representative in the RTAC was Wu Bannong, chief of the Economic and Scientific Section in the Chinese Mission.

Minutes of the first meeting of the RTAC revealed how difficult a compromise could be made among the allies. Wu first raised doubts whether it was reasonable for every member of the committee to have an equal vote:

I think the majority of the nations represented here will not have been occupied by Japanese troops; there might not be any looted properties among those few nations which were occupied by Japanese troops. I think most of the nations are in different positions so far as looted properties are concerned...These are the factors which I think do not suit very well with this point; that is, the majority of the vote and the fact that one member has only one vote.

This suggestion faced objections from other members. The member from the Netherlands immediately responded to Wu’s suggestion:

I cannot agree with the statement of Mr. Wu. I understand there is a possibility that in China the loot is much greater than in other countries, but it does not mean that, of what we define here as looted property, China has a greater percentage in such looted property than other countries. Of course, the loot can be greater in China, but it does not necessarily mean that what we define here as looted

⁴⁴⁰ “Wang Shijie Zai Guomin Canzhenghui Shang Suozuo Waijiao Baogao (王世杰在國民參政會上所作外交報告) [Wang Shijie’s Report on Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly],” May 1947, Zhongguo Dierlishidangangan ed., *Zhonghuaminguoshi Danganziliao Huibian*, Nanjing Guominzhengfu Shiqi, Vol. 5-3, 18.

⁴⁴¹ “Body Formed to Aid SCAP on Reparation Problems,” May 23, 1947, *Nippon Times*.

property will be for a greater per cent Chinese loot.⁴⁴²

Wu's attitude reflected the mentality of the Chinese which had been brewing since the wartime period. As a Chinese member of the FEC wrote in a report after his visit to Japan in early 1946, "Since we have eight-year historical accomplishment in the War of Resistance, our country's opinions must be respected by other countries."⁴⁴³ Both Chinese members in the ACJ and FEC believed that they should have a louder voice in negotiations with other allies on the disposition of reparations from Japan, owing to China's substantial contribution to the war effort, but the other allies certainly held different views.

For the case of China, restitution of looted items constituted a substantial part of the reparation scheme. As the concrete instructions of what could be taken from the thirty-percent-reparation program was still unclear, the Chinese Mission first put its mind on restitution. By July of 1947, the Chinese Mission had requested the return of 140 vessels and 25 machines plants looted by Japan to be returned. For instance, among the 25 machines plants, one was a paper mill facility moved from Guangzhou to Hokaido during the war. By disclosing this message to the Chinese press, the Chinese Mission urged its compatriots to submit evidence of looted items in order to facilitate the efficiency of restitution.⁴⁴⁴

In September 1947, the Chinese Mission set up the Committee for Reparation and Restitution headed by Wu Bannong.⁴⁴⁵ As Wu addressed to the Chinese press in May 1947, the goal of this committee was to focus on items that could immediately put into use in China, such as grain, cloth, locomotive and railroad track. As for the factories in Japan that could be transplanted to China, Wu listed electricity, machinery,

⁴⁴² "Restitution Advisory Committee Minutes, 1st meeting," April 29, 1948, Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica (IMH Archives, hereafter), 11-01-02-20-02-003.

⁴⁴³ "Canjia Yuandong Guwen Weiyuanhui Furi Kaochatuan Gongzuo Baogao," January 1946, IMH Archives, 11-01-02-19-01-001.

⁴⁴⁴ "Wo Zhuri Daibiaotuan Banli Peichang Gongzuo Gaikuang (我駐日代表團辦理賠償工作概況) [Chinese Mission in Japan Work Report on Dealing with Reparations]," July 20, 1947, *Zhongyangribao (Chongqing)*.

⁴⁴⁵ "Wo Zhuri Daibiaotuan Chengli Peichang Weiyuanhui (我駐日代表團成立賠償委員會) [Chinese Mission in Japan Sets Up a Reparation Committee]," September 27, 1947, *Yishibao (Shanghai)*.

ship building and chemistry as priorities.⁴⁴⁶ In the Chinese Mission's annual report of 1947, Shang Zhen summarized its accomplishment and the difficulties it faced in obtaining reparations:

At first SCAP contemplated Japanese economic revenue and the technical problems, thus the progress of the reparations was frequently delayed. After our incessant efforts, we have obtained 34 warships, 9,447 pieces of machines, half part of arsenal-experimental equipment. Restitution of the materials such as books, antiquities, ships, and industrial equipment looted by the Japanese Army have been progressed relatively well. However, the incomplete evidence collected in China brought substantial difficulties to our work. And we have to frequently conduct investigations in Japan by ourselves.⁴⁴⁷

China's privilege to take half of the thirty percent of reparations from Japan might have made other countries envious, but in the reality the Chinese government could not select items for reparations at will. Wu Bannong openly grumbled that the US forbade private Japanese aviation and ammunition factories to be part of the reparation program. Wu said, "We don't understand why, in terms of the Potsdam agreement, these types of factories are not to be dismantled." Wu further revealed that most of the items took over by China from the fifteen percent reparation program could not be used, "some lack motors, most lack pieces." In order to find the missing part of the machinery, the Chinese Mission had to inspect the factory in Japan. As a news story noted, "The Chinese experts wish to find the missing parts in the remnant of the factories in Japan, but it is questionable whether they can find them. If not, we have to buy those missing items with US Dollars in Japan."⁴⁴⁸ In addition, after being shipped back to China many items were not managed well. For instance, some machines took over by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (Gongshangbu 工商部) were left at the dock in Shanghai for half year, and most of which turned rotted

⁴⁴⁶ "Wu Bannong Tan Ri Peichang Wenti (吳半農談日賠償問題) [Wu Bannong on Problems with Japanese Reparations]," May 11, 1947, *Zhongyang Ribao*.

⁴⁴⁷ "Shang Zhen to Chiang Kai-shek," December 24, 1947, Guoshiguan, 001-061100-00008-004.

⁴⁴⁸ "Ri Minjian Zhanzheng Gongye Ying Suchai Chong Peichangpin (日民間戰爭工業 應速拆充賠償品) [Japan's Civil and Military Industry Should be Quickly Dismantled and Serve as Reparations]," July 20, 1948, *Dagongbao (Shanghai)*.

and could no longer put into production. The North China Herald even took a photo of these rotted items and added an satirizing description “monument of huge waste of items (*Baotian Jinianbei* 暴殄紀念碑).”⁴⁴⁹ As Kazuo Kawai summarized:

At the same time, although essential to Japan for her own recovery, the plants earmarked for reparations were in such poor condition as to be not worth the bother of dismantling and transporting to other countries. Heavy industries especially could not be moved from their original sites without inordinate loss of efficiency. Moreover, many of the nations most clamorous in their demands for Japanese industrial equipment did not have the capability of operating such equipment. Some of the nations most insistent in their claims failed to take even the interim instalments when SCAP got them ready for shipment, and some of the equipment which was taken lay unused after reaching the recipient country.⁴⁵⁰

TAKING OVER JAPANESE VESSELS⁴⁵¹

As Shang Zhen wrote in his annual report of 1947, the thirty-four warships obtained from the Japanese reparation program were perhaps the most valuable items received by the Chinese government in its struggle for reparations from Japan. Wu Bannong did not detail why the Chinese government had such a substantial interest in Japanese aviation factories. One could only surmise that the Chinese Nationalist had a huge demand for military planes to be used in the Civil War against the Chinese Communists. Despite of the fact that warships could be barely used in the Civil War, they were still indispensable in building a modern Chinese navy. The navy and air force dominance of the KMT after 1949 were in great part due to the warships obtained from Japan as well as US military assistance.

Immediately after the Second World War, the United States Navy advised the

⁴⁴⁹ “Zhongxunju (中訊局) to Chiang Kai-shek,” September 16, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00547-064.

⁴⁵⁰ Kazuo Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude*, 141.

⁴⁵¹ Detailed research on Chinese vessels received as Japanese reparations has been produced by a Navy specialist in Taiwan. See Chen Xiaodun (陳孝惇), “Zhanhou Riben Peichang Jianting zhi Jieshoubianzu ji qi Yiyi (戰後日本賠償艦艇之接收編組及其意義) [The Takeover of Vessels from Japanese Reparations and its Meaning],” *Zhonghua Junshi Xuehui Huikan* (中華軍史學會會刊) [Bulletin of the Chinese Military History Association], Vol. 6, 173-213.

KMT on the development of the Chinese navy. Chester W. Nimitz, chief of US Naval operations, suggested the establishment of a construction engineering team. American marines were garrisoned in Beijing, Tianjing, and Tanggu, but withdrew after Marshall's abortive mission in early 1947. Qingdao became the bastion of the US navy in China, where a United States Naval Training group was there to train Chinese naval forces and monitor Russian activities in Northeast China.⁴⁵² At the time when the US government was eager to upgrade China's military capacity in East Asia, President Truman even issued Executive Order 9843, "Authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to Transfer Certain Vessels and Material and to Furnish Certain Assistance to the Republic of China."⁴⁵³

The disposition of the Japanese vessels after the Japanese surrender became an extremely controversial issue. Theoretically, in terms of the Potsdam Declaration, all the Japanese vessels should have been destroyed. In reality, however, some Allied countries preferred to distribute them for practical use. On October 30, 1945, Wei Daoming, Chinese Ambassador to the United States, cabled Wang Shijie that the US government had decided to wreck all Japanese battleships and cruisers, while destroyers and small battleships would be dispensed by China, United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.⁴⁵⁴ Upon receiving this information, Wang Shijie instructed Wei to bargain a bigger share for the Chinese on the grounds that China suffered more than other allies during the war.⁴⁵⁵ According to a report from the British Foreign Office in November 1945, MacArthur intended to "hold up decision as to whether to sink them or not until views of His Majesty's Government in United Kingdom, French Government and Soviet Government had been obtained."⁴⁵⁶ From the British point of view:

General MacArthur's omission of the Chinese Government, as one of the Governments whose views should be obtained, was presumably a mere slip. It

⁴⁵² Tsou Tang, *American Failure in China, 1941-50* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 444.

⁴⁵³ Executive Order 9843, April 25, 1947, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/executive-orders/9843/executive-order-9843>.

⁴⁵⁴ ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 65-66.

⁴⁵⁵ ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 66.

⁴⁵⁶ "Japan," UK National Archives, CAB 122/898.

has no doubt occurred to you already that the Australian Government would also be extremely put out if they were not among those consulted. They would plainly have a serious grievance if there were a division of the Fleet in which they were not regarded as being entitled to a share.⁴⁵⁷

In the meantime, France and the Netherlands appealed to join the disposition and received objection from the Chinese on the grounds that “France did not actually participate in the war in the Far East, and China did not take part in the dispense of German battleships either.”⁴⁵⁸ On January 31, 1946, an agreement was made that “all Japanese submarines and all Japanese combatant vessels larger than destroyers should be destroyed but that destroyers and surface combatant vessels of lesser tonnage should be divided equally between the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China and the United States.”⁴⁵⁹ On April 6, 1946, the order given by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff was to “dispose promptly of vessels easily restorable to military use, and leave sunken and beached vessels in badly damaged condition for subsequent reduction to scrap.”⁴⁶⁰ As Robert A. Fearey summarized:

All weapons and implements of war not convertible to peacetime uses, fortifications, and specialized war-purpose industrial equipment had been scrapped or otherwise destroyed in the earlier period except surface naval vessels of destroyer size or less, which the four principal Allies had agreed in October 1946 should be divided equally among them. In October 1947, after 135 vessels had been divided, SCAP notified the four Allies that the remainder, numbering slightly over 100 ships, were required for occupation and other tasks involved in implementation of Japan’s surrender, and that their division would therefore have to be deferred. SCAP has not yet found it possible to release these ships.⁴⁶¹

News began to spread in Nanjing that the Chinese government was about to take over some Japanese warships. On April 10, 1947, Shen Jinding revealed to the press that this program was still at “an initial stage.”⁴⁶² On 30 April 1947, Shang cabled

⁴⁵⁷ “Japan,” UK National Archives, CAB 122/898.

⁴⁵⁸ ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 69.

⁴⁵⁹ “Japan,” UK National Archives, CAB 122/898.

⁴⁶⁰ “Japan,” UK National Archives, CAB 122/898.

⁴⁶¹ Robert A. Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-50* (New York: Macmillan, 1950), 13.

⁴⁶² “Ribben Lingxun (日本零訊) [Scattered News],” April 10, 1947, *Zhongyang Ribao (Chongqing)*.

Chiang that the Japanese vessels that China had received could be categorized into three types—repairable, proposed to be written-off, and written off—according to Gui Yongqing (桂永清), commander of the Chinese navy.⁴⁶³ The way to dispense the Japanese battleships was decided by drawing lots. On 24 June 1947, Shang cabled Chiang reporting that the draw to distribute the Japanese vessels would be held on 28 June in Tokyo.⁴⁶⁴ On 24 July, Gui cabled Chiang stating that Shang Zhen reported that the Chinese Mission had just received eight Japanese vessels weighing 8,450 tons in the second draw.⁴⁶⁵ On 20 August, Gui reported Chiang that the US decided to give the Japanese ships it received from the draw to China and proposed Qingdao as the port to take over.⁴⁶⁶ On 20 August, Gui reported that the Chinese Mission obtained eight vessels in the third draw and would receive them in Qingdao.⁴⁶⁷ On 22 August, Gui further reported the details of receiving the vessels transferred from the United States.⁴⁶⁸ The Ministry of National Defense summarized the result of the draw as follow:

Type of Vessel	Number	Tonnage in Total	Note
Destroyer	6	12,195	3 in the first slot, 2 in the second, 1 in the third.
Destroyer Escort	17	12,250	5 in the first slot, 6 in the second, 6 in the third.
Carrier	1	1,800	Obtained from the third slot.
Total	24	29,245	

There are still 30 battleships awaited to be delivered, but GHQ has not made the final

⁴⁶³ “Shang Zhen to Chiang Kai-shek,” April 30, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00538-096.

⁴⁶⁴ “Shang Zhen to Chiang Kai-shek,” June 24, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-094.

⁴⁶⁵ “Gui Yongqing to Chiang Kai-shek,” July 24, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-096.

⁴⁶⁶ “Gui Yongqing to Chiang Kai-shek,” August 7, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-097.

⁴⁶⁷ “Gui Yongqing to Chiang Kai-shek,” August 20, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-100.

⁴⁶⁸ “Gui Yongqing to Chiang Kai-shek,” August 22, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00319-052.

decision yet.⁴⁶⁹

As Bai Chongxi, Minister of National Defense, revealed in his military report in September 1947, those 24 warships had arrived at Shanghai and Qingdao by the end of August. However, since most of the warships were built during wartime, the constructions were primitive. Moreover, weapons and telecommunication equipment on the warships were sabotaged as Japan surrendered and awaited to be repaired.⁴⁷⁰ A book published in 1950 noted that “In October 1947, after 135 vessels had been divided, SCAP notified the four Allies that the remainder, numbering slightly over 100 ships, were required for occupation and other tasks involved in implementation of Japan’s surrender, and that their division would therefore have to be deferred. SCAP has not yet found it possible to release these ships.”⁴⁷¹

However, the engagement of the newly-received Japanese battleships into the Chinese Civil War did not reverse the failure of the Chinese Nationalists. Believing that the core problem of the Chinese navy was its leadership weakness, US Navy Rear Admiral H. R. Thurber wrote a letter on August 23, 1948 to the Chinese Navy concerning the “development of qualities of leadership and of professional fitness in the officers of the Chinese navy.”⁴⁷² But before these reforms could be implemented, Qingdao became a battleground of the civil war, and the Guomintang navy could barely do anything to defend the city offshore. Witnessing the Guomintang’s irreversible failure, in February 1949 Oscar C. Badger II, commander of Western Pacific Naval force, refused to help the Nationalists defend Qingdao. Once again, Chiang sought assistance from General MacArthur and wonder if he could dispatch several high-ranking generals as consultants to the Guomintang troops in Qingdao, but eventually this request was not made.⁴⁷³ Qingdao fell into Chinese Communist hands on June 2, 1949. In general, while the Guomintang had received the Japanese

⁴⁶⁹ “Guofangbu Gongzuo Baogaoshu (國防部工作報告書) [Work Reports of the Ministry of National Defense],” September 9, 1947, in ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 612-613.

⁴⁷⁰ Jin Dequn (金德群) and Du Jianjun (杜建軍) eds., *Zhongguo Xiandai Shi Ziliao Xuanji* (中國現代史資料選輯) [Selected Historical Documents on Contemporary Chinese History] (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin daxue Chubanshe, 1989), Vol. 6, 201.

⁴⁷¹ Robert A. Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-50*, 13.

⁴⁷² “Thurber to Chiang Kai-shek,” August 23, 1948, Guoshiguan, 001-070006-00010-002.

⁴⁷³ Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, February 12, 1949.

battleships in relatively good condition, it lacked the skill and manpower to maintain them logistically. When Ho Shailai met Admiral C. Turner Joy in Tokyo in June 1950, Ho even had to ask Joy if he could grant permission those former Japanese warships to be repaired in Japan. Joy replied that he could not sanction this request in case the Soviet Union would take a similar approach to surveil Japan's ports where the US naval vessels were stationed.⁴⁷⁴

END OF THE REPARATION PROGRAM

Despite MacArthur had been showing generosity to Nanjing by putting Chinese demands for its share in Japanese reparations as a high priority, KMT's declining military fortunes had offset what it received from the Japanese reparations. As a result, not only did China's continuous demands for reparations annoy the General, but MacArthur's attitude infuriate some Chinese as well. Many Chinese believed that MacArthur was revitalizing Japan at the expense of sacrificing China, and deprived China's rights to obtain reparations from Japan. During his visit to Japan, Wang Shijie first grumbled that the Chinese people were feeling that "the United States is building up Japan at the expense of China." For example, according to a report written by William J. Sebald, the acting Political Advisor in Japan, Wang raised the following issue:

As an example, he raised the question of the so-called "gold pot", comprised of looted gold and precious metals. He said that he could not understand why the United States has taken unilateral action in placing this gold at the sole disposal of Japan with a view to building up Japan's trade. He said that as the gold pot is eventually to be divided among the four Allies, he could not understand why it would not be possible at this time to allow China also to take advantage of the "gold pot" as a credit base upon which to encourage Chinese trade. He said China is also in dire straits for raw materials, but that the United States apparently overlooks this factor. He hoped that something could be worked out along these lines.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷⁴ DHSL, June 23, 1950.

⁴⁷⁵ "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald)," October 26, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6, 548.

A direct confrontation took place on October 24 when Wang had a two-hour talk MacArthur, in which Wang directly raised the issue of reparations. Wang stated that “the Chinese are most desirous of obtaining a larger share of reparations out of current production”, which MacArthur rebutted by drawing “two parallel horizontal lines, the lower line representing Japan’s present 45% production and the upper line a theoretical 100% production.” MacArthur further gave an explanation,

...the space between the two lines could be reached only at the expense of the United States and that the Chinese must consider us very stupid if they believe that we would fill in the gap only to have production turned over to the Chinese in the form of reparations. He [MacArthur] further stated that even the 45% production had been achieved only as a result of considerable assistance from the United States which is now \$300 million behind on this venture.⁴⁷⁶

While the Chinese believed that MacArthur was rebuilding Japan at the expense of China, the Americans also believed that China’s increasing greed for Japanese materials was at the expense of American’s interests. MacArthur clearly knew the increasing demand for its share in Japanese reparations was in great part due to the deteriorating military situation in China, but he firmly believed that, as he spoke to Shang Zhen several months earlier, any military assistance to China should be given from the United States and not from his Headquarters. In his talk with Wang, MacArthur further pointed out:

China has already received a tremendous share of Japan’s external assets in the shape of capital goods in China, Manchuria, and Formosa, and that Japan has lost huge sums in its investments in Korea and elsewhere. He [MacArthur] asked Dr. Wang how the Chinese could possibly expect Japan to produce sufficient goods and turn over a substantial amount thereof, out of current production, when Japan itself is just about keeping alive with American assistance.⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷⁶ “The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield),” October 28, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6, 555.

⁴⁷⁷ “The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield),” October 28, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6, 555.

Believing that China was the biggest victim of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese government thought that its claims for Japanese reparations were justifiable. But to MacArthur, Japanese materials should be equally divided among the four powers through negotiations and voting. Even though China was facing severe military circumstances, it ought to respect the procedure of the Allied Council. Thus, MacArthur clearly showed his dissatisfaction with China's unpractical demands for materials from his headquarters.

In March 1948, a fire razed the building of the Chinese Mission housing documents concerning reparations and restitution.⁴⁷⁸ This incident heralded the eventual failure of China's efforts in requesting reparations from Japan. 1948 witnessed a significant reverse of the US policy toward Japan. Instead of punishing Japan and depriving it of the military potential to generate wars in the future, the United States decided to lay the foundation for Japan's economic revival and make it a bastion to contain the growing threat of Communism in East Asia as Chiang Kai-shek faced increasing setbacks in the Civil War. To revive Japan's economy meant the termination of the reparation program, since "the burden of reparations would jeopardize Japanese economic recovery."⁴⁷⁹ On May 13, 1949, the US government announced the termination of the reparations program.⁴⁸⁰

This decision certainly infuriated the Chinese, especially during a period when the KMT was about to lose the Civil War. On May 26, 1949, Li Weiguo, Chinese representative in the FEC, protested that the US policy was "drastic," and "we fear it is, above all, prejudicial to a just and lasting peace in the Far East."⁴⁸¹ On May 15, 1949, representing the Chinese Mission, Wu Bannong issued a statement urging SCAP not to relinquish the entire reparation program on the grounds that those countries suffered from Japan's invasion had the right to require reparations and the final decision should be made in the FEC where all eleven nations should be present. Wu also reiterated that based on the essence of the Potsdam Declaration, all Japanese

⁴⁷⁸ "Administration Building of Chinese Mission Razed," March 12, 1948, *Nippon Times*.

⁴⁷⁹ Kazuo Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude*, 141.

⁴⁸⁰ "Text of U.S. Note Halting Further Japanese Reparations," May 13, 1949, *The New York Times*.

⁴⁸¹ "China Joins Attack on Reparation Ban," May 27, 1949, *The New York Times*.

plants for military production should be destroyed but that this policy had merely been implemented thirty percent. He further pointed out that even the aviation factories and private factories “were never touched upon,” not to mention the “industry that assist the war.”⁴⁸²

RESTITUTION

In his report to President Truman, Pauley stated honestly that restitution is “a problem in which the United States has relatively little direct interest; but there should be an American attitude and policy on restitution, because we are the friend and ally of countries and peoples to whom restitution is important.” As for the case of China, Pauley noted,

It is well known that a number of Japanese generals were connoisseurs of Chinese art, and other officers, with less educated tastes, were equally ready to appropriate any art objects which they thought might be valuable. It is to be expected that there will be claims from China for the restitution of specific works of art carried off by known Japanese individuals from private and public Chinese collections, and also claims for reparations in cases where art and similar valuables were carried off by unidentifiable Japanese.⁴⁸³

Categories of Chinese properties looted by the Japanese army during the war were too many to be detailed. The Chinese Mission paid equal attention to restitution with reparations. Upon arriving at Tokyo, Zhu Shiming immediately signed a receipt for Chinese rare books being returned to China, as *Nippon Times* wrote, “Ten cases of rare old Chinese books, part of a collection seized by the Japanese at Hongkong in 1942, were formally returned on Sunday through the Office of the Civil Property Custodian, SCAP, to the Chinese Government.”⁴⁸⁴ Restitution of Chinese books

⁴⁸² “Ribben Peichang Jihua Buying Quanbu Quxiao (日本賠償計劃不應全部取消) [Japan’s Plan for Reparations Should Not be Canceled],” May 15, 1949, *Xinwen Bao*.

⁴⁸³ Edwin W. Pauley, *Report on Japanese Reparations to the President of the United States, November 1945 to April 1946*, 9.

⁴⁸⁴ “Rare Books, Seized by Japan During War, Returned to Chinese Government, Sunday,” June 4, 1946, *Nippon Times*.

looted by Japan during the war was faced with little difficulty since it required no credentials to prove its attribution. Chinese books, 107 boxes in total, preserved in Ueno Library were shipped back to China in February 1947. As for the 36,000 Chinese books preserved in Kyoto Imperial University, SCAP assured their return to China, but asked the Chinese Mission to send persons to work on details.⁴⁸⁵ Besides ancient books, plenty of copper bells and stone lion were seized by the Japanese army and placed in Japan. According to Wu Bannong's estimation after his inspections in Japan, ninety-five percent of items seized by Japan came from China.⁴⁸⁶

Shen Jinding, counselor to the Chinese Mission, recounted that when he studied in Japan when young, he saw two anchors from the Chinese battleships captured by the Japanese navy as war booty during the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 placed in a park. When Shen returned to Japan after the war, he found the two anchors in the same place. In case the Japanese government concealed this war booty, as some Japanese officials had been doing at that time, Shen immediately wrote a memorandum to GHQ to order the Japanese government to return those anchors to China.⁴⁸⁷ In terms of decisions made by the FEC, however, items requested for restitution from Japan must have been looted after 1937. In this case, after an amendment of regulation of the FEC could the Chinese Mission requested the return of the anchors.⁴⁸⁸ Shen also noted that Zhu Shiming forced the Japanese to return a jade screen, which was sent by a big "Han traitor" in Northern China to Japan.⁴⁸⁹

Except for Chinese antiquities, the Chinese Mission in Japan paid much attention to the restitution of Chinese steamships. In later 1946, the Chinese Mission asked ship factories in China to submit credentials for the purpose of retrieving ships looted at

⁴⁸⁵ "Zhuri Daibiaotuan Disanzu Saliunian Eryuefen Gongzuo Baogao (駐日代表團第三組卅六年二月份工作報告) [Chinese Mission in Japan Third Group Work Report, February 1947]," February 1947, Guoshiguan, 020-010121-0008.

⁴⁸⁶ "Ri Haiwai Jieluepin Jin Nachu Yixiaobu (日海外劫掠品僅拿出一小部) [Only A Small Portion of Japan's Plunder from Abroad Recovered]," May 13, 1947, *Yishibao (Tianjin)*.

⁴⁸⁷ ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 657.

⁴⁸⁸ "Zhuri Daibiaotuan Disanzu Gongzuo Gaikuang ji Jianyi Shixiang (駐日代表團第三組工作概況及建議事項) [Chinese Mission in Japan Third Group General Situation and Suggestions]," Guoshiguan, 020-010121-0008.

⁴⁸⁹ ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 670.

war.⁴⁹⁰ The first Chinese steamship being retrieved was Jianshehao(建設號), which arrived at Shanghai in June.⁴⁹¹ In May 1947, SCAP dispatched eight representatives of the Allied countries to inspect ports along the western coast of Japan to examine if the Japanese were still concealing ships seized from the Allies during the war. The Japanese government reported to SCAP that only 70 ships were taken from the Allies, and those records were destroyed by bombings in Tokyo in the final period of the war.⁴⁹² According to the Chinese calculations, however, there were 220 ships looted by Japan during wartime.⁴⁹³ The Chinese Mission was obliged to find the whereabouts of those ships harboured at Japan's docks. For instance, it found a steamship of 2,000 tons named Yongyuan concealed at Osaka and a steamship of 969 tons named Xingan in use at Hokkaido.⁴⁹⁴ The obstruction, however, was providing credentials to reclaim the property. SCAP requested the Chinese government to provide credentials of the ship's nationality, details on the ship's functions, dates and places that the ship was looted or expropriated by the Japanese. The Chinese Mission complained in a report that some credentials of the ships were incomplete and urged the Ministry of Transportation and Bureau of Maritime Affairs to gather more evidence.⁴⁹⁵ Due to the procedural difficulties, by May 1947 only four of one hundred steamboats taken by Japan during the war had returned to China's hands.⁴⁹⁶

⁴⁹⁰ "Zhanshi Beidi Jieduo Chuanbo Benniandiqian Baoqing Peichang (戰時被敵劫奪船舶本年底前報請賠償) [Shipping Plundered during Wartime to Apply for Reparations by the End of this Year]," November 15, 1946, *Dagongbao (Shanghai)*.

⁴⁹¹ "Zhanshi Beidi Jieduo Chuanbo Benniandiqian Baoqing Peichang," November 15, 1946, *Dagongbao (Shanghai)*.

⁴⁹² "Chaiqian Ri Peichangpin (拆遷日賠償品) [Dismantle and Transfer Japanese Reparation Goods]," May 11, 1947, *Zhongyang Ribao*.

⁴⁹³ "Zhanshi Beiri Jieduo Chuanzhi Diaocha Yinian Qi Wuxialuo (戰時被日劫奪船只調查一年迄無下落) [Shipping Plundered by Japanese during Wartime Still Unaccounted for after Year-Long Investigation]," May 30, 1947, *Yishibao (Chongqing)*.

⁴⁹⁴ "Zhuri Daibiaotuan Disanzu Shiyuefen Gongzuo Baogao (駐日代表團第三組十月份工作報告) [Chinese Mission in Japan Third Group Work Report, October]," Guoshiguan, 020-010121-0008.

⁴⁹⁵ "Zhuri Daibiaotuan Disanzu Shiyuefen Gongzuo Baogao," Guoshiguan, 020-010121-0008.

⁴⁹⁶ "Wu Bannong Fu Rinanbu Shicha Riben Lueduowu (吳半農赴日南部視察日本掠奪物) [Wu Bannong Visits Southern Japan to Review Items Plundered by Japanese]," May 6, 1947, *Dagongbao (Shanghai)*. According to a news report in July, only five steamboats were received by the Chinese. Besides, 40 steamboats were sunk by Japan awaiting to be salvaged, some other steamboats need to be systematically repaired. See "Wo Zhuri Daibiaotuan Banli Peichang Gongzuo Gaikuang (我駐日代表團辦理賠償工作概況) [Chinese Mission in Japan Work Report on Dealing with Reparations]," July 20, 1947, *Zhongyang Ribao (Chongqing)*.

In comparison to the reparations, China's restitution of looted properties from Japan generally progressed well. According a calculation in March 1949, items that had been restored to China were as follows: “(1) 47,632 assorted hand tools at Kobe, Japan. (2) 4,860 books and 17,500 pamphlets at Kobe, Japan (3) 90 books at Kobe, Japan (4) 835,335 metric tons of copper coins and 3,788.210 kgs of nickel coins at Nagoya, Japan (5) Check in the amount of ¥ 22,292.63 representing proceeds from the scale of the hull of the vessel “KinshuMaru” and accumulated interest at Tokyo, Japan. (6) 157.176 kgs and 112,423 pieces of sheep and goat skins at Tokyo, Japan. (7) 1,000 kgs of cotton yarn at Tokyo, Japan. (8) Approximately 17761.42 lbs of raw silk and 25,000 lbs of wild silk at Tokyo, Japan. (9) 100,265 lbs of wool at Tokyo, Japan. (10) 54,093 yds of cotton cloth, at Tokyo, Japan.”⁴⁹⁷ On some occasions, the Chinese Mission was instructed not to ship the items back to China but instead sell them to Japanese enterprises to earn foreign exchange. For instance, in March 1949 the Chinese sold leather, wool and textile worth 80,000 USD to Japan.⁴⁹⁸

THE FORMER MANCHUKUO PROPERTIES

Many staff in the Chinese Mission in Japan possessed working experience in Northeast China. For example, Ho Shailai started his military career when his father, Sir Robert Ho Tung, recommended that served as a lieutenant under Zhang Xueliang. Despite Zhang's political downfall after the Xian Incident in 1936, due to his father's influence in Hong Kong as well as his own ability, Ho Shailai was not sidelined by Chiang. In the postwar era, Ho was appointed to take charge of coordinating Japanese repatriation in Huludao, a port of significant strategic position in Northeast China. As Ho assumed leadership in Tokyo in 1950, he turned toward his old acquaintances from Northeast China and promoted them to certain strategic positions. As Hong Kong merchant Dong Haoyun recounted, Ho brought Chen Yanjiong and Liu Yutang

⁴⁹⁷ “Report on Restitution of Looted Property,” March 31, 1949, UK National Archives, FO 371/76238.

⁴⁹⁸ “Wo Zhuri Daibiaotuan Biaoshou Peichang Wuzi (我駐日代表團標售賠償物資) [Chinese Mission Auctions Reparation Items],” March 16, 1949, *Yishibao* (Shanghai).

to Japan.⁴⁹⁹ Chen was the closest staff member and an important counselor to Ho, and Liu served as chief of the Overseas Chinese section of the Chinese Mission. Moreover, staff of the Chinese Mission in Japan witnessed how the Russians thwarted their efforts. In the case of reparations from Japan, the most notable case was that the Russians removed Japanese properties worthy of 2 billion, according to Pauley's estimation, in Manchuria, leading to a debate on whether those items should be regarded as "war booty" or "reparation."⁵⁰⁰ As the US government halted the reparation program in 1949, the Chinese Mission in Japan put its focus on the restitution of the former Manchukuo properties left in Japan.

According to a memorandum sent by SCAP to the Japanese government (SCAPIN- 2188) on December 10, 1951, one can see the substantial value of Manchukuo's properties left in Japan:

1. NAIGAI building, also known as the KO TOKU KAIKAN and as Empire House, being a 6-story reinforced concrete office building located at No. 18, 2-chome, Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo.
2. TO TO TEI building, 5-story reinforced concrete restaurant and club house building located at No. 2, 1-chome, Yurakucho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo.
3. MANCHUKUO EMBASSY, Main building, located at No. 50, Sakurada-cho Azabu, Minato-ku, Tokyo.
4. MANCHUKUO EMBASSY, former residence of military attache at No. 30, Sakurada-cho, Azbu, Minato-ku, Tokyo.
5. MANCHUKUO STUDENT GUIDANCE ASSOCIATION PROPERTIES consisting of:
 - a. Land and buildings located near Korakuen, Koishikawa, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo (Dormitory and Office Building)
 - b. Land and buildings of Girl Students Dormitory located at No. 91, Benten-cho, Ushigome, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo.
 - c. 2,140 tsubo of land located at Oza Nakakura-aza, Serigazawa, Karuizawa-cho, Kitasakugun, Nagano-ken
 - d. Funds in SCAP Custody Account, Bank of Japan ----- ¥ 908,132.45
 - e. Account in Yokohama Specie Bank, a closed institution in liquidation-----¥ 99,998.94⁵⁰¹

⁴⁹⁹ Dong Haoyun (董浩雲), *Dong Haoyun Riji (1948-1982)* (董浩雲日記) [Diaries of Dong Haoyun, 1948-1982] (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2004), 50.

⁵⁰⁰ "Japanese Reparation to be Topic in Parley," August 3, 1946, *The New York Times*.

⁵⁰¹ "SCAPIN-2188, Subject: Puppet Government Property in Japan," SCAPIN-DB, Nagoya University.

Among all these items, the first objective of the Chinese was the “Manchukuo Students Guidance Association.” It was an association built in 1935 for students from Manchukuo who studied in Japan. One Chinese correspondent wrote in 1939 that “whoever visited the Association will not only be amazed by its impeccable facilities but will envy the diligent students from Manchukuo who enjoyed their stays in this mentally and physically perfect Association.”⁵⁰² In 1947, the Chinese Mission began to inquire with SCAP regarding the possibility of retrieving the Manchukuo Students Guidance Association, only to receive a reply that it was not possible “without definitive instructions from higher authority.”⁵⁰³ In an investigation, SCAP determined that the Association was co-founded by the Japanese government and Manchukuo, and most of the funds came from Japan. The Chinese Mission, however, believed that following the demise of Manchukuo and its restoration to China, all properties belonging to Manchukuo, whether in China or abroad, should be taken over by the Chinese government. The Chinese Mission also protested in October 1948 that:

It has been reliably reported to this Mission that one particular Japanese national by the name of Ogo, appointed by the Japanese Foreign Ministry to serve on the Liquidation Committee, is living with his whole family in the building of the Institution and is collecting on various pretexts rents and “entrance fees” ranging from 100,000 Yen too 1,000,000 Yen from the Japanese occupants on the premises. This Ogo is said to have been pocketing all such payments as his own personal income. The Chinese students residing therein, being the persons concerned, are pursuing the right course of action by appealing to law for arbitration. When a just solution is reached through the good offices of the General Headquarters, whereby the properties of the Institution in question will be restored to China, the Chinese Mission in Japan believes that the Chinese Government will see to the return of normalcy to the Institution which is to serve the interest of Chinese students in Japan.⁵⁰⁴

In order to persuade SCAP, the Chinese Mission made a detailed study of

⁵⁰² “Canguan Manzhouguo Liuri Xuesheng Huiguan (參觀滿洲國留日學生會館) [Visit to the Manchukuo Student Association in Japan],” *Huawen Daban Meiri* (華文大阪每日), 1939, Vol. 2, No. 11, 30-31.

⁵⁰³ “Diplomatic Section to the Chinese Mission,” November 26, 1948, Guoshiguan, 020-010105-0028.

⁵⁰⁴ “The Chinese Mission to Diplomatic Section,” October 2, 1948, Guoshiguan, 020-010105-0028.

Association funds. The Chinese Mission stressed the point that the Association was in fact sponsored by the puppet government of Manchukuo, rather than the Japanese government, by listing the funds donated by private individuals and organizations in Manchuria. Of the original 883,000 Yen in donations, 10,000 came from Pu Yi, 1,000 came from Hsia Kai-shek [Xie Jieshi 謝介石], 300,000 from the South Manchuria Railway Company, 30,000 from the Manchu Power Company, 40,000 from the Manchu Central Bank, 40,000 from the Manchu Imperial Association, 20,000 from the Manchu Den-den Company and 100,000 from the Manchukuo Government. By tracing the composition of funds in the Association, the Chinese Mission was eager to prove that the funds were raised by the “Chinese common masses” in Manchuria.⁵⁰⁵

On July 18, 1949, the Chinese Mission sent a memorandum to the Diplomatic Section of SCAP with regard to the former Manchukuo Embassy located in Tokyo:

The said Embassy occupied a land of 3,567 tsubo, price paid therefor being 5351344.00. The buildings which were later burned cost 238,902.60. At the time of taking over by General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, the Embassy still owned three automobiles.....An emergency fund loaned from the Manchurian Central Bank and amounting to 20,000,000.00 is still pending further investigation, as the accounts for same are not complete.

The Chinese Mission requested SCAP to conduct an investigation on these items and wished to “file hereby a claim for the title thereof” and “very much to make use of the land because of its location in the vicinity.”⁵⁰⁶

The former-Manchukuo property that interested the Chinese Mission the most was the Ko Toku Kaikan, a clubhouse for Manchukuo officials visiting Japan during wartime. The Chinese Mission expressed its willingness to take over the property in February 1949, but again SCAP stated “[i]nstructions from higher authority relative to the disposition of interests of former puppet regimes in property in Japan are not yet available.” The Chinese Mission also urged SCAP to prohibit an attempt from the

⁵⁰⁵ “The Chinese Mission to Diplomatic Section,” October 2, 1948, Guoshiguan, 020-010105-0028. Xie Jieshi was a Taiwan-born Manchukuo Ambassador to Japan between 1935 to 1937.

⁵⁰⁶ “The Chinese Mission in Japan to the Diplomatic Section,” July 18, 1949, IMH Archives, 11-01-02-05-01-001.

Japanese government to sale this property to a third party.⁵⁰⁷ While stationed in Tokyo, Ho Shilai spent much of his time trying to recoup this property. On July 4, 1951, Ho received Junzaburō Yamada, a Japanese revolutionary zealot who had assisted Sun Yat-sen's revolution in China, who wished to offer evidence in support of retrieving the Association.⁵⁰⁸ The controversies laid in disputes between the Japanese vendor and the Manchukuo official who bequeathed this property, and negotiations should be conducted by a third party. A possible solution was to give this property to the Chinese and used the funds to support Sino-Japanese cultural interaction.⁵⁰⁹ Ho later referred this case to an American lawyer named Remond Bushell and asked SCAP to intervene. After years long investigation and judicial procedure, the properties remained in Japan's hands.

CONCLUSION

On September 30, 1946, the Chinese Mission hold a press conference, at which it complained that SCAP denied its quest for Japan's silk cocoons. Mark Gayn wrote down MacArthur's reaction upon hearing this news:

I am told that when General Marquat rushed to General MacArthur with the news of the Chinese statement, MacArthur said irritably: "What do *they*[sic] want? They've forgotten they're in debt to us." I am also informed that it was General MacArthur himself who turned down the Chinese application. General MacArthur's reason was given to me by one of his silk advisers: "It just doesn't make much sense to build up the Chinese silk industry when you're trying to help Japan."⁵¹⁰

MacArthur's response exemplified his thoughts of postwar Japan policy. KMT's historiography finds fault with the reparation policy and stresses Chiang Kai-shek's "kindness" for abandoning China's quest for "astronomical" reparations, which

⁵⁰⁷ "Diplomatic Section to the Chinese Mission," March 11, 1949, Guoshiguan, 020-010105-0028.

⁵⁰⁸ DHSL, July 4, 1951.

⁵⁰⁹ DHSL, September 18, 1951.

⁵¹⁰ Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary*, 327-328.

contributed to postwar Japan's economic recovery.⁵¹¹ It barely mentions how China struggled vehemently for its share in disposition of the Japanese reparations with other allies, as well as how it privately lobbied the United States to grant China some additional reparations. Only until these efforts became hopeless after the US halted the reparations program in 1949 did the Nationalist Chinese begin to claim their "generosity."

Edwin Pauley's concerns over China's ability to make use of Japanese plants and half of the thirty percent allotment assigned to China indicated how the US government endeavored to prioritise China before other allies in regards to Japanese reparations. From the viewpoint of Chinese public opinion, the function of the Chinese Mission in Japan was to investigate reparations from Japan and discuss the occupation policy with other allies.⁵¹² Located in Tokyo, the Chinese Mission in Japan perceived how difficult it was to obtain reparations from Japan and how impractical it was to reach agreements with other interested Allied countries. Consequently, the Chinese Mission paid more attention to restitution of Chinese properties. However, difficulties in finding credentials proved to be no easier than obtaining reparations. Consequently, the Chinese Mission focused on restitution of Chinese books, which were the least controversial items.

This chapter also suggests that many staff in the Chinese Mission had intense affiliations to the Northeast. Many of them witnessed the Mukden Incident in 1931 and suffered during the War of Resistance against Japan. After the bitter victory, once again they witnessed the Russians plunder Japanese plant and material in the Northeast. The anti-Japanese mentality in the Northeast, exacerbated by the Soviet plunder in that region, bestirred them to deal fervently with reparations regarding Northeast China. The incessant struggle to gain control over the properties of the former Manchukuo still in Japan exemplifies this mindset and deserves more scholarly research in the future.

⁵¹¹ ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 620.

⁵¹² "Lun Zhuri Daibiaotuan (論駐日代表團) [On the Chinese Mission in Japan]," January 30, 1947, *Yishibao (Tianjin)*.

CHAPTER SIX: THE KOREAN WAR

The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 and its progress had become a constant preoccupation for Chiang Kai-shek, who had been seeking for an opportunity to counterattack Mainland China after being defeated in the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Chiang's plan was to dispatch three divisions of his troops to participate in the Korean War and, after South Korea won, to further attack the Chinese Mainland and retake the territories he lost. Ho Shailai, the newly-arrived head of the Chinese Mission in Japan, was empowered with the mission to persuade General MacArthur to accept this offer. While this plan was rejected by the US government and never come into effect, the Chinese Mission in Japan had cultivated a tight relationship with SCAP and played a supportive role during the Korean War.

Chiang Kai-shek's offer of using his 33,000 troops to take part in the Korean War and General MacArthur's secret visit to Taiwan in August 1950 have been widely mentioned in previous accounts.⁵¹³ However, their importance has been overlooked. General Ho Shailai, whose significance has been downplayed and omitted in modern Chinese history, was the key figure of this overlooked episode. By using General Ho Shailai's diaries, this chapter details the interactions between Ho and MacArthur as well as the full story of Chiang's unfulfilled mission. As the leading PRC historian in Cold War studies Shen Zhihua (沈志華) has calculated, although the period between the dispatch of PRC forces and the end of the war was thirty-three months, the escalation and aggrandizement that occurred in the first four months at the outbreak of the conflict – from June 1950 to October 1950 before the PRC's involvement constituted “the significant part of the origins of the war.”⁵¹⁴ By the same token,

⁵¹³ Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (London: Pan, 1988), 67; Peter Lowe, *The Origins of the Korean War* (London; New York, Longman, 1986), 178-180; Carl Berger, *The Korea Knot: A Military-Political History* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 111, 116-117; Edgar O'Balance, *Korea: 1950-1953* (London: Faber, 1969), 34, 46; Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 67; Sheila Miyoshi Jager, *Brothers at War: the Unending Conflict in Korea* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013), 80; David Cheng Chang, *The Hijacked War: The Story of Chinese POWs in the Korean War*, 83-84.

⁵¹⁴ Shen Zhihua, *Mao Zedong Sidalin yu Chaoxian Zhanzheng* (毛澤東斯大林與朝鮮戰爭) [Mao

although the debate whether to accept Chinese Nationalist forces into the war only lasted several months, it was during this time that US policy toward Taiwan and the fate of the island were settled.

Following Lin Hsiao-ting's sketch of the course of Taipei's dealings with SCAP, this chapter looks again at the relationship, but does so in a more thorough way than previously possible. As the Korean War rekindled his eagerness to recover mainland China, Chiang immediately ordered Ho Shailai to approach MacArthur with the offer of Chinese military assistance. In Tokyo, Ho then shared frequent exchanges with General MacArthur and his high-rankings military officers – men such as Charles Willoughby and Edward Almond – as events unfolded. Many details unknown to previous historians are revealed by Ho's diaries. Regrettably, however, due to the limitations on access to Korean War records in the US, some details revealed here by Ho's diaries have not yet been crosschecked using documents from that side. By exploring these unnoticed stories, we could measure the extent to which Chiang's regime was involved in the Korean War as well as how Washington learnt the lesson of MacArthur's disobedience and adjusted its policy toward Taiwan.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR

At dawn on June 25, the Korean People's Army crossed the 38th parallel, marking the beginning of the Korean War. It was not until 6 p.m. that Ho received the news, and not from his staff in the Chinese Mission but from a call by Wei Jingmeng (魏景蒙), a famous Chinese journalist. "I heard that there was a radio report at 9 a.m. this morning," wrote Ho in his diary, "and the military and media group in our Mission don't even know yet, which dissatisfies me a lot."⁵¹⁵ When inquiring why his staff had no information on the war, Cao Shicheng, head of the military group, simply replied that his responsibilities were only related to Japanese intelligence.⁵¹⁶

Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War] (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 2003), 24.

⁵¹⁵ DHSL, June 25, 1950.

⁵¹⁶ DHSL, June 26, 1950.

Meanwhile, the crisis of the outbreak of the war earned Ho a chance to meet with John Foster Dulles on the same day. The first question Dulles asked Ho was what would be the effect on Taiwan if South Korea was defeated. "It depends on how South Korea is defeated," Ho replied, "If South Korea resisted well and is supported by others, the morale of Taiwan will be enhanced. But if South Korea is defeated like Czechoslovakia, then its effect will certainly be terrible." Dulles then enquired about the potential CCP invasion of Taiwan, to which Ho replied that no potential attack was detected.⁵¹⁷ In his diaries on that date, he added that Dulles then suggested Chinese Nationalists should be aware of intelligence gatherings, as there was no intelligence in South Korea now that such a big event had happened. Dulles also told Ho "not to bring disappointing news back to Taiwan."⁵¹⁸ In this meeting, the most important issue was the Korean War's effect on Taiwan and dispatching Nationalist troops to South Korea was neither raised nor even considered.

On June 27, for the purpose of preventing either Taiwan or mainland China from attacking each other, President Truman made a statement stating that "I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done."⁵¹⁹ While this statement was regarded as a guarantee from the United States, Ho regarded it as a disappointment. Ho immediately requested his staff to discuss all possible implications of the statement. Their biggest concern was that the prohibition on all air and sea operations against Mainland China would greatly weaken the morale of the Nationalists. On June 30, Ho visited Sebald and asked for clarification on the Truman Statement. Sebald replied that he did not know the details but could affirm that the statement expressed goodwill towards Taiwan.⁵²⁰

The Truman statement forced Chiang Kai-shek to change his strategy of retaking

⁵¹⁷ "Ho Shailai to Wang Shijie," June 26, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00031-002.

⁵¹⁸ DHSL, June 26, 1950.

⁵¹⁹ "Statement on Korea," June 28, 1950, *The New York Times*; James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 41.

⁵²⁰ DHSL, June 30, 1950; "Ho Shailai to Chen Cheng," July 1, 1950, Guoshiguan, 008-010108-00014-048.

Mainland China. Instead of a direct military counterattack on Mainland China, Chiang envisaged a plan of dispatching an army of 30,000 soldiers to join the Korean War and placing them under the command of General MacArthur. Chiang instructed Gu Weijun, the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, and Ho Shailai to deliver this offer to Washington and SCAP respectively. According to a memorandum written by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Gu told him that the Nationalists “are unable to spare naval or air force units but that they are prepared to furnish one army of approximately 33,000 men, composed of three divisions with the best field equipment available to the Chinese. They lack sufficient shipping to transport the entire body.” Gu also mentioned Ho’s activities in Tokyo to Washington, as the memorandum wrote, “The Ambassador also said that the Chief of the Chinese Mission in Tokyo was approaching General MacArthur since it was their intention that any forces supplied would come under his command.”⁵²¹ Chiang’s proposal was immediately discussed in a White House meeting held on June 30, at which Secretary Acheson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed the idea on the grounds that the use of Chiang’s forces might render intervention by the Chinese Communists. Additionally, the quality of Chiang’s troops was equivalent to that of South Korea, which made transporting them from Taiwan to the Korean peninsula by the US Navy of little practical value. In the end, President Truman agreed to reject this offer.⁵²² According to the official history of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, on July 1 Chiang was “tactfully informed,” via the Chinese Embassy in Washington, about the kindly refusal of his offer.⁵²³

In the meantime, when Chiang asked Ho to transmit this offer to General MacArthur, he further wanted Ho to ask the General, if the offer were to be accepted, the exact number of soldiers he needed and the possible material support that the United States could offer to Nationalist troops. Ho was later requested by Ye Gongchao to immediately visit General MacArthur, and Ho thereupon called Sebald

⁵²¹ “Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State,” June 29, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 239.

⁵²² James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 51, 61.

⁵²³ James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 61.

to relay this message to the General.⁵²⁴ Upon receiving this offer, MacArthur informed officials in Washington about his interest in “accepting two divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist Government” at 5 A.M. on June 30, several hours before the White House’s decision was made to turn down Chiang’s offer.⁵²⁵ The Joint Chiefs of Staff might have already foreseen that the Nationalist Chinese would approach MacArthur directly, thus it cautioned the General that the decision “whether to accept or reject the proffer of military aid by foreign governments should properly be made at highest levels in Washington.”⁵²⁶

Besides requesting Ho to make contact with General MacArthur, Chiang Kai-shek also ordered Shao Yulin (邵毓麟), the Chinese Ambassador in Korea, to approach Syng-Man Rhee, the President of Korea. Shao recollected that both he and Ho received instructions from Taipei, saying that “Our government has decided to dispatch three divisions and twenty transport planes to South Korea...You should inform General MacArthur and President Rhee about this message respectively.”⁵²⁷ Chiang’s eagerness and passion for sending his troops to Korea was best described by Michael Schaller, “During July, the Nationalists on Taiwan pushed hard to establish ties between MacArthur, the war effort in Korea, and their own pretensions to reconquer the mainland.”⁵²⁸ From the beginning of July, Ho Shailai, serving as the conduit between Taipei and Tokyo, immersed himself on establishing ties between Taipei and Tokyo. On July 1, Ho planned to visit General MacArthur with Admiral Charles M. Cooke, who just arrived at Tokyo from Taiwan, but depressingly found out that the General had no intention to meet him. However, Kim Yong Ju, the Korean Minister in Tokyo, brought an important message to Ho. President Syng-Man Rhee asked Ho to relay his gratitude to Chiang and ordered Kim to persuade General MacArthur to accept Chiang’s offer, but the General refused to meet Kim as well. “On

⁵²⁴ DHSL, June 30, 1950.

⁵²⁵ Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: the Far Eastern General*, 189.

⁵²⁶ James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 61.

⁵²⁷ Shao Yulin, “Jiang Zongtong Yuanhan Juece yu Lianheguo Yuanhan Jueyi (蔣總統援韓決策與聯合國援韓決議) [President Chiang’s Decision to Assist South Korea and the United Nation’s Resolution on Assisting South Korea],” *Zhuanji Wenxue*, No.33-1, 137.

⁵²⁸ Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 286.

this issue,” speculated Ho in his diary, “General MacArthur must not dare meet our official staff before obtaining instructions from the White House.”⁵²⁹

In the meantime, foreign diplomats in Tokyo were eager to meet MacArthur to gather information. As Sebald recalled, “Although the outbreak of the Korean War transformed Tokyo into a military command post, the parade of foreign visitors continued and the complex problems of the Occupation grew more numerous. The demands upon MacArthur’s time were incredible.”⁵³⁰ For instance, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, head of the United Kingdom Liaison Mission, had “sought to call upon MacArthur for several weeks, without success.” Sebald believed this was “due partly to MacArthur’s increased burdens.”⁵³¹ While not being able to meet the General, Ho was suggested by Sebald to write a formal note to the General, which he delivered to Sebald on the next day. In his memoir, Sebald recalled the American’s reaction when they received this note:

The Chinese (Nationalist) Mission in Tokyo sent me a formal note on July 2, offering three combat divisions to the United Nations cause in Korea. I took this offer to the Chief of Staff, Major General Almond. His tentative reaction was that the logistic problems of such a force would be too great to make the proposition practicable. General MacArthur, to whom we referred the offer, thought it necessary to let Washington decide.⁵³²

Ho correctly observed the fact, which officials in Taipei failed to recognize, that MacArthur had no authority to accept Chiang’s offer and thus kept Chinese officials at a distance. However, the Nationalists were eager to know the result and had no patience to wait. According to a CIA document, around 50,000 soldiers began to move to the ports at Keelung and Kaohsiung before June 30 and were “awaiting sailing orders.”⁵³³ This fact indicated that Chiang Kai-shek had mobilized his troops to the ports before formally enacting the proposal on June 30, which gave Ho only a day to

⁵²⁹ DHSL, July 1, 1950.

⁵³⁰ William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 118.

⁵³¹ William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 118.

⁵³² William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 189.

⁵³³ “Preparation of Nationalist Military Units for Korean Aid,” July 12, 1950, General CIA Records, CIA-RDP82-00457R005200700001-0.

deliver this offer to MacArthur. On July 2 Ye Gongchao insisted that Ho meet General MacArthur in person, and on July 3 he even requested that Ho bypass Sebald and make contact with the general directly. Receiving continuous pressure from Taipei, Ho had no choice but to keep asking Sebald to arrange a meeting with the General, and Sebald promised to try his best to help. On the afternoon of July 3, Ho received a call from Sebald, informing him that the General agreed to meet him the next day. “It proves that the estimation of the Foreign Office is wrong and mine is correct,” wrote Ho in his diary, “people who are not here clearly cannot understand the situation and could only rely upon speculation.”⁵³⁴

On July 4, Ho met General MacArthur for the first time since June 12. The General revealed that he regarded Truman’s Statement as a victory for him and Chiang Kai-shek, for he always held the view that Taiwan must be protected from falling into the hand of the communists. The General also mentioned, for the first time, that he would be willing to visit Taiwan, but the schedule might be delayed due to urgent war related matters.⁵³⁵ In a telegram sent to Secretary Acheson on July 7, Sebald reported that MacArthur wanted Ho to personally explain his viewpoints to Chiang, which were:

(a) He fully concurs with Washington view that defense of Taiwan should not be weakened at present.

(b) In view of breathing space which interposition of American naval forces affords to forces on Formosa, intervening time should be spent in augmenting strength logistics and readiness of Nationalist forces to meet any contingency.

(c) Since Nationalist army offered for Korea without artillery, transport, logistic support and short of ammunition, it would not be effective force on

⁵³⁴ DHSL, July 3, 1950.

⁵³⁵ Ho Shailai mentioned this meeting in his diary, but the details were not recorded. The details are quoted from the memoir of Zhou Hongtao (周宏濤), personal aide to Chiang Kai-shek. See Zhou Hongtao, *Jianggong yu Wo: Jianzheng Zhonghua Minguo Guanjian Bianju* (蔣公與我：見證中華民國關鍵變局) [Chiang and I: Witness to a Crucial Moment for the ROC] (Taipei: Tianxia Yuanjian, 2003), 222.

Korean front under present conditions.

(d) While discussions suggested in *aide-mémoire* of 1 July are not practical at present, MacArthur plans visit Taiwan *at first available opportunity* to investigate situation first hand.⁵³⁶

From Sebald's telegram and Ho's diaries, we could see that although MacArthur was eager to increase the troops under his command in Korea, he believed the self-defense was Taiwan's top priority. Thus, he decided to inspect Taiwan's military capability. MacArthur openly indicated his willingness to visit Taiwan when he told J. Lawton Collins, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, that he intended to visit Taiwan "as soon as the situation in Korea was reasonably stabilized."⁵³⁷ Soon after, MacArthur wrote a note to Ho with regard to his future plan to visit Taiwan:

General MacArthur to Colonel b[B]unker ([a] personal aide):

Go and deliver this message to General Ho Shailai. "In furtherance of our recent conference, please tell the Generalissimo that I am sending to Formosa Vice Admiral Struble, who commands the Seventh Fleet to confer with naval staff on some technical questions of naval liaison and co-operation. Admiral Struble will arrive on a destroyer Saturday or Sunday at Keelung. This doesn't alter in any way my own plan to visit Formosa as soon as the operation in Korea will permit."⁵³⁸

Chiang was excited upon receiving this reply, and asked Ho on July 5 to express his welcome to the General and to inquire whether the General would be willing to meet him in Tokyo, for Chiang was planning to visit Korea. Furthermore, on the same day Chiang cabled Ho to ask President Rhee whether he would be willing to receive him in Korea.⁵³⁹ Ho clearly opposed these plans as he received the instructions, since he believed that "now is not the right time to tackle with such things." On July 6 Ho

⁵³⁶ "The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State," July 7, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6, 370.

⁵³⁷ J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 271.

⁵³⁸ "General MacArthur to Colonel bunker," June 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00056-001.

⁵³⁹ "Chiang Kai-shek to Syngman Rhee," July 5, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00342-001; "Chiang Kai-shek to Ho Shailai," July 5, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-010400-00015-011.

cabled Taipei to suggest the immediate cessation of these actions. But before the cable was sent, Ho received a further order to proceed with the instructions from Taipei, and he replied that he would find General Willoughby to ask.⁵⁴⁰ This proposal, as Ho had anticipated, was kindly rejected by General Willoughby, who replied that the General was unable to meet Chiang due to the severe military situation.⁵⁴¹ According to Ho's observation, Willoughby scoffed when telling Ho that at present Taiwan should not behave in such a way and that he would not transfer this message to MacArthur.⁵⁴²

Chiang was furious upon learning that Willoughby refused to transfer his request to the General. In his diary, Chiang scoffed at Willoughby's reaction and said it represented "the fickle and capricious personality of American generals."⁵⁴³ While Chiang's proposal to visit MacArthur in Tokyo was rejected, the General's future visit to Taipei was still on the agenda. Ho went back to Taipei on July 7 and spent a week arranging more details. On July 10, Ho met Chiang Kai-shek and discussed the methods of contacting General MacArthur.⁵⁴⁴ Four days later, Chiang met Ho again and instructed him on "four points to be discussed with General MacArthur."⁵⁴⁵ While Chiang did not detail what the four points were in his diary, Ho noted in his diary that Chiang asked him to ask for MacArthur's permission to bomb the Yixu (義序) Airport in Fuzhou, which was under construction.⁵⁴⁶ Ho returned to Tokyo on July 15 and immediately delivered this request to MacArthur and submitted a memorandum to SCAP to bomb the airport in Fuzhou.⁵⁴⁷ Three days later, MacArthur sent a reply to Ho saying that the proposal had been rejected by Washington.⁵⁴⁸ At this point, Chiang's requests were certainly not a priority to MacArthur, for he was preoccupied with building up the UN forces to Korea. On July 14, General Collins formally presented a UN flag to MacArthur in Tokyo. Two weeks later, on July 25,

⁵⁴⁰ DHSL, July 6, 1950.

⁵⁴¹ Zhou Hongtao, *Jianggong yu Wo*, 223.

⁵⁴² DHSL, July 6, 1950.

⁵⁴³ Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, July 7, 1950.

⁵⁴⁴ Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, July 10, 1950.

⁵⁴⁵ Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, July 14, 1950.

⁵⁴⁶ DHSL, July 14, 1950.

⁵⁴⁷ DHSL, July 15, 1950.

⁵⁴⁸ DHSL, July 18, 1950.

MacArthur set up the United Nations Command (UNC) in Tokyo.⁵⁴⁹

In sharp contrast to Chiang's impatience, Ho Shailai had been patiently waiting for MacArthur's notice about departing for Taiwan. Meanwhile, Ho immersed himself on maintaining a positive Chinese image among the general public in Tokyo. For instance, Ho led seventy-four members of the Chinese Mission in Japan to donate their blood for soldiers in the Korean frontline. As the newspaper revealed, Ho himself donated "600 cubic centimeters of his blood", and he and his wife "were the first among the mission personnel to donate their blood to the United Nations forces who were fighting on the Korean front for the cause of freedom." Moreover, "Twenty wives and daughters of the officials of the Mission have volunteered for membership in the Red Cross to render services for the United Nations forces on the Korean front."⁵⁵⁰ The blood donation from members of the Chinese Mission reflected the Chinese eagerness to make contribution to the Korean War effort. At 6 p.m. on July 28, Ho received a call from MacArthur, who invited him to a private meeting, at which the General presented the nuts and bolts of his trip to Taipei.⁵⁵¹ According to Sebald, the General also told Karl L. Rankin in July that "If he has horns and a tail, so long as he is anti-Communist, we should help him. Rather than make things difficult, the State Department should assist him in his fight against the Communists-we can try to reform him later!"⁵⁵²

MACARTHUR'S VISIT TO TAIPEI

At 6 a.m. on July 31, Ho accompanied General MacArthur on the same plane departing for Taipei. According to Stratemeyer's diary, "Those accompanying us: Joy, Struble, Ho, Almond, Whitney, Canada (CINCFE's physician) and an orderly. The others left in the standby C-54 (FEAF flagship out of commission because of faulty engine): Marquat, Willoughby, Wright, Eberle, Navy member, my Materiel (Alkire),

⁵⁴⁹ James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 57.

⁵⁵⁰ "Chinese Donate Blood," July 28, 1950, *Nippon Times*.

⁵⁵¹ DHSL, July 28, 1950.

⁵⁵² William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 122.

7th Fleet member, and an orderly left in GHQ C-54.”⁵⁵³ After landing at Taipei, they were warmly received by Chiang. As Peter Lowe described, the General was “greeted effusively by Chiang.”⁵⁵⁴ Later a joint conference was held, at which nearly all significant Nationalist military officers were present. According to Stratemeyer’s diary, MacArthur held a meeting with the American officials, at which he stated that

.....the Chinese forces had a poor organization, that they were not deployed properly, that if they had about 75,000 to 100,000 people properly organized on paper and on the ground, the proper commanders in charge, they could hold Taiwan; that our job would be to send without delay a liaison group made up of Army, Air and Navy and that although we would not command, we would assist and direct what we as Americans considered proper in the defense of the islands. There would be no integration of forces, but that we would work along parallel lines, that our activities on Formosa would be concerned with defense only, that we would assist the Chinese, that we would in no way get involved with political aspects and that our activities would be purely professional.⁵⁵⁵

Before the visit, MacArthur might not have anticipated that Nationalist forces were in such a poor state. While investigating the feasibility of accepting Chiang’s offer was not one of the main purposes of his Taiwan visit, MacArthur may have had a slight anticipation of receiving Nationalist Chinese troops in Korea. But after hearing the Chinese officers’ reports, this idea was totally dismissed and what MacArthur wanted the Nationalist to do was to merely defend Taiwan. As Carl Berger summarized, “it was agreed that the United States and Nationalist China would coordinate their efforts to defend Formosa and that Chiang’s offer of 33,000 troops would be held in abeyance.”⁵⁵⁶

One outcome of this visit was that MacArthur decided to establish a liaison between Tokyo and Taipei, in which Ho Shailai served as the interlocutor. Ho was

⁵⁵³ George E. Stratemeyer, William T. Y’Blood, and Air Force History and Museums Program (U.S.), *The Three Wars of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer: His Korean War Diary* (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1999), 89.

⁵⁵⁴ Peter Lowe, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 179.

⁵⁵⁵ George E. Stratemeyer, William T. Y’Blood, and Air Force History and Museums Program (U.S.), *The Three Wars of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer: His Korean War Diary*, 90-91.

⁵⁵⁶ Carl Berger, *The Korean Knot: A Military-Political History*, 117.

asked by Willoughby to inform Taipei that he would dispatch General Alonzo Patrick Fox, Vice Chief of Staff of the United Nations Forces, to lead 25 officials to Taipei on the next day in order to “make a survey of the supply and manpower requirements of Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Nationalist Forces there.”⁵⁵⁷ MacArthur also recommended sending jet fighters to Taiwan, which raised doubts from the Pentagon whether those planes would be used to fight mainland China. Truman instructed MacArthur to understand the limit of his authority in making decisions and the General assured the President that he understood “thoroughly the limitations on my authority as theater commander and you need have no anxiety that I will in any way exceed them.”⁵⁵⁸

MacArthur’s unannounced visit to Taipei infuriated Washington D.C., which immediately dispatched Averell Harriman to Tokyo to meet MacArthur.⁵⁵⁹ Harriman’s trip raised doubts among foreign representatives in Japan. The British Mission in Japan was eager to know the purpose of his visit and invited Harriman for a meeting but was refused. The head of the British Mission then approached Sebald to squeeze him for some information. After being asked whether “Formosa had been listed on the agenda,” Sebald replied that “he knew no details of what had passed between the two men [Harriman and MacArthur].” Depressed at obtaining nothing, the British official protested to Sebald that he was “getting desperate about not having any access to MacArthur” and “found myself completely cut off from the oracle, MacArthur could find time to see Randolph Churchill (he actually gave him luncheon!), but he could not see the senior official representative of His Majesty’s Government in Japan.”⁵⁶⁰ As the British diplomat sensitively surmised, both Americans did discuss the Taiwan issue but reached no agreement. Michael Schaller has summarized that the General still “ridiculed the administration’s China policy and boasted of his own credentials as the greatest American expert on Oriental psychology” and believed that “Washington

⁵⁵⁷ DHSL, August 3, 1950; Walt Sheldon, *Hell or High Water: MacArthur’s Landing at Inchon* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 96.

⁵⁵⁸ Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur*, 194-195.

⁵⁵⁹ James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 81.

⁵⁶⁰ “Sir A. Gascoigne (Tokyo) to Mr. Denning,” August 9, 1950, UK National Archives, FO 371/84044.

should delegate the task of handling Chiang to an expert like himself.”⁵⁶¹

Despite facing opposition from Washington D.C., Chiang did not cease to pressure General MacArthur. MacArthur’s journey to Taiwan not only encouraged Chiang but significantly enhanced Ho’s status in Tokyo as well. On their flight back to Tokyo, MacArthur invited Ho to attend the daily military briefings on the Korean War in Tokyo.⁵⁶² In his diaries, Ho summarized the gist of every military briefing. For instance, in a briefing held on August 23, at which Ho was present, MacArthur examined the Inchon landing plan with Admiral Forrest Sherman, who was visiting Japan and Korea.⁵⁶³ The fact that Ho was allowed to receive this highly classified military intelligence, when his country was not even a part of the UN force to Korea, demonstrated how much faith MacArthur had in him.

On August 10, Chiang asked Ho to confer with General MacArthur on whether the Nationalist government should identify with echo the statement issued by the General.⁵⁶⁴ On August 18, Ho arranged a meeting between Gu Weijun and MacArthur. Gu mentioned Chiang’s proposal to dispatch his own troops as well as to organize an “Asian Volunteer Army” to Korea. After hearing this, the General simply replied that it would be meaningless to have Taiwan dispatch its troops abroad, for its status was extremely important. As to the Asian Volunteer Army question, the General believed it should be decided by the United Nations.⁵⁶⁵ In the meantime, Chiang also proposed to send observers, in the name of the Republic of China, to the Korean battlefield. Ho discussed this issue with Courtney Whitney, political advisor of SCAP, who replied that it would be better to propose this issue to the United Nations and SCAP would try its best to help.⁵⁶⁶ MacArthur also told Ho that there had been 31 countries requesting to send observers to the battlefield but were denied, and it would be difficult to fulfill Chiang’s request. In the future, the General added, if other countries were allowed to

⁵⁶¹ Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur*, 195.

⁵⁶² DHSL, August 1, 1950.

⁵⁶³ James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 87; DHSL, August 23, 1950.

⁵⁶⁴ Diaries of Chiang Kai-Shek, August 10, 1950.

⁵⁶⁵ DHSL, August 18, 1950.

⁵⁶⁶ DHSL, September 25, 1950.

send observers, China could do the same thing as well.⁵⁶⁷

While Chiang had been keeping his eyes on the Korean War and searching for the best moment to reoffer his deals with General MacArthur, the General had no intention to accept Chiang's offer. On one hand, MacArthur must obey Truman's instruction. On the other hand, he firmly believed that the Korean War could be finished in several months and there was no need to have the Nationalists involved. In the meantime, Ho was actively propagating the idea that "neutralization of Taiwan" would benefit the Chinese Communist on the grounds that the PLA could concentrate its forces to attack Taiwan without being harassed by the KMT air force and navy. Ho reiterated that even though "Free China" was now based on Taiwan, it still possessed significant power to stop the People's Volunteer Army from entering Korea.⁵⁶⁸ In a meeting between Ho, Dong Xiangguang, and MacArthur on October 5, MacArthur clearly stated that "the 38th parallel must be crossed and after that the war will be over in a month. Until now the amount of the US soldiers in Korea is enough, even if the Soviet Union or the Chinese communists joined the war they could not stop our troops' advance."⁵⁶⁹ The General's message was clear. At the outset of the war, the General was contemplating to accept Chiang's offer but needed Washington's approval. Now the situation had changed, and the General believed he could win the war without causing more trouble. At this point, MacArthur firmly believed the intervention of the Chinese communists was impractical, even if it happened, it would not affect the outcome of the war. Based on this evaluation, on September 29 Marshall gave the green light, instructing MacArthur that "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel."⁵⁷⁰

On October 15, President Truman held a meeting with MacArthur on Wake Island to discuss the progress of the Korean War and to reiterate the United States

⁵⁶⁷ DHSL, October 5, 1950.

⁵⁶⁸ "He Shili zai Dongjing Yanshuo Cheng Taiwan Zhonglihua Cuoshi Shi Zhonggong Huode Liyi (何世禮在東京演說稱台灣「中立化」措施使中共「獲得利益」) [Speaking in Tokyo, Ho Shilai Says Taiwan 'Neutralization' Measures Enabled the Chinese Communists to 'Gain Benefits']," September 21, 1950, *The Kung Sheung Daily News*.

⁵⁶⁹ DHSL, October 5, 1950.

⁵⁷⁰ "The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)," September 29, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 826.

government principle not to attack Chinese territory.⁵⁷¹ Furthermore, both of them believed that the PRC would not enter the war, even it did, MacArthur predicted that “American forces would simply mow them down as they tried to cross the Yalu-“the greatest slaughter in military history”.⁵⁷² The Nationalists regarded this meeting as the best opportunity to figure out Truman’s intention, and the news media in Taiwan assumed that Ho was to stay in Japan to investigate this meeting.⁵⁷³ Ho was infuriated by this rumor and immediately announced resignation on October 18.⁵⁷⁴ However, Ho was persuaded to remain in his position. Ho acutely sensed the fact that although the atmosphere in the Wake Island Conference was cordial, the divergence between Truman and MacArthur would widen. In a meeting with Wang Shijie, they discussed Chiang’s recent decision to send officers to visit MacArthur, which they both believed imprudent. They believed that Tokyo and Washington maintained a subtle relationship, so MacArthur might refuse to meet Chiang’s envoys. In that case, the Chinese would be embarrassed. Thus, Wang asked Ho to express their concern to the President if Chiang inquired about this issue.⁵⁷⁵ In sum, from the outset of the Korean War on June 25, Chiang had been vying for the chance to counterattack Mainland China and participate in the Korean War, and never stopped reminding MacArthur that he was ready to join the war at any time.

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ENTERED THE WAR

MacArthur was confident that the Chinese communists would not intervene. As the British representative in ACJ noted on October 3, MacArthur dismissed Zhou Enlai’s warning to Panikkar that if US forces crossed the 38th parallel they would face Chinese resistance as “pure bluff.”⁵⁷⁶ Unfortunately, MacArthur’s evaluation

⁵⁷¹ Qing Simei, *From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945-1960* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 164.

⁵⁷² Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1991), 146.

⁵⁷³ “Dumai zhi Hui Cheng Taiwan Shengsi Guantou (杜麥之會成台灣生死關頭) [Meeting of Truman and MacArthur Marks a Critical Juncture for Taiwan],” October 16, 1950, *Huaqiao Ribao*.

⁵⁷⁴ DHSL, October 18, 1950.

⁵⁷⁵ DHSL, October 27, 1950.

⁵⁷⁶ “Tokyo to Foreign Office,” October 3, 1950, UK National Archives, FO 371/84099; Zhai Qiang,

eventually proved to be wrong. On October 19, the People's Voluntary Army (PVA), which was commanded by General Peng Dehuai, joined the fighting when it launched the First Phase Offensive on October 25. The CCP's intervention not only thwarted MacArthur's victory but made the Americans reconsider the feasibility of having the Chinese Nationalists take part in the Korean War. MacArthur was also confused about the intention of the CCP and the extent of its involvement in the war, as Michael Schaller summarized that the General "did not know if Peking intended to fight a major war with the United States or whether it would make only a token, face-saving effort on behalf of a Communist ally."⁵⁷⁷ Perhaps for the purpose of better understanding the CCP's motivation, the General wanted to utilize the Chinese Nationalists. On November 4, Ho received a cable from SCAP, wishing the Chinese Mission in Japan to recruit ten or more Chinese translators.⁵⁷⁸ At this moment, Chiang and many high-ranking officials in Taipei began to firmly believe that MacArthur would appeal for Taipei's assistance. For instance, Xiao Yisu (蕭毅肅), Vice Chief of Staff of the Nationalist troops, and Wang Shijie both suggested that Ho return to Tokyo several days later in case SCAP asked for Nationalist troops before a final decision would be made by Chiang.⁵⁷⁹ On November 9, Chiang held a meeting with Ho. In his diary, Chiang noted, "I discussed MacArthur's attitude with Ho Shailai. If the General once again requested me to dispatch troops to assist South Korea, the plans are the same as before. But the U.S. government must renounce the statement that forbids me to counterattack Mainland China, which is a natural principle."⁵⁸⁰ In Ho's diary, he also noted that Chiang told him to ask MacArthur to help rescind Truman's order and to allow Nationalist troops stationed in Vietnam to retreat to Taiwan.⁵⁸¹

Ho returned to Tokyo and found that his status was enhanced again, for a China

The Dragon, the Lion & the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1958 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1994), 81.

⁵⁷⁷ Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur*, 207.

⁵⁷⁸ DHSL, November 4, 1950.

⁵⁷⁹ DHSL, November 8, 1950.

⁵⁸⁰ Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, November 10, 1950.

⁵⁸¹ DHSL, November 9, 1950.

expert was urgently needed to explain the motivations of the Chinese communists' intervention. To some extent, MacArthur might regret that he did not inquire Ho Shailai about the possibility of the Chinese communists' intervention into the war before making his overconfident judgement. As a study suggested, at this point "American policy makers did not know Chinese plans and objectives but were instead relying on guesswork and speculation for their analyses."⁵⁸² Hence, as a CIA document revealed, opinions of the Nationalist officials were attentive to the Americans for none of them really knew what the real CCP intentions were. The Americans were eager to know whether it was Beijing itself or Moscow which ordered Beijing to intervene in the Korean War, since the two possibilities would lead to two entirely different scenarios. In the first case, the Chinese communists probably intended "only a defensive action to protect electric power supplies for Manchuria, and may plan to hold only a narrow buffer area." But if it was the second case, the CCP would be following the "Indochina cold war pattern" and might "include an attempt to drive United Nations (UN) forces back to the 38th Parallel."⁵⁸³ As the closet Nationalist Chinese officials to SCAP, Ho's opinions were of abundant usefulness. For instance, Courtney Whitney told Ho that "based on current circumstances, there are many things you could help SCAP. I suggest you to have a deep conversation with the General once you meet him." George E. Stratmeyer, commanding general of Far East Air Force, also suggested Ho to give more information on the Communists forces to the General.⁵⁸⁴ In early November, MacArthur favored advancing UN troops to the Yalu. In his conversation with MacArthur on November 14, Sebald noted that the General believed his immediate objective was to "destroy the bridges across the Yalu River in order to isolate the area between the present line of the UN Forces and the border." Sebald noted:

The UN Forces would, of course, stop at the boundary. If this can be

⁵⁸² Stephen R. Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2016), 103.

⁵⁸³ "Opinion of Nationalist Official on Chinese Communist Entry into Korean Conflict," November 6, 1950, General CIA Records, CIA-RDP82-00457R006200450009-9.

⁵⁸⁴ DHSL, November 15, 1950. Stratmeyer did not mention this conversation in his diary on this date.

accomplished during the next several weeks and before the river freezes, General MacArthur feels that the Korean campaign would be at an end. Should the planned operation fail and the Communist Forces continue to stream into North Korea from Manchuria, however, he saw no alternative, from a military point of view, to bombing key points in Manchuria. He said that if this should become necessary “the fat would be in the fire”, because such operations would, in his opinion, bring about a counter-move by Soviet Russia. Such counter-move, he felt, could only lead to a spreading of the war and he therefore hoped that it would not be necessary to resort to such drastic action.⁵⁸⁵

Two days later, on November 16, MacArthur had a long conversation with Ho, at which they conferred about progress of the Korean War. The first question Ho raised, of which Chiang was eager to know the answer, was whether there was anything that Nationalist China could help; the General expressed his “deep gratitude” but replied that to defend Taiwan was still the priority for the Nationalists. Ho summarized MacArthur’s viewpoints as follows: military operations of the UN Forces must stop at Sino-Korean border, and the General was ready to fight the CCP (at the border); however, it was not likely to happen, and the General’s opinions on the Taiwan problem became much prudent in comparison to that before his visit to Taipei. The General also told Ho that if the Soviet Union attacked, he would bomb Vladivostok and Shenyang; if the CCP “still refused to repent” and insisted on elevating the warfare, the General would use atom bombs.⁵⁸⁶

Analyzing MacArthur’s conversation with Sebald and Ho, one could sense MacArthur’s insistence on the UN Forces approaching the Sino-Korean border (the Yalu River). MacArthur firmly believed his objective was to stop the PVA from dispatching more troops crossing the Yalu, and bombardment at the border would be an effective means to achieve this goal. The General also believed that the PVA had no intention to confront him on a massive scale, which made Chiang Kai-shek’s request a trivial issue. Despite so, the General kept showing his kindness to the

⁵⁸⁵ “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald),” November 14, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 1148-1149.

⁵⁸⁶ DHS, November 16, 1950; “He Shili Jilu Huiwu Maike Ase Tanhua Jilu (何世禮紀錄會晤麥克阿瑟談話紀錄) [Ho Shilai on a Meeting with MacArthur, Record of a Conversation], November 16, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00056-014.

Chinese Nationalists. On November 19, a decision was made between Ho and Willoughby that the Chinese government would dispatch officials to Korea to interview prisoners of war.⁵⁸⁷ Ho was in a position to have the captured PVA soldiers returned to Taiwan on the grounds that fifty percent of the PVA soldiers, according to his own estimation, were “conscripted from former Nationalist ranks.”⁵⁸⁸

At this point, Ho served as an advisor to SCAP to gather information about the PVA. According to a CIA document, most American officials believed the Nationalist troops “are experienced and familiar with Chinese Communist tactics.”⁵⁸⁹ By the same token, Ho’s military commander experience in the Chinese Civil War made his opinions extremely useful to the American generals in Korea. For instance, Whitney conferred with Ho about the mentality of the PVA and believed that the Chinese Communists were not willing to fight the Americans, were deeply afraid of being bombed by the Americans, and their morale was depressed and weapons were poor. Perceiving Whitney’s underestimation of the PVA’s determination, Ho kindly reminded Whitney that the communists were not willing to fight the nationalists during the Chinese Civil War either and should not underrate them.⁵⁹⁰

Regrettably, Ho’s warnings did not affect the stubborn general. Two days later, on November 25, the PVA launched the Second Phase Offensive to counterattack MacArthur’s “end the war offensive.” The embarrassed MacArthur persisted on escalating the war, which faced opposition from the Pentagon. On November 28 MacArthur admitted that “We face an entirely new war.”⁵⁹¹ “Yesterday I read the newspaper and learned that the progress of the American Force was not well,” wrote Ho in his diary on that day, “after reading the newspaper this morning it is confirmed that the American troops are retreating in an orderly fashion. The situation is worsening, as I have expected, the bandit troops [the PVA] concentrate their main

⁵⁸⁷ DHSL, November 19, 1950.

⁵⁸⁸ “Chinese Captives Held Nationalists,” November 23, 1950, *The Baltimore Sun*.

⁵⁸⁹ “Consequences of the early employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea,” December 27, 1950, General CIA Records, CIA-RDP79R01012A000300050005-7.

⁵⁹⁰ DHSL, November 23, 1950.

⁵⁹¹ “The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” November 28, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 1237.

force to attack South Korean units, resulting in overwhelming momentum.”⁵⁹² The morning following the PVA offensive, MacArthur suggested to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the use of Chiang’s troops, whose trained manpower could supplement the UN Force in Korea. The General noted that the reasons for turning down Chiang’s previous offer, notably the Chinese Communists’ potential invasion of Taiwan and intervention in Korea, were no longer applicable.⁵⁹³ In his memoir, MacArthur also recounted his request to Washington, saying “the theater commander be authorized to negotiate directly with the Chinese government authorities on Formosa for the movement north and incorporation into United Nations command of such Chinese units as may be available and desirable for reinforcing our position in Korea.”⁵⁹⁴ However, MacArthur’s suggestion was immediately turned down by President Truman on the same day. Truman rejected the proposal because it would not only “extend hostilities to Formosa” but also would disrupt the allied relationship between the United States and other countries involved in the Korean War.⁵⁹⁵

Ironically, Chiang learned nothing about MacArthur’s interest in using his troops. Perceiving the fact that the US Army was facing consecutive defeats, Chiang cabled Ho on December 1 to inform General MacArthur that “if there is anything that China could do to help, we will definitely do our best to assist and face either victory or defeat together.”⁵⁹⁶ MacArthur immediately replied Ho on December 2 and expressed his “deep gratitude” to Chiang’s kindness.⁵⁹⁷ While this reply seemed a kind rejection to Chiang’s proposal, Chiang’s attitude boosted MacArthur conviction. The General had begun to reconsider the feasibility of using Chiang’s forces since later November, as many studies have discovered.⁵⁹⁸ On December 2 the Republican Senators in the United States began to urge Truman to dispatch Chiang’s troops to Korea.⁵⁹⁹ Five days later, on December 7, MacArthur once again proposed to use the Nationalist

⁵⁹² DHSL, November 28, 1950.

⁵⁹³ James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 152.

⁵⁹⁴ Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 375.

⁵⁹⁵ James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 152-153.

⁵⁹⁶ “Chiang Kai-shek to Ho Shailai,” December 1, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00427-054.

⁵⁹⁷ “Ho Shailai to Chiang Kai-shek,” December 2, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00056-016.

⁵⁹⁸ Max Hastings, *The Korean War*, 212; Stephen R. Taaffe, *MacArthur’s Korean War Generals*, 117.

⁵⁹⁹ James McGovern, *To the Yalu: From the Chinese Invasion of Korea to MacArthur’s Dismissal* (New York: William Morrow, 1972), 138-139.

forces in Korea, as Stratemeyer wrote, “General MacArthur then pointed out the great reservoir of Chinese Nationalists on Formosa and urged that he be permitted to use them in Korea under the UN banner. He indicated that the Generalissimo would give him 60,000 or 100,000 - or all of his troops if he needed them.”⁶⁰⁰ The amount MacArthur mentioned were never seen either in Chiang’s telegram to Ho or his personal diary, clearly it was Chiang’s letter a week earlier that made MacArthur firmly believe that Chiang would give him any amount of troops he needed to join the Korean War. In a meeting on December 7 with General Collins, who was on an inspection tour in Japan, MacArthur urged the use of Chiang’s troops.⁶⁰¹ The General went on to elaborate that if restrictions on air action against and naval blockade of China could be withdrawn, and if he could “secure 50,000 – 60,000 Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa,” he thought “he could hold a line across Korea.” If the PVA stopped at the 38th Parallel, an armistice based on the Parallel could be accepted.⁶⁰²

In the meantime, news media in Tokyo was curious about the Chinese Communists’ intention and found Ho an ideal person to interview. For instance, when being asked “Why have the Chinese communists intervened in Korea?” in an interview with Richard Kallsen, Tokyo correspondent of the Mutual Broadcasting System, Ho replied that the communists “are merely carrying out orders from the Kremlin in the execution of Soviet world strategy.” The second question was “Would the Chinese Communist aggression in Korea lead to World War III?” Ho replied,

If the United Nations was willing to stop the North Korean aggressor and not the Chinese Communist aggressor, a global war may not break out right away, but no aggressor has ever stopped on its own volition. The sooner the aggressor is stopped, the less will the aggression spread, and still less will be the chances of a global conflict. Stop aggression now and there may not be a world war. Let the aggressor get away with it now and world war will be a dead certainty.⁶⁰³

⁶⁰⁰ George E. Stratemeyer, William T. Y’Blood, and Air Force History and Museums Program (U.S.), *The Three Wars of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer: His Korean War Diary*, 338.

⁶⁰¹ James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 166.

⁶⁰² “United States Delegation Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee,” December 8, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 1469.

⁶⁰³ DHSL, November 30, 1950.

Perhaps the most challenging question to Ho, which was once again raised by another journalist on December 7, was “whether Manchuria should be bombed.” Ho first answer on November 30 was “Whether or not Manchuria too should be bombed depends on whether the United Nations has courage to face the fact that the Chinese communists are now the aggressors.” A week later, Ho held the same view on this question and answered that “If the United Nations should at last consider the Communist Chinese intervention as aggression, then naturally the United Nations commander should be allowed to use all available means to fight the aggression wherever and whenever necessary.” When the journalist went further and asked “How about using the Atom Bomb in Korea or in Manchuria?” Ho replied, “There are no such targets in Manchuria, with the possible exception of Dairen and Port Arthur. However, Soviet Russia would like to see the atom Bomb dropped as soon as possible over Manchuria, to see what the effects of the newest atom bomb would be like and to further fan the frenzy of the Chinese Communists.”⁶⁰⁴

The answers given by Ho were carefully worded. As a strongly patriotic militarist whose career began in Northeast China, Ho clearly objected to any bombardment on Chinese civilians; however, as an ally to the United Nations faction, it would be unwise to directly object this idea. Consequently, Ho threw this issue back to the United Nations and believed it was its duty to make the decision. While not willing to see the outbreak of World War III, Ho still firmly believed that the counterattack on Mainland China would be feasible, which was epitomized in his answer to the question “If the U.N. decided to fight China, what would be the best way of going about it? By land? By sea? By air?”:

I think you mean Communist China. The situation in Communist China is actually more precarious than the outside world thinks. Guerrilla activities have multiplied in the past two months; the mind of the people is drifting to rebellion. Any landing by the United Nations with Chinese Government forces would start rolling the snowball of a nationwide anti-Communist upheaval through instant

⁶⁰⁴ DHSL, December 7, 1950.

physical contact with the one and a half million guerrillas scattered all over China. Millions more of the Chinese people who have been disillusioned by their Red rulers can be counted on to join the anti-Communist forces.⁶⁰⁵

While answering this question with great humor and rosy anticipation, Ho did not mention a single word about the plan of dispatching the Nationalist troops from Taiwan to join the war. In his mind, Ho had to keep this plan secret lest he infuriated MacArthur and altered his decision. Ho's main task, as he accomplished in these interviews, was to illustrate how favorable the anti-communist forces would be and wait for the General to seek for the Nationalist's assistance.

In a meeting with Ho Shailai and Dong Xianguang, both the Nationalist officials skillfully inquired the General about reconsidering Chiang's offer, and the way in which they asked questions were much cleverer than before. "Will the United States use their allies in Asia to fight against the satellite countries of the Soviet Union?" asked Dong, the General directly replied that he was in favor of using the Nationalist forces in Korea and even proposed this idea to General Collins. "In order to disperse the enemy's forces," Ho continued to ask, "our troops might land at Guangzhou and we would like to know your opinion." The General suggested the troops should be dispatched to Hong Kong so there would be no need to land at coastal areas, but the British would not agree with it because they were "scared like a rat." Realizing that the General probably answered their questions in an amusing attitude, Ho seriously asked the General whether the Nationalist forces would be used in the Korean War or not. "Definitely not," the General replied, "The United Nations will object it, and the United States will not support it either. However, if a battle between Taiwan and Mainland China broke out that would be another case."⁶⁰⁶ "Because the Chinese communists' participation in the war is out of the General's expectation," added Ho in his diary, "so his understanding of the communists' mentality is much clearer than before."⁶⁰⁷

⁶⁰⁵ DHSL, December 7, 1950.

⁶⁰⁶ "Dong Xianguang Baogao Zhaiyao (董顯光報告摘要) [Summaries of Dong Xianguang's Report]," December 14, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00056-015.

⁶⁰⁷ DHSL, December 14, 1950.

MacArthur's reply to Ho and Dong was by no means accidental. This conversation took place against the background of the retreat of UN forces, which had significantly tarnished MacArthur's prestige. To a great extent, MacArthur ascribed the PVA initiative to restrictions imposed on him, which he believed prevented him from taking a "hot pursuit" against the PVA, such as crossing the Yalu River and bombing Northeast China.⁶⁰⁸ By implying to the enthusiastic Chinese Nationalists that there was the possibility of US support if fighting erupted between Taiwan and China, the General preferred to escalate the war to redeem his military initiative and reputation. However, Washington interpreted the ongoing warfare in another way. As the future of the Korean War was uncertain, the US government believed that "Korea is not the place to fight a major war." The US Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the General to preserve his units since the withdrawal of the UN Forces from Korea was likely to happen. In the worst scenario, the Forces should retreat to Japan, since it was the main focus of US strategic interest in East Asia.⁶⁰⁹

On December 30, the General remonstrated that since the Chinese Communists' forces had been concentrated in Korea and Northeast China, "other parts of the country were vulnerable" but "existing policies prevented exploitation of this opportunity." MacArthur suggested blockading China's coast, destroying its industrial war-making capacity, reinforcing UN forces with Chiang's troops, and allowing the Chinese Nationalists to undertake "diversionary action" against the mainland.⁶¹⁰ Before receiving the final decision from Washington, MacArthur encountered another PVA offensive initiated.

PROPOSAL OF OPENING A SECOND FRONT

On New Year's Eve of 1950, the PVA launched the Third Phase Offensive and forced the UN forces to retreat southward. Perceiving this news, on January 2, 1951

⁶⁰⁸ James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 238-239.

⁶⁰⁹ "The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)," December 29, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 1625.

⁶¹⁰ James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 181-182.

Ho speculated that due to the insufficiency of the UN forces, the opportunity of using the Nationalist troops was about to come.⁶¹¹ Two days later, the fact that PVA conquered Seoul seemed to prove Ho's prediction prescient. But similar to MacArthur, enacting any military plan was futile and meaningless unless this mission was approved by Washington. Hence, what Ho could do was to wait and cultivate his close relationships with the Americans. On January 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff once again rejected MacArthur's proposal of using Chiang's troops, based on a survey conducted by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, on the grounds that "the Nationalists could not significantly affect the outcome in Korea."⁶¹²

In January 1951, He Yingqin visited Tokyo. This action alerted the Mao Zedong, as he speculated that the KMT might attack Xiamen and Shantou and requested the fortification of the cities.⁶¹³ Although these assaults did not occur, Mao's worries were not groundless. In late January the US Joint Chiefs of Staff seriously considered the plan of supporting Chiang's troops to attack mainland China in order to contain the Chinese Communist's capability of opening fronts in other places.⁶¹⁴ In mid-February 1951, MacArthur formulated a plan in which he proposed to "use the 500,000 Nationalist Chinese troops from Formosa (plus two Marine divisions) to make amphibious and air landings simultaneously on both the east and the west coasts of the neck of Korea, to join up overland and so cut off and contain the CPVA."⁶¹⁵ On February 12, Congressman Joseph Martin vehemently blamed the Truman administration for preventing Chiang Kai-shek from opening a second front in Asia.⁶¹⁶ Several days later, MacArthur's proposal "to bomb Manchurian bases and to use Chiang Kai-shek's troops" were again rejected.⁶¹⁷ Congressman Martin echoed

⁶¹¹ DHSL, January 2, 1950.

⁶¹² James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 184.

⁶¹³ Mao Zedong, "Guanyu Fangyu Guomindang Jundui Jingong Xiamen Shantou de Dianbao (關於防禦國民黨軍隊進攻廈門、汕頭的電報) [Telegram about Defending KMT Troop's Attack on Xiamen and Shantou]," January 13, 1951, in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi (中共中央文獻研究室) ed., *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao* (建國以來毛澤東文稿) [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the State] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1988), Vol. 2, 24-25.

⁶¹⁴ James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 202.

⁶¹⁵ Edgar O'Balance, *Korea: 1950-1953*, 94.

⁶¹⁶ James McGovern, *To the Yalu: From the Chinese Invasion of Korea to MacArthur's Dismissal*, 164.

⁶¹⁷ I.F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (London: Turnstile Press, 1952), 264.

MacArthur's viewpoints and became his firm supporter in the United States, a letter on March 20 in which the General supported the idea of allowing Chiang's forces to land on the mainland, was read out on April 5.⁶¹⁸ The letter revealed the General's discouragement of the limitations on him, as he wrote, "Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition."⁶¹⁹

Ho was attracted by the debate in the United States and was attentive to Americans who visited Tokyo. On April 6, Ho paid a visit to Warren Magnuson, a Senator of the Democratic Party.⁶²⁰ On April 8, Ho met Paul C. Smith, editor in chief of the San Francisco Chronicle, conferring about the progress of the Korean War.⁶²¹ In the meantime, O. K. Armstrong and W. J. Bryan Dorn, two US congressmen who were visiting Japan, strongly endorsed MacArthur's plan to bomb Manchuria and to use Nationalist Chinese forces in the war.⁶²² In a joint statement, the two congressmen further claimed that "We fail to see how the war can be won if our forces cannot carry the action to enemy territory," and MacArthur and his field commanders "should not be restricted in military actions which they consider necessary."⁶²³

Ho's contacts with the American visitors did not cease after MacArthur's dismissal but sharply increased. Under the arrangement of William Sebald, Ho met Edgar A. Mowrer, a famous American journalist on May 13.⁶²⁴ When Congressman Martin, a firm supporter of General MacArthur, paid a visit to Japan on November 10, 1951, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Ho Shailai to invite him to visit Taiwan.⁶²⁵ Three days later, Ho replied to Chiang that Martin would depart for Taipei on November 16

⁶¹⁸ Edgar O'Balance, *Korea: 1950-1953*, 101; James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 243.

⁶¹⁹ J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime*, 281.

⁶²⁰ DHSL, April 6, 1951.

⁶²¹ DHSL, April 8, 1951.

⁶²² William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 224-225.

⁶²³ "Truman Unswayed by M'Arthur Plan," April 7, 1951, *The New York Times*.

⁶²⁴ DHSL, May 13, 1951.

⁶²⁵ "Chiang Kai-shek to Ho Shailai," November 10, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-010400-00018-034.

and his main purpose was to investigate whether the US military and economic assistance was timely and satisfied the needs of the Nationalists.⁶²⁶

THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE MISSION IN THE KOREAN WAR

Although direct Nationalist Chinese participation never came into effect, the Chinese Mission had been endowed with several additional missions that contributed to the United Nations military operations in Korea. Since Ho Shailai had long experience of dealing with the Chinese communists, their fundamental psychology would have been known to him. Thus, Ho and the Chinese Mission began to serve as an advisor to the psychological warfare operation adopted in the Korean War. Two months after the Chinese communists joined the battlefield, General Roderick R. Allen secretly asked Ho Shailai to submit a refinement to the psychological warfare strategy and without informing General Willoughby, who was de facto in charge of the intelligence operation.⁶²⁷ In his refinement, Ho placed painted leaflets as the most important propaganda item.

Ho's refinement probably made MacArthur believe that a psychological warfare played by the Chinese Nationalist would be feasible. On January 2, 1951, MacArthur informed the US Consul in Taipei to request twenty linguists from the Ministry of Defense in Taiwan.⁶²⁸ On January 9, Ho also asked Jiang Jingguo, head of the Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense, to search for two comedic painters with experience in psychological warfare and offer materials on psychological warfare from the Political Department.⁶²⁹

In middle February, the PVA launched the Fourth Phase Offensive, during which the famous "Gettysburg of the Korean War" took place from February 13 to 15 and

⁶²⁶ "Ho Shailai to Chiang Kai-shek," November 13, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-090103-00007-119.

⁶²⁷ DHS, December 29, 1950.

⁶²⁸ "CINCFE to US Consul, Taipei," January 2, 1951, MacArthur Papers, RG 9, China, January-February 1951, Box 13, MacArthur Memorial Library, Norfolk VA; Quoted in Callum A. MacDonald, "'Heroes Behind Barbed Wire' The US, Britain and the POW issue in the Korean War," in James Cotton and Ian Neary eds., *The Korean War in History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 138.

⁶²⁹ "Ho Shailai to Jiang Jingguo," January 9, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00662-082.

resulted in a UN forces victory. It was perhaps this significant victory that encouraged the UN Command to invite the Chinese Nationalists to join the psychological warfare in favor of the forthcoming battles. In February, MacArthur sent another two telegrams to the US Consul in Taipei, requesting an additional 55 linguists from Taipei and dispatched an officer to Taipei to coordinate plans for psychological warfare.⁶³⁰ On February 17, Ho cabled Jiang Jingguo informing him that the chief of the Psychological Warfare Branch might accompany Ho to visit Taiwan and that he wished to meet Jiang.⁶³¹ Jiang Jingguo replied to Ho on February 19 saying that the request had been granted.⁶³² On the same day, Ho informed Jiang that the two staff accompanied him were J. W. Greene and Joseph Ambrose and asked authorities in Taipei to sanction their arrival as soon as possible.⁶³³ Jiang probably met the representatives of the Psychological Warfare Branch in Taipei, but the details of the meeting still remain classified. On March 22 Jiang cabled Ho to arrange the formalities of some Nationalist staff who would be departing for Japan to conduct psychological warfare in Korea.⁶³⁴

Jiang spent the next two months selecting people capable of undertaking this mission. On May 21 Jiang listed the names and passport numbers of the four candidates who were ready to depart for Japan and asked Ho to secure entrance cards for them from SCAP.⁶³⁵ The four candidates were Liang Dingming (梁鼎銘), Kong Qiuquan (孔秋泉), Yang Longsheng (楊隆生) and Chu Songqiu (楚崧秋), among which Liang and Yang were painters who were expected to design propaganda paintings leaflets delivered to the PVA soldiers.⁶³⁶ Kong and Chu later became a

⁶³⁰ "CINCFE to US Consul," February 3, 1951; "CINCFE to US Consul," February 18, 1951; Quoted in Callum A. MacDonald, "'Heroes Behind Barbed Wire' The US, Britain and the POW issue in the Korean War," in James Cotton and Ian Neary eds., *The Korean War in History*, 138.

⁶³¹ DHSL, February 17, 1951.

⁶³² "Jiang Jingguo to Ho Shailai," February 19, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00641-052.

⁶³³ "Ho Shailai to Jiang Jingguo," February 19, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00663-009.

⁶³⁴ "Jiang Jingguo to Ho Shailai," March 22, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00641-059. Jiang asked Ho to keep close contact with "Mr. Green," who is possibly J. Woodall Greene, a psychological warfare expert who had attended World War II and served as Chief of the Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2, Far East Command.

⁶³⁵ "Jiang Jingguo to Ho Shailai," May 21, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00641-075.

⁶³⁶ It could be postulated that some propaganda leaflets were designed by Liang and Yang. See United States. Army. Army, 8th. Psychological Warfare Section, *United States Army, 8th, Korea, Psychological*

consultant to the SCAP and a correspondent to the UN command respectively.⁶³⁷ On June 26 Jiang told Ho that he was looking forward to receiving J. Woodall Greene in Taipei in one or two months to discuss more details on the psychological warfare.⁶³⁸ Accurate assessments of these activities were fraught with difficulties, as a report noted, there is “no positive way of judging the effect of propaganda on the enemy soldier or civilian, as apart from artillery, bombing and strafing or any other weapon that may be employed.” Despite this, the psychological warfare “produced positive results in World War II and is now again proving useful in the Korean conflict.”⁶³⁹ Yet, although psychological warfare in the Korean War has attracted much scholarly attention over the past several decades, the role of the Chinese Nationalists has regrettably been barely mentioned.⁶⁴⁰

In the meantime, Ho Shailai’s importance to the UN troops in Korea was enhanced. General Frank Lowe wrote President Truman about Ho on March 16, 1951:

Now I wish to visit Formosa just as soon as possible and for the following reasons: I have received some very interesting reports of very unique, to say the least, battle training given to the Chinese Nationalist troops on Formosa. I wish to go incognito, or at least very much off the record, and with no press comment, if it can be arranged. Furthermore, I have no wish to, or expectation of, seeing the Generalissimo. I shall undertake this mission with Lt. Gen. Ho, Shai Lai, Chief of the Chinese Mission here in Japan, Ambassador and member of the Allied Council of Japan. He is a good friend, has been very kind to me, and if I remember correctly, is a graduate of West Point or of our service schools, or both. If General Ho is not available to go at the moment, he will send one of his staff. We will go there quietly, keep away from official Taipai [sic] and stay there just long enough to view this training which, by the way, is being undertaken at the south end of the Island and far removed from Taipai [sic]. Of course, I shall not undertake this mission without the knowledge and approval of The Boss.⁶⁴¹

Warfare Propaganda Leaflets and Documentation Sheets, circa 1951. 1951. Preserved in East Asia Library, University of Washington.

⁶³⁷ Lü Fangshang, Huang Kewu (黃克武) and Wang Jingling (王景玲), *Lanjin Cangsang Bashinian: Chu Songqiu Xiansheng Fangwen Jilu* (覽盡滄桑八十年: 楚崧秋先生訪問紀錄) [The Reminiscences of Mr. Tsu Sung-chiu] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2001)

⁶³⁸ “Jiang Jingguo to Ho Shailai,” June 26, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00641-093.

⁶³⁹ “Psychological Warfare in Korea,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 15, no. 1 (1951), 75.

⁶⁴⁰ Stephen E. Pease, *Psywar: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992); John Martin Campbell and Katherine Kallestad, *Slingshot in Korea: An Adventure in Psychological Warfare* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2010).

⁶⁴¹ “General Frank Lowe to President Truman,” March 16, 1951, in President Harry S. Truman's Office

On May 24, 1951, Ho Shilai met General Ridgway, at which the General introduced Ho to Riley F. Ennis, assistant Chief of Staff of the G2 section.⁶⁴² On May 25, General Ennis spent an hour asking Ho about the situation of the Chinese communists.⁶⁴³ SCAP also asked the Chinese Mission to dispatch officials to Korea to investigate the prisoners of war.⁶⁴⁴ Ho instructed Hu Weida (胡維達) and Deng Huagao (鄧華高) to visit Korea to undertake this mission and had them report the situation to him.⁶⁴⁵

Ho Shilai's opinions were regarded as important when it came to the armistice negotiation. On July 19, 1951, General Ennis suggested that Ho submit his opinion on negotiation methods with the Chinese communists.⁶⁴⁶ Ho then paid a visit to General Ennis two days later, at which several G-2 section members were presented and eager to know Ho's opinions.⁶⁴⁷ On October 30, 1951, Ho asked Jiang Jingguo to offer background on Bian Zhangwu (邊章五), the new Chinese communist negotiator, whom he had no previous knowledge.⁶⁴⁸ Jiang replied provided Ho with a brief introduction of Bian's background in a telegram two days later.⁶⁴⁹

RIDGEWAY REPLACED MACARTHUR

MacArthur's differences with Truman became greater as the Korean War progressed, which eventually led to his dismissal. Previous studies have agreed that MacArthur's visit to Taiwan and his support to Chiang Kai-shek were the main causes of his political downfall. In MacArthur's views, his visit to Taiwan, which was to inspect whether Taiwan was able to defend itself, was his responsibility as a military

Files, 1945-1953, Part 4: Korean War Files, General Frank Lowe's reports from Korea.

⁶⁴² DHSL, May 24, 1951.

⁶⁴³ DHSL, May 25, 1951.

⁶⁴⁴ DHSL, January 30, 1951; DHSL, February 1, 1951; DHSL, February 14, 1951.

⁶⁴⁵ DHSL, March 28, 1951.

⁶⁴⁶ DHSL, July 19, 1951.

⁶⁴⁷ DHSL, July 21, 1951.

⁶⁴⁸ "Ho Shilai to Jiang Jingguo," October 30, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00664-037.

⁶⁴⁹ "Jiang Jingguo to Ho Shilai," November 1, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00642-025.

commander. The State's Department, however, believed that it was ultra vires— an American official's visit to Taiwan was regarding as a diplomatic issue.⁶⁵⁰

Some opinions attributed MacArthur's dismissal to his statement published on March 24, in which the General gave the following warnings to the Chinese Communists,

The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.⁶⁵¹

In his memoir, President Truman revealed how he was offended upon receiving this statement which “was a most extraordinary statement for a military commander of the United Nations to issue on his own responsibility.” Truman further pointed out that,

It was an act totally disregarding all directives to abstain from any declarations on foreign policy. It was in open defiance of my orders as President and as Commander in Chief. This was a challenge to the authority of the President under the Constitution. It also flouted the policy of the United Nations. By this act MacArthur left me no choice—I could no longer tolerate his insubordination.⁶⁵²

In his diaries, Ho did not reveal anything in regard to this statement. In Tokyo, Ho sensed the atmosphere that MacArthur might be dismissed. In his conversation with Paul Smith on April 8, they exchanged opinions about the possible outcomes if MacArthur would be discharged.⁶⁵³ On April 9, Ho attended a cocktail party organized by General Allen, at which Frank Pace, US Secretary of the Army, was presented. Ho noted in his diary that Pace was “only 38-year-old and had good

⁶⁵⁰ Hiroshi Masuda, *MacArthur in Asia: the General and His Staff in the Philippines, Japan and Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 270-271.

⁶⁵¹ “Text of MacArthur's Korea Statement,” March 24, 1951, *The New York Times*.

⁶⁵² Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman* (New York: The New American Library, 1965), Vol. 2, 501.

⁶⁵³ DHSL, April 8, 1951.

manner in socializing.”⁶⁵⁴ Presumably Ho did not figure out the real purpose of Pace’s visit to Japan. Pace, authorized by President Truman, was to deliver the President’s message in person that MacArthur was dismissed. On the next day, Ho inquired Hodgson’s opinion about MacArthur’s potential departure. The Australian representative was not willing to directly answer this question but claimed that he believed MacArthur might be admonished and left after obtaining the number of the PLA battleplan in Manchuria from Ho.⁶⁵⁵

Ho expressed his regret after hearing MacArthur’s dismissal in his diary on April 11, “I believe replacing MacArthur is the biggest mistake that Truman has made. In addition, the order wording is impolite and there was no news about it.”⁶⁵⁶ On April 16 when MacArthur left Japan, Ho attended the farewell and felt that the sorrow was even deeper than the day Walton Walker’s remains were sent back to the United States several months ago.⁶⁵⁷ Ho heard some navy soldiers screaming “Good-Bye! General! We Are For You!” Ho was also impressed by the manner in which Ridgway sent off MacArthur, as he was standing at the front of the line and his attitude, based on Ho’s observation, was like a subordinate bidding farewell to his officer. Last, Ho wrote about how the 19-gun salute rolled in the ceremony, and he was astonished that the US Department of Defense reduced the salute in San Francisco to 17 instead of 19.⁶⁵⁸

Although MacArthur, who was perhaps the strongest American supporter of Chiang Kai-shek after the Chinese Civil War, left, departed, several proposals were still progressing. In early 1951, Chiang sent He Yingqin to Tokyo to undertake several missions, including a visit to South Korea. When receiving the news that He was about to meet the President of Korea, Willoughby was infuriated and asked Ho to cancel this trip.⁶⁵⁹ After Ridgway assumed MacArthur’s position, He even told him that the leaders of the Nationalist troops in Taiwan were either his subordinates or his

⁶⁵⁴ DHSL, April 9, 1951.

⁶⁵⁵ DHSL, April 10, 1951.

⁶⁵⁶ DHSL, April 11, 1951.

⁶⁵⁷ DHSL, April 16, 1951. Walker died in a jeep accident in South Korea on December 23, 1950. See Stephen R. Taaffe, *MacArthur’s Korean War Generals*, 121-122; James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War*, 175.

⁶⁵⁸ The 19-gun salute was also mentioned in Sebald’s memoir. See William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 235.

⁶⁵⁹ DHSL, March 21, 1951.

students, and as long as the United Nations gave the order, the troops in Taiwan would be immediately sent to Korea and placed under the command of Ridgway.⁶⁶⁰ On April 30, 1951, He Yingqin paid a twenty-minute visit to Ridgway and told him that the Nationalist troops had extremely high morale and were ready to fight their mutual enemies.⁶⁶¹ He's activities in Tokyo not only enraged the American generals, but also embarrassed Ho Shailai, who had been doing his duties prudently.

Chiang Kai-shek relied on Ho's ability to maintain a constructive relationship with General Ridgway. In a meeting between Chiang and Ho Shailai on June 19, 1951, Chiang asked Ho whether there were other methods to approach Ridgway, Ho replied that General Ridgway was stubborn and some time was needed in order to obtain his "sympathy" and it might trigger unintended problems if they rashly approached Ridgway.⁶⁶² However, although Ho was circumspect about approaching Ridgway about providing Nationalist troops in Korea, he defended the idea of committing Nationalist troops in Korea in front of Ridgway when the opportunity presented itself. For example, in a banquet held by William Sebald where General Ridgway and delegates of Brazil, Australia, France, and the Philippines were presented, Ridgway asked Australia and Brazil to dispatch more troops to Korea. In the discussion, when William Roy Hodgson, the Australia delegate, said that he opposed a Nationalist counterattack on Mainland China, Ho Shailai argued that he should not tell this to the Chinese communists in case they mobilized their troops to Northeastern China. Additionally, Ho suggested to Hodgson that although a large scale counterattack was infeasible, a small-scale counterattack was able to disturb the Chinese communists.⁶⁶³ This case shows that Ho stubbornly defended the party-line and maintained the image of the Chinese Nationalists in front of Ridgway in Tokyo.

After July 1951, the Korean warfare entered a stalemate and left Ho Shailai very limited space to advance Chiang's goals. The next two years witnessed intermittent armistice negotiations, during which Ho Shailai left Tokyo after a peace treaty

⁶⁶⁰ DHSL, April 30, 1951.

⁶⁶¹ "He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek," April 30, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080101-00029-017.

⁶⁶² DHSL, June 19, 1951.

⁶⁶³ DHSL, June 23, 1951.

between Republic of China and Japan was concluded in April 1952. However, Chiang's hope for dispatching his troops to Korea continued nevertheless, and his target shifted to General Mark Wayne Clark, who succeeded General Ridgway as the commander of the United Nations Command on May 12, 1952. General Clark recollected the offer proposed by Chiang during his visit to Taiwan in his memoir as follows:

Our discussions finally led to the subject of the employment of Chiang's forces. As I said earlier, I had long before recommended that two Nationalist divisions be sent to Korea. The recommendation was not accepted. On Formosa during our talks Chiang volunteered the offer to send up to three of his best divisions to Korea to serve as part of the United Nations Command if my Government requested the troops from him. I informed Washington of his offer, but the request was not forthcoming. By that time, of course, every day seemed to bring an armistice closer, and, since a cease-fire was the objective, it would have been contradictory for our Government to have made such a provocative move.⁶⁶⁴

According to the Chinese records, the meeting between Chiang Kai-shek and General Clark took place on March 25, 1953. In the minutes, Chiang did propose the idea of dispatching one or two divisions of his armies to join the Korean War if General Clark thought it necessary. After hearing this offer, the first reaction of Clark, which duplicated those of his predecessors MacArthur and Ridgway, was to reply to Chiang that the offer must be conferred by the two country's governments. However, Clark went further to tell Chiang that if this offer eventually came a reality, it would definitely astonish the enemy. Moreover, Clark suggested the armies dispatched to Korea should be rotated. By doing so, the Nationalist troops could obtain fighting experience and learn the CCP's potential threat.⁶⁶⁵ But this plan, like all the other possible military schemes the Nationalists had envisioned since the beginning of the Korean War, was never carried out and remained theoretical.

⁶⁶⁴ Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (London: G.G. Harrap, 1954), 303.

⁶⁶⁵ "Tanhua Jilu (談話紀錄) [Records of Conversation]," March 25, 1953, Guoshiguan, 005-010205-00108-004.

CONCLUSION

This chapter traces Ho Shailai's efforts from the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 to the beginning of the stalemate stage in July 1951, during which Ho's mission was to lobby for having the Nationalist troops participate in the war. Ho had been serving as Chiang Kai-shek's spokesman in Tokyo and strenuously presented Chiang's offers, some of which were favored by General MacArthur but all of which were ultimately turned down by Washington. In sharp contrast to people in Taipei, who kept urging Ho to directly approach MacArthur, Ho respected the chain of command of SCAP and knew the significance of William Sebald. Moreover, Ho devoted himself to maintaining a tight relationship with MacArthur and Ridgway, making his advice valuable to the American generals.

MacArthur's attitudes towards the Nationalist China position during the Korean War was a continuation of his stance on Taiwan in late 1949 and early 1950. His visit to Taipei signified the extent to which he regarded Chiang's force could be conducive to the success of the Korean War effort. As William Sebald recalled, MacArthur "never traveled within Japan and left Tokyo only for infrequent appearances at nearby Haneda Airport for the visits of high-ranking persons. Until the Korean War, his journeys outside the country were limited to quick flights to Manila in 1946 and to Seoul in 1948 for the independence ceremonies of these two nations."⁶⁶⁶ MacArthur's prestige as well as his proficiency were utilized by the China Lobby in debating with Dean Acheson, as the latter wrote in his memoir:

While waiting for dinner to be announced, Secretary Johnson asked General Bradley to read a memorandum that he had brought from General MacArthur on the strategic importance of Formosa. I recognized this as an opening gun in a diversionary argument that Johnson wished to start with me. Evidently another did also, for when General Bradley had finished, the President announced that discussion of the Far Eastern situation had better be postponed until after dinner when we would be alone.⁶⁶⁷

⁶⁶⁶ William Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 104-105.

⁶⁶⁷ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969), 405-406.

But in the end, the idea of using Chiang Kai-shek's forces in the Korean War turned out to be a failure. As Dean Rusk recounted in his memoir:

As for Taiwan's offer to send troops to Korea, the whole idea was a fraud. Just after the North Korean invasion I received a telegram from Chiang Kai-shek that Taiwan had earmarked two divisions—thirty-three thousand—for service in Korea, but Chiang also said these divisions needed outfitting from boots to helmets, the most modern weapons, and two years of intensive training before they would be ready. From an operational point of view, this offer was virtually worthless. Indeed, some years after the Korean War, I was having a drink with a high-ranking official in the Taiwan government and Chiang's offer came up. He laughed and said, "I was the one who proposed to Chiang Kai-shek that we offer our forces for Korea." He said that everyone in the government, including Chiang, adamantly opposed the idea, but he prevailed after giving categorical assurances that Washington would reject the offer. But our refusal to take Chiang up on his offer to "unleash" his forces on Korea hurt us politically as American casualties mounted.⁶⁶⁸

Regrettably, Ho Shailai's efforts during the Korean War has been neglected by previous studies. As Samuel C. Chu, a professor of history who was the son of Zhu Shiming, presented at an academic conference in Norfolk in 1982 on the occupation of Japan: "Ho was the spokesman for the Chinese Nationalist offer of troops to General MacArthur at the outbreak of the Korean War, an offer which was not accepted by Washington. Otherwise Ho, serving at a time when the mainland of China was already lost to the Communists, could do even less than his two predecessors."⁶⁶⁹

This conference was sponsored by The MacArthur Memorial Foundation, at which Samuel C. Chu presented a brief paper on Zhu Shiming's role in Tokyo. Concerning the close relationship between General MacArthur and Ho, who was 76-years-old and remained in good health when the conference was convened in 1982, it was regrettable that the MacArthur Foundation had not invited Ho to share his own experience. Although Samuel Chu correctly portrayed Ho as the "spokesman" for

⁶⁶⁸ Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It*, 154.

⁶⁶⁹ Samuel C. Chu, "General S. M. Chu on the Allied Council and Sino-Japanese Relations," in Thomas W. Burkman ed., *The Occupation of Japan: The International Context*, 33.

Chiang Kai-shek in Tokyo, he failed to recognize that Ho's efforts during the Korean War were far greater than anyone had presumed at the time. In fact, Ho's accomplishments were not merely as a spokesman at the beginning of the Korean War, as this chapter illustrates. As later chapters will demonstrate, Ho did much more than his two predecessors.

CHAPTER SEVEN: SECURING THE ROC'S POSITION

1950 proved a pivotal year for the survival of Chiang Kai-shek's regime, as the CCP also made the "emancipation" of Taiwan one of its major objectives. Undoubtedly, the outbreak of the Korean War bailed Chiang out, but there were other struggles contributing to this temporary victory. Using the lens provided by the Chinese Mission in Japan, this chapter examines the Chinese Mission's efforts to lobby MacArthur for his support, compete with the PRC for the Chinese seat in the ACJ, monitor activities of the Japanese Communist Party, and secure support from overseas Chinese based in Tokyo. Finally, the confiscation and eventual return of S.S. *Hai-lieh* was of great significance to the Chinese Nationalists in their effort to maintain the ROC's diplomatic position at this time, and the affair exemplified the arduous negotiation process that often took place between the Chinese Mission and SCAP.

ANTI-CCP BATTLES IN EARLY 1950

While deploying military forces to attack Hainan Island and Taiwan in early 1950, the CCP also made substantial efforts abroad in the hope of undermining the KMT's fighting capacity. The CCP faced great difficulty obtaining international recognition, thus it had to open multiple fronts from where to do battle against the KMT overseas. In Japan, the CCP proposed a barter trade between northern China and Japan -with SCAP permission- in April 1949.⁶⁷⁰ American intelligence noticed the existence of unofficial trade occurring between the CCP and Japan. In May, a CIA report confirmed that "The Chinese Communists are now carrying on an extensive trade with such places as South Korea and Japan. The Chinese Communist vessels rendezvous at sea with ships from Japan and Korea to exchange good. The advance arrangements are made in Chinese Communist ports. Some Chinese Nationalist Navy ships are knowingly protecting and escorting the Chinese Communist trading

⁶⁷⁰ Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 85.

vessels.”⁶⁷¹ While SCAP denied the legitimacy of the CCP regime, it connived with them to enable a limited amount of trade between mainland China and Japan on the grounds that it was conducive to Japan’s economic revival.⁶⁷² This ambivalent attitude infuriated the Chinese Mission in Japan. In early 1950, when Zhu Shuming found out about newly-established, secret trade links between mainland China and Japan, the Chinese Mission immediately urged their termination. In a meeting on January 25, MacArthur told Zhu that he could not “totally put an end to trade between the CCP and Japan” but assured the KMT representative that he would “do his best to ensure it dwindled,” and, if the CCP dispatched representatives to Japan to conduct business, whether official or unofficial, he would definitely reject them.⁶⁷³

A more serious problem bothering Zhu was the latent threat of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). At the beginning of the occupation, General MacArthur had been leery of Russian influence behind the JCP. But later, as MacMahon Ball wrote in his diaries, MacArthur “had certain knowledge that the Russians had established a great number of close connections with Japanese of a secret kind. He believed that the Communist Party in Japan was directly inspired and controlled by the Russians.”⁶⁷⁴ General Willoughby spoke frankly to MacMahon that the G-2 Section had details about Russian’s “spying activities and their connection with the Japanese Communist Party”.⁶⁷⁵ A CIA report published in 1948 also revealed that “overt communications take place through the Office of the Soviet Delegate to the Allied Council and of the USSR Representative at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.”⁶⁷⁶ In all, the

⁶⁷¹ “CHINESE COMMUNIST TRADE WITH SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN,” May 3, 1949, General CIA Records, CIA-RDP82-00457R002700440011-6.

⁶⁷² For the discussion of the positive effects of trades between mainland China and Japan, see Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 98-99.

⁶⁷³ “Zhu Shuming to Chiang Kai-shek,” January 26, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00043-106.

⁶⁷⁴ W. MacMahon Ball, *Intermittent Diplomat*, 19.

⁶⁷⁵ W. MacMahon Ball, *Intermittent Diplomat*, 56. Scalapino wrote, “A sizable Russian Mission was, of course, established in Tokyo in early 1946, and toward the latter part of this first period, at least, there were undoubtedly frequent contacts between certain Communist leaders and Soviet representatives.” See Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 76. Yoshida Shigeru wrote in his memoir that Willoughby was “most active in urging that the Japanese Communist Party should be declared illegal, although that step was never actually taken.” See Yoshida Shigeru, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis* (London: Heinemann, 1961), 45.

⁶⁷⁶ “COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN JAPAN ORE 46-48 PUBLISHED 28 SEPTEMBER 1948,” September 28, 1948, General CIA Records, CIA-RDP78-01617A003300010001-3.

Americans ascertained that the JCP was aided by the Russians, while the CCP played very little part in supporting them.

Robert A. Scalapino believed that the return of Nosaka Sanzo to Japan and a statement issued by the JCP on January 14, 1946, reflected “influences from Yenan”, he concluded that “Chinese influence on the Japanese Communist Party, in certain respects, can be dated from January 1946.”⁶⁷⁷ Sebald recounted in his memoir that “Nosaka said his task was to create the image of a “lovable Communist party,” a policy he pursued for years in opposition to more belligerent Japanese comrades, until Moscow itself changed the line.”⁶⁷⁸ Due to Nosaka’s background and his connections with the CCP in Yenan, the Chinese Mission was interested in his return to Japan and disputes over the “party line” within the JCP.⁶⁷⁹ The Chinese Mission had also been tracking activities, such as strikes, organized by the JCP since 1946, but it did not regard the JCP as anything posing anything close to a lethal threat.⁶⁸⁰ As the KMT was taking the initiative in the Chinese Civil War, the activities of the JCP as well as the possible JCP-CCP alliance were not worthy of close surveillance. As a consequence, while the Chinese Mission submitted annual reports sketching out political parties in Japan, the JCP was only briefly touched upon.

The Chinese Mission’s concerns about the JCP’s activities only increased after Chiang’s retreat to Taiwan in 1949. At about the same time, SCAP also became more suspicious of the JCP and its support by the Russians. As Esler Denning summarized,

For the main aim of Peking as well as of Moscow is to try to destroy the present relationship between Japan and the United States, and of this there is no attempt at concealment. To this end the Japan Communist Party is a useful ally for, being on the spot, it is in the best possible position to exploit every incident which is capable of causing Japanese-American friction-and, if the forces of one country are stationed in the territory of another such incidents are bound to occur from time to time. In other respects, the Communist Party fulfils its usual function of exploiting discontent: for example, amongst labour elements and amongst

⁶⁷⁷ Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966*, 53.

⁶⁷⁸ William Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 50-51.

⁶⁷⁹ “Xianzai Riben Zhengdang zhi Gaikuang (現在日本政黨之概況) [Outline of Japan’s Contemporary Party],” IMH Archives, 11-01-02-01-03-003.

⁶⁸⁰ “The Chinese Mission in Japan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” October 11, 1946, IMH Archives, 11-01-02-02-01-002.

teachers and university students.⁶⁸¹

It was against this background that the Chinese Mission began to speculate about the JCP's covert activities in Japan. On April 18, 1950, the Chinese Mission wrote a report introducing the serious internal conflicts between two factions within the JCP: the "Cadre faction" and "International faction".⁶⁸² This dispute derived from an incident from several months ago. On January 6, 1950, the Cominform, the Soviet Union's leading apparatus for conducting the international communist movement, openly criticized Nosaka for his "bourgeoise attitude" as well as for being a "servant of "American Imperialist occupiers"". ⁶⁸³ The Cominform criticized Nosaka's theory that "it was possible to establish a people's democratic regime in Japan while Japan was occupied." They claimed it was misleading and argued that "The leaders of the people and the people's patriots in Japan should realize that Japan can arise and become a great independent power only if it renounces imperialism and imperialist alliances—only if it takes the path of democracy and socialism."⁶⁸⁴ In other words, Nosaka believed that Japan could be democratized under Allied Occupation and the JCP should employ a peaceful strategy to fulfill this goal – an approach which was labeled as "making communism lovable" - while Moscow insisted that more drastic means should be undertaken by the JCP to serve the Russian's strategies in its international competitions with the United States.⁶⁸⁵

Due to Nosaka's background (he had been at Yanan and also his close relationship with the CCP), the Chinese Mission monitored the progress of this incident with huge interest. The KMT was eager to know whether Nosaka's theories were influenced by the CCP, as well as whether Moscow had seized on this incident to

⁶⁸¹ Esler Denning, *Japan*, 113.

⁶⁸² "The Chinese Mission in Japan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," April 18, 1950, IMH Archives, 11-01-02-01-03-003.

⁶⁸³ "Cominform Opens Attack on Nosaka," January 8, 1950, *Nippon Times*. Zhang Pengzhou (張篷舟), *Zhongri Guanxi Wushinian Dashiji* (中日關係五十年大事記) [Fifty Years Major Events of the Sino-Japanese Relations](Beijing: Wenhua Yishu Chubanshe, 2006), Vol. 4, 279.

⁶⁸⁴ "Cominform Opens Attack on Nosaka," January 8, 1950, *Nippon Times*.

⁶⁸⁵ Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966*, 60-61. William Sebald noted Nosaka said to him that his task was to "create the image of a "lovable Communist party," a policy he pursued for years in opposition to more belligerent Japanese comrades, until Moscow itself changed the line." William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 50-51.

criticize other communist leaders in East Asia, such as Mao Zedong. In the meantime, Mao was visiting Moscow for the purpose of signing a new treaty with the Soviet Union. Exploring further what lay behind the story might give the KMT a clearer view of the evolving relationship between Moscow and Beijing. In the meantime, the JCP consolidated its position by ousting opponents such as Nakanishi Ko (中西功), who echoed the Cominform's criticism of Nosaka.⁶⁸⁶ On January 12, the Chinese Mission reported that the JCP had expelled Nakanishi Ko from the party on the grounds that he supported *Pravda's* criticism of Nosaka and speculated about a potential split within the JCP.⁶⁸⁷ The JCP's resistance to its critics from the Cominform reached a stalemate, after which the CCP stepped in. As Scalapino put it, "It is difficult to know how far the Tokuda-Nosaka group might have carried their defiance of the Cominform had not the Chinese comrades joined the Soviets in interfering in the internal affairs of the Japanese Communist Party."⁶⁸⁸ Mao Zedong, during his visit to the Soviet Union, cabled Hu Qiaomu instructing that the CCP should support the Cominform's critics on Nosaka.⁶⁸⁹ The CCP then expressed its position by publishing an editorial entitled "Path of the emancipation of the Japanese People" in the *People's Daily* on January 17. It used the piece to criticize Nosaka and stated that his opinions were entirely wrong, were causing ideological turmoil, and assisting the enemies of the Japanese.⁶⁹⁰ The CCP's attitude disappointed the JCP and forced its acceptance of the Cominform's criticism. As Scalapino summarized, "Probably this editorial came as a great disappointment to the Mainstream leaders. It is possible that they had hoped for some aid from Peking. Relations between Nosaka and Mao Tse-tung were supposedly close." Scalapino gave a well-grounded explanation of Mao's conformity with the Cominform and the Russian line. Since the

⁶⁸⁶ Robert A. Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-50*, 204.

⁶⁸⁷ The expel of Nakanishi Ko from the JCP had been noticed and examined by Max Beloff and Robert A. Scalapino. See Max Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East*, 140; Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966*, 63.

⁶⁸⁸ Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966*, 63-64.

⁶⁸⁹ Mao Zedong, "Guanyu Zhichi Qingbaoju Kanwu dui Yeban Cansan de Piping Gei Hu Qiaomu de Dianbao (關於支持情報局刊物對野坂參三的批評給胡喬木的電報) [Telegram to Hu Qiaomu on Supporting the Cominform's Criticism of Nosaka Sanzo]," January 14, 1950, in *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao* (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1987), Vol. 1, 237.

⁶⁹⁰ Zhang Pengzhou, *Zhongri Guanxi Wushinian Dashiji*, Vol. 4, 280.

PRC and the Soviet Union signed the mutual defense agreement on February 14, the CCP would definitely “choose to join their Russian allies in condemning any theory or tactic that suggested cooperation with the American Occupation forces.”⁶⁹¹ From the CCP’s viewpoint, the American’s support of Chiang Kai-shek also rendered the JCP’s policy of leniency toward SCAP intolerable.

As Scalapino described, “Given the solidarity between the Soviet and Chinese parties, the Mainstream had no choice except to capitulate.”⁶⁹² Three days after the CCP revealed its attitude, on January 20, the JCP announced its acceptance of the criticism from the Cominform and Nosaka also made a self-criticism admitting his own theoretical faults.⁶⁹³ Observing this progress, the Chinese Mission noted that although the JCP decided to admit the faults of Nosaka and his theories, they would not alter his position within the party.⁶⁹⁴ While the Chinese Mission did not explore whether the JCP’s shifting attitude could be attributed to the stance taken by the CCP, it was correct in predicting that Nosaka’s status in the party would not be challenged. Indeed, while Nosaka’s faction made concessions to the critics, its hold on the leadership remained intact. As Scalapino concluded, “Considering the severity of the attack on Nosaka, his survival is almost without precedent in the history of the international Communist movement.”⁶⁹⁵

With little leeway, the JCP had to take a more drastic approach to their work, a move which eventually led to the party’s suppression by SCAP.⁶⁹⁶ On June 6, MacArthur ordered the Japanese Government to exclude 24 JCP members from political activities and ordered six JCP members in the House of Representatives and one JCP member in the House of Councilors to retire.⁶⁹⁷ While the CCP disagreed with Nosaka’s arguments of several months earlier, now it firmly criticized MacArthur’s “purge” of the JCP by publishing articles in the June 9 edition of the

⁶⁹¹ Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966*, 64.

⁶⁹² Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966*, 67.

⁶⁹³ Zhang Pengzhou, *Zhongri Guanxi Wushinian Dashiji*, Vol. 4, 280.

⁶⁹⁴ “The Chinese Mission in Japan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” January 23, 1950, IMH Archives, 11-01-02-02-01-070.

⁶⁹⁵ Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966*, 67.

⁶⁹⁶ Yoshida Shigeru, *The Yoshida Memoirs*, 92-93, 180, 235-236.

⁶⁹⁷ Zhang Pengzhou, *Zhongri Guanxi Wushinian Dashiji*, Vol. 4, 292.

People's Daily.⁶⁹⁸ At this point in time, the Chinese Mission was preoccupied with the arrival General Ho Shailai and did not follow up the progress of the “Red Purge.” Two days later, on June 11, Ho Shailai arrived in Tokyo. Based on his diaries, he made no mention of the activities of the JCP or SCAP’s purge of the party. On July 1, General MacArthur ordered an attack on the JCP. According to Ho’s diary entry for July 2, he “heard that the Americans arrested 500 Japanese communists, and anyone who held a leaflet would be arrested.”⁶⁹⁹ The “Red Purge” of Tokyo was a unilateral decision made by MacArthur himself and the Chinese Mission played no part in it. From this point onward, the Chinese Mission paid less attention to monitoring the activities of the Chinese and Japanese communists in Japan. After the red purge the JCP shifted underground, while Nozaka Sanzo and Tokuda Kyuichi secretly fled to Beijing to prepare for future actions. A G-2 intelligence report noted,

According to information received by a former army officer who is a repatriate from the Soviet Union, through a certain Chinese Communist named YEH, with whom he maintains contact, TOKUDA kyuichi and NOZAKA Sanzo were in Peking on 17 March, assisting the Chinese Communists in formulating political strategy and activities to be employed against Japan. They were also said to be directing and training a Special Operations Corps composed of Japanese in Peiping. The same source said that NOZAKA was going from Peking to Moscow to attend a political and military conference of satellite countries as the Japanese delegate. The details of this matter are said to have been transmitted orally by Major General KISLENKO to SHINO Etsuro.⁷⁰⁰

Based on a report from the United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan, the JCP was believed to have organized guerrilla troops as a way to support possible Soviet or Chinese communist aggression in Japan in the Spring of 1951. According to the G-2 FEC, however, it was intelligence “of low or intermediate value”:

The possibility exists that these reports are intentionally “planted” either to boost the morale of Japanese Communists or to enhance the prestige of local Communist leaders. Some of the reports may be meant as psychological warfare

⁶⁹⁸ Zhang Pengzhou, *Zhongri Guanxi Wushinian Dashiji*, Vol. 4, 293.

⁶⁹⁹ DHSL, July 2, 1950.

⁷⁰⁰ “Secret,” April 2, 1951, UK National Archives, FO 371/92523.

against the non-Communist Japanese. The reports are usually either vague or silent on where the revolutionaries are to obtain weapons for their proposed uprising. Nevertheless it is a fact that since the Cominform criticism of Jan 50, and particularly since the outbreak of the Korean war, the JCP has increasingly thought in terms of violence to achieve its ends.⁷⁰¹

Ho Shailai's diaries corroborate this evaluation. In his diaries, Ho did not mention anything about the JCP and its possible connections with the CCP during 1951. Ho only mentioned that he witnessed a small-scale uprising organized by the JCP in 1952. To him, the threat of JCP activity in Japan was no longer urgent and of less importance, comparatively, than other issues.

PRO-COMMUNISM IN THE CHINESE MISSION

Factional struggles had been a feature of the Chinese Mission in Japan ever since its establishment in 1946. According to Zhang Lingao, a secretary to Chiang Kai-shek in Chongqing, some of the KMT's Japanese specialists – men such as Wang Pengsheng (王芑生) - had been competing to become the head of the body.⁷⁰² From Chiang's point of view, however, since Japan was to remain under MacArthur's stewardship, having persons deft at dealing with American officials serving at the head of the Chinese Mission would be more pragmatic. Thus, from 1946 to 1952 Chiang dispatched Zhu Shiming, Shang Zhen and Ho Shailai to Japan, all of whom had experience in working with the Americans but, conversely, had relatively little knowledge about Japan. These appointments contributed to incessant infighting and mistrust between them and their subordinates with a background in Japanese issues. The latter doubted the capabilities of their superiors who, for example, could not speak Japanese. The mistrust came to a head during Ho Shailai's tenure, between 1950 and 1952, a period not only complicated by American/Japanese proclivities amongst the Chinese, but the CCP's ability to penetrate inside the Chinese Mission.

⁷⁰¹ "Special Intelligence Report," February 26, 1951, UK National Archives, FO 371/92523.

⁷⁰² Zhang Lingao, *Wo zai Jiang Jieshi Shicongshi de Rizhi*, 103.

Initially, the internal struggles at the Mission were not too complex. During his period of service in Japan, for instance, Zhu was reported to have been having an affair with Li Xianglan (李香蘭), a famous singer in Shanghai under Japanese occupation – a peccadillo which Zhu’s wife reported to Song Meiling and which eventually led to Zhu’s removal.⁷⁰³ As for Shang Zhen, according to Zhang Lingao’s account, he was frustrated with the downfall of the KMT regime and resigned in 1949 and began managing a business in Japan.⁷⁰⁴ Zhu’s subsequent reappointment to the leadership position only lasted for a year. This time, the reason for Zhu’s removal (in early 1950) was much more serious, as Zhu was believed to have leftist tendencies and it was thought that he might swing further to the left and align with those with links to the CCP. A CIA report indicated that, “CHU Shih-ming [Zhu Shiming], head of the Chinese Mission to Japan, is being replaced because of incompetence, failure to obtain aid from SCAP, and use of pro-Communist advisers. He would have been replaced sooner except for his close friendship with Madame CHIANG.” And, “HO Shih-li [Ho Shailai], who will replace CHU [Zhu], first learned of CHU[Zhu]’s Communist affiliations while on a trip to Japan in early January 1950; Hollington TONG [Dong Xianguang] and WU Te-chen [Wu Tiecheng], in Japan in January and April, made similar reports.”⁷⁰⁵ Ho visited Japan in late December 1949, ostensibly after “accepting invitations from Japanese friends to visit the country.”⁷⁰⁶ Whether Dong Xianguang and Wu Tiecheng had then made their reports is still unclear, but Zhu’s pro-CCP leanings were mentioned in several dispatches.

In the meantime, some other members of staff at the Chinese Mission gravitated towards the CCP during 1950. For instance, when the left-leaning Japanese-Chinese Friendship Association was established in Tokyo in January, a member of the Chinese

⁷⁰³ Zhang Lingao, *Wo zai Jiang Jieshi Shicongshi de Rizhi*, 229.

⁷⁰⁴ Zhang Lingao, *Wo zai Jiang Jieshi Shicongshi de Rizhi*, 230.

⁷⁰⁵ “REASONS FOR REMOVAL OF CHU SHIH-MING AS HEAD OF CHINESE MISSION TO JAPAN,” May 29, 1950, General CIA Records, CIA-RDP82-00457R005000100007-2. Hollington TONG was Dong Xianguang, and WU Te-chen was Wu Tiecheng.

⁷⁰⁶ “He Shili Jiangjun Feigang Zhuanri (何世禮將軍飛港轉日) [General Ho Shailai Flies to Japan, Transferring in Hong Kong],” December 23, 1949, *The Kung Sheung Daily News*.

Mission named Xie Nan (謝南) was in attendance.⁷⁰⁷ This person should be referred to as Xie Nanguang(謝南光). His story symbolized some people's shifting minds of loyalty to the Chinese government in postwar Japan. Born in 1902 in Taiwan under Japanese colonization, Xie graduated in Tokyo and moved to mainland China. Due to his Taiwanese background, Xie became a leading figure of the Taiwanese Revolutionary Allied Association (Taiwan Geming Tongmenhui 台灣革命同盟會) in Chongqing and later became a member of the Chinese Mission in Japan. Xie resigned in 1950 and went to Beijing in 1952, where he was promoted to a member of the National People's Congress (representing overseas Chinese) in 1959.⁷⁰⁸ Another staff of the Chinese Mission who resigned his post and joined the newly-established PRC was Wu Wenzao (吳文藻), who was already a famous socialist before he worked in Japan. As Zhu Shiming's classmate in Qinghua, Wu was invited by Zhu to work in Japan and worked as the head of the Second Section of the Chinese Mission since 1946.⁷⁰⁹ Huang Renyu, who worked inside the Chinese Mission at the time, recalled that Wu advocated for the Chinese Mission to surrender to the CCP in late 1949.⁷¹⁰ It was perhaps due to the influence from Zhu and Xie Nanguang that Wu voluntarily went back to mainland China in 1951. Xie Wanying (謝婉瑩), Wu's wife and a famous writer under the pseudonym Bing Xin (冰心) who worked in the Chinese Mission at that time also left for mainland China with her husband.⁷¹¹

It was against this background that Ho Shailai succeeded Zhu and began to wipe out any pro-CCP leanings – and any other opposition - inside the Chinese Mission. Ho succeeded in preventing more staffs from defecting by means of a strict control over

⁷⁰⁷ Lin Daizhao, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxishi* (戰後中日關係) [Postwar Sino-Japanese History] (Beijing: Beijingdaxue Chubanshe, 1992), 41.

⁷⁰⁸ Lin Xiantang (林獻堂), *Guanyuan Xiansheng Riji* (灌園先生日記) [The Diary of Lin Hsien-tang] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2012), Vol. 24, 275-276.

⁷⁰⁹ Bing Xin, *Bing Xin Zishu* (冰心自述) [A Self-narrative of Bing Xin] (Zhengzhou: Daxiang Chubanshe, 2005), 254.

⁷¹⁰ Huang Renyu (黃仁宇), *Huang Renyu de Dalishi Guan* (黃仁宇的大歷史觀) [Ray Huang's View of Maco-History] (Xinbei: Lianjing, 2019), 270.

⁷¹¹ Tian Baodai, *Tian Baodai Huiyilu*, 41; Bing Xin, *Bing Xin Zishu*, 255.

the organization. Ho only dispatched his henchman to deal with confidential issues and communicate with SCAP officials in case their missions were leaked to the CCP. Ho also held firm control over the Chinese Mission by sidelining staffs who had tight relations with his two predecessors. As Tian Baodai, the Chinese consul in Yokohama, recalled, due to his relations with Zhu Shiming, Ho Shailai had requested his transfer to Tokyo but this proposal was turned down by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taipei.⁷¹² Ho also instructed the Chinese Mission to keep a distance from the KMT Branch in Tokyo, as the relationship between them remained little more than cordial. A CIA report noting the “Hostility of HO Shih-li [Ho Shailai] to Kuomintang Program of Reform” recorded that the Central Reform Committee of the KMT had appointed Zhang Bojin (張伯謹), chief of the Second Section of the Chinese Mission, to “implement reforms outlined by the Committee and to extend the influence of the KMT in Japan.” The report also clarified that the reform had to be undertaken slowly due to the “animosity” between Ho Shailai and Zhang, and at first Ho had not allowed Zhang “to attend any KMT meetings in Japan, but eventually granted permission for reform and reorganization to proceed.” The report also revealed that a meeting was convened at Yokohama on 20 April, 1951. At the gathering, seven people were elected as members of the Reform Committee of the KMT headquarters in Japan. In addition, it was recorded that “plans have been made to re-register all party members in Japan. This will be helpful in determining which members are loyal and which should be purged.”⁷¹³

While the CIA report correctly sensed the hostility between Zhang Bojin and Ho Shailai, it misread the true relationship between the Chinese Mission and the KMT Branch in Japan. The Chinese Mission in Japan, especially Ho Shailai, barely meddled in the tasks of the KMT branch, and vice versa. Of the seven members of the Reform Committee mentioned in the CIA report, only one member, Chen Dongting (陳洞庭), also worked for the Chinese Mission. In fact, the election held at the April

⁷¹² Tian Baodai, *Tian Baodai Huiyilu*, 42.

⁷¹³ “ACTIVITIES OF CHINESE MISSION TO JAPAN,” August 7, 1951, General CIA Records, CIA-RDP82-00457R007900010010-7.

Yokohama meeting was actually for the Overseas Chinese Committee in Japan, but was misinterpreted by the CIA as a Reorganization Committee.⁷¹⁴ Dealing with KMT influence in Japan was not, in any case, Ho Shailai's responsibility. As Zheng Yanfen, head of the KMT's Reform Committee in Taipei, asked Ho to chair several KMT Reform Committee in Japan, Ho rejected the offer.⁷¹⁵ In other words, the two organs operated separately. The Chinese Mission concentrated on relations with SCAP and the Japanese Government, while the KMT Branch focused on the party's general affairs in Japan. But towards one goal they remained wholly united: "to Combat Communist Influence among Chinese Students in Japan."

LEFT-LEANING OVERSEAS CHINESE IN JAPAN

The national and ethnic identities among the overseas Chinese in Japan has received scholarly attention in Taiwan, mainland China and from abroad. The case of the overseas Chinese in Japan is unique on the grounds that the identity of those people developed into four general types: pro-Japanese, who were influenced by previous Japanese colonial rule; pro-Taiwanese independence; pro-KMT, who opposed Taiwanese independence; and pro-CCP.⁷¹⁶ This dissertation takes another approach by focusing on the Chinese Mission's policies to consolidate overseas Chinese support for the Chinese Nationalist regime, with a special focus on 1950 and 1951.

As the Japanese surrendered in 1945, overseas Chinese in Japan began to

⁷¹⁴ DHSL, May 12, 1951.

⁷¹⁵ DHSL, September 14, 1951.

⁷¹⁶ For the discussions on this topic, see Tull Chu, *Political Attitudes of the Overseas Chinese in Japan* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1967); Elizabeth Sinn ed., *The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998); Michael W. Charney, Brenda S.A. Yeoh, Tong Chee Kiong eds., *Chinese Migrants Abroad: Cultural, Educational, and Social Dimensions of the Chinese Diaspora* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003); Chan Lih-Shing, "Beyond the Nationalist Narrative: Contextualising the History of the Overseas Chinese Press in Japan," *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 41 (4), 2017, 594-610; He Yilin (何義麟), "Zhanhou Riben Huaqiao Tuantu Zhenghe Guocheng zhi Kaocha (戰後日本華僑團體整合過程之考察) [The Study of the Integration Process among Overseas Chinese Groups in Post-war Japan]," in Xu Wentang (許文堂) ed., *Junshi Zhanling xia de Taiwan (軍事佔領下的台灣) [Taiwan under Military Occupation, 1945-1952]* (Taipei: Taiwan Jiaoshou Xiehui, 2017), 361-393.

reorganize overseas Chinese associations. At first there were two associations representing Taiwanese and mainland Chinese respectively, but they merged into one under the title Overseas Chinese Allied Association in Tokyo (*Dongjing Huaqiao Lianhe Hui* 東京華僑聯合會) in May 1946.⁷¹⁷ Additionally, there were plenty of other associations set up by overseas Chinese, some of which began to express an inclination towards the Chinese communists. The 228 Incident of February 1947 severely weakened Overseas Taiwanese's leanings towards the Chinese Nationalists, and some amongst them began to consider the possibility of Taiwanese independence. At this point, the main bone of contention among the overseas Chinese in Japan, regardless of their geographical origins, was whether to lend their support to the Nationalist regime or endorse Taiwanese Independence. Due to political orthodoxy, CCP historiography has wrongly asserted that the 228 Incident shifted the affiliations of Overseas Chinese in Japan to the CCP.⁷¹⁸ While of course the gravitation of some individuals towards the CCP would have been apparent in 1947, no significant trend in this direction occurred until much later, in October 1949. Since 1947, some left-leaning Chinese had been actively encouraging their overseas compatriots to support the CCP, but the Chinese Mission viewed these activities as harmless and did not feel the need to place them under surveillance, nor were interactions between overseas Chinese and the JCP deemed worthy of investigation.

The success of the CCP in the Chinese Civil War won the sympathy of many Chinese students in Japan, and even their acceptance of the CCP regime. This became even more pronounced after the establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949. As a report written by the Chinese Mission noted, some left-leaning Chinese planned to publish an announcement celebrating the establishment of the PRC on October 10 but were successfully refrained from doing so.⁷¹⁹ Upon his arrival in Tokyo, Ho Shailai placed consolidating the support of overseas Chinese in Japan at the top of his

⁷¹⁷ Yang Guoguang (楊國光), *Yige Taiwanren de Guiji* (一個台灣人的軌跡) [The Trajectory of a Taiwanese] (Taipei: Renjian Chubanshe, 2001), 145-148.

⁷¹⁸ Yang Guoguang, *Yige Taiwanren de Guiji*, 175.

⁷¹⁹ "The Chinese Mission in Japan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," October 12, 1949, IMH Archives, 11-01-02-02-01-070.

political agenda. On June 15, 1950, the sixth day after his arrival in Tokyo, Ho received three representatives from the Chinese Students Association in Japan. He informed them that the Mission would assist any students who study and obey the Nationalist government. “Starting from July,” said Ho, “subsidizes will be suspended for those who openly insult the Nationalist government, and the funds will be used to support other poor students.”⁷²⁰ On June 19, Ho enjoined representatives of the Overseas Chinese to ensure they do “not to become left-leaning.” They assured Ho that, “businessmen wish to earn money, and students hope to study.” Seemingly satisfied with their answer, Ho replied that, “Along these lines, the Chinese Mission in Japan will offer firm support.”⁷²¹

Nevertheless, throughout 1950, the CCP upped their efforts to win the hearts and minds of overseas Chinese in Tokyo. Support for the Nationalists, especially amongst students, began to splinter, and support for their enemy became increasingly obvious and increasingly vocal. For instance, people began to display the Five-Star-Flag and portraits of Mao Zedong and Stalin. Then, at a sports event held by the Overseas Chinese and Student Association on October 7, songs about the CCP were openly sung. Deeply embarrassed by this, Ho asked Lin Yiwen (林以文) for information about the incident. Lin replied that the signing took place not “inside the sporting event” but “outside,” where some CCP cadres had set up a stall to exhibit CCP portraits. Beginning to take the threat of CCP infiltration more seriously, Ho asked the guards to enhance security around the Chinese Mission building to guard against CCP leaflet drops.⁷²² At the ceremony marking National Day on October 10, Liu Zenghua (劉增華), chief of the Overseas Chinese section in the Chinese Mission, addressed the fate of Zhang Yufeng (張玉峰), former head of the Chinese Students Association in Tokyo. Liu noted how Zhang had “surrendered” to Beijing, and he asked the audience not to repeat that mistake. Ho noted in his diary that at the previous year’s National Day celebration students had, at the behest of the CCP, “hung the

⁷²⁰ DHSL, June 16, 1950.

⁷²¹ DHSL, June 19, 1950.

⁷²² DHSL, October 9, 1950.

Five-Star-Flag, invited leaders of the Japanese Communist Party to make speeches, and sent CCP leaflets,” but that scenario did not play-out this year. Ho concentrated on inhibiting pro-CCP tendencies among overseas Chinese, achieving positive results. On November 15, 1950, the Japanese police force shut down the branch of the Japanese-Chinese Friendship Association in Osaka and arrested several suspects.⁷²³ Among those arrested, Ho noted, none of them was an overseas Chinese.⁷²⁴

In order to systematically inhibit the increasing sympathy for the CCP, Ho adjusted his policy towards the Chinese students in Japan. Ho’s goal was to make overseas Chinese students tow the Nationalist line by utilizing their subsidies as leverage. Redoubling his efforts to win over the Chinese students’ allegiance, Ho believed money, instead of political ideology, was key. As the CIA noted, “The funds from which the Mission in Japan has been drawing US \$5,000 per month to subsidise Chinese students in Japan will soon be exhausted. The Mission has requested the Nationalist Government to provide additional funds so that the program can be continued as a means of controlling the political activities of students in Japan.”⁷²⁵ This report reflected Ho’s new approach, according to which only those who recognized the Nationalists as the legitimate representatives of the Chinese could receive funding from the Chinese Mission.

On March 20, 1951, a general assembly of Chinese Residents Associations in Japan was convened. The *Nippon Times* reported on Ho’s address to the meeting:

...the Chinese residents associations in Japan of every possible assistance from the Nationalist Government. He said that remarkable progress has been made in a democratic form of local governments in Formosa, while thousands of people are being slaughtered by the Chinese Reds on the mainland. He stressed the necessity of close cooperation between the Chinese residents in Japan and the Nationalist Government to set up peace in the world.

Gen. Chiang Kai-shek, Gen. Ho said, is greatly concerned about the Chinese residents in Japan, and had asked Gen. Ho to return to Japan so that he could attend the assembly. During the meeting, all participants unanimously approved a resolution supporting Gen. Chiang. They also decided to do everything possible

⁷²³ Lin Daizhao, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxishi*, 45.

⁷²⁴ DHSL, November 18, 1950.

⁷²⁵ “ACTIVITIES OF CHINESE MISSION TO JAPAN,” August 7, 1951, General CIA Records, CIA-RDP82-00457R007900010010-7.

to provide comforts for the Nationalist air, army and navy forces. At present, there are 38,829 Chinese residents in Japan. They have 50 associations.⁷²⁶

On occasion, disturbances caused by the left-leaning overseas Chinese also occurred. As a news report briefed:

Deep regret was expressed by a spokesman of the Chinese Mission here Saturday over the reported use of a Tokyo Chinese Overseas Association car for the transportation of anti-American literature, and revealed that various Chinese overseas associations in Japan had unanimously requested Gen. Ho Shai-lai, Chief of the Mission, to thoroughly investigate the case and take appropriate action against the culprits in order to uphold the reputation of the overseas Chinese in Japan. The case, as reported in the Yomiuri April 2, concerned the discovery of a large quantity of anti-American newspapers and pamphlets in a raid carried out by the Japanese police on April 1.⁷²⁷

This event might have made Ho more determined to place the Chinese student associations more tightly under his control. As a report revealed, “It was recently decided by the Mission to start a rumor among the overseas students to the effect that subsidies will be granted only to those who vote for Mission-approved candidates in the coming election of officers for the student organization. These students who do not cooperate will have their subsidies suspended.”⁷²⁸ His applying this type of pressure was substantiated by Ho’s diaries. On May 4, 1951, for instance, Ho expressed his sympathy towards those students under economic pressure, but claimed that the government might not be able to offer their subsidies in such a difficult situation. Ho stated that the Chinese Mission would do its best to argue for the money from Taipei, but, those students who needed it should “express something on this issue.”⁷²⁹ Under Ho’s guidance, the KMT retained control over the main Chinese associations. As a CIA observer noted, “Two of the students nominated for president of the Chinese Students’ Association in Japan are WANG Shu and LIANG Kuo-tung,

⁷²⁶ “Chinese Meet Here,” March 20, 1951, *Nippon Times*.

⁷²⁷ “Chinese Mission Regrets,” April 9, 1951, *Nippon Times*.

⁷²⁸ “ACTIVITIES OF CHINESE MISSION TO JAPAN,” August 7, 1951, General CIA Records, CIA-RDP82-00457R007900010010-7.

⁷²⁹ DHSL, May 4, 1951.

both of whom have proven themselves loyal to the Nationalist Government.”⁷³⁰ Wang Shu later organized an organization to compete with CCP-sympathizers at schools and received compliments about his efforts from Ho.⁷³¹

The utilization of student funding proved to be effective in consolidating Chinese students’ support for the KMT in Japan, but also led to a misunderstanding between Ho Shailai and He Yingqing. In a private conversation held on July 4, 1951, He blamed Ho Shailai for granting the Chinese Students Association the right to allocate the funding.⁷³² According to Ho’s account, on February 18 Ho met He at Tokyo, explaining that he had not permitted the Students Association to allocate the funds themselves.⁷³³

In February 1951, Ho consummated his plan by proposing three steps to undermine support for leftist politics and the CCP among the overseas Chinese. First, he ordered that all overseas Chinese and Chinese students in Japan re-register so that those whose politics were suspect could be weeded out. Second, he ordered that the overseas Chinese associations be reorganized and expel any left-leaning members, - a task which he expected to be finished within three months. Third, Ho conferred with SCAP about the repatriation of certain bad members to Taiwan if necessary.⁷³⁴ In all, Ho’s efforts were successful in stabilizing the Chinese Nationalist’s image and their support during a period of constant political turmoil in 1950.

DEFENDING THE CHINESE SEAT IN TOKYO

As the CCP secured its victory over the Nationalists and declared the establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949, it began actively searching for international recognition. To the Nationalists, in opposition, the events of 1949 were

⁷³⁰ “ACTIVITIES OF CHINESE MISSION TO JAPAN,” August 7, 1951, General CIA Records, CIA-RDP82-00457R007900010010-7.

⁷³¹ DHSL, October 25, 1951.

⁷³² “yu He Jiangjun Jingzhi Tanhua Jianlue Jilu (與何將軍敬之談話簡略紀錄) [Record of a Conversation with General He Yingqin],” July 4, 1951, IMH Archives, 11-01-02-02-01-070.

⁷³³ DHSL, February 18, 1951.

⁷³⁴ “The Chinese Mission in Japan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” February 10, 1951, IMH Archives, 11-01-02-18-01-005.

detrimental to how they were perceived internationally. One calculation revealed that, “Early in the year the Nationalists had 135 separate missions abroad with nearly 1,100 men. Late in the year there were fifty-three missions (but only 19 embassies) with about 450 diplomats.”⁷³⁵

To the CCP, the main object was to have its own seat replace that of the KMT at the United Nations (UN). On January 19, 1950, Zhou Enlai cabled the UN to request that the Republic of China’s seat be nullified, but his appeal was rejected.⁷³⁶ In the meantime, besides striving for the Chinese seat in the UN, the CCP also turned its focus to seats in other international organizations, such as the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan in Tokyo.

At a Far Eastern Commission meeting on January 19, 1950, the Soviet member proposed that the Chinese representative be expelled as he represented nothing more than “Kuomintang Group,” and the Soviet member also announced that his country would take no part in the Commission so long as the KMT representative remained. Furthermore, the USSR would not “recognise [sic] as legal any action taken by Commission in the meantime.”⁷³⁷ The motion raised by the Soviet member was a burden for the FEC, and whether it could function in the absence of the Soviet Union would be particularly controversial. However, a resolution made on February 2 declared that “in the view of the United States Government the absence of a permanent member from the Council in no way diminished its power or authority to act.” The man who made the announcement was the Commission chairman and the United States’ representative to the body. After hearing this, the Chinese

⁷³⁵ Donald Klein, “Formosa’s Diplomatic World,” in Mark Mancall ed., *Formosa Today* (London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 101. The reasons for this sharp deduction, based on a Chinese resource, was in great part due to diplomatic ties with several countries being cut off, Chinese diplomats abroad being disqualified due to embezzlement. See Ye Zhenhui (葉振輝), “Qiantai Chuqi Zhongyang Jiguan de Zuzhi Tiaozheng (遷台初期中央機關的組織調整) [Organizational Adjustment of the Central Apparatus at the Initial Stage of the Relocation to Taiwan],” in Zhonghua Minguoshi Zhuanti Lunwenji Diwujie Taolunhui Mishuchu (中華民國史專題論文集第五屆討論會秘書處) ed., *Zhonghua Minguoshi Zhuanti Diwujie Taolunhui: Guoshi zhongde Zhongyang yu Difang Guanxi* (中華民國史專題第五屆討論會：國史中的中央與地方關係) [Special Essays on History of the Republic of China, The Fifth Conference] (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2000), 2018.

⁷³⁶ “The Consul General at Peiping (Club) to the Secretary of State,” January 20, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 2, 200.

⁷³⁷ “Summaries of business of the Far Eastern Commission,” UK National Archives, FO 371/83800.

representative stated that “the position of his delegation was in complete agreement with that of the United States.” However, the French representative supported the Soviet proposal, agreeing that the FEC could not properly take action without the Soviet Union. The dispute reached a deadlock, with the United States and the Republic of China on one side, and France and the Soviet Union on the other. It would only be broken when other members made their own decisions on the issue in the future.⁷³⁸

The incident alerted SCAP in Tokyo, and MacArthur assumed that a similar scenario would occur at the ACJ. In contrast to the larger FEC, however, the ACJ only comprised four members, and thus disputes between them were easier to resolve. When the dispute erupted in Washington, in January 1950 MacArthur notified Zhu Shiming that the Soviet representative to the ACJ “might not propose their objection to a Chinese KMT having a representative at the ACJ”, and that he had thus already told Sebald, chairman of ACJ, to prevent the Soviet from making such a proposal. If the Soviets insisted on doing so, Sebald should rebuke him with “the most severe tone.” MacArthur also suggested the Chinese “take a tranquil attitude” but should not “display its weakness” either.⁷³⁹ Out of the blue, though, the Soviet representative did not raise any issue with regard to the Chinese seat at the ACJ. Instead, during ACJ meetings held in the first few months of 1950, the Soviet member immersed themselves in heated exchanges with other members about the repatriation of Japanese from the Soviet Union and showed no interest in debating who occupied the Chinese seat at the body.

Then, on June 19, Zhou Enlai, the PRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote a letter to Sebald, stating that “the so-called “delegates” of the remnant clique of the Chinese Kuomintang reactionaries no longer qualify to participate in the Allied Council for Japan and should be expelled from its various organizations and meetings.” The CCP had chosen Zhou Shidi (周士第), a general who had graduated

⁷³⁸ “Summaries of business of the Far Eastern Commission,” UK National Archives, FO 371/83800; Zhang Pengzhou, *Zhongri Guanxi Wushinian Dashiji*, Vol. 4, 280.

⁷³⁹ “Zhu Shiming to Chiang Kai-shek,” January 26, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00043-106.

from the Whampoa Academy, as the replacement of Ho Shailai.⁷⁴⁰ Only at this moment did the Soviet representative officially step in to support the PRC's demands.⁷⁴¹ Col. S. Polyashenko, acting member of the USSR at the ACJ, wrote a letter to William Sebald, stating that

With reference to the telegram of the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, Chou En-lai, of June 19, 1950, I have the honor to state that I, as acting member of the Allied Council for Japan from the USSR, support the demand of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and on my own part insist on the exclusion of the representative of the Kuomintang group from the membership of the Allied Council for Japan and on the recognition of General Chou Shih-ti, appointed by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, as the sole legal representative of China in the Allied Council for Japan.⁷⁴²

The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25 immediately sidelined disputes over the Chinese seat in the ACJ. For this reason, the KMT did not regard the threat to their position at the ACJ as a serious one. Nevertheless, on June 28, Mao Zedong officially appointed Zhou Shidi as the PRC's representative to the ACJ.⁷⁴³ The date of this appointment was of great significance, as Mao Zedong declared at the eighth meeting of the Central People's Government Committee that "American's aggressions in Asia would only raise wide and stubborn objections from Asian people."⁷⁴⁴ It was at the same meeting that Mao announced Zhou's commission. The CCP knew that SCAP would never accept Zhou Shidi so soon after the outbreak of the Korean War, but Zhou's appointment to the ACJ was announced as another demonstration of the CCP's attitude and in strong protest against American interference in Asian affairs and its support of Taiwan and South Korea.

As the next chapter will suggest, the outbreak of the Korean War spurred-on the

⁷⁴⁰ Zhang Pengzhou, *Zhongri Guanxi Wushinian Dashiji*, Vol. 4, 294; Yang Hong (楊弘), *Zhoushidi Jiangjun* (周世第將軍) [General Zhou Shidi] (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 2002), 389.

⁷⁴¹ Max Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951*, 132.

⁷⁴² "Russian Demands Nationalists in Allied Council be Ousted," June 27, 1950, *Nippon Times*.

⁷⁴³ The Commission of Zhou Shidi being appointed as PRC's representative to the Allied Council in Japan is now in the possession of the Provincial Archive in Hainan, which was contributed by Zhou's family.

⁷⁴⁴ Zhang Pengzhou, *Zhongri Guanxi Wushinian Dashiji*, Vol. 4, 295.

KMT regime in Taiwan, and Chiang began to pay increasing interest to the wider situation in East Asia. Thus, while believing it would be difficult to make work, the KMT were still worried about Zhou's departure for Tokyo. On September 29, Jiang Jingguo informed Ho that Zhou Shidi had departed for Japan and asked Ho to be aware of it. Three days later, on October 2, Ho replied that information saying that Zhou had already arrived at Japan was not accurate, although it seemed that subordinates of Zhou had been active in Japan. In response, Ho had sent his staff to secretly investigate.⁷⁴⁵ Throughout September and October, Ho never mentioned a single word about Zhou Shidi in his diaries, reflecting probably the fact that Ho did not regard the issue as a pressing one. In sharp contrast to Jiang's anxiety, Ho knew that at this point the Chinese Nationalists were of great importance to SCAP. As a consequence, Ho was able to judge the situation correctly and remained confident that his seat in the ACJ would not be threatened. The last challenge faced by Ho revealed itself on November 8, when Kislenko once again raised the issue of the ACJ's Chinese representative at a meeting of the body, but his point was dismissed and was "ruled out of order."⁷⁴⁶

Despite their proposal again being rejected, the CCP never ceased trying to penetrate its forces into Japan. According to intelligence received by Mao Renfeng, the CCP had been secretly recruiting retired Japanese navy technicians through the Japanese communists. Receiving this intelligence, on August 7, Ho cabled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reporting that he had asked the intelligence department of SCAP to make investigations and block those activities by all means.⁷⁴⁷ On November 18, 1950, Jiang Jingguo informed Ho that five CCP agents were applying for the Visas to Japan, using the cover of a ship company in Hong Kong.⁷⁴⁸ Japan also became a base for the KMT's secret operations, but the details are still not known to the public. On June 16, eight days before the outbreak of the Korean War, Jiang Jingguo cabled Shao Yulin, Chinese Ambassador to South Korea, informing that four

⁷⁴⁵ "Ho Shailai to Wang Shijie and Jiang Jingguo," October 2, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00662-055.

⁷⁴⁶ Max Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951*, 133.

⁷⁴⁷ "Ho Shailai to Ye Gongchao," August 7, 1950, IMH Archives, 11-29-01-10-007.

⁷⁴⁸ "Jiang Jingguo to Ho Shailai," November 18, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00641-029.

personnel who had been dispatched to Northeast China would pass through Japan and then onto Korea, where they would enter via the Northeast border.⁷⁴⁹ Given the fact that Ho did not mention this in his diaries, it was extremely likely that Ho did not know about the mission.

THE TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN JAPAN

The 228 Incident in 1947 soured the fragile relationships between local Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders. To a great extent, it also sharply changed the ideology of local Taiwanese, some of whom began to pursue Taiwan Independence or reunion with Japan.⁷⁵⁰ Being suppressed so vehemently, the Taiwanese Independence movement shifted its base to Japan and approached SCAP.⁷⁵¹ In early 1949, the CIA had noticed the activities of Huang Jinan, a leading figure of the Taiwan Independence Movement, in Japan.⁷⁵² The Chinese Mission also began to keep his movements under close surveillance.

Representative of the entire movement as it played out in Japan, the case of Liao Wenyi (廖文毅) is typical. Liao had joined the Taiwan Independence Movement after the 228 Incident.⁷⁵³ In late 1948, Liao organized several associations, claiming to represent the will of 6 million Formosans, to petition the Allied Countries in order to prevent Taiwan from becoming further involved in the Chinese Civil War.⁷⁵⁴ Liao sought support from the United States Consulate in Taiwan and the British Government in Hong Kong, only to receive noncommittal replies.⁷⁵⁵ After his failure in lobbying the Americans and the British, Liao switched his battleplan to focus on

⁷⁴⁹ "Jiang Jingguo to Shao Yulin," June 16, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00641-006.

⁷⁵⁰ Mark Mancall ed., *Formosa Today*, 24-28.

⁷⁵¹ Lin Hsiao-Ting, *Accidental State*, 130.

⁷⁵² "POLITICAL INFORMATION: POSSIBLE SPLIT IN FORMOSAN LEAGUE RE-EMANCIPATION," February 7, 1949, General CIA Records, CIA-RDP82-00457R002300610004-9.

⁷⁵³ For a brief review of Liao's activities, see Ong Joktik, "A Formosan's View of The Formosan Independence Movement," in Mark Mancall ed., *Formosa Today*, 163-170.

⁷⁵⁴ "Statement to the World on protest against the Chinese National Government using Formosa as its Civil War Base," December 10, 1948, UK National Archives, FO 371/75734.

⁷⁵⁵ "Heathcote-Smith to K. Biggs," November 26, 1948, UK National Archives, FO 371/75734.

Japan. On January 27, 1949, “[w]ith the tacit consent of the SCAP” the Formosa League for Re-emancipation “publicly appealed for a comprehensive U.S. mandate for Taiwan, so as to prevent the fall of the island to the Chinese Communists.”⁷⁵⁶ Upon Liao’s arrival in Japan on March 14, 1950, the Chinese Mission immediately required SCAP take actions against him.⁷⁵⁷ Liao was arrested and sentenced to six months in prison for illegal entry on March 22.⁷⁵⁸ But what the Chinese Mission did not realize was that before Liao’s sentence, William Sebald had already held several meetings with Liao and sent a secrete telegram to the Department of State to evaluate to possible outcomes of the Taiwanese Independent Movement.⁷⁵⁹ Suspicious of Liao’s future movements, on October 8, 1950 Jiang Jingguo asked Ho to update him with the latest information about Liao Wenyi.⁷⁶⁰ On October 13, Ho replied that Liao had just been released and was asked to leave Japan within two months.⁷⁶¹

Similar to the previous appointment of Zhou Shidi, the differing attitudes toward Liao Wenyi’s case between Jiang Jingguo and Ho Shaiali reflected the large gap in knowledge about events happening in Japan and the priorities of the two parties. Ho only mentioned Liao Wenyi once in his diaries (January 10, 1951), noting that the Taiwan Democratic Independence Party organized by Liao hold a press conference in Tokyo on that day.⁷⁶² In sharp contrast to Jiang Jingguo’s anxiety, Ho did not care about keeping up to date on Liao. From his viewpoint, and as Ho and the KMT maintained the support of the majority of overseas Chinese in Japan, the Taiwan Independence Movement was not likely to become a threat worth worrying about.

THE CASE OF S.S. *HAI-LIEH* (海列)

Before China’s War of Resistance began in 1937, 1,500 thousand tons of shipping capacity plied along China’s coastal and inland water, but this amount sharply

⁷⁵⁶ Lin Hsiao-Ting, *Accidental State*, 130.

⁷⁵⁷ Zhang Pengzhou, *Zhongri Guanxi Wushinian Dashiji*, Vol. 4, 284.

⁷⁵⁸ Zhang Pengzhou, *Zhongri Guanxi Wushinian Dashiji*, Vol. 4, 285.

⁷⁵⁹ Lin Hsiao-Ting, *Accidental State*, 130.

⁷⁶⁰ “Jiang Jingguo to Ho Shailai,” October 8, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00641-021.

⁷⁶¹ “Ho Shailai to Jiang Jingguo,” October 13, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00662-058.

⁷⁶² DHSL, January 10, 1951.

dwindled to 100 thousand tons in the aftermath of the conflict. In order to enhance its shipping capacity after the war, the Chinese government began purchasing ships from the United States. By March 1946, the Chinese government obtained an additional 370 thousand tons shipping capacity.⁷⁶³ Among this acquisition was vessel named *Hai-lieh*, which was originally built in United States and named S.S. Arthur Dobbs in memory of the British colonial official who served as the seventh governor of North Carolina between 1754 and 1765. The *Hai-lieh* arrived at Shanghai in 1946 and was put under the command of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company (*Zhaoshang Ju*, 招商局). In August 1946 the ship was dispatched to Taiwan to carry Japanese materiel back to the mainland.⁷⁶⁴

Since the late Qing period, the Chinese shipping industry had been dominated by Western powers. It was against this background that the *Hai-lieh* was deemed as a symbol of China's reinvigoration in the postwar era. In 1947, this 11,000-tonne vessel arrived at Bangkok, marking "the first time that China navigates its own vessel to travel abroad." On this voyage, the *Hai-lieh* loaded 8,500 tons of rice and returned to Shanghai.⁷⁶⁵ Later the *Hai-lieh* was put in to use in the Chinese Civil War. In July 1948, it carried the 42nd division of the KMT army from Qinhuangdao to nearby Qingdao.⁷⁶⁶ Soon it was ordered to carry the same troops to Shanghai.⁷⁶⁷ Details of the extent to which the *Hai-lieh* was involved in the Civil War are not known, but in 1949 it resumed the carriage of grains for military purposes.

On August 13, 1949, the *Hai-lieh* arrived at Kawasaki with iron ore from Hainan island. Five days later, SCAP officials found contraband on the vessel. As later announced by the Office of Deputy Contraband Property Administrator, the contraband included 18,499 pounds of saccharin, 3,791 vials of penicillin, 32,295 vials of streptomycin, 2,367 plastic belts, 559 pounds of plastic sheets, and 12 bolts of

⁷⁶³ ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 453.

⁷⁶⁴ "Xu Xueyu to Chiang Kai-shek," August 12, 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00534-026.

⁷⁶⁵ "Hailiehao Lun Chufang Xianluo (海列號輪出訪暹羅) [S. S. Hai-lieh Visits Thailand]," February 1, 1947, *The Kung Sheung Daily News*.

⁷⁶⁶ "Li Mi to Chiang Kai-shek and Yu Jishi," July 13, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-090300-00186-388; "Li Mi to Chiang Kai-shek," July 13, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-090300-00186-423.

⁷⁶⁷ "Li Mi to Chiang Kai-shek and Gu Zhutong," July 15, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-090300-00187-069.

cloth.⁷⁶⁸ Five Chinese staffs were then arrested, after which the Chinese Mission in Japan bailed three of them out. In the meantime, the Chinese Mission also asked SCAP to return the *Hai-lieh* for the purpose of carrying Japanese reparations back to China. At first SCAP granted this request, but soon after it decided to withhold the vessel. The China Merchants Steam Navigation Company then hired an American lawyer named Thomas D. Altken to pursue lawsuits on the grounds that the United States government had no right to detain other countries' vessels. After redundant negotiation, SCAP decided to take this case to trial.

On March 10, 1950, the *Nippon Times* reported that,

Trial of six Chinese and six Japanese involved in what was described by the prosecution as the biggest smuggling attempt in postwar Japan ended Wednesday with the conviction and sentencing of 11, and confiscation of the SS Hai Lieh, owned by the China Navigation Steamship Company.

Yee Yen-chen, captain of the vessel, was sentenced to two and one-half years and fined \$3,000. Wai Chai-fee, Ah Long-dong, Tsing Liang-tsu, and Cheng Chung-tong were charged with attempting to bring contraband goods into Japan. Tong was convicted also of illegal entry into Japan.

The Japanese nationals convicted and sentenced were: Shigemori Sakata, six years and \$10,000; Kiyoshi Itagaki, six years and \$5,000; Taku Mikami, five years and \$3,000; Kindan Okubo, three years and \$2,500; Chubei Shima, four years and \$2,500; and Takeshi Hashimoto, four years and \$4,000.⁷⁶⁹

Upon Ho Shailai's arrival to Tokyo, the *Hai-lieh* case became one of his major concerns while in Japan. On June 18, Ho held a conference in his residence to address the issue. Nearly all participants in the conference believed that the fact of smuggling was undeniable, but it seemed unreasonable that SCAP had decided to confiscate the vessel. Ho thereafter would do his best to negotiate with SCAP but he believed that "some political issues were involved." In his dinner with General Cooke that same night, Cooke also agreed that from a juridical perspective the *Hai-lieh* could not be confiscated.⁷⁷⁰ The next day, Ho then asked General Winfield P. Shepard, the head of

⁷⁶⁸ "Findings and Order of District Contraband Tribunal," July 5, 1950, *Nippon Times*.

⁷⁶⁹ "Smugglers Convicted," March 10, 1950, *Nippon Times*.

⁷⁷⁰ DHS, June 18, 1950.

SCAP's Civil Affairs Section, to help him investigate the "inner story" of the case.⁷⁷¹ In his mind, Ho believed that the *Hai-lieh* case was more a political issue rather than a juridical one. In his conversation with William Sebald on June 30, five days after the outbreak of the Korean War, Ho finally confronted Sebald about the *Hai-lieh* affair. Ho told Sebald that he firmly believed that the confiscation of the *Hai-lieh* was definitely not the outcome of proper juridical procedure but was instead the result of some "revengeful motives." In the end, Sebald said that the case was outside his remit, but assured Ho that he would relay his opinion to the upper echelon of SCAP.⁷⁷²

On July 17, Sebald suggested to Ho that the case should be appealed to Washington.⁷⁷³ On the next day, Ho told Chen Dekun (陳德坤), manager of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company Tokyo office, and Aitken that he saw no chance in having a successful negotiation in Tokyo but in Washington.⁷⁷⁴ SCAP decided to send the *Hai-lieh* to auction. On July 21, an advertisement was published in the *Nippon Times*.⁷⁷⁵ Upon reading the advertisement, Chen and Aitken immediately visited Ho and asked him to approach the ACJ. Believing that this would not work, Ho promised to dispatch his subordinates to negotiate for an extension of the auction with SCAP. Ho's subordinate reported that ACJ rejected their request, informing them that they could further appeal the case to the Far Eastern Committee in Washington.⁷⁷⁶ On August 23, six days before the scheduled auction, Chen and Aitken once again paid a visit to Ho to ask the Chinese Mission to petition SCAP to delay the auction and request that Ho personally visit General MacArthur. It was at this time that General MacArthur had just returned from Taipei and had begun to consider the feasibility of using KMT troops in the Korean War. Given this fact, Ho had no desire to approach MacArthur about the *Hai-lieh* case, which was a relatively minor issue in comparison with Taiwan's possible role in the war. As a result, Ho told

⁷⁷¹ DHSL, June 19, 1950.

⁷⁷² DHSL, June 30, 1950.

⁷⁷³ DHSL, July 17, 1950.

⁷⁷⁴ DHSL, July 18, 1950.

⁷⁷⁵ "Civil Property Custodian announces sale of Type EC-2 Liberty Ship S.S. "HAI LIEH"," July 21, 1950, *Nippon Times*.

⁷⁷⁶ DHSL, July 21, 1950.

Chen and Aitken that he would be willing to give another try if they first discuss the issue with Courtney Whitney, who said that the two could appeal the *Hai-lieh* case to the Navigation Court. At the same time, Ho approached General Willoughby, who promised Ho that he could “strive with all efforts.”⁷⁷⁷

The negotiation of the *Hai-lieh* case nevertheless came to a standstill. A breakthrough finally occurred on September 29 when Ho spent an hour discussing the case with General Alonzo Patrick Fox, vice chief of staff of the United Nations Command in Korea. Ho believed that “the door of negotiation seems not closed yet.”⁷⁷⁸ On October 13, Ho sent another letter to SCAP, in which he once again referred to the Fly Arrow case, arguing the unfairness of the two cases.⁷⁷⁹ In his meeting with Carpenter, Ho sensed a different attitude from the US officials. Carpenter told Ho that if the debts of the *Hai-lieh* could be paid off, he might try to return the vessel. “I speculated that at first SCAP’s higher echelon did not pay much attention to this case,” wrote Ho in his diary, “after reading the memorandum sent by our mission, they believed our explanations are fair enough, thus we could know move into a more favorable stage.”⁷⁸⁰

During his short stays in Taiwan, Ho informed He Zhonghan (賀衷寒), Minister of Transportation, that as long as the debts of the *Hai-lieh* were paid off, the vessel could be returned.⁷⁸¹ On November 11, 1950, when Ho reported his handling of the *Hai-lieh* case, “all presenters clapped their hands.”⁷⁸² Eventually, on June 30, 1951, the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company’s office in Tokyo took over the *Hai-lieh*, marking the end of two-year-long negotiation. At this point, the *Hai-lieh* was worth one million US dollars.⁷⁸³

On July 1, Xu Xueyu admitted that the return of the *Hai-lieh* was in great part due to the contribution of the Chinese Mission in Japan. Xu knew that the Foreign

⁷⁷⁷ DHSL, August 23, 1950.

⁷⁷⁸ DHSL, September 29, 1950.

⁷⁷⁹ DHSL, October 13, 1950.

⁷⁸⁰ DHSL, October 17, 1950.

⁷⁸¹ DHSL, October 31, 1950.

⁷⁸² DHSL, November 11, 1950.

⁷⁸³ “Hailiehao Huolun Mei Jiaohuan Woguo (海列號貨輪美交還我國) [US Returns S.S. Hai-lieh to China],” July 3, 1951, *The Kung Sheung Daily News*.

Ministry believed the negotiation was doomed to be futile and had asked that the Chinese Mission to stop the negotiation, while the Chinese Mission insisted on continuing the negotiation and eventually won back the vessel.⁷⁸⁴ After its return to Nationalist China's hands, the *Hai-lieh* was arranged to be repaired in Japan.⁷⁸⁵ From Ho's diaries, one can see the great amount of effort that he put into the negotiations for the return of the vessel and the rationale behind his actions. To Ho, as well as to the ROC, it was the symbolism rather than the vessel's value that prompted the Chinese Mission to argue for its return.

CONCLUSION

Fraught with extreme tension and insecurity, 1950 was a year which can be counted as a crucial watershed for Chiang Kai-shek and his regime, one during which the Chinese Mission in Japan worked to gain more leverage for the Nationalist Chinese in Tokyo. Snuffing-out the Taiwanese independence movement in Tokyo occurred in tandem with dissuading MacArthur from placing Taiwan in trusteeship, as chapter two suggests. Also, protecting the Nationalist's seat at the ACJ was a prerequisite for suppressing the CCP's and JCP's activities, as well as for consolidating support for the KMT amongst overseas Chinese in Japan. In all, the battles fought on different fronts by the Chinese Mission in Japan reflected the Chinese Nationalist's stance towards the wider international arena during that period. To some extent, the arduous negotiations and the eventual return of the S.S. *Hai-lieh* was a victory for the Chinese Mission. Although Ho did not mention this event directly in his diaries, one could sense that an important factor contributing to SCAP's willingness to return the vessel was the increasing significance of the ROC during the Korean War.

⁷⁸⁴ DHSL, July 1, 1951.

⁷⁸⁵ "Zhaoshang Ju Shouhui Hailielun (招商局收回海列輪) [China Merchants Steam Navigation Company Takes Back S.S. Hai-lieh]," July 25, 1951, *The Kung Sheung Daily News*.

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE PEACE TREATY

The Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty signed on April 28th, 1952 terminated the wartime enmity between the Republic of China and Japan. Its historical and legitimate significance, especially regarding its decision on the status of Taiwan, has been carefully examined by scholars for decades.⁷⁸⁶ To scholars in mainland China, they regretted that this Treaty enabled the Japanese to exploited the “un-unification of China” to escape its duties of reparations.⁷⁸⁷ Moreover, PRC refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the “Chinese” appeared in the title of the treaty by unilaterally renaming this treaty into “Japan-Taiwan Treaty (*Ritai Tiaoyue* 日台條約).” The legacy of this treaty continued to resonate. In Taiwan, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party interpreted this Treaty into the concept of the “unsettled status of Taiwan (*Taiwan Diwei Weidinglun* 台灣地位未定論),” paving the way for its proposal of establishing a genuine country without any tie to the ROC. On the other hand, the KMT believed the Treaty legitimated the ROC’s takeover of Taiwan in 1945 and argued that the DPP finds no grounds to claim the legitimacy of Taiwanese Independence based on the context of this treaty.

The role of John Foster Dulles in the signing of this treaty has been examined by Howard Schonberger, who argues that Dulles successfully “mollified the angry Nationalist Chinese and their supporters in Congress.”⁷⁸⁸ Hans van de Ven has traced the original ideas in the treaty from the Cairo Conference in 1943 to the convoluted negotiations process in Taipei from 1951 to 1952, including disagreements on “the

⁷⁸⁶ Huang Zijin (黃自進), “Zhanhou Taiwan Zhuquan Zhengyi yu Zhongri Heping Tiaoyue (戰後台灣主權爭議與中日和平條約) [Disputes on the Sovereignty of Postwar Taiwan and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty],” in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, Vol. 54, December, 2006, 59-104.

⁷⁸⁷ Zeng Jingzhong (曾景忠), “1952 Nian Taibei Heyi zhong Riben Liyong Zhongguo Butongyi Taotuo Zhanzheng Peichang (1952 年台北和議中日本利用中國不統一逃脫戰爭賠償) [Japan Utilized China’s Disunity to Escape from War Reparations in 1952],” in Su Zhiliang (蘇智良), Rong Weimu (榮維木), Chen Lifei (陳麗菲) eds., *Riben Qinhua Zhanzheng Yiliu Wenti he Peichang Wenti* (日本侵華戰爭遺留問題和賠償問題) [Unresolved Issues from Japan’s War of Aggression in China and the Issue of Reparations] (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2005), Vol. 1, 92-113.

⁷⁸⁸ Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-52* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1989), 277.

name of the treaty, the formulation to be used to describe its territorial scope, the wording of China's agreement to forego war reparations, and definitions of the nature of the war." Van de Ven has also pointed out that many of today's political disputes in Taiwan are grounded in this treaty.⁷⁸⁹ Due to its highly controversy and political significance to date, scholars have been eager to explore the detailed stories behind the curtain. In recent years, Taiwanese historians began to focus on the role of Chiang Kai-shek and Ye Gongchao in the negotiation of the Treaty.⁷⁹⁰ Although the Chinese Mission did not directly participate in the negotiation of the Treaty, it successfully lobbied SCAP in Tokyo, pressuring Japan to sign the treaty with the ROC rather than the PRC after the negotiation in Taipei reached a stalemate. Drawing on Ho Shailai's diaries and archival sources preserved in the Academia Historica in Taipei, this chapter examines the role of the Chinese Mission in the conclusion of the treaty.

EFFORTLESS ATTEMPT BEFORE 1950

As the Allied Occupation in Japan began in 1945, the Allied powers had been conducting negotiations for a peace settlement with Japan, but these efforts were effortless in great part due to the opposition of the Soviet Union. On October 23, 1947, Zhang Qun and Wang Shijie visited MacArthur in Tokyo for the purpose of revealing

⁷⁸⁹ Hans van de Ven, "The 1952 Treaty of Peace between China and Japan," in Hans van de Ven, Diana Lary, and Stephen R. MacKinnon eds., *Negotiating China's Destiny in World War II* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 220-238. The significance of the treaty to contemporary China is further examined by Lin Manhong (林滿紅). See Lin Manhong, "Zhanzheng Heyue yu Taiwan (戰爭、和約與台灣) [War, Treaty, and Taiwan]," in Lü Fangshang ed., *Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzhengshi Xinbian* (中國抗日戰爭史新編) [New History of China's War of Resistance against Japan] (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2015), 465-522.

⁷⁹⁰ For the discussion on the role of Chiang Kai-shek, see Liu Weikai (劉維開), "Zhongri Heyue Qianding Jingguo: yi Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong wei Zhongxin de Tantaohao (中日和約簽訂經過：以蔣中正總統為中心的探討) [The Process of the Conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty: a Discussion Based on the Role of President Chiang Kai-shek]," in *Jindai Zhongguo* (近代中國) [Modern China], Vol. 148, April, 2002, 28-39. For discussion on the role of Ye Gongchao, see Tang Yan (湯晏), *Ye Gongchao de Liangge Shijie: Cong Ailiete dao Dulesi* (葉公超的兩個世界：從艾略特到杜勒斯) [The Two Worlds of Ye Gongchao: From Eliot to Dulles] (New Taipei City: Weicheng Press, 2015), 277-327.

China's stance on the peace treaty negotiation.⁷⁹¹ In his inauguration speech on May 20, 1948, Chiang Kai-shek reiterated his attitudes with regard to the peace treaty that China should ask other allies to grant China a "special status" in the negotiation of the treaty.⁷⁹² In September 1948, Zhang Qun visited Japan to observe the implements of Allied Occupation policies and confer with MacArthur and other Japanese politicians about postwar issues between China and Japan.⁷⁹³ As a United Kingdom report summarized, Zhang Qun's opinion represented that of the majority of the Chinese. "In particular the consensus of Chinese opinion is in favour of an early peace treaty and adverse to the building up of Japan as an arsenal of democracy, which policy has perhaps gained some adherents in the United States in the course of a year during which Chinese incompetence was so convincingly demonstrated."⁷⁹⁴ From the Russian perspective, this visit signaled "an attempt to form a close military and political combination between Nationalist China, Japan, and South Korea under American auspices."⁷⁹⁵

TENTATIVE CONTACT AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 made the United States expedite the conclusion of the peace treaty. For the Nationalists, however, the focal point was not the peace treaty, but rather seizing this opportunity to participate in the war and launch a counterattack against mainland China.⁷⁹⁶ This onerous task was given to General Ho Shailai, the newly-arrived head of the Chinese Mission in Japan. In Tokyo, Ho frequently attended SCAP conferences, at which he discussed military strategy, as well as issues related to the Nationalists' participation in the war. Only at the end of 1950 did Ho gradually shift his focus to the process of conducting a peace treaty between China and Japan. In December, Ho began to meet Japanese politicians to

⁷⁹¹ "Wang Shijie to Chiang Kai-shek," October 23, 1947, Guoshiguan, 001-062500-00001-006.

⁷⁹² ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 636.

⁷⁹³ Shen Jinding ed., *Bainianlai Zhongri Guanxi Lunwenji*, 19.

⁷⁹⁴ "Sir R. Stevenson to Mr. Bevin," February 3, 1949, UK National Archives, FO 371/75731.

⁷⁹⁵ Max Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951*, 61.

⁷⁹⁶ John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War*, 70-71.

exchange opinions on the peace treaty. The first individuals Ho met with were Ashida Hitoshi (蘆田均), former Prime Minister of Japan, and Yada Shichitaro (矢田七一郎), former Japanese Consul in Shanghai. According to Ho's diary entry from December 6, "Ashida asked me whether it would be possible to have Japan sign the treaty with the Chinese Communists. I replied that not even the Soviet Union and Japan could sign the treaty, and it would be even more difficult to add one more Communist party. He agreed with my opinion."⁷⁹⁷ Ashida also mentioned this meeting in his diary, in which he wrote that General Ho had expressed his inability to understand the attitude of Yoshida Shigeru. However, further details were not given.⁷⁹⁸ The fact that Ashida inquired about the possibility of signing a treaty with the Chinese Communists implied that this opinion had been spreading among members of the Japanese administration. In his diary, General Ho also praised the uprightness of Ashida and Yada, and mentioned his willingness to befriend them. At this point, Ho began to establish contact Japanese politicians, especially those who possessed a past relationship with China.

On December 18, Ho dined with three prominent Japanese politicians. As he wrote in his diary, "Tonight I invited Ota Ichiro (太田一郎), Kusaka Ryunosuke (草鹿淺之介), and Oda Takio (黄田多喜夫) to dinner. Although Ryunosuke was drunk, I had a great impression of him."⁷⁹⁹ On December 21, Ho invited Yoshizawa Kenkichi (芳澤謙吉), Yamazaki Motoki (山崎元幹), Takasaki Tatsunosuke and three others, all of which were prominent figures in the Sino-Japanese War, holding positions such as head of economics in Manchukuo.⁸⁰⁰ Since Ho did not jot down their conversation in his diary, the contents of their discussion remain unknown to the public. Although they might have discussed issues on the Japanese reparations in Northeastern China, it was more likely that they were exchanging opinions on the conclusion of the peace

⁷⁹⁷ DHSL, December 6, 1950.

⁷⁹⁸ Ashida Hitoshi, *Ashida Hitoshi Nikki* (芦田均日記) [Diaries of Hitoshi Ashida] (Tokyo: Yanbo Press, 1986), Vol. 3, 406.

⁷⁹⁹ DHSL, December 18, 1950.

⁸⁰⁰ DHSL, December 21, 1950.

treaty. In either case, Ho's activeness in meeting the Japanese politicians reflected the fact that he was trying to create an advantage for the Nationalists in the negotiations that were to follow. As Shidehara Kijūrō (幣原喜重郎) applauded Ho in an event on February 3, 1951, "Mr. Ho Shailai is a friend with full understanding to Japan, whom I deeply trust. For those rely on Ho in regard to adjust Sino-Japanese relations are significantly important." Shidehara also cited a Western proverb "After winter comes spring" to anticipate the forthcoming cooperation between China and Japan.⁸⁰¹

DULLES' VISIT TO JAPAN

The Chinese mission had been paying close attention to the attitude of the US after it embarked on negotiations for the peace treaty after the outbreak of the Korean War. In his late-1950 report on "the future of the peace treaty with Japan", Zhang Bojin, head of the second division of the Chinese mission, wrote,

Facing the difficulties of signing the peace treaty with Japan, the US government not only decided to declare the termination of the Korean War the following spring, but also to dispatch a significant figure to Japan to negotiate this process. Issues under discussion would include restoring the Japanese privilege of self-defense, replacing the name of the current occupation forces with "United Nation garrison", and other issues related to politics and economics.⁸⁰²

The significant figure mentioned in this report was John Foster Dulles, whose mission to Japan attracted massive political attention in Tokyo.⁸⁰³ Dulles was appointed as Truman's Special Representative for peace treaty negotiations on January 10, and he arrived in Tokyo on January 25, 1951.⁸⁰⁴ On January 23, two days before Dulles' arrival, Yoshida Shigeru held a private meeting with Ho Shailai. As Ho wrote in his diary, "Premier Yoshida has invited me to visit him tomorrow afternoon. I

⁸⁰¹ He Yingqin, *Riben Fangwen Jiangyan Xuanji*, Appendix 5.

⁸⁰² *Zhongri Heping Tiaoyue II* (中日和平條約(二)) [The Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty], 9, Guoshiguan.

⁸⁰³ For the discussion on the role of John Foster Dulles in the conclusion of the peace treaty, see Frederick Sherwood Dunn, *Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

⁸⁰⁴ William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 260.

have heard that this person is arrogant. He has not been in touch with us for five years, and this opportunity could be the first step towards breaking the ice. However, I do not know what the atmosphere will be during our discussion, which worries me.”⁸⁰⁵ In his report to Taipei written on January 24, Ho expounded upon his reasons for accepting Yoshida’s invitation:

Due to SCAP restrictions, as well as Yoshida’s preconceived ideas about our mission, I have not interacted with Premier Yoshida since my arrival in Tokyo seven months ago. The GHQ has loosed its restrictions recently and Yoshida sent me Christmas gifts last year, and therefore I paid a visit to him on January 24. Yoshida was very polite and laid-back, without any of the arrogance he usually possesses.⁸⁰⁶

The timing of his meeting with General Ho reflected Yoshida’s eagerness to exchange opinions on the peace treaty with the Chinese Mission before Dulles’ arrival. The context of their conversation can be found in neither Chinese nor Japanese official records, but was summarized in General Ho’s diary:

I paid a visit to Premier Yoshida at four this afternoon. Whether what his real intention is, I had a deep sense of his humility and humor. However, one thing he mentioned deserves special attention. He said he had discussed the fifth column strategy frequently used by the Communist party with his American friend, and did not understand why our democratic nations did not also undertake this method. The best way would be to undertake the fifth column strategy, dispatching the Japanese into mainland China and disturbing its rear.....I have always believed that if were to have Japanese participation in our mission, it would be difficult to terminate our cooperation, which would be a trouble in the future.”⁸⁰⁷

The secret mission mentioned by General Ho was the “White Group”, which at the time was operating in secret. Based on his writings, General Ho did not know about the operations of the White Group, nor did he exchange any of his opinions on the peace treaty with Yoshida. During Dulles’s visit to Japan, Ho kept an eye on his

⁸⁰⁵ DHSL, January 23, 1951.

⁸⁰⁶ *Zhongri Heping Tiaoyue II*, 68, Guoshiguan.

⁸⁰⁷ DHSL, January 24, 1951.

movements and detailed Dulles's speeches in his diary. On January 27, Ho suggested that the Chinese government "sign the peace treaty as soon as possible, or else we will not be able to increase the strength of democratic states, nor will we be able to protect their safety. However, I could not offer any suggestion with regard to the solutions of Japan's safety after the conclusion of the peace treaty."⁸⁰⁸ At this moment, Ho was still struggling for the opportunity to have the Nationalist troops participate in the Korean War. The conclusion of the peace treaty would be favorable to this mission.

On January 29, Ho met Ota Ichiro, Saito Noboru (齋藤昇), chief of the Japanese police, and Matsui Akira (松井明), chief secretary of Yoshida. According to Ho's diary, Ota believed that "the peace treaty might be concluded very soon. The biggest problem we are facing is the Chinese problem, for we are not willing to sign the treaty with mainland China, and we have no motive to sign with Taiwan either."⁸⁰⁹ On February 7, Ho held a half-hour meeting with Dulles. Afterward, Ho stated that "my biggest thinking of this meeting is that the American understanding of us has gradually been clearer, and their attitudes toward the communists have gradually been tougher."⁸¹⁰

These tentative contacts with Japanese politicians in Tokyo enabled Ho to become familiar with Japanese political and diplomatic issues. Ho proved this during discussions on Japanese diplomacy and party issues with Chiang Kai-shek at dinner on March 11.⁸¹¹ After returning to Tokyo, Ho continued to meet with Japanese politicians, soliciting their advice on the peace treaty. Ho paid special attention to the opinions of Okamura Yasuji, who believed that the Japanese government was "willing to sign the treaty as soon as possible. While there are differences of opinion within the Japanese administration, in fact it is a political effect for the purpose of wheeling and dealing, to get itself a better bargaining position."⁸¹² Due to Okamura's significance, Ho held another meeting with him on April 10. During the meeting, Okamura once

⁸⁰⁸ *Zhongri Heping Tiaoyue II*, 69, Guoshiguan.

⁸⁰⁹ DHSL, January 29, 1951.

⁸¹⁰ DHSL, February 7, 1951.

⁸¹¹ Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, March 11, 1951.

⁸¹² *Zhongri Heping Tiaoyue II*, 198, Guoshiguan.

again emphasized that the treaty could be concluded in the near future.⁸¹³ On April 18, Ho had a fifteen-minute talk with Dulles.⁸¹⁴ After listening to a speech given by Dulles, Ho believed that “Dulles’s viewpoint on Taiwan is benign.”⁸¹⁵ On May 8, Ho visited Hayashi Joji (林讓治), head of the House of Representatives in Japan, and summarized his thoughts of the meeting in his diary, stating that “if the Liberal Party succeeds, especially with regards to the signing of the peace treaty, it is in great part due to the support of the United States. However, some people in our country believe that we should keep close contact with Japan, and loosen our ties with the United States. Their opinions are too naïve.”⁸¹⁶ Through his contacts with Dulles and Japanese politicians, the savvy Ho clearly understood the United States’ significant impact on Japan.

Aside from Okamura Yasuji, another significant figure Ho befriended in Japan was Hatoyama Ichiro (鳩山一郎), who later became Prime Minister of Japan in 1954 and was famous for “autonomous diplomacy”. On May 21, Ho feted Hatoyama Ichiro and Ishiii Mitsujiro (石井光次郎). Ho wrote, “He believed the peace treaty could be concluded before July 1, but I doubt it and believe the possibility is extremely low.”⁸¹⁷ In general, Ho chose to engage those Japanese politicians with a background in China, inquiring about their attitudes toward the conclusion of the peace treaty, while also being skeptical about their opinions. In the meantime, Ho realized that the peace treaty would not be concluded in the near future. The United States’ pressure on Japan would be the decisive factor.

THE INTERIOR STRUGGLE

The original task of the Chinese mission was to participate in the operation of the Allied Council for Japan. However, due to China’s complicated circumstance and

⁸¹³ DHSL, April 10, 1951.

⁸¹⁴ “Prime Minister Sees President’s Envoy Twice Wed.,” April 19, 1951, *Nippon Times*.

⁸¹⁵ DHSL, April 23, 1951.

⁸¹⁶ DHSL, May 8, 1951.

⁸¹⁷ DHSL, May 21, 1951.

dramatic changes in the status of Japan, the Chinese mission gradually devoted itself to Sino-Japanese cooperation, rather than to cooperation with other powers. As Cao Shicheng, Chinese military attaché to Japan, wrote in a report submitted to Chiang Kai-shek in early 1951,

The Chinese Mission in Japan should be responsible for our country's tasks in Japan, but the head of the mission has been changed four times in the past five years. What exactly does this accomplish? On one hand, the policies in our country are not clear enough. On the other hand, the appointment of the head of the Chinese Mission leans on SCAP too much. Of course we had no choice but to choose a person to cooperate with GHQ after Japan's surrender, but we should adjust the proportion of these jobs as the circumstances change.

Cao further pointed out that the proportion of the Chinese mission's tasks on the United States and Japan were 90 to 10 after Japan's surrender, changed to 50 to 50 after the outbreak of the Korean War, and should be adjusted to 10 to 90 for now. Although Ho had strong ties with the United States, his unfamiliarity with Japan, as well as some jealousy generated by him within the Chinese Mission, caused many to be critical of him. As Cao sarcastically wrote, the Chinese mission should be led by a person who "deeply understands the Japanese and us Chinese."⁸¹⁸ Shao Yulin, Chinese ambassador to Korea, also mentioned that the work of the Chinese mission "shows a discernable bias towards SCAP, which possesses limited power, and ignores the potential of Japan."⁸¹⁹ As Ye Gongchao also revealed,

MacArthur is stubborn and is not willing to meet guests, especially those whom he does not know. In order to accommodate this situation, our government chose persons with the appropriate backgrounds, including Zhu Shiming and Ho Shailai, to become head of the mission. Both of them were successful in engaging MacArthur and GHQ staff. When MacArthur visited Taiwan, he told me in person that he had a good impression of Ho.⁸²⁰

Chiang's dilemma rested in the choice between allying with SCAP and Japan; he

⁸¹⁸ *Zhongri Heping Tiaoyue II*, 98-104, Guoshiguan.

⁸¹⁹ "Shao Yulin to the Executive Yuan," July 28, 1951, IMH Archives, 11-01-02-19-04-007.

⁸²⁰ "Congress Record," January 8, 1951, IMH Archives, 11-01-02-19-04-007.

decided to maintain Ho's position but dispatch envoys to Japan to work independently. The first envoy Chiang sent to Japan was He Yingqin, who arrived in Japan with his wife on January 6, 1951.⁸²¹ According to Shao Yulin's report, He was not warmly received by the Chinese mission during his visit in Japan, which caused rumors in both Tokyo and Taipei.⁸²² There might have been some discord between He and the Chinese mission, but the person who actually triggered a confrontation that lasted for several months was Dong Xiangguang, an influential journalist who would become the first Chinese ambassador to Japan after the conclusion of the peace treaty.

In 1950, Dong had been entrusted by Chiang with the task of obtaining United States support for Taiwan. On December 14, 1950, during his stopover in Tokyo before returning to Taiwan from the United States, Dong held a meeting with MacArthur, which was arranged by Ho.⁸²³ Dong had planned to visit MacArthur again on April 14, 1951, but the General refused to meet anyone after being dismissed by President Truman.⁸²⁴ While the meeting with MacArthur failed to come to fruition, Ho still managed to arrange a meeting between Dong and General Charles A. Willoughby.⁸²⁵ According to Ho's diary, on April 26 Dong discussed issues with regard to the US Military Assistance Advisory Group in Taiwan with him.⁸²⁶ On April 28, Ho feted both William C. Chase, head of the Advisory Group, and Dong at his residence.⁸²⁷ In general, Dong's missions in Japan and the United States were to arrange the arrival of the Advisory Group, of which Ho had entirely no knowledge.

Dong also met Okazaki Katsuo (岡崎勝男), secretary of Yoshida Shigeru, a meeting also arranged by Ho.⁸²⁸ However, in a 90-minute meeting between Yoshida

⁸²¹ "Gen. Ho Ying-Chin Here on Visit from Taipei," January 6, 1951, *Nippon Times*.

⁸²² "Shao Yulin to the Executive Yuan," July 28, 1951, IMH Archives, 11-01-02-19-04-007.

⁸²³ "Summaries of Dong Xiangguang's Report," December 14, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00056-015.

⁸²⁴ "Chiang Kai-shek to MacArthur," April 12, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-010400-00017-007.

⁸²⁵ "Dong Xiangguang to Chiang Kai-shek," April 23, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00056-021; Dong Xiangguang, *Dong Xiangguang Zizhuan* (董顯光自傳) [The Autobiography of Dong Xiangguang] (Taipei: Duli Zuoja, 2014), 268.

⁸²⁶ DHSL, April 26, 1951.

⁸²⁷ DHSL, April 28, 1951.

⁸²⁸ "Wang Shijie to Chiang Kai-shek," April 18, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00064-017.

and Dong on April 30, Ho was not present, nor did he organize the meeting.⁸²⁹ In his report to Chiang written on May 24, Dong summarized his conversation with Yoshida, including details of Dulles's visit to Japan, the possibility of concluding the peace treaty, as well as information about the Korean War, which reflected the fact that Dong's mission in Japan had overlapped with Ho's. This fact can be proven by the change of the recipients of Chiang's telegrams to the Chinese mission, which changed from "Chief Ho" to either "Chief Ho and Comrade Dong Xianguang" or "Chief Ho and forward to Mr. Dong Xianguang".⁸³⁰ While Dong and Ho had been working together quite amiably in Tokyo, they did not exchange opinions on the tasks that they had been assigned by Chiang individually. For instance, Dong did not inform Ho about his meeting with General Willoughby before returning to Taipei on May 12. Ho came to know of this only after being told by Willoughby that afternoon, which he believed that "Dong seems disloyal and dishonest for not mentioning the meeting to me this morning. Even if I ask him directly, he gives the excuse that there was not enough time to tell me."⁸³¹

After Dong's return to Taipei, Yu Dawei (俞大維), who had just resigned from the Minister of National Defense, paid another four-day visit to Tokyo from May 16th to the 20th, during which Ho accompanied him on his visits with several SCAP staff members.⁸³² The secret mission brought by He Yingqin, Dong Xianguang, and Yu Dawei was certainly causing discomfort on Ho's part, as he believed his honor had been offended. In his meeting with Ye Gongchao on May 28, Ho said "I am certainly not interested in my job in Japan."⁸³³ The next day, Ho told Chen Cheng that "the situation in Tokyo is unsustainable."⁸³⁴ Ho then insistently offered his resignation to Chen Cheng and Wang Shijie. Wang tried his best to convince Ho to stay and proposed three solutions:

⁸²⁹ "Wang Shijie to Chiang Kai-shek," May 7, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00053-035.

⁸³⁰ "Chiang Kai-shek's Instruction," April 13, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-010400-00017-008; "Chiang Kai-shek to Ho Shailai and Dong Xianguang," April 23, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-010400-00017-012.

⁸³¹ DHSL, May 12, 1951.

⁸³² DHSL, May 16 to 20, 1951.

⁸³³ DHSL, May 28, 1951.

⁸³⁴ DHSL, May 29, 1951.

1. In the case that you continue to lead the Chinese mission, your term of office should not be limited, or else you will have difficulty in leading your staffs.
2. Since we would like to have you return to office, the head of our government should extend to you its full trust and endow you with full authority. It must not willfully dispatch people to Japan to do their own jobs without letting you know. If it is necessary to send someone to Japan, we must first inform you, and the person should be supervised by you.
3. With regard to the Japanese question, we must clearly inform you about our policies, and must not send people there to do whatever they want wantonly.

Wang's suggestions were a clear reflection of Ho's concerns; Ho replied that he would consider staying on in the post if these three conditions could be met.⁸³⁵ Four days later, Chiang Kai-shek invited Ho to his residence on Jiaoban Mountain (角板山) for a 150-minute talk, which Ho regarded as the "longest and frankest talk with the President in my life." According to Ho's diary, he first offered his resignation to Chiang, but was immediately rejected. Chiang told Ho that his accomplishments in Japan were extraordinary, and that he had not found any suitable person to replace him. "I feel that the President is very satisfied with my job in Japan," summarized Ho. "He mentioned the abundance of our mission's accomplishments a full three or four times."⁸³⁶ Chiang was certainly not referring to the progress of the treaty with Japan, but rather to Ho's efforts to cultivate relationships with MacArthur for the purpose of defending Taiwan. In Chiang's words, Ho must maintain his position due to his great accomplishments. However, another factor, which Chiang did not tell Ho, played a significant role as well. At this moment, General MacArthur had just returned to the US, where he had been succeeded by General Matthew B. Ridgway, with whom the Nationalist government was not familiar. Chiang certainly did not want to loosen his ties with SCAP and Ho was the only suitable person to handle this job. As a consequence, after applauding and convincing Ho to stay, Chiang immediately inquired him about the methods of approaching General Ridgway, to which Ho replied, "This person is a natural soldier and strong-willed. It will take some time to

⁸³⁵ DHSL, June 10, 1951.

⁸³⁶ DHSL, June 14, 1951.

obtain his sympathy.” Ho then underscored that “if we act impulsively, it might cause unexpected problems.”⁸³⁷

After returning to Tokyo, Ho continued to cultivate relationships with SCAP and Japanese politicians. Not only did he periodically fete Okamura Yasuji and Ogata Taketora (緒方竹虎), an influential Japanese journalist, but he also broadened his circles at the same time. For instance, Ho befriended Kuhara Fusanosuke (久原房之助), a significant entrepreneur and politician, and Akao Bin (赤尾敏), an extreme-right Japanese politician.⁸³⁸ In the meantime, many people in Taiwan could not comprehend Chiang’s insistence on having Ho remain in Japan. They believed that Ho was not suitable for leading the Chinese mission because of his unfamiliarity with Japan, the same issue that Cao Shicheng had satirized in his earlier report. Zhou Hongtao (周宏濤), a secretary of Chiang, also pointed out that “although Ho has an extraordinary relationship with General MacArthur, he lacks political acumen and thus is not well-regarded by the Japanese politicians.”⁸³⁹ Facing strong criticism, as well as Ho’s reluctance, Chiang eventually found a middle ground and decided to have Ho remain in his position until the conclusion of the peace treaty. On September 13, Chiang informed Ho about this decision. Ho later grumbled in his diary, “I expressed my unwillingness to stay in Japan, but the President adamantly insisted that I go back, and I cannot reject it.”⁸⁴⁰

HO’S EFFORTS IN TOKYO AFTER THE SAN FRANCISCO PEACE CONFERENCE

Ho returned to Tokyo on September 15, six days after the conclusion of the Treaty of San Francisco. The Republic of China was excluded from the treaty because

⁸³⁷ DHSL, June 19, 1951.

⁸³⁸ DHSL, July 16, 1951; DHSL, July 27, 1951.

⁸³⁹ Zhou Hongtao and Wang Shichun, “Zhongri Shuangbian Heyue Tanpan Neimu (中日雙邊和約談判內幕) [Inside the Sino-Japanese Bilateral Peace Treaty Negotiations],” *Zhuangji Wenxue*, Vol. 80-6, 38.

⁸⁴⁰ DHSL, September 13, 1951.

the dispute between the UK and US on whether Communist or Nationalist China should represent China had yet to be resolved.⁸⁴¹ As a consequence, the US urged Japan to deal exclusively with Taiwan after the conclusion of the San Francisco treaty. The exclusion of the ROC into the conference disappointed Chiang, who went on a private hunger strike to express his fury.⁸⁴²

Thus, Ho's assignment now became extremely important. News media in Japan and China paid significant attention to Ho's return, and believed he brought new instructions from Taipei to Tokyo.⁸⁴³ As an English radio program in Japan revealed, "The General further said his home government will accept the Japanese government's bid for direct peace treaty negotiations if the proposed treaty is similar to that signed in San Francisco. He said his government is not opposed to the reported Japanese rearmament."⁸⁴⁴ On September 22, Ho said that "his government was hoping to conclude a separate peace treaty with Japan soon."⁸⁴⁵ On September 25, Ho told an AP journalist that the peace treaty between Japan and China could definitely be concluded, but it was difficult to predict when this would be. Ho also revealed that the Foreign Office of Japan had yet to contact the Chinese government concerning the treaty.

The Foreign Office's impassivity reflected the Japanese reluctance to sign the peace treaty with the Republic of China after the conclusion of the treaty of San Francisco. To overcome this hurdle, Ho actively propagandized the necessity of signing the treaty in Japan as well as its meaning to the perpetual peace between China and Japan. For instance, Ho expressed his wish to restore the normal and friendly relationship between China and Japan in a Double Tenth Day ceremony.⁸⁴⁶ But Ho's efforts could not alter Japanese public opinion, and the Japanese government decided to put off negotiations with Taipei as long as it could. As Okazaki told Dong

⁸⁴¹ Rana Mitter, "the Postwar Reconstruction of Asian Order and the Legacy of the War of Resistance in Contemporary East Asia," 9.

⁸⁴² Lin Hsiao-Ting, *Accidental State*, 178; Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, September 9, 1951.

⁸⁴³ "He Shili Fanren Xieyou Xin Xunling (何世禮返任攜有新訓令) [Ho Shailai Returns with New Instruction]," September 16, 1951, *The Kung Sheung Daily News*.

⁸⁴⁴ "Japanese-Chinese Nationalist Peace Talks," UK National Archives, FO 371/92603.

⁸⁴⁵ "Peace Treaty Sought," September 23, 1951, *The Spokesman-Review*.

⁸⁴⁶ "Gen. Ho Shai-lai Speaks at Double 10th Rites," October 11, 1951, *Nippon Times*.

Xianguang,

Our government's policy for now is just to wait, and we will take no action at least until the treaty is ratified. We will do research on when and with which Chinese government shall we sign the peace treaty as long as our country regains its autonomy. While our country deeply respects the Nationalist government, it is regrettable that its territorial possessions are limited to Taiwan.⁸⁴⁷

This conversation, also recorded by Ho Shilai and Wellington Ku, was regarded as clear evidence in support of Japan's desire to procrastinate while dealing with the Nationalists.⁸⁴⁸ On October 29, Yoshida further divulged that Japan had "the right to choose which country to sign the peace treaty with."⁸⁴⁹

Dulles was once again entrusted with the mission to pressure the Japanese government to compromise. As usual, Ho was attentive to Dulles's activities in Tokyo, this time even secretly investigating the conversations between Dulles and Yoshida and immediately reporting them to Taipei. The Nationalist government also secretly advised Willington Ku and Ho Shilai to "keep close ties with Dulles and other persons who will be departing to Japan immediately."⁸⁵⁰ Besides concentrating on Dulles, Ho also paid enormous attention to the United Kingdom's attitude. "According to our secret investigation," wrote Ho, "the UK government secretly cabled its ambassador in Japan, informing him to keep silent on the peace treaty. The UK undoubtedly put political and economic pressure on Japan. This information is the most reliable and sufficient attention should be paid to it."⁸⁵¹ On December 13, Dulles handed Yoshida a memorandum, which asked the Japanese to recognize

⁸⁴⁷ Zhonghuaminguo Waijiaowenti Yanjiuhui (中華民國外交問題研究會), *Jinshan Heyue yu Zhongri Heyue de Guanxi* (金山和約與中日和約的關係) [The Relationship between the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty] (Taipei: Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui, 1966), 170.

⁸⁴⁸ DHSL, October 26, 1951. Gu Weijun, *Guweijun Huiyilu*, Vol. 9, 260.

⁸⁴⁹ Zhonghuaminguo Waijiaowenti Yanjiuhui, *Jinshan Heyue yu Zhongri Heyue de Guanxi*, 174.

⁸⁵⁰ Gu Weijun, *Guweijun Huiyilu*, Vol. 9, 252-253.

⁸⁵¹ "Chao Zhuri Hetuanzhang Sishinian Shierue Shiwuri zhi Yebuzhang Han (抄駐日何團長四十年十二月十五日致葉部長函)," in Liu Weikai ed., "Zhongri Heyue Qianding qian He Shili yu Wang Shijie Ye Gongchao Wanglai Handian Zhuanji (中日和約簽訂前何世禮與王世杰、葉公超往來函電專輯)," *Jindai Zhongguo* (近代中國) [Modern China], Vol. 148, 218.

Chiang Kai-shek's government as the legitimate Chinese government.⁸⁵² The effects of this were immediately recognized by Ho, as he wrote to Ye Gongchao reporting that after December 13, "the tone of the Japanese newspapers has sharply changed."⁸⁵³ Ho clearly recognized the changes affected by Dulles and adjusted his tone when delivering speeches. At a banquet on December 17, Ho not only stressed the importance of the cooperation between China and Japan, but also added that "the United States has an important responsibility to nurture the intimate Sino-Japanese relationship."⁸⁵⁴ "The future of Sino-Japanese cooperation has much to do with the United States," said Ho at another banquet, "and it would be very helpful if our American friends could give assistance to both countries."⁸⁵⁵

Dulles's pressure on Yoshida was effective, as William Sebald wrote in his memoir, "little was accomplished on the matter of a China peace treaty" until Dulles' visit to Tokyo.⁸⁵⁶ On January 16, 1952, the US government published the Yoshida Letter, which was written to Dulles on December 24, 1951, signifying that the Japanese government would negotiate the peace treaty with Taipei rather than Beijing. On the same day, Shimatsu Hisanaga (島津久大), secretary general of the Foreign Office of Japan who later served as Japanese ambassador to the ROC between 1966 and 1969, handed the copy of the letter to the Chinese mission. To Ho Shailai, this letter also marked the happy ending of his mission in Tokyo, as he wrote in his diary, "I have been staying here for nearly two years; at least I know have something to show for it." That night, Ho held a celebration banquet with Okamura Yasuji, Ogata Taketora, Fujiyama Aiichiro (藤山愛一郎), and Koizumi Shinzo (小泉信三), during

⁸⁵² Hans van de Ven, "The 1952 Treaty of Peace between China and Japan," in Hans van de Ven, Diana Lary, and Stephen R. MacKinnon eds., *Negotiating China's Destiny in World War II*, 231.

⁸⁵³ "Chao Zhuri Hetuanzhang Sishinian Shierue Shiwuri zhi Yebuzhang Han," in Liu Weikai ed., "Zhongri Heyue Qinding qian He Shili yu Wang Shijie Ye Gongchao Wanglai Handian Zhuanji," *Jindai Zhongguo*, Vol. 148, 217.

⁸⁵⁴ "Shengdan Wanhui shang He Shili Tuanzhang Qiangdiao Zhongri Xu Miqie Hezuo (聖誕晚會上何世禮團長強調中日須密切合作) [At Christmas Party Ho Shailai Stresses that China and Japan Should Cooperate Tightly]," December 18, 1951, *The Kung Sheung Daily News*.

⁸⁵⁵ "Liuri Huaqiao Juxing Shengdan Wanhui He Shili Qiangdiao Zhonggrimei Hezuo (留日華僑舉行聖誕晚會何世禮強調中日美合作) [Overseas Chinese Hold Christmas Party; Ho Shailai Stresses on Sino-Japan-US Cooperation]," December 21, 1951, *The Kung Sheung Daily News*.

⁸⁵⁶ William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 285.

which they exchanged their opinions on the Yoshida Letter. Ho noted Fujiyama's opinion, which apparently echoed his, in his diary. "Since signing the peace treaty with Taipei is inevitable, it would have been better if Yoshida had published this letter before Dulles's arrival, because this would have demonstrated that Japan was taking an active initiative in signing the treaty." "Publishing the letter now," Fujiyama went on, "makes people feel that the Japanese government does so simply under the Americans' pressure."⁸⁵⁷

THE NEGOTIATIONS IN TOKYO

While the conclusion of the treaty would be a *fait accompli*, the arrangement of the Japanese delegation group to Taipei remained a convoluted task for Ho Shailai. On January 26, the Japanese government secretly informed Ho that Kawada Isao (河田 烈) would be the head of the Japanese delegation to Taipei and asked him to have Taipei keep this information top secret.⁸⁵⁸ Ho then cabled this information to Taipei on the same day.⁸⁵⁹ However, when reading a Japanese newspaper the next morning, Ho found that the speeches delivered by Yoshida in parliament had deviated from the principles of the Yoshida Letter. For instance, Yoshida said the treaty was a friendly treaty rather than a peace treaty, and the Nationalist government could not represent China. Ho immediately conferred with his colleagues in an effort to understand Yoshida's motives. As Ho wrote in his diary, "the cunning of the Japanese is predictable, but it is difficult to understand why Yoshida dares to take this tone before the US parliament ratifies the peace treaty."⁸⁶⁰ In the meantime, Ye Gongchao asked Ho to make enquiries to the Japanese about the essence and the title of the Japanese delegation to Taipei.⁸⁶¹

The next morning, Wajima Eiji (倭島 英二) replied to Ho that the mission of the

⁸⁵⁷ DHSL, January 16, 1952.

⁸⁵⁸ DHSL, January 26, 1952.

⁸⁵⁹ "Ho Shailai to Wang Shijie," January 26, 1952, Guoshiguan, 002-090105-00012-287.

⁸⁶⁰ DHSL, January 27, 1952.

⁸⁶¹ DHSL, January 27, 1952.

delegation was to dispatch Kawada Isao as plenipotentiary in charge of concluding the peace treaty, and to terminate the wartime status quo based on the principles of the treaty of San Francisco. Foreign Office staffs were to accompany them to provide assistance.⁸⁶² Ho informed him that the Taipei government would welcome the delegation, provided they fulfilled three prerequisites: the purpose of the delegation must be conclusion of the peace treaty, Kawada Isao must be the plenipotentiary, and the treaty must be immediately implemented, as long as the Japanese parliament ratified it.⁸⁶³ On January 30, Wajima brought Ho a letter with the signature of Okazaki Katsuo. After reading the letter, Ho asked why the Japanese omitted the word “peace”, instead using the word “bilateral treaty”. Ho then proposed a number of conditions: that the Japanese use the term “bilateral peace treaty”, that Isao Kawada use the title of plenipotentiary, that the Japanese promise that the treaty could be implemented, provided the Japanese parliament ratified it, and that the treaty have Yoshida’s signature. The negotiation reached a stalemate, and both sides had to inform their respective superiors.⁸⁶⁴ It should be noted that when Wajima received Ho’s proposals, he grumbled to Ho that the Taipei authority was not “as stubborn as the Chinese mission”. This detail reflects the fact that when Ho Shailai was arguing with the Japanese in Tokyo, some compromises had already been made between the Nationalist government and the Japanese Overseas Office in Taipei. Ho immediately cabled Taipei to protest. “We do not know anything about the negotiations between Taiwan and Japan, and if there is any mistake in the future, our mission will not be responsible.”⁸⁶⁵

On January 31, Wajima brought a letter with Yoshida’s signature to Ho, replying that the Japanese had agreed to his proposals, except for the provision that the word “peace” be added into the treaty, as the Taipei authority had already agreed not to use the term “bilateral peace treaty.” Ho was convinced, but that night he received a call

⁸⁶² DHSL, January 28, 1952; “Ho Shailai to Wang Shijie,” January 28, 1952, Guoshiguan, 002-090105-00012-288.

⁸⁶³ DHSL, January 29, 1952.

⁸⁶⁴ DHSL, January 30, 1952; “Ho Shailai to Wang Shijie,” January 30, 1952, Guoshiguan, 002-090105-00012-289.

⁸⁶⁵ DHSL, January 30, 1952.

from Ye Gongchao, who informed him that Taipei authority had not consented to letting the Japanese omit the word “peace”, and ordered him to express this to the Japanese. “Based on Ye’s tone,” Ho speculated in his diary, “there must be someone who told the Japanese that it would be fine if they do not use the word ‘peace’, but this person definitely does not belong to the Foreign Office.”⁸⁶⁶ In the meantime, Ho conferred the difficulties he had been facing with William Sebald, who applauded Ho’s efforts and suggested use of the term “treaty of peace” in place of “peace Treaty”. Sebald also revealed to Ho that “we hope the peace treaty can be concluded as soon as possible, since our country has given enormous assistance already.”⁸⁶⁷

Ho not only stuck to principles in his negotiations with the Japanese, he also sought assistance from SCAP. However, being sandwiched between the Chinese and Japanese governments, Ho inexorably became a scapegoat. Ho was already angry at the compromise made by the Taipei authorities and the Japanese, of which he had not been informed. However, what intrigued Ho was that his private complaint about Wajima’s shrewdness to the Foreign Office in Taipei was transmitted to the Japanese Overseas Office in Taipei by Hu Qingyu (胡慶育), vice Minister of the Foreign Office.⁸⁶⁸ Ho expressed his anger in his diary on February 2,

The Foreign Office has indebted me to Wajima, and I can share no secrets with the Foreign Office anymore. To make matters worse, I cannot get a good foothold in Tokyo, because the Foreign Office acts like the good person, while I become the pariah. As far as I am concerned, I plan to leave this job, and I do not care if my country could benefit from my efforts. China’s future might be hopeless if the Foreign Office does not change its behavior.⁸⁶⁹

This passage reflects Ho’s dissatisfaction with the Foreign Office, accumulated over the course of two years, and it is also the sharpest criticism of the Foreign Office found in Ho’s diary during his service in Tokyo. However, Ho did not make his

⁸⁶⁶ DHSL, January 31, 1952; ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 774.

⁸⁶⁷ DHSL, February 1, 1952.

⁸⁶⁸ “Ho Shilai to Wang Shijie and Ye Gongchao,” February 1, 1952, Guoshiguan, 002-090105-00012-291.

⁸⁶⁹ DHSL, February 2, 1952.

complaint public. On February 4, Ho replied to Yoshida that the Chinese government would recognize the bilateral treaty mentioned by the Japanese government as the peace treaty between the two countries. Based on this understanding, the Chinese government agreed to the appointment of Isao Kawada as penitentiary.⁸⁷⁰ After replying to Yoshida by letter, Ho believed that his mission in Tokyo had come to an end. “My accomplishments with regards to my dealings with GHQ and the affairs of overseas Chinese might be ignored,” wrote Ho in his diary on that day, “but I know that I truly made great contributions in this affair.”⁸⁷¹ Over the next few days, Ho felt relieved, and attended several events in Tokyo. The negotiations between Taipei and Tokyo seemed all settled. However, Ye Gongchao then changed his mind. While Ho’s letter to Yoshida had expressed agreement that both the Chinese and Japanese governments could have their own interpretation of the term “bilateral treaty”, Ye insisted that the name of the treaty be confirmed before the departure of the delegation. On February 11, Ye wrote a memorandum to Kimura Shiroshichi (木村四郎七). Ho believed the memorandum was not tactful enough and had caused embarrassment to the Japanese.⁸⁷² On February 12, Ho held a banquet at his residence to celebrate the departure of Waseda’s delegation. The attendants were Okazaki Katsuo, Ishihara Kanichiro (石原幹市郎), Yoshizawa Kenkichi (芳澤謙吉), Wajima Eiji, and Hayashi Joji, who Ho frequently met in Tokyo. Due to Ye’s inopportune memorandum to Kimura, Ho noticed that Okazaki was not happy during the banquet, and wrote in his diary that “our mission is lucky because the Foreign Office did not order us to write such a memorandum.”⁸⁷³

On February 13, Ho delivered a copy of the memorandum to Sebald, who replied that both the Japanese and Chinese governments should be silent and discuss all details in Taipei. Sebald also told Ho that they “could feel relief after Waseda arrives

⁸⁷⁰ Zhonghuaminguo Waijiaotenti Yanjiuhui, *Jinshan Heyue yu Zhongri Heyue de Guanxi*, 191-192; ZHMGZYSCLB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 775.

⁸⁷¹ DHSL, February 4, 1952.

⁸⁷² DHSL, February 12, 1952.

⁸⁷³ DHSL, February 12, 1952.

in Taipei.”⁸⁷⁴ Many problems would be alleviated if the battlefield could be moved to Taipei from Tokyo, as Sebald wrote in his memoir:

This did not settle the differences between Tokyo and Taipei, however, and I was increasingly in the middle of these complicated problems until the end of February, 1952, when the negotiations were transferred to Taipei. Washington asked for my advice at this time and I replied that the two nations could themselves resolve the question. The Chinese, I said, were old hands at diplomacy and would take care of their own interests. The Japanese, I added, would carry out their commitments under the Yoshida-Dulles letter of December 24, 1951.⁸⁷⁵

However, Ye still insisted that the Nationalist government would not receive the delegation unless the Japanese compromised on the word choice of the treaty. Once again, the Nationalist government hoped Sebald would put pressure on the Japanese. Sebald believed that the Japanese would eventually accept adding the term “peace”, and had yet to do so simply to prevent it from attacks in the parliament. Karl L. Rankin transmitted Sebald’s opinion to Ye, who was eventually convinced.⁸⁷⁶ On February 15, the Executive Yuan appointed Ye Gongchao as penitentiary to the negotiation with Waseda. “I feel very comfortable because the negotiations have been entirely transferred to Taipei,” wrote Ho in his diary.⁸⁷⁷ Later, Ho offered his resignation again, but was immediately rejected by Ye, who asked him to stay until the peace treaty was concluded.⁸⁷⁸

Ho’s prediction that the negotiations could be wrapped up in Taipei, and that the move to Taipei would serve to solve many of the issues that had been plaguing the negotiations, very quickly proved to be wrong. As the Waseda delegation arrived in Taipei, both the Chinese and Japanese representatives once again bickered over issues related to the treaty. On February 29, Ho discussed this issue with Sebald. Sebald told Ho that he believed the Japanese would definitely come to terms with the treaty, but

⁸⁷⁴ DHSL, February 13, 1952.

⁸⁷⁵ William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 286-287.

⁸⁷⁶ Gu Weijun, *Guweijun Huiyilu*, Vol. 9, 297.

⁸⁷⁷ DHSL, February 16, 1952.

⁸⁷⁸ DHSL, February 21, 1952.

that they must continue to wheel and deal for now. “This is the third time that he has told me the same thing”, Ho summarized in his diary. “If our government remains stubborn, the consequences are difficult to imagine.”⁸⁷⁹ On March 1, Ho paid his first visit to Okazaki and found his attitude toward the negotiations optimistic.⁸⁸⁰ Ho’s thoughts were deeply influenced by Sebald. They believed that the conclusion of the treaty was only a matter of time, and that the Nationalist government should not be too sensitive to the wording of the treaty.

Ho returned to Taipei on March 4, just at the moment when the negotiations reached a stalemate. A newspaper commented that “newspapers in Japan are paying a great deal of attention to Ho’s sudden departure to Taipei, and believe he has been entrusted with a special mission in the negotiations in Taipei.”⁸⁸¹ On the same evening, Ho held a private meeting with Waseda. Waseda told Ho that he was well received by the Chinese, and the negotiations were proceeding “slowly but surely.” Although neither side could find a consensus at that time, their attitudes were benign.⁸⁸² Ho also told Zhang Qun and Wang Shijie that the Nationalist government should agree with Waseda’s request to meet Wang Shijie and Chen Cheng, so as to avoid embarrassing him. Furthermore, Ho promised to serve as head of the Chinese mission until the conclusion of the treaty.⁸⁸³

Ho’s strenuous efforts to have Sebald pressure Yoshida were effective. As Sebald wrote in his memoir,

Early in March, 1952, I made one final call on Yoshida in relation to this problem. I thought he should know that in some Washington circles there was growing belief that the Japanese were not negotiating in good faith with the Chinese and would break off the discussions when the United States Senate had ratified the peace treaty. After hearing this, Yoshida replied with a chuckle: “We are not that clever!” However, he promised to instruct his negotiator, Isao Kawada, to be more reasonable in the Taipei discussions.⁸⁸⁴

⁸⁷⁹ DHSL, February 29, 1952.

⁸⁸⁰ DHSL, March 1, 1952.

⁸⁸¹ “He Shili Shi Jinri Fantai (何世禮氏今日返台) [Ho Shailai Returns to Taiwan Today],” March 4, 1952, *The Kung Sheung Daily News*.

⁸⁸² DHSL, March 4, 1952.

⁸⁸³ DHSL, March 5, 1952.

⁸⁸⁴ William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 287.

Besides ordering Waseda to be more rational, Yoshida also sent Wajima Eiji to Taipei “with more liberal instructions.”⁸⁸⁵ In early March Rankin confirmed that the Japanese had “accepted title “Peace Treaty” and have agreed to recognise in principle that Nationalist Sovereignty includes continental China although in practice provisions will at present only apply to territories actually controlled by Nationalists.”⁸⁸⁶ It was under this circumstance that Wajima Eiji, Chief of Asian Affairs Bureau of Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, visited Taipei on March 8 “allegedly with fresh instructions from his Government.”⁸⁸⁷ Wajima paid a visit to Ho on March 10, informing him that the Japanese had already agreed on the name of the treaty and hoped Minister Ye could have a formal meeting with Waseda on the next day.⁸⁸⁸ On March 11, Ho invited Waseda, Wajima, Kimura, and Ye to a banquet in his residence. “During the banquet, Minister Ye asked Waseda whether they hoped General Ho would stay in Japan for the long term,” wrote Ho in his diary. “Waseda replied that the Foreign Office certainly wished General Ho to stay.”⁸⁸⁹ Clearly, Ho’s resilience and thoughtfulness had won support among the Japanese politicians.

LAST EFFORTS IN TOKYO

The negotiations remained at an impasse and experienced no significant breakthrough since Waseda’s arrival on February 18. Although Yoshida had promised Sebald in early March that the Japanese would eventually conclude the peace treaty with Taipei, Waseda was still haggling over minor details with Ye. The frustrated Ye pinned his last hopes on Ho, asking the Americans to pressure the Japanese government to accept the draft written by the Chinese government.⁸⁹⁰ At this moment, the Nationalists had come to realize that the only way to have the Japanese

⁸⁸⁵ William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan*, 287.

⁸⁸⁶ “From Tamsui to Foreign Office,” March 7, 1952, UK National Archives, FO371/99405.

⁸⁸⁷ “From Tokyo to Foreign Office,” March 10, 1952, UK National Archives, FO371/99405.

⁸⁸⁸ DHSL, March 10, 1952.

⁸⁸⁹ DHSL, March 11, 1952.

⁸⁹⁰ DHSL, March 23, 1952.

compromise was to have SCAP pressure the Japanese, and any effort used in Taipei was futile. On March 20, the US Senate ratified the Treaty of San Francisco and the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, which concerned the Nationalists because it might give the Japanese an excuse not to conclude the peace treaty in Taipei.⁸⁹¹ As a consequence, Ho consulted with Niles W. Bond of SCAP, who believed that the Japanese would not reverse the decision after the Treaty of San Francisco came into effect. Furthermore, Bond told Ho that the relationship between Rankin and SCAP would be very helpful to Taiwan.⁸⁹²

Unlike people in Taipei, who were speculating on whether the Japanese delegates were sincere or not, a pragmatically minded Ho saw no reason to worry and believed that the conclusion of the peace treaty was only a matter of time. Ho's opinion was confirmed by a British report, in which Dening wrote that Wajima "told a member of my staff on 1st April that Japan was definitely prepared to have a treaty but would not give way to any unjustified Chinese demands."⁸⁹³ In his diary on April 9, Ho complained,

Whether the Japanese are sincere or not does not have anything to do with the conclusion of the peace treaty, unless our country takes a wrong step. I do believe if our country's diplomatic policy is adequate, the US Senate should have approved the Treaty of San Francisco after the conclusion of the peace treaty between China and Japan. I do believe that our country's mission in Washington D.C. is not good enough.⁸⁹⁴

Ho's complaint reflected the embarrassing fact the Chinese mission in Japan and the Chinese Embassy in Washington had been operating largely independently of each other, without central direction or coordination. In his diaries, Ho never mentioned his contact with Wellington Ku during his two years of service in Tokyo. On the other hand, Wellington Ku did not mention Ho Shailai's efforts in the negotiation of the peace treaty in his memoir, either. Wellington Ku believed it was his strenuous efforts to establish a relationship with Dulles in Washington since the outbreak of the

⁸⁹¹ Gu Weijun, *Guweijun Huiyilu*, Vol. 9, 305.

⁸⁹² DHSL, March 27, 1952.

⁸⁹³ "From Tokyo to Foreign Office," April 3, 1952, UK National Archives, FO 371/99405.

⁸⁹⁴ DHSL, April 9, 1952.

Korean War that led to the conclusion of the peace treaty, while Ho Shailai was of the opinion that the conclusion of the treaty was in great part due to his arduous cooperation with Sebald in Tokyo. Both of them seemed to ignore the fact that the victory could not have been achieved without the work of either men, and most importantly without the efforts of the United States government.

The last issue Ho encountered in the debate over the treaty was the significant “and” or “or” question. The debate was over which word should be used in the sentence “all the areas and all the territories under Chinese sovereignty which are now or may hereafter be under the control of the government of the Republic of China.”⁸⁹⁵ The Japanese, based on the principle of the Yoshida Letter, favored the word “or”, while the Chinese insisted on the word “and”.⁸⁹⁶ The Chinese Nationalist refused to use the term “or” so as to avoid admitting the fact that the ROC territory was limited to Taiwan, Pascadores and several offshore islands such as Quemoy. By using the term “and,” not only could the ROC claimed its legitimacy of representing China but paved the way for its future military campaigns to retake the mainland. It was against this background that when being asked by Wajimia Eiji in Tokyo on April 18 about this debate, Ho Shailai simply replied that “the word choice does not concern your government, but it is extremely important to my government.” When Wajima retorted by implying that the Yoshida Letter had already been publicized and could not be amended, Ho refuted, “your government has already benefited a lot on issues outside of the Yoshida Letter, so why can you not make some concessions inside the Letter?”⁸⁹⁷ Ho’s stubborn reply demonstrated that despite he disagreed with the Nationalist’s strategies during the negotiations, he always defended the principles of the Nationalist government at all costs.

Ho returned to Taipei on the morning of April 20 and immediately went to Ye Gongchao’s residence to have breakfast. Ho noticed that Ye was pessimistic about the outcome of the negotiations and asked Ho to try his best to control the situation in

⁸⁹⁵ Hans van de Ven, “The 1952 Treaty of Peace between China and Japan,” in Hans van de Ven, Diana Lary, and Stephen R. MacKinnon eds., *Negotiating China’s Destiny in World War II*, 234

⁸⁹⁶ Tang Yan, *Ye Gongchao de Liangge Shijie*, 316-317.

⁸⁹⁷ DHSL, April 18, 1952.

Tokyo.⁸⁹⁸ But Ye's worries did not become reality, since US pressure on the Japanese government had already come into effect. On April 26, Ogata Taketora told Ho that Yoshida had informed him two days' prior that all questions had already been settled.⁸⁹⁹ On the next day, Ho received the news that "a significant piece of information will be announced tomorrow."⁹⁰⁰ Chiang Kai-shek also wrote in his diary on that day: "we are able to sign a Treaty of Peace with Japan as one of the victors. Doubtless this is a major blow to the bogus Communist organization, although of course this cannot erase my responsibility for the defeat of the revolution."⁹⁰¹ As news of the conclusion of the peace treaty reached his ears, Ho concluded, "While the peace treaty was concluded, I believe the two countries' relationship has become unpleasant due to the speeches given by Yoshida and Okazaki." Ho added, "What I wish to do is to facilitate the friendship between the two countries."⁹⁰²

CONCLUSION

As Esler Denning, head of the British Mission in Japan, recounted in his book published in 1961,

Although Japan was therefore at liberty to choose between the two Governments claiming to be the Government of China, in the event, as a result of strong pressure by the United States before the Peace Treaty came into force, the Japanese Prime Minister gave an undertaking to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa.⁹⁰³

Bystanders such as Esler Denning witnessed the situation took place in Tokyo insightfully, so did General Ho Shailai. This chapter examines Ho's role in the course of the negotiations of the peace treaty between Nationalist China and Japan, with intense focus on the first few months of 1952. Despite the miscellaneous resources on the negotiations in Chinese and Japanese led to fruitful studies on this subject, by

⁸⁹⁸ DHSL, April 20, 1952.

⁸⁹⁹ DHSL, April 26, 1952.

⁹⁰⁰ DHSL, April 27, 1952.

⁹⁰¹ Hans van de Ven, *China at War*, 268.

⁹⁰² DHSL, April 28, 1952.

⁹⁰³ Esler Denning, *Japan*, 207-208.

utilizing the diaries of General Ho Shailai, this chapter seeks a different angle to explore the stories behind the curtain. Through the lens of Ho Shailai, one could sense the different understandings toward the negotiations. While the KMT's upper echelons were worried about the attitude of the Japanese government toward the peace treaty, Ho was insightful in observing that it was in the US interests to have Japan sign the bilateral treaty with Nationalist China. As long as the US continued to hold its ground, Japan would have no choice but yield.

To a great extent, Ho's sober judgement came from his earlier contacts with the Japanese politicians. As he assumed the head of the Chinese Mission in Japan in June 1950, Ho frequently feted several significant Japanese politicians, so as to exchange opinions. These individuals can be categorized into three groups: Japanese administrative politicians (Yoshida Shigeru, Ashida Hitoshi, Hayashi Joji, Hatoyama Ichiro, Fujiyama Aiichiro, Ogata Taketora, and Ota Ichiro), Japanese who involved in Manchukuo and the Sino-Japanese War (Okamura Yasuji, Yamazaki Motoki, and Takasaki Tatsunosuke), as well as former Japanese ambassadors to China (Yoshizawa Kenkichi and Yada Shichitaro). These contacts helped shaped Ho's views in understanding situation in Japan and paved the way for future contacts. Additionally, in the course of the Waseda delegation to Taipei, Ho kept close contact with Okazaki Katsuo and Wajima Eiji. While these connections had little to do with the final outcome of the peace treaty, Ho was clever enough to see through Japanese tactics and assured the Chinese that the treaty would eventually be concluded. Ho's abilities in dealing with the Japanese and SCAP officials in also earned applauses in Tokyo. During the negotiations in March 1952 in Taipei, Hu Qingyu said to Kimura that if the San Francisco Treaty came into effect before the Sino-Japanese treaty, the function of the Chinese Mission Japan and the Japanese agency in Taipei should remain their status quo for a transitional period. Kimura replied that Ho Shailai had managed to establish good rapport with his government in Tokyo and it would face no difficulties for him to handle the status quo.⁹⁰⁴

Second, behind the curtain of the negotiations of the peace treaty stood a thorny

⁹⁰⁴ ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 922.

dilemma to Chiang Kai-shek. The interior struggle in the Chinese Mission represented a debate over whether the head of the Mission should be America-oriented or Japan-oriented. More specifically, the appointment of the Chinese mission reflects Chiang's dilemma regarding whether allying with Japan, or with the United States and SCAP should be its priority. Without Ho Shailai's diaries, people might never know that Chiang Kai-shek had been contemplating the issue of who should head the Chinese Mission for several months. While Chiang mentioned his anxiety about the dearth of people capable of handling diplomacy with Japan in his diaries, not much details were given. Coincidentally, the diaries of Chen Cheng and Wang Shijie, both of whom were significant decision-makers in that period, lacked contexts in the year 1951.⁹⁰⁵ Furthermore, another key policy-maker Dong Xiangguang did not mention this detail in his memoir either. Ho's diaries not only offer an enormous amount of details about this process, but also reveal his grumblings over the fact that "the Foreign Office was always the good person, and the Chinese mission in Japan the moron."

Third, the cooperation between the Chinese Mission and SCAP proves to be significant in affecting the conclusion of the peace treaty. Ho had been cultivating personal relations with SCAP officials, notably William Sebald, in Tokyo. Ho put massive efforts into developing relations with them and securing their support, not least to pressure the Japanese government to sign the treaty in Taipei, for the benefit of the Republic of China. Furthermore, Ho's opinions on the peace treaty were deeply influenced and shaped by SCAP as well. Ho held the belief that the Chinese government should not bargain with the Japanese on the wordings in the treaty, for the conclusion of the treaty was already a fait accompli. Besides, according to Ho's diaries, Chiang once told him that if the peace treaty could not be concluded, the Chinese Mission in Japan should oppose the dismissal of the Allied Council for Japan in Tokyo. This detail has likewise not been found in previous records.

⁹⁰⁵ Chen Cheng, *Chen Cheng Xiansheng Riji* (陳誠先生日記) [The Diaries of Mr. Chen Cheng] (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2015); Wang Shijie, *Wang Shijie Xiansheng Riji* (王世杰先生日記) [The Diaries of Mr. Wang Shijie] (Taipei: Insititute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1990).

CONCLUSION

On April 28, 1952, the same day the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force, negotiations for the separate Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty were concluded in Taipei. With the treaty in place, a relieved Ho Shailai looked to depart Japan at the earliest opportunity. The agreements finally nullified the state of war previously existing between the allied countries and Japan, and they were the signal for the restoration of official Embassies over the foreign Missions which had operated in Japan since soon after combat ceased in 1945. As Esler Denning wrote, "It was only after April 28th, 1952, that foreign Ambassadors and Ministers were received by the Emperor to present their credentials, whereupon the missions of countries represented in Japan resumed the status of Embassies and Legations."⁹⁰⁶ On May 1, thirteen foreign envoys were received by Japan's Foreign Minister. Some of the newly-appointed ambassadors were previously the head of their respective Missions. Amongst their number were the French Ambassador, Maurice Dejean, the British Ambassador, Sir Esler Denning, the Spanish Ambassador, Francisco J. del Castillo, the Italian Ambassador, Marquis Blasco Lanza d'Ajeta, and the Canadian Charge d'Affaires, A. R. Menzies.⁹⁰⁷

By the same token, the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty also signified the resumption of the formal relationship between the ROC and Japan, but this process could only be undertaken after the ratification of the Treaty by the Japanese Diet. During this period, both governments had consented to the fact that the temporary status of the Chinese Mission in Japan, as well as its Japanese counterpart in Taipei, should be maintained. As the *Nippon Times* noted, "Meanwhile, the Government also recognized tentatively the status of the Chinese Mission in Japan in response to the same measure taken by the Nationalist Chinese on the status of the Japanese Government overseas agency in Taipei."⁹⁰⁸ According to Ho Shailai's account, following the conclusion of treaty negotiations, the Japanese government wished to "upgrade" the Chinese Mission to a

⁹⁰⁶ Esler Denning, *Japan*, 195.

⁹⁰⁷ "Okazaki is Named Foreign Minister; Meets Diplomats," May 1, 1952, *Nippon Times*.

⁹⁰⁸ "Korean, Chinese Missions Granted Temporary Status," May 1, 1952, *Nippon Times*.

Chinese Embassy and the Japanese body in Taipei to a Japanese Embassy, but the suggestion was rejected by the Chinese government on the grounds that this step could only be taken after the ratification of the Treaty. During the interim, people were left to speculate on whom would become the first postwar Chinese ambassador to Japan.

Although the ROC's international eminence had dwindled sharply in the course of only a few years, the post of ROC Ambassador to Japan was still appealing to many Chinese officials. Among them, Dong Xiangguang and Zhang Qun, both of whom possessed close relations to Chiang, were considered the most likely candidates. As chapter eight has demonstrated, in 1951 both figures visited Japan for a special purpose and were both active participant in Sino-Japanese affairs. In May of 1952, Foreign Minister Ye Gongchao told Ho that Chiang would select either Zhang or Dong for the ambassador role, but "it would not be a strange thing if Chiang selects a third option."⁹⁰⁹ The potential third candidate, according to Ye's assumption, was Shao Yulin, the former ROC ambassador to South Korea who served in the post between 1949 and 1951. Before his appointment to South Korea, Shao had been vice head of the Chinese Mission in Japan. Wang Dongyuan (王東原), who had succeeded Shao as the ROC ambassador to South Korea in 1951, recommended that Shao be selected to serve as the Chinese ambassador to Japan because he was familiar with the country and had years of experience working as a diplomat in South Korea, which was a background that made him suitable for conducting a three-way alliance between the ROC, Japan and South Korea in their anti-communism campaigns.⁹¹⁰

Up until July of 1952, Chiang Kai-shek had still not made up his mind on who to dispatch to Japan. Rumors about Dong's or Zhang's impending appointment continued to swirl around Taipei and Tokyo.⁹¹¹ According to Cai Menjian's account, Chen Cheng was in a strong position to have Dong replace Zhang to become the

⁹⁰⁹ DHSL, May 17, 1952.

⁹¹⁰ "Wang Dongyuan to Chiang Kai-shek," June 23, 1952, Guoshiguan, 002-090105-00015-254.

⁹¹¹ "Liyuan Linshi Huiyi Bianlun Zhongri Heyue (立院臨時會議辯論中日和約) [Interim Meeting of the Legislative Yuan to Debate the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty]," July 16, 1952, *The Kung Sheung Daily News*.

ambassador in order to strengthen his political faction.⁹¹² Eventually, Chiang came to a decision, selecting Dong as the first post-war Chinese Ambassador and dispatching Zhang Qun as his special envoy to Japan for a short visit.⁹¹³ The Japanese government was satisfied with Dong's appointment. On August 9, Okazaki replied to Liu Zenghua that:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of August 8, 1952, asking the Japanese Government about its opinion with regard to the appointment of Mr. Tung Hsien Kwang (Hollington K. Tong) by the Government of the Republic of China as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Japan. I am happy to inform you that the proposed appointment will be agreeable to the Japanese Government.⁹¹⁴

In his capacity as special envoy, Zhang Qun published an article called "Relationships between China, Japan and the United States (*Zhongri Guanxi Yu Meiguo* 中日關係與美國)". And before heading to Japan, Zhang established the Sino-Japanese Cultural and Economic Association (*Zhongri Wenhua jingji Xiehui* 中日文化經濟協會). Zhang also spoke to the news media:

"now that my country and your country have restored normal diplomatic relations, the cumulative, unfortunate events in history have come to be matters of the past. Whatever remaining psychological effects in the hearts of the two peoples as a result of these unfortunate incidents should also be all forgotten. Heretofore the relationships of friendly cooperation between the nations must enter an entirely new stage."⁹¹⁵

During his four-month stay in Japan, Zhang not only contributed to reestablishing the Chinese Embassy in Japan, but dealt too with ongoing issues of cooperation

⁹¹² Cai Mengjian, "You Zhongri Heyue Tandao Dong Xianguang Shiri Jingwei: Qinshan Dashi Koubei jiqi Youqu Zhanggu (由中日和約談到董顯光使日經緯:「親善大使」口碑及其有趣掌故) [From the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty to Dong Xianguang's Appointment to Japan: The Reputation of "Goodwill Ambassador" and His Interesting Stories]," *Zhuanji Wenxue*, 42:2, 69-75; Cai Mengjian, "Chen Cheng Fandui Zhang Qun Shiri Qiaojian Dong Xianguang zhi Neimu (陳誠反對張群使日巧薦董顯光之內幕) [Inside Story of Chen Cheng's objection to Zhang's Appointment as Ambassador to Japan and Recommend Dong Xianguang Instead]," *Zhuanji Wenxue*, 66:2, 31-36.

⁹¹³ DHSL, July 16, 1952.

⁹¹⁴ "Okazaki Katsuo to Liu Zenghua," August 9, 1952, IMH Archives, 11-38-03-00-055.

⁹¹⁵ "Taipei Goodwill Mission Head Calls for Sino-Japan Amity," August 3, 1952, *Nippon Times*.

between the ROC and Japan, as well as advising Japan on setting up the Committee of Economic Development between Japan and China (*Rihua Jingji Cujin Weihuihui* 日華經濟促進委員會).⁹¹⁶ Zhang also visited Nobusuke Kishi (岸信介), who had just been released from prison and was apparently at a low ebb. Surprised and touched, Nobusuke thereafter regarded Zhang as his lifelong friend.⁹¹⁷ Zhang also met with Okamura Yasuji and his family in August.⁹¹⁸ Besides, Zhang also met Lin Xiantang and brought him greetings from Chiang Kai-shek. According to Lin's diaries, Zhang inquired information on the Taiwanese independent movements.⁹¹⁹ This episode indicated that although the Sino-Japanese relation had been restored, Chiang was still skeptical of simmering Taiwanese Independent Movement in that country.

During this transitional period, when the Chinese Mission was being converted into a new Chinese Embassy, many arrangements remained to be settled. Many staff members, for example, were eager to know whether they could continue in Japan and, if so, what salaries they would receive. Staff of the Chinese Mission also had to pay their own rent, so Ho requested that the Ministry of Foreign affairs increase their salary. The Foreign Ministry agreed that, from May of 1952, the staff of the Chinese Mission would receive an increased salary commensurate with that of an embassy employee. Ho, however, believed that this would not resolve the issue satisfactorily, and he urged Taipei to send representatives to supervise the transformation of the Mission into an Embassy or else "people's mentality would be difficult to maintain."⁹²⁰ In the meantime, items of the Chinese Mission were being transferred to the Embassy, as those of the Chinese Mission's branches were relocated to the Consulate. For instance, the list of items to be transferred from the Chinese Mission's branch in Nagoya and Osaka to the Consulate in Osaka included a list of archives, one stamp, six stamps for visa approval, furniture and property, two secret archives, and

⁹¹⁶ Shen Jinding ed., *Bainianlai Zhongri Guanxi Lunwenji*, 22.

⁹¹⁷ Shen Jinding ed., *Bainianlai Zhongri Guanxi Lunwenji*, 238.

⁹¹⁸ Barak Kushner, *Men to Devils, Devils to Men*, 219.

⁹¹⁹ Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan Xiansheng Riji*, Vol. 24, 313.

⁹²⁰ DHSL, May 6, 1952.

some vehicles. The vehicles included one Dodge and one Jeep.⁹²¹ With the effect of the Sino-Japanese Treaty on August 5, Liu Zenghua served as the temporary Chinese Ambassador await the arrival of Dong Xianguang.⁹²² Three days later, Lin Xiantang paid a visit to the Chinese Embassy and found out that Chen Qingwen, a counsel to the Chinese Mission, lost his job due to the restoration of the Chinese Embassy and was ready to depart for Taiwan.⁹²³

In Taipei, Chinese officialdom paid close attention to the restoration of the Japanese Embassy. As the British Consul in Taipei wrote in his report, “The Chinese have made available to him, one of the most handsome houses in the city, and the Japanese Embassy is thus the most impressive in appearance of all the foreign missions in Taipei. This is another example of the Nationalist’s eagerness for Japanese friendship.”⁹²⁴ On September 24, Dong arrived at Tokyo and told newsmen that cooperation between the two countries would govern “the future stability and peace in East Asia.”⁹²⁵ The Chinese Embassy, like its Japanese counterpart in Taipei, stood as a new, firm, and tangible manifestation of the relationship between the ROC and Japan until 1972, when it was replaced by the PRC’s Embassy.

HO SHAILAI’S DEPARTURE

In Tokyo, Ho spent his final days in office observing international developments. He expressed no willingness to compete for the Chinese Ambassadorship to Japan because, having been involved in the Sino-Japanese Treaty negotiations over the previous months, he felt the burden on the new ambassador would be colossal. When asked by other diplomats about whether he was going to become the Chinese Ambassador, as many countries had appointed the head of their Missions to the post,

⁹²¹ “Yijiao Qingce (移交清冊) [Transfer List],” September 4, 1952, IMH Archives, 11-01-02-08-02-012.

⁹²² Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan Xiansheng Riji*, Vol. 24, 305.

⁹²³ Lin Xiantang, *Guanyuan Xiansheng Riji*, Vol. 24, 309.

⁹²⁴ “E.H. Jacobs-Larkcom to C.H. Johnston,” October 15, 1952, UK National Archives, FO 371/99264.

⁹²⁵ “Nationalist Diplomat Arrives for Japan Post,” September 25, 1952, *The Los Angeles Times*.

Ho replied that he was only a “caretaker.”⁹²⁶ Even though the Japanese Diet ratified the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty on June 7, a matter that Ho cabled Wang Shijie about on the same day, the appointment of the ambassador continued to drag on for two more months.⁹²⁷ In his diaries, Ho frequently expressed dissatisfaction about the delay.

Despite not participating in the competition to become postwar ambassador, Ho nevertheless worked earnestly to conclude his duties in Japan. On Labour Day, May 1st, 1952, a few days after the Peace Treaty came into force and Japan regained her independence from the occupation administration, the Japanese Communist Party took part in demonstrations which turned violent in the plaza in front of the Imperial Palace, burning a number of cars apparently belonging to Americans. This proved to be a grievous tactical error, for the essentially conservative Japanese were both shocked and alarmed at this behavior and public opinion turned against the communists.⁹²⁸ Upon hearing the news of the unfolding violence, Ho brought his staff to visit the scene and they witnessed police beating up the rioters. “We met Denmark’s charge d’affaires,” recounted Ho in his diaries, “who was so shocked that he could not speak.” Ho also concluded that this incident, occurring just “four days after the San Francisco Peace Treaty” was signed, would give the Americans a sense of the xenophobia mentality of the Japanese since they were not “fully democratized.”⁹²⁹

Writing in the 1970s, Marius Jansen stated that, “After 1952 Japan’s diplomatic and economic ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan emphasized its separation from the People’s Republic in Peking.”⁹³⁰ Even so, the Japanese government had no intention of abandoning the opportunity presented by doing business with mainland China. On June 1, 1952, a Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement was signed in Beijing, in which both sides agreed to export cargo worth some 30 million British pounds by the

⁹²⁶ DHSL, May 1, 1952.

⁹²⁷ “Ho Shailai to Wang Shijie,” June 7, 1952, Guoshiguan, 002-090105-00012-294.

⁹²⁸ Esler Dening, *Japan*, 114.

⁹²⁹ DHSL, May 1, 1952.

⁹³⁰ Marius B. Jansen, *Japan and China: from War to Peace, 1894-1972* (Chicago: Rand McNally College Pub. Co., 1975), 448.

end of 1952.⁹³¹ This agreement was regarded as the first breakthrough in PRC-Japan relations after the Sino-Japanese Treaty had been concluded and is frequently mentioned in scholarship on PRC-Japan relations.⁹³² On the following day, Ho convened a meeting to evaluate its reception among the Japanese public. A staff of the Chinese Mission was of the opinion that “a portion of small-scale merchants might dream of this agreement, while large entrepreneurs regard it as unfeasible, and the Japanese government, especially, believe there is no hope for this plan.”⁹³³ As the Chinese Mission had anticipated, this trade agreement was a failure, but it did, nevertheless, sow the seeds for opening semi-official economic cooperation between Japan and the PRC in the period which followed.

In the meantime, Ho was frequently invited to attend banquets organized by newly-appointed ambassadors to Japan from other countries, as well as farewell party organized by those who, like Ho, were going to leave. For instance, on May 2, Ho attended the banquet held by US Ambassador Robert D. Murphy.⁹³⁴ On May 5, Ho met General Ridgway, who was about to depart for Europe to succeed General Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to discuss Taiwan’s problems. According to Ho’s diaries, it was the first time that the General exchanged views on Taiwan with him.⁹³⁵ Five days later, Chiang Kai-shek recorded in his diaries that General Ridgway asked Ho “are there any alternative leaders who could lead China and are there any outstanding generals adept at coordinating field operations?” Believing that Ridgway had inherited Marshall’s prejudice on him, Chiang reminded himself that he should be aware of the “Marshall’s clique” within the US Army that was seeking an opportunity to overthrow him.⁹³⁶ A while later, on June 9, Ho attended the farewell party organized by Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander for US

⁹³¹ Lin Daizhao, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxishi*, 55; Lin Yunhui (林蘊暉), *Zhongguo Ershishiji Quanshi* (中國二十世紀全史) [The Complete History of 20th Century China] (Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, 2001), Vol. 7, 555; Mayumi Itoh, *The Making of China’s Peace with Japan*, 16-17.

⁹³² Qing Simei, *From Allies to Enemies*, 276.

⁹³³ DHSL, June 7, 1952.

⁹³⁴ DHSL, May 2, 1952.

⁹³⁵ DHSL, May 5, 1952.

⁹³⁶ Lü Fangshang ed., *Jiang Zhongzheng Xiansheng Nianpu Changbian* (蔣中正先生年譜長編) [A Chronicle of Chiang Kai-shek] (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 2015), Vol. 10, 55.

Naval Forces Far East. A report in the *Nippon Times* covered the event:

A large group of friends mostly from army, navy and diplomatic circles were at the pier to see them off. Among these were Air Marshal Bouchier, Vice-Adm. Robert P. Briscoe, Lt. Gen. Weyland, Lt. Gen. Bridgeford, Lt. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey, heads of most of the United Nations Liaison Groups, heads of most of the Diplomatic Missions including U.S. Ambassador Robert Murphy, Head of the Chinese Mission, Lt. Gen. Ho Shail-lai, Danish Minister Lars Tillistse, Apostolic Delegate, Archbishop Maximilian de Furtenburg and Swiss Representative Charles Weibel.⁹³⁷

After returning from the party, Ho complained in his diary that Admiral Joy and his wife failed to shake hands with their guests, offending many and leaving them unhappy to the extent that some commented that “next time we will not attend farewell parties organized by the Americans.”⁹³⁸ On July 25, French Ambassador told Ho that most foreign envoys were affable to him and hoped the ROC could “retake the mainland as soon as possible.” On July 26, Ho attended a “sayonara” cocktail party organized by Philippine Ambassador Jose P. Melencio at the Philippine Embassy.⁹³⁹ On July 29, Ho took the plane back to Taipei, and his two-year service in Japan came into an end.

FROM VICTORY TO DEFEAT

The Chinese Mission in Japan’s changing status symbolized the ROC’s wider decline during the postwar era. At the beginning of the postwar years, China was deemed one of the big four powers. Several years later, the ROC bore little resemblance to any of the other three powers with which it had shared the wartime stage. The political collapse of Nationalist China as the civil war was lost led to foreign countries’ losing respect for Chiang and the ROC – a phenomenon embodied by the disregard Esler Denning demonstrated for Ho Shailai with which this

⁹³⁷ “Adm. Joy Heads for U.S.,” June 10, 1952, *Nippon Times*.

⁹³⁸ DHSL, June 9, 1952.

⁹³⁹ “Society,” August 3, 1952, *Nippon Times*.

dissertation began.

Following that introduction, the main focus of this dissertation has been the Chinese Mission in Japan from 1946 to 1952. These were years of struggle, of shattered hopes, of collapse, and, finally, disillusion and dismay. This period began with the ROC regarded as one of the Big Four Powers poised to share responsibility in enacting postwar policy in a defeated Japan, and ended with the signing of a peace treaty between Taipei and Tokyo and the ROC's territory confined to Taiwan along with a number of other smaller islands of the southeastern coast of China) and with little in the way of substance supporting its claim to be the legitimate government of the Chinese polity. Very few people in 1945 would have foreseen such a rapid dissolution of Chiang's Nationalist regime. The changing role of the Chinese Mission in Japan was, in many ways, an encapsulation of this process.

Apart from delving into its relatively limited roles in the Allied Occupation of Japan, in this dissertation I have illustrated how the Chinese Mission fitted the ROC's demands as events and sometimes crises developed. The history of the Chinese Mission constitutes an important part of the prism through which China sees its postwar history. At the inceptive stage of the postwar period, when the ROC had just reached its apex on the international stage, the Chinese Mission envisaged a grandiose blueprint for postwar Sino-Japanese relations. That blueprint included: dispatching an occupational force to Japan, trying Japanese war criminals, and obtaining appropriate reparations from Japan. However, things did not develop well as the Chinese Mission and its backers had optimistically anticipated.

The outbreak of the Chinese Civil War had a significant impact on the tasks of the Chinese Mission. For the Chinese, the plan to dispatch a military force to occupy Japan was suddenly no longer practical, and Zhu Shiming, the first head of the Chinese Mission, began to seek out MacArthur and try to convince him to provide assistance to the KMT. From the Nationalist's perspective, by the end of 1949, only the repatriation of Japanese left in China after the war and the Tokyo Trial were proceeding anything like satisfactorily, but neither contributed to aiding their decline as the CCP grew exponentially in strength. With the reparation and restitution

programs ending in general disappointment for Chiang and the Chinese people, the KMT continued to “lose face” – just as they were lost far more damagingly to the Red Army on the battlefield.

As Chiang’s regime crumbled in 1949, the Chinese Mission assumed short-term importance as a base of operation for the KMT in Tokyo. After the CCP set up its new regime on October 1, 1949, the KMT’s quest to secure the support of MacArthur became its number one priority. Although now based on the island of Taiwan, Chiang’s Nationalist government still wished to be recognized by the world as the one and only legitimate Chinese government. At the same time, the KMT leadership needed to settle the lingering dispute over the island’s status, a problem which had been brewing since the surrender of the Japanese in 1945. Ultimately, the survival of the Nationalist Chinese was premised on solving these two key issues. Only if Chiang could first settle the Taiwan problem, could he then at least make a claim to legitimately represent the Chinese people. The dispute over Taiwan’s fate ceased temporarily after President Truman made his famous speech in regard to the status of Taiwan in January 1950. Although the Chinese Mission in Japan did not play a determining role in pressurizing Washington to support the KMT’s claim to Taiwan, it did, as previous chapters have suggested, exert influence on MacArthur to help secure American support for Chiang Kai-shek – support which eventually led to his estrangement from Truman after the outbreak of the Korean War.

Ho Shailai’s years as head of the Chinese Mission in Japan saw the body take an entirely different strategy and attitude towards relations with SCAP from those of Ho’s predecessors. Zhu Shiming and Shang Zhen had long grumbled about the authoritarian character of SCAP, and both men held opinions about the American-led occupation shared by representatives from the other allies. MacMahon Ball, for instance, wrote about one occasion when during a lunch appointment, the Soviet representative Derevyanko “took me aside and said ‘We must, of course, believe SCAP that Japan is now fully democratic but there is not yet any democracy in the

Allied Council.”⁹⁴⁰ Ho, though, never complained about this aspect of the occupation in his diaries or in his telegraph messages to Taipei. As a sharp-witted and dyed-in-the-wool Chinese diplomat and patriot, Ho regarded obtaining benefits for his country as his prime objective. He knew what he was supposed to say and when to say it – something he demonstrated when he stepped in to support the US representative in the debate on the repatriation issue with the Soviet member. Ho’s efforts contributed much to at least arresting somewhat the irreversible decline of the Chiang regime, and especially during the Korean War and the negotiation of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty.

To a great extent, Ho Shailai’s service in Tokyo represented the essence of the American-led Occupation of Japan. Ho spoke fluent English but had no knowledge of Japanese, nor did he ever try to learn it. Because of this, Ho had faced scepticism from both within the Chinese Mission and Taipei about whether he was capable of leading the Chinese Mission in Japan. Some Japanese politicians revealed their dissatisfaction towards Ho to their Chinese friends on the grounds that “Ho only knows how to yield to the Americans and reports everything to them.” As a result, some Japanese not only afraid of having deep conversations with him, but not dare to approach him.⁹⁴¹ After his visit to Japan in 1951, He Yingqin also revealed that some Japanese frequently asked him why did the Chinese government dispatch a “foreigner” to Tokyo to represent China.⁹⁴² Many people believed that only a Japan specialist could conduct the operations of the Chinese Mission, while failing to understand that English fluency and cultivating a positive relationship with SCAP was the key if China was to see any benefit from the relationship. It was perhaps his acknowledgement of this fact that led Chiang Kai-shek to insist on dispatching Ho to Tokyo and having him stay there until the conclusion of the peace treaty. Ironically, despite his loyalty to China being frequently questioned due to his Hong Kong

⁹⁴⁰ W. MacMahon Ball, *Intermittent Diplomat*, 64.

⁹⁴¹ “yu Lifa Weiyuan Wang Xinheng Tanhua Jianyao Jilu (與立法委員王新衡談話簡要紀錄) [Record of a Conversation with Legislator Wang Xinheng],” June 27, 1951, IMH Archives, 11-01-02-02-01-070.

⁹⁴² “yu He Jiangjun Jingzhi Tanhua Jianlue Jilu,” July 4, 1951, IMH Archives, 11-01-02-02-01-070.

background and foreign appearance, Ho was the only one of the three heads of the Chinese Mission to remain loyal to the ROC during his lifetime. Zhu Shiming never returned to Taipei despite being urged by the government there to do so; he died in 1965 in Tokyo.⁹⁴³ Shang Zhen also stayed in Japan after his retirement in 1948 and refused to go to Taiwan. In 1974, he paid a visit to Beijing to express his views about the cooperation between the KMT and CCP as well as the unification of China, which deeply embarrassed Taipei authorities.⁹⁴⁴ After death his ashes were placed in the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery (*Babaoshan Geming Gongmu* 八寶山革命公墓) in Beijing. The decisions of Zhu and Shang were not unique among the staff of the Chinese Mission and the overseas Chinese in Japan, many of whom shifted sides to the PRC as the international situation became less favorable to the ROC in the decades after 1952.

CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE

The legacy of the 1952 Sino-Japanese Treaty continues to resonate. This treaty forbade formal diplomatic relations between the PRC and Japan until 1972, before which the PRC could only vie for commercial relations with the Japanese while facing strong opposition from the ROC. The PRC labels its formalization of a new diplomatic alliance with Japan in 1972 as the “normalization of Sino-Japanese relations,” a definition implying that the “Sino-Japanese” relations led by the ROC between 1949 and 1972 were illegitimate. Anyone who is familiar with CCP historiography and ideology will not, of course, be surprised by this interpretation. According to its own historical narrative, from October 1, 1949 onwards, the only legitimate representative of a Chinese nation-state was the PRC. From that moment onward, all diplomatic ties with the ROC were deemed illegitimate by Beijing. The CCP refutes the interpretation of “Two Chinas” co-existing for a period during which

⁹⁴³ Huang Renyu, *Huang Renyu de Dalishi Guan*, 270.

⁹⁴⁴ Lin Xiaoting, *Jiang Jingguo de Taiwan Shidai: Zhonghuaminguo yu Lengzhan xia de Taiwan* (蔣經國的台灣時代：中華民國與冷戰下的台灣) [The Chiang Ching-kuo Era: The Republic of China on Taiwan in the Cold War] (Taipei: Yuanzu Wenhua, 2021), 430.

the CCP gradually achieved dominance as recognition was earned from other states. This uncompromising interpretation of history has led the CCP to unilaterally rename the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1952 the “Japanese-Taiwan Treaty,” a term which has never appeared anywhere outside of CCP historiography. Despite the PRC’s “normalization” of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972 and the growth of economic cooperation and cultural exchange, mutual misunderstanding remains a constant of the relationship, with issues such as history textbooks, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese politicians, and clashes over island territories claimed by both countries frequently reigniting hostility between them.

Taiwan, still formally using the appellation ‘Republic of China’, retained a semi-official relationship with Japan after 1972 by way of an envoy known as the *Zhuri Daibiao* (駐日代表), “ROC’s representative to Japan”. Taiwanese national identity then began to develop and become more prominent as the consequence of a series of democratic movements occurring in the 1980s. As that decade wore on, most Taiwanese and mainland Chinese no longer shared common memories of a shared past with regard to episodes like the Nanjing Massacre or the Manchurian Incident. While in recent years, there has been a resurgence of scholarly interest in the 1952 Peace Treaty in Taiwan because it theoretically supports claims of Taiwan’s national identity and independence from the mainland. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has interpreted this treaty in a way which supports Taiwanese identity with the claim that Taiwan’s status after 1945 was unsettled (*Taiwan Diwei Weidinglun* 台灣地位未定論), and that therefore the ROC’s seizure of control of the island had no legal basis. With the political success of the DPP, this viewpoint began to gain ground. In their view, the ROC regime merely occupied Taiwan instead of possessing sovereignty over the island. The KMT, on the other hand, believes that Taiwan’s return to the embrace of the motherland under the ROC is something that will occur *fait accompli*, so any efforts made by the DPP in support of Taiwanese independence are absurd. However, this once-compelling idea began to lose support. In recent years,

disputes over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands (*Diaoyutai* 釣魚台), claimed by Japan, Taiwan, and the PRC, have surfaced. Accusing the DPP of tolerating Japanese activity in the areas around the Diaoyutai, the KMT goes so far as to chastise Taiwan's representative to Japan, appointed by the DPP, as representing the interests of Japan (*Zhuri Daibiao* 助日代表) over those of the ROC. This case vividly illustrates how the legacy of the Sino-Japanese relations continues to remain a contested issue in contemporary Taiwanese politics. At a press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office in Beijing on May 12, 2021, when asked about its attitude toward the claim that Taiwan's status remained unsettled, the spokesman answered that the San Francisco Peace Treaty was "a piece of illegal and futile historical waste paper."⁹⁴⁵ In turn, the DPP utilized Beijing's reaction to embarrass, even mock, the KMT's viewpoint that Taiwan had been a part of the ROC since 1945. The DPP further undermined support for the KMT's position regarding the 1992 Concensus (*Jiu'er Gongshi* 九二共識)—a political term which has been favored by the CCP. The Concensus stipulates that Taiwan is a part of China and that its name is either the PRC or the ROC; however, the CCP has denied the KMT's legitimacy since 1949. Although the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty enable the KMT to support its political viewpoint, some of which are in essence favorable to the CCP, the CCP has had no intention to revise its standpoint. In its eyes, official CCP ideology can never be challenged.

It is indeed not at all farfetched to say that some of today's most controversial issues in East Asia, such as Diaoyutai and the fate of Taiwan, are rooted in or shaped by the events of the initial postwar period between 1945 and 1952. As this dissertation demonstrates, nearly all these issues had, at one time or another, involved the ROC's Chinese Mission in Japan. For instance, the Chinese Mission raised the problem of Japanese textbooks in an ACJ meeting, contained the movement of Taiwanese

⁹⁴⁵ "Guotaiban: Minjindang Dangju Chaozuo Feifa Wuxiao de Jiu jinshan Heyue Zhongjiu shi Tulao (國台辦：民進黨當局炒作非法無效的「舊金山和約」終究是徒勞)," May 12, 2021, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwtd/xwfb/wyly/202105/t20210512_12351717.htm.

Independence in Japan, defended its seat in the ACJ from being challenged by the PRC, and vied for the hearts and minds of overseas Chinese in Japan with the same opponent. The recent death of Chen Kunwang (陳焜旺), a prominent overseas Chinese figure in Japan, once again brings up this memory. Chen was born in Taiwan in 1923 and resided in Japan after graduation, where he became deeply involved in the affairs of overseas Chinese associations. After 1949, he joined the PRC side. In its official eulogy for Chen, the PRC praised him for “protecting the dignity of his motherland, striving for the rights of overseas Chinese, prompting the establishment of overseas Chinese associations, promoting the peaceful unification of China, and increasing the friendship among Chinese and Japanese nationals.”⁹⁴⁶ In sharp contrast to Taiwan’s oblivion toward Chen’s passing, the way that mainland China propagandized Chen’s career and accomplishments reveals the CCP’s ideology of defining history.

In a nutshell, stories playing out in the years of Japan’s occupation in which the Chinese Mission in Japan was a participant were the prelude to important events happening in later decades. The history of the Chinese Mission in Japan serves as a unique lens through which to interpret the contemporary political order in East Asia.

⁹⁴⁶ “Lüri Zhuming Qiaoling Chen Kunwang Yiti Gaobie Yishi zai Qingdao Juxing (旅日著名僑領陳焜旺遺體告別儀式在青島舉行),” June 5, 2021, <http://www.chinanews.com/hr/2021/06-05/9492975.shtml>.

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