

**THE PLANNING,
INTELLIGENCE, EXECUTION
AND AFTERMATH OF THE
DIEPPE RAID, 19 AUGUST 1942**

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On 19 August 1942 a mixed Anglo-Canadian amphibious force raided the German occupied port of Dieppe in Normandy, France, resulting in probably the worst disaster in Canadian military history. The operation, code-named *Jubilee*, lasted just nine hours and resulted in more casualties, proportionate to the forces involved, than in any other Western Allied operation of the war. As with any military failure, immediate myths and misconceptions arose that have simmered to boiling point many times during the last fifty years.

The dissertation aims to clarify the historical debate, and if possible expunge, or at least challenge, these myths. It is divided into chapters dealing with the operation's historiography, strategic and decision-making context, operational planning, intelligence aspects, execution phases, and aftermath. The conventional wisdoms concerning *Jubilee* are analysed and explored. These include the decision-making behind *Jubilee's* conception, planning, mounting, cancellation and remounting; the role and significance of radar, deception and Ultra (signal intelligence); the background, composition and role of special operational units, such as the Commandos and Special Operations Executive; the claims concerning German foreknowledge of *Jubilee* and the potential consequences of such knowledge; and the supposed lessons learned from *Jubilee* and their influence on future operations, such as the 1944 Normandy invasion.

The dissertation explores a broad collection of historical sources, primary and secondary, including written, oral and audio-visual accounts, from Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. Many of the post-war interviews, and some primary documents, have never been examined in any account of the operation, while some primary records from the Cabinet Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, were only recently released or are still officially closed. These sources shed new light on the controversial issues, such as decision-making, intelligence, and supposed lessons learned, within the historical debate surrounding the Dieppe raid.

**IN DEDICATION TO ALL THE SURVIVORS OF
OPERATION *JUBILEE* AND LATER CAPTIVITY**

O Canada, of your sons be proud
Who bravely fought and never bowed.
Against great odds, fought Freedom's cause,
For a living God and Freedom's laws,
Who strove that we may live in peace,
Took arms that wars may some day cease.
Remember them when war is done,
Remember them when peace has come,
See that they did not die in vain,
Work out the purpose of the slain.
See that their hopes are fulfilled
Lest uselessly their blood was spilled.
Remember that they paid a price
Of Freedom by their sacrifice.

Arthur S. Bourinot

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PREFACE

My interest in the Dieppe raid started while pursuing a Masters degree in military history and strategic studies at the University of Victoria, under the excellent guidance of my mentor, Dr Reg Roy, Emeritus Professor. This dissertation examined the history of The Calgary Tank Regiment during the Second World War and one chapter dealt with its actions at Dieppe. My research led me to interview many veterans, the highlight of my work, including most of the survivors of Dieppe and later captivity.

On coming up to Cambridge, my Supervisor was changed at the last minute and, consequently, I had the fortune to be given the honour of reading under Sir Harry Hinsley, Emeritus Professor. During the first five minutes of our first meeting he immediately ruled out my proposed dissertation topic. Instead, he suggested that since I had some background knowledge of the Dieppe raid and the fiftieth anniversary of the operation was approaching, I examine it.

Many myths and controversies resulted from this failed operation which have gone marching on through the decades. Thus, my aim is to resolve or at least reach a new interpretation concerning the planning, decision-making, intelligence, radar, deception and German foreknowledge aspects. The role of the special operational units are also explored.

During my first nine months I carried out preliminary research, mostly at the Public Record Office, London, and successfully completed the Diploma in Historical Studies. My interest in the subject grew when I took the opportunity to accompany Calgary Tank veterans and their families to the Fiftieth Anniversary Commemoration at Dieppe in August 1992. Here I met many veterans but, more importantly, made contact with the presidents of several of the veterans' organisations, including Ron Beal, Dieppe Veterans' and Prisoner of War Association, and Jimmy Dunning, the Commando Association. These men, and many other veterans who are too numerous to name here, were vital to the preparation of this dissertation.

What follows is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration. The published work of Professors Brian Villa, John Campbell, and Dr Peter Henshaw, concerning the decision-making, planning and intelligence aspects of this operation, were the most important leads in studying these topics. At various times during my research I was able to have fruitful discussions with them which deepened my knowledge of the subject.

Documentary sources researched include a broad collection of primary and secondary, including written, oral and audio-visual accounts, from Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. Many of the post-war interviews and some of the primary documents, have never

been examined in any account of the operation, while some of the latter were only recently released, are still officially closed or have been 'lost'.

Acknowledgements go first and foremost to my parents and family, whose constant support and encouragement was indispensable to completion of this dissertation. The unnamed archivists at the many repositories visited are specially thanked for their kind assistance. Also deserving are Brian Begbie, Louis Brown, Alain Buriot, Don Desharnais, Derek Howse, Emyr Jones F.A. Kingsley, Mary Mackie, Terence Macartney-Filgate, Vice-Admiral Sir Ian McGeoch, John Mellor, Jack Nissen, Andy Nyman, Jack Ryan, Ian Seymour, Tim Stewart, Bob Sharp and Mathias Völker.

Thanks goes to my international group of friends, Abdulla Baabood, Fernando Neves, Dr Ian Thomas, Dr Rashid Zaman, and Eddie Zengeni, who ensured that my time in Cambridge was enjoyable. A final thanks is given to the St John's College Bollinger Society and its guests who were a welcome distraction from the occasional monotony of research life.

ABBREVIATIONS

2ic — Second-in-command
14 CATR — 14 Canadian Army Tank Regiment (The Calgary Regiment)
AACO — Air Adviser Combined Operations
ABDC — Alain Buriot Dieppe Collection
Abwehr — German Military Counter-intelligence Service
ABC — American Broadcasting Corporation
ACO — Adviser Combined Operations
ADI(Sc) — Assistant Director Of Intelligence (Science), Air Ministry
ADM — Admiralty Record Group
ADTD — Assistant Director of Tank Design (Special Devices)
AIR — Air Ministry Record Group
ALO — Air Liaison Officer
ASSU — Air Support Signals Units
BBC — British Broadcasting Company
Bdes — Brigades
BGP — Rear-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman Papers
BGS — Brigadier, General Staff
BLHP — Sir Basil Liddell Hart Papers
Bn — Battalion
Brig. — Brigadier
Bty — Battery
C-in-C — Commander-in-Chief
CAB — Cabinet Office Record Group
CAC — Churchill College Archives Centre
Canmilitary — CMHQ [Address used in telegrams]
CB — Confidential Book
CBC — Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
Capt. — Captain
CCO — Chief of Combined Operations
CD — Coastal Defence [Battery]
Cdn — Canadian
CFCEM — Canadian Forces Communications and Electronics Museum
CGS — Chief of the General Staff
CIB — Canadian Infantry Brigade
CID — Canadian Infantry Division
CIGS — Chief of the Imperial General Staff
CIU — Central Interpretation Unit
CMHQ — Canadian Military Headquarters, London
CO — Commanding Officer
Col — Colonel

Comd — Command
COHQ — Combined Operations Headquarters
COHRS — Cabinet Office, Historical & Records Section
COS — British Chiefs of Staff Committee
Coy — Company
Cpl — Corporal
CP — Lt-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar Papers
CSIC — Cabinet Secret Information Centre
CSM — Company Sergeant-Major (Warrant Officer, Class II)
CSP — Col. Charles P. Stacey Papers
CWM — Canadian War Museum, Ottawa
DCCO — Deputy-Chief Combined Operations
DCGS — Deputy Chief of the General Staff
DCIGS — Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff
DCM — Distinguished Conduct Medal
DSC — Distinguished Service Cross
DSO — Distinguished Service Order
DDI — Deputy Director Intelligence
DEFE — Ministry of Defence Record Group
Defensor — NDHQ [Address used in telegrams]
DHist — Directorate of History, Ottawa
DNI — Director of Naval Intelligence
EJDC — E.W. Jones Dieppe Collection
FCO — Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FMR — Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal
ETO — European Theatre of Operations
FO — Foreign Office Record Group
FOO — Forward Observation Officer
FSS — Field Security Section
FSP — Field Security Personnel
FW — *Focke-Wulf*
GAF — German Air Force (*Luftwaffe*)
GCML — George C. Marshall Library
GEE/QH — Electronic position-finding device
Gen. — General
GHQ — General Headquarters
GOC — General Officer Commanding
GOC-in-C — General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
Gp-Capt — Group Captain
HE — high explosive
HF — High Frequency
HIP — General Lord Hastings Ismay Papers
HMS — His Majesty's Ship (Royal Navy)
HQ — Headquarters

Comd — Command
COHQ — Combined Operations Headquarters
COHRS — Cabinet Office, Historical & Records Section
COS — British Chiefs of Staff Committee
Coy — Company
Cpl — Corporal
CP — Lt-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar Papers
CSIC — Cabinet Secret Information Centre
CSM — Company Sergeant-Major (Warrant Officer, Class II)
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GEE/QH — Electronic position-finding device
Gen. — General
GHQ — General Headquarters
GOC — General Officer Commanding
GOC-in-C — General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
Gp-Capt — Group Captain
HE — high explosive
HF — High Frequency
HIP — General Lord Hastings Ismay Papers
HMS — His Majesty's Ship (Royal Navy)
HQ — Headquarters

IA — Inter-Allied
IR — Infantry Regiment
ISSB — Inter-Service Security Board
ISTDC — Inter-Service Training and Development Centre
IWM — Imperial War Museum, London
JHHP — Vice-Admiral John Hughes-Hallett Papers
JIC — Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (of COS)
JMP — John Mellor Papers
KCL — King's College London
KIA — Killed in Action
KOCR — King's Own Calgary Regiment
LCA — Landing Craft Assault
LCF(L) — Landing Craft Flak (Large)
LCM — Landing Craft Mechanised
LCP(L) — Landing Craft Personnel (Large)
LCT — Landing Craft Tank
LCS — London Controlling Station
LCS(M) — Landing Craft Support (Medium)
LHCMA — Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives
LMG — light machine-gun
LO — Liaison Officers
LSI — Landing Ship Infantry
Lt — Lieutenant
LTP — Brig.-Gen. Lucien K. Truscott Papers
MACO — Military Adviser Combined Operations
MBP — Lord Louis Mountbatten Papers
Maj. — Major
MC — Military Cross
MEW — Ministry of Economic Warfare
MG — Miscellaneous Group
MG — machine-gun
MGB — Motor Gun Boat
ML — Motor Launch
MM — Military Medal
MMDC — Mary Mackie Dieppe Collection
MP — Lt-Gen. Andrew G.L. McNaughton Papers
NAC — National Archives of Canada, Ottawa
NAM — National Army Museum
NCO — non-commissioned Officer
NDHQ — Department of National Defence HQ, Ottawa
NID — Naval Intelligence Division
NMM — National Maritime Museum
NO — Naval Officer
NRC — National Research Council

OC — Officer Commanding
OIC — Operational Intelligence Centre (Admiralty)
OKH — Oberkommando der Heeres (Army High Command)
OKW — Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces High Command)
OP — Observation Post
OR — Other Rank
PBM — Principal Beach Master
PISM — Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum
PI — Platoon
PM — Prime Minister
PMLO — Principal Military Landing Officer
PoW — Prisoner of War
PREM — Prime Minister (Churchill) Record Group
PR — Photographic Reconnaissance
PRO — Public Record Office, Kew, London
Pte — Private
PYP — Brig.-Gen. Peter Young Papers
PzD — *Panzer* Division [Armoured]
QOCHC — The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada
RAF — Royal Air Force
RCA — Royal Canadian Artillery
RCAF — Royal Canadian Air Force
RCAMC — Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps
RCASC — Royal Canadian Army Service Corps
RCCS — Royal Canadian Corps of Signals
RCE — Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers
RCNVR — Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve
RCOC — Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps
RDF — Radio Direction Finding (Radar)
RG — Record Group
RHLI — The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry
RHP — Major Robert Henriques Papers
RM — Royal Marines
RN — Royal Navy
RRC — The Royal Regiment of Canada
RRCM — The Royal Regiment of Canada Museum
SBG — Steam Gun Boat
Sgt — Sergeant
SIGINT — Signals intelligence
SIO — Senior Intelligence Officer
SLO — Smoke Liaison Officer
SO — Senior Officer
SOE — Special Operations Executive
Spr — Sapper

Sqn — Squadron
SRP — Stephen Roskill Papers
SS — *Schutz-Staffel* ('Protective Unit' — Nazi party organizations, including elite military formations)
SSB — Special Service Brigade
SSM — Squadron Sergeant-Major
SSR — The South Saskatchewan Regiment
SUL — Southampton University Library, Archives and Manuscripts
TMFDC — Terence Macartney-Filgate Dieppe Collection
Tp — Troop
Tpr — Trooper
TSM — Troop Sergeant-Major
UCSC — University of Calgary Special Collections
URA — University of Reading Archives
USACO — US Adviser Combined Operations
USNA — United States National Archives
UJ — *U-Jäger* [converted deep-sea trawler]
USACO — US Adviser Combined Operations
USNA — US National Archives, Washington, DC
UTA — University of Toronto Archives
VC — Victoria Cross
VCCO — Vice-Chief Combined Operations
VCGS — Vice-Chief of the General Staff
VMP — Vincent Massey Papers
WO — War Office Record Group
W/T — Wireless Telegraphy
XX — Twenty Committee [counter-espionage agency]

1

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

On 19 August 1942 a mixed Anglo-Canadian amphibious force raided the German occupied port of Dieppe in Normandy, France, resulting in probably the worst disaster in Canadian military history. Here in just nine hours the Canadians sustained more casualties than in the whole north-west European campaign of 1944-5. Immediately after the extent of the failure became obvious, the major players involved all attempted to shift responsibility and blame away from themselves and on to other individuals and organizations. Questions arose as to not only why the operation had failed so completely but why it had been attempted in the first place. Over fifty years of historical debate has not resulted in any clear consensus on these and other aspects of the operation's decision-making, detailed planning, training, execution, intelligence, supposed lessons learned, and ultimate responsibility. On the contrary, more common has been myth-making and heated controversy.

This is reflected in the muddled historiography of the operation, code-named *Jubilee*, which can be traced through more than three dozen monographs, several Second World War official histories, the applicable regimental histories and numerous memoirs, scholarly journals, popular magazines, newspapers, novels and poems. Evidence of confusion is not only in the written word but also in several dozen Canadian, British, French and American produced television documentaries, docu-dramas and even stage plays. The aim of this dissertation, using this myriad of material, is first to outline the operation's historiography and later examine it within the

context of the current state of debate surrounding the various controversies, myths and misconceptions. An attempt will be made to resolve or at least reach a consensus on the outstanding issues, taking into account all the relevant secondary records, primary sources and aforementioned material.

In 1942 the newly formed Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) was responsible for mounting raiding operations and therefore directly responsible for the planning and execution of the Dieppe raid (code-named Operation *Jubilee*). The Chief of Combined Operations (CCO), Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, merely a captain of destroyers less than two years previously, owed his meteoric promotion to his ambition and connections in high places. Not only was he a close friend and like a son to Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill, but also cousin to King George V. Thus on receiving the first reports of *Jubilee's* failure, Mountbatten was anxious to portray the operation in the best light possible. If the true extent of failure had become obvious at the time, his organization and his position as CCO probably would have received so much criticism from the other three Services that COHQ and the position of CCO would very likely have been abolished.

Therefore Mountbatten instigated immediate damage control in the form of propaganda to protect his organization from criticism from the other Services and public opinion. The press and radio were inundated with headlines and stories claiming a great victory. These carried the themes of heroic deeds, success against overwhelming odds and, most important, that the huge casualties sustained were not in vain but justified by the 'lessons learned'. These 'lessons', the argument went, would be vitally important in planning future amphibious operations leading up to the eventual Allied

invasion of Adolf Hitler's *Festung Europa*. The triumphant invasion of Normandy in 1944 reinforced what soon became regarded as fact, namely that the valuable lessons learned on the Dieppe raid did not just contribute, but were indeed essential, to the success of D-Day. Mountbatten continued to consistently claim this long after the end of the war, to the point that many historians and veterans came to regard it as fact. This is reflected throughout the historiography.¹

This positive official line was reinforced by politicians for their own reasons. During 1942 the Allies experienced one military reversal after another so that the British and Canadian governments, worried about sinking home-front morale, needed some kind of victory, or at least to show that they were doing something against the evils of Fascism. Therefore, to maintain adequate morale, vital to the greater goal of a continued war effort, both governments hid from public opinion the true extent of the operation's failure and fully supported Mountbatten's portrayal of the raid as a success. On 8 September 1942 Churchill, in a House of Commons speech, referred to the operation as a 'most gallant affair' and 'indispensable preliminary to full-scale operations'.²

¹ See Lord Louis Mountbatten's: 'The Dieppe raid', Transcript of filmed interview, 12 July 1962, 1-5, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation programme *Close Up*, broadcast 9 September 1962, Imperial War Museum (IWM), Haydon Papers II; 'The Dieppe raid', *The Naval Review* 51/1 (January 1963), 35-40; 'Commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the Dieppe raid on 19 August 1942: speech by Admiral of the Fleet The Earl Mountbatten of Burma; at that time Chief of Combined Operations', 19 August 1967, 1-11; 'Dieppe: the inside story', *Legion Magazine* (November 1973), 10-45; and 'Operation Jubilee: the place of the Dieppe raid in history', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 119/1 (March 1974), 25-30.

² Winston S. Churchill, 'Supply: Committee - War Situation, 8 September 1942', in *House of Commons Debates (UK)*, Vol.383 (London: King's Printer, 1942), p.84; see also Winston S. Churchill, 'Oral answers: Dieppe operations, 30 September 1942', in *House of Commons Debates (UK)*, Vol.383 (London: King's Printer, 1942), pp.768-69.

The Canadian government was quick to realize the need for some kind of public explanation of the operation, particularly in relation to the high casualty figures. Therefore, on 27 August 1942, the Commander-in-Chief, First Canadian Army Overseas, Lieutenant-General Andrew G.L. McNaughton, received the following cable:

There is a feeling that the public ought to have some sort of authoritative statement in the form of a white paper or similar document prepared by Canadian Army or CMHQ [Canadian Military Headquarters, London] in which the participation of the Canadians at Dieppe is dealt with in a factual way as a military operation from the time they left England until they returned with some indication of the preparation necessary.³

The Historical Officer at Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ), London, Maj. Charles P. Stacey, who after the war became the official historian of the Canadian Army, was assigned to the task of drafting the paper. After approval of the initial draft by the relevant Canadian authorities it was passed on to COHQ, which requested certain sections be cut. Mountbatten's insistence on revision of this white paper is a prime example of the effect and influence he had, during the war and after, on the recording of events and later historical writing. Therefore it is instructive to recount this case in detail.

During the operation the Germans had captured the military operation order, over which, in Stacey's words, Mountbatten had 'shown some disgust... and had ruled that nothing was to be published that would in any way tend to admit the loss'. At the same time, Mountbatten reportedly remarked something to the effect, 'even Boy Scouts knew better than that'. (This ignores the fact that the order itself, approved by CCO, authorized each brigade headquarters to carry two copies ashore.)⁴

³ Charles P. Stacey, 'Aftermath of a dress rehearsal', in *A date with history: memoirs of a Canadian historian* (Ottawa: Denau, 1983).

⁴ Stacey, *Date with history*, pp.91-2.

The task of revising the draft at COHQ was given to an American, Major Jock Lawrence, who a few months earlier had worked for Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer in Hollywood, California. His draft was unacceptable for issuance by the Canadian Government and Stacey was again ordered to re-draft it, to which Mountbatten, Stacey says, 'To end a long story briefly... finally gave his blessing'.⁵

The cuts insisted on by Mountbatten resulted in an extremely watered down version of events and it is worth noting that the following information was excised: the operation's local objectives; details about the decision to withdraw; a reference that many of the planned objectives were not attained; comments on pre-raid training; and the names of all British commanders (although the Canadian unit commanders names were permitted to remain). Stacey concludes this section with a comments on the command arrangement, which deserve quoting in full, as it later became a point of historical controversy:

I had written, 'The whole operation was under the general supervision, and the plans were subject to the approval, of Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten GCVO, DSO, Chief of Combined Operations. Canadian plans were concerted with the latter by Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, DSO, General Officer Commanding a Canadian Corps'. As published, this became, 'Canadian plans were concerted with the Chief of Combined Operations (Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten GCVO, DSO), by Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, DSO, General Officer Commanding a Canadian Corps'. The Canadian reader was thus denied any real understanding of the important part played by Lord Louis and his headquarters in the affair.⁶

⁵ Commenting on Major Lawrence, Stacey writes: 'In retrospect, it seems perhaps not altogether unsuitable that a man who had done publicity for Sam Goldwyn should now be doing publicity for Dickie Mountbatten'. Stacey continued that, 'Putting an American on the job was, to say the least, extraordinarily tactless. At the time I suspected it of being a calculated insult. Now, I am inclined to think it was just an exceptional piece of stupidity'. Stacey's notes at the time state that, 'He had cut out many facts and substituted adjectives; his draft... was in terms which could not be issued by the Cdn Govt', Stacey, *Date with history*, p.92, the previous passages are taken verbatim from Stacey's Diary, 'Notebook No.17, 3 August-13 September 1942', 5 September 1942, p.70, University of Toronto Archives (UTA), Charles Stacey Papers (CSP) Box/015.

⁶ Stacey, *Date with history*, p.93.

Stacey concludes that the white paper was prepared 'prematurely and hurriedly, to meet an immediate official need,' and that it was seriously lacking as a piece of history. Besides the dampening effect of the COHQ cuts and censorship office, it contained a glaring factual error that a radar facility had been captured, which was not the case.⁷ The paper was sent by bomber to Ottawa and was the basis for a public statement made on 18 September.

On 13 May 1943 to the Canadian House of Commons, the Canadian Minister of National Defence, the Honourable James L. Ralston, spoke at length about the 'splendid assistance' given by the Royal Navy, the 'magnificent' air cover provided by the combined allied air forces, and praised the determination of the ground units who 'evinced the keenest desire' to attain their objectives 'at whatever cost'. He concluded that the heavy casualties suffered by the units engaged were to be expected in amphibious operations of this kind and that 'the lessons learned and advantages gained... will be of great value to them in future operations'.⁸ The media obligingly followed suit, or at least this is the popular belief. British, Canadian and American war correspondents were permitted to accompany commando raids and about a twenty-five went on *Jubilee*. One of them noted, 'it was the best publicised military event of modern times... of all times'.⁹ After the operation they were 'briefed' by the COHQ press section

⁷ Stacey, *Date with history*, pp.93-4; Stacey, with the aid of Capt Cotterell, of the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA), War Office, also wrote an article for internal distribution to armed forces personnel only. Although more detailed than the White Paper, it still had many of its restrictions, Army Bureau of Current Affairs, War Office, 'Dieppe summary', *War* 28 (3 October 1942), 1-12.

⁸ Hon. James L. Ralston, 'War Appropriation Bill – Army, 13 May 1943' in *House of Commons Debates* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1943), 2669-2672.

⁹ Brian L. Villa, *Unauthorized action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe raid* (2 revised edn., Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989, 1990, 1994), p.23.

so that their newspaper reports and photographs toed the official line. Given the extremely tight restrictions and limited access to information imposed by COHQ and the respective government ministries of propaganda and information, British and Canadian journalists reported as accurately as possible under these conditions. As they were allowed no knowledge of the planning and high-level decision-making, they took the only option of reporting on the individual fighting man as opposed to a whole regiment or unit. Their eyewitness accounts were objective, realistic and personal descriptions. Ross Munro, Canadian war correspondent for *The Canadian Press* and *Windsor Daily Star*, reported the day after the raid:

When the Canadian battalions stormed through the flashing inferno of nazi defences, belching guns of our huge tanks rolling into the fight, I spent the grimmest 20 minutes of my life with one unit when a rain of German machine-gun fire wounded half the men in our boat and only a miracle saved us from annihilation.¹⁰

Carrying the same theme, the Canadian London correspondent for the *Montreal Standard*, Wallace Reyburn, wrote the following graphic account, entitled 'Street fighting in Dieppe,' which was not only published in his newspaper, but also in *Life Magazine*:

The bayonet on the rifle of one Canadian was covered with blood. This private named Silver Stuart, a Moose Jaw lumberman, had happened to notice two German soldiers in the doorway of a house. Each held a stick grenade in [each] hand, their rifles propped against the doorway ready for use. In a flash, Stuart detached himself from his group and made a headlong dash at the Germans. With his bayonet he slashed both Jerries to ribbons. Leaving the bodies, he rejoined his group without saying a word and marched to battalion headquarters as if nothing had happened at all.¹¹

When the journalists strayed into moralizing on the larger questions of the operation, their reports inevitably became less accurate and more

¹⁰ Ross Munro, 'Scottish at Dieppe', *The Windsor Daily Star*, 20 August 1942; Ross was the first man to arrive back in Canada who had been on the raid and his stories were carried in all the national papers, for example see his full page, 'Calgary Tanks at Dieppe Carry Brunt of Attack', *The Calgary Herald*, 20 August 1942, p.10; and 'They never flinched a minute at Dieppe - tribute to Calgary Regiment (Tank)', *The Tank-Canada* 2/10 (October 1942), 7-8, excerpted from *The Calgary Herald*.

¹¹ Wallace Reyburn, 'Street fighting in Dieppe', *Life Magazine*, 23 August 1942.

'official', due to dependence on the official sources for information. To prepare public opinion for the huge casualty figures to be released later, official sources grossly exaggerated the German losses and claimed a victory. Two days after the raid, the most prestigious Canadian newspaper, *The Toronto Globe and Mail*, carried the front-page banner, '500 Fighters Sweep French Coast, Units of Four Ontario Regiments Ashore with Commandos'. Sub-headlines on the same front page proclaimed that, 'Allied Fliers Bagged 280 Nazi Planes in Dieppe Victory'.¹²

The American papers were even more sensationalistic, this being the first time American troops had fought against the Germans. Despite the combined efforts of the authorities in London, including the American Military Headquarters, to down-play US participation, the American media made the most of this unique opportunity. Individual Rangers were interviewed by Charles Collingwood, Edward Murrow and Quentin Reynolds on the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) Radio's Army Hour. Proud that American Rangers had fought alongside the famous British Commandos, the US papers carried such wild headlines as: 'France Invaded', 'Nazi Dieppe Loss Put at 4000 Men', 'US and Britain Invade France', 'US Troops Land with Commandos in the Biggest Raid!', and 'Tanks and US Troops Smash at the French Coast'.¹³

Some of these journalists quickly followed up with books on the operation whose title and content directly reflected the propaganda line that

¹² *The Toronto Globe and Mail*, 21 August 1942.

¹³ David W. Hogan, Jr, 'American commandos', in *Raiders or elite infantry: the changing role of the US Army Rangers from Dieppe to Granada* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1992), pp.20-21; 'France Invaded', *The Los Angeles Times*, 20 August 1942; and various articles in *The New York Times* 19, 20, 21, 25 August 1942; see also 'US Fight 6-Hr Battle', *The Honolulu Star Bulletin* 20 August 1942; and 'Truscott's Rangers', *Newsweek* 31 August 1942, 21-2.

the official organisations, such as COHQ and HQ First Canadian Army Overseas, and their senior personnel, such as Mountbatten, McNaughton and Crerar, wanted to portray—that the sacrifice was worth it for future victory. Alexander B. Austin, the celebrated British correspondent for the London *Daily Herald*, declared in *We landed at dawn: the story of the Dieppe raid* (1943), 'it was a testing and rehearsing of all our combined military, naval and Air Force staff work, a detailed working out of plans on which once completed, weeks could be saved another time'; Wallace Reyburn, in *Rehearsal for invasion: an eyewitness story of the Dieppe raid* (1943), published in the United Kingdom as *Glorious chapter: the Canadians at Dieppe*; commented after the successful North African landings in November 1942, 'As well as providing the much-needed experience of landing troops and heavy fighting vehicles on hostile shores, Dieppe's place in the broad pattern of our offensive strategy in western Europe can now be clearly seen'. Quentin Reynolds, correspondent for the American *Collier's Magazine*, and well-known in Mountbatten's Hollywood circle, came out with, *Dress rehearsal: the story of Dieppe* (1943), in which he announced, 'the Dieppe attack can only be classed as a definite and useful operation which accomplished almost everything that the military leaders hoped it would accomplish'. He later claimed that it 'taught the British, Canadian and American chiefs of staff many lessons'; and concluded that it, 'was never intended to be anything but a dress rehearsal'.¹⁴

¹⁴ Alexander B. Austin, *We landed at dawn: the story of the Dieppe raid* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943), p.51; Wallace Reyburn, *Rehearsal for invasion: an eyewitness story of the Dieppe raid* (London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd), 1943, p.12; Quentin Reynolds, *Dress rehearsal: the story of Dieppe* (Garden City, New York: Blue Ribbon Books, 1943), pp.264-7, 277.

Reynolds also claimed that it was McNaughton who had pushed for Canadian participation in Dieppe and implied that the Canadians were responsible for changing Mountbatten's original plan of a flanking attack to a frontal one. This was not the case. Stacey discusses this at length in his memoirs. Concerning the charge against McNaughton, Stacey points out that it was Crerar who had been pushing for Canadian participation in raids and that, 'Perhaps Reynolds' statement is a garbled version of this'. The story that the Canadians were responsible for the frontal assault has, he explains, 'gone marching on through the decades. Lord Mountbatten himself, who in his later years tended to talk about Dieppe "without book," helped to keep it going'. In his 1973 Toronto speech, later published in the *Journal of the Royal United Institute (RUSI)*, Mountbatten discussed the frontal attack saying, 'this was what the army and air force authorities — the Canadians in particular — insisted on'. Stacey and Mountbatten had an exchange of letters, concerning this and other points in the article, published in *RUSI*, in which the latter reluctantly agreed to retract the words 'the Canadians in particular'. These journalistic accounts were based on official briefings from COHQ and other organizations and thus would directly echo the themes put out for domestic propaganda reasons — normal in wartime and practised by all official organizations and individuals responsible to them. Although Mountbatten was not responsible personally for many of these stories, natural at the time, later he perpetuated them deliberately.¹⁵

¹⁵ Reynolds, *Dress rehearsal*, pp.261-3; Stacey, 'Aftermath of a dress rehearsal', *A date with history*, pp.94-7; Lord Louis Mountbatten, 'Operation *Jubilee*: the place of the Dieppe raid in history', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 119/1 (March 1974), 25-30; and Charles P. Stacey and Lord Louis Mountbatten, 'Correspondence: Dieppe', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 119/4 (December 1974), 97.

The confusion that reigned during the actual battle itself is reflected in the reports that were sent back by the Military Force Commander, Maj.-Gen. J.H. 'Ham' Roberts, to COHQ. Many of these contained inaccurate or completely false information. COHQ, in its effort to build up its public support base, quickly issued press releases based on these early reports, without first waiting or seeking verification. That some information in these reports was soon after officially denied by the authorities, including COHQ and Mountbatten, did not matter as, unfortunately, the damage had already taken effect. Many of these claims are still being propounded over fifty years later. The most persistent being that the Germans had been forewarned and were at the highest state of readiness at the time of attack.¹⁶

One of these initial reports from the Military Force Commander, sent by a pigeon at 1340 hours, soon after the surrender of the remaining troops ashore, stated:

Very heavy casualties in men and ships. Did everything possible to get men off but in order to get any home had to come to sad decision to abandon remainder. This was joint decision by Force Commanders. *Obviously operation completely lacked surprise* [author's emphasis].¹⁷

¹⁶ In 1963 claims of German forewarning and that the Dieppe garrison was at 'full alert' were given renewed validity in a series of articles in the *Evening Standard*, written by the well known British historian David Irving. Although the official British naval historian, Stephen Roskill, soundly refuted all his claims, the myth still lingers today; see Stephen W. Roskill, 'The Dieppe raid and the question of German foreknowledge: a study in historical responsibility', *Royal United Services Institute Journal* 109/633 (February 1964), 27-31. The complete documentation of the Irving-Roskill controversy is held in Cambridge, Churchill College Archives Centre (CAC), Stephen Roskill Papers (SRP), ROSK 5/51 'The Dieppe Raid' and ROSK 8/14 'The Dieppe Raid'. For recent claims that support the Irving thesis see: Charles Reid, 'Mountbatten not to blame for Dieppe disaster', *The Times-Colonist*, Tuesday 18 January 1994; and Mervyn F. Thurgood, 'Sacrifice at Dieppe', *Military Collectors Club of Canada* (Spring 1994): 14-17. For a discussion and detailed summary of the debate see John P. Campbell's, 'Dieppe and German foreknowledge', *Extension Bulletin* [a periodical of the Canadian Forces College Extension School] 36 (summer 1974), 35-41; and *Dieppe revisited: a documentary investigation* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp.13-20.

¹⁷ Maj.-Gen. John H. Roberts, 'Military Force Commander to 1 Canadian Corps', pigeon service, 1340 hours, 19 August 1942, in Douglas Stuebing, *Dieppe 1942*, Vol.C8, The Canadian Series of Jackdaws, ed. Douglas Stuebing (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co., 1967).

Obviously when Roberts wrote this report he was under tremendous pressure, given the high casualties, failure to attain the operations military objectives, and the fact that the operation was still in progress. Thus his general frame of mind at the time can probably be easily deduced. Not surprisingly, when the surviving soldiers and sailors reached England they claimed the same thing also. This situation led to a wildfire of rumours eventually resulting in the long-standing myth that surprise was not achieved and that the Germans were forewarned. Despite protestations by the senior people involved at the time, including Mountbatten, and clear documentary evidence, German and Allied, to the contrary, outlined repeatedly by official historians, many veterans and historians still cling to this belief today.¹⁸

The other commonly held belief is that a radar station was captured by British commandos and highly-secret, specialized components from it were seized. This tale was again inadvertently begun by COHQ itself through early, unverified communiqués. Although later officially retracted, the national press had already printed the story, which was even repeated in scholarly journals.¹⁹ Curiously, the 'radar expert', Flight-Lieutenant Jack Nissenthal, assigned during the operation to examine the radar equipment,

¹⁸ Examples denying foreknowledge are: Sir William M. James, 'Letter of August 26, 1942', in *The Portsmouth letters* (London: Macmillan, 1946); Lord Louis Mountbatten, 'The Dieppe raid', *The Naval Review* 51/1 (January 1963), 35-40; and Ross Munro, 'Dieppe - key to invasion', in *Gauntlet to Overlord: the story of the Canadian Army* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1945). The relevant official histories are: Christopher Buckley, 'The raid on Dieppe', in *Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe*, 3 (London: HMSO, 1951); F. H. Hinsley, *et al.*, 'Air war in the West: May 1941 to end of 1942/Intelligence before and during the Dieppe raid', in *British intelligence in the Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations*, 2 (6 vols., New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Charles P. Stacey, 'At the war's turning point/The raid on Dieppe 19 August 1942', in *The Canadian Army 1939-1945: an official historical summary* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948); and his, *Six years of war: the Canadian Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific*, 1, Official history of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, ed. Charles P. Stacey (4 vols., Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955).

¹⁹ Editor, 'Diary of the war', *Royal United Services Institute Journal* 87/548 (November 1942), 123; and Charles P. Stacey, 'Dieppe, 19 August, 1942', *Canadian Geographic Journal* 27/2 (August 1943), 47-63.

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¹⁹ Editor, 'Diary of the war', *Royal United Services Institute Journal* 87/548 (November 1942), 123; and Charles P. Stacey, 'Dieppe, 19 August, 1942', *Canadian Geographic Journal* 27/2 (August 1943), 47-63.

is one of the main proponents of the myth which he has even taken one step further. He now asserts that the information gained by him led to advances in radar development which were instrumental in the success of the 1944 Normandy landings.²⁰

Mountbatten's efforts to mold the recording of Dieppe went through a transition stage from mere influence, during the immediate aftermath, to one of control, beginning when he commissioned, in September 1942, the preparation of a special confidential report for internal circulation. For the task Mountbatten assigned Hilary St George Saunders as the Combined Operations Recorder. In compiling this document, which became known as the 'Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid', Saunders interviewed all the senior people involved and the finished draft was proofed by Mountbatten personally in October 1942. This document, containing all the operation's orders and detailed description of events, ran to over two hundred pages. The most important part of it was the section on 'Lessons Learned', which was thirteen pages long. The Combined Report was later used as the basis for the preparation of a Naval Confidential Book in 1946 and revised in 1959, which Mountbatten vetted also, as described below.²¹

²⁰ After the war Nissenthal shortened his name to Nissen. His tale is told in: James Leasor, *Green beach: the true story of one man's courageous mission that changed the course of World War II* (New York: William Morrow & Company Inc., 1975); Jack Nissen and A.W. Cockerill, *Winning the radar war: a memoir* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1987); Bill McNeil, 'Jack Nissen', in *Voices of war remembered: an oral history of Canadians in World War II* (Toronto: Doubleday, 1991). His story was recently repeated by David Brown, 'Dieppe raid let Allies learn Nazi radar secrets for the D-Day invasion, vet says', *The Ottawa Citizen*, 4 May 1992; and C.E. Hooker, 'Signal intelligence', *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 19/2 (October 1989), 52.

²¹ COHQ, 'Lessons Learned', in 'Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid', CB 04244, (amended to BR 1887), 15 October 1942, pp.37-50, Ottawa. Directorate of History, National Defence Headquarters (DHist), 594.013 (D1); Admiralty, 'Raid on Dieppe (naval movements) 19 August 1942', CB 3081 (26) Naval Staff History, Second World War, Battle Summary No.33, February 1946, London: Admiralty Historical Section, Tactical and Staff Duties Division, pp.1-79, PRO, ADM 234/354; Admiralty, 'Raid on Dieppe (naval operations) 19 August 1942', BR 1736 (26) Naval Staff History, Second World War, Battle Summary No.33, revised 31 December 1959, London: Admiralty Historical Section, pp.1-92, PRO, ADM

All official and semi-official publications concerning Dieppe written during the war and in the post-war period also used the Combined Report as their basis.²² One of these was a 1943 Ministry of Information booklet, entitled *Combined Operations: the official story of the Commandos*, which was not shown to any Canadian until the Ministry of Information sent it in proof form to Canada House. It was passed to Stacey who noted that, besides minor errors, it failed to mention Canadian casualties. Stacey immediately contacted the author, Saunders who, Stacey explains, gave a lame excuse. On the insistence of the Canadians, the casualty figures were put in the final draft.²³

This effort to cover-up or down play the casualties was continued by Mountbatten during and after the war. In 1951, while Mountbatten was Fourth Sea Lord, he was sent a revised draft of the 1946 Naval Confidential Book covering the Dieppe operation. Even though Mountbatten was not directly blamed in it for anything, he immediately asked that it be withdrawn. The then Head of the Naval Historical Branch, Lieutenant-Commander Peter Kemp, recalled that:

234/355 [released in 1990].

²² The important wartime publications are: Admiralty, 'Weekly naval notes-current events/Newhaven-Dieppe' in *Weekly intelligence report*, 129 (London: Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty, 1942); Admiralty, 'The Royal Marines at Dieppe', in *The Royal Marines: the Admiralty account of their achievement 1939-1943* (London: HMSO, 1944); Combined Operations Headquarters, *Combined operations: the official story of the Commandos* (New York: Macmillan, 1943); Charles P. Stacey, Historical Section, CMHQ, 'The Canadians in Britain 1939-1944', in *The Canadian Army at War*, 1/B (3 vols., Ottawa: King's Printer, 1945); and Lord Roger Keyes, 'Raids in home waters in 1942', in *Amphibious warfare and combined operations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943). Other non-official wartime works are David Masters, 'The tanks at Dieppe', in *With pennants flying: the immortal deeds of the Royal Armoured Corps* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1943); Charles P. Stacey's, 'The Canadian Army in Britain, 1942-1943', *Canadian Geographic Journal* 27 (October 1943), 256-83; and his, 'Dieppe, 19 August, 1942', *Canadian Geographic Journal* 27/2 (August 1943), 47-63.

²³ Stacey, *A date with history*, p.99.

When Mountbatten realized that this was hardly possible, he asked, 'Well can you rewrite this bit saying it was an operational failure?' And I replied, 'Frankly, sir, no. We are merely repeating what the official records say'.

He walked up and down his office. He seemed more hurt than cross. Then said, 'Now, about these figures of casualties. I'm sure they're exaggerated'. 'No, sir, we have seen all the returns, the prisoner-of-war lists, and so on. They are as written'.

In the end he persuaded us to do a little tinkering, dividing the casualties into those wounded, taken prisoner and dead, which was fair enough. But it is quite interesting because it shows how badly he felt about Dieppe.²⁴

Mountbatten also attempted to influence the writing of the Dieppe sections of the Combined Operations official history and Roskill's official British naval history of the Second World War, the former in 1949, and the latter in 1955 and 1959, evidence of which is in his own papers.²⁵ It was not necessary for him to comment critically on the Stacey's official history of the Canadian army, published first in a summarized form in 1948, for it toed the official line completely, especially concerning the 'lessons learned'/D-Day scenario. Perhaps this was to be expected of any official historian, particularly from one who was so close to the events. On the other hand, Stacey leaves many questions only partially answered or not addressed at all. For example, on the decision-making aspects he is most vague; concerning Canadian responsibility in the chain of command he is more clear but obviously reluctant to assign blame to any commander (his later statements about the responsibility of Crerar should be noted here); and finally, being a military man he should have been more critical of the Outline Plan and raised objections to the overly ambitious military objectives.²⁶

²⁴ Richard Hough, 'Combined Operations', in *Mountbatten* (New York: Random House, 1981), pp.155-6 [Peter Kemp quote].

²⁵Mountbatten correspondence with Roskill, University of Southampton Library (SUL), Mountbatten Papers (MBP), MB1/116; Mountbatten to G.E. Wildman-Lushington, 9 December 1949, and Alan Campbell-Johnson to Brockman, 23 November 1950, in MB1/B58, quoted in Villa, *Unauthorized action*, pp.274-5, note 48.

²⁶ Charles P. Stacey, 'The raid on Dieppe 19 August 1942', in *The Canadian Army 1939-1945: an official historical summary* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948); for Villa's discussion of Stacey see, *Unauthorized action*, pp.26-8.

One of the most startling coups Mountbatten pulled off in this area was the manipulation of the relevant chapter in the memoirs of Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill. Professor Brian L. Villa, *Unauthorized action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe raid* (1989) details this in fifteen pages and remarks that, 'Perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of all this was that Churchill was willing to — and did — publish in his memoirs an account by someone else, the details of which he had no recollection'. Villa explains that Churchill's (actually Mountbatten's) account became the 'bedrock' of almost every history of the raid that followed.²⁷ Villa reveals how some authors have used quotations from Churchill's memoirs to corroborate Mountbatten's apparently independent account of certain aspects of the operation. One example of this situation was, Villa states, 'used to dispel doubts and uncertainty about why the raid was ever attempted'.²⁸

Historians did not have much of an opportunity to contradict the assertions of such revered people as Churchill and Mountbatten and the historiography from the end of the war through the 1950's, 1960's, and even after the opening of the records in 1972, reflects this. The standard works

²⁷ Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.39. Villa explains further that the passages most quoted by historians are, 'those in which Churchill shouldered responsibility for the decision to relaunch, together with the claim that the raid had been necessary and the results of great value'.

²⁸ The famous passage which Villa says historians never tire of quoting from is:

Dieppe occupies a place of its own in the story of the war, and the grim casualty figures must not class it as a failure. It was a costly but not unfruitful reconnaissance-in-force. Tactically it was a mine of experience. It shed revealing light on many shortcomings in our outlook. It taught us to build in good time various types of craft and appliances for our use. We learned again the value of powerful support of heavy naval guns in an opposed landing and our bombardment technique, both marine and aerial, was thereafter improved. Above all it was shown that individual skill and gallantry without thorough organization and combined training would not prevail, and that team work was the secret of success. This could only be provided by trained and organised amphibious formations. All these lessons were taken to heart... Honour to the brave who fell. Their sacrifice was not in vain.

Winston S. Churchill, 'Africa Redeemed: Return to Cairo', in *The Second World War: the Hinge of Fate*, 4 (6 vols., London: Cassell, 1951), p.459. Some histories quoting from this passage are: Richard Garrett, 'The rehearsal', in *The Raiders: the world's elite strike forces* (London: David & Charles, 1980), p.167; Terence Robertson, *The shame and the glory: Dieppe* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1962), p.xi; and Reginald W. Thompson, *Dieppe at dawn: the story of the Dieppe raid* (London: Hutchinson, 1956), p.10.

and memoirs for the period continue the lessons learned line and do not question what seems to have become regarded as fact.²⁹

This began to change after 1972. John P. Campbell was one of the first serious historians to delve into both the Allied and German primary sources and reveal new information, especially regarding the air and intelligence aspects. Ronald Atkin, in *Dieppe 1942* (1980), wrote what is a basically a narrative style with some minor analysis. He also utilised primary records, both allied and German, included interviews, and focused on the battle itself, although avoiding any indepth discussion of the planning and decision-making aspects. Atkin's book can be regarded as the best to come out of this genre of what could be called critical popular history.³⁰

²⁹ The monographs and memoirs for the post-war period dealing with Dieppe not already mentioned, up until the opening of the documents in 1972 are John Durnford-Slater, 'Dieppe', in *Commando: memoirs of a fighting commando in World War Two* (London: Geenhill, 1953, 1991); John Hughes-Hallett, 'The mounting of raids', *Royal United Services Institute Journal* 95/580 (November 1950), 580-8; Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, 'Dieppe: prelude to D-Day', in *Captains without eyes: intelligence failures of World War II* (London: Macmillan, 1969); James Leasor and Sir Leslie Hollis, *War at the top* (London: Micheal Joseph, 1959); Adolphe Lepotier, *Raiders from the sea* (London: William Kimber, 1954); Eric Maguire, *Dieppe: August 19* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1963); C. Churchill Mann, 'Dieppe was necessary and worth while', *The Legionary Magazine* (February 1959), 12, 26, 27; Bernard L. Montgomery, 'The army in England after Dunkirk', in *The memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, KG* (London: Collins, 1958); Reader's Digest, ed. 'Dieppe: The day that will not die', in *The Canadians at War 1939/45*, 1 (2 vols., Toronto: Reader's Digest Association, Canada, 1969); Goronwy Rees, 'A day at the seaside', in *A bundle of sensations: sketches in autobiography* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1960); Terence Robertson, *The shame and the glory: Dieppe* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1962); Hilary St. George Saunders, 'Twenty men and a battery/A classic operation of war', in *The green beret: the story of the commandos 1940-1945* (London: Landsborough, 1959); Charles W Schreiner, 'The Dieppe raid: its orgins, aims and results', *Naval War College Review* 25/5 (May-June 1973), 83-9; Peter Scott, 'SGB-9/Let battle commence', in *The eye of the wind* (2 revised, Brockhampton: Brockhampton Press, 1961, 1966); Peter M. Scott, 'To implement the threat', in *The battle of the narrow seas: a history of the light coastal forces in the Channel and Noth Sea, 1939-1945* (London: Country Life, 1945); Reginald W. Thompson, *Dieppe at dawn: the story of the Dieppe raid* (London: Hutchinson, 1956); Lucien K. Truscott, Jr, 'Operation Jubilee - the Dieppe raid', in *Command missions: a personal story* (New York: Dutton, 1954); and Peter Young, 'Dieppe', in *Storm from the sea* (2 revised edn, London: Lionel Leventhal Ltd, 1958, 1989).

³⁰ Ronald Atkin, *Dieppe, 1942: the Jubilee disaster* (London: MacMillan, 1980); John P. Campbell's articles are, 'Dieppe and German foreknowledge', *Extension Bulletin* [a periodical of the Canadian Forces College Extension School] 36 (summer 1974), 35-41; 'Air operations and the Dieppe raid', *Aerospace Historian* 23/1 (spring 1976), 10-20; 'The "Ultra" revelations: the Dieppe raid in a new light of now inevitable revisions in Second World War historiography',

John Mellor, in *Canada's forgotten heroes* (1975) wrote a balanced account which contained a vivid description of the prisoner-of-war experiences. Although he pointed at an important change, he did not follow it up. This was that in between the cancellation of *Rutter*, and the remounting of it as *Jubilee*, the command structure was changed. This thread was not picked up on until fifteen years later and will be discussed later. Norman L.R. Franks, in *The greatest air battle: Dieppe, 19 August 1942* (1979), expanded on Campbell's work and made the first serious examination of the air aspects of the battle. Jacques Mordal's *Dieppe: dawn of decision* (1981) utilises many German sources, written and oral, but unfortunately does not offer many references. He makes the important point that the German Luftwaffe radar operators had detected *Jubilee* several hours in advance, but had not been believed by the Dieppe naval authorities.³¹

Even though the documentary sources were available after 1972, many historians did not bother to examine them, and instead repeated the myths and stories of previously published works that had become regarded as standard works on the subject. Some of the more obvious of these that followed Mountbatten's lessons learned theme are: Robert P. Arnoldt, 'The Dieppe raid: a failure that led to success,' in *Armor* (1981); Harold Calin, in *Dieppe* (1978), cites no references and repeats old myths; William A.B. Douglas, 'The army overseas 1940-1943,' in *Out of the shadows: Canada in the Second World War* (1977), follows the official line; R.J. Fanshawe,

The Canadian Defence Quarterly 6/1 (summer 1976), 36-41; and 'Dieppe, deception and D-Day', *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 9/3 (Winter 1980), 40-44.

³¹ John Mellor, *Dieppe: Canada's forgotten heroes* (Scarborough, Ontario: Macmillan-NAL Publishing Ltd., 1975, 1979), p.30; Norman L.R. Franks, *The greatest air battle: Dieppe, 19 August 1942* (2 edn., London: William Kimber, 1979, 1992); Jacques Mordal, *Dieppe: the dawn of decision* (2 edn., Translated by Mervyn Savill, London: New English Library, 1981), pp. 157-60.

'Dieppe: unforgettable lessons,' *Marine Corps Gazette* (1977); T. Murray Hunter, formerly in the CMHQ Historical Section under Stacey, does not stray from his mentor's line in, *Canada at Dieppe* (1982); Edward L. Smith, in 'Dieppe,' *Army* (1977) continues with the lessons learned thread; as does William Whitehead, *Dieppe 1942: echoes of disaster* (1979).³²

Thus nothing that could shed new light on some of the mysteries of Dieppe came out until publication by Villa in 1989. The depth of research was most remarkable and revealed many sources which, although previously open, historians had neglected to examine. Villa's basic thesis is that the newly promoted Mountbatten, vain, ambitious and using his connection to royalty, pushed the Dieppe operation through to protect his own position, as CCO, and that of his fledgling organization, COHQ, against the judgement of the Chiefs of Staff Committee who knew better, but acquiesced for their own reasons. Villa's circumstantial case rests on the argument that no written authorisation for the remounting of *Rutter* as *Jubilee* has ever been found, and in his view does not exist. Thus the operation was mounted without the proper authorisation.

Contrary to this view is the work of the Whitaker team, *Dieppe: tragedy to triumph* (1992), which harks back to an older view that Churchill was the real protagonist behind the operation, insisting on it for political reasons. Another scenario which no author has examined until recently, is proposed by Peter Henshaw. He makes a persuasive case, in four recent articles, that

³² Robert P. Arnoldt, 'The Dieppe raid: a failure that led to success', *Armor* 90 (July/August 1981), 12-19; Harold Calin, *Dieppe* (New York: Belmont Tower Books, 1978); William A.B. Douglas and Bereton Greenhouse, 'The army overseas 1940-1943', in *Out of the shadows: Canada in the Second World War* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977); R.J. Fanshawe, 'Dieppe: unforgettable lessons', *Marine Corps Gazette* 77/2 (February 1977), 57-9; T. Murray Hunter, *Canada at Dieppe*, Vol.17, Canadian War Museum Historical Publication (Ottawa: Canadian War Museum, 1982); Edward L. Smith, 'Dieppe', *Army* 27/8 (August 1977), 25-28; William Whitehead, *Dieppe 1942: echoes of disaster* (Toronto: Personal Library, 1979).

the real pressure was from the senior Canadian commanders in England. The present author believes that the answer is not so black and white but lies in that grey area, which Mellor hinted at in 1975, that is, to do with the change in command arrangements. This is still under debate and was first enunciated in the following article published by the present author, 'A reappraisal of the Dieppe raid: planning and intelligence,' *Pro-Phile* (Spring 1993).³³

J.R. Robinson's 1991 article in the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* also clears up some of the mysteries and myths surrounding radar aspects of *Jubilee*. This author's, *Dieppe through the lens of the German war photographer* (1993), is a typical drum and bugle history that details the training and actions of each of the tanks, belonging to The Calgary Regiment, that landed at Dieppe. German photos of every one of the armoured vehicles landed are shown in A4 size format. The text is based on primary, secondary and oral interview sources.³⁴

Brereton Greenhous, while an historian at the Directorate of History (DHist), National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, produced an elegant

³³ Denis & Shelagh Whitaker, *Dieppe: tragedy to triumph* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1992). The following articles by Peter J. Henshaw consider the changes in command and responsibilities for launching raids by: 'The British Chiefs of Staff Committee and the preparation of the Dieppe raid, March-August 1942: did Mountbatten really evade the Committee's authority?', *War in History* 1/2 (1994), 197-214; 'The Dieppe raid: Montgomery's role reassessed', in *Perspectives on warfighting. Selected papers from the 1992 (59th annual) meeting of the Society for Military History*, ed. Donald F. Bittner, 3 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Command & Staff College Foundation, 1994), pp.187-202; 'The Dieppe raid: the quest for action for all the wrong reasons', *Queen's Quarterly* 101/1 (Spring 1994), 103-115; 'The Dieppe raid: a product of misplaced Canadian nationalism', *The Canadian Historical Review* 77/2 (June 1996), 250-86; Hugh G. Henry, 'A reappraisal of the Dieppe raid: planning and intelligence', *Pro-Phile* (Friends of the Public Record Office) 4/1 (Spring 1993), 4-6.

³⁴ J.R. Robinson, 'Radar intelligence and the Dieppe raid', *The Canadian Defence Quarterly* 20/5 (April 1991), 37-43; Hugh G. Henry, *Dieppe through the lens of the German war photographer*, ed. Winston G. Ramsey (London: Battle of Britain Prints International Ltd, 1993).

coffee-table style edition entitled, *Dieppe, Dieppe* (1993), which is of the critical popular history type, generally follows the Villa line, and doubts that so many useful lessons were learned as previously claimed.³⁶ Finally, John Campbell's, *Dieppe revisited* (1994), which although very confusing, complicated to follow and containing some errors, does contribute to the scholarship by clarifying the question of German foreknowledge. Using German sources, he shows that the movement away from the operational area, of important air and naval units, definitely proves that the German garrison was not forewarned. He also examines the supposed linkage between lessons learned from Dieppe and their relevance to the 1944 Normandy landings.³⁶

Although some historians, since Mountbatten's assassination in 1979, have begun to question some of his assertions, and those of the earlier historians, there is still an engrained body of thought based on this earlier scholarship that has proven resistant to change. This was revealed by the resurgence of interest in the operation at the time of the 50th anniversary (four books were published on the raid from 1992-1994), when many of the old myths that should have been laid to rest for ever, resurfaced.³⁷ It is the

³⁶ Brereton Greenhous, *Dieppe, Dieppe* (Montréal: Éditions Art Global Inc. in cooperation with the Department of National Defence, 1993). A copy of this was presented by the Canadian Minister of Veterans Affairs to the French Minister for Veterans Affairs in 1993.

³⁶ John P. Campbell, *Dieppe revisited: a documentary investigation* (London: Frank Cass, 1993). Barry Hunt and Donald Schurman also doubt the validity of the claim that Dieppe's lessons were vital to the success of *Overlord*, stating that 'the linkage between cause and result must be suspected of having been forged by the natural desires or wish to explain the disaster', see 'Prelude to Dieppe: thoughts on combined operations policy in the "raiding period", 1940-1942', in *Naval warfare in the Twentieth Century 1900-1945: essays in honour of Arthur Marder*, ed. Gerald Jordan (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p.207.

³⁷ Micheal R.D. Foot, 'Dieppe: triumph out of disaster', *History Today* 42/8 (August 1992), 10-11, makes several incorrect claims, some of these are: the poor fighting capabilities of the Canadian soldier at Dieppe; the supposed Canadian responsibility for the frontal attack; that the convoy encounter resulted in loss of surprise for the whole of *Jubilee*; and to do with lessons learned. These errors are corrected in the following replies, one by the Director of DHist, William A.B. Douglas, 'Canada's role', *History Today* 43/4 (April 1993), 60; and by Mary

intention here to resolve once and for all this confused historiography, using not only all material used by previous authors but untapped sources as well.

2

STRATEGIC PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING**STRATEGIC BACKGROUND**

The immediate consequence of any military defeat, especially one that causes casualties as high as the Dieppe raid, is the search for clarification of responsibility for the decisions behind the operation's inception and military plans. To explain effectively the decision-making and planning process it is necessary first to understand the general strategic context that the Allies found themselves inⁱⁿ late 1941 and early 1942. At this time the responsibility and chain of command for planning, authorizing, mounting and launching cross-channel operations was constantly changing. The raid's consequent failure has caused much confusion over which individual or organization was ultimately responsible for various key decisions.

By the spring of 1942 the Allied coalition fortunes reached their nadir. The Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere expanded as a wave unchecked across Southern Asia, the Pacific and threatened Australia. In the Mediterranean Sea the strategic island of Malta was under air and U-boat blockade and in the Battle of the Atlantic the Allied tonnage losses reached their war-time peak in March. In North Africa the *Afrika Korps*, under the famous General Erwin Rommel, had pushed the British forces back into Egypt and threatened Cairo and the vital Suez Canal. On the eastern front German armies, already deep inside the Russian heartland, prepared for a summer offensive designed to knock Russia out of the war. The United States, still in the process of replacing ships lost in the surprise attack at

Pearl Harbour and occupied in the Pacific, could only offer moral support and the promise of men and material to Britain in the future.

In this period the main strategic priority of the Western Allies was to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union or any possible compromise, reminiscent of 1917, between it and Nazi Germany. In support of this aim the Western Allies had engineered the lend-lease agreement with the Soviets which was implemented through regular supply convoys to Murmansk, though by July 1942 heavy losses forced their suspension. The Western Allies, determined to relieve the pressure on the Soviet Union, had various major plans for cross-channel invasion of North-West Europe on the books for 1942 and 1943. The two most important were *Sledgehammer* and *Round-Up*. *Sledgehammer* was to be implemented only if the Soviets appeared to be on the brink of collapse or 'in the case of serious German demoralisation'. The United States pushed for *Sledgehammer* to be implemented in the latter part of 1942, as did the Soviet Union. *Round-Up*, which envisaged a permanent return to the continent, was planned for May 1943 and depended for its success on the rate that the bridgehead could be built up on the continent 'versus the rate of possible German concentration for a counter-offensive'. Domestically, in Canada, the United States and Britain, the Second Front Now movement was also very vocal, and was supported by influential writers and politicians such as Basil H. Liddell Hart and the press baron Lord Beaverbrook. Liddell Hart published many newspaper articles advocating the Second Front and discussing pre-invasion strategy. He frequently criticized the policy of large-scale raids. In June 1942 he stated that large-scale raids 'will not of themselves cause the

withdrawal of substantial forces from the enemy's Russian front... only our invasion can achieve a heavy transfer'.¹

They were not alone in ignoring the factual evidence against premature invasion. American and Soviet planners equally underestimated the difficulties in mounting amphibious operations. The Soviets and Stalin especially, who held a paranoid mistrust of British intentions, disparaged legitimate British reasoning as weakness and a lack of will. This view still appears to be the prevailing orthodoxy on the Soviet side. As recently as 1992, at a conference on the 50th Anniversary of the Dieppe raid, Dr. Anatoliy Khor'kov, stated that the resources used for Operation *Torch*, the November 1942 Anglo-American invasion of North Africa, could instead have been utilised in opening the Second Front in Europe.² This scenario ignores the fact that by August 1942 American troops had not yet begun to arrive in Britain in large numbers and the shortage of specialized landing craft prevented any permanent return to the European continent occurring at that time. In early April 1942 General Marshall estimated that by the 15 September 1942 the American forces in the UK would be only two and a half infantry divisions, one armoured division and nine hundred aircraft.³

¹ 'Aide Memoir-State of Planning', 10 June 1942, pp.1-8, PRO, WO 193/809; Basil H. Liddell Hart, 'Thoughts on our pre-invasion strategy', 15 June 1942, p.1, King's College London (KCL), Liddell Hart Papers (BLHP), BHLH 10/1942/14a; for Beaverbrook's efforts at promoting a second front see Anne Chisholm and Michael Davie, 'Champion of Russia', in *Beaverbrook: a life* (London: Hutchinson, 1992), pp.431-8, 440-3.

² The paranoid and conspiratorial mind of Stalin is revealed by the fact that in October 1942 he actually suspected that Churchill was attempting a separate peace with Germany. This was first outlined by Jonathan G. Haslam in 'Stalin's fears of a separate peace, 1942', *Intelligence and National Security* 8/4 (October 1993), 97-9; Anatoliy Khor'kov, 'Dieppe and Soviet policy of second front', p.14, at the conference 'The Dieppe raid 19 August 1942' in Quebec City, Meeting of the Canadian Committee for the Second World War, 13 November 1992.

³ Gordon A. Harrison, 'The roots of strategy' in *Cross-channel attack. United States Army in World War II. The European Theatre of Operations*, 2, (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1951), p.16-17.

After some study American planners realized the impossibility of an invasion in 1942 and instead hoped to have *Round-Up* in 1943, using 1942 for general preparation, build up and especially to gain battle experience for American troops.⁴ An American delegation, sent over to prepare the way for the arrival of American forces (*Bolero*) and to work out an agreement on a timetable for the eventual return to the continent, was led by the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall.⁵

In April 1942 a fundamental shift in Allied strategic thinking occurred. The basis for *Sledgehammer's* implementation had been dependent on either Soviet collapse or German demoralisation. Marshall rejected the emergency option and based it on German failure only. This thinking was embodied in what became known as the Marshall Memorandum. Two months later Churchill supported this view stating that '*Sledgehammer* should be dependent not on Russian failure but on Russian success'.⁶ In the meantime the general Allied offensive strategy in the north-western theatre of raiding would keep German troops pinned down, possibly provoke the German Air Force (GAF) fighter squadrons to battle and help train forces for the eventual invasion.⁷

⁴ Harrison, *Cross-channel attack*, p.17.

⁵ One active step in the direction of Anglo-American cooperation was the assignment by Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Assistant Chief of Staff, of Colonel Lucien K. Truscott, Jr to the staff of COHQ. His missions were outlined as:

To study the planning, organization, preparation, and conduct of combined operations, (especially of the commando type) and to keep the ODWD [Operations Division, War Department] informed as to the developments in training, technique, and equipment pertaining to these and related operations;
To initiate plans for the participation by American troops in these operations to the fullest practicable extent with a view to affording actual battle experience to maximum personnel, and to plan and coordinate the training of detachments designated for such participation.

Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 'Letter of Instructions to Colonel L.K. Truscott, Jr, Cavalry', 5 May 1942. Washington: Operations Division, War Department, Lexington, Virginia, George C. Marshall Library (GCML), Lucien K. Truscott Papers (LTP), 9/1.

⁶ Prime Minister, Minute for General Ismay for COS Committee, 10 June 1942, Annex to COS (42) 175th, quoted in Harrison, *Cross-channel attack*, p.18, fn.47.

⁷ Important references to the raiding policy are: COS (41) 248 (O), 7 November 1941, 'Action In Spring 1942: Directive to the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces', pp.90-2, PRO, CAB

The proposed raid on Dieppe, Operation *Rutter*, set for early July, was part of this raiding policy. Doubt about its wider strategic purpose, which was not referred to in any of the operational plans, was possibly why Churchill held a small private meeting on 30 June 1942 at No.10 Downing street. His concerns were mollified though by his senior advisors. Mainly due to poor weather *Rutter* was cancelled on 8 July. The same day Churchill decided to abandon *Sledgehammer*, cabling Roosevelt that 'No responsible British general, admiral, or air marshal is prepared to recommend *Sledgehammer* as a practicable operation in 1942'. A week later he suggested that the invasion of North Africa, *Gymnast*, in the autumn of 1942, be pursued as an alternative. In response Roosevelt sent a delegation, headed by Marshall, to London to discuss the issue. On 24 July, after much debate, Roosevelt agreed to drop *Sledgehammer* and proceed with the North African venture, now renamed *Torch*. Leaving the needs of the Russian situation aside, this decision nullified any politico-strategic reasons for going ahead with a revived raid on Dieppe (Operation *Jubilee*) or any other cross-Channel operation in 1942.⁸

80/60; COS (42) 26 (O), 25 January 1942, Annex and Enclosure, 'Conclusions Reached in the Study of a Major Raid on the Continent', pp.140-5, PRO, CAB 80/61; COS (42) 40 (O), 13 February 1942, Annex, 'Operations on the Continent: Directive to the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces', pp.197-8, PRO, CAB 80/61; COS (42) 103 (O) (Final), 18 April 1942, Memorandum, 'Operations on the Continent', pp.22-24, Cambridge, Churchill College Archives (CCA), Ellis Papers, ELLS 2/5; COS (42) 157 (O) (Final), 6 June 1942, Report, 'Operations on the Continent in 1942', pp.29-30, PRO, CAB 80/63.

⁸ Barry Hunt and Donald Schurman, 'Prelude to Dieppe: thoughts on combined operations policy in the "raiding period", 1940-1942', in *Naval warfare in the Twentieth Century 1900-1945: essays in honour of Arthur Marder*, ed. Gerald Jordan (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p.204 [Churchill's doubts]; Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: the Hinge of Fate*, 4 (London: Cassell, 1951), p.391 ['No responsible'], pp.395, 404 [Roosevelt agrees]; J.R.M. Butler and J.M.A. Gwyer, 'Anglo-American strategy reconsidered: the decision for *Torch*', in *Grand strategy, June 1941-August 1942*, 3(II) (London: HMSO, 1964), p.630 [Churchill abandons *Sledgehammer*], p.634 [Roosevelt abandons *Sledgehammer*].

The fact that that Churchill and the COS did not cancel *Jubilee* immediately reveals that another reason remained for its continued existence. This was first deduced by two authors, Barry Hunt and Donald Schurman, in 1977, who explained that the formation of the bureaucracy of Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ), the organization responsible for the doctrinal development, planning, training and mounting of raids, 'developed a rationale and momentum of its own which very quickly began to raise expectations well beyond the level of raids by a few hundred men. Which is to say, the very existence of COHQ itself was one good reason for the Dieppe Raid'. How this situation came to be needs examination.⁹

MOUNTBATTEN AND COHQ

RAIDING PROCEDURE AND RESPONSIBILITY

COHQ had its origins in the pre-war Inter-Services Training and Development Centre (ISTDC). In June 1940 Churchill formed COHQ as a separate body. The following month its status was raised further by the appointment as Director of Combined Operations (DCO) of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, hero of the Great War's Zeebrugge raid. His major contribution to the organization was the provision of the basis and resources for building an actual combined operations capability, and the development of the army commando units. These units became known as the Special Service Brigade and were effectively a private army under the sole control of COHQ.¹⁰

⁹ Hunt and Schurman, 'Prelude to Dieppe', p.203.

¹⁰ Mountbatten described the role of COHQ in a 1962 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) television interview:

At Combined Operations Headquarters our job was to create the machine which would eventually make the invasion of the continent possible; and to devise the new techniques for the assault, as well as for the maintenance by sea of the great forces once they had been landed. New landing ships, craft and appliances were to be devised.

In October 1941, due to disagreement between Keyes and the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS), he was relieved and replaced by the young and ambitious Lord Louis Mountbatten.¹¹ Mountbatten brought with him a political sense that Keyes had lacked as well as the necessary drive to ensure that COHQ received the resources it needed. He not only gathered around him the brightest of officers from all three services but also recruited scientists to work on the various problems in developing amphibious warfare technique and equipment. Most important though was his talent for getting the various services to work together in supporting COHQ.¹²

The newly promoted Commodore was to be known as 'Advisor on Combined Operations' (ACO) when advising the COS or Force Commanders and 'Commodore Combined Operations' for administrative command and command of raids. The former title specifically reinforced the

designed, tested and produced; and hundreds of thousands of soldiers and airmen were to be trained together to act as a single entity in the assault.

Lord Louis Mountbatten, 'The Dieppe raid [transcript of 1962 CBC interview]', *The Naval Review* 51/1 (January 1963), 35-6. Important sources dealing with the early history and growth of COHQ are: 'History of Combined Operations Organization', London: Amphibious Warfare Headquarters, 1956, Chs. 3 & 4, pp.18-57, PRO, DEFE 2/1773; Glen St. J. Barclay, "Butcher and bolt": Admiral Sir Roger Keyes and British combined operations, 1940-1941', *Naval War College Review* 35/2/sequence 290 (March/April 1982), 18-29; Kenneth J. Clifford, 'Organization and training for combined operations 1940-1944', in *Amphibious warfare development in Britain and America from 1920-1940* (Laurens, N.Y.: Edgewood, 1983); Bernard Fergusson, *The watery maze: the story of Combined Operations*, (London: Collins, 1961); H. E. Horan, 'Combined operations, 1939-1945', *Royal United Services Institute Journal* 98/589 (February 1953), 55-65; John Hughes-Hallett, 'The mounting of raids', *Royal United Services Institute Journal* 95/580 (November 1950), 580-8; and Lord Roger Keyes, *Amphibious warfare and combined operations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943).

¹¹ Concerning Keyes' dismissal one author suggests that: apart from the 'very serious questions of [his] mental or emotional stability', combined operations necessitated the 'harmonious and mutually supportive cooperation of the other services', yet Keyes 'deliberately went out of his way to offend or intrigue against the very people upon whose goodwill his own success totally depended. Still more serious was his failure to recognize the essential difference in tactical doctrine between raids and invasion'. See Barclay, 'Butcher and bolt', p.27.

¹² A former COHQ officer states that on Mountbatten's appointment, Churchill permitted him to choose six 'brilliant staff officers, two from each Service, to join his staff, no matter where they were serving; and this he had done most carefully and on the best advice'. Fergusson, *The watery maze*, p.120.

fact that the position was subordinate to the COS. The official COS directive specified that he was the 'technical adviser' in all phases of the planning, training of personnel, research and development of equipment and technique, relating to combined operations. During his first six months at his new post he greatly expanded the COHQ staff and opened specialized training centres in Australia and India, and totally reorganised COHQ. The attachment of American Officers in May 1942 created a historical precedent as the first 'integrated, Inter-Allied, Inter-Service staff'.¹³ Although the administrative, training and preparation side of a combined operations capability was progressing well, the same could not be said for the practical side – the execution of raids in preparation for a cross channel invasion.

Mountbatten's responsibility and the procedure for mounting and launching small and large-scale raids were constantly changing during the period from October 1941 up to execution of *Jubilee* in August 1942. To fully understand the decisions behind the planning, mounting and launching of *Rutter* and *Jubilee*, this process needs to be carefully elucidated. The COS directive of October 1941 concerning the procedure for mounting a raiding operation was issued in revised form, on 9 December 1941, as follows:

- (a) A requirement arises.
- (b) COS issue necessary instructions for project to be examined by Joint Planning Staff with Adviser on Combined Operations.
- (c) Outline Plan.
- (d) COS consider Outline Plan with ACO.
- (e) Outline Plan as approved as guide only to Force Commanders.
- (f) Force Commanders.

¹³ COS (41) 732, 9 December 1941, Annex 1, 'Directive to the Adviser on Combined Operations', PRO, CAB 80/32. COHQ was reorganized into Administrative and Operations groups. The former was primarily a Naval Staff that dealt with personnel, material, assault ships and craft and the latter had the Intelligence, Planning, Training and Communications Sections. All the Operations groups were inter-service. See COS (41) 736, 10 December 1941, 'Establishment of Combined Operations Headquarters Staff', PRO, CAB 80/32; 'History of Combined Operations Organization' (London: Amphibious Warfare Headquarters, 1956), pp.20-1, PRO, DEFE 2/1773; and Clifford, 'Organization and training', pp.134-40.

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- (g) Force Commanders produce Final Plan in conjunction with Joint Planning Staff and the ACO.
- (h) Final Plan considered by COS with the ACO.
- (i) Implementation of approved Plan by Force Commanders assisted by the ACO, the Joint Planning Staff and Service Ministries.¹⁴

Under the above procedure at least three minor raids were successfully carried out: on 27 December 1941 against the Norwegian Port of Vaagsø, the main object being the destruction of enemy shipping; on 27/28 February 1942 against Bruneval on the French coast, the aim being the gathering of information on German radar capability; and on 28 March a daring attack against the French port of St. Nazaire, resulting in the destruction of the only dry dock on the Atlantic coast large enough to accommodate the German battleship *Tirpitz*. Rear-Admiral H.E. Horan states that these three raids proved that COHQ 'could produce results', that the technique and training developed there was on the right course and that most importantly, 'confidence in the command was being built up and the morale of the combined operations personnel raised to a high level'. As Hunt and Schurman observed, 'these raids did predispose the planners to the idea of success', which could be dangerous, since question of whether these small pin-prick raids had any relation to large-scale, and therefore more hazardous operations was not considered.¹⁵

¹⁴ COS (41) 732, 9 December 1941, Annex 1, 'Directive to the Adviser on Combined Operations', PRO, CAB 80/32. Curiously, a post-war unpublished confidential print produced by the successor organization to COHQ, quotes this directive slightly differently, tending to downplay Mountbatten's influence. In the above directive the 'History of Combined Operations Organization' (1956) has inserted the words *advice of* before 'ACO', in stages (b) and (g), and *as adviser* after 'ACO', in stages (d) and (h), and finally, in the significant implementation stage, has deleted completely 'ACO' after the words 'assisted by the'. There seems to be no satisfactory explanation for this. As it is, Mountbatten's powers were later expanded anyway. Amphibious Warfare Headquarters, 'History of Combined Operations Organization', Appendix 6, p.209.

¹⁵ Admiral Horan continues to explain that perhaps all this was due to the fact that Mountbatten 'dinned into his staff that their job was to think about nothing but the offensive'. He concludes that it was about this time the COHQ staff became known as 'The Crazy Gang', Horan, 'Combined operations, 1939-1945', 59; Hughes-Hallett writes that in eight months the 'Mountbatten System' of planning and mounting raids resulted in the execution of four

In late 1941 and early 1942 COHQ changed from planning operations in Norway to Northern France. The main reason for this switch was the shorter distance across the English Channel, offering less chance of navigational error and longer and more effective fighter cover. Captain John Hughes-Hallett, the Naval Adviser to COHQ and one of the principal planners, states on 21 January he and other COHQ planners prepared a rough monthly raiding schedule for the Spring and Summer. 'We were not so much concerned at this stage with the intrinsic value of objectives on a particular raid, but rather with the feasibility of reaching the place undetected'. They suggested a raid on St. Nazaire for late March and one a few days later on Bayonne. For May they planned an attack on the Channel island of Alderney and for June they picked Dieppe (*Rutter*), by which time they expected to have enough landing craft to transport an entire division. For July they planned a *second* raid on Dieppe, hoping it 'would achieve surprise and lead to the slaughter of specialized German engineers likely to be at work repairing and strengthening the fortifications'. For August they envisioned a reckless scheme of landing a large armoured force to make a

medium and one large operation.^S An equivalent number of operations of the same scale were fully mounted but were only cancelled due to unsuitable weather 'or some other cause outside our control. No other system, either before or afterwards, yielded comparable results', 'The mounting of raids', 584. Concerning *Jubilee's* relation to previous successful raids, Hunt and Schurman, state:

In this sense, experience was a poor teacher. Harmony in previous small raids led men to underrate the importance of the 'friction of war' the possibilities for which increased dramatically in larger undertakings. Dieppe would expose the insanity of planning procedures that permitted alterations and arrangements at many different levels. In this sense, Dieppe was everybody's baby. Although there was information and practical experience to draw from, there was simply no way to transfer the know-how and cooperative spirit that characterise a small operation directly to a large-scale enterprise especially when the commanders were men who could speak as equals to the Chief of Combined Operations and who were at the same time responsible to their own immediate superiors.

'Prelude to Dieppe', pp.199-200 [predispose the planners], 203 [above quote].

dash towards Paris with the objective of shooting up the German Headquarters there.¹⁶

Mountbatten submitted a note dated 19 February concerning this 'new form of regular raiding on a small scale' and it was approved by the COS on 14 March 1942. He then ordered Hughes-Hallett to prepare outline plans for each of the proposed operations. Meanwhile, on 4 March, at Churchill's insistence, Mountbatten's title was changed to 'Chief of Combined Operations' (CCO), and he was promoted to the honorary ranks of Vice-Admiral, Lt-Gen. and Air Marshal, to emphasize the 'combined' approach his position and COHQ represented. Mountbatten's appointments seems to have taken some time to go through as he was still referred to as the ACO in a COS meeting on 14 March, although his new title was used at another COS meeting three days later. The following day, 18 March, Churchill's unprecedented step to make him a full member of the COS was officially confirmed, much to the chagrin of the other Chiefs of Staff who felt that he had been promoted beyond his ability and over the heads of more qualified, senior people. Indeed on 6 March Admiral Sir Dudley Pound offered his resignation in protest but Churchill, who had been having differences of opinion with him, accepted it and two days later replaced him with Gen. Sir Alan Brooke. Villa has shown that Churchill's motivations for promoting Mountbatten were political and were mainly an attempt to de-fuse domestic critics, such as Lord Beaverbrook, and to show the Americans that

¹⁶ The only source giving details of the raiding program seems to be Hughes-Hallett himself. Vice-Admiral John Hughes-Hallett, Unpublished Memoirs, 'Before I forget', pp.117-18, NAC, JHHP; see Brian Villa's comments in *Unauthorized action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe raid*, 2 revised edn., Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989, 1994, pp.167-8.

something was being done. Mountbatten was very popular in American high-society and particularly with the President.¹⁷

During the latter half of March 1942 Mountbatten attempted to increase gradually his authority over raiding operations. The terms of the COS directive of 9 December 1941 restricted him to coordinating air and naval support for small-scale raids and using his Special Service Brigade. But the requirements of the larger raids his staff were presently planning meant that regular army troops from other commands would be needed. The current procedure for a raiding operation was somewhat complicated and difficulties could easily arise since the Force Commanders had to have their operation orders approved by their respective C-in-Cs. If any of these commanders disagreed with any part of the plan COHQ and the Force Commanders had three choices: change the plan to the C-in-C's satisfaction; change it by removing his units from the operation; or cancel the operation.¹⁸

¹⁷ COS (42) 84th, 11, 14 March 1942; the date of 4 March for Mountbatten's promotions is given by his official biographer Phillip Ziegler, *Mountbatten: the official biography* (London: Collins, 1985), p.168; Brooke's diary confirms this date. After the war Brooke recollected that Mountbatten's promotion to membership of the COS was a 'snag' and that 'there was no justification for this move'. He continued that his appointment as CCO was 'no reason for his inclusion in the COS, where he frequently wasted both his own time and ours... [and] at times was apt to concern himself with matters outside his sphere'. KCL, Brooke Papers, vol.V '1941-2/3/A/V 'Notes on my life', 4-6 March 1942, p.367. Villa, *Unauthorized action*, pp.108, [Pound's resignation], 169-72 [Churchill's motivations]. The reaction in COHQ to Mountbatten's promotion is described by his chief naval adviser, John Hughes-Hallett, who later wrote 'My own reaction was one of exhilaration, almost exultation. At one stride our organization had penetrated the very centre and citadel of Power. We were now to work for a man with access to all the secrets, and for one who could, and would be an advocate at the top level for any plan', Hughes-Hallett, 'Before I forget', p.134, NAC, JHHP, MG 30 E463/Memoirs 1971. On Mountbatten's appointments see COS (42) 84th, 11, 14 March 1942, PRO, CAB 79/19; COS (42) 87th, 8, 17 March 1942, PRO, CAB 79/19; COS (42) 174, 18 March 1942, 'Committee arrangements-Memorandum by General Ismay', PRO, DEFE 2/710; I.C.B. Dear and M.R.D. Foot, eds. 'The Oxford Companion to the Second World War', in (Oxford: OUP, 1995), p.911 [Pound's resignation].

¹⁸ COS (42) 87th, 8, 17 March 1942, PRO, CAB 79/19; COS (42) 91st, 9, 21 March 1942, PRO, CAB 79/19; Hughes-Hallett, 'The mounting of raids', 582-3; and Peter J. Henshaw, 'The British Chiefs of Staff Committee and the preparation of the Dieppe raid, March-August 1942: did Mountbatten really evade the Committee's authority?', *War in History* 1/2 (1994), 199-201.

To try to alleviate this problem and increase further his control of continental raiding operations, Mountbatten compiled a memorandum, in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, General Sir Bernard Paget, which was circulated for the COS consideration at their meeting of 21 March. Entitled 'Agreed Procedure for raiding Operations', the COS approved it by 30 March and, under its first instruction, Mountbatten became the 'sole coordinating authority for all raids on the Western seaboard of Europe'. In the words of Hughes-Hallett he became the 'mounting authority'.¹⁹

The changes to the 9 December 1941 directive gave a significant increase to Mountbatten's influence and control over raids. The relevant points of the 30 March memorandum are listed as follows:

- (a) Whereas before he was only to advise, the CCO was now responsible for preparing the Outline Plan in conjunction with Home Forces planners, who replaced the COS's Joint Planning Staff.
- (b) C-in-C Home Forces in conjunction with CCO would prepare all military operation orders.
- (c) The Outline Plan was to be approved by the C-in-C Home Forces, or his nominee.
- (d) *COS approval remained at the completion of the Outline Plan, as did their nomination of Force Commanders.*
- (e) The CCO was now to be responsible for the detailed planning with the Force Commanders, staff from Home Forces, as well as consulting 'the operational staff's at the Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry, and the principal Naval, Army and RAF Commands likely to be directly concerned'.
- (f) *The Naval C-in-C of the area of the point of origin of the expedition would 'usually' be named the 'supreme commander', and as such, maintained the 'executive decision to sail, or to postpone sailing, the Force'. He was, however, only responsible for the Force while it was at sea and not during the land operations.*²⁰

[This author's emphasis]

¹⁹ COS (42) 91th, 9, 21 March 1942, CAB 79/19; COS (42) 99th, 17, 30 March 1942, PRO, CAB 79/19; copy in PRO, WO 106/4117, fol.9A; approved COS (42) 195, 30 March 1942, Annex-'Agreed procedure for raiding operations', 21 March 1942, CAB 80/35, copies in PRO, WO 106/4117 and DEFE 2/2; Lt-Gen. J. G. Swayne, CGS Home Forces, 'GHQ Directive on small-scale raiding', HF/OO/66/G(Plans), 31 March 1942, pp.1-3, PRO, WO 106/4117.

²⁰ Hughes-Hallett, 'The mounting of raids', 581; COS (42) 195, 30 March 1942, Annex-'Agreed procedure for raiding operations', 21 March 1942, PRO, CAB 80/35; copy in COHQ War Diary, PRO, DEFE 2/2; Henshaw, 'The British Chiefs of Staff', 201; 'History of Combined Operations Organization', p.21.

No mention is made in the document of *direct* COS approval of the final detailed plans although this seemed to happen indirectly since 'at each phase of planning' the CCO was required to consult the three Services main operational staffs and the respective commands from each service likely to be involved. Thus the Force Commanders most likely submitted their detailed operation orders to their respective C-in-Cs for final approval. This could be ^aproblem for Mountbatten, though, as the C-in-Cs might be even more reluctant to grant approval to use their forces since the Joint Planners had been removed from the planning process.²¹

Through April, May and June Mountbatten continued to consolidate his authority over the planning, mounting and launching of all raiding operations. The Chiefs of Staff Minutes clearly show this trend.²² One important case serves to illustrate the difficulties COHQ would face in coordinating and gaining support from the three Services. This was during the planning of Operation *Blazing*, a large raid on the island of Alderney planned for August. The interservice problems were such that on 2 May Mountbatten and the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, requested further revision of the planning procedure.²³

²¹ Henshaw says the COS were still required to give the detailed plans final approval though his references do not indicate a source, Henshaw, 'The British Chiefs of Staff', 200.

²² Further references to Mountbatten's extending power are: JP (42) 63rd, 1, 3 April 1942, PRO, CAB 84/4; COS (42) 109th, 6, 8[?] April 1942, PRO, CAB 79/20; COS (42) 204, Memorandum by Chief of Combined Operations-'Home Forces, Joint Planning Staff and Combined Operations Headquarters-Division of responsibility for planning', 5 April 1942, CAB 80/36, copy in PRO, WO 106/4117; COS (42) 140th, 5 May, PRO, CAB 79/20; 'Note on Memorandum for the Chief of Combined Operations-'Minor Raids', 10 May 1942', Enclosure 13c, PRO, WO 106/4117; COS (42) 130(0), Memorandum for the Chief of Combined Operations-'Minor Raids', 9 May 1942, PRO, CAB 80/82; approved by COS (42) 146th, 8, 11 May 1942, PRO, CAB 79/20.

²³ COS (42) 137th, 4, 2 May 1942, PRO, CAB 79/20.

The COS accepted the revision that even if a particular C-in-C disapproved of a final detailed plan, presented by a Force Commander, Mountbatten could still submit the plan to the COS, who had the option of overruling the objections and approving the plan. Henshaw has suggested that, in this way, Mountbatten perhaps thought he could get around the RAF Bomber Command's refusal for a preliminary bombardment in support of *Blazing*. The RAF's main concern was having its bombers exposed to German daylight fighters. This concerned Churchill also, who is on record at a COS meeting on 11 May explaining that they could not, 'in present circumstances, afford the risk of heavy casualties to our bomber force which this operation would probably entail'. He considered this the decisive factor and, as a result, not only did the other Chiefs support the RAF decision but they and Churchill cancelled the operation in its present form, agreeing to consider it later in the year.²⁴ From 5 May the procedure for planning and authorizing operations up to and including *Rutter*, although not *Jubilee*, was:

- (a) Outline plan is prepared by the Chief of Combined Operations.
- (b) Agreement or comments on the outline plan is obtained by CCO from all Commanders-in-Chief* concerned.
- (c) *Outline plan with any comments by Commanders-in-Chief* is submitted by CCO for approval of Chiefs of Staff.*
- (d) If outline plan is approved, Force Commanders are appointed to produce their orders.
- (e) When the Force Commanders' orders are complete CCO should obtain the agreement or any comments of all Commanders-in-Chief* concerned.
- (f) *CCO should then submit the final plan with comments by the Commanders-in-Chief* to the Chiefs of Staffs for final approval.*

Note: Since several RAF [Royal Air Force] Commanders-in-Chief are involved in any plan, the Air Force Commander during stage (d) must obtain, either directly or through the CCO's Staff the approval of the Air Force Commander-in-Chief* for the employment of their forces which he proposes.

* Or officers nominated by them. [This author's emphasis]²⁵

²⁴ COS (42) 244th (Revised) Memorandum, 5 May 1942, PRO, CAB 80/36; COS (42) 146th, 7, 11 May 1942, PRO, CAB 79/20; Henshaw, 'British Chiefs of Staff', 201; Villa, *Unauthorized action*, pp.150-1.

²⁵ COS (42) 244th (Revised) Memorandum - 'Procedure for planning of combined operations for which the Chief of Combined Operations is responsible', and Annex-'Procedure', 5 May

In an effort to further his influence even more he submitted a memorandum to the COS on the 11 May concerning gaining COS approval to mount, launch and execute 'minor raids' of not more than 200 men. He explained his plans to have one large raid a month, interspersed with many smaller ones before the end of this year's raiding season. He went on that the need for speed in mounting small raids required a more flexible planning and approving procedure. He proposed that he select objectives and that his commando units be used who would be assisted solely by his Planning Staff at COHQ. Further he proposed dealing directly with the Rear Admiral Combined Operations and the local naval C-in-C concerned to arrange the naval forces. Fighter cover was to be arranged through the Naval C-in-C as well. He stated that he had arranged with the C-in-C, Home Forces that if he wished to employ any units under his command in this type of operation, he would make the 'necessary arrangements direct with him'. Finally, Mountbatten proposed and sought approval, 'To inform the Chiefs of Staff *verbally of minor raids, shortly before they are due to take place*' [emphasis added]. A War Office brief presented the day before the COS were to discuss the memorandum, advised them to give approval to the memorandum, stating that 'if these raids are made to confirm topographical intelligence they will be justified'. It also noted that the changed procedure Mountbatten was requesting did not just deal with minor raids but with 'raiding operations in general'. One could speculate that *Jubilee* might have gone through this COS verbal authorization procedure but there is no concrete evidence for this. The COS and Churchill approved the memorandum, Churchill

1942, PRO, CAB 80/36, hand-written copies are Enclosures 12a and 12b, PRO, WO 106/4117; approved by COS (42) 140th, 6, 5 May 1942.

qualifying his agreement by saying he would, 'provided that these pinpricks were in addition to and not in substitute of, larger scale operations'. Churchill's fears were quickly subdued as the same day, 11 May, Mountbatten submitted to the COS the Outline Plan for *Rutter* and explained it in detail. Two days later the COS approved it as a basis for detailed planning by the force Commanders. The COS noted that the executive decision to execute the operation remained with the Naval C-in-C of the home port as specified in the COS memorandum approved on 30 March 1942.²⁶

THE CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS RAIDING PROCEDURE AND RESPONSIBILITY

Closely involved in these changes in procedure, but largely overlooked until recently, were the senior commanders of the Canadian Army. Since 1939 Canadian armed forces, including naval, air and army units, had been steadily building up in Britain, yet had participated in no large scale actions. This was particularly relevant to the army, which although being sent to France in 1940 after the withdrawal at Dunkirk, and training for or participating in small abortive raids, had basically filled a garrison role as the backbone of defence against possible German invasion of southern England. After the German attack against Russia in the summer of 1941, this threat of a German invasion gradually receded, and by the

²⁶ COS(42)146th, 8, 11 May 1942, PRO, CAB 79/20, approved COS(42)130(0), 9 May 1942, 'Minor raids. Memorandum by the Chief of Combined Operations', PRO, CAB 80/62; War Office, 'Chiefs of Staff Committee. Meeting to be held on the 11 May 1942. Note on COS(42)130(0). Minor raids. Memorandum by the Chief of Combined Operations', 10 May 1942, PRO, WO 106/4117, fol.13C; CCO to COS, Memorandum 'Operation *Rutter* Outline Plan, Ref. P126/15', 11 May 1942, approved at COS(42)149th, 5 'Operation *Rutter*', 13 May 1942, both documents in PRO, CAB 121/364, SIC File D/France/1, Operation *Rutter* Folder, fols.1, 1A, 1B, 1C, the latter record is also in PRO, CAB 79/20.

spring of 1942 it appeared most unlikely. Amid the growing clamour for a Second Front were the sharp calls for active participation of Canadian ground troops, who were suffering from low morale due to constant inaction.²⁷

The strategic decision to put off *Round-Up* – the full-scale invasion of North-West Europe – until 1943, meant that the Canadian Army would not see major action for at least three and a half years. British requests for units to be detached for service in distant theatres of war were strenuously rejected by the senior Canadian commanders, Lt-Gen. A.G.L. 'Andy' McNaughton and Lt-Gen. H.D.G. 'Harry' Crerar. For them, especially the former, maintenance of unity of the Canadian Army Overseas, as it became known on 5 April 1942, was the determining factor in all negotiations on its use. Raids from Britain were the perfect answer to the calls for action while still fulfilling the ultimate objective of maintaining the unity and independence of the Canadian Army. McNaughton, and Crerar especially, actively lobbied for the participation of Canadian units in raids. This is contrary to the previous long-standing myth that during the Second World War the Canadian Army was treated as 'Empire troops', as they had been during the Great War, and that at Dieppe Canadian troops were led like lambs to the slaughter by their British masters. Unfortunately, this myth was recently given credence by Denis and Shelagh Whitaker in *Dieppe: tragedy*

²⁷ Denis Whitaker, a platoon commander in the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, claims that low Canadian Army morale in 1942 is a myth that has persisted for over fifty years: 'I don't believe the morale in the Rileys was suffering, nor was it in any other units I saw or heard about in England. Many veterans will corroborate this'. He says that the propaganda line invented by the media and Canadian government that 'we were the ones who wanted action, that we were bored and demoralised – is pure nonsense. They were the ones who were trying to justify action-action for action's sake. Action for votes. Canadian troops were *not* spoiling for a fight'. See Denis Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker, *Dieppe: tragedy to triumph* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1992), pp.75-6. Whitaker bases his claim on his personal experiences and not on the overwhelming documentary evidence to the contrary.

to triumph, who claim that the raid was undertaken for the primarily political reasons of both Churchill and Canadian Prime Minister William L. Mackenzie King.²⁸

Although the Whitakers concede that Crerar played an active role in promoting Canadian participation they do not agree that McNaughton did also. On the contrary, they claim that McNaughton was 'outfoxed by his own corps commander' and then could never admit this for the obvious reason that it would have undermined his authority. To analyse this claim it is necessary to examine the role of McNaughton and Crerar and their relationship to the British military and political establishment since the arrival of Canadian troops in Britain.²⁹

²⁸ The idea that the British Army was responsible for Canadian involvement was first claimed in a British official history that was probably vetted before publication by Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett: Christopher Buckley states that Montgomery had acted as 'chief representative of the [British] Army at some of the preliminary discussions' and that it was 'his influence which made the raid on Dieppe so largely a Canadian affair', see 'The raid on Dieppe', in *Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe*, 3 (London: HMSO, 1951), p.230; Nigel Hamilton, Montgomery's official biographer, supports this argument by quoting Buckley, see 'Dieppe', in *Monty: the making of a general 1887-1942* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981), p.551; Whitaker, *Dieppe: tragedy to triumph*; Canadian reviews of the book reflect how readily accepted is the view that the British were responsible for the debacle: Douglas Fisher, 'Between ourselves - *Dieppe: tragedy to triumph*', *Legion Magazine* 67/5 (November 1992), 4-5; Tony Foster claims Dieppe was 'badly organized by the British General Staff and Combined Operations from start to finish', in 'War is hell, though you might hear otherwise: officer's timeless story strips the myth from Dieppe [review of *Dieppe: tragedy to triumph*]', *Globe & Mail*, 1992; Ron Riter asks why the 'upper-crust' COS and the 'wily' Churchill let such an operation be 'planned, chopped, changed', and then proceed, in 'Dieppe: a bloody campaign is vindicated', *Vancouver Sun*, Saturday 15 August 1992; Peter Worthington claims Churchill and Mountbatten knew before the operation that 'secrecy had been breached' and blames the politicians who wanted to 'placate' the Americans and Soviets, in 'Dying at Dieppe: the last word', *Toronto Sun*, Tuesday 18 August 1992.

²⁹ Whitakers, *Dieppe: tragedy to triumph*, p.75. The two sources the Whitakers' use concerning Crerar's circumventing McNaughton's authority are open to interpretation. The Minutes of Crerar's meeting, on 6 March 1942, with Lt-Gen. Archibald E. Nye, Deputy Chief, Imperial General Staff (DCIGS), Mountbatten and Brigadier Guy G. Simonds, contain the statement, 'the enterprise should be known only to the Corps Com[ander] and BGS and a limited number of his own (i.e. Mountbatten's) staff. General Crerar readily agreed to these conditions', see Brigadier G.G. Simonds, BGS, Canadian Corps, 'Notes on conferences held on 6 March 1942', 8 March 1942, NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D2)/ GOC 1-0-4, Operations - Raids, Part I(a), Correspondence re Training, fol.3. The other, somewhat dubious source, is Simonds's post-war recollection of the same meeting, which he mistakes for happening on 24 March, see Simonds to Mountbatten 22 January 1969, NAC, JHHP, MG 30 E463.

As early as March 1941 when the possibility opened that the Canadian Corps might assume the defensive area of the coast of Sussex, McNaughton told Brooke, then C-in-C Home Forces, that he hoped 'that in assuming the role of a static Corps, the claims of the Canadian Forces to form the spearhead of any offensive would not be forgotten'. The move actually began in the fall and was completed by December. This brought it under the operational control of GOC-in-C South-Eastern Command, Lt-Gen. B.L.M. Montgomery.³⁰

With the increase in British raiding activities in 1941 McNaughton saw an opportunity for Canadian participation. He raised this matter with C.G. 'Chubby' Power, the Canadian Air Minister, during his visit in June, and again the next month with another Canadian minister. He spoke to the latter of the possibility of 'operations of limited scope which depend for their success on the strictest secrecy'. McNaughton noted that the present procedure of special requests to Canada for authority for each operation was cumbersome and asked that this be changed. Before this could happen the Norwegian Spitsbergen operation came up in late August.³¹

In late July the 'special question' that McNaughton had discussed with the Canadian ministers became a future operation. After some deliberation the Canadian Cabinet War Committee informed McNaughton, through Lt-Gen. Kenneth Stuart, Chief of General Staff (CGS), that once the operation

³⁰ Stacey, *Six years of war*, pp.297-8.

³¹ The Spitsbergen operation was successfully executed from 19 August to 3 September using about 650 Canadian soldiers and some small Norwegian and British units. The purpose was to ensure that the Germans could not use the Spitsbergen Islands to their advantage in the future. The objectives to remove the Russian miners and Norwegian citizens, destroy wireless and weather stations, coal dumps, mining and harbour facilities, were all attained without a single casualty. The Germans did not know of the operation until after it was over. Stacey, *Six years of war*, pp.301-6 [Spitsbergen], p.307 ['operations of limited scope'].

had the approval of the British War Cabinet the decision would be up to him. Concerning this decision the CGS cabled McNaughton to keep in mind whether or not 'prospects of success are sufficient to warrant risks involved which include not only personnel but possible encouragement to enemy if results^{are} negative or worse'. With this authority McNaughton authorized a Canadian role in the Spitsbergen expedition. In early September C-in-C Home Forces, Lt-Gen. Sir Bernard Paget, discussed with McNaughton the use of Canadians in raids on the French coast, resulting in a small detachment being given combined operations training.³²

The Canadian Minister of National Defence, Colonel James L. Ralston, and the CGS visited England in October and met with McNaughton and Crerar. Crerar's war diary recounts that McNaughton made 'strong representations concerning his authority to undertake minor raids and operations', like Spitsbergen, 'without the necessity of obtaining Cabinet approval in each case' and that these raids should be looked on as regular 'patrol activities'. The Minister subsequently recommended that McNaughton receive 'general authority to act in such cases subject to his own judgement'. On 29 October the War Cabinet Committee gave him approval to use Canadian troops in 'minor' operations. Less than six months later McNaughton would sanction the use of Canadians at Dieppe, although the official historian of the Canadian Army, Charles P. Stacey, categorically states that McNaughton 'had nothing to do with originating... Canadian participation' in it.³³

³² Stacey, *Six years of war*, pp.307-8.

³³ Crerar War Diary, 20/25 October 1941, NAC, Crerar Papers (CP), MG 30 E157/15/958C.009 (D269); Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.308; see also Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.224; and Charles P. Stacey, 'Organization and control of Canadian fighting forces', in *Arms, men and government. The war policies of Canada 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Queen's

Crerar took over command of the Corps at the end of 1941 and in the words of Stacey was 'very anxious' to get his troops onto raids and had 'used the opportunity of being in command during McNaughton's absence in early 1942 'to press this point of view' on Montgomery, Brooke and Mountbatten. Stacey concludes that 'this may at least be part of the explanation for the Canadians going to Dieppe'. In fact, recent works by Canadian historians all point the finger at Crerar and some at McNaughton also.³⁴

The senior Canadian military personnel in the first quarter of 1942, in the words of Villa, 'threw heart and soul' into gaining the right to undertake raids. The Whitakers partially support this, stating that an 'avalanche' of letters and memoranda from Crerar and Brigadier Guy G. Simonds, his Brigadier General Staff (BGS), 1 Canadian Corps, 'engulfed' senior British officers, such as, Brooke, Paget and Montgomery.³⁵

Printer, 1970), pp.208-9; Charles P. Stacey, Letter to the Editor, 'Canadians at Dieppe', *Royal United Services Institute Journal* 126/1 (March 1981), 83-4; Major-General Cyril Lloyd, who was at the Canadian Field Headquarters, Leatherhead, 'vividly remembers' McNaughton saying 'it was high time that the Canadians were "blooded" and it was he who pressed hard for the Canadians to have sole responsibility for the raid', Letter to the Editor, 'Comments on Stacey letter', *Royal United Services Institute Journal* 126/1 (March 1981), 84.

³⁴ Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.308; Stacey, Letter to the Editor, 'Canadians at Dieppe', 83-4. Recent works supporting Crerar's responsibility for Dieppe are Jack L. Granatstein, *The generals: the Canadian Army's senior commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), pp.102-3; and Whitaker, *Dieppe: tragedy to triumph*, pp.73-5; those implicating both Crerar and McNaughton are Villa, *Unauthorized action*, pp.224-7; David J. Bercuson, 'The agony of Dieppe', in *Maple leaf against the Axis: Canada's Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1995), pp.66-7, 75; Terry Copp, 'Dieppe', in *A Canadian's guide to the battlefields of Northwest Europe* (Waterloo: The Canadian Battle of Normandy Foundation/Wilfrid Laurier University, 1995), p.35; Peter J. Henshaw's three articles, 'The Dieppe raid: Montgomery's role reassessed', in *Perspectives on warfighting. Selected papers from the 1992 (59th annual) meeting of the Society for Military History*, ed. Donald F. Bittner, 3 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Command and Staff College Foundation, 1994), 193-4; 'The Dieppe raid: the quest for action for all the wrong reasons', *Queen's Quarterly* 101/1 (Spring 1994), 106; and 'The Dieppe raid: a product of misplaced Canadian nationalism', *The Canadian Historical Review* 77/2 (June 1996), 250-66.

³⁵ Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.224; Whitaker, *Dieppe: tragedy to triumph*, p.74.

On 5 February Crerar wrote to Montgomery that the Canadian Corps' 'static' role in the last year was 'not of its choosing', and that during the upcoming raiding season, 'it would be in the general interest if a very high proportion of these prospective raids, if not the total, should be undertaken' by Canadian units. He went on that the Corps would receive a 'great stimulus if, in the near future, it succeeded in making a name for itself for its raiding activities'. Two days later Montgomery replied that he hoped to receive some assault craft the following month, some of which he would allot to Newhaven so that Crerar could run his 'own raiding activities from there'. He added that 'Your men should be quite first class at raiding'. Villa states that Crerar, 'either suspecting that he was getting the polite run-around, or determined to clinch matters', decided to approach a higher authority.³⁶

On 1 March he met with Brooke who agreed to the 'importance' of Canadian troops being used in 'future raids' and that Crerar should meet with Mountbatten, to discuss 'ways and means'. A week later Crerar was invited by Mountbatten for lunch at the Naval and Military Club. Also present were the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (DCIGS), Lt-Gen. Archibald E. Nye and Brigadier Simonds, who took notes of the meeting.³⁷

Crerar opened by saying he had received permission from the GOC-in-C, South-Eastern Command, Montgomery, and the CIGS, to discuss with

³⁶ Crerar to Montgomery, 5 February 1942, 'Possibility of Canadian troops taking part in raids', NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D2)/ GOC 1-0-4, Operations - Raids, Part I(a), Correspondence re Training, fol.1; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.308; Villa states that this letter was a 'blistering reaction' by Crerar caused by 'British resistance to giving Canadians the lead in raiding operations', *Unauthorized action*, pp.224-5; Montgomery to Crerar, 8 February 1942, NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D2)/ GOC 1-0-4, Operations - Raids, Part I(a), Correspondence re Training, fol.2.

³⁷ Meeting of 1 March is noted in Brigadier G.G. Simonds, 'Notes on conferences held on 6 March 1942', NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D2)/ GOC 1-0-4, Operations - Raids, Part I(a), Correspondence re Training, fol.3.

Mountbatten, arrangements for raids using Canadians. He explained that the COHQ plan to have a series of raids through the year had not come about so far due to the scarcity of landing craft. He went on that Canadian troops in the UK had been inactive for over two and a half years and that if the present situation continued that it would have serious effects on morale in the Canadian Corps. He warned of possible long-term repercussions on recruiting in Canada and the probable effects on the US attitude to sending troops to Europe. General Nye concurred with Crerar although Mountbatten initially disagreed. Villa states that it was 'undoubtedly the memory of this meeting' that caused Simonds to claim after the war that, 'I know for facts [*sic*] that as soon as Crerar heard of the Dieppe project, he brought every pressure he could bring to bear on the British Chiefs of Staff, and even Churchill himself: (a) To nominate Canadian troops for the operation [and] (b) To have the operation carried out'. Simonds continued that in making the decision to use Canadian troops to execute the operation, and to revive it after it had been cancelled, 'Crerar was a prime mover, and his influence was probably paramount'.³⁸

Mountbatten commented that Crerar's proposal to use only Canadian troops 'ran counter to the policy' which he had agreed with C-in-C Home Forces, which was that raids were to be carried out by his Commandos and that any 'Army representation would take the form of "dilution" of the raiding

³⁸ Brigadier G.G. Simonds, 'Notes on conferences held on 6 March 1942', NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D2)/ GOC 1-0-4, Operations – Raids, Part I(a), Correspondence re Training, fol.3. Curiously both Villa and the Whitakers have stated that Crerar's meeting on 6 March was with the CIGS when it was actually with the DCIGS: the Whitakers write 'on March 6 Crerar made Brooke the key convert in his campaign', *Dieppe: tragedy to triumph*, p.74; Villa states 'On March 6 he was making his case strongly... in the office of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke', *Unauthorized action*, p.225. On Simonds's post-war recollections see Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.301, fn.25; Simonds to Stacey, 10 February 1969, UTA, CSP/054, copy in NAC, JHHP, MG 30 E463.

Commandos'. Villa states this was as close as he could come without being offensive, to implying that the Canadians were inexperienced. In the end, Mountbatten had no choice but to agree, since Nye supported Crerar. Simonds's notes of the meeting record that Mountbatten 'appreciated the special position of Canadian troops' and would agree to a 'purely Canadian enterprise, provided the C-in-C Home Forces would also agree'. Mountbatten added that he would also detail the recently arrived Canadian landing craft flotilla, if their training could be speeded up, to train with the Canadian troops.³⁹

Within a few days correspondence was being exchanged between the BGS, 1 Canadian Corps and COHQ, concerning the amphibious training of about one hundred and ninety men from 2 Canadian Infantry Division (CID) in Scotland. Training instructions and an outline training plan were also issued. On 14 March Paget visited Crerar and they discussed the arrangements that had been made with Mountbatten concerning Canadian preparation for a raid. Simonds account of the meeting noted that Paget 'had no objection to the arrangements'.⁴⁰

Just before McNaughton's return from Canada to the UK Crerar met with Mountbatten again. 'Dieppe was specifically mentioned and Crerar urged that it should be undertaken by Canadian troops'. Simonds noted that for reasons of military protocol, all three agreed to not talk of the plans for the

³⁹ Brigadier G.G. Simonds, 'Notes on conferences held on 6 March 1942', NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D2)/ GOC 1-0-4, Operations - Raids, Part I(a), Correspondence re Training, fol.3; Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.301, fn.26; see also Whitaker, *Dieppe: tragedy to triumph*, p.74.

⁴⁰ See correspondence concerning training from 9-23 March 1942, fols.4-7, 9,-10 and Brigadier G.G. Simonds, 'Memo - Gen. Paget approves arrangements for Canadian participation in raids', 15 March 1942, NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D2)/ GOC 1-0-4, Operations - Raids, Part I(a), Correspondence re Training, fol.8.

Canadians 'until a request for Canadian troops had been formally made to General McNaughton'.⁴¹

On McNaughton's return in early April 1942, now as GOC-in-C of the newly constituted First Canadian Army Overseas, he had several meetings with Mountbatten concerning Canadians taking part in raids in an attempt 'to clinch the accord'. His and Crerar's many months of pressure finally paid off when on 30 April Montgomery officially informed McNaughton of the nomination of Canadian troops for *Rutter*.⁴²

At this meeting Montgomery explained that he had been told by Paget about the Dieppe project and that the single division required was to come from South-Eastern Command. Although he had been 'pressed to agree to a composite British and Canadian Force', he told Paget that it was essential to maintain unity of command and that in his opinion the Canadian troops 'were those best suited', and Paget accepted this. Montgomery then informed McNaughton that Crerar had already been approached and had nominated 2 CID. McNaughton confirmed the selection 'subject to details of plans being satisfactory and receiving his approval'. They agreed that Montgomery should go ahead with the preparation of the plans and that he should advise the GOC 2 CID, Maj.-Gen. J.H. 'Ham' Roberts, that he could begin work on plans in conjunction with the CCO, Mountbatten. The same day HQ, 1 Canadian Corps issued 'Training Instruction No. 9', a combined operations training program beginning with 2 CID and continuing with 1 and 3 CIDs. This was done as security cover to squash any speculation or

⁴¹ Simonds to Mountbatten, 22 January 1969 and Mountbatten to Simonds, 4 February 1969, NAC, JHHP, MG 30 E463, quoted in Whitaker, *Dieppe: tragedy to triumph*, p.75.

⁴² McNaughton's visits to COHQ in April and the meeting of 30 April are recorded in his War Diary, NAC, MG 30 E 133/248, quoted in Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.226 ['clinch the accord'].

discussion about the special training 2 CID was to undertake on the Isle of Wight.⁴³

That same evening McNaughton sent a 'Most Secret' personal cable to the CGS in Ottawa, concerning the authority he had been given in October 1941 to use Canadian troops in 'minor' operations without receiving special permission. It stated that 'Plans are now being made which involve operations... on a scale which cannot properly be classed as 'minor'. He requested that his powers over raiding be increased by deleting the word 'minor' from the phrase 'minor projects of a temporary nature'. The War Committee approved this on 1 May 1942, noting that this was subject to the same conditions as required for the Spitsbergen operation, which were that the operation had the approval of the British government and that the prospects of success justified the risks. The next day McNaughton received a cable to this effect from the Vice-Chief of the General Staff (VCGS), Maj.-Gen. J.C. Murchie.⁴⁴

King, the Canadian Prime Minister, was inclined to refuse McNaughton's request, writing in his diary that 'It was essential that no such operations be undertaken without adequate preparations and a full appreciation of all the factors involved, including the extent of the Forces available and the opposition that might be anticipated'. Ralston assured the

⁴³ Lt-Col G.P. Henderson, 'Notes of a meeting between Lt-Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton and Lt-Gen. B.L. Montgomery at HQ First Cdn Army 1000 hrs 30 April 42 (given to Lieutenant-Colonel G.P. Henderson by Lt-Gen. McNaughton at 1600 hrs 30 April 42)', NAC, RG 24 C17/13611/GS, First Canadian Army HQ War Diary, July 1942/T6672; Simonds to Haydon, 13 April 1942, NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D2); Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.329.

⁴⁴ Stacey, *Six years of war*, pp.332-3; Charles P. Stacey, 'The operation at Dieppe, 19 August 1942: communications to and from Canada concerning the operation', CMHQ Historical Officer Special Report, 11 February 1943, pp.1-2, DHist 594.013; Defensor [Murchie] to Canmilitary [McNaughton], telegram CGS 180, 2 May 1942, NAC, Hon. J.L. Ralston Papers (RP), MG 27 III BII/51/ McNaughton's General Correspondence 1939-1945.

COS that the operation would only be on the same scale as the Spitsbergen operation, after which the Committee gave approval for 'a brigade or possibly larger', and also requested additional information.⁴⁵

Villa describes - Ralston subsequently 'downplayed' his request that McNaughton elaborate on the operation and McNaughton, for his part, continued to be 'guarded', replying that 'the largest project in contemplation... at present [*Rutter*] might involve up to three brigades which might all be Canadian'. If the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had had any doubts about the operation, they could have questioned Mountbatten during his meeting with them on 11 June but the minutes make no reference to a division size raid, let alone to *Rutter*, scheduled to take place ten days later. It is significant to note that at this time the War Committee still did not know the date or location of *Rutter*. Stacey explains that in the 'interests of security, no information as to the time or place of the raid was requested by or sent to Canada'.⁴⁶

After the British COS approved the outline plan for *Rutter* on 13 May, McNaughton informed the CGS of this and that he was content with the 'Higher organization for the planning of combined operations'. Concerning the present operation, he further explained that he was satisfied that: '(a) objective is worthwhile (b) land forces detailed are sufficient (c) sea and air forces adequate (d) arrangements for operation satisfactory'. He concluded

⁴⁵ Cabinet War Committee minutes of 1 May, Privy Council records, copy in Department of External Affairs files, NAC, II/4/6; and King Diary, 1 May 1942, NAC, MG 26 J13 1942, both quoted in Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.227.

⁴⁶ Canmilitary to Defensor, telegram GS 1541, 6 May 1942, NAC, RP, MG 27 III BII/51/ McNaughton's General Correspondence 1939-1945; Villa states McNaughton was somewhat 'disingenuous' as three brigades were in effect a division, and he may have been hoping that the civilian Committee would underestimate the size of a brigade. Minutes, Canadian Chiefs of Staff with Mountbatten, 11 June 1942, DHist, quoted in Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.227; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.333.

that he had approved the outline plan, had ordered detailed planning to begin and finally stressed the need for absolute secrecy. The same evening Murchie cabled McNaughton that he had 'confidence' in McNaughton's judgement and that the War Committee 'confirmed authority' for the operation. The cable finished by saying that secrecy would be 'meticulously observed' and that the War Committee would 'appreciate any information which may be from time to time communicable'.⁴⁷

RUTTER AND JUBILEE OUTLINE PLANS

Before continuing with the procedural changes for implementing raids in general, and *Rutter* in particular, it is necessary to examine why Dieppe was chosen in the first place, and who was responsible for the adoption of a frontal assault contained in the outline plan that was submitted to the COS. As was explained previously, a series of raids was planned for the spring and summer of 1942. Although many of them failed to develop, *Rutter* stayed on the books. Home Forces had previously submitted a report on the problem of a full-scale invasion of the continent. It outlined seizing about six French ports and exploiting only those where there was initial success. Hughes-Hallett, in a 1946 interview with Stacey, explained that with this background in mind, the projected raid on Dieppe 'assumed special importance from the experimental point of view', especially since it was not one of those ports named in the plan. An ex-COHQ officer, Bernard Fergusson, confirms this conclusion: 'A final reason for choosing Dieppe was the fact that the planners had already ruled it out as a desirable place to

⁴⁷ Canmilitary to Defensor, telegram GS 1658, 15 May 1942; Defensor to Canmilitary, telegram CGS 197, 15 May 1942. NAC, RP, MG 27 III BII/51/ McNaughton's General Correspondence 1939-1945.

capture in the early stages of a real invasion, and we should therefore be giving nothing away by raiding it now'.⁴⁸

The prevailing conception in the higher command circles was that any invasion would depend on seizing ports in working condition at the very start. *Rutter* offered a much needed opportunity to carry out a test of a divisional size raid on a port. Since the disastrous 1915 Gallipoli landings no large-scale amphibious^a operations had occurred. Brigadier Antony H. Head, Military Adviser Combined Operations^a (MACO), stated, 'a practical test of equipment and technique under battle conditions was considered essential'. Similarly, in a 1967 television interview Hughes-Hallett explained:

Dieppe was chosen for no particular reason originally except that it was a small sea port and we thought it would be interesting to do – to capture – a small sea port for a short time and then withdraw... It was not thought to be of any particular military importance... and it appeared... that it would be about the scale of objective that would be suitable for a divisional attack... but I must impress that we were raiding for the sake of raiding... There was no particular significance attachable to the places that were chosen.⁴⁹

Other key factors in the choice of Dieppe were that it was the only deep water port within effective range of shore based fighter aircraft and had the only suitable gorges in the steep coastal cliffs and beaches where flank landings could be put in.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ 'Memorandum of Interview with Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, 29 and 30 September 1946', 1 October 1946, Appendix A, pp.1-2, CMHQ Historical Report No.159, DHist; Fergusson, *The Watery Maze*, p.169.

⁴⁹ Commenting on the operation as a test, Hughes-Hallett writes, 'the Raid had the further tactical object of testing a method of divisional attack on a small port, which was currently popular with Army thought at Whitehall', Hughes-Hallett to Mountbatten, Letter 27 June 1962, IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/10; 'Memorandum of Conversation with Brigadier A.H. Head, 15 March 1946', 22 March 1946, Appendix B, pp.1-2, CMHQ Historical Report No.153, DHist; Hughes-Hallett, 1967 interview with John Secundari, transcript, University of Southampton Library Archives (USLA), Mountbatten Papers (MBP), MB1 67. An undated COHQ war-time document referring to the selection states, 'Dieppe was chosen since it was on the extreme edge of the "advantageous area". It was, therefore thought to be not so heavily defended as, for example, Calais or Boulogne'. Quoted in 'Operation *Jubilee*. Lecture to Staff Colleges. Notes for CCO', p.1, PRO, DEFE 2/324.

⁵⁰ Hunt and Schurman, 'Prelude to Dieppe', p.204.

The earliest references to Dieppe/*Rutter* in a primary source are in the Combined Operations War Diary but this was compiled *after* the raid or possibly the war. The references do not necessarily refer to a particular operation until they mention Dieppe from 3 April 1942. These reports concern intelligence about German defences received by COHQ as early as 26 November 1941 and in March and April 1942. They are probably not so significant since during this period COHQ also received similar intelligence information about many other French ports.⁵¹

Stacey claims that the 'Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid', produced in October 1942 under Mountbatten's direction, says that the 'first meeting to consider a definite plan took place on 3 April' 1942. Curiously, this author has been unable to find this reference in the Combined Report, however it does state, which Stacey correctly quotes, that the idea of a raid on Dieppe was first contemplated in 'early April 1942'. The same wording is used in the unpublished confidential print by COHQ's successor organisation, Amphibious Warfare HQ, entitled, 'The history of Combined Operations organization' (1956), and a unpublished Confidential Book, compiled by the Admiralty Historical Section, 'Raid on Dieppe (Naval Operations) 19 August 1942', BR 1736 (26) Naval Staff History, Second World War, Battle Summary No. 33 (revised 1959). This last report claims

⁵¹ COHQ War Diary entries about Dieppe are:

26 November 1941 Operation *Rutter* - A report was received from NID [Naval Intelligence Division] giving information re. enemy defences;

3 March 1942 Operation *Rutter* - Information was received from GHQ (I) re. position of enemy guns;

18 March 1942 Operation *Rutter* - Information was received from NID re. blocking of the harbour entrance;

3 April 1942 Operation *Rutter* - A report from Intelligence at Home Forces gave details of the landing beaches; the MEW [Ministry of Economic Warfare] gave economic information concerning Dieppe;

4 April 1942 Operation *Rutter* - Information received re. HQ in the Dieppe area;

8 April 1942 Operation *Rutter* - Further intelligence information on the Dieppe area was received;

8 April 1942 Operation *Rutter* - The DNI [Director of Naval Intelligence] sent information about *Hotel Moderne*;

COHQ, War Diary, PRO, DEFE 2/2-3. Villa states that Walter Skrine's Papers later formed 'the heart of the official COHQ *Rutter* files' and that the COHQ War Diaries are based on these, personal information from Brian Villa, also see *Unauthorized action*, p.198.

that 'It is probable that verbal discussions of which there is no written record' took place at COHQ in March. An alternative draft of the same section, states that the 'possibilities of an attack were first investigated in March 1942 and before the end of the month the Planning Staff of Combined Operations – under the general direction of Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, RN – began to prepare an outline plan'. Stacey warns that the COHQ records concerning the planning are 'exiguous and incomplete', and although these and other details may be 'authentic', they were 'presumably added from memory' after the operation.⁵²

Since no definite date can be set concerning when Dieppe was suggested as an objective, due to the fragmentary record, one is left with the COHQ claim that the Target Committee of COHQ first *seriously* examined the project in early April. At this time GHQ Home Forces was concerned that it was gradually losing control over its forces, which were to be used in combined operations, to the increasingly independent Canadian Army and ever expanding COHQ. Anxious to maintain some degree of control, or face the possibility of having no, or a limited, part in the final invasion of the continent, Home Forces insisted that it must approve and have input into any project using forces under its command. Therefore from 14 April staff officers from GHQ, Home Forces, officially joined the planning syndicate of COHQ in accordance with the procedure approved by the COS on 30 March 1942.

⁵² Stacey, *Six years of war*, pp.327; Combined Operations Headquarters, 'Combined Report on the Dieppe raid', BR 1887 (formerly CB 04244), October 1942, London, Whitehall: COHQ, p.2, DHist, 594.013 (D1); Amphibious Warfare Headquarters, 'History of Combined Operations Organization', London: Ministry of Defence, 1956, p.37; and Admiralty, 'Raid on Dieppe (Naval Operations) 19 August 1942', BR 1736 (26) Naval Staff History, Second World War, Battle Summary No.33, revised 31 December 1959 [released 1990], London: Admiralty Historical Section, p.3, PRO ADM 234/355; Mountbatten to Charles Haydon, Letter 16 July 1958 and enclosure 'Second alternative draft for paragraph 3 – Origin of the plan', by Hughes-Hallett, IWM, Haydon Papers, IV.

Also on 14 April 1942 was a meeting at COHQ to discuss *Rutter*, which was attended by a representative of GHQ, Home Forces, Brigadier C.V. McNabb. Stacey states this meeting's minutes is the 'earliest paper that appears to have been preserved' discussing the *Rutter* planning. The minutes make no mention of a frontal assault and only state that Hughes-Hallett, in his position as Naval Adviser to COHQ, gave a 'brief outline of the plan for the operation'; that it was agreed that the operation was 'attractive' and 'worthwhile'; and that the project should receive 'further examination' by COHQ Advisers and a Home Forces representative.⁵³

Some kind of examination must have been carried out by the COHQ Military Planning Syndicate, which probably included a Home Forces representative, as three days later an unsigned document was produced entitled 'Appreciation from point of view of the raid planning staff (military) on the proposed Operation *Rutter*'. Although it contains the proviso that it was produced without 'any exact information' regarding German defences and order of battle, a frontal attack is clearly indicated, with flank attacks and a 'heavy air bombardment' of the 'houses and sea front', immediately before the arrival of the first assault troops. Tanks were also to support the frontal assault. Although use of tanks during street fighting, it warned, seemed 'inadvisable', the presence of tanks to assist in 'mopping up the town' and to 'hold off' enemy armoured units was considered 'essential'.⁵⁴

⁵³ Henshaw, 'The Dieppe raid: Montgomery's role reassessed', 189; COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.2; 'Minutes of meeting held at Combined Operations Headquarters at 1100 hours 14.4.42 to discuss Operation *Rutter*', 18 April 1942, quoted in Charles P. Stacey, 'Operation *Jubilee*: the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942. New light on early planning', 22 March 1946, Appendix A, CMHQ Historical Section Report No.153, DHist.

⁵⁴ This early appreciation made the interesting suggestion of Puy as a 'possible landing' point for motor transport and 'perhaps a few light cruiser tanks', 'Appreciation from point of view of the raid planning staff (military) on the proposed Operation *Rutter*', 17 April 1942, Appendix A, CMHQ Historical Section Report No.153, DHist.

A further document, 'Operation *Rutter* and *Jubilee*: Notes on principal changes in the military plan', dated 14 September 1942, also seems to shed some light on the decision to adopt the frontal assault. Stacey points out its date is almost a month after the operation and five months after the events described, and therefore must be regarded with caution. It describes that 'about' the 18 April 1942 two alternative outline plans were prepared by the Planning Syndicate. The first was similar to the final *Jubilee* plan of a frontal assault with flank attacks. The other had no frontal assault at all and instead envisaged landing two battalions each at Puy and Pourville, one battalion and the tank battalion at Quiberville, while holding the last battalion in floating reserve. A 'verbal discussion (of which there is no written record)' was held at COHQ 'about the 18 April' to discuss the two plans. Besides Major-General J.C. Haydon, who was the Vice Chief Combined Operations (VCCO), and GOC Airborne Division, two Home Forces representatives also took part, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, GHQ Home Forces (DCGS), Major-General P.G.S. Gregson-Ellis, and Brigadier McNabb. They unanimously agreed that 'on balance there were advantages in taking the town by a frontal assault', which was the plan finally adopted. The document warns that the Naval Adviser, Hughes-Hallett, who did not attend this meeting, regarded the frontal assault as 'unduly hazardous'. The reasons given for selecting the frontal assault were that the loss of time caused by the flank landings would 'make a surprise attack on the town more difficult to achieve', and that the tanks that landed at Quiberville 'would have to cross three [actually two] rivers - all anti-tank obstacles'. Stacey adds that this

entailed capturing the bridges in advance and that it was not certain whether they could support a Churchill tank.⁵⁵

The conclusions of a meeting held on 21 April, attended by one Home Forces representative, Major R. Fanshawe, state that the previously mentioned outline plans that were 'suggested' to the GOC Airborne Division and the DCGS, Home Forces by the VCCO the previous day, had to be altered for naval reasons. The minutes show that by the 20 April, a direct frontal assault on the town, supported by tanks, had been agreed upon, as well as using parachute and glider troops. Tanks would not now be landed at Pourville as the beach there seemed 'to be more difficult than was supposed at first'. A heavy air bombardment of the sea-front and town generally was also included in the plan.⁵⁶

The Combined Report, 'The history of Combined Operations Organization', and the Admiralty Battle Summary all claim that the question of a frontal assault was discussed at the first formal meeting to discuss the newly named operation *Rutter* on 25 April. The meeting was chaired by Mountbatten and Home Forces was represented by Maj.-Gen. Gregson-Ellis and Major W. Goronwy Rees, who was Montgomery's personal liaison officer at COHQ, and charged with keeping him personally informed of events. The histories, all produced under the auspices of COHQ and hence Mountbatten, make the case that the Army's plan of a frontal assault was chosen over the COHQ plan for flank attacks. The minutes of the meeting do not indicate that the question was discussed at all and only say that Hughes-Hallett

⁵⁵ Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.328; 'Operation *Rutter* and *Jubilee*: Notes on principal changes in the military plan', G.2 P.1. to VCCO [Vice-Chief of Combined Operations], 14 September 1942, in Stacey, Appendix A, CMHQ Historical Section Report No.153, DHist.

⁵⁶ 'Operation *Rutter*: conclusions of meeting held at COHQ on Tuesday, 21 April', in Stacey, Appendix A, CMHQ Report No.153, DHist.

'explained the draft of the outline plan which, with minor amendments, was approved'. Stacey notes that the source for the claims is the unreliable document of 14 September. Thus the contemporary documentary evidence demonstrates that both Home Forces planners *and* COHQ planners were responsible for the adoption of a frontal assault, supported by heavy air bombardment, in the initial outline plan, which was approved by Mountbatten before being submitted to the COS.⁵⁷

GHQ HOME FORCES AND MONTGOMERY ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY

In 1958, while Montgomery was in the process of getting his memoirs published, it came to Mountbatten's attention that they contained serious criticisms of COHQ and its part in the planning for Dieppe. He thus used his position as naval Chief of Staff to instigate a revision of the Admiralty Battle Summary 'Raid on Dieppe' (1946), to bring it in line with the other official COHQ publications, 'The history of Combined Operations organization' and the Combined Report, concerning Home Forces and Montgomery's responsibility for the formation of the outline plan, particularly concerning the adoption of the frontal assault. In referring to the 14 April meeting the Combined Report states, 'shortly afterwards', the C-in-C, Home Forces, delegated his authority for this raid to Montgomery, as he was GOC-in-C, South-Eastern Command, to which 2 CID was subordinate. The Combined

⁵⁷ COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.2; Amphibious Warfare HQ, 'The history of Combined Operations', p.38; Admiralty, Battle Summary (1959), p.4; J.M. Gray, Plan/Sec., 'Minutes of meeting held at 1100 hours Saturday 25th April at COHQ to discuss Operation *Rutter*', 28 April 1942; and 'Operation *Rutter* and *Jubilee*: Notes on principal changes in the military plan', G.2 P.1. to VCCO, 14 September 1942, both in Stacey, CMHQ Report No.153, Appendix A, DHist. In paragraph 4 of the Report Stacey notes that the latter document mistakenly states that the meeting of 25 April was on the 24.

Report continues 'From that moment he became closely associated with the military side of the planning and attended the principal meetings of the planners'. 'The history of Combined Operations organization' uses the exact same wording. (The source for these allegations is the previously mentioned, somewhat dubious document of 14 September, 'Notes on principal changes in the military plan'.) However, the 1946 version of the Admiralty Battle Summary does not mention 'Army representatives' attending any meetings until 25 April, by which time an outline plan had previously been formulated and a frontal assault already decided on. Montgomery is not shown to be involved until he chaired a meeting on 5 June, and rightly so, as he was commander of a subordinate command to Home Forces and thus not part of its GHQ staff.⁵⁸

Mountbatten persuaded Hughes-Hallett to compose an alternative version of the planning section of the 1946 Battle Summary which was similar to the Combined Report. Home Forces and Montgomery, it implied, were responsible for adopting the frontal assault while COHQ was absolved from any responsibility. This version was passed around to veterans of the COHQ planning staff, including Haydon, Major Walter H. Skrine, and Major Robert Henriques for their comments. In a letter to Haydon concerning the draft, Mountbatten explained that 'it was on the insistence of the Army Authorities that the original COHQ plan of two big flank landings was

⁵⁸ COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.2; Amphibious Warfare HQ, 'The history of Combined Operations', p.35; Admiralty, 'Raid on Dieppe (naval movements) 19 August 1942', CB 3081 (26) Naval Staff History, Second World War, Battle Summary No. 33, February 1946, London: Admiralty Historical Section, Tactical and Staff Duties Division, p.2, PRO, ADM 234/354; the source for these histories claiming Home Forces and Montgomery's responsibility is 'Operation *Rutter* and *Jubilee*: Notes on principal changes in the military plan', G.2 P.1. to VCCO, 14 September 1942, DHist, CMHQ Report No.153, Appendix A. For a very illuminating description of the attempts of Mountbatten, COHQ and historians to distort Montgomery's role see Henshaw, 'The Dieppe raid: Montgomery's role reassessed', 187-201.

changed so that the whole Army effort was put into a frontal assault'. He requested that Haydon reword this section 'to put the responsibility for suggesting these changes fairly and squarely where it belongs'.⁵⁹

From the correspondence it is difficult to tell what Haydon's opinion was but from one of his last letters to Mountbatten concerning the matter, he seems to not want to cause any waves. Concerning the original COHQ plan, which was forwarded in 'amended form' to the COS, he writes that 'all parties, at that stage, were agreed on landings in darkness preceded by heavy air bombardment'. 'All parties' would seem to be both COHQ and Home Force planners, and could include Montgomery as well, but he is never mentioned.⁶⁰

Skrine could not agree that Montgomery had any influence on the outline plan before 5 June. Skrine recalls in a letter to Haydon that 'I can not however agree that the idea of the frontal attack was suggested by Monty in the first instance. I can only remember him attending one conference at COHQ [5 June], when the outline plan was firm and I think had received the blessing of the Chiefs of Staff'. Later in the same letter he again states he could not agree but does say 'it is conceivable that Monty had a hand in discussing the project in March but I never heard of this, at any time, before reading Admiral Hughes-Hallett's draft' on the origin of the plan. A second letter to Haydon concerns the Hughes-Hallett draft and confirms his previous recollections:

My personal view about Monty's part remains unchanged. I believe he did not come into the picture until after the Chiefs of Staff had approved the plan, as originally

⁵⁹ Mountbatten to Haydon, 16 July 1958, IWM, Haydon Papers IV.

⁶⁰ Haydon to Mountbatten, 25 September 1958, IWM, Haydon Papers IV; Skrine to Mountbatten, 29 June 1962, University of Reading Archives (URA), Henriques Papers (RHP), HEN 92; for more of the same see Skrine to Henriques, 6 July 1963, URA, RHP, HEN 115.

conceived, and I do not see how he could be blamed for the subsequent alterations in what was a joint plan... Monty lay low throughout.⁶¹

Finally, in a nine page letter to Mountbatten dealing with the planning, Skrine makes the point crystal clear. This letter, and others, from the personal papers of Maj. Robert Henriques have not been examined previously in analysing this debate. Skrine adamantly declared:

the responsibility for suggesting the frontal assault cannot be placed solely on the shoulders of HQ Home Forces... [and] at no time did I have an impression that Home Forces planners were the only ones who doubted the feasibility of taking Dieppe by assaults from the flanks.

Home Forces were quite ready to take the lead from us in any plan that could be found workable. I think therefore that the military (planners) in COHQ were quite as much responsible for the idea of a frontal assault on Dieppe as the Home Forces planners. I hate having to admit this but I am certain it is right... I think that the [Combined] Report was not very precise on this subject.

Skrine sums up by commenting again that Home Forces were 'not entirely to blame' for the frontal assault and that he did not think Montgomery was either.⁶²

Henriques, in a letter to Haydon, seems to also confirm that Montgomery became involved only after he attended his first meeting on 5 June after which planning responsibility 'passed from COHQ to Montgomery and the Force Commanders'. Henriques goes on that it was at this point that the decision was made to make the frontal attack, 'which we had always said was out of the question'.⁶³

⁶¹ Skrine to Haydon, 14 October 1958, IWM, Haydon Papers IV.

⁶² Skrine to Mountbatten, 29 June 1962, URA, RHP, HEN 92.

⁶³ Henriques to Haydon, 12 August 1958, IWM, Haydon Papers IV. In a letter to Mountbatten in 1965 he emphasised that 'when the plan left COHQ, it specified assaults under cover of darkness with heavy bomber support and naval support, and of course with no frontal assault on the esplanade', Henriques to Mountbatten, 30 July 1965, URA, RHP, HEN 115.

Henriques contradicts himself, since in 1952 he wrote to Haydon, concerning 'The history of Combined Operations organization', saying that it is:

rather off the rails as regards the changes in the Dieppe planning. The issue was less one of 'frontal attack' versus flank attacks, than of daylight and dark. We were prepared to agree to a frontal attack (as far as I remember) provided it took place before dawn and was preceded by a heavy Naval and Air bombardment.

Henriques to Haydon, 4 February 1952, URA, RHP, HEN 94.

In the end, Skrine^S and Henriques' objections were ignored and Hughes-Hallett produced a final draft that specifically fingered Montgomery and Home Forces and exonerated COHQ. The relevant sections state Montgomery 'at once criticized the military plan' and proposed 'a dawn frontal assault'. Concerning Home Forces influence, it states that at the 18 April meeting, when the two alternative plans were discussed, 'the weight of Army opinion' favoured the frontal assault option, and at the 25 April meeting, it recounts that the 'Army representatives explained the reasons which led them to favour this form of attack'.⁶⁴

Mountbatten continued throughout his life to blame Montgomery and Home Forces although it has to be recognized that he held this view at an early stage, even if it was not correct. Less than a month after the raid, Vincent Massey, the Canadian High Commissioner, invited Mountbatten for dinner. His diary entry of the evening records that Mountbatten 'told me, very privately of course, that there had been a change of plan as a result of the views of the soldiers'. The original plan of landing 'strong forces on either flank and to strike at Dieppe from the rear' had been changed 'for the plan of a frontal attack on the town from the beaches'.⁶⁵

In the 1962 CBC documentary on Dieppe both Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett were interviewed. Mountbatten's final draft notes for the occasion state that the 'Army planners decided for technical reasons such as the terrain and the time factor... that a frontal assault preceded by a short

⁶⁴ Admiralty, *Battle Summary* (1959), p.4.

⁶⁵ Vincent Massey Diary, 14 September 1942, University of Toronto Archives (UTA), Vincent Massey Papers (VMP), B1: A33.01.07.

intense air bombardment offered the best chance of success'. Hughes-Hallett repeated these claims in his own interview and in his later memoirs.⁶⁶

In 1967 in a letter to *The Sunday Telegraph*, Wallace Reyburn, a reporter who was on one of the HQ ships on the raid, criticized the planning and blamed COHQ, and Mountbatten indirectly. An exchange of correspondence between Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett resulted in the latter sending two replies to the Editor-in-chief, shifting the blame to Montgomery and Home Forces. In 1973 Mountbatten, in an address to the Dieppe Veterans and Prisoners of War Association in Toronto, and in a statement on Radio-Québec, repeated these claims of Montgomery's responsibility.⁶⁷

These claims were given new life with the publication of the official biography of Mountbatten by the reputable historian Phillip Ziegler, who, as Peter Henshaw notes, has 'accepted Hughes-Hallett's memoirs as gospel', and also by the Whitakers, who, Henshaw says, did the same. The Whitakers claim 'There is indisputable archival evidence' indicating that he 'either

⁶⁶ 'Draft notes for Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten of Burma's CBC TV interview on Dieppe', 1962, UAR, RHP, HEN 92; final draft is Louis Mountbatten, 'Dieppe: Mountbatten's view [transcript of 1962 CBC interview]', *The Legionary* (October 1962), 12; for Hughes-Hallett's claims see Henshaw, 'The Dieppe raid: Montgomery's role reassessed', 192; and Ray Hickly to McNaughton, 24 January 1962, enclosing James Senter, *Globe and Mail*, Hughes-Hallett comments on Dieppe, pp.3-4.

⁶⁷ Wallace Reyburn to the Editor, *Sunday Telegraph*, 27 August and 17 September 1967, Hughes-Hallett to the Editor, 7, 10 and 26 September 1967, NAC, JHHP, MG 30 E/163/6; Mountbatten to Hughes-Hallett, 18 September 1967, and suggested reply to Editor to Reyburn 27 August letter, UTA, CSP/062; in correspondence to his researcher, David McIntosh, Stacey states, 'Strange things went on in Mountbatten's mind about the Outline Plan', Stacey to McIntosh, 10 May 1985; McIntosh replies that he is including the letter of Mountbatten 'orchestrating' Hughes-Hallett's replies to 'upstart Wally Reyburn', 23 May 1985, both in UTA, CSP/062; Lord Louis Mountbatten, transcript of speech to Dieppe Veterans and Prisoners of War Association 30 September, 'Dieppe: the inside story', *Legion Magazine* 48/6 (November 1973), 10-45; 'Mountbatten implies Montgomery okayed Dieppe attack plan', 1 October 1973, *Toronto Star*, and Glenn Platt, 'Mountbatten blames Monty for Dieppe catastrophe', 30 September 1973, *The Sunday Sun*, Toronto, both in UTA, CSP/044; Lord Mountbatten of Burma's declaration on Radio-Québec, c. 1973, p.80, Toronto, Terence Macartney-Filgate Dieppe Collection (TMFDC), Mountbatten File.

suggested or actively promoted the changes to *Rutter*. They continue that he 'insisted on the changes to the original Dieppe plan' and 'proposed the switch from a flank attack' to a frontal attack. They conclude by claiming that from the very first meetings at COHQ until its final execution, 'it remained 'Monty's plan'.⁶⁸

As has been shown Montgomery had very little influence, if any, on the original outline plan before 5 June. As Henriques recalls, Montgomery preferred to let Roberts and his staff handle the detailed military planning, and therefore 'stepped in and more or less kicked out the COHQ [military] Planners'. Skrine remembers that he felt 'too many cooks spoiled this broth'. Skrine also states that he considered 'Monty was doing his best not to interfere' and could see that Roberts was being 'harassed' by visits from people such as McNaughton and Crerar. Henriques makes the provocative statement that initially Montgomery:

came into the picture, not as 'a senior officer nominated by the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces' – although this may have been the reason formally recorded in the Chiefs of Staff minutes – but because it was decided for political reasons to employ the Canadians who were in South-Eastern Command.⁶⁹

Thus Montgomery's involvement seems to have been due to Canadian pressure and not *vice versa*. Paget was under pressure from McNaughton and especially Crerar, who, as has been seen, was aggressively campaigning in high places for Canadian participation in raids. Thus by default Montgomery was delegated responsibility, as he was the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C), South-Eastern Command, to which 1 Canadian Corps was operationally subordinate. This

⁶⁸ Whitaker, *Dieppe: tragedy to triumph*, pp.159-65.

⁶⁹ Henriques to Haydon, 4 February 1952, URA, RHP, HEN 94; Skrine to Henriques, 29 June 1962, URA, RHP, HEN 92; Henriques to Haydon, 12 August 1958, URA, RHP, HEN 113, [copy in IWM, Haydon Papers IV].

letter, which has not been examined previously by historians concerned with Dieppe, directly contradicts the Whitaker thesis claiming Montgomery's culpability in the affair. Paget's main concern in this period was maintaining some degree of control for Home Forces in amphibious operations and at the same time putting a break on the rapidly increasing influence of the maverick COHQ and on the Canadian Army. Henshaw explains that the Canadian Army, 'from the British perspective', must have looked something like a 'private army' promoting inexperienced officers to high rank in a separate hierarchy, playing one superior authority off against another, fully under the control of neither Home Forces nor Ottawa, something of a law unto itself'.⁷⁰

THE ROYAL AIR FORCE MODIFICATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY

One significant factor in the calculations for the frontal attack was the knowledge that a heavy preliminary air bombardment would take place before it. Why then did the Force Commanders at the meeting of 5 June 1942 drop the proposed high-altitude preliminary air bombardment of Dieppe? Mountbatten, Hughes-Hallett and most Dieppe accounts blame the abandonment of this bombardment on Montgomery since he was in the chair.⁷¹ Discussion about the issue of bombing occurred again on the 4 and 16 July, the latter date being *after* the cancellation of *Rutter* and revival of the

⁷⁰ Henshaw, 'The Dieppe raid: Montgomery', 195.

⁷¹ Address by Vice-Admiral J. Hughes-Hallett, 'The Dieppe Raid', 20 January 1962, transcript, p.4, PRO, CAB 106/6; Hughes-Hallett, 'Before I forget', p.155, NAC; Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.151-2, fn.60; John Mellor, *Dieppe: Canada's forgotten heroes* (Macmillan: Scarborough, Ontario, 1975), p.23; Mountbatten's official biographer, Philip Zeigler, claims Montgomery's decision to continue without air attack had become irrevocable, *Mountbatten: the official biography* (London: Collins, 1985), p.189.

operation as *Jubilee*, long after the elimination of Montgomery from the planning process.⁷² During the several discussions on the issue, Crerar and Roberts never opposed the decision to cancel, for they agreed accurate bombing could not be guaranteed, and accepted the possibility that the resulting fires and rubble strewn streets might impede the advance of the tanks. Thus they must take a share of the blame for the decision. The main person behind the push for cancellation, though the evidence is only circumstantial, was the head of Bomber Command, Air Marshal Sir Arthur 'Bomber' Harris.⁷³

Harris advocated the policy of strategic bombing to defeat Germany and thus was very sceptical about loaning precious aircraft to support what he considered 'useless side-shows'. In a letter to Portal he complained, 'CCO sends us one wild idea after another for dispersing the bomb lift. About once a fortnight'. Harris was scraping together every bomber available for his 1000-Bomber, or *Millennium*, raids on Germany. Aware of this Leigh-Mallory probably realized that he could not get the necessary bomber support from Harris. Therefore at the 5 June meeting Leigh-Mallory suggested dispensing with the bombing of the port itself because it 'would not be the most profitable way of using the bombers, as a raid which was not overpowering, might only result in putting everyone on the alert'. Instead he

⁷² COHQ Staff Meeting No.13, 4 July 1942, Minute 1, NMM, Baillie-Grohman Papers (BGP), GRO 23, Baillie-Grohman also notes he received orders to the effect that instead of the preliminary air bombardment he would have to depend on tactical surprise. See his Unpublished Memoirs, 'Flashlight on the Past', p.158, NMM, BGP; Baillie-Grohman to Roskill, letter 23 February 1962, p.2, Cambridge, Churchill College Archives, CCA, Stephen Roskill Papers (SRP), ROSK 5/52. 'Operation *Jubilee* Force Commanders' Meeting, 16 July 1942, Minute 4, IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/1, the bombing decision was again examined by the CCO and the Force Commanders on 17 August but remain unchanged, Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.344.

⁷³ Terence Robertson, *The shame and the glory: Dieppe* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1962), pp.93-5; Villa, *Unauthorized action*, pp.152, 162.

outlined an alternative plan to attack aerodromes in the Dieppe sector and Boulogne as a diversion.⁷⁴

In examination of his reasoning many inconsistencies show up. During May and June 1942 seven bombing missions attacked Dieppe and no raids followed so why would the Germans be 'alerted' or expect anything different on the night of the 18/19 August?⁷⁵ Roberts stated on record, several months after the operation, that he thought a few more such raids were to follow to mislead the Germans as to the significance of the actual attack. Major Walter Skrine, COHQ General Staff Officer II (Plans), and therefore deeply involved in the military planning aspect, recalls the preliminary bombardment was a 'fundamental factor' in the original army plan.⁷⁶

Leigh-Mallory also indicated the resulting fires in the town and rubble on the streets would prevent the passage of the tanks on which the whole plan depended. Roberts recalled discussing the question of bombing accuracy with Leigh-Mallory, after which Roberts decided that 'I wouldn't take a chance, because if they could only hit Dieppe and not the headlands and places where I wanted them to... all we would do is block the streets and my

⁷⁴ Harris to Portal, 21 October 1942, p.4, Oxford, Christ Church College, Portal Papers, 9 'Correspondence with C-in-C Bomber Command', fol.66; Villa incorrectly states that this letter was to Churchill, Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.290, note 88; 'Combined Force Commanders and Council and Advisers to CCO Meeting', 5 June 1942, Minute 5, In Appendix 3, p.272, 'Rutter. Planning, Intelligence, Training, Security', Vol.1A, PRO, DEFE 2/542.

⁷⁵ Dieppe was bombed on 8 May and night of 29/30 May, 2 June and nights of 2/3, 3/4, 4/5 and 8/9 June. Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everett, *The Bomber Command war diaries: an operational reference book, 1939-1945* (New York: Viking, 1985), pp.264-5, 268, 274-7. Villa quotes incorrect dates from this source, *Unauthorized action*, p.289, note 62.

⁷⁶ Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.344 [Roberts]; Walter Skrine, interview, *CBC Close-Up: Dieppe*, 9 September 1962, transcript, p.11, DHist 594.009 (D13). Villa writes Skrine indicated in this interview the following comment that the present author does not find: 'Those on Combined Operations Staff closest to the ground plan were convinced that an air bombardment could easily have been fitted in without seriously compromising the element of surprise'. See also Villa's discussion, *Unauthorized action*, p.153.

tanks would never get through'. Surprisingly none of the army planners ever raised this objection during the previous two months of planning. The most important question for the planners concerning the issue of bombing was in the context of whether it was more essential to create the conditions whereby the infantry and engineers could cross the wide beach and esplanade (requiring heavy bombing) or to allow the tanks to pass through the town to the airport. Villa concludes:

The folly of sacrificing a thousand lives for the sake of easy passage for 30 tanks seems not to have been discussed – perhaps because Harris had made clear he would never provide the bombers in the quantity the infantry needed to make its frontal attack. Getting the tanks into the town – and, it was hoped, beyond – therefore became the single paramount objective.⁷⁷

Although Harris did not supply the operation with the bomber support essential to its success, Air Marshal Sholto Douglas, AOC Fighter Command, did supply a disproportionate amount of fighter support.⁷⁸ He did so not out of a keen desire to support the other Services but because he wanted to provoke the German Air Force (GAF) to battle to inflict wastage on it. This was the most important objective of the RAF in 1942 and the aim of the *Circus* operations – offensive sweeps using escorted bombers as bait. Depleting GAF fighter strength would mean fewer RAF bomber losses in its strategic bombing of Germany and, at the same time, had the added bonus

⁷⁷ Maj.-Gen. J.H. Roberts, Transcript of interview, p.5, *CBC Close-Up: Dieppe*, 9 September 1962, NAC, MG 30 E507/2; Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.153. Two official historians, Stacey and Roskill, both cite the standard reasons for eliminating the air bombardment – loss of surprise and obstruction of the tanks. Although they do not agree with the decision, they make no attempt at critical analysis. Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.336; Stephen W. Roskill, *The war at sea, 1939–1945: the period of balance 2* (2 vols., London: HMSO, 1956), p.241.

⁷⁸ Villa states of the approximately seventy squadrons engaged, only two were bombers (Boston), *Unauthorized action*, p.286, fn.2. Of the 2,614 sorties flown, 2,111 were by fighters, 288 by cannon and bomber Hurricanes, 72 by tactical reconnaissance Mustangs of Army Co-operation Command, and 86 by day bombers – 24 by the American B-17 Flying Fortresses, 60 smoke-carrying aircraft and 7 Coastal Command reconnaissance aircraft. See 'Combined Report', p.33, para.302 and John P. Campbell, 'Air operations and the Dieppe raid', *Aerospace Historian* 23/1 (Spring/March, 1976), 13.

of relieving pressure on Russia. The record shows as early as 21 March 1942 Portal thought of the idea of using large-scale raids to lure the GAF into battle. In the Chiefs of Staff Minutes for that day he suggested 'we might be able to bring on a series of air battles in advantageous conditions by dropping detachments of paratroops behind the coast defences in the Calais area and then launching a series of small sea-borne raids with the object of bringing off our paratroops'. This strain of thinking characterised the Chief of the Air Staff throughout the spring of 1942.⁷⁹

Many sources claim one of the main objectives of Dieppe was to provoke the GAF into an air battle of attrition.⁸⁰ This seems to have been the underlying aim of the RAF but definitely not of the other Services. As noted previously, COHQ's primary concern was the feasibility of capturing a port in working condition with a division. No mention of an air battle as an objective is in the RAF operational orders for *Rutter* and *Jubilee* or any of the other pre-raid documents. The object officially stated by the Air Ministry documents was to protect the naval and military forces against air attack and to interdict any enemy reinforcements.⁸¹

What resulted was the largest single-day ^{fighter}air battle in history. Leigh-Mallory, Mountbatten and Churchill quickly claimed this to be a great

⁷⁹ Fergusson, *The watery maze*, p.169; Goronwy M. Rees, *A bundle of sensations: sketches in autobiography* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1960), p.146 and Villa, *Unauthorized action*, pp.157-162; COS (42) 12th, (O), 21 March 1942, quoted in Villa, *Unauthorized action*, pp.157-8.

⁸⁰ Denis Richards and Hilary St. George Saunders, *Royal Air Force 1939-1945*, 2 (3 vols., London: HMSO, 1953), p.143; Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, *Captains without eyes: intelligence failures of World War Two* (London: Macmillan, 1969), p.165; Butler and Gwyer, *Grand strategy*, p.639; Brigadier John F. Durnford-Slater, *Commando: memoirs of a fighting Commando fighting in World War Two* (London: Greenhill, 1991, 1953), p.92; Charles Messenger, *The Commandos 1940-1946* (London: Kimber, 1985), p.144.

⁸¹ COHQ, 'Rutter. Notes for CAS' [Chief of Air Staff], 2 July 1942, p.4, PRO, AIR 8/895.

victory.⁸² A cursory examination of the documents shows that the statistical basis of this claim is grossly incorrect and the battle was a defeat for the RAF. In conclusion it seems that although the induced air battle was never an official objective, the RAF leadership all yearned for it as a way of indirectly furthering their aim of winning the war through their strategic bombing policy. Goronwy Rees recalls the RAF's 'principal objective was to force the *Luftwaffe* into the air and to give battle... We were assured that a landing in France on the scale of *Rutter* would compel the *Luftwaffe* to react violently'. The RAF looked on the COHQ military and naval objectives as ancillary and minor. Rees rather harshly, but it seems accurately, sums up the RAF view, 'The military forces employed in the operation were not only guinea pigs. They were also bait. What did it matter if the bait was devoured whole, so long as the fish, or rather the *Luftwaffe*, was properly hooked?'.⁸³

THE ADMIRALTY MODIFICATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY

The decision to cancel the bombing did not lead to any corresponding increase in naval supporting fire as one would perhaps have thought.⁸⁴ The reason, on which the majority of Dieppe chronicles agree, is that Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, Chief of Naval Staff, flatly refused the heavy naval support. COHQ first envisaged having this support before the submission to the COS

⁸² Leigh-Mallory, Cover Letter to Air Force Commander's Dieppe Report, 5 September 1942, p.3, NAC, RG 24/10870/23202 (D5); COHQ Communiqué No. 4, 19 August 1942, p.2, PRO, DEFE 2/330; Churchill speech in the House of Commons quoted in Robertson, *The shame and the glory*, p.389; War Office, 'Assessment of the Dieppe Raid, August 1942' [initials illegible, no date], PRO, WO 106/4195A.

⁸³ Rees, *A Bundle of sensations*, p.146-7.

⁸⁴ Roskill, *The war at sea*, p.241.

of the original outline plan on May 9. The reason was Pound did not want to risk losing any of his larger ships, such as cruisers or battleships, to the threat of mines and U-boats known to be in the narrow Channel. The Royal Navy, and thus Pound, having suffered many recent humiliations could not, and would not, chance any more.⁸⁵

At the beginning of June Rear-Admiral H. T. Baillie-Grohman, Naval Force Commander, arrived at COHQ and reviewed the plan. Afterwards he immediately requested a battleship. This, he recalls, 'was turned down in the "highest quarters" (Prime Minister, I presumed)'. Apparently the reason was if it was sunk 'we could never claim a victory and a victory in the face of the disasters we had lately suffered was required for the morale of the nation'. The Admiralty Battle Summary confirms this view saying, 'whatever happened, the operation could not have been represented as a success had a battleship been lost by a mine or otherwise in the confined waters off Dieppe'.⁸⁶

Major Rees, commenting on the final plan's inadequate sea and air preliminary bombardment and support, states the attitude at COHQ was that these kinds of 'unexpected obstacles' were exactly what COHQ existed to solve, 'by some commandos-raid of the imagination which would gaily overleap them'. He concludes that the over-confident atmosphere, inspired by Mountbatten, was so impossible to resist that the operation would have

⁸⁵ The Navy's defeats included the loss of aircraft carriers, battleships and seven cruisers in the previous six months. The *Ark Royal* and *Barham* were sunk in November 1941, the *Valiant* and *Queen Elizabeth* severely damaged in December, and the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* sunk in the same month. Admiralty, Battle Summary, (1959), p.1, fn.1, PRO, ADM 234/355.

⁸⁶ Baillie-Grohman, Unpublished Memoirs, p.156, NMM, BGP; Baillie-Grohman to Roskill, 23 February 1962, p.1; Admiralty, Battle Summary, (1959), p.6, PRO, ADM 234/355.

gone ahead, 'even if the troops had been asked to land with no better weapons than their bare hands and fists'.⁸⁷

THE FORCE COMMANDERS MODIFICATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY

The other most significant change introduced to the original outline plan by the Force Commanders, and probably approved by Montgomery, was that the timing of the main frontal assault was changed from thirty to sixty minutes after the flank attacks went in. This meant that the units would be landing ninety minutes after nautical twilight. The reason for this was that half an hour was not considered enough time for the flanking battalions to secure the headlands. The significant point here, first elucidated by Henshaw, was that this delay in the *Rutter* plan would have left the units carrying out the frontal assault with less cover of darkness than they would have in *Jubilee*, (as it was renamed after its revival). Since in the *Rutter* plan the landings began closer to the beginning of nautical twilight, and twilight at that time continued for a longer period, the units would have had the same amount of time to reach their objectives before sunrise as in *Jubilee's*.⁸⁸

The other important difference between the *Rutter* and *Jubilee* plans was that the Force Commanders approved *Jubilee* even though four out of the six days in August that it was planned to take place would leave the units ashore much longer than Montgomery had considered safe for *Rutter*. Each day the withdrawal schedule was different due to the changing tides, and each day of the six day period when the operation was possible left the units

⁸⁷ Rees, *A bundle of sensations*, p.146.

⁸⁸ Henshaw, 'The Dieppe raid: Montgomery', 196.

ashore progressively longer. The fear related to 10 *Panzer* Division (PzD); intelligence had recently established that it was located at Amiens, and estimated that it could intervene within four to eight hours. Therefore after its second postponement on 5 July, the plan was switched to a one-tide operation for 7/8 July, named *Rutter II*, moving up the withdrawal time by six hours. Weather forced its final cancellation.⁸⁹

Henshaw has revealed that the significance of tidal conditions and their dependent schedules has never been fully explained in any of the COHQ histories or in any published works since. Perhaps, he explains, the COHQ planners responsible were 'sensitive' about the fact that they had pressed for the main assault to go in before the flanking headlands had been secured. He says that Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett 'succeeded in twisting' the revised 1959 Battle Summary to claim that Montgomery, as soon as he entered the command chain, disagreed with the COHQ plan, and 'proposed that a dawn frontal assault should be made instead, synchronised with two smaller landings either side to seize the cliffs which over looked Dieppe'. Later in the same section, the Summary also asserted, 'it was immaterial whether the main attack preceded or followed the flank attacks'. This replaced the earlier 1946 version that the frontal assault 'was not to be launched until the two flank attacks, to be carried out in darkness against the batteries east and west of Dieppe, had been successfully delivered'. Henshaw continues that only while Montgomery was in the command chain

⁸⁹ This author is indebted to Peter Henshaw for pointing out the significance of the tidal conditions on the landing schedules. Not only *Rutter* and *Jubilee* suffered postponements because of bad weather but other operations also, such as *Lancing*. These were attributed to bad luck. Is this really so? The Military Adviser to COHQ noted, 'I am inclined to doubt whether it is, in effect, really bad luck, or whether the conditions required for such operations occur much less frequently than we think'. Brigadier Antony H. Head, 'Notes on the Preparation and Mounting of Operation *Rutter*, 8 July 1942', p.4, PRO, DEFE 2/549.

did the plan allow enough time needed, 'even in theory', to capture the headlands before the main assault on the town. Perhaps, he concludes, the changes Montgomery made in the schedule of the landings in *Rutter* made it an equal or better plan than either the original outline or final *Jubilee* plans.⁹⁰

REVIVAL OF *RUTTER* AS *JUBILEE*

CHANGES IN CHAIN OF COMMAND AND RESPONSIBILITY

The day before the cancellation of *Rutter* on 7 July Mountbatten had persuaded the COS to agree to 'consideration' being given to remounting the operation at a later date. The process of how the operation came to be remounted as *Jubilee* is unclear in all primary and secondary accounts of the operation. What is certain is that Montgomery was completely against its revival for security reasons and recommended that it should be cancelled for 'all time'. He says in his memoirs that he wrote to Paget in this regard, suggesting that if a raid had to take place to pick another target besides Dieppe, but his advice was disregarded. Hughes-Hallett's claim, that the 'real reason why Monty recommended that the operation be dropped was that he had been removed from the chain of command and was bitterly offended', can be discounted as no evidence exists for it. Villa and Henshaw give a convincing argument that Mountbatten, Hughes-Hallett and McNaughton arranged for his exclusion from the *Jubilee* chain of command as he probably would not have supported remounting the operation for security reasons.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Admiralty, *Battle Summary* (1946), p.2; Admiralty, *Battle Summary* (1959), pp.3-4; Henshaw, 'The Dieppe raid: Montgomery', 196-7.

⁹¹ COS (42) 64 (O), 2 'Operation *Rutter*', 6 July 1942, PRO, CAB 121/364/SIC D/France/1/Operation *Rutter*, agreed to at COS (42) 198th, 6, 6 July 1942, PRO, CAB 79/21; Bernard L. Montgomery, 'The army in England after Dunkirk', in *The memoirs of Field-*

Three schools of thought presently exist on the reasons for and timing of the revival of the operation as *Jubilee*. The first is Villa's. His argument is that Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett, knowing that the raiding season was coming to a close, and not having executed any large-scale raids, were both worried that the very existence of the fledgling COHQ, and their own careers, were under threat. They therefore pushed the operation through, scheming to remove any one who opposed the operation, such as Montgomery and Baillie-Grohman, and actually executed the operation without the required COS authorization. His evidence for this is largely circumstantial and he points to four vital questions that he says can only be answered once it is accepted that the operation went ahead without COS authorization. The first is why have none of the official historians who have dealt with the subject, and would have had access to all the relevant records, " been able to come to a clear consensus on the way the operation was revived? Second, why is there no document stating the COS decision to revive it? Third, why did Churchill inquire on 15 August about the status of the operation using the old code-name, *Rutter*, if the COS had already authorized the raid before he left for Moscow? If the COS gave the authorization after he left why was the DCIGS, Nye, once the raid was in progress, so angry about not knowing about it?

Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, KG (London: Collins, 1958), p.76; the Battle Summary claims Montgomery only 'alluded to his objection to the remounting', Admiralty, Battle Summary (1959), p.9, fn.2; Hughes-Hallett to Mountbatten, 27 June 1962, IWM, JHHP, quoted in Henshaw, 'The Dieppe raid: Montgomery', 198; Villa, *Unauthorized action*, pp.159-60. Hughes-Hallett replaced the Naval Force Commander for *Rutter*, Rear-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman, who was promoted out of the way as he was also seen as a potential obstacle to *Rutter's* revival; on Canadian responsibility for the revival, see Peter J. Henshaw, 'The Dieppe raid: the quest for action for all the wrong reasons', *Queen's Quarterly* 101/1 (Spring 1994), 109-12.

The second school of thought is the Whitakers'. They go to the other extreme, arguing almost the exact opposite, declaring not only that the COS and Churchill certainly knew of the operation, but actively pressed for its execution. The COS apparently did this, knowing that it would probably fail, for the more important political reasons of mollifying the demands of their Soviet and American allies for a Second Front. The Canadian commanders (except for Crerar) are portrayed as mere pawns who were led like lambs to the slaughter in a political-strategic game being played out by their Canadian political and British masters, such as Mackenzie King and Montgomery.

The third is Henshaw's. He argues that the Villa and Whitaker views on the revival are not consistent with what is certain about the actions of the Canadian Army and COHQ, or about Mountbatten's with the COS. He explains that the question is not as simplistic as Villa and the Whitakers have portrayed it and that a more careful examination of the relevant records prove that McNaughton and Crerar were more to blame than any other authors have been willing to admit. Henshaw states that McNaughton and Crerar 'pushed ahead with *Jubilee*, confident in their own assessments of its viability, no doubt reassuring themselves that a plan, which in its earlier stages had been scrutinised in almost every quarter, could not go far wrong'. He goes as far to say that the Dieppe raid would not have taken place if it had not been for Canadian pressure for it.⁹²

These three schools of thought concerning the decision-making process can be thought of as three corners of a triangle, each represented

⁹² Henshaw, 'The Dieppe raid: the quest for action', 112 [quote]; Henshaw, 'The Dieppe raid: a product of misplaced Canadian nationalism', 250-66.

by one of the three authors supporting one of the three organizations, which they consider the main protagonist. The present author's view is that these three viewpoints are extreme and that the answer lies in the middle of the triangle. Therefore the answer to which organization and/or personality was responsible for the revival must be a compromise. To be more specific, the operation would not have happened, without Churchill, the COS, Mountbatten, COHQ, MacNaughton, Crerar and the RAF, pressuring for some offensive action in their own ways, and for their own reasons.

The actual date of the decision to revive the operation seems to have been just after a Force Commanders meeting of 11 July to discuss aspects of cancelled *Rutter*. The evidence is the recollections of Hughes-Hallett. It was definitely on again by the 14 July as it is referred to in McNaughton's personal war diary and two days later a *Jubilee* Force Commanders meeting took place, attended by Mountbatten, Hughes-Hallett, Roberts and Leigh-Mallory, to discuss the plan. The same evening Roberts and Mountbatten met with McNaughton who explained that concerning the chain of command, he 'would ask General Paget to agree to General Crerar being named as the responsible military officer to coordinate' and if this was done he would grant him the 'appropriate authority' regarding the use of Canadian troops. He told Mountbatten that after preparation of the detailed plans, they would be subject his approval 'in the same way as C-in-C Home Forces and Chiefs of Staff Committee had approval for operations of British troops'. Mountbatten said that he thought he should be 'appointed Supreme Commander in lieu of Admiral James', C-in-C Portsmouth, McNaughton replied he had no objections but that this was a matter for C-in-C Home Forces and the COS to

decide. Finally, he instructed Roberts to proceed with the preparation of the detailed plans in conjunction with COHQ and to report directly to Crerar.⁹³

The evening of 17 July McNaughton met with Paget to discuss *Jubilee* and the latter agreed to a new chain of command that would run C-in-C Home Forces – GOC 1 Canadian Corps – GOC 2 CID. McNaughton stated that Crerar, GOC 1 Canadian Corps, would be named as the responsible military officer under the terms of Paget's letter of 5 May 1942. Paget agreed to write to South-Eastern Command concerning the new arrangement. He did so on 24 July, naming McNaughton the 'military officer responsible for the conduct of raiding operations to be carried out by troops under his command'. Three days later, McNaughton in turn named Crerar the 'responsible military officer for operation *Jubilee*', and officially approved the participation of 2 CID and the 14 Canadian Army Tank Regiment in the operation. He concluded that his HQ should 'be kept fully informed of the progress of plans'.⁹⁴

How Churchill and the COS viewed *Jubilee* in the wider grand strategy context needs clarification. The reason for *Jubilee's* continued existence in July 1942 was the momentum for action already established by COHQ. This was the last operation based on the old raiding policy of 1941-2, and even if it had succeeded, no more raids could have taken place, because prior to it, Mountbatten had committed COHQ's complete resources to the North African invasion and any future large-scale operations. On 8

⁹³ Villa, *Unauthorized action*, pp.195-6; Stacey, *Six years of war*, pp.342-3; McNaughton, 'Memorandum – Operation *Jubilee*, 16 July 1942', 25 July 1942, 8-3-5/OPS, NAC, MG 30 E133/248/1-31 July 1942.

⁹⁴ McNaughton, 'Memorandum – Operation *Jubilee*, 17 July 1942', 20 July 1942, fol.58; Lt-Gen. J. G. Swayne, CGS Home Forces, to HQ South-Eastern Command and copy to HQ First Canadian Army, 24 July 1942, fol.58; McNaughton to Crerar, 8-3-5/OPS, 27 July 1942, fol.59; all three in NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D3).

July Churchill and the COS had abandoned *Sledgehammer* and decided to proceed with *Gymnast/Torch*, to which the Americans eventually concurred on 24 July. This left no politico-strategic justification, excluding the Russian dimension, for executing *Jubilee*. On these grounds Churchill and the COS should have cancelled it. That it was not cancelled reflects the pressure from the other organizations and individuals.

In rebuttal of the Whitaker thesis, the COS and Churchill, did not, through the instruments of Paget and Montgomery, push to revive the operation. On the contrary, Paget and Montgomery were very reluctant about the remounting for security reasons. They could do little else than express their concerns to McNaughton which he subsequently brushed aside. He was, after all, the senior commander of the majority of the troops to be involved and was officially responsible for their welfare. In fact, the negotiations concerning chain of command in July proves it was the two senior Canadian commanders, McNaughton and Crerar, who were responsible for the revival, along with the CCO, his Naval Adviser, and GOC Fighter Command.

When the active role of the Canadian Army, in conjunction with Churchill, the COS, COHQ and RAF, is taken into account, Villa's argument that Mountbatten went ahead without COS authorization unravels. It appears that the COS in fact waived their right under the procedure of 5 May to give their approval to the final plan. On 17 July Mountbatten, in an attempt to increase his powers over raiding operations, specifically requested that the COS grant him the 'executive responsibility for the mounting and ordering' of *Jubilee*, and approve Hughes-Hallett's appointment as Naval Force Commander for it. This proposed paper was probably discussed at a COS

meeting three days later, since at that time the COS confirmed Hughes-Hallett's appointment but only said it would consider the question of extending the CCO's authority the next day. Mountbatten, probably in an impatient mood, threatened to appeal to higher authority (who else was higher except Churchill) concerning his powers as CCO and specifically lack of operational control. On 27 July the COS accepted these procedural changes.⁹⁵

The new procedure for raids was almost identical to that agreed on 5 May. There were two exceptions, stages (d) and (f). These are were:

- (d) If the outline plan is approved the *Force Commanders* are appointed who are *held responsible* under the CCO for the detailed joint planning, the operation orders, preparation and combined training of the forces, and *launching of the operation*.
 (f) CCO will be responsible for the *launching of the operation in consultation with the necessary authorities* and subject to the Naval Commander-in-Chief's approval.⁹⁶
 [This author's emphasis]

This indicates that at their meetings of 17 and 27 July the COS might have tacitly approved the outline plan for *Jubilee* by appointing Hughes-Hallett as Naval Force Commander and agreeing to the above procedural changes. On the other hand, the new procedure indicates the need for COS approval for the detailed plans has been abandoned and that the CCO has the authority to execute *any* future operation, including *Jubilee*, in consultation with the necessary authorities. The key question is who are the 'necessary authorities'? The answer lies in the changes to military command structure after the cancellation of *Rutter*, previously explained.

⁹⁵ Hughes-Hallett to Mountbatten, 'Operation *Jubilee*: proposed entry in Chiefs of Staff minutes', 17 July 1942, IWM, JHHP; Copy of minute from Mountbatten to Secretary, COS, 23 July 1942, PRO, WO 106/4117; COS (42) 218th, 11, 27 July 1942, PRO, CAB 79/22.

⁹⁶ COS (42) 218th, 27 July 1942, Minute 11, CAB 79/22, Annex located separately in 'Reconnaissance and Raiding Procedures', Enclosure 17A, PRO, WO 106/4117. The need for the Naval Commander-in-Chief's, Portsmouth, approval was in case of emergency last minute weather postponements as happened in *Rutter*.

Rutter Military Command Structure

- Home Forces — Paget
- South-Eastern Comd — Montgomery
- 1 Canadian Corps — Crerar
- 2 Canadian Division — Roberts

Jubilee Military Command Structure

- Home Forces — Paget (delegated to McNaughton)
- First Canadian Army — McNaughton (delegated to Crerar)
- 1 Canadian Corps — Crerar
- 2 Canadian Division — Roberts

Therefore the 'necessary authorities' for launching *Jubilee* were not only the Force Commanders, RAF operational commanders, and C-in-C Portsmouth, but the two senior Canadian commanders overseas. In a 1943 interview McNaughton explained that the actual control over the planning exercised by either Crerar or himself had been very slight.⁹⁷ This statement is not altogether convincing in the light of his record of participation. On 30 April he approved the rough outline plan, on 15 May approved the outline previously submitted to the Chiefs of Staff, on 3 July reviewed and approved the final *Rutter* plan and on 14 August examined the *Jubilee* plan and sanctioned the use of Canadian units.⁹⁸ The 30 July entry in McNaughton's war diary notes that Mountbatten verbally told him the operation had the approval of the British War Cabinet. It seems apparent that Mountbatten purposely deceived McNaughton, since McNaughton never received

⁹⁷ These changes in chain of command for raids directly rebuts Villa's thesis that *Jubilee* did not have authorization. This was first explained in the present author's preliminary research, 'A reappraisal of the Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942: planning and intelligence', (unpublished Diploma in Historical Studies dissertation, St. Edmund's College, University of Cambridge, 1992); the conclusions were published 'A reappraisal of the Dieppe raid: planning and intelligence', *Pro-Phile* 4/1 (Spring 1993), 4-6 [pamphlet of The Friends of the Public Record Office].

⁹⁸ 'Operation *Jubilee*', Part I, Draft, CMHQ Historical Report No.100, paragraph 133, DHist, 594.013.

⁹⁸ Stacey, *Six years of war*, pp.329, 333, 335, 344. On McNaughton's role, responsibility and effects on the plans at these meetings Stacey does not comment.

anything on paper to confirm this, and no other evidence for this has come to light. McNaughton could only sanction the use of Canadian troops in a plan that had approval, at least in outline form, by the COS. The fact that he never requested this in written form indicates his approval of the plan as a whole and his desire to get Canadian troops into action, no matter the cost.⁹⁹

Thus it seems under these procedures that the COS did not require their approval of the final detailed plans, although they might have expected Mountbatten to keep them at least in the picture. Perhaps also some ambiguity or misinterpretation existed among COS members regarding the actual meaning of key words such as 'mount' and 'launch'. Henshaw suggests that he even might have purposely 'misled' the COS. This seems unlikely, a more probable explanation is confusion arising from the fact that the procedures and terminology were new and constantly changing. At the first post-mortem COS meeting dealing with the operation, the minute entitled 'Raid on Dieppe' gives as its previous reference 'COS (42)234th, 5, 12 August 1942'. This Minute 5 is entitled 'Raiding Operations' and states that 'The committee took note with approval of the outline plan for a future raiding operation'. Strangely, this did not appear in any other confidential or official history until the publication of Sir Harry Hinsley's second volume on *British intelligence in the Second World War*. He notes that the approval occurred 'only a week before it was carried out', which historians agree was extremely late for an outline plan to be submitted. Henshaw wonders why the submission would have been necessary at all.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.231 for wrong date of McNaughton's approval, p.228 and fn.30 for his discussion of the Mountbatten and McNaughton meeting.

¹⁰⁰ Henshaw, 'The British Chiefs of Staff', 206-7; COS(42)242nd, 4, 20 August 1942, PRO, CAB 79/22; COS(42)234th, 5, 12 August 1942, PRO, CAB 79/22; F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, *et al.*, *Intelligence before and during the Dieppe raid*, in *British intelligence in the*

Villa explains there are five reasons why 12 August approval was not referring to *Jubilee*. Villa raises pertinent questions which need clarification. First, why did not any of the other official or confidential histories make note of this before? The comprehensive, thirty-four page Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) report, completed a few months after the raid with much COHQ help, dealt with all aspects of the operation, including the decision-making and planning aspects. It only makes the ambiguous statement that, 'The outline Plan drawn up by the 3 Force Commanders was approved by CCO and passed to the Chiefs of Staff'. A mistake or sloppy research seems very unlikely since, as Villa points out, these were 'some of the best official historians in the western world'. By examining the 1953 correspondence between the official Canadian army historian, C.P. Stacey, and the Cabinet Historical Section, Villa was able to conclude that the latter 'admitted in private correspondence that there was no record, nor even solid evidence of approval'.¹⁰¹

Second, during *Rutter*, the Inter-Service Security Bureau (ISSB) was completely involved in all necessary intelligence aspects of the operation, including a rigorous security check after its cancellation. Yet the ISSB never knew of with the revival of *Jubilee* or the impending operation until after it had begun. Villa makes a strong case that if the COS had approved it on 12 August, or any time previously, they naturally would have expected, and insisted, that the ISSB check to ensure that no security leaks to the Germans

Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations, 2 (6 vols., New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.697.

¹⁰¹ B. Villa to H. Henry, Confidential letter, 16 March 1993, p.1-2 [five reasons]; Allen, H.I., JIC(42)468(O), 'Operation Jubilee—Security', 5 December 1942, p.16, PRO, CAB 121/383, fol.20; Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.45 ['best historians']; C.P. Stacey 1953 correspondence with United Kingdom Cabinet Office Historical Section, DHist 981.011 (D40), quoted in Villa, 'Mountbatten, the British Chiefs of Staff', p.208.

had occurred. Mountbatten's excuse was that *Jubilee* was only on a 'need to know' basis and that many orders were put through verbally. Concerning intelligence, Mountbatten figured his own COHQ intelligence Section could handle the necessary tasks and thus the intelligence services were not informed. In the aftermath of *Jubilee* the COS reprimanded Mountbatten for not having informed them and took steps to make sure this never happened again.¹⁰²

Third, in 1950, while searching through official records for Mountbatten, the former chief of staff at COHQ, Major-General G.E. Wildman-Lushington, came across a note saying that for reasons of secrecy, a complete record of the operation's decisions were not being kept in the normal COS papers holdings but instead detailed discussions had been recorded in the COS Secretariat's secret files of General Sir Leslie Hollis, Senior Assistant Secretary (Military) to the War Cabinet. Writing to Mountbatten, Wildman-Lushington concluded, 'I do not understand, therefore, why the search through the Cabinet files has failed to reveal the record of the decision to remount'. The folder on Dieppe has extracts from COS meetings of all important decisions concerning the operation but the 12 August minute is not contained and does not seem to have been removed.¹⁰³

Fourth, Villa asks, why could the 12 August minute not have been referring to 'the town of Dieppe in some future or ancillary operation'? This seems unlikely as the minute of 20 August was specifically about the raid so

¹⁰² B. Villa to H. Henry, Confidential letter, 16 March 1993, p.1; Hinsley, *British intelligence*, p.697 [ISSB not informed].

¹⁰³ Maj.-Gen. Sir Leslie Hollis, *Cabinet Secret Information Centre Files (CSIC)*, D/France/1, 'Operation *Rutter*'; Maj.-Gen. G.E. Wildman-Lushington to Mountbatten, 17 August 1950, Kings College London (KCL), Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), General Lord Hastings Ismay Papers (HIP), Ismay II/3/260/3; also see Villa, 'Mountbatten, the British Chiefs of Staff', 208.

why would it not refer back to the last time the raid was discussed? Unless this was an error on the part of the person recording the minutes.¹⁰⁴

Fifth, Churchill's queries from Moscow and Cairo about the status of the operation do not fit. On 15 August 1942 Churchill cabled Ismay inquiring about the operation's status, using the old code-name *Rutter* and Ismay replied included the date of launch as 17 August and the correct name *Jubilee*. Then on 17 August Churchill cabled Ismay again saying 'Please report when and if *Jubilee* takes place'. Why did Churchill not know the new code-name? Villa views this as evidence that no COS approval had been received. Could Churchill have just forgotten that the code-name had been changed, after all, it only had been known as *Jubilee* for about a month and as *Rutter* for at least three months. He was not the only one to be confused. Colonel Antony Head also used the *Rutter* code-name when writing to Crerar on Mountbatten's behalf. If Churchill was just confused then the cables could be seen as confirmation that Churchill knew the operation had approval, whether it was given on 12 August or some other time. The problem was with Nye, who was present and chaired the 12 August COS meeting as VCIGS in Brooke's absence, and was furious after *Jubilee*, claiming not to have been informed until the battle communiqués started to come in. It is possible that Nye could have been lying after the fact but seems unlikely. Henshaw concludes that there is 'no clear evidence to determine whether he [or any of the other Chiefs] had seen an outline plan on 12 August, but had expected to be told about the specific launch date before the event, or whether he knew nothing at all about the operation's revival'.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ B. Villa to H. Henry, Confidential letter, 16 March 1993, p.1.

¹⁰⁵ Discussion of Churchill's cables and Nye's ignorance: Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.30 ['Please report'], pp.31- 3, 44-5; Villa, 'Mountbatten, the British Chiefs of Staff', 208, 218; B.

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¹⁰³ Maj.-Gen. Sir Leslie Hollis, Cabinet Secret Information Centre Files (CSIC), D/France/1, 'Operation *Rutter*'; Maj.-Gen. G.E. Wildman-Lushington to Mountbatten, 17 August 1950, Kings College London (KCL), Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), General Lord Hastings Ismay Papers (HIP), Ismay II/3/260/3; also see Villa, 'Mountbatten, the British Chiefs of Staff', 208.

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¹⁰⁵ Discussion of Churchill's cables and Nye's ignorance: Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.30 ['Please report'], pp.31- 3, 44-5; Villa, 'Mountbatten, the British Chiefs of Staff', 208, 218; B.

If the operation was approved on 12 August, Henshaw states this demonstrated not that Mountbatten was 'adhering to the correct procedures, but rather that, in the confusion of the time, he did not know what steps he was required to take' concerning remounting the operation or that, 'having lost his nerve at the thought of using his new powers to the full, he wished to spread responsibility for the raid more widely'. The Whitakers' claim that the COS 'approved a remounted raid again in July and August', which they give no reference for, is vague and seemingly without foundation, and therefore can be discounted.¹⁰⁶

Henshaw sums up that 'for these men and the organizations they controlled, the drive to revive the raid had become entwined with the need to justify their favoured strategy and tactics for winning the war, their claim to power and resources, their autonomy, or even their corporate existence'.¹⁰⁷ McNaughton, Crerar, Mountbatten, Hughes-Hallett and Leigh-Mallory, of the Canadian Army, COHQ, and RAF respectively, were the main protagonists in the decision-making and responsibility concerning Dieppe's original outline plan, modified *Rutter* and *Jubilee* detailed plans, and in the key decisions, such as adopting the frontal assault, excising the preliminary air bombardment, and remounting the operation. In this last regard, undoubtedly the desire for action expressed by Churchill and the COS also influenced these organizations and their representatives in pushing the operation forward.

Villa to H. Henry, Confidential letter, 16 March 1993, p.2; Henshaw, 'The British Chiefs of Staff', 209-10 [Head, quote].

¹⁰⁶ Henshaw, 'The British Chiefs of Staff', 212; Whitaker, *Dieppe: triumph to tragedy*, p.200.

¹⁰⁷ Henshaw, 'The Dieppe raid: the quest for action', 112.

3

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

On 9 May 1942 the *Rutter* outline plan was sent to the COS for examination and four days later they approved it as a basis for detailed planning. They authorized the use of 2 Canadian Infantry Division (CID) and agreed to Roberts and Air Vice-Marshal Sir Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory as the Military and Air Force Commanders. The Naval Force Commander, Rear-Admiral H.T. 'Tom' Baillie-Grohman, was not appointed until 1 June, as he was then serving in the Middle East and was slated to be responsible for training activities on the Isle of Wight. His place was temporarily held by his Chief of Staff, Commodore T.H. Back. Before close examination of the detailed operational planning and intelligence aspects of *Rutter/Jubilee*, the reasons for the selection of 2 CID and a summary of pertinent information given in the outline plan, on which the COS based their approval, is necessary.¹

The reasons for nomination of 2 CID are not entirely clear but they apparently stem from Montgomery's positive evaluations of it. In the Spring of 1942 Montgomery toured the majority of Canadian units under South-Eastern Command, making detailed personal evaluations of the officers down to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and general evaluations of the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and Other Ranks (ORs). Copies of all the reports were forwarded to Crerar at HQ 1 Canadian Corps. One might wonder why the more senior 1 CID was not chosen for the task? Possibly

¹ COS(42) 42nd, 3, 13 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/546, '*Rutter - Appendix III*', p.9; Hilary A. St. George Saunders, '*Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid*', BR 1887 (formerly CB 04244), London: COHQ, 15 October 1942, p.3, para.20, DHist 594.013 (D1).

because Montgomery considered that during Exercise *Beaver III*, in April 1942, it was 'badly handled' and had concluded that its commander, Maj.-Gen. George R. Pearkes, was a 'gallant soldier... without brains' who seemed 'unable to appreciate the essentials of a military problem and... formulate a sound plan'. He similarly castigated, Maj.-Gen. Basil Price, the senior officer of 3 CID after Exercise *Beaver IV*, 10-13 May, stating that his leadership was 'lamentable' and 'completely ineffective', that he was a 'complete amateur, one totally unable to train his Division', and that he was thus, 'unfit to command a Division in a field army'. Montgomery concluded, therefore, that the 3 CID was not as prepared for combat as the other two divisions. Finally, he stated that he did not think it 'possible to produce good divisions unless you... [had] good Divisional Commanders'.²

Montgomery judged that Roberts was 'the best divisional commander' in the Canadian Army, 'very sound, but... not in any way brilliant', and that his chief staff officer, or GSO 1, Mann, was 'first class'. In a 1996 Canadian television production, and subsequent book, Professor Terry Copp states that 'Montgomery was asked [not saying by whom] to select a division' from his Command and that 'despite pressure to employ a composite British-Canadian force, he selected 2 Canadian Division as the troops best suited to carry out the raid'. Thus Crerar probably nominated 2 CID based on Montgomery's recommendations.³

² John A. English, 'The Montgomery measurement', in *The Canadian Army and the Normandy campaign: a study of failure in high command* (London: Praeger, 1991), pp.135-6.

³ English, *The Canadian Army*, p.136; Copp also states Montgomery positive judgements meant that 2nd Division was selected for Dieppe', see Terry Copp and Richard Nielsen, 'The Dieppe raid - planning', in *No price too high: Canadians and the Second World War* (Whitby, Ontario: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1996), pp.92-3.

Apparently, Canadians had not always been included in the *Rutter* plan, at least this is the view of the Whitakers, who take at face value, and without supporting documentary evidence, the post-war claims of Colonel Brian McCool. In the Spring of 1942 he was a major in the Royal Regiment of Canada and also had, in the words of the Whitakers, a 'unique second life' as 'corps raiding officer'. On 14 March 1942 he was ordered to report to HQ 2 CID for 'special duties'. In fact, he was detached and sent to Scotland for special training. In a 1981 interview he recalled that, 'Originally, Dieppe was geared to entail the [1 Independent] Guards, Brigade [Group] reinforced by the 8th Argyles... They did a fine job in their rehearsals on the Isle of Butte, and then they moved down for a rehearsal on the Isle of Wight. There they fell apart – not entirely their fault, but partly so'. McCool continues to explain that, at that point, the operation was passed on to his 'old commander', Lt-Col Micheal Rogers, of 1 Commando. McCool states that they 'profited' from the mistakes made by the Guards, but gives no details. The Whitakers explain his plan was for a small, compact raid based on speed, mobility and surprise, in the true commando style, using approximately 500, and not 5000 men. McCool claims that their planning and training were excellent on the Isle of Wight: 'We could have done a good job, a better job than the whole division... but that was wiped out, and the job was given to the 2 Canadian Division'. Whether these claims are true or not is difficult to substantiate. Interestingly, McCool makes no mention of the fact that Mountbatten had originally envisaged using commandos *and* the Royal Marine Division. This latter claim of Mountbatten's is based on post-war testimony; no contemporary documents substantiating this have come to light.⁴

⁴ Interview transcript of Col. Brian McCool by Joan Caswell, 1981, Oakville, Ontario, Whitaker

The object of the 9 May *Rutter* plan was to capture and hold the town, while tasks including demolitions of port facilities, power stations, the aerodrome at St. Aubin, dock and rail facilities, capturing a RDF (radio direction finding or radar) station and German divisional HQ at Arques-la-Baille, removal of invasion barges back to the England, and taking prisoners, were to be carried out (see Map 2). The units were to begin withdrawal eight hours after landing. Intelligence at the time indicated the garrison consisted of 'a single low-category battalion', with a total of not over 1,400 troops that could not receive more than 2,500 reinforcements within five hours. The basics of the plan were that during the night before the attack a heavy air bombardment, of at least 150 sorties, against the town would be carried out. Thirty minutes after nautical twilight two flanking attacks by three infantry battalions, two and half miles to the eastward, at Puys, and the same distance to the westward of Dieppe, at Pourville, with the objective of capturing the anti-aircraft, coastal defence and mobile batteries and any other German defences on the headlands overlooking the town. One of the two battalions landed at Pourville was detailed to capture, with tank support, the aerodrome at St. Aubin, three and a half miles south of the town. At the same time as the flank attacks a battalion of paratroopers were to be used to capture the divisional HQ four miles south-east of Dieppe, while another

Papers; Denis Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker, *Dieppe: tragedy to triumph* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1992), p.89; confirmation of 1 Independent Guards, Brigade Group in combined operations training, using tank landing craft, at Thomess Bay, Ilse of Wight, is from official photographs taken by Lt Lockyear, IWM, Department of Photographs, H/20177-20217. In 1967 Mountbatten first went on record claiming that he had originally wanted to employ Army and Royal Marine Commandos and repeated this many times thereafter. 'Commemoration of the 25th Anniversary of the Dieppe raid on 19 August 1942: speech by Admiral of the Fleet The Earl Mountbatten of Burma; at that time Chief of Combined Operations', Transcript of speech, 19 August 1967, p.3, Author's Dieppe Collection; Transcript of interview, August 1972, p.3, BBC *Dieppe 1942*, DHist 79/567/2; 'Operation *Jubilee*: the place of the Dieppe raid in history', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 119/1 (March 1974), 26.

group of paratroopers, amounting to approximately half a battalion, would be dropped at Varengueville to neutralize coastal and anti-aircraft batteries in the area. The parachute drop was to take fifteen minutes. About six miles to the east of Dieppe, at Berneval, about two companies of airborne glider troops would attack similar anti-aircraft and coastal defence batteries. The plan noted that, 'If this time is not acceptable, the commencing time can be made 10 minutes earlier (20 minutes after the beginning of nautical twilight) but only by a sacrifice of important ground tactical advantage'.⁵

The frontal attack on the town would begin forty-five minutes after the flank landings, 'at a time when there is sufficient light for the tanks to be disembarked'. Up to two infantry battalions, supported by up to thirty, 'or their equivalent load' of, infantry tanks, would be landed. The remaining twenty-eight tanks and single infantry battalion would remain in reserve and could be landed at either the main beach or to the west of Dieppe; the plan did not specify where but most likely at Pourville. This frontal assault would be supported by a low level fighter-bomber attack on the town's beach defences and not more than three other selected targets in the vicinity, commencing fifteen minutes before and continuing for thirty minutes. Immediately following the fighter-bombers would be regular fighters, which would strafe for one hour the anti-aircraft and coast defence guns in the vicinity of the town and its beach defences. One squadron was to be held on call to support the assault on the aerodrome while a second squadron was to be held on call for tactical support throughout the day. Full fighter cover to neutralize

⁵ The 3 infantry battalions would be carried in 25 Assault Landing Craft (ALCs), 2 Motor Landing Craft (MLCs) and 25 Landing Craft Personnel (Long), LCP(L), or R-Craft (unarmoured wooden boats), COO to COS, 'Operation *Rutter* - Outline Plan', 9 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542, *Rutter* - Appendix I', pp.77-9.

German Air Force (GAF) intervention would be in place to cover both the initial assault and final withdrawal phases, as well as being available 'during the other daylight hours to meet the air situation which develops'.⁶

Naval support would be given by six *Hunt* Class destroyers, mounting 4in guns, eight Motor Gun Boats, two Beach Protection vessels and the Gun Boat HMS *Locust*, the latter which was to be in close communication with a Forward Observation Officer (FOO). Once the harbour defences had been neutralized it was proposed to have the *Locust* enter the harbour to give the infantry close-support if required. Arrangements were also made for the ship to be able to disembark a 'small force of infantry' at the discretion of the force commanders. Finally, the naval forces would provide a protection screen against possible German naval surface attack.

Concerning the withdrawal, the tanks needed to be embarked on a rising tide, while the troops could simultaneously be withdrawn either from the Dieppe beaches or from inside the harbour. The latest time this could start on 1 June was 1430 hours (eight hours after the assault) and three hours was permitted for its completion which would have been about one hour later each succeeding day. The plan warned the final withdrawal of the rear-guard units could be made under cover of darkness.⁷

A COHQ staff meeting was held on 11 May to discuss *Rutter* and some adjustments were made in the outline plan. The date for the operation was now set for 20/21 June 1942, or any of the six days following. Although

⁶ The 2 infantry battalions and 30 tanks were to be landed from 25 ALCs, 2 MLCs and 10 Tank Landing Craft (TLC). The reserve of 28 tanks were in 2 flights of 4 TLCs each, and the single infantry battalion in 25 LCP(L)s, COO to COS, 'Operation *Rutter* - Outline Plan', 9 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542, 'Rutter - Appendix I', pp.79-80.

⁷ COO to COS, 'Operation *Rutter* - Outline Plan', 9 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542, 'Rutter - Appendix I', pp.80-1.

the 9 May Outline Plan did not mention this date, but only 'late June', previous planning documents had given the specific date. The Admiralty was given the option of increasing the naval support forces 'in the light of German prevailing dispositions'. The air authorities made the firm decision that low flying bombers could not be used 'later than 30 minutes before civil twilight', which left only five minutes for the low bombing, and that the tactical fighter support could not go beyond fifteen minutes after the frontal assault had begun. This left a gap of twenty minutes in the air attacks which was unacceptable, as it was necessary to have sustained air attacks before and after the assault troops landed. Therefore it was proposed to have the one squadron (twelve aircraft) of Hurricane close-support bombers begin their short attack five minutes earlier, and to advance the landing of the infantry frontal assault by fifteen minutes. Mann, who was representing 2 CID, agreed to confirm this with the Military Force Commander, Roberts.⁸

The air authorities also reported only enough lift for one battalion of paratroopers; none for the glider troops would be available. Therefore it was decided that the batteries at Berneval, originally the task of the glider troops, would be taken over by two companies of paratroopers, while the remaining one company would be used for an attack of an 'harassing nature' on the German divisional HQ. It was finally agreed that if 'tugs' (glider pulling aircraft), could be obtained, the glider troops should be considered for use against the batteries at Varengeville and possibly to reinforce the paratrooper attack on the divisional HQ. It is significant to note here that the

⁸ COHQ, '*Rutter - Summary of Outline*', 11 May 1942, Annex 2-'Forces Required', p.86; COHQ Meeting, Minutes, 11 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/546, '*Rutter - Appendix III*', p.28.

plan in its present form left the coastal defence battery at Varengville in full operation.⁹

Surprisingly, with this serious defect, the plan was approved by the COS on 13 May 1942. The plan also stated that the heavy air bombardment was to begin at a time suitable to Bomber Command and to cease no later than one hour before nautical twilight (0430). The low level bombing by first Blenheim, then Hurricane bombers would begin at 0430 and end at 0450, while the fighter close-support would then take over, and for twenty minutes attack anti-aircraft and coastal batteries, beach defences and other targets to be decided later in the detailed plans.¹⁰

In a later, undated 'Complete' Outline Plan for *Rutter*, the serious omission of not assaulting the battery at Varengville was altered to read, 'At about 0430 a parachute force will land and attack Coastal and A.A. (anti-aircraft) batteries some six miles east and west of Dieppe'. No mention was made of the German divisional HQ and it seems, at this point, the plan for an assault on it had been wisely dropped in favour of the assault on the more dangerous batteries. No discussion concerning these changes are in the minutes or any of the planning documents.¹¹

The 13 May plan clarified the orders of the two reserve flights of four Tank Landing Craft (TLC) each, totalling thirty-two tanks. One flight would be on call to land at the main beaches, and the second would be available to land at either Dieppe or Pourville. Finally, the plan indicated some of the

⁹ COHQ Meeting, Minutes, 11 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/546, '*Rutter* - Appendix III', pp.26-7.

¹⁰ CCO to Force Commanders, 13 May 1942, Appendix II '*Operation Rutter* - Outline Plan', in, PRO, DEFE 2/542, COHQ, *Rutter*, Appendix I, p.93.

¹¹ '*Operation Rutter*. Section I-The Outline Plan', nd., PRO, DEFE 2/542, '*Rutter* - Appendix I, p.97.

colour code-names of the beaches which were later used – Blue (Puys beach), Red (East Dieppe beach), White (West Dieppe beach), Green (Pourville beach). Before 22 May 1942 the allocation of Red and Blue identifications were reversed.¹²

On the 19 May 1942 an American staff joined COHQ as part of its permanent staff. Brig.-Gen. Lucien K. Truscott, Jr, was in command of the initial four-man delegation, which quickly expanded to a total of twelve, with personnel working in all sections of COHQ. Mountbatten gave him the new title of US Adviser Combined Operations (USACO). Truscott noted in a memorandum to his superior, General Eisenhower, that *Operation Round-Up* was the agreed basis for British-American joint operations, and that the original delegation was intimately related to that plan. He stated that the three main reasons for attaching officers to COHQ were to: 'Gain battle experience in raids to provide leavening for American troops; study of combined operations to aid in training American troops; [and] promotion of common understanding, good relations, and cooperation between Allied forces'. Therefore it was sometime after this point that the idea of using a small detachment of US Rangers (American equivalent to commandos) in *Rutter* developed.¹³

¹² 'Operation *Rutter*. Section I-The Outline Plan', nd., PRO, DEFE 2/542, '*Rutter* – Appendix I, pp.97-8; COHQ, 'Combined Report', p. 8; for reallocation of beach colour code-names from west to east, i.e. Green, White, Red, Blue, see COHQ, 'Operation *Rutter* – Minutes of 2nd Meeting', 22 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/546, COHQ, '*Rutter*', Appendix III – 'Minutes of Meetings', p.266.

¹³ COHQ War Diary, 19 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/2; Truscott to Eisenhower, Memo, 7 September 1942. The memo indicated that one of the officers who joined later was the actor Lieutenant Douglas Fairbanks Jr who was assigned to 'Intelligence' and whose duty was given as '(Camouflage B)', which was possibly to do with 'Plans-Development', Lexington, VA, George C. Marshall Library, Virginia Military Institute (GCML), Lucien K. Truscott Papers (LTP), 9/1.

The detailed planning for *Rutter* began in earnest in the middle to late May. The question was discussed whether German expatriates should be used or not, presumably on intelligence tasks in association with members of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and other intelligence organizations, and if so, should they be given special training. It was agreed that the Military Adviser Combined Operations (MACO), Colonel Antony Head, should look into this. On 17 May it was suggested that the three Churchill tanks that were presently being fitted with the Ronson flame-throwing apparatus, should be transferred for 'operational reasons', from 40 Royal Tank Regiment to 14 Canadian Army Tank Regiment (14 CATR). The following day this regiment was ordered to begin special training with TLCs on the Isle of Wight. It should be noted that on 25 May Baillie-Grohman was assigned a naval staff, and thus at some point after the 13 May COS meeting, he must have been officially designated Naval Force Commander for *Rutter*. Also in late May a great variety of details were examined, in order to begin preparation of combined orders and a chronological operational programme. These included the overall organization of the naval forces into 'Groups', training of naval and military beach parties, medical preparations, use of balloons and smoke, and even such minutiae as the Army should provide the troops with 'refreshment', such as a 'rum issue', before the assault.¹⁴

Of particular interest is the entry in the COHQ war diary of the proposal, at an Examination Committee meeting on 21 May, of staging two

¹⁴ COHQ War Diary, 16-30 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/2; COHQ, Extracts from meetings and memos, 16-30 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542, COHQ, '*Rutter* - Planning', pp.12-16; COHQ, Minutes of Meetings, 21-9 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/546, COHQ, '*Rutter* - Appendix III - Minutes of Meetings', pp.263-9.

small commando raids, five to fifteen miles east and west of Dieppe, with the object being to 'distract attention from the *Rutter* objective and to assist in Operation *Rutter*'. After discussion the proposal was dropped due to lack of landing craft, although it was agreed to consider it as a 'separate operation at some other time'. This is probably the origin of the later plan to substitute commando for airborne troops, for at a meeting of the same committee five days later, it was declared that *Rutter* 'must go forward, whether or not the Airborne Division takes part'.¹⁵

Apparently the Force Commanders did not agree with the COHQ Examination Committee, for on 1 June 1942, at the first meeting of all the force commanders together, it was pointed out that the need for two additional squadrons, needed for the airborne troops, was 'essential'. The same day Mountbatten sent his Deputy-Chief Combined Operations (DCCO), Brig. Godfrey E. Wildman-Lushington, to deliver a letter to Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, which explained that the Force commanders were ready to cancel *Rutter* unless they received that required lift for the additional paratroopers, necessary to capture 'two vital batteries', which presumably were those at Varengeville.¹⁶

On 7 June the decision was made to have 2 CID mount a full scale rehearsal for *Rutter*, code-named Exercise *Yukon I*, on the 11/12 June. The area chosen was West Bay, near Bridport, Dorset, on the south-west coast of England, which was thought to resemble the landing areas around Dieppe.

¹⁵ 'Extract from Examination Committee Minutes', 21 & 26 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/2, COHQ War Diary.

¹⁶ COHQ Secretary, 'Combined Force Commanders Meeting, 1 June 1942', 4 June 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/546, COHQ, '*Rutter* - Appendix III - Minutes of Meetings', p.270; Extract of letter, CCO to CAS, 1 June 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542, COHQ, '*Rutter* - Planning', p.16, entry P/36.

The exercise was to simulate the *Rutter* plan, excluding the airborne elements, by having three separate landings involving six infantry battalions, a tank battalion, and small parties of engineers and other support units. The landing was to be opposed by the 'normal beach defences', such as barbed wire, tubular steel scaffolding and 'dragons teeth' (anti-tank concrete blocks), defended by 114 Infantry Brigade, 38 (Welsh) Division, 5 Corps, Home Forces, who were to act as the Germans. The exercise was planned to be as realistic as possible, with the assaulting engineers using reduced charges for demolitions, and both sides using smoke. The 'Germans' were also to use searchlights and pyrotechnics, such as red and green flares and white star rockets. All civilians were evacuated from the area.¹⁷

Paget, McNaughton, Crerar and other high ranking spectators attended the exercise, which was so disappointing that Mountbatten, who was in North America at the time, decided to postpone the execution of *Rutter*, which had been scheduled for 20/21 June, and ordered that a second full scale rehearsal be mounted in the same area, using the same forces, which he and Montgomery would attend. This exercise, mounted on 22/23 June, known as *Yukon II*, and the first one, taught many lessons which were of value. The two most important points were encompassed in minutes by Paget and McNaughton to Montgomery. In *Yukon I* poor naval navigation resulted in landing craft beaching fifteen minutes late and as far away as a half mile from the two flank beaches, while the TLCs arrived at the centre beach over an hour late, and not at all at the designated flank beach. McNaughton pointed out the 'insufficiency' of the smoke cover provided,

¹⁷ BGS, 5 Corps, '*Rutter* - Meeting held to mount *Yukon I*, 7 June 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/548, COHQ, '*Rutter* - Appendix III - Minutes of Meetings', p.275-8.

while Paget called its use 'amateurish'. Paget also noted the 'failure to synchronise the approach of the TLC[s] with the attack of our fighters'.¹⁸

More specific points were noted by McNaughton, Skrine, 114 Infantry Brigade, and officers of the 2 CID involved. Besides almost all reports noting lateness and errors in navigation of the landing craft, 114 Infantry Brigade warned of ALCs 'bunching up'. During the initial landings of *Yukon I*, McNaughton noted that the central beach consisted of 'fine gravel which completely defeated all wheeled vehicles including scout cars and blitz buggies [Jeeps]'. In the second exercise, engineers attempted to lay out chespalng mats to assist the wheeled vehicles across the beach, but this was 'frequently smashed by tanks and did not provided suitable surface for Scout Cars even when they managed to get to it'. In both exercises when vehicles became stuck, they had to be towed across the beach by bulldozers or carriers. Once ashore reports warned that liaison among infantry, engineers and tanks was poor, citing an example that during the first exercise, near the aerodrome, tanks and infantry were within five hundred yards of each other, and 'neither were aware of the other's presence'. This showed the need for better inter-service communications among all arms and more and better signals equipment. During *Yukon I* information on the second HQ ship, *Fernie*, was 'practically nil', since the infantry brigades did not use the 'B' wave radio frequency, the radio set for direct communication with the HQ ship, *Calpe*, was not working properly, and 'the Navy had no information'. Concerning operations inland on *Yukon I*, it was stated that section leading, as opposed to platoon leading, was 'on the whole rather

¹⁸ McNaughton to Montgomery, 23 June 1942, NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D3), GOC 1-0-4, 'Operations-Raids', Part I(b), fol.46; C-in-C, Home Forces to GOC-in-C, South-Eastern Command, Minute 1627, 24 June 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542, COHQ, 'Rutter - Training', p.64.

poor', while platoon commanders often ignored section commanders altogether. One result was that many of the 'men in the ranks did not know what the units "intention" was'. In *Yukon II* use of smoke by the attacking infantry was considered 'excellent' by the exercise umpires, and effective use of the 2in mortar in this regard was noted, although during the withdrawal, smoke was laid too close, allowing the advancing 'Germans' to get so near that 'they could have landed 2in Mortars and rifle grenades' into the TLCs, 'in addition to shooting them up with rifles and L.A. [light artillery]'. This same report explained that the withdrawal on the beach was somewhat chaotic. At one point over three hundred troops, four completely loaded TLCs, two of which were grounded due to over crowding, several carriers and Jeeps, were packed into a bridgehead protected by only two infantry platoons of the Fusilier Mont-Royal (FMR). The two TLCs remained grounded for almost an hour and one of them finally needed to be pushed off by a bulldozer.¹⁹

Concerning the *Yukon* exercises and the general training for *Rutter*, Montgomery stressed the importance of assigning a conference room with the necessary air photos, maps, sketches and miniature model of the area, that should be used for all conferences and meetings of the Force Commanders and officers down to company level. Also each company

¹⁹ Reports dealing with *Yukon I & II* are: 'Exercise *Yukon II* 22/23 June 1942 - Points noted by Defenders on Coast of 114 Inf. Bde, 38th (Welsh) Division', nd., RG 24/13746/Serial 152/GS Folder 6; McNaughton, Memorandum 64-2-2, 22 June 1942, MG 30 E133/248/1-30 June 1942, Appendix F; Skrine, '*Rutter* Training-Points raised by Battalion and Brigade Commanders', 11 July 1942; PRO, DEFE 2/549; Home Forces, 'Exercise *Yukon* 12 June 1942-Report by P.M.L.O [Principal Military Landing Officer] Umpire', 16 June 1942; Brigadier Frere, 114 Infantry Brigade, to Skrine, 16 June 1942; and 'Report on Exercise *Yukon*', 14 June 1942, all three reports in NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D37); 'Notes taken at meeting of Officers 2 Cdn Div., Drill Hall-Newport', 14 June 1942; Skrine, 'Notes on Exercise *Yukon*', 13 June 1942; Wright, Major P.E.R., 'Memo on Exercise *Yukon*', 13 June 1942, all three reports in NAC, RG 24/10873/232C2 (D54).

should be given at least an hour to have the plan explained to them in detail in this room. All naval officers and crews of the various landing craft should also go through the same process. He warned that 'the Navy can never guarantee that they will land the various parties *exactly* at the right place in each case'. Therefore, the army must be familiar with all the landmarks in the area, so that if they are landed in the incorrect place, they can immediately take corrective action. Montgomery even concerned himself with minutiae such as ensuring that all men were provided with medicine to prevent sea-sickness since, 'if troops are sea-sick they will not fight well on shore'. Concerning communications he stated that complete reliance should not be placed on radio and that alternative methods must be provided everywhere, such as 'visual, runner, motor launch from ship to shore'. He concluded his report warning that 'It is fatal to assume that everything will go according to plan; it is almost certain that this will not be so. Officers must be prepared to face up to unforeseen difficulties, and must have that robust mentality which will enable them to do something about it quickly.' Finally he stressed the need for confidence in success, from the Force Commander right down through the chain of command.²⁰

The decision to mount *Yukon II* was taken on 15 June at an afternoon meeting at COHQ of the Force Commanders, also attended by Montgomery and Mountbatten. At this time, the suggestion of having about 8 American officers and 14 NCOs take part in the operation was put forward, with 1 officer and 2 or 3 NCOs landing with each battalion commander, and 1 or 2 NCOs of the US Marines Corps with the Royal Marines on HMS *Locust*.

²⁰ Montgomery, 'Important points in training-*Rutter*', 29 June 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D37).

Mountbatten had already arranged to have about ten men of the US Airborne troops on the parachute drop. Arrangements were also made to have the American contingent attend *Yukon II*. Finally, the date for *Rutter* was fixed for the first favourable day between 3/4 and 8/9 July 1942.²¹

Further meetings were held to put the finishing touches on the detailed orders. These examined the role of the SOE and other intelligence detachments, media personnel going on the operation and post-raid publicity arrangements, changes in the naval order of battle, such as the addition of ten smoke drifters (most likely a direct result of the experience of the *Yukon* exercises), allocation of medical ships, and finally, the issue of maintaining adequate security and cover stories for the unusual training and movements of units to ports of embarkation. Although the Detailed Military Plan for Operation *Rutter* was issued on 20 June, it was amended many times and numbered over two hundred pages.²²

Rutter almost received premature cancellation when Churchill asked to review it on his premature return from the US on 26 June. The loss of Tobruk, the defence of which had gained almost mystical significance as a symbol of British resistance to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's vaunted *Afrika Korps*, resulted in the tabling of a Motion of Censure in Parliament, a direct threat to Churchill's position as Prime Minister. Fearing a potential disaster at Dieppe would coincide with the Vote of Censure, he sought assurances that the operation would be successful.

²¹ 'Operation *Rutter* - Minutes of meeting held at 1400 hours on Monday, 15 June 1942, to discuss certain points concerning Operation *Rutter*', COHQ, '*Rutter* - Appendix III - Minutes of Meetings', pp.30-1, PRO, DEFE 2/546.

²² Various planning meetings and decisions are in PRO, DEFE 2/542, '*Rutter* - Planning', 11-30 June 1942, pp.20-4.

Therefore on 30 June Churchill held a small private conference at 10 Downing Street to discuss *Rutter*. The meeting was attended by Brooke, Ismay, Mountbatten, Hollis, Hughes-Hallett, two officers of the staff of Ministry of Defence and Mrs Churchill, who 'hovered in the background arranging flowers'. No Canadian representative was present, possibly because, as Villa acutely observes, Churchill did not want any witnesses if he decided to cancel *Rutter* for domestic political reasons. Stacey interviewed Hughes-Hallett in 1946 and says that the latter got the date of the meeting from his diary, although Stacey never saw it and it has never come to light since.²³

Unfortunately no minutes of the meeting seem to have been recorded and so one is left with only a few cryptic references, most of which are post-war recollections. Brooke's diary contains a short entry confirming the meeting took place at 3pm, at Downing Street, to discuss a 'large scale raid which is to be carried out next Saturday morning on Dieppe', but gives no further details. Thus one is left with Hughes-Hallett's post-war recollections in his letters, memoirs and interviews. He describes in these that Churchill was 'reluctant to risk a serious military failure so soon after the disaster at Tobruk'. Also since Churchill had just persuaded Roosevelt to accept *Torch*, the invasion of North Africa, instead of the *Sledgehammer*, Channel operations became 'much less urgent'. Churchill first asked Hughes-Hallett his opinion about the morale of the Canadian troops. For a short time Hughes-Hallett had trained with one of the Canadian battalions,

²³ Villa's discusses the 30 June 1942 meeting in *Unauthorized action*, pp.90-2,190, 201; Stacey, Notebook, 'Visit to Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, CB, DSO, HMS *Vernon*, 29/30 September 1946, UTA, CSP/012; Stacey, 'Memorandum of interviews with Capt. J. Hughes-Hallett, CB, DSO, RN, at Portsmouth, 29 and 30 September 1946', 1 October 1946, Appendix A, pp.1-6, in 'Operation *Jubilee*: the raid on Dieppe 19 August 1942. Additional information on planning', 5 October 1946, DHist, CMHQ Report No.159; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.337; Stacey, Interview by Terence Macartney-Filgate, 1978, DHist, 79/567/106.

masquerading as a private. He replied, says Stacey, that 'they would fight like hell'. Hughes-Hallett then says Churchill asked him if he could guarantee success? Stacey claims that Hughes-Hallett told him in 1946 that it was to Mountbatten that Churchill directed this question, and that Mountbatten replied that of course he could *not* guarantee success. Hughes-Hallett seems to have become confused, since years later he recalls replying, 'so far as I knew every ship might be a blazing wreck withⁱⁿ the first 15 minutes of the beginning of the engagement', at which point Brooke quickly interrupted saying, 'If he, or anyone else, could guarantee success... there would indeed be no object in doing the operation. It is just because no-one has the slightest idea what the outcome will be that the operation is necessary'. At this juncture, Churchill stated that, at this moment, he had no wish, in Hughes-Hallett's words, 'to learn through adversity'. Hughes-Hallett claims that Brooke then said, 'no responsible General will be associated with any planning for invasion until we have an operation at least the size of Dieppe behind us to study and base our plans upon'. This adamant statement by Brooke, the most senior military man in Britain, with years of military experience, was what finally swayed the PM to accept the operation.²⁴

Villa says that it is strange that a man of Brooke's professional competence, would back such an flawed operation, and that it seems 'scarcely credible', until, that is, one realizes that what Brooke was doing,

²⁴ Churchill's account of the meeting is uninformative and even puts it at a later date, which would not have been possible as *Rutter* was scheduled from 3/4 July. Brooke, *Diary*, 30 June 1942, KCL, Alanbrooke Papers, *Notes on my life*, 3/A/VI, p.429; Hughes-Hallett to Mountbatten, 18 August 1950, KCL, Ismay Papers, II/3/260/4; Hughes-Hallett to Stacey, 30 December 1952, DHist 594.011 (D8); Hughes-Hallett, *Memoirs, Before I forget*, 1971, NAC, MG 30 E483, pp.165-6; Stacey to Editor, *RUSI Journal*, 10 May 1974, UTA, CSP/005; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.337.

'was buying time while he sorted out his strategic priorities'. *Rutter* was tied to another operation, *Jupiter*, a major assault on several Norwegian ports, which Brooke considered very risky and wanted to squash. He realized that letting *Rutter* proceed, would permit *Jupiter* to die a quiet death, but on the other hand, if *Rutter* was cancelled, Churchill would push for *Jupiter*. Villa describes that to prevent this from happening, 'Brooke was prepared to keep Dieppe alive, and from this perspective the disaster that resulted may be said to be part of the price paid for the slow strangulation of *Jupiter*'. The Whitakers, in their discussion of the meeting, imply that not only Brooke, but Churchill also, regarded Dieppe as 'their last hope against the threat of *Sledgehammer*'. Strangely, the Whitakers do not seem to regard the *Jupiter/Rutter* connection as significant, as they do not discuss *Jupiter*, or even Norway, at all in their book.²⁵

Although no Canadians took part in the preparation of the original *Rutter* outline plan, the senior Canadian commanders involved, Generals McNaughton, Crerar and Roberts, as will be shown, all had opportunities to review all preliminary and final operation orders for both *Rutter* and *Jubilee* and thus, if need be, veto Canadian participation.²⁶ The first instance was in the beginning of May after Crerar informed Roberts that his division had been selected and he, and the necessary staff, were ordered to COHQ to collaborate with the naval and air planning staffs, in the preparation of the detailed plans. Under the current procedures for combined operations, the Force Commanders had to decide whether to accept the outline plan as a basis for further planning or not. For his part, Roberts ordered his senior staff

²⁵ Villa, *Unauthorized action*, pp.90-3; Whitaker, *Dieppe: tragedy to triumph*, pp.171-2.

²⁶ All three Generals, points out the official Canadian army historian, were confident in the success of the operation. See Stacey, *Six years of war*, p. 344.

officer, Mann, 2 CID, to do a detailed review of the outline plan. This appreciation is undated and thus Stacey says it is unsure if it was started and/or completed before the outline plan had received COS approval.²⁷

In the appreciation Mann noted that tanks assaulting Dieppe could give immediate fire support to the attacking infantry and engineers and cause a psychological shock to the Germans and civilian population. Tanks could receive ammunition and engineer support material easier on the main beach where the supply craft concentrated. The tanks would also be closer to their planned objectives and the beach front was the most convenient place for re-embarkation after the raid.

Mann recognized the disadvantages of frontally attacking the enemy, the need for engineer assault teams, and the difficulty of penetrating blocked streets caused by bombardment, but he pointed out that the garrison only consisted of two low-grade infantry companies. Opting in favour of the plan, he concluded that the tanks would play an important part in the withdrawal phase and that the tanks 'seemed to have a reasonable prospect of success'.²⁸

The idea of trying to send slow-moving, infantry support tanks rapidly through the narrow streets of a defended enemy town, and out into the surrounding countryside, holding a defensive perimeter and then withdrawing through the town, all in the matter of four to five hours, seems ridiculously foolhardy and reckless. It also showed the gross ignorance of

²⁷ Concerning the lack of a date on Mann's appreciation, Stacey explains that:

So much was done verbally that there are no other documents which serve to put it in its proper place in time. The natural assumption is that the Outline Plan did not go to HQ 2 Cdn. Div. until the Chiefs of Staff had approved it; but this apparently cannot be actually proved by the available documents.

Stacey to Simonds, 22 April 1969, UTA, CSP/005.

²⁸ Mann, 'Lecture notes. The Combined Services raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942', nd., p.2, DHist 594.019; Mann, 'Observations Upon the Outline Plan', nd., pp.3-4, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D36).

COHQ planners and senior Allied commanders of the capabilities and limitations of tanks. No one seems to have considered carefully the extreme vulnerability of tanks taking part in street-fighting in built-up areas. Tanks have extremely limited vision. If a crew commander stuck his head out of the turret to get a clear view, he would expose himself to enemy sniper fire. Tanks could neither protect themselves nor return fire unless at some distance from the target because their guns could not elevate very high. They would also be moving slowly since they depended on infantry for mutual support, especially in built-up areas.²⁹

After *Yukon II* steps were taken to correct the many faults identified. These are outlined in a letter of 1 July to Paget, a copy of which he sent to McNaughton. Most important was the concern with navigation and getting the assault troops to the correct beaches and on time. To this end, three 'special R.D.F. ships' were assigned to guide the groups into the respective flank (Green and Blue) and centre beaches (Red and White). Two officers, 'with expert local knowledge of the coast in question', were also assigned to lead the flank groups in. Montgomery noted that these arrangements 'should ensure accurate navigation' and that they had not existed in *Yukon I* and *II*. He also explained provisions for improved close-support by fighters on the centre beaches, by having them controlled by radio from the HQ ship. Concerning smoke, SLOs (Smoke Liaison Officers) with 4in mortars, and a number of 'smoke-ships' were detailed to the expedition, while Mountbatten

²⁹ In this period, astonishing as it may seem, no clear and established tactical doctrine for the employment of tanks existed in the British Army. The pre-war doctrines proved disastrously imperfect during the campaign preceding Dunkirk. The British High Command had not collectively decided the type of tank to be produced and how it was to be employed mainly because during the inter-war period British senior officers, schooled in the traditions of the infantry or cavalry arms, were unwilling to recognize that the gradual mechanization of the cavalry arm, in turn required a radical revision of the cavalry's traditional roles. Lt-Gen. E.L.M. Burns, *General Mud: memoirs of two world wars* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1970), pp.110-111.

assigned his 'own smoke expert'. Montgomery explained that on 30 June, he met with all three Force Commanders on the Isle of Wight and went through all the detailed plans of the whole operation. He concluded that he was 'satisfied' that the operation as planned 'is a possible one' and has 'good prospects of success', given 'favourable weather', 'average luck', and that the navy put the assault forces ashore 'in the right places, and at the right times'. In a hand-written postscript, he confidently stated, 'The Canadians are 1st Class chaps; if anyone can pull it off, they will'.³⁰

On the day of the operation Crerar wrote to McNaughton in the same vein, noting that he had met the previous day with Roberts and his brigadiers, who had expressed 'full confidence' in the operation, 'given a break in luck'. Concerning the previous navigational difficulties, he concluded that 'this is now pretty well disappeared', although he explained that he had warned Roberts that '100% accuracy should never be expected in any human endeavour', and that any difficulties should be dealt with by 'rapid thinking and decision'. One wonders what Crerar was thinking here, as later, in the same letter, he commented that he agreed with Montgomery, that once the operation was launched, it could only be influenced by airpower. He optimistically concluded that he agreed that the plan was 'sound, and most carefully worked out', and that he would have 'no hesitation in tackling it, if in Robert's place'.³¹

With the *Rutter* plans completed, Roberts held a conference on 27 June of all officers of the 2 CID assault force. Roberts opened the conference

³⁰ Montgomery to Paget, 1 July 1942, and cover note, Montgomery to McNaughton, 1 July 1942, NAC, RG 24 C17/13611/GS First Canadian Army HQ War Diary, April 1942 - February 1943.

³¹ Crerar to McNaughton, 3 July 1942, NAC, RG 24 C17/13611/GS First Canadian Army HQ War Diary April 1942 - February 1943.

by saying that the Division was going to have a 'party', and that if any information got out the 'party' would be cancelled. He stressed security and the need for speed in neutralizing the German beach defences once landed. Perhaps of significance is his statement that, 'Certain things which we are after may mean an important factor to the outcome of the war', possibly referring to the plan to raid the RDF station. Even at this late date the actual name of the objective was not given and the officers were ordered that 'other ranks were not to be informed until on board ship'. The next day a further meeting was held to discuss last minute details among the Navy, Essex Scottish, engineers, tanks and Royal Marine Commandos. The troops boarded the assault ships on 2 and 3 July and thereafter 'sealed' on board. Only now were the men informed that what previously had been thought to be an exercise, code-named *Klondike I*, was an actual operation against Dieppe. Both Roberts and Mountbatten came on board to give pep talks to the men and each man was carefully briefed on his role and the details of the plan.³²

Poor weather caused the operation to be postponed a day, and again for the same reason the following day. On 5 July the weather forecast was unfavourable for the next forty-eight hours and thus the operational plan underwent a substantial revision. The next favourable day was 8 July which would have meant a two-tide operation, with the withdrawal not having begun until 1700 hours. As previously mentioned, this left the force in danger of a heavy counter-attack by German reserves of infantry, artillery, and more

³² 'Notes on meeting held informing Bdes [Brigades] about forthcoming operation *Rutter*', 1430 hours 27 June 1942, NAC, RG24/10872/232C2 (D37); 'Notes on conference of Navy, Essex Scottish, Tanks, Engineers and Royal Marine Commando, 28 June 1942', NAC, RG24/10872/232C2 (D37); Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.339.

menacingly, 10 *Panzer* Division. Therefore, the plan was put onto a one-tide basis. The tanks now were not to support the infantry assault towards Arques, unless ordered, and the tank withdrawal would finish by 1000 hours and the infantry by 1100 hours.³³

COHQ rather dubiously claims this alteration was an advantage. It would enable more concentrated air support due to the overall reduction in time of the operation and would give the Germans less time to develop a counter-attack. It concludes by saying, 'the concentration of all our effort over a shorter period ought to produce good chances of success which would not be much less than to be obtained by the full *Rutter* plan'.³⁴

This was an extremely optimistic appreciation and ignored several factors. The most important was that the infantry and tanks had to attain their objectives in much less time from the initial zero hour of 0515. Even with hindsight it is hard to imagine how they expected to scale defended cliffs and ravines, neutralize well-protected coastal and field batteries on the flanking headlands, clear a fortified town of its defenders, undertake demolition, and attack an airfield and headquarters four miles beyond. All these objectives were to be accomplished in *Rutter II* by 0730 hours, the time that the withdrawal code-word, *Vancouver*, would be announced. This gave the

³³ 'Alteration of the plan made necessary through postponement', nd. [probably 5 July 1942], PRO, DEFE 2/546, '*Rutter* - Appendix IV - Miscellaneous Papers', pp.347-9; COHQ War Diary, 3 to 6 July 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/2; items P/65-8, 3 to 6 July 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542/COHQ, '*Rutter* - Planning', 31 October 1942, pp.24-5; Mann, 'Notes regarding withdrawal plan', 6 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D37); Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.339; re 10 *Panzer* Division move and affects, see Lt-Col B.H Darwin, 'Memorandum of discussion between Lt-Gen. McNaughton and Lt-Gen. Montgomery, at 'A' House, HQ SE Army, at 1215 hours 5 July 1942 regarding operation *Rutter*', 6 July 1942, NAC, RG 24 C17/13611/GS First Canadian Army HQ War Diary, April 1942 - February 1943; and Montgomery to Crerar, 5 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D3), fol.51.

³⁴ Baillie-Grohman, 'Considerations affecting Operation *Rutter* and the modification of this plan to be known as *Rutter II*, 5 July 1942'; and see also 'Operation *Rutter* and *Jubilee*: Notes on Principal Changes in the Military Plan', both in PRO, DEFE 2/546, COHQ, '*Rutter* - Appendix IV - Miscellaneous Papers', pp.333-5, 345-7.

infantry and tanks only two hours and fifteen minutes to attain their objectives before beginning to withdraw. They had to be reembarked completely by 1100 and 1000 hours respectively.³⁵

In the early morning of 7 July four fighter-bombers, believed to be *Fock-Wolfe* (FW) 190s carrying five hundred kilogram bombs, attacked the concentration of shipping gathering for *Rutter* in Yarmouth Roads, Isle of Wight. Two Landing Ships Infantry (LSI) were hit, *Princess Astrid* and *Queen Josephine Charlotte*, luckily the bombs went clean through and exploded in the water, although the latter received severe damage to her engine room. Both carried men largely of the Royal Regiment of Canada (RRC) and only four men received minor injuries. Stacey says the damage to these two ships was not enough to cancel the operation as the troops were disembarked to be loaded on other vessels. Other ships were also damaged by machine gun and cannon fire. Weather was still not suitable and in the late evening of 7 July Brigadier Maurice Chilton, Home Forces, telephoned Crerar to say that the operation was cancelled on naval grounds. Montgomery supports this conclusion, stating in a letter to Crerar, a few days after, that the decision was taken 'on purely naval grounds, and was due entirely to adverse weather conditions'. The men were disembarked and the units sent back to the mainland to be dispersed to various parts of England.³⁶

³⁵ Baillie-Grohman, 'Considerations affecting Operation *Rutter* and the modification of this plan to be known as *Rutter II*, 5 July 1942', PRO, DEFE 2/546, COHQ, '*Rutter* - Appendix IV - Miscellaneous Papers', pp.334-5; Mann, 'Notes regarding withdrawal plan', 6 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D37).

³⁶ Memo, 'Bombing of Yarmouth Road, 7 July 1942', nd., PRO, DEFE 2/324; Lt-Col B.H. Darwin, 'Memorandum, cancellation of Operation *Rutter*', 7 July 1942; and Montgomery to Crerar, 11 July 1942, both in NAC, RG24 C17/13611/GS First Canadian Army HQ War Diary, April 1942 - February 1943; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.339.

On 7, 8 and 11 July meetings were held at COHQ to discuss various matters and lessons learned arising from *Rutter*. Some of the conclusions were: the need for better inter-service liaison and coordination, especially concerning communications and dissemination of intelligence; that no combined operation must entirely depend on the use of airborne troops, as weather conditions are almost never appropriate for their use; that troops should embark immediately prior to sailing, as men had been sealed on board for up to three days in 'quite intolerable' living conditions, with little air or light; the need for better security and cover story arrangements; avoidance of concentration of shipping; and, finally, that at the same time as the outline plan is given to the force commanders, they also be supplied with an appreciation of it by the joint planning staff.³⁷

A week after *Rutter* was cancelled, Canadian news papers were permitted to report on the intensive amphibious training that Canadian troops had undergone in Britain during the last few months. Canadian Press correspondent Ross Munro had been with the 2 CID during this period and

³⁷ Baillie-Grohman, Roberts, Air Commodore A.T. Cole, '*Rutter II* – Considerations affecting Operation *Rutter* and the modification of this plan to be known as *Rutter II*', 5 July 1942, and Appendix – 'Selection of date for *Rutter II* (One tide operation)', [also in PRO, AIR 16/760/101.80A]; Baillie-Grohman to CCO, 'Naval aspects of the planning and the staffs appointed', 10 July 1942; G.2.P.1. to VCCO, 'Operation *Rutter* and *Jubilee*, notes on principal changes in the military plan', 14 September 1942; all three in PRO, DEFE 2/546, '*Rutter* – Appendix IV – Miscellaneous Papers', pp.333-47; COHQ War Diary, 8-11 July 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/2; items P/69-73, 8-11 July 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542/COHQ, *Rutter – Planning*, 31 October 1942, pp.25-6; 'Minutes of the meeting held on Operation *Rutter* at Combined Operations HQ 8.7.42', 9 July 1942; 'Minutes of meeting with the *Rutter* Force Commanders held at COHQ on Saturday, 11 July 1942'; both in PRO, DEFE 2/546/COHQ, '*Rutter* – Appendix III – Minutes of Meetings', 31 October 1942, pp.294-302; A.H. Head, 'Draft – Notes on the preparation and mounting of Operation *Rutter*', 8 July 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/549, pp.1-4; Roberts and Baillie-Grohman to CCO, 'Notes on staffs and planning for *Rutter*', 9 July 1942, PRO, ADM 179/220; on living conditions of troops on sealed ships see Naval Officer-in-Charge, Newhaven, to C-in-C Portsmouth, 'Remarks on the preparations for Operation *Rutter*', 9 July 1942, PRO, ADM 179/220; to CCO and COS, 'Interim report on lessons learnt on *Rutter*', nd., PRO, DEFE 2/552; Colvin, I.G. to C.O.R., 15 September 1942, concerns his recollections of planning meetings for *Rutter* and *Jubilee*; COHQ Naval Staff Meetings Nos. 16-17 Minutes, 7 and 8 July 1942, London, Greenwich, National Maritime Museum (NMM), Baillie-Grohman Papers, GRO 23; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.339.

wrote the following accurate account, which was passed, perhaps surprisingly, by British censors:

Six battalions of infantry, supported by armoured elements, engineers, signals and miscellaneous units, set a new height in shock-troops training for the military forces in Britain.

Infantry and armoured vehicles poured ashore in the light of the early dawn, terrifying the inhabitants of the district with the realism of their dress rehearsal.

Some time ago the Canadians were brought secretly to camps near this port and from the crack-of-dawn reveille to nightfall trained in all the complexities of combined operations.³⁸

On 16 July similar news came out in all the British papers, trumpeting the Canadians' training as 'a prelude to what may be major military operations on the European coast'. At least one of the papers, *The Daily Telegraph*, was able to get the statement that 'three Ontario regiments' participated, past the censor. *The Times* opened a story with the statement, 'The biggest raid and invasion manoeuvres ever held in European waters have just been completed by a powerful Canadian force working in cooperation with the Royal Navy and RAF'. This was two days after the decision had definitely been reached to remount the operation as *Jubilee*, and the same day that the first *Jubilee* Force Commanders meeting occurred.³⁹

As previously noted, the operation was quickly revived as *Jubilee*. On 13 July Mann had been promoted to Brigadier and appointed BGS, 1 Canadian Corps. As he was familiar with the planning of *Rutter*, Roberts

³⁸ Ross Munro, *Globe and Mail*, Toronto, 14 July 1942, in 'Operation *Jubilee*: the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Part I: the preliminaries of the operation', CMHQ, Historical Report No.100, draft, 16 July, p.24, DHist 594.013 (D17).

³⁹ 'Army, Navy, And Airforce Rehearse Invasion-Canadian & US Troops Engaged', *Daily Telegraph*, 16 July 1942; 'Biggest Invasion Manoeuvres-Canadians, Navy, And RAF In Action', *The Times*, 16 July 1942; other British headlines on the same day were 'Lord Louis Watches Great Sea Landings', *The Daily Mail*; '3-Service Invasion Show', *The Daily Mirror*; 'War Chiefs See Biggest Invasion Exercise', *The News Chronicle*, all in NAC, RG 24 C17/13611/GS First Canadian Army HQ War Diary/April 1942 - February 1943.

requested him to be lent for the duration of *Jubilee* and Crerar agreed. Mann immediately began work on revising the operational plans.⁴⁰

At the Force Commanders' meeting of 16 July it was decided to substitute commandos for airborne troops, although it seems that COHQ, and definitely Hughes-Hallett, had previously decided against using the airborne element. His preliminary notes for the meeting, written the day before, state, 'Para-troops [*sic.*] will not take part and flanked batteries are to be taken out by Commandos'. The reason given was that airborne troops needed ideal weather. The minutes show that the possibility of using airborne troops was to be examined but they would not be informed of the proposal, 'until about a week before the operation'. Later discussion concluded that, 'it seemed most improbable that any useful targets could be found for the Airborne Division under the conditions of light that will prevail, and it was provisionally decided to abandon the idea of using them'.⁴¹

Although the commando groups would be responsible to the Military Force Commander for their plans, they had the freedom to compose their own operation orders, independent from the Detailed Military Plan. In the latter's Order of Battle, they are only shown as 'Under Command from Landing' only. After finishing their tasks they were to return to England, separate from the main force, and in the same craft they arrived in.⁴²

⁴⁰ Stacey, *Six year of war*, p.342.

⁴¹ Hughes-Hallett, 'Brief discussion at Force Commanders meeting 1500, 16 July, 1942', 15 July 1942, London, Imperial War Museum (IWM), Vice-Admiral John Hughes-Hallett Papers (JHHP) JHH 3/2; 'Operation *Jubilee*. Force Commanders' Meeting at 1500 hours on Thursday 16 July 1942', IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/1.

⁴² 'Operation *Jubilee*. Force Commanders' Meeting at 1500 hours on Thursday 16 July 1942', JHH 3/1; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.343.

Most accounts pass over this alteration as having no effect on *Jubilee*. They ignore the fact, as Villa accurately points out, the commandos needed to land by sea. 'Complicating still further the navigation track chart and the naval congestion in the final approach to Dieppe... and one of the commando groups failed, at least in part - with serious consequences in the withdrawal phase'.⁴³ It is significant to point out that it was one of these commando groups that collided with the German convoy, thereby raising the alarm at Blue Beach. If airborne units had been used, as in the original plan, this particular encounter would not have happened as no assault craft would have been in the area. One can speculate about whether the German convoy might have later run into other elements of the naval force and the subsequent results.

Other decisions taken at the 16 July meeting were the dates of the operation, which could be anytime during the period 18/23 August inclusive and 1/2, 6/7 September inclusive. General briefing of units would be 'deferred until the last possible moment', that is, when the operation was 'definitely about to take place'. However, Naval and Military Commanding Officers were to be warned under the 'strictest confidence that an emergency operation is being planned for August and may be ordered to take place at short notice'. These officers were to be told that the same personnel would be participating as in *Rutter*. The units' briefings just prior to the operation would be done on the exact same model of Dieppe as used for *Rutter*. This meant that no extra boat training or rehearsals would be necessary, further safeguarding security. The *Rutter* plan of having a protected anchorage for landing craft covered by smoke and special anti-aircraft, or Eagle ships, was

⁴³ Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.286, fn.59.

dropped in favour of ordering all the landing craft to stay dispersed off Dieppe and, later, to take refuge in the harbour after the capture of the town. This had the advantage of cutting the already crowded *Jubilee* force down by thirteen ships, but, more importantly, 'the Admiralty' was worried, for security reasons, that the movement of these ships, from the Thames River to the South Coast, could be observed by German air reconnaissance.⁴⁴

On 21 July 1942 a meeting of what was now termed the Combined Force Commanders was held at COHQ, which was also attended by the Commando leaders Lt-Col J.H. 'Torchy' Dumford-Slater, CO No.3 Commando, and Lt-Col The Lord 'Shimi' Lovat, CO No.4 Commando. The Air Force Commander, Leigh-Mallory, said it would be possible to have a Spitfire squadron support the commandos attack on the flank batteries and might even be able to supply some bombers. Mountbatten outlined the procedure for drawing up the operation orders for *Jubilee*. It was agreed that the three Force Commanders should, 'prepare and sign a combined plan which the CCO would forward to the Chiefs of Staff Committee for approval'. This seems never to have been done but as we have seen, it was not necessary as Mountbatten did not need their approval of the final plan. The Detailed Military Plan was drawn up on 5 August, the Naval Operation Order was issued five days later, and the Detailed Air Plan three days after that.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Hughes-Hallett, 'Brief discussion at Force Commanders meeting 1500, 16 July, 1942', 15 July, IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/2; 'Operation *Jubilee*. Force Commanders' Meeting at 1500 hours on Thursday 16 July 1942', IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/1; Hughes-Hallett to Commodore R.G. Duke, 17 July 1942 and memo, 'Operation *Jubilee*', IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/1; on Eagle ships see Hughes-Hallett to Leigh-Mallory, cover letter and memo, 'Military and Air Commander's meeting. Suggested points for discussion', 15 July 1942, PRO AIR 16/746, copy in IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/2; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.343.

⁴⁵ 'Operation *Jubilee*. Minutes of the first meeting of Combined Force Commanders at COHQ on 21 July 1942', 24 July 1942, IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/1; COHQ, War Diary 31 July-13 August 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/3.

On 11 August Crerar wrote to McNaughton, explaining that he had met with the Force Commanders to go over the *Jubilee* plans on six different occasions since 30 July. Concerning the last meeting on 11 August, he wrote:

I have today gone over the plans for the Exercise, as now agreed to by the Naval, Army and Air Force Commanders and am satisfied that the revisions made in respect to the previous exercise plans add, rather than detract, to the soundness of the plan as a whole. I am, therefore, of the opinion that, given an even break in luck and good navigation, the demonstration should prove successful.

Three days later McNaughton met with Crerar and Roberts to go over the final plans himself, writing to Cerar the same day to confirm that he was 'satisfied with these plans and with the arrangements made in all respects', and that he authorized the use of the Canadian troops for the operation.⁴⁶

To give security cover to the massive and unusual preparations that 2 CID and various detachments needed to undertake for Jubilee, orders were issued for certain exercises and demonstrations. On 10 August HQ 2 CID ordered the 14 CATR to give a combined operations demonstration, thereby giving a security cover to its tell-tale preparations, such as water-proofing of tanks. Exercise *Popsy* was to cover other preparations of the signals units. On 13 August 1 Canadian Corps HQ issued orders for three movement exercises for each of its three infantry divisions, *Ford I, II, and III*, which were to go for a month beginning on 15 August. This was just to act as a screen, since *Ford I* was to cover the movement of the *Jubilee* force units to ports of embarkation. On the evening of 17 August the loading of tanks on TLCs began at Newhaven.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Crerar to McNaughton, 11 August 1942; and McNaughton to Crerar, 14 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10750/220C1.009 (D3)/GOC 1-0-4/Operations-Raids' Part I(b), fols.66-7.

⁴⁷ Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.344; see also 2 CID HQ 'G Branch' War Diary, 13 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/13748/Serial 152/GS Folder 8; War Diary, 16-18 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/17510/August 1942.

That same morning, at 1000 hours, the preliminary execution order had been given by the CCO, C-in-C Portsmouth and the Force commanders, for *Jubilee* force to sail on the night of 18/19 August. Despite poor weather, improved weather was forecasted in the following days. Later the same day, the question of heavy air bombardment was again raised at a meeting of the CCO and the Force Commanders at RAF Station Tangmere. The fact that it was brought up at such a late time, that is, after the preliminary execution order had been given and units had begun to load, reveals what a vexing problem this was for the Force Commanders, especially Roberts. The only source come to light on this meeting is the Combined Report, which states that Roberts held the view that the destruction of the port caused by the bombardment, would be such that it would make the passage of tanks through the town 'difficult, if not it impossible'. Therefore the decision not to bomb was maintained. This issue of bombing, although discussed in the previous chapter in connection with the adoption of the frontal attack, needs further elaboration. Roberts thoughts on this question, some months after the operation are revealing, and therefore are quoted in full:

The original plan for the bombing envisaged two or three minor bombing raids on Dieppe, prior to the operation. As these had not been carried out, it was felt that a large scale attack, probably inaccurately placed, would merely serve to place the enemy on the alert. This was a considerable factor.

At all stages it was insisted that bombing could only be carried out by night, and inaccuracy, rather than accuracy, was guaranteed.⁴⁸

Ten days after the raid, David Owen, a staff member of War Cabinet member Sir Stafford Cripps, in an interview with journalist, Basil Liddell Hart, stated that the original air bombardment meant to take place the night before, 'was cancelled by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, at General Roberts'

⁴⁸ 'Combined Report', p.10, paras.46-7; Roberts to Senior Officer, CMHQ, 18 March 1943, quoted in Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.344.

request, on the ground that the destruction caused might hinder his tanks from getting through into the town'. That heavy bombing would probably result in the destruction of the port facilities and thus failure to achieve the main objective—capture of the port intact, was a major dilemma for invasion planners. This was outlined in a COS memorandum of 30 June 1942, entitled 'Bombing policy in relation to the French Channel ports'. This stated that in any offensive operations against the occupied coasts of France and the Low Countries, the 'early capture and repair of adequate base ports' was important, and that 'without port facilities at an early stage in the operations the offensive cannot be maintained and must fail'.⁴⁹

The general policy against the bombing of French towns, to avoid killing civilians, was lifted for *Rutter/Jubilee* by the COS and Churchill, leaving the Force Commanders the decision. In a post-war letter Mann stated that, with the invasion of North Africa approaching, in November 1942, Churchill did not wish to antagonise the French by heavy bombing at Dieppe, as he hoped that the French Navy would surrender to the Royal Navy without resisting. He explains that at the 5 June meeting, Roberts was presented with theoretical situation, and was asked what he would do if, after passing the 'point of no return', that is, 0300 hours and the lowering of the ALCs, he was informed that the bombers had been grounded due to fog or other reason. His reply, Mann says, was 'sail on'; and therefore, it was immediately recorded that 'The Military Force Commander does not require

⁴⁹ B. LiddellHart, 'Notes for history – David Owen', 28/29 August 1942, KCL, LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, BHLH 11/1142/88; Paget, Memorandum, 'Bombing policy in relation to the French Channel ports', 30 June 1942, COS (42) 326, PRO, CAB 80/37, p.96; Brigadier Head recalled the main planning problem associated with combined operations at the time, was the capture of a major port intact at the beginning of any operation, Stacey, 'Memorandum of Conversation with Brigadier A.H. Head', Appendix B, p.2, CMHQ Historical Report No.153, DHist.

the use of heavy bombers to carry out the operation'. Mann concludes that 'This neatly met The Prime Minister's wishes'.⁵⁰

Another aspect of the cancellation of the bombing was its effects on the execution of the plan. In *Rutter* the infantry landed at Blue beach were to begin an attack half an hour after landing, with bomber support, against the guns and heavy coastal batteries on the East headland, with the aim of neutralizing them before the main landings took place on the centre beaches. In the *Jubilee* plan the Blue beach attackers only had half an hour in total before the main assault went in to do the same task. This would mean that the guns on the Eastern headland would still be in action when the main assault on Red and White beaches occurred. In these circumstances, the Air Force Commander recommended that C-in-C Bomber Command, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, waive the rule against allowing bombers to operation in daylight, and have bombers used against the eastern headland and the houses on the Dieppe sea-front. Although later discussion ruled this out for reasons already discussed, no corresponding adjustments in the plan were made to compensate for this problem. As it turned out, the failure to take the east headland was one of the main reasons for the failure of the operation. Even after the operation, though, Leigh-Mallory, was still apparently of the opinion, claims the Air Adviser to Combined Operations (AACO), Group Captain A.H. Willetts, that a night bombardment of the east and west batteries would have been unlikely to put them out of action, since 'continuous low day bombing which took place throughout the operation failed to silence them'. This letter refers to fighter- and dive-bombers, but

⁵⁰ Concerning bombing restriction on French towns see Ismay to Churchill, Minute, 19 May 1942, COHQ, War Diary, PRO, DEFE 2/2; Mann to John Mellor, 4 January 1974, Terence Macartney-Filgate Dieppe Collection (TMFDC).

does not address whether heavy bombers, with extremely large bombs or loads, would have been effective.⁵¹

⁵¹ Leigh-Mallory, draft, 'Operation *Jubilee*. Memorandum by the Air Force Commander concerning the employment of bombers', nd., pp.1-2, 5, PRO, AIR 16/746; Group Captain (Gp-Capt.) A.H. Willetts to Gp-Capt. Grant, DDI(3), Air Ministry, 28 August 1942, PRO, AIR 40/1783/101.655.

4

**INTELLIGENCE, ULTRA, RADAR, DECEPTION
AND THE MYTH OF GERMAN FOREKNOWLEDGE**

Before addressing the actual assault phase of *Jubilee*, the intelligence available to the *Jubilee* planners, and other intelligence aspects of the operation need to be examined. At first glance the area seems to be adequately covered by the existing literature. The official wartime British intelligence historian, Professor Sir F.H. Hinsley, in *British intelligence in the Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations* (1981), expertly examines many of the issues concerning strategic and tactical intelligence, such as the Allied operational uses of wireless or signal intelligence (SIGINT). The official Canadian military intelligence history, S.R. Elliot's, *Scarlet to green: a history of intelligence in the Canadian Army, 1903-1963* (1981), primarily deals with the tactical intelligence aspects of the *Rutter* and *Jubilee* plans and their effects on the operation. His brief survey highlights and expands on some of the observations already stated in other secondary works.¹ For primary sources, he has depended almost entirely on the *Rutter* and *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plans, which are part of the Ministry of Defence, Combined Operations Headquarters Records (DEFE 2 series), at the Public Record Office (PRO), copies of which are also available in other

¹ F.H. Hinsley, *British intelligence in the Second World War. Its influence on strategy and operations*, 2 (6 vols., London: HMSO, 1981), Appendix 13, pp.695-704; and S.R. Elliot, *Scarlet to green: a history of intelligence in the Canadian Army, 1903-1963* (Toronto: Canadian Intelligence & Security Association, 1981), pp.161-178, 713. Other works describing the tactical intelligence deficiencies are Charles P. Stacey, *Six years of war: the army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955), pp.349-358; and Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, *Captains without eyes: intelligence failures in World War Two* (London: Macmillan, 1969), p.198; John Mellor, *Dieppe: Canada's forgotten heroes* (Scarborough, Ontario: Macmillan, 1975), pp.12-13.

repositories, such as the National Archives of Canada (NAC), Ottawa, and in those which hold peoples' private papers. A more thorough investigation and critical analysis of the documentary files concerned with *Rutter/Jubilee* as a whole is necessary, for a comprehensive survey of the intelligence aspects. These records include those of the Admiralty, Air Ministry, Cabinet Office, Prime Minister's Private Office, and War Office, all located at the PRO. The records of the Canadian Army Overseas, specifically those of the HQ's of the First Canadian Army, 1 Canadian Corps, and 2 Canadian Infantry Division (2 CID), located at the NAC, also contain relevant material. Finally, the official, semi-official and personal papers of senior commanders involved, such as Mountbatten, Hughes-Hallett, McNaughton and Crerar, are equally significant.²

The most significant recent contribution to the vast literature on the operation, and the first book to make a serious examination of this huge volume of primary and secondary sources from the intelligence point of view, is John P. Campbell's, *Dieppe revisited: a documentary investigation* (1993). Its first chapter, aptly entitled, 'Another book about Dieppe?', explains that the aim of the work is to analyse the raid's operational aspects, such as intelligence, radar, deception, naval and air operations, in the context of activities in the English Channel as a whole in 1942. He uses mainly Allied and German unpublished primary sources, many of the latter hitherto unused war diaries and after-action reports, although all previously available for many years to the public. In doing so Campbell demonstrates his knowledge of the period by pointing out gaps in the documentary record

² Originals of the Detailed Military Plan for *Jubilee*, 5 August 1942, are in PRO, WO 106/4196; as well as in NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25).

resulting from loss, destruction or continued classification. The Dieppe raid, he explains, 'was simply the obvious peg on which to hang such an investigation'.³

This investigation examines all the myths and misconceptions that usually flourish as a result of a military failure such as at Dieppe. Campbell puts these in their operational context and attempts to explain or, more often, disprove each scenario to the reader, acting like a detective/historian. Although this author usually agrees with his conclusions, Campbell does not always address all the issues fully, and the process he takes the reader through is often extremely confusing. He also does not go into the tactical intelligence detail necessary for a comprehensive examination of the battle itself. Since Campbell's book is the most significant contribution to the intelligence side of Dieppe in recent years, it deserves a thoroughly rigorous examination within the context of the following discussion.

Several intelligence related points and questions require attention. Allied estimates on the German order of battle were completely off. Although the incorrect identification of the defending German division and its headquarters (HQ) was not that important to the outcome of the battle, the inaccurate detection of the regimental (equivalent to the Anglo-Canadian brigade) and battalion dispositions and their several headquarters was serious. The inaccurately assessed location of the strategic *Panzer* reserves, in particular 10 *Panzer* Division (10 PzD), also is of interest. Evidence exists that the correct intelligence on its position was available much earlier but was not available to the planners. This shows that a break down in the

³ John P. Campbell, *Dieppe revisited: a documentary investigation* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), p.xiv.

intelligence dissemination process occurred. Apparently this was again the case with the supposed chance encounter with the German Convoy. An Ultra intercept revealed its presence in enough time for the assault force to take evasive action. Questions and misconceptions to do with German foreknowledge, deception, cover plans and radar also need clarification.

Before addressing these matters, a cursory look at the intelligence available to the COHQ planners, Force Commanders and their staffs, is necessary. This will give an idea of what kind of information was available with the aim of understanding, to the extent possible, what and how they were thinking when the plans were undergoing formulation. This background provides the framework for later consideration of the previous points raised.

The most important source of information of an intelligence nature for the operation was the forty-eight page Confidential Book, (CB) 04157 F(I), *Dieppe*. This was compiled by the end of May 1942 by the Intelligence Section of COHQ, under the direction of its Senior Intelligence Officer, Wing-Commander the Marquis of Casa Maury. The COHQ Planning Section received it on 8 June.⁴ The CB was essentially an updated version of the 'Special Report on Dieppe: surrounding topography, beaches and communications 5 miles either side', put together by the Inter-Service Topographical Department (ISTD) and dated 5 April 1942. It included nine addenda, totalling over one hundred pages. The last addendum was dated

⁴ COHQ, Intelligence Section, 'Dieppe. Confidential Book' (CB) 04157 F (I), May 1942, PRO, AIR 8/896; Report I/57, 8 June 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542, COHQ, 'Rutter. intelligence', p.55; COHQ, 'Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid, BR 1887 (previously CB 04244), October 1942', p.9, paragraph 43, DHist 594.013 (D1); COHQ War Diary, 8 June 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/2.

29 May.⁵ In commenting on the CB the COHQ Combined Report on Dieppe explains it provided:

A full description of Dieppe, its port, its military objectives, defences, RDF [Radio Direction Finding] Stations, the enemy order of battle, scales of resistance, rate of reinforcement, and the German Air Force scale of attack. The Confidential Book also contained a full topographical and beach report, illustrated by photographs, as well as information on the approaches to, the tides and tidal streams off Dieppe... There was [sic] issued a series of General Staff Geographical Section standard and over-printed maps, town plans, defence traces, photographs and mosaics of the operational area.⁶

Although COHQ planners only received the CB on 8 June, they did receive the individual intelligence reports that it comprised, from the COHQ Intelligence Section soon after they arrived. Sometimes the Intelligence Section only passed essential intelligence on request instead of automatically.⁷ These separate reports arrived daily from various sources in the intelligence community. These included prisoner of war (PoW) reports from Naval Intelligence Division (NID) Sections (1 and 3), reports from Allied Naval HQ, HM ships, British Missions, Diplomatic sources, the press, escaped patriots, and postal (naval) censorship, passed through the NID Geographical Section; as well as information from the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW), the Admiralty's Operations Intelligence Centre (OIC), ISTD, Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6), Special Operations Executive (SOE), Bomber Command Headquarters, Air Ministry Intelligence Sections (AI2b and 3b) and Scientific Intelligence Section (ADI[Sc]), General

⁵ Inter-Service Topographical Department (ISTD), 'Special Report on Dieppe: surrounding topography, beaches and communications 5 miles either side', Report No. C/32, 5 April 1942, PRO, WO 252/108.

⁶ COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.9.

⁷ A list of the intelligence reports received are classified as 'Reports I/1-69', 21 June 1941-30 July 1942, in PRO, DEFE 2/542, COHQ, *Rutter*: intelligence, pp. 27-58; see also *Rutter* and *Jubilee* entries in the COHQ War Diary, PRO, DEFE 2/2-3. On the problems of intelligence dissemination see Baillie-Grohman and Roberts to the CCO, 'Notes on Staffs and Planning for *Rutter*', 9 July 1942, and Baillie-Grohman to CCO, 'Naval Aspects of the Planning for *Rutter* and the Staffs Appointed', 10 July 1942, p. 3, both in NMM, Baillie-Grohman Papers, GRO/29.

Headquarters Home Forces, Military Intelligence (MI14), and air photos from the Central Interpretation Unit (CIU). The most highly guarded of all intelligence sources was intercepted German radio/signals communications, or SIGINT, which had the cover-names of 'Special Intelligence', 'Most Secret Source', or 'Boniface', and held the security classification Ultra Secret, one level above Top Secret. Since the revelation of this Ultra secret in 1974, this SIGINT has commonly been known as Ultra. Ultra provided such information as the German armed forces order of battle, dispositions and movements. Since Ultra was so highly secret, it was passed in a disguised form by the OIC, MI14 or Air Ministry intelligence sections, to COHQ, after they received it from the super secret Government Code & Cipher School (GC&CS), located at Bletchley Park.⁸

Another important source of intelligence was photographs. Vertical and oblique aerial photographs taken by the RAF Photographic Reconnaissance Unit and 140 Squadron, were passed on for scientific analysis and interpretation, to the CIU HQ at Danesfield, Medmenham, Buckinghamshire, under the direction of Wing Commander Douglas Kendall. The ISTD HQ at Oxford collected for analysis snapshots of English tourists sunbathing on beaches and picture postcards of all areas of the French coast. These seem to have been the main source for calculating the beach gradients at Dieppe. The ISTD's 'Supplementary Photographs to Special Report on Dieppe', ISTD/C/32, 16 April 1942, contains forty-three tourist

⁸ See Reports I/1-69, 21 June 1941-30 July 1942, COHQ, 'Rutter: intelligence', pp. 27-58; sources listed on each page of the COHQ, *Dieppe Confidential Book*; and C. Morgan, 'Combined operation intelligence procedure', approximately 28 June 1942, PRO, ADM 223/464, pp.247-9; Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.159.

postcards, family and aerial photographs, the latter vertical mosaics or close-up obliques, of Dieppe's environs, landing beaches and *Rutter* objectives.⁹

The Combined Report claims these aerial photographs were 'very comprehensive and provided a complete picture of the area'. Using these and information from the other intelligence sources mentioned, representatives from GHQ Home Forces and NID were able to coordinate the information about coastal and beach defences and plot them on War Office maps. On 9 May 1942, the COHQ Intelligence Planner (Naval), IP(N), minuted the COHQ SIO, cancelling two previous demands, 19 and 21 April, for models of the different Dieppe areas. Instead, the IP(N) requested construction of an overall scale relief model of the whole operational area, in four sections, with a scale of one foot equal to one mile. Elliot states the completed model measured 10-feet by 6-feet. It was to 'present a complete picture', of the terrain, such as landing beaches and gradients, cliffs, forests, woods, open spaces, roads, rivers, bridges and railways; of the town, and objectives within it, such as the dock area, which 'was to be given the greatest detail possible'; and of all known and suspected German defensive dispositions, such as units' headquarters, coastal and field batteries, anti-aircraft (AA) positions, beach and field fortifications, barbed wire, pill boxes, casemates, bunkers, machine-gun and observation posts, road blocks, anti-tank obstacles and the RDF Station, 'were to be annotated from the latest available information'. Photographs of it from 'a very low angle from

⁹ Elliot, *Scarlet to green*, p.163; Terence Robertson, *The shame and the glory*, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1960), p.90; Goronwy Rees, *A bundle of sensations: sketches in autobiography* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1960), p.152; Ewen Montagu claims these family photographs were 'the only basis from which could be calculated the slope of the Dieppe beach', *Beyond top secret U* (London: Peter Davis, 1977), pp.24-5; and confirmed by Hinsley, *British intelligence*, 2, p.699; ISTD, 'Supplementary Photographs to Special Report on Dieppe', ISTD/C/32, 16 April 1942, PRO, WO 252/108.

seaward, to represent the appearance of the coast at nautical twilight... Copies of these silhouettes, on which were marked all chosen landing places with their respective colours, were issued... as an aid to the recognition of the coastline'.¹⁰

Before starting work on the *Rutter* outline plan, the COHQ military planner, Major Walter Skrine, sent a request on 17 April for additional intelligence information regarding the German order of battle, its dispositions and rate of reinforcement. Three days later, he was able to confirm that during the first two or three hours of the raid, one German battalion would be defending the Dieppe area, with the probable support of 'five hundred Divisional or Regimental troops', equalling about 1400 troops in total. During the next five hours, he estimated the arrival of not more than 2500 regimental reinforcements. After eight hours, divisional reserves, totalling about 2400 men, could begin to arrive from Rouen and Amiens, respectively about forty and sixty miles away. He concluded that a total of 6500 troops could be in action in the Dieppe area at the end of fifteen hours.¹¹

On 23 April Home Forces Intelligence informed Skrine that the known German armoured forces in France were located around Paris, that they were equipped with only 'one or two hundred light French tanks', and

¹⁰ COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.9, paragraph 43; on plotting War Office maps see C. Morgan, 'Combined operation intelligence procedure', approximately 28 June 1942, PRO, ADM 223/464, p.248; Elliot, *Scarlet to green*, p.163; details of model request see copies of minutes I/16, I/26 and I/41, 19/21 April and 9 May 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542, COHQ, '*Rutter*: intelligence', pp. 39-40, 48. Later in the war the Dieppe model was sent to Canada and is presently at the Canadian War Museum storage facility, Vimy House, Ottawa. In August 1993 this author attempted to view the model, but was unable to, as it was stored in plastic, in several small sections on shelves, and was deteriorating badly. Its authenticity was confirmed. Instead, this author was shown a second, much smaller relief model, that had previously been displayed in the Museum, the origin of which was unknown.

¹¹ Major Walter Skrine, 'Operation *Rutter*: additional intelligence requirements', 17 April 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/550/ol.4A; Major Walter Skrine, 'Troops in Dieppe area. Dieppe: Possible scale of resistance and rate of reinforcement up to 15 hours', 20 April 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/550/ol.7C.

these would not be able to be brought into action at Dieppe within fifteen hours. The report also explained that 'the Dieppe area was defended by 302 Infantry Division (ID), which was equipped with the normal equipment of the German infantry division, 'except that it may be slightly short of mortars and anti-tank equipment'. The report stated that the troops were 'second-rate and not mobile', that there were 'not likely to be any additional first line troops in the Dieppe area', but that it was possible that there was 'up to a company of Local Defence troops (men forty to forty-five years old)', who might be used in the role of defending headquarters or vital points.¹²

Based on the intelligence described above, the COHQ Planning Section and Home Force Planners, put together the *Rutter* Outline Plan of 13 May, the very first sentence of which stated, 'Intelligence reports indicate that Dieppe is not heavily defended and that the beaches in the vicinity are suitable for landing infantry, and AFVs [armoured fighting vehicles] at some'.¹³ As has been described, the plan was then submitted to, and approved by, the COS, and then sent on for further detailed planning by the Force Commanders. About a month later the 'Operation *Rutter* – Detailed Military Plan' was produced, which contained the appendix 'Information – Enemy', as of 19 June 1942. This will be stated in detail for later comparison. It repeated the previous intelligence information received by Skrine, almost verbatim. The town was held by one infantry battalion of approximately 1500 men, with the same rate of reinforcement, 2500 within three to eight hours, and another 2400 after eight hours, which it totalled, incorrectly, at 5400 troops. Armoured forces could be expected after fifteen hours from the Paris

¹² Home Forces, Intelligence, 'Operation *Rutter*', 23 April 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/550/101.9A.

¹³ CCO to Force Commanders, 13 May 1942, Appendix II, 'Operation *Rutter* – Outline', NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D35).

area. Re-embarkation was to be completed within twelve hours. The appendix continued:

Three 4 gun troops are sighted right, left and centre, behind the town; some of these are probably divisional artillery. *Possibly* they are three troops making up a battery of field gun howitzers.

A mixed flak [anti-aircraft] battery defends the port...

There is no infantry on either side of the town. There is one troop of coastal artillery to the East, and one to the West, each being some three miles from the town defences...

The layout of machine-guns indicates the probably [*sic*] dispositions of the infantry. It is probable that one re-inforced [*sic*] rifle company holds the town East of the River Arques [including the East Headland and Puys], another the town West of the River Arques [including the West Headland], and another the area [at Pourville] around the mouth of the River Scie.

This distributes the observed pillboxes in the proportion of 12:18:11, total 31 [*sic*]; there are in all 48 machine-guns in the battalion.

The most interesting feature of the defences is the development of strong points inland and the rudimentary all round defence of the port itself.

Note the sloppy mathematics: the expected total of troops expected to be in action after eight hours, 5400 instead of 6400; and the total of pillboxes 31, instead of 41. It is difficult not to agree with the former Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) historian, and acknowledged authority on Dieppe, Brereton Greenhous, in his recent, popular history of the operation, *Dieppe, Dieppe* (1993), when he concludes that this reflected 'very well the slapdash nature of much of the work carried out at Mountbatten's headquarters'.¹⁴

On 2 July, just prior to the planned launch of *Rutter*, the previously quoted, incorrect figures were again confirmed, this time in some preparatory notes on *Rutter*, by Portal, Chief of the Air Staff. Only two important differences emerge from this document, compared with the previous information on the German order of battle and dispositions. First, the correct

¹⁴ Maj.-Gen. J.H. Roberts, 'Operation *Rutter* - Detailed Military Force Plan', 20 June 1942, Appendix A, 'Information - Enemy', pp.1-2, PRO, DEFE 2/548; Brereton Greenhous, *Dieppe, Dieppe* (Montréal: Éditions Art Global Inc. in cooperation with the Department of National Defence, 1993), p.48.

position of 10 PzD was noted as three to four hours away at Amiens. The intelligence failure regarding this unit's disposition will be discussed in greater detail later. Second, the GAF was estimated to be able to bring into battle over Dieppe 200 fighters, up to 120 Focke-Wulf (FW)109F ground-attack fighter-bombers for use against ships, as well as 210 night bombers. Although Portal thought it 'unlikely' the Germans would use these night bombers in daylight, he stated that, 'we would undoubtedly welcome it' if they did. The document concluded that the German navy would be no threat. Although 'they might bring a few "E" [motor torpedo] boats into action', it was considered unlikely that these would be risked in daylight.¹⁵

All through the period of July and August, from the cancellation of *Rutter*, to its revival and execution as *Jubilee*, the intelligence on Dieppe was constantly up-dated by COHQ and passed to Force Commanders' staffs, who were preparing their detailed plans. The 'Operation *Jubilee* – Detailed Military Plan, Appendix A, Information – Enemy', 10 August 1942, noted some changes from the previous *Rutter* intelligence appreciations. The actual coastal defences were held by a system of 'posts', of about thirty men and four machine-guns each, and located closer together at the beaches to ensure overlapping and supporting fire. Many machine-guns were protected all along the coast in concrete casemates and pillboxes, especially at the beaches, although some were known to be unoccupied dummies. In the town itself, many of the street junctions were covered by machine-gun posts to enfilade the main roads and cover open places. The appreciation then noted some of the more formidable ones on the promenade and in the town,

¹⁵ 'Rutter. Notes for CAS [Chief of the Air Staff]. Information – Enemy', 2 July 1942, pp.1-3, PRO, AIR 8/895.

and concluded that, 'It has not been possible to deny or confirm the existence of MG [machine-gun] posts in the low cliffs to the east of the entrance to the harbour'. Six coast guard stations were identified, two each in the areas of Varengeville and Berneval, and one each at Pourville and Puys, all were manned by an unknown number of German marines.¹⁶

The barbed wire on the beach and promenade, it warned, could be electrified like it was at Boulogne, but this could not be definitely confirmed. No evidence existed of land mines planted anywhere on the main beach or inland within the area of operations. Concrete or masonry road blocks were confirmed as blocking all streets leading off the Dieppe town beaches, although the two streets at either end of the promenade, were said to have gaps up to nine feet wide, one of which could be closed. The blocks were estimated to be 3 to 4 feet thick and 5 to 6 feet high. The four road blocks in Puys were predicted to be movable wire. The caves in the east headland, by the harbour entrance, were reported to be storing about 2300 E-boat torpedoes. Four trawlers, each mounting two 4in guns, and ten E-boats were identified in the harbour. A note at the end, probably relating to the trawlers and E-boats, but which Elliot claims relates to the whole appreciation, states 'This situation is changing all the time, therefore the information cannot be considered as firm'.¹⁷

Concerning anti-aircraft and artillery positions, the assessment was much the same as previous, although further details on locations were given.

¹⁶ 'Operation *Jubilee* - Detailed Military Plan. Appendix A, Information - Enemy', 10 August 1942, pp.1-2, NAC, RG 24/10871/232C2 (D25); the location of the coast guard stations is annotated by hand on Home Forces map No.30, 'France-Dieppe Area Defences', scale 1:50,000, PRO, AIR 16/747.

¹⁷ 'Operation *Jubilee* - Detailed Military Plan. Appendix A, Information - Enemy', 10 August 1942, pp.2-4, NAC, RG 24/10871/232C2 (D25); Elliot, *Scarlet to green*, p.172.

The six-gun coastal battery at Varengeville was thought to be mobile. The forty-eight field and twelve anti-tank guns were noted to be mobile but their location was not known. For reasons to be discussed later, 302 ID defending Dieppe was now wrongly thought to have been replaced by 110 ID, which had recently arrived from Russia to rest and refit. This was considered a 'first line division', and the assessment warned that although it might not be up to full strength, 'it has a good fighting record'. Besides a battalion holding the town, a second battalion was thought to be holding the coastal area eight to ten miles west of Dieppe, with its HQ at Blosseville. The location of 110's third battalion was unsure but estimated to be in reserve, with its HQ probably at Bacqueville.

During the first three hours the strength of resistance in the operational area was expected to be not more than 1700 men. If the mechanised reconnaissance unit of 10 PzD was still located in the area of Abbeville, the assessment warned, it could bring its normal strength of 12 heavy and 36 light armoured cars, and 130 motorcycles, to the outskirts of Dieppe in under three hours (see Map 1). After five hours, a further 850 troops were expected to be in the area of operations. If the mechanised reconnaissance unit was located at Amiens, its arrival within five hours was also to be expected. Within eight hours, 1600 regimental reserves would be in action, as well as 10 PzD's tank regiment. The locations of the lorry-borne infantry and motorcycle battalion were known to be based in the area of Amiens, and thus able 'to reinforce the forward troops within 4 hours after leaving'. Within fifteen hours, the appreciation warned, the whole of 110 ID, 10 PzD and elements of SS Adolf Hitler Division, near Paris, could be in action at the scene of operations (see Map 1). This latter division was

motorized and possessed 'about 12-15 armoured cars but no tanks'. The appreciation stated that, 'In spite of continuous action in Russia, it is now considered to be up to strength after refitting. It is one of the German crack divisions'.¹⁸

These general intelligence estimates concerning strength of resistance and rate of reinforcements proved accurate on the whole, but when it came down to exact statistics, such as gun numbers and calibre, troop, artillery and HQ dispositions, and identification of specific installations, they proved to be very superficial. The information concerning the three Army Coastal Batteries was essentially correct, except that Berneval had had its armament increased with the addition of three 170mm guns in naval mountings. As previously indicated, the complete dispositions of the battalion's divisional artillery were unknown. Only two of four were identified, the others were not identified at all. One was located near Les Quatres Vents Farme (see Map 2) and the other south of Puys (262674), each consisting of four 100mm Czech field howitzers, and manned by 7 and 8 Troop, 302 Artillery Regiment, respectively. Eight captured French 75mm were placed in the headland caves, in the promenade houses and behind the road-blocks, to be fired over the sites for direct beach defence. A further nine small calibre 3.7 and 4.7mm guns were in this area, as well as about thirty AA guns of various calibre. Further details concerning disposition, calibre and numbers is discussed in the battle narrative.¹⁹

¹⁸ 'Operation *Jubilee* - Detailed Military Plan. Appendix A, Information - Enemy', 10 August 1942, pp.1-3, NAC, RG 24/10871/232C2 (D25).

¹⁹ Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.354 [German guns]; Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the English attack on either side of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', pp.55-7, in Emil Kilgast, *The history of the 302 Infantry Division in retrospect* (Ottawa: Canadian War Museum, c.1976, translated 1982), CWM [confirms gun numbers]; Charles P. Stacey, 'Operation *Jubilee*: the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942. Information from German war diaries', pp.3-5, in Army Headquarters Historical Section Report No.10, 5 December 1946, DHist, AHQ Report No.10 [gun statistics];

The official Canadian army historian, Charles P. Stacey, did not seem to want to admit, what historians now agree, was an intelligence failure of the greatest proportions, when he flatly exclaimed, 'Our own intelligence concerning the enemy's defences and dispositions was on the whole excellent. Thanks to our efficient air reconnaissance, there was not much we did not know about the defences of the Dieppe area'. For evidence of this supposition, he cited two German after-action reports. Field-Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, C-in-C Army Group West, who, three days after the raid, made a quick, superficial analysis of the first lessons to be learned from the operation, concluded that, 'The English had good maps showing nearly all our defences and minefields as of June 1942'. A report of 25 August, by the Operations Officer of the German 81 Corps, also commented on the 'excellent' maps on which 'all the information obtained from aerial reconnaissance was plotted. This included the smallest detail of the German positions, and even the Dieppe anti-tank walls... All possibilities of ascent and descent were also clearly marked'. But the report indicated that information not so easily gleaned from aerial photo reconnaissance was usually lacking, noting that 'the locations of Regimental and other HQs were unknown', giving the example of the Divisional HQ, thought to be at Arques-la-Bataille, whereas it had actually moved several months earlier to Envermeu. Grudgingly, Stacey, who again appears not to want to acknowledge any intelligence deficiencies, states that there were some minor ones concerning disposition and identification of HQ, armaments and gun calibre. Deficiencies on such details were perhaps unavoidable given

none of the *Jubilee* battle maps show Battery 7 or 8, see Home Forces 'Dieppe Area Defences', Map No.30, 1:50.000, PRO, AIR 16/747.

the poor capability of intelligence about the area at the time but were rather more major than minor, especially to the assaulting Canadians at the sharp end.²⁰

An *Abwehr* (German Military Counter-Intelligence Service) report of 14 September 1942 was more to the point, stating that even though individual installations were marked on the maps 'fairly accurately' and 'correct[ly] on the whole... a claim of completeness could not be made' and, overall, the maps were 'very incomplete and faulty in interpretation'. Attention was drawn to many overlooked and inaccurate tactical details, such as bunkers under construction, zigzag trenches and air cover ditches, which 'could easily be seen from the air and by agents'. It explained that the tactical function of many installations was unknown, noting the frequent use of the word 'possible', and that sometimes their purpose was not even guessed at. Often the generic term 'pill box' was used to describe many installations, such as MG emplacements, with no comment on the possible type or calibre of gun. On the other hand, the report sometimes referred to specific mistakes, such as, as a sound detector installation which was wrongly identified as a searchlight, with the annotation 'possible only'. This, the report states, should have been easily recognisable, even to an untrained observer. It criticised the lack of knowledge of the troop dispositions in the coastal zone, especially at battalion level and lower, calling it 'extraordinarily inexact'. The maps revealed the correct

²⁰ Stacey, *Six years of war*, pp.357-8; 'Basic observations of the C-in-C West No.8, 23 August 1942', p.23, in 'Report of the German C-in-C West (Field-Marshal Von Rundstedt) on the Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942', 3 September 1942, translated by Historical Section (GS) Army HQ, Ottawa, November 1946. The captured map of the main beach showed a suspected minefield in the vicinity of the beach below the west headland. Operations Officer, HQ 81 Army Corps, 'Combat report and experiences gained during the British attack on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 25 August 1942, p.4, translation, NAC, RG 24/10423/20551.023(D1).

identification of only one battalion HQ while no regimental headquarters were shown at all. Finally, it concluded, the fact that some camouflaged installations, which could not be identified from the air, such as those in forests, were not shown, should not indicate that air intelligence was not being complemented by individual agents or an espionage network. It noted the 'extraordinarily favourable conditions' for espionage – having foreign forced labour actually doing the construction of most of the installations in question, and a local French population living in the vicinity of them. However, it concluded that if a 'well functioning and practised espionage organization' had existed, it would have produced better results, and thus in this respect, 'the maps must be described as rather poor'.²¹

COHQ also made no attempt to estimate the areas of responsibility of the German units or to pin-point in detail the individual infantry positions in the town of Dieppe. Using the basis of known German tactical doctrine COHQ should have made a more realistic appreciation of the beach defences themselves. Another serious error was the lack of an intelligence map enlargement of the town, which would have been indispensable to the assaulting troops, showing all known or suspected troop dispositions, objectives and defences, such as pill boxes, MG nests and other installations. One was prepared *after* the operation with the aid of statements from eight PoWs taken on the raid.²²

²¹ Abwehr, German Military and Counter-intelligence, Intelligence Control Station France, 'Evaluation of enemy operation on 19 August 1942', 14 September 1942, pp.3-5, NAC, RG 24/20488/981G1NT(D1).

²² Elliot, *Scarlet to green*, p.174; Lt-Col G.P. Henderson, 'Intelligence report on the Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942, Appendix A, sketch map of enemy defences on White and Red beaches', 22 September 1942, NAC, RG 24/10870/232C2(D2).

The previously highly regarded source of intelligence, vertical aerial photography, did not reveal the many natural and artificially constructed caves in the two headlands full of field, anti-tank and MG emplacements, although the caves in the west headland were known about. Thirty-six hours before the raid an air reconnaissance sortie flown very low over Dieppe revealed for the first time the suspected presence of defences built into the east headland. From these photographs it was not possible to tell the type or calibre of the guns nor did they show similar positions in the west headland. Elliot correctly points out that COHQ seriously underestimated the overall number of weapons. He claims that 'the known characteristics of certain guns, together with a knowledge of the order of battle and the equipment in use, should have enabled COHQ certainly, and 2 Canadian Division possibly, to make a more detailed evaluation of, and threat posed by, the weapons deployed'. Thus the COHQ Intelligence and Planning Sections and 2 CID planners were all at fault. The British intelligence history concludes that there was 'complacency in taking at its face value intelligence that was deficient and over-reliant on one source' (photographic intelligence), and in underrating 'the strength of the defences at Dieppe and the topographical difficulties that would be met by a landing there'.²³

The Combined Report tried to be as uncritical as possible of the intelligence available. Attempting a positive face, it noted the 'Intelligence Section arranged its direct liaison service with the Force Commanders and right up to the time of the operation the latest intelligence was passed to them'. Looking back, what could the Military Force Commander do about the defences in the headlands thirty-six hours before departure? Not much

²³ Elliot, *Scarlet to green*, p.163; Hinsley, *British intelligence*, 2, p.699.

except abort, which was extremely unlikely at so late a stage. The Combined Report concluded that beach reconnaissance for the operation 'was very complete', although it admitted that for future operations completion of all beach reconnaissance, with the aid of naval reconnaissance, was essential before the beginning of work on the outline plan.²⁴

The intelligence error of incorrectly identifying 110 ID (and location of its headquarters), instead of 302 ID, was not that significant at the time of the raid, though the reason is of interest now. Stacey wonders, 'how this mistake came to be made remains a mystery'. In the spring of 1942 the detailed intelligence of the German order of battle, needed for the planning of cross-Channel operations on the Continent, was so sparse that the COS ordered the JIC to begin an intensive collection and analysis of intelligence on the whole north-west coast of Europe. As a result the Combined Intelligence Section, GHQ Home Forces, was formed and weekly intelligence reports, code-named *Martian*, began to be issued. These included information from all intelligence sources, including Ultra in a disguised form. Air and naval aspects were covered in great detail but the Army was more difficult to follow, as it used secure land lines mainly for communication. Thus information depended mainly on intelligence from other, less reliable, sources, such as that gleaned from PoWs or received from Resistance movements or agents. Periodically, sporadic intercepts from the Eastern Front were intercepted. Campbell explains that it is possible in May 1942, Ultra might have picked up some of the discussions involving Hitler, the General Staff and Army group Centre, concerning 110's transfer from Army Group Centre in Russia to France. The OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht – Armed Forces

²⁴ COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.9, paragraph 366.

High Command) War Diary confirms these exchanges. Allied intelligence later assumed it had taken place. If transfer occurred the arrival of the division was assumed to have been on the 10 or 11 June.²⁵

The General Staff (Intelligence) [GS (I)], GHQ Home Forces, 'Martian Report No. 7', 14 July 1942, stated that '302 Infantry Division has left the Dieppe area, and has been replaced by an unidentified division'. One week later, the next *Martian* report, concluded, 'The replacement for the 306 [*sic*] Infantry Division in the Dieppe area is believed to be 110 Infantry Division, a good division but severely battered in Russia'. Further confirmation was received on 6 August 1942, when GS (I) GHQ Home Forces sent a memorandum to COHQ on the history of 110 ID. It stated the unit had arrived in France on 11 June 1942 and, although 'not yet located', was thought to have relieved 302 ID in the Dieppe area, 'although this cannot be regarded as absolutely certain'. Concerning its 'fighting value', the report said 'It is potentially a high-quality field-force division'. The correct intelligence concerning 110 ID did not come through until seven days after the raid.²⁶

Confirmation of the possibility of 110 transferring to France is in the *Abwehr* report on the raid. While commenting on captured maps and the incorrect identification of the division, it noted 'there indeed was supposed to have been some talk of 110 Infantry Division really being transported from the East to Occupied France. A check would be interesting'. The report later

²⁵ Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.357; Hinsley, *British intelligence*, 3(II), Appendix 2, 'The Martian Reports', pp.753-55; PRO, WO 219/1933, Martian Reports Nos.1-12, 12 June-19 August 1942; Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.183-4.

²⁶ General Staff (Intelligence), GHQ Home Forces, 'Martian Report No.7', 14 July 1942, PRO, WO 219/1933, p.111; General Staff (Intelligence), GHQ Home Forces, 'Martian Report No.8', 21 July 1942, PRO, WO 219/1933, p.129; GHQ Home Forces to COHQ, Memorandum HF/INT/222/2/40, 'Enemy Order of Battle information [110 Division History]', 6 August 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/330; General Staff (Intelligence), GHQ Home Forces, 'Martian Report No.13', 26 August 1942, PRO, WO 219/1934.

concluded the mistaken belief of British intelligence that the 110 had moved to Dieppe was 'apparently the result of German deceptive measures'.²⁷

The disposition of 10 PzD and intelligence concerning it was inaccurate in all published works until Campbell's. Stacey asserts that an intelligence report (probably from the SIS through its agent Bertrand) received on 5 July that 10 PzD had moved from Soissons to Amiens, only eight hours from Dieppe, caused the change of *Rutter* from a two-tide to a one-tide plan (*Rutter II*). The complete raiding force would re-embark by 1100 hours, eliminating the chance of any troops being caught ashore in the afternoon by a German armoured counter-attack. The *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan, as a precaution, noted the departure 10 PzD as imminent but, as already explained, warned that its forward reconnaissance elements could arrive between three to five hours after Zero hour.²⁸

Hinsley explains on 11 May Bertrand reported the arrival of 10 PzD from Russia at Soissons. On 1 and 8 June GS (I), GHQ Home Forces, received indications that it was preparing to move. Accordingly on 13 July the SIS checked with Bertrand who relayed back that it had moved to Amiens on 12 July. Stacey states that an anonymous report received caused the operation to be switched to a one-tide basis.²⁹

²⁷ Abwehr, German Military and Counter-intelligence, Intelligence Control Station France, 'Evaluation of enemy operation on 19 August 1942', 14 September 1942, pp.5-6, NAC, RG 24/20488/981G1NT(D1).

²⁸ Stacey, *Six years of war*, p. 339; COHQ, 'Combined Report', Annex 2, Appendix A, pp.90-1, paras 684, 687-8, DHist 594.013 (D1); Robertson agrees with Stacey, *The shame and the glory*, p.124; Kirkpatrick also supports Stacey, using Robertson as his source, but then strangely says the division moved 'in June', *Captains without eyes*, p.172.

²⁹ Hinsley, *British intelligence*, 2, p.701; COS, 'Weekly Military Intelligence Summaries', MI 14/SIF/22, 23 and 34, dated 1 June, 8 June, 24 August 1942, PRO, WO 208/3573; Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.25-7.

In fact, as Campbell elucidates, and which both Stacey and Hinsley failed to note, intelligence on 10 PzD disposition was available to the planners even earlier. As early as 23 June, 'Martian Report No. 4' notes the unconfirmed move of the 10 PzD HQ forward to Amiens. The account continues, 'This report accords well with the reported arrival of tanks in Amiens in *early June*' (this author's emphasis). It also seemed to confirm that the division was now part of the 15th Army Reserve.³⁰ German situation maps show 10 PzD HQ at Soissons on 28 May and at Amiens on 9 June. Campbell shows that at COHQ Examination Meeting of 30 June, at which key *Rutter* planners attended, including Hughes-Hallett, the true position of the PzD came up in discussion of another operation. Perhaps the Force Commanders had been informed of its presence but were waiting for definite confirmation; it is unclear, although they should have planned for this contingency. The extant documents do not explain why they were only informed on 5 July of the PzD presence. An entry in the COHQ War Diary, states that on that day the Force Commanders and C-in-C Portsmouth were informed that 10 PzD 'moved with tanks to Flixécourt, half way between Amiens and Abbeville'. The report also noted that it was 'a first class fighting formation and up to strength in men and equipment', and that advanced elements could be arrive at Dieppe after four hours. Montgomery, in a meeting on 5 July (Campbell incorrectly says this occurred on 6 July) with McNaughton at South-Eastern Command HQ, showed the latter a letter he had just dispatched to Crerar, definitely confirming that 10 PzD 'had indeed moved to Amiens, which is a distance of 80 miles direct, or about 120 miles by road, a time distance of about 8 hours. This dictates a short, i.e. "one tide"

³⁰ General Staff (Intelligence), GHQ Home Forces, 'Martian Report No.4', 23 June 1942, p.2, PRO, WO 219/1933; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.339, fn.

operation'. Finally, he warned that if the operation was postponed again, it should be cancelled.³¹

In conclusion, the available intelligence on 10 PzD was extremely slow in reaching COHQ. It seems that not only did GS (I) GHQ Home Forces and COHQ know about the division but also the Air Ministry. A document entitled '*Rutter*: Notes for CAS' (Chief of Air Staff), dated 2 July, commenting on the German dispositions, undoubtedly refers to 10 PzD in remarking, 'One Armoured Division is thought to have been moved recently to Amiens, about 50 miles away. This might be expected to appear within 3-4 hours of the assault'. This intelligence would certainly have been available to COHQ so it is a mystery why the plan was not changed until 5 July. Possibly somewhere in the intelligence process a breakdown occurred and the information was delayed in reaching the Force Commanders. One wonders how disastrous would have been the outcome if the operation had gone in on the original two-tide basis on any of the previously postponed dates.³²

The *Abwehr* report also noted that the captured orders and maps indicated correctly the designation of the Corps Command as 81st, which dated from 15 June 1942, and that 10 PzD Division was not in Corps reserve. Since 10 PzD was at Amiens, the logical assumption would be it was under Corps command. It concluded, 'the enemy was actually informed only with regard to information generally only known at higher headquarters. 81st Corps therefore believes that from this fact the conclusion must be

³¹ COHQ Examination Meeting, 30 June 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/2, COHQ War Diary, quoted in Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.27; COHQ, 'I/67', July 1942, '*Rutter*: intelligence', PRO, DEFE 2/542, p.58; Lt-Col B.H. Darwin, 'Memorandum of a between Lt-Gen. McNaughton and Lt-Gen. Montgomery, at "A" House, HQ SE Army, at 1215 hours 5 July 1942 regarding Operation *Rutter*', 6 July 1942, NAC, RG 24 C17/13611/GS First Canadian Army HQ War Diary April 1942-February 1943/T6672.

³² COHQ, '*Rutter*: Notes for CAS' [Chief of Air Staff], 2 July 1942, p.2, PRO, AIR 8/895.

drawn that the existence of an espionage organization must be looked for primarily in that direction'. Instead of examining the security of their various ciphers, which throughout the war the Germans thought were unbreakable, the report implied that an espionage organization could be responsible and that this should be investigated.³³

Intelligence failures occurred on both sides and this is amply revealed in analysis of the use of radar by the opposing forces. In previous accounts of the operation, the radar story was not comprehensively examined, and sometimes hardly mentioned, until publication by Campbell. But even his thoroughly researched contribution still leaves some questions unclear. Professor Louis Brown, in his forthcoming book, *A radar history of World War II* (1997), explains the radar story of Dieppe is 'a curious one. Succinctly put, one might say that nothing happened, seemingly belying the extent of what follows, but there are occasions where "nothing" requires a bit of explanation'. What Professor Brown's is implying here is that certain events could have had a major impact on the operation, causing it to unfold very differently.³⁴

The role of radar in *Jubilee* can be divided into three aspects: first, the British operational use of radar by shore-based stations and the *Jubilee* force itself to detect German shipping movements in the Channel during the run-up and immediately prior to *Jubilee's* sailing (which also has an operational Ultra aspect); second, the similar German operational use of radar shore-based stations to detect and track the advance of *Jubilee*; and

³³ Abwehr, German Military and Counter-intelligence, Intelligence Control Station France, 'Evaluation of enemy operation on 19 August 1942', 14 September 1942, p.6, NAC, RG 24/20488/981G1NT(D1).

³⁴ Louis Brown to H. Henry, 4 January 1996, and draft RAD13.DOC, 'The Channel, 1942', p.15, in *A radar history of World War II* (forthcoming 1997).

third, the claim that the Allies gained some technical radar intelligence that was instrumental in the subsequent highly significant development of Allied radar and radar counter-measures, which were so successful prior to, during, and immediately after the final invasion of the Continent almost two years later.

The British use of radar failed due to what apparently was a break down in intelligence dissemination. The immediate result of the failure caused *Jubilee* the loss of tactical surprise at the eastern landing areas. At 0347 hours Group 5 of the *Jubilee* naval force on the left flank suddenly met with a German coastal convoy from Boulogne. The engagement alerted the Germans at Puys and Berneval. The brief battle scattered the majority of the assault craft carrying the commandos assigned to neutralize the coastal battery at Berneval, resulting in it not being taken. The infantry attacking Puys did not get off the beach and this complete failure resulted in the east headland not being occupied. This was a catastrophe for the main landings at Dieppe half an hour later. The standard argument for this convoy collision is a failure in communications that resulted in the Naval Force Commander, Hughes-Hallett, on the headquarters ship *Calpe*, not receiving the warnings sent to him.

About a month after the operation, General Crerar, 1 Canadian Corps Commander, questioned the Recorder of Combined Operations, Hilary St George Saunders, about why this German convoy had not been picked up by British radar and a subsequent warning sent to the Naval Force Commander. This instigated Mountbatten to order an internal investigation which revealed that a different convoy had been detected at about 2300 off Boulogne moving westwards down the coast (see Map 3). The day after the

raid, at a COHQ meeting to discuss the raid, Hughes-Hallett had stated that the ships plotted were another convoy, which he referred to as a 'tanker and escort', that passed about ten miles ahead of Group 5 and entered Dieppe at approximately 0330. This was later confirmed, according to the record of a telephone conversation on 1 October 1942, by Hughes-Hallett, who assured Mountbatten that:

The plots obtained at Newhaven and passed to Portsmouth and the signals passed out by W/T [wireless telegraphy] from Portsmouth were all in order and referred to a convoy which came down the coast and did in fact enter Dieppe at 0330.

The craft which encountered the Yellow beach party were never plotted by RDF and could not have been as they were well outside the range at which RDF can detect craft of this size.

Mountbatten replied to Crerar on 5 October, explaining that three signals were sent and received by Hughes-Hallett. These were at 0143, 0258 and 0334, and concerned this 'tanker and escort', which were about ten miles north and slightly east of Dieppe at 0300. He explained that Hughes-Hallett 'was satisfied at the time and is still satisfied that this convoy had nothing to do with the German vessels met with at 0350', and repeated his assurances that, 'These were closer into shore and were well outside the range at which RDF can detect craft of their size'. The Combined Report, which it will be remembered was composed under Hughes-Hallett and Mountbatten's direct supervision, toes the line by positively declaring that the convoy plotted was much farther out than the one engaged and repeating that the latter was 'not discovered by RDF because their small size made detection at that range impossible'. Crerar accepted this explanation at face value, since he was not in a position, in Campbell's opinion, 'to appreciate how intentionally misleading it was'.³⁵

³⁵ Mountbatten to Crerar, File No. SRP 2/7, 5 October 1942, and reply, 13 October 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/324; 'Analysis of preliminary reports by Force Commanders and their staff on Operation *Jubilee*, 20 August 1942', draft, p.1, PRO, DEFE 2/330; COHQ, 'Combined

Hughes-Hallett, possibly with Mountbatten's acquiescence, appeared to be attempting some kind of cover-up, since the 1946 (revised 1959) confidential Naval Staff History of the operation does not make any mention of a second convoy, a 'tanker and escort', or of the three signals pertaining to it. It does reveal that the coastal RDF station at Fairlight, Dover, *did* track the first German convoy (Convoy 2437) moving down the coast. This radar station was part of a newly installed, secret chain along the south-east coast, that used the Mark IV High Power Type 271 equipment. The stations purportedly gave complete coverage 'from buoys to battleships' in the Straits of Dover, and were not yet being jammed by the Germans. An internal naval inquiry into the matter stated that 'on the night in question these long range naval plots were only obtained by anomalous propagation, and that the targets faded and sometimes reappeared in a most irregular way. Consistent plotting was not possible. Campbell defines anomalous propagation as 'unusual atmospheric conditions that made it possible to plot a target at exceptional range but subject to intermittent fading'. Thus Portsmouth plotted the convoy's course as early as 2140 hours on the 18 August, until 2300 hours when the contact faded (see Map 6). Ventnor RDF station K 86, on the Isle of Wight, picked it up again at 0040 and 0100 hours off the mouth of the Somme River.³⁶

Based on this last plot C-in-C Portsmouth sent a signal at 0127 to Hughes-Hallett warning, 'small craft apparently patrolling approximately

Report', p.13, para.74, DHist, 594.013(D1); PRO, DEFE 2/324, Note with indecipherable signature, 1 October 1942, possibly by Cockroft; Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.146-7.

³⁶ Admiralty Historical Section, Naval Staff History of the Second World War, BR 1736 (26), 'Raid on Dieppe (Naval operations) 19 August 1942', Battle Summary No.33, (Revised April 1959 from 1946), p.17 and Plan 5, PRO, ADM 234/355; E.C. Varley to Chief Superintendent J.D. Cockroft, 8 October 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/324; Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.147.

350° Tréport 15 miles at 0100'. At this point, the convoy did not seem likely to enter the operational area, but further radar plots by Ventnor, showed that this was very possible. At 0205, 0226 and 0251 Ventnor plotted it off Tréport moving down on a direct course of interception with the naval assault force. Based on the 0226 plot a second warning signal was sent to Hughes Hallett at 0244: 'Two craft 302° Tréport 10 miles, course 190° 13 knots at 0226'. Apparently, he did not receive either warning, seemingly the result of communication problems. The stand-by HQ ship *Fernie* received the second signal but believing the *Calpe* received it also it took no action. The signals log book of the gunboat *Locust*, between the entries of 0212 and 0245, records, 'Signals received during passage indicating the movements of certain small craft on the French coast'. The Naval Staff History concludes:

thus a full hour before the encounter, warning had been given of the presence of unidentified craft, which were then but 4 miles from the projected track of Group 5 and were almost bound to intercept it, if course and speed were maintained. At 0300 the enemy was apparently not more than 2 miles from the line of advance of Group 5.³⁷

The official naval historian, Stephen Roskill, initially declared in his first draft of *The war at sea* (1956), '*the enemy's progress was plotted at our shore stations*, and one hour before the clash the C-in-C, Portsmouth, warned the Naval Force Commander of the presence of unidentified vessels on a course *that was bound to bring them into contact with the group of landing craft*' [this author's emphasis]. In the published version the two highlighted word

³⁷ Admiralty Historical Section, Naval Staff History of the Second World War, BR 1736 (26), 'Raid on Dieppe (Naval operations) 19 August 1942', Battle Summary No.33, (Revised April 1959 from 1946), p.17, PRO, ADM 234/355. For the communication problems on Calpe, see Lucien K. Truscott, *Command missions: a personal story* (New York: Dutton, 1954), p.68, quoted in Jacques Mordal, *Dieppe: the dawn of decision* (London: New English Library, 1981, first edition 1963), p.161; Brian L. Villa, *Unauthorized action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe raid* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989, revised 1994), p.16. In the Naval Force Commander's Report in its section on 'List of Important Signals' the two signals are not listed, No. NFJ 0221/92, 30 August 1942, Enclosure 5, p.1, NMM, Baillie-Grohman Papers, GRO/26.

groups are deleted and the second group is replaced with the words '*which would probably*'. Mountbatten, who was First Lord of the Admiralty at the time, probably pressured Roskill to alter this section. Although Roskill cut out his previous assertion he still implies, albeit in a toned down manner, the plotting of the convoy from the shore stations.³⁸

Villa correctly explains no hard evidence exists about the communication failure. He believes Hughes-Hallett, instead of taking the obvious action after receipt of the warnings to abort the operation, 'decided not to throw away his last chance to carry out his mission. He was nothing if not determined'. Campbell claims the second signal at 0244 was 'hardly reason' to cancel the operation, as has been suggested, since 'there could be no cancellation after the LSIs [Landing Ship Infantry] entered the swept channels through the minefield, and by 0244 the first of the LSIs had already reached the lowering point for landing craft'. Campbell is correct that this procedure was in accordance with the operation orders, although the 'Operation *Jubilee* – Detailed Military Plan' only states that once *Jubilee* was under way, cancellation had to be ordered 'before 0300', and does not mention the minefield in this context. Campbell is incorrect quoting the lowering time of 0244. The first LSI, HMS *Queen Emma* with Group 3, did not reach the lowering point BB until 0257 (see Map 4). Therefore Hughes-Hallett had thirteen minutes, since receiving the second warning signal, which granted was not very much time, to decide whether or not to abort the operation.³⁹

³⁸ Stephen W. Roskill, 'The war at sea 1939-1945', first draft, PRO, CAB 101/335; and *The war at sea 1939-1945: the period of balance 2* (2 vols., London: HMSO, 1956), p.246.

³⁹ Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.16; Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.147; C.C. Mann, 'Operation *Jubilee* – Detailed Military Plan', 7 August 1942, p.6, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202(D25); 'Extract of report by Commanding Officer HMS *Queen Emma*', Appendix 2A, p.5 to Encl. 13,

Evidence seems to indicate that Ultra probably also played a part in the detection and warning of the German convoy. As a matter of routine the Germans signalled in advance the time of departure, destination and composition of their coastal convoys. Since August 1941 the British shore-based stations had been intercepting signals sent in the German Navy's *Heimisch* key (Ultra decrypt series ZTPG) which was used by the ships and shore establishments in Home waters, including the Bay of Biscay and the Channel. GC&CS had been reading the SIGINT with 'virtual currency' since its introduction. He states that although much of Ultra was repetitive and administrative in content, when used in conjunction with other sources of intelligence, such as other forms of SIGINT and photo reconnaissance, 'it was possible to determine what was normal activity... and thus what was out of the ordinary'. He points out, correctly, that the Admiralty could exert direct control over any amphibious operations in its Home waters, and the OIC, although not having an executive function, was able to communicate directly with both the naval C-in-C concerned, in this case, Admiral Sir William James, at Portsmouth, and with any of his subordinate naval forces at sea, in this case *Jubilee*.⁴⁰

In 1980, and later in his 1993 book, Campbell first drew attention to the fact that Ultra had picked up the German Navy's reaction to the collision of its Convoy 2437 with Group 5 of *Jubilee* and the later landings. He notes the time lapse between the signals' interception, decryption, translation and transmission by teleprinter at GC&SC, to the Admiralty's OIC in London, meant that some decrypts, such as the one concerning Convoy

Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48) [0257 lowering time].

⁴⁰ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.167,169.

2437, had no immediate operational significance, which, he is correct in saying, is 'doubtless why they are not mentioned by Hinsley', in his official history.⁴¹

In a thoroughly researched section on German naval procedures in the Channel in 1942, Campbell shows that it was standard operating procedure for the OIC to make weekly estimates of German naval dispositions and activities, such as minelaying, based on all sources of intelligence, including, most importantly, Ultra. These estimates, he states, would have definitely been taken into account when planning amphibious operations, although none of the authorities on the subject, such as Hinsley and Patrick Beesly, *Very special intelligence: the story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre 1939-1945* (1977), say so. Thus, just prior to the departure of *Jubilee*, at 1620 on 18 August, C-in-C Portsmouth received a detailed OIC summary of all German naval dispositions between Ostend and St Malo, as of noon on the 17 August. This was updated with a photo reconnaissance survey of all the Channel ports on the afternoon of 18 August.⁴²

The Ultra decrypts of most interest are those referring to Convoy 2437. The first one was 'ZIP/ZTPG/68850', referring to departure south from Boulogne, and sent by German patrol boat UJ 1411 – 'From UJ 1411: Leaving Boulogne 2100 [2000 BST] for Dieppe with UJ 1404, M 4014 and

⁴¹ J.P. Campbell to Stephen W. Roskill, 23 July 1980, and reply, 31 July 1980, CCA, Roskill Papers ROSK 5/52; Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.30.

⁴² Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.173-4; Patrick Beesly, *Very special intelligence: the story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre 1939-1945* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977), p.227; OIC, 'Dispositions of certain German naval units-from information available to 0930, 17 August 1942', OIC/SI 305, 17 August 1942; OIC, 'German Naval dispositions – 17 August 1942', OIC/SI 311, 18 August 1942; OIC, 'Channel activities-noon, 11 August to noon 15 August', OIC/SI 312, 19 August 1942, all in PRO, ADM 223/95.

convoy of 5 (corrupt group ?+ motor) ships. Speed 6 knots. Coastal H/F West'. The TOO (Time of origin) was 1952 British Summer Time (BST) on 18 August, and the TOI (Time of intercept) was 2022. The decrypted teleprinted message arrived at the OIC at 0316, half an hour before the convoy encountered *Jubilee*, but a third warning was not sent to Hughes-Hallett. It is not clear why not, and Campbell does not effectively explain this. He wonders, 'Is this one of those alleged instances when the full use of Ultra was inhibited by excessive regard for its security?'. First, he states that one reason a third signal was not sent was it risked interception and decryption by the German SIGINT agency, B-Dienst. But later he contradicts himself, while answering his own question, by showing that on many other occasions, when Ultra was the only source of vital operational information, it was still was passed on, albeit in a disguised form. In which case C-in-C Portsmouth could have sent another warning purporting to be based on radar if Ultra had indicated anything of value concerning the convoy. Campbell concludes that the Germans were not concerned about their cipher security because, 'Quite simply, there were too many other possible sources of intelligence, given the operational conditions in the Channel'. The probable reasons a third warning was not sent, are first, as previously explained, the 0300 time of cancellation, had already passed, and second, two warnings had already been sent about the convoy, and there was no reason to suppose that Hughes-Hallett had not received them. Besides, the two destroyers *Brocklesby* and *Slazak* were assigned to screen and protect the ships in that area and were more than a match for the German ships. The long period after interception before being passed to the OIC, and then on to C-in-C Portsmouth, was due to the sometimes long and difficult process of

decryption. The intelligence historian, and wartime code-breaker, Ralph Bennett, adds that:

When we were (as so often in 1943 and 1944) very busy in Hut 3 [at Bletchley Park], crafters of signals often seemed to think that their latest decrypt contained the most important news since Waterloo. They therefore assigned their craft the highest signals priority. If others followed suit, W/T [wireless transmission] channels would become so congested that there would be long delays in transmission. As officer in charge of all outgoing during my shift, it was my duty to prevent this and to see that only the really most important got the fastest treatment. I still recall some of the altercations that followed. No doubt the OIC found the same problem.⁴³

The next Ultra decrypt of interest, and the first that noted a German reaction to *Jubilee*, was – 'ZIP/ZTPG/68913: From Naval Communications Officer Le Havre: Attack on convoy at 0450 [0350 BST] 4 miles off Dieppe by surface forces'. The TOO was 0410 and the TOI was 0421. Campbell shows that the Naval Signal Station in Dieppe passed this information by landline to Le Havre, and to the air raid reporting centre and Harbour Commander in Dieppe, and was being relayed by wireless telegraphy (W/T) from there to Naval Group West, 3 Air Fleet and Army Group D, when intercepted by GC&CS. It arrived at the OIC at 0710, too late to be tactically relevant to the engagement already finished.⁴⁴

Later in the morning UJ1411, after repairing its radio which had been damaged in the fire-fight, signalled at 0641:

Convoy dispersed north of Dieppe owing to enemy landing. UJ 1404 hit in magazine has vanished burning fiercely. 1 Gunboat destroyed by ramming. Several hits on MTBs [motor torpedo boats] and on one flotilla leader. 2 A/C [aircraft] shot down,

⁴³ For ease of reference, all times are shown in British Summer Time (BST). Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) was one hour before BST, and German Summer Time (GST) was one hour ahead of BST. Ultra decrypt ZIP/ZTPG/68850, PRO, DEFE 3/187, p.871; Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.169, 171, 174; Ralph Bennett to H. Henry, 1 May 1994; Bennett also notes that 'An elaborate plan for making immediate [operational] use of R/T [radio transmissions] and Sigint broke down because the channels provided became choked' from heavy use during the operation, *Behind the battle: intelligence on the war with Germany, 1939-45* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994), p.193.

⁴⁴ Ultra decrypt ZIP/ZTPG/68913, PRO, DEFE 3/187, p.937; Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.167.

convoy is gathering at Le Tréport. UJ 1404 and 1 motor vessel are missing. W/T watch on coastal M/F again.

This decrypt (ZIP/ZTPG/68938) did not reach the OIC until 0949 and thus was of no tactical value either.⁴⁵

The first decrypt to indicate from Ultra that the Germans were aware of the *Jubilee* landings, was a signal sent at 0604 by the Sea Defence Commandant Seine-Somme, and intercepted thirteen minutes later, although it did not reach the OIC until 0826, over two hours later. This decrypt (ZIP/ZTPG/68930) stated, 'Enemy forces landed at Berneval [*sic*] 0625 [0525 BST]. Fire has been opened on the enemy's ships'.⁴⁶

Another convoy that might have caused some difficulty was 2412, made up of five patrol boats and four motor barges. It had been tracked since the evening of 17 August leaving Le Havre for Dieppe (ZIP/ZTPG/68844), where it arrived on the morning of the 18 August. This information, although intercepted at 1934 on the 17 August, did not reach the OIC until 0307 on the 19 August. A further decrypt (ZIP/ZTPG/68882), indicated that the convoy was leaving Dieppe at 2000 on the 18 August at 6 knots, and was expected to arrive in Boulogne at 0500 the next morning. The OIC received this information at 0430 on 19 August, which confirmed that it had been out of the operational area since midnight. A final decrypt (ZIP/ZTPG/68945) confirmed its arrival at Boulogne at 0530. This account of Ultra decrypts and their onward transmission, although not tactically relevant to *Jubilee*, shows how the naval authorities, including the C-in-C Portsmouth, were tracking German naval movements before and during *Jubilee*, and would have

⁴⁵ Ultra decrypt ZIP/ZTPG/68938, PRO, DEFE 3/187, p.963; Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.169.

⁴⁶ Ultra decrypt ZIP/ZTPG/68930, PRO, DEFE 3/187, p.955.

passed the information to the Naval Force Commander if it had been essential.⁴⁷

The other mystery is why ship borne RDF did not detect the convoy? Roskill is at loss for clarification, calling it an 'unexplained feature', and only offers the suggestion that 'the presence of so many friendly vessels may have confused the ships' radar screens'. The whole *Jubilee* force was maintaining RDF silence as a security precaution on naval sets Type 286 and 290, while 272 was to be used for protection against surface attacks. The Naval Staff History says that none of the ships' radar detected the convoy. In a footnote it mentions the destroyer HMS *Garth* picked up a contact at 0328 of some ship about twenty-four miles to the west, bearing 260°, but they turned out to be false. The destroyers *Brocklesby* and *Slazak*, although equipped with the 10-cm Type 272 radar, and passing within four miles, did not detect the German convoy. Campbell believes this was because the radar sets did not have a Plan Position Indicator (an electronic map superimposed on the radar screen), 'which made it difficult for the operators to untangle the confusion of so many ships'. Derek Howse disagrees. He was on the raid as the First Lieutenant of the destroyer *Garth*, although he was not concerned with radar or plotting, and is author of *Radar at sea: the Royal Navy in World War 2* (1993). He comments:

I think that the German convoy could only have been detected by a destroyer on the left flank. If she had type 286/290 – an airborne [radar] set modified for ship use which had a beam width of nearly 30° – I am not surprised she didn't do so. With a crowd of friendly ships, the chances of identifying a specific group of echoes as enemy would be almost nil (unless they were at a far greater range than the friendlies) and would have required good plotting arrangements. Type 272 with a beam width of only a degree or so would make it easier, but identification would still require good plotting.

⁴⁷ Ultra decrypt ZIP/ZTPG/68844, PRO, DEFE 3/187, p.865; Ultra decrypt ZIP/ZTPG/68882, PRO, DEFE 3/187, p.905; OIC, 'Channel activities-noon, 17 to noon, 19 August', OIC/SI 315, 21 August 1942, PRO, ADM 223/95; Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.169.

To say that detection did not take place for the lack of PPIs is a bit naive. British destroyers did not begin to be so fitted until over a year later.⁴⁸

The second aspect of radar and *Jubilee* concerns the German operational radar detection capability in 1942, and particularly its plotting of the approach of *Jubilee*. In the summer of 1942 the Germans had an improvised radar chain covering the whole coast of occupied Europe. Its main purpose, Campbell states, was 'to report the bearing, range, altitude, time of observation and approximate strength' of an approaching aircraft formation to the local aircraft reporting centre and fighter control HQ. Coast-watching radar was the responsibility of the German navy and not the GAF, as one might have expected. The *Seetakt* radar equipment (60 to 90 cm wavelength) used naval gun-laying and surface detection. Technically, it was supposedly able to detect large ships, such as LSIs, from 30 to 40 km, and destroyers from 20 to 30 km. On 19 July 1942 a *Seetakt* on Pointe d'Ailly, near Varengeville, became operational, only to be removed a week before *Jubilee*, and subsequently reinstalled in September. From this superb, cliff-top location, Campbell explains, it could have 'stood an excellent chance of detecting' eight stationary LSIs lowering their landing craft 16 km offshore. Referring to a German source, Campbell states that they 'considered detection by radar in such circumstances a virtual certainty'. At no time during the planning of *Rutter/Jubilee* was British intelligence, and therefore the planners, aware of its existence. The *Seetakt* closely resembled the GAF *Freya* in size and appearance, and only an expert PR [photo reconnaissance] interpreter could detect the minute differences. The

⁴⁸ Roskill, *The war at sea*, p.246; Admiralty Historical Section, Naval Staff History of the Second World War, BR 1736 (26), 'Raid on Dieppe (Naval Operations) 19 August 1942', Battle Summary No.33, (Revised April 1959 from 1946), p.17, PRO, ADM 234/355; Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.148; Derek Howse, *Radar at sea: the Royal Navy in World War 2* (London: Macmillan, 1993); Derek Howse to H. Henry, Letter, 11 May 1996.

Freya (240 cm) was long-range early-warning equipment used for coastal and air defence. Campbell explains that it, 'worked on the vertical beam principle, with a width of about 15 degrees, some rotating continuously while others reciprocated through an arc'. It could detect aircraft up to a range of 300 km, depending on their altitude. Although the *Freya* was capable of judging the range, bearing and approximate numbers of aircraft, it could not give the altitude. Therefore, the *Freya* was usually coupled with another type of radar known as *Würzburg*. This equipment was a shorter-wave (53 cm), anti-aircraft gun-aiming and fighter-control radar, with a steerable 'micro-wave dish' antenna, which utilised a narrower beam, approximately 10 degrees, had a range of about 40 km, and counted on the *Freya* to initially direct it to a target. Campbell notes that the *Würzburg* 'measured altitude by calculating range and the angle of elevation of the reflector disc required to produce the targets maximum response on the receiver'. Campbell says 'There was no theoretical reason why both types could not detect surface vessels'.⁴⁹

At Dieppe, on the west headland, the Germans had one *Freya* (F 28) and a *Würzburg* (W 223) close to it. The former could detect large surface targets up to 30 km range. The latter could obtain accurate bearings on surface targets by using horizontal polarisation, and often in conjunction with two other *Würzburgs*, could join in to plot a target. However, the GAF controlled *Würzburgs*, had 'earned a reputation for eccentricity', Campbell shows, due to inexperienced operators and poor location of some stations for surface plotting. Thus GAF plots resulted in a number of false alarms,

⁴⁹ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.125, 130-2; see also J.R. Robinson, 'Radar intelligence and the Dieppe raid', *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 20/5 (Spring/April, 1991), 37-8.

such as on 16/17 July 1942, when an invasion force was reported to be approaching Le Havre. The approaching amphibious force actually proved to be just a cloud bank. Another example was when the GAF, in attempting to track a convoy from Le Havre to Cherbourg, produced a plot overland across the Cotentin Peninsula.⁵⁰

The British only became aware of the effectiveness of German radar capability in early 1942. The British expert on German radar was Professor R.V. Jones, Assistant Director Intelligence (Science), ADI (Sc), Air Ministry, who also served on the Low Cover RDF Committee. In 1979 he stated that only about a dozen of his approximately five hundred wartime files on radar had not been destroyed. One of these was the 'Interim report on German Coast Watching Stations', 29 July 1942, which gave a complete and current survey of British knowledge of the German radar capability and dispositions. This report makes it clear that the British did not possess the capability to jam or spoof the *Freya* and *Würzburg* before, or for some time, after *Jubilee*. Indeed, one of the *Jubilee* mission objectives of RAF radar technician, Flight-Sergeant Jack Nissenthal (later Nissen), was to find out with what, if any, anti-jamming devices the *Freya* was equipped. Therefore the planners' only options were diversion or evasion of the German radar. Some of the measures suggested for *Rutter* were to stage diversionary air bombing raids on airfields at Boulogne, Crécy and Abbeville, or to have two motor boats each tow a balloon with a radar reflector off of Boulogne. To add to the realism, MGBs were to cruise around the area with full motors going. With

⁵⁰ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.132,135.

these measures it was hoped to preoccupy the German radar and thereby screen the final approach of the *Jubilee* landing craft.⁵¹

By the end of July 1942, at the latest, the British were definitely aware of the German *Freya* ability to detect LSIs at 'optical range' (15-25 miles) and that the *Würzburg* could give accurate horizontal plots on surface targets. Campbell states that whether this intelligence information, so important to amphibious operations, was known to COHQ during the planning of *Rutter/Jubilee*, has not been confirmed. F.A. Kingsley, who worked with radar at the time, in the Admiralty Surface Weapons Establishment, believes that there is 'little doubt' that this information was available to the *Jubilee* planners and that 'the risks of radar detection were certainly taken into account'. Derek Howse, another veteran of the radar war, agrees that 'it was common knowledge to operational commanders and staffs'. Perhaps this awareness of German capability was a reason that led to the decision, regarding *Jubilee*, not to use diversionary tactics but, instead, to depend on evasion. A more probable reason was that the nights were longer in August than in June, and thus meant less risk of the assault force being detected by GAF reconnaissance units. Leigh-Mallory concluded, 'It is therefore highly probable that surprise can be achieved. This in turn will make it unnecessary to carry out diversions, either by bombing or naval craft'. Campbell states that the *Jubilee* planners 'apparently assumed that the LSIs and destroyers would escape detection at 10-12 miles and that the landing craft, some of which were wooden, would not be picked up at all'. Campbell does not source this but it probably comes from Hughes-Hallett's memoirs. In these he

⁵¹ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.125,130, 136-7; Jack Nissen and A.W. Cockerill, *Winning the radar war: a memoir* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1987), p.147.

states that it was on his insistence that the lowering point for LSIs was changed from the usual four mile distance. At the time he expected it standard procedure for the Germans to be operating their radar at night, and 'felt strongly that it would be rash to assume that the German coastal radar was inferior to our own'. The resulting navigational problems of the landing craft, he explains, were an acceptable risk in the effort to avoid radar detection. Howse agrees that the LSI lowering point chosen was the 'best compromise' between two 'conflicting requirements': one which entailed the lowering point comparatively close to the coast, and the other, which wanted it to be as far out as possible, 'to reduce the consequences when they were detected'.⁵²

The Head of the British Naval Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, J.D. Brown, confirms the veterans' views. His comments are instructive and thus quoted at length. He believes that a *Jubilee* military planner could have considered early detection to be 'acceptable under certain circumstances', and that:

There was no way of preventing warning being given (either by detection or jamming): the LSIs lowering position was dictated by the known range of enemy radar and although the LCAs [Landing Craft Assault] and LCTs [Landing Craft Tank] would take about an hour to reach the beaches, it was believed that the under strength low-quality brigade(!) holding Dieppe could not be reinforced for four hours. *Surprise is sometimes relative*. In other words, if the margin of security remains sufficient for the objective to be achieved then total tactical surprise, though desirable, is not necessary. This concept appears to have been in the planners' minds for they were, throughout, more concerned about the German reserves than about the garrison.

Concerning German radar detection capabilities Brown confirms the Allies did not have a 'full and complete' knowledge. He explains that many

⁵² Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.137, 139-41; F.A. Kingsley to H. Henry, letter, 'The Dieppe raid/German radar detection', 12 April 1995; Derek Howse to H. Henry, letter, 'Operations *Jubilee*, Dieppe 19 August 1942', 19 March 1995; Leigh-Mallory, 'Employment of Bombers by Air Force Commander', nd., PRO, AIR 16/746; John Hughes-Hallett, 'Before I forget', *Memoirs*, 1971, p.114, NAC, MG 30 E463; Howse to Henry, letter, 'Dieppe', 30 March 1995.

variables affected radar performance and that a radar operator at the time could only guess what the day to day variations from the mean performance of his own set would be. Although the scientists might well have known about this mean expectancy, Brown asks:

did they anticipate the worst-case situation which actually prevailed on the day, of coastal radar looking *down-wind*? Had the wind in the Channel on 19 August been the prevalent westerly, instead of from the south-south-east, sea clutter (echoes from the steeper fronts of wind-driven seas) would certainly have much reduced the German radars' surface detection ranges, quite possibly by 50%.⁵³

Therefore Hughes-Hallett's categorical claim, concerning German radar performance during the whole war, that he knew 'of no case in which British Assault Ships [such as LSIs] were detected from the shore before their Landing Craft had got well clear of them', was wrong, as were so many of his other post-war comments.⁵⁴

Stacey categorically asserts that radar gave the Germans 'no warning whatever'. The source he bases this on is the post-action report of the German C-in-C West, Field-Marshal Von Rundstedt, dated 3 September 1942, which states that 'No identification about enemy forces were reported by RDF equipment up to the receipt of the report of the sea battle off Dieppe'. Ten days later, though, Campbell reveals that Rundstedt had received new information and changed his mind. The Army Group West War Diary explains how *Freya* 28, detected the LSIs as early as 0232, showed them to be stationary at 0330, and then tracked what seemed like five columns approaching Dieppe (see Map 4). But, the Navy believed the plots were either incorrect or were related to the expected German convoy. This information first came to light in 1958 in an anonymous article in a German

⁵³ J.D. Brown, Head of Naval Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, London, to H. Henry, letter D/NHB/9/2/17, 10 April 1995.

⁵⁴ Hughes-Hallett, *Memoirs*, p.115, NAC, MG 30 E463.

magazine. The author was Willi Weber, former commander of 23 Heavy Radar Company, of which *Freya* 28 was a subordinate unit. His version was soon cited in various forms by other authors, of whom the most widely read was Jacques Mordal *Dieppe* (1963). Campbell gives a detailed account, and it is unnecessary to do so here. The main point is that *Jubilee* was detected by the GAF RDF station, but was not believed by the naval authorities, because of previous reasons stated, such as interservice mistrust. Therefore tactical surprise was maintained.⁵⁵

Campbell raises the point that the collision of *Jubilee* with the German coastal convoy actually proved to be a 'stroke of good fortune' since it 'provided a form of cover'. The German radar operators ignored the radar plots of *Jubilee* at 0232 and 0330, since they had a convoy of their own in the area. This would have been the case, though, even if *Jubilee* had *not* collided with the convoy. Here Campbell is using confusing language for it was the *presence* of the German convoy, that deflected the German operators from their important radar plots, not the convoy's *collision* with *Jubilee*. Actually, the collision was a stroke of misfortune because the German defenders of Puy who, Campbell correctly states, had been on a night exercise, 'did not stand down before dawn because of the gunfire at sea'. However, one wonders whether the assaulting Canadians would have got off the beaches even if complete surprise had been attained at Puy. This question will be considered in the battle chapter.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.360; Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, 'Report of the C-in-C West on the Dieppe raid 19 August 1942', 3 September 1942, translated by Historical Section (GS), Army HQ, Ottawa, November 1946, p.4, PRO, NAC RG 24/20429/981.013(D6); Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.28-9 [Rundstedt]; For the Willi Weber version see Campbell (pp.141-5); Mordal, *Dieppe: the dawn of decision*, pp.157-160; James Leasor, *Green beach* (New York: Macmillan, 1975), pp.126-30; Kirkpatrick, *Captains without eyes*, pp.188-9.

⁵⁶ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.142-3.

The previous examination of the use of operational radar and SIGINT has, ironically, revealed that although both British and German sides had timely and valuable intelligence available to them, neither side utilised it effectively. Hughes-Hallett failed to react to C-in-C Portsmouth's warning signals, originating from shore RDF stations, about the German coastal convoy, while German army and naval authorities were sceptical and did not take seriously the invasion alert given by the GAF *Freya* 28.

The third, and final, aspect of radar and *Jubilee* to be dealt with, is the myth that the primary aim of the operation was to gather radar intelligence, and therefore the primary objective was the attack on the RDF station *Freya* 28. The assault on the RDF station was not 'a Commando raid' nor was the installation, or any of its equipment, captured. These rumours were first started by COHQ communiqués based on initially inaccurate reports received during, and immediately after, the operation. The Chiefs of Staff *Weekly Resume* for the period also noted capture of the radar station. These official reports, although renounced later, spread quickly into the media and inevitably into popular and scholarly accounts of the operation. The *Royal United Services Institute Journal's*, 'Diary of the war' (November 1942), reported, 'a radiolocation station was destroyed'. Richard Deacon, an intelligence historian, wrote 'great success was achieved in capturing enemy radar equipment', in *The silent war: a history of Western Naval intelligence* (1978). Another scholar, Jack Haswell, noted that 'a valuable German [radar] installation was destroyed and much information gained from it', in *The intelligence and deception of the D-Day landings* (1979).⁵⁷

⁵⁷ COHQ Communiqués Nos.3 and 4, 19 August 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/330; COS Weekly Resume No.155, 13 to 20 August 1942, p.2, PRO, CAB 80/37; RUSI Editor, 'Diary of the war', *Royal United Services Institute Journal* 87/548 (November 1942), 123; Richard Deacon, 'The turning point', in *The silent war: a history of Western Naval intelligence* (Newton Abbot: David

J.R. Robinson's article 'Radar intelligence and the Dieppe raid', *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (1991) should have dispelled this myth but it has survived. More recently, an interesting variation was put forward by Canadian journalist Mary Mackie. She believes that the operation was 'radar driven' from the beginning, and that 'radar espionage... was the imperative objective', which is the thesis of her unpublished paper, 'Top secret victory at Dieppe' (1993). Her most significant point is that the 'radar links between the 4 decision-makers could have been the overriding factor which pushed the Dieppe Raid into its final realization'. The four decision-makers of whom she is speaking of are Prime Minister (PM) Winston Churchill, Mountbatten, Hughes-Hallett, and Lt-Gen. McNaughton. These men, she explains, had technical radar knowledge ranging from above-average to exceptional. She states Churchill had urged the RAF, as early as 1936, to investigate radar development. As PM, he not only chaired his own weekly Scientific Committee but recruited Professor Frederick A. Lindemann (later Lord Cherwell) to be his personal scientific adviser. Since 1931 Mountbatten, she explains, had been involved in the development of signals equipment, from which radar evolved. He was head of the naval experimental staff at Portsmouth where he not only taught but reformed the syllabus. She quotes one of his superiors saying he was 'a magnificent technician and the outstanding signals officer of his generation'. She notes that he recruited a full professor of physics to the COHQ staff in 1942. Hughes-Hallett was for a time chairman of the Low Cover Radar Committee in 1941-2, which was in charge of setting up the British coastal radar chain. McNaughton was a

& Charles, 1978), p.185; Jack Haswell, 'The operational problems', in *The intelligence and deception of the D-Day landings* (London: B.T. Batsford, 1979), p.23.

graduate in Electrical Engineering and, in 1935, was appointed president of the National Research Council of Canada (NRC), the leading government sponsored, scientific think-tank. In this position, Mackie states, he instigated and pushed research into radar development. He also was the co-inventor, with Dr Robert Watson-Watt, of the Cathode Ray Direction Finder, termed 'Radar's Middleman'. Although GOC First Canadian Army Overseas, he did not resign from the NRC but went 'absent on duty', and was kept informed about developments by his personally chosen, interim president, Dr C.J. Mackenzie. Mackie concludes that 'he knew the value and power of radar intelligence'. Her argument although persuasive, is based almost entirely on circumstantial evidence. No primary sources examined have so far directly supported her thesis, although more investigation of presently closed sources could possibly shed new light on it. However, all present evidence about the planning and launching of *Jubilee* shows that it was not radar driven.⁵⁸

One final aspect of radar and *Jubilee* concerns the claim of the 'radar expert', Nissen, that his observation of the movements of the antennae array of Freya 28, and cutting some telephone cables, resulted in valuable intelligence that was instrumental in the development of radar counter-measures used before, during and after the 1944 Normandy landings. His claims were first put forward by James Leasor, in *Green beach* (1975), which received wide circulation, but unfortunately, described Nissen's mission inaccurately and credited it with over-inflated importance, out of all

⁵⁸ J.R. Robinson, 'Radar intelligence and the Dieppe raid', *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 20/5 (Spring/April, 1991); Mary Mackie, 'Top secret victory', unpublished paper, 18 August 1993, pp.4, 10-12; Mary Mackie, interview by H. Henry, Cambridge UK, 11 February 1996; Mary Mackie to H. Henry, letter, 18 February 1996.

context to the true situation. The book, which is devoid of references, and fails to live up to even minor cross-checking with the relevant primary documents, perhaps should be relegated to the fiction area of libraries. Sadly, it had been the basis of many other examinations of the subject, propagating the myth still further. Nissen himself published his own account, *Winning the radar war: a memoir* (1987), in which he claims his mission on *Rutter/Jubilee* was to discover such information as what were the anti-jamming devices the *Freya* 28 was equipped with, did it have navigational features associated with ground control of air interception? He was also, he writes, to find out what was the quality of the German cathode-ray tubes, pulse generator and receiving equipment.⁵⁹

In recent interviews Nissen makes claims that seem to support Mackie's interpretation, saying that *Jubilee* was the first ever electronic intelligence gathering mission. An attack against a defended German strongpoint would reveal, it was hoped, what radio frequencies and modes of operation and communication were used for contact among the various German HQs within the Dieppe area. The LSI *Prince Albert* was not only employed as a troop transport but also had been fitted out with special electronic gathering equipment, much of it American and scrounged by Mountbatten from other ships, for monitoring and recording the resulting German radio transmissions. On board the *Prince Albert* Chief Petty Officer Ken Dearson was in command of the team responsible for the mission.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ James Leasor, *Green beach* (New York: William Morrow & Company Inc., 1975); Nissen and Cockerill, *Winning the radar war*, pp.147, 171-5, 192-200;

⁶⁰ Nissen, interview for CBC Newsworld, 11 November 1991, audio-visual VHS recording, this author's Dieppe Collection; Nissen, telephone interviews by author, 15-16 April 1996; Nissen, extracts from unpublished manuscript on radar in the war, chapter 'Orange and Green', received by this author 4 July 1996.

In 1991 Prime Minister John Major was approached on Nissen's behalf and asked to waive the 1949 order ending the awarding of citations for wartime duty, in order to award him the Victoria Cross (VC), the highest British armed forces award. According to the newspaper report, he was not recognised at the time due to the highly secret nature of his mission. Consequently, Dr William A.B. Douglas, head of the Directorate of History, National Defence HQ, Ottawa, was contacted, and after some research, the evidence seemed to prove Nissen's claims wrong. Dr Douglas's decision seems to have been based to a large extent on the article by Robinson. Campbell describes this whole story in great detail and in the end, agrees with Robinson.⁶¹

After Robinson conducted a thorough examination of the secondary and primary sources concerned, corresponding and confirming his article with R.V. Jones, he came to the following, categorical conclusion:

No independent evidence was found to support the concept that important, or novel, radar intelligence was achieved as a result of the Dieppe Raid. The station was not captured, and the RDF expert was given no opportunity to examine equipment or documents. The enemy was not 'forced' to resort to radio transmission of his radar observations; this was his common daily procedure and nothing of significance was heard by British monitors all day. Pre-raid observation of the German radar chain had already determined the electronic characteristics, jamming vulnerability and precision of the *Freya* type of equipment in use there. Military plans to seize the station merely offered an 'extra target of opportunity'. The definitive summary belongs to the wartime Director of Air Scientific Intelligence [Jones]: 'The Dieppe Raid did not provide sufficient new information regarding the German *Freya* radar system to justify the preparation, subsequently, of any Scientific Intelligence Report about it'.⁶²

The most commonly held myth about *Jubilee* also has an intelligence dimension. This is that it did not achieve surprise and that the Germans received forewarning, resulting in the massacre on the beaches. This rumour, begun immediately after the raid by the men who managed to return

⁶¹ 'VC urged for Scientist in Dieppe raid', Daily Telegraph, 7 October 1991, in Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.29, 146, 202, 204-5

⁶² Robinson, 'Radar intelligence and the Dieppe raid', 40, 42.

to England, and which gained credence in the post-war years through repetition by veterans and historians, is understandable given the scale of the defeat and the unbelievably heavy sixty percent Canadian casualties.⁶³

All the investigations into the possibility that some kind of agent report gave forewarning are not merely inconclusive. They are pointless because they do not establish a link between any leak and the massacre on the beaches. They assume that the leak was listened to and that this explains the disaster but this ignores the fact that the Germans were not at alert readiness, except, for reasons discussed later, at Puys, and even there they were not at action stations, the highest stage of alert.

The 'historian', David Irving, took this line in 1963, writing a series of articles in the *Evening Standard*. Although the official British naval historian, Stephen Roskill, soundly refuted all his claims, the myth still lingers today. This led to a personal feud between the two, the evidence of which is clearly documented in Roskill's personal papers and in the Cabinet Historical Office, the latter, which are not open to the general public, are under a process of review and scheduled to be available at the Public Record Office (PRO) in 1998. Campbell reiterates the debate in detail, adds nothing new, and concludes by agreeing with Roskill.⁶⁴

⁶³ Some of members of the 14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment, who landed at Dieppe and were taken prisoner, are still convinced that the Germans knew they were coming. Personal interviews, Red Deer, Alberta, June 1990. On German forewarning see the letters to *The Times*, 1 August 1963, *The Evening Standard*, 2 October 1963 and *The Daily Telegraph*, 9 September 1963, CCA, Roskill Papers, ROSK 5/51.

⁶⁴ S.W. Roskill, 'The Dieppe raid and the question of German foreknowledge', *Royal United Services Institute Journal* 109/633 (February 1964), 27-31; the Roskill and Irving debate is in CCA, Roskill Papers, ROSK 5/51, 8/12, 8/14, and in CAB 146/349/11/4/iv, 'The Dieppe raid', 1955-67, fols. A-H, 1-67 [Officially closed but viewed with special permission]; Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.13-20.

Many other books followed the Irving lead, despite Roskill's denunciations. The most widely known is Anthony C. Brown's, *Bodyguard of Lies* (1975). He puts forward the ridiculous assertion that Churchill planned *Jubilee* to fail, intentionally informing the Germans, to extinguish insistent American and Soviet demands for a second front in 1942. The supposed reason behind this statement is that it is better to lose five thousand men in a raid such as *Jubilee* than many times that in a premature full-scale invasion.⁶⁵

No author undertook a serious, comprehensive examination of the many secondary and German primary sources that deal with possible reports of German foreknowledge of the raid, until Campbell. For this reason, and the fact that he still leaves some issues unresolved, it is necessary to critically analyse his arguments in detail. He begins by canvassing each of the many supposed reports received by the *Abwehr*, from various secret agents or spies, only to discount each one in the end. One agent, code-named Tate, was controlled by the XX or Twenty Committee, the organization responsible for running double agents usually for misinformation purposes. Unless some incredible mix up occurred, this eliminates him. But could Tate have been allowed to send a warning in order to build up the credibility of XX agents with the *Abwehr*? Campbell adds that Tate would not have been useful in this role since, as opposed to the controlled agents reporting to Madrid and Lisbon, his traffic passed by landline between Hamburg and Berlin, and therefore could not be

⁶⁵ Anthony C. Brown, *Bodyguard of lies* (London: Harper & Row, 1975), p.86. Brown is supported by Günther Peis, *Mirror of deception: how Britain turned the Nazi spy machine against itself* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976), pp.122-5; Deacon, *The silent war*, p.158; David Eisenhower, *Eisenhower at war, 1943-1945* (New York: Macmillan, 1986), p.96.

intercepted and deciphered by GC&CS. Here Campbell errs. In the first place, Tate's messages still had to get to Hamburg, and could therefore be intercepted by GC&CS. Secondly, GC&CS was not interested in what Tate sent since they already knew what it was. At the very least they had some input into all of his reports and sometimes even compiled them. They were interested in the German *reaction* to his reports which they could read through Ultra decrypts.⁶⁶

Campbell concludes that another agent could possibly have given warning in a report of 13 August 1942 which is cited in the German Naval Staff War Diary for the following October. This was the very successful and inventive Ostro. Unfortunately, he gives absolutely no evidence.⁶⁷ He discusses the Ostro signals read by the GC&CS between January and October 1942, but does not mention the evidence for believing that none contained any report about Dieppe. Undoubtedly, a huge enquiry would have ensued had such a report from Ostro been decrypted.⁶⁸ Concerning the report of 13 August, Campbell says on the present evidence one does not know what was reported and why it failed to make an impression until later. He fails to consider that the obvious reason it made no impression at the time is that it did not mention Dieppe. The Naval Diary only states the *Abwehr* claimed in October that it had warned of a raid on Dieppe.

This already complicated story is confused further by the oft quoted agent report, T 1022 1677 of 29 October 1942. This Campbell unfortunately

⁶⁶ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.48; information on GC&CS and Tate relationship from Professor Sir F.H. Hinsley.

⁶⁷ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.56.

⁶⁸ Ostro's reports caused great anxiety in the British intelligence community and were always carefully scrutinised. See Hinsley, *British intelligence*, 4, pp.200, 256, 279-80.

refers to under several different dates. It is first mentioned as being 'in October 1942' with the endnote giving '20 October'; then as at the 'end of October 1942', followed by 'the report earlier referred to of 29 October', which is the correct date. More important this is relevant to the Dieppe raid only because the Naval Diary quotes the *Abwehr* as saying it came from the same agent that reported in advance of the August raid.⁶⁹

Given that we know that the Germans were not alerted it is not surprising that Ultra provided no evidence that they expected the raid, Commander Ian Fleming of the Naval Intelligence Division so reported to the Director of Naval Intelligence at the time. Campbell nevertheless raises the question of whether or not Ultra could be relied on to warn that the Germans had advance knowledge of the raid? Although he does not directly answer, undoubtedly it is yes. The Naval Section of the GC&CS read *all* German naval SIGINT in the Channel and this, as Campbell himself says, provided 'a ready check on the occasions when the German defensive machine reacted to the threat of an Allied operation'.⁷⁰

A mystery remains to which Campbell gives generous treatment, but does not adequately address. This is the claim by Lt-Col Haines, in a history of Ultra and the United States strategic air war against Germany, that 'There is hard and fast evidence in Ultra that as early as the 12th of August the Germans knew of the forthcoming Dieppe operation'. Since Campbell believes Haines had access to various still classified sources, Campbell warns that the claim should not be 'rejected out of hand, if only because it has something of the authority of a primary source'. But Campbell provides

⁶⁹ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.23, 38 (note 36), 32.

⁷⁰ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.162, 166.

no evidence for his belief and only says that Haines gives no references or the text for the decrypt in question. Campbell continues that, 'Assuming for the moment that this claim was valid, it seems strange that the evidence on which it was based was evidently left out of the GC&CS's Naval Section's paper', entitled, 'Increase of German Defensive Measures, Western Area 1942'. This summarized all Ultra decrypts concerning Channel activity and alerts for over four months up to the 15 August 1942. What would be more strange is if a decrypt existed and the British intelligence community missed it. The fact is that if any evidence had existed, such significant information would never have been omitted from the Naval Section's paper. Another way to view this scenario is to compare it with other operations that were cancelled after Ultra revealed the Germans had warning. Campbell explains that provided the intelligence arrived in time, Mountbatten had the authority to cancel or recall an operation. Campbell gives the example of Operation *Coughdrop*, a raid on the Lorient U-boat base, but does not seem to make the obvious connection that any report received by British intelligence concerning *Jubilee* being compromised, would have resulted in immediate cancellation just like *Coughdrop*.⁷¹

All these explanations, though, are really not necessary and are irrelevant to the basic question of German foreknowledge because, as Campbell demonstrates, with all the Allied and German documents available, it is obvious that the Germans received no warning and were surprised. If any reports were received before the raid, they were either not passed on to the local garrison or ignored by the respective authorities in

⁷¹ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.161, 164-5; Lt-Col. Haines, 'Pearl Harbour to Rouen', in *Ultra and the history of the United States Strategic Air Force in Europe vs. the German Air Force* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1980), p.6.

Berlin. This is obvious since, as Campbell points out from the evidence of the previously mentioned Naval Section paper, after receiving reports in May, June and July of an intended landing the Germans sounded the alarm dozens of times, at many places along the coast from Norway to France, but did not do so for the 18/19 August in the Dieppe area. Further evidence Campbell points to is that the bulk of two long-range bomber groups, the only torpedo bomber unit in the GAF and an E-boat unit, the latter two extremely effective in the anti-raid role, were moved away from the operational area to Holland and Norway, three to ten days before the raid. The fact that the number of strategic reserve divisions on land gradually increased is put down 'almost entirely to one man's susceptibility to the threat of a second front'.⁷²

Another aspect of the foreknowledge debate brings in the possible Allied use of deception. Concerning this and *Rutter*, three possible explanations exist. First, that it was not leaked. Second, that it was leaked inadvertently because of poor liaison between COHQ and the intelligence community. Third, which is the recent theory put forward by Villa, is that it was leaked as part of a deception plan, to let the Germans know of the raid and then they would never suspect that it was being remounted. This is supported by Mountbatten's post-war comments to the same effect. More importantly, though, Villa believes it was conspiracy on the part of Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett, to deceive the relevant British authorities, who would have opposed its remounting for obvious security reasons.

The first scenario, that it was not leaked, is maintained by the official British intelligence historian of strategic deception, Michael Howard, who

⁷² Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.112-3, 162-4.

shows implementation of no *specific* deceptive operation for Dieppe. He notes the formal strategic deception of a feint across the Channel, Operation *Overthrow*, designed to cover the North African landings, did not get formal COS approval until 18 August 1942. This effectively refutes Anthony Cave Brown who insists the deception 'had been going full blast ever since the late spring [and] the raid on Dieppe would be launched to give teeth to *Overthrow*'. However, Howard admits ad hoc operations were underway. One almost certainly had COS approval and started on 8 June 1942. This was the BBC (British Broadcasting Company) nightly warnings to French civilians of the coastal regions to evacuate their homes because of the increasing chance of second front.⁷³

Howard does not comment on the second possible scenario concerning deception, which is that indications might have inadvertently been passed to the Germans. Ewen Montagu, in *Beyond Top Secret U* (1977) states, 'to conceal the actual target of an operation – say the Dieppe Raid – if the preparations of men and ships were to leak or if our old bugbears, the neutral diplomats, picked up the fact that something was afoot, we were asked to try and give the Germans the idea that we were going to attack somewhere else'.⁷⁴

Nigel West reluctantly admits that the operation might have been inadvertently given away for deception purposes. He asks, 'did someone decide to capitalise on an abandoned plan by feeding details of *Rutter* to the enemy through a double agent, only to be caught by the reinstatement of

⁷³ Michael Howard, *British intelligence in the Second World War. strategic deception* 5 (6 vols., New York; Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp.56-7. Brown, *Bodyguard of lies*, p.83. Brown quotes the BBC appeal as printed the following day in the *New York Times*, 9 June 1942.

⁷⁴ Montagu, *Beyond top secret U*, p.129.

Jubilee?... Clearly there was an opportunity for advantage here, but Tate, his Radio Security Service supervisor, Russell Lee, and Tate's MI5 [British counter-intelligence service] case officers have denied any involvement.' He concludes that there is 'no evidence to support an allegation of treachery or ineptitude'. Sir John Masterman, in his pioneering work on the Double-Cross System (XX) and its agents, states that Mountbatten had the offer of the services of one double agent. Supposedly, this agent, code-named *Dragonfly*, could cover the Isle of Wight where the Dieppe raiding force was training and could pass the Germans so much information that they would not plant new sources in the area. Masterman indicates the reason for refusal of the suggestion was lack of organization within this new agency, the London Controlling Station (LCS).⁷⁵

The third scenario concerning deception and *Rutter/Jubilee*, is that of Villa's additional epilogue to his revised flagship book (1994). His basic contention is that *Rutter* was intentionally leaked to the Germans, to allow COHQ and the units already trained for *Rutter*, to prepare to remount the operation. If the relevant authorities, such as the COS, ISSB, Paget, or Montgomery, had been put in the picture they would have most probably, Villa explains, squashed the operation on security grounds. By making it out as a deception operation, any opposition would be nullified. This internal deception conspiracy is based on the following evidence which requires examination. Concerning Ultra and German foreknowledge Villa is off the mark. He claims that if Ultra had picked up any indications that the Germans

⁷⁵ Nigel West, 'Jubilee or betrayal', in *Unreliable witness: espionage myths of the Second World War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984), pp.130, 133; Sir John C. Masterman, *The Double-Cross System in the war of 1939 to 1945* (London: Yale University Press, 1972), p.108.

had discovered information on *Jubilee*, it would have confirmed to British intelligence authorities that deception was working. But this information would not need to have been passed to the Force Commanders of a 'fictional' raid and thus they would not have been informed. Villa does not mention that the naval C-in-C's were on the Ultra list of recipients. The key reference that Villa uses for this scenario is explained below.⁷⁶

After the cancellation of *Rutter* on 7 July the COHQ Examination Committee held a meeting on 9 July to discuss, by orders from the COS, offensive operations to replace abandoned *Sledgehammer* and dismantled *Rutter* and a deception scheme to simulate *Sledgehammer*, the plan for an emergency Allied invasion of Northern France to relieve pressure on Russia. The Minutes explained:

It is proposed that the cover plan for these operations should take the form of a holding operation in the Dieppe and Havre [*sic*] area. For this purpose, it is proposed:

- a) To train and brief one Division for an attack on Dieppe (already done by *Rutter* which can now be 'leaked'.)
- (b) Earmark and brief one Division for an attack on Havre [*sic*]. It is intended that the cover plan should reach a climax by the end of September, the date of the original *Sledgehammer*... The proposed operations would take place about a fortnight before the climax of the cover plan.⁷⁷

From this document clearly *Rutter* could have been leaked. The permission was there but whether the LCS acted on it Villa and no one else has confirmed. In fact, they have confirmed the opposite since if the Germans did receive intelligence about the operation, they ignored it. Ultra would have revealed if they had taken notice of it and their subsequent reactions. No such indications occurred. The reports also would have showed up in the higher documents of the various German commands. No references have come to light and all German documents were captured immediately after

⁷⁶ Villa, 'Epilogue - The last major piece of the puzzle', in *Unauthorized action*, pp.248-67.

⁷⁷ COHQ, 'Examination Committee Minutes', 9 July 1942, pp.1-2, PRO, DEFE 2/2.

the war and made available to official researchers such as Stacey and Hinsley. Perhaps the simple explanation of this possible order for a leak is that it is a good example of the tension that developed between the notional threat of deception and the operational build-up of COHQ. There existed two planes, the higher one of strategic deception and the lower of tactics, such as raids like Dieppe. Both had the same long-term aim of preparing for the future invasion but in the summer of 1942 the apparatus for strong central control and coordination was in its infancy and not yet prepared to prevent such inadvertent leakage as may have occurred. This is confirmed by Ralph Bennett:

Dieppe was the first combined operation (Norway was not planned as a combined operation), and was a complete shambles anyway; St Nazaire, though planned by Mountbatten's Combined Operations staff, was mainly a naval operation) so that there were no precedents and no one knew what to expect and what problems would emerge. Everything remained to be discovered. *Torch* [1942 invasion of North Africa] was a bit better (but *Sigint* was very badly planned and under-used, *Husky* [1943 invasion of Sicily] still left a lot to be desired, and the learning process did not mature until *Overlord* [1944 invasion of Normandy].⁷⁸

Campbell, in describing the strategic context in which *Jubilee* was decided on, states that an atmosphere of semi-crisis prevailed in COHQ during early June and early July 1942. The crisis became especially acute after *Rutter* and Operation *Sledgehammer* were cancelled. Campbell wonders whether small raids leading up to the deception of a notional *Sledgehammer* in September 1942 would have been better than *Jubilee*? Of course this would have been better but, as Campbell has clearly demonstrated, COHQ met in a state of desperation and that is why they decided on *Jubilee*. He explains, within the context the German situation and order of battle in the Channel area in 1942, that small scale deception would not have been effective if only because the Germans did not seriously

⁷⁸ Ralph Bennett to H. Henry, 1 May 1994.

believe in the threat of an invasion in 1942. No good would have been served pretending a big invasion was in the offing because the Germans were just not listening to such warnings.⁷⁹

Concerning deception and cover Campbell correctly states that the former, using the XX organization, was not being practised actively until the end of September 1942 but does not make it clear why this was so. The reason was that the security authorities were not fully convinced that all German agents in the United Kingdom were under control (only one rogue agent was needed to blow a deception operation). Even by the time of Operation *Torch* the XX system was barely used. Concerning the use of a cover story, Campbell states, 'That the raid might have been somehow saved by a cover plan remains doubtful, as will be argued later'. Unfortunately, he never raises or addresses the point again. He also asserts that Masterman 'regretted' *Jubilee* had not been properly covered, which meant using the XX system to gain surprise, by referring to Masterman's earlier quote that, 'It is sad, but interesting, to speculate whether the Dieppe raid might have been more successful, or at least less costly, if it had been effectively covered'. This is not 'regret' on Masterman's part but actually pure, worthless speculation. It is pointless regretting or speculating *Jubilee* might have been more successful if covered using the XX organization, since *Jubilee* gained surprise without it. When Masterman asks whether it would have been 'less costly', he is assuming that *Jubilee* might not have been defeated if the German strategic reserves had not been redeployed. Campbell does not comment on this, possibly because it is an irrelevant question, although the answer is definitely no. The operation was defeated

⁷⁹ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.64-8.

by the static coastal defence forces. The strategic reserves, such as 10 PzD, were the only units that would have been affected by any cover or deception operation. Besides, as previously discussed and Campbell shows, the strategic reserves would have taken too long to get into action to be of significance to operations of such short duration as *Jubilee*.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.17, 28, 57, 70; Masterman, *The Double-Cross System*, p.108.

5

EXECUTION OF THE OPERATION
PHASE 1: FLANK ATTACKS

With the planning and intelligence assessments completed, and the weather forecasts suitable for the next forty-eight hours, the expedition was issued the preparatory order for the operation on 17 August 1942. This meant the beginning of the night loading of the tanks. The same day the Naval Force Commander, Hughes-Hallett, issued the following instructions to all COs of ships and craft taking part in *Jubilee*:

We are about to undertake an unusually complex and hazardous operation, the success of which from now onwards is likely to depend far more on the action of individual Commanding Officers than anything I shall be able to do from the Command ship.

It is partly for this reason that the operation orders have been prepared in such detail...

No doubt however unforeseen situations will arise, and when dealing with them, Commanding Officers should be guided before all else by the following broad and simple objects...

To get the troops there at the right time and place...

To protect the LSIs [Landing ship, Infantry] and landing craft.¹

Possibly these instructions led to confusion and catastrophe. The *Rutter* Naval Force Commander, Vice-Adm. Baillie-Grohman, certainly thought so, for after the operation he noted that they illustrated 'the pressure brought to bear by the Army on a naval operation', and also 'what can occur when the other Services interfere in what is known to experienced NO [naval officers] to be strongly advisable, from the seaman's point of view'.²

¹ John Hughes-Hallett to COs of ships and craft taking part in Operation *Jubilee*, 17 August 1942, IWM, John Hughes-Hallett Papers (JHHP), JHH 3/2.

² Baillie-Grohman, 'Dieppe Raid August 1942', December 1942, hand-written note concerning Enclosure 14 to Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NMM, Baillie-Grohman Papers (BGP), GRO/26.

The launch now depended solely on the weather. Several forecasts indicated that it would improve by the morning of 19 August. Thus, after Mountbatten consulted with the three Force Commanders and the C-in-C, Portsmouth, he gave the executive order to proceed on 18 August. During that day the troops embarked at five different ports – Southampton, Gosport, Portsmouth, Shoreham and Newhaven. Hughes-Hallett had suggested this dispersal for the security reason of negating any chance of a large concentration of ships being recognized by the GAF. The *Jubilee* naval force amounted to 253 ships. The military force was approximately 6100 all ranks, of whom 4963 were Canadian, about 1075 were British, about 50 US Rangers and about 20 all ranks of No. 10 Inter-Allied Commando, some of whom were French and German ex-patriots. This was supported by a total of 74 air squadrons, including 48 fighter squadrons, as well as those to give close-support, lay smoke and do tactical reconnaissance.³

Simultaneous surprise flank attacks were to begin at 0450 (British Summer Time-one hour in advance of Greenwich Mean Time) over a front of about ten miles, at four different places. This was during the period of

³ On weather forecasts see Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ), 'Combined Report on the Dieppe raid', in BR 1887 (formerly CB 04244), October 1942, London: COHQ, 15 October 1942, pp.9-10, DHist 594.013 (D1); and BGS, HQ First Canadian Army, Memo for File, 17 August 1942, NAC, RG 2410584/215C1 (D233). The *Jubilee* force amounted to 253 ships, and included 8, one thousand ton, *Hunt* class destroyers, 1 Gun Boat, 1 Sloop, 7 Free French Chasseurs, 9 Landing Ships, Infantry (LSI), 4 Steam Gun Boats (SGB), 12 Motor Gun Boats (MGB), 16 Motor Launches (ML), 10 Landing Craft, Tank (Mark 2) [LCT(2)], 14 Landing Craft, Tank (Mark 3) [LCT(3)], 6 Landing Craft, Flak (Large) [LCF(L)], 8 Landing Craft, Support (Medium) [LCS(M)], 7 Landing Craft, Mechanised (Mark 1) [LCM(1)], 8 Landing Craft, Support (Medium) [LCS(M)], 60 Landing Craft, Assault (LCA), 74 Landing Craft, Personnel (Large) [LCP(L)], and 16 minesweepers, see COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.11; Charles P. Stacey, *Six years of war: the Canadian Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific*, 1, *Official history of the Canadian Army in the Second World War*, ed. Charles P. Stacey (4 vols., Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955), pp.345, 347-8; Rear-Admiral H.E. Horan, COHQ, 'Designation of Landing Craft and Ships', 9 July 1942, DHist 81/520/1250/1; Hughes-Hallett, 'Jubilee Craft Requirements', 31 July 1942, IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/2 [Landing Craft, Tank (LCT) Marks and numbers].

'nautical twilight', or still dark (see Map 2).⁴ The attacks were to go in from east to west against the battery near Berneval, at Puys, at Pourville and upon the battery at Varengueville. The main attack against Dieppe itself was to go in half an hour later at 0520 hours. This included two simultaneous frontal assaults on the east (Red) and west (White) beaches. The first flight of nine tanks of the 14 Canadian Army Tank Regiment (14 CATR), commanded by Lt-Col J.G. 'Johnny' Andrews, was to land simultaneously with the first assault troops in support. Within the following two hours the remaining forty-nine tanks were to land in four successive flights. Their mission was to support the infantry in the capture of the town and the various objectives, such as the aerodrome, previously outlined in the *Rutter* plan. At 0600 the British Royal Marine 'A' Commando, commanded by Lt-Col Joseph P. 'Tiger' Phillippis and embarked on the Gun Boat *HMS Locust* and the Chasseurs, were to enter the inner harbour to capture or destroy several invasion barges and other craft. Held as a floating reserve was Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR), commanded by Lt-Col Dollard 'Joe' Ménard.⁵

Two of the destroyers, *Calpe* and *Fernie*, were designated HQ ships and outfitted with extra communications equipment. *Calpe* had the Naval and Military Force Commanders, Hughes-Hallett and Roberts, plus a

⁴ All times are British Summer Time (BST) unless indicated. On 19 August 1942 nautical twilight (defined as the Sun 12° below horizon) commenced at 0431, civil twilight (Sun 6° below horizon) at 0515, and sunrise at 0550, see Admiralty, 'Raid on Dieppe (naval operations) 19 August 1942', in BR 1736 (26) Naval Staff History, Second World War, Battle Summary No.33, revised 31 December 1959 [released in 1990], London: Admiralty Historical Section, p.11, PRO, ADM 234/355.

⁵ Unit assignments: Berneval, the British No.3 Commando, commanded by Lt-Col J.F. 'Torchy' Dumford-Slater; Puys, The Royal Regiment of Canada (RRC), commanded by Lt-Col D.E. 'Doug' Catto; Pourville, The South Saskatchewan Regiment (SSR), commanded by Lt-Col C.C.I. 'Cec' Merritt, followed later by The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada (QOCHC), commanded by Lt-Col Alfred C. Gostling; Varengueville, the British No.4 Commando, commanded by Lt-Col The Lord S.F. 'Shimi' Lovat; Dieppe's east beach, The Essex Scottish Regiment, commanded by Lt-Col F.K. 'Fred' Jaspersen; Dieppe's west beach, The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI), commanded by Lt-Col R.R. 'Bob' Labatt.

representative of the Air Force Commander, Air Commodore A.T. Cole. Leigh-Mallory stayed at HQ No.11 Fighter Group, Uxbridge (which was the best point for him to control his squadrons). Mountbatten and Crerar were also there. *Fernie* was to act as a back-up HQ ship in case *Calpe* was put out of action and had a duplicate staff and communications arrangement. Both HQ ships had a Air Fighter Controller who could direct incoming sorties on to targets requested by the Military Force Commander.⁶

To aid in navigation some vessels, such as the LSIs, were equipped with the RAF Type 7000 electronic position-finding system device GEE ('G' for grid lines). It had been effectively used by Bomber Command in the 'Thousand plane raids' and strategic bombing offensive against Germany. Specifically, it provided 'accurate navigation, timing and concentration of the bomber stream'. COHQ quickly recognized the potential of this as an aid for surface navigation. Robinson, in 'Radar intelligence and the Dieppe raid' (1991), recounts how the Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE), the main radar research centre, modified aircraft GEE sets for shipboard use. This modified set was sometimes referred to as 'RDF receiver QH'. Robinson defines GEE as 'a pulse modulated hyperbolic navigational system' and notes that it should not be confused with radar. It was successfully used during the *Yukon I* and *II* rehearsals and first used operationally on ships during *Jubilee*. Hughes-Hallett recalled it was extremely accurate in mid-Channel but became progressively less accurate east or west of there 'and would not have done for the particular purpose for which we required it'. This post-war claim contradicts a contemporary report on navigation, issued over his signature, that states it 'proved highly

⁶ Stacey, *Six years of war*, pp.348.

valuable' to the overall operation. Robinson points out that it is incorrect to assume that the similar use of GEE during the Normandy landings resulted from experience at Dieppe, since many electronic aids and 'spoofs' were already being planned by 'The Aids to Invasion Panel', whose formation was ordered by TRE on 2 August 1942, two weeks before the raid.⁷

Jubilee set off about 2110 in thirteen different groups (see Map 4 illustrating tracks of units on passage), preceded by 13 and 19 Minesweeping Flotillas. These craft, nicknamed 'Swipers', swept two paths through the suspected German minefield, although only one mine was found. All craft cleared the minefield without major incident by 0300.⁸

Once at the point just clear of the suspected German radar range for ships of this size, the LSIs lowered their various landing craft for the final run in. This was completed at 0300 according to plan. The landing craft then formed up into their various attack formations along with their assigned escorts. During the June *Yukon* Exercises the problem of landing craft flotillas not finding the correct beaches was most significant. The method chosen to solve this was to have specially equipped craft lead them inshore. Unfortunately, the only craft suitable at the time was the MGB, since it had the speed to keep up with the LSIs, was fitted with echo sounders (to measure water depth) and had GEE for navigation. A contemporary report on GEE states its accuracy for direction varied 'between 200 and 800 yards according to locality; one-quarter mile is normally practicable'. But warned its accuracy for distance was 'not so good'. The disadvantages of the MGBs

⁷ Robinson, J. R., 'Radar intelligence and the Dieppe raid', *The Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 20/5 (April 1991), 38-9, 40.

⁸ Admiralty, Battle Summary No.33, p.13; Admiralty, 'Weekly naval notes/Newhaven-Dieppe', in *Weekly Intelligence Report*, 129, London: Naval Intelligence Division, 1942, p.12, PRO, ADM 223/155 ['Swipers'].

were that they were too noisy and their slowest speed (6-7 knots) was too fast for the landing craft. This entailed many halts to allow the flotilla to catch up and resulted in inaccuracies in navigation, in spite of the use of GEE.⁹

ENCOUNTER WITH GERMAN CONVOY

The detection by shore radar stations and SIGINT of the German convoy, before it encountered the eastern flank of *Jubilee*, has previously been examined. The naval action itself and its effects on the rest of the operation, though, need to be looked at. The German convoy had left the previous evening from Boulogne for Dieppe and consisted of five Dutch coastal motor sailing vessels, escorted by two anti-submarine chasers (converted deep-sea trawlers), *U-Jäger* (UJ) 1411 and UJ 1404, and a M-Class minesweeper, M 4014. First Lieutenant S. Wurmbach was the convoy commander and captain of UJ 1411.¹⁰ All ships were fitted with an apparatus, that in the same translated German report, has been variously called 'sound detector', 'search receiver' and 'direction finding equipment', which can be concluded was probably a type of RDF.¹¹

⁹ On GEE see 'Notes on navigational aids in combined operations', nd. [probably June 1942], NMM, BGP, GRO/23, pp.1-3; on MGBs see 'Navigation of landing craft flotillas', 24 June 1942, NMM, BGP, GRO/23.

¹⁰ The equivalent British ranks will be used where possible.

¹¹ While the motor sailing vessels were lightly armed with single 20mm Flak (anti-aircraft) guns, the three escort craft were better equipped. UJ 1411 was armed with a 37mm gun as main armament, two 20mm Czech/1938 Flak guns, two or three (some double barrelled) MG 34 machine-guns, depth charges and smoke drums. UJ 1404 was similarly equipped except that it had a powerful 88mm gun as main armament. M 4014 had four 20mm guns. The crews for the submarine chasers were 1 Officer, 2 Warrant Officers and 43 NCOs and men, and was probably similar for the minesweeper, although this cannot be determined from the available records. See First Lieutenant S. Wurmbach, 'Dieppe Operation - Combat Report of Sub Chaser 1411, August 1942', 21 August 1942, pp.2, 6, Translation, DHist SGR II/270; Lieutenant Bögel, 'Dieppe Operation - Combat Report of M 4014, August 1942', nd., p.1, Translation, DHist SGR II/283; 'Dieppe Operation - Combat Report of the four Motor Coastal Ships', 22 August 1942, p.1, Translation, DHist SGR II/285; HQ Naval Group West, 'Report of Naval Group West on Dieppe landing', 21 August 1942, p.5, Translation, DHist SGR II/271.

Naval Group 5, commanded by Commander D.B. Wyburd carrying No.3 Commando and US Rangers to assault the Yellow beaches east of Dieppe, consisted of 1 and 24 LCP(L) Flotillas, which were to land at Yellow beaches I and II respectively.¹² They embarked from Newhaven and the passage over was without incident, although at 0345 Wyburd noted that his GEE/QH receiver was 'working erratically'. He estimated the Group to be 'half a mile to the east of the approach course, and six to seven miles' from the coast (see Map 5). A few minutes later, a German convoy suddenly loomed up in the darkness.¹³ LCP(L) 15, 24 Flotilla, carried the Yellow Beach Master, Sub-Lt David J. Lewis, who relates the shock of the initial engagement: 'A starshell went up on the starboard hand and lit the whole fleet in a horrible quivering semi-daylight'. Lewis's boat, which was leading the starboard column, 'was immediately enveloped in the hottest tracer fire I have ever seen. The air was filled with the whine of ricochets and the bangs

¹² Group 5 consisted of 23 LCP(L), SGB 5, ML 346 and LCF(L) 1A. The LCP(L)s each had 1 Officer per 3 craft, a crew of 3, and could carry 25 fully equipped troops. They were unarmoured, wooden craft armed with a Great War vintage Lewis .303 light machine-gun. The usual complement for a LCF(L), a shallow draft beach-protection craft, was a crew of 10, including 2 Officers, plus 46 Royal Marines, including 2 Officers, to operate the two 4inch QF (quick firing) guns and three 20mm Oerlikons. ML 346 was armed with a 3pdr, Oerlikon, Lewis MG and depth charges. SGB 5 was similarly armed, with a 3in as main armament, and equipped with the Gee/QH apparatus. See COHQ to Lt-Cmdr K.A. Maclachlan, 'Complement of Craft', 12 August 1942, DHist 81/520/1250/1; and David K. Brown, ed., *The design and construction of British warships 1939-1945: the official record: Landing craft and auxiliary vessels 3* (3 vols., London: Conway Maritime Press, 1996), pp.43-4, 54; and Arthur D. Baker, *Allied landing craft of World War II* (London: Arms & Armour, 1985).

¹³ Most of the later secondary accounts of the convoy encounter are based on that in the COHQ, 'Combined Report', pp.12-13; and Admiralty, Battle Summary No.33, pp.15-19. These two confidential studies avoid mentioning that Group 5 was off course, although it is stated in Wyburd's official after-action report, 'Extract of report by Commander D.B. Wyburd, RN', Appendix 7 to Enclosure 13, p.47, in 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48).

of exploding shells. While after every burst of the streaking balls of fire came the clattering of Oerlikons'.¹⁴

Lt Wurmbach, aboard UJ 1411 in the lead of his convoy, first heard motor sounds ahead at 0300 and sounded the alert. Although the sounds soon faded he again alerted his convoy half an hour later as a result of noises registered on his RDF equipment. Within the next half an hour, Wurmbach reported that 'faintly discernible shadows' had appeared to the starboard and at 0348 therefore ordered the convoy to open 'volley fire'. UJ 1404, bringing up the rear, immediately fired four star shells in succession within the following ten minutes, brightly illuminating Group 5. Communications aboard the three escorts were quickly put out of action. James Leasor, in *Green Beach* (1975), claims that Wurmbach instantly knew this to be an amphibious attack and, therefore, 'shouted one hoarse, dreadful word to his radio operator: "Invasion!"'. Leasor also states that Wurmbach was unable to report the encounter to the naval authorities ashore. This was not the case according to Campbell. When Wurmbach ordered the first star shell fired, Campbell explains, he thought this to be another of the common ambushes by British MGBs and Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs), and did not realize that this was an amphibious force. Although it is true that the escort's communication equipment was not functioning, it is not true he had no means of communication with the shore. Campbell's research reveals that Wurmbach had the option of firing a pre-arranged rocket signal to alert the naval signal station in Dieppe of an amphibious

¹⁴ Sub-Lt D.J. Lewis, 'Report written by Sub-Lieutenant D.J. Lewis, RCNVR [Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve], and given to Major Charles Stacey, GSO 2(History), CMHQ', 24 August 1942, DHist 594.019 (D4); Lt-Comdr K.S. MacLachlan, 'Memorandum of interview at Navy Office of Canada, 25 August, 1942 with Sub-Lieutenant D.J. Lewis', 1 September 1942, DHist 594.019 (D4).

operation. That is, if he had realized this before 0523, when he claims to have rammed one of the landing craft carrying 'fifty men'.¹⁵

Prior to sailing Commander Wyburd had issued orders to the effect that that if any German vessels were encountered during the passage, they should maintain course and fight their way through. His reasoning here was that any deviation in course and speed would lead to so much disruption that an organized landing would not be possible later. His order was in direct contradiction to the operation order, which stated that Senior Officers of Groups and detached groups, 'must take drastic avoiding action if contact is made with enemy forces or to avoid contact if the enemy are known to be in the vicinity'. Possibly Wyburd had in mind Hughes-Hallett's vague, contradictory order of 17 August, 'to get the troops there at the right time and place' and, at the same time, 'to protect' the landing-craft. Wyburd also had specific orders to break radio silence if the 'success of the landing at Yellow beach' was 'seriously jeopardised'. In his official after-action report on the operation, Hughes-Hallett did not comment on this, except to say that in his opinion, Wyburd 'would have done better to use the speed and smoke laying capabilities' of the escort vessels 'in order to protect the LCPs'. Wyburd does not mention either of these points in his after-action report. As will be seen later, the Group assaulting Orange beach had successfully landed their

¹⁵ First Lieutenant S. Wurmbach, 'Dieppe Operation – Combat Report of Sub Chaser 1411, August 1942', 21 August 1942, pp.1, 5, Translation, DHist SGR II/270; Lieutenant Bögel, 'Dieppe Operation – Combat Report of M 4014, August 1942', nd., pp.1-2, Translation, DHist SGR II/283; HQ Naval Group West, 'Report of Naval Group West on Dieppe landing', 21 August 1942, pp.3-5, Translation, DHist SGR II/271; James Leasor, *Green beach* (New York: William Morrow & Company Inc., 1975), pp.123-4; John P. Campbell, *Dieppe revisited: a documentary investigation* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), p.123.

troops on time, despite having to alter course 'fairly drastically' to avoid a German convoy in their path.¹⁶

During the initial engagement, SGB 5 continued on course and was the main target of the German convoy. In the first ten minutes, SGB 5 sustained five hits to its boiler room, all its guns were put out of action, its wireless sets were damaged and it sustained forty percent casualties, remarkably only one man being killed. SGB 5 was forced to break off contact and in the resulting confusion Group 5 scattered. ML 346, which was leading the Group, although 'hit a number of times by cannon shell' which damaged the port side of the wheelhouse, had no casualties. During this initial engagement the ML did not return fire and soon lost contact with the Group. Repeated attempts were made to contact SGB 5 by wireless but no answers were received and 'all waves of W/T [wireless telegraphy] appeared to be jammed [with heavy traffic]'.¹⁷

LCF(L)1 meanwhile had joined the melee and continued resistance after the remainder of the group had dispersed. In the ensuing time, its gunnery control was damaged and a large number of men were wounded, including all officers. Although no contemporary reports by its crew have come to light, the post-war recollections of two of them give an idea of the

¹⁶ COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.12 [Wyburd's order]; Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Operation Order No.1', 31 July 1942, pp.4-5, NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (D47); Hughes-Hallett to COs of ships and craft taking part in Operation *Jubilee*, 17 August 1942, IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/2; Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Force Commander's Narrative', Enclosure No.1, p.1 ['smoke-laying capabilities'], and 'Extract of report by Lt Cmdr H.H.H. Mulleneux, RN', Appendix 4 to Enclosure No.13, p.1 [Orange beach], both in 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48).

¹⁷ 'Extract of report by Commander D.B. Wyburd, RN', Appendix 7 to Enclosure 13, pp.47-51, in 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48), [SGB 5]; Lt Alex D. Fear, 'Report of Commanding Officer of ML 346 on Dieppe raid - Yellow beach landing', 21 August 1942, Terence Macartney-Filgate Dieppe Collection (TMFDC).

situation. Signalman Kevin J. Garnier recalls that he was challenged by a German ship but before he had time to answer, 'hell broke loose... It was pitch dark and we steamed through the German convoy which made things worse as we didn't know who we were firing on and they the same – dog eat dog!'. His opposite number, Signalman C.J. 'John' Crisp, remembers receiving permission for him and Garnier to move aft to render assistance to a wounded gunner, 'I spotted a burst of tracer approaching us, I called to him [Garnier] and dropped to the deck. As I hit the deck I felt an almighty blow on my right knee, followed by a series of explosions above my head. I had been hit by a 20mm tracer and Kevin Garnier had received a number of nasty shrapnel wounds'. Garnier confirms this account, stating 'A shell hit the bridge and the Captain and myself were hit by shrapnel. I placed my hand to my face and it was full of blood. I began to feel dizzy... When I came to my senses, my opposite number [Crisp] lay on the deck near me, with his leg half blown off'. At 0450 LCF(L)1 broke off this engagement. The wounded CO decided that he had insufficient forces to undertake an assault, especially with the increasing daylight, and therefore steered towards the *Calpe* for instructions.¹⁸

Engagements flared up and quickly died out among the units of the two convoys as they moved around in the darkness. Since 0400 three German harbour protection boats and a pilot tugboat, waiting to meet the incoming German convoy, were stationed off Dieppe. These were really 'floating listening posts', billeted outside main ports when the weather and tides were favourable for landings or when bad weather restricted aerial

¹⁸ Admiralty, Battle Summary No.33, p.16; Herbert Wells, 'Kevin J. Garnier-C/JX248590', in *Under the White Ensign* (St. John's, Newfoundland: Robinson Blackmore Printing & Publishing Ltd, nd.); C.J. Crisp to Macartney-Filigate, Letter, 28 November 1977, TMFDC.

reconnaissance. They were equipped with alarm rockets and a machine-gun, although they did not have radar. Campbell states the boats 'narrowly escaped being run over by the first wave of landing craft at Dieppe'. The official report of Dieppe Port Commandant Wahn states that the one at Position 36, off the east headland, and the Signal Station, simultaneously fired the first alarm rockets at 0435, after boats approaching Pourville did not acknowledge the challenge for identification signals and gunfire was seen 'from sea landwards'. These alert rockets were immediately reported to HQs of the Port Commander, Strong Point Group, and the Naval Signals Officer at Le Havre. Ten minutes later, the tugboat commander, Sonderführer (Boatswain) Achtermann, observed 'destroyers' and many other craft one and a half nautical miles (approximately 2.4km) away. By about 0530 the German convoy had reassembled again and began to head out of the operational area on their original course. Losses included one of the coastal sailing vessels sunk and UJ 1404, which had to be abandoned, being sunk later by the *Brocklesby*.¹⁹

The action of the LCPs in Group 5 after the convoy encounter is not altogether clear. According to Wyburd's after-action report, and supported by the Admiralty Battle Summary, four broke down before the engagement and turned back to Newhaven and one followed SGB 5. Lt-Col Durnford-Slater and Wyburd, deciding that a landing under the circumstances was futile, boarded a LCP to report in person to the *Calpe*. Mistakenly, three others followed their LCP instead of SGB 5. Three closed on LCF(L)1, six were led

¹⁹ HQ Naval Group West, 'Report of Naval Group West on Dieppe landing', 21 August 1942, p.3, Translation, DHist SGR II/271, [protection boats]; Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.107-8 ['listening posts']; Wahn, 'Port Commandant Dieppe. Report on the fighting at Dieppe', nd., translation, pp.1-2, NAC, RG 24/20488/981GN (D13). A nautical, or marine, mile = 1.6km; a land mile = 1.8km.

in by ML 346 to Yellow I, one found its own way to Yellow II, and four, damaged in the melee, managed to return to England. One of these, its naval crew wounded, was navigated by Commando Sergeant Clive E. Collins, using his army prismatic pocket compass.²⁰

Some misconceptions over the roles of the destroyers ORP *Slazak*, under Cmdr Romuald Nalecz-Tyminski, Free Polish Navy, and HMS *Berkeley*, under Lt Cmdr E.N. Pumphrey, in this encounter, need to be clarified. These two destroyers formed 3 Destroyer Division which, the operation order states, were to accompany Group 4 to point RR (see map), at which time, 0330, they were to detach, and make a sweep 'eastward to cover the passage of the landing craft to the beaches'. Terence Robertson, in *The shame and the glory: Dieppe* (1960), caused much controversy when he made, among other claims, incorrect statements about the mission of 3 Destroyer Division. He states that they were detailed to protect Group 5, during passage were stationed 'just off the port bow', and at the moment of the convoy encounter, were 'off station'. He concludes that Group 5's misfortune was further 'compounded' by the 'absence of *Slazak* and *Brocklesby* from their proper stations and the Polish commander's subsequent failure to intervene in the battle'.²¹

²⁰ 'Extract of report by Commander D.B. Wyburd, RN', Appendix 7 to Enclosure 13, p.47, in 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48); Admiralty, Battle Summary No.33, p.17; Lt-Col J.F. Durnford-Slater, 'Recommendation of award for Sergeant Clive E. Collins, No.5499772, No.3 Commando', nd., London, National Army Museum (NAM), Brigadier Peter Young Papers (PYP) 9010/31/726.

²¹ The exact orders for *Slazak* and *Brocklesby* were:
From RR steer to pass through the positions BB and JJ at 10 knots... At JJ, increase speed to about 15 knots and proceed through the following positions: (a) 50° 08' North 01° 13' East. (b) 50° 05' North 01° 05' East thence to be in a position one and a half to two miles off Red and White beaches at 0530. [See Map 4]
'Instructions to destroyers J.N.O.3', pp.1-3, in 'Naval Operation Order No.1', 31 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (D47); Terence Robertson, *The shame and the glory* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1960), pp.208, 211.

Robertson was not the first author to criticize Tyminski's actions, since Reginald Thompson made the accusations four years earlier, in *Dieppe at dawn: the story of the Dieppe raid* (1956). The controversy was only sparked, though, after Tyminski read, and was affronted by, what he described as the 'incorrect, derogatory and injurious' passages in Robertson's book. After this Tyminski attempted to set the record straight. This is reflected in his later correspondence and writing, lamenting that Robertson, and most Dieppe authors, had never bothered to interview him, or any of the other *Slazak* officers, for their side of the story. In fact, as of 1983, only two authors had ever contacted him concerning this, John Mellor, *Dieppe: Canada's forgotten heroes* (1975), and Ronald Atkin, *Dieppe, 1942: the Jubilee disaster* (1980).²²

After the operation, Hughes-Hallett stated in his official report that he considered Tyminski made an 'error of judgement' by not going to investigate the flare-up, since 'the sole reason for his patrol was to provide support for vessels engaged in the landing in the event of a contingency such as this'. In 1974, E.N. Pumphrey, former Capt. of the *Brocklesby*, responded to an enquiry of Mellor, stating, 'It was my opinion that we should certainly intervene and I signalled *Slazak* and said so; but Tyminski did not agree... in my judgement he was at fault in sticking too rigidly to his orders'.²³

²² Reginald W. Thompson, *Dieppe at dawn: the story of the Dieppe raid* (London: Hutchinson, 1956), pp.29-33, and is in Robertson's bibliography; on Tyminski's straightening the record, see Tyminski to John Mellor, 9 December 1973 and 21 April 1974, DHist 78/52; and Romuald Nalecz-Tyminski, 'Polish destroyer ORP *Slazak* in the raid on Dieppe', unpublished paper, August 1983, p.21-2, this author's Dieppe Collection; John Mellor, *Dieppe: Canada's forgotten heroes* (3rd revised edn., Kitchener, Ontario: Melco Canadian History Series, 1975, 1985), pp.30-1; Ronald Atkin, *Dieppe, 1942: the Jubilee disaster* (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp.75, 78-9.

²³ Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Force Commander's narrative', Enclosure 1, p.2, to 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48); E.N. Pumphrey to J. Mellor, Letter, 1 March 1974, Calgary, University of Calgary Special Collections (UCSC), John Mellor Papers (JMP), 508/92.6/Correspondence 3.17

At the time, Tyminski believed that the flare-up was either the result of an LCP, or LCPs, of Group 5 landing prematurely and coming under fire; or that some escorts may have been sent ahead on reconnaissance and encountered a German patrol. The two warnings sent by Portsmouth, concerning the German convoy, were never received by either *Slazak* or *Brocklesby*. This was not because of inexperienced Polish radio operators, as they were duplicated by experienced RN operators. During the whole engagement a RN Liaison Officer was stationed on the *Slazak* bridge and oversaw decoding of all signals. Both ships had RDF Type 285 (anti-aircraft gunnery radar), and although the *Slazak's* had no return, the *Brocklesby's* temporarily picked up surface echoes. Accordingly, Pumphrey ordered a star shell search towards land on this bearing but it revealed nothing so Tyminski ordered it to stop. Tyminski's after-action report entry for 0350 states that he 'Observed heavy gunfire bearing 190[°], coming from guns, light guns [20-40mm], and automatic weapons. At the same time, a dozen or so star shells were fired from the land. A barely visible gunfire can be seen in the opposite direction'. However, when told immediately afterward that the engagement was between a MGB and a German trawler, he did not believe it and opined that 'the fire was too intense for an encounter between light units'.²⁴

As the destroyers' mission was to protect the landing craft and *prevent* contact with German naval forces, Tyminski was correct in believing that once the encounter had started, it was too late for *Slazak* to investigate an

²⁴ R. Nalecz-Tyminski, 'Polish destroyer ORP *Slazak* in the raid on Dieppe', unpublished paper, August 1983, pp.7-8, 21-3; R. Nalecz-Tyminski to Mellor, 9 December 1973, 21 April 1974, DHist 78/52; on RDF Type 285 and star shells, see Lt Cmdr E.N. Pumphrey, 'Extract of report by HMS *Brocklesby*', Appendix 27 to Enclosure 13, p.101, to 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48); and R. Nalecz-Tyminski, 'ORP *Slazak*: report on the participation in the raid on Dieppe on 18-19 August 1942', 22 August 1942, pp.6-8, London, Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum (PISM), MAR.A.V 23. This report has never been used in any previous account of *Jubilee*.

uncertain situation. The accusations, made in hindsight, that *Slazak* could have provided effective assistance and protection to the scattered units of Group 5, are invalid since he did not know the true situation. He also had in mind the specific orders to avoid contact with German forces. Intervention of destroyers in a fire-fight would very likely have led to the surprise element, vital to the success of the whole operation, being compromised thirty or forty minutes before touch down time. One final addendum to this controversy. If Tyminski had been at fault, undoubtedly Mountbatten or Hughes-Hallett would have instigated an internal inquiry into the affair. This was never done. Instead, he was decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC), 'for skill and gallantry' while in command of *Slazak* during *Jubilee*.²⁵

The results of this convoy encounter on the rest of the operation, the Naval Battle Summary warns, must not be 'overestimated'. It correctly points out that the German Naval HQs initially considered this engagement to be another of the common night actions between opposing naval forces, and not a landing. It concludes correctly that the general alarm was not given along the general area of Dieppe until 0500. It is incorrect, though, in claiming that the 'effect of surprise was not compromised', and that the only result of the encounter was to alert the 'coast defence system', army coastal batteries code-named *Goebbels* (Yellow beach) and *Hess* (Orange beach), and 'the radar stations, whose role was to engage hostile shipping rather than to repel a landing'. The coastal batteries were under orders to go immediately to 'Action Stations', in the event of imminent enemy landings, and then to give predicted barrages at certain distances in front of Dieppe.

²⁵ R. Nalecz-Tyminski, 'Polish destroyer ORP *Slazak* in the raid on Dieppe', unpublished paper, August 1983, p.23; Admiralty to R. Nalecz-Tyminski, 6 October 1948 [Decoration], attached to Nalecz-Tyminski to H. Henry, 17 January 1995.

This happened with the approach of *Jubilee*. At 0430 German 302 Divisional artillery observation posts saw 'fast patrol boats' off Puy and so fired a barrage out to sea in front of the town. Five minutes later, posts observed a 'large number of fast patrol boats' heading for Pourville and therefore two batteries laid down interdictory fire. As previously noted, the German radar system detected, plotted, and reported the advance of *Jubilee*, although were not believed. The Summary also fails to mention that the defenders of Blue beach were also alerted. Concerning the *Goebbels* battery, the Summary states that even if it had been captured, 'it does not necessarily follow that the main landings would have been successful'. In fact, even though it was not captured, it did not make much of a difference to the main landings, as will be explained below.²⁶

ALLIED SPECIAL OPERATIONAL UNITS

Before examining the land assault, an examination of the background of the numerous special operational units involved is necessary. One was the British Army Commandos. As a result of their origins, organization, training, function, discipline and high morale, the level of skill and effectiveness of the commandos was much higher than that of the Canadian troops, and this had a direct bearing on the commandos conduct and performance during *Jubilee*.²⁷ J.E. 'Jimmy' Dunning, the 1992-3 President of

²⁶ Admiralty, Battle Summary No.33, p.19; Campbell also notes that some of the landing craft on the way in passed small ranging flags for the army coastal batteries, *Dieppe revisited*, p.108, note 53; Emil Kilgast, *The history of the 302 Infantry Division in retrospect* (Translation Bureau DGIS Multilingual Section, National Defence Headquarters, 7 June 1982, c1976), pp.27, 59, CWM [batteries firing].

²⁷ In the dark days of June 1940, when Britain 'stood alone', Churchill requested the formation of specially trained troops for 'butcher-and-bolt raids' on the coasts of occupied Europe, Churchill to COS, Memorandum, 3 June 1940, PRO, CAB 120/414, quoted in Ian Dear, 'The international experiment', in *Ten Commando 1942-1945* (London: Leo Cooper, 1987), p.1; on p.2 Dear states that the word 'Commando', although in general use during the Boer War,

the Commando Association, and a No.4 Commando Dieppe veteran, recalls that all these factors contributed to what Dunning calls 'the greatest factor of all on the battlefield, high morale', which he says was at the highest possible level in the commandos.²⁸

In the last three weeks before *Jubilee* No.4 Commando carried out an intensive refresher course, each troop specializing in the part it was going to carry out. Also collective training was done for all troops and Force HQ. Presumably No.3 Commando undertook a similar schedule of training. The high degree of training achieved had a direct connection with the performance of the commandos on *Jubilee*. This training included:

Hardening exercises, PT [physical training] with weapons. Swimming... Doubling fully loaded over specified distance in wet clothes... Crossing beach wire with rabbit netting. Use of Bangalore torpedoes. Fire and movement on the range; battle drill with live ammunition, bayonet fighting, and unarmed combat... Practice in withdrawal, first as a drill, then with smoke, opposition, and casualties.... Firing of LMGs [light machine guns] from LCAs... Practice of each troops' own role on full scale lay-out [of

was proposed for the new units, not by Churchill, but by the Lt-Col Dudley Clarke, Military Assistant to the CIGS. In early 1942 a wholly Royal Marine Commando was formed and later became No.40 (RM) Commando, although at the time of the *Jubilee* was designated Royal Marine 'A' Commando. Each Army Commando was made up of six fighting 'Troops'. Each consisted of fifty all ranks, with a captain and divided into two sections, commanded by lieutenants. During operations, such as *Jubilee*, this total increased to over sixty all ranks, with the attachment of intelligence, medical and other specialist personnel. A Section was the normal capacity of a LCP(L) or LCA. Sections were split into subsections under sergeants. The Commando also contained a HQ, consisting of 7 officers and 77 other ranks, divided into Administrative, Intelligence, Signal, and Transport Sections; a surgeon and 7 men of the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) and 2 armourers from the Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) were also attached. See War Department, 'Origins and organization', in 'British Commandos', 9 August 1942, Washington: Military Intelligence Service, pp.5-6, Pennsylvania, Carlisle Barracks, US Army Military History Institute, U15/U635/1; J.D. 'Jimmy' Dunning (No.4 Commando and Dieppe veteran and President of the Commando Association 1992-3) to H. Henry, 'Comments on Hugh Henry's rough draft on Dieppe - Commando training role in *Jubilee*', 4 July 1996. The full title of the Association is 'Old Comrades Association of the Army Commandos'.

²⁸ J.E. Dunning to H. Henry, October 1993. Concerning training, Dunning states:
I contend that the first priority was to instill SELF-DISCIPLINE and HIGH MORALE - the latter developing through thorough training, sound leadership and mutual confidence in fellow comrades... In my opinion, self-discipline is developed and is a vital stage further than 'discipline' as is generally accepted as a military concept - mere obedience to orders - and it incorporates initiative and self-reliance. So that when the individual Commando is faced with a situation where there is no one around to provide the orders for him to fulfil the objective of his particular mission he has the will, determination and resourcefulness to continue with his original orders. That's self-discipline - the highest pinnacle of military discipline.

J.E. Dunning to H. Henry, Comments on Chapter 5, 4 July 1996.

German battery] daily. Training in special equipment, i.e. RT [radio telegraphy] sets... personal camouflage.²⁹

For communications on *Jubilee* the mobile commando parties in No.3 and 4 Commandos were equipped with the light, man-pack, high frequency (HF) Army Wireless Set No.38, which provided voice communications only, over a range of one-half to two miles, and was used for inter-Troop communication. The more static commando parties, such the Beach Signal Stations and those on supporting landing craft, used the more bulky, longer range, HF Army No.18 set.³⁰

Besides Nos.3 and 4 Commandos, two Troops of No.10 Inter-Allied (IA) Commando also were on *Jubilee*. No documentary proof has come to light on who was responsible for the formation of this latter Commando, but it appears to have been Mountbatten's idea, or suggested to him. The Commando was made up of foreign nationals from the occupied countries of Europe. The '1ère Compagnie de Fusilier Marin Commando', consisting of Free French Marines, started commando training in March 1942 and in July it was renamed No.1 Troop (French) Inter-Allied Commando. Fifteen of this

²⁹ War Office, 'Training', Appendix A, p.18, in 'Destruction of a German Battery by No.4 Commando during the Dieppe raid', February 1943, Notes from Theatres of War, No.11.

³⁰ A Canadian signals team was attached to both No.3 and 4 Commandos for the purpose of maintaining communications with their parent unit, the nearest infantry battalion. A No.18 set was used for this purpose and put on the internal Bn-Coy (Battalion-Company) wave. These sets used telegraphy and Morse code and could be used as a ground station or as a man-carried pack. A No.46 set on 'A' wave, also operated by a Canadian, linked the Commando HQ to 4 Bde HQ. If this wave was too busy, he could also pass information via his own Bn. The Army No.46 set was a light, high frequency, crystal controlled, man-pack, providing voice and Morse communications up to a range of ten miles over land, and fifty miles over sea. It was considered ideal for amphibious operations. 2 CID Signals, J Section, War Diary, 15 August 1942, Kingston, Canadian Forces Communications and Electronics Museum (CFCEM) [Commando netted to RRC]; COHQ, 'Report on army signals communications, Operation *Jubilee*', 11 September 1942, pp.1-2, PRO, DEFE 2/333; John S. Moir, ed. 'Glossary of technical terms', *History of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals 1903-1961* (Ottawa: Corps Committee, Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, 1962), p.321 [details of wireless sets]; Mann, 'Signals orders, instructions and diagrams', 7 August 1942, Appendix Q, pp.5, 9, in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25) [Bde 'A' & 'B' waves].

Troop, under Lt Francis Vouch, were assigned to *Jubilee*. Their mission was to select up to twelve French Nationals for evacuation, liaise with the French population and to distribute propaganda leaflets and posters.³¹

The second troop from No.10 (IA) Commando involved was No.3 (Miscellaneous) Troop, or more commonly, X-Troop. This again, was probably formed by Mountbatten. Churchill allegedly stated that this name was adopted because they would be 'unknown warriors', and as such, must 'be considered an unknown quantity. Since the algebraic symbol for the unknown is X, let us call them X-Troop'. Ian Dear, in *Ten commando 1942-1945* (1987), writes that it was 'undoubtedly one of the strangest, if not the strangest, sub-unit to serve in the British Army' during in the war. The Troop was made up mostly of German and Austrian refugees, usually Jewish, and men of Germanic origin. With the outbreak of war In 1939, these foreign nationals were not allowed into His Majesty's armed forces, but were instead permitted into the non-combatant 'Alien' Pioneer Companies of the General Service Corps, although some actually became involved in fighting during the withdrawal at Dunkirk. Many of these men yearned to join the regular Services, and this led to the involvement of MI5 (Military Intelligence Department 5, or counter-intelligence/espionage Security Service), and the SOE (Special Operations Executive), in vetting and recruiting many of these men for certain formations or units, such as X-Troop, No. 10 (IA) Commando. On joining X-Troop, SOE arranged for the men to have false British

³¹ Besides the French No.1 Troop – Belgian (No.4), Dutch (No.2), Miscellaneous (No.3 or X), Norwegian (No.5), Polish (No.6), and Yugoslavian (No.7) ones were also formed, Dear, *Ten Commando*, p.207, pp.1,4 [formation, training]; Maurice Chuavet, 'La 1ère Compagnie de Fusilier Marin Commando à Dieppe', nd., pp.1-8, TMFDC [history]; War Diary, No.10 Inter-Allied (IA) Commando, 19 August 1942, PRO, WO 218/40 [names of members]; Mann, 'Intelligence plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, p.3, in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/232O2 (D25) [mission].

identities, regimental numbers, papers, and complete personal backgrounds, including false next-of-kin to write and receive mail from. SOE's involvement in recruiting for No.10 (IA) Commando, probably led to the confusion in the exact designation of these men in the operation orders, and to later current errors in the secondary sources. This is clarified below in discussion of SOE.³²

Dear explains that X-Troop members were highly educated, intelligent and one of the most highly trained groups in the British army. Besides the usual commando training, these men also learned more exotic skills, such as, driving a train, lock picking, and being able to identify every known German *Wehrmacht* unit and rank. The six men of X-Troop chosen for *Jubilee*, were German-speaking, Sudeten Czechs. Although references to this group are sparse, a close comparison of fragmentary records gives the story. The COHQ War Diary first noted a telephone conversation on 5 June 1942, to make arrangements for 'six Intelligence Officers of the *Rutter* force to be sent to MI 19 [Military Intelligence Department dealing with repatriated PoWs and escaping] for special training'. Two weeks later, the diary recorded a minute to Wing Commander Casa Maury, SIO, COHQ, stating that 'all arrangements for briefing them and producing faked identities had been carried out by their organization (SOE). This memo also explained that, in future, these men should be attached to No.10 Commando. On the same

³² Dear, *Ten Commando*, p.6 ['X-Troop', formation]. Dear sates on p.47 that a letter from the SOE Archivist, dated 22 January 1986, confirms that the SOE did aid in recruitment for No.10 (IA) Commando and that this is recorded in a SOE document outlining the wartime history of the liaison between SOE and COHQ. This document, entitled 'Provision of Allied and Alien Personnel', states:

The provision of German speakers to accompany a raiding force, either to act as interpreters, or to shout conflicting commands to the German troops, was another of the personnel tasks undertaken by SOE. Many of the men were Sudeten Germans already in this country, and their inclusion in a raiding force presented many security difficulties; these were ultimately solved by the formation of a unit known as No.10 Commando, under the command of the SS [Special Services] Brigade, which was composed of foreign nationals.

day, the diary, in referring to the last memo, recorded a request to the War Office for the Sudeten Germans be 'made available for special duties', and listed their real names. The final entry that referred to the group, 24 June 1942, was a minute ordering the six men to report to HMS *Tormentor II*, at Cowes, Isle of Wight. Their duties were described as: 'Shouting instructions calculated to mislead and confuse the enemy'; and to 'Act as interpreters to local Commanders to whom no regular Intelligence Officer or Interpreter had already been allotted'. Their adopted English identities were then listed Privates (Ptes) George Bates, Walter Harvey, Maurice Latimer, Brian Platt, Charles Rice and Joseph Smith.³³ Although *Rutter* was cancelled, these men were again called on for *Jubilee*, and their mission unchanged, as shown in the military operation orders, memoranda and War Diary of No.10 (IA) Commando through August.³⁴

US Army Rangers, the equivalent of British Army Commandos, received this same specialized training. Fifty of the Rangers were attached to various units for *Jubilee*. The Rangers were involved, states Brig.-Gen. Truscott, the American Adviser at COHQ, since one of his instructions from Eisenhower, was 'to gain battle experience in raids to provide leavening for American troops'. Therefore, forty Rangers were attached to No.3

³³ Dear, *Ten Commando*, pp.19-20 [training], p.21 [mission], pp.36-50 [recruitment, false identities]; COHQ, '*Rutter* - intelligence', p.54,1/53 [MI 19], p.56,1/63 ['(SOE)'],1/62 ['special duties'], p.57,1/65 [*Tormentor*, duties], 31 October 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/542. Records referring to X-Troop on *Jubilee* are: Brig. C.C. Mann to Col Neville, COHQ, 10 August 1942, 'SOE - Operation *Jubilee*' [Sudetan], and attached hand-written list of 'Special Intelligence' Detachment, NAC, RG 24/13747/General 152/GS8; full names and ranks of all six X-Troop members, although referred to as SOE, are given in 'Allotment of FS Personnel and SOEs', nd., NAC; War Diary, No.10 Inter-Allied (IA) Commando, 19 August 1942, PRO, WO 218/40 [five X-Troop members names].

³⁴ The real names of the X-Troop men were Ptes Klaus L.O. Ascher, Karl W. Billmann, Sgt Peter H. Gaspari, Ptes Helmut Gelsø, Paul Glaser, and Joseph Hall, COHQ, 'Intelligence', p.56,1/63, in COHQ, '*Rutter* - intelligence', PRO, DEFE 2/542.

Commando, four to No.4 Commando, and six to the 2 CID, spread through the infantry battalions. Although most sources are not in disagreement on the total of fifty, they are when it concerns to which units they were attached. On joining a Commando the Ranger ORs automatically functioned in the capacity of a British Pte, and on raids were expected to wear British uniforms and no insignia of rank. This was true for all commando operations and was done 'to confuse enemy snipers as to the priority of target', according to Ranger Alex J. Szima, 'thereby insuring [*sic*] continuity to a chain of command while under fire'.³⁵

Another special formation involved in *Jubilee* was the GHQ Liaison Regiment (*Phantom*).³⁶ *Phantom* members from 'J' Squadron, commanded by Maj. the Honourable J.J. 'Jakie' Astor, had been receiving commando training since May 1942, and were attached to COHQ for *Jubilee*. Although the contemporary press described *Phantom* as 'the eyes and ears of the Commander-in-Chief', an official definition of its function was 'to transmit vital information from the battle front, *ignoring the usual channels*, to the

³⁵ Truscott to Eisenhower, Memorandum, 'American staff at COHQ', 7 September 1942, GCMF, Brig.-Gen. L.K. Truscott Papers (LTP), 9/1 ['battle experience']; Robertson, *Shame and the Glory*, p.197 [claims 4 officers, 15 ORs – No.3 Commando, 1 officer 6 ORs – No.4 Commando, 7 all ranks – RHLI, remaining with other battalions]; Reginald W. Thompson, *Dieppe at dawn: the story of the Dieppe raid* (London: Hutchinson, 1956), p.62 [claims a 'dozen' – No.4 Commando]; Brigadier C. Churchill Mann, 'Allotment of personnel, equipment and stores', Appendix C – Part 1, pp.1,2,4,5,7,29,31 [Rangers allocation], in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan', 10 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/232O2 (D25); William O. Darby and William H. Baumer give the names of the men, see 'List of men on Dieppe raid', in *Darby's Rangers: we led the way* (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1980), p.147; one of these Rangers, Marcel G. Swank, confirms which units each Ranger was attached to, but disagrees with the operation order in that he believes four, as opposed to five, Rangers were with No.4 Commando, and six, as opposed to five, were with the 2 CID, see Swank to B. Greenhouse, 28 January 1979, DHist 79/139; Alex J. Szima to AmVETS Post #72, 30 January 1976, p.2 [British uniforms].

³⁶ *Phantom* originated in November 1939 as an RAF unit, named No.3 British Air Mission, and was tasked with ascertaining from the Belgian General Staff the deployments of Allied units, and then to send this information direct to the CO of the British Air Forces in France. By doing this, it was hoped to avoid 'friendly fire' from planes or artillery hitting Allied troops. See Philip Warner, *Phantom*, London: William Kimber, 1982, pp.12-13.

Commander'. *Phantom* was under the direct command of GHQ Home Forces.³⁷ On *Jubilee* they were to liaise closely with the infantry, commando and naval signal groups on their assigned beaches. Using special long-range, portable W/T sets, they were to pass timely operational reports on an independent '*Phantom*' wave, direct to the *Phantom* base in Fort Southwick, HQ of C-in-C Portsmouth. Astor, with one *Phantom* operator, was to maintain an intercept watch on the HQ ship *Calpe*. This extra communication with the units ashore could, if needed, be used for emergency transmission by the Force Commanders.³⁸

Liaison between the 4 and 6 Brigade HQs and the Force HQ ships, *Calpe* and *Fernie* was to be supplemented by five Liaison Officers (LOs) from 8 Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (14 Hussars). Two detachments, of a captain and lieutenant each, were to land an hour and fifteen minutes after zero hour, on Red and White beaches, and to establish contact with their respective Bde HQ. Their task was to maintain liaison between the two Bde and engineer HQs ashore, to ensure that Force HQ was kept fully informed with brief situation reports (sitreps), and to aid the Bde HQs with communication to Force HQ if need be. The information communicated was to be sent on B wave, and to be *supplementary* to that sent by the Bde HQs over A wave. Also an officer was stationed on *Fernie* to

³⁷ An example of the type of man recruited into *Phantom*, was film star David Niven, who commanded 'A' Squadron as a major in 1940; Warner, *Phantom*, p.25 [Home Forces], p.27 [Niven]; R.J.T. Hills, *Phantom was there* (London: Edward Arnold, 1951), p.14 ['eyes and ears', definition].

³⁸ Mann, 'Liaison orders, instructions and diagrams', 10 August 1942, Appendix R, pp.1-2 [see also signals diagram, Appendix Q, p.9], in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25); Major J.J. Astor, 'Report by J.J. Astor, Dieppe - August 1942', 4 September 1942, Appendix C, p.1, Annex 1, '*Phantom* W/T layout', to GHQ Liaison Regiment, War Diary, PRO, WO 215/16; COHQ, 'Report on army signals communications, Operation *Jubilee*', 11 September 1942, p.2, PRO, DEFE 2/333 [portable W/T sets].

maintain personal contact with both Bde HQs.³⁹ Another detachment of four men was to embark on LCT-11 and report to Capt. James King, Royal Engineers, who acting as a SIO (presumably Senior Intelligence or Interrogation Officer), and to assist him on an unidentified, 'special mission'. One history states, without corroborative evidence, that their secret mission was to capture a senior German officer, and as a cover story they were just to bring back samples of German uniforms.⁴⁰

Other units were also involved in general intelligence missions, such as battle or tactical intelligence collection and PoW interrogation. A member of the Ministry for Economic Warfare (MEW) had the curious job of searching for material of interest to his department, which ranged from tooth brushes and civilian underwear, to civilian gas-masks and foodstuffs.⁴¹

The 2 CID Intelligence Officer, Capt. T.H. Insinger, assisted by Capt. E.D. Magnus, was charged with establishing a PoW 'cage' in the area of White beach, with the help of three Provost personnel. Whenever possible, PoWs were to have their hands tied to prevent them destroying their documents. All PoWs were to be searched for documents and interrogated

³⁹ Mann, 'Liaison orders, instructions and diagrams', 10 August 1942, Appendix R, pp.1 [also signals diagram, Appendix Q, p.9], in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25).

⁴⁰ Mann, 'Intelligence plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, pp.1-3 [SIO, 'special mission'], 'Allotment of Personnel, equipment, and stores', 10 August 1942, Appendix C-Part 1, p.19 [Capt. King], in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25); S.R. Elliot defines SIO as Senior Intelligence Officer, see 'Dieppe', in *Scarlet to green: a history of intelligence in the Canadian Army 1903-1963* (Toronto: Canadian Intelligence and Security Association, 1981), p.169; Terence Robertson, *The shame and the glory* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1960), p.167 [secret mission].

⁴¹ The Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) was charged with gathering intelligence on Germany's industrial capacity and ability to wage total war. It analysed, for example, the effects of the strategic bombing campaign against Germany. Col A.H. Head, COHQ, to Lt-Col C.C. Mann, 'List of articles of interest to MEW', 14 May 1942, NAC, RG 24 G3/10872/23202 (D31); Mann, 'Intelligence plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, p.3, in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25) [mission].

for intelligence information of immediate tactical value, such as order of battle and unit dispositions. Several intelligence gathering parties were detailed. A Divisional Party, made up of one Special Interrogation Officer, Lt I.T. Burr, accompanied by a one Field Security Personnel (FSP), was attached to the QOCHC. It was to advance with the QOCHC, after meeting up with tanks of 14 CATR, on the aerodrome at St Aubin. Burr's mission was to search it for German Air Force (GAF) papers, pamphlets, code-books, signal papers and equipment. After this, it was to search the suspected German 110 Divisional HQ, a chateau and/or L-shaped building at Arques-la-Bataille, although the operation order warned that this may have moved. Here they were looking for secret files, pamphlets, Order of Battle, and information code-books.⁴²

A second party, also consisting of a Special Interrogation Officer, Lt F. Morgan, and one FSP, were attached to the RRC to perform several searches of the barracks, Coastguard Houses, and HQs at Puys, and the Dieppe prison. The want list included military and civilian papers and records, battalion files, engineer pamphlets and maps, and the capture of military PoWs.⁴³

Five groups of two FSP each, with an additional 'SOE', or 'Special intelligence', man were also formed. The operation order uses both these descriptions, possibly mistakenly or as a security cover, for these men were actually the Czech members of X-Troop, No.10 (IA) Commando. No other

⁴² Mann, 'Intelligence plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, pp.1-2 [PoWs], p.3 [Officers' names], p.5 [search], in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/232O2 (D25); Elliot, *Scarlet to green*, p.170, for some reason, states this group was known as '(British) Special Intelligence Officers' party'.

⁴³ Mann, 'Intelligence plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, pp.3,11, in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/232O2 (D25).

account of *Jubilee* has yet grasped the significance of this. Elliot, the official wartime Canadian military intelligence historian, takes at face value that they are SOE men. Another history refers to them as a different unit altogether known as the 'Special Intelligence' group. But a close examination and comparison of the documents, one not yet open to public scrutiny, reveals the true state of affairs. This is confirmed by the SOE Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who states that there is 'no trace in the SOE archives of the names [and]...It would be unusual in any other area of SOE activity for them to be privates. Privates would certainly not be SOE observers'. The mission of these five three-man teams was to conduct systematic, half hour searches of all the major buildings in Dieppe, such as the wireless station, Custom House, hospital, railway stations, post office, telephone exchange, municipal buildings, justice courts, police stations, military HQs and barracks, and thirteen hotels. Items of interest were all military documents, code-books, military and civilian rubber stamps, address lists, technical information, maps and charts. A recent biography of Commander Ian Fleming, inventor of the James Bond character, states that he was in on the *Fernie* and in command of these 'prototype' intelligence detachments.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Mann, 'Intelligence plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, pp.3-4,6-10 ['SOE', mission], 'Allotment of personnel, equipment and stores', Appendix C – Part 1, pp.2, 15-18, ['Special intelligence'], in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25); Elliot, *Scarlet to green*, p.170; Robertson, *The shame and the glory*, p.137 ['Special Intelligence' group]; 'Allotment of FS personnel and SOEs', nd., NAC [names, teams]; Brig. C.C. Mann to Col Neville, COHQ, 10 August 1942, 'SOE – Operation *Jubilee*', and attached hand-written list of 'Special Intelligence' detachment, NAC, RG 24/13747/General 152/GS8 [the names in the last two sources are the same as those of X-Troop, No.10 (IA) Commando War Diary, 19 August 1942, PRO, WO 218/40]; Gervase Cowell, SOE Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), to H. Henry, 21 February 1994 [no trace]; E.G. Boxshall, Foreign Office, to S.S. Wilson, Cabinet Historical Office, 16 June 1967, gives three *other* SOE names, all officers, who took part in *Jubilee*, London, Cabinet Office, Historical & Records Section (COHRS), CAB 146/349/'The Dieppe Raid, 1955-67', [This volume, although closed to public scrutiny at the time of viewing, 10 April

Another search group, known as the Pourville Party, has had a great many myths propagated about it. It consisted of one FSP, Sgt Roy Hawkins, an 'SOE', or more correctly, X-Troop Commando, Pte Bate, and a 'RDF expert', RAF Flight-Sgt Jack Nissenthal (Nissen). Their objective was first the Officers' Mess at Pourville, thought to be in a 'White House', where they were to gather officers' papers, then forty-five minutes later, they were to move on to the RDF station at Caude-Cote above Pourville, where Nissen would gather technical information and radar apparatus parts of interest. The operation order noted that Nissen 'must be given sufficient protection to prevent his falling into enemy hands (FSP and SOE to assist RAF expert)'. What this meant was that he should be killed if in danger of being captured. Actually, this was a grave slip-up by a Canadian intelligence officer, Capt. Magnus, on the *Jubilee* planning staff. Originally, Professor R.V. Jones, Assistant Director of Intelligence (Science), Air Ministry, was earmarked for *Rutter*, but the foolishness of this was quickly realized, and a Flt-Sgt technician was asked to volunteer – Nissen. Unfortunately, and unforgivably, for him, the execution order was never cancelled. On the decision to send Nissen, Jones explains that since there was a chance of the radar at Pourville being captured, it was decided to have someone go along to check if anything of interest could be brought back to England. As an objective, he concluded that it 'came into the category of "a target of opportunity" rather than the prime objective'.⁴⁵

1996, is scheduled for future transfer to the PRO]; the three SOE officers' names are confirmed in Michael R.D. Foot, *SOE in France: an account of the work of the British Special Operations Executive in France 1940-1944*, United Kingdom Series, History of the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1966), p.184; Andrew Lycett, *Ian Flemming: a biography* (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1995), pp.139-41.

⁴⁵ Mann, 'Intelligence plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, p.4, in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25), [Objective]; R.V. Jones,

One final group was the SOE. This was a British secret service organization, set up in 1940 to, in the words of Churchill, 'set Europe ablaze'; in other words, to initiate, support and guide resistance movements in the occupied countries of Europe. The SOE Adviser, Gervase Cowell, explains that 'the SOE role was, in theory, limited to providing advice, instruction and special devices, and sometimes observers... the Dieppe raid was an exception'. As explained, six supposed SOE men listed in the operation orders, were actually commandos from X-Troop. But eight or nine SOE men, the operation order gives both totals, actually did go on the raid. They were known as the 'Gillies Party', five officers and three ORs, under command of Capt. Percy J. Harratt. Other officers able to be identified were Capt. Edward G.A. Bisset, D. Wyatt, SOE Liaison Officer to COHQ, and Major Jacques T.P.M. Vaillant de Guélis. The official historian of the SOE, Professor Michael R.D. Foot, explains that de Guélis went on as an SOE officer but never made it to shore, and that Harratt was only an observer. Contradictory contemporary evidence seems to point to the latter being more than just an observer. Harratt's personal file, held in the closed SOE Archives, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, states that he was 'In command of SOE party – 4 officers and 10 other ranks, with various missions to perform'. A memorandum, dated eight days before the raid's launch, states that he and Bisset were to be issued 'two permits... to carry out their special mission on Operation *Jubilee* [and]... a town plan showing marked areas'. The operation orders also state that Harratt was to set up a SOE HQ in the vicinity

'D-Day', in *Most secret war* (London: Hamilton, 1978), pp.402-3 [slip-up]; J.R. Robinson, a wartime RCAF radar officer, confirms this analysis quoting personal correspondence with R.V. Jones, 'Radar intelligence and the Dieppe raid', *The Canadian Defence Quarterly* 20/5 (April 1991), 39-41; R.V. Jones to John Mellor, 7 January 1986, borrowed from John Mellor, Kitchener, Ontario ["target of opportunity"].

of the Dental School, assisted by seven men from 3 Canadian Light AA Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery (3 Cdn Lt AA Regt, RCA), and that his SOE group were to be provided with twenty-seven grenades and a 'sled', the latter usually used for transporting stores and material. Finally, the orders stated that the SOE detachment was to search the 'Town Hall', and repeated again the task, 'carry out special mission'.⁴⁶

The assault landings themselves were to take place in two specific phases and with two specific objectives. The first phase, at 0450, was simultaneous flank assaults on six beaches either side of Dieppe, Yellow I and 2, Blue, Green, Orange I and 2, the object being to destroy the heavy coastal defence and divisional artillery batteries. This would clear the way for the second phase half an hour later, the main assault on Red and White beaches in front of Dieppe, the object being to capture the town.

The assault will be examined on a beach by beach basis, as opposed to an analysis based on a simultaneous, chronological, time continuum. The air battle will be dealt with separately. It is important to note that the actions on the various beaches, and the air battle, were taking place at the same time. This method was used in COHQ's 'Combined Report', the Admiralty's Naval Battle Summary, and subsequent secondary accounts, and seems the most suitable.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Gervase Cowell, SOE Advisor, to H. Henry, 13 March 1996 ['SOE role']; Mann, 'Intelligence plan', 9 August 1942, Appendix L, p.3 [nine men, SOE HQ], 'Allotment of personnel, equipment and stores', 10 August 1942, Appendix C-Part 1, p.21 [eight men, grenades, 'sled'], in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan, 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25); Brig. C.C. Mann, to Col Neville, COHQ, 'SOE - Operation *Jubilee*', 10 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/13747/General 152/GS8 ['Gillies Party', eight men, 'two permits']; the SOE officers names are in Foot, *SOE in France*, p.184; and confirmed by E.G. Boxshall, Foreign Office, to S.S. Wilson, Cabinet Historical Office, 16 June 1967, COHRS, CAB 146/349/The Dieppe Raid, 1955-67; 'List of operations', in P.J. Harratt Personal File, SOE Archives, FCO.

⁴⁷ Some secondary accounts using the beach by beach analysis are Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.360, and Ronald Atkin, *Dieppe, 1942: the Jubilee disaster* (London: Macmillan, 1980).

**FLANK ATTACK I: BERNEVAL (YELLOW BEACHES)
OPERATION *FLODDEN* – NO.3 COMMANDO**

Durnford-Slater's orders were to destroy or neutralize the Army Coastal Battery at Berneval-le-Grand, which was sighted to cover the main landing beaches and sea approaches, and reembark from the same beach within four hours.⁴⁸ The Detailed Military Plan stressed that if the battery could not be destroyed, during the period of occupation the commandos 'must remain and pin' down the German gunners with harassing fire. Under this general order, the commandos had the freedom to form their own specific plans of attack. Durnford-Slater's plan, code-named Operation *Flodden*, envisaged two landings – at Yellow I (Petit Berneval) and II (near Bellville-sur-Mer) – followed by a rapid ascent of the cliffs, and an attack on the battery in a pincher movement (see Maps 2 and 6).⁴⁹

Unfortunately for Durnford-Slater, as previously recounted, Group 5 was dispersed by 0430. Although he had orders that if any of his LCPs were sunk, he was to carry out his 'allotted tasks with reduced numbers', he and

⁴⁸ Durnford-Slater had under his command a total of 422 personnel, consisting of 360 men of No.3 Commando, 40 US Rangers, the Principal Beach Master (PBM) Party of 8 men, a Naval Signals Party of 5 men, 3 RRC battalion signallers, a *Phantom* detachment of 4 men and 2 pressmen. See Mann, 'Movements arrangements to ports of embarkation', 12 August 1942, Appendix C-Part 2, Table V, in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25). The PBM, Sub-Lt Lewis, was the chief naval authority on the beach and responsible for the beach area and its defence. He was to keep the Naval Force Commander constantly informed of all events on the beach through the Naval Signals Party. Also he was to liaise directly with Durnford-Slater. See Hughes-Hallett, 'Orders for Naval Beach Parties', Appendix JNO7, pp.1-3, in 'Naval Operation Order No.1 [Operation *Jubilee*]', 31 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (D47).

⁴⁹ Mann, 'Assault and occupation', 9 August 1942, Appendix D, pp.1,4 [see also Appendix F, p.6], 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25); Lt-Col John F. Durnford-Slater, 'Operation *Flodden*: No.3 Commando Operation Order No.1', 14 August 1942, pp.3-7, NAM, PYP, 9010/31/725; see also Major Peter Young, 'Operation *Flodden*', (probably 20 August) 1942, p.1, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D49); John F. Durnford-Slater, 'Dieppe', in *Commando: memoirs of a fighting commando in World War Two* (London: Greenhill, 1953, 1991), pp.93,95.

Wyburd decided that an assault during daylight, with the meagre forces available, was not feasible. Thereafter, he was unable to effect any influence on the operation and returned to England, not knowing that seven LCPs had actually landed some of his troops.⁵⁰

The German Berneval Battery was an independent strongpoint (*Stützpunkt*), separate from Dieppe and its environs, which was still under construction at the time of the raid. The unit was 2 Troop, 770 Army Coastal Defence Artillery Battery, with seven heavy guns. A field picket, or guard post, was located on the cliffs, in a defensive position, above the entrances to the two narrow gorges leading down to Yellow beach I. One 20mm AA gun was in a pillbox situated on the cliffs between Yellow I and II, while pillboxes and machine gun posts were also situated overlooking Yellow I. The gorges were strewn with dense barbed wire entanglements, booby traps, and in the case of the western defile, anti-personnel mines.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Mann, 'Appreciation of alternative courses', 10 August 1942, Appendix T, p.6, in 'Operation Jubilee Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25) ['allotted tasks']; Durnford-Slater, *Commando*, p.105; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.361 [seven LCPs].

⁵¹ The German Order of Battle at Berneval consisted of 2 Troop, 770 Army Coastal Defence Artillery Battery, with four 105mm K35 Czech guns, three 170mm guns, in howitzer or naval mountings, and two 20mm AA guns, all manned by 127 men. The GAF had a radar station (*Gleitwitz* Equipment Unit), identified by British intelligence as a 'Beam Station', and one section of 20mm AA guns from, the Dieppe Beach Defence Unit, manned and defended by 1 officer, 16 NCOs and 97 men. A field picket of 1 Coy, 570 Infantry Regiment (IR), 302 ID, of 1 NCO and 9 men was stationed at Yellow I, Petit Berneval. This was a total of 251 all ranks, not including local reserves. The German gun type designations of that period *K(anone)* 35 (*schechisch*) – stand for 'gun, 1935, Czech'. See Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', 25 August 1942, in *The history of the 302 Infantry Division in retrospect*, ed. Emil Kilgast (DGIS Multilingual Section Translation Bureau, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), 1982, c1976, CWM, p.55, [guns], p.93 [defences, gorges], (an earlier translation is in Charles P. Stacey, 'Operation Jubilee: the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942. Information from German war diaries', in 'Army Headquarters Historical Section Report No.10', 5 December 1946, DHist AHQ Report No.10); Lt-Col John F. Durnford-Slater, 'Operation Flodden: No.3 Commando Operation Order No.1', 14 August 1942, p.1, NAM, PYP, 9010/31/725 ['Beam Station']. The beach was four hundred yards long, about twenty yards wide at high tide, and composed of small rounded boulders and rocks, commonly referred to as 'shingle'. See Mann, 'Information – Own troops', 5 August 1942, Appendix B, p.2, in 'Operation Jubilee Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25); and Hughes-Hallett, 'Navigational data', Appendix C to JNO1,

According to the after action report by the 302 ID commander, Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, the field picket reportedly first heard noise of the convoy naval battle at 0345, while the GAF radar unit defence force manned their defensive position two minutes later. At 0450 the picket and observation post of 2 Tp, 770 Bty, spotted 'four small boats and a freighter', the latter responding to a recognition signal, after which the small boats were seen to steer for Petit Berneval. These were actually ML 346 and five LCPs of No.3 Commando. As the Bty could not reach them, the field picket opened up on the approaching craft with machine gun and small arms fire. ML 346 answered with its 3pdr and Oerlikon on a pill box to the west side of Yellow I. The German report explains that at 0455, under protection of this fire, the commandos landed at Yellow I in the 'dead ground below the cliffs', scaled them and proceeded towards the eastern gully. At 0500, the 2 Tp, 770 Bty tried to contact the field picket but was not answered, so it sent a four-man MG patrol to reconnoitre the gully at Petit Berneval. It also reported to Bn HQ and requested for infantry reinforcements. At the same, the GAF defensive strongpoint also sent an assault patrol of eight men to the gorge, and recalled the radar operators from their station. Five minutes later, the strongpoint was strafed by fighter-bombers, and later had smoke bombs dropped on the area. The air attack was responded to by three 20mm AA guns (one section of 3 Tp/237 AA Bty). The air attack set fire to buildings and caused a magazine to explode. These air attacks continued for four hours.⁵²

p.10, in 'Naval Operation Order No.1 [Operation *Jubilee*]', 31 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (D47).

⁵² Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', 25 August 1942, in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM, pp.58-9, 61-2; Lt Alex D. Fear, 'Report of Commanding Officer of ML 346 on Dieppe raid - Yellow beach landing', 21 August 1942, p.1-3, TMFDC.

Of the six LCPs that actually landed at Yellow I, five beached at 0510 (twenty minutes later than that stated in the German report), and the last one arrived thirty-five minutes later. This is according to Wyburd, and based on his after-action reports of his LCP Officers. One of these was LCP(L) 42, commanded by Lt-Comdr C.L. Corke, and had Lt. Len W. Druce and his Section of No.3 Commando aboard. This LCP had been hit in the convoy fire-fight and all the crew, except Corke, had become casualties. On request from him and Druce for someone to help navigate the boat, Commando Trooper Higgins volunteered, and successfully steered the boat towards shore. These craft touched down in echelon formation, without the Germans firing at this point. This is confirmed by Wyburd's report. Druce believes that this was due to the German defenders being preoccupied with an air attack during this period, which agrees with the German report of one about this time.⁵³

The majority of the approximately 120 men landed were from 6 Troop. The advance up the mined gorge was initially held by a single row of barbed wire on the beach in front, and inside it. Captain R.L. 'Dick' Wills, ordered his men to cut through it.⁵⁴ After this delay, the commandos were able to carefully make their way up to the top. While advancing up it, the field picket

⁵³ The other four LCPs were: LCP(L) 1, Lt D.R. Stephens; LCP(L) 157, Sub-Lt K. Child; LCP(L) 81, Sub-Lt B. McCosh; LCP(L) 41, Sub-Lt D.H. Spring; the sixth to arrive was LCP(L) 85, Lt A.M. Button. See Hughes-Hallett, 'Extract of report from Commander D.B. Wyburd, RN', Appendix 7 to Enclosure 13, in 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48), p.49; Lt Len W. Druce, 'Report on landing at Yellow I, Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942, by No.3 Commando', 5 January 1943 [written while a PoW in Eichstatt, Bavaria, and hidden in an ecclesiastical book until the end of the war], received from Mary Mackie, Pender Island, British Columbia (BC), Canada [Higgins].

⁵⁴ Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.361 [120 men]. The account of the Commandos' actions on Yellow I is based on, unless otherwise indicated, COHQ, 'Combined Report', pp.13-14; Lt Len W. Druce, 'Report on landing at Yellow I, Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942, by No.3 Commando', 5 January 1943, received from Mary Mackie; Durnford-Slater, *Commando*, pp.105-8; 'Transcript of interview of Geoffrey Osmond, No.3 Commando', pp.16-65, c.1977, for T. Macartney-Filgate 1979 CBC production, 'Dieppe 1942', DHist 79/567/86.

opened up with a MG, wounding Capt. Wills. Ranger 2Lt Edwin V. Loustalot reached the top, and was killed trying to silence it, the first American casualty on land in Europe during the war. Finally, the MG was captured single-handedly by Corporal Halls. Corporal A.W. 'Mick' Taylor recalls, 'Under constant fire we reached the top of the cliffs to be confronted by nests of machine-gunners and, further on, pillboxes... We silenced those'.⁵⁵

Once out of the gorge, the commandos fanned out and attempted to head for their objectives. They quickly came under intense German fire and were only able to advance a short way into Petit Berneval, before having to go to ground or take cover in the various houses. With this group was the *Phantom* detachment, under Lt Michael Hillems, with Cpl J. Masterton, L/Cpl Craggs and Driver (Drv) Richardson. They had tried to set up their radio on landing but the fire was too intense. At 0645, though, when about two hundred yards inland, they were able to set up station. The *Phantom* patrol attached to No.4 Commando was heard passing messages and L/Cpl Craggs, recounts Cpl Masterton, 'tried to get through, and thought he had finally passed a message which stated how hard pressed we were'. But Major Astor, on *Calpe*, never received it, and never knew that Hillems patrol had landed. Masterton recalls moving further inland, with a improvised commando HQ that had been formed, until they were in sight of the German battery. At this point, they started to receive MG and small arms fire, which they replied to with their own weapons. Meanwhile, Craggs was trying to get

⁵⁵ James J. Altieri, 'The First Ranger Battalion in Britain', in *Darby's Rangers: an illustrated portrayal of the original Rangers (World War II) In training and in action* (Durham, North Carolina: Seeman, 1945), p.29 [Loustalot]; another Ranger, Sgt John J. Knapp, was previously wounded in the convoy fight aboard SGB 5, see Marcel G. Swank to Brereton Greenhous, 'List of men on Dieppe raid', cover letter, 28 January 1979, DHist 79/139; Ashton W. 'Mick' Taylor, No.3 Commando, to T. Macartney-Filgate, 'A personal account of the Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942', 15 December 1977, TMFDC.

through on the radio. Soon the frequency changed and before he could make contact on this new frequency, the order was received to withdraw. Masterton recounts that, 'smoke bombs were put down to give us some cover as we made a dash for the gully we had come up.' While returning, they were opened up on by a MG which killed Craggs, and wounded Richardson and Masterton. Taking cover in a garden, Hillerns tore up the code books and ordered Masterton to destroy the radio. They then headed back to the gorge.⁵⁶

Arriving on the same LCP as the *Phantom* detachment, were five of the fifteen French detachment of No.10 (IA) Commando. Before the operation, the majority had chosen not to wear the prescribed British battle dress and steel helmet, instead donning their own blue, serge Marine uniforms, berets with distinctive red pom-pom, and retaining their 'France' shoulder insignia. Attached to No.3 Commando were Sgt Raymond de Wandelaer, Sgt Serge Montailier, Cpl Maurice César, Cpl Georges Ropert and Cpl Jean Errard. They also made it up the cliffs, although were forced to retreat with the rest of No.3 Commando in the face of a concentrated German counter-attack. During this action Sgt Montailier was wounded and captured. César was also later captured on the beach. Previously, he had stripped off his French uniform and thrown away his beret in fear of being shot as a Free French commando. This probably saved his life, according to two historians, for when the Germans captured Montailier, on seeing his uniform, beret,

⁵⁶ This account is based the following primary source, which the subsequent secondary works seem to be entirely based on, Cpl. J. Masterton, 'Dieppe operation, 19 August 1942', c.1945 (written after repatriation), TMFDC; Warner, *Phantom*, pp.57-8; Hill, *Phantom was there*, p.79; Major J.J. Astor, 'Dieppe - August 1942', 4 September 1942, p.1, Appendix C, GHQ Liaison Regiment, War Diary, PRO, WO 215/16 [Astor].

'France' and 'Commando' insignia, summarily executed him. The other three successfully returned to Britain.⁵⁷

One hour after the initial commando landings, the Germans responded to the request by 2 Tp, 770 Bty for reinforcements, by forming the 'Blücher Battle Group', under Major von Blücher, OC 302 reserve Anti-tank and Reconnaissance Unit. He was put in command of all troops in the Berneval area and ordered to clear the area of the enemy. His battle group consisted of 3 Coy/302 Engineer Bn, hastily put into lorries, 302 Cyclist Squadron, and 11 light AA Combat Detachment. He deployed his units and counter-attacked the commandos at 0845 in Petit Berneval. A second counter-thrust by 3 Coy/570 IR came from the south-east towards the village. Within thirty-five minutes the commandos, running low on ammunition and taking heavy casualties, were forced to withdraw to Yellow I. Lt Druce's section was the last down the gorge, and he recalls, the 'not very funny' experience of, being shot at by his own men, who could not see his section very well through the thick barbed wire, and mistook them for Germans.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Although the Detailed Military Plan does not indicate it, other contemporary records, and post-war information from veterans, show that five members of 1 Troop (French), No.10 (IA) Commando also were attached to No.3 Commando and may have been included in the 360 total. Lt-Col John Durnford-Slater, 'Official account – Operation *Flodder*', 22 August 1942, p.1, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D49); Maurice Chauvet (Intelligence Section, No.4 Commando), 'Operation *Jubilée*, Dieppe 19 Août 1942', in D-Day Le B.F.M. Commando, (Paris: Amicale des Ancien Parachutistes SAS & Commando, nd.), p.6; a summary of the unit is Maurice Chauvet, 'La 1ère Compagnie de Fusilier Marin Commando à Dieppe', nd., pp.5-7, TMFDC; Cpl. J. Masterton, 'Dieppe operation, 19 August 1942', c.1945, TMFDC [LCP]; No.10 Inter-Allied (IA) Commando War Diary, 19 August 1942, PRO, WO 218/40 [last names, ranks, uniforms]; M. Chauvet to Alain Buriot (President, Association *Jubilée*), 5 February 1992, [list of raid participants with full names, ranks], A. Buriot Dieppe Collection (ABDC); Dear, *Ten Commando*, p.23 [pom-pom, executed, César], the source Dear uses concerning César's capture is, 'Report by Leading Seaman Maurice César', 5 May 1943, Paris, Chateau de Vincennes, Service Historique de la Marine, TT 1bis; Rear-Adm. Adolphe Lepotier claims that César found Montailleur's grave in Dieppe in 1950, and was told he had been shot while trying to escape, *Raiders from the sea* (London: William Kimber, 1954), p.128.

⁵⁸ Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, pp.64-6 [Blücher]; Taylor to Macartney-Filgate, 'A personal account of the Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942', 15 December 1977, TMFDC

Earlier, at 0615, the Naval Beach and Signals Parties had signalled the waiting LCPs to evacuate them, as they had had no communication with the commandos, and feared the worst. Although the official COHQ account states no commandos were evacuated from Yellow I, two probably were. These were L/Cpl Sinclair, who apparently swam out to a LCP, and Cpl 'Mick' Taylor, who claimed to have reached a LCP and returned to England 'at mid-day'. More LCPs were sent at 0950 to attempt evacuation but they mistakenly navigated to the wrong beach, and instead picked up survivors off Blue beach. Back on Yellow I beach, Masterton states they were being sniped at from the cliffs, and as no LCPs were at the beach to take them off, took refuge in a cave with about twenty commandos, including Lt Druce. Both he and Masterton recall that Capt. Hillerns attempted to swim out to a drifting LCP, with the intention of bringing it in, but was shot in the attempt. By 1000 the Germans were on the beach and advancing down it taking prisoners. Having no more ammunition, the senior officer in the cave ordered the men to break their weapons and surrender. The commandos surrounded on Hill 101 had also previously surrendered. The Germans state two officers and eighty ORs were taken PoW, some of which were wounded presumably. No definite figures are available on the exact casualties but it seems that approximately one-third were killed-in-action (KIA). The RN also lost three LCPs and had seven crew killed, eight wounded, and one missing.⁵⁹

[low ammunition, casualties]; Len Druce, 'Dieppe raid tour, August 1995', audio recording, MMDC ('not very funny').

⁵⁹ Hughes-Hallett, 'Extract of report by Commander D.B. Wyburd', Appendix 7 to Enclosure 13, p.49 [0615], p.50 [0950], p.51 [LCPs lost], 'Casualties to Naval Personnel', Appendix A to Enclosure 11, p.2, in 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', in 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48); COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.14 [no commandos evacuated]; Dumford-Slater, *Commando*, p.106 [Sinclair]; Taylor to Macartney-Filgate, 'A personal account of the Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942', 15 December 1977, TMFDC ['mid-day']; J. Masterton, 'Dieppe operation, 19 August 1942', c.1945, TMFDC; Len Druce, 'Dieppe

Of the seven LCPs to land at the Yellow beaches, only one landed at Yellow II. This was LCP(L) 15 carrying Yellow Beach Master Sub-Lt Lewis, commanded by Lt A.T. Buckee. During the convoy encounter, they had found themselves alone and, remarkably, unscathed. Buckee, and the senior commando officer aboard, Major Peter Young, 2ic No.3 Commando, conferred and decided to proceed, according to orders, to Yellow II. Expert navigation by Buckee led the LCP to the correct beach, although Young was initially sceptical. At 0445, five minutes early, Buckee beached at high tide, about fifty yards to the west of the single gully, to avoid any MG posts that could be there. All the commandos disembarked and quickly crossed to base of the one hundred-foot high cliffs. The stony beach was approximately 100 yards long, and twenty yards wide at the time of landing. Lewis stayed on board as there were not enough commandos to form a beach party. The LCP withdrew and waited offshore, sometimes hidden in a smoke screen, and at other times shot at from the cliffs.⁶⁰

Major Young had with him two officers, Captain John J. Selwyn, and Lt Anthony F. 'Buck' Ruxton, and seventeen ORs, consisting of Selwyn's HQ, part of Young's, and two mortar detachments. At this point they had not been fired upon and appeared to have landed unnoticed. Pte P.R. Dodd, HQ 3 Troop, part of the 3in mortar detachment, recalls, 'The only funny part about

raid tour, August 1995', audio recording, MMDC; Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM, p.66 [1000, Hill 101]; 81 Army Corps Headquarters, 'Combat report and experiences gained during the British attack on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 25 August 1942, SHAEF translation, 24 February 1944, NAC, RG 24/20438/981.023 (D10), p.6 [PoW].

⁶⁰ Sub-Lt D.J. Lewis, 'Report written by Sub-Lt D.J. Lewis, RCNVR, and given to Major Charles Stacey, GSO 2 (History), CMHQ', 24 August 1942, DHist 594.019 (D4), p.2 [conferred, 0445], p.3 [Lewis/LCP actions]; Maj. Peter Young, 'Operation *Flodder*', nd. (about 22 August 1942), p.1, PRO, DEFE 2/337 [conferred]; Hughes-Hallett, 'Navigational data', Appendix C to JNO1, pp.9-10, in 'Naval Operation Order No.1 [Operation *Jubilee*]', 31 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (D47) [terrain].

the whole operation', was after being squashed together on the LCP during the whole trip over, 'the sight of all our men lining up at the foot of the cliffs urinating, before taking on the German army'.⁶¹

A delay occurred at the barbed wire blocking the gorge to the tops of the cliffs because of the lack of proper breaching equipment, Young set the example of pulling himself up the sides of it using the wire and iron stakes holding it. Toggle ropes were put together and used over the most difficult part. The whole group was up after forty-five minutes, including the No.18 wireless set, but having left the heavy 3in mortar behind. During this climb, a commando observed the five LCPS heading onto Yellow I. Young assembled his group in a wood inland and gave them a pep talk. After which he split them into three sections, each under an officer. He hoped^d to go into Berneval and meet up with the commandos from Yellow I.

Advancing to the rear of the battery into the town, they moved through finally coming to a church, at which point they were fired upon. They returned the fire and then Young chose to advance on the battery through an orchard to the North-west of the Battery. After coming under fire here, he moved his men out into some cornfields beyond. From this position some of his men were only two hundred yards from the guns and began a steady harassing fire for about an hour and a half. This prevented the guns from firing at the main anchorage off Dieppe. A German artillery after-action report records that from 0510 until 0745 the battery did not fire out to sea at all. At 0610, the

⁶¹ The account of the commandos' actions on Yellow II is based on the only contemporary record to survive, and as such, was the basis for all the later official and secondary accounts, Maj. Peter Young, 'Operation *Flodder*', nd. (about 22 August 1942), p.1, PRO, DEFE 2/337; Young expands on this account in his memoir of the war, 'Dieppe', in *Storm from the sea* (2 revised edn., London: Lionel Leventhal Ltd., 1958, 1989), pp.60-9; P.R. Dodd to T. Laurel Crosby, CBC, 'Dieppe raid landing, 19 August 1942', January 1978, DHist 79/256/27 ['funny part'].

frustrated gunners did turn one of their guns around and fire four rounds over open sights at the commandos, which landed harmlessly inland. Stacey makes the point that the battery was neutralized for a period of at least two and a half hours, during a critical phase of the landing [see Map 6].⁶²

Young, having realized that ammunition was becoming short and expecting to be counter-attacked in force at any time, sent Selwyn back to form a bridgehead. He was to signal with three white Very lights if a LCP was there to take them off. On seeing this signal, Young began his withdrawal and on nearing the gully, exchanged fire with the Bty observation post on the cliff edge. As the men retreated down the defile, one man was wounded by a mine. The 3in mortar detachment fired off all its HE (high explosive) rounds at the battery, before wading out to Lt Buckee's LCP, which had come in. The Germans were now on the cliffs firing at the LCP and men on the beaches. ML 346 covered the LCP using all its guns on the cliffs. Young and Ruxton were the last two to go down the cleft, making a fighting withdrawal. The LCP was now moving out and they and one other commando were towed out holding to lifelines, scrambling aboard about three hundred yards out. The time was 0810. Remarkably, all the men landed had been successfully withdrawn. The commandos transferred to the ML 346 and both craft headed back to England. Hughes-Hallett, in his post-raid report, stated that the actions of Major Young and his men, averted 'the exceedingly serious consequences which might have resulted from the failure of the Yellow Beach landings. In my judgement this was perhaps the most outstanding

⁶² Durnford-Slater, 'Dieppe', p.93 [map]; see also Peter Young, 'Attack on a German Battery (*Goebbels*) near Berneval', hand-drawn map, nd., NAM, PYP, 9010/31/716; and; Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM, p.64 [0610]; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.361.

incident of the operation'. Both Young and Buckee were decorated for their actions with the Distinguished Service Order (DSO).⁶³

**FLANK ATTACK II: VARENDEVILLE (ORANGE BEACHES)
OPERATION CAULDRON - NO.4 COMMANDO**

On the western flank of *Jubilee* was Group 1, under command of Lt- Cmdr H.H.H. Mulleneux, Senior Officer Landings, Orange Beach, and consisting of the LSI (Small) HMS *Prince Albert*, carrying Lord Lovat's No.4 Commando, and the escorts MGB 312 and SGB 9. The LSI reached the lowering position 'SS' on time and, according to plan, lowered its LCAs, which formed into two divisions in line ahead columns, and proceeded towards the coast. MGB 312 was in the lead navigating with its GEE/QH receiver, escorted by an LCS and SGB 9. At 0350, Mulleneux states, 'three darkened vessels' were spotted off the port bow, moving up the Channel from west to east. Concerned that these were probably a German convoy, he thought 'it prudent to evade rather than investigate more closely', and therefore altered the flotilla's course 'drastically to starboard in order to pass well clear and astern of the suspicious vessels'. No navigational difficulties were experienced, and the flotilla was able to get a fix on the lights of the Pointe d'Ailley light house and Dieppe breakwaters. While approaching the shore, one white Very signal light was fired from near the light house,

⁶³ Lt Alex D. Fear, 'Report of Commanding Officer of ML 346 on Dieppe raid-Yellow beach landing', 21 August 1942, pp.2-3, TMFDC; Sub-Lt D.J. Lewis, 'Report written by Sub-Lt D.J. Lewis, RCNVR, and given to Major Charles Stacey, GSO 2 (History), CMHQ', 24 August 1942, DHist 594.019 (D4), p.4 [lifelines]; Hughes-Hallett wrote later, 'I have little doubt that the failure of the coast defence battery at Berneval to play an effective part in the operation was largely due to the action of Major Young', in 'Naval Force Commander's narrative', Enclosure No.1 to No. NFJ 0221/92, 'Covering letter to report on Operation *Jubilee*, NFJ.0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48), p.1 ['outstanding incident']; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.361 [DSO].

followed by a green one from the eastern end of Orange II beach. The first close support fighters passed low over head at this time, which probably occupied the Germans' attention, as all the LCAs landed unopposed at zero hour. Only after they returned to MGB 312 to ferry in more troops and stores, did the Germans open fire. After all troops were ashore, the landing craft and LCS then withdrew to a quiet place, about fifty yards off Orange I, where they were not being fired at. Here they waited for the reembarkation signal.⁶⁴

Like at Berneval, the German 813 Army Coastal Artillery Battery at Varengeville, consisting of six heavy guns, also formed an independent *Stützpunkt*, although it was scheduled to be moved to within the Dieppe defensive zone. The area around the Phare d'Ailly lighthouse, the highest point on the coast in the Dieppe area, was designated a 'Resistance nest', or defensive position, made up of the Naval Signal Station and Special Equipment Unit (radar), Aircraft Reporting Detachment of the 23 (Heavy) Aircraft Reporting Company, and 813 Bty OP, with a strength of seventy-seven men. On the heights between the River Saane and Ste. Marguerite was the Quiberville-East defensive position, made up of 3 Coy, 571 IR (less one platoon) and one Heavy MG section from 4 Coy, 571 IR. The area was protected by 'all-round obstacles and field-type combat installations'. As at Berneval, the lack of men meant that the stretch of coast between Pourville

⁶⁴ At 0430 the flotilla split into two groups, LCAs 2, 4, 6, escorted by MGB 312, proceeded into Orange I (Vasterival), while LCAs 3, 5, 7, 8, escorted by SGB 9 and the LCS, proceeded to Orange II (Quiberville). Hughes-Hallett, 'List of Ships, Groups and Senior Officers', Appendix A to JNO1, p.1, in 'Naval Operation Order No.1 [Operation *Jubilee*]', 31 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (D47) [Group 1 craft]; the account of the approach and landing is based almost entirely on Hughes-Hallett, 'Extract of report by Lt-Comdr H.H.H. Muleneux', Appendix 4 to Enclosure 13, pp.1-2, and 'Operation *Jubilee* - Detailed narrative', Enclosure 3, pp.5-6, in 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48).

and Quiberville-East, with the exception of some of the wire-blocked gullies, was only protected by night patrolling.⁶⁵

Lord Lovat's orders were to destroy the Army coastal Defence Battery 'with all possible speed'. Besides the six guns, the Battery area also included AA and MG defences, ammunition bunkers, and billets. All objectives had code-names, such as *Pigeon* for the guns themselves, and *Hess* for the Battery area (see Maps 2 and 7). Lovat split his Commando into two groups to land on Orange I and II. Group 1, under the 2ic, Major Derek Mills-Roberts, consisted of Group 1 HQ, C Troop, 3in mortar detachment, the PBM and the two SSR signallers, a total of seventy-one all ranks. After establishing a bridgehead on Orange I, reinforcements of approximately ten men, the remainder of the Beach and Naval signals Party, and the *Phantom* detachment, would be ferried in. Group 1 possibly totalled ninety-one men, although an official account gives a figure of eighty-eight. Group 2, under Lord Lovat, consisting of the remainder of No.4 Commando, made up of *Cauldron Force* HQ, A, B, and F Troops, landed on Orange II. Lovat's simple plan was to have Group 1 engage the battery positions from the front with mortars, LMG and small arms fire, while Group 2 would make a wide sweep to a position behind the Battery, and on a prearranged signal, assault the

⁶⁵ The battery comprising six 150mm (5.9in) K16 Krupp guns, two 20mm Flak guns, one on a two-story platform, and one 'tank gun', with a strength of between 93 and 112 men, Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM, pp.54-7; Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, 'Report of the C-in-C West on the Dieppe raid 19 August 1942', 3 September 1942, translated by Historical Section (GS), Army HQ, Ottawa, November 1946, p.19, PRO, NAC RG 24/20429/981.013(D6), [112 men]. The beach at Orange I was about seventy yards long and twenty yards wide at high tide, with two clefts leading up to cliffs covered with thick vegetation. At Orange II, it was about nine hundred yards long and approximately twenty yards wide at high tide, and led straight onto the coast road Quiberville - Ste. Marguerite, Hughes-Hallett, 'Navigational data', Appendix C to JNO1, p.6, 'Naval Operation Order No.1 [Operation *Jubilee*]', 31 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (D47), [beach lengths]; Lt A.D.C. Smith, 'Report by Lt A.D.C. Smith, Intelligence Officer, No.4 Commando, on Dieppe - Area Varengeville', 26 August 1942, p. 1, PRO, DEFE 2/550 [beach widths].

Battery from behind (see Map 7). He also had two contingency plans, in case any, or all, the LCAs were late. The first involved Group 2 moving past the town of Ste. Marguerite to attack the battery's flank and rear, while the second entailed all of Group 2 landing at Orange I for a direct attack.⁶⁶

The dress to be worn by all commandos was to be 'Skeleton Order' – belt and cross braces, basic pouches, denim slacks, cardigans, specially designed rubber soled boots and stocking caps. The four US Rangers chose to wear their own American uniforms and rank insignia. Sgt Szima relates

⁶⁶ *Cauldron* Force totalled 278 personnel, consisting of about 257 men of No.4 Commando, the PBM Party of 3 men, a Naval Signals Party of 5 men, 2 SSR battalion signallers, a *Phantom* detachment of 3 men, 4 US Rangers, 3 Frenchmen of 1 Troop, No.10 (IA) Commando and the noted correspondent of the London *Times*, Alexander B. Austin. The records do not agree on the exact numbers of each unit, especially concerning the commandos and naval personnel. The Detailed Military Plan, appears to be very inaccurate in this respect. Therefore a comparison of several contemporary records, confirmed by post-war sources, gives the closest estimate possible. The numbers for the Rangers, No.10 (IA) Commandos, SSR and *Phantom* are definite. Only one pre-raid contemporary record exists concerning operational planning and arrangements for *Cauldron*, Lt-Col Lord Lovat, 'Operation Order No.1: *Cauldron*', 14 August 1942, [p.1 – 250 commandos plus 7 'attached allied'; confirmed by Appendix B – 247 commandos, 2 SSR, 4 'Americans', 3 'Allies', 1 press; but p.5 notes a separate MGB detachment – 13 commandos, 3 *Phantom*, 3 PBM; p.6 confirms 3 *Phantom* and 2 SSR], NAC, RG 24/13747/Serial 152/GS8; Sir Martin Lindsay, 'Destruction of a German Battery by No.4 Commando during the Dieppe raid', Notes from Theatres of War, No.11, London: War Office, February 1943, pp.7 [Group 1 – eighty-eight men], pp.8-10, EJDC; see also his post-war account, 'The battery', *British Army Review* 50 (August 1975), 30-1 [Map 7]; Mann, 'Movements arrangements to ports of embarkation', 12 August 1942, Appendix C-Part 2, Table E, in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25) [225 commandos, 5 Naval Signals, 3 PBM, 5 US Army, 3 *Phantom*, 3 RCCS, 1 press]; No.4 Commando, War Diary, 12 August 1942 [3 *Phantom*], 17 August 1942 [3 French, 2 SSR], PRO, WO 218/35; No.10 (IA) Commando, War Diary, 19 August 1942, PRO, WO 218/40 [3 French]; Capt. A.R.M. Sedgwick, 'Report by Capt. Sedgwick, *Phantom* attached to No.4 Commando', 20 August 1942, Appendix C-Annex 3, p.1, to GHQ Liaison Regiment, War Diary, PRO 215/16 [3 *Phantom*]; Ranger, French, SSR, and *Phantom* commando statistics and names are confirmed by post-war sources, most important of which is the nominal role prepared by Emyr W. Jones, 'Operation *Cauldron*: No.4 Commando attack on the Hess Battery Varengeville, Wednesday 19 August 1942', July 1990, E.W. Jones Dieppe Collection (EJDC). Dunning states these varied statistics reflect:

the 'fog of war' – and also how in hasty preparations, verbal orders, decisions, even before operations, often result in poor – even absent – reports. Lovat also cut down his numbers to the bare minimum for the job. This allowed him to select only the 'cream' and also it made chaps train even harder for fear of being left out of 'the party'. He also was able to draft some really useful super shots/marksmen and demolitionists from D E Troops, who were basically 'left out of battle' (LOB), into A, B, C, and F Troops.

J.E. Dunning to H. Henry, Comments on draft Chapter 5, 4 July 1996. The probability of last minute changes is confirmed by the fact that two Officers and seven Other Ranks stated in the *Cauldron* Operation Order, did not participate. Evidence for this is from verbal testimony of surviving commandos carried out by Gordon Hurley and Emyr Jones, E.W. Jones to H. Henry, 3 July 1996.

that, 'So it was that I was able to substitute fear with audacity, my only weapon to match the coolness of the seasoned British Commandos whom we had come to respect so much'. No rations, steel helmets, or water bottles were to be carried to cut down on weight. Therefore the commandos, in the words of Dunning, were able to 'go "split-asse", that is at full speed – a nice steady double – it also enabled us to carry just that little bit extra ammunition, explosives, Bangalore [torpedoes] etc.'. This is in contrast to No.3 Commando who carried the latter two items. Faces and hands were to be camouflaged brown, while those of snipers were to be green. Snipers were also to use camouflage nets and telescopic sights on their rifle. The exact weapon and amount of ammunition to be carried per man was more than usual and specified for each man. Six men each of F and B troop were to carry specially made-up demolition charges and detonators to blow the guns. Bangalore torpedoes for blowing gaps in barbed wire, a roll of rabbit netting for crossing it, and wire-cutters were carried in the majority of LCAs. The signals set up was similar to that of No.3 Commando. Concerning PoWs, none were to be taken during the hours of darkness, although after daylight PoWs were to be taken, and 'securely tied by their thumbs with fish-line in the best Japanese tradition'.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Lord Lovat, 'Operation Order No.1: *Cauldron*', 14 August 1942, p.6, NAC, RG 24/13747/Serial 152/GS8, ['securely tied']; Szima recalls that their decision to wear US uniforms came after hearing a speech on the 18 August, on board ship prior to leaving, in which Mountbatten ended by exclaiming, 'Tomorrow we deal the Hun a bloody blow... we expect over 60 per cent casualties, and to those of you that will die tomorrow, may God have mercy on your souls', Alex J. Szima to AmVETS Post #72, 30 January 1976, TMFDC; Lt-Col John F. Durnford-Slater, 'Administrative Instructions', Appendix B, to 'Operation *Flodden*: No.3 Commando Operation Order No.1', 14 August 1942, NAM, PYP, 9010/31/725 [No.3 Commando]; Special Service Brigade, 'Some points and lessons from operations *Jubilee* as carried out by No.4 Commando on 19 August 1942', 28 August 1942, NAM, PYP, 9010/31/725 [green camouflage]; J.E. Dunning to H. Henry, letter and comments on draft Chapter 5, 4 July 1996 ["split-asse"].

Group 1 landed, according to Mills-Roberts, at 0430, and the leading sub-section of C Troop, under Lt David C.W. Style, quickly went off to reconnoitre the left-hand gully, soon reporting back that it was hopelessly filled with wire and thus impassable. The right-hand gully was therefore chosen and two Bangalore torpedoes were needed to blow a suitable gap, fortunately about the same time a strike of aircraft went over and this together with heavy firing further along the coast masked the explosions. Once at the top, a bridgehead was established by a Sub-Section of C Troop whilst the rest moved with all speed to the wood in front of the battery. Meanwhile searches were made of the deserted houses and enquiries made at the occupied houses by two of the French commandos, Cpls Rene Taverne and Raymond Rabouhans attached to A Troop. They gained valuable information about German unit dispositions from the local inhabitants. Later Rabouhans advanced with Mills-Roberts party and he took up a firing position in the area of a barn which had a good view of the battery. During the withdrawal to the bridgehead, travelling in single file, he was the last in the group and recalls always looking nervously over his shoulder in case they were being outflanked. For their part in the operation they were decorated with the *Croix de Guerre avec étoile*.⁶⁸

The records are not clear on the disposition of the third French Commando, Sgt. Francois Balloche. Three primary sources refer to him. An amendment to the Operation Order's landing craft composition refers to him

⁶⁸ Major Derek Mills-Roberts, 'Report on the landing by Major D. Mills-Roberts', 20 August 1942, p.1 [0453], PRO, DEFE 2/337; Maurice Chauvet, 'Fondation de la 1ère Cie Fusilier Marin Commando (Troop 1)/Operation *Jubilee*, Dieppe 19 Août 1942', in *D-Day Le B.F.M. Commando* (Paris: Amicale des Ancien Parachutistes SAS & Commando, nd.), p.6 [Croix de Guerre]; E.W. Jones to H. Henry, 3 July 1996 [Rabouhans actions]; Dear, *Ten Commando*, p.24 [decorated].

as '1 Ally', probably as a cover, assigned to Advance Force HQ, A Troop, under Lt A.F.S. Veasey, in LCA 3, scheduled to land at Orange II. An after-action report by Capt. B.W.S. 'Bill' Boucher-Myers, states that his HQ A Troop, plus another section of A, landed in the second flight at Orange I, and 'included three of the French Fighting Forces'. The third reference to him is a citation by Lord Lovat for the Military Medal, later awarded to him by Mountbatten, which stated that 'He was attached to one of my Troops and played a conspicuous part in the searching and occupation of the village of Le Haut'.⁶⁹

The secondary sources also describe Balloche's story somewhat differently. Dear not only recounts that 'Balloche and Mills-Roberts led C Troop off the [Orange I] beach while Rabouhans and Taverne became part of a defensive perimeter', but that Balloche's took part in the final assault on the battery. One of Dear's sources is Adolphe Lepotier, *Raiders from the sea* (1954), who claims to have interviewed Balloche. Lepotier has him 'accompanying' Mills-Roberts from Orange I, 'participating in the final attack' on the battery and finally, 'arrived among the first' on the battery's parapets. This appears inaccurate since none of Group 1 or Lt Veasey's 1 Section, A Troop, of Group 2, took part in the final hand-to-hand combat to capture the guns.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Lovat's citation continued that 'He proved of great assistance to the Troop leader [most likely Capt. Boucher-Myers], who could not speak French, and having gained the information required, he subsequently went into action, and with the rest of the Troop, inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy', Dear, *Ten Commando*, p.24 [citation]; 'Operation Order No.1: *Cauldron*, 14 August 1942, Appendix B - Amendment, NAC, RG 24/13747/Serial 152/GS8, [Orange II, LCA 3, A Troop - Lt Veasey, '1 Ally']; Capt. B. Boucher-Myers, 'Report on A Tp. Orange Beach I', 21 August 1942, NAM, PYP, 9010/31/725].

⁷⁰ Lepotier also writes that Balloche claims he received a Mentioned in Dispatches for having carried a 'British comrade on his back across the beach sprayed by bullets and into the water as far as the assault craft'. He explains about a French-Canadian volunteer [SSR?] who refused to embark, because he wanted to stay 'to fight for France' (p.134). No supporting

While Mills-Roberts, his HQ, and the rest of C Troop, proceeded at the double towards the battery, Lt E.L.K.A. Carr, moved east with a fighting patrol, to find and cut the telephone cable between the observation post (OP), in the light house area, and the battery. Cutting this in two places by 0600, he then moved south towards the double cross-roads near the village of Le Haut, east of the village of Ste. Marguerite, rendezvousing with A Troop, under Capt. Boucher-Myers. Here they took up defensive positions to block any move towards the battery by the German troops known to be in Ste. Marguerite.⁷¹

By 0540 Mills-Roberts Troops were all in their assault positions, his Bren gunners and snipers in well concealed in scrub, a house and a barn, some not more than a hundred yards from the battery, while his mortar OP had a buzzer line going back to the mortar position. The men were so close that they could hear the commands for the guns to fire and also could see a German in what appeared to be a cook's uniform and tall hat – evidence that the Battery was unaware of the commandos' presence. Two US Rangers, Sgt Szima and Cpl Franklin M. 'Zip' Koons, acted as snipers, the latter becoming the first American soldier to kill a German in the war. For his actions Mountbatten later awarded him the Military Medal. Back on the beach, the *Phantom* patrol had left the MGB at 0525 and headed towards the beach under fire. On touching down, Capt. Alister R.M. Sedgwick, sent Fusilier C. King off to guard the left flank against any infiltration and ordered Tpr B. Randall to set up station and open up the W/T set. Sedgwick recalls,

evidence has been found for these claims. Lepotier, *Raiders from the sea*, pp.131-4; Dear, *Ten Commando*, pp.24-5.

⁷¹ Capt. R.W.P. Dawson, 'Report on C Troop during Operation *Cauldron*', 21 August 1942, PRO, DEFE 2/40 [0600 cable cut].

'This was operated from inside a small portable wigwam which was somewhat akin to an Eskimo's igloo with an entrance tunnel which accommodated the set and the head and shoulders of the operator who was thereby screened from any outside noise or disturbance'. At 0609 he informed *Calpe* and Portsmouth of the successful landing. Sedgwick kept in touch with the Commando Troops using W/T and runners, and relayed messages for the whole time the Commando was ashore, and after, while aboard ship during the return journey.⁷²

Before *Phantom* had landed the battery had already opened fire, and therefore Mills-Roberts ordered his men to engage. The accurate Bren and sniper fire quickly silenced^d three of the four heavy MG positions in front of the battery. Later the 2in mortar, under direction of Troop Sergeant-Major (TSM) Jimmy Dunning, opened fire. His first shot fell short but his third one, landed in the area of No.1 gun causing a huge explosion and fire. The battery did not fire again. Men attempted to fight the flames but were quickly shot by the snipers and Brens, allowing the flames to spread to the other cordite dumps, causing them to explode. The time was 0607. Harassing fire was kept up, while contact was received from Group 2, who were now in position. At 0625, just before zero hour for Group 2's attack, Mills-Roberts ordered smoke fired from both mortars on *Hess*. At this time the pre-arranged air attack,

⁷² Lindsay, 'The battery', 32 [cook]; 'Report of Sergeant Szima, 1 Section, 2 Platoon', and 'Report of Corporal Koons, 2 Section, 2 Platoon', nd., US National Archives, EJDC [possibly from 'Report of Dieppe Operation', 1 Ranger Battalion, 29 August 1942, USMA Microfilm MP63-8/1]; Recommendation for Military Medal, Cpl F.M. Koons, nd., EJDC [first American to kill German]; confirmed by James J. Altieri, 'The First Ranger Battalion in Britain', in *Darby's Rangers: an illustrated portrayal of the original Rangers (World War II) In training and in action* (Durham, North Carolina: Seeman, 1945), p.30; Koons was later awarded the American Silver Star by Patton, Lt-Gen. George S. Patton to Koons, 16 May 1943, EJDC; Capt. A.R.M. Sedgwick, 'Report by Capt. Sedgwick, *Phantom* attached to No.4 Commando', Appendix C, Annex 2, p.2, 20 August 1942, GHQ, Liaison Regiment, War Diary, PRO, WO 215/16 [0525, 0609]; Alister R.M. Sedgwick, '*Phantom's* operation on Orange beach during the Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942', audio recording by Emyr W. Jones, 30 October 1990, EJDC.

previously referred to as masking Group 2's initial beach assault, came in and strafed the whole battery area. At 0630 Lovat's assault signal of three white Very lights went up. In the post-war period, disagreement rose over whether or not the huge explosion was from a mortar bomb or due to air attack. Mills-Roberts commented on this, explaining that the 2in mortar bomb was not a 'chance shot but a carefully aimed bomb fired by an expert... It had been expressly agreed with the RAF that no aircraft should be over the battery till 0630 precisely. No doubt the mortar bomb, which landed, so to speak, from the air (i.e. High trajectory) gave the Germans the impression that it was from an aircraft'.⁷³

At 0445, the German Quiberville defensive position received the report, 'Enemy ships approaching the coast', from 813 Bty, presumably informed by its OP. The position went to action stations and five minutes later, opened fire on the landing craft unloading on Orange II. Lord Lovat states Group 2 landed on schedule, the first flight landing in V formation, under Lt A.F. Veasey. With him were the other two US Rangers, S/Sgt Kenneth D. Stempson and Cpl William R. Brady. In his after-action report, Brady explained the landing procedure for the first Section ashore, 'the 1st man that landed had the Scaling Ladder (all three sections), 2nd man had Bangalore torpedoes, 3rd man was a scout, 4th man was a Platoon Sergeant and I was the fifth man with 6 grenades'. Veasey's Section quickly overcame the beach wire with rabbit netting (1m 20 wide), scaling the cliffs

⁷³ Major Derek Mills-Roberts, 'Report on the landing by Major D. Mills-Roberts', 20 August 1942, p.1 [0607], PRO, DEFE 2/337; Lindsay, 'The battery', 33 [0625]; Lindsay, 'Destruction of a German Battery by No.4 Commando during the Dieppe raid', Notes from Theatres of War, No.11, London: War Office, February 1943, p. 12 [0630]; J.E. Dunning to H. Henry, 4 July 1996 [third one hit No.1 gun]; 'Notes by Mills-Roberts on *Norway - the Commandos - Dieppe* [1951] by C. Buckley', nd., DHist 594.009 (D2), ['chance shot'].

with the aid of tubular ladders. He quickly captured two pillboxes, both unoccupied according to Sgt Stempson, but received minor casualties from an unidentified MG. Lateral telephone wires were cut. The main landing touched down a few minutes after the first wave, suffering casualties from a German mortar, before they could get clear of the beach. A minefield, marked in French and German was bypassed and the force formed up to advance along the River Saane. Lt Veasey section moved off towards the double cross-roads to meet up with the rest of A Troop. Meanwhile, Lovat's force moved at the double along the river about 1600 yards. At this point, they turned inland and headed east towards the wood behind the Battery. At the wood B and F troops divided, and Force HQ moved forward to the edge of an orchard near the Battery's perimeter wire. F Troop moved through the orchard and surprised a large group of Germans in the village of Le Haut, preparing to counter-attack C Troop. They were quickly killed.⁷⁴

By 0625 both of the flank troops were in position and had Bangalorees under the wire ready to blow. Precisely at 0630 the air attack came in and Lovat signalled that assault. According to Lovat:

B and F Troops then attacked with fixed bayonets; it was a stupendous charge which went in, in many cases over open ground swept by machine-gun fire, through a barbed wire entanglement, over running strong points and finally ending on the gun sites themselves, where all crews were bombed and bayoneted into submission. F Troop who behaved magnificently suffered heavy casualties. All their officers were killed... Considerable numbers of Germans who had hidden in underground tunnels... and outbuildings, were either bayoneted or shot at close range by sub-machine guns. Two officers including the Military Commander was also killed.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Lord Lovat, 'Operation *Cauldron*: Report on Orange beach II landing by Lt-Col The Lord Lovat', 21 August 1942, pp.1-2, PRO, DEFE 2/337; Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM, p.88 ['Enemy ships']; 'Report of Sergeant Stempson, 1 Section, 1 Platoon, Troop A', nd., and 'Report of Corporal Brady', nd., ['1st man'], USNA, EJDC.

⁷⁵ Lord Lovat, 'Operation *Cauldron*: Report on Orange beach II landing by Lt-Col The Lord Lovat', 21 August 1942, p.2, PRO, DEFE 2/337.

The Germans, in the meantime had been taken by surprise, at 0650 reporting to 770 CD Bty, 'Enemy has penetrated into Bty position... tank gun knocked out by direct hit. Five guns are put out of commission by the enemy with explosive and incendiary charges'. The report continued to explain that the Battery Comdr had tried to re-take the position with a fighting patrol from the Bty OP but was repulsed with severe casualties. At 0702 the last report sent out was, '813 involved in fierce close combat, Bty Com[mander] seriously wounded, Varengeville being attacked in force'; this also was the first report to reach 302 ID HQ about the plight of the Bty. It prompted an urgent telephone order to 1 Bn, 571 IR, to proceed towards the area from its position around Ouveille-la-Rivière, and counter-attack it with a reinforced rifle Coy.⁷⁶

Back on Orange I, the *Times* correspondent, Austin, arrived and informed Capt. Sedgwick of the destruction of the guns. By 0715 Sedgwick had duly sent the message: '*Pigeon* demolished. Withdrawing 0700'. In the battery area B Troop proceeded to 'mop up', while F Troop destroyed the guns and ammunition stores. The commando dead were left, as were some of the more seriously wounded (a medical orderly, Pte Joe Pascale, volunteered to stay behind to attend to them and thereby became a prisoner), the other wounded were assisted or made their own way through Group 1 to the beaches to withdraw. These wounded included Capt. Pat Porteous who was carried on a make-shift stretcher (a door from the battery) by four PoWs. The withdrawal, in spite of harassing enemy fire, Dunning explains, 'was carried out in accordance with a well-rehearsed phased

⁷⁶ Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM, pp.90-91.

thinning-out covered by smoke from mortars and smoke generators taken ashore and sited [*sic*] in the bridgehead'. The reembarkation began at 0730 and was completed by 0800. At 0855, Sedgwick sent the following message, 'To CCO from OC No.4 Commando. Everyone of gun crews finished with bayonet. OK by you?'. Porteous was awarded the Victoria Cross for his part in Lovat's charge on the guns. In a post-war interview Porteous explained that the original VC citation, written by Lovat, was 'mislaidd in the army chain of command' and it had to be written again from memory. This resulted in a description of his actions that Porteous regards as 'pure... imagination'. Unfortunately, the story was immediately seized upon by the newspapers and quickly put into print, being repeated in the official commando history and subsequent secondary sources.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Capt. A.R.M. Sedgwick, 'Report by Capt. Sedgwick, *Phantom* attached to No.4 Commando', Appendix C, Annex 2, p.2, 20 August 1942, GHQ, Liaison Regiment, War Diary, PRO, WO 215/16, [0855]; Lt Brent Hutton-Williams, 'Base Message Log', 21 August 1942, p.1 [*Pigeon*, 'OK by you?'], GHQ Liaison Regiment, War Diary, PRO, WO 215/16; J.E. Dunning to H. Henry, 4 July 1996, comments on Chapter 5 [describes withdrawal, Pte Pascale]; Commando casualties were 2 officers and 14 ORs KIA, 3 officers and 17 ORs wounded (of these 20 wounded, 12 were back on duty within 2 months), and 9 PoW. All the men who became PoW, except for Pte Pascale, were wounded too seriously to move. All *Phantom*, French Commandos and Rangers returned. See Lindsay, 'The battery', p.35; Sir Martin Lindsay, 'Destruction of a German Battery by No.4 Commando during the Dieppe raid', Notes from Theatres of War, No.11 (London: War Office, February 1943), p.17; Jones lists the Roll of Honour, including full names and rank, 'Operation *Cauldron*, EJDC. Although Lovat claimed to have killed the whole German crew, this is incorrect and German records reveal that of a crew that varied between 93 to 112 men, about 30 were KIA and 30 wounded – a proportion, states Stacey, 'which reflects the use of the bayonet'. At the time Lovat was justified in reporting this, since from his perspective, no crew were seen alive, thus some were probably wounded, shaming death or hiding. Four men were also taken back to England. See 81 Army Corps Headquarters, 'Combat report and experiences gained during the British attack on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 25 August 1942, SHAEF translation, 24 February 1944, NAC, RG 24 G3/20438/981.023 (D10), pp.6-7, [German losses – 28 KIA, 29 wounded, 4 PoW], p.19 [six 150mm guns]; Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, 'Report of the C-in-C West on the Dieppe raid 19 August 1942', 3 September 1942, p.19, translated by Historical Section (GS), Army HQ, Ottawa, November 1946, PRO, NAC RG 24/20429/981.013(D6) [30 KIA, 21 wounded, 10 missing]; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.363 [about 30 KIA, 30 wounded, 4 PoW]. Colonel P.A. Porteous, transcript of interview by T. Macartney-Filigate, c.1977, pp.10-13, DHist 79/567/92; Saunders, *The green beret*, p.94 [Porteous's exaggerated actions]; Dunning states that Porteous's comment was a typical over-modest, to the extent of self-denigration tongue-in-cheek Porteous remark', Dunning to H. Henry, Comments on Chapter 5, 4 July 1996.

Although the contemporary and post-war, official and personal, Allied sources records show that all the six guns were destroyed, two German after-action reports indicate the contrary. At 0903, 81 Corps reported to GHQ, C-in-C West, 813 Tp had been recaptured and was 'again firing with two guns'. Maj.-Gen. Kurt von Zeitzler, CGS, GHQ West, went to Dieppe to gain some personal impressions of the course of the battle, and concerning 813 Tp actions at 0910, he noted that the 'Guns still intact fired to the last'. Stacey believes that the first report is 'quite unsupported by other evidence and is probably an error' for two reasons. First, the Air Force Commander's report shows no air action against the battery at this time, and, second, the same German report states that 'six 150mm coastal defence guns' were lost, which was the battery's full complement. Stacey does not mention Zeitzler's report. The Admiralty Battle Summary argues that all of the six guns claimed destroyed did not have to belong to *Hess*. Two could have belonged to other batteries and may have been destroyed in air attacks. This supposition is possible, since other batteries had exactly the same type of gun and were under 81 Corps command. Although not a *Jubilee* objective and not in the Dieppe defensive zone, they were subjected to air bombing during the battle.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Sources claiming *all* guns destroyed are: COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.16; Lindsay, 'Destruction of a German Battery by No.4 Commando during the Dieppe raid', Notes from Theatres of War, No.11, London: War Office, February 1943, p.15; Lord Lovat, 'Operation *Cauldron*: Report on Orange beach II landing by Lt-Col The Lord Lovat', 21 August 1942, p.3, PRO, DEFE 2/337; Lt Brent Hutton-Williams, 'Base message Log', Appendix C, Annex 2, GHQ Liaison Regiment, War Diary, 21 August 1942, PRO, WO 215/16. Rundstedt, 'Report of the C-in-C West on the Dieppe raid 19 August 1942', 3 September 1942, p.7 ['again firing'], p.19 ['Guns still intact'], translated by Historical Section (GS), Army HQ, Ottawa, November 1946, PRO, NAC RG 24/20429/981.013(D6); Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.362; 81 Army Corps Headquarters, 'Combat report and experiences gained during the British attack on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 25 August 1942, p.19, SHAEF translation, 24 February 1944, NAC, RG 24 G3/20438/981.023 (D10), [six 150mm coast artillery guns]; Admiralty, Battle Summary No.33, p.23, PRO, ADM 234/355.

The available information confirms that the battery never fired again and definitely ceased to exist as a fighting unit. Thus the objectives of *Cauldron* were achieved and turned out to be the only successful land operation. Dunning concludes that 'It was conducted with panache and daring – plus, admittedly a little luck – according to a carefully worked out plan based on "fire and movement", thoroughly and tirelessly rehearsed by men who were confident, efficient and of high morale.' Rightly, *Cauldron* has been acknowledged as 'a classic infantry operation'.⁷⁹

FLANK ATTACK III: PUYS (BLUE BEACH) THE ROYAL REGIMENT OF CANADA

The attack on Puy was regarded by Hughes-Hallett as the most significant of the flank landings. Their mission was to neutralize the German defences on the east headland overlooking Dieppe (see Map 2). Obviously, this must have gravely concerned him, for just two days before *Jubilee* sailed, he sent a letter about this to Mountbatten, with copies to C-in-C Portsmouth and the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Home). In this, he stated that if any of the LSIs carrying the troops to land at Blue beach were sunk, the operation should be aborted. This letter is the only pre-raid indication to come to light concerning this matter. *Post facto*, he clarified his thoughts, speaking at the 'Conference on Landing Assaults', held at the US Assault Training Centre (UK), from 24 May to 23 June 1943, 'it had always been realized that unless the Eastern Cliff... was captured, the frontal assault on the town, on which the whole operation chiefly depended, would fail. It was, therefore, a serious disaster that this landing was totally

⁷⁹ J.E. Dunning to H. Henry, Comments on Chapter 5, 4 July 1996.

defeated'. He replied in the same vein to questions put to him in 1972 by the BBC, 'Nothing could have been more serious, since the main landings were doomed unless the east cliff could be captured'. Ten years earlier, while giving the key-note speech at a Royal Regiment of Canada Association dinner in Toronto, he lamented about the rigidity of the plan. He blamed himself for failing to have an alternative plan in case the attack on the eastern headland failed. One such plan could have had the RM Commando assault the headland from the rear. He concluded that he 'had always attached greater importance to the East Cliff than the Army', and that they 'had concluded that the capture of the Cliff was not vital' to overall success of the operation.⁸⁰

The Naval Operation Order specified that 'Surprise is the element upon which reliance is placed for the success of the landings on Green and Blue beaches and they will not be supported by gunfire from destroyers'. Although the orders did have a provision that if the landings were delayed the Forward Observation Officer (FOO) on both beaches could request it. As it turned out, the FOO on Blue was in regular touch with the destroyer *Garth* from 0541, and his operator maintained contact until the general surrender of the Bn on the beach. *Garth* bombarded the east headland for a short time but had to cease, as the shelling was coming to^O_A close to the troops on the

⁸⁰ Hughes-Hallett, 'Conclusions and recommendations', Enclosure 2, p.3, to 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48) [aborted]; Hughes-Hallett, 'Summary of an address by Commodore J. Hughes-Hallett, RN: the Dieppe raid', 26 May, in 'Conference on landing assaults 24 May-23', 1943, p.3, USNA, RG 492/Admin File ETO/109/Adm 491 'Conference on Landing Assaults'; Hughes-Hallett to BBC, 'Dieppe', 25 February 1972, p.3, NAC, MG 30 E/463/11; Hughes-Hallett, 'The Dieppe raid: Address by Vice-Admiral J. Hughes-Hallett', 20 January 1962, Royal Regiment of Canada Association Dinner, Toronto, pp.9-10, PRO CAB 106/6.

beaches. She had to turn away as she was being bracketed by the effective fire of German 75mm artillery.⁸¹

The defences of Puys, natural and artificial, were formidable. On either side were rising cliffs, in between was a sea-wall from ten to twelve feet high, topped by thick barbed wire, which intelligence had not been able to identify from aerial photos, although the RRC were prepared for this eventuality. The two exits through the sea-wall were also heavily wired. The most serious defensive point, from the Canadians' point of view, was a large brick house on the left (east) flank of the RRC landing. This had been turned into a fortified strong-point, and just below it was a camouflaged, concrete pillbox, with a wide arc of fire, and excellent view of the beach. Another heavy MG was in a second, well camouflaged pillbox, on the opposite slope. A third pillbox was located in between. On the right slope were two other fortified houses, beside various concealed infantry positions and two LMG posts. All these positions were sited in the best possible positions to bring the most effective enfilade covering the whole beach. Inland were mortar and the B Tp, 302 ID artillery battery, consisting of four 105mm field howitzers. This whole area was part of *Stützpunkt Dieppe-Ost* (Dieppe-East), part of *Stützpunktgruppe Dieppe* (Dieppe Group of Strongpoints), and thus was completely surrounded by barbed wire and prepared for all-round defence. 'Dieppe-East' was from the eastern harbour mole of Dieppe to Puys inclusive, and encompassing the immediate hinterland. Holding this area was the 3 Bn, 571 IR, commanded by Capt. Richard Schnösenberg, who had

⁸¹ John Hughes-Hallett, 'Orders for naval supporting fire', JNB, p.1, to 'Naval Operation Order No. 1', 31 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (D47) ['Surprise']; Capt. G.A. Brown, 'Operation Jubilee: Outline report of the operation at Dieppe 19 August 1942 by 2 CID and attached Troops', 3 February 1943, p.2, PRO, DEFE 2/332 [FOO].

his HQ on the eastern headland. Holding Puys itself were only two platoons, one army and one GAF, plus some GAF technicians, amounting to less than one hundred men. During the assault, apparently only two men were killed and nine wounded.⁸²

A detailed description of the RRC assault on Blue beach is unnecessary, the grim ninety-five percent casualty figure says it all. Writers have ranked not only the whole operation, but especially this episode, with other infamous military disasters such as Gallipoli and the Charge of the Light Brigade. This was not only the highest fatal casualty rate of any unit on the raid but was also the highest of any Commonwealth or American unit, per proportion of forces engaged, during the war.⁸³

Why was Blue beach a dismal failure when the other flank attacks achieved surprise and some success? Several reasons, not least of all, the terrain and German defences already mentioned. This, combined with the fact that the RRC landed sixteen or seventeen (German records say twenty)

⁸² The beach was about two hundred yards long and about fifty yards wide, and rising at the time of the assault, and composed of rounded rocks, 4-6in. in diameter, with a gradient of 1 in 16, Hughes-Hallett, 'Navigational data', Appendix C to JNO1, p.9, 'Naval Operation Order No.1 [Operation Jubilee]', 31 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (D47); Rundstedt, 'Map *Stützpunktgruppe* Dieppe 19.8.42', Appendix 4 to 'Report of the C-in-C West on the Dieppe raid 19 August 1942', 3 September 1942, translated by Historical Section (GS), Army HQ, Ottawa, November 1946, PRO, NAC RG 24/20429/981.013(D6) [units]; Richard Schnösenberg, interview by Fiona McHugh, 5 February 1978, translated transcript, DHist 79/567 [2 MG, 2LMG]; D.J. Goodspeed, 'The Second World War', in *Battle royal: a history of the Royal Regiment of Canada 1862-1962* (Toronto: The Royal Regiment of Canada Association, 1962), p.395 [one hundred men]; Gordon Churchill to C.P. Stacey, 11 September 1962, DHist 594.019 (D10) [German casualties].

⁸³ Of the 554 all ranks landed, 95 percent were casualties – killed, wounded, or PoW – only 64 men returning to the UK, 37 of which were unwounded. The majority of the unwounded ones had not even landed, Capt. W.R. Bennett, RRC Regimental Historian & Museum Curator, 'Operation Jubilee 19 August 1942, The Royal Regiment of Canada', August 1988, pp.1-12, and 'Dieppe Raid Casualties', January 1990, pp.1-2, Toronto, Royal Regiment of Canada Museum, received from Tim Stewart. Sources consulted for these were 'RRC Part II, Routine Orders, Cdn Section GHQ 2nd Echelon 21 Army Group', NAC; 'Casualty Returns', National Defence HQ, Ottawa, Commonwealth War Graves Commission; Peter Worthington, 'Dying at Dieppe: the last word', *Sun*, Toronto, Tuesday 18 August 1992 [Gallipoli].

minutes late, without the benefit of darkness and a smoke screen which had both lifted. The tardiness was due to the naval error of the LCAs forming up behind the wrong MGB. As they were then late, they advanced at a higher speed, thereby leaving the two slower LCMs, each with one hundred men, and other LCAs behind. These landed at 0525. Thus the first assault wave to land was not at full strength. A second wave, which was expecting the beach to have been consolidated, landed at 0545 and the Coys became intermingled. Gaps were blown in the wire with Bangalore torpedoes but men were immediately cut down trying to get through. The German MGs fired on fixed lines initially, then independently later. These MG sweeps forced the men to huddle in groups against the dubious cover of the sea-wall, then mortars started, previously zeroed-in, the bombs exploding on the rocks, causing flying splinters and more casualties. Commenting on the casualties, Capt. Schnösenberg stated, 'such a concentration and such a slaughter of dead, I have scarcely ever seen in Russia myself'. The 3 Bn doctor, Dr Grahamer, was at the scene, and recalls the Canadians, 'were simply decimated by our machine-guns... there were four, five, men lying on top of one another... the badly wounded were often underneath'.⁸⁴

The battle was decided before it could even get momentum going. Beside the MG and mortar fire, howitzers were precisely ranged to land their shots right at the water line to effect maximum damage, as this was exactly where the LCAs were disembarking their troops. The Germans' GAF men hurled stick grenades from long distances, from well hidden positions, on to

⁸⁴ Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', p.67, in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM [twenty minutes]; Richard Schnösenberg, interview by Fiona McHugh, 5 February 1978, translated transcript, pp.12,23, DHist 79/567; Dr Grahamer, interview by Fiona McHugh, 5 February 1978, translated transcript, p.3, DHist 79/567.

the men pinned against the wall and cliffs. All these factors led the FOO, attached to the RRC, Capt. G.A. Brown, to later observe, 'in five minutes time they were changed from an assaulting Battalion on the offensive to something less than two Coys on the defensive being hammered by fire which they could not locate. The narrow confines of the beach did not permit moving away from the fire to engage it from another position'.⁸⁵

The only group of men to have any success were the twenty-five led by the RRC CO, Lt-Col Doug Catto. About 0700, after breaching a hole in the wire with a Bangalore, his group succeeded in gaining the high ground on the right flank. This path through the wire was quickly covered by a German MG and Catto and his men were cut off and on their own, with no communications. Although clearing some houses, and moving west to attempt link up with the elements from the main beaches, they were forced to surrender in the afternoon when they ran out of ammunition. Although the air force accurately bombed the German batteries and defences on the headland, this only temporarily had any affect on the intensity of the German fire. Naval attempts at evacuation, although futile, were tried and resulting in further casualties to naval personnel, and with hindsight, probably should not have been sent in. Thus after just over three hours the remnants of the RRC were forced to surrender. The German divisional war diary recorded at 0835, 'Puys firmly in our hands; Enemy has lost about 500 prisoners and killed'.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Capt. G.A. Brown, RCA, 'Report on the Dieppe operation', nd., Appendix A, p.4, in C.P. Stacey, 'CMHQ Historical Officers Report No.89', 31 December 1942, DHist CMHQ Report No.89.

⁸⁶ Lt Willie Weber, a platoon commander at Puys, claimed after the war that the only reason that the twenty-eight men managed to get through was because, 'fortunately one of our machine-guns jammed', Gordon Churchill to C.P. Stacey, 11 September 1962, DHist 594.019 (D10); Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', p.75, in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM.

The other reason for the failure of the RRC, was that the Germans were manning their posts before the RRC reached the beach. Contrary to popular belief, this was not true for the other garrisons of Pourville and Dieppe, as will be seen. At Puys, just before the convoy encounter broke out, Capt. Schnösenberg was just finishing an anti-raid drill, normal for times of high tension', that is when the tides and moon are appropriate for raiding. He was told of the encounter by his adjutant but chose to ignore it as a normal occurrence between German ships and British patrol boats. Even the Naval Signal Station, near his command post on the east headland thought it nothing unusual, but his adjutant would not let Schnösenberg get to sleep, so the latter decided, 'if you won't let me sleep anyway, then we'll throw the whole battalion out [of its beds] and we'll make a morning alarm exercise'. He alarmed the artillery batteries OPs as well. Therefore, when the first LCAs appeared the Germans were already at their posts, first training searchlights on them, and then, at one hundreds yards, opening fire with light MGs.⁸⁷

An addendum to the Blue beach landing is a controversy that is still bubbling concerning the alleged cowardice of the RRC. This was recently referred to by Brereton Greenhous, *Dieppe, Dieppe* (1993). The background of the debate goes back to a debriefing held the day after the raid on Mountbatten's request, to examine the reasons for the raid's failure. At this meeting, according to Hughes-Hallett, Lt-Comdr Goulding, the SO Blue Beach Landings, claimed that some of the RRC troops 'were afraid to land'. Although he was immediately shut up, this incident caused Hughes-Hallett to

⁸⁷ Richard Schnösenberg, interview by Fiona McHugh, 5 February 1978, translated transcript, pp. 1-2, DHist 79/567; that the Germans were alert at Puys due to the convoy clash is apparently confirmed by Lt Willie Weber, Gordon Churchill to C.P. Stacey, 11 September 1962, DHist 594.019 (D10).

order an official investigation. This revealed that some of the young naval officers in charge of landing craft had been forced to threaten RRC men with revolvers to get ^{them} to go ashore, and that this applied to 'perhaps one-quarter of the men'. Hughes-Hallett notes that he did not take the matter any further at the time, as all the men concerned were either killed or captured.⁸⁸

Greenhous quoted at length from some of the witness statements and agrees with the naval conclusions. This resulted in a storm of anger from veterans and their families, and consequently in letters, and responses, to the Editor of *The Infantry Journal*. In a reply to a critical letter of his book by Dieppe veteran and author Brig.-Gen. Whitaker (the latter who was at the meeting of 20 August 1942), Greenhous stated that perhaps some of the naval officers concerned, such as Goulding, 'were giving false evidence'. But he thinks this 'seems unlikely, however, for there was nothing in it for them. Their reputations were not on the line'. In response, Whitaker wondered why Greenhous only used navy, and no military, sources, such as a that of Capt. Brown, who gave the opposite view. They believed that Goulding navigated wrongly, by steering on two sides of a triangle, until he got a fix, hence making the RRC even more late, instead of going on a direct course to the beach. Whitaker recalled that at the meeting, Goulding planted 'the first seeds of a shameful lie', that has been 'steadfastly perpetuated by Mr Greenhous. Instead of admitting his navigation errors, Goulding avoided personal accountability by accusing some Royals of having to be forced off the craft at pistol point. This, he said caused the debacle'. Whitaker believes

⁸⁸ Breton Greenhous, *Dieppe, Dieppe* (Montréal: Éditions Art Global Inc. in cooperation with the Department of National Defence, 1993), pp.88,99 ; 'Reports of Naval Enquiry aboard Queen Emma', 21 August 1942, JHHP, JHH 3/2; Hughes-Hallett to Terence Robertson, 'mid-June' 1962, p.1-3. (Source unknown)

that the following naval investigation was an 'attempted cover-up... that has caused long-term damage'. The debate is on-going.⁸⁹

FLANK ATTACK IV: POURVILLE (GREEN BEACH) THE QUEEN'S OWN CAMERON HIGHLANDERS OF CANADA

The attack at Pourville was the only other relatively successful part of the operation, the leading elements penetrating some two miles inland, and probably could have gone further, if it had not been for the withdrawal order. Pourville was within the Dieppe *Stützpunktgruppe* and therefore the majority of positions were prepared for all-round defence. In the German Order of Battle were two artillery batteries of 3 Bn, 302 Artillery Regiment, each with four 105mm 14/19 Czech field howitzers – 7 Tp, located on a golf course; and A Tp, near the village of Janval, both in the area of Quatre Vents Farm (see Map 2). This latter battery was an objective and code-named *Göring*. Pourville itself was garrisoned by two Coys of 2 Bn, 571 IR, 302 ID. Six Coy held the village itself, while 5 Coy was in reserve behind Quatre Vents Farme. On top of the eastern slope was the artillery OP, and the RDF station Caude Cote, protected by two 20mm Flak guns, surrounded by a ten-foot high, mixed heavy wire entanglement. Also on the cliff edge were a searchlight and two 47mm Pak anti-tank guns. COHQ Intelligence Section estimated that along the whole front of Pourville were distributed seven MG pillboxes. Many had trench systems and barbed wire around them and were connected to each other by telephone.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Brereton Greenhous, 'Letters: Dieppe debate continues', *The Infantry Journal* 26 (Spring 1994); Denis Whitaker, 'Letters: Dieppe the real issue', *The Infantry Journal* 27 (Winter 1994), 1-3.

⁹⁰ Pourville lies two and a half miles to the south-west of Dieppe at the base of the Scie River. The beach, approximately 800 yards long and was about 25 yards wide at high tide, stretches

The Allied plan was to have the SSR, under Lt-Col Cec Merritt capture Pourville itself, the heights on either side of it, including the RDF station and German 7 Tp battery, and form a bridgehead. Half an hour later the QOCHC, under Lt-Col Gostling, would land and move through the consolidated SSR positions and advance up the Scie valley, linking up with tanks coming through Dieppe, with the aim of capturing the aerodrome, 265 CD battery at Rouxmesnil Bouteilles, code-named *Hitler*, and German divisional HQ thought to be at Arques-la-Bataille. The battery consisted of six 150mm field howitzers.⁹¹

At 0452, two minutes after zero hour, the SSRs touched down. They had experienced no German fire on the run-in and had taken the German garrison by surprise. The Germans reacted quickly and opened up immediately with MG and small arms fire. Unfortunately, the navy had landed

between rising cliffs. Its composition is similar to that of Puy and the other beaches, with a gradient of about 1 in 30, and several groynes leading into the water at 100 yard intervals. Along the length of the beach is a ten-foot high sea-wall, surmounted by 4 to 8 feet in height and up to 30 feet in depth triple Dannert (coiled) barbed wire with gaps at the eastern and western ends, the latter passable by vehicles. See Hughes-Hallett, 'Navigational data', Appendix C to JNO1, p.7, in 'Naval Operation Order No.1 [Operation *Jubilee*]', 31 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (D47) [beach statistics]; and COHQ Intelligence Section, 'Dieppe CB 04157 F(1)', May 1942, pp.32-3 [beach], p.41 [defences], PRO, AIR 8/896. Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM, p.56 [batteries]; Rundstedt, 'Map - *Stützpunktgruppe Dieppe 19.8.42*', Appendix 4 to 'Report of the C-in-C West on the Dieppe raid 19 August 1942', 3 September 1942, translated by Historical Section (GS), Army HQ, Ottawa, November 1946, PRO, NAC RG 24/20429/981.013(D6), [guns, units]; COHQ Intelligence Section, 'Dieppe CB 04157 F(1)', May 1942, p.41, PRO, AIR 8/896 [specific defences].

⁹¹ The SSR strength was 484 all ranks, but Merritt had many other detachments and units under his command, such as naval and military beach and naval signal parties, the special operational groups, such as the SOE, FS Sections, and X-Troop, besides four liaison members of the 14 CATR. The total landing strength was 525 all ranks which landed in ten LCAs and two LCMs. The QOCHC strength was 488 all ranks, besides 12 attached men, including 3 signallers, 1 FS Section, 1 SOE, 4 FOO, 1 US Ranger, 1 RAF, and 1 journalist. They travelled across the Channel in 25 LCP(L)s of Group 6. Mann, in 'allotment of personnel, equipment and stores', 10 August 1942, Appendix C-Part 1, pp.2-3 [SSR], p29 [QOCHC], in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25).

all the troops to the west of the Scie river, contrary to what was hoped for, and thus the Coys attempting to take the high ground with the RDF station, first had to cross the Scie river. This complication meant that eventually the SSR were only able to gain a small, tenuous foothold on the slope, and never reached, let alone get near the RDF station. Thus, Nissen's mission, despite what has been written about him, could never accomplish anything. The beach, sea-wall and town defences were temporarily cleared, except for one MG post on the east flank, and sporadic German mortar and artillery fire on the beaches. Therefore, when the Camerons touched down half an hour late, they had suffered no casualties on the run-in. Unfortunately, one of the first of the SSRs to land was the CO, who was immediately killed by the one remaining MG post.

The SSRs were meanwhile still trying to take the eastern heights. At one point, when the attack was stalled across a bridge over the Scie, Lt-Col Merritt walked out into the middle of the hailstorm and rallied his troops to cross. For this action he was awarded the VC. Of the special units ashore little is known. Of the three US Rangers at Pourville, First Lt Joseph H. Randall, was apparently killed with the SSR inland. Sgt Marcel G. Swank relates that he heard an SSR man had taken a Browning pistol, standard side-arm of an US officer, from a dead American near a farm house. Another witness stated that he saw an American 'with little brass stripes' on his shoulder get killed near a farm house. The wartime history of the Rangers disagrees, stating, 'Though wounded three times severely soon after landing, Randall continued to lead a charge across a narrow fire-grazed beach. He was killed as he reached a German machine-gun nest'. Swank and Sgt Lloyd N. Church were with the QOCHC, although all that is known is

that they were both wounded, the former being evacuated and the latter captured. Swank writes that the claim made in a book that he lost part of his finger is false, although he did get the back of his hand creased. The search group known as the 'Pourville party', consisting of Nissen, FSS Sgt Hawkins and X-Troop member George Bates did not accomplish their missions, and Bates was killed. Curiously, the former two do not mention Bates at all in their after-action reports.⁹²

As the Camerons could not advance inland up the valley according to plan, due to the fire coming from Quatre Vents Farme, the 2ic, Major A.T. Law, adopted the contingency plan of moving into the woods on the western slope with the object of circling around to assault the village of Petit Appeville, and crossing the bridges there to meet up with the tanks. Although assaulting the village he could not dislodge the German defenders who grew stronger throughout the morning. At 0930 he overheard an order to SSR that a general withdrawal on all beaches would begin in half an hour. Therefore he ordered his own troops to withdraw the way they had come. German documents reveal that this penetration was what the Germans were most concerned about during the course of the engagement, and were not only sending local reinforcements there in strength, but also had slated the first strategic reserve element to be arriving in the zone of operations, 10 Panzer Division, to counter-attack this point. It is now clear that the majority of the SSR and QOCHC casualties occurred during the withdrawal. The

⁹² For a stirring contemporary account of Merritt's actions, which has been repeated in most narrative accounts of *Jubilee*, see 'Roll of honour: "for matchless gallantry"', *Maclean's Magazine* (15 November 1942), 22, 25 UCSC, JMP; M.G. Swank to B. Greenhouse, 28 January 1979, DHist 79/139 [Randall with SSR, Church wounded], A.J. Szima to M.G. Swank, 3 February 1979, p.1, TMFDC [Randall KIA inland]; Altieri, 'The First Ranger Battalion in Britain', in *Darby's Ranger*, p.30 [Randall KIA on beach]; M.G. Swank to 'Harry', 4 February 1979, TMFDC [finger]; Dear, *Ten (IA) Commando*, p.21 [Bates KIA].

navy also lost heavily. Many of the men had to wade and swim out to the LCAs. At about 1130 Merritt formed a rearguard of about one hundred men, which facilitated the withdrawal of a great proportion of the SSR and QOCHC, but led to the capture of the whole rearguard. At 1337 the HQ 571 IR reported to divisional HQ, 'Pourville is firmly in our hands'.⁹³

⁹³ The total SSR and QOCHC casualties were respectively 6 officers and 70 ORs, and 3 officers and 81 ORs, Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.367; Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM, p.86 ['in our hands'].

6

**EXECUTION OF THE OPERATION
PHASE 2: CENTRE ATTACKS****THE INITIAL LANDING,
GERMAN DISPOSITIONS AND REACTION**

The frontal assault on Dieppe itself was timed to take place half an hour after the flank assaults went in. This was judged to be enough time to neutralize the main German coastal defences, especially on the headlands commanding the approaches to the town. The failure of most of the flank attacks doomed the centre attacks before they had begun.

Dieppe lies at the mouth of the River Arques and is very conspicuous from seaward because of the mile wide gap between the steep cliffs on either side. The eastern half of the beach was code-named Red beach and the western portion White beach (see Map 2 Inset). At the western end of the beach was a large Casino which the Germans had begun to demolish. Behind the promenade was a line of buildings, mostly three or four storey hotels.¹ Two rows of barbed wire stretched along the full length of the beach between the promenade and the sea. The first ran in front of the sea-wall,

¹ Its beach is 1500 yards long and was estimated to vary between 180 to 360 yards wide at low tide. The gradient was 1 in 40 although the last fifty yards before a sea-wall varied between 1 in 4 to 1 in 7. The vertical, concrete and masonry sea-wall stretched the length of the beach and was approximately six feet high, although this was not constant, since the tides had washed the rocks up to with in two feet of the top in many places. The beach was similar composition to the other beaches, the stones being six inches and less in diameter. Wooden groynes extended between high and low tides at intervals of one hundred to one hundred and fifty yards. Behind the sea-wall was a wide promenade, about 165 feet wide, stretching the length of the beach. COHQ Intelligence Section, 'Dieppe CB 04157 F(1)', May 1942, pp.6, 32-3, PRO, AIR 8/896; John Hughes-Hallett, 'Navigational Data', Appendix C to JNO1, p.8, 'Naval Operation Order No.1 [Operation *Jubilee*]', 31 July 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/23202 (D47) [beach width, length, gradient].

while the second ran along its top, the latter being about seven feet in depth, six feet high and, in the words of a post-raid intelligence report, 'constituted a formidable obstacle'. Only two gaps existed for personnel access to the water, one a hundred yards west of the Casino, and the second near the junction of Red and White beaches. A natural ridge of rocks about the same height as the sea-wall had been formed by tidal action, approximately fifteen feet from the wall on which the wire ran. The ditch in between extended along certain parts of the beach and formed a natural anti-tank obstacle. It was further deepened by labourers collecting stones and rubble for construction purposes.²

The town and western headland, included in the *Stützpunktgruppe* Dieppe West (which also included Pourville), were held by 7 Coy, 2 Bn, 571 IR, consisting of about one hundred and fifty men. 1 Platoon (PI) held the area fronting Red beach, while 2 PI held that of White beach. 3 PI was positioned on the west headland, in numerous depressions and caves connected by tunnels, and equipped with two 81mm (3in) heavy mortars, two 75mm French light beach defence guns, and four heavy MGs. Elements of 8 Coy manned heavy MGs and 81mm mortars along the entire 2 Bn sector of approximately 5000 yards. As previously noted 3 Bn, 571 IR held the east headland and Puys. Besides the weapons already mentioned, 7 Coy was equipped with a 105mm howitzer, positioned to fire over open sights as a beach defence gun, six 37mm anti-tank guns, four MGs per PI – one heavy and three light, two heavy flame-throwers, two small searchlights, and one

² 'Report on information obtained from Ps/W captured at Dieppe, 19-20 August 1942', 27 August 1942, p.7, PRO, DEFE 2/324 ['formidable obstacle']; Lt-Col G.P. Henderson, 'Intelligence report: raid on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 22 September 1942, p.3 and Appendix A 'Map - Defences of Dieppe West (according to statements by prisoners of war)', NAC, RG 24/10870/232C2 (D2) [beach wire].

obsolete light French tank, type FT 17/18. Positioned at the extreme eastern end of the beach at the base of the west jetty, and embedded in concrete up to its operable turret, its 37mm gun covered Red beach and the sea before it. One 37mm anti-tank gun was located on the end of the west jetty and one on the middle. About a hundred naval personnel were also detailed to defend the town. As previously noted the four 302 Divisional batteries, two of which were located within the *Stützpunktgruppe* Dieppe West, were sighted to bring supporting barrage and interdiction fire down on the beaches and approaches to Dieppe.³

In general, 7 Coy defences, particularly MGs, were sited to fire out to sea at approaching and retreating craft. Due to their positions they were unable to see the dead ground below the sea-wall and lower down the beach. It was the fire-missions of the troops holding the two headlands to enfilade the beach. These positions and weapons were considered the main defence. Besides the numerous caves in both headlands, with guns that could be brought out to fire and then pulled back in, the majority of the weapons on the promenade were also concealed and protected in concrete pillboxes, casemates and bunkers, or behind road blocks. The Germans had even constructed underground bunkers on the promenade covered with grass and completely invisible from the air. Shallow slit trenches or grenade pits were located to cover wire obstacles or bottle-necks where assaulting troops were likely to bunch up, such as the angle of the groynes. These areas were also covered by predicted mortar fire which was coordinated with

³ Lt-Col G.P. Henderson, 'Intelligence report: raid on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 22 September 1942, Part II 'Enemy Order of Battle' and Appendix A, 'Map - Defences of Dieppe West (according to statements by prisoners of war)', NAC, RG 24/10870/232C2 (D2) [unit dispositions]; 'Report on information obtained from Pa/W captured at Dieppe, 19-20 August 1942', 27 August 1942, p.4 [7 Coy weapons], p.7 [150 men], PRO, DEFE 2/324.

the MG fire-plan and were directed by OPs. Dual purpose AA guns were sighted on both headlands, able to enfilade the beaches and approaching craft. All access roads from the town to the promenade were blocked by seven feet high, four-five feet wide concrete walls, some of which had a small space for personnel to pass. These were mounted with barbed wire, had a firing step behind them for infantry, and two had 37mm guns sighted behind them. All roads leading into Dieppe had removable road blocks with booby traps on either side of the roads. The whole town, including Pourville and Puys was set up for all round defence, being surrounded by a continuous belt of barbed wire, all defences being sighted in an anti-raid, as opposed to anti-invasion, role.⁴

The specific German defence dispositions of 2 PI, 7 Coy, are instructive for examining the assault later. Each Section had one MG. No.1 Section, 2 PI, 7 Coy, held the area on the promenade, immediately to the east of the Casino, in front of Hotel Verdun, and was centred in a large rectangular block house and in zigzag trenches around it. The blockhouse also acted as HQ 7 Coy. No.2 Section, 2 PI, was billeted in the east wing of the Casino from which it patrolled. No.3 Section, 2 PI, held the west corner of the Casino, and a concrete pillbox attached to the north-west corner of the Casino, housing a rapid-firing Czech 47mm anti-tank gun and attached

⁴ Lt-Col G.P. Henderson, 'Intelligence report: raid on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 22 September 1942, Part III 'Enemy defences and weapons', pp.1-3, and Appendix A, 'Map - Defences of Dieppe West (according to statements by prisoners of war)', NAC, RG 24/10870/232C2 (D2); 'Report on information obtained from Ps/W captured at Dieppe, 19-20 August 1942', 27 August 1942, pp.6-7, PRO, DEFE 2/324. See also after-action summaries 'Red beach' and 'White beach', nd., NAC, RG 24/10765/222C1 (D126). Underground promenade bunkers are not indicated in any German or Allied records or secondary accounts but this author has identified one in a post-raid German photograph. This shows Churchill tank BETTY, 7 Tp, stuck in a ditch, which is actually the entrance to a underground bunker, shown by the ventilation intake in front of it. Paris, Fort D'Ivry, ECP Armées, DAM 1137/L04, pictured in this author's, *Dieppe through the lens of the German war photographer* (London: Battle of Britain Prints International Ltd., 1993), p.50.

heavy MG. The Casino itself was not used as a strongpoint. No.4 Section, 2 PI, was positioned in centre block at the extreme western limit of the of the house frontage on the sea, west of the Casino, directly below the west headland.⁵

The *Jubilee* Military plan called for a short preliminary air and sea bombardment after which the Essex Scottish and RHLI, supported by 14 CATR (Calgary Tanks), engineers and other specialist units, would assault Red and White beaches. After clearing the beach defences and capturing the town, a perimeter would be set up around it. Meanwhile, the engineers would carry out demolition tasks, German military locations would be checked for documents of intelligence value, while Royal Marine 'A' Commando would enter the harbour on the gunboat *Locust*, to capture armed trawlers, in conjunction with units of the Essex Scottish and Calgary Tanks. Units of RHLI and Calgary Tanks were to push through Dieppe and link up with the advance elements of the QOCHC advancing from Pourville, to capture the aerodrome and German divisional HQ. The Essex Scottish were to consolidate the eastern side of the town and link up with the RRC. The FusilierMont-Royal was to act as floating reserve and to land later as a rear-guard to cover the withdrawal.⁶

⁵ 'Report on information obtained from Ps/W captured at Dieppe, 19-20 August 1942', 27 August 1942, p.3, PRO, DEFE 2/324.

⁶ Brigadier C. Churchill Mann, 'Assault and occupation', 9 August 1942, Appendix D, pp.1-12, in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/232O2 (D25) [detailed explanation of unit tasks]. The *Jubilee* unit embarkation strength for the centre beaches consisted of 32 Officers and 521 ORs of the Essex Scottish, 31 Officers and 551 ORs of the RHLI, 32 Officers and 552 ORs of the FMR, 125 Toronto Scottish Regiment (MG), 17 Officers and 352 ORs of Royal Marine 'A' Commando, 7 Officers and 309 ORs of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers (RCE), 14 Officers and 256 ORs of the Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA), 10 Officers and 116 ORs of the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps (RCAMC), mortar detachments of the Calgary Highlanders and Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, 32 Officers and 392 ORs of 14 CATR with 58 tanks, plus smaller and ancillary support detachments of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals (RCCS), Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (RCASC), Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps (RCOC), Canadian Provost Corps,

The RHLI were transported across in LSI *Glengyle*, the Essex Scottish in the LSIs *Prince Charles* and *Prince Leopold*, while the numerous other units crossed in twenty LCTs. The LSIs transferred their troops to LCAs for the final run-in. Before touch down close-support aircraft laid a smoke screen along the Dieppe sea-front and over the east headland (code-named *Bismarck*) which the Air Force Commander later reported, 'was most effective lasting from 0510 to 0600'. For ten minutes, from 0515, Hurricane fighters, bombers and Spitfires strafed the German defences in the sea-front buildings, on the beach, promenade and west headland. Air attacks were also mounted prior to and during the centre amphibious assaults on two of the German divisional batteries, A and B, code-named *Göring* and *Rommel*, and on 265 CD Battery, *Hitler*. The remaining two divisional batteries were not targeted as they had not been identified by aerial reconnaissance or intelligence sources.⁷

The assault received a preliminary bombardment of the sea-front houses by four destroyers – *Berkeley*, *Bleasdale*, *Garth* and *Albrighton* – which began minutes after the air attacks and lasted until 0520, at which time the bombardment was raised to the headlands and continued for fifteen minutes. The initial phase set three buildings on fire and damaged several

Canadian Intelligence Corps, and Naval Beach/Signal parties. Special operational units included Ranger, No.10 (IA) Commando and SOE personnel, besides a selection of journalists and 'spectators'. These embarkation strengths are taken, unless otherwise indicated, from Stacey, 'Dieppe Raid: Embarkation strengths – Casualties – Disembarkation Strength (Canadian Units)', in *Six years of war*, p.389. The strength of 14 CATR is based on this author's extensive research into the tank role, see *Dieppe through the lens*, pp.12, 60; and 'The Calgary Tanks at Dieppe', *Canadian Military History* 4/1 (Spring 1995), 74, fn.25. Robin Neillands, 'Dieppe, 1942', in *By sea and land: the Royal Marine Commandos, a history 1942-1982*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987, p.32 [RM Commando strength]; confirmed by J.C. Beadle, *The light blue lanyard: fifty years with 40 Commando Royal Marines*, Sansome Place, Worcester: Square One Publications, 1992, p.26.

⁷ Air Marshal Sir Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory, 'Report by the Air Force Commander on the combined operation against Dieppe – August 19, 1942', 5 September 1942, p.6, NAC, RG 24 G3/10870/23202 (D5) [timings].

others. According to the Naval Force Commander's after-action report, this did not prevent German defensive MG and sniper fire from the same buildings being 'intensive as soon as landings commenced'. Commenting on the second phase, Hughes-Hallett stated that, 'little destruction to mortar and small arms posts was caused as considerable fire continued from these areas throughout the operation'.⁸

The Adjutant to the 571 IR, Capt. P. Hinz, recalled that the air and sea bombardment on the west headland were 'not entirely without effect'. He noted that Capt. Ullrich, commander, 8 Coy, 2 Bn, was killed 'in the very first bombardment', while the searchlight battery attached to the 8 Coy was destroyed by shelling and the crew burned to death. More importantly, he noted that 'all the telephone lines were broken', although his only elaboration on this was that the 7 Tp, 302 Divisional Artillery, OP in its concrete bunker on edge of the headland, just below the Golf Hotel, had no communications with its guns, making fire control from this point impossible. A post-war interview with former A Tp lieutenant, Dr Schlie, who had been in an OP on the west headland, confirms the death of Ullrich and cutting of telephone communications. Hinz further explained that the assembly areas for 5 Coy, 2 Bn, held in reserve behind Quatre Vents Farm, also were 'carpeted with heavy fire' from air and sea, and that '5 Coy escaped annihilation only because of the fact that its commander, Lt Oldenburg, had disobeyed standing orders and had not occupied the assembly areas'. The 302 Divisional report appears to confirm these claims, stating that the telephone connections between 571 IR, divisional artillery batteries, AA units

⁸ John Hughes-Hallett, 'Bombardment Report', Enclosure No.7, p.1, to 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48).

and Aircraft reporting Centre, 'were for the most part disrupted and required the constant attention of the telephone linesmen'. Plans to use blinker lights for communication between the two headlands did not materialize due to constant smoke screens. On the larger scale, the air/sea bombardments seem to have been much less effective. The report noted that although air attacks caused 'brief periods of disruption' to telephone lines, they were 'quickly repaired', and Division 'kept up contact' with the HQs of 1 Bn/571 IR, 571 IR, and 770 Army CD Battery, while it also maintained communications with HQs of 570 IR, 572 IR, flanking divisions and 81 Corps.⁹

The *Prince Charles* and *Prince Leopold* Flotillas carried the Essex Scottish and consisted of eight LCAs and one LCS(M) each. They touched down, respectively, at 0520, on time, and 'a few minutes after schedule'. The *Glengyle* Flotilla carried the RHLI and consisted of ten LCAs, two LCM and one LCS. The Flotilla Officer, Lt. P. Cork, later reported that the flotilla came under MG and mortar fire about five minutes before touch down on White beach, badly damaging LCAs BL5 and BL7, which were abandoned on the beach. Touch down, he noted, occurred at 0522, about two hundred yards east of the Casino as planned. The Senior Officer Landings, White beach, Lt- Cmdr C.W. McMullen, on board the LCS, records the RHLI touch down one minute later and confirms that two LCA were lost. The LCS, equipped with a mortar, lobbed smoke bombs onto the beach during the approach and continued to lay this smoke screen and give covering fire for forty-five

⁹ P. Hinz and H. Titzmann, 'Organization and operational employment [571 Infantry Regiment] in France', p.13, and Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', 25 August 1942, p.126, both in *The history of the 302 Infantry Division in retrospect*, ed. Emil Kilgast. DGIS Multilingual Section Translation Bureau, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa: 1982. c1978 Hamburg, CWM; Dr Schlie, Transcript of interview by Fiona McHugh, 3 February 1978, Hamburg, DHist 79/567/100, p.3 [Ullrich], p.5 [telephone lines cut].

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minutes in the area of the Casino and below the west headland, only withdrawing when she was low on smoke bombs and her two 5in guns were jammed.¹⁰

Most troops successfully disembarked from the LCAs without heavy casualties and the suppressing effect of the close-support fighters lifted as the initial assault troops were still trying to get through the heavier than expected wire obstacle on the beach and wall. A most serious naval error in timing occurred which had a serious result on the fortunes of the infantry. The ten to fifteen minute late arrival of the first flight of LCTs, with the supporting tanks of 14 CATR, meant that a gap in suppressing fire occurred, allowing the Germans to quickly recover after the short air/sea bombardment. The German reaction was instantaneous and the results deadly. Action stations for the Dieppe garrison had been called about twenty minutes before, after receiving news of the attack on Pourville. Thus the Germans were able to quickly pin down the assaulting infantry as they attempted to cross the wire, get over the sea-wall, or cross the promenade. Stacey observes that 'In any opposed landing, the first minute or two after the craft touch down are of crucial importance; and it may be said that during that minute or two the Dieppe battle, on the main beaches, was lost. The impetus of the attack ebbed quickly away, and by the time the tanks arrived the psychological moment was past'. The Admiralty Battle Summary

¹⁰ Lt Phillips, 'Extract of report by the Flotilla Officer HMS *Prince Charles*', Appendix 3G to Encl.13, p.32 [0520]; Lt-Comdr W.S. Byles, 'Extract of report by Commanding Officer HMS *Prince Leopold*', Appendix 2E to Encl.13, p.11 ['few minute after']; Lt P. Cork, 'Extract of report by the Flotilla Officer HMS *Glengyle*', Appendix 3F to Encl.13, p.30; 'Extract of report by Lt-Comdr C.W. McMullen', Appendix 5 to Encl.13, pp.39-40, all in Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48); an after-action German photograph clearly identifies LCAs BL5 and BL7 abandoned on White beach, Paris, Fort D'Ivry, ECP Armées, DAM 1141/L13, pictured in this author's *Dieppe through the lens*, p.48.

concludes failure was due to the 'murderous enfilade fire' from the guns concealed in the east cliff face which was greater than had been anticipated.¹¹

ACTIONS OF INFANTRY ON RED AND WHITE BEACHES

Personal accounts by RHLI officers and men who landed and managed to return to the UK, clearly indicate the terrible carnage and difficulties the Coys suffered on landing. D Coy was reported to be almost wiped out, two of its Pls being in the LCAs hit on the approach in. The troops first assaulted the barbed wire which they successfully blew gaps in with Bangalore torpedoes. Suffering heavily from the fire of a concrete pillbox located to the north-east corner of the Casino, attacks on this were finally successful by the use of a Bangalore torpedo stuck through one of the embrasures. A report received at 0619 by the second HQ ship, *Fernie*, stated the RHLI were still 'held up on beach by heavy firing'. After cutting through more wire around the Casino, small RHLI units supported by engineers, were able to filter into it. A room-to-room, clearing procedure was undertaken throughout the maze of rooms in the large building. Many snipers were killed and about thirty PoWs were taken. The troublesome concrete bunker built into the north-west corner of the Casino was also neutralized with explosive

¹¹ John Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Force Commander's Narrative', Encl.1, p.3, to 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48) [LCTs 10-15 minutes late]; Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', p.60, in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM [action stations called at 0501]; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.375; The Admiralty Battle Summary continues that it is these guns were 'impossible to detect even at close range until they fired and... could not easily be silenced by our own fire. This enfilade fire made the capture and retention of the beaches almost impossible and was therefore the main cause of the failure to press on through Dieppe and attain objectives laid down in the plan, Admiralty, Battle Summary No.33, p.27, PRO, ADM 234/355.

charges. The mop up process took about an hour and at 0712 the *Calpe* received the report – 'Casino taken'.¹²

Even before the three-storey Casino was cleared, a group of fourteen men, led by Capt. A.W. 'Toni' Hill, 2ic B Coy, had penetrated through to the back of the Casino, into the first row of buildings and town. At one point they engaged an German anti-tank gun positioned at the intersection of the Rue de Sygogne and Rue Claude Groulard. The position of this gun and crew are shown in a German photograph taken during the battle. They engaged other parties of Germans before being forced to withdraw the way they had come, due to increasingly heavy German resistance. At least one other RHLI group of eighteen, led by L-Sgt G.A. Hickson, also managed to use the Casino to penetrate into the town; covered in their sprint across the open Boulevard de Verdun, to the relative safety of the sea-front buildings, by Churchill tank BERT (SSM Gerald M. Menzies, 6 Tp, B Squadron). They reached an area north of the Church of St Remy but were soon forced to withdraw to the Casino because ammunition was exhausted and no support was in evidence. For this action Hickson was decorated with the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM).¹³

¹² After-action reports by three RHLI officers – Capt. W. Denis Whitaker, Lt W.C. Dick, Lt J.B. Halladay – are in NAC, RG 24/10870/232C2 (D6); revealing post-war interviews of RHLI officers, Capt. D.W. 'Wes' Clare (Medical Officer), Capt. John Foote (Chaplain), Capt. A.W. 'Toni' Hill (B Coy), Lt-Col Robert R. Labatt (CO), are in the largely unused block of 125 interviews done by Terence McCartney-Filgate for the CBC 1979 production *Dieppe 1942*, DHist 79/567/22, 36, 46, 82; '*Fernie Intelligence Log*', p.1, HQ 2 CID, War Diary, August 1942, Appendix 83, NAC, RG 24/13747/Serial 152/GS Folder 9 ['held up on beach']; '*Calpe Intelligence Log*', p.4, HQ 2 CID, War Diary, August 1942, Appendix 51, NAC, RG 24/13746/Serial 152/GS Folder 7 [0712 'Casino taken'].

¹³ The German anti-tank gun photo is in Koblenz, Bundesarchiv 611/2124-5, pictured in this author's, 'The Calgary Tanks at Dieppe', p.84; Charles P. Stacey, 'Operation *Jubilee*: the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Part II: the execution of the operation, Section 2: the attack on the main beaches', 17 December 1943, amended 12 July 1950, p.10-11 [Hill penetration], p.11-12 [Hickson penetration], DHist, CMHQ Historical Officer Report No.108; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.376 [Hickson DCM].

The Essex Scottish were worse off than the RHLI since they did not have the cover of the Casino, once captured, and received fire not only from both headlands and the sea-front buildings, but also from the flank, from the French tank at the base of the west jetty, and from the rear, from the 37mm gun half way along the jetty. On landing, Capt. D.F. McRae, the only Essex Scottish officer to land and return to England, reported that his men were able to overcome two belts of wire on the beach and reach the wall, but by 0545 had received thirty to forty percent casualties. Stacey believes this estimate to be high.¹⁴

Some men did make it across the promenade and into the houses about five minutes after landing, before the German fire became too intense. A group of about twelve men across were able to cross, the most senior of which was CSM Cornelius Stapleton, and were joined by Cpl C.H. Grondin and a Pte Fleming. The latter reported, on repatriation in 1945, that he and Grondin had been the only two of nine to make it across. Stapleton took charge and led the group through the buildings, killing snipers and penetrating as far as the harbour, before being forced to retreat to the beach. This penetration is confirmed by two sources, a signal from the Essex to the RHLI and recorded on the *Calpe*, and the German divisional history, which recorded at 0816 that its troops 'had thrown the enemy back from the harbour railway station (100 metres distant from the beach)'. For this action Stapleton was awarded the DCM.¹⁵

¹⁴ Essex Scottish, War Diary, NAC, RG 24/17513/August 1942/Appendix 6 [MacRae report]; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.337.

¹⁵ Charles P. Stacey, 'Operation *Jubilee*: the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Part II: the execution of the operation, Section 2: the attack on the main beaches', 17 December 1943, amended 12 July 1950, pp.14-15 [Stapleton penetration, *Calpe*], DHist, CMHQ Historical Officer Report No.108; see also CSM Cornelius Stapleton, Transcript of interview, 1978, DHist 79/567/107; Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, p.74.

McRae reported that soon after landing three attempts were made to overcome the wall, wire and promenade, but all were repulsed with heavy casualties. McRae states that by 0630 the Essex Scottish had suffered seventy-five percent casualties, including the majority of officers being killed or severely wounded, thus were no longer able to continue organized assaults and could only maintain defensive fire from behind the wall. By 1030 he records that ammunition had been exhausted, including that of the casualties, and men resorted to scrounging what they could from abandoned tanks.¹⁶

ACTIONS OF THE TANKS AND ENGINEERS

The first nine tanks and supporting engineers, in three LCTs, were supposed to land simultaneously with the initial assault infantry. The tanks were to suppress or destroy all pillboxes and other difficult German defences, while the demolition engineers, infantry support and beach parties, were to remain in the LCTs until this had been done. In the event, the tanks were unable to complete this task. Many of the army troops thus did not disembark, leading to later unfounded accusations of cowardice by certain naval personnel.

A major intelligence failure was the incorrect identification of the exact composition of the beach at Dieppe which proved to be the main technical

¹⁶ Later McRae grimly depicted the situation:

The 3-inch mortars were set up but almost instantly destroyed by bomb or shell fire. Smoke cover was put over by the 2-inch mortars and the crossing of the sea wall was attempted. This crossing was met with intensive gun and mortar fire as well as LMG fire and almost all of the assaulting troops were killed or badly wounded. The Companies reformed and despite the loss of some officers started a second assault under the cover of smoke. By this time some of the 2-inch mortars had been destroyed by enemy fire and the second attack suffered similar fate to the first. By this time the wireless sets were largely destroyed; there being only the 18 set in 'C' Company still functioning. The enemy continued to shell the beach with heavy mortar and MG fire on the flanks causing many casualties. A third attempt on a reduced scale was made to cross the wall and was met by a hail of fire causing most of the personnel to become casualties.

Essex Scottish, War Diary, NAC, RG 24/17513/August 1942/Appendix 6 [MacRae report].

difficulty for the tanks. The whole beach is composed of chert rocks which range from one to six inches in diameter. All Dieppe accounts refer to the beach in general terms, such as 'shale' or 'pebbles'. The Allies had carried out landing tests with the tanks on the firm, sandy beaches of the Isle of Wight and on the small, pebbly beaches of Dorset, but not on a chert beach, such as found at Dover.¹⁷

The Germans, who had conducted at least one such trial, six months previously during an anti-invasion exercise, found their tanks became bellied down and stuck. The Port Commandant is reported as concluding, 'now we know the British cannot land here with tanks'. Since they thought the beach was not negotiable by tanks no heavy anti-tank guns or anti-tank mines were allocated to its defence.¹⁸

The RCE were divided into two main groups – the Beach Assault Party, commanded by Major Bert Sucharov, and the Demolition Party,

¹⁷ Stan A. Kanik, a former trooper of A Squadron, 14 CATR, who was on the raid but did not land, returned to Dieppe several times after the war, most recently in 1992. Drawing on his knowledge as a geological engineer his analysis of the beach clearly explains why many tanks had difficulty manoeuvring on the beach. He notes, 'the white cliffs are composed of siliceous chalk, interspersed with chert lenses and beds'. The chalk is easily dissolved and leaves behind the chert which under beach erosion is 'shaped into rounded and oblong stones (rocks) that resist cracking or breaking'. He continues, 'The entire beach is composed of chert stones, boulders and rubble', which after tidal action, 'eventually rest at an "angle of repose" of about 15 to 20 degrees... these rocks will extend many meters in depth, so vehicles cannot dig down to a solid rock base for traction. When a tracked or wheeled vehicle tries to climb up this slope, it immediately digs itself down; when the tracks are turned to either side the stones roll in between the drive sprocket and track and the object that first gives way is the pins holding the track links'. See Stan A. Kanik, 'Chert Beach – Alias Dieppe', *The informal history of The Calgary Regiment – 14th Canadian Armoured Regiment*, eds. Lt-Col R.G. 'Dick' Maltby and Major W.R. 'Jesse' James (Vancouver: 50/14 Veterans Association, Calgary, 1989), Chapter 2, p.1; see also E.L. Waldo Smith, *What time the tempest: an army chaplain's story* (Toronto: Ryerson, 1953), p.75.

¹⁸ Wahn, 'Report of the Port Commandant Dieppe on the fighting on 19 August 1942', 30 August 1942, p.4, NAC, RG 24/20488/981GN (D13) [beach tank exercise]; a former Canadian Army Historical Officer states that the Germans had not overlooked the possibility of an amphibious assault with tanks. However, he continues, 'after conducting trials with a tank on the pebbly beach, the Germans had concluded that it was impassable to tracked vehicles', T. Murray Hunter, *Canada at Dieppe 17* (Canadian War Museum Historical Publication, Ottawa: Canadian War Museum, 1982), p.33.

commanded by Lt-Col L.F. Barnes, and then subdivided into various sized detachments and squads depending on their missions and distributed throughout the LCTs. The Beach Assault Party was responsible for getting all tanks, vehicles, troops, and materials, from the point of touchdown by the naval craft onto, across, and clear of the beach area. This meant clearing minefields, demolishing any anti-tank concrete road blocks at the exits of the promenade and, using bulldozers to clear boulders, prepare ramps for evacuation and generally keep the beaches clear. If needed, these machines could also help vehicles stuck on the beach and push off grounded landing craft. Their most important task was ensuring that the tanks quickly crossed over the beach and the sea-wall. Four-man squads, carried in the first six LCTs, were to run out ahead of the lead tanks to lay chespaling tracks, which were flexible rolls of chestnut fencing, 'similar to wood-slat snow fencing but made with tough split-slats'. The bundles weighed about two hundred and fifty pounds, were approximately twenty-five feet long and could be wired together to form a continuous roadway. These tracks could be moved around by the engineers to suit the later flights of incoming LCTs.¹⁹ All tanks, carriers and jeeps then passed over these tracks, only becoming bogged down if they swerved off them. Since many of the scout cars had experienced difficulty during training even on the chespaling, it was decided that during the operation these should be towed ashore by the tanks. Note that the pebbles on the Dorset beach were small, up to two inches in diameter, whereas at Dieppe they were up to six inches. The sea-wall was estimated to be up to six feet in height. The *Rutter* plan of using

¹⁹ Major Bert Sucharov, 'Report of the training carried out by the Engineer Group from 2 Canadian Division during the exercises *Rutter* and *Jubilee*', 20 August 1942, to Chief Engineer, 1 Canadian Corps, p.6 and Appendix 2, DHist 594.019(D8).

sappers to blow gaps in the wall was changed in favour of building timber crib ramps beside it for the tanks to climb. On the morning of the operation the intensity of German fire was such that no timbers were ever unloaded.²⁰

From 7 August 1942 Major Sucharov was assigned to develop and test a device to enable the tanks to get over the sea-wall. He came up with a carpet-laying device using chespaling. He designed an apparatus to hold one roll of chespaling, three feet wide (the width of one track was twenty-two inches) and about twenty-five to thirty feet long, in front of each track. Controlled electrically from the turret, the ends of the rolls could be released when the tank was the appropriate distance from the sea-wall. The rolls would then be gradually dragged under the tank's tracks. The tank could then mount up to a twenty-eight inch wall without problem. After use, the whole apparatus could be jettisoned by an explosive charge, electrically set off from inside the turret. The device was demonstrated to Lt-Col Andrews and approved by him on 14 August.²¹ Finally, the Beach Assault Party was responsible for preparing for the successful reembarkation of all tanks and vehicles.

²⁰ Under 'favourable conditions', which supposedly meant not under heavy fire, a highly trained detachment of thirty engineers could carry the five tons of material necessary thirty yards and build a ramp beside a seven-foot wall in five minutes, Major Bert Sucharov, 'Report of the training carried out by the Engineer Group from 2 Canadian Division during the exercises *Rutter and Jubilee*', 20 August 1942, to Chief Engineer, 1 Canadian Corps, p.10 and Appendix 2, DHist 594.019(D8).

²¹ Major B. Sucharov, 'Report of the training carried out by the Engineer Group from 2 Canadian Division during the exercises *Rutter and Jubilee*', 20 August 1942, to Chief Engineer, 1 Canadian Corps, Appendix 3, DHist 594.019(D8) [beach track laying device]; also explained in A.J. Kerry and W.A. McDill, *The history of the Corps of the Royal Canadian Engineers, 1936-1946*, 2 (2 vols., Ottawa: Military Engineers Association of Canada, 1966), p.99; Major B. Sucharov, 'Combined operations, Dieppe', 2 September 1942, Appendix 1, p.1, NAC, RG 24/10870/232C2 (D3) [Andrews approval]. The only known photograph of a Churchill tank Mark III (F1 in a circle, OC C Sqn, Major Allen Glenn) training with the track laying apparatus, was taken by Lt Edwin Bennett, 10 Tp B Sqn, pictured in this author's, 'The Calgary Tanks at Dieppe', p.62.

The Demolition Party was charged with demolishing Dieppe's transportation, communication and power infrastructure – power stations, petrol dumps, dockyard, dry-docks, swing bridges, gas works, pumping stations, telephone exchanges and rail facilities. The group was split up into many small squads, each with its own commanding officer, and assigned precise objectives to be sabotaged once the infantry and tanks secured a perimeter around the town. Most of these squads never got off the beach.²²

Thirty minutes prior to the LCTs touchdown, the tanks warmed up their engines. The first wave of tanks arrived about fifteen minutes late due to navigational error. As noted, during this critical period, the infantry had no fire support and the Germans were able to recover from the short preliminary air and naval bombardment and man their weapons. The assaulting infantry were thus caught trying to breach the heavy belts of wire, the majority becoming pinned down at the sea-wall, unable to dig slit trenches for cover in the rocks. The majority of infantry that passed these obstacles, and later took the Casino, were only able to do so with the support of the engineers and tanks.²³

²² The engineers suffered 87 to 90 per cent casualties – the highest rate of any unit in the raid, see Lt-Col L.F. Barnes, 'Report on combined operations', 5 September 1942, p.7, NAC, this author's Dieppe Collection; Kerry, *Royal Canadian Engineers*, p.108, shows a breakdown of the types of casualties; as does Brigadier C. Churchill Mann, 'General Operational Questions and Answers – Operation *Jubilee*', 18 October 1942, p.4, NAC, RG 24/10870/231C2(D2).

²³ Hughes-Hallett states a fifteen minute delay by the LCTs was due to navigational error by *Fernie*, 'Navigational Report', Encl.9, p.1, 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48). The unarmoured LCTs (Mks 2 and 3) could hold three or four tanks and one or two smaller vehicles, such as scout cars, jeeps or universal carriers. They had a crew of two officers and ten men and were armed with a dual set of 2pdr pom-poms, see Admiralty, 'Types of landing craft', Appendix D, p.53, Battle Summary, PRO, ADM 234/355 [no armour, two 2pdr pom-poms]; further details of LCT specifications are from Baker, 'LCT(2 & 3) Landing Craft, Tank', *Allied landing craft of World War II*; Brown, *The design and construction of British warships*, pp.48-50; Ladd, *Assault from the sea 1939-45*, pp.91-5. The tanks themselves had been adapted for amphibious operations up to a depth of six feet using rubber balloon fabric. Tall, box-shaped ducts, known as louvre extensions, were fitted to the air intake vents and the exhaust pipes were extended

Flight 1, consisting of three LCT(2)s carrying a total of nine tanks, meant to land simultaneously with the LCAs, touched down at approximately 0525 and 0535 hours, five to fifteen minutes late. Sources do not agree on the time. Flight 1A, also consisting of three LCT(2)s carrying nine tanks, touched down on time at 0535. On touching down four of the LCTs were heavily shelled, becoming so badly damaged and killing the majority of the naval crews, that one was sunk and three were unable to withdraw, becoming stranded on the beach. Flight 2 of four LCT(2)s carried a total of twelve tanks and beached on schedule at 0605 hours. All tanks disembarked except for one, unable to do so due to the intensity of fire. Although only one LCT was sunk, the others were so severely damaged that they had to be towed back to England.²⁴

Of the twenty-nine tanks that attempted to land, two exited prematurely and drowned in deep water, while the rest landed dry-shod. Of these twenty-seven, fifteen crossed the sea-wall (German records claim sixteen), although ten ultimately returned to the beach in the area of the Casino, where one was immobilized by the chert.²⁵ The remaining twelve tanks never got off the

so as to be well above the water line. The waterproofing and the louvre extensions could be blown off by electrically-triggered cordite charges placed underneath them. The waterproofing procedure was still in the experimental stage and had never been tested under battle conditions. Detailed waterproofing instructions were first issued 9 June 1942, Lt W.H. Payne, Technical Adjutant, 14 CATR, '14 Cdn Army Tank Bn (The Calgary Regiment): Waterproofing Infantry Tank Mark IV, Churchill I, II, and III', 9 June 1942, pp.1-2, plus attachment, '14 Cdn Army Tank Bn (The Calgary Regiment): Instructions in the use of complete sealing kit on Churchills I, II, and III', nd., pp.1-3, both in 14 CATR, War Diary, NAC, RG 24/14242/January-August 1942/Appendix 4.

²⁴ The most thorough account to date of the actions of each of the twenty-nine tanks landed, including hitherto unpublished photographs of every one, and based on primary and secondary sources, including personal communication with at least one crew member of each tank and most other vehicles, is this author's, *Dieppe through the lens*, pp.9-60; see also this author's summary, with further unpublished photographs, 'The Calgary Tanks at Dieppe', pp.61-74.

²⁵ Fifteen tanks across the wall is the standard figure quoted by Allied documents and confirmed by Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.379; 81 Army Corps Headquarters, 'Combat report and experiences gained during the British attack on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 25 August

beach; four had their tracks broken by shellfire, four by the chert and three most likely by the chert, although this is not certain. The last tank chose to stay on the beach and was mobile for the duration of the battle.²⁶ Of the tanks on the promenade, one's track soon broke from the pressure of the chert stuck in it, while the others drove back and forth, unable to penetrate the town because of the huge concrete road blocks, on which the tanks' armour piercing shells had no effect. The engineers and sappers had suffered tremendous casualties and could not get across the promenade to demolish these barriers. The remaining two flights of LCT(3)s carrying the whole of A Squadron and the remaining three troops of C Squadron, a total of twenty-eight tanks, were never sent in. Although they did receive a signal at 0850 to land at White beach, this order was counter-manded ten minutes later during the approach. The two tank beach parties, instead of carrying out their planned initial tasks of directing the tanks to their objectives, spent most of their time in assisting wounded and organizing tank cover for the general withdrawal.²⁷

At 1100 hours, the senior tank officer ashore, Major Allen Glenn, OC C Sqn, ordered all remaining mobile tanks to withdraw to the beach and take up defensive positions to cover the infantry withdrawal. On doing so another tank broke its track in the chert. It seems that the Germans were preparing an

1942, p.14, SHAEF translation, 24 February 1944, NAC, RG 24 G3/20438/981.023 (D10) [16 tanks crossed]; air reconnaissance on 20 and 21 August revealed tank tracks crossing the sea-wall at eight places, 'Memorandum of interview of Major Tweedsmuir by Major J.D. Halbert, GSO2, CMHQ', 27 August 1942, Bovington, The Tank Museum, File 5025.

²⁶ The crew commander, Major Allen Glenn, OC C Sqn and the senior tank officer ashore, chose to do this as the ridge on the beach was the best place for command and control, since he could see both flanks of the beach and promenade clearly, see this author's *Dieppe through the lens*, p.14.

²⁷ SO LCTs Red and White beaches, 'Extract of report from the Commanding Officer of "B" LCT', Appendix 15 to Encl.13, p.2, Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48) [signal 0850].

infantry counter-attack which the tanks probably deterred. By noon all tanks had been immobilized, fourteen with broken tracks, although many continued to fire until they ran out of ammunition. All 14 CATR veterans and Allied reports claim no tanks' armour was penetrated by anti-tank fire while crews were still in them, although German reports and a photo, reveal that two were penetrated by 37mm shots.²⁸ This probably occurred after the crews evacuated and the Germans moved their anti-tank guns closer. Any casualties to 14 CATR personnel occurred outside the tanks. Contemporary reports that some tanks actually entered the back streets of the town are false.²⁹

Dieppe's chert beach defeated at least six, and probably nine tanks, or thirty percent of those ashore. The beach track laying device attached to some of the lead tanks had not, as many historians claim, been meant to aid the tanks over this hazardous obstacle but was designed to give a tank traction at the moment of crossing the two-foot-high sea-wall. Two of the three tanks carrying this device successfully used it as it was designed, although COUGAR, 13 Tp C Sqn, had problems jettisoning the apparatus

²⁸ 'Report by Lt-Col G.C. Reeves on the raid carried out on Dieppe on 19 August 1942', Assistant Director of Tank Design (ADTD), 28 August 1942, p.5, PRO, DEFE 2/344 [ammunition exhausted]; 81 Army Corps HQ, Operations Officer, 'Combat report and experiences gained during the British attack on Dieppe 19 August 1942', 25 August 1942, p.14, NAC, RG 24/20438/981.023 (D10) [two 37mm penetrations]; Rundstedt, 'Principal comments of the C-in-C Army Group West, No.11 (Based on practical examination of and trials with English tanks captured at Dieppe)', 15 September 1942, translation, p.2, PRO, WO 232/37 [states two tanks penetrated by something between 37mm and 50mm calibre]; ECPA, DAA 2815/L04, pictured in this author's, *Dieppe through the lens*, p.29 [close-up photo of BACKER (F1), HQ F Tp, B Sqn, showing 37mm penetration].

²⁹ Reports that tanks entered town are in Jacques Mordal, *Dieppe: the Dawn of Decision* (London: NEL, 1981, c1963), p.203; Kerry, *Royal Canadian Engineers*, p.107; a contrary report is Christopher Buckley, *Norway. The Commandos. Dieppe* (London: HMSO, 1951), p.-258.

which had either been damaged by enemy shell fire or was technically faulty.³⁰

The success of the experimental waterproofing and deep wading attachments on the tanks cannot be determined because almost all the LCTs landed dry and many tanks received damage to their exhaust and air intake louvres and waterproofing before and while exiting the LCTs, resulting in two drowning. Most of these problems were caused either by the tanks scraping against the sides of the LCTs or by enemy fire. At least one tank, BULL, 8 Tp B Sqn, had one of its louvres knocked off before disembarking, probably by the concussion of an exploding shell.³¹ Some tank crews were unable, or only partially able, to blow the waterproofing and wading attachments, probably because the charges had been damaged by enemy fire. A few crews even had to manually cut this away, either because the partially blown fabric had jammed their turret traverse or obscured their vision ports. Proper testing of this equipment under actual fire, especially during disembarking training, would have revealed its vulnerability. A former Churchill tank officer claims that due to the fact it was still in the experimental stage, there had not been enough time to undertake this kind of training and testing. No arrangement was made for shedding the exhaust extensions.³²

³⁰ This author's, *Dieppe through the lens*, p.18 [COUGAR].

³¹ Report by Lieutenant-Colonel G.C. Reeves on the Raid carried out on Dieppe on 19 August 1942', ADTD, 28 August 1942, pp.4-5, PRO, DEFE 2/334; an air louvre of BULL can be clearly seen in the photo of the stranded LCT-3, ECPA, DAM 1141 L09, pictured in this author's, *Dieppe through the lens*, p.23.

³² Director Mechanical Engineering, 'Lessons of the Dieppe Raid--19 August 1942', 18 September 1942, Bovington, The Tank Museum, File 5608 [exhaust extensions]; this author's, *Dieppe through the lens*, pp.21, 39, 49 [waterproofing problems]; John F. Wallace, a former Tp Leader in the Three Rivers Regiment, in a critical reply to this author's article, 'The Calgary Tanks at Dieppe', states, 'There were no pilot models to play with. There was simply no time to play with tests!', 'Letter to the Editor', *Canadian Military History* 4/2 (Autumn 1995), 6.

The tanks were also severely under gunned. Eleven of the tanks had obsolete 2pdrs, while the other eighteen had 6pdrs (approximately 57mm calibre). Commenting on the latter was former 9 Tp Leader, B Sqn, the Honourable Marcel J.A. Lambert, 'The tank development up to that time made us woefully undergunned, I mean we had just converted to a 6pdr gun on a forty-two ton tank. I mean it was like sending an elephant with a BB gun'. Although the 6pdr was the most modern British gun, a German military appreciation concerning the Churchill tank in the operation, and intended for internal distribution (as opposed to use for propaganda purposes), concluded that, 'so far as its performance is concerned, [it] does not approach that of the Russian guns of the same calibre'.³³ The 6pdr tanks did not even have high explosive shells since they were still in the development stage. Turret traverse jams were caused by shellfire hitting the 6pdr turret ring. Some tanks had either their radio, electrical, hydraulic or steering systems damaged by anti-tank and dive-bomber hits. All these difficulties were technical problems that could have been foreseen with more testing, especially under actual fire. The necessary firing tests were carried out *after* the operation. The new 6pdr turret gun also jammed on many occasions, even though it had been tested before the raid. However, the guns were test fired with only five or six rounds, due to the shortage of ammunition, and at a low rate of fire. During the battle crews obviously fired as quickly as possible, the majority of crews exhausting all their ammunition of about one hundred rounds. The high rate of fire was concluded as the reason for the jams and

³³ Rundstedt, 'Principal comments of the C-in-C Army Group West, No.11 (Based on practical examination of and trials with English tanks captured at Dieppe)', 15 September 1942, translation, p.1, PRO, WO 232/37.

also revealed the tanks normal stowage of ammunition was insufficient for an operation of this type.³⁴

The German appreciation noted that it, 'offers nothing worthy of consideration by technical personnel, nor has it any new constructive features either in the metallurgical field or in the field of weapon technology'. Commenting further on their armament, the 3in howitzer and 2pdr were considered obsolete. The armour thickness was considered good but of poor quality, compared to that used on German and Russian vehicles. The shape of the tank was considered outdated with the armour offering 'a considerable angle of impact'. The report concluded that the tracks were 'made of very brittle material' of 'clumsy design' and 'fractured every time' they received a direct hit, which did not occur with German and Russian tracks. On testing the tanks it was found that the considerable track noise definitely inhibited the use of the wireless, to the point where the tanks had to stop to be able to hear radio transmitted speech. On the whole, the report gave the Churchill a very low rating, finishing that it, 'in its present form, is easy to combat'.³⁵

Concerning the other vehicles landed, at least two scout cars were rammed by their towing-tanks, probably because tank crews forgot about them in the excitement of battle and confusion caused by the unexpected fierce enemy resistance. Four others were towed ashore as planned but then became bogged down or were hit by shell-fire. One, named HECTOR, did

³⁴ 'Report by Lt-Col G.C. Reeves on the raid carried out on Dieppe on 19 August 1942', ADTD, 28 August 1942, pp. 3-5, PRO, DEFE 2/334. All tanks were supplied with an extra box of Besa ammunition.

³⁵ CBC, 'Their springtime of life', Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, television production, 29 August 1972, CBC, VHS Cassette U-05717 [Lambert interview]; Rundstedt, 'Principal comments of the C-in-C Army Group West, No.11 (Based on practical examination of and trials with English tanks captured at Dieppe)', 15 September 1942, translation, p.1, PRO, WO 232/37.

make the promenade but, on returning to the beach, was disabled by a mortar bomb. Only one universal carrier and one jeep landed, both not moving off the beach. None of the bulldozers landed, although one was left in the back of the stranded LCT-3.³⁶

THE LANDING OF RESERVES AND MISCELLANEOUS UNITS

Not much information is known concerning the three Rangers who were to land on the centre beaches. Sgt. Kenneth G. Kenyon, was with a Canadian unit he could not identify, that closed on the beach and then withdrew. This would put him in one of the LCT(3)s that were ordered in at 0850. According to Ranger Swank, Kenyon was off loaded on to the *Calpe*, and 'helped lift me aboard the *Calpe* after I came off Green beach and I was with him when he was wounded a few moments later'. First Lt Robert Flanagan also never got ashore. Swank relates that Szima, who returned to the UK with Flanagan, stated that Flanagan was 'visibly disturbed by the events of 19 August', and as a result of his own request, was transferred out of the Rangers shortly after the raid. According to information related to Swank by Edwin Bennett, 10 Tp Leader, B Sqn, 14 CATR, Technician Fourth Grade (T/4) Howard M. Henry, was believed to have been attached to the RCE Beach Assault Party. Bennett states T/4 Henry was on LCT-7 with him and saw him killed on landing on White beach at the waters edge near the Casino. A post-raid German photograph shows a dead American, identified by the style leggings, near the tank BLOSSOM, in front of the Casino.³⁷

³⁶ Photograph of interior of LCT-3, ECPA, DAM 1141 L09, pictured in this author's, *Dieppe through the lens*, p.23.

³⁷ M.G. Swank to Brereton Greenhous, 'List of men on Dieppe raid: Officers and men of the First Ranger Battalion who participated in the raid on Dieppe, France', cover letter, 28 January 1979, DHist 79/139 [Kenyon, Flanagan, Henry]; Alex J. Szima to M.G. Swank and Sid

Five members of X-Troop, No.10 (IA) Commando, were scheduled to land in the four LCT(2)s of Flight 2. Their names and missions were outlined previously. None of the men achieved their objectives or even made it off the beach. Little is known of Smith and Rice except that they were captured and 'never heard of again'. Platt returned without having landed. In his after action report, he states he was switched from LCT-8 (No.125) to LCT-7 (No.124) in Harvey's place, but the rest of his account indicates that this was not the case and he definitely was in LCT-8. He explains that he was on board the same LCT as HQ 4 Canadian Armoured [*sic*] Brigade, which beached one tank at about 0605, withdrew, let off a second one, and the third did not land. The craft was then towed back to the UK. This corresponds exactly to the actions of LCT-8, the only LCT to be left with one tank. During this encounter Platt received a gunshot wound to the leg and was then transferred to another boat. He explains that he and the two FS Sgts, 'would have been hard put to have finished' their four missions 'in the allotted time'. He concluded that during the operation he did not see any other members of X-Troop.³⁸

Latimer, whose real name was M. Loewy, was on LCT-10 with two FS Sgts he had never met before. Together they were known as the 'Brown

Salomon, National President Ranger Association, 3 February 1979, TMFDC [Bennett on Henry]; Eric Maguire, *Dieppe: August 19*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1963, p.69, Plate entitled 'Dieppe.Debris of Battle' [dead American].

³⁸ Pte Smith landed in LCT-7, Pte Platt in LCT-8, Pte Rice in LCT-9, and Latimer in LCT-10. Pte Harvey, who was to have been in LCT-7 with Smith, failed to turn up, and he is not shown as having taken part in the unit war diary. Brig. C.C. Mann to Col Neville, COHQ, 10 August 1942, 'SOE - Operation *Jubilee*', and attached hand-written list of 'Special Intelligence' detachment, NAC RG 24/13747/General 152/GS8 [names, LCT allotment]; 'Statement by Pte. B. Platt on his part in operation against the enemy at Dieppe', 22 September 1942, Appendix B, and entry for 19 August 1942 [names of participants], War Diary, No.10 (IA) Commando, PRO, WO 218/40; Dear, *Ten Commando*, p.21 ['never heard'], pp.21-2, Dear quotes Platt's account at length, not noting the discrepancy concerning LCTs, and repeating Platt's error of HQ 4 Canadian 'Armoured' Brigade.

Party'. Three tanks of 15 Tp C Sqn, a jeep, motorcycle and some engineers were also aboard. He states his orders were 'to proceed independently to German General HQ in Dieppe to pick up all documents etc. of value, including, if possible, a new German respirator'. The operation orders indicate that his group was to search the 'Artillery Regiment HQ probably in Hotel Select'. They were also permitted to bring PoWs back. He recalls touching down on Red beach, 'shortly after 0600', and the 'MG and howitzer fire was intense (cross and frontal fire)'. He states that he and the two sergeants swam to the beach and found 'it was impossible to go forward'. They then swam back to another LCT which had both steering gear and main door broken and were later towed back to England.³⁹

The seven members of the French 1 Troop, No.10 (IA) Commando, under command of Lt Vourch, did not fare any better than those of X-Troop. The men were Sgt. Raymond Dumanoir, Ptes Antoine Borettini, Georges Jean, Gabriel Loverini (or Loverigny), Jean Simon and Pierre Tanniou. These men had trained with the Royal Marine Commando and landed with them. Although Dear writes that none of them landed, this is disputed by other sources, which claim that they were on shore and later managed to return to the England that evening.⁴⁰

³⁹ Gervase Cowell, SOE Advisor, to H. Henry, 13 June 1996, with attached list of names, aliases and birth dates of members of 3 (Misc.) Troop, No.10 (IA) Commando, nd., p.2 [M. Loewy]; 'Report of Pte Maurice Latimer on his part in the Dieppe raid', 23 October 1942, Appendix C, War Diary, No.10 (IA) Commando, PRO, WO 218/40; Brig. C.C. Mann, 'Intelligence Plan', 8 August 1942, Appendix L, p.10, 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25) ['Artillery Regiment HQ'].

⁴⁰ No.10 (IA) Commando, War Diary, 19 August 1942 [sumames, ranks]; Maurice Chauvet to Alain Buriot, 5 February 1992, and attached list participants, ABDC [full names, ranks]; Dear, *Ten Commando*, p.23; Maurice Chauvet, 'Operation *Jubilee*, Dieppe 19 Août 1942', in *D-Day Le B.F.M. Commando*, Paris: Amicale des Ancien Parachutistes SAS & Commando, nd., p.6 [actions ashore].

Information is scant concerning the eight SOE officers and men involved on the centre beaches. Major Valliant de Guelis never made it shore, D. Wyatt, SOE liaison officer to COHQ, was left behind and later killed while trying to establish contact with the local resistance movement, and Capt. Harratt, 'remained within hailing distance of the beach for five hours and then received orders to retire'. He was wounded but made it back to England and later recommended for the Military Cross (MC). Bisset's personal file in the SOE Archives only contains the entry 'August 1942, Dieppe Raid', in a summary of his career, giving nothing else to indicate if he landed or not.⁴¹

The actions of the other special operational groups and miscellaneous detachments suffered a similar fate, none fulfilling their missions, the majority either being pinned on the beach or unable to land. The fate of the RM Commando and Fusiliers Mont-Royal now requires examination.

Roberts unfortunately received little signal information and what he did receive was often fragmented. This was the case when he received the report that the Essex Scottish was across the beach and into the town. This report was actually only referring to Stapleton's little group. He also had the signal that the RRC had not actually landed and therefore ordered them to land at Red Beach. Subsequently, he ordered the FMR to land at Red beach also. His thinking was to exploit the success of the Essex by landing two

⁴¹ Foot, *SOE in France*, p.184 [Guelis, Wyatt, Harratt wounded]; 'List of operations', in P.J. Harratt Personal File, SOE Archives, FCO ['remained within']; Gervase Cowell, SOE Advisor, to H. Henry, 13 March 1996 [Bisset]; George Hirst, *One tide to Dieppe*, London: Transworld Publishers Ltd., 1979, makes many claims about SOE agents being parachuted in prior to *Jubilee*, their observation of the operation, reporting back to London by radio, capture and interrogation. The SOE Archivist states that he found 'no trace of any of the names' claimed in the book, and thus it must be regarded as fiction, Gervase Cowell to H. Henry, 'SOE agents and 1942 Dieppe raid', 7 June 1996.

more Bns, and with support of tanks, secure *Bismarck*, the east headland, at all costs. Thus at 0630 he ordered in the FMR. In the confusion of battle the LCPs landed along the whole length of Dieppe's beach, some directly below the west cliffs. Many casualties were incurred on the approach. Only one small group, led by Sgt. P. Dubuc, succeeded in getting into the town. These men were quickly captured although they later overcame their guard and made it back to the beach.⁴²

Roberts received the further inaccurate report, just after 0800, that RHLI 'have control of White beach'. Based on this signal he ordered the RM Commando to transfer to LCAs to 'support the Essex Scottish through White beach... the object... being to pass around the West and South of the town, and attack the batteries on the eastern cliff from the South'. Stacey calls this plan 'over-optimistic' which is a somewhat reserved judgement for an operation that was on the verge of fantasy and just would not have been possible. It did not matter since the Marines received withering fire as soon as they cleared the smoke screen. The fire being so intense that the CO, Lt-Col Phillipps, called off the assault, being mortally wounded doing so. Of the seven craft that went in only three touched down, the remainder having withdrawn or suffered engine trouble. The report of the senior Officer Chasseurs, Lt M. Buist, gives a graphic account of the landing:

It was not long before I realized that this landing was to be a sea parallel of the Charge of the Light Brigade. There was Barrage fire coming from the cliffs on the East side of the harbour and from the houses on the promenade which showed only too well that White beach was under heavy fire... Shells started to burst all round the group of landing craft, which we endeavoured to screen by smoke.

⁴² The FMR suffered a total of 8 officers and 111 men killed, Stacey, *Six years of war*, p. 382.

From two of the landing craft officers who had turned back, Buist, heard that 'the beach was a shambles with the bodies of the soldiers lying in arrowhead formation as they had advanced from the Landing Craft'.⁴³

GERMAN ACTIONS AND MOVEMENT OF RESERVES

The two infantry platoons holding the Dieppe town itself were supplemented by the Naval Experimental Coy, which manned the eight beach defence guns. This latter unit suffered heavily within the first half hour. At 0546, consequently, 5 Coy, 571 IR, the sector reserve, assembled at the garrison commandant's HQ to counter-attack, although the first reference to its commitment was not until 0955 when it was ordered, along with 2 and 3 Pls, 2 Coy, 302 Engineer Bn, 'to push forward into the beach at Dieppe in order to mop up any enemy personnel still firing there' [see Map 2]. This counter-attack started about 1100. The next reference was not until 1310 when it reported that 'mopping up is proceeding well on the Dieppe beach'.⁴⁴

At 0800, in reaction to the landing of the tanks, which the light German anti-tank guns were having no effect on, the German command ordered 302 Anti-tank Coy, with nine German Pak 97/38 75mm anti-tank guns, located south-west of Divisional HQ at Envermeu, to proceed to Dieppe. Put under command of 571 IR, it committed one PI to Dieppe East, one to the Dieppe harbour near the drawbridge, and the last to the west headland. These guns

⁴³ 'Calpe: Operation Jubilee - Intelligence Log', 19 August, p.6, NAC, RG 24/13746/Serial 152/GS Folder 7/Appendix 5-1 [0817 signal]; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.382 [plan 'over optimistic']; Lt. M. Buist, 'Extract of report from the senior Officer, Chasseurs', Appendix 19 to Encl.13, pp.2-3, Hughes-Hallett, 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48).

⁴⁴ Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', p.68 [0545], p.79 ['to push forward'], p.168 [1100, 1310 - 'mopping up'], in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM.

probably had a limited effect on the battle as the road blocks, which prevented the tanks from penetrating the towns, also prevented the anti-tank guns from engaging the tanks at close range. The heavy smoke screen, added to by the smoke of battle, also limited the effectiveness of the anti-tank guns assigned to the west headland. At 0920, hospital patients fit for action were moved up to replace the Engineer Coy as Regimental Reserve Coy. About the same time the 3 Bn, 570 IR was ordered to move to the western edge of the Forêt d'Arques. Fully motorized, this reserve Bn was to be prepared to counter any airborne landing attempt. The Dieppe garrison, with the attached units, were expected to be able to hold the town and no Corps reserves were assigned to the area.⁴⁵

AIR OPERATIONS

The air aspect of the Dieppe raid generated much documentation, including numerous after-action reports and analyses. This was because of the magnitude of the Allied air forces involved – seventy-four squadrons. As previously explained one of the objectives of the raid had been to bring the GAF fighter planes to battle and inflict wastage on them. The role of the air force in close-support actions was previously examined, though the vast majority of the airforces were not involved in this way, but in what became

⁴⁵ Lt-Gen. Conrad Haase, 'Report on the British attack on both sides of Dieppe on 19 August 1942', pp.101-2, in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM. The former commander of the German 7 Bty, Capt. H.H. Ditz, commented on the Canadians situation on the centre beaches:

To be sure it must be hell down, because our shells were striking everywhere, up and down the whole beach, and their effects were multiplied ten-fold by the rain of stone fragments hurled out with every shell burst...

Nevertheless, we carried on with our annihilation fire on the beach, even if with only two guns. After all, no matter how sorry we might feel for the poor bastards down there, we had to continue to keep the disembarked troops pinned down no matter what, because if they got their second wind and renewed their attack it could have gone badly for us. Here only one watchword applied, and it was: either them or us.

H.H. Ditz, 'A Battery Commander remembers: the landing attempt by the Englishmen at Dieppe on the 19th of August 1942', p.34 ['To be sure'], p.40 ['Nevertheless'], in *The history of the 302*, ed. Emil Kilgast, CWM.

the greatest single-seat fighter air battle of the war. This aspect, and all *Jubilee* air operations, have been adequately covered in a scholarly manner by Norman L.R. Franks, *The greatest air battle: Dieppe, 19 August 1942* (1979). Thus it is not necessary to examine it in any detail. The major myth resulting from this aspect of the raid was the greatly exaggerated German losses and the down-played Allied losses.⁴⁶

Actually Allied losses were much heavier than those of the German and it appears as though it was an Allied defeat. In fact it was the Allies' largest loss of aircraft in one day during the war. On the other hand, two former Canadian DHist historians note that not only were the Allies far more able to bear the losses, but that the situation is different when the ratio of losses to sorties flown is examined. While the Allies flew a total of 2,614 sorties, the Germans flew approximately 600. This equates to the loss of one fighter for every 27.2 sorties flown whereas the Germans lost one per 7.6 sorties. In summary, the Germans lost a third of their fighter strength in the west, while the Allies lost less than a tenth. But, as the DHist historians

⁴⁶ The initial official 'conservative' estimate of German aircraft losses were 91 destroyed, 44 probably destroyed and 151 damaged, while a 'reliable' agent report gave the figure of at least 170. The mistake was quickly realized but not before it was in the media. In actual fact German records indicate the true losses were 25 bombers and 23 fighters, and 16 bombers and 8 fighters damaged. German pilot losses are not certain but a reliable estimate is not more than thirty. Actual Allied losses were 106 aircraft, of which 88 were fighters, 10 Army Cooperation tactical Reconnaissance Mustangs, and 8 bomber and smoke-laying aircraft. The number of air crew killed or missing was 81. Norman L.R. Franks, *The greatest air battle: Dieppe, 19 August 1942* (2nd edn., London: William Kimber, 1979, 1992); Mathew Holden, *Scramble Dieppe* (London: Shere Books, 1980), is a largely fictionalized account of the air battle; Denis Richards and Hilary St. George Saunders, *Royal Air Force 1939-1945: the fight avails* [Official History] *Royal Air Force 1939-1945*, ed. Denis Richards, 2 (3rd edn., 3 vols., London: HMSO, 1993, c1953), p.144 ['conservative' estimate]; RUSI Editor, 'Diary of the war', *Royal United Services Institute Journal* 87/548 (November 1942), 123, claims 'At least 91 enemy aircraft destroyed and about 100 severely damaged or probably destroyed'; Air Historical Branch (I), 'The day fighter offensive: July-December', in 'The air defence of Great Britain: the struggle for air supremacy, January 1942-May 1945', unpublished narrative, nd., 5, London: Air Ministry, p.124, DHist 88/49 [actual German/Allied losses and sorties]; COHQ, 'Combined Report', p.33 [81 air crew casualties].

remark, the battle took place over German held territory so they would have recovered more of their air crew.⁴⁷

From the point of view of the men the air forces were supporting, their personal accounts generally praise the air forces. However, due to a complicated system of command and control for close-support, instituted by Leigh-Mallory, and ignoring the Army Cooperation Command system already in place, requests for air support from the time of origin to implementation, were approximately an hour and a half. The standard of aircraft recognition also was very low, resulting in much 'friendly fire' being directed at Allied planes. Other points of interest were the slow GAF reaction – over one hour for fighters and four hours for bombers. German records indicate that 945 planes, including black painted night-fighters, were sent into action from all over north-west Europe. One positive result of the raid was increase in German fighter strength in north-west Europe.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Brereton Greenhous, *et al.*, 'The turn of the tide 1942-3', in *The official history of the Royal Canadian Air Force: the crucible of war 1939-1945*, 3 (4 vols., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), p.243 [30 German pilots lost]; Terry Copp and Richard Nielsen, 'Dieppe – the battle', in *No price too high: Canadians and the Second World War* (Whitby, Ontario: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1996), p.99 [largest air losses in one day of the war]; William A.B. Douglas and Brereton Greenhous, 'The army overseas 1940-1943', in *Out of the shadows: Canada in the Second World War* (2nd revised edn., Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977, 1995), pp.127-8 [ratio of sortie/losses].

⁴⁸ Brereton Greenhous, *Dieppe, Dieppe* (Montréal: Éditions Art Global Inc. in cooperation with the Department of National Defence, 1993), p.130 [Army Coop Command ignored]; Charles E. Carrington, the former Army Liaison Officer at RAF Bomber Command, laments that for *Jubilee*, 'no use was made of the organization they had been patiently building up for years... There were no ALOs [Air Liaison Officers] with Fighter squadrons who carried out low-level attacks and therefore no adequate briefing, no ASSU [Air Support Signals Units] tentacles [radio nets] forward to the beaches and backward to the airfields'. The Mustangs also had no direct links with the forward troops, 'The *Dryshod* Exercise and the Dieppe Raid', in *Soldier at Bomber Command* (London: Leo Cooper, 1987), p.104; Air Marshal T.L. Leigh-Mallory, 'Dieppe report: covering letter by Air Force Commander', 5 September 1942, p.1, NAC, RG 24 G3/10870/23202 (D5) [bad aircraft recognition]; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.383 [945 planes]; F.H. Hinsley, *et al.*, 'Air war in the West: May 1941 to end of 1942', in *British intelligence in the Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations 2* (6 vols., New York: CUP, 1981), p.271 [increased fighter strength].

SURRENDER AND CASUALTIES

The tank crews were ordered to evacuate at 1225 hours, whereupon they destroyed their tanks with the two 'sticky' bombs provided for this purpose. Some crews were unable to do so because the blast would have endangered the many men who were by now using the tanks as cover.⁴⁹ Attempts at extraction of the men ashore resulted in more casualties to the landing craft crews. Stacey estimates that between 350 and 400 men were evacuated from the centre beaches and a total of approximately 1,222 from all beaches. At 1300 hours, about the time of general surrender on Red and White beaches, General Roberts sent out the code-word *Vancouver*, the signal for the entire naval force to turn around and head back to port.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Of the 17 officers and 154 ORs of 14 CATR landed; 2 officers and 10 ORs were killed, 3 ORs were evacuated, 15 officers and 142 ORs were taken prisoner, some of them wounded, while 15 officers and 241 ORs of A Squadron, the three Fighting Troops of C Squadron and those remaining from B Squadron were ordered to return to England. The three men who landed and were evacuated as wounded and were Tpr George Volk of 9 Tp B Squadron from BLUEBELL, Tpr Percy W. Aide of 8 Tp B Sqn from BULL, and L-Cpl Frank Howe of Regimental Headquarters, the driver of scout car HOUND. See 'Part II Order 52, 4 September 1942, for 14 CATR', GHQ, Canadian Section', 2 Echelon, King's Own Calgary Regiment (KOCR) Archives; '14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment Personnel Returns from Dieppe', Memorandum, 10 September 1952, DHist 594.065(D7).

⁵⁰ In summary, according to Stacey, of a force of about 5000 men, casualties totalled 3367 all ranks (approximately 67 per cent), of these 1646 were PoWs, 56 officers and 851 ORs were killed or died of wounds. Of the 7 COs of the major Canadian units engaged, only the FMR CO returned to the UK, and he was wounded. British Army casualties based on War Office statistics of 1950, estimate total casualties at 18 officers and 157 ORs, of whom 2 officers and 12 ORs were killed, and 11 officers and 117 ORs were missing (many in fact KIA) or PoWs. The Royal Marine Commando total casualties were 7 officers and 93 ORs, of which 4 officers and 27 OR were KIA, missing and presumed dead, or died in captivity. The Naval forces lost 1 destroyer, 5 LCTs, and 28 landing craft, including 17 LCAs. This was a total of 28 per cent of the *Jubilee* force. Total personnel casualties were 550, including 75 KIA or died of wounds and 269 missing or PoWs. German records indicate total casualties of 591 which is confirmed by Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.385 [between 350 and 400 evacuated], pp.387-90 [casualty statistics]; COHQ, Battle Summary, p.38, fn.4 [1,222 evacuation total based on Stacey statistical table]; HQ 4 CIB, 'Intelligence Log - Intercepted Message, 19 August 1942', p.5, NAC, RG 24/10873/232C2(D53) [signals].

7

AFTERMATH, ALLIED AND GERMAN LESSONS**CHAINING OF DIEPPE AND GERMAN POWS**

The PoWs taken at Dieppe suffered a further ordeal when, on 7 October 1942, the Germans ordered that from the following day, all Dieppe PoWs were to have their hands bound behind their backs.¹ This was in reprisal for an order contained in the Detailed Military Plan, two copies of which fell into German hands on the raid. The order, in direct contravention of the 1929 Geneva Convention concerning treatment of PoWs, specified all Germans captured were to be immediately bound to prevent them destroying their documents. General Roberts, GOC 2 CID, stated after the war that he had strongly opposed this order but was over ruled by Lord Mountbatten, CCO. At the time this practice was common in the Special Service Brigade. The *Jubilee* No.4 Commando operation order was more specific, stating 'Prisoners will be securely tied by their thumbs with fish-line in the best Japanese tradition'. One wonders what the German reaction would have been if they had captured this operation order as well.²

¹ The Germans originally issued the chaining order on 2 September 1942 but rescinded it after the British War Office categorically denied that any Germans were bound on the raid (which was incorrect) and declared that any such order, if issued, would be cancelled. Vincent Massey, High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Cipher telegram No.2212, 3 September 1942, NAC, Ralston Papers, MG 27 III B11/43/Dieppe Raid - General - 1942; the story was carried in press reports on 3 September 1942, 'Captured Germans Not Bound', *Daily Herald*, 'Dieppe Lie Nailed', *Daily Mail*, 'Dieppe Britons in Chains... War Office denial of Nazi charge', *Manchester Guardian*, all in NAC, RG 24/10708/215C1.58 (D360)/Operation *Jubilee* Papers/General File 59-1-0/Intelligence, fols.55-6. After further evidence came to light the Germans re-instituted the order.

² Brigadier C. Churchill Mann, 'Intelligence Plan', 8 August 1942, Appendix L, p.1, in 'Operation *Jubilee* Detailed Military Plan', 5-16 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10871/23202 (D25); C.P. Stacey, *Six years of war: the Canadian Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific*, *Official history of the Canadian Army in the Second World War*, ed. C.P. Stacey, 1 (4 vols., Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955), p.396; Lord Lovat, 'Operation Order No.1: *Cauldron*', 14

Without consulting the Canadian government, the British War Office ordered an equal number of German PoWs in Britain and Canada to be similarly chained. This was opposed to by the Canadian authorities who acquiesced for the sake of preserving Allied unity. This Allied chaining lasted less than three months. A tit-for-tat diplomatic exchange continued and was not resolved until 22 November 1943, when the Dieppe PoWs were unchained. The Canadian government chose to let the matter drop at this point to avoid any repercussions on the Dieppe PoWs. The PoWs had been first bound from dawn until dusk with cord, then hand-cuffs, shackles, and finally with hand-cuffs, connected by eighteen inch chains. Evidence from repatriated PoWs indicate that after some months the situation was really a joke as the German guards did not enforce the practice and the PoWs were only required to parade twice a day wearing the chains. At other times the cuffs were easily picked and not worn at all.³

CANADIAN DOMESTIC AND CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS OPINION AND MORALE

The operation's repercussions on the morale of the Canadian Army Overseas and public opinion in Canada immediately after the raid, and for the remainder of the war, are instructive. The state of morale of the returning troops and of those who did not participate was judged at the time by censorship of mail and was summarized in various reports. One, based on

August 1942, p.6, NAC, RG 24/13747/Serial 152/GS8.

³ The chaining of PoWs and the diplomatic exchanges are recounted in detail in C.P. Stacey, 'Operation *Jubilee*: the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Part III: Some special aspects', 17 December 1943, amended 31 June [s/c] 1949, pp.21-26, Amendment No.1, pp.1-2, DHist, CMHQ Historical Officer Report No.109; and summarized in Stacey, *Six years of war*, pp.396-7.

examination of over eight thousand letters, noted that heavy casualties were freely admitted and many men were grief stricken, 'anxious and depressed' about the fate of many of their comrades. A later report concluded that the writers felt the losses for such an operation were justified and that morale among the participating troops 'is clearly at a high level. They were proud and pleased at being chosen, and on returning, the survivors of even the most badly hit regiments... say they are enthusiastically looking forward to another chance'. The effect on those who did not take part, the report stated, 'raised morale to a new high level. Great pride was shown that the Canadians comprised the bulk of the invading forces... Tremendous confidence is shown in the fighting qualities of Canadian troops'. Raised morale throughout the Army, and other Services, was clearly reflected in press reports of volunteers 'rushing to fill up the ranks' of the depleted units of 2 CID. However, analysis of Canadian recruitment figures for the months following the operation reveal that only a slight increase was registered followed by a decrease lower than before the operation. Also noticeably absent were slogans similar to 'Avenge Hong Hong'.⁴

The poor publicity the operation received, discussed in the first chapter, which emphasized the American and British participation and down-played, or completely ignored, the major Canadian role, understandably upset many Canadian soldiers. One commented, 'To read these Limey papers the raid was pulled off by the English Commandos with

⁴ Field Censors (Home), 'Notes on mail examined during the period 22-28 August 1942, in respect of comments on the Dieppe raid by Canadian troops, participants and non-participants', FCH/CR 36, 1 September 1942, p.1 [eight thousand], p.2 ['anxious']; Capt. D. Verney, 'Comments and reactions of Canadian forces on the Dieppe raid of August 19. Derived from the examination of letters from Canadian soldiers carried out at Liverpool', MI 12/839/33, 10 September 1942, p.2 [losses justified], p.1 ['high level'], NAC, RG 24/10708/215C1.98 (D359).

a few Canadians etc. to tag along for a spot of experience. They make you sick sometimes. Actually it was the other way around'.⁵

A German attempt to influence morale of the Canadian units in southern England occurred on the night of 4-5 September 1942 with the dropping of propaganda pamphlets on several of them, including the Calgary Tanks. The four-page pamphlet had German photographs of the aftermath of the raid. These showed the beaches strewn with Canadian dead and disabled Churchill tanks, piles of captured equipment, and numerous Canadian soldiers as PoWs. A censorship report of mail for the period of 4-19 September 1942 concluded that the leaflets did not scare the soldiers but made them even more determined to hit back. The following extract from one letter was quoted as typical, 'The Germans dropped propaganda leaflets to show what happened to our guys over there. I wonder if they think we imagine we are on a picnic? We know what is to happen when there is a war on, and they will never scare us with pictures'.⁶

In summary, the operation had a sobering influence on members of the Canadian Army Overseas, causing them to take a more serious view of their future employment in action. The demands for an immediate second front in Europe became less, while, Stacey concludes, 'the magnitude of such an enterprise was more clearly apparent than before, as was the need

⁵ Field Censors (Home), 'Notes on mail examined during the period 22-28 August 1942, in respect of comments on the Dieppe raid by Canadian troops, participants and non-participants', FCH/CR 36, 1 September 1942, p.4; 'Canadian public opinion on the employment of the Canadian Army, 1939-1945', 26 October 1949, p.35, DHist, CMHQ Historical Officer Report No.29 [recruitment, slogans].

⁶ 'German propaganda leaflet: Dieppe', memorandum and original leaflet, 21 September 1942, DHist 594.013 (D11); Field Censors (Home) report for period 4-19 September 1942, quoted in C.P. Stacey, 'Operation *Jubilee*: the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Part III: Some special aspects', 17 December 1943, amended 31 June [sic] 1949, p.29, DHist, CMHQ Historical Officer Report No.109.

for the most detailed preparation, the most careful training, the most exacting discipline'.⁷

The reaction in Canada was somewhat different. As this was the first major operation involving Canadian troops, preceded and followed by long periods of inactivity, Canadian public opinion and media hotly debated the operation for many months after and to a lesser extent during the remainder of the war. Initially the media positively praised the operation but the tone soon changed and criticism centred on the long casualty lists and the reasons for failure. The suggestion to publish Robert's after-action report was immediately rejected for the security reason of giving valuable information to the Germans. Thus it was not possible to divulge any of the lessons learned which might have gone some way to calming the often ill-informed reports in the media.⁸

The Canadian authorities were very aware that some form of authoritative statement would have to be made to satisfy Canadian public demands for information. Several cables between Ottawa and London concerning this question were exchanged immediately after the operation. On 27 August Lt-Gen. McNaughton, the senior Canadian officer overseas, voluntarily held an international press conference to answer questions about the operation. In a secret cable in cipher sent the same day to Ottawa, he stated, 'I put myself at the disposal of visiting Canadian press representatives and others who have been asking information and for

⁷ Stacey, *Six years of war*, pp.395-6.

⁸ Initial media praise was replaced by the end of August with severe criticism of the planning, methods employed and leadership, undermining the initial confidence the raid had inspired and exacerbated by the continual inaction of the Canadian Army Overseas. Examples of critical reports are in *The Globe and Mail*, Toronto, 23 and 28 August 1942, quoted in 'Canadian public opinion on the employment of the Canadian Army, 1939-1945', 26 October 1949, pp.35-6, DHist, CMHQ Historical Officer Report No.29.

upwards of two and a half hours stood cross examination in which I answered every question so far as security and our obligations to air and navy permitted. I hope this will result in some satisfaction at least to the people of Canada'.⁹

In the same cable McNaughton informed Ottawa that Major Charles Stacey, CMHQ Historical Officer, had been ordered to prepare a general account for public statement, the subsequent 'white paper' previously discussed, and also a more detailed summary for internal circulation in the Canadian Army Overseas. The former was used as the basis for a public statement on 18 September by the Canadian Minister of National Defence, the Honourable James Ralston. The latter was published 3 October in the Army Bureau of Current Affairs pamphlet *War*.¹⁰

The continuing interest of Canadian public opinion and media in the controversy over the operation was raised to a higher plane in the Spring of 1943 with its debate in the limelight of parliament. Members criticized the origin, planning and general conduct of the operation. The media went so far as to claim, wrongly in Stacey's opinion, that the *Jubilee* plan proved the 'bankruptcy of Canadian generalship'. This criticism, Stacey states, undoubtedly undermined 'the hitherto unassailable prestige of General McNaughton with the public'. The Canadian Generals' responsibility, discussed previously, reveals Stacey is wrong to disagree. The constant

⁹ 'Notes of an interview of Lt-Gen. McNaughton by press correspondents at HQ First Canadian Army on 27 August 1942', pp.1-6, NAC, MG 30 E 133/248/1-31 August 1942, fol.F; Canmilitary to Defensor, GS 3070, 27 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/12329/4/Dieppe/1 Press, fol.12.

¹⁰ War Office, Army Bureau of Current Affairs, 'Dieppe summary', *War* 28 (3 October 1942), 1-12. Stacey discusses the preparation of this pamphlet in his diary, entries 9 through 11 September 1942, pp.74-8, UTA, CSP/015/ 'Notebook No.17, 3 August - 13 September 1942'.

domestic interest in Dieppe was exemplified by a letter of 6 January 1943, from Brig. Sherwood Lett, former OC 4 Brigade during *Jubilee*, in Vancouver recovering from a wound to his arm, to Lt-Gen. Harry Crerar, GOC 1 Canadian Corps. The letter explained that there still appeared to be a 'very keen interest' in the operation based on the number of invitations he had received to speak. He repeated questions put to him concerning the large number of casualties and possible German foreknowledge. Somewhat apologetically, he wondered if it would be possible, 'in the interests of the war effort here and of morale, [to] give the public a little more than we have of the lessons learned, the information gained and the practical benefits of that operation to the three services'. He noted that German media reports seemed to him to have been 'more widely read and better remembered' than Canadian press releases or even the Ralston's official statement. He also pointed out that some Dieppe PoW officers had sent home 'quite derogatory' letters concerning the operation', the effects of which were 'not good' in either eastern or western Canada, and reflected badly on 1 Canadian Corps in general.¹¹

Crerar replied that he thought the Canadian domestic reaction to Dieppe was normal under the circumstances, considering that the Canadian public only have one battle, instead of many, to discuss. He concluded that:

This sense of frustration is bound to lead to critical comments and unworthy inferences. A few good and successful engagements in which Canadian troops were offered a chance to distinguish themselves would clear all this muck in no time. Until this situation develops, however, those in positions of responsibility will continue to be subject to invidious attack.¹²

¹¹ Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.396 ['bankruptcy', McNaughton prestige]; Brig. Sherwood Lett to Lt-Gen. Harry Crerar, 6 January 1943, NAC, MG 30 E 15777.

¹² Crerar to Lett, 17 January 1943, NAC, MG 30 E 15777.

Crerar was correct for avid public interest in the operation began to lessen only with the involvement of Canadian forces in the invasion of Sicily, on 10 July 1943.¹³

LESSONS LEARNED – CLAIMS AND REALITIES

As in any operation of war, experience is gained and lessons are learned, that can be applied to future operations. This was so with *Jubilee*, although even with objective hindsight, a close examination of the documentary record reveals that many of these lessons were not new and, therefore, should have been obvious to the senior commanders concerned when planning the operation. In the aftermath of such an operation the usual procedure was the production, by all units involved, of after-action reports, by all senior commanders and COs, and as many individuals as possible, from which general summaries and analyses would be prepared. These, along with the units' war diaries, intelligence summaries, operational intelligence logs, operational question and answer summaries, operation orders, reconnaissance photographs, maps, and any other material relevant to the operation, were collected together by a single organization, such as COHQ, for analysis in the preparation of a comprehensive report on the operation, usually known as a Confidential Book (CB). Its most important part was the section on lessons learned.

Two days after *Jubilee*, Mountbatten held a large post-mortem meeting at COHQ, attended by the three Force Commanders, many of the officers who had taken part, the Minister of Information, Mr Brendan Bracken,

¹³ C.P. Stacey, 'Operation *Jubilee*: the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Part III: Some special aspects', 17 December 1943, amended 31 June [sic] 1949, p.29, DHist, CMHQ Historical Officer Report No.109.

and, in the words of Hughes-Hallett, 'a galaxy of Press and Public Relations men'. The Force Commanders and many of the officers gave their own accounts of the operation. It appears that no record was taken of this meeting. Immediately after this meeting, Mountbatten ordered the formation of a Study Group within COHQ to formulate the lessons learned.¹⁴

Within two months it produced the two-hundred page 'Combined Report on the Dieppe Raid' (CB 04244). Part V, entitled 'The Lessons Learned', at fourteen foolscap pages, was an exhaustive examination of the lessons, first in summarized form and then in detail. It was also printed separately for wider circulation. The report observed that some of the lessons were known from previous experience. It is important to note that this CB was prepared with the planning of future raids in mind, not an invasion.¹⁵

The reports that formed the basis of the lessons learned section of the Combined Report, were those of the three Force Commanders. Roberts, Leigh-Mallory and Hughes-Hallett, submitted after-action reports, on 27 August, 30 August and 5 September, respectively, which all indicated certain lessons. In early September 1942 all three Force Commanders planned to

¹⁴ Hughes-Hallett, Transcript of interview, American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) *Dieppe*, 30 July 1967, p.43, Southampton University Library, Archives and Manuscripts (SUL), Mountbatten Papers (MBP), MB1/B67 [no record]; John Hughes-Hallett, 'The Dieppe Raid', in 'Before I Forget', Unpublished memoirs, 1971, pp.194, NAC, MG 30 E463/Memoirs 1971 ['galaxy', Study Group].

¹⁵ Besides the wealth of Canadian unit after-action reports submitted by the CMHQ Historical Officer, Major Stacey, and other sources mentioned, one that has not come to light, is a memorandum submitted to Mountbatten, by Brig-Gen. Lucien K. Truscott, Jr, US Military Adviser to COHQ. This has never been acknowledged in any published work concerning this or any other aspect of the operation. Truscott was aboard HMS *Femie* as an official 'Spectator' and his observations concerning lessons learned are instructive. They will be elaborated on later. Brig.-Gen. L.K. Truscott to Mountbatten, Memorandum – 'Observations on *Jubilee*', 31 August 1942, pp.1-3, GCML, LTP, 10/4; Hilary A. St. George Saunders, 'The Lessons Learned', Part V, pp.37-50, 'Combined Report on the Dieppe raid', BR 1887 (formerly CB 04244), London: COHQ, 15 October 1942, DHist 594.013 (D1); Hilary A. St. George Saunders, 'The Raid on Dieppe – Lessons Learned', CB 04244(I), Extract from CB 04244 (The Dieppe Raid Combined Report), London: COHQ, September 1942, DHist 594.013 (D13).

submit a Joint Force Commanders' letter to the CCO which would summarize the most important of these lessons. A draft outlined the need for adequate fire-support, greater flexibility in the plan, especially concerning the employment of reserves, that tanks should not be landed until the obstacles are cleared, better synchronization of close-support by air, and the need for better aircraft recognition.¹⁶

The most important of these lessons are summarized below and later analysed in the light of the relevant documentary evidence. The lesson of paramount importance, and italicized for emphasis in the Report, was *'the need for overwhelming fire support, including close support, during the initial stages of the attack'*. This was to be provided by heavy and medium naval bombardment, air action, special close-support vessels or 'mobile forts' (yet to be designed), and by the military forces themselves, in the landing craft during the run in. If the required overwhelming close fire support could not be provided, the Report stated that 'attacks should be planned to develop round the flanks of a strongly defended locality rather than frontally against it'.¹⁷

The naval lesson of greatest importance was the need for 'the formation of permanent naval assault forces with a coherence comparable to that of any other first line fighting formation. Army formations intended for the

¹⁶ Roberts submitted a preliminary report to Crerar the day after the operation, Roberts to Crerar, 'Report on Operation Jubilee', 20 August, NAC, RG 24/10584/215C1 (D233); Maj.-Gen. J.H. Roberts, 'Report by Military Force Commander - Operation Jubilee', 27 August 1942, pp.5-6, NAC, RG 24/10870/232C2 (D2); Air Marshal Sir Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory, 'Report by the Air Force Commander on the combined operation against Dieppe - August 19, 1942', 5 September 1942, cover letter, p.3, NAC, RG 24/10870/232O2 (D5); John Hughes-Hallett, 'Covering Letter', pp.1-2, 'Conclusions and Recommendations', Enclosure No.2, p.1, to 'Naval Force Commander's Report No. NFJ 0221/92', 30 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D48); Joint force Commanders' Letter to CCO, draft, 2 September 1942, NAC, RG 24/10584/215C1 (D244), fols.12-13.

¹⁷ Saunders, 'Combined Report', pp.37, 42-4, 48.

amphibious assaults must without question be trained in close cooperation with such naval assault forces'.¹⁸

A further lesson was 'the necessity for flexibility in the military plan and its execution', in order to give the commander the option of reinforcing success. To this end it was emphasized that only a minimum of forces should be initially committed, retaining the maximum reserves for later exploitation of success. By the time of *Jubilee* the level of training the landing craft crews had received was insufficient to implement a flexible military plan. During the operation, the hold-up on the centre beaches had been reinforced after Roberts received a garbled, and thus erroneous, report that one of the Canadian battalions were finally in the town. Although they had been held up on the beach, and were therefore behind schedule, he reinforced them with one battalion anyway, and subsequently another, his last remaining reserve. He should have used these two battalions and the remaining twenty-eight tanks to reinforce the mile long inland penetration from Pourville – following the known military axiom of only reinforcing success.¹⁹

From this follows the lesson of 'The necessity for as accurate and comprehensive a system of control and communications as it is possible to establish'. To this end, the fitting out of a dedicated HQ ship, with no other role but this, and the duplication of channels and nets, was also noted.²⁰

Other minor or technical lessons included the necessity of having a combined staff living and working at a single HQ, better security before the operation, that tanks should not be landed until anti-tank obstacles are

¹⁸ Saunders, 'Combined Report', pp.37-8.

¹⁹ Saunders, 'Combined Report', pp.37, 39.

²⁰ Saunders, 'Combined Report', pp.37, 40.

cleared, that operations should be planned so as to take place under tidal conditions that are as varied as possible, the need for better aircraft recognition both by the Navy and Army, the importance of using smoke, in larger quantities than during *Jubilee*, the need for some form of light or self-propelled artillery, after the initial landing area has been secured, to support the assault inland.²¹

Throughout the rest of the war and in the post-war period, McNaughton, Crerar, Mountbatten, and Hughes-Hallett, and other senior Allied leaders, initially portrayed *Jubilee* as a great victory, and later, as an indispensable, preliminary and necessary sacrifice, and argued that the lessons learned were vital to the final, successful Allied invasion of the European Continent. They did this partly for propaganda reasons to maintain wartime morale, partly to protect their own organizations from criticism and cover their own responsibility, and partly because, initially at least, they believed it. The post-war historiographical manipulation of this theme has been outlined previously. The true influence of these lessons, actual or not, on future amphibious operations, particularly the 1944 Normandy landings, and on German thinking generally, especially in countering an invasion, needs comprehensive examination within the context of the documentary evidence.

The first indication of Crerar's future reasoning concerning the Dieppe raid was in a personal letter, two days after the raid, to the Maj.-Gen. R.H. Dewing, HQ European Theatre of Operations (ETO), US Army, London. The letter thanked Dewing for his part in arranging the attachment of Rangers to Canadian units for *Jubilee* and concluded, 'Although the losses have been

²¹ Saunders, 'Combined Report', pp.37-9, 45-50.

heavy indeed, I believe that from the widest point of view the results of the gallant raid on Dieppe will fully justify the cost'.²²

Although the Combined Report, under preparation throughout August and September 1942, confined itself to the lessons learned for future raids, Crerar was already arguing that they applied to the future Continental invasion. On 28 August Crerar acknowledged receipt of Roberts' after-action report, completed the previous day, and ordered him to meet with the other Force Commanders to discuss it and the lessons of *Jubilee*. The following day Crerar sent a letter to all Commanders and COs, 1 Canadian Corps, explaining that one of the reasons for carrying out *Jubilee* was that it was expected to furnish 'very important' and 'essential information' concerning the military aspect of an invasion across the Channel. He ended by saying that all three Force Commanders would later provide a detailed and comprehensive joint report, from which 'most important conclusions in respect to the requirements of full-scale invasion of the Continent should emerge'.²³

A year later, in a summary of a 1 Canadian Corps combined operations training exercise, which envisaged an assault landing against Dieppe, he referred to *Jubilee's* lessons, stating that 'we owe it to those who fought it out on the beaches on that August day last year, to see to it that every ounce of value is, indeed, obtained from everything they then did, or gallantly failed to do'. Almost a year after that, in a letter to the Canadian COS, Lt-Gen. Kenneth Stuart, emphasized that the technical and tactical

²² Crerar to Maj.-Gen. R.H. Dewing, HQ, European Theatre of Operations, US Army, 21 August 1942, NAC, MG 30 E157/6/985C.009 (D146)/6-9D.

²³ Crerar to Roberts, 28 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10584/215C1 (D233), fol.82; Crerar to all Commanders and COs, 1 Canadian Corps, 'Combined Service raid on Dieppe', Memorandum GOC 1-0-4, 29 August 1942, NAC, RG 24/10584/215C1 (D233), fol.86.

problems of an invasion, were 'bought and paid for' at Dieppe, and that 'the evolution of the requirements in the assault phase of *Overlord* [Normandy invasion/D-Day 6 June 1944] had been a resultant Canadian contribution'.²⁴

Probably the day before the launch of *Overlord*, he spoke in the same vein, in a general address to all ranks of the First Canadian Army, stating that the plans, preparations, methods, and technique, which were to be used in that operation, were based on 'knowledge and experience, bought and paid' at Dieppe. He continued, 'The contribution of that hazardous operation cannot be over-estimated. It will prove to have been the essential prelude to our forthcoming and final success'.²⁵

The day after the beginning of *Overlord*, in briefing officers at his HQ on the current operation, Crerar again brought in the connection to *Jubilee*, speaking of the 'vital part' it had played in the 'conception, planning and evolution' of *Overlord*. He concluded this introduction with his opinion that:

Although at the time the heavy cost to Canada, and the non-success of the Dieppe operation, seemed hard to bear, I believe that when this war is examined in proper perspective, it will be seen that the sobering influence of that operation on existing Allied strategical conceptions, with the enforced realizations of the Allied governments of the lengthy and tremendous preparations necessary before invasion could be attempted, was a Canadian contribution of the greatest significance to final victory.²⁶

On 1 September 1944 the bloodless liberation of Dieppe by 2 CID took place. Two days later Crerar addressed 2 CID in a remembrance

²⁴ Lt-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, 'Summing up by Commander 1 Canadian Corps, Combined Operations Study Period 26-31 July 1943', GOC 4-1-8, 31 July 1943, p.1; Crerar to Lt-Gen. K. Stewart, GOC-in-C 1-0-2, 31 May 1944, both in NAC, RG 24/12749/24 Dieppe-1, fols.203, 206.

²⁵ Lt-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, 'A personal message from Lt-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, CB, DSO, GOC-in-C, First Canadian Army', nd. [probably 5 June 1944], Appendix B(I), to Col. C.P. Stacey, 'The Operation at Dieppe, 19 August 1942: Some new information', 20 November 1944, DHist, CMHQ Historical Officer Report No.128.

²⁶ Lt-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, 'Introduction to briefing of officers, HQ First Canadian Army', 7 June 1944, Appendix B(II), p.2, to Col. C.P. Stacey, 'The Operation at Dieppe, 19 August 1942: Some new information', 20 November 1944, DHist, CMHQ Historical Officer Report No.128.

service at the cemetery for those who had died on *Jubilee*, again paying tribute to its sacrifice and contribution to *Overlord*. Crerar continued to make claims along these lines in speeches and interviews for the remainder of the war and into the post-war period.²⁷

During the spring of 1943 a month long conference on landing assaults, held at the US Assault Training Centre, HQ ETO, gave Hughes-Hallett the opportunity to emphasize his opinion on the role and lessons of *Jubilee*. In his address he stated that, 'It was definitely intended as a small-scale rehearsal for the major cross-Channel operation' intended for the future. He remarked that, the lessons learned caused a 'drastic re-casting of our ideas' about amphibious operations. Before summarizing the standard lessons, he emphatically claimed that 'In the absence of the experience gained at Dieppe there is not the slightest doubt that a major disaster would have occurred had we proceeded to attack North Western Europe on the lines hitherto visualized'.²⁸

In 1946, in an interview with Stacey, he emphasized again the direct connection between Dieppe and D-Day. In 1947, the relevant extracts, concerning *Jubilee's* lessons, of his original 1942 after-action report were reprinted in the *Supplement to The London Gazette*. Whether he had any

²⁷ Lt-Gen. H.F.G. Crerar, 'Remarks at Dieppe, 2 Canadian Division', 3 September 1944, pp.1-4, NAC, MG 30 E157/25/985C.009 (D426). See also 'Address by Gen. H.D.G. Crerar: A few reminiscences of 1939-1945', revised May 1953, p.2, NAC, MG 30 E157/25/985C.009 (D426); 'Address by Gen. H.D.G. Crerar on the contribution of the Canadians at Dieppe', nd. (Circa 1945, revised 1962), pp.1-7, NAC, MG 30 E157/26/985C.009 (D378); George Ronald, CBC, to Crerar, 16 July 1962, and hand-written notes for CBC interview, NAC, MG 30 E157/19/985C.009 (D304); Crerar, Transcript of interview by George Ronald, CBC *Close-Up: Dieppe*, 9 September 1962, pp.2,6, NAC, MG 30 E507/Gen. Crerar'.

²⁸ John Hughes-Hallett, 'Summary of an address by Commodore J. Hughes-Hallett, RN: the Dieppe raid', in 'Conference on landing assaults 24 May-23 June', 26 May 1943, Assault Training Centre, HQ European Theatre of Operations, US Army, p.1-6, USNA, RG 332/338/ETO Hist. Div. Admin. 109/491, 'Conference on Landing Assaults'.

part or influence in this is unknown but publication served further to stress the direct connection between D-Day and Dieppe. In 1962, while in Toronto, he further pressed this point to Dieppe veterans during a reunion of the Royal Regiment of Canada, and in an interview for the CBC television documentary *Close-Up: Dieppe*. This theme was expressed in two further television interviews, in 1967 for the American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) special *Dieppe* and in 1972 for the BBC production *Dieppe 1942*.²⁹

Mountbatten felt even more deeply than any one else about the need to stress the role of Dieppe as an operational rehearsal for D-Day. This was because he felt he was responsible and guilty, although he never admitted this. Many historians agree. Villa writes, 'Dieppe haunted him forever; he never succeeded in exorcising it'. Richard Hough, in his unofficial biography, *Mountbatten* (1981), stated that Mountbatten felt badly about Dieppe and that 'it was a recurring sore for Mountbatten because it was seen by some as *his failure... the name Dieppe hurt Mountbatten for the rest of his life*'.³⁰

²⁹ Capt. John Hughes-Hallett, Interview by C.P. Stacey, 29-30 September 1946, Diary, 'France 1946', UTA, CSP/0012; John Hughes-Hallett, 'The Dieppe raid. Dispatch by Naval Force Commander, August 30, 1942', *Supplement to The London Gazette*, Thursday, 14 August 1947: 3823-4; John Hughes-Hallett, 'The Dieppe raid: Address by Vice-Admiral J. Hughes-Hallett', 20 January 1962, Royal Regiment of Canada Association Dinner, Toronto, pp.10-11, PRO, CAB 106/6; see also McNaughton to Col. G.M.C. Sprung, 25 January 1962, and enclosure, Summary of Hughes-Hallett's speech 20 January 1962 and his notes, DHist 594.011 (D12); Hughes-Hallett, Transcript of interview, CBC *Close-Up: Dieppe*, 9 September 1962, p.9, NAC, MG 30 E507/8; Hughes-Hallett, Transcript of interview, ABC *Dieppe*, 30 July 1967, pp.48-50, SUL, MBP, MB1/B67; Hughes-Hallett, 'Transcription of filmed narration from Vice-Admiral John Hughes-Hallett', BBC *Dieppe 1942*, 25 February 1972, p.6, SUL, MBP, MB1/B63; Hughes-Hallett, Script for BBC production *Dieppe 1942*, 25 February 1972, p.8, NAC, MG 30 E/463/11; John Hughes-Hallett, 'The Dieppe Raid', in 'Before I Forget', Unpublished memoirs, 1971, pp.195-200, NAC, MG 30 E463/Memoirs 1971.

³⁰ Villa, *Unauthorized action*, p.210; Hough perceptively notes that: One of the strongest reasons that Mountbatten used for not permitting an authorized biography to be written in his lifetime was that he believed he had never made a single mistake in his life. 'It is a curious thing, but a fact, that I have been right in everything I have done and said in my life', Mountbatten said many times. 'No one would ever believe a biographer who made this claim while I was still alive because readers would conclude that I had caused it to be written, that I was leaning over the author's shoulder... Dieppe was a threat to this clean record. Richard Hough, 'Combined operations', in *Mountbatten*, New York: Random House, 1981, p.156.

Mountbatten attempted right up until the end of his life to convince sceptics, especially Canadians, and particularly Dieppe veterans, of the true value of Dieppe. He did this in many television interviews, radio broadcasts, public addresses, and letters. He often finished by stating various versions of the following:

Those gallant men who gave their lives at Dieppe, by their supreme sacrifice gave to the Allies the priceless secret of victory in the subsequent assaults. The Duke of Wellington is credited with having said that the battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton. I have no doubt that the battle of Normandy was won on the beaches of Dieppe. For every one man who died at Dieppe in 1942, at least ten or more must have been spared in Normandy in 1944.³¹

In his last interview concerning Dieppe, the year before his assassination in 1979, he lamented to CBC producer, Terence Macartney-Filgate, that Dieppe veterans seemed incapable of understanding that the losses had been justified. He said:

So much stems from Dieppe, so much success and for some reason the Canadians don't wish to know it, they don't wish to be proud of it... they glory in their misery... I

³¹ Lord Louis Mountbatten, 'The Dieppe raid', Transcript of filmed interview, 12 July 1962, p.5, *CBC Close Up: Dieppe*, 9 September 1962, IWM, Haydon Papers II, also in PRO, CAB 106/6 [quote]; edited versions are in, 'Dieppe: Mountbatten's view', *The Legionary* (October 1962), 33, and 'The Dieppe raid', *The Naval Review* 51/1 (January 1963), 40; other relevant quotes are: 'It was a vital stepping stone to victory and you, the heroes of Dieppe, were the few who made possible the later Victory of the many', in 'Commemoration of the 25th Anniversary of the Dieppe raid on 19 August 1942: speech by Admiral of the Fleet The Earl Mountbatten of Burma; at that time Chief of Combined Operations', Transcript of speech, 19 August 1967, p.11, this author's Dieppe Collection (this speech received wide press coverage, see Peter Strafford, 'Dieppe raid paved way for D-Day success', 21 August 1967, *The Daily Express*, Andrew Wilson, 'Dieppe raid ensured D-Day victory', 20 August 1967, *The Observer*); in a BBC interview, 'The Dieppe raid was certainly indispensable... without Dieppe the Russian frontier today might well have run along the Rhine', Transcript for BBC *Dieppe: 1942, 1972*, p.46, DHist 79/567/2; in a letter, 'If we had not done the Dieppe operation at all it is possible there would never have been an invasion of France or it would have been very greatly delayed and the results would have been very uncertain. So Dieppe was really a turning point in the war', in Mountbatten to Mr Bender, 21 December 1973, TMFDC, Mountbatten File; in a speech to the Dieppe Veterans and Prisoners of War Association, 30 September 1973, '[Jubilee] was essential to our successful invasion of France. A vast number of allied lives... were saved in the Overlord landings... and in the previous landings in the Mediterranean as a result of the lessons learned at Dieppe', see 'Dieppe: the inside story', *Legion Magazine* 48/6 (November 1973), 10 and 'Operation Jubilee: the place of the Dieppe raid in history', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 119/1 (March 1974), 25; and in a radio interview, 'From the lessons we learned at Dieppe all subsequent landings in the Mediterranean and elsewhere benefited directly', Transcript of interview, Radio-Québec, circa early 1974, p.84, TMFDC, Mountbatten File.

hope to God that you will succeed where most of your countrymen have failed, to try and explain to Canadians that they should be proud of Dieppe. Instead of revelling in the misery of all the casualties, the prisoners of war, and thinking it was a failure, it wasn't a failure. Without Dieppe we couldn't possibly have won the war... Try and make them proud, try and make them feel that if they died, they died gloriously and those who came back and suffered as prisoners of war, suffered not in vain. If you can do that, you'll have done a great thing... I don't know if it's too much to hope. It certainly hasn't worked up to now.³²

Unfortunately for Mountbatten, it has never worked, for veterans and historians are now even more critical of his role in Dieppe and of his justifying remarks.³³

Stacey added credence to the lessons learned theme with publication of his authoritative official Canadian Army histories in 1948, 1955 and 1960. Although several other amphibious operations took place between *Jubilee* and *Overlord*, he stated, 'It is doubtful, however, whether any other operation had as much influence as Dieppe upon the Normandy planning. A full analysis would require a chapter to itself'. Canadian historian, John Campbell, has written a convincing chapter disputing this claim. Based on analysis of the relevant documents, including German records, he effectively dismisses the idea of any link between the two operations, especially concerning the use of radar and deception. He concludes, 'if *Jubilee* provided the keys to unlock the secrets of success on D-Day, it is going too far to say that any of them turned the radar or deception lock', and notes that D-Day would have happened anyway in 1944 even if *Jubilee* had not occurred.³⁴

³² Lord Louis Mountbatten, Transcript of Interview, 1978, CBC *Dieppe 1942*, 1979, DHist 79/567/79.

³³ Brig-Gen. Forbes West, a Dieppe veteran, stated 'I've heard Mountbatten speak before... I don't believe any of it', in 'Some scepticism as Mountbatten gives history: Dieppe veterans' memories aren't all fond', *The Globe and Mail*, Toronto, 1 October 1973, 5; Villa, *Unauthorized action*, pp.240-2; John P. Campbell, *Dieppe revisited: a documentary investigation*, London: Frank Cass, 1993, pp.196-227.

³⁴ C.P. Stacey, 'The raid on Dieppe 19 August 1942', in *The Canadian Army 1939-1945: an official historical summary*, 1 (4 vols., Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948), pp.84-6; Stacey, *Six years*

The supposed role of deception and radar in *Jubilee's* planning and execution was examined previously and discounted. The 'Combined Report' 'Lessons Learned' section does not mention radar at all, and only mentions deception in the sense of defensive security of the location, training and movement of the forces ear-marked for an operation. This has nothing to do with strategic deception of the type used in Operation *Fortitude*, the deception component of *Overlord*. Campbell thinks the 'Combined Report' did not refer to deception, and this could be said for radar also, because it was too sensitive to be put into such a widely circulated report. But this does not hold up since, as previously indicated, strategic deception had not developed to the operational employment stage by the time of *Jubilee*. Probably radar was not mentioned, since according to R.V. Jones, wartime British radar expert, nothing novel or new was learned on *Jubilee* worth reporting on. Thus post-war claims by conspiratorial historians like Cave Brown and others can be quickly dismissed.³⁵

One post-war claim by Maj.-Gen. C. Churchill Mann, although fantastic, rates a mention, if only for the reason that he was formerly GSO 1, 2 CID, during the planning of *Rutter*, and Deputy Military Force Commander on *Jubilee*. In correspondence to journal editors from 1975-1978, and the following year, in the senior, scholarly Canadian military affairs journal,

of war, pp.398-404, 403 [quote]; Stacey, 'The development of the plan for invading north-west Europe, 1940-1944', in *The Victory Campaign: the operations in north-west Europe 1944-1945*, 3 (4 vols., Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960), p.7; see also Stacey's memoirs, 'Aftermath of a dress rehearsal', in *A date with history: memoirs of a Canadian historian* (Ottawa: Denau, 1983), pp.101-2; two years before his death, Stacey, with Barbara Wilson, wrote that Dieppe's 'justification must be sought in the contribution it made to the plans for the successful invasion of Normandy in 1944', in 'The military task', in *The half-million: the Canadian Army in Britain, 1939-1946* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p.18; Campbell, 'Dieppe and D-Day', in *Dieppe revisited*, pp.196-227, 205 [quote].

³⁵ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.198.

Canadian Defence Quarterly, he made the startling claim that the operation order captured by the Germans on the raid had been deliberately taken ashore for this purpose, as part of an elaborate strategic deception campaign to make the Germans think that when the invasion took place, it would be centred on capturing French Channel ports. The fact was that in the summer of 1942 the invasion point and method, open beach maintenance, had not been decided upon.³⁶

The Director of the Directorate of History, Dr Douglas, wrote a memorandum for the front of Mann's biographical file, containing copies of the above correspondence concerning Mann's claims. This serves as an insightful warning to historians of the dangers of dependence on the fading memories of veterans, without substantiation by documents, that can lead to myth-making and the distortion of history, and is therefore quoted at length:

These documents originated by Major General Churchill Mann are of interest even though, thirty-six years after the event his memory is seriously at fault. Bearing in mind the absence of documentation to support his claims, he is expressing a common prejudice among veterans of the Dieppe raid that Canadians were sacrificed deliberately for the purposes of high policy. This prejudice normally comes out in the form of heated verbal exchanges, as on the occasion of Lord Mountbatten's speech in 197[3]. In old age, after a belief of this kind has been fermenting for such a long time, it can become an obsession. Complete and well documented records of events should attempt to nip such beliefs in the bud, partly by getting complete accounts by key participants at the earliest possible moment after the event. Otherwise myth, as has so often been the case in Canadian military history, will come to pass for fact.³⁷

The claimed lesson that amphibious operations should develop around the flanks of a port, instead of frontally against it, now needs examination. After Dieppe the idea of a frontal attack was not in fact

³⁶ C.C. Mann to John Mellor, 26 August 1975 and 1 June 1976, TMFDC, Mann File; Mann to The Editor, *Canadian Defence Quarterly (CDQ)*, 7 October 1977 and rough drafts, DHist, C.C. Mann Biog. File; W.A.B. Douglas to C.P. Stacey, 17 October 1977, enclosed Mann to The Editor, *CDQ*, 28 November 1978, UTA, CSP/044; Mann to The Editor, *The Legion Magazine*, 15 May 1978, UCSC, JMP; C. Churchill Mann, 'On the real purpose of the Dieppe raid', *CDQ* 9/1 (1979), 57.

³⁷ W.A.B. Douglas, Memorandum – 'Dieppe raid: MGen Churchill Mann', DC 78/476, 24 October 1978, DHist, C.C. Mann Biog. File.

discounted, 'if very powerful support was available during the early stages, or if the defences had been subdued by action before the assault'. If this support was not available, then encircling attacks were recommended, although 'This by no means excludes a frontal feint staged in order to fix the enemy's defences and perhaps his reserves as well'.³⁸

This lesson was given more importance and different emphasis by Crerar, Hughes-Hallett, Mountbatten and post-war historians. Six days before the launch of D-Day, Crerar stated, in the postscript of a top secret letter to the Canadian COS:

I am also inclined to view that, when considered history is written, it will be found that had Dieppe, with great good luck, turned out to be a cheap success, there would have resulted a false and quite inadequate appreciation of the problem of invasion. The 'sobering effects' of the Dieppe operation, in my opinion, have had an important effect on Allied policies, strategy and, of course, Combined Service tactics.³⁹

This set the stage for the idea that, in the words of Stacey, 'Dieppe finally killed the always more than dubious idea of a frontal attack on a major fortified port, and at least produced grave doubts as to the possibility of the immediate acquisition of such a port by an assaulting force'. He continues that British amphibious planners were forced to thus think in terms of supporting an invasion through open beach maintenance. Stacey bases this claim, though, on the notoriously unreliable, verbal evidence given him by Hughes-Hallett in 1946.⁴⁰

³⁸ Saunders, 'Combined Report', p.48.

³⁹ Lt-Gen. H. Crerar to Lt-Gen. K. Stuart, GOC-in-C 1-0-2, 31 May 1944, NAC, RG 24/12749/24 Dieppe-1, fol.206.

⁴⁰ Stacey, 'Memorandum of interviews with Capt. J. Hughes-Hallett, CB, DSO, RN, at Portsmouth, 29 and 30 September 1946', 1 October 1946, Appendix A, pp.5-6, to 'Operation Jubilee: the Dieppe raid, 19 August 1942. Additional information on planning', 5 October 1946, DHist, CMHQ Report No.159; Stacey, *Six years of war*, pp.401, 404 [quote].

Concerning this lesson the unpublished Confidential history, 'The evolution and development of Combined Operations technique and material' (1956), states, 'probably the most important was that a frontal assault on a heavily defended port was not a practical proposition'. In the post-war period Crerar, Hughes-Hallett, Mountbatten, Mann never tired of repeating the lesson so that it has come to be regarded as fact. Interestingly, on 11 May 1942, Mountbatten had stated in his cover letter for the Summary of Outline Plan for *Rutter*, submitted to the COS, that it would not 'throw light on the maintenance problem over beaches'.⁴¹

It is true that the majority of the dozen or so raids and invasion plans on the table at the time of *Rutter/Jubilee* were based on the immediate acquisition of a port. These included three variants of *Sledgehammer*, known as *East*, *Central* and *West*, scheduled to attack, respectively, Boulogne, Alderney and St. Nazaire, in early September 1942. These would have been even more risky than *Jubilee*, since Boulogne was scheduled for a frontal attack and had stronger defences than Dieppe, Alderney's defences had been improved to the status of an impregnable fortress, while St. Nazaire was not only beyond the range of fighter cover, but the defects in its defences revealed by the commando attack on it in March had been rectified. All these operations put great emphasis on tactical surprise. No heavy air support was envisaged, beyond the bombing of aerodromes to create diversions or delay reinforcements. No heavy preliminary naval bombardment or support was planned, beyond destroyers and possibly

⁴¹ Amphibious Warfare Headquarters, 'The evolution and development of Combined Operations technique and material', Unpublished Confidential history, London: Ministry of Defence, 1956, p.19, PRO, DEFE 2/710; C. Churchill Mann, 'Dieppe was necessary and worth while', *The Legionary Magazine* 33/9 (February 1959), 26; Mountbatten to COS, P.126, 11 May 1942, NAC, RG 24/10872/232C2 (D35), fol. HIST-10.

modern cruisers. The former Chief of Staff at COHQ, General. G.E. Wildman-Lushington, wrote to Mountbatten in 1959, 'You will remember that the Prime Minister, as well as the COS, was insistent that there should be a reconnaissance in force across the Channel that autumn to test the feasibility of capturing a port for Operation *Overlord*.' Brigadier Antony H. Head, Military Adviser, Combined Operations, and a long-time member of the Joint Planning Staff, stated in a March 1949 lecture to the Royal United Service Institution, that 'it was considered that any re-entering of the Continent would have to be a quick capture of a port, and such an undertaking needed to be tried out'. Stacey's memorandum of a conversation with him days later confirm that the prevailing thinking during this period in higher command circles, was that a practical test of equipment and technique under battle conditions was considered essential as no large-scale amphibious operations had been carried out since Gallipoli. The immediate taking of a port was considered a prerequisite in all invasion plans, and thus there was a close connection between the Dieppe operation and this problem. Head further indicated that it was definitely with this problem in mind that the frontal assault was included in the *Jubilee* plan, since the capture of an intact port was the main pre-determinant. Thus, it is clear that senior American, British, and Canadian commanders were prepared to attempt a major assault on the Continent, centred on capturing a port, based solely on tactical surprise, without preliminary heavy naval and air bombardment or support. But Stacey's claim, that 'these optimistic tactical conceptions were dissipated with the gunsmoke of Operation *Jubilee*; no more was heard of them after that day on the Dieppe beaches', is false.⁴²

⁴² Gen. G.E. Wildman-Lushington to First Sea Lord [Mountbatten], draft letter, February 1959.

That this amphibious doctrine and planning did *not* change after Dieppe, is clear from the Combined Report, which explained that planners still envisaged capturing a port, but using flank, as opposed to frontal, attacks, if the supporting fire was not available. In fact, the senior commanders mentioned are completely incorrect in ascribing the idea of beach maintenance and use of pre-fabricated harbours, code-named *Mulberry*, directly to the experience of Dieppe. Even after Dieppe, planners still envisaged capturing a port as a prerequisite for any invasion but they then studied how to do this by other means, such as flank attacks and the use of airborne troops. It was not until the experience of the North African, Sicilian, and Italian mainland landings, that the idea of beach maintenance over open beaches begun to take hold. Brig. Head agreed, explaining Dieppe invasion planners still remained 'port conscious' and that it was only after the invasion of Sicily, carried out over open beaches, without the preliminary capture of a port, that the idea of mounting a major assault on a beach maintenance basis really caught hold. He noted that this was done at the insistence of Gen. Sir Bernard Montgomery.⁴³

One such port-orientated operation, planned for two months after *Jubilee* but never carried out, was Operation *Coleman*, an attack on Fécamp.

SUL, MBP, B 73, quoted in John P. Campbell, *Dieppe revisited: a documentary investigation* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), p.213, see his discussion on pp.67, 212-3; Antony H. Head, 'Amphibious operations' (Digest from a RUSI lecture 13 March 1946, printed in RUSI Journal, November 1946), *Military Review* 27/8 (November 1947), 107; Stacey, 'Memorandum of conversation with Brigadier A.H. Head, MC, MP, at Combined Operations Headquarters, 15 March 1946', 24/Dieppe/1/2, Appendix B, pp.1-2, to 'Operation *Jubilee*: the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942. New light on early planning', 22 March 1946, DHist, CMHQ Report No.153; Stacey, *Six years of war*, pp.402-3 ['gunsmoke'].

⁴³ Stacey, 'Memorandum of conversation with Brigadier A.H. Head, MC, MP, at Combined Operations Headquarters, 15 March 1946', 24/Dieppe/1/2, Appendix B, p.2, to 'Operation *Jubilee*: the raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942. New light on early planning', 22 March 1946, DHist, CMHQ Report No.153.

Its plan included a heavy preliminary bombardment of the port's central beaches, code-named Red and White, and the surrounding coastal defence installations.⁴⁴

Campbell makes a compelling case for the lack of connection between *Jubilee* and *Overlord*, all the details of which there is not room for to examine here. But a few points he makes are revealing. First, he states, 'no mere raid could in any literal sense have been a rehearsal for an operation of the sheer magnitude and complexity' of *Overlord*. The basic prerequisite for this, he explains, was the complete reorganization of the Army and Metropolitan RAF from a defensive mode to one geared toward Continental offensive operations, including the huge build up of American armed forces and supplies in southern England. Campbell points out raids did not need detailed administrative planning on the scale of that required for *Overlord*. He notes that a major difference was that 'the trickiest stage of a raid was the withdrawal and re-embarkation – the "worst possible case" contingency for invasion planners'. He emphasizes the long period of almost two years separating the two operations and indicates that the many lessons learned from other operations were invaluable and widely circulated in COHQ. This is contrary to some 'sweeping generalizations', from people like Hughes-Hallett, who thought that the Mediterranean operations were of little significance in planning cross-Channel operations due to the completely different weather and navigational conditions. Campbell acknowledges, and all historians agree, that the real lessons learned that could be applied to

⁴⁴ Operation *Coleman*, Naval Operation Order, 25 October 1942, IWM, JHHP, JHH 7/1.

any invasion were to do with the 'sharp end – the assault'. These will be examined later.⁴⁵

Not only were lessons learned in the British operations but also in the American amphibious operations in the Pacific. These lessons were passed on to COHQ and the later invasion planners and *vice versa*. This was acknowledged by McNaughton in his post-Dieppe raid press conference. When questioned about American Marine landings in the Solomon Islands, he replied:

We are in very close touch with the American staffs in London and when they have got a fuller story, we shall be given it. There is much interchanging of lessons learned from all these operations and there is free exchange between the Americans and the British and ourselves and cool-headed analysing with regard to failures, faults and lessons to be learned.⁴⁶

The idea of prefabricated floating harbours – *Mulberry*, was directly attributed to lessons of *Jubilee*. Mountbatten was a avid supporter of this, as well as others. On 2 October 1945, the *Mulberry* Exhibition, complete with a large-scale replica, was opened in Montréal, one of twelve Canadian cities on its tour. It previously had been exhibited in Paris at the request of General Charles de Gaulle. War Office Technical Staff, who had actually worked on

⁴⁵ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, pp.209-210.

⁴⁶ 'Notes of an interview of Lt-Gen. McNaughton by press correspondents at HQ First Canadian Army on 27 August 1942', p.6, NAC, MG 30 E133/248/1-31 August 1942, fol.F. That information and lessons learned were exchanged between the US and British authorities concerned is reflected in the following intercepted Japanese communication (known as 'Magic' as opposed to Ultra) from its Spanish Ambassador to Tokyo, originating from a Washington intelligence agent:

According to the statements of a certain officer of the Air Defense Command, the United States is establishing parachutists' schools. The High Command has reached the conclusion that the use of parachute troops in attacking the enemy from the rear, coupled with landing operations is extremely effective.

The High Command is dissatisfied with the activities of the RAF. It advocates boldly strengthening the air attacks on Germany on a much larger scale. Special training in landing operations must be maintained for this purpose. The causes of the Dieppe fiasco lies in the fact that the Commandos were too few and the Canadians who landed became excited... | this to Rome and Berlin.

'Madrid (Suma) to Tokyo, No.10859, "TO" Intelligence (From Washington October 7), October 1942', Magic intercept 10 October 1942, translated by the Army 11 October 1942, declassified by the Deputy Director, NSA[National Security Agency]/Chief, CSS, December 1978, USNA, received by this author January 1995 from Chris Hernandez-Roy who was researching there.

the design and construction of the original, accompanied the exhibition to tell its story and answer questions. In Montréal the Canadian Minister of Defence, Ralston, was invited to speak, and emphatically declared that, '*Mulberry* had its origins in Dieppe – without Dieppe *Mulberry* might never have been thought of... *Mulberry* to Canada is a symbol of Canadian sacrifice at Dieppe, and a pathway to Canada's telling participation in the battles through to victory!'. Crerar gave the opening speech at the Toronto opening the following month, stating that the development of *Mulberry*, was 'just one of the essential war inventions and developments which the Allies owe to the Canadians at Dieppe. The price paid was not in vain'. The accompanying information pack, 'News from the *Mulberry* Exhibition' that could be picked up at the exhibitions, contained a history of the origin, design, development, construction, and operational capacity, including statistics. In this, constant references were made to the significance of *Mulberry* and the fact that 'without Dieppe the harbour of peace might never have been born'.⁴⁷

Hughes-Hallett, usually one to support the lessons learned theme, disagreed, writing to Mountbatten in 1962, that he did 'not think it could be sustained that the artificial harbours used for the invasion stemmed from the landings of Dieppe'. Close analysis of the records reveal Hughes-Hallett's suspicions were correct. Its roots can be traced back to long before Dieppe.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Col. J.L. Ralston, '*Mulberry*', Montréal address, 2 October 1945, pp.3-4, NAC, MG 27 III B11/175/*Mulberry*, 2 October 1945; Lt-Gen. H. Crerar, 'Address – Opening of the "*Mulberry*" Exhibition, Toronto, 6 November 1945, MG 30 E158/27/985C.009 (D410); 'The Story of *Mulberry*', p.1 ['harbour of peace'], and Col. V.C. Steer-Webster, War Office, 'A technical note', pp.1-4, in 'News from *Mulberry* Exhibition', NAC, MG 30 E158/27/985C.009 (D410).

⁴⁸ Hughes-Hallett to Mountbatten, 27 June 1962, IWM, JHHP, JHH 3/10

On 16 October 1944, Mr G.A. Maunsell, a civil engineer, reacted to press reports that named Hughes-Hallett as the originator of *Mulberry*. Maunsell explains that he had sent a prefabricated port proposal, 'complete with plans and the whole idea of the Phoenix Scheme as eventually carried out', to his friend, Lt-Col. Wilson, Assistant director of Fortifications and Works, War Office, who forwarded it to the Director General of Transportation, War Office, in December 1940. Hughes-Hallett replied acknowledging Maunsell's full responsibility for the concept. Three years later Maunsell informed Hughes-Hallett of a Claim he was making to the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors concerning the *Mulberry* harbour. In this he went into great detail, describing many of his previous inventions which had already been adopted by the Admiralty, some of which were being used operationally, these included Naval Forts, Anti-Aircraft Forts and Bombardment Towers. Further correspondence shows that Hughes-Hallett completely supported his case, even volunteering to give evidence to the Claim's Commission on his behalf. In preparing to do this he examined the relevant sections of the July 1943 *Rattle* Conference, and Admiral Bertram Ramsay's covering memorandum in despatches for Operation *Neptune* (assault phase of *Overlord*). Both of these gave no indication of the origin of the master concept, although the latter confirmed that the 'original design for such harbours... were prepared, for some extraordinary reason, by the War Office'. In one of Hughes-Hallett's last letters to Maunsell, he explained that he had decided to adopt the concept on 13 June 1943, 'oddly enough during the singing of the Anthem at the Abbey'. At the end of June Hughes-Hallett explained it to a large meeting of British and American C-in-Cs and their staffs in London. Trials had been successful and it was agreed for it to be put

in the Outline Plan for *Neptune*, which was later authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in August 1943, at the Quebec Conference. Maunsell's origination of this concept has been ignored in all accounts of *Jubilee* and the lessons learned up to present.⁴⁹

What was considered the most important naval lesson, was the need to form a permanent naval assault force that would train in close conjunction with specially selected Army units. This brigade group assault force was named Force J (Jubilee), put under command of Hughes-Hallett by Mountbatten, despite the opposition from Admiral Baillie-Grohman, who considered that it should not be separated from his sphere of command, as it would tend to become a 'Navy within a Navy within a Navy', beside being a waste of resources. Hughes-Hallett pushed for the assignment of a battleship to it, but this was repeatedly refused by the Admiralty. Due to the shortage of landing craft and trained crews, the majority of which were gradually siphoned off to participate in the Mediterranean operations, Force J undertook no operations and very few training exercises. Therefore, by the end of April 1943, Hughes-Hallett, bored with his assignment, recommended the disbandment of Force J, and requested transfer. However, it was maintained and ended up training and landing 3 CID on D-Day.⁵⁰

Many of the so-called lessons learned were known before, and it was not necessary to attack a heavily defended port to re-learn them. One which

⁴⁹ G.A. Maunsell to Hughes-Hallett, 16 October 1944 and reply, 19 October 1944, IWM, JHHP, JHH 7/1; Maunsell to Hughes-Hallett, 28 October 1947, enclosure, 'Prefabricated Harbour Claim', pp.1-14, Hughes-Hallett to Maunsell, 9 November 1947, ['Anthem'], plus other correspondence, and 'Extract from Record of Operation *Rattle*', Minutes of 4 Meeting, Largs Conference, July 1943, and 'Extract from Admiral Ramsay's covering memo in despatches for Operation Neptune - *MULBERRY* Project', nd., IWM, JHHP, JHH 7/2.

⁵⁰ Rear-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman to Mountbatten, 14 September 1942 ['Navy within a Navy'], and reply, 17 September 1942, NMM, BGP, GRO/29; discussion of Force J in Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.224; Stacey, *Six years of war*, pp.401, 404

was considered one of the most important was the need for overwhelming fire support in the preliminary and close support stages. This supposedly new lesson implies that the necessary fire support doctrine for an amphibious operation such as *Jubilee* did not exist before it. This was clearly not the case. Historically the British army had always been interested in amphibious strategy and applied it when deemed in her national interest. After France's defeat in 1940, Britain found itself in a position of having 'no secure bases in Europe where its army could land and organize for operations; no prearranged supply system; no friendly army to fight alongside. Intervention on the continent now meant landing across open beaches in country occupied by the enemy. Thus, at this time, the British army was reduced to amphibious warfare'. Yet this was not an unfamiliar strategic situation that Britain found herself in 1942. Even though the previous quotation refers to Britain's strategic situation at the time of Napoleon Bonaparte, 1793 to 1815, the two periods were very similar.⁵¹ Britain, historically a naval power, could only project its influence on the European and other continents by the integrated use of naval and military forces. Therefore the basis for British amphibious doctrine can be traced back to the 16th Century, and Sir Francis Drake's raiding of Spanish possessions in Panama and on the Florida coast. Thereafter, the British carried out various forms of combined arms landings, with varying degrees of success, up until the time of Dieppe. The development of this doctrine, especially during the 20th Century, would have been studied by anyone concerned with combined operations, and this perspective is important to remember in attempting to gain an understanding of the planners' and

⁵¹ Merrill L. Bartlett, *Assault from the sea, essays on the history of amphibious warfare* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1985), p.61.

senior commanders' mindset during the planning and authorizing of *Rutter/Jubilee*.

The 1915 Allied campaign against the Turkish held Dardenelles, included the amphibious landings at Gallipoli, which was the only significant combined operation of the Great War, and as such, was studied at great lengths in the inter-war period. Bad planning and leadership led to poor coordination of naval fire support and the landing of the assault troops which resulted in ultimate disaster. Critics claimed that combined operations and its naval fire support component were incompatible with the new advances in technology and present and future warfare. This view was supported by some historians and veterans, such as Bernard Fergusson, who believed that after this no significant amphibious doctrine development took place. He states that 'In the twenty years between the wars, Combined Ops [operations] took a back seat', and most informed people 'reckoned that daylight assaults against a defended shore were suicide and folly'.⁵²

It is true that a lack of financing and lack of public and establishment support inhibited the development of amphibious doctrine and technique but this is not to say that it did not develop at all. Quite the contrary. Gallipoli yielded many lessons concerning indirect naval fire support, and the use of Forward Observation Officers and air observers, which were not ignored by the Staff Colleges, and various other military training and academic organizations and committees, concerned with the development of combined operations. From 1919-1939 these institutions produced and revised the Field Service Regulations and training manuals about combined

⁵² Bernard Fergusson, *The watery maze: the story of Combined Operations* (London: Collins, 1961), p.35.

operations. In 1921 a joint services, combined operations training manual was produced, and was revised in 1925, 1931 and 1938. The last version being the basis for staff courses up until Dieppe. During 1938 the Admiralty Also authorized the establishment of the Inter Service Training and Development Centre (ISTDC) which was an active amphibious operations training base. During the 1920s and 1930s, despite financial constraints, the Army and Navy were able to carry out sporadic combined operations training exercises, which although invariably of short duration and not very successful, were essential practical contributions to the development of the doctrine.⁵³

The combined operations manuals contain specific references to amphibious doctrine and fire support which contradict the claimed new lessons learned at Dieppe. The 1921/25 Manual of Combined Operations states that close fire support was to be augmented by the army's use of their 'land service guns', that is, howitzers and field guns, from the decks of ships during the assault landing phase. The 1931 Manual gives a detailed breakdown of the fire support capabilities at this time and suggested the maximization of this type of fire, particularly in unknown circumstances. It also indicates that destroyers could be employed close to shore for close fire support. The 1938 revised version uses similar language to explain the different types of ships and their capabilities and potential fire support situations that each ship could be used in. Relevant to *Jubilee*, is its point that in a dawn landing, if the defenders are expected to be alert, as they were at Dieppe's centre beaches, 'the value of covering fire will usually

⁵³ Kenneth J. Clifford, *Amphibious warfare development in Britain and America from 1920-1940* (Laurens, N.Y.: Edgewood, 1983), pp.vii, ix, 30-85.

outweigh the loss of surprise'. The characteristics of this covering fire – duration, intensity, and volume – is dependent usually on inexact information on the enemy defences, which also could be sited in a way that would be difficult to neutralize by naval bombardment. Therefore, the Manual continues, 'it is important to employ the greatest volume of fire available'. In the absence of precise intelligence on the defender's dispositions, 'this fire should be directed on the beaches and sea-front wherever an enemy might find cover'. Concerning close support, it states that 'If ships are able to stand close in', they will be able to maintain effective cover fire while the landing craft reach the shore, and 'perhaps even while the troops are capturing the beaches'. It concludes that howitzers and mortars, specially mounted in small craft, landing craft or motor lighters, 'may be of great value in adding to the volume of high trajectory covering fire, and may also enable such fire to be provided closer inshore than would otherwise be possible'.⁵⁴

The preceding analysis proves that, contrary to popular belief, Britain had a substantial modern amphibious doctrine, with a naval fire support component, based on eighteen years experience. By 1941 the British were also aware of the extensive American experience carried out in the 1930's of experimentation with fire support in amphibious assaults. Evidence for this is in correspondence indicating that they had copies of the current 1938 American combined operations manual, 'Landing Operations Doctrine US Navy, FTP 167'. Concerning fire support, it states:

⁵⁴ The 1921 Manual also suggested the need for special landing craft with ramps capable of landing transporting and landing tanks on beaches, Clifford, *Amphibious warfare*, p.40; Admiralty, 'Manual of Combined Operations, 1931', London: Naval Staff, Training and Staff Duties Division, 1931, pp.93-4, PRO, DEFE 2/708, pp.98-9, Chapter 7 [destroyers]; Admiralty, 'Manual of Combined Operations, 1938', CB 3042, London: Naval Staff, Training and Staff Duties Division, 1938, pp.93-4, 144-5 [quotes], PRO, DEFE 2/709.

The light cruiser is the ideal component of the close fire support group. The 6 inch light cruiser and the heavy cruiser are preferable as components of deep fire support groups of the regiment. The battleship is best reserved for deep support of the division and for use as a special fire support group. The use of destroyers as special fire support groups for participation in the preparation and for the purpose of firing on targets of opportunity on the flanks of the area to be attacked using ship spot is highly desirable. It may be desirable at times to use several destroyers instead of one cruiser as a close support fire group.⁵⁵

The British clearly agreed with this employment of destroyers, however, they also assigned them the task of preliminary bombardment as well, which they were ill-suited for. This is evidenced at Dieppe where the large use of smoke contributed to the 'fog of war', clearly revealing the destroyers lack of certain technologies which was necessary for accurate indirect fire.

Several raids took place prior to *Jubilee* under the auspices of COHQ. The success of these small scale operations led to COHQ to apply the same methods and conditions to the first large scale raid of the war. Unfortunately, the circumstances surrounding *Jubilee* were much different than the previous operations. For example, the raid against St Nazaire, 28 March 1942, proved that it was possible for a small force of about six hundred men to frontally attack strongly defended port, under cover of darkness and dependent on the element of surprise. As the casualties were high – sixty-three per cent – the objective must be shown to be worth the sacrifice. However, this operation is very different from *Jubilee* since the attacking force was transported over the water, *through* the outer German defensive ring and deposited within, whereas for *Jubilee* the attackers had to overcome outer defences first before entering. Other operations were carried out against the Norwegian coast, however, these were supported by cruisers and destroyers but they did not meet any serious German opposition form

⁵⁵ 613-013 OPS Landing US Navy. Landing Operations doctrine USN 1938 (FTP 167), p.122, information from Brian Begbie.

shore batteries, air attack or have to overcome formidable defensive positions. One worth examining was the raid on the island of Vaagsö, which was supported by one cruiser and four destroyers. The approximately six hundred commandos were put on shore, again maintaining the element of surprise. The two defending batteries were suppressed or knocked out and the troops accomplished their objectives, meeting no major opposition. The significance of the operation is that the initial, short, neutralizing bombardment was effective in allowing the assaulting commandos to gain the shore and move inland, while later cover fire with smoke and suppressing fire permitted the troops to carry out their mission with limited interference.⁵⁶

This and other successful raids, based on the elements of surprise, rapidity, preliminary and close support bombardment by air and naval forces, probably influenced the Dieppe planners into believing that these same factors could be applied to a raid on a larger scale. Dieppe was a more heavily fortified port, with a three tier defensive system, comprising coastal batteries, divisional artillery and fortifications. Correspondingly, the planners increased the number of assault troops ten times but did not do likewise for the naval fire support. Thus *Jubilee* was supplied with less naval support than was available for the unopposed raid on Spitsbergen.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Hilary A. St. George Saunders, 'Loften to Vaagsö', in *The green beret: the story of the commandos 1940-1945* (London: Michael Joseph, 1949), pp.56 (six hundred), 57-63, 98 [sixty-three percent]. Part of the fire support at Vaagsö consisted the cruiser HMS *Kenya's* twelve guns firing on one of the batteries; in ten minutes, 'between four and five hundred six-inch shells fell upon a space not more than 250 yards square', Brereton Greenhous, *Dieppe, Dieppe* (Montréal: Éditions Art Global Inc. in cooperation with the Department of National Defence, 1993), p.20.

⁵⁷ The Spitsbergen raid of 19 August 1941 was supported by two cruisers and three destroyers, Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.304.

The specific reasons why the heavy air and naval fire support was taken out of the earlier *Rutter*, and not included in the *Jubilee* plans, was discussed previously. The main reason being the prerequisite of assuring the tanks were able penetrate through the town and the fact that bombers could not accurately hit the town anyway. In hindsight it is hard to believe that the senior commanders authorized such an ill-conceived plan. Besides many of the British commanders involved in the planning of *Rutter/Jubilee*, including Mountbatten and Montgomery, all three senior Canadian commanders, McNaughton, Crerar, and Roberts, were trained gunners and had been through the Great War. Here they had experienced the need for overwhelming bombardment and rolling barrages to neutralize and suppress enemy batteries and to crush the enemy defensive belts, to clear a path for the infantry through no-mans land and the enemy positions. They were also aware of the lessons of the disastrous, amphibious Gallipoli landings. During the Second World War an amphibious operation over the Channel to take a defended port could be compared to a classic frontal attack on prepared positions of the previous war – the Channel being substituted for no-mans land. Thus to have planned, mounted and launched a frontal attack on a heavily defended port, without the required, suppressing fire of the German batteries or preliminary bombardment of the beach, town and headland defences, is inconceivable. After Dieppe Head noted that COHQ planners generally felt that 'although fixed coast defences were very troublesome, they were not as bad as had been expected'. The main difficulty, he explained, were the regular German artillery batteries,

especially mobile ones, which had been well camouflaged in good positions and continued firing on the beaches and ships during the whole operation.⁵⁸

Baillie-Grohman wrote to Mountbatten less than a month after the operation, commenting on the draft of 'Lessons learned from Dieppe' he had been sent to vet. Noting that the first ten paragraphs had been prepared by Hughes-Hallett, he stated that they only contained 'one really useful *new* lesson' – the need for better aircraft recognition. 'Practically all the others', he continued, 'should have been known to Hughes-Hallett before he started, especially if he had ever read the CO [Combined Operations] Pamphlets.' Baillie-Grohman concluded that the paper would have been more accurate if it had been headed 'Lessons learned by Hughes-Hallett from Dieppe'. Wallace Reyburn, who wrote the best-seller, *Rehearsal for invasion: an eyewitness story of the Dieppe raid* (1943), initially supported the lessons learned theme, but with more information, later changed his tune. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of *Jubilee*, he became involved in an acrimonious debate with Hughes-Hallett, acting as proxy for Mountbatten, which was reported on in the *Sunday Telegraph*, and reprinted in seventy Canadian newspapers.⁵⁹

Concerning lessons learned at the sharp end and the use of tanks in the assault, Baillie-Grohman wrote to Roberts on 25 September 1942, wondering what his views were on this aspect. Baillie-Grohman noted that tanks could be useful in neutralizing MG positions on the beaches and that

⁵⁸ Antony H. Head, 'Amphibious operations' (Digest from a lecture 13 March 1946, RUSI Journal, November 1946), *Military Review* 27/8 (November 1947), 107.

⁵⁹ Baillie-Grohman to Mountbatten, 14 September 1942, NMM, BGP, GRO/29; Wallace Reyburn, *Rehearsal for invasion: an eyewitness story of the Dieppe raid* (London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1943), pp.12-13; Reyburn/Hughes-Hallett Dieppe controversy in *Sunday Telegraph* from 27 August 1967, NAC, MG 30 E463/6; Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.197 [proxy, seventy newspapers].

possibly a 'special design of tank for landing in these assault [*sic.*] and taking the bridge-head' was necessary. Roberts did not comment on this, only replying that he felt 'tanks should not be landed in the face of strong opposition'. He noted that the important aspect of their employment was their need to have a 'clear run and room to manoeuvre'. He explained that this did not happen at Dieppe due to the heavy fire on the beaches, which hampered the engineers' mission of building ramps for the tanks to cross the sea-wall and blowing the anti-tank road blocks into the town.⁶⁰

Another lesson commonly thought to be a direct result of the tank experiences at Dieppe was the need for an armoured vehicle that could perform engineering tasks. Lt-Col. G.C. Reeves, Assistant Director of the Special Devices Branch of the Tank Department of the British Ministry of Supply, was on *Jubilee*. Back in London, he gave his staff the problem of 'developing devices to enable obstacles to be surmounted by a tank or destroyed by a tank crew without them being exposed to enemy fire'. This view was endorsed by the senior Royal Canadian Engineer (RCE) officer, attached to 2 CID, Lt-Col L.F. Barnes, and by a Home Forces report on the principal lessons submitted to the DCIGS, Lt-Gen. Nye, in late October 1942. Only eight days after the raid, on 27 August 1942, a Canadian officer attached to the Department of Tank Design (DTD), Lt. J.J. Denovan, RCE, produced drawings of an engineer tank that was a significant contribution to the development of the AVRE, Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Rear-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman to Roberts, 25 September 1942, and reply, 1 October 1942, NMM, BGP, GRO/29.

⁶¹ Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.404 [Reeves quote, tank drawing]; Lt-Col. L.F. Barnes, 'Report on Combined Operations', 5 September 1942, p.5, this author's Dieppe Collection; J.A. Sinclair, BGS (Plans), Home Forces, to DCGS, 'Operation *Jubilee* - Principal Lessons', HF/00/934/G(Plans), 28 October 1942, p.4, PRO, WO 106/4195A.

It is doubtful that Denovan based his drawing solely on the experience of Dieppe. Reeve's own after-action report, completed the day after, although concluding that it was 'essential that a method be devised of placing demolition charges by personnel protected by armour', earlier states, that 'On conclusion of the exercise held on 2 to 8 July [1942] this development was put in hand by DTD'. Also significant were the many inter-war and pre-Dieppe trials on various types of task-performing tanks, such as mine-rollers and tanks with floatation gear, or DD (Duplex-Drive) swimming tanks. Thus it can not be said that this was a new lesson but one that spurred on the development of the AVRE.⁶²

GERMAN LESSONS AND INFLUENCE ON STRATEGIC THINKING

An advantageous result of *Jubilee*, constantly noted in the post-war period by Mountbatten and historians, including Stacey, was that Dieppe 'unexpectedly, but most fortunately, became one of the great deception operations of the war'. What he meant here was that because of Dieppe the Germans learned the wrong lessons and based their whole anti-invasion defensive system on denying the Allies the use of ports. By concentrating their efforts in strengthening port defences, the argument goes, they remained vulnerable in other areas. What Mountbatten, Stacey and these proponents of this view fail to realize that the Germans would have done this anyway, even if *Jubilee* had not occurred. Hitler had ordered the construction of the Atlantic Wall, a defensive belt along the whole threatened

⁶² Lt-Col. G.C. Reeves, 'Report by Lt-Col G.C. Reeves on the raid carried out on Dieppe on 19 August 1942', 28 August 1942, pp.6,7, NAC, RG 24/10740/212C1.3009 (D18).

coasts, based on turning ports into impregnable fortresses. Thus, although it was possible to envisage capturing a port in 1942, this would not have been possible after 1943, but this was not due to Dieppe. As Campbell, clearly explains, it was a matter of strategic first principles. Any invasion would need a deep water port to ensure supplies for any attempted invasion. As early as 25 April 1941, a German report noted that the ports of Dieppe and Le Tréport 'will not be attacked directly by the enemy' but would be assaulted by means of landing attempts at nearby points'.⁶³ A German post-raid report noted that:

whereas until now it was thought that the capture of a port was necessary to land such material [tanks]. It follows that an attacker can easily, in certain cases undertake an action on large scale without having captured an organized port, though the capture of such a port of course is necessary to carry out the operation.

Another German report deduced exactly what the COHQ planners had decided, that any future operation would attempt to penetrate weak spots between defended zones and 'try to take the harbours by an encircling movement. They are not likely to repeat a massed frontal assault against a strongly fortified area', as at Dieppe. For this reason, the report continued, that mobile reserves, including a large component of armour and motorized anti-tank weapons, be prepared for a counter-attack role, were considered essential.⁶⁴

Examination of Cabinet Office Historical records closed until 1998, show a report of 1955 analysing the above problem, using all available primary and secondary Allied and German documents, especially the Führer Conferences of 2 and 13 August and 29 September 1942. The report

⁶³ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.199; Stacey, *Six years of war*, p.352 [German report].

⁶⁴ 'Note on the attempted British landing at Dieppe 19 August 1942 and its lessons from the German point of view', circa August 1942, p.3, DHist 594.003 (D1) ['whereas until']; Theatre Intelligence Section Martian Report No.86, 'German Lessons from the Dieppe raid', 8 March 1944, p.6, NAC, RG 24/10702/2125C1.981(D298) ['try to take harbours'].

concludes that Hitler was concerned at this time with strengthening the coastal fortifications in the West, 'inter alia round ports', which were known to be required in any major landing. The report also noted that he had 'perceived the need to deny ports to the enemy' in fact before *Jubilee*, and 'the raid seems merely to have confirmed him in this intention'.⁶⁵

Although in 1944 a reversal of German strategy occurred, with the intention to defeat any invasion on the beaches instead of using armoured counter-attacks, this was not due to the German experience of Dieppe. Instead, it was because of their experiences of the Allied landings in the Mediterranean theatre.⁶⁶

Contrary to some secondary accounts, it was widely believed at the time and into the post-war period, that the raid had also resulted in a significant transfer of German forces from the eastern to western fronts. In actual fact only one SS motorized division, *Das Reich*, and one SS motorized brigade, *Adolf Hitler*, were actually transferred.⁶⁷

In conclusion it is obvious that only lessons learned at the sharp end were of any real significance, although even the most obvious, such as the precursors of the AVRE, were already being developed and tested prior to the raid. The *Mulberry* has been shown also to have originated long before. Planners did not immediately change to thinking of open beach

⁶⁵ R. Wheatley, Cabinet Office, to Dr. G.W.S. Friedrichsen, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, 'Dieppe raid and Allies' need for invasion ports', 21 December 1955; and 'Notes by R. Wheatley on Dieppe raid in file II/4/iii', 13 November 1963, Cabinet Office, Historical and Records Section (COHRS), CAB 146/349 [closed until 1998].

⁶⁶ Campbell, *Dieppe revisited*, p.221.

⁶⁷ Basil H. Liddell Hart states 'Dieppe led Hitler to order the despatch of two of the best *Panzer* divisions – at a crucial moment of his drive for Stalingrad. So even in failure, the Dieppe raid created a valuable distraction in aid of the Russians', *The tanks*, 2 (London: Cassell, 1959), p.320; J.R.M. Butler and J.M.A. Gwyer, 'Anglo-American strategy reconsidered: the decision for Torch', in *Grand strategy, June 1941-August 1942*, 3(II) (London: HMSO, 1964), p.648.

maintenance but instead continued thinking of other ways of capturing a port as a predeterminant to invasion. The idea only developed after the experience of the Mediterranean operations. The Germans initially drew the same conclusions concerning an Allied cross-Channel invasion and continued strengthening their defensive system based on fortified ports, but this was decided on before *Jubilee*. Their reversal of strategy was also based on their Mediterranean experiences.

8

CONCLUSION

The aim of this dissertation has been to reinterpret and resolve certain myths and misconceptions about the Dieppe raid. The sources examined, some not previously within the context of this operation, were instrumental in this accomplishment. These myths and misconceptions resulted in a confused historiography begun by official organizations and their representatives, mainly COHQ and Mountbatten. Although they were not entirely responsible for *all* of these misconceptions, Mountbatten's later repetition of them and his attempts at controlling the recording of the operation's history cannot be glossed over. One such myth, that the lessons of Dieppe were vital to the success of the Normandy invasion two years later, was the result of domestic propaganda, normal during wartime. The senior commanders of the Canadian Army Overseas, Generals McNaughton and Crerar, also advocated this and perpetuated it in the post-war period. Until recently their responsibility in this regard and other aspects of the operation has been ignored in past accounts.

This is clearly demonstrated in the controversial debate over the responsibility for and authorization of *Jubilee*. Analysis of the three extreme schools of thought has resulted in a consensus drawn from all three. Alterations in raiding procedure that resulted in the change in chain of command for *Jubilee* made the Canadian generals and C-in-C Portsmouth directly responsible for authorization. This conclusion invalidates Villa's circumstantial contention that Mountbatten pushed *Jubilee* through without formal COS approval. Mountbatten followed what he believed to be the

guidelines set down for him by the COS concerning the procedure for planning, mounting and launching raiding operations, including *Jubilee*. Henshaw's extreme claim that *Jubilee* would have not occurred at all if it had not been for the Canadian pressure, underrates that from COHQ and the RAF, and does not properly account for the background influence of Churchill and the COS. Only Mountbatten, the existence of COHQ, the momentum it developed for raiding, the support of RAF Fighter Command, and pressure from McNaughton and Crerar, revived the operation and saw it through.

The Whitakers' extreme criticisms of Churchill's, Montgomery's, and other senior commanders' responsibility for the operation, were shown to be incorrect. On the strategic level, the Whitakers hold Churchill and the COS responsible for pushing the operation forward to mollify the American, Russian and domestic demands for action. Yet in 1942 the Americans and Russians wanted not raids but a cross-Channel invasion of the Continent. The Russians correctly considered that raids such as *Jubilee*, had no influence on the movement of German strategic reserves from the eastern to western front. Also, the decision by Churchill and the COS, three weeks before *Jubilee*, to cancel any return to the continent in 1942 (*Sledgehammer*), and proceed with the invasion of North Africa (*Torch*), defused American pressure and invalidated any remaining political-strategic justification for *Jubilee*. Montgomery recommended to Paget, C-in-C Home Forces, that the operation be cancelled forever for security reasons.

On the tactical level, the Whitakers blame Montgomery for the lack of heavy preliminary bombing on the raid. As Montgomery was delegated by Paget as the responsible military officer for *Rutter*, and chaired the Force

Commanders meeting in which preliminary bomber support was decided against, he bears some responsibility for its deletion from that plan. Yet, after *Rutter's* cancellation, the operation was revived as *Jubilee*, with Montgomery excluded from the new chain of command and the subsequent planning process. During this planning the bombing issue was again discussed and opted against. Therefore, Montgomery cannot be held responsible for the lack of bomber support or any other part of the *Jubilee* plan.

Mountbatten's and Hughes-Hallett's post-raid claim that the Canadians, in agreement with GHQ Home Force's 'Army' planners, including Montgomery, were responsible for the implementation of the frontal assault in the outline and operational *Rutter/Jubilee* plans, was proven to be groundless. New evidence from the Major Henriques Papers supports the fact that COHQ planners, in conjunction with Home Force's planners, excluding Montgomery, made the decision during the Outline planning stage, before any Canadians came into the process. That a flawed final plan based on surprise, including a frontal assault, and lacking the necessary preliminary air and naval bombardment and close fire support, was subsequently confirmed by all Canadian commanders concerned, cannot be ignored.

Analysis of the operational intelligence available before *Jubilee*, although very comprehensive in most respects, was lacking in others, especially concerning German unit dispositions, defences and weapons. *Jubilee* battle maps indicate that HQs, from divisional level down, were wrongly identified or not indicated at all. The number, calibre and location of many of the beach defence guns were underestimated. The existence of two

of the German divisional batteries was not established and the disposition of the strategic armoured reserves was incorrectly identified.

Ironically, both the Germans and British had timely and valuable intelligence available which they ignored or misinterpreted. Operational signals intelligence (Ultra) and RDF (radio direction finding) played a part in detecting German coastal convoys. German RDF actually did detect *Jubilee*, but ignored the plots, while the British also plotted the German coastal convoy on intercept course for *Jubilee*, but discounted it as a threat. Recent claims that *Jubilee* was primarily an electronic intelligence gathering mission were examined and discounted.

The long-standing myth that German foreknowledge of *Jubilee* resulted in the subsequent massacre on the beaches was analysed and rejected. Villa's recent claim that the way that *Jubilee* was remounted is explained by an internal deception plan to shield the operation from possible obstruction, is similarly rebutted.

The battle chapters examined the special operational units, such as the British and French Commandos, American Rangers, Special Operations Executive (SOE) and others, and shed new light on their role in training and in the operation. This is highlighted by the use of new evidence from Brigadier Peter Young's Papers, supported by previously unused correspondence and oral interviews with former British and French Commandos and Rangers who participated. The SOE Archivist also supplied information from closed SOE personnel files of Dieppe participants.


Analysis of the supposed lessons learned, and their relation to the 1944 Normandy invasion, reveals that on the tactical level, these were well known before, especially concerning naval bombardment and fire support.

Subsequent applications and ideas from these lessons were shown to be not new but old. An obvious example was the AVRE (Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers), the development of which predated *Jubilee*. The Mountbatten claim that after Dieppe invasion planning centred not on taking a port for logistical support but on beach maintenance and the use of artificial harbours, known as *Mulberrys*, likewise was disproved. After *Jubilee*, planners still remained 'port conscious', and this is reflected in operation orders for future raids. The claim that the *Mulberry* was a direct development from the lessons of Dieppe was proven false, as new evidence showed that it was conceived two years prior to Dieppe.


Finally, examination of the influence of *Jubilee* on German strategic thinking shows that it did not have the impact claimed by Mountbatten and other senior leaders, and repeated by various authors, including Stacey. The claim was that because of Dieppe the Germans based their defensive system against invasion on denying the Allies the use of a deep water port. Actually the Germans perceived *before* Dieppe that a prerequisite for any invasion was the early capture of a port and this is revealed in German documents dated prior to *Jubilee*. That the Germans based their defensive system on this concept had nothing to do with *Jubilee*, except to reinforce this belief. The later decision to change from a defence in depth, to defeating the invasion on the beaches, was based on their experiences of Allied amphibious operations the Mediterranean.

MAPS

ORIGINAL IN COLOUR




PLOT OF ENEMY CONVOY, 18-19th. AUGUST 1942




MAP 4


DIEPPE, OPERATION "JUBILEE" 19th. AUGUST 1942.


DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE TRACKS OF UNITS ON PASSAGE



DIEPPE. ACTION WITH ENEMY FORCES 0347, AUGUST 19th. APPROXIMATE POSITIONS







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