


# **Dio Chrysostom: a Philosopher in Civic Space**

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This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

October 2021

*For my grandparents*  
*Lions and Stars*

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*Not all those who wander are lost*  
– J. R. R. Tolkien

## Preface

This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any work that has already been submitted before for any degree or other qualification except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the Degree Committee of the Faculty of Classics.

## Abstract

This thesis argues that Dio Chrysostom's self-identification as a philosopher mattered a great deal more than what previous scholarship had suggested. Against the cultural and intellectual atmosphere of the first two centuries CE, it is argued that Dio had deliberately chosen to identify as a philosopher in his public activity in order to position himself at the apex of the intellectual pyramid. It is shown that Dio mixed philosophy, especially the public philosophy of Socrates and Diogenes, and the public speech, instead of the intimate dialogue, and that by doing so Dio had fashioned for himself – and as a legacy – a new model of public intellectual: a philosopher who is active in the public, civic space, and who intervenes in the political lives of cities by virtue of his identification as a philosopher. Instead of being a teacher, or a writer, like many other philosophers of his time, Dio urged philosophers to step out onto the public space and become active moral and political guides for their communities.

## Acknowledgments

Writing a PhD dissertation is very much a solitary project, but I could not have undertaken and completed it without the support of family, friends, mentors, and colleagues. First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Tim Whitmarsh, for the countless hours of guidance which facilitated this work. My thanks are also given to my second supervisor, Chris Whitton, who helped to shape and refine my ideas. A special thanks is given to Robin Osborne, who read the manuscript, commented on it, and offered advice and help throughout my PhD. I have a debt as well to the academic community of the Faculty of Classics and especially to the participants of the A and C caucus seminars who have attended my presentations on parts of this dissertation and offered their thoughts. Many parts of this dissertation took shape thanks to such formal as well as informal communications. I am thankful to my examiners, Richard Hunter and Michael Trapp for their valuable comments and enlightening discussion.

An immense credit is due to my friends and peers at the Faculty. My deepest thanks are given to Konstantinos Lygouris and Lea Niccolai for hours of chat on Dio and philosophy and on all matters non-academic. To Zack Case and Peter Martin for endless discussions on politics, theory, and history. And to my friends Zoë Audra, Edoardo Chiattelli, Sofia Greaves, Flo Kipps, Sarah Sheard, and Krishnan Ram-Prasad for being much more than peers and colleagues. I am, as well, indebted to my friends back and from home, above all to Amihai Wasserteil and Suf Amichay.

This dissertation could not have been written without the years of education and support I received from my teachers at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem: Gabriel Herman, and Alexander Yakobson, who taught me ancient history, Amiel Vardi, who taught me Latin and Classics, and Yoav Rinon, who is a friend as well as a teacher.

I wish also to thank Hughes Hall for all kinds of support as well as to the staff and librarians of the Faculty of Classics who were always there when I needed them.

Finally, neither my years in Cambridge nor the writing of this dissertation would be conceivable without the everlasting support of my family. My parents, Miri and Ron, and my brothers, Tal and Barak, no words can do justice to the love and support you give me and to what I feel towards you all. I am immensely grateful to have found and be received into a home away from home by my loving in-laws: Fiona and David whose support facilitated the writing of this thesis, parts of which took shape at The Croft.

A place of honour is reserved for my wife, Jessica. Your love is matched by none and none of this would have existed without you.

## Notes

Greek texts are quoted from the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* unless mentioned otherwise. Latin texts are quoted from the respective Loeb Classical Library online editions. Abbreviations of ancient authors and texts correspond to those used in the most recent edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Whitmarsh 2019) or the TLG where the *OCD* online edition is lacking.

All translations are my own unless indicated otherwise.

The word count is 76,952.

## Introduction:

### I.1 Intellectual history of philosophy in civic space

*Zenonem Cleanthes non expressisset, si tantummodo audisset; vitae eius interfuit, secreta perspexit observavit illum, an ex formula sua viveret. Platon et Aristoteles et omnis in diversum itura sapientium turba plus ex moribus quam ex verbis Socratis traxit.*

Cleanthes could not have imitated Zeno if he had only listened to his lectures; he was part of Zeno's life, examined his mysteries, and observed him to see if he lived according to his model. Plato, Aristotle and all the pack of wise men who were to advance in different directions took more from the behaviour of Socrates than from his words. Seneca *Epist.* 6. 6.

τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἢ φιλοσοφία; ταύτην δὲ τί ἄλλο ὑποληψόμεθα ἢ ἐπιστήμην ἀκριβῆ θεῶν τε περὶ <καὶ> ἀνθρωπίνων, χορηγὸν ἀρετῆς καὶ λογισμῶν καλῶν καὶ ἁρμονίας βίου καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων δεξιῶν;

What could this be other than philosophy? How should we understand philosophy other than an exact knowledge of divine and human matters, leader of virtue and noble reasonings, of an harmonious life and clever customs? Maximus of Tyre *Diss.* 26. 1.

ἀλλ' ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ φιλοσοφίας, ἣν τέχνην περὶ βίον οὔσαν...

But the essence of philosophy is a different matter; philosophy is an art concerned with life ...

Plutarch *Moralia*, 613B.t

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There exists a well-known mismatch between the notion expressed in the citations above and the notion evoked in modern audiences by the word philosophy.<sup>1</sup> For most contemporary audiences, philosophy, modern as well as ancient, is a field of knowledge, a discipline, and a way of thinking.<sup>2</sup> Scholars of ancient philosophy often enough comment on this mismatch, insisting on the fact that for the ancients, philosophy was a way of life, a βίος.<sup>3</sup> Historical accounts of philosophy, however, are more often than not a history of ideas in some form: histories not of philosophers as living actors in their societies but of thoughts, doctrines, and

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<sup>1</sup> Trapp 2007a, 23–26.

<sup>2</sup> The English, German, French, Italian, and Hebrew pages of Wikipedia – one of the most common sources of information in use today – all begin with a statement of this sort.

<sup>3</sup> Hahn 1989; Hadot 2002, 3–4; Trapp 2007a, 1–26; Fornaro 2009b, 163f.; Warren 2009, 139.



sayings detached from the lives of their progenitors, the philosophers.<sup>4</sup> This thesis, through its focus on the early imperial Greek philosopher Dio Chrysostom, contributes to the history of philosophy in appending to the plurality of histories of philosophy as histories of ideas a historical analysis of philosophy as action: the philosopher's activity in society, specifically in civic space. It aims to be an 'intellectual history' as delineated by Rorty (1984): a history that consists 'of descriptions of what the intellectuals were up to at a given time, and of their interaction with the rest of society – descriptions which, for the most part, bracket the question of what activities which intellectuals were conducting' and which paint a picture on readership, intellectuals' anxieties, choices of 'vocabularies, hopes, friends, enemies, and careers'.<sup>5</sup>

Intellectual history is achieved, Rorty adds a caveat, by focusing on those philosophers outside of the canon or even those who were not called philosophers but often performed the latter's 'jobs': 'impelling social reform, supplying new vocabularies for moral deliberation, deflecting the course of scientific and literary disciplines into new channels'.<sup>6</sup> In more than one way, the second-century intellectual Dio of Prusa, known posthumously as Chrysostom for his 'golden-mouthed' oratory, is an exquisite specimen for such a historical study.

As is well known, the intellectual identity of Dio – a sophist, or a philosopher? – has been a matter of debate since antiquity (Philostr. *VS* 487; more below).<sup>7</sup> Outside of academia, one would be hard pressed to find someone who might mention Dio in a list of ancient philosophers, but even within academia and among those who do acknowledge Dio's status as

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<sup>4</sup> This, of course, is true not only about accounts of ancient philosophy but of philosophy in general, see: Rorty 1984. The ancient notion of philosophy as a way of life, however, does lend greater urgency to the matter when ancient philosophy is discussed. Warren 2009, 133-4, comments on this in his discussion of Diogenes Laërtius. Publications, usually hefty tomes, which present themselves as a history of philosophy, are often organised around figures (Plato, Aristotle, Seneca etc.) or around schools of thought (Platonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, etc.), covering their doctrines in varying levels of detail. Rorty termed this genre doxography, which is alive and well today as much as it was when Guthrie published his first volume of *A History of Greek Philosophy* in 1962. Contemporary publications still offer similar accounts even when claiming otherwise or, in edited volumes, sporting one or two additions that are not pure doxographical: e.g. Taylor 1997; Johansen 1998; Furley 1999; Kenny 2004; Adamson 2014; Engberg-Pedersen 2017. Rorty's taxonomy (which I accept) points to three more genres in the history of philosophy: historical and rational reconstructions, and *Geistesgeschichte* (49-67). In short, the first two study philosopher's 'solutions' to problems either on their own and in their own time or in comparison to later developments in philosophy and the sciences. The third is engaged less so with the 'solutions' to questions and problems, and more with the questions about the reasons why a certain problem interested a certain philosopher or their time. Like doxography, these have examples from recent scholarship of ancient philosophy: Boys-Stones 2001; Long 2006; Sedley 2012; Schofield 2013; Laurant 2014; Trapp 2007a.

<sup>5</sup> Rorty 1984, 68. Rorty was influenced by anthropology, especially by what Gilbert Ryle termed 'thick description' (*Collected Papers: vol. II* 1971b, 465-96, although Rorty's bibliography refers to volume I: 1971a). The concept was developed and made widespread by Clifford Geertz in *The Interpretation of Cultures* (1973). For 'thick description' in literary analysis, see: Gallagher and Greenblatt 2000, 20-48. On 'Intellectual history' see as well: Kaldellis and Sinissoglou 2017, 4-11.

<sup>6</sup> Rorty 1984, 69.

<sup>7</sup> The reference is to Philostratus' short biography of Dio in his *Lives of the Sophists*, in which he confessed to be uncertain whether Dio was a philosopher or a sophist.

a philosopher, Dio is not always included in the canon.<sup>8</sup> And yet, as we will see, Dio had most definitely impelled social reform, supplied new vocabularies for moral deliberation, and deflected the course of, at least, the literary discipline.<sup>9</sup> Dio's suitability to serve as a focal point for the writing of intellectual history moves my choice of him beyond mere availability of sources to study. Source availability, however, is important as well. Not only do we have Dio's own words for analysis, but also his corpus, consisting of mainly speeches delivered by himself,<sup>10</sup> amount to about 80 overall – a vast number in comparison even to what we have left of some better-known ancient authors.

The space allotted for this dissertation does not permit an analysis of Dio's entire corpus. The guiding principle behind the choice of speeches was twofold: first, public speeches – unlike, say, texts set in a dialogue form or what may be called thematic explorations.<sup>11</sup> Public speeches are read as carriers of meaning beyond their content. They are an action in space and time, conducted in a specific manner. Studying them as such is to focus our analysis on what Dio was doing as a philosopher. In addition, since what I seek to explain is Dio's public activity, his communication with large, public gatherings are the best sources for this purpose. Secondly, this thesis is concerned with speeches which reveal information about Dio's conception of the identity and role of the philosopher. Although some of these were delivered in a private setting, without these our understanding of Dio's conception of the philosopher in society is marred since they contextualise Dio's own actions and elucidate the model of the philosophical activity beyond the way Dio embodied it by adding to the analysis Dio's own reflections on the topic.<sup>12</sup>

Based on these speeches, the reading of Dio offered here is of the philosopher *less* as a producer of written texts than as an agent of spoken words. The sort of questions I raise are why these words were spoken, how they were spoken, what aims they served and, when

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<sup>8</sup> Trapp 2007a, 23-7.

<sup>9</sup> Naturally, 'discipline' cannot be taken in its modern meaning. To the extent, however, that the study of literature and literary production forms a field of knowledge, scholars certainly understand Dio's work to have changed this field (e.g., Trapp 1995, and Sidebottom 2006 on Dio's play with and development of the themes of city panegyrics and kingship literature, respectively).

<sup>10</sup> Subjectivity, often manifesting in Dio's work as full-blown irony, is a crucial issue in literary analysis (not only of Dio's, of course) and will be part of my analysis. For the moment, we may note that methodologically, what Geertz and others have called 'thick descriptions' are based on the subjective voice as the interpreter of events (Geertz 1973, 15).

<sup>11</sup> For examples of dialogue, see: *Orr.* 14-15. For thematic explorations (these can be subdivided into different genres which is not of our concern here) see: *Or.* 11 (*The Trojan Oration*), *Or.* 52 (*An Appraisal of the Tragic Triad*), and *Or.* 63 (*On Fortune I*), each different to the others. Some of these, like the first and the third may have been presented in public. Since, however, there is no indication of time in all cases, and since in these *Discourses* Dio – even when he uses philosophical arguments and ideas – was less concerned with making his identity as a philosopher a point of interest, these were left out of this thesis, for the most part.

<sup>12</sup> The speeches studied in this thesis therefore are *Orr.* 1, 3, 4, 7-9, 12, 13, 18-20, 22, 24, 26, 31-6, 38, 40, 42, 43, 45-9, 51, 54, 72, 80.

possible, what they might have achieved. This is an analysis of Dio's *Orations* as speech acts: 'words and terms are deeds, insofar as they not only are carriers of depersonalized meaning but reflect the intentions of historical agents and the intentionality of texts that function as agents in a historical setting'.<sup>13</sup> To give a concrete example: this thesis claims that in order to understand Dio's suggestion such as to the people of Tarsus that they should enfranchise a group of linen-workers (*Or.* 34), we ought to look beyond the content and into Dio's choice to speak as a philosopher and to ask why he chose to speak as one, what he tried to achieve by that, and how he went about doing it. We will see that Dio cannot be understood as an intellectual, indeed as a philosopher, without the public cultural milieu in which he was active and to which he responded in his actions.

It should be noted, however, that whilst this thesis is located in the *history* of philosophy and most of the argumentation presented in it is of historical bent, the tools of literary analysis are not jettisoned. Although it is not the main aim of this work, we cannot do without some philological insights and analysis of Dio's literary techniques such as, for example, his use of allusions. These, however, come into the discussion only whenever they can bolster the intellectual-historical analysis and not at all turns.<sup>14</sup>

The choice of sources, corresponding to the underlying research question of this thesis – how did Dio understand the role of the philosopher in civic space? – is meant to fill a gap not only in Dionic scholarship (see below) but also in the study of philosophy in early imperial Rome. Scholars have, in general, given little attention to the question of philosophers' activity in the civic, public space. The historiographical tendency of historians of philosophy to consider ideas more than philosophers' actions is noted above. To some extent, historical argumentation that is done from the perspective of intellectual history (or any perspective that

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<sup>13</sup> Kaldellis and Sinissoglou 2017, 8.

<sup>14</sup> In this my analysis is located closer to that of Whitmarsh than Desideri's (2007, 194): 'the literary dimension can hardly be proved to be the main interest in any of Dio's speeches, which are nearly always the written version of what had originally been orally delivered speeches'. Whitmarsh (2001a, 293) observes how Dio's political agency stems from his literary (oratorical) production. Literary criticism is part of my analytic toolbox and sometimes text is treated as a product in and of itself, acknowledging the fact that a text can 'act' in ways its author did not intend. Certainly, Dio himself was aware of this (*Or.* 42.4-5). However, notwithstanding the meaning a text can hold on its own, my analysis also focuses on it as an act of performance, carried out in a specific moment in time and in a specific place. Indeed, some philosophical (or other) ideas evoked by Dio when speaking in, e.g., the theatre of Alexandria can be found in a speech delivered in the Assembly at Tarsus – pointing to some coherence in the overarching thought of Dio – but the issues dealt in each of these speeches are specific to the respective communities to which they were addressed. In addition, the ways in which Dio presented himself, whilst serving the same goal of cementing his recognition as a philosopher, were different. The act of the speech, therefore, bears its own meaning which is prior to any meaning the text might acquire on itself, and hence is emphasised in my analysis. Cf. the distinction made by Sidebottom (Sidebottom 2006) between *Kingship* literature in the form of a *treatise sent* to a ruler rather than, like Dio's, a *speech delivered* to a ruler (118; emphasis in the original) without committing to the idea that Dio actually delivered speeches before the emperor, but most certainly delivered them as a speech (118, n. 7, 145-9).

takes into account philosophers' activity as philosophers in society) is always a part of any historical analyses of philosophy, even when a study is focused more on ideas. It is a question of emphasis.<sup>15</sup> There have been, of course, publications which do consider the place of the philosopher in society, even if only in the form of a shorter discussion within a larger presentation of doctrines, or single additions to volumes which are more generally concerned with ideas in and of themselves.<sup>16</sup> Trapp's *Philosophy in the Roman Empire*, to which we shall return again later in this Introduction, is an excellent example. With the first half of the book devoted to the individual and the second to philosophy in its social context,<sup>17</sup> the latter gives the reader more in the way of philosophers' engagement with their respective communities whilst the former is more an analysis of doctrine. However, the inquiry of the second half is not done by investigating the activity of philosophers, but rather focuses on their ideas concerning philosophical action: what imperial philosophers can tell us about political power, ideal communities, and about the active place of philosophy in the community in general.<sup>18</sup>

Some excellent work has been done lately in the field of the intellectual world in the imperial era. Plutarch and his vast corpus maintain an allure for students not only of Platonism. Van Hoof's *Plutarch's Practical Ethics* (2010) and Stadter's *Plutarch and his Roman Readers* (2015) place the intellectual in the context of his readership. At least in his ambition, Plutarch emerges here as highly engaged in civic activity – a large portion of his works being dedicated to the education of the political elite, as these publications show – and we will come back to the difference between this form of engagement to that of Dio later on in this Introduction and throughout the thesis.<sup>19</sup> But the image of Plutarch, which emerges from these studies, is still one of literary output rather than Plutarch's own activity in the outside world.<sup>20</sup>

Like Trapp, Eshleman (2012) took a broader perspective on intellectuals in the Roman empire. Whilst she focused on intellectuals' actions, in the sense of how they defined their

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<sup>15</sup> See n. 4 for the bibliography. Statements such as made by Long in his introduction to *Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life* (2002) are revealing in respect to how professionals view their work: Long writes that all perspectives are relevant to his goal – intellectual and social history, the interpretation of Stoicism, ethics and psychology, both ancient and modern, the theory and practice of education, rhetoric, and religion – and then adds 'As a historian of ancient philosophy by profession, I have concentrated on the analysis of Epictetus' main ideas' (4).

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, Inwood 2017, a study of the legacy of Musonius Rufus. His public identity is discussed on a par with his ideas in a volume (Engberg-Pedersen 2017) that is presented as a history of philosophy (specifically, the interactions between Stoic and Platonic doctrines; 1-13).

<sup>17</sup> Trapp 2007a, 135.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. also Laurand 2014, a study of Stoicism in its social context through the fragments of Musonius Rufus. The philosopher is secondary to the ideas he developed and discussed.

<sup>19</sup> For a contrary opinion, about Plutarch as a populariser of philosophy, see: Roskam and van der Stockt 2011.

<sup>20</sup> A relatively older publication, Mossman 1997 *Plutarch and his Intellectual World*, also engages more with ideas than with the philosopher's activity. Although in this work, the context is around Plutarch's intellectual milieu and intellectual *persona*, not as it was acted or carried out but as it emerges from his writings.

identity and vied for and over it with their peers, hers is a social history of intellectuals, rather than an intellectual history aiming to explore the actions of intellectuals in society writ large, not only among their social networks. The analysis offered in this thesis focuses more on how an intellectual identity was not only a matter of debate among peers and other groups of intellectuals, but also forged by interaction with the larger public; and, not least, how this identity could be geared beyond establishing oneself as a philosopher, sophist, or any other form of intellectual: that is, arguing that it could, and showing how it did, serve political goals.

Hahn's *Der Philosoph und die Gesellschaft* (1989), a study of philosophical self-representation and its intersection with the popular expectations of society from philosophers in the high empire, remains to the present day the sole monograph devoted to the activity of more than one philosopher in society in general and not just among intellectuals. The work is a rich resource for philosophical activity not focused solely on ideas; but methodologically it is limited by its essentialist approach, which understood philosophers as a clear-cut category, instantly defined and immediately recognised by audiences based on outward appearance and demeanour.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, and crucially for the present thesis, Hahn's work is emblematic of a pattern of analysis found among different historians of ancient philosophy: a reading of philosophical activity as devoid of civic and political impact, locating the place of philosophers in society solely in 'cultural' contexts: teaching in private or in a school, declaiming both for the purpose of general moral guidance and for entertainment, and producing texts of varying sorts to be read mostly within the circle of practicing philosophers and their students.

An illuminating example for our purpose is Hahn's analysis of Dio's activity in his hometown of Prusa. Hahn finds it 'remarkable' that for someone who was so much inclined 'to mark himself as a philosopher', when speaking in his hometown Dio 'never' grounds his political action or his benefactions to the city in his philosophical vocation.<sup>22</sup> As we will see in Chapter 3, this is altogether wrong. I will show that it was precisely the discourse of the exiled philosopher that Dio used in order to achieve his political goals in Prusa. The result, or rather the premise, of Hahn's view is that philosophers may have played a role in the civic space, but it was no different to that of any other member of the elite and the fact that they were

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<sup>21</sup> Instead of showing identity to be a socio-cultural construct which had to be constantly asserted and maintained in and by all forms of cultural and social discourses. For the critique, see: Gleason 1991. On the discursive nature of identity, see: Eshleman 2012 esp. 1-20; see also: Whitmarsh 2001b, 159, and Gleason 1995, xvii-xxix.

<sup>22</sup> Hahn 1989, 157-8. Cf. also, Winter 2002, who, generally speaking, sees Dio as a sophist and not a philosopher even in the face of evidence that Dio appeared as a philosopher in civic contexts: 'Dio may appear in the garb of a philosopher [...] but, as he tells his audience, he has been appointed to the task of addressing the Alexandrians "by the will of some deity", #22,12. The "deity" in question is Vespasian', 42. We will discuss this matter in Chapter 4.3.1.

philosophers did not affect their interaction with their respective communities with regards to civic and political issues.<sup>23</sup>

If some scholars reduce the philosopher to simply another manifestation of elite *paideia*, those who do see philosophers as active in civic space (and, moreover, active by virtue of their philosophical identity), provide little to no analysis as to how philosophers went about this.<sup>24</sup> As I will show with respect to Dio's activity not only in Prusa but also in other cities (Chapter 4), and as follows from a larger vision he expounded (Chapter 5), a philosopher in the early imperial era could operate in civic space precisely because of his intellectual identity as a philosopher and harness this identity towards political action.<sup>25</sup> Through Dio's activity we learn that philosophers in early imperial Rome could be more than just teachers, entertainers, writers for the elite, or even moral guides to large audiences. They could have been visible civic and political actors who based their actions precisely on their authority as philosophers. This, as we will now turn to see, is not the image we find in scholarship about imperial philosophers, including scholars' image of Dio.

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<sup>23</sup> Hahn 1989, 159f. For this view see also: Bowersock 2002, who admits that the dichotomy in scholarship (more below) between the public activity of sophists and philosophers is not accurate. He sees the entry of some philosophers into the public sphere (Dio among them; 162) only as performers, entertainers of sorts. More recently, in attempt to further dissolve the longstanding sophist-philosopher dichotomy, Lauwers (2013) used Systemic Theory to analyse the intellectual culture of the empire. Lauwers suggests reading intellectual culture as divided into two 'sub-systems', a socio-political one and an intellectual-philosophical one. Whereas both stem from Greek *paideia* and rely on it for execution of public performances, the former opened a way for political success whilst the latter accorded one cultural authority that was not translated into political action, 331-40 (on Systemic Theory, see bibliography in Lauwers and further: Even-Zohar 1990). Haake (2008) took a similar approach and, based on epigraphic evidence, presented an argument which in the case of philosophers active in the civic sphere diminished *philosophos* to, essentially, an honorific title.

<sup>24</sup> Dillon 2002. Dillon admits the difficulty of recognizing philosophers among other members of the elite, but his analysis is focused on figures such as Ammonius of Naucratis who taught philosophy in Athens, gained citizenship and served in various official public roles. In 2009, Sidebottom offered an excellent analysis of the sophist-philosopher dichotomy, and its fallacy. He showed, like others, how philosophers and sophists came from the same echelons of society and shared an educational background which brought them to perform similar social functions, some in public capacities. But there is no analysis of the way in which philosophical identity informed the activity of philosophers in the public sphere.

<sup>25</sup> The bibliography adduced hitherto is mostly focused on Greek writing/speaking philosophers (which includes the Roman Stoic Musonius). Scholarship on Latin writing/speaking philosophers tends, historically, to focus more easily on the activity of philosophers in society, especially in civic, political context. E.g., M. T. Griffin 1992 and M. T. Griffin and Barnes 1989 advanced well beyond discussion of philosophy as a mere body of doctrines. In a way, this focus is also the result of the historical circumstances of philosophy in the Latin speaking world. The way Roman elites gradually adopted the wisdom from Greece makes it easier, if not more important, to think how philosophy informed the actions of the Roman elite in the civic space. In one way or another, philosophy was present at the background of leading public figures from Cicero and Cato the Younger through Musonius Rufus and Seneca to Marcus Aurelius. With all of them, however, philosophy was, to certain degrees, overshadowed by their political activities and did not *necessarily* constitute the main rationale for their actions. The bibliography on philosophy in Rome is vast. On the topic of its intersection with Roman civic life and the role it played in informing the actions of civic actors, see (in addition to the two references mentioned above): Morford 2002; Reydam-Schils 2005 esp. 84-108; Brunt 2013.

## 1.2 Dionic studies in the past two decades

We can mark four crucial points in the study of Dio. First, antiquity: about a century after Dio's death (sometime after 110 CE) he was acknowledged as a worthy subject of study by Philostratus, who devoted to him a section in his *Lives of the Sophists*, combining biographical anecdotes with comments on style and literary output (*VS* 487-8). Around the turn of the fifth century, Synesius of Cyrene – bishop of Ptolemais and a Neoplatonist philosopher – devoted a treatise (dedicated to his future son) to the life of Dio who, Synesius thought, changed track in the midst of his life from a sophist to philosopher: a lesson worthy of study, he believed. It is not an exaggeration to say that this conversion narrative posited by Synesius became the most important element in the study of Dio for millennia to come.<sup>26</sup> It is clear that Synesius had a collection of Dio's speeches in front of him and that by this point Dio was already considered a 'classic', known as Chrysostom already in the third century when Menander Rhetor commends him, with Plato, Xenophon, and some others, for his style (*Rhet.* Spengel p. 390).

The second pivotal point in Dionic studies follows a long time later (although Dio did not diminish as a subject worthy of study).<sup>27</sup> Von Arnim's monograph from the end of the nineteenth century (1898) adopted the conversion narrative from Synesius and turned it into a tripartite course – with the third part, in the spirit of Hegelian philosophy, being a synthesis between sophistry and philosophy. This shaped much of the following century's research and until 1978 remained the single book-length study on the philosopher. 1978 is our third key point in the study of Dio. It witnessed the publication of three seminal works: from Italy, Paolo Desideri on the Greek intellectual in the Roman empire; from Britain, John Moles on the intellectual identity of Dio and his alleged conversion from sophist to philosopher; and from North America, Christopher Jones on the political, historical context in which Dio was active. Lastly, at the beginning of the current century, a volume edited by Simon Swain (2000) surveyed Dio from the angles of politics, letters, and philosophy.<sup>28</sup> This dissertation revisits Dio after two decades which did not witness major additions to the study of Dio.

Since Swain's volume, in Anglophone academia the study of Dio has not been neglected. However, there are no extensive studies on Dio, who only makes appearances either

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<sup>26</sup> Note that the narrative of conversion into philosophy was a figment of Dio's (*Or.* 13). It was specifically a conversion from a sophist into philosopher that Synesius posited, a 'change' never mentioned by Dio himself.

<sup>27</sup> Brancacci 1986; Amato 2014, 141–52; Amato et al. 2016, 169: 505–38, 539–52, and 553–78.

<sup>28</sup> The introductory chapter of Swain (2000) covers in detail the study of Dio from antiquity to the time of the volume's publication, see: 13–48.

in articles – sometimes not necessarily devoted to him – or as part of a larger context.<sup>29</sup> In 2008, Bekker-Nielsen published a monograph in English titled *Urban Life and Local Politics in Roman Bithynia: The Small World of Dion Chrysostomos*.<sup>30</sup> Although enlightening and informative, only one chapter is truly devoted to Dio, whereas the lion's share of the book is faithful to the first elements in its title.<sup>31</sup> Scholarship on Dio in other languages has been more prolific in the past two decades, yet the focus there, excluding one rather short study of Dio by Amato,<sup>32</sup> has been on editions and commentaries of specific *Orations*. The major ones are: a text with annotated translation, commentary, and a number of essays from 2009, edited by H.-G. Nesselrath with contributions from multiple scholars; Bost-Pouderon's translations and commentary from 2006 and 2011 of and on *Orations* 33-35; and Vagnone's 2012 translation of the *Kingship Orations* and *Oration* 62. Another exception to these is the hefty, edited volume devoted to Dio which was a result of a 2015 conference in Nantes.<sup>33</sup> As was noted by K. Jażdżewska, the sole reviewer of the above-mentioned volume, its merit is found particularly in inspections of individual texts and passages, and although it might be reflective of several trends in Dionian scholarship it does not, as a whole, develop a coherent thesis and reading of Dio.<sup>34</sup>

Moreover, a number of articles in the Nantes volume devote most of their space to paraphrasing or general comments, which do not add much to our understanding of Dio. To look at just one example, let us take the opening article by M.-L. Freyburger-Galland, which compares Dio with his namesake and possible distant progeny, Dio Cassius. Freyburger-Galland states rather early that Dio developed a political theory that revolved more around the

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<sup>29</sup> For the sake of convenience, the following are publications on Dio in various languages from 2001 onwards. See text for my comments on the state of Dionian research outside of Anglophone academia and for a discussion of general themes these raise and integrate into. Bandini 2001; Brancacci 2001; Volpe and Ferrari 2001; Whitmarsh 2001b; Whitmarsh 2001a; Bowersock 2002; Winter 2002; Nesselrath et al. 2003; Penwill 2003; Billault 2004; Kokkinia 2004; Whitmarsh 2004; Moles 2005; Whitmarsh 2005; Gangloff 2006; Sidebottom 2006; Desideri 2007; Kokkinia 2007; Platt 2007; Trapp 2007a; Bekker-Nielsen 2008; Bost-Pouderon 2008; Madsen 2009; Nesselrath 2009; Sidebottom 2009; Ventrella 2009; Desideri 2011; Asirvatham 2012; Desideri 2012; Jones 2012; Kasprzyk and Vendries 2012; Trapp 2012; Billault 2013; Kim 2013; Zadorojnyi 2013; Amato 2014; Billault 2014; Goulet-Cazé 2014; Jażdżewska 2014; Bailey 2015; Bekker-Nielsen and Hinge 2015; Fuhrmann 2015; Jażdżewska 2015a; Jażdżewska 2015b; Jones 2015; Ventrella 2015; Amato et al. 2016; Billault 2016; Giannakopoulos 2016; Kemezis 2016; Reydam-Schils 2016; Hunter 2017; Jackson 2017; Raschieri 2017; Richter 2017; Ventrella, Grandjean, and Thévenet 2017; Fowler 2018; Oppeneer 2018; Bryen 2019; Ma 2019; Trapp 2019; Moignard 2020.

<sup>30</sup> I note the language of publication since Bekker-Nielsen is Danish.

<sup>31</sup> Fear 2009; Kuhn 2010.

<sup>32</sup> Amato 2014.

<sup>33</sup> Amato et al. 2016.

<sup>34</sup> Jażdżewska 2017, 345. It is, therefore, not surprising that such an immense volume (600 pages with 30 articles) did not attract more attention from scholars.



problems of Greek cities rather than around the central imperial government,<sup>35</sup> a statement with which this thesis agrees and develops. The focus of her contribution, however, is specifically on Dio's thoughts regarding central government – his and Cassius' views on the principate – and the piece ends with what is far from a novel conclusion: that Dio believed a monarchy that is led by a virtuous emperor, who is aided by trusted advisors, to be the best regime.<sup>36</sup>

The works by Bekker-Nielsen (2008) and Amato (2014) offer more developed, if not entirely novel, readings of Dio. Amato's collection of his own studies, other than being the work of a single author (thus lacking, for the better, some of the inconsistencies of his edited volume and edited volumes in general),<sup>37</sup> follows a chronological order which manages to provide the reader with something of a narrative of the career of Dio. The themes, however, are disparate – ranging from the dating of texts, to literary analysis, the relationship with Trajan and finally the reception of Dio (in antiquity as well as in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries). Bekker-Nielsen's monograph, on the other hand, does more in the way of presenting a unified argument. Yet this is a work more about the *world* in which Dio was active (from a time prior to Dio as well as after him) than about the *activity* of Dio in that world. If we compare this study with that of Jones' (to which the title apparently gestures)<sup>38</sup> we find two different methods of analysing an intellectual's activity in the ancient world. Jones' historical analysis, unlike that of Bekker-Nielsen, always keeps Dio at the centre of attention as an agent within his 'Roman' world.

It thus appears that whilst the last two decades have witnessed a flourishing of Dionian studies, we lack an updated, unified reading of Dio: a thesis of his literary and public activity

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<sup>35</sup> Freyburger-Galland 2016, 18.

<sup>36</sup> Freyburger-Galland 2016, 29. Cf., for example, Swain 1996, 192: 'The most important of [Dio's ideas in the *Kingships*] is his firm belief in the validity of monarchical rule as the ideal of government'. More recently, Trapp 2007a, 180: 'Most of the central emphases of Dio's message to Trajan will sound thoroughly familiar by now; the king as moral paragon, enjoying resemblance to and closeness to the supreme God; kingship as a natural, cosmically sanctioned form of authority; the deterrent contrast between king and tyrant. All four orations dwell on the need for the good monarch to be morally superior to his subjects'. Matters appear to be similar with respect to scholarship on Cassius Dio. I am not a scholar of the historian and this is only one example, but to the extent that there is merit in demonstrating a shared line of thought between the two Bithynians, Madsen (2009) had already done so and his conclusions are very much the same to those of Freyburger-Galland.

<sup>37</sup> See: Jądzewska 2017, 345: 'approaches, interpretations, and topics – at times complementary, at times parallel, and at times competing'. That edited volumes can 'suffer' such fate hardly needs any proof, yet it is interesting to note that the volume from 2009 (including texts, translations, commentaries, and essays) which was edited by H.-G. Nesselrath (to which Amato was one of the contributors as well), was also criticized for disagreements between the authors and a lack of attempt by the editor to harmonise them, see: Bekker-Nielsen 2010 (<https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2010/2010.07.07/>; for the response of Amato, see: <https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2010/2010.08.14/>).

<sup>38</sup> The title of Jones' book is *The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom* to which, I believe, Bekker-Nielsen alludes with his title: *The Small World of Dion Chrysostomos* (nomenclature choices aside).

as a whole unit, which takes into account the additions of the past two decades and presents Dio as an active agent in his world. This thesis aims to bridge this gap.

But a need for a unified discussion is not enough. In the field of Dionic studies specifically, as far as we can try to thematise the additions of the past two decades, there seem to arise three main interests around Dio: exile, his stance *vis-à-vis* the emperor and monarchy, and Dio's political career. Each of these suffers from some form of scholarly neglect.

In respect to the issue of exile, it is *Oration* 13 which keeps attracting the attention of scholars.<sup>39</sup> This is not surprising, since it is in *Oration* 13 that Dio tells the story of his exile in which, so he says, he became a philosopher (more below). Its importance to our understanding of Dio is undeniable. However, I will show in Chapter 3 that this continuous focus on the 13<sup>th</sup> *Oration* misses out on other important elements in Dio's rhetoric of exile, specifically, how it was not only connected with his identity as a philosopher but used as source of authority to facilitate political action.

Next, among publications which offer an analysis of Dio and his corpus on their own – whether alongside other figures or not – there are certainly some which focus on political action and Dio's involvement in the political world around him. In these, however, there is somewhat of a narrowing down of what political involvement means by focusing more on the relationship between philosophers (or philosophically informed political figures) and the imperial regime.<sup>40</sup> Likewise with some of the current contributions: Penwill's locating of Dio in a broader (Roman) context, Kokkina's inquiry into his relationship with Trajan, Sidebottom's exploration of Dio's contribution to *On Kingship* literature, and Reydam-Schils' analysis of Stoics speaking truth to power.<sup>41</sup> For whatever nuance these add to our understanding of Dio or the time period – and it is mostly nuance<sup>42</sup> – the focus on this form of political engagement by the philosopher is all too narrow. Activity in civic and political space for Dio exceeded whatever interactions or thoughts he had with and about the emperor and the empire.

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<sup>39</sup> This was the speech on which Synesius based his conversion narrative and was followed by von Arnim (1898) and then Moles (1978) in the discussion of this pivotal speech/moment in Dio's 'career'. For discussion post 2000, see: Whitmarsh 2001a; Moles 2005; Desideri 2007; Ventrella 2009; Bekker-Nielsen and Hinge 2015; Billault 2016; Hunter 2017; Richter 2017; Ventrella, Grandjean, and Thévenet 2017; Moignard 2020.

<sup>40</sup> The discussion goes a long way back, Brunt 1975 is a good and close enough place to start. See also: Maier 1985 (with the critique by Griffin 1987). Cf. also the recent edited volume by Bosman 2019, *Intellectual and empire in Greco-Roman antiquity* which reveals the same kind of preoccupation of scholars, focusing on Hellenistic and late Republican more so than on early Imperial time.

<sup>41</sup> Penwill 2003; Kokkina 2004; Sidebottom 2006; Reydam-Schils 2016.

<sup>42</sup> To give but a few examples, Dio's relationship with the Flavian dynasty has been treated by Jones 1978 and Desideri 1978. Whitmarsh 2001b discussed Dio's position in respect to Rome and Trajan as well as the *Kingships*, which were treated thoroughly by Moles 1990 and by Sidebottom himself in 1991.

The third thread does expand into political activity irrespective of (or in addition to) Dio's engagement with monarchy.<sup>43</sup> I have mentioned Bekker-Nielsen's monograph from 2008, and we can count here additions such as Jones' study of citizenship through the case of Dio, Fuhrmann's *Realpolitik* reading of Dio's political career, Oppeneer's comparison of Dio with his epithet-sake John Chrysostom in respect to their politics and rhetoric and, similarly, Bryen's reading of Dio's *Euboicus* as an image of political discourse and mechanism of the time.<sup>44</sup> If, however, the study of Dio's position in respect to Rome and the emperor is usually tied with his intellectual/philosophical identity, what is apparent in these studies is how much this identity tends to be watered down (if at all discussed).<sup>45</sup>

It is in reply to these threads that I develop my thesis specifically around the identity of Dio as a philosopher, and the activity of Dio as a philosopher in public, civic space. I argue that the two cannot be studied in separation because the one not only informs but facilitates the other: Dio's authority to speak and his means of trying to achieve civic and political goals are based on his insistence to be identified as a philosopher.

Here would be a good place to continue with the bibliographical exposition, alongside explaining my choice of Dio and the manner in which this thesis sees him. However, since I have thus far treated the terms philosophy, and civic/political space rather casually, and since these terms are crucial for the reading of Dio presented in this thesis, we shall now turn to the working definitions of these before we come back to our hero.

### 1.2.1 Philosophy and philosophical identity

Philosophy has many faces. It is not only the case that the modern conception of philosophy, both as a field of knowledge and as an occupation, has no ancient equivalent; also in ancient times *philosophia*, *philosophos*, and *philosophein* held different meanings for different people.<sup>46</sup> How, then, are these to be understood by the reader of this thesis?

In the ancient world, on the one end of the spectrum, philosophy was *simply* a term used to legitimise one's intellectual practice.<sup>47</sup> By declaring their respective pursuit as philosophy,

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<sup>43</sup> Perhaps it is a good time to point here to what appears as a rising interest in the rhetoric of Dio's civic speeches (more so, perhaps, than an interest in analysis of their place within his career): Bost-Pouderon 2006; Kokkinia 2007; Platt 2007; Kasprzyk and Vendries 2012; Zadorojnyi 2013; Bailey 2015; Jażdżewska 2015b; Bost-Pouderon 2016.

<sup>44</sup> Bekker-Nielsen 2008; Jones 2012; Fuhrmann 2015; Oppeneer 2018; Bryen 2019.

<sup>45</sup> Zuiderhoek 2008 is another example of this tendency.

<sup>46</sup> Literally, 'love of wisdom', 'wisdom lover', and (the infinitive form of the verb) 'to philosophise' whose basic meaning is 'to love wisdom'. Cf. Trapp 2007a, 23–26; Trapp 2017, 41–42.

<sup>47</sup> Lauwers 2015, 16.

intellectuals of various callings sought to augment their cultural and intellectual authority.<sup>48</sup> This includes some who in modern eyes, most probably, would not be seen even as intellectuals, such as the athlete and trainer Markos Aurelios Asklepiades.<sup>49</sup> At the other end of the spectrum, philosophy was the mode of life and the specialised subject matter of teaching and inquiry by men and women who subscribed to a specific *hairesis* (a school of thought, e.g. Stoicism or Epicureanism) in their pursuit after the truth and the good life.<sup>50</sup> To gain a place on this broad spectrum one had to be accepted as a philosopher by a circle of peers who constantly vied over and debated the boundaries of philosophy. Thus, philosophy was a discursive social identity which meant that whoever was accepted as a philosopher was not a philosopher unto himself but belonged also to a social network more or less discrete from other social networks and intellectual categories.<sup>51</sup>

As an intellectual pursuit philosophy could be witnessed in a plurality of spaces: private houses, gymnasia, lecture-halls, city Council and Assembly meetings, theatres, temples, stoas, baths, and simply on the street.<sup>52</sup> Philosophy meant at one and the same time, education, entertainment, and a deliberative or hortative discourse. As a consequence, philosophy, in addition to forming its own social web of ‘practitioners’, was enmeshed in society as a whole. While the majority of philosophers belonged to or came from the elite stratum of society,<sup>53</sup> philosophy was not necessarily an elitist project.<sup>54</sup>

In this dissertation, therefore, philosophy is studied as an educative and hortative discourse aimed at society at large (as represented by the audiences of various public venues). It is applied towards the cultivation of a public moral character and reasoned action and performed by a member of a social group of intellectuals.

In discussing Dio’s philosophical identity, other than his outward appearance (which, at times if not always, bore all the traditional markers of a philosopher, such as sporting a shaggy beard), what is meant is Dio’s cognitive self-association with that socio-cultural-intellectual group whose boundaries, although in constant flux, should and could be circumscribed by himself and other members of the group. Philosophy, therefore, in this thesis, is located somewhere in the middle of the spectrum (described above) as a life devoted to the

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<sup>48</sup> Trapp 2017, 41–43.

<sup>49</sup> König 2005, 1–7 (for his commemoration as such see: p. 6 there).

<sup>50</sup> Trapp 2007b, 8–9.

<sup>51</sup> Eshleman 2012, 2, 9, 24. On the matter of according one the identity of a philosopher cf. Hahn 1989, 12; Korhonen 1997, 35–36, who brings into this social web the audiences as well as the group of peers.

<sup>52</sup> Eshleman 2012, 25–26.

<sup>53</sup> Dillon 2002, 33.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Toner 2017, 171–8. Roskam and van der Stockt (2011) provide a somewhat different view than other scholars on Plutarch’s readership (cf. van Hoof 2010; Stadter 2015).

community's virtues and reason which are found already in what other philosophers, on the more 'professional' end of the spectrum have researched, refined, and passed forward.

One last remark. Dio was a versatile intellectual. I explained above the choice of my sources and how it correlates to the kind of argument I aim to make in this thesis. This, as we will see in the text below, is not the only way to read Dio but rather *another* way, which hitherto has not been taken. We need to acknowledge, even in respect to Dio's philosophy, that part of it was of a different, less public nature.<sup>55</sup> Dio would not attract the attention of so many people over such a great length of time if his work and activity were much of the same. My argument, in respect to Dio's philosophy, is that in terms of his public activity and his public identity as a philosopher, it was this form of philosophy – educative, hortative, aimed at the community for the attainment of civic and political goal – which deserves our focus at this moment.

### 1.2.2 The civic – political space

The second term crucial for the reading of Dio presented in this thesis, as appears from its title, is 'civic space'. A major contention of this dissertation is that Dio was a political agent. That he was so in a way that transcends both older and more recent views of Dio will be shown throughout the thesis and will be discussed soon in brief. First, I want to focus on what I mean by 'political agent' and its relation to the civic space.

Perhaps the simplest way to put it is in Greek terminology. The lion's share of Dio's more important works located its audience in the city, the *polis*. By partaking in a discourse framed by the physical and metaphorical confines of the *polis*, Dio participated in τὰ πολιτικά, matters of the *polis*, and so himself was πολιτικός, that is 'political'. Hence when I write that Dio was a political agent or a politician, what is meant in this thesis is that Dio had an active part in improving the affairs (life and management) of the *polis*.

This explanation, however, might be as simplistic as it is simple. Firstly, because scholars have shown that even speeches of Dio that were delivered in spaces outside the *polis* (for instance, the 12<sup>th</sup> *Oration* that was presented in Olympia at the site of the games) can be read as political.<sup>56</sup> Secondly, even today when *alles ist Politik*,<sup>57</sup> it is fair to claim that there is a difference, at least, between levels of political involvement, levels which want a demarcation between them. In concrete terms, if we agree that a citizen member of a city Council in session

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<sup>55</sup> *Or.* 30, for instance, the *Charidemus*, is a piece of extremely personal consolatory philosophy, see: Moles 2000; Jażdżewska 2014; Jażdżewska 2015a.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Moles' notes on the speech as a commentary on Roman rule (1995, 134): 'Dio is telling the Greeks that Greek culture and religion are more important than the Roman empire, that the eternal divine governance of the universe is a far greater reality than that transient empire, and that Greece's decline is largely Rome's fault'.

<sup>57</sup> 'Everything is politics', a saying attributed to Thomas Mann.

is a political agent, then we must explain how Dio can still be called a political agent when speaking as a non-citizen in front of a non-decision-making body.

My reading of Dio as such takes its cue from works influenced by Institutional Theory, or more precisely, works which show that an institutionalist approach to the study of ancient politics yields an impoverished picture of it. Alex Gottesman's *Politics and the Street in Democratic Athens* is one book that explains how politics is a phenomenon which takes place in a plurality of public spheres.<sup>58</sup> Instead of narrowing the study of politics to the events and actors in the governmental institutions such as the Council, the courts, or the Assembly, Gottesman expands the view to 'wherever people gathered and socialized'.<sup>59</sup> These *loci* constitute the informal sphere, one of many public spheres which constantly intersect and interact.<sup>60</sup> It is this that I call the civic space, that overarching sphere of public activity that encompasses what took place in the formal as well as the informal space of action.

As Gottesman notes, this view requires us to broaden our understanding of participation in politics, acknowledging the existence of degrees; from 'formal, primary participation to informal, secondary participation'.<sup>61</sup> Dio played a role in all spheres of participation. He spoke as a citizen, by birth in his hometown or by honour in others, but he also appeared by virtue of no formal office in public lecture spaces such as theatres; places which were not necessarily a part of what Danielle Allen called the structures of the decision-making sphere where the binding political shots of the *polis* were being called.<sup>62</sup> In the language of the model employed by Allen, Dio was part of both the 'influential discourse' that 'flows' through political and legal institutions, or authoritative institutional spaces, and the 'expressive discourse' that 'circulates within subnational and transnational communities and fosters shared identities, alliances, solidarities, and network connections'.<sup>63</sup> Without stretching, anachronistically, the notion of modern nationality into the ancient world, we could easily locate Dio's activity within 'influential discourse' in cities where he was a citizen and spoke in the Assembly or Council and within 'expressive discourse' where he spoke as a non-citizen in venues outside the

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<sup>58</sup> Similar approaches and arguments can be found in Vlassopoulos 2007 and in Sobak 2015.

<sup>59</sup> Gottesman 2014, 2; 20. Gottesman's approach, and hence the one taken in this thesis, can be compared and opposed to the understanding of 'politics' in a more traditional manner, such as suggested lately by Paul Cartledge in his thorough analysis of democracy from the ancient world onwards. Cartledge adopts for his discussion a 'strong definition' of politics: 'the taking of collective decisions in public on matters both operational-pragmatic and ideological-conceptual of crucial, central importance to the decision-taking collectivity as such, following an agreed process of open debate among decision-takers who for the sake of this argument will be called empowered citizens, that is, have the executive power to enforce those decisions', see: Cartledge 2016, 36–37.

<sup>60</sup> Gottesman 2014, 20.

<sup>61</sup> Gottesman 2014, 21.

<sup>62</sup> Allen 2015.

<sup>63</sup> Allen 2015, 178–79.

‘decision-making sphere’. Both forms of discourse constitute political participation and activity.<sup>64</sup> One caveat to be adduced here is that by no means is it the case that even when Dio spoke as a citizen his identity as a philosopher did not come into play.

The idea of politics proposed by Gottesman is one that is not confined to ‘acts that pursue an economic or social interest by means of formal, institutional decision’, but expands it to ‘the production of public meaning’.<sup>65</sup> This maps perfectly onto the understanding of Dio presented in this thesis. As we shall see, Dio’s actions were mostly sanctioned by his cultural authority as a philosopher and not by any official manner. In the majority of his appearances, whilst aiming to affect the social and economic life of the polity, he was not doing so (in fact many times he strictly could not do so due to lack of citizenship) through the formal, institutional means. Instead, Dio generated, or tried to generate, effect by simply pushing his agenda in the civic space.

It is important to contextualise these arguments within the political culture of *poleis* in the Roman east, evidently different from Classical Athens with which Gottesman was concerned. With respect to those cities, the scholarly discussion is focused mostly on the question of the oligarchic or democratic nature of politics, and it is less interested with exploring the question of institutionalism (although there is some of that as well).<sup>66</sup> The former *communis opinio*, best represented by the work of A. H. M. Jones, is that the Greek cities were by and large ruled and administered by local elite families with the popular element in cities, the *dēmos*, represented in the Assembly, being at best a rubber-stamp for decisions already made by the Council.<sup>67</sup> This opinion has become more nuanced with the years.<sup>68</sup> Mainly, the Assemblies in the different cities are now understood to have been much more than an impotent relic from the democratic past but rather a crucial *locus* for political activity and decision-making.

The Assemblies were certainly a political institution, but there are two points that ought to be remarked in that regard: first, as argued convincingly by Zuiderhoek, much of the power in the Assemblies was held by the non-elite citizenry, especially the urban professional classes.<sup>69</sup> These are, of course, the people who frequent city centres on an everyday basis and who would have attended not only the Assembly or the Council meetings, but other forms and

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<sup>64</sup> Cf. ‘Taken together, the two categories [...] make visible forms of political participation that have been obscured by the more traditional focus on political “spaces”’, Allen 2015, 179.

<sup>65</sup> Gottesman 2014, 22.

<sup>66</sup> Fields 2021, 4-9.

<sup>67</sup> A. H. M. Jones 1940, 177, 179, 181.

<sup>68</sup> Salmeri 1982, 56–66; Ma 2000; Salmeri 2000, 70–76; Zuiderhoek 2008; van Nijf and Alston 2011; Fields 2021.

<sup>69</sup> Zuiderhoek 2008, 437-44.

locales of public performances such as the theatres. This is an important observation for our understanding of the public sphere at the time. Habermas, whose work was instrumental to the development of this concept, put his finger on the cafes and salons of early modern Europe as *loci* of political discussion external to official institutions.<sup>70</sup> As Gottesman notes, some critics pointed to Habermas' neglect of other forms of associational life, such as that of the working class.<sup>71</sup> To some degree, this was the nature of the ancient city whose elite would gather in symposia or the gymnasium and its non-elite citizenry formed *collegia* of professionals. Both these groups, with their political opinions and ideas which we can imagine being discussed in their different gatherings, constituted the body of the Assemblies.

Moreover, Dio's political speeches were mostly delivered in the Assembly and Council chambers, but we have speeches like the *Alexandrian*, delivered in the theatre, or others (e.g., *Or.* 22) of which the place of delivery is unknown, but they seem to fit better in a city's marketplace where they would be heard by the elite and non-elite alike, in all places understood by scholarship as *loci* of political discourse. We cannot fully understand Dio's, and imperial era politics, if we focus solely on the events in the Councils and Assemblies.

The second point about the Assemblies as a political institution has to do with the overall Roman context of Dio's activity. Christopher Jones (somewhat) recently explained how Dio's status as a member of the elite (and a Roman citizen on both sides of his family) was able to meet the expectations from his own and other communities, in which he was honoured, to exert influence on Roman officials for the benefit of the Greek cities.<sup>72</sup> I will take issue with this argument in Chapter 4 in respect to Dio's appearance in Tarsus. What Jones' argument is right about, however, is that irrespective of citizen-status, Dio was able to speak on political issues in different Assemblies of the Greek East. Citizenship, which was also a political institution, becomes less important in the imperial era. If we were to analyse political activity from an institutionalist point of view, a large body of evidence – speeches, not only of Dio, concerning political issues but delivered by non-citizens – would be left out and the image of politics at the time would be partial at best if not entirely incorrect.

This leads me to a related point about the image of Dio that will result from this thesis. Dio's civic politics are, at least in the ancient sense, global. It is only under Rome that such a politician could have emerged. Salmeri rightly highlights the expression 'under Roman rule'

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<sup>70</sup> Habermas 1989 [1962].

<sup>71</sup> Gottesman 2014, 4 (with further bibliography).

<sup>72</sup> Jones 2012, 219.



as key in those analyses, described above, of political culture in Greek cities.<sup>73</sup> The reality of the Roman empire, rendering the Greek cities not wholly free, especially for modern admirers of Athenian democracy, limits the extent to which we can describe activity in Roman-Greek *poleis* as truly ‘political’. Roman rule, however, did more than threaten constantly to meddle with local politics and endanger the prospects of the elite. It also unified the Greek cities under it, giving inter-polis politics a different quality to that under the multiple, often warring, Hellenistic kingdoms. To be sure, this is a similar but different argument to that made by Bowie, Swain, and others about Second Sophistic writing emerging under Roman rule as a Greek way of asserting some form of dominance.<sup>74</sup> These works investigated literary responses of Greeks to Roman rule whereas I am arguing for a result in the possible activities of Greeks such as Dio. My argument is, also, not the more nuanced argument of Whitmarsh, problematising the very notion of ‘under’ Roman rule.<sup>75</sup>

Instead, it is, perhaps, a much more simple claim that a man like Dio could not have been the product of classical or Hellenistic Greece because his politics are not only non-institutionalist but rather supra-institutionalist: Dio could appear only in a world where different Greek cities are unified by a constant political framework of a (Roman) Other that made it impossible for cities to be fully sovereign, that diminished the meaning of local citizenship, but maintained the possibility for some degree of political life within the communities.

### 1.2.3 The image of Dio

How does the image of Dio as a philosopher in the civic space, the image this thesis aims to expound, relate to former readings of Dio? If we start from the watershed year in Dionic studies, 1978, we find already a focus on both the identity of Dio as a philosopher and on his activity as a political agent. For Desideri, Dio was a voice of the imperial court (*controllore del messaggio imperiale*).<sup>76</sup> As Swain aptly put it, Desideri’s ‘premiss is that the intellectual is always in the service of power. Ideas of resistance or independence are inconceivable’.<sup>77</sup> This Roman-world focus was shared by Jones who presented an image of Dio as a political agent hyper-aware of his Roman milieu. Again, Swain summarizes well: the result of Jones’ analysis is ‘to emphasize Roman links [...]. Jones is not interested in Dio as a Greek or in his Hellenism

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<sup>73</sup> Salmeri 2011, 202.

<sup>74</sup> E. L. Bowie 1970; Swain 1996.

<sup>75</sup> Whitmarsh 2001b, 1.

<sup>76</sup> Desideri 1978, 91.

<sup>77</sup> Swain 2000, 37.

or in the political thought that may be the manifestation of this'.<sup>78</sup> Both these readings, therefore, look outward towards the Roman political context of Dio. Bekker-Nielsen, as mentioned, in what is the latest monograph devoted to Dio, also presented such a Roman-focused reading.

Indeed Desideri himself, in the same volume from which Swain's remark was quoted, had suggested that, from the time of Dio, in addition to the 'traditional role' of the intellectual, that of a counsellor to a royalty, there was also a local political venue in which he could be active, his hometown.<sup>79</sup> But to focus on Dio's political activity solely in Prusa (which was not the only place where he was a citizen) is a misreading of the public sphere in which he was active.<sup>80</sup> It is just as deficient an image of Dio as that which is too heavily focused on the Roman context.

Bekker-Nielsen, meanwhile, places great emphasis on the city and the conditions of civic life in Asia Minor. On the other hand, when he portrayed the activity of Dio, there is always a focus on the place of the Greek city within the empire.<sup>81</sup> As mentioned above, however, the analysis of Bekker-Nielsen is more of Dio's world than of Dio's activity in the world. What is more, the crucial cultural element in Dio's identity, his intellectual *persona*, is almost absent from the analysis. Dio's identity as a philosopher is accepted (e.g. he 'assumes the role of the philosopher-advisor', 'he chose the *persona* of a wandering philosopher'),<sup>82</sup> but it is completely left out of the analysis of Dio's actual activity and how it was informed by his identity as a philosopher.<sup>83</sup> The trajectory offered in this thesis aims both to show how Dio

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<sup>78</sup> Swain 2000, 40.

<sup>79</sup> Desideri 2000, 105-6.

<sup>80</sup> Fuhrmann 2015 is an interesting and convincing argument about Dio's political activity solely in Prusa. But what is good for a single paper is not enough for a more extended discussion and we must take into account political activity outside of Prusa (and more so, not only in places where Dio was citizen) to avoid an impoverished picture.

<sup>81</sup> This is presented, from the outset, as an objective reading of the historical situation: 'The world of classical Greece was a world of city-states; the Roman empire was an empire of cities. From the fourth century BC onwards, most cities were no longer sovereign, self-governing poleis, but they were still governing on behalf of their Hellenistic or Roman rulers. The administrative functions of the city and the readiness of its elite to participate in its administration were crucial to the success of, and crucial to our understanding of, the Roman imperial project'. It is also presented as the subjective way in which Dio understood his world, e.g.: 'His problem is that his outlook is so different from that of his audience: he views Prusa and Bithynia in their imperial context, while his listeners are content to view their city in isolation. As Dio correctly sees it, petty *poleis* like Prusa, Kios or Apameia will never achieve greatness on their own', see: Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 13, 130.

<sup>82</sup> Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 121, 122.

<sup>83</sup> The language of Bekker-Nielsen suggests that he sees Dio as taking up these *personae* for the purpose of public performances. This image of Dio as an opportunist is familiar and my arguments in this thesis militate against it (see more below). Cf. also Kemezis 2016 about Dio's shifting intellectual stance (Cynic, Stoic, etc.) in accordance with specific circumstances. But the shifting between, say, advice stemming from one *hairesis* to that of another is still consistent at the level of his meta-identity (so to speak) as a philosopher – of whatever *hairesis* – in civic space.

constructed his intellectual identity as a philosopher and then how it was played out in his activity in the civic space. This analysis, therefore, expands from Dio the individual, to his activity in the city, to his ideas of Hellenism as informed both by his understanding of the place of the city within the empire and by his *paideia* and philosophical leanings.

In Bekker-Nielsen's attempt to address and explain Dio's philosophical identity and its relation to his political activity we can see the influence of another strand in the reading of Dio in the past twenty odd years:

When Dion returns to Prusa, he no longer identifies himself with the municipal elite and makes no attempt to win a place for himself in the political *agôn*; on the contrary, he assumes the role of the philosopher-advisor and, apart from heading an embassy to Rome, does not undertake any municipal office. Why? [...] Wealth on this scale [such as Dio witnessed in Rome] was not accumulated through farming or moneylending, but by exploiting the favour of the emperor. Dion's self-confidence was matched by his ambition, and he may well have dreamed of creating a fortune of his own 'by imperial favour' as his grandfather had done. When the fall of Flavius Sabinus destroyed these hopes, Dion's reaction followed the classic Aesopian pattern: he renounced what he could not attain, and chose the *persona* of a wandering philosopher for himself. In this sense, there may be some substance to the story of Dion's 'conversion' – and it would not be unlike Dion to transform the tale of his failure at Rome into a narrative of divine inspiration at Delphi.<sup>84</sup>

This is the picture of Dio the self-fashioning opportunist. It is a picture which began with Moles in 1978 but was emphasised greatly around the end of the 90s and the early 2000s. Like many of the readings of Dio presented hitherto, it is not wrong but incomplete. Famously, Moles had suggested that Dio's turn to philosophy was 'a convenient way both of suppressing the memory of his early time-serving attacks on philosophy [...] and of gratifying his personal taste for self-dramatization'.<sup>85</sup> We shall return later in this Introduction to the issue of the alleged attacks against philosophy from Dio's early years. For now, I only wish to point at Moles' paper as the beginning of this reading of Dio as an opportunist, self-fashioning himself for the need of the moment.<sup>86</sup> In 1995, Maud Gleason enhanced the argument (albeit not completely in agreement with Moles)<sup>87</sup> by looking at the self-fashioning of early imperial

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<sup>84</sup> Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 121-2.

<sup>85</sup> Moles 1978, 79.

<sup>86</sup> Against the influential reading of von Arnim who took Synesius' description of Dio's intellectual trajectory and refined it, adding a third element to Dio's career moving him from a sophistic beginning through a Cynic, philosophical, stage to a final period of synthesis between philosophy and rhetoric. For Moles on the Synesius/von Arnim approach, see: 1978, 81f.

<sup>87</sup> Gleason 1995, 153-4.

Greek intellectuals in the Bourdieusian framework of symbolic capital. Self-fashioning as a cultured intellectual, especially self-fashioning after the image of the great figures from the past, was a means to achieve honours, and status.<sup>88</sup> Gleason, however, did not focus on Dio but on his student Favorinus and the latter's antagonist, the renowned sophist Polemo.

The self-fashioning of Dio was a focal point in 2001 for Whitmarsh in his study of Greek literature and the Roman empire. Like Gleason,<sup>89</sup> Whitmarsh understood Dio as having operated within a literary and cultural tradition that provided its successful appropriators with high status and great prestige.<sup>90</sup> My reading of Dio adopts this understanding and the analysis of Dio's techniques of self-fashioning. Where I differ, however, is on the issue of purpose, or intention. It is almost possible to say that for Whitmarsh, as well as for Gleason, the self-fashioning of Dio is an end in itself. There is no translation into political goals or political power of the symbolic capital that the asserted identity of the *pepaideumenos* confers unto one.<sup>91</sup> This is the case, at least, with Dio; Whitmarsh certainly highlights how *paideia* was thought of as a means to confer practical, political power (as in the case of Plutarch, for example).<sup>92</sup> Overall, however, Whitmarsh focuses on social and cultural identity (masculinity, Greekness, and elitism) as symbolic capital and power for which the self-fashioned *pepaideumenos* continuously vies.<sup>93</sup> I aim to show that Dio tried to translate this capital to a more concrete form in the civic space where he could advocate for specific and practical action.

In Chapter 3 we will see how this translation took place specifically around the issue of exilic discourse. In Chapters 4 and 5 we will see that Dio had a vision greater than himself

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<sup>88</sup> Gleason 1995, xxi.

<sup>89</sup> Gleason 1995, 154.

<sup>90</sup> Whitmarsh 2001b, 90ff., 135, 159–60, 190.

<sup>91</sup> Thus, the emphasis is on 'prestige and symbolic profit' (135), the contest for which is a cultural/philosophical one against other *pepaideumeno*i (164).

<sup>92</sup> Whitmarsh 2001b, 96–7.

<sup>93</sup> Whitmarsh 2001b, 90–130.

even: an educational, Hellenic mission which guided his actions in the civic sphere and towards which his self-fashioning as a philosopher was geared.<sup>94</sup>

Here I wish to bring back Trapp and his grand overview of *philosophia* in the Roman empire. Trapp's reading of Dio certainly points towards such a translation of symbolic, cultural capital gained from identifying as a philosopher into an intention and ability to intervene in the civic and political lives of communities. There is, however, one more recent reading of Dio, highly influenced by Moles and Whitmarsh, to which we should point beforehand, especially as it is more recent than Trapp's book – a telling sign that this strand in Dionic studies is still in vogue.

This is Claire Jackson's chapter on Dio in *The Oxford Handbook of the Second Sophistic*. Situating Dio in the context of Second Sophistic intellectual milieu, Jackson's reading does offer an image of a Dio who certainly had a mission bigger than himself. He is still opportunistic, in the sense that his *personae* shift according to *ad hoc* purposes and needs,<sup>95</sup> but he does so in order to explore greater cultural issues and questions and to problematise them in the eyes (ears) of his contemporary audiences.<sup>96</sup> This, indeed, gives Dio's oeuvre a sense of mission (a word Jackson does not use; but she does find 'purpose' in the speeches)<sup>97</sup> higher than self-fashioning as a philosopher for the sake of his own self-aggrandisement: instead he becomes a commentator on and explorer of identity, especially nexuses of cultural and intellectual identity such as Greek vs. Roman or philosopher vs. sophist. That is, he emerges as a public intellectual commenting on the hot cultural questions of his day and contributing to the discourse. All of this is certainly true, yet it lacks any sense of Dio the intellectual who weighed in actively on issues relating to civic life, and whose interests went

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<sup>94</sup> Perhaps with the use of the word 'mission' it is proper to bring into mind the Apostle Paul. In Chapter 1, we will discuss the place of Christianity within the intellectual/cultural milieu of the time, and especially the place of Paul and his fellow early Christian speakers. Researchers have been comparing Paul and Dio for a long time now, especially the language of the two as public speakers who were active in times not too remote (see, for example, with ample bibliographies: Stowers 1981; Malherbe 1989; Winter 2002). Our interest in Paul is predominantly, if not solely, as an intellectual who was active in the public sphere. However, it is interesting to draw a short comparison – the space of this thesis forbids a full discussion – between the sense of mission of the two figures. As claimed (see, further, Chapters 4 and 5), Dio had a mission greater than himself to educate people and cities in the spirit of Hellenism. Paul, of course, spearheaded the mission of the nascent Christianity. Dio, however, embodied his very mission. He was, to his eyes, the vision of its successful end in an individual and the mission was never completely selfless (this is Dio the opportunist, as shown by the scholarship of the past two decades. An image, as mentioned, that is not wrong but rather slanted). The successes of the mission required the success of Dio the person. This was not the case for Paul, whose mission was not so much tied with himself but understood by him as one which will succeed regardless of his personal success of which he was indifferent, see: Barnett 2008.

<sup>95</sup> Jackson 2017, 217–20.

<sup>96</sup> Jackson 2017, 221–2; 228–30.

<sup>97</sup> E.g., Jackson 2017, 221.

beyond the contemplative. For this, we need to turn back ten years prior to the *Handbook*, to Trapp's *Philosophy in the Roman Empire*.

The second half, approximately, of Trapp's monograph is devoted to the question of the philosopher (*philosophos*) in society: his relations with others, his roles in politics, and the relations of *philosophia* with elements of mainstream culture. For the historical argument which this dissertation aims to make, I take a cue from the image of Dio presented by Trapp: that of a philosopher (Trapp insists, rightly, on Dio's place in the list of philosophers)<sup>98</sup> who is highly committed to intervening in the civic and political lives of the Greek communities of the Roman empire (and its outskirts). It is above all the analysis of the *Borystheniticus Oration* (the 36<sup>th</sup> in the corpus) offered by Trapp which informs my own reading of Dio:<sup>99</sup>

Trapp shows how Dio shaped the Borysthenic community, located on the fringes of the empire, into a literary *locus* for the discussion of matters civic and political in front of a local audience in Prusa: the good community, Hellenic identity, and the nature of the *polis*. This discussion is entrenched in philosophical (in this case, Stoic) language and ideas,<sup>100</sup> and takes the form of a cosmological narrative. As Trapp argues, however, the (pseudo-)Persian cosmic myth does not shift the focus entirely towards cosmology and the sublime. Instead, it serves to raise further questions about the *polis* and its nature.<sup>101</sup> The philosophical discourse, therefore, is put to use to serve Dio's goal in the political and civic sphere.

As for the goals, of course, they were to be achieved in Prusa where the speech was delivered. Borysthenes, whatever its historical reality and whatever interaction Dio had there (or not) with the locals, was an ideal place: far-flung and (hence) malleable. The lessons on the good community, Hellenic identity, and the nature of the *polis* as allegedly discussed there are meant for the Prusan ears. Dio conveyed his political message in his own hometown, a very real historical context, and to his fellow-citizens. Equally real were the other cities where his speeches pronounced ideas parallel to those found in the *Borystheniticus*.<sup>102</sup> These are ideas, however. They are Dio's political musings. Which, along with its substantial treatment in

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<sup>98</sup> Trapp 2007a, 25-6.

<sup>99</sup> A similar approach can be seen, on a smaller scale, in Salmeri 2000. Salmeri shows that Dio (and others) understand(s) political engagement in the city as a natural and primary duty for an intellectual who is committed to city politics (63; 65). Salmeri, however, focused on intellectuals active in their home city whereas I expand and show Dio's engagement with city politics both in and outside of Prusa.

<sup>100</sup> Trapp 2007a, 185-6.

<sup>101</sup> Trapp 2007a, 188.

<sup>102</sup> Such as in Tarsus and Alexandria, Trapp 2007a, 197.

scholarship, is why I will not thoroughly discuss *Oration* 36 in this thesis.<sup>103</sup> As mentioned, my aim is to work around Dio's understanding that it was his place as a philosopher to translate his philosophically-minded political ideas into political action.

This image of Dio as the philosopher who understands philosophy as a collective experience,<sup>104</sup> who understands his role within society as a civic and political agent whose legitimacy for this role stems from the fact that he identifies as a philosopher, is the image I explore in this dissertation.<sup>105</sup> This image does not deny Dio the status of a self-fashioning, ironic, master of words. It seeks, rather, to highlight the connection between these tactical aims and an ambition to supply intellectual leadership for Hellenic communities (and *the* Hellenic community as a unit within the empire)<sup>106</sup> towards a better life based on a philosophical worldview. Irony, humour, wordplay, and the like do not preclude from being seriously committed to a social or political agenda. Thus the arc of this dissertation, as hinted above, moves from portraying how Dio did indeed fashion a philosophical identity for himself, through discussing how this identity served as the basis for his civic and political interventions both in Prusa and in other Greek cities, and to (finally) describing what can be called the legacy of Dio: the image of the philosopher and his place in society not only as he embodied it, but as he tried to bequeath it to others or demand that his peers and contemporaries live up to it.

To justify this reading, the last section of this introductory chapter will be devoted to one more preliminary issue: why I insist on a reading of Dio as a philosopher?<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> For *Oration* 36, see: von Arnim; Desideri 1978; Jones 1978; Russell 1992; Trapp 1995; Schofield 1999; Swain 2000 (several of the contributions); Nesselrath et al. 2003 (with further bibliography); Gangloff 2006; Bähler 2007; Bekker-Nielsen and Hinge 2015.

<sup>104</sup> Trapp 2007a, 214.

<sup>105</sup> Another advocate of this image is John Ma, who in Swain's volume from 2000 analysed the *Euboicus* (another set-in-another-place speech like the *Borystheniticus*) to show how even within the highly literary and self-fashioning times of the Second Sophistic, intellectuals like Dio were concerned 'with the issues of community, politics, and democracy'. Dio is portrayed as a public intellectual speaking not for the sake of performance, but for the sake of civic intervention in the form of political advice (108-124; quotation is from 124).

<sup>106</sup> Individual cities are certainly the main concern of Dio, but they are often an example of Hellenism (successful or lacking) as we will see in Chapter 4. Often times, as will be shown, there is a sense that what allows some of the arguments about Hellenism and a Hellenic spirit is the ever-present framework of the empire, its ruling mechanisms as well as its ethos as it is portrayed by Dio. This can be compared with what Trapp writes on the move from *polis* to cosmos in the political philosophy of the time. On the one hand, the cosmos as a framework makes *polis* politics all the more important as it renders easier the elision of bigger political units such as province, kingdom and empire. On the other hand, the importance of the political game itself is diminished in light of an overarching cosmic authority (Trapp 2007a, 231-2). Similarly, whilst the Roman empire allows to focus on city politics, eliding Hellenism as the empire now replaces the Hellenistic kingdoms, the very existence of a grand Roman framework allows to zoom out and shift the focus to a conglomerate of Greek cities which share a Hellenic ethos that is set in relief by the Roman power. On this dynamic see: Whitmarsh (ed.) 2010, especially the first chapter by Whitmarsh (1-16), and the second by Clifford Ando 2010 (17-45).

<sup>107</sup> See the beginning of Chapter 1 for further discussion, specifically about the sophist/philosopher question.

### 1.3 Why Dio? Why a philosopher?

With the ascension of Nerva to the imperial throne, Dio returned from his wandering period committed to claiming his place in the civic sphere. His ambitions were great, far exceeding what he called the frivolous (σμικρὰ καὶ ἄδοξα) politics of Prusa, his home city (*Or.* 47.1).<sup>108</sup> Dio delivered speeches in many different cities and locales of the Greek East. He spoke before Assemblies and Councils on political issues and before gathered audiences at major Greek events on various topics – from moral philosophy through aesthetics to literature and history. If he had had any connections with the Flavians before his wandering,<sup>109</sup> upon his return he gained the favour of Nerva (*Or.* 45. 2-3) and was a delegate to the imperial court in Rome under Trajan.<sup>110</sup> At the end of his life Dio was a well-respected citizen, a teacher of *paideia*, and – if we take Philostratus’ comment (*VS* 488) to contain some kernel of truth – he was even *loved* by the emperor.

Even in the imperial era, when power was more and more centralised in the hands of one man and the branches of imperial rule, one road to establishing oneself in the political game and to garnering political power and authority ran through public, civic space.<sup>111</sup> This space was typically occupied by those whose rhetoric was impactful enough to muster the attention of their audiences.<sup>112</sup> For this purpose, Dio employed all his educated might. His speeches are full of varied rhetorical manoeuvres, and they prove his mastery of *paideia*, broadly understood as Greek education.<sup>113</sup> Yet an image of a *pepaideumenos*, a person who has acquired *paideia*, was not enough and Dio went one step further. Much of his rhetoric is devoted to presenting himself as a specific kind of a *pepaideumenos*, namely a philosopher. Much of the argument of Chapters 3 and 4 is devoted to this element in Dio’s rhetoric: I turn the spotlight to the places in the speeches where Dio attempts to highlight his identity as a philosopher in the eyes and ears of his audiences.

There is always an option to read Dio’s self-fashioning as an ironic rhetorical manoeuvre used to arrogate to himself the identity of a philosopher for tactical reasons in the

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<sup>108</sup> Desideri 1978, 376.

<sup>109</sup> See: Sidebottom 1996, who discredits the connection. In n. 1 Sidebottom adduces modern scholars who contended that Dio was on terms of intimacy with the Flavian dynasty, an opinion stemming from Philostratus’ *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana* (5.27-38) and was most strongly adopted by Italian scholars such as Momigliano 1951, 152, ; Desideri 1978, 138–39, and; Salmeri 1982, 24–26.

<sup>110</sup> Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 122.

<sup>111</sup> Ma 2000; Salmeri 2000; Oppeneer 2018.

<sup>112</sup> Whitmarsh 2001b, 190–91.

<sup>113</sup> παιδεία, literally ‘education’ extends from the basic elements of teaching taught to a child (etymologically related, παῖς) to the mastery of top branches of studies such as philosophy and rhetoric and the ability to express this mastery verbally in text or, especially in the time of Dio, orally in front of an audience. For general introductions on education and *paideia* see: Marrou 1956; Clarke 1971; Anderson 1989; Schmitz 1997; Borg 2004.



here-and-now. Especially so, since when it appeared, as it often did, it is in the early part of a speech, the *captatio benevolentiae*, which was crucial for establishing the relationship between the speaker and the audience.<sup>114</sup> It is here that speakers might want to highlight who they are or indeed to conceal their identity if the audience is likely to prove hostile towards it. Thus, when Dio highlights his identity as a philosopher it is important for us to ask why and what was at stake. But it is also important to remember the other side of the coin: that Dio could have claimed to be a philosopher because he knew his audiences would appreciate his speech more because of that. Irony was certainly an important part of Dio's rhetorical toolbox, and it was not missing from his assertion of a philosophical identity. We can especially see this in Dio's narrative of his beginnings in philosophy.<sup>115</sup> Scholars often toe this fine line of allowing Dio his place among philosophers while warning their readers of Dio's irony. Trapp, for example, although according Dio a place among philosophers, writes: 'Dio and Maximus [of Tyre] – have a tendency to play arch games with the name *philosophos*, treating it as something they wish to manoeuvre their audiences into applying to them, rather than forthrightly seizing it themselves'.<sup>116</sup> Is it, then, naïve to accept Dio's assertion of himself as a philosopher? Is my insistence on referring to him as a philosopher not only by title, but as if it was his real vocation in which he believed and upon which he built his public *persona*, a case of preferring clumsy historicism to agile literary analysis?

To answer this, I begin with Dio as my guide: ὅ τι ἂν πράττη τις καθ' αὐτόν, οὐ κοινόν ἐστι τοῦτο οὐδὲ τῆς πόλεως· ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ δὲ βλέπεται τὸ δημόσιον ἦθος ('whatever a person does in private is neither a public matter nor is it of the *polis*; the people's character is shown in the theatre', 32. 32). My working hypothesis is that Dio's character ought to be judged by what he did in public.<sup>117</sup> What Dio kept to himself in his performances; how he conducted himself privately, away from the public's eye; what, in other words, did not make it to the delivered speech (either in words or in comportment) can only be conjectured. Whether Dio truly believed he belonged within the congregation of philosophers, or whether he meticulously presented himself as such for his rhetorical purposes, and whether either idea dawned upon him before or during his time of wandering, bears little to no relevance to what the audiences, at

<sup>114</sup> The 'capture of goodwill' is a rhetorical manoeuvre used to render the audience attentive and, as the Latin phrasing implies, move the listeners into a benevolent frame of mind towards the speaker.

<sup>115</sup> Whitmarsh 2001b, 160–67; Moles 2005, esp. 132–3.

<sup>116</sup> Trapp 2007a, 25.

<sup>117</sup> In this respect, my analysis concurs with the idea evoked by Hahn (1989, 12; 26) about the audiences' (read, society) harbouring a set of expectations about the appearance and conduct of intellectuals. Expectations that had to be met by the intellectuals if they wished to be acknowledged as philosophers, sophists, physicians and so forth. See, however, n. 20 for the reception of this idea.

the moment of the speech, had in front of them. On top of this, we cannot ignore the apologetic rhetoric Dio utilised from time to time, especially in civic context (*Orr.* 34; 35).<sup>118</sup> If the purpose of the speaker is to turn the audience to his side as quickly and as much as possible, why waste time and effort on justifying a position to which they might be hostile instead of assuming, for the purpose of each speech, the identity most likely to achieve this goal?

In a way, this methodological choice to take Dio at his word and to see him as an active philosopher is related to my distinction between Dio as an author of texts and Dio as an agent of spoken words. The text can teach the scholar a lot about literary sophistication in the spirit of the time, whereas the agency of Dio, his genuine belief in his identity or his genuine belief that it was more profitable for him to assume this identity in front of an audience, can teach us about the nature of the intellectual world in which Dio operated. Scholars, as we saw, agree that at one point in his lifetime Dio understood that a philosophical identity carries much intellectual authority.<sup>119</sup> A study of his choice (ironic or not) to pursue philosophy and to translate its authority to political power will teach us why one would wish to present himself as a philosopher, the manner in which one could do so and, with regard to Dio in particular, what was his particular place as a philosopher in the intellectual scene around the turn of the first and second centuries CE.

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The first two chapters, to which we turn now, consider the fashioning of Dio's philosophical identity. In the first chapter, we explore the intellectual climate around him to which, I contend, Dio responded. In Chapter 2, we delve deeper into the literary manoeuvres, especially the play on past and present, in the self-fashioning of Dio's philosophical identity. The following chapters will focus on Dio's activity as a philosopher first in his hometown (Chapter 3), then in other Greek cities (Chapter 4). In these, the rhetoric and literary cunning of Dio, especially in the opening sections of his speeches, will be shown to serve various goals in the civic space. The last Chapter (5) is devoted to what will be described as Dio's legacy, moving away from a focus on him and how he embodied a model of the philosopher in civic space to a focus on the figure of the philosopher as he prescribed it to others.

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<sup>118</sup> But not solely (*Orr.* 12; 72).

<sup>119</sup> Contention is found around the time of this 'understanding' and the reasons for it. Was it early on in his education and carried on since or was it at the time of his wandering and strongly related with it? See main text for further discussion.

Thus, I hope to develop an analysis of the philosopher which takes us further in our understanding of his figure, by combining the literary and the historical not only as methodologies, but as elements combined by Dio himself in his orations as he utilised his literary and rhetorical skills to achieve actual goals in the civic space.

## Chapter 1 – Philosophical authority and the intellectual climate

It is said that to be acknowledged as a philosopher in the imperial era resulted in authority,<sup>1</sup> but we should pause to consider what forms this authority took. Interestingly, when one's philosophical identity took precedence over other elements, the authority emanating from this identity was not usually translated into socio-political power.<sup>2</sup> A philosopher had cultural capital which was usually put to use in a 'cultural setting' such as a school or publication of texts.<sup>3</sup> Roman emperors such as Vespasian might have perceived in philosophers a political threat – not, of course, as contenders to the throne, but as expounders of political ideas dangerous to a monarchy.<sup>4</sup> Yet, most of what we, at least, can see of imperial philosophers is the product of men such as Epictetus or Maximus of Tyre; teachers and authors secluded in their schools or school-like setting.<sup>5</sup> Of course, there was the occasional Musonius Rufus or

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<sup>1</sup> Trapp 2007a, 13, 18; Lauwers 2013, 333.

<sup>2</sup> Reydam-Schils (2017) compares the differences between the self-representation of figures such as Dio and Plutarch to that of Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Seneca. She claims that the differences result, among other reasons, from a regard or disregard to social status and authority. Cf. Trapp 2007a, 18–22: 'They wished to be acknowledged as leaders of their communities, but without occupying any formal position of civic authority' (p. 22); see also: Lauwers 2013, 333. Figures such as Cicero or Marcus Aurelius are a case in point to the interplay of identities. Their worldview was certainly informed and shaped by philosophy, but their political authority emanated from their status within the Roman political system of the Republic and the empire. Notably, Cicero's heaviest philosophical output was written at the time when he was left out of the political arena, having already established his authority. And he still needed to protect his current philosophical project (Baraz 2012). Marcus' philosophical musings were above all what their later-given title profess them to have been: *To himself*, and they have more to do with his private *persona* than his public one (Hadot 1998, 21–34).

<sup>3</sup> Reydam-Schils 2017, 535. Throughout this thesis, the word 'school' identifies an institution such as a classroom, a lecture hall, or any physical complex of teaching. αἵρεσις/αἵρέσεις (transliterated) will be used for a 'school of thought' such as Stoicism, Platonism etc. On the subordination of philosophical authority to other social distinctions see also: Trapp 2017, 39–40.

<sup>4</sup> E.g., Tac. *Ann.* 15.71.9; Philostr. *VA* 7.16.2. Jones 1978, 16; Moles 1978, 83–84; Penwill 2003, 345–46 (on the meeting [see further]; but also in general on the entire topic). The fictitious meeting, described by Philostratus, between Apollonius, Euphrates, Dio and Vespasian, in which the philosophers discuss the merits of democracy and monarchy, perhaps represents the disillusionment of many Stoic philosophers from the new emperor and the willingness of some to argue for restoration of the Republic. Winter 2002, 43–44: on Cynic criticism of empire, and on Titus specifically. Trapp 2017, 39. See also: Trapp 2007a, 226–30. The idea of philosophy as a political oppositional force (in the empire) has been greatly softened, even in respect to what has been dubbed the 'Stoic opposition': 'the tradition of "philosophical opposition" was limited to the inner circles of the Roman elite; it shows at most how aspects of *philosophia* could be used by a particular group in particular circumstances, not how those aspects had to be used anywhere and at any time. Secondly, the tradition is almost exclusively confined to Stoics, the one Academic involved, Brutus, also having in effect strong Stoic sympathies; it is not general across all the sects. [...] Thirdly, it does not seem, on calm consideration, that it was philosophical principle on its own that motivated the stances taken by the principal actors, or even constituted the leading factor. Cato, Brutus, Paetus, Rusticus and the rest were members of the governing elite before they were adherents to Stoic or any other philosophical principle [...]' (219–30). Cf. A. Mehl 2011, 122: 'Moderns have called this opposition Stoic because the senators they class under this rubric held general views concerning political power and rulers that were imbued to some extent with Stoic ethics, but their so-called "opposition" constituted neither a unified movement in itself nor did these senators pursue political goals, let alone real constitutional objectives'.

<sup>5</sup> It is interesting to read the lessons of Epictetus to his students about activity in civic space as a philosophical duty (e.g., *Diss.* 3.12.95–8) remembering that these were pronounced in the form of the school lectures and not in public *per se*.

Seneca who was deeply involved in politics,<sup>6</sup> but these form the exception. First, and importantly, as Reydamns-Schils notes, in their philosophical self-representation they were much more similar to Epictetus.<sup>7</sup> Secondly, there is a difference between the politics of the imperial court and the senate to that of Greek city and civic life. The authority which most philosophers sought was not traditional political clout. If there was a group of intellectuals who sought to use their cultural prestige to generate political sway – in the form of offices, benefactions, immunity from liturgies, acting as ambassadors or holding equestrian and senatorial posts, and forming ties all the way up Roman political hierarchy culminating with the emperors themselves – it was the sophists.<sup>8</sup> Famously, they are traditionally understood as antithetical to the philosophers<sup>9</sup> and described, at least by one author already at the time of Augustus, as usurpers of the philosophers' prerogative for such privilege and power:

ἐτέρα δέ τις ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνης [sc. φιλόσοφος ῥητορικὴ] παρελθοῦσα τάξιν, ἀφόρητος ἀναιδεία θεατρικὴ καὶ ἀνάγωγος καὶ οὔτε φιλοσοφίας οὔτε ἄλλου παιδεύματος οὐδενὸς μετεληφυῖα ἐλευθερίου, λαθοῦσα καὶ παρακρουσαμένη τὴν τῶν ὀχλῶν ἄγνοιαν, οὐ μόνον ἐν εὐπορίᾳ καὶ τρυφῇ καὶ μορφῇ πλείονι τῆς ἐτέρας διῆγεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς προστασίας τῶν πόλεων, ἃς ἔδει τὴν φιλόσοφον ἔχειν, εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀνηρτήσατο καὶ ἦν φορτικὴ τις πάνυ καὶ ὀχληρὰ καὶ τελευτῶσα παραπλησίαν ἐποίησε γενέσθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ταῖς τῶν ἀσώτων καὶ κακοδαιμόνων οἰκίαις.

(Another Rhetoric stole in and took the place of [philosophical rhetoric], intolerably shameless and histrionic, ill-bred and without a vestige either of philosophy or of any other aspect of liberal education. Deceiving the mob and exploiting its ignorance, it not only came to enjoy greater wealth, luxury and splendour than the other, but actually made itself the key to civic honours and high office, a power which ought to have been reserved for the philosophic art. It was altogether vulgar and disgusting, and finally made the Greek world resemble the houses of the profligate and the abandoned, Dion. Hal. *Orat. Vett. praef.* 1)<sup>10</sup>

<sup>6</sup> For Seneca the best source is M. T. Griffin 1992. For the political activity of Musonius Rufus, see: Tac. *His.* 3.81; 4.10, 40.3 with, Penwill 2003, 347–50, 354–57; Trapp 2007a, 23; Inwood 2017, 272.

<sup>7</sup> Reydamns-Schils 2017, 535.

<sup>8</sup> This is not to say that sophistry was the sophists' sole, let alone most important way towards political power. In his response to Bowersock 1969, *Greek sophists in the Roman empire*, Bowie observed that those who turned to sophistic activity came from families that were already established in their cities' political elite (E. L. Bowie 1982, 30). Yet sophistic activity, based on the constant proof for mastery of *paideia*, was a legitimization of power and customarily combined with political activity, see: Schmitz 1997, 44–66.

<sup>9</sup> Modern scholars have, mostly, advanced further from the ancients' almost dichotomic split between the two groups of *pepaideumenoi*, see: Whitmarsh 2001b, 159; Eshleman 2012, 1–2. On the identity of intellectuals in the imperial period (especially on the sophists-philosophers problem) see: Bowersock 1969; Stanton 1973; Hahn 1989; Anderson 1989; Anderson 1990; Anderson 1993; Anderson 1994, 1–16, 218–21; Gleason 1995; Schmitz 1997; Whitmarsh 2001b; Bowersock 2002; Whitmarsh 2005; Sidebottom 2009; Lauwers 2013; Lauwers 2015; Eshleman 2012.

<sup>10</sup> Trans.: Usher 1974, 5; 7.

Dio, therefore, is an almost unique, and a very interesting, case of an intellectual who stepped out to meet the challenge presented to philosophy by the sophists' rhetoric and aims, and chose to portray himself as a philosopher who, while attempting to gain the kind of authority which the recognition of a philosophical identity would lend one, did so for the sake of political gain and power.<sup>11</sup> Whereas Dio did not merely utilize his general education and abilities (his *paideia*), but specifically espoused philosophical rhetoric, discoursed on philosophical themes, and affiliated himself with past philosophers, the game that Dio played took place outside of the philosophical school, in the public – political – arena. Dio, therefore, stepped into the environment where intellectuals such as the sophists perform and amass political influence.<sup>12</sup> But wherefore and why in this manner are the questions this chapter aims to answer.

Dio could have played the game of symbolic capital as a sophist and capitalised on his *paideia* to garner political influence. That was, after all, as we have seen above, one of the most prevalent cultural-intellectual dynamics of his time.<sup>13</sup> Evocation of philosophical tropes and wisdom was not confined to philosophers and Dio could do so just as well as a sophist or any another kind of intellectual.<sup>14</sup> Why, then, did Dio choose not only to enter the political arena

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<sup>11</sup> In 2017 Reydam-Schils demonstrated the differences between Dio and his teacher, Musonius Rufus (and others) in respect to their self-presentation as (Stoic philosophers). One claim of hers was that Dio was far more concerned with his social status and was more active in public life (536). She ascribes the differences to 'a cultural polemic about how philosophical discourse should best be conducted' (535). This is correct. I would like to add two points to this: 1) acknowledging that this cultural polemic took place among all intellectuals of the time, and 2) a more thorough analysis of the choice made by the proponents of this cultural polemic is needed. This thesis will address these issues. The figure I found most close to Dio in the nature of his activity is Euphrates of Tyre (on him see: Frede 1997). Very much unlike the case of Dio, we do not have such a rich collection of sources either by him or about him, which leads to a very partial image. Wandering philosophers such as Apollonius of Tyana or Demonax share with Dio some characteristics as intellectuals – e.g., public speaking in different places rather than teaching at a school – but they were not active in the civic space in the same way as Dio was (on Apollonius, see: his *Life* by Philostratus and E. L. Bowie 1978, on Demonax, see: Lucian's text of the same name and Diskin 1992, esp. 3412). For philosophers who, like Dio, were active in the civic space we need to wait for later figures such as Themistius (on him, see: Heather and Moncur 2001). Inwood (2017) claimed that Musonius was more of a roaming philosopher (like his student Dio, which might explain some of Dio's choices). But even if that is true, Inwood did not argue that Musonius, like Dio, was bent on making civic and political interventions at every turn of his travelling. Musonius was much more of a school philosopher and his political activity stemmed from his personal interactions with the Roman political elite.

<sup>12</sup> Modern research, following mainly Bourdieu, has recognised the link between 'cultural capital' – in our case, essentially, the ability to convince the audience that a speaker is a *pepaideumenos*; an educated person with mastery over *paideia* – and political power. Thus, there was a link between rhetoric – one's means to prove *paideia* – and political authority, see: Schmitz 1997, 26–31. Cf. Anderson's somewhat more hedged statement: 'We must simply accept that civic and cultural prestige sometimes coincide and sometimes do not; that the latter is in any case much harder to define; and that the two are often interdependent' (1989, 147). Dio's uniqueness was, therefore, not in his wish to translate his *paideia* to political power, but in his choice and wish to translate philosophical *paideia* to political power by setting it in the public sphere.

<sup>13</sup> Gleason 1995, xxi–ii; Lauwers 2013.

<sup>14</sup> Jones 1978, 9; Sidebottom 2009, 69; Lauwers 2013, 333–34; Reydam-Schils 2017, 536.

but to do so in the cultivated guise of a philosopher? The following appears to me the most reasonable reconstruction of Dio's trajectory in respect to his choice of an intellectual identity.

While this is still somewhat debatable (due to the nature of the evidence), it is likely that Dio spent his formative educational years under the tutelage of Musonius Rufus.<sup>15</sup> It seems that Musonius' teachings of practical ethics persuaded Dio that philosophy had more to offer than other intellectual pursuits as an educational route to a truly better life. In addition, one element of Musonius' teachings was that the student of philosophy, even if ideally at the stage of studies he is removed from social circles,<sup>16</sup> should reintegrate eventually into them. Another student of Musonius, Epictetus, has embedded this in his teachings as well.<sup>17</sup> Unlike Epictetus, who after his studies with Musonius led his own school in Epirus, Dio implemented this message of integration in his public activity. Twice Dio entered the social public arena: once – we assume – after an initial period of higher education and once after his wandering.<sup>18</sup> The intellectual atmosphere that Dio met with upon his reintegration(s), I believe, forms the second element of Dio's intellectual choices on top of his initial education in philosophy with Musonius.

The relationship, described by Gleason in Bourdieu's terms of cultural capital, between the elite and their fellow-citizenry, from the point of view of the elite can be summed up in terms of two interrelated goals: benefiting oneself (creating a name and amassing honours), and benefiting the community.<sup>19</sup> Dio actively cultivated a relationship with the people of Prusa. His building project in Prusa is the well-known example of this (*Or.* 45; 46) but, I shall claim in Chapter four, he also had an educational project for the Greeks (and the Romans) as a whole.

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<sup>15</sup> Fronto, *Ep. De eloquentia liber II*, p. 133, ll. 8-11 (van den Hout 1988). This letter, written by Fronto to his master/pupil, Marcus Aurelius, is the (single) testimony that connects Dio and Musonius in a teacher (*magister*) student relationship (along with other students of the latter; van den Hout 1999, 323). Although it is a single piece of positive evidence, it is now mostly accepted: Lutz 1947, 19; van Geytenbeek 1963, 14; Desideri 1978, 5–16; Jones 1978, 12; Moles 1978, 82; Brenk 2000, 262–63; Whitmarsh 2001b, 137, n. 16; Reydam-Schils 2011, 315; Inwood 2017, 255.

<sup>16</sup> Muson. 11 (Lutz), read with: Reydam-Schils 2017, 528.

<sup>17</sup> Reydam-Schils 2017, 528–29. von Arnim claimed that what led Dio to be a sophist was his wish to practically implement his studies from his *Rhetorschule* (a wish which von Arnim opposes to a reverence to the classics, 131–2). On the basis that the sophists appear to us as, predominantly, *Prunkredner* (ceremonial speakers), von Arnim asserts that Dio's leanings towards the practical implementation of his studies seems paradoxical. Although there is definitely a sense of paradox, von Arnim's reasonings are wrong. It is far more likely that Dio's leaning stemmed from the Stoic teaching of Musonius. The paradox is there because Dio's entire self-presentation of a philosophical orator is paradoxical.

<sup>18</sup> We cannot *assuredly* ascribe any of the extant works of Dio to a period before his wandering. We have to rely on what he tells us about his life after the fact, and what we know from external sources. The scenario mentioned above where Dio acted as an advisor to Vespasian (Philostr. *VA* 5.27-37.1-2), while most probably fictitious, is yet representative of a figure who was already in the public's eye at the time. Dio himself, when speaking of the effects of exile, narrates the loss of property and position that suggests he was active publicly at least in Prusa beforehand (*Orr.* 40.2; 45.10).

<sup>19</sup> Gleason 1995, xxi.

Dio aimed, as one learnt in the school of Musonius, to benefit others through his philosophy.<sup>20</sup> Entering the public arena, the game of prestige and power, Dio, like others, had to vie for the top position. His was what Reydam-Schils has called ‘a cultural polemic about how philosophical discourse should best be conducted’.<sup>21</sup> This polemic did not take place solely between philosophers. Anyone with a claim to offer some philosophical wisdom could be a part of it. Perhaps more vehemently (than philosophers vying against philosophers), sophists competed against each other as well as against philosophers.<sup>22</sup> Other figures were also at play – as we shall soon see.<sup>23</sup> Whether or not Dio left his period of initial training with a true belief in the superiority of philosophy, he must have known that presenting himself as a sophist would have bogged him down in the quagmire of sophistic rivalries, whereas presenting himself as a philosopher would provide him with an already solid moral superiority, not only to compete with other philosophers, but to attack sophists.<sup>24</sup> In reaching for more than cultural authority that was enjoyed by his previous or fellow philosopher-teachers and writers Dio, as he shaped his (philosophical) identity, had to react and respond to the varied intellectuals with which the public scene was fraught.

Here, of course, is where any reader of Dio would wish to raise the eternal question about Dio’s biography: was he or was he not a sophist, at least, to begin with? Many good answers have been given to this question and reiterating the arguments in full here would be

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<sup>20</sup> Reydam-Schils 2011, 319–20.

<sup>21</sup> Reydam-Schils 2017, 535.

<sup>22</sup> Anderson 1989, 159–62; Gleason 1995; Whitmarsh 2005, 37–40; Eshleman 2012.

<sup>23</sup> Winter 2002, 53: ‘philosophers necessarily responding to innovation by orators and sophists’ in the way the shaped the public performances.

<sup>24</sup> Lauwers 2015, 122. As Gleason 1995, 28 writes: ‘quarrels were not a luxury but a necessary medium for self-advertisement. Feuding sophists found indignation an unfailing stimulus to wit and a useful catalyst in the construction of a public personality. If they had had no rivals, they would have created them to define themselves’. The claim for superiority over the sophist stems from the historical quarrel, going back to the days of Socrates/Plato, between the philosopher and the sophist as educators.



redundant.<sup>25</sup> As mentioned above, this thesis takes Dio on his word, not because he necessarily was not being ironic or lying outright but because we can learn more about intellectual choices of self-presentation if we ‘take the bait’. In his transmitted speeches Dio never presents himself as a sophist. When he is not silent about his intellectual identity, he presents himself as a philosopher and takes on a range of attitudes towards the sophists, varying between the more neutral ones (19. 3; 35. 10) to harsh criticisms (4. 28). Even for Philostratus, the first to raise the question about Dio’s identity, the issue arose not from Dio’s own words or from any known rivalries he had with other sophists, but rather from the fact that Dio chose the medium of public speech to convey his philosophy.<sup>26</sup> There was, therefore, no conversion from sophistry to philosophy but a choice of self-presentation. If at a given point in time Dio had contemplated presenting himself as a sophist and played within the highly competitive sophistic arena, we do not hear of it, and it seems that he abandoned this course in favour of establishing a philosophical identity. An identity which was fashioned, in part, in response to the sophists.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Philostratus (*VS* 487), famously, wrote that he did not know if Dio was a sophist or a philosopher. In section 2 of the Introduction, we discussed Synesius’ suggestion (*Dio*, 36) of conversion from sophistry to philosophy. As mentioned, this was adopted by von Arnim (1898) who expanded the idea into a three-staged career. This was challenged (separately) by Desideri, Jones, and Moles in 1978. Moles, refuted the idea of conversion and suggested Dio’s adoption of different *personae* for specific moments. Desideri and Jones, saw Dio as a philosopher, by reasons of dating of speeches or by an examination of Dio’s educational background. Eventually, many shorter treatments of Dio take the approach one can find in Salmeri’s monograph from 1980 which sees Dio as a rhetor stepped in philosophical knowledge and is, in fact, most similar to Philostratus’ opinion (see note below). With studied of intellectual identity describing it most often in terms of a discourse or a process, in which the boundaries between identities are not always clear and different elements of varying intellectual identities could be used by the same figures (see, e.g. Gleason 1995; Eshleman 2012; Lauwers 2013) the views on Dio progressed in line with this new understanding (e.g. Whitmarsh 2001b, 158–59; Bowersock 2002, 164). Nesselrath’s edited volume (2009) is somewhat of an oddity in this climate, describing the philosopher as a well-defined category (to which Dio belonged). My approach, expounded in the text above, is that *reading* Dio as a philosopher allows us a better understanding of him and his time because it allows us to ask why he wanted to appear as such.

<sup>26</sup> Philostratus ascribes Dio to the first group of figures in his book whom he introduces so: σοφιστὰς δὲ οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐπωνόμαζον οὐ μόνον τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς ὑπερφωνούντας τε καὶ λαμπροὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τοὺς ξὺν εὐροίᾳ ἐρμηνεύοντας, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀνάγκη προτέρων λέγειν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ὄντες σοφισταί, δοκοῦντες δὲ παρῆλθον ἐς τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ταύτην (‘The people of old named “sophists” not only those among the orators who shone forth and excelled in speaking, but also those among the philosophers who philosophised [lit. interpret in words] with fluency of speech. Of these there’s a need to speak first, not because they were sophists, but because they were thought to be and, hence, arrived at this title’, Philostr. *VS* 484).

<sup>27</sup> As clues to unlock Dio’s identity scholars often bring in the titles of two lost letters Dio (Synesius *Dio* 73, 75): κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων and πρὸς Μουσώνιον. As Whitmarsh remarked, at least in respect to latter, the Greek πρὸς can also be read as ‘In reply’ which is much more neutral in tone, of course, than ‘against’ (Whitmarsh 2001b, 137 n. 16). Similarly, κατὰ with the genitive, can mean ‘in respect of, concerning’ (LSJ, s.v., A.II.7). Even if we keep the more agonistic ‘against’ we still need not conclude an outright enmity towards philosophy and philosophers. As this thesis argues, Dio was far from uncritical towards contemporary philosophers. Albeit he was critical from within the field. Whatever the content of the letters was, it would not come as a surprise if indeed it expressed even a harsh critical stance.

## 1.1 The intellectual climate

Other than the sophists we can count three more groups of contemporary intellectuals against which, or in the vicinity of which, Dio situated himself and was active. The place in which this is most clear is his *Alexandrian Oration*, number 32 in the corpus.<sup>28</sup>

Around the turn of the first century Dio appears before a crowd in Alexandria.<sup>29</sup> He chastised the unruly nature of his Alexandrian audience. The message itself of the speech, that the Alexandrians should check their rowdiness if they do not wish any more harm and disrepute to befall their city, was pronounced from a philosophical standpoint. This was backed up by Dio's claim to a philosophical identity which he asserted through philosophical language,<sup>30</sup> setting himself against other intellectuals (as we shall soon see), and by his very appearance of a philosopher wearing a simple cloak (τριβωνίῳ φαύλῳ, 32.22).<sup>31</sup>

Dio knew the nature of his audience, which he saw as his mission to rebuke. A wise and experienced speaker, however, he was there to chastise but not to antagonise. The message of a philosopher, Dio knew full-well, is always at risk of being lost on an aggravated audience (*Orr.* 72.7-8; 34.3). So, he sought first to assuage the Alexandrians: Dio suggests to the audience that the fault is not in them but rather in the stars, so to speak; it is in the kind of philosophers which were dealt to Alexandria by the hand of fate. This is because, to carry on with this Shakespearean line, these philosophers are underlings. In so assuaging his crowd, Dio allows us to look into the intellectual activity of the time, and to understand how he saw his contemporary cultural situation. It was against these philosophers and other intellectuals that Dio established his position as a philosopher and it was this intellectual climate to which Dio mostly reacted in shaping his own philosophical identity. Dio presents the situation in the city as follows:

Καὶ τοῦτο ἴσως οὐ δι' ὑμᾶς· δηλώσετε δέ, ἂν ἀνάσχησθε τήμερον· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρὰ τοὺς καλουμένους φιλοσόφους. οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ὅλως εἰς πλῆθος οὐκ ἴασιν οὐδὲ θέλουσι διακινδυνεύειν, ἀπεγνωκότες ἴσως τὸ βελτίους ἂν ποιῆσαι τοὺς πολλούς· οἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς καλουμένοις ἀκροατηρίοις φωνασκοῦσιν, ἐνσπόνδους λαβόντες ἀκροατὰς καὶ χειροῖθις

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<sup>28</sup> A similar approach is taken by Dio in *Or.* 33, the *First Tarsic*, and will be discussed in Chapter 4.

<sup>29</sup> The date of *Oration* 32 is debated, see: Sidebottom 1992. If, as suggested by other scholars (Bost-Pouderon 2006, 11-40 offers a thorough discussion and summary of opinions), the speech is earlier, earlier than the wandering period even, it simply goes to show that Dio's philosophical leanings predated his exile which confirms a part of our conjecture in respect to his early education and choice of philosophy as an intellectual pursuit and identity.

<sup>30</sup> Thus, for example, Dio opens his speech with speaking of ἐγκράτεια, or having a right set of mind (ὀρθῶς δὲ διανοομένων), and carries on to cement his advice with the language of philosophical virtues and wisdom, cf. Winter 2002, 45; Trapp 2007a, 193-94. On this, see more in Chapter 4.3.1.

<sup>31</sup> Desideri 1978, 92-93. Cf. Moles who, accepting the dating of the *Alexandrian Oration* to be in the 70s, saw it as foreshadowing Dio's 'philosopho-political symbouleutics' of later years (1978, 93).

ἑαυτοῖς. τῶν δὲ Κυνικῶν λεγομένων ἔστι μὲν ἐν τῇ πόλει πλῆθος οὐκ ὀλίγον... οὗτοι δὲ ἐν τε τριόδοις καὶ στενωποῖς καὶ πυλῶσιν ἱερῶν ἀγείρουσι καὶ ἀπατῶσι παιδάρια καὶ ναύτας καὶ τοιοῦτον ὄχλον ... τοιγαροῦν ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὐδὲν ἐργάζονται, κακὸν δ' ὥς οἷόν τε τὸ μέγιστον (Yet perhaps this [rowdiness] is not your fault, and if you bear [with me] you will show a proof [of this]. But rather, this rowdiness originates from those who call themselves philosophers. For among them, some do not appear before the public altogether and do not wish to take the risk, despairing, perhaps, of the possibility of turning the many into better men. Others, on the other hand, sound their voice in what are called lecture-halls, having gathered well-disposed listeners who are submissive to them. And then there is not a small number in the city of those who are called Cynics [...] and these gather in the street-corners, the alleys, and at temples' gates, and they deceive little boys and sailors and crowds of such sort [...] for they accomplish not one thing good, but the greatest possible wrong, 32. 8-9).

Dio thus presents himself to the audience as a different kind of a philosopher to those whom the Alexandrians and other contemporaries were familiar with. The fault which Dio finds in contemporary philosophical activity is that they seclude themselves. On the one hand, we have what we may dub armchair philosophers; we can imagine an author of treatises such as Plutarch even,<sup>32</sup> or more so one who is engaged with solely reading philosophy and does not write nor have any form of interaction with the public.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, we find philosophers who avoid engagement with the general public and preach to their own selected flock; one might think of Epictetus who had students regularly attending his school.<sup>34</sup> Dio, in

<sup>32</sup> Plutarch, of course, held public positions and we can garner from his texts how philosophy informed his actions, but nevertheless, Plutarch's main philosophical output were texts aimed at society's elite (van Hoof 2010, 19–40). This choice to philosophise mainly in writing somewhat contrasts with his censure of Hellenistic philosophers (especially the Stoics) for abstaining from political life (Korhonen 1997, 66) and, famously, suggesting that a philosopher should seek to influence men in power (*Mor.* 776d).

<sup>33</sup> Compare, for instance, Epictetus' suggestion to those who wish to take up sophistry (σοφιστεύειν): ἀλλὰ εἴ σε ψυχαγωγεῖ τὰ θεωρήματα, καθήμενος αὐτὰ στρέφε αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ· φιλόσοφον δὲ μηδέποτε εἴπης σεαυτὸν μηδ' ἄλλου ἀνάσχη λέγοντος ('But, if the [philosophical] speculations attract you, then sit down on your own and turn these towards yourself. Never say that you are a philosopher, nor suffer any other to say so', Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 3.21.23). That this is more than Dio's rhetoric, and that he is not simply erecting strawmen (regardless of whether or not modern scholars can find examples of such strawmen), can be glimpsed later on by Dio's introduction of a person named Theophilus whose conduct was, apparently, well-known to the audience: he was a *sophos*, who kept quiet and did not appear before the people because he felt they were a lost cause, suffering from a great want of sense and sagacity (συνειδὼς ὑμῖν τὴν ἐσχάτην ἀπορίαν, οὐ χρημάτων, ἀλλὰ νοῦ καὶ συνέσεως, 32. 97). Cf. also, the account given by Porphyry in his *Life of Plotinus* about the different kinds of philosophers in respect to their teaching and writing activities (Porph. *Plot.* 20.25ff.).

<sup>34</sup> Such as Arrian, thanks to whom we have the record of Epictetus' teachings. Brunt 1977; Marrou 1956, 207. Cf. also Lynch, who notes that seclusion was even deeper: 'most philosophers and rhetoricians in the imperial age taught as isolated individuals, often in their own homes, not in a community of other teachers or in an established institution' (1972, 174). This seclusion of philosophers is associated as well with the coded language of philosophy (esoteric texts) which can only be understood by fellow philosophers and their students: Korhonen 1997, 37. In Ch. 2.3 we will see how this issue was tackled by Dio, who presented himself as able to bring philosophy to everyone and anyone.

contrast, not only claims to be different but by the very act of delivering this speech proves himself to be far from a secluded intellectual. This becomes even clearer as Dio goes on, speaking of the repercussions caused by philosophers who abandon the community instead of, like him, facing it in order to instruct it (32.19).

The second group of (what we would call) intellectuals, is the Cynics.<sup>35</sup> Contrary to the philosophers, they are anything but secluded. Their fault lies less with their conduct and more with the content of their teaching: being, in fact, false Cynics,<sup>36</sup> they inflict only harm on their listeners. This depiction of Cynic activity (here, specifically in Alexandria) by Dio was certainly shared by other members of the intellectual elite. Epictetus, as Arrian transmitted him to us, sheds some light on the ease with which a Cynic guise could be appropriated by many who wrongly conflated it with poverty that is peppered with some moral chastisement of others and with begging for money (Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 3.22.9-12). Dio, of course, wished the audience to perceive him as unlike those false Cynics but as the kind of philosopher who does good (ἀγαθόν), in an attempt to turn the audience into better men (βελτίονες). To Dio's mind, then, we have two kinds of faulty intellectuals (philosophers): secluded ones who might be able to improve their students' lives, but their 'student-body' is a select flock, and Cynics who 'dare' step into the public eye but are unable to offer true wisdom. Dio, locates himself as a genuine philosopher by virtue of both offering beneficial lessons and doing so in a public setting.

Dio, therefore, establishes himself as a new kind of a philosopher, different from his contemporaries and better.<sup>37</sup> His novelty is not in the message itself, but in the way he conducts himself as a philosopher. What the Alexandrians, and others, hear from him is what we can find in different philosophical texts from across antiquity. The innovation of Dio was rather in how he carried that message out from the schools and the books to the public performing of *philosophia* ἐν μέσῳ as we shall see in Chapter 2.2.

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<sup>35</sup> Perhaps at this point we should note the fairly broad use of 'intellectual' in this thesis. Cynics, and to some extent, Christian preachers, often saw themselves as removed from *paideia*. But they appeared in public and offered their audiences formative, if not educative, lessons. In this sense, they were public intellectuals even if their 'credentials' were not based on thorough learning and education. On Cynics as intellectuals, see: Anderson 1989, 122–23. On the education of public Christians speakers at the time, see: (admittedly, solely on Paul besides whom we have no early figure to construct an understanding of what might have been the education of his peers): Judge 1960; Judge 1968, 125–28; Winter 2002, 141–240; on Paul's similarities to Cynic philosophy: Downing 1998, and Goulet-Cazé 2014 who both recognize the similarities between Cynicism and early Christianity, but take antithetical approaches on the question of Cynic influence of Christianity: Downing is a leading exponent of the so-called Cynic Hypothesis whereas Goulet-Cazé debunked it.

<sup>36</sup> This phrasing appears in Dio's corpus six times: *Orr.* 13.11, 32.8, 45.12, 72.2, 77/8.34; 35. Other than in here and in *Or.* 72. 2, it always denotes figures who self-proclaim themselves as philosophers and whom Dio perceives as false philosophers. For example, in *Or.* 77/8. 34 and 35 those who serve and fawn the prosperous are those καλουμένους φιλοσόφους/ φιλοσόφων καλουμένων.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Winter's remarks on §11: Winter 2002, 51 and n. 40.

The self-imposed seclusion of Dio's contemporary philosophers within their studies and schools, however, forms only a part of Dio's spur to shaping his identity and the Cynics, to Dio's mind, are not the only hazardous group which is rampant in the city. They share their great numbers with some others:

ἄνδρα δὲ λαβεῖν καθαρῶς καὶ ἀδόλως παρρησιαζόμενον [...] οὐ ῥᾶδιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς πόλεως, ἐν τοσαύτῃ σπάνει γενναίων καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, ἀφθονία δὲ κολάκων καὶ γοήτων καὶ σοφιστῶν.

(To find a man who will clearly and fearlessly speak freely [...] is not easy, except in a very fortunate city, in such great a scarcity of noble and free men, and in such great an abundance of flatterers, cheats, and sophists, 32.11).

Of these last three categories, only the sophists shall concern us here. The sophists, in the eyes of Dio, share not only their great numbers with the Cynics, but also lead people astray.<sup>38</sup> Winter, in his analysis of the sophists' presence in Alexandria around the time of Dio, marked three criticisms which Philo, the Jewish philosopher, directed against the sophists: making money from teaching, arrogating credit to themselves for the pupils' success, and actually hindering their students' advancement.<sup>39</sup> Like those fake Cynics, then, although claiming to assist their students by their *paideia*, philosophers believed sophists to do only wrong and debase their subject matter.<sup>40</sup>

It is not merely that the city was full of people whom Dio saw as belonging to these groups, it is also – and more importantly – the fact that both these groups, (false) Cynics and sophists, were active on the public scene. Harmful as the Cynics and the sophists were to their audiences, they shared this positive characteristic which, as we have seen, Dio perceived (or wished to present) as devoid of his contemporary philosophers: they were public intellectuals. Their teachings, whether worthy or trifling to the minds of philosophers, were delivered not only in schools but at the heart of cities in front of a great many people.<sup>41</sup>

This characteristic, the public nature of intellectual activity, was shared with a fourth group that was active before and at the time of Dio and should be taken into our account: early

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<sup>38</sup> Cf. *Or.* 4. 28 and *passim*.

<sup>39</sup> Winter 2002, 91–92.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 3.21.23 on the sophists as demeaners of philosophy: μὴ προστρίβου καὶ αὐτὸς αἷσχος φιλοσοφίᾳ διὰ σαυτοῦ, μηδὲ γίνου μέρος τῶν διαβαλλόντων τὸ ἔργον ('and do not, by your very person, inflict shame on philosophy yourself, nor become a part of those who slander the matter').

<sup>41</sup> Sophists, as it is well-known, held classes in schools as well. Yet unlike philosophers, this was far from their only kind of activity: their hallmark was public declamation and their activities, in fact, overlapped so that a public performance could have been attended by students as a form of teaching whilst classes were often themselves a form of public display, see: Anderson 1989, 90; 100–101; Winter 2002, 30–31. We will see the manifestation of this element in Dio's self-construction in Ch. 2.

Christian preachers who were active around the eastern part of the Mediterranean basin. These are represented best by the activity of Paul the Apostle. In 1960 E. A. Judge argued that Paul is to be seen as a sophist.<sup>42</sup> For the purposes of his discussion, Judge lumped Paul under this title along with all sorts of figures: Dio, Aelius Aristides, Epictetus, Cynics, and ‘religious teachers’ such as Apollonius of Tyana and Peregrinus. Judge’s justification for this grouping were these figures’ modes of conduct that, among other elements, consisted of public speaking.<sup>43</sup> Since then, Paul’s identity as a sophist has been accepted and rejected with equal vigour.<sup>44</sup> For our purposes, pinpointing Paul’s self-representation matters much less than acknowledging that he was active in the same intellectual field and contested for the same audiences, not only with rival Jewish/Christian preachers,<sup>45</sup> but with other pagan intellectuals such as sophists and philosophers.<sup>46</sup>

This can also be gleaned from the observed similarities between early Christians and Cynics. In the 80s this similarity brought about the so-called Cynic hypothesis: that Jesus himself was a Cynic.<sup>47</sup> Whilst recently disproved by Goulet-Cazé in her 2014 *Cynisme et christianisme dans l’Antiquité*, the resemblances are still acknowledged,<sup>48</sup> and specifically the Pauline ministry was shown to share many elements with Cynic philosophy.<sup>49</sup> A case can even be made for Dio’s own conflation of Christianity with Cynicism: in *Acts of the Apostles*, written just before the peak years of Dio’s activity,<sup>50</sup> Paul is described by Stoic and Epicurean philosophers he had confronted in the Athenian agora as a σπερμολόγος, a babbler.<sup>51</sup> When describing the Cynics in Alexandria, Dio portrays their activity as: σκώμματα καὶ πολλὴν σπερμολογίαν συνείροντες καὶ τὰς ἀγοραίους ταύτας ἀποκρίσεις (‘stringing together jests and much babbling and such agora-like responses’, 32. 9).<sup>52</sup> This is the only time the root

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<sup>42</sup> Judge 1960.

<sup>43</sup> Judge 1960, 126. Stowers 1984 had contested the reality of Paul’s public speaking activity. He argued that Paul appeared only in front of small congregations at private houses and synagogues. This makes Paul similar to those school-philosophers Dio criticizes – except, of course, Paul had to be far more polemic in the synagogues and was not preaching to a select, amenable audience. Paul, of course, was not alone, and even if the numbers attested by *Acts* are a complete exaggeration (e.g., 3000 new converts made by Peter’s preaching, 2.41), the locations and language (e.g., διδάξαι ὄχλον, 11.26; 14.11-3, speaking in front of Zeus temple in Lystra) speak to a public context.

<sup>44</sup> Gleason 1995, 16–17 presents Paul as a sophist; Winter 2002, 141–203, rejects this identification and instead equates Paul with philosophers (e.g., 155-7).

<sup>45</sup> Winter 2002, 203–39.

<sup>46</sup> Malherbe 1989.

<sup>47</sup> Betz 1994.

<sup>48</sup> Goulet-Cazé 2014, 5.

<sup>49</sup> Malherbe 1989.

<sup>50</sup> Malherbe 1989, 159.

<sup>51</sup> *Acts* 17.17-8: τῇ ἀγορᾷ [...] τινὲς δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐπικουρείων καὶ Στωϊκῶν φιλοσόφων συνέβαλλον αὐτῷ, καὶ τινες ἔλεγον, Τί ἂν θεοὶ ὁ σπερμολόγος οὗτος λέγειν; (‘Some of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers encountered him and some asked: “what might this babbler wish to say?”’).

<sup>52</sup> Malherbe 1989, 151.

σπερμολογ- appears in Dio and it is the only time σπερμολόγος (or indeed the verb σπερμολογέω or the noun σπερμολογία) appear in the NT. We might assume, on the basis of the peculiarity of the word and its specific usage by Dio that he might have been familiar with accusations against Christians such as those found in the NT, which confused them with Cynics.

Although Christianity was still nascent and still removed from any real source of political power, to some extent early proponents of Christianity shared with both Cynics and sophists a public nature of activity.<sup>53</sup> In addition, these three groups, each in its own way, encroached upon issues that traditionally were under the purview of philosophy and philosophers.<sup>54</sup> Not only *paideia*, but also questions concerning the right way of living, what should be considered a good life, the nature of good, evil, and truth were all part and parcel of these groups' teachings and they were all matters with which philosophers had been engaged since the fifth century BC.<sup>55</sup> Indeed, sophists and Cynics were not a new phenomenon in the way Christianity was, but the sophists were enjoying (more and more if not entirely)<sup>56</sup> a new vogue and the Cynic movement, if it can be called so, was in a state of sufficient flourishing to be noticed by intellectuals such as Epictetus and Lucian.<sup>57</sup> Dio, as we have seen above and as

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<sup>53</sup> See: n. 46, above.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *Or.* 32.10, when other intellectuals present themselves as philosophers: τῶν δὲ εἰς ὑμᾶς παριόντων ὡς πεπαιδευμένων οἱ μὲν ἐπιδεικτικούς λόγους καὶ τοὺς ἀμαθεῖς [...] εἰ δ' ὡς φιλόσοφοι ταῦτα πράττουσι κέρδους ἕνεκεν καὶ δόξης τῆς ἑαυτῶν, οὐ τῆς ὑμετέρας ὠφελείας, τοῦτο δ' ἤδη δεινόν ('among those who appear before you as educated men [*pepaideuomenoi*, men of *paideia*], some declaim speeches (and unlearned even) [...]. If they perform these as philosophers for the sake of their own profit and fame and not for your own benefit, it is indeed horrendous'). Cf. as well, Lucian, *Demon.* 14: a sophist claiming ὅτι πάσης φιλοσοφίας πεπείραται ('that he is well-versed in all philosophy'). Polemo, a renowned sophist, 'quelled insolence and folly in the city's corporate behaviour with public rebukes', Gleason 1995, 24; read with Philostrat. *VS* 531-2.

<sup>55</sup> Winter 2002, 74. For the encroachment of early Christian preachers on philosophical themes: Malherbe 1989.

<sup>56</sup> Brunt 1994.

<sup>57</sup> On the sophists' bloom from, at least, the late Republic period, see: E. L. Bowie 1982, 41-42; Anderson 1989, 84-87. Lucian's *Peregrinus* depicts the image of exactly such Cynics. Peregrinus and his followers are rebuked for acting as Cynics for the show of it and for the love of glory, see: e.g., *Peregr.* 37, where the followers of Peregrinus, watching his fiery death, are accused of lingering simply for the purpose of being observed at the moment: 'Ἀπίωμεν,' φημί, 'ὧ μάταιοι! [...] ἢ περιμένετε ἔστ' ἂν γραφεὺς τις ἐπελθὼν ἀπεικάσῃ ὑμᾶς οἷους τοὺς ἐν τῷ δεσποτηρίῳ ἐταίρους τῷ Σωκράτει παραγράφουσιν;' ('“Let's go”, I said, “you fools! [...] Or are you waiting for some painter to come and depict you like those disciples who were written next to Socrates when he was in prison?”'). In §38 and 42 Lucian uses τὸ φιλόδοξον to describe the whole Peregrinus affair.

is clear from his texts, noted these intellectual activities and in fact constantly responded to them in establishing his own identity and place in public.<sup>58</sup>

The intellectual and cultural climate of the two first centuries CE was thus a challenging one for any who not only associated themselves with philosophy, but who believed that the philosophical message was superior and, perhaps more importantly, conceived of philosophers as having an important role in the (political) life of the city and empire. With philosophers cloistering themselves in their schools or devoting themselves solely to writing on the one hand, and with sophists, Cynics, and Christians usurping the intellectual authority from philosophers on the other hand, it is easy to see how someone like Dio would have seen in this situation a call to action.<sup>59</sup> Dio appears to have realised that if he wanted to be acknowledged as a philosopher, to have some effect on the public, and to garner political clout and honour he must not simply advocate the lessons of philosophy within closed circles, but set out and perform his philosophy in a public speech form in accordance with the intellectual and cultural climate of the period.<sup>60</sup> In doing so, Dio created in himself a new kind of philosopher that he believed to be best suited for the times.

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<sup>58</sup> We lack positive evidence for Dio's reaction to the burgeoning Christian faith. Indeed, we lack even evidence for his awareness of it. Yet it is almost impossible to believe that Dio, who has come to learn about Persian Zoroastrianism (*Or.* 36.39ff., read with Russell 1992, 231–47) and Hindu Brahmins (*Or.* 35.22; 49.7), would have been ignorant of a religious movement that budded around him and the proponents of which were active in civic centres such as Alexandria and Corinth where he was active himself. The closest statement to an acknowledgment of what might be a Christian belief is found in *Or.* 31.11, when Dio admits that there are people who unite all the gods into one force and power (ἀπλῶς τοὺς θεοὺς πάντα εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰσχὴν καὶ δύναμιν συνάγουσιν), but we cannot be certain that this image of monotheism specifically refers to Christianity or indeed to religion and not to philosophy. To the question whether Dio in fact 'replied' to Christianity we are, therefore, in no place to give a complete answer. However, since Dio was active in the same places (especially Corinth and Alexandria) where we would find early Christian activity. And given the public nature of this activity, taken alongside the implausibility of Dio's ignorance of the nascent religion, it is important to bring Christianity into our account. We should understand it as one more element in the public scene that lends immediacy to Dio's philosophical mission. In fact, a recent addition to Dionian scholarship compares Dio and Paul, stressing similarities and differences alike and arguing for their belonging in the same cultural climate (Ramelli 2009; cf. Malherbe 1989). Ramelli focuses on Paul's philosophy and rhetoric as part of the intellectual climate. The similarities with Dio are interesting, but I am not certain about their importance to the study of Dio himself (for instance, Paul's appearance in simple attire tells more about him than about Dio). The upshot, however, of Ramelli's discussion is that at the time of Dio's *floruit*, postdating Paul's, Christian preachers were already competing for the same audiences and civic spaces by similar ways and by addressing similar issues. This, as mentioned, must have added immediacy to Dio's goal of establishing himself (and philosophy) in the public domain as a moral guide.

<sup>59</sup> The extent of this 'crisis' could have been, of course, exaggerated by Dio as part of his rhetoric. First, however, there must have been some kernel of truth for Dio to exaggerate. Secondly, even if he did overstressed this 'crisis', this adds to our understanding of how Dio used rhetoric to establish his place as a philosopher.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Hunter 2017, 265. Lauwers 2015, 50, almost hits the mark in his analysis of Dio: 'by showing and explicitly pointing out that a self-styled philosopher could be capable of attracting such great a crowd, his very presence in front of the audience implicitly suggests to ambitious men that devotion to philosophy [...] does not deprive one of one's public voice; rather, it adds a sort of intellectual depth to one's discourse and manages to capture the attention of a distinctive part of the population'. Indeed, Dio aimed at the larger part of the population, but, as claimed above and as we shall see further below, Dio constructs his philosophical identity as a public persona not as an identity that allows for a public voice ('does not deprive' it), but as an identity that *must have* a public voice.



## Chapter 2 – Constructing a philosophical identity

This chapter investigates the use Dio made of past philosophers as models for his own activity as a philosopher. In the first chapter we located intellectuals in Dio's cultural milieu, which prompted and shaped his own identity construction. We now focus on one of the prevalent phenomenons in that cultural atmosphere of which Dio was a paragon: the engagement of imperial Greek authors with their past. Unlike the claims made by Moles in his seminal article from 1978, the influence of which is still apparent in scholarship,<sup>1</sup> I argue that the sustained use of *personae* – the masks of eminent figures from the past such as Socrates or Diogenes – is not solely a rhetorical instrument. As Gleason remarked, it was a manifestation of identity.<sup>2</sup> Whereas Gleason, however, takes this as the mark of a flippant sophistic orator, we shall consider it as that of a philosopher who truly understood himself as a scion of those great philosophers.

My argument, however, whilst focused on Dio, goes well beyond Dio as it examines him as a philosopher who was active in the time of the Second Sophistic. In 1970, when E. Bowie reappraised the phenomenon of imperial Greek authors' heightened interest in their past, he concluded that this was not simply a matter of literary predilection but rather had political reasons behind it: the cultivated focus on the past manifested a nostalgia for a time of perceived Greek greatness and liberty when Roman rule did not loom over the east.<sup>3</sup> This argument was further nuanced with time and what might have appeared as a straightforward laudation of the past was a much more complex relationship: 'the construction of that past [by imperial Greek authors] is also veined with a complex dynamic of attraction and rupture, affiliation and dismissal'.<sup>4</sup> We will see that the past was indeed an important resource for Dio and that he cultivated both affiliation with and dismissal of the great philosophers in order to fashion the identity of the philosopher. This will be shown in a tripartite argument: Dio's relationship with past figures, his adoption of the idea of philosophy *ἐν μέσῳ*, and his portrayal of his models' failures in successfully conveying their wisdom.

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<sup>1</sup> A Google Scholar search from May 2021 indicates that Moles' article has been cited 132 times (with the latest citation mentioned being Moignard 2020, although she, unlike Moles, adopts the conversion narrative as being written in 'good faith', 167). As discussed in the Introduction, Moles' article counts as one of the pivotal works on Dio (Swain 2000, 45 ; Jackson 2017, 219, 230: 'extremely influential').

<sup>2</sup> See: Gleason 1995, 154, on Moles' accusing Dio of plagiarising Socrates' biography: 'To say this is to apply anachronistic notions of sincerity and authenticity to a stylized traditional medium. In the culture of Dio and Favorinus, to be an exile *as Odysseus*, to be a philosopher *as Socrates*, is to be more, not less, oneself'.

<sup>3</sup> E. L. Bowie 1970.

<sup>4</sup> Goldhill 2001, 8.

## 2.1 Hierarchies, present and past

Most of the scholarship on the subject points to Dio's affiliation of himself with past philosophers. Moles, as I mentioned, saw this affiliation (in the form of using *personae*) as a rhetorical instrument 'to invest [himself] with something of the aura of these men while at the same time avoiding the admission that he himself is not a great original'.<sup>5</sup> More recently, Lauwers located intellectuals' affiliation with philosophy as part of the skirmish between philosophers and sophists, in which association with philosophers could lend one intellectual superiority.<sup>6</sup> Whitmarsh, as we will see, does the same in respect to *Oration* 4 and its use of the figure of Diogenes.<sup>7</sup> For Whitmarsh, however, this is also a question of intellectual superiority between philosophers since Dio, he shows, was greatly aware of the fact that the tradition of which he is a part is not only that of Socrates or Diogenes but also of more contemporary philosophers as well, such as his teacher Musonius.<sup>8</sup>

This is a crucial point about Dio's formation of his identity and his understanding of his place in the intellectual world. As far as affiliation with philosophers from the past is concerned, Dio evokes this in order to establish himself at the top of the intellectual pyramid, both over sophists and other intellectuals as well as other contemporary philosophers such as Musonius. This is not to repeat, however, what is already agreed upon by some in the field. First, as the texts examined below will show, intellectual superiority over both sophists (and others) is claimed in tandem with superiority over contemporary philosophers: all the speeches discussed show Dio's concern with both (and sometimes other) kinds of intellectuals. Second, whereas superiority over sophists was achieved by affiliation with past philosophers (as the scholars mentioned have shown), Dio's superiority over contemporary philosophers, by virtue of their identity as philosophers, could not be achieved in the same way. The next section will show how Dio construed the activity of past philosophers so as to fit with his own needs. I will argue that the Socrates and Diogenes of Dio are always shown to be active ἐν μέσῳ – in public, the sphere in which Dio was active and which he consistently, as we saw and will see again, criticised his contemporary philosophers for neglecting.

So much for affiliation. Dismissal, however, was just as much a part of Dio's relationship with philosophers from the past. Matters are more complex (and interesting!) here, and so I shall present the issue by way of example: the fourth *Kingship Oration*, which will not be extensively dealt with in this thesis. In this speech, Diogenes plays a guide to Alexander the

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<sup>5</sup> Moles 1978, 99.

<sup>6</sup> Lauwers 2013; Lauwers 2015, 15-20.

<sup>7</sup> Whitmarsh 2001b, 191. See more below.

<sup>8</sup> Whitmarsh 2001b, 159-60.

Great on the topic of good kingship. Whitmarsh writes that Dio asserted to himself here the status of the philosopher by opposition to sophistry.<sup>9</sup> An opposition which is plainly marked from §28 onwards where Diogenes dismisses the sophists' value as teachers of good kingship. The text is read as paralleling Dio's position in respect to an emperor (regardless of whether or not this speech was delivered in front of Trajan)<sup>10</sup> to that of Diogenes in respect to Alexander. Therefore, when Diogenes dismisses the sophists, by implication, Dio dismissed his contemporary sophists and aimed to be viewed as a better educator than the sophists of his time.

However, the sophists were not Dio's sole concern. Dio presents Diogenes as philosophizing with Alexander through dialogue. He plays the investigator, leading Alexander by way of *elenchus* away from his misconceptions and towards the philosophical lesson.<sup>11</sup> In contrast, Dio's discourse was delivered as an oral presentation (or as a literary piece to be read as such). Even in the scenario of the speech being presented in front of Trajan, Dio did not make it a part of his self-constructed image as a philosopher to present himself in dialogue with Trajan.

Moreover, while Cynic/Diogenic philosophy was notoriously under-cultivated, doing away with advanced learning and education (Diog. Laërt. 6.1.11; 6.2.9),<sup>12</sup> Dio's speech is a piece of refined literature. Not only is it a dramatic dialogue, but it is also a mix of genres which embodies elements from history, myth, and different philosophies.<sup>13</sup> Dio, therefore, does not share the philosophical method of Diogenes.<sup>14</sup> It is only the Diogenic (perhaps even the general) philosophical message that Dio retains here from his model if not only his character(istics). Dio's assertion to himself of the status of philosopher in this speech is not done solely with the sophists in mind, but equally with the philosopher Diogenes, and specifically by a partial dismissal of him. This dismissal, therefore, creates an intellectual hierarchy with Dio at its apex: whereas Diogenes *qua* philosopher is better than the sophists, Dio is better than Diogenes.

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<sup>9</sup> Whitmarsh 2001b, 191.

<sup>10</sup> Moles 1983; Lauwers 2015, 48.

<sup>11</sup> Moles 1990, 348–49. The final part of the discourse (§82 onwards) is indeed a speech. It is, however, still a part of Diogenes dialogue with Alexander, unlike the manner in which Dio's discourse was delivered, whatever it was (either as a text to be read or as a speech delivered in the imperial court or elsewhere).

<sup>12</sup> Malherbe 1989, 12; Frede 1997, 2.

<sup>13</sup> Moles 1983; Moles 1990, 348–50.

<sup>14</sup> Since the *Oration* is an advice to the ruler of (a) society, we can also note how Dio's Diogenes is not in line with what we understand to be the political agenda of early Cynicism: a replacement of current society with a pre-social existence (Bosman 2017, 46).

Dio's attempt to locate himself at the top of the intellectual hierarchy, above both contemporary intellectuals of all sorts and eminent philosophers such as Diogenes and Socrates, has not been noted by scholars.<sup>15</sup> Moles, as we saw in the quote above, found the whole use of *personae* by Dio to be somewhat apologetic: to avoid admission that he, Dio, was not as great as they were.<sup>16</sup> But Moles' analysis is contradictory: Moles asks what reaction Dio expected to evoke from the audience by donning a *persona*, and claims that it is 'less likely' that they would have been able to recognize the *persona*.<sup>17</sup> Earlier in the article, however, Moles wrote that '[T]he *personae* of the wandering philosopher conveniently serves to distract attention from Dio the successful sophist'.<sup>18</sup> According to Moles, Dio hid the philosophical training with Musonius as well as his 'earlier career as philosophical σύμβουλος'.<sup>19</sup> If Dio was both hiding and his *persona* was unrecognized, what was the audience left with? More importantly, claiming that the audience was less likely to recognize the *personae* ignores the explicit mentions by Dio of the figures whose *personae* he used (in all the speeches Moles worked with).<sup>20</sup> By naming, paraphrasing, quoting, and likening himself to the figures of the past, Dio made the masks of the *personae* known to the audience. By dismissing the model in his very act of speech, Dio peered from behind the mask. These are points of tension in the performance, where the speaker and the *personae* are intentionally not aligned, when Dio breaks away from his model philosophers and provides the audience with a model of his own.

Before we go into a more thorough analysis of the dynamics of affiliation with and dismissal of past philosophers, it is perhaps not unwarranted to note that this manoeuvre of establishing a model (to gain superiority over all contemporary intellectuals) and immediately breaking away from it (to gain superiority over the very model), was harmonious with Dio's identity in general: Dio was a man who eluded definition (Philostr. *VS* 487), whose philosophy was eclectic,<sup>21</sup> whose exile might not have been an exile at all (*VS* 488), a Greek and a Roman, a political figure yet, mostly, in a private capacity,<sup>22</sup> a citizen and an itinerant. Dio defies fitting

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<sup>15</sup> Whitmarsh does not address it in his discussion. However, see further down in this chapter on *Oration* 8, where Whitmarsh does bring into his analysis the dynamics of dismissal.

<sup>16</sup> Moles 1978, 99.

<sup>17</sup> Moles 1978, 99.

<sup>18</sup> Moles 1978, 97.

<sup>19</sup> Moles 1978, 96.

<sup>20</sup> In *Or.* 13, for example, the focal point of Moles' paper, Dio explicitly mentioned Odysseus and Socrates (and explicitly claimed to have used a Socratic λόγος in his travels).

<sup>21</sup> Statements such as these can often be read about Dio (e.g., Berry 1983, 70). Famously, Dio mixed elements from the Platonism, Stoicism, Cynicism, and even the Peripatetic school. This is exemplified well by several of the contributions to Swain's volume from 2000, see: Trapp 2000; Brancacci 2000; Brenk 2000; on Dio and Aristotle, see: Jazdzewska 2015a.

<sup>22</sup> E.g., in *Or.* 49, which will be discussed in Ch. 3, Dio declines an Archonship in Prusa.

into one single mould and, perhaps most significantly, even in his literary production when he seems to establish a model he breaks away from it.<sup>23</sup> Such, then, is the case with the mould of past philosophers: it is established since it allowed Dio to retain what he believed to be a better intellectual stance and message – philosophy – and it is dismissed so that he could appear as the better person to deliver this message.

## 2.2 From Dialogue to Speech: Philosophy ἐν μέσῳ

When we expand our analysis beyond *Oration* 4 and include the Dionic Socrates as well, what emerges as the salient feature of Dio's dynamic of affiliation and dismissal is, on the one hand, his adoption of his models' public nature of their philosophising and, on the other hand, his rejection of their dialogic form of philosophising. Both Diogenes' and Socrates' manner of philosophising in Dio's speeches is emphatically popular as it is carried out in city centres, gymnasia, and public gatherings such as the Greek Games. Socrates, of course, from the very early records of his activity, was portrayed as performing his philosophy in such public spaces in Athens. The same tradition, however, records Socrates performing philosophy in private as well: whether in the house of a friend as in the *Symposium* or sitting under a tree with one single interlocutor as in the *Phaedrus*. Whenever Socrates performs philosophy in the Dionic corpus, however, it is always in public space, which indicates a choice made by Dio to focus on the popular side of the Socratic tradition.<sup>24</sup>

As for Diogenes, let us stay for a moment longer with the fourth *Kingship* where Dio's choice to insist on a public setting for his philosopher is rather less clear than other speeches and so serves as an *a fortiori* argument. Like Plato's *Phaedrus*, mentioned above, where Socrates was in dialogue just with the eponymous interlocutor, *Oration* 4 presents a dialogue conducted solely between Diogenes and Alexander. The difference with the *Phaedrus*, however, is revealed through Dio's choice of scene. We are indeed told that when Alexander comes to meet Diogenes, he is found to be alone (διατρίβων μόνος, *Or.* 4.14). But he is found not in his private home (which he did not have), nor outside of the civic space (such as the *Phaedrus* scene), but in the Craneion, a famous gymnasium in Corinth. His being alone does not reflect some form of isolation from the public's eye (as we have seen Dio criticise in

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<sup>23</sup> Cf. Hunter 2017, 260: 'The pattern whereby textual imitation, including particularly marked forms such as parody, begins with close verbal tracking of the model and then, having established the relationship, goes its own way is a familiar one'. Establishing a model and breaking away from it is an important instrument in Dio's literary toolbox.

<sup>24</sup> If this results from Dio's reading of Socrates through Antisthenes rather than through Plato (Brancacci 2000; Brancacci 2001) then it is still a matter of choice made by Dio to select a specific tradition to work. Dio, after all, was more than familiar with Plato and it was not a matter of the availability of an alternative tradition.

Chapter 1) but, as it appears from the succeeding explanation clause, it is meant to set Diogenes apart from other intellectuals around him:

οὐδὲ γὰρ μαθητάς τινας οὐδὲ τοιοῦτον ὄχλον περὶ αὐτὸν εἶχεν, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφισταὶ καὶ αὐλῆται καὶ οἱ διδάσκαλοι τῶν χορῶν

For he did not have any students nor such a throng around him such as that around the sophists, the flute players, and the teachers of choruses, 4.14.

We see then that the haunt of the ancient, paradigmatic philosopher in Dio, even when he is about to embark on a private dialogue, was a public space. Whereas the mode of Diogenes' philosophising, the dialogue, was dismissed by Dio, the element of publicity, evoked by locating him in a public gymnasium, was kept. This is true for the rest of the places in the corpus where we find Socrates and Diogenes performing philosophy and to which we shall now turn.

In *Oration 8, On Virtue*, Dio made another addition of his own to the biographic tradition of Diogenes. The speech opens in Athens, where the audience are told of Diogenes' encounter with several of Socrates' followers, creating a connection between the two.<sup>25</sup> After an interval of time spent with Antisthenes, Diogenes is said to move to Corinth and to the Isthmus where the bulk of the *Oration's* events take place. In this, Dio did not deviate from the familiar biography of Diogenes.<sup>26</sup> In Dio's time, however, Corinth bore more than its historical importance and pointing to the location in the speech, I believe, bears significance greater than simple historical accuracy.

As a twice re-founded colony (once by Caesar in 44 BC and once after the earthquake of 77 CE by Vespasian),<sup>27</sup> Corinth served as a prime location for presenting new models which were based on past, respected heritages.<sup>28</sup> The choice of Corinth, then, in addition to its being a historical Hellenic centre, is in itself a marker of the dynamics of affiliation and dismissal in Dio's construction of his identity; an argument which gains more force if indeed this speech belongs in Dio's period of wandering,<sup>29</sup> as it reveals this to have been part of Dio's construction of identity already in process at an early stage.

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<sup>25</sup> Brancacci 2000; Jouan 1993.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Diog. Laërt. 6.77.

<sup>27</sup> Wiseman 1979, 497; 506.

<sup>28</sup> Famously, Favorinus spoke in Corinth in attempt to re-establish his own heritage in it (*Oration 37* in Dio's corpus). It appears that the city was, in life as in literature, a stage on which intellectuals negotiated their identity with rivals and audiences and vied for their acceptance as a model. See: Gleason 1995, 8-20; König 2001; Eshleman 2012, 82-83.

<sup>29</sup> von Arnim 1898, 264; Desideri 1978, 204-5; Jones 1978, 49; Jouan 1993.

Moreover, Corinth was a centre of activity for Paul in the middle of the first century where he addressed the Jewish, Christian, and pagan communities.<sup>30</sup> Gleason, as well as Winter,<sup>31</sup> mark the similarity of discourse between Paul and Favorinus who also spoke there: the former pre-dated Dio whilst the latter succeeded him.<sup>32</sup> Throughout the first century CE and onwards, Corinth was a *locus* (historic and literary) of contention over a plethora of identities – Hellenic and Roman identity, intellectual identity, and religious identity – and audiences were exposed continually to various performances which vied for their attention, respect, and recognition.

Whilst these are all reasons for the importance (and meaning) of Corinth for Dio as an intellectual performer, there are also reasons for the setting that are internal to the narrative. These reasons, as we have seen in our brief glimpse of *Oration* 4, focus on the public nature of the philosopher's place of activity:

ἐώρα γὰρ ὅτι πλεῖστοι ἄνθρωποι ἐκεῖ συνίασι διὰ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰς ἐταίρας, καὶ ὅτι ἡ πόλις ὥσπερ ἐν τριόδῳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἔκειτο  
(For [Diogenes] saw that the greatest number of people gather there because of the harbours and the *hetaerae*, and that the city was situated, as it were, at the triple-junction of Greece, *Or.* 8. 5).

Like its gymnasium, the Craneion we glimpsed in *Oration* 4, Corinth itself functions in the Dionic narrative as a gathering place. The phrase ἐν τριόδῳ appears in Dio once more where it is used to explain the public nature of dramaturgical activity:

θαυμαζόμενοι δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπεχείρουν αὐτοὶ τελεῖν τὸν ὄχλον, τῷ ὄντι βακχείων τινὰς σκηναὶς ἀκαλύπτους πηξάμενοι ἐν τισι τραγικαῖς τριόδοις  
(Admired by the many the dramaturges tried to initiate the mass, in truth constructing open booths for Bacchic rites at a sort of tragic crossroads, *Or.* 36. 35).<sup>33</sup>

Dio, therefore, sets his model philosopher upon the metaphorical crossroads where he can be approached by the many and speak to the masses.

Although the philosopher's haunts where he conducts his activity are public – a notion that is retained throughout the speeches – the mode of philosophising is quite the opposite. Dio portrays it as a dialogue between the philosopher and other individuals. This becomes clear

<sup>30</sup> Judge 1960; Winter 2002, 180–239.

<sup>31</sup> See note above.

<sup>32</sup> Gleason 1995, 16–17 compares Paul's rhetoric in the Corinthian epistles with that of Favorinus in his *Corinthian Oration* (treating both figures as sophists). Paul, of course, succeeded to create his own, Christian, community there, but even that community was still contentious and fractious (Judge 1960, 132; Wiseman 1979, 504–5).

<sup>33</sup> For 'constructing...crossroads', see: Russell 1992, 230 *ad* 35 τῷ ὄντι...τριόδοις.

when we move along with Diogenes from Corinth itself to the Isthmus, where Diogenes παρέσχε δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν τῷ βουλομένῳ ἐντυγχάνειν ('made himself available to anyone who wished to meet with him', 8.7), and engaged in dialogue described in the form of an elenctic exchange of words:

τῶν δὲ ξένων ἦσαν οἱ προσιόντες, καὶ τούτων ἕκαστος βραχὺ τι εἰπὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἀπήει, φοβούμενος τὸν ἔλεγχον

(those who approached [Diogenes] were from among the strangers, and each of them took off after saying or hearing something rather short, fearing from his scrutiny, 8.10)

In fact, even what might be called the 'speech' of Diogenes (§§14-35) is instigated by a discussion with a particular person (πυθομένου δέ τινος εἰ καὶ αὐτός, 8.11), consisting of a question-and-answer dialogue.<sup>34</sup> The 'speech', is simply a longer answer made by Diogenes. Moreover, what brings Diogenes to cut short his long reply is the gathering of a crowd around them, as what was supposed to be a dialogue has turned into a public performance (8.36). We shall revisit this point in the final part of this chapter, to observe that this is where Dio took back control, so to speak, over the speech and returns to his own voice. In doing that, he specifically retains the public nature of Diogenes' philosophy whilst giving up on its dialogue form.

We have already pointed out that this dynamic of affiliation and dismissal is found in the fourth *Kingship* and so it is with the third *Kingship*: a telling point not only about the diachronic nature of this dynamic in Dio's construction of identity,<sup>35</sup> but also in respect to the model. If *Orations* 4 and 8 present Diogenes to the audience, *Oration* 3 introduces the figure of Socrates who is made to appear (*passim*) in the exact same fashion in a dialogue with an unknown interlocutor (πυθομένου τινός, 3.1; ὁ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐρώτημα ἐρωτήσας, 3.30). Here as well, while Socrates is portrayed in conversation with a no-man, and hence any-man in Athens (3.1), Dio himself breaks away from this model in the act of performance itself as he delivers a public speech, or at least provides a text that is meant to be read as one.

Diogenes and Socrates, therefore, are on equal footing regarding Dio's affiliation with and dismissal of them. We have seen how Diogenes was said to be making himself available to all who wished παρέσχε δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν τῷ βουλομένῳ, (8. 7). Just as so, when Socrates'

<sup>34</sup> Note the verbal cues: ἤρετο [...] εἶπε [...] ἤρετο [...] ἔφη [...] ἢ σὺ οἶε (*Or.* 8.11-4). Diogenes embarks on his prolonged answer with the second-person, singular pronoun σύ, which marks the single individual as an interlocutor despite of Diogenes' pontification that reads speech-like.

<sup>35</sup> The 8<sup>th</sup> *Oration* is most likely from the wandering period (see n. 29) whereas the 3<sup>rd</sup> *Oration* is from the time of Trajan: von Arnim 1898, 399; Jones 1978, 119; Desideri 1978, 279 suggested that the addressee is Nerva, but see the response of Moles 1984, and Moles 1990, esp. 360-1. A Trajanic dating, of course, does not necessitate Trajan as an addressee, see: Whitmarsh 2001b, 188 with n. 26 for bibliography on 'narratee'; 325-7.



philosophising method is described, Dio uses the exact same formations: *παρεῖχεν αὐτὸν τοῖς βουλομένοις* (*Or.* 54.3). This appears in a short piece (four chapters overall) in which Socrates' life and activity are portrayed succinctly, mainly in comparison to that of the major sophists of his time. This, as with the case of the sophists from *Oration* 4, was Dio's way of creating that hierarchy between sophists, philosophers, and himself to which we shall return.<sup>36</sup> For the moment, however, we shall keep our focus on the model's nature of philosophical activity:

παρεῖχεν αὐτὸν τοῖς βουλομένοις προσιέναι καὶ διαλέγεσθαι, περὶ τε τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβων καὶ εἰς τὰς παλαίστρας εἰσιὼν καὶ πρὸς ταῖς τραπέζαις καθεζόμενος [...] εἴ τις ἄρα ἐθελήσει πυθέσθαι τι καὶ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν νεωτέρων ἢ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων.

([Socrates] made himself available to those who wished to approach and converse with him, passing most of his time around the agora, going in the wrestling-schools, and sitting beside the money-changers' tables, if perchance it would be the case that someone of the young or the old would wish to ask or to listen to something, *Or.* 54.3).

The same two features repeat themselves in *Oration* 72 where Dio speaks about (his) personal appearance as a philosopher and yet again conflates Socrates and Diogenes. Why is it, he asks, that some people approach those who look like philosophers. It is because:

πυνθανόμενοι καὶ περὶ Σωκράτους ὅτι σοφός τε ἦν καὶ διελέγετο τοῖς προσιοῦσι λόγους φρονίμους, καὶ περὶ Διογένης, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς πρὸς ἅπαντα εὐπόρει λόγου καὶ ἀποκρίσεως.

(they learned about Socrates that he was wise and used to exchange prudent words with those who approached him, and also about Diogenes that he as well abounds in sense and answer in regard to every topic, *Or.* 72. 11).<sup>37</sup>

Time and again, then, we see that Dio's portrayal of his models' manner of philosophy is built around two features: engagement with the general public, by frequenting more popular locations and by making themselves available to all, and dialogue. There is no special designated place for philosophizing, nor is it a single place. The only principle, it seems, is that it should be as public a place as possible. And, whoever wished so could come close to wherever Socrates or Diogenes were making themselves available and hold a conversation with them. Their 'target audience' was tantamount to the entire population of the city and the entire city could serve as their place of activity.

I want to look now at *Oration* 13, perhaps the most important piece of evidence in respect to Dio's self-fashioning as a philosopher. As for the popular element of Socrates' philosophy, it is emphasized to the utmost by the double use of *πασ-* root words, and the recalling of different places of activity:

<sup>36</sup> Fornaro, Amato, and Nesselrath 2009, 110 n. 2.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *Or.* 9.6: ἐδόκει γὰρ ἱκανὸς εἶναι λοιδορῆσαι καὶ τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ἔπος ('for he was known to be prepared to jeer at and reply to those who interrogate him with a word').

οὐδέποτε ἐκεῖνος ἐπαύσατο λέγων, πανταχοῦ τε καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας βοῶν καὶ διατεινόμενος ἐν ταῖς παλαιστραῖς καὶ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐργαστηρίων καὶ κατ' ἀγοράν  
 ([Socrates] never ceased talking, everywhere and towards all he used to cry out and hold forth earnestly to everyone in the wrestling schools, in the Lyceum, at the workshops, and within the agora, *Or.* 13.14).

Much has been said about the use of Socrates as a model in the speech.<sup>38</sup> The visit to the Pythia in Delphi, the Apollonian dictum which Dio received, and the speech, allegedly of Socrates, which Dio embedded within his own, are all crucial and have rightly attracted attention. Yet, regarding the way Dio constructed his own identity as a philosopher, there are three comments which have been overlooked by scholars that are key for our understanding.

Throughout his corpus where Diogenes and Socrates are mentioned, Dio almost never admits to being different from them. It is up for the audience to *read* beyond the words and to note the differences between speaker and *persona*.<sup>39</sup> It is in those three comments in *Oration* 13 that Dio does admit that he is different to his model, Socrates, although he was adopting his words (i.e., wisdom) and mode of philosophy. Read together, these comments almost create a narrative of their own which tells us what kind of a philosopher Dio wanted to appear to be and what kind of a philosopher he ended up being (and, eventually, was forced to fashion himself as such):

οὗτω δὴ παρακελευσάμενος ἑμαυτῷ μήτε δεδιέναι μήτε αἰσχύνεσθαι τὸ πρᾶγμα, στολὴν τε ταπεινὴν ἀναλαβὼν καὶ τᾶλλα κολάσας ἑμαυτὸν ἠλώμην πανταχοῦ. οἱ δὲ ἐντυγχάνοντες ἄνθρωποι ὁρῶντες, οἱ μὲν ἀλήτην, οἱ δὲ πτωχὸν ἐκάλουν, οἱ δὲ τινες καὶ φιλόσοφον. ἐντεῦθεν ἐμοὶ συνέβη κατ' ὀλίγον τε καὶ οὐ βουλευσάμενον αὐτὸν οὐδὲ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ μέγα φρονήσαντα τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυχεῖν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ τῶν καλουμένων φιλοσόφων αὐτοὺς ἀνακηρύττουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Ὀλυμπίασι κήρυκες· ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων λεγόντων οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἀεὶ καὶ πᾶσι διαμάχεσθαι.

(And so, after I encouraged myself not to fear and not be ashamed of the act, I donned a humble cloak, chastised myself in all other respects, and wandered everywhere. And the people who happened to see me, some of them called me a wanderer, some a beggar, and some a philosopher. Hence it came about, little by little and neither of my own volition nor because I had acquired a high opinion of myself, that I acquired this title. For indeed most of those who are so-called philosophers self-proclaim themselves [as such], just as the heralds at the Olympic games. As for

<sup>38</sup> von Arnim 1898, 256–67; Moles 1978, 96–100; Döring 1979, 82–91; Gleason 1995, 153–54; Brancacci 2000, 251–52; Trapp 2000, 231; Verrengia 2000, 88–91; Whitmarsh 2001a, 288–90; Moles 2005; Hunter 2017.

<sup>39</sup> A point that Moles 1978 (99) misunderstood or was, at least, contradictory about (claiming that the audience were less likely to recognise the *persona*; see above in the text). Not so later scholarship, see: Hunter 2017, 264.

me, I had no power always and in all cases to contend with others who were saying [viz. that I was a philosopher], *Or.* 13.10-11).

This is what Dio wanted the audience to understand as his turning point towards philosophy. Sent on a divine mission by Apollo (described in the preceding section), Dio set out into the world and was given the title of ‘philosopher’ by others. Dio refrains from boasting by claiming the title to himself, which would have been an unphilosophical act.<sup>40</sup> There are others who do that, and they are only so-called philosophers (τῶν καλουμένων φιλοσόφων), a phrase which in Dio’s corpus is reserved for false or less adequate philosophers.<sup>41</sup> However, and this is the first comment I want to focus on, there is something off about the metaphor of the Olympic heralds which Dio used to describe those self-proclaiming philosophers.

The heralds, after all, had the task of proclaiming *others* as winners in the Olympic games, so it is an ill-fitting metaphor for those who self-proclaim as philosophers. The heralds are not boastful about their own status but celebrate the achievements of another. This comment (metaphor) was, therefore, either mistaken or, what I believe is more likely in a speaker of Dio’s calibre, was meant to point towards something more. In the construction of his transition into philosophy, Dio wished the audience to see that there are philosophers whose activity in public is akin to the public nature of the Olympic heralds. Like them, they appear and proclaim before the many. The audience, listening to a public speech (as well as the later reader) already understand that Dio is in fact very much like these philosophers. But this is Dio’s *Apology* (conducted in tandem with his Platonic/Socratic model), his explanation of why his philosophy, whilst carried out in public, is presented in the form of a speech instead of in dialogue. He therefore begins his narrative of transition by trying to convince the audience that at first, he was not a public speaker, and that he was true to his Socratic model of philosophy. In other words, this is where Dio creates affiliation with the model.

As his short narrative of transition into philosophy continues, we are confronted with the same notion. Our familiarity with Dio’s language of describing philosophical activity, which takes place in dialogue, enables us to see that this is what Dio tried to do:

πολλοὶ γὰρ ἡρώτων προσιόντες ὃ, τι μοι φαίνοιτο ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν· ὥστε ἡναγκαζόμεν φροντίζειν ὑπὲρ τούτων, ἵνα ἔχοιμι ἀποκρίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν.

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<sup>40</sup> Cf. Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 3.21.23: φιλόσοφον δὲ μηδέποτε εἶπης σεαυτόν. Cf. Desideri 2007, 202; Lauwers 2015, 47.

<sup>41</sup> See: Ch. 1.1: p. 36, n. 36.

(For many approached me asking this: what appeared to me good or bad. I was obligated to think about these concepts, so as to be able to answer my questioners, 13.12).

The language (ἡρώτων προσιόντες; ἀποκρίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν) is that of philosophy conducted through dialogue, as we have noticed in the examples of Socrates and Diogenes and those who approached them in order to ask questions.

It is here that the speech assumes its strong apologetic force, and we move from affiliation towards dismissal. This is the second comment I want to focus on: just as it was others who called him a philosopher, it is now others who ἐκέλευον λέγειν καταστάντα εἰς τὸ κοινόν ('bade me rise up and speak in public', 12), to deliver a λόγος. As far as the transition narrative is constructed, Dio removes his own agency. First, he did not choose, but was unable to deny, the title of philosopher (οὐκ ἐδυνάμην), and then it is the demand of others (ἐκέλευον) that forms his action. At this point, Dio goes into his long 'quotation' of the alleged Socratic speech. This echoes his loss of agency as Dio confesses to ἀπορία (14), which was the reason for his recourse to the words of another. When the part of the embedded speech is finished, the narrative of transition into philosophy continues with a failed attempt to regain agency. This is, of course, a mirror image of what takes place in actuality because Dio now returns to his own voice, and he adduces the third comment I want to focus on in his apologetic narrative. In his wanderings, he says, he came to Rome, where he wished to philosophise:

οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπειρώμην διαλέγεσθαι Ῥωμαίοις, ἐπειδὴ με ἐκάλεσαν καὶ λέγειν ἡξίου, οὐ κατὰ δύο καὶ τρεῖς ἀπολαμβάνων ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ περιπάτοις· οὐ γὰρ ἦν δυνατόν οὕτως ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ πόλει συγγίγνεσθαι· πολλοῖς δὲ καὶ ἀθροίοις εἰς ταὐτὸ συνιοῦσιν ...

(So it was that I too tried to converse [make dialogue] with the Romans, when they summoned me and required me to speak [with them], not taking them separately in twos or threes in wrestling-schools and porticoes – it wasn't possible to associate with people thus in that city – but to many of them all assembled in the same place ..., 13.31).<sup>42</sup>

The constructed image is that of a philosopher who was unable to do as he wished, unable to follow the example of his model. He wanted, so he wished the audience to think, like Socrates, to engage in dialogue with two or three people at a time, in the paradigmatic haunts of philosophy such as the wrestling-schools. Instead, he was forced to speak in front of large gatherings in public places upon request (or due to the conditions of intellectual activity in the contemporary city).<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> For συγγίγνομαι as 'to converse' see: LSJ s.v., II, especially 2: 'of disciples of pupils, hold converse with a master'.

<sup>43</sup> This is noted by Trapp (2014a, 39-40) but not explored further.

Set within the most important speech that we have by Dio about his identity as a philosopher, this small narrative, from the imagery of the public Olympic heralds through the bidding of others to speak in public, to his inability to perform dialogue with private groups, is key to our understanding of this identity. It is an admission (as expected, a sophisticated and elaborate one) of Dio's dismissal of the past model. Like Diogenes and Socrates, for whom it was the whole city that served as a public arena for philosophy, for Dio it is whole cities and crowds that serve as the audience for philosophy. That philosophy should be carried out in public is adopted, and the wisdom of the models is also adopted. Dio, however, (in so many words) admitted that in his own time there was a necessity to have moved away from their dialogue mode into the public speech.<sup>44</sup> He thus retains affiliation with the model whilst still very much presenting himself as an original.<sup>45</sup>

In his dismissal of the dialogue form Dio certainly wanted the audience to see him as an original. I want to claim, however, that even more than that, Dio was a revolutionary. His aim, in constructing his identity as a philosopher, was far higher than establishing himself as the newest model in a long tradition. Dio wanted to establish himself as the best model in that tradition. *Oration 13* is a literary *apology* for his dismissal of his models' mode of philosophising. Yet we need not necessarily believe that there were real situations in which a crowd demanded that Dio speak in public, forbidding him to conduct his philosophy in dialogue form. This conclusion, I believe, Dio came to by himself. What we will see in the next section is that Dio continuously constructed the image of Diogenes and Socrates in a way that made clear that, whilst their wisdom was and still is true, the dialogue form never was, and hence will never be, effective as a mode of philosophy. This construction leaves Dio as the ultimate philosopher. Affiliated with the past whilst better suited for the needs of his time.

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<sup>44</sup> Those who investigate the issue of intellectual identity might find this dynamic between Dio and a demanding audience illustrative of what Hahn called the *Erwartungshorizont*: the 'horizon of expectation' that an audience harbours in relation to the intellectual whose performance they attend. Hahn claimed that an intellectual who wished to be understood as a philosopher had to adapt, in appearance and demeanour, to what the audience had thought a philosopher was, Hahn 1989, 12, 26. Hahn, however, did not stress enough the dynamic between Dio and the audience, and that Dio as an intellectual had agency to try and assert a new, different model to whatever was expected. Cf. Korhonen 1997, 35–36, which sees the process as far more reciprocal. See also: Gleason 1995, 132 who recognises a 'remarkably stable set of social expectations', yet in her review of Hahn criticised the essentialist nature of his thesis. See: Gleason 1991. Zambrini 1994, offered an interesting and, to my view, a correct analysis of Dio's mode of philosophising by looking at *Oration 35*: he pinpointed external circumstance as important (*'obbligato dalle circostanze'*, 60). Like, Hahn, however, the focus is too much on the audience and less on Dio.

<sup>45</sup> Against Moles 1978, 98, who read Dio as trying to avoid admission of originality. Cf. Hunter's points about Dio's updating of his Socrates model or (in respect to the embedded speech) about Dio's integration of a criticism against Socrates in this speech. Two forms of moving away from the classical model towards a more modern, better-suited, one which Dio embodies: Hunter 2017, 256; 263.

### 2.3 The ineffectiveness of past philosophers

The paradox of Dio's relationship with past philosophers is his apparent belief that their wisdom was true, which co-exists with his need to move away from them to embody a new model better suited for the times. To do so, Dio insisted on the ineffectiveness of his models. In presenting Socrates and Diogenes philosophising, especially as it is done in dialogue, Dio consistently demonstrated that they were unable to educate their interlocutors. This insistence allowed him to retain the wisdom itself (affiliation), whilst moving away from the model (dismissal), by intimating that what this wisdom needs is simply the right kind of philosopher for it to be successfully conveyed to others.

This must be understood as an authorial choice of Dio as to how to construct the past, and not a result of received tradition. Let us look at Socrates. We may claim that his ineffectiveness was a literary tradition or even the historical reality: historically, Socrates was put to death by the people of Athens and Plato's *Apology* shows Socrates as in conflict with his fellow citizens. Similarly, if we think of the, so called, aporetic dialogues, where it is more the method that comes out as important rather than any answers (since there are none) to which the reader is led.<sup>46</sup> In Plato and in real life, then, Socrates does not appear as effective at all times. Yet the Socratic tradition is of course richer than this. Xenophon, an important source, well-respected by Dio and familiar to him, famously offered an image of a Socrates who is far more successful in his educational project.<sup>47</sup> Dio could have chosen to work around this model and not to confine himself to the figure of the shunned Socrates. His choice, then, was deliberate. Time and again Dio presented his audience with the failure of his models. This failure suggests the ineffectiveness of the very model which, it appears, should be discarded in favour of what Dio had to offer himself.

When we left *Oration* 8 earlier, it was with what I suggested was Diogenes' long reply in a dialogue he was engaged in with one of the Isthmian Games' spectators. Just as much as Corinth itself was important, in the narrative and outside of it, so are the Isthmus and the games. Dio provides the audience with a tableau of the scene:

καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἦν περὶ τὸν νεὼν τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος ἀκούειν πολλῶν μὲν σοφιστῶν κακοδαιμόνων  
βοῶντων καὶ λοιδορουμένων ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τῶν λεγομένων μαθητῶν ἄλλου ἄλλω μαχομένων,  
πολλῶν δὲ συγγραφέων ἀναγιγνωσκόντων ἀναίσθητα συγγράμματα, πολλῶν δὲ ποιητῶν  
ποιήματα ᾄδόντων, καὶ τούτους ἐπαινούντων ἐτέρων, πολλῶν δὲ θαυμαστοποιῶν θαύματα

<sup>46</sup> Even more so, we could say that the model of the sage who goes unheeded by his peers, the people, or those in power, is a very common one, perhaps even a universal trope. A famous example of this are the Biblical prophets.

<sup>47</sup> Xenophon's *Memorabilia* was, in fact, written to show exactly this: that Socrates was ever beneficial (*Mem.* 1.3.1). Cf. Morrison 2010.

ἐπιδεικνύντων, πολλῶν δὲ τερατοσκόπων τέρατα κρινόντων, μυρίων δὲ ῥητόρων δίκας στρεφόντων, οὐκ ὀλίγων δὲ καπῆλων διακαπηλευόντων ὅτι τύχοιεν ἕκαστος (Moreover, at that time it was possible to hear around the Temple of Poseidon many wretched sophists shouting and abusing each other, their so-called pupils bickering one with another, many writers reading aloud their senseless compositions, many poets reciting their poems and others who praise them, and so also many fairground performers presenting their marvels, many soothsayers delivering their portents, myriads of orators pleading their contorted cases, and plenty of petty-merchants offering for sale whatever each might, 8. 9).

This vivid description seem to reflect a real-time experience, perhaps even going on during the very delivery of Dio's speech; this would suggest, once again, the context in which Dio was active and how he was attempting to situate himself against all forms of contemporary intellectuals as a philosopher and educator.<sup>48</sup> Indeed, we can compare this with the scene described by Dio around him in the Olympic Games in *Oration* 12, to which we shall come back at the end of the chapter. There as well, among the delightful spectacles, there are many things to which one can listen, orators, writers of prose and verse, and, of course, many sophists (πολλούς) and their pupils.<sup>49</sup>

Such then is the scene of intellectual public activity in which Dio locates Diogenes and it is important to keep it in mind with all its shouting, bickering, declaiming, and reciting. What I want to focus on, however, is the sense of Diogenes' ineffectiveness and lack of success which Dio builds as the speech moves forwards, and which is tied up with Diogenes' method of philosophising. The description of intellectual public activity around Diogenes is framed by two such statements:

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔφη παύσειν τοὺς πεισομένους αὐτῷ ἀγνοίας καὶ πονηρίας καὶ ἀκολασίας, οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ προσεῖχεν οὐδὲ ἐκέλευεν ἰᾶσθαι αὐτόν... (When [Diogenes] said that he would bring to end the follies, wickedness, and licentiousness of anyone who would listen to him, none paid attention to him nor asked to be healed by him, 8. 8).

Dio takes care to note Diogenes' surprise (θαυμάζειν, 7) at people's lack of attention towards him. Diogenes, we have noted, came to Corinth and the Isthmus not by chance, but because he saw in the great number of people (6) there an opportunity to be, as a philosopher, a healer of souls. He is not an aloof sage, a hermit in the desert. The picture is that of the philosopher who is removed from people only in his wisdom and customs of life but is still

<sup>48</sup> Winter 2002, 123–24.

<sup>49</sup> ὥς δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς τοσαῦτα μὲν θεάματα ἔχοντες τερπνά, τοσαῦτα δὲ ἀκούσματα, τοῦτο μὲν ῥήτορας δεινούς, τοῦτο δὲ ξυγγραφέας ἡδίστους ἐμμέτρων καὶ ἀμέτρων λόγων, τοῦτο δὲ πολλοὺς σοφιστάς, δόξη καὶ μαθηταῖς ἐπαιρομένους οἷον πτεροῖς (*Or.* 12.5).

integrated in the life of the community as part of his philosophical mission. Being thus ignored by the community points to a failure in the mission.<sup>50</sup>

After the first statement of Diogenes' lack of success, Dio presents us with the scene around Diogenes. This scene, with its strong emphasis on the public nature of other intellectuals' activity and on their great numbers, allows Dio to set in relief Diogenes' singularity and the more private nature of his activity:

εὐθὺς οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ τινες προσῆλθον, τῶν μὲν Κορινθίων οὐδεὶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ᾤοντο οὐδὲν ὠφελήσεσθαι, ὅτι καθ' ἡμέραν ἑώρων αὐτὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ· τῶν δὲ ξένων ἦσαν οἱ προσιόντες, καὶ τούτων ἕκαστος βραχὺ τι εἰπὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἀπήει, φοβούμενος τὸν ἔλεγχον  
(Straightaway, then, a number of people came towards him; none, however, from among the Corinthians for they thought him to be in no way helpful, because they were used to see him every day in Corinth. Those who approached him were from among the strangers, and each one of them fled away after making a brief remark or having one made to him, fearing his scrutiny, 10).

Like those gathered around the other performers, a number of people approach Diogenes. We receive another indication of the philosopher's inability to fulfil his educative, iatric mission through the Corinthians' avoidance of him, and we also learn that it is Diogenes' method that stands in the way of this fulfilment: the elenctic dialogue (note, talking and listening) is what puts his interlocutors to flight.

Finally, and naturally for the purpose of the *Oration*, one person enters a dialogue with Diogenes which allows him, as Dio's mouthpiece, to present his philosophical wisdom. There is a marked shift between the beginning of their talk and the end of it, a shift which makes all the difference in terms of Dio's moving away from the manner in which his models philosophised and towards his own method. For, as mentioned, Diogenes replies with a long answer that takes up about 20 passages of Dio's speech. The last passage, however, is reserved by Dio for his own voice, as he narrates what took place:

ταῦτα δὲ λέγοντος τοῦ Διογένηος, περίσταντο πολλοὶ καὶ πάνυ ἡδέως ἤκροῶντο τῶν λόγων. ἐννοήσας δὲ οἶμαι τὸ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, τοὺς μὲν λόγους ἀφῆκε, χαμαὶ δὲ καθεζόμενος ἐποίει τι τῶν ἀδόξων. εὐθὺς οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ κατεφρόνουν αὐτοῦ καὶ μαίνεσθαι ἔφασαν, καὶ πάλιν ἐθορύβουν σοφισταί, καθάπερ ἐν τέλματι βάτραχοι τὸν ὕδρον οὐχ ὁρῶντες  
(As Diogenes said these things, many people stood around him and listened with much pleasure to his words. Having just thought of the Heracleian deed [of cleaning the Augean stables], I believe, he stopped his talk and, crouching on the ground, performed an indecent act. Then immediately the crowds despised him and were saying that he was crazy, and the sophists raised their clamour once more, just like frogs in a pond that do not see the water snake, 36).

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<sup>50</sup> On this see: Malherbe 1989, 16–23; Trapp 2007a, 214–15.



What started as a dialogue, then, ended up as a speech and Dio engineered this shift to be the reason for Diogenes quitting. When Diogenes realized, by looking around, that he's just another public performer among many rather than the philosopher he perceived himself to be, he cuts his speech off, and in the most Cynic of ways, by defecating on the ground. The crowd is repulsed and disperses, and if Diogenes had any success in passing on some philosophical wisdom while speaking, their marked disgust seems to undo it. The sophists then take control over the scene and Diogenes, we can say, has failed to transmit his message.

However, Dio's speech – which was a public performance in the form of an oration to begin with – does not end with Diogenes' abrupt stop. Dio, after all, narrates this part, assuming for the last passage his own voice, and thus, unlike Diogenes, is left to contend with the sophists around him. This he himself does in a sophisticated way. Whitmarsh argued that the water-snake remark contains within it no less than three allusions, two Platonic (*Phd.* 109b and *Th.* 161d) and one Aesopic (92<sup>nd</sup> *Fable*).<sup>51</sup> Literary allusions, of course, are markers of *paideia*. Dio then not only reclaims his own voice but signals how the end of the speech completes his dismissal of Diogenes, his model, whose Cynicism renounced high education. Dio's philosophy is capable of offering more. He taps into Diogenes' philosophical wisdom (virtue, athletic versus ethic) but in a way that does not alienate the audience.

The allusions, moreover, carry over meaning from the text alluded, marking the failure of Diogenes even more strongly. The Platonic allusions speak to the conflict between philosophers and sophists and present the superiority of the former group over the latter.<sup>52</sup> The Aesopic allusion, however, goes one step further and reveals Dio's belief in his own superiority over Diogenes.<sup>53</sup> In the fable of Aesop, a viper kills a water-snake and the frogs, for whom the water-snake is an enemy, encourage the viper. The viper then reproves the frogs for merely encouraging by singing instead of actively helping him in the battle. Now, if the sophists are the helpless frogs, unable really to confront the water-snake, Diogenes, then Dio is the viper and the sole person to emerge victorious from this encounter (from his speech). Diogenes was good for his time, yet he must be removed now and clear the space for a new kind of philosopher who is more viper-like.

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<sup>51</sup> Whitmarsh 2018: 'The Hair of the Dog: Reading Dio's Diogenes Orations', an unpublished paper presented in a conference on Dio held at the Department of Classics, New York University in April 2018. I am thankful for Prof. Whitmarsh for sharing with me the text of his paper.

<sup>52</sup> In the *Phaedo*, the frogs and ants that sit around the 'pond' mark the people living around the Mediterranean, that is they are small and insignificant and so are the sophists. In the *Theaetetus*, Socrates mocks Protagoras' logic as basically leading to the conclusion that people's reasoning is as good as that of frogs.

<sup>53</sup> I am in debt, once more, to Whitmarsh's paper.

To be sure, this is not a single incident of a model's ineffectiveness, and it also cannot be explained by Diogenes' decision to quit his philosophising (because he found out that the crowd is enjoying his words). From the moment (in the speech) Diogenes leaves Athens, as we have seen, Dio describes his entire philosophical enterprise as a failed one, even though Diogenes, it is said, very much wanted to help people. *Oration* 8, then, was constructed so that on the one hand it retains the wisdom of the Cynic philosopher as valuable and worthy of transmission, and especially more valuable than whatever the sophists could produce, which is mere frog-like croaking. On the other hand, the speech presents Dio as a different kind of philosopher from his Cynic model. Not only have we moved away from the dialogue form into public speech, but we have also moved away from the under-cultivated, simple, uneducated philosophy of the Cynics. Dio's philosophy is transmitted through rhetoric that was intricate and highly literary, and, not less important, accessible and persuasive – an instrument for success in the public sphere.

*Oration* 9, similar in premise to that of 8, strikes a similar note. Diogenes is portrayed as mostly shunned or mocked by those who attended the games. The Corinthians, like those in *Or.* 8, avoid him because they know him from his time there (4), and others who did come to engage with him (if not for mocking him), run away immediately or talk with him with no intention of benefitting from him.<sup>54</sup> The penultimate section is a rare moment in which the philosopher actually manages to influence others who are not philosophers themselves. In speaking with one of the winners Diogenes belittles the importance of athletic achievement in comparison to victory over fear, pleasure, and other vices.

Τοιαῦτα δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον διαλεγόμενος πολλοὺς ἐποίησε τῶν παρόντων καταφρονῆσαι τοῦ πράγματος κἀκεῖνον αὐτὸν λυπούμενον ἀπελθεῖν καὶ πολὺ ταπεινότερον. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ μικρὸν παρεῖχε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅποτε ἴδοι τινὰ μάτην ἐπαιρόμενον καὶ διὰ πρᾶγμα οὐδενὸς ἄξιον ἔξω τοῦ φρονεῖν, συστεύλας ἐπὶ βραχὺ καὶ ἀφελὼν μικρὸν τι τῆς ἀνοίας, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ πεφουσημένα καὶ οἰδοῦντα νύξαντες ἢ σείσαντες.

(By saying such things to the man, he caused many of those present to look down on [athletic achievement] and [he caused] the man himself to take off vexed and much humbled. And this was not a small service that he provided to people, that whenever he saw someone elated for no reason or out of his mind due to some worthless matter, he would humble [him] for a short time

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<sup>54</sup> τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οἱ μακρόθεν μάλιστα προσήεσαν πρὸς αὐτόν...οὔτοι δὲ πάντες ἰδεῖν βουλόμενοι μᾶλλον αὐτὸν καὶ βραχὺ τι ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος, ὥς ἔχοιεν ἀπαγγέλλειν ἑτέροις ἢ βελτίους γενέσθαι ('As for others, those from far, far away approached him...in fact all of these wanted to see him and to listen to him say something short so that they could tell others more than so they could become better men', 9. 5).

and take away something of his stupidity, just as those who puncture and shake puffed and swollen things, 9. 21).

However, between the extensive description of those who mocked and shunned Diogenes (4-10) and the following, last section, this moment of success is a fleeting one.

In the next paragraph Diogenes carries on his mocking of the athletic institution when he crowns a horse as a winner in a kicking competition against another horse (22). This elicits laughter from the crowd and their mockery of the athletes. This is where Dio's speech ends. It is unclear if Dio capped the speech in a manner akin to that of *Oration* 8.<sup>55</sup> Yet although the crowd approves of Diogenes' action, this should not be taken as a mark of success. Firstly, because Diogenes, as we already saw, is not supposed to entertain and trigger enjoyment in his audience. Secondly, because it is in this speech itself that this kind of reaction on the side of the crowd (gloating and rejoicing over the folly of another) is marked by Dio as a sign of people's inability to truly take to heart Diogenes' words. They failed to understand that their folly is the same, and at the moment Diogenes' frank words were directed at them they fled away (7).

We might say that this failure of the philosopher has to do specifically with Cynicism. Why should people listen to a man who flouts social norms to such extremes? Yet in fact, as we shall now see, this applies to Socrates as well and to how Dio depicts the philosophy of the past in general.

*On Socrates* (*Or.* 54) is a short piece of unknown date in which Dio presents Socrates in a nutshell and sets him and his *sophia* against the sophists. It is most likely that this speech was an introduction to a longer oration presented by Dio in a public setting and most likely in proximity to other public performers and intellectuals.<sup>56</sup> We should bear in mind, therefore, that Socrates serves as a model for Dio, although a contested one, whereas standing for the contemporary sophists of Dio, we find Hippias, Gorgias, Polus, and Prodicus, with whom Dio opens the speech.

Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλεῖος καὶ Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ Πῶλος καὶ Πρόδικος οἱ σοφισταὶ χρόνον τινὰ ἤνθησαν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι καὶ θαυμαστῆς ἐτύγχανον φήμης, οὐ μόνον ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ καὶ παρ' Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ χρήματα πολλὰ συνέλεξαν, δημοσίᾳ τε παρὰ τῶν πόλεων καὶ παρὰ δυναστῶν τινῶν καὶ βασιλέων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν, ὥς ἕκαστος ἔχοι δυνάμεως.

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<sup>55</sup> In fact, Brancacci underlines the ample similarities between *Orations* 8 and 9 and there is no reason to believe that they would differ specifically on the tone of the ending, see: Brancacci 1980, 119–22.

<sup>56</sup> Fornaro 2009a, 6.

ἔλεγον δὲ πολλοὺς μὲν λόγους, νοῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔχοντας οὐδὲ βραχύν· ἀφ' ὧν ἔστιν, οἶμαι, χρήματα πορίζειν καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἡλιθίους ἀρέσκειν.

(Hippias of Elis, Gorgias of Leontini, Polus, and Prodicus the sophists flourished for a while in Greece and had marvellous fame, not just in any cities but even in Sparta and among the Athenians. They made great fortune, each according to his ability, from the public and from cities, potentates, kings, and private people. But although they used to make many speeches, these had no sense, not even a little. Rather, speeches of the kind, I think, by which they could make money and please foolish people, 54. 1).

With such an opening, the question of intellectual success can almost be said to be flagged as the topic of the speech, and it is measured by number and status of listeners as well as by number of speeches, and their coherence, i.e., having νοῦς in one's words. The sophists were successful but lacked reason. Socrates, on the other hand:

ἦν δὲ τᾶλλα τῷ τρόπῳ κοινὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος, καὶ παρεῖχεν αὐτὸν τοῖς βουλομένοις προσιέναι καὶ διαλέγεσθαι, περί τε τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβων καὶ εἰς τὰς παλαίστρας εἰσιὼν καὶ πρὸς ταῖς τραπέζαις καθεζόμενος [...] εἴ τις ἄρα ἐθελήσει πυθέσθαι τι καὶ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν νεωτέρων ἢ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων.

(He was in general sociable and a lover of man, and he made himself available to those who wished to come and converse with him, passing most of his time around the market-place, going into the wrestling schools, or sitting by the tables of the money-changers [...] in case someone, from among the young and the old, might wish to ask or listen to something, 3).

Socrates' amiability, however, and his willingness to enter dialogue with whomever so wished, serve only to mark the difference between his desire to help by philosophising and his inability to do so: οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ ῥητόρων προσεποιοῦντο μηδὲ ὁρᾶν αὐτόν ('Now, the majority of the potentates and orators were pretending not to see him', 54.3). When someone did approach, as with Diogenes, that person quickly backed off in pain, like people who stumble upon something (ὁ δὲ προσελθὼν, ὥσπερ οἱ προσπταίσαντες, ἀλγίσας ταχὺ ἀπηλλάττετο, *ibid.*). So, whereas the sophists garnered acclaim from whole cities and kings, Socrates was either ignored or avoided as a nuisance.

Interestingly, when we compare Dio's text to that of Plato's *Apology of Socrates*, from which, it appears, Dio had taken the description, we can see that Dio marked Socrates not only as less successful than the sophists of his time, but as failing even in comparison with his Platonic forerunner:

ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου δι' ὧν περ εἶωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοι...

(‘if you will hear me speaking in the same words in which I used to speak both in the agora besides the money-dealers’ tables, where many of you heard me, and in other places’, Pl. *Ap.* 17c7-9).

Where Plato chose to let Socrates be heard by many men (ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι), Dio chose to mention Socrates’ failure to receive the attention of anyone of importance.

With Socrates thus set against the sophists, Dio returns to that group and to what seems to be the second issue he flagged at the beginning: the intrinsic value of their speeches, or actually their lack thereof. We recall that their speeches had no νοῦς and that they were meant to entertain fools. Now Dio says that although they were successful, unlike the words of Socrates, the sophists’ speeches have perished and all we have left of the sophists is their name (54. 4). Similarly, Dio comments on the fortune of Socrates’ words:

οἱ δὲ τοῦ Σωκράτους οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως διαμένουσι καὶ διαμενοῦσι τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, \*τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ γράψαντος ἢ καταλιπόντος οὔτε σύγγραμμα οὔτε διαθήκας. ἐτελεύτα γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀδιάθετος τὴν τε σοφίαν καὶ τὰ χρήματα. ἀλλὰ οὐσίαν μὲν οὐκ εἶχεν, ὥστε δημευθῆναι, καθάπερ εἶωθε γίνεσθαι <ἐπὶ> τῶν καταδικασθέντων· οἱ λόγοι δὲ τῷ ὄντι ἐδημεύθησαν μὰ Δί’ οὐχ ὑπ’ ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων· οὐδὲν μέντοι ἦττον καὶ νῦν φανερῶν τε ὄντων καὶ τιμωμένων ὀλίγοι ξυνιᾶσι καὶ μετέχουσιν.

(Somehow or other the words of Socrates survived and will survive to eternity, --- when he himself wrote or left neither text nor will. In fact, the man died intestate in respect to both his wisdom and his property. Yet property that could be declared public, as was the custom in the case of the condemned, he did not have. His words, however, in truth were made public property not by his enemies, but rather by his friends. And nevertheless, even though they are now well-known now and even respected, few people understand them and have a share in them, 4).

But, what to do with the longevity of Socrates’ wisdom? Whereas the speeches of the sophists appear to have been lost due to their vapidness, and the longevity of Socrates’ words and wisdom seem then to laud him, in the long run, as more successful on both counts, this is not the picture that Dio paints. First, we note Dio’s comment on how incredible it is that Socrates’ wisdom even survived to his day (οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως). What is more, should an audience or a reader jump to the conclusion that they survived because unlike the Sophists’ speeches they are sensible, Dio quickly qualifies this: οὐδὲν μέντοι ἦττον καὶ νῦν φανερῶν τε ὄντων καὶ

τιμωμένων ὀλίγοι ξυνιᾶσι καὶ μετέχουσιν (‘although [the words of Socrates] are now known not to a few and are respected, only few understand them and share their wisdom’, 4).

These are the last words of this short speech. The last passage, then, advances a number of arguments: while it is a good thing that we have Socrates’ wisdom, it is by mere chance that we do (as he says, οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως), and that is not due to Socrates’ own activity but that of his friends. Had it been left, however, solely to what Socrates’ friends transmitted, then the words themselves may have lasted forever, but they would also have remained unintelligible to the majority, just as in Socrates’ time. All his friends could do was to improve on his failure and make his words available, famous, and respected. This respect, however, has nothing to do with intelligibility, since only a few understand them. What could make them intelligible, it follows, is an interpreter. Someone who does partake of their wisdom. Someone, clearly, like Dio who is able to bring all this before an audience.

We can safely assume that the speech which followed this short piece was full of philosophical content associated with Socrates, perhaps one of Dio’s speeches in which he admonishes a community for ignoring life’s important values and virtues and reminds them of the downfall such a lifestyle brought upon others, like the Athenians who did not listen to Socrates. Read in this way, *Oration* 54 presents Dio as able to salvage the wisdom of Socrates, something Socrates himself (and his followers) failed to do. It marks him out as a better educator and guide than other intellectuals, such as the sophists, through demonstrating the superiority of Socrates to them and associating himself with Socrates, yet it also positions Dio as an intellectual better suited than Socrates to deliver Socratic wisdom. Importantly, Dio was not unique in that. His near contemporary, Maximus of Tyre, suggests the same need of an interpreter for the Platonic text.<sup>57</sup> To suggest that he, Dio, is the right philosopher for the job is to locate himself in the middle of the *agon* over intellectual superiority which, as we can see, he entered time and again against all kinds of intellectuals (past and present).

Throughout his *Orations*, Diogenes and Socrates fail to fulfil their role as philosophers. What I want to argue now, however, is that it was not simply these particular individual models that Dio was leaving behind, but rather that he questioned the efficacy of the philosophy of the classical past as a whole – to contrast it, of course, with his own mode of philosophy and his own ability to be helpful.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Trapp 1997, xxii.

<sup>58</sup> For more instances of failures in Dio’s corpus see: *Or.* 33. 9-10, both the comic poets and Socrates chastised the Athenians, only the former were endured; *Orr.* 47. 7 and 51. 7-8, where Socrates is unheeded by the Athenians.

In *Oration 72*, which is concerned with the outward appearance of philosophers (and its social role/impacts), Dio brings Socrates and Diogenes together as paradigmatic of all philosophers.<sup>59</sup> When someone, in Dio's days, on account of his humble garb, is recognized as a philosopher, people either harass him (1–10), or they come to him, approximating him to Socrates or Diogenes, expecting to hear some words of wisdom:

πυνθανόμενοι καὶ περὶ Σωκράτους, ὅτι σοφός τε ἦν καὶ διελέγετο τοῖς προσιοῦσι λόγους φρονίμους, καὶ περὶ Διογένης, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς πρὸς ἅπαντα εὐπόρει λόγου καὶ ἀποκρίσεως.  
([because] they learned about Socrates that he was wise and used to exchange wise words with those who approached him, and about Diogenes that he as well was ready for everything with a word or and an answer, 11).

This then leads Dio to say that people still remember the sayings of Diogenes (we remember that familiarity is no sign of understanding), which brings to Dio's mind the sayings of the Seven Sages, and of Aesop who, finally, allows Dio to bring in the fable of the owl to which we shall shortly return (12–13). By bringing in Aesop, Dio begins to touch upon the idea of the philosopher's efficacy:

εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ καὶ τὸν Αἰσώπον οἶοντα τοιοῦτόν τινα γενέσθαι, σοφὸν μὲν καὶ φρόνιμον, αἰμύλον δὲ ἄλλως καὶ ξυνθεῖναι λόγους ἱκανόν, οἷον <οἱ> ἄνθρωποι ἥδιστ' ἂν ἀκούοιεν. καὶ τυχὸν <οὐ> παντάπασι ψευδῇ οἶοντα καὶ τῷ ὄντι Αἰσώπος τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπειρᾶτο νουθετεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἐπιδεικνύναι αὐτοῖς ἅττα ἀμαρτάνουσιν, ὥς ἂν μάλιστα ἠνείχοντο αὐτόν, ἠδόμενοι ἐπὶ τῷ γελοίῳ καὶ τοῖς μύθοις· ὥσπερ τὰ παιδιά ταῖς τίτθαις μυθολογουμέναις προσέχουσί τε καὶ ἤδονται.

(and there are some who also think that Aesop was such a man, wise and sensible, and in general wily and suited to compose stories, of the kind people might particularly (ἥδιστα) enjoy listening to. And perhaps, their thought is not entirely erroneous and, in truth, Aesop did attempt to admonish people in whatever way they were most likely to put up with him and to show them whatsoever they were failing in, so that they will put up with him as much as possible, enjoying the joke and the fables. Just as children too pay attention to their wet-nurses telling them fables and enjoy it, 13).

When Dio explained why people harass philosophers, one reason he provided was that upon seeing a philosopher, people immediately think that they are about to be reproved for their faulty nature. Hence:

οὐκ οὐκ δύνανται ἡδέως ὁρᾶν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ προσκρούουσι καὶ διαμάχονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες ἡδέως ὁρᾶν δύνανται οὐς ἂν ἴδωσι παιδαγωγῶν σχῆμα ἔχοντας...

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<sup>59</sup> Or at least of all philosophers whose personal appearance is the simple, ragged, and shaggy-haired one.

(they are not capable of looking at [philosophers] with pleasure, but instead they collide and fight [with them], just as children are incapable of looking with pleasure at people whom they might see having the look of pedagogues..., 10).

We can see that Aesop succeeds where philosophers fail. He was able to admonish people and to make them think of their faulty ways since people listened to him and to his fables with pleasure (ἡδόμενοι), which is exactly what they cannot do with philosophers (ἡδέως ὁρᾶν αὐτούς). It is the nature of philosophical activity, then and at the time of Dio (but not of Dio's activity), to be unpleasant to the audiences, and this is marked here as a reason for its failure.<sup>60</sup>

We now come to the fable of the owl itself. The fable is introduced because it is akin to Dio's contemporary situation. Like the birds which come to the owl in order to hear some of its wisdom, so do some people come to these men they associate with past philosophers on account of their external appearance. The birds in the fable try to convince the owl to move from its urban habitat to the trees like the rest of them (ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτά, 14). The owl refuses and moreover, warns the rest of the birds not to move their nests to the oak, on which they planned to settle, because of its mistletoe which brings ruin to winged creatures (πιτηνοῖς ὀλεθρον, 14). The birds, however, do not heed the owl and do the exact opposite (τὸναντίον, 15), which is why they are so easily caught by men. Repenting their behaviour, the birds, still today (καὶ νῦν, 15), admire the wisdom of the owl and they come to it for advice. Yet this is for naught:

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαία γλαυξ τῷ ὄντι φρονίμη τε ἦν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἐδύνατο. αἱ δὲ νῦν μόνον τὰ πτερὰ ἔχουσιν ἐκείνης καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τὸ ράμφος, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀφρονέστεραί εἰσι τῶν ἄλλων ὀρνέων. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἑαυτὰς δύνανται οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖν.

(For whereas the ancient owl was indeed sensible and was capable of counselling, the owls of today merely have the same feathers, eyes, and beaks as the former, and in all other respects they are more mindless than the rest of the birds. That is why they are incapable of even helping themselves, 15).

The lesson is, supposedly, clear, as Dio explicitly says: exactly like this, we today resemble Socrates and Diogenes only in our appearances, but in our wisdom, we are far removed from them. Yet explicit and implicit content are antithetical. The owl in the fable

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<sup>60</sup> Epictetus is famous for his idea that the study of philosophy is a harsh exercise out of which one should come out as if left the physician's clinic (ιατρεῖόν ἐστιν, ἄνδρες, τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου σχολεῖον· οὐ δεῖ ἡσθέντας ἐξελθεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀλγήσαντας, 'The lecture hall of the philosopher, men, is a clinic. People ought not walk out in pleasure, but in suffering', Arr. *Epict. Diss.* 3.23.30), see: Lauwers 2015, 61–63.



plays a double role: it is both philosophers and philosophy of old and of Dio's time. Interestingly, it fails in both these roles. In its past, as a Socrates or Diogenes-like philosopher who is unique,<sup>61</sup> the wisdom of the owl is unheeded, and those who do not heed it pay a penalty. In the present, the owl is simply unable to offer philosophical help (ὠφελεῖν).

As often, Dio displays here both irony and self-deprecation. Yet the reason for philosophy today being incapable of giving help reveals something more.

Supposedly philosophy today does not match the standard of past philosophy, just as the owls today are in fact more mindless than the rest of the birds. Yet if for a moment we assume that it did, would it change anything? The answer, it appears, is no. This is because, as we have seen, already in the past it was ineffectual. The real reason why philosophy in Dio's time is ineffective is precisely because it tries to model itself on philosophers like Diogenes and Socrates. Contemporary philosophers do not understand that this model is irrelevant for the time. Dio marks this irrelevancy through adopting the method of Aesop, however (read, because) he was not a philosopher,<sup>62</sup> and by emphasizing time and again the failure of past philosophers, leaves the audience to understand that there is need of something new.

Famously, in *Or.* 12 Dio makes use of the fable of the owl in a similar way. Here too Dio turns to the fable as a foil for the inability of contemporary philosophy to be helpful. Three times the owl warns the birds of different dangers and they do not heed it, and now, when its wisdom is recognized, the owl can only wail (12. 7-8) – past philosophy has gone mute and it is irrelevant to try and model ourselves after it, we can only *appear* like it. Instead, Dio provides what past philosophers could not. Not merely conveying this specific (if only implicit) lesson through the choice of Aesop and fables over a more old-fashioned philosophical way, but also doing so in preparation for a speech about the conception of god, and about art and aesthetics. Dio undermines the model of the past in order to embody a new model of a philosopher, who

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<sup>61</sup> The owl uniqueness is expressed through its unwillingness to move its habitat to the trees in general and only specifically to the oak.

<sup>62</sup> Note that in the narrative Aesop is removed by two degrees from Socrates and Diogenes. Once, in that he follows the Seven Sages who come after these two in the narrative, and then because he is not even wholly equated with them: εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ καὶ τὸν Αἰσώπων οἶονταί τοιοῦτόν τινα γενέσθαι ('There are *some* who *think* that Aesop was *such* a man', 72.13).

is more educated, more sophisticated, and more suitable for fighting over the hearts of his contemporaries in the new intellectual climate he was living in.<sup>63</sup>

I have argued in this chapter that like other intellectuals of his time, Dio looked to the past as a model for inspiration and intellectual authority. That in Socrates, Diogenes, and the philosophy they represented Dio found a model for a public intellectual who understood his role as situated in the middle of society, to which he is supposed to offer his wisdom. A wisdom which Dio also borrows from his models. I have also argued, however, that in accord with the same *Zeitgeist*, Dio was also constructing the past to suit his own needs and across his works Dio dismissed the very same model. Dialogue was no longer suitable if one wanted to contend successfully in the public sphere, where entertainment – some of it even making the claims for being educative and enlightening as we saw in Chapter 1 – ruled firmly. Dio constructed an image of ineffective, past philosophers, who failed to educate and whose wisdom has merit but needs to be conveyed in a different way and newly interpreted for it to be understood by the many and indeed to be of any help.

With this understanding of Dio and the cultural climate in which he was active, our next chapters will look into the ways in which Dio utilised his identity as a philosopher in the civic, public spaces where, by philosophical declamations, he sought to intervene in the lives of Greek communities around him, attempting to locate himself at the top of the intellectual pyramid as a prime educator.

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Two further notes. First, on dialogue: readers familiar with Dio's corpus will rightly ask about the 16/7 *Discourses* of Dio that indeed are not set in the form of a speech but as a dialogue between figures. It is undeniable that Dio dabbled in this literary genre, although it was not his primary medium (they are much fewer than those *Discourses* the delivery of which we can safely set in time and place – especially when we add to them texts that are presented in an

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<sup>63</sup> Cf. Lauwers 2015, 50 for the effect of the speech on the audience: 'Therefore, even if Dio's own discourse seems to portray him as a humble figure surprised at his own success, young or older men in search of intellectual instruction could glance at the intent faces of their fellow listeners and be persuaded to realize their socio-cultural aspirations in the same fashion as the speaker in front of them demonstrates. The actual rhetorical situation thus adds an extra element of persuasion that the owl's ethos and paradigm is rather to be imitated than those of the self-inflated peacocks'. Dio leads the audience to believe that his message can guide them towards success in society. What Lauwers fails to notice, however, is that this is not only in contrast to the peacock-like sophists, but also to the philosophers of old.

oration form, even if we cannot now locate their performance).<sup>64</sup> Certainly, Dio's versatility was and is part of his allure and charm for the modern reader. How, though, do those dialogues fit with the arguments espoused in this chapter?

Von Arnim suggested that the dialogues stem from Dio's time in exile.<sup>65</sup> I would like to suggest that they are a relic of Dio's form of teaching at the time of wandering, which he decided to set to writing. Unless by archaeological or archival miracle we obtain new texts by Dio, securely assigned to a time prior to his wandering period that are in the form of public speech, this theory cannot be corroborated or disproven. This, then, is a hypothesis: at first, as we have seen Dio claim in the 13<sup>th</sup> *Oration*, Dio wanted to teach like his models, to conduct dialogues in small groups of twos and threes. Only with time during his travels did this become impossible due to demands and pressures, which we have discussed in Chapter 1, and which Dio described in *Oration* 13 as a demand that he speak in public. Dio understood this need to move away from dialogue if he wished to achieve more than the teaching of individuals and make a larger impact on society.

Importantly, however, for the purposes of this thesis, it matters not whether this hypothesis is valid, or whether this set of texts stemmed from the wandering years or after them. Unless we imagine that these were somehow performed in public, in some kind of theatrical form in which Dio and an interlocutor exchange words – rehearsed to a certain extent – then these texts have little place in an analysis of Dio's public activity and *persona*. I am not familiar with any argument that these dialogues were performed. I can imagine Dio setting students of his to read and in a way perform a Platonic dialogue, and perhaps even a dialogue of his own. Yet this would take place away from the public's eye and, again, would have had no part in Dio's fashioning of his identity as a public philosopher.

A few words on exemplarity. Recent years have seen a rise in the study of the subject, especially in the Roman context. Recently, Roller (2018) provided a model for the formation of *exempla*, understood – simply put – as an action from the past commemorated as a model for behaviour to imitate or to avoid. *Exempla*, according to Roller, are formed in a cycle

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<sup>64</sup> The majority of Dio works are presented in speech form. Other than those presented as dialogues (see note below), we have several 'odd' *Discourses* which are neither and possibly 4 or 5 letters: *Or.* 18 is presumed to be a letter; *Or.* 52, essentially a piece of literary criticism, might also be a letter (there is something personal in the way Dio begins by describing his morning routine, cf. Pliny *Ep.* 36); and *Or.* 59 is a prose paraphrase of Euripides' *Philoctetes*. There are five letters which traditionally were ascribed to Dio (as they appear now in the Loeb fifth volume of Dio edited by H. Lamar Crosby, only the first two and the last one are thought to be authentic). The manuscript contains the names of the addressees as the title of each letter, see: Jones 2015. The rest of the extant corpus is constituted only of speeches.

<sup>65</sup> See: von Arnim notes (*passim*) on *Orr.* 14, 15, 21, 23, 25, 26, 30, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 67, 70, 74, and 77/8.

consisting of action: an act embodying a value shared by its witness (such as martial virtue); evaluation: a value judgment of the action's significance to the community; commemoration: the recording of the action and its evaluation via one or more monuments (e.g., text or plastic art); and lastly, norm-setting: 'primary' and 'secondary' audiences are invited to accept the action as normative. This cycle, Roller states, is always contested as actors and witnesses consistently look to past cycles and towards future ones, with actors always trying to surpass past performances, aware of themselves as setting an example for future actors and the witnesses aware of their role as judges and standard-makers.<sup>66</sup>

Whilst there can be parallels between this model (with its examples) and my analysis of Dio's use of his philosophical models, I have not analysed them in light of *exempla* theory. This is because I believe that the case of Dio and the philosophers is not as straightforward as the model suggests. First, we consider Roller's cycle: Socrates and Diogenes performed philosophy in public. This was not witnessed by a community of shared values and was evaluated in two ways (I am using Socrates here for the sake of clarity but the same is true for Diogenes): philosophy was evaluated both as beneficial to its students (e.g., by Plato and Xenophon) or as harmful to them and to the community (e.g., by Aristophanes). The commemoration of their action was, therefore twofold as well, varying between authors and in the case of Socrates, between authors and community (and I take here Socrates' trial and execution sentence as a monument in Roller's terms, 'disseminating knowledge of the action and its ascribed value' to "secondary" audiences').<sup>67</sup> Naturally, then, audiences were invited to accept the actions of the philosophers as a standard of both positive and negative behaviour. Thus, to begin with, the question of philosophical *exempla* proves problematic for analysis because philosophy inherently differs in its values from those of the community in which it is performed.<sup>68</sup>

When we try to insert Dio into this model matters become complicated still. Certainly, Dio was among those who sought themselves to adopt philosophical models. However, although we can say that Dio evaluated the quality of his models' behaviour as positive, that is their moral chastisement of their peers he deemed beneficial to the community, the manner of their action he evaluated as negative: it was ineffective. This, then, is not even a simple case of negative *exemplum*, when an action is judged as a model of behaviour not to be copied because

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<sup>66</sup> M. B. Roller 2018, 4-9.

<sup>67</sup> Roller 2018, 7.

<sup>68</sup> Morrison 2010, 208; Trapp 2014b, 53-54.

it is not beneficial to the community.<sup>69</sup> Rebecca Langlands (2018) had shown that Roman authors, at least, were not baffled by an act of supposed ambiguous value and even highlighted it.<sup>70</sup> But the examples she provided prove that the case of Dio is different. First, because the ambiguity of the Roman *exempla* always plays out within the context of a community of shared values – which is not the case with philosophy. Second, because the ambiguity stems from a supposed or actual conflict between two accepted values (such as the duty of a military officer to punish insubordination by death and the duty of a father to spare the life of his son). The values of the philosophical model are never set against other values by Dio. The conflict is not ethical at all but revolves around modes of discourse. Dio, at least, never claims that philosophising in dialogue or in public speech was an ethical choice.

In respect to that last point, Dio, as I claimed, certainly tried to surpass the models (a part, as we have seen, of Roller's model), but not in respect to their ethical lesson – trying to show that he has an improved lesson to teach like a soldier trying to prove that he can commit an even braver act than a predecessor. Dio's attempt to surpass the model was in the field of dissemination. In this regard, he competed with his models on the same field he competed with contemporary philosophers, he agreed with their teachings but criticised their avoidance from public activity.

Lastly, there is the question of purpose. *Exempla* are meant to be imitated and the focus on a single action is therefore important. When we take philosophising, or in fact living the life of a philosopher as that action, the possibility of emulation becomes greatly circumscribed. An Epictetus could have encouraged students to imitate the Socratic way of life. Dio could have imitated elements or all of it (if he so wished), but he could not encourage, and he never seems to try to encourage an entire community to imitate this way of life. I argue in this thesis that Dio made use of his identity as a philosopher in order to act in the civic, political space. We will see in Chapter 4 that a part of this meant encouraging communities to adopt philosophical guidelines in their lives and in Chapter 5 that Dio tried to encourage philosophers to be active, like him, in civic space. Neither of these are tantamount to encouraging an audience to imitate the life of Socrates.

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<sup>69</sup> Roller 2018, 6, 95-133.

<sup>70</sup> Langlands 2018, 291-335.

## Chapter 3 – A philosopher at home

### 3.1 Exile and authority in Dionic studies

Philostratus, famously, questioned the nature of Dio's period of wandering, concluding that he could not call it exile (*VS*, 488).<sup>1</sup> From the earliest critical examinations of Dio's life, his period as a wanderer has always been a matter for debate.<sup>2</sup> Since Dio himself, as discussed earlier, tied his intellectual identity as a philosopher to this period of wandering, it is not surprising that readers, ancient and modern, have often focused on, and structured their analysis of, Dio in terms of the exilic question.<sup>3</sup> In the past four decades, with the growing emphasis on literary readings and analysis of Dio's rhetoric,<sup>4</sup> scholars have paid much less attention to the question of the wandering period's historicity and much more to Dio's own constructed narrative of this period as part of his intellectual identity, and to what he aimed to achieve with this narrative.<sup>5</sup> This is the line of argument that this chapter will take: that by presenting himself as a philosopher who had undergone exile (that is, by using the literary and philosophical trope of the exile) there was something at stake for Dio. That something was political clout, a goal that most readers of Dio's exilic rhetoric ignore or, for those for whom Dio's political career is the main interest, is not tied to his identity as a philosopher. My aim in this chapter is to show exactly this: the translation of philosophical authority into political power.

Richter, in a discussion of the idea of cosmopolitanism in early imperial Rome, pointed out that exilic literature (tied in ancient philosophy with cosmopolitanism), can be roughly divided into two categories: lament and consolation. Dio, who appears in Richter's discussion alongside Musonius Rufus, Plutarch, and Favorinus, is said to be a proponent of the latter.<sup>6</sup> A similar yet more nuanced notion was already advanced by Whitmarsh, focusing on the understanding of exilic narratives' authors (Musonius, Dio, and Favorinus) that they operate

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<sup>1</sup> Philostratus associated Dio's choice to move away from the cultural centres of the world with a time in which all of philosophy was attacked by tyrants (τυραννίδων, ὑφ' ὧν ἡλαύνετο φιλοσοφία πᾶσα, *VS* 488). But he explicitly says that he cannot call Dio's *πάροδος* an exile (φυγή, *ibid.*).

<sup>2</sup> Here is the place to note that throughout the thesis I may sometime use the term 'exile' without any qualification as to its historicity. On its historicity, see: Ventrella 2009 (and more below). As for the term, I use 'exile' for convenience, and it is always interchangeable with 'wandering'. I believe that Dio travelled for a time but that the extent to which this was voluntary or ordered remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that Dio certainly wanted his audience to believe that this was an official exile and so is his rhetoric analysed here.

<sup>3</sup> This is especially true for the three longer monographs (von Arnim 1898; Desideri 1978, Jones 1978), but also for shorter studies: Moles 1978, Swain 1996, 188–92; Sidebottom 1996; Jackson 2017.

<sup>4</sup> For this, see the discussion in the second section of the Introduction.

<sup>5</sup> Here Moles (1978) is a turning point and Whitmarsh (2001a; 2001b, esp. 156–67) is perhaps most influential. See also: Moles 2005; Hunter 2017. Bekker-Nielsen (2008), is somewhat of an outlier among recent scholarship in his historicist approach to the issue: 'Given [Dio's] traumatic experience in Rome and during fifteen years of exile, it is not surprising that he should have reached a different perception of the human condition, even if this was not the fruit of a divinely inspired conversion' 121.

<sup>6</sup> Richter 2017, 94. Cf. Claassen 1999, 20, 25, 103.

within a literary and a philosophical tradition. Whitmarsh suggested that we should read those texts as a dramatization of the consolatory process which the authors deliver to their readers and audiences.<sup>7</sup> In Whitmarsh's discussion, Dio stands somewhat apart since Dio's discussion of exile, specifically *Oration* 13, 'amounts to "self-consolation"' instead of offering a consolatory text to the random exile or student of philosophy.<sup>8</sup>

Certainly, in *Oration* 13 Dio taps into the philosophical discussion over the nature of exile (arguing that it is not a bad thing). But the focus on *Oration* 13, prevalent in scholarly discussion, leaves us with an imperfect picture, as it leaves out what can be learned from other speeches in which Dio makes use of the exilic trope. Scholars who discuss Dio's exile often focus mostly, if not solely, on *Oration* 13 and scholars who discuss the other speeches (mainly those delivered in Prusa) do not focus on the use of the exilic trope.<sup>9</sup> Focusing on these (and some other) speeches shows that Dio's use of the exilic trope *qua* philosopher was a consistent element in his performative self-representation that operated as more than a dramatization of consolation. In fact, I will argue, in most of the cases Dio did not seek to console either anyone else or himself, nor did he (outside of *Oration* 13, as Whitmarsh showed) make a sustained exploration of the literary genre of such texts. In most cases, Dio sought to use his image as an exiled philosopher in order to garner political influence.

There is another element – alongside the focus on *Oration* 13 and on the exilic trope as consolatory literature – which is shared between scholars' of Dio: a growing understanding that the exilic trope was part of the discourse of identity and that it served those who used it to establish themselves within that discourse. Here Gleason and Whitmarsh constitute a watershed in the scholarship.<sup>10</sup> As discussed in the Introduction and in Chapter 1, our analysis of the public, civic space in the ancient world has profited from the utilisation of Bourdieu's theory

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<sup>7</sup> Whitmarsh 2001b, 139–40.

<sup>8</sup> Whitmarsh 2001b, 139 n. 22.

<sup>9</sup> Jones (1978) is a good example for both these 'faults'. His discussion of Dio's exile (pp. 45–51) is mostly based on *Oration* 13 (and external sources), whilst the Prusan speeches barely come into discussion. When the Prusan *Orations* are discussed, questions of exilic/philosophical identity are not taken into account. Desideri (2007) does argue for a political cause behind Dio's use of the exilic theme, but he is also focused on *Oration* 13 and he treats only imperial (cosmic, even) politics whereas I focus on *polis* politics (cf. Whitmarsh 2001a, 293). Fuhrmann 2015, deals with the Prusan *Orations* and allows a very small space for Dio's intellectual identity in his 'reappraisal' of the philosopher's career. Hunter (2017) examines, mainly, *Oration* 13 and is not interested in Dio's intellectual and/or political career, but with literary history. Bekker-Nielsen (2008) is, yet again, somewhat of an exception. His analysis of Dio's trajectory ties the period of exile with Dio's re-entry to the local political scene. His explanation, however, still falls within the boundaries of consolation literature: He argues that Dio simply understood his inability to achieve wealth and power in the magnitude Roman magnates of his time did, and so he renounced what he could not attain and chose the *persona* of the wandering philosopher (120–2). In this sense, philosophy was found to console Dio for the mismatch between his ambitions and objective capabilities. I would like to give Dio a little bit more credit than this.

<sup>10</sup> Gleason 1995; Whitmarsh 2001b; Cf. Gaertner 2007, 17.

of symbolic capital. The successful assertion to oneself of an intellectual identity – amongst one's peers and *vis-à-vis* general audiences – confers honour, status, and an aura of authority, which can then be used by the intellectuals in the performance of the social roles expected of them, and hence further bolster their position. Once exile was tied to philosophy – by the tradition of figures such as Diogenes, corroborated by contemporary historical examples – a philosopher's identity could be asserted by using exilic discourse. Put simply, one could claim to be a philosopher on the grounds of having been exiled.<sup>11</sup>

In the case of sophists and sophistic self-representation, studies (of varying veins and methodologies) have always shown how intellectual/cultural authority was translated into more than just a recognition of their status as *pepaideumenoí*.<sup>12</sup> In 1982 Bowie argued that the reason why sophists held prominent social and political roles was because they were already members of the ruling elite, thus diminishing the importance of their status as *pepaideumenoí* on their way to political prominence.<sup>13</sup> But if one is simply 'placed' at the top of the political pyramid by virtue of birth to the 'right' family, keeping that place was a different matter. The works of Gleason and Eshleman show that losing in the arena of sophistic self-representation could lead to loss of political power.<sup>14</sup> By asserting to oneself a sophistic identity, one could either maintain one's status and power as a member of the ruling elite or (if one fails to convince one's peers) lose it. In this way the intellectual identity of sophists is understood by scholars to have been translated into political power. The case with philosophers, as it is often presented by scholars, was supposedly different.

Presumably, for a philosopher such as Epictetus for instance, authority is measured in accordance with the number of students who frequented his classes (and sustained him?). For a philosopher who wished to teach at the houses of the rich it could be measured by invitations to do so. And for a philosopher of a more textual bent, like Plutarch, it corresponded to the number of readers among the elite who were to be influenced by his thought. Philosophers, therefore, did have a social role, and social authority, as educators.<sup>15</sup> Dio, however, provides us with a further, alternative model. Certainly, he saw himself as an educator, but with him philosophical identity was used for achieving goals in the civic space as well. We will see that

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<sup>11</sup> Whitmarsh 2001b, 135f.

<sup>12</sup> Bowersock 1969; E. L. Bowie 1982; Anderson 1989; Anderson 1993; Gleason 1995; Schmitz 1997; Sidebottom 2009; Lauwers 2013.

<sup>13</sup> Bowie 1982. This is against Bowersock 1969, who argued that training and activity as a sophist can take on up the political ladder.

<sup>14</sup> Gleason 1995; Eshleman 2012.

<sup>15</sup> See Chapter 1 for a full discussion.



the focus on *Oration* 13 in the scholarship, as well as the focus on Dio's exilic discourse as a representative of consolatory literature, occlude this understanding.

What I aim to show in this chapter is that by looking into a larger number of speeches in which Dio brings up the issue of his exile, and especially those speeches which he delivered in his hometown, we can see how by speaking as a philosopher and establishing oneself within the tradition of (exiled) philosophers, a public intellectual could translate this authority – this symbolic capital – into actions and achieve influence in civic space. Moreover, we will also begin to see how the alternative model that Dio offered for philosophical action in civic space is tied with the notion of philosophy ἐν μέσῳ which he adopted (and adapted) from the philosophers of old. Whereas the more secluded philosophers, and those more focused on writing, translated their authority into influence over more specific audiences, for Dio the entire city was the school of philosophy and the entire body of citizens was his potential 'student body'. What will become apparent from our study of Dio's use of the rhetoric of exile is that he did so because power – to enact decisions, to lead cities, to approach the imperial seat – was vested in the citizen body.

### 3.2 πολὺ γὰρ κρεῖττον φυγάδα εἶναι

The *Orations* in which Dio addresses the topic of his exile can be grouped into two groups: *Orations* 3, 4, 6, 8-10, and *Orations* 1, 13, 19, 40, 44-8. In the first group, it is the figure of Diogenes who is in exile. In these speeches, exile operates on two levels: it is part of the Diogenic tradition, and it is a foil for Dio the speaker (as we saw in the previous chapter). Our focus in this chapter will be on those speeches in which Dio explicitly evokes his own personal experience. Of these, *Oration* 1 and *Oration* 13 have both been treated extensively and are somewhat of an exception and so I will discuss them at the end of this chapter and only in brief.

At some point under the short-lived rule of Nerva, Dio returned from his period of wandering (*Or.* 45.2).<sup>16</sup> Bekker-Nielsen argues that at that time Dio no longer saw himself as part of the municipal elite and did not enter the political *agōn*.<sup>17</sup> This is based on a limited, institutionalist view of politics as having to do only with official magistracies.<sup>18</sup> It is interesting that Bekker-Nielsen makes this argument, especially as his exposition of Dio's career, the most recent elaborate treatment of it, presents the reader with an image of a very active political

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<sup>16</sup> Verrengia 2000, 67.

<sup>17</sup> Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 121.

<sup>18</sup> See the discussion in section 2.2 of the Introduction.

player. My focus in this section will be on how Dio used the trope of the exiled philosopher in order to advance his political agenda in Prusa. My argument is synoptic, focusing on the consistency in Dio's rhetoric across several Prusan speeches. It focuses particularly on *Or.* 47 where the rhetoric of the exiled philosopher is the most sustained. For the purpose of discussing the rhetoric, however, we should bear in mind what exactly Dio was trying to do in those speeches; that is, what were his political goals. Therefore, we begin with a brief discussion of Dio's political activity in Prusa.<sup>19</sup>

The speeches delivered in Prusa involve various issues across different levels of politics: home, local (Bithynia), and empire. In respect to home politics, Dio faced opposition to his major building project in the city (*Orr.* 40, 45, 47) and the formation of the *boulē*, the city Council (*Or.* 45). The former was a pet project of Dio's, which he believed would raise the status of the city (*Or.* 47. 15). Such a project necessitated razing several of the city's existing buildings, which was a point of contention.<sup>20</sup> The formation of the Council appears to have been a skirmish over its very nature, between democratic and oligarchic factions, with Dio's opponents believing him to be on the former side, since he wanted to introduce a hundred new members into it.<sup>21</sup> As Bekker-Nielsen puts it, both the building project and the attempts to enlarge the Council were a 'challenge [to] the traditional monopoly of municipal decision-making held by the [dignitaries class], the "benefactors" and liturgists of Prusa'.<sup>22</sup>

Issues around the Council drove opposition against Dio on the local (Bithynian) level of politics. Dio, who saw Prusa and other Bithynian cities in their imperial context as being small and so in need of unity in order to thrive,<sup>23</sup> became a proponent of an initiative to enact synoecism. Such a step, uniting Prusa with its neighbouring city Apameia, would have forced the members of the Council to welcome further new members, taking another bite from their decision-making powers.<sup>24</sup> Then, there was the matter of Dio's embassy to Rome. Although he succeeded in achieving concessions for Prusa, he was nonetheless accused of failing as the leader of the delegation since other cities had received greater concessions.<sup>25</sup> This specific

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<sup>19</sup> The *Orations* under discussion here are 40, 43-50. Exile does not feature in all of them, but they are all important to understand Dio's political goals.

<sup>20</sup> Perhaps the most contentious issues arose around the removal of tombs and shrines to which Dio devoted specific attention in his explanations (47. 16-7). See also: Fuhrmann 2015, 166-70.

<sup>21</sup> Jones 1978, 96, 98; Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 126; Fuhrmann 2015, 167, n. 21.

<sup>22</sup> Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 126-7.

<sup>23</sup> Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 130. This is part of what I understand as Dio's Hellenistic agenda (see Chapter 4).

<sup>24</sup> Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 127-8.

<sup>25</sup> Jones 1978, 106-7. Another accusation may have been against Dio's failed attempt to convince the emperor grant Prusa the status of a Free city (109).

accusation hit another important mark in Dio's presentation as a public figure active in civic space: his relationship with the emperor who, it was said, was not pleased to meet him.<sup>26</sup>

Lastly, and partly connectedly, there was opposition in matters of imperial politics as Dio found himself trying to curtail political polarisation in Prusa. Apparently, this was yet another failed attempt on his side, as the Roman governor banned the Prusan Assembly from meeting for some time. When the ban was lifted Dio thanked the governor on behalf of his fellow citizens (*Or.* 48). This presented an opportunity for Dio to try to drive home some of his other political causes such as concord (within the city) and the completion of the building project.<sup>27</sup> Dio's overall relationship with Roman officials was another point of contention: he was accused of colluding with hostile governors (*Or.* 43) and of threatening (implicitly) to bring Roman powers into Prusa to intervene on his behalf (*Orr.* 40, 44, 46, 48).<sup>28</sup>

In all of these matters, it is true, Dio stands mostly against the municipal elite and as Bekker-Nielsen argues, it is possible that he no longer identified with it.<sup>29</sup> And yet we can see that Dio was definitely an active participant in political *agōnes*. He might not have identified with the causes of the elite, but he certainly saw himself as, just like his opponents, an agent in civic space, with the power and duty to intervene in politics on all levels. We shall now turn to show how unique Dio was in comparison both to the Prusan elite and to other philosophers, in that in order to intervene in politics he spoke from the position of a(n exiled) philosopher, basing his authority not solely on his benefactions to the city or his Roman connections but also on his intellectual credentials.<sup>30</sup> And if the picture hitherto tilts towards a less successful Dio, it is important to remember that he also at times enjoyed great popularity and honours.<sup>31</sup>

The most elaborate example for the use of the rhetoric of the exiled philosopher is found in *Oration* 47, devoted to the building project. Dio begins by saying that the nature of his speech is characterised by the petty (σμικρὰ καὶ ἄδοξα) nature of the issues he is and was forced to deal with from the time of his return (1). This downplaying of his opponents' complaints and accusations is a recurring element in Dio's rhetoric,<sup>32</sup> but it was certainly not the only one. Dio

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<sup>26</sup> Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 125.

<sup>27</sup> Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 130-1.

<sup>28</sup> Fuhrmann 2015, 164-5, 169, 171-2; Guerber 2016.

<sup>29</sup> Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 121.

<sup>30</sup> This is against readings such as Hahn's (1989) who, in respect to the Prusan speeches, claimed that Dio was speaking not at all as a philosopher (157-8): Hahn says he finds it remarkable (*bemerkenswert*) that Dio, who was so much inclined to present himself as a philosopher (*sich...als Philosophen apostrophiert*), does so in no place (*an keiner Stelle*) in his speeches at home. Surely, it is remarkable because it is simply not true.

<sup>31</sup> Fuhrmann 2015, 170.

<sup>32</sup> Fuhrmann 2015, 164.

immediately sets exile in relief by firing a salvo of big (exiled) names. First in line are the founding fathers of Stoicism:

ὥς ἐγὼ πρότερον μὲν ἐθαύμαζον τῶν φιλοσόφων τοὺς καταλιπόντας μὲν τὰς αὐτῶν πατρίδας οὐδενὸς ἀναγκάζοντος, παρ' ἄλλοις δὲ ζῆν ἐλομένους [...]. λέγω δὲ τὸν Ζήνωνα, τὸν Χρύσιππον, τὸν Κλεάνθην, ὧν οὐδεὶς οἶκοι ἔμεινε [...].

(As before I used to wonder at those among the philosophers who left behind their own fatherlands, by no compulsion, and chose to live among other people [...]. I speak of Zeno, Chrysippus, and Cleanthes, of whom no one remained at home, *Or.* 47. 2).

Heracles, an important figure in imperial philosophy to whom we shall soon return, follows second. He is succeeded by Homer, not only a poet, as Dio says, but also a philosopher:<sup>33</sup>

Ὅμηρος, οὐ μόνον ποιητὴς ἀγαθὸς ὢν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ φιλόσοφος, τὸν ἅπαντα ἀποδημεῖν χρόνον, ὥστε μηδένα γινῶναι τὴν πατρίδα αὐτοῦ, καὶ μᾶλλον, ὥς ἔοικεν, αἰρεῖσθαι πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι δραχμὰς προσαιτῶν λαμβάνειν, καὶ ταῦτα ὡς μαινόμενος, ἢ οἶκοι διάγειν.

(Homer, who was not only an excellent poet, but a philosopher in his own way, spent all the time abroad, so much so that no one knows his fatherland, and what is more, as it seems, he preferred to scrounge as a beggar, and a mad-man at that, twenty-five drachmas than to pass his life at home, 47. 5).

Then comes Pythagoras, who is said to have set out into exile when Samos was ruled by a tyrant: Πυθαγόρας δὲ ἐκ Σάμου μὲν ἔφυγεν ἐκὼν τυραννουμένης (47. 5). In Pythagoras' case (and in Homer's as well, 5) the result of exile is the great fame that was bestowed upon him to such a degree that among all men, especially the people of Italy, whereto he fled, he was honoured as a god (47. 5).

This barrage of names and circumstances, I argue, is brought in by Dio for the purpose of letting the audience know (from the beginning) that he speaks as a philosopher. A scripted question from the audience reveals both the potency of this move and its purpose: immediately after naming the figures Dio interjects: τί οὖν; πάλαι τις ἤδη κάθηται λέγων, σὺ πρὸς Ὅμηρον καὶ Πυθαγόραν καὶ Ζήνωνα παραβάλλεις αὐτόν; (“So what?”, someone who sits here has been saying for a long time already, “you compare yourself with Homer, Pythagoras and Zeno?”, 47. 6). Association with these figures, Dio knows, is meaningful to the audience who will not allow just anyone to do so.

But what is interesting about Dio's opening is not his presumed audacity in comparing himself with those intellectual giants; the rhetorical question simply reveals that this is what he

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<sup>33</sup> Cf. *Or.* 55: Dio compares Socrates and Homer and claims that in an intellectual sense Socrates was a pupil of Homer. This was not a unique view of Dio, cf. Fornaro 2009a, 10.

set out to do.<sup>34</sup> Rather, it is his choice to associate himself with figures who have all left their home cities in a speech that was delivered in Prusa, attempting to integrate himself back into its power hierarchy and justify his actions. These comparisons to past figures have been taken by scholars as indications of Dio's disappointment with the political situation, or even his loss of faith in a philosopher's intellectual ability to fulfil a political role.<sup>35</sup> Dio may well have been disappointed with what he failed to achieve, but without examining his rhetoric we cannot understand how he sought to improve his situation on the basis of his philosopher's identity. Fuhrmann, whose view on Dio is, by his own admission, 'less charitable' – for him Dio was a hypocritical 'bully'<sup>36</sup> – takes one step towards such an analysis by reminding us that Dio, 'as a famous speaker and philosopher', could have chosen to live elsewhere.<sup>37</sup> But he avoids actual analysis of the rhetorical manoeuvre, which develops in two stages and aims for political clout: first, an association and dismissal proving Dio's identity and superiority as a philosopher; then, using this identity as a rhetorical leverage to try and achieve his goals.

Dio's insistence, through association with past philosophers, that he himself belongs in their company is meant to trick the audience: the wondrous (ἐθαύμαζον, Dio describes himself in §2) thing in the action of all the philosophers is that they not only loved their fatherland (47. 6) but also claimed that it is the wise man's duty to serve it (47. 2-3). If so, how could they leave it behind? The answer lies in the (in)abilities of the wise to face political conflicts. The three Stoics, Heracles, and Pythagoras have all left their homes due to political hardships either on the general level of civic life or the particular issue of tyranny (47. 3-5). Overall, Dio claims that πᾶσι τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἔδοξε χαλεπὸς ἐν τῇ πατρίδι ὁ βίος ('life in the fatherland seemed hard to all the philosophers', 47.6). The implication of this argument is that since Dio is a philosopher like all of these examples, his exilic status is not a proof of disloyalty to his fatherland, but rather a proof of his devotion to it.

This was noticed by Desideri. But whereas Desideri saw in this a genuine comment on the inability of the wise man to govern,<sup>38</sup> I argue that it is exactly the opposite. This transpires through Dio's use of the story of Heracles: Dio claims that the wise man cannot bear difficulties

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<sup>34</sup> Contrary to Desideri's argument that Dio was attempting the opposite: to show that he was not at the level of these philosophers, (1978, 381).

<sup>35</sup> The latter was argued by Desideri 1978, 380. Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 130 found Dio 'disappointed' (Cf. Jones 1978, 113 who comments on Dio's disappointment in the speech without mentioning the philosophers).

<sup>36</sup> Fuhrmann 2015, 162: 'a less charitable approach will better advance our understanding. Contrary to the sympathy he has typically received, a more critical reading of the evidence suggests that as a local politician, Dio Chrysostom was a corrupt, manipulative, and sometimes hypocritical bully'.

<sup>37</sup> Fuhrmann 2015, 167.

<sup>38</sup> Desideri 1978, 380.

at home and must leave unless he is of the strength and ability of Heracles himself.<sup>39</sup> Philosophers, Dio says, thought that achieving this level of capability, to be a Heracles, is impossible (τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἡγοῦντο, 47. 3). In fact, even in the case of Heracles himself, his strength and ability were to no avail: after performing many deeds and exploits all around the world, and even becoming king of Ilium, he was shunned and abandoned when he needed the help of the people of Thebes (4). The audience, with the group of philosophers in mind and with the comments on the philosophers' inability to face political difficulties, should now notice the superiority of Dio as well as his intention. Desideri argued that Dio meant to show that even a devotion to benefitting people as strong as Heracles' was not good enough and that his devotion was not any more or less than that of Heracles. This is not the case. Dio spoke as someone who returned from exile into the political hot pan. By this very action, he clearly marked himself as far more able than all of those figures he mentioned.<sup>40</sup> The opening of the speech shows that the entire speech is proof of what Dio was trying, and appearing to be able to do: to face political conflicts at home. He is not only a philosopher in the calibre of those great figures, but also a philosopher active in civic, political space, and he has the power and ability (ἰσχὺν καὶ δύνανται) to succeed where both the philosophers and Heracles failed.<sup>41</sup>

The rhetorical trickery of Dio (via affiliation to and dismissal of figures in the past) continues and develops as the speech progresses. To insinuate that he is better than eminent past figures is one thing. To accomplish the goal of the speech, however, requires Dio to winning the audience over to his side and overcoming his opponents. He thus moves to use the trope of the exiled philosopher as a rhetorical leverage, a threat which is meant to give him the upper hand over any listening opponent. This threat is built around the idea at which Fuhrmann

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<sup>39</sup> εἰ μή τις σοφὸς ὢν ἅμα δύναιτο τὴν τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ἔχειν ἰσχὺν καὶ δύνανται ('unless some wise man is also of the strength and prowess of Heracles').

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *Or.* 45.12: ἀλλὰ περὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οὐχ ὅμοιος ἑτέροις γέγονα, λέγω δὲ οὐ τῶν ιδιωτῶν μόνον, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων καλουμένων σωφρονέστερος ('but, in respect to [enduring exile's harshness], perhaps I was unlike others, I mean that I was not only wiser than laymen, but more than many so-called philosophers as well'). This comes after Dio, as he does in *Oration* 13, equates himself with Odysseus, an archetype in imperial literature of the wandering wise, see: Whitmarsh 2001a, 281 and *passim*. Dio's ability to suffer the toils of exile better than others is not a consolatory argument. Instead, as the next set of examples reveals (Epaminondas and Theseus, 13), Dio's aim is to push through his political agenda of synoecism.

<sup>41</sup> In Chapter 2 we saw the dynamics of affiliation and dismissal in Dio's relationship with past philosophers. The rhetoric in *Or.* 47 does not come as a surprise: Dio insists on his association with those figures and then moves to show that he is better than they were.

hinted, that as a philosopher Dio is not disturbed by exile, and hence he can always leave. We now turn to the development of the threat.<sup>42</sup>

I noted above that in mentioning Pythagoras and Homer, Dio claims that the result of the philosophers' exile is fame and good fortune. As he continues, he develops the argument: not only that a philosopher is better off in exile than at home, but also that it may prove ruinous for both the philosopher and his city if he chooses to remain at home. Socrates' famous attachment to Athens and his choice not to leave it are now evoked:

ὃς δὲ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἔμεινεν ἐν τῇ πατρίδι, πράττων ὅ, τι δοκοίη τοῖς πολίταις καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, εἰ μὲν τι μέγα ὤνησε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· τὴν δὲ βλάβην ἐπίσταμαι τὴν γενομένην αὐτοῖς. ἔτι γὰρ νῦν ὀνειδίζονται περὶ Σωκράτους, ὥς οὔτε δίκαιος οὔτε ὁσίως τῷ ἀνδρὶ προσενεχθέντες, καὶ πάντων αὐτοῖς τῶν ὕστερον γενομένων κακῶν ταύτην φασὶ συμβῆναι τὴν αἰτίαν.

(And the man [i.e. Socrates] who remained the entire time in his fatherland, doing whatever his fellow citizens and the laws decided, I am unable to say if this man greatly benefited the Athenians. Yet I know of the harm that was caused to them. For even today they are still reproached because of Socrates, that they behaved towards the man neither justly nor piously, and people say that this is the reason for all the wrongs that befell them afterwards, 47. 7).

Presented in this way, Socrates' insistence on remaining in Athens goes against the idea, attributed to the philosophers, that one has to aid and serve his fatherland. Whereas the philosopher in exile can achieve a godlike status (Πυθαγόρας [...] ἐτιμᾶτο ὡς θεός, 47. 5), the benefit of the philosopher who remains in his homeland is questioned, and what is more, this may even be harmful to the state.

With much less rhetorical flourish, yet to the same rhetorical end, Dio makes this point in other civic orations. In *Oration* 40, he proclaims that the malice and malintent which he encountered upon his return almost made him condemn himself to exile (ὥστε ὀλίγου φυγὴν ἑμαυτοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, 40. 12).<sup>43</sup> Interestingly, in *Or.* 46, possibly the sole speech from Prusa which predates the wandering years, when Dio attempts to thwart a lawsuit against him he cries "outrage" and exclaims: πολὺ γὰρ κρεῖττον φυγάδα εἶναι καὶ παροικεῖν ἐπὶ ξένης ἢ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν ('indeed it is far better to be an exile and to live away in a foreign land than to suffer such actions', 46.12).<sup>44</sup> If the dating is indeed pre-exile, this exclamation is a hint

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<sup>42</sup> It is in such instances that readers might be tempted to read Dio's remarks as conciliatory; that exile is not a bad thing (see discussion in section 1 above). As Whitmarsh (2001a, 293) remarked about *Oration* 13, however, it makes all the difference that Dio speaks not from the position of an exiled philosopher needing to console himself, and neither from the position of a philosopher who consoles others, nor from the position of a teacher who discusses exile as a non-evil in the context of a classroom lecture. The audience of Dio need no such thing and what Dio attempts is to make a fact about himself for the purpose of the rhetorical threat.

<sup>43</sup> A hint of this rhetoric is found as well in *Or.* 48. 6 where Dio questions the benefit of his presence in Prusa: τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπιδημίας ὄφελος;

<sup>44</sup> Jones 1978, 134 dated this speech to ca. 70-80, with some other scholars following him (Sheppard 1984, 166; Salmeri 2000, 63-64); recently Bekker-Nielsen confirmed this dating (2008, 177).

towards Dio's use of exile as a rhetorical threat, which he develops later on by connecting it with philosophy.

As the argument of *Oration 47* advances, Dio brings in another philosopher:

τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην ἐνίστε ἐμακάριζον, ὅστις Σταγειρίτης ὢν (τὰ δὲ Στάγειρα κώμη τῆς Ὀλυνθίας ἦν) ἀλούσης δὲ Ὀλύνθου συγγενόμενος Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ Φιλίππῳ διεπράξατο οἰκισθῆναι πάλιν τὸ χωρίον, καὶ μόνον αὐτὸν ἔφασκον εὐτυχῆσαι τὴν εὐτυχίαν ταύτην, ὥστε τῆς πατρίδος οἰκιστὴν γενέσθαι

(At time I used to deem Aristotle blessed, because he was from Stageira – which was a village in Olynthus – and after Olynthus was captured and he became acquainted with Alexander and Philip, Aristotle brought it about that the area was settled again, and they say that he alone had the fortune of this good luck, namely that he became the ‘founder’ of his fatherland, 47. 9).

The reason, of course, for deeming Aristotle blessed is because Dio himself, occupied with a building project in Prusa, would have also liked to be deemed the ‘founder’ of his fatherland, turning it from a small town into a beautifully embellished city. Telling his audience that he wants to be counted alongside Aristotle, however, cannot help him with his opponents.<sup>45</sup> Instead, Dio claims to have come upon a letter, the content of which – ‘too long to be read’ before the audience! (47. 13) – reveals that notwithstanding this blessedness of Aristotle, his titles, and his connections with the Macedonian court, the people of Stagira did not go along with the plan, and Stagira remained nothing more than a little village (47. 9-11).

The final brick in Dio's rhetorical threat begins with a rhetorical question: τί οὖν βούλεσθε; (‘What do *you* want?’, 47.14) he asks the audience, and insists that it is not for his own sake that he set out upon this project, but for the good of the city (47.15). Fuhrmann reads this as a manifestation of Dio's ‘pernicious rhetorical habits’.<sup>46</sup> Yet again, the rhetoric is not a simple “I can leave if I want” claim. It is based on Dio's claim for a philosopher's identity. Bekker-Nielsen suggests that Dio's aim was to build in Prusa a main-street stoa.<sup>47</sup> It is apparent from Dio's words that he was accused of building it for his own sake, since he goes out of his way to explain why this is not the case:

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<sup>45</sup> Indeed, if Jones (1978) is correct (‘this suggests that Dio's opponents had gone to the proconsuls and the emperor’, as Aristotle opponents went to governors of the time, 113), this hint would only antagonise them.

<sup>46</sup> Fuhrmann 2015, 162; 163, where he lists, under §§3 and 4, Dio's insistence that he is always acting selflessly and that his building project should be praised.

<sup>47</sup> Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 126. This is in line with the apparently large-scale destruction, and the vast amount of money (47.19) and time that the project demanded (48.11).



τί γὰρ ἐμοὶ τῆς ἐνθάδε στοᾶς; ὥσπερ οὐκ ἔχοντά με ὅποι βούλομαι περιπατεῖν, τὴν Ποικίλην Ἀθήνησι, τὴν Περσικὴν ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι, τὰς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ τὰς χρυσᾶς, ἐν ταῖς τῶν Ἀντιοχέων, τῶν Ταρσέων, μετὰ πλείονος τιμῆς, ἢ μόνον ἐξιόντά με καὶ περιπατήσοντα, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδένα πολιτῶν. ἀλλ' οὔτε γυμνάσιον ἐν πόλει μόνος οὐδεὶς ἔχει γυμναζόμενος οὔτε στοὰν οὔτε βαλανεῖον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν δημοσίων οὐδέν.

(For what is there for me in a colonnade here? As if I cannot walk up and down wherever I wish, in the Painted Colonnade in Athens, in the Persian one in Lacedaemon, in the Golden ones in Rome, in those of Antioch, and of Tarsus with more respect, or as if I were going to go out and walk around on my own, with no one else of the citizens. But no one in a city has a gymnasium to himself when he exercises, nor a colonnade, nor a bath, nor any other public building, 47.17).

The explicit argument is that the well-travelled Dio has no need of a stoa in Prusa when he can simply visit any stoa across the world. But in a speech which started by associating himself with Zeno, Chrysippus and Cleanthes, the founders of Stoicism, the mention of the Stoa *Poikilē*, where Stoicism was founded, as a possible haunt for himself is more than a random example of a civic building. Likewise, when just a few passages before Aristotle, the Peripatetic, was discussed, the choice of the infinitive *περιπατεῖν* and the participle *περιπατήσοντα* resonates with philosophical connotation. And finally, with Socrates in mind as well, a mention of a city's gymnasium may also be significant. All, I argue, are deliberate choices to tie the argument to the philosophical world (real, and metaphorical). The world is not just open for Dio; it is open for him specifically as a philosopher.

The threat is laid out so: philosophers, being constantly at odds with their fellow-citizens, may be better off in exile and if they choose to stay in their hometowns, both parties might suffer repercussions. Dio, a philosopher, like all the other famous figures he cited, can, if he so wishes, simply leave Prusa for his philosophical activities and he would be, so the audience is now prone to think, no worse off. And so, at this point with the threat laid out, Dio is able to expose the fact that he wishes to stay in Prusa and bring his building project to conclusion:

ὥς ἐγὼ βουλόμενος ὑμῖν ἀρέσκειν πάντα τρόπον ἀπορῶ. νῦν γὰρ ἐὰν ἅπτωμαι τοῦ πράγματος καὶ σπουδάξω γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἔργον, τυραννεῖν μέ φασι τινες καὶ κατασκάπτειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ πάντα

(For, though I want to please you in every way possible, I am at a loss. Since, as things are, if ever I assume the project and hasten the build to completion, some people say that I am a tyrant since I raze the city and all the shrines, 47. 18).

This statement makes clear the real purpose of the speech. If Dio really wanted to move away from the political game, he could easily have done so.

Dio (of course?) could not finish his speech when the last word is truly left with the audience or with his threat so unveiled. There is a man in the city, Dio claims, who in his good intentions towards Dio suggested that Dio should leave Prusa behind and live abroad since he enjoys it (47.20, 22).<sup>48</sup> Dio, as if contemplating whether to follow this suggestion, states what it would mean not to follow it: μή [...] τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἔᾶν <ἄγευστον> φιλοσοφίας καὶ τῶν τοιούτων μαθημάτων ('that I allow my soul <to go without the taste of> philosophy and such other learnings for such a long time', i.e. the time needed for the project, 47.23). And in his very final words, Dio calls attention to his long beard and hair (25): the external markers of the philosopher.

Dio, therefore, whose very soul is in need of philosophy, from beginning to end, insists on his identity as a philosopher. Yet this insistence serves a goal that lies not in the realm of philosophy, but in that of civic space. For those contemporary philosophers of Dio who formed a part of the tradition of exilic literature, to be an exiled philosopher was a goal which they retained. Exile would make one a philosopher and in exile one would remain to teach or write. Favorinus, Epictetus, Musonius and Plutarch, all contributed to this idea.<sup>49</sup> For Dio, to be understood as an exiled philosopher was *less* a matter of ethics (is it a bad or a good thing). For him it was *less* a philosophical lesson on which to muse or with which to console anyone.<sup>50</sup> To be understood as an exiled philosopher for Dio was, rather, a source of authority which he could exploit as a political agent.

To end this section, I turn now to two examples which might seem to stand apart from those discussed above: *Orr.* 44 and 43, delivered in Prusa in 97 and 106-7 respectively.<sup>51</sup> Each in its own way buttresses my argument that the trope of the exiled philosopher was used by Dio as authority to be active in civic space.

*Oration* 44 is the earlier of the two and might be the second speech delivered by Dio in Prusa.<sup>52</sup> We remember that at this point, Dio was called to Rome to see Nerva, the newly

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<sup>48</sup> εἰ δὲ ἄρα ἀποδημῶν ἡδομαι, τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις ἐπιέναι... ('[he says that] if indeed I enjoy being away from home, I should go the great cities...', 47.22).

<sup>49</sup> Dio was surely reacting to Musonius, his teacher. But it is very much possible that he also knew (of) Epictetus who taught in Rome until his own exile in 89 CE (as part of the general banishment of philosophers by Domitian, Suet. *Domitian* 10). Epictetus then moved to Nicopolis, where he taught in his school until his death.

<sup>50</sup> Certainly, these themes are developed in *Oration* 13 (see below), but it is a sole place in the corpus where the theme of exile is used for this purpose.

<sup>51</sup> Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 177-8.

<sup>52</sup> That is, if indeed *Or.* 46 precedes it, see: Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 177.

crowned emperor, which he failed to do only because of illness (45. 2). Dio did however, as we also recall, lead an embassy to Trajan and at the end of the speech even said that he will read a letter from the emperor (missing, of course, from the extant text). Although opposition was beginning to form at this time, Dio was at the height of his popularity.<sup>53</sup> Indeed, the speech is focused on the honours the city wished to bestow on Dio, which he refused by saying that the true honour is being a citizen (44. 2). Moreover, the differences between success at home and abroad are not yet part of the rhetoric: Prusa, Dio says, has many illustrious citizens; some became successful through their sojourns abroad, and some through performance of their civic duties at home (9). To be sure, he still speaks as a philosopher. The character with which Prusa instils its citizens is an assurance of this:

ὁρῶ δὲ οὐ μόνον ἀπὸ λόγων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἀξιολόγους  
 γιγνομένους ἐν τῇ πόλει·

(And I see that men become good and worthy of mention and in this city not merely through their speech making but also through philosophy, 45.10).

Dio speaks with the authority of the philosopher, being able to comment on the quality of philosophical pursuits in the city. However, with his position still secure (and more so), there is no need to use the identity of the philosopher to fight over political power. As things will get worse, the same philosophical authority, we have seen, will be used exactly for this purpose.

*Oration* 43, from the end of Dio's career,<sup>54</sup> is a form of *apologia*. Dio defends himself against the accusation of cooperating with a wicked governor (ἡγεμὼν πονηρός) who acts like a tyrant (11).<sup>55</sup> In line with his apologetic aims, Dio associates himself with Socrates and his refusal to obey the bidding of the Thirty, tyrants of Athens (8-9). We have seen above how Socrates, within the discourse of the exiled philosopher, was brought to support the idea that a philosopher is better off leaving his hometown if he is to benefit it. This evocation of Socrates seems to run contrary to that idea. However, whilst Dio was very much embroiled in political turmoil and in a need of defence, the speech was given at a moment before Dio actually had to leave the city (8). In such circumstances, the threat – based on the philosopher's ability to withstand exile – to leave the city would lose its potency. Thus, we see how, across his Prusan

<sup>53</sup> Jones 1978, 54, 104-5.

<sup>54</sup> Jones 1978, 140 placed it as the last of Dio's speeches. Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 178 as the penultimate.

<sup>55</sup> On the accusations, see: Fuhrmann 2015, 171f.

political career, it was according to the political situation in which he found himself that Dio used his philosophical identity and authority to be an active political figure in the civic space.<sup>56</sup>

### 3.3 The exilic corpus: two exceptions

Two speeches of Dio that are to do with his own personal experience as an exile – and so merit a discussion alongside the other speeches in this chapter – are the first *Kingship* and *On Exile* (*Orr.* 1 and 13, respectively). They are different and they have been discussed thoroughly by others. On the background of the previous section, I will try, briefly, to set in relief some elements of these speeches that hitherto were missed or ignored by scholars in respect to Dio's use of the discourse of exile.

The *First Kingship* is exceptional because of its internal addressee. It has received substantial treatment in the scholarship, and so a few words will suffice for us here.<sup>57</sup> Like the rest of the *Kingship Orations*, it serves the purpose discussed by Whitmarsh of situating Dio as a Greek philosopher within the hierarchy of the Roman political system, and of exploring the relationship of power between Greek and Roman.<sup>58</sup> This situating, however, is not merely (perhaps, not even especially) done with a Roman but rather with a Greek audience in mind, possibly Dio's fellow citizens of Prusa.<sup>59</sup> Therefore, although it is exceptional, *Oration* 1 is indeed akin to several of the speeches that were delivered in Prusa (*Orr.* 40-51) in which Dio attempted to present himself to his local community as someone who could procure benefits for the city due to his sway at the imperial court or with the Roman governors.<sup>60</sup>

Concluding the speech (1. 50f.) is the well-known story Dio tells of his encounter, in exile, with the prophetess who foretells his encounter with a powerful man (ἀνδρὶ καρτερῷ, 56) and tells Dio the story of Heracles at the crossroads which, she instructs, he should himself tell that man. Much as the narrative of the exile itself begins with Dio thanking the gods for the opportunity to visit many lands and peoples instead of witnessing the many injustices that took

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<sup>56</sup> *Oration* 42 was left outside of this discussion. It is a very short piece, most likely an introductory one to another speech. It, therefore, develops no theme other than the establishment of Dio's intellectual authority to perform in public. Already von Arnim (1898) set it in Dio's 'philosophical' period (173), and this dating is confirmed by later scholarship (Jones 1978, 136; Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 177). I will only point out that the stance taken by Dio is a classic 'philosophical' ignorance/irony, claiming to have no wisdom nor the ability to speak (οὐδέποτε γὰρ οὐδενὶ ἐγώ γε τοῦτο ὑπεσχόμην, ὥς ἱκανὸς ὦν λέγειν ἢ φρονεῖν ἢ πλεον τι γινώσκειν τῶν πολλῶν, 2; cf. Pernot 1993, 548). This stance is, of course, reminiscent of Socrates and so, whatever the point of the following speech was, we see how Dio built his authority to be active in the civic space on the basis of his identity as a philosopher.

<sup>57</sup> Moles 1990; Sidebottom 1991; Whitmarsh 2001b, 186–216; Sidebottom 2006.

<sup>58</sup> Whitmarsh 2001b, 181–246.

<sup>59</sup> Whitmarsh 2001b, 325–7.

<sup>60</sup> Kokkinia 2004 esp. 495–500.

place at the time (πολλῶν καὶ ἀδίκων πραγμάτων, 50), so it ends with an emphasis on what Dio came to learn through his experiences. So, the exilic narrative is not so much consolatory as an aetiological tale of Dio's wisdom. And this assumed *persona* of the wise man, as mentioned above, was Dio's way to try to make a political point (of situating Dio within the hierarchy of the Roman political system and exploring Graeco-Roman power dynamics)<sup>61</sup> more than a philosophical lesson about how exile is not a bad thing. In that way, this text operates as other *Discourses* in which Dio mentioned his exile.

*Oration* 13 is exceptional as well. This is because unlike the rest of the orations discussed in this chapter, whilst it was delivered in a civic context, it was Athens rather than Prusa (if we can trust the title, which was probably inserted later and not by Dio himself).<sup>62</sup> As mentioned, *Oration* 13 has been widely discussed in the scholarship and a sole focus on it occludes our understanding of Dio. Discussing it in the context of the other civic speeches will bring important new aspects to light.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the primary philosophical model of *Oration* 13 is Socrates. How does this model operate in respect to the question of exile, however, which is the basis for the speech? Famously, Socrates opted against leaving Athens, even at the cost of his life.<sup>63</sup> This did not stop imperial philosophers who wrote about exile (and its relation to a cosmopolitan worldview) from evoking the figure of Socrates as a model, and so utilising him as a model for the exilic life.<sup>64</sup> I argue that Dio's evocation of Socrates in respect to exile, however, is overall different from that of his predecessors, and results from Dio's attempt to move away from making a mainly consolatory point to making a political one.

This is observable through two (at first sight) minor points. We can start from the issue of exile itself. If the provenance of the Socratic *logos* embedded in the speech is still a matter of controversy among scholars,<sup>65</sup> then at least the narrative of the consultation of Apollo at the Delphi oracle is a clear allusion to Plato's *Apology of Socrates*.<sup>66</sup> There, Plato describes the beginning of Socrates' philosophical quest as a result of the consultation of Apollo by Socrates' friend Chaerephon, who is presented as follows:

Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που. οὗτος ἐμός τε ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρός τε καὶ συνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατήλθε

<sup>61</sup> See: n. 58, above.

<sup>62</sup> Desideri 2007, 199.

<sup>63</sup> As depicted by Plato in the *Crito*.

<sup>64</sup> Richter 2017, 86, 95.

<sup>65</sup> Verrengia 2000, 86–91; Moles 2005, 115–20 (with further bibliography).

<sup>66</sup> von Arnim 1898, 227; Moles 1978, 99; Jones 1978, 47; Verrengia 2000, 137.

(For certainly you all know Chaerephon. He used to be a friend of mine from young age and a friend to many of you as well. He also shared that period of exile and came back with you all, Pl. *Ap.* 21a1-2).

Clearly, alluding to the *Apology* marks Socrates to the audience as *a* model for Dio. However, out of Socrates and Chaerephon, only the latter shares with Dio a period in exile (συνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν), which means that (at least for the more attentive audience) it is Chaerephon rather than Socrates who is mapped onto Dio. Once again, then, Dio creates an intricate intertextual dialogue, in which he associates himself with a model only to depart from it.<sup>67</sup> Moreover, the exile of Chaerephon was experienced under the Tyranny of Thirty in Athens in 404. This, an exile caused by tyranny, is precisely the context in which Dio describes the nature of his exile.<sup>68</sup> Thus political exile and intellectual identity are connected, and any words of Dio spoken in exile (based on his own musings on good and evil, 13. 12) are implicitly spoken from that mixed vantage point. The civic persona and the intellectual one is enmeshed.

The second point I would like to consider in *Oration* 13 also relates to the *Apology*. Chaerephon was comparable to Dio with respect to exile. He is not so anymore when it comes to the quest narrative – Socrates’ search to prove that he cannot be the wisest man of all as proclaimed by Apollo. Socrates now becomes the only model. Even now, however, there is a discernible difference between Dio and Socrates. First, we can mark what Döring noted in his discussion of the Socratic *exemplum*: whereas in the period of his exile Dio turned into a φιλόσοφος (13. 11), Socrates, following Chaerephon’s inquiry at Delphi, turned into a σοφός.<sup>69</sup> Perhaps this difference between the two categories should not be pushed too hard,<sup>70</sup> but the exact manner of their transformation reveals much of the difference Dio emphasises between himself and his model.

Firstly, in Socrates’ case we have no actual transformation. Indeed, as Apollo says, Socrates was already the wisest man alive; the oracle offers merely a prompt to come to terms with this.<sup>71</sup> Secondly, in the case of Socrates the search is marked by a move not out of the

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<sup>67</sup> Compare the discussion in section 2 and in Chapter 2.

<sup>68</sup> ταύτης ἐνεχθείσης ἐπ’ ἐμὲ τῆς αἰτίας, ὥς δὴ τάνδρι φίλον ὄντα καὶ σύμβουλον· ἔθος γάρ τι τοῦτό ἐστι τῶν τυράννων (‘this was the charge which was brought against me, that I was a friend and counsel of that man; for this is a custom among tyrants...’, 13.1).

<sup>69</sup> Döring 1979, 85. Pl. *Ap.* 20d ff., esp. 23a3 (ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφός εἶναι).

<sup>70</sup> It is debatable to what degree σοφός and φιλόσοφος were exchangeable at the time of Socrates and Plato and if they were not, to what extent one may assume that Dio himself in fact read these terms as disparate. Note in this speech, for example, Dio’s comments on the notion of ‘philosophising’: οὐ μέντοι πολλάκις οὕτως ὀνόμαζεν [i.e. τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν], ἀλλὰ μόνον ζητεῖν ἐκέλευεν ὅπως ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ ἔσονται (However, [Socrates] didn’t often called it so, but only bade [people] to seek to be good men, 13.28). Possibly, Dio shows here an awareness that, back then, *to philosophise* was only starting to be used in a more abstract manner. On this, see: Hadot 2002, 9–51.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Brancacci 2000, 249.

*polis*, into exile, but within it. His quest (ζήτησις; Pl. *Ap.* 21b) — which is hardly a physical journey — is markedly associated with civic life: he begins with the politicians (21c), continues with the tragedians and dithyramb poets (22b), and ends with the handicraftsmen (22d). All of these are civic professions, and the first two groups are, in fact, predicated on the existence of a city.

Dio, by contrast, says that Apollo bade him go to the ends of the earth (*Or.* 13.9), and he equates himself with Odysseus, whose punishment was to continue his wanderings carrying an oar until he reaches a place where the people do not recognise it as such (13.10): in other words, to go as far away from civilisation as possible. To this we should add the fact that, whereas Socrates sets out on an active investigation (ζήτησις) in order to understand the answer of Apollo, and whereas he is active in questioning those aforementioned figures, Dio's transformation comes about passively. Others approach him, others call him philosopher, and others ask him questions. It is only by consequence of all of this that Dio becomes an active philosopher, and even then, not a wholly proactive one since, as he says, his talks were made at the bidding of others (ἐκέλευον [με] λέγειν, 13.11-2).

All of this, I argue, is another illustration of Dio's dynamic of affiliation and dismissal. While wisdom (philosophy) has been acquired by Dio outside of the city, its application is within it. The political exile is not a hermit, whose voluntarily sustained exclusion from society instils him with wisdom (more below), but a person connected to the *polis* in spite of his leaving it. Once allowed to return, the *polis* is also the place where his philosophy is to be used. Unlike in the Prusan *Oration*s, *Oration* 13 does not constitute a clear attempt to garner political influence. It is also, however, an exploration of the connection between the philosopher and the *polis*' civic life. In the Prusan *Oration*s the line of argument was that philosophers find it hard to face political difficulties at their home city. *Oration* 13 describes Dio first as a political exile (13. 1), associated with Chaerephon, and then as a philosopher coming back into the city to engage in the civic discourse.<sup>72</sup> It is upon the moment of assuming the identity of the philosopher — in and by exile, unlike Socrates — that Dio marks his return to civic activity.

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<sup>72</sup> In the next chapter we will compare this to figures like Epictetus and Musonius and their approach to the 'return' to society. We will see that Dio, once more, comes out as different to his contemporaries.

I will finish this chapter with a short excursus and argue that this move away from Socrates in respect to exile should be read against the employment of his figure which was made by contemporaries of Dio. As mentioned, Socrates was often evoked to espouse the idea of cosmopolitanism and hence arguing against the view that exile is a bad (*kakon*) experience from a philosophical standpoint. In Dio's corpus, however, the idea of cosmopolitanism is detached from Socrates. To begin with, Dio never explicitly evokes Socrates alongside the idea of cosmopolitanism. He gets rather close in *Oration 20, On Retirement*, a speech espousing common philosophical tropes.<sup>73</sup> The speech opens with two questions: τί γάρ ποτε τὸ τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως ἐστὶ καὶ τίνας χρὴ τιθέναι τοὺς ἀναχωροῦντας; ('What, then, is "retirement" and whom should be called "retired people?"', 20. 1), to which Dio then offers a set of possible answers, including the notion of moving away from one's native city or sojourning between cities (§3) which, like all the other answers, is refuted. In fact, Dio claims:

οὐ τόπος ἐστὶν ὁ παρέχων οὐδὲ τὸ ἀποδημῆσαι τὸ μὴ φαῦλ' ἅττα πράττειν οὐδὲ <τὸ> εἰς Κόρινθον ἢ Θήβας ἀνακεχωρηκέναι τὸ δὲ τὸν βουλόμενον πρὸς αὐτῷ εἶναι  
(it is not the place where you are, nor the being away from home which allows you not to do foolish things, nor is it the fact having retired to Corinth or to Thebes, but rather the ability of he who wishes to concentrate on his own self, 20. 7).

The best and most profitable retirement of all, Dio carries on to state, is: ἡ εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναχώρησις καὶ τὸ προσέχειν τοῖς αὐτοῦ πράγμασιν ('the retirement towards oneself and giving attention to the matters of one's own', 20. 8). This is reminiscent of what may be termed Socrates' exile of the soul or the mind, when he is detaching himself from this world for long periods of deep contemplation, such as we witness at the beginning of the *Symposium*.<sup>74</sup>

However, Dio avoids making an explicit reference to Socrates (again, detaching himself from this tradition of ancient authors who consistently refer to Socrates as a model of cosmopolitanism). Even if we read ἀναχώρησις as an allusion to the *Symposium* (Σωκράτης οὗτος ἀναχωρήσας, 175a6-7), there is a difference between Dio's προσέχειν τοῖς αὐτοῦ πράγμασιν and Socrates' προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν: whereas Socrates is described as turning towards his own mind, Dio speaks of turning towards one's own business/actions/matters. Dio simply does not talk of himself in the Socratic/Platonic language of the exile of the mind. In

<sup>73</sup> E.g.: ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἐστὶν, ὡς ἔοικε, πολλοῦ ἄξιον τὸ μάθημα καὶ διδάγμα τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐθίζειν ἔπεσθαι τῷ λόγῳ ('Yet, this is, as it seems, a much worthier lesson and moral, namely that it should be the custom of the soul to follow after reason', *Or.* 20.13).

<sup>74</sup> τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη ἐαυτῷ πῶς προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν, and Σωκράτης οὗτος ἀναχωρήσας ἐν τῷ τῶν γειτόνων προθύρῳ ἔστηκε ('Socrates directed his mind towards himself'; 'Socrates is withdrawn here, and he is stands at the porch of the neighbours' *Pl. Symp.* 174d4-5; 175a6-7).



fact, even when Dio speaks of himself as detached from societal norms and conventions, he does not associate himself, like Musonius does, with Socrates;<sup>75</sup> he does, in fact, not at all speak in philosophical terms but rather in political or civic terms, even when the topic of the speech itself is philosophical (*On freedom*): βουλευτήρια μὲν καὶ θέατρα καὶ συλλόγους ἀτιμάσας, ἐκκλησιάζων δὲ μόνος αὐτός ([the man, like Dio, who values true freedom] ‘thinks that the councils, theatres, and meetings are of little worth, whereas he himself alone holds a popular assembly’, *Or.* 80. 2). If Socrates is purely a mind, Dio is a political entity.

As noted by Richter, foisting on Socrates the idea of cosmopolitanism was as common in imperial times as it was historically inaccurate.<sup>76</sup> Dio seems to have understood this, or at least to have understood that the model of Socrates used by his contemporaries does not fit him. In this, Dio once again provided his audiences with a different possible paradigm of philosopher.

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<sup>75</sup> Through the idea that the philosopher is identified with the cosmos and, hence, with Socratic cosmopolitanism, see: Whitmarsh 2001a, 279–80.

<sup>76</sup> Richter 2017, 86, 95.

## Chapter 4 – A philosopher abroad

We have focused on Dio's political engagement in Prusa. Civic space, however, is not limited to the Assembly and the Council halls. As we have seen in Chapter 2, from Socrates and Diogenes Dio adopted an impromptu, popular manner of philosophising, which was not attached to one specific locale. Around Dio, the contemporary modes of performing philosophy led to misconceptions about past philosophers:

Σωκράτης γοῦν οὔτε βάθρα θεῖς οὔτ' εἰς θρόνον καθίσας οὔθ' ὥραν διατριβῆς ἢ περιπάτου τοῖς γνωρίμοις τεταγμένην φυλάττων

(Certainly, Socrates did not set out seats nor sat himself on a chair, nor observed a prescribed hour for passing time or ambling with his friends, Plu. *Mor. An seni* 796d1-11).

This statement of Plutarch's is meant to comment on the complete nature of political life and how the politician, like the philosopher, is a politician in all situations and at all times. Some, it appears, believe that philosophers are philosophers solely when they wear their teacher's hats, so to speak: when they appear in a class-room in front of their students, and not at all times. Trapp writes that to the minds of Dio, Maximus of Tyre, Plutarch, and Seneca, *philosophia* was what society needed in place of its other forms of (debilitating) entertainment.<sup>1</sup> For Plutarch, the aim was to transform the political man into a more philosophically-minded character who will lead society 'by precept and example'.<sup>2</sup> For Seneca, the essayist and 'philosophical letter-writer', this aim had been fulfilled in private.<sup>3</sup> Thus both, as Dio would have had it, had abandoned civic space.<sup>4</sup> Dio, as this chapter will show, aimed to broaden the scope and treat the whole of civic space as a school of philosophy and turn whole communities into a philosophically-minded ones.<sup>5</sup>

The argument is divided into two sections. The first one explores Dio's notion of the civic space as a school of philosophy. Starting from *Oration* 20, which has been seldom discussed by scholars,<sup>6</sup> we explore Dio's view of civic space as the philosophers' realm of activity. If in Chapter 2 we have seen this notion adopted from past models, here the focus will

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<sup>1</sup> Trapp 2007a, 213–14.

<sup>2</sup> Trapp 2007a, 214. This agrees with our understanding of Plutarch's intended readership: the elite, see: van Hoof 2010, 19–40.

<sup>3</sup> Trapp 2007a, 214.

<sup>4</sup> Reydam-Schils 2017, 535.

<sup>5</sup> In this sense, Dio was also different to Maximus of Tyre who, whilst philosophising in a public lecture form, was targeting mainly the youth of the city rather than the entire community, see: Trapp 1997, xxi.

<sup>6</sup> It makes no appearance in any of the articles in either Swain 2000 or Amato et al. 2016; Jones (1978) does not treat it. Desideri (1978) devotes only a page length discussion to it (almost half of it is a quotation) and although his reading is similar to mine (see text below on philosophy in the city's humdrum), he offers no exploration of the ideas (377–8). Von Arnim mentions it once only to remark on its dating (1898, 267).

be on the positive manner in which Dio envisions his place as a philosopher in the community – as someone who is capable of turning the entire community into a philosophically-minded one. The section concludes with two examples which show that Dio, unlike other philosophers, was not only thinking of the community as a whole but was less interested in the individual unless as a part of the community.

The second section is comprised of four case studies of civic interventions Dio made outside of Prusa. With Dio's view of civic space as a school of philosophy and the community as a collection of students in mind, we continue to explore Dio's appearances in front of audiences as a philosopher. In each case, we will see, Dio identifies as a philosopher – his source of authority – in order to advance a political agenda that could only be achieved once the community understands that it should conduct itself on the basis of philosophical precepts. The proper functioning of a community is predicated, according to Dio's argument, on its turning to a philosophically-minded community.

Lastly, there is a larger argument that stems from the entire chapter. By speaking as a philosopher, using the same language of philosophy and *paideia* in front of different communities, Dio not only fostered a sense of Hellenic identity and cohesion in individual communities, but rather through his actions, he unified as Hellenes different communities of the Greek east. In her exploration of Dio's use of myth, Anne Gangloff has shown Dio's Hellenic educational project as evident across his works.<sup>7</sup> Especially in her emphasis on Dio's preference for Panhellenic myths over local ones, Gangloff argues for Dio's deliberate creation of a Hellenic vision.<sup>8</sup> In a similar vein, the language of philosophy (appearance, past heritage, and content) which is as much a part of Greek *paideia* as myths are,<sup>9</sup> gathers the audiences of different Greek communities under the same banner. Here is a sense of mission greater than Dio himself and greater than a single city's life.

A final note before we move to our discussion. As mentioned, we begin our discussion from *Oration* 20 which is devoted to the question of 'retiring' (ἀναχώρησις) and is almost never discussed in scholarship.<sup>10</sup> Although its date and place of delivery are unknown, we can at least make out from the content that it was delivered in a city centre. We will see, as well, that Dio insisted on this civic space, with all its hubbub, as the locale where philosophy can be taught,

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<sup>7</sup> Gangloff 2006. See also: Saïd 2000 for the connection between Dio's philosophical identity, project, and use of myth.

<sup>8</sup> Gangloff 2006, 282ff.

<sup>9</sup> Trzaskoma 2017, 469.

<sup>10</sup> See: n. 6, above.

learned, and practiced by the entire community, which by this activity will be improved. Improving the life of the community brings this discussion into a larger context that scholars portrayed as Dio's notion of a 'good' or 'ideal' community. Our focus on *Oration 20*, therefore, furthers our understanding of Dio in this respect as well: in discussing the idea of 'ideal' communities, scholars have often focused on *Orr.* 7 and 36 as two examples that transport the audience outside of the civic space into peripheral locations construed by Dio to explore the idea of the good community.<sup>11</sup> These speeches supposedly look outside civic space through this 'transportation' of the audience but, in fact, they reflect back into the civic space in their content.<sup>12</sup> *Oration 20* provides a look into how Dio approached the notion without providing a *comparandum* for his audiences but rather being direct about their own ability to improve as a Greek community. It is in this sense that *Oration 20* serves as an important foundation for our readings of the other speeches where Dio is dealing with concrete problems and he is less interested in developing the idea of the good city, or community, in a theoretical manner.

#### 4.1 The city as a philosophical community

The quotation from Plutarch above applies to the philosophers' mode of conduct, or how should they instruct. What about the students? If there should be no school, no designated time and place, where should one go in order to become a philosopher? We have already discussed, moreover, how Dio wanted people to think that he himself turned to philosophy in his wanderings. Was his city-dwelling audience expected to go tour the world or indeed seek those cloistered schools of philosophy? The answer, of course, is in the negative and it is here where Dio differentiated between himself as a philosopher and the community as a potential philosophically-minded entity. We have already seen how, in *Oration 44*, upon his return to Prusa, Dio commented that the community is improved by philosophy inside the city (ἐν τῇ πόλει; 10).<sup>13</sup> At least as a community, therefore, there is no need to leave the city. This idea is explored in *Oration 20*, where the question of ἀναχώρησις (retiring) is raised, leading the audience to the conclusion that not only is it not necessary to remove oneself from the civic space, it is also the civic, public space that will serve as the locale for philosophising.

<sup>11</sup> Jones 1978, 56ff.; Schofield 1999, 57–64; Bertrand 1992; Russell 1992, 8–13, 19–23; Brenk 2000, 270–75; Desideri 2000, 99–100; Ma 2000; Salmeri 2000, 85–86; Trapp 2007a, 185–91. Some of these scholars focus more on the tension between city and country, or agricultural life versus city life, but in one way or another the discussion is focused, mostly, on the essence of the ideal community in Dio's *Orr.* 7 and 36.

<sup>12</sup> See n. 11 for scholarship.

<sup>13</sup> ὁρῶ δὲ οὐ μόνον ἀπὸ λόγων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἀξιολόγους γιγνομένους ἐν τῇ πόλει

At first it would seem that the moral to which Dio leads his audience is that philosophy and παιδεία require that a person experience a great degree of seclusion and retirement (πολλῆς ἐρημίας τε καὶ ἀναχωρήσεως) in a very literal sense (11). Yet as Dio develops the argument, a different meaning is unveiled:

Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ γε ὁρῶ καὶ τοὺς πλησίον τῆς θαλάττης οὐδὲν πάσχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ διανοεῖσθαι δυναμένους ἃ βούλονται διανοεῖσθαι καὶ λέγοντας καὶ ἀκούοντας καὶ καθεύδοντας ὅποτε αὐτοῖς ἢ καιρός, ὅτι οὐδὲν οἴονται προσήκειν αὐτοῖς τοῦ ψόφου τούτου οὐδὲ φροντίζουσιν. εἰ δέ γε ἐβούλοντο προσέχειν ὅποτε μείζων ἢ ἐλάττων γίγνοιτο ἦχος ἢ διαριθμεῖν τὰ κύματα τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἢ τοὺς λάρους τε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὄρνεα ὁρᾶν, ὅπως ἐπιπέτονται ἐπὶ τὰ κύματα καὶ νήχονται ῥαδίως ἐπ' αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἂν ἦν αὐτοῖς σχολὴ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖν.

(Yet I, at least, see that those who are close to the sea suffer no ill effects [from its noise], but are able to think about what they want to think, and they speak, listen, and sleep whenever it is appropriate for them, because they think that nothing of this noise is relevant to them and they do not think of it. Certainly, if they wanted to pay attention whenever the sound of the sea grows louder or quieter or to count the crashing waves or to watch the seagulls and the rest of the birds, how they fly over the waves and swim easily on them, they would not have the leisure to do anything else, *Or.* 20.12).

It follows from this that people are (or rather should become) accustomed to the environmental noises of their vicinity if they wish to accomplish anything and not to be wholly distracted by their environment. And if those who live near the sea ought not to be troubled by its sounds, it follows that the town dweller ought not to be troubled by the city's commotion (ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοῦ θορύβου, 13). Those, then, who wish to study φιλοσοφία and παιδεία (11) need not seek study-spaces outside the city but instead they should, and can, cultivate this state of reflection in their minds, a state untroubled by urban commotion (13-4). The audience of this speech, the city-dwellers, are exhorted towards philosophy as a goal they can each achieve within the city.

That this is not a general exhortation to the audience to seek a school of philosophy is clear from the argument that begins to develop earlier in the speech. It is civic space itself that becomes a school. Arguing for the need to ignore external disturbances, Dio comments on what he sees around him: teachers of all sorts who maintain their concentration even amidst great urban clamour:

ὁ τε αὐλῶν ἢ διδάσκων αὐλεῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖ, πολλάκις ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ὁδοῦ τὸ διδασκαλεῖον ἔχων, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτὸν ἐξίστησι τὸ πλῆθος οὐδὲ ὁ θόρυβος τῶν παριόντων, ὁ τε ὀρχούμενος ὁμοίως ἢ ὀρχηστοδιδάσκαλος πρὸς τούτῳ ἐστίν, ἀμελήσας τῶν μαχομένων τε καὶ ἀποδιδομένων καὶ ἄλλα πραττόντων, ὁ τε κιθαριστὴς ὁ τε ζωγράφος· ὁ δὲ πάντων

σφοδρότατόν ἐστιν· οἱ γὰρ τῶν γραμμάτων διδάσκαλοι μετὰ τῶν παίδων ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς κάθηνται, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς ἐμποδὼν ἐστὶν ἐν τοσοῦτῳ πλήθει τοῦ διδάσκειν τε καὶ μανθάνειν. (a person who plays the flute or rather teaches to play does exactly that [i.e. he is not disturbed], he holds his school on the very street, and not at all does the crowd distract him nor the uproar of those passing by, and likewise the dancer or the dance teacher is engaged in his own activity, neglectful of those arguing, selling, or doing other things, and so is the lute-player and so the painter. And this is the most extreme case of all: for the elementary teachers sit with their pupils in the streets, and even amidst such a great crowd nothing hampers them from teaching and learning, 9).

Proper teaching occurs on the streets, and one should not seek a closed and removed space for it. Philosophy and *paideia*, then, just like all other subjects, need only a teacher who can locate his metaphorical διδασκαλεῖον on the street. We have discussed above (chapter 2.3) how Dio presented the context of his speeches, delivered amidst other performers and educators. These occasions (*Orr.* 8 and 12) were the Pan-Hellenic Games.<sup>14</sup> *Oration* 20, like *Oration* 32 we discussed in Chapter 1, reveals the same performative context, only within the city's confines:

ἤδη δέ ποτε εἶδον ἐγὼ διὰ τοῦ ἵπποδρόμου βαδίζων πολλοὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνθρώπους ἄλλον ἄλλο τι πράττοντας, τὸν μὲν αὐλοῦντα, τὸν δὲ ὀρχούμενον, τὸν δὲ θαῦμα ἀποδιδόμενον, τὸν δὲ ποίημα ἀναγινώσκοντα, τὸν δὲ ᾄδοντα, τὸν δὲ ἱστορίαν τινὰ ἢ μῦθον διηγούμενον· καὶ οὐδὲ εἷς τούτων οὐδένα ἐκώλυσε προσέχειν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ προκείμενον πράττειν.

(once I saw as I was walking through the hippodrome many people who in the same place were doing different things; one was playing the flute, the other was dancing, this one was performing a trick, and another was reciting a poem, whereas someone was singing and some other was telling some story or myth. None of them hindered any other from concentrating on himself and performing the task in front of him, 20.10).

There is no reason to think that the narration of this past event was not also set in exactly the same context. Dio depicts himself as part and parcel of the city's public life, a kind of διδάσκαλος, philosophising amidst the din of other speakers, performers, and merchants.

<sup>14</sup> The, possibly, Isthmian or Corinthian context of *Or.* 8, where Diogenes visits the Isthmian Games, and the context of *Or.* 12, where Dio comments on the situation around him at the Olympic Games.

This sets Dio apart from his contemporaries. For his teacher, Musonius, philosophy is best taught in the countryside, away from the city's commotion.<sup>15</sup> In addition, for Musonius, much like what we see in other contemporary philosophers, countryside philosophical lives are best for teaching since the students are able to see their teacher in the context of his own life and work and so learn by example (Muson. 11. 43ff).<sup>16</sup> If Dio managed to present an example to his audience, it was embodied in his activity as a philosopher within their own open civic space. The students, moreover, are not only those who attend the school, but the community as a whole owing to the nature of public speech, which is most unlike contemporary philosophers and much like the sophists, whose public performances were seen as tantamount to their classroom teachings.<sup>17</sup>

Indeed, Dio was different from others who called themselves teachers as well. Aelius Aristides, a generation or two later, will straightforwardly describe himself as a διδάσκαλος (*Or.* 31.7). However, unlike Dio, Aristides was interested in his literary production more as a text than as a speech: 'a pure lover of speeches, concerned with his literary afterlife and devoted to the production of exemplary speeches for future generations'.<sup>18</sup> Dio, on the other hand, was far more concerned with the act of delivering a speech as an educational act (educating the audience in front of him) rather than with the fortune of his literary production, as is revealed by his awareness of, and indifference to, the (mis)use of his speeches (see more below).<sup>19</sup>

To return to Dio and to his metaphorical διδασκαλεῖον, *Oration* 20 offers us more than an image of the philosopher-teacher in his civic context. In discussing *Or.* 8 (in Chapter 2), we noted how Dio separated himself from Diogenes when his speech narrated the abrupt ending of Diogenes' philosophising. Diogenes was useful for the intellectual battles of the time as Dio both affiliated himself with him and dismissed him according to his needs. In *Or.* 20, where Dio speaks *in propria persona* throughout, he positively situates himself among those other

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<sup>15</sup> Reydam-Schils 2017, 528. Dio's 7<sup>th</sup> *Oration*, *Euboicus*, is his own example of an idyllic countryside life. Indeed, it might not be a mere rhetorical exercise but a genuine rendition of Dio's thoughts about the qualities and benefits of this bucolic and poor life (Jones 1978, 56, 60). The speech, however, was presented in a civic context, and as John Ma has shown, it is just as much an exploration of political ideas proper to *polis* life (Ma 2000). Moreover, as Desideri writes, upon returning to the city, that is in post wandering-years whence the major bulk of our corpus comes from, Dio saw the city as the important centre for his activity – not least, perhaps, because the common opinion that it was inferior to the countryside and so there was a need to educate it, (Desideri 2000 esp. 103ff.). Thus, even if the teaching of a philosopher like Musonius were only set in the countryside as an ideal whereas in practice they were given in some form of a civic context (e.g., a classroom within the city), Dio still stands apart from him.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Sen. *Ep.* 6.6.

<sup>17</sup> Anderson 1989, 90; Winter 2002, 30–31. An important difference between Dio and the sophists was that Dio made no distinction among the audience: they were all taken as students.

<sup>18</sup> Sánchez Hernández 2016, 228.

<sup>19</sup> *Or.* 42.4–5. Dio's tone is very indifferent to the fortune of his speeches.

public performers almost as one of them. This image of day-to-day activity in the city, not taking place in relation to any festival or special occasion, should indicate for us the context of many of Dio's speeches.<sup>20</sup> *Oration* 19, although it is incomplete, is a case in point:

In this *Oration*, Dio creates a hierarchy between orators (ῥήτορες), sophists, and musicians (κιθαρωδοί), whose performances Dio admits enjoying (3). The hierarchy is created by a straightforward comparison between the qualities of each (4-5) and sets Dio on top by the factitious claim of having no public speaking abilities himself (τὸ αὐτὸς ἀδύνατος εἶναι λέγειν, 4). The irony is revealed by the metaphor Dio uses to describe his enjoyment of sophists' declamations: καθάπερ οἱ πτωχοὶ καὶ τοὺς μετρίως εὐπόρους μακαρίζουσι διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀπορίαν ('just as beggars think that those who are moderately well-off are blessed because of their own lack of means', 4). Thus, the sophists' abilities are, in fact, displayed only μετρίως, allowing Dio, the feigned πτωχός, to enjoy them.<sup>21</sup>

This is an additional hierarchy to those we have seen Dio construct in Alexandria (Chapter 1) and in the various *Orations* discussed in Chapter 2. Whereas philosophers are not mentioned we find other forms of performers: be it the κιθαρωδοί or the comic and tragic poets who are brought in before the speech abruptly ends. These, similarly to what we have seen in *Orr.* 8 and 20, belong in the group of general civic performers. Dio, therefore, situates himself as offering more than these performers, just as he does with other categories of performers and intellectuals. The description of the musician's performance at Cyzicus (to where Dio came in his wandering period so that his friends could meet him) is very telling regarding the context of public performances in which Dio locates himself. The musician is described as having attracted no fewer than three thousand people (3). We do not know if Dio ever amassed such an audience and to what extent this number was an exaggeration to begin with. But this is the performative contest and context into which Dio inserted himself. A broad setting, in which he performs as a guide not only for policy making in a city's Assembly or Council, but to vast collections of audiences. This is Dio's idea of the civic space as the school of philosophy.

The content of Dio's teachings (his focus on philosophy and *paideia*) is, naturally, another way for him to make it clear that, as a philosopher, he is at the top of the performative hierarchy. Returning to *Oration* 20, we find Dio insisting on indicating himself as a performer-teacher whose subject matter is of a higher value than the content performed by the rest of the

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<sup>20</sup> *Orr.* 16, 52-4, 57, 62-6, 68-9, 71-2, 75-6, and 79-80 are, almost all, speeches concerned with philosophical issues. All of them were delivered in a time and place unknown to us. *Orations* 20 and *Oration* 19 are revealing, however, of the civic context in which these were delivered.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *Orr.* 9.8, 9 for πτωχός in the *persona* of Diogenes and 13.11 (about Dio himself).



performers. Dio's teachings, although general and aimed at big audiences, concentrate and settle the soul, and allow it to disregard all other matters (συνάγει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ καθίστησι καὶ καταφρονεῖν ποιεῖ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων). No other performance achieves this (*Or.* 20. 11). But this phrasing can tell us more than simply what philosophy is able to achieve. We shall now leave *Oration* 20 and look at two other speeches which will serve as more concrete examples of how Dio spoke to his audiences not as individuals capable of turning to philosophy, but as individuals who are part of a community who can become philosophically-minded. In this, again, Dio takes an alternate course to traditional philosophy. From at least the days of Plato, philosophy always had the soul in its crosshairs. And Dio here speaks in a vaguely Platonic fashion of concentrating the soul.<sup>22</sup> But philosophy was more often than not interested in the individual soul,<sup>23</sup> whereas Dio, I would like to argue, did not share this interest when he spoke in front of public gatherings.<sup>24</sup> Speaking ἐν μέσῳ in civic context, individuals seem to be of importance to Dio only as members of the community. His philosophy was geared towards encouraging the community as a whole to operate philosophically, rather than to succeed with just one or a handful of individuals within it.

#### 4.2 The soul of the community

We begin with *Oration* 33 which was delivered at Tarsus upon request in front of the city's Assembly (1). Unlike the following speech in the corpus which was delivered at Tarsus as well and was meant to deal with a political issue,<sup>25</sup> the *First Tarsic*, as it is called, is concerned with a problem of morals.<sup>26</sup> Dio focuses on a phenomenon, notoriously ambiguous for the modern reader, which he calls ῥέγκειν, literally meaning 'to snort' or 'to snore', but in the context of this speech this verb covers a greater spectrum of meanings and has been accorded a wide range of interpretations.<sup>27</sup> What interests us, however, is not the specific meaning of the action, but rather Dio's connection between individual and community.

To be sure, Tarsus' problem and its consequence are discussed from a philosophical point of view. They cannot be fixed by the city's splendours, luxury, and material success but only by Dio's refashioning of the audience as a philosophically-minded community: τροφή, an

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Hadot 2002, 67.

<sup>23</sup> Hadot 2002, 104; Trapp 2007a, 28-9.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Reydam-Schils 2017, esp. 535.

<sup>25</sup> See section 4.3.2.

<sup>26</sup> Jones 1978, 73-74.

<sup>27</sup> Cohoon and Crosby 1940, 273; Kim 2013, 40-42 argues, rather persuasively, that Dio, in fact, avoided defining the phenomenon on purpose. For the different meanings suggested in the literature, see: 33-4, nn. 5-13.

anti-philosophical characteristic,<sup>28</sup> crops up a number of times in the speech as ruinous,<sup>29</sup> we learn that εὐδαιμονία is what should be sought, and we hear that σωφροσύνη καὶ νοῦς ἐστὶ τὰ σῶζοντα (‘prudence and reason are the saviours’, 33. 28) of the city. At the end of the speech, in describing the stages of the city’s moral descent, Dio points to a choice of some people to conduct themselves at variance with nature: trimming their long hair (and then shaving themselves completely, §63ff.), which from the point of view of an imperial philosopher is a double offence since living κατὰ φύσιν and the growing of one’s hair were considered to be philosophical indicators.<sup>30</sup> With this in mind we can proceed to see how Dio unifies the community under its problem and its proposed solution.

Accusing his audience of this vice of ῥέγκειν, Dio raises a possible objection from the audience:

καίτοι πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαί τινων ἔστι· μὴ γὰρ ἡμεῖς μόνοι μεταβεβλήκαμεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἅπαντες. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καθάπερ εἴ τις ἐν λοιμῷ διὰ τὸ πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους νοσεῖν μηδεμίαν ἐθέλοι ποιεῖσθαι πρόνοιαν, ὥστε αὐτὸς ὑγιαίνειν, ἢ νῆ Δία ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμαζόμενος, ἔπειτα πάντας ὀρῶν τοὺς ἐν τῇ νηὶ κινδυνεύοντας ἀμελοῖ τῆς σωτηρίας. τί δέ; ἂν ὅλος καταδύηται στόλος, διὰ τοῦτο ἥττον ἐστὶν ἄτοπον τὸ ξυμβαῖνον;

(Indeed, it is often possible to hear people say: ‘May it be that it isn’t just we alone who have changed [for the worse], but more or less everyone’. Well, this thing is just the same if someone, at the time of a plague, because all or the majority are ill, would not want to give any thought as to making himself healthy. Or, by Zeus, when someone is tossed by storm at sea, when he sees that everyone on board is at peril, will have no care for his own safety. What? If a whole fleet sinks under, is the calamity less harmful? 33. 30)

It is very unlikely that the entire community was afflicted by this vice. Indeed, we will soon see that Dio singles out those who were. Posing this rhetorical question allows Dio to claim that whereas each individual must take care of their own person, it is in fact the case that the vice of one is the vice of all and the common imagery of a ship in a storm is evoked here to remind the audience that even if some of them have no part in the shameful action, they are nonetheless affected by it as a whole, unified community.

If, then, one will say that it is indeed a matter only for those who commit the odious act to cease from it, then Dio disagrees explicitly:

ἐγὼ δέ φημι τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον αἰσχρὰν τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖν καὶ δημοσίᾳ καταισχύνειν, καὶ τὴν μεγίστην ὕβριν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα ὑβρίζειν τοὺς μεθ’ ἡμέραν τούτους κοιμωμένους

<sup>28</sup> Lucian, *Dial. mort.* 20.6-8.

<sup>29</sup> *Or.* 33.15, 22-3, 25, 26, 27, 28.

<sup>30</sup> Branham and Goulet-Cazé 1996, 26.

(But I say that this action shames the city, and brings dishonour to the public, and that these daytime-snorers [lit. sleepers] inflict the greatest harm upon the city, *Or.* 33. 34).<sup>31</sup>

Although it is only a group of people that share in the affliction actively, the result of it is to do with the entire community: the city (πόλις), the people (δῆμος), the fatherland (πατρίς).

A final remark about the *First Tarsic* as a testimony for Dio's view of the community as a unified body stems from his assertion of authority. I have mentioned above that Dio speaks as a philosopher. At whatever date the speech was delivered,<sup>32</sup> Dio's claim to authority was based on his identity as a philosopher: he looks like one and he operates like one, which is to say he is bearded and unkempt, and he will tell harsh truths unlike other intellectuals around him (1-7).<sup>33</sup> Yet there is more to it than that: as part of an initial *recusatio*, while claiming that it is often best for the philosopher to keep silent (8), Dio makes a comparison between the philosopher, here Socrates, and the comic poets of Athens:

σκοπεῖτε δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα οἷόν ἐστιν. Ἀθηναῖοι γὰρ εἰωθότες ἀκούειν κακῶς, καὶ νῆ Δία ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο συνιόντες εἰς τὸ θέατρον ὡς λοιδορηθησόμενοι, καὶ προτεθεικότες ἀγῶνα καὶ νίκην τοῖς ἄμεινον αὐτὸ πράττουσιν, οὐκ αὐτοὶ τοῦτο εὐρόντες, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῦ συμβουλευσάντος, Ἀριστοφάνους μὲν ἤκουον καὶ Κρατίνου καὶ Πλάτωνος, καὶ τούτους οὐδὲν κακὸν ἐποίησαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ Σωκράτης ἄνευ σκηνῆς καὶ ἰκρίων ἐποίει τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πρόσταγμα, οὐ κορδακίζων οὐδὲ τερετίζων, οὐχ ὑπέμειναν. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ὑφορώμενοι καὶ δεδιότες τὸν δῆμον ὡς δεσπότην ἐθώπευον, ἡρέμα δάκνοντες καὶ μετὰ γέλωτος, ὥσπερ αἱ τίτθαι τοῖς παιδίοις, ὅταν δέῃ τι τῶν ἀηδεστέρων πιεῖν αὐτά, προσφέρουσι μέλιτι χρίσασαι τὴν κύλικα. τοιγαροῦν ἐβλαπτον οὐχ ἥττον ἢ περ ὠφέλουν, ἀγερωχίας καὶ σκωμμάτων καὶ βωμολοχίας ἀναπιμπλάντες τὴν πόλιν. ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος ἤλεγχε καὶ ἐνουθέτει. (See of what nature the issue is: the Athenians were accustomed to hear themselves abused, and, by Zeus, they used to convene at the theatre for this purpose so as to be berated, and they set up competitions establishing victory for those who were better at berating, not coming up with the idea themselves, but because a god so suggested. They listened to Aristophanes, Cratinus, and Plato and did nothing injurious to these men. But when Socrates, without the apparatus of the stage, did the bidding of the god, not dancing or humming tunes [as on the comic stage] the Athenians did not suffer him. For the comic poets, suspicious and afraid, flattered the people as they would a despot, biting but gently and with humour, just as the wet-nurses, whenever there is a need for the children to drink something

<sup>31</sup> See also §29. Cf. Kim 2013, 45.

<sup>32</sup> There is a disagreement among scholars. Some set the speech in the time of Vespasian and some in that of Trajan. For a recent discussion (with bibliography) see: Bost-Pouderon 2006, II: 11-40.

<sup>33</sup> ὅταν δὲ αὐχμηρόν τινα καὶ συνεσταλμένον ἴδῃτε καὶ μόνον βαδίζοντα ('whenever you see someone who is unkempt, tucked under his cloak, and strolls alone', 33.14).

disagreeable, they smear the edges of the cup with honey. The comedians, therefore, harmed no less than they benefitted the people, filling up the city with arrogance, gibes, and buffoonery. The philosopher, on the other hand, accused and admonished, 33. 9-10).

As is often the case, Dio is a little bit of both in this anecdote. Like Socrates, he is a philosopher who chides his audience. Unlike him (in this example), and like the comedians, his speech is often humorous. Unlike Socrates, he was invited to speak and hence, like the comic poets speaks from a position of safety. We are already familiar with this Dionic strategy, which situates him as a better intellectual than all the rest, past and present. But the comparison with poets such as Aristophanes adds something more. On the surface, of course, Dio maintains that he is more like Socrates than a comic poet. But in fact, as mentioned, he spoke from the same position of safety as they did: the safety to criticise that the stage of the festival allowed to the comic poets is the same safety allowed to Dio by the invitation to speak in the city's Assembly. And here is the rub: the public stage of the city's festival was an 'invitation' by the community to the comic poets to address to the community, not as individuals but as a unified *polis*.

Whereas Dio's criticism is better than that of the comic poets (as a philosopher) making him, as usual, a better educator, like the poets he aims his arrows at the city as a whole and not towards individuals, in an attempt to transform it into a community led by philosophical reasoning and precepts.

To round up our discussion we return now to the end of *Oration* 13 and to the completion of Dio's narrative of transition into a philosopher. Perhaps it is worth mentioning again that the veracity of this narrative is not our concern at all. This end point is what Dio describes as his activity in Rome. Earlier we addressed Dio's comment on his inability to perform philosophy like Socrates in dialogue (κατὰ δύο καὶ τρεῖς) since he was requested to present in public speech form in front of large gatherings (πολλοῖς τε καὶ ἀθροῖς εἰς ταὐτὸ συνιοῦσιν, *Or.* 13. 31). As he does this, Dio establishes himself as the philosopher educator of cities:

δέονται παιδείας κρείττονος καὶ ἐπιμελεστέρας, εἰ μέλλουσιν εὐδαίμονες ἔσεσθαι τῷ ὄντι κατ' ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δόξῃ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων

([I told them that] they are in need of a better and careful education if they want to be in fact truly happy, and not [simply] according to the opinion of the majority of people, 13. 31).

The city, he said, is in need of a teacher – any teacher at first,<sup>34</sup> but as he made clear, it is he that performed as such – to rid it from its moral problems: a physician of the soul (ἰᾶσθαι τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς νόσους, ‘to heal the maladies of the soul’, 32).<sup>35</sup> This educator should be placed on the acropolis and he should, by law (νόμῳ) be visited by the youth and the old together, with the view to making them philosophically-minded as a whole:

προαγορεῦσαι τοὺς νέους ἅπαντας φοιτᾶν παρ’ αὐτὸν καὶ συνεῖναι, καὶ μηδὲν ἥττον τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους, ἕως ἂν ἅπαντες σοφοὶ γενόμενοι καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐρασθέντες, καταφρονήσαντες χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου καὶ ἐλέφαντος καὶ ὄψου δὴ καὶ μύρου καὶ ἀφροδισίων, εὐδαίμονες οἰκῶσι καὶ ἄρχοντες μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον αὐτῶν, ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων.

([I told them] to instruct all of the youth to pay the teacher regular visits and to associate with him [on the acropolis], and not less so to instruct the old as well, until all of them becoming wise, lovers of justice, despisers of gold, silver, ivory, and also of food, perfume, sexual desires, live happily and will be masters first and foremost of themselves, and then of other people, 33).

It is not only, then, the targeting of the Romans in the plural (Ῥωμαῖοις) or his emphasising that he speaks to the city (31) from the most highly raised stage a city could offer – the acropolis – that confirms to us Dio’s understanding of himself as speaking to communities as a whole instead of to individuals. We see that Dio, unlike other intellectuals who focused more on youths as their audiences and students,<sup>36</sup> takes care to mention that his audience ought to comprise both young and old, covering the full spectrum of the community.

Finally, the maladies of each individual’s soul are important to Dio only in so far as each individual is a member of the community as we learn from the metaphor of the ship of state:<sup>37</sup> ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις, ὥσπερ ναὺς κουφισθεῖσα, ἀνακύψει τε καὶ πολὺ ἔσται ἐλαφροτέρα καὶ ἀσφαλεστέρα (‘the entire city, just like a lightened ship, it will rise, and will be much more nimble and strong’, 35). At the peak of his philosophical activity, as it is envisioned at the end

<sup>34</sup> Dio claims that he told the Romans that they should not care whether the teacher is Greek, Roman, Scythian, Indian or anyone else. As long as this teacher instructs them correctly on the right issues (13. 32).

<sup>35</sup> The language is different, but the idea is reminiscent of Aristophanes’ *Frogs*, where poets are described as the educators of adults as teachers are of children (l. 1055). We have noted above how Dio imagines his role as a philosopher to be like that of the poets, active in the public’s eye and aiming at the entire city.

<sup>36</sup> Aristides campaign for a liturgical ‘immunity’ as a teacher was for an ‘appointment he deemed appropriate to his literary and intellectual accomplishments: teacher of the young’, Sánchez Hernández 2016, 229. See also, in respect to Dio and Aristides specifically: Sidebottom 2009, 72. For philosophers in general, see: Trapp 2007b, 9; Trapp 2007a, 18. And Trapp 1997, xxi on Maximus of Tyre.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Trapp 2007a, 193: ‘Outer disorder and disunity is depicted as the reflection and the effect of a disordered inner state; good civic order follows from the recovery of inner poise on the part of each individual citizen’, and 195-9.

of his transition narrative, Dio stands on top of the acropolis, speaking to the city, in order to lift the entire community up and make it stronger. With this idea in mind, we can now turn to inspect some of Dio's interventions as a philosopher in the civic lives of different communities in the Greek east.

#### 4.3 Civic interventions

Bearing in mind Dio's vision of the civic community as capable of becoming philosophical and of the civic space as a school of philosophy, we can now turn to further civic *Orations* in his corpus in addition to the *Alexandrian Oration* (discussed in Chapter 1 and will be further analysed here). Previous readers of these speeches (see notes in each section) have not failed to note either Dio's political goals or his offer of philosophical wisdom to the audiences. These two elements, however, are not sufficiently connected by scholars. My discussion aims to show how it was not only philosophical wisdom that Dio meant to allay civic issues but that it was precisely Dio's philosophical identity that granted him the authority to speak in front of different communities on specific civic matters. This discussion will complete our image of Dio as a philosopher active in civic space.

Except for the discussion of the *Rhodian*, which is somewhat of an exception in the context of Dio's self-fashioning, my main concern is with the opening sections of the speeches. It is in those sections where Dio establishes his identity as a philosopher, that he predicates any advice he has to offer on civic issues on the audiences' acceptance of this identity. All public intellectuals could have turned to philosophical wisdom in their performances basing their authority to speak on a number of different sources (from intellectual credentials to citizen status). Dio, regardless of his status in the various communities in which he speaks (as we have seen even in his hometown), always emphasised that his philosophical wisdom emanates from his identification specifically as a philosopher.

##### 4.3.1– Alexandria: Home and foreign politics

In Chapter 1 we saw how Dio, appearing in Alexandria in the ragged cloak of the philosophers, established an intellectual hierarchy between himself and other philosophers and intellectuals. This hierarchy was not, however, a goal in itself and Dio had rather a different aim: an intervention in home and foreign civic affairs. I believe this intervention (see more below) was made of Dio's own volition and not, as others have argued, with Dio operating as an imperial

emissary of sorts.<sup>38</sup> Whether it was made from a position of conformity of the Greek elite, to which Dio belonged, with the imperial regime,<sup>39</sup> seems, as I will argue, less likely to me. Rather, Dio's appearance before the Alexandrians is based on his vision that the people of Alexandria should live up to the lofty heritage of their city and (cultural) ancestry as Greeks.<sup>40</sup> In other words, Dio appears in Alexandria as a Greek intellectual who argues for the capacity of the community to improve its political life by conducting their affairs in a more philosophical manner.

This is clear from the outset, as even before Dio launches his invective against the philosophers of Alexandria for shying away from their public duty (and the rest of the intellectuals for leading the people astray, see Chapter 1) much like in what we saw from the *First Tarsic*, he compares himself to the comic poets of Classical Athens:

ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε ἐκεῖνοι καὶ πάνυ καλῶς ἐποιοῦν, ὅτι τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἐπέτρεπον μὴ μόνον τοὺς  
κατ' ἄνδρα ἐλέγχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κοινῇ τὴν πόλιν, εἴ τι μὴ καλῶς ἔπραττον·

(Yet, indeed, the Athenians did absolutely well, because they allowed their poets to chastise  
people not only personally, but even the city altogether if they did something unseemly, 32.  
6)

Two quotations immediately follow, one from Aristophanes and one from Eupolis; the former targeting the people of Athens as a collective gathered on the Pnyx (δῆμος πυκνίτης, 32. 6), the latter addressing the Athenians as a whole (τί δ' ἔστ' Ἀθηναίοισι).<sup>41</sup> If anyone therefore, seeing Dio in the garb of the Cynic, thought that what was about to follow is a philosophical questioning of an individual (κατ' ἄνδρα ἐλέγχειν), Dio immediately makes it clear that it is the community as whole, the *polis* as a collective of people, that he targets. He appears before the Alexandrian *dēmos*, as the chorus, or poet, or any other form of critic that they lack as a political entity (32. 7).<sup>42</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Desideri 1978 and 2000 (68ff.; 95-99, respectively); Jones 1978 (44); Winter 2002 (42).

<sup>39</sup> Desideri 1978, 91-92. The accepted wisdom is that the Greek elite had stakes in a state of quiet and stability in their cities because it lessened interference from Roman officials (von Arnim 1898, 435-38; Bowersock 1969, 111).

<sup>40</sup> For example, *Or.* 32. 3, or in §40, Dio's concern with what other nations will say about the Alexandrians, making them representatives of the Greeks. Trapp (1995) shows how Dio subverts the encomiastic genre in order to chastise the Alexandrians. The result is an argument which, among other issues, points to the current Alexandrians' failure to live up to their city's reputation and history.

<sup>41</sup> Quoted from *Knights*, 42, and Eupolis (fr. 217, Kock 1880).

<sup>42</sup> ὑμῖν δὲ οὔτε χορός ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος οὔτε ποιητὴς οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς, ὃς ὑμῖν ὀνειδιεῖ μετ' εὐνοίας καὶ φανερά ποιήσει τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἀρρωστήματα ('But for you, there is no such [critical] chorus, nor poet, or anyone else, who will chastise you with goodwill and will make clear the moral infirmities of the city', 32.7. For ἀρρωστήματα as a moral infirmity, see: LSJ A2).

The establishment of his identity as a philosopher then takes its place (see Chapter 1), and once the identity is affirmed, Dio turns to count the problems which arise from the philosophers of Alexandria neglecting of their public duty; their seclusion and silence (διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων [sc. φιλοσόφων] ἀναχώρησιν καὶ σιωπὴν, 32. 19).<sup>43</sup> This list of problems, again, is a testimony to how Dio cares not for the individual and how to improve his life but rather the *dēmos* as a political community:

ἐρίδων ὑμῖν φύεται πλῆθος καὶ δικῶν καὶ βοή τραχεῖα καὶ γλῶτται βλαβεραὶ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι  
κατήγοροι, συκοφαντήματα, γραφαί, ῥητόρων ὄχλος  
(a multitude of strife and lawsuits arises in you, harsh cry and harmful tongues, licentious  
accusers, calumnies, indictments, and a mob of orators, 32.19).

Dio appears as a philosopher, and speaks about λόγος and παιδεία as the solutions to the problems (§§3, 16, 60),<sup>44</sup> but the problems themselves are of a political nature not only in the broad sense of taking place in the *polis*, but in the sense that they cannot take place without a *polis* and have to do with civic life. Dio's philosophical identity, and the authority which emanates from it, are put to use to directly tackle political issues.

We shall return to this argument in a moment. For now, we continue with Dio's own trajectory, which further develops his authority to speak and strengthens my reading of his appearance as a voluntary act, stemming from a belief in a shared Hellenic heritage between him and his audiences. Philosophy, as a public performance in front of the community, now supersedes place of other performances. We can see that in the first problem Dio marks out in the nature of the Alexandrians and their love of musical performances. It is impossible, Dio claims, to address the multitudes (μυριάσιν ἀνθρώπων) in Alexandria without a song or a lyre (χωρὶς ᾠδῆς καὶ κιθάρας). As a public speaker, Dio of course lacks these:

ἐγὼ γοῦν, εἰ ἦν ᾠδικός, οὐκ ἂν δεῦρο εἰσηλθὼν δίχα μέλους τινὸς ἢ ᾠματος. νῦν δὲ τούτου  
μὲν ἀπορῶ τοῦ φαρμάκου· θεὸς δ', ὅπερ ἔφη, θάρρησαί μοι παρέσχε,ν,  
(I, however, if I were musical, I wouldn't come here without a tune or a song. As of yet, I  
lack this cure. However, as I said, a god provided me with confidence to make myself  
available [to you], 32.21).<sup>45</sup>

<sup>43</sup> We recall from the first section of this chapter that true ἀναχώρησις for Dio, in terms of philosophical activity, is not at all a removal of oneself from the city or shying away from the public space, but rather the exact opposite.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. von Arnim, 436 on §60: *Denn παιδεία steht hier im Sinne ethischer Bildung, wie oft bei Dio [...], und λόγος ist der φιλόσοφος λόγος*. See also: Jones 1978, 44; Moles 1978, 88, and Trapp 1995, 167–68.

<sup>45</sup> Note the use of παρέχω, which was part of Dio's vocabulary for describing the activity of the philosopher (Chapter 2.2).



This is a classic piece of philosophical self-deprecating irony. The irony, i.e., Dio's concealed knowledge of himself as in fact *ῥηδίκος*, is short-lived however, and once it has served its rhetorical purpose of a claim to no professional knowledge it is immediately exposed when three Homeric quotations are weaved into the speech (§§21-23). Aside from revealing, again, Dio's highly cultivated version of philosophy, which is a mix of genres and sources, these quotations also swap the musical performance of a bard (which the Alexandrians admire) with the performance of the philosopher. Like the Homeric voice, Dio invokes his divine inspiration (*θεός*) and (surely in the performance itself) recites the hexameters. Although not accompanied by an instrument, this was yet a recital of an *ῥῆσμα*, which Dio claims to lack and that without which, he would not dare to come in front of the audience. Thus, rather cunningly, Dio's philosophy takes the place of song as an authority to appear before the Alexandrians.<sup>46</sup>

As a side note, that the inspiration is divine and that the quotations are Homeric seem to me more important as sources of authority than any suggestion by scholars for any imperial power behind Dio.<sup>47</sup> A divine mission, as is clear from Dio's own use of the tradition, was a familiar philosophical trope and the turn to Homer is a turn to the most common Hellenic denominator. Appearing in Alexandria is therefore some form of a Hellenic mission for Dio himself.

To return to Dio's conquest of the civic sphere over the musicians, like with the public performers Dio equates himself with in *Oration* 20, here as well he claims that he has more to offer. Listening to him will make the Alexandrians *οὐ μόνον κρουμάτων ἔμπειροι καὶ ὀρχημάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγων φρονίμων* ('experienced not only with tunes and dances, but with thoughtful words', 32. 24).<sup>48</sup> The Alexandrian theatre, therefore, is turned into a philosophical school. But this is not enough. Dio must further establish himself as a specific kind of philosopher. It is not sufficient to appear in the garb of a philosopher, nor to claim to be better than all other intellectuals (philosophers or not) or even to cunningly prove to be a philosophical bard of sagacious words. If the audience now sees him as a philosopher, Dio

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<sup>46</sup> On this as well as on Dio's views on music and musical performance, see: Kasprzyk and Vendries 2012, 89–92. Especially interesting are the comments on the connection Dio makes between the harmony of the city and the audience, and harmony in music. In the first *Kingship* Dio compares his philosophy to musical performance and its ability to induce good action. He does so by opening with the anecdote about Timotheus the flute-player inciting Alexander the Great.

<sup>47</sup> von Arnim (1898) suggested that Dio was a representative of Trajan (435-8); Desideri (1978) argued that Dio acted as a voice of the imperial regime, aiming of relieving social tensions that were aggravated by Cynic 'street philosophers' (91-93); Winter (2002) read *θεός* as standing for Vespasian, 42.

<sup>48</sup> Mind that Dio did not contrast the contribution of his performance to that of a musician, but marked it as having an added value (*οὐ μόνον...ἀλλὰ...*).

must make sure he is not mistaken for other philosophers and that his speech does not only address the *dēmos* as a political community but that its content is in fact political:

σαφέστερον δ' ὑμῖν, εἰ βούλεσθε, διελεύσομαι περὶ δήμου φύσεως, τοῦτ' ἔστι περὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν. καὶ γὰρ ἔν τι τῶν χρησίμων ἐστὶ καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήσειεν ἢ περὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς εἰ λέγοιμι

(If you wish, I will explain to you more clearly the nature of the *dēmos*, that is the nature of you yourselves. For this thing belongs with beneficial matters and [in speaking of which] I will offer you more help than if I were to speak about the sky and the earth, 32. 25).

That an audience could have expected specific topics to be discussed by specific intellectuals is well known. Having established himself as a philosopher it would not have been a farfetched assumption on the side of the audience that he will speak about the sky and the earth. That these are the issues that philosophers speak about was a running joke since, at least, the first performance of Aristophanes' *Clouds*, where Socrates and his 'Thoughtery' students are thoroughly engaged with their study. More relevantly, a cosmological discussion of this sort is where Dio ends his *Borystheniticus*. This is not so much a moment of inconsistency in Dio's thought as an example of how different aims require different means. The *Borystheniticus*, as discussed above, was a theoretical exploration of ideas about the *polis* and its nature which was delivered in Prusa. As Trapp has shown, the cosmological myth narrated at the end of it did not move away from this theme but rather raised more questions about it.<sup>49</sup> Speaking in the midst of public performances in Alexandria, tackling concrete issues, Dio must set himself apart from any such discussion. The only nature (φύσις) he can talk about is that of the people of Alexandria as a *dēmos*, that is as a political entity.

With this explanation of the nature of the *dēmos* (concluding in section 29), Dio wraps up the exposition and moves to discuss the actual problems he finds in the Alexandrian people. We have already noted some of them (general ones, resulting from the withdrawal of philosophers from the civic space) and noted their relation to the fabric of the civic life of the *polis* (lawsuits, sycophancy, and the like). Yet as the speech now progresses, we come to learn that the Alexandrians are mainly rebuked for their behaviour in the theatre or in the races. The question, which Dio rhetorically puts in the mouth of his audience, is why the unruly conduct of the Alexandrians should, in what is essentially entertainment, be so harmful (32. 33). And we can ask whether it is really the case that moralistic reproof of behaviour in the games can affect civic life. The answer reveals how this was, to Dio's mind, exactly so: that poor moral

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<sup>49</sup> Trapp 2007a, 188.

conduct in entertainment can harm civic life and that a philosophical reproach thus not only rectifies this behaviour but improves the life of the people, as a political unit, in the *polis*.

Dio's reasonings spans over 40-odd passages (beginning with behaviour in the theatre before he moves to the issues at the races). In counting the problems which stem from the Alexandrian behaviour he moves between general, mythological, and historical examples. It is on the last set that we will focus, specifically the set of historical examples that relate to the Alexandrians themselves since this shows exactly why for Dio, his moral reproof equals a political intervention.

Dio starts by emphasising the fact that the Alexandrians act as they do in public places for all the world to see (§35).<sup>50</sup> This is a matter of Hellenic pride.<sup>51</sup> The second element is the (morally, which can lead to physically) destructive nature of infatuation with entertainment (§47f.). Then comes the morally depraved character of the spectacles themselves (αἰσχροὶ καὶ μεστὰ πάσης ὕβρεως, §50). A comparison between how those of sound mind (τοὺς σώφρονας) conduct themselves in all aspects of life versus the conduct of all others follows (§53). This leads Dio to narrate several (mythological and historical) examples of good and bad behaviour (Nero, the Spartans, and a tale of Orpheus appear among other anecdotes, §§60-7). Finally, through these examples, Dio reaches the Alexandrians themselves. He recounts two incidents. The first has to do with King Ptolemy XII Auletes, 'The Piper'.

ὅτε γὰρ καθ' αὐτοὺς ἦτε, οὐχ ὁ μὲν βασιλεὺς ὑμῶν περὶ αὐλῆσιν ἡσχολεῖτο καὶ μόνῳ τούτῳ προσεῖχεν, ὑμεῖς δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἀπεχθῶς, πρὸς ἀλλήλους δὲ στασιαστικῶς διέκεισθε, χωρὶς ἕκαστοι καὶ καθ' αὐτοὺς διαφθείροντες τὰ πράγματα, Σιμάριστοι καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα ἐταιρειῶν ὀνόματα· ὥστε φυγεῖν αὐτὸν ἠναγκάσατε καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα κατιέναι πολέμῳ καὶ διὰ Ῥωμαίων; καὶ τέλος ἐκεῖνος μὲν αὐλῶν, ὑμεῖς δὲ ὀρχούμενοι τὴν πόλιν ἀπωλέσατε.

(Because when you were independent: did your king not pass his time in pipe-playing and engage himself solely with this, and you, while hostile towards him, were amongst yourselves in a state of civic discord, each group – Simaristes and other such names of factions – separately and independently ruining the state, so that you forced your king to flee

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<sup>50</sup> ὅρῳ γὰρ ἔγωγε οὐ μόνον Ἕλληνας παρ' ὑμῖν οὐδ' Ἰταλοὺς οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῶν πλησίον Συρίας, Λιβύης, Κιλικίας, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἐκεῖνους Αἰθίοπας οὐδὲ Ἀραβας ἀλλὰ καὶ Βακτρίους καὶ Σκύθας καὶ Πέρσας καὶ Ἰνδῶν τινας, οἱ συνθεῶνται καὶ πάρεσιν ἐκάστοτε ὑμῖν ('For I, indeed, see not only Hellenes and Italians among you, and not only people from the more nearby places such as Syria, Libya, or Cilicia. [I see] not only the Ethiopians who live further away from those, nor the Arabs, but even some people from Bactria, Scythia, Persia, and India', 32.41).

<sup>51</sup> In §41 Dio challenges the audience to think what do those people say about the Alexandrians when they go back to their homelands. In §44 Dio tells the story of Anacharsis, the Scythian sage who is told to have reproved all of the Greeks (τῶν Ἑλλήνων) for their behaviour (the story is found in several sources: Herodotus 4.76-7; Lucian's *Scytha*, *Anacharsis*; Diog. Laërt. 1.104; and in several places in Plutarch).

and after that he returned by warfare and through the aid of the Romans? Eventually, he, on the one hand, by piping and you, on the other hand, by dancing destroyed the *polis*, 32. 70).

Entertainment, we learn from the anecdote, was the cause of Ptolemy's own decline. But more importantly, it was the cause of *stasis*, a state of civic discord in the city, with the Alexandrians fighting among themselves and bringing to ruin the city's affairs (τὰ πράγματα).<sup>52</sup> The destruction of the city, Dio says, was brought about through Ptolemy's flute-playing and the Alexandrians' dancing. It transpires that, the wisdom of the philosopher on matters that seem non-political is highly important for civic life.

Modern historians have mined Dio's text for information about the incident. Their analysis sheds light on Dio's take on it. Fraser, in his seminal history of Alexandria, describes Ptolemy's leaving of Alexandria as strongly connected to his relations with Rome. The king's unpopularity, he writes, derived largely from his 'dependence on Roman favour'. Fraser also detects in Alexandria, for the first time, 'a common movement against the [Roman] intruder', which he sees as manifested in Dio's 'political groups' (ἐταιρειῶν).<sup>53</sup> First, then, we note that for Dio, the Romans are almost completely left out of the narrative, the ἐταιρεῖαι are mentioned only in respect to intra-city discord, and the emphasis is laid on Ptolemy's love of flute-playing.

Siani-Davies, in an article that aims to re-evaluate the rule of Auletes as far less dependent on Roman favour, is in accord with Fraser regarding the fact that it was the actions of the Alexandrians themselves (essentially, their riots) that drove Auletes out. The final sentence in the above quoted passage is adduced as a proof that Auletes' fleeing was the result of his bad relations with his Alexandrine subjects instead of with the Romans.<sup>54</sup> As an historical analysis, this is a valid reading (indeed, Dio himself testifies for the Alexandrians' dislike of the king). Yet again, we note that in that last sentence Dio describes the destruction of the city (and not the exile of the king) as a result of the two participles αὐλῶν and ὀρχούμενοι, revealing his point of emphasis to be the relation between cultural debauchery and political decline.

The second incident follows directly from the last one but is altogether different as it moves from internal to foreign affairs:

καὶ νῦν οὕτως ἐπιεικεῖς ἔχοντες ἡγεμόνας εἰς ὑποψίαν αὐτοὺς καθ' ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἡγάγετε, ὥστε ἐπιμελεστέρας χρῆναι φυλακῆς φήθησαν ἢ πρότερον· καὶ τοῦτο εἵργασθε δι' ἀγερωχίαν, οὐκ ἐπιβουλεύοντες. ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἂν ἀποσταίητέ τινος; πολεμήσατε δ' ἂν ὑμεῖς

<sup>52</sup> *Stasis* was a common theme in Greek political philosophy (Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 14). It was 'abhorred' by Dio (Jones 1978, 95) who, as we will see more below, strived to eliminate it, and achieve *ōmonoia* (concord) in both intra- as well as inter-*polis* politics.

<sup>53</sup> Fraser 1972, 1: 90.

<sup>54</sup> Siani-Davies 1997, esp. 317-8.

μίαν ἡμέραν; οὐκ ἐν τῇ γενομένη παραχῇ μέχρι σκωμμάτων ἐθρασύνοντο οἱ πολλοί, τινὲς δὲ ὀλίγοι βάλλοντες ὃ, τι ἔτυχον ἅπαξ ἢ δίς, ὥσπερ οἱ καταχέοντες τῶν παριόντων, κατέκειντο εὐθὺς ἄδοντες, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄρμους ἤεσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἐορτῇ πιούμενοι; (But now, even though you have such tolerant rulers, you led them towards suspecting you so that they came to think that you are more in need of careful watching than earlier. This you brought about through arrogance, and not through plotting against them. Could you revolt against anybody? Would you fight a single day? Is it not that in the disorder that took place the majority had the courage only to jeer, and only a few hurled whatever projectiles came to hand, only one or twice, like people drenching passers-by with slops, and then immediately lay down and begun singing, and others went to get the garlands, like those drinking in a festival?, 32. 71).<sup>55</sup>

There is not only a switch here between home and foreign politics, Dio also turns his argument on its head: if rowdy behaviour was the source of the problem before, now we can almost say that it is the lack thereof which is rebuked. The Alexandrians are so excessively fond of music, singing, and dancing, that when there comes a time that necessitates their making a violent action, they cannot bring themselves to do so. The arrogance, Dio seems to suggest, is that their over devotion to theatrical performances and other ludic activities led them away from proper care of their affairs. If they had proper care for them, perhaps they would have noticed that there was a need for plotting against or shaking off of foreign rule. In Dio's argument, the Romans are suspicious of a people who accepts their rule over itself.

This is not to say either that Dio encouraged a revolt against Rome or that he himself had any hostility towards the empire.<sup>56</sup> The aim of the paragraph is to answer the rhetorical question of why it is so wrong of the Alexandrians to be so much devoted to performances and to act as they do when attending these.<sup>57</sup> The answer is because it leads to further consolidation of the foreign Roman presence in the city and further restraints on its liberty. Accepting what Dio has to offer will lead the Alexandrians towards greater self-control and autonomy which are, of course, political consequences.

Speaking in Alexandria, Dio tackles the political implications of the *dēmos*' behaviour in their public gatherings. Instead of focusing on a moral reprimand, he expands to matters of

<sup>55</sup> For ὄρμος as 'dance', see: LSJ s.v., A 3.

<sup>56</sup> In general, Dio's attitude towards wars, violence, and civil unrest were similar to those of other contemporary philosophers who objected to these (even if they spoke approvingly on ancient wars or wars fought for the sake of freedom), see: Sidebottom 1993. For Dio's in/hostility towards Rome: Jones 1978, 124-32; Swain 1996, 192-225.

<sup>57</sup> τί δὴ καὶ τούτων ἐπεμνήσθην; ὅπως εἰδῇτε τὰ φνόμενα ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον ταύτης ἀταξίας ('Why, then, did I recall these events? So that you would know the outcomes of this disorder in your lives', 32.73).

relations with Rome and internal strife. By beginning his speech with establishing his identity as a philosopher Dio reveals to us both what he believed to be the place and role of the philosopher in civic space, extending beyond the moral adviser, and what kind of cultural milieu he was active in. If it was the norm for philosophers to intervene in political matters, Dio could have done without a strong insistence on the fact that he is one; his garb or a simple verbal reminder would have been enough. His lengthy exposition shows that the audience came to expect something else from those who identified as philosophers and that Dio attempted to carve out an influential space for himself as a philosopher and for philosophy itself in the civic, political space.

#### 4.3.2 – Tarsus: Civic discord and the philosopher

That Dio's appearance in Tarsus was a political intervention, and that in doing so Dio set himself head-to-head with the political elite of the city, is clear enough from the speech itself and has been analysed thoroughly by scholars.<sup>58</sup> What scholars have found to be at stake for Dio's appearance is the legitimacy of his speech: his source of authority. As with the *Alexandrian Oration* (and as always), Desideri saw Dio as an imperial agent. This has been contested by Salmeri who sees no proof for this assumption.<sup>59</sup> To Salmeri's mind, it is more likely that Dio spoke in Tarsus as a fellow citizen, one who had been given an honorary citizenship, even though Dio makes no mention of it. My focus in this section will be on his sources of authority, contending that it was Dio's identity as a philosopher instead of some other form of more straightforward political authority (i.e., support from the imperial regime or citizen status) and that nonetheless Dio's aim was still a political one: intervention in, and alleviating of, civic discord.

First, there is Dio's deliberate choice to indicate his non-citizen status in the first words of the speech: οὐκ ἄγνοῶ μὲν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ταρσεῖς, ὅτι νομίζεται καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοὺς πολίτας παρίεναι καὶ συμβουλεύειν ('I am aware, people of Tarsus, that it is customary both here and in other places for citizens to come forth and give counsel', 34. 1). This is an apologetic admittance of his lack of citizen status. A custom only needs to be explained where there is a divergence from it. If Dio was a citizen, he would not have to defend his appearance in Tarsus. This is buttressed by his next apologetic remark, which we will soon come to deal with, in relation to his philosophical (indeed, Cynic) guise; Dio had to defend himself against the ill-repute that philosophers and Cynics had in Tarsus (§§2-3). Moreover,

<sup>58</sup> Desideri 1978, 423–30; Jones 1978, 76–82.

<sup>59</sup> Salmeri 2000, 79.

we have evidence that when Dio wanted to mention his citizenship, he did so.<sup>60</sup> In fact, as the opening remarks advance, Dio explicitly says that he has no relation to the people of Tarsus: ἄνδρα δὲ ἀφιγμένον οὕτως καὶ μηδαμόθεν ὑμῖν προσήκοντα ([I], a man who came like this [dressed in the philosopher's garb] and not related to you in any respect, 34.5). Lastly, one argument Dio makes during the speech bears directly on the issue of citizenship – when he advises the Tarsians to enfranchise the linen-workers (§21). Arguing for enfranchisement from ‘inside’, that is as a citizen, would be far more effective. Dio makes no mention of citizenship and this silence speaks volumes since we can expect him to have tried to bolster his argument by any means.<sup>61</sup>

Dio, therefore, was an autonomous agent rather than an imperial one, and the authority on which he relied to allow him to appear before the city was not of a fellow-citizen (honorary or not). Further to the arguments above, this, to my mind, makes more sense if we understand Dio as someone who wished to appear a cosmopolite. Only a different form of authority, one not tied to a city, would have allowed him to speak in cities where he was not a citizen. This authority was that of a philosopher.

To a certain extent my argument here is also at odds with the way Dio was seen by Jones (1978). In a sense, Jones described Dio as a free agent who travelled between the different cities, not all of which he was a citizen and not on behalf of an emperor. Dio is instead portrayed by Jones as speaking on behalf of an ideology, or the idea of (mainly) ‘concord’, ὁμόνοια.<sup>62</sup> Jones sees in Dio a ‘spokesman for a class and time’. That is, for a class who at the time of imperial rule, when Greek cities were quarrelling over petty issues, benefitted from quenching of these rivalries. There is no reason to detach Dio from his ‘class’ (in Jones’ word). Dio was certainly part of the elite and that the elite profited from harmony is a valid point. Jones, however, in portraying Dio as such, detaches him from his intellectual ‘class’ – his intellectual identity as a philosopher.<sup>63</sup>

The *linourgoi* (the linen-workers mentioned above) are a case in point. Dio raises three issues overall in the speech: discord with the Roman governor, discord between Tarsus and neighbouring cities, and discord between different groups and official bodies in Tarsus itself. Under the latter falls, among other issues, the case of the linen-workers who were a

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<sup>60</sup> Speaking in Nicomedia, *Or.* 38, differently to the *Second Tarsic*, Dio highlighted his citizen status in the first sentence of the speech: ὅταν ἐκλογίσωμαι τὰς αἰτίας, ἄνδρες Νικομηδεῖς, δι’ ἧς ἐποιήσασθέ με πολίτην. See more below.

<sup>61</sup> cf. Jones 1978, 76, who sees Dio as a ‘stranger’ in Tarsus.

<sup>62</sup> Jones 1978, 76–94.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Desideri 1978, 116: Dio was able, in order to advance his own agenda, not to defend the privileged class (*‘difendere a oltranza i ceti privilegiati’*).

disenfranchised collective, some of them born in Tarsus and some having lived there for several generations already.<sup>64</sup> Dio encourages the people of Tarsus to grant citizenship to this group (34. 21-3). As Salmeri notes, Dio's rationale seems to be that once this group feels less marginalized, they will cease from their 'riotous behaviour'.<sup>65</sup> Both Jones and Salmeri think that Dio was guided to suggest the enfranchisement of this group not by a philosophical sentiment but rather by a *Realpolitik* understanding of the situation.<sup>66</sup> This view, however, ignores Dio's performance: it ignores, first, the opening of the speech, and second Dio's physical appearance (we will return to both these issues soon). These elements, we will see, indicate his attempt to speak as a philosopher.

We can agree that the idea, insofar as we think of it as the promotion of intra-city harmony, was aligned with elite ideology. Yet, it is possible to press this notion when we remember that the reason why the linen-workers did not, to begin with, qualify for citizenship was that they were poor and did not have the required 500 drachmas to become citizens (§23). If it was in the interest of the Tarsic citizen elite to include this group in their citizen body, there would not have been an issue to begin with. Dio, then, was in line here with the elite agenda only to a certain extent. Moreover, and this is the crucial point for our understanding of Dio's performative political philosophy, in appearing in front of the Assembly in Cynic garb (§2), Dio must have looked to the outsider like one of the poor (πένης) linen-workers. To speak as a poor-looking foreigner about the enfranchisement of the poor ties the argument and the performance together. Since, as we shall soon see, the Cynic appearance was related to Dio's philosophical identity, on which he banked in order to appear in Tarsus, then we can say that at least in part, what gave weight to the argument was Dio's philosophical identity. In other words, the establishment of a philosophical identity at the beginning of the speech, and the (obviously) ongoing appearance as a poor man while delivering it, constantly remind the audience (and us) that Dio appeared in Tarsus not only as a member of the elite but also, and perhaps even more so, as a member of the intellectual group of philosophers. Thus, the sentiment Dio evoked, as Jones writes, perhaps stemmed less from Stoic humanitarianism as from the duties of a politician,<sup>67</sup> yet it was grounded in his identity as a public intellectual, and as a philosopher who understood his mission as political.

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<sup>64</sup> Jones 1978, 80.

<sup>65</sup> Salmeri 2000, 75, n. 112. This follows from Dio's statement that the citizens of Tarsus say that the linen-workers are ὄχλον εἶναι περισσὸν καὶ τοῦ θορύβου καὶ τῆς ἀταξίας αἰτίον ('a useless mass and the cause for the commission and disorder' in the city, 34.21).

<sup>66</sup> Jones 1978, 81.

<sup>67</sup> Jones 1978, 81.



The case of the linen-workers exemplifies, as well as the notion raised above, that Dio spoke from a more cosmopolitan position and could not count on citizenship alone to provide him with the authority to speak and intervene in city-politics. In devaluing census as a qualifier for citizenship, Dio remarks:

εἰ δέ τις ἢ πένης ὢν ἢ πολιτογραφοῦντός τινος οὐ μετείληφε τοῦ ὀνόματος, οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς παρ' ὑμῖν γεγονώς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν προγόνων, οὐχ οἷός ἐστιν ἀγαπᾶν τὴν πόλιν οὐδ' ἡγεῖσθαι πατρίδα

(and if someone, because he is poor or because when someone was drawing up the citizen register he did not qualify for the title, even though not only he himself was born amongst you but his father as well and even his ancestors, it is not possible that he can love the city and think of it as his fatherland, 34. 23).

This is almost exactly the position from which Dio spoke: that of a poor (in demeanour) non-citizen, who harbours great care for the city: τῆς ὑμετέρας ὠφελείας ἔνεκα ἐσπούδακα ('I am eager for your benefit', 34. 4). It is hard not to read in the comment on the linen-workers a comment about Dio's place in the city as an outside counsel.

Finally, we can go back to the beginning of the speech and to examine Dio's remarks on himself. As mentioned, Dio begins apologetically. Not only citizens or the wealthy and respectable are invited to present in Tarsus, he says. Cithara players and pipe players are invited as well, and that is on the basis of their knowledge and skill (ἐπισταμένους καὶ δυναμένους) of their profession (§1). Dio, then, had to show what were his knowledge and skill, yet he was facing a problem: he looked like a Cynic (a choice that is telling of Dio's conviction to speak as a philosopher, since we can imagine he could have avoided this by simply appearing otherwise).

οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο λανθάνει με, ὅτι τοὺς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι σύνηθες μὲν ἐστὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς Κυνικοὺς καλεῖν· οὐ μόνον δὲ οὐδὲν οἶονται διαφέρειν αὐτῶν οὐδ' ἱκανοὺς εἶναι περὶ πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲ σωφρονεῖν ἡγοῦνται, μαινομένους δὲ τινας ἀνθρώπους καὶ ταλαιπώρους εἶναι. σκώπτειν δὲ καὶ καταγελαῖν ἔνιοι τούτων ἐτοίμως ἔχουσι καὶ πολλάκις μὴδὲ σιγῶσιν ἐπιτρέπειν, οὐχ ὅπως λεγόντων ἀνέχεσθαι.

(Nor does it escape me, that most people call Cynics those who customarily appear in this garb. Moreover, not only do people think that Cynics are not one bit better than they are, they also don't think them fit for practical matters but, don't think they are in their right minds at all, and even crazy and wretched people. Some, therefore, readily mock and scorn the Cynics and often they won't even trust them when they are silent, let alone put up with them when they speak, 34. 2).

As in other places, Dio is aware of the fact that his external appearance regularly invites disregard (at best), from an audience. The *captatio benevolentiae* must, therefore, be strong enough to convince the audience that even though he looks like a Cynic he still has the ἐπιστήμη, and the δύναμις to offer it, in respect to τὰ πράγματα in Tarsus.

Dio could have fallen back on his identification as a philosopher in general, as he did in Alexandria where the Cynics – as we have seen – were also marked as a problematic element in the city's intellectual life. Yet, Tarsus presented him with a difficulty in this as well:

ἔτι δέ φασιν ὑμᾶς ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ λίαν παρωξύνθαι πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσόφους καὶ καταρᾶσθαι γε, οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ ἐνίοις αὐτῶν, πάνυ μὲν εὐλαβῶς καὶ μετρίως τοῦτο ποιοῦντας, ὅτι μὴ κοινῇ κατὰ πάντων ἐβλασφημεῖτε, εἴ τι οἱ ἐνθάδε ἡμάρτανον, ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἴσως ἀγνοοῦντας, ὅτι, εἴπερ κατηρᾶσθε, οὐ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις.

(Moreover, it is said that at current time you are very much provoked against the philosophers and even curse, not all, but some of them and you thus show great caution and moderation, in not abusing all philosophers in common, simply because the ones here made some mistake, but are perhaps unaware that that although you cursed, it was not the philosophers you cursed, 34. 3)

The people of Tarsus are at variance with philosophers. To address this, Dio used some flattery – πάνυ μὲν εὐλαβῶς καὶ μετρίως τοῦτο ποιοῦντας – soothing the audience. He suggests that the people of Tarsus are in fact at odds only with some philosophers (this could be a rhetorical trick whereas in fact the Tarsians cursed philosophers κοινῇ κατὰ πάντων). He then points toward a better (indeed, real) philosopher:

οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὐδεὶς φιλόσοφος τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ πονηρῶν, οὐδ' ἂν τῶν ἀνδριάντων περίη γυμνότερος. οἱ δὲ δὴ τὴν πατρίδα βλάπτοντες καὶ συνιστάμενοι κατὰ τῶν πολιτῶν πόρρω που δοκοῦσιν εἶναι μοι τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος.

(For no one is a philosopher who belongs to the unjust and the evil men, not even if he were to go about more naked than statues. Certainly, those who hinder their fatherland and conspire against their fellow citizens do not at all seem to me to come under the title of philosopher, *ibid.*)

Jones believes ('Dio seems to be thinking') that in this passage Dio was still talking about the Cynics because of the reference to nudity.<sup>68</sup> I believe we deal here with philosophers in general, Cynics or otherwise. When speaking in Apamea,<sup>69</sup> Dio addressed a similar issue.

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<sup>68</sup> Jones 1978, 76.

<sup>69</sup> Jones 1978, 65.

His long hair and general appearance might have caused some people to form a specific opinion about him which he had to rebut:

νῦν γὰρ ἴσως ὑπονοοῦσιν εἶναί με τῶν σοφῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα εἰδότην, γελοίῳ καὶ ἀτόπῳ τεκμηρίῳ χρώμενοι, τῷ κομᾶν [...]. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ δέδοικα μὴ οὐδὲν ἢ τοῖς ἀνοήτοις ὄφελος τοῦ κομᾶν, οὐδ' ἂν τὴν καρδίαν αὐτὴν γένωνται δασεῖς  
(Now, perhaps, people surmise that I am one of the wise men and those who know everything, since they employ a ridiculous and irrelevant sign, namely, my [long] hair [...]. Yet I am afraid that there is no benefit for the fools in having long hair, not even if they were to be shaggy in their very heart, 35. 2-3).

The public sphere, being rife with intellectuals whose external appearance could have been recognised and marked by the audiences,<sup>70</sup> forced Dio – in places where intellectual activity might have been more of a nuisance – to insist on the little meaning of trappings and demeanour which he himself also bore.<sup>71</sup> In saying to the Tarsians that nudity counts for naught, Dio rendered his appearance as less important like he did with his long, shaggy hair when speaking in Apamea. It appears that in Tarsus, both the Cynics and philosophers of others kinds were a nuisance, and Dio had to distance himself from them. The Cynics and the philosophers he marked out are different groups in the city, and the argument about the Tarsians' problem with philosophers is a separate one (ἔτι δέ) to that of the Cynics. Dio, in order to maintain authority as a philosopher, had to disassociate himself from both groups. He does so by devaluing appearances as an indication for philosophical identity and by questioning morals, so he could be seen as a better kind of philosopher.

We do not know what the nature of the problem was. It is especially interesting because Tarsus, by the second century BCE, was already a famous centre of higher learning.<sup>72</sup> Strabo's description, written about a century before Dio's speech, is illuminating:

τοσαύτη δὲ τοῖς ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώποις σπουδὴ πρὸς τε φιλοσοφίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παιδείαν ἐγκύκλιον ἅπασαν γέγονεν, ὥσθ' ὑπερβέβληνται καὶ Ἀθήνας καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρειαν καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλον τόπον δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐν ᾧ σχολαὶ καὶ διατριβαὶ φιλοσόφων γεγόνασιν. διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα μὲν οἱ φιλομαθοῦντες ἐπιχώριοι πάντες εἰσὶ, ξένοι δ' οὐκ ἐπιδημοῦσι ῥαδίως· οὐδ' αὐτοὶ οὗτοι μένουσιν αὐτόθι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τελειοῦνται ἐκδημήσαντες, καὶ

<sup>70</sup> Hahn 1986, 12 and *passim*; read with Gleason 1991.

<sup>71</sup> On *Oration* 35 and on Dio's choice how to present himself in front of a new audience, see: Zambrini 1994. We do not have the full *Oration* and hence do not know the specific aim or agenda of Dio. Yet, as Zambrini's analysis shows clearly, like in other speeches, Dio was setting himself against other intellectuals who were active in Apamea, distinguished himself as better, and – at least in the *prolatia* (which is what we have of the speech) – delivers *un messaggio etico-politico* (57).

<sup>72</sup> D. W. Roller 2018, 836.

τελειωθέντες ξενιτεύουσιν ἡδέως, κατέρχονται δ' ὀλίγοι. ταῖς δ' ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, ἃς ἀρτίως εἶπον, πλὴν Ἀλεξανδρείας, συμβαίνει τάναντία· φοιτῶσι γὰρ εἰς αὐτὰς πολλοὶ καὶ διατρίβουσιν αὐτόθι ἄσμενοι, τῶν δ' ἐπιχωρίων οὐ πολλοὺς οὔτ' ἂν ἔξω φοιτῶντας ἴδοις κατὰ φιλομάθειαν, οὔτ' αὐτόθι περὶ τοῦτο σπουδάζοντας·

(The people there are so eager about philosophy and everything else in terms of general education that they have surpassed Athens and Alexandria or any other place that can be named where there have been schools or discourses of philosophers. But it is different, for those who study there are all natives, as foreigners do not readily stay. Moreover, the former do not remain there, but finish abroad, and having finished they are pleased to live abroad, although a few return. With the other cities that I have just mentioned – except Alexandria – it is the opposite, for many frequent them and are pleased to pass time there, but you would not see many natives frequenting foreign parts in pursuit of their love of learning or eager about learning at home, Str. 14. 5. 13, Trans. D. W. Roller 2014, 634)

It seems that Tarsus had an ambivalent relationship with philosophy (or intellectuals in general) where on the one hand the city counted among the best cities of the ancient world for higher education, and on the other hand, it was not the most welcoming for either foreign philosophers (/intellectuals) to come in or natives to stay. This appears to be the situation in the times of Dio, as we can learn from Philostratus' account of Dio's contemporary, Apollonius of Tyana:

γεγονότα δὲ αὐτὸν ἔτη τεσσαρακαίδεκα ἄγει ἐς Ταρσοῦς ὁ πατὴρ παρ' Εὐθύδημον τὸν ἐκ Φοινίκης. ὁ δὲ Εὐθύδημος ῥήτωρ τε ἀγαθὸς ἦν καὶ ἐπαίδευε τοῦτον, ὁ δὲ τοῦ μὲν διδασκάλου εἶχετο, τὸ δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἥθος ἄτοπὸν τε ἠγεῖτο καὶ οὐ χρηστὸν ἐμφιλοσοφῆσαι, τρυφῆς τε γὰρ οὐδαμοῦ μᾶλλον ἄπτονται, σκωπτόλαι τε καὶ ὕβρισταὶ πάντες, καὶ δεδῶκασιν τῇ ὁθόνη μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ σοφίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι [...].

(When [Apollonius] was fourteen years old, his father took him to Tarsus to study with Euthydemus of Phoenicia. Euthydemus was an excellent orator and he educated him. [Apollonius], however, whereas he stuck to his teacher, thought the nature of the city to be foul and that it was not beneficial for the study of philosophy. He thought that nowhere were people more given to luxury, mockers and offenders all, and that they are dedicated to fashion more than the Athenians to wisdom, *VA* 1. 7. 1).

Whilst this reveals the Tarsians as non-philosophical rather than anti-philosophers, later on in the biography the Tarsians come up again as the target of Apollonius' philosophical rebukes, at which point they are revealed as properly hateful towards him (ἤχθοντο τῷ Ἀπολλωνίῳ, 6. 34. 1). This is the kind of event that Dio must have referred to when he told the people of Tarsus that he was aware of their problems with philosophers. (Again, the issue with

the Cynics addressed the general, and not specific to Tarsus, opinion about Cynics being madmen).<sup>73</sup>

Indeed, we know of one instance in which a philosopher was welcomed (back) in Tarsus. Athenodorus, who left Tarsus for Rome and became the teacher of Octavian, went back to Tarsus (on behalf of, by then, Augustus) to remove Boethus from his rule. Boethus was in power by the favour of Marcus Antonius and, as Strabo writes, was a bad citizen (κακοῦ δὲ πολίτου). Athenodorus was eventually successful and instituted a better regime (Str. 14. 5. 14). However, in the *First Tarsic Oration*, Dio uses Athenodorus to show how far removed the morally depraved Tarsians (see discussion above, 4.2) are from appropriate conduct:

ἀλλὰ Ἀθηνόδωρος ὁ πρόην γενόμενος, ὃν ἡδεῖτο ὁ Σεβαστός, ἄρα οἶεσθε, εἴπερ ἔγνω τοιαύτην οὔσαν τὴν πόλιν, προύκρινεν ἂν τῆς μετ' ἐκείνου διατριβῆς τὴν ἐνθάδε; πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐπ' εὐταξία καὶ σωφροσύνη διαβόητος ἦν ὑμῶν ἡ πόλις καὶ τοιούτους ἀνέφερεν ἄνδρας· νῦν δὲ ἐγὼ δέδοικα μὴ τὴν ἐναντίαν λάβῃ τάξιν [...]

(Do you think, that Athenodorus who lived just now, whom Augustus revered, if he were to know the nature of your city now, would prefer living here than with Augustus? Formerly, indeed, your city was famous for good discipline, prudence, and it brought up such men. Now, however, I am afraid that it has taken up the opposite position, 33. 48).

We do not know if, on his return to the city, Athenodorus' identity as a philosopher was what lent him in part the authority to affect a political change. The important element, according to Strabo, was the backing of Augustus (ἐχρήσατο τῇ δοθείσῃ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καίσαρος ἐξουσίᾳ, Str. 14. 5. 14). Even if it did, however, Athenodorus was not rebuking the people of Tarsus – like Apollonius, Dio, or the other unnamed philosophers' Dio mentioned – but tried to remove a tyrant.<sup>74</sup> The question of the degree of the Tarsians' acceptance of Athenodorus, therefore, turns on these two elements: his identification as a philosopher (which we cannot be sure of) and the aim of his critique being Boethus and not the people.

Like Athenodorus', Dio's appearance before the people of Tarsus was a clear intervention in inner and foreign city politics. The tensions between the Council and the Assembly, between the young and the old, between citizens and non-citizens, and between the city's relations with the Roman governor and Tarsus' neighbouring cities were the order of the day. Unlike Athenodorus', Dio's target was the people as a whole and not one sole person in power. Tarsus, as we learn from Philostratus, was hostile towards philosophers who rebuked

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<sup>73</sup> Note how in addressing that Dio used impersonal language: ἐστὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς Κυνικοὺς καλεῖν; ἡγοῦνται, and ἔνιοι τούτων ἐτόίμως ἔχουσι. Contrary to that, when he spoke of the issue with philosophers he moved from the impersonal to the specific: φασὶν ὑμᾶς ('they say that *you*'), 34.2-3.

<sup>74</sup> D. W. Roller 2018, 836.

its ethos. Why would Dio – aware of the general feelings towards Cynics, and of Tarsus’ specific and historical issue with philosophers – risk the loss of his audience, a failure of his cause, and perhaps a loss of reputation by appearing as a philosopher and speaking from a philosophical stand point? Could he not play down his association with philosophy and philosophical appearance had he wanted to and thought it wise? To my mind, Dio’s decision to appear as a philosopher in the face of such a hostile climate towards philosophy makes clear how strongly he associated this identity with his political message and activity, to the degree that he could not see how one can go without the other. In order to intervene in politics, Dio believed, he had to insist on his philosophical credentials.

#### 4.3.3 – Rhodes: φιλόσοφος ἢ σύμβουλος;

Unlike in the *Alexandrian* or *Tarsic Orations*, where Dio made clear his assertion of a philosophical identity from the beginning of the speech, it is not entirely clear how Dio presented himself in front of the Rhodians. Or at least, what was the source of legitimacy upon which to base his critique and advice. This was what led to von Arnim’s analysis of the *Rhodian*, which began with his claim (deserted by later authors)<sup>75</sup> that this speech is different to other (non-Bithynian) civic speeches in relation to Dio’s identity as a philosopher. The latter group is of a philosophical nature, or somewhere between philosophical and sophistic to von Arnim’s mind.<sup>76</sup> Based on the *Rhodian* speech’s introductory passages, von Arnim claimed that in Rhodes Dio employed a sophistic rhetorical technique of establishing himself before the audience as a person with the right to speak in public. In §1 Dio claims that some of the audience might think that he came to speak about a private matter and adds the assumption that they might be annoyed when they find out he is in fact there to address a public issue (the custom of the Rhodians to reuse statues of old honorands in order to honour new people). The assumed vexation would arise from the fact that Dio is not a citizen of Rhodes nor was he invited by them to speak (μήτε πολίτης ὢν μήτε κληθεὶς ὑφ’ ὑμῶν). This premise, von Arnim asserts, is a fiction and Dio must have been granted permission to address the people’s Assembly.<sup>77</sup> A philosopher, von Arnim continues, has no need to accommodate himself to these civic norms according to which, if uninvited, his topic of discussion must be legitimate

<sup>75</sup> E.g., Desideri 1978, 110.

<sup>76</sup> von Arnim 1898, 210: the *Rhodian* in all of its characteristics is different ‘*von den genannten philosophischen Vorträgen, der überhaupt zwischen sophistischen und philosophischen Vorträgen stattfindet*’.

<sup>77</sup> von Arnim 1898, 210–11. Cf. Jones 1978, 28: ‘Presumably the magistrates or leading citizens had requested him, as a visitor of note, to address the people on a subject of his choice’. Salmeri 2000, 82, n. 140 still hedged: ‘This might also mean that the request to address a speech to the people of Rhodes was made to Dio extemporaneously during a visit to the island’.

or approved. Unlike the sophist or the orator, the philosopher stands aloof from his audience on a higher moral ground which allows him to address any subject matter, private or public.<sup>78</sup> This reading is partly wrong.

In the eyes of philosophers, the veracity of their words was, indeed, the source of their legitimacy. As Trapp writes: '[i]t was a firm conviction [of philosophers], therefore, that philosophical discourse – and so also its providers – belonged in public space, and indeed were sorely needed there. A responsible society owed [philosophers] and [their discourse] a secure and privileged place in the range of performers and performances that it attended to and guaranteed to provide with suitable locales and audiences'.<sup>79</sup> Such was the conviction of those who saw themselves as philosophers. Yet when one (or a group) makes such a grand claim for authority and importance as philosophers did,<sup>80</sup> it is not surprising that there was resistance to it from different quarters.<sup>81</sup> This is clear from Dio's own speeches. We have seen it in our analysis of the *Second Tarsic Oration* above. The same can be seen in the 72<sup>nd</sup> *Oration* where Dio, similarly, explained the contempt people felt towards philosophers and how they mocked them (κατεγέλασαν ἢ ἐλοιδόρησαν, §2) and tried to prove them wretched and senseless (ἀθλίους καὶ ἀνοήτους, §8). This is hardly a situation of automatic yielding of audiences before the cultural authority of philosophy.

We also saw that in Tarsus Dio's *captatio benevolentiae*, just as in the *Rhodian*, began with an apology for speaking in the Assembly as a non-citizen (34.1). The conviction, mentioned by Trapp, of philosophers about their right to speak, is seen at work here where Dio claims that he should be given permission to speak, as would any other professional who can prove ἐπιστήμη and δύναμις in a respective field. As we have seen, however, Dio needed to defend this claim exactly because he chose to appear as a Cynic philosopher and was thus exposed to both accusations of madness and ineptitude in practical affairs, as well as to the Tarsians' personal enmity with philosophers. That is, when Dio appeared as a philosopher in front of a foreign Assembly, he still had – precisely because of his identity – to construct a form of apologetic opening in order to establish his right to speak. This rhetoric was not, as von Arnim thought, a sophistic one and von Arnim's reasoning for counting the *Rhodian Oration* as sophistic does not hold water.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> von Arnim 1898, 211–12.

<sup>79</sup> Trapp 2007a, 215.

<sup>80</sup> Trapp 2007a, 18–23.

<sup>81</sup> Trapp 2007a, 249ff.

<sup>82</sup> We should note that von Arnim included the *Second Tarsic Oration* among the speeches which he termed 'philosophical' or are 'found between philosophical and sophistic', von Arnim 1898, 210.

Sidebottom and Swain (independently) argued that the dating of the *Rhodian* oration should fall within the Trajanic years.<sup>83</sup> Thus, even those who stick to the theory of a post-exilic conversion of Dio from sophistry to philosophy should now accept that the *Rhodian* falls within what this theory views as Dio's philosophical period. Yet, the dating of the oration is not reason enough to conclude that Dio presented himself at Rhodes as a philosopher. Nor should the fact that the rhetoric of the *captatio benevolentiae* could be employed by a philosopher, just as it might have been employed by other intellectuals, necessarily imply so. Even philosophical jargon and ideas do not inevitably mean that someone wishes to appear (or in fact is) a philosopher at the time of Dio.<sup>84</sup> There is, however, one famous passage in this speech which might speak to Dio's assertion of a philosopher's identity through affiliation, a method employed by Dio with which we are by now thoroughly familiar:

καὶ τὸν εἰπόντα περὶ τούτου φιλόσοφον καὶ νοουθετήσαντα αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἀπεδέξαντο οὐδὲ ἐπήνεσαν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἐδυσχέραναν, ὥστε ἐκεῖνον ὄντα μὲν γένει μὲν Ῥωμαίων μηδενὸς ὕστερον, δόξαν δὲ τηλικαύτην ἔχοντα ἡλικίης οὐδεὶς ἐκ πάνυ πολλοῦ τετύχηκεν, ὁμολογούμενον δὲ μόνον μάλιστα μετὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους ἀκολούθως βεβιωκέναι τοῖς λόγοις, καταλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ μᾶλλον ἐλέσθαι διατρίβειν ἀλλαχόσε τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

(But [the Athenians] did not approve and did not praise the philosopher who spoke against [gladiatorial games] and admonished them, but felt such dislike towards him, that even though he was by birth inferior to no Roman and of such fame as had been achieved no one in a great deal of time, and was also agreed to be the only one to come after the ancient [philosophers] who lived in accord with his teachings, he left the city and preferred to pass his time in a different place in Greece, 31. 122).

The unnamed philosopher is usually understood as Musonius Rufus, though we are not so much concerned here with his identification as we are with the high praise he receives from Dio and the very mentioning of a philosopher in the text.<sup>85</sup> This passage comes at the point where Dio integrates (contemporary) Athens into his arguments as setting a bad example (which the Rhodians ought not to follow) of how a *polis* can fail in light of its glorious past.<sup>86</sup> The Athenians, now far removed from their celebrated ancestors not only in time but in morals as well, are pitied by everyone who is reasonable (§123). The unnamed philosopher is brought

<sup>83</sup> The different propositions are presented and discussed by Sidebottom (1992), who arrives, as mentioned, to the conclusion that von Arnim's and later authors, such as Momigliano (1951), were wrong in dating the speech to the 70's. Cf. Swain 1996, 428–29.

<sup>84</sup> Lauwers 2013.

<sup>85</sup> von Arnim 1898, 216, thought that this philosopher could be no other than Musonius; Desideri 1978, 111 more doubtful; see also: Lutz 1947, 17, n. 60; Jones 1978, 12; Whitmarsh 2001b, 137, n. 16.

<sup>86</sup> Jażdżewska 2015b, 254–55.



in, therefore, to be compared with Dio himself as an advisor to a city in need of a moral guidance. His mentioning creates a frame of reference according to which the Rhodian audience can measure Dio, like those we saw Dio create in his political speeches in Prusa where he compared himself with philosophers such as Pythagoras or Zeno (*Or.* 47. 1-5).<sup>87</sup>

So, this philosopher, being a contemporary one, is presented in line with other contemporary philosophers of Dio.<sup>88</sup> In our corpus, Dio refrains from naming contemporary philosophers whom he criticises as failing.<sup>89</sup> Speaking about philosophers in general (that is, without naming them) helped Dio begin to establish philosophy – and himself – in the public space. Singling out specific examples removes some of the argument's force ('*everyone* is bad but myself' is a stronger argument than 'I am stronger than [a list of specific philosophers which is bound to be finite]'). Interestingly, however, the philosopher of 31. 122 is not criticised for his lack of engagement with society (i.e., being a school-philosopher or a recluse writer) like other contemporary philosophers in Dio's speeches. He fails because the Athenians fail to listen and in that he is akin to Dio's past models, especially Socrates, who had an appropriate philosophical moral to offer, tried to do so, and failed.

We see then that this example works just as we have come to expect from Dio when he sets a frame of reference with which to compare himself. An unnamed, failing contemporary philosopher on the one hand, who, on the other hand, in his performing of philosophy is similar to the ancients in that his address to the public was unable to affect it and achieve an ethical change. Since the lesson to the Rhodians was 'do not be like the Athenians', the framing of Dio is, 'I am unlike that philosopher'.<sup>90</sup> If this reading is correct, then the passage about the unnamed philosopher is another argument in favour of reading Dio as speaking in front of the Rhodian Assembly as a philosopher (who once again will prove to be at the top of the intellectual hierarchy) and pronouncing philosophical advice for improving of the audience which, in this case, involves affecting a change in a city's policy. The *Rhodian*, however, as a text, has another model at its background. A model which can challenge the claim that Dio indeed presented himself in the speech as a philosopher.

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<sup>87</sup> See Chapter 3.

<sup>88</sup> Most notably those of the *Alexandrian Oration* (32), and those of the *Second Tarsic Oration* (34).

<sup>89</sup> We ought to recall here the letter which Synesius Dio addressed to Musonius, supposedly attacking him. I have expressed above (Ch. 1, p. 33, n. 27) my reasons to believe that this letter, if indeed critical, was written from one philosopher to another (and not by a sophist against a philosopher). Choosing to name an addressee, instead of avoiding naming as we see in the speeches, can easily be explained by the differences between the genres. On Dio's letters, see: Ch. 2, p. 67, n. 63.

<sup>90</sup> We can note one more similarity between Dio and the unnamed philosopher: the latter, as it appears from the text, was most probably a Roman who was not an Athenian citizen. Dio, as well, was not a citizen of Rhodes and he appears before the Assembly as an outsider.

Demosthenes, as was observed already in antiquity, was one of Dio's models.<sup>91</sup> The *Rhodian*, in particular, was written with more than an eye to Demosthenes' *Against Leptines*, making an explicit reference to matters addressed in it (31. 128).<sup>92</sup> Dio, as well, indicated that his role in Rhodes was συμβουλεύειν (to advise §1). That is, Dio appeared in Rhodes as a σύμβουλος, which was the role Demosthenes ascribed to himself.<sup>93</sup> We do not know if Demosthenes' attack on the law suggested by Leptines was successful, but Dio presented it as such.<sup>94</sup> Did he wish the audience to see him as a successful Demosthenes? Should we read Dio's intellectual identity with the image of Demosthenes, the statesman and the orator, instead of the philosopher? The answers, I believe, are in the negative.

We can start from the issue of verbal allusion. It is a fair assumption that among the Rhodians were people familiar with Demosthenes' speeches and his role as a σύμβουλος. However, Demosthenes is not mentioned by name in the speech and συμβουλεύω appears only once in §1 and once in §3 (σύμβουλος does not). This could be enough for a later reader of the speech, who upon reaching section 128 might try to connect the reference to Demosthenes and the use of the verb to claim that we should read Dio as trying to appear like a latter-day Demosthenes (a statesman and orator instead of philosopher). However, it seems unlikely that a listener would have deduced this from Dio's use of συμβουλεύω at the beginning of the speech. This is not to deny the connection between *Or.* 31 and *Against Leptines*, but only to stifle possible opposition to my argument on the basis of a single word (due to its importance for the understanding of Demosthenes' own self-representation). For that matter, Bost-Pouderon, who offers the most thorough comparison between the two texts, does not raise this verbal allusion at all. She sees Demosthenes as a model for political eloquence and does not claim that Dio here wears a Demosthenic *persona*.<sup>95</sup>

We should take our cue from Bost-Pouderon here: since συμβουλεύω and its cognates appear also in the *Alexandrian* and the *Second Tarsic Orations*,<sup>96</sup> which as we saw were no doubt pronounced as from a philosopher's mouth. συμβουλεύω was simply used by Dio as part

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<sup>91</sup> Dio's 18<sup>th</sup> *Discourse* (written in the form of a letter), claims that Demosthenes surpassed all orators in vigour, style, thought, and use of vocabulary (18.11). Philostratus wrote that Dio's style was Demosthenic and that in his wanderings he had with him Demosthenes' *On the False Embassy* (*VS* 488; read with Whitmarsh 2001b, 239–40). On Dio and Demosthenes, see: Bost-Pouderon 2016.

<sup>92</sup> Note that Dio refers to incident itself and not Demosthenes' speech. Jones 1978, 35; Jazdzewska 2015b, 254–55; Bost-Pouderon 2016.

<sup>93</sup> Mader 2018, *passim*.

<sup>94</sup> Dio's account is inaccurate and cannot be simply trusted as a testimony: Badian 2000, 28.

<sup>95</sup> Bost-Pouderon 2016.

<sup>96</sup> *Or.* 32.12, 33, 77; *Or.* 34. 1, 4, 31.

of (his) civic, political rhetoric.<sup>97</sup> It is a verb (or participle) that was used to indicate an aim for a political intervention without bearing any consequences on Dio's identity as a philosopher-speaker. We will see later on (4.3.4 and Chapter 5) that when Dio wanted to construct his philosophical *persona* in connection with figures who were, traditionally, seen as statesmen and orators he knew how to do so explicitly and in a manner that indeed substantiated that philosophical self-identification. In the case of the *Rhodian*, therefore, it appears that Demosthenes had been a stylistic and historical source and not an element in the public *persona* Dio attempted to establish.

There is yet another issue at play here which further weakens the possibility of seeing Demosthenes as an element in Dio's *persona*, especially when compared to the unnamed philosopher. We saw in Chapter 3 how Dio utilised the trope of exile in philosophy as part of his own philosophical identity. His movement, or at least, the ability to move and to present himself as capable of doing so, between cities and places around the empire instilled Dio with the authority of the wise outsider and gave him a political leverage (resulting from the rhetorical threat of leaving Prusa once again). The former kind of authority was not at play when Dio spoke in a city like Rhodes of which, as we have noted, he was not a citizen. In such cases, the stakes are different since leaving the city eventually is not a rhetorical threat but a fact. If the Rhodians will not heed Dio the repercussions will be only theirs to deal with since Dio is not staying in the city. This is corroborated by the case of the unnamed philosopher who arrived at Athens from outside (presumably from Rome),<sup>98</sup> and since not well received there, μᾶλλον ἐλέσθαι διατρίβειν ἀλλαχόσε τῆς Ἑλλάδος ('preferred to pass his time somewhere else in Greece', 31. 122). Demosthenes, on the other hand, does not fit this model. He was entirely anchored in Athens, almost like Socrates: a citizen who, if his advice were unheeded, would share the burden of the consequences with the rest of the city and who, when eventually exiled, quickly returned to Athens and only when he faced a death sentence he fled again and committed suicide.<sup>99</sup> What we have of Demosthenes in Dio, similarly to what we have of Socrates in *Oration* 13 and other places, is his words or perhaps more accurately, his style.

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<sup>97</sup> The root συμβουλ- is found (*passim*) in all the following speeches, which were delivered in a civic context and in which Dio's identity as a philosopher was stressed (excluding the *Rhodian*): 13, 22, 32, 33, 34, 38, 45, 47, 49, and 50.

<sup>98</sup> ἐκεῖνον ὄντα μὲν γένει Ῥωμαίων μηδενὸς ὕστερον ('he was, by birth, inferior to no other of the Romans, 122). This does not necessarily mean that he came from the city of Rome, but it is fair to assume that he came from the western side of the Empire, was a Roman citizen, and that this citizenship was a crucial element in his identity. Otherwise, since the context is that of Athens and the Greek East, why not compare him to Ἕλληνες?

<sup>99</sup> On *Against Leptines* and the stakes for Demosthenes in this case, see: Harris 2019, 366–67. On Demosthenes' exile and return, see: Worthington 2000, 100–106. Cf. the comparison between Favorinus and Demosthenes on the issues of exile, citizenship, and autochthony made by Whitmarsh 2001b, 176–77.

Demosthenes' *Against Leptines* is a reference to turn to and Dio does not appear to assume the identity of the orator statesman.

The conclusion of the above arguments is that in Rhodes, as in his other civic speeches, even though Dio's aim was to intervene in city politics and to bring the Rhodians to change their policy regarding the use of statues; and even though Dio only somewhat tied himself with philosophical activity or philosophical appearance (through the unnamed philosopher), he was none the less speaking as a philosopher. The *Rhodian*, therefore, can be used to understand Dio's own vision of himself as a philosopher ἐν πολιτείᾳ integrating political rhetoric into his philosophical identity, making his philosophy political.

#### 4.3.4 – Nicomedia: Citizenship is not enough

*Oration 38, On concord*, which was delivered in the Bithynian city of Nicomedia, most likely, after Dio's return from his exilic period,<sup>100</sup> serves as our last example of a political intervention by Dio, which he based on his philosophical identity. It is one of Dio's most extensive treatments of ὁμόνοια,<sup>101</sup> and served to achieve two main political purposes: the lessening of Roman exterior pressures and the profits of collaboration with Nicaea in both social and monetary respects.<sup>102</sup> As with the rest of the speeches treated in this chapter, scholars have mainly focused on the body of the text.<sup>103</sup> Although these discussions are important for our understanding of the nature of Dio's political intervention, I turn, instead and again, to examine the beginning of the speech and focus on Dio's establishment of his credentials to speak in public as a philosopher.

The discussion above has shown us that speaking in front of a city's Assembly required some form of justification on the side of the speaker. In Nicomedia, Dio began by mentioning his citizen status (ἐποιήσασθέ με πολίτην, 38. 1), and stated that – at least as he saw it – the reason behind the conferral of citizenship was τὸ συμβουλεύειν ἐμέ τι περὶ τῶν κοινῇ συμφερόντων ἴσως μᾶλλον ἐτέρων καὶ βούλεσθαι καὶ δύνασθαι ('my will and ability to give some advice about issues of expediency for the public which is perhaps greater than that or others', §1). Dio even went as far as boasting that people of his kind are needed in order to keep the *polis*, as a political unit, secure (ἵνα σφύζονται ταῖς πολιτείαις, §2). This (we can only suppose because there is no reference) was what led Hahn to think that Dio's role of an advisor

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<sup>100</sup> Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 179.

<sup>101</sup> Jones 1978, 84.

<sup>102</sup> Jones 1978, 84–89; Salmeri 2000, 78–79.

<sup>103</sup> See the discussions by Jones and Salmeri (*loc. cit.*), and Desideri 1978, 416–21.

was based on his citizen status and not on his identity as a philosopher.<sup>104</sup> Yet, neither Dio's citizen status, nor even the *raison d'être* of his citizenship – which seems to be agreed on between conferrers and honorand – served as sufficient justification for Dio to speak. A series of rhetorical questions, supposedly raised by the audience, expose the insufficiency of these as credentials for his public appearance:

τί δὲ συμβουλεύεις σὺ περὶ ὧν ἡμεῖς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲ βουλευόμεθα; τί δὲ σεαυτῷ λόγου μεταδίδως, οὗ σοὶ μὴ μετέδομεν ἡμεῖς;

(But why are you advising us about matters that we are not deliberating over in the first place? And why do you allow yourself a [permission to make a] speech which we ourselves did not give to you?, 38. 4).

The first two questions challenge the authority of the speaker to simply speak on whatever subject he wishes. It might have been the case that as a citizen, Dio could have taken a place in the discussion over the city's agreed agenda. Whatever the topic of the day was, Dio knew that he was about to diverge from it and that his citizenship will not be enough to do so. Moreover, we should note, this divergence from the agenda emphasises the fact that Dio was, in fact, intervening in city politics in the more forceful sense of the word and was not merely offering advice on political issues on which he was asked to weigh in. It is clear, from the second question, that Dio was called to give advice on a particular topic from which he decided to diverge.

We recall here von Arnim's assertion that philosophers (unlike sophists) were not concerned with having an audience's permission to speak about what they deemed right.<sup>105</sup> We have already disproved this argument. Dio's rhetoric at the beginning of *Oration* 38 corroborates this, since it is clear that he was aware of the possibility of losing his audience by speaking about what they have not given him permission to speak.

A third question then follows:

διὰ τί δὲ τοσούτων πεπολιτευμένων παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνδρῶν ἐπιχωρίων, εἰσποιητῶν, ῥητόρων, φιλοσόφων, γερόντων, νέων, οὐδέποτε οὐδεὶς ἐτόλμησεν ἡμῖν συμβουλευσαὶ ταύτην τὴν συμβουλίαν;

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<sup>104</sup> 'Doch in keiner der in diesen Orten gehaltenen Reden [...] ist Dion um eine Stilisierung als Philosoph bemüht. Sein Auftreten als Redner und Ratgeber in den Nachbarstädten Prusas beruht vielmehr auf seinem Ansehen als Mitbürger und als herausragende Persönlichkeit der provinziellen Aristokratie', Hahn 1989, 166.

<sup>105</sup> von Arnim 1898, 211–12.

(Because of what reason, has no one from among so many politically active men among us, local and newcomers, orators and philosophers, old and young, ever tried to give us this specific advice?, 4).

In other words, Dio assumed here that the audience wished to know what makes him so special so that he is permitted not only to diverge from the agenda, but to advise on a matter that other intellectuals never brought up in front of them. This statement can be taken as ironic. Concord, the συμβουλία which Dio was about to suggest to the people of Nicomedia, appears in Plutarch's *Political Precepts* and *Old Men in Public Life*,<sup>106</sup> and whilst Aelius Aristides was later than Dio, he too spoke of it (*On concord between cities* and *To the people of Rhodes, on Concord*), and in a similar fashion.<sup>107</sup> It seems unlikely that Dio truly was the only proponent of concord at that moment. It is possible, of course, that at the time of the speech no one preceded Dio in speaking (in Nicomedia) about it, but the use of *τολμάω* hints towards Dio's regular boasting in respect to his freedom of speech.<sup>108</sup> His boasting notwithstanding, this rhetorical question is the key to understanding Dio's authority to speak in Nicomedia.<sup>109</sup>

This is not only because it is clear now that citizenship was not enough, but also because it is the only question that suggests the category of intellectuals with which Dio associated himself when he spoke in Nicomedia: orators or philosophers. Noticeably, the latter are *ρήτορες* and not *σοφισταί*. The latter will appear soon enough in a rather ambiguous manner (which seems to be dismissive). A clue to know with which of those two groups, orators and philosophers, Dio was associated can be found in another late speech of his that does not concern *ὁμόνοια* *per se* but *εἰρήνη*, peace, which can be conceived of as a broader category to which *ὁμόνοια* belonged as the opposite of discord between cities.<sup>110</sup> That speech is *Oration 22, On peace and war* which was delivered in an unknown place and time.<sup>111</sup>

This is a very short speech of only five passages (and hence perhaps only an introduction to a longer speech that was to be delivered on the topic). It takes up the issue of peace and war as an example of the difference between orators and philosophers. Dio begins,

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<sup>106</sup> On this see: Trapp 2007a, 194.

<sup>107</sup> The similarities are thematic (cf. Jones 1978, 85) as well as literal (cf. Aristid. *To the Rhodians about concord*, p. 558, 23 [Jebb]: ὡς καλὸν ἢ ὁμόνοια καὶ σωτήριον with Dio *Or.* 38.10: ὡς οὐ καλὸν ἢ ὁμόνοια καὶ σωτήριόν (the negation, as we see in the text below is not Dio's).

<sup>108</sup> Cf. *Or.* 3. 13, where Dio boasts that he was the only one (μόνος) who dared (ἐτόλμων) to speak freely under Domitian. Dio, if at all, was surely not the only one as we know full well from other accounts: Suetonius (*Domitian*, 10).

<sup>109</sup> Note, as well, how Dio separates it from the other two: τί...τί...δία τί.

<sup>110</sup> Jones 1978, 83: *Stasis*, the opposite of *ὁμόνοια* 'could also refer to the relations between two or more cities'.

<sup>111</sup> Desideri 1978 thinks it was post-exilic (379).

however, with what those figures have in common and in doing so illuminates even further his concept of the philosopher as active in politics. The passages are better reproduced in full:

πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα εὗροι τις ἂν καὶ ζύμπαντα ἀτεχνῶς τὰ ἔργου τινὸς ἐχόμενα καὶ πράξεως κοινὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, καὶ ῥήτορσιν ὅσοι μὴ ἀγοραῖοι μηδὲ μίσθαρνοι, πρὸς χρήματα ὀρῶντες μόνον καὶ τὰς ἰδιωτικὰς ἀμφιλογίας περὶ συμβολαίων ἢ τινων δανείων ἐπὶ τόκῳ ἀλλὰ δημοσίᾳ συμβουλεύειν καὶ νομοθετεῖν ἀξιούμενοι· καθάπερ, οἶμαι, Περικλῆς καὶ Θουκυδίδης Ἀθήνησι καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἔτι πρότερον καὶ Κλεισθένης, καὶ Πεισίστρατος ἕως ἔτι ῥήτωρ καὶ δημαγωγὸς ἠνείχετο καλούμενος· Ἀριστείδην μὲν γὰρ καὶ Λυκούργον καὶ Σόλωνα καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδαν, καὶ εἴ τις ἕτερος τοιοῦτος, φιλοσόφους ἐν πολιτείᾳ θετέον ἢ ῥήτορας κατὰ τὴν γενναίαν τε καὶ ἀληθῆ ῥητορικὴν· λέγω δὲ οἷον περὶ τε ἀγωγῆς τῶν νέων συμβουλευόντας καὶ νομοθετοῦντας, ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι Λυκούργος, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς ὁμιλίας καὶ περὶ χρημάτων κτήσεως, ὅσῃν τε καὶ ὅπως δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ περὶ γάμου καὶ περὶ κοινωνίας καὶ περὶ νομίσματος καὶ περὶ τιμῆς καὶ ἀτιμίας καὶ περὶ οἰκῶν κατασκευῆς, πότερα χρὴ τετειχισμένην οἰκεῖν πόλιν ἢ καθάπερ ὁ θεὸς παρήγεσε Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἀτειχιστον, καὶ περὶ ἀσκήσεως τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ τάξεως, οὐ μόνον ὀπλιτικῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷαν Ἐπαμεινώνδας εὖρεῖν λέγεται, τοὺς ἐραστὰς μετὰ τῶν ἐρωμένων τάξας ἵνα σφάζοντο μᾶλλον καὶ μάρτυρες ὧσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς κακίας· καὶ τὸν λόχον τοῦτον, ἱερὸν ἐπονομασθέντα, κρατῆσαι Λακεδαιμονίων τῇ περὶ Λεῦκτρα μάχῃ, ζυμπάντων ἐκείνοις ἐπομένων τῶν Ἑλλήνων. τὸ δὲ δὴ κεφάλαιον, καὶ πολλάκις πολλοῖς παρέπιπτε, περὶ τε εἰρήνης καὶ πολέμου, ὃ νῦν τυγχάνει ζητούμενον.

(Many things in general and absolutely everything involving any work or activity will be found common to philosophers and orators—all those orators, that is, who do not carry on their business in the marketplace and work for hire with their eyes fixed on matters of money only and on private disputes regarding contracts or loans out at interest, but aspire to advise and legislate for the state. That is, I think, what Pericles and Thucydides must have done at Athens, and Themistocles still earlier, and Cleisthenes, and Peisistratus, so long as he still let himself be called ‘orator’ and ‘popular leader’—for Aristeides, Lycurgus, Solon, Epaminondas, and others of the same sort should be regarded as philosophers in politics, or orators in the noble and real sense of the term. And I use the word ‘philosopher’ of men who, for example, deliberate and legislate about the training of the young, just as Lycurgus did at Sparta, and about the association of ‘lovers,’ about the acquisition of money—how much one should make and in what manner—about marriage, about the duties of citizenship, about coinage, about civic rights and the loss of them, about the setting up of households, and as to whether one should live in a walled city or, as the god advised the Spartans, in an unwallled one; about training for war and the organization of not merely the heavy-armed troops in general, but also of the formation which Epaminondas is said to have invented, in

which he put the ‘lovers’ along with their beloved in order that they might have a better chance of coming through safely and might be witness to one another’s courage or cowardice—and history tells us that this Sacred Band, as it was called, conquered the Spartans in the battle of Leuctra though these were supported by all Greece. But the main question of all, and one with which many have often had to deal, concerns peace and war; and this now, as it so happens, is my theme, 22. 1-2, Trans. Cohoon).<sup>112</sup>

These two passages are the clearest example for a conflation that took place in Dio’s mind between what he understood to be the identity and the role of the philosopher and what historically and generally would have been understood to be a statesman or political advisor. After immediately clearing the table of lesser kinds of orators, who according to the examples can be understood as either lawyers or sophists, Dio provides two groups of worthy orators who were devoted to advising the people (δημοσίᾳ συμβουλεύειν, 1). The division is not exactly clear, since Dio ties in people from different eras and differing political activity. So, e.g., whereas it makes sense for a modern reader to find the Archaic ‘lawgivers’ Solon and Lycurgus in the same group, the separation between Aristides and Themistocles is somewhat nonsensical.<sup>113</sup> Nonetheless, the conflation in Dio’s mind, who terms the latter group philosophers in politics (φιλοσόφους ἐν πολιτείᾳ, §2) and defines philosophers as people who advise and legislate (συμβουλεύοντας καὶ νομοθετοῦντας) on issues of civic life, is most clear. As Desideri noted, Dio – through the choice of these historical models – identified a new category of philosophers who are wholly committed to proper guidance of the city.<sup>114</sup> We will return to the choice of these models in our last chapter, concerning Dio’s legacy. For now, the focus of our discussion is laid on the difference Dio marks between the philosophers and the orators – noble as they are or were – for this is what provides our key to understanding Dio in the context of his appearance in Nicomedia.

Having established that φιλόσοφοι ἐν πολιτείᾳ and true orators (ρήτορας κατὰ τὴν γενναίαν τε καὶ ἀληθῆ ῥητορικὴν) consider, as part of their activity, the same kind of issues, Dio marks the difference between them as a difference of method. The following are the passages that in fact conclude this short speech.

διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι οἱ γε ῥήτορες ἐπὶ τῶνδε ἢ τῶνδε σκοποῦσιν οἷον εἰ συμφέρει πολεμεῖν Ἀθηναίοις πρὸς Πελοποννησίους ἢ βοηθεῖν Κερκυραίοις πρὸς Κορινθίους ἢ Φιλίππῳ συμμαχεῖσαι Θηβαίοις ἐπὶ Φωκέας ἢ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ διαβῆναι εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν. ἐν γὰρ

<sup>112</sup> The text is from the Loeb edition.

<sup>113</sup> The two were contemporary *strategoi* in fifth century Athens and even shared a diplomatic embassy to Sparta (Thuc. 1.91.3).

<sup>114</sup> Desideri 1978, 379.



ταύταις ἀπάσαις ταῖς βουλαῖς οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐμπίπτει καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ προαδικήσασι πολεμεῖν· εἰ συμβέβηκεν ἀδίκημα παρὰ τούτων οἷς διανοοῦνται πολεμεῖν, πηλίκον τι τοῦτο τὸ συμβεβηκός. οἱ φιλόσοφοι δὲ πόρρωθεν τὰ πράγματα ὀρῶσιν, ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἐξετάζοντες ὅποι' ἅττα ἐστίν. πολὺ γὰρ κρεῖττον τὸ βεβουλευθῆαι περὶ ἀπάντων ἐκ πλείονος καὶ διεγνωκότας, ἐπειδὴν ἤκη τινὸς πράγματος καιρός, αὐτοὺς τε εἰδότας ἔχειν χρῆσθαι καὶ ἐτέροις παραινεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τρόπον τινὰ ἐξαίφνης ληφθέντας ταράττεσθαι καὶ αὐτοσχεδιάζειν περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἴσασιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ῥήτορες, ὅταν δέη σκοπεῖν περὶ τινος, οὐδὲν εἰδότες τῶν ἄλλων πλέον οὐδὲ ἐσκεμμένοι πρότερον, ἅμα τε αὐτοὶ βουλευόνται τρόπον τινὰ καὶ συμβουλεύουσιν ἐτέροις. οἱ φιλόσοφοι δὲ περὶ τῶν πράξεων προοίδασι καὶ πάλαι βεβουλευμένοι τυγχάνουσιν· ὥστε ἂν τις αὐτοὺς παρακαλῇ συμβούλους τῶν πόλεων ἢ τῶν ἔθνων ἢ τῶν βασιλέων, κρεῖττον ἔξουσι καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον ἀποφαίνεσθαι οὐ τὸ ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ νῦν μὲν ταῦτα, πάλιν δὲ τάναντία, δι' ὀργὴν ἢ φιλονικίαν ἢ χρήμασι πληγέστες, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τρυτάνης, ἔφη τις, οἶμαι, τῶν ῥητόρων αὐτῶν, κατὰ τὸ λῆμμα ἀεὶ ῥέποντες. λέγω δὲ οὐ ψέγων ῥητορικὴν οὐδὲ ῥήτορας τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς φαύλους καὶ τοὺς προσποιουμένους τὸ πρᾶγμα.

(But there is this important difference—that the orators consider definite cases; for example, whether it is of advantage for the Athenians to make war on the Peloponnesians, for the Corcyraeans to go to the help of the Corinthians, for Philip to support the Thebans in the war against the Phocians, or for Alexander to cross over into Asia. Then too, in all these deliberations the following sort of question is apt to crop up: Is it right to go to war with those who have not provoked a war by some wrongful act? if a wrong has been done by those against whom you propose to wage war, how serious is this wrong which has been done? But philosophers look at events from a distance and examine into what their character is in the abstract; for it is much better to have already deliberated about everything a long time in advance and since they have already reached a decision, to be able, when the moment for any action has come, with full knowledge either to handle the situation themselves or to give advice to the others, and not to be caught off their guard, as it were, and so be in a state of confusion and obliged to resort to improvising measures concerning situations of which they have no knowledge. For whenever the orator-politicians have to consider any question, since they know nothing more than anybody else and have not considered the matter before, in a sense they both deliberate themselves and give advice to the others at one and the same time. The philosophers, on the other hand, know in advance about the course to be adopted and have deliberated upon it long beforehand. Consequently, if they are called in to advise cities, nations, or kings, they are in a better and safer position to set forth, neither just what occurs to them, nor one thing at one moment and the opposite at the next, influenced by anger, contentiousness, or bribery, acting just as the tongue of a balance does, as I believe some <one> of the orator-politicians themselves said, ever tipping according to what is

received. And I say this, not to criticize the art of oratory, or the good orators, but the poor ones and those who falsely claim that profession as their own, 3-5, Trans. Cohoon).

This echoes Aristotle's differentiation between poetry and history; the one is concerned with the general and the other with the particular: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποιήσις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει (Arist. *Po.* 1451b6-8). The difference is between what a certain type of person may say or do and what Alcibiades, in Aristotle's example, did or experienced. To Aristotle's mind, this universality of poetry makes it more philosophical and more serious, or important (φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον; 1451b4-11) than history. Dio, however, goes one step further (or backwards, in fact, coming full circle). His philosophers, having considered the issues in general and from afar, will still make use of their knowledge when a moment of need arrives (ἐπειδὴν ἦκη τινὸς πράγματος καιρός). That is, they move from the universal to the particular. Moreover, when that moment comes, their prior engagement with the issue allows the philosophers to avoid what happens to some of the orators, who try to fit themselves to the moment and constantly change their minds for all the wrong reasons.<sup>115</sup> It is with this idea, and the notion of prior deliberation among philosophers, that we should go back to Dio's speech in Nicomedia.

The specific issue that Dio came to tackle in Nicomedia was their relationship with their neighbouring Nicaea (Φημί δεῖν ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Νικομηδεῖς, ὁμονοῆσαι πρὸς Νικαεῖς, 7). And whereas, as mentioned above, Dio had a number of particular reasons why he believed achieving concord between the cities would be profitable, these concrete reasons were not what he began with:

βούλομαι δὲ διελεῖν τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν τῆς ὁμονοίας τῆς καθόλου, ποδαπὸν τέ ἐστι καὶ τίνων αἴτιον, εἶτα ἐξ ἐναντίας τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὴν ἔχθραν διακρίναι<sup>116</sup> πρὸς τὴν φιλίαν

(I want to split my speech and first to speak about concord itself in general; where did it come from and what are its consequences, and then to separate it wholly from discord and hatred [and closer to] friendship, 38. 8).

Dio came to Nicomedia with his answers ready from beforehand. He knew why concord is profitable in general and he knew why it was profitable for the city of Nicomedia in

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<sup>115</sup> οὐδὲ νῦν μὲν ταῦτα, πάλιν δὲ τὰναντία, δι' ὀργὴν ἢ φιλονικίαν ἢ χρήμασι πληγέντες (philosophers are in a better position than these orators, 'not [saying] now this thing and then again the exact opposite, affected by anger, rivalry, or money, 22.5). For Dio's seeing this as a vice of sophists, cf. *Or.* 35.8. For the consistency of philosophers and their teaching as a pedagogical ideal, cf. *Orr.* 3.26-7, 57.11, 60.9-10. See also: Mann 1996, 103-4 on the issue of consistency, and Jouan 1993, 385 on this pedagogical ideal in Dio.

<sup>116</sup> Crosby (1946, 56) corrected διακρίνας.

particular. That is, as he defined philosophical activity in *Oration 22*, he deliberated the issue prior to coming across an occasion when it would be necessary to speak on it. Noticeably, Dio's statement is not only in line with what he says in *Oration 22* and hence with the Aristotelian idea that universality makes a discourse more philosophical, but in this case, it even shares its key term with the Aristotelian text: καθόλου. Dio's method of beginning from the universal is a clear indication of his overall philosophical alignment when speaking in front of the Nicomedians, and his move from the general to the particular in the speech is a clear indication that Dio acted there as he believed philosophers should always act in politics. Hence, even if the orators which were mentioned in the third rhetorical question (that Dio puts in the mouth of the audience) are of the better kind, it is now nonetheless evident to us that Dio set himself among the philosophers. Yet Dio's establishing of his identity as a philosopher and his establishing of himself as better than other intellectuals do not end here.

The second notion we pointed at in *Oration 22* was the issue of the inconsistency of the lesser kind of orators and their moving from one argument to another to suit their immediate needs. This crops up in *Oration 38* as part of Dio's claim that concord is believed to be a good thing by all people:

ὁμόνοιαν τοίνυν πάντες μὲν ἐπῆνεσαν αἰεὶ καὶ λέγοντες καὶ γράφοντες, καὶ μεστὰ τῶν ἐγκωμίων αὐτῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ποιήματα καὶ τὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων συγγράμματα, καὶ ὅσοι τὰς ἱστορίας ἐξέδοσαν ἐπὶ παραδείγματι αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἀπέδειξαν αὐτὴν μέγιστον οὖσαν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀγαθῶν, καὶ πολλοὶ τολμήσαντες ἤδη τῶν σοφιστῶν παραδόξους εἰπεῖν λόγους μόνον τοῦτον οὐκ ἐπενοήθησαν ἐξενεγκεῖν, ὥς οὐ καλὸν ἢ ὁμόνοια καὶ σωτήριόν ἐστιν  
(Well then, everyone always praised concord, both speakers and writers and poetry and the works of philosophers are filled with praised of it, and all who published their histories to provide a model for real action, and showed concord to be the greatest out of all human goods, and many sophists who already dared to present paradoxical speeches, only this thing they did not think to proclaim, that concord is not a good thing and a saviour, 10).

At a first glance, this seems to be a dismissive remark against the nature of sophistic rhetoric (and rhetorical training in the form of *controversiae*), which Dio consistently presented as inconsistent. As noted in respect to *Oration 22*, this inconsistency was considered unphilosophical simply because the truth, a philosopher would claim, is always one and the

same.<sup>117</sup> A second look, however, focused less on πολλοὶ ... τῶν σοφιστῶν and more on what exactly it was that Dio told the audience that these so-called sophists say, can suggest another option.

παραδόξους, here, seems like it should be taken in the philosophical sense of paradoxes. These are most familiar from Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, which was his treatment of six well-known Stoic doctrinal aspects traditionally phrased in a 'paradoxical' manner. In this sense, a paradox is a statement contrary to received opinion or belief which retains an element of absurdity such as (the sixth paradox) 'only the wise man is rich'.<sup>118</sup> Other than the exchange of ὅτι for ὥς and the supplying of ἐστὶν by Dio, the statement ὥς οὐ καλὸν ἢ ὁμόνοια καὶ σωτήριόν ἐστιν is phrased exactly like one of those paradoxes, for example: ὅτι μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν, or ὅτι μόνος ὁ σοφὸς ἐλεύθερος καὶ πᾶς ἄφρων δοῦλος. Yet Dio relates the paradoxes to σοφισταί and not to philosophers (of any *hairesis*).

Philostratus recorded no such paradoxes in his *Lives of the sophists*. From the extant evidence we have,<sup>119</sup> Dio is the first one to form such a paradoxical line with ὁμόνοια and so, at least *ex silentio*, it seems that his statement was correct: no one has thought to say that concord is not a good thing. Yet, Philostratus' record shows almost no use of paradoxes among the sophists at all: famously, Favorinus is said to have portrayed his life in a paradox form: ὥς παράδοξα ἐπεχρησάμει τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ τρία ταῦτα: Γαλάτης ὢν ἐλληνίζειν, εὐνοῦχος ὢν μοιχείας κρίνεσθαι, βασιλεῖ διαφέρεσθαι καὶ ζῆν ('he used to describe his life, prophet-like, with these three paradoxes: although he was a Gaul he spoke Greek, although he was a eunuch he was trialled for adultery, he quarrelled with an emperor and still lived', Philostr. *VS* 489). Nicetes of Smyrna is also said to have produced some paradoxes: τὰς δ' ἐννοίας ἰδίας τε καὶ παραδόξους ἐκδίδωσιν, ὥσπερ 'οἱ βακχεῖοι θύρσοι' τὸ μέλι καὶ 'τοὺς ἐσμούς τοῦ

<sup>117</sup> This is best exemplified in Dio by the discussion he portrays between Socrates and the sophist Hippias of Elis (*Or.* 3.26-7): φασὶ γάρ ποτε Ἰππίαν τὸν Ἡλείον, διὰ χρόνου πλείονος ἀκούοντα τοῦ Σωκράτους περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀρετῆς λέγοντος καὶ παραβάλλοντος, ὥσπερ εἰώθεν, τοὺς κυβερνήτας καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ κεραμέας, εἰπεῖν, ἅτε σοφιστήν, Πάλιν σὺ ταῦτά, Σώκρατες; καὶ ὃς γελάσας ἔφη, Καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. σὺ μὲν γάρ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὑπὸ σοφίας οὐδέποτε ταῦτα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγεις, ἡμῖν δὲ ἐν τούτῳ δοκεῖ τῶν καλλίστων εἶναι. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ψευδομένους οἶδαμεν πολλὰ καὶ ἀνόμοια λέγοντας, τοῖς δὲ ἀληθεύουσιν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἕτερα εἰπεῖν τῶν ἀληθῶν ('For the story runs that once Hippias of Elis, who had been listening for some time to the words of Socrates about justice and virtue and to his wonted comparisons with pilots, physicians, cobblers and potters, finally made the exclamation natural to a sophist, "The same things once more, Socrates!" to which the other replied with a laugh, "Yes, and on the same subjects. Now you by reason of your wisdom probably never say the same about the same things, but to me this appears a thing most excellent. We know that liars say many things and all different, while those who stick to the truth cannot find anything else to say than just the truth.", Trans. Cohoon).

<sup>118</sup> Lee 1953, ix; xii; ὅτι μόνος ὁ σοφὸς πλούσιος / *solum sapientem esse divitem*.

<sup>119</sup> A search in the TLG corpus for ὁμόνοια in proximity to either ὅτι or ὥς alongside καλός,-ή,-όν and σωτήριος,-ον. The same terms were used for a search in Plato, and what we have of Antiphon, Gorgias, Hippias, and Protagoras to extend the list of possible sophists.

γάλακτος.’ (He produced idiosyncratic phrases and paradoxes such as ‘the Bacchic thyrsi’ in respect to honey and ‘the swarms of milk’, *VS* 511). It is clear, however, that these are not similar to the paradox Dio mentioned.

If Dio was not deliberately misleading the audience, and if we can count on the evidence we have, then could it be that the σοφισταί spoken of by Dio might not have been sophists at all but, in fact, Stoic philosophers who were known for their παράδοξα? I believe not. Instead, what we have here is a defence of Stoicism and yet another example of the kind of philosophically-minded intellectuals whom Dio wished to detach himself from. The following passage of the speech, in which Dio begins his exposition on the origins and virtues of concord, is based on Stoic tradition.<sup>120</sup> Paradoxes, as mentioned, were also part of the Stoic tradition.<sup>121</sup> It seems less likely that Dio, eclectic as he was, could have dismissed the Stoics for being σοφισταί in one paragraph and then build on Stoic doctrine immediately after. Instead, I believe, that there is evidence here for Dio’s familiarity with the discourse found in Cicero and some strands of the reception of Greek philosophy in Roman circles.

David Mehl has argued that Cicero’s treatment of the Stoic paradoxes in *Paradoxa Stoicorum* was a rhetorical exercise, a defence of the paradoxes ‘as if they were a difficult client’ to defend in the Roman forum.<sup>122</sup> This argument explains why Cicero’s approach to the paradoxes in that work was positive, whereas in *Pro Murena* (61f.) he vehemently attacked them. Cicero himself, in *De finibus* 4. 74, explains that his treatment of the paradoxes in his defence of Murena was itself a rhetorical strategy (unlike a discussion with learned people) and that *aliquid etiam coronae datum* (‘something, even, was presented to the crowd’), that is he might have amplified his attack for the sake of that specific argument for the benefit of the audience.<sup>123</sup> We see here, therefore, exactly the sort of wavering of opinion that Dio ascribed to the sophists (in general). If the paradoxes can be at one time defended and at another attacked, the person doing so will be identified as a sophist.<sup>124</sup>

Cicero is among the most famous examples of politicians who were guided by philosophy and, indeed even philosophised and produced philosophical texts themselves.

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<sup>120</sup> Bost-Pouderon 2006, II: 123.

<sup>121</sup> D. Mehl 2002, 39–42.

<sup>122</sup> D. Mehl 2002, 45.

<sup>123</sup> Fantham 2013, 166 *ad* 61.

<sup>124</sup> Ronnick’s (1991) gloss on Cicero’s use of *ludens* in the introduction to *Paradoxa* (*ego tibi illa ipsa quae vix in gymnasiis et in otio Stoici probant ludens conieci in communes locos* ‘I playfully adduced for you, in stock themes, those same paradoxes that the Stoics barely prove in their gymnasia and in leisure time’, 3) is interesting in this respect: ‘The participle *ludens* signals the beginning of a special “play-format” whose dynamics were present in the philosophical debates of sophists and non-sophists and that demonstrate the main factors of social play in ancient culture’ (18). This brings Cicero into sophistic culture.

However, although we do not have in *Pro Murena* a refutation of concord as an absolute good and a salutary thing, and even if Dio was not familiar with Cicero and his works, his comments in 38. 10 – on such wavering being a sophistic act – were levelled, it seems, exactly against such change of opinion as we find in Cicero. This line of argumentation in Cicero would reveal him to be a different kind of intellectual active in civic space to that Dio embodied and that is even though Cicero, and others like him, identified themselves as philosophers – as well as statesmen – and certainly not as sophists. For Dio, it transpires, self-identification as a philosopher was not enough: it had to be followed by a certain manner of tackling issues (as we have seen in *Or.* 22) and it could not have at points given way to common rhetorical practices such as arguing for and against an idea for the sake of a momentary need.

Thus, when Dio spoke in front of the people of Nicomedia, in spite of his citizen status, he nevertheless began by identifying himself as a philosopher, and he took care to situate himself as different and better than other intellectuals and philosophers who might have spoken there before him. His authority to intervene and weigh in on political issues that he was not asked to discuss emanated from his philosophical identity and from his association with philosophical ideas. He marked the sophists – or, even, as argued, intellectuals like Cicero who identified as philosophers – as an example of intellectuals who consistently change their mind and so elevated himself as an intellectual who always speaks the truth, as a true philosopher does. This, as we have seen, was the case whenever Dio spoke in front of audiences, and it shows the importance he laid on asserting his philosophical identity as a means for advancing political causes.

Of course, we have to remember, these proofs for Dio's identity as a philosopher, in cases like the speech delivered in Nicomedia when Dio did not comment on his physical appearance, are required more by us as distant readers and less so by the audience in attendance. For them, Dio was a well-known speaker who had been travelling for a long time around different cities as a political advisor who stressed his philosophical identity (which at times might have been also physically visible) as his authority to speak on political matters. That this could be seen as Dio's legacy of how philosophers should operate in society will be the topic of our next and final chapter.

## Chapter 5 – Political philosopher: a legacy

### 5.1 The philosopher is the ruler of men

Up until now we have focused on Dio's own activity as a philosopher. This chapter steps away from Dio's own embodiment of an intellectual identity and is devoted to Dio's portrayal of the figure of an ideal philosopher. Now that we have seen how Dio embodied philosophical identity and how to him, a philosopher was an active figure in the civic, and political space, we can stop to look on Dio's discussion of this figure more as an idea that he intended to be assumed by others.

Every part of Dio's oeuvre should be understood as part of his legacy. I have focused the attention, however, on speeches where Dio's identity was important for the 'here and now'. The speeches we will engage with in this chapter, even when they are addressed to a specific city in a specific point in time, and even when they revolve around Dio himself, portray a still more general figure which is needed in society overall. Alexandria, Tarsus, or Prusa could always benefit from the counsel of a philosopher who is politically involved, who sees the philosopher's place in the civic, public space. But at the moment of Dio's appearance in those cities it was he that fulfilled that role and rose to the challenge. The speeches analysed in this chapter do not revolve around Dio as the best intellectual for the moment; hence their 'generality' and our ability to read them as Dio's legacy perhaps more so than other public speeches of Dio.

We begin at a time when Dio's position was fairly established, around 102 or later.<sup>1</sup> Dio was nominated for the archonship in Prusa. His intellectual project, which we portrayed, had indeed resulted in enough public support to place Dio as a suitable candidate for the role in the popular opinion. Indeed, in itself, this nomination is a proof for the argument that the symbolic capital of a philosophical identity can be translated into political clout. Dio, however, declined the archonship, devoting a speech (*Or.* 49) to his refusal of the honour.<sup>2</sup>

Dio refrains from mentioning the reason for his refusal. It is only in the very last section of the speech (15) that Dio suggests that he has business elsewhere, beneficial for him and Prusa. Knowing that he is about to decline the archonship, Dio devotes the speech to a form of political theory: who should take up such a position. The speech, therefore, is not about Dio but for the members of the Council and future readers to read as a suggestion for political

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<sup>1</sup> Jones 1978, 139. Jones believes, however, that Dio's popularity had waned at this point. I disagree and take Dio's nomination to the position of archon as a sign of at least somewhat strong popularity.

<sup>2</sup> The Greek title of the speech, later to Dio, is *παραίτησις ἀρχῆς ἐν βούλῃ*, 'A decline of Archonship in the Council'.

conduct. Those who will follow this suggestion will find that the ideal political figure which Dio portrays is a conflation of the philosopher with the politician.

Dio begins with the broadest of terms:

τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ πεπαιδευμένοις οὔτε ἀηδὲς τὸ ἄρχειν οὔτε χαλεπὸν. ἡδοναὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδενὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ εὖ ποιεῖν· τῷ δὲ ἄρχοντι πόλεως ἢ ἔθνους ἢ καὶ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων οὐ μόνον ἐξουσία πλείστη τοῦ εὐεργετεῖν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη σχεδόν  
(To the reasonable and educated men, to rule is neither disagreeable nor difficult. For to no one else but that man it is more pleasing to do good. To the ruler of a city, a nation, or a multitude of people there is not only the most political power for doing good, but indeed it is almost a necessity, 49. 1).

Dio describes a political figure who is both ἐπιεικής and a πεπαιδευμένος. The latter, needs no elaboration. ἐπιεικής, however, is an adjective we have yet to encounter. In Classical political discourse, ἐπιείκεια is the willingness to forego possible personal advantage by preferring to act kindly, decently, and magnanimously over acting in accord with justice. That is, preferring decency in human interactions over strict legality.<sup>3</sup> We can find the adjective on honorary inscriptions of people who performed magistracies and liturgies, commanding their ‘decency’.<sup>4</sup>

Ἐπιείκεια, then, is the political element which is found in the figure Dio portrays. This is very much in accord with Dio’s political career and indeed, with this very speech. As we have noted, Dio’s interventions in politics were mostly in cities where he was not a citizen and hence had no official, legal power. Even in Prusa, other than rejecting the office there, Dio’s political activity revolved around establishing himself as a leading citizen and not as an active member of the Council or a politician in the sense of taking on any kind of magistracy, positions which in Prusa were related.<sup>5</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, to see that the legacy Dio left behind regarding the involvement of the philosopher in politics does not emphasise official powers. His ideal politicians are intellectuals who do not necessarily hold any rights, nor do they need

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<sup>3</sup> Dover 1974, 191.

<sup>4</sup> *MAMA* 8, no. 524 (consulted online on 8 Dec. 2020: <https://inscriptions.packhum.org/text/257115?hs=270-280>); *CIG* 2787 (consulted online on 8 Dec. 2020: <https://inscriptions.packhum.org/text/257105?hs=660-670>). Cf. Robert 1965, 13: 223.

<sup>5</sup> The Council at Prusa was a permanent body composed of those who had held magistracies (Jones 1978, 4). Dio, was, at least once, a magistrate, and hence a member of the Council, but this is rarely even mentioned by him, cited as a goal, or as a means to achieve his ends in Prusa in the way his identity as a philosopher was. In fact, the majority of the speeches he delivered in Prusa were delivered in the Assembly (Jones 1978, 97), a testimony to the importance of the body and to Dio’s partiality towards it and not towards the Council even though executive power resided within the latter (Jones 1978, 4).



them to exert influence and to advance political policies in the different cities of the empire. Indeed Dio even attributed ἐπιείκεια to himself several times.<sup>6</sup>

These attributions and *Or.* 49 are not the sole appearances of the characteristic in Dio. In the *Euboicus* (*Or.* 7), Dio weaves a narrative which in part is told by a hunter who, presumably, has saved the shipwrecked Dio.<sup>7</sup> Entertaining him in his hut, the hunter tells Dio how he was accused by people of the neighbouring city of avoiding payment of taxes for the land he inhabits and lives off. The accusation took place in the city's Assembly and the hunter narrates the speech of the prosecution (so to speak), a speech in his defence, and his own words. It is with the speaker in the hunter's defence, an ἐπιεικὴς ἄνθρωπος, that we are concerned now.

παρελθὼν δὲ ἄλλος τις, ὡς ἐφαίνετο, ἐπιεικὴς ἄνθρωπος ἀπὸ τε τῶν λόγων οὕς εἶπε καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ σχήματος, πρῶτον μὲν ἡζίου σιωπῆσαι τὸ πλῆθος· καὶ ἐσιώπησαν· ἔπειτα εἶπε τῇ φωνῇ πρῶτος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ τὴν ἀργὴν τῆς χώρας ἐργαζόμενοι καὶ κατασκευάζοντες, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον ἐπαίνου δικαίως ἂν τυγχάνοιεν·

(Then another man rose to speak who, as it appeared from what he said and his appearance, was a decent [ἐπιεικὴς] man. First, he asked that the crowd be silent. Then, after they were all quiet, he said in a mild voice that those who work and cultivate the idle land commit no injustice, but rather, on the contrary, they happen justly to merit praise, 7. 33).

The ἐπιεικὴς man is a respectable figure in his community. He needs no more than a gentle request and the entire crowd, hitherto wild (ἡγριοῦτο, 33),<sup>8</sup> falls silent.<sup>9</sup> His tone is mild (πρῶτος), which in the Classical discourse – echoing throughout the speech<sup>10</sup> – is tied with ἐπιείκεια ('giving preference to kindly [πρῶτος] magnanimity [τό ἐπιεικές] over obstinate insistence on justice [τό δίκαιον]'),<sup>11</sup> yet he speaks assertively about right and wrong (ἀδικοῦσιν; δικαίως), not by insisting on lawful procedure (illegal use of public land), but on reason (cultivated land is better than idle land, even if it is private hands which cultivate public land).<sup>12</sup>

In spite his preference for decency over strict legality, the ἐπιεικὴς considers it appropriate for himself to intervene in what is a political affair,<sup>13</sup> involving the redistribution

<sup>6</sup> *Orr.* 44.2, 49.1, 50.1, and 50.10.

<sup>7</sup> For a general introduction to the speech, see: Russell 1992, 8–13.

<sup>8</sup> Ma: 'the threatening physical power of the crowd, compared in its noise and its clamour to elemental, natural forces or a savage beast', 2000, 111.

<sup>9</sup> For ἡζίου implying a gentle request, see: Russell 1992, 119–20.

<sup>10</sup> Ma 2000.

<sup>11</sup> Gorgias B6 *apud* Dover 1974, 191.

<sup>12</sup> This is the essence of the man's speech: 7.33–40.

<sup>13</sup> Ma 2000, 110.

of land and citizenship laws. Bryen notes, however, that his speech, albeit positive towards the hunter, is absurd: redistribution of land and rent remittal were matters in the hands of the imperial authorities. Similar is the suggestion that citizenship is to be given to anyone who will move into the city in order to improve the land (as, allegedly, the hunter and his fellow people do).<sup>14</sup>

The ἐπιεικῆς speaker, therefore, is characterised as intervening in political matters in which having a citizen status is not of prime importance, in comparison to the authority of a Roman official. The scene of the hunter's trial is a mockery of 'political and civic rituals that attempt to enact autonomy in an imperial context'.<sup>15</sup> This, Bryen reminds us, is reminiscent of the well-known suggestion of Plutarch to the aspirant Greek politician, to remember that there will always be the 'Roman boot' above his head (*Prae. ger. Reip.* 813e-f). Indeed, more importantly, it is in accord with Dio's political activity and suggests to us one reason for its nature: operating under Roman rule, political activity which was to be confined solely to where one had citizen status was less impactful. Dio realised the lack of autonomy in the different cities and preferred to intervene in city politics on a grand scheme that was more to do with morality and ethics than legislation. A kind of political activity that has more to do with τὸ ἐπιεικές than with τὸ δίκαιον.

*Oration 7* and *Oration 49* were, apparently, proximate in time (originating both from a later period of Dio's career).<sup>16</sup> We cannot, however, claim that any Council member in Prusa had a familiarity with the *Euboicus* such as to allow the deductions made above in respect to Dio's meaning. It falls to the continuous use of ἐπιεικῆς/ἐπιείκεια in political, and philosophical discourse since Classical times to grasp the meaning of the speech's opening words (τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ πεπαιδευμένοις οὔτε ἀηδὲς τὸ ἄρχειν οὔτε χαλεπὸν, 49. 1). If, though, the audiences' shared discourse left matters vague – who are those ἄνθρωποι that Dio had in mind? – Dio makes it clear by tagging these as philosophers.

The transition to the philosopher is made through a caveat against rulers who do not fulfil the necessity to do good through their power. A bad ruler, even in the animal kingdom but above all in human societies (because of people's intelligence), is never tolerated (§2). A good ruler, on the other hand, is treated most kindly by men. To rule, therefore, is a pleasant thing (ἡδύ) for those who know how (τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις): knowledge, which in turn comes from

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<sup>14</sup> Bryen 2019, 134–36.

<sup>15</sup> Bryen 2019, 136.

<sup>16</sup> For *Or.* 49, see: Jones 1978, 139. The date of the *Euboicus* is unknown, but based on intrinsic evidence, such as the issue of land reform suggested in the hunter's trial, it is assumed to be from the time of Nerva and Trajan, see: Russell 1992, 13.

a devotion to the issue from early on (§2). It is here that the philosopher appears as the focus of the speech, as the figure who is entirely devoted to the question of how one should rule:

ὁ δὲ τῷ ὄντι φιλόσοφος οὐκ ἄλλο τι φανήσεται διαπονούμενος ἢ ὅπως ἄρχειν καλῶς  
δυνήσεται καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἰκίας καὶ πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ συλλήβδην πάντων  
ἀνθρώπων, ἃν ἐπιτρέπωσι, καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ προσδεῖσεται οὐδενὸς ἄρχοντος ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦ  
λόγου καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ φροντίζειν ἱκανὸς ἔσται  
(And the true philosopher will appear to exert himself on nothing more than how he will be  
able to rule well, himself as well as his house or the largest city and, in short, all of mankind,  
if they would entrust themselves [to him]. And whereas he himself will be in no need of any  
ruler but reason and god, he will be prepared to devote himself and care for the whole of  
mankind, 3).

The focus of the speech will later on shift to the relationship between philosopher and ruler. This brought Desideri to read *Oration* 49 as part of Dio's theory of the role of the philosopher as an advisor to the monarch(y).<sup>17</sup> This is true in so far as we take monarchy to be only one system of government, only one political system with which the philosopher should be involved, as is in fact clear from the very words of Dio (τοῦτο οὐδὲ τοὺς βασιλέας αὐτοὺς λέληθεν οὐδὲ τῶν ἐν ταῖς δυναστείαις, 3).<sup>18</sup> It is just as important, however, to see that Dio begins the speech with himself in the role of the philosopher as a ruler (of himself, a city, a nation, or of all) and hence that the theory promoted in the speech is that of the place of the intellectual in the political sphere in general and not simply (in and) as a proxy of a monarch(y). In other words, this speech promotes the legacy of Dio for philosophers as political figures.

Indeed, sections §3 and §4 bring up the relationship between Nestor and Agamemnon, Aristotle and Alexander, and Epaminondas and Lysis (the Pythagorean philosopher), as historical examples of relationships between philosophers and monarchs. However, in section §6 Dio moves to examples of philosophers who had themselves been in positions of political power (λέγω δὲ τὰς ὀνομασμένας ἀρχάς, στρατηγούς ἢ σατράπας ἢ βασιλέας, 'I mean those which are called 'offices', such as *strategoi*, satraps, or kings', 6). Thus, we find Solon, Aristides, Pericles, once more Epaminondas, and finally the Roman king Numa. As philosophers, they benefited their respective subjects (τοὺς ἀρχομένους).

We have already encountered almost the exact same when we discussed *Oration* 22, *On peace and war* (Chapter 4. 3. 4). Through those figures whom Dio defined as φιλόσοφοι ἐν

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<sup>17</sup> Desideri 1978, 286–87, 380.

<sup>18</sup> 'This fact [of the philosopher having the knowledge of how to do good and rule well] escaped neither kings themselves, nor anyone else in positions of power.

πολιτεία whose role was (/is) to advise and legislate (συμβουλευόντας καὶ νομοθετοῦντας) on matters of civic life (22. 2) we observed the clear conflation in Dio's mind between the philosopher and what we might call a politician or a statesman. The strategy of *Oration* 49 is the same: to attach the title of φιλόσοφοι to those who held (/hold) official political positions (ἀρχές) in order to assure the place of philosophy in civic life and in politics.

The idea that Pericles, Numa, and others were philosophers is, of course, more of a fiction created by Dio than a historical reality, and this figment was meant for Dio's time.<sup>19</sup> As Desideri noted, the underlying idea that an intellectual should be involved in city politics was in the air at the time of Dio and can be found in his contemporary Plutarch as well.<sup>20</sup> In addition, Desideri points to the opening, in a sense by Dio, of a new avenue for intellectual activity in hometown politics (as opposed to acting as an advisor to a monarch).<sup>21</sup> Yet, the crucial point is that Dio did not simply bring in from the past those examples of eminent statesmen. First, because, unlike Dio, these were all active solely in local politics. Dio's mission was broader and his legacy is for a political activity not solely in Prusa. Indeed, even when Dio spoke in Prusa he could speak in terms of his larger, Hellenic mission: μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ὑμᾶς βούλομαι τὸ ἥθος Ἑλληνικὸν ἔχειν, 43. 3).<sup>22</sup> Desideri's focus on hometown politics should, therefore, be substituted for civic politics in general. That was Dio's real legacy. Second, and more importantly, the statesmen enumerated by Dio are not simply listed *qua* politicians, but under the specific title of philosophers and some of them with explicit intellectual credentials.

Thus, Epaminondas would not have acquired such great power (τοσοῦτον ἴσχυσεν) and wrought such a great change (τοσαύτην μεταβολὴν ἐποίησεν) overthrowing the Spartans, if it had not been for his acquaintance with Lysis the Pythagorean (49. 5). Pericles is recalled as the student (μαθητοῦ) of Anaxagoras, and Numa as having a share in the wisdom of Pythagoras (6). It is perhaps because Solon was well known to be a sage himself that there was no need to add any kind of information about his intellectual credentials. Aristeides lacks any mention of intellectual credentials except for the fact that like the rest of this group he is listed as a philosopher.

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<sup>19</sup> Cf. On Plutarch's *Life of Numa*, 'a compilation of legends and projections' that 'does not contain much historical evidence' which portrays an ideal philosophically-minded ruler for Plutarch, see: De Blois and Bons 1992, 1.

<sup>20</sup> Such is his advice in *Prae. ger. Reip.*, when comparing political action from ancient times to that of his own days.

<sup>21</sup> Desideri 2000, 104–7.

<sup>22</sup> 'Indeed, more than anything I wish you to have a Hellenic character'.

When Dio, therefore, declined the office of archon for himself, what he wishes to leave with his audience is the image of his ideal leader. A figment created by turning the spotlight from the identity of a politician to the intellectual part of it, as a philosopher.

In a slightly different manner, this conflated figure of statesman *cum* philosopher, appears in another speech delivered by Dio in Prusa regarding the role of the archon. *Oration 51, In reply to Diodorus*, is a short laudation of a man who has just been given the role of head archon in Prusa.<sup>23</sup> Although praising the man, Dio takes a somewhat admonitory approach against excessive admiration (1-3). He focuses on the consequences of Prusa honouring the elect archon with the office:

καί ἔγωγε μέγαν αὐτῷ τὸν ἀγῶνα ὁρῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὄντα. ὅτῳ γὰρ πόλις ὅλη καὶ δῆμος ἐκὼν ἐπέτρεψε παιδεύειν αὐτὸν καὶ ὃν ἐπιστάτην εἴλετο τῆς κοινῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ ὅτῳ τὴν μεγίστην ἀρχὴν ἔδωκε τῆς σωφροσύνης καὶ τῆς εὐταξίας καὶ τοῦ καλῶς βιοῦν ἕκαστον, πῶς οὐχὶ τούτῳ μέγας ἀγὼν ἐστίν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἐλάττω φανῆναι τῆς ὑμετέρας γνώμης;

(Indeed, I myself see the great trial that is set before this man by you. For when a city as a whole and the people entrust willingly to the hands of someone to educate itself, and elects that man as an overseer of the common virtue, and allots someone with the supreme rule over prudence, good order, and each persons' correct living, how is this not the great task for this person: that he will not prove lesser than your opinion of him? 6).

First, we should note Dio's focus on the nature of the chief archonship as focused mostly on ethics: virtue, prudence, good order, and correct living. Presumably, in his role presiding over the Council,<sup>24</sup> legislation involving the entire scope of life in Prusa would be under the purview of the chief archon. And that is including matters of morality. Yet we see that Dio's focus is laid solely on this aspect with no mention, for instance, of other more pragmatic matters of civic life such as monetary issues or relationships with neighbouring cities or with the Roman authorities. Dio colours the archonship as a philosophical endeavour. Indeed, Dio ascribes the reason for the election of the person to the latter's success with the ephebes and youth of the city. Jones writes that this most likely alludes to the office of the Gymnasiarch, 'who supervised the public exercise grounds [...] a position which gave scope for ambitious generosity, since the holder was expected to distribute cheap oil'.<sup>25</sup> Dio frames

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<sup>23</sup> For our current purposes it does not matter here whether the person elected was Dio's son, as von Arnim surmised (1898, 386), or the Diodorus from the title, as Jones believes (1978, 98). Whomever the chosen person was, it is only his equation with Pericles and Socrates that is of our concern.

<sup>24</sup> Jones 1978, 4.

<sup>25</sup> Jones 1978, 98.

this mundane duty in the language he uses for the action of philosophers such as Socrates, Diogenes, and others:

οἱ γε ἐπειδὴ ἤσθεσθε τοὺς ἐφήβους καὶ τοὺς νεανίσκους κρείττονας πεποιηκότα, εὐθὺς ἡγεῖσθε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀμείνους δύνασθαι ποιεῖν  
(Since you witnessed that he had improved the ephebes and the youth, you immediately think that he is also capable of making you better people, 8).

As he continues on with the importance and impact of the role over the moral lives of people and city, we witness again the conflation in Dio's mind between the statesman and the philosopher in terms of explicit *exempla* whose juxtaposition creates that model of the political philosopher which Dio leaves behind with his audiences: Pericles and Socrates.

ὁ γοῦν Περικλῆς ἐκεῖνος, ὃν ἀκούομεν παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀκμαζούσης γενέσθαι τῆς πόλεως, στρατηγίας μὲν ἐτύγγανεν· οὐ μὴν ἄξιος ἔδοξε διὰ παντὸς ἄρχειν τοῦ χρόνου \*\* καὶ ταύτην οὐκ ἀργύριον διοικῶν οὐδὲ οἰκοδομημάτων ἐπιμελούμενος, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ᾤσιν οἱ πολῖται, καὶ νουθετεῖν ἡβούλετο τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας καὶ τὸ γοῦν καθ' αὐτὸν βελτίονας ποιεῖν.

(The famous Pericles, of whom we hear that he lived at the time when the city of the Athenians was at its peak, who held a number of *strategos* offices, was not deemed worthy to rule throughout all time [although he made the lives of the Athenians better, and Socrates as well did]<sup>26</sup> this not as administrator of funds nor as a curator of buildings, but rather chose to correct those who were at fault and to make them as best as he could so that the citizens would be best, 7).

Whereas the examples of Pericles and Socrates are brought in as a slight jab at the Prusans for their quick grants of excessive honour, their juxtaposition reveals the ideal model of the politician who is both a statesman, like Pericles and in charge of those mundane issues such as funds and buildings, and a philosopher, like Socrates who takes it upon him to instruct people in order to improve them ethically. The person chosen by the Prusan Council for the role of chief archon most likely was not the embodiment of this conflated figure. But Dio wished to portray his position as such.

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<sup>26</sup> There is a lacuna in the text which can partially be completed, by supplying 'Socrates' from the text of §8, which explicitly mentions him. The rest is my own addition, based on the actions ascribed to Socrates as improving people's lives and from the general context.

## 5.2 Idealistic visions

In Chapter 4.1, in which we described Dio's vision of the city as a philosophical community, we noted that Dio's community is different to that of Plato's *Kallipolis*. The difference was not only between the unworldliness of that Platonic text and Dio's more grounded vision.<sup>27</sup> Rather, it is also the acknowledgment, in a sense, that the city, as an organic entity, predates any instruction it was to be offered by Dio/a philosopher. Whereas Plato wished to form his city from scratch, Dio intervened in cities that already exist. When appearing in front of a community, in an attempt to correct its ways; to suggest an agenda that is based on rational (philosophical) reasonings; and to turn it into a philosophically-minded community, it is rather clear that Dio understood his philosophical instructions – whatever they were – as adding to the existing nature of the people.

When it comes to the individual politician, matters seem to be different. In the civic spaces of the Greek cities, where Dio took for himself the dyadic role of philosopher-statesman, Dio insists on the philosophical identity precedence. Political action and counsel always stem from philosophical wisdom.<sup>28</sup> I believe that this is true of Dio in general, whose education – as we have discussed in the beginning of this thesis – and philosophical training preceded his appearance in the civic space. We read this in the critique Dio lays against philosophers who neglected civic duties; since, as recognized philosophers they now ought to engage in these. And in this chapter, we saw Dio advocating for the assumption of political roles by philosophers and exemplifying this argument by stressing the prior philosophical education of well-known statesman from the past.

Thus, it transpires that in the figure which Dio himself embodies and attempts to leave behind as a legacy, unlike the case of the community as a whole, the philosophical element must precede the civic/political one.

Even when Dio recognised that some political action, which is not guided by philosophical thinking, can still be taken for the right reasons and not for the sake of vainglory, he insisted that without philosophy, politics will not yield any good either for the political agent or to the community. This can be seen in Dio's discussion of public speaking (τὸ λέγειν) as a route to (personal) εὐδαιμονία in *Oration 24, On happiness*. Public speaking in this speech

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<sup>27</sup> The difference, if we would like, between *ideal* in the sense of 'conceived or regarded as perfect or supremely excellent in its kind', to *ideal* in the sense of 'a conception of something [...] as an object to be realized or aimed at' *OED*, s.v. 'ideal', A2, B2.

<sup>28</sup> The one exception to this is the narrative of the *Kingships*. For these texts to be fulfil their purpose – to situate Dio as a Greek intellectual in the power dynamics of the Imperial regime *vis-à-vis* its most important figure, the Roman emperor – the latter must first be the emperor and only then should he be instructed by Greek wisdom. Thus, the emperor is first a political figure and only then becomes a philosophically-minded one.

serves Dio as one example for his argument that in whatever role, for one to reach εὐδαιμονία – that state of being which philosophers viewed as the realization of all intended goals<sup>29</sup> – one must inform activity with philosophy. As Desideri noted, this speech is associated with *Oration 71, On the philosopher*, where Dio states that the advantage of a philosopher in the performing of every task is not in the ability to perform it masterfully but rather the knowledge about when and whether the task should be carried out.<sup>30</sup> Dio takes the audience through four groups of people who practice public speaking:

αὐτίκα περὶ τὸ λέγειν [πάντες] ἐσπουδάκασιν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, καὶ φιλοτίμων εἶναι δοκούντων, οἱ μὲν ὥστε ἐν δικαστηρίοις ἀγωνίζεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς δῆμον λέγοντες, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἰσχύειν πλέον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ πράττειν ὅ τι ἂν αὐτοὶ θέλωσιν, οἱ δὲ τῆς δόξης ἕνεκα τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος, ὅπως δεινοὶ νομίζονται. τινὲς δὲ αὐτῆς φασὶ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐπιθυμεῖν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ συγγράφοντες μόνον, οὓς ἔφη τις τῶν πρότερον μεθόρια εἶναι τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν. ὅ τι δὲ συμφέρει πράττουσιν ἢ πρὸς ὅ τι ἡ δόξα αὐτοῖς ὠφέλιμος ἢ τί τῆς ἐμπειρίας ταύτης ὄφελος οὐ σκοποῦσιν. ἐγὼ δὲ φημι πάντα τᾶλλα δίχα τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιμελείας καὶ ζητήσεως ὀλίγου ἄξια εἶναι.

(For example, many people who are free and thought to be seekers of honour, devote time in earnest to public speaking. Some do so to contend in the courts or so that they will speak in front of the people and because of this they will grow stronger than others and will be able to accomplish whatever it is they themselves wish. Others do so for the sake of the fame that derives from public speaking, so that they would be considered eloquent. And there are those who say that they desire the experience itself. Of those, some are public speakers, and some are only writers of speeches, of whom someone of the people of old said that they are the borderline between philosophers and politicians. But those who do so do not consider what profit is there for them in this, what value holds their fame, or how is this experience beneficial. But I say that all things apart from that mentioned care and quest are of little worth, 24. 3-4).

The fact that Dio had no interest in censuring any of these groups (that is, any of the groups' goals in practising public speaking) reveals that he is concerned here not with creating a hierarchy of public speaking or its aims, but with showing that all public speaking is just the same if it is not supported by philosophy, the care towards and quest for being a better person.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Hossenfelder 2006 (consulted online on 7 January 2021).

<sup>30</sup> Desideri 1978, 141.

<sup>31</sup> οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι καθόλου μὲν οὐδὲν πεφροντίκασιν ὁποῖους χρὴ εἶναι οὐδὲ ὅ τι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπῳ ἐστίν, οὗ ἕνεκα χρὴ πάντα τᾶλλα πράττειν ('Most people have given no thought at all to what kind of people they must be nor what the supreme good for man is, for the sake of which it is necessary to do everything, *Or.* 24.1) See below on how exactly this meets a definition of philosophy.



Even the second group, which performs for the sake of fame and might be thought to mean sophists, is not censured, and Dio carefully distances himself (ἔφη τις, ‘someone said’) from the opinion some hold on the last group that they might be some kind of a philosopher-statesman figures (and so close to Dio’s ideal intellectual). But the fact that some practise public speaking not for vainglory is not enough for them to be that figure whom Dio envisions as the ideal intellectual, the philosopher *cum* statesman:

ἐγὼ δὲ φημι πάντα τᾶλλα δίχα τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιμελείας καὶ ζητήσεως ὀλίγου ἄξια εἶναι, τῷ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἐννοήσαντι καὶ ξυνέντι, τούτῳ καὶ τὸ λέγειν καὶ τὸ στρατηγεῖν καὶ ὃ τι ἂν ἄλλο ποιῇ, ξυμφέρον τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ γίνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐπαινεῖσθαι καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων ἀνοήτων, οἷοίπερ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί, ἢ τὸ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἢ τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν οὐδὲν ἂν διαφέρει πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τοῦ ψέγεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἰσχύειν καὶ ἐπιπόνως ζῆν.

(Yet I say that all of those occupations, when divorced from that kind of diligence and investigation are of little worth, but for someone who reflected on that issue and understood it, to them either public speaking, military command, or any other thing they might do, is beneficial and turns out for the good. Since just the fact of being praised, in itself by mindless people, just the kind which most people are, or to have power among such people, or to live in pleasure will be no different in respect to happiness than to being censured, having no power, and living in labour, 4).

If not philosophical training, then at least philosophical investigation of some form must precede any activity for it to be of actual worth, and that includes especially (since it could not have been chosen randomly to be the example of the case) public speaking and even civic roles.<sup>32</sup> This argument is akin to, if different from, the one Dio presented in *Oration 22, On peace and war*. There, it was the difference between philosophers in politics and orators that Dio presented, claiming that the philosophers, when met with a political issue, can tackle it better since they already devoted time and thought to it. In this speech, people’s time and thought is not given to a specific issue, but to themselves and to the ultimate good to which they should direct their attention in general. Hence although Dio did not explicitly mention philosophers here, as in other places, we can see that it is philosophical reasoning which is needed for anyone to succeed:

οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι καθόλου μὲν οὐδὲν πεφροντίκασιν ὁποῖους χρὴ εἶναι οὐδὲ ὃ τι βέλτιστον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστίν, οὗ ἕνεκα χρὴ πάντα τᾶλλα πράττειν [...]. ἦντινα δὲ χρειὰν αὐτοῖς ἔχει τούτων ἕκαστον ἢ τί τὸ ὄφελος ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίγνεται ἄν, οὐκ ἴσασιν οὐδὲ ζητοῦσιν. [...]

<sup>32</sup> What exactly Dio meant by τὸ στρατηγεῖν is not entirely clear, but since no one in the Greek cities held any official military power at the time it can be understood in the sense of *praetor*, a meaning acquired in the Hellenistic age (*OCD*, s.v. ‘stratēgoi’) and so as a civic office.

ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἄνδρα καὶ φρόνιμον, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰδότα ὅστις ἐστὶν ὁ χρηστὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ νοῦν ἔχων, οὐδένα τούτων ἔστιν εὐρεῖν.

(Most people have given no thought at all to what kind of people they must be nor what the supreme good for man is, for the sake of which it is necessary to do everything [...]. People do not know, nor do they search after what use each of these activities has for them [activities] or what benefit might arise from it. [...] But it is impossible to find among [those who mastered a craft] a single good and prudent man who knows this very thing: who a worthy man is and who has sense, 24. 1-2).

Desideri noted that these passages, steeped in philosophical language and notions (the good, the good man, the search [ζήτησις], thought, and knowledge), show that for Dio, a man in politics who did not provide his activity with a philosophical orientation is a failure.<sup>33</sup> What needs to be added to this is that the passages also make it clear that the philosophical orientation must come before assumption of the political activity. For Dio's philosopher-statesman, the identity of the philosopher and (necessarily) what makes one a philosopher, that is the search after the good, is always primary. Unlike with cities, where philosophical orientation, in the language of Desideri, is laid on top of an existing structure (people, civic space, offices, discourse, and all that makes a city), at the individual level the ideal intellectual must first be a philosopher and then a statesman. And if we remember Dio's censure of contemporary philosophers, then a more accurate conclusion is that, for Dio, the ideal intellectual must first be a philosopher and since he is a philosopher, he must take upon himself civic and public duties.

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<sup>33</sup> Desideri 1978, 142.

## Conclusions

*Not all those who wander are lost.* This verse from Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings* opened this thesis. Maybe, like the wanderer of the verse, a Tolkien line at the top of a Classics dissertation is not lost. Almost two millennia apart, this line would have struck a chord with Dio and would have put, I think, a wry smile on his face. The wanderer (ἀλήτης or πλάνης) was after all a figure that Dio cultivated for himself knowing all too well that whilst he claims to wander and roam about, in life and in speech, he always knew where he was, always was in control of the words he spoke in front of his audiences. This thesis attempted to present to the reader who has wandered thus far new and improved knowledge of Dio, philosophy, and the intellectual culture of early imperial Rome.

David Sedley wrote in the introduction to his volume on Antiochus of Ascalon that the first century BCE was the time in which philosophy loosened its 'historic moorings in the great philosophical schools of Athens and entered Rome', a transition that 'permanently changed' the character of philosophy. From that time onwards Sedley, a philosopher and an historian of philosophy, marks a shift in the efforts of philosophers, moving from the production of new arguments to the study of the foundational texts of the different schools of thought. The imperial age, Sedley writes, is when philosophy becomes more focused on producing textual commentaries on the writings of its authoritative fathers, Plato and Aristotle.<sup>1</sup>

Dio, we saw in this thesis, fits into this image both positively and negatively. Positively, because what Dio had to offer in terms of philosophical content was, in the main, neither new nor much of his own wisdom. Less so Aristotle, but Plato and his Socrates, Cynic and Stoic forefathers were weaved into the speeches in different ways. Whilst not straightforwardly commenting on them – at least not in the form of the philosophical commentary that Sedley wrote about – Dio expounded upon them, made new connections between them and between other traditional sources of wisdom such as poetry, fables, and history. He certainly put them in a place of honour in terms of authority, cultural as well as intellectual.

Yet the Dio we saw fits the image portrayed by Sedley in a negative way just as clearly. Certainly, the Dio we met in this thesis was a man of letters who had even written some texts that seem meant to be read rather than be delivered in public (for example, *Letter* 18 and his now lost history of the Getae). Mainly, however, Dio was an agent of spoken words: his philosophy was not text based, anchored to the writing table, but a live(d) experience, carried out *viva voce*. Thus, Dio's philosophy was also removed from the circumscribed, closed setting

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<sup>1</sup> Sedley 2012, 1–2.

of the private study or even the philosopher's lecture-hall. Dio's philosophy was delivered in public in the most literal meaning: in city Councils and Assemblies, on the stages of Pan-Hellenic Games, in the large theatres of the Greek cities of the empire. The Dio that emerges from this thesis, therefore, at one and the same time belongs in his time as well as outside of it, challenging the norm in an attempt to offer something different.

This is the Dio who was not lost as he navigated the intellectual and cultural field around him. Dio, it appears, discerned the change described by Sedley, that philosophy, as a body of knowledge and a way of life, turns text-based and reclusive and that the public sphere, the civic spaces, are left with other kinds of intellectuals to perform as advisors, educators, or solely entertainers even. Looking back to the great authority figures of the past Dio indeed found wisdom, but he also found a mode of philosophy that was at odds with what he saw around him. Above all, it was the figures of Socrates and Diogenes who influenced Dio's understanding of the place of philosophy and the philosopher in society: always in the public's eye.

What he discarded – at least in public performance – from his models was the dialogue. That mode of philosophising did not fit with the nature of public activity at Dio's time. Other intellectuals around him, and above all the sophists who constituted the strongest challenge for the philosophers' claim to be educators and advisors of cities and people, were mostly public performers. Just as he had to step to the public's eye in order to have an effect, Dio could not have made the dialogue his main mode of activity. Dio set himself as a new and different kind of philosopher. His model rivals that of contemporary well-known philosophers such as Seneca, Plutarch and Epictetus, who in their philosophical output were all focused more on writing or teaching in schools, and unnamed philosophers are attacked in his speeches for neglecting what Dio saw as their public duties. Indeed, the activity of Dio reveals that the early imperial age was a time of transformation in philosophy. As ever in such times, old paradigms are questioned, and new models vie for primacy of place.

The Dionic paradigm is that of a public intellectual who saw himself as an educator and a political agent. In the latter sense, Dio yet again transpires to be an innovator. Whilst his public speeches were yet more public than a lecture by Epictetus, Musonius Rufus, or Maximus of Tyre – since they were not delivered in a circumscribed space nor to a circumscribed audience – still anyone who so wished could attend the lectures of those three and others and if they had the means, they could even join a school of philosophy as students. But whereas these and other philosophers were concerned with the teaching of doctrine and with the guiding

of the individual towards the happy life, Dio was concerned with the community. And what is more, he was concerned with the civic and political lives of the community.

The model of the philosopher Dio tried to offer in himself was a philosopher who is more than an advisor to rulers or to the ruling elite, such as Seneca and Plutarch. He tried as well to be more even than a philosopher who is engaged in politics through his personal associations like Musonius Rufus. Dio was a philosopher who envisioned his role in society as a political agent: an intellectual whose credentials specifically as a philosopher were what allowed him to make interventions in the civic space regardless of any other status. The model Dio offered was thus not only of a public philosopher, but of a philosopher engaged in public affairs. A philosopher in civic space.

Dio was not completely unique. People rarely are. Around him were more than the philosophers whom he criticised for neglecting to step out in public and to perform public duties or public intellectuals who were not philosophers and hence often criticised by him for misguiding people. Contemporaries of Dio included figures such as Apollonius of Tyana, Demonax, and Euphrates. Of the latter we know very little.<sup>2</sup> The first, mostly known from his *Life* written by Philostratus of Athens, the biographer of intellectuals, was like Dio a wandering intellectual. Demonax, known from Lucian's work of which he is the eponymous hero, was a Cynic wanderer. In varying ways, all three were active in the political and civic lives of the Greek (and even Roman) communities of their time. Famously, Apollonius, Dio, and Euphrates were portrayed by Philostratus as advising Vespasian on the best form of government (*VA* 27-38), and Apollonius was, like Dio, speaking in front of city Assemblies.<sup>3</sup> Demonax, Lucian writes, whilst following Socrates and Diogenes as models was active in political life (*ξυνεπολιτεύετο*, *Dem.* 5).

Therefore, for the researcher, the main difference between these figures and Dio is the body and nature of evidence. Through Dio, the intellectual historian is able to witness how a philosopher reacted to this time of intellectual transition by the words of the philosopher himself. Dio provides a first-person viewpoint into the culture and intellectual milieu of the time, offering an image of the skirmish. Through the points Dio chose to emphasise, by his concerns and anxieties, from what he approves and commands and what he eventually tries to achieve, we form a better image of philosophy and the intellectual world in the early imperial age. Philosophy may have eventually transitioned into a text-based discipline, conducted

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<sup>2</sup> Frede 1997.

<sup>3</sup> Jones 1978, 28. On the meeting with Vespasian, see Chapter 1, p. 29, n. 4.

mainly in small, closed-up spaces; sophists certainly continued to be mostly in the public's eye, and ultimately Christianity absorbed philosophy in all its forms. Even Dio's most famous students, Favorinus of Arles and Polemo of Smyrna (/Laodocia), sought to rival successful sophists rather than philosophers. But were it not for figures like Dio who over a long career spoke as a philosopher on every public stage in order to be an effective agent in the civic lives of communities, philosophy might have been far earlier removed from the public sphere, and the place of it in the Christian – and hence, all around the Mediterranean basin – public sphere would have been entirely diminished, if not absent. Figures influenced by Dio such as Themistius, and even the emperor Julian would have had a different intellectual trajectory.

Dio Chrysostom is an incredibly interesting figure to study on his own. His speeches are full of various information, and they are exquisite literary productions. It is no surprise that he and his speeches have been studied since antiquity. He is playful, cunning, and ironic and he employed these characteristics in his commitment to improve the lives of Greek communities around him. To read Dio is to read the intellectual discourse of the first century CE in its fullest, when a battle for the primacy of the intellectual field ensued by all kinds of intellectuals who all believed they could offer their audiences guidance and truth.

## Appendix: Dates of Speeches

The dating of Dio's *Oration* is a complex matter. Since not all of the speeches contain internal information that divulges date (and place), scholars often attempted to determine dates by analysis of style and theme. Therefore, there is no one agreed chronology for Dio's speeches and scholars, naturally, offer dates mostly (if not only) to speeches they study. Thus, for example, Bekker-Nielsen (2008, 177-8) offers the most recent chronology but only for civic *Orations*, and Bost-Pouderon (2006, 11-40) offers the most recent chronology for *Orations* 31-5.

For the most part, scholars have tried to place Dio's speeches in relation to his wandering period. This in itself is related to the question of the conversion scholars assumed Dio undergone from a sophist to philosopher. I have stated that there was no conversion and argued that Dio was committed to philosophy as an intellectual throughout his career. Both after as well as before his years of wandering. Therefore, unless the date of a speech is absolutely crucial for the argument, I avoided trying to solve the matter or even taking a position. In fact, the lack of clarity itself buttresses my hypothesis and argument. For instance: the result of scholars' assignment of *Or.* 32, in which Dio is clearly speaking as a philosopher, both to the time of Vespasian (pre-wandering years) and to the time of Trajan (post-wandering years) suggests that the use of 'conversion' as a diagnostic for dating is ineffective, and may also undermine any confidence in the existence of the conversion at all (see Chapters 1 and 4.3.1 for the discussion on the speech).

Nevertheless, for the convenience of the reader, the following is a timetable of Dio's *Orations* which are discussed in this thesis.<sup>1</sup> Since some dates are unknown and due to the disagreements between scholars, this is not so much a chronology; the table is arranged according to the number of the *Orations* in the corpus and not according to their date (known or suggested). Where there is an outstanding debate, I have referred to the most recent scholarship on the matter (under the third rubric, where otherwise I suggest the reason for the dating or the source/s for it).

Oration	Date	Source/Reason
1	Probably 100	Dio talks of his wanderings
3	c. 100, probably after <i>Or.</i> 1	Dio talks of his wanderings
4	c. 100, 'conceivably 115'	Jones 1978, 136

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<sup>1</sup> Speeches that are only mentioned in footnotes or those of which the date is wholly unimportant to the argument of the thesis do not appear here.

7	96 onwards	Land reform mentioned in the speech suggests a time under Nerva or Trajan (Russell 1992, 13).
8	82-96	Diogenic, most likely in accord with the Cynic guise adopted in wandering years
9	<i>Idem</i>	
12	Either 101 or 105	Russell 1992, 16
13	After 96, perhaps 101	Dio talks of his wanderings
18	Unknown	
19	After 96	Dio talks of his wanderings
20	Unknown	
22	Unknown	
24	Presumably after 96	Dio has a fully formed theory on the relationship between philosophy and political activity
31	Trajanic	Sidebottom 1992; Swain 1996, 428-9
32	<i>Idem</i>	Sidebottom 1992
33	Either from Vespasian time or Trajanic (latter supported by most scholars most).	Bost-Pouderon 2006, 11-40
34	Trajanic	Bost-Pouderon 2006, 35-36
35	c. 100	Jones 1978, 137
36	98 or later	Dio indicates the summer 'after my exile' (1).
38	After 96	Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 179
40	Trajanic	Dio returned from embassy to Trajan
42	<i>Idem</i>	Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 177
43	106-7?, last or penultimate speech of Dio	Jones 1978, 140; Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 178
45	After 98	Nerva is dead
46	70-80	Jones 1978, 134; Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 177
47	102 or later	Jones 1978, 139
48	c. 105	Varenus Rufus proconsul
49	c. 102 or later	Declining Archonship in Prusa
51	c. 100 or later	Dio's son may have been just elected for a position in Prusa (von Arnim 1898, 386); Jones 1978, 137
54	Unknown	
72	Unknown, presumably in wandering years or later	Jones 1978, 135
80	<i>Idem</i>	



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