

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Peru, 1962-1966

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This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Jason Heeg
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Insurgency and counterinsurgency in the developing world were crucial aspects of the global Cold War. Economic, political, religious, and social factors created tensions at the international, national, and local levels that drove conflict. Scholars can gain an increased understanding of these characteristics through the study of historical examples, such as the Cuban-inspired insurgency against the government of Peru. The leaders of the Cuban government wanted to export their revolution throughout Latin America and turn the Peruvian Andes into the *Sierra Maestra* of South America. As a result, members of the New Left in Peru began an insurgency in 1962. By 1966, the Peruvian security forces had quickly and efficiently eliminated the insurgent threat. Most literature on the Peruvian Cold War experience of the mid-1960s argues the New Left failed due to internal mistakes. I combine recently uncovered documents and reinterpret the existing literature to show that it was the competence of the Peruvian security forces, not the incompetence of the insurgents, that resulted in a government victory. ‘Victory’, however, is an elusive term, there were numerous outcomes, some positive, some negative, which had a profound impact on Peruvian society and hemispheric security. This dissertation examines these understudied events and seeks to explain their significance in the context of Latin America’s Cold War story.

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For those with the guts to fight for what they believe in

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Contents

- Map of Peru – 3
- List of Abbreviations Used – 5
- Introduction – 7
- I – Beginnings – 27
- II – Establishment of the ELN and MIR – 61
- III – Development of Peru’s counterinsurgency capability – 97
- IV – Conflict with the ELN – 141
- V – Conflict with the MIR – 179
- Conclusion – 221
- Primary Sources – 231
- Bibliography – 237

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Abbreviations Used:

AD	<i>Action Democrática</i> (Democratic Action)
AID	US Agency for International Development
ALN	<i>Alianza de Liberación Nacional</i> (National Liberation Alliance)
APRA	<i>Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana</i> (Popular Alliance of American Revolution)
CIA	US Central Intelligence Agency
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CDO	<i>Comité Aprista de Defensa de los Principios Doctrinarios de la Democrática Interna Aprista</i> (Committee for the Defense of the Doctrinal Principles of Internal Democracy)
CNdC	<i>Comando Nacional de Coordinación</i> (National Coordination Command)
Comintern	Third Communist International
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DGI	<i>Dirección General de Inteligencia</i> (General Directorate of Intelligence)
DGCI	<i>Dirección General de Contra-Inteligencia</i> (General Directorate of Counter-Intelligence)
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
ELN	<i>Ejército de Liberación Nacional</i> (National Liberation Army)
FALN	<i>Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional</i> (National Liberation Armed Forces)
FAP	<i>Fuerza Aérea del Perú</i> (Peruvian Air Force)
FER	<i>Federación de Estudiantes Revolucionarios</i> (Revolutionary Student Federation)
FIR	Blanco's <i>Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario</i> (Revolutionary Left Front)
FTC	Cuzco Workers Federation
GOM	Grupo Obrero Marxista (Marxist Workers Party)
GOP	Government of Peru
IDP	Internal Defense Plan
IPA	International Police Academy
IPC	International Petroleum Company
IRAC	Institute of Agrarian Reform and Colonization
ITT	International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation
JCP	<i>Juventud Comunista Peruano</i> (Peruvian Communist Youth)
KGB	Soviet Committee for State Security
LAYC	<i>Congreso Latinoamericano de Juventudes</i> (Latin American Youth Conference)
LN	<i>Departamento Liberación Nacional</i> (National Liberation Department)
MAA	Military Assistance Agreement
MAAG	Military Assistance and Advisory Group
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MIR	<i>Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario</i> (Movement of the Revolutionary Left)
MNR	<i>Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario</i> (National Revolutionary Movement)
MOI	Ministry of the Interior
MSA	Mutual Security Act
MTT	Mobile Training Team
M15M	<i>Movimiento 15 de Mayo</i> (15th of May Movement)

M267	<i>Movimiento 26 de Julio</i> (26 th of July Movement)
NCNA	New China News Agency
NSAM	National Security Action Memorandum
NSC	National Security Council
OAS	Organization of American States
OIDP	Overseas Internal Defense Policy
OPS	Office of Public Safety
PAP	<i>Partido Aprista Peruano</i> (Peruvian APRA Party)
PCC	<i>Partido Comunista Chileno</i> (Chilean Communist Party)
PCB	<i>Partido Comunista Boliviano</i> (Bolivian Communist Party)
PCP	<i>Partido Comunista del Perú</i> (Peruvian Communist Party)
PICL	President's Intelligence Check List
PIP	<i>Policia de Investigaciones del Peru</i> (Peruvian Investigations Police)
PNP	Peruvian National Police
POR	<i>Partido Obrero Revolucionario</i> (Worker's Revolutionary Party)
POW	Prisoner of War
PS	<i>Partido Socialista de Chile</i> (Socialist Party of Chile)
PSP	<i>Partido Socialista del Perú</i> (Peruvian Socialist Party)
PSP	Popular Socialist Party (Cuba)
SAFLA	Special Action Force-Latin America
SFGA	Special Forces Group (Airborne)
SG-CI	Special Group-Counterinsurgency
SIE	<i>Servicio de Inteligencia de Ejercito</i> (Army Intelligence Service)
SIN	<i>Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional</i> (National Intelligence Service)
SLATO	<i>Secretariado Latinoamericano de Trotskismo Ortodoxo</i> (Latin American Secretariat of Orthodox Trotskyism)
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SPEU	Special Police Emergency Unit
SS	<i>Departamento de Escuelas Especiales</i> (Department of Special Schools)
StB	Czech Intelligence service
UK	United Kingdom
URJE	<i>Union Revolucionaria de Juventudes del Ecuador</i> (Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorian Youth)
USG	United States government
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Introduction

Insurgency and counterinsurgency in the developing world were crucial aspects of the global Cold War. Economic, political, religious, and social factors created tensions at the international, national, and local levels that drove conflict. Scholars can gain an increased understanding of these characteristics through the study of historical examples, such as the Cuban-inspired insurgency against the government of Peru. The leaders of the Cuban government wanted to export their revolution throughout Latin America and turn the Peruvian Andes into the *Sierra Maestra* of South America. They found willing partners among the members of the New Left in Peru who began an insurgency in 1962. There were three components to the insurgency: Hugo Blanco's *Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario* (Revolutionary Left Front, FIR), Hector Bejar's *Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional* (National Liberation Army, ELN), and Luis de la Puente's *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario* (Movement of the Revolutionary Left, MIR). By 1966, the Peruvian security forces had quickly and efficiently eliminated the insurgent threat. Most literature on the Peruvian Cold War experience of the mid-1960s argues that the New Left failed due to internal mistakes. I combine recently uncovered documents and reinterpret the existing literature to show that it was the competence of the Peruvian security forces, not the incompetence of the insurgents, that resulted in a government victory. 'Victory', however, is an elusive term, there were numerous outcomes, some positive, some negative, which had a profound impact on Peruvian society and hemispheric security. This dissertation examines these understudied events and seeks to explain their significance in the context of Latin America's Cold War story.

I approached the research process in the spirit of the recent multi-archival scholarship of Tanya Harmer, Thomas Field, and Aldo Marchesi, which takes an international view of Cold War events in Latin America.¹ While one cannot write a truly global perspective of the events until Chinese, Cuban, and additional Soviet archives are made available to researchers, I was able to consult the UK national archives at Kew, the Mitrokhin archive held at Churchill College in Cambridge, and the Czech national security archive in Prague, in addition to Peruvian and US archives. During a 2018 research trip to Lima, the Peruvian government released 119 national intelligence documents to me. These previously unexamined documents provide convincing evidence that changes the historiography

¹ Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Thomas C. Field Jr., *From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014); Aldo Marchesi, *Latin America's Radical Left: Rebellion and Cold War in the Global 1960s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

concerning the Peruvian security service's understanding of the insurgent groups. This research is significant on many levels and is an important case study for those interested in development and counterinsurgency, as well as for the wider audience concerned with the Cold War in Latin America. In 1975, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer Philip Agee wrote, 'Suppression of the MIR will be regarded as a classic case of counterinsurgency effectiveness when good intelligence is collected during the crucial period of organization and training prior to the commencement of guerrilla operations'.² This was a noteworthy prediction by Agee, but this event has not become a classic case study for effective counterinsurgency. One aim of my research is to bring this episode out of the archives and place it among the historiography of the Cold War.

My work sits at the crossroads of global history, area studies, and international history. Global Historians and Latin Americanists have been at odds for some time, but not to the same extent as the contentions between the Globalists and Africanists.³ Gustavo Paz places the blame on both sides and argues, "Most global historians seem to be at a loss when dealing with Latin America as a region participating in global historical processes". He continues, "At the same time, Latin-American historians have been slow in linking their research agendas to the emerging study of Global History".⁴ These issues are apparent in Odd Arne Westad's *The Global Cold War*, where he only allocates one half of a chapter to Latin America.⁵ In its simplest form, global history identifies worldwide connections. I certainly do this with China, Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the US, but do not consider this to raise my dissertation to the level of global history. Nor does it fit in the country-specific or regional-based area studies historiography. While I conducted extensive research in Peru and use many primary sources uncovered during that research, I draw a substantial number of sources from US archives. Having ruled out global history and area studies, we are left with international history, of which this dissertation is firmly placed.⁶ International history deals with the political and military interactions between nations. Although Peru is the central

² Phillip Agee, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (New York, NY: Stonehill Publishing Company, 1975), p. 440.

³ Toyin Falola, 'Writing and teaching national history in Africa in an era of global history', *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2005, pp. 499-519; Matthew Brown, 'The global history of Latin America', *Journal of Global History*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2015, pp. 365-386; Also see, Sebastian Conrad, *What is Global History?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); Pamela Crossley, *What is Global History?* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008); Thomas W. Zeiler, 'The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field', *Journal of American History*, Vol. 95, No. 4, 2009, pp. 1053-1073; Odd Arne Westad, 'The new international history of the Cold War: three (possible) paradigms', *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2000, pp. 551-565.

⁴ Gustavo L. Paz, 'Global History and Latin American History: A Comment', *Almanack*, Vol. 14, 2016, p. 119.

⁵ Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War: A World History* (New York: Basic Books, 2017).

⁶ Marc Trachtenberg, *The Craft of International History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

focus of this study, engagements within the Cold War context move it from the national to the international. My writing clearly incorporates elements of global history and area studies, but it is most closely aligned with the international history approach.

The body of literature concerning the Cold War is as engaging and thoughtful as it is vast and deep. Early scholarship focused on the causes of the Cold War and assigned blame to either the US or the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War saw historians racing to interpret the relatively few, when compared to today, available documents to draw conclusions as to why the Soviet Union collapsed.⁷ Now that we have some distance from the events and a large, albeit it not comprehensive, set of primary source documents, scholars are reinterpreting the original arguments in books that provide valuable insight into the conflict.⁸ These books mostly focus on high-politics and interactions between the Superpowers, and international security issues that tend to be fixated on Europe. Another group of historians provide the valuable perspective of presidential leadership and decision making.⁹ A separate tranche of Cold War studies that began in the 1970s and which Westad consolidated in 2005 focuses on the importance of the developing world in the ideological struggle between communism and capitalism. He wrote, ‘the most important aspects of the Cold War were neither military nor strategic, nor Europe-centered but connected to the political and social development in the Third World’.¹⁰ While he inspired a crucial segment of the historiography, Westad’s argument is less impressive when contrasted with the interactions between the Soviet Union and the US that prevented the nuclear destruction of the human race. Nevertheless, the focus on the developing world was an important step in gaining a holistic understanding of the conflict. An important battleground was the social and economic advancement of developing nations. Modernization theory underpinned the US activities on this front and is well

⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

⁸ Westad, *The Cold War*; Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2012); Melvyn Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War*, 1st edn (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008); Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cold War, Three vols.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁹ William Hitchcock, *The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2019); Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Andrew Hoberek (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to John F. Kennedy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile Crises 1958-1964* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1997).

¹⁰ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Time* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 396; Also see, Melvyn Leffler and David Painter (eds), *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, 2nd Edn (New York: Routledge, 2005); Paul Thomas Chamberlin, *The Cold War’s Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace* (New York: Harper Collins, 2018).

described in the works of David Engerman, Nils Gilman, and Michael Latham.¹¹ During the 1960s, this theory was central to the US efforts to prevent the spread of communism in the developing world.

The next sub-set of scholarship deals with the Western Hemisphere, and the main debate is the apportionment of blame for Latin America's most bloody period, which we can generally categorize through the lens of two influential works. The first is Hal Brands' *Latin America's Cold War*, and the second is Stephen Rabe's *The Killing Zone*. Brands argues that Latin Americans maintained agency and were involved in the crucial decisions that shaped the period.¹² While Rabe's position, set out in the subtitle *The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America*, holds that the hegemonic US was mostly responsible for everything that happened or did not happen during the conflict.¹³ Both ends of the spectrum have valid points, which, as we shall see, play out in 1960s Peru. A second important question: Did the happenings in Latin America matter to the overall Cold War? Rabe again clearly plants his flag and writes that events in Latin America 'did not weaken the Soviet Union and lead to the liberation of Eastern Europeans'.¹⁴ In the case of Peru, this oversimplification discounts that the Peruvian counterinsurgency of the mid-1960s prevented another Cuba in the hemisphere, which allowed the US to focus its resources towards other pressing matters in its conflict with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, although understandably, the broad studies of the region rarely mention Peru, and when they do, they usually focus on the 1968 *coup d'état* or the Shining Path's terrorist campaign during the 1980s and early 1990s. Embury Riddle University professor Thomas Field's book *From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era* was especially helpful as a guide on how to conduct international history properly. Set in neighbouring Bolivia during roughly the same time, Field looks at the impact of development on national and local events. There are some parallels with Peru as well as interactions among important individuals in the narrative.

¹¹ Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); David Engerman, *Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America's Soviet Experts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Michael Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).

¹² Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

¹³ Stephen Rabe, *The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Also see, Stephen Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Stephen Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999).

¹⁴ Rabe, *The Killing Zone*, p. 193.

Specific to Peru, and like the general overviews of Latin America mentioned above, the scholarship focuses on major events, of which the New Left's insurgency, and the early to mid-1960s, are not among them. However, the following exceptions are noteworthy. On the foreign policy and diplomatic front, Daniel Sharp's edited volume set a baseline in 1972.¹⁵ Lawrence Clayton takes a sweeping approach that covers relations between the US and Peru from the late 1800s until the late 1900s. Finally, Richard Walter's *Peru and the United States, 1960-1975*, offers a short chapter on the counterinsurgency that includes interviews with US Ambassador John Wesley Jones, who ran the Embassy in Lima from 1963-1969. Much work has been done concerning cultural and social issues in the Peruvian Andes that culminates in 2018 with Hugo Blanco's *We the Indians*.¹⁶ These issues caused significant tension, as David Reynolds rightfully points out, 'Perhaps the poorest and most fractured polity in South America was Peru, where divisions of class, ethnicity, and region were mutually reinforcing. Here the whites—some 12 percent of the population, centred in Lima and descended from the Spanish conquerors—dominated an indigenous, largely Indian people living mainly in the Andean mountains'.¹⁷ A limited field of inquiry pertains to religion and spirituality, yet considering its importance in the social, political, and military aspects of life and decision making in Peru, it remains understudied.¹⁸ Although few, these works gave me a perspective and understanding that would not have been possible without them. In sum, the secondary literature discussed above, which covers the breadth and depth of Superpower nuclear deterrence to rural life in the Andes, provides a backdrop for the events herein and allows for a nuanced analysis of the insurgency and counterinsurgency in Peru during the mid-1960s.

¹⁵ Daniel Sharp (ed.), *U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru* (Austin, TX: The University of Press, 1972); Lawrence Clayton, *Peru and the United States: The Condor and the Eagle* (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1999); Richard Walter, *Peru and The United States, 1960-1975: How Their Ambassadors Managed Foreign Relations in a Turbulent Era* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010).

¹⁶ Carlos Astiz, *Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969); William Whyte and Giorgio Alberti, *Power, Politics and Progress: Social Change in Rural Peru* (New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Inc., 1976); Steve Stern (ed.), *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World: 18th to 20th Centuries* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); Daniel Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America: Peru from Sanchez Cerro to Sendero Luminoso* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991); Hugo Blanco, *We the Indians: The indigenous peoples of Peru and the struggle for land* (London: The Merlin Press Ltd., 2018).

¹⁷ David Reynolds, *One World Divisible: A Global History Since 1945* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), p. 467.

¹⁸ Jeffery Klaiber, *Religion and Revolution in Peru, 1824-1976* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977); Gustavo Gutierrez, *A Theology of Liberation* (New York: Orbis Books, 1988); Milagros Pena, *Theologies of Liberation in Peru: The Role of Ideas in Social Movements* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1995); Susan Fitzpatrick-Behrens, *Maryknoll Catholic Mission in Peru, 1943-1989: Transnational Faith and Transformations* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011).

A useful essay is Leon Campbell's The Historiography of the Peruvian Guerrilla Movement, 1960-1965 (1973). He provides a well-researched and lucid review of the available literature at the time of its publication that is a useful starting point for an examination of Peru in the 1960s. Campbell offers four reasons why the guerrilla uprising failed. These themes not only resonate throughout the publications of the 1960s and early 1970s, but they also carry over to the most recent studies of the events scholars have published as late as 2013. First and foremost were the ideological differences on the Peruvian left. Recent evidence has shown that Mao himself attempted to intervene in 1964 to encourage the disparate groups of the left to work together.¹⁹ Second, is the argument that the MIR and ELN did not secure the support of the population. This argument is on shaky ground, and there is much evidence to the contrary. Third, 'the Peruvian guerrillas displayed confusion about the exact nature of the society which they were attacking, as well as a misunderstanding of the Cuban and Chinese models for guerrilla warfare which they professed to follow'.²⁰ Like the second point, there is contradictory evidence to this argument. Finally, political events at the national and local levels in the Andes coincided with the rise of the guerrillas and tamped down some of the angst among the population. These four reasons, which have become the orthodox position of most observers of the period, are valid, but not adequate to fully explain the occurrences.

A final explanation that emerges, but that the scholarship has not fully explored is the idea that the Peruvian security forces were responsible for the defeat of the FIR, MIR, and ELN. Campbell only mentions this in passing after he described the social-economic conditions of 1963-1965 and wrote, 'The Peruvian military effectively capitalized on these conditions to quickly defeat the guerrilla bands that year'.²¹ Only a few authors make vague references such as this, while the majority disregard the effectiveness of the military. Retired Peruvian Army General Armando Artola Azcarate's book is generally positive towards the army, although he does criticize high-level political decision making. In his assessment of the failure of the guerrilla movement, Artola takes a common approach. He attributes it to improper evaluation of the objective and subjective factors of Marxism combined with tactical failures of guerrilla warfare employed against the government forces. Like the other authors, he does not give the Peruvian security forces credit for successful counterinsurgency

¹⁹ CIA report, 'Plans of the MIR for Revolutionary Action', 12 February 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library (LBJL), National Security Files (NSF), Country Files, Peru, Box 72, folder 7.

²⁰ Leon Campbell, 'The Historiography of the Peruvian Guerrilla Movement, 1960-1965', *Latin American Research Review* 8.1 (1973): p. 46.

²¹ Campbell, 'The Historiography of the Peruvian Guerrilla Movement', p. 46.

operations.²² In his 2017 book, Jonathon Brown goes the furthest of any observer of this period. After explaining the MIR guerrillas ambush of a Civil Guard detachment, he wrote that Peruvian President Belaunde ‘declared a state of siege and turned the guerrilla zones over to the military. The rebels may have been ready for the rural police, but they were no match for the army’.²³ The Civil Guard was a division of the Peruvian National Police that policed rural areas. Brown goes on to explain the positive attributes of the Peruvian officer corps and its counterinsurgency capability. While Brown took the essential first step in identifying this vital theme in the historiography, his research was too broad to provide extensive evidence to support the point. This is because his book took a regional perspective on the impact of the Cuban Revolution, and he was only able to dedicate limited research time and one chapter to the events in Peru.

Anthropologists Michael Brown and Eduardo Fernandez published the only book in English on the subject, although they limit its focus to just one of the MIR fronts. They engaged in more than a decade of research with the indigenous peoples of the central Peruvian Amazon. As a result, they offer an in-depth look into the culture, social structure, spirituality, and linguistics of the area.²⁴ The book is a valuable contribution to the body of knowledge of this episode and provides a nuanced insight into MIR’s insurgency in the eastern slope of the Andes and Amazon basin.

Jan Lust provides the most comprehensive account of the guerrilla struggle in Peru during the 1960s. Lust is originally from the Netherlands, where he completed a PhD in economics at the University of Amsterdam. He moved to Peru in 1999 and taught at various universities and institutions. He based his book on thirteen years of research that included multiple archives in Peru along with over ninety-five interviews of Peruvians who participated directly in the events. These interviews provide a rich context to the narrative and the established understanding of the period. He argues that the conditions that caused the revolution during the 1960s are still present today and that political leaders in Peru and the US should take notice. The purpose of his book is twofold. The first is to ‘present a historical reconstruction of the revolutionary fight that happened in Peru between 1958 and 1967’.²⁵ In this aspect,

²² Armando Artola Azcarate, *Subversión!* (Lima: Editorial jurídica, 1976).

²³ Jonathon Brown, *Cuba’s Revolutionary World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), p. 326.

²⁴ Michael F. Brown and Eduardo Fernandez, *War of Shadows: The Struggle for Utopia in the Peruvian Andes* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991).

²⁵ Jan Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú, 1958-1967* (Barcelona: RBA Libros, S.A., 2013), 13. Spanish version: ‘presentar una reconstrucción histórica de la revolucionaria que se llevó a cabo en Perú entre 1958 and 1967’.

Lust did a commendable job. The second is to analyze the causes of the defeat of the ELN and MIR, here Lust follows the orthodox thinking and attributes the loss to the guerrilla's failures. If Lust's analysis has a flaw, it is that he disregarded government documents, news articles, and other ephemera in favor of interviews, which precludes an objective look at all available sources.

I uncovered most of the primary documents used in various archives in Peru. The *Centro de Estudios Histórico Militares del Perú* (Centre of Peruvian Historical Military Studies, CEHMP) is a government-funded research center in Lima, which focuses on researching and publishing the military history of Peru. Significantly, CEHMP holds the Hector Bejar file that includes 1,016 documents related to the ELN and the capture and trial of Bejar in 1966. These documents are critical to the reconstruction of the events surrounding the development of the ELN and its conflict with the security forces. In 2018, the Peruvian government, through the *Jurado Nacional de Elecciones* (National Jury of Elections, JNE), declassified and released a series of 119 national-level intelligence documents to me. The JNE documents completely change how scholars view the Peruvian government's understanding of the insurgent organizations before the breakout of violence in 1965, especially concerning the so-called 'northern front', of which very little has been written. The CEHMP, along with the *Centro de Información de la Defensoría del Pueblo* (Centre of Information of the Public Defence, CIDP), the *Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales* (National Centre for High Studies, CAEN), and the *Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejército del Perú* (Permanent Commission of Peruvian Army History, CPHEP) hold a massive collection of military doctrine manuals, military unit histories, military journals and magazines that provided valuable details to how the events unfolded. Finally, the *Biblioteca Nacional del Perú* (Peruvian National Library, BNP) collection of newspapers was an invaluable resource for understanding the broader context of the period. Of note, through a careful examination of these newspapers, I uncovered a MIR urban terrorism cell that conducted a series of bombings in Lima in late 1965 and early 1966 as a last-ditch effort to keep the revolution alive. Many scholars have curiously omitted these events. These archival documents, along with the memoirs mentioned below, provide the foundation of this research project.

Multiple archives in the US provide insight into the Cold War as it played out in Peru. The Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson presidential libraries form the foundation of research into this era and are crucial to understanding the strategies and policies of the respective administrations towards Latin America in general, and Peru in particular.

Significant to this project was the CIA's 2015 release of the Presidential Daily Intelligence Checklists from the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. These documents show the importance the CIA placed on the events in Peru, and I traced multiple reports that intelligence officers generated in Lima and that the CIA analysts in Washington included in briefings to Johnson. The National Archives in College Park, Maryland (NARA) has multiple collections that pertain to this dissertation. Record Group 306 has the 'Counterinsurgency in Peru, 1960-1966' file that has numerous inter-agency documents that show how the US Embassy in Lima implemented government policies in the country. Record Group 263 has the CIA's 'Press information relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency' collection that is a daily review and translation of Latin American newspaper articles concerning conflicts across the region. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, I obtained multiple intelligence products from the Defense Intelligence Agency that describe the order of battle for Cuban and Peruvian intelligence and military units during the 1960s. Finally, the US Army Special Operations Command released many heretofore unexamined documents concerning the activities of US Army Special Forces in Latin America. Previous scholars and journalists have asserted that Special Forces participated in the counterinsurgency in Peru, but do not offer convincing evidence. The Command's documents, combined with US Army motion pictures uncovered in NARA record Group 111 as well as Peruvian military journal and newspaper articles, provide indisputable proof that they supported the Peruvian Army counterinsurgency efforts during the 1960s.

Outside of Peru and the US, I consulted three archives. The first was the UK National archive in Kew. FO 371 has a few notable documents that look at the collaboration between the Ecuadorian and Peruvian security forces to prevent the MIR element in northern Peru from using the border area as a haven and from operating in the sea between the two countries. The Mitrokhin archive held at Churchill College has the K22 file that is concerned with KGB operations in Latin America. Working with a translator to examine the documents, I did not uncover any significant KGB activity in Peru during the 1960s. However, the documents provide context to the broader understanding of Latin America's Cold War. Finally, there is the Czech National Security archive in Prague. During the Cold War, the Czech Intelligence service (StB) worked closely with the Cubans to support revolutionary activity in South America. Colleagues with Brunel University in London and Charles University in Prague assisted me in navigating the archive and translating the

documents. The combined Czech and Cuban ‘Operation Manuel’ was a significant facilitation network that supported the movement of guerrilla fighters across international borders in the 1960s. While there is no single crucial document in these collections, they offer an international perspective, albeit limited to the events described herein.

There are also many essential memoirs that former insurgents published concerning their participation in these events. Hugo Blanco and Hector Bejar are two guerrilla leaders that survived their respective conflicts and later wrote about their experiences.²⁶ These two books outline the development of their respective organizations and how they implemented very different insurgent theories in attempts to change the political landscape of the country. In the early 2000s, many former insurgents published valuable memoirs about their experiences.²⁷ Additionally, Cecilia Heraud wrote a biography of her brother Javier whom the security forces killed in 1963, that includes many of his poems, letters, and other writings.²⁸ Other works of autobiography, biography, and testimonial biography, of political leaders who did not take up arms, provide useful context to the events.²⁹ Unfortunately, no Peruvian security forces personnel wrote memoirs of the events. Two former US government personnel have published memoirs that are germane to this study. The first is Philip Agee’s recollection of his time as a CIA case officer in South America. In his book, he provides a valuable yet controversial, contribution to the scholarship and outlines a CIA penetration of the MIR organization.³⁰ Second is David Laughlin’s book about his time as a US Agency for International Development, Office of Public Safety, trainer, and advisor to the Peruvian Civil Guard counterinsurgency force. He contributes a unique perspective from the tactical level about the battle against communism in rural Latin America.³¹ While accounting for the

²⁶ Héctor Béjar, *Perú 1965: Apuntes Sobre una Experiencia Guerrillera* (Habana, Cuba: Casa de las Americas, 1969); Hugo Blanco, *Land or Death: The Peasant Struggle in Peru* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972); See also, Mario Malpica, *Biografía de la revolución. Historia y antología del pensamiento socialista* (Lima: Ensayos Sociales, 1967).

²⁷ Juan Cristóbal, *Mar de mis entrañas* (Lima: Arteidea, 2005); Walther Palacios, *Memoria y Verdad. 12 de octubre: 50 aniversario del surgimiento del MIR en el Peru. 1959-2009*, October 2009, Lust private collection; Ricardo Napuri, *Pensar América Latina: Crónicas autobiográficas de un militante revolucionario* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Herramienta Ediciones, 2009).

²⁸ Cecilia Heraud, *Vida y Muerte de Javier Heraud: recuerdos, testimonios y documentos* (Lima: Mosca Azul, 1989).

²⁹ Manuel Llamajha Mitma and Jaymie Patricia Heilman, *Now Peru is Mine: The Life and Times of a Campesino Activist* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016); Kathleen Weaver, *Peruvian Rebel: The World of Magda Portal, with a Selection of Her Poems* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009); Hilda Gadea, *My Life with Che: The Making of a Revolutionary* (London: St. Martin's Griffin, 2009).

³⁰ Agee, *Inside the Company*.

³¹ David Laughlin, *Gingo Cop* (New York: Carlton Press, Inc., 1975)

shortcomings of memoirs, I relied on these manuscripts to understand and explain the conflict.

There is a vast social science literature that looks at revolutionary warfare, insurgency, and counterinsurgency. Three books directly pertain to my primary argument. First is Theda Skocpol's *States and social revolutions*. She argues that a revolutionary situation requires a "crisis of the state" to conduct regime change.³² While there was diplomatic tension between Peru and the US, and the Belaunde Administration was under domestic political pressure, it was by no means in crisis. Secondly is Timothy Wickham-Crowley's seminal quantitative work on guerrilla warfare in Latin America, which supports my primary argument.³³ He asserts three variables must be present for a successful counterinsurgency, including internal financing of the military, the military's solidarity with the government, and external military support.³⁴ The Peruvian security services had sufficient internal funding and, in 1965, were loyal to the Belaunde Administration. The US government provided limited, yet crucial, support to the Peruvian government in the preceding years to develop a formidable counterinsurgency capability. In 2020, the International Research Network on the Revolutionary Left published an overarching theory on guerrilla movements in Latin America.³⁵ Their approach remains ensconced in the orthodox factors for guerrilla failure, as described above. Although they relied heavily on Wickham-Crowley's work concerning peasant mobilization, they did not incorporate his variables concerning the military aspect of counterinsurgency. As we shall see, Skocpol and Wickham-Crowley provide a broader view of revolution that underpins my thesis.

The following three tables provide context that will allow the reader to understand nuanced concepts that permeate the following chapters.

³² Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

³³ Timothy Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 60

³⁵ Dirk Kruijt, Eduardo Rey Tristan, Alberto Martin Alvarez (eds.) *Latin American Guerrilla Movements: Origins, Evolution, Outcomes* (New York: Routledge, 2020).




Table 1 is a two-dimensional graphic representation of the political spectrum in Peru during the Belaunde administration that provides the reader with a visual reference of the major anti-government groups. The *Partido Comunista del Perú* (Peruvian Communist Party, PCP) was the traditional communist party and took direction from Moscow, although the Chinese attempted to assert control, its leaders worked closely with other national communist parties in the region and opposed armed insurrection. In September 1962, Bejar's ELN broke away from the PCP. The Trotskyist *Partido Obrero Revolucionario* (Worker's Revolutionary Party, POR) was the Peruvian division of the Fourth International. Hugo Blanco's POR-offshoot *Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario* (Revolutionary Left Front, FIR) consolidated revolutionaries in Cusco and took up arms against the Peruvian government in 1962. The *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (Popular Alliance of American Revolution, APRA) was a leftist anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist organization. Its leaders did not want to exchange US hegemony in the region for that of China, Cuba, or the Soviet Union. They demanded independence for Peru and broader Latin America. De la Puente and his followers left APRA in March 1962 and formed the MIR. The ELN, FIR, and MIR constituted the New Left that sought to force political change through violence.


	Soviet / Marxist- Leninist	Maoist Protracted People's Warfare	Cuban <i>Foco</i>
Violence is required for regime change		X	X
Party control of the revolution	X	X	
Political indoctrination	Urban Workers	Rural Masses	
Method each group used	APRA, PCP, POR	FIR	ELN, MIR

Table 2. Key attributes of revolutionary warfare methods employed in Peru during the Cold War

The reader will benefit from a brief overview of the revolutionary methods employed in Peru during the 1960s. Table 2 shows the key differentiation between the methods and the respective groups that employed them. The Soviet approach aimed to mobilize the urban proletariat to convert capitalist states to socialism and ultimately communism. While the Soviet military doctrine called the *Russian Partisan Directive of 1933* recognized the value of guerrilla warfare, it used guerrillas as tightly controlled partisans to conduct defensive operations in enemy-occupied territories, not as revolutionaries.³⁶ The Soviets directed the communist parties in Latin America to work through the political systems, and although urban masses in the barricades clashed with security forces, the violence was not on the level

³⁶ J. Boyer Bell, *The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 15. Also, see Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

of the other two methods.³⁷ Maoist protracted people's warfare sought to mobilize the rural masses (stage I), initially to conduct guerrilla warfare (stage II), and then swell into a conventional army capable of attacking the urban centers and removing those in power (stage III). Before beginning military operations, however, Mao's concept called for an exorbitant amount of time, sometimes years, to politically indoctrinate the peasants and build a support structure for the combatants.³⁸ Latin American revolutionaries did not have the patience for a long build-up period, so they developed the *foco* method. The *foco* was the revolutionary core of dedicated fighters that went to the mountains and created the conditions for revolution. While they did conduct limited political classes in the camps, proponents argued that the duty of the revolutionary was to make revolution, not discuss theory. Action would beget recruitment, and the *focos* would grow into columns that could take on the conventional militaries of the respective state. The Party would develop from the core of military leaders responsible for victory who would go on to lead the new government.³⁹ Each of the methods offered advantages as well as disadvantages to the Latin American revolutionary, and I will explore these in-depth in the following chapters.



³⁷ Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence note, Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Brezhnev Cautions on Foreign Issues', 06 November 1964, p. 2, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Latin America-Cuba, box, 24, folder 1.

³⁸ Mao Zedong, *Mao on Warfare: On Guerrilla Warfare, On Protracted Warfare, and other Martial Writings* (New York: CN Times Books, 2013), p. 185.

³⁹ Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, Third Edition with Revised and Updated Introduction and Case Studies by Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1997), p. 50; Regis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution: Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1967), p. 47.

Table 3 provides the three major aspects of counterinsurgency strategy and tactics the security forces employed in the 1960s. The Peruvian Army's *1961 Doctrine Manual of Revolutionary War and Counterrevolutionary War* outlined the strategy and tactics the military should employ in the conflict with communist insurgents.⁴⁰ The doctrine writers based the manual on US military doctrine and training from the period. Counterinsurgency is the overall concept or strategy. Civic action is '...any action performed by the military force utilizing military manpower and material resources in cooperation with civil authorities, agencies, or groups, which is designed to secure the economic or social betterment of the civilian community'.⁴¹ Counterguerrilla operations are employed '...to subvert, kill, or capture the enemy guerrilla force and prevent a resurgence of the resistance movement'.⁴² Psychological operations are designed to 'Divide, disorganize, and induce defection of irregular force [guerrilla] members; Reduce or eliminate civilian support of guerrilla elements'.⁴³ I will use these definitions unless the text of a direct quote has a similar term.

A final note on terminology. For clarity, I will use the word 'Campesino' to describe individuals in the lower social-economic strata in Peru. As anthropologist Jaymie Heilman showed:

*'In Latin America, Campesino does not necessarily mean indigenous, as the racial and ethnic identities of men and women who call themselves peasants vary enormously across the continent. In Peru, there were and are impoverished agricultural laborers of African, Chinese, and mestizo (mixed European and indigenous) descent, as well as of indigenous origin, just as there have been many indigenous men and women whose economic lives were not defined by subsistence agriculture'.*⁴⁴

The one exception to this rule is the indigenous Amazonian Campas Indians, which the reader will encounter in chapter five.

In addition to the introduction and conclusion, I divide the body of this dissertation into five chapters, and briefly described them here:

Chapter one examines economic, political, religious, and social factors on the local, national, and international levels. After a brief introduction to the country, I describe the founding and

⁴⁰ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Manual de Doctrina de Guerra Revolucionaria y de Guerra Contrarrevolucionaria* (Lima: Departamento de Operaciones y Instrucciones, 1961).

⁴¹ Department of the Army, *FM 31-15 Operations Against Irregular Forces* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1961), p. 18.

⁴² Department of the Army, *FM 31-16 Counterguerrilla Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1963), p. 20.

⁴³ Department of the Army, *FM 31-15 Operations Against Irregular Forces*, p. 17.

⁴⁴ Llamojha and Heilman, *Now Peru is Mine*, p. 11.

maturation of both APRA and the PCP. The chapter then reviews the foreign policies of the US, Cuba, the Soviet Union, and China towards Peru. I show that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations built the foundation of the Peruvian security forces counterinsurgency capability, for which many assign Kennedy the credit. While the Soviet Union did not directly participate in the conflict, the reader must understand the international role it took and its stance in the so-called wars of national liberation in the developing world. The Cubans, and to a lesser extent, the Chinese, provided support to the MIR and ELN and their attempt to dislodge the Peruvian Oligarchy. This support included ideological, financial, revolutionary theory, training in basic military skills and guerrilla warfare, communications, and intelligence tradecraft. It is difficult to imagine that the MIR and ELN would have had any success without this international assistance. This chapter provides the reader with a strategic view of communist involvement in Latin America in general, and Peru in particular, and establishes a basis for understanding the events of 1965 and 1966.

Chapter two focuses on the development of the ELN and MIR, respectively, and reveals how the Cuban Revolution inspired them to break away from the PCP and APRA and take up arms against the government. The first section outlines the Cuban policy and strategy for exporting its revolution across Latin American and the broader developing world. The second section shows how the ELN was the darling of Ernesto Guevara because of its communist beliefs, and how the Cubans prepared them and sent them into battle first. The second section explains how Fidel Castro and Guevara initially shunned the MIR leadership because they were not communist, and how De la Puente pragmatically shifted left along the political spectrum to garner Cuban support. The Chinese were also instrumental in preparing the MIR for the coming conflict. Despite the influence of the Cuban, Chinese, and Soviets, the Peruvian revolutionaries were able to maintain their agency and were not mere pawns in the Cold War. They were independent actors fighting to improve the socio-economic conditions in their country. Moreover, numerous members of the various communist parties in the region demonstrate agency when they defied Moscow's orders and assisted the guerrillas.

Chapter three looks at the development of Peru's counterinsurgency capability and its first test in 1963 when Hugo Blanco instigated a Campesino uprising in the southern Andean valleys called La Convencion and Lares. The Peruvian government gained valuable experience during this campaign that they integrated into the preparation for the conflict in 1965 and 1966. The chapter also reviews both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and considers

the overall policy for Latin America and then delves into the activities of the US Embassy personnel in Lima. Kennedy's push for a whole of government approach to counterinsurgency and support to friendly governments at risk of communist subversion increased the Peruvian security force's capability to contest internal threats. This focus drove the US Army, US Agency for International Development (AID), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to help the Peruvian government develop a formidable counterinsurgency force. Although Kennedy and Johnson would like to have been able to claim success in the socio-economic development of Peru, the MIR and ELN hampered these goals and forced the US to take a hard line against subversion. While small-scale military civic action projects positively impacted a limited number of Peruvians, high-level political issues stopped the Alliance for Progress from achieving its lofty goals. As with the insurgents mentioned above, this chapter will show that the Peruvian security forces, despite significant US influence, maintained oversight of the counterinsurgency operations.

Chapter four delves into the case of the ELN and the guerrilla front Bejar established in La Mar, which is in the central highlands. Their first contact with the Peruvian police almost destroyed the group in 1963 as they raced to Cusco to fight alongside Blanco. They later reconstituted and went into action again in 1965. My research did not uncover any new significant primary sources. However, a reinterpretation of the available documents supports the thesis that it was the Peruvian Army's superior counterinsurgency capability, not Bejar's strategy or tactics that led to the group's downfall. Following the destruction of the front in La Mar and Bejar's capture in Lima, the remaining ELN fighters attempted to establish a new front in Puno along the border with Bolivia and to coordinate activities with Guevara. However, the Peruvian security forces soon learned of the preparations, and the ELN members dispersed. Later, Juan Chang, Restituto Jose Cabera Flores, and Edilberto Lucio Galvan Hidalgo joined Guevara in Bolivia. They died fighting with him in 1967.

The last chapter outlines the MIR's final preparations for war and its ultimate defeat at the hands of the security forces. I divided this chapter into four sections based on separate rural and urban fronts. Guillermo Lobaton Milla commanded the *Tupac Amaru* front in the central highlands, which was the most successful in terms of how long it lasted and its ability to win over the local people to its cause. Luis de la Puente was the overall leader of the MIR was with the *Pachacutec* front in Mesa Pelada, which the second section examines. While these two fronts have been the subject of many chapters and books, the remaining two are less well-known. The third section looks at the *Manco Capac* front that Gonzalo Fernandez

Gasco established in Piura near the border with Ecuador. Fernandez's group was behind in its preparations at the onset of hostilities and did not engage in major combat. However, my research at Kew uncovered documents that permit a deeper understanding of the front and its activities. The final section looks at the MIR's activities in Lima, which Guevara's brother-in-law Ricardo Gadea led. The *Milicias Urbanas Luis de la Puente* (Urban Militia of Luis de la Puente) was the MIRs last attempt to further the revolution. However, the Peruvian Investigations Police quickly penetrated the group and arrested its members. Recently declassified Peruvian government documents allow for a reassessment and new understanding of the conflict and show that the security forces had much better insight into the MIR earlier in the conflict.

While China and the Soviet Union had a part in the events herein, Cuba and the US were substantially more involved. The Cuban strategy called for 100 Vietnams and for the Andes to be the *Sierra Maestra* of South America in reference to the location in Cuba, where Castro established his guerrilla army. Lust convincing shows the importance of Peru to Guevara's continental guerrilla project and argues that Peru, not Bolivia, was the key to it.⁴⁵ The CIA understood this as well and wrote in 1960, 'Peru is considered by the Cuban Government to be appropriate as the site of the first Cuba-type revolution in Latin America'.⁴⁶ Both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations desired socio-economic evolution in Latin America, but the bottom line of their foreign policies was that they would not accept another Cuba in the Western Hemisphere. State Department Policy Planning Council chairman Walt Rostow succinctly explained the US strategy to West Point cadets in 1963:

'The cost and brutal arithmetic of guerrilla war make it essential that American policy in vulnerable areas be geared to winning in Stage One. We must never permit them to come to a stage where they think the situation is objectively right to take to the streets and the hills. Virtually any amount of cost and effort that we can expend in these areas in Stage One is worthwhile, if one looks at the cost of letting a Stage Two operation like Vietnam get going'.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Jan Lust, 'The Role of the Peruvian Guerrilla in Che Guevara's Continental Guerrilla Project', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 225-239, 2016.

⁴⁶ CIA report, 'Cuban Aggression and Subversive Activities in Latin America', 26 October 1960 in Donald Robinson (ed.) *The Dirty Wars: Guerrilla Actions and Other Forms of Unconventional Warfare* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1968), p. 165.

⁴⁷ William Beecher, 'Special Forces Make Gains in Curbing Latin Guerrilla Bands', *The Wall Street Journal*, 18 February 1964, p. 10. Rostow is referring to the stages of Maoist protracted people's war, which the US government used as a model to understand and analyze insurgencies throughout the world. (See table 2 above.)

Rostow's words were significant because he was Kennedy's lead policy architect for the developing world.⁴⁸ Journalist William Beecher added, 'the \$70 million the U.S. spends yearly in Latin America to try to nip communist insurgency compares to about \$500 million spent in the Vietnam War'.⁴⁹ In this respect, the Peruvian and US governments won the counterinsurgency and prevented the Peruvian New Left and the Cubans from implementing their strategy. This low-cost success, at least in the narrow sense of defense funding, allowed the US to allocate resources to other areas in its Cold War competition with the Soviet Union.

During the research process, three themes emerged that are present across the chapters. The first is the question of agency, which engages in one of the significant arguments of the historiography. Throughout the dissertation, there are many examples, both on the revolutionary and government sides, of Peruvians exercising primary agency as compared to Cuban, Chinese, Soviet, and US interlopers. This information led me to place this case study closer to Hal Brand's school of thought, as discussed above, rather than that of Stephen Rabe. Secondly, one can find the roots of liberation theology in both the New Left and the government personnel involved in the conflict. Also, all the guerrilla commanders were raised in the Catholic religion, and many considered the priesthood as a means of social-economic advancement. Finally, very few females participated directly in guerrilla warfare, which is an anomaly considering the multitude of insurgencies during the Cold War that relied on females as fighters and leaders. While most participated in auxiliary roles, my research identified two MIR female fighters who appear here in the historiography for the first time. These findings do not directly support the main argument of this dissertation, but they help place Peru in the framework of the broader scholarship.

Building on Brown's work, my primary argument is that the Peruvian security forces conducted a successful counterinsurgency against the guerrillas, which outweighs the orthodox explanation that the guerrillas imploded due to internal mistakes. While the four orthodox explanations each have merit, they are not sufficient to explain the outcome. I approached this project by breaking the larger insurgency into six mini-insurgencies. This allowed me to examine the respective guerrilla leader's actions and security force commander's actions independently, which showcased various counterinsurgency techniques. I directly confront repressive counterinsurgency techniques such as torture, extrajudicial incarcerations and killings, and punitive campaigns. Further, I do not accept *quid pro quo*

⁴⁸ Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, p. 41.

⁴⁹ William Beecher, 'Special Forces Make Gains in Curbing Latin Guerrilla Bands', p. 10.

escalations of violence or the excuse that since the guerrillas committed human rights violations, the security forces were justified in violating the guerrilla's, or more egregious, innocent members of the population's, human rights. Scholars have understudied this episode of Latin American history for two reasons. First, during the mid-1960s, international attention focused on the Vietnam War. Second, the limited scholarly focus that South America did receive during this period centered on the 1964 anti-US riots in Panama, the 1965 US invasion of the Dominican Republic, and in 1967 another revolutionary movement in neighboring Bolivia where the Bolivian Army killed Guevara. Brown's and Lust's recent scholarship has illuminated the importance of Peru in the revolutionary struggle. What follows is my attempt to add to the existing historiography and explain the significance of these events in the context of Latin America's Cold War story.

Chapter one: Beginnings

The people living in the Andean mountains in the region that is now called central and southern Peru have endured exploitation dating back at least to the early days of the Incan Empire (1438). The Incan Royalty oppressed them, as did the Spanish, and later the Peruvian Oligarchy. This led Eric Hobsbawm to conclude, ‘If any country is ripe for and needs a social revolution it is Peru’.⁵⁰ Various would-be liberators have attempted, some successful, others not so, to mobilize the mass population to rise against their masters. This historical context is critical for the reader to fully comprehend the events of the 1960s. I will explain key events that shaped the history of Peru including the establishment of the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (Popular Alliance of American Revolution, APRA) and the *Partido Comunista del Peru* (Peruvian Communist Party, PCP), which were the forerunners of the insurgent groups of the 1960s. This chapter will then review the foreign policies of the US, Soviet Union, and China towards Latin America and how the Cuban revolution impacted them. Throughout, the I will provide context to the economic, political, religious, and social aspects of the period at the international, national, and local levels.

Located on the western coast of South America, Peru is beautiful and varied. The rugged Andean peaks separate the country into coastal, mountain, and rainforest sections. These three regions, while providing ecological diversity have caused fissures in the social strata. To the north is Ecuador and Colombia, to the east is Brazil and Bolivia, and to the south is Chile. Peru is rich in natural resources including oil, natural gas, copper, zinc, gold, guano, as well as fish in the Pacific and many inland rivers. The coastal strip, or *Costa*, consists of a rocky desert plain with poor soil that is at some points up to thirty-two kilometres wide, but usually much narrower. Fifty-two rivers flow through the valleys of the western slope of the Andes and into the Pacific Ocean, and many provide acceptable microclimates that support human life and agriculture. The Peruvian capital Lima sits in the Rimac river valley and is an example of this phenomenon.⁵¹ Spanish conquistador Pizarro established Lima in 1535, and it is now the second largest desert city in the world after Cairo.

The Andean highlands, or *Sierra*, create the central backbone that divides the country into three sections. Peaks reach as high as 6,768 metres where there are glaciers and year-round

⁵⁰ Leslie Bethell (ed.) *Viva La Revolucion: Eric Hobsbawm On Latin America* (London: Little, Brown, 2016), p. 6.

⁵¹ Paul Doughty, ‘The Society and Its Environment’ in Rex Hudson (ed.), *Peru: A Country Study*, 4th edn (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1993), p. 67.

snow in the highest elevations. Most of this territory is inhospitable, but the lush river valleys provide life-sustaining vegetation and agriculture. On the border with Bolivia, Lago Titicaca is a prominent feature of the high mountain plains and is the highest lake in the world at 3,812 meters. The eastern slope of the Andes transitions into the expansive Amazon basin, or *Selva*. The vegetation grows up the slope to a height of 2,100 meters, and this area is known as the *Ceja de la Selva*, or eyebrow of the jungle. The *Selva* is a hot, humid rainforest and is one of the most biodiverse regions on the planet. Although it is rich in flora and fauna, it is very difficult for humans to adapt to life there.⁵² As later sections of this dissertation will show, these three diverse regions will be the progenitor of many issues between the people who inhabit them.

While archaeologists have traced human life in Peru back at least 12,000 years, the Incaic period (1438-1532) established an important trend that persists to this day. David Werlich described the pattern, 'A small elite dominated the state and demanded almost absolute submission of the masses to its authority'.⁵³ Additionally, Peter Klaren has argued that the achievements of the Incan Empire have,

*'caused some twentieth century Peruvian scholars of the indigenous peoples, known as indigenistas (indigenists), such as Hildebrando Castro Pozo and Luis Eduardo Valcarcel, to idealize the Incan past and to overlook the hierarchical nature and totalitarian mechanisms of social and political control erected during their Incan heyday'.*⁵⁴

Eric Hobsbawm, while not an indigenist *per se*, argued that the Spanish exploited certain features of Inca system to facilitate the oppression of the natives.⁵⁵ In addition to scholars, revolutionaries such as Ernesto 'Che' Guevara have looked back uncritically at the Incas. In a conversation with Mao Zedong in 1960, Guevara stated, 'The case of Peru is interesting. It has always had a custom of primitive communism. The Spanish during their reign brought in feudalism and slavery. But primitive communism did not die out due to that. On the contrary, it survives until now'.⁵⁶ Notwithstanding this selective use of history, the Incas established the authoritarian trend that continued with the Spanish and later the Oligarchy. In response to this, there have been countless localized resistance movements and rebellions to

⁵² Doughty, 'The Society and Its Environment', p. 72.

⁵³ David Werlich, *Peru: A Short History* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), p. 38.

⁵⁴ Peter Klaren, 'Historical Setting', in Hudson (ed.), *Peru: A Country Study*, p. 12; Also see Louis Baudin, *A Socialist Empire: The Incas of Peru* (London: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961).

⁵⁵ Eric Hobsbawm, 'Feudal Elements in the Development of Latin America', in Bethell (ed.), *Viva La Revolucion*, p. 89.

⁵⁶ 'Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Ernesto "Che" Guevara', 19 November 1960, p. 4, Wilson Center, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 202-00098-01, translated by Zhang Qian. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115155>, (accessed 8 October 2016).

the central authority. The rugged terrain perpetuated this trend in the Andean region. Werlich argues, 'The small, dispersed communities always have been isolated and local power structures tenacious in protecting their independence from meddling central governments'.⁵⁷ Most often, the isolation of the communities proved beneficial to the governing power and prevented widespread coordinated rebellion across the region. The downfall of the Incan Empire began in the mid-1520s, and civil war would weaken it and present a vulnerable state to European encroachment.

Francisco Pizarro and a group of 180 conquistadors arrived in what is now northern Peru, armed with the sword and the cross, determined to seek out Incan riches and claim them for the Spanish crown. They contacted the Incan ruler Atahualpa and arranged a meeting with him in Cajamarca a town in the central Andes. Atahualpa and his followers did not perceive the Spanish contingent as a threat and allowed them safe passage into the central plaza of the town on 16 November 1532. Pizarro captured the Incan King while his men fought and overwhelmed a force of 5,000 lightly armed Incas by employing Spanish superior military technology and tactics. It took forty years for the Spanish to consolidate control over the region and during this period the Incas provided a stiff resistance. Incan generals led raids and ambushes against the Spanish columns as they travelled through canalized mountain passes. This was one of the first examples of guerrilla warfare in Peru. Manco Inca deserted Cusco and set up a shadow empire in the small town of Vilcabamba to the north. From there he raided and attacked the Spanish seriously challenging their foothold in the Andes. This continued for thirty years until the Viceroy Francisco de Toledo decided to destroy the rebellion with the colonial army in 1572. Werlich chronicled the event, 'Tupac Amaru, a lineal descendant of Huayna Capac, and the fourth of the Vilcabamba emperors, was brought to Cuzco and executed. Peru was quiet'.⁵⁸ The Vilcabamba insurgency was perhaps the most significant episode of Peruvian resistance and most rebel groups that have followed harkened back to the fearless Tupac Amaru and his virtuous stand against the invaders.

While the indigenous peoples fought many insurgencies over the years, the Spanish ruled until the 1820s. After defeating the Spanish in his country, the Argentine General Jose de San Martin, repeated his victory in Chile and then turned his army towards Peru. He arrived in Pisco in southern Peru via the sea in August 1820, and then captured Lima and drove the Viceroy and his troops into the Andes. After an intricate political skirmish, San Martin left

⁵⁷ Werlich, *Peru: A Short History*, p. 38.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

the command of the patriot forces to Venezuelan General Simon Bolivar. Bolivar led the initial phases of the war to destroy the remaining Spanish forces, but the politicians recalled him to Bogota. He gave command of the army to his protégé General Antonio Jose de Sucre. Sucre defeated the Spanish troops and captured the Viceroy Jose de la Serna y Hinojosa at the Battle of Ayacucho on 9 December 1824, which ended Spanish rule in the Americas. They routed out the last few vestiges of royalism over the next thirteen months. Ironically, after centuries of rebellion against Spanish domination, the liberty of Peru was won by outsiders. In post-independence Peru, instability proved to be commonplace as the newly founded country sought to establish a constitutional republic. Civil unrest in Lima combined with a push to reform the government instigated a *coup d'état* by Colonel Oscar Raimundo Benavides in 1914. Klaren shows 'The coup marked the beginning of a long-term alignment of the military with the Oligarchy, whose interests and privileges it would defend until the 1968 revolution of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-75)'.⁵⁹ The Peruvian Oligarchy consisted of a small number of social-economic elite families who were very influential with the government from the 1820s until 1968.

Since the Conquistadors arrived in Peru, the Catholic religion grew in prominence and became intertwined into the economic, military, social, and political fabric of the nations. Roberto MacLean argues, 'No Western Hemisphere country can show an older, brighter, and more glorious tradition than Peru. The Cross, together with the Sword, was one of the symbols of the Conquest, which opened the spiritual horizons of Latin culture and Catholic faith to our Fatherland'.⁶⁰ Following independence, the liberators wrote into the constitution that the new government would select the leadership of the Peruvian Catholic Church, a right formally held by the Spanish Monarchy, thus gaining a certain level of control.⁶¹ The Church continued to defend the status quo until the end of World War II when it expanded its interests from being wholly concerned with the soul to seeking better material conditions for the poor.⁶² As I will show throughout the dissertation, while the Church did not, with a few isolated exceptions (See chapter five.), directly support the New Left, the roots of the liberation theology, developed parallel to the insurgent movements of the 1960s.

⁵⁹ Klaren, 'Historical Setting', p. 38.

⁶⁰ Roberto Maclean y Estenos, *Sociología del Peru* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1959), 49, translated in Carlos Astiz, *Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 162.

⁶¹ Astiz, *Pressure Groups and Power Elites*, p. 168.

⁶² Fredrick Pike, 'The Catholic Church and Modernization in Peru and Chile', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol 20, No 2 (1966), p. 274.

Popular Alliance of American Revolution, APRA

Victor Raul Haya de la Torre was one of the most influential political thinkers and politicians in Latin America during the twentieth century. He was born on 22 February 1895, in Trujillo a small city on the northern coast of Peru. His family claimed to be of pure European descent, but Haya had bronzed coloured skin and a facial structure like the local Indians. He grew up in an upper-middle-class home and obtained a good primary education. Raised in a Catholic family, he briefly considered following in one of his uncle's footsteps and becoming a priest.⁶³ Haya matriculated at the University of San Marcos in Lima and began his studies there in 1917. He became very active in student politics, and as the President of the Federation of Students of Peru, fought to reform the University system. In 1919, he helped found the Federation of Textile Workers of Peru and was involved in the nascent labour movement. He also helped establish the Popular University, which provided education to the workers and their families. Haya became known for a high-level oratory skill and his ability to motivate large groups of people. During this time, he began to form his political ideas that would go on to influence people across Latin America.⁶⁴ His contemporary, José Carlos Mariátegui la Chira, the founder of the Peruvian Communist Party, surpassed him in intellect and writing ability. Still, Haya had much more charisma and was a natural leader.

Peruvian President Augusto Bernardino Leguía y Salcedo, who gained power by *coup d'état* in 1919, felt threatened by the student and labour movement and began to oppress them. In May 1923, Leguía, in an apparent attempt to gain the support of the Catholic Church, dedicated the country to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. This concerned Haya because his movement was competing against the Church for the support of the lower-class population. Haya was a key leader of the protests that followed, and the Leguía Regime arrested him and exiled him to Panama. The Mexican Minister of Education Jose Vasconcelos invited him to Mexico City and hired him as an editor.⁶⁵ Vasconcelos, who published *The Cosmic Race* introduced Haya to a group of revolutionary intellectuals that influenced his thinking. On 7 May 1924, Haya and a few fellow students founded APRA. They designed this umbrella organization to cover all of Latin America, or Indoamerica as they labelled it, and each

⁶³ Klaiber, *Religion and Revolution in Peru*, p. 123.

⁶⁴ Robert Alexander (ed.), *Aprismo: The Ideas and Doctrines of Victor Raul Haya Del La Torre* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1973), p. 4.

⁶⁵ Richard Salisbury, 'The Middle American Exile of Victor Raul Haya de la Torre', *The Americas*, Vol. 40, No. 1, July 1983, p. 3.

country was to have a branch or division.⁶⁶ As shown in table 1 of the introduction, the party was left of centre on the political spectrum. Moreover, it was anti-imperialist at its core. Haya argued vehemently that the Soviet model of revolution was not appropriate for and could not be successful in Latin America. Latin Americans must find their own way towards the revolution. He wrote, ‘Observing closely the social and economic reality of Indoamerica, we cannot help but see a vast and new political problem whose solution is not found in and cannot be adjusted to the known European ideological molds’.⁶⁷ APRA was inclusive of all classes and did not limit membership to the proletariat. Over the next few years, he travelled widely in Europe, including the Soviet Union, and his observations confirmed that change would require his concept of a uniquely Indoamerican method of revolution. Upon returning to Mexico, Magda Portal, a Peruvian poet and Secretary-General of the APRA cell in Mexico City, arranged for Haya to give a series of lectures at various universities. She recalled that before the lectures, her political conceptions “were vague, unformulated, barely more than impulses towards solidarity with and campesinos’.⁶⁸ These lectures demonstrated Haya’s ability to distil and effectively communicate complex topics, while his charisma won over many Peruvian exiles in Mexico. In 1930, Haya’s followers in Lima established the *Partido Aprista Peruano*, the Peruvian branch of APRA.⁶⁹ As APRA grew, it garnered a large following among the rural lower-class and the urban working class, which put it at odds with the Catholic Church because APRA pulled many of the faithful away from the Church and to its ranks. Moreover, as APRA developed into a significant force in politics and for socio-economic change, the Peruvian Communist Party also attempted to bring it down.⁷⁰ These challenges, of course, were in addition to the friction between Haya’s group and the government.

In 1931, the military junta that had ousted Leguía and allowed Haya to return to Peru and run in the presidential election. Colonel Luis Sanchez Cerro won the election.⁷¹ The Peruvian

⁶⁶ CIA intelligence report, ‘The Peruvian Aprista Party and Aprismo: Past, Present and Future’, 22 June 1966, p. 1, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) electronic reading room, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00826A000900240001-0.pdf> (accessed 9 Apr 20).

⁶⁷ Translated in Alexander, *Aprismo*, p. 38.

⁶⁸ Translated in Weaver, *Peruvian Rebel*, 52.

⁶⁹ Alexander, *Aprismo*, p. 8; Carol Graham, *Peru’s APRA: Parties, Politics, and the Elusive Quest for Democracy* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 27; Harry Kantor, *The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), p. 22.

⁷⁰ Astiz, *Pressure Groups and Power Elites*, p. 178.

⁷¹ ‘US Ambassador to Peru (Dearing) to Secretary of State’, 29 November 1931, in Joseph Fuller (ed.), *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1931, Volume II* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 923.

Apristas claimed the election was fraudulent, but the voting public elected a few APRA members to Congress. Some of Haya's followers wanted to revolt, but he convinced them to remain calm and wait for the next election, which he proclaimed they would surely win. In 1932, Sanchez banned APRA in Peru, removed its members from Congress, and arrested Haya. On 7 July 1932, Haya's followers conducted a demonstration against Sanchez in Trujillo. The demonstration became violent and fighting broke out between the Army and the *Apristas*. The Army killed many APRA members who had supposedly surrendered and claimed that APRA members had killed soldiers under similar circumstances.⁷² This solidified the enmity between the Army and the Peruvian APRA that would last for forty years.⁷³ The CIA later wrote, 'These incidents are the root of the enduring hostility between the PAP [Peruvian APRA Party] and the Peruvian armed forces...' They continued, '...a religion of hatred which is kept burning by indoctrination of the officer corps and through an annual commemoration of the military martyrs in the Trujillo uprising'.⁷⁴ On 30 April 1933, an assassin killed Sanchez, and General Oscar Benavides succeeded him. Benavides released Haya from jail and allowed the APRA members to return to Congress. This reprieve only lasted a few months, when Benavides outlawed the party again and caused Haya to go into hiding.

Over the next ten years, Haya would outmanoeuvre the security forces by avoiding capture and thus build a mystique around himself that would endear him to his followers to an even greater extent. In 1935, he published an article in the Argentinian periodical *Claridad* called 'Philosophical Synopsis of Aprismo'. The article strongly criticized the methods of communism as practiced in Latin America. He wrote, '...the historical determination of Marx is not a rule that imposes itself in all latitudes'. And concluded, 'Therefore, the history of the world, seen from the Indoamerican historical space-time will never be the same as that seen by a philosopher from the European space-time'.⁷⁵ Writings and public attacks such as this caused the other elements of the Peruvian Left to abhor APRA. Hector Bejar recalled that APRA 'is the oldest party in Peru and the best organized. It has a long tradition of struggle and has suffered the most murders, and the most deportations and the most torture

⁷² Alexander, *Aprismo*, p. 11; Rogger Mercado, *La Revolución de Trujillo, 1932* (Lima: Editorial de Cultura Popular, 1963), p. 19.

⁷³ John Wesley Jones, Ambassador to Peru (1963-69), lecture on Peru at the US National War College, 8 April 1971, LBJL, Papers of John Wesley Jones, Box 12, folder 5.

⁷⁴ CIA, 'The Peruvian Aprista Party', p. 6.

⁷⁵ Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, *El Antiimperialismo y El APRA, IV Edn* (Lima, Amauta S.A., 1972), p. 31, translated in Alexander, *Aprismo*, p. 44

victims'. Despite these seemingly positive comments, he continued, 'The [Peruvian] communist party has always called the APRA fascists and has always had a very sectarian attitude. But on many occasions the communist party has actually stood to the right of APRA ... so this has something to do with the communist party's great hatred towards the APRA'.⁷⁶ In Peru, APRA had enemies across the political spectrum.

In 1945, the political situation changed again with the election of Jose Luis Bustamante y Rivero. APRA returned to public life, and Haya came out of hiding. However, by 1948 conditions had shifted, and crisis ensued. The political left gained sufficient power and forced a reaction by the Peruvian military that put General Manuel A. Odria in the Presidency.⁷⁷ On 3 October 1948, dissident APRA members instigated a mutiny at the naval base in Lima's port Callao.⁷⁸ The uprising could have been successful, but Haya ordered the members to stand down. In the repression that followed, Odria outlawed APRA, and Haya went into exile.⁷⁹ As did many APRA members.

Senior APRA leader Hilda Gadea, and future MIR supporter, went to Guatemala, where she met her future husband, Ernesto Guevara. They debated many aspects of revolution, and Guevara questioned Gadea's allegiance to APRA, instead of the PCP. She explained her disapproval of the PCP because 'they confused the masses and often entered into alliances with the right to reach a position of power, thus obscuring the goals'.⁸⁰ In 1954, they discussed the topic of religion in Latin America and its implications concerning revolution. Guevara dismissed the Catholics because they were beholden to the Oligarchies. Gadea insisted that they must be considered, and while the Church hierarchy would support the

⁷⁶ Translated in Graham, *Peru's APRA*, p. 27.

⁷⁷ CIA Memorandum for the President, 'Military seizing power in Peru and Venezuela', 8 December 1948, GALE, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, <https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349323028/USDD?u=cambuni&sid=USDD&xid=b01486d0> (accessed 10 April 2020); CIA Memorandum for the President, 'The military's seizure of power in Peru and Venezuela, and conditions in Ecuador', 8 December 1948, GALE, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, <https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349022801/USDD?u=cambuni&sid=USDD&xid=8c5cba1e> (accessed 10 April 2020); CIA Memorandum for the President, 'Unrest in Latin America: military seizes power 10/30/48 in Peru; military seizes power in Venezuela 11/24/48; discontent in Ecuador may lead to military takeover', 8 December 1948, GALE, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, <https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349326224/USDD?u=cambuni&sid=USDD&xid=fc5407b0> (accessed 10 April 2020).

⁷⁸ Informe 100-3, 15 October 1958, Archivo Histórico de la Marina (AHM), Lima, Peru, Exhibit 1, folder 5; CIA, 'The Peruvian Aprista Party', p. 7; Jaime Miguel Taype Castillo, 'El 3 de Octubre de 1948: insurrección Naval en el Callao', *Documenta de Historia Militar*, Year 4, No. 4, 2013, pp. 155-171.

⁷⁹ 'The Ambassador in Peru (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State', 29 November 1950 in Ralph Goodwin, David Mabon, and David Stauffer (eds.), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere*, Volume II (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 998.

⁸⁰ Gadea, *My life with Che*, p. 75.

governments, there was revolutionary potential among the masses. Guevara finally conceded, 'it was possible to count on those Catholics who abandoned their faith in the name of reason'.⁸¹ For Guevara's future revolutionary activities, this was an important revelation given that a high percentage of Latin Americas were Catholic.

Back in Peru, APRA members continued to meet clandestinely, and it survived as an organization. Haya directed the *Apristas* to support former President Manuel Prado Ugarteche in the 1956 election. Prado won and, in return, legalized APRA once again, and Haya came out of hiding. Many APRA members felt that Haya should not have supported Prado because of the injustices he had caused them during his first term (1939-1945). Luis de la Puente, who would later break away from APRA, wrote, 'Unfortunately, the APRA arrived in 1956, doctrinally, politically, and morally castrated'.⁸² Not known for pragmatism, Haya argued that the critical thing for Peru at this time was following the political process and establishing democracy.⁸³ This change also relieved much of the tension between the APRA and the Catholic Church, because as political scientist Carlos Astiz shows, 'as APRA abandoned its revolutionary ideal and reached an understanding with the traditional upper-class, the banner of reform was transferred to an array of left-wing organizations, which included the Communist party'.⁸⁴ Most APRA members tolerated the so-called *convivencia* (coexistence) with the Oligarchy that ensued, but the more aggressive did not want to wait and called for revolution. In chapter two, I will explain this in detail.

Peruvian Communist Party, PCP

Jose Carlos Mariátegui la Chira, the founder of the original PCP, was perhaps the most important Marxist thinker in twentieth century Latin America. He was born in Moquegua, a small town in southern Peru, on 14 July 1894. His lower-middle-class family later moved to Lima where he grew up. The social-economic status of his family exposed him to lower strata of Peruvian society in the Andes and the coastal regions and this would have a profound impact on him later in life. At the age of fourteen he began working as an errand boy at the newspaper *La Prensa*.⁸⁵ There he was exposed to the ideas of Marxism and

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 77.

⁸² Luis de la Puente, 'El Ochenio y La Convivencia', Lima, 7 February 1964. Instituto Luis Felipe de la Puente Uceda (ILDEPU) archive. <http://gofega.tripod.com/id15.html> (accessed 12 February 2017) Spanish version 'Lastimosamente el APRA llega a 1956, doctrinaria, política y moralmente castrada'.

⁸³ Alexander, *Aprismo*, p. 15.

⁸⁴ Astiz, *Pressure Groups and Power Elites*, p. 181.

⁸⁵ Yerko Moretic, *José Carlos Mariátegui: su vida e ideario, su concepción del realismo* (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones de la Universidad Técnica del Estado, 1970), p. 62.

Socialism and left behind his childhood dream of becoming a Catholic priest. Although he did not pursue a life in the Church, he never discounted its importance as an institution in Peru, and its potential use in the coming revolution.⁸⁶ Despite only having an eighth-grade education, management quickly promoted him to writer and assistant editor. He began two newspapers with a colleague called Cesar Falcon. His writings in their two papers *Nuestra Epoca* and *La Razon* ‘took a pro-labor stance, [but] they did not espouse the revolutionary Marxism found in Mariátegui’s later writings’.⁸⁷ However, his writing and activism were enough to draw the ire of the Peruvian President Augusto Leguía, who exiled him in 1919. He first lived and studied in France and then travelled to Italy, where he studied with the many prominent Italian intellectuals. He witnessed social unrest and closely observed the Italian Socialist Party’s 1921 Livorno Congress. Marc Becker asserted, ‘Although Mariátegui matured as a Marxist-Leninist thinker later in his life, much of his thought originated from his experiences in Italy’.⁸⁸ The government allowed him to return to Peru in 1923 when he began to support APRA. The Leguía administration arrested him under the pretence of agitation and spreading communism in 1924, and again in 1927, after his release, he remained under close surveillance for the remainder of his life.⁸⁹ In 1928, after a falling out with the APRA leaders, he established the *Partiido Socialista del Peru* (Peruvian Socialist Party, PSP).

Under Joseph Stalin’s leadership (1927-1953) the Soviet Union had limited interest in Latin America. Stalin paid little attention to areas outside of the Soviet sphere in Eurasia and conceded Latin America to the United States.⁹⁰ This was due to practical reasons, not out of respect for the Monroe Doctrine. Stalin did send emissaries to Latin America during the 1920’s to shape the socialist organizations into communist parties under the concept of the united front that would join and serve the Communist International (Comintern). During the Comintern’s Sixth Congress in 1928, it determined ‘Latin America had come within reach of Communist influence and was ripe for revolution’.⁹¹ In 1929, the Comintern held its First

⁸⁶ Klaiber, *Religion and Revolution in Peru*, p. 108.

⁸⁷ Harry Vanden and Marc Becker (eds.), *Jose Carlos Mariategui: An Anthology* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2011), p. 15.

⁸⁸ Marc Becker, *Mariategui and Latin American Marxist Theory* (Columbus, OH: Ohio University Press, 1993), p. 30.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁹⁰ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*: p. 12.

⁹¹ Wayne Smith (ed.), *The Russians Aren’t Coming: New Soviet Policy in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 2; Stephen Clisshold, *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1918-1968* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 74; Kermit McKenzie, *The Comintern and World Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 82.

Latin American Congress of Communist Parties in Buenos Aires, Argentina. During the conference, the Comintern compelled Mariátegui to change the name of the PSP to the PCP under the threat of being labelled a Trotskyist.⁹² Following the conference, these groups were encouraged to begin rural guerrilla warfare, as well as strikes and agitation in the urban areas across Latin America. The governments reacted and suppressed these uprisings, and the Soviets did nothing to assist. Wayne Smith concluded, 'By 1935, as a direct result of the tactics forced upon them by the Comintern, Communist parties throughout Latin America had been either shattered or driven underground – as in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, El Salvador, and Cuba – or their influence had been reduced to almost zero – as in Uruguay, Chile, and Peru'.⁹³ The Comintern's inaccurate reading of conditions in Latin America forced it to take a hard look at how it could apply Marxist revolutionary theory to the region.

Mariátegui passed away in the spring of 1930, leaving behind the nascent PCP and a spirited legacy as one of Latin America's original Marxist thinkers. Jeffery Klaiber characterized him as a 'Spiritual Marxist' and shows that, despite his political position, he remained connected with religion until the end of his life.⁹⁴ His most influential written work was his 1928 *Seven Interpretative Essays on Peruvian Reality*, which other Marxist leaders and organizations in Peru and throughout Latin America have quoted extensively. Three points stand out.

Foremost is that while Mariátegui was a Marxist, he understood the limitations of Marxist theory and did not believe Latin American's could apply it without adaptation in the complex world of the twentieth century. He wrote, 'I do not think it is possible to imagine the entire panorama of the contemporary world in one theory... We have to explore it and know it, episode by episode, facet by facet'.⁹⁵ Vanden and Becker reflected on this passage and concluded, 'one can reach an appreciation for the agility of the thinker's mind'.⁹⁶ Through his essay writing, Mariátegui shows how one could apply Marxist thought in Peru, and Latin America, to form a better way of organizing society that would be fair and just for all.

⁹² CIA report, 'The Peruvian Aprista Party and Aprismo: Past, Present and Future', 22 June 1966, p. 1, FOIA Reading Room, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00826A000900240001-0.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2016); Harry Vanden and Marc Becker (eds.), *José Carlos Mariátegui: An Anthology* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2011), p. 38; Clisshold, *Soviet Relations with Latin America*, p. 141; Ruben Barrios, 'The USSR and the Andean Countries', in Eusebio Mujal-Leon (ed.), *The USSR and Latin America: A Developing Relationship* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1989), p. 363.

⁹³ Smith, *The Russians Aren't Coming*, p. 5; Also, see Nicola Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America 1959-1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 40-42.

⁹⁴ Klaiber, *Religion and Revolution in Peru*, p. 92.

⁹⁵ José Carlos Mariátegui, *La escena contemporánea, Obras Completas*, 4th edn (Lima: Bibliotheca Amauta, 1970), p. 9 as translated in Vanden and Becker, *José Carlos Mariátegui*, p. 30.

⁹⁶ Vanden and Becker, *José Carlos Mariátegui*, p. 30.

A second contribution is that Mariátegui understood the importance of the peasant as a potential weapon of revolution in Peru. Attempts to exploit the peasants can be traced back at least to the Spanish conquest of the Incan empire but attempts to mobilize them often failed. Mariátegui believed that if the peasants could be taught the virtue of an adapted version of Marxism, they would be willing to fight for it. In his essay, *The Agrarian Problem and the Land Problem* he wrote, 'We are not content with demanding the Indians' rights to education, culture, progress, love, and heaven. We start by categorically demanding their rights to land'.⁹⁷ The land issue would be at the heart of the revolutionary period during the 1960s as well as the later conflict in the 1980s and 1990s. Revolutionary leaders, politicians, and military officers alike would use this issue for their own respective purposes. However, Mariátegui was the first to understand and explain its importance.

Finally, Mariátegui understood that the US expansion and a desire for regional hegemony would have a significant impact on Peru. Vanden and Becker argue that Mariátegui directly applied Lenin's concepts from his important work, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Mariátegui wrote:

*'More than a great democracy the U.S. is a great empire. The growth of the U.S. had to lead to an imperialist conclusion. American capitalism could not develop any more within the confines of the U.S. and her colonies. It manifests, for this reason, a great force for the expansion and domination'.*⁹⁸

While European powers also exploited Peru, Mariátegui argued that the US was a more substantial threat. He identified business and banking interests as well as subsurface mining concessions to be forms of economic supremacy. These would manifest in the later tension between the Belaunde government and the US over the International Petroleum Company (IPC) and International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) issues. He compared the problems of land in the Andes to the industrialization of agriculture by US and UK firms in the coastal region. He wrote, 'The best lands on the coastal valleys are planted with cotton and sugarcane, not so much because they are suited only for these crops, but because they are the only ones that currently matter to English and Yankee businesses'.⁹⁹ He goes on to explain that the focus on high-value crops nudges out others that are of sustenance to the local population and that the industrial aspect prevents small farm owners from prospering. He firmly believed that an anti-imperialist stance and a transition to an adapted form of

⁹⁷ Vanden and Becker, *José Carlos Mariátegui*, p. 69.

⁹⁸ José Carlos Mariátegui, *La escena contemporánea*, p. 82 translated in Vanden and Becker, *José Carlos Mariátegui*, p. 30.

⁹⁹ Vanden and Becker, *José Carlos Mariátegui*, p. 109.

Marxism could solve these problems in Peru. For these reasons and numerous others, many remember Mariátegui as one of the most influential thinkers Latin America has ever produced.

Following the death of Mariátegui in 1930, Eudocio Ravines gained control of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP). Ravines was born in Cajamarca, Peru, in 1897. He worked closely with Mariátegui to establish the PCP. He was an adherent to the Soviet model and took instructions from the Comintern without question. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, he travelled extensively in the Soviet Union. Upon returning in 1945, he founded the weekly magazine *Vanguardia*, which became the primary organ of the PCP. In his memoir, Bejar recalled that Ravines was a significant detriment to the development of the Left in Peru, and dogmatism and fear of dissent caused him to stifle discussion and debate. Bejar wrote that Ravines was ‘possibly the most unscrupulous traitor in Latin America and he was able, while he headed the PCP, to practice a type of political liquidation that was completely unprincipled and without any kind of legality’.¹⁰⁰ He goes on to compare Ravines to Stalin and accuse him of the political destruction of many important revolutionaries. While the CIA did not make the direct Ravines to Stalin connection, in 1963 national intelligence estimate, it concluded, ‘The PCP has survived subsequent factionalism and purges in its continued adherence to whatever line Moscow dictates’.¹⁰¹ This speaks directly to one of the four orthodox explanations for the subsequent failure of the Peruvian Left and is indicative of the infighting that prevented it from becoming a viable force against the Peruvian government.

The PCP had often worked in concert with the Peruvian government against APRA. A 1963 CIA report on extremist political groups in Peru assessed, ‘The PCP secured, first, official toleration for its labor activities competing against APRA (1930-1934), and then considerable freedom, though not legal status, in the 1939-1945 period, in return for helping elect Manuel Prado to his first term in office’.¹⁰² The report goes on to explain that the strength of the bond between the PCP and the government ebbed and flowed over the years. When it was convenient for the government, they would use the PCP to check the power of APRA in the worker and student unions. As an example, in 1963, the CIA concluded, ‘Whenever the PCP has not had official encouragement, as in the 1945-1948 and 1956-1962 periods, it has lost

¹⁰⁰ Béjar, *Perú 1965*, p. 52.

¹⁰¹ CIA National Intelligence Estimate 97-63, *Political Prospects in Peru*, 1 May 1963, p. 15, LBJL, NSF, NIEs, box 9, folder 13, Peru.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

ground to APRA in the labor movement'.¹⁰³ This shows that the Left allowed the government to manipulate it, thereby preventing the consolidation of a homogenous movement.

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956 had a significant impact on Peruvian revolutionaries. Bejar recalled:

*'In Peru, the Party's whole ideological, theoretical, and practical structure automatically came under discussion. The Stalinist cult was shaken to its very roots, and with it the infallibility of the CPSU. Subjects such as the validity of the CPSU's positions, the immediacy or remoteness of the revolution and the role of social classes in it, the stages of revolution, and the Party's role in it began to be debated'.*¹⁰⁴

Stalinists, such as Ravines, were unsettled by the outcome of the Twentieth Congress and lost substantial influence over the PCP and the Left in general. The CIA determined that younger members of the PCP were disillusioned with the party's ineffectiveness and wrote, 'Their [the younger members] program, advocating violent revolution and closer identification with the Castro and Chinese Communist positions, thus far has been rejected by old-line PCP leadership'.¹⁰⁵ These were the first signs of the PCP's coming breakup into multiple factions. The pro-Chinese members exploited this confusion, and as will be shown in chapter II, this was the beginning of their takeover that culminated in 1964.

The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations

In the early 1950s, the Truman Administration (1945-1953) built the foundation of collective security in the Americas. President Truman approved National Security Council (NSC) 56/2, United States Policy Toward Inter-American Military Collaboration, on 19 May 1950.¹⁰⁶ This directed the Departments of State and Defense to begin planning for hemispheric defence. The US Congress, through the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (MSA), authorized \$38,150,000 to provide military assistance grants to other American republics. The MSA stipulated that grants would be 'in accordance with defense plans which are found by the

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁰⁴ Béjar, *Peru 1965*, p. 47.

¹⁰⁵ CIA, 'Political Prospects in Peru', p. 7; During the period, the CIA maintained a Related Mission Directive (RMD) for each country that provides authority and guidance to its stations and bases. I submitted a Freedom of Information Act request for the RMD for Peru, but the CIA declined to provide it. The RMD could have provided insight into Lima Station's intelligence collection priorities and counterinsurgency support to the Peruvian intelligence services.

¹⁰⁶ 'Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)', 15 July 1950, in Neal Petersen and all (eds.), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 641.

President to require the recipient country to participate in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere'.¹⁰⁷ On 14 December, Truman signed a finding that authorized Peru, among seven other countries, to begin the process to obtain funding. Harold Tittmann, the US Ambassador to Peru, on 20 February 1951 in Lima, signed a bilateral Military Assistance Agreement (MAA) with Peru's Foreign Minister Manuel Gallagher. The agreement met the requirements of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Treaty, and the MSA. In lofty terms, the MAA explained that it was:

*'in the spirit of cooperation prevailing among the American republics which makes it possible for them to concentrate, through self-help and mutual aid, upon increasing their ability to contribute to the collective defense of the Western Hemisphere, and, by serving as a deterrent to potential aggressors, contribute to the maintenance of world peace'.*¹⁰⁸

The following year, Truman initiated the Military Assistance Program (MAP) on 22 February 1952, when he signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Peru.¹⁰⁹ Lawrence Clayton described the MAP as the 'linchpin of the modern relationship between the two forces [US and Peruvian] from then until the early 1970s'.¹¹⁰ Over the next two decades, subsequent administrations would expand the MAP and use it as a funding vehicle to prevent the spread of communism in the developing world.

The Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961) was instrumental in preparing the region for successful counterinsurgency operations in the 1960s. Stephen Rabe asserted that 'President Dwight D. Eisenhower decisively established the Latin American policy of his administration'.¹¹¹ Moreover, Thomas Allcock provides evidence that 'undermines the notion that a fundamental reconfiguration of inter-American relations took place after Kennedy's election'.¹¹² On 18 March 1953, less than two months into his presidency, Eisenhower presided over the 137th meeting of the NSC and was directly involved in the drafting of NSC 144/1, which he signed that day.¹¹³ NSC 144/1, United States Objectives

¹⁰⁷ 'Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)', 18 March 1952, in N. Stephen Kane and William Sanford, Jr. (eds.), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, The American Republics, Volume IV* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 122.

¹⁰⁸ Quoted in Willard Barber and C. Neale Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power: Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 278.

¹⁰⁹ Luigi Einaudi, 'U.S. Relations with the Peruvian Military', in Daniel Sharp (ed.), *U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru* (Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press, 1972), p. 38.

¹¹⁰ Clayton, *Peru and the United States*, p. 179.

¹¹¹ Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, p. 26.

¹¹² Thomas Tunstall Allcock, 'The First Alliance for Progress?: Reshaping the Eisenhower Administration's Policy towards Latin America', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2014, p. 87.

¹¹³ 'Memorandum of Discussion at the 137th Meeting of the National Security Council', 18 March 1953, in N. Stephen Kane and William Sanford, Jr. (eds.), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, The American Republics, Volume IV* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 3.

and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America, outlined the policy goals for defending the Western Hemisphere from communism. The policy sought to use political, economic, and military means to meet its objectives. It stated that Latin American states should be responsible for the internal security and external defence of their territories, and ‘U.S. military assistance should be designed to reduce to a minimum the diversion of U.S. forces for the maintenance of hemisphere security’.¹¹⁴ Between 1953 and 1961, the US provided Peru with grants and credits for defence totalling \$46.9 million.¹¹⁵ By investing in the Latin American militaries, the administration hoped that they would act as force multipliers and be able to maintain their security, thus preventing the need for direct US involvement. On 25 June 1953, the US awarded Peruvian President Odria the Legion of Merit in Lima for his staunch anti-communist stance.¹¹⁶ In November 1953, the US Embassy in Lima established the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) to direct the Air Force, Army, and Navy missions to Peru and serve as the coordinating element for military assistance.¹¹⁷ In 1954, the US violated the Organization of American States (OAS) charter, and the CIA supported the overthrow of the democratically elected President Arbenz in Guatemala. While critics suggested the purpose of the intervention was to protect private US investments in the country, Eisenhower insisted it was to prevent communism from gaining a foothold in the region. Moreover, he decided the risk of communism outweighed the repercussions of violating international laws and treaties. The administration firmly established its steadfast regional policy goal of anti-communism.

During the mid-1950s, the US focused on economic development in Latin America to fortify the region against the spread of communism. Peruvian national leadership was passed democratically from Odria to Manuel Prado in 1956 who would remain in power until 1962. The US Embassy in Lima reported, ‘that general satisfaction has been expressed over the

¹¹⁴ ‘Statement of Policy by the National Security Council’, 18 March 1953, in N. Stephen Kane and William Sanford, Jr. (eds.), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 9.

¹¹⁵ NSC background paper, ‘Annex F to U.S. Military Assistance and Military Representation to Peru’, 1969, GALE, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/8h49K8> (accessed 5 January 2020).

¹¹⁶ ‘Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)’, 23 July 1953, in N. Stephen Kane and William Sanford, Jr. (eds.), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 11.

¹¹⁷ ‘Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)’, 20 November 1953, in N. Stephen Kane and William Sanford, Jr. (eds.), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 27.

open, democratic and peaceful elections which the Peruvians believe sets a good example for Latin America and justifies the belief that Peru is firmly on the democratic path'.¹¹⁸ In spite of this positive trend, local and regional events in the late 1950s prompted a significant policy shift. The first were vicious attacks against Vice President Nixon during his 1958 tour of Peru and Colombia. In Peru, Nixon met with Prado to discuss economic assistance and pass on Eisenhower's admiration for 'Peru's progress in consolidating democracy'.¹¹⁹ A large group of agitated students threw stones at him when he attempted to visit San Marcos University in Lima and prevented him from giving a speech. The second event was Castro's overthrow of the Batista regime in Cuba in 1959. Eisenhower had treated Batista with benign neglect, and the US intelligence community underestimated the Rebel Army's capabilities and did not anticipate the Sovietization of Castro. These events drew the administration's attention to the widespread anti-American sentiment in Latin America. Rabe asserted, 'During its last year in office, the Eisenhower administration extensively revised the Latin American policy of the United States and initiated a decade-long effort to reform and modernize Latin American societies, in order to make them resistant to Communist subversion'.¹²⁰ They added a cultural dimension, and expanded the economic, political, and military aspects of the policy. For example, they increased civic action based on the Draper Committee recommendation that 'the military establishments of our own and friendly nations have human and material resources for making important contributions to economic and well as to military phases of our foreign aid programs particularly in the underdeveloped areas'.¹²¹ However, Allcock shows that this shift was not as jolting as it appears on the surface because multiple mid-level policymakers had been working towards this for many years.¹²² In addition to overt economic and political measures, Eisenhower authorized covert actions against Fidel Castro and Rafael Trujillo, the autocratic leader of the Dominican Republic.¹²³ The US government designed these efforts to show South American democratic leaders that it

¹¹⁸ Department of State, Operations Coordination Board, Memorandum for Members, 'Peruvian Election Results', 25 June 1956, GALE, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/8h49K8>, (accessed 5 January 2020).

¹¹⁹ N. Stephen Kane and Paul Claussenp (eds.), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, American Republics, Volume V* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 913.

¹²⁰ Stephen Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, p. 152.

¹²¹ President's Committee To Study the Military Assistance Program, 1959: Annex D, quoted in John Baines, 'U.S. Military Assistance to Latin America: An Assessment', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 15, No. 4, November 1972, 474.

¹²² Allcock, 'The First Alliance for Progress?', p. 88.

¹²³ United States Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 71, p. 191; Luis Aguilar, *Operation Zapata: The "Ultrasensitive" Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1981), p. 58; Stephen Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, p. 162.

would not stand for dictatorial regimes in the hemisphere. By the end of his term, Eisenhower had set the stage for increased intervention in the region.

The US experienced a severe recession in 1957-58, which contributed to a 44% decrease in copper prices and negatively impacted the Peruvian economy. In response, 'Prado promised to meet the economic crises with a program of fiscal stringency but was unwilling to pay the political cost of such measures'.¹²⁴ Spending increased in 1958 by 12%. With a \$108.00 per capita gross national product, Peru fell to number seventeen of the twenty Latin American countries.¹²⁵ Inside Lima's power circle, military leaders signalled a potential *coup d'état*. Prado responded by naming Pedro Beltran, who had been severely criticizing Prado's economic policies in the Lima press, to be the finance minister. Beltran instituted severe financial restructuring and slowly began to improve the situation. Technical innovations in processing launched Peru to the forefront of the fishing industry worldwide. Prado also sought to improve the education and housing situation and implemented government programs along these lines. Most significantly to the people in the Andes, he commissioned a study of land reform and submitted an agrarian reform bill to the legislature. Hugo Blanco influenced this reform by his agitation for peasant rights in a remote valley near Cuzco, which chapter three examines in-depth. However, in Congress, 'conservatives tenaciously fought the bill while the left attacked it as insufficient'.¹²⁶ The bill did not make it to Prado's desk for signature before his departure from the presidential palace in 1962. This example shows how hemispheric and local economic forces can impact national politics. However, for the people of the Andes, the government did nothing to improve their lives. Moreover, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations' attempts to use economic assistance to thwart communism had little impact.

Cuba

Fidel Castro's march into Havana in January 1959 following the ouster of President Fulgencio Batista was a watershed moment in the Cold War and changed the political landscape of the Western Hemisphere. The repercussions of this event still affect the Americas today. It is critical for the reader to understand the Cuban revolution and the ensuing dynamics between China, the Soviet Union, the US, and Latin America to

¹²⁴ Werlich, *Peru: A Short History*, p. 259.

¹²⁵ James Carey, *Peru and the United States, 1900-1962* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), p. 19.

¹²⁶ Werlich, *Peru: A Short History*, p. 262.

contextualize Cuban influence in Peru. In this dissertation, I will refer to the period from 1953 to 1959 as the insurgency and the period from 1959 until the mid-1960s as the Cuban revolution. This follows the line of contemporary thinking that the real revolution was Castro's significant changes to the social-economic architecture of the country.

There are many excellent histories of the insurgency in Cuba, but a few key points are worth noting here because they are essential factors to the events in Peru. Castro's insurgent group, the *Movimiento 26 de Julio* (the 26th of July Movement, M267), achieved victory for a multitude of reasons. J. Bowyer Bell challenged the 'guerrilla myth' that Castro and Ernesto Guevara perpetuated.¹²⁷ Moreover, recent work has shown the importance of the urban elements of the insurgency. Julia Sweig shows how Frank País established the National Directorate. Castro charged País with an almost insurmountable task, in addition to providing the logistical lifeline to the guerrilla fighters in the *Sierra Maestra*, they were to organize a program of resistance and sabotage across Cuba, all the while avoiding detection from an aggressive and oppressive security apparatus.¹²⁸ Sweig adds that the M267 astutely employed the press, the Cuban diaspora, and the international community to apply pressure on the government in the United Nations and other international forums.¹²⁹ One cannot overstate the National Directorate's contribution to the successful overthrow of Batista. Steve Cushion provides a detailed account of the organized labour movement that fought the regime in parallel with the guerrillas. He describes the nuanced interplay between local, regional, and national labour leaders as well as the relationship between the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) and M267. Cushion makes a compelling argument that the general strikes between August 1957 and January 1959 were not spontaneous as others have described them, but that the insurgents integrated them into the broader strategy.¹³⁰ Close observers of the insurgency have shown that the strikes were a vital aspect of the ousting of Batista, making this assertion a critical element to the re-evaluation of the importance of the labour movement and the pressure it placed on the government. In Peru, the left-leaning political group APRA had insulated 'Peru's industrial proletariat from Communist influence'.¹³¹ APRA controlled the labour groups in Peru and did not allow Lima's workers to participate in agitation events

¹²⁷ Bell, *The Myth of the Guerrilla*, p. 39.

¹²⁸ Julia Sweig, *Inside the Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 15.

¹²⁹ Sweig, *Inside the Cuban Revolution*, p. 185.

¹³⁰ Steve Cushion, *A Hidden History of the Cuban Revolution: How the Working Class Shaped the Guerrillas' Victory* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2016), p. 214.

¹³¹ David Chaplin, 'Peru's Postponed Revolution', *World Politics*, Vol. 20 No. 3, April 1968, p. 393.

supporting the guerrillas.¹³² While it is difficult to quantify, Cuban labour work slowdowns and strikes, when coordinated with urban sabotage and guerrilla warfare, made a significant contribution to the downfall of Batista. These complex and nuanced factors were not easy to package into a simple, straightforward theory of revolution. Therefore, the revolutionary leaders set them aside and proffered the guerrilla myth. As we will see, this simplification would prove to be a significant factor in the failure of the revolution in Peru.

On 2 January 1959, at the Cespedes Park in Santiago, eastern Cuba, Castro declared ‘The revolution begins now’.¹³³ When Batista fled forty-eight hours before the speech, he left behind a weak civilian-military junta under the leadership of General Eulogio Cantillo and Judge Carlos Piedra. Castro called for a general strike across the island to destabilize the Junta and buy time for Guevara’s Rebel Army column that was marching on Havana. Guevara captured Havana later that day. On 6 January, the US was the first to recognize the new government, and Eisenhower dispatched Ambassador Philip Bonsal to Havana two weeks later.¹³⁴ Castro then made a long victorious procession across the length of the island and arrived in Havana on 8 January. He officially became head of the revolutionary government on 14 February. Castro rebuffed Bonsal’s overtures and attempts to establish a relationship. On 17 April, the American Society of Newspaper Editor’s invited Castro to speak at the National Press Club in Washington. Eisenhower sent Vice President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Christian Herter to meet with him in an unofficial capacity. Following the meeting, Nixon reported to Eisenhower that Castro was ‘naïve about communism’, but cautioned ‘whatever we may think of him he is going to be a great factor in the development of Cuba and very possibly in Latin American affairs generally’.¹³⁵ Castro was determined to honour his word that the revolution would rid the Cuban economy of foreign dominance and restore its sovereignty to the people. Thus, began the first phase of Cuban foreign policy, which focused on gaining economic and military assistance from foreign powers, while Castro consolidated his power at home.

Castro entered an elaborate chess match between China, the Soviet Union, and the US. While the US was the first to recognize the new government in Cuba, it would, in time,

¹³² CIA, ‘The Peruvian Aprista Party and Aprismo: Past, Present and Future’, 22 June 1966, p. 24.

¹³³ Quoted in David Deutschmann and Deborah Shnoorkal (eds.), *Fidel Castro Reader* (New York: Ocean Press, 2007), p. 108.

¹³⁴ Richard Welch, *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985), p. 29.

¹³⁵ John Glennon (ed.), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Cuba, Volume VI* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 477.

become its greatest enemy. The Soviets, although they had provided limited support to the insurgency, tread carefully with the new revolutionary government. They did not officially establish diplomatic ties until May 1960, and even then, they remained concerned with the spread of adventurism in Latin America. They did exert a slight level of control over Castro through economic and military support but found dealing with him tenuous. Michael Erisman concluded that despite the fact that Castro needed Soviet assistance, 'Cuba was quite cautious in moving toward the USSR, restrained by its fear of simply exchanging U.S. for Soviet hegemony'.¹³⁶ Chinese recognition of Cuba also included caveats. In 1961, a Chinese press release stated, 'two years ago the armed struggle led by Castro won wide support among the people of Cuba'.¹³⁷ This statement is significant for two reasons. The first is that it recognizes the armed struggle, which directly contradicts the Soviet desires in Latin America for non-violent political change. Second, it singles out Castro and not the PSP as the leader of the revolution. While Mao initially lauded Castro, he held back a full faith endorsement of the revolution because it was not under the control of a communist party. The Chinese held to the principle that the military arm of the revolution must be subservient to the party. Despite these philosophical differences, Mao was eager to work with the Cubans to further his challenge to the US in Latin America. Castro would manoeuvre within the Sino-Soviet conflict to gain assistance and maintain his prominence among revolutionaries in Latin America and the broader developing world.

Soviet Union

Khrushchev changed the course of the Politburo's policy towards the developing world after consolidating his control of the Soviet Union in 1957. Stalin died in 1953, and Khrushchev, after much infighting, replaced him.¹³⁸ In contrast to Stalin, Fursenko and Naftali explain, 'under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union looked for allies among the young nationalist leaders of what became known as the Third World'.¹³⁹ During his time as the Soviet Premier, Khrushchev tightly controlled foreign policy and considered wars of national liberation to be a critical aspect of the struggle with the West. While Stalin and Khrushchev differed on policy towards the developing world, they did have some continuity. Vladislav Zubok has

¹³⁶ H. Michael Erisman, *Cuba's International Relations: The Anatomy of a Nationalist Foreign Policy* (London, Westview Press, 1985), p. 15.

¹³⁷ Quoted in Cecil Johnson, *Communist China and Latin America 1959-1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 134.

¹³⁸ Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 176.

¹³⁹ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p. 12.

noted that Khrushchev, ‘was both a ruthless practitioner of the crudest form of *realpolitik* and a believer in the eventual demise of world capitalism’.¹⁴⁰ Khrushchev closely directed foreign policy, but two factors prevented absolute control. The first was the massive size of the Soviet bureaucracy. The second was that party diplomacy had an influential role in the decision-making process.¹⁴¹ In contrast to his overtures to the US during this period concerning disarmament and peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev employed proxy warfare in the developing world to undermine the West.¹⁴² During the Cuban insurgency, Khrushchev did support Castro, albeit very cautiously so as not to alert the US. The Soviets did not want the US to perceive they were opening a new geographical front in the Cold War. The Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) did not have contact with the Castroite revolutionaries, so they worked through a Czech Intelligence service agent based in Mexico City. The Czech Intelligence service used eighteen Czech diplomatic missions throughout Latin America to support its operations.¹⁴³ On 27 December 1958, the Kremlin, ‘Believing that the Soviet Union had an obligation to take risks to support revolutionary movements around the world’ sanctioned Prague’s support to Castro.¹⁴⁴ However, the approval came with caveats on the exact types of weapons and equipment that the Czech agent could provide along with specific security measures to protect Soviet involvement. Irrespective of the type, quantity, and quality of the weapons, they arrived too late to have an impact on the conflict.¹⁴⁵ Regardless, this is a clear example of the policy shift and that Khrushchev desired to expand Soviet influence in Latin America.

A contentious relationship developed between Castro and Khrushchev that would have major implications for Soviet policy in Latin America. The Soviets had as much difficulty evaluating Castro as did the US. He clearly leaned left on the political spectrum but was not a communist. He infuriated those who were watching him with his vague references to the

¹⁴⁰ Vladislav Zubok, ‘Unwrapping the Enigma: What was behind the Soviet challenge in the 1960s?’, in Diane Kunz (ed.), *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations During the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 150.

¹⁴¹ Zubok, ‘Unwrapping the Enigma’, p. 152.

¹⁴² CIA, NIE 11-9-64 Soviet Foreign Policy, 19 February 1964, p. 8, CREST, FOIA electronic reading room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000272914.pdf, (accessed 11 April 2020).

¹⁴³ NSC 5613/1, ‘U.S. Policy towards Latin America’, 11 September 1957, p. 3, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, National Security Files, <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/declassified/fy-2010/1957-09-11.pdf>, (accessed 21 April 2020).

¹⁴⁴ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p. 12.

¹⁴⁵ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The KGB and the World: The Mitrokhin Archive II* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 33.

desires of the people and that the revolution would follow their lead.¹⁴⁶ Castro's younger brother Raul was a communist and developed the early relationship with the Soviets.¹⁴⁷ Many historians have argued that the US pushed Castro into the arms of the Soviets. In contrast, others contend he was hiding his communist tendencies until he could consolidate his power in Havana and then naturally embraced the Soviets. Christopher Andrew and former KGB officer and archivist Vasili Mitrokhin provide the most compelling evidence of this and point out that Castro never mentioned the term socialism in his speeches or writings until 1961.¹⁴⁸ Regardless, by November 1960, Castro and Khrushchev finally met and exchanged a cheerful embrace at the United Nations in New York. Castro famously announced, 'Moscow is Our Brain and Our Great Leader'.¹⁴⁹ However, this public display of solidarity would not end the friction between the Soviets and the Cubans.

On 6 January 1961, Khrushchev gave a speech to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) at the Kremlin that explained Soviet involvement in the developing world. He described three types of war: world wars, which they should avoid; local wars, which were of little consequence; and wars of national liberation. He characterized the final category as 'an uprising of colonial peoples against their oppressors that changed into guerrilla wars'.¹⁵⁰ Stefan Possony, one of the top experts on the Soviet Union, testified before the US Congress on 16 June 1961. He explained that decisionmakers should translate wars of national liberation as 'sacred liberation wars' and emphasized that Khrushchev stressed the oppressed must gain 'their freedom and independence only from struggle, including armed struggle'.¹⁵¹ Moreover, Khrushchev stated, 'The forces of the national movement are greatly increasing owing to the fact that one more front of active struggle against American imperialism has formed in recent years. Latin America has become that front'.¹⁵² Additionally, the CIA contended, 'Indeed, one of the arguments that Khrushchev has made for the policy of peaceful coexistence was precisely that it would increase the number of unstable situations

¹⁴⁶ CIA study for Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, 'A Survey of Communism in Latin America', 3 December 1965, p.iii, CREST, FOIA electronic reading room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001462211.pdf, (accessed 11 April 2020).

¹⁴⁷ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p. 17.

¹⁴⁸ Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The KGB and the World*, p. 33; J. Gregory Oswald and Anthony Strover, *The Soviet Union and Latin America* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), p. 9.

¹⁴⁹ Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p. 3; Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The KGB and the World*, p. 33.

¹⁵⁰ U.S. Congressional Hearing, Testimony of Dr Stefan T. Possony, 10 June 1961, 'Analysis of the Khrushchev Speech of 6 January 1961', (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 33, CREST, FOIA electronic reading room, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP67B00446R000500200056-4.pdf>, (accessed 11 April 2020).

¹⁵¹ 'Analysis of the Khrushchev Speech of 6 January 1961', p. 33.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 35.

which the Soviets could turn to their advantage'.¹⁵³ These declarations show Khrushchev's desire to spread revolution throughout the developing world to hasten the collapse of capitalism. In the Western Hemisphere, Castro was at the centre of this initiative.

There were advantages and disadvantages to the contentious Soviet-Cuban relationship. The primary benefit was that Cuba provided for the establishment of communism in the Western Hemisphere. Khrushchev, in a speech to the CPSU in Moscow, explained that Cuba was vital because it was 'a catalyst for revolutionary power in Latin America'.¹⁵⁴ Moreover, Herbert Goldhamer asserted:

'For a Communist government, more or less dependent on Soviet goodwill, to control one of the wealthiest republics in Latin America, one located in the Caribbean, which more than Central and South America has been viewed as an area of major strategic importance to the United States, was well beyond Soviet expectations or even hopes in the post-Stalin period'.¹⁵⁵

Khrushchev's commitment to Castro would lead to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, which was likely the most dangerous episode of the Cold War. Historians have extensively chronicled these events, so we will not examine them here. However, the fallout was a breakdown in the solidarity between the Soviets and the Cubans, which resulted in another shift in Soviet policy. The unsuccessful outcome of Khrushchev's gambit in Cuba, his commitment to wars of liberation, and the drawbacks listed below would lead to his fall from the top of the Soviet hierarchy.

The main disadvantage of the Cuban relationship was Castro himself. He did not blindly follow instructions from the Soviets and was uncontrollable due to his erratic behaviour. He also played the Chinese and Soviets off each other and took advantage of the coming Sino-Soviet split. As the CIA explained, 'The most urgent Soviet task in these new circumstances was to prevent Castro from joining forces with Peking, with which he had much greater affinity in terms of revolutionary stance; and to deny him use of the emerging pro-Chinese Communist movement in Latin America as a revolutionary base'.¹⁵⁶ However, he did not stray too far from Soviet influence because he needed its economic assistance. The second disadvantage of the client state relationship with Cuba was that it was a financial drain on the Soviets. This was significant because although the Soviet economy was relatively healthy at

¹⁵³ CIA, NIE 11-9-64, Soviet Foreign Policy, 19 February 1964, p. 8.

¹⁵⁴ Quoted in Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p. 325.

¹⁵⁵ Herbert Goldhamer, *The Foreign Powers in Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 239.

¹⁵⁶ CIA Intelligence Report No. 196753, 'The Sino-Soviet Dispute within the Communist Movement in Latin America', 15 June 1967, p. 88, CREST, FOIA electronic reading room, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/esau-32.pdf> (accessed 11 April 2020).

the time, as the decade progressed, the Soviets discouraged the exportation of revolution in Latin America because they did not want the burden of a second client state.¹⁵⁷ Andrew and Mitrokhin contend that ‘Castro continued to alarm the Centre [KGB Headquarters in Moscow] by what it regarded as his excess of revolutionary zeal’.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, Piero Gleijeses shows, Cuban revolutionary activity in Latin America ‘angered Moscow’, and this did not abate until Guevara’s death in 1967.¹⁵⁹ Beyond the economic issue, Zubok argued, ‘Conservation of the Soviet regime in its immediate post-Stalin stage under Khrushchev and beyond was based on a promise of peace and a better life for increasingly unhappy Soviet populace’. He continued, ‘The confrontations over Berlin and Cuba had revived fears of war and led the Kremlin to renounce the goal of a historic victory in favor of strategic parity and cooperation with the United States’.¹⁶⁰ As arms control became a top concern for the Kremlin, Soviet leaders did not want to provoke the US in the Western Hemisphere, which would upset the status quo.

Khrushchev’s political enemies in Moscow used the failure of the Cuban Missile Crises to remove him from power and reduce Soviet involvement in the Western Hemisphere. After his removal on 14 October 1964, the Soviet ‘collective leadership’, nominally led by Leonid Brezhnev, modified the policy towards Latin America.¹⁶¹ The main thrust was to counter US hegemony in the region, but they were also countering the influence of China in addition to keeping Castro in line. The primary aspect of the policy was to encourage a return to united front activity led by the respective communist parties in each country.¹⁶² They also promoted nationalistic leaders who were against US meddling in the region. The most nuanced aspect of the policy was the limited support for wars of national liberation. They did not believe that another revolution like Cuba was possible in Latin America and did not desire to be responsible for one if it occurred. Herbert Dinerstein explained that guerrilla movements, ‘while hardly ideal from the Soviets’ point of view, are tolerable as long as their thesis that

¹⁵⁷ Zubok, ‘Unwrapping the Enigma’, p. 164.

¹⁵⁸ Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The KGB and the World*, p. 49.

¹⁵⁹ Piero Gleijeses, ‘Cuba and the Cold War, 1959-1980’, in Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II, Crises and Détente* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 333.

¹⁶⁰ Zubok, ‘Unwrapping the Enigma’, p. 172.

¹⁶¹ Svetlana Savranskaya and William Taubman, ‘Soviet foreign policy, 1962-1975’, in Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II, Crises and Détente* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 140.

¹⁶² ‘The Sino-Soviet Dispute within the Communist Movement in Latin America’, p. 11.

the guerrillas really have no chance of seizing power proves correct'.¹⁶³ However, they needed to provide limited support for two reasons. First, if they did not, the guerrilla groups would denounce them as bureaucrats who had lost their revolutionary desire. Second, the aim was to keep the Chinese from gaining influence.¹⁶⁴ The major drawback of providing support was that if they backed a group that was checked by US intervention, the West would perceive the Soviets as weak. As such, the Soviets did not provide any direct support to the insurgent groups in Peru.

Another important aspect of the Soviet foreign policy was cultural engagement. Tobias Rupprecht uses Akira Iriye's definition of cultural internationalism as 'attempts to build cultural understanding, international co-operation, and a sense of shared values across national borders through cultural, scientific or student exchanges'.¹⁶⁵ Rupprecht shows that the Soviets had an advantage in this aspect of its foreign policy in Latin America over other areas of the developing world because they had begun outreach to Spain and then Central and South America in the 1920s and 1930s.¹⁶⁶ These interactions resumed after 1957 and had a significant impact on the global south's perception of the Soviet Union. Goldhamer adds to Rupprecht's argument by asserting, 'The Soviet Union ranks second (to Spain) among non-hemispheric countries in the number of Latin American students it receives'.¹⁶⁷ His research also adds that Radio Moscow led China in total hours of broadcasting in Latin America. Furthermore, the Soviets broadcasted in Quechua, which was the second most common language in Peru after Spanish.¹⁶⁸ These broadcasts likely reached a wider section of the populace when compared with educational and scientific interaction with urban elites. Cultural internationalism expanded Soviet influence in Latin America and was an adjunct to higher-level political and economic engagement during the 1960s.

While the higher levels of Soviet bureaucracy quibbled over the level of ambition that it should apply to Latin America, the KGB filled the vacuum and took the lead. Few authors of this period take account of the KGB's involvement in the developing world in general and

¹⁶³ Herbert Dinerstein, 'Soviet Policy in Latin America', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 61, No. 1, March 1967, p. 88.

¹⁶⁴ Ilya Prizel, *Latin America Through Soviet Eyes: The evolution of Soviet perceptions during the Brezhnev era 1964-1982* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 135.

¹⁶⁵ Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 34.

¹⁶⁶ Tobias Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin: Interaction and Exchange between the USSR and Latin America during the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 4.

¹⁶⁷ Goldhamer, *The Foreign Powers in Latin America*, p. 146.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

Latin America in particular. Andrew and Mitrokhin provide evidence that the KGB drove the Soviet Latin America policy based on a strategy developed in 1961, which the KGB articulated in Decision Number 191/75 GS.¹⁶⁹ Rupprecht confirms that ‘While not inciting revolutions, the KGB was now, after the end of the Khrushchev reign, allowed [by Brezhnev and the collective leadership] to be much more active in Third World politics than the Kremlin and especially the foreign ministry’.¹⁷⁰ In Peru, the ELN and MIR were preparing for war, but would not receive direct Soviet support. There is no evidence of KGB involvement in Peru during the mid-1960s in the Mitrokhin archive.¹⁷¹ Former KGB General Nikolai Leonov, who was a Latin American specialist and rose to direct the Cuban desk of the Second Department, which was responsible for Latin America.¹⁷² In 1999, during a lecture at the *Centro de Estudios Públicos* in Chile, he was speaking about the situation in Peru when he arrived there in 1968 and stated, ‘In Peru we had no embassy, not even a deciphering office, no communications, nothing’.¹⁷³ In comparison with other regions of the world, the Soviets were somewhat detached from Latin America. As the situation in Peru developed, during the mid-1960s, the Soviets would have no direct involvement.

Soviet engagement with Latin America ebbed and flowed throughout the Cold War. Stalin essentially ceded the Western hemisphere to the US. Later, Khrushchev sought to counter US hegemony in Latin America and provided limited support to revolutionary movements there as well as extensive aid to Cuba. The KGB saw an opportunity in Latin America and became the *de facto* foreign office in many countries in the region. Throughout this period, the Sino-Soviet split worsened, and the Chinese influence in Latin America increased. As the Chinese sought to assume control of the world revolution in Latin America, they directly challenged the leadership of the Soviet-controlled Peruvian Communist Party. I will now turn to China’s activities, which will provide insight into the later developments of the insurrection in Peru.

People’s Republic of China

¹⁶⁹ Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The KGB and the World*, p. 42.

¹⁷⁰ Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin*, p. 234.

¹⁷¹ KGB First Chief Directorate Files, Churchill College, Cambridge, Mitrokhin archive, Envelope K-22, Central and South America.

¹⁷² Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The KGB and the World*, p. 38.

¹⁷³ Nikolai Leonov, ‘Soviet Intelligence in Latin America during the Cold War’, www.cepchile.cl/dms_archivo_1140_1465/rev73.leonov-lect_ing.pdf (accessed 20 November 2015), p. 8; Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The KGB and the World*, p. 61.

The Chinese foreign policy during the 1960s was complicated and multi-faceted. A common theme in the scholarship is that the primary goal of the Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was to secure its borders from outside influence or attack. A second important factor is that Mao aimed to expand China's influence beyond its borders and become the world leader in the communist revolution. In addition to challenging the imperialist US, we will see that Mao directly challenged the Soviet Union during the 1960s. Peru was critical to Mao because it was the first Andean nation to establish a pro-Chinese communist party, and its party became the most substantial Chinese communist movement in Latin America. Conclusive evidence from China's engagement with Latin America, especially Peru, shows that during his time in power (1949-1976), Mao implemented a policy of world revolution that went well beyond the needs of national security.

Several scholars have long suggested that Mao had ambitions beyond China's borders. Shaun Breslin explains, 'Mao's main objective in all of his foreign initiatives from 1949 to 1976 was to safeguard China's borders, and then to restore its rightful position on the world stage'.¹⁷⁴ This statement shows that there was more to Mao's foreign policy than just protecting the border. A second statement by Breslin also confirms this: 'Mao was a Marxist, but he was a Chinese Marxist, and whether it aided his Chinese Marxism or not was the bottom line in all of his foreign policy'.¹⁷⁵ J.D. Armstrong sums up the political thought of Chinese foreign policy in the early 1950s, 'The Chinese world view encompasses a set of ultimate goals and values. These include the belief in the value of struggle, particularly armed struggle, and the goal of world revolution via struggle against imperialism and capitalism'.¹⁷⁶ Moreover, in a 1965 national intelligence estimate, the CIA asserted, 'In this Third World, the Chinese not only aim to erode US strength but to displace Soviet influence; they seek to establish themselves as the champions and mentors of the underdeveloped nations'.¹⁷⁷ These scholars together, combined with the CIA's assessment, suggest that Mao was ideologically motivated to pursue revolution beyond its borders.

China's activities outside of the mainland included the export of ideological and revolutionary ideas to Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Mao actively engaged in

¹⁷⁴ Shaun Breslin, *Mao: Profiles in Power* (Boston: Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1998), p. 163.

¹⁷⁵ Breslin, *Mao: Profiles in Power*, p. 165.

¹⁷⁶ J.D. Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 49.

¹⁷⁷ Harriet Dashiell Schwar (ed.), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 169.

these regions with the aim of shifting the balance of power towards the Communist bloc.¹⁷⁸ According to Peter Van Ness, Mao considered that Asia, along with Africa and Latin America, was an intermediate zone. According to this concept, the US and other Western powers must control the zone before they could directly confront China or the Soviet Union. Van Ness shows that Mao believed the ‘U.S. imperialists are the most ferocious and most arrogant aggressors in the history of mankind’.¹⁷⁹ Cecil Johnson asserts the Chinese, ‘believe that their ultimate goal, the attainment of victory for Communism on a global scale, can best be realized through fostering revolutions in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, thereby dealing a smashing blow to the rear of the *main* enemy, the United States’.¹⁸⁰ China sought to stem the spread of Western imperialism and end feudalism in countries with revolutionary potential and also supported governments that aligned with its ideals. It did this to stop the US from expanding its control in the developing world.

Mao attempted to export his revolutionary model to Latin America to block US imperialism under the concept of the intermediate zone. Key countries in this nexus were Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, and Peru. Other countries that played a lesser role were Argentina, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Mexico. Peru first came to Mao’s attention during a meeting of the Global Communist Delegation at Qingzhen Hall in Zhongnanhai, China, on 19 November 1960. Guevara met with Mao, Lin Ping, and Zhou Enlai. There, he explained to Mao that ‘In Colombia and Peru, the possibility for a great people’s revolution movement emerges’.¹⁸¹ Guevara went on to describe a nascent communist movement that was ready for expansion. He used the recent communist party electoral victory in the Peruvian city of Cuzco to further his argument. Guevara’s information may have influenced Mao to increased involvement in Peru. Of the Andean nations, Johnson argues, ‘The Peruvian party, first of these to be established, was to become the largest and most influential of all the Latin American parties looking to Peking for guidance’.¹⁸² Peru became the critical Latin American country in Mao’s intermediate zone strategy.

¹⁷⁸ CIA NIE 10-2-64, ‘Prospects for the International Communist Movement’, 10 June 1964, p. 13, CREST, FOIA electronic reading room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000272913.pdf (accessed 16 April 2020).

¹⁷⁹ Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 5.

¹⁸⁰ Johnson, *Communist China and Latin America 1959-1967*, p. 2.

¹⁸¹ ‘Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Ernesto “Che” Guevara’, 19 November 1960.

¹⁸² Johnson, *Communist China and Latin America 1959-1967*, p. 208.

The Chinese employed various means to spread its ideology throughout Latin America, including diplomatic and friendship delegations, trade relations, and academic exchanges. However, as China did not have official diplomatic ties with any Latin American country, except Cuba during the 1960s, these exchanges were limited. An essential justification for building diplomatic relations was that China was attempting to dislodge Taiwan as the recognized government under the eyes of the United Nations, and it was looking for support from Latin American leaders. The CCPs Central Committee engagement with Latin America can be traced back to 1956 when it attempted to develop ties with socialist and left-leaning groups and leaders in countries such as Cuba and Brazil.¹⁸³ Other delegations led by senior CCP representatives travelled throughout Latin America to build diplomatic inroads. Chinese documents show that two senior members of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) visited China in February and March of 1959 with a larger group of Latin American communists to attend a seminar concerning the Chinese revolution.¹⁸⁴ A trip to Moscow preceded the visit. A CIA national intelligence estimate from 1963 identified the two Peruvians as Raul Acosta, the Secretary-General, and Jorge del Prado, the Secretary for Press and Propaganda.¹⁸⁵ In a book he published in 1979, Jose Sotomayor Perez confirmed that Jorge del Prado was present.¹⁸⁶ These events had little influence over Acosta and del Prado, who remained loyal to the Soviets while Sotomayor would go on to lead the pro-Chinese faction of the PCP. Peru also sent the largest political delegation of twelve countries to China in 1960, with a total of twenty-six members.¹⁸⁷ The China-Latin American Friendship Association had sponsored groups throughout Latin America and aimed to promote social and cultural understanding. The Peru-China Friendship Association was one of these chapters and was active in Lima and sent its leader to China in the fall of 1960.¹⁸⁸ Trade was limited as a means of building influence in Latin America because of the similar nature of the economies of China and Latin America. Johnson asserts, 'The Chinese produce few of the industrial goods which the Latins require'. He continues, 'The Latin Americans produce few goods which the Chinese really need or cannot purchase elsewhere at lower prices'.¹⁸⁹ On the educational front, China's actions were strikingly similar to the methods of Soviet cultural internationalism discussed

¹⁸³ Johnson, *Communist China and Latin America 1959-1967*, p. 27.

¹⁸⁴ William Ratliff, 'Chinese Communist Cultural Diplomacy toward Latin America, 1949-1960', *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Feb. 1969), p. 65.

¹⁸⁵ CIA, Political Prospects in Peru, p. 15.

¹⁸⁶ Jose Sotomayor Perez, *Leninismo or Maoismo* (Lima: Editorial Universo, 1979), p. 24.

¹⁸⁷ Ratliff, 'Chinese Communist Cultural Diplomacy toward Latin America, 1949-1960', p. 62.

¹⁸⁸ Johnson, *Communist China and Latin America 1959-1967*, p. 25.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 15.

above. China sponsored cultural exchanges and provided Chinese movies and books in the Spanish language. It also sponsored students from Latin American to travel to China to pursue education.¹⁹⁰ The sum of this outreach allowed the CCP to share its ideology and provided a small increase in Chinese influence in the region.

The Chinese also conducted clandestine operations that they hid from Latin American governments. The main perpetrator of these activities was the *Xinhua*, translated as the New China News Agency (NCNA), which was subordinate to the Propaganda Department of the CCP's Central Committee. The NCNA did innocuous things that one could perceive as congruent with its name, such as collecting local newspapers and magazines to send back to the mainland. In 1963, the CIA noted the NCNA, 'working primarily through local Communist parties has established a network of correspondents in Latin America'.¹⁹¹ It was also responsible for broadcasting Chinese propaganda in the Spanish and Portuguese languages.¹⁹² This began in 1957 and by the mid-1960s was broadcasting two hours per day in Latin American countries, a much lower volume than what the Soviets broadcast.¹⁹³ The NCNA acted as the *de facto* diplomatic arm in countries outside Cuba where the Chinese did not have official diplomatic ties.¹⁹⁴ Along with this theme, they worked closely with the Friendship Associations to facilitate the travel of delegations to and from China. On the more nefarious side, Johnson asserts, 'They are known to have passed money to groups having a pro-Chinese orientation, particularly newspapers and magazines that are financially weak'. He continued, 'Doubtless they also provide much of the money required by pro-Chinese Communist parties, movements, and front organizations in Latin America'.¹⁹⁵ Although Johnson does not provide conclusive evidence of this assertion, it is indeed in the realm of the possible. Moreover, a US Defense Intelligence Agency expert on the subject confirms that the Chinese used the NCNA to conduct operations, as explained by Johnson.¹⁹⁶ In 1960, the

¹⁹⁰ Ratliff, 'Chinese Communist Cultural Diplomacy toward Latin America, 1949-1960', p. 74; Goldhamer, *The Foreign Powers in Latin America*, p. 147.

¹⁹¹ CIA Special Report, OCI No. 0279/63E, 'Chinese Communist Activities in Latin America', 10 May 1963, p. 5, CREST, FOIA electronic reading room, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080006-6.pdf>, (accessed 11 April 2020).

¹⁹² 'The Sino-Soviet Dispute within the Communist Movement in Latin America', 15 June 1967, p. 134.

¹⁹³ Johnson, *Communist China and Latin America 1959-1967*, p. 9; Goldhamer, *The Foreign Powers in Latin America*, p. 147.

¹⁹⁴ Matthew Rothwell, *Transpacific Revolutionaries: The Chinese Revolution in Latin America* (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 21.

¹⁹⁵ Johnson, *Communist China and Latin America 1959-1967*, p. 10; Rothwell, *Transpacific Revolutionaries*, p. 24.

¹⁹⁶ Nicholas Eftimiades, *Chinese Intelligence Operations* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 107; Also, see Peter Mattis, 'Beyond Spy vs. Spy: The Analytic Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services', *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 56, No. 3, (September 2012), pp. 47-57.

NCNA established its office in Peru. The NCNA provided the Chinese with a mechanism to spread their ideology and influence throughout Latin America despite not having official diplomatic missions.

Johnson offered three reasons why the CCP provided support to the Communist movements in the Andean region, specifically Peru, in the 1960s. The first was a desire to influence the in-fighting between the pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet leadership of the PCP. By 1965, the Sino-Soviet split was well advanced, and the Chinese regarded this as an opportunity to take control of the Communist movement in Peru. Second, the geography of Peru, along with Colombia and Brazil, was perfect for guerrilla warfare, which was essential to Mao's theory of the People's Protracted War.¹⁹⁷ Moreover, David Scott Palmer confirms that the population of the Andean highlands in Peru was 'overwhelming indigenous and lived in extreme poverty'.¹⁹⁸ This is significant because it increases the likelihood that a population will be willing to provide support to a revolutionary People's War and ties a human element to the favourable physical geography. Finally, Peru was semi-feudal, and a major portion of the population was agrarian peasants, which was very similar to the situation in China before the revolution there, making the idea of pushing a Communist revolution in Peru seem feasible, given that parallel circumstance.¹⁹⁹ Palmer also confirms this assessment, 'As for considerations to the rise of Maoism in Peru itself, one was a socioeconomic reality of a large rural peasantry, which comprised over 40 percent of the country's population'.²⁰⁰ While these conditions would not prove sufficient to overthrow the Peruvian government, the analysis was compelling enough to warrant Mao's attention to Peru.

Johnson's first point (that there was a desire to influence the in-fighting between the pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet leadership) requires closer examination because it is crucial to the development of the PCP. In 1963 Jose Sotomayor and Manuel Soria travelled to China and consulted with Mao on how to deal with the Soviets.²⁰¹ The Peruvian Muscovites established the pro-Soviet version of the PCP before the pro-Chinese version that took the same name. The pro-Chinese leaders forced a merger of the two groups and then pushed the pro-Soviets out of the group altogether. This occurred during the Fourth National Congress of the PCP in

¹⁹⁷ Johnson, *Communist China and Latin America 1959-1967*, p. 221.

¹⁹⁸ David Scott Palmer, 'The Influence of Mao in Peru', in Alexander Cook (ed.) *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 132.

¹⁹⁹ Johnson, *Communist China and Latin America 1959-1967*, p. 223.

²⁰⁰ Palmer, 'The Influence of Mao in Peru', p. 132.

²⁰¹ Sotomayor, *Leninismo or Maoismo*, p. 19.

January 1964. The pro-Chinese element of the PCP went so far in its effort as to collaborate with the Peruvian police, providing them with information that led to the arrest of top pro-Soviet leaders. The pro-Chinese leaders justified this because, according to their view, the Soviets, under Khrushchev and then Brezhnev, had lost the revolutionary spirit and become power-hungry bureaucrats. Further, the Soviets had instituted a policy of ‘peaceful co-existence’ which was not acceptable to the Chinese or their Peruvian followers.²⁰² The detailed level of interference by the Chinese, not merely supporting like-minded movements, but seeking to vanquish any Soviet influence, suggests a deep-seated desire to have the revolution in Peru follow a precisely Chinese path.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed important events in Peruvian history that will be crucial for the reader to contextualize the insurgency described in the remainder of the dissertation. I explained the early development of APRA and the PCP. These groups became marred in the bureaucratic morass and ideological infighting and lost their revolutionary zeal by the early 1960s. Thus, forcing the more radical elements to break off and form rural guerrilla fronts and urban terrorist groups to carry out the aim of political change in Peru. The successful Cuban insurgency had a significant impact on the foreign policies of China, the Soviet Union, and the US towards Latin America. Eisenhower built on Truman’s well-established military ties with Latin American militaries to prepare counterinsurgency forces to prevent another Cuba in the Western Hemisphere. The Soviets sought to demonstrate support for wars of national liberation, but not at the level that it would upset the US. The Chinese took advantage of the Soviet’s hesitancy and began a hostile takeover of the Peruvian Communist Party while continuing its policy of blocking US hegemony in the Latin American intermediate zone. The next chapter will look at how the Cuban Revolution developed and how it exported revolution across the Caribbean and South America and supported the Peruvian New Left’s leaders.

²⁰² ‘The Sino-Soviet Dispute within the Communist Movement in Latin America’, 15 June 1967, p. 133.

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Chapter two: Establishment of the ELN and MIR

As described in chapter one, the Cuban insurgency was a watershed moment in Latin America's Cold War. Castro, in the resulting revolution, solidified control over Cuba and instituted a foreign policy that aimed to spread the revolution across Latin America. The Cubans quickly developed a world-class intelligence organization that it used to train and support revolutionaries across the developing world. In South America, Peru was a key country in the Cuban strategy. As such, Fidel Castro, Ernesto 'Che' Guevarra, and their intelligence apparatus provided extensive support to the Peruvian National Liberation Army (ELN) and, to a lesser extent, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). This section will trace Cuba's foreign policy and show how the ELN and MIR broke away from their respective parent organizations, and with Cuban assistance, developed into insurgent groups and prepared for war with the Peruvian government.

The export of Revolution

Castro was able to develop the Cuban intelligence services from an underground insurgent support organization into a world-class intelligence agency within a few short years. Ramiro Valdes headed the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and oversaw the intelligence apparatus. The MOI had two primary intelligence services known as the *Direccion General de Inteligencia* (General Directorate of Intelligence, DGI) and the *Direccion General de Contra-Inteligencia* (General Directorate of Counter-Intelligence, DGCI).²⁰³ Manuel Pineiro headed the DGI, which conducted the majority of the activities related to exporting the revolution. Pineiro, commonly referred to by his *nom de guerre* 'Barbaroja' (Red Beard), was a close confidant of the Castro brothers and Guevara. He was educated at Columbia University in New York, spoke fluent English, and was married to an American woman. While the Czech intelligence services had long-established connections with Castro, the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) quickly developed a rapport with the DGI, and along with the East German Stasi (secret police), they trained and mentored the young revolutionaries. Castro took a keen interest in the intelligence services and often personally directed operations.²⁰⁴ The early years are fraught with follies and mistakes, but the young,

²⁰³ CIA report CS-311/001 15-64, 'The Organization of the General Directorate of Intelligence', National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), 104-10185-10149, <https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10185-10149.pdf> (accessed 4 April 2020); Brian Latell, *Castro's Secrets: Cuban Intelligence, the CIA and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 66.

²⁰⁴ Latell, *Castro's Secrets*, p. 72; Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The KGB and the World*, p. 49.

dedicated Cuban officers learned and adapted quickly. However, the CIA dismissed them. Journalist Brian Latell wrote, ‘They simply were not taken seriously. After all, as the thinking went at CIA, how could an impoverished third-world country – a Caribbean one at that, and in the grips of a chaotic revolution – possibly compete with the best intelligence service in the world?’²⁰⁵ Benjamin Fischer, former Chief Historian of the CIA, confirms that the CIA underestimated the Cubans, in an article that serves as a damage assessment concerning DGI, KGB, and Stasi double agents.²⁰⁶ In the 1980s, after debriefing multiple defectors, the CIA would learn just how far the Cuban intelligence services had developed in the early 1960s.

Cuba’s desire to export its revolution in Latin America was a primary driver of its foreign policy, and it expended vast resources to meet this aim. Guevara explained, ‘As Marxists, we have maintained that peaceful coexistence among nations does not encompass coexistence between the exploiters and the exploited, between the oppressors and the oppressed’.²⁰⁷ The often-repeated mantra ‘The duty of every revolutionary is to make revolution’ was not just rhetoric. It was a deeply held belief that action would change the world. To enact this program, Cuba began providing training and education to Latin American revolutionaries as early as 1960. The Organization of American States’ (OAS) Special Consultative Committee on Security reported:

*‘Communism, through an appropriate system of selection, chooses the most capable individuals for the ends it seeks. Then, in schools or training centers, these individuals are prepared as activists of all kinds: leaders, orators, and propagandists; experts in sabotage, espionage and terrorism in all its forms; specialists in the handling of arms and radio equipment, in guerrilla warfare, etc’.*²⁰⁸

In 1963, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John McCone testified before Congress that in 1962 1,000 to 1,500 ‘young Latin Americans from every country with the possible exception of Uruguay went to Cuba for training and indoctrination’.²⁰⁹ He added that many more had arrived in 1963. A 1963 US Senate report listed the names and locations of nine training camps or schools in Cuba that the DGI used specifically for training revolutionaries

²⁰⁵ Latell, *Castro’s Secrets*, p. 2.

²⁰⁶ Benjamin B. Fischer (2016) ‘Doubles Troubles: The CIA and Double Agents during the Cold War’, *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 29:1, pp. 48-74.

²⁰⁷ Ernesto Guevara, ‘Colonialism is Doomed’, speech to the 19th General Assembly of the United Nations in New York City, 11 December 1964, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1964/12/11.htm> (accessed 07 January 2018).

²⁰⁸ Organization of American States, Special Consultative Committee on Security, *Cuba as a Base for Subversion in America*, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 4; Also see Robert Piehl, *Cuban Subversion: Shadow over Latin America*, unpublished research paper, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 18 April 1966, p. 18.

²⁰⁹ Latell, *Castro’s Secrets*, p. 73.

from the developing world.²¹⁰ Moreover, a *US News and World Report* article claimed in early 1964 that Cuba had at least nine and possibly as many as thirty training centres established that provided training to as many as 1500 revolutionaries at any given time. The article also stated that the Cubans trained an estimated 5000 revolutionaries in total and then dispatched them back to their home countries.²¹¹ Cuba funded the travel expenses and provided various training courses at no cost to the Latin American dissident groups. The DGI was the lead agency in this effort. On 12 October 1964, the CIA published details of the training program, based on debriefings of a defector, in a classified document called ‘Selection and Training of Cuban Intelligence Agents Abroad’.²¹² Historians have verified many of the assertions in the report, which confirms that the CIA had a good understanding of the Cuban efforts to export revolution to Africa and Latin America.

The Cubans had separate training programs for its two types of agents that supported different focus areas. This first type was the intelligence collection agent that also conducted sabotage. There are only fragments of evidence that the Cubans employed this type of agent in Peru during the 1960s. The second type of agent specialized in revolutionary activity with an emphasis on rural guerrilla warfare. The DGI referred to them as ‘guerrilla agents’. The ELN and MIR members who travelled to Cuba fell into this category. Upon arrival in Havana, groups of trainees were arranged in groups based on their nationality and sponsoring organization. A DGI case officer from the *Departamento Liberacion Nacional* (National Liberation Department, LN) looked after their basic needs and coordinated their training. The training courses and instruction were the responsibility of the DGI *Departamento de Escuelas Especiales* (Department of Special Schools, SS), and many of the instructors were members of the Cuban Army. Various course options lasted from three to six months. The military aspect of the training included ‘all aspects of guerrilla warfare, weapons handling, explosives, sabotage, demolition, military tactics, combat engineering, etc., as well as means of countering anti-guerrilla activities’.²¹³ The small arms instruction included both US and Soviet bloc models. Latell adds that ‘The DGI taught them how to acquire weapons and

²¹⁰ Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, *Cuba as a Base for Subversion in America* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 3.

²¹¹ *US World and News Report*, ‘Castro’s Cuba: A US Problem Becomes a Threat to the World’, 10 February 1964, p. 51.

²¹² CIA Information Report, ‘Selection and Training of Cuban Intelligence Agents Abroad’, 12 October 1964, NARA, 104-10186-101109, <https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/2018/104-10186-10109.pdf> (accessed 4 April 2020).

²¹³ ‘Selection and Training of Cuban Intelligence Agents Abroad’, p. 5.

ammunition from the uniformed services of their countries and to rob banks for funds'.²¹⁴ To this list of subjects, Juan Sanchez, former bodyguard of Castro, adds, '...hijacking of boats and planes, interrogation and torture techniques, logistics, and political strategy...' as well as instruction in Marxism.²¹⁵ Towards the end of the course, the SS trainers took the students to Las Villas province for practical exercises and survival training in the Escambray Mountains. Some trainees had the opportunity to participate in counter guerrilla operations with the Cuban Army against anti-Castro insurgent groups.²¹⁶ The instructors enforced a high standard, and the training was challenging and intense. Individuals who did not meet the standards were required to repeat portions of instruction or were removed from the training and sent home.

The Cubans made significant advancements in revolutionary theory that was adapted for Cuba specifically, and Latin America in general. On 29 January 1959, Guevara explained the significance at a meeting in Havana, 'The example of our revolution for Latin America, and the lessons it implies, have destroyed all the café theories. We have shown that a small group of resolute men, supported by the people, and not afraid to die if necessary, can take on a disciplined regular army and completely defeat it'.²¹⁷ They eschewed orthodox Marxist-Leninist theory and its application by the communist parties throughout Latin America. Because of this, the Soviets considered Castro and Guevara heretics and adventurists. There are many parallels between the Cuban *foco* theory and the Chinese People's protracted warfare. (See table two above.) In general, the Cubans have held that they did not have knowledge or access to Mao's writings on guerrilla warfare until very late in the insurgency, and it did not have an impact on their thinking or strategy. Johnson summarizes, 'One can detect a certain defensiveness in regard to the suggestions that *they* borrowed heavily from the military writings of Mao Tse-tung. Guevara denied at least three times that the Cubans were influenced by the Chinese example'. He continues, 'As a matter of fact, he asserted that they knew nothing about Mao's theory of guerrilla warfare while they were actually fighting Batista. But during an interview granted in June 1959, to Chinese journalists in Havana, he admitted that guerrilla commanders had studied Mao's works'.²¹⁸ Guevara established the

²¹⁴ Latell, *Castro's Secrets*, p. 73.

²¹⁵ Juan Reinaldo Sanchez with Alex Glyden, *The Double Life of Fidel Castro: My 17 Years as Personal Bodyguard to El Lider Maximo* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2014), p. 100.

²¹⁶ Latell, *Castro's Secrets*, p. 72.

²¹⁷ Ernesto Che Guevara, *Obras 1957-1967* (Havana, 1970), pp. 21-22 as translated in Richard Gott, *Cuba: A New History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 215.

²¹⁸ Johnson, *Communist China and Latin America 1959-1967*, p. 104; Also, see Theodore Draper, *Castroism: Theory and Practice* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 25; Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution*, p. 20.

basis of the *foco* theory in his book *Guerrilla Warfare* that he published in 1960.²¹⁹ Many consider that writing a collection of techniques and not a significant contribution to Marxist thought. However, trainees used it as a textbook during courses in Cuba, and Latin American revolutionaries consulted it during many insurrections throughout the 1960s.

Regis Debray, a young French philosopher and confidant of Castro, developed and better explained the theory and its possible practical application across Latin America in *Revolution in the Revolution?*, which he published in 1967. Debray attempted to distinguish the *foco* theory from the Chinese model and blame the failure of Latin American revolutions, such as in Peru because revolutionaries followed the Chinese way and not the Cubans. His dissection of nuanced aspects of the theories only showed that he did not actually understand Mao's flexible approach. Mao held that first, one must understand warfare; then one must understand revolutionary warfare; finally, one must apply this knowledge to the current situation. Debray focuses on China and Vietnam and does not mention early theories of Marxist-Leninist methodology. Johnson asserts this is because Debray 'apparently regards the Soviet model as totally irrelevant to conditions existing in Latin America'.²²⁰ He goes on to stress that Debray thought that the Chinese model would be attractive to Latin American because on the surface the conditions between China and Latin America were similar. While this is accurate on some levels, there are two significant differences between the Chinese and Cuban models.

The first significant difference is the relationship between the guerrilla fighters and the political leadership of the organization. In the Marxist-Leninist and Chinese versions, the guerrilla force or rebel army is subservient to the Party. Mao wrote, 'Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party'.²²¹ In the case of Cuba, the Party was the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), which held no control or influence over Castro. The *foco* theory holds that the guerrilla army is the vanguard, and the Party will later come from the rebel army leadership following the successful revolution. The instructors continually reinforced this vital point to young revolutionaries during guerrilla training courses in Cuba. The second significant difference is the use of 'armed propaganda' in the early stages of the insurgency. Armed propaganda, or political indoctrination, is a technique that employs the guerrillas to conduct agitation, propaganda, and education

²¹⁹ Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 50.

²²⁰ Johnson, *Communist China and Latin America 1959-1967*, p. 122.

²²¹ Ibid., p. 123.

sessions with the population to show them how communism could provide them with a better life. In the Cuban model, there was no time for this, and the guerrilla should concentrate on fighting. A successful battle against the government forces would demonstrate the commitment of the guerrilla to the peasant and win him over to the cause. Debray points out that ‘During two years of warfare, Fidel did not hold a single political rally in his zone of operation’.²²² Johnson concludes, ‘Debray does not attack the notion of armed propaganda per se, but he does contend that the revolutionaries in Latin America at present are so weak that they cannot at this time afford to pursue this tactic’.²²³ These two significant differences, first written about by Guevara following the Cuban insurgency, and later elaborated into a more advanced theory by Debray, were the mainstay of Cuban Army training for Latin American revolutionaries. Upon successful completion of training, the DGI facilitated the movement of the guerrilla agents back to their home countries.

The Czech intelligence service had worked with Fidel since 1957. Clandestine collaboration between the two countries continued in the form of Operation Manuel, which was active from 1962 until 1969. The Cuban section of the I. Branch, 1st Administration of the Czech Ministry of Interior, managed the project in coordination with the Czech *rezidentura* in Havana.²²⁴ The primary purpose of the project was to facilitate the movement of Latin American revolutionaries from their home countries to Cuba and back. This was required because the international community secured borders to isolate Cuba. The mechanism moved a total of 1,179.²²⁵ Javier Heraud and a small group travelled through Prague on their return to Peru in 1963.²²⁶ A partial manifest uncovered in the Czech Security Service Archive in Prague shows that sixty-five Peruvians travelled from Cuba through Prague and back to Peru between 1964 and 1969.²²⁷ Many of these were ELN and MIR members. Until 1964, it was relatively easy for Peruvian insurgents to travel from Cuba to Peru. However, as the various security services in South America began to increase border security, the insurgents required a more secure method of travel. The operation was successful because

²²² Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution*, p. 52.

²²³ Johnson, *Communist China and Latin America 1959-1967*, p. 121.

²²⁴ ‘Operation MANUEL: origins, development and aims’, 17 November 1967, p. 3, A-00921/10-67, Wilson Center, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), [Source: Archives of the Ministry of the Interior, Czech Republic, Prague. Obtained for CWIHP by Oldrich Tuma and translated for CWIHP by Ruth Tosek.] <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/operation-manuel-czechoslovakia-and-cuba> (accessed 9 July 2016).

²²⁵ Michal Zourek, ‘Operation Manuel: When Prague was a key transit hub for international terrorism’, *Central European Journal of International Security Studies*, No. 9, Vol. 3, March 2015, p. 140.

²²⁶ Heraud, *Vida y Muerte de Javier Heraud*, p. 188.

²²⁷ ‘Operation Manual Manifest’, 1969, Czech Security Services Archive, Foreign Intelligence Main Directorate – Operative Files, translated by Dr Michal Zourek.

there were direct flights between Havana and Prague. The only other city in a socialist state that had direct flights was Moscow. Prague is centrally located in Europe and proved to be a good transit point for Latin American travellers. Moreover, there were significant numbers of legitimate travellers moving through Prague, which provided cover for the revolutionaries.²²⁸ The Cubans, nor the Czechs, required the dissidents to be members of the official communist party of their respective nations in order to receive assistance. Operation Manuel supported any person who was fighting against the US regardless of whether they were socialist, communist, nationalist, or even Maoist.

The Cuban Insurgency and Revolution had a profound effect on the Western Hemisphere during the 1950s and 1960s. As shown above, Fidel, with assistance from the KGB, Czech Intel Service, and the Stasi, quickly assembled a formidable world-class intelligence service to support its foreign policy aim of exporting the revolution. This leads to a perplexing question: How did a small Lima-based group of idealistic young students transform themselves into a rural insurgent group that overmatched local security forces and required one of Latin America's most competent armies' counterinsurgency capabilities to defeat it? In the two subsections below, I will examine Peru's two main insurgent groups of the 1960s and explain how they went through this transformation process.

Formation of the ELN

Following the Cuban Revolution, many Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) members became disillusioned with the pro-Soviet leadership and looked to the Cuban model of revolution for answers. The Sino-Soviet split and ideological differences of the pro-Soviet and pro-China members exacerbated the situation and drove some members towards the Cuban way. Many believed 'Cuban socialism made the problems of revolution of immediate concern and did not allow them to be postponed to a more or less distant future'.²²⁹ They began to question and debate Marxist-Leninist doctrine. They studied Alberto Bayo's essay *One Hundred and Fifty Questions for a Guerrilla* and concluded that guerrilla warfare was the correct path. Hector Bejar recalled, 'even if we did not articulate it, we all understood in those years that a new revolutionary period had begun and that the revolution, if it were achieved, would not necessarily develop according to the models we had in our heads'.²³⁰ The infighting among the left, combined with the lethargic stance of the PCP leadership, caused Bejar and his

²²⁸ CIA, 'Selection and Training of Cuban Intelligence Agents Abroad', p. 12.

²²⁹ Béjar, *Perú 1965*, p. 47.

²³⁰ Ibid., p. 47.

cohorts to break away for the PCP and form the National Liberational Army (ELN). They travelled to Cuba to study the revolution and obtain training in the *foco* method of insurgency.

In September 1962, with the assistance of the Cubans, three elements established the ELN. The core consisted of Bejar and five others and became known as the *Grupo Bejar*. Students who had travelled to Cuba on scholarships formed the second, and the final was a random collection of individuals who by happenstance were in Cuba and linked up with the group as it was forming. Bejar's group included Guillermo Mercado, Juan Pablo Chang, Julio Dagnino, Luis Zapata, Alian Elias, Mario Rodriguez, Vladimiro Gallegos, and Fernando Tello. In late 1961, they travelled from Lima to Havana, Cuba via Mexico City. Violeta Valcarcel, a PCP member, facilitated their travel. This was a risk for her because PCP leaders directed members not to support the ELN. While Khrushchev's rhetoric seemingly supported Wars of National Liberation, Moscow wanted communist parties in Latin America to avoid armed insurrection and support to militant groups, such as the ELN. However, Valcarcel later explained that she wanted the PCP to be at the forefront of the revolution and not to be left behind.²³¹ This is the first instance of a significant trend that emerged during the ELN's existence. Individual members of the communist parties throughout Latin America sometimes supported the ELN against party orders. This solidarity among rank-and-file members of the Left was crucial to the limited successes of the ELN.

The Bejar group's journey to Havana was challenging, and they faced additional delays once they arrived. In 1961 most countries in Latin America did not have open diplomatic relations with Cuba. The security services of these nations closely monitored international travel to and from Cuba in an effort to thwart communist expansion. Bejar and his cohort flew via commercial airlines from Lima to Mexico City. Valcarcel provided them with a secret message, and upon arrival, they presented it to a successful businessman called Ignacio Magaloni. Magaloni, an associate of Valcarcel, provided the group accommodation at a hotel he owned while they waited for conveyance to Cuba. In December 1961, they finally made their way to Havana and were excited to begin training immediately. However, Bejar ran into Ruben Mollepaza in the lobby of the Hotel Habana Riviera, where they were staying. Mollepaza was a leader of the PCP and interfered with the guerrilla warfare training of the group. Moreover, there was infighting among various Castroites and the Cuban communists.

²³¹ Interview with Violeta Valcarcel in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 140.

Bejar recalled, ‘when we arrived in Havana there was much tension between July 26th Movement and the members of Anibal Escalante’s group. That was what prevented us from starting the training, and we began immediately after the Second Declaration of Havana’, which was Castro’s address to the Cuban people on 4 February 1962, in response to OAS’s expulsion of Cuba.²³² With the delays sorted out, they started their preparation for guerrilla warfare. On 18 July 1962, the Peruvian military conducted a *coup d’état*, which caused an upheaval in the political system. As journalist Jon Anderson concluded, ‘For Peruvians seeking to apply the Cuban model to their nation, it was time to strike’.²³³ However, additional delays would prevent them from taking advantage of this political situation.

A group of Peruvian students merged with Bejar’s core before the guerrilla warfare training course and significantly added to the size of the ELN. The students were openly recruited from universities across Peru from various positions on the social-economic strata. However, the majority of the students were from the University of San Marcos in Lima, which was a well-known incubator of revolution. Many of them were members of the PCP’s student group *Juventud Comunista Peruano* (Peruvian Communist Youth, JCP). Similar goings-on took place across Latin America. The leftist group *Federacion de Estudiantes Revolucionarios* (Revolutionary Student Federation, FER) used posters, flyers, newspaper advertisements, and radio announcements on Peruvian stations as well as Radio Havana to attract applicants. The Cuban government offered *becas* (scholarships) to travel and study in Havana. There was no effort to conceal this activity, and the internal security forces took notice. FER leaders reviewed the students’ academic records and screened their cognitive ability, but this was only the initial requirement. During the interview process, there was a litmus test for sympathy for and admiration of the Cuban Revolution. One of the students, Federico Garcia, explained, ‘firstly, we should send people of a social extraction that deserved assistance, and secondly, those who were committed to the student fight, and that had a progressive mindset’.²³⁴ Lust added, ‘However, to obtain a scholarship, it was not a requirement to be a member of the PCP or their youth organization’.²³⁵ This allowed for a larger pool of applicants for the scholarship program.

²³² Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 140.

²³³ Jon Anderson, *Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life* (New York: Grove Press, 1997), p. 534.

²³⁴ Interview with Federico García in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 149. Spanish version: ‘debíamos enviar allá primeramente a gente de una extracción social que mereciera este tipo de apoyo y, en segundo lugar, que se hubiera comprometido en la lucha estudiantil, que tuviera una mentalidad progresista’.

²³⁵ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 149. Spanish version: ‘Sin embargo, para obtener una beca no era requisito ser miembro del PCP o de su organización juvenil’.

The students' journey to Havana was more perilous than Bejar's group. The FER leadership completed the selection process, and notified the selectees, who became known as *Los Becados*. They consolidated in Lima and waited to travel to Cuba. Their route required them to go to Arica, a town in northern Chile, to meet a plane that would take them to their final destination. They moved in small groups in buses or taxis to Tacna, a small town on the Peruvian side of the border with Chile. At the border crossing point, Customs Officers detained Rafael Vilcapoma and Carlos Mantero y Palermo along with two others. Vilcapoma recalled, 'The police threatened us and took us to a place and stepped on us to the maximum. They threatened us because it was prohibited to travel to Cuba. They knew we were traveling to Cuba, we could not deny it. They knew our names. They knew everything'.²³⁶ The authorities collected their biographical data and took pictures and fingerprints, and then released them.

Upon arrival in Arica, the local Communists looked after the students. They were members of the *Partido Comunista Chileno* (Chilean Communist Party, PCC) and the *Partido Socialista de Chile* (Socialist Party of Chile, PS). As the *Becados* were traveling to Cuba ostensibly for educational purposes, there were no prohibitions against supporting them, as was the case with Bejar's group. Accepting a certain level of risk, various PCC and PS members welcomed students into their homes, while others stayed in local hotels. This is another example of the solidarity of communist party members supporting the New Left. The first flight departed Arica on 4 April 1962. On route to Cuba, the aircraft stopped for fuel in Guayaquil, Ecuador. This was problematic because Ecuador had broken relations with Cuba two days earlier. The Ecuadorian military detained the aircraft for a short time. Philip Agee, a CIA officer, posted to the US Consulate in Guayaquil at the time, recalled that they knew there were Peruvian students on the plane and that it was bound for Cuba. They requested the passenger manifest from the Ecuadorians and forwarded it to the CIA station in Lima.²³⁷ The aircraft was later allowed to refuel and depart for its destination. Some of the students, such as Milciades Ruiz and Manuel Cabrera, arrived a few days after the flight left. They were disillusioned and did not know what to do and considered returning to their respective universities, but they had no money. Ruiz remembered, 'My idea was to work in order to gather enough for a return ticket and continue studying at the University of Trujillo, but the

²³⁶ Interview with Rafael Vilcapoma in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 149. Spanish Version: 'La Policía nos amenazaba, nos llevaron a un lugar y nos pisaron al máximo. Ellos nos amenazaban porque estaba prohibido viajar a Cuba. Ellos sabían que viajábamos a Cuba, no pudimos negarlo. Sabían nuestros nombres. Sabían todo'.

²³⁷ Agee, *Inside the Company*, p. 233.

problem was resolved at that moment'.²³⁸ PCC members contacted Chilean Senator Salvador Allende, who was the coordinator for Arica, and he arranged a second flight for six remaining students two weeks later.²³⁹ On 21 April 1962, the second flight arrived in Havana without incident.

Hundreds of students from across Latin America were arriving in Havana in the spring of 1962, and they entered an elaborate plan that the Cuban's employed to radicalize them. Approximately eighty of the students were from Peru. Anderson explains that there were two sub-groups within the student population. The first sought academic education and knowledge of the Cuban government. He recounts an interview with one of the *Becados* called Roberto, who explained that the other group, 'wanted to take advantage of Cuba's revolutionary experience to learn from it, and return to our own country to carry out our own revolution'.²⁴⁰ While the majority of the students arrived with intentions of studying in Cuban institutions such as the University of Havana, the Cuban revolutionary spirit influenced their thinking. One day Castro himself came to speak with them and offered them military training. Antonio Pacheco, one of the Peruvian students, recalled Castro saying, 'All right, those who would like to [participate in military training] can, but first get to know the island, I want that you see what socialism is, see Marxism up close and in real life'.²⁴¹ There was no pressure to accept the offer. Castro wanted them to travel the island and encouraged them to speak with peasants, workers, militiamen, and party leaders. In a letter to his mother, Javier Heraud explained, 'We have had a wonderful tour of Cuba. We have visited and admired very closely all of the extraordinary work of the revolution. I will tell you the things you like to hear. They have put us up in the neighbourhood called Vedado, which is like Miraflores [an upscale area in Lima], in two large houses'.²⁴² While the materialistic comments of the young socialist are curious, the important aspect is that Castro was encouraging them to choose the path of violence.

²³⁸ Interview with Milciades Ruiz in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 150. Spanish version: 'Mi idea era trabajar para juntar para el pasaje y regresar a seguir estudiando en la Universidad de Trujillo, pero había que resolver el problema del momento'.

²³⁹ Heraud, *Vida y Muerte de Javier Heraud*, p. 8.

²⁴⁰ Interview with Roberto in Anderson, *Che Guevara*, p. 534.

²⁴¹ Interview with Antonio Pacheco in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 150. Spanish version: "Bueno, los que quieran ir puedan, pero primero conozcan la isla, quiero que ustedes vean que es el socialismo, el marxismo en vivo y directo".

²⁴² Heraud, *Vida y Muerte de Javier Heraud*, p. 166. Spanish version: 'Hemos tenido un maravilloso recorrido por Cuba. Hemos visitado y admirado muy de cerca todo el trabajo extraordinario de la revolución. Te diré las cosas que te gusta escuchar. Nos han colocado en el barrio llamado Vedado, que es como Miraflores, en dos casas grandes'.

The group travelled around the entire island and carefully examined the Cuban version of socialism, and this prepared them for the next phase of Castro's scheme. On 24 April, their guides took them to a house in the Nuevo Vedado neighbourhood of Havana. Castro met with the students again, however, this time he was very direct and pressured them to decide. Carlos Mantero recalled, 'In the same meeting, Fidel presented the idea that the way to participate and support the revolution in your country, in this case Peru, is in two ways. One is military, and the other is professional. He was direct and said, do not think too much about the matter, it's that simple'.²⁴³ Mantero and his fellow students were surprised by Castro's bluntness. Their choice was clear, go to study and become a professional, or join the revolution and save your homeland from the oppressive Oligarchy and US imperialism. About half of the Peruvians decided to take up arms, and Castro persuaded most of them that violence was the only way to improve their country. The tipping point for Antonio Pacheco was his observations during the tour of Cuba. He stated, 'the Cuban Revolution convinced me when I saw it up close and in real life'.²⁴⁴ Milciades Ruiz was a poor kid from a disadvantaged area in Peru but was able to work his way into medical school. However, he could not afford the tuition, so he sought the opportunity to study in Cuba so that he could complete his education and obtain a well-paying job and help his family. But Castro converted his thinking. Ruiz recalled, 'my logic was, I could fight for myself, or I could take this opportunity and fight for every young person in my situation'.²⁴⁵ The Cubans separated those who choose revolution and took them away for training.

The DGI's cadre united the three Peruvian elements that would form the ELN and prepared them to begin training. The *Grupo Bejar* and *Los Becados* were joined by other Peruvians who took various paths to the training centre. Abraham Lama was a journalist working for the Cuban news organization *Prensa Latina*. In 1959, they shut down their office in Lima, and he went to work in Havana. In an effort to complete his education, he joined the students, but later decided to take the military route. Nestor Guevara was a PCP member from Cuzco who was sent to Cuba to learn from the Revolution. He ran into Bejar in Havana

²⁴³ Interview with Carlos Mantero in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 151. Spanish version: "En la misma reunión, Fidel planteo que la manera de participar y apoyar a la revolución de su país, en este caso del Perú, era de dos maneras. Una como militares, y otra como profesionales. Él fue directo, o sea, no daba muchas vueltas al asunto, así de simple".

²⁴⁴ Interview with Antonio Pacheco in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 153. Spanish version: 'A mí me convenció la revolución cubana al verla en vivo y en directo'.

²⁴⁵ Interview with Milciades Ruiz in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 153. Spanish version: 'mi lógica era, en vez de luchar para mí mismo, yo tengo la oportunidad de luchar para todos los jóvenes que están en mi situación'.

and decided to join him in military training. Others, such as Edilberto Marquez, Gonzolo Fernandez, and Dario Acurio were members of MIR and decided to switch to the ELN.²⁴⁶ This was a common occurrence among the various leftist groups. For example, Guillermo Lobaton Milla, a senior ELN member switched to the MIR and led a guerrilla column in the central highlands.²⁴⁷ This influx was due to personality conflicts, ideological stances, and differences in tactical approaches to the future insurrection. These three elements would coalesce to establish the ELN.

The DGI assigned the Peruvian trainees to the National Liberation Department for administrative and logistical support, while the Department of Special Schools conducted the training course. The core of the Special Schools cadre was from the Cuban Army, but Russian, Czech, and Spanish advisors assisted them.²⁴⁸ Officially, the Minister of Interior Ramiro Valdes and DGI Director Manuel Pineiro oversaw the training. However, Guevara involved himself in the smallest of details when it came to the revolutionaries. DGI officer Orlando Pantoja was the primary person who looked after the ELN members while they were on the island. He was a close confidant of Guevara and died with him in Bolivia in 1967. The training went from 5 AM until 10 PM and included Marxist-Leninist theory, weapons and marksmanship, use of explosives, physical conditioning and hand-to-hand combat, survival, guerrilla tactics, as well as infiltration and exfiltration techniques. The cadre designed the course based on their practical experiences gained during the Cuban insurgency. After the introductory phase, they moved to the mountains and conducted long, arduous marches in the hot and humid climate. The Special Schools instructors devised this activity to build stamina in the students and weed out those who did not have the physical or mental resolve that mountain warfare required of a guerrilla fighter. The cadre expelled those who could not keep up with the course.

The ELN participants had differing opinions about the quality of the training. Julio Dagnino claimed that the training totally prepared him to go anywhere in Latin America and initiate the revolution. Writing in 1989, Bejar provides hour by hour detail of the training course. In a bizarre and almost loving way, he described the 'joyful design and perfect balance of the

²⁴⁶ Interviews with Nestor Guevara and Edilberto Marquez in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 157.

²⁴⁷ Anderson, *Che Guevara*, p. 678.

²⁴⁸ CIA, 'Selection and Training of Cuban Intelligence Agents Abroad', p. 5; Latell, *Castro's Secrets*, p. 93, Anderson, *Che Guevara*, p. 535.

FAL ... beautiful, black UZI ... ugly and complicated San Cristobal carbine'.²⁴⁹ Ruiz and Pacheco both recalled that the training prepared them for the revolution. Despite these positive reviews, Antonio Li, a former paratrooper in the Peruvian Army, was not impressed. He argued that the political theory aspect was adequate, but the military training was limited, rushed, and superficial. Li stated, 'I was in the Army, and the process to prepare a good soldier is much longer. In two months, you cannot do anything, having many ideas, illusions, and much enthusiasm is not sufficient because, in two months, you cannot do anything'.²⁵⁰ As a counterargument, Lust offers that Castro and Guevara only trained for four months and were not wholly prepared militarily when they departed Mexico. The DGI expedited the training for two reasons. Firstly, the Peruvian Junta had announced there would be presidential elections held in the spring of 1963, and the ELN needed to act before that happened. Secondly, there was increasing tension, which eventually led to the missile crisis, among the USSR, Cuba, and the US.

The ELN established itself in September 1962, and this led to a debate over who should provide the leadership and direction. The four emerging leaders were Bejar, Alain, Lama, and Nestor Guevara. According to Ruiz, these four stood out because they were older and more experienced and had a deeper theoretical understanding of revolution. The rank-and-file ELN members accepted the direction of this senior group. Li recalled, 'We, the members of the base, simply obeyed nothing more, we obeyed the directives'.²⁵¹ Bejar argued that everyone in the organization had a voice. He wrote, 'discipline and democracy are not opposed in a revolutionary military organization. Its internal life can combine subordination of lower to higher ranks in military questions, and democracy and freedom of expression in political matters'.²⁵² Of course, at the tactical military level, there must be a commander in charge because you cannot debate the next action in a firefight. Nevertheless, he maintained that when it came to debating political theory and revolutionary strategy, the ELN was a democracy. During this period, the MIR made a power play to gain control of the ELN and attempted to get the Cubans to subordinate the ELN to the MIR leadership. Che Guevara

²⁴⁹ Héctor Béjar, *El primer día, historia interior de una guerrilla Andina*, (Lima, 1989) unpublished monograph, quoted in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 142. Spanish version: 'FAL, joyas de diseño, perfectamente equilibrado ... USI, bellas, negrísimas ... la fea y complicada carabina San Cristóbal'.

²⁵⁰ Interview with Antonio Li in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 154. Spanish version: 'Yo estaba en el Ejército y un proceso de preparación para un buen soldado es mucho más largo. En dos meses uno no hace nada'.

²⁵¹ Interview with Antonio Li in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 160. Spanish version: 'Nosotros, la gente de base, simplemente obedecíamos nada más, obedecíamos directivas'.

²⁵² Béjar, *Perú 1965*, p. 65.

interceded and took the side of the ELN for which he had a strong affinity. Although the Cubans' welcomed any anti-imperialist organization to come to the island for training, Guevara detested the MIR. For one, they were not a communist group, but also because they were not interested in taking immediate action like the ELN. Ruiz stated, 'We were the group that was ingratiated with Che. Che was practically our godfather'.²⁵³ The ELN was now an official organization. However, they would remain underground and not officially announce themselves to the public until October 1965.

Members of the ELN came from varying backgrounds and social-economic classes. There were workers, peasants, students, intellectuals, as well as older members with significant experience leading political organizations. Wherever they came from, the common ground was the desire for action over talk and their disdain for politics as usual. They did write a manifesto but did not promulgate it widely. It was debated and argued over, and many of the drafts were lost. Bejar recalled, 'most members felt that the Left had already drawn up enough programs without their writing yet another one'.²⁵⁴ Alian Elias stated, 'we did not have time to write, but we knew exactly what we wanted, what we thought'.²⁵⁵ The main focus was that it was broad enough to be inclusive of large sections of the Peruvian population and simple enough that the population could understand it. By 1964, the main points the ELN called for were: 'People's government; Expulsion of all foreign monopolies; Agrarian revolution; Friendship with all the peoples of the world; National sovereignty'.²⁵⁶ In the simplest form, they wanted socialism for Peru. They determined that two key areas would be necessary for success: armed struggle and popular unity. Additionally, they desired a broad coalition across the Marxist Left and understood that this was their only chance at achieving their goal. This is an essential point because it shows that the ELN members understood early in the process that disunity among the Left would hamper their chances of changing the political course of Peru. Ultimately, this would become one of the four orthodox reasons that the New Left did not achieve its goal.

For the ELN leaders and rank-and-file members, a violent insurrection was the only appropriate method of political change in Peru. They wholeheartedly accepted the Cuban

²⁵³ Interview with Milcíades Ruiz in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 194. Spanish version: 'Nosotros éramos el grupo engraido del Che. El Che era prácticamente nuestro padrino'.

²⁵⁴ Béjar, *Perú 1965*, p. 61.

²⁵⁵ Interview with Alian Elías in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 161. Spanish version: 'No tuvimos tiempo de escribir, pero estaba claro lo que queríamos, lo que pensábamos'.

²⁵⁶ Béjar, *Perú 1965*, p. 62.

model and sought to establish a guerrilla *foco* in the Andes to begin the process. There was no political party at this point, as it would develop out of the military core of the *foco* just as it had in Cuba. They eschewed the voting process and did not believe that the Peruvian Oligarchy, whose power was underwritten by the Peruvian Armed Forces, would ever allow significant reform through the ballot box. In this aspect, they were correct, as evidenced by the 1962 *coup d'état*, which ended the hope of APRA gaining power in the country. For the New Left in general and the ELN specifically, the peasants were central to the armed struggle. Bejar wrote, 'guided by the Chinese and Cuban examples, all of these new groups gave the peasantry a very important role in the first phase of the evolution, and organized their major activities accordingly'.²⁵⁷ They carefully examined the history of peasant mobilization in Peru and sought to build upon agitation and uprising that were happening in the Andes at the time. In sum, the strategy they developed was that of armed insurgency supported by the peasantry to overthrow the Oligarchy and put an end to oppression and US imperialism.

After completing the overall strategy for Peru, the ELN turned to its tactical plan of action to begin the revolution. They debated this at great length and finally decided to establish two separate fronts initially, one in Cerro de Pasco y Junin and the other in Cusco. This decision reflected a growing rift between the *Grupo Bejar* and *los Becados*, and the leaders divided the ELN into two fronts along these lines. Bejar and Elias would lead the front in Pasco. This area was a logical choice because it was a historical hotbed of revolt. Moreover, it was relatively close to Lima, and any action taken there would strike at one of the economic centres of the Oligarchy. Lama and Nestor Guevara emerged as the leaders for the Cusco front. Nestor Guevara recalled that Castro suggested establishing a front in Cusco.²⁵⁸ Cusco was also a good choice because Hugo Blanco's uprising was ongoing, and he could use assistance with additional guerrilla fighters to battle the increasing number of Peruvian military forces deployed to the area.²⁵⁹ The ELN members, with their strategy and tactical plans completed, readied themselves to travel back to Peru. In parallel with the ELN's preparations, Luis de la Puente's Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) was also in Cuba receiving guerrilla warfare training.

Formation of the MIR

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 49.

²⁵⁸ Interview with Néstor Guevara in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, 174.

²⁵⁹ Blanco, *Land or Death*, 28.

Luis Felipe de la Puente Uceda was one of the most outspoken APRA members against the *convivencia*, which was when, in the 1950s, APRA deradicalized and became a mainstream political group.²⁶⁰ He was born on 1 April 1926 in the northern Peruvian town called Santiago de Chuco. His family was wealthy and owned a large tract of land. He entered the University of Trujillo, where he studied and became the president of the university student association. He was related to APRA leader Victor Haya de la Torre and joined the Peruvian APRA branch in 1942. He was involved in the 1948 mutiny attempt and consequently jailed for seven months following the event. In 1953, he was again incarcerated for subversive activities for four months and then exiled to Mexico. While there, he studied Marxism at the National Autonomous University in Mexico City. He also showed interest in the Soviet, Chinese, Mexican, and Bolivian revolutions. Mario Antonio Malpica recalled, ‘Luis de la Puente was not really an ideologue, but a political leader’ showing that he was searching for a revolutionary method and not just interested in the theoretical. De la Puente was raised Catholic and never gave up his faith. Malpica continued, ‘Until the end, he maintained his belief in the Catholic religion. It was a contradiction’.²⁶¹ Manuel Pita confirmed, ‘Lucho [De la Puente’s *nom de guerre*] was a man who sustained a deep faith and commitment to the Catholic religion’.²⁶² Ricardo Gadea recalled that although he never observed De la Puente participate in Catholic rituals, ‘like 90% of Peruvians, most of the MIR members considered themselves Catholic even though they only went to church for major life events such as baptisms and weddings’.²⁶³ De la Puente was thoughtful and studious but did not possess the patience that Haya demanded of his followers.

The deposed *Apristas* were not content with studying revolution in Mexico, and they decided to act. De la Puente, along with fifteen others, began to plan for revolution in Peru, although only three, Guillermo Carnero, Carlos Castaneda, and De la Puente, would actually take part. The plotters coordinated the plan with high-ranking members of APRA in Lima, including Armando Villanueva, Manuel Seoane, and former Peruvian Army General Juan de Dios Cuadros, but without the knowledge of Haya. They gained support from President Victor Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia and President Juan Domingo Peron in Argentina. De la Puente

²⁶⁰ APRA Rebelde, ‘La Realidad Nacional y la Línea Política de la Convivencia’, 10 October 1959, p. 7.

²⁶¹ Interview with Mario Antonio Malpica in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 235. Spanish version: ‘Luis se la Puente no era un ideólogo realmente, sino un dirigente político’.

²⁶² Interview with Manuel Pita in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 235. Spanish version: ‘Lucho era un hombre sostenido por Fe profunda, comprometido con la religión católica’.

²⁶³ Ricardo Gadea. Telephone Interview. 9 April 2020. Spanish version: ‘como el 90% de los peruanos, la mayoría de los miembros del MIR se consideraban católicos a pesar de que solo iban a la iglesia para eventos importantes de la vida, como bautizos y bodas’.

summarized the attempt, ‘in 1954, we clandestinely entered Peru from our exile in Mexico, as part of a revolutionary plan whose principal mentor was Manuel Seoane and a distinguished chief from our [Peruvian] Army who was actually retired’. He continued, ‘After a few months of clandestine work, we were betrayed, and we suffered in prison the entire year of 1955’.²⁶⁴ Pita recalled that De la Puente attempted to gain broad support among the APRA leadership in Lima.²⁶⁵ This led to the plan’s compromise because many APRA members were staunchly against any form of violent action and wanted to work through the legal and political system. This was De La Puente’s second unsuccessful involvement in armed insurrection. However, it would not deter him from his goal of social-political reform in Peru.

The APRA leadership in Lima secured the release of the jailed members before the election of 1956. De la Puente returned to his studies at the National University in Trujillo’s Law School and graduated in 1958. His thesis was titled *La Reforma del Agro Peruano* (The Peruvian Agrarian Reform). He was adamant that it should not be communist reform and wrote, ‘it is not communist, it is antiimperialist, antifeudalist, it has indeoamericanist ideals; it is aprismo’.²⁶⁶ This was congruent with APRA’s platform that it was not a communist movement, and that it was a nationalist, anti-imperialist organization. (See table one.) De la Puente still believed in APRA’s platform. It was APRA’s deradicalization that he abhorred. After graduation, he began working in northern Peru as a legal adviser to peasant farmer organizations fighting against their exploitation. On 26 July 1958, in the town of Chepen, the police confronted a meeting of peasant workers. De la Puente and another legal adviser called Gonzalo Fernandez were speaking to the group when a GC detachment, commanded by Colonel Oscar Arteta Tersi, moved in to disperse the assembly. The GC officers fired into the crowd and killed three peasants and wounded approximately a dozen others. The community leaders, along with De la Puente and Fernandez, escaped in the melee. However, the authorities arrested De la Puente two months later. The community placed intense

²⁶⁴ MIR, *Obras de Luis de La Puente Uceda* (Lima: Voz Rebelde, 1980), p. 69. Spanish version: ‘En 1954 entramos clandestinamente al país desde nuestro destierro en México, dentro de un plan revolucionario cuyo mentor principal era Manuel Seoane y en el que participaba, en primer plano, un distinguido jefe de nuestro Ejército, actualmente en retiro’. ‘Después de algunos meses de permanencia y trabajo clandestino en el país, fuimos traccionados, sufriendo prisión todo el año 1955’.

²⁶⁵ Interview with Manuel Pita in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 237.

²⁶⁶ Luis de la Puente Uceda, *La reforma del agro peruano* (Lima: Ediciones Ensayos Sociales, 1966), p. 79. Spanish version: ‘no es comunista, es antiimperialista, antifeudalismo, es ideal indoamericanismo: es aprismo’.

pressure on the local government, who released him a few days later.²⁶⁷ This episode provides another example of De la Puente's fearless defense of the Peruvian people.

In July 1959, De la Puente traveled with a delegation to Havana to represent the Peruvian APRA Party at the National Agrarian Reform Forum. There he debated with Cuban President Oswaldo Dorticos over the nature of the reform implementation in Cuba. De la Puente claimed that the agrarian reforms were capitalist and that it was for the best.²⁶⁸ There was no indication that the communists influenced De la Puente towards their position. However, he became an outspoken supporter of the Cuban Revolution and was critical of the *convivencia*. APRA leaders held their Fourth Convention 10-13 October 1959 and banned De la Puente from attending. Following the convention, they expelled him outright from the organization.²⁶⁹ In November, he and a small group of followers in Trujillo established the *Comité Aprista de Defensa de los Principios Doctrinarios de la Democrática Interna Aprista* (Committee for the Defense of the Doctrinal Principles of Internal Democracy, CDO). Sigifredo Orbegoso recalled that they carefully selected the name to reclaim the original mission of APRA in Peru. This was necessary because the Haya and other leaders had 'abandoned the founding principles and fundamentals of anti-imperialism and revolution'.²⁷⁰ The CDO established the newspaper *Voz Rebelde* and, in its first edition, explained its goals of freeing the peasants from their feudal existence and expelling the foreign imperialists.²⁷¹ De la Puente was cautious not to become the overbearing leader of the group and focused on presenting the divergent position of the CDO.

APRA Rebelde

On 26-29 May 1960, the CDO held a congress and voted to change its name to *Comité APRA Rebelde*. The members of the congress voted De la Puente to be the Secretary-General. They also changed the name of their newspaper to *Voz Apra Rebelde*. The congress did not have an ideological shift. They changed the names to distance the group from the Peruvian APRA that had expelled all the CDO members. Orbegoso explained that *APRA Rebelde* was

²⁶⁷ Walther Palacios, 'Luis de la Puente in Chepén. La Lucha por la Tierra', *La Marka*, Lima, 9 December 1985, p. 11.

²⁶⁸ Malpica, *Biografía de la revolución*, p. 501.

²⁶⁹ CIA, 'Pro-Castro Activity in Peru', in *Current Intelligence Digest*, 1 July 1960, p. 9, CREST, FOIA electronic reading room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000134248.pdf, (accessed 11 April 2020).

²⁷⁰ Interview with Sigifredo Orbegoso in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 241. Spanish version: 'abandonaron los principios primigenios fundamentales antiimperialistas y revolucionarios'.

²⁷¹ Ricardo Gadea. Telephone Interview. 9 April 2020.

headquartered in Trujillo and concentrated its involvement in northern Peru, including Cajamarca, Chepen, Chiclayo, Chimbote, Julcan, Piura, and Santiago de Chuco. They also maintained a smaller presence in Arequipa, Cusco, Lima, and Huancayo.²⁷² Malpica recalled, ‘Basically, all of the members were middle class, professionals’. He added that after they established the organization, ‘a good quantity of students from San Marcos and other Universities joined, along with some lawyers’.²⁷³ De la Puente and other APRA Rebelde members continued to organize the rural workers in northern Peru, but the core members of the group were from the disenfranchised middle class.

De la Puente traveled again to Cuba in June 1960 and met with Guevara. He may also have met with Castro.²⁷⁴ A Peruvian revolutionary called Ricardo Napuri facilitated the meeting along with Guevara’s Peruvian wife, Hilda Gadea. Napuri ingratiated himself with Guevara by getting to know his mother. During this period, Guevara oversaw the exporting of the Cuban revolution across Latin America. He initially rejected Napuri’s suggestion to meet with De la Puente because he remembered De la Puente speaking out against the Cuban method during the National Agrarian Reform Forum. However, Guevara conceded after Napuri convinced him that De la Puente was changing his line of thought. This is the first instance in De la Puente’s ideological shift towards Marxism, but it is unclear if his thoughts were evolving. De la Puente explained to Guevara the ongoing crises inside the Peruvian APRA and its *convivencia* with the Oligarchy. Guevara was impressed by De la Puente’s granular knowledge of the agrarian reform issue in Peru and Latin America in general. De la Puente explained that the peasants in Peru already had their organizations and traditional ways of resisting the landholders and government. If APRA Rebelde was to instigate an uprising, they would have to take this into account. Napuri recalled, that this caused Che to doubt the idea of a pure guerilla *foco* in Peru.²⁷⁵ As a result of this encounter, Guevara sent Napuri to Peru to coordinate Cuban support for APRA Rebelde.

De la Puente continued to develop his organization with the Cuban financial assistance. Napuri coordinated the support for APRA Rebelde through the Cuban Embassy in Lima. He

²⁷² Interview with Sigifredo Orbegoso in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 244.

²⁷³ Interview with Mario Malpica in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 244. Spanish version: ‘Básicamente era gente de la clase media, profesionales’. ‘venia una buena cantidad de dirigentes estudiantiles sanmarquinos y de otras universidades’.

²⁷⁴ CIA memorandum, ‘Cuban Subversive Activities in Ecuador’, 22 June 1961, p. 15, NARA, RG 59, Subject Files, Representative to Peru, Box 9, (ARCID 2363836).

²⁷⁵ ‘A 30 años de la muerte de Ernesto Guevara’, Interview with Ricardo Napuri in *Herramienta*, 8 October 1997, p. 11 <https://www.herramienta.com.ar/articulo.php?id=998> (accessed 17 January 2020); Also see, Napuri, *Pensar América Latina*.

remembered, ‘we began to receive various types of support, [including] money’.²⁷⁶ The CIA assessed, ‘Pro-Castro Cubans in Peru are encouraging extreme leftists students and political groups which oppose the conservative regime of President Manuel Prado’. The funding supported ‘antigovernment organizational activity and propaganda media’. They added, ‘Cuban Ambassador Luis Ricardo Alonso is directly involved in these activities, and dissident pro-Castro elements frequently meet at the embassy’.²⁷⁷ The majority of the APRA Rebelde members welcomed Napuri. However, Gonzalo Fernandez Gasco considered him a communist infiltrator. Napuri became disillusioned with the state of the organization and found that reality did not reflect what De la Puente had described to Guevara. He recalled, ‘It was an organization that was very decomposed as they were expelled members of APRA’. He estimated that there were less than 200 members but added that this core was devoted to De la Puente. Moreover, he explained, ‘there did not exist any serious implantation in the rural areas or with the campesino communities’.²⁷⁸ APRA Rebelde only had limited political influence in the small towns and with the rural population. This began three years of Guevara’s frustration with De la Puente and his organization. In 1963, after three years of financial support, Napuri recalled Guevara ranting that the MIR was still not ready for action.²⁷⁹ This is another example of the infighting and lack of cohesion among the New Left.

The Cubans sponsored the First *Congreso Latinoamericano de Juventudes* (Latin American Youth Conference, LAYC) in Havana 26 July to 4 August 1960. The communists controlled the preparations and hosted the event, but non-communist groups fought to manage the agenda. In a report released in anticipation of the conference, the CIA opined that the communists would attempt to influence the others to their ideology. The report read, ‘Its targets have been the key student, labor, and political party youth organizations - particularly those of the well-established non-Communist left, such as, APRA (Peru), AD (Venezuela), and MNR (Bolivia)’.²⁸⁰ A second report following the conference read, ‘virulent attacks on other hemisphere governments delivered by “Che” Guevara and others during the

²⁷⁶ Interview with Ricardo Napuri in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 246. Spanish version: ‘comenzamos a recibir diversos tipos de ayuda, dinero’.

²⁷⁷ CIA, ‘Pro-Castro Activity in Peru’, in *Current Intelligence Digest*, 1 July 1960, p. 9.

²⁷⁸ Interview with Ricardo Napuri in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 247. Spanish version: ‘Era una organización muy descompuesta porque fueron expulsados del APRA’. ‘no existía ninguna seria implantación en el campo, tampoco en las comunidades campesinas’.

²⁷⁹ ‘A 30 años de la muerte de Ernesto Guevara’, p. 13.

²⁸⁰ CIA, ‘Latin American Youth Congress’, in *Bi-weekly Propaganda Guidance*, No. 44, 10 July 1960, p. 8, CREST, FOIA electronic reading room, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-03061A000100020005-5.pdf> (accessed 11 April 2020).

Communist-dominated Latin American Youth Congress have further aroused other Latin American governments against the Cuban regime'.²⁸¹ The Cubans provided a guerrilla warfare demonstration to some of the attendees in an attempt to entice them to remain on the island and attend military and political training courses.²⁸² A small group of APRA Rebelde members attended the conference, and this allowed them to observe the Cuban Revolution personally. Malpica explained that this contributed to the leftward movement of APRA Rebelde. He wrote that the members of the delegation were 'impressed by the Cuban nationalization of North American companies'. He continued, 'The group returned to Peru with a completely different tone about what they had to do'.²⁸³ While it was still unclear if De la Puente was moving left or just using Cuban support as a means to an end, Castro, and Guevara, were influencing the APRA Rebelde membership.

On 29 October through 1 November 1961, APRA Rebelde held a conference in Chiclayo in northern Peru. Napuri led the proceedings because De la Puente was in jail for killing APRA member Luis Sarmiento during a confrontation in Trujillo on 11 March 1961. During the conference, they wrote the *Manifiesto de Chiclayo*. The forty-seven-page manifesto was critical in the development of the group because it codified its principles and distinctly separated it ideologically from APRA. It read, 'In consequence the core of the national revolution is imprinted with socialism in its guts'. The Peruvian APRA leaders eschewed socialism, therefore for APRA Rebelde to make it a central principle was a clear demarcation. The manifest continued, 'The achievement of this superior goal assumes that each country has specific characteristics, but it takes a general line that private domination of the methods of production is banished, that is to say, that the exploitation of man by man is liquidated'. To highlight this point the authors wrote, 'To re-affirm the necessity to restore the base Marxist theories one does it with the conviction - proven by history - that only a revolutionary theory can be the base of a revolutionary action'.²⁸⁴ As De la Puente was not

²⁸¹ CIA, 'Cuban Developments', in *Current Intelligence Weekly Summary*, 4 August 1960, CREST, FOIA electronic reading room, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00927A002800080001-5.pdf>, (accessed 11 April 2020).

²⁸² CIA report, 'Cuban Aggression and Subversive Activities in Latin America', 23 September 1960 in Donald Robinson (ed.) *The Dirty Wars: Guerrilla Actions and Other Forms of Unconventional Warfare* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1968), p. 165.

²⁸³ Malpica, *Biografía de la revolución*, p. 69. Spanish version: 'se quedó impresionada por las nacionalizaciones de compañías norteamericanas que se estaba realizando en Cuba'. 'El grupo retornó al Perú con una tónica completamente diferente a la que había ido'.

²⁸⁴ MIR, *Manifiesto de Chiclayo* (Lima: Ediciones Voz Rebelde, 1963), p. 25. Spanish version: 'En consecuencia las revoluciones nacionales llevan la impronta del socialismo en sus entrañas'. 'La consecución de esta meta superior asume en cada país características específicas, pero la línea general lleva necesariamente a modos de producción, es decir a la liquidación de la explotación del hombre por el hombre'. 'Al reafirmar la

present at the drafting of the manifesto, it remains unclear as to whether he would have restrained the leftward drift and extreme separation from APRA.

APRA Rebelde held its second national congress following the Chiclayo conference and formally approved the Manifesto of Chiclayo. They established a central committee and re-elected De la Puente as the Secretary-General. Ricardo Gadea explained that the transition to Marxism was not a simple matter among the members of APRA Rebelde. He wrote, 'As a result of this ideological struggle, some members were left on the margins because they only had minor divergences with APRA and opposed the inclusion of Marxism and ideas of insurrection'.²⁸⁵ In April 1962, Castro announced that the Cuban Revolution was based on socialism, and this had a direct impact on APRA Rebelde members. Elio Portocarrero recalled, 'When Fidel declared in Havana the Cuban Revolution was socialist, the groups around the Cuban Revolution also began to accelerate to this ideological point of view'.²⁸⁶ Ricardo Napuri stated, 'In April 1962, Cuba proclaimed itself socialist and that is how the local group viewed the island –Cuba almost decided that we had to be socialist–, this made the internal battle [within the MIR] very easy'.²⁸⁷ Despite these comments, some APRA Rebelde did not take the socialist point of view. This tension would continue until the group broke all ties with APRA.

On 12-13 March 1962, APRA Rebelde held its last meeting and changed its name to MIR. De la Puente was not present because he was still in jail. According to Hector Cordero, the name change was meaningful for two reasons. First, it symbolized a clean break from APRA. Second, it showed the ideological development from the APRA anti-imperialism stance towards socialism. They reviewed the MIR-Venezuela break from *Action Democrática* (Democratic Action, AD), a Venezuelan group similar to APRA. They considered many name combinations before settling with MIR. One option the group debated was *Partido Proletario* but discarded it because of the significant rural component of

necesidad de restaurar las bases teóricas marxistas lo hace con la convicción – probada por la historia – que solo una teoría revolucionaria puede ser la base de una acción revolucionaria'.

²⁸⁵ Ricardo Gadea, 'Dos Guerrillas Continentales: Luis De la Puente y el Movimiento Guerrillero', *OCLAE*, Havana, Vol. 3, No. 26/27, February / March 1969, pp. 15. Spanish version: 'Como resultado de esta lucha ideológica quedan que habían salido del APRA oficial solo por divergencias menores y que se oponían a toda definición marxista y a cualquier planteamiento insurreccional'.

²⁸⁶ Interview with Elio Portocarrero in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 249. Spanish version: 'Cuando Fidel declara que la Revolución Cubana va al socialismo en La Habana, los grupos que estamos adheridos a la Revolución Cubana también vamos a tener que acelerar el paso desde el punto de vista ideológico'.

²⁸⁷ Interview with Ricardo Napuri in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 249. Spanish version: 'En abril de 1962, Cuba se había proclamado socialista y como el grupo local miraba a la isla –Cuba casi ya había decretado que había de ser socialista–, entonces la batalla interna fue muy fácil'.

their revolutionary plans. Nor did it highlight their insistence on armed insurrection. Cordero recalled that the term movement in the name was due to ‘the influence that Fidel commenced and terminated the revolution with the name July 26 Movement and not with the name of the Party and that implicated the organic construction much better’.²⁸⁸ The decision to move towards socialism finally came to a head. As a result, up to 30% of APRA Rebelde, now MIR, members left the organization and returned to APRA, or maintained their political independence. However, the transition to MIR also attracted many new members. The MIR did not maintain personnel lists, and it is difficult to accurately determine the exact number of members or categorize them between militants or supporters. Following the shakeup, MIR members provided estimates that varied from 200 members to as high as 1000.²⁸⁹ The break from APRA and formalization of the MIR was a significant step towards the coming armed insurrection.

The MIR received training from China, Cuba, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Of these countries, Cuba provided political development and guerrilla warfare training to the largest number of personnel.²⁹⁰ In April through June 1962, seventy-two MIR personnel traveled to Havana. De la Puente was not among them because he was still in a Lima prison. As with the ELN, DGI assigned the MIR trainees to the National Liberation Department for administrative and logistical support, while the Department of Special Schools conducted the training courses. Most of the instructors were from the Cuban Army, but they were assisted by Russian, Czech, and Spanish advisors.²⁹¹ The theoretical training included conferences and classes on Marxism and Leninism, Cuban revolutionary theory and guerrilla strategy. The practical application focused on guerrilla tactics, weapons maintenance and firing, wilderness survival, communications, and integration with the local populace. In accordance with the guerrilla dogma, sometimes called the myth of the guerrilla, courses did not include how to develop urban groups to support the fighters in the rural areas. Throughout the summer of 1962 MIR personnel intermingled with ELN personnel in Havana and the rural training areas. A few switched groups, notably Guillermo Lobaton Milla who was a senior

²⁸⁸ Cristóbal, *Disciplina compañeros!* p. 227. Spanish version: ‘influyó el hecho que Fidel haya comenzado y terminado la revolución con el nombre de Movimiento 26 de Julio y no el nombre de Partido, que ya implica una constitución orgánica muchísimo mayor’.

²⁸⁹ CIA study, ‘A Survey of Communism in Latin America’, 3 December 1965, p. T-12; *Documentation of Communist Penetration in Latin America, Parts 1-3* (Washington, DC: United States Congress, 1965), p. 382; Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 253.

²⁹⁰ CIA study, ‘A Survey of Communism in Latin America’, 3 December 1965, p. T-12.

²⁹¹ CIA, ‘Selection and Training of Cuban Intelligence Agents Abroad’, p. 5; Ricardo Gadea. Telephone Interview. 9 April 2020; Latell, *Castro’s Secrets*, p. 93; Anderson, *Che Guevara*, p. 535.

ELN leader who would go on to lead the MIR front in the central Andes.²⁹² The ELN was the clear favorite of the Cuban leadership because of its communist ideology. While the MIR had certainly shifted its thinking to the left and adopted the Cuban model of revolution in general, there was still significant tension.

The main point of contention was that the MIR intended to build a social base and organize the population to support the revolution before commencing violent action. The Cubans insisted that the MIR went into action immediately and thought that the people would then begin to support the MIR's activities. This was *foco* theory in its most basic form, and the Cubans could not accept any deviation. The second point of contention concerned how to move back to Peru once the MIR personnel had completed their training in Cuba. The Cubans insisted that they move in a large group to Bolivia, they would then receive weapons and equipment from the *Partido Comunista Boliviano* (Bolivian Communist Party, PCB), and then cross the border into Peru as a column. The Cubans even directed, who would carry which weapons and specialized equipment. However, the MIR operatives thought it was best to travel in small groups of two or three, through various countries, and assemble in Peru after safely crossing the border. In the end, MIR personnel used this method, primarily because the ELN infiltration into Peru using the PCB mechanism in early 1963 was a catastrophe. These strategic and tactical disagreements exacerbated the situation, and the Cubans eventually marginalized the MIR. When the ELN departed for Peru in November 1962 to begin the revolution, the MIR stayed in Cuba. To end the stalemate, De la Puente, went to Havana in June 1963 to arrange the return of the MIR personnel.²⁹³ He was successful, and they returned to Peru over the summer.

The MIR members travelled in small groups using various conveyances through multiple countries including, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile. Gadea flew from Havana to Paris where he spent two months. While there MIR supporters, among them Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa, provided him food and protection. He then flew to Brazil, and from there to Lima, using fake documents the Cubans provided him.²⁹⁴ De la Puente, Tulio Galvez, and a few others travelled through Europe before flying to Ecuador. They visited Paris and Prague likely to meet with international supporters. Elio Portocarrero recalled, 'Entering through

²⁹² Anderson, *Che Guevara*, p. 678.

²⁹³ Ibid., p. 560.

²⁹⁴ Ricardo Gadea, Telephone Interview. 9 April 2020.

Ecuador was normal' because they had an extensive support mechanism there.²⁹⁵ The Ecuadorian authorities detained Tulio Galvez and two others when they landed in Guayaquil. After a period of questioning by the border control service about who was supporting them, they were set free. Their original plan was to fly directly to Lima from Guayaquil, but due to the security incident, they chose an alternate route. Galvez remembered that they moved from Guayaquil, 'to Cuenca, then to Loja and from Loja to a town called La Tina in Peru'.²⁹⁶ All of the others, with one significant exception, arrived in Peru without incident.

One MIR operative returning through Ecuador on 2 April 1963 chose a path that would have far-reaching negative repercussions for the revolution. A Peruvian who used the name Enrique Amaya Quintana walked into the US Consulate in Guayaquil and offered to work with the US government. CIA Case Officer Phillip Agee met him that day. Amaya claimed to be returning from a guerrilla warfare training course in Cuba, where he became disillusioned with the revolution. However, Agee suspected that 'he's lost his nerve now that he is almost on the battlefield'.²⁹⁷ They met twice more over the next few days before Amaya travelled on to Lima. Agee debriefed Amaya on the MIR organization, and the training in Cuba, and provided him with a method of contacting CIA agents based in Lima. He then turned the case over to the Lima Station. On 3 November 1963, Agee claims he met with the Deputy Chief of Station in Lima, who spoke positively about the amount and quality of information Amaya was providing about MIR.²⁹⁸ On multiple occasions, Amaya's information made it directly into the CIA daily reading material for President Johnson, known as the President's Intelligence Checklist.²⁹⁹ This shows that CIA analysts and senior leaders believed in the veracity and importance of the information. Following the insurgency, three MIR members vehemently defended Amaya arguing that he was not the CIA's source.³⁰⁰ Regardless, of whether it was someone else claiming to be Amaya, or Agee's faulty recollection, the CIA quite clearly had a well-placed source inside the MIR.

²⁹⁵ Interview with Elio Portocarrero in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 279. Spanish version: 'Entrar a través de Ecuador era normal'.

²⁹⁶ Interview with Tulio Galvez in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 280. Spanish version: 'Cuenca y hacia Loja y de Loja a una ciudad que se llama La Tina, en el Perú'.

²⁹⁷ Agee, *Inside the Company*, p. 268. Also, see Víctor Villanueva, 'Un Peruano Agente de la CIA', *Marka*, 1973.

²⁹⁸ Agee, *Inside the Company*, p. 313.

²⁹⁹ The President's Intelligence Checklist, 12 February 1964, p. 9, CIA, Freedom of Information Act Electronic (FOIA) Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov/search/site/DOC_0005996830 (accessed 16 November 2015); President's Intelligence Review, 11-14 February 1964, p. 7, CIA, FOIA Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov/search/site/DOC_0005996836 (accessed 16 November 2015).

³⁰⁰ Ricardo Gadea, 'Amaya: Agente de la CIA o revolucionario asesinado por la represión?', *Marka*, 1973; Eduardo González Viaña, 'Amaya o la expropiación del Heroísmo?', *Marka*, 1973; MIR communiqué written

China provided extensive support to the MIR, while North Korea and North Vietnam contributed limited political and military training. The MIR established relationships with these countries through the respective Embassies in Havana. While the tension between the MIR and the Cubans was a factor, this represents another pragmatic move by De la Puente to garner international support for his movement. Elio Portocarrero recalled, 'We did not start with the Cubans and then change to the Chinese like we were changing a shirt; that was not the process. We continued our relationship with the Cubans after establishing a relationship with the Chinese. We never broke political relations with the Cubans'.³⁰¹ In May 1962, Jorge and Olga Hammar travelled to China to facilitate the movement of MIR trainees to the country. The route to China, as well as North Korea and North Vietnam, included stops in Paris and Moscow. MIR facilitator Carlos Flores lived in Paris during this period and assisted MIR personnel during layovers on the long journeys. De la Puente travelled to China in November 1963. He met with Mao and discussed the merits of Maoist People's Protracted Warfare theory.³⁰² Some aspects of this theory were better suited for De la Puente's plans in Peru. They also discussed the similarities of the demography and social situation between pre-revolutionary China and 1960s Peru. One critical aspect of the interaction with the Chinese is that Mao did not pressure De la Puente to follow the Maoist doctrine. This was vastly different from the experience in Havana. Portocarrero recalled, 'Following this process of discussion, the Chinese government definitively decided to support the MIR'.³⁰³ However, De la Puente was not able to take full advantage of this support and parlay it into success.

There were similarities and differences between the training in China and Cuba. Around thirty to forty MIR personnel travelled to China for revolutionary warfare training. At the tactical level, guerrilla warfare techniques were similar, focusing on surprise attacks against enemy weak points. The Chinese trained them in weapons handling, marksmanship, and survival skills.³⁰⁴ At the strategic level, MIR trainees did not seem to grasp the Chinese theory beyond the guerrilla warfare phase, when later the guerrilla army grows in strength to

by Julio Montes, 'El MIR reivindica a Enrique Amata', 16 May 1975 published in *Marka*, 29 May 1975; Also see Ricardo Gadea, 'La desaparición de Enrique Amaya', *OCALE*, Vol. 3, No. 18, Havana, June 1968, p. 16.

³⁰¹ Interview with Elio Portocarrero in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 282.

³⁰² 'The Sino-Soviet Dispute Within the Communist Movement in Latin America', 15 June 1967, p. 134, CIA, FOIA Reading Room, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/esau-32.pdf> (accessed 7 October 2017).

³⁰³ Interview with Elio Portocarrero in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 286. Spanish version: 'Después de un proceso de discusión, el gobierno chino apoyo definitivamente al MIR'.

³⁰⁴ CIA report, 'Decision by the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario to begin preparations for revolution', 11 February 1964, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, folder 7; CIA report, 'Plans of the MIR for Revolutionary Action', 12 February 1964, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, folder 7.

a point it becomes a conventional army and marches to victory. They did, however, gain a nuanced understanding of the political indoctrination aspect of People's Protracted Warfare. Portocarrero explained the differences between the Chinese and Cuban methods, 'The Chinese planned a process of war that was very long'. He continued, 'the Chinese had a much more developed conception of how the military integrated with the masses. For example, the political party controlled the employment of the guerrilla ... the guerrilla force was an adjunct' to the revolution.³⁰⁵ This differentiated the Chinese method from the Cuban, which held that the party developed out of the guerrilla leadership.³⁰⁶ Despite this training, the MIR was not able to integrate it into their armed struggle in Peru. Arturo Aranda stated that of those who trained in China, only eight participated in the insurgency. The guerrilla training served as a wakeup call for many of the young revolutionaries, and although a few were detained while returning to Peru, many chose not to go to the mountains with their comrades. The group that went to North Vietnam received political training. Twenty-three MIR personnel went to North Korea and undertook political and tactical training. They also received weapons that they smuggled back to Peru.³⁰⁷ However, like their contemporaries that went to China and Vietnam, very few fought with De la Puente in 1965.

The MIR also received ideological and material support from many countries in Latin America and Europe. In addition to the countries mentioned above where they trained, MIR operatives established support cells in Czechoslovakia, France, Spain, Switzerland, Italy, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. The structure of the cells differed depending on the country and varied in size from a single person to a team of five. The purpose of the cells was to coordinate with the Leftist groups in the respective countries for financial and ideological support. The cell members facilitate the travel of MIR members as they passed through Latin America and Europe to and from the countries providing training courses. This support included providing safe houses to stay in, money, clothing, and forged travel documents. The cells maintained relationships with journalists so that De la Puente and other leaders could transmit communiqués and garner supportive press accounts. Paul Escobar and Teresa Pardo led the largest and most connected cell in Paris. They oversaw MIR's international relations in Europe. Pardo recalled, 'The roll undertaken by our base was the

³⁰⁵ Interview with Elio Portocarrero in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 283. Spanish version: 'Los chinos planteaban el proceso de una guerra muy larga'. 'los chinos tenían mucho más desarrollada la concepción militar dentro del trabajo de masas, por ejemplo, y el rol que el partido político debe jugar en el desarrollo de la lucha guerrillera ... la guerrilla como complemento'.

³⁰⁶ Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution*, p. 67

³⁰⁷ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 285.

centralization, coordination, and facilitation of information’.³⁰⁸ On 22 June 1965, just after the beginning of guerrilla operations, the cell facilitated a press release written by a group of backers most notably Hugo Neira and Mario Vargas Llosa that explained the MIR insurrection and aimed to gain the support of the international community.³⁰⁹ In September, they published another article in *Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme* that read that Peru ‘will become one of the essential foundations of the Latin America Revolution and will stimulate the struggle in Bolivia and Brazil’.³¹⁰ It also condemned the repression of the Peruvian government and its detainment of the wives of guerrilla leaders. MIR’s most extensive base in Latin America was in Ecuador, where they received assistance from the *Union Revolucionaria de Juventudes del Ecuador* (Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorian Youth, URJE).³¹¹ When not working in China, Jorge and Olga Hammar provided support in their home country of Argentina. Buenos Aires was a frequent stop to and from Europe. Hammar remembered the logistical support they provided ‘we received them, dressed them, and prepared them [to travel to] Paris so they would not attract attention’.³¹² These support cells located throughout the world were critical in facilitating MIR training and preparation for the revolution. Like Bejar’s ELN, De la Puente’s group benefited from international support.

In 1963, following his travels, De la Puente spent some time writing to formalize the political and ideological aspects of the MIR. *Monthly Review* published these writings in English and Spanish in an article titled ‘The Peruvian Revolution: Concepts and Perspectives’.³¹³ The article distilled many of the debates, previous writings, and speeches of De la Puente, and other MIR members, into a single document sixteen pages in length. Rodolfo Arrigoriaga completed the translation from Spanish to English. De la Puente began with an analysis of the geography and topography of Peru and explained how this exacerbated the social-economic situation. He described the miserable conditions of the poor, including the Andean Indians and those living in squalor in the urban slums. Concerning control of land, he wrote:

³⁰⁸ Interview with Teresa Pardo in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 287. Spanish version: ‘EL rol de nuestra base abarcaba la centralización, coordinación y facilitación de informacion’.

³⁰⁹ Rogger Mercado, *Las Guerrillas Del Perú. El MIR: De la predica ideológica a la acción armada* (Lima: Fondo de Cultura Popular, 1967), p. 171.

³¹⁰ Paris journal, *Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme*, September 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 21 October 1965, p. 14, NARA, RG 263, Records of the CIA, multiple boxes.

³¹¹ CIA memorandum, ‘Cuban Subversive Activities in Ecuador’, 22 June 1961, p. 6.

³¹² Interview with Olga Hammar in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 288. Spanish version: ‘los recibía, los vestía y los preparaba en Paris para que no atraigan la atención’.

³¹³ Luis De la Puente and Rodolfo Arrigoriaga, ‘The Peruvian Revolution: Concepts and Perspectives’, *Monthly Review*, Vol. 17, No. 6, November 1965, pp. 12-28.

*'The concentration of land ownership, according to official statistics, is as follows: in the coastal area 10 percent of the owners control 89 percent of the agricultural land; in the Sierra, three per cent of the land owners own 83 percent of the land, and in the Selva another three percent owns 93 percent of the areas allocated to colonization grants'.*³¹⁴

Astiz and Werlich provide similar statistics that confirm the article's data.³¹⁵ While De la Puente did acknowledge the efforts of the Peruvian government to redistribute the lands, he considered them too little, too late, and hypocritical. Hypocritical because the lands belonged to the Indians in the first place and had been stolen from them by the landholders. However, he did not seem to consider what impact this may have had on the revolutionary potential of the population. Perhaps he should have because the land reform efforts are one of the orthodox explanations for the insurgency's failure. De la Puente explained that foreign corporations were extracting Peru's natural resources, but that this did not benefit the population. He stated that wages in the coastal areas and the mines were between 20 and 40 Soles a day (equal to US\$0.80 and \$1.60 in 1965), and as low as one Sole per day in the Andes. He wrote, 'Our poverty is so extreme that in certain regions peasant families give away or sell their children in order to save them from starvation'.³¹⁶ He stated that Peru had one of the worst nutritional indexes in the world at 1920 calories per day and one of the highest rates of infantile death. He quoted a 62 percent illiteracy rate and a lack of access to primary and advanced education.³¹⁷ The low literacy rate exacerbated the issue because Article 86 of the 1933 Constitution reads that literacy is a voting requirement.³¹⁸ This resulted in the fact that the government excluded the poorest sector of society from the electoral process.

De la Puente argued that the bourgeoisie and the landowners controlled the political parties, the masses in the coastal areas, and to some extent, in the rest of the country. He explained that the fractured Communist Party was useless as a vehicle for change in Peru and that the Oligarchy was in firm control. He wrote, 'The executive represents certain sectors of the national bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie; while the latifundists, big bourgeoisie, and servants of imperialism are fundamentally represented by parliament'.³¹⁹ This statement is not accurate because anti-imperialist APRA controlled the parliament and exerted substantial

³¹⁴ De la Puente and Arrigorriaga, 'The Peruvian Revolution', p. 16.

³¹⁵ Astiz, *Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics*, p. 9; Werlich, *Peru: A Short History*, p. 17.

³¹⁶ De la Puente and Arrigorriaga, 'The Peruvian Revolution', p. 16.

³¹⁷ Ibid., p. 16; Also, see Werlich, *Peru: A Short History*, p. 21.

³¹⁸ Astiz, *Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics*, p. 50.

³¹⁹ De la Puente and Arrigorriaga, 'The Peruvian Revolution', p. 17.

power over the Belaunde administration.³²⁰ He wrote of the extreme pessimism of the Peruvian people, 'The phrase "No one can save Peru" expresses a general conviction'.³²¹ Following Kennedy's death, MIR leaders perceived a change in US foreign policy towards Latin America and Peru:

*'we have seen Kennedyism buried together with its creator, and American policy is more and more evidently dictated from the Pentagon, that is, toward more irreconcilable positions regarding the defense of their interests and our country's submission, and toward an indiscriminate selection of puppets, accepting or fostering whatever military coups may suit the self-interest of the United States'.*³²²

He went on to cite the US intervention in the Dominican Republic as evidence of this shift in policy. De la Puente acknowledged that the conditions were not ripe in Peru (See point 1 below.) and argued that the Communist Party was using this as an excuse to delay the revolution. Marxist theory holds that certain conditions must be in place before a revolution can begin. Nevertheless, Guevara insists, 'It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them'.³²³ In a move towards the Cuban *foco* theory, he wrote, 'Fortunately for Peru, these theories [Marxist-Leninist] are now being discarded and displaced by the idea that insurrection and armed struggle must be the order of the day'. He continued, 'and that the exploited masses should immediately pose for themselves the task of seizing power'.³²⁴ After the buildup of doom and gloom, in the final section of the paper, he explained how the MIR would approach the revolution.

They took the best of the theoretical and practical training they had acquired over the past few years and developed this insurrectional scheme:

- (1) *'The objective and subjective conditions are present, and the latter, even if they are not fully ripe, will mature in the process of the struggle*
- (2) *The exploited masses must immediately propose the seizure of power through armed struggle*
- (3) *The strategy and tactics must in the first stage be those of guerrilla war, and later those of maneuver, or even positional warfare*
- (4) *Given our conditions as mainly a peasant country and our geographical features, insurrection must start in the Sierra or in the eastern Andean escarpments*
- (5) *Given the size of our country and its lack of geographical integration and transportation systems, its multiplicity of languages, races, and culture, it is advisable to organize several guerrilla centers to initiate and develop the struggle*
- (6) *The impact of guerrilla actions will serve to build and develop the party and to start mobilizing the masses, stimulating their consciousness, and incorporating them in the struggle, both in the countryside and in the city*

³²⁰ *New York Times*, 12 September 1965, p. 32.

³²¹ De la Puente and Arrigorriaga, 'The Peruvian Revolution', p. 18.

³²² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

³²³ Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 50.

³²⁴ De la Puente and Arrigorriaga, 'The Peruvian Revolution', p. 21.

- (7) *Due to our conditions as an underdeveloped country suffering from the combined oppression of latifundists, big bourgeoisie, and imperialists, it is essential to ignite the exploited sectors: peasants, workers, petty bourgeoisie, within a united front led by the worker-peasant alliance represented by the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party*
- (8) *The Peruvian revolution is part of the continental and world process, which demands progressive forms of integration in every aspect and stage, in order to defeat the oligarchic and imperialist forces which are working together all over the continent*³²⁵

These eight points clearly show a mixture of influence from the Cuban and Chinese revolutionary theories. The MIR leadership devoted an impressive amount of intellectual effort into developing their strategy. They then explained how, at a practical level, they would go about their work of developing the insurrection.

The Editors of *Monthly Review* wrote an introduction to the article and took exception concerning one point of De la Puente's analysis. The issue concerned his use of the terms feudal and semi-feudal. The Editors argued that these terms did not accurately reflect the social-economic structure in Peru. They wrote, 'Their situation and mode of behavior, in other words, is typically capitalist, and it can only lead to confusion to introduce the concept of feudalism in analyzing their class position and historical role'.³²⁶ This criticism aside, the Editors were supportive of the MIR's plans, and appeared excited about the possibility of success.

The MIR considered the urban areas of the country critical to its revolution. They cited the slums that surrounded the cities as a potential recruiting ground for revolutionaries due to the high level of unemployment and repression by the police. They seemed hopeful that the working class, although it 'is still controlled by the bourgeoisie parties, through its consciousness is reaching higher levels everyday', and will eventually be ready to use violence. They noted that Leftists controlled twelve of Peru's sixteen national universities, and 'both university and high-school students continuously foment mass action in the cities'.³²⁷ However, outside of Trujillo, the MIR did not have the capacity or influence to organize the urban masses. APRA controlled the worker's parties and unions, while the Communist Party controlled the universities and student organizations. Moreover, APRA and the Communist Party were loath to allow the MIR to make inroads into their respective strongholds. Aside from a few support cells that operated in Lima, the MIR never gained widespread urban support for the revolution.

³²⁵ De la Puente and Arrigorriaga, 'The Peruvian Revolution', p. 25.

³²⁶ Editors introduction to 'The Peruvian Revolution', *Monthly Review*, Vol. 17, No. 6, November 1965, p. 12.

³²⁷ De la Puente and Arrigorriaga, 'The Peruvian Revolution', p. 22.

Similar to the urban strategy, the MIR leadership underwrote its rural plan with hope and optimism. MIR aimed to establish three guerrilla *focos* in the Sierra. One in the north, a second in the central, and the third in the south. In these areas, the MIR cadres would establish security zones and begin to integrate with the local populations. They intended to begin with secret propaganda and then employ overt armed propaganda. The locals would be ‘impressed by the presence of armed groups in the mountains and by our intense ideological work, begin to drop their skepticism, their dread and the deceit which formerly braked their profound eagerness to struggle’. This would motivate the Campesinos to invade and take over the large estates and then form militias to protect the land they had recovered. They noted that eighty percent of the Peruvian security forces are Campesino conscripts ‘a fact which renders them quite unsafe for the repression of a social agrarian movement centered in the Sierra’.³²⁸ Further, the article explained that the insurrectional process would unite the disparate Peruvian Left. Leaders will emerge, and the Party will build itself during the revolution. The final paragraph was a call to arms and promised that through sacrifice, the MIR would be the vanguard of the Peruvian revolution. De la Puente’s group did set up the three *focos*, integrate with the population, conduct propaganda, and gained support from the population. However, popular support was not enough to make the revolution successful. In chapter four, I will show that neither the idea that the soldiers with a Campesino background would not fight nor the aspiration of uniting the Peruvian Left came to fruition.

Accordingly, there was only one path forward, and it was through armed insurrection. This aspect had developed since the time they established APRA Rebelde. Hector Cordero recalled that during the final APRA Rebelde conference, they discussed the subject of elections, ‘There were two positions: to participate or not to participate’.³²⁹ When the group transitioned to the MIR, they discarded any potential for using non-violent means of resistance, such as voting. In the end, they decided to take up arms. The 1962 military *coup d’état* was an essential factor in this decision. Haya would have most likely won the election, but the military stepped in and prevented APRA from gaining the presidency. This convinced most MIR members that the election process would not allow them to change the system in Peru. They understood that political power in Peru allowed the elite to control economic power, which the military protected. Therefore, the Oligarchy must be destroyed and replaced by a new system that was fair to the poor and disenfranchised. To explain why

³²⁸ De la Puente and Arrigoriaga, ‘The Peruvian Revolution’, p. 26.

³²⁹ Cristóbal, *Disciplina compañeros!*, p. 79. Spanish version: ‘Habían dos posiciones: la de participar y la de no participar’.

the people had been participating in elections, the MIR offered this explanation, ‘If the people participate - in the elections – it is not because they believe in them. The people participate because, until now, there has not been another way’.³³⁰ The MIR offered the people another method, and it would begin with guerrilla warfare in the Andes.

Between 1959 and 1963, APRA members who were distrustful of the *convivencia* and wanted to act broke away from APRA and formed the CDO, APRA Rebelde, and finally, the MIR. De la Puente emerged as the clear leader of the organization. While he was a member of APRA, he was a staunch anti-communist and supported APRA’s anti-imperialist platform. He was also a practicing Catholic, which would have been at odds with communism. Absent from the historiography is the question of whether De la Puente’s position drifted towards communism in the early 1960s. While there is some evidence that he did, I maintain that De la Puente made practical decisions to appease the communists to garner support for the MIR’s revolutionary activities. His pragmatism gained significant support from China and Cuba, limited support from North Vietnam, North Korea, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentinian, and Chile, as well as social groups in Western Europe. This support would prove to be crucial, but not sufficient, as they transitioned to guerrilla warfare.

Conclusion

This chapter looked at Cuba’s foreign policy during the early 1960s, and the intelligence service it developed to support its aim of spreading the revolution in Latin America. Cuba was Bejar’s ELN primary benefactor. Although, a trend emerges that individual communists of various Latin American Communist Parties, against direction from Moscow, assisted ELN members as they set up their organization. This trend begins to show the individual agency that party members exercised despite the control the Soviets attempted to exert in Latin America. Cuba provided less support to the MIR, but De la Puente was able to build an extensive international network of support cells to provide logistical and ideological backing. De la Puente demonstrated pragmatism in his effort to secure support from the Cubans. While he remained a nationalist and anti-imperialist, he did, on the surface at least, drift towards Cuban socialism and revolutionary theory to gain support. As this dissertation will show in chapter five, once they were back in Peru, MIR leaders decided the tactics they would employ in the mountains. By 1963, both organizations had developed their

³³⁰ MIR comunique, ‘Nuestra posición frente a la revolución peruana’, 1 March 1964, p. 2. Spanish version: ‘Si el pueblo participa - y en alta proporción- en las elecciones, no es porque el pueblo crea en ellas. El pueblo participa porque hasta ahora no se le ha abierto otro camino’.

revolutionary strategies. With the support of the Guevara and the DGI, the ELN would attempt to infiltrate back into Peru to aid Hugo Blanco, who had organized a peasant uprising near Cusco. I will examine these events in chapters three and four.

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Chapter three: Development of Peru's counterinsurgency capability

Truman and Eisenhower built a foundation of military assistance in Latin America that allowed Kennedy to proliferate counterinsurgency methods. The first section of this chapter will examine the Kennedy administration's efforts in the development of Peru's internal security capability. I will then turn to Hugo Blanco's Campesino mobilization in the valleys north of Cusco, which was the first serious attempt at guerrilla warfare in Peru during the 1960s and provided the Peruvian security forces their first opportunity at conducting counterinsurgency. The final section of the chapter will look at the Johnson administration's commitment to continuing the Alliance for Progress in the honour of Kennedy, and how, when development failed, they resorted to supporting counterinsurgency. The reader should not consider this chapter to be wholly about American foreign policy, although that is an aspect of it, as the title suggests, the main focus is on the development of Peru's counterinsurgency capability, of which the US played an important role.

Kennedy administration

John F. Kennedy was inaugurated on 20 January 1961 and immediately made it clear that Latin America would be a top concern for his Administration. Kennedy specifically emphasized Latin America as a priority in his inaugural address.³³¹ Former presidential advisor Arthur Schlesinger Jr. traces Kennedy's interest in this topic to a tour of South America in the 1940s and notes a speech he gave in 1958 in Puerto Rico calling for the US to place a higher priority on Latin America.³³² Stephen Rabe has emphasized Kennedy's concern that 'Latin America was the most dangerous place in the world'. He also asserts this corresponded with the theme that if the US could not confront communist expansion in the Americas, it would not be able to do so in other areas of the world. Rabe wrote, 'Fighting and winning the Cold War in Latin America was Kennedy's paramount concern'.³³³ Unlike the rhetoric of many other U.S presidents, Kennedy's actions demonstrated he was genuinely passionate about Latin America. He initiated and strongly advocated for the Alliance for Progress, which was an ambitious development program that I will discuss in more detail below.³³⁴ He hosted more Latin American leaders in the White House than any other

³³¹ Inaugural address, 20 January 1961, JFK Presidential Library and Museum (JFKL), Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Speech Files.

³³² Arthur Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (New York: Fawcett Crest Book, 1965), p. 173.

³³³ Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, p. 19.

³³⁴ Remarks on Secretary Dillon's return from Punta del Este conference, 19 August 1961, JFKL, Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Speech Files.

previous president. Moreover, he travelled to Latin America multiple times, including visits to Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela.³³⁵ Many Latin Americans still remember him with affection, partly because of his charisma, but also because of his hard work on their behalf.³³⁶ A US Army officer working in Chile when Lee Harvey Oswald assassinated Kennedy recalled, that ‘the entire city of Santiago mourned’.³³⁷ Moreover, senior government officials concerned with Latin America had unfettered access to the president.³³⁸ Throughout his time in office, he continually focused on development and anti-communism in Latin America. This evidence clearly shows Kennedy’s high level of interest in America’s backyard.

To convert his ideas to policy, Kennedy brought in the so-called ‘best and brightest’ from academia and industry. Most US presidents have done the same thing, but historians have given special attention to Kennedy for doing it. Walt Rostow was at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as a Professor of Economic History when Kennedy called him to serve as the chairman of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council. In June 1961, he gave an influential speech to a group of US Army and international officers who were studying counterinsurgency at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He referenced Khrushchev’s wars of national liberation speech and the communist strategy of revolutionary change and how the US could leverage modernization theory, which I will explain below, to thwart the guerrilla menace in the developing world. He stated, ‘From our perspective in Washington, you take your place side by side with those who are committed to help fashion independent, modern societies out of the revolutionary process now going forward’.³³⁹ The Peruvian Army translated this speech and published it in its professional journal *Revista Militar del Peru*.³⁴⁰ Kennedy appointed Roger Hilsman as director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which supported diplomats with intelligence analysis. He was a

³³⁵ Rabe, *The Killing Zone*, p. 90.

³³⁶ Joseph Tulchin, ‘The Promise of Progress: U.S. Relations with Latin America During the Administration of Lyndon B. Johnson’, in Cohen and Bernkopf Tucker (eds.), *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World*, p. 211; Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, p. 2.

³³⁷ Charles Fry. Personal Interview. 11 March 2020.

³³⁸ Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, p. 17.

³³⁹ Walt Rostow, ‘Countering Guerrilla Attack’, *Army Magazine*, September 1961, reprinted in Franklin Mark Osanka (ed.) *Modern Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 464; Also, see Walt Rostow, ‘The Grand Area of Revolutionary Change’, in Donald Robinson (ed.) *The Dirty Wars: Guerrilla Actions and Other Forms of Unconventional Warfare* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1968), p. 332; Douglas Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 58; *Wall Street Journal*, 18 February 1964, p. 10.

³⁴⁰ Walt Rostow, ‘Oposición a un Ataque de Guerrilla’, *Revista Militar del Peru*, Lima, No. 671, July-August 1962, p. 85, CEHMP, military journal collection.

graduate of the United States Military Academy and fought against the Japanese as a guerrilla in Burma during World War II. Hilsman was also on the speech circuit, and on 10 August 1961 gave a speech called 'Internal War – The New Communist Tactic' at the Institute of World Affairs in San Diego, California. He explained the new developments in Soviet strategy and explained how the US must work with friendly governments to defeat the communists. He explained modernization theory but countered that in the short-term, the US must rely on counter guerrilla warfare tactics to allow time for development to take hold. Hilsman concluded with the warning, 'The Communists are already committed everywhere, and unless we approach the problem in a systematic way, with considerable thought, we will simply be paving the way for Mr. Khrushchev in his new and potent tactic – internal war.'³⁴¹ The Peruvian Army also translated and published this speech in *Revista Militar*.³⁴² Kennedy relied on Rostow, Hilsman, and Robert Kennedy, among others, to institute change among the interagency and prepare the US to defeat communist insurgents throughout the world.

The Alliance for Progress underpinned Kennedy's foreign policy towards Latin America. He announced the Alliance with much fanfare on a 13 March 1961 in a speech at the White House followed by a reception for 250 people, including many of the Latin American diplomats who were in Washington.³⁴³ Some compared it to the Marshall Plan, which was an unfair analogy because of the significant differences between Latin America and Europe. The Alliance was based on economic and social development and had overly optimistic goals for what the designers called the decade for progress that was to take place during the 1960s. Herbert May, a former US government official, asserted, 'President Kennedy's proposal for the Alliance for Progress electrified the continent'. Moreover, he added, 'it was taken as evidence of a sharp revision of US policy and as the augury of a great improvement in inter-American relations'.³⁴⁴ The Organization of American States (OAS) convened a conference in August 1961 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, to design the framework of the Alliance and layout its goals. Schlesinger wrote in his memoir, 'The Charter of Punta del Este was a summons to a democratic revolution – nor was revolution a word feared by the architects of

³⁴¹ Roger Hilsman, 'Internal War – The New Communist Tactic', in Robinson, *The Dirty Wars*, p. 352.

³⁴² Roger Hilsman, 'La Guerra Interna', *Revista Militar del Peru*, Lima, No. 671, July-August 1962, p. 63, CEHMP, military journal collection.

³⁴³ Address at White House reception for members of Congress and Latin American republics' diplomatic corps, 13 March 1961, JFKL, Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Speech Files; Walter, *Peru and The United States*, p. 12; Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, p. 9.

³⁴⁴ Herbert May, *Problems and Prospects of the Alliance for Progress: A Critical Examination* (New York: Fredrick Praeger Publishers, 1968), p. 31.

the Alliance, even though it continued to dismay the Department of State'.³⁴⁵ In addition to most of the heads of State, Che Guevara attended and petitioned the OAS to include Cuba in the Alliance, which they rebuffed. The US government representatives committed \$20 billion to the program, and Latin American countries were to match this four-to-one.³⁴⁶ These loans and grants were to be used to develop industry, agriculture, education, and health programs, as well as infrastructure, with the aim of improving the lives of the impoverished. The Alliance for Progress incorporated modernization theory, which was then popular with US social scientists, some of whom were close advisors to Kennedy, as its theoretical basis.³⁴⁷ The theory grew out of sociology, political science, and developmental economics. Michael Latham explains, 'As modernization grew in popularity as an intellectual model, its authors also rode a powerful wave generated by heightened expectations of what science could provide in service to American society'. He continued, 'By the time modernization theorists made specific policy recommendations to Kennedy planners, they had found positions in a strong network between professional scholarship and government patronage'.³⁴⁸ The theory held, in parsimonious form, that economic development could advance traditional societies to modern societies. In turn, these new modern societies would be democratic and capitalist. One unintended, yet beneficial, aspect of the theory was the grassroots efforts. In 1963, Peruvian President Belaunde encouraged this move forward. Teodoro Moscoso, Kennedy's coordinator for the Alliance, returned from a trip to South America and reported that Belaunde 'is spreading the gospel of "minga", an old Inca word meaning community spirit. In the Alliance tradition of self-help, the president urges villagers to move ahead on local projects without waiting for outside help'.³⁴⁹ In Peru, the theory was not effective. Firstly, the economic development that did occur mostly benefited the wealthy. Secondly, at the beginning of the decade of development, Peru was a democracy. In the end, Peru was a military-controlled autocracy.

Despite the initial euphoria, the Alliance for Progress was not the hemisphere-changing program as Kennedy and many Latin Americans had hoped. As Andrew Preston has noted,

³⁴⁵ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 655.

³⁴⁶ Brands, *Latin America's Cold War*, p. 46.

³⁴⁷ Latham, *Modernization as Ideology*, p. 6; Andrew Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), p. 510; Amanda Kay McVety, 'JFK and Modernization Theory', in Andrew Hoberek (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to John F. Kennedy*, p. 105; Brands, *Latin America's Cold War*, p. 46.

³⁴⁸ Latham, *Modernization as Ideology*, p. 46.

³⁴⁹ *The Miami Herald*, 'The Incas Had A Word For It', 12 September 1963, LBJL, Papers of John Wesley Jones, Box 8, folder 3.

Kennedy's 'vision remained trapped between the imperatives of security and the ambitions of idealism'.³⁵⁰ Schlesinger explained in his 1975 retrospective of the Alliance that the primary objectives were 'economic growth, structural change, and political democratization'.³⁵¹ He wrote that they understood there would be contradictions between these three goals in the short-term. As the Alliance developed, the competing goals did collide. The instability caused by the social evolution aspects precluded investment from the private sector that would drive economic growth, which was a primary measurement of effectiveness for the plan. The Alliance did have limited success, such as Johnson explained to Congress in 1967, 'Per capita growth rates for Latin America show that more countries have broken the economic stagnation of earlier years'.³⁵² However, it failed to meet the goals that the organizers set forth in Punta del Este.³⁵³ Observers have attributed multiple factors to the failed policy, including Kennedy's assassination, the US government's bureaucratic malaise, corruption and incompetence in the execution, and the population explosion in Latin America during the 1960s. Perhaps the most significant factor was that the Alliance could only meet its goals if the Latin American elites and bureaucrats embraced it, but they did not.³⁵⁴ The irony that the Alliance that was designed for Latin Americans, and needed to be led by Latin Americans, but was launched from the White House is not lost on historians.³⁵⁵ However, the Alliance for Progress was only one aspect of Kennedy's policy to prevent another Cuba.

The Kennedy administration also used covert paramilitary and intelligence operations and provided overt military and police assistance to internal security forces, to help achieve its policy aims. In January 1961, Soviet Premier Khrushchev gave a speech titled 'Wars of National Liberation' that disclosed the use of subversion to gain influence in the developing world.³⁵⁶ Christopher Andrew shows that Kennedy believed the Russians 'had become experts in subversive warfare'. He continued, 'The United States must therefore beat them at

³⁵⁰ Andrew Preston, 'Kennedy, The Cold War, and the National Security State', in Hoberek (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to John F. Kennedy*, p. 90; Also see Tulchin, 'The Promise of Progress', p. 213.

³⁵¹ Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 'The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective', in Ronald Hellman and Jon Rosenbaum (eds.) *Latin America: The Search for a New International Role* (New York: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 68.

³⁵² Lyndon Johnson, 'Special Message to the Congress on the Latin American Summit Meeting', 13 March 1967, LBJL, The President's Appointment file (Diary Backup), Box 57, folder 5; Also, see Lyndon Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 349.

³⁵³ Jeffery Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America* (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 196; Schlesinger, 'The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective', p. 68.

³⁵⁴ May, *Problems and Prospects of the Alliance for Progress*, p. 50.

³⁵⁵ Schlesinger, 'The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective', p. 69.

³⁵⁶ Brands, *Latin America's Cold War*, p. 47.

their own game'.³⁵⁷ On 20 January 1961, during his inauguration address, Kennedy emphasized the US commitment against hostile threats to the change in Latin America. He stated, 'But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all of our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion in the Americas. And let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house'.³⁵⁸ Kennedy's first significant attempt to check Soviet influence in America's backyard was the ill-fated Operation ZAPATA in Cuba, which is better known as the Bay of Pigs invasion. This fiasco was a major setback for the young President but did not deter the use of covert operations during the remainder of his time in office. As Ted Gup shows, 'the Bay of Pigs had not put a damper on covert operations. Far from it. Between 1960 and 1965, the CIA expanded its operations in the Western Hemisphere Division by forty percent, reflecting a perceived increase in Soviet activity in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and elsewhere'.³⁵⁹ One effect it did have was that he tightened his circle of trusted advisors in matters of national security. He came to rely on his younger brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, to manage certain aspects of foreign policy.³⁶⁰ In addition to covert operations, the administration employed counterinsurgency and civic action to thwart communist subversion.

Counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare enthralled Kennedy, a fact that is apparent in his speeches and conversations. As early as 1958, Kennedy told the US Senate the most likely threat would be 'limited brushfire wars, indirect non-overt aggression, intimidation and subversion, internal revolution'.³⁶¹ Moreover, Andrew asserted, 'He read the works of Mao Zedong and Che Guevara, amusing his wife, Jackie, during weekends at their Virginia retreat at Glen Ora'.³⁶² Political scientist Michael McClintock argued, 'the counterinsurgency dimension of political warfare, became a principal public plank of Kennedy's foreign policy'.³⁶³ On 21 July 1961, the New China News Agency (NCNA) in Beijing translated an

³⁵⁷ Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), p. 258.

³⁵⁸ Inaugural address, 20 January 1961, JFKL, Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Speech Files.

³⁵⁹ Ted Gup, *The Book of Honor: Covert Lives and Classified Deaths at the CIA* (New York: Random House, 2000), p. 140.

³⁶⁰ Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, p. 16.

³⁶¹ Papers of John F. Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers. Senate Files. Series 12. Speeches and the Press. Box 901, Folder: 'U.S. Military Power, Senate floor, 14 August 1958'.; Also, see Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, p. 258; Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, Counter-Terrorism, 1940-1990* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), p. 162.

³⁶² Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, p. 258.

³⁶³ McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, p. 161.

article from the US weekly *National Guardian* that outlined the expansion of counterinsurgency, guerrilla warfare, and unconventional warfare including the ‘150-percent increase’ within the 43-billion-dollar defence budget for these programs. This shows that the Chinese were closely watching the Kennedy Administration’s policy shift.³⁶⁴ On 12 October 1961, Kennedy visited Fort Bragg, and met with Brigadier General William Yarborough, commander of the US Army Special Forces, an element that specialized in unconventional warfare. The two developed a close relationship.³⁶⁵ On 6 June 1962, Kennedy gave the commencement speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. He contrasted guerrilla warfare with massive nuclear retaliation: ‘This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin - war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him’. The US warfare experience was most recently WW1, WWII, and Korea, which were conflicts between states engaged in conventional military warfare. So, guerrilla warfare did represent a new arena at the time. To win at this type of warfare, he called for a ‘new and wholly different kind of military training’.³⁶⁶ Kennedy’s interest in guerrilla warfare was not limited to rhetoric or theory. It was the primary driver of policy.

The National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) was an essential tool for directing policy from the White House. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, there were 372 NSAMs signed by the presidents or their respective National Security Advisors. Forty-six of the NSAMs during Kennedy’s time in office were directly related to guerrilla warfare or Latin America.³⁶⁷ McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy’s Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, signed NSAM 2 just thirteen days after the inauguration, which demonstrated the importance of counterinsurgency. Titled ‘Development of Counter-guerrilla Forces’, it directed the Secretary of Defense and other departments and agency

³⁶⁴ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, ‘U.S. Guerrilla Warfare Plans’, 17 July 1961, CREST, FOIA electronic reading room, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000700470020-5.pdf>, (accessed 11 April 2020).

³⁶⁵ President John F. Kennedy Visits Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 12 October 1961, JFKL, White House Photographs, Image ST-A5-8-61; Eliot Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies* (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, 1978), p. 40; McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, p. 180; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 310; Preston, ‘Kennedy, The Cold War, and the National Security State’, p. 97.

³⁶⁶ Address at US Military Academy, West Point, New York, 6 June 1962, JFKL, Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Speech Files.

³⁶⁷ Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. National Security Files (NSF). Meetings and Memoranda. National Security Action Memoranda; LBJL, NSF, National Security Action Memorandums.

heads to place ‘more emphasis on the development of counter-guerrilla forces’.³⁶⁸ Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara provided an interim response to Bundy on 23 February 1961 and explained the addition of 3,000 Army Special Forces personnel and a budget increase of \$19 million to expand the existing counter-guerrilla capability. Counter-guerrilla operations are a sub-component of counterinsurgency. (Refer to table three in the introduction) He also explained that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were preparing a study to ‘be used as the basis for the development of a joint State-Defense-CIA action program in this field’.³⁶⁹ Additionally, numerous NSAMs were concerned with the development of Latin American internal security forces to counter the communist threat. The National Security Council’s emphasis on this issue shows its importance and that policymakers wanted the US to be ready to conduct counterinsurgency warfare when required.

Despite the responses to NSAM 2, Kennedy was not satisfied with the speed that the government reacted to his guidance. As a result, he established the Special Group – Counterinsurgency (SG-CI) with NSAM 124 on 18 January 1962, to expedite action.³⁷⁰ A series of four additional NSAMs including, NSAM 165 (16 June 1962), NSAM 180 (13 August 1962), NSAM 184 (04 September 1962), and NSAM 204 (07 November 1962), directed modifications to NSAM 124. The purpose of the SG-CI was to ‘assure the unity of effort and the use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries’.³⁷¹ The group consisted of principal deputies to the members of the National Security Council. General Maxwell Taylor, the military representative to the President, chaired the group. The addition of the Attorney General gave Kennedy a close confidant inside the group, which is significant considering the fallout from the Bay of Pigs.³⁷² Robert Kennedy surpassed his brother’s zeal for the dark arts and took the nickname ‘Mr. Counterinsurgency’ within the beltway.³⁷³ In response to NSAM 131 (13 March 1962), he took an unusual step for an Attorney General and directed the national security apparatus to establish a counterinsurgency course. As a result, in 1962, a joint committee formed the

³⁶⁸ NSAM 2, Development of Counter-Guerrilla Forces, 3 February 1961, JFKL, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda, National Security Action Memoranda.

³⁶⁹ DoD memo, McNamara to Bundy, ‘Development of Counter-guerrilla Forces’, 23 February 1961, JFKL, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 2 folder.

³⁷⁰ Andrew Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine: 1942-1976* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2007), p. 226.

³⁷¹ NSAM 124, Establishment of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency), 18 January 1962, JFKL, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda, National Security Action Memoranda.

³⁷² Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era*, p. 69; McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, p. 167 and p. 512.

³⁷³ Larry Tye, *Bobby Kennedy: The Making of a Liberal Icon* (New York: Random House, 2016), p. 258.

Senior Interdepartmental Counter-insurgency School at the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, VA.³⁷⁴ The State Department mandated that all senior officials attend the five-week course before reporting to Embassy assignments in the developing world. Ernest Siracusa, deputy chief of mission in Lima, recalled, ‘After attending the Bobby Kennedy-mandated Counter-Insurgency Course at the Foreign Service Institute, I arrived in Lima in early October 1963’.³⁷⁵ In September 1962, the SG-CI promulgated the Overseas Internal Defense Policy (OIDP) document, which articulated the overall US government strategy to defeat insurgencies. It read:

*‘This document is concerned with the prevention and defeat of (1) communist inspired, supported, or directed subversion or insurgency and (2) other types of subversion and insurgency which are inimical to U.S. national security interests in all countries of the free world, primarily those that are underdeveloped, whether they are pro-Western, or basically neutral’.*³⁷⁶

The later NSAMs added multiple Andean countries to the SG-CI’s responsibly including, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The exclusion of Peru is likely because Luis De la Puente’s Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and Hector Bejar’s National Liberation Army (ELN) had not yet surfaced as belligerent forces by the fall of 1962. However, the policies and doctrine that resulted from the SG-CI would guide the US contribution to Peru’s development of its internal security forces.

The Kennedy fanaticism with insurgency and counterinsurgency caused a title wave across the national defence community. Throughout his tenure, he consistently applied pressure on government agencies to change their way of doing business. Some in the State Department considered the focus on counterinsurgency a distraction from high-level diplomacy. The US Agency for International Development (AID) primarily conducted economic and technical development projects. Many of its employees ‘resisted suggestions that it abandon its traditional long-term development projects for more short-term, civic action activities – activities that the agency tended to dismiss as gimmickry’.³⁷⁷ Like his brother, Bobby

³⁷⁴ Memorandum for the President, ‘Senior Interdepartmental Counter-insurgency School’, 19 April 1962, CREST, FOIA electronic reading room, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80b01676r001900120032-6> (accessed 22 January 2020). Also see, Freedman, *Kennedy’s Wars*, p. 288.

³⁷⁵ Library of Congress, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, ‘Interview with Ernest V. Siracusa’, June 1989, p. 42, <http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mfdip.2004sir01> (accessed 13 January 2018); Department of State telegram, Jones to Rusk, 3 November 1965, p. 4, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, box 72, folder 6; NSAM 131, Training Objectives for Counter-Insurgency: Part III: Memoranda, 1962: 16 February-22 March, JFKL, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda, National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 131 folder.

³⁷⁶ White House, National Security Council memo, ‘United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy’, September 1962, p. 1, <http://orchestratingpower.org/lib/COIN/Overseas%20Internal%20Defense%20Policy/OIDP.pdf> (accessed 12 January 2018).

³⁷⁷ Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine*, p. 228.

Kennedy read Mao Zedong's, Che Guevara's, and Ho Chi Minh's writings on guerrilla warfare. Moreover, 'Green Berets came to Hyannis Port to show rather than just tell the attorney general about their unconventional warfare techniques'.³⁷⁸ The Kennedy brothers believed the Special Forces could successfully employ counterinsurgency and civic action tactics in Latin America and other troubled spots around the world. However, following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, they were sceptical of senior military and intelligence officer's promises. While they did garner support among Army and Navy special warfare leadership and the rank-and-file, they met resistance at the Pentagon. Most senior officials did not agree with Kennedy and felt the military should remain focused on defending Europe. Moreover, they despised civilians questioning their professional military opinions. Andrew Birtle is critical of multiple aspects of Kennedy's emphasis on counterinsurgency, and concluded, 'A final weakness of Kennedy's method was that, by politicizing doctrine, he converted it into dogma'.³⁷⁹ As a result, he stifled debate within the government, which led to the rise of theories and policies that proved to be incorrect.

While Kennedy's commitment to Latin America was clear, he placed Peru in a prominent position among its peers. Peruvian President Manuel Prado y Ugarteche was the first Latin American head of state to meet with Kennedy in the White House.³⁸⁰ Kennedy named Joseph Loeb as Ambassador to Peru. Loeb was president of Americans for Democratic Action, a liberal activist group for anti-communism. Richard Walter concluded, 'the appointment of such a high-profile personality indicated a certain amount of administration concern for Peru'.³⁸¹ Moreover, the size of the US mission to Peru was much larger than most others in Latin America.³⁸² The Kennedy administration saw Prado as an active supporter and advocate for the Alliance for Progress. As a reward for his anti-Castro stance, they gave Peru one half-million ton of the Cuban sugar quota, which significantly increased Peruvian sugar exports to the US.³⁸³ However, Prado's term was coming to an end. Kennedy and Loeb closely watched the left-leaning, yet anti-communist, Victor Haya de la Torre, the founder, and leader of the Popular Alliance of American Revolution (APRA).³⁸⁴ They considered

³⁷⁸ Tye, *Bobby Kennedy*, p. 247.

³⁷⁹ Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine*, p. 489.

³⁸⁰ Welcome to President Prado of Peru, 19 September 1961, JFKL, Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Speech Files; U.S. Department of State, *The Biographic Register, 1963* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Press, 1963), p. 274; Walter, *Peru and The United States*, p. 13.

³⁸¹ Walter, *Peru and The United States*, p. 13.

³⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

³⁸³ Werlich, *Peru: A Short History*, p. 265.

³⁸⁴ Foreign Service Dispatch, Loeb to Rusk, 19 April 1962, p. 4, JFKL, NSF, box 151 Peru, folder 2; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, p. 166.

Haya a social progressive who could be an advocate for the Alliance if the Peruvians elected him president in 1962.

The most significant test of US-Peruvian relations during the Kennedy administration occurred after the Peruvian military conducted a *coup d'état* on 18 July 1962. Loeb predicted the military would conduct the *coup d'état* on 9 June when he wrote to Rusk 'I believe it will be within 24 hours after there are enough election returns to indicate APRA victory'.³⁸⁵ Over 1.7 million Peruvians voted in the presidential election on 10 June 1962, which resulted in a three-way tie between Haya, Fernando Belaunde Terry, and former President (1948-1956) General Manuel Odria. As there was no clear winner (Haya received 32.1%, but not the required 33.3%), Congress would decide the outcome.³⁸⁶ Haya's political manoeuvring cut a power-sharing deal that would give Odria the Presidency but give effective control of Congress to APRA. The Peruvian military establishment could not accept this.³⁸⁷ They despised Haya and employed the excuse of election fraud to justify the *coup d'état*.³⁸⁸ General Ricardo Perez Godoy led the Junta and committed to another round of elections in 1963. Many Latin American and European countries immediately recognized the Junta. However, Kennedy was incensed by the *coup d'état*, especially after Loeb's attempts to forestall it. Robert Kennedy recalled that they 'took a lot of steps, took whatever steps we could, to try to bring pressure' on the Junta.³⁸⁹ Kennedy recalled Loeb to Washington and suspended economic and military support to warn other would-be military dictators in Latin America not to follow the same path.³⁹⁰ However, many in Peru and some in Latin America viewed Kennedy's response as US meddling in Peru's internal affairs, which was a clear violation of the Organization of the Americas' (OAS) charter.³⁹¹ After a few months, the tension abated, and the two countries normalized relations.

The 1963 election of Belaunde would restore US-Peruvian relations and provide the conditions for a mutual relationship during the conflict with the ELN and MIR. During the run-up to the election, Kennedy appointed Ambassador John Wesley Jones, a career diplomat, albeit not a Latin Americanist, to lead the US mission in Lima. Jones would serve

³⁸⁵ Department of State telegram, Loeb to Rusk, 9 June 1962, p. 2, JFKL, NSF, box 151 Peru, folder 3.

³⁸⁶ Werlich, *Peru: A Short History*, p. 271.

³⁸⁷ Department of State telegram, Loeb to Rusk, 9 June 1962, p. 2, JFKL, NSF, box 151 Peru, folder 3.

³⁸⁸ Benjamin Keen and Mark Wasserman, *A Short History of Latin America* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1980), p. 396.

³⁸⁹ Edwin Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman (eds.), *Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, The Unpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years* (London: Bantam Press, 1988), p. 340.

³⁹⁰ Warren Cohen, *Dean Rusk* (Totowa, NJ: Cooper Square Publishers, 1980), p. 204.

³⁹¹ Werlich, *Peru: A Short History*, p. 275.

as Ambassador until the end of the Johnson Administration and guide the US and Peru through some difficult times.³⁹² Belaunde took 39% of the vote, defeating Haya, and Odria, and went on to be inaugurated on 28 July 1963.³⁹³ Belaunde was an enthusiastic supporter of the Alliance for Progress, which pleased the Kennedy Administration.³⁹⁴ He had trained as an architect at the University of Texas at Austin and had large-scale development plans for Peru. Belaunde wanted to build a trans-Andean highway connecting Lima to the lower eastern slopes of the Andes. Siracusa recalled, 'Here, he was convinced, was where Peru's future lay and he would tirelessly and eloquently expound his theories to all visitors, illustrating with elaborate mock-ups in full relief'.³⁹⁵ However, APRA controlled Congress, and its political manoeuvring would block some of the projects. The US State Department predicted, 'Although Belaunde's government will lack a congressional majority, its elite and military backing promises political stability. The outlook for the government's reform program is complicated by the difficulties of collaborating with APRA as well as by the formidable problems of Peruvian society'. They continued, 'Meanwhile, the military may be expected to take a more active role in reform programs, directly through civic action, and indirectly through continuing influence on government policies'.³⁹⁶ The most contentious issue between the US and Peru was the protracted dispute over the claims of the International Petroleum Company (IPC), which was a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company based in New York. While the IPC issue would continue to fester, it would not reach critical mass until 1968, late in the Johnson Administration.³⁹⁷ Throughout the remainder of Kennedy's term, U.S-Peruvian relations would remain stable.

Kennedy's national security policies included the education and training of foreign militaries and government officials. NSAM 131 read, 'it is in the interest of the United States to provide counter-insurgency training to selected foreign nationals, both in the United States and in their own countries'.³⁹⁸ It directed the AID, CIA, Department of Defense (DOD), and Department of State (DOS) to conduct training in facilities in the US and Panama, as well as

³⁹² Walter, *Peru and The United States*, p. 27.

³⁹³ CIA Special Memorandum No. 19-65, Prospects in Peru, 29 July 1965, p. 2 LBJL, NSF, NIEs, box 9, folder 13, Peru.

³⁹⁴ J. Warren Nystrom and Nathan Haverstock, *The Alliance for Progress* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), p. 104.

³⁹⁵ Library of Congress, 'Interview with Ernest V. Siracusa', p. 42.

³⁹⁶ Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Hughes to Rusk, 'Peru's New Administration and Reform Prospects', 11 July 1963, JFKL, NSF, box 151 Peru, folder 4.

³⁹⁷ Clayton, *Peru and the United States*, p. 183.

³⁹⁸ NSAM 131, p. 3 13 March 1962, JFKL, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda, National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 131 folder.

in countries with counterinsurgency programs. The ODP amplified NSAM 131 and directed the government to develop militaries and conduct nation-building in countries where insurgencies were in the incipient phase.³⁹⁹ Specific to Peru, AID, through its Office of Public Safety (OPS) trained police units, the CIA worked with the *Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional* (National Intelligence Service, SIN), DOD focused on the military, and the DOS helped develop various governmental agencies. Peruvian military and police officers, and government officials attended a plethora of seminars, training courses, and educational institutions in the US during the 1960s. For example, Peruvian Army Major Victor Mendizbal attended the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1963.⁴⁰⁰ While Truman and Eisenhower built the foundation of military cooperation, Kennedy significantly expanded training and educational opportunities for Latin American governments.

The most controversial institution was in the Canal Zone in Panama. The US Army founded its Caribbean School on 1 February 1949 and renamed it the School of the Americas (SOA) at Fort Gulick on 1 July 1963. A US Army colonel commanded the school, but much of the staff and instructors were from Latin American militaries. Its flagship offering was the prestigious Command and General Staff course that educated mid-career officers and prepared them for battalion command. Additionally, the school offered a wide variety of courses, including counterinsurgency, civic action, intelligence, military police, leadership, infantry tactics, combat engineering, communications, supply, and maintenance for vehicles, weapons, radios, and other equipment.⁴⁰¹ During the early 1960s, the school trained approximately 1,400 Latin American students per year. By December 1964, the school had taught 16,343 students from nineteen Latin American countries, including 805 Peruvians.⁴⁰² On 18 April 1963, Ambassador Jones visited the school and received an honorary degree, which increased the legitimacy of the school in the eyes of the Peruvian military.⁴⁰³ In recent years, Leslie Gill and William Blum admonished the school and alleged it was responsible

³⁹⁹ 'United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy', p. 27.

⁴⁰⁰ 'Noticias Militares del Exterior', *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, No. 22, 31 March 1963, p. 3, *Centro de Estudios Histórico Militares del Perú* (CEHMP, Centre of Peruvian Historical Military Studies), military journal collection.

⁴⁰¹ SOA newsletter *El Faro Americano*, *Revista Trimestral*, Fort Gulick, Canal Zone, 1 October 1962, NARA, School of the Americas file; 01 January 1963; 30 September 1964.

⁴⁰² Barber and Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power*, p. 145; McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, p. 185.

⁴⁰³ John Jones, Honorary Degree, U.S. Army Caribbean School, Fort Gulick, Canal Zone, 18 Apr 1963, LBJL, Papers of John Wesley Jones, Box 6, folder 2.

for the human rights violations its graduates committed.⁴⁰⁴ However, congruent with the developing counterinsurgent doctrine, much of which the US Army was testing in Vietnam, the curriculum emphasized winning the hearts and minds of the local population and de-emphasized the use of repressive techniques. It remains unclear whether any of the Peruvian graduates were responsible for the human rights violations committed during the conflict with the MIR and ELN.

The Peruvian military sent its highest-performing personnel to the SOA courses as instructors and students. The SOA newsletter *El Faro Americano* (The American Lighthouse) dated 1 October 1962, recognized Lieutenant Colonel Leonardo Demartini and Lieutenant Alfonso Aguilar as the honour graduates of the military police and engineering for officers' courses respectively.⁴⁰⁵ The Peruvian Army also sent instructors on two-year assignments. For example, Aguilar returned to teach in the engineering section, and Lieutenant Luis Gavini taught in the communications section.⁴⁰⁶ While attending training at SOA, many students took advantage of English language instruction.⁴⁰⁷ In April 1963, Peruvian Army engineers graduated from a construction course where they learned how to operate and maintain heavy equipment.⁴⁰⁸ They later used this in civic action projects across the country. In October 1963, Peruvian Army Colonel Luis Trigos Reyna, chief engineer for the Marañon region, visited SOA and gave a guest lecture on how he employed civic action in his area. US Army Colonel Marshall Wallach, SOA's director of the internal security department, bestowed him with an honorary degree for his participation.⁴⁰⁹ In May 1964, Peruvian Army Captain Carlos Luperdi Gonzales was the honour graduate of the Counterinsurgency Operations course, which taught students various methods of opposing communist insurgency.⁴¹⁰ These are but a few examples of the collaboration between the Peruvian military and SOA. The

⁴⁰⁴ Lesley Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); William Blum, *Rogue State: A Guide to the World's only Superpower* (London: Zed books, 2014), p. 87.

⁴⁰⁵ *El Faro Americano*, 1 October 1962, p. 11, NARA, School of the Americas file.

⁴⁰⁶ *El Faro Americano*, 1 April 1963, p. 8, NARA, School of the Americas file; *El Faro Americano*, 30 September 1964, p. 8, NARA, School of the Americas file.

⁴⁰⁷ 'Noticias Militares del Exterior', *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, No. 22, 31 March 1963, p. 3, CEHMP, military journal collection.

⁴⁰⁸ 'Noticias Militares del Exterior', *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, No. 23, 15 April 1963, p. 3, CEHMP, military journal collection.

⁴⁰⁹ 'Noticias Militares del Exterior', *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, No. 35, 15 October 1963, p. 3, CEHMP, military journal collection.

⁴¹⁰ 'Noticias Militares del Exterior', *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, 31 May 1964, p. 3, CEHMP, military journal collection.

Peruvian Army leaders were very proud of their involvement in the school, especially of the instructors they provided and when their soldiers took honours during training.

The primary US military element involved in Latin America during the 1960s was the US Army's 8th Special Forces Group – Airborne (SFGA) based at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone. The 8th SFGA was activated in Panama on 1 April 1963. In June 1972, it was re-designated as the 3rd Battalion, 7th SFGA. Colonel Arthur 'Bull' Simmons was the first commander of the unit. Colonel Magnus Smith replaced him on 23 July 1965.⁴¹¹ According to Command Sergeant Major Robert Ramsey, who was a member of the unit from 1962 until 1966, 'The 8th SFGA was very active all-over Latin America in the 1960s'.⁴¹² Many of the SAFLA personnel participated in SOA's jungle operations course as students and instructors. They took this experience with them when they rotated to assignments in Vietnam.

Kennedy's most senior military advisor, General Maxwell Taylor, considered Indochina a laboratory for counterinsurgency theory and techniques.⁴¹³ In turn, Special Action Force Latin America (SAFLA) personnel used the counterinsurgency experience they gained in Vietnam when training Latin American militaries.⁴¹⁴ SAFLA was responsible for providing special operations expertise in the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of responsibility, which included Latin America south of the Mexico border with Guatemala to the southernmost tip of South America. Its primary mission was 'to advise, train, and assist Latin American military and paramilitary forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency activities in support of U.S. national objectives'. Its secondary mission was 'to develop, organize, equip, train, and direct indigenous forces in the conduct of guerrilla warfare under limited or general warfare conditions as directed'.⁴¹⁵ The 8th SFGA formed the base of SAFLA, which provided SOUTHCOM with the capability to conduct civic action and counterinsurgency activities throughout Latin America. These events were instrumental in assisting many countries in thwarting the spread of communism in the region.

SAFLA conducted a variety of activities across the region including, tactical and technical training, and civic action projects. Civic action included English language instruction,

⁴¹¹ US Army, 'Special Action Force for Latin America: Historical Report', 1966, p. 11, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) archive, Latin America collection, box 1, folder 14.

⁴¹² Robert Ramsey. Telephone Interview. 12 May 2019.

⁴¹³ Robert McMahon, 'US national security policy, Eisenhower to Kennedy', in in Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I, Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 307.

⁴¹⁴ Robert Ramsey. Telephone Interview. 12 May 2019.

⁴¹⁵ Wayne Kirkbride, *Special Forces in Latin America* (1991 by Author), p. 30.

medical, dental, engineering, or construction projects to assist the host nation military in building rapport with the local populace. Tactical and technical counterinsurgency training encompassed a wide variety of skills from mission planning, staff operations, intelligence, psychological operations, communications, equipment and vehicle maintenance, and vocational educational assistance to host nation infantry, commando, and special operations units. The mobile training teams (MTT) formed the basis of the civic action and training events. SAFLA planners designed MTTs specifically for each tasking and staffed them with personnel with the required experience and training.⁴¹⁶ Sergeant Major Kenny McMullin recalled, 'Mobile training teams were sent throughout Latin America. The most famous of these was Pappy Shelton's mission to Bolivia to train the troops who would eventually track down Che Guevara'.⁴¹⁷ Across the globe, the regional SAFs conducted a total of 522 MTTs in the fiscal year 1963 and 529 in the fiscal year 1964.⁴¹⁸ SAFLA conducted 62 in 1962; 73 in 1964; 106 in 1965; and 76 in 1966. 60 percent of the MTTs were civic action projects, 30 percent were tactical and technical counterinsurgency training, and the final 10 percent were survey and assessment activities. SOUTHCOM employed these teams as the primary policy implementation tool in the region. Wayne Kirkbride asserted, 'The impact made by these teams is believed to have been of tremendous value to the military, social, and economic stability of these countries'.⁴¹⁹ In an interview with Alan Hoe, former 8th SFGA member Master Sergeant Richard Meadows described a counterinsurgency MTT he had led in the Dominican Republic in 1963. He recalled, 'Such missions as these took place in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Colombia'.⁴²⁰ SAFLA conducted numerous MTTs and civic action projects in Peru between 1963 and 1966, which were instrumental in preparing the Peruvian Army to defeat the MIR and ELN.

In 1962, the Peruvian Army established its *Escuela de Comando* (Commando School) in the Chorrillos area of Lima. A group of officers that had completed the US Army Airborne and Ranger courses at Ft. Benning, Georgia, formed the core of the instructors and developed the program of instruction for the Commando course. In April of 1963, the SAFLA conducted an MTT at the Commando School, where its personnel taught a counterinsurgency course.

⁴¹⁶ Charles Fry. Personal Interview. 11 March 2020.

⁴¹⁷ Kirkbride, *Special Forces in Latin America*, p. vii.

⁴¹⁸ United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Development Status of Military Counterinsurgency Program including Counterguerrilla Forces*, 1 August 1964 as quoted in *Analysis of the Validity of Special Action Forces (SAF)*, p. 64.

⁴¹⁹ Kirkbride, *Special Forces in Latin America*, p. 33.

⁴²⁰ Alan Hoe, *The Quiet Professional: Major Richard J. Meadows of the U.S. Army Special Forces* (Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 2011), p. 73.

Sergeant Howard, a cameraman from the US Army audio-visual detachment in Panama, filmed much of the training. The films show a Special Forces team instructing Peruvian soldiers in the tactical aspect of counterinsurgency such as small unit tactics, mission planning, mountaineering, infiltration, rifle marksmanship, sentry neutralization, raids, attacks, ambush, use of explosives. One film shows the final exercise of the course in the nearby mountains where the instructors evaluated the students to plan and execute a mission by attacking a small outpost and destroying a radio transceiver station.⁴²¹ An article in *Actualidad Militar* added that the instruction also included intelligence and psychological operations as they applied to counterinsurgency warfare. Members of the Navy and National Police also attended the course. The Commander of the Peruvian Armed Forces, General Julio Doig Sanchez, presided over the opening ceremony. In his speech, he spoke of the importance of understanding counterinsurgency and implored the graduates to ‘to lend the maximum interest to assimilate the knowledge to be imparted’ during the course.⁴²² A second article has a photo spread that shows SAFLA Captain Lorge Stewart at the graduation ceremony having a discussion with General Salas del Caprio.⁴²³ These photos, which show multiple members of the MTT directly correspond with the films, and combine with US Army historical records to provide convincing proof of US Army involvement in Peruvian Army counterinsurgency training.

The Peruvian security forces quickly proliferated the tactics and techniques, like those the SAFLA team taught during the MTT, by conducting numerous courses at the Commando school in the following years. They also held courses at regional training centres throughout Peru, including one in the northern department called Piura in the fall of 1963. Lieutenant Colonel Raul Villaronga of the US Embassy MAAG served as an advisor for the course.⁴²⁴ These training events were crucial in the development of the counterinsurgency capability. Former MIR leader Ricardo Gadea believed that this training provided a significant advantage to the Peruvian Army over the rural insurgent fronts. He explained that for the most part, the insurgents relied on guerrilla warfare tactics that dated back to the Cuban

⁴²¹ ‘8th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Mobile Training Team, Peru, South America and Panama Canal Zone, 5/1963’, NARA, Record Group 111, Motion Picture Films from the Army Library Copy Collection.

⁴²² ‘Curso de Guerra Contrasubversiva en la Escuela de Comandos’, *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, 15 May 1963, p. 4, CEHMP, military journal collection. Spanish version: ‘a prestar el máximo de interés para asimilar los conocimientos a impartirse y declaro inaugurado el Curso’.

⁴²³ ‘En la Escuela de Comandos: Clausura del Curso de Guerra Contrasubversiva’, *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, 30 June 1963, p. 3, CEHMP, military journal collection.

⁴²⁴ ‘Piura: Clausura del Ciclo de Guerra Anti Subversiva’, *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, 15 December 1963, p. 17, CEHMP, military journal collection.

insurgency (1956-1959). In contrast, the Peruvian Army significantly improved and updated its tactics between 1959 and 1965, based on lessons from the conflict in Vietnam.⁴²⁵ This suggests that the Peruvian Army's integration of evolving counterinsurgency techniques allowed them to defeat the guerrillas.

The Peruvian Army was conducting civic action projects well before the launch of the Alliance for Progress. However, they did place additional emphasis on small military-led development projects during the 1960s.⁴²⁶ Kennedy stated that 'military forces can contribute substantially to economic development'.⁴²⁷ As such, the US provided funding and equipment for two additional Peruvian Army engineer battalions under the auspices of the Alliance for Progress. The earliest direct evidence of civic action is found in the September 1962 issue of *Actualidad Militar* that has a full-page photo on the cover. The picture shows Peruvian Army engineers building a road a remote area in the jungle called Maranon.⁴²⁸ A month later, the cover page featured a small aircraft landing on a remote strip in the Amazon that the Army had built.⁴²⁹ The military publications continued to highlight these projects throughout the decade. In 1963, The Army Staff created a General Officer position to oversee and coordinate all civic action projects.⁴³⁰ This demonstrates the growing importance of civic action among the senior leaders of the army. In September 1963, SAFLA dispatched an MTT, designated 40-MTT 103-64, to Lima for a six-month temporary assignment. Lieutenant Colonel David Meyer led the team that included a public education officer, an engineer officer, and a public health officer. During the trip, they conducted civic action training for 223 personnel. This included personnel from the headquarters, all five military regions, the Navy, the Air Force, and the National Police. Meyer's team served as advisors on thirteen projects and assisted the General Staff in writing a detailed civic action plan for 1964 and 1965. The team also authored an in-depth assessment of the Peruvian Army's civic action capabilities and performance. One finding of the 65-page report that they briefed to Ambassador Jones before they departed was 'That through civic action projects and programs, national unrest of certain element[s] of the people will cease, and the masses will assist in the economic development of Peru by actually participating in self-help

⁴²⁵ Ricardo Gadea. Telephone Interview. 9 April 2020.

⁴²⁶ John Waggener, 'East of the Andes', *Military Review*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 11, November 1968, p. 20.

⁴²⁷ Field, *From Development to Dictatorship*, p. 2.

⁴²⁸ *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, 15 September 1962, cover page, CEHMP, military journal collection.

⁴²⁹ 'Nuevos Campos de Aterrizaje construye el Ejercito en nuestra amazonia', *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, 31 October 1962, cover page, CEHMP, military journal collection.

⁴³⁰ US Army memorandum, 'Civic Action Mobile Training Team to Peru', 20 March 1964, p. 4, (RCS GSGPO-125), USASOC archive, Latin America collection, box 1, folder 2.

projects'.⁴³¹ While it is complicated to measure the effectiveness of these activities, and Meyer's assessment is undoubtedly overly optimistic, the civic action programs likely had a positive impact. As a result of the team's recommendations, SAFLA conducted a series of civic action MTTs in 1964 that focused on preventative medicine, heavy equipment operation and maintenance, as well as warehousing, inventory, and logistics procedures.⁴³² In May and August, the MAAG chief Colonel Robert Ingalla travelled to Cusco, Puno, and Marañon to inspect various civic action efforts.⁴³³ In September, Ambassador Jones travelled to Marañon to visit a road construction project, which was part of the colonization initiative in the area.⁴³⁴ As the MIR and ELN prepared for war, the Peruvian Army continued to conduct civic action projects in every department in the country to win the support of the population.

AID and CIA worked with the Peruvian national police to develop a counterinsurgency capability. In December 1954, NSC action memorandum 1290-D directed the CIA to establish the Overseas Internal Security Program and improve upon a faltering DoD program that trained national police forces in counterinsurgency.⁴³⁵ This led to a conflicting mix of authorities and responsibilities between AID and CIA that the agencies did not resolve during the Eisenhower Administration. Furthermore, 'Low budgets and lack of bureaucratic support (and lack of sustained executive enthusiasm) limited the scope of the program, and its budget declined between 1958 and 1961 to less than \$14 million'.⁴³⁶ To remedy this situation, Bundy issued NSAM 114 that ordered a review of the police training and periodic reports for the President. The memo added, 'Latin America should be the first area covered by the review'.⁴³⁷ This resulted in NSAM 177 'Police Assistance Programs', which Kennedy signed

⁴³¹ US Army memorandum, 'Civic Action Mobile Training Team to Peru', 20 March 1964, p. 5.

⁴³² Various films of SAFLA MTTs to Peru, 1964, NARA, Record Group 111, Motion Picture Films from the Army Library Copy Collection; US Army, 'Special Action Force for Latin America: Historical Report', 1966, p. 11.

⁴³³ 'Visita del CRL. Jefe de la Misión Americana a la Ciudad del Cusco', *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, 15 May 1964, p. 16, CEHMP, military journal collection; 'Visita del Jefe del Grupo Militar de EE. UU. De N.A. en el Peru y Miembros de la Misión Militar Americana', *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, 15 August 1964, p. 10, CEHMP, military journal collection.

⁴³⁴ 'Embajador de los EE. UU. Visita Carreteras que Construye el Ejército', *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, 15 September 1964, p. 3, CEHMP, military journal collection; Personal correspondence, Jones to his son 2nd Lieutenant Peter Jones, 8 August 1964, LBJL, Papers of John Wesley Jones, box 2, folder 2.

⁴³⁵ 'Report of the NSC 1290-d Working Group', 16 February 1955, in Robert McMahon, William Sanford, and Sherrill Wellsin (eds.), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy, Volume X* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 6; CIA memorandum, 'Internal Discussion of NSC Action 1290-d', 24 October 1955, CREST, FOIA electronic reading room, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00268R000800020008-6.pdf>, (accessed 11 April 2020).

⁴³⁶ McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, p. 188.

⁴³⁷ NSAM 114, Training for Friendly Police and Armed Forces in Counter-Insurgency, Counter-Subversion, Riot Control and Related Matters, 23 February 1961, JFKL, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda, National Security Action Memoranda.

on 07 August 1962. As directed, AID established OPS and named Bryon Engle as the director. Engle may have been a CIA employee.⁴³⁸ The CIA used OPS as a cover for its officers working in Latin America, and it provided them a valuable link to the remote areas away from cities with embassies and consulates.⁴³⁹ AID's budget for the fiscal year 1964 allocated \$29.5 million to OPS, which included \$200,000 for Peru. For a short period, OPS maintained a regional training centre called the Inter-American Police Academy at Fort Davis in the Panama Canal Zone.⁴⁴⁰ However, OPS closed it down and moved the training to the International Police Academy (IPA) in Washington, D.C., in 1963. IPA training focused on preparing national police forces to carry out counterinsurgency in their home countries. On 27 June 1964, the Peruvian Minister of Government and Police sent a letter to Jones requesting 'assistance to equip and maintain a Special Police Emergency Unit (SPEU) that they would for counterinsurgency'.⁴⁴¹ Months later, the Special Group (CI) 'endorsed the CIA/AID proposal for a special airborne police unit to be tried out on an experimental basis in Peru'.⁴⁴² OPS worked furiously to establish the capability at a base in Mazamari in the Satipo Providence near one of the MIR fronts.⁴⁴³ However, the SPEU was not operational in time to participate in the conflict.

The development of the Peruvian government's intelligence was also critical to the looming conflict with the MIR and ELN. On 27 June 1960, Prado signed an executive order that established the National Intelligence Service (SIN). Andres Gomez and Arturo Medrano showed that 'One can view the Peruvian National Intelligence Service as a product of the Cold War, with its focus on fighting communism and counterinsurgency'.⁴⁴⁴ The CIA

⁴³⁸ McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft*, p. 190; Martha Huggins, *Political Policing: The United States and Latin America* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 107.

⁴³⁹ Agee, *CIA Diary*, p. 55; Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 107; Rufus Phillips, *Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account Of Lessons Not Learned* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), p. 107; Also, see, Blum, *Rogue State*, p. 91 and p. 179.

⁴⁴⁰ OPS, 'Survey of Training Activities of the AID Police Assistance Program', November 1962, p. 40, JFKL, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda, NSAM 114 folder; Laughlin, *Gringo Cop*, p. 73.

⁴⁴¹ David Geyer and David Herschler (eds.), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 990.

⁴⁴² 'Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group (CI)', 8 April 1965, in David Geyer and David Herschler, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 76.

⁴⁴³ Department of State telegram, Jones to Rusk, 'Special Police Emergency Unit', 27 August 1965, NARA; USAID memo, Laughlin to Engle, 10 December 1965, NARA, RG 286, AID, AID mission to Peru, subject files 1965-1970, box 2; Also, see Department of State telegram, Jones to Rusk, 3 November 1965, p. 3, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, folder 6; Laughlin, *Gringo Cop*, p. 109.

⁴⁴⁴ Andres Gomez de la Torre Rotta and Arturo Medrano Carmona, 'Intelligence Laws in Peru and Latin America – Historical, Legal, and Institutional Evolution', in Russell Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane (eds.) *Intelligence Management in the Americas* (Washington, DC: National Intelligence University Press, 2015), p. 30.

Station in Lima worked directly with the SIN to support the security forces in the fight against the insurgents. The *Policia de Investigaciones del Peru* (Peruvian Investigations Police, PIP) was responsible for investigating subversive groups. The PIP had 1,370 investigators, and OPS judged that ‘The training, organization, and morale of this organization are only fair’.⁴⁴⁵ In August 2017, the Peruvian government declassified and released a series of SIN and PIP reports that completely change how scholars have viewed how well the security services understood the insurgent movement. These documents show that the SIN and PIP had very detailed knowledge of the insurgent elements across the country. We will examine these documents in detail in chapter five. The Peruvian Army had a strategic intelligence group called the *Servicio de Inteligencia de Ejercito* (Army Intelligence Service, SIE) as well as tactical intelligence capabilities embedded with each regional and battalion headquarters. The SIE had a training school in Lima.⁴⁴⁶ SOA records show that numerous Peruvian Army intelligence officers attended training in the Canal Zone.⁴⁴⁷ During the 1960s, the US Army ran the Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program, or Project X, which provided training and manuals in Spanish for various intelligence operations, including interrogation. Under the auspices of Project X, SOA conducted some of this training in 1965 and 1966.⁴⁴⁸ It is unclear if this training influenced Peruvian Army Intelligence officers during the conflict. The research conducted for this dissertation did not uncover any direct evidence implicating any of the Peruvian Army Intelligence officers in human rights abuses. However, considering the staggering level of repressive techniques the security services employed during the conflict, it is possible. The SIN, PIP, and SIE were well prepared to confront insurgent groups by 1963.

The above examples of AID/OPS, CIA, and SAFLA support of their respective counterpart’s development significantly adds to the historiography of this period. Multiple observers have

⁴⁴⁵ ‘United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy’, p. 8.

⁴⁴⁶ ‘Clausura de la Escuela de Inteligencia’, *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, 31 December 1964, p. 12, CEHMP, military journal collection; Augustin Leon Zena, ‘La Inteligencia en la Guerra Revolucionaria’, *Revista Militar del Peru*, No. 696, January-February 1967, Lima, p. 106, CEHMP, military journal collection.

⁴⁴⁷ SOA Watch, SOA Graduates Database, <http://soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/soawhinsec-grads> (accessed 04 February 2018).

⁴⁴⁸ Memo for Secretary of Defense, ‘Improper Material in Spanish-Language Intelligence Training Manuals’, 10 March 1992, The National Security Archive, Prisoner Abuse: Patterns from the Past collection, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/920310%20Improper%20Material%20in%20Spanish-Language%20Intelligence%20Training%20Manuals.pdf> (accessed 4 February 2018); DoD memo, ‘USSOUTHCOM CI Training’, 1 August 1991, The National Security Archive, Prisoner Abuse: Patterns from the Past collection, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/> (accessed 4 February 2018); Gill, *The School of the Americas*, p. 49.

noted US involvement in Peru, some more accurately than others. Victor Marchetti and John Marks provide an inaccurate example when they claimed:

'The agency [CIA] financed the construction of what one experienced observer described as a miniature Fort Bragg [stateside home of the US Army Special Forces] in the troubled Peruvian region, complete with mess halls, classrooms, barracks, administrative buildings, parachute jump towers, amphibious landing facilities, and all the accoutrements of paramilitary operations'.⁴⁴⁹

On the surface, this seems significant. However, they were referring to the OPS base in Mazamari, and the National Police counterinsurgency troops that OPS was training there did not participate in the conflict with the ELN and MIR. First, OPS funded the base, and second, there is no convincing evidence that US Army personnel participated in the training. Lust provides the most comprehensive account of US government support to Peru's counterinsurgency development.⁴⁵⁰ However, he did not take advantage of US archives, aside from online holdings. Andrew Kirkbride, in his exhaustive account of SAFLA activities during the 1960s, only notes one MTT to Peru.⁴⁵¹ During the research for this dissertation, I consulted the official history of the SAFLA and uncovered audio-visual evidence at the National Archives in College Park as well as documentary evidence at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library archive of nine SAFLA MTTs to Peru between 1963 and 1966. Peruvian newspapers, military journal articles, and unit histories preserved in Lima confirm this research. Due to a freedom of information act request, the Defense Intelligence Agency declassified and released order of battle documents concerning the Peruvian Army that contributed to the understanding of its force structure. The sum of this training and education prepared the Peruvian security forces for the challenges to come. Hugo Blanco provided the first significant opportunity for the Peruvian Army to test its burgeoning counterinsurgency capability.

Hugo Blanco

Hugo Blanco Galdos led the most important rebellion of the early 1960s in the fertile valleys of La Convencion and Lares, which are sixty miles northeast of Cusco in the southern Peruvian Andes. This episode is significant because it was the first serious attempt to mobilize the Campesinos for ideological purposes. While Victor Haya de la Torre and Jose Mariátegui had spoken and written of the potential of the peasantry, Blanco put these

⁴⁴⁹ Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1974), p. 110. Also, see Norman Call, 'The Legacy of Che Guevara', *Commentary*, vol. 44, no. 6, December 1967, p. 39.

⁴⁵⁰ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 432.

⁴⁵¹ Kirkbride, *Special Forces in Latin America*, p. 95.

concepts into action. Blanco was more successful than the later attempts by the ELN and MIR at mobilizing the campesinos. A 1963 State Department report read, ‘Communist sympathizers promoted favorable publicity for Blanco, the Peruvian ‘Robin Hood’, particularly in Cuzco’s daily El Sol, which is reportedly edited by Blanco’s brother-in-law’.⁴⁵² He was born on 15 November 1934, in Cusco and raised in a middle-class mestizo family. His father was a lawyer who defended the rural workers in court and Blanco learned from an early age about the landowner’s abuses and exploitation of the peasants. As a child he was fascinated by Incan history, he studied archaeology and spent much time among the Quechua people learning their language, singing their songs, and experiencing their culture. This knowledge and experience combined with his maternal familial ties would have a significant impact on his ability to organize and lead the workers in La Convencion and Lares to fight for social change. Along with his father, he also took part in clandestine organization and support of the oppressed workers. In 1954, his family sent him to study agronomy at Universidad de la Plata in Buenos Aires, Argentina where he joined the Trotskyist movement. He worked in a meat packing plant and gained experience with organized labour through its trade union.⁴⁵³ The situation in Buenos Aires was not conducive for revolution as journalist Richard Gott explained, ‘At the time the Argentine Communists were vigorously opposed to Peron, whose government, for all its faults, was devoutly anti-imperialist and anti-American and consequently enjoyed the support of a sizable percentage of the working class’.⁴⁵⁴ These were Blanco’s formative years, and the contacts with Trotskyist leaders, especially Hugo Bressano, were influential.

In 1958, Blanco moved to Lima, found work in a factory, and contacted the Trotskyist movement there. The Grupo Obrero Marxista (Marxist Workers Party, GOM) had been active there since 1946 and developed into the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Worker’s Revolutionary Party, POR), which was the Peruvian division of the Fourth International. Odria’s anti-leftist repression between 1948 and 1956 almost destroyed the POR. The fragmented POR split into two factions under the two most influential leaders of the time. In his memoir, Blanco recalled:

‘The great crisis in the world Trotskyist movement during that period had an impact on the exiles, and when they returned to Peru after eight oppressive years, two PORs emerged: one was led by [Ismael]

⁴⁵² Department of State memo, ‘Communist Subversion in Peru’, 13 May 1963, p. 9, GALE, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/8h4XZ4> (Accessed 5 January 2019).

⁴⁵³ Victor Villanueva, *Hugo Blanco y La Rebelion Campesina* (Lima: Libreria Editorial Juan Mejia Baca, 1967), p. 74.

⁴⁵⁴ Richard Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America* (London, UK: Seagull Books, 2008), p. 300.

Frias and influenced by the Pablo and Posadas tendency; the other, whose best known leader was Felix Zelallos, belonged to the tendency which at the time called itself orthodox, and was strongly influenced by the Argentine Trotskyist party. It was in that party, among whose leaders Nahuel Moreno [nom de guerre for Hugo Bressano] particularly stood out, that I acquired my Marxist education'.⁴⁵⁵

The POR detested the APRA and PCP and sought to build a genuine revolutionary party for the people and workers of Peru. Blanco helped organize and participated in violent protests against US Vice President Richard Nixon's visit to Peru in 1958. The protests caught the security forces off guard, but they responded by routing out and arresting the organizers.⁴⁵⁶ Before the police could capture Blanco, POR leadership sent him to Cusco, where he would continue the struggle against the Peruvian Oligarchy.

Blanco arrived in Cusco, which in 1958 was a stronghold of communism, with the intention of developing the urban workers into a revolutionary force. He recalled, 'Naturally, we figured my first step was to become a member of the Cuzco Workers Federation (FTC), where I would find the most militant workers'.⁴⁵⁷ However, this did not turn out to be the case. Blanco discovered that the FTC was composed of artisans and peasants, and there was not a radical wing of workers. Moreover, in his opinion, the bureaucrats in charge of the FTC were only interested in maintaining the status quo. He then learned of the Campesino organizations in La Convencion and Lares valleys and discussed the concept of working with them. At the time, this was counter to POR's methods, which focused on organizing urban workers. Blanco's insistence on pursuing the rural aspect set him at odds with the POR leadership. Before his arrival in the valleys, there had been some Campesino organization, but Blanco was the driving force in the expansion. Small groups of Campesinos, usually working in the same cluster of haciendas, joined in unions known as syndicates. Gott shows that there were only six syndicates when Blanco arrived, but within three years, this had expanded to 148. He also argued that the original syndicates 'were almost entirely preoccupied with legal matters ... they were of more use for prestige purposes to leftist lawyers in Cusco than they were to the peasants themselves'.⁴⁵⁸ These lawyers from Cusco and Lima, only sought to use the Andean people as a means to create social and political change in the country. In contrast, Blanco was also a true believer in the Campesino's cause, with familial ties and a genuine interest in their heritage and language.

⁴⁵⁵ Hugo Blanco, *Land or Death: The Peasant Struggle in Peru* (New York: Pathfinder, 1972), p. 24.

⁴⁵⁶ Carey, *Peru and the United States*, p. 200; Richard Nixon, *Six Crises* (New York: Double Day, 1962), p. 202.

⁴⁵⁷ Blanco, *Land or Death*, p. 25.

⁴⁵⁸ Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 304.

In the 1930s, settlers began to arrive in the area, and the indigenous Machiguenga Indians scattered into the Amazon. By 1950 there were sixty one large estates of over 4,300 hectares consolidated under the control of twenty five families.⁴⁵⁹ The principal crops grown in the area included sugar, coffee, tea, and cocoa.⁴⁶⁰ The transportation system was limited and unreliable but improved somewhat with the completion of the rail line between Cusco city and Aguas Calientes, near Machu Pichu. The national government had very little oversight or interaction in the area. One contributing factor was that 'In the early 1960's the Office of Indigenous Affairs had only one person who could translate Spanish into Quechua'.⁴⁶¹ Additionally, unlike in Pasco, where the large mining and agriculture industries had a powerful influence in Lima, the settlers in La Convencion and Lares did not. The hacienda owners, or *hacendados*, were mostly free to exploit the workers as they desired. The local politicians controlled the security forces and usually supported the *hacendados*.

There was no native labour source in the area, so the *hacendados* were required to incentivize migration into the area. They recruited a workforce from Cusco, Apurimac, and Ayacucho. As Howard Handelman explained, 'Highland villagers were offered a plot of land in La Convencion on the condition that they render ten to twenty days of free labor per month to the *hacendado*'.⁴⁶² This was a high price to pay for a plot of land, but many highland Campesinos took advantage of the opportunity to build a better life for their families. By 1960, Cusco had a population of 611,972, and approximately 62,000 lived in La Convencion.⁴⁶³ In general, those who migrated to the area were more socially and politically aware with hopes for a better economic future than the average Campesino in the southern Andes. While they were willing to work hard, they did not pledge blind obedience to the landowners. The migrants demonstrated their entrepreneurial spirit within the coffee trade. They grew coffee beans on their plots and sold it to coffee buyers from Cusco city. As the price of coffee rose exponentially during the 1950s, this trade became very lucrative. Some *hacendados* forced their workers to sell their coffee to them at fixed prices, which they would then resell for a profit to the coffee traders. This was an obvious friction point between the landowners and the workers. Some workers invested profits from the coffee trade and hired

⁴⁵⁹ Wesley Craig, *From Hacienda to Community: An Analysis of Solidarity and Social Change in Peru* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Latin American Program Dissertation Series, Number 6, 1967), p. 31.

⁴⁶⁰ Department of State memo, 'Communist Subversion in Peru', 13 May 1963, p. 8, GALE, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/8h4XZ4> (Accessed 5 January 2019).

⁴⁶¹ Howard Handelman, *Struggle in the Andes: Peasant Political Mobilization in Peru* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1975), p. 34.

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁴⁶³ Astiz, *Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics*, p. 3.

others to fulfil their labour obligation to the *hacendado*. While others sublet sections of their plots to migrants who recently arrived from the Sierra, and these sub-letters would then be required to fulfil the original tenant's labour obligations.⁴⁶⁴ These changes in the power structure of the area combined with the economic tensions and created a situation that was predisposed to revolution.

In 1958, Blanco helped the locals form the Provincial Peasant Federation of La Convencion and Lares, and they immediately set to work by organizing strikes on the haciendas. In 1959, they conducted work stoppages in Paccha Grande, Chaucamayo, and Chaupimayo to fight for better work conditions and treatment for the peasants.⁴⁶⁵ Victor Villanueva argues that the strikes were effective because the tenants could work on their plots making them more productive while the landowners had no labour and lost their crops at great expense. He wrote, 'The landowners gave way, the peasant triumphed. As a logical consequence the unions spread through the valley like wildfire'.⁴⁶⁶ The movement took on the slogan: *Tierra o Muerte* (Land or Death). The POR leadership in Lima observed these successes and judged this to be a possible way ahead for political change. In response, other members of POR began organizing peasants in Arequipa and Puno. In November 1960, the POR held a Congress in Arequipa to decide on how they would employ the building peasant movement.⁴⁶⁷ The representatives agreed that they should use guerrilla warfare to meet their objectives. Villanueva explained that the Congress likely did not fully understand or consider the conditions in the Peruvian Andes. However, he wrote, 'But the fact is that the voting was unanimous. It could also be that the inner voice of conscience of each delegate thought that the conclusions at which they have arrived were so utopian that it did not cost much to approve the "insurreccional line" which, it could be safely assumed, would never be put into practice'.⁴⁶⁸ There is some debate among scholars as to whether Blanco used guerrilla warfare methods in the valleys of La Convencion and Lares to meet his aims.⁴⁶⁹ However, following his capture, Blanco wrote, 'I am Fidelista and I believe that only a violent revolution can improve the situation of this country. But at no time did I ever think of

⁴⁶⁴ Handelman, *Struggle in the Andes*, 72.

⁴⁶⁵ Enrique Gallegos Venero, 'Un Combate Victorioso en Guerra Contrarrevolucionaria', *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra*, July – September 1963, p. 8, CEHMP, military journal collection.

⁴⁶⁶ Víctor Villanueva, *Hugo Blanco y La Rebelión Campesina* (Lima: Librería Editorial Juan Mejía Baca, 1967), p. 77. Spanish version: 'cedió el gomal, triunfo el campesino. Como lógica consecuencia los sindicatos se propagaron por el valle como reguero de pólvora'.

⁴⁶⁷ Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 305.

⁴⁶⁸ Villanueva, *Hugo Blanco y La Rebelión Campesina*, p. 79.

⁴⁶⁹ Rene de la Pedraja, *Wars of Latin America, 1948-1982: The Rise of the Guerrillas* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, Inc., 2013), p. 159.

guerrilla warfare as the solution. I became a “guerrillero” [guerrilla fighter] because of circumstances’.⁴⁷⁰ Moreover, he wrote in his memoir that they were conducting guerrilla warfare and referred to his group as ‘we guerrillas’ and ‘the guerrilla band’.⁴⁷¹ Handelman argues, however, ‘Blanco’s armed peasant militias, which seized lands that they felt should be theirs, were not guerrillas’.⁴⁷² Villanueva agreed with this point and attempts to parse out the difference between the farmer militias and guerrilla fighters.⁴⁷³ This may be accurate for the older, lightly armed men of the local peasant militias who only protected their immediate lands. However, as I will describe below, the POR did use urban underground methods to finance and supply Blanco’s forces that did create and employ a mobile guerrilla column in the later years of the movement.

The POR sought international support from multiple fronts and found a limited positive response. The *Secretariado Latinoamericano de Trotskismo Ortodoxo* (Latin American Secretariat of Orthodox Trotskyism, SLATO) was the group of the Fourth International in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Following its Congress, POR asked for and received an endorsement for the planned insurrection, the so-called ‘Peruvian Thesis.’ SLATO also sent advisors to Lima and later Cusco. In 1961, SLATO sent Argentinians Arturo ‘Che’ Pereyra and R. Creuss along with a Spaniard called Jose Martorell to Lima. Martorell gained experience in clandestine operations during World War II while working with the French Resistance.⁴⁷⁴ The SLATO members cooperated closely with POR leaders and other organizations to consolidate the Left into a single cohesive unit. This concept failed because of the various ideological beliefs of the disparate revolutionaries. Pereyra was sent to Cusco to assist with the nascent revolution. Gott asserted, ‘Pereyra was to prepare and organize guerrilla groups, while Blanco was to turn the existing peasant movement into a more solid cohesive force’.⁴⁷⁵ In addition to the advisors, SLATO likely provided financial assistance to the POR, but observers of the events have given a broad range of numbers.⁴⁷⁶ SLATO was the most generous and forthcoming international supporter of the Peruvian insurrection in the early 1960s.

⁴⁷⁰ Statement by Hugo Blanco, April 1965, LBJL, Personal Papers of Gerold F. Baumann, Box 3, folder 4.

⁴⁷¹ Blanco, *Land or Death*, p. 96.

⁴⁷² Handelman, *Struggle in the Andes*, p. 75.

⁴⁷³ Villanueva, *Hugo Blanco y La Rebelión Campesina*, p. 141.

⁴⁷⁴ Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 306.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 307

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 307; Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión* (Lima: Ministerio de Guerra, 1966), p. 14; Villanueva, *Hugo Blanco y La Rebelión Campesina*, p. 77.

The Cubans and Bolivians also provided limited support. The FIR consulted the Cubans, who committed to providing direct support. Blanco recalled, ‘Another favorable factor that must be singled out is the Cuban assistance: it seems that the comrades made tremendous efforts to have human and material aid sent to us, but nothing arrived’.⁴⁷⁷ The Cubans sent Bejar’s ELN to Peru in an attempt to link up with Blanco and provide assistance with the guerrilla war. However, in May 1963, the Peruvian security forces intercepted them in Puerto Maldonado, so they did not reach the La Convencion valley. I will explain this episode in greater detail below. The Bolivian communists also provided support to this operation by facilitating the passage of the group from Cuba into Bolivia and across the border into Peru. From 1960 until his ouster on 4 November 1964, Bolivian President Victor Paz Estenssoro tolerated the Bolivian Communist Party’s activities and ‘maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba and Czechoslovakia’.⁴⁷⁸ Blanco concluded that even if the Cuban assistance had arrived, it would not have been enough to impact the outcome of the insurrection. He did, however, expound upon the importance of Radio Havana transmissions and the example set by the Cuban revolution. He explained, ‘It was enthusiastic and fervent assistance that filled us with emotion and reinforced our resoluteness’.⁴⁷⁹ In this sense, Cuban support, although limited, was helpful to the cause.

In June of 1961, the POR established a revolutionary front in Cusco. Blanco wrote, ‘A political event of great importance during this period was the constitution of the Revolutionary Left Front (*Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario*–FIR) in Cusco, which united the local revolutionary left’.⁴⁸⁰ The FIR later established its National Directorate in Lima. Blanco reflected, ‘Although organizing the FIR did not directly aid the work in the countryside, it helped by coordinating it with the urban work’.⁴⁸¹ In addition to Pereyra, Antonio Aragon, Gorki Tapia, and Hector Loayza arrived in Cusco to assist Blanco. As they set about organizing land seizures and preparing for guerrilla warfare, a major rift began to build among POR and FIR leaders. At the local level, Blanco tended to concentrate on working with the syndicates in employing land seizures, while Pereyra was more aggressive and desired to use violent means.⁴⁸² Bressano arrived in Lima from Buenos Aires and was

⁴⁷⁷ Blanco, *Land or Death*, p. 97.

⁴⁷⁸ Field, *From Development to Dictatorship*, p. 193.

⁴⁷⁹ Blanco, *Land or Death*, p. 97; Also, see: Library of Congress, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, ‘Interview with David Lazar’, 20 March 1997, p. 10, <https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Lazar-David.pdf> (accessed 10 September 2018).

⁴⁸⁰ Blanco, *Land or Death*, p. 27.

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁴⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 51.

adamantly against using guerrilla warfare methods and wanted to limit the movement to less aggressive resistance, such as strikes and land seizures. His opinion was critical because he controlled the allocation of funds coming from SLATO. The FIR planned two congresses in Cusco, and Blanco desperately needed funding to sponsor them. These meetings were important in the fight between the FIR and other leftists' groups in Cusco and could determine the future of the revolutionary movement. Pereyra was sent to Lima to negotiate with Bressano but was unsuccessful in obtaining funding.⁴⁸³ Because of this, he found it necessary to explore alternative methods of financing.

Pereyra decided to resort to robbing banks as a financial mechanism for the revolution. The official Peruvian government version of events noted that the expropriations were to supplement the external financial support, not replace it because Bressano withheld funding. This showed that the government forces might not have had detailed knowledge of the infighting between SLATO and FIR leadership.⁴⁸⁴ Pereyra intended the funds for the purchase weapons, in addition to financing the planned congresses and revolutionary activity in general.⁴⁸⁵ The FIR leadership tasked members of the urban section of the FIR with conducting the expropriations in Lima. The FIR recently recruited many of these individuals, but there was no rigorous vetting process for them. Blanco wrote critically of this, 'Almost immediately, those new members – untested in struggle – were assigned to such a delicate task as bank expropriations to obtain the required funds for the sharpening of the class struggle in the countryside'.⁴⁸⁶ On 12 April 1962, they robbed the Banco de Credito in the Miraflores District of Lima, and according to Gott, 'It was a complete success, and the total secured was nearly three million soles (about \$120,000)'.⁴⁸⁷ However, the banknotes were brand new and sequentially numbered, allowing the police to track the money with relative ease. Tactical errors then followed, SLATO and FIR leadership in Lima directed Pereyra to transport the money with a group of FIR operatives scheduled to drive in a rented truck to Cusco on 24 April. The truck arrived in Limatambo, about 80 kilometers west of Cusco, after a three-day journey and successfully passing through fifteen police checkpoints. Local leaders from Cusco met them and recommended an alternate plan that avoided directly entering the city, but the head of the group from Lima was adamant they continue. On 28

⁴⁸³ Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 308.

⁴⁸⁴ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 14.

⁴⁸⁵ Blanco, *Land or Death*, p. 74.

⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁴⁸⁷ Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 308; De la Pedraja, *Wars of Latin America*, p. 159.

April, they arrived in Cusco in the early morning hours, where the police intercepted them.⁴⁸⁸ Most of the group escaped, but the police captured Pereyra along with nearly all of the money.



These activities caused the SLATO and FIR leadership in Lima to make significant changes in Cusco. Bressano demoted Blanco along with other senior leaders in Cusco on accusations of lack of discipline. While the military controlled government had been closely monitoring the growing peasant movement in Cusco, they had not yet taken any steps to stop it. William Whyte and Giorgio Alberti assert that the Banco de Credito heist triggered government repression, ‘One important factor that precipitated government intervention was the FIR-organized program of bank expropriations in Lima’.⁴⁸⁹ They go on to explain that the

⁴⁸⁸ Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 309.

⁴⁸⁹ Whyte and Alberti, *Power, Politics and Progress*, p. 61.

government's internal security forces quickly and efficiently dismantled the urban FIR organizations in Lima and Cusco city. Significantly, Hernan Boggio Allende, who was a member of the FIR Central Committee and Peruvian delegate to SLATO, voluntarily surrendered to the police on 4 May.⁴⁹⁰ Boggio was involved in the bank robberies, and according to Blanco and Pereyra, stole a portion of the money for personal use.⁴⁹¹ Presumably, he provided the police with information that enabled the successful dismantling of the urban FIR. With the urban situation firmly in hand, the government turned to the countryside to deal with the revolting Campesinos and their leader Hugo Blanco.

The rural unrest in La Convencion and Lares valleys rose to the point that the government found untenable. The land seizures continued, and there were multiple clashes with police as they attempted to maintain order.⁴⁹² In November, a landowner allegedly raped the wife and daughter of a peasant called Tiburcio Balanos near the small town of Pucyura. As was the custom, the landowner made counteraccusations against Balanos, and the authorities sent the police to detain him but were unsuccessful. The local union rallied to protect Balanos and gathered in the town. Anticipating a confrontation with the landowner and his men, they decided to procure weapons from the local police post. On 13 November 1962, Blanco went into the post by himself and in the ensuing scuffle shot and killed officer Hernan Briceno and wounded officer Raul Arellano.⁴⁹³ Blanco and his men then stole weapons, bayonets, ammunition, canteens, documents, and medicine from the outpost.⁴⁹⁴ This was a significant turning point for Blanco, who transitioned, whether prepared or not, to guerrilla warfare. He wrote, 'in reality the guerrilla band was born at that moment'.⁴⁹⁵ On 18 December, the revolutionaries conducted an ambush along the road from Chaully to Chaupimayo and killed two more police officers.⁴⁹⁶ Whyte and Alberti concluded, 'It was one thing for the local police to adapt themselves to *de facto* control of the valley by peasant leaders, but it was quite

⁴⁹⁰ Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 310.

⁴⁹¹ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 119.

⁴⁹² Department of State memo, 'Communist Subversion in Peru', 13 May 1963, p. 7, GALE, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/8h4XZ4> (Accessed 5 January 2019).

⁴⁹³ Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 313; Whyte and Alberti, *Power, Politics and Progress*, p. 63; Blanco, *We the Indians*, p. 37; Also, see LBJL, Personal Papers of Gerold F. Baumann, Box 3, folder 4, U.S. government report on Hugo Blanco, April 1965.

⁴⁹⁴ Unknown author, *Compendio de la Historia General del Ejercito del Perú: 3,000 Años de Historia, Volumen II* (Lima: Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejercito, unknown date), p. 320.

⁴⁹⁵ Blanco, *Land or Death*, p. 91.

⁴⁹⁶ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 23; Enrique Gallegos Venero, 'Un Combate Victorioso en Guerra Contrarrevolucionaria', *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra*, July – September 1963, p. 17, CEHMP, military journal collection.

another to have police officers killed by peasants'.⁴⁹⁷ As a result, on 27 December 1962, the Army ordered Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Gallegos Venero to coordinate the response in La Convencion.⁴⁹⁸ He grew up in a small town in the highlands and was well acquainted with the abysmal social-economic situation.⁴⁹⁹ Forty-six percent of the Army's officer corps hailed from the *sierra*, so it was by no means dominated by people from Lima.⁵⁰⁰ Like the guerrilla commanders, many Army officers were from the lower-middle-class strata of Peruvian society. Still, their families were able to cobble together enough money to provide them with a decent education, and in turn, social mobility. Gallegos commanded the 19th Commando Battalion, which was Peru's premier counterinsurgency unit based at the Commando School in Chorrillos, where it had been training with SAFLA personnel. This would be the Army's first test of its maturing counterinsurgency capability.

Gallegos first employed civic action techniques to win the population over to support the government so that the insurgent would become isolated. As he implemented his strategy, Blanco was already losing local backing. Many of his supporters had a philosophical problem with the bank expropriations, and this is where the first negative shift in support originated. Blanco used a significant amount of text in his memoir defending the actions and explaining to future revolutionaries to make sure that the population is psychologically ready for aggressive action. He wrote, 'if they are carried out when the masses have not yet arrived at an understanding of their necessity, they play a negative role, for many reasons, and they are used by the enemy as the ostensible justification for repressive violence'.⁵⁰¹ Whyte and Alberti recount an alleged episode implicating Blanco in a revolutionary justice killing based on an interview of Gallegos in the Peruvian news magazine *Oiga*: 'Gallegos (1973:7) reports that on 18 October 1962, in hacienda Echarete, a local union leader who dared to oppose the policies of the Blanco-controlled federation was brutally murdered'.⁵⁰² If this event took place, it could have had negative repercussions for Blanco and cost him the support of the

⁴⁹⁷ Whyte and Aberti, *Power, Politics and Progress*, p. 63.

⁴⁹⁸ Lourdes Medina Montoya, Guillermo Sánchez Ortiz, and Manuel Gálvez Ríos, *Historial de Unidades del Ejército del Perú* (Lima: Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejército, 2001), p. 35; Enrique Gallegos Venero, 'Un Combate Victorioso en Guerra Contrarrevolucionaria', *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra*, July – September 1963, p. 20, CEHMP, military journal collection.

⁴⁹⁹ Dirk Kruijtt, *Revolution By Decree: Peru 1968-1975* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2003), p. 46.

⁵⁰⁰ Carlos Astiz and Jose Garcia, 'The Peruvian Military: Achievement, Orientation, Training, and Political Tendencies', *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 4, December 1972, p. 680. Excerpt from Table 8, Army officer place of birth, 1940-59: Sierra 46%, Lima 23%, Rest of Costa, 24%, Selva 6%, Abroad 1%.

⁵⁰¹ Blanco, *Land or Death*, p. 118.

⁵⁰² Whyte and Alberti, *Power, Politics and Progress*, p. 63.

population on some level. The bank expropriations, the alleged revolutionary killing combined with the attacks on the police, must have challenged the resolve of the Campesinos who were merely interested in improving their work conditions and gaining control of their respective plots of land.

The government's response capitalized on Blanco's mistakes and turned a certain portion of the population against him. They may have even leveraged religion as an adjunct to the counterinsurgency strategy. De la Pedraja asserted, 'The Catholic Church also condemned Blanco and threatened with spiritual punishments Indians who dared support the fugitive'.⁵⁰³ In early 1962, the Institute of Agrarian Reform and Colonization (IRAC) established a presence in La Convencion and began to provide government assistance to the local population. Whyte and Alberti explain that 'Gallegos's assumption was that the military and the police were in the valley not to fight the peasants but to protect the social reform program that was just getting underway'.⁵⁰⁴ The IRAC, supported by the military, worked long hours, and attempted to build rapport with the local workers. They did not confront the syndicates but instead sought to find common ground and establish development projects that would benefit the communities. In February 1963, the government issued Decree Number 14444, the Agrarian Reform Law for La Convencion and Lares.⁵⁰⁵ As the IRAC developed links with the community, the locals began to visit the government offices. The IRAC staff worked tirelessly and fined landowners that violated the newly established regulations. Whyte and Alberti concluded, 'Gallegos reports that the manifestations of public support for the reform program reached a climax on 1 May 1963, at a meeting at which 7,000 peasants who came to hear speeches and join in cheers for the reform were perfectly lined up by their [local] unions, carrying flags and posters'.⁵⁰⁶ While this interpretation may be overly optimistic, it is probable that the in-progress reforms and government support enticed some of the Campesinos away from Blanco. Considering, many of the Campesinos only wanted better working conditions and perhaps the opportunity to legally and outright own their land, it is plausible that they would have been satisfied with the IRAC's progress. As Blanco and his radical supporters displayed their actual goal of political change at the national level, a portion of the local population likely withdrew its support for him.

⁵⁰³ De la Pedraja, *Wars of Latin America*, p. 159.

⁵⁰⁴ Whyte and Alberti, *Power, Politics and Progress*, p. 64.

⁵⁰⁵ Handelman, *Struggle in the Andes*, p. 82; Loveman and Davies, *Che Guevara: Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 306.

⁵⁰⁶ Whyte and Alberti, *Power, Politics and Progress*, p. 65.

In conjunction with the development and support to the local communities, the government forces also employed counterguerrilla tactics to destroy the FIR in La Convencion and Lares. They established twelve additional police outposts and increased the number of police to 160, which assisted with population control measures. They brought in two detachments of *guardia de asalto*, or police SWAT teams, to conduct high-risk arrest operations. The Peruvian Army provided overall command and control as well as an intelligence capability. The security forces conducted cordon and search operations and ‘picked up caches of dynamite and arms and ample supplies of propaganda’.⁵⁰⁷ As the conflict escalated, there were open firefights between the security forces and the insurgents. However, the primary target of the military was Hugo Blanco.⁵⁰⁸ He, along with a small column of guerrillas, had been on the move avoiding government forces since the incident in Pucyura in November. The intelligence officers worked diligently through a growing source network of locals to determine the location of the guerrilla band, but Blanco continued to elude them. Their source network increased due to the shift in popular support for Blanco that IRAC’s civic action projects initiated. Blanco began relying on a young man called Mario Human to serve as a messenger to communicate with FIR personnel in Cusco. In late May, an informant provided this information to the security forces intelligence apparatus, and they were able to detain Human. He provided the location of Blanco, under allegations of torture.⁵⁰⁹ Based on this information, the security forces conducted an operation and captured Blanco on 29 May 1963.

The security forces initially moved Blanco to prison in Arequipa to stand trial. On 14 September 1966, the government then sentenced him to 25 years and moved him to the notorious El Fronton prison near Lima.⁵¹⁰ There, he wrote extensively and attempted to motivate the next generation of revolutionaries. The significance of Blanco is still a matter of debate. Perhaps the most prolific stand comes from Guevara, who wrote from Algiers in 1963:

‘Hugo Blanco is the head of one of the guerrilla movements in Peru. He struggled stubbornly but the repression was strong. I don’t know what his tactics were, but his fall does not signify the end of the movement. It is only one man that has fallen, but the movement continues. One time, when we were preparing to make our landing from the Granma, and when there was a great risk that all of us would be killed, Fidel said: ‘What is more important than us is the example we set.’ It’s the same thing.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 63.

⁵⁰⁸ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 20.

⁵⁰⁹ Blanco, *Land or Death*, p. 121; Blanco, *We the Indians*, p. 134; De la Pedraja, *Wars of Latin America*, p. 159.

⁵¹⁰ *La Prensa*, ‘Hugo Blanco en Lima’, 14 September 1966, LBJL, Personal Papers of Gerold F. Baumann, Box 3, folder 4.

Hugo Blanco has set an example, a good example, and he struggled as much as he could. But he suffered a defeat, the popular forces suffered a defeat. It's only a passing stage'.⁵¹¹

The movement in the Andes did not end with Blanco's arrest. Handelman acknowledges that Blanco was significant because he took action to mobilize the peasants, unlike many who had preceded him that relied only on rhetoric and theory. However, he cautions, 'Henceforth, conservative spokesman, such as Lima's *La Prensa*, could associate the peasantry's legitimate desire for land with the threat of revolutionary insurrection'.⁵¹² Whyte and Alberti concluded, 'In a sense, Blanco failed for he lost his own freedom and saw his attempted revolution aborted by skilful government countermeasures'.⁵¹³ Lust joins FIR members Pereyra, Gorki Tapia Delgado, and Blanco himself in attributing the failure to not establishing a functioning party before moving to urban and rural guerrilla warfare.⁵¹⁴ Another FIR member called Leoncio Bueno Barrantes argued that the failure was because Blanco was not an inspiring leader.⁵¹⁵ Bob Friedman, a US Peace Corps administrator working in Latin America, interviewed Blanco in prison in Arequipa on 7 January 1965 and reported, 'his mind is brilliant. He has a very likable personality'.⁵¹⁶ Despite the disparate assessments, Blanco made his mark on the political landscape and improved the plight of countless peasants in Peru.

Blanco also advanced the development of the scholarly understanding of how to motivate a population to resist oppression. He employed a very sophisticated and nuanced approach when dealing with the Campesinos. While his goal was regime change and a communist state in Peru, he tempered these long-term ends and spurred on the Campesinos with short-term achievable goals that were of immediate importance to them. For example, they wanted to sell their coffee harvest on the open market without interference from the *hacendados*. Once they gained this advantage, they agitated for more control of their plots, and once they achieved this, Blanco provided them another small step. This concept of incrementally expanding the goal of the insurrection is, perhaps, Blanco's most significant contribution to the theories of insurgency and revolutionary warfare. However, Blanco went too far, with the bank expropriations, killing of police officers, and alleged revolutionary executions, and this cost him some support of the population. As Hobsbawm explained the Campesinos

⁵¹¹ Translated in Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 299.

⁵¹² Handelman, *Struggle in the Andes*, p. 76.

⁵¹³ Whyte and Alberti, *Power, Politics and Progress*, p. 66.

⁵¹⁴ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, 122; Blanco, *Land or Death*, p. 122.

⁵¹⁵ Interview with Leoncio Bueno Barrantes in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 123.

⁵¹⁶ Peace Corps correspondence Bob Friedman to Gino Baumann, 7 January 1965, LBJL, Personal Papers of Gerold F. Baumann, Box 3, folder 4.

understood they ‘might stand a good chance of getting land and—by his standards—wealth’.⁵¹⁷ Blanco could not motivate the majority of the Campesinos to look beyond these economic goals and join him in the fight for nation-wide political change. In 1963, Blanco changed the FIR’s rhetoric. Norman Gall explained, ‘the Communists orators often harangued the peasants on matters they could understand only remotely, if at all—the need for nationalization of the Standard Oil subsidiary in Peru and for solidarity with the revolutionary peoples of Cuba and Algeria’.⁵¹⁸ This confused the Campesinos who were only interested in increasing their income and providing for their families. When Blanco transitioned to guerrilla warfare, the security forces were able to work with the segment of the population that did not support him, which led to his isolation and eventual arrest.

The arrest of Blanco and other FIR members was a significant setback for the revolutionaries in the Andes, but the uprisings continued. Belaunde was inaugurated on 28 July 1963. He ran on a platform of change in the Andes and was one of the first Peruvian politicians to reach out to the disenfranchised Campesinos and campaign for their votes. This was congruent with a political awakening in the Andes when many Campesinos gained access to the system and became able to vote, due to a change in the law. It is hard to determine the significance of the Campesino vote in the outcome of the election, but regardless the populations in central and southern Peru expected results from ‘Papa Belaunde’. In the beginning, his administration took a conciliatory policy towards the Campesinos, and the Minister of Interior Oscar Trelles led this initiative. Trelles and other senior government leaders met with the peasant organizations and pleaded for their patience and warned that the uprisings were impeding progress and change. However, the land seizures continued at unprecedented levels, primarily in Cusco, Junin, and Pasco, but also in Ancash, Ayacucho, Cajamarca, Huanuco, and Lima. This caused a policy shift, ‘Signs of a hardening government position appeared in late October as Belaunde and his cabinet suggested for the first time that many land seizures were provoked by communist agitators’.⁵¹⁹ As political pressure on Belaunde grew, he decided to remove Trelles. His replacement took a hard line against the agitators. The CIA reported that ‘the President’s controversial, but badly needed, agrarian reform bill even more difficult to obtain’.⁵²⁰ Belaunde did make some progress and

⁵¹⁷ Eric Hobsbawm, ‘A Case of Neo-Feudalism: La Convencion, Peru’, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1969, p. 45.

⁵¹⁸ Norman Gall, ‘Peru’s Misfired Guerrilla Campaign’, *The Reporter*, 26 January 1967.

⁵¹⁹ Handelman, *Struggle in the Andes*, p. 119.

⁵²⁰ CIA Intelligence Memorandum, ‘Latin America Situation Report’, 8 January 1964, p. 3, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Latin America, Box 1, folder 9.

put limited land reform in place; most significant was the opportunity for the Campesinos to purchase their land from the *hacendados*. However, this would not satisfy everyone, for example, Manuel Llamojha, the Secretary-General of the *Confederación Campesina del Perú* (Peasants Confederation of Peru) criticised Belaunde's action as the 'Law of Agrarian Fraud'.⁵²¹ The situation eventually calmed by the fall of 1963, but the government never resolved the underlying conditions that caused the unrest. This would leave ample tension for future revolutionaries to use as a basis for instigating insurrection in the coming years.

A final significant point concerning the Blanco case is how it furthered the development of the Peruvian Army's counterinsurgency capability. As described above, the 19th Commando Battalion was well prepared to respond to the insurgent threat by 1963. Gallegos developed a successful strategy based on counterinsurgency doctrine by employing civic action and possibly psychological operations to provide intelligence for precise counterinsurgency operations. He also integrated and led multiple government entities into the strategy. Based on this experience, and a keen intellect, Gallegos would become the most prolific writer of Peruvian counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine and publish numerous professional journal articles.⁵²² While the US provided extensive education and training to the Peruvian security forces, the Peruvian commanders and leaders would retain agency in the application of force in Peru. There is no evidence that US personnel participated in the actions against Blanco. As I will show in the next two chapters, while the Peruvians accepted support from the US, they did not allow the US Embassy personnel to influence their internal security operations.

Johnson administration

Judge Sarah Hughes swore in Lyndon Baines Johnson as president on Air Force One shortly after Kennedy's assassination on 22 November 1963. Before being tapped for Vice President, Johnson was a brilliant Senate leader and masterful back-door dealer in

⁵²¹ Llamojha and Heilman, *Now Peru is Mine*, p. 114; Also see, SIN report, 'Infiltración en el Campo Laboral y Campesinado', 15 May 1965, p. 9, *Jurado Nacional de Elecciones* (National Jury of Elections, JNE), *Museo Electoral y de la Democracia*, *Ficha de Bien Museológico*, Lima, Peru, 1960s file.

⁵²² Enrique Gallegos Venero, 'El estudio de situaciones en guerra subversiva', *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra*, October – December 1962, CEHMP, military journal collection; Enrique Gallegos Venero, 'Un Combate Victorioso en Guerra Contrarrevolucionaria', *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra*, July – September 1963, CEHMP, military journal collection; Enrique Gallegos Venero, 'Problemas de guerra contra revolucionaria', *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra*, April – June 1964, CEHMP, military journal collection; Enrique Gallegos Venero, 'Inteligencia y Guerra no Convencional', *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra*, July – September 1966, CEHMP, military journal collection; Also, see Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America*, p. 210.

Washington as well as an expert on domestic policy. Although he learned to speak Spanish while growing up in Texas, his knowledge and experience of Latin America did not extend south of Mexico. Some observers have argued that he viewed all of Latin America through his understanding of Mexico.⁵²³ Johnson's first major foreign policy event, held just four days after Kennedy's death, was to host a group of Latin American ambassadors at the White House's East Room to explain he would carry on the support, and even expand, the Alliance for Progress. He told the assembled diplomats, 'So I reaffirm the pledge which President Kennedy made last week to improve and strengthen the role of the United States in the Alliance for Progress'. Significantly, he concluded his address with a dedication to Kennedy, 'Let the Alliance for Progress be his living memorial'.⁵²⁴ Johnson did put some effort towards making the Alliance successful, but other events consumed his time and energy. First and foremost was the war in Vietnam, which became the dominant foreign policy issue of the period. However, like Kennedy, practical anti-communist short-term interventions in Latin America took priority over the goals of the Alliance. Johnson also had a closer relationship with US companies with business interests in Latin America.⁵²⁵ Moreover, on a personal level, Richard Walter asserted that Johnson, 'did not have the public skills and presence of his predecessor, and this proved a serious liability for him when dealing with Latin America'. He continued, 'In Latin America, in particular, Kennedy was a hard act to follow'.⁵²⁶

In December, Johnson made some significant personnel changes in the senior government ranks that would impact US relations with Latin America. He named Thomas Mann, who was serving as Ambassador to Mexico, to be the assistant secretary for Inter-American Affairs. He also designated Mann, who would be known as 'Mr. Latin America', to be the coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, which put him in charge of the majority of Latin American policy.⁵²⁷ In his memoir, Johnson referred to Mann as 'our top man on Latin

⁵²³ Tulchin, 'The Promise of Progress', p. 224.

⁵²⁴ 'Remarks on the Alliance for Progress to Representatives of the Countries of Latin America', 26 November 1963, Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks on the Alliance for Progress to Representatives of the Countries of Latin America. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/242294> (accessed 17 April 2020).

⁵²⁵ Alan McPherson, 'Latin America', in Mitchell Lerner (ed.), *A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson* (Oxford: Blackwell-Wiley Publishing, 2012), p. 389.

⁵²⁶ Walter, *Peru and The United States*, p. 40; Also, see, 'Ha Muerto un Gran Americano', *Revista Militar del Peru*, 9 December 1963, p. 4, CEHMP, military journal collection.

⁵²⁷ LBJ Library, Lyndon B. Johnson: 'Letter to Thomas C. Mann Upon His Assuming New Responsibilities for Latin American Affairs', 15 December 1963.

American affairs'.⁵²⁸ Mann was a career diplomat and experienced Latin Americanist, and his appointment placed him on the cover of *Time* magazine, which was not common for an official below the cabinet-level. This appointment infuriated Kennedy's loyalists, who predicted that Mann would dismantle the Alliance for Progress.⁵²⁹ Some have pointed to the fact that he was from Texas and, therefore, must have been close to Johnson. However, Walter LaFeber argues, 'Mann was apparently not so much a presidential intimate as a proponent of the President's view of Latin American strategy'.⁵³⁰ On 18 March 1964, Mann guided a closed-door meeting with US Ambassadors to Latin American countries. This guidance became known as the Mann Doctrine, 'whereby private United States investment would be protected; economic growth, furthered; and social reforms, not overly stressed'.⁵³¹ Walter explained, 'The application of the doctrine and other policies pursued by Johnson and Mann could be seen in some ways as a change of emphasis rather than a radical break with the past'.⁵³² Mann would retire after a year as assistant secretary and would be followed by a succession of three others during the remainder of the Johnson Administration, but his doctrine would continue until 1970.

The Mann Doctrine would result in a hard-line against the government of Peru when it concerned the business interests of US companies. Belaunde was under extreme domestic pressure regarding the IPC issue, as well as others. ITT, another publicly traded US company, controlled much of the telecommunications infrastructure in Peru. Both IPC and ITT faced threats of nationalization. Mann withheld economic aid to Peru under a thinly veiled threat of what was called the Hickenlooper Amendment, which the Congress passed as part of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. It required the executive branch to cut off foreign aid from any country that nationalized US owned property without fair market compensation.⁵³³ Ambassador Jones noted that the leveraging of the Hickenlooper amendment was dangerous and could cause significant problems between the US and Peru. In the context of the Alliance for Progress, this did not bode well for democratic institutions because while the US was withholding economic aid from Peru, it was increasing funding to

⁵²⁸ Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, p. 238; Thomas Turnstall Allcock, 'Becoming Mr. Latin America: Thomas C. Mann Reconsidered', *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 38, No. 5, 2014, p. 1017.

⁵²⁹ Robert Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson, Volume 4: The Passage of Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), 582.

⁵³⁰ Walter LaFeber, 'Latin American Policy', in Robert Devine (ed.), *Exploring the Johnson Years* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 64.

⁵³¹ Vaughn Davis Bornet, *The Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1983), p. 173.

⁵³² Walter, *Peru and The United States*, p. 42.

⁵³³ Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy*, p. 102.

the dictatorship in Brazil.⁵³⁴ Jones endorsed the Belaunde government in a telegram to Mann in January 1964, stating it was ‘respectable, democratic and progressive [with] every evidence of a desire for close collaboration and warm friendship with [the] U.S.’.⁵³⁵ On 5 December 1964, Mann travelled to Peru and met with Belaunde regarding these issues. During the beginning of the meeting, Belaunde stated that since he had taken office, ‘he had significantly reduced the attraction that many young Peruvians felt for Castroism to the point that it was no longer a threat’.⁵³⁶ As the discussion turned toward the issue of nationalizing the IPC, neither leader changed their respective position, nor was the problem resolved. These issues concerning the IPC and ITT, among others, continued until the October 1968 *coup d’état* that removed Belaunde from the presidency.⁵³⁷ Despite this, US support for Peru’s developing counterinsurgency capability continued.

Policy directives are not worth the paper the executive branch writes them on if Congress does not authorize funding for them. The Congress was also much concerned with communist expansion in Latin America. On 3 October 1963, they published a joint resolution demanding action ‘to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending by force, or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of the Hemisphere’.⁵³⁸ Until the late 1960s, Truman’s Military Assistance Program (MAP) remained the primary funding vehicle for supporting Latin American militaries. From 1950 until 1964, the U.S provided Peru \$66,776,000 in MAP funds, only Brazil and Chile received more. In 1965, the US provided Peru \$1,707,000, which was only less than Brazil and Argentina.⁵³⁹ These funding levels show a high degree of cooperation and commitment between the US and Peru. The US Embassy in Lima published its Internal Defense Plan (IDP) in December 1964. The IDP’s policy objective for the military read:

‘Development of more adequate capability and willingness on the part of Peru’s armed forces to preserve the constitutional and democratic order, to maintain internal security against anti-

⁵³⁴ Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, *Peruvian Democracy under Economic Stress: An Account of the Belaunde Administration, 1963-1968* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 125.

⁵³⁵ David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler, (eds.), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968: South and Central America; Mexico*, vol. XXXI (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 988; Walter, *Peru and The United States*, p. 55

⁵³⁶ Walter, *Peru and The United States*, p. 59.

⁵³⁷ NSC memo, Grant Hilliker to McGeorge Bundy, ‘Peruvian Oil Problems’, 2 July 1965, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, folder 6.

⁵³⁸ Quoted in Barber and Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power*, p. 33.

⁵³⁹ U.S. Congress, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1965. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, 14 April 1964, 412 and 523 Quoted in Barber and Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power*, p. 36.

*democratic and subversive threats, to participate in civic action projects, and to make a realistic although limited contribution to hemispheric defense, with the size of the armed forces limited essentially to these purposes and their orientation directed toward the U.S. '*⁵⁴⁰

The Embassy executed \$7.2 million in the fiscal year 1964 and \$7.0 million in the fiscal year 1965, of DoD funding, for internal military security and civic action. They also allocated \$575,750 in the fiscal year 1964 and \$487,000 in the fiscal year 1965, of AID funding, to police training with 'a special emphasis on internal security capabilities'.⁵⁴¹ The US mission in Peru set a clear policy and adequately resourced it, the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) and AID/OPS now had the responsibility to carry it out.

Considering the significant US investment in the Peruvian military, Johnson's national security team sought to employ it for regional and international contingencies. In October 1964, SOUTHCOM and the US Embassy in Bolivia were planning 'Operation Mountain Goat' that was a contingency for the evacuation of US citizens and embassy personnel from La Paz due to the threats. The MAAG in Lima prepared to ask the Peruvian Air Force for logistical support. However, in the end, the operation did not happen.⁵⁴² Moreover, the US Air Force's 605th Air Commando Squadron, which directly supported the SAFLA, regularly used Peruvian air bases for logistical support when transiting to the southern cone countries from Panama.⁵⁴³ Later that fall, DOS requested a Peruvian Military contribution to the 'Vietnam More Flags' initiative that sought to bring additional countries into the anti-communist alliance fighting in the Second Indochina War. DOS directed Jones to 'convey at the highest possible GOP [government of Peru] level importance attached to this matter by highest level USG [US government]', and added this was due to the '...known competence and prestige [of the] Peruvian military forces'.⁵⁴⁴ Jones met with the Minister of Foreign Relations multiple times in late December and formally requested Peruvian civic action expertise, and other non-combat troops, to be sent to Vietnam. Following some diplomatic machinations, Belaunde declined to participate because of 'political implications

⁵⁴⁰ 'Internal Defense Plan for Peru', December 1964, p. 13, NARA, RG 306 Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Counterinsurgency in Peru, box 4, folder 10.

⁵⁴¹ Memorandum, Martin to Special Group (counter-Insurgency), Transmittal of Internal Defense Plan for Peru, 17 December 1964, p. 2, NARA, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Counterinsurgency in Peru, box 4, folder 10.

⁵⁴² Department of State memo, Dean Rusk to McGeorge Bundy, 5 November 1964, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, folder 6.

⁵⁴³ Charles Fry. Personal Interview. 11 March 2020.

⁵⁴⁴ Department of State telegram, For Amembassy Lima action, 19 December 1964, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, folder 6.

domestically he wished to avoid'.⁵⁴⁵ Although these two requests did not come to fruition, they demonstrate the US's belief in Peru's competence in hemispheric and international security matters.

As 1965 approached, the US Embassy in Lima positioned itself to manage multiple issues in the country. Jones and the State Department's economic and political officers concentrated on negotiating with the Peruvians concerning mineral and fishing rights. In 1965, with the insurgency underway, Jones wrote, 'I am aware of no conflicts between any of the agencies regarding counterinsurgency and all the elements of the country team here cooperate effectively. We are all agreed as to nature of threat and pull together in plans and programs to combat it'.⁵⁴⁶ Of the Peruvians, he wrote, 'Our relations with military are close enough they have [been] unusually secretive about their anti-guerrilla actions in the field and have not allowed our attaches to visit operational units'.⁵⁴⁷ Lust's interview with former Peruvian Army Lieutenant Colonel Ramon Miranda confirmed that there were no North American advisors involved in the operations.⁵⁴⁸ US Army Colonel James Akins was the primary interlocutor between the Embassy and the Ministry of War. He attended briefings concerning the counterinsurgency and shared the information with the country team, that is the senior leadership in the Embassy. Jones wrote,

*'Shortly after his arrival, the Peruvian Army became engaged in an all-out campaign against Communist guerrillas in the Central and Southern Sierra. I always found Colonel Akins well-informed on operations and personalities involved, even from the beginning of the assumption of duties. He contributed substantially to our knowledge and understanding of the anti-guerrilla campaign and early on won the confidence and esteem of me and my colleagues in the Embassy'.*⁵⁴⁹

William Dentzer was the head of AID in Peru and kept the country team informed of its activities. Jones also had a close relationship with his CIA chief of station and noted that he and his staff had previous counterinsurgency experience that allowed them to understand the

⁵⁴⁵ Department of State telegram, John Jones to Dean Rusk, 21 December 1964, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, folder 6; Department of State telegram, John Jones to Dean Rusk, 23 December 1964, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, folder 6.

⁵⁴⁶ Department of State telegram, Jones to Rusk, 3 November 1965, p. 4, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, box 72, folder 6.

⁵⁴⁷ Department of State telegram, Jones to Rusk, 3 November 1965, p. 3, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, box 72, folder 6.

⁵⁴⁸ Interview with Ramon Miranda in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 432.

⁵⁴⁹ Official correspondence, Jones to SOUTHCOM Commander General Taylor, Effectiveness Report, Colonel Akins, 14 June 1966, LBJL, Papers of John Wesley Jones, box 21, folder 9, Military Assistance 1964-68.

situation.⁵⁵⁰ According to Jones, he had a capable team in place that would be able to observe the coming insurgency.


Conclusion

This chapter traced the development of Peru's counterinsurgency capability from 1961 until 1964. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations invested heavily in Peru's security forces, who were ready when Hugo Blanco began the first significant episode of guerrilla warfare in 1963. Another noteworthy point explained above is that Blanco advanced the development of the scholarly understanding of how to motivate a population to resist oppression. Despite Blanco's successes in mobilizing the workers in La Convencion and Lares valleys, the government was able to conduct counterinsurgency operations that captured him and destroyed his group the FIR. In the end, however, the government did little to address the underlying conditions that perpetuated the uprising in the first place. While many scholars have claimed that US Army Special Forces assisted the Peruvian Army during the 1960s, they only provide limited and sometimes inaccurate evidence. My research uncovered numerous primary sources from multiple archives and interviews with former US Army personnel that prove that this was the case. However, as was shown in the Blanco example, the Peruvian military retained agency over its counterinsurgency operations. By 1964, the Peruvian security forces had a formidable counterinsurgency capability, the MIR and ELN could not have chosen a worse time to incite revolution.

⁵⁵⁰ Department of State telegram, Jones to Rusk, 3 November 1965, p. 4, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, box 72, folder 6; Also, see, Walter, *Peru and the United States*, p. 77.

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Chapter four: Conflict with the ELN



The National Liberation Army (ELN), under the leadership and direction of Hector Bejar Rivera, was one of the two most significant guerrilla groups in Peru during the mid-1960s. The ELN emerged as a leading entity of the New Left when its leaders broke away from the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP). The ELN and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) were competitors amongst the political space of the New Left, but they were able to find common ground and worked together to a certain extent in pursuit of their respective goals. As the ELN prepared in La Mar, they were caught off guard when MIR leader Guillermo Lobaton decided unilaterally to begin the armed conflict and conducted the first attack of the campaign on 9 June 1965.⁵⁵¹ This chapter will examine an emerging trend in the

⁵⁵¹ Department of State Intelligence Memo, Allan Evans to Dean Rusk, 'Guerrilla Attack in Central Peru', 11 June 1965, p. 1, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, folder 6.

historiography that argues the ELN was the primary element in Ernesto Guevara's strategy to topple capitalist regimes across Latin America.

Return to Peru

In late 1962, international and national tensions pressured the ELN to get out of Cuba for three reasons. First, the US and the Soviets just resolved the Missile Crisis, and the Cubans feared that the US would invade the island. Second, Cuba still maintained official relations with Bolivian President Victor Paz Estenssoro administration and his left of centre *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (National Revolutionary Movement, MNR) party.⁵⁵² In addition to diplomatic relations, the MNR tolerated Cuban activity because Paz was under extreme pressure from MNR Leftists.⁵⁵³ However, the domestic political situation in Bolivia was fleeting, and it was time to act. Fourth, the Cuban wanted to use the ELN to support Hector Bejar's uprising in La Convencion and Lares Valleys near Cusco. Finally, Bejar wanted to take action before the Peruvian national elections scheduled for the early summer of 1963.⁵⁵⁴ The international security situation in Latin America severely restricted travel options. The best chance for a successful infiltration was for the ELN members to move to Bolivia and then cross the border into Peru with the assistance of the *Partido Comunista Boliviano* (Bolivian Communist Party, PCB). Mario Monje Molina was the Secretary-General of the PCB and was beholden to the Soviets for direction and guidance. He had learned of Cuban plans to establish a guerrilla *foco* in Bolivia. The *foco* was the revolutionary core of dedicated fighters that went to the mountains and created the conditions for revolution.⁵⁵⁵ The PCB Politburo held a meeting and unanimously decided against a violent uprising in their country. Monje and his colleague Hilario Claure travelled to Havana to meet with Castro. He explained that the Cuban experience was unique, and they could not replicate it in Bolivia and that the PCP felt the same way and was against the ELN strategy. Castro responded, 'I understand your position, but I think we have to help those who are going to be arriving in your country now. I'm not asking for the help of the Peruvian party. I'm asking for your help'.⁵⁵⁶ Monje reluctantly agreed to assist the ELN and believed he had

⁵⁵² Anderson, *Che Guevara*, p. 556.

⁵⁵³ Field, *From Development to Dictatorship*, p. 70.

⁵⁵⁴ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 175.

⁵⁵⁵ Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 37; Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution*, p. 19.

⁵⁵⁶ Anderson, *Che Guevara*, p. 558.

directed any revolutionary activity away from Bolivia.⁵⁵⁷ However, he did provide PCP leaders with detailed information concerning ELN plans.

The journey home to Peru would prove to be more treacherous than the previous trip to Cuba. From November 1962 until January 1963, the ELN members travelled in small groups to La Paz in Bolivia. Lust explained that the CIA closely observed these movements. Based on the 1964 CIA report titled 'Selection and Training of Cuban Intelligence Agents Abroad', he goes on to argue that the ELN personnel moved through Prague under the auspices of Operation Manuel. This is a logical assumption considering the limited information in the report. Based on a debriefing of a former DGI official who defected in 1964, the report is very general in its explanation of how the system worked and does not provide names, aliases, passport numbers, or dates of travel.⁵⁵⁸ However, recently declassified evidence uncovered in the Ministry of Interior archive in Prague disputes this argument. The Czech Intelligence service maintained detailed records of every person for whom they facilitated travel. The manifest reads that the first person, a Bolivian called Morales Rodriguez Ricardo, did not arrive in Prague until 1 November 1963. The first Peruvian to travel through Prague was Jorge Hurtado Pozo on 20 February 1964.⁵⁵⁹ Moreover, during late 1962 and 1963, the Bolivian government was tolerant of Cuban activities, so it would not make sense to spend additional time and resources that would be necessary for the revolutionaries to travel through Prague. Although it is doubtful that the ELN members used the Operation Manuel mechanism to move to La Paz securely, what is certain is that they crossed international borders and arrived without incident.

While they were in Bolivia, Bejar's ELN personnel relied exclusively on the support of the PCB. Monje showed indignation about the situation in his actions toward the ELN. He reluctantly supported them, and at least from the perspective of the ELN, did many things to make their success as difficult as possible. On a positive note, the PCB arraigned for secure locations, in most cases the homes of members, for the ELN members to stay as well as provided adequate meals, while they were in La Paz. The PCB did not handle the weapons procurement task as efficiently. The Cubans provided the PCB with sufficient funds to purchase weapons and ammunition for the ELN. Bolivia, at the time, was flush with modern military-style weapons that one could purchase at reasonable prices. La Paz was a well-

⁵⁵⁷ CIA Intelligence Report, 'Weekly Cuban Summary', 27 January 1965, p. 12, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, LA-Cuba, box 36, folder 3.

⁵⁵⁸ 'Selection and Training of Cuban Intelligence Agents Abroad', p. 12.

⁵⁵⁹ 'Operation Manual Manifest', 1969.

known place for revolutionaries and criminals alike to acquire weapons.⁵⁶⁰ However, the weapons the PCB provided were in poor repair and were old models from the time of the Mexican Revolution, and the First World War. Alain Elias was one of the first to arrive in La Paz, and his job was to organize the purchases. He recalled that the PCB was acting in a very peculiar way, but that they eventually complied with the requirement. He stated, 'They bought us bull shit weapons, but at least they were weapons of some type'.⁵⁶¹ The poor quality of the weapons was a severe issue, but Monje's next roadblock would set the ELN stratagem back two years.

Without consulting the ELN leaders, Monje changed the border crossing location and significantly altered the plan to infiltrate Peru. The original concept was for the ELN members to make the crossing in small groups near the town of Reyes, which would have allowed them to move directly into the department of Puno near Lago Titicaca. This would have taken only a few days, and then they could move to their locations in Pasco and Cusco. The new route took the ELN through a town called Guayara-Mirim in the far north of Bolivia in the department of Beni, where they would have to traverse a rugged Amazon jungle environment to enter the Peruvian Department of Madre de Dios. This route would add weeks if not months to the infiltration time and 2000 km to the distance. There were two reasons for the change. The first was that the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) leaders were vehemently against the ELN entering Peru because they did not want the government to blame them for any violence caused by the rebel group. They believed that this would be detrimental to their ability to work through the legal system to achieve their goals. The second, which Monje proffered was that the Puno routes were not feasible. He informed Bejar that he had sent a reconnaissance team to check the routes, and they reported that they were 'absolutely inhospitable, inaccessible', and it was not possible to enter there.⁵⁶² There was also, supposedly, a Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) Congress in Reyes, and the police and military saturated the area with personnel. At any rate, Monje had already ordered PCB support agents to begin moving the ELN personnel to Cochabamba on route to Guayara-

⁵⁶⁰ State Department intelligence report, 'Clandestine Arms Traffic in Latin America and the Insurgency Problem', 29 November 1963, p. 2, LBJL, NSF, Country file, Latin America, Box 1, folder 9.

⁵⁶¹ Interview with Alain Elias in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 179. Spanish Version: 'Nos compraron armas de porquería, pero había armamento de alguna forma'.

⁵⁶² Héctor Béjar, *El primer día: historia interior de una guerrilla andina* (Lima: 1989) unpublished copy quoted in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 182. Spanish version: 'absolutamente inhóspitos, inaccesibles'.

Mirim. By the time the ELN discovered the change, it was too late to go back. They were furious with the PCB leadership, but the only viable option was to move to Peru as directed.

The stress of the clandestine infiltration manifested in a security breach that was the first of the mistakes that would culminate in the defeat of the ELN's 1963 campaign. Long periods of isolation and hiding took their toll on the young revolutionaries. The first serious compromise occurred in Cochabamba. One night two of the ELN members, Alcides Rivas Paredes and Genaro Arze Pineda (possibly false names), left the PCB safe house and went out to a bar to consume alcohol. After getting drunk and making a scene, the police arrested them. Bejar recalled, 'It was not possible for the [PCB] organizers to do anything, but they discovered that the Bolivian police beat them and returned them to Peru, believing that they were illegal immigrants. From that point, we lost contact with them'.⁵⁶³ Paz had the two quickly deported and turned them over to the Peruvian military. Thomas Field determined:

*'Weeks later, Lima reported that Rivas and Arze confessed to have been part of a large-scale, Cuban-sponsored guerrilla operation termed Operation Matraca that was planning to enter Peru via Puerto Maldonado, an isolated Amazonian military outpost just across the border with Bolivia'.*⁵⁶⁴

Victor Zannier, a newspaperman and close associate of President Paz, owned the safe house. The police searched the house and discovered Cuban propaganda and weapons. However, they did not share this information with the US Embassy in La Paz, which suggests that there was a high-level cover-up of this potentially explosive event. This was the first of many breaks in security measures that would paralyze the ELN and was likely due to the immaturity and inexperience of the organization.

A second compromise soon followed. After travelling from Cochabamba to Chapare and then to the small town Riberalta near the Brazilian border, the military discovered a small ELN element. Some of them escaped across the border and hid in the Brazilian jungle. The police detained the others and took them to the police station in Guayara-Mirim. The police did not torture or mistreat them. The local population believed they were members of Hugo Blanco's band from La Convention escaping the Peruvian government's repression. The locals provided them food and other necessities, which was significant for their well-being, as Latin American jails at the time did not provide sustenance for prisoners. Lust asserted that

⁵⁶³ Héctor Béjar, *El primer día, historia interior de una guerrilla Andina*, (Lima, 1989) unpublished monograph, quoted in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 180. Spanish version: 'A los organizadores no les fue posible hacer nada, sino apenas averiguar que la policía boliviana los golpeo y los devolvió al Perú creyéndolos inmigrantes ilegales. Desde entonces perdieron todo contacto con ellos'.

⁵⁶⁴ Field, *From Development to Dictatorship*, p. 71.

‘The police station was quickly converted into a sort of hotel where the guerrillas could come and go freely’.⁵⁶⁵ This was not as uncommon as it may seem. In Peru, the Campesino organizer Llamojha found himself in similar situations numerous times. While in various jails, in remote villages, he would gain sympathy from the guards, and they would let him walk the town streets in the evenings.⁵⁶⁶ After a few weeks, they received a message to move to a rendezvous point to join up with the larger group. According to Lust, Orlando Pantoja, the DGI officer who looked after the ELN during their time in Cuba, delivered the message.⁵⁶⁷ The scene in Guayara-Mirim is an example of a population and local security forces supporting a guerrilla element and shows how complicated the situation in the region was at the micro-level.

In February 1963, without further incident, the ELN members gathered in San Silvestre, near the Peruvian border. Bejar arrived a few days later on a boat called *el Lumumba* with the weapons that the PCB procured for them in La Paz. As the guerrillas prepared to move into Peru, the PCB instigated another setback. Bejar wrote that PCB member Luis Telleria, also known as Manzanita, who had facilitated the movement of the weapons, informed him of the bad news. Telleria stated, ‘Comrades, we have received an order from the party in La Paz, we cannot act as guides, we cannot compromise our people if you want to enter [Peru]’.⁵⁶⁸ Eliberto Marquez recalled Telleria told them not to enter because ‘inside there are problems that the party is fixing, the reform will come, and they expect general amnesty’.⁵⁶⁹ He may have been referring to the Peruvian government’s general promise of land reform, or more specifically, the changes they made in La Convencion and Lares in response to Hugo Blanco’s uprising. Pedro Marote remembered, Manzanita ‘asked that we did not enter [Peru], under the pretext that Peruvian leftist leaders, especially the [Peruvian] Communist Party, had been captured, and if we entered, we would surely also be captured’.⁵⁷⁰ His comment is

⁵⁶⁵ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 186. Spanish version: ‘La comisaria se convirtió rápidamente en una especie de hotel porque los guerrilleros podían entrar y salir libremente’.

⁵⁶⁶ Llamojha and Heilman, *Now Peru is Mine*, p. 82.

⁵⁶⁷ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 186.

⁵⁶⁸ Bejar, *El primer día, historia interior de una guerrilla Andina*, (Lima, 1989) unpublished monograph, quoted in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, 186. Spanish version: ‘Compañeros, hemos recibido una orden del partido de La Paz, no podemos ponerles guías, no podemos comprometer a nuestra gente si ustedes quieren entrar’.

⁵⁶⁹ Héctor Béjar, *El primer día, historia interior de una guerrilla Andina*, (Lima, 1989) unpublished monograph, quoted in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 187. Spanish version: ‘adentro hay problemas que el partido está arreglando, que va a venir la reforma y que esperan la amnistía general’.

⁵⁷⁰ Heraud, *Vida y Muerte de Javier Heraud*, p. 193. Spanish version: ‘nos pidió no ingresar poniéndonos como pretexto que los dirigentes de la izquierda peruana, especialmente del Partido Comunista estaban presos y que nosotros entrábamos iban a quedar indefinidamente presos’.

understandable because the government was arresting many members of the PCP.⁵⁷¹ At this point, the PCB personnel wished their ELN comrades luck and returned to La Paz. The ELN members considered the information that Telleria provided them as well as their current situation and agreed to press on. They found a Peruvian called Jose Pelagio to help guide them as well as a Bolivian smuggler called Abelardo Murakami Baca. Murakami, who was also a low-level member of the PCB, provided them refuge at his Hacienda Aposento. This is another example of solidarity among the Left, as seen in chapter two, that was outside of the purview of the party leadership.

Safely concealed in the Hacienda Aposento, the ELN reevaluated its plans. Lust asserted, 'On 10 May, they took a decision that largely determined the history of the ELN'.⁵⁷² Instead of crossing the frontier as one large group, they decided to send a small team to verify the route and the situation at the border. They remained committed to developing two separate fronts in Pasco and Cusco. Alian Elias led the vanguard that consisted of Jorge Alfanzo Guevara, Javier Heraud, Mario Rodriguez, Manuel Cabrera, Abraham Lama, and Edilberto Marquez.⁵⁷³ Their primary objective was to reconnoitre the border area. Elias recalled, 'We did not have information. We did not know what was on the other side of the border. We needed information, or we could not advance'.⁵⁷⁴ Assuming the border area was safe, they were to traverse forty kilometres of the Amazonian jungle, cross the border, and avoiding the Peruvian town of Puerto Maldonado, move along Highway 1500 to Cusco. There they were to secure transportation and return for the others, they had twenty days to complete these tasks. When the group reunited, they would drive to Cusco and Pasco, pretending they were an 'electoral caravan' under the cover of the upcoming presidential elections.⁵⁷⁵ All of the vanguard members, except Alfanzo, carried valid driver's licenses. Alfanzo, who was blind, needed to go with the group because he had contacts in Cusco that would help them purchase or rent vehicles. Murakami arranged for someone to take Alfanzo by canoe separately from the main group. They set off with direct orders from Bejar not to enter Puerto Maldonado.

⁵⁷¹ Llamojha and Heilman, *Now Peru is Mine*, p. 111; Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America*, p. 191.

⁵⁷² Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 187.

⁵⁷³ Heraud, *Vida y Muerte de Javier Heraud*, p. 14.

⁵⁷⁴ Interview with Alian Elías in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 188. Spanish version: 'No teníamos información. No sabíamos que había al otro lado de la frontera. Necesitábamos información, si no podíamos seguir avanzando'.

⁵⁷⁵ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 187. Spanish version: 'caravana electoral'.

Four days later, the vanguard had crossed the border and arrived in the vicinity of Puerto Maldonado and would make the most critical error in the ELN's history. Cabrera later explained that when they arrived, there was a large political rally in support of Belaunde happening in the town. They felt that they would be able to blend in because of the influx of people visiting the town for the rally. He recalled, 'We knew the military tactics, we knew the guerrilla code well', nevertheless, 'we were hungry and wanted to sleep in a bed'.⁵⁷⁶ Therefore, they decided to set aside their discipline, disobey their orders, and on the evening of 14 May 1963, they entered the town. They went to a restaurant to eat, and a former police officer noticed them. He believed they were guerrillas from Hugo Blanco's group and immediately went to the police station to alert them. Along the way, he encountered police sergeant Aquilino San Jara and informed him about the suspicious individuals. Following dinner, Elias and the others went to a hotel to check-in. At that point, the police arrived and apprehended them under the accusation that they were smugglers and began to take them to the police station. Elias began to argue with them, and the guerrillas pulled their pistols out from their bags. In the ensuing melee, someone shot and killed San Jara and wounded police corporal Julio Tuestas and private Alejandro Rojos Castro. The guerrillas escaped, but the police captured Lama and Marquez later that night. They also captured 500 dollars, six pistols, ammunition, various knives and machetes, canteens, compasses, and a small amount of survival gear.⁵⁷⁷ The security forces would capture the remaining vanguard members over the next days.

Elias and Heraud were able to evade the police through the night and eventually made their way to a crossing point of the Madre de Dios River. They began to swim across but two police officers in a canoe spotted them. Three other officers in a separate canoe joined and began to give chase. Elias and Heraud swam towards two local civilians in a third canoe. As they reached the canoe, the police began shooting at them. Vargas Llosa claims that Elias and Heraud put up a white flag to signal that they wanted to surrender, but the police ignored it. However, this begs the obvious question – where did they get a white flag? At any rate, the officer's gunfire killed Heraud and one of the local civilians. The police captured Elias. Lust asserted, 'The intention of the police to kill both of the revolutionaries was

⁵⁷⁶ Heraud, *Vida y Muerte de Javier Heraud*, p. 14. Spanish version: 'Nosotros conocíamos las tácticas militares, el código guerrillero nos conocíamos bien' 'teníamos mucha hambre, deseos de dormir en una cama'.

⁵⁷⁷ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 29.

unmistakable'.⁵⁷⁸ To support his assertion, he cites Alias and Salazar, who claim that the Captain ordered Elias' execution, but the police officer refused.⁵⁷⁹ Another account states that the police commander was yelling at the officers to kill them.⁵⁸⁰ If Lust's assertion is accurate, there is a remarkable similarity between the capture of Hugo Blanco in May and the capture of Elias. Commanding officers ordered both executed, but lower-ranking officers refused. This striking trend did not continue in 1965 and 1966 when the military allegedly hunted down and executed ELN and MIR members instead of detaining them.

Shortly thereafter, police captured the last three members of the vanguard. Cabrera and Rodriguez were able to escape Puerto Maldonado and arrived at a small farm named La Pastora where the owner provided them food and helped them cross La Cachuela River in a canoe. On 19 May, they stopped at a house for breakfast. The owner secretly alerted the police. When they arrived, they captured Cabrera because he could not run due to a wound in his leg. Rodriguez escaped and evaded capture for a few more days, but the authorities detained him on 21 May. Alfanzo, the blind guerrilla, was also captured after crossing the border and attempting to make his way to Cusco. The ELN personnel across the border in Bolivia learned of the fiasco from news updated on the local radio station. For a short time, they considered a rescue attempt to liberate their comrades from the Peruvian authorities, but they decided it would be impossible.⁵⁸¹ Debray reported the most grandiose, albeit inaccurate, assessment, 'At Puerto Maldonado, on the Bolivian frontier, the vanguard of a sizeable column was cut to pieces. The *guerrilleros* did not even have time to go into action'.⁵⁸² Anderson concluded, 'The first Peruvian guerrilla venture had failed miserably, but Bejar and his comrades began reorganizing, and before long they would try again'.⁵⁸³ This ended the ELN's foray into Peru during 1963.

The ELN was devastated when they learned that Heraud had been killed and immediately blamed the PCB for the debacle. There would be a less emotional *post-mortem* of the events in Puerto Maldonado later, but for now, they attributed the failure to Monje and the change of the infiltration route. They decided that they could not continue with the plan as it was because of the heightened levels of security in Peru and decided to move back to La Paz and

⁵⁷⁸ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, 191. Spanish version: 'La intención de la Policía de matar a ambos revolucionarios fue inequívoca'.

⁵⁷⁹ Alain Elías and Jorge Salazar, *Piensen que estamos muertos* (Lima: Mosca Azul, 1976), p. 179.

⁵⁸⁰ Heraud, *Vida y Muerte de Javier Heraud*, p. 17.

⁵⁸¹ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 192.

⁵⁸² Regis Debray, *Strategy for Revolution* (London: John Cape, 1970), p. 35.

⁵⁸³ Anderson, *Che Guevara*, p. 559.

regroup. They divided into two elements, Bejar led the first and Nestor Guevara the other. They hid their weapons and military equipment. On 30 May, the Bolivian security forces captured Bejar and ten of his men in Manuripi. Bejar recalled that Major Pepla, a senior deputy of Claudio San Ramon, who headed the Paz's secret police, conducted the interrogation. There was a North American official present.⁵⁸⁴ This was likely Tom Flores, the CIA station chief in La Paz, who was under pressure from Washington to obtain details of the group. However, he noted, 'not one of them deviated from the group story that they are no more than leftwing *Apristas* trying to seek political asylum in Bolivia'.⁵⁸⁵ A US Embassy cable back to Washington shows that this story withheld scrutiny in the Bolivian justice system. Bejar alleged that Pepla ordered lower-ranking officers to hit him.⁵⁸⁶ Following the initial interrogations, the authorities flew the group to La Paz. Nestor Guevara's element, under the patronage of low-level PCB member Julio Luis Mendez, arrived back in the capital without incident.

After five weeks, San Ramon released Bejar and the others and allowed them to remain in Bolivia. Bejar wrote that San Ramon told him, 'You have three minutes to disappear, to be non-existent'.⁵⁸⁷ The reason for this is complex. Anderson asserted that the authorities released them 'in an apparent goodwill gesture to Cuba by Paz Estenssoro's government'.⁵⁸⁸ Humberto Vazquez Viana added that the Cuban Embassy and the PCB intervened to prevent the extradition of the revolutionaries to Peru.⁵⁸⁹ High-level US government officials doubted that the Bolivian security forces did not have the capability to keep track of the ELN members.⁵⁹⁰ However, this assumes that they wanted to, which is not certain. The level of support from the MNR and PCB that the ELN received is difficult to determine. Paz must have known about the ELN activities in some detail. Field shows that he was a master manipulator 'alternating between double-dealing and thinly veiled blackmail, President Paz employed the communist threat to secure even-higher levels of U.S. support'.⁵⁹¹ Monje intricately balanced his position between the MNR, the Soviets, and the Latin American pro-Soviet communist parties, all the while appeasing the Cubans. In an interview with Field,

⁵⁸⁴ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 201.

⁵⁸⁵ Field, *From Development to Dictatorship*, p. 73.

⁵⁸⁶ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 201.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 201. Spanish version: 'Ustedes tienen tres minutos para desaparecer, no existieron'.

⁵⁸⁸ Anderson, *Che Guevara*, p. 550.

⁵⁸⁹ Humberto Vásquez Viana, *Antecedentes de la guerrilla del Che en Bolivia*, (Estocolmo, Institute of Latin American Studies, Research Paper Series, no. 46, September 1987), p. 59.

⁵⁹⁰ Field, *From Development to Dictatorship*, p. 213.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid., p. 68.

PCB Central Committee member Ramiro Otero Lugones claimed that Operation Matraca was ‘Monje’s thing’.⁵⁹² Monje’s close interest in Matraca probably was so that he could control and manipulate the outcome of the ELN’s operation.

In La Paz, the ELN met secretly to review what had gone wrong in Puerto Maldonado and debate the future. They attributed the compromise in Puerto Maldonado to three factors. First and foremost was that the Bolivian and Peruvian Communist Parties’ sabotaged their plans. Monje’s change of the infiltration route and last-minute pullback of the guides at the border was central to this thesis. Antonio Li stated, ‘Everyone knew Monje was a traitor’ and that he ‘tricked us with the route, he tricked us with the money, he bought weapons that did not meet our needs and charged too much for them’.⁵⁹³ Others had a more nuanced understanding that Monje provided the minimum support to the ELN to meet his obligations to Castro, but not enough that they would be successful. Milciades Ruiz recalled, ‘It seemed like the Cubans compelled the PCB to help us’. He continued, ‘They completed their commitment to Fidel, but did it without enthusiasm’.⁵⁹⁴ Bejar added that the PCB was in a tenuous situation and that they ‘wanted to maintain good relations with the Cubans and, at the same time, good relations with the international communist movement, but the movement did not tolerate this type of operation [guerrilla warfare]’.⁵⁹⁵ Elias was the most forgiving of the PCB and stated that it ‘was not prepared for this type of work’.⁵⁹⁶ The ELN also condemned the PCP for the compromise in Puerto Maldonado. Monje did pass information about the ELN activities to the pro-Soviet PCP leaders in Lima. However, it is doubtful that this information would have been passed to internal security forces at Puerto Maldonado in time to intercept the guerrillas coming across the border. It is more likely that the Bolivians alerted the Peruvians when they turned over Rivas and Arze, the two rabble-rousers the police arrested in Cochabamba. Monje clearly did his part in ensuring the ELN was not successful, but he was only partially responsible.

⁵⁹² Interview with Ramiro Otero Lugones in Field, *From Development to Dictatorship*, p. 213.

⁵⁹³ Interview with Antonio Li in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 192. Spanish version: ‘Todo el mundo sabia que Monje era un traidor’. ‘él nos engañó con el camino, nos engañó con la plata, compró armas que no sirven y cobró mucho por las armas’.

⁵⁹⁴ Interview with Milciades Ruiz in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 194. Spanish version: ‘Parece que los cubanos comprometieron al Partido Comunista Boliviano para que nos ayudara’. ‘Ellos cumplieron un compromiso con Fidel y lo cumplieron de mala gana’.

⁵⁹⁵ Héctor Béjar, *El primer día, historia interior de una guerrilla Andina*, (Lima, 1989) unpublished monograph, quoted in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 194. Spanish version: ‘mantener buenas relaciones con los cubanos y al mismo tiempo buenas relaciones con el movimiento comunista internacional, pero el movimiento comunista internacional no aprobaba este tipo de operaciones’.

⁵⁹⁶ Interview with Alain Elías in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 198. Spanish version: ‘no estaba preparado para ese tipo de trabajo’.

The next major factor that caused the fiasco in Puerto Maldonado was a lack of discipline. Alfonso Imana deflected part of the blame from the PCB and argued, 'I did not take part in attributing all of the responsibility to the PCB'.⁵⁹⁷ Marquez claims that Nestor Guevara and Dagnino travelled to Cuba to meet with Che Guevara to explain the events directly to him. Che Guevara seemed to accept the PCB's explanation that the ELN members not disciplined and did not follow the security rules. In their conversation with Che, they did not make the argument that the PCB was to blame. Nestor Guevara recalled, 'they did not have the courage to tell him about the long march [change in route] to which we had been subjected'.⁵⁹⁸ Che Guevara also attributed the ELNs limited experience to the failure. In response, Che sent seasoned Cuban guerrillas on the next attempted insurgency, which they would establish in northern Argentina. When this one also failed, Che Guevara did not question his theory. This is where he began to think that only he could lead the revolution in the Andes.⁵⁹⁹ Although we can never know what would have happened if they would have bypassed Puerto Maldonado on their way to Cusco, it is clear that they were under direct orders not to enter the town. The security violations in Cochabamba and Puerto Maldonado committed by ELN members cannot be blamed on any outside force and were crucial to the failed attempt at revolution in 1963.

The final significant factor was the poor management of the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) over guerrilla operations in Latin America. Anderson argued, 'In the face of persistent and proven inadequacies of the Cuban security apparatus to successfully implement Che's guerrilla programs, a number of former guerrillas, including Ciro Bustos and several of his comrades, have singled out [Manuel] Pineiro [the DGI director] for blame'. In Pineiro's defence, Anderson points out that in addition to Peru and Argentina, the DGI was also supporting guerrilla operations in Guatemala, Colombia, and Venezuela. He adds, 'And there were problems arising on every front, ranging from logistical and communications difficulties to factional splits, and military and political setbacks'.⁶⁰⁰ The DGI used 'telex' to communicate between Havana and the Cuban Embassy in La Paz. Former Bolivian revolutionary Humberto Vazquez-Viana claimed that the US was able to intercept these communications, and the CIA was well informed because they made the initial arrangements

⁵⁹⁷ Interview with Alfonso Imana in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 194. Spanish version: 'Yo no soy partidario de atribuir toda la responsabilidad al Partido Comunista Boliviano'.

⁵⁹⁸ Interview with Néstor Guevara in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 195. Spanish version: 'no tuvieron la valentía de decirle sobre la larga marcha a la que nos habían sometido'.

⁵⁹⁹ Anderson, *Che Guevara*, p. 594.

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 559.

for the ELN in Bolivia over telex.⁶⁰¹ However, Pineiro cannot be fully responsible because Guevara was very involved in the operations and is also at fault. This third factor, while it is the least compelling, certainly was partially responsible for the failure. In a broader context, the question of blame is directly related to the efficacy of the Cuban revolutionary theory. The training the Cubans provided the ELN members taught them to avoid urban areas to prevent a security compromise, such as the compromise in Puerto Maldonado. The ELN's mistakes gave the Cubans a convenient defence for their theory, which in turn, allowed them to continue to employ it, despite its flaws, across the developing world.

After the fiasco at Puerto Maldonado, the ELN members reconstituted in La Paz. Multiple developments, along with the heightened security posture of the Peruvian security forces, forced the ELN to postpone the next attempt at insurrection. On 29 May 1963, the Army captured Hugo Blanco in La Convencion valley. The Peruvian government held elections on 9 June 1963, and Fernando Belaunde won the presidency, and they inaugurated him on 28 July, which is Independence Day. The death of Heraud tested the resiliency of the members, and they mostly internalized their grief and did not speak about it.⁶⁰² It was a wake-up call for many of the members and forced them to realize that revolutionary warfare was only for the truly committed. They continued to debate what went wrong and how they could improve in the next phase. Theoretical differences emerged and caused Pedro Morote, Alfonso Imana, Marco Antonio Olivera y Rivas, among others, to leave the organization. Despite the problems, there was a positive side. Ruiz stated, 'The first campaign served as a test, [afterward] only the most dedicated remained'.⁶⁰³ Elias argued, 'we were morally tempered, and we learned some things we would use in 1965-1966'. He explained that although 1963 was a failure, it caused an internal consolidation of the group and united theory with action. He concluded that these factors were 'inestimable in the development of the group'.⁶⁰⁴ Various PCB members aided the ELN personnel over the next months. The ELN maintained a low-profile in La Paz and the PCB controlled mining camps.⁶⁰⁵ They began to plan how to move across the border into Peru.

⁶⁰¹ Vásquez Viaña, *Antecedentes de la guerrilla del Che en Bolivia*, p. 79.

⁶⁰² Heraud, *Vida y Muerte de Javier Heraud*, p. 89.

⁶⁰³ Interview with Milcíades Ruiz in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, 201. Spanish version: 'esa primera campana sirvió para decantar y solo quedaron los mas consecuentes'.

⁶⁰⁴ Alán Elías, *Apuntes para una estrategia de poder popular* (Lima: Horizonte, 1980) p. 129. Spanish version: 'templado moralmente y habíamos aprendido algunas cosas que nos fueron útiles en el periodo 1965-1966'. 'inestimable en el desarrollo del grupo'.

⁶⁰⁵ Field, *From Development to Dictatorship*, p. 73.

Operation Matraca had one unintended consequence in that it drew some attention away from the crossing points near Puno and towards Puerto Maldonado. At the US Embassy in La Paz, Ambassador Douglas Henderson requested assistance from the National Security Council's Special Group-Counterinsurgency (SG-CI). He recalled:

*'I asked that we be given a strength, a capability in the upper Amazon area of Bolivia to first patrol the waterways and to undertake information programs in that area, and to develop a capability of monitoring what was going on there; because it was clear to me that this upper Amazon network was being used by the Peruvian guerrilla operations, for example, for their access out of Peru through Bolivia and through the Amazon system out to Cuba'.*⁶⁰⁶

The SG-CI members, specifically Robert Kennedy and Averell Harriman, denied Henderson's request for support because they wanted him to concentrate his efforts in La Paz and the mining industry. This frustrated Henderson, because he, as the expert in the country, did not think the leftist government or the miners' unions posed a risk to stability in Bolivia. Henderson's previous assignment was as the Deputy Chief of Mission in Peru, and he understood the regional dynamics well. At any rate, while the US officials quibbled over the threat, Bejar and his men slipped across the border into Peru.

Most of the ELN members did not have documents because they had intended to cross the border in remote locations that did not have control points. In an unusual show of solidarity, MIR member Gonzalo Fernandez assisted the ELN by flying from Havana to La Paz with the appropriate travel documents. Jorge Torque reconnoitred a route through the Bolivian border town called Moho that was adjacent to the Puno department in Peru. He determined this route was feasible for a safe crossing, and some ELN members crossed here by themselves or in pairs. By 1964, all the ELN members had returned to Peru. Many went to their homes in Lima to wait for instructions. Hector Bejar, Jose Bernabe, Nestor Guevara, Horacio Juarez, Antonio Pacheco, Edgardo Tello, Jorge Torque, Gurrionero, and Hermes Valiente remained in Cuzco and Puno to conduct assessments of potential areas for establishing a guerrilla *foco*. The first significant assessment they conducted was in La Convencion and Lares, the same valleys that Hugo Blanco led the Campesino uprising. Julio Dagnino recalled, they conducted an exploration of 'political, economic, military, and social issues'.⁶⁰⁷ They determined that this area was not ready to support a guerrilla element. During discussions with local leaders, the ELN members learned that the locals were content with their present

⁶⁰⁶ Library of Congress, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 'Interview with Douglas Henderson', 29 April 1988, p. 14, <https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004hen01/2004hen01.pdf> (accessed 9 April 2020).

⁶⁰⁷ Interview with Julio Dagnino in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 205. Spanish version: 'de tipo político, económico, militar y sobre todo social'.

situation, and they were working with the government on land reform. Moreover, the civic action projects that the Army conducted in 1963 still had a positive effect on the local population. Luis de la Puente's MIR, however, later determined the area was appropriate for revolution and established the Pachacutec front here, as we will see in chapter five. The ELN also visited the Laco, Paucartambo, and Vilcabamba areas near Cusco, but determined that they were not suitable for their purposes.

The group departed Cusco for Ayacucho City to visit the surrounding areas and conduct an assessment. They decided that La Mar Province in the Northeast corner of the Ayacucho region, which is approximately 500 kilometres southeast of Lima, was the best location to establish the front. San Miguel is the capital of the province and the largest town. 3,461 people lived in the towns while 35,129 lived in rural areas throughout the province.⁶⁰⁸ The altitude varies from 4000 to 16,500 feet, where the peaks are barren of vegetation. The thick vegetation of the rainforest covered the lower altitudes in the northwest of the province. The various streams flowed from the Andes and fed the Apurimac and Pampas rivers. On the haciendas and in the communal villages, Campesinos grew potatoes, corn, sugarcane, coffee, and cocoa. The province did not have modern roads, so the locals had to transport their crops to market by walking or on mules, where the merchants exploited them. Campesinos who grew crops on their small plots on the haciendas, had to sell them to the owner at below-market prices. Hector Bejar recalled the factors in their decision to select La Mar, 'there was poverty; there was no agrarian reform; the latifundio was still intact; there was a nascent Campesino movement in Chungi, Chapi, and Oronjoy; some Campesinos were imprisoned; there had been a confrontation with the police; they disarmed a police major'.⁶⁰⁹ They believed that the rugged mountains favoured guerrilla warfare. Unlike the MIR, they did not intend to create security zones. They planned to remain mobile because they understood that although the remote area was formidable, it was also vulnerable to enemy attack. The ELN leaders studied the topography and knew that if the guerrillas became intimately familiar with the terrain, they could use it to their benefit and gain a military advantage over the Army and its inevitable attack into the area.

⁶⁰⁸ Sixth National Population Census, Vol V., quoted in Béjar, *Perú 1965*, p. 89.

⁶⁰⁹ Héctor Béjar, *El primer día: historia interior de una guerrilla andina* (Lima: 1989) unpublished copy quoted in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 206. Spanish version: 'estaba la pobreza; no había habido ninguna reforma agraria, el latifundio estaba intacto; había un movimiento campesino inicial, en Chungui, en Chapi, en Oronjoy; algunos campesinos estaban presos; había habido un enfrentamiento con la Policía; habían desarmado a un mayor de la Policía'.

The social conditions in La Mar had been abysmal for decades. The ELN considered the significance of Chungui in Peruvian memory. In 1922, there was a Campesino uprising in the towns called Chungui and Tambo. They demanded that the local government officials stop the abuse and exploitation. In response, the government sent 150 soldiers to conduct a pacification campaign that resulted in 430 dead and wounded Campesinos and 1,400 homes burned.⁶¹⁰ The oppression continued into 1964 when the ELN visited the area to conduct its assessment. A common scheme during the 1960s was that an Attorney would create fake documents that showed land ownership and then take the Campesinos who had lived and worked the land for generations to court denouncing them as squatters. The court, potentially motivated by bribes, would rule in favour of the Attorney and order the Campesinos off the land. They would then have to move to less fertile lands higher in the mountains. If they refused, the local police would force them off the land or imprison them. The Chapi hacienda was the largest and wealthiest in the province, and the brothers Miguel Carrillo Cazorla and Gonzalo Carrillo Rocha governed it in an autocratic manner. The brothers forced the Campesinos to work on the hacienda in exchange for a small plot of land that they could farm. They also took liberties with the wives and daughters of the Campesinos that worked on their lands. This was a common practice among the haciendas in La Mar as well as other areas in the Andean highlands. When the Campesinos made complaints to the local authorities using the legal system, the authorities generally sided with the landowners.⁶¹¹ The education system was almost non-existent in the rural areas. A 1961 census noted that 40,961 people over the age of five lived in La Mar and that 39,598 could not speak Spanish or read and write.⁶¹² For these reasons, the ELN believed it could initiate the revolution here.

Following the assessment, the group returned to Lima to plan for the revolution and establish the urban cell. In early September 1964, ten ELN members met one-night in Chaclacayo on the eastern outskirts of Lima. They included Bejar, Edgardo Tello, Guillermo Mercado Leon, Luis Zapata Bodero, Manuel Grados, Juan Morales, Horacio Juarez La Rosa, Nemesio [Junco], Marx and Alex. The last two were *noms de guerre*. During the meeting, they formally established the rural front and named it 'Group Number 1 Javier Heraud of the National Liberation Army'. They decided that Bejar would be the Commander and Tello and Zapata would be second and third in charge respectively. The group pooled together 8,000

⁶¹⁰ Bejar, *Peru 1965*, 89; Edilberto Jiménez, *Chungui: violencia y trazos de memoria* (Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2009).

⁶¹¹ Llamojha and Heilman, *Now Peru is Mine*, p. 50.

⁶¹² Sixth National Population Census, Vol. V, quoted in Béjar, *Perú 1965*, p. 89.

soles of their money to support their operations.⁶¹³ Bejar explained that the group made these decisions by committee. The group had been working together for years and shared the same political views. They were also in one hundred percent agreement on the location to establish the front.⁶¹⁴ According to the results of their survey of La Mar, they believed the population would support them and take up arms against the oppressive government officials and landlords.

The ELN members also established the urban support element in Lima that they named the *Movimiento 15 de Mayo* (15 May Movement, M15M), which was like the Cuban M267 organization, in memory of the first ELN fighter killed in the struggle. Hildebrando Perez stated that with the M15M name they meant to honour ‘The death, the sacrifice, and the heroism of Javier Heraud’.⁶¹⁵ Juan Pablo Chang, Juan Cristobal, Elideberto Marquez, and Jorge Salazar were instrumental in establishing the M15M, as was Alain Elias after the authorities released him from jail. The police arrested Elias in Puerto Maldonado in May 1963 following the clash that ended the life of Heraud. Chang was the overall leader of the group and directly responsible for political activities and maintaining relations with Havana. M15M used a cell structure to maintain operational security and to protect the organization in the event of a member or cell being compromised or infiltrated by the security services. They were also responsible for recruitment, weapons and equipment procurement, and logistical support for the guerrilla front, propaganda, intelligence gathering, and counterintelligence activities. Perez recalled, ‘The underground was totally and directly committed to the development and support of the guerrilla [front]’.⁶¹⁶ The ELN was not able to develop an effective communication system between the urban and guerrilla fronts. Bejar did not allow urban cells in Ayacucho City because he assumed, they would be compromised and, in turn, lead the security services to the guerrillas.⁶¹⁷ He likely took this lesson from the capture of Hugo Blanco in La Convencion in 1963. This compartmentalization, for valid security reasons, also prevented M15M from sending replacements, military equipment, and other desperately needed supplies to the guerrillas in the field. In May, Elias returned from La Mar and informed Chang that Bejar needed Cuban advisors to assist with the tactical development

⁶¹³ PIP report, Atestado No. 9, 4 February 1966, p. 2, CEHMP, Béjar file.

⁶¹⁴ PIP report, ‘Manifestación del Detenido: Héctor Béjar Rivera’, 28 February 1966, p. 5, CEHMP, Béjar file.

⁶¹⁵ Interview with Hildebrando Perez in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 217. Spanish version: ‘La muerte, el sacrificio, la heroicidad de Javier Heraud’.

⁶¹⁶ Interview with Hildebrando Perez in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 218. Spanish version: ‘El subterráneo estaba ligado totalmente a la preparación de la guerrilla o apoyo a la guerrilla directamente’.

⁶¹⁷ PIP report, ‘Manifestación del Detenido: Héctor Béjar Rivera’, 28 February 1966, p. 5, CEHMP, Béjar file; Béjar, *Perú 1965*, p. 107

of the front. Chang travelled to Havana to personally pass this request to the Cubans.⁶¹⁸ The Cubans obliged, but the security forces destroyed the front before the advisors could arrive to assist them.

In late September 1964, Horacio Juarez La Rosa, along with two revolutionaries called Alberto and Wilfredo, sat in the Sucre Park in Ayacucho City. Horacio's younger brother Jose Homero Juarez La Rosa arrived to meet with them. The two were born and raised in Chungui and were 20 and 22 years old, respectively. They had not seen each other for some time because, unbeknownst to Homero, Horacio had been in Cuba to learn the principles of guerrilla warfare and had been working with the ELN preparing for the revolution. Homero was living at 108 Manco Copac Street in Ayacucho and studying at the National University. The group moved to Hotel Sucre, where Horacio, Alberto, and Wilfredo were staying. They asked Homero about his experience at school and his future. They were apparently attempting to get a feel for him and whether he would assist the ELN. They did not reveal their agenda. After completing his exams in December, he returned to his family home in Chungui. He then travelled with his friend Alberto Berrocal to Tambo, where they did some trading. There he ran into Horacio and Alberto. Horacio asked his brother and Berrocal to help him move some cargo, on five mules, to Chungui. They stopped at Berrocal's house in Hotopuquio for the night. Homero went home to Chungui and returned the next morning, but the other two had departed. In January 1965, Homero was in Ayacucho and met with Alberto, who introduced him to another revolutionary called Maxiliano Pena. Over the next few months, Homero helped them move large quantities of supplies from Ayacucho and Tambo to Chungui, Chapi, and other nearby locations. Inocencio Jassani provided the mules. Alberto paid Homero 600 Soles and one time gave him a 50 Sole tip. They hid the supplies in abandoned houses and remote locations throughout the region. Horacio, whom they called 'Tiki', and two other revolutionaries named Rios and Ladron assisted occasionally. Homero noticed that they always used their nicknames amongst each other. Finally, in May, they told Homero that they planned to assist the peasant syndicates to fight against the landowners and imperialism, but did not claim to be communists.⁶¹⁹ They told him that he could not join them because he did not have the required training and experience. Alberto warned Homero these activities 'were absolutely secret, and in their organization, the punishment for treason

⁶¹⁸ Interview with Aláin Elías in Lust, 'The Role of the Peruvian Guerrilla', p. 230.

⁶¹⁹ Army intelligence report, 'Ampliación de la manifestación de Homero Juárez La Rosa', 11 February 1966, p. 3, CEHMP, Béjar file.

was death'. He added that they were 'fighting for the people'.⁶²⁰ Homero told Army interrogators that the ELN members were not forthcoming with detailed information of their plans. Assuming this is true, it demonstrates good operational security on the part of the guerrillas.

In April 1965, Bejar and nine others travelled to La Mar to establish the Javier Heraud front. They travelled by various conveyances to Retama and then on foot to Chungui and met with a few others bringing their number to thirteen. They divided into two groups and began to move about the area to become familiar with the terrain. The ELN members attempted to avoid contact with the locals by travelling at night and staying away from the towns and villages. Miliciades Ruiz remembered, 'In the beginning we were clandestine, the people did not see us. We were hidden in the countryside, exploring the nearby areas'.⁶²¹ However, the locals began to take notice of their presence. Bejar recalled, 'The rumors spread and fantastic explanations are invented: that we are cattle thieves, *pishtacos* [murderers who sell human fat according to local superstition], Communists'. He continued, 'But what do they know about Communists except what they have heard from the village priest, the *Aprista* landowner, and the prejudiced schoolteacher'?⁶²² After a few weeks, they ran low on food, and their hunger forced them to contact the villagers. The locals called the guerrillas *papay*, which was a derogatory term for foreigners, including whites and mestizos, and also used when referring to superiors. Over the next few months, as the guerrillas built rapport, the locals begin to refer to them as *hermanos* (brothers), which signified a close affection. The term *companero* (comrade) was not commonly used between the guerrillas and the peasants as *hermano* demonstrated a closer and more intimate connection. Horacio was the only Quechua speaker in the local dialect, so he was responsible for most of the interpreting. The others, Spanish speakers, or Quechua speakers from other locations in Peru, studied hard to learn the local dialect quickly. They were also cognizant of the differences in culture and customs. Bejar wrote, 'Discipline, warm affection for the peasants, and modesty are not always characteristics of young students or of politicians filled with an intellectual self-sufficiency that offends simple people and which originates in daily habits that are often just

⁶²⁰ Army intelligence report No. 2000 CRM, 23 February 1966, p. 2, CEHMP, Béjar file. Spanish version: 'absolutamente secreto y que en su organización la traición se castigaba con la muerte'. 'luchaban por el pueblo'.

⁶²¹ Interview with Miliciades Ruiz in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 12. Spanish version: 'En un comienzo éramos clandestinos y todavía la gente no nos veía. Estábamos ocultos en el campamento y haciendo exploraciones cercanas'.

⁶²² Béjar, *Perú 1965*, p. 95.

the opposite of the way of life of country people'.⁶²³ Despite these challenges, the Javier Heraud front began to build support among the local population in La Mar.

M15M also developed an urban terrorism cell in Lima with the short-term aim of drawing attention away from the guerrilla front. The long-term purpose of the cell was to destabilize the governmental structure in preparation for the Revolutionary Army's inevitable march on the capital city. The cell went into action and employed improvised bombs on 15 May 1965, to commemorate the second anniversary of Heraud's death. The Lima daily *Expreso* noted that a group of individuals threw molotov cocktails at various locations in Lima including, 'the area of the Hipico Club, the offices of the Provisa firm, a building at 1151 Huanuco street near the Alameda Movie, and the Santa Rosa Bridge'.⁶²⁴ The following day, *Expreso* reported that the National Police had arrested two individuals suspected of being involved in the attacks. The police did not release their names, but one was said to be a university student and the other a relative of a ministerial official.⁶²⁵ The papers did not report any casualties from the bombings. M15M did not conduct any additional attacks. While M15M acted, Bejar's men in La Mar were still preparing for conflict.

Lobaton, the commander of the MIR's central front, began to conduct guerrilla warfare on 9 June 1965. By mid-July, the Peruvian government began to take the threat seriously.⁶²⁶ On 15 July, Belaunde gave a speech at the opening of a General Motors factory near Lima. After praising General Motors for helping develop Peru, he stated, 'This is where is found the greatest difference between this democratic world, which teaches how to use tooools [*sic*] to construct, and the other communist world, which tries to sway youth, training it in the infamous practice of making bombs and weapons to destroy and to separate'. Ambassador Jones wrote to Secretary of State Rusk, 'To the Embassy's knowledge, this remark (which greeted with strong applause) is the President's first public condemnation of communism'. He continued, 'We assume his action is reaction to guerrilla problem and believe it one more indication of GOP's belated but improving comprehension of potential internal security problems'.⁶²⁷ The National Security Council took notice and William Bowdler sent a copy of

⁶²³ Ibid., p. 110.

⁶²⁴ *Expreso*, 'Extremists in Lima Toss Molotov Cocktails on Anniversary of Heraud's Death', 16 May 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 3 June 1965, p. 15.

⁶²⁵ *Expreso*, 17 May 1965.

⁶²⁶ Department of State intelligence memo, Allan Evans to Dean Rusk, 'Guerrilla Attack in Central Peru', 11 June 1965, p. 1, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, folder 6.

⁶²⁷ State Department cable, John Jones to Dean Rusk, 16 July 1965, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, Folder 6.

the cable to McGeorge Bundy with a note that read, 'Statements like this one by President Belaunde are most helpful ... and hard to come by'.⁶²⁸ As we will see in chapter five, Lobaton's decision to begin guerrilla warfare before the other rural fronts readied themselves, was a significant detriment to the potential success of the insurrection. It also drew the attention of senior Peruvian government officials, including Belaunde, to the coming conflict.

Initially, the guerrillas remained in the lower altitudes of the mountains because it provided much vegetation that allowed them to stay concealed. However, much of the population lived at higher elevations, and to expand their network, and they needed to climb as high as 15,000 feet. They did not have proper clothing to withstand the elements, so they learned to move at night to stay warm and rest during the day in the sun. As they continued to make new friends and their language skills improved, they began to spread their revolutionary message. Bejar recalled, 'We don't need to convince them that the boss is their enemy. They know this and hate him wholeheartedly'.⁶²⁹ The guerrillas promised that they would repatriate the haciendas and give the land and spoils to the workers. He wrote, 'There are discontented people everywhere, and they receive us enthusiastically'.⁶³⁰ He admits that some locals may have distrusted or even feared the guerrillas, but that everyone helped them. This conflicts with the Fourth Military Region, which was responsible for La Mar, Intelligence section that alleged the Campesinos, 'were obliged to collaborate in different activities (providing food or serving as guides) under the threat of death'.⁶³¹ There is no other evidence that the guerrillas coerced the local population for support. It is more likely that the majority of the people willingly supported them, as Bejar claims, or at least remained neutral. However, the security forces soon began receiving information about the guerrilla activities, so a segment of the population did not appreciate the ELN fighters in the area. On 8 July, *La Prensa* reported that an indigenous person told the police that there was a group of men carrying weapons near Yanamonte.⁶³² This led to the speculation that they were university students from Ayacucho attempting communist agitation amongst the Campesinos.

⁶²⁸ National Security Council memo, William Bowdler to McGeorge Bundy, 20 July 1965, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, Folder 6.

⁶²⁹ Béjar, *Perú 1965*, p. 99.

⁶³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁶³¹ Army intelligence report No. 2000 CRM, 23 February 1966, p. 1, CEHMP, Béjar file. Spanish version: 'han sido obligados a colaborar en diferentes actividades (dando alojamiento o sirviendo de guías) bajo amenaza de muerte'.

⁶³² *La Prensa*, 'Ven Grupo Armado Cerca de Ayacucho', 8 July 1965, front page.

The Javier Heraud front chose to strictly follow the Cuban model of insurgency that the DGI taught to them in Havana and that Guevara described in his guide to guerrilla warfare. This contrasts with the MIR leaders that developed a hybrid version of the Chinese and Cuban models combined with their understanding of the situation in Peru. The ELN did not employ the concept of security zones, as did the MIR. The ELN leaders believed that at the beginning of the conflict, small groups of guerrillas that constantly moved, and received information from locals on the whereabouts of the security forces, was the best technique to survive. When they located a secure place to stop and rest, they would set up their hammocks, and cover themselves with ponchos to keep the rain out. They stayed in these locations less than twenty-four hours and then moved on. Bejar stated, 'We did not adopt a system of installing camps because it is very dangerous and unsecure, and it is easier to be discovered by the army or the police'.⁶³³ This idea was taken from their training in Cuba. It was consistent with Regis Debray's assertion, 'During this time the guerrilla base is, according to an expression of Fidel, the territory within which the guerrilla happens to be moving; it goes where he goes. In the initial stage, the base of support is in the guerrilla fighter's knapsack'.⁶³⁴ While this did provide enhanced security, it also made it more challenging to communicate with other guerrilla elements, intelligence sources, or coordinate logistical support with the urban front in Lima. They used messengers to communicate, or they met at prearranged locations and times to conduct planning for operations. They did not rely on technical communications means, which were susceptible to interception by the security forces. Despite the Javier Heraud front's discipline in using these tactics, it would turn out that they were no match for the Peruvian Army.

Logistical support was sufficient for the ELN's operations. They had an adequate number of weapons, most of which they purchased in Bolivia using Cuban funding and transported to La Mar. They made contacts in La Paz while they were regrouping after the Puerto Maldonado incident, so they did not have to rely on the PCB for weapons. Nestor Guevara explained that the ELN brought the weapons and ammunition from Bolivia to Cusco, where they stored them and later moved them by car to Ayacucho City. They then moved them by mule train to Chungui.⁶³⁵ Bejar had a Remington carbine. Tello, Manuel Grados, and Alex

⁶³³ PIP report, 'Manifestación del Detenido: Héctor Béjar Rivera', 28 February 1966, p. 5, CEHMP, Béjar file. Spanish version: 'No hemos adoptado el Sistema de instalar campamentos porque es muy peligroso e inseguro, debido a que es más fácil ser descubiertos por el ejército o la policía'.

⁶³⁴ Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution*, p. 65.

⁶³⁵ Interview with Néstor Guevara in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 208.

had Czech made Pistan machineguns, each with a thirty-round clip. Horacio, Juan Morales, Nemesio, and Marx had Mauser rifles. Zapata and Mercado purchased shotguns in Lima and transported them to La Mar.⁶³⁶ It is not clear how they provided weapons to newly recruited personnel. While they had weapons, there was a very limited stockpile of ammunition. Their level of proficiency with the weapons is unknown, while they received weapons instruction and participated in range firing in Cuba, there are no reports of how much time and effort they spent on weapons training in La Mar. After the guerrillas consumed the initial stock of food, they relied on foraging and hunting or the locals to provide sustenance. Bejar wrote, 'The provisions were easy, especially for a group as small as ours'.⁶³⁷ The ELN had difficulty obtaining medical supplies in La Mar. Bejar recalled, 'In respect to medicines when we exited the Capital in April 1965 we brought antibiotics, analgesics, disinfectants, and equipment for injections, but once we terminated this provisioning we were left without medicine, and we cured ourselves with "home remedies", herbs, etc'.⁶³⁸ The ELN members also shared their limited medical supplies with the local population. The sharing of medical supplies enhanced rapport and endeared the Guerrillas to the Campesinos.

For the ELN leadership, personnel issues became a concern. Alian Elias did not adapt well to the guerrilla way and could not tolerate the harsh conditions in the mountains. Bejar sent him and Edilberto Marquez back to Lima to assist Chang with the urban front.⁶³⁹ Horacio, who was a key to integrating with the local population, departed in July. He went with Bejar to reconnoitre Celestino Manchego's Hacienda in Sinto, Castrovirreyna province, in the Huancavelica department because they were considering attacking it. On their way back to Chungui, Horacio parted ways with Bejar to visit his girlfriend in Huanta for the evening. The police raided her house, captured Horacio, and took him to the military compound in Ayacucho. There was confusion over jurisdiction between the Army and the National Police. He did not return to the guerrilla front or participate in any other ELN activities. Nestor Guevara and Chiquitico attempted to travel to La Convencion to meet with De la Puente. Along the way, they learned that the security services were searching for them. When they arrived in Quillabamba, Chiquitico went to a café to eat ice cream. A person approached and

⁶³⁶ CEHMP, PIP report, Atestado No. 9, 4 February 1966, p. 2.

⁶³⁷ Béjar, *Perú 1965*, p. 107.

⁶³⁸ PIP report, 'Manifestación del Detenido: Héctor Béjar Rivera', 28 February 1966. P. 5, CEHMP, Béjar file. Spanish version: 'en lo que respecta a medicinas cuando salimos de esta capital el mes de Abril de 1965 llevamos antibióticos, analgésicos, desinfectantes y equipo para inyectar, pero una vez se nos terminó este aprovisionamiento nos quedamos sin medicinas y nos curábamos con remedios "caseros", hierbas, etc.'.

⁶³⁹ Interview with Alian Elías in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 217.

sat next to him. He recalled, 'He referenced that he knew where we were from and that we were being followed. First, I denied it, but he was very convincing'.⁶⁴⁰ Later that evening, they got into a confrontation with a drunken police officer. They departed their hotel early the next morning, which was fortunate for them because the police raided their hotel shortly after they left. They made their way through the many checkpoints to Cusco and found sanctuary. Guevara eventually went to Bolivia while Chiquitico remained in Cusco, neither had further contact with the ELN.

In early September 1965, representatives from the MIR and ELN met in Lima to discuss methods of collaboration and how they could synchronize operations against the government. They signed two documents that the MIR subsequently published in its newsletter *El Guerrillero*. The first was a manifesto that established the *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional* (National Liberation Armed Forces, FALN) also called the *Comando Nacional de Coordinacion* (National Coordination Command, CNdC). The document outlined the role of the CNdC to direct the actions of the MIR and ELN. It attacked the Belaunde administration and explained how the Oligarchy allowed the wealthy business and landowners to exploit the working class and the peasants. It read, the FALN has 'as a fundamental objective, the liquidation of the feudal system of exploitation from the earth, the destruction of the great bourgeoisie and the confiscation of the imperialist monopolies; Liquidation of this way and forever, the exploitation of man by man'. It continued, 'We will build for them a new society, one that is based on the worker-peasant alliance; Including all of the exploited sectors, applying for them a united political front'.⁶⁴¹ The FALN's National Command signed the document. The second document was a joint communiqué of the MIR and ELN, which explained that the revolution had begun, and the historical process was not reversible. The authors wrote that the MIR and ELN 'have agreed to strengthen their relations at the coordination level to jointly face the different tasks demanded by the liberation of our Homeland'.⁶⁴² They went on to invoke the revolutionary spirit of the Peruvian people and

⁶⁴⁰ Interview with Néstor Guevara in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 222. Spanish version: 'El hace referencia de lo que hacíamos desde que nos dimos cuenta que nos venía siguiendo. Primero se lo negué, pero él era bien convincente'.

⁶⁴¹ Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional manifiesto, September 1965, p. 2, CEHMP, Béjar file. Spanish version: 'como objetivos fundamentales, la liquidación del sistema feudal de explotación de la tierra, la destrucción de la gran burguesía monopolista y la confiscación de los monopolios imperialistas; liquidando de esta manera y para siempre, la explotación del hombre por el hombre'. 'Construyendo para ello una nueva sociedad, cuyo base estará dada por la alianza obrero-campesino; incluyendo además a todos los sectores explotados aplicando para ello una política acertada de Frente Único'.

⁶⁴² MIR and ELN 'Comunicado Conjunto', 9 September 2020, p. 1, CEHMP, Béjar file. Spanish version: 'han acordado estrechar sus relaciones a nivel de coordinación para enfrentar conjuntamente las diversas tareas que demanda la liberación de nuestra Patria'.

harkened back to the brave exploits of the Incan warriors, such as Manco Inca, Juan Santos, Tupac Amaru, and Pumacachua who fought against the Spanish. They also mentioned Francisco Vallejo, the peasant Mayta, and Javier Heraud, who had recently died for the revolution. They offered other groups the opportunity to join them, ‘This agreement is not exclusive or excluding, it is open to any other organization that fully identifies with the objectives of the fight and the requirements that it demands’.⁶⁴³ Ricardo Gadea, the MIR representative to the CNdC, stated that they also coordinated with the revolutionary Catholic priest Salomon Bolo Hidalgo who was the leader of the National Liberation Front.⁶⁴⁴ Mao Zedong implored the New Left of Peru to coordinated precisely in this manner back in February of 1964 because he recognized it was there only chance at a successful revolution.⁶⁴⁵ Despite the grandiose language, the National Command was at best a propaganda instrument. Lobaton’s French wife, Jacqueline Eluau explained, ‘although this organization proclaimed in theory, as the pompous title [suggests], the existence of a Command, in practice it revealed to be only a bureaucratic apparatus, a bit of service of traditional propaganda also in the classical leftist style’.⁶⁴⁶ Moreover, by the time the two guerrilla factions set aside their differences and decided to work together towards a common goal, it was too late.

By the end of the month, the ELN was ready to begin the armed propaganda phase of the revolution. Mao first published the concept of armed propaganda, which followed the political indoctrination step of the masses that led to guerrilla warfare.⁶⁴⁷ The Cubans adopted it as a tenet of the *foco* theory, although it is employed much sooner in the revolutionary cycle than it was in China or Vietnam. The concept has the guerrilla fighter demonstrate resolve through action instead of words. The ELN applied a nuanced aspect of the theory in the Peruvian Andes, where the population had been conditioned over many decades to fear the landowners, the security forces, and government officials, who are in a position of power over the poor and uneducated Campesinos. Debray argued, ‘This prestige constitutes the principal form of oppression: it immobilizes the discontented, silences them,

⁶⁴³ Ibid., p. 1, Spanish version: ‘Este acuerdo no es exclusivo ni excluyente, queda abierto a toda otra organización que se identifique planamente con los objetivos de la lucha y las exigencias que ella demande’.

⁶⁴⁴ Ricardo Gadea. Telephone Interview. 9 April 2020.

⁶⁴⁵ CIA report, ‘Plans of the MIR for Revolutionary Action’, 12 February 1964, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, folder 7.

⁶⁴⁶ Interview with Jacqueline Eluau in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 368. Spanish version: ‘Si bien este organización pregonaba en teoría, como título pomposo, la existencia de un Comando, en la práctica revelo ser solamente un aparato burocrático, un poco al servicio de la propaganda tradicional también en el modio izquierdista clásico’.

⁶⁴⁷ Mao, *Mao on Warfare*, p. 185.

leads them to swallow affronts at the mere sight of a uniform'.⁶⁴⁸ This form of power was not limited to the police and military, but extended to the landowners and *patrons* (bosses) on the haciendas. The population in Ayacucho was very sparse, and there were only a limited number of government officials. From most haciendas, workers would have to walk for days to reach a town to have access to government services, and the police rarely travelled to the haciendas.⁶⁴⁹ As a result, the hacienda owners became the *de facto* government on their land and ruled unconstrained. The ELN discovered that the Campesinos were not interested in talk, and as Debray described the guerrilla 'must make a show of strength and at the same time demonstrate that the enemy's strength is first and foremost his bluster. To destroy the idea of unassailability – that age-old accumulation of fear and humility vis-à-vis the *patron*, the policeman, the *guardia rural* – there is nothing better than combat.'⁶⁵⁰ In turn, the people will see that the guerrillas are fighting for them and provide additional active and passive support.

On the early morning of 25 September 1965, Bejar, along with his fellow guerrillas Cesar Pareja, Tello, Jorge Toque, and Zapata, walked up to the main house of the Chapi Hacienda, in the Chungui district of La Mar province. The remaining ELN members set up a security perimeter around the area in the unlikely event that the security forces would come to assist. The guerrillas attempted to enter the house silently, but the hacienda owner, retired Army Major Gonzalo Carrillo Rocha, noticed them and shot at them with a rifle. The guerrillas fought their way in and murdered Gonzalo Carrillo and his nephew Miguel Carrillo Cazorla in their bedrooms.⁶⁵¹ Gonzalo Carrillo was shot four times, once on the left side of the neck, twice in the chest, and once in the left shoulder. He was 64 years old. Miguel Carrillo was shot twice, once in the left thigh, and once in the left chest. He was 52 years old. There were four bullet holes in the wall of his bedroom.⁶⁵² During the melee, the guerrillas also killed an 18-year-old peasant domestic worker called Alberto Arone Tello, who was sleeping in the house. A stray bullet killed him, but *Correo* reported that he was a 'faithful peon', suggesting the guerrillas may have killed him intentionally.⁶⁵³ Arone's mother, Carmina

⁶⁴⁸ Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution*, p. 51.

⁶⁴⁹ Llamojha and Heilman, *Now Peru is Mine*, p. 26.

⁶⁵⁰ Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution*, p. 52.

⁶⁵¹ PIP report, 'Manifestación del Detenido: Héctor Béjar Rivera', 28 February 1966, p. 3, CEHMP, Béjar file; *La Prensa*, 25 September 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 18 October 1965, p. 5; *Correo*, 'La confesión de Béjar: Yo Dirigi El Asalto a La Hacienda Chapi', 2 March 1966, CEHMP, Béjar file.

⁶⁵² PIP report No. 430, 21 October 1965, p. 5, CEHMP, Béjar file.

⁶⁵³ *Correo*, 29 September 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 18 October 1965, p. 5.

Tello Orihuela, was sleeping in a nearby building, and the commotion woke her from her sleep. She was devastated when she later discovered the body of her son. She took his body to their home village of Pante, where they laid him to rest.⁶⁵⁴ The guerrillas stole 100,000 soles worth of gold along with three rifles, two pistols, and ammunition. *Nacional* explained that the gold was from a recent cattle sale, and Bejar may have learned of this from an informant and alleged that the motivation behind the attack was to steal the gold.⁶⁵⁵ However, this is inconsistent with the ELNs strategy. The guerrillas gathered the workers outside of the house and explained their actions. On the patio, they ceremonially burned the letters of debt that the Carrillo's had used to hold the workers in servitude, among other documents they discovered in the house. They distributed the animals, foodstuffs, and other supplies, to the workers and told them they were now the rightful owners of the land and no longer had to serve the criminal Carrillo family. At ten in the morning, the guerrillas loaded their portion of the supplies on a stolen mule and departed the hacienda for a mountainous area known as Tincoy to hide from the authorities.

This first episode of armed propaganda won over many of the Campesinos in the area. Bejar targeted the Chapi hacienda because it was the largest and most prosperous in the Ayacucho department, and its owners were among the most brutal. *El Guerrillero* reported, 'The execution of the assassins Gonzalo and Miguel Carrillo, owners of the Chapi hacienda, in the province of La Mar, department of Ayacucho, is a historic act of justice, comparable with the hanging of Corregidor Ariaga by Tupac Amaru'. The article went on to describe the crimes the Carrillo's committed against the workers over the years and how the authorities failed to act. It concluded with the rhetoric question, 'Is there any doubt in the justice of executing these criminals?'.⁶⁵⁶ In his memoir, Bejar did not seem to place the attack on Chapi in such high regard. He relegated the event to a footnote written in a dry matter of fact tone, 'The capture of Chapi, in which the hated Carrillo landowners died, took place on 25 September 1965'.⁶⁵⁷ Oddly, he did not take credit for this episode of revolutionary justice. Especially considering, by 1969, when he published his memoir from a Lima prison, various authors had

⁶⁵⁴ PIP report, 'Manifestación de Carmina Tello Orihuela', 7 October 1965, p. 2, CEHMP, Béjar file.

⁶⁵⁵ *Nacional*, 'PIP Investiga Asesinato de Hacendados: Creen Que Campesinos Asaltaron la Had. Chapi', 4 October 1965, CEHMP, Béjar file.

⁶⁵⁶ *El Guerrillero*, 'Pene de Muerte a los Explotadores', No. 6, 3 October 1965, p. 2, reprinted in Mercado, *Las Guerrillas Del Perú*, p. 187. Spanish version: '¿Cabe alguna de la justicia de la ejecución de semejantes criminales?'.
⁶⁵⁷ Béjar, *Perú 1965*, p. 99.

publicized the events at Chapi in newspapers and journal articles.⁶⁵⁸ Moreover, he had described the events himself to the police following his capture.⁶⁵⁹ Perhaps he was attempting to protect the ELN members whom the government had not detained.

Thirty police officers arrived at Chapi on 1 October. PIP Officer Rolando Huerta Conde led the investigation team and discovered the Carrillo's bloated and decaying bodies in the bedrooms where the guerrillas had left them. They completed a detailed forensic report of the main house, including photos of the corpses, the battle damage the ELN caused, and the propaganda they left behind. They interviewed nine persons who were present during the attack. The Peruvian government used the report, which was dated 21 October 1965, as evidence at Bejar's trial. Arturo Carrillo Cazorla, the brother of Miguel Carrillo, was not present at the hacienda during the attack. He later returned and to take over the management of the hacienda and selected his most trusted workers to assist him.⁶⁶⁰ The PIP team photographed the propaganda messages scribbled on the walls of the main house. The various inscriptions included: 'National Liberation Army – Land or Death – We will be victorious; Armed detachment Javier Heraud – Long live the peasant struggle'.⁶⁶¹ The Javier Heraud front announced its arrival on the Peruvian revolutionary scene, and the government now considered them a threat.

The PIP team also discovered a two-page manifesto titled 'New Front of Guerrillas in Ayacucho'. De la Pedraja shows the importance of such documents to the insurgent organizations and explained that 'manifestoes were indispensable to differentiate the noble rebels from common criminals. The manifesto magically transformed the use of violence and senseless killing to a sacred cause'.⁶⁶² The ELN's manifesto began by directly attacking the Belaunde government for not fulfilling election promises made to the Peruvian people. Specifically, for not reforming the agriculture, petroleum, and mining industries, and allowing the North American monopolies to continue to exploit Peru's natural resources. To ignite a sense of urgency, they claimed that this was one of the most critical times in Peruvian history. They wrote, 'The pillage and pitiless exploitation of our country have not stopped,

⁶⁵⁸ Ricardo Letts Colmenares under the pen name Américo Pumaruna, 'Perú: revolución, insurrección, guerrillas', *Pensamiento Crítico*, Havana, No. 1, February 1967; *Correo*, 'La confesión de Bajar: Yo Dirigí El Asalto a La Hacienda Chapi', 2 March 1966, CEHMP, Béjar file.

⁶⁵⁹ PIP Report, 'Manifestación del Detenido: Héctor Béjar Rivera', 28 February 1966, p. 4, CEHMP, Béjar file.

⁶⁶⁰ CEHMP, PIP report No 430, 21 October 1965, p2.

⁶⁶¹ PIP report No. 430, supporting documentation, 21 October 1965, p. 12, CEHMP, Béjar file. Spanish version: 'Ejército de Liberación Nacional – Tierra o Muerte – Venceremos' 'Destacamento Armado Javier Heraud – Viva La Lucha Campesina'.

⁶⁶² De la Pedraja, *Wars of Latin America*, p. 160.

even more, it continues. The people have complained and say: Enough with the Pillage and Exploitation!'. The authors were attempting to demonstrate that Belaunde had not enacted his promised reforms, and the Andean Campesinos still lived an oppressed existence. They explained that only 'popular unity had the capacity to destroy the powerful forces of the Oligarchy'.⁶⁶³ It announced the establishment of the Javier Heraud guerrilla front in Ayacucho and named Bejar as its commander. The second page of the document served as an indictment of the Carrillo's and attempted to justify their extrajudicial killing. The manifesto concluded with calls for the death of imperialism and the Oligarchy and long life for the ELN.

Immediately following the ELN's attack on the Chapi hacienda, the Army began moving troops to deal with the emerging guerrilla front. The Army tasked the Brigade General Enrique Valdez of the Fourth Military Region, who was also running operations in Mesa Pelada against De La Puente's MIR front, to command the counterinsurgency in La Mar. On 29 September, the Prefect of the region, Dr Leoncio Miranda, announced that the government dispatched two units to the area.⁶⁶⁴ The Peruvian Air Force (FAP) worked efficiently to move the troops into the area by plane and helicopter, including the Army detachment Sota (Cat) and Civil Guard (rural police) detachment Potro (Colt). They arrived 'at the junction of Apurimac and Pampas rivers, with the mission to pressure the extremists from east to west in the general direction of Torobamba river staying north of the Pampas river'.⁶⁶⁵ As the security forces prepared, the guerrillas continued the revolutionary struggle. Bejar wrote, 'It hasn't taken us long to expel the large landowners, many of whom fled before we reached them. The workers are beginning to realize how different it is to live without bosses'.⁶⁶⁶ Additionally, Lust asserted that between September and December, 'various haciendas were emptied: Esmeralda, Muyoc, Sojos, and Cohaihuay'.⁶⁶⁷ As the Army and Civil Guard units entered the area, the guerrillas used their intimate knowledge of the terrain along with information the locals provided to outmanoeuvre them. When the security forces occupied a

⁶⁶³ ELN Manifiesto, 'Nuevo Frente Guerrillero en Ayacucho', October 1965, p. 1, CEHMP, Béjar file. Spanish version: 'El saqueo y la explotación inmisericorde de nuestro país no pare, más aun, ello continua. El pueblo reclama y dice: ¡Basta ya de saque y explotación!' 'pueblo unido y organizado será capaz de derrotar a las poderosas fuerzas de la oligarquía'.

⁶⁶⁴ *Correo*, 29 September 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 18 October 1965, p. 5.

⁶⁶⁵ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 68. Spanish version: 'la confluencia de los ríos Apurimac y Pampas, con la misión de presionar a los extremistas de E a O en la dirección general del río Torobamba y curso N del río Pampas'.

⁶⁶⁶ Béjar, *Perú 1965*, p. 99.

⁶⁶⁷ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, 226. Spanish version: 'varias haciendas das fueron vaciadas: Esmeralda, Muyoc, Sojos y Conaihuay',

key terrain feature, the guerrillas simply moved around it. After years of reflection, Bejar concluded that they should have moved out of the region until the security forces departed. However, his group became complacent and created a security zone without realizing it, although they believed that if they constantly moved, they would be safe. Bejar wrote, 'But when a guerrilla thinks that he controls the terrain and is perfectly familiar with it, he begins unconsciously to fix himself to that area. And then he is lost, because not all of the information he has received is correct, and he does not have all of the information about his enemy that he ought to have'.⁶⁶⁸ As the security forces patrolled the area, the guerrillas began to have security problems. The ELN members, over the past months, had openly and publicly consorted with the villagers and hacienda workers. Everyone knew the locals that were directly supporting the guerrillas, and it did not take long for the security forces to penetrate this network.

Although the guerrillas were under constant pressure from 19 November 1965, Radio Habana announced that Peru had a new guerrilla front called the National Liberation Army. The transmission stated, 'the new guerrilla front was under the command of the Hector Bejar and was baptized with the name Javier Heraud, the young poet that lost his life in Puerto Maldonado'.⁶⁶⁹ Six days later, a letter from Bejar was presented at the Tenth National Students Conference in Lima. He offered them a warm and fraternal greeting from the Javier Heraud front and explained what actions they were taking in La Mar for the revolution. Bejar thanked the students for their moral support and implored them to keep fighting to improve the universities and the overall education system in the country. He wrote, 'I would like to remind you, dear communist colleagues, that the struggle for university reform is intimately linked to the general action of the Peruvian people for its definitive and total liberation'.⁶⁷⁰ He did not ask, or even suggest, that the students should go to the mountains and take up arms with the guerrillas. He wanted them to complete their educations and continue the civil resistance in the universities. In contrast, a source close to the military leaked that the ELN was attempting to recruit students in Ayacucho and offering them 3,000 soles to join. *La Prensa* wrote, 'The informant pointed out that the offer by the guerrillas to the students

⁶⁶⁸ Béjar, *Perú 1965*, p. 108.

⁶⁶⁹ *La Prensa*, 'Cuba Anuncia Otro Frente De Guerrillas en el Perú', 19 November 1965, front page.

⁶⁷⁰ ELN document dated 25 November 1965, CEHMP, Béjar file. Spanish version: 'Quisiera recordarles, queridos colegas comunistas, que la lucha por la reforma universitaria está íntimamente ligada a la acción general del pueblo peruano por su liberación definitiva y total'.

probably indicates that the Communists are suffering from manpower shortages'.⁶⁷¹ There is no evidence to support this claim, but if it was true, it was a risky move that was outside of the ELN's operational pattern.

The ELN had mixed success with the recruitment of new personnel. Chang was able to recruit aspiring revolutionaries in Lima. However, after the initial infiltration of the guerrillas into La Mar in April, there was no apparatus to send the recruits to link up with Bejar and the guerrilla column. Moreover, after the ELN initiated actions in September, it would have been complicated to infiltrate new members into the area because of the population control measures and scrutiny the security forces placed on people entering the area. As a result, Bejar's only option was to recruit guerrilla fighters from the local population, which was probably better for the movement than bringing in more outsiders that did not speak the language or understand the local culture. Bejar recalled, 'The recruiting was feasible, but it was too lengthy a process due to the slowness with which the peasant makes a decision'.⁶⁷² A few locals did join the ELN as fighters after the armed propaganda in Chapi, but most waited to see if additional actions would be successful as the ELN promised. Bejar asserted that the ELN needed to be able to recruit at a faster pace and that because of the length of the peasant's decision-making cycle, they could not. Therefore, the size of the guerrilla column remained small and prevented it from conducting offensive operations against the security forces. A mestizo ferryman who worked on the Sojos hacienda was the first brother the ELN recruited in 1965, and he later died in battle. Of the local recruits, Bejar wrote, 'They were seized by the new possibilities that guerrilla warfare opened before them and by the truth that suddenly appeared in all its stark reality before their primitive eyes. They were our best propagandists'. He continued, 'They had an unforgettable way of lifting their rifles in their strong, work-hardened hands as they talked to their brothers in their native tongue and said: "Brothers, the landowners are through. This is respect!"'.⁶⁷³ This must have been a powerful message, but it is puzzling why it did not attract more Campesinos to the cause. This offers a case study for future research into recruiting and motivating indigenous peoples to support revolutions. In the end, the ELN was not able to recruit enough fighters to support its goal of changing the political landscape in Peru.

⁶⁷¹ *La Prensa*, 'Guerrillas Attempt to Attract Students With Wage Offers', 21 December 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 12 January 1966, p. 9.

⁶⁷² Bejar, *Peru 1965*, p. 108.

⁶⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

By late November, the security forces gained an understanding of the situation and brought more units into the area to help encircle the guerrillas. The Army moved the following detachments from Mesa Pelada into La Mar: Torpedo to Luisiana; Ronco to San Miguel; Rodillo to Occbamba; Rombo and Topo to the intersection of the Pampas and Apurimac rivers. These units were operational on 6 December and began to patrol their sectors for the guerrillas. They paid close attention to the villages of Anko, Chungui, and Punqui.⁶⁷⁴ As more troops moved into the area, the guerrillas separated into three groups. They also began to take certain Campesinos with them, so the security forces could not harm them. On 17 December, the Potro detachment surprised a guerrilla element near Tincoj and killed Edgardo Tello, Ricardo Leon, and Juan Zapata Boderó. Bejar and the others survived, but they were scattered and unable to reconstitute as a force. Bejar wrote, ‘with the guerrilla unit dispersed, its men left to die one by one under the guns of their hunters. The individual’s fate of each of the comrades is not known. Some died in combat, while others were captured, jailed, and then shot by Army Intelligence’.⁶⁷⁵ Meanwhile, the Rodillo detachment advanced on Socos and Moyoc villages, where they encountered a guerrilla element and, in the ensuing firefight, killed three ELN members. The final engagements between security forces and the guerrillas involved the Rodillo and Ronco detachments between 24 December 1965 and 5 January 1966. The detachments killed twelve, including Carlos Edwin Garcia Miranda, Nemesio Unco Escobar, Juan Morales, Jorge Hernan Zapata Boderó, Jorge Toque Apaza, Jose Bernabe Gurreonero Castro, Hermes Agapito Valiente Granados, Guillermo Mercado Leon, Hugo Ricra Corrales, Celestino Valencia, Julio Oscco, and Pedro Haway Junco.⁶⁷⁶ Bejar and the rest of the guerrillas escaped from La Mar to various places such as Lima and Cusco. The official Ministry of War report read: ‘Like in the Central Sierra and La Convencion, thanks to the intervention of the Armed Forces, the region returned to normal, and under the law, the people calmly returned to their labors’.⁶⁷⁷ Although this language overstates the tranquillity of La Mar, the security forces were able to destroy the ELN guerrilla column efficiently.

Bejar was able to slip past the security force’s cordon of La Mar and make his way back to Lima. Following the ambush on 17 December, Bejar and Edgard de la Sota found

⁶⁷⁴ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 68.

⁶⁷⁵ Béjar, *Perú 1965*, p. 109.

⁶⁷⁶ Army Intelligence report No 4101-B2, 23 August 1966, CEHMP, Béjar file; Various death certificates signed by Brigade General Enrique Valdez Angulu, Fourth Military Region Commander, 10 April 1968, CEHMP, Béjar file; PIP report No. 158, 10 May 1966, CEHMP, Béjar file.

⁶⁷⁷ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, 69. Spanish version: ‘Como en la Sierra Central y en La Convención, gracias a la intervención de la FA, esta región vuelve a la normalidad y al amparo de la ley población se tranquiliza reiniciando sus labores’.

themselves isolated from the rest of the guerrillas, so they decided to make travel to Ayacucho, where they would hopefully meet up with their comrades. During the trek, they were split up. Bejar eventually found refuge with a local villager in Anco who sheltered him.⁶⁷⁸ At one point in January 1966, he secretly met with a journalist from the Lima weekly periodical *Gestos* and sat for an interview. He explained that if the guerrillas, or even himself, were killed the revolution will continue. He stated, ‘The road of violence, when it is travelled by the people, is the road to victory’.⁶⁷⁹ Bejar also noted the irony of the fact that they were attempting to use violence to end violence.⁶⁸⁰ He also provided the reporter photographs of the guerrilla band from April 1965 so that they could publish them to show the people in Lima the Javier Heraud front members were indeed guerrillas and not thieves or cattle rustlers as the government had described them. On 26 February, Bejar departed Anco in a truck to Chinchibamba and then got a ride on another vehicle to Ayacucho. In Ayacucho, he boarded the Pullman bus service under the assumed name Raul Vargas Leon and false identification document #2443383.⁶⁸¹ At 2330 that evening, Bejar arrived at the bus station at Junior Gamarra area in the capital at the intersection of Bolivar Avenue and Humboldt Street.

Bejar first contacted Mario Alvarez, who offered a room, but he would have to share it with an actor from Argentina. He declined and went to see his former colleague and professor at San Marcos University, Virgilio Roel Pineta, who lived at 353 Manuel Segura, Apartment B, Lince. Roel was an old friend and best man at Bejar’s wedding. Roel later told the police that Bejar arrived at ‘four in the morning, dirty, fatigued, without socks, sick’.⁶⁸² Roel agreed to let him stay for one day. Julio Dagnino and Gonzalo Manrique arrived at 0700 to take Bejar to another safe house, but Roel sent them away because he was sleeping. Alian Elias stated that eight people who knew where the ELN leader was hiding.⁶⁸³ At 1800 that afternoon, the PIP arrived and arrested Bejar and Roel. Bejar has a severe cutaneous leishmaniasis lesion on his right foot.⁶⁸⁴ The court found him guilty and he served five years in prison before the Velasco government released him on 24 December 1970. Five theories

⁶⁷⁸ Héctor Béjar, *El primer día: historia interior de una guerrilla andina* (Lima: 1989) unpublished copy quoted in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 229.

⁶⁷⁹ *Gestos*, ‘Gestos Publishes Interview With Héctor Béjar’, 31 January 1966, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 17 February 1966, p. 5.

⁶⁸⁰ *Gestos*, ‘Reportaje al Último Guerrillero’, 31 January 1966, p. 2, CEHMP, Béjar file.

⁶⁸¹ Bus Manifest, ‘Empresa de Transporte Ayacucho, S. A.’, 27 February 1966, CEHMP, Béjar file.

⁶⁸² PIP report, ‘Manifestación del Detenido Virgilio Roel Pineda’, 1 March 1966, p. 1, CEHMP, Béjar file. Spanish version: ‘cuatro de la madrugada, completamente sucio, fatigado, sin medias, enfermo’.

⁶⁸³ Interview with Alian Elias in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, 230.

⁶⁸⁴ Ministerio de Guerra, Servicio de Sanidad report, 20 May 1966, CEHMP, Béjar file.

explain how the PIP tracked down Bejar so quickly. The first is that one of the eight provided the authorities with the location.⁶⁸⁵ Second, the PIP had Bejar's wife under surveillance and followed her to the apartment.⁶⁸⁶ Third, according to Roel, the PIP were looking for student leader Licurgo Pinto and stumbled across Bejar.⁶⁸⁷ Fourth, Harry Villegas wrote from Bolivia in his war diary on 6 August 1966, 'Based on how events have unfolded, it appears Calixto [Bejar's *nom de guerre*], using a doctor as an intermediary, might have surrendered, perhaps in exchange for guarantees for his life'.⁶⁸⁸ Finally, taking a more strategic view, Lust argued the police discovered Bejar because the ELN did not build an urban support structure capable of handling the situation.⁶⁸⁹ Regardless, the Peruvian government had captured the guerrilla, which put an end to this chapter in the ELN's history.

In an interview with the Havana based journal *Pensamiento Crítico*, Bejar made serious accusations against the Peruvian government and armed services. Specifically, of the Army, he wrote, 'it ruthlessly massacred the population, in a genocidal operation that had the objective of causing panic and punishing exemplarily the peoples who had helped us'. He added that the Army 'killed innocents, raped women, destroyed villages and crops'.⁶⁹⁰ The journalist asked Bejar about the counterinsurgency strategy and techniques the Army used in La Mar. He replied that they employed 'indiscriminate repression' and alleged torture, assassination, and genocide. About the torture, he wrote, 'the tortures inflicted on the detainees illustrate the behavior of the henchmen with regard to the prisoners'.⁶⁹¹ The reports of torture are difficult to corroborate. It is doubtful that the Peruvian government would produce documents that would support these claims. He stated that the Peruvian government assassinated Maximo Velando, Edwin Garcia, Tomas Salazar, Aniceto Flores, Eramos Flores, and their children. He added, Walter Palacios would have been assassinated if not for the

⁶⁸⁵ *El Comercio*, 'Extremista Béjar detenido en Lince participo en el asesinato de la Had. Chapi', 2 March 1966, p. 19, CEHMP, Béjar file; See, also, *La Prensa*, 'Cae en Lima Guerrillero Rojo Que Dirigio la Masacre de Chapi', 2 March 1966, front page, CEHMP, Béjar file.

⁶⁸⁶ *Caretas*, 15 March 1966, p. 14.

⁶⁸⁷ PIP report, 'Declaración Testimonial del Dr. Virilio Roel Pineda', 6 May 1966, CEHMP, Béjar file.

⁶⁸⁸ Harry Villegas, *Pambo, A Man of Che's Guerrilla* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1997), p. 99.

⁶⁸⁹ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 232.

⁶⁹⁰ 'Perú: entrevista a dos guerrilleros', *Pensamiento Crítico*, Habana, No. 6, July 1967, p. 188, <http://www.filosofia.org/rev/pch/1967/pdf/n06p171.pdf> (accessed 12 November 2019). Spanish version: 'masacraba despiadadamente a la población, en una operación genocida que tenía por objetivo causar el pánico y castigar ejemplarmente a los pueblos que nos habían ayudado'. 'que mato inocentes, violó mujeres, destruyó poblados y sembrados'.

⁶⁹¹ 'Perú: entrevista a dos guerrilleros', p. 192 and 193. Spanish version: 'represión indiscriminada'. 'las torturas infligidas a los detenidos ilustran sobre la conducta de los esbirros con respecto a los presos'.

‘rapid intervention by various democratic personalities’.⁶⁹² On 21 December 1967, Bejar sent official correspondence to the legal officer of the Army’s second judicial zone. He wrote, ‘Edwin Garcia Miranda, Luis Zapata Boderó, Ricardo Amaya Quintana, and Carlos Valderrama died in the dungeons of the PIP and the Armed Forces intelligence service, these bloody facts have to date not been clarified nor sanctioned’.⁶⁹³ Moreover, there are many inconsistencies in the government documents that exist. For example, there is a PIP report from 21 May 1966, stating they captured Edwin Garcia Miranda, but does not provide the date.⁶⁹⁴ There is also a death certificate signed by the Army Commander in the region that states Carlos Edwin Garcia Miranda died in combat at 1800 hours on 30 December 1965. However, Brigade General Enrique Valdez Anculo signed it on 10 April 1968, long after the event supposedly took place.⁶⁹⁵ Lust wrote, there are ‘many doubts about the dates that these different guerrillas were killed’.⁶⁹⁶ A close review of the available documents leads one to think that the government was hiding something. However, an alternative explanation that does not involve conspiracy could be that it was bureaucratic incompetence and general confusion or the fact that the security forces could not positively identify dead individuals.

Like the events involving the MIR that I will describe in chapter five, the security forces may have tortured detainees and committed extrajudicial killings. However, the allegations of genocide are questionable. Bejar explained, ‘Indiscriminate repression has only one name: genocide. Communities like Pucuta, Anquea, Chungui, Muyoc, Palljas, etc. were razed and destroyed without differentiating between guerrillas, sympathizers, or simply suspicious [people]’.⁶⁹⁷ The United Nations defines genocide as ‘any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’.⁶⁹⁸ The Army and the Civil Guard certainly employed brutal counterinsurgency tactics in La

⁶⁹² ‘Perú: entrevista a dos guerrilleros’, p. 193. Spanish version: ‘rápida intervención de varias personalidades democráticas’.

⁶⁹³ Héctor Béjar statement, 21 December 1967, CEHMP, Béjar file. Spanish version: ‘Edwin García Miranda, Luis Zapata Boderó, Ricardo Amaya Quintana, and Carlos Valderrama murieron en los calabozos de la PIP y de los servicios de inteligencia de las Fuerzas Armadas, sin que estos hechos sangrientos hayan sido hasta hoy ni esclarecidos ni sancionados’.

⁶⁹⁴ PIP report 280-S, 21 May 1966, CEHMP, Béjar file.

⁶⁹⁵ Death certificate signed by Brigade General Enrique Valdez Angulo, Forth Military Region Commander, 10 April 1968, CEHMP, Béjar file.

⁶⁹⁶ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, 228. Spanish version: ‘muchas dudas acerca de las fechas de muerte de los distintos guerrilleros’.

⁶⁹⁷ ‘Perú: entrevista a dos guerrilleros’, p. 192. Spanish version: ‘represión indiscriminada que tiene un solo nombre: genocidio; poblaciones como Pucutá, Anquea, Chungui, Muyoc, Palljas, etc. fueron arrasadas y destruidas sin hacer diferencias entre guerrilleros, simpatizantes o simples sospechosos’.

⁶⁹⁸ United Nations, The Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Genocide background page, <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml> (accessed 5 April 2020).

Mar, but it is difficult to conclude that they were attempting to wipe out the Andean Indians for ethnic and racial reasons. The simplest explanation is that the landowners, to whom, according to the leftists, the security forces were beholden, needed the Campesinos to provide inexpensive labour. Therefore, it makes no sense to wipe them out. It is understandable that the locals did not complain about the abuses, because after all, to whom would they complain? However, Bejar is the lone voice in making these events known to people outside of La Mar. The security forces tightly controlled press access to La Mar, but, surprisingly, news of genocide did not make its way to journals and newspapers. Similar events show that it is challenging to cover up large-scale atrocities that occur during counterinsurgency operations. For example, the My Lai massacre in Vietnam and the Accomarca village massacre in Peru on 14 August 1985, during the internal conflict with the Shining Path.⁶⁹⁹ Moreover, many Peruvian service members have come forward and testified about atrocities they participated in or observed during the 1980s and 1990s, but none have come forward to speak about the events in La Mar. The fact that the ELN committed extrajudicial killings does not exonerate the security services. As far as the public record can discern, the Peruvian government did not conduct investigations into Bejar's allegations. This is curious and leads one to believe that there was something to hide.

Conclusion


This chapter reviewed Bejar's ELN attempt to incite revolution in Peru during the 1960s. This was an integral part of the Cuban plan to liberate South America. The intelligence services of Latin America and the US closely observed the ELN's movement back to Peru from Cuba. Bolivian Communist Party leader Mario Monje's assistance was contentious and unreliable, but the rank-and-file PCB members provided the ELN support, sometimes against Party orders, and almost always at great risk from the security forces. Despite the failure and loss of Javier Heraud at Puerto Maldonado, the ELN gained valuable experience, tested the will of its fighters, and in the words of Alian Elias merged 'theory with action'. In 1964 and 1965, the ELN members established the M15M urban front in Lima and the Javier Heraud

⁶⁹⁹ David Anderson (ed.) *Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1998); 'Comisión Investigadora de los Hechos Producidos en la Localidad de Accomarca', Senado Comisión Derechos Humanos, República Peruana, 1985, Collection of ephemera from the Peruvian Insurrection. Rare Book Division, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections. Princeton University Library (EX) JL3481.C65 1974q, box 4, folder 2; *Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación* (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, CVR). 'Final Report', 28 August 2003. <http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-peru-01> Accessed 24 December 2017; CVR, Volume VII, paragraph 2.15, p. 155; Heeg, 'Use of Psychological Operations During the Insurgency in Peru, 1970-1995', p. 6.

rural front in La Mar. Bejar, in consultation with other ELN leaders, selected La Mar because the government's land reform programs had not been instituted there. They assumed this would increase the Campesino's willingness to support the revolution. While this turned out to be partially true, in the end, the Peruvian security forces overmatched them. The Peruvian Army and Civil Guard, underpinned by the US government, were fully prepared to move in and destroy the guerrilla threat. Moreover, the National Police were able to control ELN attempts to subvert the government in the capital. They captured Hector Bejar within twenty-four hours of his return to Lima. Human rights abuses occurred on both the government and guerrilla side of the conflict. Unfortunately, there were no serious investigations or truth commissions that considered the events of 1965. Regardless of the security forces victory, the local population in La Mar still suffers to this day.

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Chapter five: Conflict with the MIR



In 1964, Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) personnel were making the final arrangements for their violent insurrection. While scholars have written extensively about the central and southern fronts, recently declassified documents and multi-archival research has revealed new insight into the importance of the MIR's northern front and urban operations. Although the Belaunde administration initially quibbled over the MIR threat, it was the largest and most competent guerrilla group in Latin America during the 1960s.

However, as former MIR senior leader Ricardo Gadea cautions us, it was primarily a political group, with a military arm, that had a distinct set of goals to reform the country.⁷⁰⁰ As such, its activities would have a long-term impact on Peru's social-economic development.

The MIR Threat

Peruvian government officials disagreed about the efficacy of the MIR threat. Until June 1965, Belaunde discounted the guerrilla menace and claimed they were cattle rustlers.⁷⁰¹ The Lima biweekly newsmagazine *Caretas* ran a cover story that dubbed the MIR operatives 'Los Gerrigeos', which combined the Spanish words for guerrilla and cattle rustler.⁷⁰² In response, the Peruvian Investigations Police (PIP) published a six-page assessment of the rising insurrection titled 'About no existence of guerrilla warfare in the country'. The report shows that the PIP intelligence analysts understood that the MIR had three clandestine bases, and that they knew the locations, in addition to the names and backgrounds of most of the senior leaders.⁷⁰³ Moreover, the National Intelligence Service (SIN) determined the MIR was 'the best prepared [insurgent] organization in the country with permanent centers of activity in Piura, Cajamarca, Bagua, in Amazonas, Lambayeque, La Libertad, Lima, Junin, Arequipa, Cusco, and Puno'.⁷⁰⁴ The CIA assessed, 'The best organized and best trained of any revolutionary group in Peru is the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). The MIR has about 1,000 members, at least 150 of whom have received extensive guerrilla training in Cuba, Communist China, and North Korea. The MIR has the potential to become a very serious insurgent threat'.⁷⁰⁵ The Country Team at the US Embassy added that the MIR 'is still the best organized and best-trained revolutionary group in Peru but it is now having financial difficulties and effective police action has kept this group off-balance'. They continued, 'this situation possibly could force the MIR into some move if only to attempt to show its backers that it is capable of action and deserves further support'.⁷⁰⁶ All of these reports concurred that while the MIR had the capability to conduct guerrilla warfare, it was

⁷⁰⁰ Ricardo Gadea. Telephone Interview. 9 April 2020.

⁷⁰¹ Lima daily newspaper, *Presente*, 1965, p. 20 translated in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 105; Lima daily newspaper *La Cronica*, 'Rotalde Calls Guerrillas Rural Gangsters', 12 June 1965 translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 30 June 1965, p. 25.

⁷⁰² *Caretas*, 'Los Gerrigeos', 25 June 1965, p. 13.

⁷⁰³ PIP report, 'Sobre no existencia de Guerra de guerrilla en el País', 4 June 1965, p. 5, JNE, 1960s file.

⁷⁰⁴ SIN report 'Infiltración el Campo Laboral y Campesinado', 15 May 1965, p. 4, JNE, 1960s file. Spanish version: 'el mejor organizado a lo largo del país, con centros permanentes de actividad en Piura, Cajamarca, Bagua, in Amazonas, Lambayeque, La Libertad, Lima, Junín, Arequipa, Cusco, and Puno'.

⁷⁰⁵ CIA study, 'A Survey of Communism in Latin America', 3 December 1965, p. T-12.

⁷⁰⁶ AIRGRAM-224, 'Review of Internal Defense Plan for Peru', 27 September 1964, p. 3, NARA, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Counterinsurgency in Peru, box 4, folder 10.

not likely that it was strong enough to defeat the security forces. On 24 June, the US Embassy deputy chief of mission Ernest Siracusa recommended to a senior Peruvian official that they should take the threat seriously.⁷⁰⁷ Despite high-level government member's failure to recognize the problem, the military and security services had an acceptable level of understanding of the MIR and its capabilities.

As the MIR continued to organize its personnel and the local populations near their security zones, they brought in weapons, equipment, and money from neighboring countries. MIR operatives had been clandestinely transporting items into Peru in preparation for the guerrilla war since 1963. On 28 October 1963, Bolivian police arrested Peruvian MIR members Mario Castrillo Rios and Juan Caravajal Rodriguez in Santa Rosa, a remote town in the Department of Beni in the Amazon basin. The authorities accused them of transporting 'Czech light machine guns and pistols'.⁷⁰⁸ CIA informant DUHAM-1 (Enrique Amaya Quintana) reported in February 1964 that 'The MIR had arms in Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Ecuador, and these will now be brought into Peru. There are 17,000 dollars worth of arms in Chile, 20,000 worth of arms in Brazil, and 7,000 dollars worth in Argentina'.⁷⁰⁹ Two days later, he reported, 'De la Puente said that arms coming from Brazil would be used in support of the northern and central departments, such as Junin. These arms will be brought through Manaus, Brazil on the Amazon'. He continued, De la Puente, 'said that in each instance where arms are brought into Peru from a neighboring country, they would serve the needs of the MIR in departments bordering on that country'.⁷¹⁰ He went on to detail the methods that MIR operatives Edmundo Cuzquen and Maximo Velezmoro employed to traffic arms from Arica, Chile, across the border to a rented safe house in Tacna. The SIN reported a Peruvian smuggler called Juan Florentino Carrion oversaw a facilitation network in Puno near Lake Titicaca and the Bolivian border. This network moved weapons and other supplies across the border and to the De la Puente's central front in Mesa Pelada.⁷¹¹ This may have been part of the same network the Army Intelligence Service (SIE) was monitoring in the

⁷⁰⁷ Telegram to Secretary of State, 24 June 1965, quoted in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 129.

⁷⁰⁸ Department of State AIGRAM, Amembassy La Paz to Rusk, 'Developments in Latin America: including: Peruvian guerrilla arrests in Bolivia', p. 3, 2 January 1964, GALE, U.S. Declassified Documents Online, <https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CK2349115578/USDD?u=cambuni&sid=USDD&xid=6a91438f>, (accessed 10 April 2020).

⁷⁰⁹ CIA report, 'Decision by the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario to begin preparations for revolution', 11 February 1964, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, folder 7 Also see, Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 128 and Agee, *CIA Diary*, p. 271 and 319.

⁷¹⁰ CIA report, 'Plans of the MIR for Revolutionary Action', 12 February 1964, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, folder 7.

⁷¹¹ SIN report, 'Infiltración en el Campo Laboral y Campesinado', 15 May 1965, p. 6, JNE, 1960s file.

Saihua northeast of Puno that was transporting military equipment.⁷¹² The MIR used a variety of networks and techniques to move the required items into the country. While the authorities showed some success in disrupting these facilitation networks, the MIR moved a sufficient quantity of material to the guerrillas in the field.

The Central Front

The longest surviving and most successful of the guerrilla fronts was the *Tupac Amaru* in the central Peruvian highlands. The front took its name from an Incan warrior who led an insurrection against the Spanish in the late Eighteenth Century.⁷¹³ Guillermo Lobaton Milla commanded the Tupac Amaru.⁷¹⁴ He was of Haitian descent and had black skin. He was born in 1927 and raised in the urban slums of Lima, where he experienced social injustice. He had a keen intellect and studied literature and philosophy at the University of San Marcos. He was active in student politics and was imprisoned and then exiled by the Odria administration in 1954. He settled in Paris and continued his studies at the Sorbonne. He worked odd jobs to finance his studies. Gadea noted, 'At that time it was common for Latin American students in Paris to work in the *ramassage* of used newspapers and magazines, which were later sold by the kilo'. In the summers, he went to Geneva, where the pay was much higher, Lobaton once explained to Gadea, 'that with the July and August salary in Switzerland they could live almost all year in Paris, eating in the University Dining Hall'.⁷¹⁵ Many French people at the time looked on him with suspicion because of the racial tension caused by the war in Algeria. He married a French woman called Jacqueline Eluau. He then earned a scholarship to study economics in East Germany but was expelled for his criticism of Stalin. In 1961, he travelled to Cuba and began training with the Peruvian students. He initially joined the ELN, but later changed to the MIR. However, Lobaton was not a blind follower of De la Puente and criticized him in private. Despite his concerns, he respected the support that the MIR had developed in Peru and saw it as the best chance for a successful revolution. His wife recalled, 'He had to assist and develop the struggle. He dissented only in a solitary way, always trying to prevent disunity'.⁷¹⁶ Within the MIR, he would rise to be a near-peer rival to De la Puente and commanded the Tupac Amaru front with impunity.

⁷¹² Artola, *Subversion!*, p. 49.

⁷¹³ Daniel Valcarcel, 'Plan Militar de Tupac Amaru', *Revista Militar del Perú*, July-August 1962, No. 671, p. 33, CEHMP, military journal collection.

⁷¹⁴ *La Prensa*, 'Cuban-Trained Red Directs Guerrillas', translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 30 June 1965, p. 26.

⁷¹⁵ Ricardo Gadea. Telephone Interview. 9 April 2020.

⁷¹⁶ Interview in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, 102.

Unlike other MIR leaders, he was not a longtime friend and confidant of De la Puente, and he earned his position based on skill and leadership ability.⁷¹⁷ The Peruvian Ministry of War described him as ‘cunning, cold, calculating, and bloodthirsty’.⁷¹⁸ Although others have described him as a ‘Passionate man capable of fierce loyalty and love’.⁷¹⁹ Of all the MIR leaders, the Andean Campesinos and Amazonian Indians trusted Lobaton the most, perhaps because of his dark skin.

Tupac Amaru fighters began to prepare for guerrilla warfare in the Concepcion and Satipo provinces in early 1965. Lima reporters first noted this activity in April and explained, ‘the Reds are said to be planning to open a guerrilla front’.⁷²⁰ Concepcion province is in the central Andes and included MIR camps in Ajospampa, Intihallamuy, Jatunhuasi, Pucuta, and Yugurpampa. Satipo province is on the eastern slope of the Andes and descends into the Amazon basin, Tupac Amaru personnel did not formally establish camps there, but they continued to develop inroads with the Campas Indians in the Amazon. Four of the camps were in remote areas, apart from Pucuta, that was near a village of the same name, high in the mountains, and the MIR leadership determined that the location was ideal for guerrilla warfare. They thought the high altitude and constant fog and cloud cover would negate the military’s advantage of fighter-bombers and helicopters. Although, the US determined that it would be easy for the Peruvian to send troops into the area because it would only take one day to travel there from Lima by road or rail.⁷²¹ Lobaton oversaw Intihallamuy and Maximo Velando Galvez, the second in command, led the preparations in Pucuta. The local population provided passive and active support to the MIR. A MIR member recalled, ‘The peasantry helped us enthusiastically. They helped us carry provisions, arms, medicines, to take us from one site to another, to show us places and trails with great enthusiasm’.⁷²² However, Armando Artola asserted that the guerrillas exploited the peasants and forced them to work the fields under inhuman conditions to supply the MIR with sustenance. He wrote, ‘That is to say, in practice, the guerrillas did the same thing as the exploiters and hacienda owners of the area’.⁷²³ While most locals remained skeptical of the MIR’s revolutionary

⁷¹⁷ *Caretas*, ‘Los Gerrigeos’, 25 June 1965, p. 13.

⁷¹⁸ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 46. Spanish version: ‘astuto, frio, calculador y sanguinario’.

⁷¹⁹ Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, 103.

⁷²⁰ *La Prensa* and *El Comercio*, 13 April 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 28 April 1965, p. 25.

⁷²¹ Department of State Intelligence memo, Allan Evans to Dean Rusk, ‘Guerrilla Attack in Central Peru’, 11 June 1965, p.1, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Peru, Box 72, folder 6.

⁷²² Interview in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 99; Brown, *Cuba’s Revolutionary World*, p. 324.

⁷²³ Artola, *Subversion!*, p. 51, as translated in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 98.

promises, a small number did join the guerrillas as fighters. Guillermo Loardo recalled, ‘they spoke to me of misery and inequality and their cause’. He continued, ‘I found out that there is misery and inequality because there are people with great property, and the immortality of public officials favors those who have large landholdings’.⁷²⁴ It is difficult to quantify the level of support Tupac Amaru gained from the population. However, inevitably, it was not enough to protect them from the military. As soon as the Army would enter the area, the local population turned on the guerrillas.

In May and early June, Tupac Amaru and the newly recruited Campesinos prepared for the start of the guerrilla warfare phase of the insurrection. One observer estimated that Tupac Amaru recruited 120 guerrilla fighters, which was ‘the greatest increment of peasant support of the three MIR contingents’.⁷²⁵ Two of the Campesino fighters were female. The first was Victoria Navarro, a seventeen-year-old schoolteacher from Huancayo, who, according to Ricardo Gadea, the military ‘captured, tortured, and buried her alive’.⁷²⁶ The second was Eusebia Bravo, a thirteen-year-old that Froilan Herrera ‘brought’ to the movement, the security forces captured her in Anapati.⁷²⁷ A former MIR member recalled that his guerrilla element in Andamarca was only ‘thirteen persons, but with the peasants we were more than sixty or seventy’.⁷²⁸ They conducted weapons training, long marches through the mountains, and simulated attacks on future targets. On 17 May, they went on a forced march from Yugurpampa to Pucuta to punish Marcielino Alvarez, a Campesino, for a revolutionary infraction.⁷²⁹ As they prepared, De la Puente held a high-level meeting at his headquarters in Mesa Pelada, near Cuzco, and the MIR Central Committee decided to delay the onset of guerrilla warfare. Lobaton was not present, nor was the leadership for the northern front. Hector Cordero recalled they decided to ‘slow slightly the process of armed struggle in order to find a more propitious moment’.⁷³⁰ Yet, this decision was not conveyed to Lobaton before he ordered the onset of hostilities. Despite the communication issue, some MIR members blamed the failure of the revolution on Lobaton for beginning early. Gonzalo Fernandez Gasco, leader of the northern front, argued that there was an agreement that they would not

⁷²⁴ Sara Beatriz Guardia, *Proceso a campesinos de la guerrilla ‘Tupac Amaru’* (Lima: Compania de Impresiones y Publicidad, 1972), p. 48, as translated in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 99.

⁷²⁵ Brown, *Cuba’s Revolutionary World*, p. 324.

⁷²⁶ Ricardo Gadea. Telephone Interview. P. 9 April 2020. Spanish version: ‘la apresaron, la torturaron y dicen que la enterraron viva’; Also see Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 334.

⁷²⁷ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 334. Spanish version: ‘llevada’.

⁷²⁸ Interview in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 99

⁷²⁹ Artola, *Subversion!*, p. 52.

⁷³⁰ Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 198.

commence armed action until they thoroughly prepared all three rural fronts, ‘However, Lobaton, without communicating, took the decision to begin’.⁷³¹ Carlos Flores agreed and stated that Lobaton’s decision, ‘Frustrated, practically, the entire guerrilla movement’.⁷³² The Tupac Amaru was clearly further ahead in preparations than the other MIR elements, and because of this, the local authorities were beginning to take notice. The intelligence services closely followed the increasing activity in the area. The Civil Guard planned to establish a new post in Bangoa to help control the central front. A local official told *La Prensa* that ‘the Huancayo-Pariahuanca highway is under control of the police and that it would be very difficult for guerrillas to transport foodstuff easily’.⁷³³ He would soon learn that he was overstating the capabilities of the local authorities.

On 9 June, Lobaton’s Tupac Amaru guerrillas conducted multiple attacks in Concepcion province. One element hijacked a truck with driver in Chapicancha and used it to raid the Santa Rosa mine, which the Cercapuquio Company owned and operated, where they took an engineer hostage and captured twenty-two boxes of dynamite along with blasting caps and detonation cord, among other tools and supplies. After departing Santa Rosa, the same element used the explosives to partially destroy a bridge over the Maraniyoc River. The captured miners explained that the guerrillas transferred the supplies to a mule caravan and went off into the mountains.⁷³⁴ They later returned the vehicle undamaged and released the hostages unharmed. A second element raided the Runatullo hacienda and captured food, weapons, and ammunition. According to the Ministry of War report, a third element raided Andamarca’s Civil Guard post and captured additional weapons and ammunition.⁷³⁵ Carlos Busso, one of the Civil Guards at the post, recalled that the insurgents did not just capture the police station, they captured the entire town.⁷³⁶ If this is accurate, it shows that the central front had developed into a significant force. Whenever the guerrillas encountered the local population, they ‘issued revolutionary proclamations to the somewhat bewildered

⁷³¹ Interview with Gonzalo Fernandez Gasco in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 318. Spanish version: ‘Sin embargo, Lobatón, sin comunicar, simplemente dio a saber su decisión de que se lanzaba’.

⁷³² Lima monthly magazine *Gente*, *La Gran Revista del Perú*, F Bermudez, ‘Testimonial: la guerrilla 20 años después’, 28 November 1995, p. 20. Spanish version: ‘Eso frustró, prácticamente, todo el movimiento guerrillero’.

⁷³³ *La Prensa*, ‘Prefect Says Civil Guard will control Andamarca Guerrillas’, 1 June 1965 translated in CIA, press reports, 16 June 1965, p. 7.

⁷³⁴ Lima daily newspapers *Ultima Hora*, *Expreso*, and *La Cronica* dated 10 June 1965, and *El Comercio*, ‘Truck Drivers and Miners make report’, 11 June 1965, translated in CIA, press reports, 28 June 1965, p. 11.

⁷³⁵ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 47; *La Prensa*, ‘60 Hombres Armados Asaltan Dos Haciendas y Vuelan Dos Puentes: Robaron Dinamita en Concepción’, 10 June 1965.

⁷³⁶ Interview with Carlos Busso Osores in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 343.

onlookers'.⁷³⁷ They also dispersed leaflets explaining their cause. There were no casualties during the attacks on the first day, and when the news reached Lima, Belaunde, and other senior officials dismissed the events as criminal activity.

Over the next few weeks, the Tupac Amaru continued to conduct these types of attacks. They destroyed three other bridges in the area. The purpose of the bridge destruction was to slow the movement of security forces. However, this annoyed the local population because it clogged the limited transportation network in the region and slowed commerce. The military took advantage of this mistake and rapidity brought in an engineer unit to repair the bridges under the auspices of civic action.⁷³⁸ The rebel group raided three other haciendas called Alegria, Armas, and Punta, and redistributed the animals, food supplies, and farming equipment to the locals. The MIR considered these actions 'armed propaganda', a technique they took from Maoist revolutionary theory. In a letter to De la Puente dated 20 June, Lobaton explained, 'We held meetings and gave out food from the stores, all along the road, from the lorry which we captured and returned undamaged. All the next day, we were masters of our zone of influence'. He added concerning the Hacienda Alegria, 'which belonged to one of our worse enemies and a scourge of the poor, Raul Ribeck. The police were already in Andamarca, one day away from the hacienda. We turned it into a commune, and the goods were shared among the peasants'.⁷³⁹ The first bloodshed occurred on 15 and 16 June when Tupac Amaru ambushed two separate police patrols. The police fought back and did not sustain any casualties. However, they killed five guerrillas in the clashes. On 27 June, Civil Guard Major Horacio Patino commanded a patrol of twenty-nine that were searching the area near Yahuarina for insurgents. Velando and his group of guerrillas, along with thirty Campesinos, set an ambush along a narrow gorge and opened fire.⁷⁴⁰ They killed Patino and eight of his personnel and captured the others. Velando lectured the senior surviving officer, Lieutenant Edilberto Terry, and instructed him to 'Cease serving the rich'.⁷⁴¹ The guerrilla element took the Civil Guard's weapons, ammunition, and equipment,

⁷³⁷ Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 104.

⁷³⁸ *Caretas*, 'No Es Una Simple Operacion Militar', 19 August 1965, p. 12.

⁷³⁹ Translated in Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 342; Mercado, *Las Guerrillas Del Perú*, p. 153; Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 104; *La Prensa*, 'Guerrilleros Roban Fundo y Saquean Un Poblado', 20 June 1965.

⁷⁴⁰ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 346.

⁷⁴¹ *Caretas*, 'Siete Muertes fríamente Calculadas', 12 July 1965, p. 17; MIR newspaper *Voz Rebelde*, No. 46, translated in Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 344; Rogger Mercado, *Las Guerrillas del Peru*, p. 157; Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 105; Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 53; 'Acontecimientos en la Sierra Central', *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, 31 August 1965, p. 2, CEHMP, military journal collection.

and released all but two of the prisoners. According to David Laughlin, a US AID, Office of Public Security (OPS) police advisor who was working in Peru at the time, ‘Two of the Civil Guards were brutally tortured before they were killed’.⁷⁴² Normally, outspoken on matters of human rights, Lust and De la Pedrala do not mention the allegations of torture and murder and claim the guerrillas set the prisoners free.⁷⁴³ Only Rogger Mercado denied the allegations and wrote that they were ‘absolutely false’.⁷⁴⁴ This was a watershed event in the conflict and demonstrated to senior government officials that this was more than criminal activity and beyond the ability of local law enforcement to control.

The Peruvian Army had anticipated its involvement for some time and was preparing for action. Belaunde finally publicly acknowledged the guerrilla threat.⁷⁴⁵ On 2 July, by Supreme Decree, Belaunde placed the Army in command of counterinsurgency operations. The Decree also placed the Air Force (FAP), Navy, and Reserve units necessary for the operations at the disposal of the Army. The Peruvian Congress formalized this executive order on 20 August by enacting Law 15590 and 15591.⁷⁴⁶ The government never used the term guerrilla preferring to label the MIR fighters *extremistas comunistas*, or communist extremists. The Army headquarters tasked the Second Military Region with coordinating and executing the operations against the Tupac Amaru from the airbase in Jauja and heliport in Chilifruta. They developed a strategy called *el Gran Cerco* (the big fence, or encirclement) to surround the guerillas in Andamarca and Satipo and then close with and destroy them. The Army was responsible for the mountain areas, while Navy riverine units prevented the guerrillas from escaping into the Amazon, the FAP provided rapid air movement of troops and close air support, and the Police and Civil Guard established checkpoints along the roads. As the units assembled in the area, the Army began a psychological operations campaign directed at the local population, ‘giving out messages in the native languages through loudspeakers installed in airplanes and helicopters, and dropping thousands of leaflets so both the literate and illiterate peasants of the area would not co-operate with the guerrillas through

⁷⁴² Laughlin, *Gingo Cop*, p. 107; Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 57; *La Prensa*, ‘Llegaron Restos de los Policías Torturados por Rojos en Pucuta’, 4 August 1965, front page; Artola, *Subversion!*, p. 64

⁷⁴³ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 346; De la Pedraja, *Wars of Latin America*, p. 161; Also, see, Brown, *Cuba's Revolutionary World*, p. 325; Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 105.

⁷⁴⁴ Mercado, *Las Guerrillas del Peru*, p. 157. Spanish version: ‘absolutamente falso’.

⁷⁴⁵ *La Prensa*, ‘Belaunde Reitera que Guerrilleros Son Solo Delincuentes Armados’, 3 July 1965, p. 2.

⁷⁴⁶ CIA Intelligence memorandum, ‘Review of Insurgency Problems’, 7 July 1965, p. 3, CREST, FOIA electronic reading room, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00472A001100040008-4.pdf>, (accessed 11 April 2020) ; Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 54.

ignorance or fear'.⁷⁴⁷ The Army controlled the information sphere by only allowing select members of the press into the area, which led to random speculation by the Lima newspapers.⁷⁴⁸ The Second Light Infantry Division troops made their way from Jauja by truck and then entered the guerrilla security zones on foot.

On 20 July, Loma and Zorro companies began to move toward the Tupac Amaru bases. They questioned Campesinos along the way and gained detailed information about the locations. On 30 July, the guerrillas ambushed Zorro company with small arms, dynamite, and homemade bombs. The Army killed four guerrillas and did not sustain any casualties. The Second Division commander then ordered both companies to converge on Pucuta village, which the SIE had determined to be the most important guerrilla base. Along the way, one of the elements came across the bodies of Civil Guard officers Diogenes Valderrama and Eusebio Galves Silvera, whom the guerrillas had captured during the fighting at Yaguarina. Velando allegedly tortured the officers to death and dumped their bodies in the mountains.⁷⁴⁹ Meanwhile, Lobaton made a bold decision to go on the offensive and attack an unprotected Army base in Balcon. However, as his small group moved into the area, one of the guerrillas defected and warned Army personnel, and as a result, Lobaton cancelled the attack.⁷⁵⁰ On 1 and 2 August, the FAP bombed and strafed Pucuta with Canberra jets to prepare the way for the infantry troops. British Aerospace produced the jets in the UK and then sold them to the Peruvian government.⁷⁵¹ This bombardment was the first reported use of napalm in the conflict, which the FAP dropped from C-46 aircraft. A guerrilla later recalled, 'The bomb fell and burned an immense stretch of ground, maybe a hundred meters around ... There was a huge hole, and the rest blackened. Snakes and toads were swollen up from the flames ... it was a terrible fire'. He also alleged that the air attacks only killed innocent peasants.⁷⁵² The troops entered Pucuta on 3 August, but only engaged in limited fighting. Tupac Amaru personnel separated into two columns, the first with Lobaton, the second with Velando, and

⁷⁴⁷ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 55. Spanish version: 'propalando mensajes en lengua nativa por medio de altoparlantes instalados en aviones y helicópteros, arrojando miles de volantes para que el campesinado alfabeto on no de esos lugares se abstuviera de colaborar con los guerrilleros por ignorancia o por temor'.

⁷⁴⁸ State Department memorandum written by Ernest V. Siracusa, 23 June 1966, Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 112.

⁷⁴⁹ Laughlin, *Gringo Cop*, p. 107; Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 57; *La Prensa*, 'Llegaron Restos de los Policías Torturados por Rojos en Pucuta', 4 August 1965, front page; Artola, *Subversion!*, p. 64

⁷⁵⁰ Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 113.

⁷⁵¹ Christopher Chant, *A Compendium of Armaments and Military Hardware* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 377.

⁷⁵² Interview in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 114.

moved east towards Satipo in the Amazon basin. Tupac Amaru lost seven fighters in the battle, while the Army suffered four dead and three injured.⁷⁵³ The Army confronted the guerrillas who remained in Intihallamuy, killing eight, and Santa Rosa killing three but suffering six casualties and three dead.⁷⁵⁴ Some units from the Second Division remained in the highlands to consolidate their gains and conduct Operation Limpieza (Cleanup), they conducted small-scale civic action projects to assist the local population and endear them to the government.⁷⁵⁵ Tupac Amaru attempted to return to the highlands and conduct counterattacks against the remaining government forces, but they were not successful.

From the beginning, Lobaton planned to expand the Tupac Amaru into the Amazon basin. There is uncorroborated information that the MIR began developing inroads with the Ashaninka Indians, referred to by outsiders as *Campa*, in Satipo province in 1963. However, as Brown and Fernandez assert, 'But while there were probably some contacts between radicals and Indians prior to 1965, there is little evidence that the MIR had laid a strong foundation among the Ashaninkas'.⁷⁵⁶ On 27 June, Lobaton sent Froilan Herrera and Juan Paucarcaya to prepare an evacuation route to Satipo in case the Army forced the Tupac Amaru from its security zone. They were also to establish rapport with the Ashaninkas. They quickly gained an understanding of the Indian's history, grievances, needs, and superstitions that would allow them to manipulate them to support the MIR's cause. Paucarcaya was the primary facilitator of this and had extensive knowledge of the region. He was married to an Ashaninka woman, and spoke the local language, he owned a small farm in the area and was active in supporting the Indians. The Indians and the settlers had been at odds for some time, the landowners and local government officials abused Indian women and forced the men to work on the farms for very little pay. The MIR's propaganda to end this exploitation and ideas of land redistribution resonated with the Indians, but they did not seem to understand the higher-level Marxism and promise of utopia. Lobaton played the part of the Sun God, and the other MIR members came to be called *Itomi Pava*, Sons of the Sun. They were fascinated by his dark skin and thick beard and noticed that he was very different from the other guerrillas as well as the white and mestizo landowners in the area.⁷⁵⁷ While a few of the Indians were skeptical, a fair number became supporters of the Tupac Amaru.

⁷⁵³ *La Prensa*, 'Rangers en Pucuta Matan 12 Guerrilleros', 3 August 1965, cover page.

⁷⁵⁴ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 59.

⁷⁵⁵ Artola, *Subversion!*, p. 79.

⁷⁵⁶ Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 119.

⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

One late night in early August, Herrera and several guerrillas were drinking with some Indians they had recruited and began to discuss potential targets. Alfredo Atiri proffered a hacienda called Cubanita, which was owned by an Italian coffee grower named Antonio Favaro. Atiri described the crimes Favaro has committed against the locals, which drove the guerrillas into a drunken frenzy. Lobaton was not with them because he had returned to Pucuta to conduct a counterattack on the Army unit that had remained there. The security forces were expecting attacks in Satipo and had placed Civil Guard elements at many of the haciendas. Cubanita had a twenty-five-man detachment, as well as a short-wave radio and airstrip. The Katari Hacienda was the nearest help with a small Civil Guard contingent that was twelve kilometers away over an ill-maintained jungle road. The first attempt to attack Cubanita was thwarted by a braying donkey that compromised the attackers and woke the guards out of their early morning slumber.

On 9 August, the guerrillas returned to the Cubanita hacienda and threw grenades at the main building. After an exchange of gunfire, they withdrew into the jungle and set up an ambush along the road in case reinforcements came to assist the hacienda's inhabitants. The attack sent the authorities into a panic. Favaro desperately called for assistance over the radio. A small aircraft landed by mid-morning, and the pilot flew Favaro around to surveil the area. He dropped a message to warn Ismael Castillo, an agriculture engineer, and manager of Katari. Castillo loaded his family in a truck to escape but offered to drop a few of the Civil Guards at Cubanita on his way out of the area. As the truck approached, where the guerrillas set up an ambush along the road that connected the two haciendas, they fell a tree across the road and exploded dynamite to stop the vehicle, and then threw grenades into the back of the truck. A *Correo* reporter explained, 'Engineer Castillo, who was much loved by the Campa Indians, got out of his truck to speak with them and avoid any incident'. However, he was unable to defuse the situation, 'One of the Campas shouted, "Die you wretch!" and there were gunshots. At the same instant, two machine guns opened fire from the bushes, and it was a true massacre'.⁷⁵⁸ Castillo and three others died in the ambush. A woman, a child, and one Civil Guard officer survived. Atiri later confirmed the murder of Castillo as he begged for his life, 'But those who were most drunk shouted "Damn! You are helping them! That's why those soldiers were coming to kill us." So they killed him. Who? It's unknown'.⁷⁵⁹ A guerrilla using the pseudonym Elias Murillo, admitted to another extrajudicial killing during

⁷⁵⁸ Huancayo daily *Correo*, 17 August 1965, translated in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 125.

⁷⁵⁹ Interview in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 126.

the attack. As he approached the vehicle, he recalled, 'I got there and put a bullet in the guy who was [he pauses]. The grenade had emptied his guts, and he asked, please would I finish it, so I gave him the coup de grace'.⁷⁶⁰ These interviews confirm the information in the War Ministry's official account of the event, which lists the dead Civil Guards as Guillermo Alcantara Mena and Jose Del Carmen Huaman.⁷⁶¹ Significantly, the Indians directly participated in the ambush and killings. The guerrillas took the weapons and supplies and returned to their camp. This is important because it demonstrates that the Indians were not just observers of the fighting but were active participants. It also shows that the MIR was able to recruit locals and gain the support of the population in the Satipo area, which contradicts the orthodox reason for the New Left's failure.

The FAP responded immediately and sent Canberra jets to bomb and strafe the guerrilla encampment and a C-46 to drop napalm. Like the air attacks in Pucata, non-combatants, in this case, the Indians took the brunt of the damage because they hid in their houses. However, the guerrillas were successful in persuading some of the locals to hide with them in the jungle to avoid the bombing. The FAP expended almost all of its napalm stockpile in this attack, only four of sixteen canisters remained. The International Petroleum Company (IPC) likely provided the initial supply, which came in fifty-five-gallon drums. As a method of delivery, the C-46 crews lit a fuse connected to the drums before pushing them out the back of the aircraft. However, crude the weapon was, it terrified the local population.⁷⁶² The Peruvian government sent an official request for additional napalm bombs, but the US government was not forthcoming.⁷⁶³ As the FAP fought the war from the air, the other security forces prepared for ground combat in the Satipo region.

As combat forces moved into the region, the Army employed civic action and psychological operations to separate the Indians from the guerilla fighters. The Special Police Emergency Unit (SPEU) in Mazamari provided medical care to locals nears its base. Like in the highlands, the Army dropped fliers and flew aircraft over the villages, and using loudspeakers warned the Indians not to support the insurgents. They offered \$1,100.00 to locals who

⁷⁶⁰ Interview in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 126.

⁷⁶¹ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 60.

⁷⁶² Department of State telegram, Jones to Rusk, 25 August 1965, p. 3, NARA, NARA, RG 306 Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Counterinsurgency in Peru, box 4, folder 12; Victor Villanueva, *100 Años del Ejército Peruano: Frustraciones y Cambios* (Lima: Liberia Editorial Juan Mejia Baca, 1971), p. 152; Interview in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 114.

⁷⁶³ Special Group (Counterinsurgency) memorandum, 22 July 1965, quoted in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 113.

turned in a guerrilla. There were multiple instances of Ashaninka Indian's providing locations of the guerrillas and one event where they detained a guerrilla and brought him to the authorities. However, it is unclear as to whether this was a direct result of the rewards program. Army personnel did not have a nuanced understanding of Ashaninka history and culture but were able to gain limited influence via simplistic means. Anthropologists Brown and Fernandez explained that some Army personnel thought the Ashaninka had an infantile intellect and that petty materialism was their primary motivation. Army personnel attempted to win over the Indians by giving them radios, flashlights, machetes, and other goods seem to confirm this theory.⁷⁶⁴ However, Fernandez's fieldwork in the Satipo region led him to the realization that the Ashaninka considered the Inca as a higher form of civilization and that the Inca rulers were powerful because of their material wealth. They felt that gathering material belongings would allow them to become more powerful than the outsiders and give them agency over their situation. Brown and Fernandez assert, 'This is not to deny that the Indians wanted the goods *as goods*. But the goods defined a semiotic field much larger than immediate material needs'.⁷⁶⁵ As with the military's other attempts, it is difficult to determine the impact of the psychological operations and civic action projects, but a portion of the Indian community worked with the security services against the insurgents.

The 19th Commando Battalion, of the newly established Peruvian Army Special Forces Command, was the primary unit conducting counterinsurgency operations in Satipo.⁷⁶⁶ Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Arrisueno Escudero was the commander.⁷⁶⁷ He was unable to effectively combine civic action with counterinsurgency operations under the umbrella of counterinsurgency doctrine. The former commander of the 19th was Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Gallegos Venero who successfully did this in 1963 against Hugo Blanco in La Convencion, it is unfortunate that he did not pass his knowledge and tactical acumen to Arrisueno. The Army did bring the 3rd Engineer Battalion to the region in November to build roads, but by then, the major fighting had concluded.⁷⁶⁸ The following example shows that

⁷⁶⁴ Artola, *Subversion!*, p. 49.

⁷⁶⁵ Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 137.

⁷⁶⁶ Defense Intelligence Agency, Order of Battle Summary, Foreign Ground Forces: Peru, 1 December 1966, p. 7, Defense Intelligence Agency archive, series 600 AWC, box 6, folder 54, Peru; *La Prensa*, 'Paracaidistas Siguen a los Rojos en Satipo', 11 August 1965, cover page.

⁷⁶⁷ Lourdes Medina Montoya, Guillermo Sánchez Ortiz, and Manuel Gálvez Ríos, *Historial de Unidades del Ejército del Perú*, p. 35.

⁷⁶⁸ *La Prensa*, 'Ejército Contruiria en Satipo Marginal y Vias de Penetracion', 8 November 1965, p. 3; *El Comercio*, 'Army to Construct Highway from Satipo to Puerto Maldonado', translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 1 December 1965, p. 17.

aggressive Army commanders did not want to wait for civic action and psychological operations programs to take hold and resorted to repressive counterguerrilla tactics.

The Commando units pursued the Tupac Amaru elements deeper into the jungle, while the Navy patrolled the rivers. The Second Infantry Division's 43rd Infantry Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Luis Vela Emanuel, blocked escape routes to the south towards De la Puente's southern front in Cusco.⁷⁶⁹ The resulting pressure forced the Tupac Amaru fighters' motivation and discipline to break down. Lobaton and Velando were at odds, and Lobaton was furious with Herrera for the attack on Cubantia. One Indian who fought with the guerrillas recalled Lobaton saying to Herrera, 'Damn, why did you do this? I didn't give the order to do this. Now they're going to kill the poor Indians. The Indians need to be taught first. They need to learn first, then they can attack'.⁷⁷⁰ Norman Gall, one of the few journalists to gain access to the guerrilla zone, confirmed this issue. He wrote that Lobaton, 'was apparently attempting to work with the warlike Campas the way General Vo Nguyen Giap worked with the mountain tribes of northeastern Vietnam during World War II. The difference, however, is that Giap worked *politically* with his tribesman for two years before entering into combat'.⁷⁷¹ While there are other differences, Gall's point is valid and relevant. However, the MIR was mostly following the Cuban *foco* method, which did not, despite Lobaton's frustration, allow for extended periods of political indoctrination before beginning guerrilla warfare.

The SIE began to receive reports that a Tupac Amaru element was preparing a stronghold in Shuenti, which had a hill that jutted up to 3,000 feet. The guerrillas thought they would be able to defend the terrain feature because it was very rugged and difficult to approach. Lomo company and Commando detachment Leon took part in the campaign that began on 27 September and concluded on 2 October 1965. The Army killed eleven guerrillas and captured 17, Velando was not there, and Lobaton escaped towards the Sonomoro river.⁷⁷² Throughout October and November, there were small ambushes and attacks in the Satipo region as the military pursued the guerrillas from location to location. The guerrillas forced

⁷⁶⁹ Velasquez, *Historial de Unidades del Ejército del Perú*, p. 79; *La Prensa*, 'Army Headquarters Issues Bulletin No 10', 24 September 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 14 October 1965, p. 6.

⁷⁷⁰ Interview in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 140.

⁷⁷¹ Norman Gall, 'The Legacy of Che Guevara', *Commentary*, December 1967, p. 39.

⁷⁷² Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 63.

Ashaninka villagers and hacienda owners to provide them with food and temporary shelter before moving again to stay ahead of the Army forces.

Non-Peruvian civilians, clergy, and missionaries participated in various roles in the conflict in Satipo. There are many unconfirmed reports that protestant missionaries provided information to the security forces as well as logistical support to antiguerrilla hacienda owners in the region.⁷⁷³ David Pent was one colourful character who may have supported the guerrillas.⁷⁷⁴ He was born in the US; his parents were missionaries in Peru, where he spent his youth. He moved to the US and attended a boarding high school. As an adult, he returned to Peru and purchased a farm he called *Fronta Alegre*, which was located along the Upper Ucayali river in the Amazon basin. He drew in investors from the US and used the money to buy influence in the region. In 1962, after a run-in with law enforcement in Iquitos, he was deported. He lost all of his belongings in Peru. By 1965, Pent had made his way back to the Peruvian Amazon and was supporting the MIR insurgency. The fate of Pent remains a mystery.⁷⁷⁵ In November 1965, Tupac Amaru invaded a Franciscan missionary in Obenteni.⁷⁷⁶ Padre Donato Lecuona recalled that the guerrillas called him out of bed one morning, ‘There was a zambo, a black man, who pointed a machine gun at me. I wanted to say, “Jesus have mercy on me” because I thought they were going to riddle me with bullets. Then the black man said, “Well, Padre, we won’t hurt you if you don’t try anything. All right?”’.⁷⁷⁷ Thus began a three-day siege, and the guerrillas politely forced the missionaries to provide food and shelter to them. Lecuona held mass one morning, and most of the guerrillas attended. They even held a soccer match between the guerrillas and the locals. The above-mentioned black man was Lobaton, who spent a good amount of time conversing with Lecuona. Of the guerrillas, Lecuona remembered, ‘They were exhausted, disillusioned. Lobaton was very sick’.⁷⁷⁸ The Tupac Amaru fighters departed for another missionary called Shumahuani. Lecuona warned the other missionaries in the region but did not alert the security services of the guerrilla presence, perhaps, because he feared reprisals by the

⁷⁷³ Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 169.

⁷⁷⁴ *Prensa*, ‘David Pent Directs Guerrillas in the Jungle’, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 9 November 1965, p. 9.

⁷⁷⁵ Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 160.

⁷⁷⁶ Lima daily *El Comercio*, ‘Guerrilleros capturan misiones religiosas, se abastecen y huyen’, 10 December 1965, front page.

⁷⁷⁷ Interview in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 177.

⁷⁷⁸ Interview in Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 179.

military, or maybe because he wanted to buy some time for Lobaton and his followers to leave the area.

In December and January, the Army killed all of the Tupac Amaru senior leaders. Like the demise of each of the leaders, Velando's is controversial. An Ashaninka Indian provided the Army information that led to Velando's capture near Puerto Bermudo. They moved him to Satipo, and according to the Army, he attempted to commit suicide, he died later when they tried to evacuate him to Huancayo for medical care.⁷⁷⁹ The MIR claims that he was tortured and interrogated about the whereabouts of Lobaton, and 'as it was impossible to make his death look natural, he was put in a helicopter and thrown out, while still alive, but unconscious, into a ravine in the Andes'.⁷⁸⁰ On 22 December, the Army conducted an attack in Kuatsirqui, and during the combat, they killed Herrera.⁷⁸¹ However, on 28 December, the US Embassy wrote that he was captured on the 21st and executed on the 22nd.⁷⁸² On 7 January 1966, Lobaton and a small group of guerrillas ambushed a Commando squad near the Sotziqui river. The Army claimed that they killed Laboton in the melee.⁷⁸³ Many have speculated on the actual events leading to Lobaton's death. The various accounts contradict each other, and all show bias from their respective points of view. Gott asserted in 1970, 'Whatever the exact story – capture, torture and disposal would seem most likely – the Latin Left and his French wife still believe that he may be alive'.⁷⁸⁴ Lust argued the Ashaninka chief Alejandro Calderon betrayed Lobaton, and the Army approached him while he was bathing in a river and executed him.⁷⁸⁵ Apart from the above atrocities, Indians reported many instances of Army personnel committing human rights abuses. Atiri alleged that a Ranger squad accused an Indian boy of guiding the guerrillas and hung him from a tree by his testicles. Basic knowledge of human physiology makes one question the validity of this claim, but one cannot discount the widespread accusations of abuse. The *ley de fuga* (law of flight) provided legal protection for the security forces and allowed them to shoot fleeing or escaping suspects.⁷⁸⁶ Former guerillas have alleged that the security forces applied this law liberally in Satipo. Brown and Fernandez provide some anecdotal evidence that there was an

⁷⁷⁹ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 64.

⁷⁸⁰ Summary of MIR Central Committee meeting, quoted in Mercado, *Las Guerrillas Del Perú*, p. 159, translated in Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 350.

⁷⁸¹ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 64.

⁷⁸² Embassy Telegram, Lima to Department of States, 28 December 1965. Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 184.

⁷⁸³ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 64.

⁷⁸⁴ Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 351.

⁷⁸⁵ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 350.

⁷⁸⁶ Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 175.

unwritten rule of executing guerrillas instead of detaining them. However, there is no convincing evidence that it was an official government policy, as was the case during the Belaunde Administration's conflict with the Shining Path in the early 1980s.⁷⁸⁷ The well-respected Lima weekly newsmagazine *Caretas* acknowledged and denounced the atrocities committed by both sides of the conflict.⁷⁸⁸ The security forces and the guerrillas both committed human rights violations and extrajudicial killings. This is an unfortunate fact that often corresponds with this form of warfare.

Lust is the only author who has written about this conflict and considered international law, the Geneva Conventions, and the Law of Armed Conflict. In 1949, the Geneva Conventions delegates wrote four international treaties, and Peru became a signatory to the treaties in 1956. Civilians are protected under the treaties if they do not participate in combat. Belligerents are afforded prisoner of war (POW) status upon capture. The third treaty affords POW status to 'members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements'.⁷⁸⁹ In order to gain POW status, MIR members must have complied with the following four criteria. First, be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; the MIR was a hierarchal organization with a clear command structure. Second, have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; MIR members had a designated uniform that met this requirement.⁷⁹⁰ Ironically, it included US brand blue jeans, a worldwide symbol of capitalism. Third, carry arms openly; they did in rural areas. Fourth, conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war; multiple examples above clearly show that MIR members did not comply with this criterion. Therefore, under the Geneva Convention, the Peruvian government was not required to afford POW status to MIR personnel following capture. While military leadership considered the conventions, they did not have detailed knowledge of treaty. Retired General Edgardo Mercado explained, 'If we called them guerrillas, they would have rights under the Geneva Convention. If they were taken prisoner, they would only have to give their name, rank, and mission, and they would be subject to a series of considerations'.⁷⁹¹ The Peruvian

⁷⁸⁷ Jason Heeg, 'Use of Psychological Operations During the Insurgency in Peru, 1970-1995: Limitations in a Context of Human Rights Abuses', *Journal of Intelligence and Terrorism Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 3.

⁷⁸⁸ *Caretas*, 'No Es Una Simple Operacion Militar', 19 August 1965, p. 13.

⁷⁸⁹ International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Convention, Third Treaty, Article 4(A) <https://ihl.databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e63bb/6fef854a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68> (accessed 1 March 2020).

⁷⁹⁰ Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 99.

⁷⁹¹ Interview with Edgardo Mercado in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 446. Spanish version: 'Si se daba la nominación de guerrilleros, ellos tenían derecho a la Convención de Ginebra. Si eran tomados presos, solamente podían dar su nombre, su grado y su misión y estaban sujetos a una serie de consideraciones'.

government could have invited inspectors from the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit detention facilities, or members of the press, which would have given credibility to their counteraccusations of human rights abuses.

The Southern Front

Near Cusco, the MIR National Revolutionary Command and the independent Pachacutec *foco*, or southern front, were located together. Lobaton caught them off guard when he ordered the central front to begin its armed insurrection, and they were not prepared to engage in combat with the Peruvian security services. Therefore, Lobaton's decision forced them to react to the military offensive. De la Puente headed the National Revolutionary Command along with Ruben Tupayachi, Enrique Amaya (CIA informant DUHAM-1), Paul Escobar, Antonio Guevara, Albino Guzman, and Enrique Rueda. Tupayachi commanded the southern front. MIR sources trace the group's involvement in the Department of Cusco back to 1960.⁷⁹² By 1963 little work had been done, Jacqueline Eluau recalled, 'the structure was very weak and with deficiencies in the work related to the indigenous populations'.⁷⁹³ Moreover, in 1963, De la Puente declined to join forces with or provide support to Hugo Blanco's insurrection in La Convencion and Lares valleys. In early 1964, De la Puente, along with fifteen MIR personnel, departed Lima and moved into the area to prepare for the coming insurrection.

De la Puente and Tupayachi chose Mesa Pelada to serve as the security zone, which they called Illarec Ch'asca, for a variety of reasons, but primarily because they believed it would be inaccessible to the security forces. A *Caretas* reporter visited the area in June 1965 and interviewed De la Puente, who explained that 'because of the topography and geography, it was virtually inaccessible'.⁷⁹⁴ It was close to La Convencion valley where Hugo Blanco was successful in organizing Campesinos in 1963, and located north of Machu Picchu and Cusco city, in the Department of Cusco. There were also many haciendas in nearby towns such as Quillabamba, Ocobamba, Maranura, Santa Maria, Huayopata, and Amaybamba that could be raided and turned over to the Campesinos. The sparsely populated plateau was at 12,000 feet above sea level and was forty miles long and twelve miles wide and covered with thick *ichu* grass. Steep and jagged cliffs dropped to the surrounding valley floors at 3,000 feet above

⁷⁹² MIR, *Obras de Luis De la Puente Uceda*, 1980, p. 4.

⁷⁹³ Interview with Jacqueline Eluau in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 352. Spanish version: 'una estructura muy débil y con deficiencias en el trabajo con las poblaciones indígenas'.

⁷⁹⁴ *Caretas*, 'Entrevista a Del le Puente Uceda', 25 June 1965, p. 10. Spanish version: 'debido a la topografía y la geografía, era prácticamente inaccesible'.

sea level. Amazon tributaries and thick jungle-covered the valley floors, and the vegetation grew about halfway up the cliffs. The average temperature in the valleys was 75 degrees Fahrenheit, while the plateau dropped to below freezing. Clouds, torrential rains, and thick fog permeated the area year-round.⁷⁹⁵ Seemingly, this terrain and climate would be beneficial to guerrilla warfare. However, not all the southern front members agreed. Hector Quiroz thought, 'Mesa Pelada was difficult to defend and simple to isolate'.⁷⁹⁶ Carlos Morillo added, 'the access routes were easy to control'.⁷⁹⁷ The MIR leaders must have realized this at some point because they sent teams to reconnoiter alternate security zone locations in July and August.⁷⁹⁸ By then, it was too late to make any significant changes.

When the MIR arrived, it focused on two areas of development, the first was political, and the second was military. They attempted to build rapport with the local peasants and indoctrinated them in the revolutionary ideology. De la Puente explained that the guerrillas were the armed element of the population, and 'The peasant masses were their [the guerrillas] support, their source of sustenance, information, and their bond'.⁷⁹⁹ Abraham Risco remembered, 'First we tried to win their appreciation, helping them with their agricultural work; looking after the coca and other work they had to do, helping them grow and harvest the coffee. This way, like collaborators, comingled in the agricultural work, we could then talk to them of other subjects'.⁸⁰⁰ Blanco employed this approach effectively in the early 1960s, and it is an essential contribution to revolutionary theory, although it takes much longer than other methods. It probably would have been more successful than the more direct armed propaganda technique used by Lobaton in the central highlands. However, following Blanco's uprising, the Peruvian government instituted land reform in the Cusco area, and this adequately resolved the Campesino's major grievance. This continued on a broader scale throughout the mid-1960s, although many Peruvians criticized the government for not doing

⁷⁹⁵ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 31.

⁷⁹⁶ Interview with Hector Quiroz in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 352. Spanish version: 'Mesa Pelada era muy difícil de defender y fácil de asilar'.

⁷⁹⁷ Interview with Carlos Morillo in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 352. Spanish version: 'las vías de acceso fueron muy fáciles de controlar'.

⁷⁹⁸ MIR, 1980, *Obras de Luis De la Puente Uceda*, p. 5.

⁷⁹⁹ *Caretas*, 'Entrevista a Del la Puente Uceda', 25 June 1965, p. 10. Spanish version: 'Las masas campesinas fueron su apoyo, su fuente de sustento, información y su enlace'.

⁸⁰⁰ Interview with Abraham Risco in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 353. Spanish version: 'Primero nosotros tratamos de ganar su aprecio, ayudándolos en sus tareas agrícolas; a cosechar la coca y otras tareas que tenían que hacer, ayudar en la cosecha y moler el café. De esta manera, como colaboradores, confundidos en las tareas agrícolas, ya pudimos hablar sobre otros temas'.

enough.⁸⁰¹ In response, the MIR conducted a propaganda campaign to mitigate the effects of the land reform.⁸⁰² The peasants had other minor complaints, but they were not significant enough to predispose them to take up arms.

While the MIR did receive active and passive support from the local population for its cause, it was not sufficient to facilitate the success of the guerrilla front. The only female fighter, Cornelia Bravo from village called Colpani Chico, joined the front along with her brother Antonio.⁸⁰³ The MIR provided the Campesinos that choose to actively participate with general education classes as well as ideological indoctrination. They also provided military training. The second focus was military preparation for the coming conflict. They constructed seven camps on the plateau, and each had a specific purpose. Camp one was for logistical coordination; two held ideological classes; three was for planning and supporting reconnaissance missions; four was a gathering place for the committee and party meetings; five and six were general defensive positions; seven was for weapons training. The MIR operatives quickly became intimately knowledgeable about the terrain and built secret trails to move about the area, as well as cached ammunition, food, and other supplies. They debated strategy, conducted weapons training, and practiced guerrilla tactics. Their activities first appeared in the press in April of 1965, *La Prensa* wrote, 'The guerrillas are said to be inciting the peasant masses to create an atmosphere of uneasiness and disorder'.⁸⁰⁴ While *Expreso* noted, 'Cusco is being disrupted by news that extremist groups, directed by Communists trained in Cuba, are operating in the zones of Echarte and Mesa Pelada in the valley of Quillabamba'.⁸⁰⁵ Into mid-1965 they continued to prepare for the conflict.

Observation posts overlooked the routes of approach to the plateau. Additionally, Campesinos, who lived in the valley floors and a network of informants in the nearby towns, provided an early warning network in case security forces moved towards Mesa Pelada. Carlos Morillo was a MIR counterintelligence specialist and worked in a nearby town called

⁸⁰¹ *La Prensa*, 'Thousands of Tenants to Become Landowners', 9 April 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 26 April 1965, p. 16; *El Comercio*, 'Peruvian President Says Peru, Chile, and Colombia Are Uniting Efforts in Agrarian Reform', 15 April 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 28 April 1965, p. 2; *Carates*, 5 April 1965, p. 9.

⁸⁰² *La Prensa*, 'Subversive Leaflets Circulate in Cuzco', 10 April 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 28 April 1965, p. 26.

⁸⁰³ Ricardo Gadea. Telephone Interview. 9 April 2020.

⁸⁰⁴ *La Prensa*, 6 April 1965 translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 23 April 1965, p. 14.

⁸⁰⁵ Lima daily *Expreso*, 6 April 1965 translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 23 April 1965, p. 14; Also see, *Caretas*, 5 April 1976, p. 12.

Quillabamba. His cell's mission was to observe the police and determine if they were attempting to penetrate the guerrilla's organization, as well as advise the southern front leadership of any security forces movements in the region. They took their job one step further and penetrated the PIP element in the town. Many of the PIP personnel were from Lima and assigned to Quillabamba on a temporary status. Some of them were homesick and missed their families who stayed behind in Lima, and the situation drove them to drink in the local bars. Morillo explained, 'We became friends with them, we drank beer with them, we connected with their sentimental side. Through the beer we found out everything, they told us everything'.⁸⁰⁶ The intelligence network extended to Cusco city, where MIR operated a cell based at the University of San Antonio. Among other duties, the MIR tasked the cell with reporting on military movements in the city. The early warning network provided ample notice of the coming Army campaign against the southern front, but it could not prevent the inevitable outcome.

The front had an extensive logistical support network that personnel working at camp number one coordinated. The Cusco cell sent food and other supplies, as well as facilitated the movement of personnel from Lima to Mesa Pelada.⁸⁰⁷ In Quillabamba, Morillo's duties included obtaining medical supplies for the guerrillas in the field. De la Puente had asthma and ulcers that impeded his ability to lead the organization. The security services were aware of his ulcer condition and were vigilant for anyone obtaining medicines for this ailment who did not have a valid reason for the purchase. Morillo found a sympathetic medical doctor called Arturo Plaza Valdivieso who 'diagnosed him' with ulcers and wrote him a prescription for the medication that De la Puente required. Morillo also collaborated with Dona Venezuela de Sumarriva at the Venezuela pharmacy who provided medications for the guerrillas.⁸⁰⁸ In addition to Cuzco and Quillabamba, MIR logistical personnel developed active and passive support networks in the surrounding towns and villages of Alta, Beatriz, Huayanay, Huyro, Ocabamba, Pucayara, and San Lorenzo. In April 1965, Civil Guard Colonel Humberto Canales reported that his men intercepted an arms shipment from Bolivia that was bound for the MIR guerrillas.⁸⁰⁹ They may have also implemented a scheme to

⁸⁰⁶ Interview with Carlos Morillo in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 356. Spanish version: 'Nos volvíamos amigos de ellos, tomábamos cerveza con ellos, nos hablaban de su familia, les tocábamos el lado sentimental. Mediante la cerveza averiguamos todo, nos cantaban todo'.

⁸⁰⁷ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 357.

⁸⁰⁸ Interview with Carlos Morillo in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 357.

⁸⁰⁹ *La Prensa*, 'Civil Guard Patrol Confiscates Firearms of Bolivian Origin', 9 April 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 26 April 1965, p. 16.

counterfeit Peruvian currency to fund operations. *Ultima Hora* reported that counterfeit money was circulating the country, and it may be 'part of a communist plot to weaken the national economy. Security agents have traced some of the monies to the guerrilla infested zones of Andamarca and Quillabamba'.⁸¹⁰ The MIR's extensive logistical network provided the required food, medicine, and other supplies for the guerrillas.

The 2 July Supreme Decree and subsequent Laws 15590 and 15591 applied to Cusco as well as the other areas of guerrilla activity. The Army assigned the Fourth Military Region the responsibility to plan and execute operations against the Southern Front. Military Intelligence personnel could not have planned for a better situation. Enrique Amaya (CIA informant DUHAM-1), a close confidant of De la Puente and member of the National Revolutionary Command, was in Mesa Pelada and had intimate knowledge of the plans and preparations. However, it is unclear if he had the means to communicate with his handlers from Mesa Pelada, or if the CIA would have passed the information to the military personnel preparing for battle. More critical was guerrilla leader Albino Guzman's defection. In a 1966 *post-mortem* of the events, the MIR determined Guzman's role in establishing the security zone and 'his personal knowledge of the party organization, made him the enemy's most effective weapon for locating and destroying the main group'.⁸¹¹ Guzman did not adapt well to the spartan living conditions in Mesa Pelada, and he lost his revolutionary zeal. The MIR stated, 'This individual, incapable of putting up with the privations of guerrilla warfare, his morale shattered, surrendered to the forces of repression and gave away all the military secrets of the guerrilla group, thus making the enemy's task that much easier'.⁸¹² In early August, MIR leaders had serious concerns about the mental stability of Guzman. They detained him and planned a trial, 'In Mesa Pelada, Albino Guzman repeatedly demonstrated indiscipline and created serious inconvenience inside the organization for which he will be judged in the second half of August'.⁸¹³ Before Guzman could be judged by the revolutionary court, he escaped and fled to the police office in Huyro. The officials transported him to Chaullay and turned him over the Army element in charge of the

⁸¹⁰ *Ultima Hora*, 'Counterfeit Money May be Part of Subversive Plot', 11 October 1965, translated in CIA, Press Information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 27 October 1965, p. 16.

⁸¹¹ MIR, 1966, translated in Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 381.

⁸¹² *Ibid.*, p. 381.

⁸¹³ MIR and UDP, 1980, quoted in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 362. Spanish version: 'En Mesa Pelada, Albino Guzmán repite manifestaciones de indisciplina y crea serios inconvenientes dentro de la organización por lo cual será juzgado en la segunda quincena de agosto'.

counterinsurgency operations. He arrived there on 15 August and provided detailed information concerning the situation on the plateau.

The Peruvian government prepared the population, local government, and military for the operation. On 26 August, the SIN Director Jose Benavides, an Army colonel, dismissed the Prefect of Cusco, Luis Felipe Paredes, because he was 'indecisive and tolerant with the Communists' and the Sub-Prefect of La Convencion, because he was sick and away in Lima for treatment.⁸¹⁴ This cleared the way to appoint pro-counterinsurgency officials. He also directed the Civil Guard elements to conduct physical training and automatic weapons training and to reinforce the physical security of critical government facilities. Three days later, the Army moved Detachments *Leopardo* (Leopard) and *Tigre* (Tiger) to Ocobamba to the east of Mesa Pelada. They also moved Army Detachments *Condor*, *Aguila* (Eagle), *Lince* (Lynx) as well as Civil Guard section *Cernicalo* (Kestrel) to Chaullay to the west of Mesa Pelada.⁸¹⁵ They began a psychological operations campaign similar to the operations in Pucuta and Satipo. They used Radio Quillabamba to transmit messages to the local population that warned them to distance themselves from the guerrillas, so they would not be harmed in the coming fighting.⁸¹⁶ They also dropped flyers and passed messages over loudspeakers mounted on helicopters. The Ministry of War claimed the presence of the troops in the area 'produced a favorable effect on the population, which was efficiently stimulated by the treatment given to them and by the campaign of persuasion immediately initiated by the respective commandos'.⁸¹⁷ Three Campesinos leaders resigned and denounced the MIR.⁸¹⁸ The military quickly prepared for the offensive.

The Commando units began to conduct scout missions to determine the locations of guerrilla defenses and minefields. FAP aircraft conducted reconnaissance missions to confirm the information provided by the MIR informants. The first contact occurred on 9 September when the guerrillas ambushed the Condor detachment. The detachment killed five guerrillas, and a land mine that the guerrillas had emplaced, exploded and injured two Army

⁸¹⁴ SIE document #447, 'Sugiere la subrogación de autoridades políticas que indica y recomienda intensificar instrucción de personal de la GC y P', 26 August 1965, p. 2, JNE, 1960s file. Spanish version: 'indeciso y tolerante con los comunistas'.

⁸¹⁵ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 65.

⁸¹⁶ Artola, *Subversión!*, p. 95.

⁸¹⁷ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 65. Spanish version: 'produjo efecto favorable sobre la población, la que colaboro eficientemente estimulada por el trato que se les dio y por la campana de persuasión iniciada de inmediato por los respectivos comandos'.

⁸¹⁸ *Expreso*, 'Three Peasant Leaders Resign from MIR', 12 September 1965 translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 8 October 1965, p. 13.

personnel.⁸¹⁹ On 20 September, the entire force converged on Mesa Pelada. Condor detachment attacked camp number six and killed two guerrillas before the remainder escaped. They captured a large stock of weapons, ammunition, and explosives, which they destroyed. Aguila detachment did not make enemy contact, but they lost three soldiers due to the extreme weather conditions, which they were not prepared for, in the Andes. On 24 September, Lince detachment captured camps numbers three and four. The guerrillas mounted an unsuccessful counterattack on camp four, but the Army killed three of them and repelled the attack. The next day, Lince detachment engaged in heavy fighting with a guerrilla element and killed three before the others escaped. Later that week, two soldiers killed themselves while firing a 120mm mortar system to harass the guerrillas during the night. Skirmishes continued into October.⁸²⁰ The official Ministry of War account does not mention aerial bombardment at Mesa Pelada. However, various press accounts and books claim the FAP conducted attacks and dropped napalm on innocent civilians. Considering the number of accusations of napalm bombings, either the reporters exaggerated, or the Peruvian military must have had more than sixteen napalm drums in its inventory. The fighting continued over the next few weeks while the Army destroyed the camps and cleared out the last few pockets of guerrillas.

De la Puente's death is as controversial, and the facts are as murky as with the case of Lobaton. Accusations and counteraccusations of human rights abuses prevail. According to the Ministry of War, De la Puente and a small group of guerrillas, including Raul Escobar and Ruben Tupayachi, were escaping to the south of Mesa Pelada near the Amaybamba village. They approach a hacienda of the same name and requested help from three Campesinos. The Campesinos refused, so the guerrillas killed them with weapons fire and homemade grenades. The noise drew the attention of a nearby security detachment, and the commander immediately sent a squad to investigate. They engaged in a firefight with the guerrillas and suffered three killed in action. Among the fifteen MIR dead were the three guerrilla commanders. The official account reads, 'With this last action, the MIR command

⁸¹⁹ *Expreso*, 'Armed Forces Clash with Guerrillas in Cuzco Area', 13 September 1965 translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 8 October 1965, p. 13; *La Prensa*, 'Land Mines Slow Advances in Mesa Pelada Area', 25 September 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 14 October 1965, p. 7.

⁸²⁰ *La Prensa*, 'Army Units and Guerrillas Clash in Cuzco and Piura', 12 October 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 27 October 1965, p. 14.

and the guerrilla “Pachacutec” were destroyed’.⁸²¹ Artola echoed the official account.⁸²² Various press accounts and the books alleged that the government murdered the guerrilla leaders in cold blood. One account explained that the security forces compromised the guerrillas when they sent two of their group to a store in the village to purchase food items. The security forces followed them back to where the group was hiding. Gott wrote, ‘The guerrillas were either captured or killed. There is some doubt as to what happened to De la Puente and Tupayachi, but it seems probable that they were captured and shot in captivity two days later. The group had barely seen a month’s action’.⁸²³ Significantly, two government officials have recently added to this line of reasoning. Former SIE Colonel Rafael Cordova stated that the government detained De la Puente and interrogated him for two weeks before executing him. Former Civil Guard officer Alejandro Hernandez, who commanded the *Cernicalo* detachment in Mesa Pelada, recalled that the security forces detained and interrogated the guerrilla commanders, and after: ‘*Ley de Fuga*’.⁸²⁴ Meaning the security forces killed them while they supposedly attempted to escape. The government did not give their remains to their families. Assuming the security forces executed them, as the preponderance of the evidence shows, the Peruvian government cost itself a great deal of credibility for minimal gain.

The Northern Front

Of the MIR’s three rural fronts, observers have given the least attention to the *Manco Capac*, or northern front. This is understandable considering the dearth of primary source material until now. However, this did not preclude Gott from asserting,

*‘For some reason, the Manco Capac group in the far north on the Ecuadorian border, led by Gonzalo Fernandez Gasco, never went into action at all. Six guerrillas were captured during the period between 18 October and 5 November [1965], and they provided the army with their first knowledge that a guerrilla group was planning to operate in their area’.*⁸²⁵

Gott’s criticism supports the belief that the government was not competent to defeat the MIR, and therefore, the MIR failed for internal reasons. The recently released Peruvian national intelligence documents show that 18 October was not the security forces’ first knowledge of the front. Moreover, a 2018 interview of a retired Peruvian military officer and an

⁸²¹ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 68. Spanish version: ‘Con esta ultima acción quedan destruidos el Comando del MIR y la guerrilla “Pachacutec”’.

⁸²² Artola, *Subversión!*, p. 96.

⁸²³ Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 358.

⁸²⁴ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 366

⁸²⁵ Richard Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, p. 367.

examination of local newspapers reveal that the front did go into action against the government. The new research shows the security forces defeated the northern front.

As the MIR established its northern front, the intelligence services closely observed them. De la Puente may have met with Castro in 1960 about spreading the revolution across Latin America. The CIA reported, 'In preparation for this outbreak Castro received such important APRA Rebelde [the former name of the MIR] leaders as Luis de la Puente Uceda and ordered reconnaissance of northern Peru to select a proper location for an uprising'.⁸²⁶ The MIR named the northern front '*Manco Capac*', but some referred to as the César Vallejo group. They set up their security zone near *Cerro Negro* in the Ayabaca province of the Piura Department. The leaders calculated that the proximity to Ecuador would provide an international aspect to the conflict with the goal of spreading the fighting across the border.⁸²⁷ Gonzalo Fernandez Gasco was the political leader and overall commander of the *Manco Capac* as well as a senior MIR leader.⁸²⁸ Elio Arturo Portocarrero Rios, a native of Piura, was the military commander of the front. He was from Ayabaca City, where his wife and children lived. *La Prensa* wrote, 'Portocarrero has been directing training of armed guerrillas in different parts of the country for the last three years'.⁸²⁹ While the Lima daily *Correo* reported he 'is a Communist, an expert in terrorism and has been trained in Moscow and Havana'.⁸³⁰ *Cerro Negro* was remotely located in the Andes mountains, and MIR leaders estimated it was suited for guerrilla warfare. Portocarreo recalled, 'The geographic conditions were adequate for the formation of a guerrilla group considering a military point of view'.⁸³¹ They focused their efforts in the nearby towns of Indio, San Pedro, San Sebastian, and Pato Piedra. Like the other areas where the MIR established security zones, *Manco Capac* personnel began to organize revolutionary elements in Ayabaca during 1964. The Peruvian National Investigations Police (PIP) surveilled the developing front and gained insight and knowledge of its organization and plans when they detained five MIR personnel

⁸²⁶ CIA memorandum, 'Cuban Subversive Activities in Ecuador', 22 June 1961, p. 15.

⁸²⁷ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 70.

⁸²⁸ *Correo*, 'Ferando Gasco Leads Guerrillas in Ayabaca', 28 August 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 15 September 1965, p. 5. Ricardo Gadea. Telephone Interview. 9 April 2020.

⁸²⁹ *La Prensa*, 'Guerrilla Chief in Ayabaca Identified', 15 July 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 28 July 1965, p. 10.

⁸³⁰ *Correo*, 'Ferando Gasco Leads Guerrillas in Ayabaca', 28 August 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 15 September 1965, p. 5.

⁸³¹ Interview with Elio Arturo Portocarrero Ríos in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 313. Spanish version: 'Las condiciones geográficas eran adecuadas para la formación de un grupo guerrillero desde el punto de vista militar'.

in October 1964 with weapons, military equipment, and propaganda materials.⁸³² The newspaper articles and intelligence documents show that the security forces had knowledge of the northern front before 1965.

The PIP developed a viable informant network, which is a precursor to successful counterinsurgency operations, and produced detailed intelligence on the insurgent situation in the area. In a report that consolidated information from eight informants, the analysts described the MIR organization with a level of detail that identified Elio Portocarrero as the commander of an extremist group based at the Hacienda Tapal in Ayabaca. The members included: Mario Calle, Pancho Calle, who was married to Dona Castillo Zegarra, El Chino Aguilera, Eloy Jaramillo, Ramon Morocho, Alfonso Morocho, Galvez Rios, Julio Rojas, among others that remained unnamed. The members all wore beards. The group was working to recruit young men from the area. Portocarrero maintained a house in Ayabaca on San Sebastian street across from the old cemetery. The mayor Horacio Camino Flores and lieutenant mayor Horacio Calle were communists. The communist Carmen Saavedra Zegara, the girlfriend of Ramon Morocho, was a teacher in Cuevas. She had hidden Ramon Morocho from the police on multiple occasions. She travelled to the hacienda Tapal to teach the children of the extremists. Another example of the detailed level of intelligence reporting was that the MIR had a base in *Cerro Negro*, and they hid their weapons in a cave and covered the opening with rocks. In October, a small aircraft flew low over the camp and dropped a package to the extremists. The men always carried weapons, and the locals, who they often robbed, were scared. The report also noted that the extremists spent their time having discussions about Marxism and speaking with the locals about improving the political situation in Peru.⁸³³ The PIP shared their intelligence with the military as they prepared for action. A retired Peruvian Army officer recalled that the successful counterinsurgency operations against the Northern Front were a direct result of this detailed intelligence.⁸³⁴ These examples together show that, far from an incompetent military, the Peruvian forces, at least on the intelligence front, were more than adept at understanding their enemy.

The Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) was also organizing workers in Piura, and the two groups competed for the disenfranchised people of the region. The PIP also closely followed the PCP's developments in the department, including the Drivers Syndicate of Piura and its

⁸³² PIP report, 'Sobre no existencia de Guerra de guerrilla en el país', 6 June 1965, p. 3, JNE, 1960s file.

⁸³³ PIP report 'Actividades Extremistas en Ayabaca', 1965, pp. 1-3, JNE, 1960s file.

⁸³⁴ Herrmann Hamann Carrillo. Personal Interview. 28 August 2014.

Secretary Abdon Suaarez Farfan. The Youth Circle of Journalism ‘Jose Carlos Mariategui’ and its President Manuel Eduardo Velarde Bogiano. Its editor, Jorge Merino Guerrero, had links to MIR. They also watched the Workers Federation of Piura and its President Gabino Vilela Guzman and Secretary Luis Atarama Chavez. Directly in the MIR’s operational area, the PIP was interested in PCP delegate Timoteo Rodrigo Villavicencio.⁸³⁵ On 13 May 1965, a group of workers invaded the Hacienda San Rosendo and occupied it for twenty-four hours before peacefully dispersing. The departmental level government in Piura dismissed the workers’ claims and ruled that the land belonged to Hacienda’s owners. The police detained three of the invasion leaders overnight in the Piura jail.⁸³⁶ Unlike the MIR, the PCP was organizing the people to work through the legal system to improve their situation, which was in line with the Soviet leadership’s direction. These developments, revealed in the newly released intelligence documents, are essential to this dissertation because they show the PIP’s competence in following multiple threats in the area.

Until mid-1965, the Northern Front personnel spent most of their time developing syndicates among the rural workers and did not place much emphasis on military training or preparedness. On 09 June, Lobaton’s central front raided a mining centre in the central highland town of Satipo. After learning of these actions, the northern front personnel set aside organizing syndicates and accelerated military preparations for the conflict. The onset of hostilities also gave the police justification to crack down on left-leaning MIR sympathizers in Piura. Their first contact with security forces occurred in July when *Expreso* reported, ‘New arrests have been made in Sullana and in Ayabaca in the continuing round up of extremists’.⁸³⁷ Rodigo Villavicencio, the former prefect of Ayabaca, was among them. However, Portocarrero was not. Also arrested were Juan Parihuaman Alvarado, Isabel Flores Avilas, her father and brother, twelve in total.⁸³⁸ Also, in July, the people in Piura heard the first propaganda transmissions from a transmitter that was in *Cerro Negro*. *La Prensa* reported one of the transmissions said, ‘in Peru, there are five centers of Peasant rebellion, two of them are in action. Elio Arturo Portocarrero is the chief of the popular guerrillas in Peru. Luis de la Puente commands the guerrillas in south Peru and Guillermo Lobaton in the

⁸³⁵ PIP report 1009, 10 December 1965, p. 10, JNE, 1960s file.

⁸³⁶ *La Prensa*, ‘Comuneros Withdraw After Invading Piura Hacienda’, 15 May 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 03 June 1965, p. 3.

⁸³⁷ *Expreso*, ‘Round Up of Extremists in Piura Continues’, 16 July 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 28 July 1965, p. 11.

⁸³⁸ *La Prensa*, ‘Apresan en Ayabaca 12 Agitadores Rojos’, 16 July 1965, front page; Lima newsmagazine *Presente Nacional*, ‘Universidades: Foco de Subversiones Comunistas’, September-October, 1965, No. 102, p. 36.

center of the same country'.⁸³⁹ On 29 August, the police arrested five MIR personnel for agitation. They were Lino Jimenez, Samuel Nizahuanca, Felix Repeto Campoverde, Concepcion Reira, and Santo Reyes. They had a large amount of propaganda in their possession.⁸⁴⁰ In response, Dr Octovio Mongrut, the Minister of Government, assured the public that the government had the situation in control. He stated, 'the zone of Ayabaca is completely under the control of the Military Command which will be able to prevent subversive actions'. He continued, 'in the northern sector the Armed Forces will prepare to control any outbreak of Communist-inspired violence'.⁸⁴¹ The Army placed the First Military Region in charge of the strategy to counter the guerrillas in Ayabaca, while the First Calvary Division would execute the tactical level counterinsurgency operations. Mongrut's confidence may have come from the in-depth knowledge that the security forces had developed concerning the northern front.

As an example of how seriously the government finally responded, on 22 September 1965, Corley Smith, of the British Embassy in Ecuador, reported to the Foreign Office talks between the General Staffs of Ecuador and Peru. The purpose of the talks was to coordinate efforts against the MIR element operating in Northern Peru near the border with Ecuador. These high-level discussions were an important adjunct to the on-going tactical level coordination at the local level between the police, border patrol, and military units.⁸⁴² On 5 October 1965, Patricia Hutchinson, of the British Embassy in Peru, referenced the Corley dispatch and provided amplifying information. She noted that the Commanding General of the Peruvian Army, and former commander of the Piura Military Region in northern Peru, General Julio Doig confirmed the coordination to British Embassy representative John White. Paraphrasing the General, Hutchinson wrote, 'Desultory conversations about the guerrilla problem – for there has been a little encampment of the MIR near Ayabaca since 1962 – sharpened into purposeful discussions with the outbreak of guerrilla activity in the Peruvian Central Sierra in June'. She continued, 'the Peruvians have therefore asked the Ecuadorians to do what they can on their side of the border to prevent the MIRistas from finding a safe

⁸³⁹ *La Prensa*, 'Cuba Dice que Ayuda Subversión en el Perú', 17 July 1965, front page. Spanish version: 'en el Perú hay cinco centros de rebelión campesina, dos de los cuales ya se encuentran en acción. Elio Arturo Portocarrero es el jefe de las guerrillas populares del Perú. Luis de la Puente Uceda comanda las guerrillas en el sur del Perú y Guillermo Lobatón en el centro del mismo país'.

⁸⁴⁰ *La Cronica*, 'Five Extremists Captured in Ayabaca', 30 August 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 15 September 1965, p. 5.

⁸⁴¹ *La Prensa*, 'Army Said to Have Subversive Groups Under Control', 29 August 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 5 September 1965, p. 5.

⁸⁴² Correspondence from Corley Smith, British Embassy in Ecuador to Foreign Office, 22 September 1965, UK National Archive at Kew AE105/40.

refuge in Ecuador'. There was good reason for the Peruvian concern because Leftists in Ecuador provided support to the Ayabaca Front. Portocarrero recalled, 'We had a support structure in Ecuador that practically arrived in the guerrilla zone. We had support people in various cities in Ecuador, from Quito, Guayaquil, Loja, to Cuenca'.⁸⁴³ This network consisted of the remnants of the *Union Revolucionaria de Juventudes de Ecuador* (Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorian Youth, URJE), which was a significant insurgent group in Ecuador during the early 1960s.⁸⁴⁴ On a strategic note, Hutchinson determined that the De la Puente is not spreading his revolution across the region. She concluded, 'While one of the basic themes of the MIR is, in conscious or unconscious tribute to Leon Trotsky that the revolution cannot succeed in one country alone, we here have seen no signs that the Peruvian MIR leadership is yet ready to begin an export drive'.⁸⁴⁵ Contrary to the views of the literature, these communications suggest that the Peruvian government had moved beyond military preparedness to international coordination in its efforts to defeat the guerrillas.

The MIR personnel in Ayabaca furiously prepared for armed conflict and completely set aside all other activities. They set up their guerrilla base in *Cerro Negro* and patrolled the surrounding area to gain familiarity with the terrain. There was a nascent guerrilla front in Jaen that was not having success establishing itself, so many of the MIR members there moved to Ayabaca to join forces with the MIR's Northern Front. The influx of personnel led to a powerplay by Portocarrero to displace Fernandez as the overall leader. A vote by the members relegated Portocarrero to his place as second in command. They received an adequate level of support from the local population in the form of food, medicine, and other necessary supplies. Their critical shortage was weapons and ammunition. Portocorrero recalled, 'We had completely deficient weapons. This was one of the problems that could not be solved'.⁸⁴⁶ They were limited to some older model revolvers, shotguns, and rifles, which they understood were not sufficient to take on the well-equipped military. The Cubans and Czech intelligence services provided weapons to the URJE in 1961.⁸⁴⁷ Apparently, none of

⁸⁴³ Interview with Elio Arturo Portocarrero Ríos in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 279. Spanish version: 'Teníamos una infraestructura de apoyo en Ecuador, que llegaba prácticamente hasta la zona guerrillera. Teníamos gente de apoyo en varias ciudades de Ecuador, desde Quito, Guayaquil, Loja hasta Cuenca'.

⁸⁴⁴ CIA memorandum, 'Cuban Subversive Activities in Ecuador', 22 June 1961, p. 6; Agee, *CIA Diary*, p. 112; Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 288.

⁸⁴⁵ Correspondence from Patricia Hutchinson, British Embassy in Peru to Foreign Office, 05 October 1965, Kew FO371/179379.

⁸⁴⁶ Interview with Elio Arturo Portocarrero Ríos in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 326. Spanish version: 'Nosotros teníamos armas completamente deficientes. Esto fue uno de los problemas que no se lograron resolver'.

⁸⁴⁷ CIA memorandum, 'Cuban Subversive Activities in Ecuador', 22 June 1961, p. 7.

these made their way into the hands of the MIR. This lack of arms forced them to turn away volunteers from the local population that wanted to join as guerrilla fighters. Gerardo Benavides remembered, 'There were many people we wanted to incorporate. The youth in Ayabaca came up in groups of ten and twenty and wanted to incorporate into the guerrilla, but we could not accept them because we did not have weapons'.⁸⁴⁸ One local they did accept was Aurora Chanta, the only female fighter to join the front.⁸⁴⁹ To obtain military-grade weapons, the leadership began planning an attack on a Civil Guard outpost. This evidence directly conflicts with Leon Campbell's point that the guerrillas did not receive popular support. The northern front did receive a high level of support. However, the limiting factor in the group's expansion was the availability of weapons for new fighters.

The press noticed this increased activity. *La Tribune* reported, 'Military spokesmen in Piura have expressed their opinion that Ayabaca, in the mountainous and remote Piura Province, is today a Communist boiling pot'.⁸⁵⁰ *Ultima Hora* added, 'The Headquarters of the red extremists is said to be at *Cerro Negro*, said to be ten hours by muleback from the city of Ayabaca'. They continued, 'In this city, it is not unusual to hear radio broadcasts of speeches by Fidel Castro and calls to subversion by the guerrilla leaders of Ayabaca. These broadcasts are said to come from a transmitter installed on *Cerro Negro*'.⁸⁵¹ Both accounts greatly exaggerated the number of guerrillas in Piura, citing 300 and 1500, respectively. However, the MIR's ability to set up a radio transmitter and broadcast propaganda show that they had the capability to organize and conduct activities usually associated with national militaries. In early October, the northern front conducted their only offensive operation when they raided a Civil Guard post in Paltachaca, in the Santa Catalina de Moza District of Morropon Province. The guards successfully defended the outpost but requested reinforcements.⁸⁵² A few days later, a group of eight MIR personnel, along with two local guides, conducted a reconnaissance patrol along the border with Ecuador in an area called Salala. They ran out of provisions and decided to enter a small town in search of food. Five of them entered, and the

⁸⁴⁸ Interview with Gerardo Benavides in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 327. Spanish version: 'Había mucha gente que quería incorporarse. Los jóvenes de Ayabaca subían, grupos de diez, de veinte, que querían incorporarse en la guerrilla, pero no los aceptaban porque no tenían armas'.

⁸⁴⁹ Ricardo Gadea. Telephone Interview. 9 April 2020.

⁸⁵⁰ *La Tribune*, 'Ayabaca Becomes New Center of Subversive Activity', 18 September 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 11 October 1965, p. 6.

⁸⁵¹ *Ultima Hora*, 16 September 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 11 October 1965, p. 6.

⁸⁵² *La Prensa*, 'Army Units and Guerrillas Clash in Cuzco and Piura', 12 October 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 27 October 1965, p. 14; *La Prensa*, 'Chocan con Guerrillas En el Cuzco y Piura', 12 October 1965, front page.

remainder stayed hidden in the mountains. They found a few locals who provided them food and shelter. However, one local who thought they were cattle rustlers reported them to the police. This may have been the result of the government's media campaign denouncing the guerrillas as thieves. The police captured them while they slept in a house on 18 October. On 05 November, the police then tracked down and captured the other five.⁸⁵³ These are the operations quoted in Gott in the opening paragraph of this section. It is apparent that the Peruvian security forces had significant knowledge of the MIR's northern front before these arrests.

By early November, the Peruvian Army, with its accurate intelligence picture and well-trained counterinsurgency forces, was prepared to go on the offensive while the US military monitored the situation. The US Department of Defense National Military Command Center reported that Peruvian Police had knowledge of approximately twelve guerrillas of the revolutionary left operating in northern Peru. The report stated, 'some are said to have been trained in Cuba, North Korea, and China' and that the Air Force was investigating a clandestine airfield that was under construction in the same zone.⁸⁵⁴ The Peruvian military's First Regional Command was responsible for the northwestern section of the country and had been training its forces in counterinsurgency since 1963.⁸⁵⁵ It deployed three counterguerrilla detachments from the First Cavalry Division to the area and surrounded *Cerro Negro*. The *Pacaso* detachment moved to Huancabamba, while *Lagarto* (Crocodile) and *Iguana* detachments arrived in Ayabaca. On 11 December, the three elements converged on *Cerro Negro* and continued to patrol the area until the end of the month, but they did not encounter significant resistance from the guerrilla forces.⁸⁵⁶ There were a few skirmishes in the area, but no major combat.⁸⁵⁷ The guerrillas had departed the security zone before the arrival of the army after deciding it would be better to live and fight another day. They took this decision with the members of MIR's Central Committee in Lima. Portocarrero alleged the army committed human rights violations during the search operations. He wrote, 'Numerous Campesinos and some combatants were victims of the military campaign. Among them,

⁸⁵³ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 70; Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú, 1958-1967*, p. 323; *La Prensa*, 'Guerrilleros Asaltan Pueblo de Morropon', 18 October 1965, front page.

⁸⁵⁴ Department of Defense, National Military Command Center message, 06 November 1964, p. 2, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Cuba, box 22, Exile Activities, Vol. 2; Rene De La Pedraja, *Wars of Latin America*, p. 160.

⁸⁵⁵ Defense Intelligence Agency, Order of Battle Summary, Foreign Ground Forces: Peru, 1 December 1966, p. 2 and p. 9, Defense Intelligence Agency archive, series 600 AWC, box 6, folder 54, Peru; 'Piura: Clausura del Ciclo de Guerra Anti Subversiva', *Actualidad Militar*, Lima, 15 December 1963, p. 17, CEHMP, military journal collection.

⁸⁵⁶ Ministerio de Guerra del Perú, *Las Guerrillas en el Perú y su represión*, p. 70.

⁸⁵⁷ Rossevelt Bravo Axedo. Personal Interview. 14 August 2017.

Basilio Chanta, [father of Aurora Chanta] the stupendous collaborator, and Campesino organizer, was captured, tortured, and murdered'.⁸⁵⁸ The official Ministry of War account does not mention these events. I was not able to assess the validity of the claims of human rights abuses by the military. However, such abuses, wrong as they would have been, are a testament to the argument that the military was serious in its response, not incompetent or unaware of the threat. At the very least, it suggests that the guerrillas understood they faced lethal force, not an incompetent military.

In late December, the Peruvian National Police (PNP) detained three guerrillas, Juan and Ursulo Chanta Grande, and Isidro Pastor, at a checkpoint while they attempted to make their way back to Jaen.⁸⁵⁹ The other northern front members travelled in groups of two or three and made their way across the border and into Ecuador, where they found refuge among their support network. Fernandez recalled, 'We conducted a strategic withdrawal to Ecuador where we stayed for one month'.⁸⁶⁰ They did not return to take up the revolution in Piura. The MIR Central Committee announced, 'In spite of these setbacks, both the political and military parts of our organization have stayed in the area and have achieved such a level of cohesion and entrenchment that the armed forces have been unable to destroy them'.⁸⁶¹ In 1967, during an interview, a former MIR operative explained that the local population assisted them in evading the security forces. He stated, 'This also explains how the guerrilla of the North managed to elude three circles of the Peruvian Army in a joint operation with the Ecuadorian Army'.⁸⁶² The civilian support must have been a factor, but the technique of moving in small groups was instrumental in passing through the army pickets and across the border. In early 1966, press accounts varied concerning the status of the guerrilla front. *La Cronica* reported that the group was still operational as late as 11 January.⁸⁶³ On 27 January, *Correo* wrote that there was a firefight between the military and Portocarrero and a few

⁸⁵⁸ Elio Portocarrero, 'Responde', *Proceso: Revista de la Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad Agraria La Milina*, Lima, 1968, p. 100. Spanish version: 'Numerosos campesinos y algunos combatientes fueron víctimas de la campaña militar. Entre ellos, Basilio Chanta, el estupendo colaborador y organizador campesino, fue capturado, torturado y asesinado'; Ricardo Gadea. Telephone Interview. 9 April 2020.

⁸⁵⁹ *Expreso*, 'Three Guerrillas Captured in Ayabaca', 21 December 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 12 January 1966, p. 9.

⁸⁶⁰ *El Diario*, Victor Pelaez, 'Memorias de un Guerrillero en Nueva York', 05 February 2001, p. 12. Spanish version: 'Realizamos un retiro estratégico a Ecuador, donde nos quedamos durante un mes'.

⁸⁶¹ MIR Central Committee communiqué, 1966, quoted in Gott, *Guerrilla Movements in Latin America*, 379.

⁸⁶² 'Perú: entrevista a dos guerrilleros', p. 178. Spanish version: 'Esto explica también, como es que la guerrilla del Norte logra eludir tres cercos del ejército peruano en operación conjunta con el ejército ecuatoriano'; *La Cronica*, 'Ayabaca Guerrilla Group Remains Intact', 11 January 1966, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 1 February 1966, p. 7.

guerrillas.⁸⁶⁴ On 29 January, Colonel Rodolfo Acevedo, the First Military Region's Chief of Intelligence, denied they had been killed and stated that Portocarrero and Fernandez Gasco had fled to Ecuador. *La Prensa* wrote, 'Acevedo added that the clean-up operations in the zone of Ayabaca and Huancabamba were concluded on 4 January and that permanent control posts had been established in the area'.⁸⁶⁵ He also mentioned that the Peruvian government was working with Ecuador and seeking extradition of the extremists. On 25 February 1966, *Caretas* reported that a government official close to the Joint Command pronounced the actions against the MIR over and that the group was no longer a threat. However, they received a letter from the commander of the northern front, Gonzalo Fernandez Gasco. He wrote that the group was still operational and that they renamed it 'Cesar Vallejo' for the fallen MIR leader De la Puente. He also stated that Lobaton was still alive. *Caretas* wrote that this might be accurate, considering the government had not been forthcoming with information. The article concluded that Fernandez was hiding and only fighting an 'offensive of paper'.⁸⁶⁶ In the end, the northern front did little to advance the revolutionary cause because the military was good at rooting them out and limiting their capabilities.

This section brings to light three factors that change our understanding of the MIR's northern front. First, the local population did support them, and provided them with food, shelter, medical supplies, and guide services. This contradicts Campbell's second reason for the guerrilla failure. Moreover, the above narrative shows the front's shortage of weapons forced them to turn away recruits who were willing to take up arms against the government.

Secondly, the newly released Peruvian government documents show that the intelligence services had an in-depth understanding of the northern front and were monitoring them in early 1964. This was long before Gott's assertion that the first government knowledge of the front was in October 1965. The government's accurate intelligence picture allowed the Army units to conduct precise counterinsurgency operations. Finally, in contrast to Gott's assertion, the northern front personnel did go on the offensive, but they were not successful in their attack on the Civil Guard post. When the army entered the guerrilla stronghold in *Cerro Negro* the MIR personnel lost the initial skirmishes and quickly decided to retreat across the Ecuadorian border. This shows that the northern front did not implode due to internal

⁸⁶⁴ *Correo*, 27 January 1966.

⁸⁶⁵ *La Prensa*, 'Guerrilla Leaders Reported To Have Fled To Ecuador', 29 January 1966, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 17 February 1966, p. 5.

⁸⁶⁶ *Caretas*, '¿Todavía en el norte?', 25 February 1966, p. 16. Spanish version: 'ofensiva de papel'.

mistakes, but rather the Peruvian security forces, armed with accurate intelligence, were able to defeat the guerrillas outright.

Urban Front in Lima

The MIR's Lima-based urban front is almost absent from the historiography. Only a few authors even mention it. For example, Brown explained, 'As the Peruvian summertime passed into January 1966, MIR operatives in Lima attempted to divert government forces by exploding bombs and scattering leaflets proclaiming the Peruvian revolution'.⁸⁶⁷ Brown and Fernandez dismiss the urban front and downplay it as a support element.⁸⁶⁸ Jan Lust devotes seven pages to the 'Fight in the city', but does not consider the urban front's activities central to the MIR's insurgency.⁸⁶⁹ The lack of emphasis concerns because the Central Committee, the urban front, and its attack cell were critical components to the MIR's plans for a revolution in Peru, and the events bear directly on the question of whether the military did indeed defeat the MIR. This section will focus on the activities of Ricardo Gadea's attack cell and what the Peruvian government and press labelled a terrorism campaign in Lima during late 1965 and early 1966. As with the rural fronts, when the urban front went into action, the Peruvian security forces quickly penetrated the organization and arrested the operatives.

Further evidence makes clear that the MIR was organized enough that a competent military could only accomplish its defeat. In 1964, De la Puente and most of the MIR personnel moved to their respective locations throughout Peru to begin the rural phase of the insurgency. A three-person element from the Central Committee remained in Lima to coordinate urban operations. The Central Committee organized the personnel who remained in Lima into cells. Carlos Flores explained that each cell had a specific task on which to focus. These included finance, weapons and ammunition procurement, intelligence gathering, counterintelligence, recruitment, logistics, propaganda, and media relations.⁸⁷⁰ Gonzalo Fernandez recalled that the urban cells were 'improvised because they did not have a prolonged formation'.⁸⁷¹ This contrasted with APRA and the PCP, who had been organizing in Lima for decades. MIR personnel attempted to build relations with the unions and workers

⁸⁶⁷ Brown, *Cuba's Revolutionary World*, p. 331.

⁸⁶⁸ Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 198.

⁸⁶⁹ Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, pp. 371- 378. Spanish version: 'La Lucha en La Ciudad'.

⁸⁷⁰ Interview with Carlos Flores in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 371.

⁸⁷¹ Interview with Gonzalo Fernández in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 370. Spanish version: 'improvisados porque no habían tenido una formación prolongada'.

organizations, but APRA had strong historical ties with this segment and kept the MIR out. The PCP historically controlled the leftist student groups at the major universities, but the MIR distributed propaganda flyers at University Park to draw students to its cause.⁸⁷² The cell structure allowed the MIR to remain relatively obscure until they committed crimes and bombings that drew the attention of the National Police.

There was an extremist group in Lima called *Alianza de Liberacion Nacional* (National Liberation Alliance, ALN) that was not directly part of but supported the MIR. Former ALN member Luis Alberto Arana claimed they had twenty-five operatives in the city.⁸⁷³ Their first attack was on 31 January 1965 when they attempted to burn down the office building of the US military mission. A US State Department intelligence memo noted, 'The perpetrators of this unsuccessful attempt probably were members of the extreme leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), which has long been planning to initiate guerrilla activities in the mountains'.⁸⁷⁴ On 4 July, during the evening, two bombs exploded in Lima. The first was at the entrance to the Crillon hotel, which during the time was the best hotel in Lima, and where many foreigners stayed, the explosion seriously injured three people. The second was at the National Club, where there was a high-society debutante ball that evening. The doorman noticed the bomb as someone threw it in, and he grabbed it and threw it out of the building. As a result, there were no significant injuries. Richard Walter explained that these two locations were 'the principal social institutions of the nation's elite'.⁸⁷⁵ Later, in the evening, MIR supporters and students held a rally at the Plaza San Martin. *La Prensa* reported, 'Armando Villanueva, Secretary General of APRA, said that he had learned that the Communists were planning to begin terrorist activity in the cities to coincide with guerrilla activity in the country'.⁸⁷⁶ Following each of these events, the PNP made arrests and began to gain an understanding of the ALN.

ALN and MIR operatives robbed the Banco de Credito in the La Molina district of Lima on 16 July to provide funding to the guerrillas in the field. They initially escaped with 365,000 Soles (approximately \$100,000.00 in 1965). However, the Civil Guard arrested Jorge Nako

⁸⁷² SIN report, 'Infiltración en el Campo Laboral y Campesinado', 15 May 1965, p. 18, JNE, 1960s file.

⁸⁷³ Interview with Luis Alberto Arana in Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 375.

⁸⁷⁴ Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research memorandum, 'Guerrilla and Terrorist Activity in Latin America Over the Past Four Months', 08 April 1965, p. 7, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Latin America-Cuba, box, 31, folder 7, Cuban Subversion.

⁸⁷⁵ Walter, *Peru and The United States*, p. 70.

⁸⁷⁶ *La Prensa*, 'Bombs Explosion Signal Extremist Demonstrations in Lima', translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 20 July 1965, p. 11.

the same day with part of the money. He provided the officers with information that led to a police raid on a safehouse where they arrested Luis Alberto Arana and confiscated the getaway car, weapons, and dynamite.⁸⁷⁷ It is unknown what happened with the remainder of the money, but the investigation provided the PNP with the information they needed to arrest most of the ALN members. The Lima news magazine *Presente Nacional* speculated that the group was responsible for two earlier bank robberies in Lima.⁸⁷⁸ The police never captured Hector Cordero, also known as Comrade Pedro, a close confidant of De la Puente and suspected planner of the robberies.⁸⁷⁹ However, after the raid on the safehouse, the ALN did not conduct any other operations, the PNP had successfully dismantled the group.

The capital city was relatively quiet until October when the information reached the city that De la Puente was dead. In response, the MIR established the *Milicias Urbanas Luis de la Puente* (Urban Militia of Luis de la Puente) to begin a bombing campaign in Lima to continue the fight against the Peruvian government.⁸⁸⁰ Ricardo Gadea, the brother-in-law to Che Guevara, commanded the cell, which the CIA considered an 'urban terrorist militia'.⁸⁸¹ They had a training camp called 'Ancalayo' located in a remote area east of Lima near Huancayo in the Junin region to train, plan, and prepare for operations.⁸⁸² The PNP subsequently identified and surveilled the location. The first attack occurred on 29 October at the home of Augusto Wiese and the Center for Reeducation. *La Prensa* reported, 'The bombs caused slight damage. Almost simultaneously, this newspaper received a call from a self-styled member of the urban militia of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, which said that these terrorist acts are the prelude of the revolutionary war in the city'.⁸⁸³ This bombing was the urban militia's only attack during 1965. The PNP investigated the incident and began to gather evidence that would allow them to dismantle the cell as they had the ALN.

⁸⁷⁷ *La Prensa*, 'Roban 365 Mil Soles A Banco en la Molina', 17 July 1965, front page; *La Prensa*, 'El Comunista Fonken Dirigio Robo del Banco', front page, 18 July 1965.

⁸⁷⁸ Lima newsmagazine *Presente Nacional*, 'Soles para las Guerrillas', September-October, 1965, No. 102, p. 37.

⁸⁷⁹ 'Hector Cordero May Be Terrorist Leader', *La Prensa*, 27 October 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 15 November 1965, p. 6.

⁸⁸⁰ *El Militante*, 'Las Guerrillas del 65 y las acciones armadas en la ciudad', 28 October 1978, p. 4; Lust, *Lucha Revolucionaria Perú*, p. 374.

⁸⁸¹ CIA Intelligence memorandum, Review of Insurgency Problems, 8 March 1966, p. 5.

⁸⁸² *La Prensa*, 'Campo de Practicas Tienen Rojos en Junín', 13 January 1966, front page.

⁸⁸³ *La Prensa*, 'Bombs Explode in Lima', 29 October 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 15 November 1965, p. 6.

Gadea's cell accelerated its bombing campaign in the new year. On the early morning of 2 January, operatives exploded two bombs in the lower-class neighbourhood called San Luis. The frontpage story in *La Prensa* showed a picture of fourteen-year-old Dominica Pena Ricse, one of the explosions had permanently disfigured her face. The police stated they thought the MIR intended to use the bombs to start a fire in the neighbourhood.⁸⁸⁴ On the evening of 10 January, the cell attacked five separate locations with bombs, including military sites, the homes of high-level government officials, and the residence of the Venezuelan Embassy. The bombs injured one baby and two young children but did not result in any deaths.⁸⁸⁵ The following day, the PIP director Javier Campos Montoya announced that they detained six suspects, four of whom are university students and the other two workers from Surquillo.⁸⁸⁶ The results of these bombings bring into question the strategic aim of the MIR's urban campaign. Assuming they did not intend to attack and injure children, one must conclude that the cell's operational capability did not meet its aspirations.

On Sunday, 16 January 1966, the MIR cell destroyed the vehicle of the editor of *Caretas*, a Lima-based weekly news magazine. In the early evening, Enrique Zileri Gibson worked at his home in the upscale Lima neighbourhood called San Isidro. Meanwhile, MIR operatives quietly installed a bomb on his car that he had parked along the street outside. The bomb exploded later that evening but did not result in any injuries or fatalities.⁸⁸⁷ Ironically in the final issue of *Caretas* in 1965, Zileri had named De la Puente 'Man of the Year for Peru' alongside Pope Paul VI, who took the honour for the world. They gave De la Puente the award because he was the most influential person in Peru that year.⁸⁸⁸ However, Zileri's magazine took a hard stance against the violence of the New Left, and this drew the enmity of the remaining MIR members. The 20 January edition of *Caretas* had a picture of the destroyed vehicle on the cover. On page 14, Zileri published an oped that read, 'We are, in truth, in the middle of a small wave (17 bombs in the last five weeks) produced by the MIR'. He went on to denounce the café Marxists and thank the journalist community in Lima for their outpouring of support.⁸⁸⁹ The leftist weekly magazine *Oiga* offered an alternative view

⁸⁸⁴ *La Prensa*, 'Dos Menores Heridos En Atentado con Bomba: Fue en Barrio S. Luis; Serian Terroristas', 02 January 1966, front page.

⁸⁸⁵ *La Prensa*, 'Rojos Ponen 4 Bombas; heridos Bebe y 2 Chicos: Una Estallo en Casa Del Gral. Verastegui', 11 January 1966, front page.

⁸⁸⁶ *La Prensa*, 'Hay 4 Sospechosos De Colocar Bombas', 12 January 1966, front page; *Expreso*, 'MIR Urban Militia Carries Out Terrorist Activities', 12 January 1966, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 01 February 1966, p. 7.

⁸⁸⁷ *La Prensa*, 17 January 1966.

⁸⁸⁸ *Caretas*, 20 December 1965, p. 12. Spanish version: 'Hombre del año para el Perú'.

⁸⁸⁹ *Caretas*, Enrique Zileri, 'La Bomba', 20 January 1965, pp. 12-15.

of the bombing and questioned the motivation of the MIR in attacking the person who just named De le Puente 'Man of the Year'. They suggested that the attackers could have been from several different groups and cautioned, 'The Police should investigate, capture, and punish the author, or authors, of the attack, whomever they are'.⁸⁹⁰ Despite this impassioned defence, all of the evidence point towards MIR's urban militia. The police continued to investigate, and they gained vital intelligence that would allow them to disrupt the cell.

The cell continued to prepare for future attacks in Lima. On 20 January, the PIP announced that it had evidence that they could attribute the recent bombings to the MIR, including that attack against Zileri. They also reminded the public that the MIR had distributed propaganda leaflets stating that they would 'initiate a series of reprisals' for the death of their leaders.⁸⁹¹ The cell conducted an attack on 18 February when they placed five bombs at various locations across Lima focused on military and economic targets. The bombs did not produce any casualties.⁸⁹² Three days later, the CIA reported, 'Eight sticks of dynamite with a fuse detonator were discovered on 21 February in the garden of the Colombian residence, but were safely removed by police'.⁸⁹³ During the ensuing investigation, the PIP obtained evidence that allowed them to capture cell members, and in turn, dismantle the cell. In early April, the PIP arrested the cell leader Ricardo Gadea, who was by then the senior MIR leader in the country. He provided information that led to the raid of two safehouses, one in El Ermitano neighbourhood, and the second at kilometre 4 of Canta Road. At these locations, the PIP arrested Luciano Murrugarra, Angel Valverde, Silvio Horna, Filiberto Ramos, and Alonso Falcon Campos along with discovering eighty-seven homemade *perro caliente* (hot dog) bombs. The PIP Director stated that the bombs would not have been harmful and were meant to scare and that the MIR planned to use them on 24 and 30 April to protest the war in Vietnam.⁸⁹⁴ This ended the attack cell's activities and the MIR's participation in the New Left's revolutionary movement.

No previous author has emphasized the activities of the MIR's Central Committee, the urban front, and its attack cell. Gadea's Lima-based attack cell and its actions were critical

⁸⁹⁰ *Oiga*, 'Terrorismo: Atentado contra el director de Caretas', No. 158, 21 January 1966, p. 7. Spanish version: 'La policía debe investigar, capturar y castigar al autor o autores del ataque, sean quienes sean'.

⁸⁹¹ *La Tribuna*, 'PIP Attributes Attacks to Urban Militia', 20 January 1966, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 07 February 1966, p. 6.

⁸⁹² *La Prensa*, 'Rojos Lanzan Cinco Bombas; Guardian Saco una a la Calle', 19 February 1966, front page.

⁸⁹³ CIA Intelligence Memorandum 'Review of Insurgency Problems', 08 March 1966, p. 3, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001467972.pdf (accessed 12 November 2019).

⁸⁹⁴ *Caretas*, 16 April 1966, p. 15.

components to the MIR's plans for a revolution in Peru. In the words of its spokesman, the attacks were 'the prelude of the revolutionary war in the city'.⁸⁹⁵ However, this would not come to fruition. Like how the security forces responded to the rural fronts, the Peruvian security forces quickly penetrated the organization and arrested the operatives once they exposed themselves in the conduct of the bank robberies and bombings. The urban front was well organized and employed a cellular structure to maintain security and remain hidden from the Police. However, once they commenced operations, they left behind a trail of evidence that led to their downfall.

Conclusion

In December 1965, the MIR claimed they had met their initial objectives of the revolution. These included: 'To survive by establishing themselves in the countryside, obtaining control of land in certain territorial zones, evading attempts at encirclements, and striking blows against the mercenaries of the Oligarchy'.⁸⁹⁶ Despite this optimistic view, by March 1966, the security forces had dismantled all three rural fronts and the urban militia. A CIA report read, 'The Peruvian government's recent successes against guerrillas of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) has caused serious disarray in the MIR organization. Insurgency is now so limited that most of the army troops have returned to their barracks'. The report concluded, 'The MIR will undoubtedly have to go through a lengthy period of retrenchment and reorganization before it can again operate effectively'.⁸⁹⁷ In a 1967 interview, a former MIR operative reflected, 'In the first place it is necessary to establish with absolute clarity that the revolution is a process, that it is an uneven and complicated phenomenon that develops in the middle of ups and downs, ebbs and flows, advances and regresses'. He continued, 'The term *defeat* is not the most just, we prefer to call it a *setback*'.⁸⁹⁸ The group was never able to reconstitute its military arm. However, as I will show in the conclusion, the MIR was partially responsible for the 1968 *coup d'état* that brought major economic, social, and political change in Peru.

⁸⁹⁵ *La Prensa*, 'Bombs Explode in Lima', 29 October 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 15 November 1965, p. 6.

⁸⁹⁶ *Voz Rebelde*, 'MIR Organ Say Guerrillas Attained Initial Objectives', No. 2, December 1965, translated in CIA, Press information Relating to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Latin America, 01 February 1966, p. 7.

⁸⁹⁷ CIA intelligence memorandum, 'Review of Insurgency Problems', 08 March 1966, p. 4.

⁸⁹⁸ 'Perú: entrevista a dos guerrilleros', p. 172. Spanish version: 'En primer lugar es necesario establecer con absoluta claridad que la revolución es un proceso, esto es, un fenómeno complicado y accidentado que se desarrolla en medio de altas y bajas, flujos y reflujos, avances y retrocesos'. 'El termino *derrota* no es el mas justo, nosotros preferimos llamarlo *revés*'.

This chapter reviewed the elements of the MIR's insurrection against the government of Peru in the 1960s. While Leon Campbell's four explanations for the guerrilla's failure are each partially valid, I advance the literature with new primary sources that confirm Jonathan Brown's assertion that the guerrillas were no match for the army, which shows that even if the guerrillas had not made fundamental mistakes, the government forces still would have defeated them. All three rural fronts received substantial support from the local population in their respective areas. Gott's assertion that the Peruvian security forces were not aware of the existence of Gonzalo Fernandez's northern front in the northeastern most department called Piura along the border with Ecuador before the 1965 commencement of hostilities has been definitively proven false by newly released documents. These Peruvian intelligence documents show that the security forces were tracking Fernandez's group in early 1964. This understanding was critical for the army to conduct precise counterinsurgency operations that forced the northern front to retreat across the border to Ecuador. Secondly, MIR leader Ricardo Gadea's attack cell, along with the Central Committee and the urban front in Lima, has been curiously excluded by most writers and observers of these events. However, the events provide critical support for the argument that the military means defeated the MIR. The cell began a bombing campaign upon learning of the death of De la Puente, the overall leader of the MIR, in October 1965. The cell was able to cause havoc in the capital city, but the National Police quickly investigated and arrested the cell members. This also adds to Brown's argument and expands it to the National Police and shows how it had the capability to dismantle urban insurgent groups. My international multi-archival research is vital to furthering the knowledge of the MIR's insurgency and challenges the orthodox explanations of the failed Peruvian guerrilla experiment.

Conclusion

The chapters herein have told the story of a tragic period in Peruvian history. There is much blame on both the side of the government, as well as the guerrillas. Ultimately, the Oligarchy ‘won’. President Belaunde prematurely concluded in 1966, ‘We have beaten the Communists once and for all. We are sure they won’t be back’.⁸⁹⁹ Nevertheless, finite terms such as ‘beat’, ‘success’, ‘winning’, ‘victory’, and ‘defeat’ do not tell the entire story. Many innocent civilians were caught in the middle and suffered human rights abuse or death. Fortunately, some of the Peruvian commanders, such as Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Gallegos in La Convencion, were clever and flexible enough to employ all the facets of counterinsurgency to isolate the guerrillas and conduct precise counterguerrilla operations without having to resort to repressive measures. During the 1960s, the New Left attempted six mini insurgencies against the Peruvian government in an effort to change the socio-economic and political landscape of the country. I distilled key points from each episode through the re-interpretation of available primary and secondary sources, as well as the incorporation of previously unexamined documents. This conclusion will look at agency, religious factors, the role of females, and then survey each of the four orthodox explanations for the guerrilla failure in turn and challenge their importance, and then argue that it was the Peruvian security force’s competence, not the guerrilla’s incompetence, that created the results.

The question of agency, that is, the capacity to act without external control, warrants more in-depth discussion here. Many of the New Left revolutionaries were adept at securing international, national, and local support, yet when it came time to execute operations, they retained agency at the tactical level. Hugo Blanco fought with the Trotskyist movement over strategy and tactics, yet in the end, used tactics as he saw fit in La Convencion and Lares. Fidel Castro withheld support from Blanco because of his political orientation. However, it is doubtful the Cubans had the capability to assist him even if they wanted to, especially considering Hector Bejar’s failed attempt to infiltrate Peru and come to Blanco’s aid in 1963. Bejar’s National Liberation Army (ELN) was Castro’s and Ernesto Guevara’s favourite group and received extensive support and guidance. Even so, once they returned to Peru, ELN leaders were free to make their own decisions. Luis de la Puente’s Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) case is a bit more complicated. De la Puente was not a communist, and therefore Castro did not trust him. The MIR leader showed he could be pragmatic and

⁸⁹⁹ Gall, ‘Peru’s Misfired Guerrilla Campaign’, p. 2.

adjusted his position numerous times to secure international support. In the end, the MIR commanders employed a hybrid strategy that neither the Chinese nor the Cubans would have approved. Finally, many individual members of the communist parties in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru demonstrated agency when they supported Peruvian revolutionaries through individual acts of solidarity against the direction of party leadership.

For the Peruvian government's part, they did accept a significant amount of aid and training from the US yet retained agency in the execution of the counterinsurgency operation in the 1960s. The Peruvian Ministry of War limited the US Embassy to receiving reports via its Army attaché. Many authors cite Marchetti's and Marks' assertion that US Army Special Forces personnel participated in the counterinsurgency from a mini-Fort Bragg in the jungle. Chapter three of this dissertation shows that the US Aid for International Development, Office of Public Safety, built this base for the Peruvian Special Police Emergency Unit (SPEU). The SPEU was meant to be a counterinsurgency capability but was not ready in time for operations against the ELN and MIR. Moreover, Walter makes a convincing case that US personnel were not involved in planning and executing counterinsurgency operations. Concerning CIA involvement, he interviewed Ambassador Jones, who stated he had 'a very good relationship with my CIA chief ... and was kept informed of all principal plans and actions and projects that were going to be developed and carried out in a covert manner'.⁹⁰⁰ In an interview with Lust, Ramon Miranda, a former Peruvian Army Lieutenant Colonel, stated, 'the CIA participated always' but does not provide any supporting evidence.⁹⁰¹ Perhaps the most compelling reason concerning the credibility of the non-US involvement argument is that in a similar conflict in Bolivia in 1967, when the Bolivian Army, whom the US Army and CIA directly supported and advised, killed Guevara, the US government did not keep its involvement a secret. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the US government would, in the case of Peru. A final point is that the Peruvian Army and President Fernando Belaunde domestic political opposition put him under significant pressure to fight the guerrillas so it is unlikely that he would have been influenced by US Embassy personnel. Religion in Peru is wide-ranging and profoundly ingrained in politics and society. As Jeffery Klaiber shows, 'Religion and politics are so deeply intertwined in Peru that government officials automatically seek the support of the church in order to win religious legitimacy,

⁹⁰⁰ Walter, *Peru and the United States*, p. 77.

⁹⁰¹ Interview with Ramon Miranda in Lust, *Lucha revolucionaria Perú*, p. 432 Spanish version: 'la CIA ha participado siempre'.

without which their political influence would be seriously limited'.⁹⁰² Sociologist Milagros Pena identified the roots of liberation theology in the insurgent activities of the 1960s, but did not explore it in-depth.⁹⁰³ Of the political thinkers and guerrilla leaders, only Bejar eschewed religion as a contributing aspect to the revolution. While religious leaders did not provide active support to the revolutionaries, Padre Donato Lecuona provided food and shelter to Guillermo Lobaton's men in Satipo, perhaps under coercion, and did not report the guerrilla's presence to the security forces. Some religious people took notice as the insurgent activity drew attention to the socio-economic conditions in the Andes. Father Salomon Bolo Hidalgo was the leader of the National Liberation Front, which Carlos Astiz described as a 'pro-Castro organization'.⁹⁰⁴ In 1963, Bolo wrote, 'I consider that it is absolutely necessary for the clergy to place themselves on the side of the peasants, on the side of the unprotected and the forgotten, instead of prostituting themselves before grants spotted with blood'.⁹⁰⁵ He was a harsh critic of the Church hierarchy and its support of the Oligarchy, and Church leaders forced him underground for his actions. In 1966, Romeo Luna Victoria, a Jesuit priest and university professor wrote *Ciencia y Practica de la Revolucion (Science and Practice of the Revolution)*, which was a manual of strategy and tactics. He argued that not only was it acceptable for Catholics to engage in social revolution, but it was also their duty.⁹⁰⁶ Father Gustavo Gutierrez distilled these ideas into liberation theology in 1971, which held that the church should engage in political activism to improve the lives of the oppressed. While Camilo Torres, a Catholic priest, and Colombian National Liberation Army commander, was the most well know practitioner of the doctrine during the 1960s in Latin America, Peru's revolutionaries also hold a prominent position in its development.

Most of the females who appear in these pages were relegated to supporting roles. However, although they were few, they made a significant impact on revolutionary activities. A notable example is Hilda Gadea, who influenced Ernesto Guevara's early thinking on the integration of religion and revolution in Latin America. There were only four female fighters in the rural fronts. All of them were locally recruited and very young, ranging from thirteen to seventeen years old. Other females filled critical roles providing logistical support, often at extreme

⁹⁰² Klaiber, *Religion and Revolution in Peru*, p. xi.

⁹⁰³ Pena, *Theologies of Liberation in Peru*, p. 71.

⁹⁰⁴ Astiz, *Pressure Groups and Power Elites*, p. 183; Also see, SIN report, 'Infiltración en el Campo Laboral y Campesinado', 15 May 1965, p. 7, JNE, 1960s file.

⁹⁰⁵ Translated in Astiz, *Pressure Groups and Power Elites*, p. 184.

⁹⁰⁶ Astiz, *Pressure Groups and Power Elites*, p. 185; Dan McCurry, 'U.S. Church-Financed Missions in Peru', in Sharp (ed.), *U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru*, p. 385.

personal risk. In the rural areas, they tended to the children of the guerrillas and provided supplies and communications. In Lima, and in the international cells, they provided food, shelter, and transportation, as well as ideological support through liaison with news outlets. The Peruvian government detained many of the wives and girlfriends of the guerrillas and imprisoned them without a trial. These aspects of the conflict necessitate further research that could illuminate the indispensable contribution of these revolutionaries.

The primary argument that previous authors have employed to explain the events of the 1960s was the ideological differences of the Peruvian Left. This theme is present throughout this dissertation and is certainly worth looking at here. The Soviets openly committed to supporting Wars of National Liberation, but their actions were not congruent with their rhetoric. They could ill afford another Cuba in the region and did not desire to be so provocative in America's backyard. Instead, they ordered the Muscovite Peruvians to work through legal and democratic methods towards their desired outcomes. The Cubans, as well as the Czechs, supported most anti-US groups regardless of whether they were communist, Trotskyist, or non-communist anti-imperialists. However, the ELN was Castro's and Guevara's preferred group because of its close ideological alignment with the Cuban Revolution. The Chinese also supported any group that was willing to use violence to initiate political change. Ego was a factor and contributed to many of the rifts between the charismatic and influential leaders of the Peruvian Left, and most of them were genuinely committed to their respective places on the political spectrum. As was shown throughout this dissertation, the infighting occurred in the party halls and coffee shops of Lima to meeting places in Trujillo and Cusco to the guerrilla camps in the Andes and the Amazon basin. At times these disparate groups came together and set aside their differences to form alliances; at other times, they figuratively stabbed one another in the back. As early as February 1964, Mao Zedong identified this issue and implored the Peruvian Left to unite. Moreover, in 1965 the Peruvian Investigations Police determined, 'For the moment, none of the national parties of the extreme left has an upcoming leader with the capacity to unite all of the left'.⁹⁰⁷ This brings one to consider the counterfactual that if the Left, or even just the New Left, could have united, would they have been strong enough to overthrow the Peruvian government? To which, I give an emphatic no. Therefore, while it is essential to understand the political

⁹⁰⁷ PIP report, 'Sobre no existencia de Guerra de guerrilla en el País', 4 June 1965, p. 4, JNE, 1960s file. Spanish version: 'Por el momento ninguno de los partidos de extrema izquierda nacionales cuenta con líderes de ascendencia, capaces de aglutinar toda la izquierda'.

differences and disparities among the political parties and insurgent groups, this is not the critical factor in their failure to topple the government.

The second common explanation for the failure is that the guerrillas did not secure the support of the population. While this is accurate, it merits unpacking. Hugo Blanco was the most successful person in regards to building rapport and support among the population in Cusco. His mother was indigenous to the area, and he spoke fluent Quechua, deeply cared for the peasants, and toiled with them on the haciendas before becoming a syndicate leader. Blanco developed a method to incrementally increase their awareness to build animosity towards the landowners and the government. Everything was going according to plan when he turned to violence and, worse, employed revolutionary justice against the locals. These miscalculations coincided with the masterful counterinsurgency strategy employed by Gallegos when he incorporated psychological operations and civic action with intelligence collection to enable a precision counterguerrilla operation and captured Blanco.

Unfortunately, other Peruvian Army commanders did not replicate Gallegos' methods and resorted to repressive techniques. The four rural fronts that the MIR and ELN established in 1965 all had some level of success in winning over the local population in their respective areas. Many have asserted that the locals respected Lobaton the most because he had dark skin, and they did not consider him as much of an outsider as the *mestizo* or white revolutionaries. Lobaton was successful in building rapport with Andean peasants in the central highlands as well as the Campas Indians in the Amazon basin. Across the four rural fronts, there are countless examples of locals providing passive and direct support, as well as taking up arms and fighting with the guerrillas. Hector Bejar insisted that there was no better recruitment tool than a local fighter imploring his brothers to join the cause. Regardless of the amount of support the guerrillas engendered, it could not withstand the pressure of the security forces. As Jonathon Brown concluded, 'The Peruvian case of 1965 points out that an army well prepared and well-disposed to confront the guerrilla *foco* can destroy the potential of the guerrilla to garner support among the *Campesinos*'.⁹⁰⁸ Whether it was through psychological operations, civic action ploys, intelligence tricks, brutal, repressive means, or even torture, the tenacity of the Peruvian counterinsurgency forces overcame the protection that the local population could have provided to the insurgents.

⁹⁰⁸ Brown, *Cuba's Revolutionary World*, p. 339.

Leon Campbell described the third explanation, ‘the Peruvian guerrillas displayed confusion about the exact nature of the society which they were attacking, as well as a misunderstanding of the Cuban and Chinese models for guerrilla warfare which they professed to follow’.⁹⁰⁹ Moreover, Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, a Peruvian Army general who went on to be the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1968, wrote:

*‘The solidarity of communism has suffered notably as a result of the number of groups, the ideological conflict between Moscow and Peking, the differences between Fidel Castro and the orthodox parties of Latin America regarding tactics to be used, the lack of doctrinal and directional unity, and the diversity of the support’.*⁹¹⁰

These arguments are important to scholarly understanding of the events. However, there is a significant counterargument. David Chaplin has shown how the Popular Alliance of American Revolution (APRA) insulated ‘Peru’s industrial proletariat from communist influence’.⁹¹¹ Furthermore, the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) had firm control over the students in left-leaning universities. The Cuban myth of the guerrilla aside, ELN and MIR leaders understood this and attempted to make in-roads with the industrial workers as well as university students in the urban areas to garner support from these segments of society. Additionally, many ELN and MIR documents show that the leadership knew that the objective and subjective conditions did not exist in Peru in 1964, but they believed, as the Cubans had taught them, they could create these conditions through action. To date, no author has examined the five-rural guerrilla fronts in Peru on a case by case basis. In doing so, I discovered that the respective leaders of each mini insurgency were well versed in the Chinese and Cuban models of revolutionary warfare. Moreover, they did as Mao Zedong had recommended in his writings and used this knowledge to develop a specific strategy for the situations in which they found themselves. Regis Debray has been the most virulent critic of Peruvian guerrilla tactics and has blamed the defeat on the use of ‘security zones’.⁹¹² However, only Luis de la Puente and Ruben Tupayachi’s southern front used this method in Mesa Pelada, where they believed that had a location that was so remote and rugged that it was impenetrable to the security forces. In the central highlands, Lobaton’s element would stand and fight when they could and then move to secondary and tertiary positions to prevent direct engagement with the military. In La Mar, Hector Bejar followed the Cuban theory closely and constantly moved using their familiarity with the terrain to evade the security

⁹⁰⁹ Campbell, ‘The Historiography of the Peruvian Guerrilla Movement, 1960-1965’, p. 46.

⁹¹⁰ Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, ‘Insurgency in Latin America: Its Impact on Political and Military Strategy’, *Military Review*, Vol. XLVIV, No. 3, March 1969, p. 12.

⁹¹¹ Chaplin, ‘Peru’s Postponed Revolution’, p. 393.

⁹¹² Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution*, p. 59.

forces. In the end, the Peruvian Army defeated each of these tactics, which illuminates weakness in the theoretician's critique from the outside. Ironically, the Bolivian security forces captured Debray as he violated the principals he espoused in his writing.

Finally, national political events and local-level politics in the Andes coincided with the rise of the guerrillas and tamped down some of the angst among the population. Campbell explained:

'The belief of many Peruvians that Belaunde's politics represented an emerging new order was reinforced by the passage of a moderate agrarian reform bill which may have considerably eased peasant discontent and thereby prevented the subjective conditions favorable to a guerrilla war from materializing between 1963 and 1965'.⁹¹³

The cycle of hope amongst the peasant population during Belaunde's campaign and early presidency and the legal changes mitigated the rural people's desire to revolt. Moreover, journalist Luis Mercier noted that in 1965, 'President Belaunde's popularity was not at the time entirely used up and there was still a reserve of confidence in his agrarian, housing and social reform programme'.⁹¹⁴ Bejar and his inner circle understood this and specifically chose La Mar because the government had not undertaken land reform in that area. The MIR acknowledged the agrarian reform measures taken in rural Peru but did not believe that it was enough.⁹¹⁵ However, the Campesinos proved the MIR wrong in Mesa Pelada when they seemed content with the current situation and failed to revolt against the government. The Peruvian military's civic action projects may have appeased some. However, it is not very easy to determine the level of impact of the development projects on the local population. This line of explanation ties back to the second and third discussed above and may have been more about guerrilla strategy and winning over the population. Eric Hobsbawm, a critic of the Cuban inspired insurgencies, argued:

'With the emergence of the Indians into political visibility in the 1960s, the parameters of Peruvian politics changed. For the first time, the rumblings of the social volcano had to be taken seriously: it had shown it could erupt. At the same time, the possibility of bypassing the political system now existed, and with it the possibility of hauling Peru out of its state of backward dependence, an aim with which all except the Oligarchy sympathized'.⁹¹⁶

He went on to state, 'The Peruvian generals were and are afraid of a social revolution that one day might be led by the left, for – as Bejar also shows – the potential peasant support for

⁹¹³ Campbell, 'The Historiography of the Peruvian Guerrilla Movement, 1960-1965', p. 46.

⁹¹⁴ Luis Mercier Vega, *Guerrillas in Latin America: The technique of the counter-state* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969), p. 149.

⁹¹⁵ 'Perú: entrevista a dos guerrilleros', p. 183.

⁹¹⁶ Eric Hobsbawm, 'What's New in Peru', May 1971, in Leslie Bethell (ed.) *Viva La Revolucion*, p. 329.

insurrection was substantial'.⁹¹⁷ In response, the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (1968-1980) 'transferred more than 9.5 million hectares of land to more than 370,000 Peruvian families'.⁹¹⁸ Despite this massive land redistribution, the Shining Path terrorist group (1970-1993) employed the Chinese people's protracted war revolutionary strategy and almost toppled the government. Considering this, it is difficult to conclude that Belaunde's charm and limited reform had a significant impact on Campesino discontent.

The above four points are not without merit, and while they each contribute a partial reason for the guerrilla defeat, there is room for additional explanation. I argue that the Peruvian security forces were responsible for the defeat of the FIR, MIR, and ELN. Before Brown, only a few authors made vague references to this theme, while the majority disregarded the effectiveness of the military. In 1966, the Peruvian Ministry of War released an eighty-six-page document that described the government's response to the MIR and ELN. Apparently written by military officers, the congratulatory tone does heap praise on the army and offers the only argument that the military defeated the insurgents. Surprisingly, retired Peruvian Army General Armando Artola Azcarate's does not take the opportunity to trumpet the success of the army in his book about the conflict. Campbell only devotes one sentence to this idea in his historiography of the events. Bejar concedes, 'The ELN's guerrilla unit, like all the others operating that year, did not possess these qualities to the degree required to overcome the inevitable problems and face a large, well-trained enemy force'.⁹¹⁹ However, this did not prevent him from advising future guerrilla leaders how to overcome the four orthodox explanations in an effort to topple the government. Brown shows that 'The White House, though distracted by the Vietnam War, had been keeping track of the guerrilla problems in Latin America'.⁹²⁰ For example, US National Security Council Staffer William Bowdler understood the importance of this theme and wrote to President Johnson, 'Peru's record in dealing with insurgency at the incipient stage is the best in the hemisphere'.⁹²¹ The Peruvian government's success can be explained by four factors.

The first factor was that the Peruvian Army possessed a formidable counterinsurgency capability in 1965. In fact, the guerrillas could not have chosen a worse time to begin their

⁹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 330.

⁹¹⁸ Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America*, p. 252.

⁹¹⁹ Bejar, *Peru 1965*, p. 111.

⁹²⁰ Brown, *Cuba's Revolutionary World*, p. 332.

⁹²¹ NSC memo, William G. Bowdler, 'Guerrilla Problems in Latin America', 05 July 1967, LBJL, NSF, Intelligence File, box 2, quoted in Brown, *Cuba's Revolutionary World*, p. 332.

insurrection, and while they were able to outmatch the rural Civil Guard detachments, they could not withstand the full force of the military. I explained the development of this capability in chapter three and the employment of the operations in chapters four and five. The second factor was the national, army, and police intelligence service's ability to penetrate and understand the insurgent groups. While this occurred in all six of the mini insurgencies, the penetrations were most notable in the southern, northern, and Lima fronts. Heretofore, unexamined documents from the national and police intelligence services clearly show the extent of the Peruvian government's knowledge of the rural and urban elements. The third factor was the integration of civic action and psychological operations into the counterinsurgency strategy. When commanders used these adjuncts efficiently, they were able to conduct precise counterguerrilla operations and minimize collateral damage. The final factor was that Peruvian government officials, military commanders, and individual soldiers willingly violated international norms and laws in their haste to defeat the guerrillas. This led them to use repressive counterinsurgency techniques such as torture, extrajudicial imprisonment and killings, and indiscriminate aerial bombing with both conventional munitions as well as napalm. If the widespread allegations of these crimes were not true, one must wonder, why the government did not demonstrate transparency by allowing the press or international observers such as the Red Cross or Amnesty International into the conflict zones. While the guerrillas are not without blame, there is no legal or moral justification for the government's use of these methods, even if they were effective.

The final question that remains is whether any good emerged from this conflict? From a regional standpoint, Brown shows that 'Within two decades of Castro's victory speech in Santiago de Cuba, the vast majority of Latin American citizens lived under dictatorship'.⁹²² In this view, it is not possible to consider the spread of the Cuban Revolution a success. In March 1966, the CIA wrote, 'With the insurgency problem well under control, the government hopes to be able to concentrate its resources and attention more fully on socio-economic reform and development programs'.⁹²³ This did happen to an extent, but domestic political pressure and divisive issues such as the controversial International Petroleum Company's land and mineral rights, led to the 1968 *coup d'état*, which ousted Belaunde and placed the military in charge of the government for the next twelve years. The Velasco regime distanced itself from the US and built a close relationship with the Soviets. Many

⁹²² Brown, *Cuba's Revolutionary World*, p. 10.

⁹²³ CIA Intelligence Memorandum, Review of Insurgency Problems, 8 March 1966, p. 5.

have argued that some of the Peruvian military officers involved in the guerrilla conflict of the 1960s came away with an appreciation of the poor condition of the country outside of the prosperous areas in Lima and a few other cities.⁹²⁴ This may have engendered empathy among the officer corps and support for Velasco's massive land reforms, and other attempts to improve the socio-economic system, so that it was fair for all. Unfortunately, these actions did not do enough to prevent the Shining Path from mobilizing much of the population against the government. This dissertation examined the New Left's insurrection in 1960s Peru and the government's response to provide scholars with a case study of counterinsurgency strategy and techniques. I hope to have made a timely and original contribution to the existing corpus of Latin America's Cold War historiography.

⁹²⁴ John Baines, 'U.S. Military Assistance to Latin America: An Assessment', p. 479; Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America*, p. 249; Mercier, *Guerillas in Latin America*, p. 86; Brown, *Cuba's Revolutionary World*, p. 337; Einaudi, 'U.S. Relations with the Peruvian Military', p. 22; Brown and Fernandez, *War of Shadows*, p. 194.

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