

SMALL SCALE, COMMUNITY BASED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN THE CANADIAN ARCTIC

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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is between 10,000 and 20,000 words in length, excluding figures, tables, abstract, acknowledgements and references and is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration.

ABSTRACT

The term "northern development" in the Canadian Arctic is often associated only with large, non-renewable resource extraction projects. Other alternative development projects such as the co-operatives provide development on a scale that a community itself can manage and control. The "boom and bust" cycle of mega project development has been of little benefit to Inuit community development and the current "bust" in the Canadian Beaufort Sea oil and gas exploration activity is a case in point. A more sustainable, alternative development strategy is provided by small scale, community based economic development.

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I would like to thank the following people for sharing their knowledge and experience of economic development in the Canadian Arctic.

Mr. Roger Connolly was the Economic Development and Tourism Officer with the Government of the N.W.T. in Cambridge Bay. Subsequently, (in 1984), he was appointed Assistant Regional Director of the Inuvik Region, N.W.T. Mr. Connolly provided some current information for this thesis. Mr. Keith Crowe was living at Fort Chimo during the early days of the co-operative there. He is the author of A History of the Original Peoples of Northern Canada and A Cultural Geography of Northern Foxe Basin N.W.T. He represented the Government of Canada in the early land claims negotiations with the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada. I visited him at his home in Ottawa in the spring of 1986. Mr. Dick Hill, former Manager of the Inuvik Research Station, is a long time Inuvik resident. He has held the office of Mayor in Inuvik, and is presently an independent consultant in Inuvik. While he was visiting Cambridge in April 1987 he kindly agreed to discuss aspects of this thesis.

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1. INTRODUCTION

a) Large versus small scale development

The term "northern development" is most commonly used in Canada to describe large non-renewable resource extraction projects in the Arctic and sub-Arctic. These require finance and human resources which that area usually cannot provide. But there is another aspect of "northern development" which is often overlooked, indeed ignored. This is small scale, community based economic development. This thesis examines this other very important aspect of development. A close look will be taken at three very different examples of economic development which have contributed, each in a unique way, to the development of northern communities. There follows an overview of projects and programs, past and present, which have also played a part, in this "alternative" development.

This alternative aspect of northern development is particularly important because, with the settlement in 1984 of the Committee for Original Peoples Entitlement (COPE) land claim and the soon-to-be settled Nunavut claim by the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC), Inuit people will have available the capital necessary to develop the sorts of projects they themselves choose. Also, they will have jurisdiction over land, and will have more authority in the management of the living resources of that land.

In 1986 there were economic development conferences held in each of the five administrative regions of the N.W.T. What was stated repeatedly was that there was an urgent need for the development of small scale, community based economic development. This thesis looks at this alternative aspect of northern development which has often been overlooked and which will be of increasing importance as Inuit people gain political and economic power through the settlement of land claims.

b) A sketch of the growing and confused involvements of Southern interests in

Inuit territory

Different development eras in the Canadian Arctic have come about to exploit various Arctic resources for the benefit of distant people in distant communities. Rarely were there more than token gestures of concern for the Inuit people and the communities that were affected by such development.

The Inuit have always been regarded as a remarkable group of people because they inhabit such a difficult part of the world. Theirs was an introspective culture without much contact with the world outside their own. Their term for themselves translates simply as "The People". The terms "inventive", "adaptable", and "innovative" are often attached to these people. Their material culture was sparse because it had to be carried from camp to camp. Their tools are beautiful examples of utility and economy.

From their first contact with Europeans, Inuit "adapted" to the changes which contact with Europeans brought. Early trade with Russian fur dealers in the Bering Strait area and the British and European whalers in the Baffin Bay area introduced new and useful trade items such as steel knives, pots, materials, needles and thread. The Arctic fox was an animal for which Inuit had little use before the European traders and whalers arrived. It then became very important because many useful trade items could be had in exchange for the white fox skins. The whalers had closer social relations with the Inuit than did the traders. Often Inuit groups were employed to catch whales on contract and were paid well. There were many mixed marriages between Inuit and the whalers. While the whaling era brought changes in the Inuit lifestyle and economy, the "traditional" way of life remained relatively unchanged. Perhaps the most dramatic effect of the whaling industry in both the eastern and western Arctic

is that the diseases brought by the whalers and to which the Inuit had no immunity led to very high mortality. Some writers suggest that 80% of the original 1,500 Mackenzie Inuit died from diseases introduced by the whalers and others (Smith 1984, p.349; Crowe 1974, p.110). See table below from Smith (1984).

Mackenzie Eskimo Population Estimates, 1826-1930

Year	Population	Source
1826	2,000	Franklin 1828 :86-228
1850	2,500	Usher 1971a :169-171
1865	2,000	Petitot 1876a :x
1905	250	RCMP 1906 :129
1910	130	RCMP 1911 :151
1930	10	Jenness 1964 :14

Source: Smith 1984, p.349.

The whaling era in the Western Arctic ended with the collapse in 1904 of the price of baleen. Some later whaling did go on there and in the Eastern Arctic, but on a vastly reduced scale. Even though their population was severely reduced, Inuit people were able to return to a life not unlike their traditional one. The Hudson's Bay Company and private traders moved into the cArctic in order to satisfy the market for trade goods that the whalers had created. The fur trade continued with the usual fluctuations in prices. Gradually there was an increase in the presence of government as police and medical patrols in the Arctic became more frequent. The Arctic was regarded by the Government of Canada as a distant liability - better left more or less on its own with only the occasional official visit.

All this changed very abruptly in the 1950s. In the late 1940s the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear bomb. Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States had gradually deteriorated to the point where their relationship

was termed the "Cold War". Fearing a possible airborne attack over the north polar region, the military persuaded the United States Congress to approve the design and later construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line. At first this project was secret - known simply as Project 572. Between the start of construction in 1955 and completion in 1957, there was frantic activity along the Arctic coast from Point Barrow, Alaska, all the way across the coast, overland to Hall Beach, and across the Foxe Basin and Baffin Island to Cape Dyer. There were more than 50 radar sites in a band between latitudes 66° N. and 70° N., and stretching from 60° W. to 160° W. The line also extended across Greenland. Each site had between three and fifty men. Soon after the line was opened, the small, three-man "auxiliary" sites were closed, as new technology had made them obsolete almost as soon as they went into operation.

It was during this period that irrevocable changes were taking place in the Arctic. The construction of the DEW line did provide some wage employment for Inuit but this was mostly in the west. The most significant effect of the DEW line is that it provided a transportation and communications infrastructure which paved the way for future large scale development in the Arctic. Furthermore, the construction of the DEW Line drew attention to the condition of Canada's northernmost citizens - the Inuit. Many were suffering from tuberculosis; in 1956 almost one-sixth of Canada's Inuit were under treatment for tuberculosis (Judd 1969, p.598) and some were starving. Their living conditions became, for Canada, a national disgrace. The north was a skeleton in Canada's closet (*ibid.*).

Without much of an opportunity to formulate an overall comprehensive plan, the action taken by the Government of Canada might be seen, in retrospect, as lacking cohesion and direction. Certainly the construction of the town of

Inuvik in the late 1950s did much to demonstrate clearly a government presence in the Canadian Western Arctic. Throughout the Arctic, the increased government presence took the form of a provision of basic housing, government services such as welfare, nursing stations, police, and schools. The provision of basic housing without cost was a way of encouraging people from the remote hunting and fishing camps to move into the government centres.

It seems that there were many dedicated key people in a number of departments doing "what had to be done". It must have been an exciting period when Canada was seriously moving into the Arctic for the first time. It was regarded as the "Last Frontier". Inuvik was likened to the city of Brasilia. Bulldozers cleared virgin bush to make way for a large, brand-new town with all the modern conveniences and shops, hotels, a theatre, hospital, airport, and military base. It inspired the pioneer spirit. The same impetus that pushed back the "frontier" in Canada from east to west was now moving north.

The Honourable John Diefenbaker was the Prime Minister of Canada between 1957 and 1963. He is remembered for his "northern vision" and his famous speech of February 12, 1958, in which he said "... we are fulfilling the vision and the dream of Canada's first prime minister - Sir John A. Macdonald. But Macdonald saw Canada from East to West. I see a new Canada. A Canada of the north!" (cited in Rea 1968, p.357). The 1950s were days of hope and promise: anything was possible. With a "northern vision", Canada was to expand its frontiers into the north.

The machinery to run this "vision" remained in place but ran in a much slower gear under the Liberal government that succeeded Diefenbaker and the Conservatives. Under Lester Pearson, the Liberals retreated a bit from the north and concentrated on more southerly issues. Then in 1968 the same Liberal government under Pierre Trudeau had to cope with the embarrassment of the voyage

of the American oil supertanker *Manhattan* through the Northwest Passage. Not only was Canada unclear about her own position on Arctic sovereignty, but she was both unequipped and unprepared to defend it. Other southern intrusions into the north had proved the same thing. The whalers came and essentially had the Arctic to themselves. The meagre Government moves to control their activities were too late and ineffectual. The north was essentially on its own and the only connection with the south was through occasional Government patrols, Royal Canadian Mounted Police reports and the reports of the missionaries and of the Hudson's Bay Company. Inuit were the wards of the Hudson's Bay Company and the missions.

Canada's lack of a northern policy was made embarrassingly clear in the 1950s since the United States' DEW Line was built equally across Canadian Arctic territory. Some journalists at the time even suggested that while Canada liked to think that the Arctic of the 1950s was its new frontier, in fact it was the frontier of the sleeping giant south of the 48th parallel (Allen 1956, p.3).

In his recent book Northern Development: The Canadian Dilemma, p.325 the author Robert Page (1986) suggests that Canadians in the 1950s and even in the 1980s "are still hung up in their dilemma about the north - that ambivalent mixture of greed and idealism". He also concludes that there never has been a comprehensive policy on the north. Most glaring of all is that it has never been clear to the native inhabitants of the north just where they fit into the picture that the south has in its "on again, off again, northern vision" (*ibid.*). The vision of what the north was, or was to be, has never been clear.

2. SMALL SCALE, COMMUNITY BASED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN PRACTICE

a) Some early forerunners

Though in recent years they have risen into prominence, the idea of this kind of enterprise is not new. There have been in the past a number of imaginative and inventive projects and programmes designed to create jobs or income in Inuit communities. Many of these have never been documented. They may have been written up as part of the field reports of the early Industrial Development Officers and have been buried in some government archive (Crowe, personal communication, 1986). In an article published in 1968 entitled "The Economic Situation of the Eskimo", Diamond Jenness mentions several of these early projects. He mentions a beluga whale fishery in the mouth of the Churchill River, which was started in 1949 by a commercial enterprise. In 1951, 584 beluga were taken, each measuring about ten feet long and weighing about 900 lbs. The company shipped 3,200 lbs of beluga steaks to Winnipeg where they sold without difficulty. Over a ten-year period the annual catch decreased, and only the rendered whale oil, not meat, was exported. The oil extraction plant gradually fell into disrepair and suspended operations in 1960, which effectively ended beluga fishing at Churchill as a commercial enterprise (Jenness 1968, p.138).

At the Koksoak River in Arctic Quebec, the Hudson's Bay Company shipped as much as 40 tons of salmon and char per season, starting in 1881. However, by 1931 the industry had closed down. There was an experimental cod and seal fishery at Port Burwell but it was only partially successful because the local people did not like the taste of the salt cod produced by the experimental fishing station.

There were "small boat building plants at Lake Harbour in the Eastern Arctic and at Tuktoyaktuk in the Western [Arctic]: both of these languished" (*ibid.*, p.139). There was an attempt to create an eiderdown industry like the

one in Iceland which had been so successful. This too "failed to take root, perhaps because the handling of wild birds as carefully as domestic poultry lay outside the realm of Eskimo experience" (*ibid.*). And then there were the sheep,

Undismayed [by the above failures], the government landed at Fort Chimo in 1955 ten sheep from the Central Experimental Farm in Ottawa, hoping that those animals might thrive as they have in the southernmost fiords of Greenland and replace the vanishing caribou; but the half-starved sled dogs quickly wrote *finis* to that experiment (Jenness 1968, p.139).

However, the pace of such undertaking greatly increased during the 1950s and '60s until today this style of enterprise is widespread, prominent and arguably the best way forward for the region as a whole. Some examples of these are discussed below.

b) Co-operatives

One of the most significant forms of the small scale, community based economic enterprise is the co-operative. The basic idea of co-operatives is self-help and local economic development under democratic control. Co-operatives were first started in the Northwest Territories in the late 1950s. The first Inuit co-operative was incorporated on 14 April 1959 at George River, Quebec. The Industrial Division of the Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources (now Indian and Northern Affairs) sent their officers to places like George River, Fort Chimo and Frobisher Bay. At George River the starting up of the first Arctic co-operative became a community project with almost everyone pitching in. The first building erected by the co-operative was made from local logs. A detailed account of this is in Inuit Journey by Edith Iglauer (1979).

At Frobisher Bay the first co-operative was established to provide housing for Inuit people. Prior to the 1940s there was no permanent settlement at the present site of Frobisher Bay. The nearby Sylvia Grinnell River was used by Inuit as a fishing camp but the present town site at the uppermost point of the bay was not inhabited. Like many other settlements which were suddenly created in the Arctic (Resolute, Cape Dyer, Churchill, Hall Beach, Cape Parry, to name only a few), Frobisher Bay was selected as a site to build an airstrip because it was a convenient location to locate a refuelling spot for aircraft travelling from Canada to Europe during the later stages of the Second World War. Airstrips and adjacent military compounds were built at Frobisher Bay and Coral Harbour on Southampton Island. These depots were part of what was known as the Crimson Route, a series of airstrips along a polar route, which could be used by aircraft bringing war casualties back to North America.

Between the construction of the airstrip in 1943 and the start of the construction of the DEW Line in 1955, Frobisher Bay became a place which Inuit of the area visited. Gradually a few Inuit people acquired jobs and stayed in the vicinity. Houses were built of scraps of building materials and shipping cases from the military base. Ironically, the Inuit became part of a squatter settlement in their own land.

Many of the DEW Line sites had adjacent squatter communities with family, relatives and friends coming to be near those Inuit who had succeeded in getting a job at the site. These dwellings were often little more than primitive shacks. While an igloo was seldom used for more than a few weeks at a time, these shacks became semi-permanent dwellings. Cramped, uninsulated, damp and

cold, these dwellings were unhealthy and unsafe. Under these conditions, the tuberculosis which had come with Europeans in the 1940s and 1950s and to which Inuit had little resistance, became rampant. Whole families became infected and the squalor of the squatter settlements was partially to blame.

The DEW Line had created the transportation and communications infrastructure for future large scale development. Media coverage, albeit restricted, led to public awareness and the national embarrassment of the living conditions of the "undeveloped" Inuit. This was a very significant turning point for native people in the North and particularly the Inuit people of the Arctic. Life in the Arctic was never to be the same again.

Co-operatives were chosen as the vehicle by which to introduce development. Canada by this time had a long and successful experience with co-operatives. Of particular note were the agricultural co-operatives of the western prairies. Additionally co-operatives were considered to be a good way to introduce change, for the government would be seen to be assisting a group rather than individuals.

The second co-operative was started at Port Burwell, just a few months after the start of the George River co-operative. It became the first retail co-operative store and also purchased sealskins, fish, and handicrafts. In 1962 a trial seal-meat and fish-cannery was started at Port Burwell. The settlement is situated on a small island in the Button Islands, just off the northernmost tip of Quebec and Labrador in an area rich in marine life.

In their book Eskimo Townsmen (Honigmann and Honigmann 1965), published in 1965, John and Irma Honigmann describe the process by which the first Baffin Region co-operative was formed. At first the traditional camp leaders were sought and one leader by the name of Simonie Michael was elected as president

of the co-operative. The most pressing problem was seen to be the housing situation. Consequently the industrial development officer helped organize the first housing co-operative and managed it.

The Honigmanns were anthropologists and viewed the early European-Inuit relationship from a sociological perspective. They suggest that because it was the industrial development officer who had the political and economic tools to carry out the co-operative project, it was essentially he who put the co-operative idea into the heads of the Inuit. The Honigmanns point out that while there was considerable co-operation among Inuit in the way they lived and hunted, the co-operative principles of a European co-operative, while similar, are not a "natural" and total fit with Inuit co-operation in spite of what some would like to believe (*ibid*, p.21).

While it is important to have a record of an anthropological view of what the government was doing to modernize the Inuit of the Arctic, there was at the time, a great sense of political urgency to cope with a problem. In this case, it was the problem of confronting the whole question of what to do about the condition of the Inuit in the Arctic. For so long, the government view had been to leave northern natives alone, and that the best policy was a laissez faire policy or no policy at all. Now, owing to the construction of the DEW Line and the exposure of the north to the media of the south, the government had to act or at least be seen to be in the process of acting.

The situation that the Honigmanns observed in Frobisher was, undoubtedly, of interest to anthropologists. Here was the most traditional native culture of North America living beside an American military camp with geodesic domes which housed the most advanced radar equipment known. No one knew the best way to go about making the process of modernization as gentle as possible for the Inuit.

Co-operatives seemed to be a good way because they were considered to be a modern application of the old Inuit way of sharing and of communal effort for the communal good.

Another good example of the evolution of a co-operative is provided by the case of Pelly Bay. This is the only Inuit community which is not accessible by ship each year. Because of the remoteness and inaccessibility of this community, the effects of whalers and traders were minimal. The first Oblate priest arrived in the area in 1935. A small school and dispensary were started. All supplies were carried overland by dog team and sled from Repulse Bay. Until the mid-1960s the Netsilingmiut Inuit of the Pelly Bay area lived an essentially "traditional" life of fishing, hunting and trapping. They continued to live in snow houses and tents until almost ten years after a DEW Line site was constructed a few miles from what is now the settlement of Pelly Bay.

In 1967, as part of a territories-wide project to provide or improve native housing in the Arctic, 32 three-bedroom prefabricated houses were flown to Pelly Bay in 39 trips by a Hercules cargo plane. Normally a southern construction crew would have been imported to erect these houses but the local priest and the local co-operative were persistent in their desire to erect their own houses under contract. The co-operative stressed the following points:

- The work would be more attended to if undertaken by the future homeowners themselves.
- The whole community would profit substantially by this contract and would benefit financially in a venture which would otherwise but satisfy a contractor and carpenters from the south.
- Finally, it would be possible to adapt the timing of construction work to the needs of the [seal] hunt and to enable the hunter to exchange his weapons for carpenter's tools as soon as the wind fell and permitted him to take maximum advantage of the rare, but most ideal working conditions (Goussaert 1968, p.12).

The project was successful and, under Goussaert, other co-operatives at Spence Bay and Gjoa Haven successfully bid on and completed subsequent work on, new housing projects.

From their rather humble beginnings the co-operatives have become a major development force in the Canadian Arctic. In 1959 the George River Cooperative had retail sales of \$12,811 but ten years later, they had sales of over half a million dollars. In 1977 they paid into the local economy \$100,000 in wages, dividends and in purchases of carving, crafts, fish and furs (Iglauer 1979, p.210).

In her book Inuit Journey, Edith Iglauer describes some of the early co-operatives which she visited in the early 1960s. She describes some of the Boards of Directors' meetings and how these were a forum for the political and economic development of their respective areas. Most importantly she captures an element of the newness, enthusiasm and hope that was part of the first Arctic co-operatives. At this time many Inuit settlements were struggling to find a way to replace, or at least exist together with, the traditional economy. Diseases had taken many lives. People wanted or needed to be close to health centres and in some cases to their children, who were encouraged to attend school in the settlements. It was a period of insecurity and great uncertainty (Canada's North 1985, p.3-9). The co-operatives became a focus in these settlements.

The acceptance and success of these early co-operatives led to the creation of many more. The purchase of soapstone carvings and other crafts was a major activity of some of the early co-operatives. Additional activities were construction, municipal services contracts, commercial fishing, country food,

airline agencies, taxis, cartage, hotels, restaurants and other miscellaneous work. Most co-operatives have a general store as the central part of their operations.

In 1972 the co-operatives of the N.W.T. formed a federation, now called Arctic Cooperatives Limited (ACL), to centralize training, accounting, purchasing, and other development services. Additionally they opened retail outlets for carvings, prints and other crafts at Yellowknife, Whitehorse, Edmonton, Inuvik and Churchill. There are now 38 active cooperatives in the N.W.T. with combined annual sales of about \$23 million. The following Table shows this remarkable growth of the N.W.T. co-operatives.

N.W.T. Co-operatives - the first 19 years

Year	No. of Co-ops	Sales	Total Assets	Local Income Generated
1959	2	15 000	20 000	6 000
1965	20	1 200 000	925 000	260 000
1968	35	2 400 000	2 200 000	1 100 000
1978	52	24 000 000	15 000 000	6 500 000

Source: Inuktitut Magazine Winter 1979-80, p.64.
 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada.
 Supply and Services, Ottawa.

In 1977 the Federal Government began a five-year Co-operative Development Program which was designed to improve the working capital position "and give assistance in operating grants; some funds were made available to supplement and increase services, and the government guaranteed credit for the annual sea-lift purchases and costs" (Stager 1981, p.4). Altogether \$6.7 million was injected in the five years. Additionally, ACL identified a need to educate and train managers, members and Boards of Directors of its member co-operatives. This was

a move towards developing a better understanding of the co-operatives as businesses. ACL developed an Education and Training program and applied for, and was awarded, a \$2.5 million grant for the period 1978 to 1982.

The management training program was a well-designed and thorough course covering all aspects of a co-operative business. The course package is easy to use and, perhaps most importantly, was designed in the knowledge that most of the managers who would be "teaching" the course to trainees would not have had any prior experience in formal teaching. By breaking each major section into small manageable objectives, the trainee was less inclined to be intimidated by the course. These aspects of the course were important because management-trainee candidates might not have been good students when at school. The idea was to emphasize "on the job" training with the necessary training from books and other materials made as informal as possible. The trainees attended six seminar/workshops where they were able to meet their fellow students from across the N.W.T. Teleconference calls were sometimes used to link all the trainees and instructors. Two instructors from ACL travelled to the various co-operatives to visit the trainees, see them in action and to make sure that the managers were spending enough time in training the trainees both "on the job" and in informal sessions.

The candidates for the program were chosen by the Board of Directors in each community. There was a broad range of ages and educational experience among the candidates. Of 48 people who entered the program in 1978, 28 were still in the program in 1981. Just prior to the end of the program in 1982 there were ten people who had taken on the position of general manager and eight were department managers. There was a 27% dropout rate (Stager 1981, p.4).

The Board of Directors' Education program was not as thorough or intensive as the management training program. Regional conferences were held which were particularly useful in exposing Board members to the operation, procedures and by-laws of other co-operatives. For example, if a Board member could return to his own community and report that other co-operatives had firm policies in regard to credit and the repaying of old debts, the Board members might themselves make better decisions in regard to their own co-operative's credit policy. These conferences used teaching techniques such as workshops to help the members gain a better understanding of their responsibilities in policy and overall direction of their co-operatives (Stager 1981, p.40). These meetings, as well as the Co-operatives' annual general meetings, also helped to strengthen Inuit solidarity.

One of the greatest sources of pride for the co-operatives of the N.W.T. is the number of now influential people whom they can name as people who started their careers with the co-operatives. The names of a few of these people follow, with their current positions:

John Amagoalik	Chief negotiator for Inuit constitutional rights
John Ningak	Hamlet manager of Pelly Bay
Ludy Pudluk	Member of the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories and Minister of Culture and Communications
Louis Tapardjuk	Chief Executive Officer, Baffin Development Corporation
Jo Eruk	Chairman, Baffin Schoolboard Trustees
James Eetoolook	Hamlet manager, Spence Bay
Peter Ernerk	President, Keewatin Inuit Association and member of the Board of Tungavik Federation of Nunavut
Jack Anawak	Mayor, Rankin Inlet
Willy Adams	Senator
Raymond Ningeocheak	Mayor, Coral Harbour

Source: A. Goussaert, Chief Executive Officer of Arctic Co-operatives Limited, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada (personal communication, 1987)

Co-operatives thus served as an important training ground for northern people by virtue of the fact that they were locally autonomous bodies long before local self-government in the municipal field was introduced to the Arctic regions (Canada's North 1985, p.12-15). Through participation in the co-operatives as members, Board members or employees, many northern natives learned about management, marketing and general business skills.

One of the problems that the co-operatives face, however, is the loss of their trained people to other organizations which can offer higher salaries and wages and often better working conditions. With some new jobs being created in the settlements such as with hamlet or settlement councils, government, wildlife service, health, new businesses, land claims or native development corporations, the co-operatives are regularly losing people they have trained. On the other hand, while this makes things difficult for the individual co-operative and ACL, the time, effort and expense of training is seen as a sound investment in the future of the Arctic.

The co-operatives always believed that they were in the north for both human and economic development, a purpose which sets them apart very clearly from the Hudson's Bay Company. This Company, having been in business in the north since 1670, was a huge and experienced fur buyer and merchandizer. One might have expected that the co-operatives would be hardly a match but they have been able to compete with them to such an extent that the Hudson's Bay Company's profits were not adequate for the latter to remain in the north. Their northern stores are now to be sold off to another company ("Hudson's Bay Bids Farewell to the North Country", National Herald Tribune, 6 April 1987). Certainly from the standpoint of training native people, the record of the Hudson's Bay Company is

atrocious. A glance at the Mocassin Telegraph, the staff magazine of the Northern Stores of the Hudson's Bay Company, shows hardly one native manager. Inuit or Indian employees never seemed to get anywhere within the company. The withdrawal of the Hudson's Bay Company from the north comes as no surprise.

The co-operatives are not without their problems, however. One of the chief problem areas is the relationship between the member co-operatives and Arctic Co-operatives Limited. A service fee of 7% is added to the cost of anything ordered by member co-operatives through the purchasing division of the ACL. Additionally, ACL provides audit services and prepares the financial statements for most member co-operatives. Many member co-operatives object to the quality and expense of some of the member services provided by ACL. Another common area of discontent is the relationship between the member co-operatives and the retail and wholesale departments of the arts and crafts section. The ideal of co-operatives is that all work together for the common good. In some communities and in some situations they just have not worked. In Frobisher Bay, for example, there was only a small co-operative gift shop - an enterprise much smaller in volume than the other co-operatives in the other eastern Arctic communities with no co-operative retail store and consequently little co-operative presence. In regard to the marketing of carvings, some co-operatives avoid marketing through ACL because they feel they can get better prices by selling their carvings to independent buyers or direct to art dealers and galleries. Though the initial ideal was that the strong co-operatives would support the weak ones, there is, perhaps inevitably, a growing trend for the stronger ones to want to look after themselves. This seems especially true with the most well-known of the art producing co-operatives, such as the West Baffin Co-operative Ltd. at Cape Dorset. The quality and volume of their carvings and prints allow them to have their own retail outlet in Toronto.

In spite of their difficulties the co-operatives have been a remarkable success. There are some 4,800 members representing 65% of the adult population (Doering 1984, p.4). Aside from government, co-operatives are the largest employer of native people in the N.W.T. (*ibid.*) and they are correspondingly the "strongest non-government force for economic development in the N.W.T. More people derive direct economic benefit from co-operatives than from other agencies" (Stager 1982, p.22). In 1982 there were about 350 people in permanent employment with the N.W.T. co-operatives, not counting casual employees and fishermen. Their total payroll was about \$3.5 million, for an average salary of about \$10,000. Almost 2,000 other people obtained indirect employment through the sale of their carvings, crafts or other produce to local co-operatives (Canada's North 1985, p.12-15). In excess of 90 per cent of employees are native people (Stager 1982b, p.9).

The strongest attributes of co-operatives in the north compared to other economic development proposals, are that the co-operatives have been around for over 25 years, are locally controlled and are compatible with local culture. People know what co-operatives are and understand them. While they have received much government support over the years they have in turn done a great deal of development work that the government would have otherwise had to do itself. In spite of government funding the co-operatives have never had enough money to get themselves firmly established. As an example, several co-operatives exist in old, shabby buildings which are difficult and inefficient to heat. They often do not have the resources to afford a new, more efficient building.

Summary. Co-operatives have experienced slow and gradual growth. They originated in the communities and continue to serve them. While they are joined together through Arctic Co-operatives Limited, each co-operative is responsible to its own Board of Directors. Co-operatives are a good example of enterprises owned and controlled by a community for the benefit of the community. Perhaps most importantly, by spearheading development, co-operatives have become the infrastructure upon which other community development projects can build.

c) Carving

In 1948 a Canadian artist by the name of James Houston visited the Canadian Arctic and became very interested in the small toys which Inuit adults carved for their children. Houston returned to the Arctic in 1949 as a Crafts Officer to encourage the production of these crafts to supplement Inuit income. This commercialization of the arts grew rapidly. Initially the Hudson's Bay Company bought these items (with funds supplied at first by the Federal Government) (Graburn, 1984 cited in Vallee and others 1984, p.667). Initially the carvings sold well. The carvers were being paid at a rate that would correspond to a wage of between \$0.25 and \$2.50 per hour.

In the late 1950s the Government set up Canadian Arctic Producers. This was an Ottawa-based Crown corporation, designed to market Inuit carvings and later the soapstone prints produced at Cape Dorset. Close ties developed between the co-operatives and Canadian Arctic Producers. The latter would arrange special shows and promotions to publicize the work of one community or of a particular artist. As the Canadian Arctic was getting increased media coverage in the 1960s, Inuit art was getting more and more public exposure and "became an internationally recognized symbol for Canada itself" (*ibid.*).

Sales of Inuit carvings increased and carving and the production of other crafts became a significant source of income for Inuit. Graburn suggests that

the arts income of Cape Dorset's 600 Inuit had, by the 1970s, exceeded one million dollars per year and the total [Canadian] Inuit arts income was five to seven million dollars per year. The average artist in communities such as Cape Dorset, Lake Harbour, Rankin Inlet and Baker Lake made \$1,000-3,000 per year and some artists made \$35,000-50,000 per year (Graburn 1984, p.668)

By the late 1970s and the early 1980s the co-operatives and Canadian Arctic Producers were having financial difficulties, among which were an overpriced inventory of carvings and a decrease in sales from \$3 million to \$2 million (News North, 6 March 1987, p.D12). By 1983 the effects of the decrease in carving sales reached the communities at a time when fur sales were at a very low level as well. Fortunately, according to an article in Inuktitut Magazine (No.63, Summer 1986, p.38), the market for carvings has begun to recover. The author of this article goes on to state that "about 20 percent of the adult Inuit population earn all or part of their income from art production".

In 1984 the Government of the Northwest Territories launched the Inuit Fine Art Task Force to develop and revitalize the carving industry. In the introduction to the final report the group states that the Inuit arts and crafts industry is important as it:

- (i) provides meaningful and profitable employment. The annual retail value of Inuit art is estimated to exceed \$6,500,000. It is the single largest source of cash income to Inuit.
- (ii) is culturally relevant and is a means by which skills, values and heritage are transmitted.
- (iii) produces distinctive products that promote the N.W.T. and Canada.

(Inuit Fine Art Task Force, Final Report, October 1985, p.6)

In the Executive Summary, the task force makes 19 recommendations and conclusions. Among these are the following highlights:

- Some communities have a poor or inconsistent supply of soapstone for carving. The sum of \$450,000 should be set aside as a special reserve to support soapstone quarrying and transportation so that a carver does not have to pay more than \$1.25 per lb for this material.
- There should be itinerant art advisers hired, preferably Inuit, who would visit the producing co-operatives for a total of six person years.
- New dealers should be encouraged to use a fund of \$90,000 for such expenses as travel, publicity and a line of credit for opening inventory.
- An advisory group to be called the Inuit Art Association should be formed to advise on matters that relate to the consuming public. It would provide technical support, artistic support, art bank administration, school and young artist programs and advice to the federal and territorial governments.

Summary. Carving plays a very significant part in small scale, community based economic development. A carver, if talented, can earn a good living. He or she works when there is inspiration or a need for cash. The skills can be taken anywhere. It is an industry which is compatible with the Inuit lifestyle and is part of their cultural heritage, although it does depend on a southern market for the finished product.

d) The Mackenzie Delta Region Reindeer Herd: When is a project community-based?

The criterion of what is to count as small scale and community based, is not always certain, and an enterprise may shift in or out of such a category. An instructive example of this is the Mackenzie Delta Region reindeer herd. As

early as 1918 the explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson was urging the Canadian government to support a reindeer industry in the north (Hunt 1986, p.169). The government was not keen to be directly involved in this and suggested that private industry should be involved. Eventually Stefansson persuaded the Hudson's Bay Company in 1921 to import 550 Norwegian reindeer to Baffin Island. Some Saami were recruited but they turned out to be skilled as fishermen rather than as reindeer herders. They were eventually returned to Norway and local Inuit did the herding. For a while the herd was successfully managed by a group of whites and Inuit, and began to increase in size. In the end, though, the Baffin herd did not survive. Apparently the winters were too severe for the growth of the proper variety of lichen upon which the reindeer fed (Hunt 1986, p.170).

Stefansson's idea was that reindeer in the north would be exported for sale in the south. In contrast to this idea was the recommendation of the 1921 Royal Commission, which suggested the creation of a number of experimental herds in selected areas to supply meat for the Inuit and Indians and skins for winter clothing. Additionally the herd would supply meat to mining exploration crews and lay the groundwork for the possible future establishment of a commercial reindeer industry aimed at the production and export of meat (Treude 1979, p.122).

Initially there was great hope for the reindeer in the Canadian Arctic. The Danish botanist A.E. Porsild conducted field investigations and suggested that the area encompassed by the Alaskan boundary in the west, the Coppermine River in the east and Great Bear Lake in the south, could support over half a million reindeer. Then in 1929 the Canadian Government purchased 3,400 reindeer

from Kotzebue Sound in Alaska. Five years later the herd, then numbering 2370 and the Saami and Inuit herdsman finally reached the Mackenzie Delta. "Less than 20 per cent of the original herd remained; the rest had been born along the way" (Treude 1968, p.16).

Since its arrival, the Mackenzie reindeer herd has had a jumbled and complicated history. It was intended, in the first instance, that the herd would be a benefit to the Inuit of the area. However, to this day the herd has been essentially a bureaucratic and political "football" as different government departments have haggled over its management (J. Hill, personal communication, 1987). It was privatized, then taken back under government control. Inuit were encouraged to take over small herds but these were later given back to the government. At present the herd is owned by one Inuit man who has had some sound management advice and support. William Nasogaluak bought the herd, numbering 5,200 in 1978 for \$250,000 from Silas Kangegana. While it is presently a very profitable operation, it has not managed to avoid controversy. The present problem is that the land that the reindeer graze is part of the Committee for Original Peoples Entitlement (COPE) land claim area. It seems that the herd owner and the land owners are unable to negotiate a satisfactory solution. In December of 1986 the herd owner was served with an eviction notice by the land owner, the Inuvialuit Development Corporation (*ibid.*)

The original aim of establishing the reindeer herd in 1935 was "to place the crisis-shaken Eskimo economy on a new and secure basis through the establishment of Eskimo-owned herds" (Treude 1979, p.132). In this respect at least the project was not a success. It seemed a very good idea taken from the experience of other circumpolar peoples and was a project that many believed was a fair and reasonable risk. But the good idea did not work the way it had been

hoped. People in the area were some of the wealthiest trappers in Canada. There was a great deal of money from trapping and there was no desperate need for more money. Moreover, the work of herding reindeer seems to the Inuit to be difficult and monotonous work, and the majority of Inuit were unwilling to exchange the unfettered traditional life of a hunter or trapper for that of a herdsman or herd owner (Treude 1979, p.132). And finally, the Inuit herd owners did not evolve into modern entrepreneurs intent on maximizing profits but remained generally constrained by their hereditary modes of thoughts and value system (*ibid.*).

But there is another chapter to the story. While the introduction of reindeer failed to make Saami-like herders out of the Inuvialuit (Western Arctic Inuit), in another sense it has become the only successful, small scale, community based economic development in the western Arctic (R.M. Hill, personal communication, 1987). Stager (1984), in an article entitled "Reindeer Herding as Private Enterprise in Canada" discusses the herd under the present ownership of William Nasogaluak. Stager and Denike (1972) had earlier recommended that the herd be turned over to private enterprise. This was a risky recommendation because all previous attempts at turning the herd over to Inuit herders had not been successful. It seems likely that one of the reasons that Nasogoluak was the successful bidder was the fact that he had strong and experienced advisers. One of these was Dr. D. Billingsley, an Inuvik businessman.

The new company known as Canadian Reindeer (1978) Limited began to export meat from the N.W.T., once the slaughtering operations were approved by the Federal Department of Agriculture in Canada. At about the same time, Korean buyers started to purchase reindeer horn [antlers in velvet] (Stager 1984, p.129). The revenue from the sale of antler is now likely to exceed that from the sale of meat (*ibid.*). Prices were in the range \$20 to \$25 per kg in 1977.

In 1983, 8,400 kg of antler were harvested. The antler contains pantocrin (Armstrong, T., Lecture to M.Phil. Program, Scott Polar Research Institute, 1987) and is much sought after for its medicinal and/or aphrodisiac properties.

A number of changes were implemented to make the operation more efficient and cost-effective. The herd, which previously consisted of about four smaller herds, was allowed to aggregate in the early 1970s. This meant that it was now possible to have simply two herders on snowmobiles following the herd and circling it each day. These two herders would rotate on a fortnightly basis with another pair of herders. Remote sensing has allowed the owners to identify good winter grazing areas. After experimenting with different portable slaughterhouses, the company then modified a portable seismic trailer camp which had hot water, electricity, dining and sleeping accommodation and an abattoir of a standard approved by Canada's Federal Department of Agriculture (Stager 1984, p.133). The main annual slaughter takes place in February and takes two weeks, employing 20 people. Approximately 300 animals are killed per day. In 1983, 2,500 animals were killed. Dressed carcasses are simply allowed to freeze in the open air and are then loaded on to a refrigerated lorry for transport to Calgary. Much of this meat is then cut and packaged for sale in a southern supermarket chain where it is sold as a speciality item. Whole carcasses are sold in the nearby community of Tuktoyaktuk. At Inuvik, carcasses and cuts are sold through the country food store Ulu Foods.

The table below allows some speculation on the revenue of the herd. In 1983 for example, a slaughter of 2,500 animals at an average of 55 kg per carcass would yield 137,500 kg of meat. An average price for reindeer meat per kg would be \$1.80. The 1983 harvest of horn was 8,400 kg. I do not know the current price paid for the horn but if we use a 1977 price of \$25 per kg this

would yield \$210,000. While the actual financial statement of Canadian Reindeer (1978) Limited is not public, the enterprise is regarded as a profitable success. Stager concludes his 1984 article by suggesting that this herd has demonstrated the value of reindeer as a renewable Arctic resource and the economic success of reindeer herding under private enterprise.

Table 1. Herd size at roundup, annual slaughter and horn harvest.

Year	Corral count	Herd size Strays (estimate)	Total	Slaughter count	Horn harvest (kg)
1973	4116	986	5102	—	—
1974	5692	1000	6692	90	—
1975	missing				
1976	—	8500	8500	875	—
1977	5202	5000	10202	1500	2640
1978	8245	3000	11245	1400	4360
1979	9855	2700	12555	1100	130
1980	12745	?	12745	2500	10270
1981	10879	800	11679	1500	5450
1982	9300	5000	14300	400	6360
1983	9975	6000	15975	2500	8400

Source: correspondence and reports, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Canadian Reindeer (1978) Ltd.

From: Stager (1984) p.129

Treude suggests that in spite of the many failures of the herd, the contributions that the project has made in improving the economic situation of the Inuit should not be overlooked (Treude 1979, p.132). From 1935 to 1953 a total of 120 Inuit received training as herders. In 1953, 21 Inuit lived exclusively from the herd, either as herders or herd managers. There were another 70-80 Inuit at Reindeer Station. These people were paid in cash and also received a meat ration. Originally the reindeer were split into about four herds. Now the smaller herds have been allowed to aggregate and form one large herd. This, combined with new techniques in herding, has meant that there are

only about four full-time herding jobs. During the June round-up, ripe horns are removed and the animals tagged, culled, marked and counted. Helicopters and small aircraft are used in this exercise. Up to 40 men are present for the 10-14 day period (Stager 1984, p.133).

Controversy still surrounds the Mackenzie Delta reindeer herd. After a rather chequered history since 1935 it seems to be profitable. The idea of the herd was a good one. It would not have been possible in the planning stages before 1935, to foresee the sorts of problems that the herd now has. It was a gamble that took a long time to pay dividends. It is unlikely that the government of Canada recouped any of its expenditure. It was, however, a gamble that had to be taken. If reindeer had never been tried, there would be, to this day, demands that such a project be implemented. Now, at least, there are more than 50 years of experience from which to evaluate the successes and failures of this attempt towards community economic development. While it may not have borne the label of "small scale, community-based economic development" in the early days, it certainly has become an example of such. It has had both successes and failures and is a project that is still evolving and finding its place in the economy and politics of the Western Arctic.

Summary. As an idea imported from the experience of other northern people, the introduction of reindeer into northern Canada had to undergo a process of change to fit the Canadian context. This process continues today as it moves into the category of small scale, community based economic development.

3. LIVING IN A DUAL ECONOMY

a) Introduction

"A bird from the bush but well in hand is worth a score that may be expected one day from the South"

From: "Prospects for the northern Canadian economy" by Bruce A. Cox, Polar Record, 22 (139), p.400.

The dual economy is one of several terms used to describe a pattern which has been common in the Arctic since wage employment first became available to Inuit workers. The term refers to a balance between wage employment (seasonal, part-time, rotational shift with casual employment) or transfer payments (*i.e.* welfare, family allowance, unemployment insurance) on the one hand, and a hunting, fishing, and trapping economy on the other. Both sides of this equation have been the centre of much research, particularly since the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry (more commonly referred to as the Berger Inquiry or Commission).

b) The cash sector; especially the extraction of non-renewable resources

The wage side of this "dual" economy balance might be from construction, fishing or work with an oil or mining company. The cash earned is used to purchase food, clothing, equipment, and supplies.

The economy of the N.W.T. is based primarily on the mining industry and government. In the past the production of fur was important but fur production and the value of furs has declined as a result of the anti-harvest campaigns at home and abroad. In the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a great deal of exploration in the Beaufort Sea. Some of the key players were Imperial Oil (Exxon Corporation), Gulf Oil and Dome Petroleum. The greatest impetus to this

activity was a Federal Government program known as the Petroleum Incentive Program (PIP) which gave grants of up to 80% to cover drilling costs (Page 1986, p.175). Each summer drilling season, there was some new high technology rig, supply ship or icebreaker. There were jobs for local people with the oil companies or with the contractors to the oil companies. There was a small college of technology set up at Tuktoyaktuk to train personnel. Northern development had really arrived in the Western Arctic. But like the other boom periods that the Western Arctic had experienced viz. steam whaling 1889-1906, high fur prices 1920s and 1930s, construction of the DEW Line and the town of Inuvik 1955-1965, this boom subsided with the drop in world oil prices and a change in government from Liberal to Conservative which ended PIP grants.

In an open letter dated November 1986 to subscribers of the newsletter Northern Perspectives, John Merritt, the Executive Director of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, talks about this collapse of the oil and gas exploration activity and estimates "the loss of more than \$100 million per year in wage income or approximately one-third of total wage income for the Territories in a year". He suggests that "as many as 3,000 people may be added to the region's welfare rolls" (Merritt 1986, p.1). This last "bust" phase of the all too frequent "boom-bust" cycle has reverberated all through the N.W.T. It has always been the presumption that large scale non-renewable resource extraction projects were the best type of project for northern development. It was thought that the spin-off effects would benefit local industries, and that both the national economy and the economy of the north would prosper. What the is that mega-project development in the north benefits southern industry and a southern economy, and provides little that is of long-term benefit to northern people and northern communities.

Since the mid 1980s when oil prices started to slide and companies like Dome Petroleum started to cut back on their activities, there has been a renewed interest in small scale, community based economic development. This has been due to a number of factors but perhaps most important of all was the outcome of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry 1974-1976. For the first time in Canadian history, native people were consulted and serious social and environmental impact studies were done prior to a decision on a major resource extraction project. The recommendation of Mr. Justice T.R. Berger was that the pipeline be delayed for ten years to allow the settlement of the native land claims and to permit native people to prepare for the social changes that the pipeline and its construction would bring. In hundreds of personal testimonies before the Inquiry, native people described how land and the living resources of that land were their livelihood and their life. The proposed pipeline presented nothing of long term benefit to them. The Berger Commission (as the Inquiry came to be called) established and stated that development of native communities meant development of the human and natural resources of the land and the communities on a scale which native people could manage and control.

c) The "subsistence" economy, or living at least partly off the land

By subsistence economy is meant the hunting, fishing and trapping economy - indeed in principle the perfect small scale, community based economy without any planning. In pre-contact times, very few imports were needed by the Inuit although there was some trade and exchange. In present day terms in the Canadian Arctic, "subsistence" has come to mean reliance on local country food, namely marine and terrestrial animals; in other words, it no longer implies a total subsistence. The degree to which it is part of the family economy varies a great deal. Subsistence can refer to the activities of a well-paid civil

servant who goes caribou hunting twice a year or to the activities of a person who has seldom or never worked for wages. Bennett (1982, p.3) quotes the Black's Law Dictionary, (4th edition), definition of subsistence as the "means of support, provisions or that which procures provisions or livelihood". Bennett concludes his paper with the suggestion that the Federal Government in Canada is willing to consider the trade and barter of country food as part of the subsistence economy (Bennett 1982, p.8). The term subsistence is therefore vague and difficult to define precisely. In some communities, such as Nanisivik, most men work a 40-hr work week or more at the mine and have less time and energy to provide country food for their families. On the other hand, the men from Grise Fiord may spend an equal 40 hours engaged in hunting, fishing, or the activities related to this such as equipment repair and preparation.

The debate and disagreement about the subsistence economy and its "value" is usually between people who are simply trying to measure and quantify it. Most of the people who write about the subsistence economy have never lived it. Most people who try to quantify it are trying to express its values in familiar terms. But perhaps this is where the value of the subsistence economy and the description of that value can never be really understood by southerners. So often, we ask science to quantify things for us so that we can put this information into a limiting context. Definitely when it comes to the subsistence economy and its value to Inuit people it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. Not only is the subsistence economy a very significant means of feeding a family without exchanging cash, it is a way of nurturing body and soul in a way that most non-natives would find hard to understand. One society that feeds itself from shops or a supermarket and renews its spirit

through religion, classical music, and books tends to downgrade as primitive a society that kills to feed itself and renews its spirit through hunting animals and being outdoors.

When the clutter of trying to enumerate and quantify the subsistence economy is removed, the subsistence economy is seen to be simply what people like doing. For most people it is what they look forward to once their day or week of wage employment is over. Often, "working" is regarded as an activity to be done only to be able to accumulate the money necessary to "go camping" or to do what they *really* want to do. This helps to explain why, in some jobs, there is a high rate of turnover of native employees. It also explains why rotational shifts such as 20 days on and 20 days off are becoming a popular type of pattern, because they produce relatively high income in relation to the number of days away from home, and they provide time off for individual pursuits such as hunting.

Why is the dual or mixed economy important? Some activities like the demonstration of sovereignty, shipping, transportation, oil exploration and other activities receive a great deal of media and scholarly attention and are presented there as exciting. There is new technology to meet the old problems of making the Arctic manageable for exploitation by the south and we are led to believe that Inuit people will be involved too. The Inuit, however, know better. They are aware that every development wave in the Arctic has been motivated because the Arctic had some resource that the south needed. The south understands these sorts of development. "Subsistence" to the south is about as foreign a concept as the DEW Line was to most native northerners. There was no understanding. Inuit firmly believe as well that each wave of development has generally left Inuit people worse off. The Beaufort Sea whalers nearly exterminated their prime quarry, the bowhead whale, but also seriously

reduced the Porcupine caribou herd in northern Alaska/Yukon. The DEW Line and other developments brought tuberculosis and "modernization". These development waves from the south may provide some wage employment but the overall benefit has been small and for only a few people. As Usher (1982b, quoted in CARC 1984, p.712) points out, "many of the industrial benefits in the North are offset, at least in part, by individual and community costs"; that is, costs which do not show up on a conventional cost-benefit analysis.

What have Inuit done after these waves have dispersed? There is a settling period but gradually people return to the sort of lifestyle they were leading prior to the wave - albeit altered and perhaps diminished. That lifestyle is essentially the subsistence economy. Often it is supplemented - and indeed underpinned now - by transfer payments such as unemployment insurance benefits and welfare. The important thing is that it is the option which has always been there in the background. Village people giving testimony to the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry said this over and over again. No program or government plan will be able to replace the natural resources of the land and sea.

It is important to note that where this principle is recognized in planning, it seems to lead clearly to success. A further example will illustrate this.

One program with a direct link to the subsistence economy has come about as a result of the 1974 Outpost Camp Policy of the Government of the Northwest Territories. This policy is set out and discussed in an article entitled "An Outpost Camp Policy for the Northwest Territories" by L. Elkin [Polar Record 1976, 18(113) p.184-186]. This was an innovative program which recognized that the government plan of the 1950s for the urbanization of Inuit had not been as successful as hoped. There were jobs in the towns for only about half of the

male population. For the rest there was welfare and some subsistence hunting and fishing. For many families, town life, in places like Frobisher Bay, meant a circle of welfare, store food, alcohol, family breakdown and violence.

The Outpost Camps Policy defines an outpost as "any person or group of persons, less than 60 in number, who make a living off the land for any part of the year in an isolated location in the Northwest Territories" (Elkin 1976, p.185). The objective is "to provide maximum services and assistance to persons wishing to establish outpost camps while ensuring the most effective use of the monies available to the Government of the Northwest Territories" (*ibid.*). Under this policy the Government of the Northwest Territories has essentially made it easy for people to leave the circle of welfare and trouble in the town and live a basic, subsistence lifestyle in adequate but spartan conditions in the outpost camps. Provided at no cost are the basic materials for a "trapper's cabin", heating fuel and transport to and from the camp at the start and end of the season or on an irregular basis. There is no provision for conventional schooling for children.

There is some variation in the reported size of the outpost camp program. Canada's North: The Reference Manual, (1985, p.3-1), suggests there are "about twelve, all operating in the eastern Arctic". The 1985 Annual Report of the Government of the Northwest Territories (p.370) states that "in the past few years the outpost camp program has supported over 1300 people in 28 permanent and almost 90 short-term camps". The Annual Report for the following year suggests that for the Kitikmeot Region "15 outpost camps received funding totalling \$58,100 to continue their operations" and that there were "79 people living in these outpost camps". The Report also states that the Baffin Region in 1986 had 29 outpost camps which is the highest number ever supported. There were 53 families consisting of 350 people at the camps. The outpost camps are

often operated in conjunction with the local Hunters and Trappers Association of which there is one in almost every community. The camps often produce meat and fur for sale in the towns and sometimes offer guided trophy hunts for polar bears. This is the case with the Allen Island outpost camp on the east coast of Baffin Island, due east of Frobisher Bay.

In the midst of so many government programs which have not succeeded, the outpost camp program stands as a success. What is remarkable is that the government program squarely faced the fact that a previous government plan had gone wrong *and* that something had to be changed.

d) Local access to local resources: a fragile but necessary way forward

All this bears eloquent testimony to the argument that the only equitable future for the north must take more account of the natives' needs and wishes than has been done in the past. What are the prospects and opportunities for this?

It must be said that the opportunities are perhaps greater than the prospects in that the risk is of missing those opportunities. At first sight, it might seem that all is heading for the best. A major funding program for native economic development was announced in March 1984. This is the Native Economic Development Program (NEDP) which has a budget of \$345 million over a four-year period. One of the four objectives of the program is to assist the

process of community based economic development and to provide assistance to selected communities for the following activities

- opportunity analysis
- economic development planning
- improving community access to other Federal government programs
- community based economic development projects which have the potential to be commercially successful

Another funding program established by the Government of Canada and the Government of the Northwest Territories is the Economic Development Agreement (EDA) with a budget of \$21 million. These funds support projects to study potential business opportunities, help expand existing businesses and establish new businesses (Government of the Northwest Territories, 1985 Annual Report, p.30). Additionally the territorial government operates the Business Loan Fund (BLF) which in 1984-85 issued 31 loans totalling \$2,055,000 and the Eskimo Loan Fund (ELF) which issued four loans totalling \$54,491. Finally, there is the Special Agricultural and Rural Development Agreement (S/ARDA) which has assisted 59 projects totalling \$5,504,342 since 1983 (Government of the Northwest Territories, 1986 Annual Report, p.41).

It seems that there is no shortage of funding available. A survey of the Yellowknife newspaper News North for 1986 and early 1987 provides the following sampling of the types of small scale community based economic development projects which have received funding:

- A project to expand the Southampton Island char fishery received \$103,000 plus a further \$200,000 for a special fishing boat, a weir fish trap and related harvesting and processing equipment (News North, May 30, 1986, p.B16).

- A project at the cooperative-run hotel in Pond Inlet was assisted in constructing a small greenhouse to grow vegetables for the hotel kitchen. Both hydroponic and "gravel culture" methods were used and successfully grew small quantities of Chinese cabbage and leaf lettuce (News North, July 11, 1986, p.B16).
- There is a proposal to establish a tannery on a small scale to produce tanned furs for producing practical, not luxury, fur garments such as hats (News North, December 19, 1986, p.A10).
- Amiq Leathers, a subsidiary of the Inuit-owned Nunasi Corporation received \$50,000 in EDA funding for a sealskin tannery to produce fine quality leathers for a variety of items such as briefcases and wallets (News North, August 1, 1986, p.B5).
- The Arctic Co-operatives Limited received a total of \$12 million of which \$5 million came from the Native Economic Development Program (NEDP), about \$5 million from the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and \$2 million from the Government of the Northwest Territories. This funding covered a number of programs including the paying off of outstanding debts and the financing of new facilities in the small village co-operatives (News North, May 9, 1986, p.B14).
- A \$1.9 million Special Agricultural and Rural Development Agreement (S/ARDA) grant provided for the building of 11 community freezers in the Baffin Region. Each cost \$170,000. Each freezer is divided in half, with the Hunters and Trappers Association utilizing one part and the community residents using the other. There is a small processing room containing a butcher shop. The freezers are to facilitate the harvesting of country foods and subsequent sale to retail outlets, private entrepreneurs, and others such as the local hospital or school (News North, March 6, 1987).

- At Eskimo Point, David Alagalak has started a fox farm with a potential harvest of 500-600 foxes per year. Unfortunately he has had some setbacks but he hopes to breed a cross between a white fox which is native to the area and other types to produce a hybrid called a "shadow fox" (News North, March 6, 1987, p.E11).
- A privately-owned country food shop has opened up in Rankin Inlet. It uses the facilities of the fish plant in winter when it would otherwise be vacant (News North, March 6, 1987, p.E8).

Yet when all this is set into the wider commercial and political context, the picture no longer seems so rosy. It is fairly easy to get a picture of the industrial activities in the Canadian Arctic in years to come. From 1974 the offshore drilling activities increased every year up to 1985. Each season there was much more new equipment in the Beaufort Sea. We are learning more and more about the Arctic through continued research on the technical side of northern development. There were new players, new incentive schemes. Ten years after the Berger Inquiry, a scaled-down version of a Mackenzie Valley Pipeline was completed from Zama, Alberta, to Norman Wells. Current publications, such as Offshore Resources, Arctic Petroleum Review and current journals such as Polar Record, Arctic, and Northern Engineer, give detailed descriptions of just how the resources of the Arctic will be exploited and delivered to distant markets.

It is harder, however, to get a clear picture of just how northern people will fit into this picture. We should have just as clear a picture - but we do not. While we have the technology to develop the Arctic we know very little about how development can be made compatible with the people of the north.

There has been a considerable amount of solid, successful work done on the topic of the subsistence economy and renewable resource harvesting by native northerners. Ironically, it has been the development impact studies which have created much of the present database on the environment and natural resources of the Arctic. There are many successful training programs such as the Airport Observer/Communicator positions now established at many of the small N.W.T. airports. Arctic College, at its Fort Smith, Inuvik and Iqaluit (Frobisher Bay) campuses, offers such courses as business administration, teacher education, and renewable resources technology. There has been considerable work done on renewable resources, such as feasibility studies in the Baffin Region and the Central Arctic for commercial Arctic char fisheries. We are attempting to find more and different ways in which the resources, both human and natural, of the Arctic can feed or employ the native people who choose to live there.

Perhaps, as some believe, the Arctic will never be able to sustain the Inuit population as it did until quite recently. Others believe that it will be a balance between the consumption of local resources and imported food.

What is particularly striking is how little we seem to know about accommodating southern-based development within the social fabric of the north.

"It is fashionable nowadays, to talk about shortages of this and of that and so, inevitably there must be talk of a strategy for northern development. If this is the case, then I would suggest that there is only one strategy for northern development which meets our obligations and makes any sense, and that is the strategy of knowledge - a strategy aimed at furthering in every way possible, our knowledge and understanding of this great region for which we hold

responsibility. We need to enlarge as rapidly as possible our knowledge of the land and its seas, and of the circumstances and problems these entail: its strategic implications, its resources, and *as a first priority, its peoples*" (Symons 1981, p.336, my italics).

In testimony to this we can cite our earlier examples of co-operatives and other small scale, community based economic developments. These place the natives in a situation where they can come to terms with a dual economy without being crushed by it - indeed, they can use the monetized sector as an outlet for their activities in order to generate cash income. But crucially, such activities are always based on the concept of a renewable resource or at least the non-destruction of the environment. Thus the co-operatives are a community development structure which has been in place in N.W.T. communities for, in some cases, a longer period than government. Because they meet this requirement, not only do co-operatives provide extensive experience of development issues, they also provide a development structure on which to build future projects. The reindeer industry will provide experience of the problems involved in game ranching and the commercial harvest of wildlife. With so many communities wanting a commercial quota for caribou (and in some cases a small abattoir as well) the experience of the failures and successes of the reindeer industry will be useful in future planning. Perhaps more than anything, the reindeer industry is a prime example of the complicated tangles that seem to be so much a part of the mixture of game management, politics and government. The carving and crafts industries play a significant role in Inuit community economic development. Soapstone carving requires little infrastructure at the production end: that is, from raw material to finished product requires few, if any, people other than the carver. Carving can be a full-time occupation or part of the mixed economy. The main drawback is that it is governed by a fickle market. Finally, the dual

economy provides the background for all contemporary, small scale community based economic development. As Ross and Usher (1986), Berger (1985, p.184) and other writers have pointed out, there simply will not be in the foreseeable future, wage employment for more than a small percentage of Inuit. Various projects and programs will come and go, government funding priorities will change, commodity prices will change, but there must always be the uncontested right to sensibly harvest the resources of the land and sea.

4. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FUTURE

Canada is in an unusual position of being able to redefine the place of native people in its Constitution. In a way, this is like being able to re-write the history of its relationship with native Canadians. Through the current negotiations on native constitutional rights there is a rare opportunity, a second chance. Let us hope that things are better the second time around.

There is little doubt that large scale non-renewable resource development projects will come to the Canadian Arctic. During the present lull in large scale industrial activity there is an opportunity to concentrate on community based development which will endure through the next mega project boom... and the next mega project bust. We must use this time wisely and build on our experiences of small scale community based economic development. Otherwise, large scale development proponents might rightly ask what there is of the native economy that is worthy of protection. Now is the time to firmly establish that worth.

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
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CENTRES OF POPULATION



YUKON, NORTHWEST TERRITORIES AND NORTHERN QUEBEC

1959 *

- City.....(1)
- Town.....(2)
- Village.....(3)
- Settlement.....(4)
- Co-operative.....(5)
- Local Improvement District.....(6)
- Development Area.....(7)
- Highways.....(8)
- Railways.....(9)



DEW Line Sites.....(10)



DRAWN FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL RESOURCES BY THE GEOGRAPHICAL BRANCH DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND TECHNICAL SURVEYS 1959

* THIS COPY OF A MAP DATED 1959 HAS BEEN USED TO SHOW THE 1986 POSITIONS OF DEW LINE SITES AND COOPERATIVES. OTHER DETAILS (OR LACK OF THEM) ARE OUT OF DATE.